{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45850/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45850","id":"gutenberg_45850","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45850","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Theism"],"text":"THEISM\n\n  BEING\n\n  The Baird Lecture for 1876\n\n  BY\n\n  ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D.\n\n  PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH AUTHOR OF 'THE\n  PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN EUROPE,' ETC.\n\n  WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCLXXVII\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE.\n\n\nThe Lectures in this volume have been delivered in Glasgow, St Andrews,\nand Edinburgh, in connection with the Lectureship founded by the late\nMr James Baird of Auchmedden and Cambusdoon. They will be followed by a\nvolume on Anti-theistic Theories, containing the Baird Lectures for 1877.\n\nThe author has to thank the Baird Trustees for having twice appointed\nhim Lecturer, and for much indulgence extended to him during his tenure\nof office. His special thanks are due to James A. Campbell, Esq.,\nLL.D., of Stracathro, for kindly revising the sheets of this volume,\nand for suggesting many corrections and improvements.\n\n  JOHNSTONE LODGE, CRAIGMILLAR PARK,\n  EDINBURGH, _22d August 1877_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nLECT.                                                      PAGE\n\n   I. ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE QUESTION TO BE DISCUSSED--WHENCE\n      AND HOW WE GET THE\n      IDEA OF GOD,                                            1\n\n  II. GENERAL IDEA OF RELIGION--COMPARISON OF\n      POLYTHEISM AND PANTHEISM WITH THEISM--THE\n      THREE GREAT THEISTIC RELIGIONS COMPARED--NO\n      RELIGIOUS PROGRESS BEYOND\n      THEISM,                                                30\n\n III. THE NATURE, CONDITIONS, AND LIMITS OF THEISTIC\n      PROOF,                                                 59\n\n  IV. NATURE IS BUT THE NAME FOR AN EFFECT\n      WHOSE CAUSE IS GOD,                                    96\n\n   V. THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER,                              131\n\n  VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER\n      EXAMINED,                                             169\n\n VII. MORAL ARGUMENT--TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE\n      AND HISTORY,                                          210\n\nVIII. CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE\n      WISDOM, BENEVOLENCE, AND JUSTICE,                     233\n\n  IX. _A PRIORI_ THEISTIC PROOF,                            264\n\n   X. MERE THEISM INSUFFICIENT,                             302\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nNOTE                                                      PAGE\n\n    I. NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION,                      323\n\n   II. INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON MORALITY,                  329\n\n  III. ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS INQUIRY,                        335\n\n   IV. TRADITIVE THEORY OF RELIGION,                       338\n\n    V. NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY,                      340\n\n   VI. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION BY THE HIGHEST\n      TYPE,                                                342\n\n  VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF RELIGION,                   343\n\n VIII. ARGUMENT _E CONSENSU GENTIUM_,                      348\n\n   IX. THE THEISTIC EVIDENCE COMPLEX AND COMPREHENSIVE,    350\n\n    X. INTUITION, FEELING, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE IN\n      RELIGION,                                            355\n\n   XI. THE THEOLOGICAL INFERENCE FROM THE THEORY\n      OF ENERGY,                                           359\n\n  XII. THE HISTORY OF THE \u00c6TIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT,            364\n\n XIII. MATHEMATICS AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT,                367\n\n  XIV. ASTRONOMY AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT,                  369\n\n   XV. CHEMISTRY AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT,                  373\n\n  XVI. GEOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, ETC., AND THE DESIGN\n       ARGUMENT,                                           375\n\n XVII. THE ORGANIC KINGDOM AND DESIGN,                     378\n\nXVIII. EVIDENCES OF DESIGN IN ORGANISMS,                   380\n\n  XIX. PSYCHOLOGY AND DESIGN,                              383\n\n   XX. HISTORY AND DESIGN,                                 386\n\n  XXI. HISTORY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT,               387\n\n XXII. CREATION AND EVOLUTION,                             390\n\nXXIII. THEOLOGICAL INFERENCES FROM THE DOCTRINE\n       OF SPONTANEOUS GENERATION,                          394\n\n XXIV. DARWIN AND PALEY,                                   396\n\n  XXV. KANT'S MORAL ARGUMENT,                              397\n\n XXVI. DR SCHENKEL'S VIEW OF CONSCIENCE AS THE\n       ORGAN OF RELIGION,                                  400\n\nXXVII. CHALMERS AND ERSKINE ON THE ARGUMENT\n       FROM CONSCIENCE,                                    401\n\nXXVIII. ASSOCIATIONIST THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIENCE, 403\n\n  XXIX. CHALMERS AND BAIN ON THE PLEASURE OF MALEVOLENCE,  403\n\n   XXX. HISTORY OF THE MORAL PROOF,                        406\n\n  XXXI. DEFECTS IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD,                     413\n\n XXXII. NO BEST POSSIBLE CREATED SYSTEM,                   417\n\nXXXIII. DEFECTS IN THE ORGANIC WORLD,                      418\n\n XXXIV. EPICUREAN DILEMMA,                                 420\n\n  XXXV. GOD AND DUTY,                                      422\n\n XXXVI. HISTORIES OF THE THEISTIC PROOFS,                  423\n\nXXXVII. _A PRIORI_ PROOF NOT PROOF FROM A CAUSE,           424\n\nXXXVIII. SOME _A PRIORI_ ARGUMENTS,                        425\n\n\n\n\nTHEISM.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\n ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE QUESTION TO BE DISCUSSED--WHENCE AND HOW WE GET\n THE IDEA OF GOD.\n\n\nI.\n\nIs belief in God a reasonable belief, or is it not? Have we sufficient\nevidence for thinking that there is a self-existent, eternal Being,\ninfinite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and goodness,\nthe Maker of heaven and earth, or have we not? Is theism true, or is\nsome antagonistic, some anti-theistic theory true? This is the question\nwhich we have to discuss and to answer, and it seems desirable to\nstate briefly at the outset what issues are involved in answering it.\nObviously, the statement of these issues must not be so framed as\nto create prejudice for or against any particular answer. Its only\nlegitimate purpose is to help us to realise aright our true relation\nto the question. We can never in any investigation see too early or\ntoo clearly the true and full significance, the general and special\nbearings, of the question we intend to study; but the more important\nand serious the question is, the more incumbent on us is it not to\nprejudge what must be the answer.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is obvious, then, in the first place, that the inquiry before us\nis one as to whether or not religion has any reasonable ground, any\nbasis, in truth; and if so, what that ground or basis is. Religion,\nin order to be reasonable, must rest on knowledge of its object. This\nis not to say that it is exclusively knowledge, or that knowledge\nis its one essential element. It is not to say that feeling and\nwill are not as important constituents in the religious life as\nintellectual apprehension. Mere knowledge, however clear, profound,\nand comprehensive it may be, can never be religion. There can be no\nreligion where feeling and affection are not added to knowledge. There\ncan be no religion in any mind devoid of reverence or love, hope or\nfear, gratitude or desire--in any mind whose thinking is untouched,\nuncoloured, uninspired by some pious emotion. And religion includes\nmore even than an apprehension of God supplemented by feeling--than the\nlove or fear of God based on knowledge. It is unrealised and incomplete\nso long as there is no self-surrender of the soul to the object of its\nknowledge and affection--so long as the will is unmoved, the character\nand conduct unmodified. The importance of feeling and will in religion\nis thus in no respect questioned or denied when it is maintained that\nreligion cannot be a reasonable process, a healthy condition of mind,\nif constituted by either feeling or volition separate from knowledge.\nSome have represented it as consisting essentially in the feeling of\ndependence, others in that of love, and others in fear; but these are\nall feelings which must be elicited by knowledge, and which must be\nproportional to knowledge in every undisordered mind. We can neither\nlove nor fear what we know nothing about. We cannot love what we do\nnot think worthy of love, nor fear unless we think there is reason for\nfear. We cannot feel our dependence upon what we do not know to exist.\nWe cannot feel trustful and confiding dependence on what we do not\nsuppose to have a character which merits trust and confidence. Then,\nhowever true it may be that short of the action of the will in the\nform of the self-surrender of the soul to the object of its worship\nthe religious process is essentially imperfect, this self-surrender\ncannot be independent of reason and yet reasonable. In order to be\na legitimate act it must spring out of good affections,--and these\naffections must be enlightened; they must rest on the knowledge of an\nobject worthy of them, and worthy of the self-sacrifice to which they\nprompt. Unless there be such an object, and unless it can be known, all\nthe feeling and willing involved in religion must be delusive--must be\nof a kind which reason and duty command us to resist and suppress.\n\nBut religion is certainly a very large phenomenon. It is practically\ncoextensive, indeed, with human life and history. It is doubtful if\nany people, any age, has been without some religion. And religion has\nnot only in some form existed almost wherever man has existed, but\nits existence has to a great extent influenced his whole existence.\nThe religion of a people colours its entire civilisation; its action\nmay be traced on industry, art, literature, science, and philosophy,\nin all their stages. And the question whether there is a God or not,\nwhether God can be known or not, is, otherwise put, whether or not\nreligious history, and history so far as influenced by religion, have\nhad any root in reason, any ground in fact. If there be no God, or if\nit be impossible to know whether there be a God or not, history, to\nthe whole extent of its being religious and influenced by religion,\nmust have been unreasonable. Perhaps religion might still be conceived\nof, although it is difficult to see how it could be so conceived of on\nconsistent grounds, as having done some good: and one religion might\nbe regarded as better than another, in the sense of doing more good\nor less evil than another; but no religion could be conceived of as\ntrue, nor could one religion be conceived of as truer than another. If\nthere be no God to know, or if God cannot be known, religion is merely\na delusion or mental disease--its history is merely the history of a\ndelusion or disease, and any science of it possible is merely a part of\nmental pathology.\n\nFurther, whether Christianity be a reasonable creed or not obviously\ndepends on whether or not certain beliefs regarding God are reasonable.\nIf there be no God, if there be more Gods than one, if God be not the\nCreator and Upholder of the world and the Father of our spirits, if\nGod be not infinite in being and perfection, in power, wisdom, and\nholiness, Christianity cannot possibly be a thing to be believed. It\nprofesses to be a revelation from God, and consequently assumes that\nthere is a God. It demands our fullest confidence, on the ground of\nbeing His word; and consequently assumes that He is \"not a man that\nHe should lie,\" but One whose word may be trusted to the uttermost.\nIt professes to be a law of life, and therefore assumes the holiness\nof its author; to be a plan of salvation, and therefore presupposes\nHis love; to be certain of final triumph, and so presupposes His\npower. It presents itself to us as the completion of a progressive\nprocess of positive revelation, and therefore presupposes a heavenly\nFather, Judge, and King. The books in which we have the record of this\nprocess--the books of the Old and New Testaments--therefore assume,\nand could not but assume, that God is, and that He is all-powerful,\nperfectly wise, and perfectly holy. They do not prove it, but refer us\nto the world and our own hearts for the means and materials of proof.\nThey may draw away from nature, and from before the eyes of men, a veil\nwhich covers and conceals the proof; they may be a record of facts\nwhich powerfully confirm and largely supplement what proof there is in\nthe universe without and the mind within: but they must necessarily\nimply, and do everywhere imply, that a real proof exists there. If what\nthey in this respect imply be untrue, all that they profess to tell us\nof God, and as from God, must be rejected by us, if we are to judge and\nact as reasonable beings.[1]\n\n[1] See Appendix I.\n\nFor all men, then, who have religious beliefs, and especially for all\nmen who have Christian beliefs, these questions, What evidence is\nthere for God's existence? and, What is known of His nature? are of\nprimary importance. The answers given to them must determine whether\nreligion and Christianity ought to be received or rejected. There can\nbe no use in discussing other religious questions so long as these\nfundamental questions have not been thoughtfully studied and distinctly\nanswered. It is only through their investigation that we can establish\na right to entertain any religious belief, to cherish any religious\nfeeling, to perform any religious act. And the result to which the\ninvestigation leads us must largely decide what sort of a religious\ntheory we shall hold, and what sort of a religious life we shall lead.\nAlmost all religious differences of really serious import may be traced\nback to differences in men's thoughts about God. The idea of God is\nthe generative and regulative idea in every great religious system and\nevery great religious movement. It is a true feeling which has led to\nthe inclusion of all religious doctrines whatever in a science which\nbears the name of theology (discourse about God, [Greek: logos peri\ntou theou]), for what is believed about God determines what will be\nbelieved about everything else which is included either under natural\nor revealed religion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the second place, the moral issues depending on the inquiry before\nus are momentous. An erroneous result must, from the very nature of\nthe case, be of the most serious character. If there be no God, the\ncreeds and rites and precepts which have been imposed on humanity in\nHis name must all be regarded as a cruel and intolerable burden. The\nindignation which atheists have so often expressed at the contemplation\nof religious history is quite intelligible--quite natural; for to them\nit can only appear as a long course of perversion of the conscience\nand affections of mankind. If religion be in its essence, and in all\nits forms and phases, false, the evils which have been associated with\nit have been as much its legitimate effects as any good which can be\nascribed to it; and there can be no warrant for speaking of benefits\nas its proper effects, or uses and mischiefs as merely occasioned by\nit, or as its abuses. If in itself false, it must be credited with\nthe evil as well as with the good which has followed it; and all the\nunprofitable sufferings and useless privations--all the undefined\nterrors and degrading rites--all the corruptions of moral sentiment,\nfactitious antipathies, intolerance, and persecution--all the spiritual\ndespotism of the few, and the spiritual abjectness of the many--all\nthe aversion to improvement and opposition to science, &c., which\nare usually referred to false religion and to superstition,--must be\nattributed to religion in itself, if there be no distinction between\ntrue and false in religion--between religion and superstition. In\nthat case, belief in God must be regarded as really the root of all\nthese evils. It is only if we can separate between religious truth\nand religious error--only if we can distinguish religion itself from\nthe perversions of religion--that we can possibly maintain that the\nevils which have flowed from religious error, from the perversions of\nreligion, are not to be traced to the religious principle itself.[2]\n\nOn the other hand, if there be a God, he who denies His existence,\nand, in consequence, discards all religious motives, represses all\nreligious sentiments, and despises all religious practices, assuredly\ngoes morally far astray. If there be a God--all-mighty, all-wise, and\nall-holy--the want of belief in Him must be in all circumstances a\ngreat moral misfortune, and, wherever it arises from a want of desire\nto know Him, a serious moral fault, necessarily involving, as it\ndoes, indifference to one who deserves the highest love and deepest\nreverence, ingratitude to a benefactor whose bounties have been\nunspeakable, and the neglect of those habits of trust and prayer by\nwhich men realise the presence of infinite sympathy and implore the\nhelp of infinite strength. If there be a God, the virtue which takes\nno account of Him, even if it were otherwise faultless, must be most\ndefective. The performance of personal and social duty can in that\ncase no more compensate for the want of piety than justice can excuse\nintemperance or benevolence licentiousness.\n\n[2] See Appendix II.\n\nBesides, if God exist--if piety, therefore, ought also to exist--it\ncan scarcely be supposed that personal and social morality will not\nsuffer when the claims of religion are unheeded. It has seemed to\nsome that morality rests on religion, and cannot exist apart from it.\nAnd almost all who believe that there are religious truths which men,\nas reasonable beings, are bound to accept, will be found maintaining\nthat, although morality may be independent of religion for its mere\nexistence, a morality unsupported by religion would be insufficient to\nsatisfy the wants of the personal and social life. Without religion,\nthey maintain, man would not be able to resist the temptations and\nsupport the trials of his lot, and would be cut off from the source\nof his loftiest thoughts, his richest and purest enjoyments, and his\nmost heroic deeds. Without it nations, they further maintain, would\nbe unprogressive, selfish, diseased, corrupt, unworthy of life,\nincapable of long life. They argue that they find in human nature and\nin human history the most powerful reasons for thinking thus; and\nso much depends upon whether they are right or wrong, that they are\nobviously entitled to expect that these reasons, and also the grounds\nof religious belief, will be impartially and carefully examined and\nweighed.\n\nIt will be denied, indeed, by no one, that religious belief influences\nmoral practice. Both reason and history make doubt on this point\nimpossible. The convictions of a man's heart as to the supreme object\nof his reverence, and as to the ways in which he ought to show his\nreverence thereof, necessarily affect for good or ill his entire mind\nand conduct. The whole moral life takes a different colour according\nto the religious light which falls upon it. As the valley of the Rhone\npresents a different aspect when seen from a summit of the Jura and\nfrom a peak of the Alps, so the course of human existence appears very\ndifferent when looked at from different spiritual points of view.\nAtheism, polytheism, pantheism, theism, cannot regard life and death\nin the same way, and cannot solve in the same way the problems which\nthey present to the intellect and the heart. These different theories\nnaturally--yea, necessarily--yield different moral results. Now, doubt\nmay be entertained as to whether or not we can legitimately employ the\nmaxim, \"By their fruits ye shall know them,\" in attempting to ascertain\nthe truth or falsity of a theory. The endeavour to support religion\nby appealing to its utility has been denounced as \"moral bribery and\nsubornation of the understanding.\"[3] But no man, I think, however\nscrupulous or exacting, can doubt that when one theory bears different\nmoral and social fruits than another, that fact is a valid and weighty\nreason for inquiring very carefully which of them is true and which\nfalse. He who believes, for example, that there is a God, and he who\nbelieves that there is no being in the universe higher than himself--he\nwho believes that material force is the source of all things, and he\nwho believes that nature originated in an intelligent, holy, and loving\nWill,--must look upon the world, upon history, and upon themselves so\nvery differently--must think, feel, and act so very differently--that\nfor every man it must be of supreme importance to know which of these\nbeliefs he is bound in reason to accept and which to reject.\n\n[3] By J. S. Mill, in the very essay in which he assailed religion by\ntrying to show that the world had outgrown the need of it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThen, in the third place, the primary question in religion is\nimmediately and inseparably connected with the ultimate question of\nscience. Does the world explain itself, or does it lead the mind\nabove and beyond itself? Science cannot but suggest this question;\nreligion is an answer to it. When the phenomena of the world have\nbeen classified, the connections between them traced, their laws\nascertained, science may, probably enough, have accomplished all that\nit undertakes--all that it can perform; but is it certain that the\nmind can ascend no further? Must it rest in the recognition of order,\nfor example, and reject the thought of an intelligence in which that\norder has its source? Or, is this not to represent every science as\nleading us into a darkness far greater than any from which it has\ndelivered us? Granting that no religious theory of the world can be\naccepted which contradicts the results established by the sciences, are\nwe not free to ask, and even bound to ask--Do these results not, both\nseparately and collectively, imply a religious theory of the world, and\nthe particular religious theory, it may be, which is called theism? Are\nthese results not the expressions of a unity and order in the world\nwhich can only be explained on the supposition that material nature,\norganic existences, the mind and heart of man, society and its history,\nhave originated in a power, wisdom, and goodness not their own, which\nstill upholds them, and works in and through them? The question is one\nwhich may be answered in various ways, and to which the answer may be\nthat it cannot be answered; but be the answer that or another--be the\nanswer what it may--obviously the question itself is a great one,--a\ngreater than any science has ever answered--one which all science\nraises, and in the answering of which all science is deeply interested.\n\nNo scientific man can be credited with much insight who does not\nperceive that religious theory has an intimate and influential bearing\non science. There are religious theories with which science cannot\nconsistently coexist at all. Where fetichism or polytheism prevails,\nyou cannot have science with its pursuit of general laws. A dualistic\nreligion must, with all the strength it possesses, oppose science\nin the accomplishment of its task--the proof of unity and universal\norder. Even when the conception of One Creative Being is reached, there\nare ways of thinking of His character and agency which science must\nchallenge, since they imperil its life and retard its progress. The\nmedieval belief in miracles and the modern belief in law cannot be held\nby the same mind, and still less by the same society.\n\nWe have no reason, however, to complain at present that our scientific\nmen are, as a class, wanting in the insight referred to, or that the\ntruth just indicated is imperfectly realised by them. Perhaps such\ncomplaint was never less applicable. It is not long since it was the\nfashion among men of science to avoid all reference to religion--to\ntreat religious theory and scientific theory as entirely separate\nand unconnected. They either cared not or dared not to indicate how\ntheir scientific findings were rationally related to current religious\nbeliefs. But within the last few years there has been a remarkable\nchange in this respect. The attitude of indifference formerly assumed\nby so many of the representatives of science towards religion has been\nvery generally exchanged for one of aggression or defence. The number\nof them who seem to think themselves bound to publish to the world\nconfessions of their faith, declarations of the religious conclusions\nto which their scientific researches have led them, is great, perhaps,\nbeyond example in any age. They are manifesting unmistakably the most\nserious interest in the inquiry into the foundation of religion, and\ninto the relationship of religion to science. The change is certainly\none for the better. It is not wholly good only because scientific men\nin their excursions into the domain of religion are too frequently\nchargeable with a one-sidedness of view and statement which their\nscientific education might have been hoped to make impossible--only\nbecause they too seldom give to religious truths the patient and\nimpartial consideration to which these are entitled. But most deserving\nof welcome is every evidence on their part of the conviction that\nwhen science goes deep enough it cannot but raise the questions to\nwhich religion professes to be an answer; so that the mind, instead\nof getting free from religious reflection by advancing in scientific\ninquiry, finds such reflection only the more incumbent on it the\nfarther it advances--a conviction which falls short of, indeed, but is\nclosely allied to, the belief so aptly expressed by Lord Bacon, \"that\nwhile a slight taste of philosophy may dispose the mind to indifference\nto religion, deeper draughts must bring it back to it; that while on\nthe threshold of philosophy, where second causes appear to absorb the\nattention, some oblivion of the highest cause may ensue, when the mind\npenetrates deeper, and sees the dependence of causes and the works of\nProvidence, it will easily perceive, according to the mythology of the\npoets, that the upper link of nature's chain is fastened to Jupiter's\nthrone.\" Men of science are simply exercising a right to which they\nare fully entitled when they judge of religion by what they find to be\nascertained in science; and no class of men is more likely than they\nare to open up the way to points of view whence religious truth will be\nseen with a clearness and comprehensiveness greater than any to which\nprofessional theologians could hope of themselves to attain. He can be\nno wise theologian who does not perceive that to a large extent he is\ndependent on the researches of men of science for his data, and who,\nfirm in the faith that God will never be disgraced by His works, is\nnot ready to accept all that is truly discovered about these works, in\norder to understand thereby God's character.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe greatest issues, then, are involved in the investigation on which\nwe enter. Can we think what these are, or reflect on their greatness,\nwithout drawing this inference, that we ought, in conducting it, to\nhave no other end before us than that of seeking, accepting, and\ncommunicating the truth? This is here so important that everything\nbeside it must be insignificant and unworthy. Any polemical triumphs\nwhich could be gained either by logical or rhetorical artifices would\nbe unspeakably paltry. Nothing can be appropriate in so serious a\ndiscussion but to state as accurately as we can the reasons for our own\nbelief in theism, and to examine as carefully and impartially as we\ncan the objections of those who reject that belief, and their reasons\nfor holding an opposite belief. It can only do us harm to overrate the\nworth of our own convictions and arguments, or to underrate the worth\nof those of others. We must not dare to carry into the discussion\nthe spirit of men who feel that they have a case to advocate at all\nhazards. We must not try to conceal a weakness in our argumentation\nby saying hard things of those who endeavour to point it out. There\nis no doubt that character has an influence on creed--that the state\nof a man's feelings determines to a considerable extent the nature of\nhis beliefs--that badness of heart is often the cause of perversity of\njudgment; but we have no right to begin any argument by assuming that\nthis truth has its bright side--its side of promise--turned towards\nus, and its dark and threatening side turned towards those who differ\nfrom us. If we can begin by assuming our opponents to be wicked, why\nshould we not assume them at once to be wrong, and so spare ourselves\nthe trouble of arguing with them? It will be better to begin by\nassuming only what no one will question--namely, that it is a duty to\ndo to others as we would have others do to us. When a man errs, it\nis a kindness to show him his error--and the greater the error, the\ngreater the kindness; but error is so much its own punishment to every\ningenuous nature, that to convince a person of it is all that one\nfallible person ought to do to another. The scoff and the sneer are out\nof place in all serious discussion; especially are they out of place\nwhen our minds are occupied with thoughts of Him who, if He exist, is\nthe Father and Judge of us all, who alone possesses the full truth, and\nwho has made us that we might love one another.[4]\n\n[4] See Appendix III.\n\n\nII.\n\nTheism is the doctrine that the universe owes its existence, and\ncontinuance in existence, to the reason and will of a self-existent\nBeing, who is infinitely powerful, wise, and good. It is the doctrine\nthat nature has a Creator and Preserver, the nations a Governor, men a\nheavenly Father and Judge. It is a doctrine which has a long history\nbehind it, and it is desirable that we should understand how we are\nrelated to that history.\n\nTheism is very far from coextensive with religion. Religion is spread\nover the whole earth; theism only over a comparatively small portion of\nit. There are but three theistic religions--the Mosaic, the Christian,\nand the Mohammedan. They are connected historically in the closest\nmanner--the idea of God having been transmitted to the two latter,\nand not independently originated by them. All other religions are\npolytheistic or pantheistic, or both together. Among those who have\nbeen educated in any of these heathen religions, only a few minds\nof rare penetration and power have been able to rise by their own\nexertions to a consistent theistic belief. The God of all those among\nus who believe in God, even of those who reject Christianity, who\nreject all revelation, is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. From\nthese ancient Jewish fathers the knowledge of Him has historically\ndescended through an unbroken succession of generations to us. We\nhave inherited it from them. If it had not thus come down to us,\nif we had not been born into a society pervaded by it, there is no\nreason to suppose that we should have found it out for ourselves, and\nstill less that we should merely have required to open our eyes in\norder to see it. Rousseau only showed how imperfectly he realised the\ndependence of man on man, and the extent to which tradition enters\ninto all our thinking, when he pretended that a human being born on\na desert island, and who had grown up without any acquaintance with\nother beings, would naturally, and without assistance, rise to the\napprehension of this great thought. The Koran well expresses a view\nwhich has been widely held when it says, \"Every child is born into\nthe religion of nature; its parents make it a Jew, a Christian, or\na Magian.\" The view is, however, not a true one. A child is born,\nnot into the religion of nature, but into blank ignorance; and, left\nentirely to itself, it would probably never find out as much religious\ntruth as the most ignorant of parents can teach it. It is doubtless\nbetter to be born into the most barbarous pagan society than it would\nbe to be born on a desert island and abandoned to find out a religion\nfor one's self.\n\nThe individual man left to himself is very weak. He is strong only\nwhen he can avail himself of the strength of many others, of the\nstores of power accumulated by generations of his predecessors, or\nof the combined forces of a multitude of his contemporaries. The\ngreatest men have achieved what they have done only because they have\nhad the faculty and skill to utilise resources vastly greater than\ntheir own. Nothing reaches far forward into the future which does not\nstretch far back into the past. Before a tragedy like 'Hamlet,' for\nexample, could be written, it was requisite that humanity should have\npassed through ages of moral discipline, and should be in possession\nof vast and subtle conceptions such as could only be the growth of\ncenturies, of the appropriate language at the appropriate epoch of\nits development, and of a noble style of literary workmanship. \"We\nallow ourselves,\" says Mr Froude, \"to think of Shakespeare, or of\nRaphael, or of Phidias as having accomplished their work by the power\nof their individual genius; but greatness like theirs is never more\nthan the highest degree of perfection which prevails widely around it,\nand forms the environment in which it grows. No such single mind in\nsingle contact with the facts of nature could have created a Pallas,\na Madonna, or a Lear.\" What the historian has thus said as to art is\nequally true of all other forms of thinking and doing. It is certainly\ntrue of religious thought, which has never risen without much help to\nthe sublime conception of one God. It is, in fact, an indisputable\nhistorical truth that we owe our theism in great part to our\nChristianity,--that natural religion has had no real existence prior to\nor apart from what has claimed to be revealed religion--and that the\nindependence which it now assumes is that of one who has grown ashamed\nof his origin.\n\nIt does not in the least follow that we are to regard theism as\nmerely or even mainly a tradition--as a doctrine received simply\non authority, and transmitted from age to age, from generation to\ngeneration, without investigation, without reflection. It does not\nfollow that it is not a truth the evidence of which has been seen in\nsome measure by every generation which has accepted it, and into the\ndepth and comprehensiveness and reasonableness of which humanity has\nobtained a constantly-growing insight. There have, it is true, been\na considerable number of theologians who have traced all religious\nbeliefs to revelation, and who have assigned to reason merely the\nfunction of passively accepting, retaining, and transmitting them.\nThey have conceived of the first man as receiving the knowledge of God\nby sensible converse with Him, and of the knowledge thus received as\ntransmitted, with the confirmation of successive manifestations, to\nthe early ancestors of all nations. The various notions of God and a\nfuture state to be found in heathen countries are, according to them,\nbroken and scattered rays of these revelations; and all the religious\nrites of prayer, purification, and sacrifice which prevail among savage\npeoples, are faint and feeble relics of a primitive worship due to\ndivine institution. This view was natural enough in the early ages of\nthe Christian Church and in medieval times, when the New World was\nundiscovered and a very small part of either Asia or Africa was known.\nIt was consonant also to the general estimate of tradition as a means\nof transmitting truth, entertained by the Roman Catholic Church; but\nit is not consistent with the Protestant rejection of tradition, and\nit is wholly untenable in the light of modern science, the geography,\nethnology, comparative mythology, &c., of the present day. A man who\nshould thus account for the phenomena of the religious history of\nheathen humanity must be now as far behind the scientific knowledge\nof his age regarding the subject on which he theorises, as a man who\nshould still ascribe, despite all geological proofs to the contrary,\nthe occurrence of fossils in the Silurian beds to the action of the\nNoachian deluge.[5]\n\n[5] See Appendix IV.\n\nTheism has come to us mainly through Christianity. But Christianity\nitself rests on theism; it presupposes theism. It could only manifest,\nestablish, and diffuse itself in so far as theism was apprehended. The\nbelief that there is one God, infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness,\nhas certainly not been wrought out by each one of us for himself, but\nhas been passed on from man to man, from parent to child: tradition,\neducation, common consent, the social medium, have exerted great\ninfluence in determining its acceptance and prevalence; but we have\nno right to conceive of them as excluding the exercise of reason and\nreflection. We know historically that reason and reflection have not\nbeen excluded from the development of theistic belief, but have been\nconstantly present and active therein; that by the use of his reason\nman has in some countries gradually risen to a belief in one God; and\nthat where this belief existed, he has, by the use of his reason, been\ncontinuously altering, and, it may be hoped, extending and improving\nhis views of God's nature and operations. We know that in Greece,\nfor example, the history of religion was not a merely passive and\ntraditional process. We know as a historical fact that reason there\nundermined the polytheism which flourished when Homer sang; that it\ndiscovered the chief theistic proofs still employed, and attained\nin many minds nearly the same belief in God which now prevails. The\nexperience of the ancient classical world is insufficient to prove\nthat a purely rational philosophy can establish theism as the creed\nof a nation; but it is amply sufficient to prove that it can destroy\npolytheism, and find out all the principal arguments for theism. We\nknow, further, that in no age of the history of the Christian Church\nhas reason entirely neglected to occupy itself in seeking the grounds\non which the belief of God can be rested. We know that reason is\ncertainly not declining that labour in the present day. The theistic\nbelief, although common to the whole Christian world, is one which\nevery individual mind may study for itself, which no one is asked to\naccept without proof, and which multitudes have doubtless accepted\nonly after careful consideration. It comes to us so far traditionally,\nbut not nearly so much so as belief in the law of gravitation. For\nevery one who has examined the evidences for belief in the law of\ngravitation, thousands on thousands have examined the evidences for the\nexistence of God.\n\nTradition, then, does not necessarily exclude private judgment,\nand private judgment does not necessarily imply the rejection of\ntradition--that is, of transmitted belief. The one does not even\nnecessarily confine or restrict the activity of the other. They are\nso far from being essentially antagonistic, that they may co-operate,\nmay support and help each other; nay, they must do, if religious\ndevelopment is to be natural, easy, peaceful, and regular. This is\nbut saying in another form that religious development, when true and\nnormal, must combine and harmonise conservatism and progress. All\ndevelopment must do that, or it will be of an imperfect and injurious\nkind. In nature the rule of development is neither _revolution_ nor\n_reaction_, but _evolution_--a process which is at once conservative\nand progressive, which brings the new out of the old by the continuous\ngrowth and elaboration of the germs of life into organic completeness.\nAll that is essential in the old is retained and perfected, while\nthe form is altered to accord with new circumstances and to respond\nto new wants. It should not be otherwise in the moral and social\nworlds. The only true progress there, also, is that continuous\nand consistent development which can only be secured through true\nconservatism--through retaining, applying, and utilising whatever\ntruth and goodness the past has brought down to the present; and the\nonly true conservatism is that which secures against stagnation and\ndeath by continuous progress. Therefore it is that, alike in matters\nof civil polity, of scientific research, and of religious life, wisdom\nlies in combining the conservative with the progressive spirit, the\nprinciple of authority with the principle of liberty, due respect to\nthe collective reason in history with due respect to the rights of\nthe individual reason. The man who has not humility enough to feel\nthat he is but one among the living millions of men, and that his\nwhole generation is but a single link in the great chain of the human\nrace--who is arrogant enough to fancy that wisdom on any great human\ninterest has begun with himself, and that he may consequently begin\nhistory for himself,--the man who is not conservative to the extent\nof possessing this humility, and shrinking from this arrogance, is no\ntruly free man, but the slave of his own vanity, and the inheritance\nwhich his fathers have left him will be little increased by him. The\nman, on the other hand, who always accepts what is as what ought to\nbe; who identifies the actual with the reasonable; who would have\nto-morrow exactly like to-day; who would hold fast what Providence is\nmost clearly showing ought to pass away, or to pass into something\nbetter,--the man, in a word, who would lay an arrest on the germs\nof life and truth, and prevent them from sprouting and ripening--is\nthe very opposite of genuinely conservative--is the most dangerous\nof destructives. There is nothing so conservative against decay and\ndissolution as natural growth, orderly progress.\n\nThe truth just stated is, as I have said, of universal application.\nBut it is nowhere more applicable than in the inquiry on which we are\nengaged. The great idea of God--the sublimest and most important of\nall ideas--has come to us in a wondrous manner through the minds and\nhearts of countless generations which it has exercised and sustained,\nwhich it has guided in darkness, strengthened in danger, and consoled\nin affliction. It has come to us by a long, unbroken tradition; and\nhad it not come to us, we should of a certainty not have found it out\nfor ourselves. We should have had to supply its place, to fill \"the\naching void\" within us caused by its absence, with some far lower idea,\nperhaps with some wild fiction, some foul idol. Probably we cannot\nestimate too humbly the amount or worth of the religious knowledge\nwhich we should have acquired, supposing we acquired any, if we had\nbeen left wholly to our own unaided exertions--if we had been cut off\nfrom the general reason of our race, and from the Divine Reason, which\nhas never ceased to speak in and to our race.\n\nWhile, however, the idea of God has been brought to us, and is not\nindependently wrought out by us, no man is asked to accept it blindly\nor slavishly; no man is asked to forego in the slightest degree,\neven before this the most venerable and general of the beliefs of\nhumanity, the rights of his own individual reason. He is free to\nexamine the grounds of it, and to choose according to the result of\nhis examination. His acceptance of the idea, his acquiescence in the\nbelief, is of worth only if it be the free acceptance of, the loving\nacquiescence in, what his reason, heart, and conscience testify to be\ntrue and good. Therefore, neither in this idea or belief itself, nor\nin the way in which it has come to us, is there any restriction or\nrepression of our mental liberty. And the mere rejection of it is no\nsign, as some seem to fancy, of intellectual freedom, of an independent\njudgment. It is no evidence of a man's being freer from incredulity\nthan the most superstitious of his neighbours. \"To disbelieve is to\nbelieve,\" says Whately. \"If one man believes there is a God, and\nanother that there is no God, whichever holds the less reasonable of\nthese two opinions is chargeable with credulity. For the only way to\navoid credulity and incredulity--the two necessarily going together--is\nto listen to, and yield to the best evidence, and to believe and\ndisbelieve on good grounds.\" These are wise words of Dr Whately.\nWhenever reason has been awakened to serious reflection on the subject,\nthe vast majority of men have felt themselves unable to believe that\nthis mighty universe, so wondrous in its adjustments and adaptations,\nwas the product of chance, or dead matter, or blind force--that the\nphysical, mental, and moral order which they everywhere beheld implied\nno Supreme Intelligence and Will; and the few who can believe it,\nhave assuredly no right, simply on the ground of such ability, to\nassume that they are less credulous, freer thinkers, than others. The\ndisbelief of the atheist must ever seem to all men but himself to\nrequire more faith, more credulity, than the beliefs of all the legends\nof the Talmud.[6]\n\n[6] See Appendix V.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\n GENERAL IDEA OF RELIGION--COMPARISON OF POLYTHEISM AND PANTHEISM WITH\n THEISM--THE THREE GREAT THEISTIC RELIGIONS COMPARED--NO RELIGIOUS\n PROGRESS BEYOND THEISM.\n\n\nI.\n\nThere are three great theistic religions. All of them can scarcely be\nsupposed to be perfect. It is most unlikely that they should all be\nequal in rank and value. But to determine the position and worth of a\nreligion, whether theistic or non-theistic, it is indispensable that we\nhave some notion of what religion is in itself.\n\nIt is very difficult to give a correct definition or accurate\ndescription of religion. And the reason is that religion is so wide\nand diversified a thing. It has spread over the whole earth, and it\nhas assumed an almost countless variety of forms. Some sense of an\ninvisible power or powers ruling his destiny is manifested by man\nalike in the lowest stages of barbarism and in the highest stages of\ncivilisation, but the rude savage and the cultured thinker conceive\nvery differently of the powers which they adore. The aspects of\nreligion are, in fact, numerous as the phases of human life and the\nsteps of human progress. It extends its sway over all lands, ages,\nand peoples, and yet it is the same in no two countries, no two\ngenerations, no two men even. There is, accordingly, of necessity a\ngreat difficulty in finding an expression which will comprehend and\nsuit the vast variety of forms assumed by the religious life. Instead\nof trying to find an expression of the kind, many, I might almost say\nmost, theologians are content silently to substitute for religion\nthe phases of it with which they are most familiar, and instead of a\ndefinition of religion, to give us, say, a definition of theism, or\neven of Christianity. It is the rule and not the exception to find the\nsame theologians who define religion as the communion of man with God,\nor the self-surrender of the soul to God, arguing that religion is\ncommon to all races and peoples. Of course, this is self-contradictory.\nTheir definitions identify religion with monotheism, and their\narguments assume it to include pantheism, polytheism, fetichism, &c.\nBelief in the one God and the worship of Him are very far from being\nuniversal even at the present day. If there be no other religion--if\nnothing short of that be religion--there are still vast continents and\npopulous nations where religion is unknown.\n\nA definition of religion must completely circumscribe religion; it must\nnot be applicable merely to one religion, or at the most to several out\nof the vast host of religions which are spread over the earth; it must\ndraw a boundary line which includes all religions, the lowest as well\nas the highest, and which excludes all things else.[7] A definition\nthus extensive cannot be, in logical language, very comprehensive; to\ninclude all religions, it must not tell us much about what any religion\nis; in significance it can be neither rich nor definite. Perhaps if we\nsay that religion is man's belief in a being or beings, mightier than\nhimself and inaccessible to his senses, but not indifferent to his\nsentiments and actions, with the feelings and practices which flow from\nsuch belief, we have a definition of the kind required. I fear at least\nthat any definition less abstract and vague will be found to apply only\nto particular forms or special developments of religion. Religion is\nman's communion, then, with what he believes to be a god or gods; his\nsense of relationship to, and dependence on, a higher and mysterious\nagency, with all the thoughts, emotions, and actions which proceed\ntherefrom. The communion may be dark and gross, and find expression\nin impure and bloody rites, or it may be in spirit and in truth, and\nexpressed in ways which educate and elevate both mind and heart. The\nbelief may rest on wild delusions, on authority blindly accepted, or\non rational grounds. The god may be some personified power of nature,\nsome monstrous phantom of the brain, some imaginary demon of lust or\ncruelty; or it may be He in whom all truth, wisdom, goodness, and\nholiness have their source. But whatever be the form or character which\nreligion presents, it always and everywhere involves belief in a god\nor object of worship, and feelings and actions corresponding to that\nbelief. It is always and everywhere a consciousness of relationship to\na worshipped being.\n\n[7] See Appendix VI.\n\nIs there any truth which can be affirmed to belong universally to this\nconsciousness? If there be, it will hold good universally of religion,\nand the recognition of it will advance us a step in the knowledge of\nthe nature of religion. One such truth at least, it appears to me,\nthere is--viz., that the religious consciousness, or the frame and\ncondition of spiritual life distinctive and essential in religion, is\nnot peculiar to some one province of human nature, but extends into all\nits provinces. This truth has been often contradicted in appearance,\nseldom in reality. The seat of religion, as I indicated in last\nlecture, has been placed by some in the intellect, by others in the\naffections, and by others still in the will. It has been represented\nas knowing, or feeling, or doing. When we examine, however, the\nmultitude of, at first glance, apparently very conflicting views which\nhave originated in thus fixing upon some single mental faculty as the\nreligious faculty, the organ and seat of religion, we soon find that\nthey are not so discordant and antagonistic as they seem to be.\n\nThose who represent religion as essentially knowledge or belief, do\nnot really mean to affirm that anything entitled to be called religion\nis ever mere knowledge or mere belief; on the contrary, they proceed\non the supposition that feeling and volition will correspond to the\nknowledge or belief. They define religion as knowledge or belief, and\nnot as affection or volition, because, regarding religious knowledge\nor belief as the ground of religious feeling and willing, they think\nthey may treat the two latter, not as constituents, but as consequences\nof religion. Then, although a few of those who have defined religion\nas feeling have written as if they supposed that the feeling rested\nupon no sort of apprehension or conviction, they have been very\nfew, and they have never been able to explain what they meant. In\npresence of the Power which is manifested in the universe, or of the\nmoral order of the world, they have felt an awe or joy, it may be,\nirresistibly raising them above themselves, above the hampering details\nof earth, and \"giving fulness and tone to their existence;\" and being\nunaccustomed to analyse states of consciousness, although familiar\nwith the mechanics and chemistry of matter, they have overlooked the\nobvious fact, that but for an intellectual perception of the presence\nof an all-pervading Power, and all-embracing order, the awe and joy\ncould never have been excited. Mere feeling cannot tell us anything\nabout what is out of ourselves, and cannot take us out of ourselves.\nMere feeling is, in fact, mere absurdity. It is but what we should\nexpect, therefore, that all those capable of reflecting in any measure\non mental processes who have placed the essence of religion in feeling,\nhave always admitted that the religious feeling could not be wholly\nseparated either from the power of cognition on the one hand, or the\nexertion of will on the other. Men like Schleiermacher and Opzoomer\nargue strenuously that religion is feeling and not knowledge or\npractice; but it is expressly on the ground that, as there can be\nwhat is called religious knowledge and practice without piety, the\nknowledge is a mere antecedent, and the practice a mere consequent.\nThose, again, who make religion consist essentially in an act of will,\nin the self-surrender of the soul to the object of its worship, do so,\nthey tell us, because pious feeling, even though based on knowledge, is\nonly religiousness, not religion--the capacity of being religious, not\nactually being so; and religion only exists as a reality, a completed\nthing, when the will of man submits itself to the Divine Will. But\nthis is to acknowledge, you observe, that both thought and feeling are\npresent and presupposed wherever religion exists.\n\nNow, if the facts be as I have just stated, obviously the controversy\nas to whether religion is essentially knowing, feeling, or willing,\nis mainly verbal. It turns on an undefined use of the term\nessential. Thought, feeling, and will--knowledge, affection, and\nself-surrender--are admitted to be indissolubly united, inseparably\npresent, in religion, even by those who will not admit them to be all\nits equally essential constituents. But in these circumstances, they\nshould carefully explain what they mean by essential and non-essential,\nand tell us how we are to distinguish among inseparable states those\nwhich are essential from those which are non-essential. This they never\ndo; this they cannot do. All facts which always go together, and are\nalways equally found in any state or process, are its equally essential\ncomponents. When we always find certain elements together, and can\nneither discover nor imagine them apart, we have no right to represent\nsome of them as essential to the compound into which they enter, and\nothers as non-essential. They are all essential.\n\nThe conclusion to which we are thus brought is, that religion belongs\nexclusively to no one part or province, no one disposition or faculty\nof the soul, but embraces the whole mind, the whole man. Its seat is\nthe centre of human nature, and its circumference is the utmost limit\nof all the energies and capacities of that nature. At the lowest it has\nsomething alike of intellect, affection, and practical obedience in it.\nAt its best it should include all the highest exercises of reason, all\nthe purest and deepest emotions and affections, and the noblest kind of\nconduct. It responds to its own true nature only in the measure that\nit fills the whole intellect with light, satisfies the reverence and\nlove of the most capacious heart, and provides an ideal and law for\npractical life in all its breadth. There is, then, a general notion of\nreligion which includes all religions, and that notion both suggests\nto us that the various religions of the world are of very different\nvalues, and points us to a standard by which we may determine their\nrespective rank, and estimate their worth. The definition of religion,\nin other words, though not to be confounded with the type or ideal of\nreligion, is connected with it, and indicates what it is. The type is\nthe normal and full development of what is expressed in the definition.\nIt is the type, of course, and not the definition, which is the\nstandard--the medium and measure of comparison. And the type or ideal\nof religion is the complete surrender of the heart, and strength, and\nsoul, and mind of man to Deity. Only a religion which admits of a full\ncommunion of the reason, affection, and will of the worshipper with\nthe object of his worship--only a religion which presents an object of\nworship capable of eliciting the entire devotion of the worshipper's\nnature, and at the same time of ennobling, enlarging, refining, and\nsatisfying that nature--fully realises the idea of religion, or, in\nother words, can claim to be a perfect religion.[8]\n\n[8] See Appendix VII.\n\n\nII.\n\nApplying the very general idea of religion which has now been reached,\nit soon becomes apparent that no religion can possibly claim to conform\nto it which does not present to man as the true and supreme object\nof his adoration, love, and obedience, the One Infinite Personal\nGod--almighty, all-wise, and all-holy; or, in other words, that it is\nonly in a theistic religion that whatever in religion is fitted to\nsatisfy the reason and affections of man, and to strengthen and guide\nhis will, can find its proper development.\n\nLook at polytheism--the worship of more gods than one. Clearly religion\ncan only be very imperfectly realised in any polytheistic form; and\nstill more clearly are most of the forms which polytheism has actually\nassumed unspeakably degrading. Think for a moment of a human being\nworshipping a stock or a stone, a plant or a tree, a fish or serpent,\nan ox or tiger--of the negro of Guinea beating his gods when he does\nnot get what he wishes, or the New Zealander trying to frighten them by\nthreatening to kill and eat them--of the car of Juggernaut, the fires\nof Moloch, the sacrifices to the Mexican war-god, the abominations\nascribed to Jupiter, the licentious orgies so widely practised by the\nheathen in honour of their deities. Reflect on such a scene as is\nbrought before us in the forty-fourth chapter of Isaiah. The language\nof the prophet is so graphic that one almost seems to see the man whom\nhe depicts choosing his tree in the forest and hewing it down--to see\nthe smith working at it with his tongs among the coals, and hear the\nring of his hammer--to see the carpenter with adze and line and compass\nshape it into an ugly monstrous shape, bearing faint resemblance to\nthe human--to see the workman with one part of the tree kindling a\nfire, and baking bread, and roasting roast, and eating it, and then\ngoing up to the ugly, wooden, human shape that he has fashioned out of\nanother part of the same tree, prostrating himself before it, feeling\nawed in its presence, and praying, \"Deliver me; for thou art my god.\"\nThe prophet obviously painted from the life, and his picture is still\ntrue to the life where polytheism prevails. But what could be more\ncalculated to inspire both horror and pity? How awful is it that man\nshould be able so to delude and degrade himself! As a rule, the gods\nof polytheists are such that, even under the delusion that they are\ngods, little improving communion with them is possible. As a rule, the\nreligion of polytheists consists of vague, dark, wild imaginations,\ninstead of true and reasoned convictions--of coarse, selfish desires,\nfear and suspicion, instead of love, and trust, and joy--and of\narbitrary or even immoral rites and practices, instead of spiritual\nworship, and the conformity of the will to a righteous law.\n\nThen, at the very best, polytheism must be far from good,--at its\nhighest, it must be low. Were it much better than it has ever been--had\nit all the merits of Greek polytheism, without any of its faults,\nsave those which are inherent in the very nature of polytheism--it\nwould still be but a poor religion, for its essential and irremediable\ndefects are such as to render it altogether incapable of truly\nsatisfying the nature of man. It is a belief in more gods than one.\nThis of itself is what reason cannot rest in--what reason is constantly\nfinding out more clearly to be false. The more the universe is examined\nand understood, the more apparent does it become that it is a single,\nself-consistent whole--a vast unity in which nothing is isolated or\nindependent. The very notion, therefore, of separate and independent\ndeities, and still more, of course, of discordant or hostile deities,\nruling over different departments of nature, is opposed to the\nstrivings and findings of reason. The heart will no less vainly seek\nsatisfaction in the belief of many gods. Its spiritual affections\nneed a single Divine object. To distribute them among many objects is\nto dissipate and destroy them. The reverence, love, and trust which\nreligion demands are a whole-hearted, absolute, unlimited reverence,\nlove, and trust, such as can only be felt towards one God, with no\nother beside Him. The will of man in like manner requires to be under\nnot a number of independent wills, but a single, all-comprehensive,\nperfectly consistent, and perfectly righteous will. It cannot serve\nmany masters; it can only reasonably and rightly serve one. It can\nonly yield itself up unreservedly to be guided by One Supreme Will.\nIf there be no such will in the universe, but only a multitude of\nindependent and co-ordinate wills, that full surrender of the will of\nthe worshipper to the object of his worship, in which religion should\nfind its consummation, is impossible.\n\nFurther, polytheism is not only the belief in more gods than one, but\nin gods all of which are finite. There can be no true recognition of\nthe infinity of God where there is no true recognition of His unity.\nBut the mind of man, although finite itself, cannot be satisfied with\nany object of worship which it perceives to be finite. It craves an\ninfinite object; it desires to offer a boundless devotion; it seeks an\nabsolute blessedness. The aim of the religious life is the communion\nof the finite with the infinite; and every religion, however otherwise\nexcellent, which suppresses the infinite, and presents to the finite\nonly the finite, is a failure.\n\nReligion can no more attain to its proper development in pantheism\nthan in polytheism. For pantheism denies that the One Infinite Being\nis a person--is a free, holy, and loving intelligence. It denies even\nthat we ourselves are truly persons. It represents our consciousness\nof freedom and sense of responsibility as illusions. God, according\nto pantheism, alone is. All individual existences are merely His\nmanifestations,--all our deeds, whether good or bad, are His actions;\nand yet, while all is God and God is all, there is no God who can\nhear us or understand us--no God to love us or care for us--no God\nable or willing to help us. Such a view of the universe may have its\nattractions for the poet and the philosopher in certain moods of mind,\nbut it assuredly affords little foundation for religion, if religion be\nthe communion of the worshipper and the worshipped. What communion of\nreason can a man have with a being which does not understand him, or\nof affection with a being which has no love, or of will with a being\nwhich has no choice or freedom, and is the necessary cause both of good\nand evil? Pantheism represents absorption in Deity, the losing of self\nin God, as the highest good of humanity; but this is a mere caricature\nof that idea of communion with God in which religion must find its\nrealisation, as pantheism leaves neither a self to surrender, nor a\npersonal God to whom to surrender it. The absorption of the finite\nin the infinite which pantheism preaches is as different from that\nsurrender of the self to God, which is the condition of God dwelling in\nus and we in God, as night is from day, as death is from life.\n\nWe find ample historical confirmation of what has just been said in the\nvery instructive fact, that widespread as pantheism is, it has never in\nitself been the religion of any people. It has never been more than the\nphilosophy of certain speculative individuals. India is no exception,\nfor even there, in order to gain and retain the people, pantheism\nhas had to combine with polytheism. It is the personal gods of Hindu\npolytheism and not the impersonal principle of Hindu pantheism that\nthe Hindu people worship. The Sankhya and Vedanta systems are no more\nreligions than the systems of Spinoza, Schelling, or Hegel. They are\nmerely philosophies. Buddhism has laid hold of the hearts of men to a\nwonderful extent; not, however, in virtue of the pantheism, scarcely\ndis-tinguishable from atheism, which underlies it, but because of the\nattractiveness of the character and teaching of the Buddha Sakyamuni\nhimself, of the man-god who came to save men. The human heart cries out\nfor a living personal God to worship, and pantheism fails miserably as\na religion because it wholly disregards, yea, despises that cry.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe are compelled to pass onwards, then, to theism. And here, applying\nthe same view of religion as before, it soon becomes obvious that\nof the three great theistic religions--Judaism, Christianity, and\nMohammedanism--the last is far inferior to the other two, and the first\nis a transition to and preparation for the second. Although the latest\nof the three to arise, Mohammedanism is manifestly the least developed,\nthe least matured. Instead of evolving and extending the theistic\nidea which it borrowed, it has marred and mutilated it. Instead of\nrepresenting God as possessed of all spiritual fulness and perfection,\nit exhibits Him as devoid of the divinest spiritual attributes.\nAlthough the Suras of the Koran are all, with one exception, prefaced\nby the formula, \"In the name of Allah, the God of mercy, the merciful,\"\nthere is extremely little in them of the spirit of mercy, while they\nsuperabound in a fierce intolerance. Allah is set before us with\nclearness, with force, with intense sincerity, as endowed with the\nnatural attributes which we ascribe to God, but only so as to exhibit\nvery imperfectly and erroneously His moral attributes. He is set\nbefore us as God alone, beside whom there is none other; as the first\nand the last, the seen and the hidden; as eternal and unchanging; as\nomnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient; as the Creator, the Preserver,\nand the Judge of all;--but He is not set before us as truly righteous\nor even as truly reasonable, and still less as Love. He is set before\nus as an infinite and absolute arbitrary Will, the acts of which are\nright simply because they cannot be wrong, and which ordains its\ncreatures and instruments to honour or dishonour, heaven or hell,\nwithout love or hate, without interest or sympathy, and on no grounds\nof fitness or justice.\n\nHis infinite exaltation above His creatures is recognised, but not His\nrelationship to and interest in His creatures. His almighty power is\nvividly apprehended, but His infinite love is overlooked, or only seen\ndimly and in stray and fitful glimpses. His character is thus most\nimperfectly unveiled, and even seriously defaced; and, in consequence,\na whole-hearted communion with Him is impossible. As an unlimited\narbitrary Will He leaves man with no true will to surrender to Him.\nInaccessible, without sympathy, jealous, and egoistic, His appropriate\nworship is servile obedience, blind submission--not the enlightened\nreverence and loving affection of the true piety in which mind and\nheart fully accord; unquestioning belief, passionless resignation,\noutward observances, mere external works--not the free use of reason,\nnot the loving dependence of a child on its father, not an internal\nlife of holiness springing from a divine indwelling source. God and\nman thus remain in this system, theistic although it be, infinitely\nseparate from each other. Man is not made to feel that his whole\nspiritual being should live and rejoice in God; on the contrary, he\nis made to feel that he has scarcely any other relation to God than\nan inert instrument has to the hand which uses it. Submission to the\nwill of God, whatever it may be, without recognition of its being the\nwill of a Father who seeks in all things the good of His children, is\nthe Mussulman's highest conception either of religion or duty, and\nconsequently he ignores the central principle of religious communion\nand the strongest motive to moral action.\n\nThe theism of the Old Testament is incomparably superior to that of\nthe Koran. It possesses every truth contained in Mohammedanism, while\nit gives due prominence to those aspects of the Divine character which\nMohammedanism obscures and distorts. The unity and eternity of God, His\nomniscience, omnipresence, and inscrutable perfections, the wonders of\nHis creative power, His glory in the heavens and on the earth, are\ndescribed by Moses and the author of the Book of Job, by the psalmists\nand the prophets, in language so magnificent that all the intervening\ncenturies have been unable to surpass it. And yet far greater stress\nis justly laid by them on the moral glory of God, which is reflected\nin so dim and broken and disproportionate a way through the visions\nof Mohammed. It is impossible to take a comprehensive view of the Old\nTestament dispensation without perceiving that its main aim, alike in\nits ceremonial observances, moral precepts, and prophetic teaching, was\nto open and deepen the sense of sin, to give reality and intensity to\nthe recognition of moral law, to make known especially that aspect of\nGod's character which we call His righteousness, His holiness. At the\nsame time God is set forth as merciful, long-suffering, and gracious;\nas healing our diseases, redeeming our life, and crowning us with\nloving-kindnesses; as creating in us clean hearts, and desiring not\nsacrifice but a broken spirit.\n\nBefore the close of the Old Testament dispensation, a view of God's\ncharacter had been attained as complete as could be reached through\nmere spiritual vision and expressed through mere words. The character\nof God was so disclosed that His people longed with their whole hearts\nfor the blessedness of true spiritual communion with Him, and worthily\napprehended what that communion ought to be. But with the widening of\ntheir views and the deepening of their longings as to this the supreme\ngood, they realised the more how far they were from the attainment of\nit. From the beginning Judaism looked beyond itself and confessed its\nown preparatory and transitional character. And this consciousness grew\nwith its growth. In the days of the later prophets men knew far better\nwhat spiritual communion with God ought to be than in the days of the\npatriarchs, but they did not actually enjoy even the same measure of\nchildlike communion with Him. The law had done its work; it had made\nmen feel more than ever the need of being in communion with God, but\nit had made them realise also the distance between God and them, and\nespecially the awful width of the gulf between them caused by sin.\n\nThat gulf no mere spiritual vision of man could see across, and no\nmere declarations of love and mercy even from God Himself could bridge\nover. The reason of man could only be enlightened--the heart of man\ncould only be satisfied--as to how God would deal with sin and sinners,\nby an actual self-manifestation of God in humiliation, suffering, and\nsacrifice, which would leave men in no doubt that high and holy as God\nwas, He was also in the deepest and truest sense their Father, and that\nthey were His ransomed and redeemed children. It was only when this was\naccomplished that religion and theism were alike perfected. Then the\ncharacter of God was unveiled, the heart of God disclosed, and in such\na manner that the most childlike confidence in Him could be combined\nwith the profoundest sense of His greatness and righteousness. Perfect\ncommunion with Him in trustful love no longer supposed, as it did in\nearlier times, an imperfect knowledge, on the part of the worshipper,\neither of God's character or of his own. It required no overlooking\nof the evil of sin, for it rested on the certainty that sin had been\novercome. Only the life hid with God in Christ can completely realise\nthe idea of religion, for only in Christ can the heart of sinful man\nbe sincerely and unreservedly yielded to a holy God. \"I am the way,\nthe truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father, but by me,\"\nare words of the Lord Jesus which can only be denied by those who do\nnot understand what they mean--what the truth and the life are, what\nfatherhood signifies, and what is involved in coming to a Father.\n\nChristian theism alone gives us a perfect representation of God.\nIt precedes and surpasses reason, especially in the disclosure of\nthe depths of fatherly love which are in the heart of the infinite\nJehovah; but it nowhere contradicts reason--nay, it incorporates\nall the findings of reason. It presents as one great and brilliant\nlight all the scattered sparks of truth which scintillated amidst\nthe darkness of heathendom; it combines into a living unity all the\nseparate elements of positive truth which are to be found in systems\nlike pantheism, deism, rationalism; it excludes all that is false\nin views lower than or contrary to its own. Whenever it maintains a\ntruth regarding God, reason finds that it is defending a principle of\nChristian theism; whenever it refutes an error regarding Him, it finds\nitself assailing some one of the many enemies of Christian theism.\n\n\nIII.\n\nTheism, I argued in last lecture, can never be reasonably rejected in\nthe name of religious liberty. I may now, I think, maintain that it\ncan never be reasonably thrown off in the name of religious progress.\nIt can never be an onward step in the spiritual life to pass away\nfrom the belief which is distinctive and characteristic of theism.\nThe highest possible form of religion must be a theistic religion--a\nreligion in which the one personal and perfect God is the object of\nworship. Fetichism, nature-worship, humanitarian polytheism, and\npantheism, are all very much lower forms of religion, and therefore to\nabandon theism for any of them is not to advance but to retrograde,\nis not to rise but to fall. We can turn towards any of them only by\nturning our back on the spiritual goal towards which humanity has\nbeen slowly but continuously moving through so many ages. There is no\nhope or possibility of advance on the side of any of the old forms of\nheathendom.\n\nShall we try, then, to get out of and beyond theism on that other\nside to which some moderns beckon us? Shall we suppose that as men\nhave given up the lower for the higher forms of polytheism, and then\nabandoned polytheism for theism, so they may now surrender theism\nitself for systems like the positivism of Comte or the new faith\nof Strauss? No. And for two reasons. First, so far as there is any\nreligion in these systems there is no advance on theism in them but the\nreverse. Comte strives to represent humanity, and Strauss to represent\nthe universe, as a god, by imaginatively investing them with attributes\nwhich do not inherently and properly belong to them; but with all their\nefforts they can only make of them fetich gods; and Europeans, it is\nto be hoped, will never fall down and worship fetiches, however big\nthese fetiches may be, and whoever may be willing to serve them as\nprophets or priests. Humanity must be blind to its follies and sins,\ninsensible to its weakness and miseries, and given over to the madness\nof a boundless vanity, before it can raise an altar and burn incense to\nits own self. \"Man,\" says an eloquent author, \"is great is sublime,\nwith immortal hope in his heart and the divine aureole around his brow;\nbut that he may preserve his greatness let us leave him in his proper\nplace. Let us leave to him the struggles which make his glory, that\ncondemnation of his own miseries which does him honour, the tears shed\nover his faults which are the most unexceptionable testimony to his\ndignity. Let us leave him tears, repentance, conflict, and hope; but\nlet us not deify him; for no sooner shall he have said, 'I am God,'\nthan, deprived that instant of all his blessings, he shall find himself\nnaked and spoiled.\"[9] Man, I may add, if his eyes be open and capable\nof vision, can still less worship the universe than he can worship\nhimself. Mind can never bow down to matter except under the influence\nof delusion. Man is greater than anything he can see or touch; and\nthose who believe only in what they can see and touch, who have what\nStrauss calls a feeling for the universe, but no true feeling for what\nis spiritual and divine, must either worship humanity or something even\nless worthy of their adoration. There is thus no advance on this side\neither, even if the systems which we are invited to adopt could be\nproperly regarded as religious. But, secondly, we may safely say that\nso far as they are theories based on science, there is no religion in\nthem; and that, consequently, to give up a religion for them would be\nto give up not one form of religion for another, a lower for a higher,\nbut would be to give up religion for what is not religion, or, in other\nwords, would be to cast off religion altogether. And to cease to be\nreligious can surely never be to advance in religion. Positivism and\nmaterialism are not stages beyond theism, for they are not on the same\nroad. They are not phases in the development of religion; they are\nforms of the denial of religion. The grossest fetichism has more of\nreligion in it than either of them can consistently claim on scientific\ngrounds. There is nothing in science, properly so called, which\njustifies the exaltation either of matter or man to the rank of gods\neven of the lowest fetich order.\n\n[9] E. Naville, 'The Heavenly Father,' pp. 283, 284.\n\nIt is only, then, by keeping within the limits of theism that further\nreligious progress is possible. If we would advance in religion, it\nmust be, not by getting rid of our belief in God, but by getting deeper\nand wider views of His character and operations, and by conforming\nour hearts and lives more sincerely and faithfully to our knowledge.\nThere is still ample room for religious progress of this kind. I do not\nsay, I do not believe indeed, that we shall find out any absolutely\nnew truth about God. Were a man to tell me that he had discovered a\nDivine attribute which had never previously been thought of, I should\nlisten to him with the same incredulous pity as if he were to tell\nme that he had discovered a human virtue which had escaped the notice\nof all other men. In a real and important sense, the revelation of\nGod made in Scripture, and more particularly and especially the\nrevelation of God in Jesus Christ, is most justly to be regarded as\ncomplete, and incapable of addition. But there may be no limits to the\ngrowth of our apprehension and realisation of the idea of God there\nset before us perfectly as regards general features. To perceive the\nmere general outline and general aspect of a truth is one thing, and\nto know it thoroughly, to realise it exhaustively--which is the only\nway thoroughly to know it--is another and very different thing; and\ncenturies, yea, millenniums without number, may elapse between the\nformer and the latter of these two stages, between the beginning and\nthe end of this process. Thousands of years ago there were men who\nsaid as plainly as could be done or desired that God was omnipotent;\nbut surely every one who believes in God will acknowledge, that the\ndiscoveries of modern astronomy give more overwhelming impressions\nof Divine power than either heathen sage or Hebrew psalmist can be\nimagined as possessing. It is ages since men ascribed perfect wisdom\nto God; but all the discoveries of science which help us to understand\nhow the earth is related to other worlds--how it has been brought into\nits present condition--how it has been stocked, adorned, and enriched\nwith its varied tribes of plants and animals--and how these have been\ndeveloped, distributed, and provided for,--must be accepted by every\nintelligent theist as enlarging and correcting human views as to God's\nways of working, and consequently as to His wisdom. The righteousness\nof God has been the trust and support of men in all generations; but\nhistory is a continuous unveiling of the mysteries of this attribute:\nthrough the discipline of Providence individuals and nations are ever\nbeing more thoroughly instructed in the knowledge of it. I have,\nindeed, heard men say--I have heard even teachers of theology say--that\nthe knowledge of God is unlike all other knowledge, in being unchanging\nand unprogressive. To me it seems that of all knowledge the knowledge\nof God is, or at least ought to be, the most progressive. And that for\nthis simple reason, that every increase of other knowledge,--be it the\nknowledge of outward nature, or of the human soul, or of history--be\nit the knowledge of truth, or beauty, or goodness,--ought also to\nincrease our knowledge of Him. If it do not, it has not been used\naright; and the reason why it has not been so used must be that we have\nlooked upon God as if He were only one among many things, instead of\nlooking upon Him as the One Being of whom, through whom, and to whom\nare all things; and that we have, in consequence, kept our knowledge\nof Him wholly apart from our other knowledge, instead of centring all\nour knowledge in it, because we feel it to be \"the light of all our\nseeing,\" as well as \"a lamp to our feet.\" In other words, our knowledge\nof God is in this case not a living, all-diffusive knowledge. Only a\ndead knowledge of Him is an unprogressive knowledge. That, I admit, is\nunprogressive. It may fade away and be effaced, but it does not grow,\ndoes not absorb and assimilate, and thereby transmute and glorify all\nour other knowledge.\n\nGrowth in the knowledge of God is a kind of progress which can have\nabsolutely no end, for the truth to be realised is infinite truth;\ntruth unlimited by time or space; truth involved in all actual\nexistence, and containing the fulness of inexhaustible possibilities.\nIt is, I shall conclude by adding, a kind of progress which underlies\nand determines all other progress. Whenever our views of truth, of\nrighteousness, of love, of happiness rise above experience; whenever\nwe have ideals of existence and conduct which transcend the actual\nworld and actual life; whenever we have longings for a perfection and\nblessedness which finite things and finite persons cannot confer upon\nus,--our minds and hearts are really, although it may be unconsciously,\nfeeling after God, if haply they may find Him. It is only in and\nthrough God that there is anything to correspond to these ideals and\nlongings. If man be himself the highest and best of beings, how comes\nit that all the noblest of his race should be haunted and possessed\nas they are by aspirations after what is higher and better than\nthemselves--by visions of a truth, beauty, and holiness which they have\nnot yet attained--by desires for a blessedness which neither earth\nnor humanity can bestow? Must not, in that case, his ideals be mere\ndreams--his longings mere delusions? Pessimists like Schopenhauer and\nHartmann and their followers, openly avow that they believe them to\nbe so; that the history of the world is but the series of illusions\nthrough which these ideals and longings have impelled humanity; that\nour ideals never have been and never will be realised; that our\nlongings never have been and never will be satisfied, for, \"behold, all\nis vanity.\" I believe them to be quite logical in thinking so, seeing\nthat they have ceased to believe in God, who is the ideal which alone\ngives meaning to all true ideals, who can alone satisfy the deeper\nspiritual longings of the heart, and likeness to whom is the goal of\nall mental, moral, and religious progress. Of course, if the pessimists\ncan persuade mankind that the sources of progress are not the truths\nand affections by which Infinite Goodness is drawing men to itself, but\nmere fictions of their own brains and flatteries of their own hearts,\nprogress must soon cease. When a delusion is seen through, the power\nof it is gone. But the pessimists will not, we may trust, succeed.\nThey will mislead for a time, as they are now misleading, certain\nunstable minds; but the main result of their activity must be just the\nopposite of what they anticipate. It must be that men will prize more\nthe doctrines the most opposite to the dreary view of life and history\nwhich they propagate. Pessimism must send the philosophical few back\nwith deepened reverence and quickened insight to Plato, in order to\nmaster more thoroughly, and take to heart more seriously, his great\nmessage to the world, that the actual and the ideal meet and harmonise\nin God, who is at once the First and the Final Cause, the Absolute\nIdea, the Highest Good; and it must increase the gratitude of the many,\nwhether learned or unlearned, for the Gospel which has taught them\nthat to glorify God is an end in which there is no illusion, and to\nenjoy Him a good which never disappoints. God, as the presupposition of\nall elevating ideals, and the object of all ennobling desires, is the\nprimary source and the ultimate explanation of all progress.[10]\n\n[10] See Appendix VIII.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\n THE NATURE, CONDITIONS, AND LIMITS OF THEISTIC PROOF.\n\n\nI.\n\nIf we believe that there is one God--the Creator, Preserver, and\nRuler of all finite beings--we ought to have reasons or grounds for\nthis belief. We can have no right to believe it simply because we\nwish or will to believe it. The grounds or reasons which we have for\nour belief must be to us proofs of God's existence. Those who affirm\nthat God exists, and yet deny that His existence can be proved, must\neither maintain a position obviously erroneous, or use the term proof\nin some extraordinary sense, fitted only to perplex and mislead. True\nand weighty, therefore, seem to me these words of one of the most\ndistinguished of living German philosophers: \"The proofs for the\nexistence of God, after having long played a great part in philosophy\nand theology, have in recent times, especially since Kant's famous\ncritique, fallen into disrepute. Since then, the opinion has been\nwidely spread, both among believers and unbelievers, that the existence\nof God does not admit of being proved. Even theologians readily assent\nto this opinion, deride the vain attempts, and imagine that in so doing\nthey are serving the faith which they preach. But the proofs for the\nexistence of God coincide with the grounds for the belief in God; they\nare simply the real grounds of the belief established and expounded in\na scientific manner. If there be no such proofs, there are also no such\ngrounds; and a belief which has no ground, if possible at all, can be\nno proper belief, but an arbitrary, self-made, subjective opinion. Yes,\nreligious belief must sink to the level of the mere illusion or fixed\nidea of a mind which is insane, if contradicted by all reality, all\nfacts scientifically established, and the theory of the universe which\nsuch facts support and justify.\"[11]\n\n[11] Ulrici, Gott und die Natur, i.\n\nThe proofs of God's existence must be, in fact, simply His own\nmanifestations; the ways in which He makes Himself known; the phenomena\non which His power and character are imprinted. They can neither be,\nproperly speaking, our reasonings, nor our analyses of the principles\ninvolved in our reasonings. Our reasonings are worth nothing except in\nso far as they are expositions of God's modes of manifestation; and\neven when our reasonings are correct, our analyses of them, supposing\nwe attempt to analyse them, may be erroneous. The facts,--the works\nand ways of God--which are the real evidences of His existence and the\ntrue indications of His character,--may raise countless minds to God\nwhich can give no general description of the process by which they are\nthus elevated, and are still less capable of resolving it into its\nprinciples. It is late in the history both of the individual mind and\nof the collective mind before they can so reflect on their own acts, so\ndistinguish them one from another, and so discern the characteristics\nof each, as to be able even to give a clear and correct account of\nthem; and it is much later before they can detect their conditions and\nlaws. The minds of multitudes may therefore readily be supposed to rise\nlegitimately from perception of the visible universe to apprehension\nof the invisible personal Creator, although either wholly unconscious\nor only dimly and inaccurately aware of the nature of the transition,\nand although, if called on to indicate the conclusion at which they had\narrived, they would employ far weaker reasons in words than those by\nwhich they were actually convinced in thought. The principles of the\ntheistic inference may be very badly determined, and yet the theistic\ninference itself may be perfectly valid.\n\nIf the real proofs of God's existence are all those facts which cannot\nbe reasonably conceived of as other than the manifestations of God--His\nglory in the heavens, His handiwork on the earth, His operations in\nthe soul, His ways among the nations--and if the task of the theist\nis to trace out these facts, and to show that they cannot reasonably\nbe denied to be marks or impressions of Divine agency, then must a\ntheist, when seeking or expounding the reasons for his belief, feel\nthat his mind is conversant not with mere thoughts of his own, but\nwith the manifested thoughts or acts of God Himself. He must carry\ninto his inquiry the consciousness that he is not simply engaged in\nan intellectual process, but is trying to apprehend and actually\napprehending the Divine Being. To him, therefore, the inquiry as to the\nultimate source and reason of things must be an essentially solemn and\nawe-inspired one. To the atheist it must, of course, be much less so;\nbut even he ought to feel it to be not only a most important inquiry,\nbut one which carries him into the presence of a vast, eternal, and\nmysterious power--a power in darkness shrouded, yet on which hang all\nlife and death, all joy and woe.\n\nAccording to the view just stated, the evidences or proofs of God's\nexistence are countless. They are to be found in all the forces, laws,\nand arrangements of nature--in every material object, every organism,\nevery intellect and heart. At the same time, they concur and coalesce\ninto a single all-comprehensive argument, which is just the sum of the\nindications of God given by the physical universe, the minds of men,\nand human history. Nothing short of that is the full proof. There may\nbe points in space and instants in time where creative and sustaining\npower appear to our narrow and superficial intellects to have been\nstrangely limited, but surely we ought not so to concentrate our\nattention on any such points or instants as to be unable to take in\na general impression of the immeasurable power displayed throughout\nthe realms of space and the ages of time. It may be possible to show\nthat many things which have been regarded as evidences of intelligence\nor wisdom are not really so, and yet the universe may teem with the\nmanifestations of these attributes. Faith in the righteousness and\nmoral government of God must be able to look over and to look beyond\nmany things calculated to produce doubt and disbelief. No man can judge\nfairly as to whether or not there is a God, who makes the question turn\non what is the significance of a few particular facts, who is incapable\nof gathering up into one general finding the results of innumerable\nindications. A true religious view of the world must be a wide, a\ncomprehensive view of it, such as demands an eye for the whole and not\nmerely for a part--the faculties which harmonise and unify, and not\nmerely those which divide and analyse. A part, a point, the eye of an\ninsect, the seed of a fruit, may indeed be looked at religiously, but\nit must be in the light of the universe as a whole, in the light of\neternity and infinity.\n\n    \"Flower in the crannied wall,\n      I pluck you out of the crannies;\n    Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,\n    Little flower--but if I could understand\n      What you are, root and all, and all in all,\n      I should know what God and man is.\"\n\nIn another respect the theistic proof is exceedingly complex and\ncomprehensive. It takes up into itself, as it were, the entire wealth\nof human nature. The mind can only rise to the apprehension of God\nby a process which involves all that is most essential in its own\nconstitution. Thus the will is presupposed. Theistic inference clearly\ninvolves the principle of causality. God can only be thought of in\nthe properly theistic sense as the cause of which the universe is the\neffect. But to think of God as a cause--to apprehend the universe\nas an effect,--we must have some immediate and direct experience of\ncausation. And such experience we have only in the consciousness\nof volition. When the soul wills, it knows itself as an agent, as\na cause. This is the first knowledge of causation which the mind\nrequires, and the most perfect knowledge thereof which it ever\nrequires. It is a knowledge which sheds light over all the regions\nof experience subsequently brought under the principle of causality,\nwhich accompanies the reason in its upward search until it rests in\nthe cognition of an ultimate cause, and which enables us to think of\nthat cause as the primary, all-originating will. If we did not know\nourselves as causes, we could not know God as a cause; and we know\nourselves as causes only in so far as we know ourselves as wills.\n\nBut the principle of causality alone or by itself is quite insufficient\nto lead the mind up to the apprehension of Deity; and an immediate and\ndirect consciousness of far more within us than will is required to\nmake that apprehension possible. The evidences of intelligence must\nbe combined with the evidences of power before we can be warranted\nto infer more from the facts of the universe than the existence of\nan ultimate force; and no mere force, however great or wonderful,\nis worthy to be called God. God is not only the ultimate Cause, but\nthe Supreme Intelligence; and as it is only in virtue of the direct\nconsciousness of our volitions that we can think of God as a cause, so\nis it only in virtue of the direct consciousness of our intellectual\noperations that we can think of Him as an intelligence. It is not\nfrom the mere occurrence of a change, or the mere existence of a\nderivative phenomenon, that we infer the change or phenomenon to be\ndue to an intelligent cause, but from the mode of the occurrence\nor the character of the phenomenon being such that any cause but an\nintelligent cause must be deemed an insufficient cause. The inference\nsupposes, however, that we already have some knowledge of what an\nintelligent cause is--that we have enough of knowledge of the nature of\nintelligence to convince us that it alone can fully account for order,\nlaw, and adjustment. Whence do we get this knowledge? We have not far\nto seek it; it is inherent in self-consciousness. We know ourselves as\nintelligences, as beings that foresee and contrive, that can discover\nand apply principles, that can originate order and adjustment. It is\nonly through this knowledge of the nature of intelligence that we can\ninfer our fellow-men to be intelligent beings; and not less is it an\nindispensable condition of our inferring God to be an intelligence.\n\nThen, causality and design, and the will and intelligence within us\nthrough which they are interpreted, cannot, even when combined, enable\nus to think of the Creative Reason as righteous; although obviously,\nuntil so thought of, that reason is by no means to be identified with\nGod. The greatest conceivable power and intelligence, if united with\nhatred of righteousness and love of wickedness, can yield us only\nthe idea of a devil; and if separated from all moral principle and\ncharacter, good or bad, only that of a being far lower than man, which\nmight have reason for worshipping man, but which man cannot worship\nwithout degrading himself. The existence, however, of a moral principle\nwithin us, of a conscience which witnesses against sin and on behalf\nof holiness, is of itself evidence that God must be a moral being, one\nwho hates sin and loves holiness; and the light of this, \"the candle of\nthe Lord,\" in the soul, enables us to discover many other reasons for\nthe same conclusion in the constitution of society and the course of\nhistory. But if we had no moral perceptions on the contemplation of our\nown voluntary acts, we certainly would not, and could not, invest the\nDivine Being with moral perfections because of His acts.\n\nThere is still another step to be taken in order to obtain an\napprehension of God; and it is one where the outward universe fails us,\nwhere we are thrown entirely, or nearly so, on our internal resources.\nThe universe, interpreted by the human mind in the manner which has\nbeen indicated, may warrant belief in a Being whose power is immense,\nwhose wisdom is inexpressibly wonderful, and whose righteousness is to\nbe held in profoundest admiration and reverence, notwithstanding all\nthe clouds and darkness which may in part conceal it from our view; but\nnot in a Being whose existence is absolute, whose power is infinite,\nwhose wisdom and goodness are perfect. We cannot infer that the author\nof a universe which is finite, imperfect, and relative, and all the\nphenomena of which are finite, imperfect, and relative, must be, in the\ntrue and strict sense of the terms, infinite, perfect, and absolute.\nWe cannot deduce the infinite from the finite, the perfect from the\nimperfect, the absolute from the relative. And yet it is only in the\nrecognition of an absolute Being of infinite power, who works with\nperfect wisdom towards the accomplishment of perfectly holy ends, that\nwe reach a true knowledge of God, or, which is much the same thing,\na knowledge of the true God. Is there, then, any warrant in our own\nnature for thinking of God as infinite, absolute, and perfect, since\nthere seems to be little or none in outward nature? Yes, there are\nwithin us necessary conditions of thought and feeling and ineradicable\naspirations which force on us ideas of absolute existence, infinity,\nand perfection, and will neither permit us to deny these perfections to\nGod nor to ascribe them to any other being.\n\nThus the mental process in virtue of which we have the idea of God\ncomprehends and concentrates all that is most essential in human\nnature. It is through bearing the image of God that we are alone able\nto apprehend God. Take any essential feature of that image out of a\nhuman soul, and to apprehend God is made thereby impossible to it. All\nthat is divine in us meets, unites, co-operates, to lay hold of what is\ndivine without us. Hence the fuller and clearer the divine image is in\nany man, the fuller and clearer will be his perception of the divine\noriginal. Hence what is more or less true everywhere, is especially\nand emphatically true in religion, that \"the eye sees only what it\nbrings with it the power of seeing.\" Where the will, for example, is\nwithout energy--where rest is longed for as the highest good, and\nlabour deemed the greatest evil--where extinction is preferred to\nexertion,--the mind of a nation may be highly cultured, and subtle\nand profound in speculation, and yet may manifest a marked inability\nto think of God as a cause or will, with a consequently inveterate\ntendency to pantheism. The Hindu mind, and the systems of religion\nand philosophy to which it has given birth, may serve as illustration\nand proof. Where the animal nature of man is strong, and his moral\nand spiritual nature still undeveloped, as is the case among all rude\nand undisciplined races, he worships not the pure and perfect supreme\nSpirit, whose goodness, truth, and righteousness are as infinite as\nHis power and knowledge, but gods endowed in his imagination chiefly\nwith physical and animal qualities. \"Recognition of Nature,\" says Mr\nCarlyle, \"one finds to be the chief element of Paganism; recognition of\nMan and his Moral Duty--though this, too, is not wanting--comes to be\nthe chief element only in purer forms of religion. Here, indeed, is a\ngreat distinction and epoch in Human Beliefs; a great landmark in the\nreligious development of Mankind. Man first puts himself in relation\nwith Nature and her Powers, wonders and worships over those; not till\na later epoch does he discern that all Power is Moral, that the grand\npoint is the distinction for him of Good and Evil, of _Thou shalt, and\nthou shalt not_.\" The explanation of the historical truth thus stated\nby Mr Carlyle is just that man is vividly alive to the wants and claims\nof his body and merely natural life during long ages in which he is\nalmost dead to the wants and claims of his spirit or true self and the\nmoral life. So the ordinary mind is prone, even at present, in the most\ncivilised countries of the world, to think of God after the likeness\nof man, or, in other words, as a vastly magnified man. Why? Because\nthe ordinary mind is always very feebly and dimly conscious of those\nprinciples of reason which demand in God the existence of attributes\nneither to be found in the physical universe nor in itself. Some\nexercise in speculation, some training in philosophy, is needed to make\nus reflect on them; and until we reflect on them we cannot be expected\nto do them justice in the formation of our religious convictions.\nThose who have never thought on what infinite and unconditioned\nmean, and who have never in their lives grappled with a metaphysical\nproblem, will infer quite as readily as if they had spent their days in\nphilosophical speculation that all the power and order in the universe,\nand all the wisdom and goodness in humanity, are the reflections of\na far higher power, wisdom, and goodness in their source--the Divine\nMind; but they must realise much less correctly in what respects\nGod cannot be imaged in His works: they may do equal or even fuller\njustice to what is true in anthropomorphism, but they cannot perceive\nas distinctly where anthropomorphism is false. It is only through the\nactivity of the speculative reason that religion is prevented from\nbecoming a degrading anthropomorphism, that the mind is compelled\nto think of God not merely as a Father, King, and Judge, but as the\nAbsolute and Infinite Being. This is, perhaps, the chief service which\nphilosophy renders to religion; and it ought not to be undervalued,\nnotwithstanding that philosophy has often, in checking one error,\nfallen into another as great, or even greater, denying that there is\nany likeness between God and man.\n\nWhile the mental process which has been described--the theistic\ninference--is capable of analysis, it is in itself synthetic. The\nprinciples on which it depends are so connected that the mind can\nembrace them all in a single act, and must include and apply them all\nin the apprehension of God. Will, intelligence, conscience, reason,\nand the ideas which they supply; cause, design, goodness, infinity,\nwith the arguments which rest on these ideas,--all coalesce into this\none grand issue. The inferences are as inseparable as the principles\nfrom which they spring. A very large number of the objections to theism\narise wholly from inattention to this truth. Men argue as if each\nprinciple involved in the knowledge of God were to be kept strictly by\nitself, as if each argument brought forward as leading to a theistic\nconclusion were to be jealously isolated; and then, if the last result\nof the principle, the conclusion of the argument, be not an adequate\nknowledge of God, they pronounce the principle altogether inapplicable,\nand the argument altogether fallacious. It is strange that this\nprocedure should not be universally seen to be sophistical in the\nextreme--a kind of reasoning which, if generally adopted, would at once\narrest all science and all business; but obviously anti-theists think\ndifferently, for they habitually have recourse to it. If you argue,\nfor example, that the universe is an event or effect which must have\nan adequate cause, they will question your right to refer to the order\nwhich is in the universe as a proof that it is an event or effect,\nbecause order implies another principle, and is the ground of another\nargument. They overlook that you are not making an abstract use of\nthe principle of causality, and that you are not arguing from the mere\nterms universe and event, but from the universe itself; and that in\norder to know whether it be an event or not--an effect or not--you\nmust study it as it is, and take everything into account which bears\non the question. They reason as if they supposed that a cause and an\nintelligence must be two different things, and that a cause cannot be\nan intelligence, nor an intelligence a cause. Similarly, the arguments\nfrom the power, order, and goodness displayed in nature have often been\nobjected to altogether, have often been pronounced worthless, because\nthey do not in themselves prove God to be _infinitely_ powerful, wise,\nand good. They are brought forward to show that the Author of the\nuniverse must have the power, wisdom, and goodness required to create\nand govern it; and forthwith many oppose them by declaring that they do\nnot show Him to be infinite. Now, no man who did not imagine nature to\nbe infinite ever adduced them to prove God infinite. Their not proving\nthat, is therefore no reason for denying them to prove what they\nprofess to prove. No argument can stand if we may reject it because it\ndoes not prove more than it undertakes to prove.\n\nIt is clear that the evidences of design, instead of being wholly\ndistinct from the evidences of power, and independent of the principle\nof causality, are evidences of a kind of power and manifestations of a\nkind of causality--intelligent power and causality. In like manner the\nevidences of goodness are also evidences of design, for goodness is a\nform of design--morally, beneficent design. Although causality does\nnot involve design, nor design goodness, design involves causality,\nand goodness both causality and design. The proofs of intelligence\nare also proofs of power; the proofs of goodness are proofs both of\nintelligence and power. The principles of reason which compel us to\nthink of the Supreme Moral Intelligence as a self-existent, eternal,\ninfinite, and unchangeable Being, supplement the proofs from other\nsources, and give self-consistency and completeness to the doctrine of\ntheism. The various theistic arguments are, in a word, but stages in a\nsingle rational process, but parts of one comprehensive argument. They\nare naturally, and, as it were, organically related--they support and\nstrengthen one another. It is therefore an arbitrary and illegitimate\nprocedure to separate them any farther than may be necessary for the\npurpose of clear and orderly exposition. It is sophistry to attempt to\ndestroy them separately by assailing each as if it had no connection\nwith the other, and as if each isolated fragmentary argument were bound\nto yield as large a conclusion as all the arguments combined. A man\nquite unable to break a bundle of rods firmly bound together may be\nstrong enough to break each rod separately. But before proceeding to\ndeal with the bundle in that way, he may be required to establish his\nright to untie it, and to decline putting forth his strength upon it as\nit is presented to him.[12]\n\n[12] See Appendix IX.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe theistic inference, although a complex process, is not a difficult\none. It looks, indeed, long and formidable when analysed in books\nof evidences, and elaborated with perverse ingenuity into series of\nsyllogisms. But numerous processes, very simple and easy in themselves,\nare toilsome and troublesome to analyse, or describe, or comprehend.\nVision and digestion are, in general, not difficult bodily functions,\nbut they have been the subjects of a great many very large treatises;\nand doubtless physiologists have not even yet found out all that is\nto be known about them. As a rule, the theistic process is as simple\nand easy an operation for the mind as vision or digestion for the\nbody. The multitude of books which have been written in explanation\nand illustration of it, and the subtle and abstruse character of the\nresearches and speculations contained in many of these books, are not\nthe slightest indications of its being other than simple and natural\nin itself. The inferences which it involves are, in fact, like those\nwhich Weber, Helmholtz, and Z\u00f6llner have shown to be implied in the\nperceptions of sense, involuntary and unconscious. If not perfectly\ninstantaneous, they are so rapid and spontaneous as to have seemed to\nmany intuitive. And in a loose sense, perhaps, they may be considered\nso. Not, however, strictly and properly, since the idea of Deity is no\nsimple idea, but the most complex of ideas, comprehending all that is\ngreat and good in nature and man, along with perfections which belong\nto neither nature nor man; and since the presence of Deity is not seen\nwithout the intervention of any media--face to face, eye to eye--but\nonly as \"through a glass darkly.\" The contemplation of nature, and\nmind, and history is an indispensable stage towards the knowledge of\nHim. Physical and mental facts and laws are the materials or data of\nreason in its quest of religious truth. There is a rational transition\nfrom the natural to the supernatural, wherever the latter is reached.\n\nOur knowledge of God is obtained as simply and naturally as our\nknowledge of our fellow-men. It is obtained, in fact, mainly in the\nsame way. In both cases we refer certain manifestations of will,\nintelligence, and goodness--qualities which are known to us by\nconsciousness--to these qualities as their causes. We have no direct\nor immediate knowledge--no intuitive or _a priori_ knowledge--of\nthe intelligence of our fellow-creatures, any more than we have\nof the intelligence of our Creator; but we have a direct personal\nconsciousness of intelligence in ourselves which enables us confidently\nto infer that the works both of God and of men can only have originated\nin intelligences. We grow up into knowledge of the mind of God as we\ngrow in acquaintance with the minds of men through familiarity with\ntheir acts. The Father in heaven is known just as a father on earth\nis known. The latter is as unseen as the former. No human being has\nreally ever seen another. No sense has will, or wisdom, or goodness\nfor its object. Man must infer the existence of his fellow-men, for\nhe can have no immediate perception of it; he must become acquainted\nwith their characters through the use of his intelligence, because\ncharacter cannot be heard with the ear, or looked upon with the eye,\nor touched with the finger. Yet a child is not long in learning to\nknow that a spirit is near it. As soon as it knows itself, it easily\ndetects a spirit like its own, yet other than itself, when the signs of\na spirit's activity are presented to it. The process of inference by\nwhich it ascends from the works of man to the spirit which originates\nthem is not more legitimate, more simple, or more natural, than that\nby which it rises from nature to nature's God.\n\nIn saying this, I refer merely to the process of inference in itself.\nThat is identical in the two cases. In other respects there are obvious\ndifferences, of which one important consequence is, that while the\nscepticism which denies the existence of God is not unfrequently to\nbe met with, a scepticism which denies the existence of human beings\nis unknown. The facts which prove that there are men, are grouped\ntogether within limits of space and of time which allow of their\nbeing so easily surveyed, and they are in themselves so simple and\nfamiliar, that all sane minds draw from them their natural inference.\nThe facts which prove that there is a God need, in order to be rightly\ninterpreted, more attention and reflection, more comprehensiveness,\nimpartiality, and elevation of mind. Countless as they are, they can be\noverlooked, and often have been overlooked. Clear and conspicuous as\nthey are, worldliness and prejudice and sin may blind the soul to their\nsignificance. True, the existence and possibility of atheism have often\nbeen denied, but the testimony of history to the reality of atheism\ncannot be set aside. Although many have been called atheists unjustly\nand calumniously, and although a few who have professed themselves to\nbe atheists may have really possessed a religious belief which they\noverlooked or were averse to acknowledge, we cannot reasonably refuse\nto take at their own word the majority of those who have inculcated\na naked and undisguised atheism, and claimed and gloried in the name\nof atheist. Incredible as it may seem that any intelligent being,\nconscious of human wants and weaknesses, should be able to look upon\nthe wonders of the heavens and of the earth, of the soul within him and\nof society around him, and yet say that there is no God, men have done\nso, and we have no alternative but to accept the fact as we find it.\nIt is a fact which involves nothing inconsistent with the truth that\nthe process by which the mind attains to a belief in God is of the same\nnatural and direct, yet inferential, character as the process by which\nit attains to belief in the existence of finite minds closely akin to\nitself.\n\nOur entire spiritual being is constituted for the apprehension of\nGod in and through His works. All the essential principles of mental\naction, when applied to the meditative consideration of finite things,\nlead up from them to Infinite Creative Wisdom. The whole of nature\nexternal to us is a revelation of God; the whole nature within us has\nbeen made for the reception and interpretation of that revelation. What\nmore would we have? Strange as it may seem, there are many theists at\nthe present day who represent it as insufficient, or as even worthless,\nand who join with atheists in denying that God's existence can be\nproved, and in affirming that all the arguments for His existence are\ninconclusive and sophistical. I confess I deem this a most erroneous\nand dangerous procedure. Such theists seem to me not only the best\nallies of atheists, but even more effective labourers in the cause of\nunbelief than atheists themselves. They shake men's confidence to a far\ngreater extent in the reasonable grounds of faith in God's existence,\nand substitute for these grounds others as weak and arbitrary as any\natheist could possibly wish. They pronounce illegitimate and invalid\nthe arguments from effect to cause, from order and arrangement to\nintelligence, from history to providence, from conscience to a moral\ngovernor,--an assertion which, if true, infallibly implies that the\nheavens do not declare the glory of God, and that the earth does not\nshow forth His handiworks--that the course of human events discloses no\ntrace of His wisdom, goodness, or justice--and that the moral nature\nof man is wholly dissociated from a Divine law and a Divine lawgiver.\nThen, in place of a universe revealing God, and a soul made in His\nimage, and a humanity overruled and guided by Him, they present to\nus as something stronger and surer--an intuition or a feeling or an\nexercise of mere faith. For it is a noticeable and certainly not a\npromising circumstance, that there is no general agreement as to what\nthat state of mind is on which the weight of the entire edifice of\ntheism is proposed to be rested even among those who profess to possess\nit. An intuition, a feeling, and a belief are very different things;\nand not much dependence is to be put on the psychology which is unable\nto distinguish between them.\n\nMan, say some, knows God by immediate intuition; he needs no argument\nfor His existence, because he perceives Him directly--face to\nface--without any medium. It is easy to assert this, but obviously\nthe assertion is the merest dogmatism. Not one man in a thousand\nwho understands what he is affirming will dare to claim to have an\nimmediate vision of God, and nothing can be more likely than that the\nman who makes such a claim is self-deluded. It is not difficult to see\nhow he may be deluded. There is so much that is intuitive involved in\nthe apprehension of God that the apprehension itself may readily be\nimagined to be intuitive. The intuitive nature of the conditions which\nit implies may arrest the attention, and the fact that they are simply\nconditions may be overlooked. The possibility, however, of analysing\nthe apprehension into simpler elements--of showing that it is a complex\nact, and presupposes conditions that can be indicated--is a conclusive\nproof that it is no intuition, that our idea of God is no more or\notherwise intuitive than our idea of a fellow-man. Besides, what seem\nintuitions are often really inferences, and not unfrequently erroneous\ninferences; what seem the immediate dictates of pure reason, or the\ndirect and unclouded perceptions of a special spiritual faculty, may\nbe the conceits of fancy or the products of habit and association,\nor the reflections of strong feeling. A man must prove to himself,\nand he must prove to others, that what he takes to be an intuition\nis an intuition. Is that proof in this case likely to be easier or\nmore conclusive than the proof of the Divine existence? The so-called\nimmediate perception of God must be shown to be a perception and to be\nimmediate; it must be vindicated and verified: and how this is to be\ndone, especially if there be no other reasons for believing in God than\nitself, it is difficult to conceive. The history of religion, which is\nwhat ought to yield the clearest confirmation of the alleged intuition,\nappears to be from beginning to end a conspicuous contradiction of\nit. If all men have the spiritual power of directly beholding their\nCreator--have an immediate vision of God--how happens it that whole\nnations believe in the most absurd and monstrous gods? that millions\nof men are ignorant whether there be one god or thousands? that even\na people like the Greeks could suppose the highest of their deities\nto have been born, to have a body, and to have committed the vilest\nactions? A true power of intuition is little susceptible of growth,\nand its testimonies vary within narrow limits; any development of\nwhich it admits is only slightly due to external conditions, and\nmainly the necessary consequence of internal activity, of inherent\nexpansibility. It is thus, for example, with the senses of sight and\nhearing, in so far as they are intuitive. But it is manifestly very\ndifferent with the religious nature. Its growth is mainly dependent,\nnot on the organic evolution of a particular faculty, but on the\ngeneral state of the soul, on the one hand; and on the influence of\nexternal circumstances--education, example, law, &c.--on the other\nhand. It is this difference in the character of their development\nwhich explains why the deliverances of the senses are so uniform and\nnearly infallible, while the most cursory survey of the religious\nworld shows us the greatest want of uniformity and truthfulness in\nreligious judgments. The various phases of polytheism and pantheism\nare inexplicable, if an intuition of God be universally inherent in\nhuman nature. Theism is perfectly explicable without intuition, as the\nevidences for it are numerous, obvious, and strong.\n\nThe opinion that man has an intuition or immediate perception of God\nis untenable; the opinion that he has an immediate feeling of God\nis absurd. A man feels only in so far as he perceives and knows.\nFeeling is in consciousness essentially dependent on, and necessarily\nsubsequent to, knowing. Mere feeling--feeling without knowing--is an\nutterly inconceivable and impossible experience. Admit, however, not\nonly that there may be a mere feeling, but that there is a mere feeling\nof God. What worth can it have? By supposition--by definition--no\nknowledge of God underlies and explains it. But in that case, how can\nany man pretend to get a knowledge of God out of it? What right can\nany one have to represent it as a source of knowledge of God? I am not\naware that these questions have ever been answered except by the merest\nverbal jugglery. The very men who tell us that we cannot know God, but\nthat we feel Him, tell us also that the feeling of Him is an immediate\nconsciousness of Him, and that immediate consciousness is its own\nself-evidence, is absolute certainty, or, in other words, the highest\nand surest knowledge. We do not know God, but we feel Him; however, to\nfeel Him is to know Him,--such is their answer more or less distinctly\nexpressed, or, I should rather say, more or less skilfully concealed.\nIt is at once a Yes and a No, the affirmation of what is denied and\nthe denial of what is affirmed. And it is this because it cannot be\nanything else--because mere feeling is an impossible experience--and\nbecause feeling, so far as it is uncaused and unenlightened by\nknowledge, testifies only to the folly or insanity of the being which\nfeels. If theism have no other basis than feeling, it is a house\nwhich foolish men have built upon the sand. The first storm will cast\nit down, and no wise man will regret its fall. Whatever is founded on\nmere emotion--on emotion which is not itself explained and justified by\nreason--stands but by sufferance; has no right to stand; ought to be\ncast down and swept from the earth. But the storms which have already\nin the course of the ages spent their force against theism with no\nother effect than to make its strength more conspicuous, and to carry\naway what would have weakened or deformed it, are sufficient to show\nus that it has been built on eternal truth by the finite human reasons\nwhich have been enlightened by Infinite and Divine Reason.\n\nThe strangest of all theories as to the foundation of our belief in\nGod is, that it has no foundation at all--that it is a belief which\nrests upon itself, an act of faith which is its own warrant. We are\ntold that we can neither know that God is nor what God is, but that\nwe can nevertheless believe in God, and ought to believe in Him, and\ncan and ought to act as if we knew His existence and character. But\nsurely belief without a reason must be arbitrary belief, and either to\nbelieve or act as if we knew what we do not know, can never be conduct\nto be justified, much less commended. Faith which is not rational is\nfaith which ought to be rejected. We cannot believe what we do not\nknow or think that we know. We have no right to believe more than we\nknow. I know, for example, that the grass grows, and consequently I\nbelieve, and am justified in believing, that it grows. I do not know\nhow the grass grows, and I do not believe how it grows; I can justify\nmy believing about its growth nothing beyond what I know to be true.\nThis law of belief is as binding for the highest as for the lowliest\nobjects. If I have no reason for believing that there is a God, I have\nno right to believe that there is a God. If I do not know that God is\ninfinite, I am bound not to believe that He is infinite. Belief is\ninseparable from knowledge, and ought to be precisely coextensive with\nknowledge. Those who deny this fundamental truth will always be found\nemploying the words knowledge and belief in a capricious and misleading\nway.[13]\n\n[13] See Appendix X.\n\n\nIII.\n\nWhen man apprehends God as powerful, wise, and good--as possessed of\nwill, reason, and righteousness--obviously he thinks of Him as bearing\nsome likeness to himself, as having in an infinite or perfect measure\nqualities which human creatures have in a finite and imperfect measure.\nThis can be no stumbling-block to any one who believes that God made\nman in His image, after His likeness. If man be in some respects\nlike God, God must, of course, be in some respects like man. Power\nand freedom, knowledge and wisdom, love, goodness, and justice, are,\naccording to this view, finitely in man, because they are infinitely\nin God. But it is a view which excites in certain minds deep aversion.\nThere are men who protest, in the name of religion, in the name of\nGod, against this anthropomorphic theism, as they call it. According\nto them, to attribute to God any human qualities, even the highest and\nbest, is to limit and degrade Him--is contrary to reason and contrary\nto piety--is idolatrous and profane. The Psalmist represents the Lord\nas reproaching the wicked for supposing that He was like them in their\nwickedness--\"altogether such an one as themselves;\" but the modern\nphilosophers to whom I am referring are horrified at the thought that\nthe most righteous man, even in his righteousness, has any likeness\nto God. According to them, to think of God as wise is to dishonour\nHim, and to declare Him holy is to calumniate Him. To think of Him as\nfoolish, and to pronounce Him wicked, are, in their eyes, only a little\nmore irreverent and no more irrational.\n\n\"We must not fall down and worship,\" writes one of these philosophers,\n\"as the source of our life and virtue, the image which our own minds\nhave set up. Why is such idolatry any better than that of the old wood\nand stone? If we worship the creations of our minds, why not also\nthose of our hands? The one is, indeed, a more refined self-adoration\nthan the other; but the radical error remains the same in both. The\nold idolaters were wrong, not because they worshipped themselves, but\nbecause they worshipped their creation as if it were their creator; and\nhow can any anthropomorphic theory 'escape the same condemnation'?\"[14]\nThe writer does not see that God can only be thought of as wise and\nrighteous and free because the mind of man is His creation, so that\nHis being thus thought of can be no proof that He is _its_ creation.\nThe fact that we can think of God as wise and righteous and free is\nno evidence that He is an image which our own minds have set up.\nThe man who draws such an inference from such a premiss can be no\ndispassionate reasoner. And certainly the fact that we can think of God\nas possessed of intellectual and moral perfections is no reason for our\nnot falling down and worshipping Him, and no evidence that our doing so\nis idolatry. To fall down and worship any being whom we do not know to\npossess these characteristics is what would clearly be idolatry. And\nthis idolatry is what the philosophers to whom I refer are manifestly\nchargeable with encouraging. When they have rejected the living,\npersonal, righteous, loving God, in whom humanity has so long trusted,\nthey can only suggest as a substitute for Him a mysterious Power which\nis wholly unknown, and even unknowable. Great is their simplicity if\nthey fancy that they can persuade men to receive any such god as that,\nor if they fancy that men would be any better for a faith so vague\nand empty. To believe in we know not what, is directly contrary to\nreason; to worship it would be \"an idolatry no better than that of\nthe old wood and stone.\" What we know is often not the creation of\nour minds: the unknowable is in itself nothing at all to us, and, as\na thought, is always the mere creation of our minds; it is different\nfor each creature, each mind; it is the mere result and reflection of\nour finiteness. There can be no unknown or unknowable to an infinite\nmind. To worship what is unknowable would be, therefore, simply to\nworship our own ignorance--one of the creations of our minds least\nworthy, perhaps, of being worshipped. There is, at least, no kind of\nworship less entitled \"to escape condemnation,\" even as anthropomorphic\nidolatry, than the worship of the Unknowable,--the god proposed to us\nby some as the alone true God, belief in whom--perhaps I should rather\nsay, belief in which--is to be the final and perfect reconciliation of\nscience and religion.\n\n[14] Barrett's Physical Ethics, p. 225.\n\nAll true theism implies a certain likeness between God and man. It\nholds that God is not merely an all-pervading and all-sustaining\nPower, but an omniscient Mind and perfectly holy Will. It refuses to\nthink of Him merely according to the analogies of the physical world,\nas if human reason and human love were less worthy expressions of\nHis perfections than mechanical or brute force. It refers to Him not\nonly \"all the majesty of nature, but all the humanity of man.\" This\ntruth--that there is a likeness between God and man--must, however, be\ncombined with two other truths, otherwise it will lead to the gravest\nerrors.\n\nThe first is, that while God and man are both like each other, in that\nboth possess certain excellences, they are utterly unlike, in that God\npossesses these excellences in all their perfection and in an infinite\nmeasure, while man possesses them in a very small degree and violated\nwith many flaws and faults. The highest glory which a man can hope for\nis, that he should be made wholly into the image of God; but never can\nGod be rightly thought of as mainly, and still less as merely, in the\nimage of man. It was the great error of classic heathendom that it thus\nconceived of the Divine. \"Men,\" says Heraclitus, \"are mortal gods, and\nthe gods immortal men.\" And the gods of Greece, as represented by her\npoets and adored by her people, were simply magnified and immortal\nmen--a race closely akin to their worshippers in weaknesses and vices\nno less than in powers and virtues. They were supposed to be born as\nmen are, to have voice and figure, parts and passions, and even at\ntimes to cheat and rail and lie. They reflected all the tendencies of\nthe Greek mind, both good and evil.\n\nWorshippers of the one God can scarcely fall into the same extravagance\nof error in this respect as the Greeks and Romans did, as all\npolytheists do; but they can, and often do, fall into the error, and\nthink of God as subject to limits and defects, which are only in\nthemselves. For instance, what is called deism, as distinguished from\ntheism, rests wholly on the conception that the presence and power\nof God are limited, and that He acts in the manner to which man as a\nfinite creature is restricted. The deist thinks of God as outside of\nand away from the universe; he thinks of the universe as a mechanism\nwhich God has contrived, and which He has endowed with certain powers,\nin virtue of which it is able to sustain itself in existence, and to\nperform its work so as to save God, as it were, all further trouble\nand labour concerning it. It is a great gain for us to have a machine\ndoing what we desire without our needing to pay any attention to it or\neven to be present where it is, because we cannot give our attention\nto more than one object at one and the same instant of time, and\ncannot be present at the same time in more places than one; but those\nwho liken God to man in this respect, divest Him of His omnipresence\nand omnipotence, and represent Him as characterised in some measure by\ntheir own impotency. There is a truth which Pantheism often claims as\npeculiarly and distinctively its own,--the truth that in God we and all\nthings live, and move, and have our being--that of Him, and through\nHim, and to Him, are all things,--but which theism must sincerely and\nfully appropriate as one of its simplest and most certain elements,\notherwise the charge against it of being a false and presumptuous\nlikening of God to man will be warranted. We must not think of Him as\n\"an absentee God, sitting idle ever since the first Sabbath, at the\noutside of His universe, and 'seeing it go'\"--as a God at hand but not\nafar off, or afar off but not at hand--as here, not there, or there,\nnot here; but we must think of Him as everywhere present, everywhere\nactive--as at once the source of all order, the spring of all life, and\nthe ground of all affection and thought.\n\nWe need to be still more on our guard against limiting His wisdom or\nrighteousness or love, as it is what we are still more prone to do.\nThese attributes of God are often thought of in the meanest and most\nunworthy ways; and doubtless it has to a large extent been horror at\nthe consequent degradation of the idea of God which has made some men\nrefuse to assign to Him any of the properties of humanity, saying,\nwith Xenophanes, that if the animals could think, they would imagine\nthe Deity to be in their likeness--and with Spinoza, that if a circle\ncould think, it would suppose His essence to be circularity. But this\nis to flee from one extreme to another extreme, from one error to a\nstill more terrible error, through utterly failing to distinguish\nbetween perfection and imperfection, between what ought and what ought\nnot to be ascribed to God. Circularity, animal forms and dispositions,\nhuman limitations--these are imperfections, and we must not refer them\nto God; but intelligence, righteousness, love--these are so little\nin their own nature imperfections that an intelligent being, however\nfeeble, would be more excellent than an omnipotent and omnipresent\nbeing destitute of intelligence; and righteousness and love are as much\nsuperior to mere intelligence as it is to mere power and magnitude.\nTo ascribe these to God, if we only ascribe them to Him in infinite\nperfection, is no presumption, no error; not to ascribe them to Him is\nthe greatest presumption, the most lamentable error.\n\nThe second truth necessary to be borne in mind, whenever we affirm the\nlikeness of God to man, is, that in whatever measure and to whatever\nextent God may be known, our knowledge of Him is, and always must\nbe, very inadequate. In these latter days of science we are proud\nof our knowledge of the universe; and yet, although we do know a\nlittle of far-away stars and systems, what is this, after all, but,\nas Carlyle says, the knowledge which a minnow in its native creek has\nof the outlying ocean? And our knowledge of God must fall unspeakably\nfarther short of being coextensive with its object. To illustrate\nthe disproportion there, no comparison can be appropriate. \"Canst\nthou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto\nperfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than hell;\nwhat canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth,\nand broader than the sea.\" Our idea of God may contain nothing which\nis not true of God, and may omit nothing which it is essential for\nour spiritual welfare that we should know regarding Him; but it is\nimpossible that it should be a complete and exhaustive idea of Him. We\nhave scarcely a complete and exhaustive idea of anything, and least\nof all can we have such an idea of the infinite and inexhaustible\nsource of all being. God alone can have a complete and exhaustive idea\nof Himself. There must be infinitely more in God than we have any\nidea of. There must be many qualities, powers, excellences, in Divine\nnature, which are wholly unknown to men, or even wholly unknowable\nby them, owing to their want of any faculties for their apprehension.\nAnd even as to what we do know of God, our knowledge is but partial\nand inadequate. We know that God knows, that He feels, that He acts;\nbut as to how He knows, feels, and acts, as to what is distinctive and\ncharacteristic of His knowing, feeling, and acting, we have little or\nno notion. We can _apprehend_ certain attributes of God, but we can\n_comprehend_, or fully grasp, or definitely image, not one of them. If\nwe could find out God unto perfection in any respect, then, either we\nmust be infinite or God must be finite in that respect. The finite mind\ncan never stretch itself out in any direction until it is coextensive\nwith the Infinite Mind. Man is made in the image of God, but he is not\nthe measure of God.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\n NATURE IS BUT THE NAME FOR AN EFFECT WHOSE CAUSE IS GOD.\n\n\nI.\n\nWe have now to consider the principle of causality so far as it is\nimplied in the theistic inference, and the theistic inference so far as\nit is conditioned by the principle of causality. It is not necessary to\ndiscuss the nature of the principle of causality in itself or for its\nown sake; it is even expedient, I believe, not to attempt to penetrate\nfarther into its metaphysics and psychology than the work on hand\nimperatively requires. We must of course go as far as those have gone\nwho have maintained on metaphysical or psychological grounds that the\nprinciple of causality warrants no theistic inference; we must show\nthat their metaphysics and psychology are irrelevant when true, and\nfalse when relevant; but we may be content to stop when we have reached\nthis result. The truth of theism has been very generally represented,\nboth by those who admit and by those who deny the validity of the\ntheistic inference, as much more dependent than it really is on the\ntruth or falsity of some one or other of the many views which have been\nentertained as to the nature of causation, and the origin of the causal\njudgment. We are constantly being warned by theists that unless we\naccept this or that particular notion of causation, and account for it\nin this or that particular manner, we cannot reasonably believe in the\nexistence of God; we are constantly being assured by anti-theists that\nbelief in God is irrational, because it assumes some erroneous view\nof causation, or some erroneous explanation of the process by which\ncausation is apprehended. But it will be found that representations\nof this kind seldom prove more than one-sidedness and immaturity of\nthought in those who make them. An accurate and comprehensive view\nof the nature of causation, and of our apprehension of it, will, it\nis true, have here as elsewhere great advantages over an erroneous\nand narrow one, but hardly any of the theories which have been held\non these points can be consistently argued by those who hold them to\ninvalidate theistic belief. Even utterly inadequate statements and\nexplanations of the principle of causality--as, for example, those\nof Hume and J. S. Mill--are not more incompatible with the theistic\ninference than they are with any other inference which is a real\nextension of knowledge. Unless they are understood and applied more\nrigidly than by those who propound them, they allow us to draw the\ntheistic inference; if understood and applied so as to forbid our\ndrawing it, they logically disallow all scientific inference except\nsuch as is purely formal and deductive. In a word, if compatible with\nscience they are compatible with theism, and if incompatible with\ntheism they are incompatible with science.\n\nWhen we assume the principle of causality in the argument for the\nexistence of God, what precisely is it that we assume? Only this: that\nwhatever has begun to be, must have had an antecedent, or ground, or\ncause which accounts for it. We do not assume that every existence\nmust have had a cause. We have no right, indeed, to assume that any\nexistence has had a cause until we have found reason to regard it as\nnot an eternal existence, but one which has had an origin. Whatever\nwe believe, however, to have had an origin, we at once believe also\nto have had a cause. The theistic argument assumes that this belief\nis true. It assumes that every existence, once new, every event or\noccurrence or change, must have a cause. This is certainly no very\nlarge assumption: on the contrary, if any assumption can claim to be\nself-evident, it surely may. Thought implies the truth of it every\nmoment. Sensation only gives rise to thought in virtue of it. Unless\nit were true there could be no such thing as thought. To deny that\nthe principle of causality, understood as has been indicated, is\ntrue, would be to deny that reason is reason; it would be equivalent\nto affirming that to seek for a reason is always and essentially an\nunreasonable process. And, in fact, so understood, the principle never\nhas been denied. Hume even did not venture to deny it, although he\nought in consistency to have denied it, and obviously desired to be\nable to deny it. He did not, however, deny that every object which\nbegins to exist must have a cause,--he did not venture to do more than\ndeny that this is either intuitively or demonstratively certain, and\nthat any bond or tie can be perceived between what is called a cause\nand what is called an effect. The inquiry which he instituted was not\nwhether we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has\na beginning should also have a cause or not, but for what reason we\npronounce it necessary. He assumed that we pronounce it necessary, and\nhis elaborate investigation into the nature of causation was undertaken\nexpressly and entirely to discover why we do so. The conclusion to\nwhich he came--viz., that the causal judgment is an \"offspring of\nexperience engendered upon custom\"--was not only a very inadequate and\nerroneous one in itself, but inconsistent with the reality of what it\nprofessed to explain: still the admission which has been mentioned was\nwhat was professed to be explained.\n\nNow, if it be true at all that every event, whether it be a\nnew existence or a change in an old existence, presupposes an\nexplanatory antecedent or cause, there can of course be no accepting\nin all its breadth one of the propositions which Hume urges most\nstrenuously--viz., that the mere study of an event can tell us nothing\nabout its cause. We may grant that it can tell us very little,--that\nHume performed an immense service in showing how extremely little we\ncan know of the particular causes of particular events apart from\nthe study of both in connection, apart from observation, experiment,\nand induction,--but we cannot grant that the event itself teaches us\nabsolutely nothing. If every event must have a cause, every event must\nhave a sufficient cause. For these two statements, although verbally\ndifferent, are really identical. The second seems to mean, but does not\nactually mean, more than the first. The whole cause of the elevation\nof a weight of ten pounds a foot high cannot be also the whole cause\nof the elevation of twenty pounds to the same height, for the simple\nreason that in the latter case the elevation of ten pounds--of half\nthe weight--would be an event which had no cause at all. And this is\nuniversally true. If every event have not a sufficient cause, some\nevents have no cause at all. This, then, I say, we necessarily know\nthat the efficient cause of every event is a sufficient cause, however\nvague may be our knowledge of efficiency and sufficiency.\n\nIf every event--using this term as convenient to denote either a new\nexistence or a change in some existence--must have a cause, to prove\nthat the universe must have had a cause we require to prove it to have\nbeen an event--to have had a commencement. Can this be done? That\nis _the_ question in the theistic argument from causality. Compared\ntherewith, all other questions which have been introduced into or\nassociated with the argument are of very subordinate importance. Now\nthere is only one way of reasonably answering the question, and that\nis by examining the universe, in order to determine whether or not it\nbears the marks of being an event--whether or not it has the character\nof an effect. We have no right to _assume_ it to be an event, or to\nhave had a beginning. The entire argument for the Divine existence,\nwhich is at present under consideration, can be no stronger than the\nstrength of the proof which we can adduce in favour of its having had\na beginning, and the only valid proof of that which reason can hope to\nfind must be derived from the examination of the universe itself.\n\nWhat, then, is the result of such an examination? An absolute\ncertainty that all the things which are seen are temporal,--that\nevery object in the universe which presents itself to the senses has\nhad a beginning,--that the most powerful, penetrating, and delicate\ninstruments devised to assist our senses reach no cause which is\nnot obviously also an effect. The progress of science has not more\nconvincingly and completely disproved the once prevalent notion that\nthe universe was created about six thousand years ago, than it has\nconvincingly and completely established that everything of which our\nsenses inform us has had a commencement in time, and is of a compound,\nderivative, and dependent nature. It is not long since men had no means\nof proving that the rocks, for example, were not as old as the earth\nitself--no direct means of proving even that they were not eternal; but\nscience is now able to tell us with confidence under what conditions,\nin what order, and in what epochs of geological time they were formed.\nWe have probably a more satisfactory knowledge of the formation of\nthe coal-measures than of the establishment of the feudal system. We\nknow that the Alps, although they look as if they might have stood\nfor ever, are not even old, as geologists count age. The morning and\nnight, the origin and disappearance of the countless species of living\nthings which have peopled the earth from the enormously remote times\nwhen the rocks of the Laurentian period were deposited down to the\nbirths and deaths of contemporaneous animals, have been again brought\ninto the light of day by the power of science. The limits of research\nare not even there reached, and with bold flight science passes beyond\nthe confines of discovered life--beyond the epochs of formation even of\nthe oldest rocks--to a time when there was no distinction of earth and\nsea and atmosphere, as all were mingled together in nebulous matter, in\nsome sort of fluid or mist or steam; yea, onwards to a time when our\nearth had no separate existence, and suns, moons, and stars were not\nyet divided and arranged into systems. If we seek, then, after what is\neternal, science tells us that it is not the earth nor anything which\nit contains, not the sea nor the living things within it, not the\nmoving air, not the sun, nor the moon, nor the stars. These things when\ninterrogated all tell us to look above and beyond them, for although\nthey may have begun to be in times far remote, yet it was within times\nto which the thoughts of finite beings can reach back.\n\nThere is no denying, then, that the universe is to a great extent\nan effect, an event, something which has begun to be, a process of\nbecoming. Science is, day by day, year by year, finding out more and\nmore that it is an effect. The growth of science is in great part\nmerely the extension of the proof that the universe is an effect. But\nthe scientific proof of the non-eternity of matter is as yet far\nfrom a complete one. It leaves it possible for the mind to refer the\nphases through which the universe has passed, and the forms which it\nhas assumed, to an underlying eternal source in nature itself, and,\ntherefore, not to God. And this is by far the most plausible and\nforcible way of combating the argument we are employing. It meets it\nwith a direct counter-argument, which every person must acknowledge\nto be relevant, and which, if sufficiently made out, is obviously\ndecisive. That counter-argument we are bound, therefore, to dispose\nof. It has been thus stated by Mr J. S. Mill: \"There is in nature a\npermanent element, and also a changeable: the changes are always the\neffects of previous changes; the permanent existences, so far as we\nknow, are not effects at all. It is true we are accustomed to say not\nonly of events, but of objects, that they are produced by causes, as\nwater by the union of hydrogen and oxygen. But by this we only mean\nthat when they begin to exist, their beginning is the effect of a\ncause. But their beginning to exist is not an object, it is an event.\nIf it be objected that the cause of a thing's beginning to exist may\nbe said with propriety to be the cause of the thing itself, I shall\nnot quarrel with the expression. But that which in an object begins\nto exist, is that in it which belongs to the changeable element in\nnature; the outward form and the properties depending on mechanical\nor chemical combinations of its component parts. There is in every\nobject another and a permanent element--viz., the specific elementary\nsubstance or substances of which it consists and their inherent\nproperties. These are not known to us as beginning to exist: within the\nrange of human knowledge they had no beginning, and consequently no\ncause; though they themselves are causes or non-causes of everything\nthat takes place. Experience, therefore, affords no evidences, not even\nanalogies, to justify our extending to the apparently immutable, a\ngeneralisation grounded only on our observation of the changeable.\"[15]\n\n[15] Three Essays on Religion, pp. 142, 143.\n\nOn this I would remark, first, that mere experience does not take us\nto anything which we are entitled to call even apparently immutable.\nIt only takes us, even when extended to the utmost by scientific\ninstruments and processes, to elements which we call simple because\nwe have hitherto failed to analyse them into simpler elements. It is\na perfectly legitimate scientific hypothesis that all the substances\nrecognised by chemists as elementary and intransmutable, are in\nreality the modifications or syntheses of a single material element,\nwhich have been produced under conditions that render them incapable\nof being affected by any tests or agencies which the analyst in his\nlaboratory can bring to bear upon them. Indeed, unless this hypothesis\nbe true, the theory of development, so generally accepted at present,\ncan hardly be supposed to be of any very wide application, seeing that\nat its very outset it has to affirm the existence of no fewer than\nsixty-four true untransformable species. But suppose the so-called\nelementary substances of chemistry to be simple, no one can reasonably\nsuppose them as known to us to be ultimate. In oxygen there may be no\natoms which are not atoms of oxygen, but we know by experience only\noxygen, not atoms of oxygen. No man has ever been able to put himself\nin sensible contact with what alone can be immutable in oxygen, if\nthere be anything immutable in it, its ultimate atoms. No man has seen,\nheard, touched, or tasted an ultimate atom of any kind of matter. We\nknow nothing of atoms--nothing of what is permanent in nature--from\ndirect experience. We must pass beyond such experience--beyond all\ntestimony of the senses--when we believe in anything permanent in\nnature, not less than when we believe in something beyond and above\nnature. The atomic theory in chemistry demands a faith which transcends\nexperience, not less than the theistic theory in religion.\n\nThen, secondly, although we grant that there is a permanent element\nin the physical universe, something in matter itself which is\nself-existent and eternal, we still need, in order to account for the\nuniverse which we know, an Eternal Intelligence. The universe, regarded\neven only so far as it is admitted by all materialists no less than\nby theists and pantheists to be an effect, cannot be explained, as\nmaterialists think, merely physically. The atoms of matter are, it is\nsaid, eternal and immutable. Grant them to be so. There are, however,\ncountless millions of them, and manifestly the universe is one, is\na single, magnificent, and complicated system, is characterised by\na marvellous unity in variety. We must be informed how the universe\ncame to be a universe,--how it came to have the unity which underlies\nits diversity,--if it resulted from a countless multitude of ultimate\ncauses. Did the atoms take counsel together and devise a common plan\nand work it out? That hypothesis is unspeakably absurd, yet it is\nrational in comparison with the notion that these atoms combined by\nmere chance, and by chance produced such a universe as that in which\nwe live. Grant all the atoms of matter to be eternal, grant all the\nproperties and forces which with the smallest degree of plausibility\ncan be claimed for them to be eternal and immutable, and it is still\nbeyond all expression improbable that these atoms with these forces,\nif unarranged, uncombined, ununified, unutilised by a presiding mind,\nwould give rise to anything entitled to be called a universe. It is\nmillions to one that they would never produce the simplest of the\nregular arrangements which we comprehend under the designation of\ncourse of nature, or the lowest of vegetable or animal organisms;\nmillions of millions to one that they would never produce a solar\nsystem, the earth, the animal kingdom, or human history. No number of\nmaterial atoms, although eternal and endowed with mechanical force,\ncan explain the unity and order of the universe, and therefore the\nsupposition of their existence does not free us from the necessity\nof believing in a single intelligent cause--a Supreme Mind--to move\nand mould, combine and adjust, the ultimate atoms of matter into a\nsingle orderly system. There at once rises the question, Is it really\nnecessary to believe both matter and mind to be eternal? No, must\nbe our answer. The law of parsimony of causes directly forbids the\nbelief, unless we can show that one cause is insufficient to explain\nthe universe. And that we cannot do. We can show that matter is\ninsufficient,--that it cannot account of itself even for the physical\nuniverse,--but not that mind is insufficient, not that mind cannot\naccount for anything that is in matter. On what grounds can it be shown\nthat a mind possessed of sufficient power to originate the universe,\nthe ultimate elements of matter being given, could not also have\ncreated these elements? that the Supreme Intelligence, which gave to\neach sun, and planet, and satellite its size, and shape, and position,\nand motion, could not have summoned into being their constituent\nparticles? On none whatever. We may not understand how they could be\ncreated, but we have no reason for thinking that they could not be\ncreated; and it is surely far easier and far more reasonable to believe\nthat they were created, than that a countless number of inconceivably\nsmall indivisible particles of matter, lying far beyond the range of\nany of our senses, but extending through immeasurable fields of space,\nshould all, inconceivably minute although they be, be self-existent\nand eternal. The man who asks us to accept the latter supposition,\nasks us, it seems to me, to believe what is not only as mysterious as\nthe self-existence of Deity, but millions of millions of times more\nmysterious. I should require strong reasons for assigning infinitely\ngreat attributes to excessively little things, and to an inconceivable\nnumber of them; but I can in this instance find no reasons at all.\n\nThen, in the third place, any plausible conceptions we can form of the\nultimate nature of matter lead to the belief that even that is an event\nor effect, a something derivative and caused. It must be admitted that\nthe most plausible of these conceptions are vague and conjectural.\nWe have a practical and relative knowledge of matter which is both\nexact and trustworthy,--a knowledge of its properties from which we\ncan mathematically deduce a multitude of remote consequences of an\nextremely precise character--but we are hardly entitled to characterise\nas knowledge at all any of the views which have been propounded as to\nwhat it is in itself. It is only the unreflecting who fancy that matter\nin itself is something very clear and obvious, which they may apprehend\nby merely opening their eyes and stretching out their hands. Those\nwho have never reasoned on the subject are apt to imagine that the\nnature of matter is of all things the easiest to understand, and they\nunhesitatingly invest it with their own sensations and perceptions.\nThat is the so-called commonsense view of matter; but the slightest\ninquiry proves it to be delusive and nonsensical. Colour, for example,\nis just what is seen, and sound just what is heard; they are not\nqualities inherent in objects independent of the eye and ear: the\nmatter which is supposed to cause by its motions on our senses these\nand other perceptions of the material world, we cannot see, hear, or\napprehend by any sense. Change our senses and the universe will be\nthereby changed, everything in it becoming something other than it was\nbefore, green perhaps red, the bitter sweet, the loudest noise a gentle\nwhisper, the hardest substance soft. As soon, then, as we thoughtfully\nask ourselves, What is matter? we begin to discover that it is in\nitself something utterly mysterious. The collection of phenomena which\nwe call its properties are quite unlike the phenomena of mind in this\nmost important respect, that whatever they may be they are not what\nthey appear to be. A state of mind is what we feel it to be; a state\nof matter is certainly not what we seem to ourselves to perceive it\nto be. No one, of course, knew all this better than Mr Mill. He, as a\nphilosopher, had asked himself what matter is; he had formed a theory\nin answer to the question. And what is his theory? Just this,--that we\ncannot find a permanent element in matter; that we have no right to\nsuppose that there is a permanent real existence or actual substance\nin matter; that all that we are warranted to affirm about the ultimate\nnature of matter is that it is a permanent possibility,--the permanent\npossibility of sensations. That was the conclusion which he arrived at\nwhen he theorised on matter without any theological aim. But he appears\nto have forgotten it when he came to criticise the argument for a first\ncause. He could not otherwise have written as if it were quite certain\nthat there was in matter \"a permanent element,\" not an underlying\npossibility but an inherent real substance. Had he remembered what his\nown theory as to the nature of matter was, he would have avoided as\nutterly untrue and misleading every expression which could suggest the\nnotion of there being a permanent element in matter, and would have\nadmitted that very probably the permanent possibilities of sensation,\nthe causes of all material phenomena, lay in the Divine will, since he\nhad been unable to find anything else permanent in which they could be\nsupposed to subsist. That is a view which many profound thinkers have\nadopted. They have been led to hold that matter is essentially force,\nand nothing but force; that the whole material world is ultimately\nresolvable into forces; and that all its forces are but manifestations\nor outgoings of will-force. If so, the whole material world is not\nonly dependent on, but _is_, the will of God, and has no being of any\nkind apart from the will of God. If so, God's will is not only the\ncause and controlling power of nature, but its substance, its self. And\nthis view, that what alone substantially underlies all the phenomena\nwe designate material is an acting mind, an energising will, has not\nonly been reached by mental philosophers and idealistic speculators,\nbut by those physicists who, like Boscovitch and Faraday, have found\nthemselves forced to conclude that what is constitutive of matter is\nnot indivisible particles, even infinitesimally small, but mere centres\nof force, since force necessarily implies some sort of substance, and,\ntherefore, spirit where not matter.\n\nBut suppose the substratum of the universe to consist of a countless\nnumber of inconceivably small indivisible particles of matter, and\ndo we not even on this hypothesis reach by a single step the truth\non which theism rests, and on which only theism can be based? \"None\nof the processes of nature,\" says one of the most eminent of our\nphysical philosophers, \"since the time when nature began, have produced\nthe slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are\ntherefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or\nthe identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes\nwhich we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality of each\nmolecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel\nhas well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and\nprecludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have\nbeen led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at\nwhich science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the\nexternal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any\nmore than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together.\nBut, in tracing back the history of matter, science is arrested when\nshe assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made,\nand on the other that it has not been made by any of the processes we\ncall natural.\"[16] I believe that no reply to these words of Professor\nClark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary view of\nscientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They must\nsuppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be so\nrelated to others, and to the universe generally, that things may be\nsuch as we see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into\nthe structure of the universe is a proof that they have been made fit,\nand since natural forces could not have acted on them while not yet\nexistent, a supernatural power must have created them, and created them\nwith a view to their manifold uses. Every atom, every molecule, must\neven in what is ultimate in it bear the impress of a Supernatural Power\nand Wisdom; must, from the very nature of the case, reflect the glory\nof God and proclaim its dependence upon Him.\n\n[16] President's Address in Transactions of the British Association for\nthe Advancement of Science, 1870.\n\nIn like manner the latest speculation regarding the nature of\nmatter--the vortex-atom theory of Sir William Thomson--seems, so far\nfrom having any tendency to exclude creative action, necessarily to\nimply it. He supposes that the atoms may be small vortex-rings in the\nether, the rotating portions of a perfect fluid which fills all space.\nBut a perfect fluid can neither explain its own existence nor the\ncommencement of rotation in any part of it. Rotation once commenced\nin a perfect or frictionless and incompressible fluid would continue\nfor ever, but it never could naturally commence. There is nothing\nin a perfect fluid to account either for the origin or cessation of\nrotation, and consequently nothing, on the vortex-atom hypothesis,\nto account either for the production or destruction of an atom of\nmatter. The origin and cessation of rotation in fluids are due to their\nimperfection, their internal friction, their viscosity. The origin\nor cessation of rotation in a perfect fluid must be the effect of\nsupernatural action; in other words, every vortex-atom must owe the\nrotation which gives it its individuality to a Divine impulse.\n\nA theist has certainly no need, then, to be afraid of researches into\nthe ultimate nature of matter. Our knowledge thereof is exceedingly\nsmall and imperfect, but all that we do know of it, all that we can\neven rationally conceive of it, leads to the inference that it is not\nself-existent, but the work of God. The farther research is pushed, the\nmore clearly, we may be assured, will this become apparent, for the\nmore wonderfully adapted will the ultimate constituents of matter be\nfound for assuming countless forms and composing countless objects--the\nair, the land, the sea, and starry heavens, with all that in or on\nthem is. Research has already shown us reason to believe \"that even\nchemical atoms are very complicated structures; that an atom of pure\niron is probably a vastly more complicated system than that of the\nplanets and their satellites; that each constituent of a chemical atom\nmust go through an orbit in the millionth part of the twinkling of an\neye, in which it successively or simultaneously is under the influence\nof many other constituents, or possibly comes into collision with them;\nthat each of these particles is, as Sir John Herschel has beautifully\nsaid, for ever solving differential equations which, if written out\nin full, might perhaps belt the earth.\"[17] Now, what does this mean,\nif not that every ultimate atom of matter is full to the very heart\nof it with evidences of the power and wisdom of God, and that every\nparticle of dust or drop of water is crowded with traces of the action\nof the Divine Reason, not less marvellous, it may be, than those which\nastronomy exhibits in the structure of the heavens and the evolutions\nof the heavenly bodies? Those who hoped that molecular science would\nhelp them to get rid of God have obviously made a profound mistake. It\nhas already shown far more clearly than ever was or could have been\nanticipated, that every atom of matter points back beyond itself to the\nall-originating will of God, and refuses to receive the idolatrous\nhomage of those who would put it in the place of God.\n\n[17] See W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 452, 453.\n\nTo these considerations it has to be added that some of our ablest\nphysicists believe that in the present age a strictly scientific proof\nhas been found of the position that the universe had a beginning in\ntime. \"According to Sir W. Thomson's deductions from Fourier's Theory\nof Heat, we can trace down the dissipation of heat by conduction\nand radiation to an infinitely distant time when all things will\nbe uniformly cold. But we cannot similarly trace the heat-history\nof the universe to an infinite distance in the past. For a certain\nnegative value of the time the formul\u00e6 give impossible values,\nindicating that there was some initial distribution of heat which\ncould not have resulted, according to known laws of nature, from any\nprevious distribution. There are other cases in which a consideration\nof the dissipation of energy leads to the conception of a limit to\nthe antiquity of the present order of things.\"[18] If this theory\nbe true, physical science, instead of giving any countenance to the\nnotion of matter having existed from eternity, distinctly teaches\nthat creation took place, that the present system of nature and its\nlaws originated at an approximately assignable date in the past. The\ntheory is supported by the most eminent physical philosophers of this\ncountry, and if there be any oversight or error in the principles or\ncalculations on which it is founded, it would appear not to have been\nas yet detected. It is a theory on which, however, only specialists\nare entitled to pronounce judgment; and therefore, although those who\nassume that matter was not created are bound to refute it, I do not\nwish myself to lay any stress upon it--the more especially as I believe\nthat apart from it there is amply sufficient evidence for holding that\n\"Nature is but the name for an effect whose cause is God.\"[19]\n\n[18] Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 438.\n\n[19] See Appendix XI.\n\n\nII.\n\nIt seems to me, then, that the universe when examined must be concluded\nto be throughout--from centre to circumference--alike in what is most\npermanent and what is most changeable in it,--an event or effect,\nand that its only adequate cause is a Supreme Intelligence. It is\nonly such a cause which is sufficient to explain the universe as we\nknow it, and that universe is what has to be explained. The assertion\nof Kant that the principle of causality cannot take us beyond the\nlimits of the sensible world is only true if causality be confined to\nstrictly material events which display no signs of law and order, and\nthe progress of science is one long uninterrupted proof that no such\nevents are to be discovered; that it is hopeless to look for them; that\nmatter and its changes are ordained, arranged, adjusted phenomena. The\nassertion of Kant is clearly false, if we are not to exclude from the\nevent anything which demands explanation; if we are to reason from the\nuniverse itself and not from its name; if we are to infer a particular\ncause from a knowledge of the nature of a given particular event.\nThis, the so-called concrete use of the principle of causality, is the\nonly use of it which is legitimate, the only use of it which is not\nextremely childish.\n\nThe opposite--the absurd--notion that the principle of causality is\nabstractly applied, has led some to argue that it leads legitimately\nto nothing else than an infinite regress--an eternal succession of\ncauses and effects. But whatever it may lead to, it certainly does not\nlead to that conclusion, and has never led any human being, either\nlegitimately or illegitimately, to that conclusion. Those even who\nhave maintained that the principle of causality cannot lead to a first\ncause, to an eternal self-existent cause, but only to an eternal\nsuccession of causes and effects, have all, without a single exception,\nallowed themselves to be led by it to a first cause and not to an\neternal succession of causes. They have all believed what they say\nthey ought to have disbelieved; they have all disbelieved what they\nsay they ought to have believed. They have all accepted as true that\nthere is a first and self-existent cause, although some have supposed\nit to be matter, some mind, some within the world, some without the\nworld. They have differed as to what it is, but not as to that it is.\nNone of them have adopted the conclusion to which they have said the\nargument founded on causation logically leads. No man has ever adopted\nthat conclusion. The human mind universally and instantaneously rejects\nit as inconceivable, unthinkable, self-contradictory, absurd. We may\nbelieve either in a self-existent God or in a self-existent world, and\nmust believe in one or the other; we cannot believe in an infinite\nregress of causes. The alternatives of a self-existent cause and an\ninfinite regress of causes are not, as some would represent, equally\ncredible alternatives. The one is an indubitable truth, the other is a\nmanifest absurdity. The one all men believe, the other no man believes.\n\nThis takes away, it seems to me, all force from the objection that the\nargument founded on the principle of causality when it infers God as\nthe self-existent cause of the universe infers more than is strictly\nwarranted, a self-existent cause being something which does not in\nitself fall under the principle of causality. That every event must\nhave a cause will be valid, it is said, for an endless series of\ncauses and effects; but if you stop, if you affirm the existence of\nwhat is uncaused, of what is at once, as it were, cause and effect, you\nmay affirm what is true, but you affirm also what is independent of the\nprinciple of causation. You claim more than your argument entitles you\nto; you are not developing a logical conclusion, but concealing under a\nterm which seems to express the same idea what is really the vaulting\nof the mind to a higher idea which cannot be expressed under the form\nefficient cause at all.\n\nNow, of course, a self-existent cause does not in itself come\ncompletely under the law of causality. That law cannot inform us what\nself-existence is. A self-existent cause, however, may be known as\nwell as any other cause by its effects. The mind may rise to it from\nits effects. The principle of causality may lead up to it, although it\ndoes not include within itself the proof of the self-existence of the\ncause. It may at the last stage be attached to some other principle\nwhich compels the affirmation of the self-existence of the cause\nreached; in other words, the affirmation that the first cause is a\nself-existent cause, may be a distinct mental act not necessitated by\nthe principle of causality itself. It may either be held that this\nmental necessity is the reason why we cannot entertain the thought\nof an infinite regress of causes, or that the incapacity of the mind\nto regard the thought of an infinite regress of causes as other than\nself-contradictory, is the explanation of its felt necessitation to\naffirm a self-existent cause; in which latter case the principle\nof causality really necessitates a belief in the ungenerated and\nself-existent. Both of these views are plausible, and which of them is\ntrue is an interesting subject of metaphysical investigation, but it is\none of no practical consequence in the inquiry on which we are engaged.\nThe principle of causality can lead us up from all things which have\non them the marks of having begun to be, and if we at length come to\nsomething which bears no such marks, be it matter or be it mind, no\nman can doubt, or does doubt, that something to be self-existent. This\ndifficulty about a self-existent cause not being able to be arrived\nat by the principle of causality, will be worth attending to by the\ntheist when it is attended to by any one else,--when any atheist or\nany anti-theist of any kind is prepared to deny that the last cause\nin the order of knowledge, and the first in the order of existence,\nmust be a self-existent cause--but not until then; and it is mere\nsophistry to represent it as of practical importance. Whenever we come\nto an existence which we cannot regard as an effect or thing generated\nin time, we, either in consequence of the very nature of the causal\njudgment, or of some self-evident condition or conditions of knowledge\nnecessarily attached thereto, attribute to it self-existence and\neternity. We may dispute as to whether this is done in the one or the\nother of these two ways, but that is a merely theoretical question;\nthat every one does, and must, as a reasonable being, do it, is what\nno man disputes, or can dispute,--and this alone is of practical\nconsequence.\n\nAnother admission must be made by every man who reflects carefully\non the nature of causation. To say that the idea of cause can never\ndemand belief in an uncaused cause, sounds as self-evident; to say\nthat the idea of cause can find no satisfaction save in the belief of\nan uncaused cause, sounds as a paradox; but let a man meditate for a\nlittle with real thoughtfulness on the meaning of these two statements,\nand he cannot fail to perceive that the former is an undeniable\nfalsehood, and the latter an undeniable truth. An uncaused cause, a\nfirst cause, alone answers truly to the idea of a cause. A secondary\ncause, in so far as secondary, in so far as caused, is not a cause. I\nwitness some event--some change. I am compelled as a rational being to\nseek its cause. I reach it only to find that this cause was due to a\nprior cause. What has happened? The cause from which I have had to go\nback has ceased to be a cause; the cause to which I have had to go back\nhas become the cause of two effects, but it will remain so only if I am\nnot reasonably bound to seek a cause for _it_. If I am, its causality\nmust pass over to its explanatory antecedent. We may go back a hundred,\na thousand, a million times, but if the last cause reached be not truly\na first cause, an uncaused cause, the idea of cause in our mind will\nbe as unsatisfied at the end of our search as at the beginning, and\nthe whole process of investigation will be aimless and meaningless. A\ntrue cause is one to which the reason not only moves but in which it\nrests, and except in a first cause the mind cannot rest. A first cause,\nhowever, is certainly not one which has been itself caused.\n\nWe are warranted, then, in looking upon the universe as an event or\neffect, and we may be certain that it is not the last link of an\ninfinite chain of causes and effects, or of any series of causes and\neffects, long or short, suspended upon nothing. No chain or series can\nbe, properly speaking, infinite, or without a first link or term. The\nuniverse has a First Cause. And its First Cause, I must proceed to\nremark, reason and observation alike lead us to believe must be one--a\nsingle cause. When one First Cause is sufficient to explain all the\nfacts, it is contrary to reason to suppose another or several. We must\nprove that no one First Cause could account for the universe before\nwe can be entitled to ascribe it to more causes than one. The First\nCause, we shall further see afterwards, must have attributes which no\ntwo or more beings can be supposed to possess, which one being alone\ncan possess. Then the character of the effect itself refers us back\nto a single cause. A belief in more gods than one not only finds no\nsupport in the universe, but, as the very word universe indicates,\nis contradicted by it. For, numerous and diverse as are the objects\nin nature, they are so constituted and connected--so dependent on\nand related to one another--as to compose a whole which exhibits a\nmarvellous unity in variety. Everything counteracts or balances or\nassists something else, and thus all things proclaim their common\ndependence on One Original. Co-ordinate things must all be derivative\nand secondary, and all things in nature are co-ordinate parts of a\nstupendous system. Each one of us knows, for example, that a few years\nago he was not, and that in a few years hence the place which knows him\nnow will know him no more; and each one of us has been often taught\nby the failure of his plans, and the disappointment of his hopes, and\nthe vanity of his efforts, that there are stronger forces and more\nimportant interests in the world than his own, and that he is in the\ngrasp of a Power which he cannot resist--which besets him behind and\nbefore, and hems him in on all sides. When we extend our view, we\nperceive that this is as true of others as of ourselves, and that it is\ntrue even, in a measure, of all finite things. No man lives or dies to\nhimself; no object moves and acts absolutely from and for itself alone.\nThis reveals a single all-originating, all-pervading, all-sustaining\nprinciple. These manifold mutually dependent existences imply one\nindependent existence. The limitations assigned to all individual\npersons and things point to a Being which limits them all. Particular\ncauses and secondary movements lead back to \"a cause of causes,\" \"a\nfirst mover, itself immovable, yet making all things else to move.\"\n\nThe first cause must be far more truly and properly a cause than any\nsecondary cause. In fact, as we have already seen, a secondary cause\nis not strictly a cause; so far as secondary, it merely transmits to\nits consequent what it has received from its antecedent. There may be\na succession of a thousand such causes in a process, yet the first\ncause is also the last, and there is, in fact, all through, but one\ncause; the others merely convey and communicate its force. A machine,\nhowever numerous its parts and movements, does not create the least\namount of force; on the contrary, the most perfect machine wastes and\nabsorbs some of the force which is imparted to it. The universe, so far\nas subject to mechanical laws, is merely a machine which transmits a\ngiven quantity of force, but which no more creates it than it creates\nitself. The author of that force is the one true cause of all physical\nphenomena. Life is probably, and mind is certainly, not entirely\nexplicable on mechanical principles; but neither life nor mind can be\nmaintained to do more than to determine the direction or application of\nthe power implanted in them, or rendered accessible to them, through\nthe working of the first cause. All things must, consequently, \"live,\nmove, and have their being\" therein. It is at their end as well as\nat their origin; it encompasses them, all round; it penetrates them,\nall through. The least things are not merely linked on to it through\nintermediate agencies which go back an enormous distance, but are\nimmediately present to it, and filled to the limit of their faculties\nwith its power. It is in every ray of sunlight, every breath of wind,\nand blade of grass; it is the source and life of all human minds and\nhearts. The pantheist errs not so much in what he affirms of it, as in\nwhat he denies to it.\n\nThis cause--the cause of causes--must, it is further obvious, be in\npossession of a power far beyond the comprehension of our reasons or\nimaginations. All other power is derived from its power. All the power\nwhich is distributed and distinguished in secondary causes must be\ncombined and united in the first cause. Now, think what an enormous\npower there is displayed even in this world. In every half-ounce of\ncoal there is stored up power enough, if properly used, to draw two\ntons a mile. How vast, then, the power which God has deposited in the\ncoal-beds of the world alone! The inhabitants of this little island,\nby availing themselves of the natural forces which Providence has\nplaced at their disposal, annually accomplish more work than could by\nany possibility be effected by the inhabitants of the whole earth, if\nthey exerted merely the power which is in their own bodies, the power\nof human bones and muscles. And yet there can be little doubt that,\neven in this country, we make no use at all of many natural agents,\nand only a wasteful use of any of them. \"Weigh the earth on which we\ndwell,\" says an astronomer; \"count the millions of its inhabitants\nthat have come and gone for the last six thousand years; unite their\nstrength into one arm; and test its power in an effort to move the\nearth. It could not stir it a single foot in a thousand years; and yet,\nunder the omnipotent hand of God, not a minute passes that it does\nnot fly far more than a thousand miles.\" The earth, however, is but a\nmere atom in the universe. Through the vast abysses of space there are\nscattered countless systems, at enormous distances, yet all related;\nglorious galaxies of suns, planets, satellites, comets, all sweeping\nonwards in their appointed courses. How mighty the arm which impels\nand guides the whole! God can do all that, for He continually does it.\nHow much more He could do than He does, we cannot know. The power of\nno true cause, of no free cause, is to be measured by what it does.\nIt must be adequate to produce its actual effects, but it may be able\nto produce countless merely possible effects. It has power over its\npowers, and is not necessitated to do all that it is capable of doing.\nIt is difficult, perhaps, to show that the universe is not infinite. It\nis obviously unreasonable and presumptuous to deny that the power of\nits Author may be infinite. And yet we find men who do so. For example,\nthe late Mr John Stuart Mill, for no better reasons than that nature\nsometimes drowns men, and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful\nprocess, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall\nnot say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed in\nsuch an argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the\nlittleness of a human intellect. The mind of man never shows itself\nso small as when it tries to measure the attributes and limit the\ngreatness of its Creator.\n\nA first cause, we have already seen, must be a free cause. It cannot\nhave been itself caused. It is absurd to look for it among effects.\nBut we never get out of the sphere of effects until we enter that of\nfree agency; until we emerge from the natural into the spiritual;\nuntil we leave matter and reach mind. The first cause must, indeed,\nbe in--all through--the universe; but it must also be out of the\nuniverse, anterior to, and above the universe. The idea of cause is\na delusion--the search for causes an inexplicable folly--if there be\nno first cause, and if that first cause be not a free cause, a Will, a\nSpirit, a Person. Those who object to the causation argument, that it\ndoes not take us beyond the world--does not lead us up to a personal\ncause of the world--have failed to apprehend what causation signifies.\nSecondary causes may not be true causes, and yet reason be trustworthy,\nfor there is that behind them on which it can fall back; but if\nthere be no first cause, or if the first cause be not free, reason\nis throughout a lie. Reason, if honest and consistent, cannot in its\npursuit of causes stop short of a rational will. That alone answers to\nand satisfies its idea of a cause.\n\nThe most rapid glance at the universe powerfully confirms the\nconclusion that its first cause can only be a Mind, a Reason. The\nuniverse is a universe; that is to say, it is a whole, a unity, a\nsystem. The first cause of it, therefore, in creating and sustaining\nit, must comprehend, act on, and guide it as a systematic whole;\nmust have created all things with reference to each other; and must\ncontinually direct them towards a preconceived goal. The complex and\nharmonious constitution of the universe is the expression of a Divine\nIdea, of a Creative Reason. This thought brings me to my next argument\nand next lecture.[20]\n\n[20] See Appendix XII.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\n THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe prevalence of order in nature has already been referred to as\ncontributing to prove that the universe is an event, a generated\nexistence, a something which once began to be. It will now be brought\nforward as in itself a manifestation of, and consequently a ground\nfor believing in, a Supreme Mind. Where order meets us, the natural\nand immediate inference is that there is the work of intelligence.\nAnd order meets us everywhere in the universe. It covers and pervades\nthe universe. It is obvious to the ordinary naked eye, and spreads\nfar beyond the range of disciplined vision when assisted by all the\ninstruments and appliances which science and art have been able to\ninvent. It is conspicuous alike in the architecture of the heavens\nand the structure of a feather or a leaf. It goes back through all\nthe epochs of human history, and all the ages of geological and\nastronomical time. It is the common work of all the sciences to\ndiscover and explain the order in the universe. There is no true\nscience which is not constantly making new and fuller discoveries of\nthe order in nature,--the order within us and without us; not one\nwhich is not ever increasingly establishing that in order all things\nmove and have their being. What is maintained by the theist is, that\nthis order, the proof of which is the grand achievement of science,\nuniversally implies mind; that all relations of order--all laws and\nuniformities--are evidences of an intelligent cause.\n\nThe order which science finds in nature may be described as either\ngeneral or special, although in strictness the difference between them\nis only a difference of degree, the former being the more and the\nlatter the less general, or the former being the less and the latter\nthe more special. In what may be called general order, that which\nstrikes us chiefly is regularity; in what may be called special order,\nthat which chiefly strikes us is adaptation or adjustment. In inorganic\nnature general order is the more conspicuous; in organic nature special\norder. Astronomy discloses to us relations of number and proportion\nso far-reaching that it almost seems as if nature were \"a living\narithmetic in its development, a realised geometry in its repose.\"\nBiology, on the other hand, impresses us by showing the delicacy and\nsubtlety of the adjustment of part to part, of part to whole, and\nof whole to surroundings, in the organic world. There is, perhaps,\nsufficient difference between these two kinds of order to warrant\ntheir being viewed separately, and as each furnishing the basis of an\nargument for the existence of God. The argument from regularity has\nsometimes been kept apart from the argument from adjustment. The former\ninfers the universe to be an effect of mind because it is characterised\nby proportion or harmony, which is held to be only explicable by the\noperation of mind. The latter draws the same inference because the\nuniverse contains countless complex wholes, of which the parts are\nso collocated and combined as to co-operate with one another in the\nattainment of certain results; and this, it is contended, implies an\nintelligent purpose in the primary cause of these things.\n\nWhile we may readily admit the distinction to be so far valid, it is\ncertainly not absolute. Regularity and adjustment are rather different\naspects of order than different kinds of order, and, so far from\nexcluding each other, they will be found implying each other. It is\nobvious that even the most specialised adjustments of organic structure\nand activity presuppose the most general and simple uniformities of\npurely physical nature. Such cases of adjustment comprehend in fact\nmany cases of regularity. It is less obvious, but not less true, that\nwherever regularity can be traced adjustment will also be found, if the\nsearch be carried far enough. The regularity disclosed by astronomy\ndepends on adjustment as regards magnitude, weight, distance, &c.,\nin the celestial bodies, just as the adjustments brought to light by\nbiology depend on the general regularity of the course of nature. There\nis no law of nature so simple as not to presuppose in every instance\nof its action at least two things related to one another in the manner\nwhich is meant when we speak of adjustment. It being thus impossible\nto separate regularity from adjustment as regards the phenomena of the\nuniverse, it seems unnecessary to attempt by abstraction to separate\nthem in the theological argumentation, while giving a rapid general\nglance at the phenomena which display them.\n\nThe physical universe has, perhaps, no more general characteristic than\nthis,--its laws are mathematical relations. The law of gravitation,\nwhich rules all masses of matter, great or small, heavy or light,\nat all distances, is a definite numerical law. The curves which\nthe heavenly bodies describe under the influence of that law are\nthe ellipse, circle, parabola, and hyperbola--or, in other words,\nthey all belong to the class of curves called conic sections, the\nproperties of which mathematicians had begun to investigate nearly\ntwenty centuries before Newton established that whatever was true\nof them might be directly transferred to the heavens, since the\nplanets revolve in ellipses, the satellites of Jupiter in circles,\nand the comets in elliptical, parabolic, and hyperbolic orbits. The\nlaw of chemical combination, through which the whole world of matter\nhas been built up out of a few elements, always admits of precise\nnumerical expression. So does the law of the correlation of heat and\ngravitation. Each colour in the rainbow is due to a certain number of\nvibrations in a given time; so is each note in the scale of harmony.\nEach crystal is a geometrical construction. The pistils of flowers,\nand the feathers in the wings and tails of birds, are all numbered.\nIf nature had not thus been ruled by numerical laws, the mathematical\nsciences might have existed, but they would have had no other use than\nto exercise the intellect, whereas they have been the great instruments\nof physical investigation. They are the creations of a mental power\nwhich, while occupied in their origination and elaboration, requires\nto borrow little, if anything, from matter; and yet, it is only with\ntheir help that the constitution of the material universe has been\ndisplayed, and its laws have been discovered, with that high measure\nof success of which physicists are so proud. But they could not have\nbeen applied to the universe at all unless its order had been of the\nexact numerical and geometrical kind which has been indicated; unless\nmasses had attracted each other, and elements combined with each\nother, in invariable proportions; unless \"the waters had been measured\nas if in the hollow of a hand, the heaven meted out as with a span,\nthe dust of the earth comprehended in a measure, and the mountains\nweighed in scales and the hills in a balance.\" Now it is possible to\ndeny that things have been thus weighed, measured, and numbered by a\nCreative Intelligence, but not that they have been weighed, measured,\nand numbered. If we are to give any credit to science, there can be\nno doubt about the weights and measures and numbers. This question,\nthen, is alone left,--Could anything else than intelligence thus weigh,\nmeasure, and number? Could mere matter know the abstrusest properties\nof space and time and number, so as to obey them in the wondrous way\nit does? Could what has taken so much mathematical knowledge and\nresearch to apprehend, have originated with what was wholly ignorant\nof all quantitative relations? Or must not the order of the universe\nbe due to a mind whose thoughts as to these relations are high above\neven those of the profoundest mathematicians, as are the heavens above\nthe earth? If the universe were created by an intelligence conversant\nwith quantitative truth, it is easy to understand why it should be\nruled by definitely quantitative laws; but that there should be such\nlaws in a universe which did not originate in intelligence, is not\nonly inexplicable but inconceivably improbable. There is not merely in\nthat case no discoverable reason why there should be any numerically\ndefinite law in nature, but the probability of there being no law\nor numerical regularity of any kind is exceedingly great, and of\nthere being no law-governed universe incalculably great. Apart from\nthe supposition of a Supreme Intelligence, the chances in favour of\ndisorder against order, of chaos against cosmos, of the numerically\nindefinite and inconstant against the definite and constant, must be\npronounced all but infinite. The belief in a Divine Reason is alone\ncapable of rendering rational the fact that mathematical truths are\nrealised in the material world.[21]\n\n[21] See Appendix XIII.\n\nThe celestial bodies were among the earliest objects of science, and\nbefore there was any science they stimulated religious thought and\nawakened religious feeling. The sun and moon have given rise to so\nextraordinary a number of myths that some authors have referred to them\nthe whole of heathen mythology. There can be little doubt that the\ngrowth of astronomical knowledge contributed greatly to bring about\nthe transition from polytheism to monotheism, and that so soon as the\nheavens were clearly understood to be subject to law, and the countless\nbodies which circle in them not to be independent agents but parts or\nmembers of a single mechanical or organic system, the triumph of the\nlatter was for ever secured. No science, indeed, has hitherto had so\nmuch influence on man's religious beliefs as astronomy, although there\nmay now appear to be indications that chemistry and biology will rival\nit in this respect in the future. And it has been thus influential\nchiefly because through its whole history it has been a continuous,\nconspicuous, and ever-advancing, ever-expanding demonstration of a\nreign of law on the most magnificent scale,--a demonstration begun when\nwith unassisted vision men first attempted roughly to distribute the\nstars into groups or constellations, and far from yet ended when the\nsame laws of gravitation, light, heat, and chemical combination which\nrule on earth have been proved to rule on orbs so distant that their\nrays do not reach us in a thousand years. The system of which our earth\nis a member is vast, varied, and orderly, the planets and satellites\nof which it is composed being so adjusted as regards magnitude and\nmass, distance, rate, and plane of direction, &c., that the whole is\nstable and secure, while part ministers to part as organ to organ in\nan animal body. Our own planet, for example, is so related to the sun\nand moon that seed-time and harvest never fail, and the ebb and flow\nof the tides never deceive us. And the solar system is but one of\nhundreds of millions of systems, some of which are incalculably larger\nthan it, yet the countless millions of suns and stars thus \"profusely\nscattered o'er the void immense\" are so arranged and distributed in\nrelation to one another and in accordance with the requirements of the\nprofoundest mathematics as to secure the safety of one and all, and to\nproduce everywhere harmony and beauty. Each orb is affecting the orbit\nof every other--each is doing what, if unchecked, would destroy itself\nand the entire system--but so wondrously is the whole constructed\nthat these seemingly dangerous disturbances are the very means of\npreventing destruction and securing the universal welfare, being due to\nreciprocally compensating forces which in given times exactly balance\none another. Is it, I ask, to be held as evidence of the power of\nthe human mind that it should have been able after many centuries of\ncombined and continuous exertion to compute with approximate accuracy\nthe paths and perturbations of the planets which circle round our\nsun and the returns of a few comets, but as no evidence even of the\nexistence of mind in the First Cause of things that the paths and\nperturbations of millions on millions of suns and planets and comets\nshould have been determined with perfect precision for all the ages\npast and future of their existence, so that, multitudinous as they\nare, each proceeds safely on its destined way, and all united form a\nglorious harmony of structure and motion?[22]\n\n[22] See Appendix XIV.\n\nA much more recent science than astronomy, the science of chemistry,\nundertakes to instruct us as to the composition of the universe, and it\nis marvellous how much it can tell us even of the composition of the\nstars. What, then, is its most general and certain result? Just this,\nthat order of the strictest kind, the most definite proportions, are\nwrought into the very structure of every world, and of every compound\nobject in the world, air and water, earth and mineral, plant and\nanimal. The vast variety of visible substances are reducible to rather\nmore than sixty constituent elements, each of which has not only its\nown peculiar properties but its own definite and unvarying combining\nproportions with other elements, so that amidst the prodigious number\nof combinations all is strictly ordered, numerically exact. There is no\nchemical union possible except when the elements bear to each other a\nnumerically constant ratio. Different compounds are always the products\nof the combination of the elements in different yet strictly definite\nproportions, there being no intermediate combinations, no transitional\ncompounds. If each element did not admit of union with many others, the\nworld would be dead and poor, its contents few and unvaried; if their\nunions were not always regulated by law, disorder would everywhere\nprevail. How comes it that they are so made in relation to one another\nthat their manifold unions are ever regulated by law, and generate an\nendless variety of admirable products? Who made them thus? Did they\nmake themselves? or, did any blind force make them? Reason answers\nthat they must have been made by an intelligence which wanted them\nfor its purposes. When the proportions of the elementary constituents\nare altered, the same elements produce the most diverse substances\nwith the most dissimilar and even opposite properties, charcoal and\ndiamond, a deadly poison or the breath of life, theine or strychnine.\nThese powers all work together for good; but if they worked even a\nvery little differently--if the circumstances in which they work, not\nto speak of the laws by which they work, were altered--they would\nspread destruction and death through the universe. The atmosphere is\nrather a mixture than a combination of chemical elements, but it is a\nmixture in which the constituents are proportioned to each other in\nthe only way which fits it to sustain the lives of plants and animals,\nand to accomplish its many other important services; and wonderful in\nthe extreme is the provision made for the constant restoration of\nthe due proportions amidst perpetual oscillations. One of the chiefs\nof modern chemistry, Baron Liebig, points to what takes place when\nrain falls on the soil of a field adapted for vegetable growth as to\nsomething which \"effectually strikes all human wisdom dumb.\" \"During\nthe filtration of rain-water,\" he says, \"through the soil, the earth\ndoes not surrender one particle of all the nutritive matter which it\ncontains available for vegetable growth (such as potash, silicic acid,\nammonia, &c.); the most unintermittent rain is unable to abstract\nfrom it (except by the mechanical action of floods) any of the chief\nrequisites for its fertility. The particles of mould not only firmly\nretain all matter nutritive to vegetable growth, but also immediately\nabsorb such as are contained in the rain-water (ammonia, potash, &c.).\nBut only such substances are _completely_ absorbed from the water as\nare indispensable requisites for vegetable growth; others remain either\nentirely or for the most part in a state of solution.\" The laws and\nuses of light and heat, electricity and magnetism, and the adjustments\nwhich they presuppose, all point not less clearly to the ordinances\nof a supremely profound and accurate mind. In a word, out of a few\nelements endowed with definite powers, this world with its air and its\nseas, its hills and valleys, its vegetable forms and animal frames,\nand other worlds innumerable, have been built up by long-sustained\nand endlessly-varied processes of chemical synthesis mostly conducted\nunder conditions so delicately adjusted to the requirements of each\ncase, that the ablest chemists, with all their instruments and\nartifices, cannot even reproduce them on any scale however small. Can\nthese elements be reasonably thought of as having been unfashioned\nand unprepared, or these processes as having been uninstituted and\nunpresided over by intelligence?[23]\n\n[23] See Appendix XV.\n\nThe sciences of geology and pal\u00e6ontology disclose to us the history of\nour earth and of its vegetable and animal organisms. They prove that\nfor countless ages, that from the inconceivably remote period of the\ndeposition of the Laurentian rocks, light and heat, air and moisture,\nland and sea, and all general physical forces have been so arranged and\nco-ordinated as to produce and maintain a state of things which secured\nduring all these countless ages life and health and pleasure for the\ncountless millions of individuals contained in the multitude of species\nof creatures which have contemporaneously or successively peopled the\nearth. The sea, with its winds and waves, its streams and currents,\nits salts, its flora and fauna, teems with adaptations no less than\nthe land. Probably no one has studied it with more care or to more\npurpose than Lieutenant Maury, and his well-known work on its physical\ngeography proceeds throughout on the principle that \"he who would\nunderstand its phenomena must cease to regard it as a waste of waters,\nand view it as the expression of One Thought, a unity with harmonies\nwhich One Intelligence, and One Intelligence alone, could utter;\" while\nmany of its pages might appropriately be read as a commentary on these\nlines of Wordsworth,--\n\n    \"Huge ocean shows, within his yellow strand,\n    A habitation marvellously planned,\n    For life to occupy in love and rest.\"\n\nThe sciences referred to certify further, that as regards the various\nforms of life there has been from the time when it can be first traced\nto the present day \"advance and progress in the main,\" and that the\nhistory of the earth corresponds throughout with the history of life\non the earth, while each age prepares for the coming of another better\nthan itself. But advance and progress presuppose intelligence, because\nthey cannot be rationally conceived of apart from an ideal goal\nforeseen and selected. Volumes might be written to show how subtly and\naccurately external nature is adjusted to the requirements of vegetable\nand animal life, and how vegetable and animal life are inter-related;\nnay, even on how well the earth is fitted for the development and\nhappiness of man. Think of the innumerable points of contact and\nconnection, for example, between physical geography and political\neconomy, which all indicate so many harmonies between the earth and\nman's economical condition, capacities, and history.[24]\n\n[24] See Appendix XVI.\n\nThe vegetable and animal kingdoms viewed generally, are also striking\ninstances of unity of plan, of progressive order, of elaborately\nadjusted system. There are general principles of structure and general\nlaws of development common to all organisms, constituting a plan of\norganisation capable of almost infinite variation, which underlies\nall the genera and orders of living creatures, vegetable and animal.\nIt comprehends a number of subordinate plans which involve very\nabstract conceptions, and which even the ablest naturalists still\nvery imperfectly comprehend. These higher plans would probably never\nhave been thought of but for the detection of the numerous phenomena\nwhich seemed on a superficial view irreconcilable with the idea of\npurpose in creation. Just as it was those so-called \"disturbances\"\nin the planetary orbits, which appeared at first to point to some\ndisorder and error in the construction of the sidereal system, that\nprompted Lagrange to the investigations which resulted in establishing\nthat the order of the heavens was of a sublimer and more remarkable\ncharacter than had been imagined, essentially including these\napparent disturbances, so it has been the seeming exceptions to plan\nwhich are witnessed in rudimentary and aborted organs (such as the\nwing-bones in wingless birds, the finger-bones in horses, the legs\nbelow the skin in serpents, the teeth which never cut the gums in\nwhales, &c.), that have indicated to modern biologists a unity of\norganisation far more comprehensive and wonderful than had previously\nbeen suspected. The larger and more ideal order thus brought to light\nas ruling in the organic world is one which could only have originated\nin a mind of unspeakable power and perfection. And it not only thus\ntestifies directly of itself in favour of a Divine Intelligence, but\nthe recognition of it, while correcting in some respects earlier\nconceptions as to the place of utility in nature, far from proving\nthat utility has been disregarded or sacrificed, shows that each organ\nhas been formed, not only with reference to its actual use in a given\nindividual or species, but to the capacity of being applied to use in\ncountless other individuals and species.[25]\n\n[25] See Appendix XVII.\n\nWhen we enter into the examination of organisation in itself,\nadjustment becomes still more obvious in the processes of growth,\nreproduction, fructification, &c., in plants and animals, and in the\nprovisions for locomotion, for securing food and shelter, for sight,\nhearing, &c., in the latter. The great physician, Sir Charles Bell,\ndevoted a whole treatise to point out those which are to be found\nin the hand alone. The arrangement of bones, muscles, joints, and\nother parts in the limb of a tiger or the wing of an eagle are not\nless admirable. The eye and ear are singularly exquisite structures,\nthe former being far the most perfect of optical, and the latter far\nthe most perfect of acoustic instruments. Instances of this sort\nare, indeed, so remarkable, and so irresistibly convincing to most\nminds, that some theists have consented to rest on them exclusively\nthe inference of a designing intelligence. They would grant that\nthe evidences of purpose are only to be traced in organisation. The\nlimitation is inconsistent and untenable, but not inexplicable. The\nadjustment of parts to one another, and their co-ordination as means\nto an end, are not more certainly existent in fitting the eye to see\nand the ear to hear than in securing the stability of the solar system,\nbut they are more obviously visible because compressed into a compass\neasily grasped and surveyed; because organ and function are the most\nspecialised kinds of means and ends; because organisms are the most\ncuriously and conspicuously elaborate examples of order. And as the\ntelescope can show us no end of the simple and majestic order of the\nheavens, so the microscope can show us no end of the exquisite and\nimpressive order which discloses even--\n\n    \"In Nature's most minute design,\n    The signature and stamp of power divine;\n    Contrivance intricate, expressed with ease,\n    Where unassisted sight no beauty sees.\n    The shapely limb and lubricated joint\n    Within the small dimensions of a point;\n    Muscle and nerve miraculously spun,\n    His mighty work, who speaks and it is done.\n    The Invisible, in things scarce seen revealed,\n    To whom an atom is an ample field.\"--(COWPER.)[26]\n\n[26] See Appendix XVIII.\n\nThe traces of a Supreme Reason crowd still more upon the vision when we\ncome to the human mind,--\n\n    \"The varied scene of quick-compounded thought,\n    And where the mixing passions endless shift.\"\n\n    --(THOMSON.)\n\nThe mere existence of originated minds necessarily implies the\nexistence of an unoriginated mind. \"What can be more absurd,\" asks\nMontesquieu, \"than to imagine that a blind fatalistic force has\nproduced intelligent beings?\" The complicated and refined adjustments\nof the body to the mind, and of the mind to the body, are so numerous\nand interesting that their study has now become the task of a special\nclass of scientific men. A very little disorder in the organisation\nof the brain--such as even microscopic _post-mortem_ examination may\nfail to detect--suffices to cause hallucinations of the senses, to\nshake intellect from its throne, to paralyse the will, and to corrupt\nthe sentiments and affections. How precise and skilful must the\nadjustment be between the sound brain and sane mind! Who sufficiently\nrealises the mystery of wisdom which lies in the familiar fact that\nthe mind, by merely willing to use the members of the body, sets in\nmotion instantaneously and unconsciously, without effort and without\nfailure, cords and pulleys and levers, joints and muscles, of which\nit only vaguely, if at all, surmises the existence? The laws of our\nvarious appetencies, affections, and emotions, and their relations to\ntheir special ends or objects, the nature of the several intellectual\nfaculties and their subservience to mental culture, and still more the\ngeneral constitution of the mind as a system consisting of a multitude\nof powers under the government of reason and conscience, present to us\nvast fields filled with the evidences of Divine Wisdom.[27]\n\n[27] See Appendix XIX.\n\nThere are others no less extensive and inexhaustible in the principles\nwhich underlie and maintain human society, and those which preside\nover the progressive development of humanity. Political economy is\nthe department of social science which has been cultivated with most\nsuccess. What, then, is its most comprehensive and best established\ntheorem? This--that although the great majority of men are moved\nmainly by self-interest, and few seek with much zeal or persistency\nthe general good, the result of their being left in perfect freedom to\npursue their own advantage, so long as they do not outwardly violate\nthe rules of justice, is far better for the whole society than if\nthey conformed their conduct to any plan which human wisdom, aiming\ndirectly at the general good, could devise; nature having provided in\nthe principles of the human constitution and the circumstances of human\nlife for the selfish plans and passions of individuals so neutralising\none another, so counteracting and counterpoising one another, as to\nsecure the social stability and welfare--as to leave general ideas and\ninterests to rule with comparatively little resistance. It is surely\na natural inference from this that a Supreme Reason grasps all human\nreasons, and uses them in order to realise a purpose grander and better\nthan any which they themselves contemplate. History viewed as a whole\nteaches the same truth on a wider scale. An examination of it discloses\na plan pervading human affairs from the origin of man until the present\nday--a progress which has proceeded without break or stoppage, in\naccordance with laws which are as yet very imperfectly apprehended. Of\nthe countless generations which have come and gone like the leaves of\nthe forest, for unknown thousands of years, few have had the slightest\nglimpse of the order which connected them with their fellows, and\nembraced their every action; fewer still have sought to conform to it;\nthe immense majority have set before them only mean and narrow schemes\nfor personal good; all passions have raged and all vices prevailed\nin their turn; there have been confusion and tumult and war; and yet\nthe order, progress, plan I speak of have been slowly and silently\nbut surely built up. In this evolution of order out of the chaos of\nmillions on millions of conflicting human wills seeking merely their\nown pleasure, there is, perhaps, even a more impressive proof of the\noperation of Divine Wisdom than in the origination and preservation\nof order among the multitudinous stars of heaven. The philosophical\nhistorian who has most conclusively shown by the scrutiny of the chief\nevents in the annals of humanity the existence of such a progressive\nplan, is amply justified in arguing that it cannot have originated\nwith man, or matter, or chance, but must be the work of God. \"We have\npassed in review,\" he says, \"all the theories imagined by philosophers\nand historians to explain the mysterious fact that there is in the life\nof man unfolded in history a succession, a plan, a development, which\ncannot be referred to man himself. Some, despairing from the outset to\nfind a solution, make of their ignorance a blind power which they call\nhazard. Evidently that is no solution. Hazard is a word, and nothing\nmore. Other writers--the majority of writers--say that this mysterious\npower is nature, under the form of climate, or races, or the whole\nof the physical influences which act on the moral world. But what is\nnature? Whence has it this power, this foresight, this intelligence,\nwhich are so conspicuous in the course of our destinies? If nature\nis matter, and nothing but matter, that too is no answer. Who will\nbelieve that matter acts with wisdom--with intelligence? Where there is\nintelligent action there must be an intelligent being; therefore nature\nleads us to God. Finally, there are those who substitute for nature\ngeneral laws. But do not laws suppose a legislator? and who can this\nlegislator be, if not God?\"[28]\n\n[28] See Appendix XX.\n\nThere is, then, everywhere, both in the physical and moral worlds,\norder and adaptation, proportion and co-ordination, and there is very\nwidely present progress--order which advances in a certain direction\nto a certain end, which is until realised only an ideal. This is the\nstate of things which science discloses. The question is, Is this\nstate of things intelligible on any other supposition than that of\na designing mind? The theist holds that it is not; that it directly\nand imperatively demands an intelligent cause; that to assign it\neither to no cause, or to any other than an intelligent cause, is,\nin the strictest and strongest sense of the term, absurd. If we\ndeny that there is such order as I have indicated, we set aside the\nentire teaching of all the sciences--we pronounce science to be from\nbeginning to end a delusion and a lie. Men in the present day dare not\ndo this. If we deny that such order implies the agency of a Supreme\nIntelligence, we contradict no express declaration of any of the\nsciences; we may accept all that they have to tell us about order, and\nthey can tell us about nothing else. But notwithstanding this, it is\nfar more reasonable, far less absurd, to deny that there is order in\nthe universe, than to admit it and deny that its ultimate cause is an\nintelligence. Further, although we cannot be more certain of the cause\nthan of the effect from which it is inferred, and consequently cannot\nbe more certain that an intelligence has produced the order which is in\nthe universe than that there is order therein, the theistic inference\nfrom the whole of that order may well be greatly stronger than the\nscientific proof of order in any particular instance. Men of science\nhave probably never as good reasons for believing in the laws of order\nbrought to light by their own special science, as the theist has for\nbelieving in a Supreme Intelligence because of the order which is the\ncommon and concurrent result of all the sciences, and which is obvious\nto every eye.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe argument from order and adaptation is often spoken of as \"the\nargument from design.\" The phrase is an unfortunate one. The argument\nis not _from_ but _to_ design. To assume design and then to affirm\nthat \"every design must have a designer,\" is manifestly not serious\nreasoning, but a play upon words. To assume design at all is to\nassume precisely what one is most bound to prove; and to assume\ndesign in the universe is to assume what cannot be proved, yea, what\nthe theist requires to show against the pantheist cannot be proved.\nIn any other than a very loose and metaphorical sense design has no\nexistence except in mind. There is no design in the sky, or the sea,\nor the land; there are only law, order, and arrangement therein, and\nthese things are not designs although they imply designs. What we can\ndescribe as the designs of the lower animals are given to them with\ntheir constitutions, and are only a part of the instrumentality which\nfits them for their place in the world. Men have designs properly so\ncalled; but the argument for the existence of God from the evidences\nof a Supreme Wisdom in the progressive evolution of human history,\ninstead of resting on these designs, is based on the fact that what\nhas actually been realised has far transcended them. Science as a\nmere exposition of the facts of the universe can never show us Divine\ndesign, for the good reason that there is no such design in these\nfacts, although, had it not existed elsewhere, they could never have\nbeen what they are. While this is true, it must in justice be added\nthat most if not all of the advocates of theism who have presented\nthe argument under consideration in the faulty form,--\"Design implies\na designer; the universe abounds in design; therefore the universe,\nso far as it abounds in design, implies a designer,\"--have erred more\nin expression than in thought. In reality they have not meant by\ndesign what is properly so called, and consequently have not begun\ntheir argument by assuming what was denied and in need of proof. In\nreality they have meant by design those characteristics of things\nwhich they hold to be the indications or evidences or correlatives of\nintelligence, and which they might have designated by such terms as\norder, adjustment, adaptation, fitness, progress, &c. All attempts\nto refute their reasoning, therefore, by a strict and literal\ninterpretation of the phrase \"Design implies a designer,\" must be\npronounced unfair. Censure of the phrase is warranted. Rejection of the\nargument on account of the phrase is superficial and unjust.\n\nIt has been held that the argument from order and adaptation is\nessentially different from the design argument. The reason given for\nthis has been that the design argument is based on the analogy or\nsupposed analogy between the works of nature and the products of human\nart. In this argument, we are told, we infer from the likeness which\ncertain natural objects bear to artificial objects that there must be\na likeness in their causes. We know, it is said, that only intelligent\nbeings frame such structures as houses, ships, and watches, and seeing\nthat there is in the mechanism of the heavens, the circulation of the\nblood, and the construction of the eye, arrangements and adjustments\nof a similar kind, we conclude that they also must have been framed\nby an intelligent being, who must be as much greater than man as the\nworks of nature are greater than the works of art, for causes are\nproportional to their effects. Now this may be the design argument\nas some have presented it who had no particular wish to criticise it\nseverely, and it certainly is the way in which Hume and Kant wished\nit to be presented; but it has no claim whatever to be considered the\nonly proper form of the argument, and is, in fact, a very bad form of\nit. It is true that there is an analogy between the works of nature\nand the works of art, and that on the strength of this analogy the two\nclasses of works, and also their causes, may be compared, but not true\nthat the design argument when correctly stated either rests on such\nanalogy or implies such comparison. The analogy and comparison may be\ndrawn into, and, as it were, incorporated with the design argument,\nbut that is rather as a means of illustration than as a condition of\ninference. When we infer from an examination of their construction\nthat the eye and the ear have been designed by an intelligent being,\nwe are no more dependent on our knowledge that a watch or a telescope\nhas been designed by an intelligent being than we are dependent on\nour knowledge of the eye and ear being the products of intelligence\nwhen we infer that the watch and the telescope are the products of\nintelligence. There is an inference in both cases, and an inference\nof precisely the same nature in both cases. It is as direct and\nindependent when the transition is to God from His works as when to\nour fellow-men from their works. We are greatly mistaken if we suppose\nthat we have an immediate knowledge of the intelligence of the beings\nwho make watches, houses, and ships; we only know that the beings who\nmake these things are intelligent because such things could not be made\nwithout intelligence: in a word, we only know our fellow-creatures to\nbe intelligent beings because they utter and arrange sounds so as to\nconvey a meaning, execute movements which tend to an end, and construct\nmachines. We have no more a direct perception or a personal experience\nof the intelligence of our fellow-men than we have of the intelligence\nof God. The mind which has given origin to the order and adjustments\nof the universe is not more absolutely inaccessible to sense and\nself-consciousness than the mind which gives origin to the order and\nadjustments of a watch. It is therefore impossible that our knowledge\nof the former should be dependent on our knowledge of the latter. In\nboth cases the knowledge is inferential,--in both cases it is dependent\non the immediate consciousness of intelligence in ourselves,--but the\ninference is in the former case neither longer nor less legitimate than\nin the latter. We deny, then, that there is any truth in the statement\nthat the design argument rests on the analogy between the works of\nnature and the products of art It rests directly on the character\nof the works of nature as displaying order and adjustment. It is\nessentially identical with the argument which we have expounded.\n\nIt is not less objectionable to speak of the argument from order and\nadaptation as being an argument from final causes than to speak of it\nas being an argument from design, unless the different significations\nof final cause be distinguished, and those which are irrelevant and\nillegitimate be excluded. For the expression \"final cause\" has various\nsignifications which are indeed intimately related, yet which cannot\nbe employed indifferently without leading to utter confusion. These\nsignifications may be distributed into two classes. Each class contains\nthree significations, and every signification of the first class has\na signification of the second class to correspond to it. In fact,\nthe significations of the first class are simply so many aspects of\norder or adaptation, and those of the second class so many aspects of\ndesign or intention; the former are order and adaptation viewed with\nreference to the intrinsic, the extrinsic, and the ultimate ends of\nthings, and the latter are design and intention viewed with reference\nto the same three ends. Final cause sometimes means the intrinsic\nend of what is orderly and adjusted, the realisation of the nature\nof anything which is considered as a whole, a complex of order and\nadjustment. The combined stability and movement of the solar system\nis in this sense the final cause of the arrangements by which that\nresult is secured. Sight is in this sense the final cause of the eye,\nbecause in sight the true nature of the eye manifests itself. Then,\nfinal cause sometimes means not the intrinsic but the extrinsic end of\nwhat is orderly and adjusted; not merely the realisation of the nature\nof anything, but its relationship to other things, its adaptations to\ntheir requirements, its uses; not merely the end of an arrangement\nregarded as a self-contained or completed whole, but the end or\nends which it serves as a system surrounded by, connected with, and\nincluded in other systems. It is impossible to admit final cause in\nthe sense of intrinsic end and to deny it in that of extrinsic end;\nfor the universe is not a mere aggregate of systems placed alongside\nof one another, but otherwise unconnected--it is itself a system\ncomposed of an infinity of systems within systems. Nothing in nature\nstands alone; nothing lives to itself nor dies to itself. What is a\nwhole with reference to something smaller than itself, is a part with\nreference to something larger than itself. The eye is a whole with\nreference to its own cords, lenses, fluids, and membranes, but it is a\npart with reference to the body; sight is therefore not more certainly\nits end than the uses of sight How can a man admit final cause to be\ninvolved in the relationship between his stomach and bodily life, but\ndeny it to be involved in the relationship between his stomach and the\nvegetable and animal substances with which he satisfies its cravings?\nClearly the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ends is a\nnarrow one, and exists not so much in the nature of things as in our\nway of looking at things. We have but to elevate and extend our own\nview, and what was before an extrinsic end is thereby changed into an\nintrinsic end. Admit, in fact, final cause anywhere, and you must admit\nit everywhere; admit anything to have an end, and you must admit all\nthings to have an end; for the world is a grand and wondrous unity\nin which all objects depend on and serve one another, and all forces\ncontribute to the attainment of a single comprehensive issue. Once\naccept the principle of finality, and there is no consistent stopping\nshort of the conviction of Aristotle, that on it hang the whole heavens\nand earth.\n\nIt is only when the word final cause is used in one or other of these\ntwo senses that we can with any propriety speak of reasoning from\nfinal causes to the existence of God. And these are just the senses\nin which the expression is now least used. Final cause is generally\nemployed at present to signify design. It means, not the arrangement\nof causes and effects into systematic unities, the parts of which have\ndefinite relations to one another and a common issue, or the adaptation\nof these unities to support and serve one another, but purpose or\nintention in the Divine Mind with respect to such arrangement or\nadaptation. This sense of the word is so obviously general enough to\nrefer both to intrinsic and extrinsic ends that it would be unnecessary\nto direct attention to the fact, were it not that we are much more\napt to fall into error regarding extrinsic than intrinsic ends, and\nconsequently, regarding the intention or purpose which refers to them.\nA thing has just one intrinsic end--namely, the single conspicuous\nand all-comprehensive function or issue in virtue of which we can\nregard it as being a whole or unity, and as possessed of a certain\nrelative independence or completeness. There is thus comparatively\nlittle possibility of error in determining what the intrinsic end is\nin a given instance, and comparatively little danger of presumption\nin affirming it to have been the end contemplated by the Divine\nMind. There is no doubt, for example, that the eye is an instrument\nconstructed in a way calculated to attain the intrinsic end--sight; and\nthere can be no presumption in affirming that God must have had that\nend in view in the construction of the eye. If there be a God, and if\nHe have had anything to do with the making of the eye, He must have\ndesigned that His creatures should see with their eyes. It is different\nwith extrinsic ends. A thing has never merely one extrinsic end; it\nhas always a multitude of extrinsic ends, for it is always related to\na multitude of other things. If we would speak of the extrinsic end\nof a thing we must mean thereby the whole of its adaptations to other\nthings, the entire circle of its external relationships, the sum of\nits uses. But men have always shown themselves prone in judging of the\nextrinsic ends of things to single out some particular adaptation or\nuse, or at least a few adaptations or uses, and to ignore or exclude\nall others. And especially have they shown themselves prone to judge\nof things merely from their relationship and utility to themselves, as\nif their happiness was the chief if not sole end of all things. This\nis, of course, an utterly erroneous method of judging, and necessarily\nleads to ridiculous thoughts about things, and to irreverent thoughts\nabout God's designs in the creation of things. \"It can,\" as Hegel tells\nus, \"truly profit neither religion nor science, if, after considering\nthe vine with reference to the well-known uses which it confers upon\nman, we proceed to consider the cork-tree with reference to the corks\nwhich are cut from its bark to serve as stoppers for wine-bottles.\"\n\nWhen we affirm, then, that final causes in the sense of intrinsic ends\nare in things, we affirm merely that things are systematic unities, the\nparts of which are definitely related to one another and co-ordinated\nto a common issue; and when we affirm that final causes in the sense\nof extrinsic ends are in things, we affirm merely that things are not\nisolated and independent systems, but systems definitely related to\nother systems, and so adjusted as to be parts or components of higher\nsystems, and means to issues more comprehensive than their own. We\ncannot affirm that final causes in the sense of designs are in things;\nthey can only exist in a mind. What do we mean when we hold that final\ncauses in this sense truly are in the Divine Mind, and with reference\nequally to intrinsic and extrinsic ends? Merely that such order and\nadjustment as may actually be seen in things and between things--seen\nwith the naked eye it may be, or only to be seen through the telescope\nor microscope--or which, if they cannot be seen, yet can by scientific\ninduction be proved to be in and between things,--that that order and\nadjustment which actually exist, were intended or designed by God to\nexist. Of course every theist who sees evidences of God's existence in\nthe harmonies of nature, must necessarily rise to final causes in this\nsense from final causes in the other senses which have been indicated;\nhe must pass from material arrangements to the Divine Intelligence\nwhich he believes to be manifested by them. And there can be no shadow\nof presumption in any theist searching for final causes--Divine\ndesigns--in this sense and to this extent. What Descartes and others\nhave said against doing so, on the ground that it is arrogant for a man\nto suppose he can investigate the ends contemplated by the Deity--can\npenetrate into the counsels of Divine Wisdom--has manifestly no force\nor relevancy, so long as all that is maintained is that the order\nwhich actually exists was meant to exist. The doubt or denial of that\nis irreverent. To admit the existence of God, and yet to refuse to\nacknowledge that He purposed and planned the adaptations and harmonies\nin nature, is surely as presumptuous as it is inconsistent. To assume\nthat God is ignorant of the constitution and character of the universe,\nand has had no share in the contrivance and management of it, is to\ndegrade Him to the level of the dream-and-dread-begotten gods of\nDemocritus and Epicurus. Better not to think of God at all, than to\nthink of Him in such a way.\n\nThe final cause of a thing, however, may mean, and with reference\nboth to adjustment and design, neither its intrinsic nor extrinsic,\nbut its ultimate end. It may mean, not merely that a thing is and\nwas intended to be the mechanism or organism which science analyses\nand explains, and to stand in the relationships and fulfil the uses\nwhich science traces, but also that it will have, and was intended to\nhave, a destination in the far future. We may ask, What is the goal\ntowards which creation moves? What will be the fate of the earth? In\nwhat directions are vegetable and animal life developing? What is the\nchief end of man? Whither is history tending? What is the ideal of\ntruth which science has before it, and which it hopes to realise? of\nbeauty, which art has before it? of goodness, which virtue has before\nit? And although to most if not all of these questions probably no\nvery definite and certain answer can be given, to deny that they can\nin any measure be answered, to pronounce all speculation regarding\nultimate ends as wholly vain, would justly be deemed the expression of\na rash and thoughtless dogmatism. Science claims not only to explain\nthe past but to foretell the future. The power of prevision possessed\nby a science is the best criterion of its rank among the sciences when\nrank is determined by certitude. And most significant is the boldness\nwith which some of the sciences have of late begun to forecast the\nfuture. Thus, with reference to the end of the world, the spirit of\nprophecy, which until very recently was almost confined to the most\nnoted religious visionaries, is now poured largely out upon our most\ndistinguished physicists. This we regard as a most significant and\nhopeful circumstance, and trust that ere long the prophets of science\nwill be far less discordant and conflicting in their predictions even\nof the remotest issues than they must be admitted to be at present.\n\nWhile speculation as to final causes in the sense of ultimate ends is,\nwithin certain limits, as legitimate as it is natural, its results are\nundoubtedly far too meagre and uncertain to allow of our reasoning from\nthem to the existence or wisdom of God. We must prove that there is a\nDivine Intelligence from what we actually perceive in things, and not\nfrom what we can conjecture as to the final destinies of things. In\nfact, until we have ascertained that there is a Divine Intelligence,\nand in some measure what are the principles on which that Intelligence\nproceeds, our chance of reaching truth through speculation as to the\nultimate ends of things is, in all probability, exceedingly small. It\nis on no hazardous speculations of this kind that we would rest an\nargument for the Divine existence, although questions have been raised\nas to the Divine character and government which will, at a later stage\nof the discussion, involve us to some extent in the consideration of\nultimate ends.\n\nWhen final cause is employed to signify design in any reference,\nbe it to intrinsic, extrinsic, or ultimate ends, I have nothing to\nobject to Bacon and Descartes's condemnation of it as illegitimate\nand unprofitable in science. I know of no science, physical or moral,\nin which, while thus understood, it can be of the slightest use as\na principle of scientific discovery. It is as much out of place in\nthe world of organic as of inorganic nature. It is quite incorrect\nto say that although it does not lead to the discovery of new truths\nin strictly physical science, it does so in physiology for example,\nor in psychology, or in ethics. It is only when it means merely the\ninherent order and adjustment of things--not when it means designs\nand purposes regarding them--that the search after it can possibly\nlead to scientific truth, and, when so understood, it leads to truth\nin all sciences alike. It was the suggestive principle in Adams and\nLeverrier's discovery of the planet Neptune from certain unexplained\nperturbations of the planet Uranus, quite as much as in Harvey's\ndiscovery of the circulation of the blood from the observation of\ncertain unexplained valves at the outlet of the veins and the rise\nof the arteries. It is involved in the very nature of the inductive\nprocess, and is only confirmed and enlarged by the progress of\ninductive research. It stands in no opposition to the principle of\nefficient causes, and is in no degree disproved by the discovery of\nsuch causes. Assertions to the effect that it has gradually been driven\nby the advance of knowledge from the simpler sciences into those which\nare complex and difficult,--that it is being expelled even out of\nbiology and sociology--and that it always draws its confirmation, not\nfrom phenomena which have been explained, but from phenomena which\nawait explanation,--are often made, but they rest almost exclusively\non the wishes of those who make them. They have no real historical\nbasis.[29]\n\n[29] See Appendix XXI.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\n OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER EXAMINED.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe universe is a system which comprehends countless subordinate\nsystems. It is full of combinations of parts which constitute\nwholes, and of means which conspire to ends. The natural and obvious\nexplanation of the order and adjustments which it thus presents is that\nthey are due to a mind or intelligence. And this is the only rational\nexplanation of them. Mind can alone account for order and adjustment,\nfor the co-ordination of parts into a whole, or the adaptation of\nmeans to an end. If we refer them to anything else, the reference is\nessentially contrary to reason, essentially irrational. It may seem at\nthe first superficial glance as if there were a variety of hypotheses\nas to the origin of the order we everywhere see around us, all equally\nor nearly equally credible; but adequate reflection cannot fail to\nconvince us that they must be reduced to a single alternative--to two\nantagonistic theories. Our only choice is between reason and unreason,\nbetween a sufficient and an insufficient cause, between, we may even\nsay, a cause and no cause. This will be brought out by an examination\nof the various hypotheses which have been suggested by those who are\nunwilling to admit that the order of the world originated in mind. They\ntry their best to suggest some other alternative than that which I have\nsaid is inevitable; but every suggestion they make only raises the\nalternative which they would avoid--mind or chance, reason or unreason,\na sufficient explanation or an absurd one. Before proceeding to\nestablish this, however, it may be necessary to remark on some direct\nobjections which have been taken to the design argument,--objections\nwhich might be valid, although no explanation of order could be given\nor were even attempted.\n\nThe inference which the theist requires to draw from the existence of\norder in the universe is merely the existence of an intelligence who\nproduced that order. It follows that it is an unfair objection to his\nargument to urge, as has often been urged, that it does not directly\nand of itself prove God to be the creator of the universe, but only the\nformer of it--not the author of matter, but only of the collocations of\nmatter. This objection, which men even like Hume and Kant and J. S.\nMill, have thought worth employing, is simply that the argument does\nnot prove more than it professes to prove. It does not pretend to make\nall other reasoning for the Divine existence superfluous. It is no\ncondition of its validity that it should stand alone; that it should\ncontribute nothing to other arguments and receive nothing from them.\nThe objection is thus entirely irrelevant. It may be a wise caution\nto those who would trust exclusively to it, and neglect or depreciate\nother arguments. It is no objection to its legitimacy.\n\nIt is remarkable, too, that those who have urged this objection\nhave never felt that before employing it they were bound to satisfy\nthemselves and to prove to others that order is a mere surface or\nsuperficial thing--outside of matter, superimposed on it. If order\nbe something inherently and intrinsically in matter--be of its very\nessence--belong to what is ultimate in it; if matter and its form be\ninseparable,--then the author of its order must have been also the\nauthor of itself; and all that this objection shows us is, that those\nwho have employed it have had mistaken notions about the nature of\nmatter. Now, as I have already had to indicate, modern science seems\nrapidly perfecting the proof of this. The order in the heavens, and in\nthe most complicated animal organisms, appears to be not more wonderful\nthan the order in the ultimate atoms of which they are composed. The\nbalance of evidence is in favour of the view that order extends as far\nand penetrates as deep as matter itself does. The human intellect is\ndaily learning that it is foolish to fancy that there is anywhere in\nmatter a sphere in which the Divine Wisdom does not manifest itself in\nand through order.\n\nThere is still another remark to be made on the objection under\nconsideration. The immediate inference from the order of the universe\nis to an intelligent former of the universe, not to a creator. But\nthis does not preclude the raising of the question, Is it reasonable\nto believe the former of the world merely its former? Must not its\nformer be also its creator? On the contrary, the inference that the\norder of the world must be the result of intelligent agency ought\nto suggest this question to every serious and reflective mind, and\nit should even contribute something to its answer. The order of the\nuniverse must have originated with intelligence. What is implied in\nthis admission? Clearly that the order of the universe cannot have\noriginated with matter,--that matter is unintelligent, and cannot\naccount either for intelligence or the effects of intelligence. But\nif so, the intelligence which formed the universe must be an eternal\nintelligence. The supposition that matter is eternal must in this case\nbe supplemented by the admission that mind is eternal. In other words,\nthe affirmation that the former of the world is merely its former--the\ndenial that its former is also its creator--means dualism, the belief\nin two distinct eternal existences,--an eternal mind and eternal\nmatter. Whoever is not prepared to accept this hypothesis must abandon\nthe affirmation and denial from which it necessarily follows. And who\ncan, after due deliberation, accept it? The law of parsimony of causes\nabsolutely forbids our assuming, for the explanation of anything, more\ncauses than are necessary to account for it. It forbids, therefore,\nour belief in an eternal matter and an eternal mind, unless we can\nshow reason for holding that one of them alone is not a sufficient\ncause of the universe. Now those who grant the inference from order\nto intelligence, themselves admit that matter is not a sufficient\nFirst Cause of the universe as it actually exists. Do they find any\nperson admitting that mind would be an insufficient First Cause? Do\nthey themselves see any way of showing its insufficiency? Do they not\neven perceive that it would be foolish and hopeless to try to show\nthat an eternal mind could not create a material universe, and that\nall they could show would be, the here quite irrelevant truth, that\nthe human mind is ignorant of the manner in which this could be done?\nIf the answers to these questions are what I believe they must be, it\nmust also be acknowledged that the former of the universe can only be\nrationally thought of as also its creator.\n\nI turn to the consideration of another equally futile objection to\nthe argument from order. That argument, it is said, does not prove\nthe Divine Intelligence to be infinite. The universe, as a system of\norder, is finite, and we have no right to conclude that its cause\nis in respect of intelligence, or in any other respect, infinite.\nWe must attribute to the cause the wisdom necessary to produce the\neffect, but no more. The obvious reply is, that this is precisely\nwhat we do. The argument is not employed to prove the infinity of the\nDivine Intelligence, but to prove that the order and adaptations which\neverywhere abound in the universe must have had an intelligence capable\nof conceiving and producing them. It is an obvious and legitimate\nargument to that extent, and it is pushed no farther. The inference\nthat the world had an intelligent author is as simple, direct, and\nvalid, as that any statue, painting, or book had an intelligent author.\nWhen Mr Spencer, Mr Lewes, and Professor Tyndall argue that the cause\nof the universe cannot be known to be intelligent, because the reason\nof man, being finite, cannot comprehend the infinite, they overlook\nthat the reason of man has no need to comprehend the infinite in order\nto apprehend such manifestations of the infinite as come before it.\nJust as a person reading the works of the able men who urge this weak\nobjection feels certain that these books must have had their origin in\nminds endowed with certain intellectual powers, and cannot have been\nproduced by chance, or blind forces, or bodies destitute of minds, and\nthis although much in their minds is and always must be inscrutable\nto him; so, when he studies the books of nature and of history, he\nfeels equally certain, and in the same way certain, that they are the\ncompositions of a most amazing intellect; and his certainty as to this\nneed not be lessened, clouded, or in any degree affected, by the great\nand indubitable, but here irrelevant, truth--that the mind of God is\nin itself, in its essence, inscrutable; and in its greatness, its\ninfinity, incomprehensible.\n\nThe argument from order must further be admitted sufficient to show,\nif valid at all, that the wisdom of the First Cause is of the most\nwondrous character. The more nature and mind and history are studied by\nany one who sees in them evidence of design at all, the more wondrous\nmust the wisdom displayed in them be felt to be. Whoever realises\nthat that wisdom is at once guiding the countless hosts of heavenly\nbodies in all their evolutions through the boundless realms of space,\nand fashioning and providing for the countless hosts of microscopic\ncreatures dwelling on the leaf of a flower or in a drop of water,\neverywhere accomplishing a multitude of ends by few and simple means,\nor effecting single and definite purposes by the most elaborate and\ncomplex contrivances, must feel that rash beyond all expression is the\nshort-sighted mortal who can venture to affirm that it is not infinite.\nIf \"the Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, and by understanding\nhath established the heavens,\" His wisdom and His understanding are\nat least so great that we cannot measure them, and have no right to\npronounce them limited. The adjustments and harmonies of the universe,\nas we know it, indicate a depth and richness of wisdom in its Author\nwhich far pass our comprehension; and the universe which we know is\nprobably less in comparison with the universe which God has made, than\nthe leaf on which a host of animalcules live and die is in comparison\nwith the vastest of primeval forests, or an ant-hill with the solar\nsystem. The universe which we see and know is a noble commentary on\nsuch words of Scripture as these: \"I wisdom dwell with prudence,\nand find out knowledge of witty inventions. The Lord possessed me\nin the beginning of His way, before His works of old. I was set up\nfrom everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When He\nprepared the heavens, I was there: when He set a compass on the face of\nthe depth: when He established the clouds above: when He strengthened\nthe fountains of the deep: when He gave to the sea his decree, that\nthe waters should not pass His commandment: when He appointed the\nfoundations of the earth: then I was by Him, as one brought up with\nHim; and I was daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him.\" But\nbeyond the universe which we see and know, extend illimitable fields of\nspace and stretches of time which we do not see and do not know, but\nwhich may be even more crowded with the works of Divine Intelligence\nthan any which are within our range of bodily or mental vision. The\ningenious authors of the book entitled 'The Unseen Universe' suppose\nthe entire visible universe to be but a local product and temporary\nphase of a far older and greater universe, which itself again may be\nonly an island in the ocean of a universe still more stupendous and\nrefined. Whatever error may be mingled with this thought in the work\nmentioned, there is, I doubt not, at least this much of truth also,\nthat the entire course of nature which science reveals is but a ripple,\na current, in the ocean of God's universal action. The man whose mind\nis duly open to the possibility of this will not venture to pronounce\nthe intelligence of God to be finite. The man who fails to recognise\nits possibility is very blind, very thoughtless.\n\nIt is scarcely credible that the evidences of God's wisdom should\nhave been argued to be proofs of His weakness. And yet this has\nhappened. \"It is not too much to say,\" wrote Mr J. S. Mill, \"that\nevery indication of design in the Kosmos is so much evidence against\nthe omnipotence of the Designer. For what is meant by design?\nContrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity for\ncontrivance--the need of employing means--is a consequence of the\nlimitation of power. Who would have recourse to means if to attain his\nend his mere word was sufficient? The very idea of means implies that\nthe means have an efficacy which the direct action of the being who\nemploys them has not. Otherwise they are not means, but an encumbrance.\nA man does not use machinery to move his arms. If he did, it could\nonly be when paralysis had deprived him of the power of moving them\nby volition. But if the employment of contrivance is in itself a sign\nof limited power, how much more so is the careful and skilful choice\nof contrivances? Can any wisdom be shown in the selection of means\nwhen the means have no efficacy but what is given them by the will\nof him who employs them, and when his will could have bestowed the\nsame efficacy on any other means? Wisdom and contrivance are shown\nin overcoming difficulties, and there is no room for them in a being\nfor whom no difficulties exist. The evidences, therefore, of natural\ntheology distinctly imply that the author of the Kosmos worked under\nlimitations.\"[30]\n\n[30] Three Essays on Religion, pp. 176, 177.\n\nThis, it seems to me, is very strange and worthless reasoning.\nAccording to it, the ability of God to form and execute a purpose is\nevidence not of power but of weakness. I wonder if Mr Mill imagined\nthat the inability of God to form and carry out a purpose would have\nbeen evidence not of His weakness but of His power. Or did he suppose,\nperhaps, that both ability and inability were signs of weakness, and\nthat, consequently, for once opposites were identical? Or did he not\nthink on the subject at all, and so reasoned very much at random?\nI confess I cannot see how ability to contrive things is weakness,\nor inability to contrive them power. I hold to Bacon's maxim that\n\"knowledge is power,\" and refuse to admit that wisdom is weakness.\nBut God, if omnipotent, it is said, did not need to contrive: His\nmere word must have been sufficient. Yes, is the obvious answer;\nHis mere word, His mere will, was sufficient to produce all His\ncontrivances, and has produced them all. There is no shadow of reason\nfor suspecting that anything was difficult to Him or for Him. No such\nsuspicion is entertained by those who employ the design argument;\nand those who would rationally object to that argument must find\nsomething else to insist on than the power of God's mere will. The\nwill of God is everywhere as efficacious as He in His omnipotence and\nomniscience chooses that it should be. At the same time, if He desire\ncertain ends, His will cannot remain mere will and dispense with the\ncontrivance of appropriate means. If He wish to bestow happiness on\nhuman beings, He must create human beings, and contrive their bodies\nand minds. To speak of His will as able to \"bestow the same efficacy\non any means\" is no less contrary to reason than it would be to speak\nof it as able to make the part greater than the whole. It is only\nin the world imagined by Mr Mill--one in which two and two might be\nfive--that a sunbeam could serve the same purpose as a granite pillar\nor a steam-engine; and such a world, most people will assuredly hold,\neven omnipotence could not create. Infinite power and wisdom must\nnecessarily work \"under limitations\" when they originate and control\nfinite things; but the limitations are not in the infinite power and\nwisdom themselves--they are in their operations and effects. According\nto Mr Mill's argument, infinite power could not create a finite world\nat all: only a finite power could do so. That surely means that a\nfinite power must be mightier than an infinite power; and that, again,\nis surely a plain self-contradiction, a manifest absurdity.\n\nThere is another objection which, although in itself unworthy of\nanswer, has been urged so often and presented in so many forms, some\nof which are rhetorically impressive, that it cannot be wholly\npassed over. The design argument has been censured as \"assuming\nthat the genesis of the heavens and the earth was effected somewhat\nafter the manner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture\"--as\n\"converting the Power whose garment is seen in the visible universe\ninto an Artificer, fashioned after the human model, and acting as man\nis seen to act\"--as \"transforming the First Cause into a magnified\nmechanist who constructs a work of art, and then sits apart from it and\nobserves how it goes,\" &c. Now the heavens and the earth are to such a\nwonderful extent exemplifications both of mechanical laws and \u00e6sthetic\nprinciples, that no man of sense, I think, will deny that they may most\njustly be compared to machines or works of art, or even pronounced to\nbe machines and works of art. They are that, although they are more\nthan that. An animal is a machine, although an organism too. Every\norganism is a machine, although every machine is not an organism. Art\nand nature are not antagonistic and exclusive. Man and all man's arts\nare included in nature, and nature is the highest art. While, however,\nit is legitimate and even necessary to illustrate the design argument\nby references to human inventions, the numerous and immense differences\nbetween the works of man's art and the processes of nature must not\nbe overlooked; and there is no excuse for saying that they have been\noverlooked. It is precisely because the universe is so above anything\nman has made or can make, and because vegetable and animal organisms\nare so different from watches and statues, that the argument in\nquestion leads us to a divine and not to a merely human intelligence.\nIt implies that both the works of God and the works of man are products\nof intelligence; but it does not require that they should have anything\nelse in common. It recognises that the most elaborate and exquisite\ncontrivances of man fall immeasurably below \"nature's most minute\ndesigns.\" So far from requiring, it forbids our carrying any of the\nlimitations or peculiarities of human contrivance over to that which is\ndivine. Besides, the belief in design is held in conjunction with the\nbelief in creation out of nothing. The same persons who recognise that\nthere is a divine wisdom displayed in the constitution and course of\nnature believe the universe to have been called into being by the mere\nvolition of the Almighty. But among all theories of the genesis of the\nheavens and the earth, that is the only one which does not represent\nthe First Cause as working like a man. Man never creates--he cannot\ncreate. To produce anything he must have something to work on--he must\nhave materials to mould and modify.[31]\n\n[31] See Appendix XXII.\n\n\nII.\n\nThose who refuse to refer the order and adaptations in the universe to\na designing intelligence are bound to account for them in some other\nway. Has this been done? Has any person succeeded in tracing them back\nto any other principle which can be reasonably regarded as their cause,\nor as adequate to their production? This is the question which we have\nnow to consider.\n\nMatter, some would have us believe, is the origin of the order of the\nuniverse. Grant it, and there is still the question--What is the origin\nof matter?--to be disposed of. We have seen that this is a question\nwhich we are bound to raise; we have seen that there are strong reasons\nfor holding that matter had an origin, had a beginning in time, and\nnone whatever for regarding it as self-existent and eternal. The very\nexistence of order and system, of mechanical adjustments and organic\nadaptations in the universe, seems to prove that matter must have had\na beginning. If certain collocations of matter evince design, and\nmust have had a beginning, the adaptation of the parts to form the\ncollocation evinces design, and implies a beginning. And if matter\nhad a beginning, its cause can only have been mind. To say that it\noriginated with chance or necessity is plainly absurd. Chance and\nnecessity are meaningless terms unless mind or matter be presupposed.\nThere can be no accidents where neither mind nor matter exists. There\ncan be no chance where there is no law. Chance or accident is what\noccurs when two or more independent series of phenomena meet, without\ntheir meeting having been premeditated and provided for. When one\nseries of causes leads a man to pass a house at a given moment of a\ngiven day, and another series of causes, coexistent with but wholly\nindependent of the former series, determines that a heavy body shall\nfall from the roof of that house at that moment of that day and\nkill that man, the consequence--his death--is what may be properly\ncalled an accident, or matter of chance. One who believes, indeed,\nin the omniscience and universal foreordination and government of\nGod, will hold that even in such a case the accident or chance is\nmerely apparent; but he will not deny the right of the atheist to\nspeak of chance or accident in this way, or to explain as matters of\nchance whatever he can. The word chance, or accident, can have no\nintelligible sense, however, unless there be such independent series of\nphenomena--unless there be mental and material existences, mental and\nmaterial laws. Chance cannot be conceived of, even by the atheist, as\nthe origin of existence. The same may be said of necessity. Matter or\nmind may act necessarily, but necessity cannot act without matter or\nmind. If it be requisite, therefore, to seek a cause for matter, mind\nalone can be assigned as its cause. If we are justified in seeking for\nthe origin of matter at all, our choice of an answer lies between mind\nand absurdity, between a real and sufficient cause and an imaginary and\ninconceivable cause. Besides, how could matter of itself produce order,\neven if it were self-existent and eternal? It is far more unreasonable\nto believe that the atoms or constituents of matter produced of\nthemselves, without the action of a Supreme Mind, this wonderful\nuniverse, than that the letters of the English alphabet produced the\nplays of Shakespeare, without the slightest assistance from the human\nmind known by that famous name. These atoms might, perhaps, now and\nthen, here and there, at great distances and long intervals, produce,\nby a chance contact, some curious collocation or compound; but never\ncould they produce order or organisation, on an extensive scale or of\na durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and adjusted in ways of\nwhich intelligence alone can be the ultimate explanation. To believe\nthat their fortuitous and undirected movements could originate the\nuniverse, and all the harmonies and utilities and beauties which abound\nin it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant than has ever been\ndisplayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet no consistent\nmaterialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance-hypothesis.\nAll the explanations of the order of the universe which materialists,\nfrom Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have devised, rest\non the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal, must\npass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be our\npresent world--a special collocation among the countless millions of\ncollocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet,\nit has been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the\nIliad and all Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardly\nsay, requires us to believe nothing so absurd. Throw letters together\nwithout thought through all eternity, and you will never make them\nexpress thought. All the letters in the Iliad might have been tossed\nand jumbled together from morning to night by the hands of the whole\nhuman race, from the beginning of the world until now, and the first\nline of the Iliad would have been still to compose, had not the genius\nof Homer been inspired to sing the wrath of Achilles and the war around\nTroy. But what is the Iliad to the hymn of creation, and the drama of\nprovidence? Were these glorious works composed by the mere jumbling\ntogether of atoms, which were not even prepared beforehand to form\nthings, as letters are to form words, and which had to shake themselves\ninto order without the help of any hand? They may believe that who\ncan. It seems to me that it ought to be much easier to believe all the\nArabian Nights.\n\nTo ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of\nthe real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained.\nThe question is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The\nunperverted human mind cannot believe it to be without a reason. \"The\nexistence of a law connecting and governing any class of phenomena\nimplies a presiding intelligence which has preconceived and established\nthe law. The regulation of events by precise rules of time and space,\nof number and measure, is evidence of thought and mind.\" So says Dr\nWhewell; and the statement is amply justified by the fact, that all\nlaws and rules in the universe imply that existences are related to one\nanother in a way of which intelligent adjustment alone is the adequate\nand ultimate explanation. The existence of a law uniformly involves\nthe coexistence of several conditions, and that is a phenomenon\nwhich, whenever the conditions and law are physically ultimate, and\nconsequently physically inexplicable, clearly presupposes mind. Laws,\nin a word, are not the causes but the expressions of order. They are\nthemselves the results of delicately accurate adjustments, which\nindicate the operation of a divine wisdom. There are chemical laws,\nfor example, simply because there are chemical elements endowed with\naffinities, attractions, or forces the most diverse, yet so balanced\nand harmonised as to secure the welfare of the world. Besides, laws\ndo not act of themselves. No law produces of itself any result. It is\nthe agents which act according to the law that produce results, and\nthe nature of the result produced depends on the number and character\nof the agents, and how each is situated and circumstanced. If the\nagents oppose each other, or are inappropriately distributed, they\nbring about disorder and disaster in conformity to law. There is no\ncalamity, no evil, no scene of confusion, in the known world, which\nis not the result of the action of agents which operate in strictest\naccordance to law. The law of gravitation might rule every particle\nof matter, and yet conflict and confusion and death would prevail\nthroughout the entire solar system were harmony and stability and\nlife not secured by very special arrangements. Matter might have all\nits present inherent and essential laws, and yet remain for ever a\nchaos. Apart from a designing and superintending intelligence, the\nchances in favour of chaos and against cosmos, even allowing matter\nto have uncreated properties and laws, were incalculable. The obvious\ninference is that which Professor Jevons expresses in these words--\"As\nan unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an\nunlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting\nmatter to have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment\nin time, out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that\none choice and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe\nthat now exists.\" Only out of rational choice can order have come.\n\nThe most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order\npresents to reason, is the indication of the process by which the\norder has been realised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there\nhave been men who supposed that they had completely explained away the\nevidences for design in nature when they had described the physical\nantecedents of the arrangements appealed to as evidences. Aristotle\nshowed the absurdity of the supposition more than 2200 years ago. But\nthose who deny final causes have gone on arguing in the same irrational\nmanner down to the present time. They cannot, in fact, do otherwise.\nThey are committed to a false position, and they dare not abandon the\nsophism on which it rests. Nothing else can explain how any sane mind\nshould infer that because a thing is conditioned it cannot have been\ndesigned. The man who argues that the eye was not constructed in order\nto see because it has been so constructed as to be capable of seeing,\nis clearly either unable to reason correctly, or allows his reasoning\nfaculty to be terribly perverted by prejudice. That a result is secured\nby appropriate conditions can seem to no sound and unprejudiced\nintellect a reason for regarding it to have been undesigned. And yet\nwhat other reason is involved in all the attempts to explain away\nfinal causes by means of the nebular, Darwinian, and other development\nhypotheses?\n\nM. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference of design, from\nthe order and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when\nhe has pointed out the physical conditions through which that order\nand stability are secured, and the process by which they have been\nobtained. He refers to the comparative smallness of the planetary\nmasses in relation to the central mass, the feeble eccentricity of\ntheir orbits, the moderate mutual inclination of their planes, and the\nsuperior mean density of their solid over their fluid constituents,\nas the circumstances which render it stable and habitable, and these\ncharacteristic circumstances, as he calls them, he tells us flow\nnaturally and necessarily from the simple mutual gravity of the several\nparts of nebulous matter. When he has done this, he supposes himself\nto have proved that the heavens declare no other glory than that of\nHipparchus, of Kepler, and of Newton.\n\nNow, the assertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system\nstable and the earth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily\nfrom the simple mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter,\nis one which greatly requires proof, but which has never received it.\nIn saying this, we do not challenge the proof of the nebular theory\nitself. That theory may or may not be true. We are quite willing to\nsuppose it true; to grant that it has been scientifically established.\nWhat we maintain is, that even if we admit unreservedly that the earth,\nand the whole system to which it belongs, once existed in a nebulous\nstate, from which they have been gradually evolved into their present\ncondition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree entitled\nto infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others have\ndrawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the law\nof gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the\ncourse of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing\nin the existence and operation of a Divine Mind, proves merely that he\nis not exempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could\nonly have been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it\nnow presents if the nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and\nconstitution--if it was neither too rare nor too dense, neither too\nfluid nor too tenacious; if its atoms were all numbered, its elements\nall weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to each\nother--that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much a\nsystem of order, which intelligence alone could account for, as the\nworlds which have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus\npresents itself to the reason as a problem which demands solution no\nless than the origin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the\nnebula require to be accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It\nmust be either reason or unreason. We may go back as far as we please,\nbut at every step and stage of the regress we must find ourselves\nconfronted with the same question--the same alternative.\n\nThe argument of Comte, it is further obvious, proceeds on the arbitrary\nand erroneous assumption that a process is proved to have been without\nsignificance or purpose when the manner in which it has been brought\nabout is exhibited. It is plain that on this assumption even those\nworks of man which have cost most thought might be shown to have\ncost none. A house is not built without considerable reflection and\ncontinuous reference to an end contemplated and desired, but the end\nis only gradually realised by a process which can be traced from its\norigin onwards, and through the concurrence or sequence of a multitude\nof conditions. Would a description of the circumstances on which the\nsecurity and other merits of a house depend,--of the peculiarities in\nits foundation, walls, and roof, in its configuration and materials,\nwhich render it convenient and comfortable, or of the processes by\nwhich these peculiarities were attained,--prove the house to have\nbeen unbuilt by man, to have been developed without the intervention\nof an intelligent architect? It would, if Comte's argument were good;\nif it would not, Comte's argument must be bad. But can any one fail\nto see that such an argument in such a case would be ridiculous? The\ncircumstances, peculiarities, and processes referred to are themselves\nmanifest evidences of design and intelligence. They are a part of what\nhas to be explained, and a part of it which can only be explained on\nthe supposition of a contriving and superintending mind. They entitle\nus to reject all hypotheses which would explain the construction\nof the house without taking into account the intelligence of its\narchitect. The circumstances, peculiarities, and process described\nby Comte, as rendering the earth an orderly system and the abode of\nlife, are no less among the evidences for the belief that intelligence\nhas presided over the formation of the earth. They require for their\nrational comprehension to be thought of as the means and conditions by\nwhich ends worthy of intelligence have been secured. They require to\nbe accounted for; and they cannot be reasonably accounted for except\non the supposition of having been designed. If we reject that view\nwe must accept this, that the present system of things is a special\ninstance of order which has occurred among innumerable instances of\ndisorder, produced by the interaction of the elements or atoms of\nmatter in infinite time. These elements or atoms we must imagine as\naffecting all possible combinations, and falling at length, after\ncountless failures, into a regular and harmonious arrangement of\nthings. Now, we can in a vague, thoughtless way imagine this, but we\ncannot justify our belief of it either by particular facts or general\nreasons. It is an act of imagination wholly divorced from intelligence.\nThus to refer the origin and explanation of universal order to chance,\nis merely mental caprice.\n\nIf the evolution of the earth and the heavenly bodies from a nebula\ndestroy neither the relevancy nor the force of the design argument,\nthe development of complex organisms from simple ones, and the descent\nof all the plants and animals on earth from a very few living cells\nor forms, will not remove or lessen the necessity for supposing an\nintelligence to have designed all the organisms, simple and complex\nalike, and to have foreordained, arranged, and presided over the course\nof their development. Were it even proved that life and organisation\nhad been evolved out of dead and inorganic matter, the necessity of\nbelieving in such an intelligence would still remain. Nothing of the\nkind has yet been proved. On the contrary, scientific experimentation\nhas all tended to show that life proceeds only from life. But had it\nbeen otherwise--had this break and blank in the development theory been\nfilled up--matter would only have been proved to be more wonderful\nthan it had been supposed to be. The scientific confirmation of the\nhypothesis of what is called spontaneous generation would not relieve\nthe mind from the necessity of referring the potency of life and all\nelse that is wonderful in matter either to design or chance, reason or\nunreason--it would not free it from the dilemma which had previously\npresented itself.[32]\n\n[32] See Appendix XXIII.\n\nThe development of higher from lower organisms, of course, still less\nfrees us from the obligation to believe that a supreme intelligence\npresides over the development. Development is not itself a cause, but\na process,--it is a something which must have a cause; and the only\nkinds of development which have yet been shown to be exemplified in\nthe organic world demand intelligence as their ultimate cause. I do\nnot know that I can better prove that there is no opposition between\ndevelopment and design than by referring to an illustration which\nProfessor Huxley made use of with a directly contrary view. To show\nthat the argument from final causes, or what is often called the\ntheological argument, had, as commonly stated, received its death-blow\nfrom Mr Darwin, he wrote as follows: \"The theological argument runs\nthus--an organ or organism (A) is precisely fitted to perform a\nfunction or purpose (B); therefore it was specially constructed to\nperform that purpose. In Paley's famous illustration, the adaptation of\nall the parts of the watch to the function or purpose of showing the\ntime, is held to be evidence that the watch was specially contrived\nto that end, on the ground that the only cause we know of competent\nto produce such an effect as a watch which shall keep time is a\ncontriving intelligence, adapting the means directly to that end.\nSuppose, however, that any one had been able to show that the watch\nhad not been made directly by any person, but that it was the result\nof the modification of another watch which kept time but poorly, and\nthat this, again, had proceeded from a structure which could hardly\nbe called a watch at all, seeing that it had no figures on the dial,\nand the hands were rudimentary, and that, going back and back in\ntime, we come at last to a revolving barrel as the earliest traceable\nrudiment of the whole fabric. And imagine that it had been possible\nto show that all these changes had resulted first from a tendency in\nthe structure to vary indefinitely, and secondly from something in the\nsurrounding world which helped all variations in the direction of an\naccurate time-keeper and checked all those in other directions,--then\nit is obvious that the force of Paley's argument would be gone. For it\nwould be demonstrated that an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a\nparticular purpose might be the result of a method of trial and error\nworked by unintelligent agents, as well as of the direct application of\nthe means appropriate to that end by an intelligent agent.\"[33]\n\n[33] Lay Sermons, pp. 330, 331.\n\nOur great comparative physiologist would probably not write so at\npresent. He may still not accept the design argument; but he is now\nwell aware that it has not got its death-blow, nor even any serious\nwound, from the theory of evolution. He has since, on more than one\noccasion, shown the perfect compatibility of development with design.\nHe might, perhaps, in defence of his earlier and less considerate\nutterances, maintain that no organ has been made with the precise\nstructure which it at present possesses in order to accomplish the\nprecise function which it at present fulfils; but he admits that the\nmost thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume \"a primordial\nmolecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are\nthe consequences,\" and \"is thereby at the mercy of the theologist,\nwho can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular\narrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe.\"\nGranting thus much, he is logically bound to grant more. If the entire\nevolution of the universe may have been intended, the several stages of\nits evolution may have been intended; and they may have been intended\nfor their own sakes as well as for the sake of the collective evolution\nor its final result. If eyes and ears were contrived for a purpose, the\neyes and ears of each species of animals may have been made with the\nprecise structure which they exhibit for the precise purposes which\nthey fulfil, although they may have been developed out of a different\nkind of eyes and ears, and will, in the lapse of ages, be developed\ninto still other kinds. The higher theology, the general designs, which\nProfessor Huxley admits evolution cannot touch, is in no opposition to\nthe lower theology, the special designs, which he strangely supposes it\nto have definitively discarded.\n\nNothing can be more certain than that Dr Paley would have held the\ndesign argument to have been in no degree weakened by the theory\nof evolution, and that he would have been very much astonished by\nProfessor Huxley's remarks on that argument. In referring to the\nmechanism of a watch as an evidence of intelligence in its maker, Dr\nPaley pointed out that our idea of the greatness of that intelligence\nwould be much increased if watches were so constructed as to give rise\nto other watches like themselves. He must necessarily have admitted\nthat the watch imagined by Professor Huxley was still more remarkable,\nand implied a still greater intelligence in its contrivance. The\nrevolving barrel must have had wonderful capabilities, which only\nintelligence could confer. All the circumstances in which it was to\nbe placed must have been foreseen, and all the influences which were\nto act upon it must have been taken into account, which could only\nbe done by intelligence. All that helped variations in the direction\nof an accurate time-keeper must have been brought into requisition,\nand all that hindered it, or favoured variations in other directions,\nmust have been detected and checked; but no unintelligent agents can\nbe conceived of as accomplishing such work, or as more than the means\nof accomplishing it employed by a providential Reason. The greater\nthe distance between the revolving barrel and the most elaborated\nwatch--the greater the number of mechanisms between the first and the\nlast of these two terms, or between the commencing cause and the final\nresult--the greater the necessity for a mind the most comprehensive and\naccurate, to serve as an explanation of the entire series of mechanisms\nand the whole process of development.\n\nMr Darwin, and a large number of those who are called Darwinians,\nprofess to prove that all the order of organic nature may have been\nunintentionally originated by the mechanical operation of natural\nforces. They think they can explain how, from a few simple living\nforms, or even from a single primordial cell, the entire vegetable and\nanimal kingdoms, with all their harmonies and beauties, have arisen\nwholly independent of any ordaining and presiding mind, by means of\nthe operation of the law of heredity that like produces like; of\nvariability from the action of the conditions of life, and from use and\ndisuse; of over-production, or a ratio of increase so high as to lead\nto a struggle for existence; of natural selection, or the survival and\nprevalence of the fittest, and the disappearance and extinction of what\nis unsuited to its circumstances and inferior to its competitors; and\nof sexual selection. But the remarkable originality, ingenuity, and\nskill which they display in endeavouring to establish, illustrate, and\napply these laws, make all the more striking the absence of freshness\nand independence, of force or relevancy, in the reasonings by which\nthey would attach to them an irreligious inference. The same men who\nhave adduced so many new facts, and thrown so much new light on facts\npreviously known, in support of the real or alleged laws indicated,\nhave not adduced a single new reason, and scarcely even set in a more\nplausible light a single old reason, for the denial of design. They\nassure us, copiously and vehemently, that the laws which they claim to\nhave proved are in themselves a disproof of design; but they somehow\nforget that it is incumbent on them to bestow the labour requisite\nto make this manifest. They reason as if it were almost or wholly\nself-evident, whereas a little more thought would show them that all\ntheir laws imply mind and purpose.\n\nThere is a law of heredity: like produces like. But why is there such\na law? Why does like produce like? Why should not all nature have been\nsterile? Why should there have been any provision for the propagation\nof life in a universe ruled by a mere blind force? And why should\nproducer and produced be like? Why should offspring not always be as\nunlike their parents as tadpoles are unlike frogs? The offspring of\nall the higher animals pass through various embryological stages in\nwhich they are extremely unlike their parents. Why should they ever\nbecome like to them? Physical science cannot answer these questions;\nbut that is no reason why they should not both be asked and answered.\nI can conceive of no other intelligent answer being given to them than\nthat there is a God of wisdom, who designed that the world should be\nfor ages the abode of life; that the life therein should be rich and\nvaried, yet that variation should have its limits; that there should\nbe no disorder or confusion; and who, to secure this result, decreed\nthat plants should yield seeds, and animals bring forth, after their\nkind. He who would disprove design must certainly not start with the\ngreat mystery of generation.\n\nThen, the so-called law of variability is the expression of a purpose\nwhich must have Reason at its beginning, middle, and end. There is in\nno organism an absolutely indefinite tendency to vary. Every variation\nof every organism is in some measure determined by the constitution\nof the organism. \"A whale,\" as Dr Huxley says, \"does not tend to vary\nin the direction of producing feathers, nor a bird in the direction\nof producing whalebone.\" But a tendency to definite variation is an\nindication of purpose. If a man could make a revolving barrel with a\ntendency to develop into a watch, he would have to be credited with\nhaving designed both the barrel and watch, not less than if he had\ncontrived and constructed the two separately. Further, variation has\nproceeded in a definite direction. Darwin admits that there is no law\nof necessary advancement. There is no more reason in the nature of the\ncase for improvement than for deterioration. Apart from the internal\nconstitution of an organism having been so planned, and its external\ncircumstances so arranged, as to favour the one rather than the other,\nits variations could not have been more towards self-perfection than\nself-destruction. But variation, according to the Darwinians, has\ntaken place in one direction and not in another; it has been forward,\nnot backward; it has been a progression, not a retrogression. Why?\nOnly because of a continuous adjustment of organisms to circumstances\ntending to bring this about. Had there been no such adjustment, there\nmight have been only unsuitable variations, or the suitable variations\nmight have been so few and slight that no higher organisms would\nhave been evolved. Natural selection might have had no materials, or\naltogether insufficient materials, to work with. Or the circumstances\nmight have been such, that the lowest organisms were the best endowed\nfor the struggle of life. If the earth were covered with water, fish\nwould survive, and higher creatures would perish. Natural selection\ncannot have made the conditions of its own action--the circumstances\nin the midst of which it must operate. Therefore, there is more in\nprogressive variation than it can explain: there is what only an\nall-regulative intelligence can explain.\n\nAgain, there is a law of over-production, we are told, which gives\nrise to a struggle for existence. Well, is this law not a means to an\nend worthy of Divine Wisdom? In it we find the reason why the world is\nso wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life. What is called\nover-production is a productivity which is in excess of the means of\nsubsistence provided for the species itself; but no species exists\nmerely for itself. The ratio of the production of life is probably none\ntoo high for the wants of all the creatures which have to be supplied\nwith food and enjoyment. And the wants of all creatures are what have\nto be taken into account; not the wants of any single species--not the\nwants of man alone. If we adequately realised how vast is the number\nof guests which have constantly to be fed at the table of nature, we\nwould, I have no doubt, acknowledge that there is little, if any, real\nwaste of life in the world. Then, the struggle to which the rate of\nproduction gives rise is, on the showing of the Darwinians themselves,\nsubservient to the noblest ends. Although involving privation, pain,\nand conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections\nof sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion\nhas gained its strength, the deer its speed, the dog its sagacity. The\ninference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be\nattained by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake\nof the advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering\nwhich the conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals\nfor some higher end than happiness--that He cares for animal perfection\nas well as for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying\nthat the ends which the conflict actually serves, it was also intended\nto serve. Besides, the conflict is clearly not a struggle for bare\nexistence; it is, even as regards the animals, a struggle for the\nlargest amount of enjoyment which they can secure, and for the free\nand full exercise of all their faculties. It thus manifests, not only\nindirectly but also directly, what its ends are. They are ends which\ncan only be reasonably conceived of as having been purposed by an\nintelligence, and which are eminently worthy of a Divine intelligence.\n\nBut what of the law, or so-called law, of natural selection? In itself,\nand so far as physical science can either prove or disprove it, it is\nsimply an expression of the alleged fact, that in the struggle of life,\nany variation, however caused, which is profitable to the individuals\nof a species, will tend to their preservation, will have a chance\nof being transmitted to their offspring, and will be of use to them\nlikewise, so that they will survive and multiply at the expense of\ncompetitors which are not so well endowed. But natural selection thus\nunderstood is obviously in no opposition to design; on the contrary,\nit is a way in which design may be realised. Some might even hold that\ndesign cannot be conceived of as realised in any other natural way;\nthat if not thus realised, it could only be miraculously realised.\nBut Mr Darwin, and many of those who call themselves his followers,\ntell us not only that there is natural selection, but that blind\nforces and mechanical laws alone bring it about; that intention and\nintelligence have nothing to do with it. What proof do they give us?\nAlas! the painful thing is that they give us none. They point out the\nblind forces and the mechanical laws by which the selection is effected\nand its results secured; they show how they are adapted to accomplish\ntheir work: and then they assert that these forces and laws explain\nthe whole matter; that no underlying and all-embracing reason has\nprepared, arranged, and used them. They see the physical agencies and\nthe physical process by which order and beauty have been attained--they\ndo not see intelligence and design; and because they do not see them,\nthey conclude that they have no existence. They describe the mechanism\nwhich their senses apprehend, and affirm it to have made itself, or\nat least to have been unmade, and to work of itself, because the mind\nwhich contrived it and directs it is inaccessible to sense. All their\nreasoning resolves itself into a denial of what is spiritual because it\nis unseen.\n\nThe only instances of natural selection which have been adduced to show\nthat blind forces may bring about results as remarkable, and of the\nsame kind, as those which are accomplished by intelligent agents, are\nmanifestly irrelevant. They are of such a nature that every teleologist\nmust hold them to imply what they are intended to disprove. When\nProfessor Huxley points to the winds and waves of the Bay of Biscay\nas carefully selecting the particles of sea-sand on the coast of\nBrittany, and heaping them, according to their size and weight, in\ndifferent belts along the shore; to a frosty night selecting the hardy\nplants in a plantation from among the tender ones; and to a hurricane\ntransporting a sapling to a new seat in the soil,--he completely\nmistakes what the problem before him is. Fire and water can produce\nwonderful effects in a steam-engine; but the man who should infer, from\nthere being no intelligence in the fire and water themselves, that\nintelligence must have had nothing to do with their effects when they\nwere brought into contact in a steam-engine, would deserve no great\ncredit for his reasoning. It is precisely Professor Huxley's reasoning.\nHe looks at the fire and water separately, and completely ignores the\nengine. Because in a world which is a system of order and law a certain\ncollocation and combination of physical conditions and forces will\nproduce an orderly result, he infers that design and intelligence are\nnot needed to produce such a result. I submit that that is illegitimate\nand irrelevant reasoning. It resolves itself into a denial of Divine\nand intelligent agency, because the senses apprehend merely physical\nelements and a physical process. It assumes a selected adaptation,\nwhich presupposes intelligence in order to get rid of intelligence. It\nbegs the whole question.\n\nThe so-called law of sexual selection, if it be a law at all, is\nobviously teleological in its nature. Its end is the production\nof beauty in form and colour. Can blind physical forces, if not\nsubservient to intelligence, be conceived of as working towards so\nessentially ideal a goal as beauty?\n\nI think enough has now been said to show that the researches and\nspeculations of the Darwinians have left unshaken the design argument.\nI might have gone farther if time had permitted, and proved that\nthey had greatly enriched the argument. The works of Mr Darwin are\ninvaluable to the theologian, owing to the multitude of \"beautiful\ncontrivances\" and \"marvellous adjustments\" admirably described in them.\nThe treatises on the fertilisation of orchids and on insectivorous\nplants require only to have their legitimate conclusions deduced and\napplied in order to be transformed into treatises of natural theology.\nIf Paley's famous work be now somewhat out of date, it is not because\nMr Darwin and his followers have refuted it, but because they have\nbrought so much to light which confirms its argument.[34]\n\n[34] See Appendix XXIV.\n\nI have challenged the theology of Mr Darwin, and those who follow his\nguidance in theology. I have no wish to dispute his science. I pass\nno judgment on his theories so far as they are scientific theories. It\nmay be safely left to the progress of scientific research to determine\nhow far they are true and how far erroneous. We ought not to assail\nthem needlessly, or to reject the truth which is in them, under the\ninfluence of a senseless dread that they can hurt religion. In so far\nas they are true, they must be merely expressions of the way in which\nDivine intelligence has operated in the universe. Instead of excluding,\nthey must imply belief in an all-originating, all-foreseeing,\nall-foreordaining, all-regulative intelligence, to determine the rise\nand the course and the goal of life, as of all finite things. That\nintelligence far transcends the comprehension of our finite minds,\nyet we apprehend it as true intelligence. It is no blind force, but a\nReason which knows itself, and knows us, and knows all things, and in\nthe wisdom of which we may fully confide, even when clouds and darkness\nhide from us the definite reasons of its operations. We can see and\nknow enough of its wisdom to justify faith where sight and knowledge\nare denied to us. Let us trust and follow it, and, without doubt, it\nwill lead us by a path which we knew not, and make darkness light\nbefore us, and crooked things straight.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\n MORAL ARGUMENT--TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY.\n\n\nI.\n\nWE have seen how the power manifest in the universe leads up to God\nas the First Cause, the all-originating Will. We have seen also how\nthe order manifest in the universe leads up to Him as the Supreme\nIntelligence. But there is more in the universe than force and order;\nthere is force which works for good, and a just and benevolent order;\nthere are moral laws and moral actions, moral perceptions and moral\nfeelings. Can anything be thence inferred as to whether God is, and\nwhat He is? I think we shall find that they clearly testify both as to\nHis existence and character.\n\nThe moral law which reveals itself to conscience has seemed to certain\nauthors so decisive a witness for God, that all other witnesses may be\ndispensed with. Kant, who exerted his great logical ability to prove\nthat the speculative reason in searching after God inevitably loses\nitself in sophisms and self-contradictions, believed himself to have\nfound in the practical reason or moral faculty an assurance for the\nDivine existence and government capable of defying the utmost efforts\nof scepticism. Sir William Hamilton has also affirmed that \"the only\nvalid arguments for the existence of God, and for the immortality\nof the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature.\" Dr\nJohn Newman has insisted that conscience is the creative principle\nof religion, and has endeavoured to show how the whole doctrine of\nnatural religion should be worked out from this central principle. A\nwell-known living theologian of Germany, Dr Schenkel, has attempted to\nbuild up a complete theology on conscience as a basis, starting from\nthe position that conscience is \"the religious organ of the soul\"--the\nfaculty through which alone we have an immediate knowledge of God.\nThese thinkers may have erred in relying thus exclusively on the moral\nargument--I believe that they have--but the error, if error there be,\nshows only the more clearly how convincing that argument has seemed to\ncertain minds, and these assuredly not feeble minds.\n\nThere is, besides, valuable truth underlying any exaggerations into\nwhich they may have fallen on the subject. There is probably no living\npractical belief in God which does not begin with the conscience. It\nis not reasoning on a first cause, nor even admiration of the wisdom\ndisplayed in the universe, which makes the thought of God habitually\nand efficaciously present to the mind. It is not any kind of thinking\nnor any kind of feeling excited by the physical universe or by the\ncontemplation of society, which gives us an abiding and operative sense\nof God's presence, and of His relationship to us. It is only in and\nthrough an awakened and active conscience that we realise our nearness\nto God--His interest in us, and our interest in Him. Without a moral\nnature of our own, we could not recognise the moral character and moral\ngovernment manifested by Him. We might tremble before His power, or we\nmight admire His skill, but His righteousness would be hidden from us,\nHis moral laws would be meaningless to us, and their sanctions would\nbe merely a series of physical advantages or physical disasters. But a\nGod without righteousness is no true God, and the worship which has no\nmoral element in it is no true worship. As, then, it is only through\nthe glass of conscience that the righteousness of God can be discerned,\nand as that attribute alone can call forth, in addition to the fear,\nwonder, and admiration evoked by power and intelligence, the love,\nthe sense of spiritual weakness and want, and the adoring reverence,\nwhich are indispensable in true worship--such worship as God ought\nto receive and man ought to render--the significance of the moral\nprinciple in the theistic argumentation is vast indeed.\n\nIt follows, however, from the entire course of the reasoning in which\nwe have been engaged, that the moral argument is not to be exclusively\nrelied on. It is but a part of a whole from which it ought not to be\nsevered. It cannot be stated in any valid form which does not imply\nthe legitimacy of the arguments from efficiency and order. If other\nfacts do not refer us back to a primary case, neither will moral\nfacts lead us to the primary moral agent. If order is no evidence of\nintelligent purpose, moral order can be no evidence of moral purpose.\nThe moral argument proves more, but also less, than the arguments which\nhave been already expounded. It shows us that God is endowed with\nthe highest moral excellence, and is the source of moral law and of\nmoral government, but it does not prove Him to be the Creator of the\nuniverse or the Author of all order in the universe. It contributes to\nthe idea of God an essential element, without which that idea would be\nlamentably defective, but it supposes other elements also essential\nto be given by other arguments. The office of bearing witness to\nthe existence and character of God can be safely devolved on no one\nprinciple alone, even although that principle be conscience. It is\na work in which all the principles of human nature are privileged\nto concur. Either all bear true testimony, or all have conspired to\ndeceive us. The self-manifestation of God is addressed to the entire\nman, and can only be rightly apprehended by the concurrent action of\nall the energies and capacities of the soul.[35]\n\n[35] See Appendix XXV.\n\nIt is, perhaps, especially important in conducting the moral argument\nto ask ourselves distinctly, Whence ought we to begin? Is there any\npoint, any fact or principle, which we are in reason bound to start\nfrom? Inattention to this preliminary inquiry has caused many to try\nto look at moral facts _en masse_, as it were, and to endeavour to\ndraw an inference from them in virtue of something common to them all.\nThis can only lead to confusion and error. Moral facts are of two\nradically distinct classes, and cannot be comprehended under any higher\ngeneralisation, which can be taken as the foundation of a theistic\ninference. The facts need to be distributed and interpreted--to have\ntheir characters discriminated; and we must begin with the principle\nby which this is done--that is, with conscience itself. We need no\nmore attempt to judge of moral qualities without reference to our\nmoral perceptions and feelings--to the information given us through\nconscience--than to pass a judgment on colours before seeing them, or\nirrespective of how they appeared to us when we saw them. If we look\nat the moral facts of the universe from any outside point of view--not\nfrom that of conscience--how can we escape ascribing the evil as well\nas the good to God, and trying His character either from both or from\nthe preponderance of the one over the other? But if we do so,--if we\nseek to rise to God through an induction from all moral facts--we\nshall form a miserable notion of God, and we shall, besides, ride\nrough-shod, as it were, over conscience. For what is it that conscience\ndeclares most clearly about moral good and evil, right and wrong?\nIs it not that they are radically antagonistic--irreconcilable and\ncontradictory,--that they cannot have the same ultimate author--that\nif the one be the expression of God's will, the other must be the\nexpression of His aversion? If conscience have any testimony to give\nabout God at all, it is that, as the author of good, He must be the\nenemy of evil. The contemplation of the moral world may perplex us, but\nconscience is an assurance that evil, however perplexing, is not to be\nreferred to the same source as good.\n\nThe testimony of conscience on behalf of God has been presented\nin various ways, and it need not surprise us to find some of them\nunsatisfactory. I regard as unwarranted the view that conscience is\n\"the religious organ of the soul,\" the sole faculty through which the\nhuman mind is in contact and communion with God. There is no one\nspecific power or organ of the mind in virtue of which exclusively man\nis a religious being. It is by the whole make and constitution of his\nnature, not by a particular faculty, that he is framed for religion.\nI more than question if we have a right even to ascribe to conscience\nan immediate intuition of God. It brings us, some have affirmed, in a\nstrict and positive sense into the real presence of God, with nothing\nintervening between us and Him--He as the absolute personality standing\nsharply and distinctly over against our personality. This doctrine has,\nhowever, one obvious and serious difficulty before it. Conscience--that\nis a word which has got in ordinary use a very clear and definite\nmeaning. We all know what conscience is as well as we know what the eye\nor the ear is, and we all know what an act of conscience is as well as\nwe know what seeing or hearing is. It is not more certain that by the\neye we see colours, and that by the ear we hear sounds, than that by\nconscience we discern good and evil. When, therefore, any man comes and\nassures us that through conscience we have an immediate apprehension\nof God, it is natural that we should answer at once, You may as well\nassure us that through sight we immediately hear sounds or smell\nodours. What we immediately apprehend through conscience is the right\nor wrong in actions, and therefore not God. Morality is the direct\nobject of conscience; God can therefore only be the presupposition or\npostulate of conscience,--can only be given in conscience as implied in\nmorality. This, I say, is an obvious objection to the assertion that\nGod is immediately known in conscience. It is an objection which has\nnot been got over, and which, I believe, cannot be got over.[36]\n\n[36] See Appendix XXVI.\n\nThe argument from conscience, like all the other theistic arguments,\nis extremely simple. It is the obvious inference from the most\nobvious facts of our moral consciousness. It demands of us no subtle\nanalysis of conscience. It is not dependent on the truth of some\none particular theory as to the origin of conscience. It is based\ndirectly on what cannot be denied or disputed,--the existence of\nconscience, the existence of certain moral judgments and feelings\ncommon to the experience of all men. Conscience exists. It exists as\na consciousness of moral law; as an assertion of a rule of duty; as a\nsense of responsibility. When it pronounces an action right, it does\nso because it recognises it to be conformed to law; when it pronounces\nan action wrong, it does so because it recognises it to fall short of\nor to transgress law. It acts as the judge of all that we do, and as\nsuch it accuses or excuses, condemns or approves, punishes or rewards\nus, with a voice of authority, which we may so far disregard, but the\nlegitimacy of which we cannot dispute. It claims to rule over body and\nsoul, heart and mind, all our appetites, affections, and faculties;\nand the claim is implicitly admitted even by those who have most\ninterest in denying it. But it does not rule, nor pretend to rule,\nas an autocratic authority; it does not give us, nor pretend to give\nus, a law of its own: on the contrary, it claims to rule in us only\nin virtue of recognising a law which is over us; its authority is\nderived wholly from a law which it interprets and applies, but does not\ncreate. It thus speaks not of itself but as the deputy of another. It\nunequivocally declares itself a delegated authority. Some may say that\nthe law of conscience is set by man's own will, and that the will is a\nlaw unto itself; but this assertion cannot bear examination. The will\napart from reason and conscience is a mere force, not a true will. It\nhas a rational law only through its connection with reason, a moral law\nonly through its connection with conscience. Whoever affirms that the\nwill is its own law must grossly abuse language, and signify by the\nterm will what others mean by reason and will, conscience and will. He\nmust do worse than this, bad as it is. He must contradict the plain\ndictates of his own consciousness. The will and its law are distinctly\nfelt to be not one but two. The will is clearly realised in our moral\nexperience as not legislative, as not giving itself a law but as\nbeing under a law, the law which conscience apprehends. To identify\nthe will and its law is to confound entirely distinct things. For the\nwill to rule the will, it would need at once to command and to obey,\nto be bond and free, dependent and independent. To be its own rule\nwere for it to be without rule. Conscience claims to rule my will in\nvirtue of a law which cannot be the expression of my will, and which\ncannot be anything else than the expression of another will; one often\nin antagonism to mine--one always better than mine--one which demands\nfrom me an unvarying and complete obedience. It comes to me and speaks\nto me in defiance of my will; when my will is set against hearing it,\nand still more against obeying it; when my will is bent on stifling\nand drowning its voice. It warns, threatens, condemns, and punishes\nme, against my will, and with a voice of authority as the delegate or\ndeputy of a perfectly good and holy will which has an absolute right\nto rule over me, to control and sway all my faculties; which searches\nme and knows me; which besets me behind and before. Whose is this\nperfect, authoritative, supreme will, to which all consciences, even\nthe most erring, point back? Whose, if not God's? Those who object that\nthis argument is a mere verbal inference, or that it rests on a double\nmeaning of the word law, do not understand it, simple as it is. They\nmay be honest enough disputants, but their objection is strangely\nsuperficial. In the utterly irrelevant criticism of a word they\nlose sight of a great fact, and so necessarily fail to perceive its\nmomentous significance. From no mere word, whether law or any other,\nbut from that consciousness of moral dependence which no moral creature\ncan shake off, which conscience implies in every exercise, which\nreveals itself in a thousand ways in the hearts and lives of men, do\nwe conclude that there is One on whom we morally depend, that we have\na holy Creator and Judge to deal with. Reason takes no mere name, but\nit takes the fact that man feels himself under a law of duty, that he\nis conscious of obligation and responsibility, that he has a conscience\nwhich does not counsel but which commands him to do what is right and\nto resist what is wrong; and it finds this fact inexplicable, this\nconsciousness a delusion, this conscience a false witness--unless there\nbe a holy God, a Moral Governor.\n\nConscience reveals a purpose as well as declares a law. Its very\nexistence is a proof of purpose. The eye is not more certainly given\nus in order that we may see, than conscience is given us in order that\nwe may use all our powers in a righteous and beneficent manner. Is it\nconceivable that any other than a righteous God would have bestowed on\nus such a gift, such a faculty? Would an intelligent but unrighteous\nGod have made us to hate and despise what is characteristic of his own\nnature? Would he have made us better than himself? The purpose which\nconscience reveals is certainly not our own purpose, just as the law\nwhich it declares is not the law of our own will. The purpose which\nfinds its expression in conscience, and our own purpose, are often\nfelt by us to be in direct antagonism. Our souls may be tortured by\nthe conflict between them. But in all phases of the conflict we are\nsensible that it is our purpose which ought to be abandoned; that the\npurpose which we dislike is that which we are bound to accept and to\nobey. In this way, also, conscience speaks to us of a righteous God\nby speaking in His name. If the inference from effect to cause, from\nmanifestation of purpose to intelligence, is good anywhere, it is good\nhere; and it warrants us to believe that the First Cause of conscience\nis a righteous Being.[37]\n\n[37] See Appendix XXVII.\n\nAll the feelings, emotions, and affections which gather around the\napprehension of right and wrong, which accompany the sense of duty\nor conviction of obligation, point to the same conclusion. The\nconsciousness of good or ill desert, remorse and self-approval, moral\nhopes and fears, concur in referring to a holy God. They imply that\nman is a person related not merely to things and laws, but to another\nperson who is his rightful and righteous Judge. The atheist himself,\nwhen he grieves even for secret and private sins, or enjoys the inner\npeace which only his own heart knoweth, mourns and rejoices as if\nin the presence of a higher personal Being--the God whom he denies.\nNeither his sorrow nor his satisfaction is fully intelligible if his\nsoul have before it only an impersonal law or the abstract nature of\nthings; both presuppose that he has some kind of consciousness of being\nunder the cognisance of a Person possessed of moral attributes. If\nmen felt that they were responsible for their evil thoughts and words\nand deeds to no one higher than themselves or their fellows, is it\nconceivable that the consciousness of guilt and the fear of retribution\nwould have been what experience and history testify them to have been?\nWould prayers and penances and sacrifices have prevailed so widely,\nif the law of right and wrong when broken had been merely felt to be\nbroken--if there were no underlying sense of the existence of One\nbehind the law whose righteousness must be satisfied, and whose wrath\nmust be turned away by the breaker of the law? Would there have been in\nthat case any moral conflicts in the human heart akin to those which\na Sophocles or a Shakespeare has delineated? Were there no God, there\nought to be no fear of God awakened even by crime; but atheism itself\ncannot protect a criminal when alive to his guilt from being haunted\nand appalled by fears of a judgment and a justice more terrible than\nthose of man. When we are perfectly willing to bear any pain which the\nmere laws of nature attach to our sins, and when our reason assures us\nthat we have nothing to fear on account of them from the law or even\nthe opinion of society, why, if our moral natures are not seared and\ndeadened, do we yet fear, and fear most when most alone? \"Inanimate\nthings,\" says Dr Newman, \"cannot stir our affections; these are\ncorrelative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility,\nare ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience,\nthis implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom\nwe are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong,\nwe feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us\non hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming\nserenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows\non one receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us\nthe image of some person to whom our love and veneration look, in\nwhose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we\ndirect our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away.\nThese feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an\nintelligent being; we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we\nfeel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction\nin breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these\npainful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, on\nthe other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a\nresignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object\nto elicit. 'The wicked flees, when no one pursueth;' then why does\nhe flee? Whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in\ndarkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these\nemotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his\nperception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the\nphenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination\nwith the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful,\nall-seeing, retributive.\"[38]\n\n[38] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.\n\nIt will, I need scarcely say, be objected to the arguments which have\nnow been presented, that conscience is a product of association or a\nconsequence of evolution; that it has been developed either in the\nexperience of individuals or in the course of ages, out of sensations\nof pleasure and pain, out of benefits and injuries; and that the\nconvictions and feelings implicated in it are due to the circumstances\nunder which it has grown up and the causes which have combined to\ngenerate it. But to this it may be answered either that conscience\nhas not been shown to have grown up by association and development out\nof sensuous experiences, or that even if this were proved the argument\nwould continue good; in other words, either the truth or the relevancy\nof the objection may be denied. All associationist and evolutionist\ntheories of conscience seem to many of the most competent psychologists\nto have failed as regards their main object, although they may admit\nthem to contain important elements of truth. This view I share. It\ndoes not seem to me that even Mr J. S. Mill, Prof. Bain, Mr Spencer,\nand Mr Darwin, have been able to show that conscience contains in it\nnothing original. But, of course, I am aware that the vindication of\nmy dissent would require an adequate examination of associationism\nand evolutionism as explanations of the origin of conscience. No such\nexamination is here possible. Nor is it required; on the contrary, a\ndiscussion of the kind ought, I believe, to be avoided in an inquiry\nlike the present. No psychological investigation of a difficult and\ndelicate nature is, so far as I can judge, essentially involved in the\ntheistic argumentation at any stage. It is certainly unnecessary in\nconducting the moral argument to engage in any scientific disquisition\nas to the origin of conscience.[39] For our second or alternative\nanswer will suffice. It does not matter, so far as our present purpose\nis concerned, whether conscience be primary or derivative. It exists;\nit bears a certain testimony; it gives rise necessarily to the thoughts\nand feelings which I have mentioned. Are these thoughts and feelings\ntrue? If not, conscience is a delusion; it utters lies; the completest\nmoral scepticism is justified. If they are, the argument stands. The\nmode in which they have been acquired is in this reference a matter of\nindifference.\n\n[39] See Appendix XXVIII.\n\nThe argument from conscience, I may add, rests on the general and\ndistinctive characteristics of our moral nature; not on the truth\nof particular moral judgments or the purity of particular moral\naffections. It cannot, therefore, be affected by the fact that moral\nperceptions and emotions admit of variation and development, and are\nsometimes false and depraved. However important in other respects may\nbe the circumstance that men's thoughts and sentiments as to right\nand wrong are not always identical or even accordant, it is plainly\nirrelevant as an objection to any of the forms in which the argument\nfor the Divine existence from the constitution of our moral nature\nhas just been stated. It cannot be necessary to do more than merely\nindicate this, although some who maintain the wholly derivative nature\nof conscience appear to believe that the moral differences to be traced\namong men disprove all inferences from the moral faculty which they\nfeel disinclined to accept.\n\n\nII.\n\nIs the testimony which conscience gives to the existence and character\nof God confirmed when we look out into the moral world? No one will say\nthat all is clear and unambiguous in that world--that it is nowhere\nshrouded in unpenetrated, if not impenetrable, darkness--that it\ncontains no perplexing anomalies. There is an enormous mass of sin on\nearth, and the mere existence of sin is a mystery under the government\nof an omnipotent God who hates sin. There is a vast amount of\napparently prosperous sin, and a vast amount of temporarily suffering\nvirtue, and these are often severe trials of faith in the justice\nand holiness of God. Pessimism may exaggerate the emptiness and the\nsadness of life, but it has done service by exposing and discrediting\nthe optimism which ignores the dark features and tragic elements of\nexistence. Can an unprejudiced mind, however, even with all the sins\nand sufferings of the world before its view, and although consciously\nunable to resolve the difficulties which they suggest, refuse to\nacknowledge that the general testimony rendered by the moral world to\nthe being and righteousness of its Author is ample and unmistakable?\nI think not. The conclusion which we have drawn from the character\nof the sentiments inevitably excited by the contemplation of virtue\nand vice, is also that which follows from the natural tendencies\nand issues of good and evil affections and actions. Virtue does not\nalways meet with its due reward, nor vice with its due punishment,\nin any obvious outward shape; if they did, earth would cease to be a\nscene of moral discipline; but internal moral laws of an essentially\nretributive nature are in incessant operation, and show not obscurely\nor doubtfully what is the judgment of God both on character and\nconduct. Virtue is self-rewarding and vice is self-punishing. Virtue\ntends of its very nature to honour and life, vice to dishonour and\ndeath. There are outward bonds between virtue and happiness, vice and\nmisery, which may be severed; but there are also inward bonds which\ncannot be broken--relations of cause and effect as inflexible as any in\nthe physical world. Virtue may be followed by no external advantages,\nor may even involve the possessor of it in suffering; but infallibly\nit ennobles and enriches, elevates and purifies the soul itself, and\nthus gradually and increasingly imparts \"a peace above all earthly\ndignities.\" Vice may outwardly prosper and meet only with honour from\nmen, but it cannot be said to be passing wholly unpunished so long\nas it weakens, poisons, and corrupts the spiritual constitution. Now\nthis it always does, and never more actively than when the individual\nwho is guilty has silenced the voice of his conscience, and when a\ndepraved society encourages him in his wickedness. The law--\"he that\nsoweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption\"--is never even\nfor an instant suspended, although the growth and ripening of the seed\ninto its fruit may be unobserved. In the very commission of sin the\nsoul violates the conditions of its own welfare, destroys its own best\nfeelings, impoverishes and ruins itself.\n\n    \"He that has light within his own clear breast,\n    May sit in the centre, and enjoy bright day;\n    But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,\n    Benighted walks under the mid-day sun--\n    Himself is his own dungeon.\"[40]\n\n[40] See Appendix XXIX.\n\nWhen we look from individuals to societies, we perceive the same\ntruth confirmed on a more comprehensive and conspicuous scale. It\nis true that in the social world there are bad triumphs and impious\nsuccesses--that the victory of good over evil is often reached\nonly after a long series of defeats. But it is equally true that\nthe welfare of society is dependent on a practical recognition of\nmoral principles--that the laws of morality are conditions of the\nprogress, and even of the existence, of society. A cynical moralist\nof the eighteenth century maintained that private vices were public\nbenefits; but, of course, his sophisms were easily exposed: he failed\nto convince any one of the correctness of his paradox. No inductive\ntruth can be easier to establish, or better established, than that\nrighteousness exalteth a nation, while sin lowers and destroys it.\nThe vicious affections which torment and debase isolated men, equally\ndisturb and degrade a tribe or nation. The virtuous affections which\ndiffuse peace and happiness in a single heart, equally spread harmony\nand prosperity through the largest community. Thus the general\nconditions of social life testify that God loves virtue and hates vice.\nThen, if we examine history as a whole, we cannot but recognise that\nit has been in the main a process of moral progress, of moral growth.\nThe children of the present day may be born with no better dispositions\nthan those of five thousand years ago, and men may be now as guilty, as\nwilful sinners against what they know to be right, as ever they were;\nin that sense there may be no moral progress; but of this there can\nbe, I think, no reasonable doubt in the mind of any impartial student\nof history, that the thoughts of men have been surely, if slowly,\nwidened as to liberty, chastity, justice, benevolence, piety--and\nthat their feelings have been correspondingly modified, their manners\nrefined, and their laws and institutions improved. There may be no such\nthing as the inheritance or transmission of virtue, and every step\nof moral advance may have to be gained by the free exertion of each\nindividual, people, and generation in succession; but, as a matter\nof fact, our race does on the whole advance, and not recede, in the\npath towards good. Just as reason, although it may be feebler than the\npassions in a short struggle, can always conquer them if it get time\nto collect its energies--so virtue gains and vice loses advantages\nwith the lapse of years; for, while the prejudices which opposed the\nformer subside and its excellences become ever increasingly apparent,\nas history flows onward, those who leagued themselves in support of\nthe latter quarrel among themselves, its fascinations decay, and its\ndeformities become more manifest and repulsive. Age is linked to age,\nand in the struggle of good and evil which pervades all the ages,\nvictory is seen slowly but steadily declaring itself for the good.\nThe vices die--the virtues never die. Some great evils which once\nafflicted our race have passed away. What great good has ever been\nlost? Justice carries it over injustice in the end. Now, whatever be\nthe means by which moral progress is brought about, the testimony which\nit involves as to the moral character of God is none the less certain.\nThe successful application of Darwinian principles, for example, to\nthe explanation of human progress, would be no disproof of design in\nsocial evolution. If a natural selection, based on force, were shown\nto have prepared the way for a natural selection based on craft, which\nin its turn gave place to justice, and that again to love, God must\nnone the less be credited with having contemplated the final result,\nand that result must none the less be held to be an indication of His\ncharacter. When what is called the struggle for existence has been\nproved to lead, not to the deterioration but to the improvement of\nlife--to the greatest abundance of the highest kinds of life possible\nin the circumstances--it will have been vindicated and shown to have\nbeen a means to secure such ends as a wise and benevolent Being would\nentertain. When it has been proved to have constrained men gradually\nto recognise that the virtues are the conditions of the most desirable\nexistence, and that the vices are so many obstacles to the attainment\nof such an existence, it will have been still further vindicated\nby having been thus shown to be the mode in which righteousness is\nrealised in the world. It matters little, so far as the religious\ninference is concerned, after what natural process and by what natural\nlaws moral progress has been brought about; for whatever the process\nand laws may be discovered to be, they will be those which God has\nchosen, and will be fitted to show forth the glory of His wisdom, love,\nand justice.[41]\n\n[41] See Appendix XXX.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VIII.\n\n CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE WISDOM, BENEVOLENCE, AND\n JUSTICE.\n\n\nI.\n\nConscience testifies that there is a God who is good and just; and\nsociety and history, on the whole, confirm its testimony. But there are\na multitude of moral evils in the world, and these may seem to warrant\nan opposite inference, or at least so to counterbalance what has been\nadduced as evidence for the goodness and justice of God as to leave us\nlogically unable to draw any inference regarding His moral character.\nWe must consider, therefore, whether these evils really warrant an\nanti-theistic conclusion; and as they are analogous to, and closely\nconnected with, those facts which have been argued to be defects in the\nphysical constitution of the universe inconsistent with wisdom, or at\nleast with perfect wisdom, in the Creator, it seems desirable to ask\nourselves distinctly this general question, Are there such defects in\nthe constitution and course of nature that it is impossible for us to\nbelieve that it is the work of a wise and holy God?\n\nEpicurus and Lucretius imagined that the world was formed by a happy\ncombination of atoms, acting of themselves blindly, and necessarily\nafter innumerable futile conjunctions had taken place. Lange, the\nmost recent historian of materialism, has revived the hypothesis, and\nrepresented the world as an instance of success which had been preceded\nby milliards of entire or partial failures. This is the theory of\nnatural selection applied to account for the origin of worlds; and no\none, I believe, who combines the hypotheses of natural selection and\natheism can consistently entertain any other conception of the origin\nof worlds. But where are the milliards of mishaps which are said to\nhave occurred? Where are the monstrous worlds which preceded those\nwhich constitute the cosmos? We must, of course, have good evidence for\ntheir existence before we can be entitled to hold Nature responsible\nfor them; we must not charge upon her the mere dreams of her accusers.\nNot a trace, however, of such worlds as, according to the hypothesis,\nwere profusely scattered through space, has been pointed out. It would\nbe a waste of time for us to argue with men who invent worlds in order\nto find fault with them. We turn, therefore, to those who censure not\nimaginary worlds but the actual world.\n\nComte, following Laplace, has argued that there is no evidence of\nintelligence or design in the solar system, because its elements and\nmembers are not disposed in the most advantageous manner. The moon, in\nparticular, we are assured, should have been so placed that it would\nrevolve round the earth in the same time that the earth revolved round\nthe sun. In that case she would appear every night, and always at the\nfull. Storms, volcanoes, earthquakes, and deserts have been often\nargued to be defects which mar both the beauty and utility of creation.\nChanges in the polar regions, in the physical character of Africa, in\nthe position of the Asiatic continent, and in the Pacific Ocean, have\nbeen suggested as improvements on the constitution of the world. The\nactual climates of various countries have been maintained to be not the\nmost favourable to life which are possible under the existing laws of\nnature.[42]\n\n[42] See Appendix XXXI.\n\nA little reflection will enable us to assign its just value to such\ncriticism of creation. Remark, then, in the first place, that there may\nbe abundant evidence of intelligence where there is not evidence of\nperfect intelligence. Although very considerable defects were clearly\nshown to exist in the constitution and arrangements of the physical\nworld, there might yet be ample and unmistakable proof of the vast\nwisdom of its Author. Were it even true that science could show that\nthe mechanism of the heavens, and the distribution of land and sea,\nheat and cold, on earth, were not in every respect the best, that\nwould not prove that there was no intelligence, no design whatever,\ninvolved therein. The question, Did the earth and the solar system\noriginate with intelligence? is distinct from the question, Was the\nintelligence in which they originated perfect? It is conceivable that\nthe one question might have to be answered in the affirmative and the\nother in the negative. It is obvious that the former question ought to\nbe considered apart from and before the latter. The theist proposes,\nof course, to prove in the end that there is a perfect intelligence,\nbut he is content to establish at first that there is an intelligence.\nAware that whoever admits intelligence to be the first cause of the\nuniverse may be forced also to admit that the creative intelligence is\nperfect, he is under no temptation himself to confound two entirely\ndistinct questions, and he is obviously entitled to protest against so\nillogical a procedure in others.\n\nRemark, in the second place, that we are plainly very incompetent\ncritics of a system so vast as the universe. We are only able to\nsurvey a small portion of it, and the little that we perceive we\nimperfectly comprehend. We see but an exceedingly short way before\nus into the future, and can form only the vaguest and most general\nconception of the final goal to which creation, as a whole, is tending.\nThis need not, and ought not, to prevent us from recognising the\nevident indications of intelligence which fall within our range of\napprehension; but it may well cause us to hesitate before pronouncing\nthat this or that peculiarity, which appears to us a defect, is\nan absolute error or evil. There is no one who would not feel it\nvery unwise to pronounce an apparent defect, even in an elaborate\nhuman mechanism with which he was only imperfectly acquainted, an\nunmistakable blunder, and surely far more caution is required in a\ncritic of the constitution of the universe; for, as Bishop Butler\ntruly observes, \"The most slight and superficial view of any human\ncontrivance comes abundantly nearer to a thorough knowledge of it than\nthat part which we know of the government of the world does to the\ngeneral scheme and system of it.\" All Nature is one great whole, and\neach thing in it has, as I have previously had to insist, a multitude\nof uses and relations, with reference to all of which it must be\nviewed, in order that a complete and definitive judgment regarding it\nmay be formed. Has this fact been adequately realised by those who\nhave criticised, in the manner which has been indicated, the wisdom\ndisplayed in the system of Nature? I think not. In regard to the moon,\nit would seem that, even if that luminary were intended to serve no\nother purpose than to give light on earth, it is not the Maker of it\nwho has blundered, but Comte and Laplace. The real consequences of\ntheir pretended improvement have been shown to be that the moon would\ngive sixteen times less light than it does, and be in constant danger\nof extinction. In other words, what they have demonstrated is, that\ntheir own mathematical and mechanical knowledge was so inferior to that\nof the intelligence which placed the moon where it is, that they could\nnot appreciate the correctness of its procedure in the solution of a\ncomparatively simple astronomical problem. But even if the change which\nthey suggested would really have rendered the moon a better lamp to the\ninhabitants of the earth, they were not entitled to infer that it was\nan error to have placed it elsewhere, unless they were warranted to\nassume that the moon was meant merely to be a lamp to the inhabitants\nof the earth. But that they were clearly not entitled to assume. To\ngive light on earth is a use of the moon, but it is foolish to imagine\nthat this is its sole use. It serves other known ends, such as raising\nthe tides, and may serve many ends wholly unknown to us. So in regard\nto volcanoes, earthquakes, &c. Any single generation of men and beasts\nmight well dispense, perhaps, with their existence, and yet they may\nbe most appropriate instrumentalities for securing order and welfare in\nthe economy of the universe as a whole. It is not by their relations\nto the present and local only, but by their relations to all the past\nand future of the entire system of things, that they are to be judged\nof. If Greenland were submerged, and the Asiatic and North American\ncontinents so altered that no large rivers should flow into the polar\nocean, the climate of Iceland and Canada might be greatly improved.\nWould the world thereby, however, be made better as a whole, and\nthroughout all its future history? He must be either a very wise man or\na very foolish one who answers this question by a decided affirmation;\nand yet he who cannot so answer it has obviously no right to hold that\nthe changes mentioned would really be improvements.\n\nCould we survey the whole universe, and mark how all its several parts\nwere related to each other and to the whole, we might intelligently\ndetermine whether or not an apparent defect in it was real; but we\ncannot do this with our present powers. We can readily imagine that\nany one thing in the world, looked at by itself or in relation to\nonly a few other objects, might be much better than it is, but we\ncannot show that the general system of things would not be deranged\nand deteriorated thereby. Considered merely in reference to man, the\nrelative imperfections of the world may be real advantages. A world so\nperfect that man could not improve it, would probably be, paradoxical\nas the statement may sound, one of the most imperfect worlds men could\nbe placed in. An imperfect world, or in other words, a world which can\nbe improved, can alone be a fitting habitation for progressive beings.\nScripture does not represent nature even before the Fall as perfect\nand incapable of improvement, but only as \"very good;\" and still less\ndoes it require us to believe that the actual course of nature is\nperfect. The true relation of man to nature can only be realised when\nthe latter is perceived to be imperfect,--a thing to be ruled, not to\nbe obeyed--improved, not imitated--and yet a thing which is essentially\ngood relatively to the wants and powers of its inhabitants. No created\nsystem, it must further be remembered, can be _perfect_ in the sense of\nbeing _the best possible_. None can be so good but that a better may\nbe imagined. What is created must be finite in its perfections, and\nwhatever is finite can be imagined to be increased and improved. The\nCreator Himself--the absolutely perfect God--the Highest Good--is, as\nPlato and Anselm so profoundly taught, the only best possible Being.\nIn Him alone the actual is coincident and identical with the possible,\nthe real with the ideal. Whoever receives this truth as it ought to\nbe received, cannot fail to see that all speculations as to a best\npossible world, and all judgments of the actual world based on such\nspeculations, are vain and idle imaginations.[43]\n\n[43] See Appendix XXXII.\n\nI may add, that when a man argues, as Comte does, that we can know\nnothing of final causes, nothing of the purposes which things are\nmeant to accomplish, and yet that they might have realised their final\ncauses, fulfilled their purposes, better than they do, he obviously\ntakes up a very untenable and self-contradictory position. If we can\nhave no notion of the purpose of a thing, we cannot judge whether it\nis fulfilling its purpose or not, whether it is fulfilling it well or\nill. The denial of the possibility of knowing the ends of things is\ninconsistent with the assertion that things might have been constituted\nand arranged in a happier and more advantageous manner.\n\nOrganic nature has been still more severely criticised than the\ninorganic world. There have been pointed out a few fully developed\norgans, as, for example, the spleen, of which the uses are unknown, and\na multitude of organs so imperfectly developed as to be incapable of\nperforming any serviceable functions. Even the most elaborate organisms\nhave been maintained to have essential defects; thus the eye has been\nargued by Helmholtz to be not a perfect optical instrument, and on the\nstrength of the proof one writer at least has declared that if a human\noptician were to blunder as badly as the supposed author of eyes must\nhave done, he would be hissed out of his trade. Stress has been laid\non the fact that abortions and monsters are not rare. Many seemingly\nintelligent contrivances, we are reminded, serve mainly to inflict pain\nand destruction. And the inference has been drawn that the first cause\nof organic existences was not Divine Wisdom but mere matter and blind\nforce.\n\nThe considerations which have already been brought forward should\nenable us to answer all reasonings of this kind. An organ is not to be\npronounced useless because its uses have not yet been discovered. To\nthe extent that evolutionism is true, rudimentary and obsolete organs\nare accounted for, and the wisdom displayed in them amply vindicated;\nand if evolutionism be not true, they can still be explained on the\ntheory of types. They are stages in the realisation of the Divine\nconception; indications of an order which comprehends and conditions\nthe law of use and contrivance for use; keys to the understanding\nof the Divine plan. Theism cannot have much to fear from the fact\nthat all human eyes are limited in their range and finite in their\nperfections, or even from the fact that a great many persons have very\nbad eyesight. Whatever may be its imperfections, the eye, if viewed\nwith a comprehensive regard to its manifold uses and possibilities,\nmust be admitted by every unprejudiced judge to be incomparably\nsuperior to every other optical instrument: indeed it is the only\nreal optical instrument; all so-called optical instruments are merely\naids and supplements to it. If the eye had been absolutely perfect,\nits modification or evolution could only have been deterioration,\nartificial optical instruments would not have been needed, and all\nman's relations to creation must have been essentially different\nfrom what they are. Who can rationally assure us that this was to be\ndesired? Abortions and monsters are at least exceptions. If mind were\nnot what is ultimate in the universe--if nature worked blindly--if\nthere were any truth in what Lange and Huxley have said of her\nprocedure, that it is \"like shooting a million or more loaded guns in a\nfield to kill one hare,\"--this could not be the case; the bullets which\nmiss would then be incalculably more numerous than those which hit,\nand the evidence of her failures ought to be strewn far more thickly\naround us than the remains of her successes; there would be, as it\nwere, no course of nature because of the multitude of deviations, no\nrule in nature because of the multitude of exceptions. But what are\nthe facts? These: the lowest organisms are as perfectly adapted to\ntheir circumstances as the highest, the earliest as the latest; there\nis a vast amount of death and a vast amount of life in the world,\nbut, whatever some men may thoughtlessly assert, no man can show that\nthere is too much of either, any real waste, if the wants of creation\nas a whole are to be provided for; abortions and monsters, which\nare the only things in nature which can be plausibly characterised\nas \"failures,\" as \"bullets which have fallen wide of the mark,\" are\ncomparatively few and far between; and the monsters, even, are not\nreally exceptions to law and order, are not strictly monsters. The\nlabours of teratologists have scientifically established the grand\ngeneral result that there are no monsters in nature in the sense which\nEmpedocles imagined; none except in the sense in which a man who gets\nhis leg broken is a monster. A monster is simply a being to whom an\naccident not fatal has happened in the womb. Why should an accident not\noccur there as well as elsewhere? Why should God not act by general\nlaws there as well as elsewhere? Who is entitled to say that any result\nof His general laws is a failure; that any so-called accident was not\nincluded in His plan; that a world in which a child could not be born\ndeformed nor a grown man have a leg broken, would be, were all things\ntaken into account, as good as the world in which we actually live?\nHuxley, Lange, and those whom they represent, have failed to show\nus any of nature's \"bullets which have missed the mark,\" and have\nnot sufficiently, I think, realised how imperfect might be their own\nperception of nature's target. The contrivances for the infliction\nof pain and death displayed in the structure of animals of prey are\nnone the less evidences of intelligence because they are not also, at\nleast immediately or directly, evidences of beneficence. Intelligence\nis one thing, benevolence is another, and what conclusively disproved\nbenevolence might conclusively prove intelligence.[44]\n\n[44] See Appendix XXXIII.\n\n\nII.\n\nLet us pass on to the contemplation of greater difficulties; to\nsuffering, which seems to conflict with the benevolence of God--and to\nsin, which seems irreconcilable with His righteousness.\n\nI cannot agree with those who think that there is no mystery in mere\npain; that it is sufficiently accounted for by moral evil, and involves\nno separate problem. The history of suffering began on our planet\nlong before that of sin; ages prior to the appearance of man, earth\nwas a scene of war and mutual destruction; hunger and fear, violence\nand agony, disease and death, have prevailed throughout the air, the\nland, and ocean, ever since they were tenanted. And what connection in\nreason can there be between the sin of men or the sin of angels and\nthe suffering endured or inflicted by primeval saurians? The suffering\nof the animals is, in fact, more mysterious than the suffering of\nman, just because so little of the former and so much of the latter\ncan be traced, directly or indirectly, to sin. But every animal is\nmade subject to suffering; every animal appetite springs out of a\nwant; every sense and every faculty of every animal are so constituted\nas to be in certain circumstances sources of pain; hosts of animals\nare so constructed that they can only live by rending and devouring\nother animals; no large animal can move without crushing and killing\nnumbers of minute yet sentient creatures. How can all this be under the\ngovernment of Infinite Goodness?\n\nThe human mind may very probably be unable fully to answer this\nquestion. It can only hope truthfully to answer it even in a measure by\nstudying the relevant facts, the actual effects and natural tendencies\nof suffering; general speculations are not likely to profit it much.\nNow, among the relevant facts, one of the most manifest is that pain\nserves to warn animals against what would injure or destroy them. It\nhas a preservative use. Were animals unsusceptible of pain, they would\nbe in continual peril. Bayle has ingeniously devised some hypotheses\nwith a view to show that pain might have safely been dispensed with\nin the animal constitution, but they are obviously insufficient. It\nwould be rash to affirm that pain is indispensable as a warning against\ndanger, but certainly no one has shown how it could be dispensed with,\nor even plausibly imagined how it might be dispensed with. For anything\nwe can see or even conceive, animal organisms could only be preserved\nin a world like ours by being endowed with a susceptibility to pain.\nFor anything we know or can even imagine, the demand that there should\nbe no pain is implicitly a demand that there should be no animal life\nand no world like the earth;--a most foolish and presumptuous demand.\nBut however this may be, pain has, as a fact, plain reference to the\nprevention of physical injury. \"Painful sensations,\" says Professor Le\nConte, \"are only watchful vedettes upon the outposts of our organism\nto warn us of approaching danger. Without these, the citadel of our\nlife would be quickly surprised and taken.\" Now, to the whole extent\nthat what has just been said is true, pain is not evil but good, and\njustifies both itself and its author. It is not an end in itself, but\na means to an end, and its end is a benevolent one. The character of\npain itself is such as to indicate that its author must be a benevolent\nbeing,--one who does not afflict for his own pleasure, but for his\ncreatures' profit.\n\nAnother fact makes this still more evident. Pain is a stimulus to\nexertion, and it is only through exertion that the faculties are\ndisciplined and developed. Every appetite originates in the experience\nof a want, and the experience of a want is a pain; but what would the\nanimals be without their appetites and the activities to which these\ngive rise? Would they be the magnificent and beautiful creatures so\nmany of them are? If the hare had no fear, would it be as swift as\nit is? If the lion had no hunger, would it be as strong as it is? If\nman had nothing to struggle with, would he be as enterprising, as\ningenious, as variously skilled and educated as he is? Pain tends\nto the perfection of the animals. It has, that is to say, a good\nend; an end which justifies its use; one which would do so even if\nperfection should not be conducive to happiness. Perfection, it seems\nto me, is a worthy aim in itself, and the pain which naturally tends\nto it is no real evil, and needs no apology. I fail to see that the\nnearest approximation to the ideal of animal life is the existence\nof a well-fed hog, which does not need to exert itself, and is not\ndesigned for the slaughter. Whatever pain is needed to make the animals\nso exercise their faculties as to improve and develop their natures,\nhas been wisely and rightly allotted to them. We assign a low aim\nto Providence when we affirm that it looks merely to the happiness\neven of the animals. It would be no disproof of benevolence in the\nCreator if pain in the creatures tended simply to perfection and not\nto happiness; while it must be regarded as a proof of His benevolence\nif the means which lead to perfection lead also to happiness. And this\nthey do. The pain which gives rise to exertion and the pain which\nis involved in exertion are, as a rule, amply rewarded even with\npleasure. Perhaps susceptibility to pain is a necessary condition of\nsusceptibility to pleasure; perhaps the bodily organism could not\nbe capable of pleasure and insensible to pain; but whether this be\nthe case or not, it is a plain and certain matter of fact that the\nactivities which pain originates are the chief sources of enjoyment\nthroughout the animal creation. This fact entitles us to hold that\npain itself is an evidence of the benevolence of God. The perfecting\npower of suffering is seen in its highest form not in the brute, but\nin man; not in its effects on the body, but in its influence on the\nmind. It is of incalculable use in correcting and disciplining the\nspirit. It serves to soften the hard of heart, to subdue the proud, to\nproduce fortitude and patience, to expand the sympathies, to exercise\nthe religious affections, to refine, strengthen, and elevate the entire\ndisposition. To come out pure gold, the character must pass through the\nfurnace of affliction. And no one who has borne suffering aright has\never complained that he had been called on to endure too much of it. On\nthe contrary, all the noblest of our race have learned from experience\nto count suffering not an evil but a privilege, and to rejoice in it\nas working out in them, through its purifying and perfecting power, an\neternal weight of glory.\n\nIn the measure that the theory of evolution can be established,\nthe wisdom and benevolence displayed in pain would seem to receive\nconfirmation. So far as that theory can be proved, want, the struggle\nfor existence, the sufferings which flow from it, and death itself,\nmust, it would appear, be regarded as means to the formation,\nimprovement, and adornment of species and races. The afflictions which\nbefall individuals will in this case be scientifically demonstrated to\nhave a reference not merely to their own good, but to the welfare of\ntheir kind in all future time. The truth that nothing lives or dies\nto itself would thus receive remarkable verification. But although it\nshould never receive this verification, although a strictly scientific\nproof of it shall never be forthcoming, there is already sufficient\nevidence for it of an obvious and unambiguous kind. Every being, and\nthe animated certainly not less than the inanimate, is adjusted, as\nI have previously had occasion to show, to every other. \"All are but\nparts of one stupendous whole.\" This is a truth which throws a kindly\nand cheering light on many an otherwise dark and depressing fact. Turn\nit even towards death. Can death itself, when seen in the light of\nit, be denied to be an evidence of benevolence? I think not. The law\nof animal generation makes necessary the law of animal death, if the\nlargest amount of animal happiness is to be secured. If there had been\nless death there must have been also less life, and what life there\nwas must have been poorer and meaner. Death is a condition of the\nprolificness of nature, the multiplicity of species, the succession\nof generations, the coexistence of the young and the old; and these\nthings, it cannot reasonably be doubted, add immensely to the sum of\nanimal happiness.\n\nSuch considerations as have now been indicated are sufficient to show\nthat suffering is a means to ends which only a benevolent Being can\nbe conceived of as designing. They show that pain and death are not\nwhat they would have been if a malevolent Being had contrived them;\nthat they are characterised by peculiarities which only love and mercy\ncan explain. We do not need for any practical spiritual purpose to\nknow more than this. An objector may still ask, Could not God have\nattained all good ends without employing any painful means? He may\nstill confront us with the Epicurean dilemma: \"The Deity is either\nwilling to take away all evil, but is not able to do so, in which case\nHe is not omnipotent; or He is able to remove the evil, but is not\nwilling, in which case He is not benevolent; or He is neither willing\nnor able, which is a denial of the Divine perfections; or He is both\nable and willing to do away with the evil, and yet it exists.\" But only\nsuperficial and immature minds will attach much weight to questionings\nand reasonings of this kind. A slight tincture of inductive science\nwill suffice to make any man aware that speculations as to what God\ncan or can not do, as to what the universe might or might not have\nbeen, belong to a very different region from investigations into the\ntendencies of real facts and processes. It would seem as if, with our\npresent faculties, these speculations could lead us to no reliable\nconclusions. We clearly perceive that pain and death serve many good\nends; but we should require a knowledge of God and of the universe\nfar beyond that which we possess, to be able to state, even as an\nintelligent conjecture, that these evils could be wisely dispensed\nwith, or that there is anything in them in the least inconsistent\neither with the power or the benevolence of God.[45]\n\n[45] See Appendix XXXIV.\n\nA large amount of human suffering is accounted for by its connection\nwith human sin. Whatever so-called physical evil is needed to prevent\nmoral evil, or to punish it, or to cure it, or to discipline in moral\ngood, is not really evil. Any earthly suffering which saves us from\nsin is to be classed among benefits. There is nothing to perplex\neither mind or heart in the circumstance that sin causes a profound\nand widespread unhappiness. It is strange that it should sometimes\napparently produce so little misery; only a dull conscience, I think,\nwill be surprised that it produces so much. It is merely in so far as\nphysical evil is dissociated from moral evil that its existence is a\nproblem and a perplexity. But the very existence of moral evil is a\nmost painful mystery. The absence of physical evil while moral evil was\npresent would be inconsistent with a moral government of the world;\nwhereas if moral evil were removed no real difficulty would be left.\nPhysical evil may be a relative good, which God can easily be conceived\nof as causing and approving; moral evil is an unconditional evil, and\ncannot be the work of any morally perfect being.\n\nHave we any reason, however, to suppose that sin is willed by God in\nthe sense either of being caused or approved by Him? All the sin we\nknow of on earth is willed by man, and all the sin which Scripture\ntells us of as existing elsewhere is said to be willed by evil spirits;\nneither nature nor Scripture informs us that there is any moral evil\nwilled by God. In other words, there are no facts which refer us to God\nas the author of evil. In the absence of facts, we can, it is true,\nform conjectures, and give expression to them in such questions as, How\ncould God make beings capable of sinning? Why did He not prevent them\nsinning? Wherefore has He permitted sin to endure so long and spread\nso widely? But thoughtful searchers for truth, at least after a certain\nage, cannot feel much interested in, or much perplexed by, questions\nlike these. They will be quite willing to leave the discussion of them\nto debating societies. They will resolutely refuse to assign the same\nvalue to conjectures as to facts.\n\nSin is not God's work. Moral order may exist without moral disorder,\nbut moral disorder can only exist as rebellion against moral order. The\nvery notion of moral evil implies a moral good which it contravenes,\nand a moral law by which it is condemned. It can never be thought of as\nother than a something grafted on nature, by which nature is perverted\nand depraved. It is not natural, but unnatural; not primary and\noriginal, but secondary and derivative; not the law, but the violation\nof the law.\n\n    \"The primal Will, innately good, hath never\n    Swerved, or from its own perfect self declined.\"\n\nBetween this Will and sin there are ever interposed created wills,\nwhich are conscious of their power to choose good or evil, obedience\nor disobedience to God's law. God bestows on His creatures only good\ngifts, but one of the best of all these gifts includes in its very\nnature ability to abuse and pervert itself and all things else.\nFreewill needs no vindication, for it is the primary and indispensable\ncondition of moral agency. Without it there might be a certain animal\ngoodness, but there could be no true virtue. A virtuous being is one\nwhich chooses of its own accord to do what is right. The notion of a\nmoral creature being governed and guided without the concurrence and\napproval of its own will is a contradiction. If God desired to have\nmoral creatures in His universe He could only have them by endowing\nthem with freewill, which is the power to accept or reject His own\nwill. The determination to create moral beings was a determination\nto create beings who should be the causes of their own actions, and\nwho might set aside His own law. It was a determination to limit His\nown will to that extent and in that manner. Hence, when He created\nmoral beings, and these beings, in the free exercise of their power,\nviolated His law, sin entered into the world, but not through His\nwill. It resulted from the exercise of an original good gift which He\nhad bestowed on certain of His creatures, who could abuse that gift,\nbut were not necessitated to abuse it. Their abuse of it was their\nown action, and the action consisted not in conforming to, but in\ncontravening, God's will. Thus, God's character is not stained by the\nsins which His creatures have committed.\n\nBut, it will be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who\nwould be certain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce\nin His own holy will? and if He could do this, why did He not? Why did\nHe create a class of moral creatures whom He could not but foresee\nto be certain to abuse their power of choice between obedience and\ndisobedience to His law? Well, far be it from me to deny that God could\nhave originated a sinless moral system. If anything I have already said\nbe understood to imply this, it has been completely misunderstood. I\nhave no doubt that God has actually made many moral beings who are\ncertain never to oppose their own wills to His; or that He might, if\nit had so pleased Him, have created only such angels as were sure to\nkeep their first estate. But if questioned as to why He has not done\nthe latter, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me\nthat when you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil\ninto the question, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which\nthe lowest moral being would be as excellent as the archangels are?\nyou have at once shown it to be speculatively incapable of solution\nand practically without importance. The question is one which would\nobviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral\nbeings as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to\nthe lowest Australian aborigines? and that to still another of the\nsame kind, and so on _ad infinitum_? But no complete answer can be\ngiven to a question which may be followed by a series of similar\nquestions to which there is no end. We have, besides, neither the\nfacts nor the faculties requisite to answer such questions. A merely\nimaginary universe is one on which we have no data to reason. We who\nare so incompetent judges of the actual universe, notwithstanding the\nvarious opportunities which we possess of studying it, and the special\nadaptation of our organs and powers to the objects which it presents,\ncan have no right to affirm its inferiority to any universe which we\ncan imagine as possible. The best world, we may be assured, that our\nfancies can feign, would in reality be far inferior to the world God\nhas made, whatever imperfections we may think we see in it. We ought to\nbe content if we can show that what God has done is wise and right, and\nnot perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of other\nthings, the propriety of which we cannot possibly estimate aright or as\nparts of any scheme unlimited in extent and eternal in duration.\n\nSin, then, is not God's work, and we are unable to prove that He\nought to have prevented it. Can we go any farther than this? Yes; we\ncan show that the permission of it has been made subservient to the\nattainment of certain great ends. Man has the power to choose evil, but\nGod has also the power to overrule it--to cause it, as it were, to\ncontradict itself, to work out its own defeat and disgrace, to promote\nwhat it threatens to hinder; and the facts of experience and history\nshow us that this is what He does. There is thus developed in His\nhuman creatures a higher kind of virtue than that of mere innocence;\na virtue which can only be reached through suffering, and conflict,\nand conquest. The struggle with moral evil, still more than that\nwith physical disadvantages and intellectual difficulties, tests and\nexercises the soul, teaches it its weakness and dependence on Divine\nstrength, and elicits and trains its spiritual faculties. Successive\nbattles with vice raise honest combatants to successive stages of\nvirtue. The type of character presented to us in the second Adam is\nno bare restoration of that which was lost in the first Adam, but one\nimmeasurably superior. The humblest of true Christians now aspires\nafter a far grander moral ideal than that of an untested innocence. Is\nthere not in this fact a vindication of God's wisdom and holiness worth\nmore than volumes of abstract speculation?\n\nDue weight ought also to be given to the circumstance that the system\nof God's moral government of our race is only in course of development.\nWe can see but a small part of it, for the rest is as yet unevolved.\nHistory is not a whole, but the initial or preliminary portion of a\nprocess which may be of vast duration, and the sequel of which may\nbe far grander than the past has been. That portion of the process\nwhich has been already accomplished, small though it be, indicates the\ndirection which is being taken; it is, on the whole, a progressive\nmovement; a movement bearing humanity towards truth, freedom, and\njustice. Is it scientific, or in any wise reasonable, to believe that\nthe process will not advance to its legitimate goal? Surely not.\nThe physical history of the earth affords abundant evidence of the\nrealisation of the most comprehensive plans, and no indication of\nfailure. We can have no right to imagine that it will be otherwise in\nthe moral sphere; that the ideals towards which history shows humanity\nto have been approaching in the past will not be reached even in the\nmost distant future. But if moral progress will, no less than physical\nprogress, be carried on unto completion, the future cannot fail to\nthrow light on the past--cannot fail to some extent to justify the\npast. The slowness of the progress may perplex us, and yet, perhaps,\nit is just what we ought to expect, both from God's greatness and our\nown littleness. He is patient because eternal. His plans stretch from\neverlasting to everlasting, and a thousand years are in His sight but\nas yesterday when it is past. We have not the faculties which fit us\nfor rapid movements and vast achievements. We need to be conducted by\neasy and circuitous courses. \"Lofty heights must be ascended by winding\npaths.\"\n\n    \"We have not wings, we cannot soar,\n    But we have feet to scale and climb\n    By slow degrees, by more and more,\n    The cloudy summits of our time.\"\n\nIt must be added that whoever acknowledges Christianity to be a\nrevelation from God, must see in it reasons which go far to explain\nthe permission of sin. There is, it is true, in the authoritative\nrecords of the Christian religion, the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, no\nexplanation of the origin of moral evil as a speculative problem. The\naccount of the first parents of the human race introducing sin into the\nworld by yielding to the seduction of a being who had himself sinned,\nis wholly of a historical character, and can neither be compared\nnor contrasted with the theories of philosophers as to the nature,\npossibility, and cause of sin. To measure the one by the others, or\nto set the one over against the others, is to do injustice both to\nScripture and philosophy. But the whole scheme of Christianity must\nseem to those who accept it the strongest possible of practical grounds\nfor the Divine permission of man's abuse of freewill. The existence\nof sin has, according to the Christian view, been the occasion and\ncondition of a manifestation of the Divine character far more glorious\nthan that which had been given by the creation of the heavens and the\nearth. It called forth a display of justice, love, and mercy before\nwhich all moral beings in the universe may well bow down in wonder\nand adoration, and man especially with unspeakable gratitude. If God\nhas really manifested Himself in Christ for the reconciliation of the\nworld to Himself, His permission of sin has certainly to all practical\nintents been amply justified.\n\nBut I must conclude. Let it be in leaving with you the lesson that\nbelief in conscience and belief in God--belief in the moral order\nof the universe and belief in a moral Governor and Judge--are most\nintimately connected and mutually support each other. Many of you\nwill remember how Robertson of Brighton,--when describing the crisis\nof the conflict between doubt and faith in the awful hour in which,\nas he says, life has lost its meaning, and the grave appears to be\nthe end of all, and the sky above the universe is a dead expanse,\nblack with the void from which God has disappeared,--tells us that he\nknows but of one way in which a man may come forth from this agony\nscatheless--namely, by holding fast to those things which are certain\nstill, the grand, simple landmarks of morality. \"In the darkest hour,\"\nare his words, \"through which a human soul can pass, whatever else\nis doubtful, this at least is certain,--If there be no God, and no\nfuture state, even then, it is better to be generous than selfish,\nbetter to be chaste than licentious, better to be brave than to be\na coward. Blessed, beyond all earthly blessedness, is the man who in\nthe tempestuous darkness of the soul has dared to hold fast to these\nvenerable landmarks. Thrice blessed is he who, when all is drear and\ncheerless within and without, when his teachers terrify him and his\nfriends shrink from him, has obstinately clung to moral good. Thrice\nblessed, because his night shall pass into clear bright day.\" Now there\nis a great truth, a most sacred and solemn truth, in these words. But\nit is only a half truth, and it should not be mistaken for the whole\ntruth. It is not less true, and it is true, perhaps, of a far greater\nnumber of human souls, that there are dark and dreadful hours when\nthey are tempted to believe that virtue is but a name, that generosity\nis not better than selfishness, truth not better than falsehood, and\nthe courage which defends a post of dangerous duty not better than the\ncowardice which abandons it; and in these hours I know not how the soul\nis to regain its trust in human goodness, except by holding fast its\nfaith in Divine goodness; or how it can be strengthened to cling to\nwhat is right, except by cleaving to God. It is as possible to doubt of\nthe authority of conscience as to doubt of the existence of God. There\nare few souls which have not their Philippi, when they are tempted\nto cry like Brutus, \"O virtue, thou art but an empty name!\" Blessed\nin such an hour is he who, feeling himself to be sinking in gloomy\nwaters, cries to that God who is able to rescue him from the abyss,\nand clings to that justice in heaven which is the pledge that justice\nwill be done on earth below. Thrice blessed, because he will be guided\nthrough the darkness of a sea of doubts even thus terrible to a haven\nof light and safety. Faith in duty helps us to faith in God: faith in\nGod helps us to faith in duty. Duty and God, God and duty, that is the\nfull truth.[46]\n\n[46] See Appendix XXXV.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IX.\n\n _A PRIORI_ THEISTIC PROOF.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe arguments which we have been considering are not merely proofs\nthat God is, but indications of what He is. They testify to the Divine\nexistence by exhibiting the Divine character. They are expressions\nof how He manifests Himself, and expositions of how we apprehend His\nself-manifestations. We have seen that against each of them various\nobjections have been urged, but that these objections when examined\ndo not approve themselves to reason; they leave the arguments against\nwhich they have been thrown quite unshaken. These arguments, however,\nalthough perfectly conclusive so far as they go, do not, even in\ncombination, yield us the full idea of God which is entertained\nwherever theism prevails. They show Him to be the First Cause of the\nworld--the Source of all the power, wisdom, and goodness displayed\ntherein. They do not prove Him to be infinite, eternal, absolute in\nbeing and perfection. Yet it cannot be questioned that the cultivated\nhuman mind thinks of God as the absolute, infinite, eternal, perfect\nFirst Cause, and that no lower idea of God can satisfy it. The\nintellect cannot accept, and the heart also revolts against, the\nthought that God is dependent on any antecedent or higher Being; that\nHe is limited to a portion either of time or space; or that He is\ndevoid of any excellence, deficient in any perfection. Such a thought\nis rejected as at once utterly unworthy of its object, and inherently\ninconsistent.\n\nAre we, then, rationally warranted to assign to God those attributes\nwhich are called absolute or incommunicable? This is the question we\nhave now to answer. What has been proved makes it comparatively easy\nto establish what is still unproved. We have ascertained that there\nis a God, the First Cause of the universe, the powerful, wise, good,\nand righteous Author of all things. We are conscious, also, that we\nhave ideas of infinity, eternity, necessary existence, perfection, &c.\nWe may be doubtful as to whence we got these ideas--we may feel that\nthere is very much which is vague and perplexing in them; but we cannot\nquestion or deny that we have them. Having them, no matter how or\nwhence we have got them, and knowing that God is, as also in a measure\nwhat He is, the remaining question for us is, Must these ideas apply to\nGod or not? Must the First Cause be thought of as eternal or not--as\ninfinite or finite, as perfect or imperfect? Reason, after it has\nreached a certain stage of culture, has never found this a difficult\nquestion. Indeed, often even before freeing itself from polytheism, it\nhas been internally constrained to ascribe to some of the objects of\nadoration those very attributes of eternity, infinity, and perfection\nwhich polytheism implicitly denies. Once it has come to believe that\nthe universe has its origin in a rational and righteous creative Will,\nit can hardly refuse to admit that that Will must be infinite and\neternal. Where it has rejected polytheism without accepting theism,\nit has been forced to acknowledge the world itself to be infinite and\neternal. When it has risen beyond the world, when it has reached an\nintelligent cause of the world, it cannot, of course, refuse to that\ncause the perfections which it would have granted to the effect--to the\nCreator what it would have attributed to the creation. The first and\nultimate Being, and not any derived and dependent Being, must obviously\nbe the infinite, eternal, and perfect Being.\n\nThe proof that God is absolute in being and perfection should, it\nseems to me, not precede but follow the proofs that there is a cause\nsufficiently powerful, wise, and good to account for physical\nnature, the mind of man, and the course of history. The usual mode\nof conducting the theistic argumentation has been the reverse; it\nhas been to begin by endeavouring to prove, from principles held to\nbe intuitive and ideas held to be innate, the necessary existence,\nabsolute perfection, infinity, and eternity of God; or, in other words,\nwith what is called the _a priori_ or ontological arguments. This mode\nof procedure seems to me neither judicious nor effective. If we have\nnot established that there is a God by reasoning from facts, we must\ndemonstrate His existence from ideas: but to get from the ideal to the\nactual may be impossible, and is certain to be difficult; whereas, if\nwe have allowed facts to teach us all that they legitimately can about\nthe existence, power, wisdom, and righteousness of God, it may be easy\nto show that our ideas of absolute being and perfection must apply to\nHim, and can only apply to Him.\n\nTheism, according to the view now expressed, is not vitally interested\nin the fate of the so-called _a priori_ or ontological arguments.\nThere may be serious defects in all these arguments, considered as\nformal demonstrations, and yet the conclusion which it is their aim to\nestablish may be in no way compromised. It may be that the principles\non which they rest do not directly involve the existence of God, and\nyet that they certainly, although indirectly, imply it, so that\nwhoever denies it is rationally bound to set aside the fundamental\nconditions of thought, and to deem consciousness essentially delusive.\nIt may be that the _a priori_ arguments are faulty as logical\nevolutions of the truth of the Divine existence from ultimate and\nnecessary conceptions, and yet that they concur in manifesting that if\nGod be not, the human mind is of its very nature self-contradictory;\nthat God can only be disbelieved in at the cost of reducing the whole\nworld of thought to a chaos. Whether this be the case or not, some of\nthe _a priori_ proofs are so celebrated that I cannot pass them over in\nentire silence.[47]\n\n[47] See Appendix XXXVI.\n\nThere is a charge which has been very often brought against the _a\npriori_ proofs, but which may be at once set aside as incorrect. It has\nbeen alleged that they proceed on forgetfulness of the truth that the\nDivine existence is the first and highest reality, and therefore cannot\nbe demonstrated from anything prior to or higher than itself. But in\nno case that I know of have those who adopted what they supposed to be\nthe _a priori_ line of argument been under the delusion that the ground\nof the existence of God was not in Himself, but in something outside\nof or above Himself, from which His existence could be deduced. Such\na notion is, in fact, so self-contradictory, that no sane mind could\ndeliberately entertain it. It would imply that theism could be founded\non atheism. Whatever _a priori_ proof of the Divine existence may be,\nit has certainly never been imagined by those who employed it to be\ndemonstration from an antecedent necessary cause.[48]\n\n[48] See Appendix XXXVII.\n\n_A priori_ proof is proof which proceeds from primary and necessary\nprinciples of thought. From its very nature it could only appear at\na comparatively late period in the history of intelligence. It is\nonly a profound study of the constitution of thought, only a refined\nreflective analysis of consciousness into its elements, which can\nbring to light the principles which necessarily underlie and govern\nall intellectual activity; and it is only on these principles that\n_a priori_ proof is based. As these principles never exist in an\nabsolutely pure form, as what is universal and necessary in thought\nis never found wholly apart from what is particular and contingent,\nno absolutely pure _a priori_ argumentation need be looked for,\nand certainly none such can be discovered in the whole history of\nspeculation.\n\nPlato was, perhaps, the first to attempt to prove the existence of God\nfrom the essential principles of knowledge. He could not consistently\nreason from the impressions of sense or the phenomena of the visible\nworld. He denied that sense is knowledge, and that visible things\ncan be more than images and indications of truth. He maintained,\nhowever, that besides the visible world there is an intelligible\nworld, with objects which reason sees and not sense. These objects\nare either conceptions or ideas, either hypothetical principles or\nabsolute principles, either scientific assumptions and definitions or\nnecessary and eternal truths which have their reality and evidence in\nthemselves. The mathematical sciences deal with conceptions; but their\nchief value, according to Plato, is that they help the mind to rise\nto that absolute science--dialectics--which is conversant with ideas.\nThe apprehension of ideas is the apprehension of the common element in\nthe manifold, the universal in the individual, the permanent in the\nmutable. Reason contemplates ideas, and participates in ideas, and\nideas are at once the essences of things and the regulative principles\nof cognition. By communion with them the reason reaches objective\nreality and possesses subjective certainty. They are not isolated and\nunconnected, but so related that each higher idea comprehends within\nit several lower ones, and that all combined constitute a graduated\nseries or articulated organism, unified and completed by an idea which\nhas none higher than itself, which is ultimate, which conditions all\nthe others while it is conditioned by none. The supreme idea, which\ncontains in itself all other ideas, is absolute truth, absolute beauty,\nabsolute good, absolute intelligence, and absolute being. It is the\nsource of all true existence, knowledge, and excellence. It is God. In\nthis part of its course the dialectic of Plato is simply a search for\nGod. It is _a priori_ inasmuch as it rests on necessary ideas, but _a\nposteriori_ inasmuch as it proceeds from these ideas upwards to God\nin a manner which is essentially analytic and inductive. Only when\nGod--the principle of principles--is reached, can it become synthetic\nand deductive.\n\nThe question, Is the Platonic proof of the Divine existence\nsubstantially true? is precisely equivalent to the question, Is the\nPlatonic philosophy substantially true? Of course, I cannot here\nattempt to argue a theme so vast as Spiritualism _versus_ Empiricism,\nPlatonism _versus_ Positivism. My belief, however, is, that Platonism\nis substantially true; that the objections which the empiricism and\npositivism at present prevalent urge against its fundamental positions\nare superficial and insufficient; that what is essential in its\ntheory of ideas, and in the theism inseparable from that theory, must\nabide with our race for ever as a priceless possession. The Platonic\nargument--by which is meant not a particular argument incidentally\nemployed by Plato, but the reasoning which underlies and pervades his\nentire philosophy as a speculative search for certainty--has been\ntransmitted from age to age down to the present day by a long series\nof eminent thinkers. Augustine, for example, argues for the existence\nof God from the very nature of truth. It is impossible to think that\nthere is no truth. If there were none, to affirm that there was none\nwould be itself true; or, in other words, the denial of the existence\nof truth is a self-contradiction. But what is truth? It is not mere\nsensuous perception, not a something which belongs to the individual\nmind and varies with its moods and peculiarities, but a something\nwhich is unsensuous, unchangeable, and universal. The human reason\nchanges and errs in its judgments; but ideas, necessary truths, are not\nthe products, but the laws and conditions, of the human reason--they\nare over it, and it is only through apprehending, realising, and\nobeying them, that it enlightens and regulates our nature. These\nideas--the laws of our intellectual and moral constitution--cannot\nhave their source in us, but must be eternally inherent in an eternal,\nunchangeable, and perfect Being. This Being--the absolute truth and\nultimate ground of all goodness--is God. Anselm reasoned in altogether\nthe same spirit and in nearly the same manner. In one of his works he\ninstitutes an inquiry as to whether the goodness in good actions is\nor is not the same thing present in all; and when he has convinced\nhimself that it is the same thing, he asks, What is it? and where has\nit a real existence? Ascending upwards by these stages, Good _is_; Good\nis _perfect_; Good is _one_; the one perfect Good is God,--he comes\nto the conclusion that the goodness constitutive of good actions has\nnecessarily its source in God, and that the absolutely and essentially\ngood is identical with God. In another of his works he similarly\ninquires whether there is any truth except mere actual existence. He\nholds that there is, and argues, as he had done before in regard to the\ngood, that the absolute and ultimate truth must be God. Thomas Aquinas\nwas at one with Anselm thus far. The very nature of knowledge seemed to\nhim to show that it was in man only through the dependence of the human\nintelligence on an underived and perfect intelligence.\n\nAmong the many modern philosophers who have adopted and enforced the\nsame doctrine I shall refer only to a few. Lord Herbert of Cherbury,\nthe founder of English deism, is very explicit on the subject.\nHe thought of the human mind as united in the closest and most\ncomprehensive way to the Divine mind through the universal notions of\nwhat he called the rational instinct. These notions are the laws which\nevery faculty is meant to conform to and obey--the laws of all thought,\naffection, and action. As to nature and origin, they are, in Herbert's\nview, Divine; thoughts of God present in the mind of man; true\nrevelations of the Father of spirits to His children. In apprehending\none of them we have truly an intuition of a Divine attribute, of\nsome feature of the Divine character. It is through contact, through\ncommunion with the Divine Intelligence, Love, and Will, that we know\nand feel and act. The Divine is the root and the law of human thought,\nemotion, and conduct. Not afar off, not to be realised by great stretch\nof intellect, not separated by innumerable existences which intervene\nbetween Him and us, but close around us, yea, with nothing between Him\nand our inmost souls, is the Being with whom we have to do. \"In Him,\"\nreally and without any figure of speech, \"we live, and move, and have\nour being.\"\n\nAmong the various metaphysical proofs of Divine existence employed\nby Cudworth, one is in like manner founded on the very nature of\nknowledge. Knowledge, it is argued, is possible only through ideas\nwhich have their source in an eternal reason. Sense is not only not\nthe whole of knowledge, but is in itself not at all knowledge; it\nis wholly relative and individual, and not knowledge until the mind\nadds to it what is absolute and universal. Knowledge does not begin\nwith what is individual, but with what is universal. The individual\nis known by being brought under a universal, instead of the universal\nbeing gathered from a multitude of individuals. And these universals\nor ideas which underlie all the knowledge of all men, which originate\nit and do not originate in it, have existed eternally in the only mode\nin which truths can be said to be eternal, in an eternal mind. They\ncome to us from an eternal mind, which is their proper home, and of\nwhich human reason is an emanation. \"From whence it cometh to pass,\nthat all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas\nor notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same.\nTruths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend\nthem; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the\nsame original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be\nreflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a\nthousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be\nin a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds\nhave the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is\nbut one and the same eternal light that is reflected in them all ('that\nlight which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world,') or the\nsame voice of that one everlasting Word that is never silent, re-echoed\nby them.\"\n\nMalebranche's celebrated theory of \"seeing all things in God\" is but an\nexaggeration of the doctrine that \"God is the light of all our seeing.\"\nIt found a zealous English defender in John Norris of Bemerton.\nAccording to Malebranche and Norris, all objects are seen or understood\nthrough ideas, which derive their existence neither from the senses nor\nfrom the operations of the mind itself but are created in us by the\nDeity; and which are not drawn from contemplation of the perfections\nof the soul, but are inherent in the Divine nature. Better guarded\nstatements of the Platonic argument from necessary ideas will be found\nin Leibnitz, and Bossuet, and Fenelon.\n\nIn the hands of Cousin more was again attempted to be deduced from it\nthan it could legitimately yield. We may reject, however, his opinion\nthat reason is not individual or personal, without rejecting with it\nthe substance at least of what he has so eloquently said regarding the\nnecessary ideas which govern the reason, or the reasoning by which he\nseeks to show that truth is incomprehensible without God, and that all\nthought implies a spontaneous faith in God. The most recent defenders\nof theism employ in one form or another the same argument. In the works\nof Ulrici, Hettinger, and Luthardt, of Saisset and Simon, of Thompson\nand Tulloch, it still holds a prominent place.\n\nI pass from it to indicate the character of some other arguments, which\nare of a much more formal nature, but which have by no means commanded\nso wide an assent. In fact, the arguments to which I now refer have\nnever laid hold of the common reason of men. They are the ingenious\nconstructions of highly-gifted metaphysicians, and have awakened much\ninterest in a certain number of speculative minds, but they have not\ncontributed in any considerable degree either to the maintenance or the\ndiffusion of theistic belief, and have had no lengthened continuous\nhistory. They obviously stand, therefore, on a very different footing\nfrom the proofs which have already been adduced--proofs which are\nas catholic as the conclusions which they support, or as any of the\ndoctrines of the Christian system.\n\nThe Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, author of the famous Hymn to Zeus,\nargued that every comparison, in affirming or denying one thing to\nbe better than another, implied and presupposed the existence of\na superlative or an absolutely good and perfect Being. Centuries\nlater, Boethius had recourse to nearly identical reasoning. It is\nonly, he maintained, through the idea of perfection that we can\njudge anything to be imperfect; and the consciousness or perception\nof imperfection leads reason necessarily to believe that there is a\nperfect existence--one than whom a better cannot be conceived--God.\nCleanthes and Boethius were thus the precursors of Anselm, who was,\nhowever, the first to endeavour to show that from the very idea of God\nas the highest Being His necessary reality may be strictly deduced.\nIn consequence, Anselm was the founder of that kind of argumentation\nwhich, in the opinion of many, is alone entitled to be described as\n_a priori_ or ontological. He reasoned thus: \"The fool may say in his\nheart, There is no God; but he only proves thereby that he is a fool,\nfor what he says is self-contradictory. Since he denies that there is\na God, he has in his mind the idea of God, and that idea implies the\nexistence of God, for it is the idea of a Being than which a higher\ncannot be conceived. That than which a higher cannot be conceived\ncannot exist merely as an idea, because what exists merely as an idea\nis inferior to what exists in reality as well as in idea. The idea\nof a highest Being which exists merely in thought, is the idea of a\nhighest Being which is not the highest even in thought, but inferior\nto a highest Being which exists in fact as well as in thought.\" This\nreasoning found unfavourable critics even among the contemporaries of\nAnselm, and has commended itself completely to few. Yet it may fairly\nbe doubted whether it has been conclusively refuted, and some of the\nobjections most frequently urged against it are certainly inadmissible.\nIt is no answer to it, for example, to deny that the idea of God is\ninnate or universal. The argument merely assumes that he who denies\nthat there is a God must have an idea of God. There is also no force,\nas Anselm showed, in the objection of Gaunilo, that the existence of\nGod can no more be inferred from the idea of a perfect being, than the\nexistence of a perfect island is to be inferred from the idea of such\nan island. There neither is nor can be an idea of an island which is\ngreater and better than any other that can ever be conceived. Anselm\ncould safely promise that he would make Gaunilo a present of such an\nisland when he had really imagined it. Only one being--an infinite,\nindependent, necessary being--can be perfect in the sense of being\ngreater and better than every other conceivable being. The objection\nthat the ideal can never logically yield the real--that the transition\nfrom thought to fact must be in every instance illegitimate--is merely\nan assertion that the argument is fallacious. It is an assertion which\ncannot fairly be made until the argument has been exposed and refuted.\nThe argument is that a certain thought of God is found necessarily to\nimply His existence. The objection that existence is not a predicate,\nand that the idea of a God who exists is not more complete and perfect\nthan the idea of a God who does not exist, is, perhaps, not incapable\nof being satisfactorily repelled. Mere existence is not a predicate,\nbut specifications or determinations of existence are predicable.\nNow the argument nowhere implies that existence is a predicate; it\nimplies only that reality, necessity, and independence of existence\nare predicates of existence; and it implies this on the ground that\nexistence _in re_ can be distinguished from existence _in conceptu_,\nnecessary from contingent existence, self-existence from derived\nexistence. Specific distinctions must surely admit of being predicated.\nThat the exclusion of existence--which here means real and necessary\nexistence--from the idea of God does not leave us with an incomplete\nidea of God, is not a position, I think, which can be maintained. Take\naway existence from among the elements in the idea of a perfect being,\nand the idea becomes either the idea of a nonentity or the idea of an\nidea, and not the idea of a perfect being at all. Thus, the argument\nof Anselm is unwarrantably represented as an argument of four terms\ninstead of three. Those who urge the objection seem to me to prove only\nthat if our thought of God be imperfect, a being who merely realised\nthat thought would be an imperfect being; but there is a vast distance\nbetween this truism and the paradox that an unreal being may be an\nideally perfect being.\n\nThe Cartesian proofs have been much and keenly discussed. The one\nwhich founds on the fact of our existence and its limitations is\nmanifestly _a posteriori_. The other two both proceed from the idea\nof a perfect being. The first is, that the idea of an all-perfect and\nunlimited being is involved in the very consciousness of imperfection\nand limitation. The imperfect can only be seen in the light of the\nperfect; the finite cannot be conceived of except in relation to the\ninfinite. But can a finite and imperfect cause--like the human mind\nor the outward world--be reasonably supposed to originate the idea of\nan infinite and perfect being? Descartes holds that it cannot; that\nthe idea of an infinite and perfect being can only be explained by\nthe existence and operation of such a being. Was he correct in this\njudgment? Perhaps not; but what has been urged in refutation of it\nis probably by no means conclusive. It has been said that the ideas\nof infinity and perfection are mere generalisations from experience.\nBut this is a statement which can only be proved on the principles\nof sensationalism, and never has been proved. It has been likewise\nsaid that these ideas are purely subjective, or, in other words,\nthat there may be nothing whatever to correspond to them. But this\nis a meaningless collocation of words. No finite mind can conceive\nthe infinite, for example, as within itself at all. The human mind\ncan only think of the infinite as without itself. If the infinite\nbe not objective, the idea of the infinite is false and delusive.\nThe infinite, it has been further objected, means merely what is not\nfinite; and the perfect what is not imperfect. So be it; the argument\nis as valid if the words be taken in that sense as in any other. Only\ndo not add, as some do, that the perfect and the imperfect, the finite\nand the infinite, are mere verbal correlatives. Such a proposition can\nbe spoken, but it cannot be thought; and it is most undesirable to\ndivorce thought from speech. It has also been urged that all men have\nnot the idea of perfection; that different men have different ideas\nthereof; and that in each man who possesses it the idea is constantly\nchanging. This must be granted; but it does not affect the argument,\nwhich is founded on the existence of the idea of a perfect being, and\nnot on the perfection of the idea itself.\n\nThe second form of the Cartesian argument is, that God cannot be\nthought of as a perfect Being unless He be also thought of as a\nnecessarily existent Being; and that, therefore, the thought of God\nimplies the existence of God. \"Just as because,\" for example, \"the\nequality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily\ncomprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that\nthe three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from\nits perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the\nidea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to\nconclude that this all-perfect Being exists.\" Kant met this argument\nthus: \"It is a contradiction that there should be a triangle the three\nangles of which are not equal to two right angles, or that there\nshould be a God who is not necessarily existent. I cannot in either\ncase retain the subject and do away with the predicate. If I assume\na triangle, I must take it with its three angles. If I assume a God,\nI must grant Him to be necessarily existent. But why should I assume\neither that there is a triangle or that there is a God? I may annul\nthe subject in both cases, and then there will be no contradiction in\nannulling the predicate in both cases. There may be no such thing as a\ntriangle, why should there be such a Being as God?\"\n\nThis reasoning of Kant has generally been accepted as conclusive. It\ndoes not appear to me to be so. He ought not merely to have asserted\nbut to have shown that we can annul the subject in either of the cases\nmentioned. We obviously cannot. I can say \"there is no triangle,\" but\ninstead of annulling that implies the idea of a triangle, and from\nthe idea of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to\ntwo right angles. In like manner I can say \"there is no God,\" but\nthat is not to annul but to imply the idea of God, and it is from\nthe idea of God that, according to Descartes, the existence of God\nnecessarily follows. Kant should have seen that the proposition \"there\nis no God\" could be no impediment to an argument the very purpose\nof which is to prove that that proposition is a self-contradiction.\nIt is futile to meet this by saying that existence ought not to be\nincluded in any mere conception, for it is not existence but necessary\nexistence which is included in the conception reasoned from, and that\nGod can be thought of otherwise than as necessarily existent requires\nto be proved, not assumed. To affirm that existence cannot be given\nor reached through thought, but only through sense and sensuous\nexperience, can prove nothing except the narrowness of the philosophy\non which such a thesis is based.\n\nCudworth, Leibnitz, and Mendelssohn modified the Cartesian argument\nlast specified in ways which do not greatly differ from one another. It\nmay be doubted whether their modifications were improvements.\n\nIn the eighteenth century there were elaborated a great many proofs\nwhich claimed to be _a priori_ theistic demonstrations based on the\nnotions of existence and causality. Assuming that something is,\nand that nothing cannot be the cause of something, these arguments\nattempted to establish that there must be an unoriginated Being of\ninfinite perfection, and possessed of the attributes which we ascribe\nto God. The most famous of them was, perhaps, that of Dr Samuel Clarke,\ncontained in the Boyle Lecture of 1704. But Dr Richard Fiddes, the\nRev. Colin Campbell, Mr Wollaston, Moses Lowman, the Chevalier Ramsay,\nDean Hamilton, and many others, devised ingenious demonstrations\nof a similar nature. It is impossible for me to discuss here their\nmerits and demerits. Probably not one of them has completely satisfied\nmore than a few speculative minds. They are certainly not fitted to\ncarry conviction to the ordinary practical understanding. Yet it is\nnot easy to detect flaws in some of them; and the more carefully they\nare studied, the more, I am inclined to think, will it be recognised\nthat they are pervaded by a substantial vein of truth. They attempted\nlogically to evolve what was implied in certain primary intuitions or\nfundamental conditions of the mind, and although they may not have\naccomplished all that they aimed at, they have at least succeeded\nin showing that unless there exists an eternal, infinite, and\nunconditioned Being, the human mind is, in its ultimate principles,\nself-contradictory and delusive.[49]\n\n[49] See Appendix XXXVIII.\n\nThere must, for example, unless consciousness and reason are utterly\nuntrustworthy, be an eternal Being. Present existence necessarily\nimplies to the human intellect eternal existence. The man who says\nthat a finite mind cannot rise to the idea of an eternal Being talks\nfoolishly, for all the thinking of a finite mind implies belief in\nwhat he says is inaccessible to human thought. No man can thoughtfully\naffirm his own existence, or the existence even of a passing fancy of\nhis mind, or of a grain of sand, without feeling that that affirmation\nas certainly implies that something existed from all eternity as any\nmathematical demonstration whatever implies its conclusion. And this\ntruth, that the most transient thing cannot be conceived of as existing\nunless an eternal Being exist, may be syllogistically expressed and\nexhibited in a variety of ways, because the contradictions involved\nin denying it are numerous. This is what has been done by the authors\nabove mentioned with much ingenuity, and by some of them in a manner\nwhich never has been and never can be refuted. It may be doubted\nwhether they did wisely in throwing their arguments into syllogistic\nform; but as nobody ventures to undertake the refutation of them, they\nmust be admitted to be substantially valid. The reasonings of men like\nClarke and Fiddes, Lowman and Ramsay, have sufficiently proved that\nwhoever denies such propositions as these,--Something has existed from\neternity; The eternal Being must be necessarily existent, immutable,\nand independent; There is but one unoriginated Being in the universe;\nThe unoriginated Being must be unlimited or perfect in all its\nattributes, &c.,--inevitably falls into manifest absurdities.\n\nThis, it may be objected, is not equivalent to a proof of the existence\nof an infinite and eternal Being. It leads merely to the alternative,\neither an infinite and eternal Being exists, or the consciousness and\nreason of man cannot be trusted. The absolute sceptic will rejoice to\nhave the alternative offered to him; that the human mind is essentially\nuntrustworthy is precisely what he maintains. I answer that I admit\nthat the arguments in question do not amount to a direct positive\nproof, but that they constitute a _reductio ad absurdum_, which is just\nas good, and that if they do not exclude absolute scepticism, it is\nmerely because absolute scepticism is willing to accept what is absurd.\nI am not going to examine absolute scepticism at present. I shall have\nsomething to say regarding it when I treat of antitheistic theories.\nJust now it is sufficient simply to point out that if disbelief in an\ninfinite, self-existent, eternal Being necessarily implies belief in\nthe untrustworthiness of all our mental processes, the absolute sceptic\nis the only man who can consistently disbelieve in God. Unless we are\nprepared to believe that no distinction can be established between\ntruth and error--that there is no certainty that our senses and our\nunderstandings are not at every moment deceiving us--no real difference\nbetween our perceptions when we are awake and our visions when we\nare asleep--no ground of assurance that we are not as much deluded\nwhen following a demonstration of Euclid as any have been who busied\nthemselves in attempting to square the circle,--we must accept all\narguments which show that disbelief of the existence of an infinite and\neternal Being logically involves a self-contradiction or an absurdity,\nas not less valid than a direct positive demonstration of the existence\nof such a Being. If, although I am constrained to conclude that there\nis an infinite and eternal Being, I may reject the conclusion on the\nsupposition that reason is untrustworthy, I am clearly bound, in\nself-consistency, to set aside the testimony of my senses also by the\nassumption that they are habitually delusive. When any view or theory\nis shown to involve absolute scepticism it is sufficiently refuted,\nfor absolute scepticism effaces the distinction between reason and\nunreason, and practically prefers unreason to reason.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe _a priori_ arguments have a value independent of their truth and\nof their power to produce conviction. True or false, persuasive or\nmerely perplexing, they are admirable means of disciplining the mind\ndistinctly to apprehend certain ideas which experience cannot yield,\nyet which must be comprehended in any worthy view taken of God. They\nhelp us steadily to contemplate and patiently to consider such abstract\nand difficult thoughts as those of being, absolute being, necessary\nbeing, cause, substance, perfection, infinity, eternity, &c.; and this\nis a service so great, that it may safely be said--as some writer whose\nname I cannot recall has said--that they will never be despised so long\nas speculative thinking is held in repute.\n\nWhile believing that several of these arguments on the whole accomplish\nwhat they undertake, I am not prepared to maintain that any of them\nare faultless or even conclusive throughout. They are all, probably,\nmuch too formal and elaborate, so far as any directly practical\npurpose is concerned. It ought to be constantly kept in view that\nthey presuppose an immediate apprehension of the infinite, and that\ntheir value consists entirely in establishing that that apprehension\nimplies the reality and presence of God. The simplest mode of doing\nthis must be the best. It may be thought that no reasoning at all is\nneeded; that the intuition does not require to be supplemented by any\ninference; that if the infinite be apprehended, the living God must be\nself-evidently present to the human mind. But this is plainly a hasty\nview. Few atheists will deny that something is infinite, or that they\nimmediately apprehend various aspects of infinity. What they refuse\nto acknowledge is, that the apprehension of the infinite implies\nmore than the boundlessness of space, the eternity of time, and the\nself-existence of matter. There is certainly some reasoning needed in\norder to show that this interpretation of the intuition is inadequate.\nBut such reasoning cannot be too direct, for otherwise the function of\nthe intuition is almost certain to be obscured, and argument is almost\ncertain to be credited with accomplishing far more than it really\neffects.\n\nAccording to the view of the theistic argumentation which has been\ngiven in the present course of lectures, all that is now necessary to\ncomplete the theistic proof is very simple indeed. The universe has\nbeen shown to have an inconceivably powerful and intelligent cause,\na Supreme Creator, who has dealt bountifully with all His creatures,\nwho has given to men a moral law, and who has abundantly manifested\nin history that He loveth righteousness and hateth iniquity. We are\nfurther conscious of having ideas or intuitions of infinity, eternity,\nnecessary existence, and perfection. We may dispute as to whence and\nhow we have got them, but we cannot deny that we possess them. Were\nany person, for example, to affirm that he did not believe that there\nis a self-existent or necessary being--a being which derived its\nexistence from no other and depends upon no other but is what it is in\nand of itself alone--we should be entitled to tell him either that he\ndid not know the meaning of what he said, or that he did not himself\nbelieve what he said. But if we undoubtedly possess these ideas, they\nmust, unless they are wholly delusive--which is what we are unable to\nconceive--be predicable of some being. The sole question for us is,\nOf what being? And the whole of our previous argumentation has shut\nus up to one answer. It must be, Of Him who has been proved to be the\nFirst Cause of all things--the Source of all the power, wisdom, and\ngoodness displayed in the universe. It cannot be the universe itself,\nfor that has been shown to be but an effect--to have before and behind\nit a Mind, a Person. It cannot be ourselves or anything to which our\nsenses can reach, seeing that we and they are finite, contingent, and\nimperfect. The author of the universe alone--the Father of our spirits,\nand the Giver of every good and perfect gift--can be uncreated and\nunconditioned, infinite and perfect.\n\nThis completes the idea of God so far as it can be reached or\nformed by natural reason. And it gives consistency to the idea. The\nconclusions of the _a posteriori_ arguments fail to satisfy either\nmind or heart until they are connected with, and supplemented by,\nthis intuition of the reason--infinity. The conception of any other\nthan an infinite God--a God unlimited in all perfections--is a\nself-contradictory conception which the intellect refuses to entertain.\nThe self-contradictions inherent in such a conception have been\nexposed times without number, and in ways which cannot possibly be\nrefuted. The chief value of most of the _a priori_ arguments lies in\nsuch demonstration; and no theologian who has thoughtfully discussed\neither the immanent or the transitive attributes of God has been\nable to dispense with as much of _a priori_ reasoning as necessary\nto establish that a denial of the eternity, or immutability, or\nomnipotence, or ubiquity, or omniscience, or any other attribute\nimplied in the infinity of the Divine Being, logically leads to\nabsurdity. If the infinity or independence, for example, of the First\nCause be questioned, whoever would maintain it must return some\nsuch answer as that which Mr Spencer, although not assenting to it,\nputs in these words: \"If we go a step further, and ask what is the\nnature of this First Cause, we are driven by an inexorable logic to\ncertain further conclusions. Is the First Cause finite or infinite?\nIf we say finite, we involve ourselves in a dilemma. To think of the\nFirst Cause as finite is to think of it as limited. To think of it\nas limited necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its\nlimits: it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded\nwithout conceiving a region surrounding its boundaries. What now\nmust we say of this region? If the First Cause is limited, and there\nconsequently lies something outside of it, this something must have\nno First Cause--must be uncaused. But if we admit that there can be\nsomething uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything.\nIf beyond that finite region over which the First Cause extends there\nlies a region which we are compelled to regard as infinite, over which\nit does not extend--if we admit that there is an infinite uncaused\nsurrounding the finite caused--we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of\ncausation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the First Cause\nas finite. And if it cannot be finite it must be infinite. Another\ninference concerning the First Cause is equally unavoidable. It must\nbe independent. If it is dependent, it cannot be the First Cause; for\nthat must be the First Cause on which it depends. It is not enough to\nsay that it is partially independent; since this implies some necessity\nwhich determines its partial dependence, and this necessity, be it what\nit may, must be a higher cause, or the true First Cause, which is a\ncontradiction. But to think of the First Cause as totally independent,\nis to think of it as that which exists in the absence of all other\nexistence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence is\nnecessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, and\nso cannot be the First Cause.\"\n\nIt is impossible, I think, to show that we are justified in ascribing\nto God the attributes most essential to His nature without having\nrecourse to a very considerable extent to reasoning of an _a priori_\nkind similar to that of which we have a specimen in the passage just\nquoted. Such reasoning may be perfectly legitimate and conclusive. Mr\nSpencer, I have said, does not accept as valid the arguments cited. But\nhe admits that from their inferences \"there appears to be no escape,\"\ncharacterises their logic as \"inexorable,\" and makes not the slightest\nattempt directly to refute them. On what grounds, then, does he\nwithhold his assent from them?\n\nOne reason is, that the very conclusions which such arguments yield,\nlead, he thinks, by a logic as inexorable, to self-contradictions as\ngreat as those found to be involved in the denial of the infinity,\nindependence, &c., of God. Reasoning from which there appears to be no\nescape, and in which no logical fallacy can be detected, yields the\nconclusion that there is an infinite and absolute First Cause; but\nreasoning as faultless yields also the conclusion that an infinite and\nabsolute First Cause is a self-contradiction--that there is no infinite\nand absolute First Cause. In other words, an inexorable logic proves\nboth that there is an infinite and absolute First Cause, and that there\nis none. Therefore it proves nothing at all except the worthlessness of\nlogic when applied to such an idea as that of a First Cause.\n\nMost persons will probably be of opinion that a view like this is its\nown sufficient refutation; that the reasoning which tries to prove\nthat reasoning may be necessarily and essentially self-contradictory\nis self-condemned. And they will be quite right in their opinion. If\nfor any proposition the proof and counter-proof be equally cogent--if\nfor contradictories there may be perfect demonstrations--it is not God\nonly, but everything, that we shall have to cease to believe in. Such\na _reductio ad absurdum_ of a proposition would be also a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_ of the reason itself, leaving no inference, no intuition, no\nperception, to be rationally trusted. A scepticism more absolute and\ncomprehensive than any human being has dared to advocate, would be the\nonly legitimate result. Our whole nature would have to be regarded as a\nlie. But we need have no fear of reason thus terminating its existence\nby committing suicide. If we are disposed to be afraid that the human\nmind is in danger of so terrible a calamity, an examination of the\nreasoning by which it has been attempted to show that the idea of an\ninfinite and absolute First Cause involves a variety of contradictions\nought speedily to reassure us. Few persons of ordinary reasoning\npowers, if not committed to a foregone conclusion, will regard as\n\"inexorable logic\" the argumentation by which Mr Mansel and Mr Spencer\nfancy that they show that one and the same Being cannot be a cause,\ninfinite and absolute, or its inferences as those \"from which there\nappears to be no escape.\" On the contrary, ninety-nine men in a hundred\nwill deem them extremely weak, and possessed of no other plausibility\nthan that which they derive from an inaccurate and ambiguous use of\nlanguage. There are arguments proving that there is a First Cause, and\nthat the First Cause must be infinite and absolute, in which no fallacy\ncan be detected. But the only arguments which have yet been invented\nto show that the First Cause cannot without contradiction be thought\nof as infinite and absolute, are good for little else than to exercise\nstudents of logic in the examination of fallacies. The two sets of\narguments are by no means of equal worth and weight.\n\nThey are also notably different in nature. Those which attempt to\nprove the First Cause to be infinite and absolute imply no more than\nthat the mind may conclude that such a cause is not finite, dependent,\nand imperfect. In this there is nothing arrogant. Those which attempt\nto prove that the First Cause cannot be infinite and absolute are of\na much less humble character. They imply that we have a positive and\ncomprehensive knowledge of the First Cause; the infinite, and the\nabsolute; that we can define, compare, and contrast them, and thus find\nout that they are incompatible and contradictory. But we may be quite\nunable to do anything of the kind, and yet be fully entitled to hold\nthat the First Cause is not finite, dependent, or imperfect. We may\nreason _to_ the infinite, if we only know what the finite is and is\nnot, without being justified in reasoning _from_ the infinite, as if we\nknew definitely, not to say exhaustively, its nature.\n\nThe idea of an infinite First Cause--the idea of the infinite\nGod--contains no self-contradiction; on the contrary, it solves certain\notherwise inevitable self-contradictions of thought. It is only by\nthe apprehension of a Being who passeth knowledge that knowledge\ncan be rendered self-consistent; only by the admission that all\nexistence is not included within the conditions of the finite that\nthought can escape self-destruction. But, of course, we may easily\nput contradictions into our idea of an infinite Being, by assuming\nthat we know more about unoriginated existence, primary causation,\ninfinity, independence, &c., than we really do, and by defining or\ndescribing them in ways for which we have no warrant. The idea of an\ninfinite First Cause is, it must not be forgotten, the idea of an\nincomprehensible Being. No sane mind can refuse to acknowledge that\nsomething is eternal and immense; but we cannot comprehend eternity and\nimmensity, and when we reason as if we comprehended them, we speedily\nfind ourselves involved in absurdities. We may know and believe that\nGod is eternal and immense, but if He be so, we undoubtedly cannot\ncomprehend Him. We cannot think of God otherwise than as self-existent,\nyet we certainly cannot comprehend the nature of self-existence. We\ncan think of it negatively as unoriginated and independent existence,\nand consequently as a positive, most perfect, and peculiar manner of\nexistence, unlike that which is characteristic of ourselves and other\nfinite beings; but we are ignorant wherein its peculiarities and\nperfections positively consist.\n\nThe incomprehensibleness of the Divine perfections is no reasonable\nobjection against their reality. We do not comprehend the manner\neven of our own existence, although we are quite certain that we do\nexist. Assent, however, has often been refused to _a priori_ theistic\nargumentation, not on the ground that it is illogical, but on the\nground that the conclusions inferred are incomprehensible. Thus the\nauthor of whom I have just been speaking urges in favour of the\nprocedure which he adopts the following argument, in addition to the\none already specified: \"Self-existence necessarily means existence\nwithout a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is\nto form a conception of existence without a beginning. Now by no\nmental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite\npast-time, implies the conception of infinite past-time, which is an\nimpossibility.\" \"Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe,\nand who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe, take\nfor granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator. The mystery\nwhich they recognise in this great fact surrounding them on every\nside, they transfer to an alleged source of this great fact, and then\nsuppose that they have solved the mystery. But they delude themselves.\nSelf-existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this holds true\nwhatever be the nature of the object of which it is predicated. Whoever\nagrees that the atheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves\nthe impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit that the\ntheistic hypothesis is untenable if it contains the same impossible\nidea.\"\n\nNow, that we can by no mental effort conceive existence without a\nbeginning is certain, if by conceive be meant to comprehend, or\ndefinitely imagine, or sensibly represent; but that we not only\nconceive but cannot avoid conceiving such existence is equally\ncertain, if by conceive be simply meant to be conscious of, to know\nto be true, to be rationally convinced. It is impossible seriously\nto doubt that existence was without beginning. Something is, and\nsomething never sprang from nothing. From nothing nothing ever came\nor can come. Something always was. Being was without beginning.\nMr Spencer can no more deliver himself from the sublime and awful\nnecessity of acknowledging an eternal something--a self-existent\nreality--underlying the whole universe, than any one else. His own\nAbsolute is such a something, such a reality; and although, in\naccordance with his peculiar use of the words \"know\" and \"conceive,\"\nhe denies that that Absolute can be known or conceived, he admits\nthat its positive existence is a \"necessary datum of consciousness.\"\nFurther, no intelligent theist argues \"that the atheistic hypothesis is\nuntenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence.\"\nOn the contrary, the theist, far from objecting to the idea of\nself-existence as impossible, admits it to be a necessary idea. He\nrecognises that the universe must be allowed to be self-existent until\nit is shown to be a creation or event. It is only after an examination\nof its character--only after having convinced himself that it is an\neffect--that he transfers the attribute of self-existence to its\ncause or creator. To say that in doing so he flees from one mystery\nto another as great, is a statement which admits of no possible\njustification. In a word, Mr Spencer's account of the reasoning of the\ntheist is an inexplicable caricature.\n\nThe _a priori_ reasoning employed in the establishment of theism is\nindependent of any particular theory as to the origin of our ideas of\ninfinity. It presupposes merely that these ideas are valid--are not\ndelusive. It is only as predisposing to, or implying, scepticism, as\nto their truth or objective worth, that a theory as to their origin has\na bearing on their application. Such scepticism cannot be logically\nlimited to the ideas in question. If we do not accept these ideas as\ntrue and trustworthy, absolute scepticism is rationally inevitable. An\nexamination of the nature and principles of scepticism will make this\nmanifest, but I cannot enter on that examination at present.\n\nIn conclusion, I remark that the conception of any other than an\ninfinite God--a God unlimited in all perfections--is not only a\nself-contradictory but an unworthy conception; it not only perplexes\nthe intellect but revolts the spiritual affections. The heart can find\nno secure rest except on an infinite God. If less than omnipotent,\nHe may be unable to help us in the hour of sorest need. If less than\nomniscient, He may overlook us. If less than perfectly just, we cannot\nunreservedly trust Him. If less than perfectly benevolent, we cannot\nfully love Him. The whole soul can only be devoted to One who is\nbelieved to be absolutely good.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE X.\n\n MERE THEISM INSUFFICIENT.\n\n\nI.\n\nI have endeavoured to show, in the course of lectures which I am now\nbringing to a close, that the light of nature and the works of creation\nand providence prove the existence, and so far manifest the goodness,\nwisdom, and power of God. This truth ought always to be combined with\nanother--namely, that the light of nature and the works of creation\nand providence \"are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God,\nand of His will, which is necessary unto salvation.\" Reason sends\nforth a true light which is to be trusted and followed so far as it\nextends, but which is much more limited than the wants of human nature.\nThe deepest discoveries and the highest achievements of the unaided\nintellect need to be supplemented by truths which can only come to us\nthrough special revelation. The natural knowledge of God which man can\nattain by the exercise of his own faculties is not sufficient to make\nhim feel that the Eternal bears to him fatherly love, or to break the\npower of sin within him and over him, or to sustain and develop his\nmoral and spiritual life. It falls far short of what is required to\nenable a human soul, a religious and immortal being, to accomplish its\ntrue destination. It falls far short, in other words, of being what is\n\"necessary unto salvation,\" in the broad and comprehensive sense which\nthe term salvation bears throughout Scripture.\n\nThere are those who, instead of regarding theism as simply so much\nfundamental truth which Christianity presupposes and applies, would\noppose theism to Christianity, and substitute theism for Christianity.\nThey would rest in mere theism and would reject Christianity. They\nrepresent theism, dissociated from Christianity, as all-sufficient, and\nas the religion to which alone the future belongs. In doing so, these\nmen--many of them most earnest and excellent men--seem to me to show\ngreat want of reflection, great ignorance of the teachings of history,\nand a very superficial acquaintance with human nature.\n\nAtheism, polytheism, and pantheism have always proved stronger than\nmere theism--more popular, more influential on ordinary minds. It\nis only in alliance with revelation that theism has been able to\ncope successfully with these foes. In no land, and in no age, has\na theism resting exclusively on the authority of reason gained and\nretained the assent of more than a small minority of the community. Its\nadherents may have been men who did credit to their creed--honourable,\nhigh-minded, cultivated men--but they have always been few. In India,\nin Persia, in Greece, in Rome, some specially gifted and religious\nminds reached, or at least approached, theism; but, on the whole,\nthe development of belief in all these countries was not towards but\naway from theism. The Israelites, although authoritatively taught\nmonotheism, fell back again and again into polytheism. Mythology is not\nmerely \"a disease of language,\" but also a testimony to the fact that\nthe minds and hearts of the mass of mankind cannot be satisfied with\na Deity who is only to be apprehended by abstract thought,--a proof\nthat while a few speculative philosophers may rest content with the God\ndiscovered by pure reason, the countless millions of their fellow-men\nare so influenced by sense, imagination, and feeling, that they have\never been found to substitute for such a God deities whom they could\nrepresent under visible forms, as subject to the limitations of space\nand time, and as actuated by the passions of humanity. Pantheism has\na powerful advantage over theism, inasmuch as it can give a colouring\nof religion to what is virtually atheism, and a semblance of reason\neven to the most wildly extravagant polytheism. There is no logical\nnecessity why a mere theist should become an atheist, but the causes\nwhich tend to produce atheism are too strong to be counteracted by any\nforce inherent in mere theism; and hence, as a matter of historical\nfact, mere theism has always, even in modern Christendom, largely given\nplace to atheism. All the powers of the world above, and of the world\nto come, are needed to oppose the powers of the world below, and of\nthe world which now is. Only a much fuller exhibition of the Divine\ncharacter than is presented to us by mere theism can make faith in God\nthe ruling principle of human life. Mere theism might have sufficed us\nhad we remained perfectly rational and perfectly sinless; but those who\nfancy that it is sufficient for men as they are, only make evident that\nthey know not what men are. In the state into which we have fallen, we\nneed a higher light to guide us than any which shines on sea or land;\nwe need the light which only shines from the gracious countenance of\nChrist.\n\n\"The world by wisdom knew not God.\" The whole history of the heathen\nworld testifies to the truth of this affirmation of St Paul. It\nis an indubitable historical fact that, outside of the sphere of\nspecial revelation, man has never obtained such a knowledge of God\nas a responsible and religious being plainly requires. The wisdom of\nthe heathen world, at its very best, was utterly inadequate to the\naccomplishment of such a task as creating a due abhorrence of sin,\ncontrolling the passions, purifying the heart, and ennobling the\nconduct. Not one religion devised by man rested on a worthy view of the\ncharacter of God; not one did not substitute for the living and true\nGod false and dead idols, or represent Him in a mean and dishonouring\nlight. We are apt to associate with the religion of Greece and Rome\nthe religious philosophy of a few eminent Greek and Roman thinkers\nwho rose above the religion of their age and country. The religion\nitself was mainly the creation of imagination, and in various respects\nwas extremely demoralising in its tendencies. The worshippers of\nJupiter and Juno, of Mars and Venus, and the gods and goddesses who\nwere supposed to be their companions, must have been very often not\nthe better but the worse for worshipping such beings. Certainly, they\ncould find no elevating ideal or correct and consistent rule of moral\nlife among the capricious and unrighteous and impure objects of their\nadoration. It was less from the religion, the idolatrous polytheism,\nof Greece and Rome that the human soul in these lands drew spiritual\ninspiration, than from philosophy, from reason apprehending those\ntruths of natural religion which the positive religion concealed and\ndisfigured and contradicted. If salvation be deliverance from darkness\nto light, from sin to holiness, from love of the world to love of God,\nno sane man will say that the Greek or Roman religion was the way to\nit, or an indication of the way to it.\n\nDid, then, the philosophers discover the way? There is no need that\nwe should depreciate what they did. Men like Socrates, Plato, and\nAristotle, among the Greeks--like Cicero, Epictetus, and Antoninus,\namong the Romans--obtained wonderful glimpses of Divine truth, and gave\nto the world noble moral instructions, which are of inestimable value\neven to this day. But they all failed to effect any deep and extensive\nreform. They did not turn men from the worship of idols to the service\nof the true God. They were unable to raise any effective barrier either\nto superstition or to vice. They were insufficiently assured in their\nown minds, and spoke as without authority to others. They saw too\nclearly to be able to believe that the popular religion was true, but\nnot clearly enough to know what to put in its place. In the systems\nand lives of the very greatest of them there were terrible defects,\nand neither the doctrine nor the conduct of the majority of those\nwho pretended to follow them, the common specimens of philosophers,\nwas fitted to improve society. Philosophy found out _many truths_,\nbut not _the truth_. It did not disclose the holiness and love of\nGod--discovered no antidote for the poison of sin--showed the soul no\nfountain of cleansing, healing, and life.\n\nThe true character of the philosophical theism of antiquity has been\nadmirably described by one of the ablest theologians of the present\nday. \"Theism was discussed as a philosophical, not as a religious\nquestion, as one rationale among others of the origin of the material\nuniverse, but as no more affecting practice than any great scientific\nhypothesis does now. Theism was not a test which separated the orthodox\nphilosopher from the heterodox, which distinguished belief from\ndisbelief; it established no breach between the two opposing theorists;\nit was discussed amicably as an open question: and well it might be,\nfor of all questions there was not one which could make less practical\ndifference to the philosopher, or, upon his view, to anybody, than\nwhether there was or was not a God. Nothing would have astonished him\nmore than, when he had proved in the lecture-hall the existence of a\nGod, to have been told to worship Him. 'Worship whom?' he would have\nexclaimed; 'worship what? worship how?' Would you picture him indignant\nat the polytheistic superstition of the crowd, and manifesting some\nspark of the fire of St Paul 'when he saw the city wholly given to\nidolatry,' you could not be more mistaken. He would have said that\nyou did not see a plain distinction; that the crowd was right on the\nreligious question, and the philosopher right on the philosophical;\nthat however men might uphold in argument an infinite abstraction,\nthey could not worship it; and that the hero was much better fitted\nfor worship than the Universal Cause--fitted for it not in spite of,\nbut in consequence of, his want of true divinity. The same question\nwas decided in the same way in the speculations of the Brahmans. There\nthe Supreme Being figures as a characterless, impersonal essence, the\nmere residuum of intellectual analysis, pure unity, pure simplicity.\nNo temple is raised to him, no knee is bended to him. Without action,\nwithout will, without affection, without thought, he is the substratum\nof everything, himself a nothing. The Universal Soul is the Unconscious\nOmnipresent _Looker-on_; the complement, as coextensive spectator, of\nthe universal drama of nature; the motionless mirror upon which her\nboundless play and sport, her versatile postures, her multitudinous\nevolutions are reflected, as the image of the rich and changing sky is\nreceived into the passive bosom of the lake. Thus the idea of God, so\nfar from calling forth in the ancient world the idea of worship, ever\nstood in antagonism with it: the idol was worshipped because he was not\nGod, God was not worshipped because He was. One small nation alone out\nof all antiquity worshipped God, believed the universal Being to be a\npersonal Being. That nation was looked upon as a most eccentric and\nunintelligible specimen of humanity for doing so; but this whimsical\nfancy, as it appeared in the eyes of the rest, was cherished by it as\nthe most sacred deposit; it was the foundation of its laws and polity;\nand from this narrow stock this conception was engrafted upon the human\nrace.\"[50]\n\n[50] Canon Mosley, On Miracles, Lect. IV.\n\nIt is historically certain, then, that the world by its unaided wisdom\nfailed to know God. Of course, it may be said that the experiment was\nincomplete; that even if Christianity had not appeared, the human\nmind would have found out in process of time all the religious truth\nneeded to satisfy the human heart, guide human life, and sustain human\nsociety. But such an assertion is quite arbitrary. History gives it\nno confirmation. It was only after human wisdom had a lengthened and\nunembarrassed opportunity of showing what it could accomplish in the\nmost favourable circumstances, and after it had clearly displayed its\ninsufficiency, that Christianity appeared. Christ did not come till it\nwas manifest that reason was wandering farther and farther away from\nGod--that religion had no inherent principle of self-improvement--that\nman had done his utmost with the unaided resources of his nature to\ndevise a salvation, and had failed. There was no probability whatever\nthat a new and higher civilisation would rise on the ruins of that\nwhich fell when the hordes of Northern barbarians subdued and overran\nthe Roman empire, had not Christianity been present to direct the work\nof construction.\n\nWe need not, however, discuss what might or might not have happened,\nsupposing the sun of Christianity had not appeared on the horizon when\nthat of classical civilisation was hastening to its setting, since\nit is obvious that the science and philosophy even of the present\nday, dissevered from revelation, can produce no religion capable of\nsatisfying, purifying, and elevating man's spiritual nature. They are\nfar advanced beyond the stage which they had reached in the time of St\nPaul. Knowledge has since received large accessions from all sides,\nand reflection has been taught by a lengthened and varied process\nof correction and discipline valuable lessons. In mathematical and\nphysical science especially there has been enormous progress. The human\nmind is now enriched not only with the intellectual wealth which it\nhas inherited from Greece and Rome, but with that of many ages not\nless fruitful than those in which they flourished. Can we accomplish,\nthen, what the Greeks and Romans so signally failed to achieve? Can\nwe, with all our knowledge of nature and man, devise a religion which\nshall be at once merely rational and thoroughly effective? Can we,\nwhen we set aside Christianity, construct a creed capable of not only\ncommanding the assent of the intellect, but of attracting and changing\nthe heart, quickening and guiding the conscience, and purifying and\nennobling the conduct? Can we build a system worthy to be called a\nreligion on any other foundation than that which has been laid in the\nGospel? If science and philosophy cannot do anything of this kind even\nat the present day, we are surely at length entitled to say that the\nworld needs to know more about God than it can find out for itself. In\nproof that they cannot, we would appeal both to facts and reason--both\nto the character of what science and philosophy have actually done in\nthis connection, and to the nature of the task which their injudicious\nfriends would impose on them.\n\nWhat, then, even at the present day, do the ablest of those who\nreject Christianity propose to offer us instead? Comte would have us\nto worship humanity. Can we? Comte himself did not believe that we\ncan in any but a very partial and insincere way. If we could, would\nour worship do either our minds or hearts more good than the worship\nof Jupiter and Juno did the Greeks of old? Strauss would have us to\nrevere the universe. Is that not to go back to fetichism? Might we\nnot just as wisely and profitably adore a stock or stone? Herbert\nSpencer would present to us for God the Unknowable. But what thoughts,\nwhat feelings, can we have about the Unknowable? Might we not as\nwell worship empty space, the eternal no, or the absolute nothing?\nSchopenhauer, Hartmann, Mainlander, and others, would have us to go\nback to Buddhism and welcome annihilation. But it is clear as the light\nthat if the advice were acted on, the springs of intellectual life and\nsocial progress would soon be dried up. The philosophy and science on\nwhich they exclusively rely have enabled none of these men to find out\nGod; nay, they have left them under the delusion that there is no God\nto find out, except those strange gods to which I have referred. And\nbeing without God in the world, these philosophers, with all their\nknowledge and accomplishments, are also without any hope of a life\nbeyond the grave. No man need go to them with the question, \"What\nshall I do to inherit eternal life?\" Among all their differences--and\nthey are many and radical--on one point they are agreed, and it is\nthat eternal life is but a dream; that the highest hope even of the\nbest of mankind is to survive for a time as a memory and an influence\nin the minds and conduct of others, after having ceased to be real\nand personal beings; that the only form in which the aspiration after\nimmortality can be rationally cherished is that which the greatest of\ncontemporary novelists and among the greatest of contemporary poets has\nexpressed in the words:--\n\n    \"O may I join the choir invisible\n    Of those immortal dead who live again\n    In minds made better by their presence: live\n    In pulses stirred to generosity,\n    In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn\n    For miserable aims that end with self,\n    In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,\n    And with their mild persistence urge man's search\n    To vaster issues....\n                              This is life to come,\n    Which martyred men have made more glorious\n    For us who strive to follow.\"\n\nIt is as true, then, as ever it was, that the world by wisdom knows not\nGod. The advantages which the eighteen Christian centuries have brought\nus only make more manifest the world's inability by its own wisdom\nto know God. The longer the trial has lasted, the more manifest has\nit become that God's revelation of Himself is indispensable--is what\nman can provide no substitute for. The philosophy which sets itself\nin opposition to revelation--which professes to supply in another and\nbetter way the spiritual wants to which revelation responds--which\naims at constructing a religion out of the conclusions of science--is\na mournful failure. The only religious constructions which it has been\nable to raise, even with all the scientific resources of the nineteenth\ncentury at its command, are simply monuments of human folly.\n\nThis is just what was to be expected; for apart from special Divine\nteaching, apart from special Divine revelation, man cannot truly know\nGod, as a sinful being needs to know Him. Apart, for example, from\nthe revelation which God has made of Himself in Christ, the mind\ncannot possibly attain to a sincere and well-grounded conviction even\nof that primary truth on which all the perfection of religion and\nall the happiness and hopes of mankind depend--the truth that God is\nreally a Father, with all a Father's love, to the children of men.\nThere are manifold signs or evidences of God's goodness and bounty in\ncreation and providence, but, unless seen in the light reflected on\nthem from redemption, they fall far short of a complete proof of God's\ncherishing fatherly love to sinful men. In the light of the Cross\nit is otherwise; the man who looks at the works of creation in that\nlight will unhesitatingly and with full reason say, \"My Father made\nthem all,\" and will easily and clearly trace in all the dealings of\nprovidence a Father's hand guiding His children. Suppose, however, that\nblessed light not shining or shut out, and that creation and providence\nare before us in no other light than their own,--what then? What can\ncreation and providence teach us about God?\n\nSubstantially this only: that He has vast power, since He has created\nand sustains and controls the whole of this mighty universe; wondrous\nwisdom, since He has arranged everything so well and directs everything\nso well; and a goodness corresponding to His power and wisdom, since\na beneficent purpose may be detected underlying all His works of\ncreation and pervading the course of providence. I cannot suppose that\nany one will seriously maintain that creation and providence teach\nus more than that God is thus powerful and wise and good; and fully\ngranting that they teach us all this, if any one mean by God being the\nFather of men no more than that He is as good as He is powerful and\nwise, and that His power and wisdom have been so employed on behalf of\nmen that good gifts meet them at every step, I readily agree with him\nthat creation and providence are sufficient to show God to be a Father\nin that sense and to that extent.\n\nBut is there nothing more, nothing higher than this, implied in\nfatherhood among men? Unquestionably there is. Love in the form of\nmere goodness is far from the noblest and most distinctive quality in\na human father's heart; nay, there is no true fatherliness of heart\nat all in a man in whom there is nothing better than that. One can,\nby an effort of imagination, indeed, conceive a man to have children\nso absolutely innocent and happy, and so perfectly guarded from all\npossibility of evil and suffering, that love in the form of goodness\nor kindness would be the only kind of love he could show them; but\nwould his fatherly love be ever really tested in that case? Could he\never show the deeper, the truly distinctive feelings of a father's\nheart--those we so often see manifested in the toils, the hardships,\nthe dangers, the sacrifices of wealth, comfort, and even life, which\nparents undertake and endure for their children? Certainly not. Apply\nthis to God. In what sense is He a Father? In what sense has He\nfatherly love? Among the angels this question could have no place, for\nthey were such perfectly innocent and happy children that love in the\nform of goodness was all they required--all that could be shown to\nthem. And it would have been the same with men also, if they had not\nfallen. But as soon as sin, suffering, and death invaded earth, and\nseized on man's body and soul, and help or healing there was none for\nhim in any creature, the most awful of questions for the human race\ncame to be, whether or not God was a Father in the full meaning of that\nterm, or, in other words, whether or not He had a love which, in order\nto save men, would submit to humiliation, suffering, sacrifice?\n\nNow that is what I say creation and providence cannot prove. Point to\nanything in creation or to anything in ordinary providence which you\ncan show to have _cost_ God anything. You can easily point to thousands\nand thousands of things and events which you may justly conclude to be\nsigns or gifts of God's goodness; but can you point to one thing in\ncreation, one event in ordinary providence, which you can seriously\nmaintain to come from a self-sacrificing love such as a father\ndisplays when he rushes into a house in flames, or throws himself\ninto a raging flood, to save the life of his child at the risk of his\nown? If you cannot, you fail to prove God a Father in the sense I\nmean. And in that sense, which is the true sense, there seems to me no\npossibility of proving God a Father from creation and providence, apart\nfrom redemption.\n\nWherein is it that both fail? Obviously in this, that they can show\nno traces of sacrifice on God's part. But it is just here that the\nrevelation of redemption comes in. God, in the unspeakable gift of His\nSon, shows us a power of sacrifice infinitely above anything known\namong men--an intensity of tenderest fatherly affection of which\nthe strongest fatherly affection on earth is but a pale and feeble\nreflection; and Christ in His incarnation, life, sufferings, and death,\nreveals to us not merely the power, and wisdom, and goodness of God,\nbut the very depths, if we may so speak, of His heart as a Father,\nenabling us to feel without a doubt that now indeed are we the sons\nof God. Nothing but a special revelation, however, could thus unveil\nand disclose God. The natural reason could not thus discern Him by its\nunaided power. And yet it is only in the knowledge of God as a Father\nthat the soul can either discern or realise its true destiny.\n\nThere are many other precious truths set before us in the Gospel which\nwe might in like manner show to be at once most necessary for human\nguidance, and inaccessible to unaided human research. We shall not,\nhowever, dwell on them or even enumerate them. The entire problem of\nour present and future salvation is beyond our powers of solution.\nThe light of nature and the works of creation and providence cannot\nshow man a way of reconciliation to God. No man by mere human wisdom,\nby any searching into the secrets of nature or providence, can find\nthat out. Mere human wisdom is utter folly here; and if man may be\nwise at all in this connection, he must confess his natural folly, the\npowerlessness of his own reason, and must consent to be guided by the\nwisdom of God--or, in other words, to accept Christ, who is the wisdom\nof God to us for salvation, who is God's solution of the problem of our\nsalvation. The only real wisdom possible to man must, from the very\nnature and necessity of the case, be the wisdom of renouncing his own\nwisdom. If he say, I shall solve this awful problem for myself, without\nhelp from any one, then he in his wisdom is a most manifest fool, whose\nfolly will ruin him; but if he have the candour to confess his own\nfolly, to admit his own intellect powerless here, and to acknowledge\nthe wisdom of God and acquiesce in His plan of salvation, then, in the\nvery act of confessing himself foolish he is made wise, for Christ is\nmade wisdom unto him.\n\nThe oracle at Delphi pronounced Socrates the wisest of men. Socrates\ncould not understand it, and yet he was unwilling to disbelieve the\noracle, so he went about from one person reputed wise to another, in\norder to be able to say, \"here is a wiser man than I am,\" or at least\nto find out what the oracle meant. He went to many, but he found that,\nwhile they in reality knew almost nothing that was worth knowing, they\nthought they knew a great deal, and were angry with one who tried to\nconvince them of their ignorance. So that at last Socrates came to\nrecognise that there was a truth in what had been said about him; to\nuse nearly his own words,--\"He left them, saying to himself, I am wiser\nthan these men; for neither they nor I, it would seem, know anything\nvaluable: but they, not knowing, fancy that they do know; I, as I\nreally do not know, so I do not think that I know. I seem, therefore,\nto be in one small matter wiser than they.\" Now it is only the kind\nof spirit which in its degree and about less important matters was in\nSocrates--it is precisely that kind of spirit about the things which\nconcern eternal life and peace, that can alone make a man wise unto\nsalvation. The most ignorant person, provided he only know that he must\nrenounce his own wisdom as foolishness--which on subjects pertaining\nto salvation it really is--and accept what is disclosed in Christ as\nto salvation, is infinitely wiser than the most able or learned man who\ntrusts solely to his own wisdom apart from Christ's revealed work and\nwill. Both of them are foolish and ignorant; but the one knows it, and,\nin consequence of knowing it, accepts Christ's plan of salvation, and\nis made a partaker of infinite wisdom--the other does not know it, and,\nthinking that he is wise while he is a fool, remains in his folly, and\nmust bear its punishment.\n\nAnd now I bring this course of lectures to a close. I trust that they\nmay not have been found wholly without profit, through the blessing of\nHim who despises not even the smallest and most imperfect service, if\nhumbly rendered to Him. I should rejoice to think that I had helped\nany one to hold, in such a time as the present, with a firmer and more\nintelligent grasp, the fundamental truth on which all religious faith\nmust rest. Amen.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nNOTE I., page 6.\n\nNATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.\n\nThe Hindus regard the Vedas, the Parsees the Zend-Avesta, and the\nMohammedans the Koran, as having been immediately and specially\ninspired. This means that they believe the spiritual truth contained\nin these books to belong to revealed religion, although it in reality\nis merely a portion of natural religion. The Greeks and Romans could\nnot distinguish between nature and revelation, reason and faith,\nbecause ignorant of what we call revelation and faith. Without special\nrevelation or inspiration the oriental and classical mind attained,\nhowever, to the possession of a very considerable amount of most\nprecious religious truth. In all ages of the Christian Church there\nhave been theologians who have traced at least the germinal principles\nof such truth to written or unwritten revelation; and probably few\npatristic or scholastic divines would have admitted that there was a\nknowledge of God and of His attributes and of His relations to the\nworld which might be the object of a science distinct from, and\nindependent of, revelation. This is quite consistent with what is also\na fact--namely, that the vast majority of Christian writers have always\nacknowledged that \"the light of nature and the works of creation and\nprovidence manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God,\" and that\nthis general revelation is implied in the special revelation made at\nsundry times and divers manners and recorded in the Scriptures. The\n'Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturum' of the Spanish physician,\nRaymond de Sebonde, who taught theology in the University of Toulouse\nduring the earlier part of the fifteenth century, was, so far as I\nknow, the first work which, proceeding on the principle that God has\ngiven us two books, the book of nature and the book of Scripture,\nconfined itself to the interpretation of the former, merely indicating\nthe mutual relations of natural and revealed religion. Faustus Socinus\nwas one of the first distinctly to maintain that there was no such\nthing as natural religion--no knowledge of God attainable except from\nScripture: see his 'De Auctoritate Scriptur\u00e6 Sacr\u00e6.' A conviction\nof the importance of natural theology spread very rapidly in the\nseventeenth century. This contributed to awaken an interest in the\nvarious religions of the world, and thus led to the rise of what may\nbe called Comparative Theology, although more generally designated the\nPhilosophy of Religion. Its origin is to be sought in the attempts made\nto prove that the principles of natural theology were to be found in\nall religions. Lord Herbert of Cherbury's 'De Religione Gentilium,'\npublished in 1663, was one of the earliest and most characteristic\nattempts of the kind. From that time to the present the study of\nreligions has proceeded at varying rates of progress, but without\ninterruption, and has at length begun to be prosecuted according to the\nrules of that comparative method which has, in the words of Mr Freeman,\n\"carried light and order into whole branches of human knowledge which\nbefore were shrouded in darkness and confusion.\"\n\nThe eighteenth century was the golden age of natural theology. The\ndeists both of England and France endeavoured to exalt natural theology\nat the expense of positive theology by representing the former as\nthe truth of which the latter was the perversion. \"All religions in\nthe world,\" said Diderot, \"are merely sects of natural religion.\"\nThe prevalent opinion of the freethinkers of his time could not have\nbeen more accurately expressed. It was just what his predecessors in\nEngland meant by describing Christianity as \"a republication of natural\nreligion,\" and by maintaining that it was \"as old as the creation.\"\nThe wisest opponents of the deists, and thoughtful Christian writers\nin general--the adherents of the moderate and rational theology\nof the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--strove, on the other\nhand, to show that natural theology was in reality presupposed by\nrevelation, and that it should carry the mind onwards to the acceptance\nof revelation. But there were some who undertook to maintain that\nthere was no such thing as natural theology; that reason of itself\ncan teach us absolutely nothing about God or our duties towards Him.\nThe Hutchinsonians, for example, whose best representatives, besides\nthe founder, were Bishop Horne of Norwich, and William Jones, curate\nof Nayland, believed that all knowledge of religion and morals, and\neven the chief truths of physical science, ought to be drawn from the\nBible. Dr Ellis, in his treatise entitled 'The Knowledge of Divine\nThings from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature' (1743), laboured\nto prove that neither the being of a God nor any other principle of\nreligion could be legitimately deduced from the study of the phenomena\nof the universe. He argued on the assumption that the senses are the\nonly natural inlets to knowledge. The late Archbishop Magee adopted\nhis views on this subject. One of the most widely known expositions\nand defences of the theory is that contained in the 'Theological\nInstitutes' (1823) of the eminent Wesleyan divine, Richard Watson. In\norder to establish that all our religious knowledge is derived from\nspecial revelation, he employs all the usual arguments of scepticism\nagainst the proofs of theism and the principles of reason on which\nthey rest. In the Roman Catholic Church, scepticism as to reason and\nthe light of nature has often been combined with dogmatism as to the\nauthority of revelation and the Church. In the system of what is called\nthe theocratic school may be seen the result to which attempts to\nestablish the certitude of authority by destroying the credit of human\nreason naturally lead. It is a system of which I have endeavoured to\ngive some account in my 'Philosophy of History in France and Germany,'\npp. 139-154.\n\nThe fact on which I have insisted in the latter part of the\nlecture--the fact that theism has come to mankind in and through\nrevelation--has caused some altogether to discard the division\nof religion into natural and revealed. They pronounce it to be a\ndistinction without a difference, and attribute to it sundry evil\nconsequences. It has led, they think, on the one hand, to depreciation\nof revelation--and, on the other, to jealousy of reason: some minds\nlooking upon Christianity as at best a republication of the religion\nof nature, in which all that is most essential and valuable is \"as\nold as the creation;\" while others see in natural religion a rival of\nrevealed religion, and would exclude reason from the religious sphere\nas much as possible. The distinction is, however, real, and the errors\nindicated are not its legitimate consequences. If there be a certain\namount of knowledge about God and spiritual things to be derived from\nnature--from data furnished by perception and consciousness, and\naccessible to the whole human race,--while there is also a certain\nknowledge about Him which can only have been communicated through a\nspecial illumination or manifestation--through prophecy, or miracle, or\nincarnation,--the distinction must be retained. It is no real objection\nto it to urge that in a sense even natural religion may be regarded as\nrevealed religion, since in a sense the whole universe is a revelation\nof God, a manifestation of His name, a declaration of His glory. That\nis a truth, and, in its proper place, a very important truth, but it\nis not relevant here: it is perfectly consistent with the belief that\nGod has not manifested Himself merely in nature, but also in ways which\nrequire to be carefully distinguished from the manifestation in nature.\nIn like manner, the distinction is not really touched by showing that\nrevealed religion has embodied and endorsed the truths of natural\nreligion, or by proving that even what is most special in revelation\nis in a sense natural. These are both impregnable positions. The Bible\nis to a large extent an inspired republication of the spiritual truths\nwhich are contained in the physical creation, and in the reason,\nconscience, and history of man. But this does not disprove that it is\nsomething more. The highest and most special revelation of God--His\nrevelation in Jesus Christ--was also the fullest realisation of the\ntrue nature of man. But this is no reason why we should not distinguish\nbetween the general and the special in that revelation. We can only\nefface the distinction by reducing Christ to a mere man, or confounding\nGod with man in a pantheistic manner.\n\nIt has been further objected to the division of religion into natural\nand revealed that it is unhistorical, that natural religion is only\nrevealed religion disguised and diluted--Christianity without Christ.\nIt never existed, we are told, apart from revelation, and never would\nhave existed but for revelation. But this very objection, it will\nbe observed, implies that natural religion is not identical with\nrevealed religion--is not revealed religion pure and simple--is not\nChristianity with Christ. Why is this? Is it not because revealed\nreligion contains more than natural religion--what reason cannot read\nin the physical universe or human soul? Besides, while the principles\nof natural religion were presented in revelation in a much clearer form\nthan in any merely human systems, and while there can be no reasonable\ndoubt that but for revelation our knowledge of them would be greatly\nmore defective than it is, to maintain that they had no existence or\nwere unknown apart from revelation, is manifestly to set history at\ndefiance. Were there no truths of natural religion in the works of\nPlato, Cicero, and Seneca? Is there any heathen religion or heathen\nphilosophy in which there are not truths of natural religion?\n\nThe belief in a natural religion which is independent alike of special\nrevelation and of positive or historical religions has been argued\nto have originated in the same condition of mind as the belief in\na \"state of nature\" entertained by a few political theorists in\nthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This can only be done by\nconfounding natural religion with an imaginary patriarchal religion,\nwhich is, of course, inexcusable. Natural religion is analogous, not to\nthe state of nature, but to the law of nature of the jurists. Natural\nreligion is the foundation of all theology, as the law of nature is the\nfoundation of all ethical and political science; and just as belief in\nthe law of nature is perfectly independent of the theory of a state of\nnature, so the belief in natural religion has no connection whatever\nwith any theory of patriarchal or primitive religion.\n\nThere is a well-known essay by Professor Jowett on the subject of this\nnote in the second volume of his 'St Paul's Epistles,' &c.\n\n\nNOTE II., page 9.\n\nINFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON MORALITY.\n\nThe assertion of Mr Bentham and of Mr J. S. Mill that much has been\nwritten on the truth but little on the usefulness of religion, is quite\ninaccurate. Most of the apologists of religion have set forth the proof\nthat it serves to sustain and develop personal and social morality;\nand, from the time of Bayle downwards, not a few of its assailants have\nundertaken to show that it is practically useless or even hurtful. But\nBentham may have been the first who proposed to estimate the utility\nof religion apart from the consideration of its truth. The notion was\ncharacteristically Benthamite. It was likewise far too irrational to be\ncapable of being consistently carried out or applied. The work compiled\nby Mr Grote from the papers of Mr Bentham, and published under the name\nof Philip Beauchamp--'Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on\nthe Temporal Happiness of Mankind'--and Mr Mill's 'Essay on the Utility\nof Religion,' are, in almost every second page, as well as in their\ngeneral tenor, attacks not merely on the utility but on the truth of\nreligion.\n\nThe former of these works is an attempt to show that natural religion\nhas done scarcely any good, and produced no end of evils--inflicting,\nso runs the indictment, unprofitable suffering, imposing useless\nprivations, impressing undefined terrors, taxing pleasure by the\ninfusion of preliminary scruples and subsequent remorse, creating\nfactitious antipathies, perverting the popular opinion, corrupting\nmoral sentiment, producing aversion to improvement, disqualifying the\nintellectual faculties for purposes useful in this life, suborning\nunwarranted belief, depraving the temper, and, finally, creating a\nparticular class of persons incurably opposed to the interests of\nhumanity. The author makes out that religion is responsible for this\ncatalogue of mischiefs, by two simple devices. First, he defines\nreligion as \"the belief in the existence of an almighty Being, by whom\npains and pleasures will be dispensed to mankind during an infinite and\nfuture state of existence,\" or, in other words, he so defines religion\nas to exclude from the idea of God the thought of moral goodness,\nrighteousness, and holiness. He even insists that the God of natural\nreligion can only be conceived of as \"a capricious and insane despot,\"\nand bases his argumentation on this assumption. Dr Caselles, who has\ntranslated the treatise into French, and prefaced it by an interesting\nintroduction, informs us that the argumentation is not applicable\nto the new, but only to the old theism. It is historically certain,\nhowever, that the \"old\" theism of Jeremy Bentham and his friends never\nexisted outside of their own imaginations. It is likewise certain that\na lamb would acquire a very bad character if it were by definition\nidentified with a wolf, and credited with all that creature's doings.\nThe second device is \"a declaration of open war against the principle\nof separating the abuses of a thing from its uses.\" The only excuse\nwhich can be given for this declaration of a most unjust war is, that\nMr Bentham was able completely to misunderstand the obvious meaning of\nthe principle which he assailed. That a book so unfair and worthless\nshould have produced on the mind of Mr J. S. Mill, even when a boy of\nsixteen, the impression which he describes in his Autobiography would\nhave been inexplicable, had we not known the character of his education.\n\nMr Mill's own essay is rather strange. It begins with six pages of\ngeneral observations, which are meant to show that it is a necessary\nand very laudable undertaking to attempt to prove that the belief in\nreligion, considered as a mere persuasion apart from the question\nof its truth, may be advantageously dispensed with, any benefits\nwhich flow from the belief being local, temporary, and such as may\nbe otherwise obtained, without the very large amount of alloy always\ncontained in religion. Yet we are told that \"an argument for the\nutility of religion is an appeal to unbelievers to induce them to\npractise a well-meant hypocrisy; or to semi-believers to make them\navert their eyes from what might possibly shake their unstable belief;\nor, finally, to persons in general to abstain from expressing any\ndoubts they may feel, since a fabric of immense importance to mankind\nis so insecure at its foundations, that men must hold their breath in\nits neighbourhood for fear of blowing it down.\" An argument for the\nutility of religion is \"moral bribery.\" An argument for its uselessness\nis highly to be commended. Mr Mill further tells us that \"little\nhas been written, at least in the way of discussion or controversy,\nconcerning the usefulness of religion;\" and likewise, that \"religious\nwriters have not neglected to celebrate to the utmost the advantage\nboth of religion in general and of their own religious faith in\nparticular.\" The inference must be, that what religious writers urge\nfor the utility of religion is not to be reckoned as reasoning; that\nonly what writers like Mr Bentham and Mr Mill urge against its utility\nis to be thus regarded. The charity of this view is capped by the\nassertion that \"the whole of the prevalent metaphysics of the present\ncentury is one tissue of suborned evidence in favour of religion;\"\nan assertion which is made amusing by following a sentence in which\nMr Mill speaks of \"the intolerant zeal\" of intuitionists. After his\ngeneral considerations, he professes to inquire what religion does for\nsociety, but in reality never enters on the investigation. He devotes\ntwo pages to insisting on \"the enormous influence of authority on the\nhuman mind;\" three to emphasising \"the tremendous power of education;\"\nand ten to enlarging on \"the power of public opinion.\" He might as\nrelevantly have dwelt on the influence of reason, speech, the press,\nmachinery, clothes, marriage, and thousands of other things which\nundoubtedly affect the intellectual and moral condition of society.\nIt is as unreasonable to infer that religion is useless because\nauthority, education, and public opinion are powerful, as it would\nbe to infer that the fire in a steam-engine might be dispensed with\nbecause water is necessary. Any person who assumes, as Mr Mill assumed,\nthat authority, education, or public opinion may be contrasted with\nreligion--who does not see, as Mr Mill did not see, that all these\npowers are correlatives, which necessarily intermingle with, imply,\nand supplement one another--is, _ipso facto_, unable intelligently to\ndiscuss the question, What does religion do for society? In the second\npart of his essay, Mr Mill ought, in order to have kept his promise,\nto have considered what influence religion in the sense of belief in\nand love of God is naturally calculated to exert on the character and\nconduct of the individual; but instead of this he applies himself to\nthe very different task of attempting to prove that \"the idealisation\nof our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it\nmay be made, is capable of supplying a poetry, and, in the best sense\nof the word, a religion, equally fitted to exalt the feelings, and\n(with the same aid from education) still better calculated to ennoble\nthe conduct, than any belief respecting the unseen powers.\" He forgets\nto inquire whether there is any opposition between \"the idealisation\nof our earthly life\" and \"belief respecting the unseen powers,\" or\nwhether, on the contrary, religious belief is not the chief source of\nthe idealisation of our earthly life. That this logical error is as\nserious as it is obvious, appears from the fact that ten years later\nMr Mill himself confessed that \"it cannot be questioned that the\nundoubting belief of the real existence of a Being who realises our\nown best ideas of perfection, and of our being in the hands of that\nBeing as the ruler of the universe, gives an increase of force to our\naspirations after goodness beyond what they can receive from reference\nto a merely ideal conception\" (Theism, p. 252). His proof that the\nworship of God is inferior to the religion of humanity rests mainly on\nthese three assertions: (1) That the former, \"what now goes by the name\nof religion,\" \"operates merely through the feeling of self-interest;\"\n(2) That \"it is impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who\nis unable to blunt his inquiring intellect by sophistry, should be able\nwithout misgiving to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author\nand ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as\nthis planet and the life of its inhabitants;\" and (3), That \"mankind\ncan perfectly well do without the belief in a heaven.\" \"It seems to me\nnot only possible, but probable, that in a higher, and, above all, a\nhappier condition of human life, not annihilation but immortality may\nbe the burdensome idea; and that human nature, though pleased with the\npresent, and by no means impatient to quit it, would find comfort and\nnot sadness in the thought that it is not chained through eternity to a\nconscious existence which it cannot be assured that it will always wish\nto preserve.\" On this last point more mature reflection brought him to\na different and wiser conclusion (see Theism, pp. 249, 250).\n\nThose who wish to study the important subject of the relations of\nreligion and morality will find the following references useful: the\nlast chapter of M. Janet's 'La Morale;' the _\u00e9tude_ on \"La Morale\nind\u00e9pendante\" in M. Caro's 'Probl\u00e8mes de Morale Sociale;' many articles\nand reviews in M. Renouvier's 'Critique Philosophique;' Martensen's\n'Christian Ethics,' \u00a7\u00a7 5-14; O. Pfleiderer's 'Moral und Religion;'\nLuthardt's 'Apologetic Lectures on the Moral Truths of Christianity;'\nand Bradley's 'Ethical Studies,' pp. 279-305.\n\n\nNOTE III., page 18.\n\nETHICS OF RELIGIOUS INQUIRY.\n\nMuch has been written regarding the spirit and temper in which\nreligious truth should be pursued and defended. In a large number of\nthe general treatises both of apologetic and systematic theology,\nthe subject is considered, and not a few essays, lectures, &c., have\nbeen specially devoted to it. The greater portion of this literature\nmay, I believe, be forgotten without loss, but there is a part of it\nwhich will well repay perusal. The \"Oratio de recto Theologi zelo\" in\nthe first volume of the 'Opuscula' of Werenfels, is worthy of that\ntolerant and philosophical divine. Archbishop Leighton's 'Exhortations\nto Students' exhale from every line a heavenly ether and fragrance. It\nwill be long before Herder's 'Letters on the Study of Theology' are out\nof date.\n\nDr Chalmers attached high value to the distinction between the ethics\nof theology and the objects of theology, and expatiated with great\neloquence on the duty which is laid upon men by the probability or\neven the imagination of a God (Nat. Theol., B. i. ch. i. ii.) \"Man is\nnot to blame, if an atheist, because of the want of proof. But he is\nto blame, if an atheist, because he has shut his eyes. He is not to\nblame that the evidence for a God has not been seen by him, if no such\nevidence there were within the field of his observation. But he is to\nblame if the evidence have not been seen, because he turned away his\nattention from it. That the question of a God may be unresolved in his\nmind, all he has to do is to refuse a hearing to the question. He may\nabide without the conviction of a God, if he so choose. But this his\nchoice is matter of condemnation. To resist God after that He is known,\nis criminality towards Him; but to be satisfied that He should remain\nunknown, is like criminality towards Him. There is a moral perversity\nof spirit with him who is willing, in the midst of many objects of\ngratification, that there should not be one object of gratitude. It is\nthus that, even in the ignorance of God, there may be a responsibility\ntowards God. The Discerner of the heart sees whether, for the blessings\ninnumerable wherewith he has strewed the path of every man, He be\ntreated like the unknown benefactor who was diligently sought, or like\nthe unknown benefactor who was never cared for. In respect at least of\ndesire after God, the same distinction of character may be observed\nbetween one man and another--whether God be wrapt in mystery, or stand\nforth in full development to our world. Even though a mantle of deepest\nobscurity lay over the question of His existence, this would not efface\nthe distinction between the piety on the one hand which laboured and\naspired after Him, and the impiety upon the other which never missed\nthe evidence that it did not care for, and so grovelled in the midst of\nits own sensuality and selfishness. The eye of a heavenly witness is\nupon all these varieties; and thus, whether it be darkness or whether\nit be dislike which hath caused a people to be ignorant of God, there\nis with Him a clear principle of judgment that He can extend even to\nthe outfields of atheism.\"--(Pp. 72, 73.)\n\nThe Rev. Alexander Leitch, in the First Part of his 'Ethics of Theism'\n(1868), discusses in a thoughtful and suggestive manner the following\nsubjects: the reality and universality of the antithesis between\ntruth and error, the legitimate dependence in all cases of belief on\nknowledge, the responsibility of man for his whole system of belief,\nthe distinction between mystery and contradiction, the distinction\nbetween speculative and practical knowledge, the distinction between\ncertainty and probability, the standard of morality, and the claims of\nreason and faith.\n\nMr Venn's 'Hulsean Lectures' for 1869 \"are intended to illustrate,\nexplain, and work out into some of their consequences, certain\ncharacteristics by which the attainment of religious belief is\nprominently distinguished from the attainment of belief upon most other\nsubjects. These characteristics consist in the multiplicity of the\nsources from which the evidence for religious belief is derived, and\nthe fact that our emotions contribute their share towards producing\nconviction.\"\n\nWhat I have said in the text ought not to be understood as implying any\ndoubt that men are largely responsible for their beliefs. This I accept\nas an indubitable truth, although there is great room for difference of\nopinion as to the limits of the responsibility; but it is a truth which\nno one party in a discussion has a right to urge as against another\nparty. It is a law over all disputants, and is abused when severed from\ntolerance and charity. Perhaps it has never been better expounded and\nenforced than in Dr Pusey's 'Responsibility of the Intellect in Matters\nof Faith' (1873).\n\nThat religious belief is in a great measure conditioned and determined\nby character is implied in the whole argument of my third lecture.\nIn this fact lies the main reason why the highest evidence may not\nproduce belief even where there is no conscious dishonesty in those\nwho reject it. A person desirous of working himself fully into the\ntruth in this matter, will find excellent thoughts and suggestions in\nDr Newman's 'Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford,\nbetween A.D. 1826 and 1843,' and in Principal Shairp's 'Culture and\nReligion.'\n\n\nNOTE IV., page 23.\n\nTRADITIVE THEORY OF RELIGION.\n\nMr Fairbairn makes the following remarks on the theory which traces\nreligion to a primitive revelation: \"Although often advanced in the\nsupposed interests of religion, the principle it assumes is most\nirreligious. If man is dependent on an outer revelation for his idea\nof God, then he must have what Schelling happily termed 'an original\natheism of consciousness.' Religion cannot, in that case, be rooted\nin the nature of man--must be implanted from without. The theory that\nwould derive man's religion from a revelation is as bad as the theory\nthat would derive it from distempered dreams. Revelation may satisfy or\nrectify, but cannot create, a religious capacity or instinct; and we\nhave the highest authority for thinking that man was created 'to seek\nthe Lord, if haply he might feel after and find Him'--the finding being\nby no means dependent on a written or traditional word. If there was\na primitive revelation, it must have been--unless the word is used in\nan unusual and misleading sense--either written or oral. If written,\nit could hardly be primitive, for writing is an art, a not very early\nacquired art, and one which does not allow documents of exceptional\nvalue to be easily lost. If it was oral, then either the language for\nit was created or it was no more primitive than the written. Then an\noral revelation becomes a tradition, and a tradition requires either\na special caste for its transmission, becomes therefore its property,\nor must be subjected to multitudinous changes and additions from the\npopular imagination--becomes, therefore, a wild commingling of broken\nand bewildering lights. But neither as documentary nor traditional can\nany traces of a primitive revelation be discovered, and to assume it is\nonly to burden the question with a thesis which renders a critical and\nphilosophic discussion alike impossible.\"--Studies in the Philosophy of\nReligion and History, pp. 14, 15.\n\nThere is an examination of the same theory in the learned and able work\nof Professor Cocker of Michigan on 'Christianity and Greek Philosophy'\n(1875). He argues: 1. \"That it is highly improbable that truths so\nimportant and vital to man, so essential to the wellbeing of the human\nrace, so necessary to the perfect development of humanity as are the\nideas of God, duty, and immortality, should rest on so precarious and\nuncertain a basis as tradition.\" 2. \"That the theory is altogether\nincompetent to explain the _universality_ of religious rites, and\nespecially of religious ideas.\" 3. \"That a verbal revelation would be\ninadequate to convey the knowledge of God to an intelligence purely\npassive and utterly unfurnished with any _a priori_ ideas or necessary\nlaws of thought.\"--Pp. 86-96.\n\nA good history of the traditive theory of the diffusion of religion is\na desideratum in theological literature.\n\n\nNOTE V., page 29.\n\nNORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY.\n\nThe truth that social development ought to combine and harmonise\npermanence and progress, liberty and authority, the rights of\nthe individual and of the community, has been often enforced and\nillustrated. The earnestness with which Comte did so in both of his\nchief works is well known. A philosopher of a very different stamp, F.\nv. Baader, has in various of his writings given expression to profound\nthoughts on the subject. His essay entitled 'Evolutionismus und\nRevolutionismus des gesellschaftlichen Lebens' merits to be specially\nmentioned. Alexander Vinet has often been charged with a one-sided\nindividualism, and perhaps not altogether without justice; but he\nalways maintained that he was merely the advocate of individuality.\n\"Individualism and individuality are two sworn enemies; the first\nbeing the obstacle and negation of all society--the second, that to\nwhich society owes all it possesses of savour, life, and reality.\nNowhere does individualism prosper more easily than where there is an\nabsence of individuality; and there is no more atomistic policy than\nthat of despotism.\" Vinet has probably not held the balance exactly\npoised between the individual and society; but his dissertations, 'Sur\nl'individualit\u00e9 et l'individualisme' and 'Du r\u00f4le de l'individualit\u00e9\ndans une r\u00e9forme sociale,' would have been far less valuable than they\nare if he had forgotten that, although it is the individual who thinks,\nthe thought of the individual cannot form itself outside of society\nnor without its aid. But he did not, as words like the following\nsufficiently prove:--\"It is better to connect ourselves with society\nthan to learn to dispense with it, or rather to persuade ourselves\nthat we are able to dispense with it. It is only given to the brute to\nsuffice to itself. Man has been chained to man. We hardly give more\ncredit to spontaneous generation in the intellectual sphere than in the\nphysical world; the most individual work is to a certain point the work\nof all the world; everywhere _solidarity_ reappears, without, however,\nany prejudice to liberty: God has willed it so.\" \"It is with the soul\nengaged in the life of religion, or that of thought, as with the vessel\nlaunched upon the waters, and seeking beyond the ocean for the shores\nof a new world. This ocean is society, religious or civil. It bears\nus just as the ocean does--fluid mass, on which the vessel can indeed\ntrace furrows, but may nowhere halt. The ocean bears the ship, but the\nocean may swallow it up, and sometimes does so; society swallows us\nup still more often, but yet it is what upbears us; nor can we arrive\nwithout being upborne by it, for it is like the sea, which, less fluid\nthan the air, and less dense than the earth, just yields to and resists\nus enough to sustain without impeding our progress towards the desired\ngoal.\" There are no finer pages in Martensen's 'Christian Ethics' than\nthose in which he treats of \"individualism and socialism,\" \"liberty\nand authority in the development of society,\" and \"conservatism and\nprogress.\" The most adequate historical proof and illustration of the\ntruth in question as to the nature of social evolution will be found in\nthe Earl of Crawford's 'Progression by Antagonism' and 'Scepticism and\nthe Church of England.'\n\n\nNOTE VI., page 32.\n\nDEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION BY THE HIGHEST TYPE.\n\nDr Whewell maintained that in natural history groups are fixed not by\ndefinition, but by type. \"The class,\" he wrote, \"is steadily fixed,\nthough not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it\nis determined not by a boundary-line without, but by a central point\nwithin; not by what it strictly excludes, but by what it eminently\nincludes; by an example, not by a precept; in short, instead of\nDefinition we have a Type for our director. A type is an example of\nany class--for instance, a species of a genus--which is considered\nas eminently possessing the characters of the class. All the species\nwhich have a greater affinity with this type-species than with any\nothers form the genus, and are ranged about it, deviating from it\nin various directions and different degrees.\"--Philosophy of the\nInductive Sciences, vol. i. pp. 476, 477. Dr Whewell, it will be\nobserved, was more cautious in his language than the theologians to\nwhom I have referred. He did not speak of defining by type, but only\nof classifying, not by definition, but by type. His motive, however,\nfor entertaining the view he laid down, was obviously the same which\nhas led so many theologians to give definitions of religion which are\nonly applicable to its highest forms. Probably it was insufficient.\nProf. Huxley (Lay Sermons, pp. 90-92) very justly, it seems to me,\nargues that classification by type is caused by ignorance, and that as\nsoon as the mind gets a scientific knowledge of a class it defines.\nNothing which is not precisely limited is steadily fixed; nothing\nwhich is not circumscribed is exactly given: if the boundary-line is\nnot determined, the central point cannot be accurately ascertained;\nwhat is eminently included cannot be known so long as what is strictly\nexcluded is unknown. While assenting to the view of Prof. Huxley in\nthe passage indicated, I may remark that he falls into one error which\nrather forcibly illustrates what is said in the page to which this\nnote refers regarding the necessary poverty of the significance of a\nstrictly scientific definition of an extensive class. He instances as\na definition which is of a truly scientific kind and \"rigorous enough\nfor a geometrician,\" the following: \"Mammalia are all animals which\nhave a vertebrated skeleton and suckle their young.\" But clearly this\ndefinition says too much if we are to criticise it rigorously. Were\nit true, there would be no males among mammalia. The definition is in\nstrictness applicable to females only.\n\n\nNOTE VII., page 38.\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF RELIGION.\n\nIn this note I shall briefly summarise three class lectures on the\npsychological nature of religion.\n\n1. Investigations into the psychological nature of religion date only\nfrom about the end of last century.\n\nFor ages previously men sought to know what religion was; but they\nattempted to find an answer merely by reflection on positive or\nobjective religion. Kant opened up to them a new path--that of\ninvestigation into the nature of religion as an internal or mental\nfact. O. Pfleiderer's account (Die Religion, pp. 5-124) of the\nresearches thus started characterised, and criticised.\n\n2. The testimony of consciousness is sufficient to establish the\nexistence of religion as a subjective or mental state, but cannot\ncertify whether, as such, it be simple or complex, primary or\nderivative, coextensive with human consciousness, or wider or narrower,\nor whether there be anything objectively corresponding to it.\n\n3. In order to analyse religion, the ultimate genera of consciousness\nmust be ascertained, which has only been slowly done. History of\nthe process: Plato, Aristotle, their followers, Descartes, Spinoza,\nthe English philosophers from Bacon to Dugald Stewart, Kant and the\nGerman psychologists, Brown, Hamilton, and Bain. Establishment of the\nthreefold division of mental phenomena into cognitions, emotions, and\nvolitions. Difficulties of the division shown by the author in 'Mind,'\nNo. V.\n\nReligion must be a state of intellect, sensibility, or will, or some\ncombination of two or all of these factors.\n\n4. Religion may be held to consist essentially and exclusively of\nknowledge; but this mistake is too gross to have been frequently\ncommitted.\n\nThe Gnostics, the earlier and scholastic theologians, the rationalists,\nSchelling and Cousin, have been charged with this error. The grounds of\nthe charge indicated. Shown to be in all these cases exaggerated.\n\n5. Schleiermacher refutes the theory by the consideration that the\nmeasure of our knowledge is not the measure of our religion.\n\nVindication and illustration of his argument. Service rendered by\nSchleiermacher to religion and theology in this connection.\n\n6. Hegel came nearest to the identification of religion and thought,\nmaintaining that sentiment was the lowest manifestation of religion,\nwhile the comprehension of the absolute, the highest knowledge,\nwas its complete realisation, as also that religion was the\nself-consciousness of God through the mediation of the finite spirit.\n\nExposition and criticism of this theory. Examination of Vera's defence\nof it. Worship supposes two persons morally and spiritually as well as\nintellectually related.\n\n7. While no mere intellectual act constitutes religion, the exercise of\nreason is an essential part of religion.\n\nThe denial of this an error prevalent among the modern theologians of\nGermany, owing to their accepting Kant's argumentation against the\npossibility of apprehending God by the speculative or pure reason as\nconclusive. If religion have no rational foundation, it has no real\nfoundation. Reason does not apprehend merely what is finite. True place\nof reason in religion.\n\n8. Religion has often been resolved into feeling or sentiment,\nbut erroneously, since whatever feeling is fixed on requires some\nexplanation of its existence, and this can only be found in some act or\nexercise of intellect.\n\n9. Epicurus, Lucretius, and Hume have traced religion to fear.\n\n10. Fear explains atheism better than it explains religion, and in\norder even to be feared God must be believed in.\n\nMen fear a great many things. Mere fear founds nothing, but only causes\nefforts to avoid the presence or thought of its object. Fear enters\ninto religion, and is filial in the higher, and servile in the lower,\nforms of religion.\n\n11. Feuerbach resolves religion into desire--into an ignorant and\nillusive personification of man's own nature as he would wish it to be.\n\n12. This view presupposes the truth of atheism, does not explain why\nman should refer to supramundane ends or objects, and is contradicted\nby the historical facts, which show that reason and conscience have at\nleast co-operated with desire in the origination and development of\nreligion.\n\n13. Schleiermacher resolves religion into a feeling of absolute\ndependence--of pure and complete passiveness.\n\nStatement of his theory. Shown to rest on a pantheistic conception of\nthe Divine Being. His reduction of the Divine attributes into _power_.\n\n14. No such feeling can exist, the mind being incapable of experiencing\na feeling of nothingness--a consciousness of unconsciousness.\n\n15. Could it be supposed to exist, it would have no religious\ncharacter, because wholly blind and irrational.\n\n16. The theory of Schleiermacher makes the moral and religious\nconsciousness subversive of each other, the former affirming and the\nlatter denying our freedom and responsibility.\n\n17. Mansel supposes the religious consciousness to be traceable to\nthe feeling of dependence and the conviction of moral obligation; but\nthe latter feeling implies the perception of moral law, and is not\nreligious unless there be also belief in a moral lawgiver.\n\n18. Schenkel represents conscience as 'the religious organ of the\nsoul,' but this is not consistent with the fact that conscience is the\nfaculty which distinguishes right from wrong.\n\nSchenkel's view of conscience shown to make its religious testimony\ncontradict its ethical testimony.\n\n19. Strauss combines the views of Epicurus, Feuerbach, and\nSchleiermacher; but three errors do not make a truth.\n\nAccount of the criticism to which the Straussian theory of religion has\nbeen subjected by Vera, Ulrici, and Professor H. B. Smith.\n\n20. Although there can be no true religion without love, and although\nto love the true God with the whole heart is the ideal of religion,\nreligion cannot be resolved exclusively into love; since love\npresupposes knowledge, and is not the predominant feeling, if present\nat all, in the lower forms of religion.\n\n21. Religion includes will, implying the free and deliberate surrender\nof the soul to God,--the making self an instrument where it might,\nalthough wrongfully, have been made an end,--but it is not merely will,\nsince all volition, properly so called, presupposes reason and feeling.\n\n22. Kant made religion merely a sanction for duty, and duty the\nexpression of a will which is its own law, and which is unaffected by\nfeeling; but this view rested on erroneous conceptions as to (1) the\nrelation of religion and morality, (2) the nature of the will, and (3)\nthe place of feeling in the mental economy.\n\nReligion and morality inseparable in their normal conditions; but not\nto be identified, religion being communion with God, while morality\nis conformity to a law which is God's will but which may not be\nacknowledged to be His will, so that they may and do exist in abnormal\nforms apart from each other.\n\nThe will has not its law in itself. Kant's errors on this subject.\n\nFeeling is the natural and universal antecedent of action. Kant's\nerrors on this subject.\n\n23. Dr Brinton (Religious Sentiment, &c., 1876) analyses religion into\nemotion and idea--an effective and intellectual element--the latter of\nwhich arises necessarily from the law of contradiction and excluded\nmiddle.\n\nMerits and defects of his theory.\n\n24. The religious process is at once rational, emotional, and\nvolitional.\n\nIts unity, and the co-operation of knowing, feeling, and willing.\n\n25. Description of (1) its essential contents, (2) its chief forms,\n(3) its principal moments or stages, and (4) its manifestations in\nspiritual worship and work.\n\n\nNOTE VIII., page 58.\n\nARGUMENT E CONSENSU GENTIUM.\n\nPessimism will be treated of along with other anti-theistic theories.\nThe fact that religion is a natural and universal phenomenon, as\nwidespread as humanity and as old as its history, and the fact insisted\non in the lecture, that religion can only realise its proper nature\nin a theistic form, give us, when adequately established, the modern\nand scientific statement of the old argument--_e consensu gentium_.\nThis argument, which we already meet with in Cicero (De Nat. Deor.,\ni. 17; Tusc. Ques., i. 13; De Leg., i. 8) and Seneca (Epist. 117), in\nClement of Alexandria (Strom., v. 14) and Lactantius (Div. Inst., i.\n2), has gradually grown into the science of comparative theology. An\ninstructive essay might be written on its development.\n\nMr J. S. Mill, who had obviously no suspicion that there had been\nany development of the kind, criticised the argument in his essay\non Theism, pp. 154-160. He was entirely mistaken in representing it\nas an appeal to authority--\"to the opinions of mankind generally,\nand especially of some of its wisest men.\" It has certainly very\nrarely--probably never--been advanced in a form which could justify\nsuch an account of it. He was also mistaken in supposing that it had\nany necessary connection with the view which ascribes to men \"an\nintuitive perception, or an instinctive sense, of Deity.\" I agree with\nhis objections to that view; but the argument does not imply it. If it\nprove that man's mental constitution is such that, in the presence of\nthe facts of nature and life, religion necessarily arises, and that\nthe demands of reason, heart, and conscience, in which it originates,\ncan only be satisfied by the worship and service of one God, with the\nattributes which theism assigns to Him, it has accomplished all that\ncan reasonably be expected from it.\n\nMr Mill was, however, it seems to me, perfectly correct in holding\nthat the mere prevalence of the belief in Deity afforded no ground\nfor inferring that the belief was native to the mind in the sense of\nindependent of evidence. In no form ought the argument from general\nconsent to be regarded as a primary argument. It is an evidence that\nthere are direct evidences--and when kept in this its proper place it\nhas no inconsiderable value--but it cannot be urged as a direct and\nindependent argument. This is a most important consideration, which is\nin danger of being overlooked in the present day. Some authors would\nactually contrast the argument for theism or Christianity derivable\nfrom the comparative study of religion with the ordinary or formal\nproofs, and would substitute it for them, not seeing that, although\npowerful in connection with, and dependence on, these proofs, it has\nlittle relevancy or weight when dissociated from them.\n\nThe two recent writers who have made most use of the argument are,\nperhaps, Ebrard, who has devoted to it the whole of the second volume\nof his Apologetics, and Baumstark, whose 'Christian Apologetics on an\nAnthropological Basis' has for its exclusive aim to prove that man has\nbeen made for religion, and that the non-Christian religions do not,\nwhile Christianity does, satisfy his religious cravings and needs.\nIn this country we ought not to forget the service which Mr Maurice\nrendered by his 'Religions of the World,' and Mr Hardwicke by his\n'Christ and other Masters.'\n\nThe position maintained by Sir John Lubbock, that religion is not\na universal phenomenon, and that advocated by Comte, that it is a\ntemporary and transitional phenomenon, will be examined in the volume\non Anti-theism.\n\n\nNOTE IX., page 75.\n\nTHE THEISTIC EVIDENCE COMPLEX AND COMPREHENSIVE.\n\nCousin has said, \"There are different proofs of the existence of God.\nThe consoling result of my studies is, that these different proofs are\nmore or less strict in form, but they have all a depth of truth which\nneeds only to be disengaged and put in a clear light, in order to give\nincontestable authority. Everything leads to God. There is no bad way\nof arriving at Him, but we go to Him by different paths.\"\n\nThe truth, that all the faculties of man's being must co-operate in\nthe formation of the idea of God, is well enforced and illustrated\nin an article on \"The Origin of the Concept of God,\" by the Rev.\nGeorge T. Ladd, in the 'Bibliotheca Sacra,' vol. xxxiv.; also in\nPrincipal M'Cosh's 'Method of the Divine Government,' B. i., c. i.,\nsec. 1, and 'Intuitions of the Mind,' Pt. iii., B. ii., c. v., sec.\n2. The following quotation from Mr Ladd's article is a statement of\nits central idea: \"Nothing is more necessary, in the endeavour to\nunderstand how the concept under consideration originates, than to hold\ncorrect views of the entire relation of man to truth. The view which,\nif not held as a theory, is quite too frequently carried out in the\npractical search after knowledge, seems to be this one--that truth is\na product of mind wrought out by the skilful use of the ratiocinative\nfaculties. It follows, then, that the correct working of these\nfaculties is almost the only important or necessary guarantee of truth.\nBut it is not any lone faculty or set of faculties which is concerned\nin man's reception of truth. The truth becomes ours only as a gift\nfrom without. All truth is of the nature of a revelation, and demands\nthat the organ through which the revelation is made should be properly\nadjusted. The organ for the reception of truth is symmetrically\ncultured manhood, rightly correlated action, and balanced capabilities\nof man's different powers. The attitude of him who would attain to\ntruth is one of docility, of receptiveness, of control exercised\nupon all the powers of the soul,--so that none of them, by abnormal\ndevelopment or activity, interfere with the action of all the rest....\nIf the statements just made are true with regard to human knowledge in\ngeneral, they are pre-eminently true with regard to such knowledge as\nis presented to the soul in the form of the concept of God. The pure\nin heart shall see God; they that obey shall know of the doctrine;\nthe things of the spirit are spiritually judged of. These statements\nare as profound in their philosophic import as they are quickening in\ntheir practical tendencies. This concept comes as God's revelation of\nHimself within all the complex activities of the human soul. It is\nadapted to man as man in the totality of his being and energies. And\nthe whole being of man must be co-operative in the reception of this\nself-revelation of God, as well as met and filled by the form which the\nrevelation takes, in order that the highest truth concerning God may\nbecome known.... In his work on Mental Physiology, Dr Carpenter speaks\nof certain departments of science 'in which our conclusions rest, not\non any one set of experiences, but upon our _unconscious co-ordination\nof the whole aggregate of our experience_; not on the conclusions of\nany one train of reasoning, but on _the convergence of all our lines\nof thought toward one centre_.' These words, italicised by that author\nhimself, well represent the form in which the knowledge of God is given\nto the human soul. It is the convergence of these lines of thought that\nrun together from so many quarters which makes a web of argument far\nstronger to bind men than any single thread could be. This is a form\nof proof which, while it is, when understood aright, overwhelmingly\nconvincing, gives also to all the elements of our complex manhood\ntheir proper work to do in its reception. In its reception it makes\nfar greater difference, whether the moral and religious sections of\nthe whole channel through which the truth flows are open or not, than\nwhether the faculty of the syllogism is comparatively large or not. Nor\nis there any effort to disparage any intellectual processes involved,\nin thus insisting upon the complete and co-ordinated activity of the\nsoul, as furnishing the organon for the knowledge of God. All the\nstrings of the harp must be in tune, or there will be discord, not\nharmony, when the breath of the Lord blows upon it.\"\n\nThat the power of apprehending God is conditioned by the character of\nman's nature as a whole, was clearly seen and beautifully expressed\nby the ancient Christian apologist, Theophilus. \"If thou sayest, show\nme thy God, I answer, show me first thy man, and I will show thee my\nGod. Show me first, whether the eyes of thy soul see, and the ears of\nthy heart hear. For as the eyes of the body perceive earthly things,\nlight and darkness, white and black, beauty and deformity, &c., so the\nears of the heart and the eyes of the soul can perceive divine things.\nGod is seen by those who can see Him, when they open the eyes of their\nsoul. All men have eyes, but the eyes of some are blinded that they\ncannot see the light of the sun. But the sun does not cease to shine\nbecause they are blind; they must ascribe it to their blindness that\nthey cannot see. This is thy case, O man! The eyes of thy soul are\ndarkened by sin, even by thy sinful actions. Like a bright mirror, man\nmust have a pure soul. If there be any rust on the mirror, man cannot\nsee the reflection of his countenance in it; likewise if there be any\nsin in man, he cannot see God.\"--Ad Autolycum, i. c. 2.\n\nThere is an improper use of the fact that the emotional capacities as\nwell as the intellectual faculties are concerned in the apprehension of\nGod. Some persons express themselves as if there was an evidence for\nGod in the feelings not only as well as in the intellect, but distinct\nfrom, and independent of, the evidence on which the intellect has to\ndecide. They reason as if although the latter were necessarily and in\nits own nature inconclusive, the former might still warrant belief, or\nas if at least feelings might so supplement weak arguments as to allow\nof their conclusions being firmly held. They virtually acknowledge\nthat, although it were incontestably proved that the theistic inference\nwas such as could not reasonably be deemed trustworthy or sufficient\nby the intellect, they would believe in the existence of God all the\nsame in reliance on their feelings, because the heart is as trustworthy\nas the head and as well entitled to be heard. This is a very different\ndoctrine from what I regard to be the true one--namely, that neither\nthe head nor the heart is a competent witness in the case under\nconsideration when the one is dissociated from the other. Purity of\nheart and obedience to the will of God enable us to see God and to know\nHis character and doctrine, but they do not dispense with vision and\nknowledge, nor do they create a vision and knowledge which are distinct\nfrom, and independent of, reason. The heart must be appealed to and\nsatisfied as well as the head, but not apart from or otherwise than\nthrough the head, or the appeal is sophistical and the satisfaction\nillegitimate. Our feelings largely determine whether we recognise and\nassent to reasons or not, but they ought not to be substituted for\nreasons, or even used to supplement reasons. The sentimentalism which\npleads feelings in deprecation of the rigid criticism of reasons, or\nin order to retain a conviction which it cannot logically justify,\nnecessarily tends to scepticism, and, indeed, is a kind of scepticism.\n\n\nNOTE X., page 86.\n\nINTUITION, FEELING, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE IN RELIGION.\n\nThere are few who hold in a consistent manner that God is known by\nimmediate intuition. The great majority of those who profess to\nbelieve this, so explain it as to show that they believe nothing of\nthe kind. Dr Charles Hodge (Systematic Theology, pt. i. ch. i.) may\nbe indicated as an example. Professing to hold that the knowledge of\nGod is innate and intuitive, he so explains and restricts these terms\nas would make our knowledge of our fellow-men as much innate and\nintuitive as our knowledge of God, or even more so; and even after\nall these qualifications finds that nothing more can be maintained\nthan \"that a sense of dependence and accountability to a being\nhigher than themselves exists in all minds\"--which is far from being\nequivalent to the conclusion that God is intuitively known. Cousin\nis sometimes represented as an advocate of the view in question,\nbut erroneously. Discounting a few inaccurate phrases, his theory\nas to the nature of the theistic process is substantially identical\nwith that expounded in the lecture. Its purport is not that reason\ndirectly and immediately contemplates the Absolute Being, but that it\nis enabled and necessitated by the essential conditions of cognition,\nthe _a priori_ ideas of causality, infinity, &c., to apprehend Him\nin His manifestations. To find intuitionists who in this connection\nreally mean what they say, we must go to Hindu Yogi, Plotinus and the\nAlexandrian Mystics, Schelling, and a few of his followers--or, in\nother words, to those who have thought of God as a pantheistic unity\nor a Being without attributes.\n\nMany German theologians, unduly influenced by the authority of\nSchleiermacher, and destitute of a sound knowledge of psychology, have\nrested religion on feeling--mere or pure feeling. Hegel opposed the\nattempt to do this, with considerable effect, although on erroneous\nprinciples. Krause exposed it, however, with far more thoroughness\nin his 'Absolute Religionsphilosophie.' It is on feeling that belief\nis rested by most of the advocates of what is called \"the faith\nphilosophy.\" With thinkers of this class a man like Cousin must not\nbe confounded, although he maintained that religion begins with faith\nand not with reflection; or like Hamilton, although he denied that the\ninfinite can be _known_ while affirming that it \"is, must, and ought to\nbe, _believed_.\" Cousin meant by faith \"nothing else than the consent\nof reason,\" and Hamilton meant by belief \"assent to the original data\nof reason.\"\n\nThe words faith and belief are used in a bewildering variety of senses.\nA few remarks will make this apparent.\n\n(_a_) By belief or faith is sometimes meant _reason_ as distinguished\nfrom _understanding_, and sometimes _reason_ as distinguished from\n_reasoning_. These two senses are so very closely allied that we may\nallow them to count as but a single signification. It is extraordinary\nthat in either sense belief should be contrasted with reason, as it\nis by those who tell us that the infinite is an object only of faith,\nand that reason has to do exclusively with the finite, or that first\nprinciples are inaccessible to reason but revealed to faith. To create\nan appearance of conflict between reason and faith by identifying\nfaith with reason in a special sense, and reason with understanding\nor reasoning, is unwarranted, if not puerile. What use can there be\nin telling us that God cannot be known--cannot be apprehended by\nreason--but is only an object of faith, a Being merely to be believed\nin, when what is meant is that we have the same immediate certainty of\nHis existence as of the truth of an axiom of geometry?\n\n(_b_) Belief may be limited to apprehension, and knowledge to\ncomprehension. It may be said that \"we have but faith, we cannot know\"\nthe unseen and infinite, just as it is said that we believe that the\ngrass grows but do not know how it grows. It is obvious, however, that\nif apprehension be knowledge, as it surely is, we believe only what we\nknow. We know--_i.e._, apprehend--the existence of God and the growth\nof the grass, and we believe what we thus know. We do not know--_i.e._,\ncomprehend--the nature of God or the nature of growth, and what we do\nnot thus know neither do we believe.\n\n(_c_) At other times faith or belief relates to probable, as opposed\nto certain, knowledge. \"We do not know this, but we believe it,\" often\nmeans, \"We are not sure of this, but we think it likely.\" It is not in\nthis sense, of course, that any one except a religious sceptic will\nallow that the existence of God is a matter of faith. A man may admit\nthat religion and science differ as faith and knowledge, but if he is\nwilling to understand this as signifying that while science is certain,\nreligion is at the most merely probable, he must necessarily be a\ndoubter or an unbeliever.\n\n(_d_) Faith or belief sometimes refers to the knowledge which rests on\npersonal testimony, Divine or human. Such faith may be more certain\nthan assent given to the evidence furnished by science. It ought to be\nprecisely proportioned to the evidence that there is such and such\ntestimony, and that the testimony is trustworthy.\n\n(_e_) By faith or belief is sometimes meant trust in a person or\nfidelity to a truth; the yielding up of the heart and life to the\nobject of faith. Faith or belief of this kind always involves\n\"preparedness to act upon what we affirm.\" It does not appear to me\nthat such preparedness is, as Professor Bain maintains, \"the genuine,\nunmistakable criterion of belief\" in general. This kind of faith,\nlike all other faith, ought to rest on the assent of the intellect to\nevidence, although what is characteristic of it is to be found not in\nthe intellect but in the emotions and will. Since it constitutes and\nproduces, however, spiritual experience, it is a condition and source\nas well as a consequence of knowledge. There can be, in fact, no\nprofound religious knowledge, because there can be no vital religion,\nwithout it.\n\nIn religion, as in every other department of thought and life, man is\nbound to regulate his belief by the simple but comprehensive principle\nthat evidence is the measure of assent. Disbelief ought to be regulated\nby the same principle, for disbelief is belief; not the opposite of\nbelief, but belief of the opposite. Unbelief is the opposite both of\nbelief and disbelief. Ignorance is to unbelief what knowledge is to\nbelief or disbelief. The whole duty of man as to belief is to believe\nand disbelieve according to evidence, and neither to believe nor\ndisbelieve when evidence fails him.\n\n\nNOTE XI., page 118.\n\nTHE THEOLOGICAL INFERENCE FROM THE THEORY OF ENERGY.\n\nA remarkably clear account of the chief theories as to the nature of\nmatter will be found in Professor Tait's 'Lectures on some Recent\nAdvances in Physical Science,' Lect. XII. In Thomson and Tait's\n'Natural Philosophy,' Thomson's article on \"The Age of the Sun's\nHeat\" ('Macmillan's Magazine,' March 1862), Tait's 'Thermodynamics,'\nHelmholtz's 'Correlation and Conservation of Forces,' Balfour Stewart's\n'Treatise on Heat,' &c., the facts and theorems which seem to establish\nthat the material universe is a temporary system will be found fully\nexpounded.\n\nI am not acquainted with any more effective criticism of the\nargumentation by which the eminent physicists mentioned support their\nconclusion than that of the Rev. Stanley Gibson; and, although it\nseems to me not to come to very much, I feel bound in fairness to give\nit entire. After an exposition of the theory of energy, and of the\nreasoning founded on it by which we seem necessitated to infer that\nthe universe tends at last to be a scene of rest, coldness, darkness,\nand death, he thus writes: \"Is this reasoning, I ask, open to any\nobjection? and if not, does it bear out the theological conclusion\nhere sought to be rested upon it? In attempting to pass a verdict upon\nthe question here raised, we cannot but feel, not only the grandeur\nof the subject before us, but also the imminent risk of its being\naffected by considerations unknown to us. We certainly need to judge\nwith diffidence. Perhaps the first question which arises is, Are we to\ntake the material universe to be infinite? If it be, and if its stores\nof energy, potential and kinetic, have no limit, then it is no longer\nclear that the final stage of accumulation need have been reached,\nhowever long its past history may have been; nor yet, I may add, that\nit would ever be reached in the future. I may be reminded that at\npresent, at all events, only finite accumulations have arisen, and that\nthis is not consistent with an accumulation through a past eternity.\nBut this objection assumes that there never could have been more than\nsome assignable degree of diffusion of matter. Why should this be? If\nat any past period there was a certain degree of diffusion, why may\nthere not have been a greater degree at an earlier period? And if so,\nwhy may not this integrating, as I should propose to call it, have been\ngoing on for ever?\n\n\"If, on the other hand, the universe be finite, then, according to the\nprinciple of the conservation of energy, reflection of heat must take\nplace from its boundaries, and there may be reconcentration of energy\non certain points, according to the form of the bounding surface.\n\n\"A second inquiry arises thus. If it be impossible to imagine the\npresent history of the universe continued backward indefinitely under\nits present code of laws, are we therefore obliged to assume some\nanomalous interference? We speak, of course, of these laws as they are\nknown to us. Might there not be others, yet unknown, that would solve\nthe difficulty?\n\n\"The history of the universe, as immediately known to us, offers as\nits leading feature the falling together of small discrete bodies in\nenormous numbers and with great velocities, or the condensation of\nvery rare and diffused gases. Hence the formation of bodies, some\nof vast size, others smaller, but all originally greatly heated.\nThis process seems to point to an earlier state of things, in which\nsuch accumulations of matter, though sparse even now, were far less\ncommon--a state in which, to use the expression which I have proposed,\nmatter was far less integrated. It is quite true that the great change\nof which we thus obtain a glimpse is not a recurring process. It is\nnot therefore fitted for eternal repetition and continuance. But it\nis a bold thing to say that this earlier state of things may not have\nfollowed from one still older by a natural process, and this again\nfrom one before, and so on through an indefinite regression. We have\nseen what an important part the ether plays in the present process of\nthe dissipation of energy. The existence of that ether, the separation\nof matter into two main forms, may have sprung out of some previous\ncondition of things wholly unknown to us. And so also there may be\nforms and stores of energy as yet unknown.\n\n\"Mr Proctor, in his work on the sun, has cautioned us how we speculate\non the physical constitution of that body, whilst we must feel\nuncertain how far the physical laws, which we observe here, will hold\nunder the vastly different conditions obtaining there. He supports\nhis caution by referring to cases in which what had been confidently\nthought by many to be safe generalisations have been shown to fail in\nnovel circumstances. Thus it was thought that the passage of a gas\nfrom the gaseous into the liquid form was always an abrupt change.\nBut it has been found that carbonic acid gas can be made to pass into\nthe liquid state by insensible gradations. Again, it had been thought\nthat gas, when incandescent, always gave light whose spectrum was\nbroken into thin lines; but it has been shown that hydrogen, under\nhigh pressure, may be made to give forth light with a continuous\nspectrum. Now surely this caution, which Mr Proctor enters in the case\nof which he speaks, might still more wisely be entered when we come to\nconsider a state of things so novel, so remote from our experience,\nas that which attended the origin of the universe, or rather of that\nstate of the universe with which we are acquainted. We certainly must\nnot be in haste to conclude that because the laws of nature, as they\nare known to us, will not explain what must have taken place at some\nvery remote period, therefore those events must have been altogether\nanomalous.\"--Religion and Science, pp. 71-74.\n\nIt is here virtually--perhaps I may say expressly--conceded that if the\nmatter and energy of the universe be finite and located in infinite\nspace, the reasoning by which the theorists of thermodynamics maintain\nthat perpetual motion is incompatible with the transformation and\ndissipation of energy, cannot be resisted. Unless matter and energy\nbe infinite or space finite, the known laws of nature must eventually\nabolish all differences of temperature and destroy all life--this\nis what is admitted. To me it seems to amount to yielding all that\nis demanded; because whoever seriously considers the difficulties\ninvolved in believing either matter infinite or space finite must, I am\npersuaded, come to regard it as equivalent to an acknowledgment that\nthe world will have an end and must have had a beginning.\n\nZoellner, in his ingenious work on the nature of comets, endeavours\nto avoid this inference by recourse to the hypotheses of Riemann and\nothers as to a space of _n_ dimensions. In such a space the shortest\nline would be a circle, and a body might move for ever, yet describe a\nlimited course. Matter, space, and inferentially time, would, in fact,\naccording to this hypothesis, be both finite and infinite. It is to be\nhoped that few persons in the full possession of their intellects will\never accept a view like this. The imaginary geometry may be thoroughly\nsound reasoning, but it is reasoning from erroneous premises, and it\ncan only be useful so long as it is remembered that its premises are\nerroneous. They have only to be assumed to be true to experience and\nreality, and all science must be set aside in favour of nonsense. Logic\nought not, however, to be confounded with truth.\n\nCaspari fancies that by representing the universe as not a mechanism\nbut an organism, he preserves the right to believe it eternal. But\nsurely the laws of heat apply to organisms no less than to mechanisms.\n\nIn an article concerning the cosmological problem, published in\nthe first number of the 'Vierteljahrsschrift f. Wissenschaftliche\nPhilosophie,' Professor Wundt rejects the theory in question on\nextremely weak grounds. \"It is easy to see,\" he says, \"that, in the\ncase of the English physicists at least, the desire of harmonising the\ndata of the exact sciences with theological conceptions has not been\nwithout influence on this limitation of the universe.\" The rashness\ndisplayed by such a statement, and the utter want of evidence or\nprobability for it, as regards men like Thomson or Tait, need not\nbe pointed out. Besides, Clausius and Helmholtz are neither English\nphysicists nor likely to be influenced by theological conceptions.\nWill it be believed that, notwithstanding this charge against others,\nProfessor Wundt's own reasoning is not scientific, but merely\nanti-theological? Such is the case. If the Thomsonian theory be\nadmitted, a place is left for creative action, for miracle; and this,\nhe argues, is a contradiction of the principle of causality. Therefore\nthe theory must be rejected. It is to be regretted that so eminent a\nman of science should employ so unscientific an argument.\n\nThere is obviously a very widespread unwillingness to accept the\nThomsonian theory; but, so far as I am aware, good reasons have not\nyet been given for its rejection. The contrast between the reception\nwhich it has received and that which has been accorded to the Darwinian\ntheory is certainly curious, and probably instructive.\n\n\nNOTE XII., page 130.\n\nTHE HISTORY OF THE \u00c6TIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.\n\nThe argument for the Divine existence which proceeds on the principle\nof causality is generally called the cosmological argument, but\nsometimes, and perhaps more accurately, the \u00e6tiological argument.\nThe proof from order is not unfrequently termed cosmological. It is\nimpossible to keep the \u00e6tiological argument entirely separate either\nfrom the ontological or cosmological argument. \u00c6tiological reasoning\nmay be detected as a creative factor in the rudest religious creeds.\nThe search for causes began not with the origin of philosophy but with\nthe origin of religion. Passages like Ps. xc. 1, 2, cii. 26-28; Rom. i.\n19, 20; Heb. i. 10-12--have been referred to as anticipations of the\nargument. Wherever nature is spoken of in Scripture, it is as the work\nof an uncreated being, of a free and sovereign mind. Aristotle gave a\nformal expression to the \u00e6tiological argument by inferring from the\nmotion of the universe the existence of a first unmoved mover--Phys.,\nvii. 1, 2, viii. 7, 9, 15. Cicero repeated his reasoning, and tells us\nit had been also employed by Carneades, De Nat. Deor., ii. 9, iii. 12,\n13. Well known is St Augustine's \"Interrogavi terram, et dixit: non\nsum. Interrogavi mare et abyssos--et responderunt: non sumus deus tuus,\nqu\u00e6re super nos. Interrogavi coelum, solem, lunam, stellas: neque nos\nsumus deus, quem qu\u00e6ris, inquiunt. Et dixi omnibus iis--dicite mihi de\nillo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna: ipse fecit nos. Interrogavi\nmundi molem de Deo meo et respondit mihi: non ego sum, sed ipse me\nfecit.\"--Conf., x. 6. Diodorus of Tarsus (Phot. Bib. Cod., 223, p.\n209 Bekk.), and John of Damascus (De Fid. Orth., i. 3), inferred the\nnecessity of a creative unity from the mutability and corruptibility\nof worldly things. Thomas Aquinas argued on the principle of causality\nin three ways--viz.: 1. From motion to a first moving principle,\nwhich is not moved by any other principle; 2. From effects to a first\nefficient cause; and 3. From the possible and contingent to what is in\nitself necessary.--Summa. P. i., Qu. 2, 3. Most of the theologians of\nthe sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries who treat of the\nproofs of the Divine existence, employ in some form the argument from\ncausation. Thus, in Pearson 'On the Creed' and Charnock's 'Discourses\non the Existence and Attributes of God' will be found good examples of\nhow it was presented in this country in the seventeenth century. Hume's\nspeculations on causation attracted attention to it. The philosophers\nof the Scottish school and their adherents among the theologians\nlaboured to present it in a favourable light. In Germany, Leibnitz\n(Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, I. c. 7) and Wolff (Rational Thoughts of God, \u00a7 928)\nlaid stress on the accidental contingent character of the world and\nits contents, and, relying on the principle of the sufficient reason,\nconcluded that there must be a universal and permanent cause of all\nthat is changing and transitory, an absolute ground of all that is\nrelative and derivative. Further, Wolff and his followers raised on\nthis reasoning a large amount of metaphysical speculation as to the\nnature of a necessary cause, the properties of an absolute Being, which\nwas of a very questionable sort in itself, and had no proper connection\nwith the so-called cosmological argument. To this argument, as stated\nby Wolff, Kant applied his transcendental criticism, and proved, as\nhe thought, that it was \"a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions.\"\nHis argumentation may be allowed to have had force against Wolff, but\nit is weak wherever it is relevant to the \u00e6tiological proof rightly\nunderstood. In fact, his objections openly proceed on the assumption\nthat the principle of causality is only applicable within the sphere\nof sense experience. If this be true, no objections, of course, are\nnecessary. As a rule, the \u00e6tiological argument is not skilfully or even\ncarefully treated in the works of recent German theologians. It has\nbeen expounded, however, with great philosophical ability and with a\nrare wealth of scientific knowledge, by Professor Ulrici of Halle, in\nthe work entitled 'Gott und die Natur.' A translation of this treatise\nwould confer a real service both on the theology and philosophy of this\ncountry.\n\n\nNOTE XIII., page 137.\n\nMATHEMATICS AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.\n\n\"Another science regarded as barren of religious applications, and\neven as sometimes positively injurious, is mathematics. Its principles\nare, indeed, of so abstruse a nature, that it is not easy to frame out\nof them a religious argument that is capable of popular illustration.\nBut, in fact, mathematical laws form the basis of nearly all the\noperations of nature. They constitute, as it were, the very framework\nof the material world.... It seems, then, that this science forms the\nvery foundation of all arguments for theism, from the arrangements\nand operations of the material universe. We do, indeed, neglect the\nfoundation, and point only to the superstructure, when we state\nthese arguments. But suppose mathematical laws to be at once struck\nfrom existence, and what a hideous case would the universe present!\nWhat then would become of the marks of design and unity in nature,\nand of the theist's argument for the being of a God?... It is said,\nhowever, that mathematicians have been unusually prone to scepticism\nconcerning religious truth. If it be so, it probably originates from\nthe absurd attempt to apply mathematical reasoning to moral subjects;\nor rather, the devotees of this science often become so attached to\nits demonstrations, that they will not admit any evidence of a less\ncertain character. They do not realise the total difference between\nmoral and mathematical reasonings, and absurdly endeavour to stretch\nreligion on the Procrustean bed of mathematics. No wonder they become\nsceptics. But the fault is in themselves, not in this science, whose\nnatural tendencies, upon a pure and exalted mind, are favourable to\nreligion.\"--Hitchcock's Religion of Geology, pp. 387-389.\n\n\"Nor can we fail to notice how frequently the law which men have\ninvented proves to have been already known and used in nature. The\nmathematician devises a geometric locus or an algebraic formula from\n_a priori_ considerations, and afterward discovers that he has been\nunwittingly solving a mechanical problem, or explaining the form of a\nreal phenomenon. Thus, for example, in Peirce's 'Integral Calculus,'\npublished in 1843, is a problem invented and solved purely in the\nenthusiasm of following the analytic symbols; but in 1863 it proved\nto be a complete prophetic discussion and solution of the problem of\ntwo pendulums suspended from one horizontal cord. Thus also Galileo's\ndiscussion of the cycloid proved, long afterward, to be a key to\nproblems concerning the pendulum, falling bodies, and resistance\nto transverse pressure. Four centuries before Christ, Plato and\nhis scholars were occupied upon the eclipse as a purely geometric\nspeculation, and Socrates seemed inclined to reprove them for their\nwaste of time. But in the seventeenth century after Christ, Kepler\ndiscovers that the Architect of the heavens had given us magnificent\ndiagrams of the eclipse in the starry heavens; and, since that time,\nall the navigation and architecture and engineering of the nineteenth\ncentury have been built on these speculations of Plato. Equally\nremarkable is the history of the idea of extreme and mean ratio. Before\nthe Christian era geometers had invented a process for dividing a\nline in this ratio, that they might use it in an equally abstract and\nuseless problem--the inscribing a regular pentagon in a circle. But it\nwas not until the middle of the present century that it was discovered\nthat this idea is embodied in nature. It is hinted at in some animal\nforms, it is very thoroughly and accurately expressed in the angles\nat which the leaves of plants diverge as they grow from the stem, and\nit is embodied approximately in the revolutions of the planets about\nthe sun.... Now, in all these cases of the embodiment in nature of an\nidea which men have developed, not by a study of the embodiment, but\nby an _a priori_ speculation, there seems to us demonstrative evidence\nthat man is made in the image of his Creator; that the thoughts\nand knowledge of God contain and embrace all possible _a priori_\nspeculations of men. It is true that God's knowledge is infinite, and\nbeyond our utmost power of conception. But how can we compare the\nreasonings of Euclid upon extreme and mean ratio with the arrangement\nof leaves about the stem, and the revolutions of planets around the\nsun, and not feel that these phenomena of creation express Euclid's\nidea as exactly as diagrams or Arabic digits could do; and that\nthis idea was, in some form, present in the creation?\"--The Natural\nFoundations of Theology. By T. Hill, D.D., LL.D.\n\nThere is an ingenious and judicious little work by Charles Girdlestone,\nM.A., published in 1875, and entitled 'Number: a Link between Divine\nIntelligence and Human. An Argument.'\n\n\nNOTE XIV., page 140.\n\nASTRONOMY AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.\n\nThe design argument has always drawn some of its data from astronomy.\nThe order and beauty of the heavenly bodies, the alternation of\nday and night, the succession of the seasons, and the dependence of\nliving creatures on these changes, are referred to as indications of\nGod's character and agency in many passages of Scripture. Thus, to\nselect only from the Psalms: \"When I consider Thy heavens, the work\nof Thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained;\nwhat is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that\nThou visitest him?\"--viii. 3, 4. \"The heavens declare the glory of\nGod; and the firmament showeth His handiwork. Day unto day uttereth\nspeech, and night unto night showeth knowledge.\"--xix. 1, 2. \"He\nappointed the moon for seasons; the sun knoweth his going down. Thou\nmakest darkness, and it is night: wherein all the beasts of the forest\ndo creep forth.... The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together,\nand lay them down in their dens. Man goeth forth unto his work and\nto his labour until the evening. O Lord, how manifold are Thy works!\nin wisdom hast Thou made them all.\"--civ. 19-24. Among classical\nwriters, Cicero has presented the design argument as founded on the\narrangements and movements of the heavenly bodies in a very striking\nmanner, when, referring to the instrument by which Posidonius had\ningeniously represented them, he asks whether, if that instrument were\ncarried into Scythia or Britain, any even of the barbarians of these\nlands would doubt that it was the product of reason, and rebukes those\nwho would regard the wondrous system of which it was a feeble copy as\nthe effect of chance. \"Quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam, sph\u00e6ram\naliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius,\ncujus singul\u00e6 conversiones idem efficiunt in sole, et in lun\u00e2, et in\nquinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in coelo singulis diebus\net noctibus: quis in ill\u00e2 barbarie dubitet, quin ea sph\u00e6ra sit perfecta\nratione? Hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia,\ncasune ipse sit effectus, aut necessitate aliqu\u00e2, an ratione ac mente\ndivin\u00e2: et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sph\u00e6r\u00e6\nconversionibus, quam naturam in efficiendis, pr\u00e6sertim cum multis\npartibus sint illa perfecta, quam h\u00e6c simulata, sollertius.\"--De Nat.\nDeorum, ii. 34, 35. The 'Astro-Theology' of Wm. Derham, published in\n1714, was perhaps the first work entirely devoted to the illustration\nof the design argument from astronomical facts and theories. Among\ncomparatively recent works of a similar kind I may mention Vince's\n'Confutation of Atheism from the Laws and Constitution of the Heavenly\nBodies,' Whewell's 'Bridgewater Treatise,' Dick's 'Celestial Scenery,'\nMitchell's 'Planetary and Stellar Worlds,' and Leitch's 'God's Glory\nin the Heavens.' They afford ample evidence of the erroneousness of\nComte's assertion that \"the opposition of science to theology is more\nobvious in astronomy than anywhere else, and that no other science has\ngiven more terrible shocks to the doctrine of final causes.\" Kepler did\nnot think so, for he concludes his work on the 'Harmony of Worlds' with\nthese devout words: \"I thank Thee, my Creator and Lord, that Thou hast\ngiven me this joy in Thy creation, this delight in the works of Thy\nhands. I have shown the excellency of Thy work unto men, so far as my\nfinite mind was able to comprehend Thine infinity. If I have said aught\nunworthy of Thee, or aught in which I may have sought my own glory,\ngraciously forgive it.\" Nor did Newton, for he wrote: \"Elegantissima\nh\u00e6cce compages solis, planetarum, et cometarum (et stellarum), non\nnisi consilio et dominio Entis cujusdam potentis et intelligentis oriri\npotuit.\" And in our own times such men as Herschel, Brewster, M\u00e4dler,\n&c., have protested against the notion that astronomy tends to atheism.\n\nThe late Professor De Morgan demonstrated in his 'Essay on\nProbability,' when only eleven planets were known, that the odds\nagainst chance, to which in such a case intelligence is the only\nalternative, being the cause of all these bodies moving in one\ndirection round the sun, with an inconsiderable inclination of the\nplanes of their orbits, were twenty thousand millions to one. \"What\nprospect,\" are his own words, \"would there have been of such a\nconcurrence of circumstances, if a state of chance had been the only\nantecedent? With regard to the sameness of the directions, either of\nwhich might have been from west to east, or from east to west, the case\nis precisely similar to the following: There is a lottery containing\nblack and white balls, from each drawing of which it is as likely a\nblack ball shall arise as a white one: what is the chance of drawing\neleven balls all white?--answer 2047 to one against it. With regard to\nthe other question, our position is this: There is a lottery containing\nan infinite number of counters, marked with all possible different\nangles less than a right angle, in such a manner that any angle is\nas likely to be drawn as another, so that in ten drawings the sum of\nthe angles drawn may be anything under ten right angles: now, what is\nthe chance of ten drawings giving collectively less than one right\nangle?--answer 10,000,000 to one against it. Now, what is the chance of\nboth these events coming together?--answer, more than 20,000,000,000 to\none against it. It is consequently of the same degree of probability\nthat there has been something at work which is not chance in the\nformation of the solar system.\"\n\nThere are several departments of science as much, or even more, adapted\nthan astronomy, to furnish proofs of the wisdom of God; but there is\nnone which affords us such evidence of His power, or so helps us to\nrealise His omnipresence, our own nothingness before Him, and the\nlittleness of our earth in the system of His creation. Those who wish\nto have impressions of this kind deepened may be recommended to read\nthe works of Proctor and Flammarion.\n\nWhat is said in the paragraph to which this note refers must not be so\nunderstood as to be in consistent with the possibility or probability,\nif not demonstrated certainty, that the universe is not a perfectly\nconservative system, but one which is tending surely although slowly to\nthe destruction of the present condition of things. This fact, if it\nbe a fact, can no more affect the design argument in its relation to\nastronomy, than the decay of plants and the death of animals can affect\nit in relation to vegetable and animal physiology.\n\n\nNOTE XV., page 143.\n\nCHEMISTRY AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.\n\nThe history of chemistry is of itself sufficient to disprove the view\nof Comte that the initial and conjectural stages of a science are those\nin which it affords most support to theology. It was only after the\ndefinitive constitution of chemistry as a science, only after the\ndiscovery of positive and precise chemical laws, that the teleological\nargument for the Divine existence began to be rested to a certain\nextent upon it.\n\nThe Honourable Robert Boyle, the founder of the Boyle Lectureship, was\none of the most distinguished chemists of his age, a zealous defender\nof final causes, and the author of several treatises intended to\ndiffuse worthy views and sentiments as to the character and operations\nof the Creator.\n\nProbably the two best English treatises on the relationship of\nchemistry to theism are the Bridgewater Treatise of Dr Prout,\n'Chemistry, Meteorology, and the Function of Digestion, considered\nwith reference to Natural Theology' (3d ed., 1845), and the Actonian\nPrize Essay of Professor Fownes, 'Chemistry as exemplifying the\nWisdom and Beneficence of God' (1844). Both writers were chemists of\nhigh reputation, but they were not very conversant with theology or\nphilosophy, and have, in consequence, by no means fully utilised the\nexcellent scientific materials which they collected.\n\nThis makes it all the more to be regretted that the late Professor\nGeorge Wilson was not permitted to accomplish his design of writing \"a\nbook corresponding to the 'Religio Medici' of Sir Thomas Browne, with\nthe title 'Religio Chemici.'\" Among the fragments comprised in the work\npublished under that title after his death, three essays--\"Chemistry\nand Natural Theology,\" \"The Chemistry of the Stars,\" and \"Chemical\nFinal Causes\"--are most interesting and suggestive.\n\nThe attempts of writers like Moleschott and B\u00fcchner to draw atheistic\ninferences from the theories or hypotheses of modern chemistry\nhave given rise to a multitude of answers, but it may be sufficient\nto refer to the 'Antimaterialismus' of Dr L. Weiss. Liebig in his\n'Chemical Letters' manifests profound contempt for the materialistic\nand anti-theistic speculations attempted to be based on the science of\nwhich he was so illustrious a master.\n\n\nNOTE XVI., page 145.\n\nGEOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, ETC., AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT.\n\nThe single fact that geology proves that every genus and species of\norganic forms which exist or have existed on the earth had a definite\nbeginning in time, gives to this science great importance in reference\nto theism. It decides at once and conclusively what metaphysics might\nhave discussed without result for ages. Its religious bearings are\nexhibited in Buckland's 'Geology and Mineralogy considered in reference\nto Natural Theology,' Hugh Miller's 'Footprints of the Creator,'\nHitchcock's 'Religion of Geology,' and many other works. Lyell\nconcludes both his 'Elements of Geology' and 'Principles of Geology'\nby affirming that geological research finds in all directions the\nclearest indications of creative intelligence; that \"as we increase\nour knowledge of the inexhaustible variety displayed in nature, and\nadmire the infinite wisdom and power which it manifests, our admiration\nis multiplied by the reflection, that it is only the last of a great\nseries of pre-existing creations, of which we cannot estimate the\nnumber or limit in times past.\"\n\nThe numerous adaptations which exist between the terrestrial and\ncelestial economies are dwelt on in detail by M'Culloch in the second\nvolume of his 'Proofs and Illustrations of the Attributes of God\nfrom the Facts and Laws of the Physical Universe,' and by Buchanan\nin 'Faith in God and Modern Atheism,' vol. i. pp. 132-156. These two\nauthors have also treated of the adaptations subsisting between the\norganic and inorganic worlds. The Bridgewater Treatise of Chalmers was\non 'The Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual\nConstitution of Man;' and that of Kidd, on 'The Adaptation of External\nNature to the Physical Constitution of Man.'\n\nIn Ritter's 'Geographical Studies,' Guyot's 'Earth and Man,' Kapp's\n'Allgemeine Erdkunde,' Lotze's 'Mikrokosmus,' B. vi. c. 1, Duval's\n'Des Rapports entre la G\u00e9ographie et l'Economie Politique,' Cocker's\n'Theistic Conception of the World,' ch. vii., &c., will be found a\nrich store of teleological data as to the fitness of the earth to be\nthe dwelling-place and the schoolhouse of human beings. Of course,\nthose who attempt to prove this thesis require carefully to resist the\ntemptation to conceive of the relation of nature to man as not one of\ncause and effect, of action and reaction, of mutual influence, but as\nan immediate and inexplicable pre-established harmony like that which\nLeibnitz supposed to exist between the body and the soul. This was\nthe theory which Cousin set forth in a celebrated lecture on the part\nof geography in history. Regarding it I may quote the words which I\nhave used elsewhere: \"This notion is not only purely conjectural, but\ninconsistent with the innumerable facts which manifest that nature\ndoes influence man, and that man does modify nature. It is impossible\nto hold, either in regard to the body and soul, or in regard to nature\nand man, _both_ the theory of mutual influence and of pre-established\nharmony. All that, in either case, proves the former, disproves the\nlatter. The belief in a pre-established harmony between man and nature\nis, indeed, considerably more absurd than in a pre-established harmony\nbetween the body and soul; for when a body is born, a soul is in it,\nwhich remains in it till death, and is never known to leave it in\norder to take possession of some other body: but every country is not\ncreated with a people in it, nor is every people permanently fixed\nto a particular country. Imagination may be deceived for a moment\nby an obvious process of association into this belief of certain\npeoples being suited for certain lands, independently of the action\nof natural causes--the Greeks, let us say, for Greece, the Indian for\nthe prairies and forests of America, the Malayan for the islands of\nthe Indian Archipelago; but a moment's thought on the fact that the\nTurk has settled down where the Greeks used to be--that mighty nations\nof English-speaking men are rising up where the Indian roamed, and\nthat Dutchmen are thriving in the lands of the Malayan, should suffice\nto disabuse us. Besides, just as the dictum, 'Marriages are made in\nheaven,' is seriously discredited by the great number that are badly\nmade, so the kindred opinion that every country gets the people which\nsuits it, and every people the country, as a direct and immediate\nconsequence of their pre-established harmony, is equally discredited by\nthe prevalence of ill-assorted unions, a great many worthless peoples\nliving in magnificent lands, while far better peoples have much worse\nones.\"--Philosophy of History in France and Germany, pp. 191, 192.\n\n\nNOTE XVII., page 146.\n\nTHE ORGANIC KINGDOM AND DESIGN.\n\nThe order and system in the vegetable and animal kingdoms are\nundeniable general facts, whatever may have been the secondary\nagencies by which they have been produced; and the inference of\ndesign from these facts is valid, whatever may have been the mode of\ntheir production. The characters and relationships of organic forms\nconstitute a proof of intelligence, whether their genera and species\nbe the immediate and immutable expressions of the ideas of the Divine\nMind, or the slowly-reached results of evolution. Of course, if\nthere has been a process of evolution, it must have been one exactly\nfitted to attain the result. But the discovery or exhibition of such\na process will be sufficient to cause a certain class of minds to\nbelieve that there has been no cause but the process--that the process\ncompletely explains both itself and the result, and leaves no room for\nintelligence.\n\nThe character of the order and system in the organic world is so\nextremely abstruse, subtle, and comprehensive, that all the attempts\nat classification in botany prior to De Candolle, and in zoology prior\nto Cuvier, were failures. The labours of the great naturalists and\nbiologists of the present century have, doubtless, accomplished much;\nbut the light reached is still but the feeble light of an early dawn.\nYet that light is most pleasant and satisfying to the eye of the mind.\nThe reason sees in it a profound significance and a wonderful beauty.\nHow, it may well be asked, can a scheme of order which tasks to such\nan extent the powers of comprehension possessed by the human mind, and\nyet which is perceived, when discovered, to be admirably rational, be\nsupposed to have originated elsewhere than in a Mind?\n\nI can only mention a few out of the multitude of books which treat of\ndesign in the organic world. Among general works on natural theology it\nmay be sufficient to refer to those of Paley, Buchanan, and Tulloch;\nand among special works to Professor Balfour's 'Phyto-Theology; or,\nBotanical Sketches, intended to illustrate the Works of God in the\nStructure, Functions, and General Distribution of Plants;' M'Cosh's\n'Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation;' Agassiz's 'Structure of\nAnimal Life; being Six Lectures on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of\nGod, as manifested in His Works;' Kirby's 'Power, Wisdom, and Goodness\nof God, as manifested in the Creation of Animals;' Roget's 'Animal and\nVegetable Physiology, considered in reference to Natural Theology;'\nand Sir Charles Bell's 'The Hand, its Mechanism and Vital Endowments,\nas evincing Design.' The three last-mentioned works are Bridgewater\nTreatises.\n\nIt is a duty to call particular attention to the recent work of M.\nJanet, 'Les Causes Finales.' Although M. Janet concedes, perhaps, too\nmuch to the opponents of finality, his treatise contains the ablest\nand most adequate discussion of the various problems suggested by the\nindications which organic nature gives of design that has yet appeared.\nIt is eminently worthy of a careful study. I am glad to know that a\ntranslation of this valuable work is in progress.\n\nAmong the masters of biological science, Cuvier, V. Baer, Agassiz, and\nR. Owen may be named, as among those who have set the highest value on\nthe principle of finality. The essay on Classification of Agassiz, and\nthe various essays which Von Baer has published at different times, on\nwhat he calls \"Zielstrebigkeit,\" are specially important.\n\n\nNOTE XVIII., page 148.\n\nEVIDENCES OF DESIGN IN ORGANISMS.\n\n\"The _savants_ are generally too much disposed to confound the doctrine\nof final cause with the hypothesis of an invisible force acting\nwithout physical means, as a _deus ex machin\u00e2_. These two hypotheses,\nfar from reducing themselves the one to the other, are in explicit\ncontradiction; for he who says _design_ says at the same time _means_,\nand, consequently, causes adapted to produce a certain effect. To\ndiscover this cause is by no means to destroy the idea of design; it\nis, on the contrary, to bring to light the condition, _sine qu\u00e2 non_,\nof the production of the end. To make clear this distinction we cite a\nbeautiful example, borrowed from M. Claude Bernard. How does it happen,\nsays this eminent physiologist, that the gastric juice, which dissolves\nall aliments, does not dissolve the stomach itself, which is of\nprecisely the same nature as the aliments with which it is nourished?\nFor a long time the vital force was supposed to intervene--that is to\nsay, an invisible cause which, in some way, suspended the properties\nof the natural agents, to prevent their producing their necessary\neffects. The vital force would, by a sort of moral _veto_, forbid the\ngastric juice to touch the stomach. We see that this would be a real\nmiracle. Everything is explained when we know that the stomach is lined\nwith a coating or varnish which is not attacked by the gastric juice,\nand which protects the walls which it covers. Who does not see that\nin refuting the omnipotence of the vital force, very far from having\nweakened the principle of finality, we have given to it a wonderful\nsupport? What could the most perfect art have done to protect the\nwalls of the stomach, but invent a precaution similar to that which\nexists in reality? And how surprising it is that an organ destined to\nsecrete and use an agent most destructive to itself, is found armed\nwith a protective tunic, which must have always coexisted with it,\nsince otherwise it would have been destroyed before having had time\nto procure for itself this defence--which excludes the hypothesis\nof long gropings and happy occurrences.\"--Janet, 'Final Causes and\nContemporaneous Physiology,' Presb. Quart. Rev., April 1876.\n\nProfessor Tyndall gives a very graphic description of the combination\nof remarkable arrangements by which the human ear is fitted to be an\norgan of hearing. I quote from it the following words, and connect\nwith them some striking observations of Max M\u00fcller. \"Finally, there is\nin the labyrinth a wonderful organ, discovered by the Marchese Corti,\nwhich is to all appearance a musical instrument, with its chords so\nstretched as to accept vibrations of different periods, and transmit\nthem to the nerve-filaments which traverse the organ. Within the\nears of men, and without their knowledge or contrivance, this lute of\n3000 strings has existed for ages, accepting the music of the outer\nworld, and rendering it fit for reception by the brain. Each musical\ntremor which falls upon this organ selects from its tensioned fibres\nthe one appropriate to its own pitch, and throws that fibre into\nunisonant vibration. And thus, no matter how complicated the motion of\nthe external air may be, those microscopic strings can analyse it and\nreveal the constituents of which it is composed.\"--On Sound, p. 325.\n\"What we hear when listening to a chorus or a symphony is a commotion\nof elastic air, of which the wildest sea would give a very inadequate\nimage. The lowest tone which the ear perceives is due to about 30\nvibrations in one second, the highest to about 4000. Consider, then,\nwhat happens in a _presto_, when thousands of voices and instruments\nare simultaneously producing waves of air, each wave crossing the\nother, not only like the surface waves of the water, but like spherical\nbodies, and, as it would seem, without any perceptible disturbance;\nconsider that each tone is accompanied by secondary notes, that each\ninstrument has its peculiar _timbre_, due to secondary vibrations;\nand, lastly, let us remember that all this cross-fire of waves, all\nthis whirlpool of sound, is moderated by laws which determine what\nwe call harmony, and by certain traditions or habits which determine\nwhat we call melody--both these elements being absent in the songs of\nbirds--that all this must be reflected like a microscopic photograph on\nthe two small organs of hearing, and there excite not only perception,\nbut perception followed by a new feeling even more mysterious, which\nwe call either pleasure or pain;--and it will be clear that we are\nsurrounded on all sides by miracles transcending all we are accustomed\nto call miraculous.\"--Science of Language, second series, p. 115.\n\nThe structure of the eye has often been described as an evidence of\ndesign. There is an extremely interesting comparison of it with the\nphotographic camera in Le Conte's 'Religion and Science,' pp. 20-33.\n\nThe whole reading public knows the masterly chapter on \"The Machinery\nof Flight\" in the Duke of Argyll's 'Reign of Law.'\n\n\nNOTE XIX., page 149.\n\nPSYCHOLOGY AND DESIGN.\n\nThe following writers treat at considerable length of the evidences of\ndesign to be traced in the constitution of the mind: Sir Matthew Hale\nin his 'Primitive Origination of Mankind;' Barrow in the seventh of\nhis 'Sermons on the Creed;' Bentley in the second sermon of his 'Boyle\nLecture;' Crombie in the second volume of his 'Natural Theology;' Lord\nBrougham in his 'Discourse on Natural Theology,' sect. iii., pp. 52-80;\nTurton's 'Natural Theology Considered,' pp. 65-160; Chalmers's 'Natural\nTheology,' Book III.; Buchanan's 'Faith in God,' pp. 213-231; Tulloch's\n'Theism,' pp. 182-247; and Ulrici's 'Gott und Mensch.'\n\nThe phenomena of animal instinct are of themselves an inexhaustible\nsource of instruction as to the Divine wisdom and goodness. \"The\nspinning machinery which is provided in the body of a spider is not\nmore accurately adjusted to the viscid secretion which is provided\nfor it, than the instinct of the spider is adjusted both to the\nconstruction of its web and also to the selection of likely places\nfor the capture of its prey. Those birds and insects whose young\nare hatched by the heat of fermentation, have an intuitive impulse\nto select the proper materials, and to gather them for the purpose.\nAll creatures, guided sometimes apparently by senses of which we\nknow nothing, are under like impulses to provide effectually for the\nnourishing of their young; and it is most curious and instructive\nto observe that the extent of provision which is involved in the\nprocess, and in the securing of the result, seems very often to be\ngreater as we descend in the scale of nature, and in proportion as the\nparents are dissociated from the actual feeding or personal care of\ntheir offspring. The mammalia have nothing to provide except food for\nthemselves, and have at first, and for a long time, no duty to perform\nbeyond the discharge of a purely physical function. Birds have more to\ndo--in the building of nests, in the choice of sites for these, and\nafter incubation in the choice of food adapted to the period of growth.\nInsects, much lower in the scale of organisation, and subject to the\nwonderful processes of metamorphosis, have to provide very often for a\ndistant future, and for successive stages of development not only in\nthe young but in the _nidus_ which surrounds them. Bees, if we are to\nbelieve the evidence of observers, have an intuitive guidance in the\nselection of food which has the power of producing organic changes in\nthe bodies of the young, even to the determination and development of\nsex, so that, by the administration of it, under what may be called\nartificial conditions, certain selected individuals can be made the\nmothers and queens of future hives. These are but a few examples of\nfacts of which the whole animal world is full, presenting, as it does,\none vast series of adjustments between bodily organs and corresponding\ninstincts. But this adjustment would be useless unless it were part of\nanother adjustment--between the instincts and perceptions of animals\nand those facts and forces of surrounding nature which are related\nto them, and to the whole cycle of things of which they form a part.\nIn those instinctive actions of the lower animals which involve the\nmost distant and the most complicated anticipations, it is certain\nthat the prevision involved is a prevision which is not in the animals\nthemselves. They appear to be, and beyond all doubt really are,\nguided by some simple appetite, by an odour or a taste, and, in all\nprobability, they have generally as little consciousness of the ends\nto be subserved as the suckling has of the processes of nutrition. The\npath along which they walk is a path which they did not engineer. It is\na path made for them, and they simply follow it. But the propensities\nand tastes and feelings which make them follow it, and the rightness\nof its direction towards the ends to be attained, do constitute an\nadjustment which may correctly be called mechanical, and is part of\na unity which binds together the whole world of life, and the whole\ninorganic world on which living things depend.\"--Duke of Argyll on\nAnimal Instinct (Cont. Rev., July 1875).\n\nInstinctive actions will not be shown to be less evidences of Divine\npurpose by its being proved that intelligence, at least in the higher\nanimals, probably always co-operates in some degree with instinct, or\nthat much which is referred to instinct may be traced either directly\nto experience or to the hereditary transmission of qualities originally\ngenerated by experience.\n\n\nNOTE XX., page 152.\n\nHISTORY AND DESIGN.\n\nThe quotation is from the eighteenth--the concluding--volume of the\n'Etudes sur l'Histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9,' by Professor Laurent of Ghent.\nI have given some account of his historical doctrine, and endeavoured\nto defend the theistic inference which he has drawn from his laborious\nsurvey of historical facts against the objections of Professor J.\nB. Meyer, in my 'Philosophy of History in France and Germany,' pp.\n321-330. Bunsen, in the work entitled 'God in History,' seeks to\nestablish the same great thesis.\n\n\"History,\" says Niebuhr, \"shows, on a hundred occasions, an\nintelligence distinct from nature, which conducts and determines\nthose things which may seem to us accidental; and it is not true\nthat history weakens our belief in Divine Providence. History is, of\nall kinds of knowledge, the one which tends most decidedly to that\nbelief.\"--Lectures on the History of Rome, vol. ii. p. 59.\n\nS\u00fcssmilch's celebrated treatise, 'G\u00f6ttliche Ordnung in der Ver\u00e4nderung\ndes menschlichen Geschlechtes, &c.;' M'Cosh's 'Method of the Divine\nGovernment;' and Gillett's 'God in Human Thought,' vol. ii. pp.\n724-792, may be consulted as regards the evidences of Divine purpose to\nbe found in the constitution of society.\n\n\nNOTE XXI., page 168.\n\nHISTORY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.\n\nThe proof of the Divine existence from the order and adaptations of the\nuniverse is known as the physico-theological or teleological argument.\nIt has also been sometimes called the cosmological argument; the very\nword cosmos, like the Latin _mundus_ and our own universe, implying\norder. It is so obvious and direct that it has presented itself to\nthe mind from very ancient times. It is implied in such passages of\nScripture as Job, xxxvii.-xli.; Ps. viii., xix., civ.; Isa. xl. 21-26;\nMatt. vi. 25-32; Acts, xiv. 15-17, xvii. 24-28. Pythagoras laid great\nstress on the order of the world; and it was mainly on that order\nthat Anaxagoras rested his belief in a Supreme Intelligence. Socrates\ndeveloped the argument from the adaptation of the parts of the body to\none another, and to the external world, with a skill which has never\nbeen surpassed. His conversation with Aristodemus, as recorded in the\n'Memorabilia' of Xenophon, is of wonderful interest and beauty. Few\nwill follow it even now without feeling constrained to join Aristodemus\nin acknowledging that \"man must be the masterpiece of some great\nArtificer, carrying along with it infinite marks of the love and favour\nof Him who thus formed it.\" Plato presents the argument specially in\nthe 'Tim\u00e6us,' and his whole philosophy is pervaded by the thought that\nGod is the primary source and perfect ideal of all order and harmony.\nAristotle expressly maintains that \"the appearance of ends and means\nis a proof of design,\" and conceives of God as the ultimate Final\nCause. Cicero (De Nat. Deor., ii. c. 37) puts into the mouth of Balbus\nan elaborate exposition of the design argument. The 'De Usu Partium'\nof Galen is a treatise on natural theology, teaching design in the\nstructure of the body.\n\nThis proof is found more frequently than any other in the writings of\nthe fathers and scholastics. \"When we see a vessel,\" says Theophilus,\n\"spreading her canvas, and majestically riding on the billows of the\nstormy sea, we conclude that she has a pilot on board; thus, from the\nregular course of the planets, the rich variety of creatures, we infer\nthe existence of the Creator.\"--Ad Autol., 5. Minucius Felix (c. 18)\ncompares the universe to a house, and Gregory of Nazianzum (Orat.,\nxxviii. 6) compares it to a lyre, in illustrating the same argument.\nAmbrose, Athanasius, Augustine, Basil the Greek, Chrysostom, &c.,\nemploy it. So do Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, &c.\n\nThe opposition of Bacon and Descartes to final causes had no influence\nin preventing theologians from insisting on their existence. From\nBoyle and Derham to Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, an enormous\nliterature appeared in England devoted to this end. Germany, also,\nin the second half of the eighteenth century, was almost as much\noverflooded with Lithotheologies, Hydrotheologies, Phytotheologies,\nInsectotheologies, &c., as it at present is with works on Darwinism.\nIn France, Fenelon in his 'D\u00e9monstration de l'Existence de Dieu,' and\nBernardin de Saint Pierre in his 'Etudes' and 'Harmonies de la Nature,'\neloquently, although not perhaps very solidly or cautiously, reasoned\nfrom the wonders of nature to the wisdom of God.\n\nHume and Kant, by their criticisms of the design argument, rendered to\nit the great service of directing attention to the principles on which\nit proceeds. Theologians had previously gone on merely accumulating\nillustrative instances and instituting minute investigations into the\nconstitutions of the complex objects which they selected with this\nview. Attention was thus distracted from what really needed argument.\nHume and Kant showed men the real point at issue.\n\nAlthough Kant rejected the argument, he speaks of it in these terms:\n\"This proof deserves to be mentioned at all times with respect. It\nis the oldest, the clearest, and the most suited to the ordinary\nunderstanding. It animates the study of nature, because it owes its\nexistence to thought, and ever receives from it fresh force. It brings\nout reality and purpose where our observation would not of itself have\ndiscovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature by exhibiting\nindications of a special unity whose principle is beyond nature. This\nknowledge, moreover, directs us to its cause--namely, the inducing\nidea, and increases our faith in a supreme originator to an almost\nirresistible conviction.\"\n\nI must refer to the Notes from XIII. to XX. inclusive, for the titles\nof recent works on the design argument.\n\n\"The assertion appears to be quite unfounded that, as science advances\nfrom point to point, final causes recede before it, and disappear\none after the other. The principle of design changes its mode of\napplication, indeed, but it loses none of its force. We no longer\nconsider particular facts as produced by special interpositions; but\nwe consider design as exhibited in the establishment and adjustment of\nthe laws by which particular facts are produced. We do not look upon\neach particular cloud as brought near to us that it may drop fatness\non our fields; but the general adaptation of the laws of heat and air\nand moisture to the promotion of vegetation does not become doubtful.\nWe do not consider the sun as less intended to warm and vivify the\ntribes of plants and animals because we find that, instead of revolving\nround the earth as an attendant, the earth, along with other planets,\nrevolves round him. We are rather, by the discovery of the general laws\nof nature, led into a scene of wider design, of deeper contrivance, of\nmore comprehensive adjustments. Final causes, if they appear driven\nfarther from us by such extension of our views, embrace us only with a\nvaster and more majestic circuit. Instead of a few threads connecting\nsome detached objects, they become a stupendous network, which is wound\nround and round the universal frame of things.\"--Whewell, 'History of\nScientific Ideas,' vol. ii. pp. 253, 254.\n\n\nNOTE XXII., page 182.\n\nCREATION AND EVOLUTION.\n\nCreation is the _only_ theory of the _origin_ of the universe.\nEvolution assumes either the creation or the self-existence of\nthe universe. The evolutionist must choose between creation and\nnon-creation. They are opposites. There is no intermediate term. The\nattempt to introduce one--the Unknowable--can lead to no result; for\nunless the Unknowable is capable of creating, it can account for the\norigin of nothing. All attempts to explain even the formation of the\nuniverse, either by the evolution of the Unknowable or by evolution\nout of the Unknowable, must be of a thoroughly delusive character. The\nevolution of what is known can alone have significance either to the\nordinary or scientific mind. Nothing can be conceived of as subject\nto evolution which is not of a finite and composite nature. Nothing\ncan be evolved out of a finite and composite existence which was not\npreviously involved in it. And what gives to anything its limits and\nconstitution must be more perfect than itself. [Greek: To pr\u00f4ton ou\nsperma estin, alla to teleion.]\n\n\"As many philosophers as adopt the supposition--such as the\nPythagoreans and Spensippus--that what is best and most fair is not\nto be found in the principle of things, from the fact that though\nthe first principles both of plants and animals are causes, yet\nwhat is fair and perfect resides in created things as results from\nthese,--persons, I say, who entertain these sentiments, do not form\ntheir opinions correctly. For seed arises from other natures that are\nantecedent and perfect, and seed is not the first thing, whereas that\nwhich is perfect is.\"--Aristotle, 'Metaphysics,' xi. 7.\n\n\"It is manifest by the light of nature that there must at least be as\nmuch reality in the efficient and entire cause as in its effect; for\nwhence can the effect draw its reality if not from its cause? And how\ncould the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed\nit in itself? And hence it follows, not only that what is cannot be\nproduced by what is not, but likewise that the more perfect--in other\nwords, that which contains in itself more reality--cannot be the effect\nof the less perfect.\"--Descartes, 'Meditations,' iii.\n\n\"In not a few of the progressionists the weak illusion is unmistakable,\nthat, with time enough, you may get everything out of next-to-nothing.\nGrant us, they seem to say, any tiniest granule of power, so close upon\nzero that it is not worth begrudging--allow it some trifling tendency\nto infinitesimal increment--and we will show you how this little stock\nbecame the kosmos, without ever taking a step worth thinking of, much\nless constituting a case for design. The argument is a mere appeal\nto an incompetency in the human imagination, in virtue of which,\nmagnitudes evading conception are treated as out of existence; and an\naggregate of inappreciable increments is simultaneously equated,--in\nits cause to _nothing_, in its effect to _the whole of things_. You\nmanifestly want the same causality, whether concentrated on a moment\nor distributed through incalculable ages; only, in drawing upon it,\na logical theft is more easily committed piecemeal than wholesale.\nSurely it is a mean device for a philosopher thus to crib causation\nby hair's-breadths, to put it out at compound interest through all\ntime, and then disown the debt.\"--Martineau, 'Essays Philosophical and\nTheological,' pp. 141, 142.\n\n\"Think of it! An endless evolution, an eternal working, an infinite\ncausation, and yet an effect so finite. Nature has been working upward\nfrom eternity, and has just passed the long-armed ape who begat\nprognathus, as prognathus begat the troglodyte homo. What becomes of\nour doctrine of progress? As sure as mathematics, it should have been\nall evolved, all that we now have, over and over again--all _out_, or\nfar more _out_ than has come out, incalculable ages ago. An eternal\nante-past of progressive working. To what a height should it have\narisen! It should have transcended all our ideals. The most exalted\nfinite being should have been reached, the most exalted that our minds\ncan conceive, instead of this creature man, so poor, so low; for you\nwill bear in mind that I am speaking of him as measured by no higher\nscale of value than that afforded by this physical hypothesis--man\nevolved from nebular gas--man just coming out of darkness, and so soon\nto return to darkness again--_e tenebris in tenebras_. This all comes\nfrom that hideous [Greek: hysteron proteron], that inversion of all\nnecessary thinking. Nature first, it says--matter first, an impalpable\nnebulous nihilism first, the lowest and most imperfect first; life,\nthought, reason, idea, their junior products, and God, therefore, the\nlast product, if there be a God at all, or anything to which such a\nname can possibly be given. And we are asked to adopt this, and call it\ngrand, whilst rejecting as narrow and soul-contracting the revelation\nwhich makes God first, reason first, idea first, the perfect first,--as\nhas been said before--the imperfect and the finite ever a departure\nfrom it, whether in the scale of order or of time, whether as exhibited\nin processes of lapse and deterioration or the contrary seeming of\nrecovery and restoration in cyclical rounds. The two schemes have two\nentirely different modes of speech. Says the mere physical hypothesis:\nIn the beginning was the nebula, and all things were in the nebula,\nand all things were self-evolved from the nebula--even life, thought,\nconsciousness, idea, reason itself, having no other source. The other\nspeaks to us in language like this: [Greek: En arch\u00ea \u00ean ho Logos], \"In\nthe beginning was the Word,\" the [Greek: Logos], the Reason, \"and the\nWord was with God, and the Word was God. All things came into being\nby Him. In Him was life,\" [Greek: Z\u00f4\u00ea], and \"from this life\"--not\nfrom motions, or molecules, or correlated forces, or the vibration of\nfibres, or the arrangements of nebular atoms, but from this life of\nthe Logos, the eternal Reason--\"came the light of men\"--the mind,\nreason, conscience of humanity--even \"the light that lighteth\" every\nrational being \"coming into the cosmos.\"--Prof. Lewis, 'The Kingdom of\nGod' (Dickinson's Theological Quarterly, No. 6).\n\n\nNOTE XXIII., page 195.\n\nTHEOLOGICAL INFERENCES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF SPONTANEOUS GENERATION.\n\nAn eloquent preacher exclaims, \"Great ought to be our compassion\nfor the weak brother whose faith in God would be shaken because\na chemist should succeed next year in producing vital cells out\nof a hermetically-sealed vessel containing only the elements of\nprotoplasm.\"--Rev. E. A. Abbott, D.D., 'Cambridge Sermons,' p. 33. It\nmust be admitted, however, that many who certainly cannot be fairly\ndescribed as \"weak brethren,\" entertain very strongly that fear of\nthe doctrine of spontaneous generation which Dr Abbott deprecates. I\nquote, from the 'Presbyterian Quarterly' of January 1874, the words of\nPresident Barnard of Columbia College, New York, expressing an entirely\nopposite sentiment. I do so without criticism or comment, as I shall\nhave to consider the relation of materialistic theories of the origin\nof life to theism in next volume.\n\n\"To the philosopher, the demonstration of the theory of spontaneous\ngeneration, should it ever be demonstrated beyond all possibility of\ndoubt or cavil, cannot but be a matter of the deepest interest. But to\nthe man who finds himself compelled to receive it, this interest, it\nseems to me, must be no less painful than it is deep. Nor is this the\nonly theory which the investigators of our time are urging upon our\nattention, of which I feel compelled to make the same remark. There\nare, at least, two besides which impress me with a similar feeling;\nand the three together constitute a group which, though to a certain\nextent independent of each other, are likely in the end to stand or\nfall together. These are, the doctrine of spontaneous generation, the\ndoctrine of organic evolution, and the doctrine of the correlation of\nmental and physical forces. If these doctrines are true, the existence\nof an intelligence separate from organised matter is impossible, and\nthe death of the human body is the death of the human soul. If these\ndoctrines are true, the world becomes an enigma, no less to the theist\nthan it has always been to the atheist. We are told, indeed, that the\nacceptance of these views need not shake our faith in the existence of\nan almighty Creator. It is beautifully explained to us how they ought\nto give us more elevated and more worthy conceptions of the modes by\nwhich He works His will in the visible creation. We learn that our\ncomplex organisms are none the less the work of His hands because they\nhave been evolved by an infinite series of changes from microscopic\ngemmules, and that these gemmules themselves have taken on their forms\nunder the influence of the physical forces of light and heat and\nattraction acting on brute mineral matter. Rather, it should seem, we\nare a good deal more so. This kind of teaching is heard in our day even\nfrom the theologians. Those sentinels on the watch-towers of the faith,\nwhose wont it has been for so many centuries to stand sturdily up in\nopposition to the science which was not, in any proper sense, at war\nwith them, now, by a sudden and almost miraculous conversion, accept\nwith cheerful countenances, and become in their turn the expounders\nand champions of the science which is. But while they find the mystery\nof the original creation thus satisfactorily cleared up in their minds,\nthey seem to have taken very little thought as to what is going to\ncome of the rest of their theology. It is, indeed, a grand conception\nwhich regards the Deity as conducting the work of His creation by\nmeans of those all-pervading influences which we call the forces of\nnature; but it leaves us profoundly at a loss to explain the wisdom\nor the benevolence which brings every day into life such myriads of\nsentient and intelligent beings only that they may perish on the morrow\nof their birth. But this is not all. If these doctrines are true, all\ntalk of creation or methods of creation becomes absurdity; for just as\ncertainly as they are true, God Himself is impossible. If intelligence\npresupposes a material organism, of which it is a mode of action, then\nGod must be a material organism or there is no God. But it is the law\nof all living organisms that they grow, mature, and perish; and since\nGod cannot perish, He cannot be an organism.\"\n\n\nNOTE XXIV., page 208.\n\nDARWIN AND PALEY.\n\nTo the two treatises of Mr Darwin mentioned in the lecture, there\nmust now be added another equally rich in fact suggesting theological\ninferences--'The Different Forms of Flowers on Plants of the same\nSpecies.'\n\nA multitude of books have been written on Darwinism and Teleology.\nMost of those published between 1859 and 1875 will be found named in\nthe list of works on Darwinism appended to Seidlitz's 'Darwin'sche\nTheorie.' There are two good popular accounts of the controversy: 'What\nis Darwinism?' by Dr Charles Hodge of Princetown, and 'Die Darwin'schen\nTheorien' of Rudolf Schmid.\n\nAs to Paley, it gives one pleasure to quote the following passage\nfrom Sir William Thomson's address to the British Association in\n1871; because the foolish writing which is so frequently met with in\nbooks and journals about \"the mechanical God of Paley,\" about Paley\nrepresenting Deity as \"outside of the universe,\" or as \"a God who makes\nthe world after the manner that a watchman manufactures a watch,\" &c.,\ncan only be explained by utter ignorance of Paley's views: \"I feel\nprofoundly convinced that the argument of design has been greatly too\nmuch lost sight of in recent zoological speculations. Reaction against\nthe frivolities of teleology, such as are to be found, not rarely, in\nthe notes of the learned commentators on Paley's 'Natural Theology,'\nhas, I believe, had a temporary effect of turning attention from the\nsolid irrefragable argument so well put forward in that excellent old\nbook. But overpowering proof of intelligence and benevolent design\nlies all around us; and if ever perplexities, whether metaphysical or\nscientific, turn us away from them for a time, they come back upon us\nwith irresistible force, showing to us through nature the influence of\na free will, and teaching us that all living beings depend upon one\never-acting Creator and Ruler.\"\n\n\nNOTE XXV., page 214.\n\nKANT'S MORAL ARGUMENT.\n\nThe unsatisfactoriness of the position that conscience can supply the\nplace of reason, and can do without its help, in the search after God,\nis clearly seen in the case of the thinker who undertook with most\ndeliberation to maintain that position. When Kant said,--Although all\nother arguments for the existence of God are delusive, still conscience\ngives us a feeling of responsibility and a sense of freedom which\ncompel us to believe in One through whom virtue and fortune, duty and\ninclination, will be reconciled, and in whom the will will be free to\ndo all that it ought,--he saw that he would be met with the retort and\nreproach that the same process by which he pretended to have demolished\nthe other arguments was just as applicable to this new one; that the\nideas of freedom and responsibility might be as delusive when supposed\nto assure us of reality, as those of causation and design; that if the\nlatter were mere forms of human thought, the former might be held to be\nso likewise with equal reason, and to be equally incapable of affording\na warrant to belief in God Himself; and consequently, that the final\nreligious result of his philosophy was, not that there is a God, but\nthat there is an idea of God, which, although we cannot get rid of it,\nis full of contradictions, and wholly incapable of justification or\nverification. He saw all this as clearly as man could do, and it is\nmarvellous that so many authors should have written as if he had not\nseen it; but certainly he might as well not have seen it, for all that\nhe was able to do in the way of repelling the objection. His reply\namounted merely to reaffirming that we are under the necessity of\nassociating the idea of a Supreme Being with the moral law, and then\nqualifying the statement by the admission that we can know, however,\nnothing about that Being; that as soon as we try to know anything about\nHim we make a speculative, not a practical, use of reason, and fall\nback into the realm of sophistry and illusion from which the Critical\nPhilosophy was designed to deliver us. In other words, what he tells\nus is, that the argument is good, but only on the conditions that\nit is not to be subjected to rational scrutiny, and that no attempt\nis to be made to determine what its conclusion signifies. It seems\nto me that, on these conditions, he might have found any argument\ngood. Such conditions are inconsistent with the whole spirit and very\nexistence of a critical philosophy. And it is not really God that Kant\nreaches by his argument: it is a mere moral ideal--a dead, empty,\nabstract assumption, which is regarded as practically useful, although\nrationally baseless--a necessary presupposition of moral action, but\none which tells us nothing about the nature of its object. Fichte was\nonly consistent when he refused to speak of that object as a Will or\nPerson, and affirmed that God exists only as the Moral Order of the\nuniverse, and that we can neither know nor conceive of any other God.\nHe was also, only following out the principles of his master when he\nrepresented that order as the creation of the individual mind, the form\nof the individual conscience, a mode of mental action.\n\nKant has expounded his argument, and discussed its bearings fully and\nminutely, in his 'Kritik der Urtheilskraft,' sec. 86-90, and 'Kritik\nder Praktischen Vernunft, Zweites Buch, Zweites Hauptst\u00fcck,' v.-viii.\nM. Renouvier, in an article entitled \"De la Contradiction reproch\u00e9e \u00e0\nla doctrine de Kant\" (La Critique Philosophique, 3^{ieme.} Ann\u00e9e, No.\n29), has exposed some errors on the subject which are common in France,\nand equally common in England.\n\n\nNOTE XXVI., page 217.\n\nDR SCHENKEL'S VIEW OF CONSCIENCE AS THE ORGAN OF RELIGION.\n\nDr Schenkel has fully set forth his reasons for holding that\nconscience is the religious organ of the soul, in the ninth chapter\nof the first volume of his 'Christliche Dogmatik.' He endeavours to\nmeet the objection urged in the text by representing what is truly\nthe primary and distinctive function of conscience as a secondary\nand derivative function. Its primary activity is, according to him,\nreligious; it unites with God--it is conscious communion with Him. Its\nethical activity is only elicited when this communion is disturbed and\nbroken; its source is the religious want occasioned by the rupture of\ncommunion. That is felt to be a something abnormal and unsatisfactory,\nand awakens a desire after the restoration of the lost communion\nwith God. The conscience is cognisant of a moral law only when, its\ncommunion with God being disturbed, it seeks its re-establishment Dr\nSchenkel thus, as he thinks, accounts for conscience having an ethical\nfunction as well as a religious function. But clearly the result at\nwhich he arrives is in direct contradiction to the position from which\nhe starts. The affirmation of conscience as religious is represented\nas being that man is in direct communion with God; and the affirmation\nof conscience as ethical is represented as being that man is not in\ndirect communion with God, but desires to be so. These are, however,\ncontrary declarations; and to describe conscience in the way Schenkel\ndoes, as \"a synthesis of the ethical and religious factor,\" is to\nrepresent it as a synthesis of self-contradictory elements--a compound\nof yes and no. We cannot be conscious both of communion with God and of\nnon-communion with Him. And, on Dr Schenkel's own showing, the evidence\nfor immediate communion with Him is but small. The consciousness\nof moral law he affirms to be consciousness of the want or need of\ncommunion with God, not the consciousness of enjoying it. But is\nconscience ever independent of the consciousness of moral law? If not,\nit can never, according to the hypothesis, be a consciousness of God.\nIf it be independent thereof, the fact would require to be better\nproved than by the misinterpretation of a few texts of Scripture.\nSolidly proved it never, I believe, can be. A conscience not conscious\nof a moral law is simply no conscience at all.\n\n\nNOTE XXVII., page 221.\n\nCHALMERS AND ERSKINE ON THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIENCE.\n\nThe moral argument was, as was to be expected, a very favourite one\nwith Dr Chalmers, and his way of stating it was as remarkable for\nits simplicity and directness as for its eloquence. \"Had God,\" he\nasks, \"been an unrighteous Being Himself, would He have given to\nthe obviously superior faculty in man so distinct and authoritative\na voice on the side of righteousness? Would He have so constructed\nthe creatures of our species as to have planted in every breast a\nreclaiming witness against Himself? Would He have thus inscribed on\nthe tablet of every heart the sentence of His own condemnation; and\nis this not just as likely, as that He should have inscribed it in\nwritten characters on the forehead of each individual? Would He so have\nfashioned the workmanship of His own hands; or, if a God of cruelty,\ninjustice, and falsehood, would He have placed in the station of master\nand judge that faculty which, felt to be the highest in our nature,\nwould prompt a generous and high-minded revolt of all our sentiments\nagainst the Being who formed us? From a God possessed of such\ncharacteristics, we should surely have expected a differently-moulded\nhumanity; or, in other words, from the actual constitution of man,\nfrom the testimonies on the side of all righteousness, given by the\nvicegerent within the heart, do we infer the righteousness of the\nSovereign who placed it there.\"--Natural Theology, vol. i. pp. 323,\n324. This argument of Dr Chalmers, like all other arguments from\nconscience, implies the soundness of the reasoning by which God has\nbeen attempted to be shown to be the intelligent cause or author of the\nuniverse; and, on that perfectly legitimate presupposition, it seems\nto me as irresistible as it is simple. An intelligent but unrighteous\nGod would never have made a creature better than himself and endowed\nwith admiration of what is most opposite to himself, the reverse and\ncounterpart of his own character.\n\nThe argument as stated by the late Mr Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, is\nno less simple and direct: \"When I attentively consider what is going\non in my conscience, the chief thing forced on my notice is, that I\nfind myself face to face with a purpose--not my own, for I am often\nconscious of resisting it--but which dominates me and makes itself\nfelt as ever present, as the very root and reason of my being....\nThis consciousness of a purpose concerning me that I should be a good\nman--right, true, and unselfish--is the first firm footing I have in\nthe region of religious thought: for I cannot dissociate the idea of\na purpose from that of a Purposer, and I cannot but identify this\nPurposer with the Author of my being and the Being of all beings; and\nfurther, I cannot but regard His purpose towards me as the unmistakable\nindication of His own character.\"--'The Spiritual Order, and other\nPapers,' pp. 47, 48.\n\n\nNOTE XXVIII., page 225.\n\nASSOCIATIONIST THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIENCE.\n\nI have indicated to some extent my reasons for regarding this theory as\nunsatisfactory in an article entitled \"Associationism and the Origin\nof Moral Ideas,\" in 'Mind,' No. III. (July 1876). In the treatise of\nM. Carrau, 'La Morale Utilitaire,' the various forms of the theory are\nexamined with fairness and penetration.\n\n\nNOTE XXIX., page 229.\n\nCHALMERS AND BAIN ON THE PLEASURE OF MALEVOLENCE.\n\nDr Chalmers devotes a chapter of his 'Natural Theology' to the\nillustration of \"the inherent pleasure of the virtuous, and misery of\nthe vicious affections.\" I do not think the psychological doctrine\nof that chapter unexceptionable; but, at the same time, I cannot\nunderstand on what ground Prof. Bain imagines that it \"implies\ndoubts as to the genuineness of the pleasures of malevolence,\" and\nvirtually denies that \"the feeling of gratified vengeance is a real\nand indisputable pleasure.\"--See Emotions and the Will, pp. 187-189.\nThe very passage which Prof. Bain quotes is quite inconsistent with\nthis view. It is as follows: \"The most ordinary observer of his own\nfeelings, however incapable of analysis, must be sensible, even at the\nmoment of wreaking the full indulgence of his resentment on the man who\nhas provoked or injured him, that all is not perfect within; but that\nin this, and indeed in every other malignant feeling, there is a sore\nburden of disquietude, an unhappiness tumultuating in the heart, and\nvisibly pictured in the countenance. The ferocious tyrant who has only\nto issue forth his mandate, and strike dead at pleasure the victim of\nhis wrath, with any circumstance too of barbaric caprice and cruelty\nwhich his fancy, in the very waywardness of passion unrestrained and\npower unbounded, might suggest to him--he may be said through life\nto have experienced a thousand gratifications, in the solaced rage\nand revenge which, though ever breaking forth on some new subject, he\ncan appease again every day of his life by some new execution. But we\nmistake it if we think otherwise than that, in spite of these distinct\nand very numerous, nay, daily gratifications, if he so choose, it is\nnot a life of fierce internal agony notwithstanding.\"\n\nThe sentence which precedes these words leaves no doubt that Prof.\nBain's interpretation of them is incorrect. \"True, it is inseparable\nfrom the very nature of a desire, that there must be some enjoyment or\nother at the time of its gratification; but, in the case of these evil\naffections, it is not unmixed enjoyment.\" The following passage is,\nhowever, still more explicit: \"There is a certain species of enjoyment\ncommon to all our affections. It were a contradiction in terms to\naffirm otherwise; for it were tantamount to saying, that an affection\nmay be gratified without the actual experience of a gratification.\nThere must be some sensation or other of happiness at the time when a\nman attains that which he is seeking for; and if it be not a positive\nsensation of pleasure, it will at least be the sensation of a relief\nfrom pain, as when one meets with the opportunity of wreaking upon its\nobject that indignation which had long kept his heart in a tumult of\ndisquietude. We therefore would mistake the matter if we thought that a\nstate even of thorough and unqualified wickedness was exclusive of all\nenjoyment, for even the vicious affections must share in that enjoyment\nwhich inseparably attaches to every affection at the moment of its\nindulgence. And thus it is that even in the veriest Pandemonium might\nthere be lurid gleams of ecstasy and shouts of fiendish exultation--the\nmerriment of desperadoes in crime, who send forth the outcries of their\nspiteful and savage delight when some deep-laid villany has triumphed,\nor when, in some dire perpetration of revenge, they have given full\nsatisfaction and discharge to the malignity of their accursed nature.\nThe assertion, therefore, may be taken too generally, when it is stated\nthat there is no enjoyment whatever in the veriest hell of assembled\noutcasts; for even there, might there be many separate and specific\ngratifications. And we must abstract the pleasure essentially involved\nin every affection at the instant of its indulgence, and which cannot\npossibly be disjoined from it, ere we see clearly and distinctively\nwherein it is that, in respect of enjoyment, the virtuous and vicious\naffections differ from each other. For it is true that there is a\ncommon resemblance between them; and that, by the universal law and\nnature of affection, there must be some sort of agreeable sensation\nin the act of their obtaining that which they are seeking after. Yet\nit is no less true that, did the former affections bear supreme rule\nin the heart, they would brighten and tranquillise the whole of human\nexistence; whereas, had the latter the entire and practical ascendancy,\nthey would distemper the whole man, and make him as completely wretched\nas he was completely worthless.\" Dr Chalmers, then, did not call in\nquestion the pleasures of malevolence.\n\n\nNOTE XXX., page 232.\n\nHISTORY OF THE MORAL PROOF.\n\nConscience has from the earliest times and among the rudest peoples\nexercised great influence in the formation of religious belief. Moral\nreasons weighed with men in their origination and elaboration of\nreligion long before they expressed them in abstract propositions and\nlogical forms. The historical proof of this truth is so ample that it\nwould require a volume to do it justice: all literatures might be made\nto yield contributions to it.\n\nThe simplest form of the moral argument, and the one which has been\nmost generally employed, is that of an inference from the moral law to\na moral lawgiver. Closely associated with it are those forms which rest\non the emotions involved in or accompanying virtue and guilt. These\nare the directest modes of exhibiting what Chalmers calls \"the theology\nof conscience, which is not only of wider diffusion but of far more\npractical influence than the theology of academic demonstration.\"\n\nRaymond of Sebonde, in a work which I have previously had occasion to\nmention, was perhaps the first to present it in a more artificial form.\nHe argues thus: Man is a responsible being who can neither reward nor\npunish himself, and who must consequently be under a superior being\nwho will reward and punish him, unless his life is to be regarded as\nvain and purposeless--unless even the whole of external nature, which\nis subject to man and exists for his sake, is to be pronounced aimless\nand useless. External nature, however, is seen to be throughout orderly\nand harmonious; how can we suppose the moral world to be disorderly\nand chaotic? As the eye corresponds to things visible, the ear to\nthings audible, the reason to things intelligible, so conscience must\ncorrespond to a judgment which implies some one to pronounce it, and to\na retribution which implies some one to inflict it. But this some one\nmust be absolutely just; he must be omniscient, as possessing a perfect\nknowledge of all human actions, and a thorough insight into their moral\ncharacter; omnipotent, to execute his judgments; and, in a word, must\nbe the most perfect of all beings--_i.e._, God.\n\nKant's argument is thus summarised by the Archbishop of York: \"The\nhighest good of man consists of two parts, the greatest possible\nmorality and happiness. The former is the demand of his spiritual, the\nlatter of his animal nature. The former only, his morality, is within\nhis own power; and while, by persevering virtue, he makes this his\npersonal character, he is often compelled to sacrifice his happiness.\nBut since the desire of happiness is neither irrational nor unnatural,\nhe justly concludes either that there is a Supreme Being who will so\nguide the course of things (the natural world, not of itself subject to\nmoral laws) as to render his holiness and happiness equal, or that the\ndictates of his conscience are unjust and irrational. But the latter\nsupposition is morally impossible; and he is compelled, therefore, to\nreceive the former as true.\"\n\nAkin to this argument are those which are based on man's desire of\ngood. Proclus, in his 'Theology of Plato,' argues to the following\neffect: All beings desire the good; but this good cannot be identical\nwith the beings which desire it, for then these beings would be\nthemselves the good, and would not desire what they already possessed.\nThe good is antecedent, therefore, to all the beings who desire it.\nSince the time of Proclus to the present many have argued that there\nmust be a God because the heart demands one to satisfy its desire\nof love, or holiness, or happiness; few, perhaps, have done so with\nmore ingenuity of logic or fervour of belief than John Norris in\n\"Contemplation and Love, or the Methodical Ascent of the Soul to God\nby steps of Meditation,\" and in \"An Idea of Happiness\" ('Collection of\nMiscellanies').\n\nA contemporary theologian, Principal Pirie of Aberdeen, has laid great\nstress on an argument which we may assign to this class. \"No argument,\"\nhe says, \"can be valid which founds on innate ideas, or which embraces\nconsiderations so entirely beyond the range of human apprehension that\nwe cannot positively be assured whether they be true or false. Yet\nwe have no hesitation in saying that there is an argument _a priori_\nfor the existence and attributes of a God, which is involved in\nthe very nature of our feelings, and which therefore tells upon the\nfaith of the whole human race, even when they are altogether ignorant\nof it logically, as existing in the form of a proposition. It makes\nno appeal, however, to profound metaphysical speculations, and is\nconsequently plain and intelligible to any one capable of exercising\nreason at all. It rests on the principle which both our feelings\nand our experience demonstrate to be true, that every primary and\nessential desire of the human mind has a co-relative--or, in other\nwords, a something to gratify it--existing in the nature of things.\nThe mode in which the development of this principle constitutes an\nargument _a priori_ for the existence and attributes of a God we now\nproceed to explain. Every human being feels from the moment in which\nhe comes into existence, and through his whole subsequent history,\nthat he is in himself a weak, helpless creature. As we have said, this\nfeeling begins from the very beginning of our conscious existence.\nThe appeals of the infant for aid are made continually.... As we\nadvance to childhood, youth, and manhood, our sense of power gradually\nincreases. We are conscious that under certain circumstances we can do\nsomething for ourselves. Yet this capability, we are also conscious\nin its very exercise, does not depend on us for its continuance. We\ncannot preserve to ourselves fortune, health, or even life, for _a\nsingle moment_. Yet all these things we desire, and desire with the\nutmost earnestness, and desire as a primary tendency of our minds. We\nmay not indeed always clothe such desire in words--we may not put it\ninto the form of a proposition; but that it exists in every mind as a\nfeeling, and practically operates upon every individual, is as certain\nas our existence itself, and is indeed manifest every moment in the\nefforts which we make to preserve these and all other forms of what we\nbelieve to involve happiness. In this desire, consequently, we have the\nvoice of nature speaking, and commanding us to use such efforts. Of\nourselves we know that they would be insufficient. The results depend\nupon causes over which we have no control. Our own efforts, we are\nconscious, are only means which nature has appointed us to employ, but\ntheir success depends on circumstances altogether beyond our power. It\nis, as has been said, the voice of nature telling us that each of our\ndesires has a co-relative, through which it may be fully gratified by\nthe use of the proper means. This co-relative, in the case of intense\nand permanent happiness, can only be found in the existence of a God,\nomnipotent, omniscient, true, just, benevolent, and eternal, _in whom\nwe repose entire confidence_. No other assumption could by possibility\nsatisfy our desire for the highest and permanent happiness now and for\never. For to realise thoroughly the argument, it is to be observed\nthat our desire is for the highest and permanent happiness. It is not\nimperfect or temporary happiness merely which we desire, though we may\nbe compelled to be content with this, if we cannot procure more. It\nis the highest happiness possible for our natures, and that without\nend. Now, if such happiness is to be attained at all, it can only\nbe obtained through a God possessed of the attributes which we have\nenumerated.\"--Natural Theology, pp. 71-74.\n\nProf. Wace, in the second course of his Boyle Lectures--Christianity\nand Morality (1876)--has exhibited, with considerable detail, and in\nan ingenious and eloquent manner, the testimony which conscience bears\nto a personal God, a moral Creator, and a moral Governor. A glimpse\nof his general idea may be obtained from the following words: \"In our\nendeavour to trace in the conscience, and in the personal experience\nof individuals, the roots of our faith in a God of infinite power,\nwisdom, and goodness, we have now advanced two considerable steps\nbeyond our first and simplest sense of right and wrong. We have seen\nthat this sense, when allowed to speak with its full imperative and\npersonal force, arouses in us, as it aroused in the Psalmist, a sense\nof our being in contact with a personal and righteous Will. This\nconviction necessarily involves, as it involved in the writer of the\n139th Psalm, the further belief that an authority which has this claim\nupon our obedience in every particular of our conduct, in all our\nthoughts and acts, must at the same time be the author and source of\nour whole constitution; that the righteous eyes which now penetrate,\nwhether through darkness or through light, to the very depths of our\nsouls, must also have seen our 'substance, yet being imperfect,' and\nthat in their book must all our members have been written. If it be\nthe imperative and paramount law of our nature to obey our conscience,\nand to make moral perfection, or spiritual excellence, our ultimate\naim, we cannot but conclude that our whole nature, and the whole order\nof things in which we are placed, is in the hands of a moral power;\nand that, as we are fearfully and wonderfully made for righteous and\nreasonable ends, it must be by a righteous and reasonable Will that we\nare made. The conscience of man must never be omitted from our view of\nthe design of man; and it is only when we contemplate the adjustment of\nhis whole nature to the purposes of the loftiest moral development,\nthat the argument from design acquires its full strength.... The\napprehension of a Power which establishes righteousness as the law of\nlife, involves also the conviction that it is able to enforce that\nlaw, and to render it finally and everywhere supreme. The conviction,\nindeed, is one of faith and not of demonstration; and the Scriptures,\nno less than life, are full of instances in which this faith is\ntried by the bitterest experience. Even prophets, as I have before\nobserved, are at times driven to the cry that 'the law is slacked,\nand that judgment doth never go forth.' But the deepest instincts and\nnecessities of conscience forbid the toleration of any such instinct of\ndespair. If right were not essentially and ultimately might, I do not\nsay--God forbid--that it would not still claim the supreme allegiance\nof the soul; but life would be a bitter mockery and an inexplicable\ncruelty. Not merely to be under an imperative law to pursue that\nwhich cannot be realised, but to be bound to such a fruitless pursuit\nby every noble and lovely influence--to be condemned in moral and\nspiritual realities to the torments of a Tantalus--this is a conception\nof human life against which the whole soul rebels. Accordingly, a God\nof all righteousness must of necessity be regarded as a God of all\npower.... That 'categorical imperative' of the conscience, on which the\nGerman philosopher insisted, is imperative in demanding not only a God,\nbut an Almighty God.\"\n\n\nNOTE XXXI., page 235.\n\nDEFECTS IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD.\n\nLucretius (ii. 177-v. 196) has dwelt on the arrangements which render\none zone of the earth torrid and others frigid--on the extent of barren\nheaths and rocks, of sands and seas--on the prevalence of unseasonable\nweather, storms, and tempests--and on the abundance of noxious herbs\nand destructive animals, &c.--as evidences that the earth was faulty\nand ill made, and could not be the work of a Divine Intelligence.\nWhether it was well or ill made appears to have been a favourite\nsubject of dispute between the Epicureans and Stoics. Lactantius (De\nIra Dei, c. xiii.) reports, and attempts to answer, the objections\nwhich the Epicureans and Academics were accustomed to urge against\nthe constitution of the physical world. In Cudworth's 'Intellectual\nSystem,' vol. iii., pp. 464-8, Bentley's 'Folly of Atheism,' pt.\ni., Serm. 8; Derham's 'Astro-Theology,' book vii., c. 2, &c., such\nobjections are discussed. In the remarks which I made on the subject in\nthe lecture, I have had chiefly in view the opinions of Comte, J. S.\nMill, and J. J. Murphy (Scientific Bases of Faith, c. xvi.)\n\nMr Mill's charges against nature are very vigorously and graphically\nexpressed. \"Next to the greatness of these cosmic forces, the quality\nwhich most forcibly strikes every one who does not avert his eyes\nfrom it, is their perfect and absolute recklessness. They go straight\nto their end, without regarding what or whom they crush on the road.\nOptimists, in their attempts to prove that 'whatever is, is right,'\nare obliged to maintain, not that Nature ever turns one step from\nher path to avoid trampling us into destruction, but that it would\nbe very unreasonable in us to expect that she should. Pope's 'Shall\ngravitation cease when you go by?' may be a just rebuke to any one who\nshould be so silly as to expect common human morality from Nature. But\nif the question were between two men, instead of between a man and\na natural phenomenon, that triumphant apostrophe would be thought a\nrare piece of impudence. A man who should persist in hurling stones\nor firing cannon when another man 'goes by,' and, having killed him,\nshould urge a similar plea in exculpation, would very deservedly be\nfound guilty of murder. In sober truth, nearly all the things which\nmen are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are Nature's\neveryday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognised by\nhuman laws, Nature does once to every being that lives, and in a\nlarge proportion of cases after protracted tortures, such as only\nthe greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on\ntheir living fellow-creatures. If, by an arbitrary reservation, we\nrefuse to account anything murder but what abridges to a certain term\nsupposed to be allotted to human life, Nature also does this to all\nbut a small percentage of lives, and does it in all the modes, violent\nor insidious, in which the worst human beings take the lives of one\nanother. Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts\nthem to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them\nwith stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger,\nfreezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her\nexhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such\nas the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed.\nAll this Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of\nmercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest\nindifferently with the meanest and worst--upon those who are engaged\nin the highest and worthiest enterprises, and often as the direct\nconsequence of the noblest acts,--and it might almost be imagined as\na punishment for them. She mows down those on whose existence hangs\nthe wellbeing of a whole people, perhaps the prospects of the human\nrace for generations to come, with as little compunction as those\nwhose death is a relief to themselves, or a blessing to those under\ntheir noxious influence. Such are Nature's dealings with life. Even\nwhen she does not intend to kill, she inflicts the same tortures in\napparent wantonness. In the clumsy provision which she has made for\nthat perpetual renewal of animal life, rendered necessary by the\nprompt termination she puts to it in every individual case, no human\nbeing ever comes into the world but another human being is literally\nstretched on the rack for hours or days, not unfrequently issuing in\ndeath. Next to taking life (equal to it, according to a high authority)\nis taking the means by which we live; and Nature does this, too, on\nthe largest scale and with the most callous indifference. A single\nhurricane destroys the hopes of a season; a flight of locusts, or an\ninundation, desolates a district; a trifling chemical change in an\nedible root starves a million of people. The waves of the sea, like\nbanditti, seize and appropriate the wealth of the rich and the little\nall of the poor with the same accompaniments of stripping, wounding,\nand killing, as their human antitypes. Everything, in short, which the\nworst men commit either against life or property, is perpetrated on a\nlarger scale by natural agents. Nature has _noyades_ more fatal than\nthose of Carrier; her explosions of fire-damp are as destructive as\nhuman artillery; her plague and cholera far surpass the poison-cups\nof the Borgias. Even the love of 'order,' which is thought to be a\nfollowing of the ways of Nature, is, in fact, a contradiction of them.\nAll which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' and its\nconsequences, is precisely a counterpart of Nature's ways. Anarchy and\nthe Reign of Terror are overmatched in injustice, ruin, and death, by a\nhurricane and a pestilence.\"--Three Essays, pp. 28-31.\n\nThe opinion that the world would be either physically or morally\nimproved were gravitation to cease when men went by, were fire not\nalways to burn and were water occasionally to refuse to drown, were\nlaws few and miracles numerous, may safely be left to refute itself.\nTherefore, let me simply set over against Mr Mill's censure of Nature\nWordsworth's praise:--\n\n              \"Nature never did betray\n    The heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege,\n    Through all the years of this our life, to lead\n    From joy to joy; for she can so inform\n    The mind that is within us, so impress\n    With quietness and beauty, and so feed\n    With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues,\n    Rash judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men,\n    Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all\n    The dreary intercourse of daily life,\n    Shall e'er prevail against us, or disturb\n    Our cheerful faith, that all which we behold\n    Is full of blessings. Therefore, let the moon\n    Shine on thee in thy solitary walk;\n    And let the misty mountain winds be free\n    To blow against thee: and, in after years,\n    When these wild ecstasies shall be matured\n    Into a sober pleasure, when thy mind\n    Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms,\n    Thy memory be as a dwelling-place\n    For all sweet sounds and harmonies; oh then,\n    If solitude, or fear, or pain, or grief,\n    Should be thy portion, with what healing thoughts\n    Of tender joy wilt thou remember me\n    And these my exhortations!\"\n\n\nNOTE XXXII., page 241.\n\nNO BEST POSSIBLE CREATED SYSTEM.\n\nDante has given magnificent expression to the truth that no created\nsystem can be absolutely perfect:--\n\n                  \"Colui che volse il sesto\n      Allo stremo del mondo, e dentro ad esso\n      Distinse tanto occulto e manifesto,\n    Non poteo suo valor si fare impresso\n      In tutto l'universo, che il suo verbo\n      Non rimanesse in infinito eccesso.\n    E ci\u00f2 fa certo, che il primo Superbo,\n      Che fu la somma d'ogni creatura,\n      Per non aspettar lume, cadde acerbo:\n    E quinci appar ch' ogni minor natura\n      \u00c8 corto recettacolo a quel bene\n      Che non ha fine, e se in se misura.\n    Dunque nostra veduta, che conviene\n      Essere alcun de' raggi della mente\n      Di che tutte le cose son ripiene,\n    Non pu\u00f2 di sua natura esser possente\n      Tanto, che suo principio non discerna\n      Molto di l\u00e0, da quel ch' egli \u00e8, parvente.\n    Per\u00f2 nella giustizia sempiterna\n      La vista che riceve il vostro mondo,\n      Com' occhio per lo mare, entro s' interna;\n    Che, bench\u00e8 dalla proda veggia il fondo,\n      In pelago nol vede; e nondimeno\n      Egli \u00e8; ma cela lui l'esser profondo.\"\n\n  --_Del Paradiso_, cant. xix. 40-63.\n\n              \"He his compasses who placed\n      At the world's limit, and within the line\n      Drew beauties, dimly or distinctly traced--\n    Could not upon the universe so write\n      The impress of his power, but that His Word\n      Must still be left in distance infinite:\n    And hence 'tis evident that he in heaven\n      Created loftiest his fate incurred\n      Because he would not wait till light was given.\n    And hence are all inferior creatures shown\n      Scant vessels of that Goodness unconfined\n      Which nought can measure save Itself alone.\n    Therefore our intellect--a feeble beam,\n      Struck from the light of the Eternal Mind,\n      With which all things throughout creation teem,--\n    Must by its nature be incapable,\n      Save in a low and most remote degree,\n      Of viewing its exalted principle.\n    Wherefore the heavenly Justice can no more\n      By mortal ken be fathomed than the sea:\n      For though the eye of one upon the shore\n    May pierce its shallows, waves unfathomed bound\n      His further sight, yet under them is laid\n      A bottom, viewless through the deep profound.\"\n\n    --WRIGHT.\n\n\nNOTE XXXIII., page 245.\n\nDEFECTS IN THE ORGANIC WORLD.\n\nThe objections to final causes from alleged defects in the organic\nworld have been answered with wisdom and success by M. Janet, in his\n'Causes Finales,' pp. 313-348.\n\nThe views of Professor Helmholtz as to the defects of the eye will be\nfound stated at length in his popular lectures on scientific subjects.\nThe chief defects enumerated are: 1. Chromatic aberration, connected\nwith 2. Spherical aberration and defective centring of the cornea\nand lens, together producing the imperfection known as astigmatism;\n3. Irregular radiation round the images of illuminated points; 4.\nDefective transparency; 5. Floating corpuscles, and 6. The \"blind spot\"\nwith other gaps in the field of vision. \"The eye has every possible\ndefect that can be found in an optical instrument, and even some\nwhich are peculiar to itself.\" \"It is not too much to say that if an\noptician wanted to sell me an instrument which had all these defects, I\nshould think myself quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the\nstrongest terms, and giving him back his instrument. Of course I shall\nnot do this with my eyes, and shall be only too glad to keep them as\nlong as I can--defects and all. Still, the fact that, however bad they\nmay be, I can get no others, does not at all diminish their defects, so\nlong as I maintain the narrow but indisputable position of a critic on\npurely optical grounds.\"\n\nHelmholtz himself, however, points out that the defects of the eye are\n\"all so counteracted, that the inexactness of the image which results\nfrom their presence very little exceeds, under ordinary conditions of\nillumination, the limits which are set to the delicacy of sensation\nby the dimensions of the retinal cones;\" that \"the adaptation of the\neye to its function is most complete, and is seen in the very limits\nwhich are set to its defects.\" In fact, were the eye more perfect\nas an instrument of optical precision, it would be less perfect as\nan eye. Its absolute defects are practical merits. To be a useful\neye it must be neither a perfect telescope nor a perfect microscope,\nbut a something which can readily serve many purposes, and which can\nbe supplemented by many instruments. The delicate finish of a razor\nrenders it unfit for cutting wood. All man's senses and organs are\ninferior to those possessed by some of the lower animals, but the\ninferiority is of a kind which is a real and vast advantage. It is of\na kind which allows them to be put to a greater variety of uses than\ncould more perfect senses and organs. It is the very condition of\ntheir capacity to be utilised in manifold directions by an inventive\nand progressive reason. Further, no man can see at all merely with a\nso-called perfect optical instrument. He must have in addition the\nimperfect instrument, composed of a soft, watery, animal substance,\nand designated the eye. There is that in the eye which immeasurably\ntranscends all mere physics and chemistry, all human mechanism and\ncontrivance; there is life; there is vision.\n\n\nNOTE XXXIV., page 252.\n\nEPICUREAN DILEMMA.\n\nThe Epicurean dilemma has been often dealt with. I shall content\nmyself with quoting Mr Bowen's remarks on the subject: \"_Omnipotence\nand benevolence_ are apparently very simple and very comprehensive\nterms, though few are more vaguely used. The former means a power\nto do everything; but this does not include the ability to do two\ncontradictory things at the same moment, or to accomplish any\nmetaphysical impossibility. Thus, the Deity cannot cause two and two to\nmake five, nor place two hills near each other without leaving a valley\nbetween them. The impossibility in such cases does not argue a defect\nof power, but an absurdity in the statement of the case to which the\npower is to be applied. A statement which involves a contradiction\nin terms does not express a limitation of ability, because in truth\nit expresses nothing at all; the affirmation and the denial, uttered\nin the same breath, cancel each other, and no meaning remains. All\nmetaphysical impossibilities can be reduced to the formula, that it is\nimpossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same moment,\nas this would be an absurdity--that is, an absurd or meaningless\nstatement. Thus, virtue cannot exist without free agency, because a\nfree choice between good and evil is involved in the idea of _virtue_,\nso that the proposition means no more than this--that what contains\nfreedom cannot be without freedom. We cannot choose between good and\nevil, unless good and evil are both placed before us--that is, unless\nwe know what these words mean; and we cannot express our choice in\naction, unless we are able to act--that is, unless we have the power\nof doing either good or evil. In the dilemma quoted from Epicurus,\na contradiction in terms is held to prove a defect of power, or to\ndisprove omnipotence; the dilemma, therefore, is a mere logical puzzle,\nlike the celebrated one of Achilles and the tortoise.\n\n\"The meaning of _benevolence_ appears simple enough; but it is often\ndifficult to tell whether a certain act was or was not prompted by kind\nintentions. Strictly speaking, of course, benevolence is a quality\nof mind--that is, of will (bene _volo_) or intention, not of outward\nconduct. An _action_ is said to be benevolent only by metaphor; it is\nso called, because we infer from it, with great positiveness, that the\nagent must have had benevolent intentions. We think that the motives\nare indicated by the act; but we may be mistaken. He who gives food\nto the hungry poor would be esteemed benevolent; but he may do it with\na view to poison them. To strike for the avowed purpose of causing\npain usually argues ill-will or a malignant design; but the blow may\ncome from the kindest heart in the world, for the express purpose of\nbenefiting him who receives it. In the present argument, Epicurus\nassumes that the presence of evil--that is, the outward fact--is enough\nto prove a want of benevolence, or even a malignant design, on the part\nof him who might have prevented it. But if by evil is here meant mere\npain or suffering, whether proceeding from bodily or mental causes, we\nmay boldly deny the inference. If pleasure or mere enjoyment is not the\ngreatest good, if sometimes it is even inconsistent with the possession\nof a higher blessing, then a denial of it may be a proof of goodness\ninstead of malice.\"--Metaphysical and Ethical Science, pp. 362, 363.\n\n\nNOTE XXXV., page 263.\n\nGOD AND DUTY.\n\n\"To such readers as have reflected on man's life; who understand that\nfor man's wellbeing Faith is properly the one thing needful; how with\nit martyrs, otherwise weak, can cheerfully endure the shame and the\ncross--and without, worldlings puke up their sick existence by suicide\nin the midst of luxury: to such it will be clear that for a pure moral\nnature the loss of religious belief is the loss of everything.\n\n\"All wounds, the crush of long-continued destitution, the stab of false\nfriendship and of false love, all wounds in thy so genial heart, would\nhave healed again had not its life-warmth been withdrawn.\n\n\"Well mayest thou exclaim, 'Is there no God, then; but at best an\nabsentee God, sitting idle, ever since the first Sabbath, at the\noutside of His universe and _seeing_ it go?' 'Has the word Duty no\nmeaning? is what we call Duty no Divine messenger and guide, but a\nfalse earthly phantasm made up of desire and fear?' 'Is the heroic\ninspiration we name Virtue but some passion; some bubble of the blood,\nbubbling in the direction others profit by?' I know not; only this I\nknow, if what thou namest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all\nastray. 'Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the universe is--the\nDevil's.'\"--Carlyle.\n\n\nNOTE XXXVI., page 268.\n\nHISTORIES OF THE THEISTIC PROOFS.\n\nThere are several histories of the proofs for the Divine existence.\nOne of the earliest is Ziegler's 'Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte des Glaubens\nan das Dasein Gottes' (1792). The best known, and perhaps the most\ninteresting, is Bouchitt\u00e9's 'Histoire des Preuves de l'Existence de\nDieu' (M\u00e9moires de l'Acad\u00e9mie, Savants \u00c9trangers, i.), written from\nthe Krausean point of view. The 'Geschichte der Beweise f\u00fcr das Dasein\nGottes bis zum 14 Jahrhundert' (1875), by Alfred Tyszka, and the\n'Geschichte der Beweise f\u00fcr das Dasein Gottes von Cartesius bis Kant'\n(1876), by Albert Krebs, supplement each other. There are two very able\narticles--partly historical, but chiefly critical--on these proofs by\nProfessor K\u00f6stlin in the 'Theol. Studien und Kritiken,' H. 4, 1875,\nand H. 1, 1876. The most conscientious, useful, and learned history\nof speculation regarding Deity is, so far as is known to me, the\nfour-volumed work of Signor Bobba, 'Storia della Filosofia intorno all'\nIdea di Dio.'\n\nOn the history of the _a priori_ proofs there may be consulted the\ntreatise of Fischer, 'Der ontologische Beweis f. d. Dasein Gottes u.\ns. Geschichte,' 1852, and an article of Seydel, \"Der gesch. Eintritt\nontologischer Beweisf\u00fchring,\" &c. (Tr. f. Ph. H. i. 1858). In Hase's\n'Life of Anselm' (of which there is an English translation) there is\na good account of Anselm's argument. There is also a translation of\nthe 'Proslogion,' with Gaunilo's objections and Anselm's reply, in the\n'Bibliotheca Sacra,' 1851. On the Cartesian proofs there is a special\nwork by Huber, 'Die cartes. Beweise v. Dasein Gottes' (1854).\n\nHegel's 'Vorlesungen \u00fcber d. Beweise f. d. Dasein Gottes' are of great\ninterest and value in various respects; but his view of the historical\nsuccession of the proofs does not appear to me to be tenable.\n\n\nNOTE XXXVII., page 269.\n\n_A PRIORI_ PROOF NOT PROOF FROM A CAUSE.\n\nThe philosophers and theologians who have supposed A PRIORI proof\nto be proof from a cause or antecedent existence, have, of course,\ndenied that there can be any _a priori_ proof of the Divine existence.\nAristotle laid down as a rule that demonstration must proceed from\nthings prior to and the causes of the things to be demonstrated, and\nthose who assented to this rule necessarily denied the possibility\nof demonstrating the existence of God. The assertion of Clemens of\nAlexandria that \"God cannot be apprehended by any demonstrative\nscience\" is indubitable, if the view of demonstration on which he\nrests it be correct; \"for such science is from things prior and more\nknowable, whereas nothing can precede that which is uncreated.\" It is a\nmanifest contradiction to imagine that an eternal being is subsequent\nto any other being, or a perfect being dependent on any other being.\nEven mathematical demonstration, however, is not from causes; nor\nis there any reason for supposing that the order of knowledge is\nnecessarily and universally the same as the order of existence.\n\nIt is by confounding demonstration erroneously understood in the manner\nindicated with proof in general that not a few persons have arrived at\nthe conclusion that the existence of God cannot be proved at all, and\nhave deemed preposterous assertions like that of Jacobi, \"A God who can\nbe proved is no God, for the ground of proof is necessarily above the\nthing proved by it,\" both profound and pious.\n\n\nNOTE XXXVIII., page 285.\n\nSOME _A PRIORI_ ARGUMENTS.\n\nI have treated of Clarke's argument in the 'Encyc. Brit.' art. \"Samuel\nClarke.\"\n\nThe demonstration of Dr Fiddes is contained in his 'Theologia\nSpeculativa, or a Body of Divinity,' 2 vols., 1718-20. It consists\nof six propositions: 1. Something does now exist; 2. Something has\nexisted eternally; 3. Something has been eternally self-existent;\n4. What is self-existent must have all the perfections that exist\nanywhere or in any subject; 5. What is self-existent must have all\npossible perfections, and every perfection, in an infinite measure;\n6. What has all possible perfections in an infinite measure is God.\nHe proves his fourth proposition thus: \"Since nothing can arise out\nof nothing, and since there can be no perfection but what has some\nsubject of inherence, every perfection must have been eternally\nsomewhere or other, or in one subject or other, into which it must be\nultimately resolved, or else it could never have been at all; without\nadmitting, what of all things we are the best able to conceive, an\ninfinite progression of efficient causes--that is, an infinite series\nof beings derived one from another, without a beginning or any original\ncause at the head of the series. So that whatever perfections we\nobserve in any being must have been originally and eternally in the\nself-existent being.\" On behalf of his fifth proposition he advances\ntwo arguments: 1. \"All properties essentially follow the nature and\ncondition of the subject, and must be commensurate to it. For this\nreason we say that wisdom, power, and goodness being attributes of an\ninfinite subject, or one which is the substratum of one _infinite_\nattribute, these and all the other perfections belonging to it must be\ninfinite also. Otherwise the same subject, considered as a subject,\nwould be infinite in one respect, and yet finite in another; which, if\nit be not a contradiction, seems to border so near upon one that we\ncannot comprehend the possibility of it.\" 2. \"A self-existent being\nas the subject of any perfection cannot limit itself; because it must\nnecessarily have existed from all eternity what it is, and have been\nthe same in all properties essentially inherent in it, antecedently\nto any act or volition of its own. Nor can such a being be limited by\nanything external to it; for, besides that self-existence necessarily\nimplies independence, properties which are essential to any subject\ncan admit of no increase or diminution or the least imaginable change,\nwithout destroying the essence itself of the subject. Nor yet can it\nbe said that there is any impossibility in the nature of the thing\nthat the perfections inhering in an _infinite_ subject should be\nin the highest or even in an infinite degree. Indeed it is scarce\npossible for us (for the reasons already assigned) to conceive how they\nshould be otherwise. Neither can any such impossibility arise from\nthe nature of the perfections themselves. If, then, the perfections\nof a self-existent being cannot be limited by itself, nor by anything\nexternal to it, nor from any invincible repugnancy in the nature of\nthe perfections themselves, I conclude that the self-existent being\nmust not only have all possible perfections, but every perfection in an\n_infinite_ degree.\"\n\nThe 'Demonstration of the Existence of God against Atheists,' by the\nRev. Colin Campbell, Minister of the Parish of Ardchattan, 1667-1726,\nhas been recently printed for private circulation from a MS. now\ndeposited in the library of Edinburgh University. The editor has\nadded to it a learned and admirable appendix. Mr Campbell's manner of\nproving that there is one, and but one, infinite Being, is as follows:\n\"As everything which hath a beginning forces confession of one who\nhath none--because to produce is an action, and must presuppose an\nactor,--by the same force of reason, we must confess that whatever is\nlimited, or made of such and such a limited nature, is limited by\nsomething which did limit it to be such a thing, and no other. For\nlimit is an action, and confesseth an actor. So that there must be a\nbeing anterior to all limited beings, and, consequently, some being\nthat is not at all limited, to evite the absurd progress of running\ninfinitely upwards unlimited beings, without a single limiter. Now, an\nunlimited being is the same as to say an infinite being. And so, by the\nforce of reason, we have a being which is eternal, which is infinite.\nThere can be but one infinite, because, were there two or more, the\none would limit the other; and so the infinite would be finite, the\nunlimited would be limited. Therefore, the unlimited, or infinite, must\nbe one only; and that one purely single and uncompounded, else every\npart of the compound would limit the other parts, so that all the parts\nwould be limited. And a whole whose parts are limited must be limited\nin the whole, it being impossible that a compound or conjunction of\nfinites can, by addition, produce an infinite, unless you imagine this\ncomplex whole to consist partly of finites, and also of some infinite.\nBut the one infinite part, if infinite, cannot leave place for any\nother finite to make it up, it being itself unlimited and infinite; and\nsuch an addition would speak it limited by the part which was added.\nAnd a thousand like absurdities would follow.\"\n\nWollaston's attempted demonstration is contained in the fifth section\nof his 'Religion of Nature Delineated' (1725). This is a common book,\nand the mere reference to it must suffice.\n\nMoses Lowman's 'Argument to prove the Unity and Perfection of God\n_a priori_' was published in 1735, and reprinted, with a preface by\nDr Pye Smith, containing an account of the author and his works,\nin the Cabinet Library of Scarce and Celebrated Tracts (1836). I\nreproduce the abstract which Dr Smith gave of this ingenious argument\nin his 'First Lines of Christian Theology:' \"1. Positive existence is\npossible, for it involves no contradiction. 2. All possible existence\nis either _necessary_, which must be, and in its own nature cannot\nbut be; or _contingent_, which may be or not be, for in neither case\nis a contradiction involved. 3. _Some_ existence is _necessary_: for,\nif all existence were contingent, all existence might not be as well\nas might be; and that thing which might not be never could be without\nsome other thing as the prior cause of its existence, since every\neffect must have a cause. If, therefore, all possible existence were\ncontingent, all existence would be impossible; because the idea or\nconception of it would be that of an effect without a cause, which\ninvolves a contradiction. 4. Necessary existence must be _actual_\nexistence: for necessary existence is that which must be and cannot\nbut be--that is, it is such existence as arises from the nature of\nthe thing in itself; and it is an evident contradiction to affirm\nthat necessary existence might not be. 5. Necessary existence being\nsuch as must be and cannot but be, it must be _always_ and cannot\nbut be always; for to suppose that necessary existence could begin\nto be, or could cease to be--that is, that a time might be in which\nnecessary existence would not be--involves a contradiction. Therefore,\nnecessary existence is without beginning and without end--that is, it\nis eternal. 6. Necessary existence must be _wherever_ any existence\nis possible: for all existence is either contingent or necessary; all\ncontingent existence is impossible without necessary existence being\npreviously as its cause, and wherever existence is possible it must\nbe either of a necessary or a contingent being. Therefore, necessary\nexistence must be wherever existence is possible--that is, it must be\n_infinite_. 7. There can be but _one_ necessarily existent being; for\ntwo necessarily existent beings could in no respect whatever differ\nfrom each other--that is, they would be one and the same being. 8. The\none necessarily existent being must have _all possible perfections_:\nfor all possible perfections must be the perfections of some existence;\nall existence is either necessary or contingent; all contingent\nexistence is dependent upon necessary existence; consequently, all\npossible perfections must belong either to necessary existence or to\ncontingent existence--that is, to contingent beings, which are caused\nby and are dependent upon necessary being. Therefore, since there\ncan be but one necessarily existent being, that being must have all\npossible perfections. 9. The one necessarily existent being must be a\n_free agent_; for contingent existence is possible, as the conception\nof it involves no contradiction; but necessary existence must be the\ncause or producing agent of contingent existence, otherwise contingent\nexistence would be impossible, as an effect without a cause; and\nnecessary existence as the cause of contingent existence does not act\nnecessarily, for then contingent existence would itself be necessary,\nwhich is absurd as involving a contradiction. Therefore necessary\nexistence, as the cause of contingent existence, acts _not necessarily_\nbut _freely_--that is, is a free agent, which is the same thing as\nbeing an _intelligent agent_. 10. Therefore, there is one necessarily\nexistent being, the cause of all contingent existence--that is, of all\nother existences besides himself; and this being is eternal, infinite,\npossessed of all possible perfections, and is an intelligent free\nagent--that is, _this Being is God_.\"\n\nThe demonstration of the Divine existence given by the Chevalier\nRamsay is contained in the First Book of his 'Philosophical Principles\nof Natural and Revealed Religion' (1748). It is as elaborately\nmathematical in form as the reasoning in Spinoza's 'Ethics,' and has\ncontinuous reference to that reasoning. It is impossible to give any\ndistinct conception of its nature by a brief description.\n\nThe argument of Dr Hamilton, Dean of Armagh, is fully set forth in his\n'Attempt to prove the Existence and Absolute Perfection of the Supreme\nUnoriginated Being, in a Demonstrative Manner' (1785). It assumes the\n\"axiom\" that \"whatever is contingent, or might possibly have been\notherwise than it is, had some cause which determined it to be what it\nis. Or in other words: if two different or contrary things were each of\nthem possible, whichever of them took place, or came to pass, it must\nhave done so in consequence of some cause which determined that _it_,\nand not _the other_, should take the place.\" The propositions which he\nendeavours to demonstrate are these: I. There must be in the universe\nsome one being, at least, whose non-existence is impossible--whose\nexistence had no cause, no beginning, and can have no end. II. The\nwhole nature of the unoriginated being, or the aggregate of his\nattribute, is uncaused, and must be necessarily and immutably what\nit is; so that he cannot have any attribute or modification of his\nattributes but such as were the eternal and necessary concomitants of\nhis existence. III. Whatever are the attributes of the unoriginated\nbeing, he must possess each of them unlimitedly, or in its whole\nextent, such as it is when considered in the abstract. IV. In whatever\n_manner_ the unoriginated being exists or is present anywhere, he\nmust in the _like manner_ exist or be present everywhere. V. The\nunoriginated being is one individual uncompounded substance identically\nthe same everywhere, and to which our ideas of _whole_ and _parts_,\n_magnitude_ or _quantity_, are not applicable. VI. The unoriginated\nbeing must necessarily possess intelligence and power unlimited,\nand all other natural attributes that are in themselves absolute\nperfections. VII. There is in the universe but one unoriginated being,\nwho must therefore be the original fountain of all existence, and\nthe first cause of all things. VIII. All things owe their existence\nultimately to the power of the first cause operating according to his\nfree will. IX. Almighty God, the first cause and author of all things,\nmust be a Being of infinite goodness, wisdom, mercy, justice, and\ntruth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the supreme\nauthor and governor of the universe.\n\n\n  THE END.\n\n\n  PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Transcriber's Notes\n\n  Variations in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been retained\n  except in obvious cases of typographical errors.\n\n  Italics are shown thus _italic_.\n\n  3^{ieme.} indicates that the letters enclosed in curly brackets\n  are superscripted.\n\n  The repetition of the title on the first two pages has been removed.","title":"Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":107032}