{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45851/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45851","id":"gutenberg_45851","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45851","summary":null,"tags":["Aristotle, 384 BC-322 BC","Category: Biographies","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics"],"text":"ARISTOTLE.\n\nBY GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,\n\nD.C.L. OXFORD, AND LL.D. CAMBRIDGE;\nLATE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON;\nPRESIDENT OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON;\nAND FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.\n\n\nEDITED BY\n\nALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D.,\n\nPROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN,\n\n\nAND\n\n\nG. CROOM ROBERTSON, M.A.,\n\nPROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND LOGIC IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,\nLONDON.\n\n_SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS._\n\nLONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.\n\n1880.\n\n_The right of Translation is reserved._\n\n\nPRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,\nLONDON:\nSTAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.\n\n\n\n\nNOTICE TO THE SECOND EDITION.\n\n\nThis Edition is an exact reprint of the First Edition, with the\naddition of two important Essays on the Ethics and Politics of\nAristotle, which were found among the author's posthumous papers.\nThey were originally published in 1876, in 'Fragments on Ethical\nSubjects, by the late George Grote,' but would have been included in\nthe First Edition of this Work, had they been discovered in time.\nThese Essays are the fruit of long and laborious study, and, so far\nas they extend, embody the writer's matured views upon the Ethics and\nthe Politics: the two treatises whose omission from his published\nexposition of the Aristotelian philosophy has been most regretted.\n\nThe Essay on 'The Ethics of Aristotle' falls naturally into two\ndivisions; the first treats of Happiness; the second of what,\naccording to Aristotle, is the chief ingredient of Happiness, namely.\nVirtue. On Aristotle's own conception of Happiness, Mr. Grote dwells\nvery minutely; turning it over on all sides, and looking at it from\nevery point of view. While fully acknowledging its merits, he gives\nalso the full measure of its defects. His criticisms on this head are\nin the author's best style and are no less important as regards\nEthical discussion than as a commentary on Aristotle.\n\nHis handling of Aristotle's doctrine of Virtue is equally subtle and\ninstructive. Particularly striking are the remarks on the _Voluntary_\nand the _Involuntary_, and on [Greek: proai/resis], or _deliberate\npreference_.\n\nThe treatment of the Virtues in detail is, unhappily, more\nfragmentary; but what he does say regarding Justice and Equity has a\npermanent interest.\n\nThe Essay on 'The Politics of Aristotle' must be studied in\nconnection with the preceding. Although but a brief sketch, it is\nremarkable for the insight which it affords us into the most\nconsummate political ideal of the ancient world.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE BY THE EDITORS\n\nTO THE FIRST EDITION.\n\n\nThe Historian of Greece, when closing his great narrative in the year\n1856, promised to follow out in a separate work that speculative\nmovement of the fourth century B.C. which upheld the supremacy of the\nHellenic intellect long after the decline of Hellenic liberty. He had\ntraced the beginnings of the movement in the famous chapter on\nSokrates, but to do justice to its chief heroes--Plato and\n\nAristotle--proved to be impossible within the limits of the History.\nWhen, however, the promised work appeared, after nine laborious years,\nit was found to compass only Plato and the other immediate companions\nof Sokrates, leaving a full half of the appointed task unperformed.\nMr. Grote had already passed his 70th year, but saw in this only a\nreason for turning, without a moment's pause, to the arduous labour\nstill before him. Thenceforth, in spite of failing strength and the\nincreasing distraction of public business, he held steadily on till\ndeath overtook him in the middle of the course. What he was able to\naccomplish, though not what study he had gone through towards the\nremainder of his design, these volumes will show. The office of\npreparing and superintending their publication was entrusted to the\npresent editors by Mrs. Grote, in the exercise of her discretion as\nsole executrix under his last Will. As now printed, the work has its\nform determined by the author himself up to the end of Chapter XI.\nThe first two chapters, containing a biography of Aristotle and a\ngeneral account of his works, are followed by a critical analysis, in\neight chapters, of all the treatises included under the title\n'Organon;' and in the remaining chapter of the eleven the handling of\nthe Physica and Metaphysica (taken together for the reasons given) is\nbegun. What now stand as Chapters III., IV., &c., were marked,\nhowever, as Chapters VI., VII., &c., by the author; his design\nevidently being to interpolate before publication three other\nchapters of an introductory cast. Unfortunately no positive\nindication remains as to the subject of these; although there is\nreason to believe that, for one thing, he intended to prefix to the\ndetailed consideration of the works a key to Aristotle's perplexing\nterminology. Possibly also he designed to enter upon a more\nparticular discussion of the Canon, after having viewed it externally\nin Chapter II.; citations and references bearing on such a discussion\nbeing found among his loose notes.\n\nWhat might have been the course of the work from the point where it\nis broken off, is altogether matter of inference, beyond an\nindication of the subject of the chapter next to follow; but the\nremarks at the beginning of Chapter III. point to some likely\nconclusions. After the metaphysical discussions, which must have been\nprolonged through several chapters, there would probably have been\ntaken in order the treatises De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione,\nthe Meteorologica, and next the various Biological works; though with\nwhat detail in each case it is impossible to guess. Then must have\nfollowed the De Anim\u00e2 with the minor Psychological treatises summed\nup as Parva Naturalia, and next, without doubt, the Ethica and\nPolitica; last of all, the Rhetorica and Poetica. That Mr. Grote had\ncarefully mastered all these works is evident from his marginal\nannotations in the various copies which he read. With the Ethica and\nPolitica in particular he had early been familiar, and most there is\nreason to regret that he has left nothing worked out upon this field\nso specially his own.[1] Fortunately it happens that on the\npsychological field next adjoining there is something considerable to\nshow.\n\n[Footnote 1: It has been already stated that two important Essays on\nthese subjects have been discovered among Mr. Grote's posthumous\npapers since the publication of the First Edition. They are printed\nin this Edition after the chapter De Anim\u00e2.--Second Edition.]\n\nIn the autumn of 1867 Mr. Grote undertook to write a short account of\nAristotle's striking recognition of the physical aspect of mental\nphenomena, to be appended to the third edition of the senior editor's\nwork, 'The Senses and the Intellect;' but, on following out the\nindications relative to that point, he was gradually led by his\ninterest in the subject to elaborate a full abstract of the De Anim\u00e2\nand the other psychological treatises. Several months were spent on\nthis task, and at the end he declared that it had greatly deepened\nhis insight into Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. He also expressed\nhis satisfaction at having thus completed an exposition of the\nPsychology, fitted to stand as his contribution to that part of\nAristotle, in case he should never reach the subject in the regular\ncourse of his general work. The exposition was printed in full at the\ntime (1868), and drew the attention of students. It is now reprinted,\nwith the prominence due to its literary finish and intrinsic value,\nas a chapter--the last--in the body of the present work. The long\nAppendix coming after is composed of elements somewhat heterogeneous;\nbut the different sections were all written in the period since 1865,\nand all, not excepting the last two (treating briefly of Epikurus and\nthe Stoics), have a bearing upon the author's general design.\n\nThe first section--an historical account of ancient theories of\nUniversals--has already seen the light.[2] It brings together, as\nnowhere else, all the chief references to the doctrine of Realism in\nPlato, and exhibits the directly antagonistic position taken up by\nAristotle towards his master. This it does so impressively that there\ncould be no question of excluding it, even although it reproduces in\npart some of the matter of Chapter III., on the Categories. Being\ncomposed, in 1867, later than this Chapter, it is on that account\nwritten with all the firmer a grasp. On finishing it as it stands,\nMr. Grote, in a private letter, expressed himself in terms that\ndeserve to be quoted:--\"I never saw before so clearly the extreme\nimportance of Aristotle's speculations as the guides and stimulants\nof medi\u00e6val philosophy. If I had time to carry the account further, I\nshould have been able to show how much the improved views of the\nquestion of Universals depended on the fact that more and more of the\nworks of Aristotle, and better texts, became known to Albertus\nMagnus, Thomas Aquinas, and their successors. During the centuries\nimmediately succeeding Bo\u00ebthius, nothing of Aristotle except the\nCategories and the treatise De Interpretatione was known, and these\nin a Latin translation. Most fortunately the Categories was never put\nout of sight; and it is there that the doctrine of _Substantia Prima_\nstands clearly proclaimed.\"\n\n[Footnote 2: In the Appendix to the senior editor's 'Manual of Mental\nand Moral Science' (1867).]\n\nThe second section, or, rather, the part therein treating of\nAristotle's doctrine of First Principles, is also a reprint. It was\ncomposed (in 1867) at the same time as the section on Universals, and\nwas printed along with that; shorn, however, of the critical\nexamination of Sir William Hamilton's views on Aristotle, which is\nnow prefixed to the statement of the Aristotelian doctrine. Hamilton\nhaving (in Note A, appended to his edition of Reid's Works) claimed\nAristotle as a supporter of the Philosophy of Common Sense, basing\nupon a long list of passages quoted, these were subjected by Mr.\nGrote to a searching criticism, the pointed vigour of which will be\nduly appreciated. The statement of his own view of Aristotle's\ndoctrine, though containing little that may not be found at more\nplaces than one in the body of the present work, is yet reprinted,\nbecause iteration was his favourite art for impressing anything to\nwhich he attached as much importance as he did attach to this\nconviction of his, regarding the very heart of Aristotle's thought.\n\nThe long abstracts of six books of the Metaphysica and two books of\nthe De Coelo, next following in the Appendix, are sections of a\ncharacter altogether different from the foregoing. Evidently not\nintended for publication, they have been included, partly as\nfurnishing some indication of the labour the author underwent in\nseeking to lay hold of his subject, partly because of their inherent\nvalue. From the first motive, they are here reproduced as nearly as\npossible in the guise they wore as preliminary drafts, bestrewed with\nreferences. Their value consists in the fact that they give Mr.\nGrote's interpretation of the text of treatises at once exceedingly\ndifficult and important: difficult, as is proved by the great\ndivergence, among commentators at many points; important, not more\nfor the deeper aspects of Aristotle's own system, than for the\nspeculations of the earlier Greek philosophers on which they are the\nclassical authority. What relation, in the case of each treatise, the\nbooks abstracted (often translated) hold to the other books left\nuntouched, is specially indicated at the beginning of the third\nsection and at the end of the fourth. Here let it suffice to mention\nthat each abstract has a certain completeness in itself, and at the\nsame time a bond of connection with the other. The abstract of the\nMetaphysica closes where Aristotle descends to speak of the concrete\nheavenly bodies, and just as much of the De Coelo is given as treats\nspecially of these. This connection, whether or not it was present to\nthe author's mind, enhances the value of the abstracts as here\npresented.[3]\n\n[Footnote 3: The author carried the abstract of De Coelo a little\nfarther, and then abruptly broke it off; probably finding himself\nborne too far away from the logical treatises with which he was at\nthe time dealing.]\n\nIn the remaining sections of the Appendix, not dealing with\nAristotle, the short account of Epikurus aims at setting in its true\nlight a much-maligned system of thought. On writing it, in 1867, Mr.\nGrote remarked that the last word had not yet been said on Epikurus.\nThe ethical part of the sketch was printed at the time:[4] the whole\nis now given. More fragmentary is the notice of the Stoics, as merely\nreplacing passages that he considered inadequate in a sketch\nsubmitted to him. Since it formed part of his entire design to add to\nthe treatment of Aristotle a full exposition both of Stoic and\nEpikurean doctrines, considered as the outgrowth of the Cynic and\nKyrenaic theories already handled at the end of the 'Plato,' the two\nfragments may not unfitly close the present work.\n\n[Footnote 4: Also in the 'Manual of Mental and Moral Science,' among\n'Ethical Systems.']\n\nTaken altogether, the two volumes are undoubtedly a most important\ncontribution to the history of ancient thought. As regards Aristotle,\nthe author's design must be gathered chiefly from the first eleven\nchapters,--begun as these were in 1865, and proceeded with in their\norder, till he was overtaken, in the act of composing the last, by\nthe insidious malady which, after six months, finally carried him\noff. Perhaps the most striking feature in the exposition of the\nOrganon, is the very full analysis given of the long treatise called\nTopica. While the other treatises have all, more or less, been drawn\nupon for the ordinary theory of Logic, the Topica, with its mixed\nlogical and rhetorical bearings, has ceased to be embodied in modern\nschemes of discipline or study. Mr. Grote's profound interest in\neverything pertaining to Dialectic drew him especially to this work,\nas the exhibition in detail of that habit of methodized discussion so\ndeep rooted in the Hellenic mind. And in the same connection it may\nbe noted how the natural course of his work brought him, in the last\nmonths of his intellectual activity, to tread again old and familiar\nground. A plea--this time against Aristotle--for the decried\nSophists, and, once more, a picture of that **dialectical mission of\nSokrates which for him had an imperishable charm, were among the very\nlast efforts of his pen.\n\n. . . . . . .\n\nBesides making up the Second Volume from the end of Chapter XI., the\neditors have, throughout the whole work, bestowed much attention on\nthe notes and references set down by the author with his usual\ncopious minuteness. It was deemed advisable to subject these\neverywhere to a detailed verification; and, though the editors speak\non the matter with a diffidence best understood by those who may have\nundergone a similar labour, it is hoped that a result not unworthy of\nthe author has been attained. In different places additional\nreferences have been supplied, either where there was an obvious\nomission on the author's part, or in farther confirmation of his\nviews given in the text: such references, mostly to the works of\nAristotle himself, it has not been thought necessary to signalize.\nWhere, as once or twice in the Appendix, a longer note in explanation\nseemed called for, this has been printed within square brackets.\n\nFrom the text some passages, where the iterations seemed excessive,\nhave been withheld, but only such as it was thought the author would\nhimself have struck out upon revision: wherever there was evidence\nthat revision had been made, the iterations, freely employed for\nemphasis, have been allowed to stand. On rare occasions,\ninterpolations and verbal changes have been made with the view of\nbringing out more clearly the meaning sought to be conveyed. It is\nimpossible to be more deeply sensible than the editors are, of the\nresponsibility they have thus incurred; but they have been guided by\ntheir very respect for the venerable author, and they were fortunate\nin the many opportunities they enjoyed of learning from his own lips\nthe cast of his views on Aristotle.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: It is but due to the younger editor to state that the\nheaviest part of all the work here indicated has been done by\nhim.--A. B.]\n\nAn index has been drawn up with some care; as was needful, if meant\nto be of real service to the readers of so elaborate a work.\n\nIt only remains to add that in printing the Greek of the notes, &c.,\nthe text of Waitz has been followed for the Organon (everywhere short\nof the beginning); the text of Bonitz, for the Metaphysica; and for\nother works of Aristotle, generally the Berlin edition. Regard was\nhad, as far as the editors' knowledge went, to the author's own\npreferences in his reading.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\nLIFE OF ARISTOTLE                                    1\n\nCHAPTER II.\nARISTOTELIAN CANON                                  27\n\nCHAPTER III.\nCATEGORI\u00c6                                           54\n\nCHAPTER IV.\nDE INTERPRETATIONE                                 108\n\nCHAPTER V.\nANALYTICA PRIORA I.                                139\n\nCHAPTER VI.\nANALYTICA PRIORA II.                               171\n\nCHAPTER VII.\nANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.                            207\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\nANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.                           238\n\nCHAPTER IX.\nTOPICA (I.-VIII.)                                  262\n\nCHAPTER X.\nSOPHISTICI ELENCHI                                 376\n\nCHAPTER XI.\nPHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA                            422\n\nCHAPTER XII.\nDE ANIM\u00c2, ETC.                                     446\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\nETHICA                                             494\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\nPOLITICA                                           539\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nI. THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS                      551\n\nII. FIRST PRINCIPLES:\n  A. Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle's Doctrine  565\n  B. Aristotle's Doctrine                          573\n\nIII. METAPHYSICA:\n  Book [Greek: G].                                 583\n  Book [Greek: E].                                 592\n  Book [Greek: Z].                                 594\n  Book [Greek: \u00ca].                                 609\n  Book [Greek: Th].                                613\n  Book [Greek: L].                                 619\n\nIV. DE COELO:\n  Book I.                                          630\n  Book II.                                         639\n\nV. EPIKURUS                                        654\n\nVI. THE STOICS.--A FRAGMENT                        660\n\n\n\n\n\nARISTOTLE.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nLIFE OF ARISTOTLE.\n\n\nIn my preceding work, 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' I\ndescribed a band of philosophers differing much from each other, but\nall emanating from Sokrates as common intellectual progenitor; all\nmanifesting themselves wholly or principally in the composition of\ndialogues; and all living in an atmosphere of Hellenic freedom, as\nyet untroubled by any over-ruling imperial ascendancy from without.\nFrom that band, among whom Plato is _facil\u00e8 princeps_, I now proceed\nto another, among whom the like pre-eminence belongs to Aristotle.\nThis second band knew the Sokratic stimulus only as an historical\ntradition; they gradually passed, first from the Sokratic or Platonic\ndialogue--dramatic, colloquial, cross-examining--to the Aristotelian\ndialogue, semi-dramatic, rhetorical, counter-expository; and next to\nformal theorizing, ingenious solution and divination of special\nproblems, historical criticism and abundant collections of detailed\nfacts: moreover, they were witnesses of the extinction of freedom in\nHellas, and of the rise of the Macedonian kingdom out of comparative\nnullity to the highest pinnacle of supremacy and mastership. Under\nthe successors of Alexander, this extraneous supremacy, intermeddling\nand dictatorial, not only overruled the political movements of the\nGreeks, but also influenced powerfully the position and working of\ntheir philosophers; and would have become at once equally\nintermeddling even earlier, under Alexander himself, had not his\nwhole time and personal energy been absorbed by insatiable thirst for\neastern conquest, ending with an untimely death.\n\nAristotle was born at Stageira, an unimportant Hellenic colony in\nThrace, which has obtained a lasting name in history from the fact of\nbeing his birthplace. It was situated in the Strymonic Gulf, a little\nnorth of the isthmus which terminates in the mountainous promontory\nof Athos; its founders were Greeks from the island of Andros,\nreinforced afterwards by additional immigrants from Chalkis in\nEuboea. It was, like other Grecian cities, autonomous--a distinct,\nself-governing community; but it afterwards became incorporated in\nthe confederacy of free cities under the presidency of Olynthus. The\nmost material feature in its condition, at the period of Aristotle's\nbirth, was, that it lay near the frontier of Macedonia, and not far\neven from Pella, the residence of the Macedonian king Amyntas (father\nof Philip). Aristotle was born, not earlier than 392 B.C., nor later\nthan 385-384 B.C. His father, Nikomachus, was a citizen of Stageira,\ndistinguished as a physician, author of some medical works, and\nboasting of being descended from the heroic _gens_ of the Asklepiads;\nhis mother, Phaestis, was also of good civic family, descended from\none of the first Chalkidian colonists.[1] Moreover, Nikomachus was\nnot merely learned in his art, but was accepted as confidential\nphysician and friend of Amyntas, with whom he passed much of his\ntime--a circumstance of great moment to the future career of his son.\nWe are told that among the Asklepiads the habit of physical\nobservation, and even manual training in dissection, were imparted\ntraditionally from father to son, from the earliest years, thus\nserving as preparation for medical practice when there were no\nwritten treatises to study.[2] The mind of Aristotle may thus have\nacquired that appetite for physiological study which so many of his\ntreatises indicate.\n\n[Footnote 1: Diog. L. v. 10. This was probably among the reasons\nwhich induced Aristotle to prefer Chalkis as his place of temporary\nretirement, when he left Athens after the death of Alexander.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Galen, De Anatomicis Administr. ii. 1. T. ii. pp.\n280-281, ed. K\u00fchn. [Greek: para\\ toi=s goneu=sin e)k pai/d\u00f4n\na)skoume/nois, \u00f4(/sper a)nagin\u00f4/skein kai\\ gra/phein, ou(/t\u00f4s\na)nate/mnein]--(compare Plato--Protagoras, p. 328 A, p. 311 C).\n\nDiog. L. v. 1. [Greek: O( de\\ Niko/machos \u00ea)=n a)po\\ Nikoma/chou tou=\nMacha/nos tou= A)skl\u00eapiou=, katha/ ph\u00easin E(/rmippos e)n t\u00f4=| peri\\\nA)ristote/lous kai\\ sunebi/\u00f4 A)mu/nta| t\u00f4=| Makedo/n\u00f4n basilei=\ni)atrou= kai\\ phi/lou chrei/a|.]\n\nWe here learn that in the heroic genealogy of the Asklepiads, the son\nof Machaon himself bore the name of Nikomachus. I do not think that\nWill. v. Humboldt and Bernays are warranted in calling Aristotle \"ein\nHalbgrieche,\" \"kein vollb\u00fcrtiger Hellene\"--(Die Dialoge des\nAristoteles, pp. 2-56-134). An Hellenic family which migrated from\nAthens, Chalkis, Corinth, etc., to establish a colony on the coast of\nThrace, or Asia Minor, did not necessarily lose its Hellenism. One\ncannot designate Demokritus, Xenokrates, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, &c.,\nhalf Greeks.\n\nDiogenes here especially cites Hermippus (B.C. 220-210), from whom\nseveral of his statements in this and other biographies appear to\nhave been derived. The work of Hermippus seems to have been entitled\n\"Lives of the Philosophers\" (v. 2), among which lives that of\nAristotle was one.\n\nHermippus mentioned, among other matters, communications made to\nAristotle by Stroebus (a person engaged in the service of\nKallisthenes as reader) respecting the condemnation and execution of\nKallisthenes in Baktria, by order of Alexander (Plutarch, Alex. c.\n54). From what source did Hermippus derive these statements made by\nStroebus to Aristotle?]\n\nRespecting the character of his youth, there existed, even in\nantiquity, different accounts. We learn that he lost his father and\nmother while yet a youth, and that he came under the guardianship of\nProxenus, a native of Atarneus who had settled at Stageira. According\nto one account, adopted apparently by the earliest witnesses\npreserved to us,[3] he was at first an extravagant youth, spent much\nof his paternal property, and then engaged himself to military\nservice; of which he soon became weary, and went back to Stageira,\nturning to account the surgical building, apparatus, and medicines\nleft by his father as a medical practitioner. After some time, we\nknow not how long, he retired from this profession, shut up the\nbuilding, and devoted himself to rhetoric and philosophy. He then\nwent to Athens, and there entered himself in the school of Plato, at\nthe age of thirty.[4] The philosophical life was thus (if this\naccount be believed) a second choice, adopted comparatively late in\nlife.[5] The other account, depending also upon good witnesses,\nrepresents him as having come to Athens and enlisted as pupil of\nPlato, at the early age of seventeen or eighteen: it omits all\nmention of an antecedent period, occupied by military service and a\ntentative of medical profession.[6] In both the two narratives,\nAristotle appears as resident at Athens, and devoting himself to\nrhetoric and philosophy, from some period before 360 B.C. down to the\ndeath of Plato in 347 B.C.; though, according to the first of the two\nnarratives, he begins his philosophical career at a later age, while\nhis whole life occupied seventy years instead of sixty-two\nyears.\n\n[Footnote 3: Epikurus and Tim\u00e6us. [Greek: E)pi/kouros e)n t\u00ea=| peri\\\ne)pit\u00eadeuma/t\u00f4n e)pistol\u00ea=|] (Eusebius, Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 5)--Diogen. L.\nx. 8; \u00c6lian. V. H. v. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 4: An author named Eum\u00ealus (cited by Diogenes, v. 6, [Greek\ne)n t\u00ea=| pe/mpt\u00ea| t\u00f4=n i(stori\u00f4=n], but not otherwise known) stated\nthat Aristotle came to Plato at the age of thirty, and that he lived\naltogether to seventy years of age, instead of sixty-three, as\nHermippus and Apollodorus affirmed. Eum\u00ealus conceived Aristotle as\nborn in 392 B.C., and coming to Plato in 362 B.C. His chronological\ndata are in harmony with the statements of Epikurus and Tim\u00e6us\nrespecting the early life of Aristotle. The [Greek: Bi/os A)n\u00f4/numos]\ngiven by M\u00e9nage recognizes two distinct accounts as to the age at\nwhich Aristotle died: one assigning to him 70 years, the other only\n63.]\n\n[Footnote 5: See the Fragments of Tim\u00e6us in Didot, Fragmenta\nHistoricorum Gr\u00e6corum, Fr. 70-74; also Aristokles, ap. Eusebium,\nPr\u00e6p. Evang. xv. 2; Diogenes, L. x. 8; Athen\u00e6us, viii. p. 354. Tim\u00e6us\ncalled Aristotle [Greek: _sophist\u00ea\\n o)psimath\u00ea=_ kai\\ mis\u00eato/n, kai\\\nto\\ poluti/m\u00eaton i)atrei=on a)rti/\u00f4s a)pokekeiko/ta]. The speaker in\nAthen\u00e6us designates him as [Greek: o( pharmakop\u00f4/l\u00eas]. The terms used\nby these writers are illtempered and unbecoming in regard to so great\na man as Aristotle; but this is irrelevant to the question, whether\nthey do not describe, in perverted colouring, some real features in\nhis earlier life, or whether there was not, at least, a chronological\nbasis of possibility for them. That no such features were noticed by\nother enemies of Aristotle, such as Eubulides and Kephisod\u00f4rus, is a\nreason as far as it goes for not believing them to be real, yet not\nat all a conclusive reason; nor is the speaker in Athen\u00e6us exact when\nhe says that Epikurus is the _only_ witness, for we find Tim\u00e6us\nmaking the same statements. The [Greek: i)atrei=on] (see Antiphanes,\napud Polluc. iv. 183--Fragmenta Comic. cxxv., Meineke) of a Greek\nphysician (more properly we should call the [Greek: i)atro\\s] _a\ngeneral practitioner and chemist_) was the repository of his\nmaterials and the scene of his important operations; for many of\nwhich instructions are given in the curious Hippokratic treatise\nentitled [Greek: Kat' I)\u00eatrei=on], vol. iii. pp. 262-337 of the\nedition of M. Littr\u00e9, who in his preface to the treatise, p. 265,\nremarks about Aristotle:--\"Il para\u00eet qu'Aristote, qui \u00e9tait de\nfamille m\u00e9dicale, avoit renonc\u00e9 \u00e0 une officine de ce genre, d'une\ngrande valeur.\" Stahr speaks of this [Greek: i)atrei=on] as if\nAristotle had set up one _at Athens_ (Aristotelia, p. 38), which the\nauthorities do not assert; it was probably at Stageira. Ideler (Comm.\n**ad Aristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 16, p. 433) considers this story about\nAristotle's [Greek: i)atrei=on] to have been a fiction arising out of\nvarious expressions in his writings about the preparation of\ndrugs--[Greek: ta\\ pha/rmaka e(/psein], &c. I think this is\nfar-fetched. And when we find Aristokles rejecting the allegation\nabout the [Greek: i)atrei=on], by speaking of it as an [Greek:\na)/doxon i)atrei=on], we can admit neither the justice of the epithet\nnor the ground of rejection.]\n\n[Footnote 6: This account rested originally (so far as we know) upon\nthe statement of Hermippus (B.C. 220), and was adopted by Apollod\u00f4rus\nin his Chronology (B.C. 150), both of them good authorities, yet\nneither of them so early as Epikurus and Tim\u00e6us. Diogenes Laertius\nand Dionysius of Halikarnassus alike follow Hermippus. Both the life\nof Aristotle ascribed to Ammonius, and the Anonymous Life first\nedited by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 2), include the same strange\nchronological blunder: they affirm Aristotle to have come to Athens\nat the age of seventeen, and to have frequented the society of\n_Sokrates_ (who had been dead more than thirty years) for three\nyears; then to have gone to Plato at the age of twenty. Zeller\nimagines, and I think it likely, that Aristotle may have been for a\nshort time pupil with _Isokrates_, and that the story of his having\nbeen pupil with _Sokrates_ has arisen from confusion of the two\nnames, which confusion has been seen on several occasions (Zeller,\nGesch. der Philos. der Griechen, ii. 2, p. 15.)]\n\nDuring the interval, 367-360 B.C., Plato was much absent from Athens,\nhaving paid two separate visits to Dionysius the younger at Syracuse.\nThe time which he spent there at each visit is not explicitly given;\nbut as far as we can conjecture from indirect allusions, it cannot\nhave been less than a year at each, and may possibly have been\nlonger. If, therefore, Aristotle reached Athens in 367 B.C. (as\nHermippus represents) he cannot have enjoyed continuous instructions\nfrom Plato for the three or four years next ensuing.\n\nHowever the facts may stand as to Aristotle's early life, there is no\ndoubt that in or before the year 362 B.C. he became resident at\nAthens, and that he remained there, profiting by the society and\nlectures of Plato, until the death of the latter in 347 B.C. Shortly\nafter the loss of his master, he quitted Athens, along with his\nfellow-pupil Xenokrates, and went to Atarneus, which was at that time\nruled by the despot Hermeias. That despot was a remarkable man, who\nbeing a eunuch through bodily hurt when a child, and having become\nslave of a prior despot named Eubulus, had contrived to succeed him\nin the supreme power, and governed the towns of Atarneus and Assos\nwith firmness and energy. Hermeias had been at Athens, had heard\nPlato's lectures, and had contracted friendship with Aristotle; which\nfriendship became farther cemented by the marriage of Aristotle,\nduring his residence at Atarneus, with Pythias the niece of\nHermeias.[7] For three years Aristotle and Xenokrates remained at\nAssos or Atarneus, whence they were then forced to escape by reason\nof the despot's death; for Mentor the Rhodian, general of the\nPersians in those regions, decoyed Hermeias out of the town under\npretence of a diplomatic negociation, then perfidiously seized him,\nand sent him up as prisoner to the Persian king, by whose order he\nwas hanged. Mentor at the same time seized the two towns and other\npossessions of Hermeias,[8] while Aristotle with his wife retired to\nMitylene. His deep grief for the fate of Hermeias was testified in a\nnoble hymn or p\u00e6an which he composed, and which still remains, as\nwell as by an epigram inscribed on the statue of Hermeias at Delphi.\nWe do not hear of his going elsewhere, until, two or three years\nafterwards (the exact date is differently reported), he was invited\nby Philip into Macedonia, to become preceptor to the young prince\nAlexander, then thirteen or fourteen years old. The reputation, which\nAristotle himself had by this time established, doubtless coincided\nwith the recollection of his father Nikomachus as physician and\nfriend of Amyntas, in determining Philip to such a choice. Aristotle\nperformed the duties required from him,[9] enjoying the confidence\nand favour both of Philip and Alexander, until the assassination of\nthe former and the accession of the latter in 336 B.C. His principle\nresidence during this period was in Macedonia, but he paid occasional\nvisits to Athens, and allusion is made to certain diplomatic services\nwhich he rendered to the Athenians at the court of Philip; moreover\nhe must have spent some time at his native city Stageira,[10] which\nhad been among the many Greek cities captured and ruined by Philip\nduring the Olynthian war of 349-347 B.C. Having obtained the consent\nand authority of Philip, Aristotle repaired to Stageira for the\npurpose of directing the re-establishment of the city. Recalling such\nof its dispersed inhabitants as could be collected, either out of the\nneighbouring villages or from more distant parts, he is said to have\ndrawn up laws, or framed regulations for the returned citizens, and\nnew comers. He had reason to complain of various rivals who intrigued\nagainst him, gave him much trouble, and obstructed the complete\nrenovation of the city; but, notwithstanding, his services were such\nthat an annual festival was instituted to commemorate them.[11] It is\nfarther stated, that at some time during this period he had a school\n(analogous to the Academy at Athens) in the Nymph\u00e6um of the place\ncalled Mieza; where stone seats and shady walks, ennobled by the name\nof Aristotle, were still shown even in the days of Plutarch.[12]\n\n[Footnote 7: Strabo, xiii. 610; Diodor. xvi. 52. It appears that\nAristotle incurred censure, even from contemporary rivals, for this\nmarriage with Pythias. On what ground we cannot exactly make out\n(Aristokles ap. Eusebium Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2), unless it be from her\nrelationship to Hermeias. She died long before Aristotle, but he\nmentions her in his will in terms attesting the constant affection\nwhich had reigned between them until her death. Aristotle thought it\nright to reply to the censure in one of his letters to Antipater.\nAristokles (ap. Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2) says that Aristotle did not\nmarry Pythias until after the death of Hermeias, when she was\ncompelled to save herself by flight, and was in distress and poverty.\nMr. Blakesley (Life of Aristotle, p. 36) and Oncken (Die Staatslehre\ndes Aristoteles, p. 158) concur in thinking that the departure of\nAristotle from Athens had nothing to do with the death of Plato, but\nwas determined by the capture of Olynthus, and by the fear and\ndislike of Philip which that event engendered at Athens.\n\nBut the fact that Xenokrates left Athens along with Aristotle\ndisproves this supposition, and proves that the death of Plato was\nthe real cause.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Diog. Laert. v. 7-8. Diodorus ascribes this proceeding\nto Mentor the Rhodian: Strabo, to his brother Memnon. I think\nDiodorus is right. A remarkable passage in the Magna Moralia (genuine\nor spurious) of Aristotle, seems to me to identify the proceeding\nwith Mentor (Aristot. Magn. Mor. i. 35, p. 1197, b. 21; as also the\nspurious second book of the OEkonomica, p. 1351, a. 33).]\n\n[Footnote 9: It was probably during this period that Aristotle\nintroduced to Alexander his friend the rhetor Theodekt\u00eas of Phas\u00ealis.\nAlexander took delight in the society of Theodekt\u00eas, and testified\nthis feeling, when he conquered Phas\u00ealis, by demonstrations of\naffection and respect towards the statue of the rhetor, who had died\nduring the intervening years--[Greek: a)podidou\\s tim\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=|\ngenome/n\u00ea| di' A)ristote/l\u00ean kai\\ philosophi/an o(mili/a| pro\\s to\\n\na)/ndra] (Plutarch, Alex. c. 17).]\n\n[Footnote 10: It is to this period of Aristotle's life that the\npassage extracted from his letters in Demetrius (so-called [Greek:\nperi\\ E(rm\u00eanei/as]) refers. [Greek: \u00f4(s A)ristote/l\u00eas ph\u00easi/n--e)g\u00f4\\\ne)k me\\n A)th\u00ean\u00f4=n ei)s Sta/geira \u00ea)=lthon dia\\ to\\n basile/a to\\n\nme/gan, e)k de\\ Stagei/r\u00f4n ei)s A)th\u00ea/nas dia\\ to\\n cheim\u00f4=na to\\n\nme/gan]--s. 29.\n\nWe shall hardly consider this double employment of the epithet\n[Greek: **me/gan] as an instance of that success in epistolary style,\nwhich Demetrius ascribes to Aristotle (s. 239); but the passage\nproves Aristotle's visits both to Stageira and to Athens. The very\ncold winters of the Chalkidic peninsula were severely felt by the\nGreeks (Plato--Symposion, p. 220), and may well have served as motive\nto Aristotle for going from Stageira to Athens.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Ammonius, Vit. Aristot. See the curious statements\ngiven by Dion Chrysostom, out of the epistles of Aristotle; Orat. ii.\np. 100, xlvii. p. 225, Reiske.\n\nRespecting the allusions made in these statements to various persons\nwho were reluctant to return out of the separate villages into the\nrestored city, compare what Xenophon says about the [Greek:\ndioi/kisis], and subsequent restitution, of Mantineia; Hellenica, v.\n2, 1-8, vi. 5, 3-6.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plutarch, Alexander, c. 7. What Plutarch calls the\n_Nymph\u00e6um_, is considered by Stahr (Aristotelia, i. p. 93 n.) to be\nprobably the same as what Pliny denominates the _Museum_ at Stageira\n(N. H. xvi. c. 23); but Zeller (p. 23, n.), after Geier, holds that\nMieza lay S.W. of Pella, in Emathia, far from Stageira. Plutarch\nseems to imply that Aristotle was established along with Alexander at\nMeiza by Philip.\n\nCompare, for these facts of the biography of Aristotle, Stahr,\nAristotelia, Part I., pp. 86-94, 103-106.\n\nI conceive that it was during this residence in Macedonia and at\nPella, that Aristotle erected the cenotaph in honour of Hermeias,\nwhich is so contemptuously derided by the Chian poet Theokritus in\nhis epigram, Diog. L. v. 11. The epigram is very severe on Aristotle,\nfor preferring Pella to the Academy as a residence; ascribing such\npreference to the exigencies of an ungovernable stomach.]\n\nIn 336 B.C. Alexander became king of Macedonia, and his vast projects\nfor conquest, first of Persia, next of other peoples known and\nunknown, left him no leisure for anything but military and imperial\noccupations. It was in the ensuing year (335 B.C. when the\npreparations for the Persian expedition were being completed, ready\nfor its execution in the following spring, that Aristotle transferred\nhis residence to Athens. The Platonic philosophical school in which\nhe had studied was now conducted by Xenokrates as Scholarch, having\npassed at the death of Plato, in 347 B.C., to his nephew Speusippus,\nand from the latter to Xenokrates in 339 B.C. Aristotle established\nfor himself a new and rival school on the eastern side of Athens, in\nthe gymnasium attached to the temple of Apollo Lykeius, and deriving\nfrom thence the name by which it was commonly known--the Lykeium. In\nthat school, and in the garden adjoining, he continued to lecture or\nteach, during the succeeding twelve years, comprising the life and\nthe brilliant conquests of Alexander. Much of his instruction is said\nto have been given while walking in the garden, from whence the\nstudents and the sect derived the title of Peripatetics. In the\nbusiness of his school and the composition of his works all his time\nwas occupied; and his scholars soon became so numerous that he found\nit convenient to desire them to elect from themselves every ten days\na rector to maintain order, as Xenokrates had already done at the\nAcademy.[13] Aristotle farther maintained correspondence, not merely\nwith Alexander and Antipater but also with Themison, one of the\nprinces of Cyprus, as Isokrates had corresponded with Nikokles, and\nPlato with Dionysius of Syracuse.[14]\n\n[Footnote 13: Diog. L. v. 4. Brandis notes it as a feature in\nAristotle's character (p. 65), that he abstained from meddling with\npublic affairs at Athens. But we must remember, that, not being a\ncitizen of Athens, Aristotle was not competent to meddle personally.\nHis great and respected philosophical competitor, Xenokrates (a\nnon-citizen or metic as well as he), was so far from being in a\ncondition to meddle with public affairs, that he was once even\narrested for not having paid in due season his [Greek: metoi/kion],\nor capitation-tax imposed upon metics. He was liberated, according\nto one story, by Lykurgus (Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. p. 842);\naccording to another story (seemingly more probable), by Demetrius\nPhalereus (Diog. La. iv. 14). The anonymous life of Aristotle\npublished by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 3), takes due notice of\nAristotle's position at Athens as a metic.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristotle addressed to Themison a composition now lost,\nbut well known in antiquity, called [Greek: Protreptiko/s]. It was\nprobably a dialogue; and was intended as an encouragement to the\nstudy of philosophy. See Rose, Aristot. Pseud. pp. 69-72, who gives a\nvery interesting fragment of it out of Stob\u00e6us.\n\nWe have the titles of two lost works of Aristotle--[Greek: Peri\\\nBasilei/as], and [Greek: A)le/xandros, \u00ea)\\ u(pe\\r a)poi/k\u00f4n] (or\n[Greek: a)poiki\u00f4=n]). Both seem to have been dialogues. In one, or in\nboth, he gave advice to Alexander respecting the manner of ruling his\nnewly acquired empire in Asia; and respecting the relations proper to\nbe established between Hellenes and native Asiatics (see Rose, Arist.\nPseud. pp. 92-96; Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristot. pp. 51-57).]\n\nIn June, 323 B.C., occurred the premature and unexpected decease of\nthe great Macedonian conqueror, aged 32 years and 8 months, by a\nviolent fever at Babylon. So vast was his power, and so unmeasured\nhis ambition, that the sudden removal of such a man operated as a\nshock to the hopes and fears of almost every one, both in Greece and\nAsia. It produced an entire change in the position of Aristotle at\nAthens.\n\nTo understand what that position really was, we must look at it in\nconnection with his Macedonian sympathies, and with the\ncontemporaneous political sentiment at Athens. It was in the middle\nof the year 335 B.C., that Alexander put down by force the revolt of\nthe Thebans, took their city by assault, demolished it altogether\n(leaving nothing but the citadel called Kadmeia, occupied by a\nMacedonian garrison), and divided its territory between two other\nBoeotian towns. Immediately after that terror-striking act, he\ndemanded from the Athenians (who had sympathized warmly with Thebes,\nthough without overt acts of assistance) the surrender of their\nprincipal anti-Macedonian politicians. That demand having been\nrefused, he at first prepared to extort compliance at the point of\nthe sword, but was persuaded, not without difficulty, to renounce\nsuch intention, and to be content with the voluntary exile of\nEphialtes and Charidemus from Athens. Though the unanimous vote of\nthe Grecian Synod at Corinth constituted him Imperator, there can be\nno doubt that the prevalent sentiment in Greece towards him was that\nof fear and dislike; especially among the Athenians, whose dignity\nwas most deeply mortified, and to whom the restriction of free speech\nwas the most painful.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: See History of Greece, chap. xci. pp. 18, 41, 64.]\n\nNow it was just at this moment (in 335 B.C.) that Aristotle came to\nAthens and opened his school. We cannot doubt that he was already\nknown and esteemed as the author of various published writings. But\nthe prominent mark by which every one now distinguished him, was,\nthat he had been for several years confidential preceptor of\nAlexander, and was still more or less consulted by that prince, as\nwell as sustained by the friendship of Antipater, viceroy of\nMacedonia during the king's absence. Aristotle was regarded as\nphilo-Macedonian, and to a certain extent, anti-Hellenic--the\nsentiment expressed towards him in the unfriendly epigram of the\ncontemporary Chian poet Theokritus.[16] His new school, originally\nopened under the protection and patronage of Alexander and Antipater,\ncontinued to be associated with their names, by that large proportion\nof Athenian citizens who held anti-Macedonian sentiments. Alexander\ncaused the statue of Aristotle to be erected in Athens,[17] and sent\nto him continual presents of money, usefully employed by the\nphilosopher in the prosecution of his physical and zoological\nresearches,[18] as well as in the purchase of books. Moreover,\nAristotle remained in constant and friendly correspondence with\nAntipater, the resident viceroy at Pella,[19] during the absence of\nAlexander in Asia. Letters of recommendation from Aristotle to the\nMacedonian rulers were often given and found useful: several of them\nwere preserved and published afterwards. There is even reason to\nbelieve that the son of Antipater--Kassander, afterwards viceroy or\nking of Macedonia, was among his pupils.[20]\n\n[Footnote 16: Diog. L. v. 11.\n\n  [Greek: E(rmi/ou eu)nou/chou \u00ea)/d' Eu)bou/lou a(/ma dou/lou\n    S\u00ea=ma keno\\n keno/phr\u00f4n teu=xen A)ristote/l\u00eas;\n  O(\\s dia\\ t\u00ea\\n a)krat\u00ea= gastro\\s phu/sin ei)/leto nai/ein\n    A)nt' A)kad\u00eamei/as Borbo/rou e)n prochoai=s.]\n\nCf. Plutarch, De Exilio, p. 603.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. ii. p. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Athen\u00e6us, ix. 398; Pliny, H. N. viii. c. 16. Athen\u00e6us\nalludes to 800 talents as having been given by Alexander to Aristotle\nfor this purpose. Pliny tells us that Alexander put thousands of men\nat his service for enquiry and investigation. The general fact is all\nthat we can state with confidence, without pretending to verify\namounts.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Vit. Aristotelis, Leyden, 1861, Robbe, pp. 4-6;\nAristokles ap. Eusebium Pr\u00e6p. Evang. xv. 2. Respecting the Epistles\nof Aristotle, and the collection thereof by Artemon, see Rose,\nAristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 594-598.]\n\n[Footnote 20: We may infer this fact from the insulting reply made by\nAlexander, not long before his death, to Kassander, who had just then\njoined him for the first time at Babylon, having been sent by\nAntipater at the head of a reinforcement. Some recent comers from\nGreece complained to Alexander of having been ill-used by Antipater.\nKassander being present at the complaint, endeavoured to justify his\nfather and to invalidate their testimony, upon which Alexander\nsilenced him by the remark that he was giving a specimen of\nsophistical duplicity learnt from Aristotle. [Greek: Tau=ta e)kei=na\nsophi/smata t\u00f4=n A)ristote/lous ei)s e(ka/teron t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n,\noi)m\u00f4xome/n\u00f4n, a)\\n kai\\ mikro\\n a)dikou=ntes tou\\s a)nthr\u00f4/pous\nphan\u00ea=te] (Plutarch, Alex. 74).]\n\nI have recounted elsewhere how the character of Alexander became\ngradually corrupted by unexampled success and Asiatic influences;[21]\nhow he thus came to feel less affection and esteem for Aristotle, to\nwhom he well knew that his newly acquired imperial and semi-divine\npretensions were not likely to be acceptable; how, on occasion of the\ncruel sentence passed on Kallisthenes, he threatened even to punish\nAristotle himself, as having recommended Kallisthenes, and as\nsympathizing with the same free spirit; lastly, how Alexander became\nmore or less alienated, not only from the society of Hellenic\ncitizens, but even from his faithful viceroy, the Macedonian\nAntipater. But these changed relations between Aristotle and\nAlexander did not come before the notice of the Athenians, nor alter\nthe point of view in which they regarded the philosopher; the rather,\nsince the relations of Aristotle with Antipater continued as intimate\nas ever.\n\n[Footnote 21: Histor. of Greece, ch. xciv. pp. 291, 301, 341;\nPlutarch, Alexand. c. lv.; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. 64, p. 338,\nReiske.]\n\nIt will thus appear, that though all the preserved writings of\nAristotle are imbued with a thoroughly independent spirit of\ntheorizing contemplation and lettered industry, uncorrupted by any\nservility or political bias--yet his position during the twelve years\nbetween 335-323 B.C. inevitably presented him to the Athenians as the\nmacedonizing philosopher, parallel with Phokion as the macedonizing\npolitician, and in pointed antithesis to Xenokrates at the Academy,\nwho was attached to the democratical constitution, and refused kingly\npresents. Besides that enmity which he was sure to incur, as an acute\nand self-thinking philosopher, from theology and the other\nanti-philosophical veins in the minds of ordinary men, Aristotle thus\nbecame the object of unfriendly sentiment from many Athenian\npatriots,[22] who considered the school of Plato generally as hostile\nto popular liberty, and who had before their eyes examples of\nindividual Platonists, ruling their respective cities with a sceptre\nforcibly usurped.[23]\n\n[Footnote 22: The statement of Aristokles (ap. Eusebium, Pr\u00e6p. Ev.\nxv. 2) is doubtless just--[Greek: phanero\\n ou)=n, o(/ti katha/per\npolloi=s kai\\ a)/llois, ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\ A)ristote/lei sune/b\u00ea, dia/ te\nta\\s pro\\s tou\\s basilei=s phili/as kai\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n e)n toi=s lo/gois\nu(peroch\u00ea/n, u(po\\ t\u00f4=n to/te sophist\u00f4=n phthonei=sthai.] The like is\nsaid by the rhetor Aristeides--Or. xii. p. 144, Dindorf. I have\nalready observed that the phrase of \"Halbgrieche\" applied by Bernays\nand W. v. Humboldt to Aristotle (Bernays, Die Dialoge des\nAristoteles, p. 2, p. 134) is not accurate literally, unless we\nchoose to treat all the Hellenic colonies as half-Greek. His ancestry\nwas on both sides fully Hellenic. But it is true of him, in the same\nmetaphorical sense in which it is true of Phokion. Aristotle was\nsemi-Macedonian in his sympathies. He had no attachment to Hellas as\nan organized system autonomous, self-acting, with an Hellenic city as\npresident: which attachment would have been considered, by Perikles,\nArchidamus, and Epameinondas, as one among the constituents\nindispensable to Hellenic patriotism.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Quintilian--Declamat. 268. \"Quis ignorat, ex ips\u00e2\nSocratis (quo velut fonte omnis philosophia manasse creditur) schol\u00e2\nevasisse tyrannos et hostes patri\u00e6 su\u00e6?\" Compare Athen\u00e6us, xi.\n508-509.]\n\nSuch sentiment was probably aggravated by the unparalleled and\noffensive Macedonian demonstration at the Olympic festival of 324\nB.C. It was on that occasion that Alexander, about one year prior to\nhis decease, sent down a formal rescript, which was read publicly to\nthe assembled crowd by a herald with loud voice; ordering every\nGrecian city to recall all exiles who had been banished by judicial\nsentence, and intimating, that if the rescript were not obeyed\nspontaneously, Antipater would be instructed to compel the execution\nof it by force. A large number of the exiles whose restitution was\nthus ordered, were present on the plain of Olympia, and heard the\norder proclaimed, doubtless with undisguised triumph and exultation.\nSo much the keener must have been the disgust and humiliation among\nthe other Grecian hearers, who saw the autonomy of each separate city\nviolently trampled down, without even the pretence of enquiry, by\nthis high-handed sentence of the Macedonian conqueror. Among the\nAthenians especially, the resentment felt was profound; and a vote\nwas passed appointing deputies to visit Alexander in person, for the\npurpose of remonstrating against it. The orator Demosthenes, who\nhappened to be named Archi-The\u00f4rus of Athens (chief of the solemn\nlegation sent to represent Athens) at this Olympic festival, incurred\nsevere reproach from his accuser Deinarchus, for having even been\nseen in personal conversation with the Macedonian officer who had\narrived from Asia as bearer of this odious rescript.[24]\n\n[Footnote 24: See the description of this event in History of Greece,\nch. xcv. p. 416.\n\nThere is reason for supposing that Hypereides also (as well as\nDeinarchus) inveighed against Demosthenes for having publicly sought\nthe company of Nikanor at this Olympic festival. At least we know\nthat Hypereides, in his oration against Demosthenes, made express\nallusion to Nikanor. See Harpokration _v._ [Greek: Nika/n\u00f4r].\n\nThe exordium prefixed to the Pseud-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad\nAlexandrum, announces that discourse to have been composed pursuant\nto the desire of Alexander; and notices especially one message\ntransmitted by him to Aristotle through Nikanor (p. 1420 a. 6, 1421\na. 26-38, [Greek: katha/per \u00ea(mi=n e)d\u00ea/l\u00f4se Nika/n\u00f4r], &c.).]\n\nNow it happened that this officer, the bearer of the rescript, was\nNikanor of Stageira;[25] son of Proxenus who had been Aristotle's\nearly guardian, and himself the cherished friend or ward, ultimately\nthe son-in-law, of the philosopher. We may be certain that Aristotle\nwould gladly embrace the opportunity of seeing again this attached\nfriend, returning after a long absence on service in Asia; that he\nwould be present with him at the Olympic festival, perhaps receive a\nvisit from him at Athens also. And the unpopularity of Aristotle at\nAthens, as identified with Macedonian imperial authority, would thus\nbe aggravated by his notorious personal alliance with his\nfellow-citizen Nikanor, the bearer of that rescript in which such\nauthority had been most odiously manifested.\n\n[Footnote 25: Diodor. xviii. 8. [Greek: dio/per u(pogu/\u00f4n o)/nt\u00f4n\nt\u00f4=n O)lumpi/\u00f4n e)xe/pempsen] (Alexander) [Greek: ei)s t\u00ea\\n E(lla/da\nNika/nora to\\n Stageiri/t\u00ean, dou\\s e)pistol\u00ea\\n peri\\ t\u00ea=s katho/dou.]\n\nAntipater, when re-distributing the satrapies of the Macedonian\nempire, after the death both of Alexander and of Perdikkas, appointed\nNikanor prefect or satrap of Kappadokia (Arrian, [Greek: Ta\\ meta\\\nA)le/xandron], apud Photium, cod. 92, s.37, Didot).\n\nAmmonius, in the life of Aristotle, mentions Nikanor as son of\nProxenus of Atarneus. Sextus Empiricus alludes to Nikanor as\nson-in-law of Aristotle (adv. Mathematicos, sect. 258. p. 271, Fabr.).\nSee M\u00e9nage ad Diogen. Laert. v. 12. Robbe's Life of Aristotle also\n(Leyden, 1861, p. 2) mentions Nikanor as son of Proxenus.\n\nNikanor was appointed afterwards (in 318 B.C., five years later than\nthe death of Aristotle) by Kassander, son of Antipater, to be\ncommander of the Macedonian garrison which occupied Munychia, as a\ncontrolling force over Athens (Diodor. xviii. 64). It will be seen in\nmy History of Greece (ch. xcvi. p. 458) that Kassander was at that\nmoment playing a difficult game, his father Antipater being just\ndead; that he could only get possession of Munychia by artifice, and\nthat it was important for him to entrust the mission to an officer\nwho already had connections at Athens; that Nikanor, as adopted son\nof Aristotle, possessed probably beforehand acquaintance with Phokion\nand the other macedonizing leaders at Athens; so that the ready way\nin which Phokion now fell into co-operation with him is the more\neasily explained.\n\nNikanor, however, was put to death by Kassander himself, some months\nafterwards.]\n\nDuring the twelve or thirteen years[26] of Aristotle's teaching and\nAlexander's reign, Athens was administered by macedonizing citizens,\nwith Phokion and Demades at their head. Under such circumstances, the\nenmity of those who hated the imperial philosopher could not pass\ninto act; nor was it within the contemplation of any one, that only\none year after that rescript which insulted the great Pan-Hellenic\nfestival, the illustrious conqueror who issued it would die of fever,\nin the vigour of his age and at the height of his power (June, 323\nB.C.). But as soon as the news of his decease, coming by surprise\nboth on friends and enemies, became confirmed, the suppressed\nanti-Macedonian sentiment burst forth in powerful tide, not merely at\nAthens, but also throughout other parts of Greece. There resulted\nthat struggle against Antipater, known as the Lamian war:[27] a\ngallant struggle, at first promising well, but too soon put down by\nsuperior force, and ending in the occupation of Athens by Antipater\nwith a Macedonian garrison in September, 322 B.C., as well as in the\nextinction of free speech and free citizenship by the suicide of\nDemosthenes and the execution of Hypereides.\n\n[Footnote 26: There remain small fragments of an oration of Demades\nin defence of his administration, or political activity, for twelve\nyears--[Greek: u(pe\\r t\u00ea=s d\u00f4dekaeti/as] (Demad. Fragm. 179, 32). The\ntwelve years of Demades, however, seem to be counted from the battle\nof Ch\u00e6roneia in 338 B.C.; so that they end in B.C. 326. See Clinton,\nFast. Hellen. B.C. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 27: For the account of the Lamian war, see History of\nGreece, ch. xcv. pp. 420-440. As to the **anti-Macedonian sentiment\nprevalent at Athens, see Diodorus, xviii. 10.]\n\nDuring the year immediately succeeding the death of Alexander, the\nanti-Macedonian sentiment continued so vehemently preponderant at\nAthens, that several of the leading citizens, friends of Phokion,\nleft the city to join Antipater, though Phokion himself remained,\nopposing ineffectually the movement. It was during this period that\nthe enemies of Aristotle found a favourable opportunity for assailing\nhim. An indictment on the score of impiety was preferred against him\nby Eurymedon the Hierophant (chief priest of the Eleusinian Demeter),\naided by Demophilus, son of the historian Ephorus. The Hymn or P\u00e6an\n(still existing), which Aristotle had composed in commemoration of\nthe death, and in praise of the character, of the eunuch\nHermeias,[28] was arraigned as a mark of impiety; besides which\nAristotle had erected at Delphi a statue of Hermeias with an\nhonorific inscription, and was even alleged to have offered\nsacrifices to him as to a god. In the published writings of\nAristotle, too, the accusers found various heretical doctrines,\nsuitable for sustaining their indictment; as, for example, the\ndeclaration that prayer and sacrifices to the gods were of no\navail.[29] But there can be little doubt that the Hymn, Ode, or P\u00e6an,\nin honour of Hermeias, would be more offensive to the feelings of an\nordinary Athenian than any philosophical dogma extracted from the\ncautious prose compositions of Aristotle. It is a hymn, of noble\nthought and dignified measure, addressed to Virtue ([Greek:\nA)ret\u00ea\\]--masculine or military Virtue), in which are extolled the\nsemi-divine or heroic persons who had fought, endured, and perished\nin her service. The name and exploits of Hermeias are here introduced\nas the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with H\u00earakl\u00eas,\nthe Diosk\u00fbri, Achilles, and Ajax. Now the poet Kallistratus, in his\nmemorable Skolion, offers a like compliment to Harmodius and\nAristogeiton; and Pindar, to several free Greeks of noble family, who\npaid highly for his epinician Odes now remaining. But all the persons\nthus complimented were such as had gained prizes at the sacred\nfestivals, or had distinguished themselves in other ways which the\npublic were predisposed to honour; whereas Hermeias was a eunuch, who\nbegan by being a slave, and ended by becoming despot over a free\nGrecian community, without any exploit conspicuous to the eye. To\nmany of the Athenian public it would seem insult, and even impiety,\nto couple Hermeias with the greatest personages of Hellenic\nmythology, as a successful competitor for heroic honours. We need\nonly read the invective of Claudian against Eutropius, to appreciate\nthe incredible bitterness of indignation and contempt, which was\nsuggested by the spectacle of a eunuch and a slave exercising high\npublic functions.[30] And the character of a despot was, to the\nanti-macedonizing Athenians, hardly less odious than either of the\nothers combined with it in Hermeias.\n\n[Footnote 28: Diogen. L. v. 5; Athen\u00e6us, xv. 696. The name of\nDemophilus was mentioned by Favorinus as also subscribed to the\nindictment: this Demophilus was probably son of the historian\nEphorus. See Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 582. He took\npart afterwards in the indictment against Phokion. As an historian,\nhe completed the narrative of the Sacred War, which his father\nEphorus had left unfinished (Diodor. xvi. 14). The words of Athen\u00e6us,\nas far as I can understand them, seem to imply that he composed a\nspeech for the Hierophant Eurymedon.]\n\n[Footnote 29: See the passages from Origen advers. Celsum, cited in\nStahr's Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 146.\n\nAmong the titles of the lost works of Aristotle (No. 14 in the\nCatalogue of Diogenes Laertius, No. 9 in that of the Anonymous; see\nRose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 12-18), one is [Greek: Peri\\\nEu)ch\u00ea=s]. From its position in the Catalogue, it seems plainly to\nhave been a dialogue; and the dialogues were the most popular and\nbest-known writings of Aristotle. Now we know from the Nikomach.\nEthica (x. 8, 1178, b. 6-32) that Aristotle declared all constructive\neffort, and all action with a view to external ends, to be\ninconsistent with the Divine Nature, which was blest exclusively in\ntheorizing and contemplation. If he advocated the same doctrine in\nthe dialogue [Greek: Peri\\ Eu)ch\u00ea=s], he must have contended that\npersons praying could have no additional chance of obtaining the\nbenefits which they prayed for; and this would have placed him in\nconflict with the received opinions.\n\nRespecting the dialogue [Greek: Peri\\ Eu)ch\u00ea=s], see Bernays, Die\nDialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 120-122; and Rose, Arist. Pseudepigr.\npp. 67, 68.]\n\n[Footnote 30: \"Omnia cesserunt, eunucho consule, monstra:\" this is\namong the bitter lines of Claudian, too numerous to cite; but they\nwell deserve to be read in the original. Compare also, about the\nancient sentiment towards eunuchs, Herodotus, viii. 106; Xenophon,\nCyrop\u00e6d. viii. 3. 15.\n\nApellikon thought it worth while to compose a special treatise, for\nthe purpose of vindicating Aristotle from the aspersions circulated\nin regard to his relations with Hermeias. Aristokles speaks of the\nvindication as successful (ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 2).]\n\nTaking these particulars into account, we shall see that a charge\nthus sustained, when preferred by a venerable priest, during the\nprevalence of strong anti-Macedonian feeling, against a notorious\nfriend of Antipater and Nikanor, was quite sufficient to alarm the\nprudence of the accused. Aristotle bowed to the storm (if indeed he\nhad not already left Athens, along with other philo-Macedonians) and\nretired to Chalkis (in Euboea),[31] then under garrison by Antipater.\nAn accused person at Athens had always the option of leaving the\ncity, at any time before the day of trial; Sokrates might have\nretired, and obtained personal security in the same manner, if he had\nchosen to do so. Aristotle must have been served, of course, with due\nnotice: and according to Athenian custom, the indictment would be\nbrought into court in his absence, as if he had been present; various\naccusers, among them Demochares,[32] the nephew of Demosthenes, would\nprobably speak in support of it; and Aristotle must been found guilty\nin his absence. But there is no ground for believing that he intended\nto abandon Athens, and live at Chalkis, permanently; the rather,\ninasmuch as he seems to have left not only his school, but his\nlibrary, at Athens under the charge of Theophrastus. Aristotle knew\nthat the Macedonian chiefs would not forego supremacy over Greece\nwithout a struggle; and, being in personal correspondence with\nAntipater himself, he would receive direct assurance of this\nresolution, if assurance were needed. In a question of military\nforce, Aristotle probably felt satisfied that Macedonian arms must\nprevail; after which the affairs of Athens would be again\nadministered, at least in the same spirit, as they had been before\nAlexander's death, if not with more complete servility. He would then\nhave returned thither to resume his school, in competition with that\nof Plato under Xenokrates at the Academy; for he must have been well\naware that the reputation of Athens, as central hearth of Hellenic\nletters and philosophy, could not be transferred to Chalkis or to any\nother city.[33]\n\n[Footnote 31: That Chalkis was among the Grecian towns then occupied\nby a Macedonian garrison is the statement of Brandis (Entwickelungen\nder Griechischen Philosophie, i. p. 391, 1862). Though I find no\ndirect authority for this statement, I adopt it as probable in the\nhighest degree.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristokles (ap. Eusebium Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2) takes notice\nof the allegations of Demochares against Aristotle: That letters of\nAristotle had been detected or captured ([Greek: a(l\u00f4=nai]), giving\ninformation injurious to Athens: That Aristotle had betrayed Stageira\nto Philip: That when Philip, after the capture of Olynthus, was\nselling into slavery the Olynthian prisoners, Aristotle was present\nat the auction ([Greek: e)pi\\ tou= laphurop\u00f4lei/ou]), and pointed out\nto him which among the prisoners were men of the largest property.\n\nWe do not know upon what foundation of fact (if upon any) these\nallegations were advanced by a contemporary orator. But they are\ncurious, as illustrating the view taken of Aristotle by his enemies.\nThey must have been delivered as parts of one of the accusatory\nspeeches on Aristotle's trial _par contumace_: for this was the\nearliest occasion on which Aristotle's enemies had the opportunity of\npublicly proclaiming their antipathy against him, and they would\nhardly omit to avail themselves of it. The Hierophant, the principal\naccuser, would be supported by other speakers following him; just as\nMel\u00eatus, the accuser of Sokrates, was supported by Anytus and Lykon.\nThe [Greek: i(stori/ai] of Demochares were not composed until\nseventeen years after this epoch--certainly not earlier than 306\nB.C.--sixteen years after the death of Aristotle, when his character\nwas not prominently before the public. Nevertheless Demochares may\npossibly have included these accusatory allegations against the\nphilosopher in his [Greek: i(stori/ai], as well as in his published\nspeech. His invectives against Antipater, and the friends of\nAntipater, were numerous and bitter:--Polybius. xii. 13, 9; Cicero,\nBrutus, 83; compare Democharis Fragmenta, in Didot's Fragm.\nHistoricorum Gr\u00e6corum, vol. ii. p. 448. Phil\u00f4n, who indicted\nSophokles (under the [Greek: graph\u00ea\\ parano/m\u00f4n]) for the law which\nthe latter had proposed in 306 B.C. against the philosophers at\nAthens, had been a friend of Aristotle, [Greek: A)ristote/lous\ngn\u00f4/rimos]. Athen\u00e6us, xiii. 610.]\n\n[Footnote 33: We may apply here the same remark that Dionysius makes\nabout Deinarchus as a speech-maker; when Deinarchus retired to\nChalkis, no one would send to Chalkis for a speech: [Greek: Ou) ga\\r\nei)s Chalki/da a)/n tines e)/pleon lo/g\u00f4n cha/rin, \u00ea)\\ i)di/\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\\nd\u00eamosi/\u00f4n; ou) ga\\r te/leon \u00ea)po/roun ou(/t\u00f4 lo/g\u00f4n.] Dionys. Halic.\nDinar. p. 639.]\n\nThis is what would probably have occurred, when the Lamian war was\nfinished and the Macedonian garrison installed at Athens, in Sept.\n322 B.C.--had Aristotle's life lasted longer. But in or about that\nvery period, a little before the death of Demosthenes, he died at\nChalkis of illness; having for some time been troubled with\nindigestion and weakness of stomach.[34] The assertion of Eum\u00ealus and\nothers that he took poison, appears a mere fiction suggested by the\nanalogy of Sokrates.[35] One of his latest compositions was a defence\nof himself against the charge of impiety, and against the allegations\nof his accusers (as reported to him, or published) in support of it.\nA sentence of this defence remains,[36] wherein he points out the\ninconsistency of his accusers in affirming that he intended to honour\nHermeias as an immortal, while he had notoriously erected a tomb, and\nhad celebrated funeral ceremonies to him as a mortal. And in a letter\nto Antipater, he said (among other things) that Athens was a\ndesirable residence, but that the prevalence of sycophancy or false\naccusation was a sad drawback to its value; moreover that he had\nretired to Chalkis, in order that the Athenians might not have the\nopportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy, as they had\nalready done once, in the person of Sokrates.[37] In the same or\nanother letter to Antipater, he adverted to an honorific tribute\nwhich had been voted to him at Delphi before the death of Alexander,\nbut the vote for which had been since rescinded. He intimated that\nthis disappointment was not indifferent to him, yet at the same time\nno serious annoyance.[38]\n\n[Footnote 34: Censorinus, De Die Natali--M\u00e9nage ad Diogen. Laert. v.\n16.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Diogenes L. however (v. 8) gave credit to this story,\nas we may see by his Epigram.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Athen\u00e6us xv. p. 696, 697. Probably this reply of\nAristotle (though Zeller, p. 33, declares it to be spurious, in my\njudgment very gratuitously), may have been suited to the words of the\nspeech (not preserved to us) which it was intended to answer. But the\nreply does not meet what I conceive to have been the real feeling in\nthe minds of those who originated the charge. The logical\ninconsistency which he points out did not appear an inconsistency to\nGreeks generally. Aristotle had rendered to the deceased Hermeias the\nsame honours (though less magnificent in degree) as Alexander to the\ndeceased Heph\u00e6stion, and the Amphipolitans to the deceased Brasidas\n(Thucyd. v. 11; Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. v. 7. 1). In both these\ncases a tomb was erected to the deceased, implying mortality; and\npermanent sacrifices were offered to him, implying immortality: yet\nthese two proceedings did not appear to involve any logical\ncontradiction, in the eyes of the worshippers. That which offended\nthe Athenians, really, in the case of Aristotle, was the\nworthlessness of Hermeias, to whom he rendered these prodigious\nhonours--eunuch, slave, and despot; an assemblage of what they\nconsidered mean attributes. The solemn measure and character of a\nP\u00e6an was disgraced by being applied to such a vile person.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ammonius, Vit. Aristotelis, p. 48, in Buhle's Aristot.\nvol. i.; M\u00e9nage ad Diog. Laert. v. 5, with the passage from Origen\n(adv. Celsum) there cited; \u00c6lian, V. H. iii. 36.\n\nWe learn from Diogenes that Theophrastus was indicted for impiety by\nAgnonides; but such was the esteem in which Theophrastus was held,\nthat the indictment utterly failed; and Agnonides was very near\nincurring the fine which every accuser had to pay, if he did not\nobtain one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts (Diog. L. v. 37).\nNow Agnonides comes forward principally as the vehement accuser of\nPhokion four years after the death of Aristotle, during the few\nmonths of democratical reaction brought about by the edicts and\ninterference of Polysperchon (318 B.C.) after the death of Antipater\n(History of Greece, ch. xcvi. p. 477). Agnonides must have felt\nhimself encouraged by what had happened five years before with\nAristotle, to think that he would succeed in a similar charge against\nTheophrastus. But Theophrastus was personally esteemed; he was not\nintimately allied with Antipater, or directly protected by him;\nmoreover, he had composed no hymn to a person like Hermeias.\nAccordingly, the indictment recoiled upon the accuser himself.]\n\n[Footnote 38: \u00c6lian, V. H. xiv. 1. [Greek: A)ristote/l\u00eas, e)pei/ tis\nau)tou= a)phei/leto ta\\s ps\u00eaphisthei/sas e)n Delphoi=s tima/s,\ne)piste/ll\u00f4n pro\\s A)nti/patron peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n, ph\u00easi/n--U(pe\\r t\u00f4=n\ne)n Delphoi=s ps\u00eaphisthe/nt\u00f4n moi, kai\\ \u00f4(=n a)ph\u00ea/|r\u00eamai nu=n,\nou(/t\u00f4s e)/ch\u00f4 \u00f4(s m\u00ea/te moi spho/dra me/lein au)t\u00f4=n, m\u00ea/te moi\nm\u00eade\\n me/lein.] The statue of Aristotle at Athens was before the\neyes of Alexander of Aphrodisias about A.D. 200. See Zumpt,\nScholarchen zu Athen, p. 74.]\n\nIn regard to the person and habits of Aristotle, we are informed that\nhe had thin legs and small eyes; that in speech he was somewhat\nlisping; that his attire was elegant and even showy; that his table\nwas well-served--according to his enemies, luxurious above the\nmeasure of philosophy. His pleasing and persuasive manners are\nespecially attested by Antipater, in a letter, apparently of marked\nsympathy and esteem, written shortly after the philosopher's\ndeath.[39] He was deeply attached to his wife Pythias, by whom he had\na daughter who bore the same name. His wife having died after some\nyears, he then re-married with a woman of Stageira, named Herpyllis,\nwho bore him a son called Nikomachus. Herpyllis lived with him until\nhis death; and the constant as well as reciprocal attachment between\nthem is attested by his last will.[40] At the time of his death, his\ndaughter Pythias had not yet attained marriageable age; Nikomachus\nwas probably a child.\n\n[Footnote 39: Plutarch--Alkibiad. et Coriolan. Comp. c. 3; Aristeid.\ncum Caton. maj. Comp. c. 2. The accusation of luxury and dainty\nfeeding was urged against him by his contemporary assailant\nKephisodorus (Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xv. 2); according to some statements,\nby Plato also, \u00c6lian, V. H. iii. 19. Contrast the epigram of the\ncontemporary poet Theokritus of Chios, who censures Aristotle [Greek:\ndia\\ t\u00ea\\n a)krat\u00ea= gastro\\s phu/sin], with the satirical drama of the\npoet Lykophron (ap. Athen\u00e6um, ii. p. 55), in which he derided the\nsuppers of philosophers, for their coarse and unattractive food:\ncompare the verses of Antiphanes, ap. Athen\u00e6. iii. p. 98 F.; and\nDiog. L. vii. 27; Tim\u00e6us ap. Athen\u00e6um, viii. 342. The lines of\nAntiphanes ap. Athen\u00e6. iv. 1346, seem to apply to Aristotle,\nnotwithstanding Meineke's remarks, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Diog. L. v. 1, 13; Aristokles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv.\n2.]\n\nThe will or testament of the philosopher is preserved.[41] Its first\nwords constitute Antipater his general executor in the most\ncomprehensive terms,[42] words well calculated to ensure that his\ndirections should be really carried into effect; since not only was\nAntipater now the supreme potentate, but Nikanor, the chief\nbeneficiary under the will, was in his service and dependent on his\norders. Aristotle then proceeds to declare that Nikanor shall become\nhis son-in-law, by marriage with his daughter Pythias as soon as she\nshall attain suitable age; also, his general heir, subject to certain\nparticular bequests and directions, and the guardian of his infant\nson Nikomachus. Nikanor being at that time on service, and perhaps in\nAsia, Aristotle directs that four friends (named Aristomenes,\nTimarchus, Hipparchus, Diotel\u00eas) shall take provisional care of\nHerpyllis, his two children, and his effects, until Nikanor can\nappear and act: Theophrastus is to be conjoined with these four if he\nchooses, and if circumstances permit him.[43] The daughter Pythias,\nwhen she attains suitable age, is to become the wife of Nikanor, who\nwill take the best care both of her and her son Nikomachus, being in\nthe joint relation of father and brother to them.[44] If Pythias\nshall die, either before the marriage or after it, but without\nleaving offspring, Nikanor shall have discretion to make such\narrangements as may be honourable both for himself and for the\ntestator respecting Nikomachus and the estate generally. In case of\nthe death of Nikanor himself, either before the marriage or without\noffspring, any directions given by him shall be observed; but\nTheophrastus shall be entitled, if he chooses, to become the husband\nof Pythias, and if Theophrastus does not choose, then the executors\nalong with Antipater shall determine what they think best both for\nher and for Nikomachus.[45] The will then proceeds as follows:--\"The\nexecutors (here Antipater is not called in to co-operate) with\nNikanor, in faithful memory of me and of the steady affection of\nHerpyllis towards me, shall take good care of her in every way, but\nespecially if she desires to be married, in giving her away to one\nnot unworthy of me. They shall assign to her, besides what she has\nalready received, a talent of silver, and three female slaves chosen\nby herself, out of the property, together with the young girl and the\nPyrrh\u00e6an slave now attached to her person. If she prefers to reside\nat Chalkis, she may occupy the lodging near the garden; if at\nStageira, she may live at my paternal house. Whichever of the two she\nmay prefer, the executors shall provide it with all such articles of\nfurniture as they deem sufficient for her comfort and dignity.\"[46]\n\n[Footnote 41: Diog. L. v. 11. [Greek: E)/stai men eu)=; e)a\\n de/ ti\nsumbai/n\u00ea|, ta/de die/theto A)ristote/l\u00eas; e)pi/tropon me\\n ei)=nai\npa/nt\u00f4n kai\\ dia\\ panto\\s A)nti/patron], &c. The testament of\nAristotle was known to Hermippus (Athen\u00e6us, xiii. p. 589) about a\ncentury later than Aristotle, and the most ancient known authority\nrespecting the facts of his life. Stahr (Aristotelia, vol. i. 159)\nand Brandis (Arist. p. 62) suppose that what Diogenes gives is only\nan extract from the will; since nothing is said about the library,\nand Aristotle would not omit to direct what should be done with a\nlibrary which he so much valued. But to this I reply, that there was\nno necessity for his making any provision about the library; he had\nleft it at Athens along with his school, in the care of Theophrastus.\nHe wished it to remain there, and probably considered it as an\nappendage to the school; and it naturally would remain there, if he\nsaid nothing about it in his testament. We must remember (as I have\nalready intimated) that when Aristotle left Athens, he only\ncontemplated being absent for a time; and intended to come back and\nresume his school, when Macedonian supremacy should be\nre-established.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) describes a statue of Aristotle\nwhich he saw at Olympia: the fact by which Aristotle was best known\nboth to him and to the guides, seems to have been the friendship\nfirst of Alexander, next of Antipater.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: e(/\u00f4s d' a)\\n Nika/n\u00f4r\nkatala/b\u00ea|, e)pimelei=sthai A)ristome/n\u00ean, Ti/marchon, I(/pparchon,\nDiote/l\u00ean, Theo/phraston, e)a\\n bou/l\u00eatai kai\\ e)nde/ch\u00eatai au)t\u00f4=|,\nt\u00f4=n te paidi/\u00f4n kai\\ E(rpulli/dos kai\\ t\u00f4=n kataleleimme/n\u00f4n.] The\nfour persons here named were probably present at Chalkis, so that\nAristotle could count upon them; but at the time when this will was\nmade, Theophrastus was at Athens, conducting the Aristotelian school;\nand in the critical condition of Grecian politics, there was room for\ndoubt how far he could securely or prudently act in this matter.\n\nThe words of Diogenes--[Greek: e(/\u00f4s d' a)\\n Nika/n\u00f4r\nkatala/b\u00ea|]--are rendered in the improved translation of the edition\nby Firmin Didot, \"_quoad vero Nicanor adolescat,\" &c. I cannot think\nthis a correct understanding, either of the words or of the fact.\nNikanor was not a minor under age, but an officer on active service.\nThe translation given by M\u00e9nage appears to me more true--\"_tantisper\ndum redux sit Nicanor:_\" (ad. D. L. v. 12.)]\n\n[Footnote 44: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: \u00f4(s kai\\ pat\u00ea\\r \u00f4)\\n kai\\\na)delpho/s].]\n\n[Footnote 45: Diog. L. v. 13. In following the phraseology of this\ntestament, we remark that when Aristotle makes allusion to these\ninauspicious possibilities--the death of Nikanor or of Pythias, he\nannexes to them a deprecatory phrase: [Greek: e)a\\n de\\ t\u00ea=| paidi\\\nsumb\u00ea=|--o(\\ m\u00ea\\ ge/noito ou)de\\ e)/stai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Diog. L. v. 14. [Greek: kai\\ e)a\\n me\\n e)n Chalki/di\nbou/l\u00eatai oi)kei=n, to\\n xen\u00f4=na to\\n pro\\s t\u00f4=| k\u00ea/p\u00f4|; e)a\\n de\\\ne)n Stagei/rois, t\u00ea\\n patr\u00f4/|an oi)ki/an.] The \"lodging near the\ngarden\" may probably have been the residence occupied by Aristotle\nhimself, during his temporary residence at Chalkis. The mention of\nhis paternal house, which he still possessed at Stageira, seems to\nimply that Philip, when he destroyed that town, respected the house\ntherein which had belonged to his father's physician.\n\nWe find in the will of Theophrastus (Diog. L. v. 52) mention made of\na property ([Greek: ch\u00f4ri/on]) at Stageira belonging to Theophrastus,\nwhich he bequeaths to Kallinus. Probably this is the same property\nwhich had once belonged to Aristotle; for I do not see how else\nTheophrastus (who was a native of Eresus in Lesbos) could have become\npossessed of property at Stageira.]\n\nAristotle proceeds to direct that Nikanor shall make comfortable\nprovision for several persons mentioned by name, male and female,\nmost of them slaves, but one (Myrmex), seemingly, a free boarder or\npupil, whose property he had undertaken to manage. Two or three of\nthese slaves are ordered to be liberated, and to receive presents, as\nsoon as his daughter Pythias shall be married. He strictly enjoins\nthat not one of the youthful slaves who attended him shall be sold.\nThey are to be brought up and kept in employment; when of mature age,\nthey are to be liberated according as they shew themselves\nworthy.[47]\n\n[Footnote 47: Diog. L. v. 15. [Greek: m\u00ea\\ p\u00f4lei=n de\\ t\u00f4=n pai/d\u00f4n\nm\u00eade/na t\u00f4=n e)me\\ therapeuo/nt\u00f4n, **a)lla\\ chr\u00ea=sthai au)toi=s;\no(/tan d' e)n \u00ea(liki/a| ge/n\u00f4ntai, e)leuthe/rous a)phei=nai kat'\na)xi/an.]]\n\nAristotle had in his lifetime ordered, from a sculptor named\nGryllion, busts of Nikanor and of the mother of Nikanor; he intended\nfarther to order from the same sculptor a bust of Proxenus, Nikanor's\nfather. Nikanor is instructed by the will to complete these orders,\nand to dedicate the busts properly when brought in. A bust of the\nmother of Aristotle is to be dedicated to Demeter at Nemea, or in any\nother place which Nikanor may prefer; another bust of Arimn\u00eastus\n(brother of Aristotle) is to be dedicated as a memento of the same,\nsince he has died childless.[48]\n\n[Footnote 48: Diog. L. v. 15.]\n\nDuring some past danger of Nikanor (we do not know what) Aristotle\nhad made a vow of four marble animal figures, in case the danger were\naverted, to Zeus the Preserver and Ath\u00ean\u00ea the Preserver. Nikanor is\ndirected to fulfil this vow and to dedicate the figures in\nStageira.[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: Diog. L. v. 16. [Greek: a)nathei=nai de\\ kai\\ Nika/nora\ns\u00f4the/nta, \u00ea(\\n eu)ch\u00ea\\n u(pe\\r au)tou= \u00eau)xa/m\u00ean, z\u00f4=|a li/thina\ntetrap\u00ea/ch\u00ea Dii+\\ S\u00f4/t\u00eari kai\\ A)th\u00ea/na| S\u00f4tei/ra| e)n Stagei/rois.]\n\nHere is a vow, made by Aristotle to the gods under some unknown\nprevious emergency, which he orders his executor to fulfil. I presume\nthat the last words of direction given by Sokrates before his death\nto Kriton were of the same nature: \"We owe a cock to \u00c6sculapius: pay\nthe debt, and do not fail.\" (See my preceding work, Plato and the\nother Companions of Sokrates, vol. ii. ch. 23, p. 195.)]\n\nLastly, wherever Aristotle is buried, the bones of his deceased wife\nPythias are to be collected and brought to the same spot, as she had\ncommanded during her lifetime.[50]\n\n[Footnote 50: Diog. L. v. 16.]\n\nThis testament is interesting, as it illustrates the personal\ncircumstances and sentiments of the philosopher, evincing an\naffectionate forethought and solicitude for those who were in\ndomestic relations with him. As far as we can judge, the\nestablishment and property which he left must have been an ample\none.[51] How the provisions of the will were executed, or what became\nof most persons named in it, we do not know, except that Pythias the\ndaughter of Aristotle was married three times: first, to Nikanor\n(according to the will); secondly, to Prokl\u00eas, descendant of\nDemaratus (the king of Sparta formerly banished to Asia) by whom she\nhad two sons, Prokl\u00eas and Demaratus, afterwards pupils in the school\nof Theophrastus; thirdly, to a physician named Metrod\u00f4rus, by whom\nshe had a son named Aristotle.[52]\n\n[Footnote 51: The elder Pliny (H. N. xxxv. 12, 46; compare also\nDiogen. L. v. 1, 16) mentions that in the sale of Aristotle's effects\nby his heirs there were included seventy dishes or pans (_patinas_,\nearthenware). Pliny considered this as a mark of luxurious living;\nsince (according to Fenestella) \"tripatinium appellabatur summam\ncoenarum lautitia.\"]\n\n[Footnote 52: Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, i. p. 271 F. sect.\n258. About the banishment, or rather voluntary exile, of Demaratus to\nAsia, in the reign of Darius I. king of Persia, see Herodot. vi. 70.\nSome towns and lands were assigned to him in \u00c6olis, where Xenophon\nfound his descendant Prokles settled, after the conclusion of the\nCyreian expedition (Xen. Anab. vii. 8, 17).\n\nRespecting this younger Aristotle--son of Metrodorus and grandson of\nthe great philosopher--mention is made in the testament of\nTheophrastus, and directions are given for promoting his improvement\nin philosophy (Diog. La. v. 53). Nikomachus was brought up chiefly by\nTheophrastus, but perished young in battle (Aristokles ap. Euseb.\nPr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2).]\n\nThere existed in antiquity several works, partly by contemporaries\nlike the Megaric Eubulides, partly by subsequent Platonists, in which\nAristotle was reproached with ingratitude to Plato,[53] servility to\nthe Macedonian power, love of costly display and indulgences, &c.\nWhat proportion of truth may lie at the bottom of these charges we do\nnot know enough to determine confidently; but we know that he had\nmany enemies, philosophical as well as political;[54] and controversy\non those grounds (then as now) was rarely kept free from personal\nslander and invective.\n\n[Footnote 53: Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2; Diog. La. ii. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 54: The remarkable passage of Themistius (Orat. xxiii.\np. 346) attests the number and vehemence of these opponents. [Greek:\nK\u00eaphisod\u00f4=rous te kai\\ Eu)bouli/das kai\\ Timai/ous kai\\\nDikaia/rchous, kai\\ stra/ton o(/lon t\u00f4=n e)pitheme/n\u00f4n A)ristote/lei\nt\u00f4=| Stageiri/t\u00ea|, po/t' a)\\n katale/xaimi eu)pet\u00f4=s, \u00f4(=n kai\\\nlo/goi e)xiknou=ntai ei)s to/nde to\\n chro/non, diat\u00earou=ntes t\u00ea\\n\na)pe/chtheian kai\\ philoneiki/an?]]\n\nThe accusation of ingratitude or unbecoming behaviour to Plato is no\nway proved by any evidence now remaining. It seems to have been\nsuggested to the Platonists mainly, if not wholly, by the direct\nrivalry of Aristotle in setting up a second philosophical school at\nAthens, alongside of the Academy; by his independent, self-working,\nphilosophical speculation; and by the often-repeated opposition which\nhe made to some capital doctrines of Plato, especially to the\nso-called Platonic Ideas.[55] Such opposition was indeed expressed,\nas far as we can judge, in terms of respectful courtesy, and\nsometimes even of affectionate regret; examples of which we shall\nhave to notice in going through the Aristotelian writings. Yet some\nPlatonists seem to have thought that direct attack on the master's\ndoctrines was undutiful and ungrateful in the pupil, however\nunexceptionable the language might be. They also thought, probably,\nthat the critic misrepresented what he sought to refute. Whether\nAristotle really believed that he had superior claims to be made\nScholarch of the Platonic school at the death of Plato in 347 B.C.,\nor at the death of Speusippus in 339 B.C., is a point which we can\nneither affirm nor deny. But we can easily understand that the act of\nsetting up a new philosophical school at Athens, though perfectly\nfair and admissible on his part, was a hostile competition sure both\nto damage and offend the pre-established school, and likely enough to\nbe resented with unbecoming asperity. Ingratitude towards the great\ncommon master Plato, with arrogant claims of superiority over\nfellow-pupils, were the allegations which this resentment would\nsuggest, and which many Platonists in the Academy would not scruple\nto advance against their macedonizing rival at the Lykeium.\n\n[Footnote 55: This is what lies at the bottom of the charges advanced\nby Eubulides, probably derived from the Platonists, [Greek: kai\\\nEu)bouli/d\u00eas prod\u00ea/l\u00f4s e)n t\u00f4=| kat' au)tou= bibli/\u00f4| pseu/detai,\npha/sk\u00f4n, teleut\u00f4=nti Pla/t\u00f4ni m\u00ea\\ paragene/sphai, ta/ te bi/blia\nau)tou= diaphthei=rai] (Aristokles ap. Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 2). There\ncan be no possible basis for this last charge--destroying or\ncorrupting the books of Plato--except that Aristotle had sharply\ncriticized them, and was supposed to have mis-stated or unfairly\ndiscredited them.\n\nThe frequently recurring protest of Aristotle against the Platonic\ndoctrine of Ideas may be read now in the Analytica, Topica,\nMetaphysica, and Ethica Nikomachea, but was introduced even in the\nlost Dialogues. See Plutarch adv. Kol\u00f4ten, c. 14; and Proklus adv.\nJoann. Philoponum ap. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, not. 22,\np. 151.]\n\nSuch allegations moreover would find easy credence from other men of\nletters, whose enmity Aristotle had incurred, and to a certain extent\neven provoked--Isokrates and his numerous disciples.\n\nThis celebrated rhetor was an elderly man at the zenith of his glory\nand influence, during those earlier years which Aristotle passed at\nAthens before the decease of Plato. The Isokratean school was then\nthe first in Greece, frequented by the most promising pupils from\ncities near and far, perhaps even by Aristotle himself. The political\nviews and handling, as well as the rhetorical style of which the\nmaster set the example, found many imitators. Illustrious statesmen,\nspeakers, and writers traced their improvement to this teaching. So\nmany of the pupils, indeed, acquired celebrity--among them\nTheodekt\u00eas, Theopompus, Ephorus, Naukrates, Philiskus, Kephisod\u00f4rus,\nand others--that Hermippus[56] thought it worth his while to draw up\na catalogue of them: many must have been persons of opulent family,\nhighly valuing the benefit received from Isokrates, since each of\nthem was required to pay to him a fee of 1000 drachm\u00e6.[57] During the\nfirst sojourn of Aristotle in Athens (362-347 B.C.), while he was\nstill attached to and receiving instruction from Plato, he appears to\nhave devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy, and even to\nhave given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric. He thus entered\ninto rivalry with Isokrates, for whom, as a teacher and author, he\ncontracted dislike or contempt.\n\n[Footnote 56: Athen\u00e6us x. p. 451; Dionys. Hal., De Is\u00e6o Judic. pp.\n588, 625. [Greek: ou)de\\ ga\\r o( tou\\s I)sokra/tous math\u00eata\\s\na)nagra/phas E(/rmippos, a)krib\u00ea\\s e)n toi=s a)/llois geno/menos,\nu(pe\\r tou=de tou= r(\u00ea/toros ou)de\\n ei)/r\u00eaken, e)/x\u00f4 duoi=n\ntou/toin, o(/ti di\u00ea/kouse me\\n I)sokra/tous, kath\u00eag\u00ea/sato de\\\nD\u00eamosthe/nous, sunege/neto de\\ toi=s a)ri/stois t\u00f4=n philoso/ph\u00f4n.]\nSee Hermippi Fragmenta ed. Lozinski, Bonn, 1832, pp. 42-43. Cicero,\nDe Oratore, ii. 22, 94. \"Ecce tibi exortus est Isocrates, magister\nistorum omnium, cujus \u00e8 ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes\nexierunt: sed eorum partim in pomp\u00e2, partim in acie, illustres esse\nvoluerunt. Atqui et illi--Theopompi, Ephori, Philiski, Naucrat\u00e6,\nmultique alii--ingeniis differunt,\" &c. Compare also Cicero, Brutus,\n8, 32; and Dionys. Hal., De Isocrate Judicium, p. 536. [Greek:\ne)piphane/statos de\\ geno/menos t\u00f4=n kata\\ to\\n aou)to\\n a)kmasa/nt\u00f4n\nchro/non, kai\\ tou\\s krati/stous t\u00f4=n e)n A)th\u00ea/n\u00ea|si/ te kai\\ e)n\nt\u00ea=| a)/ll\u00ea| E(lla/di ne/\u00f4n paideu/sas; \u00f4(=n oi( me\\n e)n toi=s\ndikanikoi=s e)ge/nonto a)/ristoi lo/gois, oi( d' e)n t\u00f4=|\npoliteu/esthai kai\\ ta\\ koina\\ pra/ttein di\u00eanegkan, kai\\ a)/lloi de\\\nta\\s koina\\s t\u00f4=n e(ll\u00ea/n\u00f4n te kai\\ barba/r\u00f4n pra/xeis a)ne/grapsan],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 57: See Demosthenes, adv. Lakritum, pp. 928, 938. Lakritus\nwas a citizen of Phas\u00ealis--[Greek: me/ga pra=gma, I)sokra/tous\nmath\u00eat\u00ea/s]. To have gone through a course of teaching from Isokrates,\nwas evidently considered as a distinction of some importance.]\n\nThe composition of Isokrates was extremely elegant: his structure of\nsentences was elaborate even to excess, his arrangement of words\nrhythmical, his phrases nicely balanced in antithetical equipoise,\nlike those of his master Gorgias; the recital of his discourses\nproved highly captivating to the ear.[58] Moreover, he had composed a\nbook of rhetorical precepts known and esteemed by Cicero and\nQuintilian. Besides such technical excellence, Isokrates strove to\nattain, and to a certain extent actually attained, a higher order of\nmerit. He familiarized his pupils with thoughts and arguments of\nlofty bearing and comprehensive interest; not assisting them to gain\nvictory either in any real issue tried before the Dikasts, or in any\nexpress motion about to be voted on by the public assembly, but\npredisposing their minds to prize above all things the great\nPan-hellenic aggregate--its independence in regard to external force,\nand internal harmony among its constituent cities, with a reasonable\nrecognition of presidential authority, equitably divided between\nAthens and Sparta, and exercised with moderation by both. He\ninculcated sober habits and deference to legal authority on the part\nof the democrats of Athens; he impressed upon princes, like Philip\nand Nikokles, the importance of just and mild bearing towards\nsubjects.[59] Such is the general strain of the discourses which we\nnow possess from Isokrates; though he appears to have adopted it only\nin middle life, having begun at first in the more usual track of the\nlogographer--composing speeches to be delivered before the Dikastery\nby actual plaintiffs or defendants,[60] and acquiring thus both\nreputation and profit. His reputation as a teacher was not only\nmaintained but even increased when he altered his style; and he made\nhimself peculiarly attractive to foreign pupils who desired to\nacquire a command of graceful expressions, without special reference\nto the Athenian Assembly and Dikastery. But his new style being\nmidway between Demosthenes and Plato--between the practical advocate\nand politician on one side, and the generalizing or speculative\nphilosopher on the other--he incurred as a semi-philosopher,\nprofessing to have discovered the _juste milieu_, more or less of\ndisparagement from both extremes;[61] and Aristotle, while yet a\nyoung man in the Platonic school, raised an ardent controversy\nagainst his works, on the ground both of composition and teaching.\nThough the whole controversy is now lost, there is good ground for\nbelieving that Aristotle must have displayed no small acrimony. He\nappears to have impugned the Isokratean discourses, partly as\ncontaining improper dogmas, partly as specimens of mere unimpressive\nelegance, intended for show, pomp, and immediate admiration from the\nhearer--_ad implendas aures_--but destitute both of comprehensive\ntheory and of applicability to any useful purpose.[62] Kephisod\u00f4rus,\nan intimate friend and pupil of Isokrates, defended him in an express\nreply, attacking both Aristotle the scholar and Plato the master.\nThis reply was in four books, and Dionysius characterizes it by an\nepithet of the highest praise.[63]\n\n[Footnote 58: Dionysius, while admiring Isocrates, complains of him,\nand complains still more of his imitators, as somewhat monotonous,\nwanting in flexibility and variety (De Compos. Verborum, p. 134). Yet\nhe pronounces Isokrates and Lysias to be more natural, shewing less\nof craft and art than Is\u00e6us and Demosthenes (De Is\u00e6o Judicium, p.\n592). Isokrates [Greek: to\\n o)/gkon t\u00ea=s poi\u00eatik\u00ea=s kataskeu\u00ea=s\ne)pi\\ lo/gous \u00ea)/gage philoso/phous, z\u00eal\u00f4/sas tou\\s peri\\ Forgi/an.]\n(Dionys. Hal. ad Pompeium de Platone, p. 764; also De Is\u00e6o Judicium,\np. 592; besides the special chapter, p. 534, seq., which he has\ndevoted to Isokrates.)\n\nCicero, De Oratore, iii. 44, 173: \"Idque princeps Isocrates\ninstituisse fertur, ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem\ndelectationis atque aurium caus\u00e2, quemadmodum scribit discipulus ejus\nNaucrates, numeris adstringeret.\" Compare Cicero, Orator. 52, 175,\n176.\n\nThe reference to Naucrates (whose works have not been preserved,\nthough Dionysius commends his [Greek: Lo/gos E)pita/phios], Ars.\nRhet. p. 259) is interesting, as it shews what was said of Isokrates\nby his own disciples. Cicero says of the doctrines in his own\ndialogue De Oratore (Epist. ad Famil. i. 9, 23), \"Abhorrent a\ncommunibus pr\u00e6ceptis, et omnem antiquorum, et _Aristoteleam et\nIsocrateam_, rationem oratoriam complectuntur.\" About the [Greek:\nTe/chn\u00ea] of Isokrates, see Spengel, [Greek: Sunag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ Techn\u00f4=n]\n(Munich), pp. 155-170.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Dionysius Hal. dwells emphatically on the lofty\nmorality inculcated in the discourses of Isokrates, and recommends\nthem as most improving study to all politicians (De Isocrate Judic.\npp. 536, 544, 555, seq.)--more improving than the writers purely\ntheoretical, among whom he probably numbered Plato and Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Dionysius Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, pp. 576, 577,\nReiske: [Greek: de/smas pa/nu polla\\s dikanik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n I)sokratei/\u00f4n\nperiphe/resthai/ ph\u00easin u(po\\ t\u00f4=n bibliop\u00f4l\u00f4=n A)ristote/l\u00eas.] It\nappears that Aphareus, the adopted son of Isokrates, denied that\nIsokrates had ever written any judicial orations; while Kephisod\u00f4rus,\nthe disciple of Isokrates, in his reply to Aristotle's accusations,\nadmitted that Isokrates had composed a few, but only a few. Dionysius\naccepts the allegation of Kephisod\u00f4rus and discredits that of\nAristotle: I, for my part, believe the allegation of Aristotle, upon\na matter of fact which he had the means of knowing. Cicero also\naffirms (Brutus, xii. 46-48), on the authority of Aristotle, that\nIsokrates distinguished himself at first as a composer of speeches\nintended to be delivered by actual pleaders in the Dikastery or\nEkklesia; and that he afterwards altered his style. And this is what\nAristotle says (respecting Isokrates) in Rhetoric. i. 9, 1368, a. 20,\n[Greek: o(/per I)sokra/t\u00eas e)poi/ei dia\\ t\u00ea\\n sun\u00ea/theian tou=\ndikologei=n], where Bekker has altered the substantive to [Greek:\nt\u00ea\\n a)sun\u00ea/theian]; in my judgment, not wisely. I do not perceive\nthe meaning or pertinence of [Greek: a)sun\u00ea/theian] in that\nsentence.]\n\n[Footnote 61: See Plato, Euthydemus, p. 305; also 'Plato and the\nOther Companions of Sokrates,' vol. i. ch. xix. pp. 557-563.\n\nIt is exactly this _juste milieu_ which Dionysius Hal. extols as the\nmost worthy of being followed, as being [Greek: \u00ea( a)l\u00eathin\u00ea\\\nphilosophi/a]. De Isocrate Jud. pp. 543, 558.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141. \"Itaque ipse\nAristoteles quum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret,\nquod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad\ninanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam\nformam prope disciplin\u00e6 su\u00e6, versumque quendam Philoctet\u00e6 paulo secus\ndixit. Ille enim 'turpe sibi ait esse tacere, quum barbaros'--hic\nautem, 'quum Isocratem'--'pateretur dicere'\" See **Quintilian, Inst.\nOr. iv. 2, 196; and Cicero, Orator. 19, 62: \"Aristoteles Isocratem\nipsum lacessivit.\" Also, ib. 51, 172: \"Omitto Isocratem discipulosque\nejus Ephorum et Naucratem; quanquam orationis faciend\u00e6 et ornand\u00e6\nauctores locupletissimi summi ipsi oratores esse debebant. Sed quis\nomnium doctior, quis acutior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel\njudicandis acrior Aristotele fuit? _Quis porro Isocrati adversatus\nest infensius?_\" That Aristotle was the first to assail Isokrates,\nand that Kephisod\u00f4rus wrote only in reply, is expressly stated by\nNumenius, ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6: [Greek: o( K\u00eaphiso/d\u00f4ros,\ne)peid\u00ea\\ u(p' A)ristote/lous ballo/menon e(aut\u00f4=| to\\n dida/skalon\nI)sokra/t\u00ean e(\u00f4/ra], &c. Quintilian also says, Inst. Or. iii. 1, p.\n126: \"Nam et Isocratis pr\u00e6stantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni\nstudiorum genere; eoque jam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum\nimplevit annum) pomeridianis scholis Aristoteles pr\u00e6cipere artem\noratoriam coepit; noto quidem illo (ut traditur) versu ex Philoctet\u00e2\n_frequenter usus_: [Greek: Ai)schro\\n si\u00f4pa=|n me/n, kai\\ I)sokra/t\u00ean\ne)a=|n le/gein].\"\n\nDiogenes La. (v. 3) maintains that Aristotle turned the parody not\nagainst _Isokrates_, but against _Xenokrates_: [Greek: Ai)schro\\n\nsi\u00f4pa=|n, Xenokra/t\u00ean d' e)a=|n le/gein]. But the authority of Cicero\nand Quintilian is decidedly preferable. When we recollect that the\nparody was employed by a young man, as yet little known, against a\nteacher advanced in age, and greatly frequented as well as admired by\npupils, it will appear sufficiently offensive. Moreover, it does not\nseem at all pertinent; for the defects of Isokrates, however great\nthey may have been, were not those of analogy with [Greek:\nba/rbaroi], but the direct reverse. Dionysius must have been forcibly\nstruck with the bitter _animus_ displayed by Aristotle against\nIsokrates, when he makes it a reason for rejecting the explicit\naverment of Aristotle as to a matter of fact: [Greek: kai\\ ou)/t'\nA)ristote/lei pei/thomai _r(upai/nein to\\n a)/ndra boulome/n\u00f4|_] (De\nIsocr. Jud. p. 577).\n\nMr. Cope, in his Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (p. 39, seq.),\ngives a just representation of the probable relations between\nAristotle and Isokrates; though I do not concur in the unfavourable\nopinion which he expresses about \"the malignant influence exercised\nby Isokrates upon education in general\" (p. 40). Mr. Cope at the same\ntime remarks, that \"Aristotle in the Rhetorica draws a greater number\nof illustrations of excellences of style from Isokrates than from any\nother author\" (p. 41); and he adds, very truly, that the absence of\nany evidence of ill feeling towards Isokrates in Aristotle's later\nwork, and the existence of such ill feeling as an actual fact at an\nearlier period, are perfectly reconcileable in themselves (p. 42).\n\nThat the Rhetorica of Aristotle which we now possess is a work of his\nlater age, certainly published, perhaps composed, during his second\nresidence at Athens, I hold with Mr. Cope and other antecedent\ncritics.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Athen\u00e6us, ii. 60, iii. 122; Euseb. Pr. E. xiv. 6;\nDionys. H. de Isocrate Judic. p. 577: [Greek: i(kano\\n \u00ea(g\u00easa/menos\nei)=nai t\u00ea=s a)l\u00eathei/as bebai\u00f4t\u00ea\\n to\\n A)th\u00eanai=on K\u00eaphiso/d\u00f4ron,\no(\\s kai\\ sunebi/\u00f4sen I)sokra/tei, kai\\ gn\u00easi\u00f4/tatos a)koust\u00ea\\s\ne)ge/neto, kai\\ t\u00ea\\n a)pologi/an t\u00ea\\n pa/nu thaumast\u00ea\\n e)n tai=s\npro\\s A)ristote/l\u00ea a)ntigraphai=s e)poi\u00ea/sato], &C. Kephisod\u00f4rus, in\nthis defence, contended that you might pick out, even from the very\nbest poets and sophists, [Greek: e(\\n \u00ea)\\ du/o pon\u00ear\u00f4=s ei)r\u00eame/na].\nThis implies that Aristotle, in attacking Isokrates, had cited\nvarious extracts which he denounced as exceptionable.]\n\nThese polemics of Aristotle were begun during his first residence at\nAthens, prior to 347 B.C., the year of Plato's decease, and at the\ntime when he was still accounted a member of the Platonic school.\nThey exemplify the rivalry between that school and the Isokratean,\nwhich were then the two competing places of education at Athens: and\nwe learn that Aristotle, at that time only a half-fledged Platonist,\nopened on his own account not a new philosophical school in\ncompetition with Plato, as some state, but a new rhetorical school in\nopposition to Isokrates.[63] But the case was different at the latter\nepoch, 335 B.C., when Aristotle came to reside at Athens for the\nsecond time. Isokrates was then dead, leaving no successor, so that\nhis rhetorical school expired with him. Aristotle preferred\nphilosophy to rhetoric: he was no longer trammelled by the living\npresence and authority of Plato. The Platonic school at the Academy\nstood at that time alone, under Xenokrates, who, though an earnest\nand dignified philosopher, was deficient in grace and in\npersuasiveness, and had been criticized for this defect even by Plato\nhimself. Aristotle possessed those gifts in large measure, as we know\nfrom the testimony of Antipater. By these circumstances, coupled with\nhis own established reputation and well-grounded self-esteem, he was\nencouraged to commence a new philosophical school; a school, in which\nphilosophy formed the express subject of the morning lecture, while\nrhetoric was included as one among the subjects of more varied and\npopular instruction given in the afternoon.[64] During the twelve\nensuing years, Aristotle's rivalry was mainly against the Platonists\nor Xenokrateans at the Academy; embittered on both sides by\nacrimonious feelings, which these expressed by complaining of his\ningratitude and unfairness towards the common master, Plato.\n\n[Footnote 64: That Aristotle had a school at Athens before the death\nof Plato we may see by what Strabo (xiii. 610) says about Hermeias:\n[Greek: geno/menos d' A)th\u00ea/n\u00ea|sin \u00ea)kroa/sato kai\\ Pla/t\u00f4nos kai\\\nA)ristote/lous]. Compare Cicero, Orator. 46; also Michelet, Essai sur\nla M\u00e9taphys. d'Aristote, p. 227. The statement that Aristotle during\nPlato's lifetime tried to set up a rival school against him, is\nrepeated by all the biographers, who do not however believe it to be\ntrue, though they cite Aristoxenus as its warrant. I conceive that\nthey have mistaken what Aristoxenus said; and that they have\nconfounded the school which Aristotle first set up as a rhetor,\nagainst Isokrates, with that which he afterwards set up as a\nphilosopher, against Xenokrates.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Aulus Gellius, N. A. xx. 5. Quintilian (see note on p.\n35) puts the rhetorical \"pomeridian\u00e6 schol\u00e6\" within the lifetime of\nIsokrates; but Aristotle did not then lecture on philosophy in the\nmorning.]\n\nThere were thus, at Athens, three distinct parties inspired with\nunfriendly sentiment towards Aristotle: first, the Isokrateans;\nafterwards, the Platonists; along with both, the anti-Macedonian\npoliticians. Hence we can account for what Themistius entitles the\n\"army of assailants\" ([Greek: stra/ton o(/lon]) that fastened upon\nhim, for the unfavourable colouring with which his domestic\ncircumstances are presented, and for the necessity under which he lay\nof Macedonian protection; so that when such protection was nullified,\ngiving place to a reactionary fervour, his residence at Athens became\nboth disagreeable and insecure.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nARISTOTELIAN CANON.\n\n\nIn the fourth and fifth chapters of my work on 'Plato and the Other\nCompanions of Sokrates,' I investigated the question of the Platonic\nCanon, and attempted to determine, upon the best grounds open to us,\nthe question, What are the real works of Plato? I now propose to\ndiscuss the like question respecting Aristotle.\n\nBut the premisses for such a discussion are much less simple in\nregard to Aristotle than in regard to Plato. As far as the testimony\nof antiquity goes, we learn that the Canon of Thrasyllus, dating at\nleast from the time of the Byzantine Aristophanes, and probably from\nan earlier time, was believed by all readers to contain the authentic\nworks of Plato and none others; an assemblage of dialogues, some\nunfinished, but each undivided and unbroken. The only exception to\nunanimity in regard to the Platonic Canon, applies to ten dialogues,\nwhich were received by some (we do not know by how many, or by whom)\nas Platonic, but which, as Diogenes informs us, were rejected by\nagreement of the most known and competent critics. This is as near to\nunanimity as can be expected. The doubts, now so multiplied,\nrespecting the authenticity of various dialogues included in the\nCanon of Thrasyllus, have all originated with modern scholars since\nthe beginning of the present century, or at least since the earlier\ncompositions of Wyttenbach. It was my task to appreciate the value of\nthose doubts; and, in declining to be guided by them, I was at least\nable to consider myself as adhering to the views of all known ancient\ncritics.\n\nVery different is the case when we attempt to frame an Aristotelian\nCanon, comprising all the works of Aristotle and none others. We find\nthe problem far more complicated, and the matters of evidence at once\nmore defective, more uncertain, and more contradictory.\n\nThe different works now remaining, and published in the Berlin\nedition of Aristotle, are forty-six in number. But, among these,\nseveral were disallowed or suspected even by some ancient critics,\nwhile modern critics have extended the like judgment yet farther. Of\nseveral others again, the component sections (either the _books_, in\nour present phraseology, or portions thereof) appear to have existed\nonce as detached rolls, to have become disjointed or even to have\nparted company, and to have been re-arranged or put together into\naggregates, according to the judgment of critics and librarians.\nExamples of such doubtful aggregates, or doubtful arrangements, will\nappear when we review the separate Aristotelian compositions (the\nMetaphysica, Politica, &c.). It is, however, by one or more of these\nforty-six titles that Aristotle is known to modern students, and was\nknown to medi\u00e6val students.\n\nBut the case was very different with ancient _literati_, such as\nEratosthenes, Polybius, Cicero, Strabo, Plutarch, &c., down to the\ntime of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Athen\u00e6us, Diogenes Laertius, &c.,\ntowards the close of the second century after the Christian era. It\nis certain that these ancients perused many works of Aristotle, or\ngenerally recognized as his, which we do not now possess; and among\nthose which we do now possess, there are many which it is not certain\nthat they perused, or even knew.\n\nDiogenes Laertius, after affirming generally that Aristotle had\ncomposed a prodigious number of books ([Greek: pa/mpleista bi/blia]),\nproceeds to say, that, in consequence of the excellence of the author\nin every variety of composition, he thinks it proper to indicate them\nbriefly.[1] He then enumerates one hundred and forty-six distinct\ntitles of works, with the number of books or sections contained in\neach work. The subjects are exceedingly heterogeneous, and the form\nof composition likewise very different; those which come first in the\nlist being Dialogues,[2] while those which come last are Epistles,\nHexameters, and Elegies. At the close of the list we read: \"All of\nthem together are 445,270 lines, and this is the number of books\n(works) composed by Aristotle.\"[3] A little farther on, Diogenes\nadds, as an evidence of the extraordinary diligence and inventive\nforce of Aristotle, that the books (works) enumerated in the\npreceding list were nearly four hundred in number, and that these\nwere not contested by any one; but that there were many other\nwritings, and _dicta_ besides, ascribed to Aristotle--ascribed (we\nmust understand him to mean) erroneously, or at least so as to leave\nmuch doubt.[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Diog. La. v. 21. [Greek: Sune/grapse de\\ pa/mpleista\nbi/blia, a(/per a)ko/louthon \u00ea(g\u00easa/m\u00ean u(pogra/psai, dia\\ t\u00ea\\n peri\\\npa/ntas lo/gous ta)ndro\\s a)ret\u00ea/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Bernays has pointed out (in his valuable treatise, Die\nDialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133) that the first in order, nineteen in\nnumber, among the titles enumerated by Diogenes, designate Dialogues.\nThe longest of them, those which included more than one book or\nsection, are enumerated first of all. Some of the dialogues appear to\nhave coincided, either in title or in subject, with some of the\nPlatonic:--[Greek: Peri\\ Dikaiosu/n\u00eas], in four books (comparable\nwith Plato's Republic); [Greek: Politikou=], in two books; [Greek:\nSophist\u00ea\\s, Mene/xenos, Sumpo/sion], each in one book; all similar in\ntitle to works of Plato; perhaps also another, [Greek: Peri\\\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s \u00ea)\\ Gru/llos], the analogue of Plato's Gorgias.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Diog. La. v. 27. [Greek: gi/gnontai ai( pa=sai muria/des\nsti/ch\u00f4n te/ttares kai\\ tettara/konta pro\\s toi=s pentakischili/ois\nkai\\ diakosi/ois e(bdom\u00ea/konta. Kai\\ tosau=ta me\\n au)t\u00f4=|\npepragma/teutai bi/blia.]]\n\n[Footnote 4: Diog. La. v. 34. Heitz (Die Verlorenen Schriften des\nAristoteles, p. 17) notices, as a fact invalidating the\ntrustworthiness of the catalogue given by Diogenes, that Diogenes, in\nother places, alludes to Aristotelian compositions which are not\nmentioned in his own catalogue. For example, though Diogenes, in the\ncatalogue, allows only five books to the Ethica, yet he himself\nalludes (v. 21) to the seventh book of the Ethica. But this example\ncan hardly be relied upon, because [Greek: e)n t\u00f4=| e(bdo/m\u00f4| t\u00f4=n\n\u00ea)thik\u00f4=n] is only a conjecture of H. Stephens or M\u00e9nage. The only\ncase which Heitz really finds to sustain his remark, is the passage\nof the Prooemium (i. 8), where Diogenes cites Aristotle [Greek: e)n\nt\u00f4=| Magik\u00f4=|], that work not being named in his catalogue. But there\nis another case (not noticed by Heitz) which appears to me still\nstronger. Diogenes cites at length the Hymn or P\u00e6an composed by\nAristotle in honour of Hermeias. Now there is no general head of his\ncatalogue under which this hymn could fall. Here Anonymus (to be\npresently mentioned) has a superiority over Diogenes; for he\nintroduces, towards the close of his catalogue, one general\nhead--[Greek: e)gk\u00f4/mia \u00ea)\\ u(/mnous], which is not to be found in\nDiogenes.]\n\nWe have another distinct enumeration of the titles of Aristotle's\nworks, prepared by an anonymous biographer cited in the notes of\nM\u00e9nage to Diogenes Laertius.[5] This anonymous list contains only one\nhundred and twenty-seven titles, being nineteen less than the list in\nDiogenes. The greater number of titles are the same in both; but\nAnonymus has eight titles which are not found in Diogenes, while\nDiogenes has twenty-seven titles which are not given by Anonymus.\nThere are therefore thirty-five titles which rest on the evidence of\none alone out of the two lists. Anonymus does not specify any total\nnumber of lines; nevertheless he gives the total number of _books_\ncomposed by Aristotle as being nearly four hundred--the same as\nDiogenes. This total number cannot be elicited out of the items\nenumerated by Anonymus; but it may be made to coincide pretty nearly\nwith the items in Diogenes,[6] provided we understand by _books_,\nsections or subdivisions of one and the same title or work.\n\n[Footnote 5: M\u00e9nage ad Diog. tom. ii. p. 201. See the very\ninstructive treatise of Professor Heitz, Die Verlorenen Schriften des\nAristoteles, p. 15 (Leipzig, 1865).]\n\n[Footnote 6: Heitz, Die Verl. Schrift. des Aristot. p. 51. Such\ncoincidence assumes that we reckon the [Greek: Politei=ai] and the\nEpistles each as one book.\n\nI think it unnecessary to transcribe these catalogues of the titles\nof works mostly lost. The reader will find them clearly printed in\nthe learned work of Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp.\n12-20.]\n\nThe two catalogues just mentioned, agreeing as they do in the total\nnumber of books and in the greater part of the items, may probably be\nconsidered not as original and copy, but as inaccurate transcripts\nfrom the same original authority. Yet neither of the two transcribers\ntells us what that original authority was. We may, however, be\ncertain that each of them considered his catalogue to comprehend all\nthat Aristotle could be affirmed on good authority to have published;\nDiogenes plainly signifies thus much, when he gives not only the\ntotal number of books, but the total number of lines. Such being the\ncase, we expect to find in it, of course, the titles of the forty-six\nworks composing the Berlin edition of Aristotle now before us. But\nthis expectation is disappointed. The far greater number of the\nAristotelian works which we now peruse are not specified either in\nthe list of Diogenes, or in that of Anonymus.[7] Moreover, the lists\nalso fail to specify the titles of various works which are not now\nextant, but which we know from Aristotle himself that he really\ncomposed.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Heitz, Verl. Schr. Aristot. p. 18, remarks that \"In\ndiesem Verzeichnisse (that of Diogenes) die bei weitem gr\u00f6sste Zahl\nderjenigen Schriften fehlt, welche wir heute noch besitzen, und die\nwir als den eigentlichen Kern der aristotelischen Lehre enthaltend zu\nbetrachten gewohnt sind.\" Cf. p. 32. Brandis expresses himself\nsubstantially to the same effect (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, pp. 77,\n78, 96); and Zeller also (Gesch. der Phil. 2nd ed. Aristot.\nSchriften, p. 43).]\n\n[Footnote 8: Heitz, Verl. Schr. des Aristoteles, p. 56, seq.]\n\nThe last-mentioned fact is in itself sufficiently strange and\ndifficult to explain, and our difficulty becomes aggravated when we\ncombine it with another fact hardly less surprising. Both Cicero, and\nother writers of the century subsequent to him (Dionysius Hal.,\nQuintilian, &c.), make reference to Aristotle, and especially to his\ndialogues, of which none have been preserved, though the titles of\nseveral are given in the two catalogues mentioned above. These\nwriters bestow much encomium on the style of Aristotle; but what is\nremarkable is, that they ascribe to it attributes which even his\nwarmest admirers will hardly find in the Aristotelian works now\nremaining. Cicero extols the sweetness, the abundance, the variety,\nthe rhetorical force which he discovered in Aristotle's writings: he\neven goes so far as to employ the phrase \"flumen orationis aureum\" (a\ngolden stream of speech), in characterizing the Aristotelian\nstyle.[9] Such predicates may have been correct, indeed were\ndoubtless correct, in regard to the dialogues, and perhaps other lost\nworks of Aristotle; but they describe exactly the opposite[10] of\nwhat we find in all the works preserved. With most of these (except\nthe History of Animals) Cicero manifests no acquaintance; and some of\nthe best modern critics declare him to have been ignorant of\nthem.[11] Nor do other ancient authors, Plutarch, Athen\u00e6us, Diogenes\nLaertius, &c., give evidence of having been acquainted with the\nprincipal works of Aristotle known to us. They make reference only to\nworks enumerated in the Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius.[12]\n\n[Footnote 9: Cicero, Acad. Prior. ii. 38, 119: \"Quum enim tuus iste\nStoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis\naureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat.\" Also Topica,\ni. 3. \"Quibus (_i.e._ those who were ignorant of Aristotle) eo minus\nignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus iis, qu\u00e6 ab illo dict\u00e6 et\ninvent\u00e6 sunt, adlici debuerunt, sed dicendi quoque incredibili qu\u00e2dam\nquum copi\u00e2, tum suavitate.\" Also De Oratore, i. 11, 49; Brutus, 31,\n121; De Nat. Deor. ii. 37; De Inventione, ii. 2; De Finibus, i. 5,\n14; Epistol. ad Atticum, ii. 1, where he speaks of the \"Aristotelia\npigmenta,\" along with the [Greek: muroth\u00ea/kion] of Isokrates.\nDionysius Hal. recommends the style of Aristotle in equal terms of\nadmiration: [Greek: paral\u00eapte/on de\\ kai\\ A)ristote/l\u00ea ei)s mi/m\u00easin\nt\u00ea=s te peri\\ t\u00ea\\n e(rm\u00eanei/an deino/t\u00eatos kai\\ t\u00ea=s saph\u00eanei/as,\nkai\\ tou= \u00ea(de/os kai\\ polumathou=s] (De Veter. Script. Censur\u00e2, p.\n430, R.; De Verb. Copi\u00e2, p. 187). Quintilian extols the \"eloquendi\nsuavitas\" among Aristotle's excellences (Inst. Or. X. i. p. 510).\nDemetrius Phalereus (or the author who bears that title), De\nEloquenti\u00e2, s. 128, commends [Greek: ai( A)ristote/lous cha/rites].\nDavid the Armenian, who speaks of him (having reference to the\ndialogue) as [Greek: A)phrodi/t\u00eas e)nno/mou ge/m\u00f4n] (the correction\nof Bernays, Dial. des Arist. p. 137) [Greek: kai\\ chari/t\u00f4n\na)na/mestos], probably copies the judgment of predecessors (Scholia\nad Categor. p. 26, b. 36, Brandis).\n\nBernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 3-5) points out how little\njustice has been done by modern critics to the literary merits,\nexhibited in the dialogues and other works now lost, of one whom _we_\nknow only as a \"dornichten und wortkargen Systematiker.\"]\n\n[Footnote 10: This opinion is insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la\nM\u00e9taphysique d'Aristote, pp. 210, 211.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Valentine Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 23:\n\"Cicero philosophicis certe ipsius Aristotelis libris nunquam usus\nest.\" Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des Aristot. pp. 31, 158, 187:\n\"Cicero, dessen Unbekanntschaft mit beinahe s\u00e4mmtlichen heute\nvorhandenen Werken des Aristoteles eine unstreitige Thatsache bildet,\nderen Bedeutung man sich umsonst bem\u00fcht hat abzuschw\u00e4chen.\" Madvig,\nExcursus VII. ad Ciceron. De Finibus, p. 855: \"Non dubito profiteri,\nCiceronem mihi videri dialogos Aristotelis populariter scriptos, et\nRhetorica (quibus hic Topica adnumero) tum [Greek: politei/as]\nlegisse; difficiliora vero, quibus omnis interior philosophia\ncontinebatur, aut omnino non attigisse, aut si aliquando attigerit,\nnon longe progressum esse, ut ipse de subtilioribus Aristotelis\nsententiis aliquid habere possit explorati.\" The language here used\nby Madvig is more precise than that of the other two; for Cicero must\nbe allowed to have known, and even to have had in his library, the\nTopica of Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 12: See this point enforced by Heitz, pp. 29-31. Athen\u00e6us\n(xiv. 656) refers to a passage of Philochorus, in which Philochorus\nalludes to Aristotle, that is, as critics have hitherto supposed, to\nAristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 21. Bussemaker (in his Pr\u00e6fat. ad Aristot.\nDidot, vol. iv. p. xix.) has shewn that this supposition is\nunfounded, and that the passage more probably refers to one of the\nProblemata Inedita (iii. 43) which Bussemaker has first published in\nDidot's edition of Aristotle.]\n\nHere, then, we find several embarrassing facts in regard to the\nAristotelian Canon. Most of the works now accepted and known as\nbelonging to Aristotle, are neither included in the full Aristotelian\nCatalogue given by Diogenes, nor were they known to Cicero; who,\nmoreover, ascribes to Aristotle attributes of style not only\ndifferent, but opposite, to those which _our_ Aristotle presents.\nBesides, more than twenty of the compositions entered in the\nCatalogue are dialogues, of which form _our_ Aristotle affords not a\nsingle specimen: while others relate to matters of ancient exploit or\npersonal history; collected proverbs; accounts of the actual\nconstitution of many Hellenic cities; lists of the Pythian victors\nand of the scenic representations; erotic discourses; legendary\nnarratives, embodied in a miscellaneous work called 'Peplus'--a title\nperhaps borrowed from the _Peplus_ or robe of Ath\u00ean\u00ea at the\nPanathenaic festival, embroidered with various figures by Athenian\nwomen; a symposion or banquet-colloquy; and remarks on intoxication.\nAll these subjects are foreign in character to those which _our_\nAristotle treats.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: Brandis and Zeller, moreover, remark, that among the\nallusions made by Aristotle in the works which we possess to other\nworks of his own, the majority relate to other works actually extant,\nand very few to any of the lost works enumerated in the Catalogue\n(Brand. Aristoteles, pp. 97-101; Zeller, Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, p.\n79, ed. 2nd). This however is not always the case: we find (_e.g._)\nin Aristotle's notice of the Pythagorean tenets (Metaphys. A. p. 986,\na. 12) the remark, [Greek: di\u00f4/ristai de\\ peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n e)n e(te/rois\n\u00ea(mi=n a)kribe/steron]; where he probably means to indicate his\nspecial treatises, [Greek: Peri\\ t\u00f4=n Puthagorei/\u00f4n] and [Greek:\nPro\\s tou\\s Puthagorei/ous], enumerated by Diog. L. v. 25, and\nmentioned by Alexander, Porphyry, and Simplikius. See Alexander,\nSchol. ad Metaphys. p. 542, b. 5, 560, b. 25, Br.; and the note of\nSchwegler on Metaphys. i. 5, p. 47.]\n\nThe difficulty of harmonizing _our_ Aristotle with the Aristotle of\nthe Catalogue is thus considerable. It has been so strongly felt in\nrecent years, that one of the ablest modern critics altogether\ndissevers the two, and pronounces the works enumerated in the\nCatalogue not to belong to _our_ Aristotle. I allude to Valentine\nRose, who in his very learned and instructive volume, '_Aristoteles\nPseudepigraphus_,' has collected and illustrated the fragments which\nremain of these works. He considers them all pseudo-Aristotelian,\ncomposed by various unknown members of the Peripatetic school, during\nthe century or two immediately succeeding the death of Aristotle, and\ninscribed with the illustrious name of the master, partly through\nfraud of the sellers, partly through carelessness of purchasers and\nlibrarians.[14] Emil Heitz, on the other hand, has argued more\nrecently, that upon the external evidence as it stands, a more\ncorrect conclusion to draw would be (the opposite of that drawn by\nRose, viz.): That the works enumerated in the Catalogue are the true\nand genuine; and that those which we possess, or most of them, are\nnot really composed by Aristotle.[15] Heitz thinks this conclusion\nbetter sustained than that of Rose, though he himself takes a\ndifferent view, which I shall presently mention.\n\n[Footnote 14: Valent. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 4-10. The\nsame opinion is declared also in the earlier work of the same author,\nDe Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des **Ar. pp. 29, 30.]\n\nIt will be seen from the foregoing observations how much more\ndifficult it is to settle a genuine Canon for Aristotle than for\nPlato. I do not assent to either of the two conclusions just\nindicated; but I contend that, if we applied to this question the\nsame principles of judgment as those which modern Platonic critics\noften apply, when they allow or disallow dialogues of Plato, we\nshould be obliged to embrace one or other of them, or at least\nsomething nearly approaching thereto. If a critic, after attentively\nstudying the principal compositions now extant of _our_ Aristotle,\nthinks himself entitled, on the faith of his acquired\n\"_Aristotelisches Gef\u00fchl_,\" to declare that no works differing\nmaterially from them (either in subject handled, or in manner of\nhandling, or in degree of excellence), can have been composed by\nAristotle--he will assuredly be forced to include in such rejection a\nlarge proportion of those indicated in the Catalogue of Diogenes.\nEspecially he will be forced to reject the Dialogues--the very\ncompositions by which Aristotle was best known to Cicero and his\ncontemporaries. For the difference between them and the known\ncompositions of Aristotle, not merely in form but in style (the style\nbeing known from the epithets applied to them by Cicero), must have\nbeen more marked and decisive than that between the Alkibiades,\nHippias, Theages, Erast\u00e6, Leges, &c.--which most Platonic critics now\nset aside as spurious--and the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias,\nPhil\u00eabus, &c., which they treat as indisputably genuine.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: Thus (for example) in Bernays, who has displayed great\nacuteness and learning in investigating the Aristotelian Canon, and\nin collecting what can be known respecting the lost dialogues of\nAristotle, we read the following observations:--\"In der That mangelt\nes auch nicht an den bestimmtesten Nachrichten \u00fcber die vormalige\nExistenz einer grossen aristotelischen Schriftenreihe, die von der\njetzt erhaltenen _durch die tiefste formale Verschiedenheit_ getrennt\nwar. Das Verzeichniss aristotelischer Werke f\u00fchrt an seiner Spitze\nsieben und zwanzig B\u00e4nde jetzt verlorener Schriften auf, die alle in\nder k\u00fcnstlerischen Gespr\u00e4chsform abgefasst waren,\" &c. (Bernays, Die\nDialoge des Aristoteles, p. 2; compare ibid. p. 30).\n\nIf, as Bernays justly contends, we are to admit these various\nwritings, notwithstanding \"the profound difference of form,\" as\nhaving emanated from the same philosopher Aristotle, how are we to\ntrust the Platonic critics when they reject about one-third of the\npreserved dialogues of Plato, though there is no difference of form\nto proceed upon, but only a difference of style, merit, and, to a\ncertain extent, doctrine?\n\nZeller (Die Phil. der Griechen, ii. 2, pp. 45, 46, 2nd ed.) remarks\nthat the dialogues composed by Aristotle are probably to be ascribed\nto the earlier part of his literary life, when he was still (or had\nrecently been) Plato's scholar.]\n\nIn discussing the Platonic Canon, I have already declared that I\nconsider these grounds of rejection to be unsafe and misleading. Such\njudgment is farther confirmed, when we observe the consequences to\nwhich they would conduct in regard to the Aristotelian Canon. In\nfact, we must learn to admit among genuine works, both of Plato and\nAristotle, great diversity in subject, in style, and in excellence.\n\nI see no ground for distrusting the Catalogue given by Diogenes, as\nbeing in general an enumeration of works really composed by\nAristotle. These works must have been lodged in some great\nlibrary--probably the Alexandrine--where they were seen and counted,\nand the titles of them enrolled by some one or more among the\n_literati_, with a specification of the sum total obtained on adding\ntogether the lines contained in each.[17] I do not deny the\nprobability, that, in regard to some, the librarians may have been\nimposed upon, and that pseudo-Aristotelian works may have been\nadmitted; but whether such was partially the fact or not, the general\ngoodness of the Catalogue seems to me unimpeachable. As to the author\nof it, the most admissible conjecture seems that of Brandis and\nothers, recently adopted and advocated by Heitz: that the Catalogue\nowes its origin to one of the Alexandrine _literati_; probably to\nHermippus of Smyrna, a lettered man and a pupil of Kallimachus at\nAlexandria, between 240-210 B.C.. Diogenes does not indeed tell us\nfrom whom he borrowed the Catalogue; but in his life of Aristotle, he\nmore than once cites Hermippus, as having treated of Aristotle and\nhis biography in a work of some extent; and we know from other sources\nthat Hermippus had devoted much attention to Aristotle as well as to\nother philosophers. If Hermippus be the author of this Catalogue, it\nmust have been drawn up about the same time that the Byzantine\nAristophanes arranged the dialogues of Plato. Probably, indeed,\nKallimachus the chief librarian, had prepared the way for both of them.\nWe know that he had drawn up comprehensive tables, including, not only\nthe principal orators and dramatists, with an enumeration of their\ndiscourses and dramas, but also various miscellaneous authors, with the\ntitles of their works. We know, farther, that he noticed Demokritus and\nEudoxus, and we may feel assured that, in a scheme thus large, he\nwould not omit Plato or Aristotle, the two great founders of the\nfirst philosophical schools, nor the specification of the works of\neach contained in the Alexandrine library.[18] Heitz supposes that\nHermippus was the author of most of the catalogues (not merely of\nAristotle, but also of other philosophers) given by Diogenes;[19] yet\nthat nevertheless Diogenes himself had no direct acquaintance with\nthe works of Hermippus, but copied these catalogues at second-hand\nfrom some later author, probably Favorinus. This last supposition is\nnoway made out.\n\n[Footnote 17: Stahr, who in the first volume of his work Aristotelia\n(p. 194), had expressed an opinion that the Catalogue given by\nDiogenes is the Catalogue \"der eigenen Schritten des Stageiriten, wie\nsie sich in seinem Nachlasse befanden,\" retracts that opinion in the\nsecond volume of the same work (pp. 68-70), and declares the\nCatalogue to be an enumeration of the Aristotelian works in the\nlibrary of Alexandria. Trendelenburg concurs in this later opinion\n(Prooemium ad Commentar. in Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, p. 123).]\n\n[Footnote 18: [Greek: E(/rmippos o( Kallima/cheios e)n t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4|\nperi\\ A)ristote/lous], is cited by Athen\u00e6us, xv. 696; also v. 213.\n\nAmong the Tables prepared by Kallimachus, one was [Greek: Pantoda/p\u00f4n\nSuggramma/t\u00f4n Pi/nax]; and in it were included the [Greek:\nPlakountopoii+ka\\ suggra/mmata Ai)gimi/ou, kai\\ \u00ca(g\u00easi/ppou, kai\\\nM\u00eatrobi/ou, e)/ti de\\ Phai/tou] (Athen\u00e6us, xiv. 644). If Kallimachus\ncarried down his catalogue of the contents of the library to works so\nunimportant as these, we may surely believe that he would not omit to\ncatalogue such works of Aristotle as were in it. He appears to have\nmade a list of the works of Demokritus (_i.e._ such as were in the\nlibrary) with a glossary. See Brandis (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, p.\n74); also Suidas _v._ [Greek: Kalli/machos], Diogen. Laert. viii. 86;\nDionys. Hal. De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 652 R.; Athen\u00e6us, viii. 336, xv.\n669.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Heitz, Die Verl. Schr. des Aristot. pp. 45-48.\n\nPatricius, in his Discuss. Peripatetic. (t. i. pp. 13-18), had\npreviously considered Hermippus as having prepared a Catalogue of the\nworks of Aristotle, partly on the authority of the Scholion annexed\nto the conclusion of the Metaphysica of Theophrastus. Hermippus\nrecited the testament of Aristotle (Athen\u00e6us, xiii. 589).\n\nBoth Valentine Rose and Bernays regard Andronikus as author of the\nCatalogue of Aristotle in Diogenes. But I think that very sufficient\nreasons to refute this supposition have been shown by Heitz, pp.\n49-52. The opinion given by Christ, respecting the Catalogue which we\nfind in Diogenes Laertius--\"illum catalogum non Alexandrin\u00e6\nbibliothec\u00e6, sed exemplarium Aristotelis ab Apelliconte Athenas\ntranslatorum fuisse equidem censeo\"--is in substance the same as that\nof Rose and Bernays. I do not concur in it. (Christ, Studia in\nAristotelis Libros Metaphysicos, Berlin, 1853, p. 105).]\n\nIt seems thus probable that the Catalogue given by Diogenes derives\nits origin from Hermippus or Kallimachus, enumerating the titles of\nsuch works of Aristotle as were contained in the Alexandrine library.\nBut the aggregate of works composing _our_ Aristotle is noway in\nharmony with that Catalogue. It proceeds from a source independent\nand totally different, viz., the edition and classification first\npublished by the Rhodian Andronikus, in the generation between the\ndeath of Cicero and the Christian era. To explain the existence of\nthese two distinct and independent sources and channels, we must have\nrecourse to the remarkable narrative (already noticed in my chapter\non the Platonic Canon), delivered mainly by Strabo and less fully by\nPlutarch, respecting the fate of the Aristotelian library after\nAristotle's death.\n\nAt the decease of Aristotle, his library and MSS. came to\nTheophrastus, who continued chief of the Peripatetic school at Athens\nfor thirty-five years, until his death in 287 B.C. Both Aristotle and\nTheophrastus not only composed many works of their own, but also laid\nout much money in purchasing or copying the works of others;[20]\nespecially we are told that Aristotle, after the death of Speusippus,\nexpended three talents in purchasing his books. The entire library of\nTheophrastus, thus enriched from two sources, was bequeathed by his\ntestament to a philosophical friend and pupil, Neleus;[21] who left\nAthens, and carried away the library with him to his residence at the\ntown of Sk\u00eapsis, in the Asiatic region known as \u00c6olis, near Troad. At\nSk\u00eapsis the library remained for the greater part of two centuries,\nin possession of the descendants of Neleus, men of no accomplishments\nand no taste for philosophy. It was about thirty or forty years after\nthe death of Theophrastus that the kings of Pergamus began to occupy\nthemselves in collecting their royal library, which presently reached\na magnitude second only to that of Alexandria. Now Sk\u00eapsis was under\ntheir dominion, and it would seem that the kings seized the books\nbelonging to their subjects for the use of the royal library; for we\nare told that the heirs of Neleus were forced to conceal their\nliterary treasures in a cellar, subject to great injury, partly from\ndamp, partly from worms. In this ruinous hiding-place the manuscripts\nremained for nearly a century and a half--\"_blattarum ac tinearum\nepul\u00e6_,\"--until the Attalid dynasty at Pergamus became extinct. The\nlast of these kings, Attalus, died in 133 B.C., bequeathing his\nkingdom to the Romans. All fear of requisitions for the royal library\nbeing thus at end, the manuscripts were in course of time withdrawn\nby their proprietors from concealment, and sold for a large sum to\nApellikon, a native of Teos, a very rich resident at Athens, and\nattached to the Peripatetic sect. Probably this wealthy Peripatetic\nalready possessed a library of his own, with some Aristotelian works;\nbut the new acquisitions from Sk\u00eapsis, though not his whole stock,\nformed the most rare and precious ingredients in it. Here, then, the\nmanuscripts and library both of Aristotle and Theophrastus became,\nfor the first time since 287 B.C., open to the inspection of the\nAthenian Peripatetics of the time (about 100 B.C.), as well as of\nother learned men. Among the stock were contained many compositions\nwhich the Scholarchs, successors of **Theophrastus at Athens, had\nneither possessed nor known.[22] But the manuscripts were found\nimperfect, seriously damaged, and in a state of disorder. Apellikon\ndid his best to remedy that mischief, by causing new copies to be\ntaken, correcting what had become worm-eaten, and supplying what was\ndefective or illegible. He appears to have been an erudite man, and\nhad published a biography of Aristotle, refuting various calumnies\nadvanced by other biographers; but being (in the words of Strabo) a\nlover of books rather than a philosopher, he performed the work of\ncorrection so unskilfully, that the copies which he published were\nfound full of errors.[23] In the year 86 B.C., Sylla besieged Athens,\nand captured it by storm; not long after which he took to himself as\na perquisite the library of Apellikon, and transported it to\nRome.[24] It was there preserved under custody of a librarian, and\nvarious literary Greeks resident at Rome obtained access to it,\nespecially Tyrannion, the friend of Cicero and a warm admirer of\nAristotle, who took peculiar pains to gain the favour of the\nlibrarian.[25] It was there also that the Rhodian Andronikus obtained\naccess to the Aristotelian works.[26] He classified them to a great\ndegree anew, putting in juxtaposition the treatises most analogous in\nsubject;[27] moreover, he corrected the text, and published a new\nedition of the manuscripts, with a tabulated list. This was all the\nmore necessary, because some booksellers at Rome, aiming only at sale\nand profit, had employed bad writers, and circulated inaccurate\ncopies, not collated with the originals.[28] These originals,\nhowever, were so damaged, and the restitutions made by Apellikon were\nso injudicious, that the more careful critics who now studied them\nwere often driven to proceed on mere probable evidence.\n\n[Footnote 20: Diog. L. iv. 5; Aulus Gellius, N. A. iii. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 21: From a passage of Lucian (De Parasito, c. xxxv.) we\nlearn that Aristoxenus spoke of himself as friend and guest of\nNeleus: [Greek: kai\\ ti/s peri\\ tou/tou le/gei? Polloi\\ me\\n kai\\\na)/lloi, A)risto/xenos de\\ o( mousiko/s, pollou= lo/gou a)/xios kai\\\nau)to\\s de\\ para/sitos N\u00ea/le\u00f4s \u00ea)=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 22: Strabo, xiii. 608, 609; Athen\u00e6us, v. 214. The narrative\nof Strabo has been often misunderstood and impugned, as if he had\nasserted that none of the main works of Aristotle had ever been\npublished until they were thus exhumed by Apellikon. This is the\nsupposed allegation which Stahr, Zeller, and others have taken so\nmuch pains to refute. But in reality Strabo says no such thing. His\nwords affirm or imply the direct contrary, viz., that many works of\nAristotle, not merely the exoteric works but others besides, _had_\nbeen published earlier than the purchase made by Apellikon. What\nStrabo says is, that few of these works were in possession of the\nPeripatetic Scholarchs at Athens before the time of that purchase;\nand he explains thus how it was that these Scholarchs, during the\ncentury intervening, had paid little attention to the profound and\nabstruse speculations of Aristotle; how it was that they had confined\nthemselves to dialectic and rhetorical debate on special problems. I\nsee no ground for calling in question the fact affirmed by\nStrabo--the poverty of the Peripatetic school-library at Athens;\nthough he may perhaps have assigned a greater importance to that fact\nthan it deserves, as a means of explaining the intellectual working\nof the Peripatetic Scholarchs from Lykon to Kritolaus. The\nphilosophical impulse of that intervening century seems to have\nturned chiefly towards ethics and the _Summum Bonum_, with the\nconflicting theories of Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and\nEpikureans thereupon.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: \u00ea)=n de\\ o( A)pellik\u00f4=n\nphilo/biblos ma=llon \u00ea)\\ philo/sophos, dio\\ kai\\ z\u00eat\u00f4=n\ne)pano/oth\u00f4sin t\u00f4=n diabr\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n, ei)s a)nti/grapha kaina\\ met\u00ea/negke\nt\u00ea\\n graph\u00ea\\n a)napl\u00ear\u00f4=n ou)k eu)=, kai\\ e)xe/d\u00f4ken a(marta/d\u00f4n\npl\u00ea/r\u00ea ta\\ bi/blia.]]\n\n[Footnote 24: Strabo, xiii. 609; Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: Turanni/\u00f4n, o( grammatiko\\s\ndiecheiri/sato philaristote/l\u00eas \u00f4)/n, therapeu/sas to\\n e)pi\\ t\u00ea=s\nbibloth\u00ea/k\u00eas.] Tyrannion had been the preceptor of Strabo (xii. 548);\nand Bo\u00eathus, who studied Aristotle along with Strabo, was a disciple\nof the Rhodian Andronikus. See Ammonius ad Categorias, f. 8; and\nRavaisson, Essai sur la M\u00e9taphysique d'Aristote, Introduction, p.\n10.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 27: The testimony of Porphyry in respect to Andronikus, and\nto the real service performed by Andronikus, is highly valuable.\nPorphyry was the devoted disciple and friend, as well as the literary\nexecutor, of Plotinus; whose writings were left in an incorrect and\ndisorderly condition. Porphyry undertook to put them in order and\npublish them; and he tells us that, in fulfilling this promise, he\nfollowed the example of what Andronikus had done for the works of\nAristotle and Theophrastus. [Greek: E)pei\\ de\\ au)to\\s] (Plotinus)\n[Greek: t\u00ea\\n dio/rth\u00f4sin kai\\ t\u00ea\\n dia/taxin t\u00f4=n bibli/\u00f4n\npoiei=sthai \u00ea(mi=n e)pe/trepsen, e)g\u00f4\\ de\\ e)kei/n\u00f4| z\u00f4=nti\nu(pescho/m\u00ean kai\\ toi=s a)/llois e(tai/rois e)p\u00eaggeila/m\u00ean poi\u00ea=sai\ntou=to, pr\u00f4=ton me\\n ta\\ bi/blia ou) kata\\ chro/nous e)a=sai phu/rd\u00ean\ne)kdedome/na e)dikai/\u00f4sa, mim\u00easa/menos d' A)pollo/d\u00f4ron to\\n\nA)th\u00eanai=on kai\\ A)ndro/nikon to\\n Peripat\u00eatiko/n, \u00f4(=n o( me\\n\nE)pi/charmon to\\n k\u00f4m\u00f4|diogra/phon ei)s de/ka to/mous phe/r\u00f4n\nsun\u00ea/gagen, o( de\\ ta\\ A)ristote/lous kai\\ Theophra/stou ei)s\npragmatei/as diei=le, ta\\s oi)kei/as u(pothe/seis ei)s tau)to\\n\nsunagag\u00f4/n, ou(/t\u00f4 d\u00ea\\ kai\\ e)g\u00f4\\ pent\u00ea/konta te/ssarau)/nta e)/ch\u00f4n\nta\\ tou= Pl\u00f4ti/nou bi/blia diei=lon me\\n ei)s e(\\x e)nnea/das, t\u00ea=|\nteleio/t\u00eati tou= e(\\x a)rithmou= kai\\ tai=s e)nnea/sin a)sme/n\u00f4s\ne)pituch\u00f4/n, e(ka/st\u00ea| de\\ e)nnea/di ta\\ oi)kei=a phe/r\u00f4n\nsunepho/r\u00easa, dou\\s kai\\ ta/xin pr\u00f4/t\u00ean toi=s e)laphrote/rois\nprobl\u00ea/masin.] (Porphyry, Vita Plotini, p. 117, Didot.) Porphyry here\ndistinctly affirms that Andronikus rendered this valuable service not\nmerely to the works of Aristotle, but also to those of Theophrastus.\nThis is important, as connecting him with the library conveyed by\nSylla to Rome; which library we know to have contained the\nmanuscripts of both these philosophers. And in the Scholion appended\nto the Metaphysica of Theophrastus (p. 323, Brandis) we are told that\nAndronikus and Hermippus had made a catalogue of the works of\nTheophrastus, in which the Metaphysics was not included.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: bibliop\u00f4=lai/ tines\ngrapheu=si phau/lois chr\u00f4/menoi kai\\ ou)k a)ntiba/llontes], &c.]\n\nThis interesting narrative--delivered by Strabo, the junior\ncontemporary of Andronikus, and probably derived by him either from\nTyrannion his preceptor or from the Sidonian Bo\u00eathus[29] and other\nphilosophical companions jointly, with whom he had prosecuted the\nstudy of Aristotle--appears fully worthy of trust. The proceedings\nboth of Apellikon and of Sylla prove, what indeed we might have\npresumed without proof, that the recovery of these long-lost original\nmanuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus excited great sensation in\nthe philosophical world of Athens and of Rome. With such\nnewly-acquired materials, a new epoch began for the study of these\nauthors. The more abstruse philosophical works of Aristotle now came\ninto the foreground under the auspices of a new Scholarch; whereas\nAristotle had hitherto been chiefly known by his more popular and\nreadable compositions. Of these last, probably, copies may have been\nacquired to a certain extent by the previous Peripatetic Scholarchs\nor School at Athens; but the School had been irreparably impoverished,\nso far as regarded the deeper speculations of philosophy, by the loss\nof those original manuscripts which had been transported from Athens\nto Sk\u00eapsis. What Aristotelian Scholarchs, prior to Andronikus, chiefly\npossessed and studied, of the productions of their illustrious\nfounder, were chiefly the _exoteric_ or extra-philosophical and\ncomparatively popular:--such as the dialogues; the legendary and\nhistorical collections; the facts respecting constitutional history\nof various Hellenic cities; the variety of miscellaneous problems\nrespecting Homer and a number of diverse matters; the treatises on\nanimals and on anatomy, &c.[30] In the Alexandrine library (as we see\nby the Catalogue of Diogenes) there existed all these and several\nphilosophical works also; but that library was not easily available\nfor the use of the Scholarchs at Athens, who worked upon their own\nstock, confining themselves mainly to smooth and elegant discourses\non particular questions, and especially to discussions, with the\nPlatonists, Stoics, and Epikureans, on the _principia_ of Ethics,\nwithout any attempt either to follow up or to elucidate the more\nprofound speculations (logical, physical, metaphysical, cosmical) of\nAristotle himself. A material change took place when the library of\nApellikon came to be laid open and studied, not merely by lecturers\nin the professorial chair at Athens, but also by critics like\nTyrannion and Andronikus at Rome. These critics found therein the\nmost profound and difficult philosophical works of Aristotle in the\nhandwriting of the philosopher himself; some probably, of which\ncopies may have already existed in the Alexandrine library, but some\nalso as yet unpublished. The purpose of Andronikus, who is described\nas Peripatetic Scholarch, eleventh in succession from Aristotle, was\nnot simply to make a Catalogue (as Hermippus had made at Alexandria),\nbut to render a much greater service, which no critic could render\nwithout having access to original MSS., namely, to obtain a correct\ntext of the books actually before him, to arrange these books in\nproper order, and then to publish and explain them,[31] but to take\nno account of other Aristotelian works in the Alexandrine library or\nelsewhere. The Aristotelian philosophy thus passed into a new phase.\nOur editions of Aristotle may be considered as taking their date from\nthis critical effort of Andronikus, with or without subsequent\nmodifications by others, as the case may be.\n\n[Footnote 29: Strabo, xvi. 757. Stahr, in his minor work, Aristoteles\nunter den R\u00f6mern, p. 32, considers that this circumstance lessens the\ncredibility of Strabo. I think the contrary. No one was so likely to\nhave studied the previous history of the MSS. as the editors of a new\nedition.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: sune/b\u00ea de\\ toi=s e)k t\u00f4=n\nperipa/t\u00f4n toi=s me\\n pa/lai toi=s meta\\ Theo/phraston, o(/l\u00f4s ou)k\ne)/chousi ta\\ bi/blia pl\u00ea\\n o)li/g\u00f4n kai\\ ma/lista t\u00f4=n e)x\u00f4terik\u00f4=n,\nm\u00eade\\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ the/seis\nl\u00eakuthi/zein; toi=s d' u(/steron, a)ph' ou)= ta\\ bi/blia tau=ta\npro\u00ea=lthen, a)/meinon me\\n e)kei/n\u00f4n philosophei=n kai\\\na)ristoteli/zein, a)nagka/zesthai me/ntoi ta\\ polla\\ ei)ko/ta le/gein\ndia\\ to\\ pl\u00ea=thos t\u00f4=n a(marti\u00f4=n.] Also Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.\n\nThe passage of Strabo is so perspicuous and detailed, that it has all\nthe air of having been derived from the best critics who frequented\nthe library at Rome, where Strabo was when he wrote ([Greek: kai\\\n_e)/nthade_ kai\\ e)n A)lexandrei/a|], xiii. 609). The Peripatetic\nAndronikus, whom he names among the celebrated Rhodians (xiv. 655),\nmay have been among his informants. His statements about the bad\nstate of the manuscripts; the unskilful emendations of Apellikon; the\ncontrast between the vein of Peripatetic study, as it had stood\nbefore the revelation of the manuscripts, and as it came to stand\nafterwards; the uncertain evidences upon which careful students, even\nwith the manuscripts before them, were compelled to proceed; the tone\nof depreciation in which he speaks of the carelessness of booksellers\nwho sought only for profit,--all these points of information appear\nto me to indicate that Strabo's informants were acute and diligent\ncritics, familiar with the library, and anxious both for the real\nunderstanding of these documents, and for philosophy as an end.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi. Spengel (\"Ueber die\nReihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles,\"\nM\u00fcnchen. philol. Abhandl. 1848,) remarks justly that the critical\narrangement of Aristotle's writings, for collective publication,\nbegins from the library of Apellikon at Rome, not from that of\nAlexandria. See p. 146: \"Mehr als zweihundert Jahre lang fehlt uns\nalle n\u00e4here Kunde \u00fcber die peripatetische Schule. Erst mit der viel\nbesprochenen Auffindung der Bibliothek des Aristoteles in Athen und\nderen Wegf\u00fchrung nach Rom durch Sulla wird ein regeres Studium f\u00fcr\ndie Schriften des Philosophen bemerkbar--_und zwar jetzt eigentlich\nder Schriften, weniger der Lehre und Philosophie im Allgemeinen,\nwelche fr\u00fcher allein beachtet worden ist_. Wir m\u00f6chten sagen, von\njetzt an beginne das philologische Studium mit den Werken des\nAristoteles, die kritische und exegetische Behandlung dieser durch\nTyrannion, Andronikus, Adrastus und viele andre nachlfolgende,\" &c.]\n\nThe explanation just given, coinciding on many points with Brandis\nand Heitz, affords the most probable elucidation of that obscurity\nwhich arises about the Aristotelian Canon, when we compare _our_\nAristotle with the Catalogue of Diogenes--the partial likeness, but\nstill greater discrepancy, between the two. It is certain that\nneither Cicero[32] nor the great Alexandrine _literati_, anterior to\nand contemporary with him, knew Aristotle from most of the works\nwhich we now possess. They knew him chiefly from the dialogues, the\nmatters of history and legend, some zoological books, and the\nproblems; the dialogues, and the historical collections respecting\nthe constitutions of Hellenic cities,[33] being more popular and\nbetter known than any other works. While the Republic of Plato is\nfamiliar to them, they exhibit no knowledge of our Aristotelian\nPolitica, in which treatise the criticism upon the Platonic Republic\nis among the most interesting parts. When we look through the\ncontents of our editions of Aristotle the style and manner of\nhandling is indeed pretty much the same throughout, but the subjects\nwill appear extremely diverse and multifarious; and the\nencyclopedical character of the author, as to science and its\napplications, will strike us forcibly. The entire and real Aristotle,\nhowever, was not only more encyclopedical as to subjects handled, but\nalso more variable as to style and manner of handling; passing from\nthe smooth, sweet, and flowing style--which Cicero extols as\ncharacterizing the Aristotelian dialogues--to the elliptical brevity\nand obscurity which we now find so puzzling in the De Anim\u00e2 and the\nMetaphysica.[34]\n\n[Footnote 32: This is certain, from the remarks addressed by Cicero\nto Trebatius at the beginning of the Ciceronian Topica, that in his\ntime Aristotle was little known and little studied at Rome, even by\nphilosophical students. Trebatius knew nothing of the Topica, until\nhe saw the work by chance in Cicero's library, and asked information\nabout the contents. The reply of Cicero illustrates the little notice\ntaken of Aristotle by Roman readers. \"Cum autem ego te, non tam\nvitandi laboris mei caus\u00e2, quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer, vel\nut eos per te ipse legeres, vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam\nrhetore acciperes, hortatus essem, utrumque ut ex te audiebam, es\nexpertus. Sed a libris te obscuritas rejecit: rhetor autem ille\nmagnus, ut opinor, _Aristotelia se ignorare_ respondit. Quod quidem\nminime sum admiratus, eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, _qui\nab ipsis philosophis, pr\u00e6ter admodum paucos, ignoraretur._\" Compare\nalso Cicero, Academ. Post. i. 3, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Even the philosophical commentators on Aristotle, such\nas David the Armenian, seem to have known the lost work of Aristotle\ncalled [Greek: Politei=ai] (the history of the constitutions of 250\nHellenic cities), better than the theoretical work which we possess,\ncalled the Politica; though they doubtless knew both. (See Scholia ad\nCategorias, Brandis, p. 16, b. 20; p. 24, a. 25; p. 25, b. 5.)--We\nread in Schneider's Preface to the Aristotelian Politica (p. x.):\n\"Altum et mirabile silentium est apud antiquitatem Gr\u00e6cam et Romanam\nde nov\u00e2 Aristotelis Republic\u00e2, cum omnes fer\u00e8 scriptores Gr\u00e6ci et\nRomani, mentione Reipublic\u00e6 Platonic\u00e6 pleni, vel laudibus vel\nvituperiis ejus abundant.\"--There is no clear reference to the\nAristotelian Politica earlier than Alexander of Aphrodisias. Both\nHildenbrand (Geschichte der Staats- und Rechts-Philosophen, t. i. pp.\n358-361), and Oncken (Staatslehre des Aristot. pp. 65-66), think that\nthe Aristotelian Politica was not published until after the purchase\nof the library by Apellikon.]\n\n[Footnote 34: What Strabo asserts about the Peripatetic Scholarchs\nsucceeding Theophrastus (viz., [Greek: m\u00eade\\n e)/chein philosophei=n\npragmatik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ the/seis l\u00eakuthi/zein]: that they could not\nhandle philosophy in a businesslike way--with those high generalities\nand that subtle analysis which was supposed to belong to\nphilosophy--but gave smooth and ornate discourses on set problems or\ntheses) is fully borne out by what we read in Cicero about these same\nPeripatetics. The Stoics (immediate successors and rivals) accused\ntheir Peripatetic contemporaries even of being ignorant of Dialectic:\nwhich their founder, Aristotle, in his works that we now possess, had\nbeen the first to raise into something like a science. Cicero says\n(De Finibus, iii. 12, 41): \"His igitur ita positis (inquit Cato)\nsequitur magna contentio: quam tractatam \u00e0 Peripateticis mollius\n(_est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta, propter\nignorationem Dialectic\u00e6_), Carneades tuus, egregi\u00e2 qu\u00e2dam\nexercitatione in dialecticis summ\u00e2que eloquenti\u00e2, rem in summum\ndiscrimen adduxit.\" Also Cicero, in Tuscul. Disput. iv. 5. 9: \"Quia\nChrysippus et Stoici, quum de animi perturbationibus disputant,\nmagnam partem in iis partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa\neorum perexigua oratio est, qu\u00e2 medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos\nesse patiantur. Peripatetici autem _ad placandos animos multa\nafferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi pr\u00e6termittunt_.\" This last\nsentence is almost an exact equivalent of the words of Strabo:\n[Greek: m\u00eade\\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ the/seis\nl\u00eakuthi/zein.] Aristotle himself, in the works which we possess,\nmight pass as father of the Stoics rather than of the Peripatetics;\nfor he abounds in classification and subdivision (spinas partiendi et\ndividendi), and is even derided on this very ground by opponents (see\nAtticus ap. Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 4); but he has nothing of the\npolished amplification ascribed to the later Peripatetics by Strabo\nand Cicero. Compare, about the Peripatetics from Lykon to Kritolaus,\nCicero, De Finibus, v. 5: \"Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis\njejunior.\" Plutarch (Sylla, c. xxvi.) calls these later Peripatetics\n[Greek: charie/ntes kai\\ philo/logoi], &c.]\n\nI shall assume this variety, both of subject and of handling, as a\nfeature to be admitted and allowed for in Aristotle, when I come to\ndiscuss the objections of some critics against the authenticity of\ncertain treatises among the forty-six which now pass under his name.\nBut in canvassing the Aristotelian Canon I am unable to take the same\nground as I took in my former work, when reviewing the Platonic\nCanon. In regard to Plato, I pointed out a strong antecedent\npresumption in favour of the Canon of Thrasyllus--a canon derived\noriginally from the Alexandrine librarians, and sustained by the\nunanimous adhesion of antiquity. In regard to Aristotle, there are no\nsimilar grounds of presumption to stand upon. We have good reason for\nbelieving that the works both of Plato and Aristotle--if not all the\nworks, at least many of them, and those the most generally\ninteresting--were copied and transmitted early to the Alexandrine\nlibrary. Now _our_ Plato represents that which was possessed and\naccredited as Platonic by the Byzantine Aristophanes and the other\nAlexandrine librarians; but _our_ Aristotle does not, in my judgment,\nrepresent what these librarians possessed and accredited as\nAristotelian. That which they thus accredited stands recorded in the\nCatalogue given by Diogenes, probably the work of Hermippus, as I\nhave already stated; while _our_ Aristotle is traceable to the\ncollection at Athens, including that of Apellikon, with that which he\nbought from the heirs of Neleus, and to the sifting, correction, and\nclassification, applied thereto by able critics of the first century\nB.C. and subsequently; among whom Andronikus is best known. We may\neasily believe that the library of Apellikon contained various\ncompositions of Aristotle, which had never been copied for the\nAlexandrine library--perhaps never prepared for publication at all,\nso that the task of arranging detached sections or morsels into a\nwhole, with one separate title, still remained to be performed. This\nwas most likely to be the case with abstruser speculations, like the\ncomponent books of the Metaphysica, which Theophrastus may not have\nbeen forward to tender, and which the library might not be very eager\nto acquire, having already near four hundred other volumes by the\nsame author. These reserved works would therefore remain in the\nlibrary of Theophrastus, not copied and circulated (or at least\ncirculated only to a few private philosophical brethren, such as\nEud\u00eamus), so that they never became fully published until the days of\nApellikon.[35]\n\n[Footnote 35: The two Peripatetic Scholarchs at Athens, Straton and\nLykon, who succeeded (after the death of Theophrastus and the\ntransfer of his library to Sk\u00eapsis) in the conduct of the school,\nleft at their decease collections of books, of which each disposes by\nhis will (Diogen. L. v. 62; v. 73). The library of Apellikon, when\nsent by Sylla to Rome, contained probably many other Aristotelian\nMSS., besides those purchased from Sk\u00eapsis.\n\nMichelet, in his Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethica, advances a\ntheory somewhat analogous but bolder, respecting the relation between\nthe Catalogue given by Diogenes, and the works contained in _our_\nAristotle. Comm. p. 2. \"Id solum addam, hoc Aristotelis opus (the\nNikomachean Ethica), ut reliqua omnia, ex brevioribus\ncommentationibus consarcinatum fuisse, qu\u00e6 quidem vivo Aristotele in\nlucem prodierint, cum unaqu\u00e6que disciplina, e qu\u00e2 excerpta fuerint in\nadmirabilem illum quem habemus ordinem jam ab ipso Aristotele sive\nquodam ejus discipulo redacta, in libris Aristotelis manu scriptis\nlatitaverit, qui hereditate ad Nelei prolem, ut notum est,\ntransmissi, in cell\u00e2 ill\u00e2 subterrane\u00e2 Scepsi\u00e2 absconditi fuerunt,\ndonec Apellicon Teius et Rhodius Andronicus eos ediderint. Leguntur\nautem commentationum illarum de Moribus tituli in elencho librorum\nAristotelis apud Diogenem (v. 22-26): [Greek: peri\\ a)ret\u00f4=n] (Lib.\nii., iii. c. 6-fin. iv. nostrorum Ethicorum); [Greek: peri\\\ne(kousi/ou] (Lib. iii. c. 1-5); &c. Plerumque enim non integra\nvolumina, sed singulos libros vel singula volumina diversarum\ndisciplinarum, Diogenes in elencho suo enumeravit.\"\n\nIn his other work (Essai sur la M\u00e9taphysique d'Aristote, pp. 202,\n205, 225) Michelet has carried this theory still farther, and has\nendeavoured to identify separate fragments of the Aristotelian works\nnow extant, with various titles in the Catalogue given by Diogenes.\nThe identification is not convincing.]\n\nBut though the edition published by Andronikus would thus contain\nmany genuine works of Aristotle not previously known or edited, we\ncannot be sure that it would not also include some which were\nspurious. Reflect what the library of Apellikon, transported to Rome\nby Sylla, really was. There was in it the entire library of\nTheophrastus; probably, also, that of Neleus, who must have had some\nbooks of his own, besides what he inherited from Theophrastus. It\nincluded all the numerous manuscript works composed by Aristotle and\nTheophrastus, and many other manuscript works purchased or acquired\nby them, but composed by others--the whole in very bad order and\ncondition; and, moreover, the books which Apellikon possessed before,\ndoubtless as many Aristotelian books as he could purchase. To\ndistinguish, among this heterogeneous mass of manuscripts, which of\nthem were the manuscripts composed by Aristotle; to separate these\nfrom the writings of Theophrastus, Eud\u00eamus, or other authors, who\ncomposed various works of their own upon the same subjects and with\nthe same titles as those of Aristotle--required extreme critical\ndiscernment and caution; the rather, since there was no living\ncompanion of Aristotle or Theophrastus to guide or advise, more than\na century and a half having elapsed since the death of Theophrastus,\nand two centuries since that of Aristotle. Such were the difficulties\namidst which Apellikon, Tyrannion, and Andronikus had to decide, when\nthey singled out the manuscripts of Aristotle to be published. I will\nnot say that they decided wrongly; yet neither can I contend (as I\nargued in the case of the Platonic dialogues) that the presumption is\nvery powerful in favour of that Canon which their decision made\nlegal. The case is much more open to argument, if any grounds against\nthe decision can be urged.\n\nAndronikus put in, arranged, and published the treatises of Aristotle\n(or those which he regarded as composed by Aristotle) included in the\nlibrary conveyed by Sylla to Rome. I have already observed, that\namong these treatises there were some, of which copies existed in the\nAlexandrine library (as represented by the Catalogue of Diogenes),\nbut a still greater number which cannot be identified with the titles\nremaining of works there preserved. As to the works common to both\nlibraries, we must remember that Andronikus introduced a\nclassification of his own, analogous to the Enneads applied by\nPorphyry to the works of Plotinus, and to the Tetralogies adopted by\nThrasyllus in regard to the Dialogues of Plato; so that even these\nworks might not be distributed in the same partitions under each of\nthe two arrangements. And this is what we actually see when we\ncompare the Catalogue of Diogenes with _our_ Aristotle. Rhetoric,\nEthics, Physics, Problems, &c., appear in both as titles or subjects,\nbut distributed into a different number of books or sections in one\nand in the other; perhaps, indeed, the compositions are not always\nthe same.\n\nBefore I proceed to deal with the preserved works of Aristotle--those\nby which alone he is known to us, and was known to medi\u00e6val readers,\nI shall say a few words respecting the import of a distinction which\nhas been much canvassed, conveyed in the word _exoteric_ and its\nopposite. This term, used on various occasions by Aristotle himself,\nhas been also employed by many ancient critics, from Cicero\ndownwards; while by medi\u00e6val and modern critics, it has not merely\nbeen employed, but also analysed and elucidated. According to Cicero\n(the earliest writer subsequent to Aristotle in whom we find the\nterm), it designates one among two classes of works composed by\nAristotle: _exoteric_ works were those composed in a popular style\nand intended for a large, indiscriminate circle of readers: being\ncontrasted with other works of elaborated philosophical reasoning,\nwhich were not prepared for the public taste, but left in the\ncondition of memorials for the instruction of a more select class of\nstudious men. Two points are to be observed respecting Cicero's\ndeclaration. First, he applies it to the writings not of Aristotle\nexclusively, but also to those of Theophrastus, and even of\nsucceeding Peripatetics; secondly, he applies it directly to such of\ntheir writings only as related to the discussion of the _Summum\nBonum_.[36] Furthermore, Cicero describes the works which Aristotle\ncalled exoteric, as having _proems_ or introductory prefaces.[37]\n\n[Footnote 36: Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5, 12. \"De summo autem bono,\nquia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod\n[Greek: e)x\u00f4teriko\\n] appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in\ncommentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur: nec in\nsumm\u00e2 tamen ips\u00e2 aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem quos\nnominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio.\"\n\nThe word _limatius_ here cannot allude to high polish and ornament of\nstyle (nitor orationis), but must be equivalent to [Greek:\na)kribe/steron], _doctius_, _subtilius_, &c. (as Buhle and others\nhave already remarked, Buhle, De Libris Aristot. Exoter. et Acroam.\np. 115; Madvig, ad Cicero de Finib. v. 12; Heitz, p. 134), applied to\nprofound reasoning, with distinctions of unusual precision, which it\nrequired a careful preparatory training to apprehend. This employment\nof the word _limatius_ appears to me singular, but it cannot mean\nanything else here. The _commentarii_ are the general heads--plain\nunadorned statements of facts or reasoning--which the orator or\nhistorian is to employ his genius in setting forth and decorating, so\nthat it may be heard or read with pleasure and admiration by a\ngeneral audience. Cicero, in that remarkable letter wherein he\nentreats Lucceius to narrate his (Cicero's) consulship in an\nhistorical work, undertakes to compose \"commentarios rerum omnium\" as\nmaterials for the use of Lucceius (Ep. ad Famil. v. 12. 10). His\nexpression, \"in commentariis reliquerunt,\" shows that he considered\nthe exoteric books to have been prepared by working up some naked\npreliminary materials into an ornate and interesting form.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Cicero, Ep. ad Att. iv. 16.]\n\nIn the main, the distinction here drawn by Cicero, understood in a\nvery general sense, has been accepted by most following critics as\nintended by the term _exoteric_: something addressed to a wide,\nindiscriminate circle of general readers or hearers, and intelligible\nor interesting to them without any special study or training--as\ncontrasted with that which is reserved for a smaller circle of\nstudents assumed to be specially qualified. But among those who agree\nin this general admission, many differences have prevailed. Some have\nthought that the term was not used by Aristotle to designate any\nwritings either of his own or of others, but only in allusion to\ninformal oral dialogues or debates. Others again, feeling assured\nthat Aristotle intended by the term to signify some writings of his\nown, have searched among the works preserved, as well as among the\ntitles of the works lost, to discriminate such as the author\nconsidered to be exoteric: though this search has certainly not ended\nin unanimity; nor do I think it has been successful. Again, there\nhave not been wanting critics (among them, Thomas Aquinas and\nSepulveda), who assign to the term a meaning still more vague and\nundefined; contending that when Aristotle alludes to \"exoteric\ndiscourses,\" he indicates simply some other treatise of his own,\ndistinct from that in which the allusion occurs, without meaning to\nimply anything respecting its character.[38]\n\n[Footnote 38: Sepulveda, p. 125 (cited by Bernays, Dialoge des\nAristoteles, p. 41): \"Externos sermones sive exotericos solet\nAristoteles libros eos appellare, quicunque sunt extra id opus in quo\ntunc versatur, ut jure pontificio periti consueverunt: non enim\nexoterici sermones seu libri certo aliquo genere continentur, ut est\npublicus error.\"\n\nZeller lends his high authority to an explanation of _exoteric_ very\nsimilar to the above. (Gesch. der Philos. ii. 2, p. 100, seq.:--\"dass\nunter exoterischen Reden nicht eine eigene Klasse popul\u00e4r\ngeschriebener B\u00fccher, sondern nur \u00fcberhaupt solche Er\u00f6rterungen\nverstanden werden, welche nicht in den Bereich der vorliegenden\nUntersuchung geh\u00f6ren.\") He discusses the point at some length; but\nthe very passages which he cites, especially Physica, iv. 10, appear\nto me less favourable to his view than to that which I have stated in\nthe text, according to which the word means _dialectic_ as contrasted\nwith _didactic_.]\n\nTo me it appears that this last explanation is untenable, and that\nthe term _exoteric_ designates matter of a certain character,\nassignable to some extent by positive marks, but still more by\nnegative; matter, in part, analogous to that defined by Cicero and\nother critics. But to conceive clearly or fully what its character\nis, we must turn to Aristotle himself, who is of course the final\nauthority, wherever he can be found to speak in a decisive manner.\nHis preserved works afford altogether eight passages (two of them\nindeed in the Eudemian Ethics, which, for the present at least, I\nshall assume to be his work), wherein the phrase \"exoteric\ndiscourses\" ([Greek: e)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi]) occurs. Out of these eight\npassages, there are seven which present the phrase as designating\nsome unknown matter, not farther specified, but distinct from the\nwork in which the phrase occurs: \"Enough has been said (or is said,\nAristotle intimates) about this subject, even in the exoteric\ndiscourses.\" To what it is that he here alludes--whether to other\nwritings of his own or oral discussions of his own, or writing and\nspeech of a particular sort by others--we are left to interpret as we\nbest may, by probable reason or conjecture. But there is one among\nthe eight passages, in which Aristotle uses the term _exoteric_ as\ndescribing, not what is to be looked for elsewhere, but what he is\nhimself about to give in the treatise in hand. In the fourth book of\nthe Physica, he discusses the three high abstractions, Place, Vacuum,\nTime. After making an end of the first two, he enters upon the third,\nbeginning with the following words:--\"It follows naturally on what\nhas been said, that we should treat respecting Time. But first it is\nconvenient to advert to the difficulties involved in it, by _exoteric\ndiscourse also_--whether Time be included among entities or among\nnon-entities; then afterwards, what is its nature. Now a man might\nsuspect, from the following reasons, that Time either absolutely does\nnot exist, or exists scarcely and dimly,\" &c. Aristotle then gives a\nstring of dialectic reasons, lasting through one of the columns of\nthe Berlin edition, for doubting whether Time really exists. He\nafterwards proceeds thus, through two farther columns:--\"Let these be\nenumerated as the difficulties accompanying the attributes of Time.\nWhat Time is, and what is its nature, is obscure, as well from what\nhas been handed down to us by others, as from what we ourselves have\njust gone through;\"[39] and this question also he first discusses\ndialectically, and then brings to a solution.\n\n[Footnote 39: Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 29. [Greek:\nE)cho/menon de\\ t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n e)sti\\n e)pelthei=n peri\\ chro/nou;\npr\u00f4=ton de\\ kal\u00f4=s e)/chei diapor\u00ea=sai peri\\ au)tou= _kai\\ dia\\ t\u00f4=n\ne)x\u00f4terik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n_, po/teron t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n e)sti\\n \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=n m\u00ea\\\no)/nt\u00f4n, ei)=ta ti/s \u00ea( phu/sis au)tou=. O(/ti me\\n ou)=n \u00ea)\\ o(/l\u00f4s\ne)/stin, \u00ea)\\ mo/lis kai\\ a)mudr\u00f4=s, e)k t\u00f4=nde/ tis a)\\n\nu(popteu/seien.] Then, after a column of text urging various [Greek:\na)pori/as] as to whether Time is or is not, he goes on, p. 218, a.\n31:--[Greek: Peri\\ me\\n ou)=n t\u00f4=n u(parcho/nt\u00f4n au)t\u00f4=| tosau=t'\ne)/st\u00f4 di\u00eapor\u00eame/na. Ti/ d' e)sti\\n o( chro/nos, kai\\ ti/s au)tou= \u00ea(\nphu/sis, o(moi/\u00f4s e)/k te t\u00f4=n paradedome/n\u00f4n a)/d\u00ealo/n e)sti, kai\\\nperi\\ \u00f4(=n tugcha/nomen diel\u00ealutho/tes pro/teron]--thus taking up the\nquestions, What Time is? What is the nature of Time? Upon this he\ngoes through another column of [Greek: a)pori/ai], difficulties and\ncounter-difficulties, until p. 219, a. 1, when he approaches to a\npositive determination, as the sequel of various negatives--[Greek:\no(/ti me\\n ou)=n ou)/te ki/n\u00easis ou)/t' a)/neu kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s o( chro/nos\ne)sti/, phanero/n. _l\u00eapte/on_ de/, e)pei\\ z\u00eatou=men ti/ e)stin o(\nchro/nos, _e)nteu=then a)rchome/nois_, ti/ t\u00ea=s kin\u00ea/se\u00f4/s e)stin.]\nHe pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns\n(see [Greek: u(pokei/sth\u00f4], a. 30), until at length he arrives at his\nfinal definition of Time--[Greek: a)rithmo\\s kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s kata\\ to\\\npro/teron kai\\ u(/steron, kai\\ sunech\u00ea/s (sunechou=s ga\\r)]--which he\ndeclares to be [Greek: phanero/n], p. 220, a. 25.\n\nIt is plain that the phrase [Greek: e)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi] here\ndesignates the preliminary dialectic tentative process, before the\nfinal affirmative is directly attempted, as we read in De Gener. et\nCorr. i. 3, p. 317, b. 13: [Greek: peri\\ me\\n ou)=n tou/t\u00f4n e)n\na)/llois _te di\u00eapo/r\u00eatai kai\\ di\u00f4/ristai_ toi=s lo/gois e)pi\\\nplei=on]--first, [Greek: to\\ _diaporei=n_], next, [Greek: to\\\n_diori/zein_].]\n\nNow what is it that Aristotle here means by \"exoteric discourse?\" We\nmay discover by reading the matter comprised between the two\nforegoing citations. We find a string of perplexing difficulties\nconnected with the supposition that Time exists: such as, \"That all\nTime is either past or future, of which the former no longer exists,\nand the latter does not yet exist; that the Now is no part of Time,\nfor every Whole is composed of its Parts, and Time is not composed of\nNows,\" &c. I do not go farther here into these subtle suggestions,\nbecause my present purpose is only to illustrate what Aristotle calls\n\"exoteric discourse,\" by exhibiting what he himself announces to be a\nspecimen thereof. It is the process of noticing and tracing out all\nthe doubts and difficulties ([Greek: a)pori/as]) which beset the\nenquiry in hand, along with the different opinions entertained about\nit either by the vulgar, or by individual philosophers, and the\nvarious reasons whereby such opinions may be sustained or impugned.\nIt is in fact the same process as that which, when performed (as it\nwas habitually and actively in his age) between two disputants, he\ncalls _dialectic debate_; and which he seeks to encourage as well as\nto regulate in his treatise entitled Topica. He contrasts it with\nphilosophy, or with the strictly didactic and demonstrative\nprocedure: wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires\nthe learner to admit, and then deduces from them, by syllogisms\nconstructed in regular form, consequences indisputably binding on all\nwho have admitted the principles. But though Aristotle thus\ndistinguishes Dialectic from Philosophy, he at the same time declares\nit to be valuable as an auxiliary towards the purpose of philosophy,\nand as an introductory exercise before the didactic stage begins. The\nphilosopher ought to show his competence as a dialectician, by\nindicating and handling those various difficulties and controversies\nbearing on his subject, which have already been made known, either in\nwritings or in oral debate.[40]\n\n[Footnote 40: See Aristot. Topic. i. p. 100, b. 21, p. 101, a. 25,\n34-36, b. 2. [Greek: Pro\\s de\\ ta\\s kata\\ philosophi/an e)pist\u00ea/mas\n(chr\u00ea/simos \u00ea( pragmatei/a), o(/ti duna/menoi pro\\s a)mpho/tera\ndiapor\u00ea=sai r(a=|on e)n e(ka/stois katopso/metha ta)l\u00eathe/s te kai\\\nto\\ pseu=dos], p. 105, b. 30. [Greek: Pro\\s me\\n ou)=n philosophi/an\nkat' a)l\u00eatheian peri\\ **au)t\u00f4=n pragmateue/on, _**dialektik\u00f4=s de\\\npro\\s do/xan_.]\n\nCompare also the commencement of book B. in the Metaphysica, p. 995,\na. 28 seq., and, indeed, the whole of book B., which contains a\ndialectic discussion of numerous [Greek: a)pori/ai]. Aristotle\nhimself refers to it afterwards ([Greek: G]. p. 1004, a. 32) in the\nwords [Greek: u(/per e)n tai=s a)pori/ais e)lechth\u00ea].\n\nThe Scholia of Alexander on the beginning of the Topica (pp. 251,\n252, Brandis) are instructive; also his Scholia on p. 105, b. 30, p.\n260, a. 24. [Greek: _dialektik\u00f4=s de\\ pro\\s do/xan_, \u00f4(s e)n tau/t\u00ea|\nt\u00ea=| pragmatei/a|] (_i.e._ the Topica) [Greek: kai\\ e)n toi=s\nr(\u00eatorikoi=s, kai\\ _e)n toi=s e)x\u00f4terikoi=s_. kai\\ ga\\r e)n\ne)kei/nois plei=sta kai\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n** \u00ea)thik\u00f4=n kai\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n\nphusik\u00f4=n _e)ndo/x\u00f4s_ le/getai.]\n\nWe see here that Alexander understands by the _exoteric_ the\ndialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics.\n\nIn the Eudemian Ethica also (i. 8, p. 1217, b. 16) we find [Greek:\ne)pe/skeptai de\\ polloi=s peri\\ au)tou= tro/pois, kai\\ e)n toi=s\ne)x\u00f4terikoi=s lo/gois kai\\ e)n toi=s kata\\ philosophi/an], where we\nhave the same antithesis in other words--Exoteric or Dialectic\n_versus_ Philosophical or Didactic. Compare a clear statement in\nSimplikius (Schol. ad Physic. p. 364, b. 19). [Greek: Pr\u00f4=ton me\\n\nlogik\u00f4=s e)picheirei=, tou/testi pithan\u00f4=s kai\\ e)ndo/x\u00f4s, kai\\ e)/ti\nkoino/tero/n p\u00f4s kai\\ dialektik\u00f4/teron. \u00ca( ga\\r dialektik\u00ea\\ \u00ea(\nA)ristote/lous koin\u00ea/ e)sti me/thodos peri\\ panto\\s tou=\nprotethe/ntos e)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n sullogizome/n\u00ea--to\\ ga\\r logiko\\n \u00f4(s\nkoino\\n ei)/\u00f4then a)ntidiaste/llein ta| oi)kei/\u00f4| kai\\ kata\\ phu/sin\ntou= pra/gmatos kai\\ a)podeiktik\u00f4=|.]]\n\nWe thus learn, from the example furnished by Aristotle himself, what\nhe means by \"exoteric discourses.\" The epithet means literally,\n_extraneous to_, _lying on the outside of_; in the present case, on\nthe outside of philosophy, considered in its special didactic and\ndemonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is\nnevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for\nphilosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica\nand Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric\ntreatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica\nis one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a\ndialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points,\nbefore he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of\nhis own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several\nother passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in\nthe Metaphysica, the treatises De Anim\u00e2, De Generatione et\nCorruptione, &c.\n\n[Footnote 41: We find the epithet [Greek: e)x\u00f4teriko\\s] used once by\nAristotle, not in conjunction with [Greek: lo/goi], but with [Greek:\npra/xeis], designating those acts which are performed with a view to\nsome ulterior and extraneous end ([Greek: t\u00f4=n a)pobaino/nt\u00f4n\ncha/rin], as contrasted with [Greek: pra/xeis\nau)totelei=s--oi)kei=ai]): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29.\n[Greek: schol\u00ea=| **ga\\r a)\\n o( theo\\s e)/choi kal\u00f4=s kai\\ pa=s o(\nko/smos, oi(=s ou)k ei)si\\n e)x\u00f4terikai\\ pra/xeis para\\ ta\\s\noi)kei/as ta\\s au)t\u00f4=n.] In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase [Greek:\n_toi=s a)llotri/ois lo/gois_ sophi/zontai] is used much in the same\nsense as [Greek: _toi=s e)x\u00f4terikoi=s_ lo/gois]: _i.e._ opposed to\n[Greek: toi=s oi)kei/ois]--to that which belongs specially to the\nscientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218,\nb. 18).\n\nThe phrase [Greek: dia\\ t\u00f4=n e)x\u00f4terik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n], in Aristot.\nPhysic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase [Greek: e)k\nt\u00f4=n ei)\u00f4tho/t\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n le/gesthai], in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13,\nappear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad\nArist. Phys. p. 501.]\n\n[Footnote 42: If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica,\nwhere Aristotle undertakes to examine [Greek: To/pos], _Place_, we\nshall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of [Greek:\na)pori/ai], exactly analogous to that which he himself calls [Greek:\ne)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi], when he proceeds to examine [Greek: Chro/nos],\n_Time_: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12,\nb. 31. He does the like also about [Greek: Keno/n], _Vacuum_, p. 213,\na. 20, b. 28, and about [Greek: A)/peiron], _Infinitum_, iii. p. 204,\nb. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).\n\nCompare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1,\nBr.)--[Greek: _i)/s\u00f4s_ de\\] (Simplikius uses this indecisive word\n[Greek: i)/s\u00f4s]) [Greek: o(/ti \u00ea( e)ph' e(ka/tera a)pori/a tou=\nlo/gou e)x\u00f4terik\u00ea/ tis \u00ea)=n, \u00f4(s Eu)/d\u00eamo/s ph\u00easi, dialektik\u00ea\\ ma=llon\nou)=sa], with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes\nthe same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it\n_exoteric_.]\n\nHaving thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of\nAristotle himself, what he means by \"exoteric discourses,\" we must\ninterpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages\nin which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase,\nhe does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his\nown--nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean\nthis; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a\ndialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions\nand probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of\nothers, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates\nwhich his treatise called Topica presupposes--this is a point which\nthe phrase itself does not determine. He _may_ mean to allude, in\nsome cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but\nhe may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies\ncarried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on\nintellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays\nrefers \"exoteric discourse\" to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when\nMadvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the\ncontemporary oral dialectic[43]--I think that neither of these\nexplanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each\nparticular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable.\nWe cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where\nAristotle alludes to the \"exoteric discourses,\" than to understand\nthe general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus\ndesignates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in\ngeneral (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a\npreparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some\nparticular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient\nand satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future\ndeduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited;\nwithout informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was\nwritten or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol.\ni. \u00a7 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of [Greek:\ne)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi], as conceived by Aristotle. See also the\ndissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of\nAristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp.\n107-152--which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a\ncollection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it.\nIt is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the\nsupposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die\nDialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by _exoteric books_ are\nalways meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much\nreasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad\nCicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Anim\u00e2, p.\n123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant\nany writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of\ncultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other\nhand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has\ndefended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer,\nAristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is\nthus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these\ntwo opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively\nright. \"Exoteric discourse,\" as I understand it, might be found both\nin the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men\nout of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic\nworks. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which\nAristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric\ndiscourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by\ncultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the\n_salons_ or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at\nAthens--this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the\nTopica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled\ndialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and\nthat this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens.\nTo discuss these matters in the way which he calls [Greek: pro\\s\ndo/xan], was more frequent than to discuss them [Greek: pro\\s\na)l\u00ea/theian].\n\nZell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage\nin Aristotle's Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in a\nprevious note), \"quo loco, \u00e0 Buhlio neglecto, [Greek: e)x\u00f4terikoi\\\nlo/goi] idem significant quod alibi [Greek: koinai\\ do/xai,\nei)\u00f4tho/tes lo/goi], vel [Greek: ta\\ lego/mena]: qu\u00e6 semper,\npriusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet\nAristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1.\" I find also in Weisse\n(Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a\nfair explanation of what Aristotle really means by _exoteric_; an\nexplanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment\nerroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).]\n\n[Footnote 44: Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i.\n13, p. 1102, a. 26. [Greek: le/getai de\\ peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n kai\\ e)n toi=s\ne)x\u00f4terikoi=s lo/gois a)rkou/nt\u00f4s e)/nia, kai\\ chr\u00easte/on au)toi=s],\nis explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring\nto oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors;\nand this _may_ possibly be a correct explanation.]\n\nFrom the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn\nbetween some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that\nwere not so; these last being occasionally designated as\n_akroamatic_. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out\nwhich, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of\nthese heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero,\nStrabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly called\n_exoteric_, _i.e._ consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse\nand debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an\nexoteric _book_, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his\nDialogues. But all the works designated as akroamatic (or\nnon-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of\n\"exoteric discourse\"; as the Physica ([Greek: Phusik\u00ea\\ A)kro/asis])\nand the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction\nindicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works,\nwherein \"exoteric discourse\" was exclusive or paramount,--and\nanother, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some\nspecified didactic purpose.[45] To this last class belong all the\nworks of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have\nfound none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.\n\n[Footnote 45: To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by\nWeisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: \"Dass\ndieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten\nB\u00fccherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleich\n_exoterisch_ und _esoterisch_ sein konnte; und zweitens, dass\n_exoterisch_ \u00fcberhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den\npositiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen\nunmittelbar als Glied eintritt.\" But Weisse goes on afterwards to\ngive a different opinion (about the meaning of _exoteric_ books),\nconformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda;\nand in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in\nwhich Aristotle handled the Abstracta, _Place_ and _Infinite_, is\njust the same as that which he declares to be _exoteric_ in the case\nof _Time_. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not\naccurate: \"[Greek: E)x\u00f4terika\\] dicebantur, qu\u00e6 ad rhetoricas\nmeditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam\nconducebant. [Greek: A)kroatika\\] autem vocabantur, in quibus\nphilosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; qu\u00e6que ad natur\u00e6\ncontemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant.\" It\nappears to me that _disceptationes dialectic\u00e6_ ought to be\ntransferred to the department [Greek: e)x\u00f4terika/], and that\n_civilium rerum notitia_ belongs as much to [Greek: a)kroatika\\] as\nto [Greek: e)x\u00f4terika/]. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question\nvery ably and instructively, Essai sur la M\u00e9taphysique d'Aristote,\npp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have\ncited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings\ngo really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks,\njustly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of\nSearch) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute\nForchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot.\nExot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when\nAristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: [Greek:\nnomi/santas ou)=n i(kan\u00f4=s polla\\ le/gesthai kai\\ t\u00f4=n e)n toi=s\ne)x\u00f4terikoi=s lo/gois peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)ri/st\u00eas z\u00f4/\u00eas, kai\\ nu=n\nchr\u00easte/on au)toi=s], he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be\nso; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover,\neven in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions,\n[Greek: e)n toi=s e)x\u00f4terik\u00f4=s lo/gois] (Eth. N. I. 13).]\n\nTo understand fully the extent comprehended by the word _exoteric_,\nwe must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative--\n_extraneous to philosophy_, and suitable to an audience not specially\ntaught or prepared for philosophy. Now this negative characteristic\nbelongs not merely to dialectic (as we see it in the example above\ncited from the Aristotelian Physica), but also to rhetoric or\nrhetorical argument. We know that, in Aristotle's mind, the\nrhetorical handling and the dialectical handling, are placed both of\nthem under the same head, as dealing with opinions rather than with\ntruth.[46] Both the one and the other are parted off from the\ndidactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth;\nthough dialectic has a distant affinity with that march, and is\nindeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher. The term _exoteric_ will\nthus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical\nargument.[47] Of the latter, we have just seen a specimen extracted\nfrom the Physica; of the former, I know no specimen remaining, but\nthere probably were many of them in the Aristotelian dialogues now\nlost--that which was called 'Eudemus,' and others. With these\ndialogues Cicero was probably more familiar than with any other\ncomposition of Aristotle. I think it highly probable that Aristotle\nalludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to\n\"exoteric discourses.\" To that extent I agree with Bernays; but I see\nno reason to believe (as he does) that the case is the same with all\nthe passages, or that the epithet is to be understood _always_ as\nimplying one of these lost Aristotelian dialogues.[48]\n\n[Footnote 46: See the first two chapters of Aristotle's Rhetorica,\nespecially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.:\n[Greek: o(/l\u00f4s ou)/s\u00eas _pro\\s do/xan_ t\u00ea=s pragmatei/as t\u00ea=s peri\\\nt\u00ea\\n r(\u00eatorik\u00ea/n], which is exactly what he says also about\nDialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De\nSermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: \"Quod si Dialecticus et\nRhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et\nRhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat--de his ipsis veteribus\nDialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul\net rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum\ndebet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui\ncum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more,\nillorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentes\"--Ferrari\nadverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the\ndialectician (_sensu Aristotelico_), handling often the same\nsubjects, but in a different way: between the [Greek: oi)kei=ai\na)rchai/], upon which didactic method rested, and the [Greek: do/xai]\nor diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority,\nfrom which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).]\n\n[Footnote 48: I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts\nhis case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between\np. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior\npublic for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page,\ndenied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just\nindicated amounts only to this--that the dialogues were _included in_\nAristotle's phrase, [Greek: e)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi]; which appears to me\ntrue.]\n\nThere grew up, in the minds of some commentators, a supposition of\n\"exoteric doctrine\" as denoting what Aristotle promulgated to the\npublic, contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved\nfor a special few, and denoted by the term _esoteric_; though this\nterm is not found in use before the days of Lucian.[49] I believe the\nsupposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to\nAristotle; but it is true as to the Pythagoreans, and is not without\nsome colour of truth even as to Plato. That Aristotle employed one\nmanner of explanation and illustration, when discussing with advanced\npupils, and another, more or less different, when addressing an\nunprepared audience, we may hold as certain and even unavoidable; but\nthis does not amount to a double positive doctrine. Properly\nspeaking, indeed, the term \"exoteric\" (as I have just explained it\nout of Aristotle himself) does not designate, or even imply, any\npositive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial\ndebate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the\nexpress purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing\naspects of each. There are indeed a few exceptional cases, in which\n\"exoteric discourse\" will itself have thrown up a tolerably\ntrustworthy result: these few (as I have above shown) Aristotle\noccasionally singles out and appeals to. But as a general rule, there\nis no _doctrine_ which can properly be called _exoteric_: the\n\"exoteric discourse\" suggests many new puzzles, but terminates\nwithout any solution at all. The doctrine, whenever any such is\nproved, emerges out of the didactic process which follows.\n\n[Footnote 49: Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nCATEGORI\u00c6.\n\n\nOf the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have\nalready mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there\nstill remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any\nreasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence,\nin respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative,\nsystematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of\nfact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of\nthese treatises, we perceive some in which the order of sequence is\ndetermined by assignable reasons; as regards others, no similar\ngrounds of preference appear. The works called 1. De Coelo; 2. De\nGeneratione et Corruptione; 3. Meteorologica,--are marked out as\nintended to be studied in immediate succession, and the various\nZoological treatises after them. The cluster entitled Parva Naturalia\nis complementary to the treatise De Anim\u00e2. The Physica Auscultatio is\nreferred to in the Metaphysica, and discusses many questions\nidentical or analogous, standing in the relation of prior to a\nposterior, as the titles indicate; though the title 'Metaphysica' is\nnot affixed or recognized by Aristotle himself, and the treatise so\ncalled includes much that goes beyond the reach of the Physica. As to\nthe treatises on Logic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Poetics,\nMechanics, &c., we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient\norder of study. Of no one among them can we assign the date of\ncomposition or publication. There are indeed in the Rhetorica,\nPolitics, and Meteorologica, various allusions which must have been\nwritten later than some given events of known date; but these\nallusions may have been later additions, and cannot be considered as\nconclusively proving, though they certainly raise a presumption, that\nthe entire work was written subsequently to those events.\n\nThe proper order in which the works of Aristotle ought to be studied\n(like the order proper for studying the Platonic dialogues),[1] was\nmatter of debate from the time of his earliest editors and\ncommentators, in the century immediately preceding the Christian era.\nBo\u00eathus the Sidonian (Strabo's contemporary and fellow-student)\nrecommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology\nshould be perused first; contending that these were the easiest, the\nmost interesting, and, on the whole, the most successful among all\nthe Aristotelian productions. Some Platonists advised that the\nethical treatises should be put in the front rank, on the ground of\ntheir superior importance for correcting bad habits and character;\nothers assigned the first place to the mathematics, as exhibiting\nsuperior firmness in the demonstrations. But Andronikus himself, the\nearliest known editor of Aristotle's works, arranged them in a\ndifferent order, placing the logical treatises at the commencement of\nhis edition. He considered these treatises, taken collectively, to be\nnot so much a part of philosophy as an _Organon_ or instrument, the\nuse of which must be acquired by the reader before he became\ncompetent to grasp or comprehend philosophy; as an exposition of\nmethod rather than of doctrine.[2] From the time of Andronikus\ndownward, the logical treatises have always stood first among the\nwritten or printed works of Aristotle. They have been known under the\ncollective title of the 'Organon,' and as such it will be convenient\nstill to regard them.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen.\nL. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises\nstand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions,\ncorresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle\nhimself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; [Greek:\nthe\u00f4r\u00eatikai/] 2. Practical; [Greek: praktikai/]. 3. Constructive or\nTechnical; [Greek: poi\u00eatikai/].\n\nPatricius, in his Discussiones Peripatetic\u00e6, published in 1581 (tom.\ni. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who\nwill undertake to give an account of Aristotle's philosophy _from\nAristotle himself_ (instead of taking it, as others before him had\ndone, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander,\nPorphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will\nconsult _all_ the works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself,\nas his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius\nthen proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the\nprofessors \"in Italicis scholis\" lectured, and to which the attention\nof all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of\nPorphyry. 2. The Categori\u00e6. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The\nAnalytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book.\n5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first\nbook; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second;\nthen parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The\nDe Coelo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et\nCorruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Anim\u00e2; all the three\nbooks. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third,\nsixth, and eleventh. \"Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis\nordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot\nlibris, mirum silentium.\" Patricius expressly remarks that neither\nthe Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full\ncourse of four years. But he does not remark--what to a modern reader\nwill seem more surprising--that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica,\nnor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of\nAlexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a.\n47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8.\nThis conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by\nAristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The\ncontemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i.\n136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.\n\nAristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as\n[Greek: the\u00f4r\u00eatikai/, praktikai/, poi\u00eatikai/]; next he subdivides the\nfirst of the three into [Greek: phusik\u00ea/, math\u00eamatik\u00ea/, pr\u00f4/t\u00ea\nphilosophi/a]. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this\ndistribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission\nas follows: \"Diese auffallende Erscheinung erkl\u00e4rt sich daraus, dass\ndiese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle\nSein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer\nBetrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; w\u00e4hrend die Logik\ndas bloss rationelle Sein, das [Greek: o(\\n \u00f4(s a)l\u00eathe/s],\nbehandelt.\" (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p.\n39.)--Investigations [Greek: peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)l\u00eathei/as, o(\\n tro/pon\ndei= a)pode/chesthai] are considered by Aristotle as belonging to\n[Greek: ta\\ A)naluktika]; enquiries into method in the first\ninstance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys.\n[Greek: G]. p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys. ]Greek: G]. 1005, b. 7, he\ndeclares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of the\n_principia_ of syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima\n(compare Metaphys. Z. 12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary\n(p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which\nAristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to\nMetaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among\nhis [Greek: A)pori/ai] Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes\napplied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ, ii. p.\n294.]\n\nThese treatises are six in number:--1. Categori\u00e6;[4] 2. De\nInterpretatione, or De Enunciatione; 3. Analytica Priora; 4.\nAnalytica Posteriora; 5. Topica; 6. De Sophisticis Elenchis. This\nlast short treatise--De Sophisticis Elenchis--belongs naturally to\nthe Topica which precedes it, and of which it ought to be ranked as\nthe ninth or concluding book. Waitz has printed it as such in his\nedition of the Organon; but as it has been generally known with a\nseparate place and title, I shall not depart from the received\nunderstanding.\n\n[Footnote 4: Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them,\nconsider the treatise Categori\u00e6 not to be the work of Aristotle. The\narguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and\neven if they were, the treatise could not be left out of\nconsideration, since the _doctrine_ of the Ten Categories is\nindisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2,\npp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.]\n\nAristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a\ndistinct aggregate, nor as belonging to one and the same department,\nnor as bearing one comprehensive name. We find indeed in the Topica\nreferences to the Analytica, and in the Analytica references to the\nTopica. In both of them, the ten Categories are assumed and\npresupposed, though the treatise describing them is not expressly\nmentioned: to both also, the contents of the treatise De\nInterpretatione or Enunciatione, though it is not named, are\nindispensable. The affinity and interdependence of the six is\nevident, and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating\nthem as belonging to one and the same department. To that department\nthere belonged also several other treatises of Aristotle, not now\npreserved, but specified in the catalogue of his lost works; and\nthese his disciple Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Phanias, had before\nthem. As all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on\nthe same or similar topics,[5] amplifying, elucidating, or\ncontroverting the views of their master, the Peripatetics immediately\nsucceeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature, in\nwhich the six treatises now constituting the Organon appeared as\nportions, but not as a special aggregate in themselves.\n\n[Footnote 5: Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.]\n\nOf the two treatises which stand first in the Aristotelian\nOrganon--the Categori\u00e6 and the De Interpretatione--each forms in a\ncertain sense the complement of the other. The treatise De\nInterpretatione handles Propositions (combinations of terms in the\nway of Subject and Predicate), with prominent reference to the\nspecific attribute of a Proposition--the being true or false, the\nobject of belief or disbelief; the treatise Categori\u00e6 deals with\nthese same Terms (to use Aristotle's own phrase) pronounced without\nor apart from such combination. In his definition of the simple\nTerm, the Proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown\nas the correlate or antithesis to it.[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: [Greek: Ta\\ a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s lego/mena--t\u00f4=n kata\\\nm\u00eademi/an sumplok\u00ea\\n legome/n\u00f4na] Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See\nSchol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad\nAristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.\n\nThe Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most\nprominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge,\nadvanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates\nand the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited,\nhe asks, [Greek: \u00ea)kou/sate de\\ au)= tinos t\u00f4=n e)m\u00f4=n e)pit\u00eadei/\u00f4n\nu(ps\u00ealogoume/nou kai\\ brenthuome/nou _e)pi\\ toi=s sun\u00f4nu/mois \u00ea)\\\no(m\u00f4nu/moi=s \u00ea)\\ par\u00f4nu/mois_]; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)\n\nReference is made (in the Scholia on the Categori\u00e6, p. 43, b. 19) to\na classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at\nleast as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since\nSpeusippus died in 339 B.C. We do not hear enough of this to\nunderstand clearly what it was. Bo\u00eathus remarked that Aristotle had\nomitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this\nmatter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De Coelo,\ni. p. 280, b. 2.]\n\nThe first distinction pointed out by Aristotle among simple,\nuncombined Terms, or the things denoted thereby, is the Homonymous,\nthe Synonymous, and the Paronymous. _Homonymous_ are those which are\ncalled by the same name, used in a different sense or with a\ndifferent definition or rational explanation. _Synonymous_ are those\ncalled by the same name in the same sense. _Paronymous_ are those\ncalled by two names, of which the one is derived from the other by\nvarying the inflexion or termination.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.]\n\nWe can hardly doubt that it was Aristotle who first gave this\npeculiar distinctive meaning to the two words Homonymous and\nSynonymous, rendered in modern phraseology (through the Latin)\n_Equivocal_ and _Univocal_. Before his time this important\ndistinction between different terms had no technical name to\ndesignate it. The service rendered to Logic by introducing such a\ntechnical term, and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking\nwhich it indicated, was great. In every branch of his writings\nAristotle perpetually reverts to it, applying it to new cases, and\nespecially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and\nfrequently, under the common persuasion that their meaning is not\nonly thoroughly known but constant and uniform. As a general fact,\nstudents are now well acquainted with this source of error, though\nthe stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant,\never renewed and diversified. But in the time of Aristotle the source\nitself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice, nor\nsignalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon. The natural\nbias which lead us to suppose that one term always carries one and\nthe same meaning, was not counteracted by any systematic warning or\ngeneralized expression. Sokrates and Plato did indeed expose many\nparticular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology. No part\nof the Platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which\nthis operation is performed, forcing the respondent to feel how\nimperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use. But it is\nrarely Plato's practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or\nsystematic distinctions. He has no general term corresponding to\nhomonymous or equivocal; and there are even passages where (under the\nname of Prodikus) he derides or disparages a careful distinctive\nanalysis of different significations of the same name. To recognize a\nclass of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name, was\nan important step in logical procedure; and that step, among so many\nothers, was made by Aristotle.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the\nCategori\u00e6 (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his\npupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published\nby Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against\nsome critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments\n([Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa, sun\u00f4/numa], &c.), instead of proceeding at once\nto the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that\nwithout understanding this distinction between _equivoca_ and\n_univoca_, the Categories themselves could not be properly\nappreciated; for Ens--[Greek: to\\ o)\\n]--is homonymous in reference\nto all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the\nCategories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a\nGenus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes\nthat this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown\nand never self-suggested to the ordinary mind ([Greek: o(/s\u00f4n ga\\r\ne)/nnoian ou)k e)/chomen, tou/t\u00f4n pro/l\u00eapsin ou)k e)/chomen], p. 20),\nand therefore required to be brought out first of all at the\nbeginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come\nlater on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of\nfamiliar terms loosely employed, (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20,\n21.)]\n\nThough Aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms\nimplicated in predication, and terms not so implicated,[9] yet when\nhe comes to explain the functions of the latter class, he considers\nthem in reference to their functions as constituent members of\npropositions. He immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of\nmatters (_Entia_): That which is affirmable of a Subject, but is not\nin a Subject; That which is in a Subject, but is not affirmable of a\nSubject; That which is both in a Subject, and affirmable of a\nSubject; That which is neither in a Subject, nor affirmable of a\nSubject.[10]\n\n[Footnote 9: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. [Greek: t\u00f4=n legome/n\u00f4n\nta\\ me\\n kata\\ sumplok\u00ea\\n le/getai, ta\\ d' a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s; ta\\\nme\\n ou)=n kata\\ sumplok\u00ea\\n oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos tre/chei, a)/nthr\u00f4pos\nnika=|; ta\\ d' a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s oi)=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos, bou=s, tre/chei,\nnika=|.]\n\nIt will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can\nonly explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be\nassumed as foreknown. That which Aristotle discriminates in this\ntreatise, in the phrases--[Greek: le/gesthai kata\\ sumplok\u00ea\\n] and\n[Greek: le/gesthai a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s] is equivalent to what we read\nin the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently\nexpressed, [Greek: ph\u00f4n\u00ea\\ s\u00eamantik\u00ea\\ \u00f4(s kata/phasis] and [Greek:\nph\u00f4n\u00ea\\ s\u00eamantik\u00ea\\ \u00f4(s pha/sis].]\n\n[Footnote 10: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.]\n\nThis fundamental quadruple distinction of _Entia_, which serves as an\nintroduction to the ten Categories or Predicaments, belongs to words\naltogether according to their relative places or functions in the\nproposition; the meanings of the words being classified accordingly.\nThat the learner may understand it, he ought properly to be master of\nthe first part of the treatise De Interpretatione, wherein the\nconstituent elements of a proposition are explained: so intimate is\nthe connection between that treatise and this.\n\nThe classification applies to _Entia_ (Things or Matters)\nuniversally, and is thus a first step in Ontology. He here looks at\nOntology in one of its several diverse aspects--as it enters into\npredication, and furnishes the material for Subjects and Predicates,\nthe constituent members of a proposition.\n\nOntology, or the Science of _Ens quatenus Ens_, occupies an important\nplace in Aristotle's scientific programme; bearing usually the title\nof First Philosophy, sometimes Theology, though never (in his works)\nthe more modern title of Metaphysica. He describes it as the\nuniversal and comprehensive Science, to which all other sciences are\nrelated as parts or fractions. Ontology deals with _Ens_ in its\nwidest sense, as an _Unum_ not generic but analogical--distinguishing\nthe derivative varieties into which it may be distributed, and\nsetting out the attributes and accompaniments of _Essentia_\nuniversally; while other sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, &c.,\nconfine themselves to distinct branches of that whole;[11] each\nhaving its own separate class of _Entia_ for special and exclusive\nstudy. This is the characteristic distinction of Ontology, as\nAristotle conceives it; he does not set it in antithesis to\nPhenomenology, according to the distinction that has become current\namong modern metaphysicians.\n\n[Footnote 11: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33,\nE. p. 1025, b. 8. [Greek: e)/stin e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea tis \u00ea)\\ the\u00f4rei= to\\\no)\\n \u00ea(=| o)\\n kai\\ ta\\ tou/t\u00f4| u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/; au(/t\u00ea d'\ne)sti\\n ou)demia=| t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n e)piskopei= _katho/lou peri\\ tou=\no)/ntos \u00ea(=| o(/n, a)lla\\ me/ros au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai peri\\\ntou/tou the\u00f4rou=si to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s], &c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.]\n\nNow _Ens_ (or _Entia_), in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not a\nsynonymous or univocal word, but an homonymous or equivocal word; or,\nrather, it is something between the two, being equivocal, with a\ncertain qualification. Though not a _Summum Genus_, _i.e._ not\nmanifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity, nor\ndivisible into species by the addition of well-marked essential\n_differenti\u00e6_, it is an analogical aggregate, or a _Summum Analogon_,\ncomprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name\nfrom being all related in some way or other to a common root or\n_fundamentum_, the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer\nor more distant in degree. The word _Ens_ is thus homonymous, yet in\na qualified sense. While it is not univocal, it is at the same time\nnot absolutely equivocal. It is _multivocal_ (if we may coin such a\nword), having many meanings held together by a multifarious and\ngraduated relationship to one common _fundamentum_.[12] _Ens_ (or\n_Entia_), in this widest sense, is the theme of Ontology or First\nPhilosophy, and is looked at by Aristotle in four different principal\naspects.[13]\n\n[Footnote 12: Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as [Greek: to\\\nme/son t\u00f4=n te sun\u00f4nu/m\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4n, to\\ a)ph' e(no/s],\n&c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys. Z. p.\n1030, a. 34.\n\nDexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title,\nthis intermediate stage between [Greek: sun\u00f4/numa] and [Greek:\no(m\u00f4/numa]. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as [Greek:\no(m\u00f4/numon], while other philosophers considered it as [Greek:\nsun\u00f4/numon] (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he\nintimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain\ncontinuity and interdependence ([Greek: sune/cheian kai\\\na)ll\u00ealouchi/an]) each with the others, branching out from [Greek:\nou)si/a] in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii.\nsects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon\n[Greek: diai/resis] (generic division), nor yet is it simple\nenumeration ([Greek: a)pari/thm\u00easis] of incoherent items. In the\nPhysica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: [Greek: ei)si\\\nde\\ t\u00f4=n o(m\u00f4numi\u00f4n ai( me\\n polu\\ a)pe/chousi ai( de\\ e)/chousai/\ntina o(moio/t\u00eata, ai( d' e)ggu\\s \u00ea)\\ ge/nei \u00ea)\\ a)nalogi/a|, dio\\ ou)\ndokou=sin o(m\u00f4numi/ai ei)=nai ou)=sai.]]\n\n[Footnote 13: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 7, E. p.\n1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the\nnote of Bonitz.]\n\n1. [Greek: To\\ o)\\n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]--_Ens per Accidens_--_Ens_\naccidental, or rather concomitant, either as rare and exceptional\nattribute to a subject, or along with some other accident in the same\ncommon subject.\n\n2. [Greek: To\\ o)\\n \u00f4(s a)l\u00eathe/s, kai\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)\\n \u00f4(s\npseu=dos]--_Ens_, in the sense /of Truth, _Non-Ens_, in the sense of\nFalsehood. This is the _Ens_ of the Proposition; a true affirmation\nor denial falls under _Ens_ in this mode, when the mental conjunction\nof terms agrees with reality; a false affirmation or denial, where no\nsuch agreement exists, falls under _Non-Ens_.[14]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18,--p. 1028, a. 4.\n[Greek: ou) ga\\r e)sti to\\ pseu=dos kai\\ to\\ a)l\u00eathe\\s e)n toi=s\npra/gmasin--a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|--ou)k e)/x\u00f4 d\u00ealou=sin ou)=sa/n tina\nphu/sin tou= o)/ntos.] Also [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 1: [Greek:\nto\\ kuri\u00f4/tata o)\\n a)l\u00eathes kai\\ pseu=dos]. In a Scholion, Alexander\nremarks: [Greek: to\\ de\\ \u00f4(s a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s o)\\n pa/thos e)sti\\ kai\\\nbou/l\u00eama dianoi/as, to\\ de\\ z\u00eatei=n to\\ e(ka/st\u00f4| dokou=n ou)\nspho/dra a)nagkai=on.]]\n\n3. [Greek: To\\ o)\\n duna/mei kai\\ to\\ o)\\n e)nergei/a|]--_Ens_,\npotential, actual.\n\n4. [Greek: To\\ o)\\n kata\\ ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata t\u00f4=n kat\u00eagori\u00f4=n]--_Ens_,\naccording to the ten varieties of the Categories, to be presently\nexplained.\n\nThese four are the principal aspects under which Aristotle looks at\nthe aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal word _Entia_.\nIn all the four branches, the varieties comprised are not species\nunder a common genus, correlating, either as co-ordinate or\nsubordinate, one to the other; they are _analoga_, all having\nrelationship with a common term, but having no other necessary\nrelationship with each other. Aristotle does not mean that these four\nmodes of distributing this vast aggregate, are the only modes\npossible; for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of\ndistributions.[15] Nor would he maintain that the four distributions\nwere completely distinguished from each other, so that the same\nsubordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two; for on the\ncontrary, the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great\ndegree, especially the first and fourth. But he considers the four as\ndiscriminating certain distinct aspects of _Entia_ or _Entitas_, more\nimportant than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out,\nand as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the Science\ncalled Ontology.\n\n[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10.\nCompare the able treatise of Brentano, \"Ueber die Bedeutung des\nSeienden nach Aristoteles,\" pp. 6, 7.]\n\nOf these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly\ndismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,[16] being conceived as\nhaving little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more\nto Logic than to Ontology; _i.e._ to the subjective processes of\nnaming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the\nobjective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.[17] It is the third\nand fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the\nfourth only (_Ens_ according to the ten figures of the Categories)\nwhich is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the\nOrganon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into\none.\n\n[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028. a. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15,\nwith Schwegler's Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by\nSimplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and\nthe Metaphysica: [Greek: Ai( ga\\r a)rchai\\ kata\\ me\\n t\u00ea/n\ns\u00eamantik\u00ea\\n au)t\u00f4=n le/xin e)n t\u00ea=| logik\u00ea=| pragmatei/a| d\u00ealou=ntai,\nkata\\ de\\ ta\\ s\u00eamaino/mena e)n t\u00ea=| Meta\\ ta\\ Phusika\\ oi)kei/\u00f4s.]\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ o)/nta] are equivalent to [Greek: ta\\ lego/mena], in this\nand the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20,\nb. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.\n\nThis is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered\nas Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for\npropositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with\nthe exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers\nand hearers.\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ lego/mena] (or Entia considered in this aspect) are\ndistinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. [Greek: Ta\\ lego/mena\n_kata\\ sumplok\u00ea/n_, oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos tre/chei, a)/nthropos nika=|.]\n2. [Greek: Ta\\ lego/mena _a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s_] (or [Greek: kata\\\nm\u00eademi/an sumplok\u00ea/n]) [Greek: oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos, bou=s, tre/chei,\nnika=|.]\n\nWe are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation\nis the Prius Natur\u00e2, which must be presupposed as known before we can\nunderstand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a.\n16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain\nwhat is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of\nAristotle; see Metaphys. Z. p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the\nentire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can\nunderstand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which\nthat act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the\nProposition, [Greek: o(/ron de\\ kal\u00f4= ei) o)\\n dialu/etai \u00ea(\npro/tasis] (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ lego/mena], as here used by Aristotle, coincides in\nmeaning with what the Stoics afterwards called [Greek: Ta\\\nlekta/]--of two classes: 1. [Greek: _lekta\\ au)totel\u00ea=_], one branch\nof which, [Greek: ta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata], are equivalent to the Aristotelian\n[Greek: ta\\ kata\\ sumplok\u00ea\\n lego/mena]. 2. [Greek: _lekta\\\ne)llip\u00ea=_], equivalent to [Greek: ta\\ a)/neu sumplok\u00ea=s lego/mena]\n(Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii.\n69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to [Greek: ta\\ diano\u00eata\\] in\nAristotle: [Greek: o( diano\u00eato\\s A)ristome/n\u00eas] (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47,\nb. 22).\n\nHobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): \"Nor is it at\nall necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as\nthese, _a man_, _a tree_, _a stone_, are the names of the things\nthemselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are\nrepresented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be\nnot things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can\nremember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have\nnames to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this\nword _future_ is a name; but no future thing has yet any being.\nMoreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever\ncan be, has a name--_impossible_. To conclude, this word _nothing_ is\na name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract\ntwo and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call\nthat subtraction to mind, this speech _nothing remains_, and in it\nthe word _nothing_, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say\ntruly, _less than nothing_ remains, when we subtract more from less;\nfor the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake, and\ndesires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But\nseeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though\nthat which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature,\nyet is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word _thing_ to\nwhatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly\nexistent, or be only feigned.\"\n\nThe Greek neuter gender ([Greek: to\\ lego/menon] or [Greek: to\\\nlekto/n, ta\\ lego/mena] or [Greek: ta\\ lekta/]) covers all that\nHobbes here includes under the word _thing_.--Scholia ad Aristot.\nPhysic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: [Greek: o)noma/zontai me\\n kai\\\nta\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/nta, o(ri/zontai de\\ mo/na ta\\ o)/nta.]]\n\nOf this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the\nfirst distinction set forth in the Categori\u00e6--the distinction between\nmatters _predicated of_ a Subject, and matters which are _in_ a\nSubject--the Subject itself being assumed as the _fundamentum_\ncorrelative to both of them. The definition given of that which is\n_in_ a Subject is ontological: viz., \"_In_ a Subject, I call that\nwhich is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist\nseparately from that in which it is.\"[18] By these two negative\ncharacteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define\nwhat is meant by being _in_ a Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes\namong them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though\nHobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but\nmust be elucidated by examples.[19]\n\n[Footnote 18: Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2,\nii. 8, 2-3.]\n\nThe distinction here drawn by Aristotle between being _predicated of_\na Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between\nessential and non-essential predication: all the predicates\n(including the _differentia_) which belong to the essence, fall under\nthe first division;[20] all those which do not belong to the essence,\nunder the latter. The Subjects--what Aristotle calls the First\nEssences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the\nfullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual\nthings or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree.\nThese are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted\nand unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates\nas possible, but declines to take into account); they are always\nSubjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the\nSubjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there\nare also Second Essences--Species and Genus, which stand to the first\nEssence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other\nCategories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.[21] These\nSecond Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is\nan Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the\nSecond Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it\nbelongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus\nis farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of\n_more or less_ in Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more\ncomplete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the\nGenus. As he recognizes a First Essence, _i.e._ an individual object\n(such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an\nindividual accident (this particular white colour, that particular\ngrammatical knowledge) which is _in_ a Subject, but is not\n_predicated of_ a Subject; this particular white colour exists _in_\nsome given body, but is not _predicable of_ any body.[22]\n\n[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus\ndid not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same\nmanner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in\n[Greek: ta\\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias,\nBasil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry\ncareful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See\nSchol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p.\n106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b.\n26, [Greek: to\\ de\\ e)n o(/l\u00f4| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/r\u00f4|, kai\\ to\\\nkata\\ panto\\s kat\u00eagorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin],\nhe seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it\nis not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but\nthat First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the\nspecies which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a.\n9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)npl\u00f4=s de\\\nta\\ a)/toma kai\\ e(\\n a)rithm\u00f4=| kat' ou)deno\\s u(pokeime/nou\nle/getai, e)n u(pokeime/n\u00f4| de\\ e(/nia ou)de\\n k\u00f4lu/ei ei)=nai; \u00ea(\nga/r tis grammatik\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n e)n u(pokeime/n\u00f4| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here\nrecognizes an attribute as \"individual and as numerically one;\" and\nvarious other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say,\nthat an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically,\nand is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum\nNumero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of\ndifferent objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in\nwhich we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum\nNumero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the\n[Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek:\npr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a--ou) ga\\r e)n e)sti to\\ u(pokei/menon \u00d4(/sper \u00ea(\npr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a, a)lla\\ kata\\ poll\u00f4=n o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos le/getai kai\\ to\\\nz\u00f4=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he\nought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though\nit is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is\n_in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_,\naccording to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two\npassages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016,\nb. 32: [Greek: a)rithm\u00f4=| me\\n \u00f4(=n \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea mi/a], &c.]\n\nRespecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the\ncommencement of this treatise on the Categories--between predicates\nwhich are _affirmed of_ a Subject, and predicates which are _in_ a\nSubject[23]--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by\nwhich you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species\nand Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be\n_predicated of_ Sokrates, but are not _in_ Sokrates; while knowledge\nis _in_ Sokrates, but cannot be _predicated of_ Sokrates; and may be\n_predicated of_ grammar, but is not _in_ grammar. But if we look at\nthis comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the\npredicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the\npreceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal,\nrational).[24] If, in place of these three last words, we substitute\nthe abstract words corresponding to them--humanity, animality,\nrationality--we shall have to say that these are _in_ Sokrates,\nthough they cannot (in their abstract form) be _predicated of_\nSokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which\nAristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the\nabstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise,\nwe can no longer say that this is _in_ Sokrates, and that it may be\n_predicated of_ grammar. Abstract alone can be _predicated of_\nabstract; concrete alone can be _predicated of_ concrete; if we\ndescribe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The\nAbstract is _in_ the Concrete--the Concrete contains or embodies the\nAbstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when\ndescribed by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described\nby the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different\nCategory.[25] The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the\nphilosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the\nCategori\u00e6, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential\nand predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be _in_\nthe Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be _co-efficients of_\nits essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this\ndistinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other\nworks. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categori\u00e6 on\none side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the\nCategori\u00e6 he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on\nverbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical\nstructure of a proposition.[26]\n\n[Footnote 23: The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51,\nb. 46) as follows:--[Greek: ai( pr\u00f4=tai ou)si/ai u(pokeu=ntai pa=sin,\na)ll' ou)ch o(moi/\u00f4s; toi=s me\\n ga\\r _pro\\s u(/parxin_, tou/testi\ntoi=s sumbeb\u00eako/sin, toi=s de\\ _pro\\s kat\u00eagori/an_, tou/testi tai=s\nkatho/lou ou)si/ais.]]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this.--System der\nLogik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.]\n\n[Footnote 25: The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of\ndescribing the Differentia--whether by the concrete word [Greek:\npezo\\n], or by the abstract [Greek: pezo/t\u00eas]--gives occasion to an\nobjection against Aristotle's view, and to a reply from Dexippus not\nvery conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a.\n14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase\n[Greek: e(/n tini]. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform\nor consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categori\u00e6, pp. 44, 45,\n53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br.,\nwe shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his\nfluctuation. The doctrine of the Categori\u00e6 was found especially\ndifficult in its application to the Differentia.\n\nIn Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, [Greek: o(/sa de\\\nm\u00ea\\ ou)si/an s\u00eamai/nei, dei= kata/ tinos u(pokeime/nou\nkat\u00eagorei=sthai], which is at variance with the language of the\nCategori\u00e6, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be\nsaid about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; [Greek: D]. p. 1017, b. 13.\nSee the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.\n\nSee also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a.\n31: [Greek: ou)the\\n ga\\r t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ch\u00f4risto/n e)sti para\\ t\u00ea\\n\nou)si/an; pa/nta ga\\r kath' u(pokeime/nou t\u00ea=s ou)si/as le/getai],\nwhere Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used [Greek: a)nti\\ tou=\ne)n u(pokeime/n\u00f4|] (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).]\n\nLastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting\nthose predicates which he describes as (not _in a Subject_ but)\n_affirmed_ or _denied of_ a Subject--_i.e._ the essential predicates.\nIn these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied\nof the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the\nSubject.[27] This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact\na brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the\nSyllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica\nPriora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.\n\n[Footnote 27: Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.]\n\nAfter such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds[28] to give the\nenumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other\nof which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of\nentering into a proposition, must belong: 1. _Essence_ or\n_Substance_; such as, man, horse. 2. _How much_ or _Quantity_; such\nas, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. _What manner of_ or\n_Quality_; such as, white, erudite. 4. _Ad aliquid_--_To something_\nor _Relation_; such as, double, half, greater. 5. _Where_; such as,\nin the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. _When_; such as, yesterday,\nlast year. 7. _In what posture_; such as, he stands up, he is sitting\ndown. 8. _To have_; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. _Activity_;\nsuch as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. _Passivity_; such as, he\nis being cut, he is being burned.\n\n[Footnote 28: Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.]\n\n_Ens_ in its complete state--concrete, individual, determinate--\nincludes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First _Ens_\nbeing the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question\nbe asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in\nthe answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of\nthese ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will\ncomprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten\nis a _Generalissimum_; having more or fewer species contained under\nit, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (_Ens_ not\nbeing a genus) So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or\ndescribe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing\ntwo or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even\nof wider extent than _Summa Genera_; thus, Quality cannot be\nconsidered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases\nfalling under it. It is a _Summum Analogon_, reaching beyond the\ncomprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to\nmany cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.[29] And again the\nsame particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under\nRelation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.[30]\nMoreover, Good, like _Ens_ or _Unum_, is common to all the\nCategories, but is differently represented in each.[31]\n\n[Footnote 29: Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. [Greek: e)/sti de\\ \u00ea(\npoio/t\u00eas t\u00f4=n pleonach\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n], &c.\n\nSee the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true\nexplanation of this phrase, [Greek: t\u00f4=n pleonach\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n] (p.\n69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies\nhere a [Greek: sun\u00f4/nomon].]\n\n[Footnote 30: Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of\nDexippus, p. 48, a. 28-37.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic.\nEudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.]\n\nAristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the\nten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4.\nRelation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon\nsome, nothing at all.\n\nHis decuple partition of _Entia_ or _Enunciata_ is founded entirely\nupon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to\nPropositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which\nthey bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a\nproposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of\nscientific research, but from common speech; and from the dialectic,\nfrequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and\ntalk, about received and current opinions.[32] We may presume him to\nhave studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to\ndiscover what were the different relations in which Subjects and\nPredicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various\nquestions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the\nanswers suitable to be returned.[33]\n\n[Footnote 32: Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: \"Id Categoriis non\nde ips\u00e2 rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales\napparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut\nin Categoriis alia sit [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a] et in prima\nphilosophia: illa enim partes habet, h\u00e6c vero non componitor ex\npartibus.\"\n\nCompare Metaphys. Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the [Greek: a)pori/a] in Z.\np. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.\n\nThe different meaning of [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a] in the Categori\u00e6 and\nin the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and\nseeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which\nI shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der\nGriech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche\nDialektik, p. 141, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer\ngiven, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: [Greek:\ne)a\\n ga\\r a)podid\u00f4=| tis t\u00ea\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean ou)si/an ti/ e)sti,\ngn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron kai\\ oi)keio/teron a)pod\u00f4/sei], &c.; also ibid. p. 2,\nb. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.]\n\nAristotle ranks as his first and fundamental Category Substance or\nEssence--[Greek: Ou)si/a]; the abstract substantive word\ncorresponding to [Greek: To\\ o)/n]; which last is the vast aggregate,\nnot generically One but only analogically One, destined to be\ndistributed among the ten Categories as _Summa Genera_. The First\n_Ens_ or First Essence--that which is _Ens_ in the fullest sense--is\nthe _individual_ concrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates,\nBukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This First _Ens_\nis indispensable as Subject or _Substratum_ for all the other\nCategories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only;\nit never appears as a predicate of anything else. As _Hic Aliquis_ or\n_Hoc Aliquid_, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of\nall the work of predication. It is _Ens_ or Essence most of all, _par\nexcellence_; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all First\n_Entia_ were supposed to be removed, neither Second _Entia_ nor any\nof the other Categories could exist.[34]\n\n[Footnote 34: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. [Greek: Ou)si/a \u00ea(\nkuri\u00f4/tata kai\\ pr\u00f4/t\u00f4s kai\\ ma/lista legome/n\u00ea--m\u00ea\\ ou)s\u00f4=n ou)=n\nt\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n ou)si\u00f4=n, a)du/naton t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ti ei)=nai.]]\n\nThe Species is recognized by Aristotle as a Second _Ens_ or Essence,\nin which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely\nthe character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as\nPredicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,[35] in\nwhich both the First and the Second Essence are included; it is\nfarther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has\ntherefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as\npredicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the\nFirst Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more\nthan the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this\nrespect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse,\nthat tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.[36] The First\nEssence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or\ndegrees of more or less.\n\n[Footnote 35: Aristotle here, in the Categori\u00e6, ranks Genus and\nSpecies as being, both of them, [Greek: deu/terai ou)si/ai]. Yet\nsince he admits Genus to be farther removed from [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea\nou)si/a] than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a\nThird Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or\nordination of [Greek: ou)si/a] into First, Second, and Third, founded\nupon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the\nCategori\u00e6 ranks as [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a], ranks as [Greek: tri/t\u00ea\nou)si/a] in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys. [Greek: \u00ca]. p. 1043. a.\n18-28.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.\n\nNothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences,\nor said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare\nwhat the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates,\n_What_ he _is_? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus\nto which he belongs--that he is a man or an animal--your answer will\nbe appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood\nif you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you\nanswer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz.,\nthat he is white, that he is running), your answer will be\ninappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declare\n_what_ Sokrates _is_.[37] Accordingly, none of these other Categories\ncan be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First\nand of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of\nFirst Essences.[38]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ibid. p. 2, b. 29-37. [Greek: ei)ko/t\u00f4s de\\ meta\\ ta\\s\npr\u00f4/tas ou)si/as mo/na t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea kai\\ ta\\ ge/n\u00ea\ndeu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na ga\\r d\u00ealoi= t\u00ea\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean ou)si/an\nt\u00f4=n kat\u00eagoroume/n\u00f4n. to\\n ga/r tina a)/nthr\u00f4pon e)a\\n a)podid\u00f4=| tis\nti/ e)sti, to\\ me\\n ei)=dos \u00ea)\\ to\\ ge/nos a)podidou\\s _oi)kei/\u00f4s\na)pod\u00f4/sei_, kai\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron poi\u00ea/sei a)/nthr\u00f4pon \u00ea)\\ z\u00f4=|on\na)podidou/s; t\u00f4=n de\\ a)/ll\u00f4n o(/, ti a)\\n a)podid\u00f4=| tis,\n_a)llotri/\u00f4s e)/stai a)poded\u00f4k\u00f4/s_, oi(=on leuko/n \u00ea)\\ tre/chei \u00ea)\\\no(tiou=n t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n a)podidou/s. \u00d4(/ste ei)ko/t\u00f4s t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n\ntau=ta mo/na ou)si/ai le/gontai.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.]\n\nEssence or Substance is not _in_ a Subject; neither First nor Second\nEssence. The First Essence is neither _in_ a Subject nor _predicated\nof_ a Subject; the Second Essences are not _in_ the First, but are\n_predicated of_ the First. Both the Second Essence, and the\ndefinition of the word describing it, may be _predicated of_ the\nFirst; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas,\nof that which is _in_ a Subject, the name may often be predicated,\nbut never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second\nEssence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is not _in_ a\nSubject, but that it may be _predicated_ univocally _of_ a Subject--\nnot only its name, but also the definition of its name.[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. [Greek: koino\\n de\\ kata\\\npa/s\u00eas ou)si/as to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)n u(pokeime/n\u00f4| ei)=nai--ou)k i)/dion de\\\nt\u00ea=s tou=to ou)si/as, a)lla\\ kai\\ \u00ea( diaphora\\ t\u00f4=n m\u00ea\\ e)n\nu(pokeime/n\u00f4| e)sti/n--u(pa/rchei de\\ tai=s ou)si/ais kai\\ tai\\s\ndiaphorai=s to\\ pa/nta sun\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s a)p' au)t\u00f4=n le/gesthai.]]\n\nAll Essence or Substance seems to signify _Hoc Aliquid Unum Numero_.\nThe First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does\nnot really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is\nenunciated by a substantive name, like the First.[40] It signifies\nreally _Tale Aliquid_, answering to the enquiry _Quale Quid_? for it\nis said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each\nnumerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The\nSecond Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signify\n_Tale Aliquid_ simply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It\nsignifies _Talem Aliquam Essentiam_; it declares what the Essence is,\nor marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences,\neach _Unum Numero_. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than\nthe Species.[41]\n\n[Footnote 40: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10-16: [Greek: Pa=sa de\\\nou)si/a _dokei=_ to/de ti s\u00eamai/nein. e)pi\\ me\\n ou)=n t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n\nou)si\u00f4=n a)namphisb\u00ea/t\u00eaton kai\\ a)l\u00eathe/s e)stin o(/ti to/de ti\ns\u00eamai/nei; a)/tomon ga\\r kai\\ e(\\n a)rithm\u00f4=| to\\ d\u00ealou/meno/n\ne)stin; e)pi\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n deute/r\u00f4n ou)si\u00f4=n _phai/netai me\\n o(moi/\u00f4s\nt\u00f4=| sch\u00ea/mati t\u00ea=s pros\u00eagori/as to/de ti s\u00eamai/nein_, o(/tan ei)/p\u00ea|\na)/nthr\u00f4pon \u00ea)\\ z\u00f4=|on, _ou) m\u00ea\\n a)l\u00eathe/s ge_, a)lla\\ ma=llon\npoio/n ti s\u00eamai/nei.]]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 3, b. 18-24.]\n\nAgain, Essences have no contraries.[42] But this is not peculiar to\nEssences, for _Quanta_ also have no contraries; there is nothing\ncontrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one\nof the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other\nvariety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse,\nneither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was\nat another time; though he may become more or less white, more or\nless handsome.[43]\n\n[Footnote 42: Ibid. b. 24-30.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ibid. b. 34, seq.]\n\nBut that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remaining\n_Unum et Idem Numero_, it is capable by change in itself of receiving\nalternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category.\nFor example, this particular colour, being one and the same in\nnumber, will never be now black, and then white; this particular\naction, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time\nvirtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all\nthe other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white,\nhot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An\nobjector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also\nof Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remains\n_Unum Numero_, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes;\nfor the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting, may now be\ntrue and may presently become false. But this case is different,\nbecause there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the\nperson or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the\nsame man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick;\nnow hot, then cold.[44]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.]\n\nHere Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament--Essence\nor Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranks Quantity first\namong them.[45] _Quantum_ is either Continual or Discrete; it\nconsists either of parts having position in reference to each other,\nor of parts not having position in reference to each other. Discrete\n_Quanta_ are Number and Speech; Continual _Quanta_ are Line, Surface,\nBody, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no\nposition in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface,\nBody, have position in reference to each other. These are called\n_Quanta_, primarily; other things are called _Quanta_ in a secondary\nway, [Greek: kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s].[46] Thus we say _much white_, when\nthe surface of white is large; we say, _the action is long_, because\nmuch time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked,\n_how long the action_ is? we must answer by specifying its length in\ntime--a year or a month.\n\n[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 21, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.]\n\nTo _Quantum_ (as to Essence or Substance) there exists no\ncontrary.[47] There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits\nor an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more\nproperly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to\nanother Category. Nor is _Quantum_ ever more or less _Quantum_; it\ndoes not admit of degree. The _Quantum_ a yard is neither more nor\nless _Quantum_ than that called a foot. That which is peculiar to\n_Quanta_ is to be equal or unequal:[48] the relations of equality and\ninequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of\n_Quanta_.\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 11, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. p. 6, a. 26-35.]\n\nFrom the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that of\nRelation;[49] which he discusses in immediate sequence after\nQuantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his\nexposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how\nclosely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it\nwas that the distinction between the two should be made clear.\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 36, seq.]\n\n_Relata_ ([Greek: ta\\ pro/s ti]--_ad Aliquid_) are things such, that\nwhat they are, they are said to be _of other things_, or are said to\nin some other manner _towards something else_ ([Greek: o(/sa au)ta\\\na(/per e)sti\\n **e(te/r\u00f4n ei)=nai le/getai, \u00ea)\\ o(p\u00f4stou=n a)/ll\u00f4s\npro\\s e(/teron]). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greater\n_than another_; that which is called double is called also double _of\nanother_. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c.,\nare all _Relata_. Habit, is habit _of something_; perception and\ncognition, are always _of something_; position, is position _of\nsomething_. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some\ncases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or\nthe more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each\nother.[50] All _Relata_ are so designated in virtue of their relation\nto other _Correlata_; the master is master _of a servant_--the\nservant is servant _of a master_. Sometimes the _Correlatum_ is\nmentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus\ncognition is cognition _of_ the _cognitum_, but _cognitum_ is\n_cognitum by_ cognition; perception is perception _of_ the\n_perceptum_, but the _perceptum_ is _perceptum by_ perception.[51]\nThe correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the\nCorrelate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be\ndeclared to be wing _of a bird_, there is no apparent correlation; we\nought to say, the wing is wing _of the winged_, and the winged is\nwinged _through_ or _by_ the wing; for the wing belongs to the bird,\nnot _qu\u00e2 bird_, but _qu\u00e2 winged_,[52] since there are many things\nwinged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term\nappropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of\ncoining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict\naccuracy, [Greek: \u00ea( kephal\u00ea/, tou= kephal\u00f4tou= kephal\u00ea/] not [Greek:\n\u00ea( kephal\u00ea/, tou= z\u00f4=|ou kephal\u00ea/]; [Greek: to\\ p\u00eada/lion, tou=\np\u00eadali\u00f4tou= p\u00eada/lion], not [Greek: to\\ p\u00eada/lion, ploi/ou\np\u00eada/lion].[53]\n\n[Footnote 50: Aristot. Categ. p. 6, b. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 28-37.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 36; p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: ou) m\u00ea\\n a)ll'\ne)ni/ote ou) do/xei a)ntistre/phein, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ oi)kei/\u00f4s pro\\s o(\\\nle/getai a)podoth\u00ea=|, a)lla\\ diama/rt\u00ea| o( a)podidou/s, oi(=on to\\\nptero\\n e)a\\n a)podoth\u00ea=| o)/rnithos, ou)k a)ntistre/phei o)/rnis\npterou=; ou) ga\\r oi)kei/\u00f4s to\\ pr\u00f4=ton a)pode/dotai ptero\\n\no)/rnithos; ou) ga\\r \u00ea(=| o)/rnis, tau/t\u00ea| to\\ ptero\\n au)tou=\nle/getai, a)ll' \u00ea(=| pter\u00f4to/n e)sti; poll\u00f4=n ga\\r kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4n\nptera/ e)stin, a(\\ ou)k ei)si\\n o)/rnithes.]]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ibid. p. 7, a. 6-25. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\\ kai\\\no)nomatopoiei=n I)/s\u00f4s a)nagkai=on, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ kei/menon \u00ea)=| o)/noma\npro\\s o(\\ oi)kei/\u00f4s a)\\n a)podothei/\u00ea], &c.]\n\nThe _Relatum_ and its Correlate seem to be _simul natur\u00e2_. If you\nsuppress either one of the pair, the other vanishes along with it.\nAristotle appears to think, however, that there are many cases in\nwhich this is not true. He says that there can be no _cognoscens_\nwithout a _cognoscibile_, nor any _percipiens_ without a\n_percipibile_; but that there may be _cognoscibile_ without any\n_cognoscens_, and _percipibile_ without any _percipiens_. He says\nthat [Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eato\\n] exists [Greek: pro\\ tou= ai)/sth\u00easin\nei)=nai].[54] Whether any Essence or Substance can be a _Relatum_ or\nnot, he is puzzled to say; he seems to think that the Second Essence\nmay be, but that the First Essence cannot be so. He concludes,\nhowever, by admitting that the question is one of doubt and\ndifficulty.[55]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 15; p. 8, a. 12. The Scholion of Simplikius on\nthis point (p. 65, a. 16, b. 18, Br.) is instructive. He gives his\nown opinion, and that of some preceding commentators, adverse to\nAristotle. He says that [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] and [Greek: to\\\ne)pist\u00eato/n, ai)sth\u00easis] and [Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eato/n], are not\nproperly correlates. The actual correlates with the actual, the\npotential with the potential. Now, in the above pairs, [Greek: to\\\ne)pist\u00eato\\n] and [Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eato\\n] are potentials, while\n[Greek: **e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] and [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis] are actuals; therefore\nit is correct to say that [Greek: to\\ e)pist\u00eato\\n] and [Greek: to\\\nai)sth\u00eato\\n] will not cease to exist if you take away [Greek:\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] and [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis]. But the real and proper\ncorrelate to [Greek: to\\ e)pist\u00eato\\n] would be [Greek: to\\\ne)pist\u00eamoniko/n]: the proper correlate to [Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eato\\n]\nwould be [Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eatiko\\n]. And when we take these two\nlatter pairs, it is perfectly correct to say, [Greek: sunanairei=\ntau=ta a)/ll\u00eala].\n\nIn the treatise, De Partibus Animalium, i. p. 641, b. 2, where\nAristotle makes [Greek: nou=s] correlate with [Greek: ta\\ no\u00eata/], we\nmust understand [Greek: nou=s] as equivalent to [Greek: to\\\nno\u00eatiko/n], and as different from [Greek: \u00ea( no/\u00easis].]\n\n[Footnote 55: Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 22.]\n\nQuality is that according to which Subjects are called Such and Such\n([Greek: poioi/ tines]). It is, however, not a true genus, but a\nvague word, of many distinct, though analogous, meanings including an\nassemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie.[56]\nThe more familiar varieties are--1. Habits or endowments ([Greek:\ne(/xeis]) of a durable character, such as, wise, just, virtuous; 2.\nConditions more or less transitory, such as, hot, cold, sick,\nhealthy, &c. ([Greek: diathe/seis]); 3. Natural powers or\nincapacities, such as hard, soft, fit for boxing, fit for running,\n&c. 4. Capacities of causing sensation, such as sweet of honey, hot\nand cold of fire and ice. But a person who occasionally blushes with\nshame, or occasionally becomes pale with fear, does not receive the\ndesignation of _such or such_ from this fact; the occasional emotion\nis a passion, not a quality.[57]\n\n[Footnote 56: See the first note on p. 66. Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b.\n26: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ \u00ea( poio/t\u00eas t\u00f4=n pleonach\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n], &c.\nCompare Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, a. 33, and the Scholion of\nAlexander, p. 715, a. 5, Br.\n\nThe abstract term [Greek: Poio/t\u00eas] was a new coinage in Plato's\ntime; he introduces it with an apology (The\u00e6tet. p. 182 A.).]\n\n[Footnote 57: Aristot. Categ. p. 9, b. 20-33.]\n\nA fifth variety of Quality is figure or circumscribing form,\nstraightness or crookedness. But dense, rare, rough, smooth, are not\nproperly varieties of Quality; objects are not denominated _such and\nsuch_ from these circumstances. They rather declare position of the\nparticles of an object in reference to each other, near or distant,\nevenly or unevenly arranged.[58]\n\n[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 10, a. 11-24.]\n\nQuality admits, in some cases but not in all, both contrariety and\ngraduation. Just is contrary to unjust, black to white; but there is\nno contrary to red or pale. If one of two contraries belongs to\nQuality, the other of the two will also belong to Quality. In regard\nto graduation, we can hardly say that Quality in the abstract is\ncapable of more and less; but it is indisputable that different\nobjects have more or less of the same quality. One man is more just,\nhealthy, wise, than another; though justice or health in itself\ncannot be called more or less. One thing cannot be more a triangle,\nsquare, or circle than another; the square is not more a circle than\nthe oblong.[59]\n\n[Footnote 59: Aristot. Categ. p. 10, b. 12; p. 11, a. 10, 11-24.]\n\nWhat has just been said is not peculiar to Quality; but one\npeculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned. Quality is the\nfoundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity. Objects are called _like_\nor _unlike_ in reference to qualities.[60]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ibid. p. 11, a. 15.]\n\nIn speaking about Quality, Aristotle has cited many illustrations\nfrom _Relata_. Habits and dispositions, described by their generic\nnames, are _Relata_; in their specific varieties they are Qualities.\nThus cognition is always cognition _of something_, and is therefore a\n_Relatum_; but _grammatik\u00e9_ (grammatical cognition) is not\n_grammatik\u00e9 of any thing_, and is therefore a Quality. It has been\nalready intimated[61] that the same variety may well belong to two\ndistinct Categories.\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 20-38. [Greek: e)/ti ei) tu/gchanoi to\\ au)to\\\npro/s ti kai\\ poio\\n o)/n, ou)de\\n a)/topon e)n a)mphote/rois toi=s\nge/nesin au)to\\ katarithmei=sthai.]]\n\nAfter having thus dwelt at some length on each of the first four\nCategories, Aristotle passes lightly over the remaining six.\nRespecting _Agere_ and _Pati_, he observes that they admit (like\nQuality) both of graduation and contrariety. Respecting _Jac[=e]re_\nhe tells us that the predicates included in it are derived from the\nfact of positions, which positions he had before ranked among the\n_Relata_. Respecting _Ubi_, _Quando_, and _Habere_, he considers them\nall so manifest and intelligible, that he will say nothing about\nthem; he repeats the illustrations before given--_Habere_, as, to be\nshod, or to be armed (to have shoes or arms); _Ubi_, as, in the\nLykeium; _Quando_, as, yesterday, last year.[62]\n\n[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 8-15. [Greek: dia\\ to\\ prophan\u00ea= ei)=nai,\nou)de\\n u(pe\\r au)t\u00f4=n a)/llo le/getai \u00ea)\\ o(/sa e)n a)rch\u00ea=|\ne)rre/th\u00ea], &c.]\n\n. . . . . .\n\n\nNo part of the Aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated\nwith logical tradition, or elicited a greater amount of comment and\ndiscussion,[63] than these Ten Categories or Predicaments. I have\nendeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and\nwith the illustrations of Aristotle; because in many of the comments\nnew points of view are introduced, sometimes more just than those of\nAristotle, but not present to his mind. Modern logicians join the\nCategories side by side with the five Predicables, which are\nexplained in the Eisagoge of Porphyry, more than five centuries after\nAristotle's death. As expositors of Logic they are right in doing\nthis; but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of Aristotle.\nThe mind of Aristotle was not altogether exempt from that\nfascination[64] which particular numbers exercised upon the\nPythagoreans and after them upon Plato. To the number Ten the\nPythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection. The fundamental\nContraries, which they laid down as the Principles of the Universe,\nwere ten in number.[65] After them, also, Plato carried his ideal\nnumbers as far as the Dekad, but no farther. That Aristotle\nconsidered Ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of\ngeneral heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten,\nand looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different\nmanner in which he deals with the different items. At least, such was\nhis point of view when he composed this treatise. Though he\nrecognizes all the ten Categories as co-ordinate in so far that\n(except _Quale_) each is a distinct Genus, not reducible under either\nof the others, yet he devotes all his attention to the first four,\nand gives explanations (copious for him) in regard to these. About\nthe fifth and sixth (_Agere_ and _Pati_)[66] he says a little, though\nmuch less than we should expect, considering their extent and\nimportance. About the last four, next to nothing appears. There are\neven passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of\nthe two last (_Jacere_ and _Habere_), and to recognize no more than\neight Predicaments. In the treatise Categori\u00e6 where his attention is\nfastened on Terms and their signification, and on the appropriate way\nof combining these terms into propositions, he recites the ten\n_seriatim_; but in other treatises, where his remarks bear more upon\nthe matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified, he\nthinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose\napplications are most confined to special subjects. If he had thought\nfit to carry the total number of Predicaments to twelve or fifteen\ninstead of ten,[67] he would probably have had little difficulty in\nfinding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than\n_Jacere_ and _Habere_; the rather, as he himself allows, even in\nregard to the principal Categories, that particulars comprised under\none of them may also be comprised under another, and that there is no\nnecessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one\nCategory exclusively.\n\n[Footnote 63: About the prodigious number of these comments, see the\nScholion of Dexippus, p. 39, a. 34, Br.; p. 5, ed. Spengel.]\n\n[Footnote 64: See Simpl. in Categ. Schol. p. 78, b. 14, Br.; also the\ntwo first chapters of the Aristotelian treatise De Coelo; compare\nalso, about the perfection of the [Greek: tri/t\u00ea su/stasis], De\nPartibus Animalium, ii. p. 646, b. 9; De Generat. Animal. iii. p.\n760, a. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 986, a. 8. There existed, in the\ntime of the later Peripatetics, a treatise in the Doric dialect by\nArchytas--[Greek: Peri\\ tou= Panto/s]--discriminating Ten Categories,\nand apparently the same ten Categories as Aristotle. By several\nAristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed\nby Archytas the Tarentine, eminent both as a Pythagorean philosopher\nand as the leading citizen of Tarentum--the contemporary and friend\nof Plato, and, therefore, of course, earlier than Aristotle. Several\ncritics believed that Aristotle had borrowed his Ten Categories from\nthis work of Archytas; and we know that the latter preserved the\ntotal number of Ten. See Schol. ad Categor. p. 79, b. 3, Br.\n\nBut other critics affirmed, apparently with better reason, that the\nArchytas, author of this treatise, was a Peripatetic philosopher\nlater than Aristotle; and that the doctrine of Archytas on the\nCategories was copied from Aristotle in the same manner as the Doric\ntreatise on the Kosmos, ascribed to the Lokrian Tim\u00e6us, was copied\nfrom the Tim\u00e6us of Plato, being translated into a Doric dialect.\n\nSee Scholia of Simplikius and Bo\u00ebthius, p. 33, a. 1, n.; p. 40, a.\n43, Brandis. The fact that this treatise was ascribed to the\nTarentine Archytas, indicates how much the number Ten was consecrated\nin men's minds as a Pythagorean canon.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Trendelenburg thinks (Geschichte der Kategorienlehre,\np. 131) that Aristotle must have handled the Categories _Agere_, and\n_Pati_ more copiously in other treatises; and there are some passages\nin his works which render this probable. See De Anim\u00e2, ii. p. 416, b.\n35; De Generat. Animal. iv. p. 768, b. 15. Moreover, in the list of\nAristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius, one title appears--\n[Greek: Peri\\ tou= poiei=n kai\\ peponthe/nai] (Diog. L. v. 22).]\n\n[Footnote 67: Prantl expresses this view in his Geschichte der Logik\n(p. 206), and I think it just.]\n\nThese remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by\ncommentators in regard to the Ten Categories. From the century\nimmediately succeeding Aristotle, down to recent times, the question\nhas always been asked, why did Aristotle fix upon Ten Categories\nrather than any other number? and why upon these Ten rather than\nothers? And ancient commentators[68] as well as modern have insisted,\nthat the classification is at once defective and redundant; leaving\nout altogether some particulars, while it enumerates others twice\nover or more than twice. (This last charge is, however, admitted by\nAristotle himself, who considers it no ground of objection that the\nsame particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads.)\nThe replies made to the questions, and the attempts to shew cause for\nthe selection of these Ten classes, have not been satisfactory;\nthough it is certain that Aristotle himself treats the classification\nas if it were real and exhaustive,[69] obtained by comparing many\npropositions and drawing from them an induction. He tries to\ndetermine, in regard to some particular enquiries, under which of the\nTen _Summa Genera_ the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged; he\nindicates some predicate of extreme generality (_Unum_, _Bonum_,\n&c.), which extend over all or several Categories, as equivocal or\nanalogous, representing no true _Genera_. But though Aristotle takes\nthis view of the completeness of his own classification, he never\nassigns the grounds of it, and we are left to make them out in the\nbest way we can.\n\n[Footnote 68: Schol. p. 47, b. 14, seq., 49, a. 10, seq. Br.; also\nSimplikius ad Categor. fol. 15, 31 A, 33 E. ed. Basil., 1551.]\n\n[Footnote 69 Scholia ad Analyt. Poster. (I. xxiii. p. 83, a. 21) p.\n227, b. 40, Br. [Greek: O(/ti de\\ tosau=tai mo/nai ai( kat\u00eagori/ai\nai( kata\\ t\u00f4=n ou)si\u00f4=n lego/menai, e)k t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s lamba/nei.]\n\nBrentano (in his treatise, Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden in\nAristoteles, Sects. 12 and 13, pp. 148-177) attempts to draw out a\nscheme of systematic deduction for the Categories. He quotes (pp.\n181, 182) a passage from Thomas Aquinas, in which such a scheme is\nset forth acutely and plausibly. But if Aristotle had had any such\nsystem present to his mind, he would hardly have left it to be\ndivined by commentators.\n\nSimplikius observes (Schol. ad Categ. p. 44, a. 30) that the last\nnine Categories coincide in the main (excepting such portion of\n_Quale_ as belongs to the Essence) with [Greek: to\\ o)/n kata\\\nsumbeb\u00eako/s]: which latter, according to Aristotle's repeated\ndeclarations, can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific\ntreatment--[Greek: ou)demi/a e)sti\\ peri\\ au)to\\ the\u00f4ri/a], Metaphys.\nE. p. 1026, b. 4; K. p. 1064, b. 17. This view of Aristotle\nrespecting [Greek: to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s], is hardly consistent with a\nscheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates.]\n\nWe cannot safely presume, I think, that he followed out any deductive\nprinciple or system; if he had done so, he would probably have\nindicated it. The decuple indication of general heads arose rather\nfrom comparison of propositions and induction therefrom. Under each\nof these ten heads, some predicate or other may always be applied to\nevery concrete individual object, such as a man or animal. Aristotle\nproceeded by comparing a variety of propositions, such as were\nemployed in common discourse or dialectic, and throwing the different\npredicates into _genera_, according as they stood in different\nlogical relation to the Subject. The analysis applied is not\nmetaphysical but logical; it does not resolve the real individual\ninto metaphysical [Greek: a)rchai\\] or Principles, such as Form and\nMatter; it accepts the individual as he stands, with his full complex\narray of predicates embodied in a proposition, and analyses that\nproposition into its logical constituents.[70] The predicates derive\ntheir existence from being attached to the First Subject, and have a\ndifferent manner of existence according as they are differently\nrelated to the First Subject.[71] What is this individual, Sokrates?\nHe is an _animal_. What is his Species? _Man_. What is the\nDifferentia, limiting the Genus and constituting the Species?\n_Rationality_, _two-footedness_. What is his height and bulk? He is\n_six feet_ high, and is of _twelve stone_ weight. What manner of man\nis he? He is _flat-nosed_, _virtuous_, _patient_, _brave_. In what\nrelation does he stand to others? He is a _father_, a _proprietor_, a\n_citizen_, a _general_. What is he doing? He is _digging his garden_,\n_ploughing his field_. What is being done to him? He is _being rubbed\nwith oil_, he is _having his hair cut_. Where is he? _In the city_,\n_at home_, _in bed_. When do you speak of him? _As he is, at this\nmoment_, _as he was, yesterday_, _last year_. In what posture is he?\nHe is _lying down_, _sitting_, _standing up_, _kneeling_, _balancing\non one leg_. What is he wearing? He _has a tunic_, _armour_, _shoes_,\n_gloves_.\n\n[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1038, b. 15. [Greek: dich\u00f4=s\nu(pokei=tai, \u00ea)\\ to/de ti o)/n, \u00f4(/sper to\\ z\u00f4=|on toi=s pa/thesin,\n\u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea t\u00ea=| e)ntelechei/a|.] The first mode of [Greek:\nu(pokei/menon] is what is in the Categories. For the second, which is\nthe metaphysical analysis, see Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1029, a. 23:\n[Greek: ta\\ me\\n ga\\r a)/lla t\u00ea=s ou)si/as kat\u00eagorei=tai, au(/t\u00ea de\\\nt\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas. \u00f4(/ste to\\ e)/schaton kath' au(to\\ ou)/te ti\\ ou)/te\nposo\\n ou)/te a)/llo ou)the/n e)sti.]\n\nPorphyry and Dexippus tell us (Schol. ad Categ. p. 45, a. 6-30) that\nboth Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton\nu(pokei/menon] and [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon]. The [Greek:\npr\u00f4=ton u(pokei/menon] is [Greek: \u00ea( a)/poios u(/l\u00ea--to\\ duna/mei\ns\u00f4=ma], which Aristotle insists upon in the Physica and Metaphysica,\nthe [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon, o(\\ koin\u00f4=s poio\\n \u00ea)\\ i)di/\u00f4s\nu(phi/statai], coincides with the [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a] of the\nCategories, already implicated with [Greek: ei)=dos] and stopping\nshort of metaphysical analysis.\n\nThe remarks of Bo\u00eathus and Simplikius upon this point deserve\nattention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\\ t\u00ea=s\na)sche/tou u(/l\u00eas e)sti\\n o( par\u00f4\\n lo/gos, a)lla\\ t\u00ea=s \u00ea)/d\u00ea\nsche/sin e)chou/s\u00eas pro\\s to\\ ei)=dos. to\\ de\\ su/ntheton d\u00ealo/noti,\no(/per e)sti\\ to\\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\\ to/de.] They point out\nthat the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories,\nnor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry\nanalysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de\nti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a\nkuri\u00f4/tata kai\\ pr\u00f4/t\u00f4s kai\\ ma/lista legome/n\u00ea].\n\nSimplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\\n de\\ tou= m\u00ea\\\nmn\u00eamoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\\ t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas ai)/tion le/gein, kai\\\nto\\ t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n Kat\u00eagori\u00f4=n pragmatei/an _kata\\ t\u00ea\\n pro/cheiron kai\\\nkoin\u00ea\\n tou= lo/gou chr\u00ea=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\\ de\\ t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas kai\\\ntou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\\ ta\\ u(po\\ tou/t\u00f4n s\u00eamaino/mena ou)k \u00ea)=n\ntoi=s polloi=s sun\u00ea/th\u00ea], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what\nDexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\npr\u00f4/t\u00ean chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' \u00ea(\\n ta\\ pra/gmata d\u00ealou=n\na)ll\u00ealois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).\n\nWaitz, ad Categor. p. 284. \"In Categoriis, non de ips\u00e2 rerum natur\u00e2\net veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi\nvit\u00e2 homini philosophi\u00e2 non imbuto.\"\n\nWe may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form\nand Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to\nthat of [Greek: poio\\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a.\n14.)]\n\n[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek:\no(sach\u00f4=s ga\\r le/getai, tosautach\u00f4=s to\\ ei)=nai s\u00eamai/nei].]\n\nConfining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does\nin the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which\nevery one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we\nshall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine\nquestions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are\nmost likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the\nlast can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person\n(including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls\nnecessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus\nanimal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain\nqualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is\ndoing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must\nbe described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a\ncertain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain\nmanner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him\nunder each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but\nnot always of any particular quantity. Until such information is\ngiven, the concrete individual is not known under conditions\nthoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and\nindependent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation,\npresently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive\nmeaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed\nwith a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or\npassion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads\ndistinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you\nsuppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the\npreceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the\npredicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a\ntunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth\nCategories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the\nlist, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the\nCategories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower\ncomprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable\nvarieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate\nheads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by\nmodern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that\nreason the less entitled to a place in the list.\n\n[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek:\nai( ai)sth\u00eatai\\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]\n\n[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--\"Fragen\nwir, wie Aristoteles \u00fcberhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu\nsprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere\nAntwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen\nPlaton, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des\nSeienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realit\u00e4t von dem\nmenschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der\nVerwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom\nUnbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber f\u00e4higen, zum allseitig\nBestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit \u00fcberhaupt als eine\nselbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von\nihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung\nist sonach: die zeitlich-r\u00e4umlich concret auftretende und hiemit\nindividuell gewordene Substanzialit\u00e4t, in einer dem Zustande der\nConcretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst\ndas ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche\nin der Welt der r\u00e4umlichen Ausdehnung numer\u00e4ren Vielheit erscheint.\nDie ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die\nConcretion f\u00fchrende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit\n\u00fcberhaupt.\"]\n\n[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the\nten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the\nground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).\n\nBo\u00eathus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be\nrecognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic\nobjectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]\n\nIf we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a\nphilosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind\nof Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the\ngreater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme\nof classification, as to the minor features which constitute its\npeculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more\nsignificant than the first four, and the tenth is the most\nsignificant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds\n_Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with\n_Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and\ntenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only\nSubjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the\nsame time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least\nfrequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in\nsome particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his\nhorse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover\nanimals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal\nSubject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined\nby internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to\nknow. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten\nCategories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made\nabout any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least\nprincipally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then,\nhow it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to\nneed no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his\nclothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But\nwhen Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from\nrecognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the\nPost-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categori\u00e6, either by\nhimself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a\npredicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of\n_Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal\nequipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of\nsignification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek:\nD].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of\nphilosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word\n_Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of\nview, dropping that special reference to an individual man as\nSubject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten\nCategories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to\nomit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more\nextensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the\ncontrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories,\ntried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it\nbears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series,\nimmediately after _Relata_.[77]\n\n[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James\nHarris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable\nillustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think,\nhowever, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai]\n(_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in\nthe treatise Categori\u00e6; and that neither he, nor the commentators\nwhom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked\ndistinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and\n[Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement\nof words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid\nsyllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai];\nwhich is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the\nAristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the\nfact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and\nspecial subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and\n[Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach\nshall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the\nlist of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize\n(chap. ii. p. 29).]\n\n[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D].\np. 1023, a. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p.\n92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus,\nand Bo\u00eathus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: pro\u00eagei=tai ga\\r\n\u00ea( sumphu\u00ea\\s t\u00f4=n pro/s ti sche/sis t\u00f4=n e)pikt\u00ea/t\u00f4n sche/se\u00f4n, \u00f4(s\nkai\\ t\u00f4\\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek:\nai( e)pi/kt\u00eatoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian\n[Greek: e)/chein].]\n\nThe narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament\n_Habere_ in the treatise Categori\u00e6, and the enlarged sense given to\nthat term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead\nto a suspicion that the Categori\u00e6 is comparatively early, in point of\ndate, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should\nbegin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger,\nrather than _vice vers\u00e2_. Probably the predicates specially\napplicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by\nlater thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only\nwhich had a wider philosophical application.\n\n[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the\nCategori\u00e6) about [Greek: to\\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's\ned. of the Organon, p. 38.\n\nThe fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian\nCategory [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek:\nai( e)pi/kt\u00eatoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the\nreasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]\n\nI have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten\nPredicaments as independent heads, each the _Generalissimum_ of a\nseparate descending line of predicates, admitted at the same time\nthat various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these\nlines exclusively, but might take rank in more than one line. There\nare some which he enumerates under all the different heads of\nQuality, Relation, Action, Passion. The classification is evidently\nrecognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes\nespecially in regard to Quality and Relation, under both of which\nheads (he says) the same predicates may sometimes be counted.[79] And\nthe observation is much more extensively true than he was aware; for\nhe both conceives and defines the Category of Relation or Relativity\n(_Ad Aliquid_) in a way much narrower than really belongs to it. If\nhe had assigned to this Category its full and true comprehension, he\nwould have found it implicated with all the other nine. None of them\ncan be isolated from it in predication.\n\n[Footnote 79: Aristot. Categ. p. 11, a. 37.\n\nSimplikius says that what Aristotle admits about [Greek: poio/t\u00eas],\nis true about all the other Categories also, viz.: that it is not a\nstrict and proper [Greek: ge/nos]. Each of the ten Categories is\n(what Aristotle says about [Greek: to\\ o(\\n]) [Greek: me/son t\u00f4=n te\nsun\u00f4no/m\u00f4n kai\\ o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4n.--ou)de\\ ga\\r e)kei=na kuri/\u00f4s e)sti\\\nge/n\u00ea, ou)de\\ \u00f4(s ge/n\u00ea t\u00f4=n u(p' au)ta\\ kat\u00eagorei=tai, _ta/xe\u00f4s\nou)/s\u00eas pantachou= pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n kai\\ deute/r\u00f4n_.] (Scholia ad Categor. p.\n69, b. 30, Br.) This is a remarkable observation, which has been\nsufficiently adverted to, I think, by Brentano in his treatise on\nAristotle's Ontology.]\n\nThat _Agere_ and _Pati_ (with the illustrations which he himself\ngives thereof--_urit_, _uritur_) may be ranked as varieties under the\ngeneric Category of Relation or Relativity, can hardly be overlooked.\nThe like is seen to be true about _Ubi_ and _Quando_, when we advert\nto any one of the predicates belonging to either; such as, _in the\nmarket-place_, _yesterday_.[80] Moreover, not merely the last six of\nthe ten Categories, but also the second and fourth (_Quantum_ and\n_Quale_) are implicated with and subordinated to Relation. If we look\nat _Quantum_, we shall find that the example which Aristotle gives of\nit is [Greek: trip\u00ea=chus], tricubital, or three cubits long; a term\nquite as clearly relative as the term [Greek: dipla/sios] or double,\nwhich he afterwards produces as instance of the Category _Ad\nAliquid_.[81] When we are asked the questions, How much is the\nheight? How large is the field? we cannot give the information\nrequired except by a relative predicate--_it is three feet_--_it is\nfour acres_; we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some\nunit of length or superficies already known to him, and we convey our\nmeaning by comparison with such unit. Again, if we turn from\n_Quantum_ to _Quale_, we find the like Relativity implied in all the\npredicates whereby answer is made to the question [Greek: Poio\\s ti/s\ne)sti?] _Qualis est_? What manner of man is he? _He is such as A, B,\nC_--persons whom we have previously seen, or heard, or read of.[82]\n\n[Footnote 80: The remarks of Plotinus upon these four last-mentioned\nCategories are prolix and vague, but many of them go to shew how much\n[Greek: to\\ pro/s ti] is involved in all of the four (Ennead. vi. 1,\n14-18).]\n\n[Footnote 81: Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 184) admits a\ncertain degree of interference and confusion between the Categories\nof _Quantum_ and _Ad Aliquid_; but in very scanty measure, and much\nbeneath the reality.]\n\n[Footnote 82: The following passages from Mr. James Mill (Analysis of\nthe Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. ii. ch. xiv. sect. ii. pp. 48,\n49, 56, 1st ed.) state very clearly the Relativity of the predicates\nof Quantity and Quality:--\n\n\"It seems necessary that I should say something of the word\n_Quantus_, from which the word Quantity is derived. _Quantus_ is the\ncorrelate of _Tantus_. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are relative terms,\napplicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms Great,\nLittle.\"--\"Of two lines, we call the one _tantus_, the other\n_quantus_. The occasions on which we do so, are when the one is as\nlong as the other.\"--\"When we say that one thing is _tantus_,\n_quantus_ another, or one so great, as the other is great; the first\nis referred to the last, the _tantus_ to the _quantus_. The first is\ndistinguished and named by the last. The _Quantus_ is the\nstandard.\"--\"On what account, then, is it that we give to any thing\nthe name _Quantus_? As a standard by which to name another thing,\n_Tantus_. The thing called _Quantus_ is the previously known thing,\nthe ascertained amount, by which we can mark and define the other\namount.\"\n\n\"_Talis_, _Qualis_, are applied to objects in the same way, on one\naccount, as _Tantus_, _Quantus_, on another; and the explanation we\ngave of _Tantus_, _Quantus_, may be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to\nthe pair of relatives which we have now named. _Tantus_, _Quantus_,\nare names applied to objects on account of dimension. _Talis_,\n_Qualis_, are names applied to objects on account of all other\nsensations. We apply _Tantus_, _Quantus_, to a pair of objects when\nthey are equal; we apply _Talis_, _Qualis_, to a pair of objects when\nthey are alike. One of the objects is then the standard. The object\n_Qualis_ is that to which the reference is made.\"\n\nCompare the same work, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 225:--\"The word _Such_ is a\nrelative term, and always connotes so much of the meaning of some\nother term. When we call a thing _such_, it is always understood that\nit is such _as_ some other thing. Corresponding with our words _such\nas_, the Latins had _Talis_, _Qualis_.\"]\n\nWe thus see that all the predicates, not only under the Category\nwhich Aristotle terms _Ad Aliquid_, but also under all the last nine\nCategories, are relative. Indeed the work of predication is always\nrelative. The express purpose, as well as the practical usefulness,\nof a significant predicate is, to carry the mind of the hearer either\nto a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past\ncomparisons. But though each predicate connotes Relation, each\nconnotes a certain _fundamentum_ besides, which gives to the Relation\nits peculiar character. Relations of Quantity are not the same as\nrelations of Quality; the predicates of the former connote a\n_fundamentum_ different from the predicates of the latter, though in\nboth the meaning conveyed is relative. In fact, every predicate or\nconcrete general name is relative, or connotes a Relation to\nsomething else, actual or potential, beyond the thing named. The only\nname not relative is the Proper name, which connotes no attributes,\nand cannot properly be used as a predicate (so Aristotle remarks),\nbut only as a Subject.[83] Sokrates, Kallias, Bukephalus &c., denotes\nthe _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which, when pronounced alone,\nindicates some concrete aggregate (as yet unknown) which may manifest\nitself to my senses, but does not, so far as the name is concerned,\ninvolve necessary reference to anything besides; though even these\nnames, when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same\nobject, may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past\nor future existence, and become thus to a certain extent relative.\n\n[Footnote 83: You may make Sokrates a predicate, in the proposition,\n[Greek: to\\ leuko\\n e)kei=no S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas e)sti/n], but Aristotle\ndismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking (see\nAnalytic. Priora, i. p. 43, a. 35; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 83,\na. 2-16).\n\nAlexander calls these propositions [Greek: ai( para\\ phu/sin\nprota/seis] (see Schol. ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23).\n\nMr. James Harris observes (Philosophical Arrangements, ch. x. p. 214;\nalso 317, 348):--\"Hence too we may see why Relation stands next to\nQuantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which follow are but\ndifferent modes of Relation, marked by some peculiar character over\ntheir own, over and above the relative character, which is common to\nthem all.\" To which I would add, that the first two Categories,\nSubstance and Quantity, are no less relative or correlative than the\neight later Categories; as indeed Harris himself thinks; see the same\nwork, pp. 90, 473: \"Matter and Attribute are essentially distinct,\nyet, like _convex_ and _concave_, they are by nature inseparable. We\nhave already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes; we now\nspeak as to that of matter. [Greek: \u00ca(mei=s de\\ phame\\n me\\n ei)=nai/\ntina u(/l\u00ean t\u00f4=n s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n, a)lla\\ tau/t\u00ean ou)\nch\u00f4rist\u00ea\\n a)ll' a)ei\\ met' e)nanti\u00f4/se\u00f4s--u(/l\u00ean t\u00ea\\n a)ch\u00f4/riston\nme\\n, u(pokeime/n\u00ean de\\ toi=s e)nanti/ois (Aristot. De Gen. et Corr.\np. 329, a. 24). By contraries, Aristotle means here the several\nattributes of matter, hot, cold, &c.; from some one or other of which\nmatter is always inseparable.\"]\n\nWe must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain\nconcrete One and individual,[84] with his attributes essential and\nnon-essential, whatever they may be, though as yet undeclared, and\nwith his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even\nopposite. This is what Aristotle indicates as the most special\ncharacteristic of Substance or Essence, that while it is _Unum et\nIdem Numero_, it is capable of receiving contraries. This\npotentiality of contraries, described as characterizing the _Unum et\nIdem Numero_,[85] is relative to something about to come; the First\nEssence is doubtless logically First, but it is just as much relative\nto the Second, as the Second to the First. We know it only by two\nnegations and one affirmation, all of which are relative to\npredications _in futuro_. It is neither in a Subject, nor predicable\nof a Subject. It is itself the ultimate Subject of all predications\nand all inherencies. Plainly, therefore, we know it only relatively\nto these predications and inherencies. Aristotle says truly, that if\nyou take; away the First Essences, everything else, Second Essences\nas well as Accidents, disappears along with them. But he might have\nadded with equal truth, that if you take away all Second Essences and\nall Accidents, the First Essences will disappear equally. The\ncorrelation and interdependence is reciprocal.[86] It may be\nsuitable, with a view to clear and retainable philosophical\nexplanation, to state the Subject first and the predicates\nafterwards; so that the Subject may thus be considered as logically\n_prius_. But in truth the Subject is only a _substratum_ for\npredicates,[87] as much as the predicates are _superstrata_ upon the\nSubject. The term _substratum_ designates not an absolute or a _per\nse_, but a _Correlatum_ to certain _superstrata_, determined or\nundetermined: now the _Correlatum_ is one of the pair implicated\ndirectly or indirectly in all Relation; and it is in fact specified\nby Aristotle as one variety of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[88] We see\ntherefore that the idea of Relativity attaches to the first of the\nten Categories, as well as to the nine others. The inference from\nthese observations is, that Relation or Relativity, understood in the\nlarge sense which really belongs to it, ought to be considered rather\nas an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories, than\nas a separate Category in itself, co-ordinate with the other nine. It\nis the condition and characteristic of the work of predication\ngenerally; the last analysis of which is into Subject and Predicate,\nin reciprocal implication with each other. I remark that this was the\nview taken of it by some well-known Peripatetic commentators of\nantiquity;[89] by Andronikus, for example, and by Ammonius after him.\nPlato, though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of Categories,\nhas an incidental passage respecting Relativity;[90] conceiving it in\na very extended sense, apparently as belonging more or less to all\npredicates. Aristotle, though in the Categori\u00e6 he gives a narrower\nexplanation of it, founded upon grammatical rather than real\nconsiderations, yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked\nunder the heads of _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, _Jacere_, &c., may\nalso be looked at as belonging to the head of _Ad Aliquid_.[91] This\nlatter, moreover, he himself declares elsewhere to be _Ens_ in the\nlowest degree, farther removed from the _Prima Essentia_ than any of\nthe other Categories; to be more in the nature of an appendage to\nsome of them, especially to _Quantum_ and _Quale_;[92] and to\npresuppose, not only the _Prima Essentia_ (which all the nine later\nCategories presuppose), but also one or more of the others,\nindicating the particular mode of comparison or Relativity in each\ncase affirmed. Thus, under one aspect, Relation or Relativity may be\nsaid to stand _prius natur\u00e2_, and to come first in order before all\nthe Categories, inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business\nof predication (which those Categories are intended to resolve into\nits elements), and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we\ncall the Subject, than to the mode of conceiving what we call its\nPredicates, each and all. Under another aspect, Relativity may be\nsaid to stand last in order among the Categories--even to come after\nthe adverbial Categories _Ubi et Quando_; because its _locus standi_\nis dim and doubtful, and because every one of the subordinate\npredicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of\nthe remaining Categories also. Aristotle remarks that the Category\n_Ad Aliquid_ has no peculiar and definite mode of generation\ncorresponding to it, in the manner that Increase and Diminution\nbelong to _Quantum_, Change to _Quale_, Generation, simple and\nabsolute, to Essence or Substance.[93] New relations may become\npredicable of a thing, without any change in the thing itself, but\nsimply by changes in other things.[94]\n\n[Footnote 84: Simplikius ap. Schol. p. 52, a. 42: [Greek: pro\\s o(/\nphasin oi( spoudaio/teroi t\u00f4=n e)x\u00eag\u00eat\u00f4=n, o(/ti \u00ea( ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea\\\nou)si/a sumpho/r\u00easi/s ti/s e)sti poiot\u00ea/t\u00f4n kai\\ u(/l\u00eas, kai\\ o(mou=\nme\\n pa/nta sumpage/nta mi/an poiei= t\u00ea\\n ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea\\n ousi/an,\nch\u00f4ri\\s de\\ e(/kaston lambano/menon to\\ me\\n poio\\n to\\ de\\ poso/n\ne)sti lambano/menon, \u00ea)/ ti a)/llo.]]\n\n[Footnote 85: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10: [Greek: Ma/lista de\\\nI)/dion tou=to t\u00ea=s ou)si/as dokei= ei)=nai, to\\ tau)to\\n kai\\ e(\\n\na)rithm\u00f4=| o)\\n t\u00f4=n e)nanti/\u00f4n ei)=nai dektiko/n.] See Waitz, note,\np. 290: [Greek: dektiko\\n] dicitur [Greek: to\\ e)n \u00f4(=| pe/phuken\nu(pa/rchein ti].\n\nDexippus, and after him Simplikius, observe justly, that the\ncharacteristic mark of [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a] is this very\ncircumstance of being _unum numero_, which belongs in common to all\n[Greek: pr\u00f4=|tai ou)si/ai], and is indicated by the Proper name:\n[Greek: lu/sis de\\ touo/tou, o(/ti au)to\\ to\\ mi/an ei)=nai\na)rithm\u00f4=|, koino/s e)sti lo/gos]. (Simpl. in Categor., fol. 22\n[Greek: D]].; Dexippus, book ii. sect. 18, p. 57, ed. Spengel.)]\n\n[Footnote 86: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 5. [Greek: m\u00ea\\ ou)s\u00f4=n ou)=n\nt\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n ou)si\u00f4=n a)du/naton t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ti ei)=nai.]\n\nMr. John Stuart Mill observes: \"As to the self-existence of\nSubstance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist\nwithout any other substance; but so also may an attribute without any\nother attributes. And we can no more imagine a substance without\nattributes, than we can imagine attributes without a substance.\"\n(System of Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. p. 61, 6th ed.)]\n\n[Footnote 87: Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, b. 8. [Greek: e)/ti t\u00f4=n\npro/s ti \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea; a)/ll\u00f4| ga\\r ei)/dei a)/ll\u00ea u(/l\u00ea.]\n\nPlotinus puts this correctly, in his criticisms on the Stoic\nCategories; criticisms which on this point equally apply to the\nAristotelian: [Greek: pro/s ti ga\\r to\\ u(pokei/menon, ou) pro\\s to\\\ne)n au)t\u00f4=|, a)lla\\ pro\\s to\\ poiou=n ei)s au)to/, kei/menon. Kai\\\nto\\ u(pokei/menon u(pokei=tai pro\\s to\\ ou)ch u(pokei/menon; ei)\ntou=to, pro\\s ta\\ to\\ e)/x\u00f4], &c. Also Dexippus in the Scholia ad\nCategor. p. 45, a. 26: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r u(pokei/menon kata\\ pro/s ti\nle/gesthai e)do/kei, tini\\ ga\\r u(pokei/menon.]]\n\n[Footnote 88: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 31, p. 1021,\na. 27, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Schol. p. 60, a. 38, Br.; p. 47, b. 26. Xenokrates and\nAndronikus included all things under the two heads [Greek: to\\ kath'\nau(to\\] and [Greek: to\\ pro/s ti]. [Greek: A)ndro/nikos me\\n ga\\r o(\nR(o/dios teleutai/an a)pone/mei toi=s pros ti ta/xin, le/g\u00f4n ai)ti/an\ntoiau/t\u00ean. ta\\ pro/s ti oi)kei/an u(/l\u00ea ou)k e)/chei; _paraphua/di\nga\\r e)/oiken oi)kei/an phu/sin m\u00ea\\ e)chou/s\u00ea| a)lla\\ periplekome/n\u00ea|\ntoi=s e)/chousin oi)kei/an r(i/zan; ai( de\\ e)/nnea kat\u00eagori/ai\noi)kei/an u(/l\u00ean e)/chousin_; ei)ko/t\u00f4s ou)=n teleutai/an \u00f4)/pheilon\ne)/chein ta/xin.] Again, Schol. p. 60, a. 24 (Ammonius): [Greek:\nkal\u00f4=s de/ tines a)peika/zousi ta\\ pro/s ti paraphua/sin], &c. Also\np. 59, b. 41; p. 49, a. 47; p. 61, b. 29: [Greek: i)/s\u00f4s de\\ kai\\\no(/ti ta\\ pro/s ti e)n toi=s a)/llois ge/nesin u(phe/st\u00eake, dia\\\ntou=to su\\n au)toi=s the\u00f4rei=tai, ka)\\n m\u00ea\\ pro\u00eagoume/n\u00eas e)/tuche\nmn\u00ea/m\u00eas (and the Scholia ad p. 6, a. 36, prefixed to Waitz's edition,\np. 33). Also p. 62, a. 37: [Greek: dia\\ tau=ta de\\ \u00f4(s paraphuome/n\u00ean\ntai=s a)/llais kat\u00eagori/ais t\u00ea\\n tou= pro/s ti e)peisodi\u00f4/d\u00ea\nnomi/zousi, kai/toi pro\u00eagoume/n\u00ean ou)=san kai\\ kata\\ diaphora\\n\noi)kei/an the\u00f4roume/n\u00ean.] Bo\u00eathus had written an entire book upon\n[Greek: ta\\ pro/s ti], Schol. p. 61, b. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. 437 C. to 439 B. (compare also\nSophistes, p. 255 C., and Politicus, p. 285). [Greek: Kai\\ ta\\ plei/\u00f4\nd\u00ea\\ pro\\s ta\\ e)la/tt\u00f4 kai\\ ta\\ dipla/sia pro\\s ta\\ \u00ea(mi/sea kai\\\npa/nta ta\\ toiau=ta, kai\\ au)= baru/tera pro\\s koupho/tera kai\\\ntha/tt\u00f4 pro\\s bradu/tera, _kai\\ e)/ti ge ta\\ therma\\ pro\\s ta\\\npsuchra\\_ kai\\ pa/nta ta\\ tou/tois o(/moia, a)=r' ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s\ne)/chei?] (438 C.)]\n\n[Footnote 91: See Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 26, p. 1021, b.\n10. Trendelenburg observes (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, pp. 118-122,\nseq.) how much more the description given of [Greek: pro/s ti] in the\nCategori\u00e6 is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations, than\nin the Metaphysica and other treatises of Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 92: See Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 20: [Greek: to\\ de\\\nkath' au(to\\ kai\\ \u00ea( ou)si/a pro/teron t\u00ea=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti;\nparaphua/di ga\\r tou=t' e)/oike kai\\ sumbeb\u00eako/ti tou= o)/ntos,\n\u00f4(/ste ou)k a)\\n ei)/\u00ea koin\u00ea/ tis e)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n i)de/a.] (The\nexpression [Greek: paraphua/di] was copied by Andronikus; see a note\non the preceding page.) Metaphys. N. p. 1088, a. 22-26: [Greek: to\\\nde\\ pro/s ti pa/nt\u00f4n \u00ea(/kista phu/sis tis \u00ea)\\ ou)si/a t\u00f4=n kat\u00eagori\u00f4n\ne)sti/, kai\\ u(ste/ra tou= poiou= kai\\ posou=; kai\\ _pa/thos ti tou=\nposou= to\\ pro/s ti_, \u00f4(/sper e)le/chth\u00ea, a)ll' ou)ch u(/l\u00ea, ei)/ ti\ne(/teron kai\\ t\u00f4=| o(/l\u00f4s koin\u00f4=| pro/s ti kai\\ toi=s me/resin\nau)tou= kai\\ ei)/desin.] Compare Bonitz in his note on p. 1070, a.\n33.\n\nThe general doctrine laid down by Aristotle, Metaphys. N. p. 1087, b.\n34, seq., about the universality of [Greek: me/tron] as pervading all\nthe Categories, is analogous to the passage above referred to in the\nPoliticus of Plato, and implies the Relativity involved more or less\nin all predicates.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Aristot. Metaph. N. p. 1088, a. 29: [Greek: s\u00eamei=on\nde\\ o(/ti \u00ea(/kista ou)si/a tis kai\\ o)/n ti _to\\ pro\\/s ti_ to\\\nmo/non m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai ge/nesin au)tou= m\u00eade\\ phthora\\n m\u00eade\\ ki/n\u00easin,\n\u00f4(/sper kata\\ to\\ poso\\n au)/x\u00easis kai\\ phthi/sis, kata\\ to\\ poio\\n\na)lloi/\u00f4sis, kata\\ to/pon phora/, kata\\ t\u00ea\\n ou)si/an \u00ea( a(pl\u00ea=\nge/nesis kai\\ phthora/.] Compare K. p. 1068, a. 9: [Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea\ntrei=s ei)=nai kin\u00ea/seis, poiou=, posou=, to/pou. kat' ou)si/an d'\nou)/, dia\\ to\\ m\u00eathe\\n ei)=nai ou)si/a| e)nanti/on, ou)de\\ tou= pro/s\nti.] Also Physica, v. p. 225, b. 11: [Greek: e)nde/chetai ga\\r\nthate/rou metaba/llontos a)l\u00eatheu/esthai tha/teron m\u00eade\\n\nmeta/ballon.] See about this passage Bonitz and Schwegler's notes on\nMetaphys. p. 1068.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Hobbes observes (First Philosophy, part ii. ch. xi. 6):\n\"But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an accident\ndiffering from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of\nthem, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the\nlikeness of one white to another white, or its unlikeness to black,\nis the same accident with its whiteness.\" This may be true about the\nrelations Like and Unlike (see Mr. John Stuart Mill, Logic, ch. iii.\np. 80, 6th ed.) But, in Relations generally, the _fundamentum_ may be\nlogically distinguished from the Relation itself.\n\nAristotle makes the same remarks upon [Greek: to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s] as\nupon [Greek: to\\ pro/s ti]:--That it verges upon Non-ens; and that it\nhas no special mode of being generated or destroyed. [Greek:\nphai/netai ga\\r to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s e)ggu/s ti tou= m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos; t\u00f4=n\nme\\n ga\\r a)/llon tro/pon o)/nt\u00f4n e)/sti ge/nesis kai\\ phthora/, t\u00f4=n\nde\\ kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s ou)k e)/stin.] (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 21.)]\n\nThose among the Aristotelian commentators who denied the title of _Ad\nAliquid_ to a place among the Categories or _Summa Genera_ of\npredicates, might support their views from passages where Aristotle\nranks the Genus as a _Relatum_, though he at the same time declares\nthat the Species under it are not _Relata_. Thus _scientia_ is\ndeclared by him to be a _Relatum_; because it must be _of\nsomething--alicujus scibilis_; while the _something_ thus implied is\nnot specified.[95] But (_scientia_) _musica_, _grammatica_, _medica_,\n&c., are declared not to be _Relata_; the indeterminate _something_\nbeing there determined, and bound up in one word with the predication\nof Relativity. Now the truth is that both are alike _Relata_, though\nboth also belong to the Category of Quality; a man is called _Talis_\nfrom being _sciens_, as well as from being _grammaticus_. Again, he\ngives as illustrative examples of the Category _Ad Aliquid_, the\nadjectives double, triple. But he ranks in a different Category (that\nof _Quantum_) the adjectives bicubital, tricubital ([Greek:\ndip\u00ea=chus, trip\u00ea=chus]. It is plain that the two last of these\npredicates are species under the two first, and that all four\npredicates are alike relative, under any real definition that can be\ngiven of Relativity, though all four belong also to the Category of\n_Quantum_. Yet Aristotle does not recognize any predicates as\nbelonging to _Ad Aliquid_, except such as are logically and\ngrammatically elliptical; that is, such as do not include in\nthemselves the specification of the Correlate, but require to be\nsupplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case,\nspecifying the latter. As we have already seen, he lays it down\ngenerally, that all _Relata_ (or _Ad Aliquid_) imply a _Correlatum_;\nand he prescribes that when the _Correlatum_ is indicated, care shall\nbe taken to designate it by a precise and specific term, not of wider\nimport than the _Relatum_,[96] but specially reciprocating therewith:\nthus he regards _ala_ (a wing) as _Ad Aliquid_, but when you specify\nits correlate in order to speak with propriety ([Greek: oi)kei/\u00f4s]),\nyou must describe it as _ala alati_ (not as _ala avis_), in order\nthat the _Correlatum_ may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating\nwith the _Relatum_. Wing, head, hand, &c., are thus _Ad Aliquid_,\nthough there may be no received word in the language to express their\nexact _Correlata_; and though you may find it necessary to coin a new\nword expressly for the purpose.[97] In specifying the _Correlatum_ of\nservant, you must say, servant _of a master_, not servant of a man or\nof a biped; both of which are in this case accompaniments or\naccidents of the master, being still accidents, though they may be in\nfact constantly conjoined. Unless you say master, the terms will not\nreciprocate; take away master, the servant is no longer to be found,\nthough the man who was called _servant_ is still there; but take away\nman or biped, and the servant may still continue.[98] You cannot know\nthe _Relatum_ determinately or accurately, unless you know the\n_Correlatum_ also; without the knowledge of the latter, you can only\nknow the former in a vague and indefinite manner.[99] Aristotle\nraises, also, the question whether any Essence or Substance can be\ndescribed as _Ad Aliquid_.[100] He inclines to the negative, though\nnot decisively pronouncing. He seems to think that Simo and Davus,\nwhen called men, are Essences or Substances; but that when called\nmaster and slave, they are not so; this, however, is surprising, when\nhe had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents\n([Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/ta]) belonging to the connotation of master. He\nspeaks of the members of an organized body (wing, head, foot) as\nexamples of _Ad Aliquid_; while in other treatises, he determines\nvery clearly that these members presuppose, as a _prius natur\u00e2_, the\ncomplete organism whereof they are parts, and that the name of each\nmember connotes the performance of, or aptitude to perform, a certain\nspecial function: now, such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole\norganism be held together in co-operative agency, so that if this\nlast condition be wanting, the names, head, eye, foot, can no longer\nbe applied to the separate members, or at least can only be applied\nequivocally or metaphorically.[101] It would seem therefore that the\nfunctioning _something_ is here the Essence, and that all its\nmaterial properties are accidents ([Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/ta]).\n\n[Footnote 95: Categor. p. 6, b. 12, p. 11, a. 24; Topic. iv. p. 124,\nb. 16. Compare also Topica, iv. p. 121, a. 1, and the Scholia\nthereupon, p. 278, b. 12-16, Br.; in which Scholia Alexander feels\nthe difficulty of enrolling a generic term as [Greek: pro/s ti],\nwhile the specific terms comprised under it are not [Greek: pro/s\nti]; and removes the difficulty by suggesting that [Greek:\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] may be at once both [Greek: poio/t\u00eas] and [Greek: pro/s\nti]; and that as [Greek: poio/t\u00eas] (not as [Greek: pro/s ti]) it may\nbe the genus including [Greek: mousik\u00ea\\] and [Greek: ge\u00f4metri/a],\nwhich are not [Greek: pro/s ti], but [Greek: poio/t\u00eates].]\n\n[Footnote 96: Categor. p. 6, b. 30, p. 7, b. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Categor. p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\\\no)nomatopoiei=n I)/s\u00f4s a)nagkai=on, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ kei/menon \u00ea)=| o)/noma\npro\\s o(\\ _oi)kei/\u00f4s_ a)\\n a)podothei/\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 98: Categor. p. 7, a. 31. [Greek: e)/ti d' e)a\\n me/n ti\noi)kei/\u00f4s a)podido/menon \u00ea)=| pro\\s o(\\ le/getai, pa/nt\u00f4n\nperiairoume/n\u00f4n t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n o(/sa _sumbeb\u00eako/ta_ e)sti/,\nkataleipome/nou de\\ mo/nou tou/tou pro\\s o(\\ a)pedo/th\u00ea oi)kei/\u00f4s,\na)ei\\ pro\\s au)to\\ r(\u00eath\u00ea/setai, oi(=on o( dou=los e)a\\n pro\\s\ndespo/t\u00ean le/g\u00eatai, periairoume/n\u00f4n t\u00f4=n _a)/ll\u00f4n a(pa/nt\u00f4n o(/sa\nsumbeb\u00eako/ta_ e)sti\\ _t\u00f4=| despo/t\u00ea|_ oi(=on to\\ di/podi ei)=nai kai\\\nto\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas dektik\u00f4=| kai\\ _to\\ a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|_, kataleipome/nou de\\\nmo/nou tou= despo/t\u00ean ei)=nai, a)ei\\ o( dou=los pro\\s au)to\\\nr(\u00eath\u00easetai.]\n\nThis is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of\npredication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In\ngeneral, it would be said that _man_ and _biped_ belonged to the\nEssence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); and the being a master to the Accidents\nor Accompaniments ([Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/ta]). Here the case is reversed;\nman and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the\nEssence. What is connoted by the term _master_ is here the essential\nidea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by _servant_;\nwhile the connotation of _man_ or _biped_ sinks into the character of\nan accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a\nman, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the\nCorinthian Aphrodit\u00e9, had each many slaves belonging to them.\nMoreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by\n_man_ are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by\nthe term master. Compare Metaphysica, [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 32;\nTopica, i. p. 102, a. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 99: That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of\nprecision and appropriateness in designating the _Correlatum_\nbelonging to each _Relatum_, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning\nin the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where [Greek: despo/t\u00eas] and\n[Greek: dou=los] are also the illustrative examples employed.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.]]\n\n[Footnote 101: See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: [Greek: kai\\ pro/tero\nd\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=| phu/sei po/lis \u00ea)\\ oi)ki/a kai\\ e(/kastos \u00ea(m\u00f4=n e)sti/n;\nto\\ ga\\r o(/lon pro/teron a)nagkai=on ei)=nai tou= me/rous;\na)nairoume/nou ga\\r tou= o(/lou ou)k e)/stai pou=s ou)de\\ chei\\r, ei)\nm\u00ea\\ o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s, \u00f4(/sper ei)/ tis le/gei **t\u00ea\\n lithi/n\u00ean;\ndiaphtharei=sa ga\\r e)/stai toiau/t\u00ea. pa/nta de\\t\u00f4=| e)/rg\u00f4|\n\u00f4(/ristai kai\\ t\u00ea=| duna/mei, \u00f4/ste _m\u00eake/ti toiau=ta o)/nta ou)\nlekte/on ta\\ au)ta ei)=nai_ a)ll' o(m\u00f4/numa]; also p. 1254, a. 9:\n[Greek: to/ te ga\\r mo/rion ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\\ mo/rion, a)lla\\\nkai\\ a)/llou].\n\nCompare De Anim\u00e2, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a.\n12.\n\nThe doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in\nthe Aristotelian philosophy.\n\nTrendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion\nof the Categories, but faintly and partially.]\n\nIn the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation\nof _Ad Aliquid_ different from, and superior to, that which we read\nin the Categori\u00e6; treating it, not as one among many distinct\nCategories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a\ndifferent character according as it is blended with one or the\nother--_Essentia_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, &c.[102] He\nthere, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of _Relata_, what\nseems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct\ndenotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety,\n_Relata Numero_, and, as another, _Relata secundum actionem et\npassionem ([Greek: to\\ thermantiko\\n pro\\s to\\ thermanto/n], &c.), he\nproceeds to a third variety, such as the _mensurabile_ with reference\nto _mensura_, the _scibile_ with reference to _scientia_, the\n_cogitabile_ with reference to _cogitatio_; and in regard to this\nthird variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that _mensura_\nand _cogitatio_ are _Ad Aliquid_, not because they are themselves\nrelated to _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_, but because _mensurabile_\nand _cogitabile_ are related to them.[103] You cannot say (he thinks)\nthat mensura is referable to the _mensurabile_, or _cogitatio_ to the\n_cogitabile_, because that would be repeating the same word twice\nover--_mensura est illius cujus est mensura_--_cogitatio est illius\ncujus est cogitatio._ So that he regards _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ as\n_Correlata_, rather than as _Relata_; while _mensurabile_ and\n_cogitabile_ are the _Relata_ to them. But in point of fact, the\ndistinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one\nwhich is more properly called the _Correlatum_; yet both are alike\nrelative.\n\n[Footnote 102: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 27-32. At the same\ntime we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates [Greek: to\\\nu(pe/rechon] and [Greek: to\\ u(perecho/menon] under [Greek: Pro/s\nti], he had just before (a. 25) ranked [Greek: to\\ me/ga kai\\ to\\\nmikro/n, to\\ mei=zon kai\\ to\\ e(/latton], under the general head\n[Greek: Poso/n]--as [Greek: posou= pa/th\u00ea kath' au(ta/].]\n\n[Footnote 103: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p.\n1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction\nhere drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it\nis not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words\nin the Categori\u00e6; viz., that to be _simul natur\u00e2_ is not true of\n_all_ Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that [Greek: to\\\nai)sth\u00eato\\n] is [Greek: pro/teron t\u00ea=s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s], and [Greek: to\\\ne)pist\u00eato\\n pro/teron t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas] (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8,\na. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the\nScholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been\ncareful here to observe his own precept of selecting [Greek:\noi)kei/\u00f4s] the correlative term. He ought to have stated the\npotential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the\nactual. If he had done this, the [Greek: sunu/parxis t\u00f4=n pro/s ti]\nwould have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a\nsimilar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of [Greek: pte/ron] and\n[Greek: pter\u00f4to/n] (Schol. 63, a. 43). See 'Plato and the Other\nCompanions of Sokrates,' vol. ii. p. 330, note x.\n\nI transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same\nquestion:--\"On r\u00e9plique maintenant, que la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 du mouvement est\nind\u00e9pendante de l'observation: et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer, sans\nque celui qui est dedans s'en aper\u00e7oive. Je r\u00e9ponds, que le mouvement\nest ind\u00e9pendant de l'observation: mais qu'il _n'est point ind\u00e9pendant\nde l'observabilit\u00e9_. Il n'y a point de mouvement, quand il n'y a\npoint de changement _observable_. Et m\u00eame quand il n'y a point de\nchangement observable, il n'y a point de changement du tout. Le\ncontraire est fond\u00e9 sur la supposition d'un Espace r\u00e9el absolu, que\nj'ai r\u00e9fut\u00e9 demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une Raison\nsuffisante des choses.\" (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770.\nErdmann's edition.)]\n\nIf we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites\nand applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us,\nbut also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see\nthat he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same\npredicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head\nin another: what is here spoken of as belonging to _Actio_ or\n_Passio_, will be treated in another place as an instance of _Quale_\nor _Ad Aliquid_; even the derivative noun [Greek: e(/xis] (_habitus_)\ndoes not belong to the Category [Greek: e)/chein] (_Habere_), but\nsometimes to _Quale_, sometimes to _Ad Aliquid_.[104] This is\ninevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really\nseveral different aspects, and may be classified in one way or\nanother, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover,\nthis same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would\nstill be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of\nTen, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal\nCategories--Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction\nwhich has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by\nacute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept\nclearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must\nat the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates\nwhich declare Relation must also imply the _fundamentum_ either of\nQuantity or of Quality.[105]\n\n[Footnote 104: Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The\nremarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i.\nch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged\nphilosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well\ndeserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr.\nMill says:--\"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked\nout by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to\npenetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these\ncommon distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the\nenumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are\nomitted, and others repeated several times under different heads.\"\n(Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol.\np. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes t\u00ea\\n diai/resin \u00f4(s polla\\\npariei=san kai\\ m\u00ea\\ perilamba/nousan, \u00ea)\\ kai\\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.]\nAnd Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be\nranked often under more than one head.) \"That could not be a very\ncomprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude\naction, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same\nobjection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and\nUbi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter\nand Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of\nerecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the\nother hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but\nSubstances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place\nsensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy,\nfear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment,\nconception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed\nby the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and\nthe relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of\nsuch of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly\nso placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind,\nwrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be\ncounted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among\nsubstances or among attributes.\" Among the many deficiencies of the\nAristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more\nglaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the\nRelative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek:\nKei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which\nAristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek:\nto\\ de\\ a)nakei=sthai \u00ea)\\ e(sta/nai \u00ea)\\ kath\u00ea=sthai au)ta\\ me\\n ou)k\nei)si\\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark,\nthat it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_.\n[Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It\nis a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He\nis lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\\x protei/n\u00f4n],\n&c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In\nthe market-place, in the pal\u00e6stra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as\nAristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily\ndistinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general\nword [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under\nGreek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai,\ne(sta/nai, kath\u00ea=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but\nto come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek:\nKei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_.\n\nAgain, to Mr. Mill's question, \"In what Category are we to place\nsensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain,\npleasure, thought, judgment,\" &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I\napprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of\n_Pati_--[Greek: Poio/t\u00eates] or [Greek: Pa/th\u00ea]. They are attributes\nor modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of\nwhich we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos],\nand we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/sch\u00f4n ti]; if it be a durable\ndisposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations,\nit is [Greek: poio/t\u00eas], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s\ntis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental\nand bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ tou/tois kai\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n\npsuch\u00ea\\n path\u00eatikai\\ poio/t\u00eates kai\\ pa/th\u00ea le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33).\nThe line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and\n[Greek: poio/t\u00eas], but one or other of the two will comprehend all\nthe mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have\nadmitted that \"feelings are to be counted among realities,\" except as\nthey are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some\nother _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as\nattributes belonging to these [Greek: Pr\u00f4=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in\nfact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified\nthe Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the\nSubstance to which they belong.\n\nMr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more\ncomplete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into\nfull prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective\npoints of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of\nRelativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either\nconfuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and\ninadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the\nCategories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has\na place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He\ntakes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the\n[Greek: pr\u00f4=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and\nKallias.]\n\nThe most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the\nCategories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is\nsometimes announced as having a standing _per se_; as not only\nlogically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine,\nif we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,[106] or from the other\nthree, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real\nseparation cannot be maintained. The _Prima Essentia_ (we are told)\nis indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while\nall the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is\nfounded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and\ntherefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a\nRelation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what\nthe First Essence is, together with some _predicabilia_ as\ncorrelates, though it is not yet specified what the _predicabilia_\nare. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between\nFirst and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of\nseparation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade\ndown into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in\nSubstance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating\nthat the Species is _more_ Substance or Essence, and that Genus\n_less_ so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from\nattributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists\n_without_ the mind (excluding _within_ the mind or _relation_ to the\nmind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without\nthe mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be\nwithout; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of\nwithin and without understood, there is then room for graduation,\naccording as the one or the other aspect may be more or less\nprominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the\nmental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and\nto the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When\nhe speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all\nthat he can say about it positively is to call it _Unum numero_ and\nindivisible:[107] even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity,\nmeasure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of\nQuantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance\nremains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it\nby the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes\ncertain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence\nof the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would\nbe considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the\nspecific name.[108] When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we\nfind ourselves not merely in the Category of _Substantia_\n(_Secunda_), but also in that of _Qualitas_. The boundary between\n_Substantia_ and _Qualitas_ disappears; the latter being partially\ncontained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes\nattributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second\nSubstance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here\nand elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at\nall, but Quality,[109] though when considered as being in implication\nwith the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes\nsubstantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both\nto Substance and to Quality (_quale quid_), making up as complement\nthat which is designated by the specific name.[110]\n\n[Footnote 106: Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as [Greek:\nch\u00f4risto/n], the other Categories being not [Greek: ch\u00f4rista/]\n(Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to\ndistinguish whether he means by the term [Greek: ch\u00f4rista\\]\n\"_sejuncta re_\", or \"_sejuncta notione sol\u00e2_.\" See Bonitz ad\nMetaphysic. ([Greek: D]. p. 1017), p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Categor. p. 3, b. 12: [Greek: a)/tomon ga\\r kai\\ e(\\n\na)rithm\u00f4=| to\\ d\u00ealou/meno/n e)stin.] Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087,\nb. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Hobbes says:--\"Now that accident (_i.e._ attribute)\nfor which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which\ndenominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as\nrationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing,\nand extension the essence of a body\" (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii.\ns. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and\nphilosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book I.\nch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n deute/r\u00f4n\nou)si\u00f4=n phai/netai me\\n o(moi/\u00f4s t\u00f4=| sch\u00ea/mati t\u00ea=s pros\u00eagori/as\nto/de ti s\u00eamai/nein, o(/tan ei)/p\u00ea| a)/nthr\u00f4pon \u00ea)\\ z\u00f4=on, ou) m\u00ea\\n\na)l\u00eathe/s ge, a)lla\\ ma=llon _poio/n ti s\u00eamai/nei--poia\\n ga/r tina\nou)si/an_ s\u00eamai/nei] (b. 20).\n\nMetaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: [Greek: phanero\\n o(/ti ou)the\\n t\u00f4=n\nkatho/lou u(parcho/nt\u00f4n ou)si/a e)sti/, kai\\ o(/ti ou)the\\n s\u00eamai/nei\nt\u00f4=n koin\u00ea=| kat\u00eagoroume/n\u00f4n to/de ti, a)lla\\ toio/nde.] Compare\nMetaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a.\n9.\n\nThat which is called [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a] in the Categori\u00e6 is\ncalled [Greek: tri/t\u00ea ou)si/a] in Metaphys. [Greek: \u00ca]. p. 1043, a.\n18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the _generalissima_ are\ncalled [Greek: pr\u00f4=ta], and particulars are called [Greek:\ne)/schata]. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), \"[Greek: ta\\\ne)/schata] sunt res singul\u00e6, qu\u00e6 et ips\u00e6 sunt extrem\u00e6, ratione mentis\nnostr\u00e6, ab universis ad singula delabentis.\" Patricius remarks upon\nthe different sense of the terms [Greek: Pr\u00f4/t\u00ea Ou)si/a] in the\nCategori\u00e6 and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p.\n21).]\n\n[Footnote 110: Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 13: [Greek:\nschedo\\n d\u00ea\\ kata\\ du/o tro/pous le/goit' a)\\n to\\ poio/n, kai\\\ntou/t\u00f4n e(/na to\\n kuri\u00f4/taton; pr\u00f4/t\u00ea me\\n ga\\r poiot\u00ea\\s \u00ea( t\u00ea=s\nou)si/as diaphora/.] Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See\nTrendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.\n\nThe remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp.\n52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of\nDifferentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be\nNeither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato,\nEuthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something\nintermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/t\u00eas], or\nbetween [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/s].]\n\nWe see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between\nthe Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so\nimpassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as\nsome thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as\nadmitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps\ndown to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete\nmanifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete\nmanifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or\nunderstood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity,\nQuality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of\n_Substantia_ given by Spinoza--\"_quod in se est et per se\nconcipitur_.\" It can no more be conceived or described without some\nof the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described\nwithout it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two\nnegative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it\ncannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all\nPredicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of\nthese four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we\nhave in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to\nthem. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is,\nrelatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without\nthe Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by\na Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of\nSubstance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor\ncan be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic\nnotion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the\nanalytical process, as the last findings and residuum.\n\n[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by\n[Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p.\n73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary\nto include in [Greek: to\\ kath' au(to\\] of the Category [Greek:\nOu)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation\nof that Category understood.\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his\ntranslation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the\nCategories generally, and especially of [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea ou)si/a], as\nsimply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more.\nI transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and\n_posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and\nposteriority.\n\n\"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 seule qu'il faut\nle demander; \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 dont le langage n'est que le r\u00e9flet, dont\nles mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous pr\u00e9sente la r\u00e9alit\u00e9? Des\nindividus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-m\u00eames, et se\ngroupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs diff\u00e9rences, sous des\nesp\u00e8ces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en \u00e9tudiant l'individu,\nl'\u00eatre individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est\npossible d'en dire en tant qu'\u00eatre, on aura les classes les plus\ng\u00e9n\u00e9rales des mots; les cat\u00e9gories, ou pour prendre le terme\nfran\u00e7ais, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer.\nVoil\u00e0 tout le fondement des Cat\u00e9gories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une\nclassification des choses \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re de celles de l'histoire\nnaturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple\n\u00e9num\u00e9ration de tous les points de vue, d'**o\u00f9 l'esprit peut\nconsid\u00e9rer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport \u00e0 l'esprit\nlui-m\u00eame, mais par rapport \u00e0 leur r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et \u00e0 leurs\nappellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix\nsignifications principales des mots.--La Cat\u00e9gorie de la Substance\nest \u00e0 la t\u00eate de toutes les autres, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment parceque la premi\u00e8re,\nla plus essentielle, marque d'un \u00eatre, c'est d'\u00eatre. Cela revient \u00e0\ndire qu'avant tout, l'\u00eatre est, l'\u00eatre existe. Par suite les mots qui\nexpriment la substance sont ant\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 tous les autres et sont les\nplus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots l\u00e0 participeront en\nquelque sorte \u00e0 cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la\nnature. Mais de m\u00eame que, dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, les individus subsistant\npar eux seuls forment des esp\u00e8ces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi\nune existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de m\u00eame en\nsubstance premi\u00e8re et substance seconde.--Les esp\u00e8ces et les genres,\ns'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa\npuret\u00e9; c'est **d\u00e9j\u00e0 de la substance qualifi\u00e9, comme le dit\nAristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 que des individus et des\nesp\u00e8ces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent\npas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence\nse produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi,\ntout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes\nde mots formeront les autres Cat\u00e9gories.--Ces modifications, ces\naccidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en\nreconna\u00eet pas davantage.--**Voil\u00e0 donc les dix Cat\u00e9gories: les dix\nseules attributions possibles. _Par la premi\u00e8re, on nomme les\nindividus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les\nqualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il\nest.\" Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp.\nlxxii.-lxxvii.]\n\nAristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete\nsentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the\nSubject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The\nnoun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when\npronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception\nthan either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these\nmake themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing\ncomplementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the\nconception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu\nsumplok\u00ea=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we\nadded to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from\nthis conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it\nwould seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to\ncome; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by\nthe various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for\nvarious attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known\nonly as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure\nto come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the\nmention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There\nmay be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience,\nbelonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and\nthe same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is\nnothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an\nability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is\nsimultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of\nthe phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all\nimply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is\nthe cause of the others.[114]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more\nthan [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\n gramm\u00ea=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a.\n21).]\n\n[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\\\na(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\\ t\u00ea\\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/th\u00easin,\nm\u00eadam\u00f4=s de\\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/r\u00f4| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on\ne)pi\\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\\ tou= \u00ea(mi/seos;] &c.]\n\nWhen Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were\nnon-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must\nunderstand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in\nthis treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here\nit means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the\nextreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence,\nin the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]),\nillustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus\nexplained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second\nSubstance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of\nThis man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the\nattributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental\nattributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The\nFirst Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as\na mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any\nAccidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet\nindeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what\nits Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are.\nBeing an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the\nessential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes\npeculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including\nattributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare\n([Greek: d\u00ealou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The\nFirst or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments,\nthough as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating\nadjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of\nexistence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away\neither one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in\nregard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority,\nfounded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc\nAliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a\ncertain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not\nyet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally\nas Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and\nspecifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential\nattributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a\nspecific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential\nattributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a\nspecific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential\ncharacters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are\ndomiciliated foreigners.[118]\n\n[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8.\n[Greek: To\\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as \u00ea)\\ S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas e)sti\\n \u00f4(/sper \u00ea(\nsphai=ra \u00ea( chalk\u00ea= \u00ea(di/, o( d' a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\ to\\ z\u00f4=|on \u00f4(/sper\nsphai=ra chalk\u00ea= o(l\u00f4s.--to\\ d' a(/pan \u00ea)/d\u00ea to\\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n\ntai=sde tai=s sarxi\\ kai\\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\\ S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas; kai\\\ne(/teron me\\n dia\\ t\u00ea\\n u(/l\u00ean, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\\ de\\ t\u00f4=|\nei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\\r to\\ ei)=dos.]]\n\n[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/t\u00f4s de\\ meta\\\nta\\s pr\u00f4/tas ou)si/as mo/na t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea kai\\ ta\\ ge/n\u00ea\ndeu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\\r d\u00ealoi=_ t\u00ea\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean\nou)si/an t\u00f4=n kat\u00eagoroume/n\u00f4n.] &c.\n\n[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\\\nbadi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\\n badi/zon e)sti\\ kai\\ leuko/n, \u00ea( d'\nou)si/a, kai\\ o(/sa to/de ti s\u00eamai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta\no(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai/ ti\nleuko/n, o(\\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b.\n22.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\\n ga/r tina\na)nthr\u00f4pon e)a\\n a)podid\u00f4=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\\ me\\n ei)=dos \u00ea)\\ to\\\nge/nos a)podidou\\s _oi)kei/\u00f4s_ a)pod\u00f4/sei--t\u00f4=n d' a)/ll\u00f4n o(/ ti\na)\\n a)podid\u00f4=| tis, _a)llotri/\u00f4s_ e)stai a)poded\u00f4k\u00f4/s], &c.]\n\nIt is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four\ndistinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other;\nthat is, in the distribution of _Entia_ according to their logical\norder, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication. _Ens_ is a\nmultivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal.\nIt denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate,\ndivisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from\none common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no\nother community except that of relationship to the same\nterminus.[119] The different modes of _Ens_ are distinguished by the\ndegree or variety of such relationship. The _Ens Primum_, _Proprium_,\n_Completum_, is (in Aristotle's view) the concrete individual; with a\ndefined essence or essential constituent attributes ([Greek: ti/ \u00ea(/n\nei)=nai]), and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all\nembodied and implicated in the One _Hoc Aliquid_. In the Categori\u00e6\nAristotle analyses this _Ens Completum_ (not metaphysically, into\nForm and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically\ninto Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject\nwhich can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near\nkinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the\nFirst Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates--as applied to\n_Substantia Prima_, sometimes Subjects--in regard to the extrinsic\naccompaniments or accidents;[120] in the third rank, come the more\nremote kinsmen, Predicates pure and simple. These are the logical\nfactors or constituents into which the _Ens Completum_ may be\nanalysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But\nno one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent\n_locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the\nothers; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates\nto their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a\nreal standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something\nafterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a\ngeneral potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a\nrelative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject,\nare jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121]\n\n[Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek:\nkath' au(ta\\ de\\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper s\u00eamai/nei ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata\nt\u00ea=s kat\u00eagori/as; o)sach\u00f4=s ga\\r le/getai, tosautach\u00f4=s to\\ ei)=nai\ns\u00eamai/nei.]]\n\n[Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: \u00f4(s de/ ge ai( pr\u00f4=tai\nou)si/ai pro\\s ta\\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/t\u00f4 ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea kai\\\nta\\ ge/n\u00ea pro\\s ta\\ loipa\\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\\ tou/t\u00f4n ga\\r pa/nta\nta\\ loipa\\ kat\u00eagorei=tai.]]\n\n[Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter,\nthe _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_,\nSokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which\nillustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject,\nthe _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes\n(not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). \"Quoniam ex\nduabus substantiis, qu\u00e6 quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit\nsubstantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus,\nnunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek:\nto/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam,\nutrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut form\u00e6\ndefinitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero\nper se et absolute sit.\" What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form\nis no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the\nother--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In\nfact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p.\n1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the\nCategories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is\ncalled there by Aristotle [Greek: to\\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\\\na)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\\ m\u00eake/ti kat' a)/llo--le/g\u00f4 d'\nu(/l\u00ean \u00ea(\\ kath' au(t\u00ea\\n m\u00ea/te ti\\ m\u00ea/te poso\\n m\u00ea/te a)/llo m\u00eathe\\n\nle/getai oi(=s \u00f4(/ristai to\\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti\nga/r ti kath' ou(= kat\u00eagorei=tai tou/t\u00f4n e(/kaston, \u00f4(=| _to\\ ei)=nai\ne(/teron_ kai\\ t\u00f4=n kat\u00eagori\u00f4=n e(ka/st\u00ea|; ta\\ me\\n ga\\r a)/lla t\u00ea=s\nou)si/as kat\u00eagorei=tai, au(/t\u00ea de\\ t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas.]\n\nAristotle proceeds to say that this Subject--the Subject for all\nPredicates, but never itself a Predicate--cannot be the genuine\n[Greek: ou)si/a], which must essentially be [Greek: ch\u00f4risto\\n kai\\\nto\\ to/de ti] (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a [Greek: ti/\n\u00ea)=n ei)=nai] (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true [Greek:\nou)si/a], but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being\nrelative to the Predicates as _Correlata_: it is the potentiality for\nPredicates generally, as _Materia_ is the potentiality for Forms.]\n\nThe logical aspect of Ontology, analysing _Ens_ into a common Subject\nwith its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with\nAristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the\npoint of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or\nother perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular\nwith all its outfit of details, as the type of _Ens_ proper, complete\nand primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary\nmodes of _Ens_, according to their different relations to the primary\ntype and the mode in which they contributed to make up its\ncompleteness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and\nPlatonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type\nof full and true Entity;[122] while he also dissented from\nDemokritus, who recognized no true _Ens_ except the underlying,\nimperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to\nhave been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its\nwidest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which\nwe read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but\ndistinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in\nthe other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the\nPlatonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental\nattributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only\nreal _Entia_ capable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle\ncontends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting\naltogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the\nregion of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;[123] in\nPlato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to\nthe essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of\ngeneric and specific subdivision.[124] His own logical analysis takes\naccount both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what\nhe thinks their proper relation. The Accidental ([Greek:\nsumbeb\u00eako/s]), concomitant, _i.e._ of the essence) is _per se_ not\nknowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study\npursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating\nthe lowest degree of _Ens_, bordering on _Non-Ens_.[125] It is a term\ncomprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories;\nyet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so\nmuch as analogical relation.[126] In the treatise now before us, he\ndoes not recognize either that or any other general term as common to\nall those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as a\n_Summum Genus_, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by\nits own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents\nin his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as\nsubordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct,\nvariable, and irregular accompaniments, attaching themselves to this\nconstant root, without uniformity or steadiness.[127]\n\n[Footnote 122: Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1,\nBr: [Greek: A)rchu/tas o( Puthagorei=os ou) prosi/etai t\u00ea\\n nuni\\\nprokeime/n\u00ean t\u00f4=n ou)si/\u00f4n diai/resin, a)ll' a)/ll\u00ean a)nti\\ tau/t\u00eas\ne)kei=nos e)gkri/nei--t\u00f4=n me/ntoi Puthagorei/\u00f4n ou)dei\\s a)\\n\npro/soito tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n diai/resin t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n kai\\ deute/r\u00f4n\nou)si\u00f4=n, o(/ti toi=s katho/lou to\\ pr\u00f4/t\u00f4s u(pa/rchein marturou=si,\nto\\ de\\ e)/schaton e)n toi=s meristoi=s a)polei/pousi, kai\\ dio/ti\ne)n toi=s a(plousta/tois t\u00ea\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean kai\\ kuri\u00f4ta/t\u00ean ou)si/an\na)poti/thentai, a)ll' ou)ch \u00f4(s nu=n le/getai e)n toi=s sunthe/tois\nkai\\ ai)sth\u00eatoi=s, kai\\ dio/ti ta\\ ge/n\u00ea kai\\ ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea o)/nta\nnomi/zousin, a)ll' ou)chi\\ sugkephalaiou/mena tai=s ch\u00f4ristai=s\ne)pinoi/ais.]]\n\n[Footnote 123: Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 15: [Greek: ei)si\\ ga\\r oi(\nt\u00f4=n sophist\u00f4=n lo/goi peri\\ to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s \u00f4(s ei)pei=n ma/lista\npa/nt\u00f4n], &c.; also K. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b.\n10.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. [Greek: \u00f4(/sper\nga\\r o)no/mati mo/non to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s--phai/netai ga\\r to\\\nsumbeb\u00eako\\s e)ggu/s ti tou= m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos.]]\n\n[Footnote 126: Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. [Greek: koino\\n d'\ne)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n ou)de/n e)sti labei=n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 127: See the explanation given of [Greek: to\\ o)\\n kata\\\nsumbeb\u00eako\\s] in Metaphys. E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense\nin which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of [Greek:\nsumbeb\u00eako/s], though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant\nand inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in\nthe Essence (_i. e._ not connoted by the specific name); thus, to\nhave the three angles equal to two right angles is a [Greek:\nsumbeb\u00eako\\s] of the triangle, Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 80. The\nproper sense in which he understands [Greek: to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s] is as\nopposed to [Greek: to\\ a)ei\\ e)x a)na/gk\u00eas], as well as [Greek: to\\\n\u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu/]. See Metaphys. K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster.\ni. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.\n\nIt is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See\nthe valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden\nnach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of [Greek: to\\\nsumbeb\u00eako\\s] in Aristotle is clearly set forth.]\n\nIn discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg\nsupposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by\ngrammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of\nspeech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as\nthe eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in\nthe time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before\nthe time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a\ncentury after him. _Essentia_ or _Substantia_, the first Category,\nanswers (so Trendelenburg thinks[128]) to the Substantive; _Quantum_\nand _Quale_ represent the Adjective; _Ad Aliquid_, the comparative\nAdjective, of which _Quantum_ and _Quale_ are the positive degree;\n_Ubi_ and _Quando_ the Adverb; _Jacere_, _Habere_, _Agere_, _Pati_\nthe Verb. Of the last four, _Agere_ and _Pati_ correspond to the\nactive and passive voices of the Verb; _Jacere_ to the neuter or\nintransitive Verb; and _Habere_ to the peculiar meaning of the Greek\nperfect--the present result of a past action.\n\n[Footnote 128: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.]\n\nThis general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having\nbeen only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of\nAristotle,[129] appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and\nothers have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle's own\nlanguage, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon\nhis mind; that the form (_e.g._) of a substantive implied in his view\na mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken\ninto account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I\napprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his\nCategories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of\ncourse include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is\nalso remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last\nCategories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding\nby adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a\nsubstantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which\nhas no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this\nCategory, though not represented by any part of speech, is\nnevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way,\nwith close reference to the form of expression, and to the\nrequirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or\ndative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the\nmind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from\ngrammatical and syntactic forms.\n\n[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: \"Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den\nerfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die\ngrammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht.\" P. 216:\n\"der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt.\"]\n\n[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n deute/r\u00f4n\nou)si\u00f4=n phai/netai me\\n o(moi/\u00f4s t\u00f4=| _sch\u00ea/mati t\u00ea=s pros\u00eagori/as_\nto/de ti s\u00eamai/nein, o(/tan ei)/p\u00ea| a)/nthr\u00f4pon \u00ea)\\ z\u00f4=|on, ou) m\u00ea\\n\na)l\u00eathe/s ge, a)lla\\ ma=llon poio/n ti s\u00eamai/nei.] &c.]\n\nWe may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them\nwith the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding\nAristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the\nlatter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new\narrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates.\nTheir distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first\nCategory was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\\\nu(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek:\npoio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: p\u00f4\\s e)/chon],\n_certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti p\u00f4\\s\ne)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]\n\n[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\\\np\u00f4\\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p.\n48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( St\u00f4i+koi\\ ei)s e)la/ttona\nsuste/llein a)xiou=si to\\n t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n gen\u00f4=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina\ne)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(p\u00eallagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\\r\nt\u00ea\\n tom\u00ea\\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\\ poia\\, kai\\ p\u00f4\\s\ne)/chonta, kai\\ pro/s ti p\u00f4\\s e)/chonta.]\n\nIt would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the\nStoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the\nabove four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi.\n1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He\nadmits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme\n[Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but\ntreated all the ten as [Greek: pr\u00f4=ta ge/n\u00ea], under an analogous\naggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their\nfour [Greek: ge/n\u00ea] in the same manner; for I do not see what they\ncould find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek:\nti/].]\n\nWe do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of\nAristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by\nits authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes\nLaertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly\nadverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some\nAristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this\nevidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with\nthe [Greek: Pr\u00f4/t\u00ea Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle.\nIt was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it\nwas indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its\nmeaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general\nnotions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this\nCategory,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina],\nNon-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not\nunder the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category\n[Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining\nthe Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_\nthus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and\nalso the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making\nCategory ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the\nEssence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or\nattributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof,\ncoinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge.\nIt therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since\nthe Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to\ndeclare its Accidents.\n\n[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek:\nsumparal\u00eapte/on de\\ kai\\ t\u00ea\\n sun\u00ea/theian t\u00f4=n St\u00f4i+k\u00f4=n peri\\ t\u00f4=n\ngenik\u00f4=n poi\u00f4=n, p\u00f4=s ai( pt\u00f4/seis kat' au)tou\\s prophe/rontai, kai\\\np\u00f4=s _ou)/tina_ ta\\ koina\\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\\ o(/p\u00f4s para\\\nt\u00ea\\n a)/gnoian tou= m\u00ea\\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti s\u00eamai/nein kai\\ to\\\n_para\\ to\\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\\ to\\ sch\u00ea=ma t\u00ea=s\nle/xe\u00f4s; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)th\u00ea/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n\nMega/rois; _ o( ga\\r a)/nthr\u00f4pos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis\no( koino/s_, \u00f4(s tina\\ de\\ au)to\\n e)la/bomen e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|, kai\\\npara\\ tou=to to\\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis\nkl\u00eathei/s.]\n\nCompare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as\nwell as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of\ndeparture [Greek: to\\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\\\npr\u00f4=ton u(pokei/menon ( = t\u00ea\\n a)/poion u(/l\u00ean)].]\n\n[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De\nStoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67.\nBr. [Greek: Poia\\] were distributed by the Stoics into three\nvarieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/t\u00eas], in the Stoic\nsense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these\nthree varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek:\npoio/t\u00eas] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were\n[Greek: poia\\] without any [Greek: poiot\u00ea\\s] corresponding to them.\nTo the third Category, [Greek: P\u00f4\\s e)/chonta], which was larger and\nmore varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding;\nnor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one\nreason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek:\npoio/t\u00eates] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the\n[Greek: poio/t\u00eates t\u00f4=n s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n] were themselves [Greek: s\u00f4/mata] or\n[Greek: s\u00f4matika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix.\np. 463, seq. ed. K\u00fchn). The Stoics considered these qualities as\n[Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or\ngaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.\n\nIt is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the\nevidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp.\n67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek:\npoia\\] and [Greek: p\u00f4\\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek:\npoio/t\u00eas] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/st\u00f4n e)poistik\u00ea\\ sumpt\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n,\n\u00f4(s \u00ea( phro/n\u00easis tou= te phroni/m\u00f4s peripatei=n kai\\ tou= phron/m\u00f4s\ndiale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumpt\u00f4/mata]\nwere included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/m\u00f4s\nperipat\u00f4=n, o( pu\\x protei/n\u00f4n] and [Greek: o( tre/ch\u00f4n], were\n[Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for\nthe third Category [Greek: p\u00f4\\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although,\naccording to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most\ncomprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among\nthemselves and to have written inconsistently.\n\nNeither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even\nPrantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik,\npp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]\n\nThe Third Stoic Category ([Greek: p\u00f4\\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion\nof what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under\n_Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The\nfourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_.\nThe third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute\nor non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood\nas Relative Accidents.\n\nThe order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and\nperemptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same\ngenus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second\npresupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and\nattaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing\nand attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first\nproposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_?\nYou answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon\nthis, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by\na term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental\nattributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon\nthis, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad\nalia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._\na Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).\n\n[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429;\nSimplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\\\nsu/ntheta poiei=n ta\\ ge/n\u00ea e)k prote/r\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n kai\\ deute/r\u00f4n \u00f4(s\nto\\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,\n25-29.\n\nPorphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/ta] under [Greek:\npoio\\n] and [Greek: p\u00f4\\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the\nlatter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek:\nkei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a.\n30).]\n\nIn comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we\nsee that the first great difference is in the extent and\ncomprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by\ndistinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other\n(by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the\nEssence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide\ntheir third Category, but included therein all the matter of six\nAristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the\nAristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking\nas the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual,\nSubstance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed\nof the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.\n\n[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the\nnumber of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\\ p\u00f4\\s e)/chon], which\nhas (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is\ncurious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the\ndecuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.\n\nSimplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\\\npro/s ti] and [Greek: to\\ pro/s ti p\u00f4\\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg,\n(pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which,\nhowever, appears to be very obscure.]\n\nPlotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he\ndoes not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_,\n_Diversum_; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes.\nHe does not admit _Quantum_, _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, to be _Prima\nGenera_; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he\ninsists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and\nthe sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for\nneglecting. His five _Genera_ he applies directly and principally to\nthe intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately\nfive Catgories; _Substantia_ or _Essentia_ (though he conceives this\nas fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two),\n_Ad Aliquid_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Motus_. But he doubts whether\n_Quantum_, _Quale_, and _Motus_, are not comprehended in _Ad\nAliquid_.[137] He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not\nSubstance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a\ncongeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.[138]\nDexippus,[139] in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much\non the difference between Aristotle's point of view in the Categori\u00e6,\nin the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categori\u00e6, Aristotle\ndwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand)\nand the modes of naming and describing them.\n\n[Footnote 136: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. [Greek: \u00ea)\\ kai\\ tau=ta\nei)s ta\\ pro/s ti; periektiko\\n ga\\r ma=llon.] His idea of Relation\nis more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that\nterms, propositions, discourse, &c., are [Greek: pro/s ti; kath' o(\\\ns\u00eamantika/] (vi. 3. 19).]\n\n[Footnote 138: Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.]\n\n[Footnote 139: The second and third books of Dexippus's Dialogue\ncontain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus.\nAristotle, in the Categori\u00e6 (Dexippus says), accommodates himself\nboth to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary\nconception of [Greek: ou)si/a] entertained by youth or\nunphilosophical men--[Greek: ou)/te ga\\r peri\\ t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n, ou)/te\nperi\\ t\u00f4=n gen\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s pr\u00f4/t\u00eas ou)si/as nu=n au)t\u00f4=| pro/keitai\nle/gein; stocha/zetai ga\\r t\u00f4=n ne/\u00f4n toi=s a(plouste/rois\ne)pakolouthei=n duname/n\u00f4n] (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where\nDexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the\nPhysica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending\nthoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categori\u00e6. Dexippus gives an\ninteresting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his\nmode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are\nphilosophical or otherwise--[Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ me\\n ou)=n, \u00f4)= kale\\\nka)gathe\\ Se/leuke, dogmatik\u00f4/teron pro\\s Pl\u00f4ti=non a)pant\u00f4=, su\\\nde/, e)pei\\ bathu/terai/ p\u00f4s ei)si\\n ai( lu/seis au(=tai, pro\\s me\\n\ntou=s e)k philosophi/as o(rm\u00f4me/nous tai=s toiau/tais a)pant\u00ea/sesi\nchr\u00f4=, pro\\s de\\ tou\\s o)li/ga e)pistame/nous t\u00f4=n dogma/t\u00f4n tai=s\nprochei/rois chr\u00f4= dialu/sesin, e)kei=no le/g\u00f4n, _o(/ti peri\\ po/da\npoiei=sthai e)/thos ta\\s a)kroa/seis A)ristote/lei;_ dio\\ kai\\ nu=n\nou)de\\n e)/x\u00f4then e)peisa/gei t\u00f4=n a)n\u00f4te/r\u00f4 keime/n\u00f4n\nphilosoph\u00eama/t\u00f4n], &c. (pp. 50, 51).]\n\nGalen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as\nPlotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian\nten, partly out of the Stoic four:--[Greek: Ou)si/a, poso/n, poio/n,\n_pro/s ti_, pro/ ti p\u00f4\\s e)/chon].[140]\n\n[Footnote 140: Schol. ad Categor. p. 49 a. 30.]\n\n. . . . . .\n\nThe latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories\nor Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually known under the\ntitle of 'Post-Predicamenta;'[141] wherein the following terms or\nnotions are analysed and explained--_Opposita_, _Prius_, _Simul_,\n_Motus_, _Habere_.\n\n[Footnote 141: Andronikus and other commentators supposed the\nPost-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categori\u00e6 by some\nlater hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The\ndistinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.]\n\nOf _Opposita_, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other,\nyet not different species under the same genus:[142]--1.\n_Relative-Opposita_--_Relatum_ and _Correlatum_. 2. _Contraria_.\n3. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. 4. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_.\n\n[Footnote 142: Categ. p. 11, b. 16: [Greek: peri\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n\na)ntikeime/n\u00f4n, posach\u00f4=s ei)/\u00f4then a)ntikei=sthai r(\u00eate/on.] See\nSimpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned\n[Greek: ta\\ a)ntikei/mena] a true genus or not, was debated among the\ncommentators. The word [Greek: posach\u00f4=s] implies that he did not;\nand he treats even the term [Greek: e)nanti/a] as a [Greek:\npollach\u00f4=s lego/menon], though it is less wide in its application\nthan [Greek: a)ntikei/mena], which includes _Relata_ (Metaphys. I. p.\n1055, a. 17). He even treats [Greek: ste/r\u00easis] as a [Greek:\npollach\u00f4=s lego/menon] (p. 1055, a. 34).\n\n[Greek: Ai( a)ntithe/seis te/ssares], the four distinct varieties of\n[Greek: ta\\ a)ntikei/mena] are enumerated by Aristotle in various\nother places:--Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys. I.\np. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, a. 20, two other\nvarieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that\nAristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of\n_Opposita_, \"tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum\nnumerum,\" &c.]\n\nThese four modes of opposition have passed from the Categori\u00e6 of\nAristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The\nthree last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated\nby their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four,\nI cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he\nhas assigned to it. To treat _Relativa_ as a variety of _Opposita_,\nappears to me an inversion of the true order of classification;\nplacing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less\ncomprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the\nOpposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the\nRelative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few\npages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle\nformed of his _Ad Aliquid_ or the Relative; restricting it to cases\nin which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.[143] The\nthree classes last-mentioned by Aristotle (1. _Contraria_, 2.\n_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, 3. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_) are truly\n_Opposita_; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it\nis good to distinguish from the others. But the _Relatum_ and its\n_Correlatum_, as such, are not necessarily _Opposite_ at all; they\nare compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a\nname, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is\nbestowed upon each. _Opposita_ fall under this general description,\nas parts (together with other parts not _Opposita_) of a larger\nwhole. They ought properly to be called _Opposite-Relativa_: the\nphrase _Relative-Opposita_, as applied to Relatives generally, being\ndiscontinued as incorrect.[144]\n\n[Footnote 143: Categ. p. 11, b. 24.\n\nAmmonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among\nthe commentators about these four alleged varieties of [Greek:\na)ntikei/mena]; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a\nspecial treatise (not now extant), [Greek: Peri\\ t\u00f4=n\nA)ntikeime/n\u00f4n], full of perplexing [Greek: a)pori/ai], which the\nStoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48).\nHerminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all\nRelatives [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; for they admitted that the\nantithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler\ncharacter, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander\ningeniously compared _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_ to the opposite\nrafters of a roof, each supporting the other ([Greek: malak\u00f4/tera\nkai\\ \u00ea(=tton macho/mena e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois, \u00f4(s _ kai\\\na)mphiba/lesthai ei) ei)si\\n a)ntikei/mena s\u00f4/zonta a)/ll\u00eala;_ a)lla\\\ntou=to me\\n dei/knusin A)le/xandros o(/ti a)ntikei/mena, o(\\s kai\\\nta\\ labdoeid\u00ea= xu/la paradei=gma lamba/nei], &c., Schol. p. 81, b.\n32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning\nof _Opposita_, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct\nto the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have\nworked out the views of Aristotle about [Greek: e)nanti/a], but to\nhave restricted the meaning of [Greek: **a)ntikei/mena] to\ncontradictory opposition, _i. e._ to Affirmative and Negative\nPropositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b.\n11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica, A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the\nfinal cause ([Greek: to\\ ou(= e(/neka kai\\ ta)gatho/n) t\u00ea\\n\na)ntikeime/n\u00ean ai)ti/an] to the cause (among his four), [Greek: to\\\n**o(/then \u00ea( ki/n\u00easis]. This is a misleading phrase; the two\nare not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.]\n\n[Footnote 144: See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative\nNames given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I.\nchap. ii. \u00a7 7, p. 46.\n\nAfter reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives\nas a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.]\n\nFrom _Opposita_ Aristotle passes to _Prius_ and _Simul_; with the\ndifferent modes of each.[145] _Successive_ and _Synchronous_, are the\ntwo most general classes under which facts or events can be cast.\nThey include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They\nadmit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to\nimmediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and\nSimultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the\nclearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle\nrecognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he\ndistinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes\n(in the ten Categories) the different meanings of _Essentia_, in a\ngradually descending scale of analogy. The secondary _Prius_ is that\nwhich does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with\nits _Posterius_; where the _Posterius_ presupposes the _Prius_, while\nthe _Prius_ does not presuppose the _Posterius_: for example, given\ntwo, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the\nexistence of two is not implied.[146] The tertiary _Prius_ is that\nwhich comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in\ngeometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and\ndemonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with\nsyllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the\nexposition. A fourth mode of _Prius_ (which is the most remote and\nfar-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable is _prius\nnatur\u00e2_. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which\nreciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the\nother effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature\nto the effect.[147] For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists,\nthe proposition \"Caius exists,\" is a true proposition; and _vice\nvers\u00e2_, if the proposition \"Caius exists\" is a true proposition, it\nis a fact that Caius exists. But though from either **of these you\ncan infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and\nnot the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say\nthat the latter is _prius natur\u00e2_, and the former _posterius natur\u00e2_.\n\n[Footnote 145: Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode of _Prius_\nis entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys. [Greek: D].) p.\n707, b. 7, Brandis) [Greek: pro/teron t\u00ea=| phu/sei]. But Aristotle\ndoes not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and\nfifth modes.\n\nIt appears that debates, [Greek: Peri\\ Prote/rou kai\\ U(ste/rou] were\nfrequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle's day as well as\ndebates, [Greek: Peri\\ Tau)tou= kai\\ E(te/rou, Peri\\ O(moi/ou kai\\\nA)nomoi/ou, Peri\\ Tau)to/t\u00eatos kai\\ E)nantio/t\u00eatos] (Arist. Metaph.\nB. p. 995, b. 20).]\n\n[Footnote 147: Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.]\n\nThis is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the\nvarious derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and\nthere is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where\nthe derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by\nroads considerably different.[148] The two terms are relatives;\n_Prius_ implies a _Posterius_, as _Simul_ implies another _Simul_;\nand it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various\nmeanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed\nclearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to\nelucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are\nfew terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets\nout, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of\nPriority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various\nsecondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to\nemploy the term _Prius_ in the course of his reasonings, he often\ndoes so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be\nunderstood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is\nthe most present and familial to every man's mind, so the term is\noften construed in this sense when it properly bears only the\nmetaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority\n(priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and\nrespect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability\nof existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the\nAristotelian Physics and Metaphysics. The order of logical\nantecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of\ngreat importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth,\nto the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes\nof thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the\nlogical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, orf\nseparable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause\nor Agent.[149]\n\n[Footnote 148: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019,\na. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that\nin the Categori\u00e6. In this last, _Order in Place_ receives no special\nrecognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and\nwe find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or\nintellectual _Prius_.]\n\n[Footnote 149: In the language of Porphyry, [Greek: prou+phe/st\u00eake]\n(priority in real existence) means nothing more than [Greek:\nproe+pinoei=tai] (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc.\nxv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nDE INTERPRETATIONE.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle\ncalls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands\nsecond in the aggregate called the Organon--the treatise De\nInterpretatione.\n\nWe have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one\ngroup of varieties of _Ens_ (or different meanings of the term _Ens_)\nas corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while\nrecognizing also another variety of _Ens_ as _Truth_, with its\nantithesis _Non-Ens_ as _Falsehood_.[1] The former group was dealt\nwith in the preceding chapter; the latter will form the subject of\nthe present chapter. In both, indeed, Ontology is looked at as\nimplicated with Logic; that is, _Ens_ is considered as distributed\nunder significant names, fit to be coupled in propositions. This is\nthe common basis both of the Categori\u00e6 and of the treatise De\nInterpretatione. The whole classification of the Categories rests on\nthe assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts, and on\nthe different relation borne by each of the nine _genera_ of\npredicates towards their common Subject. But in the Categori\u00e6 no\naccount was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood, in\nthe application of these predicates to the Subject. If we say of\nSokrates, that he is fair, pug-nosed, brave, wise, &c., we shall\npredicate truly; if we say that he is black, high-nosed, cowardly,\nstupid, &c., we shall predicate falsely; but in each case our\npredicates will belong to the same Category--that of _Quale_. Whether\nwe describe him as he now is, standing, talking, in the market-place\nat Athens; or whether we describe him as he is not, sitting down,\nsinging, in Egypt--in both speeches, our predicates rank under the\nsame Categories, _Jacere_, _Agere_, _Ubi_. No account is taken in the\nCategori\u00e6 of the distinction between true and false application of\npredicates; we are only informed under what number of general heads\nall our predicates must be included, whether our propositions be true\nor false in each particular case.\n\n[Footnote 1: See above in the preceding chapter, p. 60.]\n\nBut this distinction between _true_ and _false_, which remained\nunnoticed in the Categori\u00e6, comes into the foreground in the treatise\nDe Interpretatione. The Proposition, or enunciative speech,[2] is\ndistinguished from other varieties of speech (interrogative,\nprecative, imperative) by its communicating what is true or what is\nfalse. It is defined to be a complex significant speech, composed of\ntwo terms at least, each in itself significant, yet neither of them,\nseparately taken, communicating truth or falsehood. The terms\nconstituting the Proposition are declared to be a Noun in the\nnominative case, as Subject, and a Verb, as Predicate; this latter\nessentially connoting time, in order that the synthesis of the two\nmay become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact, susceptible of\nbeing believed or disbelieved. All this mode of analysing a\nproposition, different from the analysis thereof given or implied in\nthe Categori\u00e6, is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its\nfunction of imparting true or false information. The treatise called\nthe Categori\u00e6 is a theory of significant names subjicible and\npredicable, fit to serve as elements of propositions, but not yet\nlooked at as put together into actual propositions; while in the\ntreatise De Interpretatione they are assumed to be put together, and\na theory is given of Propositions thus completed.\n\n[Footnote 2: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: [Greek: lo/gos\na)pophantiko/s].]\n\nWords spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated\nwith them both by speaker and hearer; words written are symbols of\nthose thus uttered. Both speech and writing differ in different\nnations, having no natural connection with the things signified. But\nthese last, the affections or modifications of the mind, and the\nfacts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses, are\nthe same to all. Words are marks primarily and directly of the first,\nsecondarily and indirectly of the second.[3] Aristotle thus\nrecognizes these two aspects--first, the subjective, next the\nobjective, as belonging, both of them conjointly, to significant\nlanguage, yet as logically distinguishable; the former looking to the\nproximate _correlatum_, the latter to the ultimate.\n\n[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. [Greek: \u00f4(\\n me/ntoi tau=ta\ns\u00eamei=a pr\u00f4/t\u00f4s, tau)ta\\ pa=si path\u00ea/mata t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s, kai\\ \u00f4(=n\ntau=ta o(moi\u00f4/mata, pra/gmata \u00ea)/d\u00ea tau)ta/.]]\n\nFor this doctrine, that the mental affections of mankind, and the\nthings or facts which they represent, are the same everywhere, though\nthe marks whereby they are signified differ, Aristotle refers us to\nhis treatise De Anim\u00e2, to which he says that it properly belongs.[4]\nHe thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of Logic on Psychology\nor Mental Philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: [Greek: peri\\ me\\n\nou)=n tau/t\u00f4n ei)/r\u00eatai e)n toi=s peri\\ psuch\u00ea=s; a)/ll\u00eas ga\\r\npragmatei/as.] It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus\nthe Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione\nwas not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was\nnothing in the De Anim\u00e2 to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his\nScholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of\nAndronikus. The third book De Anim\u00e2 (pp. 430, 431) lays down the\ndoctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick's Commentary, p. 210.]\n\nThat which is signified by words (either single or in combination) is\nsome variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they\nrepresent. But the signification of a single Term is distinguished,\nin an important point, from the signification of that conjunction of\nterms which we call a Proposition. A noun, or a verb, belonging to\nthe aggregate called a language, is associated with one and the same\nphantasm[5] or notion, without any conscious act of conjunction or\ndisjunction, in the minds of speakers and hearers: when pronounced,\nit arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas, and\ndetermines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is\ncalled its meaning.[6] But neither the noun nor the verb, singly\ntaken, does more than this; neither one of them affirms, or denies,\nor communicates any information true or false. For this last purpose,\nwe must conjoin the two together in a certain way, and make a\nProposition. The signification of the Proposition is thus\nspecifically distinct from that of either of its two component\nelements. It communicates what purports to be matter of fact, which\nmay be either true or false; in other words, it implies in the\nspeaker, and raises in the hearer, the state of belief or disbelief,\nwhich does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately.\nHerein the Proposition is discriminated from other significant\narrangements of words (precative, interrogative, which convey no\ntruth or falsehood), as well as from its own component parts. Each of\nthese parts, noun and verb, has a significance of its own; but these\nare the ultimate elements of speech, for the parts of the noun or of\nthe verb have no significance at all. The Verb is distinguished from\nthe Noun by connoting time, and also by always serving as predicate\nto some noun as subject.[7]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n ou)=n o)no/mata\nau)ta\\ kai\\ ta\\ r(\u00ea/mata e)/oike t\u00f4=| a)/neu diaire/se\u00f4s kai\\\nsunthe/se\u00f4s no\u00ea/mati, oi(=on to\\ a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\ to\\ leuko/n, o(/tan\nm\u00ea\\ proste/th\u00ea| ti; ou)/te ga\\r pseu=dos ou)/te a)l\u00eathe/s p\u00f4.]]\n\n[Footnote 6: Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: [Greek: au)ta\\ me\\n kath' e(auta\\\nlego/mena ta\\ r(\u00ea/mata o)no/mata/ e)sti kai\\ s\u00eamai/nei ti (_i(/st\u00easi\nga\\r o( le/g\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n dia/noian_, kai\\ _o( a)kou/sas \u00ea)re/m\u00easen_) a)ll'\nei) e)sti\\n \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea/, ou)/p\u00f4 s\u00eamai/nei], &c.\n\nCompare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine\noccurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is\ndetermined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of\nrunaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the\nrest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total,\nis detained, or \"stands still\" as an object of attention. Also\nAristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.]\n\nAristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon\nthe main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down\nthat all significant speech is significant by convention only, and\nnot by nature or as a natural instrument.[8] He tells us also that,\nin this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant\nspeech, but only of that variety which is known as _enunciative_.\nThis last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part\nbelonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the\nprecative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to\nRhetoric or Poetic.[9] Enunciative speech may be either simple or\ncomplex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either\nin one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise\nseveral such.[10] The conjunction of the predicate with the subject\nconstitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the\ndisjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.[11] But such\nconjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between\ntwo mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever\nconjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be\nenunciated, and _vice vers\u00e2_. Whatever may be affirmed, it is\npossible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to\naffirm.[12]\n\n[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 17, a. 6: [Greek: _o( de\\ a)pophantiko\\s t\u00ea=s\nnu=n the\u00f4ri/as_]. See the **Scholion of Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a.\n27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the\nlost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished\n[Greek: to\\n a)pophantiko\\n lo/gon] from the other varieties of\n[Greek: lo/gos], by the difference of [Greek: sche/sis]: the [Greek:\na)pophantiko\\s lo/gos] was [Greek: pro\\s ta\\ pra/gmata], or\n_objective_; the others were [Greek: pro\\s tou\\s a)kro\u00f4me/nous],\n_i.e._ varying with the different varieties of hearers, or\n_subjective_.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: [Greek: a(/pan a)\\n e)nde/choito\nkai\\ o(\\ kate/ph\u00ease/ tis a)poph\u00ea=sai, kai\\ o(\\ a)pe/ph\u00ease/ tis\nkataph\u00ea=sai.]]\n\nTo every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a\ncontradictory negative proposition; to every negative a contradictory\naffirmative. This pair of contradictory opposites may be called an\n_Antiphasis_; always assuming that the predicate and subject of the\ntwo shall be really the same, without equivocation of terms--a\nproviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by\nSophists.[13] And we must also distinguish these propositions\nopposite as _Contradictories_, from propositions opposite as\n_Contraries_. For this, it has to be observed that there is a\ndistinction among things ([Greek: pra/gmata]) as universal or\nsingular, according as they are, in their nature, predicable of a\nnumber or not: _homo_ is an example of the first, and _Kallias_ is an\nexample of the second. When, now, we affirm a predicate universally,\nwe must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the\npredicate; we must say, Every man is white, No man is white. We\ncannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate, and say,\nEvery man is every animal; this would be untrue.[14] An affirmation,\nthen, is _contradictorily_ opposed to a negation, when one indicates\nthat the subject is universally taken, and the other, that the\nsubject is taken not universally, _e.g. Omnis homo est albus_, _Non\nomnis homo est albus_; _Nullus homo est albus_, _Est aliquis homo\nalbus_. The opposition is _contrary_, when the affirmation is\nuniversal, and the negation is also universal, _i.e._, when the\nsubject is marked as universally taken in each: for example, _Omnis\nhomo est albus_, _Nullus homo est albus_. Of these contrary\nopposites, both cannot be true, but both may be false. Contradictory\nopposites, on the other hand, while they cannot both be true, cannot\nboth be false; one must be false and the other true. This holds also\nwhere the subject is a singular term, as Sokrates.[15] If, however,\nan universal term appear as subject in the proposition\n_indefinitely_, that is, without any mark of universality whatever,\n_e.g._, Est albus homo_, _Non est albus homo_, then the affirmative\nand negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory,\nthough they may be so sometimes: there is no opposition, properly\nspeaking, between them; both may alike be true. This last observation\n(says Aristotle) will seem strange, because many persons suppose that\n_Non est homo albus_ is equivalent to _Nullus homo est albus_; but\nthe meaning of the two is not the same, nor does the truth of the\nlatter follow from that of the former,[16] since _homo_ in the former\nmay be construed as not universally taken.\n\n[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 17, a. 33: [Greek: _kai\\ e)/st\u00f4 a)nti/phasis\ntou=to_, kata/phasis kai\\ a)po/phasis ai( a)ntikei/menai.]\n\nIt seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that [Greek:\na)nti/phasis] in this sense was a technical term, introduced by\nAristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: [Greek: e)pei\\\nd' e)sti\\ ta\\ me\\n katho/lou t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n, ta\\ de\\ kath' e(/kaston\n(le/g\u00f4 de\\ katho/lou me\\n o(\\ e)pi\\ pleio/n\u00f4n pe/phuke\nkat\u00eagorei=sthai, kath' e(/kaston de\\ o(\\ m\u00ea\\, oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos me\\n\nt\u00f4=n katho/lou, Kalli/as de\\ t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston);] &c. Ammonius (in\nSchol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many\nsubjects or of one, must be [Greek: mi/a phu/sis].\n\nThe warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical\ntreatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I.\nxxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: [Greek: ou)demi/a kata/phasis\na)l\u00eath\u00ea\\s e)/stai, e)n \u00ea(=| tou= kat\u00eagoroume/nou katho/lou to\\\nkatho/lou kat\u00eagorei=tai, oi(=on e)/sti pa=s a)/nthr\u00f4pos pa=n z\u00f4=|on]\n(b. 14).]\n\n[Footnote 15: Ibid. b. 16-29.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of\nLogic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately's\nobservation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions called\n_indefinite_ \"is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by\ngrammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the\n_doubtful_ gender. The speaker _must mean_ to assert the proposition\neither as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has\nfailed to declare which.\"\n\nBut Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately's doctrine,\ndeclaring what the speaker \"_must mean_.\" Aristotle fears that his\nclass, _indefinite_, will appear impertinent, because many speakers\nare not conscious of any distinction or transition between the\nparticular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and\nthought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard\nagainst, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately:\nmoreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.\n\nAristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common\nspeaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when\nhe began to theorize on propositions.\n\nI think that Whately's assumption--\"the speaker _must mean_\"--is\nanalogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his\nproposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the\nspeaker _must_, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and\nthat his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification\nexplicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir.\nW. Hamilton's is incorrect.]\n\nIt thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to\none and the same affirmation; making up together the _Antiphasis_, or\npair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary\nopposites. By _one_ affirmation we mean, that in which there is one\npredicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or\nnot universally:--\n\n _E.g._ Omnis homo est albus  ...  ... Non omnis homo est albus.\n        Est homo albus   ...  ...  ... Non est homo albus.\n        Nullus homo est albus ...  ... Aliquis homo est albus.\n\nBut this will only hold on the assumption that _album_ signifies one\nand the same thing. If there be one name signifying two things not\ncapable of being generalized into one nature, or not coming under the\nsame definition, then the affirmation is no longer one.[17] Thus if\nany one applies the term _himation_ to signify both horse and man,\nthen the proposition, _Est himation album_, is not one affirmation,\nbut two; it is either equivalent to _Est homo albus_ and _Est equus\nalbus_--or it means nothing at all; for this or that individual man\nis not a horse. Accordingly, in this case also, as well as in that\nmentioned above, it is not indispensable that one of the two\npropositions constituting the _Antiphasis_ should be true and the\nother false.[18]\n\n[Footnote 17: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 13, seq.: [Greek: mi/a\nde/ e)sti kata/phasis kai\\ a)po/phasis \u00ea( e(\\n kath' e(no\\s\ns\u00eamai/nousa, \u00ea)\\ katho/lou o)/ntos katho/lou \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ o(moi/\u00f4s, oi(=on\npa=s a)/nthr\u00f4pos leuko/s e)stin . . . _ei) to\\ leuko\\n e(\\n\ns\u00eamai/nei_. ei) de\\ duoi=n e(\\n o)/noma kei=tai, e)x \u00f4(=n _m\u00ea/ e)stin\ne(/n_, ou) mi/a kata/phasis], &c., and the Scholion of Ammonius, p.\n116, b. 6, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 26. The example which\nAristotle here gives is one of a _subject_ designated by an equivocal\nname; when he had begun with the _predicate_. It would have been more\npertinent if he had said at first, [Greek: ei) o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos e(\\n\ns\u00eamai/nei].]\n\nWith these exceptions Aristotle lays it down, that, in every\n_Antiphasis_, one proposition must be true and the other must be\nfalse. But (he goes on to say) this is only true in regard to matters\npast or present; it is not true in regard to events particular and\nfuture. To admit it in regard to these latter, would be to affirm\nthat the sequences of events are all necessary, and none of them\ncasual or contingent; whereas we know, by our own personal\nexperience, that many sequences depend upon our deliberation and\nvolition, and are therefore not necessary. If all future sequences\nare necessary, deliberation on our part must be useless. We must\ntherefore (he continues) recognize one class of sequences which are\nnot uniform--not predetermined by antecedents; events which _may_\nhappen, but which also _may not_ happen, for they will not happen.\nThus, my coat _may_ be cut into two halves, but it never _will_ be so\ncut; it will wear out without any such bisection occurring.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 28-p. 19, b. 4.]\n\nIf you affirm the reality of a fact past or present, your affirmation\nis of necessity determinately true, or it is determinately false,\n_i.e._ the contradictory negation is determinately true. But if you\naffirm the reality of a fact to come, then your affirmation is not by\nnecessity determinately true, nor is the contradictory negation\ndeterminately true. Neither the one nor the other separately is true:\nnothing is true except the disjunctive antithesis as a whole,\nincluding both. If you say, To-morrow there will either be a\nsea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight, this disjunctive or\nindeterminate proposition, taken as a whole, will be true. Yet\nneither of its constituent parts will be determinately true; neither\nthe proposition, To-morrow there will be a sea-fight, nor the\nproposition, To-morrow there will not be a sea-fight. But if you\nspeak with regard to past or present--if you say, Yesterday either\nthere was a sea-fight or there was not a sea-fight--then not only\nwill the disjunctive as a whole be true, but also one or other of its\nparts will be determinately true.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 18, b. 29. Ammonius (Scholia ad De Interpret.\np. 119, bb. 18, 28, seq.) expresses Aristotle's meaning in terms more\ndistinct than Aristotle himself: [Greek: m\u00ea\\ pa/nt\u00f4s e)/chein to\\\ne(/teron mo/rion t\u00ea=s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s _a)ph\u00f4risme/n\u00f4s a)l\u00eatheu=on_],\n&c. (b. 43).]\n\nThis remarkable logical distinction is founded on Aristotle's\nontological or physical doctrines respecting the sequence and\nconjunction of events. He held (as we shall see more fully in the\nPhysica and other treatises) that sequences throughout the Kosmos\nwere to a certain extent regular, to a certain extent irregular. The\nexterior sphere of the Kosmos (the _Aplan=es_) with the countless\nnumber of fixed stars fastened into it, was a type of regularity and\nuniformity; eternal and ever moving in the same circular orbit, by\nnecessity of its own nature, and without any potentiality of doing\notherwise. But the earth and the elemental bodies, organized and\nunorganized, below the lunar sphere and in the interior of the\nKosmos, were of inferior perfection and of very different nature.\nThey were indeed in part governed and pervaded by the movement and\ninfluence of the celestial substance within which they were\ncomprehended, and from which they borrowed their Form or constituent\nessence; but they held this Form implicated with Matter, _i.e._ the\nprinciple of potentiality, change, irregularity, generation, and\ndestruction, &c. There are thus in these sublunary bodies both\nconstant tendencies and variable tendencies. The _constant_ Aristotle\ncalls 'Nature;' which always aspires to Good, or to perpetual\nrenovation of Forms as perfect as may be, though impeded in this work\nby adverse influences, and therefore never producing any thing but\nindividuals comparatively defective and sure to perish. The\n_variable_ he calls 'Spontaneity' and 'Chance,' forming an\nindependent agency inseparably accompanying Nature--always modifying,\ndistorting, frustrating, the full purposes of Nature. Moreover, the\ndifferent natural agencies often interfere with each other, while the\nirregular tendency interferes with them all. So far as Nature acts,\nin each of her distinct agencies, the phenomena before us are regular\nand predictable; all that is uniform, and all that (without being\nquite uniform) recurs usually or frequently, is her work. But,\nbesides and along with Nature, there is the agency of Chance and\nSpontaneity, which is essentially irregular and unpredictable. Under\nthis agency there are possibilities both for and against; either of\ntwo alternative events may happen.\n\nIt is with a view to this doctrine about the variable kosmical\nagencies or potentialities that Aristotle lays down the logical\ndoctrine now before us, distinguishing propositions affirming\nparticular facts past or present, from propositions affirming\nparticular facts future. In both cases alike, the disjunctive\nantithesis, as a whole, is necessarily true. Either there was a\nsea-fight yesterday, or there was not a sea-fight yesterday: Either\nthere will be a sea-fight to-morrow, or there will not be a sea-fight\nto-morrow--both these disjunctives alike are necessarily true. There\nis, however, a difference between the one disjunctive couple and the\nother, when we take the affirmation separately or the negation\nseparately. If we say, There will be a sea-fight to-morrow, that\nproposition is not necessarily true nor is it necessarily false; to\nsay that it is either the one or the other (Aristotle argues) would\nimply that every thing in nature happened by necessary agency--that\nthe casual, the potential, the _may be or may not be_, is stopped out\nand foreclosed. But this last is really the case, in regard to a past\nfact. There was a sea-fight yesterday, is a proposition either\nnecessarily true or necessarily false. Here the antecedent agencies\nhave already spent themselves, blended, and become realized in one or\nother of the two alternative determinate results. There is no\npotentiality any longer open; all the antecedent potentiality has\nbeen foreclosed. The proposition therefore is either necessarily true\nor necessarily false; though perhaps we may not know whether it is\nthe one or the other.\n\nIn defending his position regarding this question, Aristotle denies\n(what he represents his opponents as maintaining) that all events\nhappen by necessity. He points to the notorious fact that we\ndeliberate and take counsel habitually, and that the event is\nfrequently modified, according as we adopt one mode of conduct or\nanother; which could not be (he contends), if the event could be\ndeclared beforehand by a proposition necessarily or determinately\ntrue. What Aristotle means by _necessity_, however, is at bottom\nnothing else than constant sequence or conjunction, conceived by him\nas necessary, because the fixed ends which Nature is aiming at can\nonly be attained by certain fixed means. To this he opposes\nSpontaneity and Chance, disturbing forces essentially inconstant and\nirregular; admitting, indeed, of being recorded when they _have_\nproduced effects in the past, yet defying all power of prediction as\nto those effects which they _will_ produce in the future. Hence\narises the radical distinction that he draws in Logic, between the\ntruth of propositions relating to the past (or present) and to the\nfuture.\n\nBut this logical distinction cannot be sustained, because his\nmetaphysical doctrine (on which it is founded) respecting the\nessentially irregular or casual, is not defensible. His opponents\nwould refuse to grant that there is any agency essentially or in\nitself irregular, casual, and unpredictable.[21] The aggregate of\nNature consists of a variety of sequences, each of them constant and\nregular, though intermixed, co-operating, and conflicting with each\nother, in such manner that the resulting effects are difficult to\nrefer to their respective causes, and are not to be calculated\nbeforehand except by the highest scientific efforts; often, not by\nany scientific efforts. We must dismiss the hypothesis of Aristotle,\nassuming agencies essentially irregular and unpredictable, either as\nto the past or as to the future. The past has been brought about by\nagencies all regular, however multifarious and conflicting, and the\nfuture will be brought about by the like: there is no such\ndistinction of principle as that which Aristotle lays down between\npropositions respecting the past and propositions respecting the\nfuture.\n\n[Footnote 21: The Stoics were opposed to Aristotle on this point.\nThey recognized no logical difference in the character of the\nAntiphasis, whether applied to past and present, or to future.\nNikostratus defended the thesis of Aristotle against them. See the\nScholia of Simplikius on the Categori\u00e6, p. 87, b. 30-p. 88, a. 24.\n[Greek: ai( ga\\r ei)s to\\n me/llonta chro/non e)gklino/menai\nprota/seis ou)/te a)l\u00eathei=s ei)si\\n ou)/te pseudei=s dia\\ t\u00ea\\n tou=\ne)ndechome/nou phu/sin.]\n\nThe remarks of Hobbes, upon the question here discussed by Aristotle,\nwell deserve to be transcribed (De Corpore, part II. ch. X. s. 5):--\n\n\"But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things,\nwhich are called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, therefore, that\ngenerally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called\ncontingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not\ndepend; as the rain, which shall be to-morrow, shall be necessary,\nthat is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by\nchance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though\nthey exist now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_,\nwhereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same\nmanner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a\nthing be done or no, they say, it is possible it never was done.\n\n\"Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or\nnot contingent--as this, _It will rain to-morrow_, or this,\n_To-morrow the sun will rise_--are either necessarily true, or\nnecessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet\nknow whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not\nupon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there\nare some, who, though they confess this whole proposition, _To-morrow\nit will either rain or not rain_, to be true, yet they will not\nacknowledge the parts of it, as _To-morrow it will rain_, or\n_To-morrow it will not rain_, to be either of them true by itself;\nbecause they say neither this nor that is true _determinately_. But\nwhat is this _determinately true_, but true _upon our knowledge_, or\nevidently true? And therefore they say no more, but that it is not\nyet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely,\nand darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which\nthey endeavour to hide their own ignorance.\"\n\nCompare also the fuller elucidation of the subject given by Mr. John\nStuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Bk. III. ch. xvii. s. 2:--\"An\nevent occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence\nfrom which we have no ground to infer an uniformity; the occurrence\nof an event in certain circumstances, without our having reason on\nthat account to infer that it will happen again in those\ncircumstances. This, however, when looked closely into, implies that\nthe enumeration of the circumstances is not complete. Whatever the\nfact was, since it has occurred once, we may be sure that if all the\ncircumstances were repeated, it would occur again; and not only if\nall, but there is some particular portion of those circumstances, on\nwhich the phenomenon is invariably consequent. With most of them,\nhowever, it is not connected in any permanent manner: its conjunction\nwith those is said to be the effect of chance, to be merely casual.\nFacts casually conjoined are separately the effect of causes, and\ntherefore of laws; but of different causes, and causes not connected\nby any law. It is incorrect then to say that any phenomenon is\nproduced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are\nconjoined by chance, that they co-exist or succeed one another only\nby chance.\"]\n\nThere is, indeed, one distinction between inferences as to the past\nand inferences as to the future, which may have contributed to\nsuggest, though it will not justify, the position here laid down by\nAristotle. In regard to the disjunctive--To-morrow there will be a\nsea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight--nothing more trustworthy\nthan inference or anticipation is practicable: the anticipation of a\nsagacious man with full knowledge is more likely to prove correct\nthan that of a stupid man with little knowledge; yet both are alike\nanticipations, unverifiable at the present moment. But if we turn to\nthe other disjunctive--Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or there was\nnot a sea-fight--we are no longer in the same position. The two\ndisputants, supposed to declare thus, may have been far off, and may\nhave no other means of deciding the doubt than inference. But the\ninference here is not unverifiable: there exist, or may exist,\nwitnesses or spectators of the two fleets, who can give direct\nattestation of the reality, and can either confirm or refute the\ninference, negative or affirmative, made by an absentee. Thus the\nproposition, Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or the other, Yesterday\nthere was not a sea-fight, will be verifiable or determinably true.\nThere are indeed many inferences as to the past, in regard to which\nno direct evidence is attainable. Still this is an accident; for such\ndirect evidence may always be supposed or imagined as capable of\nbeing brought into court. But, in respect to the future, verification\nis out of the question; we are confined to the region of inference,\nwell or ill-supported. Here, then, we have a material distinction\nbetween the past and the future. It was probably present to the mind\nof Aristotle, though he misconceives its real extent of operation,\nand makes it subservient to his still more comprehensive\nclassification of the different contemporaneous agencies (regular and\nirregular) which he supposes to pervade the Kosmos.\n\nIn the treatise before us, he next proceeds to state what collocation\nof the negative particle constitutes the special or legitimate\nnegation to any given affirmation, or what are the real forms of\nproposition, standing in contradictory opposition to certain other\nforms, so as to make up one _Antiphasis_.[22] The simplest\nproposition must include a noun and a verb, either definite or\nindefinite: _non homo_ is a specimen of an indefinite noun--_non\ncurrit_, of an indefinite verb. There must be, in any one\nproposition, one subject and one predicate; even the indefinite noun\nor verb signifies, in a certain sense, one thing. Each affirmation\ncomprises a noun, or an indefinite noun, with a verb; the special\ncorresponding or contradictory negation (making up the _Antiphasis_\nalong with the former) comprises a noun (or an indefinite noun) with\nan indefinite verb. The simplest proposition is--\n\n     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.\n\n      Est homo     ... ... ... ... Non est homo.\n      Est non homo ... ... ... ... Non est non homo.\n\nHere are only two pairs of antithetic propositions, or one\nquaternion. The above is an indefinite proposition (which may be\neither universal or not). When we universalize it, or turn it an\nuniversal proposition, we have--\n\n     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.\n\n      Est omnis homo ... ... ... Non est omnis homo.\n      Est omnis non homo ... ... Non est omnis non homo.\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 5, seq.]\n\nThe above are specimens of the smallest proposition; but when we\nregard larger propositions, such as those (called _tertii\nadjacentis_) where there are two terms besides _est_, the collocation\nof the negative particle becomes more complicated, and requires\nfuller illustration. Take, as an example, the affirmative _Est justus\nhomo_, the true negation of this is, _Non est justus homo_. In these\ntwo propositions, _homo_ is the subject; but we may join the negative\nwith it, and we may consider _non homo_, not less than _homo_, as a\ndistinct subject for predication, affirmative or negative. Farther,\nwe may attach _est_ and _non est_ either to _justus_ or to _non\njustus_ as the predicate of the proposition, with either _homo_, or\n_non homo_, as subject. We shall thus obtain a double mode of\nantithesis, or two distinct quaternions, each containing two pairs of\ncontradictory propositions. The second pair of the first quaternion\nwill not be in the same relation as the second pair of the second\nquaternion, to the proposition just mentioned, viz.--(A) _Est justus\nhomo_; with its negative, (B) _Non est justice homo_.[23]\n\n[Footnote 23: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 19. [Greek: o(/tan de\\\nto\\ e)/sti tri/ton proskat\u00eagor\u00ea=tai, \u00ea)/d\u00ea dich\u00f4=s le/gontai ai(\na)ntithe/seis; le/g\u00f4 de\\ oi(=on _e)/sti di/kaios a)/nthr\u00f4pos_; to\\\n_e)/sti_ tri/ton ph\u00eami\\ sugkei=sthai o)/noma \u00ea)\\ r(\u00ea=ma e)n t\u00ea=|\nkatapha/sei. \u00f4(/ste dia\\ tou=to te/ttara e)/stai tau=ta, \u00f4(=n ta\\\nme\\n du/o pro\\s t\u00ea\\n kata/phasin kai\\ a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\\ to\\\nstoichou=n \u00f4(s ai( ster\u00ea/seis, ta\\ de\\ du/o, ou)/. [le/g\u00f4 de\\ o(/ti\nto\\ _e)/stin_ \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| dikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|],\n\u00f4(/ste kai\\ \u00ea( a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai. noou=men de\\ to\\\nlego/menon e)k t\u00f4=n u(pogegramme/n\u00f4n.] In this passage the words\nwhich I have enclosed between brackets are altered by Waitz: I shall\nstate presently what I think of his alteration. Following upon these\nwords there ought to be, and it seems from Ammonius (Schol. p. 121,\na. 20) that there once was, a scheme or table arranging the four\npropositions in the order and disposition which we read in the\nAnalytica Priora, I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 37, and which I shall here\nfollow. But no such table now appears in our text; we have only an\nenumeration of the four propositions, in a different order, and then\na reference to the Analytica.]\n\nFirst, let us assume _homo_ as subject. We have then\n\n                              (QUATERNION I.)\n\n (A) Est justus homo  ...    ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.\n (D) Non est non justus homo ... ... ... (C) Est non justus homo.\n\nExamining the relation borne by the last two among these four\npropositions (C and D), to the first two (A and B), the simple\naffirmative and negative, we see that B is the legitimate negative of\nA, and D that of C. We farther see that B is a consequence of C, and\nD a consequence of A, but not _vice vers\u00e2_: that is, if C is true, B\nmust certainly be true; but we cannot infer, because B is true, that\nC must also be true: while, if A is true, D must also be true; but D\nmay perhaps be true, though A be not true. In other words, the\nrelation of D to A and of C to B, is the same as it would be if the\nprivative term _injustus_ were substituted in place of _non justus_;\n_i.e._ if the proposition C (_Est injustus homo_) be true, the other\nproposition B (_Non est justus homo_) must certainly be true, but the\ninference will not hold conversely; while if the proposition A (_Est\njustus homo_) be true, it must also be true to say D (_Non est\ninjustus homo_), but not _vice vers\u00e2_.[24]\n\n[Footnote 24: Referring to the words cited in the preceding note, I\nconstrue [Greek: ta\\ de\\ du/o, ou)/] as Boethius does (II. pp.\n384-385), and not in agreement with Ammonius (Schol. p. 122, a. 26,\nBr.), who, however, is followed both by Julius Pacius and Waitz (p.\n344). I think it impossible that these words, [Greek: ta\\ de\\ du/o,\nou)/], can mean (as Ammonius thinks) the [Greek: kata/phasis] and\n[Greek: a)po/phasis] themselves, since the very point which Aristotle\nis affirming is the relation of these words, [Greek: pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\nkata/phasin kai\\ a)po/phasin], _i.e._ to the affirmative and negative\nstarted from--\n\n (A) Est justus homo ... ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.\n\nAs the words [Greek: ta\\ me\\n du/o] refer to the second contradictory\npair (that is, C and D) in the _first_ Quaternion, so the words\n[Greek: ta\\ de\\ du/o, ou)/] designate the second contradictory pair\n(G and H) in the _second_ Quaternion. Though G and H are included in\nthe second Quaternion, they are here designated by the negative\nrelation ([Greek: ta\\ de\\ du/o, ou)/]) which they bear to A and B,\nthe first contradictory pair of the _first_ Quaternion. [Greek:\ndich\u00f4=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis] (line 20) is explained and\nillustrated by line 37--[Greek: au(=tai me\\n ou)=n du/o\na)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\\ du/o pro\\s to\\ _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ \u00f4(s\nu(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n]. Lastly, Aristotle expressly states\nthat the second Quaternion will stand independently and by itself (p.\n20, a. 1), having noticed it in the beginning only in relation to the\nfirst.]\n\nSuch is the result obtained when we take _homo_ as the subject of the\nproposition; we get four propositions, of which the two last (C and\nD) stand to the two first (B and A) in the same relation as if they\n(C and D) were privative propositions. But if, instead of _homo_, we\ntake _non homo_ as Subject of the proposition (_justus_ or _non\njustus_ being predicates as before), we shall then obtain two other\npairs of contradictory propositions; and the second pair of this new\nquaternion will not stand in that same relation to these same\npropositions B and A. We shall then find that, instead of B and A, we\nhave a different negative and a different affirmative, as the\nappropriate correlates to the third and fourth propositions. The new\nquaternion of propositions, with _non homo_ as subject, will stand\nthus--\n\n                              (QUATERNION II.)\n\n (E) Est justus non homo ... ... ... (F) Non est justus non homo.\n (H) Non est non justus non homo ... (G) Est non justus non homo.[25]\n\nHere we see that propositions G and H do not stand to B and A in the\nsame relations as C and D stand to B and A; but that they stand in\nthat same relation to two perfectly different propositions, F and E.\nThat is, if in place of _non **justus_, in propositions G and H, we\nsubstitute the privative term _injustus_ (thus turning G into _Est\ninjustus non homo_, and turning H into _Non est injustus non homo_),\nthe relation of G, when thus altered, to F, and the relation of H,\nwhen thus altered, to E, will be the same as it was before. Or, in\nother words, if G be true, F will certainly be true, but not _vice\nvers\u00e2_; and if E be true, H will certainly be true, but not _vice\nvers\u00e2_.\n\n[Footnote 25: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 36. [Greek: au(=tai me\\n\nou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (the two pairs--A B and C D--of the first\nquaternion), [Greek: a)/llai de\\ du/o pro\\s to\\ _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_\n\u00f4(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;]\n\n (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos] ... ... ... (F)\n[Greek: ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]\n (H) [Greek: ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos] ... (G)\n[Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]\n\n[Greek: plei/ous de\\ tou/t\u00f4n ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai\nde\\ ch\u00f4ri\\s e)kei/n\u00f4n au)tai\\ kath' e(auta\\s e)/sontai, \u00f4(s o)no/mati\nt\u00f4=| _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ chr\u00f4/menai.] The second [Greek: au(=tai]\nalludes to this last quaternion, [Greek: e)kei/n\u00f4n] to the first. I\nhave, as in the former case, transposed propositions three and four\nof this second quaternion, in order that the relation of G to F and\nof H to E may be more easily discerned.\n\nThere are few chapters in Aristotle more obscure and puzzling than\nthe tenth chapter of the De Interpretatione. It was found so by\nAlexander, Herminus, Porphyry, Ammonius, and all the Scholiasts.\nAmmonius (Schol. pp. 121, 122, Br.) reports these doubts, and\ncomplains of it as a riddle almost insolvable. The difficulties\nremain, even after the long note of Waitz, and the literal\ntranslation of M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire.]\n\nThe propositions which we have hitherto studied have been indefinite;\nthat is, they might be universal or not. But if we attach to them the\nsign of universality, and construe them as universals, all that we\nhave said about them would still continue to be true, except that the\npropositions which are diametrically (or diagonally) opposed would\nnot be both true in so many instances. Thus, let us take the first\nquaternion of propositions, in which _est_ is attached to _homo_, and\nlet us construe these propositions as universal. They will stand\nthus--\n\n (A) Omnis est homo justus  ... ... (B) Non omnis est homo justus.\n (D) Non omnis est homo non justus  (C) Omnis est homo non justus.\n\nIn these propositions, as in the others before noticed, the same\nrelation prevails between C and B, and between A and D; if C be true,\nB also is true, but not _vice vers\u00e2_; if A be true, D also will be\ntrue, but not _vice vers\u00e2_. But the propositions diagonally opposed\nwill not be so often alike true:[26] thus, if A be true (_Omnis est\nhomo justus_), C cannot be true (_Omnis est homo non justus_);\nwhereas in the former quaternion of propositions (indefinite, and\ntherefore capable of being construed as not universal) A and C might\nboth be alike true.[27]\n\n[Footnote 26: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, b. 35. [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n\nou)ch o(moi/\u00f4s ta\\s kata\\ dia/metron e)nde/chetai sunal\u00eatheu/ein;\ne)nde/chetai de\\ pote/.] The \"diameter\" or \"diagonal\" is to be\nunderstood with reference to the scheme or square mentioned p. 119,\nnote, the related propositions standing at the angles, as above.]\n\n[Footnote 27: The Scholion of Ammonius, p. 123, a. 17, Br., explains\nthis very obscure passage: [Greek: a)ll' e)pi\\ me\\n t\u00f4=n\na)prosdiori/st\u00f4n] (indefinite propositions, such as may be construed\neither as universal or as particular), [Greek: kata\\ t\u00ea\\n\ne)ndechome/n\u00ean u(/l\u00ean ta/s te katapha/seis] (of the propositions\ndiagonally opposite), [Greek: sunal\u00eatheu/ein a)ll\u00ea/lais sumbai/nei\nkai\\ ta\\s a)popha/seis, _a(/te tai=s merikai=s i)sodunamou/sas_.\ne)pi\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n prosdi\u00f4risme/n\u00f4n] (those propositions where the mark\nof universality is tacked to the Subject), [Greek: peri\\ \u00f4(=n nuni\\\nau)t\u00f4=| o( lo/gos, t\u00ea=s katho/lou katapha/se\u00f4s kai\\ t\u00ea=s e)pi\\\nme/rous a)popha/se\u00f4s, ta\\s me\\n katapha/seis a)du/naton\nsunal\u00eatheu=sai kath' oi(and\u00ea/pote u(/l\u00ean, ta\\s me/ntoi a)popha/seis\nsumbai/nei sunal\u00eatheu/ein kata\\ mo/n\u00ean t\u00ea\\n e)ndechome/n\u00ean;] &c.]\n\nIt is thus that Aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in\npropositions, arising out of the altered collocation of the negative\nparticle; the distinction between (1) _Non est justus_, (2) _Est non\njustus_, (3) _Est injustus_. The first of the three is the only true\nnegative, corresponding to the affirmative _Est Justus_. The second\nis not a negative at all, but an affirmative ([Greek: e)k\nmetathe/se\u00f4s], or by transposition, as Theophrastus afterwards called\nit). The third is an affirmative, but privative. Both the second and\nthe third stand related in the same manner to the first; that is, the\ntruth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or\nof the third, but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the\nfirst. This is explained still more clearly in the Prior Analytics;\nto which Aristotle here makes express reference.[28]\n\n[Footnote 28: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. [Greek: tau=ta me\\n\nou)=n, \u00f4(/sper e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s le/getai, ou(/t\u00f4 te/taktai.]\n\nWaitz in his note suggests that instead of [Greek: te/taktai] we\nought to read [Greek: teta/chth\u00f4]. But if we suppose that the formal\ntable once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing\nwith the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.\n\nWaitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear\nto me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker\nand Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text\nwas a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander\nof Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the\nchanges made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with\neither. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the\nportion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter\nhere discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of\nAristotle's reasoning.\n\n(Bekker.)--[Greek: O(/tan de\\ to\\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton proskat\u00eagor\u00ea=tai,\n\u00ea)/d\u00ea dich\u00f4=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis. le/g\u00f4 de\\ oi(=on _e)/sti\ndi/kaios a)/nthr\u00f4pos_; to\\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton ph\u00eami\\ sugkei=sthai\no)/noma \u00ea)\\ r(\u00ea=ma e)n t\u00ea=| katapha/sei. \u00f4(/ste dia\\ tou=to te/ttara\ne)/stai tau=ta, \u00f4(=n ta\\ me\\n du/o pro\\s t\u00ea\\n kata/phasin kai\\\na)po/phasin e(/xei kata\\ to\\ stoichou=n \u00f4(s ai( ster\u00ea/seis, ta\\ de\\\ndu/o, ou)/. le/g\u00f4 d' o(/ti to\\ _e)/stin_ \u00ea)\\ _t\u00f4=| dikai/\u00f4|\nproskei/setai_ \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| _ou) dikai/\u00f4|_] (25), [Greek: \u00f4(/ste kai\\ \u00ea(\na)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai.] (Here follow the first pairs of\nAntitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as\ngiven)--\n\n (A) [Greek: e)/sti di/kios a)/nthr\u00f4pos]   ... ... (B) [Greek: ou)k\ne)/sti di/kios a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]y\n (C) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthr\u00f4pos] ... (D) [Greek: ou)k\ne)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]\n\n[Greek: to\\ ga\\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha kai\\ to\\ _ou)k e)/sti t\u00f4=|\ndikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai kai\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|]_ (30).--[Greek:\nAu(=tai me\\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\\ du/o pro\\s to\\\nou)k _a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ \u00f4(s u(pokei/meno/n ti] (38) [Greek:\n_prostethe/n_.] (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the\nsecond Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I\nhave departed above)--\n\n (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos]  ... ... (F) [Greek:\nOu)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]\n (G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos] ... (H) [Greek:\nOu)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos.]\n\n[Greek: plei/ous de\\ tou/t\u00f4n ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai\nde\\] (the second Quaternion) [Greek: ch\u00f4ri\\s e)kei/n\u00f4n] (first\nQuaternion) [Greek: au)tai\\ kath' e(auta\\s e)/sontai, \u00f4(s o)no/mati\nt\u00f4=| _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ chr\u00f4/menai.]\n\nIn this text Waitz makes three alterations:--1. In line 24, instead\nof [Greek: \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| dikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|]--he\nreads, [Greek: \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| proskei/setai \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| ou)k\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|].\n\n2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of [Greek: t\u00f4=|\ndikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai kai\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|]--he reads, [Greek:\nt\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| proskei/setai kai\\ t\u00f4=| ou)k a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|].\n\nIn line 38, instead of [Greek: prostethe/n], he reads [Greek:\nprostethe/ntos].\n\nOf these three alterations the first appears to me good, but\ninsufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in\nBekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.\n\nThe purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason\nwhy, when the propositions were _tertii adjacentis_, there were two\nQuaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in\npropositions _secundi adjacentis_, there was only one Quaternion or\ntwo couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the\ndistinction between the first and the second Quaternion in\npropositions _tertii adjacentis_.\n\nNow the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I\nthink we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in\nplace of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker\nand inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage\nafter such addition will stand thus--[Greek: le/g\u00f4 d' o(/ti to\\\n_e)/stin_ \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| dikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|, kai\\\n\u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| ou)k a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|, \u00f4(/ste kai\\ \u00ea(\na)po/phasis. te/ttara _ou)=n_ e)/stai.] Here Aristotle declares the\n_reason why_ ([Greek: ou)=n]) there come to be four couples of\npropositions; that reason is, because [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek:\nou)k e)/sti] may be joined either with [Greek: di/kaios] or [Greek:\nou) di/kaios] and either with [Greek: a)/nthr\u00f4pos] or with [Greek:\nou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos]. Both these alternatives must be specified in order\nto make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of\nantithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives\nonly one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz,\ngives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is\nsufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason\nrequired, and thus answer Aristotle's purpose.\n\nAristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions,\nand then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is\nirrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me\nstill worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz\nreads [Greek: to\\ ga\\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha] (in the first\nQuaternion, which has just been enunciated) [Greek: kai\\ to\\ _ou)k\ne)/stin_ t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| proskei/setai kai\\ _t\u00f4=| ou)k\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|_]. These last words are incorrect in fact, for [Greek:\nou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos] does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is\nreserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently\nwrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless\nto tell us merely that [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin]\nattach both to [Greek: di/kaios] and to [Greek: ou) di/kaios] in this\nfirst Quaternion ([Greek: e)ntau=tha]), because that characteristic\nis equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and\ntherefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out\nthe meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to\nretain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not\nall, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand\nthus--[Greek: to\\ ga\\r e)/stin e)ntau=tha kai\\ to\\ ou)k e)/sti t\u00f4=|\ndikai/\u00f4| proskei/setai kai\\ t\u00f4=| ou) dikai/\u00f4|, kai\\ t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|,\n_a)ll' ou)_ t\u00f4=| ou)k a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|.] Or perhaps [Greek: _kai\\ ou)_\nt\u00f4=| ou)k a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|] might suffice in the last clause (being a\nsmaller change), though [Greek: a)ll' ou)] seem the proper terms to\ndeclare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence\nintended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us\nthat [Greek: e)/stin] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] being joined\nalternately with [Greek: di/kaios] and with [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and\nalso with [Greek: a)/nthr\u00f4pos] and [Greek: ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos], make up\ntwo Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character\nbelonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it\n[Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] are joined both with\n[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios], and also with [Greek:\na)/nthr\u00f4pos] _but not with_ [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_], This is\nexactly the truth.\n\nAristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points\nout, as the characteristic distinction, that [Greek: ou)k\na)/nthr\u00f4pos] comes in and [Greek: a)/nthr\u00f4pos] disappears, while\n[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios] remain included, as in\nthe first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:--[Greek:\nau(=tai me\\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (referring to the two pairs of\nantithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), [Greek: _a)/llai\nde\\ pro\\s to\\ ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ \u00f4(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;\ne)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k\na)/nthr\u00f4pos-ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos, e)/stin ou)\ndi/kaios ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos-ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k\na)/nthr\u00f4pos.] When we read these words, [Greek: a)/llai de\\ du/o\npro\\s to\\ ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos \u00f4(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n], as\napplied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been\nsome words preceding which excluded [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_] from\nthe first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing\n[Greek: prostethe/n] into [Greek: prostethe/ntos]. I do not concur\nwith his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line\n2, [Greek: \u00f4(s o)no/mati t\u00f4=| _ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ chr\u00f4/menai\n(proschr\u00f4/menai)], are a reasonable justification of [Greek:\nprostethe/n--_ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos_ \u00f4(s _u(pokei/meno/n ti_ prostethe/n]\nbeing very analogous to [Greek: ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos \u00f4(s o)/noma].\n\nThis long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure\ntext, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the\nperplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by\nAmmonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander\n(Schol. p. 122**, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of\nAristotle; several read [Greek: t\u00f4=| dikai/\u00f4|] (p. 19, b. 25),\nseveral others read [Greek: t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|]. I think that all of\nthem were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only\nor mainly.]\n\nAfter this very subtle and obscure distinction between propositions\n_secundi adjacentis_, and those _tertii adjacentis_, in respect to\nthe application of the negative, Aristotle touches on the relation of\n_contrariety_ between propositions. The universal affirmation _Omne\nest animal justum_ has for its contrary _Nullum est animal justum_.\nIt is plain that both these propositions will never be true at once.\nBut the negatives or contradictories of both may well be true at\nonce: thus, _Non omne animal est justum_ (the contradictory of the\nfirst) and _Est aliquid animal justum_ (the contradictory of the\nsecond) may be and are both alike true. If the affirmative\nproposition _Omnis homo est non justus_ be true, the negative _Nullus\nest homo justus_ must also be true; if the affirmative _Est aliquis\nhomo justus_ be true, the negative _Non omnis homo est non justus_\nmust also be true. In singular propositions, wherever the negative or\ndenial is true, the indefinite affirmative ([Greek: e)k\nmetathe/se\u00f4s], in the language of Theophrastus) corresponding to it\nwill also be true; in universal propositions, the same will not\nalways hold. Thus, if you ask, Is Sokrates wise? and receive for\nanswer No, you are warranted in affirming, Sokrates is not wise (the\nindefinite affirmation). But if you ask, Are all men wise? and the\nanswer is No, you are not warranted in affirming, All men are not\nwise. This last is the contrary of the proposition, All men are wise;\nand two contraries may both be false. You are warranted in declaring\nonly the contradictory negative, Not all men are wise.[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, a. 16-30.]\n\nNeither the indefinite noun ([Greek: ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos]) nor the\nindefinite verb ([Greek: ou) tre/chei--ou) di/kaios]) is a real and\ntrue negation, though it appears to be such. For every negation ought\nto be either true or false; but _non homo_, if nothing be appended to\nit, is not more true or false (indeed less so) than _homo_.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Ibid. a. 31, seq.]\n\nThe transposition of substantive and adjective makes no difference in\nthe meaning of the phrase; _Est albus homo_ is equivalent to _Est\nhomo albus_. If it were not equivalent, there would be two negations\ncorresponding to the same affirmation; but we have shown that there\ncan be only one negation corresponding to one affirmation, so as to\nmake up an _Antiphasis_.[31]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 1-12. That [Greek: e)sti\\ leuko\\s\na)/nthr\u00f4pos], and [Greek: e)sti\\n a)/nthr\u00f4pos leuko/s], mean exactly\nthe same, neither more nor less--we might have supposed that\nAristotle would have asserted without any proof; that he would have\nbeen content [Greek: a)po\\ t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n pistou=sthai] (to use the\nphrase of Ammonius in a portion of the Scholia, p. 121, a. 27). But\nhe prefers to deduce it as a corollary from a general doctrine much\nless evident than the statement itself; and after all, his deduction\nis not conclusive, as Waitz has already remarked (ad Organ. I. p.\n351).]\n\nIn one and the same proposition, it is indispensable that the subject\nbe one and the predicate one; if not, the proposition will not be\none, but two or more. Both the subject and the predicate indeed may\nconsist of several words; but in each case the several words must\ncoalesce to make one total unity; otherwise the proposition will not\nbe one. Thus, we may predicate of man--_animal_, _bipes_,\n_mansuetum_; but these three coalesce into one, so that the\nproposition will be a single one. On the other hand the three terms\n_homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not coalesce into one; and therefore,\nif we predicate all respecting the same subject, or if we affirm the\nsame predicate respecting all three, expressing them all by one word,\nthe proposition will not be one, but several.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 20, b. 13-22.]\n\nAristotle follows this up by a remark interesting to note, because we\nsee how much his generalities were intended to bear upon the actual\npractice of his day, in regard to dialectical disputation. In\ndialectic exercise, the respondent undertook to defend a thesis, so\nas to avoid inconsistency between one answer and another, against any\nquestions which might be put by the opponent. Both the form of the\nquestions, and the form of the answers, were determined beforehand.\nNo question was admissible which tended to elicit information or a\npositive declaration from the respondent. A proposition was tendered\nto him, and he was required to announce whether he affirmed or denied\nit. The question might be put in either one of two ways: either by\nthe affirmative alone, or by putting both the affirmative and the\nnegative; either in the form, Is Rhetoric estimable? or in the form,\nIs Rhetoric estimable or not? To the first form the respondent\nanswered Yes or No: to the second form, he replied by repeating\neither the affirmative or the negative, as he preferred. But it was\nnot allowable to ask him, _What_ is Rhetoric? so as to put him under\nthe necessity of enunciating an explanation of his own.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: See the Scholia of Ammonius, p. 127, Br.]\n\nUnder these canons of dialectic debate, each question was required to\nbe really and truly one, so as to admit of a definite answer in one\nword. The questioner was either unfair or unskilful, if he wrapped up\ntwo questions really distinct in the same word, and thus compelled\nthe respondent either to admit them both, or to deny them both, at\nonce. Against this inconvenience Aristotle seeks to guard, by\nexplaining what are the conditions under which one and the same word\ndoes in fact include more than one question. He had before brought to\nview the case of an equivocal term, which involves such duplication:\nif _himation_ means both horse and man, it will often happen that\nquestions respecting _himation_ cannot be truly answered either by\nYes or No. He now brings to view a different case in which the like\nambiguity is involved. To constitute one proposition, it is essential\nboth that the subject should be one, and that the predicate should be\none; either of them indeed may be called by two or three names, but\nthese names must coalesce into one. Thus, _animal_, _bipes_,\n_mansuetum_, coalesce into _homo_, and may be employed either as one\nsubject or as one predicate; but _homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not\ncoalesce into one; so that if we say, _Kallias est homo, albus,\nambulans_, the proposition is not one but three.[34] Accordingly, the\nrespondent cannot make one answer to a question thus complicated. We\nthus find Aristotle laying down principles--and probably no one had\never attempted to do so before him--for the correct management of\nthat dialectical debate which he analyses so copiously in the Topica.\n\n[Footnote 34: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, b. 2. seq.; Ammonius,\nSchol. pp. 127-128, a. 21, Br. Compare De Sophist. Elench. p. 169, a.\n6-15.]\n\nThere are cases (he proceeds to state) in which two predicates may be\ntruly affirmed, taken separately, respecting a given subject, but in\nwhich they cannot be truly affirmed, taken together.[35] Kallias is a\n_currier_, Kallias is _good_--both these propositions may be true;\nyet the proposition, Kallias is a _good currier_, may not be true.\nThe two predicates are both of them accidental co-inhering in the\nsame individual; but do not fuse themselves into one. So, too, we may\ntruly say, Homer _is a poet_; but we cannot truly say, Homer\n_is_.[36] We see by this last remark,[37] how distinctly Aristotle\nassigned a double meaning to _est_: first, _per se_, as meaning\nexistence; next, relatively, as performing the function of copula in\npredication. He tells us, in reply either to Plato or to some other\ncontemporaries, that though we may truly say, _Non-Ens est\nopinabile_, we cannot truly say _Non-Ens est_, because the real\nmeaning of the first of these propositions is, **_Non-Ens est\nopinabile non esse_.[38]\n\n[Footnote 35: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 7, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ibid. a. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Compare Schol. (ad Anal. Prior. I.) p. 146, a. 19-27;\nalso Eudemi Fragment. cxiv. p. 167, ed. Spengel.\n\nEudemus considered [Greek: e)/stin] as one term in the proposition.\nAlexander dissented from this, and regarded it as being only a copula\nbetween the terms, [Greek: sunthe/se\u00f4s m\u00eanutiko\\n mo/rion t\u00f4=n e)n\nt\u00ea=| prota/sei o(/r\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32; compare Rhetorica,\nii. p. 1402, a. 5. The remark of Aristotle seems to bear upon the\ndoctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistes, p. 258--the close of\nthe long discussion which begins, p. 237, about [Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\\no)/n], as Ammonius tells us in the Scholia, p. 112, b. 5, p. 129, b.\n20, Br. Ammonius also alludes to the Republic; as if Plato had\ndelivered the same doctrine in both; which is not the fact. See\n'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii. pp.\n447-458, seq.]\n\nAristotle now discusses the so-called Modal Propositions--the\nPossible and the Necessary. What is the appropriate form of\n_Antiphasis_ in the case of such propositions, where _possible to\nbe_, or _necessary to be_, is joined to the simple _is_. After a\nchapter of some length, he declares that the form of _Antiphasis_\nsuitable for the Simple proposition will not suit for a Modal\nproposition; and that in the latter the sign of negation must be\nannexed to the modal adjective--_possible_, _not possible_, _&c._ His\nreasoning here is not merely involved, but substantially incorrect;\nfor, in truth, both in one and in the other, the sign of\ncontradictory negation ought to be annexed to the copula.[39] From\nthe _Antiphasis_ in Modals Aristotle proceeds to legitimate sequences\nadmissible in such propositions, how far any one of them can be\ninferred from any other.[40] He sets out four tables, each containing\nfour modal determinations interchangeable with each other.\n\n     1.\n\n1. Possible (physically) to be.\n2. Possible (logically) to be.\n3. Not impossible to be.\n4. Not necessary to be.\n\n     2.\n\n1. Possible (physically) not to be.\n2. Possible (logically) not to be.\n3. Not impossible not to be.\n4. Not necessary not to be.\n\n     3.\n\n1. Not possible (physically) to be.\n2. Not possible (logically) to be.\n3. Impossible to be.\n4. Necessary not to be.\n\n     4.\n\n1. Not possible (physically) not to be.\n2. Not possible (logically) not to be.\n3. Impossible not to be.\n4. Necessary to be.\n\nAristotle canvasses these tables at some length, and amends them\npartly by making the fourth case of the second table change place\nwith the fourth of the first.[41] He then discusses whether we can\ncorrectly say that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_. If\nnot, then we might say correctly that the _necessary to be_ is _not\npossible to be_; for one side or other of a legitimate _Antiphasis_\nmay always be truly affirmed. Yet this would be absurd: accordingly\nwe must admit that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_.\nHere, however, we fall seemingly into a different absurdity; for the\n_possible to be_ is also _possible not to be_; and how can we allow\nthat what is _necessary to be_ is at the same time _possible not to\nbe_? To escape from such absurdities on both sides, we must\ndistinguish two modes of the Possible: one, in which the affirmative\nand negative are alike possible; the other in which the affirmative\nalone is possible, because it is always and constantly realized. If a\nman is actually walking, we know that it is possible for him to walk;\nand even when he is not walking, we say the same, because we believe\nthat he may walk if he chooses. He is not always walking; and in his\ncase, as in all other intermittent realities, the affirmative and the\nnegative are alike possible. But this is not true in the case of\nnecessary, constant, and sempiternal realities. With them there is no\nalternative possibility, but only the possibility of their doing or\ncontinuing to do. The celestial bodies revolve, sempiternally and\nnecessarily; it is therefore possible for them to revolve; but there\nis no alternative possibility; it is not possible for them not to\nrevolve. Perpetual reality thus includes the unilateral, but not the\nbilateral, possibility.[42]\n\n[Footnote 39: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 21, a. 34-p. 22, a. 13. See\nthe note of Waitz, ad Organ. I. p. 359, who points out the error of\nAristotle, partly indicated by Ammonius in the Scholia.\n\nThe rule does not hold in propositions with the sign of universality\nattached to the subject; but it is at least the same for Modals and\nNon-modals.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, a. 14-b. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, b. 22, [Greek: lei/petai\ntoi/nun] &c.; Ammonius, Schol. p. 133, b. 5-27-36.\n\nAristotle also intimates (p. 23, a. 18) that it would be better to\nreverse the order of the propositions in the tables, and to place the\nNecessary before the Possible. M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire has inserted\n(in the note to his Translation, p. 197) tables with this reversed\norder.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 22, b. 29-p. 23, a. 15.]\n\nHaving thus stated that _possible to be_, in this unilateral and\nequivocal sense but in no other, is a legitimate consequence of\n_necessary to be_, Aristotle proceeds to lay down a tripartite\ndistinction which surprises us in this place. \"It is plain from what\nhas been said that that which is by Necessity, is in Act or\nActuality; so that if things sempiternal are prior, Actuality is\nprior to Possibility. Some things, like the first (or celestial)\nsubstances, are Actualities without Possibility; others (the\ngenerated and perishable substances) which are prior in nature but\nposterior in generation, are Actualities along with Possibility;\nwhile a third class are Possibilities only, and never come into\nActuality\" (such as the largest number, or the least magnitude).[43]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 23, a. 21-26.]\n\nNow the sentence just translated (enunciating a doctrine of\nAristotle's First Philosophy rather than of Logic) appears decidedly\nto contradict what he had said three lines before, viz., that in one\ncertain sense, the _necessary to be_ included and implied the\n_possible to be_; that is, a possibility or potentiality unilateral\nonly, not bilateral; for we are here told that the celestial\nsubstance is Actuality without Possibility (or Potentiality), so that\nthe unilateral sense of this last term is disallowed. On the other\nhand, a third sense of the same term is recognized and distinguished;\na sense neither bilateral nor unilateral, but the negation of both.\nThis third sense is hardly intelligible, giving as it does an\n_impossible_ Possible; it seems a self-contradictory description.[44]\nAt best, it can only be understood as a limit in the mathematical\nsense; a terminus towards which potentiality may come constantly\nnearer and nearer, but which it can never reach. The first, or\nbilateral potentiality, is the only sense at once consistent,\nlegitimate, and conformable to ordinary speech. Aristotle himself\nadmits that the second and third are equivocal meanings,[45]\ndeparting from the first as the legitimate meaning; but if equivocal\ndeparture to so great an extent were allowed, the term, put to such\nmultifarious service, becomes unfit for accurate philosophical\nreasoning. And we find this illustrated by the contradiction into\nwhich Aristotle himself falls in the course of a few lines. The\nsentence of First Philosophy (which I translated in the last page) is\na correction of the logical statement immediately preceding it, in so\nfar as it suppresses the _necessary_ Possible, or the unilateral\npotentiality. But on the other hand the same sentence introduces a\nnew confusion by its third variety--the _impossible_ Potential,\ndeparting from all clear and consistent meaning of potentiality, and\ncoinciding only with the explanation of _Non-Ens_, as given by\nAristotle elsewhere.[46]\n\n[Footnote 44: M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his\ntranslation (p. 197) calls it justly--\"le possible qui n'est jamais;\net qui par cela m\u00eame, porte en lui une sorte d'impossibilit\u00e9.\" It\ncontradicts both the two explanations of [Greek: dunato\\n] which\nAristotle had given a few lines before. 1. [Greek: dunato\\n o(/ti\ne)nergei=]. 2. [Greek: dunato\\n o(/ti e)nerg\u00ea/seien a)/n] (p. 23, a.\n10).]\n\n[Footnote 45: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 5. [Greek: tou=to me\\n\ntou/tou cha/rin ei)/r\u00eatai, o(/ti ou) pa=sa du/namis t\u00f4=n\na)ntikeime/n\u00f4n, ou)d' o(/sai le/gontai kata\\ to\\ au)to\\ ei)=dos.\ne)/niai de\\ duna/meis o(m\u00f4/numoi/ ei)sin; to\\ ga\\r dunato\\n ou)ch\na(pl\u00f4=s le/getai, a)lla\\ to\\ me\\n o(/ti a)l\u00eathe\\s \u00f4(s e)nergei/a|\no)/n], &c.\n\nIf we read the thirteenth chapter of Analytica Priora I. (p. 32, a.\n18-29) we shall see that [Greek: to\\ e)ndecho/menon] is declared to\nbe [Greek: ou)k a)nagkai=on], and that in the definition of [Greek:\nto\\ e)ndecho/menon], the words [Greek: ou(= m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos a)nagkai/ou]\nare expressly inserted. When [Greek: to\\ a)nagkai=on] is said [Greek:\ne)nde/chesthai], this is said only in an _equivocal_ sense of [Greek:\ne)nde/chesthai--to\\ ga\\r a)nagkai=on _o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s_ e)nde/chesthai\nle/gomen.]\n\nOn the meaning of [Greek: to\\ e)ndecho/menon], translated above, in\nthe table, \"possible (logically) to be,\" and its relation to [Greek:\nto\\ dunato/n], see Waitz, ad Organ. I. pp. 375-8. Compare Prantl.\nGescht. der Logik, I. pp. 166-8.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32: [Greek: to\\ de\\ m\u00ea\\\no)/n, o(/ti doxasto/n, ou)k a)l\u00eathe\\s ei)pei=n o)/n ti; do/xa ga\\r\nau)tou= ou)k e)/stin o(/ti e)/stin, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k e)/stin. To\\ m\u00ea\\\no)/n] is the true description of that which Aristotle improperly\ncalls [Greek: du/namis \u00ea(\\ ou)de/pote e)ne/rgeia/ e)stin].\n\nThe triple enumeration given by Aristotle (1. Actuality without\nPotentiality. 2. Actuality with Potentiality. 3. Potentiality without\nActuality) presents a neat symmetry which stands in the place of\nphilosophical exactness.]\n\nThe contrast of Actual and Potential stands so prominently forward in\nAristotle's First Philosophy, and is, when correctly understood, so\nvaluable an element in First Philosophy generally, that we cannot be\ntoo careful against those misapplications of it into which he himself\nsometimes falls. The sense of Potentiality, as including the\nalternative of either affirmative or negative--_may be or may not\nbe_--is quite essential in comprehending the ontological theories of\nAristotle; and when he professes to drop the _may not be_ and leave\nonly the _may be_, this is not merely an equivocal sense of the word,\nbut an entire renunciation of its genuine sense. In common parlance,\nindeed, we speak elliptically, and say, _It may be_, when we really\nmean, _It may or may not be_. But the last or negative half, though\nnot expressly announced, is always included in the thought and belief\nof the speaker and understood by the hearer.[47]\n\n[Footnote 47: See Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, pp. 303-307.]\n\nMany logicians, and Sir William Hamilton very emphatically, have\nconsidered the Modality of propositions as improper to be included in\nthe province of Logic, and have treated the proceeding of Aristotle\nin thus including it, as one among several cases in which he had\ntranscended the legitimate boundaries of the science.[48] This\ncriticism, to which I cannot subscribe, is founded upon one peculiar\nview of the proper definition and limits of Logic. Sir W. Hamilton\nlays down the limitation peremptorily, and he is warranted in doing\nthis for himself; but it is a question about which there has been\ngreat diversity of view among expositors, and he has no right to\nblame others who enlarge it. My purpose in the present volume is to\nexplain how the subject presented itself to Aristotle. He was the\nfirst author that ever attempted to present Logic in a scientific\naspect; and it is hardly fair to try him by restrictions emanating\nfrom critics much later. Yet, if he is to be tried upon this point, I\nthink the latitude in which he indulges preferable to the restricted\ndoctrine of Sir W. Hamilton.\n\n[Footnote 48: See pp. 143-5 of the article, \"Logic,\" in Sir William\nHamilton's Discussions on Philosophy--a very learned and instructive\narticle, even for those who differ from most of its conclusions.\nCompare the opposite view, as advocated by M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire,\nLogique d'Aristote, Pr\u00e9face, pp. **lxii.-lxviii.]\n\nIn the treatise now before us (De Interpretatione) Aristotle\nannounces his intention to explain the Proposition or Enunciative\nSpeech, the conjunction of a noun and a verb; as distinguished,\nfirst, from its two constituents (noun and verb) separately taken;\nnext, from other modes of speech, also combining the two (precative,\ninterrogative, &c.). All speech (he says), the noun or verb\nseparately, as well as the proposition conjointly, is, in the first\ninstance, a sign of certain mental states common to the speaker with\nhis hearers; and, in the second instance, a sign of certain things or\nfacts, resembling (or correlating with) these mental states.[49] The\nnoun, pronounced separately, and the verb, pronounced separately, are\neach signs of a certain thought in the speaker's mind, without either\ntruth or falsehood; the Proposition, or conjunction of the two, goes\nfarther and declares truth or falsehood. The words pronounced (he\nsays) follow the thoughts in the mind, expressing an opinion (_i.e._\nbelief or disbelief) entertained in the mind; the verbal affirmation\nor negation gives utterance to a mental affirmation or negation--a\nfeeling of belief or disbelief--that something _is_, or that\nsomething _is not_.[50] Thus, Aristotle intends to give a theory of\nthe Proposition, leaving other modes of speech to Rhetoric or\nPoetry:[51] the Proposition he considers under two distinct aspects.\nIn its first or _subjective_ aspect, it declares the state of the\nspeaker's mind, as to belief or disbelief. In its second or\n_objective_ aspect, it declares a truth or falsehood correlating with\nsuch belief or disbelief, for the information of the hearer. Now the\nMode belonging to a proposition of this sort, in virtue of its\n_form_, is to be _true_ or _false_. But there are also other\npropositions--other varieties of speech enunciative--which differ\nfrom the Simple or Assertory Proposition having the form _is_ or _is\nnot_, and which have distinct modes belonging to them, besides that\nof being true or false. Thus we have the Necessary Proposition,\ndeclaring that a thing _is_ so _by necessity_, that it _must be_ so,\nor _cannot but be_ so; again, the Problematical Proposition,\nenunciating that a thing _may or may not be so_. These two modes\nattach to the _form_ of the proposition, and are quite distinct from\nthose which attach to its _matter_ as simply affirmed or denied; as\nwhen, instead of saying, John is sick, we say, John is sick _of a\nfever_, John is _dangerously_ sick, with a merely material\nmodification. Such adverbs, modifying the _matter_ affirmed or\ndenied, are numerous, and may be diversified almost without limit.\nBut they are not to be placed in the same category with the two just\nmentioned, which modify the _form_ of the proposition, and correspond\nto a state of mind distinct from simple belief or disbelief,\nexpressed by a simple affirmation or negation.[52] In the case of\neach of the two, Aristotle has laid down rules (correct or incorrect)\nfor constructing the legitimate _Antiphasis_, and for determining\nother propositions equipollent to, or following upon, the\npropositions given; rules distinct from those applying to the simple\naffirmation. When we say of anything, _It may be or may not be_, we\nenunciate here only one proposition, not two; we declare a state of\nmind which is neither belief nor disbelief, as in the case of the\nSimple Proposition, but something wavering between the two; yet which\nis nevertheless frequent, familiar to every one, and useful to be\nmade known by a special form of proposition adapted to it--the\nProblematical. On the other hand, when we say, _It is by\nnecessity--must be--cannot but be_--we declare our belief, and\nsomething more besides; we declare that the supposition of the\nopposite of what we believe, would involve a contradiction--I would\ncontradict some definition or axiom to which we have already sworn\nadherence. This again is a state of mind known, distinguishable, and\nthe same in all, subjectively; though as to the objective\ncorrelate--what constitutes the Necessary, several different\nopinions have been entertained.\n\n[Footnote 49: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, a. 3-8: [Greek: e)/sti me\\n\nou)=n ta\\ e)n t\u00ea=| ph\u00f4n\u00ea=| t\u00f4=n e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| path\u00eama/t\u00f4n\nsu/mbola--\u00f4(=n me/ntoi tau=ta s\u00eamei=a _pr\u00f4/t\u00f4s_, tau)ta\\ pa=si\npath\u00ea/mata t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s, kai\\ \u00f4(=n tau=ta o(moi\u00f4/mata, pra/gmata\n\u00ea)/d\u00ea tau)ta/.] Ibid. a. 13: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n ou)=n o)no/mata au)ta\\\nkai\\ ta\\ r(\u00ea/mata e)/oike t\u00f4=| a)/neu sunthe/se\u00f4s kai\\ diaire/se\u00f4s\nno\u00ea/mati--ou)/te ga\\r pseu=dos ou)/t' a)l\u00eathe/s p\u00f4.] Ib. p. 17, a. 2:\n[Greek: lo/gos a)pophantiko\\s, e)n \u00f4(=| to\\ a)l\u00eatheu/ein \u00ea)\\\npseu/desthai u(pa/rchei]. Compare p. 20, a. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 23, a. 32: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n\ne)n t\u00ea=| ph\u00f4n\u00ea=| a)kolouthei= toi=s e)n t\u00ea=| dianoi/a|, e)kei= de\\\ne)nanti/a do/xa \u00ea( tou= e)nanti/ou], &c. Ib. p. 24, b. 1: [Greek:\n\u00f4(/ste ei)/per e)pi\\ do/x\u00eas ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chei, ei)si\\ de\\ ai( e)n t\u00ea=|\nph\u00f4n\u00ea=| katapha/seis kai\\ a)popha/seis su/mbola t\u00f4=n e)n t\u00ea=|\npsuch\u00ea=|, d\u00ea=lon o(/ti kai\\ katapha/sei e)nanti/a me\\n a)po/phasis\n\u00ea(/ peri\\ tou= au)tou= katho/lou], &c. Ib. p. 17, a. 22: [Greek:\ne)/sti de\\ \u00ea( a(pl\u00ea= a)po/phansis ph\u00f4n\u00ea\\ s\u00eamantik\u00ea\\ peri\\ tou=\nu(pa/rchein ti \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ u(pa/rchein], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 17, a. 5. [Greek: oi( me\\n ou)=n a)/lloi\n(lo/goi) a)phei/sth\u00f4san; r(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s ga\\r \u00ea)\\ poi\u00eatik\u00ea=s oi)keiote/ra\n\u00ea( ske/psis; o( de\\ a)pophantiko\\s t\u00ea=s nu=n the\u00f4ri/as.]]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ammonius (in the Scholia on De Interpret. p. 130, a.\n16, seq., Brand.) ranks all modal propositions under the same\ncategory, and considers the number of them to be, not indeed\ninfinite, but very great. He gives as examples: \"The moon changes\n_fast_; Plato loves Dion _vehemently_.\" Sir W. Hamilton adopts the\nsame view as Ammonius: \"Modes may be conceived without end--all must\nbe admitted, if any are; the line of distinction attempted to be\ndrawn is futile.\" (Discussions on Phil. ut sup. p. 145.) On the other\nhand, we learn from Ammonius that most of the Aristotelian\ninterpreters preceding him reckoned the simple proposition [Greek:\nto\\ u(pa/rchein] as a modal; and Aristotle himself seems so to\nmention it (Analytica Priora, I. ii. p. 25, a. 1); besides that he\nenumerates _true_ and _false_, which undoubtedly attach to [Greek:\nto\\ u(pa/rchein], as examples of modes (De Interpret. c. 12, p. 22,\na. 13). Ammonius himself protests against this doctrine of the former\ninterpreters.\n\nMr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 2) says:--\"A\nremark of a similar nature may be applied to most of those\ndistinctions among propositions which are said to have reference to\ntheir _modality_; as difference of tense or time; the sun _did_ rise,\n_is_ rising, _will_ rise. . . . The circumstance of time is properly\nconsidered as attaching to the copula, which is the sign of\npredication, and not to the predicate. If the same cannot be said of\nsuch modifications as these, C\u00e6sar is _perhaps_ dead; it is\n_possible_ that C\u00e6sar is dead; it is only because these fall together\nunder another head; being properly assertions not of anything\nrelating to the fact itself, but of the state of our own mind in\nregard to it; namely, our absence of disbelief of it. Thus, _C\u00e6sar\nmay be dead_, means, _I am not sure that C\u00e6sar is alive_.\"\n\nI do not know whether Mr. Mill means that the function of the copula\nis different in these problematical propositions, from what it is in\nthe categorical propositions: I think there is no difference. But his\nremark that the problematical proposition is an assertion of the\nstate of our minds in regard to the fact, appears to me perfectly\njust. Only, we ought to add, that this is equally true about the\ncategorical proposition. It is equally true about all the three\nfollowing propositions:--1. The three angles of a triangle may or may\nnot be equal to two right angles. 2. The three angles of a triangle\nare equal to two right angles. 3. The three angles of a triangle are\nnecessarily equal to two right angles. In each of these three\npropositions, an assertion of the state of our minds is involved, and\na different state of mind in each. This is the subjective aspect of\nthe proposition; it belongs to the form rather than to the matter,\nand may be considered as a mode. The commentators preceding Ammonius\ndid so consider it, and said that the categorical proposition had its\nmode as well as the others. Ammonius differed from them, treating the\ncategorical as having no mode--as the standard unit or point of\ndeparture.\n\nThe propositions now known as Hypothetical and Disjunctive, which may\nalso be regarded as in a certain sense Modals, are not expressly\nconsidered by Aristotle. In the Anal. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50 a. 16-38,\nhe adverts to hypothetical syllogisms, and intimates his intention of\ndiscussing them more at length: but this intention has not been\nexecuted, in the works that we possess.]\n\nIn every complete theory of enunciative speech, these modal\npropositions deserve to be separately explained, both in their\nsubstantive meaning and in their relation to other propositions.\nTheir characteristic property as Modals belongs to _form_ rather than\nto _matter_; and Aristotle ought not to be considered as\nunphilosophical for introducing them into the Organon, even if we\nadopt the restricted view of Logic taken by Sir W. Hamilton, that it\ntakes no cognizance of the matter of propositions, but only of their\nform. But though I dissent from Hamilton's criticisms on this point,\nI do not concur with the opposing critics who think that Aristotle\nhas handled the Modal Propositions in a satisfactory manner. On the\ncontrary, I think that the equivocal sense which he assigns to the\nPotential or Possible, and his inconsistency in sometimes admitting,\nsometimes denying, a Potential that is always actual, and a Potential\nthat is never actual--are serious impediments to any consistent\nLogic. The Problematical Proposition does not admit of being cut in\nhalf; and if we are to recognize a _necessary_ Possible, or an\n_impossible_ Possible, we ought to find different phrases by which to\ndesignate them.\n\nWe must observe that the distinction of Problematical and Necessary\nPropositions corresponds, in the mind of Aristotle, to that capital\nand characteristic doctrine of his Ontology and Physics, already\ntouched on in this chapter. He thought, as we have seen, that in the\nvast circumferential region of the Kosmos, from the outer sidereal\nsphere down to the lunar sphere, celestial substance was a necessary\nexistence and energy, sempiternal and uniform in its rotations and\ninfluence; and that through its beneficent influence, pervading the\nconcavity between the lunar sphere and the terrestrial centre (which\nincluded the four elements with their compounds) there prevailed a\nregularizing tendency called Nature: modified, however, and partly\ncounteracted by independent and irregular forces called Spontaneity\nand Chance, essentially unknowable and unpredictable. The irregular\nsequences thus named by Aristotle were the objective correlate of the\nProblematical Proposition in Logic. In these sublunary sequences, as\nto future time, _may or may not_ was all that could be attained, even\nby the highest knowledge; certainty, either of affirmation or\nnegation, was out of the question. On the other hand, the necessary\nand uniform energies of the celestial substance, formed the objective\ncorrelate of the Necessary Proposition in Logic; this substance was\nnot merely an existence, but an existence necessary and unchangeable.\nI shall say more on this when I come to treat of Aristotle as a\nkosmical and physical philosopher; at present it is enough to remark\nthat he considers the Problematical Proposition in Logic to be not\npurely subjective, as an expression of the speaker's ignorance, but\nsomething more, namely, to correlate with an objective essentially\nunknowable to all.\n\nThe last paragraph of the treatise De Interpretatione discusses the\nquestion of Contraries and Contradictories, and makes out that the\ngreatest breadth of opposition is that between a proposition and its\ncontradictory (Kallias is just--Kallias is not just), not that\nbetween, a proposition and what is called its contrary (Kallias is\njust--Kallias is unjust); therefore, that according to the definition\nof contrary, the true contrary of a proposition is its\ncontradictory.[53] This paragraph is not connected with that which\nprecedes; moreover, both the reasoning and the conclusion differ from\nwhat we read as well in this treatise as in other portions of\nAristotle. Accordingly, Ammonius in the Scholia, while informing us\nthat Porphyry had declined to include it in his commentary, intimates\nalso his own belief that it is not genuine, but the work of another\nhand. At best (Ammonius thinks), if we must consider it as the work\nof Aristotle, it has been composed by him only as a dialectical\nexercise, to debate an unsettled question.[54] I think the latter\nhypothesis not improbable. The paragraph has certainly reference to\ndiscussions which we do not know, and it may have been composed when\nAristotle had not fully made up his mind on the distinction between\nContrary and Contradictory. Considering the difficult problems that\nhe undertook to solve, we may be sure that he must have written down\nseveral trains of thought merely preliminary and tentative. Moreover,\nwe know that he had composed a distinct treatise 'De Oppositis,'[55]\nwhich is unfortunately lost, but in which he must have included this\nvery topic--the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory.\n\n[Footnote 53: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 27, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Scholia ad Arist. pp. 135-139, Br. [Greek: gumna/sai\nmo/non boul\u00eathe/ntos tou\\s e)ntugcha/nontas pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)pi/krisin\nt\u00f4=n pithan\u00f4=s me\\n ou) me/ntoi a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n] &c. (p.\n135, b. 15; also p. 136, a. 42).]\n\n[Footnote 55: Scholia ad Categorias, p. 83, a. 17-19, b. 10, p. 84,\na. 29, p. 86, b. 42, p. 88, a. 30. It seems much referred to by\nSimplikius, who tells us that the Stoics adopted most of its\nprinciples (p. 83, a. 21, b. 7).]\n\nWhatever may have been the real origin and purpose of this last\nparagraph, I think it unsuitable as a portion of the treatise De\nInterpretatione. It nullifies, or at least overclouds, one of the\nbest parts of that treatise, the clear determination of _Anaphasis_\nand its consequences.\n\nIf, now, we compare the theory of the Proposition as given by\nAristotle in this treatise, with that which we read in the Sophistes\nof Plato, we shall find Plato already conceiving the proposition as\ncomposed indispensably of noun and verb, and as being either\naffirmative or negative, for both of which he indicates the technical\nterms.[56] He has no technical term for either subject or predicate;\nbut he conceives the proposition as belonging to its subject:[57] we\nmay be mistaken in the predicates, but we are not mistaken in the\nsubject. Aristotle enlarges and improves upon this theory. He not\nonly has a technical term for affirmation and negation, and for\nnegative noun and verb, but also for subject and predicate; again,\nfor the mode of signification belonging to noun and verb, each\nseparately, as distinguished from the mode of signification belonging\nto them conjointly, when brought together in a proposition. He\nfollows Plato in insisting upon the characteristic feature of the\nproposition--aptitude for being true or false; but he gives an ampler\ndefinition of it, and he introduces the novel and important\ndistribution of propositions according to the quantity of the\nsubject. Until this last distribution had been made, it was\nimpossible to appreciate the true value and bearing of each\n_Antiphasis_ and the correct language for expressing it, so as to say\nneither more nor less. We see, by reading the Sophistes, that Plato\ndid not conceive the _Antiphasis_ correctly, as distinguished from\nContrariety on the one hand, and from mere Difference on the other.\nHe saw that the negative of any proposition does not affirm the\ncontrary of its affirmative; but he knew no other alternative except\nto say, that it affirms only something different from the\naffirmative. His theory in the Sophistes recognizes nothing but\naffirmative propositions, with the predicate of contrariety on one\nhand, or of difference on the other;[58] he ignores, or jumps over,\nthe intermediate station of propositions affirming nothing at all,\nbut simply denying a pre-understood affirmative. There were other\ncontemporaries, Antisthenes among them, who declared contradiction to\nbe an impossibility;[59] an opinion coinciding at bottom with what I\nhave just cited from Plato himself. We see, in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, the Sophistes, and elsewhere, how great was the\ndifficulty felt by philosophers of that age to find a proper _locus\nstandi_ for false propositions, so as to prove them theoretically\npossible, to assign a legitimate function for the negative, and to\nescape from the interdict of Parmenides, who eliminated _Non-Ens_ as\nunmeaning and incogitable. Even after the death of Aristotle, the\nacute disputation of Stilpon suggested many problems, but yielded few\nsolutions; and Mened\u00eamus went so far as to disallow negative\npropositions altogether.[60]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 261-262. [Greek: pha/sin kai\\\na)po/phasin].--ib. p. 263 E. In the so-called Platonic 'Definitions,'\nwe read [Greek: e)n katapha/sei kai\\ a)popha/sei] (p. 413 C); but\nthese are probably after Aristotle's time. In another of these\nDefinitions (413 D.) we read [Greek: a)po/phasis], where the word\nought to be [Greek: a)po/phansis].]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A-C.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 257, B: [Greek: Ou)k a)r', e)nanti/on o(/tan\na)po/phasis le/g\u00eatai s\u00eamai/nein, sugch\u00f4r\u00easo/metha, tosou=ton de\\\nmo/non, o(/ti _t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ti m\u00eanu/ei to\\ m\u00ea\\ kai\\ to\\ ou)/_\nprotithe/mena t\u00f4=n e)pio/nt\u00f4n o)noma/t\u00f4n, ma=llon de\\ t\u00f4=n\npragma/t\u00f4n, peri\\ a(/tt' a)\\n ke/\u00eatai ta\\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron\nt\u00ea=s a)popha/se\u00f4s o)no/mata.]\n\nThe term [Greek: a)nti/phasis], and its derivative [Greek:\na)ntiphatik\u00f4=s], are not recognized in the Platonic Lexicon. Compare\nthe same dialogue, Sophistes, p. 263; also Euthyd\u00eamus, p. 298, A.\nPlato does not seem to take account of negative propositions as such.\nSee 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.\npp. 446-455.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Aristot. Topica, I. xi. p. 104, b. 20; Metaphys.\n[Greek: D]. p. 1024, b. 32; Analytic. Poster. I. xxv. p. 86, b. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Diogon. Laert. ii. 134-135. See the long discussion in\nthe Platonic The\u00e6t\u00eatus (pp. 187-196), in which Sokrates in vain\nendeavours to produce some theory whereby [Greek: pseud\u00ea\\s do/xa] may\nbe rendered possible. Hobbes, also, in his Computation or Logic (De\nCorp. c. iii. \u00a7 6), followed by Destutt Tracy, disallows the negative\nproposition _per se_, and treats it as a clumsy disguise of the\naffirmative [Greek: e)k metathe/se\u00f4s], to use the phrase of\nTheophrastus. Mr. John Stuart Mill has justly criticized this part of\nHobbes's theory (System of Logic, Book I. ch. iv. \u00a7 2).]\n\nSuch being the conditions under which philosophers debated in the age\nof Aristotle, we can appreciate the full value of a positive theory\nof propositions such as that which we read in his treatise De\nInterpretatione. It is, so far as we know, the first positive theory\nthereof that was ever set out; the first attempt to classify\npropositions in such a manner that a legitimate _Antiphasis_ could be\nassigned to each; the first declaration that to each affirmative\nproposition there belonged one appropriate negative, and to each\nnegative proposition one appropriate counter-affirmative, and one\nonly; the earliest effort to construct a theory for this purpose,\nsuch as to hold ground against all the puzzling questions of acute\ndisputants.[61] The clear determination of the _Antiphasis_ in each\ncase--the distinction of Contradictory antithesis from Contrary\nantithesis between propositions--this was an important logical\ndoctrine never advanced before Aristotle; and the importance of it\nbecomes manifest when we read the arguments of Plato and Antisthenes,\nthe former overleaping and ignoring the contradictory opposition, the\nlatter maintaining that it was a process theoretically indefensible.\nBut in order that these two modes of antithesis should be clearly\ncontrasted, each with its proper characteristic, it was requisite\nthat the distinction of quantity between different propositions\nshould also be brought to view, and considered in conjunction with\nthe distinction of quality. Until this was done, the Maxim of\nContradiction, denied by some, could not be shown in its true force\nor with its proper limits. Now, we find it done,[62] for the first\ntime, in the treatise before us. Here the Contradictory antithesis\n(opposition both in quantity and quality) in which one proposition\nmust be true and the other false, is contrasted with the Contrary\n(propositions opposite in quality, but both of them universal).\nAristotle's terminology is not in all respects fully developed; in\nregard, especially, to the quantity of propositions it is less\nadvanced than in his own later treatises; but from the theory of the\nDe Interpretatione all the distinctions current among later\nlogicians, take their rise.\n\n[Footnote 61: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 36: [Greek: pro\\s ta\\s\nsophistika\\s e)nochl\u00ea/seis].]\n\n[Footnote 62: We see, from the argument in the Metaphysica of\nAristotle, that there were persons in his day who denied or refused\nto admit the Maxim of Contradiction; and who held that contradictory\npropositions might both be true or both false (Aristot. Metaph.\n[Greek: G]. p. 1006, a. 1; p. 1009, a. 24). He employs several pages\nin confuting them.\n\nSee the Antinomies in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 154-155), some of\nwhich destroy or set aside the Maxim of Contradiction ('Plato and the\nOther Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxv. p. 306).]\n\nThe distinction of Contradictory and Contrary is fundamental in\nratiocinative Logic, and lies at the bottom of the syllogistic theory\nas delivered in the Analytica Priora. The precision with which\nAristotle designates the Universal proposition with its exact\ncontradictory antithesis, is remarkable in his day. Some, however, of\nhis observations respecting the place and functions of the negative\nparticle ([Greek: ou)]), must be understood with reference to the\nvariable order of words in a Greek or Latin sentence; for instance,\nthe distinction between _Kallias non est justus_ and _Kallias est non\njustus_ does not suggest itself to one speaking English or\nFrench.[63] Moreover, the Aristotelian theory of the Proposition is\nencumbered with various unnecessary subtleties; and the introduction\nof the Modals (though they belong, in my opinion, legitimately to a\ncomplete logical theory) renders the doctrine so intricate and\ncomplicated, that a judicious teacher will prefer, in explaining the\nsubject, to leave them for second or ulterior study, when the simpler\nrelations between categorical propositions have been made evident and\nfamiliar. The force of this remark will be felt more when we go\nthrough the Analytica Priora. The two principal relations to be\nconsidered in the theory of Propositions--Opposition and\nEquipollence--would have come out far more clearly in the treatise De\nInterpretatione, if the discussion of the Modals had been reserved\nfor a separate chapter.\n\n[Footnote 63: The diagram or parallelogram of logical antithesis,\nwhich is said to have begun with Apuleius, and to have been\ntransmitted through Boethius and the Schoolmen to modern times\n(Ueberweg, System der Logik, sect. 72, p. 174) is as follows:--\n\n A. Omnis homo est justus.   --- E. Nullus homo est justus.\n                             |X|\n I. Aliquis homo est justus. --- O. Aliquis homo non est justus.\n\nBut the parallelogram set out by Aristotle in the treatise De\nInterpretatione, or at least in the Analytica Priora, is different,\nand intended for a different purpose. He puts it thus:--\n\n1. Omnis homo est justus . . . .  . 2. Non omnis homo est justus.\n4. Non omnis homo est non justus  . 3. Omnis homo est non justus.\n\nHere Proposition (1) is an affirmative, of which (2) is the direct\nand appropriate negative: also Proposition (3) is an affirmative\n(Aristotle so considers it), of which (4) is the direct and\nappropriate negative. The great aim of Aristotle is to mark out\nclearly what is the appropriate negative or [Greek: A)po/phasis] to\neach [Greek: Kata/phasis (mi/a a)po/phasis mia=s katapha/se\u00f4s], p.\n17, b. 38), making up together the pair which he calls [Greek:\nA)nti/phasis], standing in Contradictory Opposition; and to\ndistinguish this appropriate negative from another proposition which\ncomprises the particle of negation, but which is really a new\naffirmative.\n\nThe true negatives of _homo est justus--Omnis homo est justus_ are,\n_Homo non est justus--Non omnis homo est justus_. If you say, _Homo\nest non justus--Omnis homo est non justus_, these are not negative\npropositions, but new affirmatives ([Greek: e)k metathe/se\u00f4s] in the\nlanguage of Theophrastus).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nANALYTICA PRIORA I.\n\n\nReviewing the treatise De Interpretatione, we have followed Aristotle\nin his first attempt to define what a Proposition is, to point out\nits constituent elements, and to specify some of its leading\nvarieties. The characteristic feature of the Proposition he stated to\nbe--That it declares, in the first instance, the mental state of the\nspeaker as to belief or disbelief, and, in its ulterior or final\nbearing, a state of facts to which such belief or disbelief\ncorresponds. It is thus significant of truth or falsehood; and this\nis its logical character (belonging to Analytic and Dialectic), as\ndistinguished from its rhetorical character, with other aspects\nbesides. Aristotle farther indicated the two principal discriminative\nattributes of propositions as logically regarded, passing under the\nnames of quantity and quality. He took great pains, in regard to the\nquality, to explain what was the special negative proposition in true\ncontradictory antithesis to each affirmative. He stated and enforced\nthe important separation of contradictory propositions from contrary;\nand he even parted off (which the Greek and Latin languages admit,\nthough the French and English will hardly do so) the true negative\nfrom the indeterminate affirmative. He touched also upon equipollent\npropositions, though he did not go far into them. Thus commenced with\nAristotle the systematic study of propositions, classified according\nto their meaning and their various interdependences with each other\nas to truth and falsehood--their mutual consistency or\nincompatibility. Men who had long been talking good Greek fluently\nand familiarly, were taught to reflect upon the conjunctions of words\nthat they habitually employed, and to pay heed to the conditions of\ncorrect speech in reference to its primary purpose of affirmation and\ndenial, for the interchange of beliefs and disbeliefs, the\ncommunication of truth, and the rectification of falsehood. To many\nof Aristotle's contemporaries this first attempt to theorize upon the\nforms of locution familiar to every one would probably appear hardly\nless strange than the interrogative dialectic of Sokrates, when he\ndeclared himself not to know what was meant by justice, virtue,\npiety, temperance, government, &c.; when he astonished his hearers by\nasking them to rescue him from this state of ignorance, and to\ncommunicate to him some portion of their supposed plenitude of\nknowledge.\n\nAristotle tells us expressly that the theory of the Syllogism, both\ndemonstrative and dialectic, on which we are now about to enter, was\nhis own work altogether and from the beginning; that no one had ever\nattempted it before; that he therefore found no basis to work upon,\nbut was obliged to elaborate his own theory, from the very rudiments,\nby long and laborious application. In this point of view, he\ncontrasts Logic pointedly with Rhetoric, on which there had been a\nseries of writers and teachers, each profiting by the labours of his\npredecessors.[1] There is no reason to contest the claim to\noriginality here advanced by Aristotle. He was the first who\nendeavoured, by careful study and multiplied comparison of\npropositions, to elicit general truths respecting their ratiocinative\ninterdependence, and to found thereupon precepts for regulating the\nconduct of demonstration and dialectic.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: See the remarkable passage at the close of the\nSophistici Elenchi, p. 183, b. 34-p. 184, b. 9: [Greek: tau/t\u00eas de\\\nt\u00ea=s pragmatei/as ou) to\\ me\\n \u00ea)=n to\\ de\\ ou)k \u00ea)=n\nproexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\\n pantel\u00f4=s u(p\u00ea=rche--kai\\ peri\\ me\\n\nt\u00f4=n r(\u00eatorik\u00f4=n u(p\u00ea=rche polla\\ kai\\ palaia\\ ta\\ lego/mena, peri\\\nde\\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantel\u00f4=s ou)de\\n ei)/chomen pro/teron\na)/llo le/gein, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ trib\u00ea=| z\u00eatou=ntes polu\\n chro/non\ne)ponou=men.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Lect. v. pp. 87-91,\nvol. III.:--\"The principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle can\nboth be traced back to Plato, by whom they were enounced and\nfrequently applied; though it was not till long after, that either of\nthem obtained a distinctive appellation. To take the principle of\nContradiction first. This law Plato frequently employs, but the most\nremarkable passages are found in the Ph\u00e6do (p. 103), in the Sophista\n(p. 252), and in the Republic (iv. 436, vii. 525). This law was\nhowever more distinctively and emphatically enounced by Aristotle. .\n. . . Following Aristotle, the Peripatetics established this law as\nthe highest principle of knowledge. From the Greek Aristotelians it\nobtained the name by which it has subsequently been denominated, the\n_principle_, or _law_, or _axiom_, of _Contradiction_ ([Greek:\na)xi/\u00f4ma t\u00ea=s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s]). . . . . The law of Excluded Middle\nbetween two contradictories remounts, as I have said, also to Plato;\nthough the Second Alcibiades, in which it is most clearly expressed\n(p. 139; also Sophista, p. 250), must be admitted to be spurious. . .\n. . This law, though universally recognized as a principle in the\nGreek Peripatetic school, and in the schools of the middle ages, only\nreceived the distinctive appellation by which it is now known at a\ncomparatively modern date.\"\n\nThe passages of Plato, to which Sir W. Hamilton here refers, will not\nbe found to bear out his assertion that Plato \"enounced and\nfrequently applied the principles of Contradiction and Excluded\nMiddle.\" These two principles are both of them enunciated,\ndenominated, and distinctly explained by Aristotle, but by no one\nbefore him, as far as our knowledge extends. The conception of the\ntwo maxims, in their generality, depends upon the clear distinction\nbetween Contradictory Opposition and Contrary Opposition; which is\nfully brought out by Aristotle, but not adverted to, or at least\nnever broadly and generally set forth, by Plato. Indeed it is\nremarkable that the word [Greek: A)nti/phasis], the technical term\nfor Contradiction, never occurs in Plato; at least it is not\nrecognized in the _Lexicon Platonicum_. Aristotle puts it in the\nforeground of his logical exposition; for, without it, he could not\nhave explained what he meant by Contradictory Opposition. See\nCategori\u00e6, pp. 13-14, and elsewhere in the treatise De\nInterpretatione and in the Metaphysica. Respecting the idea of the\nNegative as put forth by Plato in the Sophistes (not coinciding\neither with Contradictory Opposition or with Contrary Opposition),\nsee 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.\npp. 449-459. I have remarked in that chapter, and the reader ought to\nrecollect, that the philosophical views set out by Plato in the\nSophistes differ on many points from what we read in other Platonic\ndialogues.]\n\nHe begins the Analytica Priora by setting forth his general purpose,\nand defining his principal terms and phrases. His manner is one of\ngeometrical plainness and strictness. It may perhaps have been common\nto him with various contemporary geometers, whose works are now lost;\nbut it presents an entire novelty in Grecian philosophy and\nliterature. It departed not merely from the manner of the\nrhetoricians and the physical philosophers (as far as we know them,\nnot excluding even Demokritus), but also from Sokrates and the\nSokratic school. For though Sokrates and Plato were perpetually\ncalling for definitions, and did much to make others feel the want of\nsuch, they neither of them evinced aptitude or readiness to supply\nthe want. The new manner of Aristotle is adapted to an undertaking\nwhich he himself describes as original, in which he has no\npredecessors, and is compelled to dig his own foundations. It is\nessentially didactic and expository, and contrasts strikingly with\nthe mixture of dramatic liveliness and dialectical subtlety which we\nfind in Plato.\n\nThe terminology of Aristotle in the Analytica is to a certain extent\ndifferent from that in the treatise De Interpretatione. The\nEnunciation ([Greek: A)po/phanis]) appears under the new name of\n[Greek: Pro/tasis], _Proposition_ (in the literal sense) or\n_Premiss_; while, instead of Noun and Verb, we have the word _Term_\n([Greek: O(/ros]), applied alike both to Subject and to Predicate.[3]\nWe pass now from the region of _declared_ truth, into that of\n_inferential_ or _reasoned_ truth. We find the proposition looked at,\nnot merely as communicating truth in itself, but as generating and\nhelping to guarantee certain ulterior propositions, which communicate\nsomething additional or different. The primary purpose of the\nAnalytica is announced to be, to treat of Demonstration and\ndemonstrative Science; but the secondary purpose, running parallel\nwith it and serving as illustrative counterpart, is, to treat also of\nDialectic; both of them[4] being applications of the inferential or\nratiocinative process, the theory of which Aristotle intends to\nunfold.\n\n[Footnote 3: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 16: [Greek:\no(/ron de\\ kal\u00f4= ei)s o(\\n dialu/etai \u00ea( pro/tasis, oi(=on to/ te\nkat\u00eagorou/menon kai\\ to\\ kath' ou(= kat\u00eagorei=tai], &c.\n\n[Greek: O(/ros]--_Terminus_--seems to have been a technical word\nfirst employed by Aristotle himself to designate subject and\npredicate as the _extremes_ of a proposition, which latter he\nconceives as the _interval_ between the _termini_--[Greek:\n_dia/st\u00eama_]. (Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 35, a. 12. [Greek:\nster\u00eatik\u00f4=n diast\u00eama/t\u00f4n], &c. See Alexander, Schol. pp. 145-146.)\n\nIn the Topica Aristotle employs [Greek: o(/ros] in a very different\nsense--[Greek: lo/gos o( to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai s\u00eamai/n\u00f4n] (Topic. I.\nv. p. 101, b. 39)--hardly distinguished from [Greek: o(rismo/s]. The\nScholia take little notice of this remarkable variation of meaning,\nas between two treatises of the Organon so intimately connected (pp.\n256-257, Br.).]\n\n[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, a. 25.]\n\nThe three treatises--1, Analytica Priora, 2, Analytica Posteriora, 3,\nTopica with Sophistici Elenchi--thus belong all to one general\nscheme; to the theory of the Syllogism, with its distinct\napplications, first, to demonstrative or didactic science, and, next,\nto dialectical debate. The scheme is plainly announced at the\ncommencement of the Analytica Priora; which treatise discusses the\nSyllogism generally, while the Analytica Posteriora deals with\nDemonstration, and the Topica with Dialectic. The first chapter of\nthe Analytica Priora and the last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi\n(closing the Topica), form a preface and a conclusion to the whole.\nThe exposition of the Syllogism, Aristotle distinctly announces,\nprecedes that of Demonstration (and for the same reason also precedes\nthat of Dialectic), because it is more general: every demonstration\nis a sort of syllogism, but every syllogism is not a\ndemonstration.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. I. iv. p. 25, b. 30.]\n\nAs a foundation for the syllogistic theory, propositions are\nclassified according to their quantity (more formally than in the\ntreatise De Interpretatione) into Universal, Particular, and\nIndefinite or Indeterminate;[6] Aristotle does not recognize the\nSingular Proposition as a distinct variety. In regard to the\nUniversal Proposition, he introduces a different phraseology\naccording as it is looked at from the side of the Subject, or from\nthat of the Predicate. The Subject is, or is not, in the whole\nPredicate; the Predicate is affirmed or denied respecting all or\nevery one of the Subject.[7] The minor term of the Syllogism (in the\nfirst mode of the first figure) is declared to be in the whole middle\nterm; the major is declared to belong to, or to be predicable of, all\nand every the middle term. Aristotle says that the two are the same;\nwe ought rather to say that each is the concomitant and correlate of\nthe other, though his phraseology is such as to obscure the\ncorrelation.\n\n[Footnote 6: Ibid. I. i. p. 24, a. 17. The Particular ([Greek: e)n\nme/rei]), here for the first time expressly distinguished by\nAristotle, is thus defined:--[Greek: e)n me/rei de\\ to\\ tini\\ \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\\ntini\\ \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ panti\\ u(pa/rchein.]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 26: [Greek: to\\ d' e)n o(/l\u00f4| ei)nai e(/teron\ne(te/r\u00f4|, kai\\ to\\ kata\\ panto\\s kat\u00eagorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron,\ntau)to/n e)sti--tau)to\\n], _i.e._ [Greek: _a)ntestramme/n\u00f4s_], as\nWaitz remarks in note. Julius Pacius says:--\"Idem re, sed ratione\ndifferunt ut ascensus et descensus; nam subjectum dicitur esse vel\nnon esse in toto attributo, quia attributum dicitur de omni vel de\nnullo subjecto\" (p. 128).]\n\nThe definition given of a Syllogism is very clear and\nremarkable:--\"It is a speech in which, some positions having been\nlaid down, something different from these positions follows as a\nnecessary consequence from their being laid down.\" In a _perfect_\nSyllogism nothing additional is required to make the necessity of the\nconsequence obvious as well as complete. But there are also\n_imperfect_ Syllogisms, in which such necessity, though equally\ncomplete, is not so obviously conveyed in the premisses, but requires\nsome change to be effected in the position of the terms in order to\nrender it conspicuous.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: Aristot. Anal. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-26. The same,\nwith a little difference of wording, at the commencement of Topica,\np. 100, a. 25. Compare also Analyt. Poster. I. x. p. 76, b. 38:\n[Greek: o(/s\u00f4n o)/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=| e)kei=na ei)=nai gi/netai to\\\nsumpe/rasma.]]\n\nThe term Syllogism has acquired, through the influence of Aristotle,\na meaning so definite and technical, that we do not easily conceive\nit in any other meaning. But in Plato and other contemporaries it\nbears a much wider sense, being equivalent to reasoning generally, to\nthe process of comparison, abstraction, generalization.[9] It was\nAristotle who consecrated the word, so as to mean exclusively the\nreasoning embodied in propositions of definite form and number.\nHaving already analysed propositions separately taken, and\ndiscriminated them into various classes according to their\nconstituent elements, he now proceeds to consider propositions in\ncombination. Two propositions, if properly framed, will conduct to a\nthird, different from themselves, but which will be necessarily true\nif they are true. Aristotle calls the three together a Syllogism.[10]\nHe undertakes to shew how it must be framed in order that its\nconclusion shall be necessarily true, if the premisses are true. He\nfurnishes schemes whereby the cast and arrangement of premisses,\nproper for attaining truth, may be recognized; together with the\nnature of the conclusion, warrantable under each arrangement.\n\n[Footnote 9: See especially Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. p. 186, B-D., where\n[Greek: o( sullogismo\\s] and [Greek: ta\\ a)nalogi/smata] are\nequivalents.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Julius Pacius (ad Analyt. Prior. I. i.) says that it is\na mistake on the part of most logicians to treat the Syllogism as\nincluding three propositions (ut vulgus logicorum putat). He\nconsiders the premisses alone as constituting the Syllogism; the\nconclusion is not a part thereof, but something distinct and\nsuperadded. It appears to me that the _vulgus logicorum_ are here in\nthe right.]\n\nIn the Analytica Priora, we find ourselves involved, from and after\nthe second chapter, in the distinction of Modal propositions, the\nnecessary and the possible. The rules respecting the simple Assertory\npropositions are thus, even from the beginning, given in conjunction\nand contrast with those respecting the Modals. This is one among many\ncauses of the difficulty and obscurity with which the treatise is\nbeset. Theophrastus and Eudemus seem also to have followed their\nmaster by giving prominence to the Modals:[11] recent expositors\navoid the difficulty, some by omitting them altogether, others by\ndeferring them until the simple assertory propositions have been\nfirst made clear. I shall follow the example of these last; but it\ndeserves to be kept in mind, as illustrating Aristotle's point of\nview, that he regards the Modals as principal varieties of the\nproposition, co-ordinate in logical position with the simple\nassertory.\n\n[Footnote 11: Eudemi Fragmenta, cii.-ciii. p. 145, ed. Spengel.]\n\nBefore entering on combinations of propositions, Aristotle begins by\nshewing what can be done with single propositions, in view to the\ninvestigation or proving of truth. A single proposition may be\n_converted_; that is, its subject and predicate may be made to change\nplaces. If a proposition be true, will it be true when thus\nconverted, or (in other words) will its converse be true? If false,\nwill its converse be false? If this be not always the case, what are\nthe conditions and limits under which (assuming the proposition to be\ntrue) the process of conversion leads to assured truth, in each\nvariety of propositions, affirmative or negative, universal or\nparticular? As far as we know, Aristotle was the first person that\never put to himself this question; though the answer to it is\nindispensable to any theory of the process of proving or disproving.\nHe answers it before he enters upon the Syllogism.\n\nThe rules which he lays down on the subject have passed into all\nlogical treatises. They are now familiar; and readers are apt to\nfancy that there never was any novelty in them--that every one knows\nthem without being told. Such fancy would be illusory. These rules\nare very far from being self-evident, any more than the maxims of\nContradiction and of the Excluded Middle. Not one of the rules could\nhave been laid down with its proper limits, until the discrimination\nof propositions, both as to quality (affirmative or negative), and as\nto quantity (universal or particular), had been put prominently\nforward and appreciated in all its bearings. The rule for trustworthy\nconversion is different for each variety of propositions. The\nUniversal Negative may be converted simply; that is, the predicate\nmay become subject, and the subject may become predicate--the\nproposition being true after conversion, if it was true before. But\nthe Universal Affirmative cannot be thus converted simply. It admits\nof conversion only in the manner called by logicians _per accidens_:\nif the predicate change places with the subject, we cannot be sure\nthat the proposition thus changed will be true, unless the new\nsubject be lowered in quantity from universal to particular; _e.g._\nthe proposition, All men are animals, has for its legitimate converse\nnot, _All_ animals are men, but only, _Some_ animals are men. The\nParticular Affirmative may be converted simply: if it be true that\nSome animals are men, it will also be true that Some men are animals.\nBut, lastly, if the true proposition to be converted be a Particular\nNegative, it cannot be converted at all, so as to make sure that the\nconverse will be true also.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 1-26.]\n\nHere then are four separate rules laid down, one for each variety of\npropositions. The rules for the second and third variety are proved\nby the rule for the first (the Universal Negative), which is thus the\nbasis of all. But how does Aristotle prove the rule for the Universal\nNegative itself? He proceeds as follows: \"If A cannot be predicated\nof any one among the B's, neither can B be predicated of any one\namong the A's. For if it could be predicated of any one among them\n(say C), the proposition that A cannot be predicated of any B would\nnot be true; since C is one among the B's.\"[13] Here we have a proof\ngiven which is no proof at all. If I disbelieved or doubted the\nproposition to be proved, I should equally disbelieve or doubt the\nproposition given to prove it. The proof only becomes valid, when you\nadd a farther assumption which Aristotle has not distinctly\nenunciated, viz.: That if some A (_e.g._ C) is B, then some B must\nalso be A; which would be contrary to the fundamental supposition.\nBut this farther assumption cannot be granted here, because it would\nimply that we already know the rule respecting the convertibility of\nParticular Affirmatives, viz., that they admit of being converted\nsimply. Now the rule about Particular Affirmatives is afterwards\nitself proved by help of the preceding demonstration respecting the\nUniversal Negative. As the proof stands, therefore, Aristotle\ndemonstrates each of these by means of the other; which is not\nadmissible.[14]\n\n[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 25, a. 15: [Greek: ei) ou)=n m\u00eadeni\\ t\u00f4=n B\nto\\ A u(pa/rchei, ou)de\\ t\u00f4=n A ou)deni\\ u(pa/rxei to\\ B. ei) ga\\r\ntini, oi(=on t\u00f4=| G, ou)k a)l\u00eathe\\s e)/stai to\\ m\u00eadeni\\ t\u00f4=n B to\\ A\nu(pa/rchein; to\\ ga\\r G t\u00f4=n B ti/ e)stin.]\n\nJulius Pacius (p. 129) proves the Universal Negative to be\nconvertible _simpliciter_, by a _Reductio ad Absurdum_ cast into a\nsyllogism in the First figure. But it is surely unphilosophical to\nemploy the rules of Syllogism as a means of proving the legitimacy of\nConversion, seeing that we are forced to assume conversion in our\nprocess for distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms. Moreover\nthe _Reductio ad Absurdum_ assumes the two fundamental Maxims of\nContradiction and Excluded Middle, though these are less obvious, and\nstand more in need of proof than the simple conversion of the\nUniversal Negative, the point that they are brought to establish.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Waitz, in his note (p. 374), endeavours, but I think\nwithout success, to show that Aristotle's proof is not open to the\ncriticism here advanced. He admits that it is obscurely indicated,\nbut the amplification of it given by himself still remains exposed to\nthe same objection.]\n\nEven the friends and companions of Aristotle were not satisfied with\nhis manner of establishing this fundamental rule as to the conversion\nof propositions. Eud\u00eamus is said to have given a different proof; and\nTheophrastus assumed as self-evident, without any proof, that the\nUniversal Negative might always be converted simply.[15] It appears\nto me that no other or better evidence of it can be offered, than the\ntrial upon particular cases, that is to say, Induction.[16] Nothing\nis gained by dividing (as Aristotle does) the whole A into parts, one\nof which is C; nor can I agree with Theophrastus in thinking that\nevery learner would assent to it at first hearing, especially at a\ntime when no universal maxims respecting the logical value of\npropositions had ever been proclaimed. Still less would a Megaric\ndialectician, if he had never heard the maxim before, be satisfied to\nstand upon an alleged _\u00e0 priori_ necessity without asking for\nevidence. Now there is no other evidence except by exemplifying the\nformula, No A is B, in separate propositions already known to the\nlearner as true or false, and by challenging him to produce any one\ncase, in which, when it is true to say No A is B, it is not equally\ntrue to say, No B is A; the universality of the maxim being liable to\nbe overthrown by any one contradictory instance.[17] If this proof\ndoes not convince him, no better can be produced. In a short time,\ndoubtless, he will acquiesce in the general formula at first hearing,\nand he may even come to regard it as self-evident. It will recall to\nhis memory an aggregate of separate cases each individually\nforgotten, summing up their united effect under the same aspect, and\nthus impressing upon him the general truth as if it were not only\nauthoritative but self-authorized.\n\n[Footnote 15: See the Scholia of Alexander on this passage, p. 148,\na. 30-45, Brandis; Eudemi Fragm. ci.-cv. pp. 145-149, ed. Spengel.]\n\n[Footnote 16: We find Aristotle declaring in Topica, II. viii. p.\n113, b. 15, that in converting a true Universal Affirmative\nproposition, the negative of the Subject of the convertend is always\ntrue of the negative of the Predicate of the convertend; _e.g._ If\nevery man is an animal, every thing which is not an animal is not a\nman. This is to be assumed (he says) upon the evidence of\nInduction--uncontradicted iteration of particular cases, extended to\nall cases universally--[Greek: lamba/nein d' e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s, oi(=on\nei) o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos z\u00f4=|on, to\\ m\u00ea\\ z\u00f4=|on ou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos; o(moi/\u00f4s\nde\\ kai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n. . . . . e)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n ou)=n to\\\ntoiou=ton a)xi\u00f4te/on.]\n\nThe rule for the simple conversion of the Universal Negative rests\nupon the same evidence of Induction, never contradicted.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Dr. Wallis, in one of his acute controversial treatises\nagainst Hobbes, remarks upon this as the process pursued by Euclid in\nhis demonstrations:--\"You tell us next that an Induction, without\nenumeration of all the particulars, is not sufficient to infer a\nconclusion. Yes, Sir, if after the enumeration of some particulars,\nthere comes a general clause, _and the like in other cases_ (as here\nit doth), this may pass for a proofe till there be a possibility of\ngiving some instance to the contrary, which here you will never be\nable to doe. And if such an Induction may not pass for proofe, there\nis never a proposition in Euclid demonstrated. For all along he takes\nno other course, or at least grounds his Demonstrations on\nPropositions no otherwise demonstrated. As, for instance, he\nproposeth it in general (i. c. 1.)--_To make an equilateral triangle\non a line given_. And then he shows you how to do it upon the line A\nB, which he there shows you, and leaves you to supply: _And the same,\nby the like means, may be done upon any other strait line_; and then\ninfers his general conclusion. Yet I have not heard any man object\nthat the Induction was not sufficient, because he did not actually\nperforme it in all lines possible.\"--(Wallis, Due Correction to Mr.\nHobbes, Oxon. 1656, sect. v. p. 42.) This is induction by _parity of\nreasoning_.\n\nSo also Aristot. Analyt. Poster. I. iv. p. 73, b. 32: [Greek: to\\\nkatho/lou de\\ u(pa/rchei to/te, o(/tan e)pi\\ tou= tucho/ntos kai\\\npr\u00f4/tou deiknu/\u00eatai.]]\n\nAristotle passes next to Affirmatives, both Universal and Particular.\nFirst, if A can be predicated of all B, then B can be predicated of\n_some_ A; for if B cannot be predicated of any A, then (by the rule\nfor the Universal Negative) neither can A be predicated of any B.\nAgain, if A can be predicated of some B, in this case also, and for\nthe same reason, B can be predicated of some A.[18] Here the rule for\nthe Universal Negative, supposed already established, is applied\nlegitimately to prove the rules for Affirmatives. But in the first\ncase, that of the Universal, it fails to prove _some_ in the sense of\n_not-all_ or _some-at-most_, which is required; whereas, the rules\nfor both cases can be proved by Induction, like the formula about the\nUniversal Negative. When we come to the Particular Negative,\nAristotle lays down the position, that it does not admit of being\nnecessarily converted in any way. He gives no proof of this, beyond\none single exemplification: If some animal is not a man, you are not\nthereby warranted in asserting the converse, that some man is not an\nanimal.[19] It is plain that such an exemplification is only an\nappeal to Induction: you produce one particular example, which is\nentering on the track of Induction; and one example alone is\nsufficient to establish the negative of an universal proposition.[20]\nThe converse of a Particular Negative is not in all cases true,\nthough it may be true in many cases.\n\n[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 17-22.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Ibid. p. 25, a. 22-26.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Though some may fancy that the rule for converting the\nUniversal Negative is intuitively known, yet every one must see that\nthe rule for converting the Universal Affirmative is not thus\nself-evident, or derived from natural intuition. In fact, I believe\nthat every learner at first hears it with great surprise. Some are\napt to fancy that the Universal Affirmative (like the Particular\nAffirmative) may be converted _simply_. Indeed this error is not\nunfrequently committed in actual reasoning; all the more easily,\nbecause there is a class of cases (with subject and predicate\nco-extensive) where the converse of the Universal Affirmative _is_\nreally true. Also, in the case of the Particular Negative, there are\nmany true propositions in which the simple converse is true. A novice\nmight incautiously generalize upon those instances, and conclude that\nboth were convertible simply. Nor could you convince him of his error\nexcept by producing examples in which, when a true proposition of\nthis kind is converted simply, the resulting converse is notoriously\nfalse. The appeal to various separate cases is the only basis on\nwhich we can rest for testing the correctness or incorrectness of all\nthese maxims proclaimed as universal.]\n\nFrom one proposition taken singly, no new proposition can be\ninferred; for purposes of inference, two propositions at least are\nrequired.[21] This brings us to the rules of the Syllogism, where two\npropositions as premisses conduct us to a third which necessarily\nfollows from them; and we are introduced to the well-known three\nFigures with their various Modes.[22] To form a valid Syllogism,\nthere must be three terms and no more; the two, which appear as\nSubject and Predicate of the conclusion, are called the _minor_ term\n(or minor extreme) and the _major_ term (or major extreme)\nrespectively; while the third or _middle_ term must appear in each of\nthe premisses, but not in the conclusion. These terms are called\n_extremes_ and _middle_, from the position which they occupy in every\nperfect Syllogism--that is in what Aristotle ranks as the First among\nthe three figures. In _his_ way of enunciating the Syllogism, this\nmiddle position formed a conspicuous feature; whereas the modern\narrangement disguises it, though the denomination _middle_ term is\nstill retained. Aristotle usually employs letters of the alphabet,\nwhich he was the first to select as abbreviations for exposition;[23]\nand he has two ways (conforming to what he had said in the first\nchapter of the present treatise) of enunciating the modes of the\nFirst figure. In one way, he begins with the major extreme (Predicate\nof the conclusion): A may be predicated of all B, B may be predicated\nof all C; therefore, A may be predicated of all C (Universal\nAffirmative). Again, A cannot be predicated of any B, B can be\npredicated of all C; therefore, A cannot be predicated of any C\n(Universal Negative). In the other way, he begins with the minor term\n(Subject of the conclusion): C is in the whole B, B is in the whole\nA; therefore, C is in the whole A (Universal Affirmative). And, C is\nin the whole B, B is not in the whole A; therefore, C is not in the\nwhole A (Universal Negative). We see thus that in Aristotle's way of\nenunciating the First figure, the middle term is really placed\nbetween the two extremes,[24] though this is not so in the Second and\nThird figures. In the modern way of enunciating these figures, the\nmiddle term is never placed between the two extremes; yet the\ndenomination _middle_ still remains.\n\n[Footnote 21: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, a. 17; xxiii. p. 40, b.\n35; Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 73, a. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 26, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 23: M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire (Logique d'Aristote, vol. ii.\np. 7, n.), referring to the examples of Conversion in chap. ii.,\nobserves:--\"Voici le pr\u00e9mier usage des lettres repr\u00e9sentant des\nid\u00e9es; c'est un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 tout \u00e0 fait alg\u00e9brique, c'est \u00e0 dire, de\ng\u00e9n\u00e9ralisation. D\u00e9j\u00e0, dans l'Herm\u00e9neia, ch. 13, \u00a7 1 et suiv.,\nAristote a fait usage de tableaux pour repr\u00e9senter sa pens\u00e9e\nrelativement \u00e0 la cons\u00e9cution des modales. Il parle encore\nsp\u00e9cialement de figures explicatives, liv. 2. des Derniers\nAnalytiques, ch. 17, \u00a7 7. Vingt passages de l'Histoire des Animaux\nattestent qu'il joignait des dessins \u00e0 ses observations et \u00e0 ses\nth\u00e9ories zoologiques. Les illustrations pittoresques datent donc de\nfort loin. L'emploi symbolique des lettres a \u00e9t\u00e9 appliqu\u00e9 aussi par\nAristote \u00e0 la Physique. Il l'avait emprunt\u00e9, sans doute, aux proc\u00e9d\u00e9s\ndes math\u00e9maticiens.\"\n\nWe may remark, however, that when Aristotle proceeds to specify those\ncombinations of propositions which _do not_ give a valid conclusion,\nhe is not satisfied with giving letters of the alphabet; he superadds\nspecial illustrative examples (Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 7, 12,\n34, 38).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 35: [Greek:\nkal\u00f4= de\\ _me/son_, o(\\ kai\\ au)to\\ e)n a)/ll\u00f4| kai\\ a)/llo e)n\ntou/t\u00f4| e)sti/n, o(\\ kai\\ t\u00ea=| the/sei gi/netai me/son.]]\n\nThe Modes of each figure are distinguished by the different character\nand relation of the two premisses, according as these are either\naffirmative or negative, either universal or particular. Accordingly,\nthere are four possible varieties of each, and sixteen possible modes\nor varieties of combinations between the two. Aristotle goes through\nmost of the sixteen modes, and shows that in the first Figure there\nare only four among them that are legitimate, carrying with them a\nnecessary conclusion. He shows, farther, that in all the four there\nare two conditions observed, and that both these conditions are\nindispensable in the First figure:--(1) The major proposition must be\nuniversal, either affirmative or negative; (2) The minor proposition\nmust be affirmative, either universal or particular or indefinite.\nSuch must be the character of the premisses, in the first Figure,\nwherever the conclusion is valid and necessary; and _vice vers\u00e2_, the\nconclusion will be valid and necessary, when such is the character of\nthe premisses.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, b. 26, et sup.]\n\nIn regard to the four valid modes (_Barbara_, _Celarent_, _Darii_,\n_Ferio_, as we read in the scholastic Logic) Aristotle declares at\nonce in general language that the conclusion follows necessarily;\nwhich he illustrates by setting down in alphabetical letters the\nskeleton of a syllogism in _Barbara_. If A is predicated of all B,\nand B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. But he\ndoes not justify it by any real example; he produces no special\nsyllogism with real terms, and with a conclusion known beforehand to\nbe true. He seems to think that the general doctrine will be accepted\nas evident without any such corroboration. He counts upon the\nlearner's memory and phantasy for supplying, out of the past\ndiscourse of common life, propositions conforming to the conditions\nin which the symbolical letters have been placed, and for not\nsupplying any contradictory examples. This might suffice for a\ntreatise; but we may reasonably believe that Aristotle, when teaching\nin his school, would superadd illustrative examples; for the doctrine\nwas then novel, and he is not unmindful of the errors into which\nlearners often fall spontaneously.[26]\n\n[Footnote 26: Analyt. Poster. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 21.]\n\nWhen he deals with the remaining or invalid modes of the First\nfigure, his manner of showing their invalidity is different, and in\nitself somewhat curious. \"If (he says) the major term is affirmed of\nall the middle, while the middle is denied of all the minor, no\nnecessary consequence follows from such being the fact, nor will\nthere be any syllogism of the two extremes; for it is equally\npossible, either that the major term may be affirmed of all the\nminor, or that it may be denied of all the minor; so that no\nconclusion, either universal or particular, is necessary in all\ncases.\"[27] Examples of such double possibility are then exhibited:\nfirst, of three terms arranged in two propositions (A and E), in\nwhich, from the terms specially chosen, the major happens to be truly\naffirmable of all the minor; so that the third proposition is an\nuniversal Affirmative:--\n\nMajor and  }\n           } Animal is predicable of every Man;\n  Middle.  }\n\nMiddle and }\n           } Man is not predicable of any Horse;\n  Minor    }\n\nMajor and  }\n           } Animal is predicable of every Horse.\n  Minor    }\n\nNext, a second example is set out with new terms, in which the major\nhappens not to be truly predicable of any of the minor; thus\nexhibiting as third proposition an universal Negative:--\n\nMajor and  }\n           } Animal is predicable of every Man;\n  Middle.  }\n\nMiddle and }\n           } Man is not predicable of any Stone;\n  Minor    }\n\nMajor and  }\n           } Animal is not predicable of any Stone.\n  Minor    }\n\nHere we see that the full exposition of a syllogism is indicated with\nreal terms common and familiar to every one; alphabetical symbols\nwould not have sufficed, for the learner must himself recognize the\none conclusion as true, the other as false. Hence we are taught that,\nafter two premisses thus conditioned, if we venture to join together\nthe major and minor so as to form a pretended conclusion, we may in\nsome cases obtain a true proposition universally Affirmative, in\nother cases a true proposition universally Negative. Therefore\n(Aristotle argues) there is no one necessary conclusion, the same in\nall cases, derivable from such premisses; in other words, this mode\nof syllogism is invalid and proves nothing. He applies the like\nreasoning to all the other invalid modes of the first Figure; setting\nthem aside in the same way, and producing examples wherein double and\nopposite conclusions (improperly so called), both true, are obtained\nin different cases from the like arrangement of premisses.\n\n[Footnote 27: Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, a. 2, seq.]\n\nThis mode of reasoning plainly depends upon an appeal to prior\nexperience. The validity or invalidity of each mode of the First\nfigure is tested by applying it to different particular cases, each\nof which is familiar and known to the learner _aliunde_; in one case,\nthe conjunction of the major and minor terms in the third proposition\nmakes an universal Affirmative which he knows to be true; in another\ncase, the like conjunction makes an universal Negative, which he also\nknows to be true; so that there is no one _necessary_ (_i.e._ no one\nuniform and trustworthy) conclusion derivable from such\npremisses.[28] In other words, these modes of the First figure are\nnot valid or available in form; the negation being sufficiently\nproved by one single undisputed example.\n\n[Footnote 28: Though M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire (note, p. 19) declares\nAristotle's exposition to be a model of analysis, it appears to me\nthat the grounds for disallowing this invalid mode of the First\nfigure (A--E--A, or A--E--E) are not clearly set forth by Aristotle\nhimself, while they are rendered still darker by some of his best\ncommentators. Thus Waitz says (p. 381): \"Per exempla allata probat\n(Aristoteles) quod demonstrare debebat ex ips\u00e2 ratione quam singuli\ntermini inter se habeant: est enim proprium artis logic\u00e6, ut\nterminorum rationem cognoscat, dum res ignoret. Num de Caio\npr\u00e6dicetur animal nescit, scit de Caio pr\u00e6dicari animal, si animal de\nhomine et homo de Caio pr\u00e6dicetur.\"\n\nThis comment of Waitz appears to me founded in error. Aristotle had\nno means of shewing the invalidity of the mode A E in the First\nfigure, except by an appeal to particular examples. The invalidity of\nthe invalid modes, and the validity of the valid modes, rest alike\nupon this ultimate reference to examples of propositions known to be\ntrue or false, by prior experience of the learner. The valid modes\nare those which will stand this trial and verification; the invalid\nmodes are those which will not stand it. Not till such verification\nhas been made, is one warranted in generalizing the result, and\nenunciating a formula applicable to unknown particulars (rationem\nterminorum cognoscere, dum res ignoret). It was impossible for\nAristotle to do what Waitz requires of him. I take the opposite\nground, and regret that he did not set forth the fundamental test of\nappeal to example and experience, in a more emphatic and\nunmistakeable manner.\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire (in the note to his translation, p. 14)\ndoes not lend any additional clearness, when he talks of the\n\"_conclusion_\" from the propositions A and E in the First figure.\nJulius Pacius says (p. 134): \"Si tamen _conclusio_ dici debet, qu\u00e6\nnon colligitur ex propositionibus,\" &c. Moreover, M. St. Hilaire (p.\n19) slurs over the legitimate foundation, the appeal to experience,\nmuch as Aristotle himself does: \"Puis prenant des exemples o\u00f9 la\n_conclusion est de toute \u00e9vidence_, Aristote les applique\nsuccessivement \u00e0 chacune de ces combinaisons; celles qui donnent la\n_conclusion fournie d'ailleurs par le bon sens_, sont concluantes ou\nsyllogistiques, les autres sont asyllogistiques.\"]\n\nWe are now introduced to the Second figure, in which each of the two\npremisses has the middle term as Predicate.[29] To give a legitimate\nconclusion in this figure, one or other of the premisses must be\nnegative, and the major premiss must be universal; moreover no\naffirmative conclusions can ever be obtained in it--none but negative\nconclusions, universal or particular. In this Second figure too,\nAristotle recognizes four valid modes; setting aside the other\npossible modes as invalid[30] (in the same way as he had done in the\nFirst figure), because the third proposition or conjunction of the\nmajor term with the minor, might in some cases be a true universal\naffirmative, in other cases a true universal negative. As to the\nthird and fourth of the valid modes, he demonstrates them by assuming\nthe contradictory of the conclusion, together with the major premiss,\nand then showing that these two premisses form a new syllogism, which\nleads to a conclusion contradicting the minor premiss. This method,\ncalled _Reductio ad Impossibile_, is here employed for the first\ntime; and employed without being ushered in or defined, as if it were\nfamiliarly known.[31]\n\n[Footnote 29: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 26, b. 34. As Aristotle\nenunciates a proposition by putting the predicate before the subject,\nhe says that in this Second figure the middle term comes [Greek:\npr\u00f4=ton t\u00ea=| the/sei]. In the Third figure, for the same reason, he\ncalls it [Greek: e)/schaton t\u00ea=| the/sei], vi. p. 28, a. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 18. In these invalid\nmodes, Aristotle says there is no _syllogism_; therefore we cannot\nproperly speak of a _conclusion_, but only of a third proposition,\nconjoining the major with the minor.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 27, a. 15, 26, seq. It is said to involve\n[Greek: u(po/thesis], p. 28, a. 7; to be [Greek: e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s]\nxxiii. p. 41, a. 25; to be [Greek: tou= e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s], as opposed\nto [Greek: deiktiko/s], xxiii. p. 40, b. 25.\n\nM. B. St. Hilaire remarks justly, that Aristotle might be expected to\ndefine or explain what it is, on first mentioning it (note, p. 22).]\n\nLastly, we have the Third figure, wherein the middle term is the\nSubject in both premisses. Here one at least of the premisses must be\nuniversal, either affirmative or negative. But no universal\nconclusions can be obtained in this figure; all the conclusions are\nparticular. Aristotle recognizes six legitimate modes; in all of\nwhich the conclusions are particular, four of them being affirmative,\ntwo negative. The other possible modes he sets aside as in the two\npreceding figures.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Ibid. I. vi. p. 28, a. 10-p. 29, a. 18.]\n\nBut Aristotle assigns to the First figure a marked superiority as\ncompared with the Second and Third. It is the only one that yields\nperfect syllogisms; those furnished by the other two are all\nimperfect. The cardinal principle of syllogistic proof, as he\nconceives it, is--That whatever can be affirmed or denied of a whole,\ncan be affirmed or denied of any part thereof.[33] The major\nproposition affirms or denies something universally respecting a\ncertain whole; the minor proposition declares a certain part to be\nincluded in that whole. To this principle the four modes of the First\nfigure manifestly and unmistakably conform, without any\ntransformation of their premisses. But in the other figures such\nconformity does not obviously appear, and must be demonstrated by\nreducing their syllogisms to the First figure; either ostensively by\nexposition of a particular case, and conversion of the premisses, or\nby _Reductio ad Impossibile_. Aristotle, accordingly, claims\nauthority for the Second and Third figures only so far as they can be\nreduced to the First.[34] We must, however, observe that in this\nprocess of reduction no new evidence is taken in; the matter of\nevidence remains unchanged, and the form alone is altered, according\nto laws of logical conversion which Aristotle has already laid down\nand justified. Another ground of the superiority and perfection which\nhe claims for the First figure, is, that it is the only one in which\nevery variety of conclusion can be proved; and especially the only\none in which the Universal Affirmative can be proved--the great aim\nof scientific research. Whereas, in the Second figure we can prove\nonly _negative_ conclusions, universal or particular; and in the\nThird figure only _particular_ conclusions, affirmative or\nnegative.[35]\n\n[Footnote 33: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 37: [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s ga\\r o(\\ m\u00ea/\ne)stin \u00f4(s o(/lon pro\\s me/ros kai\\ a)/llo pro\\s tou=to \u00f4(s me/ros\npro\\s o(/lon, e)x ou)deno\\s t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n dei/knusin o( deiknu/\u00f4n,\n\u00f4(/ste ou)de\\ gi/netai sullogismo/s.]\n\nHe had before said this about the relation of the three terms in the\nSyllogism, I. iv. p. 25, b. 32: [Greek: o(/tan o(/roi trei=s ou(/t\u00f4s\ne)/ch\u00f4si pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous \u00f4(/ste to\\n e)/schaton e)n o(/l\u00f4| ei)=nai\nt\u00f4=| me/s\u00f4| kai\\ to\\n me/son e)n o(/l\u00f4| t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ ei)=nai \u00ea)\\\nm\u00ea\\ ei)=nai, a)na/gk\u00ea t\u00f4=n a)/kr\u00f4n ei)=nai sullogismo\\n te/leion]\n(_Dictum de Omni et Nullo_).]\n\n[Footnote 34: Analyt. Prior. I. vii. p. 29, a. 30-b. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ibid. I. iv. p. 26, b. 30, p. 27, a. 1, p. 28, a. 9, p.\n29, a. 15. An admissible syllogism in the Second or Third figure is\nsometimes called [Greek: dunato\\s] as opposed to [Greek: te/leios],\np. 41, b. 33. Compare Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-Theorie des Aristoteles,\np. 245, Leipzig, 1870.]\n\nSuch are the main principles of syllogistic inference and rules for\nsyllogistic reasoning, as laid down by Aristotle. During the medi\u00e6val\nperiod, they were allowed to ramify into endless subtle\ntechnicalities, and to absorb the attention of teachers and studious\nmen, long after the time when other useful branches of science and\nliterature were pressing for attention. Through such prolonged\nmonopoly--which Aristotle, among the most encyclopedical of all\nwriters, never thought of claiming for them--they have become so\ndiscredited, that it is difficult to call back attention to them as\nthey stood in the Aristotelian age. We have to remind the reader,\nagain, that though language was then used with great ability for\nrhetorical and dialectical purposes, there existed as yet hardly any\nsystematic or scientific study of it in either of these branches. The\nscheme and the terminology of any such science were alike unknown,\nand Aristotle was obliged to construct it himself from the\nfoundation. The rhetorical and dialectical teaching as then given (he\ntells us) was mere unscientific routine, prescribing specimens of art\nto be committed to memory: respecting syllogism (or the conditions of\nlegitimate deductive inference) absolutely nothing had been said.[36]\nUnder these circumstances, his theory of names, notions, and\npropositions as employed for purposes of exposition and\nratiocination, is a remarkable example of original inventive power.\nHe had to work it out by patient and laborious research. No way was\nopen to him except the diligent comparison and analysis of\npropositions. And though all students have now become familiar with\nthe various classes of terms and propositions, together with their\nprincipal characteristics and relations, yet to frame and designate\nsuch classes for the first time without any precedent to follow, to\ndetermine for each the rules and conditions of logical\nconvertibility, to put together the constituents of the Syllogism,\nwith its graduation of Figures and difference of Modes, and with a\nselection, justified by reasons given, between the valid and the\ninvalid modes--all this implies a high order of original\nsystematizing genius, and must have required the most laborious and\nmultiplied comparisons between propositions in detail.\n\n[Footnote 36: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 184, a. 1, b. 2: [Greek:\ndio/per tachei=a me\\n a)/technos d' \u00ea)=n \u00ea( didaskali/a toi=s\nmantha/nousi par' au)t\u00f4=n; ou) ga\\r te/chn\u00ean a)lla\\ ta\\ a)po\\ t\u00ea=s\nte/chn\u00eas dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon . . . . _peri\\ de\\ tou=\nsullogi/zesthai pantel\u00f4=s ou)de\\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo\nle/gein, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ trib\u00ea=| z\u00eatou=ntes polu\\n chro/non e)ponou=men_.]]\n\nThe preceding abridgment of Aristotle's exposition of the Syllogism\napplies only to propositions simply affirmative or simply negative.\nBut Aristotle himself, as already remarked, complicates the\nexposition by putting the Modal propositions (Possible, Necessary)\nupon the same line as the above-mentioned Simple propositions. I have\nnoticed, in dealing with the treatise De Interpretatione, the\nconfusion that has arisen from thus elevating the Modals into a line\nof classification co-ordinate with propositions simply Assertory. In\nthe Analytica, this confusion is still more sensibly felt, from the\nintroduction of syllogisms in which one of the premisses is\nnecessary, while the other is only possible. We may remark, however,\nthat, in the Analytica, Aristotle is stricter in defining the\nPossible than he has been in the De Interpretatione; for he now\ndisjoins the Possible altogether from the Necessary, making it\nequivalent to the Problematical (not merely _may be_, but _may be or\nmay not be_).[37] In the middle, too, of his diffuse exposition of\nthe Modals, he inserts one important remark, respecting universal\npropositions generally, which belongs quite as much to the preceding\nexposition about propositions simply assertory. He observes that\nuniversal propositions have nothing to do with time, present, past,\nor future; but are to be understood in a sense absolute and\nunqualified.[38]\n\n[Footnote 37: Analyt. Prior. I. viii. p. 29, a. 32; xiii. p. 32, a.\n20-36: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r a)nagkai=on o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s e)nde/chesthai\nle/gomen]. In xiv. p. 33, b. 22, he excludes this equivocal meaning\nof [Greek: to\\ e)ndecho/menon--dei= de\\ to\\ e)nde/chestha lamba/nein\nm\u00ea\\ e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois, a)lla\\ kata\\ to\\n ei)r\u00eame/non\ndiorismo/n.] See xiii. p. 32, a. 33, where [Greek: to\\ e)nde/chesthai\nu(pa/rchein] is asserted to be equivalent to or convertible with\n[Greek: to\\ e)nde/chesthai m\u00ea\\ u(pa/rchein]; and xix. p. 38, a. 35:\n[Greek: to\\ e)x a)na/gk\u00eas ou)k \u00ea)=n _e)ndecho/menon_]. Theophrastus\nand Eudemus differed from Aristotle about his theory of the Modals in\nseveral points (Scholia ad Analyt. Priora, pp. 161, b. 30; 162, b.\n23; 166, a. 12, b. 15, Brand.). Respecting the want of clearness in\nAristotle about [Greek: to\\ e)ndecho/menon], see Waitz's note **ad p.\n32, b. 16. Moreover, he sometimes uses [Greek: u(pa/rchon] in the\nwidest sense, including [Greek: e)ndecho/menon] and [Greek:\na)nagkai=on], xxiii. p. 40, b. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, b. 7.]\n\nHaving finished with the Modals, Aristotle proceeds to lay it down,\nthat all demonstration must fall under one or other of the three\nfigures just described; and therefore that all may be reduced\nultimately to the two first modes of the First figure. You cannot\nproceed a step with two terms only and one proposition only. You must\nhave two propositions including three terms; the middle term\noccupying the place assigned to it in one or other of the three\nfigures.[39] This is obviously true when you demonstrate by direct or\nostensive syllogism; and it is no less true when you proceed by\n_Reductio ad Impossibile_. This last is one mode of syllogizing from\nan hypothesis or assumption:[40] your conclusion being disputed, you\nprove it indirectly, by assuming its contradictory to be true, and\nconstructing a new syllogism by means of that contradictory together\nwith a second premiss admitted to be true; the conclusion of this new\nsyllogism being a proposition obviously false or known beforehand to\nbe false. Your demonstration must be conducted by a regular\nsyllogism, as it is when you proceed directly and ostensively. The\ndifference is, that the conclusion which you obtain is not that which\nyou wish ultimately to arrive at, but something notoriously false.\nBut as this false conclusion arises from your assumption or\nhypothesis that the contradictory of the conclusion originally\ndisputed was true, you have indirectly made out your case that this\ncontradictory must have been false, and therefore that the conclusion\noriginally disputed was true. All this, however, has been\ndemonstration by regular syllogism, but starting from an hypothesis\nassumed and admitted as one of the premisses.[41]\n\n[Footnote 39: Ibid. xxiii. p. 40, b. 20, p. 41, a. 4-20.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ibid. p. 40, b. 25: [Greek: e)/ti \u00ea)\\ deiktik\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\\ne)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s; tou= d' _e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s_ me/ros to\\ dia\\ tou=\na)duna/tou.]]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 41, b. 23: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\\r oi( dia\\ tou=\na)duna/tou perai/nontes to\\ me\\n pseu=dos sullogi/zontai, to\\ d' e)x\na)rch\u00ea=s _e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s_ deiknu/ousin, o(/tan a)du/nato/n ti\nsumbai/n\u00ea| t\u00ea=s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s tethei/s\u00eas.]\n\nIt deserves to be remarked that Aristotle uses the phrase [Greek:\nsullogismo\\s _e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s_], not [Greek: sullogismo\\s\nu(pothetiko/s]. This bears upon the question as to his views upon\nwhat subsequently received the title of _hypothetical syllogisms_;\na subject to which I shall advert in a future note.]\n\nAristotle here again enforces what he had before urged--that in every\nvalid syllogism, one premiss at least must be affirmative, and one\npremiss at least must be universal. If the conclusion be universal,\nboth premisses must be so likewise; if it be particular, one of the\npremisses may not be universal. But without one universal premiss at\nleast, there can be no syllogistic proof. If you have a thesis to\nsupport, you cannot assume (or ask to be conceded to you) that very\nthesis, without committing _petitio principii,_ (_i.e._ _qu\u00e6siti_ or\n_probandi_); you must assume (or ask to have conceded to you) some\nuniversal proposition containing it and more besides; under which\nuniversal you may bring the subject of your thesis as a minor, and\nthus the premisses necessary for supporting it will be completed.\nAristotle illustrates this by giving a demonstration that the angles\nat the base of an isosceles triangle are equal; justifying every step\nin the reasoning by an appeal to some universal proposition.[42]\n\n[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. I. xxiv. p. 41, b. 6-31. The\ndemonstration given (b. 13-22) is different from that which we read\nin Euclid, and is not easy to follow. It is more clearly explained by\nWaitz (p. 434) than either by Julius Pacius or by M. Barth. St.\nHilaire (p. 108).]\n\nAgain, every demonstration is effected by two propositions (an _even_\nnumber) and by three terms (an _odd_ number); though the same\nproposition may perhaps be demonstrable by more than one pair of\npremisses, or through more than one middle term;[43] that is, by two\nor more distinct syllogisms. If there be more than three terms and\ntwo propositions, either the syllogism will no longer be one but\nseveral; or there must be particulars introduced for the purpose of\nobtaining an universal by induction; or something will be included,\nsuperfluous and not essential to the demonstration, perhaps for the\npurpose of concealing from the respondent the real inference\nmeant.[44] In the case (afterwards called _Sorites_) where the\nultimate conclusion is obtained through several mean terms in\ncontinuous series, the number of terms will always exceed by one the\nnumber of propositions; but the numbers may be odd or even, according\nto circumstances. As terms are added, the total of intermediate\nconclusions, if drawn out in form, will come to be far greater than\nthat of the terms or propositions, multiplying as it will do in an\nincreasing ratio to them.[45]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ibid. I. xxv. p. 41, b. 36, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ibid. xxv. p. 42, a. 23: [Greek: ma/t\u00ean e)/stai\nei)l\u00eamme/na, ei) m\u00ea\\ e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s \u00ea)\\ kru/pse\u00f4s \u00ea)/ tinos a)/llou t\u00f4=n\ntoiou/t\u00f4n cha/rin.] Ib. a. 38: [Greek: ou(=tos o( lo/gos \u00ea)\\ ou)\nsullelo/gistai \u00ea)\\ plei/\u00f4 t\u00f4=n a)nagkai/\u00f4n \u00ea)r\u00f4/t\u00eake pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\nthe/sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 45: Ibid. p. 42, b. 5-26.]\n\nIt will be seen clearly from the foregoing remarks that there is a\ngreat difference between one thesis and another as to facility of\nattack or defence in Dialectic. If the thesis be an Universal\nAffirmative proposition, it can be demonstrated only in the First\nfigure, and only by one combination of premisses; while, on the other\nhand, it can be impugned either by an universal negative, which can\nbe demonstrated both in the First and Second figures, or by a\nparticular negative, which can be demonstrated in all the three\nfigures. Hence an Universal Affirmative thesis is at once the hardest\nto defend and the easiest to oppugn: more so than either a Particular\nAffirmative, which can be proved both in the First and Third figures;\nor a Universal Negative, which can be proved either in First or\nSecond.[46] To the opponent, an universal thesis affords an easier\nvictory than a particular thesis; in fact, speaking generally, his\ntask is easier than that of the defendant.\n\n[Footnote 46: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvi. p. 42, b. 27, p. 43, a. 15.]\n\nIn the Analytica Priora, Aristotle proceeds to tell us that he\ncontemplates not only theory, but also practice and art. The reader\nmust be taught, not merely to understand the principles of Syllogism,\nbut likewise where he can find the matter for constructing syllogisms\nreadily, and how he can obtain the principles of demonstration\npertinent to each thesis propounded.[47]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 20: [Greek: p\u00f4=s d'\neu)por\u00ea/somen au)toi\\ pro\\s to\\ tithe/menon a)ei\\ sullogism\u00f4=n, kai\\\ndia\\ poi/as o(dou= l\u00eapso/metha ta\\s peri\\ e(/kaston a)rcha/s, nu=n\n\u00ea)/d\u00ea lekte/on; ou) ga\\r mo/non i)/s\u00f4s dei= t\u00ea\\n ge/nesin the\u00f4rei=n\nt\u00f4=n sullogism\u00f4=n, a)lla\\ kai\\ t\u00ea\\n du/namin e)/chein tou= poiei=n.]\nThe second section of Book I. here begins.]\n\nA thesis being propounded in appropriate terms, with subject and\npredicate, how are you the propounder to seek out arguments for its\ndefence? In the first place, Aristotle reverts to the distinction\nalready laid down at the beginning of the Categori\u00e6.[48] Individual\nthings or persons are subjects only, never appearing as\npredicates--this is the lowest extremity of the logical scale: at\nthe opposite extremity of the scale, there are the highest\ngeneralities, predicates only, and not subjects of any predication,\nthough sometimes supposed to be such, as matters of dialectic\ndiscussion.[49] Between the lowest and highest we have intermediate\nor graduate generalities, appearing sometimes as subjects, sometimes\nas predicates; and it is among these that the materials both of\nproblems for debate, and of premisses for proof, are usually\nfound.[50]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 25, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. p. 43, a. 39: [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n ei) m\u00ea\\ kata\\\ndo/xan]. Cf. Schol. of Alexander, p. 175, a. 44, Br.: [Greek:\ne)ndo/x\u00f4s kai\\ dialektik\u00f4=s, \u00f4(/sper ei)=pen e)n toi=s Topikoi=s],\nthat even the _principia_ of science may be debated; for example, in\nbook B. of the Metaphysica. Aristotle does not recognize either\n[Greek: to\\ o)/n] or [Greek: to\\ e(/n] as true genera, but only as\npredicates.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 40-43.]\n\nYou must begin by putting down, along with the matter in hand itself,\nits definition and its _propria_; after that, its other predicates;\nnext, those predicates which _cannot_ belong to it; lastly, those\nother subjects, of which it may itself be predicated. You must\nclassify its various predicates distinguishing the essential, the\n_propria_, and the accidental; also distinguishing the true and\nunquestionable, from the problematical and hypothetical.[51] You must\nlook out for those predicates which belong to it as subject\nuniversally, and not to certain portions of it only; since universal\npropositions are indispensable in syllogistic proof, and indefinite\npropositions can only be reckoned as particular. When a subject is\nincluded in some larger genus--as, for example, man in animal--you\nmust not look for the affirmative or negative predicates which belong\nto animal universally (since all these will of course belong to man\nalso) but for those which distinguish man from other animals; nor\nmust you, in searching for those lower subjects of which man is the\npredicate, fix your attention on the higher genus animal; for animal\nwill of course be predicable of all those of which man is predicable.\nYou must collect what pertains to man specially, either as predicate\nor subject; nor merely that which pertains to him necessarily and\nuniversally, but also usually and in the majority of cases; for most\nof the problems debated belong to this latter class, and the worth of\nthe conclusion will be co-ordinate with that of the premisses.[52]**\nDo not select predicates that are predicable[53] both of the\npredicate and subject; for no valid affirmative conclusion can be\nobtained from them.\n\n[Footnote 51: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 8: [Greek: kai\\\ntou/t\u00f4n poi=a doxastik\u00f4=s kai\\ poi=a kat' a)l\u00ea/theian.]]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 10-35.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 36: [Greek: e)/ti ta\\ pa=sin e(po/mena ou)k\ne)klekte/on; ou) ga\\r e)/stai sullogismo\\s e)x au)t\u00f4=n.] The phrase\n[Greek: ta\\ pa=sin e(po/mena], as denoting predicates applicable both\nto the predicate and to the subject, is curious. We should hardly\nunderstand it, if it were not explained a little further on, p. 44,\nb. 21. Both the Scholiast and the modern commentators understand\n[Greek: ta\\ pa=sin e(po/mena] in this sense; and I do not venture to\ndepart from them. At the same time, when I read six lines afterwards\n(p. 44, b. 26) the words [Greek: oi(=on ei) ta\\ e(po/mena e(kate/r\u00f4|\ntau)ta/ e)stin]--in which the same meaning as that which the\ncommentators ascribe to [Greek: ta\\ pa=sin e(po/mena] is given in its\nown special and appropriate terms, and thus the same supposition\nunnecessarily repeated--I cannot help suspecting that Aristotle\nintends [Greek: ta\\ pa=sin e(po/mena] to mean something different; to\nmean such wide and universal predicates as [Greek: to\\ e(\\n] and\n[Greek: to\\ o)/n] which soar above the Categories and apply to every\nthing, but denote no real _genera_.]\n\nThus, when the thesis to be maintained is an universal affirmative\n(_e.g._ A is predicable of all E), you will survey all the subjects\nto which A will apply as predicate, and all the predicates applying\nto E as subject. If these two lists coincide in any point, a middle\nterm will be found for the construction of a good syllogism in the\nFirst figure. Let B represent the list of predicates belonging\nuniversally to A; D, the list of predicates which cannot belong to\nit; C, the list of subjects to which A pertains universally as\npredicate. Likewise, let F represent the list of predicates belonging\nuniversally to E; H, the list of predicates that cannot belong to E;\nG, the list of subjects to which E is applicable as predicate. If,\nunder these suppositions, there is any coincidence between the list C\nand the list F, you can construct a syllogism (in _Barbara_, Fig. 1),\ndemonstrating that A belongs to _all_ E; since the predicate in F\nbelongs to all E, and A universally to the subject in C. If the list\nC coincides in any point with the list G, you can prove that A\nbelongs to _some_ E, by a syllogism (in _Darapti_, Fig. 3). If, on\nthe other hand, the list F coincides in any point with the list D,\nyou can prove that A cannot belong to any E: for the predicate in D\ncannot belong to any A, and therefore (by converting simply the\nuniversal negative) A cannot belong as predicate to any D; but D\ncoincides with F, and F belongs to all E; accordingly, a syllogism\n(in _Celarent_, Fig. 1) may be constructed, shewing that A cannot\nbelong to any E. So also, if B coincides in any point with H, the\nsame conclusion can be proved; for the predicate in B belongs to all\nA, but B coincides with H, which belongs to no E; whence you obtain a\nsyllogism (in _Camestres_, Fig. 2), shewing that no A belongs to\nE.[54] In collecting the predicates and subjects both of A and of E,\nthe highest and most universal expression of them is to be preferred,\nas affording the largest grasp for the purpose of obtaining a\nsuitable middle term.[55] It will be seen (as has been declared\nalready) that every syllogism obtained will have three terms and two\npropositions; and that it will be in one or other of the three\nfigures above described.[56]\n\n[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 43, b. 39-p. 44, a. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 44, a. 39. Alexander and Philoponus (Scholia,\np. 177, a. 19, 39, Brandis) point out an inconsistency between what\nAristotle says here and what he had said in one of the preceding\nparagraphs, dissuading the inquirer from attending to the highest\ngeneralities, and recommending him to look only at both subject and\npredicate in their special place on the logical scale. Alexander's\nway of removing the inconsistency is not successful: I doubt if there\nbe an inconsistency. I understand Aristotle _here_ to mean only that\nthe universal expression KZ ([Greek: to\\ katho/lou Z]) is to be\npreferred to the indefinite or indeterminate (simply Z, [Greek:\na)dio/riston]), also K[Greek: G] ([Greek: to\\ katho/lou G]) to simple\n[Greek: G (a)dio/riston)]. This appears to me not inconsistent with\nthe recommendation which Aristotle had given before.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ibid. p. 44, b. 6-20.]\n\nThe way just pointed out is the only way towards obtaining a suitable\nmiddle term. If, for example, you find some predicate applicable both\nto A and E, this will not conduct you to a valid syllogism; you will\nonly obtain a syllogism in the Second figure with two affirmative\npremisses, which will not warrant any conclusion. Or if you find some\npredicate which cannot belong either to A or to E, this again will\nonly give you a syllogism in the Second figure with two negative\npremisses, which leads to nothing. So also, if you have a term of\nwhich A can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of E, you\nderive from it only a syllogism in the First figure, with its minor\nnegative; and this, too, is invalid. Lastly, if you have a subject,\nof which neither A nor E can be predicated, your syllogism\nconstructed from these conditions will have both its premisses\nnegative, and will therefore be worthless.[57]\n\n[Footnote 57: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 44, b. 25-37.]\n\nIn the survey prescribed, nothing is gained by looking out for\npredicates (of A and E) which are different or opposite: we must\ncollect such as are identical, since our purpose is to obtain from\nthem a suitable middle term, which must be the same in both\npremisses. It is true that if the list B (containing the predicates\nuniversally belonging to A) and the list F (containing the predicates\nuniversally belonging to E) are incompatible or contrary to each\nother, you will arrive at a syllogism proving that no A can belong to\nE. But this syllogism will proceed, not so much from the fact that B\nand F are incompatible, as from the other fact, distinct though\ncorrelative, that B will to a certain extent coincide with H (the\nlist of predicates which cannot belong to E). The middle term and the\nsyllogism constituted thereby, is derived from the coincidence\nbetween B and H, not from the opposition between B and F. Those who\nderive it from the latter, overlook or disregard the real source, and\nadopt a point of view merely incidental and irrelevant.[58]\n\n[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 44, b. 38-p. 45, a. 22. [Greek: sumbai/nei d\u00ea\\\ntoi=s ou(/t\u00f4s e)piskopou=si prosepible/pein a)/ll\u00ean o(do\\n t\u00ea=s\na)nagkai/as, dia\\ to\\ lantha/nein t\u00ea\\n tau)to/t\u00eata t\u00f4=n B kai\\ t\u00f4=n\nTh.]]\n\nThe precept here delivered--That in order to obtain middle terms and\ngood syllogisms, you must study and collect both the predicates and\nthe subjects of the two terms of your thesis--Aristotle declares to\nbe equally applicable to all demonstration, whether direct or by way\nof _Reductio ad Impossibile_. In both the process of demonstration is\nthe same--involving two premisses, three terms, and one of the three\na suitable middle term. The only difference is, that in the direct\ndemonstration, both premisses are propounded as true, while in the\n_Reductio ad Impossibile_, one of the premisses is assumed as true\nthough known to be false, and the conclusion also.[59] In the other\ncases of hypothetical syllogism your attention must be directed, not\nto the original _qu\u00e6situm_, but to the condition annexed thereto; yet\nthe search for predicates, subjects, and a middle term, must be\nconducted in the same manner.[60] Sometimes, by the help of a\ncondition extraneous to the premisses, you may demonstrate an\nuniversal from a particular: _e.g._, Suppose C (the list of subjects\nto which A belongs as predicate) and G (the list of subjects to which\nE belongs as predicate) to be identical; and suppose farther that the\nsubjects in G are the _only_ ones to which E belongs as predicate\n(this seems to be the _extraneous_ or _extra-syllogistic_ condition\nassumed, on which Aristotle's argument turns); then, A will be\napplicable to all E. Or if D (the list of predicates which cannot\nbelong to A) and G (the list of subjects to which E belongs as\npredicate) are identical; then, assuming the like extraneous\ncondition, A will not be applicable to any E.[61] In both these\ncases, the conclusion is more universal than the premisses; but it is\nbecause we take in an hypothetical assumption, in addition to the\npremisses.\n\n[Footnote 59: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, a. 25-b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 15-20. This paragraph is very\nobscure. Neither Alexander, nor Waitz, nor St. Hilaire clears it up\n**completely. See Schol. pp. 178, b., 179, a. Brandis.\n\nAristotle concludes by saying that syllogisms from an hypothesis\nought to be reviewed and classified into varieties--[Greek:\ne)piske/psasthai de\\ dei= kai\\ dielei=n posach\u00f4=s oi( e)x\nu(pothe/se\u00f4s] (b. 20). But it is doubtful whether he himself ever\nexecuted this classification. It was done in the Analytica of his\nsuccessor Theophrastus (Schol. p. 179, a. 6, 24). Compare the note of\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, p. 140.]\n\n\n[Footnote 61: Analyt. Prior. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 21-30.]\n\nAristotle has now shown a method of procedure common to all\ninvestigations and proper for the solution of all problems, wherever\nsoluble. He has shown, first, all the conditions and varieties of\nprobative Syllogism, two premisses and three terms, with the place\nrequired for the middle term in each of the three figures; next, the\nquarter in which we are to look for all the materials necessary or\nsuitable for constructing valid syllogisms. Having the two terms of\nthe thesis given, we must study the predicates and subjects belonging\nto both, and must provide a large list of them; out of which list we\nmust make selection according to the purpose of the moment. Our\nselection will be different, according as we wish to prove or to\nrefute, and according as the conclusion that we wish to prove is an\nuniversal or a particular. The lesson here given will be most useful\nin teaching the reasoner to confine his attention to the sort of\nmaterials really promising, so that he may avoid wasting his time\nupon such as are irrelevant.[62]\n\n[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 36-xxx. p. 46, a. 10.]\n\nThis method of procedure is alike applicable to demonstration in\nPhilosophy or in any of the special sciences,[63] and to debate in\nDialectic. In both, the premisses or _principia_ of syllogisms must\nbe put together in the same manner, in order to make the syllogism\nvalid. In both, too, the range of topics falling under examination is\nlarge and varied; each topic will have its own separate premisses or\n_principia_, which must be searched out and selected in the way above\ndescribed. Experience alone can furnish these _principia_, in each\nseparate branch or department. Astronomical experience--the observed\nfacts and phenomena of astronomy--have furnished the data for the\nscientific and demonstrative treatment of astronomy. The like with\nevery other branch of science or art.[64] When the facts in each\nbranch are brought together, it will be the province of the logician\nor analytical philosopher to set out the demonstrations in a manner\nclear and fit for use. For if nothing in the way of true matter of\nfact has been omitted from our observation, we shall be able to\ndiscover and unfold the demonstration, on every point where\ndemonstration is possible; and, wherever it is not possible, to make\nthe impossibility manifest.[65]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ibid. p. 46, a. 8**: [Greek: kata\\ me\\n a)l\u00ea/theian e)k\nt\u00f4=n kat' a)l\u00ea/theian _diagegramme/n\u00f4n_ u(pa/rchein, ei)s de\\ tou\\s\ndialektikou\\s sullogismou\\s e)k t\u00f4=n kata\\ do/xan prota/se\u00f4n.]\n\nJulius Pacius (p. 257) remarks upon the word [Greek: diagegramme/n\u00f4n]\nas indicating that Aristotle, while alluding to special sciences\ndistinguishable from philosophy on one side, and from dialectic on\nthe other, had in view geometrical demonstrations.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 10-20**: [Greek: ai(\nd' a)rchai\\ t\u00f4=n sullogism\u00f4=n katho/lou me\\n ei)/r\u00eantai--i)/diai de\\\nkath' e(ka/st\u00ean ai( plei=stai. dio\\ ta\\s me\\n a)rcha\\s ta\\s peri\\\ne(/kaston e)mpeiri/as e)/sti paradou=nai. le/g\u00f4 d' oi(=on t\u00ea\\n\na)strologik\u00ea\\n me\\n e)mpeiri/an t\u00ea=s a)strologik\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas;\nl\u00eaphthe/nt\u00f4n ga\\r i(kan\u00f4=s t\u00f4=n phainome/n\u00f4n ou(/t\u00f4s eu(re/th\u00easan ai(\na)strologikai\\ a)podei/xeis. o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ peri\\ a)/ll\u00ean\no(poianou=n e)/chei te/chn\u00ean te kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean.]\n\nWhat Aristotle says here--of astronomical observation and experience\nas furnishing the basis for astronomical science--stands in marked\ncontrast with Plato, who rejects this basis, and puts aside, with a\nsort of contempt, astronomical observation (Republic, vii. pp.\n530-531); treating acoustics also in a similar way. Compare Aristot.\nMetaphys. [Greek: L]. p. 1073, a. 6, seq., with the commentary of\nBonitz, p. 506.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 22-27**: [Greek:\n\u00f4(/ste a)\\n l\u00eaphth\u00ea=| ta\\ u(pa/rchonta peri\\ e(/kaston, \u00ea(me/teron\n\u00ea)/d\u00ea ta\\s a)podei/xeis e(toi/m\u00f4s e)mphani/zein. ei) ga\\r m\u00eade\\n\n_kata\\ t\u00ea\\n i(stori/an_ paraleiphthei/\u00ea t\u00f4=n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s u(parcho/nt\u00f4n\ntoi=s pra/gmasin, e(/xomen peri\\ a(/pantos ou(= me\\n e)/stin\na)po/deixis, tau/t\u00ean eu(rei=n kai\\ a)podeiknu/nai, ou(= de\\ m\u00ea\\\npe/phuken a)po/deixis, tou=to poiei=n phanero/n.]\n\nRespecting the word [Greek: i(stori/a]--investigation and record of\nmatters of fact--the first sentence of Herodotus may be compared with\nAristotle, Histor. Animal. p. 491, a. 12; also p. 757, b. 35;\nRhetoric. p. 1359, b. 32.]\n\nFor the fuller development of these important principles, the reader\nis referred to the treatise on Dialectic, entitled Topica, which we\nshall come to in a future chapter. There is nothing in all\nAristotle's writings more remarkable than the testimony here\nafforded, how completely he considered all the generalities of\ndemonstrative science and deductive reasoning to rest altogether on\nexperience and inductive observation.\n\nWe are next introduced to a comparison between the syllogistic\nmethod, as above described and systematized, and the process called\nlogical Division into _genera_ and _species_; a process much relied\nupon by other philosophers, and especially by Plato. This logical\nDivision, according to Aristotle, is a mere fragment of the\nsyllogistic procedure; nothing better than a feeble syllogism.[66]\nThose who employed it were ignorant both of Syllogism and of its\nconditions. They tried to demonstrate--what never can be\ndemonstrated--the essential constitution of the subject.[67] Instead\nof selecting a middle term, as the Syllogism requires, more universal\nthan the subject but less universal (or not more so) than the\npredicate, they inverted the proper order, and took for their middle\nterm the highest universal. What really requires to be demonstrated,\nthey never demonstrated but assume.[68]\n\n[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxi. p. 46, a. 33. Alexander, in\nScholia, p. 180, a. 14. The Platonic method of [Greek: diai/resis] is\nexemplified in the dialogues called Sophist\u00eas and Politicus; compare\nalso Phil\u00eabus, c. v., p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Ibid. p. 46, a. 34: [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton d' au)to\\ tou=to\ne)lel\u00ea/thei tou\\s chr\u00f4me/nous au)t\u00ea=| pa/ntas, kai\\ pei/thein\ne)pechei/roun \u00f4(s o)/ntos dunatou= peri\\ ou)si/as a)po/deixin\ngi/nesthai kai\\ tou= ti/ e)stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 68: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]\n\nThus, they take the subject man, and propose to prove that man is\nmortal. They begin by laying down that man is an animal, and that\nevery animal is either mortal or immortal. Here, the most universal\nterm, animal, is selected as middle or as medium of proof; while\nafter all, the conclusion demonstrated is, not that man is mortal,\nbut that man is either mortal or immortal. The position that man is\nmortal, is assumed but not proved.[69] Moreover, by this method of\nlogical division, all the steps are affirmative and none negative;\nthere cannot be any refutation of error. Nor can any proof be given\nthus respecting _genus_, or _proprium_, or _accidens_; the _genus_ is\nassumed, and the method proceeds from thence to _species_ and\n_differentia_. No doubtful matter can be settled, and no unknown\npoint elucidated by this method; nothing can be done except to\narrange in a certain order what is already ascertained and\nunquestionable. To many investigations, accordingly, the method is\naltogether inapplicable; while even where it is applicable, it leads\nto no useful conclusion.[70]\n\n[Footnote 69: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 26-37. Alexander in Schol. p. 180, b. 1.]\n\nWe now come to that which Aristotle indicates as the third section of\nthis First Book of the Analytica Priora. In the first section he\nexplained the construction and constituents of Syllogism, the\nvarieties of figure and mode, and the conditions indispensable to a\nvalid conclusion. In the second section he tells us where we are to\nlook for the premisses of syllogisms, and how we may obtain a stock\nof materials, apt and ready for use when required. There remains one\nmore task to complete his plan--that he should teach the manner of\nreducing argumentation as it actually occurs (often invalid, and even\nwhen valid, often elliptical and disorderly), to the figures of\nsyllogism as above set forth, for the purpose of testing its\nvalidity.[71] In performing this third part (Aristotle says) we shall\nat the same time confirm and illustrate the two preceding parts; for\ntruth ought in every way to be consistent with itself.[72]\n\n[Footnote 71: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxii. p. 47, a. 2: [Greek: loipo\\n\nga\\r e)/ti tou=to t\u00ea=s ske/pse\u00f4s; ei) ga\\r t\u00ea/n te ge/nesin t\u00f4=n\nsullogism\u00f4=n the\u00f4roi=men kai\\ tou= eu(ri/skein e)/choimen du/namin,\ne)/ti de\\ tou\\s gegen\u00eame/nous a)nalu/oimen ei)s ta\\ proeir\u00eame/na\nsch\u00ea/mata, te/los a)\\n e)/choi \u00ea( e)x a)rch\u00ea=s pro/thesis.]]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ibid. a. 8.]\n\nWhen a piece of reasoning is before us, we must first try to\ndisengage the two syllogistic premisses (which are more easily\ndisengaged than the three terms), and note which of them is universal\nor particular. The reasoner, however, may not have set out both of\nthem clearly: sometimes he will leave out the major, sometimes the\nminor, and sometimes, even when enunciating both of them, he will\njoin with them irrelevant matter. In either of these cases we must\nourselves supply what is wanting and strike out the irrelevant.\nWithout this aid, reduction to regular syllogism is impracticable;\nbut it is not always easy to see what the exact deficiency is.\nSometimes indeed the conclusion may follow necessarily from what is\nimplied in the premisses, while yet the premisses themselves do not\nform a correct syllogism; for though every such syllogism carries\nwith it necessity, there may be necessity without a syllogism. In the\nprocess of reduction, we must first disengage and set down the two\npremisses, then the three terms; out of which three, that one which\nappears twice will be the middle term. If we do not find one term\ntwice repeated, we have got no middle and no real syllogism. Whether\nthe syllogism when obtained will be in the first, second, or third\nfigure, will depend upon the place of the middle term in the two\npremisses. We know by the nature of the conclusion which of the three\nfigures to look for, since we have already seen what conclusions can\nbe demonstrated in each.[73]\n\n[Footnote 73: Ibid. a. 10-b. 14.]\n\nSometimes we may get premisses which look like those of a true\nsyllogism, but are not so in reality; the major proposition ought to\nbe an universal, but it may happen to be only indefinite, and the\nsyllogism will not in all cases be valid; yet the distinction between\nthe two often passes unnoticed.[74] Another source of fallacy is,\nthat we may set out the terms incorrectly; by putting (in modern\nphrase) the abstract instead of the concrete, or abstract in one\npremiss and concrete in the other.[75] To guard against this, we\nought to use the concrete term in preference to the abstract. For\nexample, let the major proposition be, Health cannot belong to any\ndisease; and the minor. Disease can belong to any man; _Ergo_, Health\ncannot belong to any man. This conclusion seems valid, but is not\nreally so. We ought to substitute concrete terms to this effect:--It\nis impossible that the sick can be well; Any man may be sick; _Ergo_,\nIt is impossible that any man can be well. To the syllogism, now, as\nstated in these concrete terms, we may object, that the major is not\ntrue. A person who is at the present moment sick may at a future time\nbecome well. There is therefore no valid syllogism.[76] When we take\nthe concrete man, we may say with truth that the two contraries,\nhealth-sickness, knowledge-ignorance, _may_ both alike belong to him;\nthough not to the same individual at the same time.\n\n[Footnote 74: Ibid. I. xxxiii. p. 47, b. 16-40: [Greek: au(/t\u00ea me\\n\nou)=n \u00ea( a)pa/t\u00ea gi/netai e)n t\u00f4=| para\\ mikro/n; \u00f4s ga\\r ou)de\\n\ndiaphe/ron ei)pei=n _to/de t\u00f4=|de u(pa/rchein, \u00ea)\\ to/de t\u00f4=|de\npanti\\ u(pa/rchein_, sugch\u00f4rou=men.]\n\nM. B. St. Hilaire observes in his note (p. 155): \"L'erreur vient\nuniquement de ce qu'on confond l'universel et l'indetermin\u00e9 s\u00e9par\u00e9s\npar une nuance tr\u00e8s faible d'expression, qu'on ne doit pas cependant\nnegliger.\" Julius Pacius (p. 264) gives the same explanation at\ngreater length; but the example chosen by Aristotle ([Greek: o(\nA)ristome/n\u00eas e)sti\\ diano\u00eato\\s A)ristome/n\u00eas]) appears open to other\nobjections besides.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxiv. p. 48, a. 1-28.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 2-23. See the Scholion of Alexander, p. 181,\nb. 16-27, Brandis.]\n\nAgain, we must not suppose that we can always find one distinct and\nseparate name belonging to each term. Sometimes one or all of the\nthree terms can only be expressed by an entire phrase or proposition.\nIn such cases it is very difficult to reduce the reasoning into\nregular syllogism. We may even be deceived into fancying that there\nare syllogisms without any middle term at all, because there is no\nsingle word to express it. For example, let A represent equal to two\nright angles; B, triangle; C, isosceles. Then we have a regular\nsyllogism, with an explicit and single-worded middle term; A belongs\nfirst to B, and then to C through B as middle term (triangle). But\nhow do we know that A belongs to B? We know it by demonstration; for\nit is a demonstrable truth that every triangle has its three angles\nequal to two right angles. Yet there is no other more general truth\nabout triangles from which it is a deduction; it belongs to the\ntriangle _per se_, and follows from the fundamental properties of the\nfigure.[77] There is, however, a middle term in the demonstration,\nthough it is not single-worded and explicit; it is a declaratory\nproposition or a fact. We must not suppose that there can be any\ndemonstration without a middle term, either single-worded or\nmany-worded.\n\n[Footnote 77: Ibid. I. xxxv. p. 48, a. 30-39: [Greek: phanero\\n o(/ti\nto\\ me/son ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s a)ei\\ l\u00eapte/on \u00f4(s to/de ti, a)ll' e)ni/ote\nlo/gon, o(/per sumbai/nei ka)pi\\ tou= lechthe/ntos.] A good Scholion\nof Philoponus is given, p. 181, b. 28-45, Brand.]\n\nWhen we are reducing any reasoning to a syllogistic form, and tracing\nout the three terms of which it is composed, we must expose or set\nout these terms in the nominative case; but when we actually\nconstruct the syllogism or put the terms into propositions, we shall\nfind that one or other of the oblique cases, genitive, dative, &c.,\nis required.[78] Moreover, when we say, 'this belongs to that,' or\n'this may be truly predicated of that,' we must recollect that there\nare many distinct varieties in the relation of predicate to subject.\nEach of the Categories has its own distinct relation to the subject;\npredication _secundum quid_ is distinguished from predication\n_simpliciter_, simple from combined or compound, &c. This applies to\nnegatives as well as affirmatives.[79] There will be a material\ndifference in setting out the terms of the syllogism, according as\nthe predication is qualified (_secundum quid_) or absolute\n(_simpliciter_). If it be qualified, the qualification attaches to\nthe predicate, not to the subject: when the major proposition is a\nqualified predication, we must consider the qualification as\nbelonging, not to the middle term, but to the major term, and as\ndestined to re-appear in the conclusion. If the qualification be\nattached to the middle term, it cannot appear in the conclusion, and\nany conclusion that embraces it will not be proved. Suppose the\nconclusion to be proved is. The wholesome is knowledge _quatenus\nbonum_ or _quod bonum est_; the three terms of the syllogism must\nstand thus:--\n\n _Major_--_Bonum_ is knowable, _quatenus bonum_ or _quod bonum est_.\n\n _Minor_--The wholesome is _bonum_.\n\n _Ergo_--The wholesome is knowable, _quatenus bonum_, &c.\n\nFor every syllogism in which the conclusion is qualified, the terms\nmust be set out accordingly.[80]\n\n[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxvi. p. 48, a. 40-p. 49, a. 5.\n[Greek: a(pl\u00f4=s le/gomen ga\\r tou=to kata\\ pa/nt\u00f4n, o(/ti tou\\s me\\n\no(/rous a)/ei thete/on kata\\ ta\\s kl\u00ea/seis t\u00f4=n o)noma/t\u00f4n--ta\\s de\\\nprota/seis l\u00eapte/on kata\\ ta\\s e(ka/stou pt\u00f4/seis.] Several examples\nare given of this precept.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Ibid. I. xxxvii. p. 49, a. 6-10. Alexander remarks in\nthe Scholia (p. 183, a. 2) that the distinction between simple and\ncompound predication has already been adverted to by Aristotle in De\nInterpretatione (see p. 20, b. 35); and that it was largely treated\nby Theophrastus in his work, [Greek: Peri\\ Katapha/se\u00f4s], not\npreserved.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxxviii. p. 49, a. 11-b. 2. [Greek: phanero\\n\nou)=n o(/ti e)n toi=s e)n me/rei sullogismoi=s ou(/t\u00f4 l\u00eapte/on tou\\s\no(/rous.] Alexander explains [Greek: oi( e)n me/rei sullogismoi/]\n(Schol. p. 183, b. 32, Br.) to be those in which the predicate has a\nqualifying adjunct tacked to it.]\n\nWe are permitted, and it is often convenient, to exchange one phrase\nor term for another of equivalent signification, and also one word\nagainst any equivalent phrase. By doing this, we often **facilitate\nthe setting out of the terms. We must carefully note the different\nmeanings of the same substantive noun, according as the definite\narticle is or is not prefixed. We must not reckon it the same term,\nif it appears in one premiss with the definite article, and in the\nother without the definite article.[81] Nor is it the same\nproposition to say B is predicable of C (indefinite), and B is\npredicable of _all_ C (universal). In setting out the syllogism, it\nis not sufficient that the major premiss should be indefinite; the\nmajor premiss must be universal; and the minor premiss also, if the\nconclusion is to be universal. If the major premiss be universal,\nwhile the minor premiss is only affirmative indefinite, the\nconclusion cannot be universal, but will be no more than indefinite,\nthat is, counting as particular.[82]\n\n[Footnote 81: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxix.-xl. p. 49, b. 3-13. [Greek:\nou) tau)to\\n e)sti to\\ ei)=nai t\u00ea\\n \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n a)gatho\\n kai\\ to\\\nei)=nai t\u00ea\\n \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n to\\ a)gatho/n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 14-32. The Scholion of\nAlexander (Schol. p. 184, a. 22-40) alludes to the peculiar mode,\ncalled by Theophrastus [Greek: kata\\ pro/sl\u00eapsin], of stating the\npremisses of the syllogism: two terms only, the major and the middle,\nbeing enunciated, while the third or minor was included potentially,\nbut not enunciated. Theophrastus, however, did not recognize the\ndistinction of meaning to which Aristotle alludes in this chapter. He\nconstrued as an universal minor, what Aristotle treats as only an\nindefinite minor. The liability to mistake the Indefinite for an\nUniversal is here again adverted to.]\n\nThere is no fear of our being misled by setting out a particular case\nfor the purpose of the general demonstration; for we never make\nreference to the specialties of the particular case, but deal with it\nas the geometer deals with the diagram that he draws. He calls the\nline A B, straight, a foot long, and without breadth, but he does not\ndraw any conclusion from these assumptions. All that syllogistic\ndemonstration either requires or employs, is, terms that are related\nto each other either as whole to part or as part to whole. Without\nthis, no demonstration can be made: the exposition of the particular\ncase is intended as an appeal to the senses, for facilitating the\nmarch of the student, but is not essential to demonstration.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: Ibid. I. xli. p. 50, a. 1: [Greek: t\u00f4=| d'\ne)kti/thesthai ou(/t\u00f4 chr\u00f4/metha \u00f4(/sper kai\\ t\u00f4=| ai)stha/nesthai\nto\\n mantha/nonta le/gontes; ou) ga\\r ou(/t\u00f4s \u00f4(s a)/neu tou/t\u00f4n\nou)ch oi(=o/n t' a)podeichth\u00ea=nai, \u00f4(/sper e)x \u00f4(=n o(\nsullogismo/s.]\n\nThis chapter is a very remarkable statement of the Nominalistic\ndoctrine; perceiving or conceiving all the real specialties of a\nparticular case, but attending to, or reasoning upon, only a portion\nof them.\n\nPlato treats it as a mark of the inferior scientific value of\nGeometry, as compared with true and pure Dialectic, that the geometer\ncannot demonstrate through Ideas and Universals alone, but is\ncompelled to help himself by visible particular diagrams or\nillustrations. (Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 510-511, vii. p. 533, C.)]\n\nAristotle reminds us once more of what he had before said, that in\nthe Second and Third figures, not all varieties of conclusion are\npossible, but only some varieties; accordingly, when we are reducing\na piece of reasoning to the syllogistic form, the nature of the\nconclusion will inform us which of the three figures we must look\nfor. In the case where the question debated relates to a definition,\nand the reasoning which we are trying to reduce turns upon one part\nonly of that definition, we must take care to look for our three\nterms only in regard to that particular part, and not in regard to\nthe whole definition.[84] All the modes of the Second and Third\nfigures can be reduced to the First, by conversion of one or other of\nthe premisses; except the fourth mode (_Baroco_) of the Second, and\nthe fifth mode (_Bocardo_) of the Third, which can be proved only by\n_Reductio ad Absurdum_.[85]\n\n[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. I. xlii., xliii. p. 50, a. 5-15. I\nfollow here the explanation given by Philoponus and Julius Pacius,\nwhich M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire adopts. But the illustrative example\ngiven by Aristotle himself (the definition of _water_) does not\nconvey much instruction.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ibid. xlv. p. 50, b. 5-p. 51, b. 2.]\n\nNo syllogisms from an Hypothesis, however, are reducible to any of\nthe three figures; for they are not proved by syllogism alone: they\nrequire besides an extra-syllogistic assumption granted or understood\nbetween speaker and hearer. Suppose an hypothetical proposition\ngiven, with antecedent and consequent: you may perhaps prove or\nrefute by syllogism either the antecedent separately, or the\nconsequent separately, or both of them separately; but you cannot\ndirectly either prove or refute by syllogism the conjunction of the\ntwo asserted in the hypothetical. The speaker must ascertain\nbeforehand that this will be granted to him; otherwise he cannot\nproceed.[86] The same is true about the procedure by _Reductio ad\nAbsurdum_, which involves an hypothesis over and above the syllogism.\nIn employing such _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you prove syllogistically a\ncertain conclusion from certain premisses; but the conclusion is\nmanifestly false; therefore, one at least of the premisses from which\nit follows must be false also. But if this reasoning is to have\nforce, the hearer must know _aliunde_ that the conclusion is false;\nyour syllogism has not shown it to be false, but has shown it to be\nhypothetically true; and unless the hearer is prepared to grant the\nconclusion to be false, your purpose is not attained. Sometimes he\nwill grant it without being expressly asked, when the falsity is\nglaring: _e.g._ you prove that the diagonal of a square is\nincommensurable with the side, because if it were taken as\ncommensurable, an odd number might be shown to be equal to an even\nnumber. Few disputants will hesitate to grant that this conclusion is\nfalse, and therefore that its contradictory is true; yet this last\n(viz. that the contradictory is true) has not been proved\nsyllogistically; you must assume it by hypothesis, or depend upon the\nhearer to grant it.[87]\n\n[Footnote 86: Ibid. xliv. p. 50, a. 16-28.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Analyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 29-38. See above,\nxxiii. p. 40, a. 25.\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire remarks in the note to his translation of\nthe Analytica Priora (p. 178): \"Ce chapitre suffit \u00e0 prouver\nqu'Aristote a distingu\u00e9 tr\u00e8s-nettement les syllogismes par l'absurde,\ndes syllogismes hypoth\u00e9tiques. Cette derni\u00e8re d\u00e9nomination est tout \u00e0\nfait pour lui ce qu'elle est pour nous.\" Of these two statements, I\nthink the _latter_ is more than we can venture to affirm, considering\nthat the general survey of hypothetical syllogisms, which Aristotle\nintended to draw up, either never was really completed, or at least\nhas perished: the _former_ appears to me incorrect. Aristotle\ndecidedly reckons the _Reductio ad Impossibile_ among hypothetical\nproofs. But he understands by _Reductio ad Impossibile_ something\nrather wider than what the moderns understand by it. It now means\nonly, that you take the contradictory of the conclusion together with\none of the premisses, and by means of these two demonstrate a\nconclusion contradictory or contrary to the other premiss. But\nAristotle understood by it this, and something more besides, namely,\nwhenever, by taking the contradictory of the conclusion, together\nwith some other incontestable premiss, you demonstrate, by means of\nthe two, some new conclusion notoriously false. What I here say, is\nillustrated by the very example which he gives in this chapter. The\nincommensurability of the diagonal (with the side of the square) is\ndemonstrated by _Reductio ad Impossibile_; because if it be supposed\ncommensurable, you may demonstrate that an odd number is equal to an\neven number; a conclusion which every one will declare to be\ninadmissible, but which is not the contradictory of either of the\npremisses whereby the true proposition was demonstrated.]\n\nHere Aristotle expressly reserves for separate treatment the general\nsubject of Syllogisms from Hypothesis.[88]\n\n[Footnote 88: The expressions of Aristotle here are remarkable,\nAnalyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 39-b. 3: [Greek: polloi\\ de\\ kai\\\ne(/teroi perai/nontai e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s, ou(\\s e)piske/psasthai dei=\nkai\\ dias\u00eam\u00ea=nai kathar\u00f4=s. ti/nes me\\n ou)=n ai( diaphorai\\ tou/t\u00f4n,\nkai\\ posach\u00f4=s gi/netai to\\ e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s, u(/steron e)rou=men;\nnu=n de\\ tosou=nton \u00ea(mi=n e)/st\u00f4 phanero/n, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin\na)nalu/ein ei)s ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata tou\\s toiou/tous sullogismou/s. kai\\\ndi' \u00ea(\\n ai)ti/an, ei)r\u00ea/kamen.]\n\nSyllogisms from Hypothesis were many and various, and Aristotle\nintended to treat them in a future treatise; but all that concerns\nthe present treatise, in his opinion, is, to show that none of them\ncan be reduced to the three Figures. Among the Syllogisms from\nHypothesis, two varieties recognized by Aristotle (besides [Greek:\noi) dia\\ tou= a)duna/tou]) were [Greek: oi( kata\\ meta/l\u00eapsin] and\n[Greek: oi( kata\\ poio/t\u00eata]. The same proposition which Aristotle\nentitles [Greek: kata\\ meta/l\u00eapsin], was afterwards designated by the\nStoics [Greek: kata\\ pro/sl\u00eapsin] (Alexander ap. Schol. p. 178,\nb. 6-24).\n\nIt seems that Aristotle never realized this intended future treatise\non Hypothetical Syllogisms; at least Alexander did not know it. The\nsubject was handled more at large by Theophrastus and Eud\u00eamus after\nAristotle (Schol. p. 184, b. 45. Br.; Boethius, De Syllog.\nHypothetico, pp. 606-607); and was still farther expanded by\nChrysippus and the Stoics.\n\nCompare Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. pp. 295, 377, seq. He treats\nthe Hypothetical Syllogism as having no logical value, and commends\nAristotle for declining to develop or formulate it; while Ritter\n(Gesch. Phil. iii. p. 93), and, to a certain extent, Ueberweg (System\nder Logik, sect. 121, p. 326), consider this to be a defect in\nAristotle.]\n\nIn the last chapter of the first book of the Analytica Priora,\nAristotle returns to the point which we have already considered in\nthe treatise De Interpretatione, viz. what is really a _negative_\nproposition; and how the adverb of negation must be placed in order\nto constitute one. We must place this adverb immediately before the\ncopula and in conjunction with the copula: we must not place it after\nthe copula and in conjunction with the predicate; for, if we do so,\nthe proposition resulting will not be negative but affirmative\n([Greek: e)k metathe/se\u00f4s], by transposition, according to the\ntechnical term introduced afterwards by Theophrastus). Thus of the\nfour propositions:\n\n  1. Est bonum.          2. Non est bonum.\n  4. Non est non bonum.  3. Est non bonum.\n\nNo. 1 is affirmative; No. 3 is affirmative ([Greek: e)k\nmetathe/se\u00f4s]); Nos. 2 and 4 are negative. Wherever No. 1 is\npredicable, No. 4 will be predicable also; wherever No. 3 is\npredicable, No. 2 will be predicable also--but in neither case _vice\nvers\u00e2_.[89] Mistakes often flow from incorrectly setting out the two\ncontradictories.\n\n[Footnote 89: Analyt. Prior. I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 5, ad finem. See\nabove, Chap. IV. p. 118, seq.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nANALYTICA PRIORA II.\n\n\nThe Second Book of the Analytica Priora seems conceived with a view\nmainly to Dialectic and Sophistic, as the First Book bore more upon\nDemonstration.[1] Aristotle begins the Second Book by shortly\nrecapitulating what he had stated in the First; and then proceeds to\ntouch upon some other properties of the Syllogism. Universal\nsyllogisms (those in which the conclusion is universal) he says, have\nalways more conclusions than one; particular syllogisms sometimes,\nbut not always, have more conclusions than one. If the conclusion be\nuniversal, it may always be converted--_simply_, when it is negative,\nor _per accidens_, when it is affirmative; and its converse thus\nobtained will be proved by the same premisses. If the conclusion be\nparticular, it will be convertible simply when affirmative, and its\nconverse thus obtained will be proved by the same premisses; but it\nwill not be convertible at all when negative, so that the conclusion\nproved will be only itself singly.[2] Moreover, in the universal\nsyllogisms of the First figure (_Barbara_, _Celarent_), any of the\nparticulars comprehended under the minor term may be substituted in\nplace of the minor term as subject of the conclusion, and the proof\nwill hold good in regard to them. So, again, all or any of the\nparticulars comprehended in the middle term may be introduced as\nsubject of the conclusion in place of the minor term; and the\nconclusion will still remain true. In the Second figure, the change\nis admissible only in regard to those particulars comprehended under\nthe subject of the conclusion or minor term, and not (at least upon\nthe strength of the syllogism) in regard to those comprehended under\nthe middle term. Finally, wherever the conclusion is particular, the\nchange is admissible, though not by reason of the syllogism in regard\nto particulars comprehended under the middle term; it is not\nadmissible as regards the minor term, which is itself particular.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: This is the remark of the ancient Scholiasts. See Schol.\np. 188, a. 44, b. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 3-14.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 14-35. M. Barth\u00e9lemy St.\nHilaire, following Pacius, justly remarks (note, p. 203 of his\ntranslation) that the rule as to particulars breaks down in the cases\nof _Baroco_, _Disamis_, and _Bocardo_.\n\nOn the chapter in general he remarks (note, p. 204):--\"Cette th\u00e9orie\ndes conclusions diverses, soit patentes soit cach\u00e9es, d'un m\u00eame\nsyllogisme, est surtout utile en dialectique, dans la discussion; o\u00f9\nil faut faire la plus grande attention \u00e0 ce qu'on accorde \u00e0\nl'adversaire, soit explicitement, soit implicitement.\" This\nillustrates the observation cited in the preceding note from the\nScholiasts.]\n\nAristotle has hitherto regarded the Syllogism with a view to its\n_formal_ characteristics: he now makes an important observation which\nbears upon its _matter_. Formally speaking, **the two premisses are\nalways assumed to be true; but in any real case of syllogism (form\nand matter combined) it is possible that either one or both may be\nfalse. Now, Aristotle remarks that if both the premisses are true\n(the syllogism being correct in form), the conclusion must of\nnecessity be true; but that if either or both the premisses are\nfalse, the conclusion need not necessarily be false likewise. The\npremisses being false, the conclusion may nevertheless be true; but\nit will not be true because of or by reason of the premisses.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 5-10: [Greek: e)x\na)l\u00eath\u00f4=n me\\n ou)=n ou)k e)/sti pseu=dos sullogi/sasthai, e)k\npseud\u00f4=n d' e)/stin a)l\u00eathe/s, pl\u00ea\\n ou) dio/ti a)ll' o(/ti; tou=\nga\\r dio/ti ou)k e)/stin e)k pseud\u00f4=n sullogismo/s; di' \u00ea(\\n d'\nai)ti/an, e)n toi=s e(pome/nois lechth\u00ea/setai.]\n\nThe true conclusion is not true by reason of these false premisses,\nbut by reason of certain other premisses which are true, and which\nmay be produced to demonstrate it. Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p.\n71, b. 19.]\n\nFirst, he would prove that if the premisses be true, the conclusion\nmust be true also; but the proof that he gives does not seem more\nevident than the _probandum_ itself. Assume that if A exists, B must\nexist also: it follows from hence (he argues) that if B does not\nexist, neither can A exist; which he announces as a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_, seeing that it contradicts the fundamental supposition of\nthe existence of A.[5] Here the _probans_ is indeed equally evident\nwith the _probandum_, but not at all more evident; one who disputes\nthe latter, will dispute the former also. Nothing is gained in the\nway of proof by making either of them dependent on the other. Both of\nthem are alike self-evident; that is, if a man hesitates to admit\neither of them, you have no means of removing his scruples except by\ninviting him to try the general maxim upon as many particular cases\nas he chooses, and to see whether it does not hold good without a\nsingle exception.\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. II. ii. p. 53, b. 11-16.]\n\nIn regard to the case here put forward as illustration, Aristotle has\nan observation which shows his anxiety to maintain the characteristic\nprinciples of the Syllogism; one of which principles he had declared\nto be--That nothing less than three terms and two propositions, could\nwarrant the inferential step from premisses to conclusion. In the\npresent case he assumed, If A exists, then B must exist; giving only\none premiss as ground for the inference. This (he adds) does not\ncontravene what has been laid down before; for A in the case before\nus represents two propositions conceived in conjunction.[6] Here he\nhas given the type of hypothetical reasoning; not recognizing it as a\nvariety _per se_, nor following it out into its different forms (as\nhis successors did after him), but resolving it into the categorical\nsyllogism.[7] He however conveys very clearly the cardinal principle\nof all hypothetical inference--That if the antecedent be true, the\nconsequent must be true also, but not _vice vers\u00e2_; if the consequent\nbe false, the antecedent must be false also, but not _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\n[Footnote 6: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 16-25. [Greek: to\\\nou)=n A \u00f4(/sper e(\\n kei=tai, du/o prota/seis sull\u00eaphthei=sai.]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Aristotle, it should be remarked, uses the word [Greek:\nkat\u00eagoriko/s], not in the sense which it subsequently acquired, as\nthe antithesis of [Greek: u(pothetiko/s] in application to the\nproposition and syllogism, but in the sense of affirmative as opposed\nto [Greek: ster\u00eatiko/s].]\n\nHaving laid down the principle, that the conclusion may be true,\nthough one or both the premisses are false, Aristotle proceeds, at\ngreat length, to illustrate it in its application to each of the\nthree syllogistic figures.[8] No portion of the Analytica is traced\nout more perspicuously than the exposition of this most important\nlogical doctrine.\n\n[Footnote 8: Analyt. Prior. II. ii.-iv. p. 53, b. 26-p. 57, b. 17. At\nthe close (p. 57, a. 36-b. 17), the general doctrine is summed up.]\n\nIt is possible (he then continues, again at considerable length) to\ninvert the syllogism and to demonstrate _in a circle_. That is, you\nmay take the conclusion as premiss for a new syllogism, together with\none of the old premisses, transposing its terms; and thus you may\ndemonstrate the other premiss. You may do this successively, first\nwith the major, to demonstrate the minor; next, with the minor, to\ndemonstrate the major. Each of the premisses will thus in turn be\nmade a demonstrated conclusion; and the circle will be complete. But\nthis can be done perfectly only in _Barbara_, and when, besides, all\nthe three terms of the syllogism reciprocate with each other, or are\nco-extensive in import; so that each of the two premisses admits of\nbeing simply converted. In all other cases, the process of circular\ndemonstration, where possible at all, is more or less imperfect.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ibid. II. v.-viii. p. 57, b. 18-p. 59, a. 35.]\n\nHaving thus shown under what conditions the conclusion can be\nemployed for the demonstration of the premisses, Aristotle proceeds\nto state by what transformation it can be employed for the refutation\nof them. This he calls _converting_ the syllogism; a most\ninconvenient use of the term _convert_ ([Greek: a)ntistre/phein]),\nsince he had already assigned to that same term more than one other\nmeaning, distinct and different, in logical procedure.[10] What it\nhere means is _reversing_ the conclusion, so as to exchange it either\nfor its contrary, or for its contradictory; then employing this\nreversed proposition as a new premiss, along with one of the previous\npremisses, so as to disprove the other of the previous\npremisses--_i.e._ to prove its contrary or contradictory. The result\nwill here be different, according to the manner in which the\nconclusion is reversed; according as you exchange it for its contrary\nor its contradictory. Suppose that the syllogism demonstrated is: A\nbelongs to all B, B belongs to all C; _Ergo_, A belongs to all C\n(_Barbara_). Now, if we reverse this conclusion by taking its\n_contrary_, A belongs to no C, and if we combine this as a new premiss\nwith the major of the former syllogism, A belongs to all B, we shall\nobtain as a conclusion B belongs to no C; which is the _contrary_ of\nthe minor, in the form _Camestres_. If, on the other hand, we reverse\nthe conclusion by taking its _contradictory_, A does not belong to all\nC, and combine this with the same major, we shall have as conclusion,\nB does not belong to all C; which is the _contradictory_ of the minor,\nand in the form _Baroco_: though in the one case as in the other the\nminor is disproved. The major is _contradictorily_ disproved, whether\nit be the contrary or the contradictory of the conclusion that is\ntaken along with the minor to form the new syllogism; but still the\nform varies from _Felapton_ to _Bocardo_. Aristotle shows farther how\nthe same process applies to the other modes of the First, and to the\nmodes of the Second and Third figures.[11] The new syllogism,\nobtained by this process of reversal, is always in a different figure\nfrom the syllogism reversed. Thus syllogisms in the First figure are\nreversed by the Second and Third; those in the second, by the First\nand Third; those in the Third, by the First and Second.[12]\n\n[Footnote 10: Schol. (ad Analyt. Prior. p. 59, b. 1), p. 190, b. 20,\nBrandis. Compare the notes of M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, pp. 55,\n242.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Analyt. Prior. II. viii.-x. p. 59, b. 1-p. 61, a. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ibid. x. p. 61, a. 7-15.]\n\nOf this reversing process, one variety is what is called the\n_Reductio ad Absurdum_; in which the conclusion is reversed by taking\nits contradictory (never its contrary), and then joining this last\nwith one of the premisses, in order to prove the contradictory or\ncontrary of the other premiss.[13] The _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is\ndistinguished from the other modes of reversal by these\ncharacteristics: (1) That it takes the contradictory, and not the\ncontrary, of the conclusion; (2) That it is destined to meet the case\nwhere an opponent declines to admit the conclusion; whereas the other\ncases of reversion are only intended as confirmatory evidence towards\na person who already admits the conclusion; (3) That it does not\nappeal to or require any concession on the part of the opponent; for\nif he declines to admit the conclusion, you presume, as a matter of\ncourse, that he must adhere to the contradictory of the conclusion;\nand you therefore take this contradictory for granted (without asking\nhis concurrence) as one of the bases of a new syllogism; (4) That it\npresumes as follows:--When, by the contradictory of the conclusion\njoined with one of the premisses, you have demonstrated the opposite\nof the other premiss, the original conclusion itself is shown to be\nbeyond all impeachment on the score of form, _i.e._ beyond\nimpeachment by any one who admits the premisses. You assume to be\ntrue, for the occasion, the very proposition which you mean finally\nto prove false; your purpose in the new syllogism is, not to\ndemonstrate the original conclusion, but to prove it to be true by\ndemonstrating its contradictory to be false.[14]**\n\n[Footnote 13: Analyt. Prior. II. xi. p. 61, a. 18, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Ibid. p. 62, a. 11: [Greek: phanero\\n ou)=n o(/ti ou)\nto\\ e)nanti/on, a)lla\\ to\\ a)ntikei/menon, u(pothete/on e)n a(/pasi\ntoi=s sullogismoi=s. ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r to\\ a)nagkai=on e)/stai kai\\ to\\\na)xi/\u00f4ma e)/ndoxon. ei) ga\\r kata\\ panto\\s \u00ea)\\ kata/phasis \u00ea)\\\na)po/phasis, deichthe/ntos o(/ti ou)ch \u00ea( a)po/phasis, a)na/gk\u00ea t\u00ea\\n\nkata/phasin a)l\u00eatheu/esthai.] See Scholia, p. 190, b. 40, seq.,\nBrand.]\n\nBy the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ you can in all the three figures\ndemonstrate all the four varieties of conclusion, universal and\nparticular, affirmative and negative; with the single exception, that\nyou cannot by this method demonstrate in the First figure the\nUniversal Affirmative.[15] With this exception, every true conclusion\nadmits of being demonstrated by either of the two ways, either\ndirectly and ostensively, or by reduction to the impossible.[16]\n\n[Footnote 15: Ibid. p. 61, a. 35-p. 62, b. 10; xii. p. 62, a. 21.\nAlexander, ap. Schol. p. 191, a. 17-36, Brand.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ibid. xiv. p. 63, b. 12-21.]\n\nIn the Second and Third figures, though not in the First, it is\npossible to obtain conclusions even from two premisses which are\ncontradictory or contrary to each other; but the conclusion will, as\na matter of course, be a self-contradictory one. Thus if in the\nSecond figure you have the two premisses--All Science is good; No\nScience is good--you get the conclusion (in _Camestres_), No Science\nis Science. In opposed propositions, the same predicate must be\naffirmed and denied of the same subject in one of the three different\nforms--All and None, All and Not All, Some and None. This shows why\nsuch conclusions cannot be obtained in the First figure; for it is\nthe characteristic of that figure that the middle term must be\npredicate in one premiss, and subject in the other.[17] In dialectic\ndiscussion it will hardly be possible to get contrary or\ncontradictory premisses conceded by the adversary immediately after\neach other, because he will be sure to perceive the contradiction:\nyou must mask your purpose by asking the two questions not in\nimmediate succession, but by introducing other questions between the\ntwo, or by other indirect means as suggested in the Topica.[18]\n\n[Footnote 17: Analyt. Prior. II. xv. p. 63, b. 22-p. 64, a. 32.\nAristotle here declares _Subcontraries_ (as they were later\ncalled),--Some men are wise, Some men are not wise,--to be opposed\nonly in expression or verbally ([Greek: kata\\ t\u00ea\\n le/xin mo/non]).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Ibid. II. xv. p. 64, a. 33-37. See Topica, VIII. i. p.\n155, a. 26; Julius Pacius, p. 372, note. In the Topica, Aristotle\nsuggests modes of concealing the purpose of the questioner and\ndriving the adversary to contradict himself: [Greek: e)n de\\ t\u00f4=s\nTopikoi=s paradi/d\u00f4si metho/dous t\u00f4=n kru/pse\u00f4n di' a(\\s tou=to\ndoth\u00ea/setai] (Schol. p. 192, a. 18, Br.). Compare also Analyt. Prior.\nII. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]\n\nAristotle now passes to certain general heads of Fallacy, or general\nliabilities to Error, with which the syllogizing process is beset.\nWhat the reasoner undertakes is, to demonstrate the conclusion before\nhim, and to demonstrate it in the natural and appropriate way; that\nis, from premisses both more evident in themselves and logically\nprior to the conclusion. Whenever he fails thus to demonstrate, there\nis error of some kind; but he may err in several ways: (1) He may\nproduce a defective or informal syllogism; (2) His premisses may be\nmore unknowable than his conclusion, or equally unknowable; (3) His\npremisses, instead of being logically prior to the conclusion, may be\nlogically posterior to it.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Ibid. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 30-35: [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r ei)\no(/l\u00f4s m\u00ea\\ sullogi/zetai, kai\\ ei) di' a)gn\u00f4stote/r\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ o(moi/\u00f4s\na)gn\u00f4/st\u00f4n, kai\\ ei) dia\\ t\u00f4=n u(ste/r\u00f4n to\\ pro/teron; \u00ea( ga\\r\na)po/deixis e)k pistote/r\u00f4n te kai\\ prote/r\u00f4n e)stin.... ta\\ _me\\n\ndi' au(t\u00f4=n pe/phuke gn\u00f4ri/zesthai, ta\\ de\\ di' a)/ll\u00f4n_.]]\n\nDistinct from all these three, however, Aristotle singles out and\ndwells upon another mode of error, which he calls _Petitio\nPrincipii_. Some truths, the _principia_, are by nature knowable\nthrough or in themselves, others are knowable only through other\nthings. If you confound this distinction, and ask or assume something\nof the latter class as if it belonged to the former, you commit a\n_Petitio Principii_. You may commit it either by assuming at once\nthat which ought to be demonstrated, or by assuming, as if it were a\n_principium_, something else among those matters which in natural\npropriety would be demonstrated by means of a _principium_. Thus,\nthere is (let us suppose) a natural propriety that C shall be\ndemonstrated through A; but you, overlooking this, demonstrate B\nthrough C, and A through B. By thus inverting the legitimate order,\nyou do what is tantamount to demonstrating A through itself; for your\ndemonstration will not hold unless you assume A at the beginning, in\norder to arrive at C. This is a mistake made not unfrequently, and\nespecially by some who define parallel lines; for they give a\ndefinition which cannot be understood unless parallel lines be\npresupposed.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 33-p. 65, a. 9.\n_Petere principium_ is, in the phrase of Aristotle, not [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\na)rch\u00ea\\n ai)tei=sthai], but [Greek: to\\ e)n a)rch\u00ea=| ai)tei=sthai] or\n[Greek: to\\ e)x a)rch\u00ea=s ai)tei=sthai] (xvi. p. 64, b. 28, 34).]\n\nWhen the problem is such, that it is uncertain whether A can be\npredicated either of C or of B, if you then assume that A is\npredicable of B, you may perhaps not commit _Petitio Principii_, but\nyou certainly fail in demonstrating the problem; for no demonstration\nwill hold where the premiss is equally uncertain with the conclusion.\nBut if, besides, the case be such, that B is identical with C, that\nis, either co-extensive and reciprocally convertible with C, or\nrelated to C as genus or species,--in either of these cases you\ncommit _Petitio Principii_ by assuming that A may be predicated of\nB.[21] For seeing that B reciprocates with C, you might just as well\ndemonstrate that A is predicable of B, because it is predicable of C;\nthat is, you might demonstrate the major premiss by means of the\nminor and the conclusion, as well as you can demonstrate the\nconclusion by means of the major and the minor premiss. If you cannot\nso demonstrate the major premiss, this is not because the structure\nof the syllogism forbids it, but because the predicate of the major\npremiss is more extensive than the subject thereof. If it be\nco-extensive and convertible with the subject, we shall have a\ncircular proof of three propositions in which each may be alternately\npremiss and conclusion. The like will be the case, if the _Petitio\nPrincipii_ is in the minor premiss and not in the major. In the First\nsyllogistic figure it may be in either of the premisses; in the\nSecond figure it can only be in the minor premiss, and that only in\none mode (_Camestres_) of the figure.[22] The essence of _Petitio\nPrincipii_ consists in this, that you exhibit as true _per se_ that\nwhich is not really true _per se_.[23] You may commit this fault\neither in Demonstration, when you assume for true what is not really\ntrue, or in Dialectic, when you assume as probable and conformable to\nauthoritative opinion what is not really so.[24]**\n\n[Footnote 21: Ibid. p. 65, a. 1-10.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Ibid. p. 65, a. 10: [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis, a)d\u00ea/lou\no)/ntos o(/ti to\\ A u(pa/rchei t\u00f4=| G, o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ o(/ti t\u00f4=|\nB, ai)toi=to t\u00f4=| B u(pa/rchein to\\ A, ou(/p\u00f4 d\u00ea=lon ei) to\\ e)n\na)rch\u00ea=| ai)tei=tai, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k a)podei/knusi, d\u00ea=lon; ou) ga\\r\na)rch\u00ea\\ a)podei/xe\u00f4s to\\ o(moi/\u00f4s a)/d\u00ealon. ei) me/ntoi to\\ B pro\\s\nto\\ G ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chei \u00f4(/ste tau)to\\n ei)=nai, \u00ea)\\ d\u00ea=lon o(/ti\na)ntistre/phousin, \u00ea)\\ u(pa/rchei tha/teron thate/r\u00f4|, to\\ e)n\na)rch\u00ea=| ai)tei=tai. kai\\ ga\\r a)/n, o(/ti t\u00f4=| B to\\ A u(pa/rchei,\ndi' e)kei/n\u00f4n deiknu/oi, ei) a)ntistre/phoi. nu=n de\\ tou=to k\u00f4lu/ei,\na)ll' ou)ch o( tro/pos. ei) de\\ tou=to poioi=, to\\ ei)r\u00eame/non a)\\n\npoioi= kai\\ a)ntistre/phoi \u00f4(s dia\\ tri\u00f4=n.]\n\nThis chapter, in which Aristotle declares the nature of Petitio\nPrincipii, is obscure and difficult to follow. It has been explained\nat some length, first by Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 192, a. 35, b.\n24), afterwards by Julius Pacius (p. 376, whose explanation is\nfollowed by M. B. St. Hilaire, p. 288), and by Waitz, (I. p. 514).\nBut the translation and comment given by Mr. Poste appear to me the\nbest: \"Assuming the conclusion to be affirmative, let us examine a\nsyllogism in Barbara:--\n\n      All B is A.\n  .   All C is B.\n . .  All C is A.\n\nAnd let us first suppose that the major premiss is a Petitio\nPrincipii; _i.e._ that the proposition _All B is A_ is identical with\nthe proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because the terms B\nand C are identical. Next, let us suppose that the minor premiss is a\nPetitio Principii: _i.e._ that the proposition _All C is B_ is\nidentical with the proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because\nB and A are identical. The identity of the terms is, their\nconvertibility or their sequence ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]).\nThis however requires some limitation; for as the major is always\npredicated ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]) of the middle, and the\nmiddle of the minor, if this were enough to constitute Petitio\nPrincipii, every syllogism with a problematical premiss would be a\nPetitio Principii.\" (See the Appendix A, pp. 178-183, attached to Mr.\nPoste's edition of Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi.)\n\nCompare, about Petitio Principii, Aristot. Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162,\nb. 34, in which passage Aristotle gives to the fallacy called Petitio\nPrincipii a still larger sweep than what he assigns to it in the\nAnalytica Priora. Mr. Poste's remark is perfectly just, that\naccording to the above passage in the Analytica, every syllogism with\na problematical (_i.e._ real as opposed to verbal) premiss would be a\nPetitio Principii; that is, all real deductive reasoning, in the\nsyllogistic form, would be a Petitio Principii. To this we may add,\nthat, from the passage above referred to in the Topica, all inductive\nreasoning also (reasoning from parts to whole) would involve Petitio\nPrincipii.\n\nMr. Poste's explanation of this difficult passage brings into view\nthe original and valuable exposition made by Mr. John Stuart Mill of\nthe Functions and Logical Value of the Syllogism.--System of Logic,\nBook II. ch. iii. sect 2:--\"It must be granted, that in every\nsyllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there\nis a Petitio Principii,\" &c.\n\nPetitio Principii, if ranked among the Fallacies, can hardly be\nextended beyond the first of the five distinct varieties enumerated\nin the Topica, VIII. xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 65, a. 23-27: [Greek: to\\\nga\\r e)x a)rch\u00ea=s ti/ du/natai, ei)/r\u00eatai \u00ea(mi=n, o(/ti to\\ di'\nau(tou= deiknu/nai to\\ m\u00ea\\ di' au(tou= d\u00ea=lon.--tou=to d' e)/sti, to\\\nm\u00ea\\ deiknu/nai.]\n\nThe meaning of some lines in this chapter (p. 65, a. 17-18) is to me\nvery obscure, after all the explanations of commentators.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 65, a. 35; Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162, b. 31.]\n\nWe must be careful to note, that when Aristotle speaks of a\n_principium_ as knowable in itself, or true in itself, he does not\nmean that it is innate, or that it starts up in the mind ready made\nwithout any gradual building up or preparation. What he means is,\nthat it is not demonstrable deductively from anything else prior or\nmore knowable by nature than itself. He declares (as we shall see)\nthat _principia_ are acquired, and mainly by Induction.\n\nNext to _Petitio Principii_, Aristotle indicates another fallacious\nor erroneous procedure in dialectic debate; misconception or\nmisstatement of the real grounds on which a conclusion rests--_Non\nper Hoc_. You may impugn the thesis (set up by the respondent)\ndirectly, by proving syllogistically its contrary or contradictory;\nor you may also impugn it indirectly by _Reductio ad Absurdum_;\n_i.e._ you prove by syllogism some absurd conclusion, which you\ncontend to be necessarily true, if the thesis is admitted. Suppose\nyou impugn it in the first method, or directly, by a syllogism\ncontaining only two premisses and a conclusion: _Non per Hoc_ is\ninapplicable here, for if either premiss is disallowed, the\nconclusion is unproved; the respondent cannot meet you except by\nquestioning one or both of the premisses of your impugning\nsyllogism.[25] But if you proceed by the second method or indirectly,\n_Non per Hoc_ may become applicable; for there may then be more than\ntwo premisses, and he may, while granting that the absurd conclusion\nis correctly made out, contend that the truth or falsehood of his\nthesis is noway implicated in it. He declares (in Aristotle's phrase)\nthat the absurdity or falsehood just made out does not follow as a\nconsequence from his thesis, but from other premisses independent\nthereof; that it would stand equally proved, even though his thesis\nwere withdrawn.[26] In establishing the falsehood or absurdity you\nmust take care that it shall be one implicated with or dependent upon\nhis thesis. It is this last condition that he (the respondent)\naffirms to be wanting.[27]\n\n[Footnote 25: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 4: [Greek: o(/tan\na)naire/th\u00ea| ti deiktik\u00f4s dia\\ t\u00f4=n A, B, G], &c.; xviii. 66, a. 17:\n[Greek: \u00ea)\\ ga\\r e)k t\u00f4=n du/o prota/se\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ e)k pleio/n\u00f4n pa=s\ne)sti\\ sullogismo/s; ei) me\\n ou)=n e)k t\u00f4=n du/o, tou/t\u00f4n a)na/gk\u00ea\nt\u00ea\\n me\\n e(te/ran \u00ea)\\ kai\\ a)mphote/ras ei)=nai pseudei=s;] &c.\nWhoever would understand this difficult chapter xvii., will do well\nto study it with the notes of Julius Pacius (p. 360), and also the\nvaluable exposition of Mr. Poste, who has extracted and illustrated\nit in Appendix B. (p. 190) of the notes to his edition of the\nSophistici Elenchi. The six illustrative diagrams given by Julius\nPacius afford great help, though the two first of them appear to me\nincorrectly printed, as to the brackets connecting the different\npropositions.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 38, b. 14, p. 66, a. 2, 7:\n[Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ _para\\ tou=to_ sumbai/nein to\\ pseu=dos--tou= m\u00ea\\\n_para\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin_ ei)=nai to\\ pseu=dos--ou) _para\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin_\nsumbai/nei to\\ pseu=dos--ou)k a)\\n ei)/\u00ea _para\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin_.]\n\nInstead of the preposition [Greek: para/], Aristotle on two occasions\nemploys [Greek: dia/--ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r e)/stai _dia\\ t\u00ea\\n\nu(po/thesin_]--p. 65, b. 33, p. 66, a. 3.\n\nThe preposition [Greek: para/], with acc. case, means _on account\nof_, _owing to_, &c. See Matthi\u00e6 and K\u00fchner's Grammars, and the\npassage of Thucydides i. 141; [Greek: kai\\ e(/kastos _ou) para\\ t\u00ea\\n\ne(autou= a)me/leian_ oi)etai bla/psein, me/lein de/ tini kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4|\nu(pe\\r e(autou= ti proi+dei=n], &c., which I transcribe partly on\naccount of Dr. Arnold's note, who says about [Greek: para\\]\nhere:--\"This is exactly expressed in vulgar English, _all along of_\nhis own neglect, _i. e._ owing to his own neglect.\"]\n\n[Footnote 27: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 33: [Greek: dei= pro\\s tou\\s\ne)x a)rch\u00ea=s o(/rous suna/ptein to\\ a)du/naton; ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r e)/stai\ndia\\ t\u00ea\\n u(po/thesin.]]\n\nAristotle tells us that this was a precaution which the defender of a\nthesis was obliged often to employ in dialectic debate, in order to\nguard against abuse or misapplication of _Reductio ad Absurdum_ on\nthe part of opponents, who (it appears) sometimes took credit for\nsuccess, when they had introduced and demonstrated some absurd\nconclusion that had little or no connection with the thesis.[28] But\neven when the absurd conclusion is connected with the thesis\ncontinuously, by a series of propositions each having a common term\nwith the preceding, in either the ascending or the descending scale,\nwe have here more than three propositions, and the absurd conclusion\nmay perhaps be proved by the other premisses, without involving the\nthesis. In this case the respondent will meet you with _Non per\nHoc_:[29] he will point out that his thesis is not one of the\npremisses requisite for demonstrating your conclusion, and is\ntherefore not overthrown by the absurdity thereof. Perhaps the thesis\nmay be false, but you have not shown it to be so, since it is not\namong the premisses necessary for proving your _absurdum_. An\n_absurdum_ may sometimes admit of being demonstrated by several lines\nof premisses,[30] each involving distinct falsehood. Every false\nconclusion implies falsity in one or more syllogistic or\nprosyllogistic premisses that have preceded it, and is _owing to_ or\noccasioned by this first falsehood.[31]\n\n[Footnote 28: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, a. 38: [Greek: o(\\\npolla/kis e)n toi=s lo/gois ei)\u00f4/thamen le/gein], &c. That the\n_Reductio ad Absurdum_ was sometimes made to turn upon matters wholly\nirrelevant, we may see from the illustration cited by Aristotle, p.\n65, b. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 29: In this chapter of the Analytica, Aristotle designates\nthe present fallacy by the title, _Non per Hoc_, [Greek: ou) para\\\ntou=to--ou) para\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin sumbai/nei to\\ pseu=dos]. He makes\nexpress reference to the Topica (_i.e._ to the fifth chapter of\nSophist. Elenchi, which he regards as part of the Topica), where the\nsame fallacy is designated by a different title, _Non Causa pro\nCaus\u00e2_, [Greek: to\\ a)nai/tion \u00f4(s ai)/tion tithe/nai]. We see\nplainly that this chapter of the Anal. Priora was composed later than\nthe fifth chapter of Soph. El.; whether this is true of the two\ntreatises as wholes is not so certain. I think it probable that the\nchange of designation for the same fallacy was deliberately adopted.\nIt is an improvement to dismiss the vague term Cause.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 66, a. 11: [Greek: e)pei\\ tau)to/ ge\npseu=dos sumbai/nein dia\\ pleio/n\u00f4n u(pothe/se\u00f4n ou)de\\n i)/s\u00f4s\na)/topon, oi(=on ta\\s parall\u00ea/lous sumpi/ptein], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. xviii. p. 66, a. 16-24: [Greek: o( de\\\npseud\u00ea\\s lo/gos gi/netai para\\ to\\ pr\u00f4=ton pseu=dos], &c.]\n\nIn impugning the thesis and in extracting from your opponent the\nproper concessions to enable you to do so, you will take care to put\nthe interrogations in such form and order as will best disguise the\nfinal conclusion which you aim at establishing. If you intend to\narrive at it through preliminary syllogisms (prosyllogisms), you will\nask assent to the necessary premisses in a confused or inverted\norder, and will refrain from enunciating at once the conclusion from\nany of them. Suppose that you wish to end by showing that A may be\npredicated of F, and suppose that there must be intervening steps\nthrough B, C, D, E. You will not put the questions in this regular\norder, but will first ask him to grant that A may be predicated of B;\nnext, that D may be predicated of E; afterwards, that B may be\npredicated of C, &c. You will thus try to obtain all the concessions\nrequisite for your final conclusion, before he perceives your drift.\nIf you can carry your point by only one syllogism, and have only one\nmiddle term to get conceded, you will do well to put the middle term\nfirst in your questions. This is the best way to conceal your purpose\nfrom the respondent.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Analyt. Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 33-b. 3: [Greek:\nchr\u00ea\\ d' o(/per phila/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous,\nau)tou\\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.--ka)\\n di' e(no\\s\nme/sou gi/n\u00eatai o( sullogismo/s, a)po\\ tou= me/sou a)/rchesthai;\nma/lista ga\\r a)\\n ou(/t\u00f4 la/nthanoi to\\n a)pokrino/menon.] See the\nexplanation of Pacius, p. 385. Since the middle term does not appear\nin the conclusion, the respondent is less likely to be prepared for\nthe conclusion that you want to establish. To put the middle term\nfirst, in enunciating the Syllogism, is regarded by Aristotle as a\nperverted and embarrassing order, yet it is the received practice\namong modern logicians.]\n\nIt will be his business to see that he is not thus tripped up in the\nsyllogistic process.[33] If you ask the questions in the order above\nindicated, without enunciating your preliminary conclusions, he must\ntake care not to concede the same term twice, either as predicate, or\nas subject, or as both; for you can arrive at no conclusion unless he\ngrants you a middle term; and no term can be employed as middle,\nunless it be repeated twice. Knowing the conditions of a conclusion\nin each of the three figures, he will avoid making such concessions\nas will empower you to conclude in any one of them.[34] If the thesis\nwhich he defends is affirmative, the _elenchus_ by which you impugn\nit must be a negative; so that he will be careful not to concede the\npremisses for a negative conclusion. If his thesis be negative, your\npurpose will require you to meet him by an affirmative; accordingly\nhe must avoid granting you any sufficient premisses for an\naffirmative conclusion. He may thus make it impossible for you to\nprove syllogistically the contrary or contradictory of his thesis;\nand it is in proving this that the _elenchus_ or refutation consists.\nIf he will not grant you any affirmative proposition, nor any\nuniversal proposition, you know, by the rules previously laid down,\nthat no valid syllogism can be constructed; since nothing can be\ninferred either from two premisses both negative, or from two\npremisses both particular.[35]\n\n[Footnote 33: Analyt Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32: [Greek: pro\\s\nde\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ katasullogi/zesthai parat\u00ear\u00eate/on, o(/tan a)/neu t\u00f4=n\nsumperasma/t\u00f4n e)r\u00f4ta=| to\\n lo/gon], &c.\n\nWaitz (p. 520) explains [Greek: katasullogi/zesthai], \"disputationum\net interrogationum laqueis aliquem irretire.\" This is, I think, more\ncorrect than the distinction which M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire seeks to\ndraw, \"entre le Catasyllogisme et la R\u00e9futation,\" in the valuable\nnotes to his translation of the Analytica Priora, p. 303.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ibid. xx. p. 66, b. 4-17. The reader will observe how\ncompletely this advice given by Aristotle is shaped for the purpose\nof obtaining victory in the argument and how he leaves out of\nconsideration both the truth of what the opponent asks to be\nconceded, and the belief entertained by the defendant. This is\nexactly the procedure which he himself makes a ground of contemptuous\nreproach against the Sophists.]\n\nWe have already seen that error may arise by wrong enunciation or\narrangement of the terms of a syllogism, that is, defects in its\nform; but sometimes also, even when the form is correct, error may\narise from wrong belief as to the matters affirmed or denied.[36]\nThus the same predicate may belong, immediately and essentially,\nalike to several distinct subjects; but you may believe (what is the\ntruth) that it belongs to one of them, and you may at the same time\nbelieve (erroneously) that it does not belong to another. Suppose\nthat A is predicable essentially both of B and C, and that A, B, and\nC, are all predicable essentially of D. You may know that A is\npredicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all D; but you may\nat the same time believe (erroneously) that A is not predicable of\nany C, and that C is predicable of all D. Under this state of\nknowledge and belief, you may construct two valid syllogisms; the\nfirst (in _Barbara_, with B for its middle term) proving that A\nbelongs to _all_ D; the second (in _Celarent_, with C for its middle\nterm) proving that A belongs to _no_ D. The case will be the same,\neven if all the terms taken belong to the same ascending or\ndescending logical series. Here, then, you _know_ one proposition;\nyet you _believe_ the proposition contrary to it.[37] How can such a\nmental condition be explained? It would, indeed, be an impossibility,\nif the middle term of the two syllogisms were the same, and if the\npremisses of the one syllogism thus contradicted directly and in\nterms, the premisses of the other: should that happen, you cannot\nknow one side of the alternative and believe the other. But if the\nmiddle term be different, so that the contradiction between the\npremisses of the one syllogism and those of the other, is not direct,\nthere is no impossibility. Thus, you know that A is predicable of all\nB, and B of all D; while you believe at the same time that A is\npredicable of _no_ C, and C of _all_ D; the middle term being in one\nsyllogism B, in the other, C.[38] This last form of error is\nanalogous to what often occurs in respect to our knowledge of\nparticulars. You know that A belongs to all B, and B to all C; you\nknow, therefore, that A belongs to all C. Yet you may perhaps be\nignorant of the existence of C. Suppose A to denote equal to two\nright angles; B, to be the triangle generally; C, a particular\nvisible triangle. You know A B the universal proposition; yet you may\nat the same time believe that C does not exist; and thus it may\nhappen that you know, and do not know, the same thing at the same\ntime. For, in truth, the knowledge, that every triangle has its three\nangles equal to two right angles, is not (as a mental fact) simple\nand absolute, but has two distinct aspects; one as concerns the\nuniversal, the other as concerns the several particulars. Now,\nassuming the case above imagined, you possess the knowledge in the\nfirst of these two aspects, but not in the second; so that the\napparent contrariety between knowledge and no knowledge is not\nreal.[39] And in this sense the doctrine of Plato in the Menon is\npartially true--that learning is reminiscence. We can never know\nbeforehand particular cases _per se_; but in proportion as we extend\nour induction to each case **successively, we, as it were, recognize\nthat, which we knew beforehand as a general truth, to be realized in\neach. Thus when we ascertain the given figure before us to be a\ntriangle, we know immediately that its three angles are equal to two\nright angles.[40]\n\n[Footnote 36: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 18: [Greek:\nsumbai/nei d' e)ni/ote, katha/per e)n t\u00ea=| the/sei t\u00f4=n o(/r\u00f4n\na)pat\u00f4/metha, kai\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n u(po/l\u00eapsin gi/nesthai t\u00ea\\n a)pa/t\u00ean.]\n\nThe vague and general way in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek:\nu(po/l\u00eapsis], seems to be best rendered by our word _belief_. See\nTrendelenburg ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, p. 469; Biese, Philos. des\nAristot. i. p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 33: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste o(/ p\u00f4s\ne)pi/statai, tou=to o(/l\u00f4s a)xioi= m\u00ea\\ u(polamba/nein; o(/per\na)du/naton.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-8.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 19: [Greek: ou(/t\u00f4\nme\\n ou)=n \u00f4(s t\u00ea=| katho/lou ou)=de to G o(/ti du/o o)rthai/, \u00f4(s\nde\\ t\u00ea=| kath' e(/kaston ou)k oi)=den, \u00f4(/st' ou)ch e(/xei ta\\s\ne)nanti/as] (sc. [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/mos]).]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: ou)damou= ga\\r sumbai/nei\nproepi/stasthai to\\ kath' e(/kaston, a)ll' a(/ma t\u00ea=| e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=|\nlamba/nein t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n kata\\ me/ros e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean _\u00f4(/sper\na)nagn\u00f4ri/zontas_], &c. Cf. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9, seq.;\nPlato, Menon, pp. 81-82.]\n\nWe thus, by help of the universal, acquire a theoretical knowledge of\nparticulars, but we do not know them by the special observation\nproperly belonging to each particular case: so that we may err in\nrespect to them without any positive contrariety between our\ncognition and our error; since what we know is the universal, while\nwhat we err in is the particular. We may even know that A is\npredicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all C; and yet we\nmay believe that A is not predicable of C. We may know that every\nmule is barren, and that the animal before us is a mule, yet still we\nmay believe her to be in foal; for perhaps we may never have combined\nin our minds the particular case along with the universal\nproposition.[41] _A fortiori_, therefore, we may make the like\nmistake, if we know the universal only, and do not know the\nparticular. And this is perfectly possible. For take any one of the\nvisible particular instances, even one which we have already\ninspected, so soon as it is out of sight we do not know it by actual\nand present cognition; we only know it, partly from the remembrance\nof past special inspection, partly from the universal under which it\nfalls.[42] We may know in one, or other, or all, of these three\ndistinct ways: either by the universal; or specially (as remembered):\nor by combination of both--actual and present cognition, that is, by\nthe application of a foreknown generality to a case submitted to our\nsenses. And as we may know in each of these three ways, so we may\nalso err or be deceived in each of the same three ways.[43] It is\ntherefore quite possible that we may know, and that we may err or be\ndeceived about the same thing, and that, too, without any\ncontrariety. This is what happens when we know both the two premisses\nof the syllogism, but have never reflected on them before, nor\nbrought them into conjunction in our minds. When we believe that the\nmule before us is in foal, we are destitute of the actual knowledge;\nyet our erroneous belief is not for that reason contrary to\nknowledge; for an erroneous belief, contrary to the universal\nproposition, must be represented by a counter-syllogism.[44]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 36: [Greek: ou) ga\\r\ne)pi/statai o(/ti to\\ A t\u00f4=| G, _m\u00ea\\ sunthe\u00f4r\u00f4=n_ to\\ kath'\ne(ka/teron.]]\n\n[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 39: [Greek: ou)de\\n\nga\\r t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n e)/x\u00f4 t\u00ea=s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s geno/menon i)/smen,\nou)/d' a)\\n \u00ea)|sth\u00eame/noi tugcha/n\u00f4men, ei) m\u00ea\\ \u00f4(s t\u00f4=| katho/lou\nkai\\ t\u00f4=| e)/chein t\u00ea\\n oi)kei/an e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean, a)ll' _ou)ch \u00f4(s t\u00f4=|\ne)nergei=n_.]\n\nComplete cognition ([Greek: to\\ e)nergei=n], according to the view\nhere set forth) consists of one mental act corresponding to the major\npremiss; another corresponding to the minor; and a third including\nboth the two in conscious juxta-position. The third implies both the\nfirst and the second; but the first and the second do not necessarily\nimply the third, nor does either of them imply the other; though a\nperson cognizant of the first is _in a certain way, and to a certain\nextent_, cognizant of _all_ the particulars to which the second\napplies. Thus the person who knows Ontology (the most universal of\nall sciences, [Greek: tou= o)/ntos \u00ea(=| o)/n]), knows _in a certain\nway_ all _scibilia_. Metaphys. A., p. 982, a. 21: [Greek: tou/t\u00f4n de\\\nto\\ me\\n pa/nta e)pi/stasthai t\u00f4=| ma/lista e)/chonti t\u00ea\\n katho/lou\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean a)nagkai=on u(pa/rchein; ou(/tos ga\\r _oi)=de/ p\u00f4s_\npa/nta ta\\ u(pokei/mena.] Ib. a. 8: [Greek: u(polamba/nomen d\u00ea\\\npr\u00f4=ton me\\n e)pi/stasthai pa/nta to\\n sopho\\n \u00f4(s _e)nde/chetai, m\u00ea\\\nkath' e(/kaston e)/chonta e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean au)t\u00f4=n_.] See the Scholia of\nAlexander on these passages, pp. 525, 526, Brandis; also Aristot.\nAnalyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 25; Physica, VII. p. 247, a. 5.\nBonitz observes justly (Comm. **ad Metaphys. p. 41) as to the doctrine\nof Aristotle: \"Scientia et ars versatur in notionibus universalibus,\nsolutis ac liberis \u00e0 conceptu singularum rerum; ideoque, _etsi orta\nest \u00e0 principio et experienti\u00e2_, tradi tamen etiam iis potest qui\ncareant experienti\u00e2.\"]\n\n[Footnote 43: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 3: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r\ne)pi/stasthai le/getai trich\u00f4=s, \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s t\u00ea=| katho/lou, \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s t\u00ea=|\noi)kei/a|, \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s t\u00f4=| e)nergei=n; \u00f4(/ste kai\\ to\\ \u00ea)pat\u00ea=sthai\ntosautach\u00f4=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: ou)de\\n ou)=n k\u00f4lu/ei kai\\\nei)de/nai kai\\ \u00ea)pat\u00ea=sthai peri\\ au)to/, pl\u00ea\\n ou)k e)nanti/\u00f4s.\no(/per sumbai/nei kai\\ t\u00f4=| kath' e(kate/ran ei)do/ti t\u00ea\\n pro/tasin\nkai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)peskemme/n\u00f4| pro/teron. u(polamba/n\u00f4n ga\\r ku/ein t\u00ea\\n\n\u00ea(mi/onon ou)k e)/chei t\u00ea\\n kata\\ to\\ e)nergei=n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean, ou)d'\nau)= dia\\ t\u00ea\\n u(po/l\u00eapsin e)nanti/an a)pa/t\u00ean t\u00ea=| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea|;\nsullogismo\\s ga\\r \u00ea( e)nanti/a a)pa/t\u00ea t\u00ea=| katho/lou.] About\nerroneous belief, where a man believes the contrary of a true\nconclusion, adopting a counter-syllogism, compare Analyt. Post. I.\nxvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia kata\\ dia/thesin].]\n\nIt is impossible, however, for a man to believe that one contrary is\npredicable of its contrary, or that one contrary is identical with\nits contrary, essentially and as an universal proposition; though he\nmay believe that it is so by accident (_i.e._ in some particular\ncase, by reason of the peculiarities of that case). In various ways\nthis last is possible; but this we reserve for fuller\nexamination.[45]\n\n[Footnote 45: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 23: [Greek: a)ll'\ni)/s\u00f4s e)kei=no pseu=dos, to\\ u(polabei=n tina\\ kak\u00f4=| ei)=nai to\\\na)gath\u00f4=| ei)=nai, ei) m\u00ea\\ kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s; pollach\u00f4=s ga\\r\ne)gch\u00f4rei= tou=th' u(polamba/nein. e)piskepte/on de\\ tou=to\nbe/ltion.] This distinction is illustrated by what we read in Plato,\nRepublic, v. pp. 478-479. The impossibility of believing that one\ncontrary is identical with its contrary, is maintained by Sokrates in\nPlato, The\u00e6tetus, p. 190, B-D, as a part of the long discussion\nrespecting [Greek: pseud\u00ea\\s do/xa]: either there is no such thing as\n[Greek: pseud\u00ea\\s do/xa], or a man may know, and not know, the same\nthing, ibid. p. 196 C. Aristotle has here tried to show in what sense\nthis last-mentioned case is possible.]\n\nWhenever (Aristotle next goes on to say) the extremes of a syllogism\nreciprocate or are co-extensive with each other (_i.e._ when the\nconclusion being affirmative is convertible simply), the middle term\nmust reciprocate or be co-extensive with both.[46] If there be four\nterms (A, B, C, D), such that A reciprocates with B, and C with D,\nand if either A or C must necessarily be predicable of every subject;\nthen it follows that either B or D must necessarily also be\npredicable of every subject. Again, if either A or B must necessarily\nbe predicable of every subject, but never both predicable of the same\nat once; and if, either C or D must be predicable of every subject,\nbut never both predicable of the same at once; then, if A and C\nreciprocate, B and D will also reciprocate.[47] When A is predicable\nof all B and all C, but of no other subject besides, and when B is\npredicable of all C, then A and B must reciprocate with each other,\nor be co-extensive with each other; that is, B may be predicated of\nevery subject of which A can be predicated, though B cannot be\npredicated of A itself.[48] Again, when A and B are predicable of all\nC, and when C reciprocates with B, then A must also be predicable of\nall B.[49]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 67, b. 27, seq. In this chapter\nAristotle introduces us to affirmative universal propositions\nconvertible _simpliciter_; that is, in which the predicate must be\nunderstood to be distributed as well as the subject. Here, then, the\nquantity of the predicate is determined in thought. This is (as\nJulius Pacius remarks, p. 371) in order to lay down principles for\nthe resolution of Induction into Syllogism, which is to be explained\nin the next chapter. In these peculiar propositions, the reason urged\nby Sir W. Hamilton for his favourite precept of verbally indicating\nthe quantity of the predicate, is well founded as a fact: though _he_\nsays that in _all_ propositions the quantity of the predicate is\nunderstood in thought, which I hold to be incorrect.\n\nWe may remark that this recognition by Aristotle of a class of\nuniversal affirmative propositions in which predicate and subject\nreciprocate, contrived in order to force Induction into the\nsyllogistic framework, is at variance with his general view both of\nreciprocating propositions and of Induction. He tells us (Analyt.\nPost. I. iii. p. 73, a. 18) that such reciprocating propositions are\nvery rare, which would not be true if they are taken to represent\nevery Induction; and he forbids us emphatically to annex the mark of\nuniversality to the predicate; which he has no right to do, if he\ncalls upon us to reason on the predicate as distributed (Analyt.\nPrior. I. xxvii., p. 43, b. 17; De Interpret. p. 17, b. 14).]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 2-15.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. a. 16-21. [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n au)tou= tou= A]. Waitz\nexplains these words in his note (p. 531): yet I do not clearly make\nthem out; and Alexander of Aphrodisias declared them to assert what\nwas erroneous ([Greek: e)spha/lthai le/gei], Schol. p. 194, a. 40,\nBrandis).]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 21-25.]\n\nLastly, suppose two pairs of opposites, A and B, C and D; let A be\nmore eligible than B, and D more eligible than C. Then, if A C is\nmore eligible than B D, A will also be more eligible than D. For A is\nas much worthy of pursuit as B is worthy of avoidance, they being two\nopposites; the like also respecting C and D. If then A and D are\nequally worthy of pursuit, B and C are equally worthy of avoidance;\nfor each is equal to each. Accordingly the two together, A C, will be\nequal to the two together, B D. But this would be contrary to the\nsupposition; since we assumed A to be more eligible than B, and D to\nbe more eligible than C. It will be seen that on this supposition A\nis more worthy of pursuit than D, and that C is less worthy of\navoidance than B; the greater good and the lesser evil being more\neligible than the lesser good and the greater evil. Now apply this to\na particular case of a lover, so far forth as lover. Let A represent\nhis possession of those qualities which inspire reciprocity of love\ntowards him in the person beloved; B, the absence of those qualities;\nD, the attainment of actual sexual enjoyment; C, the non-attainment\nthereof. In this state of circumstances, it is evident that A is more\neligible or worthy of preference than D. The being loved is a greater\nobject of desire to the lover _qua_ lover than sexual gratification;\nit is the real end or purpose to which love aspires; and sexual\ngratification is either not at all the purpose, or at best only\nsubordinate and accessory. The like is the case with our other\nappetites and pursuits.[50]\n\n[Footnote 50: Analyt. Prior. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 25-b. 17. Aristotle\nmay be right in the conclusion which he here emphatically asserts;\nbut I am surprised that he should consider it to be proved by the\nreasoning that precedes.\n\nIt is probable that Aristotle here understood the object of [Greek:\ne)/r\u00f4s] (as it is conceived through most part of the Symposion of\nPlato) to be a beautiful youth: (see Plato, Sympos. pp. 218-222; also\nXenophon, Sympos. c. viii., Hiero, c. xi. 11, Memorab. I. ii. 29,\n30). Yet this we must say--what the two women said when they informed\nSim\u00e6tha of the faithlessness of Delphis (Theokrit. Id. ii.\n149)--[Greek: K\u00ea)=|pe/ moi a)/lla te polla/, kai\\ \u00f4(s a)/ra De/lphis\ne)/ratai;\nK\u00ea)/|te min au)=te gunaiko\\s e)/chei po/thos, ei)/te kai\\ a)ndro/s,\nOu)k e)/phat' a)treke\\s i)/dmen.]]\n\nSuch is the relation of the terms of a syllogism in regard to\nreciprocation and antithesis. Let it next be understood that the\ncanons hitherto laid down belong not merely to demonstrative and\ndialectic syllogisms, but to rhetorical and other syllogisms also;\nall of which must be constructed in one or other of the three\nfigures. In fact, every case of belief on evidence, whatever be the\nmethod followed, must be tested by these same canons. We believe\neverything either through Syllogism or upon Induction.[51]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\\r\npisteu/omen \u00ea)\\ dia\\ sullogismou= \u00ea)\\ e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s.]]\n\nThough Aristotle might seem, even here, to have emphatically\ncontrasted Syllogism with Induction as a ground of belief, he\nproceeds forthwith to indicate a peculiar form of Syllogism which may\nbe constructed out of Induction. Induction, and the Syllogism from or\nout of Induction (he says) is a process in which we invert the order\nof the terms. Instead of concluding from the major through the middle\nto the minor (_i.e._ concluding that the major is predicable of the\nminor), we now begin from the minor and conclude from thence through\nthe middle to the major (_i.e._ we conclude that the major is\npredicable of the middle).[52] In Syllogism as hitherto described, we\nconcluded that A the major was predicable of C the minor, through the\nmiddle B; in the Syllogism from Induction we begin by affirming that\nA the major is predicable of C the minor; next, we affirm that B the\nmiddle is also predicable of C the minor. The two premisses, standing\nthus, correspond to the Third figure of the Syllogism (as explained\nin the preceding pages) and would not therefore by themselves justify\nanything more than a _particular_ affirmative conclusion. But we\nreinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption:--That the\nminor C is co-extensive with the middle B, and comprises the entire\naggregate of individuals of which B is the universal or class-term.\nBy reason of this assumption the minor proposition becomes\nconvertible simply, and we are enabled to infer (according to the\nlast preceding chapter) an universal affirmative conclusion, that the\nmajor term A is predicable of the middle term B. Thus, let A (the\nmajor term) mean the class-term, long-lived; let B (the middle term)\nmean the class-term, bile-less, or the having no bile; let C (the\nminor term) mean the individual animals--man, horse, mule, &c.,\ncoming under the class-term B, bile-less.[53] We are supposed to\nknow, or to have ascertained, that A may be predicated of all C;\n(_i.e._ that all men, horses, mules, &c., are long-lived); we farther\nknow that B is predicable of all C (_i.e._ that men, horses, mules,\n&c., belong to the class bile-less). Here, then, we have two\npremisses in the Third syllogistic figure, which in themselves would\nwarrant us in drawing the particular affirmative conclusion, that A\nis predicable of _some_ B, but no more. Accordingly, Aristotle\ndirects us to supplement these premisses[54] by the extraneous\nassumption or postulate, that C the minor comprises all the\nindividual animals that are bile-less, or all those that correspond\nto the class-term B; in other words, the assumption, that B the\nmiddle does not denote any more individuals than those which are\ncovered by C the minor--that B the middle does not stretch beyond or\noverpass C the minor.[55] Having the two premisses, and this\npostulate besides, we acquire the right to conclude that A is\npredicable of _all_ B. But we could not draw that conclusion from the\npremisses alone, or without the postulate which declares B and C to\nbe co-extensive. The conclusion, then, becomes a particular\nexemplification of the general doctrine laid down in the last\nchapter, respecting the reciprocation of extremes and the\nconsequences thereof. We thus see that this very peculiar Syllogism\nfrom Induction is (as indeed Aristotle himself remarks) the opposite\nor antithesis of a genuine Syllogism. It has no proper middle term;\nthe conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition,\nthe characteristic feature of which it is to be _immediate_, or not\nto be demonstrated through a middle term. Aristotle adds that the\ngenuine Syllogism, which demonstrates through a middle term, is by\nnature prior and more effective as to cognition; but that the\nSyllogism from Induction is _to us_ plainer and clearer.[56]\n\n[Footnote 52: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 15: [Greek:\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ me\\n ou)=n e)sti\\ kai\\ o( e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s sullogismo\\s to\\\ndia\\ tou= e(te/rou tha/teron a)/kron t\u00f4=| me/s\u00f4| sullogi/sasthai;\noi(=on ei) t\u00f4=n AG me/son to\\ B, dia\\ tou= G dei=xai to\\ A t\u00f4=| B\nu(pa/rchon; ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r poiou/metha ta\\s e)pag\u00f4ga/s.]\n\nWaitz in his note (p. 532) says: \"Fit Inductio, cum per minorem\nterminum demonstratur _medium pr\u00e6dicari de majore_.\" This is an\nerroneous explanation. It should have been: \"demonstratur _majorem\npr\u00e6dicari de medio_.\" Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. 68, b. 32: [Greek:\nkai\\ tro/pon tina\\ a)ntikei=tai \u00ea( e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=| sullogism\u00f4=|; o(\nme\\n ga\\r dia\\ tou= me/sou to\\ a)/kron t\u00f4=| tri/t\u00f4| dei/knusin, \u00ea(\nde\\ dia\\ tou= tri/tou to\\ a)/kron t\u00f4=| me/s\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 18: [Greek: oi(=on e)/st\u00f4\nto\\ A makro/bion, to\\ d' e)ph' \u00f4(=| B, to\\ chol\u00ea\\n m\u00ea\\ e)/chon, e)ph'\n\u00f4(=| de\\ G, to\\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\\ni(/ppos kai\\ \u00ea(mi/onos. t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ G o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A; pa=n ga\\r\nto\\ a)/cholon makro/bion; a)lla\\ kai\\ to\\ B, to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/chein\nchol\u00ea/n, panti\\ u(pa/rchei t\u00f4=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\\ G\nt\u00f4=| B kai\\ m\u00ea\\ u(pertei/nei to\\ me/son, a)na/gk\u00ea to\\ A t\u00f4=| B\nu(pa/rchein.]\n\nI have transcribed this Greek text as it stands in the editions of\nBuhle, Bekker, Waitz, and F. Didot. Yet, notwithstanding these high\nauthorities, I venture to contend that it is not wholly correct; that\nthe word [Greek: _makro/bion_], which I have emphasized, is neither\nconsistent with the context, nor suitable for the point which\nAristotle is illustrating. Instead of [Greek: _makro/bion_], we ought\nin that place to read [Greek: a)/cholon]; and I have given the sense\nof the passage in my English text as if it did stand [Greek:\na)/cholon] in that place.\n\nI proceed to justify this change. If we turn back to the edition by\nJulius Pacius (1584, p. 377), we find the text given as follows after\nthe word [Greek: \u00ea(mi/onos] (down to that word the text is the same):\n[Greek: t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ G o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A; pa=n ga\\r to\\ G\nmakro/bion; a)lla\\ kai\\ to\\ B, to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/chon chol\u00ea/n, panti\\\nu(pa/rchei t\u00f4=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\\ G t\u00f4=| B, kai\\ m\u00ea\\\nu(pertei/nei to\\ me/son, a)na/gk\u00ea to\\ A t\u00f4=| B u(pa/rchein.] Earlier\nthan Pacius, the edition of Erasmus (Basil. 1550) has the same text\nin this chapter.\n\nHere it will be seen that in place of the words given in Waitz's\ntext, [Greek: pa=n ga\\r to\\ _a)/cholon_ makro/bion], Pacius gives\n[Greek: pa=n ga\\r _to\\ G_ makro/bion]: annexing however to the letter\n[Greek: G] an asterisk referring to the margin, where we find the\nword [Greek: a)/cholon] inserted in small letters, seemingly as a\nvarious reading not approved by Pacius. And M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire\nhas accommodated his French translation (p. 328) to the text of\nPacius: \"Donc A est \u00e0 C tout entier, car tout C est long\u00e8ve.\"\nBoethius in his Latin translation (p. 519) recognizes as his original\n[Greek: pa=n ga\\r to\\ a)/cholon makro/bion], but he alters the text\nin the words immediately preceding:--\"Ergo _toti B_ (instead of _toti\nC_) inest A, omne enim quod sine cholera est, long\u00e6vum,\" &c. (p.\n519). The edition of Aldus (Venet. 1495) has the text conformable to\nthe Latin of Boethius: [Greek: t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ B o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A;\npa=n ga\\r to\\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Three distinct Latin\ntranslations of the 16th century are adapted to the same text, viz.,\nthat of Vives and Valentinus (Basil. 1542); that published by the\nJunta (Venet. 1552); and that of Cyriacus (Basil. 1563). Lastly, the\ntwo Greek editions of Sylburg (1587) and Casaubon (Lugduni 1590),\nhave the same text also: [Greek: t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ B o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A;\npa=n ga\\r [to\\ G] to\\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Casaubon prints in\nbrackets the words [Greek: [to\\ G]] before [Greek: to\\ a)/cholon].\n\nNow it appears to me that the text of Bekker and Waitz (though Waitz\ngives it without any comment or explanation) is erroneous; neither\nconsisting with itself, nor conforming to the general view enunciated\nby Aristotle of the Syllogism from Induction. I have cited two\ndistinct versions, each different from this text, as given by the\nearliest editors; in both the confusion appears to have been felt,\nand an attempt made to avoid it, though not successfully.\n\nAristotle's view of the Syllogism from Induction is very clearly\nexplained by M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire in the instructive notes of\nhis translation, pp. 326-328; also in his Preface, p.\nlvii.:--\"L'induction n'est au fond qu'un syllogisme dont le mineur et\nle moyen sont d'extension \u00e9gale. Du reste, il n'est qu'une seule\nmani\u00e8re dont le moyen et le mineur puissent \u00eatre d'\u00e9gale extension;\nc'est que le mineur se compose de toutes les parties dont le moyen\nrepr\u00e9sente la totalit\u00e9. D'une part, tous les individus: de l'autre,\nl'esp\u00e8ce totale qu'ils forment. L'intelligence fait aussit\u00f4t\n\u00e9quation entre les deux termes \u00e9gaux.\"\n\nAccording to the Aristotelian text, as given both by Pacius and the\nothers, A, the major term, represents _long\u00e6vum_ (long-lived, the\nclass-term or total); B, the middle term, represents _vacans bile_\n(bile-less, the class-term or total); C, the minor term, represents\nthe aggregate individuals of the class _long\u00e6vum_, man, horse, mule,\n&c.\n\nJulius Pacius draws out the Inductive Syllogism, thus:--\n\n  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est long\u00e6vus.\n  2. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., vacat bile.\n       Ergo:\n  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est long\u00e6vum.\n\nConvertible into a Syllogism in Barbara:--\n\n  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est long\u00e6vus.\n  2. Quicquid vacat bile, est homo, equus, asinus, &c.\n       Ergo:\n  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est long\u00e6vum.\n\nHere the force of the proof (or the possibility, in this exceptional\ncase, of converting a syllogism in the Third figure into another in\n_Barbara_ of the First figure) depends upon the equation or\nco-extensiveness (not enunciated in the premisses, but assumed in\naddition to the premisses) of the minor term C with the middle term\nB. But I contend that this is _not_ the condition peremptorily\nrequired, or sufficient for proof, if we suppose C the minor term to\nrepresent _omne long\u00e6vum_. We must understand C the minor term to\nrepresent _omne vacans bile_, or _quicquid vacat bile_: and unless we\nunderstand this, the proof fails. In other words, _homo, equus,\nasinus, &c._ (the aggregate of individuals), must be co-extensive\nwith the class-term bile-less or _vacans bile_: but they need not be\nco-extensive with the class-term long-lived or _long\u00e6vum_. In the\nfinal conclusion, the subject _vacans bile_ is distributed; but the\npredicate _long\u00e6vum_ is not distributed; this latter may include,\nbesides all bile-less animals, any number of other animals, without\nimpeachment of the syllogistic proof.\n\nSuch being the case, I think that there is a mistake in the text as\ngiven by all the editors, from Pacius down to Bekker and Waitz. What\nthey give, in setting out the terms of the Aristotelian Syllogism\nfrom Induction, is: [Greek: e)/st\u00f4 to\\ A makro/bion, to\\ d' e)ph'\n\u00f4(=| B, to\\ chol\u00ean m\u00ea\\ e)/chon, e)ph' \u00f4(=| de\\ G, _to\\ kath'\ne(/kaston makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\ i(/ppos kai\\\n\u00ea(mi/onos.] Instead of which the text ought to run, [Greek: e)ph'\n\u00f4(=| de\\ G, _to\\ kath' e(/kaston a)/cholon_, oi(=on a)/nthr. k. i(/p.\nk. \u00ea(mi/]. That these last words were the original text, is seen by\nthe words immediately following: [Greek: t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ G o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei\nto\\ A. _pa=n ga\\r to\\ a)/cholon makro/bion_]. For the reason thus\nassigned (in the particle [Greek: ga/r]) is irrelevant and unmeaning\nif [Greek: G] designates [Greek: to\\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_ ],\nwhile it is pertinent and even indispensable if [Greek: G] designates\n[Greek: to\\ kath' e(/kaston _a)/cholon_]. Pacius (or those whose\nguidance he followed in his text) appears to have perceived the\nincongruity of the reason conveyed in the words [Greek: pa=n ga\\r to\\\na)/cholon makro/bion]; for he gives, instead of these words, [Greek:\npa=n ga\\r _to\\ G_ makro/bion]. In this version the reason is indeed\nno longer incongruous, but simply useless and unnecessary; for when\nwe are told that A designates the class _long\u00e6vum_, and that [Greek:\nG] designates the individual _long\u00e6va_, we surely require no reason\nfrom without to satisfy us that A is predicable of all [Greek: G].\nThe text, as translated by Boethius and others, escapes that\nparticular incongruity, though in another way, but it introduces a\nversion inadmissible on other grounds. Instead of [Greek: t\u00f4=| _d\u00ea\\\nG_ o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A, pa=n ga\\r to\\ a)/cholon makro/bion],\nBoethius has [Greek: t\u00f4=| _d\u00ea\\ B_ o(/l\u00f4| u(pa/rchei to\\ A, pa=n ga\\r\nto\\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. This cannot be accepted, because it\nenunciates the conclusion of the syllogism as if it were one of the\npremisses. We must remember that the conclusion of the Aristotelian\nSyllogism from Induction is, that A is predicable of B, one of the\npremisses to prove it being that A is predicable of the minor term C.\nBut obviously we cannot admit as one of the premisses the proposition\nthat A may be predicated of B, since this proposition would then be\nused as premiss to prove itself as conclusion.\n\nIf we examine the Aristotelian Inductive Syllogism which is intended\nto conduct us to the final _probandum_, we shall see that the terms\nof it are incorrectly set out by Bekker and Waitz, when they give the\nminor term [Greek: G] as designating [Greek: to\\ kath' e(/kaston\nmakro/bion]. This last is not one of the three terms, nor has it any\nplace in the syllogism. The three terms are:\n\n1. A--major--the class-term or class [Greek: makro/bion]--_long\u00e6vum_.\n2. B--middle--the class term or class [Greek: a)/cholon]--bile-less.\n3. C--minor--the individual bile-less animals, man, horse, &c.\n\nThere is no term in the syllogism corresponding to the individual\n_long\u00e6va_ or long-lived animals; this last (I repeat) has no place in\nthe reasoning. We are noway concerned with the totality of long-lived\nanimals; all that the syllogism undertakes to prove is, that in and\namong that totality all bile-less animals are included; whether there\nare or are not other long-lived animals besides the bile-less, the\nsyllogism does not pretend to determine. The equation or\nco-extensiveness required (as described by M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire\nin his note) is not between the individual long-lived animals and the\nclass, bile-less animals (middle term), but between the aggregate of\nindividual animals known to be bile-less and the class, bile-less\nanimals. The real minor term, therefore, is (not the individual\n_long-lived_ animals, but) the individual _bile-less_ animals. The\ntwo premisses of the Inductive Syllogism will stand thus:--\n\n Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are long-lived (major).\n Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are bile-less (minor).\n\nAnd, inasmuch as the subject of the minor proposition is co-extensive\nwith the predicate (which, if quantified according to Hamilton's\nphraseology, would be, _All_ bile-less animals), so that the\nproposition admits of being converted simply,--the middle term will\nbecome the subject of the conclusion, All bileless animals are\nlong-lived.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=\nde\\ noei=n to\\ G to\\ e)x a(pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;\n\u00ea( ga\\r e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ dia\\ pa/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. II. **xxiii. p. 68, p. 23: [Greek: ei)\nou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\\ G t\u00f4=| B, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ u(pertei/nei to\\ me/son,\na)na/gk\u00ea to\\ A t\u00f4=| B u(pa/rchein.]\n\nJulius Pacius translates this: \"Si igitur convertatur [Greek: to\\ G]\ncum B, nec medium excedat, necesse est [Greek: to\\ A t\u00f4=| B] inesse.\"\nThese Latin words include the same grammatical ambiguity as is found\nin the Greek original: _medium_, like [Greek: to\\ me/son], may be\neither an accusative case governed by _excedat_, or a nominative case\npreceding _excedat_. The same may be said of the other Latin\ntranslations, from Boethius downwards.\n\nBut M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire in his French translation, and Sir W.\nHamilton in his English translation (Lectures on Logic, Vol. II. iv.\np. 358, Appendix), steer clear of this ambiguity. The former says:\n\"Si donc C est r\u00e9ciproque \u00e0 B, et qu'il ne d\u00e9passe pas le moyen, il\nest n\u00e9cessaire alors que A soit \u00e0 B:\" to the same purpose, Hamilton,\n_l. c._ These words are quite plain and unequivocal. Yet I do not\nthink that they convey the meaning of Aristotle. In my judgment,\nAristotle meant to say: \"If then C reciprocates with B, and if the\nmiddle term (B) does not stretch beyond (the minor C), it is\nnecessary that A should be predicable of B.\" To show that this must\nbe the meaning, we have only to reflect on what C and B respectively\ndesignate. It is assumed that C designates the sum of individual\nbile-less animals; and that B designates the class or class-term\nbile-less, that is, the totality thereof. Now the sum of individuals\nincluded in the minor (C) cannot upon any supposition overpass the\ntotality: but it may very possibly fall short of totality; or (to\nstate the same thing in other words) the totality may possibly\nsurpass the sum of individuals under survey, but it cannot possibly\nfall short thereof. B is here the limit, and may possibly stretch\nbeyond C; but cannot stretch beyond B. Hence I contend that the\ntranslations, both by M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire and Sir W. Hamilton,\ntake the wrong side in the grammatical alternative admissible under\nthe words [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\ u(pertei/nei to\\ me/son]. The only doubt\nthat could possibly arise in the case was, whether the aggregate of\nindividuals designated by the minor did, or did not, reach up to the\ntotality designated by the middle term; or (changing the phrase)\nwhether the totality designated by the middle term did, or did not,\nstretch beyond the aggregate of individuals designated by the minor.\nAristotle terminates this doubt by the words: \"And if the middle term\ndoes _not_ stretch beyond (the minor).\" Of course the middle term\ndoes not stretch beyond, when the terms reciprocate; but when they do\nnot reciprocate, the middle term must be the _more_ extensive of the\ntwo; it can _never_ be the _less_ extensive of the two, since the\naggregate of individuals cannot possibly exceed totality, though it\nmay fall short thereof.\n\nI have given in the text what I think the true meaning of Aristotle,\ndeparting from the translations of M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire and\nSir** W. Hamilton.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 30-38: [Greek:\ne)/sti d' o( toiou=tos sullogismo\\s t\u00ea=s pr\u00f4/t\u00eas kai\\ a)me/sou\nprota/se\u00f4s; \u00f4(=n me\\n ga/r e)sti me/son, dia\\ tou= me/sou o(\nsullogismo/s, \u00f4(=n de\\ m\u00ea/ e)sti, di' e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s.--phu/sei me\\n ou)=n\npro/teros kai\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teros o( dia\\ tou= me/sou sullogismo/s, \u00ea(mi=n\nd' e)narge/steros o( dia\\ t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s.]]\n\nFrom Induction he proceeds to Example. You here take in (besides the\nthree terms, major, middle, and minor, of the Syllogism) a fourth\nterm; that is, a new particular case analogous to the minor. Your\npurpose here is to show--not, as in the ordinary Syllogism, that the\nmajor term is predicable of the minor, but, as in the Inductive\nSyllogism--that the major term is predicable of the middle term; and\nyou prove this conclusion, not (as in the Inductive Syllogism)\nthrough the minor term, but through the new case or fourth term\nanalogous to the minor.[57] Let A represent evil or mischievous; B,\nwar against neighbours, generally; C, war of Athens against Thebes,\nan event to come and under deliberation; D, war of Thebes against\nPhokis, a past event of which the issue is known to have been\nsignally mischievous. You assume as known, first, that A is\npredicable of D, _i.e._ that the war of Thebes against Phokis has\nbeen disastrous; next, that B is predicable both of C and of D,\n_i.e._ that each of the two wars, of Athens against Thebes, and of\nThebes against Phokis, is a war of neighbours against neighbours, or\na conterminous war. Now from the premiss that A is predicable of D,\nalong with the premiss that B is predicable of D, you infer that A is\npredicable of the class B, or of conterminous wars generally; and\nhence you draw the farther inference, that A is also predicable of C,\nanother particular case under the same class B. The inference here\nis, in the first instance, from part to whole; and finally, through\nthat whole, from the one part to another part of the same whole.\n_Induction_ includes in its major premiss all the particulars,\ndeclaring all of them to be severally subjects of the major as\npredicate; hence it infers as conclusion, that the major is also\npredicable of the middle or class-term comprising all these\nparticulars, but comprising no others. _Example_ includes not all,\nbut only one or a few particulars; inferring from it or them, first,\nto the entire class, next, to some new analogous particular belonging\nto the class.[58]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ibid. II. xxiv. p. 68, b. 38: [Greek: paradei=gma d'\ne)sti\\n o(/tan t\u00f4=| me/s\u00f4| to\\ a)/kron u(pa/rchon deichth\u00ea=| dia\\\ntou= o(moi/ou t\u00f4=| tri/t\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 58: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiv. p. 69, a. 1-19**.\nJulius Pacius (p. 400) notes the unauthorized character of\nthis so-called Paradeigmatic Syllogism, contradicting the rules of\nthe figures laid down by Aristotle, and also the confused manner in\nwhich the scope of it is described: first, to infer from a single\nexample to the universal; next, to infer from a single example\n_through_ the universal to another parallel case. To which we may add\nthe confused description in p. 69, a. 17, 18, where [Greek: to\\\na)/kron] in the first of the two lines signifies the _major_\nextreme--in the second of the two the _minor_ extreme. See Waitz's\nnote, p. 533.\n\nIf we turn to ch. xxvii. p. 70, a. 30-34, we shall find Aristotle on\na different occasion disallowing altogether this so-called Syllogism\nfrom Example.]\n\nThese chapters respecting Induction and Example are among the most\nobscure and perplexing in the Aristotelian Analytica. The attempt to\nthrow both Induction and Example into the syllogistic form is alike\ncomplicated and unfortunate; moreover, the unsatisfactory reading and\ndiversities in the text, among commentators and translators, show\nthat the reasoning of Aristotle has hitherto been imperfectly\napprehended.[59] From some of his phrases, we see that he was aware\nof the essential antithesis between Induction and Syllogism; yet the\nsyllogistic forms appear to have exercised such fascination over his\nmind, that he could not be satisfied without trying to find some\nabnormal form of Syllogism to represent and give validity to\nInduction. In explaining generally what the Syllogism is, and what\nInduction is, he informs us that the Syllogism presupposes and rests\nupon the process of Induction as its postulate. For there can be no\nvalid Syllogism without an universal proposition in one (at least) of\nthe premisses; and he declares, unequivocally, that universal\npropositions are obtained only through Induction. How Induction\noperates through the particular facts of sense, remembered, compared,\nand coalescing into clusters held together by associating similarity,\nhe has also told us; it is thus that Experience, with its universal\nnotions and conjunctions, is obtained. But this important process is\nradically distinct from that of syllogizing, though it furnishes the\nbasis upon which all syllogizing is built.\n\n[Footnote 59: Sir W. Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 319)\nsays justly, that Aristotle has been very brief and unexplicit in his\ntreatment of Induction. Yet the objections that Hamilton makes to\nAristotle are very different from those which I should make. In the\nlearned and valuable Appendix to his Lectures (vol. iv. pp. 358-369),\nhe collects various interesting criticisms of logicians respecting\nInduction as handled by Aristotle. Ramus (in his Schol\u00e6 Dialectic\u00e6,\nVIII. xi.) says very truly:--\"Quid vero sit Inductio, perobscure ab\nAristotele declaratur; nec ab interpretibus intelligitur, quo modo\n_syllogismus_ per medium concludat majus extremum de minore;\n_inductio_, majus de medio per minus.\"\n\nThe Inductive Syllogism, as constructed by Aristotle, requires a\nreciprocating minor premiss. It may, indeed, be cited (as I have\nalready remarked) in support of Hamilton's favourite precept of\nquantifying the predicate. The predicate of this minor must be\nassumed as _quantified in thought_, the subject being taken as\nco-extensive therewith. Therefore Hamilton's demand that it shall be\n_quantified in speech_ has really in this case that foundation which\nhe erroneously claims for it in all cases. He complains that Lambert\nand some other logicians dispense with the necessity of quantifying\nthe predicate of the minor by making it disjunctive; and adds the\nremarkable statement that \"the recent German logicians, Herbart,\nTwesten, Drobisch, &c., following Lambert, make the Inductive\nSyllogism a byeword\" (p. 366). I agree with them in thinking the\nattempted transformation of Induction into Syllogism very\nunfortunate, though my reasons are probably not the same as theirs.\n\nTrendelenburg agrees with those who said that Aristotle's doctrine\nabout the Inductive Syllogism required that the minor should be\ndisjunctively enunciated (Logische Untersuchungen, xiv. p. 175, xvi.\npp. 262, 263; also Erl\u00e4uterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen\nLogik, ss. 34-36, p. 71). Ueberweg takes a similar view (System der\n**Logik, sect. 128, p. 367, 3rd ed.). If the Inductive Inference\nis to be twisted into Syllogism, it seems more naturally to fall into\nan _hypothetical_ syllogism, _e. g._:--\n\nIf this, that, and the other magnet attract iron, all magnets attract\niron;\nBut this, that, and the other magnet do attract iron: _Ergo_,\n&c.]\n\nThe central idea of the Syllogism, as defined by Aristotle, is that\nof a conclusion following from given premisses by _necessary_\nsequence;[60] meaning by the term _necessary_ thus much and no\nmore--that you cannot grant the premisses, and deny the conclusion,\nwithout being inconsistent with yourself, or falling into\ncontradiction. In all the various combinations of propositions, set\nforth by Aristotle as the different figures and modes of Syllogism,\nthis property of necessary sequence is found. But it is a property\nwhich no Induction can ever possess.[61] When Aristotle professes to\npoint out a particular mode of Syllogism to which Induction conforms,\nhe can only do so by falsifying the process of Induction, and by not\naccurately distinguishing between what is observed and what is\ninferred. In the case which he takes to illustrate the Inductive\nSyllogism--the inference from all particular bile-less animals to the\nwhole class bile-less--he assumes that we have ascertained the\nattribute to belong to _all_ the particulars, and that the inductive\ninference consists in passing from all of them to the class-term; the\npassage from premisses to conclusion being here necessary, and thus\nfalling under the definition of Syllogism; since, to grant the\npremisses, and yet to deny the conclusion, involves a contradiction.\nBut this doctrine misconceives what the inductive inference really is.\nWe never can observe _all_ the particulars of a class, which is\nindefinite as to number of particulars, and definite only in respect\nof the attributes connoted by the class-term. We can only observe\n_some_ of the particulars, a greater or smaller proportion. Now it is\nin the transition from these _to_ the totality of particulars, that\nthe real inductive inference consists; not in the transition _from_\nthe totality to the class-term which denotes that totality and\nconnotes its determining common attribute. In fact, the distinction\nbetween the totality of particulars and the meaning of the\nclass-term, is one not commonly attended to; though it is worthy of\nnote in an analysis of the intellectual process, and is therefore\nbrought to view by Aristotle. But he employs it incorrectly as an\nintermediate step to slur over the radical distinction between\nInduction and Syllogism. He subjoins:[62]--\"You must conceive the\nminor term C (in the Inductive Syllogism) as composed of all the\nparticulars; for Induction is through all of them.\" You may say that\nInduction is _through_ all the particulars, if you distinguish this\ntotality from the class-term, and if you treat the class-term as the\nultimate _terminus ad quem_. But the Induction must first travel _to_\nall the particulars; being forced to take start from a part only, and\nthen to jump onward far enough to cover the indefinite unobserved\nremainder. This jump is the real Induction; and this can never be\nbrought under the definition of Syllogism; for in the best and most\ncertain Induction the sequence is never a necessary one: you may\ngrant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting\nyourself.\n\n[Footnote 60: Alexander intimates that Aristotle enunciated\n\"necessary sequence\" as a part of his definition of Syllogism, for\nthe express purpose of distinguishing it from Induction, which is a\nsequence _not necessary_ (Schol. ad Top. p. 253, a. 19, Br.): [Greek:\nto\\ d' _e)x a)na/gk\u00eas_ proskei/menon e)n t\u00f4=| o(/r\u00f4|, t\u00ea=s\n**e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s ch\u00f4ri/zei to\\n sullogismo/n; **e)/sti me\\n ga\\r kai\\\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ lo/gos e)n \u00f4(=| tethe/nt\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n e(/tero/n ti t\u00f4=n\nkeime/n\u00f4n sumbai/nei, a)ll' _ou)k_ e)x a)na/gk\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 61: Alexander (in his Scholia on the Metaphysica, E. i. p.\n406**, ed. Bonitz) observes truly: [Greek: a)ll' ei) e)k t\u00ea=s\nai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s kai\\ t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s pi/stis, ou)k e)/stin a)po/deixis,\npro\\s pa=san ga\\r e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\n du/natai/ tis e)ni/stasthai kai\\ m\u00ea\\\ne)a=|n to\\ katho/lou sumperai/nein.]]\n\n[Footnote 62: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=\nde\\ noei=n to\\ G to\\ e)x a(pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;\n\u00ea( ga\\r e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ dia\\ pa/nt\u00f4n.] See Professor Bain's 'Inductive\nLogic,' chap. i. s. 2, where this process is properly criticised.]\n\nAristotle states very clearly:--\"We believe everything either through\nSyllogism, or from Induction.\"[63] Here, as well as in several other\npassages, he notes the two processes as essentially distinct. The\nSyllogism requires in its premisses at least one general proposition;\nnor does Aristotle conceive the \"generalities as the original\ndata:\"[64] he derives them from antecedent Induction. The two\nprocesses are (as he says) opposite in a certain way; that is, they\nare complementary halves of the same whole; Induction being the\nestablishment of those universals which are essential for the\ndeductive march of the Syllogism; while the two together make up the\nentire process of scientific reasoning. But he forgets or\nrelinquishes this antithesis, when he presents to us the Inductive\nprocess as a given variety of Syllogism. And the objection to such a\ndoctrine becomes the more manifest, since in constructing his\nInductive Syllogism, he is compelled to admit either that there is no\nmiddle term, or that the middle term is subject of the conclusion, in\nviolation of the syllogistic canons.[65]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\\r\npisteu/omen \u00ea)\\ dia\\ sullogismou= \u00ea)\\ e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s]. Here Induction\nincludes Example, though in the next stage he puts the two apart.\nCompare Anal. Poster. I. i. p. 71, a. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 64: See Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Bk. II. ch.\niii. a. 4, p. 219, 5th ed.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Aldrich (Artis Log. Rudim. ch. iii. 9, 2, p. 175) and\nArchbishop Whately (Elem. of Logic, ch. i. p. 209) agree in treating\nthe argument of Induction as a defective or informal Syllogism: see\nalso to the same purpose Sir.** W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, vol.\ni. p. 322. Aldrich treats it as a Syllogism in _Barbara_, with the\nminor suppressed; but Whately rejects this, because the minor\nnecessary to be supplied is false. He maintains that the premiss\nsuppressed is the major, not the minor. I dissent from both. It\nappears to me that the opinion which Whately pronounces to be a\nfallacy is the real truth: \"Induction is a distinct kind of argument\nfrom the Syllogism\" (p. 208). It is the essential property of the\nSyllogism, as defined by Aristotle and by every one after him, that\nthe truth of the conclusion follows _necessarily_ from the truth of\nits premisses: that you cannot admit the premisses and reject the\nconclusion without contradicting yourself. Now this is what the best\nInduction never attains; and I contend that the presence or absence\nof this important characteristic is quite enough to constitute \"two\n_distinct kinds_ of argument.\" Whately objects to Aldrich (whom\nHamilton defends) for supplying a suppressed _minor_, because it is\n\"manifestly false\" (p. 209). I object to Whately's supplied _major_,\nbecause it is uncertified, and therefore cannot be used to prove any\nconclusion. By clothing arguments from Induction in syllogistic form,\nwe invest them with a character of necessity which does not really\nbelong to them. The establishment of general propositions, and the\ninterpretation of them when established (to use the phraseology of\nMr. Mill), must always be distinct mental processes; and the forms\nappropriate to the latter, involving necessary sequence, ought not to\nbe employed to disguise the want of necessity--the varying and\ngraduated probability, inherent in the former. Mr. Mill says (Syst.\nLog. Bk. III. ch. iii. s. 1, p. 343, 5th ed.:)--\"As Whately remarks,\nevery induction is a syllogism with the major premiss suppressed; or\n(as I prefer expressing it) every induction may be thrown into the\nform of a syllogism, by supplying a major premiss.\" Even in this\nmodified phraseology, I cannot admit the propriety of throwing\nInduction into syllogistic forms of argument. By doing this we efface\nthe special character of Induction, as the jump from particular\ncases, more or fewer, to an universal proposition comprising them and\nan indefinite number of others besides. To state this in forms which\nimply that it is a necessary step, involving nothing more than the\ninterpretation of a higher universal proposition, appears to me\nunphilosophical. Mr. Mill says with truth (in his admirable chapter\nexplaining the real function of the major premiss in a Syllogism, p.\n211), that the individual cases are all the evidence which we\npossess; the step from them to universal propositions ought not to be\nexpressed in forms which suppose universal propositions to be already\nattained.\n\nI will here add that, though Aldrich himself (as I stated at the\nbeginning of this note) treats the argument from Induction as a\ndefective or informal Syllogism, his anonymous Oxonian editor and\ncommentator takes a sounder view. He says (pp. 176, 177, 184, ed.\n1823. Oxon.):--\n\n\"The principles acquired by human powers may be considered as\ntwofold. Some are _intuitive_, and are commonly called Axioms; the\nother class of general principles are those acquired by Induction.\nBut it may be doubted whether this distinction is correct. It is\nhighly probable, if not certain, that those primary Axioms generally\nesteemed _intuitive_, are in fact acquired by an inductive process;\nalthough that process is less discernible, because it takes place\nlong before we think of tracing the actings of our own minds. It is\noften found necessary to facilitate the understanding of those\nAxioms, when they are first proposed to the judgment, by\nillustrations drawn from individual cases. But whether it is, as is\ngenerally supposed, the mere _enunciation_ of the principle, or the\n_principle itself_, which requires the illustration, may admit of a\ndoubt. It seems probable, however that, such illustrations are\nnothing more than a recurrence to the original method by which the\nknowledge of those principles was acquired. Thus, the repeated trial\nor observation of the necessary connection between mathematical\ncoincidence and equality, first authorizes the general position or\nAxiom relative to that subject. If this conjecture is founded in\nfact, it follows that both _primary_ and _ultimate_ principles have\nthe same nature and are alike acquired by the exercise of the\ninductive faculty.\" \"Those who acquiesce in the preceding\nobservations will feel a regret to find _Induction_ classed among\ndefective or informal Syllogisms. It is in fact prior in its order to\nSyllogism; nor can syllogistic reasoning he carried on to any extent\nwithout previous Induction\" (p. 184).]\n\nWe must presume Syllogisms without a middle term, when we read:--\"The\nSyllogism through a middle term is _by nature_ prior, and of greater\ncognitive efficacy; but _to us_ the Syllogism through Induction is\nplainer and clearer.\"[66] Nor, indeed, is the saying, when literally\ntaken, at all well-founded; for the pretended Syllogisms from\nInduction and Example, far from being clear and plain, are more\ninvolved and difficult to follow than _Barbara_ and _Celarent_. Yet\nthe substance of Aristotle's thought is true and important, when\nconsidered as declaring the antithesis (not between varieties of\nSyllogisms, but) between Induction and Example on the one part, and\nSyllogism (Deduction) on the other. It is thus that he sets out the\nsame antithesis elsewhere, both in the Analytica Posteriora and the\nTopica.[67] Prior and more cognizable _by nature_ or _absolutely_,\nprior and more cognizable _to us_ or _in relation to us_--these two\nare not merely distinct, but the one is the correlate and antithesis\nof the other.\n\n[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 35: [Greek: phu/sei\nme\\n ou)=n pro/teros kai\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teros o( dia\\ tou= me/sou\nsullogismo/s, \u00ea(mi=n d' e)narge/steros o( dia\\ t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 2, b. 29; Ethic. Nik.\nVI. iii**. p. 1139, b. 28: [Greek: \u00ea( me\\n d\u00ea\\ e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ a)rch\u00ea/\ne)sti kai\\ tou= katho/lou=, o( de\\ sullogismo\\s e)k t\u00f4=n katho/lou.\nei)si\\n a)/ra a)rchai\\ e)x \u00f4(=n o( sullogismo/s, \u00f4(=n ou)k e)/sti\nsullogismo/s; e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ a)/ra.] Compare Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a.\n11; VI. iv. pp. 141, 142**; Physica, I. i. p. 184, a. 16; Metaphysic.\nE. iv. p. 1029, b**. 4-12. Compare also Trendelenburg's explanation\nof this doctrine, Erl\u00e4uterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen\nLogik, sects. 18, 19, 20, p. 33, seq.]\n\n_To us_ the particulars of sense stand first, and are the earliest\nobjects of knowledge. _To us_, means to the large variety of\nindividual minds, which grow up imperceptibly from the simple\ncapacities of infancy to the mature accomplishments of adult years;\neach acquiring its own stock of sensible impressions, remembered,\ncompared, associated; and each learning a language, which both\nembodies in general terms and propositions the received\nclassification of objects, and communicates the current emotional\nbeliefs. We all begin by being learners; and we ascend by different\npaths to those universal notions and beliefs which constitute the\ncommon fund of the advanced intellect; developed in some minds into\n_principia_ of philosophy with their consequences. _By nature_, or\n_absolutely_, these _principia_ are considered as prior, and as\nforming the point of departure: the advanced position is regarded as\ngained, and the march taken is not that of the novice, but that of\nthe trained adult, who having already learnt much, is doubly equipped\neither for learning more or for teaching others; who thus stands on a\nsummit from whence he surveys nature as a classified and coherent\nwhole, manifesting herself in details which he can interpret and\nsometimes predict. The path of knowledge, seen _relatively to us_, is\none through particulars, by way of example to fresh particulars, or\nby way of induction to universals. The path of knowledge, _by nature_\nor _absolutely_, is from universals by way of deduction either to new\nuniversals or to new particulars. By the cognitive _nature_ of man,\nAristotle means the full equipment, of and for cognition, which our\nmature age exhibits; _notiora natur\u00e2_ are the acquisitions, points of\nview, and processes, familiar in greater or less perfection to such\nmature individuals and societies. _Notiora nobis_ are the facts and\nprocesses with which all of us begin, and which belong to the\nintellect in its highest as well as its lowest stage; though, in the\nhigher stages, they are employed, directed, and modified, by an\nacquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of\nuniversal significant terms in which that capital is invested.\n\nSuch is the antithesis between _notiora natur\u00e2_ (or _simpliciter_)\nand _notiora nobis_ (or _quoad nos_), which Aristotle recognizes as a\ncapital point in his philosophy, and insists upon in many of his\nwritings. The antithesis is represented by Example and Induction, in\nthe point of view--_quoad nos_--last mentioned; by Syllogism or\nDeduction, in the other point of view--_natur\u00e2_. Induction (he\nsays),[68] or the rising from particulars to universals, is plainer,\nmore persuasive, more within the cognizance of sensible perception,\nmore within the apprehension of mankind generally, than Syllogism;\nbut Syllogism is more cogent and of greater efficacy against\ncontroversial opponents. What he affirms here about Induction is\nequally true about the inference from Example, that is, the inference\nfrom one or some particulars, to other analogous particulars; the\nrudimentary intellectual process, common to all human and to many\nanimal minds, of which Induction is an improvement and an exaltation.\nWhile Induction will be more impressive, and will carry assent more\neasily with an ordinary uncultivated mind, an acute disputant may\nalways deny the ultimate inference, for the denial involves no\ncontradiction. But the rightly constructed Syllogism constrains\nassent;[69] the disputant cannot grant the premisses and deny the\nconclusion without contradicting himself. The constraining force,\nhowever, does not come into accurate and regulated working until the\nprinciples and conditions of deductive reasoning have been set\nforth--until the Syllogism has been analysed, and the characteristics\nof its validity, as distinguished from its invalidity, have been\nmarked out. This is what Aristotle teaches in the Analytica and\nTopica. It admits of being set out in regular figure and mode--forms\nof premisses with the conclusion appropriate to each; and the lesson\nmust be learnt before we can know how far the force of deductive\nreasoning, which begins with the _notiora natur\u00e2_, is legitimately\nbinding and trustworthy.\n\n[Footnote 68: Aristot. Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a. 13-19: [Greek:\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ de\\ \u00ea( a)po\\ t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston e)pi\\ ta\\ katho/lou\ne)/phodos; oi(=on ei) e)/sti kubern\u00ea/t\u00eas o( e)pista/menos kra/tistos\nkai\\ \u00ea(ni/ochos, kai\\ o(/l\u00f4s e)sti\\n o( e)pista/menos peri\\ e(/kaston\na)/ristos. e)/sti d' \u00ea( me\\n e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ pithan\u00f4/teron kai\\\nsaphe/steron kai\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron, _kai\\ toi=s\npolloi=s koino/n_; o( de\\ sullogismo\\s biastik\u00f4/teron kai\\ pro\\s\ntou\\s a)ntilogikou\\s e)nerge/steron.] Also the same treatise. VI. iv.\np. 141, b. 17.\n\nThe inductive interrogations of Sokrates relating to matters of\ncommon life, and the way in which they convinced ordinary hearers,\nare strikingly illustrated in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, especially\nIV. vi.: [Greek: polu\\ ma/lista \u00f4(=n e)g\u00f4\\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi,\ntou\\s a)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen] (15). The same can\nhardly be said of the Platonic dialogues.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Bacon, Novum Organ. I. Aphor. 13:--\"Syllogismus\nassensum constringit, non res.\"]\n\nBoth the two main points of Aristotle's doctrine--the antithesis\nbetween Induction and Deduction, and the dependence of the latter\nprocess upon premisses furnished by the former, so that the two\ntogether form the two halves of complete ratiocination and\nauthoritative proof--both these two are confused and darkened by his\nattempt to present the Inductive inference and the Analogical or\nParadeigmatic inference as two special forms of Syllogistic\ndeduction.[70] But when we put aside this attempt, and adhere to\nAristotle's main doctrine--of Induction as a process antithetical to\nand separate from Deduction, yet as an essential preliminary\nthereto,--we see that it forms the basis of that complete and\ncomprehensive System of Logic, recently elaborated in the work of Mr.\nJohn Stuart Mill. The inference from Example (_i.e._ from some\nparticulars to other similar particulars) is distinguished by\nAristotle from Induction, and is recognized by him as the primitive\nintellectual energy, common to all men, through which Induction is\nreached; its results he calls Experience ([Greek: e)mpeiri/a]), and\nhe describes it as the real guide, more essential than philosophical\ngeneralities, to exactness of performance in detail.[71] Mr. John\nMill has been the first to assign to Experience, thus understood, its\nfull value and true position in the theory of Ratiocination; and to\nshow that the Paradeigmatic process exhibits the prime and ultimate\nreality of all Inference, the real premisses and the real conclusion\nwhich Inference connects together. Between these two is interposed\nthe double process of which Induction forms the first half and\nDeduction the second; neither the one nor the other being\nindispensable to Inference, but both of them being required as\nsecurities for Scientific inference, if we desire to have its\ncorrectness tested and its sufficiency certified; the real evidence,\nwhereby the conclusion of a Syllogism is proved, being the minor\npremiss, together with (not the major premiss itself, but) the\nassemblage of particular facts from which by Induction the major\npremiss is drawn. Now Aristotle had present to his mind the\nconception of Inference as an entire process, enabling us from some\nparticular truths to discover and prove other particular truths: he\nconsiders it as an unscientific process, of which to a limited extent\nother animals besides man are capable, and which, as operative under\nthe title of Experience in mature practical men, is a safer guide\nthan Science amidst the doubts and difficulties of action. Upon this\nfoundation he erects the superstructure of Science; the universal\npropositions acquired through Induction, and applied again to\nparticulars or to lower generalities, through the rules of the\ndeductive Syllogism. He signalizes, with just emphasis, the\nuniversalizing point of view called Science or Theory; but he regards\nit as emerging from particular facts, and as travelling again\ndownwards towards particular facts. The misfortune is, that he\ncontents himself with barely recognizing, though he distinctly\nproclaims the necessity of, the inductive part of this complex\noperation; while he bestows elaborate care upon the analysis of the\ndeductive part, and of the rules for conducting it. From this\ndisproportionate treatment, one half of Logic is made to look like\nthe whole; Science is disjoined from Experience, and is presented as\nconsisting in Deduction alone; every thing which is not Deduction, is\ndegraded into unscientific Experience; the major premiss of the\nSyllogism being considered as part of the proof of the conclusion,\nand the conclusion being necessarily connected therewith, we appear\nto have acquired a _locus standi_ and a binding cogency such as\nExperience could never supply; lastly, when Aristotle resolves\nInduction into a peculiar variety of the Syllogism, he appears\nfinally to abolish all its separate dignity and jurisdiction. This\none-sided view of Logic has been embraced and perpetuated by the\nAristotelian expositors, who have carefully illustrated, and to a\ncertain extent even amplified, the part which was already in\ncomparative excess, while they have added nothing to the part that\nwas in defect, and have scarcely even preserved Aristotle's\nrecognition of it as being not merely legitimate but essential. The\nvast body of Inductive Science, accumulated during the last three\ncenturies, has thus, until recently, been allowed to grow up, as if\nits proofs and processes had nothing to do with Logic.\n\n[Footnote 70: Heyder (in his learned treatise, Darstellung der\nAristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, p. 226), after having\nconsidered the unsatisfactory process whereby Aristotle attempts to\nresolve Induction into a variety of Syllogism, concludes by a remark\nwhich I think just:--\"Aus alle dem erhellt zur Gen\u00fcge, dass sich\nAristoteles bei dem Versuch die Induction auf eine Schlussform\nzur\u00fcckzuf\u00fchren, selbst sich nicht recht befriedigt f\u00fchlte, und\nderselbe wohl nur aus seinem durchg\u00e4ngigen Bestreben zu erkl\u00e4ren ist,\nalles wissenschaftliche Verfahren in die Form des Schlusses zu\nbringen; dass dagegen, seiner eigentlichen Meinung und der strengen\nConsequenz seiner Lehre zu Folge, die Induction zum syllogistischen\nund beweisenden Verfahren einen in dem Begriff der beiden\nVerfahrungsweisen liegenden Gegensatz bildete, was sich ihm dann auch\nauf das Verh\u00e4ltniss der Induction zur Begriffsbestimmung ausdehnen\nmusste.\"]\n\n[Footnote 71: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 12; xxvi.\np. 69, a. 17. Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30, seq**.; xiii. p.\n97, b. 7. Topica, VIII. i. p. 155, b. 35; p. 156, b. 10; p. 157, a.\n14-23; p. 160, a. 36. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 25-p. 981, a. 30.\nThis first chapter of the Metaphysica is one of the most remarkable\npassages of Aristotle, respecting the analytical philosophy of mind.]\n\nBut though this restricted conception of Logic or the theory of\nReasoning has arisen naturally from Aristotle's treatment, I maintain\nthat it does not adequately represent his view of that theory. In his\nnumerous treatises on other subjects, scarcely any allusion is made\nto the Syllogism; nor is appeal made to the rules for it laid down in\nthe Analytica. His conviction that the formalities of Deduction were\nonly one part of the process of general reasoning, and that the value\nof the final conclusion depended not merely upon their being\ncorrectly performed, but also upon the correctness of that initial\npart whereby they are supplied with matter for premisses--is\nmanifested as well by his industry (unrivalled among his\ncontemporaries) in collecting multifarious facts, as by his specific\ndeclarations respecting Induction. Indeed, a recent most erudite\nlogician, Sir William Hamilton, who insists upon the construction of\nLogic in its strictest sense as purely formal, blames Aristotle[72]\nfor having transgressed this boundary, and for introducing other\nconsiderations bearing on diversities of matter and of material\nevidence. The charge so made, to whatever extent it is well-founded,\ndoes rather partake of the nature of praise; inasmuch as it evinces\nAristotle's larger views of the theory of Inference, and confirms his\nown statement that the Deductive process was only the last half of\nit, presupposing a prior Induction. It is only this last half that\nAristotle has here analysed, setting forth its formal conditions with\nprecepts founded thereupon; while he claims to have accomplished the\nwork by long and patient investigation, having found not the smallest\nfoundation laid by others, and bespeaks indulgence[73] as for a first\nattempt requiring to be brought to completion by others. He made this\nfirst step for himself; and if any one would make a second step, so\nas to apply the same analysis to the other half, and to bring out in\nlike manner the formal conditions and principles of Induction, we may\nfairly believe that Aristotle would have welcomed the act, as filling\nup what he himself recognized to be a gap in the entire compass of\nReasoning. As to his own achievement, it is certain that he could not\nhave composed the Analytica and Topica, if he had not had before him\nmany specimens of the deductive process to study and compare. Neither\ncould the inductive process have been analysed, until after the\nexamples of successful advance in inductive science which recent\nyears have furnished. Upon these examples, mainly, has been based the\nprofound System of Mr. John Stuart Mill, analysing and discriminating\nthe formalities of Induction in the same way as those of Deduction\nhad before been handled by Aristotle; also fusing the two together as\nco-operative towards one comprehensive scheme of Logic--the Logic of\nEvidence generally, or of Truth as discoverable and proveable. In\nthis scheme the Syllogistic Theory, or Logic of Consistency between\none proposition and others, is recognized as an essential part, but\nis no longer tolerated as an independent whole.[74]\n\n[Footnote 72: See his Discussions on Philosophy, p. 139, seq.;\nLectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 73: See the remarkable paragraph at the close of the\nSophistici Elenchi, already quoted (supra, p. 140, note).]\n\n[Footnote 74: Mr. John Stuart Mill says (Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 3):\n**\"Induction is inferring a proposition from premisses _less general_\nthan itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a proposition from\npremisses _equally or more general_.\" Again in another passage: \"We\nhave found that all Inference, consequently all Proof, and all\ndiscovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions, and the\ninterpretation of inductions; that all our knowledge, not intuitive,\ncomes to us exclusively from that source. What Induction is,\ntherefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be\ndeemed the main question of logic--the question which includes all\nothers. It is however one which professed writers on logic have\nalmost entirely passed over. The generalities of the subject, indeed,\nhave not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for want\nof sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has\nactually succeeded in establishing general truths, their analysis of\nthe inductive operation, even when unexceptionable as to correctness,\nhas not been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical\nrules, which might be for Induction itself what the rules of the\nSyllogism are for interpretation of Induction\" (Bk. III. ch. i. s. 1.\np. 313.)--\"The business of Inductive Logic is to provide rules and\nmodels (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination) to\nwhich if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive,\nand not otherwise. This is what the Four Methods profess to be, and\nwhat I believe they are universally considered to be by experimental\nphilosophers, who had practised all of them long before any one\nsought to reduce the practice to theory\" (Bk. III. ch. ix. s. 5, p.\n471, 5th ed.)--See also the same point of view more copiously set\nforth, in Mr. Mill's later work, 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's\nPhilosophy' (ch. xx. pp. 454-462, 3rd ed.): \"It is only as a means to\nmaterial truth that the formal (or to speak more clearly, the\nconditional) validity of an operation of thought is of any value; and\neven that value is only negative: we have not made the smallest\npositive advance towards right thinking, by merely keeping ourselves\nconsistent in what is perhaps systematic error. This by no means\nimplies that Formal Logic, even in its narrowest sense, is not of\nvery great, though purely negative value.\"--\"Not only however is it\nindispensable that the larger Logic, which embraces all the general\nconditions of the ascertainment of truth, should be studied in\naddition to the smaller Logic, which only concerns itself with the\nconditions of consistency; but the smaller Logic ought to be (at\nleast, finally) studied as part of the greater--as a portion of the\nmeans to the same end; and its relation to the other parts--to the\nother means--should be distinctly displayed.\"]\n\nAfter adverting to another variety of ratiocinative procedure, which\nhe calls _Apagoge_ or Abduction (where the minor is hardly more\nevident than the conclusion, and might sometimes conveniently become\na conclusion first to be proved),[75] Aristotle goes on to treat of\nObjection generally--the function of the dialectical respondent. The\n_Enstasis_ or Objection is a proposition opposed not to a conclusion,\nbut to the proposition set up by the defendant. When the proposition\nset up by him is universal, as it must be if he seeks to establish an\nuniversal conclusion, your objection may be either universal or\nparticular: you may deny either the whole of his proposition, or only\none portion of the particulars contained under it; the denial of one\nsingle particular, when substantiated, being enough to overthrow his\nuniversal. Accordingly, your objection, being thus variously opposed\nto the proposition, will lie in the syllogistic figures which admit\nopposite conclusions; that is, either in the First or Third; for the\nSecond figure admits only negative conclusions not opposed to each\nother. If the defendant has set up an Universal Affirmative, you may\ndeny the whole and establish a contrary negative, in the First\nfigure; or you may deny a part only, and establish a contradictory\nnegative, in the Third figure. The like, if he has set up an\nUniversal Negative: you may impugn it either by an universal contrary\naffirmative, in the First figure; or by a particular contradictory\naffirmative, in the Third figure.[76]\n\n[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. II. xxv. p. 69, a. 20-36.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Ibid. II. xxvi. p. 69, a. 37-b. 37.\n\nIn objecting to A _universally_, you take a term comprehending the\noriginal subject; in objecting _particularly_, a term comprehended by\nit. Of the new term in each case you deny the original predicate, and\nhave thus, as a major premiss, E. For a minor premiss, you affirm, in\nthe first case, the new term as predicate of the original subject\n(less comprehensive); in the second case, the original subject (more\ncomprehensive) as predicate of the new term. This gives you, in the\nfirst case, a conclusion in _Celarent_ (Fig. I.), and, in the second,\na conclusion in _Felapton_ (Fig. III.); opposed, the one universally\nor contrarily, the other particularly or contradictorily, to the\noriginal proposition.]\n\nThe Enthymeme is a syllogism from Probabilities or Signs;[77] the two\nbeing not exactly the same. _Probabilities_ are propositions commonly\naccepted, and true in the greater number of cases; such as, Envious\nmen hate those whom they envy, Persons who are beloved look with\naffection on those who love them. We call it a _Sign_, when one fact\nis the antecedent or consequent of another, and therefore serves as\nmark or evidence thereof. The conjunction may be either constant, or\nfrequent, or merely occasional: if constant, we obtain for the major\npremiss of our syllogism a proposition approaching that which is\nuniversally or necessarily true; if not constant but only frequent or\noccasional, the major premiss of our syllogism will at best only be\nprobable. The constant conjunction will furnish us with a Syllogism\nor Enthymeme in the First figure; the significant mark being here a\ngenuine middle term--subject in the major premiss, and predicate in\nthe minor. We can then get a conclusion both affirmative and\nuniversally true. In other cases, we cannot obtain premisses for a\nsyllogism in the First figure, but only for a syllogism in the Second\nor Third. In the Third figure, since we get by right no universal\nconclusions at all, but only particular conclusions, the conclusion\nof the Enthymeme, though it may happen to be true, is open to\nrefutation. Where by the laws of Syllogism no affirmative conclusion\nwhatever is possible, as in the Second figure, the conclusion\nobtained by Enthymeme is altogether suspicious. In contrast with the\nSign in these figures, that which enters as an effective middle term\ninto the First figure, should be distinguished under the name of\n_Proof_ ([Greek: tekm\u00ea/rion].)[78]\n\n[Footnote 77: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 10: [Greek: e)nthu/m\u00eama me\\n\nou)=n e)sti\\ sullogismo\\s e)x ei)ko/t\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ s\u00eamei/\u00f4n; lamba/netai de\\\nto\\ s\u00eamei=on trich\u00f4=s, o(sach\u00f4=s kai\\ to\\ me/son e)n toi=s\nsch\u00ea/masi.]]\n\n[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 31-b. 6.\n\nAristotle throws in the remark (a. 24), that, when one premiss only\nof the Enthymeme is enunciated, it is a Sign; when the other is\nadded, it becomes a Syllogism. In the examples given to illustrate\nthe description of the Enthymeme, that which belongs to the First\nfigure has its three terms and two propositions specified like a\ncomplete and regular Syllogism; but when we come to the Third and\nSecond figures, Aristotle gives two alternate ways of stating each:\none way in full, with both premisses enunciated, constituting a\nnormal, though invalid, Syllogism; the other way, with only one of\nthe premisses enunciated, the other being suppressed as well-known\nand familiar.\n\nAmong logicians posterior to Aristotle, the definition given of the\nEnthymeme, and supposed to be derived from Aristotle was, that it was\na Syllogism with one of the premisses suppressed--[Greek:\nmonol\u00ea/mmatos]. Sir W. Hamilton has impugned this doctrine, and has\ndeclared the definition to be both absurd in itself, and not\ncountenanced by Aristotle. (Lectures on Logic, Vol. I. Lect. xx. p.\n386, seq.) I think Hamilton is mistaken on this point. (See Mr.\nCope's Introd. to Arist. Rhetoric, p. 103, seq.) Even in the present\nchapter Aristotle distinctly alludes to the monolemmatic enunciation\nof the Enthymeme as one mode of distinguishing it from a full\nSyllogism; and in the Rhetorica he brings out this characteristic\nstill more forcibly. The distinction is one which belongs to Rhetoric\nmore than to Logic; the rhetor, in enunciating his premisses, must be\ncareful not to weary his auditors; he must glance at or omit reasons\nthat are familiar to them; logical fulness and accuracy would be\ninconsistent with his purpose. The writers subsequent to Aristotle,\nwho think much of the rhetorical and little of the logical point of\nview, bring out the distinction yet more forcibly. But the rhetorical\nmode of stating premisses is often not so much an omission either of\nmajor or minor, as a confused blending or packing up of both into\none.]\n\nAristotle concludes his Analytica Priora by applying this doctrine of\nSigns to determine the limits within which Physiognomy as a science\nis practicable. The basis upon which it rests is this general fact or\npostulate: That in all natural affections of the animal, bodily\nchanges and mental changes accompany each other. The former,\ntherefore, may become signs or proofs of the latter,[79] if, in each\nclass of animals, we can discriminate the one specific bodily\nphenomenon which attaches to each mental phenomenon. Thus, the lion\nis a courageous animal. What is the bodily sign accompanying a\ncourageous disposition? It is (we assume here) the having extremities\nof great size. This belongs to all lions, as a _proprium_; in the\nsense that, though it may or does belong also to some individuals of\nother races (as men), it does not belong to any other entire race.\nPhysiognomy as a science will, then, be possible, if we can find\nraces of animals which have only one characteristic mental attribute,\nand if we can discover what is the physical attribute correlating\nwith it.[80] But the difficulties are greater when the same race has\ntwo characteristic mental attributes (_e.g._ lions are both\ncourageous and generous), each with its correlative physical\nattribute; for how can we tell which belongs to which? We have then\nto study individuals of other races possessing one of these\nattributes without the other; thus, if we find that courageous men,\nwho are not generous, agree in having large extremities, we may infer\nthat this last circumstance is, in the lion, the correlative mark of\nhis courage and not of his generosity. The physiognomonic inference\nwill be expressed by a syllogism in the First figure, in which the\nmajor term (A) reciprocates and is convertible with the middle term\n(B), while B stretches beyond (or is more extensive than) the minor\n(C); this relation of the terms being necessary, if there is to be a\nsingle mark for a particular attribute.[81]\n\n[Footnote 79: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 7-16: [Greek: ei)/\ntis di/d\u00f4sin a(/ma metaba/llein to\\ s\u00f4=ma kai\\ t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea/n, o(/sa\nphusika/ e)sti path\u00ea/mata;--sumpa/schein ga\\r a)ll\u00ea/lois\nu(pokei=tai.] See the Aristotelian treatise entitled [Greek:\nPhusiogn\u00f4monika/], pp. 808-809, Bekk.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 22. About the\ncharacteristics of the lion see Aristot. Physiognom. p. 809, b.\n14-36: [Greek: ta\\ peri\\ t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n dotiko\\n kai\\ e)leu/theron,\nmegalo/psuchon kai\\ philo/nikon, kai\\ prau+\\ kai\\ di/kaion kai\\\nphilo/storgon pro\\s a(\\ a)\\n o(mil\u00ea/s\u00ea|.]]\n\n[Footnote 81: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 31-36.]\n\nHere the treatise ends; but the reader will remember that, in\ndescribing the canons laid down by Aristotle for the Syllogism with\nits three Figures and the Modes contained therein, I confined myself\nto the simple Assertory syllogism, postponing for the moment the long\nexpositions added by him about Modal syllogisms, involving the\nPossible and the Necessary. What is proper to be said about this\ncomplicated and useless portion of the Analytica Priora, may well\ncome in here; for, in truth, the doctrines just laid down about\nProbabilities, Signs, and Proofs, bring us back to the Modals under a\ndifferent set of phrases. The Possible or Problematical is that, of\nthe occurrence or reality of which we doubt, neither believing nor\ndisbelieving it, not being prepared to assert either that it is, or\nthat it is not; _that which may be or may not be_. It is our manner\nof speaking, when we have only signs or probabilities to guide us,\nand not certain proofs. The feeling of doubt is, as a psychological\nphenomenon, essentially distinct from the feeling of belief which, in\nits objective aspect, correlates with certainty or matter of fact; as\nwell as from the feeling of disbelief, the correlate of which can\nonly be described negatively. Every man knows these feelings by his\nown mental experience. But in describing the feeling of doubt, as to\nits matter or in its objective aspect, we must take care to use\nphrases which declare plainly both sides of its disjunctive or\nalternative character. The Possible is, _That which either may be or\nmay not be_. As _That which may be_, it stands opposed to the\nImpossible; as _That which may not be_, it stands opposed to the\nNecessary. It thus carries with it negation both of impossibility and\nof necessity; but, in common parlance, the first half of this meaning\nstands out prominently, and is mistaken for the whole. Aristotle, as\nwe saw previously, speaks equivocally on this point, recognizing a\ndouble signification of the term: he sometimes uses it in the sense\nopposed only to impossible, maintaining that what is necessary must\nalso be possible; sometimes in the truer sense, opposed both to\nnecessity and to impossibility.[82]\n\n[Footnote 82: Aristot. De Interpret. xiii. p. 22. Analyt. Prior. I.\nxiii. p. 32, a. 21, 29, 36, xiv. p. 33, b. 22; xix. p. 38, a. 35.]\n\nThe Possible or Problematical, however, in this latter complete\nsense--_What may or may not be_--exhibits various modifications or\ngradations. 1. The chances on either side may be conceived as\nperfectly equal, so that there is no probability, and we have no more\nreason for expecting one side of the alternative than the other; the\nsequence or conjunction is indeterminate. Aristotle construes this\nindeterminateness in many cases (not as _subjective_, or as depending\nupon our want of complete knowledge and calculating power, but) as\n_objective_, insuperable, and inherent in many phenomenal agencies;\ncharacterizing it, under the names of Spontaneity and Chance, as the\nessentially unpredictable. 2. The chances on both sides may be\nconceived as unequal and the ratio between them as varying\ninfinitely: the usual and ordinary tendency of phenomena--what\nAristotle calls Nature--prevails in the majority of cases, but not in\nall; being liable to occasional counteraction from Chance and other\nforces. Thus, between Necessity and perfect constancy at one extreme\n(such as the rotation of the sidereal sphere), and Chance at the\nother, there may be every shade of gradation; from natural agency\nnext below the constant, down to the lowest degree of\nprobability.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: Analyt. Prior. I. xiii. p. 32, b. 5-19. [Greek: to\\ d'\na)o/riston t\u00f4=| m\u00eade\\n ma=llon ou(/t\u00f4s \u00ea)\\ e)kei/n\u00f4s]. Compare\nMetaphys. K. p. 1064, b. 32.]\n\nNow, within the range of these limits lie what Aristotle describes as\nSigns and Probabilities; in fact, all the marks which we shall\npresently come to as distinguishing the _dialectical_ syllogism from\nthe _demonstrative_. But here is involved rather the matter of the\nSyllogism than its form. The form indeed is so far implicated, that\n(as Aristotle justly remarks at the end of the Analytica Priora[84]),\nthe First figure is the only one that will prove both conjunctions\nand disjunctions, as well constant as occasional; the Third figure\nproves only occasional conjunctions and occasional disjunctions, not\nconstant; the Second figure will prove no conjunctions at all, but\nonly disjunctions, constant as well as occasional. Here a difference\nof form is properly pointed out as coupled with and founded on a\ndifference of matter. But the special rules given by Aristotle, early\nin the present treatise, for the conversion of Modal Propositions,\nand the distinctions that he draws as to the modal character of the\nconclusion according as one or other of the premisses belongs to one\nor other of the different modes,--are both prolix and of little\npractical value.[85]\n\n[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 2-38. Compare what\nis said here about [Greek: ei)ko/s, s\u00eamei=on, tekm\u00ea/rion], with the\nfirst chapter of the Topica, and the dialectic syllogism as there\ndescribed: [Greek: o( e)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n sullogizo/menos].]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ibid. I. viii.-xxii. p. 29, b. 29-p. 40, b. 16.]\n\nWhat he calls the Necessary might indeed, from the point of view now\nreached, cease to be recognized as a separate mode at all. The\nCertain and the Problematical are real modes of the Proposition;\nobjective correlates to the subjective phases called Belief and\nDoubt. But no proposition can be more than certain: the word\n_necessary_, in strictness, implies only a peculiarity of the\nevidence on which our belief is grounded. Granting certain given\npremisses to be true, a given conclusion must be true also, if we\nwould avoid inconsistency and contradiction.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.\n\nIn the two books of Analytica Priora, Aristotle has carried us\nthrough the full doctrine of the functions and varieties of the\nSyllogism; with an intimation that it might be applied to two\npurposes--Demonstration and Dialectic. We are now introduced to these\ntwo distinct applications of the Syllogism: first, in the Analytica\nPosteriora, to Demonstration; next, in the Topica, to Dialectic. We\nare indeed distinctly told that, as far as the forms and rules of\nSyllogism go, these are alike applicable to both;[1] but the\ndifference of matter and purpose in the two cases is so considerable\nas to require a distinct theory and precepts for the one and for the\nother.\n\n[Footnote 1: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 4-10; Analyt. Post. I.\nii. p. 71, a. 23.]\n\nThe contrast between Dialectic (along with Rhetoric) on the one hand\nand Science on the other is one deeply present to the mind of\nAristotle. He seems to have proceeded upon the same fundamental\nantithesis as that which appears in the Platonic dialogues; but to\nhave modified it both in meaning and in terminology, dismissing at\nthe same time various hypotheses with which Plato had connected it.\n\nThe antithesis that both thinkers have in view is Opinion or Common\nSense _versus_ Science or Special Teaching and Learning; those\naptitudes, acquirements, sentiments, antipathies, &c., which a man\nimbibes and appropriates insensibly, partly by his own doing and\nsuffering, partly by living amidst the drill and example of a given\nsociety--as distinguished from those accomplishments which he derives\nfrom a teacher already known to possess them, and in which both the\ntime of his apprenticeship and the steps of his progress are alike\nassignable.\n\nCommon Sense is the region of Opinion, in which there is diversity of\nauthorities and contradiction of arguments without any settled truth;\nall affirmations being particular and relative, true at one time and\nplace, false at another. Science, on the contrary, deals with\nimperishable Forms and universal truths, which Plato regards, in\ntheir subjective aspect, as the innate, though buried, furniture of\nthe soul, inherited from an external pre-existence, and revived in it\nout of the misleading data of sense by a process first of the\ncross-examining _Elenchus_, next of scientific Demonstration. Plato\ndepreciates altogether the untaught, unexamined, stock of\nacquirements which passes under the name of Common Sense, as a mere\nworthless semblance of knowledge without reality; as requiring to be\nbroken up by the scrutinizing _Elenchus_, in order to impress a\npainful but healthy consciousness of ignorance, and to prepare the\nmind for that process of teaching whereby alone Science or Cognition\ncan be imparted.[2] He admits that Opinion may be right as well as\nwrong. Yet even when right, it is essentially different from Science,\nand is essentially transitory; a safe guide to action while it lasts,\nbut not to be trusted for stability or permanence.[3] By Plato,\nRhetoric is treated as belonging to the province of Opinion,\nDialectic to that of Science. The rhetor addresses multitudes in\ncontinuous speech, appeals to received common places, and persuades:\nthe dialectician, conversing only with one or a few, receives and\nimparts the stimulus of short question and answer; thus awakening the\ndormant capacities of the soul to the reminiscence of those universal\nForms or Ideas which are the only true Knowable.\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 228-229; Symposion, pp. 203-204;\nThe\u00e6tetus, pp. 148, 149, 150. Compare also 'Plato and the Other\nCompanions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. chs. vi.-vii. pp. 245-288; II. ch.\nxxvi. p. 376, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478; Menon, pp. 97-98.]\n\nLike Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the region of Common Sense or\nOpinion from that of Science, and regards Universals as the objects\nof Science. But his Universals are very different from those of\nPlato: they are not self-existent realities, known by the mind from a\nlong period of pre-existence, and called up by reminiscence out of\nthe chaos of sensible impressions. To operate such revival is the\ngreat function that Plato assigns to Dialectic. But in the philosophy\nof Aristotle Dialectic is something very different. It is placed\nalongside of Rhetoric in the region of Opinion. Both the rhetor and\nthe dialectician deal with all subjects, recognizing no limit; they\nattack or defend any or all conclusions, employing the process of\nratiocination which Aristotle has treated under the name of\nSyllogism; they take up as premisses any one of the various opinions\nin circulation, for which some plausible authority may be cited; they\nfollow out the consequences of one opinion in its bearing upon\nothers, favourable or unfavourable, and thus become well furnished\nwith arguments for and against all. The ultimate foundation here\nsupposed is some sort of recognized presumption or authoritative\nsanction[4]--law, custom, or creed, established among this or that\nportion of mankind, some maxim enunciated by an eminent poet, some\ndoctrine of the Pythagoreans or other philosophers, current proverb,\nanswer from the Delphian oracle, &c. Any one of these may serve as a\ndialectical authority. But these authorities, far from being\nharmonious with each other, are recognized as independent,\ndiscordant, and often contradictory. Though not all of equal\nvalue,[5] each is sufficient to warrant the setting up of a thesis\nfor debate. In Dialectic, one of the disputants undertakes to do\nthis, and to answer all questions that may be put to him respecting\nthe thesis, without implicating himself in inconsistencies or\ncontradiction. The questioner or assailant, on the other hand, shapes\nhis questions with a view to refute the thesis, by eliciting answers\nwhich may furnish him with premisses for some syllogism in\ncontradiction thereof. But he is tied down by the laws of debate to\nsyllogize only from such premisses as the respondent has expressly\ngranted; and to put questions in such manner that the respondent is\nrequired only to give or withhold assent, according as he thinks\nright.\n\n[Footnote 4: Aristot. Topica, I. x. p. 104, a. 8, xi. p. 104, b. 19.\nCompare Metaphysica, A. p. 995, a. 1-10.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 18: [Greek: kata\\ me\\n\nou)=n do/xan sullogizome/nois kai\\ mo/non dialektik\u00f4=s d\u00ea=lon o(/ti\ntou=to mo/non skepte/on, ei) e)x \u00f4(=n e)nde/chetai e)ndoxota/t\u00f4n\ngi/netai o( sullogismo/s, \u00f4(/st' ei) kai\\ e)/sti ti t\u00ea=| a)l\u00eathei/a|\nt\u00f4=n AB me/son, dokei= de\\ m\u00ea/, o( dia\\ tou/tou sullogizo/menos\nsullelo/gistai dialektik\u00f4=s, pro\\s d' a)l\u00ea/theian e)k t\u00f4=n\nu(parcho/nt\u00f4n dei= skopei=n.] Compare Topica, VIII. xii. p. 162, b.\n27.]\n\nWe shall see more fully how Aristotle deals with Dialectic, when we\ncome to the Topica: here I put it forward briefly, in order that the\nreader may better understand, by contrast, its extreme antithesis,\nviz., Demonstrative Science and Necessary Truth as conceived by\nAristotle. First, instead of two debaters, one of whom sets up a\nthesis which he professes to understand and undertakes to maintain,\nwhile the other puts questions upon it,--Demonstrative Science\nassumes a teacher who knows, and a learner conscious of ignorance but\nwishing to know. The teacher lays down premisses which the learner is\nbound to receive; or if they are put in the form of questions, the\nlearner must answer them as the teacher expects, not according to his\nown knowledge. Secondly, instead of the unbounded miscellany of\nsubjects treated in Dialectic, Demonstrative Science is confined to a\nfew special subjects, in which alone appropriate premisses can be\nobtained, and definitions framed. Thirdly, instead of the several\nheterogeneous authorities recognized in Dialectic, Demonstrative\nScience has _principia_ of its own, serving as points of departure;\nsome _principia_ common to all its varieties, others special or\nconfined to one alone. Fourthly, there is no conflict of authorities\nin Demonstrative Science; its propositions are essential, universal,\nand true _per se_, from the commencement to the conclusion; while\nDialectic takes in accidental premisses as well as essential.\nFifthly, the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science are obtained from\nInduction only; originating in particulars which are all that the\nordinary growing mind can at first apprehend (_notiora nobis_), but\nculminating in universals which correspond to the perfection of our\ncognitive comprehension (_notiora natur\u00e2_.)[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: Aristot. Topica, VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14. [Greek: oi(\npolloi\\ ga\\r ta\\ toiau=ta progn\u00f4ri/zousin; ta\\ me\\n ga\\r t\u00ea=s\ntuchou/s\u00eas, ta\\ d' a)kribou=s kai\\ peritt\u00ea=s dianoi/as katamathei=n\ne)sti/n.] Compare in Analyt. Post. I. xii. pp. 77-78, the contrast\nbetween [Greek: ta\\ math\u00ea/mata] and [Greek: oi( dia/logoi].]\n\nAmidst all these diversities, Dialectic and Demonstrative Science\nhave in common the process of Syllogism, including such assumptions\nas the rules of syllogizing postulate. In both, the conclusions are\nhypothetically true (_i.e._ granting the premisses to be so). But, in\ndemonstrative syllogism, the conclusions are true universally,\nabsolutely, and necessarily; deriving this character from their\npremisses, which Aristotle holds up as the cause, reason, or\ncondition of the conclusion. What he means by Demonstrative Science,\nwe may best conceive, by taking it as a small [Greek: te/menos] or\nspecially cultivated enclosure, subdivided into still smaller\nseparate compartments--the extreme antithesis to the vast common land\nof Dialectic. Between the two lies a large region, neither\nessentially determinate like the one, nor essentially indeterminate\nlike the other; an intermediate region in which are comprehended the\nsubjects of the treatises forming the very miscellaneous Encyclop\u00e6dia\nof Aristotle. These subjects do not admit of being handled with equal\nexactness; accordingly, he admonishes us that it is important to know\nhow much exactness is attainable in each, and not to aspire to\nmore.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. I. p. 1094, b. 12-25; p. 1098, a.\n26-b. 8; Metaphys. A. p. 995, a. 15; Ethic. Eudem. I. p. 1216, b.\n30-p. 1217, a. 17; Politic. VII. p. 1328, a. 19; Meteorolog. I. p. 338,\na. 35. Compare Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 78, b. 32 (with Waitz's\nnote, II. p. 335); and I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31.\n\nThe passages above named in the Nikomachean Ethica are remarkable:\n[Greek: le/goito d' a)\\n i(kan\u00f4=s, ei) kata\\ t\u00ea\\n u(pokeime/n\u00ean\nu(/l\u00ean diasaph\u00eathei/\u00ea; to\\ ga\\r a)kribe\\s ou)ch o(moi/\u00f4s e)n a(/pasi\ntoi=s lo/gois e)piz\u00eat\u00eate/on, \u00f4(/sper ou)d' e)n toi=s\nd\u00eamiourgoume/nois. t\u00ea\\n a)kri/beian m\u00ea\\ o(moi/\u00f4s e)n a(/pasin\ne)piz\u00eatei=n (chr\u00ea/), a)ll' e)n e(ka/stois kata\\ t\u00ea\\n u(pokeime/n\u00ean\nu(/l\u00ean, kai\\ e)pi\\ tosou=ton e)ph' o(/son oi)kei=on t\u00ea=| method\u00f4=|.]\nCompare Metaphys. E. p. 1025, b. 13: [Greek: a)podeiknu/ousin \u00ea)\\\na)nagkai/oteron \u00ea)\\ malak\u00f4/teron.]\n\nThe different degrees of exactness attainable in different\ndepartments of science, and the reasons upon which such difference\ndepends are well explained in the sixth book of Mr. John Stuart\nMill's System of Logic, vol. II. chap. iii. pp. 422-425, 5th ed.\nAristotle says that there can be no scientific theory or cognition\nabout [Greek: to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s] which he defines to be that which\nbelongs to a subject neither necessarily, nor constantly, nor\nusually, but only on occasion (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 3, 26, 33; K.\np. 1065, a. 1, meaning [Greek: to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s m\u00ea\\ kath'\nau(to/],--Analyt. Post. I. 6, 75, a. 18; for he uses the term in two\ndifferent senses--Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 31). In his view,\nthere can be no science except about constant conjunctions; and we\nfind the same doctrine in the following passage of Mr. Mill:--\"Any\nfacts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which\nfollow one another according to constant laws; although those laws\nmay not have been discovered, nor even be discoverable by our\nexisting resources. Take, for instance, the most familiar class of\nmeteorological phenomena, those of rain and sunshine. Scientific\ninquiry has not yet succeeded in ascertaining the order of antecedence\nand consequence among these phenomena, so as to be able, at least in\nour regions of the earth, to predict them with certainty, or even with\nany high degree of probability. Yet no one doubts that the phenomena\ndepend on laws. . . . . Meteorology not only has in itself every\nrequisite for being, but actually is, a science; though from the\ndifficulty of observing the facts upon which the phenomena depend (a\ndifficulty inherent in the peculiar nature of those phenomena), the\nscience is extremely imperfect; and were it perfect, might probably be\nof little avail in practice, since the data requisite for applying its\nprinciples to particular instances would rarely be procurable.\n\n\"A case may be conceived of an intermediate character between the\nperfection of science, and this its extreme imperfection. It may\nhappen that the greater causes, those on which the principal part of\nthe phenomena depends, are within the reach of observation and\nmeasurement; so that, if no other causes intervened, a complete\nexplanation could be given, not only of the phenomenon in general,\nbut of all the variations and modifications which it admits of. But\ninasmuch as other, perhaps many other, causes, separately\ninsignificant in their effects, co-operate or conflict in many or in\nall cases with those greater causes, the effect, accordingly,\npresents more or less of aberration from what would be produced by\nthe greater causes alone. Now if these minor causes are not so\nconstantly accessible, or not accessible at all, to accurate\nobservation, the principal mass of the effect may still, as before,\nbe accounted for, and even predicted; but there will be variations\nand modifications which we shall not be competent to explain\nthoroughly, and our predictions will not be fulfilled accurately, but\nonly approximately.\n\n\"It is thus, for example, with the theory of the Tides. . . . . And\nthis is what is or ought to be meant by those who speak of sciences\nwhich are not exact sciences. Astronomy was once a science, without\nbeing an exact science. It could not become exact until not only the\ngeneral course of the planetary motions, but the perturbations also,\nwere accounted for and referred to their causes. It has become an\nexact science because its phenomena have been brought under laws\ncomprehending the whole of the causes by which the phenomena are\ninfluenced, whether in a great or only in a trifling degree, whether\nin all or only in some cases, and assigning to each of those causes\nthe share of effect that really belongs to it. . . . . The science of\nhuman nature falls far short of the standard of exactness now\nrealized in Astronomy; but there is no reason that it should not be\nas much a science as Tidology is, or as Astronomy was when its\ncalculations had only mastered the main phenomena, but not the\nperturbations.\"]\n\nIn setting out the process of Demonstration, Aristotle begins from\nthe idea of teaching and learning. In every variety thereof some\n_pr\u00e6cognita_ must be assumed, which the learner must know before he\ncomes to be taught, and upon which the teacher must found his\ninstruction.[8] This is equally true, whether we proceed (as in\nSyllogism) from the more general to the less general, or (as in\nInduction) from the particular to the general. He who comes to learn\nGeometry must know beforehand the figures called circle and triangle,\nand must have a triangular figure drawn to contemplate; he must know\nwhat is a unit or monad, and must have, besides, exposed before him\nwhat is chosen as the unit for the reasoning on which he is about to\nenter. These are the _pr\u00e6cognita_ required for Geometry and\nArithmetic. Some _pr\u00e6cognita_ are also required preparatory to any\nand all reasoning: _e.g._, the maxim of Identity (fixed meaning of\nterms and propositions), and the maxims of Contradiction and of\nExcluded Middle (impossibility that a proposition and its\ncontradictory can either be both true or both false.)[9] The learner\nmust thus know beforehand certain Definitions and Axioms, as\nconditions without which the teacher cannot instruct him in any\ndemonstrative science.\n\n[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. I. i. pp. 71-72; Metaphys. A. IX. p. 992,\nb. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I, i. p. 71, a. 11-17. [Greek:\na(/pan \u00ea)\\ ph\u00ea=sai \u00ea)\\ a)poph\u00ea=sai a)l\u00eathe/s].]\n\nAristotle, here at the beginning, seeks to clear up a difficulty\nwhich had been raised in the time of Plato as between knowledge and\nlearning. How is it possible to _learn_ at all? is a question started\nin the Menon.[10] You either know a thing already, and, on this\nsupposition, you do not want to learn it; or you do not know it, and\nin this case you cannot learn it, because, even when you have learnt,\nyou cannot tell whether the matter learnt is what you were in search\nof. To this difficulty, the reply made in the Menon is, that you\nnever _do_ learn any thing really new. What you are said to learn, is\nnothing more than reminiscence of what had once been known in an\nanterior life, and forgotten at birth into the present life; what is\nsupposed to be learnt is only the recall of that which you once knew,\nbut had forgotten. Such is the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence.\nAristotle will not accept that doctrine as a solution; but he\nacknowledges the difficulty, and intimates that others had already\ntried to solve it without success. His own solution is that there are\ntwo grades of cognition: (1) the full, complete, absolute; (2) the\npartial, incomplete, qualified. What you already know by the first of\nthese grades, you cannot be said to learn; but you may learn that\nwhich you know only by the second grade, and by such learning you\nbring your incomplete cognition up to completeness.\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Menon. p. 80.]\n\nThus, you have learnt, and you know, the universal truth, that every\ntriangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; but you do\nnot yet know that A B C, D E F, G H I, &c., have their two angles\nequal to two right angles; for you have not yet seen any of these\nfigures, and you do not know that they _are_ triangles. The moment\nthat you see A B C, or hear what figure it is, you learn at one and\nthe same time two facts: first, that it is a triangle; next, by\nvirtue of your previous cognition, that it possesses the\nabove-mentioned property. You knew this _in a certain way_ or\nincompletely before, by having followed the demonstration of the\nuniversal truth, and by thus knowing that _every_ triangle had its\nthree angles equal to two right angles; but you did not know it\nabsolutely, being ignorant that A B C was a triangle.[11]\n\n[Footnote 11: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 17-b. 8: [Greek:\ne)/sti de\\ gn\u00f4ri/zein ta\\ me\\n pro/teron gn\u00f4ri/zonta, t\u00f4=n de\\ kai\\\na)/ma lamba/nonta t\u00ea\\n gn\u00f4=sin, oi(=on o(/sa tugcha/nei o)/nta u(po\\\nto\\ katho/lou, \u00f4(=n e)/chei t\u00ea\\n gn\u00f4=sin. o(/ti me\\n ga\\r pa=n\ntri/g\u00f4non e)/chei dusi\\n o)rthai=s i)/sas, pro\u00ea/|dei; o(/ti de\\ to/de\nto\\ e)n t\u00f4=| \u00ea(mikukli/\u00f4| tri/g\u00f4no/n e)stin, a(/ma e)pago/menos\ne)gn\u00f4/risen.--pri\\n d' e)pachth\u00ea=nai \u00ea)\\ labei=n sullogismo/n,\ntro/pon me/n tina i)/s\u00f4s phate/on e)pi/stasthai, tro/pon d' a)/llon\nou)/. o(\\ ga\\r m\u00ea\\ \u00ea)/|dei ei) e)/stin a(pl\u00f4=s, tou=to p\u00f4=s \u00ea)/|dei\no(/ti du/o o)rtha\\s e)/chei a(pl\u00f4=s? a)lla\\ d\u00ea=lon \u00f4(s _\u00f4(di\\ me\\n\ne)pi/statai, o(/ti katho/lou e)pi/statai, a(pl\u00f4=s d' ou)k\ne)pi/statai_.--ou)de\\n (oi)=mai) k\u00f4lu/ei, o(\\ mantha/nei, e)/stin \u00f4(s\ne)pi/stasthai, e)/sti d' \u00f4(s a)gnoei=n; a)/topon ga\\r ou)k ei)\noi)=de/ p\u00f4s o(\\ mantha/nei, a)ll' ei) \u00f4(di/, oi(=on \u00ea(=| mantha/nei\nkai\\ \u00f4(/s.] Compare also Anal. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 23, and\nMetaph. A. ii. p. 982, a. 8; Anal. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-b.\n10.)\n\nAristotle reports the solution given by others, but from which he\nhimself dissented, of the Platonic puzzle. The respondent was asked,\nDo you know that every Dyad is even?--Yes. Some Dyad was then\nproduced, which the respondent did not know to be a Dyad; accordingly\nhe did not know it to be even. Now the critics alluded to by\nAristotle said that the respondent made a wrong answer; instead of\nsaying I know every Dyad is even, he ought to have said. Every Dyad\n_which I know to be a Dyad_ is even. Aristotle pronounces that this\ncriticism is incorrect. The respondent knows the conclusion which had\npreviously been demonstrated to him; and that conclusion was, Every\ntriangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; it was not,\nEvery thing _which I know_ to be a triangle has its three angles\nequal to two right angles. This last proposition had never been\ndemonstrated, nor even stated: [Greek: ou)demi/a ga\\r pro/tasis\nlamba/netai toiau/t\u00ea, o(/ti _o(\\n su\\ oi)=das_ a)rithmo/n, _\u00ea)\\ o(\\\nsu\\ oi)=das_ eu)thu/grammon, a)lla\\ _kata\\ panto/s_] (b. 3-5).\n\nThis discussion, in the commencement of the Analytica Posteriora\n(combined with Analyt. Priora, II. xxi.), is interesting, because it\nshows that even then the difficulties were felt, about the major\nproposition of the Syllogism, which Mr. John Stuart Mill has so ably\ncleared up, for the first time, in his System of Logic. See Book II.\nch. iii. of that work, especially as it stands in the sixth edition,\nwith the note there added, pp. 232-233. You affirm, in the major\nproposition of the Syllogism, that every triangle has its three\nangles equal to two right angles; does not this include the triangle\nA, B, C, and is it not therefore a _petitio principii_? Or, if it be\nnot so, does it not assert more than you know? The Sophists (upon\nwhom both Plato and Aristotle are always severe, but who were\nvaluable contributors to the theory of Logic by fastening upon the\nweak points) attacked it on this ground, and raised against it the\npuzzle described by Aristotle (in this chapter), afterwards known as\nthe Sophism entitled [Greek: o( e)gkekalumme/nos] (see Themistius\nParaphras. I. i.; also 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,'\nVol. III. ch. xxxviii. p. 489). The critics whom Aristotle here cites\nand disapproves, virtually admitted the pertinence of this puzzle by\nmodifying their assertion, and by cutting it down to \"Everything\n_which we know to be a triangle_ has its three angles equal to two\nright angles.\" Aristotle finds fault with this modification, which,\nhowever, is one way of abating the excess of absolute and peremptory\npretension contained in the major, and of intimating the want of a\nminor to be added for interpreting and supplementing the major; while\nAristotle himself arrives at the same result by admitting that the\nknowledge corresponding to the major proposition is not yet absolute,\nbut incomplete and qualified; and that it is only made absolute when\nsupplemented by a minor.\n\nThe very same point, substantially, is raised in the discussion\nbetween Mr. John Stuart Mill and an opponent, in the note above\nreferred to. \"A writer in the 'British Quarterly Review' endeavours\nto show that there is no _petitio principii_ in the Syllogism, by\ndenying that the proposition All men are mortal, asserts or assumes\nthat Socrates is mortal. In support of this denial, he argues that we\nmay, and in fact do, admit the general proposition without having\nparticularly examined the case of Socrates, and even without knowing\nwhether the individual so named is a man or something else. But this\nof course was never denied. That we can and do draw inferences\nconcerning cases specifically unknown to us, is the datum from which\nall who discuss this subject must set out. The question is, in what\nterms the evidence or ground on which we draw these conclusions may\nbest be designated--whether it is most correct to say that the\nunknown case is proved by known cases, or that it is proved by a\ngeneral proposition including both sets of cases, the known and the\nunknown? I contend for the former mode of expression. I hold it an\nabuse of language to say, that the proof that Socrates is mortal, is\nthat all men are mortal. Turn it in what way we will, this seems to\nme asserting that a thing is the proof of itself. Whoever pronounces\nthe words, All men are mortal, has affirmed that Socrates is mortal,\nthough he may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates,\nwhether known to be a man or not, really is a man, he is included in\nthe words, All men, and in every assertion of which they are the\nsubject. . . . . The reviewer acknowledges that the maxim (Dictum de\nOmni et Nullo) as commonly expressed--'Whatever is true of a class is\ntrue of everything included in the class,' is a mere identical\nproposition, since the class _is_ nothing but the things included in\nit. But he thinks this defect would be cured by wording the maxim\nthus: 'Whatever is true of a class is true of everything which can be\nshown to be a member of the class:' as if a thing could be shown to\nbe a member of the class without being one.\"\n\nThe qualified manner in which the maxim is here enunciated by the\nreviewer (what _can be shown_ to be a member of the class)\ncorresponds with the qualification introduced by those critics whom\nAristotle impugns ([Greek: lu/ousi ga\\r ou) pha/skontes ei)de/nai\npa=san dua/da a)rti/an ou)=san, a)ll' _\u00ea(\\n i)/sasin o(/ti dua/s_]);\nand the reply of Mr. Mill would have suited for these critics as well\nas for the reviewer. The puzzle started in the Platonic Menon is, at\nbottom, founded on the same view as that of Mr. Mill, when he states\nthat the major proposition of the Syllogism includes beforehand the\nconclusion. \"The general principle, (says Mr. Mill, p. 205), instead\nof being given as evidence of the particular case, cannot itself be\ntaken for true without exception, until every shadow of doubt which\ncould affect any case comprised in it is dispelled by evidence\n_aliunde_; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove? From a\ngeneral principle we cannot infer any particulars but those which the\nprinciple itself assumes as known.\"\n\nTo enunciate this in the language of the Platonic Menon, we learn\nnothing by or through the evidence of the Syllogism, except a part of\nwhat we have already professed ourselves to know by asserting the\nmajor premiss.]\n\nAristotle proceeds to tell us what is meant by knowing a thing\n_absolutely_ or completely ([Greek: a(pl\u00f4=s]). It is when we believe\nourselves to know the cause or reason through which the matter known\nexists, so that it cannot but be as it is. That is what\nDemonstration, or Scientific Syllogism, teaches us;[12] a Syllogism\nderived from premisses true, immediate, prior to, and more knowable\nthan the conclusion--causes of the conclusion, and specially\nappropriate thereto. These premisses must be known beforehand without\nbeing demonstrated (_i.e._ known not through a middle term); and must\nbe known not merely in the sense of understanding the signification\nof the terms, but also in that of being able to affirm the truth of\nthe proposition. _Prior_ or _more knowable_ is understood here as\nprior or more knowable _by nature_ (not _relatively to us_, according\nto the antithesis formerly explained); first, most universal,\nundemonstrable _principia_ are meant. Some of these are Axioms, which\nthe learner must \"bring with him from home,\" or know before the\nteacher can instruct him in any special science; some are Definitions\nof the name and its essential meaning; others, again, are Hypotheses\nor affirmations of the existence of the thing defined, which the\nlearner must accept upon the authority of the teacher.[13] As these\nare the _principia_ of Demonstration, so it is necessary that the\nlearner should know them, not merely as well as the conclusions\ndemonstrated, but even better; and that among matters contradictory\nto the _principia_ there should be none that he knows better or\ntrusts more.[14]\n\n[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. ii. p. 71, b. 9-17. Julius\nPacius says in a note, ad c. ii. p. 394: \"Propositio demonstrativa\nest prima, immediata, et indemonstrabilis. His tribus verbis\nsignificatur una et eadem conditio; nam propositio prima est, qu\u00e6,\nquod medio caret, demonstrari nequit.\"\n\nSo also Zabarella (In lib. I. Post. Anal. Comm., p. 340, Op. ed.\nVenet. 1617): \"Du\u00e6 ill\u00e6 dictiones (_primis_ et _immediatis_) unam\ntantum significant conditionem ordine secundam, non duas; idem namque\nest, principia esse medio carentia, ac esse prima.\"]\n\n[Footnote 13: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 1-24;\nThemistius, Paraphr. I. ii. p. 10, ed. Spengel; Schol. p. 199, b. 44.\nThemistius quotes the definition of an Axiom as given by\nTheophrastus: [Greek: A)xi/\u00f4ma/ e)sti _do/xa_ tis], &c. This shows\nthe difficulty of adhering precisely to a scientific terminology.\nTheophrastus explains an axiom to be a sort of [Greek: do/xa], thus\nlapsing into the common loose use of the word. Yet still both he and\nAristotle declare [Greek: do/xa] to be of inferior intellectual worth\nas compared with [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] (Anal. Post. I. xxiii.), while\nat the same time they declare the Axiom to be the very maximum of\nscientific truth. Theophrastus gave, as examples of Axioms, the\n**maxim of Contradiction, universally applicable, and, \"If\nequals be taken from equals the remainders will be equal,\" applicable\nto homogeneous quantities. Even Aristotle himself sometimes falls\ninto the same vague employment of [Greek: do/xa], as including the\nAxioms. See Metaphys. B. ii. p. 996, b. 28; [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005,\nb. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 25, b. 4. I\ntranslate these words in conformity with Themistius, pp. 12-13, and\nwith Mr. Poste's translation, p. 43. Julius Pacius and M. Barth\u00e9lemy\nSt. Hilaire render them somewhat differently. They also read [Greek:\na)meta/pt\u00f4tos], while Waitz and Firmin Didot read [Greek:\na)meta/peistos], which last seems preferable.]\n\nIn Aristotle's time two doctrines had been advanced, in opposition to\nthe preceding theory: (1) Some denied the necessity of any\nindemonstrable _principia_, and affirmed the possibility of,\ndemonstrating backwards _ad infinitum_; (2) Others agreed in denying\nthe necessity of any indemonstrable _principia_, but contended that\ndemonstration in a circle is valid and legitimate--_e.g._ that A may\nbe demonstrated by means of B, and B by means of A. Against both\nthese doctrines Aristotle enters his protest. The first of them--the\nsupposition of an interminable regress--he pronounces to be obviously\nabsurd: the second he declares tantamount to proving a thing by\nitself; the circular demonstration, besides, having been shown to be\nimpossible, except in the First figure, with propositions in which\nthe predicate reciprocates or is co-extensive with the subject--a\nvery small proportion among propositions generally used in\ndemonstrating.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 5-p. 73, a.\n20: [Greek: \u00f4(/st' e)peid\u00ea\\ _o)li/ga toiau=ta_ e)n tai=s\na)podei/xesin], &c.]\n\nDemonstrative Science is attained only by syllogizing from necessary\npremisses, such as cannot possibly be other than they are. The\npredicate must be (1) _de omni_, (2) _per se_, (3) _quatenus ipsum_,\nso that it is a _Primum Universale_; this third characteristic not\nbeing realized without the preceding two. First, the predicate must\nbelong, and belong at all times, to everything called by the name of\nthe subject. Next, it must belong thereunto _per se_, or essentially;\nthat is, either the predicate must be stated in the definition\ndeclaring the essence of the subject, or the subject must be stated\nin the definition declaring the essence of the predicate. The\npredicate must not be extra-essential to the subject, nor attached to\nit as an adjunct from without, simply concomitant or accidental. The\nlike distinction holds in regard to events: some are accidentally\nconcomitant sequences which may or may not be realized (_e.g._, a\nflash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey); in\nothers, the conjunction is necessary or causal (as when an animal\ndies under the sacrificial knife).[16] Both these two characteristics\n(_de omni_ and _per se_) are presupposed in the third (_quatenus\nipsum_); but this last implies farther, that the predicate is\nattached to the subject in the highest universality consistent with\ntruth; _i.e._, that it is a First Universal, a primary predicate and\nnot a derivative predicate. Thus, the predicate of having its three\nangles equal to two right angles, is a characteristic not merely _de\nomni_ and _per se_, but also a First Universal, applied to a\ntriangle. It is applied to a triangle, _quatenus_ triangle, as a\nprimary predicate. If applied to a subject of higher universality\n(_e.g._, to every geometrical figure), it would not be always true.\nIf applied to a subject of lower universality (_e.g._, to a\nright-angled triangle or an isosceles triangle), it would be\nuniversally true and would be true _per se_, but it would be a\nderivative predicate and not a First Universal; it would not be\napplied to the isosceles _quatenus_ isosceles, for there is a still\nhigher Universal of which it is predicable, being true respecting\nany triangle you please. Thus, the properties with which\nDemonstration, or full and absolute Science, is conversant, are _de\nomni_, _per se_, and _quatenus ipsum_, or _Universalia Prima_;[17]\nall of them necessary, such as cannot but be true.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 21, b. 16.\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ a)/ra lego/mena e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n a(pl\u00f4=s e)pist\u00eat\u00f4=n kath'\nau(ta\\ ou(/t\u00f4s \u00f4(s e)nupa/rchein toi=s kat\u00eagoroume/nois \u00ea)\\\ne)nupa/rchesthai di' au(ta/ te/ e)sti kai\\ e)x a)na/gk\u00eas] (b. 16,\nseq.). _Line_ must be included in the definition of the opposites\n_straight_ or _curve_. Also it is essential to every line that it is\neither straight or curve. _Number_ must be included in the definition\nof the opposites _odd_ or _even_; and to be either odd or even is\nessentially predicable of every number. You cannot understand what is\nmeant by _straight_ or _curve_ unless you have the notion of a\n_line_.\n\nThe example given by Aristotle of _causal_ conjunction (the death of\nan animal under the sacrificial knife) shows that he had in his mind\nthe perfection of Inductive Observation, including full application\nof the Method of Difference.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, b. 25-p. 74, a. 3.\n[Greek: o(\\ toi/nun _to\\ tucho\\n pr\u00f4=ton_ dei/knutai du/o o)rtha\\s\ne)/chon \u00ea)\\ o(tiou=n a)/llo, tou/t\u00f4| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| u(pa/rchei katho/lou,\nkai\\ \u00ea( _a)po/deixis kath' au(to\\_ tou/tou katho/lou e)sti\\, t\u00f4=n d'\na)/ll\u00f4n tro/pon tina\\ ou) kath' au(to/; ou)de\\ tou= i)soske/lous ou)k\ne)/sti katho/lou a)ll' e)pi\\ ple/on.]\n\nAbout the precise signification of [Greek: katho/lou] in Aristotle,\nsee a valuable note of Bonitz (ad Metaphys. Z. iii.) p. 299; also\nWaitz (ad Aristot. De Interpr. c. vii.) I. p. 334. Aristotle gives it\nhere, b. 26: [Greek: katho/lou de\\ le/g\u00f4 o(\\ a)\\n kata\\ panto/s te\nu(pa/rch\u00ea| kai\\ kath' au(to\\ kai\\ \u00ea(=| au)to/.] Compare Themistius,\nParaphr. p. 19, Spengel. [Greek: To\\ kath' au(to/] is described by\nAristotle confusedly. [Greek: To\\ katho/lou], is that which is\npredicable of the subject as a whole or _summum genus_: [Greek: to\\\nkata\\ panto/s], that which is predicable of every individual, either\nof the _summum genus_ or of any inferior species contained therein.\nCf. Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: \u00f4(=| ga\\r kath'\nau(to\\ u(pa/rchei ti, tou=to au)to\\ au(t\u00f4=| ai)/tion]--the subject is\nitself the cause or _fundamentum_ of the properties _per se_. See the\nexplanation and references in Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie des\nAristoteles, ch. v. pp. 160-165.]\n\nAristotle remarks that there is great liability to error about these\n_Universalia Prima_. We sometimes demonstrate a predicate to be true,\nuniversally and _per se_, of a lower species, without being aware\nthat it might also be demonstrated to be true, universally and _per\nse_, of the higher genus to which that species belongs; perhaps,\nindeed, that higher genus may not yet have obtained a current name.\nThat proportions hold by permutation, was demonstrated severally for\nnumbers, lines, solids, and intervals of time; but this belongs to\neach of them, not from any separate property of each, but from what\nis common to all: that, however, which is common to all had received\nno name, so that it was not known that one demonstration might\ncomprise all the four.[18] In like manner, a man may know that an\nequilateral and an isosceles triangle have their three angles equal\nto two right angles, and also that a scalene triangle has its three\nangles equal to two right angles; yet he may not know (except\nsophistically and by accident[19]) that a triangle _in genere_ has\nits three angles equal to two right angles, though there be no other\ntriangles except equilateral, isosceles, and scalene. He does not\nknow that this may be demonstrated of every triangle _quatenus_\ntriangle. The only way to obtain a certain recognition of _Primum\nUniversale_, is, to abstract successively from the several conditions\nof a demonstration respecting the concrete and particular, until the\nproposition ceases to be true. Thus, you have before you a brazen\nisosceles triangle, the three angles whereof are equal to two right\nangles. You may eliminate the condition brazen, and the proposition\nwill still remain true. You may also eliminate the condition\nisosceles; still the proposition is true. But you cannot eliminate\nthe condition triangle, so as to retain only the higher genus,\ngeometrical figure; for the proposition then ceases to be always\ntrue. Triangle is in this case the _Primum Universale_.[20]\n\n[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. v. p. 74, a. 4-23. [Greek:\na)lla\\ dia\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai \u00f4)nomasme/non ti pa/nta tau=ta e(/n,\na)rithmoi/, m\u00ea/k\u00ea, chro/nos, sterea/, kai\\ ei)/dei diaphe/rein\na)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n, ch\u00f4ri\\s e)lamba/neto.] What these four have in common is\nthat which he himself expresses by [Greek: Poso/n]--_Quantum_--in the\nCategori\u00e6 and elsewhere. (Categor. p. 4, b. 20, seq.; Metaph. [Greek:\nD]. p. 1020, a. 7, seq.)]\n\n[Footnote 19: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. v. p. 74, a. 27: [Greek:\nou)/p\u00f4 oi)=de to\\ tri/g\u00f4non o(/ti du/o o)rthai=s, ei) m\u00ea\\ _to\\n\nsophistiko\\n tro/pon_ ou)de\\ katho/lou tri/g\u00f4non, ou)/d' ei) m\u00eade/n\ne)sti para\\ tau=ta tri/g\u00f4non e(/teron.] The phrase [Greek: to\\n\nsophistiko\\n tro/pon] is equivalent to [Greek: to\\n sophistiko\\n\n**tro/pon to\\n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s], p. 71, b. 10. I see nothing\nin it connected with Aristotle's characteristic of a Sophist (special\nprofessional life purpose--[Greek: tou= bi/ou t\u00ea=| proaire/sei],\nMetaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1004, b. 24): the phrase means nothing more\nthan _unscientific_.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Aristot. Analyt Post I. v. p. 74, a. 32-b. 4.]\n\nIn every demonstration the _principia_ or premisses must be not only\ntrue, but necessarily true; the conclusion also will then be\nnecessarily true, by reason of the premisses, and this constitutes\nDemonstration. Wherever the premisses are necessarily true, the\nconclusion will be necessarily true; but you cannot say, _vice\nvers\u00e2_, that wherever the conclusion is necessarily true, the\nsyllogistic premisses from which it follows must always be\nnecessarily true. They may be true without being necessarily true, or\nthey may even be false: if, then, the conclusion be necessarily true,\nit is not so by reason of these premisses; and the syllogistic proof\nis in this case no demonstration. Your syllogism may have true\npremisses and may lead to a conclusion which is true by reason of\nthem; but still you have not demonstrated, since neither premisses\nnor conclusion are _necessarily_ true.[21] When an opponent contests\nyour demonstration, he succeeds if he can disprove the _necessity_ of\nyour conclusion; if he can show any single case in which it either is\nor may be false.[22] It is not enough to proceed upon a premiss which\nis either probable or simply true: it may be true, yet not\nappropriate to the case: you must take your departure from the first\nor highest universal of the genus about which you attempt to\ndemonstrate.[23] Again, unless you can state the _why_ of your\nconclusion; that is to say, unless the middle term, by reason of\nwhich the conclusion is necessarily true, be itself necessarily\ntrue,--you have not demonstrated it, nor do you know it absolutely.\nYour middle term not being necessary may vanish, while the conclusion\nto which it was supposed to lead abides: in truth no conclusion was\nknown through that middle.[24] In the complete demonstrative or\nscientific syllogism, the major term must be predicable essentially\nor _per se_ of the middle, and the middle term must be predicable\nessentially or _per se_ of the minor; thus alone can you be sure that\nthe conclusion also is _per se_ or necessary. The demonstration\ncannot take effect through a middle term which is merely a Sign; the\nsign, even though it be a constant concomitant, yet being not, or at\nleast not known to be, _per se_, will not bring out the _why_ of the\nconclusion, nor make the conclusion necessary. Of non-essential\nconcomitants altogether there is no demonstration; wherefore it might\nseem to be useless to put questions about such; yet, though the\nquestions cannot yield necessary premisses for a demonstrative\nconclusion, they may yield premisses from which a conclusion will\nnecessarily follow.[25]\n\n[Footnote 21: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 5-18. [Greek: e)x a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n me\\n\nga\\r e)/sti kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)podeiknu/nta sullogi/sthai, e)x a)nagkai/\u00f4n d'\nou)k e)/stin a)ll' \u00ea)\\ a)podeiknu/nta; tou=to ga\\r \u00ea)/d\u00ea\na)podei/xe\u00f4/s e)stin.] Compare Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 53, b. 7-25.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 18: [Greek:\ns\u00eamei=on d' o(/ti \u00ea( a)po/deixis e)x a)nagkai/\u00f4n, o(/ti kai\\ ta\\s\ne)nsta/seis ou(/t\u00f4 phe/romen pro\\s tou\\s oi)ome/nous a)podeiknu/nai,\no(/ti ou)k a)na/gk\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 21-26: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon d' e)k\ntou/t\u00f4n kai\\ o(/ti eu)\u00ea/theis oi( lamba/nein oi)o/menoi kal\u00f4=s ta\\s\na)rcha/s, e)a\\n e)/ndoxos \u00ea)=| \u00ea( pro/tasis kai\\ a)l\u00eath\u00ea/s, oi(=on\noi( sophistai\\ o(/ti to\\ e)pi/stasthai to\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean e)/chein;],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 26-p. 75, a.\n17.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ibid. vi. p. 75, a. 8-37.\n\nOn the point last mentioned, M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire observes in\nhis note, p. 41: \"Dans les questions de dialectique, la conclusion\nest n\u00e9cessaire en ce sens, qu'elle suit n\u00e9cessairement des pr\u00e9misses;\nelle n'est pas du tout n\u00e9cessaire en ce sens, que la chose qu'elle\nexprime soit n\u00e9cessaire. Ainsi il faut distinguer la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la\nforme et la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la mati\u00e8re: ou comme disent les\nscholastiques, _necessitas illationis et necessitas materi\u00e6_. La\ndialectique se contente de la premi\u00e8re, mais la demonstration a\nessentiellement besoin des deux.\"]\n\nIn every demonstration three things may be distinguished: (1) The\ndemonstrated conclusion, or Attribute essential to a certain genus;\n(2) The Genus, of which the attributes _per se_ are the matter of\ndemonstration; (3) The Axioms, out of which, or through which, the\ndemonstration is obtained. These Axioms may be and are common to\nseveral genera: but the demonstration cannot be transferred from one\ngenus to another; both the extremes as well as the middle term must\nbelong to the same genus. An arithmetical demonstration cannot be\ntransferred to magnitudes and their properties, except in so far as\nmagnitudes are numbers, which is partially true of some among them.\nThe demonstrations in arithmetic may indeed be transferred to\nharmonics, because harmonics is subordinate to arithmetic; and, for\nthe like reason, demonstrations in geometry may be transferred to\nmechanics and optics. But we cannot introduce into geometry any\nproperty of lines, which does not belong to them _qu\u00e2_ lines; such,\nfor example, as that a straight line is the most beautiful of all\nlines, or is the contrary of a circular line; for these predicates\nbelong to it, not _qu\u00e2_ line, but _qu\u00e2_ member of a different or more\nextensive genus.[26] There can be no complete demonstration about\nperishable things, or about any individual line, except in regard to\nits attributes as member of the genus line. Where the conclusion is\nnot eternally true, but true at one time and not true at another,\nthis can only be because one of its premisses is not universal or\nessential. Where both premisses are universal and essential, the\nconclusion must be eternal or eternally true. As there is no\ndemonstration, so also there can be no definition, of perishable\nattributes.[27]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. vii. p. 75, a. 38-b. 20. Mr. Poste, in his\ntranslation, here cites (p. 50) a good illustrative passage from Dr.\nWhewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Book II. ii.:--\"But,\nin order that we may make any real advance in the discovery of truth,\nour ideas must not only be clear; they must also be _appropriate_.\nEach science has for its basis a different class of ideas; and the\nsteps which constitute the progress of one science can never be made\nby employing the ideas of another kind of science. No genuine advance\ncould ever be obtained in Mechanics by applying to the subject the\nideas of space and time merely; no advance in Chemistry by the use of\nmere mechanical conceptions; no discovery in Physiology by referring\nfacts to mere chemical and mechanical principles.\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. viii. p. 75, b. 21-36.\nCompare Metaphys. Z. p. 1040, a. 1: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea au)t\u00f4=n (t\u00f4=n phthart\u00f4=n) ou)/th' o(rismo\\s ou)/t'\na)po/deixis]. Also Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, ch. iv. p.\n249.]\n\nFor complete demonstration, it is not sufficient that the premisses\nbe true, immediate, and undemonstrable; they must, furthermore, be\nessential and appropriate to the class in hand. Unless they be such,\nyou cannot be said to know the conclusion _absolutely_; you know it\nonly by accident. You can only know a conclusion when demonstrated\nfrom its own appropriate premisses; and you know it best when it is\ndemonstrated from its highest premisses. It is sometimes difficult to\ndetermine whether we really know or not; for we fancy that we know,\nwhen we demonstrate from true and universal _principia_, without\nbeing aware whether they are, or are not, the _principia_ appropriate\nto the case.[28] But these _principia_ must always be assumed without\ndemonstration--the class whose essential constituent properties are\nin question, the universal Axioms, and the Definition or meaning of\nthe attributes to be demonstrated. If these definitions and axioms\nare not always formally enunciated, it is because we tacitly presume\nthem to be already known and admitted by the learner.[29] He may\nindeed always refuse to grant them in express words, but they are\nsuch that he cannot help granting them by internal assent in his\nmind, to which every syllogism must address itself. When you assume a\npremiss without demonstrating it, though it be really demonstrable,\nthis, if the learner is favourable and willing to grant it, is an\nassumption or Hypothesis, valid relatively to him alone, but not\nvalid absolutely: if he is reluctant or adverse, it is a Postulate,\nwhich you claim whether he is satisfied or not.[30] The Definition by\nitself is not an hypothesis; for it neither affirms nor denies the\nexistence of anything. The pupil must indeed understand the terms of\nit; but this alone is not an hypothesis, unless you call the fact\nthat the pupil comes to learn, an hypothesis.[31] The Hypothesis or\nassumption is contained in the premisses, being that by which the\nreason of the conclusion comes to be true. Some object that the\ngeometer makes a false hypothesis or assumption, when he declares a\ngiven line drawn to be straight, or to be a foot long, though it is\nneither one nor the other. But this objection has no pertinence,\nsince the geometer does not derive his conclusions from what is true\nof the visible lines drawn before his eyes, but from what is true of\nthe lines conceived in his own mind, and signified or illustrated by\nthe visible diagrams.[32]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ibid. ix. p. 75, b. 37-p. 76, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ibid. x. p. 76, a. 31-b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. x. p. 76, b. 29-34: [Greek:\ne)a\\n me\\n dokou=nta lamba/n\u00ea| t\u00f4=| mantha/nonti, u(poti/thetai, kai\\\ne)/stin ou)/ch a(pl\u00f4=s u(po/thesis, a)lla\\ pro\\s e)kei=non mo/non,\na)\\n de\\ \u00ea)\\ m\u00eademi/a=s e)nou/s\u00eas do/x\u00eas \u00ea)\\ kai\\ e)nanti/as\ne)nou/s\u00eas lamba/n\u00ea| to\\ au)to/, ai)tei=tai. kai\\ tou/t\u00f4| diaphe/rei\n_u(po/thesis_ kai\\ _ai)/t\u00eama_], &c. Themistius, Paraphras. p. 37,\nSpengel.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 76, b. 36: [Greek: tou=to d' ou)ch\nu(po/thesis, ei) m\u00ea\\ kai\\ _to\\ a)kou/ein_ u(po/thesi/n tis ei)=nai\nph\u00ea/sei]. For the meaning of [Greek: _to\\ a)kou/ein_], compare\n[Greek: o( a)kou/\u00f4n], infra, Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Ibid. p. 77, a. 1: [Greek: o( de\\ ge\u00f4me/tr\u00eas ou)de\\n\nsumperai/netai t\u00f4=| t\u00ea/nde ei)=nai t\u00ea\\n gramm\u00ea\\n \u00ea(\\n au)to\\s\ne)/phthegktai, a)lla\\ ta\\ dia\\ tou/t\u00f4n d\u00ealou/mena.]\n\nThemistius, Paraphr. p. 37: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper ou)d' oi( ge\u00f4me/trai\nke/chr\u00eantai tai=s grammai=s u(pe\\r \u00f4(=n diale/gontai kai\\\ndeiknu/ousin, a)ll' a(\\s e)/chousin e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|, \u00f4(=n ei)si\\\nsu/mbola ai( grapho/menai.]\n\nA similar doctrine is asserted, Analyt. Prior. I. xli. p. 49, b. 35,\nand still more clearly in De Memoria et Reminiscentia, p. 450,\na. 2-12.]\n\nThe process of Demonstration neither requires, nor countenances, the\nPlatonic theory of Ideas--universal substances beyond and apart from\nparticulars. But it does require that we should admit universal\npredications; that is, one and the same predicate truly applicable in\nthe same sense to many different particulars. Unless this be so,\nthere can be no universal major premiss, nor appropriate middle term,\nnor valid demonstrative syllogism.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xi. p. 77, a. 5-9.]\n\nThe Maxim or Axiom of Contradiction, in its most general enunciation,\nis never formally enunciated by any special science; but each of them\nassumes the Maxim so far as applicable to its own purpose, whenever\nthe _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is introduced.[34] It is in this and the\nother common principles or Axioms that all the sciences find their\npoint of contact and communion; and that Dialectic also comes into\ncommunion with all of them, as also the science (First Philosophy)\nthat scrutinizes the validity or demonstrability of the Axioms.[35]\nThe dialectician is not confined to any one science, or to any\ndefinite subject-matter. His liberty of interrogation is unlimited;\nbut his procedure is essentially interrogatory, and he is bound to\naccept the answer of the respondent--whatever it be, affirmative or\nnegative--as premiss for any syllogism that he may construct. In this\nway he can never be sure of demonstrating any thing; for the\naffirmative and the negative will not be equally serviceable for that\npurpose. There is indeed also, in discussions on the separate\nsciences, a legitimate practice of scientific interrogation. Here the\nquestions proper to be put are limited in number, and the answers\nproper to be made are determined beforehand by the truths of the\nscience--say Geometry; still, an answer thus correctly made will\nserve to the interrogator as premiss for syllogistic\ndemonstration.[36] The respondent must submit to have such answer\ntested by appeal to geometrical _principia_ and to other geometrical\npropositions already proved as legitimate conclusions from the\n_principia_; if he finds himself involved in contradictions, he is\nconfuted _qu\u00e2_ geometer, and must correct or modify his answer. But\nhe is not bound, _qu\u00e2_ geometer, to undergo scrutiny as to the\ngeometrical _principia_ themselves; this would carry the dialogue out\nof the province of Geometry into that of First Philosophy and\nDialectic. Care, indeed, must be taken to keep both questions and\nanswers within the limits of the science. Now there can be no\nsecurity for this restriction, except in the scientific competence of\nthe auditors. Refrain, accordingly, from all geometrical discussions\namong men ignorant of geometry and confine yourself to geometrical\nauditors, who alone can distinguish what questions and answers are\nreally appropriate. And what is here said about geometry, is equally\ntrue about the other special sciences.[37] Answers may be improper\neither as foreign to the science under debate, or as appertaining to\nthe science, yet false as to the matter, or as equivocal in middle\nterm; though this last is less likely to occur in Geometry, since the\ndemonstrations are accompanied by diagrams, which help to render\nconspicuous any such ambiguity.[38] To an inductive proposition,\nbringing forward a single case as contributory to an ultimate\ngeneralization, no general objection should be offered; the objection\nshould be reserved until the generalization itself is tendered.[39]\nSometimes the mistake is made of drawing an affirmative conclusion\nfrom premisses in the Second figure; this is formally wrong, but the\nconclusion may in some cases be true, if the major premiss happens to\nbe a reciprocating proposition, having its predicate co-extensive\nwith its subject. This, however, cannot be presumed; nor can a\nconclusion be made to yield up its principles by necessary\nreciprocation; for we have already observed that, though the truth of\nthe premisses certifies the truth of the conclusion, we cannot say\n_vice vers\u00e2_ that the truth of the conclusion certifies the truth of\nthe premisses. Yet propositions are more frequently found to\nreciprocate in scientific discussion than in Dialectic; because, in\nthe former, we take no account of accidental properties, but only of\ndefinitions and what follows from them.[40]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. a. 10, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ibid. a. 26-30: [Greek: kai\\ ei)/ tis katho/lou\npeir\u00f4=|to deiknu/nai ta\\ koina/, oi(=on o(/ti a(/pan pha/nai \u00ea)\\\na)popha/nai, \u00ea)\\ o(/ti i)/sa a)po\\ i)/s\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n\na)/tta.] Compare Metaph. K. p. 1061**, b. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xii, p. 77, a. 36-40;\nThemistius, p. 40.\n\nThe text is here very obscure. He proceeds to distinguish Geometry\nespecially (also other sciences, though less emphatically) from\n[Greek: ta\\ e)n toi=s dialo/gois] (I. xii. p. 78, a. 12).\n\nJulius Pacius, ad Analyt. Post. I. viii. (he divides the chapters\ndifferently), p. 417, says:--\"Differentia interrogationis dialectic\u00e6\net demonstrativ\u00e6 h\u00e6c est. Dialecticus ita interrogat, ut optionem det\nadversario, utrum malit affirmare an negare. Demonstrator vero\ninterrogat ut rem evidentiorem faciat; id est, ut doceat ex\nprincipiis auditori notis.\"]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 1-15; Themistius, p. 41:\n[Greek: ou) ga\\r \u00f4(/sper t\u00f4=n e)ndo/x\u00f4n oi( polloi\\ kritai/, ou(/t\u00f4\nkai\\ t\u00f4=n kat' e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean oi( a)nepist\u00ea/mones].]\n\n[Footnote 38: Analyt. Post. I. xii. p. 77, b. 16-33. Propositions\nwithin the limits of the science, but false as to matter, are styled\nby Aristotle [Greek: pseudograph\u00ea/mata]. See Aristot. Sophist.\nElench. xi. p. 171, b. 14; p. 172, a. 1.\n\n\"L'interrogation syllogistique se confondant avec la proposition, il\ns'ensuit que l'interrogation doit \u00eatre, comme la proposition, propre\n\u00e0 la science dont il s'agit.\" (Barth\u00e9lemy St Hilaire, note, p. 70).\nInterrogation here has a different meaning from that which it bears\nin Dialectic.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77**, b. 34 seq. This passage is to\nme hardly intelligible. It is differently understood by commentators\nand translators. John Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 217, b. 17-32,\nBrandis), cites the explanation of it given by Ammonius, but rejects\nthat explanation, and waits for others to supply him with a better.\nZabarella (Comm. in Analyt. Post. pp. 426, 456, ed. Venet 1617)\nadmits that as it stands, and where it stands, it is unintelligible,\nbut transposes it to another part of the book (to the end of cap.\nxvii., immediately before the words [Greek: phanero\\n de\\ kai\\\no(/ti], &c., of c. xviii.), and gives an explanation of it in this\naltered position. But I do not think he has succeeded in clearing it\nup.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 40-p. 78, a. 13.]\n\nKnowledge of Fact and knowledge of the Cause must be distinguished,\nand even within the same Science.[41] In some syllogisms the\nconclusion only brings out [Greek: to\\ o(/ti]--the reality of certain\nfacts; in others, it ends in [Greek: to\\ dio/ti]--the affirmation of\na cause, or of the _Why_. The syllogism of the _Why_ is, where the\nmiddle term is not merely the cause, but the proximate cause, of the\nconclusion. Often, however, the effect is more notorious, so that we\nemploy it as middle term, and conclude from it to its reciprocating\ncause; in which case our syllogism is only of the [Greek: o(/ti]; and\nso it is also when we employ as middle term a cause not proximate but\nremote, concluding from that to the effect.[42] Sometimes the\nsyllogisms of the [Greek: o(/ti] may fall under one science, those of\nthe [Greek: dio/ti] under another, namely, in the case where one\nscience is subordinate to another, as optics to geometry, and\nharmonics to arithmetic; the facts of optics and harmonics belonging\nto sense and observation, the causes thereof to mathematical\nreasoning. It may happen, then, that a man knows [Greek: to\\ dio/ti]\nwell, but is comparatively ignorant [Greek: tou= o(/ti]: the geometer\nmay have paid little attention to optical facts.[43] Cognition of the\n[Greek: dio/ti] is the maximum, the perfection, of all cognition; and\nthis, comprising arithmetical and geometrical theorems, is almost\nalways attained by syllogisms in the First figure. This figure is the\nmost truly scientific of the three; the other two figures depend upon\nit for expansion and condensation. It is, besides, the only one in\nwhich universal affirmative conclusions can be obtained; for in the\nSecond figure we get only negative conclusions; in the Third, only\nparticular. Accordingly, propositions declaring Essence or\nDefinition, obtained only through universal affirmative conclusions,\nare yielded in none but the First figure.[44]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. I. xiii. p. 77, a. 22 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Themistius, p. 45: [Greek: polla/kis sumbai/nei kai\\\na)ntistre/phein a)ll\u00ea/lois to\\ ai)tion kai\\ to\\ s\u00eamei=on kai\\ a)/mph\u00f4\ndei/knusthai di' a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n, dia\\ tou= s\u00eamei/ou me\\n \u00f4(s to\\ o(/ti,\ndia\\ thate/rou de\\ \u00f4(s to\\ dio/ti.]\n\n\"Cum enim vera demonstratio, id est [Greek: tou= dio/ti], fiat per\ncausam proximam, consequens est, ut demonstratio vel per effectum\nproximum, vel per causam remotam, sit demonstratio [Greek: tou=\no(/ti]\" (Julius Pacius, Comm. p. 422).\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire observes (Note, p. 82):--\"La cause \u00e9loign\u00e9e\nnon imm\u00e9diate, donne un syllogisme dans la seconde figure.--Il est\nvrai qu'Aristote n'appelle cause que la cause imm\u00e9diate; et que la\ncause \u00e9loign\u00e9e n'est pas pour lui une v\u00e9ritable cause.\"\n\nSee in Schol. p. 188, a. 19, the explanation given by Alexander of\nthe syllogism [Greek: tou= dio/ti].]\n\n[Footnote 43: Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 79, a. 2, seq.: [Greek:\ne)ntau=tha ga\\r to\\ me\\n o(/ti t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eatik\u00f4=n ei)de/nai, to\\ de\\\ndio/ti t\u00f4=n math\u00eamatik\u00f4=n], &c. Compare Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p.\n67, a. 11; and Metaphys. A. p. 981, a. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Analyt. Post. I. xiv. p. 79, a. 17-32.]\n\nAs there are some affirmative propositions that are indivisible,\n_i.e._, having affirmative predicates which belong to a subject at\nonce, directly, immediately, indivisibly,--so there are also some\nindivisible negative propositions, _i.e._, with predicates that\nbelong negatively to a subject at once, directly, &c. In all such\nthere is no intermediate step to justify either the affirmation of\nthe predicate, or the negation of the predicate, respecting the given\nsubject. This will be the case where neither the predicate nor the\nsubject is contained in any higher genus.[45]\n\n[Footnote 45: Ibid. I. xv. p. 79, a. 33-b. 22. The point which\nAristotle here especially insists upon is, that there may be and are\nimmediate, undemonstrable, _negative_ (as well as affirmative)\npredicates: [Greek: phanero\\n ou)=n o(/ti e)nde/chetai/ te a)/llo\na)/ll\u00f4| _m\u00ea\\ u(pa/rchein_ a)to/m\u00f4s]. (Themistius, Paraphr. p. 48,\nSpengel: [Greek: a)/mesoi de\\ prota/seis ou) katapha/seis mo/non\nei)si/n, a)lla\\ kai\\ a)popha/seis o(moi/\u00f4s ai(\\ m\u00ea\\ du/nantai dia\\\nsullogismou= deichth\u00ea=nai, au(=tai d' ei)si\\n e)ph' \u00f4(=n ou)dete/rou\nt\u00f4=n o(/r\u00f4n a)/llos tis o(/lou kat\u00eagorei=tai.]) It had been already\nshown, in an earlier chapter of this treatise (p. 72, b. 19), that\nthere were _affirmative_ predicates immediate and undemonstrable.\nThis may be compared with that which Plato declares in the Sophistes\n(pp. 253-254, seq.) about the intercommunion [Greek: t\u00f4=n gen\u00f4=n kai\\\nt\u00f4=n ei)d\u00f4=n] with each other. Some of them admit such\nintercommunion, others repudiate it.]\n\nIn regard both to these propositions immediate and indivisible, and\nto propositions mediate and deducible, there are two varieties of\nerror.[46] You may err simply, from ignorance, not knowing better,\nand not supposing yourself to know at all; or your error may be a\nfalse conclusion, deduced by syllogism through a middle term, and\naccompanied by a belief on your part that you do know. This may\nhappen in different ways. Suppose the negative proposition, No B is\nA, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then, if you conclude the\ncontrary of this[47] (All B is A) to be true, by syllogism through\nthe middle term C, your syllogism must be in the First figure; it\nmust have the minor premiss false (since B is brought under C, when\nit is not contained in any higher genus), and it may have both\npremisses false. Again, suppose the affirmative proposition, All B is\nA, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then if you conclude the\ncontrary of this (No B is A) to be true, by syllogism through the\nmiddle term C, your syllogism may be in the First figure, but it may\nalso be in the Second figure, your false conclusion being negative.\nIf it be in the First figure, both its premisses may be false, or one\nof them only may be false, either indifferently.[48] If it be in the\nSecond figure, either premiss singly may be wholly false, or both may\nbe partly false.[49]\n\n[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia\nkat' a)po/phasin--a)/gnoia kata\\ dia/thesin]. See Themistius, p. 49,\nSpengel. In regard to simple and uncombined ideas, ignorance is not\npossible as an erroneous combination, but only as a mental blank. You\neither have the idea and thus know so much truth, or you have not the\nidea and are thus ignorant to that extent; this is the only\nalternative. Cf. Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1051, a. 34; De\nAnim\u00e2, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 29. M. Barth\u00e9lemy St.\nHilaire remarks (p. 95, n.):--\"Il faut remarquer qu'Aristote ne\ns'occupe que des modes universels dans la premi\u00e8re et dans la seconde\nfigure, parceque, la d\u00e9monstration \u00e9tant toujours universelle, les\npropositions qui expriment l'erreur oppos\u00e9e doivent l'\u00eatre comme\nelle. Ainsi ce sont les propositions contraires, et non les\ncontradictoires, dont il sera question ici.\"\n\nFor the like reason the Third figure is not mentioned here, but only\nthe First and Second: because in the Third figure no universal\nconclusion can be proved (Julius Pacius, p. 431).]\n\n[Footnote 48: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, a. 6-26.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 27-b. 14: [Greek: e)n de\\ t\u00f4=| me/s\u00f4|\nsch\u00ea/mati o(/las me\\n ei)=nai ta\\s prota/seis a)mphote/ras pseudei=s\nou)k e)nde/chetai--e)pi/ ti d' e(kate/ran ou)de\\n k\u00f4lu/ei pseud\u00ea=\nei)=nai.]]\n\nLet us next assume the affirmative proposition, All B is A, to be\ntrue, but mediate and deducible through the middle term C. If you\nconclude the contrary of this (No B is A) through the same middle\nterm C, in the First figure, your error cannot arise from falsity in\nthe minor premiss, because your minor (by the laws of the figure)\nmust be affirmative; your error must arise from a false major,\nbecause a negative major is not inconsistent with the laws of the\nFirst figure. On the other hand, if you conclude the contrary in the\nFirst figure through a different middle term, D, either both your\npremisses will be false, or your minor premiss will be false.[50] If\nyou employ the Second figure to conclude your contrary, both your\npremisses cannot be false, though either one of them singly may be\nfalse.[51]\n\n[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, b. 17-p. 81, a. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 81, a. 5-14.]\n\nSuch will be the case when the deducible proposition assumed to be\ntrue is affirmative, and when therefore the contrary conclusion which\nyou profess to have proved is negative. But if the deducible\nproposition assumed to be true is negative, and if consequently the\ncontrary conclusion must be affirmative,--then, if you try to prove\nthis contrary through the same middle term, your premisses cannot\nboth be false, but your major premiss must always be false.[52] If,\nhowever, you try to prove the contrary through a different and\ninappropriate middle term, you cannot convert the minor premiss to\nits contrary (because the minor premiss must continue affirmative, in\norder that you may arrive at any conclusion at all), but the major\ncan be so converted. Should the major premiss thus converted be true,\nthe minor will be false; should the major premiss thus converted be\nfalse, the minor may be either true or false. Either one of the\npremisses, or both the premisses, may thus be false.[53]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ibid. xvii. p. 81, a. 15-20.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ibid. a. 20-34. Mr. Poste's translation (pp. 65-70) is\nvery perspicuous and instructive in regard to these two difficult\nchapters.]\n\nErrors of simple ignorance (not concluded from false syllogism) may\nproceed from defect or failure of sensible perception, in one or\nother of its branches. For without sensation there can be no\ninduction; and it is from induction only that the premisses for\ndemonstration by syllogism are obtained. We cannot arrive at\nuniversal propositions, even in what are called abstract sciences,\nexcept through induction of particulars; nor can we demonstrate\nexcept from universals. Induction and Demonstration are the only two\nways of learning; and the particulars composing our inductions can\nonly be known through sense.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, a. 38-b. 9. In this\nimportant chapter (the doctrines of which are more fully expanded in\nthe last chapter of the Second Book of the Analyt. Post.), the text\nof Waitz does not fully agree with that of Julius Pacius. In Firmin\nDidot's edition the text is the same as in Waitz; but his Latin\ntranslation remains adapted to that of Julius Pacius. Waitz gives the\nsubstance of the chapter as follows (ad Organ. II. p. 347):--\n\"Universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam\nin iis, qu\u00e6 a sensibus maxime aliena videntur et qu\u00e6, ut mathematica\n([Greek: ta\\ e)x a)phaire/se\u00f4s]), cogitatione separantur \u00e0 materia\nquacum conjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea qu\u00e6 de genero (e. g.,\nde linea vel de corpore mathematico), ad quod demonstratio pertineat,\npr\u00e6dicentur [Greek: kath' au(ta/] et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint.\nInductio autem iis nititur qu\u00e6 sensibus percipiuntur; nam res\nsingulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine\ninductione, non datur inductio sine sensu.\"]\n\nAristotle next proceeds to show (what in previous passages he had\nassumed)[55] that, if Demonstration or the syllogistic process be\npossible--if there be any truths supposed demonstrable, this implies\nthat there must be primary or ultimate truths. It has been explained\nthat the constituent elements assumed in the Syllogism are three\nterms and two propositions or premisses; in the major premiss, A is\naffirmed (or denied) of all B; in the minor, B is affirmed of all C;\nin the conclusion, A is affirmed (or denied) of all C.[56] Now it is\npossible that there may be some one or more predicates higher than A,\nbut it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such\nhigher predicates. So also there may be one or more subjects lower\nthan C, and of which C will be the predicate; but it is impossible\nthat there can be an infinite series of such lower subjects. In like\nmanner there may perhaps be one or more middle terms between A and B,\nand between B and C; but it is impossible that there can be an\ninfinite series of such intervening middle terms. There must be a\nlimit to the series ascending, descending, or intervening.[57] These\nremarks have no application to reciprocating propositions, in which\nthe predicate is co-extensive with the subject.[58] But they apply\nalike to demonstrations negative and affirmative, and alike to all\nthe three figures of Syllogism.[59]\n\n[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 38; Analyt. Post. I.\nii. p. 71, b. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 10-17.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ibid. p. 81, b. 30-p. 82, a. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 82, a. 15-20. M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, p.\n117:--\"Ceci ne saurait s'appliquer aux termes r\u00e9ciproques, parce que\ndans les termes qui peuvent \u00eatre attribu\u00e9s r\u00e9ciproquement l'un \u00e0\nl'autre, on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait ni premier ni dernier\nr\u00e9lativement \u00e0 l'attribution.\"]\n\n[Footnote 59: Analyt. Post. I. xx., xxi. p. 82, a. 21-b. 36.]\n\nIn Dialectical Syllogism it is enough if the premisses be admitted or\nreputed as propositions immediately true, whether they are so in\nreality or not; but in Scientific or Demonstrative Syllogism they\nmust be so in reality: the demonstration is not complete unless it\ncan be traced up to premisses that are thus immediately or directly\ntrue (without any intervening middle term).[60] That there are and\nmust be such primary or immediate premisses, Aristotle now undertakes\nto prove, by some dialectical reasons, and other analytical or\nscientific reasons.[61] He himself thus distinguishes them; but the\ndistinction is faintly marked, and amounts, at most, to this, that\nthe analytical reasons advert only to essential predication, and to\nthe conditions of scientific demonstration, while the dialectical\nreasons dwell upon these, but include something else besides, viz.,\naccidental predication. The proof consists mainly in the declaration\nthat, unless we assume some propositions to be true immediately,\nindivisibly, undemonstrably,--Definition, Demonstration, and Science\nwould be alike impossible. If the ascending series of predicates is\nendless, so that we never arrive at a highest generic predicate; if\nthe descending series of subjects is endless, so that we never reach\na lowest subject,--no definition can ever be attained. The essential\nproperties included in the definition, must be finite in number; and\nthe accidental predicates must also be finite in number, since they\nhave no existence except as attached to some essential subject, and\nsince they must come under one or other of the nine later\nCategories.[62] If, then, the two extremes are thus fixed and\nfinite--the highest predicate and the lowest subject--it is\nimpossible that there can be an infinite series of terms between the\ntwo. The intervening terms must be finite in number. The\nAristotelian theory therefore is, that there are certain\npropositions directly and immediately true, and others derived from\nthem by demonstration through middle terms.[63] It is alike an error\nto assert that every thing can be demonstrated, and that nothing can\nbe demonstrated.\n\n[Footnote 60: Ibid. xix. p. 81, b. 18-29.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. xxi. p. 82, b. 35; xxii. p. 84, a. 7: [Greek:\n_logik\u00f4=s_ me\\n ou)=n e)k tou/t\u00f4n a)/n tis pisteu/seie peri\\ tou=\nlechthe/ntos, _a)nalutik\u00f4=s_ de\\ dia\\ t\u00f4=nde phanero\\n\nsuntom\u00f4/teron.] In Scholia, p. 227, a. 42, the same distinction is\nexpressed by Philoponus in the terms [Greek: logik\u00f4/tera] and [Greek:\npragmat\u00f4de/stera]. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles,\npp. 134, 261; Bassow, De Notionis Definitione, pp. 19, 20; Heyder,\nAristot. u. Hegel. Dialektik, pp. 316, 317.\n\nAristotle, however, does not always adhere closely to the\ndistinction. Thus, if we compare the _logical_ or _dialectical_\nreasons given, p. 82, b. 37, seq., with the _analytical_, announced\nas beginning p. 84, a. 8, seq., we find the same main topic dwelt\nupon in both, namely, that to admit an infinite series excludes the\npossibility of Definition. Both Alexander and Ammonius agree in\nannouncing this as the capital topic on which the proof turned; but\nAlexander inferred from hence that the argument was purely\n_dialectical_ ([Greek: logiko\\n e)pichei/r\u00eama]), while Ammonius\nregarded it as a reason thoroughly convincing and evident: [Greek: o(\nme/ntoi philo/sophos] (Ammonius) [Greek: e)/lege m\u00ea\\ dia\\ tou=to\nle/gein _logika\\_ ta\\ e)picheir\u00ea/mata; e)narge\\s ga\\r o(/ti ei)si\\n\no(rismoi/, ei) m\u00ea\\ a)katal\u00eapsi/an ei)saga/g\u00f4men] (Schol. p. 227, a.\n40, seq., Brand.).]\n\n[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 83, a. 20, b. 14. Only eight\nof the ten Categories are here enumerated.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ibid. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 30-35. The paraphrase of\nThemistius (pp. 55-58, Spengel) states the Aristotelian reasoning in\nclearer language than Aristotle himself. Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt.\nPost. I. xviii.; context. 148, 150, 154) repeats that Aristotle's\nproof is founded upon the undeniable fact that there _are_\ndefinitions, and that without them there could be no demonstration\nand no science. This excludes the supposition of an infinite series\nof predicates and of middle terms:--\"Sumit rationem \u00e0 definitione; si\nin _predicatis in quid_ procederetur ad infinitum, sequeretur auferri\ndefinitionem et omnino essenti\u00e6 cognitionem; sed hoc dicendum non\nest, quum omnium consensioni adversetur\" (p. 466, Ven. 1617).]\n\nIt is plain from Aristotle's own words[64] that he intended these\nfour chapters (xix.-xxii.) as a confirmation of what he had already\nasserted in chapter iii. of the present treatise, and as farther\nrefutation of the two distinct classes of opponents there indicated:\n(1) those who said that everything was demonstrable, demonstration in\na circle being admissible; (2) those who said that nothing was\ndemonstrable, inasmuch as the train of predication upwards,\ndownwards, and intermediate, was infinite. Both these two classes of\nopponents agreed in saying, that there were no truths immediate and\nindemonstrable; and it is upon this point that Aristotle here takes\nissue with them, seeking to prove that there are and must be such\ntruths. But I cannot think the proof satisfactory; nor has it\nappeared so to able commentators either of ancient or modern\ntimes--from Alexander of Aphrodisias down to Mr. Poste.[65] The\nelaborate amplification added in these last chapters adds no force to\nthe statement already given at the earlier stage; and it is in one\nrespect a change for the worse, inasmuch as it does not advert to the\nimportant distinction announced in chapter iii., between universal\ntruths known by Induction (from sense and particulars), and universal\ntruths known by Deduction from these. The truths immediate and\nindemonstrable (not known through a middle term) are the inductive\ntruths, as Aristotle declares in many places, and most emphatically\nat the close of the Analytica Posteriora. But in these chapters, he\nhardly alludes to Induction. Moreover, while trying to prove that\nthere must be immediate universal truths, he neither gives any\ncomplete list of them, nor assigns any positive characteristic\nwhereby to identify them. Opponents might ask him whether these\nimmediate universal truths were not ready-made inspirations of the\nmind; and if so, what better authority they had than the Platonic\nIdeas, which are contemptuously dismissed.\n\n[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 32: [Greek: o(/per\ne)/phame/n tinas le/gein kat' a)rcha/s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 65: See Mr. Poste's note, p. 77, of his translation of this\ntreatise. After saying that the first of Aristotle's _dialectical_\nproofs is faulty, and that the second is a _petitio principii_, Mr.\nPoste adds, respecting the so-called _analytical_ proof given by\nAristotle:--\"It is not so much a proof, as a more accurate\ndetermination of the principle to be postulated. This postulate, the\nexistence of first principles, as concerning the constitution of the\nworld, appears to belong properly to Metaphysics, and is merely\nborrowed by Logic. See Metaph. ii. 2, and Introduction.\" In the\npassage of the Metaphysica ([Greek: a]. p. 994) here cited the main\nargument of Aristotle is open to the same objection of _petitio\nprincipii_ which Mr. Poste urges against Aristotle's second\n_dialectical_ argument in this place.\n\nMr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, takes for granted that\nthere _must_ be immediate, indemonstrable truths, to serve as a basis\nfor deduction; \"that there cannot be a chain of proof suspended from\nnothing;\" that there must be ultimate laws of nature, though we\ncannot be sure that the laws now known to us are ultimate.\n\nOn the other hand, we read in the recent work of an acute\ncontemporary philosopher, Professor Delboeuf (Essai de Logique\nScientifique, Li\u00e8ge, 1865, Pref. pp. v, vii, viii, pp. 46, 47:)--\"Il\nest des points sur lesquels je crains de ne m'\u00eatre pas expliqu\u00e9 assez\nnettement, entre autres la question du fondement de la certitude. Je\nsuis de ceux qui repoussent de toutes leurs forces l'axiome si\nsp\u00e9cieux qu'on ne peut tout d\u00e9montrer; cette proposition aurait, \u00e0\nmes yeux, plus besoin que toute autre d'une d\u00e9monstration. Cette\nd\u00e9monstration ne sera en partie donn\u00e9e que quand on aura une bonne\nfois \u00e9num\u00e9r\u00e9 toutes les propositions ind\u00e9montrables; et quand on aura\nbien d\u00e9fini le caract\u00e8re auquel on les reconnait. Nulle part on ne\ntrouve ni une semblable \u00e9num\u00e9ration, ni une semblable d\u00e9finition. On\nreste \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard dans une position vague, et par cela m\u00eame facile \u00e0\nd\u00e9fendre.\"\n\nIt would seem, by these words, that M. Delboeuf stands in the most\ndirect opposition to Aristotle, who teaches us that the [Greek:\na)rchai\\] or _principia_ from which demonstration starts cannot be\nthemselves demonstrated. But when we compare other passages of M.\nDelboeuf's work, we find that, in rejecting all undemonstrable\npropositions, what he really means is to reject all _self-evident\nuniversal truths_, \"C'est donc une v\u00e9ritable illusion d'admettre des\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9s \u00e9videntes par elles-m\u00eames. Il n'y a pas de proposition fausse\nque nous ne soyons dispos\u00e9s d'admettre comme axiome, quand rien ne\nnous a encore autoris\u00e9s \u00e0 la repousser\" (p. ix.). This is quite true\nin my opinion; but the immediate indemonstrable truths for which\nAristotle contends as [Greek: a)rchai\\] of demonstration, are not\nannounced by him as _self-evident_, they are declared to be results\nof sense and induction, to be raised from observation of particulars\nmultiplied, compared, and permanently formularized under the\nintellectual _habitus_ called No\u00fbs. By Demonstration Aristotle means\ndeduction in its most perfect form, beginning from these [Greek:\na)rchai\\] which are inductively known but not demonstrable (_i. e._\nnot knowable deductively). And in this view the very able and\ninstructive treatise of M. Delboeuf mainly coincides, assigning even\ngreater preponderance to the inductive process, and approximating in\nthis respect to the important improvements in logical theory advanced\nby Mr. John Stuart Mill.\n\nAmong the universal propositions which are not derived from\nInduction, but which serve as [Greek: a)rchai\\] for Deduction and\nDemonstration, we may reckon the religious, ethical, \u00e6sthetical,\nsocial, political, &c., beliefs received in each different community,\nand impressed upon all newcomers born into it by the force of\nprecept, example, authority. Here the major premiss is felt by each\nindividual as carrying an authority of its own, stamped and enforced\nby the sanction of society, and by the disgrace or other penalties in\nstore for those who disobey it. It is ready to be interpreted and\ndiversified by suitable minor premisses in all inferential\napplications. But these [Greek: a)rchai\\] for deduction, differing\nwidely at different times and places, though generated in the same\nmanner and enforced by the same sanction, would belong more properly\nto the class which Aristotle terms [Greek: ta\\ e)/ndoxa].]\n\nWe have thus recognized that there exist immediate (ultimate or\nprimary) propositions, wherein the conjunction between predicate and\nsubject is such that no intermediate term can be assigned between\nthem. When A is predicated both of B and C, this may perhaps be in\nconsequence of some common property possessed by B and C, and such\ncommon property will form a middle term. For example, equality of\nangles to two right angles belongs both to an isosceles and to a\nscalene triangle, and it belongs to them by reason of their common\nproperty--triangular figure; which last is thus the middle term. But\nthis need not be always the case.[66] It is possible that the two\npropositions--A predicated of B, A predicated of C--may both of them\nbe immediate propositions; and that there may be no community of\nnature between B and C. Whenever a middle term can be found,\ndemonstration is possible; but where no middle term can be found,\ndemonstration is impossible. The proposition, whether affirmative or\nnegative, is then an immediate or indivisible one. Such propositions,\nand the terms of which they are composed, are the ultimate elements\nor _principia_ of Demonstration. Predicate and subject are brought\nconstantly into closer and closer conjunction, until at last they\nbecome one and indivisible.[67] Here we reach the unit or element of\nthe syllogizing process. In all scientific calculations there is\nassumed an unit to start from, though in each branch of science it is\na different unit; _e.g._ in barology, the pound-weight; in harmonics,\nthe quarter-tone; in other branches of science, other units.[68]\nAnalytical research teaches us that the corresponding unit in\nSyllogism is the affirmative or negative proposition which is\nprimary, immediate, indivisible. In Demonstration and Science it is\nthe No\u00fbs or Intellect.[69]\n\n[Footnote 66: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 3-18. [Greek: tou=to\nd' ou)k a)ei\\ ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chei.]]\n\n[Footnote 67: Ibid. b. 25-37. [Greek: a)ei\\ to\\ me/son puknou=tai,\ne(/\u00f4s a)diai/reta ge/n\u00eatai kai\\ e(/n. e)/sti d' e(/n, o(/tan a)/meson\nge/n\u00eatai kai\\ mi/a pro/tasis a(pl\u00f4=s \u00ea( a)/mesos.]]\n\n[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 37: [Greek: kai\\\n\u00f4(/sper e)n toi=s a)/llois \u00ea( a)rch\u00ea\\ a(plou=n, tou=to d' ou) tau)to\\\npantachou=, a)ll' e)n barei= me\\n mna=, e)n de\\ me/lei di/esis,\na)/llo d' e)n a)/ll\u00f4|, ou(/t\u00f4s e)n sullogism\u00f4=| to\\ e(\\n pro/tasis\na)/mesos, e)n d' a)podei/xei kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea| o( nou=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 69: Ibid. b. 35-p. 85, a. 1.]\n\nHaving thus, in the long preceding reasoning, sought to prove that\nall demonstration must take its departure from primary undemonstrable\n_principia_--from some premisses, affirmative and negative, which are\ndirectly true in themselves, and not demonstrable through any middle\nterm or intervening propositions, Aristotle now passes to a different\nenquiry. We have some demonstrations in which the conclusion is\nParticular, others in which it is Universal: again, some Affirmative,\nsome Negative, Which of the two, in each of these alternatives, is\nthe best? We have also demonstrations Direct or Ostensive, and\ndemonstrations Indirect or by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_. Which of\nthese two is the best? Both questions appear to have been subjected\nto debate by contemporary philosophers.[70]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ibid. xxiv. p. 85, a. 13-18. [Greek: a)mphisb\u00eatei=tai\npote/ra belti/\u00f4n; \u00f4(s d' au(/t\u00f4s kai\\ peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)podeiknu/nai\nlegome/n\u00eas kai\\ t\u00ea=s ei)s to\\ a)du/naton a)gou/s\u00eas a)podei/xe\u00f4s.]]\n\nAristotle discusses these points dialectically (as indeed he points\nout in the Topica that the comparison of two things generally, as to\nbetter and worse, falls under the varieties of\n**dialectical enquiry[71]), first stating and next refuting\nthe arguments on the weaker side. Some persons may think (he says)\nthat demonstration of the Particular is better than demonstration of\nthe Universal: first, because it conducts to fuller cognition of that\nwhich the thing is in itself, and not merely that which it is\n_quatenus_ member of a class; secondly, because demonstrations of the\nUniversal are apt to generate an illusory belief, that the Universal\nis a distinct reality apart from and independent of all its\nparticulars (_i.e._, that figure in general has a real existence\napart from all particular figures, and number in general apart from\nall particular numbers, &c.), while demonstrations of the Particular\ndo not lead to any such illusion.[72]\n\n[Footnote 71: Aristot. Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 1, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 20-b. 3. Themistius,\npp. 58-59, Spengel: [Greek: ou) ga\\r o(m\u00f4/numon to\\ katho/lou\ne)sti/n, ou)de\\ ph\u00f4n\u00ea\\ mo/non, a)ll' u(po/stasis, ou) ch\u00f4rist\u00ea\\ me\\n\n\u00f4(/sper ou)de\\ ta\\ sumbeb\u00eako/ta, e)narg\u00f4=s d' ou)=n emphainome/n\u00ea\ntoi=s pra/gmasin.] The Scholastic doctrine of _Universalia in re_ is\nhere expressed very clearly by Themistius.]\n\nTo these arguments Aristotle replies:--1. It is not correct to say\nthat cognition of the Particular is more complete, or bears more upon\nreal existence, than cognition of the Universal. The reverse would be\nnearer to the truth. To know that the isosceles, _quatenus_ triangle,\nhas its three angles equal to two right angles, is more complete\ncognition than knowing simply that the isosceles has its three angles\nequal to two right angles. 2. If the Universal be not an equivocal\nterm--if it represents one property and one definition common to many\nparticulars, it then has a real existence as much or more than any\none or any number of the particulars. For all these particulars are\nperishable, but the class is imperishable. 3. He who believes that\nthe universal term has one meaning in all the particulars, need not\nnecessarily believe that it has any meaning _apart_ from all\nparticulars; he need not believe this about Quiddity, any more than\nhe believes it about Quality or Quantity. Or if he does believe so,\nit is his own individual mistake, not imputable to the demonstration.\n4. We have shown that a complete demonstration is one in which the\nmiddle term is the cause or reason of the conclusion. Now the\nUniversal is most of the nature of Cause; for it represents the First\nEssence or the _Per Se_, and is therefore its own cause, or has no\nother cause behind it. The demonstration of the Universal has thus\nmore of the Cause or the _Why_, and is therefore better than the\ndemonstration of the Particular. 5. In the Final Cause or End of\naction, there is always some ultimate end for the sake of which the\nintermediate ends are pursued, and which, as it is better than they,\nyields, when it is known, the only complete explanation of the\naction. So it is also with the Formal Cause: there is one highest\nform which contains the _Why_ of the subordinate forms, and the\nknowledge of which is therefore better; as when, for example, the\nexterior angles of a given isosceles triangle are seen to be equal to\nfour right angles, not because it is isosceles or triangle, but\nbecause it is a rectilineal figure. 6. Particulars, as such, fall\ninto infinity of number, and are thus unknowable; the Universal tends\ntowards oneness and simplicity, and is thus essentially knowable,\nmore fully demonstrable than the infinity of particulars. The\ndemonstration thereof is therefore better. 7. It is also better, on\nanother ground; for he that knows the Universal does in a certain\nsense know also the Particular;[73] but he that knows the Particular\ncannot be said in any sense to know the Universal. 8. The\n_principium_ or perfection of cognition is to be found in the\nimmediate proposition, true _per se_. When we demonstrate, and thus\nemploy a middle term, the nearer the middle term approaches to that\n_principium_, the better the demonstration is. The demonstration of\nthe Universal is thus better and more accurate than that of the\nParticular.[74]\n\n[Footnote 73: Compare Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 25; also\nMetaphys. A. p. 981, a. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 4-p. 86, a. 21. Schol.\np. 233, b. 6: [Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ o)/nt\u00f4n gn\u00f4ri/m\u00f4n, \u00ea( di'\ne)latto/n\u00f4n me/s\u00f4n ai(ret\u00f4te/ra; ma=llon ga\\r e)ggute/r\u00f4 t\u00ea=s tou=\nnou= e)nergei/as.]]\n\nSuch are the several reasons enumerated by Aristotle in refutation of\nthe previous opinion stated in favour of the Particular. Evidently he\ndoes not account them all of equal value: he intimates that some are\npurely dialectical ([Greek: logika/]); and he insists most upon the\ntwo following:--1. He that knows the Universal knows in a certain\nsense the Particular; if he knows that every triangle has its three\nangles equal to two right angles, he knows potentially that the\nisosceles has its three angles equal to the same, though he may not\nknow as yet that the isosceles _is_ a triangle. But he that knows the\nParticular does not in any way know the Universal, either actually or\npotentially.[75] 2. The Universal is apprehended by Intellect or\nNo\u00fbs, the highest of all cognitive powers; the Particular terminates\nin sensation. Here, I presume, he means, that, in demonstration of\nthe Particular, the conclusion teaches you nothing more than you\nmight have learnt from a direct observation of sense; whereas in that\nof the Universal the conclusion teaches you more than you could have\nlearnt from direct sensation, and comes into correlation with the\nhighest form of our intellectual nature.[76]\n\n[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86**, a. 22: [Greek: a)lla\\\nt\u00f4=n me\\n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n e)/nia logika/ e)sti; _ma/lista_ de\\ d\u00ea=lon\no(/ti \u00ea( katho/lou kuri\u00f4te/ra, o(/ti--o( de\\ tau/t\u00ean e)/ch\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n\npro/tasin] (the Particular) [Greek: _to\\ katho/lou ou)dam\u00f4=s oi)=den,\nou)/te duna/mei ou)/t' e)nergei/a|_.]]\n\n[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: kai\\ \u00ea( me\\n katho/lou no\u00eat\u00ea/, \u00ea(\nde\\ kata\\ me/ros ei)s ai)/sth\u00easin teleuta=|.] Compare xxiii. p. 84,\nb. 39, where we noticed the doctrine that [Greek: Nou=s] is the\n_unit_ of scientific demonstration.]\n\nNext, Aristotle compares the Affirmative with the Negative\ndemonstration, and shows that the Affirmative is the better. Of two\ndemonstrations (he lays it down) that one which proceeds upon a\nsmaller number of postulates, assumptions, or propositions, is better\nthan the other; for, to say nothing of other reasons, it conducts you\nmore speedily to knowledge than the other, and that is an advantage.\nNow, both in the affirmative and in the negative syllogism, you must\nhave three terms and two propositions; but in the affirmative you\nassume only that something _is_; while in the negative you assume\nboth that something _is_, and that something _is not_. Here is a\ndouble assumption instead of a single; therefore the negative is the\nworse or inferior of the two.[77] Moreover, for the demonstration of\na negative conclusion, you require one affirmative premiss (since\nfrom two negative premisses nothing whatever can be concluded); while\nfor the demonstration of an affirmative conclusion, you must have two\naffirmative premisses, and you cannot admit a negative. This, again,\nshows that the affirmative is logically prior, more trustworthy, and\nbetter than the negative.[78] The negative is only intelligible and\nknowable through the affirmative, just as _Non-Ens_ is knowable only\nthrough _Ens_. The affirmative demonstration therefore, as involving\nbetter principles, is, on this ground also, better than the\nnegative.[79] _A fortiori_, it is also better than the demonstration\nby way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_, which was the last case to be\nconsidered. This, as concluding only indirectly and from\nimpossibility of the contradictory, is worse even than the negative;\nmuch more therefore is it worse than the direct affirmative.[80]\n\n[Footnote 77: Analyt. Post. I. xxv. p. 86, a. 31-b. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Ibid. b. 10-30.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Ibid. b. 30-39.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxvi. p. 87, a. 2-30. Waitz (II. p. 370),\nsays: \"deductio (ad absurdum), quippe qu\u00e6 per ambages cogat, post\nponenda, est demonstrationi rect\u00e6.\"\n\nPhiloponus says (Schol. pp. 234-235**, Brand.) that the\nCommentators all censured Aristotle for the manner in which he here\nlaid out the Syllogism [Greek: di' a)duna/tou]. I do not, however,\nfind any such censure in Themistius. Philoponus defends Aristotle\nfrom the censure.]\n\nIf we next compare one Science with another, the prior and more\naccurate of the two is, (1) That which combines at once the [Greek:\no(/ti] and the [Greek: dio/ti]; (2) That which is abstracted from\nmaterial conditions, as compared with that which is immersed\ntherein--for example, arithmetic is more accurate than harmonics;\n(3) The more simple as compared with the more complex: thus,\narithmetic is more accurate than geometry, a monad or unit is a\nsubstance without position, whereas a point (more concrete) is a\nsubstance with position.[81] One and the same science is that which\nbelongs to one and the same generic subject-matter. The premisses of\na demonstration must be included in the same genus with the\nconclusion; and where the ultimate premisses are heterogeneous, the\ncognition derived from them must be considered as not one but a\ncompound of several.[82] You may find two or more distinct middle\nterms for demonstrating the same conclusion; sometimes out of the\nsame logical series or table, sometimes out of different tables.[83]\n\n[Footnote 81: Analyt. Post. I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31-37. Themistius,\nParaphras. p. 60, ed. Speng.: [Greek: kat' a)/llon de\\ (tro/pon),\ne)a\\n \u00ea( me\\n peri\\ u(pokei/mena/ tina kai\\ ai)sth\u00eata\\\npragmateu/\u00eatai, \u00ea( de\\ peri\\ no\u00eata\\ kai\\ katho/lou.]\n\nPhiloponus illustrates this (Schol. p. 235, b. 41, Br.): [Greek:\noi(=on ta\\ Theodosi/ou sphairika\\ a)kribe/stera/ e)stin e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea|\nt\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n Au)tolu/kou peri\\ kinoume/n\u00eas sphai/ras.] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Analyt. Post. I. xxviii. p. 87, a. 38-b. 5. Themistius,\np. 61: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon de\\ tou=to gi/netai proi+ou=sin e)pi\\ ta\\s\na)napodei/ktous a)rcha/s; au(=tai ga\\r ei) m\u00eademi/an e)/choien\nsugge/neian, e(/terai ai( e)pist\u00ea=mai.]]\n\n[Footnote 83: Analyt. Post. I. xxix. p. 87, b. 5-18. Aristotle gives\nan example to illustrate this general doctrine: [Greek: \u00ea(/desthai,\nto\\ kinei=sthai, to\\ \u00ea)remi/zesthai, to\\ metaba/llein]. As he\nincludes these terms und this subject among the topics for\ndemonstration, it is difficult to see where he would draw a distinct\nline between topics for Demonstration and topics for Dialectic.]\n\nThere cannot be demonstrative cognition of fortuitous events,[84] for\nall demonstration is either of the necessary or of the customary. Nor\ncan there be demonstrative cognition through sensible perception. For\nthough by sense we perceive a thing as such and such (through its\nsensible qualities), yet we perceive it inevitably as _hoc aliquid_,\n_hic_, _et nunc_. But the Universal cannot be perceived by sense; for\nit is neither _hic_ nor _nunc_, but _semper et ubique_.[85] Now\ndemonstrations are all accomplished by means of the Universal, and\ndemonstrative cognition cannot therefore be had through sensible\nperception. If the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two\nright angles were a fact directly perceivable by sense, we should\nstill have looked out for a demonstration thereof: we should have no\nproper scientific cognition of it (though some persons contend for\nthis): for sensible perception gives us only particular cases, and\nCognition or Science proper comes only through knowing the\nUniversal.[86] If, being on the surface of the moon, we had on any\none occasion seen the earth between us and the sun, we could not have\nknown from that single observation that such interposition is the\ncause universally of eclipses. We cannot directly by sense perceive\nthe Universal, though sense is the _principium_ of the Universal. By\nmultiplied observation of sensible particulars, we can hunt out and\nelicit the Universal, enunciate it clearly and separately, and make\nit serve for demonstration.[87] The Universal is precious, because it\nreveals the Cause or [Greek: dio/ti], and is therefore more precious,\nnot merely than sensible observation, but also than intellectual\nconception of the [Greek: o(/ti] only, where the Cause or [Greek:\ndio/ti] lies apart, and is derived from a higher genus. Respecting\nFirst Principles or _Summa Genera_, we must speak elsewhere.[88] It\nis clear, therefore, that no demonstrable matter can be known,\nproperly speaking, from direct perception of sense; though there are\ncases in which nothing but the impossibility of direct observation\ndrives us upon seeking for demonstration. Whenever we can get an\nadequate number of sensible observations, we can generalize the fact;\nand in some instances we may perhaps not seek for any demonstrative\nknowledge (_i.e._ to explain it by any higher principle). If we could\nsee the pores in glass and the light passing through them, we should\nlearn through many such observations why combustion arises on the\nfarther side of the glass; each of our observations would have been\nseparate and individual, but we should by intellect generalize the\nresult that all the cases fall under the same law.[89]\n\n[Footnote 84: Analyt. Post. I. xxx. p. 87, b. 19-27.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ibid. xxxi. p. 87, b. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\\r kai\\ e)/stin\n\u00ea( ai)/sth\u00easis tou= toiou=de kai\\ m\u00ea\\ tou=de/ tinos, a)ll'\nai)stha/nesthai/ ge a)nagkai=on to/de ti kai\\ pou= kai\\ nu=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 86: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon o(/ti kai\\ ei) \u00ea)=n\nai)stha/nesthai to\\ tri/g\u00f4non o(/ti dusi\\n o)rthai=s i)/sas e)/chei\nta\\s g\u00f4ni/as, e)z\u00eatou=men a)\\n a)po/deixin, kai\\ ou)ch (_\u00f4(/sper\nphasi/ tines_) \u00ea)pista/metha; ai)stha/nesthai me\\n ga\\r a)na/gk\u00ea\nkath' e(/kaston, \u00ea( d' e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea t\u00f4=| to\\ katho/lou gn\u00f4ri/zein\ne)sti/n.]\n\nEuclid, in the 20th Proposition of his first Book, demonstrates that\nany two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side.\nAccording to Proklus, the Epikureans derided the demonstration of\nsuch a point as absurd; and it seems that some contemporaries of\nAristotle argued in a similar way, judging by the phrase [Greek:\n\u00f4(/sper phasi/ tines].]\n\n[Footnote 87: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 2: [Greek: ou) m\u00ea\\n\na)ll' e)k tou= the\u00f4rei=n tou=to polla/kis sumbai=non, to\\ katho/lou\na)\\n th\u00eareu/santes a)po/deixin ei)/chomen; e)k ga\\r t\u00f4=n kath'\ne(/kasta pleio/n\u00f4n to\\ katho/lou d\u00ea=lon.] Themistius, p. 62, Sp.:\n[Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ me\\n ga\\r a)podei/xe\u00f4s ai)/sth\u00easis, kai\\ to\\\nkatho/lou e)nnoou=men dia\\ to\\ polla/kis ai)sthe/sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 88: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 6: [Greek: to\\ de\\\nkatho/lou ti/mion, o(/ti d\u00ealoi= to\\ ai)/tion; \u00f4(/ste peri\\ t\u00f4=n\ntoiou/t\u00f4n \u00ea( katho/lou timi\u00f4te/ra t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00ea=s\nno\u00ea/se\u00f4s, o(/s\u00f4n e(/teron to\\ ai)/tion; peri\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n\na)/llos lo/gos.]\n\nBy [Greek: ta\\ pr\u00f4=ta], he means the [Greek: a)rchai\\] of\nDemonstration, which are treated especially in II. xix. See Biese,\nDie Philos. des Aristoteles, p. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 9-17. [Greek: e)/sti\nme/ntoi e)/nia a)nago/mena ei)s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s e)/kleipsin e)n toi=s\nprobl\u00ea/masin; e)/nia ga\\r ei) e(\u00f4/r\u00f4men, ou)k a)\\n e)z\u00eatou=men, ou)ch\n\u00f4(s ei)do/tes t\u00f4=| o(ra=|n, a)ll' \u00f4(s e)/chontes to\\ katho/lou e)k\ntou= o(ra=|n.]\n\nThe text of this and the succeeding words seems open to doubt, as\nwell as that of Themistius (p. 63). Waitz in his note (p. 374)\nexplains the meaning clearly:--\"non ita quidem ut ipsa sensuum\nperceptio scientiam afferat; sed ita ut quod in singulis accidere\nvideamus, idem etiam in omnibus accidere coniicientes universe\nintelligamus.\"]\n\nAristotle next proceeds to refute, at some length, the supposition,\nthat the _principia_ of all syllogisms are the same. We see at once\nthat this cannot be so, because some syllogisms are true, others\nfalse. But, besides, though there are indeed a few Axioms essential\nto the process of demonstration, and the same in all syllogisms, yet\nthese are not sufficient of themselves for demonstration. There must\nfarther be other premisses or matters of evidence--propositions\nimmediately true (or established by prior demonstrations) belonging\nto each branch of Science specially, as distinguished from the\nothers. Our demonstration relates _to_ these special matters or\npremisses, though it is accomplished _out of_ or by means of the\ncommon Axioms.[90]\n\n[Footnote 90: Analyt. Post. I. xxxii. p. 88, a. 18-b. 29. [Greek: ai(\nga\\r a)rchai\\ dittai/, e)x \u00f4(=n te kai\\ peri\\ o(\\; ai( me\\n ou)=n e)x\n\u00f4(=n koinai/, ai( de\\ peri\\ o(/ i)/diai, oi(=on a)rithmo/s,\nme/gethos.] Compare xi. p. 77, a. 27. See Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire,\nPlan G\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Derniers Analytiques, p. lxxxi.]\n\nScience or scientific Cognition differs from true Opinion, and the\n_cognitum_ from the _opinatum_, herein, that Science is of the\nUniversal, and through necessary premisses which cannot be otherwise;\nwhile Opinion relates to matters true, yet which at the same time may\npossibly be false. The belief in a proposition which is immediate\n(_i. e._, undemonstrable) yet not necessary, is Opinion; it is not\nScience, nor is it No\u00fbs or Intellect--the _principium_ of Science or\nscientific Cognition. Such beliefs are fluctuating, as we see every\nday; we all distinguish them from other beliefs, which we cannot\nconceive not to be true and which we call cognitions.[91] But may\nthere not be Opinion and Cognition respecting the same matters? There\nmay be (says Aristotle) in different men, or in the same man at\ndifferent times; but not in the same man at the same time. There may\nalso be, respecting the same matter, true opinion in one man's mind,\nand false opinion in the mind of another.[92]\n\n[Footnote 91: Analyt. Post. I. xxxiii. p. 88, b. 30-p. 89, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Ibid. p. 89, a. 11-b. 6. That eclipse of the sun is\ncaused by the interposition of the moon was to the astronomer\nHipparchos scientific Cognition; for he saw that it _could not_ be\notherwise. To the philosopher Epikurus it was Opinion; for he thought\nthat it _might_ be otherwise (Themistius, p. 66, Spengel).]\n\nWith some remarks upon Sagacity, or the power of divining a middle\nterm in a time too short for reflection (as when the friendship of\ntwo men is on the instant referred to the fact of their having a\ncommon enemy), the present book is brought to a close.[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 89, b. 10-20.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.\n\nAristotle begins the Second Book of the Analytica Posteriora by an\nenumeration and classification of Problems or Questions suitable for\ninvestigation. The matters knowable by us may be distributed into\nfour classes:--\n\n[Greek: O(/ti]. [Greek: Dio/ti]. [Greek: Ei) e)/sti]. [Greek: Ti/\ne)sti].\n\n1. Quod. 2. Cur. 3. An sit. 4. Quid sit.\n\nUnder the first head come questions of Fact; under the second head,\nquestions of Cause or Reason; under the third, questions of\nExistence; under the fourth, questions of Essence. Under the first\nhead we enquire, Whether a fact or event is so or so? Whether a given\nsubject possesses this or that attribute, or is in this or that\ncondition? enumerating in the question the various supposable\nalternatives. Under the second head, we assume the first question to\nhave been affirmatively answered, and we proceed to enquire, What is\nthe cause or reason for such fact, or such conjunction of subject and\nattribute? Under the third head, we ask, Does a supposed subject\nexist? And if the answer be in the affirmative, we proceed to\nenquire, under the fourth head, What is the essence of the\nsubject?[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 89, b. 23, seq. Themistius\nobserves, p. 67, Speng.: [Greek: z\u00eatou=men ti/nun \u00ea)\\ peri\\ a(plou=\ntino\\s kai\\ a)sunthe/tou, \u00ea)\\ peri\\ sunthe/tou kai\\ e)n prota/sei.]\nThemistius has here changed Aristotle's order, and placed the third\nand fourth heads before the first and second. Compare Schol. p. 240,\nb. 30; p. 241, a. 18. The Scholiast complains of the enigmatical\nstyle of Aristotle: [Greek: t\u00ea=| griph\u00f4/dei tou= r(\u00eatou= e)paggeli/a]\n(p. 240, b. 25).]\n\nWe have here two distinct pairs of _Qu\u00e6sita_: Obviously the second\nhead presupposes the first, and is consequent thereupon; while the\nfourth also presupposes the third. But it might seem a more suitable\narrangement (as Themistius and other expositors have conceived) that\nthe third and fourth heads should come first in the list, rather than\nthe first and second; since the third and fourth are simpler, and\ncome earlier in the order of philosophical exposition, while the\nfirst and second are more complicated, and cannot be expounded\nphilosophically until after the philosophical exposition of the\nothers. This is cleared up by adverting to the distinction, so often\ninsisted on by Aristotle, between what is first in order of cognition\nrelatively to us (_nobis notiora_), and what is first in order of\ncognition by nature (_natur\u00e2 notiora_). _To us_ (that is to men taken\nindividually and in the course of actual growth) the phenomena of\nnature[2] present themselves as particulars confused and complicated\nin every way, with attributes essential and accidental implicated\ntogether: we gradually learn first to see and compare them as\nparticulars, next to resolve them into generalities, bundles,\nclasses, and partially to explain the _Why_ of some by means of\nothers. Here we start from facts embodied in propositions, that\ninclude subjects clothed with their attributes. But in the _order of\nnature_ (that is, in the order followed by those who know the\n_scibile_ as a whole, and can expound it scientifically) that which\ncomes first is the Universal or the simple Subject abstracted from\nits predicates or accompaniments: we have to enquire, first, whether\na given subject exists; next, if it does exist, what is its real\nconstituent essence or definition. We thus see the reason for the\norder in which Aristotle has arranged the two co-ordinate pairs of\n_Qu\u00e6sita_ or Problems, conformable to the different processes\npursued, on the one hand, by the common intellect, growing and\nuntrained--on the other, by the mature or disciplined intellect,\nalready competent for philosophical exposition and applying itself to\nnew _incognita_.\n\n[Footnote 2: **Schol. Philopon. p. 241, a. 18-24: [Greek:\ntou/t\u00f4n to\\ ei) e)/sti kai\\ to\\ ti/ e)stin ei)si\\n a(pla=, to\\ de\\\no(/ti kai\\ to\\ dio/ti su/ntheta--pro/tera ga\\r \u00ea(mi=n kai\\\ngn\u00f4rim\u00f4/tera ta\\ su/ntheta, \u00f4(s t\u00ea=| phu/sei ta\\ a(pla=.]\n\nMr. Poste observes upon this quadruple classification by Aristotle\n(p. 96):--\"The two last of these are problems of Inductive, but first\nprinciples of Deductive, Science; the one being the hypothesis, the\nother the definition. The **attribute as well as the subject\nmust be defined (I. x.), so that to a certain degree the second\nproblem also is assumed among the principles of Demonstration.\"]\n\nComparing together these four _Qu\u00e6sita_, it will appear that in the\nfirst and third (_Quod_ and _An_), we seek to find out whether there\nis or is not any middle term. In the second and fourth (_Cur_ and\n_Quid_), we already know or assume that there is a middle term; and\nwe try to ascertain what that middle term is.[3] The enquiry _Cur_,\nis in the main analogous to the enquiry _Quid_; in both cases, we aim\nat ascertaining what the cause or middle term is. But, in the enquiry\n_Cur_, what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event,\nwhich is the cause of the event _qu\u00e6situm_; while, in the enquiry\n_Quid_, what we seek is the real essence or definition of the\nsubstance--the fundamental, generating, immanent cause of its\nconcomitant attributes. Sometimes, however, the _Quid_ and the _Cur_\nare only different ways of stating the same thing. _E.g._, _Quid est\neclipsis lun\u00e6_? Answer: The essence of an eclipse is a privation of\nlight from the moon, through intervention of the earth between her\nand the sun. _Cur locum habet eclipsis lun\u00e6_? Answer: Because the\nlight of the sun is prevented from reaching the moon by intervention\nof the earth. Here it is manifest that the answers to the enquiries\n_Quid_ and _Cur_ are really and in substance the same fact, only\nstated in different phrases.[4]\n\n[Footnote 3: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 889, b. 37-p. 90, a. 7. [Greek:\nsumbai/nei a)/ra e)n a(pa/sais tai=s z\u00eat\u00ea/sesi z\u00eatei=n \u00ea)\\ ei) e)/sti\nme/son, \u00ea)\\ ti/ e)sti to\\ me/son; to\\ me\\n ga\\r ai)/tion to\\ me/son,\ne)n a(/pasi de\\ tou=to z\u00eatei=tai.] Compare Schol. p. 241, b. 10, Br.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 14-23, 31: [Greek: to\\\nti/ e)stin ei)de/nai tau)to/ e)sti kai\\ dia\\ ti/ e)stin.]]\n\nThat the _qu\u00e6situm_ in all these researches is a middle term or\nmedium, is plain from those cases wherein the medium is perceivable\nby sense; for then we neither require nor enter upon research. For\nexample, if we were upon the moon, we should see the earth coming\nbetween us and the sun, now and in each particular case of eclipse.\nAccordingly, after many such observations, we should affirm the\nuniversal proposition, that such intervention of the earth was the\ncause of eclipses; the universal becoming known to us through\ninduction of particular cases.[5] The middle term, the Cause, the\n_Quid_, and the _Cur_, are thus all the same enquiry, in substance;\nthough sometimes such _qu\u00e6situm_ is the quiddity or essential nature\nof the thing itself (as the essence of a triangle is the cause or\nground of its having its three angles equal to two right angles, as\nwell as of its other properties), sometimes it is an extraneous\nfact.[6]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. a. 24-30. [Greek: e)k ga\\r tou= ai)sthe/sthai kai\\\nto\\ katho/lou e)ge/neto a)\\n \u00ea(mi=n ei)de/nai; \u00ea( me\\n ga\\r\nai)/sth\u00easis o(/ti nu=n a)ntiphra/ttei; kai\\ ga\\r d\u00ea=lon o(/ti nu=n\ne)klei/pei; e)k de\\ tou/tou to\\ katho/lou a)\\n e)ge/neto.]\n\nThe purport and relation of this quadruple classification of problems\nis set forth still more clearly in the sixth book of the Metaphysica\n(Z. p. 1041) with the explanations of Bonitz, Comm. pp. 358, 359.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 31.]\n\nBut how or by what process is this _qu\u00e6situm_ obtained and made\nclear? Is it by Demonstration or by Definition? What is Definition,\nand what matters admit of Definition?[7] Aristotle begins by treating\nthe question dialectically; by setting out a series of doubts and\ndifficulties. First, Is it possible that the same cognition, and in\nthe same relation, can be obtained both by Definition and by\nDemonstration? No; it is not possible. It is plain that much that is\nknown by Demonstration cannot be known by Definition; for we have\nseen that conclusions both particular and negative are established by\nDemonstration (in the Third and Second figures), while every\nDefinition is universal and affirmative. But we may go farther and\nsay, that even where a conclusion universal and affirmative is\nestablished (in the First figure) by Demonstration, that same\nconclusion can never be known by Definition; for if it could be known\nby Definition, it might have been known without Demonstration. Now we\nare assured, by an uncontradicted induction, that this is not the\nfact; for that which we know by Demonstration is either a proprium of\nthe subject _per se_, or an accident or concomitant; but no\nDefinition ever declares either the one or the other: it declares\nonly the essence.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ibid. iii. p. 90, a. 37: [Greek: ti/ e)stin o(rismo/s,\nkai\\ ti/n\u00f4n, ei)/p\u00f4men, diapor\u00ea/santes pr\u00f4=ton peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. II. iii. p. 90, b. 13: [Greek: i(kan\u00ea\\ de\\\npi/stis kai\\ e)k t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s; ou)de\\n ga\\r p\u00f4/pote o(risa/menoi\ne)/gn\u00f4men, ou)/te t\u00f4=n kath' au(to\\ u(parcho/nt\u00f4n ou)/te t\u00f4=n\nsumbeb\u00eako/t\u00f4n. e)/ti ei) o( o(rismo\\s ou)si/as tis gn\u00f4rismo/s, ta\\ ge\ntoiau=ta phanero\\n o(/ti ou)k ou)si/ai.]]\n\nAgain, let us ask, _vice vers\u00e2_, Can everything that is declared by\nDefinition, or indeed anything that is declared by Definition, be\nknown also by Demonstration? Neither is this possible. One and the\nsame _cognitum_ can be known only by one process of cognition.\nDefinitions are the _principia_ from which Demonstration departs; and\nwe have already shown that in going back upon demonstrations, we must\nstop somewhere, and must recognize some _principia_\nundemonstrable.[9] The Definition can never be demonstrated, for it\ndeclares only the essence of the subject, and does not predicate\nanything concerning the subject; whereas Demonstration assumes the\nessence to be known, and deduces from such assumption an attribute\ndistinct from the essence.[10]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ibid. b. 18-27.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Ibid. b. 33, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti pa=sa a)po/deixis ti\\\nkata/ tinos dei/knusin, oi(=on o(/ti e)/stin \u00ea)\\ ou)k e)/stin; e)n\nde\\ t\u00f4=| o(rism\u00f4=| ou)de\\n e(/teron e(te/rou kat\u00eagorei=tai, oi(=on\nou)/te to\\ z\u00f4=|on kata\\ tou= di/podos ou)de\\ tou=to kata\\ tou=\nz\u00f4=|ou--o( me\\n ou)=n o(rismo\\s ti/ e)sti d\u00ealoi=, \u00ea( de\\ a)po/deixis\no(/ti \u00ea)\\ e)/sti to/de kata\\ tou=de \u00ea)\\ ou)k e)/stin.]\n\nThemistius (p. 71, Speng.) distinguishes the [Greek: o(rismo/s]\nitself from [Greek: \u00ea( pro/tasis \u00ea( to\\n o(rismo\\n kat\u00eagorou/menon\ne)/chousa].]\n\nProsecuting still farther the dialectical and dubitative\ntreatment,[11] Aristotle now proceeds to suggest, that the Essence\n(that is, the entire Essence or Quiddity), which is declared by\nDefinition, can never be known by Demonstration. To suppose that it\ncould be so known, would be inconsistent with the conditions of the\nsyllogistic proof used in demonstrating. You prove by syllogism,\nthrough a middle term, some predicate or attribute; _e.g._ because A\nis predicable of all B, and B is predicable of all C, therefore A is\npredicable of all C. But you cannot prove, through the middle term B,\nthat A is the essence or quiddity of C, unless by assuming in the\npremisses that B is the essence of C, and that A is the essence of B;\naccordingly, that the three propositions, AB, BC, AC, are all\nco-extensive and reciprocate with each other. Here, then, you have\nassumed as your premisses two essential propositions, AB, BC, in\norder to prove as an essential proposition the conclusion AC. But\nthis is inadmissible; for your premisses require demonstration as\nmuch as your conclusion. You have committed a _Petitio\nPrincipii_;[12] you have assumed in your minor premiss the very point\nto be demonstrated.\n\n[Footnote 11: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12: [Greek: tau=ta me\\n\nou)=n me/chri tou/tou di\u00eapor\u00ea/sth\u00f4]. One would think, by these words,\nthat [Greek: to\\ diaporei=n] (or the dubitative treatment) finished\nhere. But the fact is not so: that treatment is continued for four\nchapters more, to the commencement of ch. viii. p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12-32: [Greek: tau=ta\nd' a)na/gk\u00ea antistre/phein; ei) ga\\r to\\ A tou= G i)/dion, d\u00ea=lon\no(/ti kai\\ tou= B kai\\ tou=to tou= G, \u00f4(/ste pa/nta\na)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n.--lamba/nei ou)=n o(\\ dei= dei=xai; kai\\ ga\\r to\\ B e)/sti\nti/ e)stin a)/nthr\u00f4pos.] Themistius, pp. 72, 73: [Greek: to\\n\na)podeiknu/nta to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai tou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou, a)/llo ti dei=\nprolabei=n tou= au)tou= to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai.--ou(= ga\\r bou/letai\nto\\n o(rismo\\n a)podei=xai, tou/tou prolamba/nei tina\\ o(rismo\\n\nei)=nai ch\u00f4ti\\s a)podei/xe\u00f4s.]\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire, notes, p. 205:--\"Il faut donc, pour\nconclure par syllogisme que A est la d\u00e9finition essentielle de C, que\nA soit la d\u00e9finition essentielle de B, et que B soit lui-m\u00eame la\nd\u00e9finition essentielle de C. Mais alors la d\u00e9finition de la chose\nsera dans le moyen terme lui-m\u00eame, avant d'\u00eatre dans la conclusion;\nen effet, la mineure: B est la d\u00e9finition essentielle de C, donne la\nd\u00e9finition essentielle de C, sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller jusqu'**\u00e0\nla conclusion. Donc la d\u00e9monstration de l'essence ainsi entendue est\nabsurde.\"]\n\nIf you cannot obtain Definition as the conclusion of syllogistic\nDemonstration, still less can you obtain it through the method of\ngeneric and specific Division; which last method (as has been already\nshown in the Analytica Priora) is not equal even to the Syllogism in\nrespect of usefulness and efficacy.[13] You cannot in this method\ndistinguish between propositions both true and essential, and\npropositions true but not essential; you never obtain, by asking\nquestions according to the method of generic subdivision, any\npremisses from which the conclusion follows by necessity. Yet this is\nwhat you ought to obtain for the purpose of Demonstration; for you\nare not allowed to enunciate the full actual conclusion among the\npremisses, and require assent to it. Division of a genus into its\nspecies will often give useful information, as Induction also\nwill;[14] but neither the one nor the other will be equivalent to a\ndemonstration. A definition obtained only from subdivisions of a\ngenus, may always be challenged, like a syllogism without its middle\nterm.\n\n[Footnote 13: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 12, seq.; Analyt. Prior.\nI. xxxi. p. 46, a. 31. Aristotle here alludes to the method pursued\nby Plato in the Sophistes and Politicus, though he does not name\nPlato: [Greek: \u00ea( dia\\ t\u00f4=n diaire/se\u00f4n o(do/s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 15-33: [Greek: ou)de\\\nga\\r o( e)pa/g\u00f4n i)/s\u00f4s a)podei/knusin, a)ll' o(/m\u00f4s d\u00ealoi= ti.]\nCompare Themistius, p. 74.]\n\nAgain, neither can you arrive at the definition of a given subject,\nby assuming in general terms what a definition ought to be, and then\ndeclaring a given form of words to be conformable to such assumption;\nbecause your minor premiss must involve _Petitio Principii_. The same\nlogical fault will be committed, if you take your departure from an\nhypothesis in which you postulate the definition of a certain\nsubject, and then declare inferentially what the definition of its\ncontrary must be. The definition which you here assume requires proof\nas much as that which you infer from it.[15] Moreover, neither by\nthis process, nor by that of generic subdivision, can you show any\nreason why the parts of the definition should coalesce into one\nessential whole. If they do not thus coalesce--if they be nothing\nbetter than distinct attributes conjoined in the same subject, like\n_musicus_ and _grammaticus_--the real essence is not declared, and\nthe definition is not a good one.[16]\n\n[Footnote 15: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 6-28. Themist. p. 76.\n\nRassow renders [Greek: e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s]--\"assumpt\u00e2 generali\ndefinitionis notione;\" and also says: \"[Greek: to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n\nei)=nai]--generalem definitionis notionem; [Greek: to\\ ti/\ne)stin]--certam quandam definitionem, significare perspicuum est.\"\n(Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina, p. 65).]\n\n[Footnote 16: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32. That the parts of\nthe definition must coalesce into one unity is laid down again in the\nMetaphysica, Z. pp. 1037, 1038, where Aristotle makes reference to\nthe Analytica as haying already treated the same subject, and\nprofesses an intention to complete what has been begun in the\nAnalytica; [Greek: e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s peri\\\no(rismou= m\u00ea\\ ei)/r\u00eatai.]]\n\nAfter stating some other additional difficulties which seem to leave\nthe work of Definition inexplicable, Aristotle relinquishes the\ndubitative treatment, and looks out for some solution of the puzzle:\nHow may it be possible that the Definition shall become known?[17] He\nhas already told us that to know the essence of a thing is the same\nas to know the cause or reason of its existence; but we must first\nbegin by knowing that the _definiendum_ exists; for there can be no\ndefinition of a non-entity, except a mere definition of the word, a\nnominal or verbal definition. Now sometimes we know the existence of\nthe subject by one or other of its accidental attributes; but this\ngives us no help towards finding the definition.[18] Sometimes,\nhowever, we obtain a partial knowledge of its essence along with the\nknowledge of its existence; when we know it along with some constant\nantecedent, or through some constant, though derivative, consequent.\nKnowing thus much, we can often discover the cause or fundamental\ncondition thereof, which is the essence or definition of the\nsubject.[19] Indeed, it may happen that the constant derivative, and\nthe fundamental essence on which it depends, become known both\ntogether; or, again, the cause or fundamental condition may perhaps\nnot be the essence of the subject alone, but some fact including\nother subjects also; and this fact may then be stated as a middle\nterm. Thus, in regard to eclipse of the moon, we know the constant\nphenomenal fact about it, that, on a certain recurrence of the time\nof full moon, the moon casts no light and makes no shadow. Hence we\nproceed to search out the cause. Is it interposition of the earth, or\nconversion of the moon's body, or extinction of her light, &c.? The\nnew fact when shown, must appear as a middle term, throwing into\nsyllogistic form (in the First figure) the cause or rational\nexplanation of a lunar eclipse; showing not merely that there is an\neclipse, but what an eclipse is, or what is its definition.[20]\n\n[Footnote 17: Analyt. Post. II. vii. p. 92, a. 34, seq. The [Greek:\na)po/riai] continue to the end of ch. vii. He goes on, ch. viii. p.\n93, a. 1-2: [Greek: pa/lin de\\ skepte/on ti/ tou/t\u00f4n le/getai kal\u00f4=s,\nkai\\ ti/ ou) kal\u00f4=s], &c. \"Tout ce qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de ne repr\u00e9sente pas la\nth\u00e9orie proprement dite; ce n'est qu'une discussion pr\u00e9liminaire\"\n(Barth. St. Hilaire, not. p. 222). These difficult chapters are well\nillustrated by Hermann Rassow, ch, i. pp. 9-14.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 3: [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\ne)sti/n, \u00f4(s e)/phamen, tau)to\\n to\\ ei)de/nai ti/ e)sti kai\\ to\\\nei)de/nai to\\ ai)/tion tou= ei) e)/sti;] Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: o(/sa\nme\\n ou)=n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s oi)/damen o(/ti e)/stin, a)nagkai=on\nm\u00eadam\u00f4=s e)/chein pro\\s to\\ ti/ e)stin; **ou)de\\ ga\\r o(/ti\ne)/stin i)/smen; to\\ de\\ z\u00eatei=n ti/ e)sti m\u00ea\\ e)/chontas o(/ti\ne)/sti, m\u00eade\\n z\u00eatei=n e)sti/n. kath' o(/s\u00f4n d' e)/chome/n ti,\nr(a=|on; \u00f4(/ste \u00f4(s e)/chomen o(/ti e)/stin, ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chomen kai\\\npro\\s to\\ ti/ e)stin.] Compare Brentano, Ueber die Bedeutung des\nSeienden nach Aristoteles, p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 21. Themistius, p.\n79, Speng.: [Greek: o(/sa de\\ a)po\\ t\u00f4=n oi)kei/\u00f4n te kai\\ e)x\nau)tou= tou= pra/gmatos, a)po\\ tou/t\u00f4n \u00ea)/d\u00ea r(a=|on ei)s to\\ ti/\ne)sti metabai/nomen.]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 93, a. 30-b. 14.]\n\nAristotle has thus shown how the Essence or Quiddity ([Greek: ti/\ne)sti]) may become known in this class of cases. There is neither\nsyllogism nor demonstration thereof, yet it is declared through\nsyllogism and demonstration: though no demonstration thereof is\npossible, yet you cannot know it without demonstration, wherever\nthere is an extraneous cause.[21]\n\n[Footnote 21: Ibid. b. 15-20: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste sullogismo\\s me\\n tou=\nti/ e)stin ou) gi/netai ou)d' a)po/deixis, d\u00ea=lon me/ntoi dia\\\nsullogismou= kai\\ di' a)podei/xe\u00f4s.]\n\nMr. Poste translates an earlier passage (p. 93, a. 5) in this very\ndifficult chapter as follows (p. 107): \"If one cause is demonstrable,\nanother indemonstrable cause must be the intermediate; and the proof\nis in the first figure, and the conclusion affirmative and universal.\nIn this mode of demonstrating the essence, we prove one definition by\nanother, for the intermediate that proves an essence or a peculiar\npredicate must itself be an essence or a peculiar predicate. Of two\ndefinitions, then, one is proved and the other assumed; and, as we\nsaid before, this is not a demonstration but a dialectical proof of\nthe essence.\" Mr. Poste here translates [Greek: logiko\\s\nsullogismo/s] \"dialectical proof.\" I understand it rather as meaning\na syllogism, [Greek: tou= u(pa/rchein] simply (Top. I. v. p. 102, b.\n5), in which all that you really know is that the predicate belongs\nto the subject, but in which you _assume_ besides that it belongs to\nthe subject _essentially_. It is not a demonstration because, in\norder to obtain Essence in the conclusion, you are obliged to\npostulate Essence in your premiss. (See Alexander ad Topic. I. p.\n263, Br.). You have therefore postulated a premiss which required\nproof as much as the conclusion.]\n\nBut the above doctrine will hold only in cases where there _is_ a\ndistinct or extraneous cause; it will not hold in cases where there\nis none. It is only in the former (as has been said) that a middle\nterm can be shown; rendering it possible that Quiddity or Essence\nshould be declared by a valid formal syllogism, though it cannot be\ndemonstrated by syllogism. In the latter, where there is no distinct\ncause, no such middle term can be enunciated: the Quiddity or Essence\nmust be assumed as an immediate or undemonstrable principium, and\nmust be exposed or set out in the best manner practicable as an\nexistent reality, on Induction or on some other authority. The\narithmetician makes his first steps by assuming both what a monad is\nand that there exists such a monad.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: Analyt. Post. II. ix. p. 93, b. 21. [Greek: e)/sti de\\\nt\u00f4=n me\\n e(/tero/n ti ai)/tion, t\u00f4=n d' ou)k e)/stin. \u00f4(/ste d\u00ea=lon\no(/ti kai\\ t\u00f4=n ti/ e)sti ta\\ me\\n a)/mesa kai\\ a)rchai/ ei)sin, a(\\\nkai\\ ei)=nai kai\\ ti/ e)stin u(pothe/sthai dei= \u00ea)\\ a)/llon tro/pon\nphanera\\ poi\u00ea=sai. o(/per o( a)rithm\u00eatiko\\s poiei=; kai\\ ga\\r ti/\ne)sti t\u00ea\\n mona/da u(poti/thetai, kai\\ o(/ti e)/stin.]\n\nThemistius, p. 80: [Greek: a(\\ kai\\ ei)=nai kai\\ ti/ e)stin\nu(pothe/sthai dei=, \u00ea)\\ a)/llon tro/pon phanera\\ poi\u00ea=sai e)x\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s \u00ea)\\ pi/ste\u00f4s \u00ea)\\ e)mpeiri/as.] Rassow, De Notionis\nDefinitione, pp. 18-22.]\n\nWe may distinguish three varieties of Definition. 1. Sometimes it is\nthe mere explanation what a word signifies; in this sense, it has\nnothing to do with essence or existence; it is a nominal definition\nand nothing more.[23] 2. Sometimes it enunciates the Essence, cause,\nor reason of the _definitum_; this will happen where the cause is\ndistinct or extraneous, and where there is accordingly an intervening\nmiddle term: the definition will then differ from a demonstration\nonly by condensing into one enunciation the two premisses and the\nconclusion which together constitute the demonstration.[24] 3.\nSometimes it is an immediate proposition, an indemonstrable\nhypothesis, assuming Essence or Quiddity; the essence itself being\ncause, and no extraneous cause--no intervening middle term--being\nobtainable.[25]\n\n[Footnote 23: Analyt. Post. II. x. p. 93, b. 29-37.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 93, b. 38, seq. [Greek: oi(=on a)po/deixis\ntou= ti/ e)stin, t\u00ea=| the/sei diaphe/r\u00f4n t\u00ea=s\na)podei/xe\u00f4s;--sullogismo\\s tou= ti/ e)sti, pt\u00f4/sei diaphe/r\u00f4n t\u00ea=s\na)podei/xe\u00f4s]--differing \"situ et positione terminorum\" (Julius\nPacius, p. 493).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ibid. p. 94, a. 9: [Greek: o( de\\ t\u00f4=n a)me/s\u00f4n\no(rismo/s, the/sis e)sti\\ tou= ti/ e)stin a)napo/deiktos.] Compare I.\nxxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: \u00f4(=| ga\\r kath' au(to\\ u(pa/rchei ti,\ntou=to au)to\\ au(t\u00f4=| ai)/tion.] See Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie\ndes Aristoteles, p. 212, seq.]\n\nTo know or cognize is, to know the Cause; when we know the Cause, we\nare satisfied with our cognition. Now there are four Causes, or\nvarieties of Cause:--\n\n1. The Essence or Quiddity (Form)--[Greek: to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai].\n\n2. The necessitating conditions (Matter)--[Greek: to/ ti/n\u00f4n o)/nt\u00f4n\na)na/gk\u00ea tou=t' ei)=nai].\n\n3. The proximate mover or stimulator of change (Efficient)--[Greek:\n\u00ea( ti/ pr\u00f4=ton e)ki/n\u00ease].\n\n4. That for the sake of which (Final Cause or End)--[Greek: to\\\nti/nos e(/neka].\n\nAll these four Causes (Formal, Material, Efficient, Final) appear as\nmiddle terms in demonstrating. We can proceed through the medium\neither of Form, or of Matter, or of Efficient, or of End. The first\nof the four has already been exemplified--the demonstration by Form.\nThe second appears in demonstrating that the angle in a semi-circle\nis always a right angle; where the middle term (or matter of the\nsyllogism, ([Greek: to\\ e)x ou(=]) is, that such angle is always the\nhalf of two right angles.[26] The Efficient is the middle term, when\nto the question, Why did the Persians invade Athens? it is answered\nthat the Athenians had previously invaded Persia along with the\nEretrians. (All are disposed to attack those who have attacked them\nfirst; the Athenians attacked the Persians first; _ergo_, the\nPersians were disposed to attack the Athenians.) Lastly, the Final\nCause serves as middle term, when to the question, Why does a man\nwalk after dinner? the response is, For the purpose of keeping up his\nhealth. In another way, the middle term here is digestion: walking\nafter dinner promotes digestion; digestion is the efficient cause of\nhealth.[27]\n\n[Footnote 26: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-36. Themistius, p.\n83: [Greek: ma/lista me\\n ga\\r e)pi\\ pa/s\u00eas a)podei/xe\u00f4s o( me/sos\ne)/stin oi(=on \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea t\u00f4=| sullogism\u00f4=|; ou(/tos ga\\r o( poi\u00f4=n\nta\\s du/o prota/seis, e)ph' ai(=s to\\ sumpe/rasma.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 36-b. 21.]\n\nThe Final Cause or End is prior in the order of nature, but posterior\nto the terms of the conclusion in the order of time or generation;\nwhile the Efficient is prior in the order of time or generation. The\nFormal and Material are simultaneous with the effect, neither prior\nnor posterior.[28] Sometimes the same fact may proceed both from a\nFinal cause, and from a cause of Material Necessity; thus the light\npasses through our lantern for the purpose of guiding us in the dark,\nbut also by reason that the particles of light are smaller than the\npores in the glass. Nature produces effects of finality, or with a\nview to some given end; and also effects by necessity, the necessity\nbeing either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by\nextraneous force. Thus a stone _falls_ to the ground by necessity of\nthe first kind, but _ascends_ by necessity of the second kind. Among\nproducts of human intelligence some spring wholly from design without\nnecessity; but others arise by accident or chance and have no final\ncause.[29]\n\n[Footnote 28: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-26. Themistius, p.\n83: [Greek: \u00ea( ge/nesis ou)=n tou= me/sou kai\\ ai)ti/ou t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n\nou)k e)/chei ta/xin e)ph' a(pa/nt\u00f4n, a)ll' ou(= me\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean \u00f4(s\ne)pi\\ t\u00f4=n kin\u00eatik\u00f4=n, ou(= de\\ teleutai/an \u00f4(s e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n tel\u00f4=n\nkai\\ \u00f4(=n e(/neka, ou(= d' a(/ma \u00f4(s e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n o(rism\u00f4=n kai\\ tou=\nti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 29: Analyt. Post. II. p. 94, b. 27-p. 95, a. 9.]\n\nThat the middle term is the Cause, is equally true in respect to\n_Entia_, _Fientia_, _Pr\u00e6terita_, and _Futura_; only that in respect\nto _Entia_, the middle term or Cause must be an _Ens_; in respect to\n_Fientia_ it must be a _Fiens_; in respect to _Pr\u00e6terita_, a\n_Pr\u00e6teritum_; and in respect to _Futura_, a _Futurum_; that is, in\neach case, it must be generated at the corresponding time with the\nmajor and minor terms in the conclusion.[30] What is the cause of an\neclipse of the moon? The cause is, that the earth intervenes between\nmoon and sun; and this is true alike of eclipses past, present, and\nfuture. Such an intervention is the essence or definition of a lunar\neclipse: the cause is therefore Formal, and cause and effect are\nsimultaneous, occurring at the same moment of time. But in the other\nthree Causes--Material, Efficient, Final--where phenomena are\nsuccessive and not simultaneous, can we say that the antecedent is\ncause and the consequent effect, time being, as seems to us, a\n_continuum_? In cases like this, we can syllogize from the consequent\nbackward to the antecedent; but not from the antecedent forward to\nthe consequent. If the house has been built, we can infer that the\nfoundations have been laid; but, if the foundations have been laid,\nwe cannot infer that the house has been built.[31] There must always\nbe an interval of time during which inference from the antecedent\nwill be untrue; perhaps, indeed, it may never become true. Cause and\n_causatum_ in these three last varieties of Cause, do not universally\nand necessarily reciprocate with each other, as in the case of the\nFormal cause. Though time is continuous, events or generations are\ndistinct points marked in a continuous line, and are not continuous\nwith each other.[32] The number of these points that may be taken is\nindeed infinite; yet we must assume some of them as ultimate and\nimmediate _principia_, in order to construct our syllogism, and\nprovide our middle term.[33] Where the middle term reciprocates and\nis co-extensive with the major and the minor, in such cases we have\ngeneration of phenomena in a cycle; _e.g._, after the earth has been\nmade wet, vapour rises of necessity: hence comes a cloud, hence\nwater; which again falls, and the earth again becomes wet.[34]\nFinally, wherever our conclusion is not universally and necessarily\ntrue, but true only in most cases, our immediate _principia_ must\nalso be of the same character, true in most cases, but in most cases\nonly.[35]\n\n[Footnote 30: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 10, 36: [Greek: to\\\nga\\r me/son o(mo/gonon dei= ei)=nai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. a. 24 seq., b. 32; Julius Pacius, ad loc.; Biese,\nDie Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 302-303.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 39-b. 8; Themistius,\np. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, b. 14-31: [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\\nde\\ kai\\ e)n tou/tois a)/mesos l\u00eapte/a].]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. b. 38-p. 96, a**. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ibid. p. 96, a. 8-19.]\n\nHow are we to proceed in hunting out those attributes that are\npredicated _in Quid_,[36] as belonging to the Essence of the subject?\nThe subject being a lowest species, we must look out for such\nattributes as belong to all individuals thereof, but which belong\nalso to individuals of other species under the same genus. We shall\nthus find one, two, three, or more, attributes, each of which,\nseparately taken, belongs to various individuals lying out of the\nspecies; but the assemblage of which, collectively taken, does not\nbelong to any individual lying out of the species. The Assemblage\nthus found is the Essence; and the enunciation thereof is the\nDefinition of the species. Thus, the triad is included in the genus\nnumber; in searching for its definition, therefore, we must not go\nbeyond that genus, nor include any attributes (such as _ens_, &c.)\npredicable of other subjects as well as numbers. Keeping within the\nlimits of the genus, we find that every triad agrees in being an odd\nnumber. But this oddness belongs to other numbers also (pentad,\nheptad, &c.). We therefore look out for other attributes, and we find\nthat every triad agrees in being a prime number, in two distinct\nsenses; first, that it is not measured by any other number; secondly,\nthat it is not compounded of any other numbers. This last attribute\nbelongs to no other odd number except the triad. We have now an\nassemblage of attributes, which belong each of them to every triad,\nuniversally and necessarily, and which, taken all together, belong\n_exclusively_ to the triad, and therefore constitute its essence or\ndefinition. The triad is a number, odd, and prime in the two\nsenses.[37] The _definitum_ and the definition are here exactly\nco-extensive.\n\n[Footnote 36: Ibid. xiii. p. 96, a. 22: [Greek: p\u00f4=s dei=\n_th\u00eareu/ein_ ta\\ e)n t\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti kat\u00eagorou/mena?]]\n\n[Footnote 37: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, a. 24-b. 14. [Greek: ei)\ntoi/nun m\u00eadeni\\ u(pa/rchei a)/ll\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ tai=s a)to/mois tria/si,\ntou=t' a)\\n ei)/\u00ea to\\ tria/di ei)=nai. u(pokei/sth\u00f4 ga\\r kai\\ tou=to,\n\u00ea( ou)si/a \u00ea( e(ka/stou ei)=nai \u00ea( e)pi\\ tai=s a)to/mois e)/schatos\ntoiau/t\u00ea kat\u00eagori/a. \u00f4(/ste o(moi/\u00f4s kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4| o(t\u00f4|ou=n t\u00f4=n\nou(/t\u00f4 deichthe/nt\u00f4n to\\ _au)t\u00f4=| ei)=nai_ e)/stai.]]\n\nWhere the matter that we study is the entire genus, we must begin by\ndistributing it into its lowest species; _e.g._ number into dyad,\ntriad, &c.; in like manner, taking straight line, circle, right\nangle, &c.[38] We must first search out the definitions of each of\nthese lowest species; and these having been ascertained, we must next\nlook above the genus, to the Category in which it is itself\ncomprised, whether _Quantum_, _Quale_, &c. Having done thus much we\nmust study the derivative attributes or propria of the lowest species\nthrough the common generalities true respecting the larger. We must\nrecollect that these derivative attributes are derived from the\nessence and definition of the lowest species, the complex flowing\nfrom the simple as its _principium_: they belong _per se_ only to the\nlowest species thus defined; they belong to the higher genera only\nthrough those species.[39] It is in this way, and not in any other,\nthat the logical Division of genera, according to specific\ndifferences, can be made serviceable for investigation of essential\nattributes; that is, it can only be made to demonstrate what is\nderivative from the essence. We have shown already that it cannot\nhelp in demonstrating essence or Definition itself. We learn to\nmarshal in proper order the two constituent elements of our\ndefinition, and to attach each specific difference to the genus to\nwhich it properly belongs. Thus we must not attempt to distribute the\ngenus animal according to the difference of having the wing divided\nor undivided: many animals will fall under neither of the two heads;\nthe difference in question belongs to the lower genus winged animal,\nand distributes the same into two species. The characteristic or\nspecific difference must be enunciated and postulated by itself, and\nmust be attached to its appropriate genus in order to form the\ndefinition. It is only by careful attention to the steps of\nlegitimate logical Division that we can make sure of including all\nthe particulars and leaving out none.[40]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 18. The straight line is the first or lowest\nof all lines: no other line can be understood, unless we first\nunderstand what is meant by a straight line. In like manner the right\nangle is the first of all angles, the circle the first of all\ncurvilinear figures (Julius Pacius, ad loc. p. 504).]\n\n[Footnote 39: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 19-25: [Greek: meta\\\nde\\ tou=to, la/bo/nta ti/ to\\ ge/nos, oi(=on po/teron t\u00f4=n pos\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\\nt\u00f4=n poi\u00f4=n, ta\\ i)/dia pa/th\u00ea the\u00f4rei=n dia\\ t\u00f4=n koin\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n.\ntoi=s ga\\r suntitheme/nois e)k t\u00f4=n a)to/m\u00f4n] (speciebus infimis)\n[Greek: ta\\ sumbai/nonta e)k t\u00f4=n o(rism\u00f4=n e)/stai d\u00ea=la, dia\\ to\\\na)rch\u00ea\\n ei)=nai pa/nt\u00f4n to\\n o(rismo/n kai\\ to\\ a(plou=n, kai\\ toi=s\na(ploi=s kath' au(ta\\ u(pa/rchein ta\\ sumbai/nonta mo/nois, toi=s d'\na)/llois kat' e)kei=na.]\n\nThemistius illustrates this obscure passage, p. 89. The definitions\nof [Greek: eu)thei=a gramm\u00ea/, keklasme/n\u00ea gramm\u00ea/, peripher\u00ea\\s\ngramm\u00ea/], must each of them contain the definition of [Greek: gramm\u00ea/\n(= m\u00ea=kos a)plate/s)], since it is in the Category [Greek: Poso/n\n(poso\\n m\u00ea=kos a)plate/s)]. But the derivative properties of the\ncircle ([Greek: peripher\u00ea\\s gramm\u00ea/]) are deduced from the definition\nof a circle, and belong to it in the first instance _qu\u00e2_ [Greek:\nperipher\u00ea\\s gramm\u00ea/], in a secondary way _qu\u00e2_ [Greek: gramm\u00ea/].]\n\n[Footnote 40: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 25-p. 97, a. 6.]\n\nSome contemporaries of Aristotle, and among them Speusippus,\nmaintained that it was impossible either to define, or to divide\nlogically, unless you knew all particulars without exception. You\ncannot (they said) know any one thing, except by knowing its\ndifferences from all other things; which would imply that you knew\nalso all these other things.[41] To these reasoners Aristotle\nreplies: It is not necessary to know _all_ the differences of every\nthing; you know a thing as soon as you know its essence, with the\nproperties _per se_ which are derivative therefrom. There are many\ndifferences not belonging to the essence, but distinguishing from\neach other two things having the same essence: you may know the\nthing, without knowing these accidental differences.[42] When you\ndivide a genus into two species, distinguished by one proximate\nspecific difference, such that there cannot be any thing that does\nnot fall under one or other of these _membra condividentia_, and when\nyou have traced the subject investigated under one or other of these\nmembers, you can always follow this road until no lower specific\ndifference can be found, and you have then the final essence and\ndefinition of the subject; even though you may not know how many\n_other_ subjects each of the two members may include.[43] Thus does\nAristotle reply to Speusippus, showing that it is not necessary, for\nthe definition of one thing, that you should know _all_ other things.\nHis reply, as in many other cases, is founded on the distinction\nbetween the Essential and the Accidental.\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 97, a. 6-10; Themistius, p. 92. Aristotle does\nnot here expressly name Speusippus, but simply says [Greek: phasi/\ntines]. It is Themistius who names Speusippus; and one of the\nScholiasts refers to Eudemus as having expressly indicated Speusippus\n(Schol. p. 248, a. 24, Br.).]\n\n[Footnote 42: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 12: [Greek: pollai\\\nga\\r diaphorai\\ u(pa/rchousi toi=s au)toi=s t\u00f4=| ei)/dei, a)ll' ou)\nkat' ou)si/an ou)de\\ kath' au(ta/.]]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ibid. a. 18-22: [Greek: phanero\\n ga\\r o(/ti a)\\n\nou(/t\u00f4 badi/z\u00f4n e)/lth\u00ea| ei)s tau=ta \u00f4(=n m\u00eake/ti e)sti\\ diaphora/,\ne(/xei to\\n lo/gon t\u00ea=s ou)si/as.]]\n\nTo obtain or put together a definition through logical Division,\nthree points are to be attended to.[44] Collect the predicates _in\nQuid_; range them in the proper order; make sure that there are no\nmore, or that you have collected all. The essential predicates are\ngenera, to be obtained not otherwise than by the method (dialectical)\nused in concluding accidents. As regards order, you begin with the\nhighest genus, that which is predicable of all the others, while none\nof these is predicable of it, determining in like fashion the\nsuccession of the rest respectively. The collection will be complete,\nif you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference,\nsuch that every thing must be included in one or other of the two\nproximate and opposed portions; and then taking the species thus\nfound as your _dividendum_, subdivide it until no lower specific\ndifference can be found, or you obtain from the elements an exact\nequivalent to the subject.[45]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: ei)s de\\ to\\ kataskeua/zein o(/ron\ndia\\ diaire/se\u00f4n]. The Scholiast, p. 248, a. 41, explains [Greek:\nkataskeua/zein] by [Greek: eu(rei=n, sunthei=nai, a)podou=nai]. He\ndistinguishes it from [Greek: a)podeiknu/nai]; demonstration of the\ndefinition being impracticable.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 23 seq. See Waitz,\nComm. p. 418.]\n\nWhen the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of\nsimilar particulars, you compare them, and note what is the same in\nall; then turn to another group which are the same _in genere_ yet\ndiffer _in specie_ from the first group, and have a different point\nof community among themselves. You next compare the point of\ncommunity among the members of the first group, and that among the\nmembers of the second group. If the two points of community can be\nbrought under one rational formula, that will be the definition of\nthe subject; but if at the end of the process, the distinct points of\ncommunity are not found resolvable into any final one, this proves\nthat the supposed _definiendum_ is not one but two or more.[46] For\nexample, suppose you are investigating, What is the essence or\ndefinition of magnanimity? You must study various magnanimous\nindividuals, and note what they have in common _qu\u00e2_ magnanimous.[47]\nThus, Achilles, Ajax, Alkibiades were all magnanimous. Now, that\nwhich the three had in common was, that they could not endure to be\ninsulted; on that account Alkibiades went to war with his countrymen,\nAchilles was angry and stood aloof from the Greeks, Ajax slew\nhimself. But, again, you find two other magnanimous men, Sokrates and\nLysander. These two had in common the quality, that they maintained\nan equal and unshaken temper both in prosperity and adversity. Now\nwhen you have got thus far, the question to be examined is, What is\nthe point of identity between the temper that will not endure insult,\nand the temper that remains undisturbed under all diversities of\nfortune? If an identity can be found, this will be the essence or\ndefinition of magnanimity; to which will belong equanimity as one\nvariety, and intolerance of insult as another. If, on the contrary,\nno identity can be found, you will then have two distinct mental\ndispositions, without any common definition.[48]\n\n[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 7-15. [Greek: pa/lin\nskopei=n ei) tau)to\\n e(/\u00f4s a)\\n ei)s e(/na e)/lth\u00ea| lo/gon; ou(=tos\nga\\r e)/stai tou= pra/gmatos o(rismo/s. e)a\\n de\\ m\u00ea\\ badi/z\u00ea| ei)s\ne(/na a)ll' ei)s du/o \u00ea)\\ plei/\u00f4, d\u00ea=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\\n ei)/\u00ea e(/n\nti ei)=nai to\\ z\u00eatou/menon, a)lla\\ plei/\u00f4.]]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 16: [Greek: skepte/on e)pi/ tin\u00f4n\nmegalopsu/ch\u00f4n, ou(\\s i)/smen, ti/ e)/chousin e(\\n pa/ntes \u00ea(=|\n_toiou=toi_.]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. b. 17-25. [Greek: tau=ta du/o lab\u00f4\\n skop\u00f4= ti/\nto\\ au)to\\ e)/chousin \u00ea(/ te a)pa/theia \u00ea( peri\\ ta\\s tu/chas kai\\ \u00ea(\nm\u00ea\\ u(pomon\u00ea\\ a)timazome/n\u00f4n. ei) de\\ m\u00eade/n, du/o ei)/d\u00ea a)\\n ei)/\u00ea\nt\u00ea=s megalopsuchi/as.]\n\n  \u00c6quam memento rebus in arduis\n  Servare mentem: non secus in bonis\n    Ab insolenti temperatam\n      L\u00e6titi\u00e2.--Horace. _Ode_, ii. 3.\n\nAristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But\nsurely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they\nare not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a\ngenus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and\nLysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous.]\n\nEvery definition must be an universal proposition, applicable, not\nexclusively to one particular object, but to a class of greater or\nless extent. The lowest species is easier to define than the higher\ngenus; this is one reason why we must begin with particulars, and\nascend to universals. It is in the higher genera that equivocal terms\nmost frequently escape detection.[49] When you are demonstrating,\nwhat you have first to attend to is, the completeness of the form of\nsyllogizing: when you are defining, the main requisite is to be\nperspicuous and intelligible; _i.e._ to avoid equivocal or\nmetaphorical terms.[50] You will best succeed in avoiding them, if\nyou begin with the individuals, or with examples of the lowest\nspecies, and then proceed to consider not their resemblances\ngenerally, but their resemblances in certain definite ways, as in\ncolour or figure. These more definite resemblances you will note\nfirst; upon each you will found a formula of separate definition;\nafter which you will ascend to the more general formula of less\ndefinite resemblance common to both. Thus, in regard to the acute or\nsharp, you will consider the acute in sound, and in other matters\n(tastes, pains, weapons, angles, &c.), and you will investigate what\nis the common point of identity characterizing all. Perhaps there may\nbe no such identity; the transfer of the term from one to the other\nmay be only a metaphor: you will thus learn that no common definition\nis attainable. This is an important lesson; for as we are forbidden\nto carry on a dialectical debate in metaphorical terms, much more are\nwe forbidden to introduce metaphorical terms in a definition.[51]\n\n[Footnote 49: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 29: [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r\nai( o(m\u00f4numi/ai **lantha/nousi ma=llon e)n toi=s katho/lou\n\u00ea)\\ e)n toi=s a)diapho/rois.]]\n\n[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 31: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper\nde e)n tai=s a)podei/xesi dei= to/ ge sullelogi/sthai u(pa/rchein,\nou(/t\u00f4 kai\\ e)n toi=s o(/rois _to\\ saphe/s_.]\n\nBy [Greek: to\\ saphe/s], he evidently means the avoidance of\nequivocal or metaphorical terms, and the adherence to true genera and\nspecies. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 308-310.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 35-39.--([Greek:\ndiale/gesthai/ ph\u00easi, to\\ dialektik\u00f4=s o(milei=n].--Schol. p. 248, b.\n23, Brand.). Aristotle considers it metaphorical when the term\n_acute_ is applied both to a sound and to an angle.\n\nThe treatment of this portion of the Aristotelian doctrine by Prantl\n(Geschichte der Logik, vol. I. ch. iv. pp. 246, 247, 338), is\ninstructive. He brings out, in peculiar but forcible terms, the idea\nof \"notional causality\" which underlies Aristotle's Logic. \"So also\nist die Definition das Aussprechen _des sch\u00f6pferischen\nWesensbegriffes_. . . . . Soweit der sch\u00f6pferische Wesensbegriff\nerreicht werden kann, ist durch denselben die begriffliche Causalit\u00e4t\nerkannt; und die Einsicht in diese _primitive Urs\u00e4chlichkeit_ wird in\ndem Syllogismus vermittelst des Mittelbegriffes erreicht. Ueber den\nsch\u00f6pferischen Wesensbegriff hinauszugehen, ist nicht m\u00f6glich. . . .\n. Sobald die Definition mehr als eine blosse Namenserkl\u00e4rung ist--und\nsie muss mehr seyn--erkennt sie den Mittelbegriff als sch\u00f6pferische\nCausalit\u00e4t. . . . . Die ontologische Bedeutung des Mittelbegriffes\nist, dass er sch\u00f6pferischer Wesensbegriff ist.\" Rassow (pp. 51, 63,\n&c.) adopts a like metaphorical phrase:--\"Definitionem est, explicare\nnotionem; qu\u00e6 quidem est _creatrix rerum causa_.\"]\n\nTo obtain and enunciate correctly the problems suitable for\ndiscussion in each branch of science, you must have before you tables\nof dissection and logical division, and take them as guides;[52]\nbeginning with the highest genus and proceeding downward through the\nsuccessively descending scale of sub-genera and species. If you are\nstudying animals, you first collect the predicates belonging to all\nanimals; you then take the highest subdivision of the genus animal,\nsuch as bird, and you collect the predicates belonging to all birds;\nand so on to the next in the descending scale. You will be able to\nshow cause why any of these predicates must belong to the man\nSokrates, or to the horse Bukephalus; because it belongs to the genus\nanimal, which includes man and horse. Animal will be the middle term\nin the demonstration.[53] This example is taken from the class-terms\ncurrent in vulgar speech. But you must not confine yourself to these;\nyou must look out for new classes, bound together by the possession\nof some common attribute, yet not usually talked of as classes, and\nyou must see whether other attributes can be found constantly\nconjoined therewith. Thus you find that all animals having horns,\nhave also a structure of stomach fit for rumination, and teeth upon\none jaw only. You know, therefore, what is the cause that oxen and\nsheep have a structure of stomach fit for rumination. It is because\nthey have horns. Having-horns is the middle term of the\ndemonstration.[54] Cases may also be found in which several objects\npossess no common nature or attribute to bind them into a class, but\nare yet linked together, by analogy, in different ways, to one and\nthe same common term.[55] Some predicates will be found to accompany\nconstantly this analogy, or to belong to all the objects _qu\u00e2_\nanalogous, just as if they had one and the same class-nature.\nDemonstration may be applied to these, as to the former cases.\n\n[Footnote 52: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98**, a. 1. [Greek: pro\\s de\\\nto\\ e)/chein ta\\ probl\u00ea/mata, le/gein dei= ta/s te _a)natoma\\s_ kai\\\nta\\s diaire/seis, ou(/t\u00f4 de\\ diale/gein, u(pothe/menon to\\ ge/nos to\\\nkoino\\n a(pa/nt\u00f4n.] This is Waitz's text, which differs from Julius\nPacius and from Firmin Didot.\n\nThemistius (pp. 94-95) explains [Greek: ta\\s a)natoma\\s] to be\nanatomical drawings or exercises prepared by Aristotle for teaching:\n[Greek: kai\\ ta\\s a)natoma\\s e)/chein dei= prochei/r\u00f4s, o(/sai\npepoi/\u00eantai A)ristote/lei].\n\nThe collection of Problems or questions for investigation was much\nprosecuted, not merely by Aristotle but by Theophrastus (Schol. p.\n249, a. 12, Br.).]\n\n[Footnote 53: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98, a. 5-12.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ibid. a. 13-19. Aristotle assumes that the material\nwhich ought to have served for the upper teeth, is appropriated by\nNature for the formation of horns.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ibid. a. 20-23: [Greek: e)/ti d' a)/llos tro/pos e)sti\\\n_kata\\ to\\ a)na/logon_ e)kle/gein]. He gives as examples, [Greek:\ns\u00ea/pion, a)/kantha, o)stou=n].]\n\nProblems must be considered to be the same, when the middle term of\nthe demonstration is the same for each, or when the middle term in\nthe one is a subordinate or corollary to that in the other. Thus, the\ncause of echo, the cause of images in a mirror, the cause of the\nrainbow, all come under the same general head or middle term\n(refraction), though with a specific difference in each case. Again,\nwhen we investigate the problem, Why does the Nile flow with a more\npowerful current in the last half of the (lunar) month? the reason is\nthat the month is then more wintry. But why _is_ the month then more\nwintry? Because the light of the moon is then diminishing. Here are\ntwo middle terms, the one of which depends upon the other. The\nproblem for investigation is therefore the same in both.[56]\n\n[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. II. xv. p. 98, a. 24-34. Theophrastus is\nsaid to have made collections of \"_like problems_,\" problems of which\nthe solution depended upon the same middle term (Schol. p. 249, a.\n11**, Brand.).]\n\nRespecting _Causa_ and _Causatum_ question may be made whether it is\nnecessary that when the _causatum_ exists, the _causa_ must exist\nalso? The answer must be in the affirmative, if you include the cause\nin the definition of _causatum_. Thus, if you include in the\ndefinition of a lunar eclipse, the cause thereof, viz., intervention\nof the earth between moon and sun--then, whenever an eclipse occurs,\nsuch intervention must occur also. But it must not be supposed that\nthere is here a perfect reciprocation, and that as the _causatum_ is\nin this case demonstrable from the cause, so there is the like\ndemonstration of the cause from the _causatum_. Such a demonstration\nis never a demonstration of [Greek: dio/ti]; it is only a\ndemonstration of [Greek: o(/ti]. The _causatum_ is not included in\nthe definition of the cause; if you demonstrate that because the moon\nis eclipsed, therefore the earth is interposed between the moon and\nthe sun, you prove the fact of the interposition, but you learn\nnothing about the cause thereof. Again, in a syllogism the middle\nterm is the cause of the conclusion (_i.e._, it is the reason why the\nmajor term is predicated of the minor, which predication is the\nconclusion); and in this sense the cause and _causatum_ may sometimes\nreciprocate, so that either may be proved by means of the other. But\nthe _causatum_ here reciprocates with the _causa_ only as premiss and\nconclusion (_i.e._, we may know either by means of the other), not as\ncause and effect; the _causatum_ is not cause of the _causa_ as a\nfact and reality, as the _causa_ is cause of the _causatum_.[57]\n\n[Footnote 57: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, a. 35, seq. Themistius,\npp. 96-97: [Greek: ou) ga/r e)stin ai)/tion tou= t\u00ea\\n g\u00ea=n e)n me/s\u00f4|\nei)=nai to\\ t\u00ea\\n sel\u00ea/n\u00ean e)klei/pein, a)lla\\ me/son tou=\nsullogismou=; kai\\ tou= sumpera/smatos i)/s\u00f4s ai)/tion, _tou=\npra/gmatos de\\ ou)dam\u00f4=s_.] Themistius here speaks with a precision\nwhich is not always present to the mind of Aristotle; for he\ndiscriminates the cause of _the fact_ from the cause of the _affirmed\nfact_ or _conclusion_. M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire says (Plan G\u00e9n\u00e9ral\ndes Derniers Analytiques, p. cxl.):--\"Ainsi, la d\u00e9monstration de\nl'effet par la cause apprend pourquoi la chose est; la d\u00e9monstration\npar l'effet apprend seulement que la chose est. On sait que la terre\ns'interpose, mais on ne sait pas pourquoi elle s'interpose: et ce qui\nle montre bien, c'est que l'id\u00e9e de l'interposition de la terre est\nindispensable \u00e0 la d\u00e9finition essentielle de l'\u00e9clipse tandis que\nl'id\u00e9e de l'\u00e9clipse n'a que faire dans la d\u00e9finition de\nl'interposition. L'interposition de la terre fait donc comprendre\nl'\u00e9clipse; tandis que l'\u00e9clipse ne fait pas du tout comprendre\nl'interposition de la terre.\"]\n\nThe question then arises, Can there be more than one cause of the\nsame _causatum_? Is it necessary that the same effect should be\nproduced in all cases by the same cause? In other words, when the\nsame predicate is demonstrated to be true of two distinct minors, may\nit not be demonstrated in one case by one middle term, and in the\nother case by a different middle term?[58] Answer: In genuine and\nproper scientific problems the middle term is the rational account\n(definition, interpretation) of the major extreme; this middle term\ntherefore, or the cause, must in all cases be one and the same. The\ndemonstration in these cases is derived from the same essence; it is\n_per se_, not _per accidens_. But there are other problems, not\nstrictly and properly scientific, in which cause and _causatum_ are\nconnected merely _per accidens_; the demonstration being operated by\na middle term which is not of the essence of the major, but is only a\nsign or concomitant.[59] According as the terms of the conclusion are\nrelated to each other, so also will the middle term be related to\nboth. If the conclusion be equivocal, the middle term will be\nequivocal also; if the predicate in the conclusion be in generic\nrelation to the subject, the major also will be in generic relation\nto the middle. Thus, if you are demonstrating that one triangle is\nsimilar to another, and that one colour is similar to another, the\nword similar in these two cases is not univocal, but equivocal;\naccordingly, the middle term in the demonstration will also be\nequivocal. Again, if you are demonstrating that four proportionals\nwill also be proportionals alternately, there will be one cause or\nmiddle term, if the subject of the conclusion be lines; another, if\nthe subject be numbers. Yet the middle term or cause in both is the\nsame, in as far as both involve a certain fact of increment.[60]\n\n[Footnote 58: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, b. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Ibid. xvii. p. 99, a. 4: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ kai\\ ou(=\nai)/tion kai\\ \u00f4(=| skopei=n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s; ou) m\u00ea\\n dokei=\nprobl\u00ea/mata ei)=nai.]\n\n\"Veluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est\naptus ad ridendum.\" (Julius Pacius, p. 514.)]\n\n[Footnote 60: Analyt. Post. II. xvii. p. 99, a. 8-16.]\n\nThe major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger\nthan any particular minor, but equal or co-extensive with the sum\ntotal of the particulars. Thus the predicate deciduous, affirmable of\nall plants with broad leaves, is greater in extension than the\nsubject vines, also than the subject fig-trees; but it is equal in\nextension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees (the other\nparticular broad-leaved plant). The middle also, in an universal\ndemonstration, reciprocates with the major, being its definition.\nHere the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees\nshed their leaves, is not that they are broad-leaved plants, but\nrather a coagulation of sap or some such fact.[61]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 16 seq.]\n\nThe last chapter of the present treatise is announced by Aristotle as\nthe appendix and completion of his entire theory of Demonstrative\nScience, contained in the Analytica Priora, which treats of\nSyllogism, and the Analytica Posteriora, which treats of\nDemonstration. After formally winding up the whole enquiry, he\nproceeds to ask regarding the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science:\nWhat are they? How do they become known? What is the mental habit or\ncondition that is cognizant of them?[62]\n\n[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 15-19: [Greek: peri\\\nme\\n ou)=n sullogismou= kai\\ a)podei/xe\u00f4s, ti/ te e(ka/tero/n e)sti\nkai\\ p\u00f4=s gi/netai, phanero/n, a(/ma **de\\ kai\\ peri\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas\na)podeiktik\u00ea=s; tau)to\\n ga/r e)stin. peri\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n a)rch\u00f4=n, p\u00f4=s\nte gi/nontai gn\u00f4/rimoi, kai\\ _ti/s \u00ea( gn\u00f4ri/zousa e(/xis_,\ne)nteu=the/n e)sti d\u00ea=lon proapor\u00ea/sasi pr\u00f4=ton.]\n\nBekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch.\nxix.: the older editions placed the words preceding [Greek: peri\\\nde\\] in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject\n(Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):--\"Postremum hoc caput\n(beginning at [Greek: peri\\ de\\]) extra primariam tractationem\npositum esse manifestum est: quum pr\u00e6cesserit epilogus respondens\nprooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum.\"]\n\nAristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration\nwithout certain _pr\u00e6cognita_ to start from; and that these\n_pr\u00e6cognita_ must, in the last resort, be _principia_ undemonstrable,\nimmediately known, and known even more accurately than the\nconclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant\nhabits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the\nfirst? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such\nvaluable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood,\nand yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired;\nyet how is it possible for us to acquire them?[63] The fact is, that,\nthough we do not from the first possess any such complete and\naccurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn\ncapacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the\nsame kind belongs to all animals.[64] All of them possess an\napprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible\nPerception; but, though all possess such power, there is this\ndifference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer\nor shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with\nwhom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception,\nat least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent;\nbut with those that both perceive and retain perceptions in their\nminds, ulterior knowledge grows up.[65] There are many such retentive\nanimals, and they differ among themselves: with some of them reason\nor rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained; with\nothers, it is not so. First, out of perception arises memory; next,\nout of memory of the same often repeated, arises experience, since\nmany remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one\nexperience. Lastly, out of experience, or out of the universal\nnotion, the _unum et idem_ which pervades and characterizes a\nmultitude of particulars, when it has taken rest and root in the\nmind, there arises the _principium_ of art and science: of science,\nin respect to objects existent; of art, in respect to things\ngenerable.[66] And thus these mental habits or acquirements neither\nexist in our minds determined from the beginning, nor do they spring\nfrom other acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy. They spring\nfrom sensible perception; and we may illustrate their growth by what\nhappens in the panic of a terrified host, where first one runaway\nstops in his flight, then a second, then a third, until at last a\nnumber docile to command is collected. One characteristic feature of\nthe mind is to be capable of this process.[67]\n\n[Footnote 63: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 25-30: [Greek:\npo/teron ou)k e)nou=sai ai( e(/xeis e)ggi/nontai, \u00ea)\\ e)nou=sai\nlel\u00ea/thasin. ei) me\\n d\u00ea\\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei\nga\\r a)kribeste/ras e)/chontas gn\u00f4/seis a)podei/xe\u00f4s lantha/nein; ei)\nde\\ lamba/nomen m\u00ea\\ e)/chontes pro/teron, p\u00f4=s a)\\n gn\u00f4ri/zoimen kai\\\nmantha/noimen e)k m\u00ea\\ prou+parchou/s\u00eas gn\u00f4/se\u00f4s?] Compare, supra,\nAnalyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30; Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1,\nwith the Comment. of Alexander, p. 96, Bonitz.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30: [Greek: phanero\\n\ntoi/nun ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\\ m\u00eademi/an\ne)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai; a)na/gk\u00ea a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina\ndu/namin, m\u00ea\\ toiau/t\u00ean d' e)/chein \u00ea)\\ e)/stai tou/t\u00f4n timi\u00f4te/ra\nkat' a)kri/beian. phai/netai de\\ tou=to/ ge pa=sin u(pa/rchon toi=s\nz\u00f4/|ois.]]\n\n[Footnote 65: Analyt. Post II. xix. p. 99, b. 37: [Greek: o(/sois\nme\\n ou)=n m\u00ea\\ e)ggi/netai, \u00ea)\\ o(/l\u00f4s \u00ea)\\ peri\\ a(\\ m\u00ea\\ e)ggi/netai,\nou)k e)/sti tou/tois gn\u00f4=sis e)/x\u00f4 tou= ai)stha/nesthai; e)n oi(=s d'\ne)/nestin ai)sthanome/nois e)/chein e)/ti e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|. poll\u00f4=n\nde\\ toiou/t\u00f4n ginome/n\u00f4n \u00ea)/d\u00ea diaphora/ tis gi/netai, \u00f4(/ste toi=s\nme\\n gi/nesthai lo/gon e)k t\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n mon\u00ea=s, toi=s de\\\nm\u00ea/.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. p. 81, a. 38, seq., where the\ndependence of Induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed.\nSee Themistius, pp. 50-51, ed. Spengel. The first chapter of the\nMetaphysica (p. 981), contains a striking account of this generation\nof universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible\nparticulars: [Greek: gi/netai de\\ te/chn\u00ea, o(/tan e)k poll\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s\ne)mpeiri/as e)nno\u00eama/t\u00f4n mi/a katho/lou ge/n\u00eatai peri\\ t\u00f4=n o(moi/\u00f4n\nu(po/l\u00eapsis] (\"_intellecta similitudo\"_). Also in the Physica VII. p.\n247, b. 20 (in the Paraphrase of Themistius, as printed in the Berlin\nedition, at bottom of page): [Greek: e)k ga\\r t\u00ea=s kata\\ me/ros\ne)mpeiri/as t\u00ea\\n katho/lou lamba/nomen e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean.]]\n\n[Footnote 66: Analyt Post II. xix. p. 100, a. 3-10: [Greek: e)k me\\n\nou)=n ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s gi/netai mn\u00ea/m\u00ea, \u00f4(/sper le/gomen, e)k de\\ mn\u00ea/m\u00eas\npolla/kis tou= au)tou= ginome/n\u00eas e)mpeiri/a; ai( ga\\r pollai\\\nmn\u00ea=mai t\u00f4=| a)rithm\u00f4=| e)mpeiri/a mi/a e)sti/n. e)k d' e)mpeiri/as,\n\u00ea)\\ e)k panto\\s \u00ea)rem\u00ea/santos tou= katho/lou e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|, tou=\ne(no\\s para\\ ta\\ polla/, o(\\ a)\\n e)n a(/pasin e(\\n e)n\u00ea=| e)kei/nois\nto\\ au)to/, te/chn\u00eas a)rch\u00ea\\ kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas; e)a\\n me\\n peri\\\nge/nesin, te/chn\u00eas, e)a\\n de\\ peri\\ to\\ o)/n, e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas.]\n\nA theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of\nscientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of\nsense) is stated in the Ph\u00e6don of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where\nSokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in\nphilosophy: [Greek: kai\\ po/teron to\\ ai(=ma/ e)stin \u00f4(=|\nphronou=men, \u00ea)\\ o( a)\u00ea\\r, \u00ea)\\ to\\ pu=r, \u00ea)\\ tou/t\u00f4n me\\n ou)de/n, o(\nde\\ e)gke/phalo/s e)stin o( ta\\s ai)sth\u00ea/seis pare/ch\u00f4n tou=\na)kou/ein kai\\ o(pa=n kai\\ o)sphrai/nesthai, e)k _tou/t\u00f4n de\\\ngi/gnoito mn\u00ea/m\u00ea kai\\ do/xa_, e)k _de\\ mn\u00ea/m\u00eas kai\\ do/x\u00eas, labou/s\u00eas\nto\\ \u00ea)remei=n, kata\\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean_.]\n\nBoethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:--\"Plato ideas\nquasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque\nconstantes et per se ab aliis natur\u00e6 ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsum\n_homo_, quibus participantes c\u00e6ter\u00e6 res homines vel animalia fierent.\nAt vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sed\n_intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium\nsubstantialem_, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus\ndifferunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horum _intellecta\nsimilitudo_ efficit genus. Ergo communitas qu\u00e6dam et plurimorum inter\nse differentium similitudo _notio_ est; cujus notionis aliud _genus_\nest, aliud _forma_. Sed quoniam _similium intelligentia_ est omnis\nnotio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum\ndiscretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione;\nvelut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit,\" &c.\n\nThe phrase _intellecta similitudo plurimorum_ embodies both Induction\nand Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure\npassages of Aristotle, De Anim\u00e2, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p.\n432, a. 3: [Greek: o( nou=s, ei)=dos ei)d\u00f4=n, kai\\ \u00ea( ai)/sth\u00easis,\nei)=dos ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n. e)pei\\ de\\ ou)de\\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\\\nta\\ mege/th\u00ea, \u00f4(s dokei=, ta\\ ai)sth\u00eata\\ kech\u00f4risme/non, e)n toi=s\nei)/desi toi=s ai)sth\u00eatoi=s ta\\ no\u00eata/ e)stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 10-14: [Greek: ou)/te\nd\u00ea\\ e)nupa/rchousin a)ph\u00f4risme/nai ai( e(/xeis, ou)/t' a)p' a)/ll\u00f4n\ne(/xe\u00f4n gi/nontai gn\u00f4rim\u00f4te/r\u00f4n, a)ll' a)po\\ ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s,--\u00ea( de\\\npsuch\u00ea\\ u(pa/rchei toiau/t\u00ea ou)=sa oi(/a du/nasthai pa/schein\ntou=to.]\n\nThe varieties of intellectual [Greek: e(/xeis] enumerated by\nAristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated\nby Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica. (A. p. 981) pp. 7,\n8, Bonitz. The difference of [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: dia/thesis],\nthe durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in\nCategori\u00e6, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.]\n\nAristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms--at\nleast in terms which he thinks clearer.[68] We perceive the\nparticular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in\nthe particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we\nperceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of\nparticulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion\narises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and\nuniversal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until\nat last we reach the highest stage--the most universal and simple.\nFrom Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animal\n_in genere_; from animal _in genere_, still higher, until we reach\nthe highest or indivisible genus.[69] Hence it is plain that the\nfirst and highest _principia_ can become known to us only by\nInduction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds\nup in us the Universal.[70] Now among )those intellective habits or\nacquirements, whereby we come to apprehend truth, there are some\n(Science and No\u00fbs) that are uniformly and unerringly true, while\nothers (Opinion and Ratiocination) admit an alternative of\nfalsehood.[71] Comparing Science with No\u00fbs, the latter, and the\nlatter only, is more accurate and unerring than Science. But all\nScience implies demonstration, and all that we know by Science is\nconclusions deduced by demonstration. We have already said that the\n_principia_ of these demonstrations cannot be themselves\ndemonstrated, and therefore cannot be known by Science; we have also\nsaid that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions.\nHow then can these _principia_ themselves be known? They can be known\nonly by No\u00fbs, and from particulars. It is from the _principia_ known\nby No\u00fbs, with the maximum of accuracy, that Science demonstrates her\nconclusions. No\u00fbs is the great _principium_ of Science.[72]\n\n[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: [Greek: o(\\ d'\n_e)le/chth\u00ea me\\n pa/lai_, ou) saph\u00f4=s de\\ e)le/chth\u00ea, pa/lin\nei)/p\u00f4men.]\n\nWaitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first\nbook of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M.\nBarth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to\nan earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these\nsuppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning\nof [Greek: pa/lai]. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done\nmuch _to clear up_ what was obscure in the antecedent statements.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 15: [Greek: sta/ntos\nga\\r t\u00f4=n a)diapho/r\u00f4n e(no/s, pr\u00f4=ton me\\n e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|\nkatho/lou (kai\\ ga\\r ai)sth\u00easis tou= katho/lou e)sti/n, oi(=on\na)nthr\u00f4/pou, a)ll' ou) Kalli/ou a)nthr\u00f4/pou) pa/lin d' e)n tou/tois\ni(/statai, _e(/\u00f4s a)\\n ta\\ a)mer\u00ea= st\u00ea=| kai\\ ta\\ katho/lou_, oi(=on\ntoiondi\\ z\u00f4=|on, e(/\u00f4s z\u00f4=|on; kai\\ e)n tou/t\u00f4| \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s.]\n\nThese words are obscure: [Greek: ta\\ a)mer\u00ea=] must mean the highest\ngenera; indivisible, _i.e._ being a _minimum_ in respect of\n_comprehension_. Instead of [Greek: ta\\ katho/lou], we might have\nexpected [Greek: ta\\ ma/lista katho/lou], or, perhaps, that [Greek:\nkai\\] should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this\npassage, Arist. De Anim\u00e2 Comment. pp. 170-174.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon d\u00ea\\\no(/ti \u00ea(mi=n ta\\ pr\u00f4=ta e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=| gn\u00f4ri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\\ ga\\r\nkai\\ ai)/sth\u00easis ou(/t\u00f4 to\\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=.] Compare, supra,\nAnalyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, b. 1. Some commentators contended that\nAristotle did not mean to ascribe an inductive origin to the common\nAxioms properly so called, but only to the special _principia_\nbelonging to each science. Zabarella refutes this doctrine, and\nmaintains that the Axioms (Dignitates) are derived from Induction\n(Comm. in Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 649, ed. Venet., 1617):--\"Quum\nigitur inductio non sit proprie discursus, nec ratio, jure dicit\nAristoteles principiorum notitiam non esse cum ratione, quia non ex\naliis innotescunt, sed ex seipsis dum per inductionem innotescunt.\nPropterea in illa propositione, qu\u00e6 in initio **primi libri\nlegitur, sub doctrina discursiva cognitio principiorum non\ncomprehenditur, quia non est diano\u00ebtica. Hoc, quod modo diximus, si\nnonnulli advertissent, fortasse non negassent principia communia, qu\u00e6\ndicuntur Dignitates, inductione cognosci. Dixerunt enim Aristotelem\nhic de principiis loquentem sola principia propria considerasse, qu\u00e6\ncum non proprio lumine cognoscantur, inductione innotescunt; at\nDignitates (inquiunt) proprio lumine ab intellectu nostro\ncognoscuntur per solam terminorum intelligentiam, ut quod omne totum\nmajus est su\u00e2 parte; hoc enim non magis est evidens sensui in\nparticulari, quam intellectui in universali, proinde inductione non\neget. Sed hanc sententiam hic Averroes refutat, dicens h\u00e6c quoque\ninductione cognosci, sed non animadverti nobis tempus hujus\ninductionis; id enim omnino confitendum est, omnem intellectualem\ndoctrinam \u00e0 sensu originem ducere, et nihil esse in intellectu quod\nprius in sensu non fuerit, ut ubique asserit Aristoteles.\"\n\nTo the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion\nof his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that\nthe truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part,\nis known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of\nInduction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p.\n225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things\nequal to the same are equal to each other.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 5: [Greek: e)pei\\ de\\\nt\u00f4=n peri\\ t\u00ea\\n dia/noian e(/xe\u00f4n, ai(=s a)l\u00eatheu/omen, ai( me\\n\na)ei\\ a)l\u00eathei=s ei)si/n, ai( de\\ e)pide/chontai to\\ pseu=dos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ibid. fin. p. 100.]\n\nThe manner in which Aristotle here describes how the _principia_ of\nSyllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention. The\nmarch up to _principia_ is not only different from, but the reverse\nof, the march down from _principia_; like the athlete who runs first\nto the end of the stadium, and then back.[73] Generalizing or\nuniversalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent\nendowment; growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of\nsense, remembered, compared, and coalescing into one mental group\nthrough associating resemblance. As the ethical, moral, practical\nhabits, are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular\nacts, so also the intellectual, theorizing habits are mental results\ngenerated by a multitude of particular judgments of sense, retained\nand compared, so as to imprint upon the mind a lasting stamp of some\nidentity common to all. The Universal (_notius natur\u00e2_) is thus\ngenerated in the mind by a process of Induction out of particulars\nwhich are _notiora nobis_; the potentiality of this process, together\nwith sense and memory, is all that is innate or connatural.\n\n[Footnote 73: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. I. iv. p. 1095, b. 1.]\n\nThe _principia_, from which the conclusions of Syllogism are deduced,\nbeing thus obtained by Induction, are, in Aristotle's view,\nappreciated by, or correlated with, the infallible and unerring No\u00fbs\nor Intellect.[74] He conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction\nas carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity: the\nsyllogistic deductions constituting Science he regards as also\ncertain; but their certainty is only derivative, and the _principia_\nfrom which they flow he ranks still higher, as being still more\ncertain.[75] Both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with\nOpinion and Calculation, which he declares to be liable to error.\n\n[Footnote 74: The passages respecting [Greek: a)rchai\\] or\n_principia_, in the Nikomachean Ethica (especially Books I. and VI.),\nare instructive as to Aristotle's views. The _principia_ are\nuniversal notions and propositions, not starting up ready-made nor as\noriginal promptings of the intellect, but gradually built up out of\nthe particulars of sense and Induction, and repeated particular acts.\nThey are judged and sanctioned by [Greek: Nou=s] or Intellect, but it\nrequires much care to define them well. They belong to the [Greek:\no(/ti], while demonstration belongs to the [Greek: dio/ti]. Eth. Nik.\nI. vii. p. 1098, a. 33: [Greek: ou)k a)pait\u00eate/on d' ou)de\\ t\u00ea\\n\nai)ti/an e)n a(/pasin o(moi/\u00f4s, a)ll' i(kano\\n e)/n tisi to\\ o(/ti\ndeichth\u00ea=nai kal\u00f4=s, oi(=on kai\\ peri\\ ta\\s a)rcha/s; to\\ d' o(/ti\npr\u00f4=ton kai\\ a)rch\u00ea/. t\u00f4=n a)rch\u00f4=n d' ai( me\\n e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=|\nthe\u00f4rou=ntai, ai( d' ai)sth\u00ea/sei, ai( d' e)thism\u00f4=| tini, kai\\\na)/llai d' a)ll\u00f4=s. metie/nai de\\ peirate/on e(ka/stas \u00ea(=|\npephu/kasin, kai\\ spoudaste/on o(/p\u00f4s o(risth\u00f4=si kal\u00f4=s; mega/l\u00ean\nga\\r e)/chousi r(op\u00ea\\n pro\\s ta\\ e(po/mena.]\n\nCompare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is\ncited by name--[Greek: \u00ea( me\\n d\u00ea\\ e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ a)rch\u00ea/ e)sti kai\\ tou=\nkatho/lou, o( de\\ sullogismo\\s e)k t\u00f4=n katho/lou; ei)si\\n a)/ra\na)rchai\\ e)x \u00f4(=n o( sullogismo/s, \u00f4(=n ou)/k e)sti sullogismo/s;\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ a)/ra.]--ib. p. 1141, a. 7: [Greek: lei/petai nou=n ei)=nai\nt\u00f4=n a)rch\u00f4=n.]--p. 1142, a. 25: [Greek: o( me\\n ga\\r nou=s t\u00f4=n\no(/r\u00f4n, \u00f4(=n ou)/k e)sti lo/gos].--p. 1143, b. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 37: [Greek: to\\n de\\\nme/llonta e(/xein t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean t\u00ea\\n di' a)podei/xe\u00f4s ou) mo/non\ndei= ta\\s a)rcha\\s gn\u00f4ri/zein kai\\ ma=llon au)tai=s pisteu/ein \u00ea)\\\nt\u00f4=| deiknume/n\u00f4|, a)lla\\ m\u00ead' a)/llo au)t\u00f4=| pisto/teron ei)=nai\nm\u00eade\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron t\u00f4=n a)ntikeime/n\u00f4n tai=s a)rchai=s, e)x \u00f4(=n\ne)/stai sullogismo\\s o( t\u00ea=s e)nanti/as a)pa/t\u00eas, ei)/per dei= to\\n\ne)pista/menon a(pl\u00f4=s a)meta/peiston ei)=nai.]]\n\nAristotle had inherited from Plato this doctrine of an infallible\nNo\u00fbs or Intellect, enjoying complete immunity from error. But,\ninstead of connecting it (as Plato had done) with reminiscences of an\nanterior life among the Ideas, he assigned to it a position as\nterminus and correlate to the process of Induction.[76] The like\npostulate and pretension passed afterwards to the Stoics, and various\nother philosophical sects: they could not be satisfied without\nfinding infallibility somewhere. It was against this pretension that\nthe Academics and Sceptics entered their protest; contending, on\ngrounds sometimes sophistical but often very forcible, that it was\nimpossible to escape from the region of fallibility, and that no\ncriterion of truth, at once universal and imperative, could be set\nup.\n\n[Footnote 76: Ibid. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30. [Greek: kai\\ ou) mo/non\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean a)lla\\ kai\\ a)rch\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ei)=nai tina/ phamen,\n\u00ea(=| tou\\s o(/rous gn\u00f4ri/zomen.]\n\nThemistius, p. 14: [Greek: \u00f4(=n d\u00ea\\ a)/rchei pa/lin o( nou=s \u00f4(=|\ntou\\s o(/rous th\u00eareu/omen, e)x \u00f4(=n sugkei\\tai ta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata.]\n\nThe Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive,\nwhere he amplifies the last chapter, and explains [Greek: Nou=s] as\nthe generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up\ngradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction.]\n\nIt is to be regretted that Aristotle should have contented himself\nwith proclaiming this Inductive process as an ideal, culminating in\nthe infallible No\u00fbs; and that he should only have superficially\nnoticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality,\nin order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results. This is a\ndeficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present\ncentury.[77]\n\n[Footnote 77: Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. III. Lect.\nxix. p. 380, says:--\"In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an\noriginal dogma of the Platonic School, and an early dogma of the\nPeripatetic, that philosophy (science strictly so-called) was only\nconversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and\nthe doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general\nknowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars,\nwas too easily forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus\nobtained almost the force of an acknowledged principle, that\neverything to be known must be known under some general form or\nnotion. Hence the exaggerated importance attributed to definition and\ndeductions, it not being considered that we only take out of a\ngeneral notion what we had previously placed therein, and that the\namplification of our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but\nfrom below,--not from speculation about abstract generalities, but\nfrom the observation of concrete particulars. But however erroneous\nand irrational, the persuasion had its day and influence, and it\nperhaps determined, as one of its effects, the total neglect of one\nhalf, and that not the least important half, of the reasoning\nprocess. For while men thought only of looking upward to the more\nextensive notions, as the only objects and the only media of science,\nthey took little heed of the more comprehensive notions, and\nabsolutely contemned individuals, as objects which could neither be\nscientifically known in themselves nor supply the conditions of\nscientifically knowing aught besides. The Logic of Comprehension and\nof Induction was therefore neglected or ignored,--the Logic of\nExtension and Deduction exclusively cultivated, as alone affording\nthe rules by which we might evolve higher notions into their\nsubordinate concepts.\"\n\n(Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic of _Induction_ to be\nthe same as the Logic of _Comprehension_.)]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTOPICA.\n\n\nI.\n\nIn treating of the Analytica Posteriora I have already adverted, in\nthe way of contrast, to the Topica; and, in now approaching the\nlatter work, I must again bring the same contrast before the mind of\nthe reader.\n\nThe treatise called Topica (including that which bears the separate\ntitle De Sophisticis Elenchis, but which is properly its Ninth or\nlast Book, winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of\nthe Analytica and Topica considered as one scheme) is of considerable\nlength, longer than the Prior and Posterior Analytics taken together.\nIt contains both a theory and precepts of Dialectic; also, an\nanalysis of the process called by Aristotle Sophistical Refutation,\nwith advice how to resist or neutralize it.\n\nAll through the works of Aristotle, there is nothing which he so\ndirectly and emphatically asserts to be his own original performance,\nas the design and execution of the Topica: _i.e._, the deduction of\nDialectic and Sophistic from the general theory of Syllogism. He had\nto begin from the beginning, without any model to copy or any\npredecessor to build upon: and in every sort of work, he observes\njustly, the first or initial stages are the hardest.[1] In regard to\nRhetoric much had been done before him; there were not only masters\nwho taught it, but writers who theorized well or ill, and laid down\nprecepts about it; so that, in his treatise on that subject, he had\nonly to enlarge and improve upon pre-existing suggestions. But in\nregard to Dialectic as he conceives it--in its contrast with\nDemonstration and Science on the one hand, and in its analogy or\nkinship with Rhetoric on the other--nothing whatever had been done.\nThere were, indeed, teachers of contentious dialogue, as well as of\nRhetoric;[2] but these teachers could do nothing better than\nrecommend to their students dialogues or orations ready made, to be\nlearnt by heart. Such a mode of teaching (he says), though speedy,\nwas altogether unsystematic. The student acquired no knowledge of the\nart, being furnished only with specimens of art-results. It was as if\na master, professing to communicate the art of making the feet\ncomfortable, taught nothing about leather-cutting or shoe-making, but\nfurnished his pupils with different varieties of ready-made shoes;\nthus supplying what they wanted for the protection of the feet, but\nnot imparting to them any power of providing such protection for\nthemselves.[3] \"In regard to the process of syllogizing (says\nAristotle, including both Analytic and Dialectic) I found positively\nnothing said before me: I had to work it out for myself by long and\nlaborious research.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 22: [Greek:\nme/giston ga\\r i)/s\u00f4s a)rch\u00ea\\ panto/s, \u00f4(/sper le/getai; dio\\ kai\\\nchalep\u00f4/taton. o(/s\u00f4| ga\\r kra/tiston t\u00ea=| duna/mei, tosou/t\u00f4|\nmikro/taton o)\\n t\u00f4=| mege/thei chalep\u00f4/tato/n e)stin o)phth\u00ea=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 34: [Greek: tau/t\u00eas\nde\\ t\u00ea=s pragmatei/as ou) to\\ me\\n \u00ea)=n to\\ d' ou)k \u00ea)=n\nproexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\\n pantel\u00f4=s u(p\u00ea=rchen. kai\\ ga\\r t\u00f4=n\nperi\\ tou\\s e)ristikou\\s lo/gous mistharnou/nt\u00f4n o(moi/a tis \u00ea)=n \u00ea(\npai/deusis t\u00ea=| Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a|; lo/gous ga\\r oi( me\\n\nr(\u00eatorikou\\s oi( de\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00eati/kous e)di/dosan e)kmantha/nein, ei)s\nou(\\s pleista/kis e)mpi/ptein \u00f4)\u00ea/th\u00easan e(ka/teroi tou\\s a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n\nlo/gous.]]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ibid. a. 7: [Greek: kai\\ peri\\ me\\n t\u00f4=n r(\u00eatorik\u00f4=n\npolla\\ kai\\ palaia\\ ta\\ lego/mena, peri\\ de\\ tou= sullogi/zesthai\npantel\u00f4=s ou)de\\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' \u00ea)\\\ntrib\u00ea=| z\u00eatou=ntes polu\\n chro/non e)ponou=men.]]\n\nThis is one of the few passages, throughout the philosopher's varied\nand multitudinous works, in which he alludes to his own speciality of\nmethod. It is all the more interesting on that account. If we turn\nback to Sokrates and Plato, we shall understand better what the\ninnovation operated by Aristotle was; what the position of Dialectic\nhad been before his time, and what it became afterwards.\n\nIn the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the great antithesis was between\nDialectic and Rhetoric--interchange of short question and answer\nbefore a select audience, as contrasted with long continuous speech\naddressed to a miscellaneous crowd with known established sentiments\nand opinions, in the view of persuading them on some given\ninteresting point requiring decision. In such Dialectic Sokrates was\na consummate master; passing most of his long life in the\nmarket-place and pal\u00e6stra, and courting disputation with every one.\nHe made formal profession of ignorance, disclaimed all power of\nteaching, wrote nothing at all, and applied himself almost\nexclusively to the cross-examining _Elenchus_ by which he exposed and\nhumiliated the ablest men not less than the vulgar. Plato, along with\nthe other companions of Sokrates, imbibed the Dialectic of his master,\nand gave perpetuity to it in those inimitable dialogues which are still\npreserved to us from his pen. He composed nothing but dialogues; thus\ngiving expression to his own thoughts only under borrowed names, and\nintroducing that of Sokrates very generally as chief spokesman. But\nPlato, though in some dialogues he puts into the mouth of his\nspokesman the genuine Sokratic disclaimer of all power and all\npurpose of teaching, yet does not do this in all. He sometimes\nassumes the didactic function; though he still adheres to the form of\ndialogue, even when it has become inconvenient and unsuitable. In the\nPlatonic Republic Sokrates is made to alternate his own peculiar vein\nof cross-examination with a vein of dogmatic exposition not his own;\nbut both one and the other in the same style of short question and\nanswer. In the Leges becomes still more manifest the inconvenience of\ncombining the substance of dogmatic exposition with the form of\ndialogue: the same remark may also be made about the Sophistes and\nPoliticus; in which two dialogues, moreover, the didactic process is\nexhibited purely and exclusively as a logical partition,\nsystematically conducted, of a genus into its component species.\nLong-continued speech, always depreciated by Plato in its rhetorical\nmanifestations, is foreign to his genius even for purposes of\nphilosophy: the very lecture on cosmogony which he assigns to Tim\u00e6us,\nand the mythical narrative (unfinished) delivered by Kritias, are\nbrought into something like the form of dialogue by a prefatory\ncolloquy specially adapted for that end.\n\nIt thus appears that, while in Sokrates the dialectic process is\nexhibited in its maximum of perfection, but disconnected altogether\nfrom the didactic, which is left unnoticed,--in Plato the didactic\nprocess is recognized and postulated, but is nevertheless confounded\nwith or absorbed into the dialectic, and admitted only as one\nparticular, ulterior, phase and manifestation of it. At the same\ntime, while both Sokrates and Plato bring out forcibly the side of\nantithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, they omit entirely to\nnotice the side of analogy or parallelism between them. On both these\npoints Aristotle has corrected the confusion, and improved upon the\ndiscrimination, of his two predecessors. He has pointedly\ndistinguished the dialectic process from the didactic; and he has\ngone a step farther, furnishing a separate theory and precepts both\nfor the one and for the other. Again, he has indicated the important\nfeature of analogy between Dialectic and Rhetoric, in which same\nfeature both of them contrast with Didactic--the point not seized\neither by Sokrates or by Plato.\n\nPlato, in his Sokratic dialogues or dialogues of Search, has given\nadmirable illustrative specimens of that which Sokrates understood\nand practised orally as Dialectic. Aristotle, in his Topica, has in\nhis usual vein of philosophy theorized on this practice as an art. He\nhad himself composed dialogues, which seem as far as we can judge\nfrom indirect and fragmentary evidence, to have been Ciceronian or\nrhetorical colloquies--a long pleading _pro_ followed by a long\npleading _con_, rather than examples of Sokratic brachylogy and\ncross-examination. But his theory given in the Topica applies to\ngenuine Sokratic fencing, not to the Ciceronian alternation of set\nspeeches. He disallows the conception of Plato, that Dialectic is a\nprocess including not merely dispute but all full and efficacious\nemployment of general terms and ideas for purposes of teaching: he\ntreats this latter as a province by itself, under the head of\nAnalytic: and devotes the Topica to the explanation of argumentative\ndebate, pure and simple. He takes his departure from the Syllogism,\nas the type of deductive reasoning generally; the conditions under\nwhich syllogistic reasoning is valid and legitimate, having been\nalready explained in his treatise called Analytica Priora. So\nobtained, and regulated by those conditions, the Syllogism may be\napplied to one or other of two distinct and independent\npurposes:--(1) To Demonstration or Scientific Teaching, which we\nhave had before us in the last two chapters, commenting on the\nAnalytica Posteriora; (2) To Dialectic, or Argumentative Debate,\nwhich we are now about to enter on in the Topica.\n\nThe Dialectic Syllogism, explained in the Topica, has some points in\ncommon with the Demonstrative Syllogism, treated in the Analytica\nPosteriora. In both, the formal conditions are the same, and the\nconclusions will certainly be true, if the premisses are true; in\nboth, the axioms of deductive reasoning are assumed, namely, the\nmaxims of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. But, in regard to the\nsubject-matter, the differences between them are important. The\nDemonstrative Syllogism applies only to a small number of select\nsciences, each having special _principia_ of its own, or primary,\nundemonstrable truths, obtained in the first instance by induction\nfrom particulars. The premisses being thus incontrovertibly certain,\nthe conclusions deduced are not less certain; there is no necessary\nplace for conflicting arguments or counter-syllogisms, although in\nparticular cases paralogisms may be committed, and erroneous\npropositions or majors for syllogism may be assumed. On the contrary,\nthe Dialectic Syllogism applies to all matters without exception; the\npremisses on which it proceeds are neither obtained by induction, nor\nincontrovertibly certain, but are borrowed from some one among the\nvarieties of accredited or authoritative opinion. They may be\nopinions held by the multitude of any particular country, or by an\nintelligent majority, or by a particular school of philosophers or\nwise individuals, or from transmission as a current proverb or dictum\nof some ancient poet or seer. From any one of these sources the\ndialectician may borrow premisses for syllogizing. But it often\nhappens that the premisses which they supply are disparate, or in\ndirect contradiction to each other; and none of them is entitled to\nbe considered as final or peremptory against the rest. Accordingly,\nit is an essential feature of Dialectic as well as of Rhetoric that\nthey furnish means of establishing conclusions contrary or\ncontradictory, by syllogisms equally legitimate.[5] The dialectic\nprocedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious, implying a\ndebate between two persons, one of whom sets up a thesis to defend,\nwhile the other impugns it by interrogation: the assailant has gained\nhis point, if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of\ncontradicting himself; while the defendant on his side has to avoid\ngiving any responses which may drive him to the necessity of such\ncontradiction.\n\n[Footnote 5: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 29: [Greek: e)/ti\nde\\ ta)nanti/a dei= du/nasthai pei/thein, katha/per kai\\ e)n toi=s\nsullogismoi=s, ou)ch o(/p\u00f4s a)mpho/tera pra/tt\u00f4men, (ou) ga\\r dei=\nta\\ phau=la pei/thein), a)ll' i(/na m\u00ea/te lantha/n\u00ea| p\u00f4=s e)/chei,\nkai\\ o(/p\u00f4s a)/llou chr\u00f4me/nou toi=s lo/gois m\u00ea\\ dikai/\u00f4s au)toi\\\nlu/ein e)/ch\u00f4men. t\u00f4=n me\\n ou)=n a)/ll\u00f4n techn\u00f4=n ou)demi/a\nta)nanti/a sullogi/zetai; \u00ea( de\\ dialektik\u00ea\\ kai\\ \u00ea( r(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\\nmo/nai tou=to poiou=sin; o(moi/\u00f4s ga/r ei)sin a)mpho/terai t\u00f4=n\ne)nanti/\u00f4n.]]\n\nAristotle takes great pains to enforce the separation both of\nDialectic and Rhetoric from Science or Instruction with its purpose\nof teaching or learning. He disapproves of those (seemingly intending\nPlato) who seek to confound the two. Dialectic and Rhetoric (he says)\nhave for their province words and discourse, not facts or things:\nthey are not scientific or didactic processes, but powers or\naccomplishments of discourse; and whoever tries to convert them into\nmeans of teaching or learning particular subjects, abolishes their\ncharacteristic feature and restricts their universality of\napplication.[6] Both of them deal not with scientific facts, but with\nthe sum total of accredited opinions, though each for its own\npurpose: both of them lay hold of any one among the incoherent\naggregate of accepted generalities, suitable for the occasion; the\nDialectician trying to force his opponent into an inconsistency, the\nRhetor trying to persuade his auditors into a favourable decision.\nNeither the one nor the other goes deeper than opinion for his\npremisses, nor concerns himself about establishing by induction\nprimary or special _principia_, such as may serve for a basis of\ndemonstration.\n\n[Footnote 6: Ibid. iv. 2, p. 1359, b. 12: [Greek: o(/s\u00f4| d' a)/n tis\n\u00ea)\\ t\u00ea\\n dialektik\u00ea\\n \u00ea)\\ tau/t\u00ean (t\u00ea\\n r(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\n) m\u00ea\\ katha/per\na)\\n duna/meis, a)ll' e)pist\u00ea/mas, peira=tai kataskeua/zein, l\u00ea/setai\nt\u00ea\\n phu/sin au)t\u00f4=n a)phani/sas, t\u00f4=| metabai/nein e)piskeua/z\u00f4n\nei)s e)pist\u00ea/mas u(pokeime/n\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n, a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\ mo/non\nlo/g\u00f4n.]]\n\nIn every society there are various floating opinions and beliefs,\neach carrying with it a certain measure of authority, often\ninconsistent with each other, not the same in different societies,\nnor always the same even in the same society. Each youthful citizen,\nas he grows to manhood, imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly\nand without special or professional teaching.[7] The stock of\nopinions thus transmitted would not be identical even at Athens and\nSparta: the difference would be still greater, if we compared Athens\nwith Rome, Alexandria, or Jerusalem. Such opinions all carry with\nthem more or less of authority, and it is from them that the\nreasonings of common life, among unscientific men, are supplied. The\npractice of dialectical discussion, prevalent in Athens during and\nbefore the time of Aristotle, was only a more elaborate, improved,\nand ingenious exhibition of this common talk; proceeding on the same\npremisses, but bringing them together from a greater variety of\nsources, handling them more cleverly, and having for its purpose to\nconvict an opponent of inconsistency. The dialecticians dwelt\nexclusively in the region of these received opinions; and the purpose\nof their debates was to prove inconsistency, or to repel the proof of\ninconsistency, between one opinion and another.\n\n[Footnote 7: For an acute and interesting description of this\nunsystematic transmission of opinions, see, in the Protagoras of\nPlato, the speech put into the mouth of Protagoras, pp. 323-325. See\nalso 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II. ch. xxi.\np. 45, seq.]\n\nThis dialectic debate, which Aristotle found current at Athens, he\ntries in the Topica to define and reduce to system. The dialectician\nmust employ Syllogism; and we are first taught to distinguish the\nSyllogism that he employs from others. The Dialectic syllogism is\ndiscriminated on one side from the Demonstrative, on the other from\nthe Eristic (or litigious); also from the scientific Paralogism or\nPseudographeme. This discrimination is founded on the nature of the\nevidence belonging to the premisses. The Demonstrative syllogism\n(which we have already gone through in the Analytica Posteriora) has\npremisses noway dependent upon opinion: it deduces conclusions from\ntrue first principles, obtained by Induction in each science, and\ndifferent in each different science. The Dialectic syllogism does not\naspire to any such evidence, but borrows its premisses from Opinion\nof some sort; accredited either by numbers, or by wise individuals,\nor by some other authoritative holding. As this evidence is very\ninferior to that of the demonstrative syllogism, so again it is\nsuperior to that of the third variety--the Eristic syllogism. In this\nthird variety,[8] the premisses do not rest upon any real opinion,\nbut only on a fallacious appearance or simulation of opinion;\ninsomuch that they are at once detected as false, by any person even\nof moderate understanding; whereas (according to Aristotle) no real\nopinion ever carries with it such a merely superficial semblance, or\nis ever so obviously and palpably false. A syllogism is called\nEristic also when it is faulty in form, though its premisses may be\nborrowed from real opinion, or when it is both faulty in form and\nfalse in the matter of the premisses. Still a fourth variety of\nsyllogism is the scientific Paralogism: where the premisses are not\nborrowed from any opinion, real or simulated, but belong properly to\nthe particular science in which they are employed, yet nevertheless\nare false or erroneous.[9]\n\n[Footnote 8: Topic. I. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\\s d' e)/sti\nsullogismo\\s o( e)k phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n, m\u00ea\\ o)/nt\u00f4n de/, kai\\ o(\ne)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n phaino/menos. ou) ga\\r pa=n\nto\\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\\n ga\\r t\u00f4=n\nlegome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantel\u00f4=s t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an,\nkatha/per peri\\ ta\\s t\u00f4=n e)ristik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n a)rcha\\s sumbe/b\u00eaken\ne)/chein; parachr\u00ea=ma ga\\r kai\\ \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu\\ toi=s kai\\ mikra\\\nsunora=n duname/nois kata/d\u00ealos e)n au)toi=s \u00ea( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\\\nphu/sis.]]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ibid. i. p. 101, a. 5-17.]\n\nUpon the classification of syllogisms here set forth by Aristotle, we\nmay remark that the distinction between the Demonstrative and the\nDialectic is true and important; but that between the Dialectic and\nthe Eristic is faint and unimportant; the class called Eristic\nsyllogisms being apparently introduced merely to create a difference,\nreal or supposed, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, and thus\nto serve as a prelude to the last book of this treatise, entitled\nSophistici Elenchi. The class-title Eristic (or litigious) is founded\nupon a supposition of dishonest intentions on the part of the\ndisputant; but it is unphilosophical to make this the foundation of a\nclass, and to rank the same syllogism in the class, or out of it,\naccording as the intentions of the disputant who employs it are\nhonest or dishonest. Besides, a portion of Aristotle's definition\ntells us that the Eristic syllogism is one of which the premisses can\nimpose upon no one; being such that a very ordinary man can at once\ndetect their falsity. The dishonest disputant, surely, would argue to\nlittle purpose, if he intentionally employed such premisses as these.\nLastly, according to another portion of Aristotle's definition, every\nsyllogism faulty in form, or yielding no legitimate conclusion at\nall, will fall under the class Eristic, and this he himself in\nanother place explicitly states;[10] which would imply that the bad\nsyllogism must always emanate from litigious or dishonest intentions.\nBut in defining the Pseudographeme, immediately afterwards, Aristotle\ndoes not imply that the false scientific premiss affords presumption\nof litigious disposition on the part of those who advance it; nor\ndoes there seem any greater propriety in throwing all bad dialectic\nsyllogisms under the general head of Eristic.\n\n[Footnote 10: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 4.]\n\nThe dialectician, then, will carry on debate only by means of\npremisses sustained by real opinion; which not only always carry some\nauthority, but are assumed as being never obviously fallacious;\nthough often inconsistent with each other, and admitting of\nargumentation _pro_ and _con_. These are what Aristotle calls\n_Endoxa_; opposed to _Adoxa_, or propositions which are\ndiscountenanced, or at least not countenanced, by opinion, and to\n_Paradoxa_ (a peculiar variety of _Adoxa_),[11] or propositions\nwhich, though having ingenious arguments in their favour, yet are\nadverse to some proclaimed and wide-spread opinions, and thus have\nthe predominant authority of opinion against them.\n\n[Footnote 11: Ibid. I. xi. p. 104, b. 24: [Greek: peri\\ \u00f4(=n lo/gon\ne)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais.]]\n\nOf these three words, _Paradox_ is the only one that has obtained a\nfooting in modern languages, thanks to Cicero and the Latin authors.\nIf the word _Endox_ had obtained the like footing, we should be able\nto keep more closely to the thought and views of Aristotle. As it is,\nwe are obliged to translate the Greek _Endoxon_ as Probable, and\n_Adoxon_ as Improbable:[12] which, though not incorrect, is neither\nsuitable nor exactly coincident. Probable corresponds more nearly to\nwhat Aristotle (both in this treatise and in the Analytica) announces\nsometimes as [Greek: to\\ \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu/]--that which happens in\nmost cases but not in all, as distinguished from the universal and\nnecessary on one side, and from the purely casual on the other;[13]\nsometimes, also, as [Greek: to\\ ei)ko/s] or [Greek: to\\ s\u00eamei=on].\nNow this is a different idea from (though it has a point of analogy\nwith) the _Endoxon_: which is not necessarily true even in part, but\nmay be wholly untrue; which always has some considerations against\nit, though there may be more in its favour; and which, lastly, may be\ndifferent, or even opposite, in different ages and different states\nof society. When Josephus distinguished himself as a disputant in the\nschools of Jerusalem on points of law and custom,[14] his arguments\nmust have been chiefly borrowed from the _Endoxa_ or prevalent\nopinions of the time and place; but these must have differed widely\nfrom the _Endoxa_ found and argued upon by the contemporaries of\nAristotle at Athens. The _Endoxon_ may indeed be rightly called\nprobable, because, whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain\nbody of opinion, Aristotle admits a certain presumption (greater or\nless) that it is true. But such probability is not essential to the\n_Endoxon_: it is only an accident or accompaniment (to use the\nAristotelian phrase), and by no means an universal accompaniment. The\nessential feature of the _Endoxon_ is, that it has acquired a certain\namount of recognition among the mass of opinions and beliefs floating\nand carrying authority at the actual time and place. The English word\nwhereby it is translated ought to express this idea, and nothing\nmore; just as the correlative word Paradox does express its\nimplication, approached from the other side. Unfortunately, in the\nabsence of Endox, we have no good word for the purpose.\n\n[Footnote 12: Aristotle gives a double meaning of [Greek: a)/doxon]\n(Topic. VIII. ix. ix. 160, b. 17):-- 1. That which involves absurd or\nstrange consequences ([Greek: a)/topa]). 2. That which affords\npresumption of a bad disposition, such as others will\ndisapprove--[Greek: oi(=on o(/ti \u00ea(don\u00ea\\ ta)gatho\\n kai\\ to\\\na)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai].]\n\n[Footnote 13: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, b. 1: [Greek: e)pei\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n\npragma/t\u00f4n ta\\ me\\n e)x a)na/gk\u00eas e)sti/, ta\\ d' \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu/,\nta\\ d' o(po/ter' e)/tuchen], &c. Compare also Analyt. Post. I. xxx.,\net alib.]\n\n[Footnote 14: See Josephus, De Vit\u00e2 Su\u00e2, c. ii.]\n\nIt is within this wide field of floating opinions that dialectical\ndebate and rhetorical pleading are carried on. Dialectic supposes a\nquestioner or assailant, and a respondent or defendant. The\nrespondent selects and proclaims a problem or thesis, which he\nundertakes to maintain: the assailant puts to him successive\nquestions, with the view of obtaining concessions which may serve as\npremisses for a counter-syllogism, of which the conclusion is\ncontradictory or contrary to the thesis itself, or to some other\nantecedent premiss which the respondent has already conceded. It is\nthe business of the respondent to avoid making any answers which may\nserve as premisses for such a counter-syllogism. If he succeeds in\nthis, so as not to become implicated in any contradiction with\nhimself, he has baffled his assailant, and gained the victory. There\nare, however, certain rules and conditions, binding on both parties,\nunder which the debate must be carried on. It is the purpose of the\nTopica to indicate these rules; and, in accordance therewith, to\nadvise both parties as to the effective conduct of their respective\ncases--as to the best thrusts and the best mode of parrying. The\nassailant is supplied with a classified catalogue of materials for\nquestions, and with indications of the weak points which he is to\nlook out for in any new subject which may turn up for debate. He is\nfarther instructed how to shape, marshal, and disguise his questions,\nin such a way that the respondent may least be able to foresee their\nultimate bearing. The respondent, on his side, is told what he ought\nto look forward to and guard against. Such is the scope of the\npresent treatise; the entire process being considered in the large\nand comprehensive spirit customary with Aristotle, and distributed\naccording to the Aristotelian terminology and classification.\n\nIt is plain that neither the direct purpose of the debaters, nor the\nusual result of the debate, is to prove truth or to disprove\nfalsehood. Such may indeed be the result occasionally; but the only\ncertain result is, that an inconsistency is exposed in the\nrespondent's manner of defending his thesis, or that the assailant\nfails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency. Whichever way\nthe debate may turn, no certain inference can be drawn as to the\nthesis itself: not merely as to whether it is true or false, but even\nas to whether it consists or does not consist with other branches of\nreceived opinions. Such being the case, what is the use or value of\ndialectic debate, or of a methodized procedure for conducting it?\nAristotle answers this question, telling us that it is useful for\nthree purposes.[15] First, the debate is a valuable and stimulating\nmental exercise; and, if a methodized procedure be laid down, both\nparties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more\nefficaciously. Secondly, it is useful for our intercourse with the\nmultitude;[16] for the procedure directs us to note and remember the\nopinions of the multitude, and such knowledge will facilitate our\nintercourse with them: we shall converse with them out of their own\nopinions, which we may thus be able beneficially to modify. Thirdly,\ndialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the\nprocesses of science and philosophy, and upon the truths thereby\nacquired.[17] For it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both\nsides of every question, and thus assists us in detecting and\ndiscriminating truth and falsehood. Moreover, apart from this mode of\nusefulness, it opens a new road to the scrutiny of the first\n_principia_ of each separate science. These _principia_ can never be\nscrutinized through the truths of the science itself, which\npresuppose them and are deduced from them. To investigate and verify\nthem, is the appropriate task of First Philosophy. But Dialectic\nalso, carrying investigation as it does everywhere, and familiarized\nwith the received opinions on both sides of every subject, suggests\nmany points of importance in regard to these _principia_.\n\n[Footnote 15: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26: [Greek: e)/sti d\u00ea\\ pro\\s\ntri/a, pro\\s gumnasi/an, pro\\s ta\\s e)nteu/xeis, pro\\s ta\\s kata\\\nphilosophi/an e)pist\u00ea/mas.]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: pro\\s de\\ ta\\s e)nteu/xeis, dio/ti\nta\\s t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n kat\u00earithm\u00eame/noi do/xas ou)k e)k t\u00f4=n a)llotri/\u00f4n\na)ll' e)k t\u00f4=n oi)kei/\u00f4n dogma/t\u00f4n o(mil\u00ea/somen pro\\s au)tou/s,\nmetabiba/zontes o(/ ti a)\\n m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s phai/n\u00f4ntai le/gein \u00ea(mi=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 17: Ibid. a. 34: [Greek: pro\\s de\\ ta\\s kata\\ philosophi/an\ne)pist\u00ea/mas], &c.]\n\nThe three heads just enumerated illustrate the discriminating care of\nAristotle. The point of the first head is brought out often in the\nPlatonic Dialogues of Search: the stimulus brought to bear in\nawakening dormant intellectual power, and in dissipating that false\npersuasion of knowledge which is the general infirmity of mankind, is\nfrequently declared by Plato to be the most difficult, but the\nindispensable, operation of the teacher upon his pupil. Under the\nthird head, Aristotle puts this point more justly than Plato, not as\na portion of teaching, nor as superseding direct teaching, but as a\npreliminary thereunto; and it is a habit of his own to prefix this\nantecedent survey of doubts and difficulties on both sides, as a\nmeans of sharpening our insight into the dogmatic exposition which\nimmediately follows.\n\nUnder the second head, we find exhibited another characteristic\nfeature of Aristotle's mind--the value which he sets upon a copious\nacquaintance with received opinions, whether correct or erroneous.\nThe philosophers of his day no longer talked publicly in the\nmarket-place and with every one indiscriminately, as Sokrates had\ndone: scientific study, and the habit of written compositions\nnaturally conducted them into a life apart, among select companions.\nAristotle here indicates that such estrangement from the multitude\nlessened their means of acting beneficially on the multitude, and in\nthe way of counteraction he prescribes dialectical exercise. His own\nlarge and many-sided observation, extending to the most vulgar\nphenomena, is visible throughout his works, and we know that he drew\nup a collection of current proverbs.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Diog. Laert. v. 26. Kephisodorus, the disciple of\nIsokrates, in defending his master, depreciated this Aristotelian\ncollection; see in Athen\u00e6us II. lvi., comparing Schweigh\u00e4user's\nAnimadversiones I. p. 406.]\n\nAgain, what we read under the third head shows that, while Aristotle\neverywhere declares Demonstration and teaching to be a process apart\nfrom Dialectic, he at the same time recognizes the legitimate\nfunction of the latter, for testing and verifying the _principia_ of\nDemonstration:[19] which _principia_ cannot be reached by\nDemonstration itself, since every demonstration presupposes them. He\ndoes not mean that these _principia_ can be proved by Dialectic, for\nDialectic does not prove any thing; but it is necessary as a test or\nscrutinizing process to assure us that all the objections capable of\nbeing offered against them can be met by sufficient replies. In\nrespect of universal competence and applicability, Dialectic is the\ncounterpart, or rather the tentative companion and adjunct, of what\nAristotle calls First Philosophy or Ontology; to which last he\nassigns the cognizance of _principia_, as we shall see when we treat\nof the Metaphysica.[20] Dialectic (he repeats more than once) is not\na definite science or body of doctrine, but, like rhetoric or\nmedicine, a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying\nsituations of the dialogue; of imagining and enunciating the question\nproper for attack, or the answer proper for defence, as the case may\nbe. As in the other arts, its resources are not unlimited. Nor can\nthe dialectician, any more than the rhetor or the physician, always\nguarantee success. Each of them has an end to be accomplished; and if\nhe employs for its accomplishment the best means that the situation\npermits, he must be considered a master of his own art and\nprocedure.[21] To detect truth, and to detect what is like truth,\nbelong (in Aristotle's judgment) to the same mental capacity. Mankind\nhave a natural tendency towards truth, and the common opinions\ntherefore are, in most cases, coincident with truth. Accordingly, the\nman who divines well in regard to verisimilitude, will usually divine\nwell in regard to truth.[22]\n\n[Footnote 19: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, b. 3: [Greek: e)xetastik\u00ea\\ ga\\r\nou)=sa pro\\s ta\\s a(pas\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n metho/d\u00f4n a)rcha\\s o(do\\n e)/chei.]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 20-b. 10;\n[Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 15-30.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, b. 5: [Greek: e(/xomen de\\\ntele/\u00f4s t\u00ea\\n me/thodon, o(/tan o(moi/\u00f4s e)/ch\u00f4men \u00f4(/sper e)pi\\\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s kai\\ i)atrik\u00ea=s kai\\ t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n duna/me\u00f4n. tou=to d'\ne)sti\\ to\\ e)k t\u00f4=n e)ndechome/n\u00f4n poiei=n a(\\ proairou/metha. ou)/te\nga\\r o( r(\u00eatoriko\\s e)k panto\\s tro/pou pei/sei, ou)/th' o(\ni)atriko\\s u(gia/sei; a)ll' e)a\\n t\u00f4=n e)ndechome/n\u00f4n m\u00eade\\n\nparali/p\u00ea|, i(kan\u00f4=s au)to\\n e)/chein t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean ph\u00ea/somen.]\n\nThe word [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean] in the last line is used loosely, since\nAristotle, in the Rhetorica (p. 1369, b. 12), explicitly states that\nRhetoric and Dialectic are not to be treated as [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/mas]\nbut as mere [Greek: duna/meis].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 17.]\n\nThe subject-matter of dialectic debate, speaking generally, consists\nof Propositions and Problems, to be propounded as questions by the\nassailant and to be admitted or disallowed by the defendant. They\nwill relate either to _Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_, or they must bear,\nat least indirectly, upon some point of scientific truth or observed\ncognition.[23] They will be either ethical, physical, or logical;\nclass-terms which Aristotle declines to define, contenting himself\nwith giving an example to illustrate each of them, while adding that\nthe student should collect other similar examples, and gradually\nfamiliarize himself with the full meaning of the general term,\nthrough such inductive comparison of particulars.[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Topic. I, xi. p. 104, b. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 20-29: [Greek: ai( me\\n ga\\r\n\u00ea)thikai\\ prota/seis ei)si/n, ai( de\\ phusikai/, ai( de\\\nlogikai/.--poi=ai d' e(/kastai t\u00f4=n proeir\u00eame/n\u00f4n, o(rism\u00f4=| me\\n\nou)k eu)pete\\s a)podou=nai peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n, t\u00ea=| de\\ _dia\\ t\u00ea=s\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s sun\u00eathei/a|_ peirate/on gn\u00f4ri/zein e(ka/st\u00ean au)t\u00f4=n,\nkata\\ ta\\ proeir\u00eame/na paradei/gmata e)piskopou=nta.]\n\nThis illustrates Aristotle's view of the process of Induction and its\nresults; the acquisition of the import of a general term, through\ncomparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it.\n\nThe term _logical_ does not exactly correspond with Aristotle's\n[Greek: logikai/], but on the present occasion no better term\npresents itself.]\n\nBut it is not every problem coming under one of these three heads\nthat is fit for dialectic debate. If a man propounds as subject for\ndebate, Whether we ought to honour the gods or to love our parents,\nhe deserves punishment instead of refutation: if he selects the\nquestion, Whether snow is white or not, he must be supposed deficient\nin perceptive power.[25] What all persons unanimously believe, is\nunsuitable:[26] what no one believes is also unsuitable, since it\nwill not be conceded by any respondent. The problem must have some\ndoubts and difficulties, in order to afford scope for discussion; yet\nit must not be one of which the premisses are far-fetched or\nrecondite, for that goes beyond the limits of dialectic exercise.[27]\nIt ought to be one on which opinions are known to be held, both in\nthe affirmative and in the negative; on which either the multitude\ndiffer among themselves, the majority being on one side, while yet\nthere is an adverse minority; or some independent authority stands\nopposed to the multitude, such as a philosopher of eminence, a\nprofessional man or artist speaking on his own particular craft, a\ngeometer or a physician on the specialities of his department.\nMatters such as these are the appropriate subjects for dialectic\ndebate; and new matters akin to them by way of analogy may be\nimagined and will be perfectly admissible.[28] Even an ingenious\nparadox or thesis adverse to prevailing opinions may serve the\npurpose, as likely to obtain countenance from some authority, though\nas yet we know of none.[29]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 67: [Greek:\nkola/se\u00f4s--ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s, de/ontai]. Yet he considers the question,\nWhether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands\nof our parents, in case of discrepancy between the two,--as quite fit\nfor debate (xiv. p. 105, b. 22).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. x. p. 104, a. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 7: [Greek: ou)de\\ d\u00ea\\ \u00f4(=n\nsu/neggus \u00ea( a)po/deixis, ou)/d' \u00f4(=n li/an po/r)r(\u00f4; ta\\ me\\n ga\\r\nou)k e)/chei a)pori/an, ta\\ de\\ **plei/on \u00ea)\\ kata\\\ngumnastik\u00ea/n.] The loose use of the word [Greek: a)po/deixis]\ndeserves note here: it is the technical term of the Analyt. Post.,\ndenoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with\nDialectic altogether.\n\nAristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits\nare the best for dialectic discussion; but, in his suggestions later\non, he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost\ngeneralities of philosophy. For example, he often adverts to\ndialectic debate on the Platonic Ideas or Forms (Topic. II. vii. p.\n113, a. 25; V. vii. p. 137, b. 7; VI. vi. p. 143, b. 24. Compare also\nI. xi. p. 104, b. 14.)]\n\n[Footnote 28: Topic. I. x. p. 104, a. 11-37.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ibid. xi. p. 104, b. 24-28: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ peri\\ \u00f4(=n\nlo/gon e)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais--tou=to ga/r, ei) kai/ tini\nm\u00ea\\ dokei=, do/xeien a)\\n dia\\ to\\ lo/gon e)/chein.]]\n\nThese conditions apply both to problems propounded for debate, and to\npremisses tendered on either side during the discussion. Both the\ninterrogator and the respondent--the former having to put appropriate\nquestions, and the latter to make appropriate answers--must know and\nkeep in mind these varieties of existing opinion among the multitude\nas well as among the special dissident authorities above indicated.\nThe dialectician ought to collect and catalogue such _Endoxa_, with\nthe opinions analogous to them, out of written treatises and\nelsewhere;[30] distributing them under convenient heads, such as\nthose relating to good and evil generally, and to each special class\nof good, &c. Aristotle, however, admonishes him that he is debating\nproblems not scientifically, but dialectically: having reference not\nto truth, but to opinion.[31] If the interrogator were proceeding\nscientifically and didactically, he would make use of all true and\nascertained propositions, whether the respondent conceded them or\nnot, as premisses for his syllogism. But in Dialectic he is dependent\non the concession of the respondent, and can construct his syllogisms\nonly from premisses that have been conceded to him.[32] Hence he must\nkeep as closely as he can to opinions carrying extrinsic authority,\nas being those which the respondent will hesitate to disallow.[33]\n\n[Footnote 30: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 1-18. [Greek: e)kle/gein de\\\nchr\u00ea\\ kai\\ e)k t\u00f4=n gegramme/n\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 30: [Greek: pro\\s me\\n ou)=n philosophi/an\nkat' a)l\u00ea/theian peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n pragmateute/on, dialektik\u00f4=s de\\ pro\\s\ndo/xan.]]\n\n[Footnote 32: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10: [Greek: pro\\s e(/teron\nga\\r pa=n to\\ toiou=ton, t\u00f4=| de\\ philoso/ph\u00f4| kai\\ z\u00eatou=nti kath'\ne(auto\\n ou)de\\n me/lei, e)a\\n a)l\u00eath\u00ea= me\\n \u00ea)=| kai\\ gn\u00f4/rima di'\n\u00f4(=n o( sullogismo/s, m\u00ea\\ th\u00ea=| d' au)ta\\ o( a)pokrino/menos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Ibid. i. p. 156, b. 20: [Greek: chr\u00ea/simon de\\ kai\\ to\\\ne)pile/gein o(/ti su/n\u00eathes kai\\ lego/menon to\\ toiou=ton; _o)knou=si\nga\\r kinei=n to\\ ei)\u00f4tho/s_, e)/nstasin m\u00ea\\ e)/chontes.]]\n\nMoreover, the form of the interrogation admissible in dialectic\ndebate is peculiar. The respondent is not bound to furnish any\ninformation in his answer: he is bound only to admit, or to deny, a\nproposition tendered to him. You must not ask him, What is the genus\nof man? You must yourself declare the genus, and ask whether he\nadmits it, in one or other of the two following forms--(1) Is animal\nthe genus of man? (2) Is animal the genus of man, or not? to which\nthe response is an admission or a denial.[34]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. I. iv. p. 101, b. 30. The first of these two\nforms Aristotle calls a [Greek: pro/tasis], the second he calls a\n[Greek: pro/bl\u00eama]. But this distinction between these two words is\nnot steadily adhered to: it is differently declared in Topic. I. x.,\nxi. p. 104, as Alexander has remarked in the Scholia, p. 258, b. 4,\nBrand. Compare also De Interpretat. p. 20, b. 26; and Topic. VIII.\nii. p. 158, a. 14: [Greek: ou) dokei= de\\ pa=n to\\ katho/lou\ndialektik\u00ea\\ pro/tasis ei)=nai, oi(=on ti/ e)stin a)/nthr\u00f4pos, \u00ea)\\\nposach\u00f4=s le/getai ta)gatho/n? e)/sti ga\\r pro/tasis dialektik\u00ea\\\npro\\s \u00ea(\\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\\ \u00ea)\\ ou)/; pro\\s de\\ ta\\s\nei)r\u00eame/nas ou)k e)/stin. dio\\ ou) dialektika/ e)sti ta\\ toiau=ta\nt\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4t\u00eama/t\u00f4n, a)\\n m\u00ea\\ au)to\\s diori/sas \u00ea)\\ dielo/menos\nei)/p\u00ea|.]]\n\nDialectic procedure, both of the assailant and of the defendant, has\nto do with propositions and problems; accordingly, Aristotle\nintroduces a general distribution of propositions under four heads.\nThe predicate must either be Genus, or Proprium, or Accident, of its\nsubject. But the Proprium divides itself again into two. It always\nreciprocates with, or is co-extensive with, its subject; but\nsometimes it declares the essence of the subject, sometimes it does\nnot. When it declares the essence of the subject, Aristotle calls it\nthe Definition; when it does not declare the essence of the subject,\nalthough reciprocating therewith, he reserves for it the title of\nProprium. Every proposition, and every problem, the entire material\nof Dialectic, will declare one of these four--Proprium, Definition,\nGenus, or Accident.[35] The Differentia, as being attached to the\nGenus, is ranked along with the Genus.[36]\n\n[Footnote 35: Topic. I. iv. p. 101, b. 17-36.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: t\u00ea\\n diaphora\\n \u00f4(s ou)=san\ngenik\u00ea\\n o(mou= t\u00f4=| ge/nei takte/on.]]\n\nThe above four general heads include all the Predicables, which were\ndistributed by subsequent logicians (from whom Porphyry borrowed)\ninto five heads instead of four--Genus, Species, Differentia,\nProprium, Accident; the Differentia being ranked as a separate item\nin the quintuple distribution, and the Species substituted in place\nof the Definition. It is under this quadruple classification that\nAristotle intends to consider propositions and problems as matters\nfor dialectic procedure: he will give argumentative suggestions\napplicable to each of the four successively. It might be practicable\n(he thinks) to range all the four under the single head of\nDefinition; since arguments impugning Genus, Proprium, and Accident,\nare all of them good also against Definition. But such a\nsimplification would be perplexing and unmanageable in regard to\ndialectic procedure.[37]\n\n[Footnote 37: Topic. I. vi. p. 102, b. 27-38. [Greek: a)ll' ou) dia\\\ntou=to mi/an e)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n katho/lou me/thodon z\u00eat\u00eate/on; ou)/te ga\\r\nr(a/|dion eu(rei=n tou=t' e)sti/n, ei)/ th' eu(rethei/\u00ea, pantel\u00f4=s\na)saph\u00ea\\s kai\\ du/schr\u00eastos a)\\n ei)/\u00ea pro\\s t\u00ea\\n prokeime/n\u00ean\npragmatei/an.]]\n\nThat the quadruple classification is exhaustive, and that every\nproposition or problem falls under one or other of the four heads,\nmay be shown in two ways. First, by Induction: survey and analyse as\nmany propositions as you will, all without exception will be found to\nbelong to one of the four.[38] Secondly, by the following Deductive\nproof:--In every proposition the predicate is either co-extensive and\nreciprocating with the subject, or it is not. If it does reciprocate,\nit either declares the essence of the subject, or it does not: if the\nformer, it is the Definition; if the latter, it is a Proprium. But,\nsupposing the predicate not to reciprocate with the subject, it will\neither declare something contained in the Definition, or it will not.\nIf it does contain a part of the Definition, that part must be either\na Genus or a Differentia, since these are the constituents of the\nDefinition. If it does not contain any such part, it must be an\nAccident.[39] Hence it appears that every proposition must belong to\none or other of the four, and that the classification is exhaustive.\n\n[Footnote 38: Ibid. viii. p. 103, b. 3: [Greek: mi/a me\\n pi/stis \u00ea(\ndia\\ t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s; ei) ga/r tis e)piskopoi/\u00ea e(ka/st\u00ean t\u00f4=n\nprota/se\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n probl\u00eama/t\u00f4n, phai/noit' a)\\n \u00ea)\\ a)po\\ tou=\no(/rou \u00ea)\\] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Topic. I. **viii. p. 103, b. 6-19:\n[Greek: a)/ll\u00ea de\\ pi/stis \u00ea( dia\\ sullogismou=].\n\nIt will be observed that Aristotle here resolves Definition into\nGenus and Differenti\u00e6--[Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ o( o(rismo\\s e)k ge/nous kai\\\ndiaphor\u00f4=n e)sti/n]. Moreover, though he does not recognize Species\nas a separate head, yet in his definition of Genus he implies Species\nas known--[Greek: ge/nos e)sti\\ to\\ kata\\ pleio/n\u00f4n kai\\\n_diaphero/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=| ei)/dei_ e)n t\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti kat\u00eagorou/menon] (p.\n102, a. 31).\n\nIt thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and\nlogical one; but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the\nTopica, with a view to dialectic procedure, since debates turn upon\nthe attack and defence of a Definition.]\n\nMoreover, each of the four Predicables must fall under one or other\nof the ten Categories or Predicaments. If the predicate be either of\nGenus or Definition, declaring the essence of the subject, it may\nfall under any one of the ten Categories; if of Proprium or Accident,\nnot declaring essence, it cannot belong to the first Category\n([Greek: Ou)si/a]), but must fall under one of the remaining\nnine.[40]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ibid. ix. p. 103, b. 20-39.]\n\nThe notion of Sameness or Identity occurs so often in dialectic\ndebate, that Aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or\ngrades: (1) _Numero_; (2) _Specie_; (3) _Genere_. Water from the same\nspring is only _idem specie_, though the resemblance between two cups\nof water from the same spring is far greater than that between water\nfrom different sources. Even _Idem Numero_ has different\nsignifications: sometimes there are complete synonyms; sometimes an\nindividual is called by its proprium, sometimes by its peculiar\ntemporary accident.[41]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39.]\n\nHaving thus classified dialectic propositions, Aristotle proceeds to\nthe combination of propositions, or dialectic discourse and argument.\nThis is of two sorts, either Induction or Syllogism; of both which we\nhave already heard in the Analytica. Induction is declared to be\nplainer, more persuasive, nearer to sensible experience, and more\nsuitable to the many, than Syllogism; while this latter carries\ngreater compulsion and is more irresistible against professed\ndisputants.[42] A particular example is given to illustrate what\nInduction is. But we remark that though it is always mentioned as an\nargumentative procedure important and indispensable, yet neither here\nnor elsewhere does Aristotle go into any discriminative analysis of\nthe conditions under which it is valid, as he does about Syllogism in\nthe Analytica Priora.\n\n[Footnote 42: Ibid. xii. p. 105, a. 10-19: [Greek: po/sa t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n\nei)/d\u00ea t\u00f4=n dialektik\u00f4=n], &c.]\n\nWhat helps are available to give to the dialectician a ready and\nabundant command of syllogisms? Four distinct helps may be named:[43]\n(1) He must make a large collection of Propositions; (2) He must\nstudy and discriminate the different senses in which the Terms of\nthese propositions are used; (3) He must detect and note Differences;\n(4) He must investigate Resemblances.\n\n[Footnote 43: Topic. I. xiii. p. 105, a. 21: [Greek: ta\\ d' o)/rgana,\ndi' \u00f4(=n eu)por\u00ea/somen t\u00f4=n sullogism\u00f4=n, e)sti\\ te/ttara, e(/n me\\n\nto\\ prota/seis labei=n, deu/teron de\\ posach\u00f4=s e(/kaston le/getai\ndu/nasthai dielei=n, tri/ton ta\\s diaphora\\s eu(rei=n, te/tarton de\\\n\u00ea( tou= o(moi/ou ske/psis.]\n\nThe term [Greek: o)/rgana], properly signifying _instruments_,\nappears here by a strained metaphor. It means simply _helps_ or\n_aids_, as may be seen by comparing Top. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 9.\nWaitz says truly (Prolegg. ad Analyt. Post. p. 294): \"unde fit, ut\n[Greek: o)/rgana] dicat qu\u00e6cunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum\nafferant.\"]\n\n1. About collecting Propositions, Aristotle has already indicated\nthat those wanted are such as declare _Endoxa_, and other modes of\nthought cognate or **analogous to the _Endoxa_:[44] opinions\nof the many, and opinions of any small sections or individuals\ncarrying authority. All such are to be collected (out of written\ntreatises as well as from personal enquiry); nor are individual\nphilosophers (like Empedokles) to be omitted, since a proposition is\nlikely enough to be conceded when put upon the authority of an\nillustrious name.[45] If any proposition is currently admitted as\ntrue in general or in most cases, it must be tendered with confidence\nto the respondent as an universal principle; for he will probably\ngrant it, not being at first aware of the exceptions.[46] All\npropositions must be registered in the most general terms possible,\nand must then be resolved into their subordinate constituent\nparticulars, as far as the process of subdivision can be carried.[47]\n\n[Footnote 44: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 4: [Greek: e)kle/gein m\u00ea\\\nmo/non ta\\s ou)/sas e)ndo/xous, a)lla\\ kai\\ ta\\s o(moi/as tau/tais.]]\n\n[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 17: [Greek: thei/\u00ea ga\\r a)/n tis to\\ u(po/\ntinos ei)r\u00eame/non e)ndo/xou].]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ibid. b. 10: [Greek: o(/sa e)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=n\nplei/st\u00f4n phai/netai, l\u00eapte/on \u00f4(s a)rch\u00ea\\n kai\\ dokou=san the/sin;\ntithe/asi ga\\r oi( m\u00ea\\ sunor\u00f4=ntes e)pi\\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s.]]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 31-37: [Greek: l\u00eapte/on d' o(/ti ma/lista\nkatho/lou pa/sas ta\\s prota/seis, kai\\ t\u00ea\\n mi/an polla\\s\npoi\u00eate/on--diairete/on, e(/\u00f4s a)\\n e)nde/ch\u00eatai diairei=n], &c.]\n\n2. The propositions having been got together, they must be examined\nin order to find out Equivocation or double meaning of terms. There\nare various ways of going about this task. Sometimes the same\npredicate is applied to two different subjects, but in different\nsenses; thus, courage and justice are both of them good, but in a\ndifferent way. Sometimes the same predicate is applied to two\ndifferent classes of subjects, each admitting of being defined; thus,\nhealth is good in itself, and exercise is good as being among those\nthings that promote health.[48] Sometimes the equivocal meaning of a\nterm is perceived by considering its contrary; if we find that it has\ntwo or more distinct contraries, we know at once that it has\ndifferent meanings. Sometimes, though there are not two distinct\ncontraries, yet the mere conjunction of the same adjective with two\nsubstantives shows us at once that it cannot mean the same in\nboth[49] ([Greek: leuk\u00ea\\ ph\u00f4n\u00ea/--leuko\\n chr\u00f4=ma]). In one sense, the\nterm may have an assignable contrary, while in another sense it may\nhave no contrary; showing that the two senses are distinct: for\nexample, the pleasure of drinking has for its contrary the pain of\nthirst; but the pleasure of scientifically contemplating that the\ndiagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side, has no\ncontrary; hence, we see that pleasure is an equivocal term.[50] In\none sense, there may be a term intermediate between the two\ncontraries; in another sense, there may be none; or there may be two\ndistinct intermediate terms for the two distinct senses; or there may\nbe several intermediate terms in one of the senses, and only one or\nnone in the other: in each of these ways the equivocation is\nrevealed.[51] We must look also to the contradictory opposite (of a\nterm), which may perhaps have an obvious equivocation of meaning;\nthus, [Greek: m\u00ea\\ ble/pein] means sometimes to be blind, sometimes\nnot to be seeing actually, whence we discover that [Greek: ble/pein]\nalso has the same equivocation.[52] If a positive term is equivocal,\nwe know that the privative term correlating with it must also be\nequivocal; thus, [Greek: to\\ ai)stha/nesthai] has a double sense,\naccording as we speak with reference to mind or body; and this will\nbe alike true of the correlating privative--[Greek: to\\ a)nai/sth\u00eaton\nei)=nai].[53] Farther, an equivocal term will have its derivatives\nequivocal in the same manner; and conversely, if the derivative be\nequivocal, the radical will be so likewise.[54] The term must also be\nlooked at in reference to the ten Categories: if its meanings fall\nunder more than one Category, we know that it is equivocal.[55] If it\ncomprehends two subjects which are not in the same genus, or in\ngenera not subordinate one to the other, this too will show that it\nis equivocal.[56] The contrary, also, of the term must be looked at\nwith a view to the same inference.[57]\n\n[Footnote 48: Topic. I. xv. p. 106, a. 1-8: [Greek: to\\ de\\\nposach\u00f4=s, pragmateute/on m\u00ea\\ mo/non o(/sa le/getai kath' e(/teron\ntro/pon, a)lla\\ kai\\ tou\\s lo/gous au)t\u00f4n peirate/on a)podido/nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 9-35.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 13-20.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 21-28.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 107, a. 3-17.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ibid. a. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ibid. a. 32-35.]\n\nAgain, it will be useful to bring together the same term in two\ndifferent conjunctions, and to compare the definitions of the two.\nDefine both of them, and then deduct what is peculiar to each\n_definitum_: if the remainder be different, the term will be\nequivocal; if the remainder be the same, the term will be univocal.\nThus, [Greek: leuko\\n s\u00f4=ma] will be defined, a body having such and\nsuch a colour: [Greek: leuk\u00ea\\ ph\u00f4n\u00ea/], a voice easily and distinctly\nheard: deduct [Greek: s\u00f4=ma] from the first definition, and [Greek:\nph\u00f4n\u00ea\\] from the second, the remainder will be totally disparate;\ntherefore, the term [Greek: leuko/n] is equivocal.[58] Sometimes,\nalso, the ambiguity may be found in definitions themselves, where the\nsame term is used to explain subjects that are not the same; whether\nsuch use is admissible, has to be considered.[59] If the term be\nunivocal, two conjunctions of it may always be compared as to greater\nor less, or in respect of likeness; whenever this cannot be, the term\nis equivocal.[60] If, again, the term is used as a differentia for\ntwo genera quite distinct and independent of each other, it must be\nequivocal; for genera that are unconnected and not subordinate one to\nthe other, have their differenti\u00e6 also disparate.[61] And,\nconversely, if the term be such that the differenti\u00e6 applied to it\nare disparate, we may know it to be an equivocal term. The like, if\nthe term be used as a species in some of its conjunctions, and as a\ndifferentia in others.[62]\n\n[Footnote 58: Topic. I. xv. p. 107, a. 36-b. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Ibid. b. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ibid. b. 13-18: [Greek: e)/ti ei) m\u00ea\\ sumbl\u00eata\\ kata\\\nto\\ ma=llon \u00ea)\\ o(moi/\u00f4s,--to\\ ga\\r sun\u00f4/numon pa=n sumbl\u00eato/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. b. 19-26.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 27-37.]\n\n3. Aristotle has thus indicated, at considerable length, the points\nto be looked for when we are examining whether a term is univocal or\nequivocal. He is more concise when he touches on the last two out of\nthe four helps ([Greek: o)/rgana]) enumerated for supplying\nsyllogisms when needed,--viz. the study of Differences and of\nResemblances. In regard to the study of Differences, standing third,\nwhile he remarks that, where these are wide and numerous, they are\nsure without any precept to excite our attention, he advises that we\nshould study the differences of subjects that are nearly\nallied,--those within the same genus, or comprehended in genera not\nmuch removed from one another, such as, the distinction between\nsensible perception and science. But he goes into no detail.[63]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ibid. xvi. p. 107, b. 39.]\n\n4. In regard to the study of Resemblances, he inverts the above\nprecept, and directs us to note especially the points of resemblance\nbetween subjects of great apparent difference.[64] We must examine\nwhat is the quality common to all species of the same genus--man,\nhorse, dog, &c.; for it is in this that they are similar. We may also\ncompare different genera with each other, in respect to the analogies\nthat are to be found in each: _e.g._, as science is to the\ncognizable, so is perception to the perceivable; as sight is in the\neye, so is intellection in the soul; as [Greek: gal\u00ea/n\u00ea] is in the\nsea, so is [Greek: n\u00eanemi/a] in the air.[65]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ibid. xvii. p. 108, a. 12: [Greek: ma/lista d' e)n\ntoi=s polu\\ diest\u00f4=si gumna/zesthai dei=; r(a=|on ga\\r e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n\nloip\u00f4=n dun\u00easo/metha ta\\ o(/moia sunora=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 65: Topic. I. xvii. p. 108, a. 7.]\n\nSuch are the four distinct helps, towards facility of syllogizing,\nenumerated by Aristotle. It will be observed that the third and\nfourth (study of Resemblances and Differences) bear more upon matters\nof fact and less upon words; while the second ([Greek: to\\\nposach\u00f4=s]), though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and\nderiving from thence its main real worth, yet takes its departure\nfrom terms and propositions, and proceeds by comparing multiplied\nvarieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning. Upon this\nground it is, apparently, that Aristotle has given so much fuller\ndevelopment to the second head than to the third and fourth; for, in\nthe Topica, he is dealing with propositions and\ncounter-propositions--with opinions and counter-opinions, not with\nscience and truth.\n\nHe proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps\n(the second, third, and fourth) further the purpose of the\ndialectician--respondent as well as assailant. Unless the different\nmeanings of the term be discriminated, the respondent cannot know\nclearly what he admits or what he denies; he may be thinking of\nsomething different from what the assailant intends, and the\nsyllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only, not upon any\nreality.[66] The respondent will be able to protect himself better\nagainst being driven into contradiction, if he can distinguish the\nvarious meanings of the same term; for he will thus know whether the\nsyllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has\nadmitted.[67] On the other hand, the assailant will have much\nfacility in driving his opponent into contradiction, if he (the\nassailant) can distinguish the different meanings of the term, while\nthe respondent cannot do so; in those cases at least where the\nproposition is true in one sense of the term and false in\nanother.[68] This manner of proceeding, however, is hardly consistent\nwith genuine Dialectic. No dialectician ought ever to found his\ninterrogations and his arguments upon a mere unanalysed term, unless\nhe can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate.[69]\n\n[Footnote 66: Ibid. xviii. p. 108, a. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: chr\u00ea/simon de\\ kai\\ pro\\s to\\ m\u00ea\\\nparalogisth\u00ea=nai kai\\ pro\\s to\\ paralogi/sasthai. ei)do/tes ga\\r\nposach\u00f4=s le/getai ou) m\u00ea\\ paralogisth\u00f4=men, a)ll' ei)d\u00ea/somen e)a\\n\nm\u00ea\\ pro\\s to\\ au)to\\ to\\n lo/gon poi\u00ea=tai o( e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 68: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: au)toi/ te e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntes\ndun\u00easo/metha paralogi/sasthai e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ tugcha/n\u00ea| ei)d\u00f4\\s o(\na)pokrino/menos posach\u00f4=s le/getai; tou=to d' ou)k e)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n\ndunato/n, a)ll' o(/tan \u00ea)=| t\u00f4=n pollach\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n ta\\ me\\n\na)l\u00eath\u00ea=, ta\\ de\\ pseud\u00ea=.]]\n\n[Footnote 69: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, a. 34: [Greek: dio\\ pantel\u00f4=s\neu)lab\u00eate/on toi=s dialektikoi=s to\\ toiou=nton, to\\ pro\\s tou)/noma\ndiale/gesthai, _e)a\\n m\u00ea/ tis a)/ll\u00f4s e)xadunat\u00ea=| peri\\ tou=\nprokeime/nou diale/gesthai_.]]\n\nThe third help (an acquaintance with Differences) will be of much\navail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon Same and\nDifferent, and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition\nof any thing; for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign\nthereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case.[70]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 2.]\n\nLastly, the fourth help (the intelligent survey of Resemblances)\nserves us in different ways:--(1) Towards the construction of\ninductive arguments; (2) Towards syllogizing founded upon assumption;\n(3) Towards the declaration of definitions. As to the inductive\nargument, it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar\nparticulars, whereby the universal is obtained.[71] As to the\nsyllogizing from an assumption, the knowledge of resemblances is\nvaluable, because we are entitled to assume, as an _Endoxon_ or a\ndoctrine conformable to common opinion, that what happens in any one\nof a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest. We lay\ndown this as the major proposition of a syllogism; and thus, if we\ncan lay hold of any one similar case, we can draw inference from it\nto the matter actually in debate.[72] Again, as to the declaration of\ndefinitions, when we have once discovered what is the same in all\nparticular cases, we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject\nbefore us belongs;[73] for that one of the common predicates which is\nmost of the essence, will be the genus. Even where the two matters\ncompared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus, the\nknowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful\nanalogies, and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative.\nThus, as the point is in a line, so is the unit in numbers; each of\nthem is a _principium_; this, therefore, is a common genus, which\nwill serve as a tolerable definition. Indeed this is the definition\nof them commonly given by philosophers; who call the unit\n_principium_ of number, and the point _principium_ of a line, thus\nputting one and the other into a genus common to both.[74]\n\n[Footnote 71: Ibid. b. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: pro\\s de\\ tou\\s e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s\nsullogsismou/s, _dio/ti e)/ndoxo/n e)stin_, \u00f4(/s pote e)ph' e(no\\s\nt\u00f4=n o(moi/\u00f4n e)/chei, ou(/t\u00f4s kai\\ e)i\\ t\u00f4=n loip\u00f4=n; \u00f4(/ste pro\\s\no(/ ti a)\\n au)t\u00f4=n eu)por\u00f4=men diale/gesthai,\n_prodiomolog\u00easo/metha_, \u00f4(/s pote e)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n e)/chei, ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\\ne)pi\\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein. dei/xantes de\\ e)kei=no kai\\\n**to\\ prokei/menon _e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s dedeicho/tes e)so/metha;\nu(pothe/menoi_ ga/r, \u00f4(/s pote e)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n e)/chei,\nou(/t\u00f4 kai\\ e)pi\\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein, t\u00ea\\n a)po/deixin\npepoi\u00ea/metha.] For [Greek: to\\ e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s], compare Topic. III.\nvi. p. 119, b. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 27: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste to\\\nkoino\\n e)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n ge/nos a)podi/dontes _do/xomen ou)k a)llotri/\u00f4s\no(ri/zesthai_.] It will be recollected that all the work of Dialectic\n(as Aristotle tells us often) has reference to [Greek: do/xa] and not\nto scientific truth. \"We shall _seem to define_ not in a manner\ndeparting from the reality of the subject\" is, therefore, an\nappropriate dialectic artifice.]\n\n\nII.\n\nThe First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was\nentitled by some ancient commentators [Greek: ta\\ pro\\ t\u00f4=n\nTo/p\u00f4n]--matters preliminary to the _Loci_. This is quite true, as a\ndescription of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the\nbook, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the _Loci_\ntowards which the four above-mentioned _Organa_ will be useful.[75]\n\n[Footnote 75: Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: [Greek: oi( de\\ to/poi pro\\s ou(\\s\nchr\u00ea/sima ta\\ lechthe/nta oi(/de ei)si/n.]]\n\n_Locus_ ([Greek: to/pos]) is a place in which many arguments\npertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose, may be found--\n_sedes argumentorum_. In each _locus_, the arguments contained\ntherein look at the thesis from the same point of view; and the\n_locus_ implies nothing distinct from the arguments, except this\nmanner of view common to them all. In fact, the metaphor is a\nconvenient one for designating the relation of every Universal\ngenerally to its particulars: the Universal is not a new particular,\nnor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars, but simply a\n_place_ in which all known similar particulars may be found grouped\ntogether, and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new\nones. If we wish to arm the student with a large command of\ndialectical artifices, we cannot do better than discriminate the\nvarious groups of arguments, indicating the point of view common to\neach group, and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable. By\nthis means, whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate, he\nwill consider the thesis in reference to each one of these different\n_loci_, and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them,\naccording as the case may admit.\n\nThe four _Helps_ ([Greek: o)/rgana]) explained in the last book\ndiffer from the _Loci_ in being of wider and more undefined bearing:\nthey are directions for preparatory study, rather than for dealing\nwith any particular situation of a given problem; though it must be\nconfessed that, when Aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in\nwhich the three last-mentioned helps are useful, he makes\nconsiderable approach towards the greater detail and\nparticularization of the _Loci_. In entering now upon these, he\nreverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems\n(according to the four Predicables), noted at the beginning of the\ntreatise, in which the predicate is either Definition, Proprium,\nGenus, or Accident, of the subject. He makes a fourfold distribution\nof _Loci_, according as they bear upon one or other of these four. In\nthe Second and Third Books, we find those which bear upon\npropositions predicating Accident; in the Fourth Book, we pass to\nGenus; in the Fifth, to Proprium; in the Sixth and Seventh, to\nDefinition.\n\nThe problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on\nwhich it may be impugned: either it may be untrue; or it may be\nexpressed in a way departing from the received phraseology.[76] It\nwill be universal, or particular, or indefinite; and either\naffirmative or negative; but, in most cases, the respondent propounds\nfor debate an affirmative universal, and not a negative or a\nparticular.[77] Aristotle therefore begins with those _loci_ that are\nuseful for refuting an Affirmative Universal; though, in general, the\nsame arguments are available for attack and defence both of the\nuniversal and of the particular; for if you can overthrow the\nparticular, you will have overthrown the universal along with it,\nwhile if you can defend the universal, this will include the defence\nof the particular. As the thesis propounded is usually affirmative,\nthe assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation.\nAnd this indeed (as Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, remarked, after\nhis master[78]) is the principal function and result of dialectic\nexercise; which refutes much and proves very little, according to the\nanalogy of the Platonic Dialogues of Search.\n\n[Footnote 76: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: [Greek: diori/sasthai de\\\ndei= kai\\ ta\\s a(marti/as ta\\s e)n toi=s probl\u00ea/masin, o(/ti ei)si\\\ndittai/, \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| pseu/desthai, \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| parabai/nein t\u00ea\\n keime/n\u00ean\nle/xin.]\n\nAlexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that [Greek: pro/bl\u00eama]\nhere means, not the interrogation, but [Greek: to\\ \u00f4(risme/non \u00ea)/d\u00ea\nkai\\ kei/menon--ou(= proi+/statai/ tis, o(/n o( dialektiko\\s\ne)le/gchein e)picheirei=].]\n\n[Footnote 77: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 8: [Greek: dia\\ to\\ ma=llon\nta\\s the/seis komi/zein e)n t\u00f4=| u(pa/rchein \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea/, tou\\s de\\\ndialegome/nous a)naskeua/zein.]]\n\n[Footnote 78: Alexander ap. Schol. p. 264, a. 27, Br.: [Greek: o(/ti\nde\\ oi)keio/teron t\u00f4=| dialektik\u00f4=| to\\ a)naskeua/zein tou=\nkataskeua/zein, e)n t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| t\u00f4=n e)pigraphome/n\u00f4n Eu)d\u00eamei/\u00f4n\nA)nalutik\u00f4=n (e)pigra/phetai de\\ au)to\\ kai\\ Eu)d\u00ea/mou u(pe\\r t\u00f4=n\nA)nalutik\u00f4=n) ou(/t\u00f4s le/getai, o(/ti o( dialektiko\\s a(\\ me\\n\nkataskeua/zei mikra/ e)sti, to\\ de\\ polu\\ t\u00ea=s duna/me\u00f4s au)tou=\npro\\s to\\ a)nairei=n ti e)sti/n.]]\n\nAristotle takes the four heads--Accident, Genus, Proprium, and\nDefinition, in the order here enumerated. The thesis of which the\npredicate is enunciated as Accident, affirms the least, is easiest to\ndefend, and hardest to upset.[79] When we enunciate Genus or\nProprium, we affirm, not merely that the predicate belongs to the\nsubject (which is all that is affirmed in the case of Accident), but,\nalso something more--that it belongs to the subject in a certain\nmanner and relation. And when we enunciate Definition, we affirm all\nthis and something reaching yet farther--that it declares the whole\nessence of the _definitum_, and is convertible therewith.\nAccordingly, the thesis of Definition, affirming as it does so very\nmuch, presents the most points of attack and is by far the hardest to\ndefend.[80] Next in point of difficulty, for the respondent, comes\nthe Proprium.\n\n[Footnote 79: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 27: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\\\npa/nt\u00f4n kataskeua/sai to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s--a)naskeua/zein de\\\nchalep\u00f4/taton to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)t\u00f4=|\nde/dotai; ou) ga\\r pross\u00eamai/nei e)n t\u00f4=| sumbeb\u00eako/ti p\u00f4=s\nu(pa/rchei, \u00f4(/st' e)pi\\ me\\n t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n dich\u00f4=s e)/stin a)nelei=n,\n\u00ea)\\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei \u00ea)\\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s\nu(parchei, e)pi\\ de\\ tou= sumbeb\u00eako/tos ou)k e)/stin a)nelei=n a)ll'\n\u00ea)\\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei.]]\n\n[Footnote 80: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3. [Greek: pa/nt\u00f4n r(a=|ston\no(/ron a)naskeua/sai; plei=sta ga\\r e)n au)t\u00f4=| ta\\ dedome/na poll\u00f4=n\nei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n.] a. 23: [Greek: t\u00f4=n d' a)/ll\u00f4n to\\ i)/dion ma/lista\ntoiou=ton.]]\n\nBeginning thus with the thesis enunciating Accident, Aristotle\nenumerates no less than thirty-seven distinct _loci_ or argumentative\npoints of view bearing upon it. Most of them suggest modes of\nassailing the thesis; but there are also occasionally intimations to\nthe respondent how he may best defend himself. In this numerous list\nthere are indeed some items repetitions of each other, or at least\nnot easily distinguishable.[81] As it would be tedious to enumerate\nthem all, I shall select some of the most marked and illustrative.\n\n[Footnote 81: Aristotle himself admits the repetition in some cases,\nTopic. II. ii. p. 110, a. 12: the fourth _locus_ is identical\nsubstantially with the second _locus_.\n\nTheophrastus distinguished [Greek: para/ggelma] as the general\nprecept, from [Greek: to/pos] or _locus_, as any proposition\nspecially applying the precept to a particular case (Schol. p. 264,\nb. 38).]\n\n1. The respondent has enunciated a certain predicate as belonging in\nthe way of accident, to a given subject. Perhaps it may belong to the\nsubject; yet not as accident, but under some one of the other three\nPredicables. Perhaps he may have enunciated (either by explicit\ndiscrimination, or at least by implication contained in his\nphraseology) the genus as if it were an accident,--an error not\nunfrequently committed.[82] Thus, if he has said, To be a colour is\nan accident of white, he has affirmed explicitly the genus as if it\nwere an accident. And he has affirmed the same by implication, if he\nhas said, White (or whiteness) is coloured. For this is a form of\nwords not proper for the affirmation of a genus respecting its\nspecies, in which case the genus itself ought to stand as a literal\npredicate (White is a colour), and not to be replaced by one of its\nderivatives (White is coloured). Nor can the proposition be intended\nto be taken as affirming either proprium or definition; for in both\nthese the predicate would reciprocate and be co-extensive with the\nsubject, whereas in the present case there are obviously many other\nsubjects of which it may be predicated that they are coloured.[83] In\nsaying, White is coloured, the respondent cannot mean to affirm\neither genus, proprium, or definition; therefore he must mean to\naffirm _accident_. The assailant will show that this is erroneous.\n\n[Footnote 82: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, a. 34: [Greek: ei(=s me\\n d\u00ea\\\nto/pos to\\ e)pible/pein ei) to\\ kat' a)/llon tina\\ tro/pon u(pa/rchon\n\u00f4(s sumbeb\u00eako\\s a)pode/d\u00f4ken. a(marta/netai de\\ ma/lista tou=to peri\\\nta\\ ge/n\u00ea, oi(=on ei)/ tis t\u00f4=| leuk\u00f4=| phai/\u00ea sumbeb\u00eake/nai\nchr\u00f4/mati ei)=nai; ou) ga\\r sumbe/b\u00eake t\u00f4=| leuk\u00f4=| chr\u00f4/mati\nei)=nai, a)lla\\ ge/nos au)tou= to\\ chr\u00f4=ma/ e)stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 83: We may find cases in which Aristotle has not been\ncareful to maintain the strict logical sense of [Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/s]\nor [Greek: sumbe/b\u00eaken] where he applies these terms to Genus or\nProprium: _e.g._ Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 24; Soph. El. vi. p. 168,\nb. 1.]\n\n2. Suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal\naffirmative, or an universal negative. You (the interrogator or\nassailant) should review the particulars contained under these\nuniversals. Review them not at once as separate individuals, but as\ncomprised in subordinate genera and species; beginning from the\nhighest, and descending down to the lowest species which is not\nfarther divisible except into individuals. Thus, if the thesis\npropounded be, The cognition of opposites is one and the same\ncognition; you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated\nrespecting all the primary species of _Opposita_: respecting _Relata_\nand _Correlata_, respecting Contraries, respecting Contradictories,\nrespecting _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. If, by going thus far, you\nobtain no result favourable to your purpose,[84] you must proceed\nfarther, and subdivide until you come to the lowest species:--Is the\ncognition of just and unjust one and the same? that of double and\nhalf? of sight and blindness? of existence and non-existence? If in\nall, or in any one, of these cases you can show that the universal\nthesis does not hold, you will have gained your point of refuting it.\nOn the other hand, if, when you have enumerated many particulars, the\nthesis is found to hold in all, the respondent is entitled to require\nyou to grant it as an universal proposition, unless you can produce a\nsatisfactory counter-example. If you decline this challenge, you will\nbe considered an unreasonable debater.[85]\n\n[Footnote 84: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 20: [Greek: ka)\\n e)pi\\\ntou/t\u00f4n m\u00ea/p\u00f4 phanero\\n \u00ea)=|, pa/lin tau=ta diairete/on me/chri t\u00f4=n\na)to/m\u00f4n, oi(=on ei) t\u00f4=n dikai/\u00f4n kai\\ a)di/k\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ibid. b. 25-30. [Greek: e)a\\n ga\\r m\u00eade/teron tou/t\u00f4n\npoi\u00ea=|, a)/topos phanei=tai m\u00ea\\ tithei/s.]]\n\n3. You will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in\nthe thesis, and the subject respecting which it is predicated, or at\nleast one of them: you will see then whether these definitions reveal\nanything false in the affirmation of the thesis. Thus, if the thesis\naffirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god, you will define\nwhat is meant by doing injustice. The definition is--hurting\nintentionally: you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no\ninjustice to a god can possibly be done; for a god cannot be\nhurt.[86] Or let the thesis maintained be, The virtuous man is\nenvious. You define envy, and you find that it is--vexation felt by\nreason of the manifest success of some meritorious man. Upon this\ndefinition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy: he\nwould be worthless, if he did feel it. Perhaps some of the terms\nemployed in your definition may themselves require definition; if so,\nyou will repeat the process of defining until you come to something\nplain and clear.[87] Such an analysis will often bring out some error\nat first unperceived in the thesis.\n\n[Footnote 86: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 34: [Greek: ou) ga\\r\ne)nde/chetai bla/ptesthai to\\n theo/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 87: Ibid. p. 110, a. 4: [Greek: lamba/nein de\\ kai\\ a)nti\\\nt\u00f4=n e)n toi=s lo/gois o)noma/t\u00f4n lo/gous, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)phi/stasthai\ne(/\u00f4s a)\\n ei)s gn\u00f4/rimon e)/lth\u00ea|.]]\n\n4. It will be advisable, both for assailant and respondent, to\ndiscriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is\nconclusive from those in which it is not. Thus, in regard to the\nmeaning of terms and in naming objects, we must speak like the\nmultitude; but, when the question is as to what objects deserve to be\ndenominated so and so, we must not feel bound by the multitude, if\nthere be any special dissentient authority.[88] That which produces\ngood health we must call wholesome, as the multitude do; but, in\ncalling this or that substance wholesome, the physician must be our\nguide.\n\n[Footnote 88: Ibid. a. 14-22.]\n\n5. Aristotle gives more than one suggestion as to those cases in\nwhich the terms of the thesis have a double or triple sense, yet in\nwhich the thesis is propounded either as an universal affirmative or\nas an universal negative. If the respondent is himself not aware of\nthe double sense of his thesis, while you (the questioner) are aware\nof it, you will prove the point which you are seeking to establish\nagainst him in one or other of the two senses, if you cannot prove it\nin both. If he is aware of it in the double sense, he will insist\nthat you have chosen the sense which he did not intend.[89] This mode\nof procedure will be available to the respondent as well as to you;\nbut it will be harder to him, since his thesis is universal. For, in\norder to make good an universal thesis, he must obtain your assent to\na preliminary assumption or convention, that, if he can prove it in\none sense of the terms, it shall be held proved in both; and, unless\nthe proposition be so plausible that you are disposed to grant him\nthis, he will not succeed in the procedure.[90] But you on your side,\nas refuting, do not require any such preliminary convention or\nacquiescence; for, if you prove the negative in any single case, you\nsucceed in overthrowing the universal affirmative, while, if you\nprove the affirmative in any single case, you succeed in overthrowing\nthe universal negative.[91] Such procedure, however, is to be adopted\nonly when you can find no argument applicable to the equivocal thesis\nin all its separate meanings; this last sort of argument, wherever it\ncan be found, being always better.[92]\n\n[Footnote 89: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: kataskeua/zousi de\\\nprodiomolog\u00eate/on o(/ti ei) o(t\u00f4|ou=n u(pa/rchei, panti\\ u(pa/rchei,\na)\\n pithano\\n \u00ea)=| to\\ a)xi/\u00f4ma; ou) ga\\r a)po/chr\u00ea pro\\s to\\\ndei=xai o(/ti panti\\ u(pa/rchei to\\ e)ph' e(no\\s dialechth\u00ea=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 91: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 32: [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n\na)naskeua/zonti me\\n ou)de\\n dei= e)x o(mologi/as diale/gesthai].]\n\n[Footnote 92: Ibid. b. 4.]\n\nIn cases where the double meaning is manifest, the two meanings must\nbe distinguished by both parties, and the argument conducted\naccordingly. Where the term has two or more meanings (not equivocal\nbut) related to each other by analogy, we must deal with each of\nthese meanings distinctly and separately.[93] If our purpose is to\nrefute, we select any one of them in which the proposition is\ninadmissible, neglecting the others: if our purpose is to prove, we\nchoose any one in which the proposition is true, neglecting the\nothers.[94]\n\n[Footnote 93: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 16-p. 111, a. 7. This\n_locus_ is very obscurely stated by Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Ibid. p. 110, b. 29-32: [Greek: e)a\\n boul\u00f4/metha\nkataskeua/sai, ta\\ toiau=ta prooiste/on o(/sa e)nde/chetai, kai\\\ndiairete/on _ei)s tau=ta mo/non_ o(/sa kai\\ chr\u00ea/sima pro\\s to\\\nkataskeua/sai; a)\\n d' a)naskeua/sai, o(/sa m\u00ea\\ e)nde/chetai, _ta\\\nde\\ loipa\\ paraleipte/on_.]\n\nAristotle's precepts indicate the way of managing the debate _with a\nview to success._]\n\n6. Observe that a predicate which belongs to the genus does not\nnecessarily belong to any one of its species, but that any predicate\nwhich belongs to one of the species does belong also to the genus; on\nthe other hand, that any predicate which can be denied of the genus\nmay be denied also of all its contained species, but that any\npredicate which can be denied of some one or some portion of the\ncontained species cannot for that reason be denied of the genus. You\nmay thus prove from one species to the genus, and disprove from the\ngenus to each one species; but not _vice vers\u00e2_. Thus, if the\nrespondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and\nworthless, you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of\nmind estimable and worthless; for cognition is a species under the\ngenus habit of mind. But if the negative were granted, that there\nexist no cognitions both estimable and worthless, you could not for\nthat reason infer that there are no habits of mind estimable and\nworthless. So, if it were granted to you that there are judgments\ncorrect and erroneous, you could not for that reason infer that there\nwere perceptions of sense correct and erroneous; perceiving by sense\nbeing a species under the genus judging. But, if it were granted that\nthere were no judgments correct and erroneous, you might thence infer\nthe like negative about perceptions of sense.[95]\n\n[Footnote 95: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 14-32. [Greek: nu=n me\\n\nou)=n e)k tou= ge/nous peri\\ to\\ ei)=dos \u00ea( a)po/deixis; to\\ ga\\r\nkri/nein ge/nos tou= ai)stha/nesthai; o( ga\\r ai)sthano/menos kri/nei\np\u00f4s--o( me\\n ou)=n pro/teros to/pos pseud\u00ea/s e)sti pro\\s to\\\nkataskeua/sai, o( de\\ deu/teros a)l\u00eath\u00ea/s.--pro\\s de\\ to\\\na)naskeua/zein o( me\\n pro/teros a)l\u00eath\u00ea/s, o( de\\ deu/teros\npseud\u00ea/s.]\n\nIt is here a point deserving attention, that Aristotle ranks [Greek:\nto\\ ai)stha/nesthai] as a species under the genus [Greek: to\\\nkri/nein]. This is a notable circumstance in the Aristotelian\npsychology.]\n\n7. Keep in mind also that if there be any subject of which you can\naffirm the genus, of that same subject you must be able to affirm one\nor other of the species contained under the genus. Thus, if science\nbe a predicate applicable, grammar, music, or some other of the\nspecial sciences must also be applicable: if any man can be called\ntruly a scientific man, he must be a grammarian, a musician, or some\nother specialist. Accordingly, if the thesis set up by your\nrespondent be, The soul is moved, you must examine whether any one of\nthe known varieties of motion can be truly predicated of the soul,\n_e.g._, increase, destruction, generation, &c. If none of these\nspecial predicates is applicable to the soul, neither is the generic\npredicate applicable to it; and you will thus have refuted the\nthesis. This _locus_ may serve as a precept for proof as well as for\nrefutation; for, equally, if the soul be moved in any one species of\nmotion, it is moved, and, if the soul be not moved in any species of\nmotion, it is not moved.[96]\n\n[Footnote 96: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 33-b. 11.]\n\n8. Where the thesis itself presents no obvious hold for\ninterrogation, turn over the various definitions that have been\nproposed of its constituent terms; one or other of these definitions\nwill often afford matter for attack.[97] Look also to the antecedents\nand consequents of the thesis--what must be assumed and what will\nfollow, if the thesis be granted. If you can disprove the consequent\nof the proposition, you will have disproved the proposition itself.\nOn the other hand, if the antecedent of the proposition be proved,\nthe proposition itself will be proved also.[98] Examine also whether\nthe proposition be not true at some times, and false at other times.\nThe thesis, What takes nourishment grows necessarily, is true not\nalways, but only for a certain time: animals take nourishment during\nall their lives, but grow only during a part of their lives. Or, if a\nman should say that knowing is remembering, this is incorrect; for we\nremember nothing but events past, whereas we know not only these, but\npresent and future also.[99]\n\n[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 12-16.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Ibid. b. 17-23.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, b. 24-31.]\n\n9. It is a sophistical procedure (so Aristotle terms it) to transfer\nthe debate to some point on which we happen to be well provided with\narguments, lying apart from the thesis defended. Such transfer,\nhowever, may be sometimes necessary. In other cases it is not really\nbut only apparently necessary; in still other cases it is purely\ngratuitous, neither really nor apparently necessary. It is really\nnecessary, when the respondent, having denied some proposition\nperfectly relevant to his thesis, stands to his denial and accepts\nthe debate upon it, the proposition being one on which a good stock\nof arguments may be found against him; also, when you are\nendeavouring to disprove the thesis by an induction of negative\nanalogies.[100] It is only apparently, and not really, necessary, when\nthe proposition in debate is not perfectly relevant to the thesis,\nbut merely has the semblance of being so. It is neither really nor\napparently necessary, when there does not exist even this semblance\nof relevance, and when some other way is open of bringing\nbye-confutation to bear on the respondent. You ought to avoid\nentirely such a procedure in this last class of cases; for it is an\nabuse of the genuine purpose of Dialectic. If you do resort to it,\nthe respondent should grant your interrogations, but at the same time\nnotify that they are irrelevant to the thesis. Such notification will\nrender his concessions rather troublesome than advantageous for your\npurpose.[101]\n\n[Footnote 100: Ibid. v. p. 111, b. 32-p. 112, a. 2: [Greek: e)/ti o(\nsophistiko\\s tro/pos, to\\ a)/gein ei)s toiou=ton pro\\s o(\\\neu)por\u00ea/somen e)picheir\u00eama/t\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Ibid. p. 112, a. 2-15. [Greek: dei= d' eu)labei=sthai\nto\\n e)/schaton t\u00f4=n r(\u00eathe/nt\u00f4n tro/p\u00f4n; pantel\u00f4=s ga\\r\na)p\u00eart\u00eame/nos kai\\ a)llo/trios e)/oiken ei)=nai t\u00ea=s dialektik\u00ea=s.]\n\nThe epithet [Greek: sophistiko\\s tro/pos] is probably intended by\nAristotle to apply only to this last class of cases.\n\nThis paragraph is very obscure, and is not much elucidated by the\nlong Scholion of Alexander (pp. 267-268, Br.).]\n\n10. You will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by\nthe respondent carries with it by implication many other\npropositions; since every affirmation has necessary consequences,\nmore or fewer. Whoever says that Sokrates is a man, has said also\nthat he is an animal, that he is a living creature, biped, capable of\nacquiring knowledge. If you can disprove any of these necessary\nconsequences, you will have disproved the thesis itself. You must\ntake care, however, that you fix upon some one of the consequences\nwhich is really easier, and not more difficult, to refute than the\nthesis itself.[102]\n\n[Footnote 102: Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 16-23.]\n\n11. Perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a\nnature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to\nthe subject; _e.g._, either health or sickness. In that case, if you\nare provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries, the\nsame arguments will also serve indirectly for proof, or for disproof,\nof the other. Thus, if you show that one of the two contraries does\nbelong to the subject, the same arguments prove that the other does\nnot; _vice vers\u00e2_, if you show that one of them does not belong, it\nfollows that the other does.[103]\n\n[Footnote 103: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, a. 25-31. [Greek: d\u00ea=lon ou)=n\no(/ti pro\\s a)mph\u00f4 chr\u00ea/simos o( to/pos.]]\n\n12. You may find it advantageous, in attacking the thesis, to\nconstrue the terms in their strict etymological sense, rather than in\nthe sense which common **usage gives them.[104]\n\n[Footnote 104: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: e)/ti to\\ e)picheirei=n\nmetaphe/ronta tou)/noma e)pi\\ to\\n lo/gon, \u00f4(s ma/lista pros\u00ea=kon\ne)klamba/nein \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s kei=tai tou)/noma.]\n\nThe illustrative examples which follow prove that [Greek: lo/gon]\nhere means the etymological origin, and not the definition, which is\nits more usual meaning.]\n\n13. The predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily, or\nusually, or by pure hazard. You will take notice in which of these\nthree ways the respondent affirms it, and whether that which he\nchooses is conformable to the fact. If he affirms it as necessary,\nwhen it is really either usual or casual, the thesis will be open to\nyour attacks. If he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in\nwhich of the three senses he intends it to be understood, you are at\nliberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best\nsuits your argument.[105]\n\n[Footnote 105: Ibid. b. 1-20. This _locus_ seems unsuitable in that\npart of the Topica where Aristotle professes to deal with theses\n[Greek: tou= symbeb\u00eako/tos], or theses affirming or denying\n_accidental_ predicates. It is one of the suppositions here that the\nrespondent affirms the predicate as _necessary_.]\n\n14. Perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly\nsynonymous, so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of\nitself. On this ground it will be assailable.[106]\n\n[Footnote 106: Ibid. b. 21-26.]\n\n15. Sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary\nto it. If so, you may employ in arguing against it that one among its\nvarious contraries which is most convenient for your purpose.[107]\nPerhaps the predicate (accidental) of the thesis may have some\ncontrary: if it has, you will examine whether that contrary belongs\nto the subject of the thesis; and, should such be the case, you may\nuse it as an argument to refute the thesis itself.[108] Or the\npredicate of the thesis may be such that, if the thesis be granted,\nit will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates\nmust belong to the same subject. Thus, if the thesis be that the\nPlatonic Ideas exist _in us_, it follows necessarily that they are\nboth in motion and at rest; both perceivable by sense, and cogitable\nby intellect.[109] As these two predicates (those constituting the\nfirst pair as well as the second pair) are contrary to each other,\nand cannot both belong to the same subject, this may be used as an\nargument against the thesis from which such consequence follows.\n\n[Footnote 107: Ibid. vii. p. 112, b. 28-p. 113, a. 19. [Greek: d\u00ea=lon\nou)=n e)k t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n o(/ti t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| plei/ona e)nanti/a\nsumbai/nei gi/nesthai.--lamba/nein ou)=n t\u00f4=n e)nanti/\u00f4n o(po/teron\na)\\n \u00ea)=| pro\\s t\u00ea\\n the/sin chr\u00ea/simon.]]\n\n[Footnote 108: Ibid. viii. p. 113, a. 20-23.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, a. 24-32: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ ei)/ ti\ntoiou=ton ei)/r\u00eatai kata/ tinos, ou(= o)/ntos a)na/gk\u00ea ta\\ e)nanti/a\nu(pa/rchein; oi(=on ei) ta\\s i)de/as e)n \u00ea(mi=n e)/ph\u00easen ei)=nai;\nkinei=sthai/ te ga\\r kai\\ \u00ea)remei=n au)ta\\s sumb\u00ea/setai, e)/ti de\\\nai)sth\u00eata\\s kai\\ no\u00eata\\s ei)=nai.] Aristotle then proceeds to state\nhow this consequence arises. Those who affirm the Platonic Ideas,\nassign to them as fundamental characteristic, that they are at rest\nand cogitable. But, if the Ideas exist _in us_, they must be\nmoveable, because _we_ are moved; they must also be perceivable by\nsense, because it is through vision only that we discriminate and\nknow differences of form. Waitz observes (in regard to the last pair,\n[Greek: kai\\ ai)sth\u00eatai/]): \"Nam singul\u00e6 ide\u00e6 certam quandam rerum\nspeciem et formam exprimunt: species autem et forma oculis cernitur.\"\nI do not clearly see, however, that this is a consequence of\naffirming Ideas to be [Greek: e)n \u00ea(mi=n]; it is equally true if they\nare _not_ [Greek: e)n \u00ea(mi=n].]\n\n16. We know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries,\nis capable also of becoming recipient of the other. If, therefore,\nthe predicate of the thesis has any contrary, you will examine\nwhether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such\ncontrary. If not, you have an argument against the thesis. Let the\nthesis be, The appetitive principle is ignorant. If this be true,\nthat principle must be capable of knowledge.[110] Since this last is\nnot generally admitted, you have an argument against the thesis.\n\n[Footnote 110: Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 33-b. 10.]\n\n17. We recognize four varieties of _Opposita_: (1) Contradictory; (2)\nContrary; (3) _Habitus_ and _Privatio_; (4) _Relata_. You will\nconsider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon\nthe thesis in debate.\n\nIn regard to Contradictories, you are entitled, converting the terms\nof the thesis, to deny the predicate of the converted proposition\nrespecting the negation of the subject. Thus, if man is an animal,\nyou are entitled to infer, What is not an animal is not a man. You\nwill prove this to be an universal rule by Induction; that is, by\nciting a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably\ntrue, without possibility of finding any one case in which it does\nnot apply. If you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the\nthesis--What is not an animal is not a man--you will have proved or\ndisproved, the thesis itself, Man is an animal. This _locus_ is\navailable both for assailant and respondent.[111]\n\n[Footnote 111: Ibid. viii. p. 113, b. 15-26: [Greek: e)pei\\ d' ai(\na)ntithe/sis te/ssares, skopei=n e)k me\\n t\u00f4=n a)ntipha/se\u00f4n e)k t\u00ea=s\na)kolouth\u00ea/se\u00f4s kai\\ a)nairou=nti kai\\ kataskeua/zonti; _lamba/nein\nd' e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s_, oi(=on ei) o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos z\u00f4=|on, to\\ m\u00ea\\ z\u00f4=|on\nou)k a)/nthr\u00f4pos; _o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n--e)pi\\\npa/nt\u00f4n ou)=n to\\ toiou=ton a)xi\u00f4te/on_.]\n\nAristotle's declaration, that this great logical rule can only be\nproved by Induction, deserves notice. I have remarked the same thing\nabout his rules for the conversion of propositions, in the beginning\nof the Analytica Priora. See above, p. 145, seq.]\n\nIn regard to Contraries, you will study the thesis, to see whether\nthe contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the\ncontrary of the subject, or whether the contrary of the subject can\nbe truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate. This last\nalternative occurs sometimes, but not often; in general the first\nalternative is found to be true. You must make good your point here\nalso by Induction, or by repetition of particular examples. This\n_locus_ will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that\nof defence, according to circumstances. If neither of the two\nalternatives above-mentioned is found correct, this is an argument\nagainst the thesis.[112]\n\n[Footnote 112: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, b. 27-p. 114, a. 6. [Greek:\nlamba/nein de\\ kai\\ ta\\ toiau=ta e)x e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s, e)ph' o(/son\nchr\u00ea/simon.--spa/nion de\\ to\\ a)na/palin e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n e)nanti/\u00f4n\nsumbai/nei, a)lla\\ toi=s plei/stois e)pi\\ tau)ta \u00ea( a)kolou/th\u00easis.\nei) ou)=n m\u00eat' e)pi\\ tau)ta\\ t\u00f4=| e)nanti/\u00f4| to\\ e)nanti/on\na)kolouthei= m\u00ea/te a)na/palin, d\u00ea=lon o(/ti ou)de\\ t\u00f4=n r(\u00eathe/nt\u00f4n\na)kolouthei= to\\ e(/teron t\u00f4=| e(te/r\u00f4|.]]\n\nIn regard to _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, the rule is the same as about\nContraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always\nholds, and the second never occurs.[113] If sensible perception can\nbe predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of\nblindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.\n\n[Footnote 113: Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.]\n\nIn regard to _Relata_, the inference holds from the correlate of the\nsubject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief,\nthat which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception,\nthat which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there\nare cases in which the above does not hold; _e.g._, That which is\nsensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not\nknowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute\nthe first of the two propositions. This _locus_ will be equally\navailable for the purpose of refutation--thus, you may argue--That\nwhich is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible\nperception is not knowledge.[114]\n\n[Footnote 114: Ibid. a. 13-25.]\n\n18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to\ntheir Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with\nthem in the way of production, preservation, &c. This _locus_ serves\nboth for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject,\nis affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the\nderivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.[115]\n\n[Footnote 115: Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. [Greek: du/stoicha,\npt\u00f4/seis, ta\\ poi\u00eatika\\ kai\\ phulaktika/--d\u00ea=lon ou)=n o(/ti e(no\\s\no(poiouou=n deichthe/ntos t\u00f4=n kata\\ t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n sustoichi/an\na)gathou= \u00ea)\\ e)painetou=, kai\\ ta\\ loipa\\ pa/nta dedeigme/na\ngi/netai.]--b. 23: [Greek: \u00f4(=n me\\n ga\\r ta\\ poi\u00eatika\\ a)gatha/,\nkai\\ au)ta\\ t\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n, \u00f4(=n de\\ ta\\ phthartika\\ a)gatha/, au)ta\\\nt\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n.]]\n\n19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation,\nfrom matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the\nthesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things,\none and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to\npossess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear.\nIf to possess audition is _not_ to hear, then neither is to possess\nvision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is\nreal or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference\nwill not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then\nto know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last\nis impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate\nmany things; therefore, to know is _not_ to cogitate.[116]\n\n[Footnote 116: Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\\\nt\u00f4=n o(moi/\u00f4n, ei) o(moi/\u00f4s e)/chei,--kai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n kai\\\nt\u00f4=n dokou/nt\u00f4n; chr\u00ea/simos d' o( to/pos pro\\s a)/mph\u00f4;--skopei=n de\\\nkai\\ ei) e)ph' e(no\\s kai\\ ei) e)pi\\ poll\u00f4=n o(moi/\u00f4s e)/chei;\ne)niachou= ga\\r diaph\u00f4nei=.]]\n\n20. There are various _loci_ for argument, arising from degrees of\nComparison--more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant\nvariations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to\ndo injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an\nincrease in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of\nthe predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not.\nThis may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular\ninstances.[117] Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of\ntwo distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of\nA than of B. Then, if you can show that it does _not_ belong to A,\nyou may argue (_\u00e0 fortiori_) that it does _not_ belong to B; or, if\nyou can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (_\u00e0 fortiori_) that\nit belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable\nrespecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability,\nthen, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue\nfrom thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove\nthe less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more\nprobable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two\ndistinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if\nyou can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against\nthe less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are\nfurnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.[118] If the\ndegrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike,\nyou may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from\nproof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.[119]\n\n[Footnote 117: Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: [Greek: ei)si\\ de\\ tou=\nma=llon to/poi te/ssares, ei(=s me\\n ei) a)kolouthei= to\\ ma=llon\nt\u00f4=| ma=llon,--chr\u00ea/simos de\\ pro\\s a)/mph\u00f4 o( to/pos; ei) me\\n ga\\r\na)kolouthei= t\u00ea=| tou= u(pokeime/nou e)pido/sei \u00ea( tou= sumbeb\u00eako/tos\ne)pi/dosis, katha/per ei)/r\u00eatai, d\u00ea=lon o(/ti sumbe/b\u00eaken, ei) de\\\nm\u00ea\\ a)kolouthei=, ou) sumbe/b\u00eaken. tou=to d' e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=| l\u00eapte/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 118: Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Ibid. a. 15-24: [Greek: e)k tou= o(moi/\u00f4s u(pa/rchein\n\u00ea)\\ dokei=n u(pa/rchein], &c.]\n\n21. Another _locus_ for argument is, that _ex adjuncto_. If the\nsubject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good,\nand if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you\nmay argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you\nmight argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were\nto a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good\nafter such adjunction.[120] But this _locus_ will not be found\navailable for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue,\nbecause the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that\ntherefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.[121]\n\n[Footnote 120: Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]\n\n22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less\ndegree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely.\nUnless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can\nnever call it more white or more good. This _locus_ again, however,\ncannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation.\nBecause the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or\nless degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be\naffirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater\nor less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not\ncalled a man simply.[122] If the predicate can be denied of the\nsubject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every\nsort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with\nqualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely,\nas a possible predicate.[123] This, however, when it comes to be\nexplained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the\nparticulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes\nthat the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject\n_secundum quid_, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In\nsome places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice\nyour father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who\nis sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking\nsimply and absolutely (_i.e._, to persons generally in the ordinary\nstate of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can\ntruly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words,\nthat the proposition is true simply and absolutely.[124]\n\n[Footnote 122: Ibid. b. 3-10.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 11-35. [Greek: ei) ga\\r kata/ ti\ne)nde/chetai, kai\\ a(pl\u00f4=s e)nde/chetai.]]\n\n[Footnote 124: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste o(\\ a)\\n\nm\u00eadeno\\s prostitheme/nou dok\u00ea=| ei)=nai kalo\\n \u00ea)\\ ai)schro\\n \u00ea)\\\na)/llo ti t\u00f4=n toiou=t\u00f4n, a(pl\u00f4=s r(\u00eath\u00ea/setai.]]\n\n\nIII.\n\nSuch are the chief among the thirty-seven _Loci_ which Aristotle\nindicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the\npredication is only of Accident--not of Genus, or Proprium, or\nDefinition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal\nseparately with one special branch of such theses, respecting\n_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_: where the question put is, Of two or more\ndistinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The\ncases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the\ntwo subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where\nthere is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as\nto warrant doubt and debate.[125]\n\n[Footnote 125: Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: [Greek: Po/teron d'\nai(ret\u00f4/teron \u00ea)\\ be/ltion duei=n \u00ea)\\ pleio/n\u00f4n, e)k t\u00f4=nde\nskepte/on.] &c.]\n\nWe must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently\namong the dialectical debates of Aristotle's contemporaries; so that\nhe thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in\nthe best manner.\n\n1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable\nwhich is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good\nman; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law;\nor by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or\nsimply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the\nbetter cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is\ndeclared to be better by his own cognition.[126]\n\n[Footnote 126: Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.]\n\n2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than\nwhat is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account\nand _per se_, is better than what is desirable only on account of\nsomething else and _per accidens_; the cause of what is good in\nitself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by\naccident.[127]\n\n[Footnote 127: Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.]\n\n3. What is good absolutely and simply (_i.e._, to all and at all\ntimes) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or\nindividual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for\nthe stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by\nnature; _e.g._, justice (good by nature), than the just individual,\nwhose character must have been acquired.[128] What is good, or what\nis peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is\nbetter than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good,\nhaving its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of\nany subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative,\nsecondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in\nproper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of\nthe body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or\nbeauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper\nsymmetry of the limbs.[129] Next, an end is superior to that which is\nmeans thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is\nnearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great\nend of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end;\nmeans to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the\npossible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with\nanother subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is\nmore superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end\nproduced by the first subject is superior to the means or first\nsubject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health,\nif happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater\nproportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means\nproducing happiness is better than the end health.[130]\n\n[Footnote 128: Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Ibid. b. 12-22: [Greek: kai\\ to\\ e)n belti/osin \u00ea)\\\nprote/rois \u00ea)\\ timi\u00f4te/rois be/ltion, oi(=on u(gi/eia i)schu/os kai\\\nka/llous. \u00ea( me\\n ga\\r e)n u(groi=s kai\\ x\u00earoi=s kai\\ thermoi=s kai\\\npsuchroi=s, a(pl\u00f4=s d' ei)pei=n e)x \u00f4(=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n sune/st\u00eake to\\\nz\u00f4=|on, ta\\ d' e)n toi=s u(ste/rois; \u00ea( me\\n ga\\r i)schu\\s e)n toi=s\nneu/rois kai\\ o)stoi=s, to\\ de\\ ka/llos t\u00f4=n mel\u00f4=n tis summetri/a\ndokei= ei)=nai.]\n\nThe reason given in this _locus_ for superior estimation is a very\ncurious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than\ncompounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the\ndefinition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty\nto reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of\nthe face.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 22-36.]\n\nAgain, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy\n_per se_, is better than what possesses these same attributes in\nequal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus,\nfriendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one\nvalues wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem\nfriendship _per se_, even though no consequences ensue from it.[131]\n\n[Footnote 131: Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.]\n\nWhere the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal\nthat the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to\nthe antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the\nconsequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of\nevil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which\nthey respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is\npreferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if\ncast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to\nanother thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not _per se_\ngood, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice\nand courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with\nthe absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or\nalong with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it\ntells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence\nand absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than\nin youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required,\nand therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is\nuseful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is\nuseful only now and then; _e.g._, justice and moderation, as compared\nwith courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other\nwould not be required; _e.g._, justice is better than courage, for,\nif every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]\n\n[Footnote 132: Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Ibid. a. 16-25.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.]\n\nAmong two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation\nor acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or\nthe loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to\nthe _Summum Bonum_ or to that which is better than itself (unless\nindeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of\na caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more\nconspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and\npeculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that\nwhich we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our\nfriends, rather than to ordinary strangers (_e.g._, doing justice or\nconferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we\nprefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer\nseeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as\ncompared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally\ndesirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have\nsomething else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground\nof just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that\nwhich does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the\nproprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is\neligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that\nwhich is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139]\nAcquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are\nsometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life\nsimply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes\nnecessaries are more eligible, as, _e.g._, to a starving man.\nSpeaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are\nbetter.[140]\n\n[Footnote 135: Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. [Greek: skopei=n de\\ kai\\ ei)\ne)pi\\ ta\\ geloio/tera ei)/\u00ea o(/moion, katha/per o( pi/th\u00eakos t\u00f4=|\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|, tou= i(/ppou m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos o(moi/ou; ou) ga\\r ka/llion o(\npi/th\u00eakos, o(moio/teron de\\ t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 136: Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. [Greek: a(\\ pro\\s to\\n\nphi/lon pra=xai ma=llon boulo/metha \u00ea)\\ a(\\ pro\\s to\\n tucho/nta,\ntau=ta ai(ret\u00f4/tera, oi(=on to\\ dikaiopragei=n kai\\ eu)= poiei=n\nma=llon \u00ea)\\ to\\ dokei=n; tou\\s ga\\r phi/lous eu)= poiei=n boulo/metha\nma=llon \u00ea)\\ dokei=n, _tou\\s de\\ tucho/ntas a)na/palin_.]]\n\n[Footnote 137: Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition\nis--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that\nwe possessed it: [Greek: o(/ros de\\ tou= pro\\s do/xan, to\\ m\u00eadeno\\s\nsuneido/tos m\u00ea\\ a)\\n spouda/sai u(pa/rchein.]]\n\n[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. [Greek: ou) ga\\r ei) belti/\u00f4,\na)nagkai=on kai\\ ai(ret\u00f4/tera; to\\ gou=n philosophei=n be/ltion tou=\nchr\u00eamati/zesthai, a)ll' ou)ch ai(ret\u00f4/teron t\u00f4=| e)ndeei= t\u00f4=n\na)nagkai/\u00f4n. to\\ d' e)k periousi/as e)sti/n, o(/tan u(parcho/nt\u00f4n\nt\u00f4=n a)nagkai/\u00f4n a)/lla tina\\ proskataskeua/z\u00eatai/ tis t\u00f4=n kal\u00f4=n.\nschedo\\n d' i)/s\u00f4s ai(ret\u00f4/teron to\\ a)nagkai=o/n e)sti, be/ltion de\\\nto\\ e)k periousi/as.]]\n\nAmong many other _loci_, applicable to this same question of\ncomparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will\nsuffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to\nwhich any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous,\nthe beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is\nmore eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If\nthere be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among\nthe three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again,\nthat which conduces to the better end (_e.g._, to virtue rather than\nto pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied\nto the _Fugienda_ as well as to the _Expetenda_. That is most to be\navoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions:\n_e.g._, sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for\nsickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from\npleasure.[141]\n\n[Footnote 141: Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.]\n\nThe same _loci_ which are available for the question of comparison\nwill also be available in the question of positive eligibility or\npositive ineligibility.[142] Further, it holds for all cases of the\nkind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms\nthat each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of\nparticulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen\nyour case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that\nwhich is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which\nit is better than that which does not make the subject good.[143]\n\n[Footnote 142: Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: [Greek: l\u00eapte/on d'\no(/ti ma/lista katho/lou tou\\s to/pous peri\\ tou= ma=llon kai\\ tou=\nmei/zonos; l\u00eaphthe/ntes ga\\r ou(/t\u00f4s pro\\s plei/\u00f4 chr\u00ea/simoi a)\\n\nei)/\u00easan.]]\n\nThe _loci_ just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the\ndebate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be\napplicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.\n\nIf you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time\nprove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove\nthe particular negative also. The universal _loci_ from Opposites,\nfrom Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to\nparticular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal _locus_\nfrom Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is\nevil,--this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is\ngood, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal\nform the proposition is alike an _Endox_ or conformable to common\nreceived opinion. The like may be said about the _loci_ from\n_Habitus_ and _Privatio_; also about those from Generation and\nDestruction;[144] again, from More, Less, and Equally--this last,\nhowever, with some restriction, for the _locus_ from Less will\nserve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a\nless good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, _\u00e0\nfortiori_, some science is a good. But, if you take the same _locus_\nin the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be\nwarranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.[145]\nYou may apply this same _locus_ from Less to compare, not merely two\nsubjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different\ndegrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science\nor cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show\nthat prudence ([Greek: phro/n\u00easis]) is not a good; for, if prudence,\nwhich in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be\nreally not so, you may argue that, _\u00e0 fortiori_ no other science can\nbe so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that,\nif it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be\naccepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if\nthe human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if\nnot that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such\na thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds\nhis thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some\nparticular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be\nequivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand,\nhe puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular\naffirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry\nthe universal affirmative also.[146]\n\n[Footnote 144: Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. [Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s ga\\r\ne)/ndoxon to\\ a)xi\u00f4=sai, ei) pa=sa \u00ea(don\u00ea\\ a)gatho/n, kai\\ lu/p\u00ean\npa=san ei)=nai kako/n, t\u00f4=| ei)/ tis \u00ea(don\u00ea\\ a)gatho/n, kai\\ lu/p\u00ean\nei)=nai/ tina kako/n--e)n a(/pasi ga\\r o(moi/\u00f4s to\\ e)/ndoxon.]]\n\n[Footnote 145: Ibid. b. 17-30. [Greek: d\u00ea=lon ou)=n o(/ti\nkataskeua/zein mo/non e)k tou= \u00ea(=tton e)/stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 146: Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.]\n\nSuppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not\ncarrying the indication either of universal or particular; _e.g._,\nPleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all\npleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be\nrefuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no\npleasure is good.[147] But, if the thesis be divested of its\nindefinite character and propounded either as universal or as\nparticular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If\nit be farther specialized--_e.g._, One pleasure only is good--there\nwill be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all\npleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more\npleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized\nfarther still--_e.g._, Prudence alone among all the virtues is\nscience,--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you\nmay prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is\nscience; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or\nthat prudence is not science.[148]\n\n[Footnote 147: Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: [Greek: a)diori/stou me\\n ou)=n\no)/ntos tou= probl\u00ea/matos monach\u00f4=s a)naskeua/zein\ne)nde/chetai--a)nairei=n me\\n monach\u00f4=s e)nde/chetai, kataskeua/zein\nde\\ dich\u00f4=s.] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Ibid. a. 15-31.]\n\nIn dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other\n_loci_ already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will\nbe available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the\nsubject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced\na number of particulars successively to establish the universal,\naffirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the\nrespondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side\nsome adverse particular.[149] You will also (as was before\nrecommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various\nspecies which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly\naffirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly\naffirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to\nbe affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly\naffirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly\naffirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to\nbe negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number:\nyou divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that\nthe soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.[150]\n\n[Footnote 149: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: a)/n te ga\\r panti\\ phai/n\u00eatai\nu(pa/rchon a)/n te m\u00eadeni/, polla\\ proene/gkanti a)xi\u00f4te/on katho/lou\no(mologei=n, \u00ea)\\ phe/rein e)/nstasin e)pi\\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s.]]\n\n[Footnote 150: Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear\nfrom the examples here given by Aristotle--[Greek: o( chro/nos ou)\nkinei=tai, o( chro/nos ou)/k e)sti ki/n\u00easis, \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ ou)/k e)stin\na)rithmo/s], that he considers these propositions as either\nindefinite or particular.]\n\n\nIV.\n\nAfter this long catalogue of _Loci_ belonging to debate on\npropositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those\napplicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus\nnor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of\nthem are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition,\nwhich is of frequent occurrence.[151] For that reason, both deserve\nto be studied.\n\n[Footnote 151: Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: [Greek: meta\\ de\\ tau=ta\nperi\\ t\u00f4=n pro\\s to\\ ge/nos kai\\ to\\ i)/dion e)piskepte/on; e)/sti\nde\\ tau=ta stoichei=a t\u00f4=n pro\\s tou\\s o(/rous; peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n de\\\ntou/t\u00f4n o)liga/kis ai( ske/pseis gi/nontai toi=s dialegome/nois.]]\n\nWhen the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run\nover all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among\nthem respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be,\nthis is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be\npredicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an\naccident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence\nof the subject. Perhaps (_e.g._) white is affirmed in the thesis as\nbeing genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is\nnot of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.[152]\nExamine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already\ngiven of an Accident,--that which may or may not be predicated of the\nsubject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of\nthe ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes under\n_Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, the predicate ought also to\nbelong to _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_: the species and\nthe genus ought to come under the same Category.[153] If this be not\nthe case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.\n\n[Footnote 152: Ibid. b. 23-29.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. [Greek: katho/lou d'\nei)pei=n u(po\\ t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n diai/resin dei= to\\ ge/nos t\u00f4=| ei)/dei\nei)=nai.]\n\nAristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we\nturn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it\nnot to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b.\n15.]\n\nYou are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while\nthe genus never partakes of the species; to _partake_ meaning that\nthe species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the\ngenus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You\nwill examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this\ncondition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose,\n_e.g._, that it enunciates some superior genus as including _Ens_ or\n_Unum_. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake\nof _Ens_ and _Unum_; for _Ens_ and _Unum_ maybe predicated of all\nexistences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a\ngenus, cannot be a real genus.[154]\n\n[Footnote 154: Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.]\n\nPerhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species)\nmay be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly\naffirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis\nmay enunciate _Ens_ or _Scibile_ as being the genus of _Opinabile_.\nBut this last, the species or subject _Opinabile_, may be affirmed\nrespecting _Non-Ens_ also; while the predicates _Ens_ or _Scibile_\n(given as the pretended genus of _Opinabile_) cannot be affirmed\nrespecting _Non-Ens_. You can thus show that _Ens_ or _Scibile_ is\nnot the real genus of _Opinabile_.[155] The pretended species\n_Opinabile_ (comprising as it does both _Ens_ and _Non-Ens_)\nstretches farther than the pretended genus _Ens_ or _Scibile_:\nwhereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any\nportion of its constituent species.[156] The thesis may thus be\noverthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally\nfar or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.[157]\n\n[Footnote 155: Ibid. a. 20-26.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Ibid. b. 1-14. [Greek: stoichei=on de\\ pro\\s a(/panta\nta\\ toiau=ta, to\\ e)pi\\ ple/on to\\ ge/nos \u00ea)\\ to\\ ei)=dos kai\\ t\u00ea\\n\ndiaphora\\n le/gesthai; e)p' e)/latton ga\\r kai\\ \u00ea( diaphora\\ tou=\nge/nous le/getai.]]\n\n[Footnote 157: Ibid. b. 4.]\n\nIt is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two\ndistinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other,\nor unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher\ngenus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus,\nbesides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the\nthesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under\neither of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate\nenunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject.\nThus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to\nthe genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct\ngenus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular\ncase, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both\nbe referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and\ndisposition. Therefore the thesis, Justice is science, will not be\ntruly open to objection on this ground.[158]\n\n[Footnote 158: Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.]\n\nAgain, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the\nsubject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained\nmust also be predicated _in Quid_ (as the predicate itself is**)\nrespecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of\nparticular instances, no counter-instance being producible.[159] If\nthe thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will\nhave a good argument against it. You will also run over the\nsub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis,\nconsidered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of\nthe thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable\nessentially or _in Quid_ of all these sub-species. If you can find\nany one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially\npredicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the\nsubject;[160] the like also, if the definitions of those genera are\nnot predicable of the subject or its sub-species.[161]\n\n[Footnote 159: Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. [Greek: o(/ti de\\ e(no\\s e)n\nt\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti kat\u00eagoroume/nou pa/nta ta\\ loipa/, a)/nper\nkat\u00eagor\u00ea=tai, e)n t\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti kat\u00eagor\u00eath\u00ea/setai, di' e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s\nl\u00eapte/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 160: Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Ibid. b. 7-11. [Greek: ei) ou)=n diaph\u00f4nei=, d\u00ea=lon\no(/ti ou) ge/nos to\\ a)podothe/n.]]\n\nPerhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing\nmore than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either\nas a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may\nenunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part\nof the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a\ngenus, nor does it respond to the question _Quid est_, but to the\nquestion _Quale quid est_. It is always either **more\nextensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.[162] If none\nof the differenti\u00e6 belonging to a genus can be predicated of a\nspecies, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus,\nneither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly,\nneither can the genus (number) be predicated of the soul.[163] If the\nspecies be _prius natur\u00e2_, so that when it disappears the enunciated\ngenus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor,\nif the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear\nand yet the species does not disappear along with them.[164] If the\nspecies partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to\nthe enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the\nspecies includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in\nthat genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its\nessence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be\na species of number.[165]\n\n[Footnote 162: Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. [Greek: ou)de\\ dokei=\nmete/chein \u00ea( diaphora\\ tou= ge/nous; pa=n ga\\r to\\ mete/chon tou=\nge/nous \u00ea)\\ ei)=dos \u00ea)\\ a)/tomo/n e)stin. a)ei\\ ga\\r \u00ea( diaphora\\\ne)p' i)/s\u00eas \u00ea)\\ e)pi\\ plei=on tou= ei)/dous le/getai.--e)pi\\ ple/on\nte ga\\r to\\ ge/nos t\u00ea=s diaphora=s dei= le/gesthai, kai\\ m\u00ea\\\nmete/chein t\u00ea=s diaphora=s.]\n\nAs an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the\nspecies ([Greek: ei) to\\ ge/nos ei)s to\\ ei)=dos e)/th\u00eaken]),\nAristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\nkata\\ to/pon ki/n\u00easin], as [Greek: phora/n]. Now [Greek: phora\\] is\nless extensive in its meaning than [Greek: \u00ea( kata\\ to/pon ki/n\u00easis],\nwhich includes [Greek: ba/disis] and other terms of motion apart from\nor foreign to [Greek: phora/].--Example of enunciating differentia as\na genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs.\nImmortal is the differentia belonging to [Greek: z\u00f4=|on], and\nconstituting therewith the species god.--Example of enclosing the\ndifferentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number\n([Greek: o(/per a)rithmo/n]).--Example of enclosing differentia in\nthe species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god\n([Greek: o(/per theo/n]).--Example of enclosing the genus in the\ndifferentia is, number given as the essence of the odd.--Example of\nenunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is\ngiven as the differentia of [Greek: phora/].]\n\n[Footnote 163: Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Ibid. a. 14-19.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.]\n\nAgain, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in\nsignification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in\nthe First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the\nthesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be\ntaken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the\nproper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a\ngenus.[166] Note farther that every true genus has more than one\ndistinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other\nspecies, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as\nbelonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate\ncannot be the true genus of the subject.[167]\n\n[Footnote 166: Ibid. a. 27-37. [Greek: skopei=n de\\ kai\\ ei) to\\\nmetaphora=| lego/menon \u00f4(s ge/nos a)pode/d\u00f4ken, oi(=on t\u00ea\\n\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean sumph\u00f4ni/an; pa=n ga\\r ge/nos kuri/\u00f4s kata\\ t\u00f4=n ei)d\u00f4=n\nkat\u00eagorei=tai, \u00ea( de\\ sumph\u00f4ni/a kata\\ t\u00ea=s s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00eas ou) kuri/\u00f4s\na)lla\\ metaphora=|; pa=sa ga\\r sumph\u00f4ni/a e)n phtho/ggois.]]\n\n[Footnote 167: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.]\n\nSeveral _loci_ are furnished by Contraries, either to the species or\nthe genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing\ncontrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species\nought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but,\nif there be something contrary to the species, and also something\ncontrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species\nought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of\nthese doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular\ncases.[168] If that which is contrary to the species be a genus\nitself (_e.g._, _bonum_) and not included in any superior genus, then\nthe like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be\nincluded in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a\ntrue genus. _Bonum_ and _malum_ are not included in any common\nsuperior genus; each is a genus _per se_.[169] Or suppose that the\nsubject (species) of the thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the\nthesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an\nintermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This\nshows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species;\nfor, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of\nthe species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries\nof the genus; and _vice vers\u00e2_.[170] If there be an intermediate\nbetween the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate\nbetween the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether\nboth intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms.\nIf it be not so (if, _e.g._, the one intermediate is designated by a\npositive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have\nground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate\nenunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate,\nthis is a probable ([Greek: e)/ndoxon]) dialectical argument--to\ninsist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are\nsome particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.[171]\n\n[Footnote 168: Ibid. b. 1-8. [Greek: phanero\\n de\\ tou/t\u00f4n e(/kaston\ndia\\ t\u00ea=s e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s].]\n\n[Footnote 169: Ibid. b. 8-12.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Ibid. b. 17-23: [Greek: e)/nstasis tou/tou o(/ti\nu(giei/as kai\\ no/sou ou)de\\n metaxu/, kakou= de\\ kai\\ a)gathou=; \u00ea)\\\nei) e)/sti me/n ti a)mphoi=n a)na\\ me/son, kai\\ t\u00f4=n ei)d\u00f4=n kai\\\nt\u00f4=n gen\u00f4=n, m\u00ea\\ o(moi/\u00f4s de/, a)lla\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n kat' a)po/phasin,\nt\u00f4=n d' \u00f4(s u(pokei/menon. _e)/ndoxon ga\\r to\\ o(moi/\u00f4s a)mphoi=n_,\nkatha/per e)p' a)ret\u00ea=s kai\\ kaki/as, kai\\ dikaiosu/n\u00eas kai\\\na)diki/as; a)mphoi=n ga\\r kata\\ a)po/phasin ta\\ a)na\\ me/son.]]\n\nAgain, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the\ngenus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine\nwhether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the\nintermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same\ngenus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the\nintermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argument\n_probable_ (_i.e._, conformable to general presumption, and\nrecommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting\nexamples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the\nsame genus evil, but the moderate or measured ([Greek: to\\ me/trion])\nis not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.[172] We must remark,\nmoreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that,\nwherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a\ncontrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus,\nsickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but\nparticular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.)\nhave no contrary.[173]\n\n[Footnote 172: Ibid. b. 23-30.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Ibid. b. 30-37.]\n\nSuch will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be\nAffirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But\nif, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make\nout an affirmative against it, you have then three lines of procedure\nopen. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a\ncontrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the\ncontrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the\nthesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included\ntherein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the\nspecies and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then\nthat same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for,\nwherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between\nwhich it is intermediate. 3. Lastly, if the genus has a contrary as\nwell as the species, you may be able to show that the contrary of the\nspecies is included in the contrary of the genus; assuming which to\nbe the case, then the species itself will be included in the\ngenus.[174] These are the three modes of procedure, if your task is\nto make out the negative.\n\n[Footnote 174: Topic. IV. iii. p. 124, a. 1-9.]\n\nIf the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one, all the\nDerivatives and Collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable\nfor those of the subject. Thus, if justice be a sort of science,\njustly will be scientifically, and the just man will be a scientific\nman. This _locus_ is useful to be kept in mind, whether you have to\nmake out an affirmative or a negative.[175] You may reason in the\nsame way about the _Analoga_ of the predicate and the subject; about\nthe productive and destructive causes of each; the manifestations\npresent, past, and future, of each, &c.[176]\n\n[Footnote 175: Ibid. a. 10-14.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Ibid. iv. p. 124, a. 15-34.]\n\nWhen the opposite of the species (subject) is Privative, the thesis\nwill be open to attack in two ways. 1. If the privative opposite be\ncontained in the predicate, the subject itself will not be contained\ntherein; for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative\nopposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus:\nthus, if vision is sensible perception, blindness is not sensible\nperception. 2. If both the species and the genus have privative\nopposites, then if the privative opposite of the species be contained\nin the privative opposite of the genus, the species itself will also\nbe contained in the genus; if not, not. Thus, if blindness be an\ninability of sensible perception, vision will be a sensible\nperception. This last _locus_ will be available, whether you are\nmaking out an affirmative or a negative.[177]\n\n[Footnote 177: Ibid. a. 35-b. 6.]\n\nIf the predicate of the thesis be a true genus, you may convert the\nthesis simply, having substituted for the predicate the denial of its\nContradictory; if not, not. _Vice vers\u00e2_, if the new proposition so\nformed be true, the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus; if\nnot, not. Thus, if good be the true genus of pleasurable, nothing\nthat is not good will be pleasurable. This _locus_ also will serve\nboth for making out an affirmative and for making out a\nnegative.[178]\n\n[Footnote 178: Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 7-14: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\\\nt\u00f4=n a)popha/se\u00f4n skopei=n a)na/palin], &c.]\n\nIf the subject (species) of the thesis be a Relative, you will\nexamine whether the predicate (genus) be relative also; if not, it\nwill not be the true genus of the subject. The converse of this rule,\nhowever, will not hold; and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely\nuniversal.[179] You may also argue that, if the correlate of the\ngenus be not the same as the correlate of the species, the genus\ncannot be truly predicated of that species: thus, half is the\ncorrelate of double, but half is not the proper correlate of\nmultiple; therefore, multiple is not the true genus of double. But\nyour argument may here be met by contradictory instances; thus,\ncognition has reference to the _cognitum_, but _habitus_ and\n_dispositio_ (the genera to which _cognitio_ belongs) do not refer to\n_cognitum_ but to _anima_.[180] You may also examine whether the\ncorrelate, when applied to the genus, is put in the same case\n(_e.g._, genitive, dative, &c.) as when it is applied to the species:\nif it be put into a different case, this affords presumption that the\ngenus is not a true genus; though here again instances may be\nproduced showing that your presumption will not hold universally.\nFarther, you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly\ninflected reciprocate like the species and genus; if not, this will\nfurnish you with the same adverse presumption.[181]\n\n[Footnote 179: Ibid. b. 15-22.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Ibid. b. 23-34.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Ibid. b. 35, seq.]\n\nAgain, examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the\ncorrelate of the species; if it be not so, you may argue that the\ngenus is not truly predicated. Thus, if the thesis affirms that\n_perceptio_ is the genus of _cognitio_, it will follow that\n_percipibile_ is the genus of _cognoscibile_. Now this cannot be\nmaintained; for there are some _cognoscibilia_ which are not\nperceivable, _e.g._, some _cogitabilia_ (_intelligibilia_, [Greek:\nno\u00eata/]). Since therefore _percipibile_ is not the true genus of\n_cognoscibile_, neither can _perceptio_ be the true genus of\n_cognitio_.[182]\n\n[Footnote 182: Ibid. p. 125, a. 25-32: [Greek: o(ra=n de\\ kai\\ ei)\ntou= a)ntikeime/nou to\\ a)ntikei/menon ge/nos, oi(=on ei) tou=\ndiplasi/ou to\\ pollapla/sion kai\\ tou= \u00ea(mi/seos to\\ pollost\u00eamo/rion;\ndei= ga\\r to\\ a)ntikei/menon tou= a)ntikeime/nou ge/nos ei)=nai.]\n\nWe must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses\n[Greek: A)ntikei/mena]--_Opposita_, including as one of the four\nvarieties _Relata_ and _Correlata_ = _Relativ\u00e9-Opposita_ (to use a\ntechnical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (_supra_,\np. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relative _opposite_\nto its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to\ntreat _Relata_ as a species or mode of the genus _Opposita_. The\nreverse would be more correct: we ought to rank _Opposita_ or a\nspecies or mode under the genus _Relata_. Since Aristotle numbers\n_Relata_ among the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it\ncannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.]\n\nSuppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is--a continuance of\ncognition. This will be open to attack, if the predicate be affirmed\nas the genus (or even as the accident) of the subject. For every\ncontinuance must be _in_ that which continues. But memory is of\nnecessity _in_ the soul; it cannot therefore be _in_ cognition.[183]\nThere is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable, if it\ndefines memory to be--a habit or acquirement retentive of belief.\nThis will not hold, because it confounds habit or disposition with\nact; which last is the true description of memory. The opposite error\nwill be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be\na--movement through or by means of the body. Here perceptivity, which\nis a habit or disposition, is ranked under movement, which is the act\nexercising the same, _i.e._, perceptivity in actual exercise.[184]\nOr, the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition\nunder the power consequent on the possession thereof, as if this\npower were the superior genus: thus the respondent may define\ngentleness to be a continence of anger; courage, a continence of\nfears; justice, a continence of appetite of lucre. But the genus here\nassigned is not a good one: for a man who feels no anger is called\ngentle; a man who feels no fear is called courageous; whereas the\ncontinent man is he who feels anger or fear, but controls them. Such\ncontrolling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage,\ninsomuch that, if the gentle man happened to feel anger, or the\ncourageous man to feel fear, each would control these impulses; but\nit is no part of the essence thereof, and therefore cannot be the\ngenus under which they fall.[185] A like mistake is made if pain be\npredicated as the genus of anger, or supposition as the genus of\nbelief. The angry man doubtless feels pain, but his pain precedes his\nanger in time, and is the antecedent cause thereof; now the genus can\nnever precede its species in time. So also a man may have the same\nsupposition sometimes with belief, sometimes without it; accordingly,\nsupposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same\nanimal can be sometimes a man, sometimes a brute.[186] And indeed the\nsame negative conclusion would follow, even if we granted that every\nsupposition was always attended with belief. For, in that case,\nsupposition and belief would be co-extensive terms; but the generic\nterm must always be more extensive than its specific.[187]\n\n[Footnote 183: Topic. IV. iv. p. 125, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on ei) t\u00ea\\n\nmn\u00ea/m\u00ean _mon\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas_ ei)=pen. pa=sa ga\\r mon\u00ea\\ e)n t\u00f4=|\nme/nonti kai\\ peri\\ e)kei=no, \u00f4(/ste kai\\ \u00ea( t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas mon\u00ea\\\ne)n t\u00ea=| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea|. \u00ea( mn\u00ea/m\u00ea a)/ra e)n t\u00ea=| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea|, e)peid\u00ea\\\nmon\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas e)sti/n. tou=to d' ou)k e)nde/chetai; mn\u00ea/m\u00ea\nga\\r pa=sa e)n psuch\u00ea=|.] A definition similar to this is found in\nthe Kratylus of Plato, p. 437, B.: [Greek: e)/peita de\\ \u00ea( mn\u00ea/m\u00ea\npanti/ pou m\u00eanu/ei o(/ti mon\u00ea/ e)stin e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|, a)ll' ou)\nphora/.]]\n\n[Footnote 184: Ibid. v. p. 125, b. 15-19. [Greek: oi(=on t\u00ea\\n\nai)/sth\u00easin _ki/n\u00easin dia\\ s\u00f4/matos_; \u00ea( me\\n ga\\r ai)/sth\u00easis\ne(/xis, \u00ea( de\\ ki/n\u00easis e)ne/rgeia.] This, too, seems to allude to\nPlato's explanation of [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis] in the Tim\u00e6us, pp. 43, C,\n64, B; compare also the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, p.\n414, C.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 20-27.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Waitz, in his notes (p. 478), says that Aristotle is\nhere in the wrong. But I do not agree with Waitz. Aristotle considers\n[Greek: pi/stis] to be an accidental accompaniment of [Greek:\nu(po/l\u00eapsis], not a species thereof. It may be present or absent\nwithout determining any new specific name to [Greek: u(po/l\u00eapsis],\nwhich term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part\nof the mental supposition. At least there seems to be nothing\ncontradictory or erroneous in what Aristotle here says, though he\ndoes not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of [Greek:\nu(po/l\u00eapsis]]\n\n[Footnote 187: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 28-p. 126, a. 2.]\n\nYou will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a\nnature to inhere in the same substance as the subject. If it be not,\nit cannot be truly predicated thereof, either as genus or even as\naccident. White (species) and colour (genus) are of a nature to\ninhere or belong to the same substance. But, if the thesis declares\nthat shame is a species of fear, or that anger is a species of pain,\nyou may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning\nelement in man, fear to the courageous or energetic element; and that\npain belongs to the appetitive element, anger to the courageous. This\nproves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame;\nthat pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger.[188]\n\n[Footnote 188: Ibid. p. 126, a. 3-16. Compare V. iv. p. 133, a. 31.\nAristotle appears here to recognize the Platonic doctrine as laid\ndown in the Republic and Tim\u00e6us, asserting either three distinct\nparts of the soul, or, rather, three distinct souls. In the treatise\nDe Anim\u00e2 (III. ix. p. 432, a. 25; I. v. p. 411, b. 25), he dissents\nfrom and impugns this same doctrine.]\n\nSuppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genus\n_visibile_ or _percepibile_. You may oppose it by pointing out that\nanimal is only _visibile secundum quid_, or partially; that is, only\nso far as regards body, not as regards mind. But the species always\npartakes of its genus wholly, not partially or _secundum quid_; thus,\nman is not partially animal, but wholly or essentially animal. If\nwhat is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken, it\ncannot be a true genus; hence neither _visibile_ nor _percepibile_ is\na true genus of animal.[189]\n\n[Footnote 189: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 17-25.]\n\nSometimes what is predicated as the genus is, when compared to its\nspecies, only as a part to the whole; which is never the case with a\ntrue genus. Some refer animal to the genus living body; but body is\nonly part of the whole animal, and therefore cannot be the true genus\nthereof.[190] Sometimes a species which is blameworthy and hateful,\nor a species which is praiseworthy and eligible, may be referred to\nthe power or capacity from which it springs, as genus; thus, the\nthief, a blameworthy and hateful character, may be referred to the\npredicate--capable of stealing another man's property. But this,\nthough true as a predicate, is not the true genus; for the honest man\nis also capable of so acting, but he is distinguished from the thief\nby not acting so, nor having the disposition so to act. All power and\ncapacity is eligible; if the above were the true genus of thief, it\nwould be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and\nhateful. Neither, on the other hand, can any thing in its own nature\npraiseworthy and eligible, be referred to power and capacity as its\ngenus; for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in\nitself or its own nature, but by reason of something else, namely,\nits realizable consequences.[191]\n\n[Footnote 190: Ibid. a. 26-29.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: [Greek: o(ra=n de\\\nkai\\ ei)/ ti t\u00f4=n psekt\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\ pheut\u00f4=n ei)s du/namin \u00ea)\\ to\\\ndunato\\n e)/th\u00eaken, oi(=on to\\n sophist\u00ea\\n \u00ea)\\ dia/bolon \u00ea)\\ kle/pt\u00ean\nto\\n duna/menon la/thra ta\\ a)llo/tria kle/ptein.]\n\nThe general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking\nthe thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice\nhere the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons\ncalled Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of\n[Greek: psekta\\] and [Greek: pheukta\\] along with thieves. The\nmajority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have\nagreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled\nAristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.]\n\nAgain, you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting\nunder one genus a species which properly comes under two genera\nconjointly, not subalternate one to the other; sometimes, the mistake\nof predicating the genus as a differentia, or the differentia as a\ngenus.[192] Sometimes, also, the subject in which the attribute or\naffection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such\naffection; or, _\u00e8 converso_, the attribute or affection is predicated\nas the genus of the subject wherein it resides; _e.g._, when breath\nor wind, which is really a movement of air, is affirmed to be air put\nin motion, and thus constituted as a species under the genus air; or\nwhen snow is declared to be water congelated; or mud, to be earth\nmixed with moisture.[193] In none of these cases is the predicate a\ntrue genus; for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject.\n\n[Footnote 192: Ibid. b. 7-33.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Ibid. b. 34-p. 127, a. 19.]\n\nOr perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all;\nfor nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under\nit; _e.g._, if the thesis declare white to be a genus, this may be\nimpugned, because white objects do not differ _in specie_ from each\nother. Or a mere universal predicate (such as _Ens_ or _Unum_) may be\nput forward as a genus or differentia; or a simple concomitant\nattribute, or an equivocal term, may be so put forward.[194]\n\n[Footnote 194: Topic. IV. vi. p. 127, a. 20-b. 7.]\n\nPerhaps it may happen that the subject (species) and the predicate\n(genus) of the thesis may each have a contrary term; and that in each\npair of contrary terms one may be better, the other worse. If, in\nthat case, the better species be referred to the worse genus, or\n_vice vers\u00e2_, this will render the thesis assailable. Or perhaps the\nspecies may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary\ngenera; in which case, if the thesis should refer it to the worse of\nthe two, that will be a ground of objection. Thus, if the soul be\nreferred to the genus _mobile_, you are at liberty to object that it\nis equally referable to the genus _stabile_: and that, as the latter\nis the better of the two, it ought to be referred to the better in\npreference to the worse.[195]\n\n[Footnote 195: Ibid. b. 8-17.]\n\nThere is a _locus_ of More and Less, which may be made available in\nvarious ways. Thus, if the genus predicated admits of being graduated\nas more or less, while the species of which it is predicated does not\nadmit of such graduation, you may question the applicability of the\ngenus to the species.[196] You may raise the question also, if there\nbe any thing else which looks equally like the true genus, or more\nlike it than the genus predicated by the thesis. This will happen\noften, when the essence of the species includes several distinct\nelements; _e.g._, in the essence of anger, there is included both\npain (an emotional element), and the supposition or belief of being\nundervalued (an intellectual element); hence, if the thesis ranks\nanger under the genus pain, you may object that it equally belongs to\nthe genus supposition[197] This _locus_ is useful for raising a\nnegative question, but will serve little for establishing an\naffirmative. Towards the affirmative, you will find advantage in\nexamining the subject (species) respecting which the thesis\npredicates a given genus; for, if it can be shown that this supposed\nspecies is no real species but a genus, the genus predicated thereof\nwill be _\u00e0 fortiori_ a genus.[198]\n\n[Footnote 196: Ibid. b. 18-25: [Greek: e)/ti e)k tou= ma=llon kai\\\n\u00ea(=tton, a)naskeua/zonti me/n, ei) to\\ ge/nos de/chetai to\\ ma=llon,\nto\\ d' ei)=dos m\u00ea\\ de/chetai m\u00ea/t' au)to\\ m\u00ea/te to\\ kat' e)kei=no\nlego/menon.]]\n\n[Footnote 197: Ibid. b. 26-37: [Greek: chr\u00ea/simos d' o( to/pos e)pi\\\nt\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n ma/lista e)ph' \u00f4(=n plei/\u00f4 phai/netai tou= ei)/dous\ne)n t\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti kat\u00eagorou/mena, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ di\u00f4/ristai, m\u00ea/d'\ne)/chomen ei)pei=n poi=on au)t\u00f4=n ge/nos,] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Ibid. b. 38-p. 128, a. 12.]\n\nSome think (says Aristotle)[199] that Differentia as well as Genus is\npredicated essentially respecting the Species. Accordingly, Genus\nmust be discriminated from Differentia. For such discrimination the\nfollowing characteristics are pointed out:--1. Genus has greater\nextent in predication than Differentia. 2. In replying to the\nenquiry, _Quid est?_ it is more suitable and significant to declare\nthe Genus than the Differentia. 3. Differentia declares a quality of\nGenus, and therefore presupposes Genus as already known; but Genus\ndoes not in like manner presuppose Differentia. If you wish to show\nthat belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine\nwhether the _cognoscens_ believes _qu\u00e2 cognoscens_. If he does so,\nyour point is made out.[200]\n\n[Footnote 199: Ibid. a. 20, seq.: [Greek: e)pei\\ de\\ dokei= tisi\\\nkai\\ \u00ea( diaphora\\ e)n t\u00f4=| ti/ e)sti t\u00f4=n ei)d\u00f4=n kat\u00eagorei=sthai,\nch\u00f4riste/on to\\ ge/nos a)po\\ t\u00ea=s diaphora=s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Topic. IV. vi. p. 128, a. 35. If you are trying to\nshow [Greek: t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean o(/per pi/stin], you must examine\n[Greek: ei) o( e)pista/menos \u00ea(=| e)pi/statai pisteu/ei; d\u00ea=lon ga\\r\no(/ti \u00ea( e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea pi/stis a)/n tis ei)/\u00ea.]]\n\nWherever a predicate is universally true of its subject, while the\nproposition is not true if simply converted (_i.e._, wherever the\npredicate is of larger extension than the subject), there is\ndifficulty in distinguishing it from a genus. Accordingly, when you\nare respondent, maintaining the affirmative side, you will use such\npredicate as if it were a genus; but, when you are assailant, you\nwill not allow the respondent to do so. You may quote against him the\ninstance of _Non-Ens_; which is predicable of every thing generated,\nbut which is not a genus, since it has no species under it.[201]\n\n[Footnote 201: Ibid. a. 38-b. 9.]\n\n\nV.\n\nAristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates\nin which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the\nsubject.\n\nA Proprium may belong to its subject either _per se_ and _semper_, or\nrelatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a\nproprium _per se_ of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a\nrelative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise\ncommand; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a\nproprium _semper_ of a god, to be immortal; it is an occasional\n_proprium_ (_i.e._, sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in\nthe market-place.[202] When the proprium is set out relatively to\nsomething else, the debate must involve two questions, and may\ninvolve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of\nman relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by\nnature two-footed, you may (as opponent) either deny that man is\ntwo-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther\nand affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is\nby nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these\nfour, you will have refuted the thesis.[203]\n\n[Footnote 202: Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle\ncalls Proprium _per se_ is a proprium of the subject as much\n_relative_ as what he calls specially the _relative_ Proprium. The\nProprium _per se_ discriminates the subject from everything else; the\n_relative_ Proprium discriminates it from some given correlate.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.]\n\nThe Proprium _per se_ discriminates its subject from everything else,\nand is universally true thereof; the _relative_ Proprium\ndiscriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject.\nThe relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or\ntrue with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of\nthings: it may be tested through those _Loci_ which have been\nenumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Proprium _per se_, and\nthe _constant_ Proprium, have certain _Loci_ of their own, which we\nshall now indicate. These are the most logical (_sensu Aristotelico_)\nor suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for\ndebates.[204]\n\n[Footnote 204: Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. [Greek: t\u00f4=n d' i)di/\u00f4n\ne)sti\\ _lo/gika\\_ ma/lista;] &c. He explains presently what he means\nby [Greek: logika/--logiko\\n de\\ tou=t' e)sti\\ pro/bl\u00eama, pro\\s o(\\\nlo/goi ge/noit' a)\\n kai\\ suchnoi\\ kai\\ kaloi/]. The distinctions in\nthis paragraph are not very sharply drawn.]\n\nAristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium\nis a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the\nthesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no\nproprium at all.\n\nTo set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be\nclearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated,\nsince the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate\nknowledge.[205] If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn\nthe thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis\ndeclare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most\nlike to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of\nthe soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the\nfact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better\nknown even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A\nbelongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of\nB.[206] Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is\nthe first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul\nto be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the\nhearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he\ndoes not know that fire is the _first_ subject in which soul is\nfound. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he\ncan show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two\nabove-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have\nsensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium\nis both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the\ngiven subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this\ncondition is concerned.[207]\n\n[Footnote 205: Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: [Greek: gn\u00f4/se\u00f4s ga\\r e(/neka to\\\ni)/dion poiou/metha; dia\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4te/ron ou)=n a)podote/on; ou(/t\u00f4\nga\\r e)/stai katanoei=n i(kan\u00f4=s ma=llon.]\n\n\nHe repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130,\na. 4: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r i)/dion tou= mathei=n cha/rin a)podi/dotai];\nand, again, p. 131, a. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Ibid. b. 15: [Greek: o( m\u00ea\\ ga\\r ei)d\u00f4\\s ei) t\u00f4=|d'\nu(pa/rchei, ou)d' ei) t\u00f4=|d' u(pa/rchei mo/n\u00f4| gn\u00f4riei=.]]\n\n[Footnote 207: Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.]\n\nA second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall\ncontain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical\nproposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the\nproprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to\nhave sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception\nactually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing\nfrom one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will\nmake good his defence, if he shows that there is no such\nequivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of\nfire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where\nthere is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.[208]\nSometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium\nitself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where\nthis last is not _unum et simplex_ but equivocal, the thesis must\nspecify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be\nneglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.[209]\n\n[Footnote 208: Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.]\n\nAnother form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated\nboth in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both\nas to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of\nobscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.[210] The repetition may\nbe made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring\ntwice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it\ncannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct\nrepetition is, Fire is a _body_ the rarest among _bodies_ (for\nproprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is a\n_substance_ which tends most of all _bodies_ downwards to the lowest\nregion (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required\nto define _bodies_, he must define them--such and such\n_substances_.[211] An example free from objection on this ground is,\nMan is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).\n\n[Footnote 210: Ibid. a. 30-34. [Greek: tara/ttei ga\\r to\\n a)kou/onta\npleona/kis lechthe/n--kai\\ pro\\s tou/tois a)doleschei=n dokou=sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 211: Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. [Greek: e(/n ga\\r kai\\ tau)to/n\ne)sti s\u00f4=ma kai\\ ou)si/a toiadi/; e)/stai **ga\\r ou(=tos to\\\n_ou)si/a_ pleona/kis ei)r\u00eak\u00f4/s.]]\n\nAnother mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term\npredicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to\nall other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes\nno means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas\ndiscrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of\nthe Definition.[212] Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares\nseveral propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing\nthat they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his\ndefinition any words beyond what are required for declaring the\nessence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a\nproprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the\nproprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that\nit is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of\none. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection\njust pointed out--Moist is that which may assume every variety of\nfigure.[213]\n\n[Footnote 212: Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: [Greek: a)chrei=on\n**ga\\r e)/stai to\\ m\u00ea\\ ch\u00f4ri/zon a)po/ tin\u00f4n, **to\\ d' e)n\ntoi=s i)di/ois lego/menon ch\u00f4ri/zein dei=, katha/per kai\\ ta\\ e)n\ntoi=s o(/rois.]]\n\n[Footnote 213: Ibid. b. 23-37.]\n\nA farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium\nincludes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under\nthe subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal,\nthat animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already\nseen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but\nman is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than\nanimal, because it is a species under the genus animal.[214]\n\n[Footnote 214: Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.]\n\nAgain, our canon--That the Proprium should be better known than its\nsubject, or should make the subject better known--will be violated in\nanother way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the\nsubject, or in any other way _simul natur\u00e2_ as compared with the\nsubject; and still more, if it be _posterius natur\u00e2_ as compared with\nthe subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that\ngood is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be\nwell or correctly set out.[215]\n\n[Footnote 215: Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. This _locus_ is not clear or\nsatisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23,\nBr.). He says that it may pass as an [Greek: e)/ndoxon]--something\nsufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact,\nAlexander virtually controverts this _locus_ in what he says a little\nfarther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is always\n_simul natur\u00e2_ with its subject.]\n\nPerhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not\nconstantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent\ntherefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may\nomit to specify the qualifying epithet _occasional_. In either case\nthe proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for\ncensure, which ought always to be avoided.[216]\n\n[Footnote 216: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. [Greek: ou)k\ne)/stai kal\u00f4=s kei/menon to\\ i)/dion--ou)/koun dote/on e)sti\\n\ne)pitim\u00ea/se\u00f4s sk\u00ea=psin.]]\n\nMoreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as\ndoes not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the\nevidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject\nis out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the\nsupposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the\nthesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the\nbrightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is\nso borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible\nperception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see\nit, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a\nproprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one\nwhich is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by\nnecessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies,\nthat superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives\ncolour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it\nmust always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the\nadditional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable\nbody.[217]\n\n[Footnote 217: Ibid. b. 19-36. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\\ o( the/menos\ne)piphanei/as i)/dion o(\\ pr\u00f4=ton ke/chr\u00f4stai, ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=| me/n tini\n_proske/chr\u00eatai_ t\u00f4=| kechr\u00f4=sthai, _toiou/t\u00f4| d' o(\\ phanero/n\ne)stin u(pa/rchon a)ei/_, ei)/\u00ea a)\\n kata\\ tou=to kal\u00f4=s\na)podedome/non to\\ t\u00ea=s e)piphanei/as i)/dion.]\n\nAristotle means that we know clearly, _by evidence independent of\nsense_, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body\nthat becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence\nof our senses ([Greek: _proske/chr\u00eatai_]) to the same fact.]\n\nPerhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a\nProprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is\nnot well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man,\nthat man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as\nproprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in\nthe proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to\nreciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not\nto affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set\nout is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the\npredicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the\nessence of the subject.[218]\n\n[Footnote 218: Ibid. b. 37-p. 132, a. 9.]\n\nLastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare\nthe essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the\ngeneric portion of the essence, and to attach itself thereunto as a\nconstant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to\nenunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will\nnot be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached\nto the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis\nenunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring\ncognition,--this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the\npresent objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first\nthe generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the\npeculiar adjunct thereupon.[219]\n\n[Footnote 219: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 10-21.]\n\nThus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended\nto in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described,\nwithout determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may\nperhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a\nbetter description which would show it to be a proprium of the\nsubject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the\nassailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds\nto a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining\nwhether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect\nto the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the\ndescription of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds\nabove enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection,\ndisproving its title to the character of Proprium?[220]\n\n[Footnote 220: Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. [Greek: po/teron me\\n ou)=n\nkal\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\ ou) kal\u00f4=s a)pode/dotai to\\ i)/dion, dia\\ t\u00f4=nde\nskepte/on; po/teron d' _i)/dio/n e)stin_ o(/l\u00f4s to\\ ei)r\u00eame/non \u00ea)\\\nou)k i)/dion, e)k t\u00f4=nde the\u00f4r\u00eate/on.]\n\nThe distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two\nquestions:--(1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or\nclearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at\nall?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out,\nwith strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and\nbecome confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.)\nthat the three or four last-mentioned _loci_ under the first head\nembrace the second head also. He allows only three _loci_ as belonging\npeculiarly to the first head--[Greek: tou= m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s a)podedo/sthai\nto\\ i)/dion]:--(1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating\nor co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than\nsubject. The other _loci_ (besides these three) enumerated by\nAristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging\nequally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a\ndistinction between the two heads: [Greek: ou) ga\\r pa=n to\\\na)p\u00eallotri\u00f4me/non tou/t\u00f4n, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/chon o(m\u00f4nu/mous ph\u00f4na\\s \u00ea)/\nti t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n, kai\\ i)/dion r(\u00eate/on e)x a)na/gk\u00eas.] The manner\nin which M. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is\nnot clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).]\n\n1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will\nexamine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if\nit can so be, whether it is truly predicable of B _qu\u00e2_ B, or of\nevery thing that comes under B _qu\u00e2_ B. Thus, if he contends that not\nto be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be\nable to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians\nare deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms. Or, should\nthe respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in\nrefuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B\nand _qu\u00e2_ B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of\nacquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of\nevery man _qu\u00e2_ man.[221]\n\n[Footnote 221: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 27, seq.]\n\n2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B:\nyou will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing\ncalled B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called\nA; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation,\nA god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation;\nbut it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be\nparticipant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the\nproprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be\nable to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the\nnegation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish\nthe affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting\nwhich A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, and _vice\nvers\u00e2_. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.[222]\n\n[Footnote 222: Ibid. b. 8-18.]\n\n3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a\nproprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by\nshowing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of\nseveral things differing from each other in species. On the other\nhand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the\nsubject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is\ntruly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any\nthing else.[223]\n\n[Footnote 223: Ibid. b. 19-34. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 285, a.\n14, Br.) has stated this _locus_ more clearly than Aristotle--[Greek:\nto\\ ga\\r i)/dion u(pa/rchein dei= e)n e(te/r\u00f4|, ou)ch e(/teron e)n\nau)t\u00f4=|.]]\n\n4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something\ncontained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him\nby showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a\nproprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not\ncontained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless\npredicable co-extensively therewith.[224]\n\n[Footnote 224: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, b. 35-p. 133, a. 11.]\n\n5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a\nnecessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or\nfollow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a\nproprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary\nconcomitant of the subject, without being included either in its\ndefinition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for\nrefuting him.[225]\n\n[Footnote 225: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, a. 12-23.]\n\n6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has\nalready denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may\ndeny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name.\nYou will have grounds for refuting him.[226]\n\n[Footnote 226: Ibid. a. 24-32.]\n\n7. If there be two subjects (_e.g._, man and horse) the same with\neach other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of\nthem a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of\nthe other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand\nstill spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of\nman to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in\nspecies, and belonging both to man and to horse _quatenus_\nanimal.[227] If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he\ndenies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other\nhand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while\nhe affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make\ngood the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of\nthat which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a\nwalking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped.\nThe two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in\nspecies with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the\nsame genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are\ndifferenti\u00e6, under the same genus animal. This _locus_, however, is\nnot universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may\nnot be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to\nother subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one\nvariety--man; but walking-quadruped designates several--horse, ass,\ndog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.[228]\n\n[Footnote 227: Ibid. a. 35-b. 5. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\\ tau)to/n e)sti\nt\u00f4=| ei)/dei a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\ i(/ppos, ou)k a)ei\\ de\\ tou= i(/ppou\ne)sti\\n i)/dion to\\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ou)k a)n ei)/\u00ea tou=\na)nthr\u00f4/pou i)/dion to\\ kinei=sthai u(ph' au(tou=; tau)to\\n ga/r\ne)sti t\u00f4=| ei)/dei to\\ kinei=sthai kai\\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, \u00ea(=|\nz\u00f4/|\u00f4| e)sti\\n e(kate/r\u00f4| au)t\u00f4=n to\\ sumbeb\u00eake/nai.] The last words\nare very obscure: they are explained by Waitz (p. 486)--\"[Greek: \u00ea(=|\nto\\ sumbeb\u00eake/nai e(ka/teron (to\\ kinei=sthai kai\\ e(sta/nai u(ph'\nau(tou=] intell.) [Greek: e(kate/r\u00f4| au)t\u00f4=n e)sti\\ sumbeb\u00eake/nai\n\u00ea(=| z\u00f4/|\u00f4|], quatenus utrumque de utroque, quatenus animal est,\npr\u00e6dicatur.\"]\n\n[Footnote 228: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 5-14. Alexander declares this\n_locus_ to be obscure. He comments, not without reason, on the loose\nmanner in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek: ei)=dos]; and he\nobserves that Aristotle himself admits the _locus_ to be [Greek:\nkata/ ti pseud\u00ea/s] (Schol. p. 285, a. 40-45, Br.). It is strange to\nread that man and horse, man and bird, are [Greek: tau)to\\n ei)/dei],\nthe same in _species_.]\n\n8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, when the\nrespondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails\nhimself of the equivocal application of _Idem_ and _Diversum_:\ncontending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different\nsubject--_e.g._, _homo albus_, a subject different from _homo_ (so\nthat, when a proprium has been shown to belong to _homo_, it has not\nbeen shown that the same proprium belongs to _homo albus_); and that\nthe Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete--_e.g._\ncognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as\nproprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing\nman). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving\nto you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will\nmeet him by saying that _homo_ is not a subject absolutely different\nand distinct from _homo albus_, but that there is only a notional\ndistinction, the same subject having here two names each with a\ndistinct connotation: _homo_ has its own connotation; _homo albus_\nhas also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each\nof the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a\nproprium of _scientia_ cannot be predicated also as a proprium of\n_homo sciens_, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with\na slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ\nsophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a\nsophistical way.[229]\n\n[Footnote 229: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. [Greek:\npro\\s ga\\r to\\n pa/nt\u00f4s e)nista/menon, pa/nt\u00f4s a)ntitakte/on\ne)sti/n]. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat\nthis objection as sophistical (_i.e._ as unfair Dialectic). He is\nhere considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication\nas Accident. What is true as an accident respecting _homo albus_,\nwill also be true as an accident respecting _homo_: but what is true\nas a proprium respecting _homo albus_, will not be true as a proprium\nrespecting _homo_--nor _vice vers\u00e2_. This is a good _locus_ for\nobjections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction\nbetween _homo_ and _homo albus_; between Koriskus and Koriskus\n_albus_: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by\npointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium\nof the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction\nas Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does\nnot clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of\nspeech which _his_ classification and theory demand, this distinction\nmust undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.]\n\n9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something\nwhich by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of\nstating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject.\nThus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man.\nUnder this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is\nwrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other\nhand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying\nupon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual,\nyou will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct\nphraseology of belonging to man by nature.[230]\n\n[Footnote 230: Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. This _locus_ is a\nquestion rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore\nrather to belong to the former class of _Loci_ respecting the\nProprium--[Greek: po/teron kal\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\ ou) kal\u00f4=s a)pode/dotai to\\\ni)/dion]--than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv.\np. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question [Greek: po/teron i)/dio/n\ne)stin o(/l\u00f4s to\\ **ei)r\u00eame/non \u00ea)\\ ou)k i)/dion].]\n\n10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject\neither primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way--relatively\nto some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is\ndifficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly\nunobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what is _first_\ncoloured: when we speak of _corpus album_, this is by reason of its\nwhite superficies. _Album_ is a proprium true both of body and of\nsuperficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not\nhold here--that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject\ncan be affirmed also. _Album_ is proprium of superficies; and _album_\ncan be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies\ncannot be truly affirmed of body.[231]\n\n[Footnote 231: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure\nand difficult _locus_. I am not sure that I understand it.]\n\n11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by\nnot clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what\nprecise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different\nmodes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm\nit:--[232]\n\n_a._ As belonging to the subject by nature. _E.g._, Biped is by\nnature a proprium of man.\n\n_b._ As belonging to the subject simply--in some way or other.\n_E.g._, To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other\nindividual man.\n\n_c._ As belonging to the _species_. _E.g._, It belongs to fire to be\nthe most subtle of all bodies.\n\n_d._ As belonging absolutely ([Greek: a(pl\u00f4=s, katha/per z\u00f4/|ou to\\\nz\u00ea=n])--in virtue of the essence of the subject--_per se_.[233]\n\n_e._ As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary\nintervening aspect or attribute thereof. _E.g._, Prudence is a\nproprium of the soul, looked at _quatenus_ reasonable or\nintellectual.\n\n_f._ As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect,\nlogically distinguished and named separately from the subject.\n_E.g._, Prudence is a proprium of the _logistikon_ or _rationale_.\n\n_g._ As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in\npossession. _E.g._, The scientific man possesses that acquired mental\nhabit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther\naltered by discussion.\n\n_h._ As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person.\n_E.g._, Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a\npossession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the\nproprium, unalterable by discussion.\n\n_i._ As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in\nparticipation by another subject lying behind. _E.g._, Sensible\nperception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken\nor held in participation by this individual man, that individual\nhorse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also\nof man, as thus participant.\n\n_k._ As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking. _E.g._, To live\nis a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the\ngenus animal, in the way just indicated.\n\n[Footnote 232: Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: [Greek: sumbai/nei d' e)n e)ni/ois\nt\u00f4=n i)di/\u00f4n \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu\\ gi/nesthai/ tina a(marti/an para\\\nto\\ m\u00ea\\ diori/zesthai p\u00f4=s kai\\ ti/n\u00f4n ti/th\u00easi to\\ i)/dion.\na(/pantes ga\\r e)picheirou=sin a)podido/nai to\\ i)/dion \u00ea)\\ to\\\nphu/sei u(pa/rchon], &c.\n\nHe then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I\nhave given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.\n\nI cannot but repeat the remark here (which I made _supra_ p. 318),\nthat the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former\ninvestigation (_viz._, How ought the Proprium to be set out and\ndescribed?) rather than to the present investigation (_viz._, Whether\nthe alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or\nnot?).]\n\n[Footnote 233: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ a(pl\u00f4=s,\nkatha/per z\u00f4/|ou to\\ z\u00ea=n.] Is not [Greek: to\\ z\u00ea=n] included in the\n_essentia_ ([Greek: to\\ ti\\ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai]) of [Greek: z\u00f4=|on]? If so,\nhow can it be admitted as a _proprium_ thereof?]\n\nNow each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode\nof erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding\nerrors will be:--[234]\n\n_a._ Not to add the qualifying words _by nature_.\n\n_b._ Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only\nbelong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.\n\n_c._ Not to state the proprium as belonging _to the species_. If he\nomits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety\nalone among the species (_e.g._, should it be a superlative) and not\nto others: perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously, and to others\nfaintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words--_to the\nspecies_, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species\nproperly so called.\n\n_e._ _f._ Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by\nreason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the\nobjection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he\ndeclares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.\n\n_g._ _h._ Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person\npossessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the\nobjector may attack him on one ground or the other.\n\n_i._ _k._ Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the\npartaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will\nhave ground for attack either from one side or from the other.\n\n[Footnote 234: Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth\nhead (_d._), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted\nthat the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of\nthe last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.]\n\nIn case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of\nthe above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections\nagainst him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium,\nyou will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by\ndiscriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm\nit.[235]\n\n[Footnote 235: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: [Greek: a)/llou me\\n ou)=n\nou(/t\u00f4s a)podido/ntos to\\ i)/dion e)picheir\u00eate/on, au)t\u00f4=| d' ou)\ndote/on e)sti\\ tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n e)/nstasin, a)ll' eu)thu\\s tithe/menon\nto\\ i)/dion dioriste/on o(\\n tro/pon ti/th\u00easi to\\ i)/dion.]]\n\n12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate\nreally identical with the subject, though under a different name.\nThus, he may declare to [Greek: to\\ pre/pon] to be a proprium [Greek:\ntou= kalou=]: you may then refute him by showing that [Greek:\npre/pon] is identical with [Greek: kalo/n]. If he is on the negative\nside, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is\nidentical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by\nshowing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and\nreciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance\nis not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.[236]\n\n[Footnote 236: Ibid. a. 11-19.]\n\n13. Where the subject is _homoeomeric_, the respondent may declare as\nproprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a\npart separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately\nwhat cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either\ncase, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your\nrefutation will not be always conclusive, because there are various\ncases in which what is true of each homoeomeric part is not true of\nthe whole; and _vice vers\u00e2_. If your position in the debate is\naffirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what\nis by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part:\n_e.g._, The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature\ndownwards. This is a proprium of the earth.[237]\n\n[Footnote 237: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.]\n\n14. Respecting _Opposita_, there are different _loci_ for different\nvarieties.\n\n_a._ _Contraria_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of\nB: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the\ncontrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus,\nif best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium\nof injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may\nprove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the\nalleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged\nsubject.[238]\n\n[Footnote 238: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.]\n\n_b._ _Relata_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm a _relatum_ A as\nproprium of a _relatum_ B, you may refute him by showing that the\ncorrelate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to\ndeny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between\ncorrelate and correlate.[239]\n\n[Footnote 239: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.]\n\n_c._ _Habitus et Privatio_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm an\nattribute of the _habitus_ B, as proprium thereof: you may refute him\nby showing that the corresponding attribute of the _privatio_\ncorrelating with _habitus_ B, is not proprium of that _privatio_.\nSuppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving\nthe affirmative of this latter proposition.[240]\n\n[Footnote 240: Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.]\n\n15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation\nof the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever\nthe affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot\nalso be a proprium thereof; and _vice vers\u00e2_. If the affirmative\npredicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can\nthe negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; and _vice\nvers\u00e2_. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative\nsubject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative\nsubject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the\naffirmative subject and of the negative subject.[241]\n\n[Footnote 241: Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. This _locus_ is declared by\nAristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for\nproof.]\n\n16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under the same genus\nand exhausting the whole genus:--Suppose A and B contra-specific\nterms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as\npredicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium\nof B; thus, if perceivable ([Greek: ai)sth\u00eato/n]) is not a proprium\nof any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal,\nneither will intelligible ([Greek: no\u00eato/n]) be proprium of a god.\nAgain, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus,\nif it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the\nexcellence of the rational or calculating soul ([Greek:\nlogistikou=]), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it\nis the excellence of the appetitive soul ([Greek:\ne)pithum\u00eatikou=]).[242]\n\n[Footnote 242: Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. \"Il faut supposer ici\nquatre termes, qui sont deux \u00e0 deux les membres d'une division: si le\npremier n'est pas le propre du troisi\u00e8me, le second ne le sera pas du\nquatri\u00e8me; et r\u00e9ciproquement pour la n\u00e9gation d'abord. Les quatre\ntermes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d'une m\u00eame division:\nmortel, divinit\u00e9, membres d'une autre division.\" (Barth\u00e9lemy St.\nHilaire, p. 197.)]\n\n17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the\npredicate A:--If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a\nproprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject,\nneither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or\ninflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case\nor inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be\nproprium of the subject. _Pulchr\u00e9_ is not proprium of _just\u00e9_;\ntherefore, _pulchrum_ is not proprium of _justum_.\n\nThis _locus_ will be found available in combination with the\npreceding _locus_ bearing on _Opposita_. Not only _opposita_\nthemselves, but also the cases and inflections of _opposita_, may be\nadduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.[243]\n\n[Footnote 243: Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.]\n\n18. Analogous cases or propositions:--If the respondent affirms A as\nproprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that\nsomething analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B.\nThus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the\nphysician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the\nproprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the\nproprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative,\nyou will apply this same _locus_ in the affirmative against him:\n_e.g._, as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit\nof body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart\nhealth.[244]\n\n[Footnote 244: Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.]\n\n19. _Esse_, and _Generari_ or _Fieri_:--If A considered as _Ens_ is\nnot the proprium of B considered as _Ens_, then neither will A\nconsidered as _Fiens_ be the proprium of B considered as _Fiens_.\n_Vice vers\u00e2_, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be\nthe fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.[245]\n\n[Footnote 245: Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.]\n\n20. Comparison with the Idea:--If the respondent sets up A as\nproprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note\nwhether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the\nsame aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so,\nyou will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if\nhe maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will\nargue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the\nproprium of the Self-man ([Greek: au)toa/nthr\u00f4pos]) _quatenus_ man,\nbut _quatenus_ Idea. _Vice vers\u00e2_, you will have an affirmative\nargument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus,\nsince it is a proprium of the self-animal _quatenus_ animal to be\ncomposed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul\nand body is really a proprium of animal.[246]\n\n[Footnote 246: Ibid. b. 3-13.]\n\n21. _Locus_ from More and Less:--Suppose the respondent to affirm A\nas proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can\nshow that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B.\nThus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more\nbody, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less\nbody; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply. _Vice vers\u00e2_, if\nyou can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you\nwill have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of\nB. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living.\nHence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply;\nalso, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is\nmost, least, or less living, respectively.[247]\n\n[Footnote 247: Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.]\n\nIf you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have\nan argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium\nof that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the\naffirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the\naffirmative of the last.[248] Perhaps you can show that what is more\nA is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show\nthat A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of\nanimal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not\nproprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or\nagain, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is\nless B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B.\nThus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is\nproprium of animal; but natural mansuetude _is_ proprium of man:\ntherefore life is proprium of animal.[249] Farther, if you can show\nthat A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet\nnevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that\nA is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of\nsuperficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium\nof superficies; therefore, it is _not_ a proprium of body. This last\nvariety of the _locus_ of More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords\nno corresponding affirmative plea;[250] for the same predicate cannot\nbe a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of\nsuperficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may\nperhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a\nproprium of B; yet, if C is _not_ a proprium of B, you will infer\nnegatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable\nis more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of\nanimal; yet to be perceivable is _not_ proprium of animal, and,\ntherefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may\ninvert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is\nless a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that C _is_\na proprium of B; hence you will infer, _\u00e0 fortiori_, that A is a\nproprium thereof. _E.g._, If to perceive is less a proprium of animal\nthan to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceive _is_ a proprium\nof animal; then, to live is so likewise.[251]\n\n[Footnote 248: Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: [Greek: kataskeua/zonti de\\ o(\nto/pos ou(=tos ou)/k e)sti chr\u00ea/simos; a)du/naton ga/r e)sti tau)to\\\npleio/n\u00f4n i)/dion ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 251: Ibid. a. 21-30.]\n\n22. _Locus_ from Equal Relation:--Arguments both negative and\naffirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different\nthings which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally\npropria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C\nis proprium of D, while yet A is _not_ a proprium of B, you may hence\ninfer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, A\n_is_ a proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a\nproprium of D.[252] Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of\nthe same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof,\nyou will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that A _is_\nproprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise.\nOr, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E,\nthen, if you can show that A is _not_ a proprium of E, you may infer\nnegatively that it is _not_ a proprium of B. Here, however, the\ncounter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same\nproprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was\nstated before.[253]\n\n[Footnote 252: Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Ibid. b. 16-22.]\n\n23. _Locus_ from Potentiality:--No potentiality whatever can belong\nto _Non-Ens_. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject\nB, is a potentiality, this must imply some real _Ens_ in which it\ninheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the\nspecification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate,\nyou will attack it as a bad proprium--as a potentiality inhering in\n_Non-Ens_ or nothing. _E.g._, if the case be, It is a proprium of air\nto be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is\ntrue only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of\nbreathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this\ncorrelate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as\nthe specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over as\n_Non-Ens_ or a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good\nproprium.[254] Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium\nof _Ens_ to be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be\ndefensible because it is only when the subject _is Ens_, that it is\ndeclared to have such proprium.[255]\n\n[Footnote 254: Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\\\no( ei)/pas a)e/ros i)/dion to\\ a)napneusto/n t\u00ea=| duna/mei me\\n\na)pe/d\u00f4ke to\\ i)/dion (to\\ ga\\r toiou=ton i)/dion _oi(=on\na)napnei=sthai_ a)napneusto/n e)stin), a)pode/d\u00f4ke de\\ kai\\ pro\\s to\\\nm\u00ea\\ o(\\n to\\ i)/dion; kai\\ ga\\r m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos z\u00f4/|ou, oi(=on a)napnei=n\npe/phuke to\\n a)e/ra, e)nde/chetai a)e/ra ei)=nai; ou) me/ntoi m\u00ea\\\no)/ntos z\u00f4/|ou dunato/n e)stin a)napnei=n; \u00f4(/st' ou)d' a)e/ros\ne)/stai i)/dion to\\ toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=sthai, _to/te o(/te_\nz\u00f4/|on ou)k e)/stai toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=n. ou)k a)\\n ou)=n\nei)/\u00ea a)e/ros i)/dion to\\ a)napneusto/n.]\n\n_Respirability_ (the proprium here discussed) being a relative term,\nAristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and\nincluded in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a\nrefutative argument may be drawn from such omission--that the\nrespondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that\nthis objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the\nproprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of\nthat proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs\nto that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the\ncommencement of Book V.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.]\n\n24. _Locus_ from the Superlative:--Suppose the affirmation to be, It\nis a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may\nrefute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be\nsome other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium\nmay still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject\nhas ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not\nreciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true\nproprium.[256]\n\n[Footnote 256: Ibid. a. 9-20.]\n\n\nVI.\n\nWe now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the _Loci_ bearing on\nDefinition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points\non any of which the attack and defence may turn:--[257]\n\n1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true\nat all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be\ndefined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of\nthe subject.\n\n2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that\ngenus to which it rightly and specially belongs.\n\n3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the\ndefiniend (_i.e._, it may include, not only that but, other matters\nbesides).\n\n4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three\ngrounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.\n\n5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly\nexpressed or set out.\n\n[Footnote 257: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: [Greek: t\u00ea=s de\\ peri\\\ntou\\s o(/rous pragmatei/as me/r\u00ea pe/nte e)sti/n.]]\n\nAs to the first of these five heads, the _Loci_ bearing thereupon\nhave already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in\naccidental predications the question raised is always about the truth\nor falsehood of the predication.[258] As to the second and third of\nthe five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth\nBooks, enumerating the _Loci_ on Genus and Proprium.[259]\n\n[Footnote 258: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Ibid. b. 3.]\n\nThere remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to\nenter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the\nfifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition\nat all, _i.e._, whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the\nfourth).[260] The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is\nalways more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely\nto afford greater opening for argumentative attack.\n\n[Footnote 260: Ibid. b. 6.]\n\nThe definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set\nout in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor\nclear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is\nrequired for the definition. Under each of these defects of\nexpression several _loci_ may be indicated.[261]\n\n[Footnote 261: Ibid. b. 12-18.]\n\n1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in\nthe definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being\nitself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such\nequivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and\nthe same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the\ndefinition as given covers all the different meanings of the\ndefiniend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has\nomitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them\nor few of them are covered by the definition.[262]\n\n[Footnote 262: Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. [Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s de\\\nkai\\ ei) tou= o(rizome/nou pleonach\u00f4=s legome/nou m\u00ea\\ diel\u00f4\\n\nei)=pen; a)/d\u00ealon ga\\r o(pote/rou to\\n o(/ron a)pode/d\u00f4ken,\ne)nde/chetai/ te _sukophantei=n_ \u00f4(s ou)k e)pharmo/ttontos tou=\nlo/gou e)pi\\ pa/nta \u00f4(=n to\\n o(rismo\\n a)pode/d\u00f4ken.]\n\nThe term [Greek: sukophantei=n] surprises us here, because the point\nunder consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real\nmistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure\nwhereby such mistake is exposed as _mere cavil_--[Greek:\nsukophanti/a]. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says\nthat Aristotle intends to apply the term [Greek: sukophantei=n] to\nthe respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant\nwho impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with\nthis interpretation.]\n\n2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but\nAristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as\nthough it were _proprio sensu_.[263] He declares it to be wrong, but\nhe seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a\nmetaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.\n\n[Footnote 263: Ibid. b. 32: [Greek: e)nde/chetai de\\ kai\\ t\u00ea\\n\nmetaphora\\n ei)po/nta _sukophantei=n_ \u00f4(s kuri/\u00f4s ei)r\u00eako/ta.] Here\nagain we have the word [Greek: sukophantei=n] to designate what seems\na legitimate mode of argumentative attack.]\n\n3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare\nor far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.[264]\nDefinitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.\n\n[Footnote 264: Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: [Greek: pa=n ga\\r a)saphe\\s to\\\nm\u00ea\\ ei)\u00f4tho/s].]\n\n4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image,\nwhich is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is\ndefined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just.[265]\n\n[Footnote 265: Ibid. a. 6-17. [Greek: chei=ron o(poiouou=s t\u00f4=n kata\\\nmetaphora\\n legome/n\u00f4n].]\n\n5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known\nthe definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.[266]\n\n[Footnote 266: Ibid. a. 18.]\n\n6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated,\nmake known what the definiend is, without requiring that the\ndefiniend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by\nitself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise,\nthe definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when\npainting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside\nin order that the animal might be recognized.[267]\n\n[Footnote 267: Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of\nperfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle's own\ndefinitions often fall lamentably short of it.]\n\nSuch are the _Loci_ regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of\nthe definition. The second defect is Redundancy.\n\n1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include\neither all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same\ngenus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a\ngeneric term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic\nthings, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things\nwithin the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be\nuseless through redundancy.[268] It will also be open to the like\nobjection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend,\nover and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes\nany thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the\ndefiniend.[269] It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute\nnot belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not\neven be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.[270]\n\n[Footnote 268: Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however,\nremarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are\ndefects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed\nunconsciously from the latter to the former: [Greek: e)n me\\n t\u00ea=|\npr\u00f4/t\u00ea| t\u00f4=n e)pho/d\u00f4n do/xeien a)\\n o( A)ristote/l\u00eas meta/gein ei)s\nta\\s pragmatika\\s e)xeta/seis] (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).]\n\n[Footnote 269: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: a(pl\u00f4=s d' ei)pei=n, a(/pan\nperi/ergon ou(= a)phairethe/ntos to\\ loipo\\n d\u00ea=lon poiei= to\\\no(rizo/menon.]]\n\n[Footnote 270: Ibid. b. 16.]\n\n2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same\nattribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow\nattribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and\ncomprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.[271]\n\n[Footnote 271: Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.]\n\nSo much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the\ndefinition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of\nthe definition, the following _loci_ are distinguishable.\n\n1. The first of these _loci_ is, if the matter of the definition is\nnot _prius_ and _notius_ as compared with the definiend. It is one of\nthe canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge\nof the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature\nand better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend--the\nbeing what it is--is one and only one. If a definition be given,\nother than that by means of what is _prius_ and _notius_, it would\nfollow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences;\nwhich is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a\ndefinition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better\nknown than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held\nas no true definition at all.[272]\n\n[Footnote 272: Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.]\n\nThe _locus_ here indicated by this general feature is one, but it\nincludes a number of varieties.[273] More known, or less known, it\nshould first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or\nless known _absolutely_ (_by nature_); or more or less known _to us_.\nAbsolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line;\nthe line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the\n_prius_, than the _posterius_. But _to us_ the reverse is true. The\nsolid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more\nknown than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line,\nthan the point; the _posterius_, than the _prius_. _To us_ means to\nthe bulk of mankind: _absolutely_ or _by nature_ refers to the\ninstructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.[274] There\nmay be some cases in which the _notius nobis_ coincides and is\nidentical with the _notius natur\u00e2_;[275] but, as a rule, the two are\ndistinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and\nperfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species\nthrough Genus and Differenti\u00e6, which are both of them absolutely\nprior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed\nnon-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the\nSpecies without knowing its Genus and Differenti\u00e6; but you may know\nthe Genus and Differenti\u00e6 without knowing the Species; hence the\nSpecies is more unknowable than they are.[276] This is the true\nscientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring\nknowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation\nor quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to\nthem.[277] Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as\ntrue definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we\nshould be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same\ndefiniend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what\nis more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to\nanother. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at\ndifferent periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of\nsensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been\nimproved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the\nobjects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.[278] To\ndefine properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the _notiora\nnobis_ but, the _notiora natur\u00e2_ or _simpliciter_; understanding by\nthis last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but,\nwhat is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted\nintellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is\nwholesome to the well-constituted body.[279] These conditions of\nDefinition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as\nthe occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition\nwill be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of\nthe above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what is\n_notius natur\u00e2_ nor what is _notius nobis_.[280]\n\n[Footnote 273: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Ibid. b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Ibid. b. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Ibid. b. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Ibid. b. 34.\n\nThe general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen\nphilosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain\non the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p.\n581, 2nd ed.)\n\n\"A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the\nmind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as\ndiscrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode\nof neutral excitement.--But this is not all. After much contact with\nthe sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the\nconsciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child\nexperiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is\nnothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.\n. . . It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original\nshock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the\nrarest thing for us _then_ to come under a radically new impression;\nand we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate\nconception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative\nsensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind\nafter repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different\ncharacter as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if\nit stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is\nthe nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but\nrestores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The\nsensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a\ncoalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous\noccasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or\ntouch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more\nby the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is\ncomplicated by three concurring elements--the new shock, the flash of\nagreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that\npast as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to\nbe entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating\nby virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our\ndiscrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before\nme two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as\nI am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about\nprocess of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past\nimpressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference\nthat I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be\nattributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a\nwrong act of identification.--All sensations, therefore, after the\nfirst of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which\nis what really determines their character. The present shock is\nsimply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference\nto all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost\ninsignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the\ncerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the\nprevious scarlets.--Sensation thus calls into operation the two great\nintellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of\ndifference.--When we consider ourselves as performing the most\nordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those\nvery functions of the intellect that make its development and its\nglory in its highest manifestations.\"]\n\n[Footnote 279: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 280: Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.]\n\nThe canon being, That what is _posterius_ must be defined by its\n_prius_,--the definer may sin against this in defining the _prius_ by\nits _posterius_; _e.g._, if he defines the stationary and the\ndeterminate by means of the moveable and the variable.[281] Also,\nwhen his definition is neither _prius_, nor _posterius_, but of equal\nposition with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when\nhe defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of\nOpposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one\nof a pair can be absolutely more knowable than the other; though it\nis true that no relative can be understood or explained without the\nknowledge of its correlative, _e.g._, double and half); or (2) when\nhe includes the definiend itself in his definition, either under its\nproper name or any other name;[282] or (3) when he defines by means\nof a contra-specific to the definiend--by something of equal specific\nrank or position, which is therefore _simul natur\u00e2_ therewith\n(_e.g._, Odd is that which is greater than even by unity); or (4)\nwhen he defines by something specifically subordinate (_e.g._, An\neven number is that which may be bisected, where bisected means\ndivisible by two, itself one among the even numbers[283]).\n\n[Footnote 281: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: pro/teron ga\\r to\\ me/non kai\\\nto\\ \u00f4(risme/non tou= a)ori/stou kai\\ e)n kin\u00ea/sei o)/ntos.]]\n\n[Footnote 282: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Ibid. b. 7-19: [Greek: pa/lin, ei) t\u00f4=|\na)ntidi\u00ea|r\u00eame/n\u00f4| to\\ a)ntidi\u00ea|r\u00eame/non \u00f4(/ristai--o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\\nei) dia\\ t\u00f4=n u(poka/t\u00f4 to\\ e)pa/n\u00f4 \u00f4(/ristai.]]\n\n2. The second _locus_ (after that bearing on the _Prius et Notius_)\nof argument for **impugning a definition is, where it does not\nenunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included.\nThe mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of\nthe definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your\nopponent defines body--that which has three dimensions, or man--that\nwhich knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that\nhas three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus\nhas been assigned.[284]\n\n[Footnote 284: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 22-29.]\n\n3. A third _locus_ is, where the definiend is a complex whole having\nreference to several distinct facts or phenomena, while the\ndefinition indicates only one of them. Thus, if grammar be\ndefined--the knowing how to write from dictation, you will object\nthat it is just as much--the knowing how to read. The definition is\nincomplete unless it includes both.[285]\n\n[Footnote 285: Ibid. b. 30.]\n\n4. A fourth _locus_ is, where the definiend admits both of a better\nand a worse construction, and where the definition enunciates only\nthe worse. You may impugn it, on the ground that every cognition and\nevery power must be understood as tending to its best results.[286]\n\n[Footnote 286: Ibid. p. 143, a. 9.]\n\n6. A fifth _locus_ is, where the definiend is enunciated as ranking,\nnot in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but, in\nsome higher and more distinct genus. Here the real essence will not\nbe declared, and the definition will thus be incomplete; unless\nindeed it includes, along with the highest genus, the superadded\nmention of all the differenti\u00e6 descending down to the lowest species.\nIt will then be complete, because it will include, in circumlocutory\nphrase, all that would be declared by enunciating the specific\nname.[287]\n\n[Footnote 287: Ibid. a. 15-28.]\n\n6. Assuming the genus to be truly declared in the definition you will\nexamine whether the differenti\u00e6 enunciated are differenti\u00e6 at all?\nwhether they really belong to the definiend? what is it which they\nserve to contrast with and exclude,--since, if there be nothing such,\nthey cannot be truly differenti\u00e6? whether the differential term and\nits counter-differential apply to and cover the whole genus? whether,\ngranting the differentia to be real, it be such, when taken along\nwith the genus, as to constitute a true species, and whether its\ncounter-differentia be such also? This is a _locus_ furnishing many\npossibilities of impugning the definition.[288]\n\n[Footnote 288: Topic. VI. vi. p. 143, a. 29-b. 10.]\n\n7. Perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely\nnegative; _e.g._, A line is length without breadth. If you are\ndebating with a respondent who holds the (Platonic) doctrine of\nIdeas, and who considers each Idea or genus to be something\nnumerically one, distinct from all its participants, you will find\nhere a _locus_ for attacking them.[289] He asserts the existence of a\nSelf-long or generical long, a Self-animal or generic animal, each\nnumerically one. Now, upon this hypothesis, since of all long you may\npredicate either in the affirmative or the negative (_i.e._, either\nit is broad or it is not broad), so this alternative may be\npredicated of the Self-long or generical long; and thus the genus\nwill coincide with, or fall under the definition of, one among its\nown species. Or, if this be denied, it will follow that the generic\nlong must be both broad and not broad; which is a contradiction still\nmore inadmissible. Accordingly, against one who holds the doctrine of\nIdeas, declaring the genus to be _unum numero_, the negative\ndifferentia will furnish grounds for attack; but not against any\nother respondent.[290] For there are various cases in which the\nnegative must be employed as a part of the differentia: _e.g._, in\nprivative terms, blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does\nnot see. And, even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative, it\nmay have for its condivident member only a negative term, _e.g._,\nlength having-breadth has for its condivident member only the\nnegative, length not-having-breadth.[291]\n\n[Footnote 289: Ibid. b. 11-30.]\n\n[Footnote 290: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste _pro\\s e)kei/nous mo/nous_\nchr\u00ea/simos o( to/pos, o(/soi to\\ ge/nos e(\\n a)rithm\u00f4=| phasi\\n\nei)=nai. tou=to de\\ poiou=sin oi( ta\\s i)de/as tithe/menoi; au)to\\\nga\\r m\u00ea=kos kai\\ au)to\\ z\u00f4=|on ge/nos phasi\\n ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 291: Ibid. b. 33.]\n\n8. Perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is\nreally a subordinate species; or what is really the genus itself\nunder another name; or what is not _Quale_, but _Quid_; or what\nbelongs to the definiend as an accident only. Each of these is a\n_locus_ for arguments against the definition.[292]\n\n[Footnote 292: Topica, VI. vi. p. 144, a. 5-27.]\n\n9. Perhaps also, in the definition given, the differentia or the\nspecies may be found predicable of the entire genus; or the genus may\nbe found predicable of the differentia itself, and not of objects\nunder it; or the species (sometimes even one of its sub-species) may\nbe found predicable of the differentia; or perhaps the differentia\nmay not be a _prius_ as regards the species (which it ought to be,\nwhile it is a _posterius_ as regards the genus). Arguments against\nthe definition may be drawn from any one of these loci.[293]\n\n[Footnote 293: Ibid. a. 28-b. 11.]\n\n10. Recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct\ngenera neither of which comprehends the other, unless both are\ncomprehended under some higher genus. Examine whether this is\nobserved in the definition tendered to you.[294]\n\n[Footnote 294: Ibid. b. 12.]\n\n11. No genuine differentia can be derived either from the Category\n_Ubi_ or from the Category _Passio_; for neither of them furnishes\ncharacteristics essential to the subject. All _Passio_ when\nintensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject\nand removes it from its own appropriate species; but the differentia\nis inseparable from its subject; accordingly, nothing by virtue of\nwhich the subject is called [Greek: a)lloi=on] can be a true\ndifferentia. If the definition sins against this rule, it will be\nopen to question.[295]\n\n[Footnote 295: Ibid. b. 31-p. 145, a. 12: [Greek: o(ra=n de\\ kai\\ ei)\nto\\ e)/n tini diaphora\\n a)pode/d\u00f4ken ou)si/as; ou) dokei= ga\\r\ndiaphe/rein ou)si/a ousi/as t\u00f4=| _pou_ ei)=nai.--pa/lin ei) to\\\npa/thos diaphora\\n a)pode/d\u00f4ken.--a(pl\u00f4=s d' ei)pei=n, kath' o(/sa\na)lloiou=tai to\\ e)/chon, ou)de\\n tou/t\u00f4n diaphora\\\ne)kei/nou;--a(pl\u00f4=s ga\\r ou)k a)lloiou/metha kata\\ ta\\s diaphora/s.]]\n\n12. If the subject be relative, its true differentia ought to be\nrelative also; thus, science or cognition is a _relatum_, and\naccordingly its three differenti\u00e6--theoretical, practical,\nconstructive--are all _relata_ also.[296] The definition must conform\nto this; and it must also, in cases where the relative subject has\nmore than one correlate, declare that correlate which is the ordinary\nand natural one, not any other which is rare and realized only on\noccasion.[297] You must watch to see whether this condition is\nobserved; and also whether the correlative enunciated in the\ndefinition is the one strictly proximate. Thus, if the definition\ngiven of prudence be, It is an excellence of man or an excellence of\nthe soul, this will not be a good definition. It ought to be--an\nexcellence of the rational department of the soul; for it is through\nand by reason of this department that both man and soul are\ndenominated prudent.[298]\n\n[Footnote 296: Ibid. a. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 297: Ibid. a. 19-26.]\n\n[Footnote 298: Topic. VI. vi. p. 145, a. 28-32. [Greek: pr\u00f4/ton ga\\r\ntou= logistikou= a)ret\u00ea\\ \u00ea( phro/n\u00easis; kata\\ ga\\r tou=to kai\\ \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea\\ kai\\ o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos phronei=n le/getai.]]\n\n13. When the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition\nof some subject, you must examine whether it really resides or can\nreside (as by nature it ought to do) in the subject to which it is\nreferred in the definition. If it cannot, the **definition is\nuntenable; and this mistake is sometimes made, the producing\nconditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon\nitself, or _vice vers\u00e2_.[299] Thus, some persons have\ndefined sleep--incapacity of sensible perception; doubt--equality of\ncontrary reasonings; pain--breach of continuity violently made in\nparts of the organism which naturally grow together. Now sleep does\nnot reside in perception, nor doubt in reasonings. Sleep is that\nwhich produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception; doubt\nis a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings.[300]\nThis will be a _locus_ for arguing against the definition.\n\n[Footnote 299: Ibid. b. 11: [Greek: to\\ poiou/menon ei)s to\\\npoi\u00eatiko\\n \u00ea)\\ a)na/palin sumbai/nei tithe/nai toi=s ou(/t\u00f4s\no(rizome/nois.]]\n\n[Footnote 300: Ibid. a. 33-b. 20.]\n\n14. Another _locus_ is, when the definiend has direct bearing and\nreference to something different from what is enunciated in the\ndefinition. Thus, if the respondent defines justice--a power tending\nto make equal distribution, you may remark hereupon, that the just\nman is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution,\nnot he who has the power to do so. If this definition were allowed,\nthe justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so\ndistributing.[301]\n\n[Footnote 301: Ibid. vii. p. 145, b. 34-p. 146, a. 2.]\n\n15. Again, the definition will be assailable, if the definiend admits\ngraduation of More or Less, while that which is enunciated in the\ndefinition does not admit it, or _vice vers\u00e2_; also, if both of them\nadmit graduation, but the variations of the two are not corresponding\nand concomitant. The defining phrase ought to be identical in\nsignification with the term defined.[302] If both of them agree in\nreference to some common correlate, but one is to this in the\nrelation of more while the other is in the relation of less, the\ndefinition is faulty.[303]\n\n[Footnote 302: Ibid. p. 146, a. 3-12. [Greek: ei)/per d\u00ea\\ tau)to/n\ne)sti to\\ kata\\ to\\n lo/gon a)podothe\\n t\u00f4=| pra/gmati.]\n\nHere we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that\nwhich is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in\nMr. J. S. Mill's 'System of Logic.' See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 303: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 6-20: [Greek: e)/dei d'\na)mpho/tera ma=llon t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| u(pa/rchein, ei)/per tau)ta\\ \u00ea)=n],\n&c.]\n\n16. Again, you will be able to object, if the definition enunciate\nreferences to two distinct correlates, severally or alternately:\n_e.g._, The beautiful is that which affords pleasure either through\nthe eye or through the ear; _Ens_ is that which is capable either of\nsuffering or acting. You may show that, according to this definition,\nbeautiful and not beautiful, or that _Ens_ and Non-Ens, will coincide\nand be predicable of the same subjects.[304]\n\n[Footnote 304: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 21-32.\n\nThe definition here given of _Ens_ appears in the Sophistes of Plato,\np. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful ([Greek: to\\ kalo/n])\nappears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is\ncriticized by Sokrates.]\n\n17. When the definition is tendered, you ought to examine and define\nits own terms, which, of course, profess to enunciate genus and\ndifferentia of the definiend.[305] You will see whether the\ndefinitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to\nthe definiend.\n\n[Footnote 305: Ibid. a. 33-35.]\n\n18. If the definiend be a _Relatum_, the definition ought to\nenunciate its true correlate, or the true correlate of the genus to\nwhich it belongs. You must examine whether this is done, and whether\nthe correlate enunciated be an ultimate end, as it ought to be\n(_i.e._ not merely a means towards something ulterior). If the\ncorrelate enunciated is a generation or a process, this will afford\nyou an argument against the definition; for all generation or process\nis a means towards some ulterior end.[306]\n\n[Footnote 306: Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle\ndistinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire of _the\npleasurable_, but) desire of _pleasure_: we desire _the pleasurable_\nfor the sake of _pleasure_. He admits, however, that there are cases\nin which the argument will not hold: [Greek: schedo\\n ga\\r oi(\nplei=stoi \u00ea(/desthai ma=llon bou/lontai \u00ea)\\ pepau=sthai \u00ea(do/menoi;\n\u00f4(/ste to\\ e)nergei=n ma=llon te/los a)\\n poioi=nto tou=\ne)n\u00earg\u00eake/nai.]]\n\n19. The definition ought not to omit any of the differenti\u00e6 of the\ndefiniend; if any be omitted, the real essence is not declared. Here\nthen is a defect in the definition, which it is your business always\nto assail on its defective side.[307] Thus, if the definiend be a\n_relatum_ corresponding, not to some correlate absolutely but, to\nsome correlate specially quantified or qualified, the definition\nought to enunciate such quantification or qualification; if it does\nnot, it is open to attack.\n\n[Footnote 307: Ibid. b. 20: [Greek: pa/lin e)p' e)ni/\u00f4n ei) m\u00ea\\\ndi\u00f4/rike tou= po/sou, \u00ea)\\ poi/ou, \u00ea)\\ pou=, \u00ea)\\ kata\\ ta\\s a)/llas\ndiaphora/s,--a)polei/p\u00f4n ga\\r diaphora\\n \u00ea(ntinou=n ou) le/gei to\\ ti\n\u00ea)=n ei)=nai; _dei= d' a)ei\\ pro\\s to\\ e)ndee\\s e)picheirei=n_.]]\n\n20. Suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites, relative to\nan _appetitum_ as correlate, a mode of the good or agreeable. You\nwill take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the\ncorrelate as only an apparent mode of good: if it does not, you have\na _locus_ for attacking it. But if it does, and if the definer be one\nwho believes in the Platonic Ideas, you may attack him by showing\nthat his definition will not square with that doctrine. For the\ndefinition as so given will not suit for the ideal or generic\nappetite--the Self-appetite; which correlates with the ideal or\ngeneric good--the Self-good. In this no distinction is admissible of\nreal and apparent: a Self-apparent-good is an absurdity.[308]\n\n[Footnote 308: Topic. VI. viii. p. 146, b. 36-p. 147, a. 11. [Greek:\ne)a\\n de\\ kai\\ a)pod\u00f4=| to\\ ei)r\u00eame/non, e)pi\\ ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea a)kte/on\nto\\n tithe/menon i)de/as ei)=nai; ou) ga/r e)stin i)de/a phainome/nou\nou)deno/s, to\\ d' ei)=dos pro\\s to\\ ei)=dos dokei= le/gesthai, oi(=on\nau)t\u00ea\\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= \u00ea(de/os kai\\ au)t\u00ea\\ bou/l\u00easis au)tou=\na)gathou=. ou)k e)/stai ou)=n phainome/nou a)gathou= ou)de\\\nphainome/nou \u00ea(de/os; a)/topon ga\\r to\\ ei)=nai au)to\\ phaino/menon\na)gatho\\n \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(du/.]\n\nCompare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if\nthe _relatum_ be an Idea (_sensu Platonico_), the _correlatum_ must\nalso be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences:\n[Greek: o(/sai t\u00f4=n i)de\u00f4=n pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/las ei)si\\n ai(/ ei)sin,\nau)tai\\ pro\\s au(ta\\s t\u00ea\\n ou)si/an e)/chousin, a)ll' ou) pro\\s ta\\\npar' \u00ea(mi=n ei)/te o(moi\u00f4/mata ei)/te o(/p\u00ea| d\u00ea/ tis au)ta\\\nti/thetai], &c.--[Greek: au)t\u00ea\\ de\\ despotei/a au)t\u00ea=s doulei/as\ne)sti\\n o(/ e)sti], &c. (133, C-E.)]\n\n21. Again, suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition. You\nwill examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual\nperson who has the habit; and how far it fits when taken in\ncomparison with subjects contrary or congeneric. Every such\ndefinition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the\ncontrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the\ndefinition of ignorance.[309]\n\n[Footnote 309: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 12-22.]\n\n22. Or suppose the definiend to be a generic _relatum_, and the\ndefinition to enunciate its generic correlate. You must call to mind\nthe specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms, and\nobserve whether they fit on to each other respectively. If they do\nnot, the definition is faulty.[310]\n\n[Footnote 310: Ibid. a. 23-28.]\n\n23. You will farther examine whether the Opposite of the definition\nwill serve as definition to the Opposite of the definiend, as the\ndefinition of half is opposite to the definition of double; thus, if\ndouble is that which exceeds equality, half is that which is exceeded\nby equality. The like is true of Contraries: if the profitable be\nthat which is productive of good, the hurtful will be that which is\nproductive of evil or destructive of good. If, on trying the\ncontraries, you find that this will not hold, the definition\noriginally given will be found unsatisfactory.[311] In defining the\nprivative contrary of any term, a man cannot avoid enunciating in the\ndefinition the term of which it is the privative: but he is not\nallowed to define the term itself by means of its privative. To\ndefine equality--that which is contrary to inequality, is improper.\nYou will require him at once to define inequality; and his definition\nmust be--the privation of equality. Substitute this definition of the\nterm inequality, in place of that term itself, in the above-named\ndefinition of equality: and the last definition will then run as\nfollows: Equality is that which is contrary to the privation of\nequality. Here the definiend is enunciated as a part of the\ndefinition of itself; a proof that the original definition--Equality\nis the contrary of inequality--is itself wrong.[312]\n\n[Footnote 311: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 29-b. 4.\n\nWe most remember that Aristotle, classifying _Relata_ as one species\nunder the genus _Opposita_, treats double and half as _Opposita_,\n_i.e._ _Relative-Opposita_. I have already said that I think this\nclassification improper, and that _Opposita_ ought to be ranked as a\nspecies under the genus _Relata_.]\n\n[Footnote 312: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, b. 4-25.]\n\n24. When the definiend is a Privative Term, the definition given\nought to enunciate that which it is, and that of which it is the\nprivation; also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the\nfirst instance. In defining ignorance, the definition must enunciate\nnot privation only, but privation of knowledge; nor will this be\nsufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in\nthe rational department of the soul ([Greek: e)n t\u00f4=| logistik\u00f4=|]).\nPrivation of knowledge in the soul or in the man, will not suffice;\nbecause neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute\nresides in the first instance: the rational department of the soul\nmust be named by itself, as being the primary subject of the\nattribute. If the definition be wanting in any of these conditions,\nyou will have an argument for impeaching it.[313]\n\n[Footnote 313: Ibid. b. 26-p. 148, a. 2.]\n\n25. A term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the\nsense of mere negation, not in that of privation. If this term be\ndefined generally by privation, the definition will not include the\nmerely negative sense, and will therefore be impeachable. The only\ngeneral explanation attainable is that by pure negation, which is\ncommon both to the negative and the privative. Thus, if the\nrespondent defines ignorance--privation of knowledge, such privation\ncan be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have\nknowledge or who might be expected to have it: such privation cannot\nbe predicated of infants, or of inanimate objects like stones. To\ninclude these, ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or\nnon-existence of knowledge; the definition thereof by privation is\ninadequate.[314]\n\n[Footnote 314: Ibid. p. 148, a. 3-9: [Greek: o(ra=n de\\ kai\\ ei) m\u00ea\\\nlegome/nou kata\\ ste/r\u00easin ster\u00ea/sei \u00f4(ri/sato, oi(=on kai\\ e)pi\\\nt\u00ea=s a)gnoi/as do/xeien a)\\n u(pa/rchein \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea a(marti/a toi=s\nm\u00ea\\ kat' a)po/phasin t\u00ea\\n a)/gnoian le/gousin.]\n\nWaitz says in note, p. 503:--\"Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per\nprivationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire\nvoluerunt qu\u00e6 est [Greek: kat' a)po/phasin], sed eam qu\u00e6 est [Greek:\nkata\\ dia/thesin].\" Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23.]\n\n26. If you are debating with one who holds the Platonic doctrine of\nIdeas, you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not\nonly the definiend itself but also the Idea of the definiend. Thus,\nPlato in defining animal introduces mortality as a part of his\ndefinition;[315] but mortality cannot be predicated of the Idea or\ngeneric animal--the Self-animal; therefore, you will have an argument\nagainst his definition. In like manner, if any active or passive\nattribute is brought into his definition, you will object that this\ncannot apply to the Ideas; which are avowedly impassive and\nunchangeable.[316]\n\n[Footnote 315: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 15: [Greek: oi(=on \u00f4(s\nPla/t\u00f4n o(ri/zetai to\\ thn\u00eato\\n prosa/pt\u00f4n e)n toi=s t\u00f4=n z\u00f4/|\u00f4n\no(rismoi=s.]\n\nThis may perhaps allude to Plato's manner of speaking of [Greek:\nz\u00f4=|a] in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; Tim\u00e6us, p. 69, C.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Topica, VI. x. p. 148, a. 14-22. [Greek: a)pathei=s\nga\\r kai\\ a)ki/n\u00eatoi dokou=sin ai( i)de/ai toi=s le/gousin i)de/as\nei)=nai].]\n\n27. Another _locus_ for counter-argument is, where the definiend is\nEquivocal or Analogous, while one and the same definition is made to\napply to all its distinct meanings. Such a definition, pretending to\nfit all, will in reality fit none; nothing but an univocal term can\ncome under one and the same definition. It is wrong to attempt to\ndefine an equivocal term.[317] When its equivocation is not obvious,\nthe respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal; while you\nas assailant will expose the equivocation. Sometimes, indeed, a\nrespondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal, or that an\nequivocal word is univocal, in the course of the debate. To obviate\nsuch misconception, you will do well to come to an agreement with him\nprior to the debate, or to determine by special antecedent reasonings\nwhat terms are univocal or equivocal; for at that early stage, when\nhe does not foresee the consequence of your questions, he is more\nlikely to concede what will facilitate your attack. In the absence of\nsuch preliminary agreement, if the respondent, when you have shown\nthat his bad definition will not apply universally, resorts to the\npretence that the definiend, though really univocal, is equivocal,\nyou will press him with the true definition of the part not included\nunder his definition, and you will show that this true definition\nsuits also for the remaining parts of the definiend. You will thus\nconfute him by showing that, upon his original hypothesis, it must\nfollow that there are two distinct definitions for the same\ndefiniend--the bad one which he has given, and the true one which you\nhave constrained him to admit.[318] Perhaps, however, the term which\nhe has undertaken to define may be really equivocal, and therefore\nindefinable; nevertheless, when you have shown the insufficiency of\nhis definition, he may refuse to admit that the term is equivocal,\nbut will deny a portion of its real meaning. You will then remind him\nthat, as to the meaning of names, we must recognize tradition and\ncustom without presuming to disturb it; but that, when we combine\nthese names in our own discourse, we must beware of those\nequivocations which mislead the multitude.[319]\n\n[Footnote 317: Ibid. a. 23-37: [Greek: e)/ti ei) t\u00f4=n kath'\no(m\u00f4numi/an legome/n\u00f4n e(/na lo/gon a(pa/nt\u00f4n koino\\n\na)pe/d\u00f4ken.--a)ll' ou)de\\n \u00ea(=tton, ei) o(poter\u00f4sou=n pepoi/\u00eaken,\n\u00ea(ma/rt\u00eaken.]\n\nAristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a\nphilosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal\nterm, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in\nplants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good\ndefinition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with\nphilosophers.\n\nMr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his 'System of\nLogic' (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p.\n371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define\nEquivocal Terms. \"The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some\nof the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by\nBacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is\nelsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost\nperfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and\nabstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he\noften wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries\nin which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose\ncommon properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not\nreally any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error\nin his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently\nconfounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no\nproperty in common.\"--\"He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking\nfor the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron,\nflint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that\ncan be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart.\"]\n\n[Footnote 318: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 37, seq. [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\ne)/nia lantha/nei t\u00f4=n o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4n, _e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nti me\\n \u00f4(s sun\u00f4nu/mois\nchr\u00easte/on, au)t\u00f4=| d' a)pokrinome/n\u00f4| diairete/on_. e)pei\\ d'\ne)/nioi t\u00f4=n a)pokrinome/n\u00f4n to\\ me\\n sun\u00f4/numon o(m\u00f4/numo/n phasin\nei)=nai, o(/tan m\u00ea\\ e)pharmo/tt\u00ea| e)pi\\ pa=n o( a)podothei\\s\nlo/gos,--prodiomolog\u00eate/on u(pe\\r t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ prosullogiste/on\no(/ti o(m\u00f4/numon \u00ea)\\ sun\u00f4/numon, o(po/teron a)\\n \u00ea)=|; _ma=llon ga\\r\nsugch\u00f4rou=sin ou) proor\u00f4=ntes to\\ sumb\u00easo/menon_.]\n\nThese counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the\ndetails, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate.]\n\n[Footnote 319: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, b. 16-22. [Greek: r(\u00eate/on pro\\s\nto\\n toiou=ton o(/ti t\u00ea=| me\\n o)nomasi/a| dei= chr\u00ea=sthai t\u00ea=|\nparadedome/n\u00ea| kai\\ parepome/n\u00ea| kai\\ m\u00ea\\ kinei=n ta\\ toiau=ta,\ne)/nia d' ou) lekte/on o(moi/\u00f4s toi=s polloi=s.]]\n\n28. If the definiend, of which a definition is tendered to you, is a\ncompound, you may subtract from this definition the definition of one\nof the parts of the definiend, and then examine whether the remainder\nwill suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend. If\nthe remainder should not suit, this will show that the entire\ndefinition tendered is not tenable. Thus, if the definiend be a\nfinite straight line, and if the definition tendered be, It is the\nboundary of a finite plane, of which (boundary) the middle covers or\nstands in the way of the extremities; you may subtract from this\ndefinition the definition of a finite line, viz., the boundary of a\nplane surface having boundaries, and the remainder of the definition\nought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend. Now the\nremainder of the definiend is--straight; and the remainder of the\ndefinition is--that of which the middle covers or stands in the way\nof the extremities. But these two will _not_ suit; for a line may be\nstraight, yet infinite, in which case it will have neither middle nor\nextremities. Accordingly, since the remainder of the definition will\nnot suit for the remainder of the definiend, this will serve as an\nargument that the entire definition tendered is not a good one.[320]\n\n[Footnote 320: Topic. VI. xi. p. 148, b. 23-32.]\n\nIf the definiend be a compound, and if the definition contain no\ngreater number of words than the definiend, the definition must be\nfaulty; it will be nothing better than a substitution of words. Still\nmore faulty will it be, if it substitutes rare and strange words in\nplace of others which are known and familiar; or if it introduces a\nnew word which signifies something different from that which it\nreplaces.[321]\n\n[Footnote 321: Ibid. b. 32-p. 149, a. 13.]\n\nThe definiend, being compound, will contain both a generic and a\ndifferential term. In general, the generic term will be the better\nknown of the two; yet sometimes the other is the better known.\nWhichever of the two is the better known, the definer ought to choose\nthat, if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in\nplace of another. But, if he aims at something more or at the\nsubstitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name\n(without which there can be no true definition), he ought then to\nchoose the differentia in preference to the genus; for the definition\nis produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge, and the\ndifferentia, being usually less known than the genus, stands most in\nneed of extraneous help to cognition.[322] When the definition of the\ndifferentia has thus been tendered, you will examine whether it will\nbe equally suitable for any other definiend also. If it be, you have\nan argument against the goodness of the definition. For example, the\ndefinition of odd number tendered to you may be--number having a\nmiddle. Here, since number is common both to the definiend and to the\ndefinition, having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the\nequivalent of odd. But this cannot stand as equivalent to odd; since\nvarious other subjects which are not odd (such, for example, as a\nbody or a line), nevertheless have a middle. Since, then, we see that\nhaving-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are\nnot odd, it cannot be admitted, without some qualifying adjunct, as a\ngood definition of odd. The adjunct annexed must declare in what\nsense middle is intended, since it is an equivocal phrase.[323]\n\n[Footnote 322: Ibid. p. 149, a. 14-28.]\n\n[Footnote 323: Ibid. a. 29-37.]\n\n29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition\ngiven of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible\ncombination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example,\ndefine white--colour mingled with fire; which is incompatible, since\nthat which is incorporeal (colour) cannot be mingled with a body\n(fire).[324]\n\n[Footnote 324: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.]\n\n30. Again, suppose the definiend to be a _Relatum_: the correlate\nthereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however,\nmust be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but,\ndistinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition\nwill be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the\nrespondent defines medicine--the science of the really existent, he\nis incorrect either wholly or partially. The _relatum_ ought to\nreciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.[325] When the\ncorrelate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may\nbe declared under several different descriptions; for the same real\nthing may be at once _ens_, _album_, _bonum_. None of these\ndescriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus\ndescribed in the definition of a _relatum_, the definition cannot be\nconsidered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides\nthe definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be\nco-extensive with its definiend.[326]\n\n[Footnote 325: Ibid. b. 4, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti o(/soi m\u00ea\\ diairou=sin\ne)n toi=s pro/s ti pro\\s o(\\ le/getai, a)ll' e)n plei/osi\nperilabo/ntes ei)=pan, \u00ea)\\ o(/l\u00f4s \u00ea)\\ e)pi/ ti pseu/dontai, oi(=on\nei)/ tis t\u00ea\\n i)atrik\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean o)/ntos ei)=pen--o(moi/\u00f4s de\\\nkai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n, e)peid\u00ea\\ a)ntistre/phei pa/nta ta\\ pro/s\nti.]]\n\n[Footnote 326: Ibid. b. 12-23. [Greek: e)/ti d' a)du/naton to\\n\ntoiou=ton lo/gon i)/dion tou= a)podothe/ntos ei)=nai;--d\u00ea=lon ou)=n\no(/ti o( toiou=tos ou)demia=s e)sti\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas o(rismo/s; i)/dion\nga\\r kai\\ ou) koino\\n dei= to\\n o(rismo\\n ei)=nai.]]\n\n31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not\nthe subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of\nexcellence. Sometimes the rhetor (_e.g._) is defined--one who can\nperceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in\nany cause; the thief is defined--one who takes away secretly what\nbelongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor\nand a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The\nthief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one who _does_\ntake away secretly.[327]\n\n[Footnote 327: Ibid. b. 24-30. [Greek: ou) ga\\r o( la/thra|\nlamba/n\u00f4n, a)ll' o( boulo/menos la/thra| lamba/nein, kle/pt\u00eas\ne)sti/n.]]\n\n32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in\nitself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means\ntowards some other end--as productive or preservative thereof. For\nexample, if a man defines justice--that which is preservative of the\nlaws; or wisdom--that which is productive of happiness, he presents\nthem as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with\nreference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake;\nand it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject\nmay be desirable both for itself and for the sake of something else.\nFor the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend;\nand the best of everything resides most in its essence, not in what\nit is relatively to something else. It is better to be desirable _per\nse_, than _alterius caus\u00e2_.[328]\n\n[Footnote 328: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. [Greek: e(ka/stou\nga\\r to\\ be/ltiston e)n t\u00ea=| ou)si/a| ma/lista, be/ltion de\\ to\\ di'\nau(to\\ ai(reto\\n ei)=nai tou= di' e(/teron, \u00f4(/ste tou=to kai\\ to\\n\no(rismo\\n e)/dei ma=llon s\u00eamai/nein.]]\n\n33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition,\nenunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of\nthree combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that\nwhich springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.[329] In each of\nthese three cases you may find arguments for impugning the\ndefinition.\n\n[Footnote 329: Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: [Greek: skopei=n de\\ kai\\\nei)/ tinos o(rismo\\n a)podidou\\s ta/de, \u00ea)\\ to\\ e)k tou/t\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\\nto/de meta\\ tou=de \u00f4(ri/sato.]]\n\n_a._ Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to\ndefine justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge\nagainst him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being\ncourageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate,\nwill be just together, though neither of them separately is just;\nnay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and\ncowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just\nand unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice\nwill be intemperance and cowardice.[330] The definer is open to the\nfarther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical\nwith the whole; as if he defined a house--bricks and mortar,\nforgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and\nmortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.[331]\n\n[Footnote 330: Ibid. a. 4-14.]\n\n[Footnote 331: Ibid. a. 15-21. [Greek: d\u00ea=lon ga\\r o(/ti t\u00f4=n mer\u00f4=n\no)/nt\u00f4n ou)de\\n k\u00f4lu/ei to\\ o(/lon m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai; \u00f4(/ste ou) tau)to\\n\nta\\ me/r\u00ea t\u00f4=| o(/l\u00f4|.]]\n\n_b._ Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is\nthat which springs from A and B--is a result or compound of A and B.\nYou will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any\nresult; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result.\nOr, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first\nsubject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but\none in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.[332]\nOr, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the\nsame first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the\nsame as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot\nthus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a\ngood objection. Or, perhaps, it may appear that, if the whole be\ndestroyed, the parts will be destroyed also; which ought not to be,\nbut the reverse; for, when the parts are destroyed, the whole must\nnecessarily vanish. Or, perhaps, the definiend may be good or bad,\nwhile the parts of the definition (A and B) are neither one nor the\nother. (Yet this last is not a conclusive objection; for it will\nsometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients\nis good, while they are bad if given in conjunction.)[333] Or,\nperhaps, the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts: this,\nalso, will render the definition impeachable. Still more will it be\nimpeachable, if it enunciates simply a result or compound of A and B,\nwithout specifying the manner of composition; it ought to declare not\nmerely the parts of the compound, but also the way in which they are\nput together to form the compound.[334]\n\n[Footnote 332: Ibid. a. 22-30. [Greek: e)/ti ei) to\\ me\\n \u00f4(risme/non\ne)n e(ni/ tini pe/phuke t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| gi/nesthai, e)x \u00f4(=n d'\ne)/ph\u00easen au)to\\ ei)=nai, m\u00ea\\ e)n e(ni/ tini t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4|, all'\ne(ka/teron e)n e(kate/r\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 333: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 334: Ibid. b. 14-26. [Greek: e)/ti ei) m\u00ea\\ ei)/r\u00eake to\\n\ntro/pon t\u00ea=s sunthe/se\u00f4s;] &c.]\n\n_c._ Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is\nA along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be\nidentical either with the first or with the second (_e.g._, honey\n_with_ water means either honey and water, or the compound of honey\nwith water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other\nof the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent\nmay admit.[335] You may also distinguish all the different senses in\nwhich one thing may be said to be _with_ another (_e.g._, when the\ntwo are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the\nsoul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able\nto show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the\ndefinition be truly said to be one along with the other.[336] Or, if\nit be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may\nenquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different\ncorrelates. _E.g._, The definition of courage may be tendered thus:\nCourage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may\nremark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and\nthat right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of\nhealth. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in\n_these_ senses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have\nan argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed\nwith reference to the same correlate (_e.g._, the duties of a\nphysician), a man who has both daring and right intelligence in\nreference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous; the term\ncourage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate\nend; _e.g._, the dangers of war, or any still more public-spirited\nend.[337] Another mistake may, perhaps, be committed in this same\nsort of definition--A along with B; as when, for example, the\ndefinition tendered of anger is--pain along with the belief of being\ntreated with contempt. What the definer really intends here is, that\nthe pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt. But\nthis is not expressed by the terms of his definition, in any one of\ntheir admissible meanings.[338]\n\n[Footnote 335: Ibid. b. 27-32. [Greek: \u00f4(/st' e)a\\n o(poter\u00f4|ou=n\nt\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n tau)to\\n _o(molog\u00ea/s\u00ea|_ ei)=nai to\\ to/de meta\\\ntou=de, tau)ta\\ a(rmo/sei le/gein a(/per pro\\s e(ka/teron tou/t\u00f4n\ne)/mprosthen ei)/r\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Footnote 336: Ibid. b. 32-39. [Greek: \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(s e)/n tini tau)t\u00f4=|\ndektik\u00f4=|], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 337: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. [Greek: ou)/te ga\\r\npro\\s e(/teron au)t\u00f4n e(ka/teron dei= le/gesthai ou)/te pro\\s\ntau)to\\n to\\ tucho/n, a)lla\\ pro\\s to\\ t\u00ea=s a)ndrei/as te/los, oi(=on\npro\\s tou\\s polemikou\\s kindu/nous \u00ea)\\ ei)/ ti ma=llon tou/tou\nte/los.]]\n\n[Footnote 338: Ibid. a. 14-19.]\n\n34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct\nparts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition\nof A and B; _e.g._, animal is the composition of soul and body. You\nwill first note that the definer has not declared what sort of\ncomposition. There is a great difference between one mode of\ncomposition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and\nbone may be defined--a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one\nmode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these\nsame elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define\na compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially\ndisparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.[339]\n\n[Footnote 339: Ibid. a. 20-31.]\n\n35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two\ncontrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other\nof them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is\nadmissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition\nthere would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which\nhas been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the\nsoul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also\nrecipient of ignorance.[340]\n\n[Footnote 340: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]\n\n36. Perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable\nyou to attack the definition as a whole, but you may find arguments\nagainst one or other of its parts; this is sufficient to upset it. If\nit be obscure and unintelligible, you should help to correct and\nre-model it until it becomes clear; you will then see what are the\nreally assailable points in it. When you indicate and expose the\nobscurity, the respondent must either substitute some clearer\nexposition of his own meaning, or else he must acquiesce in that\nwhich you propose as substitute.[341] If the improved definition\nwhich you propose is obviously clearer and better, his previous\ndefinition is of course put out of court; since there cannot be\nseveral definitions of the same subject.[342]\n\n[Footnote 341: Topic. VI. xiv. p. 151, b. 3-11. [Greek: o(/soi t'\na)saphei=s t\u00f4=n o(rism\u00f4=n, sundiorth\u00f4/santa kai\\ susch\u00eamati/santa\npro\\s to\\ d\u00ealou=n ti kai\\ e)/chein e)pichei/r\u00eama, ou(/t\u00f4s\ne)piskopei=n; a)nagkai=on ga\\r t\u00f4=| a)pokrinome/n\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ de/chesthai\nto\\ e)klambano/menon u(po\\ tou= e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntos, \u00ea)\\ au)to\\n diasaph\u00ea=sai\nti/ pote tugcha/nei to\\ d\u00ealou/menon u(po\\ tou= lo/gou.]]\n\n[Footnote 342: Ibid. b. 12-17.]\n\nTo conclude, one suggestion may be given bearing upon all the\narguments that you have to carry on against definitions tendered by\nrespondents:--Reflect on the definiend, and frame a definition of it\nfor yourself, as cleverly as you can at the moment; or call to mind\nany good definition of it which you may have heard before. This will\nserve you as a standard with which to compare the definition\ntendered, so that you will see at once what there is in it either\ndefective or redundant, and where you can find arguments against\nit.[343]\n\n[Footnote 343: Ibid. b. 18-23. [Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea ga\\r, \u00f4(/sper pro\\s\npara/deigma the\u00f4/menon, to/ t' e)llei=pon \u00f4(=n pros\u00ea=ken e)/chein\nto\\n o(rismo\\n kai\\ to\\ proskei/menon perie/rg\u00f4s kathora=n, \u00f4(/ste\nma=llon e)picheir\u00eama/t\u00f4n eu)porei=n.]]\n\n\nVII.\n\nIn the Seventh Book of the Topica Aristotle continues his review of\nthe manner of debating theses which profess to define, but enters\nalso on a collateral question connected with that discussion: viz.,\nBy what arguments are we to determine whether two Subjects or\nPredicates are the same _Numero_ (_modo maxime proprio_), as\ndistinguished from being the same merely _Specie_ or _Genere_? To\nmeasure the extent of identity between any two subjects, is important\ntowards the attack and defence of a definition.[344]\n\n[Footnote 344: Ibid. VII. i. p. 151, b. 28: [Greek: po/teron de\\\ntau)to\\n \u00ea)\\ e(/teron kata\\ to\\n kuri\u00f4/taton t\u00f4=n r(\u00eathe/nt\u00f4n peri\\\ntau)tou= tro/p\u00f4n (e)le/geto de\\ kuri\u00f4/tata tau)to\\n to\\ t\u00f4=|\na)rithm\u00f4=| e(/n)] &c.]\n\nTwo subjects (A and B) being affirmed as the same _numero_, you may\ntest this by examining the Derivatives, the Co-ordinates, and the\nOpposites, of each. Thus, if courage is identical with justice, the\ncourageous man will be identical with the just man; courageously will\nbe identical with justly. Likewise, the opposite of courage (in all\nthe four modes of Opposition) will be identical with the opposite of\njustice. Then, again, the generators and destroyers, the generations\nand destructions, of courage, will be identical with those of\njustice.[345] If there be any predicate applied to courage in the\nsuperlative degree, the same predicate will also be applied to\njustice in the superlative degree.[346] If there be a third subject C\nwith which A is identical, B also will be identical therewith. The\nsame attributes predicable of A will also be predicable of B; and, if\nthe two be attributes, each will be predicable of the same subjects\nof which the other is predicable. Both will be comprised in the same\nCategory, and will have the same genus and differentia. Both will\nincrease or diminish under the same circumstances. Each, when added\nto or subtracted from any third subject, will yield the same\nresult.[347]\n\n[Footnote 345: Ibid. p. 152, a. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 346: Topic. VII. p. 152, a. 5-30: [Greek: skopei=n de\\ kai\\\n\u00f4(=n tha/teron ma/lista le/getai o(tiou=n, ei) kai\\ tha/teron t\u00f4=n\nau)t\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n kata\\ to\\ au)to\\ ma/lista le/getai, katha/per\nXenokra/t\u00eas to\\n eu)dai/mona bi/on kai\\ to\\n spoudai=on a)podei/knusi\nto\\n au)to/n, e)peid\u00ea\\ pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n bi/\u00f4n ai(ret\u00f4/tatos o( spoudai=os\nkai\\ o( eu)dai/m\u00f4n; e(\\n ga\\r to\\ ai(ret\u00f4/taton kai\\ to\\ me/giston;]\n&c.\n\nAristotle remarks that Xenokrates here carried his inference too far:\nthat the application of the same superlative predicate to A and B\naffords indeed a presumption that they are _Idem numero_, but not a\nconclusive proof thereof; that the predicate might be applied in like\nmanner, if B were a species comprised in A as genus.\n\nXenokrates made the mistake of drawing an affirmative conclusion from\nsyllogistic premisses in the Second figure.]\n\n[Footnote 347: Topic. VII. i. p. 152, a. 31-b. 16.]\n\nFarther, in examining the thesis (A is identical _numero_ with B) you\nmust look not merely whether it involves actually any impossible\nconsequences, but also whether any cases can be imagined in which it\nwould involve such;[348] whether the identity is not merely _specie_\nor _genere_; finally, whether the one can exist without the\nother.[349]\n\n[Footnote 348: Ibid. b. 17-24. Aristotle illustrates this _locus_ as\nfollows:--Some say that to be _void_, and to be _full of air_, are\nthe same. But suppose the air to be drawn away; then the place will\nno longer be full of air, yet it will still be void, even more than\nit was before. One of the two terms declared to be identical is thus\nwithdrawn, while the other remains. Accordingly, the two are not\nreally identical. This illustration fits better to the principle laid\ndown, b. 34: [Greek: ei) du/naton tha/teron a)/neu thate/rou ei)=nai;\nou) ga\\r a)\\n ei)/\u00ea tau)to/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 349: Ibid. b. 25-35.]\n\nSuch are the various _loci_ available for argument against the thesis\naffirming the equivocal predicate _same_. All of them may be useful\nwhen you are impugning a definition; for the characteristic of this\nis to declare that the defining proposition is equivalent or\nidentical with the defined name; and, if you can disprove such\nidentity, you upset the definition. But these _loci_ will be of\nlittle avail, if your task is to defend or uphold a definition; for,\neven if you succeed in establishing the above-mentioned identity, the\ndefinition may still be open to attack for other weaknesses or\ndefects.[350]\n\n[Footnote 350: Ibid. ii. p. 152, b. 36-p. 158, a. 5. [Greek:\na(/pantes oi( pro\\s tau)to\\n a)naskeuastikoi\\ to/poi kai\\ pro\\s\no(/ron chr\u00ea/simoi--t\u00f4=n de\\ kataskeuastik\u00f4=n to/p\u00f4n ou)dei\\s\nchr\u00ea/simos pro\\s o(/ron;] &c.]\n\nTo uphold, or prove by way of syllogism, requires a different\nprocedure. It is a task hard, but not impossible. Most disputants\nassume without proving their definition, in the same way as the\nteachers of Geometry and Arithmetic do in their respective sciences.\nAristotle tells us that he does not here intend to give a didactic\nexposition of Definition, nor of the proper way of defining\naccurately or scientifically. To do this (he says) belongs to the\nprovince of Analytic; while in the present treatise he is dealing\nmerely with Dialectic. For the purposes, then, of Dialectic, he\ndeclares that syllogistic proof of a definition is practicable,\ninasmuch as the definition is only a proposition declaring what is\nessential to the definiend; and nothing is essential except genus (or\ngenera) and differenti\u00e6.[351]\n\n[Footnote 351: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, a. 6-22. Compare Analyt.\nPost. II. iii.-x., where the theory of Scientific Definition is\nelaborately worked out; supra, Vol. I. ch. viii. pp. 346-353.]\n\nTowards the establishment of the definition which you have to defend,\nyou may find arguments by examining the Contraries and Opposites of\nthe component terms, and of the defining proposition. If the opposite\nof the definition is allowed as defining properly the opposite of the\ndefiniend, you may argue from hence that your own definition is a\ngood one.[352] If you can show that there is declared in your\ndefinition a partial correspondence of contraries either separately\nin the genus, or separately in the differentia, you have a certain\nforce of argument in your favour; and, if you can make out both the\ntwo separately, this will suffice for your entire definition.[353]\nYou may also draw arguments from the Derivatives, or Co-ordinates of\nyour own terms; from Analogous Terms, or from Comparates (More or\nLess). If the definition of any one of these is granted to you, an\nargument is furnished for the defence of an analogous definition in\nthe case of your own term. If it is conceded as a good definition\nthat forgetfulness is--the casting away of knowledge, then the\ndefinition must also hold good that to forget is--to cast away\nknowledge. If destruction is admitted to be well defined--dissolution\nof essence, then to be destroyed is well defined--to be dissolved as\nto essence. If the wholesome may be defined--that which is productive\nof health, then also the profitable may be defined--that which is\nproductive of good; that is, if the declaration of the special end\nmakes a good definition in one case, so it will also in the\nother.[354]\n\n[Footnote 352: Ibid. a. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\\r o( a)ntikei/menos tou=\na)ntikeime/nou, kai\\ to\\n ei)r\u00eame/nou tou= prokeime/nou a)na/gk\u00ea\nei)=nai (o(/ron).]]\n\n[Footnote 353: Ibid. b. 14: [Greek: katho/lou d' ei)pei=n, e)pei\\ o(\no(rismo/s e)stin e)k ge/nous kai\\ diaphor\u00f4=n, a)\\n o( tou= e)nanti/ou\no(rismo\\s phanero\\s \u00ea)=|, kai\\ o( tou= prokeime/nou o(rismo\\s\nphanero\\s e)/stai.]]\n\n[Footnote 354: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, b. 25-p. 154, a. 11: [Greek:\ne)/ti e)k t\u00f4=n pt\u00f4/se\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n sustoi/ch\u00f4n; a)na/gk\u00ea a)kolouthei=n\nta\\ ge/n\u00ea toi=s ge/nesin kai\\ tou\\s o(/rous toi=s o(/rois.--e(no\\s\nou)=n o(poiouou=n t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n o(mol\u00eathe/ntos, a)na/gk\u00ea ki\\ ta\\\nloipa\\ o(mologei=sthai.--kai\\ e)k t\u00f4=n o(moi/\u00f4s e)cho/nt\u00f4n pro\\s\na)/ll\u00eala--o(moi/\u00f4s ga\\r e(/kaston t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n pro\\s to\\\noi)kei=on te/los e)/chei.]]\n\nThese _loci_, from _Analoga_, from Derivatives, from Conjugates, are\nof the most frequent avail in dialectical debates or definitions. The\ndisputant must acquire promptitude in the employment of them. He must\nlearn, moreover, to test a definition tendered to him by calling to\nmind particulars and sub-species, so as to determine whether the\ndefinition fits them all. Such a procedure will be found especially\nserviceable in debate with one who upholds the Platonic Ideas. Care\nmust also be taken to see whether the definiend is distorted from its\nproper signification, or whether it is used in defining itself.[355]\n\n[Footnote 355: Topic. VII. iv. p. 154, a. 12-22.]\n\nThese last observations are addressed to the questioner or assailant\nof the definition. We have already seen however that his task is\ncomparatively easy; the grand difficulty is to defend a definition.\nThe respondent cannot at once see what he ought to aim at; and, even\nwhen he does see it, he has farther difficulty in obtaining the\nrequisite concessions from his opponent, who may decline to grant\nthat the two parts of the definition tendered are really the genus\nand differentia of the definiend; while, if there be any thing\nbesides these two parts contained in the essence of the definiend,\nthere is an excuse for declining to grant it.[356] The opponent\nsucceeds, if he can establish one single contradictory instance;\naccordingly, a syllogism with particular conclusion will serve his\npurpose. The respondent on the other hand, must meet each one of\nthese instances, must establish an universal conclusion, and must\nshow that his definition reciprocates with the definiend, so that,\nwherever the latter is predicable, the former is predicable likewise,\nand not in any other case whatever.[357]\n\n[Footnote 356: Topic. VII. v. p. 154, a. 23, seq. [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r\ni)dei=n au)to\\n kai\\ labei=n para\\ t\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4t\u00f4me/n\u00f4n ta\\s toiau/tas\nprota/seis ou)k eu)pete/s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 357: Ibid. a. 32-b. 12.]\n\nSo much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a\nDefinition, as compared with the attack upon it; and the same may be\nsaid about attack and defence of a Proprium, and of a Genus. In both\ncases, the assailant will carry his point, if he can show that the\npredicate in question is not predicable, in this relation, of all, or\nthat it is not predicable, in this relation, of any one. But the\ndefendant is required to make good the universal against every\nseparate objection advanced against any one of the particulars. It is\na general rule, that the work of destruction is easier than that of\nconstruction; and the present cases come under that rule.[358] The\nhardest of all theses to defend, and the easiest to overthrow, is\nwhere Definition is affirmed; for the respondent in this case is\nrequired to declare well the essence of his subject, and he stands in\nneed of the greatest number of auxiliary data; while all the _Loci_\nfor attack, even those properly belonging to the Proprium, the Genus,\nand the Accident, are available against him.[359] Next in order, as\nregards difficulty of defence, comes the theses affirming Proprium;\nwhere the respondent has to make out, not merely that the predicate\nbelongs to the subject, but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and\nreciprocally: here also all the _Loci_ for attack, even those\nproperly belonging to Accident, are available.[360] Easiest of all\ntheses to defend, while it is the hardest to impugn, is that in which\nAccident alone is affirmed--the naked fact, that the predicate A\nbelongs to the Subject B, without investing it with the character\neither of Genus or Proprium. Here what is affirmed is a minimum,\nrequiring the smallest array of data to be conceded; moreover, the\n_Loci_ available for attack are the fewest, since many of those which\nmay be employed against Genus, Proprium, and Definition, have no\napplication against a thesis affirming merely Accident.[361] Indeed,\nif the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular (and not\nuniversal), affirming Accident (and nothing more), the task of\nrefuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it.[362]\n\n[Footnote 358: Ibid. b. 13-32. [Greek: e)/oike d', \u00f4(/sper kai\\ e)n\ntoi=s a)/llois to\\ diaphthei=rai toi= poi\u00ea=sai r(a=|on, ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\\ne)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n to\\ a)naskeua/sai tou= kataskeua/sai.]]\n\n[Footnote 359: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3-21: [Greek: phanero\\n de\\\nkai\\ dio/ti pa/nt\u00f4n r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai.]]\n\n[Footnote 360: Ibid. a. 23-27. Aristotle has in view the most\ncomplete Proprium: belonging _omni_, _soli_, _et semper_.]\n\n[Footnote 361: Ibid. a. 28-36: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\\ pa/nt\u00f4n\nkataskeua/sai to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s;--a)naskeua/zein de\\ chalep\u00f4/taton to\\\nsumbeb\u00eako/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)t\u00f4=| de/dotai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 362: Ibid. p. 154, b. 36-p. 155, a. 2: [Greek: to\\ d' e)pi\\\nme/rous a)na/palin r(a=|on kataskeua/sai \u00ea)\\ a)naskeua/sai;\nkataskeua/zonti me\\n ga\\r a)po/chr\u00ea dei=xai tini\\ u(pa/rchon,\na)naskeua/zonti de\\ deikte/on o(/ti ou)deni\\ u(pa/rchei.]]\n\n\nVIII.\n\nThe Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the\ngeneral considerations contained in the First. In the intervening\npart of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of\ndialectical problems, with the enumeration of those _Loci_ of\nargument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the\napplication of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to\nlook once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical\ndebate. What is the order of procedure most suitable, first, for the\nquestioner or assailant; next, for the respondent or defender?[363]\nThis order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation\nbetween the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher: to\nboth of them the _Loci_ of arguments are alike available, though each\nof them deals with those arguments in his own way, and in an\narrangement suitable for his purpose.[364] The dialectician, being\nengaged in debate, must shape his questions, and regulate his march\nas questioner, according to the concessions obtained or likely to be\nobtained from his respondent; who, if a question be asked having an\nobvious refutative bearing on the thesis, will foresee the\nconsequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to\ngrant what is asked. On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues\ninvestigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no\nsimilar restriction. He looks out at once for such premisses as\nconduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing\non the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and\nthe better will he be pleased.[365]\n\n[Footnote 363: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 3: [Greek: meta\\ de\\ tau=ta\nperi\\ ta/xe\u00f4s, kai\\ p\u00f4=s dei= e)r\u00f4ta=n, lekte/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 364: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 7: [Greek: me/chri me\\n\nou)=n tou= eu(rei=n to\\n to/pon, o(moi/\u00f4s tou= philoso/phou kai\\ tou=\ndialektikou= \u00ea( ske/psis, to\\ d' \u00ea)/d\u00ea tau=ta ta/ttein kai\\\ne)r\u00f4t\u00eamati/zein i)/dion tou= dialektikou=.]]\n\n[Footnote 365: Ibid. b. 10-16.]\n\nIn the _praxis dialectica_ (as has already been stated) two talkers\nare assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes\nto defend, and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn\nit; or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an\ninconsistent or contradictory manner. We are to assume, farther, a\ncircle of listeners, who serve to a certain extent as guarantees\nagainst any breach of the rules of debate.[366] Three distinct\npurposes may be supposed in the debate. 1. You as a questioner may be\na teacher, and the respondent a learner; your purpose is to teach\nwhat you know, while he wishes to learn from you what he does not\nknow. 2. You engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the\nrespondent, each of you seeking only victory over the other, though\nsubject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate. 3. You\nneither seek to teach, nor to conquer; you and the respondent have\nboth the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of\ndifferent admissions, and to acquire a larger command of the chains\nof reasoning _pro_ and _con_, bearing on some given topic.[367]\n\n[Footnote 366: Ibid. ii. p. 158, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 367: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\\r oi( au)toi\\\nskopoi\\ toi=s dida/skousin \u00ea)\\ mantha/nousi kai\\ toi=s\na)gn\u00f4nizome/nois, ou)de\\ tou/tois te kai\\ toi=s diatri/bousi met'\na)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n ske/psis cha/rin.]]\n\nAccording as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three,\nthe good or bad conduct of the dialogue, on the part both of\nquestioner and of respondent, must be differently appreciated. Of\neach of the three, specimens may be found in Plato, though not\ncarefully severed but running one into the other. Aristotle appears\nto have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically,\nand to prescribe for the practice of each separately. He tells us\nparticularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the\nthird head, and prescribed for it apart from the second. The merit of\nhaving first done this he expressly claims for the Topica.[368]\n\n[Footnote 368: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, a. 25-37: [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\ne)sti\\n a)dio/rista toi=s gumnasi/as kai\\ pei/ras e(/neka tou\\s\nlo/gous poioume/nois--e)n de\\ tai=s dialektikai=s suno/dois toi=s m\u00ea\\\na)g\u00f4=nos cha/rin a)lla\\ pei/ras kai\\ ske/pse\u00f4s tou\\s lo/gous\n**poioume/nois, ou) **di\u00ea/rthr\u00f4tai/ p\u00f4 ti/nos dei= stocha/zesthai\nto\\n a)pokrino/menon kai\\ o(poi=a dido/nai kai\\ poi=a m\u00ea/, pro\\s to\\\nkal\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s phula/ttein t\u00ea\\n the/sin. _e)pei\\ ou)=n ou)de\\n\ne)/chomen paradedome/non u(p' a)/ll\u00f4n, au)toi/ ti peirath\u00f4=men\nei)pei=n_.]]\n\nBoth the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the\ndialogue; their common purpose is to conduct it well, not only\nobeying the peremptory rules, but displaying, over and above, skill\nfor the attainment of their separate ends. Under the first and third\nheads, both may be alike successful. Under the second or contentious\nhead, indeed, one only of the two can gain the victory; yet, still,\neven the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his\nposition admits. This is sufficient for his credit; so that the\ncommon work will still be well performed.[369] But a partner who\nperforms his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this\ncommon work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered\ncontention rather than of regular Dialectic--deserves censure.[370]\n\n[Footnote 369: Ibid. xi. p. 161, a. 19-b. 10: [Greek: ou) ga\\r\ne)/stin e)pi\\ thate/r\u00f4| mo/non to\\ lal\u00f4=s e)pitelesth\u00ea=nai to\\\nkoino\\n e)/rgon--e)pei\\ de\\ phau=los koin\u00f4no\\s o( e)mpodi/z\u00f4n to\\\nkoino\\n e)/rgon, d\u00ea=lon o(/ti kai\\ e)n lo/g\u00f4|.] Compare Topica, I.\niii. p. 101, b. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 370: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dialektik\u00f4=s kai\\ _m\u00ea\\_\ne)ristik\u00f4=s].--b. 2-18.]\n\nHaving thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit,\nAristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the\nresponding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set\nup by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is\nrequired to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and\nyour business is so to shape your questions as to induce the\nrespondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism.\nIf you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he\nsees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin\nyour approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions\nbearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate\nconclusion.[371] These outlying and preparatory questions will fall\nunder four principal heads. Either (1) they will be inductive\nparticulars, multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an\nuniversal comprising them all; or (2) they will be put for the\npurpose of giving dignity to your discourse; or (3) they will be\nshaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate\nconclusion that you aim at; or (4), lastly, they will be introduced\nto make your whole argument clearer.[372] The third of these four\ngeneral heads--the head of questions for the purpose of\nconcealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for\nvictory. In those it is of supreme importance, and the result depends\nmuch on the employment of it; but even in other dialectical debates\nyou must employ it to a certain extent.[373]\n\n[Footnote 371: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 29: [Greek: ta\\s me\\n ou)=n\na)nagkai/as, di' \u00f4(=n o( sullogismo/s, ou)k eu)thu\\s au)ta\\s\nprotate/on, a)ll' a)postate/on o(/ti a)n\u00f4ta/t\u00f4], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 372: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 373: Ibid. b. 26.]\n\nAristotle goes at great length into the means of Concealment. Suppose\nthe proposition which you desire to get conceded is, The science of\ntwo contraries is the same. You will find it useful to commence by a\nquestion more general: _e.g._, Is the science of two opposites the\nsame? If the respondent answers in the affirmative, you will deduce\nfrom his concession, by syllogism, the conclusion which you desire.\nIf he answers in the negative, you must then try to arrive at your\nend by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or\nopposites; which if the respondent grants successively, you will\nbring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result\nfrom those concessions.[374] Your particulars must be selected from\nobvious matters of sense and notoriety. You are likely to obtain in\nthis way admissions which will serve as premisses for several\ndifferent prosyllogisms, not indeed sufficient by themselves, yet\nvaluable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism\nwhereby the thesis is refuted. For, when the questions are put in\nthis way, the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences\nof his own concessions; so that he will more readily concede what you\nwant.[375] The better to conceal your purpose, you will refrain from\ndrawing out any of these prosyllogisms clearly at once; you will not\neven put the major and minor premiss of any one of them in immediate\nsequence; but you will confound the order of them intentionally,\nstating first a premiss belonging to one, and next a premiss\nbelonging to another.[376] The respondent, thus kept in the dark,\nanswers in the affirmative to each of your questions successively. At\nlength you find that you have obtained a sufficient number of\nconcessions from him, to enable you to prove the syllogism\ncontradictory of his thesis. You inform him of this; and it shows the\nperfect skill and success of your procedure, when he expresses\nsurprise at the announcement, and asks on what premisses you\nreckon.[377]\n\n[Footnote 374: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)\\n de\\ m\u00ea\\ tith\u00ea=|, di'\ne)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s l\u00eapte/on, protei/nanta e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n kata\\ me/ros\ne)nanti/\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 375: Ibid. p. 156, a. 7: [Greek: kru/ptonta de\\\nprosullogi/zesthai di' \u00f4(=n o( sullogismo\\s tou= e)x a)rch\u00ea=s me/llei\ngi/nesthai, kai\\ tau=ta \u00f4(s plei=sta.]]\n\n[Footnote 376: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: chr\u00ea/simon de\\ kai\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\\nsunech\u00ea= ta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata lamba/nein e)x \u00f4(=n oi( sullogismoi/, a)ll'\ne)nalla\\x to\\ pro\\s e(/teron kai\\ e(/teron sumpe/rasma.]]\n\n[Footnote 377: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, a. 13: [Greek: katho/lou d'\nei)pei=n, ou(/t\u00f4 dei= e)r\u00f4ta=n to\\n kruptik\u00f4=s punthano/menon, \u00f4(/st'\n\u00ea)r\u00f4t\u00eame/nou tou= panto\\s lo/gou kai\\ ei)po/ntos to\\ sumpe/rasma\nz\u00eatei=sthai to\\ dia\\ ti/.]]\n\nThere are also other manoeuvres serving your purpose of concealment,\nand preventing the respondent from seeing beforehand the full\npertinence of your questions. Thus, if you wish to obtain the\ndefinition of your major, you will do well to ask the definition, not\nof the term itself but, of some one among its conjugates. You will\nput your question, as if the answer were of little importance in\nitself, and as if you did not care whether it was given in the\naffirmative or in the negative;[378] you will sometimes even suggest\nobjections to that which you are seeming to aim at. All this will\ngive you the air of a candid disputant; it will throw the respondent\noff his guard, and make him more ready to answer as he really thinks,\nwithout alarm for the consequences.[379] When you wish to get a\ncertain premiss conceded, you will put the question first upon a\ndifferent premiss analogous to it. In putting your question, you will\nadd that the answer which you desire is a matter of course, familiar\nand admitted by every one; for respondents are shy of contradicting\nany received belief, unless they have present to their minds a clear\ninstance adverse to it.[380] You will never manifest apparent\nearnestness about an answer; which would make the respondent less\nwilling to concede it.[381] You will postpone until the last the\npremiss which you wish to obtain, and will begin by putting questions\nthe answers to which serve as remote premisses behind it, only in the\nend conducting to it as consequence. Generally speaking, questioners\ndo the reverse, putting first the questions about which they are most\nanxious; while most respondents, aware of this habit, are most\nintractable in regard to the first questions, except some\npresumptuous and ill-tempered disputants, who concede what is asked\nat first but afterwards become obstinate in denegation.[382] You will\nthrow in some irrelevant questions with a view to lengthen the\nprocedure, like fallacious geometers who complicate a diagram by\ndrawing unnecessary lines. Amidst a multitude of premisses falsehood\nis more likely to escape detection; and thus, also, you may perhaps\nbe able to slip in, unperceived and in a corner, some important\npremiss, which, if put as a separate question by itself, would\ncertainly not have been granted.[383]\n\n[Footnote 378: Ibid. b. 6: [Greek: a(pl\u00f4=s d' ei)pei=n, o(/ti\nma/lista poiei=n a)/d\u00ealon, po/teron to\\ proteino/menon \u00ea)\\ to\\\na)ntikei/menon bou/letai labei=n; a)d\u00ea/lou ga\\r o)/ntos tou= pro\\s\nto\\n lo/gon chr\u00easi/mou, ma=llon to\\ dokou=n au(toi=s tithe/asin.]]\n\n[Footnote 379: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dei= de\\ kai\\ au)to/n pote\nau(t\u00f4=| e)/nstasin phe/rein; a)nupo/pt\u00f4s ga\\r e)/chousin oi(\na)pokrino/menoi pro\\s tou\\s dokou=ntas dikai/\u00f4s e)picheirei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 380: Ibid. b. 10, 20: [Greek: chr\u00ea/simon de\\ kai\\ to\\\ne)pile/gein o(/ti su/n\u00eathes kai\\ lego/menon to\\ toiou=ton; o)knou=si\nga\\r kinei=n to\\ ei)\u00f4tho/s, e)/nstasin m\u00ea\\ e)/chontes.]]\n\n[Footnote 381: Ibid. b. 23: [Greek: e)/ti to\\ m\u00ea\\ spouda/zein].]\n\n[Footnote 382: Ibid. b. 30-39: [Greek: kai\\ to\\ e)p' e)scha/t\u00f4|\ne)r\u00f4ta=n o(\\ ma/lista bou/letai labei=n;] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 383: Topic. VIII. i. p. 157, a. 1-5: [Greek: e)/ti to\\\nm\u00eaku/nein kai\\ paremba/llein ta\\ m\u00eade\\n chr\u00ea/sima pro\\s to\\n lo/gon,\nkatha/per oi( pseudographou=ntes; poll\u00f4=n ga\\r o)/nt\u00f4n a)/d\u00ealon e)n\no(poi/\u00f4| to\\ pseu=dos. dio\\ kai\\ lantha/nousin e)ni/ote oi(\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntes e)n parabu/st\u00f4| prostithe/ntes a(\\ kath' au(ta\\\nproteino/mena ou)k a)\\n tethei/\u00ea.]]\n\nSuch are the multifarious suggestions addressed by Aristotle to the\nquestioner for concealing his method of attack;[384] Concealment\nbeing the third of the four general heads relating to the treatment\nof premisses not immediately necessary for proof of the final\nrefutative conclusion. On the other three general heads--Induction\nfrom particulars to an universal, Dignity, Clearness--Aristotle goes\ninto less detail. For Clearness, he recommends that examples should\nbe introduced; especially familiar examples, taken from well-known\npoets like Homer, not from obscure poets like Choerilus.[385]\n\n[Footnote 384: Ibid. a. 6: [Greek: ei)s me\\n ou)=n pru/psin toi=s\nei)r\u00eame/nois chr\u00easte/on], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 385: Ibid. a. 14.]\n\nIn regard to Induction, Aristotle points out an embarrassment often\narising from the want of suitable universal names. When, after having\nobtained an affirmative answer about several similar particulars, you\nwish to put a question generalizing the result, you will sometimes\nfind no universal term fitting the position. You are obliged to say:\nWill it not be so in all such cases? and this lets in a serious\ndifficulty, how to know what other cases are like, and what are not.\nHere the respondent will often dispute your right to include this or\nthat other particular.[386] You will do well to coin a new universal\nterm fitting the situation.\n\n[Footnote 386: Ibid. ii. p. 157, a. 18-33. [Greek: dio\\ peirate/on\ne)pi\\ pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n o)nomatopoiei=n au)to/n], &c.]\n\nIf the respondent answers in the affirmative to several questions of\nsimilar particulars, but answers in the negative when you sum them up\nin an universal comprehending all similar cases,--you may require him\nto cite some particular case justifying his denial; though you cannot\nrequire him to do this before he has made the affirmative\nanswers.[387] It is not sufficient that he should cite, as the single\ncase of exception, the express case which forms the subject of the\nthesis: He ought to produce some distinct and independent instance,\nreally comprised within the genus, and not merely connected with it\nby the link of an equivocal term.[388] If he produces an adverse\ninstance really comprised within the genus, you may perhaps be able\nto re-model your question, so as to make reserve for the basis on\nwhich this objection is founded. The respondent will then be\ncompelled (unless he can foresee some new case of objection) to\nconcede the universal with this special qualification; so that you\nwill have gained all that you really require. Should the respondent\ncontinue to refuse, without producing any new case, he will\ntransgress the rules of Dialectic; which recognize an universal\naffirmative, wherever there are numerous affirmative particulars\nwithout one assignable negative.[389] Indeed, if you know the\nuniversal to hold in many particular cases, and do not know of any\nothers adverse, you may boldly put your question at once in reference\nto the universal (without going first through the series of\nparticulars). The respondent will hardly venture to deny it, not\nhaving in his mind any negative particulars.[390]\n\n[Footnote 387: Ibid. a. 34-37.]\n\n[Footnote 388: Ibid. a. 37-b. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 389: Topic. VIII. ix. p. 1577, b. 8-33. [Greek: dialektik\u00ea\\\nga/r e)sti pro/tasis pro\\s \u00ea(\\n ou(/t\u00f4s e)pi\\ poll\u00f4=n e)/chousan m\u00ea\\\ne)/stin e)/nstasis.]]\n\n[Footnote 390: Ibid. p. 158, a. 3-6.]\n\nYou must however keep in mind what a dialectic universal premiss\nreally is. Not every question requiring an universal answer is\nallowed to be put. You must not ask for positive information, nor put\nsuch questions as the following: What is man? In how many different\nsenses is good employed? A dialectic question is one to which the\nrespondent makes sufficient reply by saying, Yes or No.[391] You must\nask in this form: Is the definition of man so and so? Is good\nenunciated in this or that different sense? To these questions the\nrespondent may answer Yes or No. But if he persists in negative\nanswers to your multiplied questions as to this or that sense of the\nterm good, you may perhaps stand excused for asking him: \"In how many\ndifferent senses, then, do you yourself use the term good?\"[392]\n\n[Footnote 391: Ibid. p. 158, a. 14, seq. [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r\npro/tasis dialektik\u00ea\\ pro\\s \u00ea(\\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\\ \u00ea)\\\nou)/.]]\n\n[Footnote 392: Ibid. a. 21-24.]\n\nWhen you have obtained concessions which furnish premisses for a\nformal syllogism, you will draw out and propound that syllogism and\nits conclusion forthwith, without asking any farther question from\nthe respondent or any leave from him to do so. He may indeed deny\nyour right to do this, in spite of the concessions which he has made;\nand the auditors around, not fully appreciating all his concessions,\nmay perhaps think that he is entitled to deny it. But, if you ask his\nleave to draw out the syllogism and he refuses to give leave, the\nauditors are much more likely to think that your syllogism is not\nallowable.[393] If you have the choice between an ostensive syllogism\nand a _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you ought always to prefer the former,\nas plainer and more incontestable.[394]\n\n[Footnote 393: Ibid. a. 7-12: [Greek: ou) dei= de\\ to\\ sumpe/rasma\ne)r\u00f4/t\u00eama poiei=n; ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, a)naneu/santos ou) dokei= gegone/nai\nsullogismo/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 394: Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, b. 34-p. 158, a. 2.]\n\nYou must not persevere long in the same line of questions. For, if\nthe respondent answers them all, it will soon appear that you are in\nthe wrong course, since your syllogism, if you can get one at all,\nwill always be obtained from a small number of premisses; and, if the\nrespondent will not answer them, you have no alternative except to\nprotest and desist.[395]\n\n[Footnote 395: Ibid. p. 158, a. 25-30.]\n\nThe theses that are most difficult to attack are also most easy to\ndefend; and these are the highest universals, and the lowest\nparticulars. The highest you cannot deal with, unless you can get a\ndefinition of them; which is sometimes impossible and always\ndifficult; since the respondent will neither define them himself nor\naccept your definitions. Those which are next to the highest are also\ndifficult to impugn, because there are few intermediate steps of\nproof. Again, the lowest particulars are also difficult for the\ncontrary reason, that there are so many intermediate steps, and it is\ntedious to enumerate them all continuously; while, if any are\nomitted, the demonstration is incomplete, and the procedure will\nappear sophistical.[396] The most difficult of all to impugn are\ndefinitions framed in vague and unintelligible terms, where you do\nnot know whether they are univocal or equivocal, literal or\nmetaphorical. When the thesis tendered to you presents such\ndifficulty, you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of\nterms here indicated; or, at any rate, that its terms stand in need\nof definition.[397] In geometrical construction, as well as in\ndialectical debate, it is indispensable that the _principia_ or\nprimary terms should be defined, and defined properly; without this,\nneither the one nor the other can be pursued.[398]\n\n[Footnote 396: Ibid. iii. p. 158, a. 31, seq. [Greek: \u00ea)\\\nsophismat\u00f4/d\u00ea phai/netai ta\\ e)picheir\u00ea/mata.]]\n\n[Footnote 397: Ibid. iii. p. 158, b. 8-23; p. 159, a. 3: [Greek:\nou)/koun dei= lantha/nein, o(/tan dusepichei/r\u00eatos \u00ea)=| \u00ea( the/sis,\no(/ti pe/ponthe/ ti t\u00f4=n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 398: Ibid. p. 158, b. 24-p. 159, a. 2.]\n\nSometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic\nconclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of\naverage intelligence--than the thesis itself. In such a case some may\nthink that the respondent ought to grant these premisses, because, if\nhe refuses and requires them to be proved, he will be imposing upon\nthe questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes;\nothers may say that he ought not to grant them, because, if he did,\nhe would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses\nrequiring proof as much or more than itself.[399] A distinction must\nhere be made. If you are putting questions with a view to teach, the\nlearner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described,\nbecause he is entitled to require that in every step of the process\nhe shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less\nknowable. Accordingly, when you attempt to demonstrate to him\nsomething which he knows little, by requiring him to concede\nsomething which he knows still less, he cannot be advised to grant\nwhat you ask. But, if you are debating with a companion for the\npurpose of dialectical exercise, he ought to grant what you ask\nwhenever the affirmative really appears to him true.[400]\n\n[Footnote 399: Topic. VIII. iii. p. 159, a. 4-11. [Greek: o(/tan d'\n\u00ea)=| pro\\s to\\ a)xi/\u00f4ma kai\\ t\u00ea\\n pro/tasin mei=zon e)/rgon\ndialeg\u00ea=nai \u00ea)\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin, diapor\u00ea/seien a)/n tis po/teron\nthete/on ta\\ toiau=ta \u00ea)\\ ou)/;] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 400: Ibid. a. 11-14: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=| me\\n mantha/nonti ou)\nthete/on, a)\\n m\u00ea\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron \u00ea)=|, t\u00f4=| de\\ gumnazome/n\u00f4|\nthete/on, a)\\n a)l\u00eathe\\s mo/non phai/n\u00eatai. \u00f4(/ste phanero\\n o(/ti\nou)ch o(moi/\u00f4s e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nti/ te ki\\ dida/skonti a)xi\u00f4te/on tithe/nai.]\n\nThis section is obscure and difficult. I am not sure that I\nunderstand it. It seems doubtful whether the verb [Greek: tithe/nai]\nis intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent.]\n\nWe have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner\nhow to frame and marshal his interrogations. We must turn to the\nrespondent, and point out how _he_ must answer in order to do well\nand perform his duty to the common work of dialogue. Speaking\ngenerally, the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so\nas to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd\nreplies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has\nundertaken to defend; while the task of the respondent is to make it\nappear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself, and not\nfrom his manner of defending it. The respondent may err in one of two\nways, or indeed in both together: either he may set up an\nindefensible thesis; or he may fail to defend it in the best manner\nthat it really admits; or he may do both. The second is a worse error\nthan the first, in reference to the general purpose of\nDialectic.[401]\n\n[Footnote 401: Ibid. iv. p. 159, a. 15-24: [Greek: tou= d'\na)pokrinome/nou to\\ m\u00ea\\ di' au)to\\n phai/nesthai sumbai/nein to\\\na)du/naton \u00ea)\\ to\\ para/doxon, a)lla\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin; e(te/ra ga\\r\ni)/s\u00f4s a(marti/a to\\ the/sthai pr\u00f4=ton o(\\ m\u00ea\\ dei= kai\\ to\\\nthe/menon m\u00ea\\ phula/xai kata\\ tro/pon.]]\n\nAristotle distinguishes (as has been already stated) three purposes\nin the dialogue:--(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Contention, where\nboth questioner and respondent strive only for victory; (3)\nInvestigating and Testing the consequences of some given\ndoctrine.[402] The first two of these three are dismissed rapidly. In\nthe first, the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving, and\nthe pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears\nto him true.[403] In the second, Aristotle tells us only that the\nquestioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his\nown; while the respondent, on his side, must always appear as if no\npoint were made against him.[404] But in regard to the third\nhead--dialogues of Search, Testing, Exercise--he is more copious in\nsuggestions: he considers these as the proper field of Dialectic,\nand, as we saw, claims to have been the first who treated them apart\nfrom the didactic dialogues on one side, and the contentious on the\nother.[405]\n\n[Footnote 402: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 24-28.]\n\n[Footnote 403: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: t\u00f4=| me\\n ga\\r mantha/nonti\nthete/on a)ei\\ ta\\ dokou=nta; kai\\ ga\\r ou)/d' e)picheirei= pseu=dos\nou)dei\\s dida/skein.]]\n\n[Footnote 404: Topic. VIII. iv. p. 159,. a. 30: [Greek: t\u00f4=n d'\na)gn\u00f4nizome/n\u00f4n to\\n me\\n e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nta phai/nesthai/ ti dei= poiei=n\npa/nt\u00f4s, to\\n d' a)pokrino/menon m\u00eade\\n phai/nesthai pa/schein.]]\n\n[Footnote 405: Ibid. a. 32-37; xi. p. 161, a. 23-25: [Greek:\nduskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gn\u00f4nistika\\s kai\\ ou) dialektika\\s poiou=ntai\nta\\s diatriba/s; e)/ti d' e)pei\\ gumnasi/as kai\\ pei/ras cha/rin\na)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n], &c.]\n\nThe thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend (in a dialogue\nof Search or Testing) must be either probable, or improbable, or\nneither one nor the other. The probability or improbability may be\neither simple and absolute, or special and relative--in the\nestimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons.\nNow, if the thesis be improbable, the opposite thereof, which you the\nquestioner try to prove, must be probable; if the thesis be probable,\nthe opposite thereof must be improbable; if the thesis be neither,\nits opposite will also be neither. Suppose, first, that the thesis is\nimprobable absolutely. In that case, its opposite, which you the\nquestioner must fish for premisses to prove, will be probable; the\nrespondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is\neither simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which\nyou aim at proving; for no such concessions can really serve your\npurpose, since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses\nmore probable than itself.[406] Suppose, next, that the thesis is\nprobable absolutely. In that case, the opposite conclusion, which you\nhave to make out, will be improbable absolutely. Accordingly,\nwhenever you ask concessions that are probable, the respondent ought\nto grant them; whenever you ask for concessions that are less\nimprobable than your intended conclusion, he ought to grant these\nalso; but, if you ask for any thing more improbable than your\nintended conclusion, he ought to refuse it.[407] Suppose, thirdly,\nthat the thesis is neither probable nor improbable. Here, too, the\nrespondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him\nprobable, as well as all that he thinks more probable than the\nopposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at; but no\nothers. This is sufficient for the purpose of Dialectic, and for\nkeeping open the lines of probable argument.[408]\n\n[Footnote 406: Ibid. v. p. 159, b. 9: [Greek: phanero\\n \u00f4(s a)do/xou\nme\\n o)/ntos a(pl\u00f4=s tou= keime/nou ou) dote/on t\u00f4=| a)pokrinome/n\u00f4|\nou)/th' o(\\ m\u00ea\\ dokei= a(pl\u00f4=s, ou)/th' o(\\ dokei= me/n \u00ea(=tton de\\\ntou= sumpera/smatos dokei=. a)do/xou ga\\r ou)/s\u00eas t\u00ea=s the/se\u00f4s\ne)/ndoxon to\\ sumpe/rasma, \u00f4(/ste dei= ta\\ lambano/mena e)ndoxa\npa/nt' ei)=nai kai\\ ma=llon e)/ndoxa tou= prokeime/nou, ei) me/llei\ndia\\ t\u00f4=n gn\u00f4rim\u00f4te/r\u00f4n to\\ \u00ea(=tton gn\u00f4/rimon perai/nesthai. \u00f4(/st'\nei)/ ti m\u00ea\\ toiou=to/n e)sti t\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4t\u00f4me/n\u00f4n, ou) thete/on t\u00f4=|\na)pokrinome/n\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 407: Ibid. b. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 408: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, b. 19-23: [Greek: i(kan\u00f4=s\nga\\r a)\\n do/xeie dieile/chthai--ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r e)ndoxote/rous\nsumb\u00ea/setai tou\\s lo/gous gi/nesthai.]]\n\nWhen the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered\nsimply and absolutely, the respondent ought to measure his\nconcessions by the standard of opinion received usually.[409] When\nthe probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as\nreferable to the respondent himself, he has only to consult his own\njudgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked. When\nhe undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some\nknown philosopher, such as Herakleitus, he must, in giving his\nanswers, measure probability and improbability according to what\nHerakleitus would determine.[410]\n\n[Footnote 409: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: pro\\s ta\\ dokou=nta a(pl\u00f4=s t\u00ea\\n\n**su/gkrisin poi\u00eate/on].]\n\n[Footnote 410: Ibid. b. 25-35. [Greek: pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)kei/nou dia/noian\na)poble/ponta thete/on e(/kasta kai\\ a)rn\u00eate/on].]\n\nSince all the questions that you ask must be either probable,\nimprobable, or neuter, and either relevant[411] or not relevant to\nyour purpose of refuting the thesis, let us first suppose that you\nask for a concession which is in itself probable, but not relevant.\nThe respondent ought to grant it, adding that he thinks it probable.\nIf what you ask is neither probable nor relevant, he ought even then\nto grant it; but annexing a notification that he is aware of its\nimprobability, in order to save his own credit for intelligence.[412]\nIf it be both probable and relevant, he ought to say that he is aware\nof its probability, but that it is too closely connected with the\nthesis, and that, if he grants it, the thesis will stand refuted. If\nit be relevant, yet at the same time very improbable, he must reply\nthat, if he grants it, the thesis will be refuted, but that it is too\nsilly to be propounded. If, being neutral, it is also not relevant,\nhe ought to grant it without comment; but if, being neutral, it is\nrelevant, he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his\nthesis will be refuted.[413]\n\n[Footnote 411: Ibid. vi. p. 159, b. 39: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ pro\\s to\\n\nlo/gon, \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ pro\\s to\\n lo/gon]. By this phrase Aristotle seems to\nmean, not simply relevant, but closely, directly, conspicuously\nrelevant--equivalent to [Greek: li/an suneggu\\s tou= e)n a)rch\u00ea=|]\n(p. 160, a. 5).]\n\n[Footnote 412: Ibid. b. 36-p. 160, a. 2. [Greek: e)a\\n de\\ m\u00ea\\\ndokou=n kai\\ m\u00ea\\ pro\\s to\\n lo/gon, dote/on me/n, e)pis\u00eamante/on de\\\nto\\ m\u00ea\\ dokou=n pro\\s eu)la/beian eu)\u00eathei/as.]\n\nHow is this to be reconciled with what Aristotle says in the\npreceding chapter, p. 159, b. 11-18, that the respondent ought not to\ngrant such improbabilities at all?]\n\n[Footnote 413: Ibid. p. 160, a. 6-11.]\n\nIn this way of proceeding, the march of the dialogue on both sides\nwill be creditable. The respondent, signifying plainly that he\nunderstands the full consequences of his own concessions, will not\nappear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own, but only\nthrough what is inherent in his thesis; while you the questioner,\nhaving asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the\nconclusion to be established, and having had them granted, will have\nmade out your point. It must be understood that you ought not to try\nto prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself;\nand that, if you put questions of this sort, you transgress the rules\nof dialectical procedure.[414]\n\n[Footnote 414: Topic. VIII. vi. p. 160, a. 11-16. [Greek: ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r\no(/ t' a)pokrino/menos ou)de\\n do/xei di' au(to\\n pa/schein, e)a\\n\nproor\u00f4=n e(/kasta tith\u00ea=|, o(/ t' e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n teu/xetai sullogismou=\ntitheme/n\u00f4n au)t\u00f4=| pa/nt\u00f4n e)ndoxote/r\u00f4n tou= sumpera/smatos. o(/soi\nd' e)x a)doxote/r\u00f4n tou= sumpera/smatos e)picheirou=si\nsullogi/zesthai, d\u00ea=lon \u00f4(s ou) kal\u00f4=s sullogi/zontai; dio\\ toi=s\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4=sin ou) thete/on.]]\n\nIf you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language, the\nrespondent is bound to answer Yes or No. But if you ask it in terms\nobscure or equivocal, he is not obliged to answer thus directly. He\nis at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question;\nhe ought to have no scruple in telling you so, if such is really the\nfact. Suppose the terms of your question to be familiar, but\nequivocal; the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false,\nalike in all the different senses of the terms. In that case, the\nrespondent ought to answer Yes or No directly. But, if the answer\nwould be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in\nanother, he must take care to signify that he is aware of the\nequivocation, and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning; for,\nif the distinction is not noticed till afterwards, he cannot clearly\nshow that he was aware of it from the first. If he really was not at\nfirst aware of the equivocation, and gave an affirmative answer\nlooking only to one among the several distinct meanings, you will try\nto convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning. The best\nthing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight, and to\nexcuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same\nterm or the same proposition may mean several different things.[415]\n\n[Footnote 415: Ibid. vii. p. 160, a. 17-34.]\n\nSuppose you put several particular questions (or several analogous\nquestions) with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the\nconcession of an universal, comprising them all. If they are all both\ntrue and probable, the respondent must concede them all severally;\nyet he may still intend to answer No, when the universal is tendered\nto him after them. He has no right to answer thus, however, unless he\ncan produce some contradictory particular instance, real or apparent,\nto justify him; and, if he does so without such justification, he is\na perverse dialectician.[416] Perhaps he may try to sustain his\ndenegation of the universal, after having conceded many particulars,\nby a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning\nsuch as that of Zeno against motion; there being many such paradoxes\ncontradictory of probabilities, yet hard to refute. But this is no\nsufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal, when,\nafter having admitted many particulars, he can produce no particular\nadverse to them. The case will be still worse, if he refuses to admit\nthe universal, having neither any adverse instance, nor any\ncounter-ratiocinative attack. It is then the extreme of perverse\nDialectic.[417]\n\n[Footnote 416: Topic. VIII. viii. p. 160, b. 2-5: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r\na)/neu e)nsta/se\u00f4s, \u00ea)\\ ou)/s\u00eas \u00ea)\\ dokou/s\u00eas, k\u00f4lu/ein to\\n lo/gon\nduskolai/nein e)sti/n. ei) ou)=n e)pi\\ poll\u00f4=n phainome/nou m\u00ea\\\ndi/d\u00f4si to\\ katho/lou m\u00ea\\ e)/ch\u00f4n e)/nstasin, phanero\\n o(/ti\nduskolai/nei.]]\n\n[Footnote 417: Ibid. b. 5, seq. [Greek: e)/ti ei) m\u00ead'\na)ntepicheirei=n e)/chei o(/ti ou)k a)l\u00eathe/s, poll\u00f4=| ma=llon a)\\n\ndo/xeie duskolai/nein. kai/toi ou)de\\ tou=th' i(kano/n; pollou\\s ga\\r\nlo/gous e)/chomen e)nanti/ous tai=s do/xais, ou(\\s chalepo\\n lu/ein,\nkatha/per to\\n Z\u00ea/n\u00f4nos o(/ti ou)k e)nde/chetai kinei=sthai ou)de\\\nto\\ sta/dion dielthei=n; _a)ll' ou) dia\\ tou=to ta)ntikei/mena\ntou/tois ou) thete/on_.]]\n\nBefore the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition,\nhe ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it,\nand to have prepared himself for meeting them.[418] He must also be\ncautious of taking up improbable theses, in either of the senses of\nimprobable. For a thesis is so called when it involves strange and\nparadoxical developments, as if a man lays down either that every\nthing is in motion or that nothing is in motion; and also, when it\nimplies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men\nwish to be thought to hold, as, for example, the doctrine that\npleasure is the good, or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer\nwrong. If a man defends such theses as these, people hate him because\nthey presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for\ndialectical argument, but advocating them as convictions of his\nown.[419]\n\n[Footnote 418: Ibid. ix. p. 160, b. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 419: Ibid. b. 17-22: [Greek: a)/doxon d' u(po/thesin\neu)lab\u00eate/on u(pe/chein; ei)/\u00ea d' a)\\n a)/doxos dich\u00f4=s;] &c.]\n\nThe respondent must farther be able, if you bring against him a false\nsyllogistic reasoning, to distinguish upon which among your premisses\nthe false conclusion really turns, and to refute that one. Your\nreasoning may have more than one false premiss; but he must not\ncontent himself with refuting any one or any other: he must single\nout that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood.\nThus, if your syllogism be:--Every man in a sitting position is\nwriting, Sokrates is a man in a sitting position; therefore, Sokrates\nis writing,--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute\nyour minor premiss, though this may be false;[420] because such a\nrefutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men\nare sitting but not writing; and therefore it will not expose the\nfull bearing of the falsehood. Your major premiss is that upon which\nthe full bearing of the falsehood depends; and the respondent must\nshow that he is aware of this by refuting your major.[421]\n\n[Footnote 420: Topic. VIII. x. p. 160, b. 23-26. [Greek: ou) ga\\r o(\no(tiou=n a)nel\u00f4\\n le/luken, ou)/d' ei) pseu=do/s e)sti to\\\na)nairou/menon; e)/choi ga\\r a)\\n plei/\u00f4 pseud\u00ea= o( lo/gos.]]\n\n[Footnote 421: Ibid. b. 30-39. [Greek: oi)=de de\\ t\u00ea\\n lu/sin o(\nei)d\u00f4\\s o(/ti para\\ tou=to o( lo/gos--ou) ga\\r a)po/chr\u00ea to\\\ne)nst\u00ea=nai, ou)/d' a)\\n pseu=dos \u00ea)=| to\\ a)nairou/menon, a)lla\\ kai\\\ndio/ti pseu=dos a)podeikte/on; _ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r a)\\n ei)/\u00ea phanero\\n\npo/teron proor\u00f4=n ti \u00ea)\\ ou)\\ poiei=tai t\u00ea\\n e)/nstasin_.]]\n\nThis last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which\nyour false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only\nregular, valid, and complete objection whereby the respondent can\nstop out your syllogistic approaches. There are indeed three other\nmodes of objection to which he may resort; but these are all either\ninconclusive or unfair. He may turn his objection against you\npersonally; and, without refuting any of your premisses, he may thus\nperplex and confuse you, so that you are disqualified from pursuing\nthe thread of your questions. Or he may turn his objections against\nportions of your questions; not refuting any one of your premisses,\nbut showing that, as they stand, they are insufficient to warrant the\nconclusion which you seek to establish; when, if you are master of\nyour subject, and retain your calmness, you will at once supply the\ndeficiency by putting additional questions, so that his objection\nthus vanishes. Or, lastly, he may multiply irrelevant objections\nagainst time, for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring\nyou out.[422] Of these four modes of objection open to the respondent\nthe first is the only one truly valid and conclusive; the three\nothers are obstructions either surmountable or unfair, and the last\nis the most discreditable of all.[423]\n\n[Footnote 422: Ibid. p. 161, a. 1-12: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ lo/gon\nk\u00f4lu=sai sumpera/nasthai tetrach\u00f4=s. \u00ea)\\ ga\\r a)nelo/nta par' o(\\\ngi/netai to\\ pseu=dos. \u00ea)\\ pro\\s to\\n e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nta e)/nstasin\nei)po/nta;--tri/ton de\\ pro\\s ta\\ \u00ea)r\u00f4t\u00eame/na;--teta/rt\u00ea de\\ kai\\\ncheiri/st\u00ea t\u00f4=n e)nsta/se\u00f4n \u00ea( pro\\s to\\n chro/non.]]\n\n[Footnote 423: Ibid. a. 13-15: [Greek: ai( me\\n ou)=n e)nsta/seis,\nkatha/per ei)/pamen, tetrach\u00f4=s gi/nontai; lu/sis d' e)sti\\ t\u00f4=n\nei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea mo/non, ai( de\\ loipai\\ k\u00f4lu/seis tine\\s kai\\\ne)mpodismoi\\ t\u00f4=n sumperasma/t\u00f4n.]]\n\nTo blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are\ntwo distinct things. Perhaps your manner of conducting the\ninterrogation, preparatory to your final syllogism, may be open to\ncensure; yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure;\nfor it may be the respondent's fault, not yours. He may refuse to\ngrant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of\nyour case; he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for\nthe mere purpose of thwarting you; so that you are forced to adapt\nyourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis\nitself. Dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners\ndo their duty to the common purpose; the bad conduct of your\nrespondent puts you out, and the dialectic presently degenerates on\nboth sides into angry contention.[424] Apart from this, too, it must\nbe remembered that the express purpose of Dialectic is not to teach,\nbut to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of\nboth parties. Accordingly you are not always restricted to true\nsyllogistic premisses and conclusions. You are allowed to resort\noccasionally to false premisses and false conclusions; for, if what\nthe respondent advances be true, you have no means of refuting it\nexcept by falsehood; and, if what he advances be false, the best way\nof refuting it may be through some other falsehood.[425] You render\nservice to him by doing so; for, since his beliefs are contrary to\ntruth, if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs, the result may\nperhaps contribute to persuade him, but it will not instruct or\nprofit him.[426] It is your business to bring him round and\nemancipate him from these erroneous beliefs; but you must accomplish\nthis in a manner truly dialectical, and not contentious; whether you\nproceed by true or by false conclusions.[427] If you on your side,\nindeed, put questions in a contentious spirit, it is you that are to\nblame. But often the respondent is most to blame, when he refuses to\ngrant what he thinks probable, and when he does not apprehend what\nyou really intend to ask.[428] He is sometimes also to blame for\ngranting what he ought to refuse; such as _Petitio Principii_ or\nAffirmation of Contraries. It is often difficult to distinguish what\nquestions involve _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries:\nthey are asked and granted without either party being aware, and the\nlike mistake is committed by men in private talk, not merely in\nformal dialogue. When this happens, the argument will inevitably be a\nbad one; but the fault is with the respondent who, having before\nrefused what he ought to have granted, now grants what he ought to\nrefuse.[429]\n\n[Footnote 424: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 16-24. [Greek:\nduskolai/nontes ou)=n a)g\u00f4nistika\\s kai\\ ou) dialektika\\s poiou=ntai\nta\\s diatriba/s.] a. 37: [Greek: phau=los koin\u00f4no\\s o( e)mpodi/z\u00f4n\nto\\ koino\\n e)/rgon.]]\n\n[Footnote 425: Ibid. a. 24-31: [Greek: e)/ti d' e)pei\\ gumnasi/as\nkai\\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi t\u00f4=n\nlo/g\u00f4n, d\u00ea=lon \u00f4(s ou) mo/non ta)l\u00eath\u00ea= sullogiste/on a)lla\\ kai\\\npseu=dos, ou)de\\ di' a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n a)ei\\ a)ll' e)ni/ote kai\\ pseud\u00f4=n.\npolla/kis ga\\r a)l\u00eathou=s tethe/ntos a)nairei=n a)na/gk\u00ea to\\n\ndialego/menon, \u00f4(/ste protate/on ta\\ pseud\u00ea=. e)ni/ote de\\ kai\\\npseu/dous tethe/ntos a)nairete/on dia\\ pseud\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 426: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: ou)de\\n ga\\r k\u00f4lu/ei tini\\\ndokei=n ta\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/nta ma=llon t\u00f4=n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n, \u00f4(/st' e)k t\u00f4=n\ne)kei/n\u00f4| dokou/nt\u00f4n tou= lo/gou genome/nou ma=llon e)/stai\npepeisme/nos \u00ea)\\ \u00f4)phel\u00eame/nos.]]\n\n[Footnote 427: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\\ to\\n kal\u00f4=s\nmetabiba/zonta dialektik\u00f4=s kai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)ristik\u00f4=s metabiba/zein.]\nAbout [Greek: to\\ metabiba/zein], compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a.\n23.]\n\n[Footnote 428: Ibid. b. 2: [Greek: o(/ te ga\\r e)ristik\u00f4=s e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n\nphau/l\u00f4s diale/getai, o(/ t' e)n t\u00f4=| a)pokri/nesthai m\u00ea\\ didou\\s ta\\\nphaino/menon m\u00ead' e)kdecho/menos o(/ ti/ pote bou/letai o( e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n\nputhe/sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 429: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, b. 11-18: [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\ne)sti\\n a)dio/riston po/te ta)nanti/a kai\\ po/te ta\\ e)n a)rch\u00ea=|\nlamba/nousin oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi (polla/kis ga\\r kath' au(tou\\s le/gontes\nta)nanti/a le/gousi, kai\\ a)naneu/santes pro/teron dido/asin\nu(/steron; dio/per e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menoi ta)nanti/a kai\\ to\\ e)n a)rch\u00ea=|\npolla/kis u(pakou/ousin)--a)na/gk\u00ea phau/lous gi/nesthai tou\\s\nlo/gous; ai)/tios d' o( a)pokrino/menos, ta\\ me\\n ou) didou/s, ta\\\nde\\ toiau=ta didou/s.]\n\nThis passage is not very clear.]\n\nSuch then are the cases in which the conduct of the dialogue is open\nto censure, without any fault on your part as questioner. But there\nare other cases in which the fault is really yours. These are five in\nnumber:--(1) When all or most of your questions are so framed as to\nelicit premisses either false or improbable, so that neither the\nconclusion which you seek to obtain, nor any other conclusion at all,\nfollows from them; (2) When, from similar defects, the proper\nconclusion that you seek to obtain cannot be drawn from your\npremisses; (3) When the proper conclusion would follow, if certain\nadditions were made to your premisses, but such additions are of a\ncharacter worse than the premisses already obtained, and are even\nless probable than the conclusion itself; (4) When you have\naccumulated a superfluous multitude of premisses, so that the proper\nconclusion does not follow from all of them but from a part of them\nonly (5) When your premisses are more improbable and less trustworthy\nthan the proper conclusion, or when, though true, they are harder and\nmore troublesome to prove than the problem itself.[430]\n\n[Footnote 430: Ibid. b. 19-33: [Greek: kath' au(to\\n de\\ t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|\npe/nte ei)si\\n e)pitim\u00ea/seis].]\n\nIn regard to the last item, however, the fault may sometimes be in\nthe problem itself rather than in you as questioner. Some problems,\nbeing in their own nature hard and not to be settled from probable or\nplausible data, ought not to be admitted into Dialectic. All that can\nbe required from you as questioner is that you shall know and obtain\nthe most probable premisses that the problem admits: your procedure\nmay be thus in itself blameable, yet it may even deserve praise,\nhaving regard to the problem, if this last be very intractable; or it\nmay be in itself praiseworthy, yet blameable in regard to the\nproblem, if the problem admit of being settled by premisses still\nmore probable.[431] You may even be more blameable, if you obtain\nyour conclusion but obtain it from improbable premisses, than if you\nfailed to obtain it; the premisses required to make it complete being\ntrue and probable and not of capital importance, but being refused by\nthe respondent.[432] However, you ought not to be blamed if you\nobtain your true and proper conclusion but obtain it through\npremisses in themselves false; for this is recognized in analytical\ntheory as possible: if the conclusion is false, the premisses (one or\nboth) must be false, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false\npremisses.[433]\n\n[Footnote 431: Ibid. b. 34-p. 162, a. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 432: Ibid. p. 162, a. 3-8.]\n\n[Footnote 433: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 162, a. 8-11: [Greek: toi=s de\\\ndia\\ pseud\u00f4=n a)l\u00eathe\\s sumperainome/nois ou) di/kaion e)pitima=n--\nphanero\\n d' e)k t\u00f4=n A)nalutik\u00f4=n.]]\n\nWhen you have obtained your premisses and proved a conclusion, these\nsame premisses will not serve as proof of any other proposition\nseparate and independent of the conclusion; such may sometimes seem\nto be the case, but it is a mere sophistical delusion. If your\npremisses are both of them probable, your conclusion may in some\ncases be more probable than either.[434]\n\n[Footnote 434: Ibid. a.12-24.\n\nAristotle here introduces four definitions of terms, which are useful\nin regard to his thoughts but have no great pertinence in the place\nwhere they occur: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ _philoso/ph\u00eama_ me\\n\nsullogismo\\s a)podeiktiko/s, _e)pichei/r\u00eama_ de\\ sullogismo\\s\ndialektiko/s, _so/phisma_ de\\ sullogismo\\s e)ristiko/s, _a)po/r\u00eama_\nde\\ sullogismo\\s dialektiko\\s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s.]]\n\nOne other matter yet remains in which your procedure as questioner\nmay be blameable. The premisses through which you prove your\nconclusion may be long and unnecessarily multiplied; the conclusion\nmay be such that you ought to have obtained it through fewer, yet\nequally pertinent premisses.[435]\n\n[Footnote 435: Ibid. a. 24-34.\n\nThe example whereby Aristotle illustrates this position is obscure\nand difficult to follow. It is borrowed from the Platonic theory of\nIdeas. The point which you are supposed to be anxious to prove is,\nthat one opinion is more opinion than another ([Greek: o(/ti e)sti\\\ndo/xa ma=llon e(te/ra e(te/ras]). To prove it you ask as premisses:\n(1) That the Idea of every class of things is more that thing than\nany one among the particulars of the class; (2) That there is an Idea\nof _matter of opinion_, and that this Idea is more opinion than any\none of the particular matters of opinion. If this Idea is more\nopinion, it must also be more true and accurate than any particular\nmatter of opinion. And it is this last conclusion that Aristotle\nseems to indicate as the conclusion to be proved: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste\nau(t\u00ea\\ \u00ea( do/xa a)kribeste/ra e)sti/n] (a. 32).\n\nAs I understand it, Aristotle supposes that the doctrine which you\nare here refuting is, that all [Greek: e)/ndoxa] are on an equal\nfooting as to truth and accuracy; and that the doctrine which you are\nproving against it is, that one [Greek: e)/ndoxon] is more true and\naccurate than another. If you attempt to prove this last by invoking\nthe Platonic theory of Ideas, you will introduce premisses\nfar-fetched and unnecessary, even if true; whereas you might prove\nyour conclusion from premisses easier and more obvious.\n\nThe fault is (he says) that such roundabout procedure puts out of\nsight the real ground of the proof: [Greek: ti/s de\\ \u00ea( mochth\u00eari/a?\n\u00ea)\\ o(/ti poiei=, par' o(\\ o( lo/gos, lantha/nein to\\ ai)/tion] (a.\n33). The dubitative and problematical form here is remarkable. How\nwould Aristotle himself have proved the above conclusion? By\nInduction? He does not tell us.]\n\nThe cases in which your argument will carry the clearest evidence,\nimpressing itself even on the most vulgar minds, are those in which\nyou obtain such premisses as will enable you to draw your final\nconclusion without asking any farther concessions. But this will\nrarely happen. Even after you have obtained all the premisses\nsubstantially necessary to your final conclusion, you will generally\nbe forced to draw out two or more prosyllogisms or preliminary\nsyllogisms, and to ask the assent of the respondent to these, before\nyou can venture to enunciate the final conclusion. This second grade\nof evidence is however sufficient, even if the premisses fall short\nof the highest probability.[436]\n\n[Footnote 436: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, a. 35-b. 2.]\n\nOn the other hand, your argument may deserve to be pronounced false\non four distinct grounds:--(1) If your syllogism appears to prove the\nconclusion but does not really prove it, being then an _eristic_ or\n_contentious_ syllogism; (2) If the conclusion be good but not\n**relevant to the thesis, which is most likely to happen\nwhere you employ _Reductio ad Impossible_; (3) If your conclusion\nthough valid and even relevant, is not founded on the premisses and\n_principia_ appropriate to the thesis; (4) If your premisses are\nfalse, even though the conclusion in itself may prove true, since it\nhas already been said that a true conclusion may sometimes be\nobtained from false premisses.[437]\n\n[Footnote 437: Ibid. b. 3-15: [Greek: pseud\u00ea\\s de\\ lo/gos kalei=tai\ntetrach\u00f4=s], &c.]\n\nFalsehood in your argument will be rather your own fault than that of\nyour argument, especially if you yourself are not aware of its\nfalsehood. Indeed, there are some false arguments which are more\nvaluable in Dialectic than many true ones; where, for example, from\nhighly probable premisses you refute some recognized truth. Such an\nargument is sure to serve as a demonstration of other truths; at the\nvery least, it shows that some one of the propositions concerned is\naltogether untrue.[438] On the other hand, if you prove a true\nconclusion by premisses false and improbable, your argument will be\nmore worthless than many others in which the conclusion is false;\nfrom such premisses, indeed, the conclusion may well be really\nfalse.[439]\n\n[Footnote 438: Ibid. b. 16-22: [Greek: to\\ me\\n ou)=n pseud\u00ea= to\\n\nlo/gon ei)=nai tou= le/gontos a(ma/rt\u00eama ma=llon \u00ea)\\ tou= lo/gou,\nkai\\ ou)de\\ tou= le/gontos a)ei\\ to\\ a(ma/rt\u00eama, a)ll' o(/tan\nlantha/n\u00ea| au)to/n, e)pei\\ kath' au(to/n _ge poll\u00f4=n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n\na)podecho/metha ma=llon, a)\\n e)x o(/ti ma/lista dokou/nt\u00f4n a)nair\u00ea=|\nti t\u00f4=n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n; toiou=tos ga\\r \u00f4)\\n e(te/r\u00f4n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=n\na)po/deixi/s e)stin_; dei= ga\\r t\u00f4=n keime/n\u00f4n ti m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai\npantel\u00f4=s, \u00f4(/st' e)/stai _tou/tou_ a)po/deixis.]]\n\n[Footnote 439: Ibid. b. 22-24.]\n\nIn estimating the dialectical value of an argument, therefore, we\nmust first look whether the conclusion is formally valid; next,\nwhether the conclusion is true or false; lastly, what are the\npremisses from whence it is derived.[440] For, if it be derived from\npremisses false yet probable, it has logical or dialectical value;\nwhile, if derived from premisses true yet improbable, it has\nnone.[441] If derived from premisses both false and improbable, it\nwill of course be worthless; either absolutely in itself, or with\nreference to the thesis under debate.\n\n[Footnote 440: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste d\u00ea=lon o(/ti pr\u00f4/t\u00ea me\\n\ne)pi/skepsis lo/gou kath' au(to\\n ei) sumperai/netai, deute/ra de\\\npo/teron a)l\u00eathe\\s \u00ea)\\ pseu=dos; tri/t\u00ea d' e)k poi/\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 441: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 27: [Greek: ei) me\\n ga\\r\ne)k pseud\u00f4=n e)ndo/x\u00f4n de/, logiko/s, ei) d' e)x o)/nt\u00f4n me\\n\na)do/x\u00f4n de/, phau=los], &c.]\n\nTwo faults of questioners in Dialectic are dealt with specially by\nAristotle:--(1) _Petitio Principii_; (2) _Petitio Contrariorum_. He\nhad touched upon both of them (in the Analytica Priora) as they\nconcerned the demonstrative process, or the proving of truth: he now\ndeals with them as they concern the dialectical process, or the\nsetting out of opinions and probabilities.[442]\n\n[Footnote 442: Ibid. xiii. p. 162, b. 31: [Greek: to\\ d' e)n a)rch\u00ea=|\nkai\\ ta\\ e)nanti/a p\u00f4=s ai)tei=tai o( e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n, _kat' a)l\u00ea/theian_\nme\\n e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s] (Priora, II. xvi.) [Greek: ei)/r\u00eatai,\n_kata\\ do/xan_ de\\ nu=n lekte/on.]]\n\nFive distinct modes may be enumerated of committing the fault called\n_Petitio Principii_:--\n\n1. You may put as a question the very conclusion which it is\nincumbent on you to prove, in refutation of the thesis of the\nrespondent. If this is done in explicit terms, your opponent can\nhardly fail to perceive it; but he possibly may fail, if you\nsubstitute an equivalent term or the definition in place of the\nterm.[443]\n\n[Footnote 443: Ibid. b. 34. [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton ei)/ tis au)to\\ to\\\ndei/knusthai de/on ai)t\u00ea/sei; tou=to d' e)p' au)tou= me\\n ou)\nr(a/|dion lantha/nein, e)n de\\ toi=s sun\u00f4nu/mois, kai\\ e)n o(/sois\nto\\ o)/noma kai\\ o( lo/gos to\\ au)to\\ s\u00eamai/nei, ma=llon.]]\n\n2. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove is a particular\none, you may put as a question the universal in which it is\ncomprised. Thus, if you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries\nis one and the same, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge\nof Opposites one and the same? You are asking the very point which it\nwas your business to show; but you are asking along with it much more\nbesides.[444]\n\n[Footnote 444: Ibid. p. 163, a. 1.]\n\n3. If you are seeking to prove an universal conclusion, **you\nmay put as a question one of the particulars comprised therein. Thus,\nif you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries is one and the\nsame, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge of white and\nblack, good and evil, or any other pair of particular contraries, one\nand the same? It was your business to prove this particular, along\nwith many others besides; but you are now asking it as a question\nseparately.[445]\n\n[Footnote 445: Ibid. a. 5.]\n\n4. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove has two terms\nconjointly, you may put as a question one or the other of these\nseparately. Thus, when you are trying to show that the healing art is\nknowledge of what is wholesome and unwholesome, you may ask, Is it a\nknowledge of the wholesome?[446]\n\n[Footnote 446: Ibid. a. 8.]\n\n5. Suppose there are two conclusions necessarily implicated with each\nother, and that it is your business to prove one of them: you may put\nas a question the other of the two. Thus, if you are seeking to prove\nthat the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, you may put as a\nquestion, Is not the side incommensurable with the diagonal?[447]\n\n[Footnote 447: Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 163, a. 10.]\n\nThere are also five distinct modes of _Petitio Contrariorum_:--\n\n1. You may ask the respondent, in plain terms, to grant first the\naffirmative, next, the negative, of a given proposition.[448]\n\n[Footnote 448: Ibid. a. 14: [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton me\\n ga\\r ei)/ tis ta\\s\na)ntikeime/nas ai)t\u00ea/saito pha/sin kai\\ a)nti/phasin.]]\n\n2. You may ask him to grant, first, that a given subject is, _e.g._,\ngood, next, that the same subject is bad.[449]\n\n[Footnote 449: Ibid. a. 16: [Greek: deu/teron de\\ ta)nanti/a kata\\\nt\u00ea\\n a)nti/thesin, oi(=on a)gatho\\n kai\\ kako\\n tau)to/n.]]\n\n3. After he has granted to you the affirmative universally, you may\nask him to grant the negative in some particular case under the\nuniversal: _e.g._, after he has granted that the knowledge of\nContraries is one and the same, you ask him to grant that the\nknowledge of wholesome and unwholesome is not one and the same. Or\nyou may proceed by the way of reversing this process.[450]\n\n[Footnote 450: Ibid. a. 17-21.]\n\n4. You may ask the contrary of that which follows necessarily from\nthe premisses admitted.[451]\n\n[Footnote 451: Ibid. a. 21.]\n\n5. Instead of asking the two contraries in plain and direct terms,\nyou may ask the two contraries in different propositions, yet\nnecessarily implicated with the first two.[452]\n\n[Footnote 452: Ibid. a. 22.]\n\nThere is this difference between _Petitio Principii_, and _Petitio\nContrariorum_: the first has reference to the conclusion which you\nhave to prove, and the wrong procedure involved in it is relative to\nthat conclusion; but in the second the wrong procedure affects only\nthe two propositions themselves and the relation subsisting between\nthem.[453]\n\n[Footnote 453: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: diaphe/rei de\\ to\\ ta)nanti/a\nlamba/nein tou= e)n a)rch\u00ea=|, o(/ti tou= me/n e)stin \u00ea( a(marti/a\npro\\s to\\ sumpe/rasma (pro\\s ga\\r e)kei=no ble/pontes to\\ e)n\na)rch\u00ea=| le/gomen ai)tei=sthai), ta\\ d' e)nanti/a e)sti\\n e)n tai=s\nprota/sesi t\u00f4=| e)/chein p\u00f4s tau/tas pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/las.]]\n\nAristotle now, finally, proceeds to give some general advice for\nexercise and practice in Dialectic. You ought to accustom yourself to\ntreat arguments by converting the syllogisms of which they consist;\nthat is, by applying to them the treatment of which the _Reductio ad\nAbsurdum_ is one case.[454] You ought to test every thesis by first\nassuming it to be true, then assuming it to be false, and following\nout the consequences on both sides.[455] When you have hunted out\neach train of arguments, look out at once for the counter-arguments\navailable against it. This will strengthen your power both as\nquestioner and as respondent. It is indeed an exercise so valuable,\nthat you will do well to go through it by yourself, if you have no\ncompanion.[456] Put the different trains of argument, bearing on the\nsame thesis, into comparison with each other. A wide command of\narguments affirmative as well as negative will serve you well both\nfor attack and for defence.[457]\n\n[Footnote 454: Ibid. xiv. p. 163, a. 29: [Greek: pro\\s de\\ gumnasi/an\nkai\\ mele/t\u00ean t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n pr\u00f4=ton me\\n a)ntistre/phein\ne)thi/zesthai chr\u00ea\\ tou\\s lo/gous.] For _Conversion_ of Syllogism,\nsee p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 455: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 36: [Greek: pro\\s\na(/pasa/n te the/sin kai\\ o(/ti ou(/t\u00f4s kai\\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s to\\\ne)pichei/r\u00eama skepte/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 456: Ibid. b. 3: [Greek: ka)\\n pro\\s m\u00eade/na a)/llon\ne)/ch\u00f4men, pro\\s au(tou/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 457: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: tou=to ga\\r _pro/s te to\\\nbia/zesthai_ poll\u00ea\\n eu)pori/an poiei= kai\\ pro\\s to\\ e)le/gchein\nmega/l\u00ean e)/chei bo\u00ea/theian, o(/tan eu)por\u00ea=| tis kai\\ o(/ti ou(/t\u00f4s\nkai\\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s; pro\\s ta\\ e)nanti/a ga\\r sumbai/nei\npoiei=sthai t\u00ea\\n phulak\u00ea/n.]\n\nInstead of [Greek: pro/s te to\\ bia/zesthai], ought we not to read\nhere [Greek: pro/s te to\\ m\u00ea bia/zesthai], taking this verb in the\npassive sense? Surely [Greek: bia/zesthai] in the active sense gives\nthe same meaning substantially as [Greek: e)le/gchein], which comes\nafterwards, both of them referring to the assailant or questioner,\nwhereas Aristotle intends here to illustrate the usefulness of the\npractice to _both_ parties.]\n\nThis same accomplishment will be of use, moreover, for acquisitions\neven in Science and Philosophy. It is a great step to see and grasp\nin conjunction the trains of reasoning on both sides of the question;\nthe task that remains--right determination which of the two is the\nbetter--becomes much easier. To do this well, however,--to choose the\ntrue and to reject the false correctly--there must be conjoined a\ngood natural predisposition. None but those who are well constituted\nby nature, who have their likings and dislikes well set in regard to\neach particular conjuncture, can judge correctly what is best and\nwhat is worst.[458]\n\n[Footnote 458: Ibid. b. 12-16: [Greek: dei= de\\ pro\\s to\\ toiou=to\nu(pa/rchein eu)phua=; kai\\ tou=t' e)/stin \u00ea( kat' a)l\u00ea/theian\neu)phui+/a, to\\ du/nasthai kal\u00f4=s e(le/sthai ta)l\u00eathe\\s kai\\ phugei=n\nto\\ pseu=dos; o(/per oi( pephuko/tes eu)= du/nantai poiei=n; eu)=\nga\\r philou=ntes kai\\ misou=ntes to\\ prosphero/menon eu)= kri/nousi\nto\\ be/ltiston.]]\n\nIn regard to the primary or most universal theses, and to those\nproblems which are most frequently put in debate, you will do well to\nhave reasonings ready prepared, and even to get them by heart. It is\non these first or most universal theses that respondents become often\nreluctant and disgusted. To be expert in handling primary doctrines\nand probabilities, and to be well provided with the definitions from\nwhich syllogisms must start, is to the dialectician an acquisition of\nthe highest moment; like familiarity with the Axioms to a geometer,\nand ready application of the multiplication table to an arithmetical\ncalculator.[459] When you have these generalities and major\npropositions firmly established in your mind, you will recall, in a\ndefinite order and arrangement, the particular matters falling under\neach of them, and will throw them more easily into syllogisms. They\nwill assist you in doing this, just as the mere distribution of\nplaces in a scheme for topical memory makes you recollect what is\nassociated with each. You should lodge in your memory, however,\nuniversal major premisses rather than complete and ready-made\nreasonings; for the great difficulty is about the _principia_.[460]\n\n[Footnote 459: Ibid. b. 17-26.]\n\n[Footnote 460: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 27-33: [Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s\nkai\\ e)n toi=s lo/gois to\\ pro/cheiron ei)=nai peri\\ ta\\s a)rcha\\s\nkai\\ ta\\s prota/seis a)po\\ sto/matos e)xepi/stasthai; katha/per ga\\r\ne)n t\u00f4=| mn\u00eamonik\u00f4=| mo/non oi( to/poi tethe/ntes eu)thu\\s poiou=sin\nau)ta\\ mn\u00eamoneu/ein, kai\\ tau=ta poi\u00ea/sei sullogistik\u00f4/teron dia\\ to\\\npro\\s \u00f4(risme/nas au)ta\\s ble/pein kat' a)rithmo/n; pro/tasi/n te\nkoin\u00ea\\n ma=llon \u00ea)\\ lo/gon ei)s mn\u00ea/m\u00ean thete/on; a)rch\u00ea=s ga\\r kai\\\nu(pothe/se\u00f4s eu)por\u00ea=sai metri/\u00f4s chalepo/n.]]\n\nYou ought also to accustom yourself to break down one reasoning into\nmany; which will be done most easily when the theme of the reasoning\nis most universal. Conceal this purpose as well as you can; and in\nthis view begin with those particulars which lie most remote from the\nsubject in hand.[461] In recording arguments for your own\ninstruction, you will generalize them as much as possible, though\nperhaps when spoken they may have been particular; for this is the\nbest way to break down one into several. In conducting your own case\nas questioner you will avoid the higher generalities as much as you\ncan.[462] But you must at the same time take care to keep up some\ncommon or general premisses throughout the discourse; for every\nsyllogistic process, even where the conclusion is particular, implies\nthis, and no syllogism is valid without it.[463]\n\n[Footnote 461: Ibid. b. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 462: Ibid. p. 164, a. 2-7: [Greek: dei= de\\ kai\\ ta\\s\na)pomn\u00eamoneu/seis katho/lou poiei=sthai t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n, ka)\\n \u00ea)=|\ndieilegme/nos e)pi\\ me/rous;--au)to\\n de\\ o(/ti ma/lista pheu/gein\ne)pi\\ to\\ katho/lou phe/rein tou\\s sullogismou/s.]\n\nThis passage is to me obscure. I have given the best meaning which it\nseems to offer.]\n\n[Footnote 463: Ibid. a. 8.]\n\nExercise in inductive discourse is most suitable for a young\nbeginner; exercise in deductive or syllogistic discourse, for skilful\nveterans. From those who are accomplished in the former you can learn\nthe art of multiplying particular comparisons; from those who are\naccomplished in the latter you derive universal premisses; such being\nthe strong points of each. When you go through a dialectical\nexercise, try to bring away with you for future use either some\ncomplete syllogism, or some solution of an apparent refutation, or a\nmajor premiss, or a well-sustained exceptional example ([Greek:\ne)/nstasin]); note also whether either you or your respondent\nquestion correctly or otherwise, and on what reason such correctness\nor incorrectness turned.[464] It is the express purpose of\ndialectical exercise to acquire power and facility in this procedure,\nespecially as regards universal premisses and special exceptions.\nIndeed the main characteristic of the dialectician is to be apt at\nuniversal premisses, and apt at special exceptions. In the first of\nthese two aptitudes he groups many particulars into one universal,\nwithout which he cannot make good his syllogism; in the second of the\ntwo he breaks up the one universal into many, distinguishing the\nseparate constituents, and denying some while he affirms others.[465]\n\n[Footnote 464: Ibid. a. 12-19. [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s d' e)k tou=\ngumna/zesthai dialego/menon peirate/on a)pophe/resthai \u00ea)\\\nsullogismo\\n peri\\ tinos, \u00ea)\\ lu/sin \u00ea)\\ pro/tasin \u00ea)\\ e)/nstasin],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 465: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 164, b. 2-6: [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r\n\u00f4(s a(pl\u00f4=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\\s o( protatiko\\s kai\\ e)nstatiko/s;\ne)/sti de\\ to\\ me\\n protei/nesthai e(\\n poiei=n ta\\ plei/\u00f4 (dei=\n**ga\\r e(\\n o(/l\u00f4s l\u00eaphth\u00ea=nai pro\\s o(\\ o( lo/gos), to\\ d'\ne)ni/stasthai to\\ e(\\n polla/; \u00ea)\\ ga\\r diairei= \u00ea)\\ a)nairei=, to\\\nme\\n didou\\s to\\ d' ou)\\ t\u00f4=n **proteinome/n\u00f4n.]]\n\nYou must take care however not to carry on this exercise with every\none, especially with a vulgar-minded man. With some persons the\ndispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn. When the respondent\ntries to make a show of escaping by unworthy manoeuvres, the\nquestioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but\nthis is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse,\nyou must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared,\nrespondents.[466]\n\n[Footnote 466: Ibid. b. 8-15: [Greek: pro\\s ga\\r to\\n pa/nt\u00f4s\npeir\u00f4/menon phai/nesthai diapheu/gein, di/kaion me\\n pa/nt\u00f4s\npeira=sthai sullogi/sasthai, ou)k eu)/sch\u00eamon de/.]]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nSOPHISTICI ELENCHI.\n\n\nThe Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional\noccupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without\nthe reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he\npossesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun\n_Sophistic_, with the verb _to practice as a Sophist_ ([Greek:\nsophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This\napplication of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various\ndialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthyd\u00eamus, &c.) introduced Sokrates\nconversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a\nlonger dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition\nof the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the\nactual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes\nto himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his\ngeneral theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming\nproperly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly\nknown as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici\nElenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.\n\n[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r\n\u00ea( sophistik\u00ea\\ phainome/n\u00ea sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\\ o( sophist\u00ea\\s\nchr\u00eamatist\u00ea\\s a)po\\ phainome/n\u00eas sophi/as a)ll' ou)k\nou)/s\u00eas;--a)na/gk\u00ea ou)=n _tou\\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\\_ t\u00f4=n\nei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n ge/nos z\u00eatei=n;--o(/ti me\\n ou)=n e)/sti ti\ntoiou=ton lo/g\u00f4n ge/nos, kai\\ o(/ti toiau/t\u00eas e)phi/entai duna/me\u00f4s\n_ou(\\s kalou=men sophista/s_, d\u00ea=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]\n\nThe Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of\nrefutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept\nit as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of\nElenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the\nentire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one\nvariety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a\nconclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis\nor proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions\nof a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid\nElenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on\nthe distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical,\ninvalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and\nclassification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise\non Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with\nAristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.\n\n[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]\n\nAristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive\nappearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail\nnot less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a\nnotorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their\nprofession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of\nsyllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of\ndebate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or\nSophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not\nconsistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as\ndistinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis\nis between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as\nvarieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is\nunder the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or\nPseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in\nwhich Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]\n\n[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti d\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n e)n\nt\u00f4=| diale/gesthai lo/g\u00f4n te/ttara ge/n\u00ea, didaskalikou\\ kai\\\ndialektikoi\\ kai\\ peirastikoi\\ kai\\ e)ristikoi/.]]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]\n\nDidactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately,\nbut only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own\nseparate, undemonstrable _principia_, from which its conclusions, so\nfar as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher\nacquainted with these _principia_ and deductions, talking with some\none who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts\nquestions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can;\nand, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw,\naccording to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he\nhimself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must\nbelieve upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the\ndidactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that\nDialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and\nreason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o(\ndialektio\\s peri\\ ge/nos ti \u00f4(risme/non, ou)de\\ deiktiko\\s ou)deno/s,\nou)de\\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n\ne(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/\u00ea, oi(=o/n te u(po\\ ta\\s au)ta\\s\na)rcha\\s ei)=nai ta\\ o)/nta. \u00f4(/st' ou)demi/a te/chn\u00ea t\u00f4=n\ndeiknuous\u00f4=n tina\\ phu/sin e)r\u00f4t\u00eatik\u00ea/ e)stin; ou) ga\\r e)/xestin\no(poteronou=n t\u00f4=n mori/\u00f4n dou=nai; sullogismo\\s ga\\r ou) gi/netai\ne)x a)mphoi=n. \u00ea( de\\ dialektik\u00ea\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00earik\u00ea/ e)stin; ei) d'\ne)dei/knuen, ei) kai\\ m\u00ea\\ pa/nta, a)lla\\ ta/ ge pr\u00f4=ta kai\\ ta\\s\noi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\\n \u00ea)r\u00f4/ta. m\u00ea\\ dido/ntos ga\\r ou)k a)\\n\ne)/ti ei)=chen e)x \u00f4(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)/nstasin.]\n\nWhen Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as\none of the four species [Greek: t\u00f4=n e)n t\u00f4=| diale/gesthai lo/g\u00f4n]\n(Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\\\ndiale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the\nderivative noun [Greek: dialektik\u00ea/].]\n\nDialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally\nand indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable _principia_\nwhich the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic\nsyllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an\ninterrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares\na problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other\nputs questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling\nhim either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some\nother point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and\nto deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the\nrespondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other\npremisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood\nall to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary\nmultitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority.\nAccordingly there is often a conflict of arguments _pro_ and _con_,\nmuch diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if\nthe questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the\nrespondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.\n\nSuch is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between\nDidactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that\nwhich he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and\ndistinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate\nvarieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed,\nadmits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the\nlike is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.\n\n[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r\npeirastik\u00ea/ e)sti dialektik\u00ea/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o(\nte/chn\u00ea| sullogistik\u00ea=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169,\nb. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' \u00ea( peirastik\u00ea\\ me/ros t\u00ea=s dialektik\u00ea=s.]]\n\nThese subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations,\nand the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is\nconducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it\nmay be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two\ndebaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and\ndoctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of\nthe two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing\nand confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose\n([Greek: koino\\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and\nenlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a\nvariety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing\nmore or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and\nundertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain\nrules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and\nrespondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to\nexert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and,\nthough one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably\nconducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the\nassailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to\ndishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse\nand obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that\ncase the debate is called by Aristotle _eristic_ or _contentious_,\nfrom the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and\npurpose; also _sophistic_, from the fact that there existed (as\nhe asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who\nregularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with\na view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit,\nbeing pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to\njustify them.[9]\n\n[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\\s\ngumnasi/an--e)xetastik\u00ea\\ ga\\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII.\nxi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\\ de\\\ngumna/zesthai duna/me\u00f4s cha/rin, kai\\ ma/lista peri\\ ta\\s prota/seis\nkai\\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\\r \u00f4(s a(pl\u00f4=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\\s o(\nprotatiko\\s kai\\ e)nstatiko/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\\n ou)=n\nt\u00ea=s ni/k\u00eas au)t\u00ea=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\\ a)/nthr\u00f4poi kai\\\nphile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\\ do/x\u00eas cha/rin t\u00ea=s ei)s\nchr\u00eamatismo\\n sophistikoi/;--kai\\ t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n t\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n me/n\nei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) t\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n\ne(/neken. kai\\ lo/gos o( au)to\\s me\\n e)/stai sophistiko\\s kai\\\ne)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\\ tauto/n, a)ll' \u00ea(=| me\\n ni/k\u00eas\nphainome/n\u00eas, e)ristiko/s, \u00ea(=| de\\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]\n\nWe thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked\nas two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and\nDialectic; but that _peirastic_ is in fact an epithet applicable\ngenerally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and\nappropriate functions; while _eristic_ designates only a peculiar\nmode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is\nthat it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations.\nStill less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since\nit involves no intrinsic or intellectual _differentia_, but connotes\nonly ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who\nis treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of\npecuniary profit.[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o(\nga\\r sophistiko\\s ou)k e)n t\u00ea=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n t\u00ea=|\nproaire/sei;--sophist\u00ea\\s me\\n kata\\ t\u00ea\\n proai/resin, dialektiko\\s d'\nou) kata\\ t\u00ea\\n proai/resin a)lla\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n du/namin.] To the same\npurpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25,\ndistinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the\nDialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both\nare alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El.,\nnotes, p. 99):--\"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect;\n[Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between\nthese terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the\nrelation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power _plus_ the\nwill to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will,\nDialectic (p. 100).\"]\n\nWhile, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the\ntwo heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle\nhas of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the\nlatter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers\nenunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic\nsyllogism is derived from the _principia_ belonging specially to one\nparticular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to\nconclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from\nprobable premisses (_i.e._, accredited by the ordinary public or by a\nfew wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are\nprobable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle\nrecognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic\nsyllogism there corresponds the _pseudographic_ syllogism or the\n_paralogism_: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism\ndoes) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which\nnevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality;\neither because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the\nmatter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To\nthe dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the\n_eristic_ or _sophistic_ syllogism: which is a good syllogism in\nappearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in\nform, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to\nbe probable without being really probable.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k t\u00f4=n\nperi/ tinas e)pist\u00ea/mas oi)kei/\u00f4n gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per\ne)pi\\ t\u00ea=s ge\u00f4metri/as kai\\ t\u00f4=n tau/t\u00ea| suggen\u00f4=n sumbe/b\u00eaken\ne)/chein;--e)k t\u00f4=n oi)kei/\u00f4n me\\n t\u00ea=| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea| l\u00eamma/t\u00f4n, ou)k\na)l\u00eath\u00f4=n de/, to\\n sullogismo\\n poiei=tai.]]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164,\na. 20-b. 21.]\n\nOne would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and\nthe didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the\npseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic\ndeserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would\ndeserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal\nconditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does\nnot admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist\n(he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to\ndeceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though\nsometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps\nwithin the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be\nfalse, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science\ngeometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it\ntransgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it\nsolves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two\nepithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the\nquadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical\nprinciples, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical.\nBoth demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of\nHippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the\nsphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled\nout of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally\nsophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had\nsucceeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic\nsyllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic,\neven though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if\nit be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however\nuntrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or\neristic.[15]\n\n[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\\ ga\\r\npseudograph\u00ea/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\\ ga\\r ta\\ u(po\\ t\u00ea\\n te/chn\u00ean\noi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/ph\u00eama peri\\\na)l\u00eathe/s, oi(=on to\\ I(ppokra/tous \u00ea)\\ o( tetrag\u00f4nismo\\s o( dia\\\nt\u00f4=n m\u00eani/sk\u00f4n. a)ll' \u00f4(s Bru/s\u00f4n e)tetrag\u00f4/nize to\\n ku/klon, _ei)\nkai\\ tetrag\u00f4ni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\\ to\\ pra=gma,\ndia\\ tou=to sophistiko/s_.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p.\n161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\\ to\\n kal\u00f4=s metabiba/zonta dialektik\u00f4=s\nkai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)ristik\u00f4=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\\n ge\u00f4me/tr\u00ean\nge\u00f4metrik\u00f4=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)l\u00eathe\\s \u00ea)=| to\\\nsumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]\n\nSuch is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication\nof the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process.\nNow this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no\nappropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with _Omne\nScibile_, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts\nthe analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the\nSophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the\ntask which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he\nshall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given\nscience,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may\nbe. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and\ndishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of\nthe regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all\nprice, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a\nspecies, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being\nanalysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations\nis intended to describe and illustrate the _Loci_ belonging to it,\nand contributing to its purpose.[17]\n\n[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper ga\\r \u00ea(\ne)n a)g\u00f4=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a\ntis, ou(/t\u00f4s e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a \u00ea( e)ristik\u00ea/ e)stin;\ne)kei= te ga\\r oi( pa/nt\u00f4s nika=n proairou/menoi pa/nt\u00f4n a(/ptontai,\nkai\\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]\n\n[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon ou)=n o(/ti\nou) pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n e)/legch\u00f4n a)lla\\ t\u00f4=n para\\ t\u00ea\\n dialektik\u00ea\\n\nl\u00eapte/on tou\\s to/pous.]]\n\nFallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to\ndishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and\nbeing assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see\nby what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses\nfrom fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for\nits appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either\nby the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not\neverything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is\nreally probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is\nthe case, the _probabilia_ are apparent only and not real; they have\nthe character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately\nmanifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It\nis such apparent _probabilia_ as these, which make up the premisses\nof eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or\nfallacious refutations turn.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\\s d'\ne)/sti sullogismo\\s o( e)k phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n m\u00ea\\ o)/nt\u00f4n de/,\nkai\\ o( e)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n phaino/menos. ou)\nga\\r pa=n to\\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon.\nou)the\\n ga\\r t\u00f4=n legome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n e)pipo/laion e)/chei\npantel\u00f4=s t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\\ ta\\s t\u00f4=n e)ristik\u00f4=n\nlo/g\u00f4n a)rcha\\s sumbe/b\u00eaken e)/chein; parachr\u00ea=ma ga\\r kai\\ \u00f4(s e)pi\\\nto\\ polu/ toi=s kai\\ mikra\\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/d\u00ealos e)n\nau)toi=s \u00ea( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p.\n165, b. 7.]\n\nAristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the\none hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the\nwhole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this\nlatter department. The distinction that he draws between them is\ntwo-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part\nof the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose\nof victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely\napparent--such as any one may see not to be real\nprobabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.\n\nNow, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of\nprofit as having no essential connection with the question. It is\nquite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the\nSophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the\neagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even\nin well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and\nbenefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the\ndistinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and\nthe Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more\nunsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate\nbetween what is really probable (_i.e._, accredited either by the\nmultitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance\nand not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation\ngiven by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently\nprobable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most\nordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the\nmore gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest.\nNothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to\nfallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint\nto impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed\nto come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would\nundoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the\nPreface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most\ndishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact,\nAristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning\nof the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic\nsyllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible\nenough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection;\nlike base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver,\nand like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger\nthan they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic\nsyllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken\nfor truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be\napplied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as\nbearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even\nby the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that\ndefinition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of\ndialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthyd\u00eamus) puts into\nthe mouth of the Sophists Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus. And, since\nAristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest\npurposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest\ndebaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as\nsomething which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept\nas true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but\nas a fool.\n\n[Footnote 19: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. [Greek: to\\n au)to\\n\nde\\ tro/pon kai\\ sullogismo\\s kai\\ e)/legchos o( me\\n e)/stin, o( d'\nou)k e)/sti me/n, phai/netai de\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n a)peiri/an; oi( ga\\r\na)/peiroi \u00f4(/sper a)\\n a)pe/chontes po/r)r(\u00f4then the\u00f4rou=sin.]]\n\nI think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies\nincidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by\nSophists and litigants; and as if they would never show themselves,\nassuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to\nits legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out\nargumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities\nincident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely\nto take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his\npresence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these\ninfirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested\nundesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary\ndiscourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the\nintellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as\nliabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or\ndishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or\ncorrection if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a\nclass of professional cheats,[21] or as tares sown by the enemy in a\nfield where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.\n\n[Footnote 21: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.]\n\nIn point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by\nAristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to\nexpect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing\nthem as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by\nprofessional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for\nvictory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection,\nand as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.[22]\nThe various general heads under which he distributes them are each\ncharacterized by intellectual or logical marks.\n\n[Footnote 22: Ibid. xi. p. 172, b. 7.]\n\nHis first and most general observation is, that language is the usual\nmedium and instrument through which fallacies are operated.[23] Names\nand propositions are of necessity limited in number; but things named\nor nameable are innumerable; hence it happens inevitably that the\nsame name or the same proposition must have several different\nmeanings. Since we cannot talk of things except by means of their\nnames, the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant\nsource of false conclusions.[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 10: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n ga\\r o)no/mata\npepe/rantai kai\\ to\\ t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n pl\u00ea=thos, ta\\ de\\ pra/gmata to\\n\na)rithmo\\n a)/peira/ e)stin. a)nagkai=on ou)=n plei/\u00f4 to\\n au)to\\n\nlo/gon kai\\ tou)/noma to\\ e(\\n s\u00eamai/nein.]]\n\nIn dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim\nat the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:--(1) To refute,\nor obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch,\nor appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or\ncontradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in\nuttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological\nrepetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most\ndesires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the\nsucceeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.]\n\nThe syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really\nrefuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or\nirrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring\nabout this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be\ndistributed first under two great divisions:--\n\nI. _Fallaci\u00e6 Dictionis_.\nII. _Fallaci\u00e6 Extra Dictionem_.\n\nI. The first division--_Fallaci\u00e6 Dictionis_--includes all those cases\nwherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning\nis expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:--\n\n1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one\nsingle term--noun or verb.\n2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word\nbut, in a combination of words--proposition, phrase, or sentence.\n3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately\npreceding--Amphiboly).\n4. Disjunction: where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true\ndisjunctively, or the reverse. (_E.g._, Five are two and three; but\nyou cannot say, Five are even and odd. The greater is equal and\nsomething besides; but you cannot say, The greater is equal.)\n5. Accentuation: where the same word differently accentuated has a\ndifferent meaning.\n6. _Figura Dictionis_: where two words, from being analogous in form,\nstructure, or conjugation, are erroneously supposed to be analogous\nin meaning also.[26]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. iv. p. 165, b. 23-p. 166, b. 19.]\n\nSuch are the six heads of _Fallaci\u00e6 Dictionis_--Fallacies or\nParalogisms arising from words as such, or something directly\nappertaining to them.\n\nII. Under the second division--Fallacies or Paralogisms _Extra\nDictionem_--there are seven heads:\n\n1. _Fallacia Accidentis_.\n2. _Fallacia a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.\n3. _Ignoratio Elenchi_.\n4. _Fallacia Consequentis_\n5. _Petitio Principii_.\n6. _Non Causa pro Caus\u00e2_.\n7. _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_.[27]\n\n[Footnote 27: Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 20-27.]\n\n1. The first of these varieties, called _Fallacia Accidentis_, arises\nwhen a syllogism is made to conclude that, because a given predicate\nmay be truly affirmed of a given subject, the same predicate may also\nbe truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject: as\nwhen Koriskus is denied to be a man, because he is not Sokrates, who\nis a man; or is denied to be Koriskus, because he is a man, while a\nman is not Koriskus.\n\nIn the title given to this general head of Fallacy,[28] we must\nunderstand Accident, not in its special logical sense as opposed to\nEssence, but in a far larger sense, including both Genus when\npredicated separately from Differentia, and Differentia when\npredicated separately from Genus; including, in fact, every thing\nwhich is distinguishable from the subject in any way, and at the same\ntime predicable of it--every thing except the Definition, which\nconjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and\nconvertible with the _definitum_.\n\n[Footnote 28: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: oi( para\\ to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s\nparalogismoi/]. Every man is an animal; but, because a predicate is\ntrue of the subject man, you cannot infer that the same predicate is\ntrue of the subject animal. This title comprehends within its range\nanother, which is presently announced as distinct and\nseparate--_Fallacia Consequentis_.]\n\n2. The second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed\nwith qualification or limitation in the premisses, but is affirmed\nwithout qualification, simply and absolutely, in the conclusion. The\nEthiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin; therefore, he\nis both white and not white--both white and black. In this example\nthe fallacy is obvious, and can hardly escape any one; but there are\nmany other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous, and\nin which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or\nrefuse a question simply and absolutely.[29] One example given by\nAristotle deserves notice on its own account: _Non-Ens est\nopinabile_, therefore _Non-Ens est_; or, again, _Ens non est homo_,\ntherefore, _Ens non est_. This is one among Aristotle's ways of\nbringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double\nfunction of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication,\nand to predicate existence.[30] He regards the confusion between\nthese two functions as an example of the Fallacy now before us--of\npassing _a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.[31]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ibid. b. 37, seq. [Greek: o(/tan to\\ e)n me/rei\nlego/menon \u00f4(s a(pl\u00f4=s ei)r\u00eame/non l\u00eaphth\u00ea=|--to\\ de\\ toiou=ton e)p'\ne)ni/\u00f4n me\\n panti\\ the\u00f4r\u00ea=sai r(a/|dion--e)p' e)ni/\u00f4n de\\ lantha/nei\npolla/kis.]]\n\n[Footnote 30: The same double or multiple meaning of _Est_ is\ndiscriminated by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, but in a different\nway--[Greek: to\\ o)\\n \u00f4(s a)l\u00eathe/s, kai\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)\\n \u00f4(s\npseu=dos]--[Greek: D].] vii. p. 1017, a. 31; E. iv. p. 1027, b. 18-36.\nBonitz (ad. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 310) says:--\"Quid quod etiam illud\n_esse_ huc refert, quo non existentiam significamus, sed predicati\ncum subjecto conjunctionem.\" Aristotle is even more precise than\nmodern logicians in analysing the different meanings of [Greek: to\\\no)/n]: he distinguishes _four_ of them.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 1: [Greek: oi(=on ei) to\\ m\u00ea\\\no)/n e)sti doxasto/n, o(/ti to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)\\n e)/stin; ou) ga\\r tau)to\\n\nei)=nai te/ ti kai\\ ei)=nai a(pl\u00f4=s.]\n\nCompare Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1030, a. 25, and De Interpretatione, p.\n21, a. 25-34: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper O(/m\u00earo/s e)sti/ ti, oi(=on poi\u00eat\u00ea/s;\na)=r' ou)=n kai\\ e)/stin, \u00ea) ou)/? kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s ga\\r\nkat\u00eagorei=tai tou= O(m\u00ea/rou to\\ e)/stin; o(/ti ga\\r poi\u00eat\u00ea/s e)stin,\na)ll' ou) kath' au(to/, kat\u00eagorei=tai kata\\ tou= O(m\u00ea/rou to\\\ne)/stin.]\n\nIt is clear from the above passages that Aristotle was thoroughly\naware of the logical fact which Hobbes, James Mill, and Mr. John\nStuart Mill, have more fully brought out and illustrated, as the\nconfusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb.\nMany excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the 'System of\nLogic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill (Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 1); also in the\n'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, especially in the recent\nedition of that work, containing the explanatory notes by Mr. J. S.\nMill and Dr. Findlater (Vol. I. ch. iv. p. 174, seq.). Mr. J. S.\nMill, however, speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having\nescaped the notice of Aristotle, and as having been brought to light\nonly by or since Hobbes. He says (in a note on the 'Analysis,' p.\n183):--\"As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach\nis found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though\nhe did not reach it, came very close to it; and it was still more\ndistinctly anticipated by Laromigui\u00e8re, though without any sufficient\nperception of its value . . . in the following words:--'Quand on dit,\nl'\u00eatre est, &c., le mot _est_, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la m\u00eame\nchose que le mot _\u00eatre_, sujet de la d\u00e9finition. Si j'\u00e9nonce la\nproposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire\nassur\u00e9ment, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens: de\nm\u00eame, si je dis que Virgile est po\u00e8te, je ne veux pas donner \u00e0\nentendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe _est_ dans la proposition\nn'exprime dont pas l'existence r\u00e9elle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport\nsp\u00e9cial entre le sujet et l'attribut, &c.'\" The passages above cited\nfrom Aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as\nLaromigui\u00e8re, but even illustrated it by the same example (Homer\ninstead of Virgil). I shall in another place state more fully the\nviews of Aristotle respecting _Existence_.]\n\n3. The third of these heads of Fallacy--_Ignoratio Elenchi_--is, when\nthe speaker, professing to contradict the thesis, advances another\nproposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in\nreality, because he does not know what are the true and sufficient\nconditions of a valid Elenchus. In order to be valid, it must be\nreal, not merely verbal; it must be proved by good syllogistic\npremisses, without any _Petitio Principii_; and it must deny the same\nmatter, in the same relations, and at the same time, as that which\nthe thesis affirmed. Thus, it is no contradiction to affirm and deny\ndoubleness of the same body; both affirmation and denial may be true,\nif you take the comparison against different numbers or different\nbodies, or at different times. Sometimes persons neglect some of\nthese conditions, and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis,\nwhen they have not: this is _Ignoratio Elenchi_.[32] (If the thesis\nbe an affirmative universal, it _is_ sufficient contradiction if you\nprove a negative particular against it.)\n\n[Footnote 32: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 21-35: [Greek: oi( de\\ para\\\nto\\ m\u00ea\\ di\u00f4ri/sthai ti/ e)sti sullogismo\\s \u00ea)\\ ti/ e)/legchos, a)lla\\\npara\\ t\u00ea\\n e)/lleipsin gi/nontai tou= lo/gou.]\n\nWe may remark, by the way, that it is not very consistent in\nAristotle to recognize one general head of Sophistical Refutation\ncalled _Ignoratio Elenchi_, after the definition that he has given of\nthe Sophist at the beginning of this treatise. He had told us that\nthe Sophist was a dishonest man, who made it his profession to study\nand practise these tricks, for the purpose of making himself pass for\na clever man, and of getting money. According to this definition,\nthere is no _Ignoratio Elenchi_ in the Sophist, though there may be\nin the person who supposes himself refuted. The Sophist is assumed to\nknow what he is about, and to be aware that his argument is a\nfallacious one.]\n\n4. The fourth head includes what are called _Fallaci\u00e6 Consequentis_:\nwhen a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a\ncategorical proposition affirmative and universal, thinking that it\nmay be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of\nthe predicate; or when, in an hypothetical proposition, he inverts\nthe relation between antecedent and consequent, arguing that, because\nthe consequent is true, the antecedent must for that reason be true\nalso. Honey is of yellow colour; you see a yellow substance, and you\ninfer for that reason that it must be honey. Thieves generally walk\nout by night; you find a man walking out by night, and you infer that\nhe must be a thief. These are inferences from Signs, opinions founded\non facts of sense, such as are usually employed in Rhetoric; often or\nusually true, but not necessarily or universally true, and therefore\nfallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 1-18. This head (_Fallacia\nConsequentis_) is not essentially distinguishable from the first\n(_Fallacia Accidentis_), being nothing more than a peculiar species\nor variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits a little farther\non--vi. p. 168, a. 26; vii. p. 169, b. 7; viii. p. 170, a. 3. Compare\nalso xxviii. p. 181, a. 25.]\n\n5. The fifth head is that of _Petitio Principii_: a man sometimes\nassumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be\nproved, without being aware of the identity.[34]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. v. p. 167, a. 38: [Greek: dia\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ du/nasthai\nsunora=n to\\ tau)to\\n kai\\ to\\ e(/teron].]\n\n6. The sixth head of Fallacy--_Non Causa pro Caus\u00e2_--is, when we\nmistake for a cause that which is not really a cause; or, to drop the\nmisleading word _cause_, and to adopt the clearer terms in which this\nsame fallacy is announced in the Analytica Priora[35]--_Non per\nHoc_--_Non propter Hoc_, it arises when we put forward, as an essential\npremiss of a given conclusion, something that is not really an\nessential premiss thereof. When you intend to refute a given thesis\nby showing, that, if admitted, it leads to impossible or absurd\nconclusions, you must enunciate that thesis itself among the\npremisses that lead to such absurdities.[36] But, though enunciated\nin this place, it may often happen that the thesis may be an\nunnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and\nessential: and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently\nproved, even though the thesis were omitted. Still, since the thesis\nis declared along with the rest, it will appear falsely to be a part\nof the real proof. It will often appear so even to yourself the\nquestioner; you not detecting the fallacy.[37] Under such\ncircumstances the respondent meets you by _Non propter Hoc_. He\nadmits your conclusion to be impossible, and at the same time to be\nduly proved, but he shows you that it is proved by evidence\nindependent of his thesis, and not by reason or means of his thesis.\nAccordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself, but not\ngood for the purpose which you aimed at;[38] viz., to refute the\nthesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences. You\nwill fail, even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a\nproposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of\nintermediate propositions, each of them having one common term with\nthe next. Much more will you fail, if your impossible consequence is\nquite foreign and unconnected with the thesis; as we sometimes find\nin Dialectic.\n\n[Footnote 35: Ibid. b. 21; vii. p. 169, b. 13. Compare Analyt. Prior.\nII. xvii. p. 65.\n\nIn commenting on the above chapter of the Analytica Priora, I have\nalready remarked (Vol. I. p. 258, note) how much better is the\ndesignation there given of the present fallacy--_Non per Hoc_\n([Greek: ou) para\\ t\u00ea\\n the/sin to\\ pseu=dos])--than the designation\nhere given of the same fallacy--_Non Causa pro Caus\u00e2_. Aristotle is\nspeaking of a syllogistic process, consisting of premisses and a\nconclusion; the premisses being the _reasons_ or grounds of the\nconclusion, not the _cause_ thereof, as that term is commonly\nunderstood. The term _cause_ is one used in so many different senses\nthat we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it. See Whately's\nremarks on this subject, Bk. iii. Sect. 14, of his Logic: also his\nAppendix I. to that work, under article _Reason_.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 24: [Greek: e)a\\n ou)=n\ne)gkatarithm\u00ea/th\u00ea| e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/masi pro\\s to\\\nsumbai=non a)du/naton, do/xei para\\ tou=to gi/nesthai polla/kis o(\ne)/legchos.]]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: kai\\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch\n\u00ea(=tton au)tou\\s tou\\s e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntas to\\ toiou=ton.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)sullo/gistoi me\\n ou)=n a(pl\u00f4=s\nou)k ei)si\\n oi( toiou=toi lo/goi, pro\\s de\\ to\\ prokei/menon\na)sullo/gistoi.]]\n\n7. The seventh and last of these heads of Fallacy is, when the\nquestioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words, as\nif they were one--_Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_. In\nwell-conducted Dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either\nYes or No to the question put; or, if it was put in the form of an\nalternative, he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative.\nUnder such conditions he could not reply to one of these\ndouble-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself.\nAre the earth and the sea liquid? Is the heaven or the earth sea? The\nquestions are improperly put, and neither admits of any one correct\nanswer. You ought to confine yourself to one question at a time, with\none subject and one predicate, making what is properly understood by\none single proposition. The two questions here stated as examples\nought properly to be put as four.[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: Ibid. b. 38-p. 168, a. 16; vi. p. 169, a. 6-12. [Greek:\n\u00ea( ga\\r pro/tasi/s e)stin e(\\n kath' e(no/s.--ei) ou)=n mi/a\npro/tasis \u00ea( e(\\n kath' e(no\\s a)xiou=sa, kai\\ a(pl\u00f4=s e)/stai\npro/tasis \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea e)r\u00f4/t\u00easis.]\n\nThe examples given of this fallacy by Aristotle are so palpable--the\nexpounder of every fallacy _must_ make it clear by giving examples\nthat every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine\nthat no one can be imposed on by it. But Aristotle himself remarks,\nvery justly, that there occur many cases in which we do not readily\nsee whether one question only, or more than one, is involved; and in\nwhich one answer is made, though two questions are concerned. To set\nout distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most\nessential precautions for ensuring correct decision. The importance\nof such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed\nby Descartes in his Discours de la M\u00e9thode. The present case comes\nunder Mr. Mill's Fallacies of Confusion.]\n\nAristotle has thus distinguished and classified Fallacies under\nthirteen distinct heads in all--six _In Dictione_, and seven _Extra\nDictionem_; among which last one is _Ignoratio Elenchi_. He now\nproceeds to show that, in another way of looking at the matter, all\nthe Fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads, may be shown to be\nreducible to this single one--_Ignoratio Elenchi_. Every Fallacy,\nwhatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy, in some way or\nother, the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid\nElenchus,[40] or a valid Syllogism. For a true Elenchus is only one\nmode of a true Syllogism; namely, that of which the conclusion is\ncontradictory to some given thesis or proposition.[41] With this\nparticular added, the definition of a valid Syllogism will also be\nthe definition of a good Elenchus. And thus _Ignoratio\nElenchi_--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good\nElenchus--understood in its largest meaning, is rather a\ncharacteristic common to all varieties of Fallacy, than one variety\namong others.[42]\n\n[Footnote 40: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, a. 19: [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r\na(/pantas a)nalu=sai tou\\s lechthe/ntas tro/pous ei)s to\\n tou=\ne)le/gchou diorismo/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. a. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Ibid. p. 169, b. 15.]\n\nIn regard to two among the thirteen heads--_Fallacia Accidentis_ and\n_Fallacia Consequentis_ (which however ought properly to rank as only\none head, since the second is merely a particular variety of the\nfirst)--Aristotle's observations are remarkable. After having pointed\nout that a Syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or\nconclusive (thus showing that it involves _Ignoratio Elenchi_), he\naffirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it, and\nconceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent\nurging against them such an inconclusive syllogism. To take an\nexample:--Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right\nangles; every triangle is a figure; therefore, every figure has its\nthree angles equal to two right angles.[43] Here we have an invalid\nsyllogism; for it is in the Third figure, and sins against the\nconditions of that figure, by exhibiting an universal affirmative\nconclusion: it is a syllogism properly concluding in _Darapti_, but\nwith conclusion improperly generalized. Yet Aristotle intimates that\na scientific geometer of his day, in argument with an unscientific\nopponent, would admit the conclusion to be well proved, not knowing\nhow to point out where the fallacy lay: he would, if asked, grant the\npremisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism; and, even if\nnot asked, would suppose that he had already granted them, or that\nthey ought to be granted.[44]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 168, a. 40: [Greek: ou)d' ei) to\\ tri/g\u00f4non\nduoi=n o)rthai=n i)/sas e)/chei, _sumbe/b\u00eake d' au)t\u00f4=| sch\u00ea/mati\nei)=nai_ \u00ea)\\ pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ a)rch\u00ea=|, o(/ti _sch\u00ea=ma_ \u00ea)\\ a)rch\u00ea\\ \u00ea)\\\npr\u00f4=ton tou=to.]\n\nHere we have Figure reckoned as an _accident_ of Triangle. This is a\nspecimen of Aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word\n[Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/s]. He commonly uses it as contrasted with\n_essential_, of which last term Mr. Poste says very justly (notes, p.\n129):--\"To complete the statement of Aristotle's view, it should be\nadded, that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot\nbe defined without naming the subject, or whose subject cannot be\ndefined without naming the predicate.\" Now figure is the genus to\nwhich triangle belongs, and triangle cannot be defined without naming\nits genus figure. But to include Genus as a predicable under the head\nof [Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/s]or Accident, is in marked opposition to\nAristotle's own doctrine elsewhere: see Topic. I. v. p. 102, b. 4;\niv. p. 101, b. 17; Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9; Metaphys. E. p.\n1026, b. 32. It is a misfortune that Aristotle gave to this general\nhead of Fallacy the misleading title of _Fallacia\nAccidentia_--[Greek: para\\ to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]. When he gave this title,\nhe probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates\nin Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 32. Throughout the Topica and elsewhere,\nGenus is distinguished pointedly from [Greek: sumbeb\u00eako/s], though\nexamples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected. The\ntwo Fallacies called _Accidentis_ and _Consequentis_, would both be\nmore properly ranked under one common logical title--_Supposed\nconvertibility or interchangeableness between Subject and\nPredicate_--[Greek: ei) to/de a)po\\ tou=de m\u00ea\\ ch\u00f4ri/zetai, m\u00ead' a)po\\\nthate/rou ch\u00f4ri/zesthai tha/teron] (vii. p. 169, b. 8).]\n\n[Footnote 44: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 6: [Greek: a)lla\\ para\\ tou=to\nkai\\ oi( techni=tai kai\\ o(/l\u00f4s oi( e)pist\u00ea/mones u(po\\ t\u00f4=n\na)nepist\u00eamo/n\u00f4n e)le/gchontai; kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s ga\\r poiou=ntai\ntou\\s sullogismou\\s pro\\s tou\\s ei)do/tas; oi( d' ou) duna/menoi\ndiairei=n \u00ea)\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menoi dido/asin \u00ea)\\ ou) do/ntes oi)/ontai\nded\u00f4ke/nai.]]\n\nThe passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp\nof the scientific men contemporary with Aristotle. Most of them were\nprepared to admit fallacious inferences (such as the above) which\nassumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate. They had\npaid little or no attention to the logical relations between one\nproposition and another, and between the two different terms of the\nsame proposition. The differences of essential from accidental\npredication, and of each among the five Predicables from the others,\nmust have been practically familiar to them, as to others, from the\nhabit of correct speaking in detail; but they had not been called\nupon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory, nor to\nunderstand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of\ntheir argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results.\nAnd, if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical\nfallacies, we may be sure that this must have been still more the\ncase with unscientific men, of ordinary intelligence and education.\nAristotle tells us here, in more than one passage, how widespread\nsuch illogical tendencies were: to fancy that two subjects which had\none predicate the same must be the same with each other in all\nrespects;[45] to understand each predicate applied to a subject as\nbeing itself an independent subject, implying a new _Hoc Aliquid_ or\n_Unum_;[46] to treat the universal, not as a common epithet but, as a\nsubstantive and singular apart;[47] to use equivocal words or\nphrases, even the most wide and vague, without any attempt to\ndiscriminate their various meanings.[48] Such insensibility to the\nconditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men\nand among the men of special science. A geometer would be imposed\nupon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph,\nwhich, as being founded on the _Fallacia Accidentia_ (or\ninterchangeability of subject and predicate), Aristotle numbers among\nSophistical Refutations. Such a refutation, however, even when\nsuccessful, would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in\nknowledge of his own science;[49] for it would puzzle the really\nscientific man as well as the pretender.\n\n[Footnote 45: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 31: [Greek: ta\\ ga\\r e(ni\\\ntau)ta/, kai\\ a)ll\u00ea/lois a)xiou=men ei)=nai tau)ta/.]--vii. p. 169,\nb. 7: [Greek: e)/ti kai\\ e)pi\\ poll\u00f4=n phai/netai _kai\\ a)xiou=tai\nou(/t\u00f4s_, ei) to/de a)po\\ tou=de m\u00ea\\ ch\u00f4ri/zetai, m\u00ead' a)po\\\nthate/rou ch\u00f4ri/zesthai tha/teron.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 33: [Greek: o(/ti _pa=n to\\\nkat\u00eagorou/meno/n tinos u(polamba/nomen to/de ti kai\\ \u00f4(s e(\\n\nu(pakou/omen_; t\u00f4=| ga\\r e(ni\\ kai\\ t\u00ea=| ou)si/a| ma/lista dokei=\npare/pesthai to\\ to/de ti kai\\ to\\ o)/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. viii. p. 169, b. 27: [Greek: oi( de\\ sophistikoi\\\ne)/legchoi, a)\\n kai\\ sullogi/z\u00f4ntai t\u00ea\\n a)nti/phasin, ou) poiou=si\nd\u00ea=lon ei) a)gnoei=; kai\\ ga\\r to\\n ei)do/ta e)mpodi/zousi tou/tois\ntoi=s lo/gois.] Compare vi. p. 168, b. 6.]\n\nWe must always recollect that Aristotle was the first author who\nstudied the logical relations between Terms and Propositions, with a\nview to theory and to general rules founded thereupon. The\ndistinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties;\neven the simplest rules, such as those relating to the Conversion of\npropositions, or to Contraries and Contradictories, had never been\nstated in general terms before. Up to a certain point, indeed,\nacquired habit, even without these generalities, would doubtless lead\nto correct speech and reasoning; yet liable to be perverted in many\ncases by erroneous tendencies, requiring to be indicated and guarded\nagainst by a logician. When we are told that even a professed\ngeometer was imposed upon by these fallacies, we learn at once how\ndeep-seated were such illogical deficiencies, how useful was\nAristotle's theoretical study in marking them out, and how\ninsufficient was his classification when he described the Fallacies\nas obvious frauds, broached only by dishonest professional Sophists.\nAs he himself states, the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling\ndifference; having its root in the imperfection of language and in\nour frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical\ndistinctions.[50]\n\n[Footnote 50: Soph. El. vii. p. 169, b. 14: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\\r\n\u00ea( a)pa/t\u00ea dia\\ to\\ para\\ mikro/n; ou) ga\\r diakribou=men ou)/te t\u00ea=s\nprota/se\u00f4s ou)/te tou= sullogismou= to\\n o(/ron dia\\ t\u00ea\\n ei)r\u00eame/n\u00ean\nai)ti/an.] Compare v. p. 167, a. 5-14; i. p. 165, a. 6-19.]\n\nUnder one or other, then, of the thirteen general heads above\nenumerated, all Paralogisms must be included--merely apparent\nsyllogisms, or refutations, which are not real and valid;[51] and all\nof them designated by Aristotle as sophistic or eristic. Besides\nthese, moreover, he includes, as we saw, under the same designation,\nsyllogisms or refutations valid in form, and true as to conclusion,\nyet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate; _i.e._,\nnot suited to Dialectic. Now, here it is that difficulty arises.\nDialectic and Rhetoric are carefully distinguished by Aristotle from\nall the special sciences (such as Geometry, Astronomy, Medicine,\n&c.); and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative\n_dicta_, current beliefs, and matters of opinion, together with all\nthe most general maxims and hypotheses of Ontology and Metaphysics,\nof Physics and Ethics, and the common Axioms assumed in all the\nsciences, as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each.\nConstrued in this way, we might imagine that the subject-matter of\nDialectic was all-comprehensive, and that every thing without\nexception belonged to it, except the specialties of Geometry and of\nthe other sciences; and such is the usual language of Aristotle. Yet\nin the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish\nanother classification, and to part off Dialectic from a certain\nother science or art which he acknowledges under the title of\nSophistic or Eristic.[52] Elsewhere he describes Sophistic as\noccupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions; and\nthis characteristic feature parts it off from Demonstration and\nScience. But there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off\nfrom Dialectic. Where are we to find a clear line of distinction\nbetween the matter of dialectic debate (gymnastic or testing) on the\none hand, and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious, on the\nother? At the beginning of the Topica Aristotle assigned, as the\ndistinction, that the Dialectician argues upon premisses _really_\nprobable, while the litigious Sophist takes up premisses which are\nprobable _in appearance only_, and not in reality; such apparent\n_probabilia_ (he goes on to say) having only the most superficial\nsemblance of truth, and being seen immediately to be manifest\nfalsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence.[53] But I have\nalready pointed out that this description of apparent _probabilia_,\nif considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally, is both\nuntenable in itself, and contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere.\nThe truth is, that there is no clear distinction between the matter\nof Dialectic and the matter of Sophistic. And so, indeed, Aristotle\nmust be understood to admit, when he falls back upon an alleged\ndistinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and\nthe other. The litigious man (he tells us) is bent upon nothing but\nvictory in debate, _per fas et nefas_: the Sophist aims at passing\nhimself off falsely for a wise or clever man, and making money\nthereby.[54]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Metaphys. K. viii. p. 1064, b. 26: [Greek: tou=to de\\\n(to\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s) ou)demi/a z\u00eatei= t\u00f4=n o(mologoume/n\u00f4s ou)s\u00f4=n\ne)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n, _pl\u00ea\\n \u00ea( sophistik\u00ea/_; peri\\ to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s ga\\r\nau(/t\u00ea mo/n\u00ea pragmateu/etai.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71,\nb. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\\r pa=n to\\\nphaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\\n ga\\r t\u00f4=n\nlegome/n\u00f4n e)/ndox\u00f4n e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantel\u00f4=s t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an,\nkatha/per peri\\ ta\\s t\u00f4=n e)ristik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n a)rcha\\s sumbe/b\u00eaken\ne)/chein; parachr\u00ea=ma ga\\r kai\\ \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu\\ toi=s kai\\ mikra\\\nsunora=n duname/nois kata/d\u00ealos e)n au)toi=s \u00ea( tou= pseudou=s e)sti\\\nphu/sis.] It is by reference to this distinction between [Greek:\ne)/ndoxa] which are genuine and [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are only such\nin appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning\nof Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: [Greek:\no( me\\n ou)=n kata\\ to\\ pra=gma the\u00f4r\u00f4=n ta\\ koina\\ dialektiko/s, o(\nde\\ tou=to phainome/n\u00f4s poi\u00f4=n sophistiko/s] (p. 171, b. 6-20). I\nconfess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words [Greek: kata\\\nto\\ pra=gma the\u00f4r\u00f4=n ta\\ koina\\], which characterizes the\nDialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much\nfrom the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the\npassage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato,\nor Book B. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in\nthese two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to [Greek:\nta\\ koina\\ kata\\ to\\ pra=gma], or that they do so only in\nappearance?]\n\n[Footnote 54: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.]\n\nNow, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by\nAristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or\nsophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it\nlies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy;\nand that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of\nindividuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic\ncitizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as\nwe find argued in the Ran\u00e6 of Aristophanes), must be decided by\nexamining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of\nthem was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these\nblemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of\nRhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of \u00c6schines and\nDemosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the\noration De Coron\u00e2 in their character of compositions intended for a\nparticular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether \u00c6schines\nwas venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot;\nthis is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian\nand not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not\nguided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious\njealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to\nhis character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed\nupon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and\nreasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its\nforce when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good\nbecause it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the\ncharacter of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair\nlogical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite\nto that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth\nof one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in\nthe mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is\nworth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes--those employed\nby persons of dishonourable character and those employed by\nhonourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of\nLogic.\n\n[Footnote 55: Eurip. Hecub. 293.\n\n  [Greek: to\\ d' a)xi/\u00f4ma, ka)\\n ka\u00f4=s le/g\u00ea|s, to\\ so\\n\n  pei/sei; lo/gos ga\\r e)/k t' a)doxou/nt\u00f4n i)\u00f4\\n\n  ka)\\k t\u00f4=n dokou/nt\u00f4n au)to\\s ou) tau)to\\n sthe/nei.]\n\nAristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.]\n\nAs to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur\nto it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical\narguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In\nenumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these\nfallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that\nthey are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an\nunprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them,\nand even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the\nfallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and\nexposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in\nDialectic.[56] That Fallacies _In Dictione_, taken as a class (though\nthese are what he declares to be the most usual _modus operandi_ of\nthe sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed\nunperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when\nperceived--we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in\nthe Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and\nother works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the\nseveral distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such\nas _idem_, _unum_, _pulchrum_, _bonum_, _amare_, _album_, _acutum_,\n&c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always\nliable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells\nus the like in specifying the seven Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_: that\nthey also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see\nthrough and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which\nAristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process\npeculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the\ndefinition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the\ncommencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for\nthe _type-specimens_ which he and other logicians give to illustrate\nthis or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must\ncarry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first\nsight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in\nbelieving that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling.\nBut, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this\ndefinition fails in the essential character which Aristotle\npostulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable\nfor numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59]\nAristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into\nclasses, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens\npalpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in\neach class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the\nfallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but\nrequired attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining\nundetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion.\nThis was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the\nclassification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to\nall subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding\nthat the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But\nthe value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all\nfallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never\nreally deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of\nthe Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were\nonly impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional\nknaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and\nall the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by\nnature and as never falling into them.\n\n[Footnote 56: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. [Greek: kai\\\nlantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch \u00ea(=tton au)tou\\s tou\\s e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntas to\\\ntoiou=ton.]--vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\\r\n\u00ea( a)pa/t\u00ea dia\\ to\\ para\\ mikro/n].--xv. p. 175, a. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107,\na. 12, b. 7: [Greek: polla/kis de\\ kai\\ e)n au)toi=s toi=s lo/gois\nlantha/nei parakolouthou=n to\\ o(m\u00f4/numon.] Cf. Topic. II. iii. p.\n110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq.\nSoph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.\n\nCompare also Book [Greek: D]. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent\nrecognition and analysis [Greek: t\u00f4=n polla/k\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n]\nthroughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: [Greek: dei= ga\\r to\\n\ntou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou o(rismo\\n kata\\ panto\\s a)nthr\u00f4/pou\na)l\u00eatheu/esthai.]--VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: [Greek: dei= ga\\r\ne)pi\\ pa=n to\\ sun\u00f4/numon e)pharmo/ttein.]\n\nWhoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle\nindicates to the questioner _Loci_ for impugning a definition, will\nsee how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand\nsuch attacks.]\n\nThe appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives\nas the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all\nthe more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential\nfeature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention\nbetween two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a\nmatch at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between\ntwo celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack\nand defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each\noutwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or\nfor nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less\nintense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It\nis indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should\nexert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying:\nif they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common\nbusiness of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly\ndeclared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it\nexpressly from teaching,[60] where one man who knows communicates\nsuch knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the\npromptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing\nwhether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to\navoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or\nnotoriously false.[61] Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten\nbut, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to\nmask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the\nwork and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and\nundertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such\nthat arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the\nnegative.\n\n[Footnote 60: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2.\nCf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.]\n\nAccording to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is\nagonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries\nto entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the\nother: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded\nupon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of\nprocedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under\na discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the\ndialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to\nrefute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent\nto concede what is false; that, even where the thesis is false, he\noften can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood,\nbecause he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that,\nwhere the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his\nonly way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into\nconcessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.[62] But\nthese ends--fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox--are the\nvery same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)[63]\nsets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist.\nAnd the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to\nSophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic,\nbeing declared in very similar words.[64] That there were\ndialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle,\ncannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute\nof invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians\nsuch as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class, called\nSophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen\nfallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely\navoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably\ndoubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it\nis good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes\nhim, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and\npainted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies\nof Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the\ncross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own\ndeclarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates\ndepicted him--as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici\nElenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and\npuzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by\nPlato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre--which\nis an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and\nbearing on the personal character of the individual. If the\nsophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when\nexhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited\ngratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would\nhave us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;[65]\nnor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it,\nbut an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.[66] If\nthe Sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know,\nso also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of\nSokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two\nminds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and\nblindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as\nAristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are\nadapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both\nfor attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without\nstratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such\naggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player.\nThose who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude\nstratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding.\nMastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.\n\n[Footnote 62: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph.\nEl. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.\n\nCompare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.]\n\nDoubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the\ndialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other\nmatches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if\nAristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these\nrules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game\nunfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the\nDialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those\naimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means\nemployed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see\nhow any real line can be drawn between them.\n\nThus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist\nis--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without\nany visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing\nexamination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take\nadvantage.[67] But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we\nfind Aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the\nDialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme\nand intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible\napart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession\ndesignedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if\nobtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses\nnecessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent\nbeing aware that he had conceded them.[68] The questioner is farther\nadvised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting\nindifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or\nnegatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in\norder that he may create the impression of a strictly honest\npurpose.[69] If we compare the interrogative procedure which\nAristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in\nthe Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater\nrefinement of deception than the latter.\n\n[Footnote 67: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.\n\nAristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding\nherein--[Greek: du/nantai de\\ nu=n \u00ea(=tton _katourgei=n_ dia\\ tou/t\u00f4n\n\u00ea)\\ pro/teron.] The very same charge was urged against the dialectic\nof Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373--[Greek:\na)lla\\ S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas a)ei\\ tara/ttei e)n toi=s lo/gois kai\\ e)/oiken\n\u00f4(/sper kakourgou=nti.] Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E.,\n483, A.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a.\n5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp.\n155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.]\n\nThe next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is--that he\nconducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it\nupon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with\ntopics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or\nill and dishonourably.[70] From his own admission we see that this\npractice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those\nwhom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure,\nit might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted\nhe does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the\nelaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly\nintended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses\nwell-arranged and ready for interrogation,[71] we may be sure that\nevery Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them\nwould be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for\ndoing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the\nanswers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of\nrefuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to\nhim.[72] We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would\nbe such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism\nwhich the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he\nwas of course punished by failure.\n\n[Footnote 70: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116,\na. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician.\nSee also Waitz's note on the passage.\n\nAlexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary\nfor the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he\nshows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says\nthat the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here\nproduced does not serve Alexander's purpose. The Sophist Protagoras\n(in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting\ndialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it\naltogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato,\nProtagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for\ndebate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that\nof Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue,\np. 361. Compare 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates', Vol.\nII. pp. 53, 59, 70.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22;\nVIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112,\na. 14.]\n\nA third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he\ntakes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the\nrespondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations\nwhatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But\nwould not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would\nbe done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a\nHerakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?\n\n[Footnote 73: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.]\n\nAnother proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he\nseeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in\ncross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions\nwhich subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess\nin their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at\nthe bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power _per\nfas et nefas_. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which\nis just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers\napprove; the other, that which is just according to law or custom,\nsuch as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve.\nThere is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that\nof the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is\nmore eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these\nantitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which\n(_i.e._, to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes\nreference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the\nSophist from the genuine Dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses\nfor the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers.\nBut, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name\nare of a class utterly opposed to the class of _pseudo-probabilia_,\nwhich he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist,\nthough every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight\nas fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having\nplausible arguments _pro_ and _con_, debateable without end, and\nsettled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and\npredisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for\nthe acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to\ndeserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis\nbeing supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the\nequivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what\nis just by nature and what is just according to some local or\npeculiar sentiment.[77] The manoeuvre which Aristotle imputes to the\nSophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to\nSokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not\nKallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a\nSophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic\nSokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what\nis probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is\nparadoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against\nall the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering\nthem; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency,\nso as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved\ncontradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he\nconstrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which\nis exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a\nreproach.\n\n[Footnote 74: Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: [Greek: oi( me\\n\nga\\r sullogismoi\\ e)k t\u00f4=n e)ndo/x\u00f4n, dokou=nta de\\ polla\\ e)nanti/a\na)ll\u00ea/lois e)sti/n.]\n\nA disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must\nbe allowed [Greek: kata\\ to\\ pra=gma the\u00f4rei=n ta\\ koina/], which is\nthe characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician,\nas contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so\nfar us I can understand the words [Greek: kata\\ to\\ pra=gma]. See\nnote b p. 394 supra.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. [Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n\ne)ndechome/n\u00f4n poiei=n a(\\ proairou/metha.]]\n\n[Footnote 77: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p.\n1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373,\nb. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. [Greek: o(\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ su\\]\n(Sokrates) [Greek: tou=to to\\ sopho\\n kataneno\u00eak\u00f4\\s kakourgei=s e)n\ntoi=s lo/gois, e)a\\n me/n tis kata\\ no/mon le/g\u00ea|, kata\\ phu/sin\nu(per\u00f4t\u00f4=n, e)a\\n de\\ ta\\ t\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s, ta\\ tou= no/mou.]]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.]\n\nSome predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or\ndiscourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name,\nand those addressed to the thought.[80] This distinction Aristotle\ndisapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality.\nThere can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from\nthe name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it\nto the thought.[81] Whether an argument is addressed to the thought\nor not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon\nthe meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the\nwords: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended,\nit is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the\nquestioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts\nthe question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a\nteacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83]\nAnd this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to\nrefrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns\nas peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the\nattitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can,\nnot to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The\npurpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double\nfunction of question and answer (while entirely absent from\nDidactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the\nSophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all\ncost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the\nprocedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a\n_differentia_ giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair\nDialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the\nsame, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This\ndistinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very\ninsufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either\non the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of\nconcessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are\njustly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the\nenumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his\nanxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself,\ndistinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much\nthat belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really\nunfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the\nforeground.\n\n[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\\\ndiaphora\\ t\u00f4=n _\u00ea(\\n le/gousi tines_, to\\ ei)=nai tou\\s me\\n pro\\s\ntou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\\ pro\\s t\u00ea\\n dia/noian.]\n\nFrom this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx.\np. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors,\nwe see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of\nSophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of\nprior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\\r e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| e)/sti\nto\\ pro\\s t\u00ea\\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n t\u00f4=| to\\n a)pokrino/menon\ne)/chein p\u00f4s pro\\s ta\\ dedome/na.]]\n\n[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]\n\nThough Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he\nnevertheless indicates _Loci_ (or general heads of subjects) to\nassist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the\nsophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these\nprecepts are not materially different from those laid out in the\nTopica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to\nSolecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical\nquestioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice\nin sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical,\nand, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as\nvaluable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument,\nbut also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific\ntruths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the\nequivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of\nescaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without\nbeing aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when\nwe pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see\ngenerally that there _is_ a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect\nat once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how\nit may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because\nfallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our\nnotice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we\nacquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall\nfind ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular\ncase of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally,\nwe shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own\nstupidity and incompetence.[88]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p.\n101, a. 30, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\\\npro\\s ta\\s kath' au(to\\n z\u00eat\u00ea/seis (chr\u00ea/simoi); o( ga\\r u(ph'\ne(te/rou r(a|di\u00f4s paralogizo/menos kai\\ tou=to m\u00ea\\ ai)sthano/menos\nka)\\n au)to\\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]\n\n[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\\ d' e)sti\\ labo/nta te\nto\\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\\ lu=sai t\u00ea\\n mochth\u00eari/an, kai\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menon\na)panta=n du/nasthai tache/\u00f4s. o(\\ ga\\r i)/smen, polla/kis\nmetatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste, a)\\n\nd\u00ea=lon me\\n \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea)=|, a)mele/t\u00eatoi d' \u00f4)=men, u(sterou=men t\u00f4=n\nkair\u00f4=n polla/kis.]]\n\nAccordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable\nlength,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or\nsolution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions;\nall the thirteen Fallacies, (the six _In Dictione_, and the seven\n_Extra Dictionem_) being treated in succession. In conducting his\ndefensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what\nthe Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real\nor genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must\nso arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of\nsimulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really\nrefuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism\nconstructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does\nEquivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore\nyielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent\nis really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his\ninterrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where\nthey have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly\nand briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered.\nBut, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent\ncannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two\nmeanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards\nhimself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a\ncontradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the\nquestion will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions\nas one.[92]\n\n[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s ga\\r\npro\\s tou\\s e)ristikou\\s machete/on, ou)k \u00f4(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll'\n\u00f4(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s,\n\u00f4(/ste pro\\s to\\ m\u00ea\\ dokei=n diorth\u00f4te/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a.\n29.\n\nAristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct,\nwithout any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by\ndialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his\nown--[Greek: o(/ t' e)piz\u00eatou=si nu=n me\\n \u00ea(=tton pro/teron de\\\nma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\\ \u00ea)\\ nai\\ \u00ea)\\ ou)\\ a)pokri/nesthai to\\n\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison\nwith the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias,\npp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]\n\nAs the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such\nbut is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an\napparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various\ncases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution\nof this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is\nplausible, the respondent may answer, \"Be it so\"; but, if it involves\nany paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, \"So it would\nappear\": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to\nrefutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while\ninvolving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is\nat the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set\nup,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a _Petitio\nPrincipii_, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the\nquestioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by\nInduction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but,\nas the general result of the particulars conceded (and such\nlike),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may\nsay that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]\n\n[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]\n\nIf a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must\nbe made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the\nquestion is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the\nmeaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly.\nIf he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the\nresult:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real\nrefutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the\nfirst, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent,\nwhere he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the\nfirst. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape\nwith a less;[97] _e.g._, he ought to concede the particular rather\nthan the universal.\n\n[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 8-13.]\n\nAgain, among opinions generally received, there are some which the\npublic recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty;\nothers, on which they are firmly assured that every one who\ncontradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of\nthese two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will\nbe safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but\nsimply, \"I go with the received opinions.\"[98] In cases where\nopinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms,\nand for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes.\nSuch change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the\ndoubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the\nquestioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may\nfurther embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to\nbe put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]\n\n[Footnote 98: Soph. El. **xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.\n\nBoth the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are\ndifferently given by various commentators. The text and construction\nof Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot\nagree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) [Greek:\na)popha/neis] to be the true reading, instead of [Greek:\na)popha/seis], which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the\nedition of **Firmin Didot.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Ibid. b. 20-25.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Ibid. b. 26.]\n\nWhen the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks\nnecessary, and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism, the\nrespondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or\nnot.[101] A good and proper solution is, to point out on which\npremiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends. First, he must examine\nwhether it is formally correct, or whether it has only a false\nappearance of being so: if the last be the case, he must distinguish\nin which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has\narisen. If on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct, he\nmust look whether the conclusion is true or false. Should it be true,\nhe cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of\nthe premisses; but should the conclusion be false, two modes of\nsolution are open to him. One mode is, if he can point out an\nequivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion; another\nmode will be, to controvert, or exhibit a fallacy in, one of the\npremisses.[102] The respondent, however, must learn to apply this\nexamination rapidly and unhesitatingly: to do so at once is very\ndifficult, though it may be easily done if he has leisure to\nreflect.[103]\n\n[Footnote 101: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 29: [Greek: \u00ea( me/n\no)rth\u00ea\\ lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(poi/an\ne)r\u00f4/t\u00easin sumbai/nei to\\ pseu=dos.]]\n\n[Footnote 102: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 38: [Greek: tou\\s me\\n\nkata\\ to\\ sumpe/rasma pseudei=s dich\u00f4=s e)nde/chetai lu/ein; kai\\\nga\\r t\u00f4=| a)nelei=n ti t\u00f4=n \u00ea)r\u00f4t\u00eame/n\u00f4n, kai\\ t\u00f4=| dei=xai to\\\nsumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s.]\n\nMr. Poste translates these last words--\"or by a counterproof directed\nagainst the conclusion:\" and he remarks in his note (pp. 145-147),\n\"that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative\nsyllogism is one mode of _solution_--is both manifestly\ninadmissible, and flatly contradicted by Aristotle himself\nelsewhere.\" The words of Aristotle doubtless seem to countenance Mr.\nPoste's translation; yet the contradiction pointed out by Mr. Poste\n(and very imperfectly explained, p. 147) ought to make us look out\nfor another meaning; which is suggested by the chapter immediately\nfollowing (xix. p. 177, a. 9), where Aristotle treats of the\nFallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly. He tells us that\nequivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the\npremisses; and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of\nsolving or invalidating the refutation. This is what Aristotle means\nby the words cited at the beginning of this note: [Greek: t\u00f4=|\ndei=xai to\\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch o)rth\u00f4=s]. In Mr. Poste's\ntranslation these words mean the same as [Greek: a)nelei=n] used just\nbefore, which Aristotle obviously does not intend.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Soph. El. xviii. p. 177, a. 7.]\n\nAristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent\nmay provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious\nrefutation above enumerated. For these thirteen classes, he\npronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to\nall fallacies contained in one and the same class.[104]\n\n[Footnote 104: Scholia, p. 312, a. 4, Br.; Soph. El. 20, p. 177, b.\n31: [Greek: t\u00f4=n ga\\r para\\ tau)to\\n lo/g\u00f4n \u00ea( au)t\u00ea\\ lu/sis], &c.]\n\nThus, in the two first of them--Equivocation of Terms and Amphiboly\nof Propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the\nconclusion, or in the premisses, of the refutative syllogism. If it\nbe in the conclusion, the refutation must at once be rejected, unless\nthe respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing\nthe equivocal word as one of its terms, so that the refutation may\nappear to contradict it expressly and distinctly. But, if it be in\nthe premisses, then there is no necessity that the respondent should\nhave previously admitted such a proposition; for the equivocal word\nmay form the middle term of the refutative syllogism, and may thus\nnot appear in the conclusion thereof.[105] The proper way for the\nrespondent to deal with these questions, involving equivocation or\namphiboly, is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the\ndouble meaning, thus: \"In one sense, it is so; in another sense, it\nis not.\" If he does not perceive the double meaning until he has\nalready answered the first question, he must recover himself, when he\nanswers the second, by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly,\nand by specifying how much he is prepared to concede.[106] Even if he\nhas been taken unawares, and has not perceived the equivocation until\nthe refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely,\nhe should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been\napparently refuted, and that the refutation tells only against the\nname, not against the thing meant;[107] so that there is no genuine\nrefutation at all.\n\n[Footnote 105: Soph. El. xix. p. 177, a. 18: [Greek: o(/sois d' e)n\ntoi=s e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/masin, ou)k a)na/gk\u00ea proapoph\u00ea=sai to\\ ditto/n; ou) ga\\r\npro\\s tou=to a)lla\\ dia\\ tou=to o( lo/gos.]]\n\n[Footnote 106: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: e)a\\n de\\ la/th\u00ea|, e)pi\\ te/lei\nprostithe/nta t\u00ea=| e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/sei diorth\u00f4te/on;] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s te machete/on, a)\\n kai\\\na(pl\u00f4=s sullogi/z\u00eatai, o(/ti ou)ch o(\\ e)/ph\u00easen a)pe/ph\u00ease pra=gma,\na)ll' o)/noma; \u00f4(/st' ou)k e)/legchos.]\n\nInstead of [Greek: a)\\n kai/], Julius Pacius reads [Greek: ka)/n]:\nthe meaning is much the same.]\n\nIn the next two Fallacies--those of Composition and Division, or\nConjunction and Disjunction--when the questioner draws up his\nrefutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded, the\nrespondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended\nonly in the other construction of the words. This fallacy is distinct\nfrom Equivocation; and it is a mistake to try (as some have tried) to\nreduce all fallacies to Equivocation or Amphiboly.[108] The\nrespondent will distinguish, in each particular case, that\nconstruction of the words which he intended in his admission, from\nthat which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation.[109]\n\n[Footnote 108: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, a. 33-b. 9. [Greek: ou) pa/ntes\noi( e)/legchoi para\\ to\\ ditto/n, katha/per tine/s phasin.]\n\nThis is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists\nprior to Aristotle on logical proof; and that his declaration of\noriginality (in the concluding chapter of Sophist. Elenchi) must be\ntaken with reserve.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, b. 10-26: [Greek: diairete/on\nou)=n t\u00f4=| a)pokrinome/n\u00f4|;] &c.]\n\nThe Fallacies of Accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations,[110]\nbut those of _Figura Dictionis_ furnish a great many. When two words\nhave the like form and structure, it may naturally be imagined that\nthe signification of one belongs to the same Category as that of the\nother. But this is often an illusion; and in such cases a sophistical\nrefutation may be founded thereupon. The respondent will solve it by\ndenying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of\nmeaning, and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten\nCategories the meaning of each several word or each proposition\nbelongs. When two words thus seem, by their form, to belong to the\nsame Category, the questioner will often take it for granted, without\nexpressly asking, that they do belong to the same, and will found a\nconfutation thereupon; but the respondent must not admit the\nconfutation to be valid, unless this question has been explicitly put\nto him and conceded.[111] A question is put which, in its direct and\nobvious meaning, bears only on the category of Quantity, of Quality,\nof Relation, of Action, or of Passion; but the respondent, not aware\nof the equivocation, answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the\nCategory of Substance, and is so understood by the questioner when he\nconstructs his refutative syllogism. The respondent will secure\nhimself from being thus confuted, by keeping constantly in view to\nwhich of the Categories his answer is intended to refer.[112]\n\n[Footnote 110: Ibid. xxi. p. 177, b. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, a. 4-28. [Greek: to\\ ga\\r loipo\\n\nau)to\\s prosti/th\u00easin o( a)kou/\u00f4n \u00f4(s o(moi/\u00f4s lego/menon; to\\ de\\\nle/getai me\\n ou)ch o(moi/\u00f4s, phai/netai de\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n le/xin.]]\n\n[Footnote 112: Several illustrative examples of this mode of\nsophistical refutation, founded on the Fallacy called _Figura\nDictionis_, are indicated in this chapter by Aristotle. The\nindication however, is often so brief and elliptical, that there is\ngreat difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full, and still\ngreater difficulty in translating them into any modern language.\n\n1. Is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same\nthing?--No. To see something is to do something; to have seen\nsomething is to have done something?--Yes. Is it possible at the same\ntime to see and to have seen the same thing?--Yes.\n\nThe respondent has thus contradicted himself. The form of the word\n[Greek: o(ra=n] appears to rank it under the Category [Greek:\npoiei=n]. However, I think that the mistake really made here was,\nthat the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the\nfirst question.\n\n2. Does anything coming under the Category _Pati_ come under the\nCategory _Agere_?--No. But [Greek: te/mnetai, kai/etai,\nai)stha/netai], all show by their form that they belong to the\nCategory _Pati_?--Yes. Again, [Greek: le/gein, tre/chein, o(ra=n],\nshow by their form that they belong to the Category _Agere_?--Yes.\nYou will admit, however, that [Greek: to\\ o(ra=n] is [Greek:\nai)stha/nesthai/ ti]?--Certainly. Therefore something that belongs to\nthe Category _Agere_ belongs also to that of _Pati_.\n\nIf we turn back to Aristot. Categ. viii. p. 11, a. 37, we shall find\nthat he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to\ntwo distinct Categories.\n\n3. Did any one write that which stands here written?--Yes. It stands\nhere written that you are standing up--a false statement; but when it\nwas written the statement was true?--Yes. Therefore the writer has\nwritten a statement both true and false?--Yes.\n\nHere _true_ and _false_ belong to the Category Quality; the statement\nor matter written belongs to that of Substance. What the writer wrote\nhad nothing to do with the former of the two Categories; and no\ncontradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement _was_\nonce true and _is_ now false.\n\n4. Does a man tread that which he walks?--Yes. But he walks the whole\nday?--Yes. Therefore he treads the whole day.\n\nHere the Category of _Quando_ is confused with that of Substance.\n\n5. But the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one\nCategory with another, is furnished by Aristotle in respect of the\ndifference between himself and Plato as to Ideas or Universals.\nAccording to Plato the universal term denoted a separate something\napart from the particulars, yet of which each of these particulars\npartook. According to Aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the\nparticulars, but something belonging (essentially or non-essentially)\nto all and each of the particulars. In the Platonic theory it was an\n_Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]), or had an existence substantive\nand separate: in the Aristotelian it was a _Quale_ or _Quale Quid_\n([Greek: poio/n]), having an existence merely adjective or\npredicative. Aristotle maintains that Plato or the Platonists placed\nit in the wrong Category--in the Category of Substance instead of in\nthat of Quality.\n\nNow it is by rectifying this confusion of Categories that Aristotle\nsolves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical:--(1)\nThe argument concluding in what was called the 'Third Man;' (2) The\nfollowing question: Koriskus, and the musical Koriskus--are these the\nsame, or is the second different from the first?\n\nWhat is called the 'Third Man' was a refutation of the Platonic\ntheory of Ideas. Because Plato recognized a substantive existence,\ncorresponding to each common denomination connoting likeness, apart\nfrom all the similar particulars denominated, _e.g._, a Self-man, or\nseparate self-existent man, corresponding to the Idea, and apart from\nall individual men, Caius, &c.--opponents argued against him,\nsaying:--If this is recognized, you must also recognize that the\nSelf-man, and the individual man called Caius, have also a common\ndenomination and similarity, which (upon your principles) corresponds\nto another Ideal Man, or a Third Man. You must, therefore, go on\ninferring upwards to a Fourth Man, a Fifth Man, &c., and so onwards\nto an indefinite number of Ideal Men, one above the other. This was\nintended as a refutation, by _Reductio ad Impossibile_, of the\nPlatonic view of Ideas as separate Entities, each of them One and\nUniversal. But Aristotle here treats it as a Sophistical Refutation;\nand he indicates what he calls the solution of it by saying that it\nconfounds the Categories of Substance and Quality, putting the\nUniversal (which ought to be under the Category of Quality) under the\nCategory of Substance. He has no right, however, to include this\namong Sophistical Refutations, which are (as he himself defines them)\nnot real but fallacious refutations, invented by a dishonest\nmoney-getting profession called Sophists, and which are solved by\npointing out the precise seat of the fallacy. The refutation called\nthe 'Third Man' is so far from being fallacious, that it is valid,\nand is recited as such elsewhere by Aristotle himself (Metaphs. A. ix.\np. 990, b. 17**); while the solution tendered by Aristotle, instead of\nbeing a solution, is a confirmation, pointing out, not where the\nfallacy of the refutation resides but, where the fallacy of the\ndoctrine refuted resides. Moreover, if we are to treat the refutation\ncalled the 'Third Man' as sophistical, we must number Plato himself\namong the dishonest class called Sophists. Here is one among the many\nproofs that the strong line drawn by Aristotle between the\nDialectician and the Sophist is quite untenable. The argument is\ndistinctly enunciated in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 131-133).\n\nThe meaning of the Universal (Aristotle maintains) must be considered\nas predicative only, tacked on to some _Hoc Aliquid_, and belonging\nto _Quale_ or some other of the nine latter Categories. It may be set\nout as a distinct subject for logical consideration and reasoning:\nbut it cannot be set out as a distinct existence beyond and apart\nfrom its particulars ([Greek: para\\ tou\\s pollou\\s e(/n ti]). It is\n[Greek: poio/n], and it cannot even be recognized as [Greek: o(/per\npoio/n] or [Greek: au)to-poio/n], for this would put it apart from\nall the other [Greek: poia/], and would be open to the refutation\nabove noticed called the 'Third Man.' Such is the drift of the very\ndifficult passage of the Sophistici Elenchi (xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p.\n179, a. 10**). I differ from Mr. Poste's translation (p. 71) of part\nof this passage, and still more from the explanation given in the\nlatter part of his note (p. 155). I think that the doctrine of\n[Greek: to\\ e(\\n para\\ ta\\ polla/] is produced by Aristotle here and\nelsewhere in his work as untrue and inadmissible, not as his own\ndoctrine. Mr. Poste understands this passage differently from the\nprevious translators, with whom I agree for the most part, though M.\nBarth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire appears to me to have missed the hinge upon\nwhich Aristotle's argument turns, by translating [Greek: o(/per\npoio/n]--id ipsum, quod quale est (J. Pacius)--\"une qualit\u00e9:\" the\nargument turns upon the distinction between [Greek: o(/per poio/n]\nand [Greek: poio/n].\n\nI come now to the second sophistical refutation given by Aristotle:\nKoriskus, and the musician Koriskus--are the two the same or\ndifferent? This is what Aristotle calls a sophistical or fallacious\nargument (compare Metaphys. E. ii. p. 1026, b. 15); but it can hardly\nbe so called with propriety, for the only solution that Aristotle\nhimself gives of it is, that the two are _idem numero_, but in an\nimproper or secondary sense (Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 30); _i. e._,\nthat they are in one point of view the same, in another point of view\ndifferent--they are [Greek: e(\\n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]. See Arist.\nMetaph. [Greek: D]. vi. p. 1015, b. 16; Scholia, p. 696, a. 22, seq.;\nand Alexand. Aphrodis. ad Metaph. pp. 321, 322, 414, 415, ed. Bonitz.\nI understand Aristotle to say that [Greek: Ko/riskos mousiko/s]\ncannot be properly _set out_ or abstracted ([Greek: ou)k e)/stin\nau)to\\ e)kthe/sthai]), because it includes two Categories (Substance\nand Quality) in one; wherefore it cannot be properly compared either\nwith [Greek: Ko/riskos] simply (Category of Substance) or with\n[Greek: mousiko/s] simply (Category of Quality). It seems strange\nthat Aristotle does not notice this argumentative difficulty in the\ndiscussion which he bestows on [Greek: tau)to/n] in the Seventh Book\nof the Topica. The subtle reasonings, very hard to follow, which\nAristotle employs (Physic. V. iv. p. 227) might have made him\ncautious in treating the difficulties of opponents as so many\ndishonest cavils. It is curious that Alexander, in reciting the\nsophistical argument, assumes as a matter of course that [Greek: o(\ngrammatiko\\s S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas] is [Greek: o( au)to\\s t\u00f4=| S\u00f4kra/tei] (Schol.\nad Metaphys. p. 736, b. 26, Brand.).]\n\nAs a general rule, in all the refutations founded on the seven\nFallacies _In Dictione_, the respondent will solve the refutation by\ndistinguishing the double meaning of the words or of the phrase, and\nby adopting as his own the one opposite to that which the questioner\nproceeds upon. If the Fallacy is of Conjunction and Disjunction, and\nif the questioner assumes Conjunction, the respondent will adopt\nDisjunction; if it be a Fallacy of Accent, and if the questioner\nassumes the grave accent, the respondent will adopt the acute.[113]\n\n[Footnote 113: Soph. El. xxiii. p. 179, a. 11-25.]\n\nPassing to the Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_, where the sophistical\nrefutation is founded upon a Fallacy of Accident, the respondent\nought to apply one and the same solution to all. He will say: \"The\nconclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses\"; and he\nwill be prepared with an example, in which the conclusion obtained\nunder this fallacy is notoriously untrue.[114] \"Do you know\nKoriskus?\"--\"Yes.\" \"Do you know the distant person coming this\nway?\"--\"No.\" \"That distant person is Koriskus: therefore you know,\nand you do not know, the same person.\" The inference here is not\nnecessary. To be coming this way--is an accident of Koriskus; and,\nbecause you do not know the accident, we cannot infer that you do\nnot know the subject; such may or may not be the case.[115]\n\n[Footnote 114: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, a. 30: [Greek: r(\u00eate/on ou)=n\nsumbibasthe/ntas o(moi/\u00f4s pro\\s a(/pantas o(/ti ou)k a)nagkai=on;\ne)/chein de\\ dei= prophe/rein to\\ oi(=on.]]\n\n[Footnote 115: Ibid. a. 35-b. 7.]\n\nThe major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation\nmust rest, is, That it is impossible both to know and not to know the\nsame thing. This must be put as a direct question by the questioner,\nand must be conceded by the respondent, before the intended\nrefutation can be made good. Now there are some persons who solve the\nrefutation by answering this question in the negative, and by saying\nthat it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing, only\nnot in the same respect: such is the case when we know Koriskus, but\ndo not know Koriskus approaching from a distance.[116] Aristotle\ndisapproves this mode of solution, as well as another mode which\nrefers the fallacy to equivocation of terms. He points out that there\nare many other sophistical refutations, coming under the general head\nof _Fallaci\u00e6 Accidentis_, to which such solution will not apply; and\nthat there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to\nevery fallacy coming under the same general head; though he admits at\nthe same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious\nin more than one way. He says, moreover, that this contradiction or\nnegation of the premiss is no true solution; for a solution ought to\nbring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation\nappears to be a real refutation. Thus the _Fallacia Accidentis_\nconsists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true\nalso of the subject thereof: you explain that such inference, though\napparently cogent, has no real cogency, and in that explanation\nconsists the only proper solution of the fallacy.[117]\n\n[Footnote 116: Ibid. b. 7, 18, 37: [Greek: lu/ousi de/ tines\na)nairou=ntes t\u00ea\\n e)r\u00f4/t\u00easin; phasi\\ ga\\r e)nde/chesthai tau)to\\\npra=gma ei)de/nai kai\\ a)gnoei=n, a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\ kata\\ tau)to/.]\n\nMr. Poste (pp. 152-157) translates [Greek: a)nairou=ntes t\u00ea\\n\ne)r\u00f4/t\u00easin]--\"contradicting the thesis,\" and he expresses his\nsurprise at the assertion, observing (very truly) that contradiction\nof the thesis is the very opposite of a solution; it helps in the\nvery work which the refutation aims at accomplishing. But I cannot\nthink that [Greek: e)r\u00f4/t\u00easis] does mean \"the thesis,\" either here or\nin the other passage to which Mr. Poste refers (xxii. p. 178, b. 14).\nI think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded, or must\nbe presumed to have conceded, essential to the validity of the\nrefutation. The term [Greek: e)r\u00f4/t\u00easis] cannot surely, with any\npropriety, be applied to the thesis. It means either a question, or\nwhat is conceded in reply to a question; and the _thesis_ cannot come\nunder either one meaning or the other, being the proposition which\nthe respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, b. 23: [Greek: \u00ea)=n ga\\r \u00ea(\nlu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(\\ pseud\u00ea/s.]]\n\nIn like manner, all those Fallacies which come under the general head\nof _A dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_, can only be solved\nby pointing out, in each particular case, in what terms this\nconfusion is concealed--wherein resides the inference apparently\ncogent which is mistaken for one really cogent. The respondent is\ndriven to an apparent contradiction, by having granted premisses from\nwhich the inference is derivable that both sides of the _Antiphasis_\nare true--that the same predicate A may be both affirmed and denied\nof the same subject B. He solves the contradiction by analysing the\n_Antiphasis_, and by showing that affirmation is _secundum quid_,\nwhile denial is _simpliciter_; and that there is a contradiction not\nreal, but only apparent, between the two.[118]\n\n[Footnote 118: Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.]\n\nIn like manner, the Fallacy _Ignoratio Elenchi_ will be solved by\nanalysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the _Antiphasis_,\nand by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency\nbetween them.[119]\n\n[Footnote 119: Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.]\n\nIn regard to the Fallacies under _Petitio Principii_, the respondent\nif he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a\nfallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in\nitself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it,\nhe must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner;\ndeclaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in\nquestion is null, and that the concession was made under the\nsupposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in\ncontemplation.[120]\n\n[Footnote 120: Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.]\n\nThere are two distinct ways in which the _Fallacia Consequentis_ may\nbe employed. The predicate may be an universal, comprehending the\nsubject: because animal always goes along with man, it is falsely\ninferred that man always goes along with animal; or it is falsely\ninferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man. The fallacy\nis solved when this is pointed out. The last inference is only valid\nwhen the terms are inverted; if animal always goes along with man,\nnot-man will always go along with not-animal.[121]\n\n[Footnote 121: Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. [Greek: a)na/palin\nga\\r \u00ea( a)kolou/th\u00easis].]\n\nIf the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are\nindispensable to the conclusion, the respondent, after having\nsatisfied himself that this is the fact, will point out the\nmal-procedure of the questioner, and will say that he conceded the\nsuperfluous premiss, not because it was in itself probable but,\nbecause it seemed relevant to the debate; while nevertheless the\nquestioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards\nthat object.[122] This is the mode of solution applicable in the case\nof the Fallacies coming under the head _Non Causa pro Caus\u00e2_.[123]\n\n[Footnote 122: Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.]\n\nWhere the sophistical questioner tries to refute by the _Fallacia\nPlurium Interrogationum_ (_i.e._, by putting two or more questions as\none), the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question\ninto its component simple questions, and make answer accordingly. He\nmust not give one answer, either affirmative or negative, to that\nwhich is more than one question. Even if he does give one answer, he\nmay sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction; for it may\nhappen that the same predicate is truly affirmable, or truly\ndeniable, of two or more distinct and independent subjects. Often,\nhowever, the contrary is the case: no one true answer, either\naffirmative or negative, can be given to one of these complex\nquestions: the one answer given, whatever it be, must always be\npartially false or inconsistent.[124] Suppose two subjects, A and B,\none good, the other bad: if the question be, Whether A and B are good\nor bad, it will be equally true to say--Both are good, or, Both are\nbad, or, Both are neither good nor bad. There may indeed be other\nsolutions for this fallacy: Both or All may signify two or more items\ntaken individually, or taken collectively; but the only sure\nprecaution is--one answer to one question.[125]\n\n[Footnote 124: Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: [Greek: ou)/te plei/\u00f4\nkath' e(no\\s ou)/te e(\\n kata\\ poll\u00f4=n, a)ll' e(\\n kath' e(no\\s\nphate/on \u00ea)\\ a)pophate/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 125: Ibid. b. 6-25.]\n\nSuppose that, instead of aiming at a seeming refutation, the Sophist\ntries to convict the respondent of Tautology. The source of this\nembarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used\nand conveys clear meaning without its correlate, though the correlate\nis always implied and understood. The respondent must avoid this trap\nby refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without\nits correlate; and by requiring that the correlate shall be\ndistinctly enunciated along with it. He ought to treat the relative\nwithout its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant\nexpression--as merely syncategorematic; just as ten is in the\nphrase--ten minus one, or as the affirmative word is in a negative\nproposition.[126] Thus he will not recognize double as significant by\nitself without its correlate half, nor half without its correlate\ndouble; although in common parlance such correlate is often\nunderstood without being formally enunciated.\n\n[Footnote 126: Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: [Greek: ou) dote/on\nt\u00f4=n pro/s ti legome/n\u00f4n s\u00eamai/nein ti ch\u00f4rizome/nas kath' au(ta\\s\nta\\s kat\u00eagori/as.]\n\nMr. Poste observes in his note:--\"The sophistic locus of tautology\nmay be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault\nwhich dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction\nof superfluous words.\" He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4,\nseq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same\nword is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the\nSophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.]\n\nLastly, another purpose which Aristotle ascribes to the Sophist, is\nthat of driving the respondent into a Solecism--into some grammatical\nor syntactical impropriety, such as, using a noun in the wrong case\nor gender, using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the\nnoun to which it belongs, &c. He points out that the solution of\nthese verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case; in\ngeneral, when thrown into a regular syllogistic form, even the\nquestioner himself will be found to speak bad Greek. The examples\ngiven by Aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern\nlanguage, so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their\npeculiarity.[127]\n\n[Footnote 127: Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.]\n\nAfter having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to\nthe Sophist, and the ways of solving or meeting them, Aristotle\nremarks that there are material distinctions between the different\ncases which fall under one and the same general head of Sophistical\nParalogism. Some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself,\nand the particular point upon which it turns, are obvious and\ndiscernible at first sight. In other cases, again, an ordinary person\ndoes not perceive that there is any fallacy at all; or, if he does\nperceive it, he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy, so\nthat one man will refer the case to one general head, and another, to\na different one.[128] Thus, for example, Fallacies of Equivocation\nare perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies; some of\nthem are childish and jocular, not really imposing upon any one; but\nthere are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at\nfirst unnoticed, and is disputed even when pointed out, so that it\ncan only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis.\nThis happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and\ngeneral: which are treated by many, including even **philosophers\nlike Parmenides and Zeno, as if they were not equivocal at all, but\nunivocal.[129] Again, the _Fallaci\u00e6 Accidentis_, and the other\nclasses _Extra Dictionem_, are also often hard to detect. On the\nwhole, it is often hard to determine, not merely to which of the\nclasses any case of fallacy belongs, but even whether there is any\nfallacy at all--whether the refutation is, or is not, a valid one.[130]\n\n[Footnote 128: Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper\nou)=n e)n toi=s para\\ t\u00ea\\n o(m\u00f4numi/an, o(/sper dokei= tro/pos\neu)\u00eathe/statos ei)=nai t\u00f4=n paralogism\u00f4=n, ta\\ me\\n kai\\ toi=s\ntuchou=si/n e)sti d\u00ea=la--ta\\ de\\ kai\\ tou\\s e)mpeirota/tous\nphai/netai lantha/nein; s\u00eamei=on de\\ tou/t\u00f4n o(/ti ma/chontai\npolla/kis peri\\ o)noma/t\u00f4n, oi(=on po/teron tau)to\\ s\u00eamai/nei kata\\\npa/nt\u00f4n to\\ o)\\n kai\\ to\\ e(\\n \u00ea)\\ e(/teron.]]\n\n[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 27: [Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ peri\\ tou=\nsumbeb\u00eako/tos kai\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n e(/kaston, oi( me\\n e)/sontai\nr(a/|ous i)dei=n oi( de\\ chalep\u00f4/teroi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n; kai\\ labei=n e)/n\ntini ge/nei, kai\\ po/teron e)/legchos \u00ea)\\ ou)k e)/legchos, ou)\nr(a/|dion o(moi/\u00f4s peri\\ pa/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\nThe pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly, and\ncreate the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle.[131] In\ndialectical debate a puzzle arises, when the respondent finds that a\ncorrect syllogism has been established against him, and when he does\nnot at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert, in\norder to overthrow the conclusion. In the eristic or sophistic debate\nthe puzzle of the respondent is, in what language to enunciate his\npropositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will\nbe brought against him by the questioner.[132] It is these pungent\narguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation.\nThe most pungent of all is, where the syllogistic premisses are\nhighly probable, yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion\nwhich is also highly probable. Here we have an equal antithesis as to\npresumptive credibility, between the premisses taken together on one\nside and the conclusion on the other.[133] We do not know whether it\nis in the premisses only, or in the conclusion, that we are to look\nfor untruth: the conclusion, though improbable, may yet be true,\nwhile we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from\nuntrue premisses; or the conclusion may be both improbable and\nuntrue, in which case we must look for untruth in one of the\npremisses also--either the major or the minor. This is the most\nembarrassing position of all. Another, rather less embarrassing, is,\nwhere our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting\nconclusion to be untrue, but where each of the premisses on which the\nconclusion depends is equally probable, so that we do not at once see\nin which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought. These two\nare the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of\ndialectical debate.\n\n[Footnote 131: Ibid. 32: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ drimu\\s lo/gos o(/stis\na)porei=n poiei= ma/lista; da/knei ga\\r ou(=tos ma/lista.]]\n\n[Footnote 132: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: [Greek: a)pori/a d'\ne)sti\\ ditt\u00ea/, \u00ea( me\\n e)n toi=s sullelogisme/nois, o(/ ti a)ne/l\u00ea|\ntis t\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4t\u00eama/t\u00f4n, \u00ea( d' e)n toi=s e)ristikoi=s, p\u00f4=s ei)/p\u00ea| tis\nto\\ protathe/n.] The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language\nnot open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is\nillustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for\nguarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17,\na. 34: [Greek: le/g\u00f4 de\\ a)ntikei=sthai t\u00ea\\n tou= au)tou= kata\\ tou=\nau)tou=, m\u00ea\\ o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s de/, _kai\\ o(/sa a)/lla prosdiorizo/metha\npro\\s ta\\s sophistika\\s e)nochl\u00ea/seis_.] What is here meant by\n[Greek: sophistikai\\ e)nochl\u00ea/seis] is expressed elsewhere by [Greek:\npro\\s ta\\s logika\\s duscherei/as]--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p.\n1005, b. 21; N. i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651,\nBr.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr.\nand Metaphys.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: [Greek:\ne)/sti de\\ sullogistiko\\s me\\n lo/gos drimu/tatos, a)\\n e)x o(/ti\nma/lista dokou/nt\u00f4n o(/ti ma/lista e)/ndoxon a)nair\u00ea=|; ei(=s ga\\r\n\u00f4)\\n o( lo/gos, metatitheme/n\u00eas t\u00ea=s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s, a(/pantas\no(moi/ous e(/xei tou\\s sullogismou/s; a)ei\\ ga\\r e)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n\no(moi/\u00f4s e)/ndoxon a)nair\u00ea/sei [\u00ea)\\ kataskeua/sei]; dio/per a)porei=n\na)nagkai=on. ma/lista me\\n ou)=n o( toiou=tos drimu/s, o( e)x i)/sou\nto\\ sumpe/rasma poi\u00f4=n toi=s e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/masi.] I transcribe this text as\nit is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions\nanterior to Bekker had the additional words [Greek: \u00ea)\\\nkataskeua/z\u00ea|] after [Greek: a)nair\u00ea=|] in the fourth line; and M.\nBarth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them.\nBekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have\nretained the last words [Greek: \u00ea)\\ kataskeua/sei] in the seventh\nline. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be\nretained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be\nomitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.\n\nThis difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p.\n320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note\nof Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full\n(p. 164) the three \"similar syllogisms\" to which Aristotle here\nbriefly alludes. The phrase [Greek: metatitheme/n\u00eas t\u00ea=s\na)ntipha/se\u00f4s] is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II.\nviii. p. 59, b. 1: it means \"employment of the contradictory of the\nconclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset\nthe other.\" The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses,\neach highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable,\nbeing the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original\nsyllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M; _Ergo_, All S is\nP: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the\nconclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory\nof the conclusion will be highly probable--Some S is not P. We take\nthis contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as\nfollows:--\"All M is P; Some S is not P; _Ergo_ Some S is not M. And\nagain, Some S is not P: All S is M; _Ergo_, Some M is not P. All\nthese three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two\nhighly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly\nimprobable.]\n\nBut in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as\nrespondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the\nrefutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and\nwhether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.[134] Next\nin order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which\nof the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our\nsolution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to\nbring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process\nrequired, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the\npremisses.[135] A defective syllogistic argument is silly, when the\ndeficient points are of capital importance--relating to the minor or\nto the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange;\nbut it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient\nare outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the\ncarelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the\nargument itself.[136] Both the line of argument taken by the\nquestioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may\nbe directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the\nthesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally\n(_i.e._, to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to\nneither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (_i.e._,\nagainst time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would\ntake more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors\nwill allow.[137]\n\n[Footnote 134: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Ibid. a. 9: [Greek: deu/teros de\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n o(\nd\u00ea=los me\\n o(/ti para\\ diai/resin \u00ea)\\ a)nai/resi/n e)sti, m\u00ea\\\nphanero\\s d' \u00f4)\\n dia\\ ti/nos t\u00f4=n \u00ea)r\u00f4t\u00eame/n\u00f4n a)nai/resin \u00ea)\\\ndiai/resin lute/os e)sti/n, a)lla\\ po/teron au(/t\u00ea para\\ to\\\nsumpe/rasma \u00ea)\\ para/ ti t\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4t\u00eama/t\u00f4n e)sti/n.]\n\nMr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:--\"Whether it is\none of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction.\"\nHere Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by\napplying _distinction_ ([Greek: diai/resis]) to _the conclusion_ as\nwell as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be\nfurnished by applying _disproof_ ([Greek: a)nai/resis]) to _the\nconclusion_. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste's note\nrespecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).]\n\n[Footnote 136: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Ibid. a. 21.]\n\nThe last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle\nin recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica\n(reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in\npropriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value\nof that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the\nday.\n\nThe business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the\nsyllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most\nprobable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle\ntreats as the proper function of Dialectic _per se_ and of Peirastic;\nconsidering both--the last, of course--as referring wholly to the\nquestioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing\npower--the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who\nsets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers.\nIt appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the\nrespondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if\nthere had not happened to be another art--Sophistic, closely\nbordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable\nto furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical\ncross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at\nthe same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of\nDialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotle **tells\nus[138]) that he has included in the Topica precepts on the best mode\nof defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of\nimpugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner\ndoes not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man\nof knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but\nquestion and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for\nhe explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the\nneighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it\nsufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the\ndanger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his\nscheme--to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms\npeculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses\nand solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against\nthem. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies\nas if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic,\nand as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the\nDialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and\nPlato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling\ninto paralogisms.\n\n[Footnote 138: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: [Greek: proeilo/metha\nme\\n ou)=n eu(rei=n du/nami/n tina sullogistik\u00ea\\n peri\\ tou=\nprobl\u00eathe/ntos e)k t\u00f4=n u(parcho/nt\u00f4n \u00f4(s e)ndoxota/t\u00f4n; _tou=to ga\\r\ne)/rgon e)sti\\_ t\u00ea=s _dialektik\u00ea=s kath' au(t\u00ea\\n kai\\ t\u00ea=s\npeirastik\u00ea=s_. e)pei\\ de\\ _proskataskeua/zetai pro\\s au)t\u00ea\\n dia\\\nt\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s sophistik\u00ea=s geitni/asin_, \u00f4(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai\nlabei=n dialektik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ kai\\ \u00f4(s ei)d\u00f4/s, _dia\\ tou=to ou)\nmo/non to\\ lechthe\\n_ e)/rgon u(pethe/metha t\u00ea=s pragmatei/as to\\\nlo/gon du/nasthai labei=n, a)lla\\ kai\\ o(/p\u00f4s lo/gon u(pe/chontes\nphula/xomen t\u00ea\\n the/sin \u00f4(s di' e)ndoxota/t\u00f4n o(motro/p\u00f4s. t\u00ea\\n d'\nai)ti/an ei)r\u00ea/kamen tou/tou, e)pei\\ kai\\ dia\\ tou=to S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas\n\u00ea)r\u00f4/ta a)ll' ou)k a)pekri/neto; \u00f4(molo/gei ga\\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]\n\nIt appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word\nhas dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about\nthe middle) [Greek: \u00f4(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n\ndialektik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ kai\\ \u00f4(s ei)d\u00f4/s]. Now the words [Greek: pei=ran\nlabei=n] as the passage stands, must be construed along with [Greek:\n\u00f4(s ei)d\u00f4/s], and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible\nmeaning. I think it clear that the word [Greek: u(pe/chein] or\n[Greek: dou=nai] has dropped out before [Greek: ei)d\u00f4/s]. The passage\nwill then stand:--[Greek: \u00f4(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n\ndialektik\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ kai\\ _u(pe/chein_] (or [Greek: _dou=nai_) \u00f4(s\nei)d\u00f4/s]. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in\nharmony with what follows, which at present it is not. [Greek:\nPei=ran labei=n] applies to the questioner, but not to the\nrespondent; [Greek: \u00f4(s ei)d\u00f4/s] applies to the respondent, but not\nto the questioner; [Greek: pei=ran u(pe/chein] applies to the\nrespondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of [Greek: \u00f4(s\nei)d\u00f4/s]. The translation given by Mr. Poste _first_\n(p. 93):--\"professing not only to test knowledge with the resources\nof Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility\nof science\" appears to me (excepting the word _infallibility_, which\nis unsuitable) to render Aristotle's thought, though not his words as\nthey now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended\ntranslation (p. 175):--\"Since it claims the power of catechizing or\ncross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically.\" This\nsecond translation may approach more nearly to the present words of\nAristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine.\nAristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the\npower of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists\nnothing but cavil and fallacy--verbal and extra-verbal--the pretence\nand sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).]\n\nAristotle, we have already more than once seen, asserts emphatically\nhis claim to originality as having been the first to treat these\nsubjects theoretically, and to suggest precepts founded on the\ntheory. On all important subjects (he remarks) the elaboration of any\ngood theory is a gradual process, the work of several successive\nauthors. The first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary;\nupon these, however, subsequent authors build, both correcting and\nenlarging, until, after some considerable time, a tolerably complete\nscheme or system comes to be constructed. Such has been the case with\nRhetoric and other arts. Tisias was the first writer and preceptor on\nRhetoric, yet with poor and insufficient effect. To him succeeded\nThrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom\npartial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we\nhave now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a copious body of rhetorical\ntheory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by\nsuccessive traditions. Compared with this, the earliest attempt at\ntheory was indeed narrow and imperfect; but it was nevertheless the\nfirst step in a great work, and, as such, it was the most difficult\nand the most important. The task of building on a foundation already\nlaid, is far easier.[139]\n\n[Footnote 139: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: [Greek: t\u00f4=n ga\\r\neu(riskome/n\u00f4n a(pa/nt\u00f4n ta\\ me\\n par' e(te/r\u00f4n l\u00eaphthe/nta pro/teron\npepon\u00eame/na kata\\ me/ros e)pide/d\u00f4ken u(po\\ t\u00f4=n paralabo/nt\u00f4n\nu(/steron; ta\\ d' e)x u(parch\u00ea=s eu(risko/mena mikra\\n to\\ pr\u00f4=ton\ne)pi/dosin lamba/nein ei)/\u00f4the, chr\u00easim\u00f4te/ran me/ntoi poll\u00f4=| t\u00ea=s\nu(/steron e)k tou/t\u00f4n au)x\u00ea/se\u00f4s; me/giston ga\\r i)/s\u00f4s a)rch\u00ea\\\npanto/s, \u00f4(/sper le/getai; dio\\ kai\\ chalep\u00f4/taton; o(/s\u00f4| ga\\r\nkra/tiston t\u00ea=| duna/mei, tosou/t\u00f4| mikro/taton o(\\n t\u00f4=| mege/thei\nchalep\u00f4/tato/n e)stin o)phth\u00ea=nai; tau/t\u00eas d' eu(r\u00eame/n\u00eas r(a=|on\nprostithe/nai kai\\ sunau/xein to\\ loipo/n e)stin.]]\n\nWhile rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to\nmaturity, the case has been altogether different with Dialectic. In\nthis I (Aristotle) found no basis prepared; no predecessor to follow;\nno models to copy. I had to begin from the beginning, and to make\ngood the first step myself. The process of syllogizing had never yet\nbeen analysed or explained by any one; much less had anything been\nset forth about the different applications of it in detail. I worked\nit out for myself, without any assistance, by long and laborious\napplication.[140] There existed indeed paid teachers, both in\nDialectic and in Eristic (or Sophistic); but their teaching has been\nentirely without analysis, or theory, or system. Just as rhetoricians\ngave to their pupils orations to learn by heart, so these dialectical\nteachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects\nwhich they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse.\nThey thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency;\nbut they communicated no art, no rational conception of what was to\nbe sought or avoided, no skill or power of dealing with new\ncircumstances.[141] They proceeded like men, who, professing to show\nhow comfortable covering might be provided for the feet, should not\nteach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself, but should\nmerely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes--a present\nvaluable indeed for use, but quite unconnected with any skill as an\nartificer. The syllogism as a system and theory, with precepts\nfounded on that theory for Demonstration and Dialectic, has\noriginated first with me (Aristotle). Mine is the first step, and\ntherefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard\nlabour: it must be looked at as a first step, and judged with\nindulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think\nthat I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory\nstart, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will\nacknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for\nothers to accomplish.[142]\n\n[Footnote 140: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: [Greek: kai\\ peri\\ me\\n\nt\u00f4=n r(\u00eatorik\u00f4=n u(p\u00ea=rche polla\\ kai\\ palaia\\ ta\\ lego/mena, peri\\\n_de\\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantel\u00f4=s ou)de\\n ei)/chomen pro/teron\na)/llo le/gein_, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ trib\u00ea=| z\u00eatou=ntes polu\\n chro/non\ne)ponou=men.]]\n\n[Footnote 141: Ibid. a. 1: [Greek: dio/per tachei=a me\\n a)/technos\nd' \u00ea)=n \u00ea( didaskali/a toi=s mantha/nousi par' au)t\u00f4=n; ou) ga\\r\nte/chn\u00ean a)lla\\ ta\\ a)po\\ t\u00ea=s te/chn\u00eas dido/ntes paideu/ein\nu(pela/mbanon.]\n\nCicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the\nmarked difference between his mode of treatment and the common\nrhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the\nAristotelian Dialogues:--\"Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum\nquidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos\narbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus\npr\u00e6ceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam\nrationem oratoriam complectuntur\" (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).]\n\n[Footnote 142: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: [Greek: ei) de\\\nphai/netai theasame/nois u(mi=n \u00f4(s e)k toiou/t\u00f4n e)x a)rch\u00ea=s\nu(parcho/nt\u00f4n e)/chein \u00ea( metho/dos i(kan\u00f4=s para\\ ta\\s a)/llas\npragmatei/as ta\\s e)k parado/se\u00f4s \u00ea)ux\u00eame/nas, loipo\\n a)\\n ei)/\u00ea\npa/nt\u00f4n u(m\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=n \u00ea)kroame/n\u00f4n e)/rgon toi=s me\\n\nparaleleimme/nois t\u00ea=s metho/dou suggn\u00f4/m\u00ean toi=s d' eu(r\u00eame/nois\npoll\u00ea\\n e)/chein cha/rin.]\n\nIt would seem that by [Greek: toi=s theasame/nois] Aristotle means to\naddress the readers of the present treatise, while by [Greek: t\u00f4=n\n\u00ea)kroame/n\u00f4n] he designates those who had heard his oral expositions\non the same subject.]\n\nSuch is the impressive closing chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi. It\nis remarkable in two ways: first, that Aristotle expressly addresses\nhimself to hearers and readers in the second person; next, that he\nasserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on\nLogic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first\nbeginnings of such theory by laborious application. I understand his\nclaim to originality as intended to bear, not simply on the treatise\ncalled Sophistici Elenchi and on the enumeration of Fallacies therein\ncontained, but, in a larger sense, on the theory of the Syllogism; as\nfirst unfolded in the Analytica Priora, applied to Demonstration in\nthe Analytica Posteriora, applied afterwards to Dialectic in the\nTopica, applied lastly to Sophistic (or Eristic) in the Sophistici\nElenchi. The phrase, \"Respecting the _process of syllogizing_,[143] I\nfound absolutely nothing prepared, but worked it out by laborious\napplication for myself\"--seems plainly to denote this large\ncomprehension. And, indeed, in respect to Sophistic separately, the\nremark of Aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him,\nwould not be well founded: we find in his own treatise of the\nSophistici Elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines, from which he\ndissents.[144] In these prior doctrines, however, his predecessors\nhad treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to\nthe Syllogism and its general theory.[145] It is against such\nseparation that Aristotle distinctly protests. He insists upon the\nnecessity of first expounding the Syllogism, and of discussing the\nlaws of good or bad Refutation as a corollary or dependant of the\nsyllogistic theory. Accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating\nthat he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest\ngeneralities of the subject;[146] and he concludes it by claiming\nthis method of philosophizing as original with himself.\n\n[Footnote 143: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: [Greek: peri\\ de\\ tou=\nsullogi/zesthai pantel\u00f4=s ou)de\\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo\nle/gein], &c. (cited in a preceding note).]\n\n[Footnote 144: See note p. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s te a)/topon,\nto\\ peri\\ e)le/gchou diale/gesthai, a)lla' m\u00ea\\ pro/teron peri\\\nsullogismou=; _ o( ga\\r e)/legchos sullogismo/s e)stin, \u00f4(/ste chr\u00ea\\\nkai\\ peri\\ sullogismou= pro/teron \u00ea)\\ peri\\ pseudou=s e)le/gchou_.]]\n\n[Footnote 146: Ibid. i. p. 164, a. 21: [Greek: le/g\u00f4men, a)rxa/menoi\nkata\\ phu/sin a)po\\ t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nPHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA.\n\n\nAristotle distinguishes, in clear and explicit language, a science\nwhich he terms Wisdom, Philosophy, or First Philosophy; the\nsubject-matter of which he declares to be _Ens quatenus _Ens__,\ntogether with the concomitants belonging to it as such. With this\nOntology the treatise entitled Metaphysica purports to deal, and the\nlarger portion of it does really so deal. At the same time, the line\nthat parts off Ontology from Logic (Analytic and Dialectic) on the\none hand, and from Physics on the other, is not always clearly marked.\nFor, though the whole process of Syllogism, employed both in Analytic\nand Dialectic, involves and depends upon the Maxim of Contradiction,\nyet the discussion of this Maxim is declared to belong to First\nPhilosophy;[1] while not only the four Aristotelian varieties of\nCause or Condition, and the distinction between Potential and Actual,\nbut also the abstractions Form, Matter and Privation, which play so\ncapital a part in the Metaphysica, are equally essential and equally\nappealed to in the Physica.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b. 11. Whether\nthat discussion properly belongs to _Philosophia Prima_, or not,\nstands as the first [Greek: A)pori/a] enumerated in the list which\noccupies Book B. in that treatise, p. 995, b. 4-13; compare K. i. p.\n1059, a. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Physica, I. pp. 190-191; II. p. 194, b. 20, seq.;\nMetaph. A. p. 983, a. 33; Alexander ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 306,\ned. Bonitz; p. 689, b. Schol. Br.]\n\nIf we include both what is treated in the Analytica Posteriora (the\nscientific explanation of Essence and Definition) and what is treated\nin the Physica, we shall find that nearly all the expository\nprocesses employed in the Metaphysica are employed also in these two\ntreatises. To look upon the general notion as a cause, and to treat\nit as a creative force (_der sch\u00f6pferische Wesensbegriff_, to use the\nphrase of Prantl and other German logicians[3]), belongs alike to the\nPhysica and to the Analytica Posteriora. The characteristic\ndistinction of the treatise entitled Metaphysica is, that it is\nall-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered; that the\nexpository process is applied, not exclusively to any separate branch\nof _Ens_, but to _Ens_ as a whole _quatenus Ens_--to all the varieties\nof _Ens_ that admit of scientific treatment at all;[4] that the same\nabstractions and analytical distinctions, which, both in the\nAnalytica and in the Physica, are indicated and made to serve an\nexplanatory purpose, up to a certain point--are in the Metaphysica\nsometimes assumed as already familiar, sometimes followed out with\nnicer accuracy and subtlety.[5] Indeed both the Physica and the\nMetaphysica, as we read them in Aristotle, would be considered in\nmodern times as belonging alike to the department of Metaphysics.\n\n[Footnote 3: See ch. viii. pp. 240 seq. of the present work, with the\ncitations in note b, p. 252, from Prantl and Rassow.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. i. p. 1003, a. 21: [Greek: e)/stin\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea tis \u00ea(\\ the\u00f4rei= to\\ o)\\n \u00ea(=| o)\\n kai\\ ta\\ tou/t\u00f4|\nu(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/. Au(/t\u00ea d' e)sti\\n ou)demi/a| t\u00f4=n e)n\nme/rei legome/n\u00f4n \u00ea( au)t\u00ea/. ou)demi/a ga\\r t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n\ne)piskopei= _katho/lou_ peri\\ tou= o)/ntos \u00ea(=| o)/n, a)lla\\ me/ros\nau)tou= ti a)potemo/menai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Metaphys. [Greek: L]. vii. p. 1073, a. with Bonitz's\nComment. pp. 504-505. Physica, I. ix. p. 192, a. 34: [Greek: peri\\\nde\\ t\u00ea=s kata\\ to\\ ei)=dos a)rch\u00ea=s, po/teron mi/a \u00ea)\\ pollai\\ kai\\\nti/s \u00ea)\\ ti/nes ei)si/, di' a)kribei/as t\u00ea=s pr\u00f4/t\u00eas philosophi/as\ne)/rgon e)sti\\ diori/sai, \u00f4(/st' ei)s e)kei=non to\\n kairo\\n\na)pokei/sth\u00f4.] Compare Physic. I. viii. p. 191, b. 29, and Weisse,\nAristoteles Physik, p. 285.\n\nAbout the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition\nof the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys. Z. xii. p. 1037, b. 8:\n[Greek: nu=n de\\ le/g\u00f4men pr\u00f4=ton, e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s\nA)nalutikoi=s peri\\ o(rismou= m\u00ea\\ ei)/r\u00eatai] (Analyt. Post. II. vi.\np. 92, a. 32; see note b, p. 243).]\n\nThe primary distinction and classification recognized by Aristotle\namong Sciences or Cognitions, is, that of (1) Theoretical, (2)\nPractical, (3) Artistic or Constructive.[6] Of these three divisions,\nthe second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action, but\nthe two are distinguished from each other by this--that in the\nArtistic there is always some assignable product which the agency\nleaves behind independent of itself, whereas in the Practical no such\nindependent result remains,[7] but the agency itself, together with\nthe purpose (or intellectual and volitional condition) of the agent,\nis every thing. The division named Theoretical comprises intelligence\nalone--intelligence of _principia_, causes and constituent elements.\nHere again we find a tripartite classification. The highest and most\nuniversal of all Theoretical Sciences is recognized by Aristotle as\nOntology (First Philosophy, sometimes called by him Theology) which\ndeals with all _Ens_ universally _quatenus Ens_, and with the _Prima\nMoventia_, themselves immoveable, of the entire Kosmos. The two other\nheads of Theoretical Science are Mathematics and Physics; each of\nthem special and limited, as compared with Ontology. In Physics we\nscientifically study natural bodies with their motions, changes, and\nphenomena; bodies in which Form always appears implicated with\nMatter, and in which the principle of motion or change is immanent\nand indwelling (_i.e._, dependent only on the universal _Prima\nMoventia_, and not impressed from without by a special agency, as in\nworks of human art). In Mathematics, we study immoveable and\nunchangeable numbers and magnitudes, apart from the bodies to which\nthey belong; not that they can ever be really separated from such\nbodies, but we intellectually abstract them, or consider them\napart.[8]\n\n[Footnote 6: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1026; K. vii. p. 1064, a. 28-b. 14;\nM. iii. pp. 1077-1078; Bonitz, Commentar. p. 284.]\n\nSuch is Aristotle's tripartite distribution of Theoretical or\nContemplative Science. In introducing us to the study of First\nPhilosophy, he begins by clearing up the meaning of the term _Ens_.\nIt is a term of many distinct significations; being neither univocal,\nnor altogether equivocal, but something intermediate between the two,\nor multivocal. It is not a generic whole, distributed exhaustively\namong correlative species marked off by an assignable difference:[9]\nit is an analogical whole, including several genera distinct from\neach other at the beginning, though all of them branches derivative\nfrom one and the same root; all of them connected by some sort of\nanalogy or common relation to that one root, yet not necessarily\nconnected with each other by any direct or special tie.\n\n[Footnote 9: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1003, a. 33-p. 1004, a. 5:\n[Greek: to\\ d' o)\\n le/getai me\\n pollach\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ pro\\s e(\\n kai\\\nmi/an tina\\ phu/sin, kai\\ ou)ch o(m\u00f4nu/m \u00f4s--u(pa/rchei ga\\r\neu)thu\\s ge/n\u00ea e)/chonta to\\ o)\\n kai\\ to\\ e(/n.]\n\nCompare K. iii. p. 1060, b. 32. See also above, ch. iii. p. 60, of\nthe present work.]\n\nOf these various significations, he enumerates, as we have already\nseen, four:--(1) _Ens_ which is merely concomitant with, dependent\nupon, or related to, another _Ens_ as terminus; (2) _Ens_ in the\nsense of the True, opposed to _Non-Ens_ in the sense of the False;\n(3) _Ens_ according to each of the Ten Categories; (4) _Ens_\npotentially, as contrasted with _Ens_ actually. But among these four\nheads, the two last only are matters upon which science is\nattainable, in the opinion of Aristotle. To these two, accordingly,\nhe **confines Ontology or First Philosophy. They are the only\ntwo that have an objective, self-standing, independent, nature.\n\nThat which falls under the first head (_Ens per Accidens_) is\nessentially indeterminate; and its causes, being alike indeterminate,\nare out of the reach of science. So also is that which falls under\nthe second head--_Ens tanquam verum_, contrasted with _Non-Ens\ntanquam falsum_. This has no independent standing, but results from\nan internal act of the judging or believing mind, combining two\nelements, or disjoining two elements, in a way conformable to, or\nnon-conformable to, real fact. The true combination or disjunction is\na variety of _Ens_; the false combination or disjunction is a variety\nof _Non-Ens_. This mental act varies both in different individuals,\nand at different times with the same individual, according to a\nmultitude of causes often unassignable. Accordingly, it does not fall\nunder Ontological Science, nor can we discover any causes or\nprinciples determining it.[10] When Aristotle says that the two first\nheads are out of the reach of science, or not proper subjects of\nscience, he means that their first _principia_, causes, or deepest\nfoundations, cannot be discovered and assigned; for it is in\ndetermining these _principia_ and causes that true scientific\ncognition consists.[11]\n\n[Footnote 10: Aristot. Met. E. iv. p. 1027, b. 17; [Greek: Th]. p.\n1051, b. 2; p. 1052, a. 17-30; K. viii. p. 1065, a. 21.\n\nThere remains much obscurity about this meaning of _Ens_ (_Ens_\n[Greek: \u00f4(s a)l\u00eathe/s]), even after the Scholia of Alexander (p. 701,\na. 10, Sch. Brand.), and the instructive comments of Bonitz,\nSchwegler, and Brentano (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach\nAristoteles, ch. iii. pp. 21-39).\n\nThe foundation of this meaning of _Ens_ lies in the legitimate\n_Antiphasis_, and the proper division thereof ([Greek: to\\ de\\\nsu/nolon peri\\ merismo\\n a)ntipha/se\u00f4s], p. 1027, b. 20). It is a\nfirst principle (p. 1005, b. 30) that, if one member of the\n_Antiphasis_ must be affirmed as true, the other must be denied as\nfalse. If we fix upon the right combination to affirm, we say _the\nthing that is_: if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it,\nwe say _the thing that is not_ (p. 1012, b. 10). \"Falsehood and Truth\n(Aristotle says, E. iv. p. 1027, b. 25) are not in things but in our\nmental combination; and as regards simple (uncombined) matters and\nessences, they are not even in our mental combination:\" [Greek: ou)\nga/r e)sti to\\ pseu=dos kai\\ to\\ a)l\u00eathe\\s e)n toi=s pra/gmasin,\noi(=on to\\ me\\n a)gatho\\n a)l\u00eathe/s, to\\ de\\ kako\\n eu)thu\\s\npseu=dos, a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|; peri\\ de\\ ta\\ a(pla= kai\\ ta\\ ti/\ne)stin ou)d' e)n t\u00ea=| dianoi/a|.] Compare Bonitz (ad Ar. Metaph. Z.\niv. p. 1030, a.), p. 310, Comm.\n\nIn regard to _cogitabilia_--simple, indivisible, uncompounded--there\nis no combination or disjunction; therefore, strictly speaking,\nneither truth nor falsehood (Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. vi. p. 430, a.\n26; also Categor. x. p. 13, b. 10). The intellect either apprehends\nthese simple elements, or it does not apprehend them; there is no\n[Greek: dia/noia] concerned. Not to apprehend them is ignorance,\n[Greek: a)/gnoia], which sometimes loosely passes under the title of\n[Greek: pseu=dos] (Schwegler, Comm. Pt. II., p. 32).]\n\n[Footnote 11: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 3: [Greek: ai( a)rchai\\\nkai\\ ta\\ ai)/tia z\u00eatei=tai t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n, d\u00ea=lon d' o(/ti \u00ea(=|\no)/nta.--o(/l\u00f4s de\\ pa=sa e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea diano\u00eatik\u00ea\\ \u00ea)\\ mete/chousa/ ti\ndianoi/as peri\\ ai)ti/as kai\\ a)rcha/s e)stin \u00ea)\\ a)kribeste/ras \u00ea)\\\na(plouste/ras.]\n\nCompare Metaph. K. vii. p. 1063, b. 36; p. 1065, a. 8-26. Analyt.\nPost. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9.]\n\nThere remain, as matter proper for the investigation of First\nPhilosophy, the two last-mentioned heads of _Ens_; viz., _Ens_\naccording to the Ten Categories, and _Ens_ potential and actual. But,\nalong with these, Aristotle includes another matter also; viz., the\ncritical examination of the Axioms and highest generalities of\nsyllogistic proof or Demonstration. He announces as the first\nprinciple of these Axioms--as the highest and firmest of all\nPrinciples--the Maxim of Contradiction:[12] The same predicate cannot\nboth belong and not belong to the same subject, at the same time and\nin the same sense; or, You cannot both truly affirm, and truly deny,\nthe same predicate respecting the same subject; or, The same\nproposition cannot be at once true and false. This Axiom is by nature\nthe beginning or source of all the other Axioms. It stands first in\nthe order of knowledge; and it neither rests upon nor involves any\nhypothesis.[13]\n\n[Footnote 12: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 7, 17, 22, 34:\n[Greek: au(/t\u00ea d\u00ea\\ pas\u00f4=n e)sti\\ bebaiota/t\u00ea t\u00f4=n\na)rch\u00f4=n--phu/sei ga\\r a)rch\u00ea\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n a)xi\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n au(/t\u00ea\npa/nt\u00f4n.]--p. 1011, b. 13: [Greek: bebaiota/t\u00ea _do/xa_ pas\u00f4=n to\\ m\u00ea\\\nei)=nai a)l\u00eathei=s a(/ma ta\\s a)ntikeime/nas pha/seis]--(He here\napplies the term [Greek: do/xa] to designate this fundamental maxim.\nThis deserves notice, because of the antithesis, common with him\nelsewhere, between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]).]\n\n[Footnote 13: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 13-14: [Greek:\ngn\u00f4rim\u00f4ta/t\u00ean--a)nupo/theton].]\n\nThe Syllogism is defined by Aristotle as consisting of premisses and\na conclusion: if the two propositions called premisses be granted as\ntrue, a third as conclusion must for that reason be granted as true\nalso.[14] The truth of the conclusion is affirmed conditionally on\nthe truth of the premisses; and the rules of Syllogism set out those\ncombinations of propositions in which such affirmation may be made\nlegitimately. The rules of the Syllogism being thus the rules for\nsuch conditional affirmation, the Principle or Axiom thereof\nenunciates in the most general terms what is implied in all those\nrules, as essential to their validity. And, since the syllogistic or\ndeductive process is applicable without exception to every variety of\nthe _Scibile_, Aristotle considers the Axioms or Principles thereof\nto come under the investigation of Ontology or First Philosophy. Thus\nit is, that he introduces us to the Maxim of Contradiction, and its\nsupplement or correlative, the Maxim of the Excluded Middle.\n\n[Footnote 14: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-20, et alib.]\n\nHis vindication of these Axioms is very illustrative of the\nphilosophy of his day. It cannot be too often impressed that he was\nthe first either to formulate the precepts; or to ascend to the\ntheory, of deductive reasoning; that he was the first to mark by\nappropriate terms the most important logical distinctions and\ncharacteristic attributes of propositions; that before his time,\nthere was abundance of acute dialectic, but no attempt to set forth\nany critical scheme whereby the conclusions of such dialectic might\nbe tested. Anterior to Sokrates, the cast of Grecian philosophy had\nbeen altogether either theological, or poetical, or physical, or at\nleast some fusion of these three varieties into one. Sokrates was the\nfirst who broke ground for Logic--for testing the difference between\ngood and bad ratiocination. He did this by enquiry as to the\ndefinition of general terms,[15] and by dialectical exposure of the\nignorance generally prevalent among those who familiarly used them.\nPlato in his Sokratic dialogues followed in the same negative track;\nopening up many instructive points of view respecting the erroneous\ntendencies by which reasoners were misled, but not attempting any\npositive systematic analysis, nor propounding any intelligible scheme\nof his own for correction or avoidance of the like. If Sokrates and\nPlato, both of them active in exposing ratiocinative error and\nconfusion, stopped short of any wide logical theory, still less were\nthe physical philosophers likely to supply that deficiency. Aristotle\ntells us that several of them controverted the Maxim of\nContradiction.[16] Herakleitus and his followers maintained the\nnegative of it, distinctly and emphatically;[17] while the disciples\nof Parmenides, though less pronounced in their negative, could not\nhave admitted it as universally true. Even Plato must be reckoned\namong those who, probably without having clearly stated to himself\nthe Maxim in its universal terms, declared doctrines quite\nincompatible with it: the Platonic Parmenides affords a conspicuous\nexample of contradictory conclusions deduced by elaborate reasoning\nand declared to be both of them firmly established.[18] Moreover, in\nthe Sophistes,[19] Plato explains the negative proposition as\nexpressing what is different from that which is denied, but nothing\nbeyond; an explanation which, if admitted, would set aside the Maxim\nof Contradiction as invalid.\n\n[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, b. 1: [Greek: S\n\u00f4kra/tous de\\ peri\\ me\\n ta\\ \u00ea)thika\\ pragmateuome/nou, peri\\ de\\\nt\u00ea=s o(/l\u00eas phu/se\u00f4s ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\\ katho/lou\nz\u00eatou=ntos, kai\\ peri\\ o(rism\u00f4=n e)pist\u00ea/santos _pr\u00f4/tou_ t\u00ea\\n\ndia/noian.]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1005, b. 35:\n[Greek: ei)si\\ de/ tines, oi(/, katha/per ei)/pomen, au)toi/ te\ne)nde/chesthai/ phasi to\\ au)to\\ ei)=nai kai\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai, kai\\\nu(polamba/nein ou(/t\u00f4s. chr\u00f4=ntai de\\ t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| tou/t\u00f4|\npolloi\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n peri\\ phu/se\u00f4s.]]\n\n[Footnote 17: Ibid. iii. p. 1005, b. 25; v. p. 1010, a. 13; vi. p.\n1011, a. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic. v. p. 479, A.; vii. p. 538, E. Compare\nalso the conclusion of the Platonic Parmenides, and the elaborate\ndialectic or antinomies by which the contradictions involved in it\nare proved.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Sophistes, p. 257, B.]\n\nWhile Aristotle mentions these various dissentients, and especially\nHerakleitus, he seems to imagine that they were not really in\nearnest[20] in their dissent. Yet he nevertheless goes at length into\nthe case against them, as well as against others, who agreed with him\nin affirming the Maxim, but who undertook also to demonstrate it. Any\nsuch demonstration Aristotle declares to be impossible. The Maxim is\nassumed in all demonstrations; unless you grant it, no demonstration\nis valid; but it cannot be itself demonstrated. He had already laid\ndown in the Analytica that the premisses for demonstration could not\nbe carried back indefinitely, and that the attempt so to carry them\nback was unphilosophical.[21] There must be some primary,\nundemonstrable truths; and the Maxim of Contradiction he ranks among\nthe first. Still, though in attempting any formal demonstration of\nthe Maxim you cannot avoid assuming the Maxim itself and thus falling\ninto _Petitio Principii_, Aristotle contends that you can demonstrate\nit in the way of refutation,[22] relatively to a given opponent,\nprovided such opponent will not content himself with simply denying\nit, but will besides advance some affirmative thesis of his own, as a\ntruth in which he believes; or provided he will even grant the fixed\nmeaning of words, defining them in a manner significant alike to\nhimself and to others,--each word to have either one fixed meaning,\nor a limited number of different meanings, clear and well\ndefined.[23] It is impossible for two persons to converse, unless\neach understands the other. A word which conveys to the mind not one\nmeaning, but a multitude of unconnected meanings, is for all useful\npurposes unmeaning.[24] If, therefore, the opponent once binds\nhimself to an affirmative definition of any word, this definition may\nbe truly predicated of the _definitum_ as subject; while he must be\nconsidered as interdicting himself from predicating of the same\nsubject the negative of that definition. But when you ask for the\ndefinition, your opponent must answer the question directly and _bon\u00e2\nfide_. He must not enlarge his definition so as to include both the\naffirmative and negative of the same proposition; nor must he tack on\nto the real essence (declared in the definition) a multitude of\nunessential attributes. If he answers in this confused and perplexing\nmanner, he must be treated as not answering at all, and as rendering\nphilosophical discussion impossible.[25] Such a mode of speaking goes\nto disallow any ultimate essence or determinate subject, and shuts\nout all predication; for there cannot be an infinite regress of\npredicates upon predicates, and accidents upon accidents, without\narriving at an ultimate substratum--Subject or Essence.[26] If,\nwherever you can truly affirm a predicate of any subject, you can\nalso truly deny the same predicate of the same subject, it is\nmanifest that all subjects are one: there is nothing to discriminate\nman, horse, ship, wall, &c., from each other; every one speaks truth,\nand every one at the same time speaks falsehood; a man believes and\ndisbelieves the same thing at the same time; or he neither believes\nnor disbelieves, and then his mind is blank, like a vegetable.[27]\n\n[Footnote 20: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 26; K. v.\np. 1062, a. 32. Here Aristotle intimates that Herakleitus may have\nasserted what he did not believe; though we find him in another place\nciting Herakleitus as an example of those who adhered as obstinately\nto their opinions as other persons adhered to demonstrated truth\n(Ethic. Nik. VII. v. p. 1146, b. 30.).]\n\n[Footnote 21: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 5: [Greek:\na)xiou=si d\u00ea\\ kai\\ tou=to a)podeiknu/nai tine\\s di' a)paideusi/an;\ne)/sti ga\\r a)paideusi/a to\\ m\u00ea\\ gign\u00f4/skein ti/n\u00f4n dei= z\u00eatei=n\na)po/deixin kai\\ ti/n\u00f4n ou) dei=.]]\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11:\n[Greek: e)/sti d' a)podei=xai e)legktik\u00f4=s kai\\ peri\\ tou/tou o(/ti\na)du/naton, a)\\n mo/non ti le/g\u00ea| o( a)mphisb\u00eat\u00f4=n.]--K. v. p. 1062,\na. 2: [Greek: kai\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n a(pl\u00f4=s me\\n ou)k e)/stin\na)po/deixis, pro\\s to/nde d' e)/stin.]--p. 1062, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ibid. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 18-34.\n[Greek: diaphe/rei d' ou)the\\n ou)/d' ei) plei/\u00f4 tis phai\u00ea/\ns\u00eamai/nein, mo/non de\\ \u00f4(risme/na.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 7: [Greek: to\\ ga\\r\nm\u00ea\\ e(/n ti s\u00eamai/nein ou)the\\n s\u00eamai/nein e)sti/n, m\u00ea\\ s\u00eamaino/nt\u00f4n\nde\\ t\u00f4=n o)noma/t\u00f4n a)n\u00ea/|r\u00eatai to\\ diale/gesthai pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous,\nkata\\ de\\ t\u00ea\\n a)l\u00ea/theian kai\\ pro\\s au(to/n; ou)the\\n **ga\\r\ne)nde/chetai noei=n m\u00ea\\ noou=nta e(/n.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 30-p. 1007, a. 20.\n[Greek: sumbai/nei to\\ lechthe/n, a)\\n a)pokri/n\u00eatai to\\\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menon. e)a\\n de\\ prostith\u00ea=| e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=ntos a(pl\u00f4=s kai\\ ta\\s\na)popha/seis, ou)k a)pokri/netai to\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menon.--e)a\\n de\\\ntou=to poi\u00ea=|, ou) diale/getai.]]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. p. 1007, a. 20-b. 19: [Greek: o(/l\u00f4s d'\na)nairou=sin oi( tou=to le/gontes ou)si/an kai\\ to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n\nei)=nai.--ei) de\\ pa/nta kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s le/getai, ou)the\\n e)/stai\npr\u00f4=ton to\\ kath' ou(=, ei) a)ei\\ to\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s kath'\nu(pokeime/nou tino\\s s\u00eamai/nei t\u00ea\\n kat\u00eagori/an; a)na/gk\u00ea a)/ra ei)s\na)/peiron i)e/nai; a)ll' a)du/naton.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Aristot. Met. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, a. 18-b. 12:\n[Greek: ei) de\\ o(moi/\u00f4s kai\\ o(/sa a)poph\u00ea=sai pha/nai\na)na/gk\u00ea--pa/nta d' a)\\n ei)/\u00ea e(/n--ou)the\\n dioi/sei e(/teron\ne(te/rou--ei) de\\ m\u00eathe\\n u(polamba/nei a)ll' o(moi/\u00f4s oi)/etai kai\\\nou)k oi)/etai, ti/ a)\\n diaphero/nt\u00f4s e)/choi t\u00f4=n phut\u00f4=n?] K. v. p.\n1062, a. 28.]\n\nThe man who professes this doctrine, however (continues\nAristotle[28]), shows plainly by his conduct that his mind is not\nthus blank; that**, in respect of the contradictory alternative, he\ndoes not believe either both sides or neither side, but believes one\nand disbelieves the other. When he feels hungry, and seeks what he\nknows to be palatable and wholesome, he avoids what he knows to be\nnasty and poisonous. He knows what is to be found in the\nmarket-place, and goes there to get it; he keeps clear of falling into\na well or walking into the sea; he does not mistake a horse for a man.\nHe may often find himself mistaken; but he shows by his conduct that\nhe believes certain subjects to possess certain definite attributes,\nand not to possess others. Though we do not reach infallible truth,\nwe obtain an approach to it, sometimes nearer, sometimes more remote;\nand we thus escape the extreme doctrine which forbids all definite\naffirmation.[29]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 12-31; K. vi. p.\n1063, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 36: [Greek: ei) ou)=n\nto\\ ma=llon e)ggu/teron, ei)/\u00ea ge a)/n ti a)l\u00eathe\\s ou(= e)ggu/teron\nto\\ ma=llon a)l\u00eathe/s; ka)\\n ei) m\u00ea/ e)stin, a)ll' \u00ea)/d\u00ea ge/ ti\ne)sti\\ bebaio/teron kai\\ a)l\u00eathin\u00f4/teron, kai\\ tou= lo/gou\na)p\u00eallagme/noi a)\\n ei)/\u00eamen tou= a)kra/tou kai\\ k\u00f4lu/onto/s ti t\u00ea=|\ndianoi/a| o(ri/sai.]]\n\nIt is in this manner that Aristotle, vindicating the Maxims of\nContradiction and of Excluded Middle as the highest _principia_ of\nsyllogistic reasoning, disposes of the two contemporaneous dogmas\nthat were most directly incompatible with these Maxims:--(1) The\ndogma of Herakleitus, who denied all duration or permanence of\nsubject, recognizing nothing but perpetual process, flux, or change,\neach successive moment of which involved destruction and generation\nimplicated with each other: _Is_ and _is not_ are both alike and\nconjointly true, while neither is true separately, to the exclusion\nof the other;[30] (2) The dogma of Anaxagoras, who did not deny\nfixity or permanence of subject, but held that everything was mixed\nup with everything; that every subject had an infinite assemblage of\ncontrary predicates, so that neither of them could be separately\naffirmed or separately denied: The truth lies in a third alternative\nor middle, between affirmation and denial.[31]\n\n[Footnote 30: Aristot. Met. A. vi. p. 987, a. 34; [Greek: G]. v. p.\n1010, a. 12: [Greek: Kra/tulos--o(\\s to\\ teleutai=on ou)the\\n \u00f4/|eto\ndei=n le/gein a)lla\\ to\\n da/ktulon e)ki/nei mo/non, kai\\\n\u00ca(raklei/t\u00f4| e)peti/ma ei)po/nti o(/ti di\\s t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| pota/m\u00f4| ou)k\ne)/stin e)mb\u00ea=nai; au)to\\s ga\\r \u00f4)/|eto ou)/d' a(pa/x.] Herakleitus\nadopted as his one _fundamentum_ Fire or Heat, as being the principle\nof mobility or change: [Greek: chr\u00f4=ntai ga\\r \u00f4(s kin\u00eatik\u00ea\\n\ne)/chonti t\u00f4=| puri\\ t\u00ea\\n phu/sin]--Metaph. A. iii. p. 984, b. 5.\nIbid. K. v. p. 1062, a. 31-b. 10; K. x. p. 1067, a. 5; M. iv. p.\n1078, b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Aristot. Met. K. vi. p. 1063, b. 25; A. viii. p. 989,\na. 31-b. 16. [Greek: o(/te ga\\r ou)the\\n \u00ea)=n a)pokekrime/non, d\u00ea=lon\n\u00f4(s ou)the\\n \u00ea)=n a)l\u00eathe\\s ei)pei=n kata\\ t\u00ea=s ou)si/as e)kei/n\u00eas,\nle/g\u00f4 d' oi(=on o(/ti ou)/te leuko\\n ou)/te me/lan \u00ea)\\ phaio\\n \u00ea)\\\na)/llo chr\u00f4=ma, a)ll' a)/chr\u00f4n \u00ea)=n e)x a)na/gk\u00eas; o(moi/\u00f4s de\\\nkai\\ a)/chumon t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| tou/t\u00f4|, ou)de\\ a)/llo t\u00f4=n\no(moi/\u00f4n ou)the/n; ou)/te ga\\r poio/n ti oi(=o/n te au)to\\ ei)=nai\nou)/te poso\\n ou)/te ti/.]--[Greek: G]. iv. b. 1007, b. 25: [Greek:\nkai\\ gi/gnetai d\u00ea\\ to\\ tou= A)naxago/rou, o(mou= pa/nta chr\u00ea/mata;\n\u00f4(/ste m\u00eathe\\n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s u(pa/rchein.]--[Greek: G]. viii. p. 1012,\na. 24: [Greek: e)/oike d' o( me\\n \u00ca(raklei/tou lo/gos, le/g\u00f4n pa/nta\nei)=nai kai\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai, a(/panta a)l\u00eath\u00ea= poiei=n, o( d'\nA)naxago/rou ei)=nai/ ti metaxu\\ t\u00ea=s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s, \u00f4(/ste pa/nta\npseud\u00ea=; o(/tan ga\\r michth\u00ea=|, ou)/t' a)gatho\\n ou)/t' ou)k\na)gatho\\n to\\ mi=gma, \u00f4(/st' ou)the\\n ei)pei=n a)l\u00eathe/s.]]\n\nHaving thus refuted these dogmas to his own satisfaction, Aristotle\nproceeds to impugn a third doctrine which he declares to be analogous\nto these two and to be equally in conflict with the two syllogistic\n_principia_ which he is undertaking to vindicate. This third doctrine\nis the \"_Homo Mensura_\" of Protagoras: Man is the measure of all\nthings--the measure of things existent as well as of things\nnon-existent: To each individual that is true or false which he\nbelieves to be such, and for as long as he believes it. Aristotle\ncontends that this doctrine is homogeneous with those of Herakleitus\nand Anaxagoras, and must stand or fall along with them; all three being\nalike adverse to the Maxim of Contradiction.[32] Herein he follows\npartially the example of Plato, who (in his The\u00e6t\u00eatus[33]), though\nnot formally enunciating the Maxim of Contradiction, had declared the\ntenets of Protagoras to be coincident with or analogous to those of\nHerakleitus, and had impugned both one and the other by the same line\nof arguments. Protagoras agreed with Herakleitus (so Plato and\nAristotle tell us) in declaring both affirmative and negative (in the\ncontradictory alternative) to be at once and alike true; for he\nmaintained that what any person believed was true, and that what any\nperson disbelieved was false. Accordingly, since opinions altogether\nopposite and contradictory are held by different persons or by the\nsame person at different times, both the affirmative and the negative\nof every _Antiphasis_ must be held as true alike;[34] in other words,\nall affirmations and all negations were at once true and false. Such\nco-existence or implication of contradictions is the main doctrine of\nHerakleitus.\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristot. Met [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, a. 6: [Greek:\ne)/sti d' a)po\\ t\u00ea=s au)t\u00ea=s do/x\u00eas kai\\ o( Pr\u00f4tago/rou lo/gos, kai\\\na)na/gk\u00ea o(moi/\u00f4s a)/mph\u00f4 au)tou\\s \u00ea)\\ ei)=nai \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 33: Aristotle refers here to Plato by name, Metaphys.\n[Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, b. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ibid. p. 1009, a. 8-20. [Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea pa/nta a(/ma\na)l\u00eath\u00ea= kai\\ pseud\u00ea= ei)=nai.]--p. 1011, a. 30.]\n\nI have already in another work,[35] while analysing the Platonic\ndialogues The\u00e6t\u00eatus and Kratylus, criticized at some length the\ndoctrine here laid down by Plato and Aristotle. I have endeavoured to\nshow that the capital tenet of Protagoras is essentially distinct\nfrom the other tenets with which these two philosophers would\nidentify it: distinct both from the dogma of Herakleitus, That\neverything is in unceasing flux and process, each particular moment\nthereof being an implication of contradictions both alike true; and\ndistinct also from the other dogma held by others, That all cognition\nis sensible perception. The Protagorean tenet \"_Homo Mensura_\" is\nsomething essentially distinct from either of these two; though\npossibly Protagoras himself may have held the second of the two,\nbesides his own. His tenet is nothing more than a clear and general\ndeclaration of the principle of universal Relativity. True belief and\naffirmation have no meaning except in relation to some believer, real\nor supposed; true disbelief and negation have no meaning except in\nrelation to some disbeliever, real or supposed. When a man affirms\nany proposition as true, he affirms only what he (perhaps with some\nother persons also) believes to be true, while others may perhaps\ndisbelieve it as falsehood. Object and Subject are inseparably\nimplicated: we may separate them by abstraction, and reason about\neach apart from the other; but, as reality, they exist only locked up\none with the other.\n\n[Footnote 35: 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II.\nc. xxvi. pp. 325-363: \"The Protagorean doctrine--Man is the measure\nof all things--is simply the presentation in complete view of a\ncommon fact; uncovering an aspect of it which the received\nphraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some\nbelieving subject--and the words have no meaning except in that\nrelation. Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same\ncomplex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side.\nHe refuses to admit the object absolute--the pretended _thing in\nitself_--Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the\nindefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every\nperception--of the concipient mind in every conception--of the\ncognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges\nmany distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every\nobject known must be relative to (or in his language, _measured by_)\nthe knowing Subject: that every _cognitum_ must have its\n_cognoscens_, and every _cognoscibile_ its _cognitionis capax_; that\nthe words have no meaning unless this be supposed; that these two\nnames designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact\nof cognition--actual or potential--not two factors, which are in\nthemselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a\ncompound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard\nhis own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent, concerned\nin every moment of consciousness, &c.\" Compare also c. xxiv. p. 261.]\n\nThat such is and always has been the state of the fact, in regard to\ntruth and falsehood, belief and disbelief, is matter of notoriety:\nProtagoras not only accepts it as a fact, but formulates it as a\ntheory. Instead of declaring that what he (or the oracle which he\nconsults and follows) believes to be true, is absolute truth, while\nthat which others believe, is truth relatively to them,--he lowers\nhis own pretensions to a level with theirs. He professes to be a\nmeasure of truth only for himself, and for such as may be satisfied\nwith the reasons that satisfy him. Aristotle complains that this\ntheory discourages the search for truth as hopeless, not less than\nthe chase after flying birds.[36] But, however serious such\ndiscouragement may be, we do not escape the real difficulty of the\nsearch by setting up an abstract idol and calling it Absolute Truth,\nwithout either relativity or referee; while, if we enter, as sincere\nand _bon\u00e2 fide_ enquirers, on the search for reasoned truth or\nphilosophy, we shall find ourselves not departing from the\nProtagorean canon, but involuntarily conforming to it. Aristotle,\nafter having declared that the Maxim of Contradiction was true beyond\nthe possibility of deception,[37] but yet that there were several\neminent philosophers who disallowed it, is forced to produce the best\nreasons in his power to remove their doubts and bring them round to\nhis opinion. His reasons must be such as to satisfy not his own mind\nonly, but the minds of opponents and indifferent auditors as\nreferees. This is an appeal to other men, as judges each for himself\nand in his own case: it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy of\neach individual enquirer as a measure of truth to himself. In other\nwords, it is a recognition of the Protagorean canon.\n\n[Footnote 36: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, b. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 11: [Greek:\nbebaiota/t\u00ea d' a)rch\u00ea\\ pas\u00f4=n, peri\\ \u00ea(\\n diapseusth\u00ea=nai\na)du/naton.]]\n\nWe know little about the opinions of Protagoras; but there was\nnothing in this canon necessarily at variance either with the Maxim\nof Contradiction or with that of Excluded Middle. Both Aristotle and\nPlato would have us believe that Protagoras was bound by his canon to\ndeclare every opinion to be alike false and true, because every\nopinion was believed by some and disbelieved by others.[38] But\nherein they misstate his theory. He did not declare any thing to be\n_absolutely_ true, or to be _absolutely_ false. Truth and Falsehood\nwere considered by him as always relative to some referee, and he\nrecognized no universal or infallible referee. In his theory the\nnecessity of _some_ referee was distinctly enunciated, instead of\nbeing put out of sight under an ellipsis, as in the received theories\nand practice. And this is exactly what Plato and Aristotle omit, when\nthey refute him. He proclaimed that each man was a measure for\nhimself alone, and that every opinion was true _to the believer_,\nfalse _to the disbeliever_; while they criticize him as if he had\nsaid--Every opinion is alike true and false; thus leaving out the\nvery qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his\ntheory. They commit that fallacy which Plato shows up in the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, and which Aristotle[39] numbers in his list of _Fallaci\u00e6\nExtra Dictionem_, imputing it as a vice to the Sophists: they slide\n_\u00e0 dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_. And it is remarkable\nthat Aristotle, in one portion of his argument against \"_Homo\nMensura_,\" expressly admonishes the Protagoreans that they must take\ncare to adhere constantly to this qualified mode of enunciation;[40]\nthat they must not talk of apparent truth generally, but of truth as\nit appears _to themselves_ or _to some other persons_, now or at a\ndifferent time. Protagoras hardly needed such an admonition to keep\nto what is the key-note and characteristic peculiarity of his own\ntheory; since it is only by suppressing this peculiarity that his\nopponents make the theory seem absurd. He would by no means have\ndisclaimed that consequence of his theory, which Aristotle urges\nagainst it as an irrefragable objection; viz., that it makes every\nthing relative, and recognizes nothing as absolute. This is perfectly\ntrue, and constitutes its merit in the eyes of its supporters.\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. pp. 171-179. Aristot. Met. [Greek: G].\niv. p. 1007, b. 21: [Greek: ei) kata\\ panto/s ti \u00ea)\\ kataph\u00ea=sai \u00ea)\\\na)poph\u00ea=sai e)nde/chetai, katha/per a)na/gk\u00ea toi=s to\\n Pr\u00f4tago/rou\nle/gousi lo/gon.] Compare v. p. 1009, a. 6; viii. p. 1012, b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 167, a. 3; Rhetoric. II. xxiv. p.\n1402, a. 2-15. [Greek: \u00f4(/sper kai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n e)ristik\u00f4=n to\\\n_kata/ ti_ kai\\ _pro/s ti_ kai\\ _p\u00ea=|_ ou) prostithe/mena poiei= t\u00ea\\n\nsukophanti/an.]]\n\n[Footnote 40: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. vi. p. 1011, a. 21:\n[Greek: dio\\ kai\\ phulakte/on toi=s t\u00ea\\n bi/an e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|\nz\u00eatou=sin, a(/ma de\\ kai\\ u(pe/chein lo/gon a)xiou=sin, o(/ti ou) to\\\nphaino/menon e)/stin, a)lla\\ to\\ phaino/menon\u00f4(=| phai/netai kai\\\no(/te phai/netai kai\\ \u00ea(=| kai\\ \u00f4(/s.]--b. 1: [Greek: a)ll' i)/s\u00f4s\ndia\\ tou=t' a)na/gk\u00ea le/gein toi=s m\u00ea\\ di' a)pori/an a)lla\\ lo/gou\ncha/rin le/gousin, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)l\u00eathe\\s tou=to, a)lla\\\ntou/t\u00f4| a)l\u00eathe/s.]]\n\nAnother argument of Aristotle[41] against the Protagorean \"_Homo\nMensura_\"--That it implies in every affirming Subject an equal\nauthority and equal title to credence, as compared with every other\naffirming Subject--I have already endeavoured to combat in my review\nof the Platonic The\u00e6t\u00eatus, where the same argument appears fully\ndeveloped. The antithesis between Plato and Aristotle on one side,\nand Protagoras on the other, is indeed simply that between Absolute\nand Relative. The Protagorean doctrine is quite distinct from the\nother doctrines with which they jumble it together--from those of\nHerakleitus and Anaxagoras, and from the theory that Knowledge is\nsensible perception. The real opponents of the Maxim of Contradiction\nwere Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Plato himself as\nrepresented in some of his dialogues, especially the Parmenides,\nTim\u00e6us, Republic, Sophistes. Each of these philosophers adopted a\nFirst Philosophy different from the others: but each also adopted one\ncompletely different from that of Aristotle, and not reconcileable\nwith his logical canons. None of them admitted determinate and\ndefinable attributes belonging to determinate particular subjects,\neach with a certain measure of durability.\n\n[Footnote 41: Ibid. v. p. 1010, b. 11.]\n\nNow the common speech of mankind throughout the Hellenic world was\nfounded on the assumption of such fixed subjects and predicates.\nThose who wanted information for practical guidance or security,\nasked for it in this form; those who desired to be understood by\nothers, and to determine the actions of others, adopted the like mode\nof speech. Information was given through significant propositions,\nwhich the questioner sought to obtain, and which the answer, if\ncognizant, enunciated: _e.g._, The\u00e6t\u00eatus **is sitting down[42]--to\nrepeat the minimum or skeleton of a proposition as given by Plato,\nrequiring both subject and predicate in proper combination, to convey\nthe meaning. Now the logical analysis, and the syllogistic precepts\nof Aristotle,--as well as his rhetorical and dialectical suggestions\nfor persuading, for refuting, or for avoiding refutation--are all\nbased upon the practice of common speech. In conversing (he says) it\nis impossible to produce and exhibit the actual objects signified;\nthe speaker must be content with enunciating, instead thereof, the\nname significant of each.[43] The first beginning of rhetorical\ndiction is, to speak good Greek;[44] the rhetor and the dialectician\nmust dwell upon words, propositions, and opinions, not peculiar to\nsuch as have received special teaching, but common to the many and\nemployed in familiar conversation; the auditors, to whom they address\nthemselves, are assumed to be commonplace men, of fair average\nintelligence, but nothing beyond.[45] Thus much of acquirement is\nimbibed by almost every one as he grows up, from the ordinary\nintercourse of society. The men of special instruction begin with it,\nas others do; but they also superadd other cognitions or\naccomplishments derived from peculiar teachers. Universally--both in\nthe interior of the family, amidst the unscientific multitude, and by\nthe cultivated few--habitual speech was carried on through terms\nassuming fixed subjects and predicates. It was this recognized\nprocess in its two varieties of Analytic and Dialectic, which\nAristotle embraced in his logical theory, and to which he also\nadapted his First Philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 262-263.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 165, a. 5: [Greek: e)pei\\ ga\\r\nou)k e)/stin au)ta\\ ta\\ pra/gmata diale/gesthai phe/rontas, a)lla\\\ntoi=s o)no/masin a)nti\\ t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n chr\u00f4/metha sumbo/lois.]]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhet. III. v. p. 1407, b. 19: [Greek: e)/sti\nd' a)rch\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=s le/xe\u00f4s to\\ E(ll\u00eani/zein.]]\n\n[Footnote 45: Aristot. Rhet. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1: [Greek: \u00ea(\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\ a)nti/stropho/s e)sti t\u00ea=| dialektik\u00ea=|; a)mpho/terai ga\\r\nperi\\ toiou/t\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n ei)si\\n a(\\ koina\\ tro/pon tina\\ a(pa/nt\u00f4n\ne)sti\\ gn\u00f4ri/zein kai\\ ou)demia=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas a)ph\u00f4risme/n\u00eas; dio\\\nkai\\ pa/ntes tro/pon tina\\ mete/chousin a)mphoi=n.]--p. 1355, a. 25:\n[Greek: didaskali/as ga/r e)stin o( kata\\ t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean lo/gos,\ntou=to de\\ a)du/naton, a)ll' a)na/gk\u00ea dia\\ t\u00f4=n koin\u00f4=n poiei=sthai\nta\\s pi/steis kai\\ tou\\s lo/gous, \u00f4(/sper kai\\ e)n toi=s Topikoi=s\ne)le/gomen peri\\ t\u00ea=s pro\\s tou\\s pollou\\s e)nteu/xe\u00f4s.]--p. 1357,\na. 1: [Greek: e)/sti de\\ to\\ e)/rgon au)t\u00ea=s peri/ te toiou/t\u00f4n\nperi\\ \u00f4(=n bouleuo/metha kai\\ te/chnas m\u00ea\\ e)/chomen, kai\\ e)n toi=s\ntoiou/tois a)kroatai=s oi(\\ ou) du/nantai dia\\ poll\u00f4=n sunora=n\nou)de\\ logi/zesthai po/r)r(\u00f4then.]--p. 1357, a. 11: [Greek: o( ga\\r\nkri/t\u00eas u(pokei=tai ei)=nai a(plou=s.] Compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101,\na. 26-36; Soph. El. p. 172, a. 30.]\n\nBut the First Philosophy that preceded his, had not been so adapted.\nThe Greek philosophers, who flourished before dialectical discussion\nhad become active, during the interval between Thales and Sokrates,\nconsidered Philosophy as one whole--_rerum divinarum et humanarum\nscientia_--destined to render Nature or the Kosmos more or less\nintelligible. They took up in the gross all those vast problems,\nwhich the religious or mythological poets had embodied in divine\ngenealogies and had ascribed to superhuman personal agencies.\n\nThales and his immediate successors (like their predecessors the\npoets) accommodated their hypotheses to intellectual impulses and\naspirations of their own; with little anxiety about giving\nsatisfaction to others,[46] still less about avoiding inconsistencies\nor meeting objections. Each of them fastened upon some one grand and\nimposing generalization (set forth often in verse) which he stretched\nas far as it would go by various comparisons and illustrations, but\nwithout any attention or deference to adverse facts or reasonings.\nProvided that his general point of view was impressive to the\nimagination,[47] as the old religious scheme of personal agencies was\nto the vulgar, he did not concern himself about the conditions of\nproof or disproof. The data of experience were altogether falsified\n(as by the Pythagoreans)[48] in order to accommodate them to the\ntheory; or were set aside as deceptive and inexplicable from the\ntheory (as by both Parmenides and Herakleitus).[49]\n\n[Footnote 46: Aristot. Met. B. iv. p. 1000, a. 9: [Greek: oi( me\\n\nou)=n peri\\ \u00ca(si/odon kai\\ pa/ntes o(/soi theo/logoi mo/non\ne)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\\s au)tou/s, \u00ea(m\u00f4=n d'\n\u00f4)lig\u00f4/r\u00easan;--kai\\ ga\\r o(/nper oi)\u00eathei/\u00ea le/gein a)/n tis ma/lista\no(mologoume/n\u00f4s au(t\u00f4=|, E)mpedokl\u00ea=s, kai\\ ou(to\\s tau)to\\n\npe/ponthen.]--Metaph. N. iv. p. 1091, b. 1-15.]\n\n[Footnote 47: This is strikingly expressed by a phrase of Aristotle\nabout the Platonic theory, Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 35: [Greek:\noi( de\\ ch\u00f4risto\\n poiou=ntes, o(/ti e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n ou)k\ne)/stai ta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata, a)l\u00eath\u00ea= de\\ ta\\ lego/mena kai\\ sai/nei t\u00ea\\n\npsuch\u00ea/n, ei)=nai/ te u(polamba/nousi kai\\ ch\u00f4rista\\ ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 34: [Greek: e)oi/kasi peri\\\na)/llou ou)ra/nou le/gein kai\\ s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n a)ll' ou) t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\n\u00f4=n.]--Metaph. A. v. p. 986, a. 5; and De Coelo, II. xiii. p. 293, a.\n25.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Physic. I. ii.-iii. pp. 185-186.]\n\nBut these vague hypotheses became subjected to a new scrutiny, when\nthe dialectical age of Zeno and Sokrates supervened. Opponents of\nParmenides impugned his theory of _Ens Unum Continuum Immobile_, as\nleading to absurdities; while his disciple Zeno replied, not by any\nattempt to disprove such allegations but, by showing that the\ncounter-theory of _Entia Plura Discontinua Moventia_, or _Mutabilia_,\ninvolved consequences yet more absurd.[50] In the acute dialectical\nwarfare, to which the old theories thus stood exposed, the means of\nattack much surpassed those of defence; moreover, the partisans of\nHerakleitus despised all coherent argumentation, confining themselves\nto obscure oracular aphorisms and multiplied metaphors.[51] In point\nof fact, no suitable language could be found, consistently with\ncommon speech or common experience, for expanding in detail either\nthe Herakleitean[52] or the Parmenidean theory; the former\nsuppressing all duration and recognizing nothing but events--a\nperpetual stream of _Fientia_ or interchange of _Ens_ with _Non-Ens_;\nthe latter discarding _Non-Ens_ as unmeaning, and recognizing no real\nevents or successions, but only _Ens Unum_ perpetually lasting and\nunchangeable. The other physical hypotheses, broached by Pythagoras,\nEmpedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, each altogether discordant\nwith the others, were alike imposing in their general enunciation and\npromise, alike insufficient when applied to common experience and\ndetail.\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, D.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. p. 179, E: [Greek: peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n t\u00f4=n\n\u00ca(rakleitei/\u00f4n,--to\\ e)pimei=nai e)pi\\ lo/g\u00f4| kai\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/mati\nkai\\ \u00ea(suchi/\u00f4s e)n me/rei a)pokri/nasthai kai\\ e)re/sthai \u00ea(=tton\nau)toi=s e)/ni \u00ea)\\ to\\ m\u00eade/n;--\u00f4(/sper e)k phare/tras r(\u00eamati/skia\nai)nigmat\u00f4/d\u00ea a)nasp\u00f4=ntes a)potoxeu/ousi, ka)\\n tou/tou z\u00eat\u00ea=|s\nlo/gon labei=n, ti/ ei)/r\u00eaken, e(te/r\u00f4| pepl\u00ea/xei kain\u00f4=s\nmet\u00f4nomasme/n\u00f4|, peranei=s de\\ ou)de/pote ou)de\\n pro\\s ou)de/na au)t\n\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ibid. p. 183, B: [Greek: a)lla/ tin' a)/ll\u00ean ph\u00f4n\u00ea\\n\nthete/on toi=s to\\n lo/gon tou=ton le/gousin, \u00f4(s nu=n ge pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\nau(t\u00f4=n u(po/thesin ou)k e)/chousi r(\u00ea/mata, ei) m\u00ea\\ a)/ra to\\\nou)/d' o(/p\u00f4s; ma/lista d' ou(/t\u00f4s a)\\n au)toi=s a(/rmottoi,\na)/peiron lego/menon.]\n\nPlato applies this remark to the theory of Protagoras; but the remark\nbelongs properly to that of Herakleitus.]\n\nBut the great development of Dialectic during the Sokratic age,\ntogether with the new applications made of it by Sokrates and the\nunrivalled acuteness with which he wielded it, altered materially the\nposition of these physical theories. Sokrates was not ignorant of\nthem;[53] but he discouraged such studies, and turned attention to\nother topics. He passed his whole life in public and in\nindiscriminate conversation with every one. He deprecated astronomy\nand physics as unbecoming attempts to pry into the secrets of the\ngods; who administered the general affairs of the Kosmos according to\ntheir own pleasure, and granted only, through the medium of prophecy\nor oracles, such special revelations as they thought fit. In his own\ndiscussions Sokrates dwelt only on matters of familiar conversation\nand experience--social, ethical, political, &c., such as were in\nevery one's mouth, among the daily groups of the market-place. These\nhe declared to be the truly _human_ topics[54]--the proper study of\nmankind--upon which it was disgraceful to be ignorant, or to form\nuntrue and inconsistent judgments. He found, moreover, that upon\nthese topics no one supposed himself to be ignorant, or to require\nteaching. Every one gave confident opinions, derived from intercourse\nwith society, embodied in the familiar words of the language, and\nimbibed almost unconsciously along with the meaning of these words.\nNow Sokrates not only disclaimed all purpose of teaching, but made\nostentatious profession of his own ignorance. His practice was to ask\ninformation from others who professed to know; and with this view, to\nquestion them about the import of vulgar words with the social\nconvictions contained in them.[55] To the answers given he applied an\nacute cross-examination, which seldom failed to detect so much\ninconsistency and contradiction as to cover the respondent with\nshame, and to make him sensible that he was profoundly ignorant of\nmatters which he had believed himself to know well. Sokrates\ndeclared, in his last speech before condemnation by the Athenian\nDikasts, that such false persuasion of knowledge, combined with real\nignorance, was universal among mankind; and that the exposure\nthereof, as the great misguiding force of human life, had been\nenjoined upon him as his mission by the Delphian God.[56]\n\n[Footnote 53: Xenophon, Mem. IV. vii. 5: [Greek: kai/toi ou)de\\ tou/t\n\u00f4n ge a)n\u00ea/koos \u00ea)=n].]\n\n[Footnote 54: Xenophon, Mem. I. i. 12-16: [Greek: kai\\ pr\u00f4=ton me\\n\nau)t\u00f4=n e)sko/pei po/tera/ pote nomi/santes i(kan\u00f4=s \u00ea)/d\u00ea ta)nthr\n\u00f4/peia ei)de/nai e)/rchontai e)pi\\ to\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n\nphronti/zein, \u00ea)\\ ta\\ me\\n a)nthr\u00f4/peia pare/ntes, ta\\ de\\ daimo/nia\nskopou=ntes, \u00ea(gou=ntai ta\\ pros\u00ea/konta pra/ttein.--au)to\\s de\\ peri\\\nt\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4pei/\u00f4n a)ei\\ diele/geto, skop\u00f4=n ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/\na)sebe/s, ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n, ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon, ti/\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea, ti/ mani/a, ti/ po/lis, ti/ politiko/s, ti/ a)rch\u00ea\\\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, ti/ a)rchiko\\s a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n], &c.\n\nCompare IV. vii. 2-9.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memor. I. ii. 26-46; III. vi. 2-15; IV. ii.;\nIV. vi. 1: [Greek: skop\u00f4=n su\\n toi=s sunoi=si ti/ e(/kaston ei)/\u00ea\nt\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n ou)de/pot' e)/l\u00eage.]--IV. iv. 9: [Greek: a)rkei= ga\\r\no(/ti t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n katagela=|s, e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n me\\n kai\\ e)le/gch\u00f4n\npa/ntas, au)to\\s d' ou)deni\\ the/l\u00f4n u(pe/chein lo/gon ou)de\\\ngn\u00f4/m\u00ean a)pophai/nesthai perei\\ ou)deno/s.]--Plato, Republic I. pp.\n336-337; The\u00e6t\u00eat. p. 150 C.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. pp. 22, 28, 33: [Greek: e)moi\\ de\\\ntou=to, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4/ ph\u00eami, proste/taktai u(po\\ tou= theou= pra/ttein\nkai\\ e)k mantei\u00f4=n kai\\ e)x e)nupni/\u00f4n kai\\ panti\\ tro/p\u00f4|,\n\u00f4(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\\ a)/ll\u00ea thei/a moi=ra a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| kai\\\no(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.]--Plato, Sophist. pp. 230-231; Menon,\npp. 80, A., 84, B.\n\nCompare the analysis of the Platonic Apology in my work, 'Plato and\nthe Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. c. vii.]\n\nThe peculiarities which Aristotle ascribes to Sokrates are--that he\ntalked upon ethical topics instead of physical, that he fastened\nespecially on the definitions of general terms, and that his\ndiscussions were inductive, bringing forward many analogous\nillustrative or probative particulars to justify a true general\nproposition, and one or a few to set aside a false one.[57] This\nSokratic practice is copiously illustrated both by Plato in many of\nhis dialogues, and by Xenophon throughout all the Memorabilia.[58] In\nPlato, however, Sokrates is often introduced as spokesman of\ndoctrines not his own; while in Xenophon we have before us the real\nman as he talked in the market-place, and apparently little besides.\nXenophon very emphatically exhibits to us a point which in Plato's\nDialogues of Search is less conspicuously marked, though still\napparent: viz., the power possessed by Sokrates of accommodating\nhimself to the ordinary mind in all its varieties--his habit of\ndwelling on the homely and familiar topics of the citizen's daily\nlife--his constant appeal to small and even vulgar details, as the\nway of testing large and imposing generalities.[59] Sokrates\npossessed to a surprising degree the art of selecting arguments\nreally persuasive to ordinary non-theorizing men; so as often to\ncarry their assent along with him, and still oftener to shake their\nprevious beliefs, if unwarranted, or even if adopted by mere passive\nreceptivity without preliminary reflection and comparison.\n\n[Footnote 57: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 28: [Greek: du/o\nga/r e)stin a(/ tis a)\\n a)podoi/\u00ea S\u00f4kra/tei dikai/\u00f4s, tou/s t'\ne)paktikou\\s lo/gous kai\\ to\\ o(ri/zesthai katho/lou; tau=ta ga/r\ne)stin a)/mph\u00f4 peri\\ a)rch\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas.]--ib. A. p. 987, b. 1:\n[Greek: S\u00f4kra/tous de\\ peri\\ me\\n ta\\ \u00ea)thika\\ pragmateuome/nou,\nperi\\ de\\ t\u00ea=s o(/l\u00eas phu/se\u00f4s ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\\\nkatho/lou z\u00eatou=ntos kai\\ peri\\ o(rism\u00f4=n e)pist\u00ea/santos pr\u00f4/tou\nt\u00ea\\n dia/noian.]]\n\n[Footnote 58: No portion of the Memorabilia illustrates this point\nbetter than the dialogue with Euthyd\u00eamus, IV. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Xenophon, Memor. IV. vi. 15: [Greek: o(/pote de\\\nau)to/s ti t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| diexi/oi, dia\\ t\u00f4=n ma/lista o(mologoume/n\n\u00f4n e)poreu/eto, nomi/z\u00f4n tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n a)spha/leian ei)=nai lo/gou;\ntoigarou=n polu\\ ma/lista \u00f4(=n e)g\u00f4\\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi, tou\\s\na)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen; e)/ph\u00ea de\\ kai\\ O(/m\u00earon t\u00f4=|\nO)dussei= a)nathei=nai to\\ a)sphal\u00ea= r(\u00ea/tora ei)=nai, \u00f4(s i(kano\\n\nau)to\\n o)/nta dia\\ t\u00f4=n dokou/nt\u00f4n toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois a)/gein\ntou\\s lo/gous.]\n\nCompare ib. I. ii. 38; IV. iv. 6; also Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eatus, p. 147, A,\nB; Republic I. p. 338, C.]\n\nWithout departing from Aristotle's description, therefore, we may\nconceive the change operated by Sokrates in philosophical discussion\nunder a new point of view. In exchanging Physics for Ethics, it\nvulgarized both the topics and the talk of philosophy. Physical\nphilosophy as it stood in the age of Sokrates (before Aristotle had\nbroached his peculiar definition of Nature) was merely an obscure,\nsemi-poetical, hypothetical _Philosophia Prima_,[60] or rather\n_Philosophia Prima_ and _Philosophia Secunda_ blended in one. This is\ntrue of all its varieties,--of the Ionic philosophers as well as of\nPythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, and even\nDemokritus. Such philosophy, dimly enunciated and only half\nintelligible,[61] not merely did not tend to explain or clear up\nphenomenal experiences, but often added new difficulties of its own.\nIt presented itself sometimes even as discrediting, overriding, and\ncontradicting experience; but never as opening any deductive road\nfrom the Universal down to its particulars.[62] Such theories, though\nin circulation among a few disciples and opponents, were foreign and\nunsuitable to the talk of ordinary men. To pass from these cloudy\nmysteries to social topics and terms which were in every one's mouth,\nwas the important revolution in philosophy introduced in the age of\nSokrates, and mainly by him.\n\n[Footnote 60: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. A. x. p. 993, a. 15: [Greek: psellizome/n\u00ea| ga\\r\ne)/oiken \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea philosophi/a peri\\ pa/nt\u00f4n, a(/te ne/a te kat'\na)rcha\\s ou)=sa kai\\ to\\ pr\u00f4=ton.]]\n\n[Footnote 62: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: a.] i. p. 993, b. 6: [Greek:\nto\\ o(/lon ti e)/chein kai\\ me/ros m\u00ea\\ du/nasthai d\u00ealoi= to\\\nchalepo\\n au)t\u00ea=s (t\u00ea=s peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)l\u00eathei/as the\u00f4ri/as).]\n\nAlexander ap. Schol. p. 104, Bonitz: [Greek: ei)s e)/nnoian me\\n tou=\no(/lou kai\\ e)pi/stasin pa/ntas e)lthei=n, m\u00eade\\n de\\ me/ros au)t\u00ea=s\ne)xakrib\u00f4/sasthai dun\u00eath\u00ea=nai, d\u00ealoi= to\\ chalepo\\n au)t\u00ea=s.]\n\nAristotle indicates how much the _Philosophia Prima_ of his earlier\npredecessors was uncongenial to and at variance with phenomenal\nexperience--Metaphys. A. v. p. 986, b. 31.\n\nTo shape their theories in such a way--[Greek: ta\\ phaino/mena ei)\nme/llei tis a)pod\u00f4/sein] (Metaphys. [Greek: L]. viii. p. 1073, b.\n36), was an obligation which philosophers hardly felt incumbent on\nthem prior to the Aristotelian age. Compare Simplikius (ad. Aristot.\nPhysic. I.), p. 328, a. 1-26, Schol. Br.; Schol. (ad. Aristot. De\nCoelo III. I.) p. 509, a. 26-p. 510, a. 13.]\n\nThe drift of the Sokratic procedure was to bring men into the habit\nof defining those universal terms which they had hitherto used\nundefined, the definitions being verified by induction of particulars\nas the ultimate authority. It was a procedure built upon common\nspeech, but improving on common speech; the talk of every man being\nin propositions, each including a subject and predicate, but neither\nsubject nor predicate being ever defined. It was the mission of\nSokrates to make men painfully sensible of that deficiency, as well\nas to enforce upon them the inductive evidence by which alone it\ncould be rectified. Now the Analytic and Dialectic of Aristotle grew\ndirectly out of this Sokratic procedure, and out of the Platonic\ndialogues in so far as they enforced and illustrated it. When\nSokrates had supplied the negative stimulus and indication of what\nwas amiss, together with the appeal to Induction as final authority,\nAristotle furnished, or did much to furnish, the positive analysis\nand complementary precepts, necessary to clear up, justify, and\nassure the march of reasoned truth.[63] What Aristotle calls the\nsyllogistic _principia_, or the principles of syllogistic\ndemonstration, are nothing else than the steps towards reasoned\ntruth, and the precautions against those fallacious appearances that\nsimulate it. The steps are stated in their most general terms, as\ninvolving both Deduction and Induction; though in Aristotle we find\nthe deductive portion copiously unfolded and classified, while\nInduction, though recognized as the only verifying foundation of the\nwhole, is left without expansion or illustration.\n\n[Footnote 63: Though the theorizing and the analysis of Aristotle\npresuppose and recognize the Sokratic procedure, yet, if we read the\nXenophontic Memorabilia, IV. vii., and compare therewith the first\ntwo chapters of Aristotle's Metaphysica, in which he describes and\nextols _Philosophia Prima_, we shall see how radically antipathetic\nwere the two points of view: Sokrates confining himself to practical\nresults--[Greek: me/chri tou= \u00f4)phelimou=]; Aristotle extolling\n_Philosophia Prima_, because it soars above practical results, and\nserves as its own reward, elevating the philosopher to a partial\ncommunion with the contemplative self-sufficiency of the Gods. Indeed\nthe remark of Aristotle, p. 983, a. 1-6, denying altogether the\njealousy ascribed to the Gods, &c., is almost a reply to the opinion\nexpressed by Sokrates, that a man by such overweening researches\nbrought upon himself the displeasure of the Gods, as prying into\ntheir secrets (Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 6; I. i. 12).]\n\nIf we go through the Sokratic conversations as reported in the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon, we shall find illustration of what has been\njust stated: we shall see Sokrates recognizing and following the\ncommon speech of men, in propositions combining subject and\npredicate; but trying to fix the meaning of both these terms, and to\ntest the consistency of the universal predications by appeal to\nparticulars. The syllogizing and the inductive processes are\nexhibited both of them in actual work on particular points of\ndiscussion. Now on these processes Aristotle brings his analysis to\nbear, eliciting and enunciating in general terms their _principia_\nand their conditions. We have seen that he expressly declares the\nanalysis of these _principia_ to belong to First Philosophy.[64] And\nthus it is that First Philosophy as conceived by Aristotle,\nacknowledges among its _fundamenta_ the habits of common Hellenic\nspeech; subject only to correction and control by the Sokratic\ncross-examining and testing discipline. He stands distinguished among\nthe philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects\nand builds upon the beliefs actually prevalent among mankind.[65]\nHerein as well as in other respects his First Philosophy not only\ndiffered from that of all the pre-Sokratic philosophers (such as\nHerakleitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, &c.) by explaining the\n_principia_ of Analytic and Dialectic as well as those of Physics and\nPhysiology, but it also differed from that of the post-Sokratic and\nsemi-Sokratic Plato, by keeping up a closer communion both with\nSokrates and with common speech. Though Plato in his Dialogues of\nSearch appears to apply the inductive discipline of Sokrates, and to\nhandle the Universal as referable to and dependent upon its\nparticulars; yet the Platonic _Philosophia Prima_ proceeds upon a\nview totally different. It is a fusion of Parmenides with\nHerakleitus;[66] divorcing the Universal altogether from its\nparticulars; treating the Universal as an independent reality and as\nthe only permanent reality; negating the particulars as so many\nunreal, evanescent, ever-changing copies or shadows thereof.\nAristotle expressly intimates his dissent from the divorce or\nseparation thus introduced by Plato. He proclaims his adherence to\nthe practice of Sokrates, which kept the two elements together, and\nwhich cognized particulars as the ultimate reality and test for the\nUniversal.[67] Upon this doctrine his First Philosophy is built:\nbeing distinguished hereby from all the other varieties broached by\neither his predecessors or contemporaries.\n\n[Footnote 64: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b.\n11.]\n\n[Footnote 65: See Aristot. De Divinat. per Somnum, i. p. 462, b. 15;\nDe Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 3, 20; Metaphys. A. ii. p. 982, a. 4-14.\nAlexander ap. Scholia, p. 525, b. 36, Br.: [Greek: e)n pa=sin e)/thos\na)ei\\ tai=s koinai=s kai\\ phusikai=s t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n prol\u00ea/psesin\na)rchai=s ei)s ta\\ deiknu/mena pro\\s au)tou= chr\u00ea=sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 66: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, a. 32; M. iv. p. 1078,\nb. 12. That Plato's _Philosophia Prima_ involved a partial\ncoincidence with that of Herakleitus is here distinctly announced by\nAristotle: that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of\nParmenides with Herakleitus is made out in the ingenious Dissertation\nof Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, G\u00f6ttingen (1805),\nwhich winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result (p.\n50):--\"Divide Heracliti [Greek: ge/nesin ou)si/a|] Parmenidis, et\nhabebis Ideas Platonicas.\" Compare Plato, Republic VII. p. 515, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 17, seq.; ix. p.\n1086, a. 37: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n ou)=n e)n toi=s ai)sth\u00eatoi=s kath'\ne(/kasta r(ei=n e)no/mizon] (Platonici) [Greek: kai\\ me/nein ou)the\\n\nau)t\u00f4=n, to\\ de\\ katho/lou para\\ tau=ta ei)=nai/ te kai\\ e(/tero/n\nti ei)=nai. tou=to d', \u00f4(/sper e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen e)le/gomen,\ne)ki/n\u00ease me\\n S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas dia\\ tou\\s o(rismou/s, ou) m\u00ea\\n e)ch\u00f4/rise/\nge t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston. kai\\ tou=to o)rth\u00f4=s e)no/\u00easen ou)\nch\u00f4ri/sas.]]\n\nThe Maxim of Contradiction, which Aristotle proclaims as the first\nand firmest _principium_ of syllogizing, may be found perpetually\napplied to particular cases throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon\nand the Sokratic dialogues of Plato. Indeed the Elenchus for which\nSokrates was so distinguished, is nothing more than an ever-renewed\nand ingenious application of it; illustrating the painful and\nhumiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a\nplain contradiction, when a respondent, having at first confidently\nlaid down some universal affirmative, finds himself unexpectedly\ncompelled to admit, in some particular case, the contradictory\nnegative. As against a Herakleitean, who saw no difficulty in\nbelieving both sides of the contradiction to be true at once, the\nSokratic Elenchus would have been powerless. What Aristotle did was,\nto abstract and elicit the general rules of the process; to classify\npropositions according to their logical value, in such manner that he\ncould formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between\nwhich an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted. The important\nlogical distinctions between propositions _contradictory_ and\npropositions _contrary_, was first clearly enunciated by Aristotle;\nand, until this had been done, the Maxim of Contradiction could not\nhave been laid down in a defensible manner. Indeed we may remark\nthat, while this Maxim is first promulgated as a formula of First\nPhilosophy in Book [Greek: G]. of the Metaphysica, it had already\nbeen tacitly assumed and applied by Aristotle throughout the De\nInterpretatione, Analytica, and Topica, as if it were obvious and\nuncontested. The First Philosophy of Aristotle was adapted to the\nconditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by Sokrates,\nfurnishing the theoretical basis of his practical Logic.\n\nBut, as Aristotle tells us, there were several philosophers and\ndialecticians who did not recognize the Maxim; maintaining that the\nsame proposition might be at once true and false--that it was\npossible for the same thing both to be and not to be. How is he to\ndeal with these opponents? He admits that he cannot demonstrate the\nMaxim against them, and that any attempt to do this would involve\n_Petitio Principii_. But he contends for the possibility of\ndemonstrating it in a peculiar way--_refutatively_ or _indirectly_;\nthat is, provided that the opponents can be induced to grant (not\nindeed the truth of any proposition, to the exclusion of its\ncontradictory antithesis, which concession he admits would involve\n_Petitio Principii_, but) the fixed and uniform signification of\nterms and propositions. Aristotle contends that the opponents ought\nto grant thus much, under penalty of being excluded from discussion\nas incapables or mere plants.[68] I do not imagine that the opponents\nthemselves would have felt obliged to grant as much as he here\ndemands. The _onus probandi_ lay upon him, as advancing a positive\ntheory; and he would have found his indirect or refutative\ndemonstration not more available in convincing them than a direct or\nordinary demonstration. Against respondents who proclaim as their\nthesis the negative of the Maxim of Contradiction, refutation and\ndemonstration are equally impossible. No dialectical discussion could\never lead to any result; for you can never prove more against them\nthan what their own thesis unequivocally avows.[69] As against\nHerakleitus and Anaxagoras, I do not think that Aristotle's qualified\nvindication of the Maxim has any effective bearing.\n\n[Footnote 68: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: a)nair\u00f4=n ga\\r lo/gon u(pome/nei\nlo/gon.]--p. 1008, a. 30.]\n\nBut Aristotle is quite right in saying that neither dialectical\ndebate nor demonstration can be carried on unless terms and\npropositions be defined, and unless to each term there be assigned\none special signification, or a limited number of special\nsignifications--excluding a certain number of others. This demand for\ndefinitions, and also the multiplied use of inductive interrogations,\nkeeping the Universal implicated with and dependent upon its\nparticulars--are the innovations which Aristotle expressly places to\nthe credit of Sokrates. The Sokratic Elenchus operated by first\nobtaining from the respondent a definition, and then testing it\nthrough a variety of particulars: when the test brought out a\nnegative as against the pre-asserted affirmative, the contradiction\nbetween the two was felt as an intellectual shock by the respondent,\nrendering it impossible to believe both at once; and the unrivalled\nacuteness of Sokrates was exhibited in rendering such shock\npeculiarly pungent and humiliating. But the Sokratic Elenchus\npresupposes this psychological fact, common to most minds, ordinary\nas well as superior,--the intellectual shock felt when incompatible\nbeliefs are presented to the mind at once. If the collocutors of\nSokrates had not been so constituted by nature, the magic of his\ncolloquy would have been unfelt and inoperative. Against a\nHerakleitean, who professed to feel no difficulty in believing both\nsides of a contradiction at once, he could have effected nothing: and\nif not he, still less any other dialectician. Proof and disproof, as\ndistinguished one from the other, would have had no meaning;\ndialectical debate would have led to no result.\n\nThus, then, although Aristotle was the first to enunciate the Maxim\nof Contradiction in general terms, after having previously originated\nthat logical distinction of contrary and contradictory Propositions\nand doctrine of legitimate _Antiphasis_ which rendered such\nenunciation possible,--yet, when he tries to uphold it against\ndissentients, it cannot be said that he has correctly estimated the\nlogical position of those whom he was opposing, or the real extent to\nwhich the defence of the Maxim can be carried without incurring the\ncharge of _Petitio Principii_. As against Protagoras, no defence was\nneeded, for the Protagorean \"_Homo Mensura_\" is not incompatible with\nthe Maxim of Contradiction; while, as against Herakleitus,\nAnaxagoras, Parmenides, &c., no defence was practicable, and the\nattempt of Aristotle to construct one appears to me a failure. All\nthat can be really done in the way of defence is, to prove the Maxim\nin its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases: if your\nopponent is willing to grant these particular cases, you establish\nthe general Maxim against him by way of Induction; if he will not\ngrant them, you cannot prove the general Maxim at all. Suppose you\nare attempting to prove to an Herakleitean that an universal\naffirmative and its contradictory particular negative cannot be both\ntrue at once. You begin by asking him about particular cases, Whether\nit is possible that the two propositions--All men are mortal, and,\nSome men are not mortal--can both be true at once? If he admits that\nthese two propositions cannot both be true at once, if he admits the\nlike with regard to other similar pairs of contradictories, and if he\ncan suggest no similar pair in which both propositions are true at\nonce, then you may consider yourself as having furnished a sufficient\ninductive proof, and you may call upon him to admit the Maxim of\nContradiction in its general enunciation. But, if he will not admit\nit in the particular cases which you tender, or if, while admitting\nit in these, he himself can tender other cases in which he considers\nit inadmissible, then you have effected nothing sufficient to\nestablish the general Maxim against him. The case is not susceptible\nof any other or better proof. It is in vain that Aristotle tries to\ndiversify the absurdity, and to follow it out into collateral absurd\nconsequences. If the Herakleitean does not feel any repulsive shock\nof contradiction in a definite particular case, if he directly\nannounces that he believes the two propositions to be both at once\ntrue, then the collateral inconsistencies and derivative absurdities,\nwhich Aristotle multiplies against him, will not shock him more than\nthe direct contradiction in its naked form. Neither the general\nreasoning of Aristotle, nor the Elenchus of Sokrates brought to bear\nin particular cases, would make any impression upon him; since he\nwill not comply with either of the two conditions required for the\nSokratic Elenchus: he will neither declare definitions, nor give\nsuitable point and sequence to inductive interrogatories.\n\nNor is anything gained, as Aristotle supposes, by reminding the\nHerakleitean of his own practice in the daily concerns of life and in\nconversation with common persons: that he feeds himself with bread\nto-day, in the confidence that it has the same properties as it had\nyesterday;[70] that, if he wishes either to give or to obtain\ninformation, the speech which he utters or that which he acts upon\nmust be either affirmative or negative. He will admit that he acts in\nthis way, but he will tell you that he has no certainty of being\nright; that the negative may be true as well as the affirmative. He\nwill grant that there is an inconsistency between such acts of detail\nand the principles of the Herakleitean doctrine, which recognize no\nreal stability of any thing, but only perpetual flux or process; but\ninconsistency in detail will not induce him to set aside his\nprinciples. The truth is, that neither Herakleitus, nor Parmenides,\nnor Anaxagoras, nor Pythagoras, gave themselves much trouble to\nreconcile Philosophy with facts of detail. Each fastened upon some\ngrand and impressive primary hypothesis, illustrated it by a few\nobvious facts in harmony therewith, and disregarded altogether the\nmass of contradictory facts. That a favourite hypothesis should\ncontradict physical details, was noway shocking to them. Both the\npainful feeling accompanying that shock, and the disposition to test\nthe value of the hypothesis by its consistency with inductive\ndetails, became first developed and attended to in the dialectical\nage, mainly through the working of Sokrates. The Analytic and the\nFirst Philosophy of Aristotle were constructed after the time of\nSokrates, and with regard, in a very great degree, to the Sokratic\ntests and conditions--to the indispensable necessity for definite\nsubjects and predicates, capable of standing the inductive scrutiny\nof particulars. In this respect the _Philosophia Prima_ of Aristotle\nstands distinguished from that of any of the earlier philosophers,\nand even from that of Plato. He departed from Plato by recognizing\nthe _Hoc Aliquid_ or the definite Individual, with its essential\nPredicates, as the foundation of the Universal, and by applying his\nanalytical factors of Form and Matter to the intellectual generation\nof the Individual ([Greek: to\\ su/nolon--to\\ sunampho/teron]); and\nthus he devised a First Philosophy conformable to the habits of\ncommon speech as rectified by the critical scrutiny of Sokrates. We\nshall see this in the next Chapter. * * * *\n\n[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaph. K. vi. p. 1063, a. 31.]\n\n[The Author's MS. breaks off here. What follows on the next page, as\nChapter XII, is the exposition of Aristotle's Psychology, originally\ncontributed to the third edition of Professor Bain's work 'The Senses\nand the Intellect,' in 1868.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nDE ANIM\u00c2, ETC.\n\n\nTo understand Aristotle's Psychology, we must look at it in\ncomparison with the views of other ancient Greek philosophers on the\nsame subject, as far as our knowledge will permit. Of these ancient\nphilosophers, none have been preserved to us except Plato, and to a\ncertain extent Epikurus, reckoning the poem of Lucretius as a\ncomplement to the epistolary remnants of Epikurus himself. The\npredecessors of Aristotle (apart from Plato) are known only through\nsmall fragments from themselves, and imperfect notices by others;\namong which notices the best are from Aristotle himself.\n\nIn the Tim\u00e6us of Plato we find Psychology, in a very large and\ncomprehensive sense, identified with Kosmology. The Kosmos, a scheme\nof rotatory spheres, has both a soul and a body: of the two, the soul\nis the prior, grander, and predominant, though both of them are\nconstructed or put together by the Divine Architect or Demiurgus. The\nkosmical soul, rooted at the centre, and stretched from thence\nthrough and around the whole, is endued with self-movement, and with\nthe power of initiating movement in the kosmical body; moreover,\nbeing cognitive as well as motive, it includes in itself three\ningredients mixed together:--(1) The Same--the indivisible and\nunchangeable essence of Ideas; (2) The Diverse--the Plural--the\ndivisible bodies or elements; (3) A Compound, formed of both these\ningredients melted into one. As the kosmical soul is intended to know\nall the three--_Idem_, _Diversum_, and _Idem_ with _Diversum_ in one,\nso it must comprise in its own nature all the three ingredients,\naccording to the received Axiom--Like knows like--Like is known by\nLike. The ingredients are blended together according to a scale of\nharmonic proportion. The element _Idem_ is placed in an even and\nundivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos; the\nelement _Diversum_ is distributed among the rotations, all oblique,\nof the seven interior planetary spheres, that is, the five planets,\nwith the Sun and Moon. Impressions of identity and diversity, derived\neither from the ideal and indivisible, or from the sensible and\ndivisible, are thus circulated by the kosmical soul throughout its\nown entire range, yet without either voice or sound. Reason and\nScience are propagated by the circle of _Idem_: Sense and Opinion, by\nthose of _Diversum_. When these last-mentioned circles are in right\nmovement, the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: See this doctrine of the Tim\u00e6us more fully expounded in\n'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' III. xxxvi.\npp. 250-256, seq.]\n\nIt is thus that Plato begins his Psychology with Kosmology: the\nKosmos is in his view a divine immortal being or animal, composed of\na spherical rotatory body and a rational soul, cognitive as well as\nmotive. Among the tenants of this Kosmos are included, not only gods,\nwho dwell in the peripheral or celestial regions, but also men,\nbirds, quadrupeds, and fishes. These four inhabit the more central or\nlower regions of air, earth, and water. In describing men and the\ninferior animals, Plato takes his departure from the divine Kosmos,\nand proceeds downwards by successive stages of increasing degeneracy\nand corruption. The cranium of man was constructed as a little\nKosmos, including in itself an immortal rational soul, composed of\nthe same materials, though diluted and adulterated, as the kosmical\nsoul; and moving with the like rotations, though disturbed and\nirregular, suited to a rational soul. This cranium, for wise purposes\nwhich Plato indicates, was elevated by the gods upon a tall body,\nwith attached limbs for motion in different directions--forward,\nbackward, upward, downward, to the right and left.[2] Within this\nbody were included two inferior and mortal souls: one in the thoracic\nregion near the heart, the other lower down, below the diaphragm, in\nthe abdominal region; but both of them fastened or rooted in the\nspinal marrow or cord, which formed a continuous line with the brain\nabove. These two souls were both emotional; the higher or _thoracic_\nsoul being the seat of courage, energy, anger, &c., while to the\nlower or _abdominal_ soul belonged appetite, desires, love of gain,\n&c. Both of them were intended as companions and adjuncts, yet in the\nrelation of dependence and obedience, to the _rational_ soul in the\ncranium above; which, though unavoidably debased and perturbed by\nsuch unworthy companionship, was protected partially against the\ncontagion by the difference of location, the neck being built up as\nan isthmus of separation between the two. The thoracic soul, the seat\nof courage, was placed nearer to the head, in order that it might be\nthe medium for transmitting influence from the cranial soul above, to\nthe abdominal soul below; which last was at once the least worthy and\nthe most difficult to control. The heart, being the initial point of\nthe veins, received the orders and inspirations of the cranial soul,\ntransmitting them onward through its many blood-channels to all the\nsensitive parts of the body; which were thus rendered obedient, as\nfar as possible, to the authority of man's rational nature.[3] The\nunity or communication of the three souls was kept up through the\ncontinuity of the cerebro-spinal column.\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 44, E.; 'Plato and Other Comp. of\nSokr.', III. xxxvi. p. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 70; 'Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.',\nIII. pp. 271-272.]\n\nBut, though by these arrangements the higher soul in the cranium was\nenabled to control to a certain extent its inferior allies, it was\nitself much disturbed and contaminated by their reaction. The\nviolence of passion and appetite, the constant processes of nutrition\nand sensation pervading the whole body, the multifarious movements of\nthe limbs and trunk, in all varieties of direction,--these causes all\ncontributed to agitate and to confuse the rotations of the cranial\nsoul, perverting the arithmetical proportions and harmony belonging\nto them. The circles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false\ninformation; and the soul, for some time after its first junction\nwith the body, became destitute of intelligence.[4] In mature life,\nindeed, the violence of the disturbing causes abates, and the man may\nbecome more and more intelligent, especially if placed under\nappropriate training and education. But in many cases no such\nimprovement took place, and the rational soul of man was\nirrecoverably spoiled; so that new and worse breeds were formed, by\nsuccessive steps of degeneracy. The first stage, and the least amount\nof degeneracy, was exhibited in the formation of woman; the original\ntype of man not having included diversity of sex. By farther steps of\ndegradation, in different ways, the inferior animals were\nformed--birds, quadrupeds, and fishes.[5] In each of these, the\nrational soul became weaker and worse; its circular rotations ceased\nwith the disappearance of the spherical cranium, and animal appetites\nwith sensational agitations were left without control. As man, with\nhis two emotional souls and body joined on to the rational soul and\ncranium, was a debased copy of the perfect rational soul and\n**spherical body of the divine Kosmos, so the other inhabitants of\nthe Kosmos proceeded from still farther debasement and\ndisrationalization of the original type of man.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 43-44; 'Plato and Other Comp. of\nSokr.', III. pp. 262-264.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 91; 'Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.',\npp. 281-282.]\n\nSuch is the view of Psychology given by Plato in the Tim\u00e6us;\nbeginning with the divine Kosmos, and passing downwards from thence\nto the triple soul of man, as well as to the various still lower\nsuccessors of degenerated man. It is to be remarked that Plato,\nthough he puts soul as prior to body in dignity and power, and as\nhaving for its functions to control and move body, yet always\nconceives soul as attached to body, and never as altogether detached,\nnot even in the divine Kosmos. The soul, in Plato's view, is\nself-moving and self-moved: it is both _Primum Mobile_ in itself,\nand _Primum Movens_ as to the body; it has itself the corporeal\nproperties of being extended and moved, and it has body implicated\nwith it besides.\n\nThe theory above described, in so far as it attributes to the soul\nrational constituent elements (_Idem_, _Diversum_), continuous\nmagnitude, and circular rotations, was peculiar to Plato, and is\ncriticized by Aristotle as the peculiarity of his master.[6] But\nseveral other philosophers agreed with Plato in considering\nself-motion, together with motive causality and faculties perceptive\nand cognitive, to be essential characteristics of soul. Alkm\u00e6on\ndeclared the soul to be in perpetual motion, like all the celestial\nbodies; hence it was also immortal, as they were.[7] Herakleitus\ndescribed it as the subtlest of elements, and as perpetually fluent;\nhence it was enabled to know other things, all of which were in flux\nand change. Diogenes of Apollonia affirmed that the element\nconstituent of soul was air, at once mobile, all-penetrating, and\nintelligent. Demokritus declared that among the infinite diversity of\natoms those of spherical figure were the constituents both of the\nelement fire and of the soul: the spherical atoms were by reason of\ntheir figure the most apt and rapid in moving; it was their nature\nnever to be at rest, and they imparted motion to everything else.[8]\nAnaxagoras affirmed soul to be radically and essentially distinct from\nevery thing else, but to be the great primary source of motion, and to\nbe endued with cognitive power, though at the same time not suffering\nimpressions from without.[9] Empedokles considered soul to be a\ncompound of the four elements--fire, water, air, earth; with love and\nhatred as principles of motion, the former producing aggregation of\nelements, the latter, disgregation: by means of each element the soul\nbecame cognizant of the like element in the Kosmos. Some Pythagoreans\nlooked upon the soul as an aggregate of particles of extreme\nsubtlety, which pervaded the air and were in perpetual agitation.\nOther Pythagoreans, however, declared it to be an harmonious or\nproportional mixture of contrary elements and qualities; hence its\nuniversality of cognition, extending to all.[10]\n\n[Footnote 6: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. iii. p. 407, a. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ibid. ii. p. 405, a. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 404, a. 8; p. 405, a. 22; p. 406, b. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 405, a. 13, b. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. ii. p. 404, a. 16; p. 407, b.\n27.]\n\nA peculiar theory was delivered by Xenokrates (who, having been\nfellow-pupil with Aristotle under Plato, afterwards conducted the\nPlatonic School, during all the time that Aristotle taught at the\nLykeium), which Aristotle declares to involve greater difficulty than\nany of the others. Xenokrates described the soul as \"a number (a\nmonad or indivisible unit) moving itself.\"[11] He retained the\nself-moving property which Plato had declared to be characteristic of\nthe soul, while he departed from Plato's doctrine of a soul with\ncontinuous extension. He thus fell back upon the Pythagorean idea of\nnumber as the fundamental essence. Aristotle impugns, as alike\nuntenable, both the two properties here alleged--number and\nself-motion. If the monad both moves and is moved (he argues), it\ncannot be indivisible; if it be moved, it must have position, or must\nbe a point; but the motion of a point is a line, without any of that\nvariety that constitutes life. How can the soul be a monad? or, if it\nbe, what difference can exist between one soul and another, since\nmonads cannot differ from each other except in position? How comes it\nthat some bodies have souls and others not? and how, upon this\ntheory, can we explain the fact that many animated bodies, both\nplants and animals, will remain alive after being divided, the\nmonadic soul thus exhibiting itself as many and diverse? Besides, the\nmonad set up by Xenokrates is hardly distinguishable from the highly\nattenuated body or spherical atom recognized by Demokritus as the\norigin or beginning of bodily motion.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: Ibid. iv. p. 408, b. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 409, b. 12.]\n\nThese and other arguments are employed by Aristotle to refute the\ntheory of Xenokrates. In fact, he rejects all the theories then\ncurrent. After having dismissed the self-motor doctrine, he proceeds\nto impugn the views of those who declared the soul to be a compound\nof all the four elements, in order that they might account for its\npercipient and cognitive faculties upon the maxim then very generally\nadmitted[13]--That like is perceived and known by like. This theory,\nthe principal champion of which was Empedokles, appears to Aristotle\ninadmissible. You say (he remarks) that like knows like; how does\nthis consist with your other doctrine, that like cannot act upon, or\nsuffer from, like, especially as you consider that both in perception\nand in cognition the percipient and cognizant suffers or is acted\nupon?[14] Various parts of the cognizant subject, such as bone, hair,\nligaments, &c., are destitute of perception and cognition; how then\ncan we know anything about bone, hair, and ligaments, since we cannot\nknow them by like?[15] Suppose the soul to be compounded of all the\nfour elements; this may explain how it comes to know the four\nelements, themselves, but not how it comes to know all the\ncombinations of the four; now innumerable combinations of the four\nare comprised among the _cognita_. We must assume that the soul\ncontains in itself not merely the four elements, but also the laws or\ndefinite proportions wherein they can combine; and this is affirmed\nby no one.[16] Moreover, _Ens_ is an equivocal, or at least a\nmultivocal, term; there are _Entia_ belonging to each of the ten\nCategories. Now the soul cannot include in itself all the ten, for\nthe different Categories have no elements in common; in whichever\nCategory you rank the soul, it will know (by virtue of likeness) the\n_cognita_ belonging to that category, but it will not know the\n_cognita_ belonging to the other nine.[17] Besides, even if we grant\nthat the soul includes all the four elements, where is the cementing\nprinciple that combines all the four into one? The elements are\nmerely matter; and what holds them together must be the really potent\nprinciple of soul; but of this no explanation is given.[18]\n\n[Footnote 13: Ibid. v. p. 409, b. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. v. p. 410, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Ibid. a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 409, b. 28; p. 410, a. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Ibid. p. 410, a. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Ibid. p. 410, b. 10.]\n\nSome philosophers have assumed (continues Aristotle) that soul\npervades the whole Kosmos and its elements; and that it is inhaled by\nanimals in respiration along with the air.[19] They forget that all\nplants, and even some animals, live without respiring at all;\nmoreover, upon this theory, air and fire also, as possessing soul,\nand what is said to be a better soul, ought (if the phrase were\npermitted) to be regarded as animals. The soul of air or fire must be\nhomogeneous in its parts; the souls of animals are not homogeneous,\nbut involve several distinct parts or functions.[20] The soul\nperceives, cogitates, opines, feels, desires, repudiates; farther, it\nmoves the body locally, and brings about the growth and decay of the\nbody. Here we have a new mystery:[21]--Is the whole soul engaged in\nthe performance of each of these functions, or has it a separate part\nexclusively consecrated to each? If so, how many are the parts? Some\nphilosophers (Plato among them) declare the soul to be divided, and\nthat one part cogitates and cognizes, while another part desires. But\nupon that supposition what is it that holds these different parts\ntogether? Certainly not the body (which is Plato's theory); on the\ncontrary, it is the soul that holds together the body; for, as soon\nas the soul is gone, the body rots and disappears.[22] If there be\nanything that keeps together the divers parts of the soul as one,\nthat something must be the true and fundamental soul; and we ought\nnot to speak of the soul as having parts, but as essentially one and\nindivisible, with several distinct faculties. Again, if we are to\nadmit parts of the soul, does each part hold together a special part\nof the body, as the entire soul holds together the entire body? This\nseems impossible; for what part of the body can the No\u00fbs or Intellect\n(_e.g._) be imagined to hold together? And, besides, several kinds of\nplants and of animals may be divided, yet so that each of the\nseparate parts shall still continue to live; hence it is plain that\nthe soul in each separate part is complete and homogeneous.[23]\n\n[Footnote 19: Ibid. ii. p. 404, a. 9: [Greek: tou= z\u00ea=n o(/ron\nei)=nai t\u00ea\\n a)napno\u00ea/n], &c. Compare the doctrine of Demokritus.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Ibid. v. p. 411, a. 1, 8, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Ibid. a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. v. p. 411, b. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ibid. b. 15-27.]\n\nAristotle thus rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent\nphilosophers, but more especially the two following:--That the soul\nderives its cognitive powers from the fact of being compounded of the\nfour elements; That the soul is self-moved. He pronounces it\nincorrect to say that the soul is moved at all.[24] He farther\nobserves that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the\nfull meaning or all the varieties of soul; and that none of these\ndefective theories suffices for the purpose that every good and\nsufficient theory ought to serve, viz., not merely to define the\nessence of the soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the\nconcomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be\ndeducible from it.[25] Lastly, he points out that most of his\npredecessors had considered that the prominent characteristics of\nsoul were--to be motive and to be percipient:[26] while, in his\nopinion, neither of these two characteristics is universal or\nfundamental.\n\n[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ibid. i. p. 402, b. 16, seq.; v. p. 409, b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ibid. ii. p. 403, b. 30.]\n\nAristotle requires that a good theory of the soul shall explain alike\nthe lowest vegetable soul, and the highest functions of the human or\ndivine soul. And, in commenting on those theorists who declared that\nthe essence of soul consisted in movement, he remarks that their\ntheory fails altogether in regard to the No\u00fbs (or cogitative and\nintellective faculty of the human soul); the operation of which bears\nfar greater analogy to rest or suspension of movement than to\nmovement itself.[27]\n\n[Footnote 27: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. iii. p. 407, a. 32: [Greek: e)/ti\nd' \u00ea( no/\u00easis e)/oiken \u00ea)rem\u00ea/sei tini\\ \u00ea)\\ e)pista/sei ma=llon \u00ea)\\\nkin\u00ea/sei.]]\n\nWe shall now proceed to state how Aristotle steers clear (or at least\nbelieves himself to steer clear) of the defects that he has pointed\nout in the psychological theories of his predecessors. Instead of\ngoing back (like Empedokles, Plato, and others) to a time when the\nKosmos did not yet exist, and giving us an hypothesis to explain how\nits parts came together or were put together, he takes the facts and\nobjects of the Kosmos as they stand, and distributes them according\nto distinctive marks alike obvious, fundamental, and pervading; after\nwhich he seeks a mode of explanation in the principles of his own\nFirst Philosophy or Ontology. Whoever had studied the Organon and the\nPhysica of Aristotle (apparently intended to be read prior to the\ntreatise De Anim\u00e2) would be familiar with his distribution of _Entia_\ninto ten Categories, of which Essence or Substance was the first and\nthe fundamental. Of these Essences or Substances the **most\ncomplete and recognized were physical or natural bodies; and among\nsuch bodies one of the most striking distinctions, was between those\nthat had life and those that had it not. By life, Aristotle means\nkeeping up the processes of nutrition, growth, and decay.[28]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ibid. II i. p. 412, a. 11: [Greek: ou)si/ai de\\\nma/list' ei)=nai dokou=si ta\\ s\u00f4/mata, kai\\ tou/t\u00f4n ta\\ phusika/;\nt\u00f4=n de\\ phusik\u00f4=n ta\\ me\\n e)/chei z\u00f4\u00ea/n, ta\\ d' ou)k e)/chei; z\u00f4\u00ea\\n\nde\\ le/g\u00f4, t\u00ea\\n di' au)tou= troph\u00ea\\n kai\\ au)/x\u00easin kai\\ phthi/sin.]]\n\n\"To live\" (Aristotle observes) is a term used in several different\nmeanings; whatever possesses any one of the following four properties\nis said to live:[29] (1) Intellect, (2) Sensible perception, (3)\nLocal movement and rest, (4) Internal movement of nutrition, growth,\nand decay. But of these four the last is the only one common to all\nliving bodies without exception; it is the foundation presupposed by\nthe other three. It is the only one possessed by plants,[30] and\ncommon to all plants as well as to all animals--to all animated\nbodies.\n\n[Footnote 29: Ibid. ii. p. 413, a. 22: [Greek: pleonach\u00f4=s de\\ tou=\nz\u00ea=n legome/nou, ka)\\n e(/n ti tou/t\u00f4n e)nupa/rch\u00ea| mo/non, z\u00ea=n\nau)to/ phamen], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Ibid. I. v. p. 411, b. 27, ad fin.]\n\nWhat is the animating principle belonging to each of these bodies,\nand what is the most general definition of it? Such is the problem\nthat Aristotle states to himself about the soul.[31] He explains it\nby a metaphysical distinction first introduced (apparently) by\nhimself into _Philosophia Prima_. He considers Substance or Essence\nas an ideal compound; not simply as clothed with all the accidents\ndescribed in the nine last Categories, but also as being analysable\nin itself, even apart from these accidents, into two abstract,\nlogical, or notional elements or _principia_--Form and Matter. This\ndistinction is borrowed from the most familiar facts of the sensible\nworld--the shape of solid objects. When we see or feel a cube of wax,\nwe distinguish the cubic shape from the waxen material;[32] we may\nfind the like shape in many other materials--wood, stone, &c.; we may\nfind the like material in many different shapes--sphere, pyramid,\n&c.; but the matter has always some shape, and the shape has always\nsome matter. We can name and reason about the matter, without\nattending to the shape, or distinguishing whether it be cube or\nsphere; we can name and reason about the shape, without attending to\nthe material shaped, or to any of its various peculiarities. But\nthis, though highly useful, is a mere abstraction or notional\ndistinction. There can be no real separation between the two: no\nshape without some solid material; no solid material without some\nshape. The two are correlates; each of them implying the other, and\nneither of them admitting of being realized or actualized without the\nother.\n\n[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. p. 413, b. 11: [Greek: \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n\nei)r\u00eame/n\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n a)rch\u00ea/].--Ibid. I. p. 412, a. 5: [Greek: ti/s\na)\\n ei)/\u00ea koino/tatos lo/gos au)t\u00ea=s].]\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. i. p. 412, b. 7: [Greek: to\\n\nk\u00earo\\n kai\\ to\\ sch\u00ea=ma].]\n\nThis distinction of Form and Matter is one of the capital features of\nAristotle's _Philosophia Prima_. He expands it and diversifies it in\na thousand ways, often with subtleties very difficult to follow; but\nthe fundamental import of it is seldom lost--two correlates\ninseparably implicated in fact and reality in every concrete\nindividual that has received a substantive name, yet logically\nseparable and capable of being named and considered apart from each\nother. The Aristotelian analysis thus brings out, in regard to each\nindividual substance (or _Hoc Aliquid_, to use his phrase), a triple\npoint of view: (1) The Form; (2) The Matter; (3) The compound or\naggregate of the two--in other words, the inseparable _Ens_, which\ncarries us out of the domain of logic or abstraction into that of the\nconcrete or reality.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 1-34; De Anim\u00e2,\nII. i. p. 412, a. 6; p. 414, a. 15.\n\nIn the first book of the Physica, Aristotle pushes this analysis yet\nfurther, introducing three _principia_ instead of two:--(1) Form,\n(2) Matter, (3) Privation (of Form); he gives a distinct general name\nto the negation as well as to the affirmation; he provides a sign\n_minus_ as counter-denomination to the sign _plus_. But he intimates\nthat this is only the same analysis more minutely discriminated, or\nin a different point of view: [Greek: dio\\ e)/sti me\\n \u00f4(s du/o\nlekte/on ei)=nai ta\\s a)rcha/s, e)/sti d' \u00f4(s trei=s] (Phys. I. vii.\np. 190, b. 29).\n\n_Materia Prima_ (Aristotle says, Phys. I. vii. p. 191, a. 8) is\n\"knowable only by analogy\"--_i.e._, explicable only by illustrative\nexamples: as the brass is to the statue, as the wood is to the couch,\n&c.; natural substances being explained from works of art, as is\nfrequent with Aristotle.]\n\nAristotle farther recognizes, between these two logical correlates, a\nmarked difference of rank. The Form stands first, the Matter\nsecond,--not in time, but in notional presentation. The Form is higher,\ngrander, prior in dignity and esteem, more _Ens_, or more nearly\napproaching to perfect entity; the Matter is lower, meaner, posterior\nin dignity, farther removed from that perfection. The conception of\nwax, plaster, wood, &c., without amy definite or determinate shape,\nis confused and unimpressive; but a name, connoting some definite\nshape, at once removes this confusion, and carries with it mental\npre-eminence, alike as to phantasy, memory, and science. In the\nlogical hierarchy of Aristotle, Matter is the inferior and Form the\nsuperior;[34] yet neither of the two can escape from its relative\ncharacter: Form requires Matter for its correlate, and is nothing in\nitself or apart,[35] just as much as Matter requires Form; though\nfrom the inferior dignity of Matter we find it more frequently\ndescribed as the second or correlate, while Form is made to stand\nforward as the _relatum_. For complete reality, we want the concrete\nindividual having the implication of both; while, in regard to each\nof the constituents _per se_, no separate real existence can be\naffirmed, but only a nominal or logical separation.\n\n[Footnote 34: Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 729, a. 10. Matter\nand Form are here compared to the female and the male--to mother and\nfather. Form is a cause operative, Matter a cause co-operative,\nthough both are alike indispensable to full reality. Compare Physic.\nI. ix. p. 192, a. 13: [Greek: \u00ea( me\\n ga\\r u(pome/nousa sunaiti/a\nt\u00ea=| morph\u00ea=| t\u00f4=n ginome/n\u00f4n e)sti/n, \u00f4(/sper m\u00ea/t\u00ear;--a)lla\\ tou=t'\ne)/stin \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea, \u00f4(/sper a)\\n ei) th\u00ea=lu a)/r)r(enos kai\\ ai)schro\\n\nkalou= (e)phi/eto).]--De Partibus Animalium, I. i. p. 640, b. 28:\n[Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r kata\\ t\u00ea\\n morph\u00ea\\n phu/sis kuri\u00f4te/ra t\u00ea=s u(lik\u00ea=s\nphu/se\u00f4s].\n\nMetaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 5: [Greek: to\\ ei)=dos t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas\npro/teron kai\\ ma=llon o)/n]--p. 1039, a. 1.\n\nSee in Schwegler, pp. 13, 42, 83, Part II. of his Commentary on the\nAristotelian Metaphysica.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. Z. viii. p. 1033, b. 10, seq.]\n\nThis difference of rank between Matter and Form--that the first is\ninferior and the last the superior--is sometimes so much put in the\nforeground, that the two are conceived in a different manner and\nunder other names, as Potential and Actual. Matter is the potential,\nimperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the\nperfect and complete; a transition from half-reality to entire\nreality or act. The Potential is the undefined or\nindeterminate[36]--what may be or may not be--what is not yet actual,\nand may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into\nactuality when the energizing principle comes to aid. In this way of\nputting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with\nthe Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual: it\nis as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential\nas a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation.[37] The\nthree logical divisions--Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or\nConcrete ([Greek: to\\ su/nolon, to\\ suneil\u00eamme/non]), are here\ncompressed into two--the Potential and the Actualization thereof.\nActuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia, e)ntele/cheia]) coincides in meaning\npartly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form\nbeing so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost\neffaced.[38]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ibid. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, b. 10. He says, p.\n1048, a. 35, that this distinction between Potential and Actual\ncannot be defined, but can only be illustrated by particular\nexamples, several of which he proceeds to enumerate. Trendelenburg\nobserves (Note **ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, p. 307):--\"[Greek: Du/namis]\ncontraria adhuc in se inclusa tenet, ut in utrumque abire possit:\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] alterum excludit.\" Compare also ib. p. 302. This\n_May or May not be_ is the widest and most general sense of the terms\n[Greek: du/namis] and [Greek: dunato/n], common to all the analogical\nor derivative applications that Aristotle points out as belonging to\nthem. It is more general than that which he gives as the [Greek:\nku/rios o(/ros t\u00ea=s pr\u00f4/t\u00eas duna/me\u00f4s--a)rch\u00ea/ metabl\u00eatik\u00ea\\ e)n\na)/ll\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(=| a)/llo], and ought seemingly to be itself considered\nas the [Greek: ku/rios o(/ros]. Cf. Arist. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. xii.\np. 1020, a. 5, with the comment of Bonitz, who remarks upon the loose\nlanguage of Aristotle in this chapter but imputes to Aristotle a\ngreater amount of contradiction than he seems to deserve (Comm. ad\nMetaphys. pp. 256, 393).]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Ens potenti\u00e2_ is a variety of _Ens_ (Arist. Metaph.\n[Greek: D]. vii. p. 1017, b. 6), but an imperfect variety: it is\n[Greek: o)\\n a)tele/s], which may become matured into [Greek: o)\\n\nte/leion, o)\\n e)ntelechei/a|] or [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (Metaphys.\n[Greek: Th]. i. p. 1045, a. 34).\n\nMatter is either remote or proximate, removed either by one stage or\nseveral stages from the [Greek: su/nolon] in which it culminates.\nStrictly speaking, none but proximate matter is said to exist [Greek:\nduna/mei]. Alexander Schol. (ad Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1049, a. 19)\np. 781, b. 39: [Greek: \u00ea( po/r)r(\u00f4 u(/l\u00ea ou) le/getai duna/mei. ti/\nd\u00ea/ pote? o(/ti ou) par\u00f4numia/zomen ta\\ pra/gmata e)k t\u00ea=s po/r)r(\u00f4\na)ll' e)k t\u00ea=s prosechou=s; le/gomen ga\\r to\\ kib\u00f4/tion xu/linon e)k\nt\u00ea=s prosechou=s, a)ll' ou) g\u00ea/i+non e)k t\u00ea=s po/r)r(\u00f4.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: \u00ca]. i. p. 1042, a. 25, seq.\nHe scarcely makes any distinction here between [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] and\n[Greek: du/namis], or between [Greek: morph\u00ea\\] and [Greek:\ne)ne/rgeia] (cf. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, a. 15).\n\nAlexander in his Commentary on this book ([Greek: Th]. iii. p. 1047,\na. 30) p. 542, Bonitz's edit., remarks that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is\nused by Aristotle in a double sense; sometimes meaning [Greek:\nki/n\u00easis pro\\s to\\ te/los], sometimes meaning the [Greek: te/los]\nitself. Comp. [Greek: \u00ca]. iii. p. 1043, a. 32; also the commentary of\nBonitz, p. 393.]\n\nTwo things are to be remembered respecting Matter, in its\nAristotelian (logical or ontological) sense: (1) It may be Body, but\nit is not necessarily Body;[39] (2) It is only intelligible as the\ncorrelate of Form: it can neither exist by itself, nor can it be\nknown by itself (_i.e._, when taken out of that relativity). This\ndeserves notice, because to forget the relativity of a relative word,\nand to reason upon it as if it were an absolute, is an oversight not\nunfrequent. Furthermore, each variety of Matter has its appropriate\nForm, and each variety of Form its appropriate Matter, with which it\ncorrelates. There are various stages or gradations of Matter; from\n_Materia Prima_, which has no Form at all, passing upwards through\nsuccessive partial developments to _Materia Ultima_; which last is\nhardly[40] distinguishable from Form or from _Materia Formata_.\n\n[Footnote 39: Aristot. Metaph. Z. xi. p. 1036, a. 8: [Greek: \u00ea( d'\nu(/l\u00ea a)/gn\u00f4stos kath' au(t\u00ea/n. u(/l\u00ea d' \u00ea( me\\n ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea/, \u00ea( de\\\nno\u00eat\u00ea/; ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea\\ me\\n oi(=on chalko\\s kai\\ xu/lon kai\\ o(/s\u00ea\nkin\u00eat\u00ea\\ u(/l\u00ea, no\u00eat\u00ea\\ de\\ \u00ea( e)n toi=s ai)sth\u00eatoi=s u(pa/rchousa m\u00ea\\\n\u00ea(=| ai)sth\u00eata/, oi(=on ta\\ math\u00eamatika/.]--p. 1035, a. 7.\n\nPhysica, III. vi. p. 207, a. 26; De Generat. et Corrupt. I. v. p.\n320, b. 14-25.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ii. p. 414, a. 25: [Greek:\ne(ka/stou ga\\r \u00ea( e)ntele/cheia e)n t\u00f4=| duna/mei u(pa/rchonti kai\\\nt\u00ea=| oi)kei/a| u(/l\u00ea pe/phuken e)ggi/nesthai.]--Physica, II. ii. p.\n194, b. 8: [Greek: e)/ti t\u00f4=n pro/s ti \u00ea( u(/l\u00ea; a)/ll\u00f4| ga\\r ei)/dei\na)/ll\u00ea u(/l\u00ea.]--Metaph. [Greek: \u00ca]. vi. p. 1045, b. 17: [Greek:\ne)/sti d', \u00f4(/sper ei)/r\u00eatai, kai\\ \u00ea( e)scha/t\u00ea u(/l\u00ea kai\\ \u00ea( morph\u00ea\\\ntau)to/ kai\\ duna/mei, to\\ de\\ e)nergei/a|.] See upon this doctrine\nSchwegler's Commentary, pp. 100, 154, 173, 240, Pt. 2nd. Compare also\nArist. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 735, a. 9; also De Coelo, IV. iii.\np. 310, b. 14.]\n\nThe distinction above specified is employed by Aristotle in his\nexposition of the Soul. The soul belongs to the Category of Substance\nor Essence (not to that of Quantity, Quality, &c.); but of the two\npoints of view under which Essence may be presented, the soul ranks\nwith Form, not with Matter--with the Actual, not with the Potential.\nThe Matter to which (as correlate) soul stands related, is a natural\nbody (_i.e._, a body having within it an inherent principle of motion\nand rest) organized in a certain way, or fitted out with certain\ncapacities and preparations to which soul is the active and\nindispensable complement. These capacities would never come into\nactuality without the soul; but, on the other hand, the range of\nactualities or functions in the soul depends upon, and is limited by,\nthe range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body. The\nimplication of the two constitutes the living subject, with all its\nfunctions, active and passive. If the eye were an animated or living\nsubject, seeing would be its soul; if the carpenter's axe were\nliving, cutting would be its soul;[41] the matter would be the lens\nor the iron in which this soul is embodied. It is not indispensable,\nhowever, that all the functions of the living subject should be at\nall times in complete exercise: the subject is still living, even\nwhile asleep; the eye is still a good eye, though at the moment\nclosed. It is enough if the functional aptitude exist as a dormant\nproperty, ready to rise into activity, when the proper occasions\npresent themselves. This minimum of Form suffices to give living\nefficacy to the potentialities of body; it is enough that a man,\nthough now in a dark night and seeing nothing, will see as soon as\nthe sun rises; or that he knows geometry, though he is not now\nthinking of a geometrical problem. This dormant possession is what\nAristotle calls the First Entelechy or Energy, _i.e._, the lowest\nstage of Actuality, or the minimum of influence required to transform\nPotentiality into Actuality. The Aristotelian definition of Soul is\nthus: The first entelechy of a natural organized body, having life in\npotentiality.[42] This is all that is essential to the soul; the\nsecond or higher entelechy (actual exercise of the faculties) is not\na constant or universal property.[43]\n\n[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. i. p. 412, b. 18: [Greek: ei)\nga\\r \u00ea)=n o( o)phthalmo\\s z\u00f4|o/n, psuch\u00ea\\ a)\\n \u00ea)=n au)tou= \u00ea(\no)/psis; au(/t\u00ea ga\\r ou)si/a o)phthalmou= \u00ea( kata\\ to\\n lo/gon. o( d'\no)phthalmo\\s u(/l\u00ea o)/pse\u00f4s, \u00ea(=s a)poleipou/s\u00eas ou)ke/t'\no)phthalmo/s, pl\u00ea\\n o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s, katha/per o( li/thinos kai\\ o(\ngegramme/nos.]]\n\n[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. i. p. 412, a. 27: [Greek: dio\\\npsuch\u00ea/ e)stin e)ntele/cheia \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea s\u00f4/matos phusikou= duna/mei\nz\u00f4\u00ea\\n e)/chontos; toiou=to de\\ o(\\ a)\\n \u00ea)=| o)rganiko/n.] Compare\nMetaphysica, Z. x. p. 1035, b. 14-27.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ii. p. 414, a. 8-18. The\ndistinction here taken between the first or lower stage of Entelechy,\nand the second or higher stage, coincides substantially with the\ndistinction in the Nikomachean Ethica and elsewhere between [Greek:\ne(/xis] and [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. See Topica, IV. v. p. 125, b. 15;\nEthic. Nikom. II. i.-v. p. 1103 seq.]\n\nIn this definition of Soul, Aristotle employs his own _Philosophia\nPrima_ to escape the errors committed by prior philosophers. He does\nnot admit that the soul is a separate entity in itself; or that it is\ncomposed (as Empedokles and Demokritus had said) of corporeal\nelements, or (as Plato had said) of elements partly corporeal, partly\nlogical and notional. He rejects the imaginary virtues of number,\ninvoked by the Pythagoreans and Xenokrates; lastly, he keeps before\nhim not merely man, but all the varieties of animated objects, to\nwhich his definition must be adapted. His first capital point is to\nput aside the alleged identity, or similarity, or sameness of\nelements, between soul and body; and to put aside equally any\nseparate existence or substantiality of soul. He effects both these\npurposes by defining them as essentially _relatum_ and correlate; the\nsoul, as the _relatum_, is unintelligible and unmeaning without its\ncorrelate, upon which accordingly its definition is declared to be\nfounded.\n\nThe real animated subject may be looked at either from the point of\nview of the _relatum_ or from that of the correlate; but, though the\ntwo are thus logically separable, in fact and reality they are\ninseparably implicated; and, if either of them be withdrawn, the\nanimated subject disappears. \"The soul (says Aristotle) is not any\nvariety of body, but it cannot be without a body; it is not a body,\nbut it is something belonging to or related to a body; and for this\nreason it is in a body, and in a body of such or such\npotentialities.\"[44] Soul is to body (we thus read), not as a\ncompound of like elements, nor as a type is to its copy, or _vice\nvers\u00e2_, but as a _relatum_ to its correlate; dependent upon the body\nfor all its acts and manifestations, and bringing to consummation\nwhat in the body exists as potentiality only. Soul, however, is\nbetter than body; and the animated being is better than the inanimate\nby reason of its soul.[45]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ii. p. 414, a. 19: [Greek: kai\\\ndia\\ tou=to kal\u00f4=s u(polamba/nousin oi(=s dokei= m\u00eat' a)/neu s\u00f4/matos\nei)=nai m\u00ea/te s\u00f4/ma/ ti \u00ea( psuch\u00ea/; s\u00f4=ma me\\n ga\\r _ou)k e)/sti,\ns\u00f4/matos de/ ti_, kai\\ dia\\ tou=to e)n s\u00f4/mati u(pa/rchei, kai\\ e)n\ns\u00f4/mati toiou/t\u00f4|.] Compare Aristot. De Juventute et Senectute, i. p.\n467, b. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 29.]\n\nThe animated subject is thus a form immersed or implicated in matter;\nand all its actions and passions are so likewise.[46] Each of these\nhas its formal side, as concerns the soul, and its material side, as\nconcerns the body. When a man or animal is angry, for example, this\nemotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact of the body: in the\nfirst of these two characters, it may be defined as an appetite for\nhurting some one who has hurt us; in the second of the two, it may be\ndefined as an ebullition of the blood and heat round the heart.[47]\nThe emotion, belonging to the animated subject or aggregate of soul\nand body, is a complex fact having two aspects, logically\ndistinguishable from each other, but each correlating and implying\nthe other. This is true not only in regard to our passions, emotions,\nand appetites, but also in regard to our perceptions, phantasms,\nreminiscences, reasonings, efforts of attention in learning, &c. We\ndo not say that the soul weaves or builds (Aristotle observes[48]):\nwe say that the animated subject, the aggregate of soul and body,\n_the man_, weaves or builds. So we ought also to say, not that the\nsoul feels anger, pity, love, hatred, &c., or that the soul learns,\nreasons, recollects, &c., but that the man with his soul does these\nthings. The actual movement throughout these processes is not in the\nsoul, but in the body; sometimes going _to_ the soul (as in sensible\nperception), sometimes proceeding _from_ the soul to the body (as in\nthe case of reminiscence). All these processes are at once corporeal\nand psychical, pervading the whole animated subject, and having two\naspects coincident and inter-dependent, though logically\ndistinguishable. The perfect or imperfect discrimination by the\nsentient soul depends upon the good or bad condition of the bodily\nsentient organs; an old man that has become shortsighted would see as\nwell as before, if he could regain his youthful eye. The defects of\nthe soul arise from defects in the bodily organism to which it\nbelongs, as in cases of drunkenness or sickness; and this is not less\ntrue of the No\u00fbs, or intellective soul, than of the sentient\nsoul.[49] Intelligence, as well as emotion, are phenomena, not of the\nbodily organism simply, nor of the No\u00fbs simply, but of the community\nor partnership of which both are members; and, when intelligence\ngives way, this is not because the No\u00fbs itself is impaired, but\nbecause the partnership is ruined by the failure of the bodily\norganism.\n\n[Footnote 46: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. i. p. 403, a. 25: [Greek: ta\\\npa/th\u00ea lo/goi e)/nuloi/ ei)sin.] Compare II. p. 412, b. 10-25; p.\n413, a. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ibid. I. i. p. 403, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Ibid. iv. p. 408, b. 12. [Greek: to\\ de\\ le/gein\no)rgi/zesthai t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n o(/moion ka)\\n ei)/ tis le/goi t\u00ea\\n\npsuch\u00ea\\n u(phai/nein \u00ea)\\ oi)kodomei=n; be/ltion ga\\r i)/s\u00f4s m\u00ea\\\nle/gein t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n _e)leei=n \u00ea)\\ mantha/nein \u00ea)\\ dianoei=sthai_,\na)lla\\ _to\\n a)/nthr\u00f4pon_ t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|; tou=to de\\ m\u00ea\\ \u00f4(s e)n\ne)kei/n\u00ea| t\u00ea=s kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s ou)/s\u00eas, a)ll' o(/te me\\n me/chri e)kei/n\u00eas,\no(/te d' a)p' e)kei/n\u00eas], &c. Again, b. 30: [Greek: o(/ti me\\n ou)=n\nou)ch oi(=o/n te kinei=sthai t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea/n, phanero\\n e)k tou/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 49: Ibid. b. 26. Compare a similar doctrine in the Tim\u00e6us\nof Plato, p. 86, B.-D.]\n\nRespecting the No\u00fbs (the theorizing No\u00fbs), we must here observe that\nAristotle treats it as a separate kind or variety of soul, with\nseveral peculiarities. We shall collect presently all that he says\nupon that subject, which is the most obscure portion of his\npsychology.\n\nIn regard to soul generally, the relative point of view with body as\nthe correlate is constantly insisted on by Aristotle; without such\ncorrelate his assertions would have no meaning. But the relation\nbetween them is presented in several different ways. The soul is the\ncause and principle of a living body;[50] by which is meant, not an\nindependent and pre-existent something that brings the body into\nexistence but, an immanent or indwelling influence which sustains the\nunity and guides the functions of the organism. According to the\nquadruple classification of Cause recognized by Aristotle--Formal,\nMaterial, Movent, and Final--the body furnishes the Material Cause,\nwhile the soul comprises all the three others. The soul is (as we\nhave already seen) the Form in relation to the body as Matter, but it\nis, besides, the Movent, inasmuch as it determines the local\ndisplacement as well as all the active functions of the\nbody--nutrition, growth, generation, sensation, &c.; lastly, it is\nalso the Final Cause, since the maintenance and perpetuation of the\nsame Form, in successive individuals, is the standing purpose aimed\nat by each body in the economy of Nature.[51] Under this diversity of\naspect, soul and body are reciprocally integrant and complementary of\neach other, the real integer (the Living or Animated Body) including\nboth.\n\n[Footnote 50: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. iv. p. 415, b. 7: [Greek: e)/sti\nd' \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ tou= z\u00f4=ntos s\u00f4/matos ai)ti/a kai\\ a)rch\u00ea/; tau=ta de\\\npollach\u00f4=s le/getai.]]\n\n[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 1.]\n\nSoul, in the Aristotelian point of view--what is common to all living\nbodies, comprises several varieties. But these varieties are not\nrepresented as forming a genus with co-ordinate species under it, in\nsuch manner that the counter-ordinate species, reciprocally excluding\neach other, are, when taken together, co-extensive with the whole\ngenus; like man and brute in regard to animal. The varieties of soul\nare distributed into successive stages gradually narrowing in\nextension and enlarging in comprehension; the first or lowest stage\nbeing co-extensive with the whole, but connoting only two or three\nsimple attributes; the second, or next above, connoting all these and\nmore besides, but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by\nthe first; the third connoting all this and more, but denoting yet\nfewer individuals; and so on forward. Thus the concrete individuals,\ncalled living bodies, include all plants as well as all animals; but\nthe soul, called Nutritive by Aristotle, corresponding thereto\nconnotes only nutrition, growth, decay, and generation of another\nsimilar individual.[52] In the second stage, plants are left out, but\nall animals remain: the Sentient soul, belonging to animals, but not\nbelonging to any plants, connotes all the functions and unities of\nthe Nutritive soul, together with sensible perception (at least in\nits rudest shape) besides.[53] We proceed onward in the same\ndirection, taking in additional faculties--the Movent, Appetitive,\nPhantastic (Imaginative), No\u00ebtic (Intelligent) soul, and thus\ndiminishing the total of individuals denoted. But each higher variety\nof soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower. Thus the\nSentient soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of\nthe Nutritive, though the Nutritive exists (in plants) without any\nadmixture of the Sentient. Again, the Sentient soul does not\nnecessarily possess either memory, imagination, or intellect (No\u00fbs);\nbut no soul can be either Imaginative or No\u00ebtic, without being\nSentient as well as Nutritive. The No\u00ebtic Soul, as the highest of\nall, retains in itself all the lower faculties; but these are found\nto exist apart from it.[54]\n\n[Footnote 52: In the Aristotelian treatise De Plantis, p. 815, b. 16,\nit is stated that Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, all\naffirmed that plants had both intellect and cognition up to a certain\nmoderate point. We do not cite this treatise as the composition of\nAristotle, but it is reasonably good evidence in reference to the\ndoctrine of those other philosophers.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. v. p. 411, b. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ibid. II. ii. p. 413, a. 25-30, b. 32; iii. p. 414, b.\n29; p. 415, a. 10.]\n\nWe may remark here that the psychological classification of Aristotle\nproceeds in the inverse direction to that of Plato. In the Platonic\nTim\u00e6us we begin with the grand soul of the Kosmos, and are conducted\nby successive steps of degradation to men, animals, plants; while\nAristotle lays his foundation in the largest, most multiplied, and\nlowest range of individuals, carrying us by successive increase of\nconditions to the fewer and the higher.\n\nThe lowest or Nutritive soul, in spite of the small number of\nconditions involved in it, is the indispensable basis whereon all the\nothers depend. None of the other souls can exist apart from it.[55]\nIt is the first constituent of the living individual--the implication\nof Form with Matter in a natural body suitably organized; it is the\npreservative of the life of the individual, with its aggregate of\nfunctions and faculties, and with the proper limits of size and shape\nthat characterize the species;[56] it is, moreover, the preservative\nof perpetuity to the species, inasmuch as it prompts and enables each\nindividual to generate and leave behind a successor like himself;\nwhich is the only way that an individual can obtain\nquasi-immortality, though all aspire to become immortal.[57] This\nlowest soul is the primary cause of digestion and nutrition. It is\ncognate with the celestial heat, which is essential also as a\nco-operative cause; accordingly, all animated bodies possess an\ninherent natural heat.[58]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ibid. iv. p. 415, a. 25: [Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea kai\\ koinota/t\u00ea\ndu/nami/s e)sti psuch\u00ea=s, kath' \u00ea(\\n u(pa/rchei to\\ z\u00ea=n\na(/pasin.]--p. 415, b. 8: [Greek: tou= z\u00f4=ntos s\u00f4/matos ai)ti/a kai\\\na)rch\u00ea/].--III. xii. p. 434, a. 22-30, b. 24. Aristot. De\nRespiratione, viii. p. 474, a. 30, b. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. iv. p. 416, a. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ibid. p. 415, b. 2; p. 416, b. 23: [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\na)po\\ tou= te/lous a(/panta prosagoreu/ein di/kaion, te/los de\\ to\\\ngenn\u00ea=sai oi(=on au)to/, a)\\n \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea psuch\u00ea\\ genn\u00eatik\u00ea\\ oi(=on\nau)to/.] Also De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. iv. p. 416, a. 10-18, b. 29.]\n\nWe advance upwards now from the nutritive soul to that higher soul\nwhich is at once nutritive and Sentient; for Aristotle does not\nfollow the example of Plato in recognizing three souls to one body,\nbut assigns only one and the same soul, though with multiplied\nfaculties and functions, to one and the same body. Sensible\nperception, with its accompaniments, forms the characteristic\nprivilege of the animal as contrasted with the plant.[59] Sensible\nperception admits of many diversities, from the simplest and rudest\ntactile sensation, which even the lowest animals cannot be without,\nto the full equipment of five senses which Aristotle declares to be a\nmaximum not susceptible of increase.[60] But the sentient faculty,\neven in its lowest stage, indicates a remarkable exaltation of the\nsoul in its character of form. The soul, _qu\u00e2_ sentient and\npercipient, receives the form of the _perceptum_ without the matter;\nwhereas the nutritive soul cannot disconnect the two, but receives\nand appropriates the nutrient substance, form and matter in one and\ncombined.[61] Aristotle illustrates this characteristic feature of\nsensible perception by recurring to his former example of the wax and\nthe figure. Just as wax receives from a signet the impression\nengraven thereon, whether the matter of the signet be iron, gold,\nstone, or wood; as the impression stamped has no regard to the\nmatter, but reproduces only the figure engraven on the signet, the\nwax being merely potential and undefined, until the signet comes to\nconvert it into something actual and definite;[62] so the percipient\nfaculty in man is impressed by the substances in nature, not\naccording to the matter of each but, according to the qualitative\nform of each. Such passive receptivity is the first and lowest form\nof sensation,[63] not having any magnitude in itself, but residing in\nbodily organs which have magnitude, and separable from them only by\nlogical abstraction. It is a potentiality, correlating with, and in\ndue proportion to, the exterior _percipibile_, which, when acting\nupon it, brings it into full actuality. The actuality of both\n(_percipiens_ and _perceptum_) is one and the same, and cannot be\ndisjoined in fact, though the potentialities of the two are distinct\nyet correlative; the _percipiens_ is not like the _percipibile_\noriginally, but becomes like it by being thus actualized.[64]\n\n[Footnote 59: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 436, b. 12. He\nconsiders sponges to have some sensation (Hist. Animal. I. i. p. 487,\nb. 9).]\n\n[Footnote 60: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. iii. p. 414, b. 2; p. 415, a. 3;\nIII. i. p. 424, b. 22; xiii. p. 435, b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ibid. II. xii. p. 424, a. 32-b. 4: [Greek: dia\\ ti/\npote ta\\ phuta\\ ou)k ai)stha/netai, e)/chonta/ ti mo/rion psuchiko\\n\nkai\\ pa/schonta/ ti u(po\\ t\u00f4=n a(pt\u00f4=n? kai\\ ga\\r psu/chetai kai\\\nthermai/netai; ai)/tion ga\\r to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/chein meso/t\u00eata, m\u00eade\\\ntoiau/t\u00ean a)rch\u00ea\\n oi(/an ta\\ ei)/d\u00ea de/chesthai t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n,\na)lla\\ pa/schein meta\\ t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas.]\n\nThemistius ad loc. p. 144, ed. Spengel: [Greek: pa/schei (ta\\ phuta/)\nsuneisiou/s\u00eas t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas tou= poiou=ntos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. xii. p. 424, a. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea/rion de\\ pr\u00f4=ton e)n\n\u00f4(=| \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea du/namis], &c.--III. xii. p. 434, a. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ibid. III. ii. p. 425, b. 25: [Greek: \u00ea( de\\ tou=\nai)sth\u00eatou= e)ne/rgeia kai\\ t\u00ea=s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s \u00ea( au)t\u00ea\\ me/n e)sti\nkai\\ mi/a, to\\ d' ei)=nai ou) tau)to\\n au)tai=s.]--II. v. p. 418, a.\n3: [Greek: to\\ d' ai)sth\u00eatiko\\n duna/mei e)sti\\n oi(=on to\\\nai)sth\u00eato\\n \u00ea)/d\u00ea e)ntelechei/a|,--pa/schei me\\n ou)=n ou)ch o(/moion\no)/n, pepontho\\s d' \u00f4(moi/\u00f4tai kai\\ e)/stin oi(=on e)kei=no.] Also p.\n417, a. 7, 14, 20.\n\nThere were conflicting doctrines current in Aristotle's time: some\nsaid that, for an agent to act upon a patient, there must be\n_likeness_ between the two; others said that there must be\n_unlikeness_. Aristotle dissents from both, and adopts a sort of\nintermediate doctrine.]\n\nThe sentient soul is communicated by the male parent in the act of\ngeneration,[65] and is complete from the moment of birth, not\nrequiring a process of teaching after birth; the sentient subject\nbecomes at once and instantly, in regard to sense, on a level with\none that has attained a certain actuality of cognition, but is not at\nthe moment reflecting upon the _cognitum_. Potentiality and Actuality\nare in fact distinguishable into lower and higher degrees; the\nPotential that has been actualized in a first or lower stage, is\nstill a Potential relatively to higher stages of Actuality.[66] The\nPotential may be acted upon in two opposite ways; either by deadening\nand extinguishing it, or by developing and carrying it forward to\nrealization. The sentient soul, when asleep or inert, requires a\ncause to stimulate it into actual seeing or hearing; the no\u00ebtic or\ncognizant soul, under like circumstances, must also be stimulated\ninto actual meditation on its _cognitum_. But there is this\ndifference between the two. The sentient soul communes with\nparticulars; the no\u00ebtic soul with universals. The sentient soul\nderives its stimulus from without, and from some of the individual\nobjects, tangible, visible, or audible; but the no\u00ebtic soul is put\ninto action by the abstract and universal, which is in a certain\nsense _within_ the soul itself; so that a man can at any time\nmeditate on what he pleases, but he cannot see or hear what he\npleases, or anything except such visible or audible objects as are at\nhand.[67]\n\n[Footnote 65: Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. v. p. 741, a. 13, b. 7;\nDe Anim\u00e2, II. v. p. 417, b. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. v. p. 417, b. 18-32. See above,\np. 457, note a.\n\nThe extent of Potentiality, or the partial Actuality, which Aristotle\nclaims for the sentient soul even at birth, deserves to be kept in\nmind; we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the\nNo\u00fbs.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. v. p. 417, b. 22: [Greek:\nai)/tion de\\ o(/ti, t\u00f4=n kath' e(/kaston \u00ea( kat' e)ne/rgeian\nai)/sth\u00easis, \u00ea( d' e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea t\u00f4=n katho/lou; tau=ta d' e)n au)t\u00ea=|\np\u00f4/s e)sti t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|.] III. iii. p. 427, b. 18.]\n\nWe have already remarked, that in many animals the sentient soul is\nlittle developed; being confined in some to the sense of touch (which\ncan never be wanting),[68] and in others to touch and taste. But even\nthis minimum of sense--though small, if compared with the variety of\nsenses in man--is a prodigious step in advance of plants; it\ncomprises a certain cognition, and within its own sphere it is always\ncritical, comparing, discriminative.[69] The sentient soul possesses\nthis discriminative faculty in common with the no\u00ebtic soul or\nIntelligence, though applied to different objects and purposes; and\npossesses such faculty, because it is itself a mean or middle term\nbetween the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance,--hot\nand cold, hard and soft, wet and dry, white and black, acute and\ngrave, bitter and sweet, light and darkness, visible and invisible,\ntangible and intangible, &c. We feel no sensation at all when the\nobject touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves,\nneither hotter nor colder; the sentient soul, being a mean between\nthe two extremes, is stimulated to assimilate itself for the time to\neither of them, according as it is acted upon from without. It thus\nmakes comparison of each with the other, and of both with its own\nmean.[70] Lastly, the sentient faculty in the soul is really one and\nindivisible, though distinguishable logically or by abstraction into\ndifferent genera and species.[71] Of that faculty the central\nphysical organ is the heart, which contains the congenital or animal\nspirit. The Aristotelian psychology is here remarkable, affirming as\nit does the essential relativity of all phenomena of sense to the\nappreciative condition of the sentient; as well as the constant\nimplication of intellectual and discriminative comparison among them.\n\n[Footnote 68: Ibid. III. xii. p. 434, b. 23: [Greek: phanero\\n o(/ti\nou)ch oi(=o/n te a)/neu a(ph\u00ea=s ei)=nai z\u00f4=|on.]]\n\n[Footnote 69: Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 16: [Greek: t\u00f4=| kritik\u00f4=|, o(\\\ndianoi/as e)/rgon e)sti\\ kai\\ ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s.]--III. iii. p. 427, a.\n20; p. 426, b. 10-15. De Generat. Animal. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 30-b.\n5; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 458**, b. 2. The sentient faculty is\ncalled [Greek: du/namin su/mphuton kritik\u00ea/n] in Analyt. Poster.\nII. xix. p. 99, b. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. x. p. 422, a. 20; ix. p. 421, b.\n4-11; xi. p. 424, a. 5: [Greek: kai\\ dia\\ tou=to kri/nei ta\\\nai)sth\u00eata/--to\\ ga\\r me/son kritiko/n]. III. vii. p. 431, a. 10:\n[Greek: e)/sti to\\ \u00ea(/desthai kai\\ lupei=sthai to\\ e)nergei=n t\u00ea=|\nai)sth\u00eatik\u00ea=| meso/t\u00eati pro\\s to\\ a)gatho\\n \u00ea)\\ kako/n, \u00ea(=|\ntoiau=ta.] III. xiii. p. 435, a. 21.\n\nHe remarks that plants have no similar [Greek: meso/t\u00eas]--II. xii. p.\n424, b. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8, 17. De\nMotu Animal. x. p. 703, a. 15. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 15,\n21, 35; p. 456, a. 5. De Juventute et Senect. p. 467, b. 27; p. 469,\na. 4-12.]\n\nAll the objects generating sensible perception, are magnitudes.[72]\nSome perceptions are peculiar to one sense alone, as colour to the\neye, &c. Upon these we never make mistakes directly; in other words,\nwe always judge rightly what is the colour or what is the sound,\nthough we are often deceived in judging what the thing coloured is,\nor where the sonorous object is.[73] There are, however, some\nperceivables not peculiar to any one sense alone, but appreciable by\ntwo or more; though chiefly and best by the sense of vision; such are\nmotion, rest, number, figure, magnitude. Here the appreciation\nbecomes less accurate, yet it is still made directly by sense.[74]\nBut there are yet other matters that, though not directly affecting\nsense, are perceived indirectly, or by way of accompaniment to what\nis directly perceived. Thus we see a white object; nothing else\naffecting our sense **except its whiteness. Beyond this,\nhowever, we judge and declare, that the object so seen is the son of\nKleon. This is a judgment obtained indirectly, or by way of\naccompaniment; by _accident_, so to speak, inasmuch as the same does\nnot accompany all sensations of white. It is here that we are most\nliable to error.[75]\n\n[Footnote 72: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 20:\n[Greek: to\\ ai)sth\u00eato\\n pa=n e)sti\\ me/gethos.]]\n\n[Footnote 73: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vi. p. 418, a. 10-16.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 8; iv. p.\n442, b. 4-12. He says in this last passage, that the common\nperceivables are appreciable _at least by both sight and touch_--if\nnot by all the senses.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vi. p. 418, a. 7-25: [Greek:\nle/getai de\\ to\\ ai)sth\u00eato\\n trich\u00f4=s, \u00f4(=n du/o me\\n kath' au(ta/\nphamen ai)stha/nesthai, to\\ de\\ e(\\n kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s.] Also, III.\ni. p. 425, b. 24; iii. p. 428, b. 18-25.]\n\nAmong the five senses, Aristotle distinguishes two as operating by\ndirect contact between subject and object (touch, taste); three as\noperating through an external intervening medium (vision, smell,\ntaste). He begins with Vision, which he regards as possessing most\ncompletely the nature and characteristics of a sense.[76] The direct\nand proper object of vision is colour. Now colour operates upon the\neye not immediately (for, if the coloured object be placed in contact\nwith the eye, there will be no vision), but by causing movements or\nperturbations in the external intervening medium, air or water, which\naffect the sense through an appropriate agency of their own.[77] This\nagency is, according to Aristotle, the Diaphanous or Transparent.\nWhen actual or in energy, the transparent is called light; when\npotential or in capacity only, it is called darkness. The eye is of\nwatery structure, apt for receiving these impressions.[78] It is the\npresence either of fire, or of something analogous to the celestial\nbody, that calls forth the diaphanous from the state of potentiality\ninto that of actuality or light; in which latter condition it is\nstimulated by colour. The diaphanous, whether as light or as\ndarkness, is a peculiar nature or accompaniment, not substantive in\nitself, but inherent chiefly in the First or Celestial Body, yet also\nin air, water, glass, precious stones, and in all bodies to a greater\nor less degree.[79] The diaphanous passes at once and simultaneously,\nin one place as well as in another, from potentiality to\nactuality--from darkness to light. Light does not take time to travel\nfrom one place to another, as sound and smell do.[80] The diaphanous\nis not a body, nor effluvium from a body, nor any one of the elements:\nit is of an adjective character--a certain agency or attribute\npervading or belonging to bodies, along with their extension.[81]\nColour marks and defines the surface of the body _qu\u00e2_ diaphanous, as\nfigure defines it _qu\u00e2_ extended. Colour makes the diaphanous itself\nvisible, and its own varieties visible through the diaphanous. Air\nand water are transparent throughout, though with an ill-defined\nsuperficial colour. White and black, as colours in solid bodies,\ncorrespond to the condition of light or darkness in air. There are\nsome luminous objects visible in the dark, as fire, fungous matter,\neyes, and scales of fish, &c., though they have no appropriate\ncolour.[82] There are seven species or varieties of colours, but all\nof them proceed from white and black, blended in different\nproportions, or seen one through another; white and black are the\ntwo extremes, the other varieties being intermediate between them.\n\n[Footnote 76: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 429, a. 2: [Greek: \u00ea(\no)/psis ma/lista ai)sth\u00easi/s e)stin.] Also Metaphysica, A. init.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 419, a. 12, 14, 19;\nAristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 440, a. 18: [Greek: \u00f4(/st'\neu)thu\\s krei=tton pha/nai, t\u00f4=| kinei=sthai to\\ metaxu\\ t\u00ea=s\nai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s u(po\\ tou= ai)sth\u00eatou= gi/nesthai t\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin,\na(ph\u00ea=| kai\\ m\u00ea\\ tai=s a)por)r(oi/ais.]--Ib. ii. p. 438, b. 3:\n[Greek: ei)/te ph\u00f4=s ei)/t' a)\u00ea/r e)sti to\\ metaxu\\ tou= o(r\u00f4me/nou\nkai\\ tou= o)/mmatos, \u00ea( dia\\ tou/tou ki/n\u00easi/s e)stin \u00ea( poiou=sa to\\\no(ra=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 78: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 419, a. 9: [Greek:\ntou=to ga\\r \u00ea)=n au)t\u00f4=| to\\ chr\u00f4/mati ei)=nai, to\\ kin\u00eatik\u00f4=|\nei)=nai tou= kat' e)ne/rgeian diaphanou=s ph\u00f4=s e)sti/n.]--Ib. ii. p.\n418, b. 11-17: [Greek: o(/tan \u00ea)=| e)ntelechei/a| diaphane\\s u(po\\\npuro\\s \u00ea)\\ toiou/tou oi(=on to\\ a)/n\u00f4 s\u00f4=ma;--puro\\s \u00ea)\\ toiou/tou\ntino\\s parousi/a e)n t\u00f4=| diaphanei=.]]\n\n[Footnote 79: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 418, b. 4. De Sensu et\nSensili, ii. p. 438, a. 14, b. 7; iii. p. 439, a. 21, seq.: [Greek:\no(\\ de\\ le/gomen diaphane/s, ou)k e)/stin i)/dion a)e/ros \u00ea)\\\nu(/datos, ou)d' a)/llou t\u00f4=n ou(/t\u00f4 legome/n\u00f4n s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n, a)lla/ ti/s\ne)sti\\ koin\u00ea\\ phu/sis kai\\ du/namis, \u00ea(\\ ch\u00f4rist\u00ea\\ me\\n ou)k e)/stin,\ne)n tou/tois d' e)sti/, kai\\ toi=s a)/llois s\u00f4/masin e)nupa/rchei,\ntoi=s me\\n ma=llon toi=s d' \u00ea(=tton.]]\n\n[Footnote 80: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vi. p. 446, a. 23, seq.,\nb. 27: [Greek: t\u00f4=| ei)=nai ga/r ti ph\u00f4=s e)sti/n, a)ll' ou)\nki/n\u00easi/s tis.] Empedokles affirmed that light travelling from the\nSun reached the intervening space before it came to the earth;\nAristotle contradicts him.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 418, b. 18: [Greek:\ne)/sti de\\ to\\ sko/tos ste/r\u00easis t\u00ea=s toiau/t\u00eas e(/xe\u00f4s e)k\ndiaphanou=s, \u00f4(/ste d\u00ea=lon o(/ti kai\\ \u00ea( _tou/tou parousi/a_ ph\u00f4=s\ne)sti/n.]--Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 439, a. 26: [Greek:\n\u00ea( me\\n ou)=n tou= ph\u00f4to\\s phu/sis e)n ao)ri/st\u00f4| t\u00f4=| diaphanei=\ne)sti/n; tou= d' e)n toi=s s\u00f4/masi diaphanou=s to\\ e)/schaton, o(/ti\nme\\n ei)/\u00ea a)/n ti, d\u00ea=lon; o(/ti de\\ tou=to e)sti\\ to\\ chr\u00f4=ma, e)/k\nt\u00f4=n sumbaino/nt\u00f4n phanero/n.--e)/sti me\\n ga\\r e)n t\u00f4=| tou=\ns\u00f4/matos pe/rati, a)ll' ou)/ ti to\\ tou= s\u00f4/matos pe/ras, a)lla\\ t\u00ea\\n\nau)t\u00ea\\n phu/sin dei= nomi/zein, \u00ea(/per kai\\ e)/x\u00f4 chr\u00f4mati/zetai,\ntau/t\u00ean kai\\ e)nto/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 82: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 419, a. 2-25; Aristot.\nDe Sensu et Sensili, iv. p. 442, a. 20,--seven colours.]\n\nThe same necessity for an intervening medium external to the subject,\nas in the case of vision, prevails also in the senses of hearing and\nsmell. If the audible or odorous object be placed in contact with its\norgan of sense, there will be no hearing or smell. Whenever we hear\nor smell any object, there must be interposed between us and the\nobject a suitable medium that shall be affected first; while the\norgan of sense will be affected secondarily through that medium. Air\nis the medium in regard to sound, both air and water in regard to\nsmell; but there seems besides (analogous to the transparent in\nregard to vision) a special agency called the Trans-Sonant, which\npervades air and enables it to transmit sound; and certainly another\nspecial agency called the Trans-Olfacient, which pervades both air\nand water, and enables them to transmit smell.[83] (It seems thus\nthat something like a luminiferous ether--extended, mobile, and\npermeating bodies, yet still incorporeal in itself--was an hypothesis\nas old as Aristotle; and one other ether besides, analogous in\nproperty and purpose--an odoriferous ether; perhaps a third or\nsoniferous ether, but this is less distinctly specified by\nAristotle.)\n\n[Footnote 83: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii. p. 419, a. 25-35; De Sensu\net Sensili, v. p. 442, b. 30; Themistius ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II.\nvii., viii. p. 115, Spengel. Of the three names, [Greek: to\\\ndiaphane/s--to\\ di\u00eache/s--to\\ di/osmon], the last two are not\ndistinctly stated by Aristotle, but are said to have been first\napplied by Theophrastus after him. See the notes of Trendelenburg and\nTorstrick; the latter supposes Themistius to have had before him a\nfuller and better text of Aristotle than that which we now possess,\nwhich seems corrupt. In our present text, the transparent as well as\nthe trans-olfacient ether are clearly indicated, the trans-sonant not\nclearly.]\n\nSound, according to Aristotle, arises from the shock of two or more\nsolid bodies communicated to the air. It implies local movement in\none at least of those bodies. Many soft bodies are incapable of\nmaking sound; those best suited for it are such as metals, hard in\nstructure, smooth in surface, hollow in shape. The blow must be smart\nand quick, otherwise the air slips away and dissipates itself before\nthe sound can be communicated to it.[84] Sound is communicated\nthrough the air to the organ of hearing; the air is one _continuum_\n(not composed of adjacent particles with interspaces), and a wave is\npropagated from it to the internal ear, which contains some air\nenclosed in the sinuous ducts within the membrane of the tympanum,\ncongenitally attached to the organ itself, and endued with a certain\nanimation.[85] This internal air within the ear, excited by the\nmotion propagated from the external ear, causes hearing. The ear is\nenabled to appreciate accurately the movements of the external air,\nbecause it has itself little or no movement within. We cannot hear\nwith any other part of the body; because it is only in the ear that\nnature has given us this stock of internal air. If water gets into\nthe ear, we cannot hear at all; because the wave generated in the air\nwithout, cannot propagate itself within. Nor can we hear, if the\nmembrane of the ear be disordered; any more than we can see, when the\nmembrane of the eye is disordered.[86]\n\n[Footnote 84: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, **II. viii. p. 419, b. 4 seq. He\ncalls air [Greek: psathuro/s, eu)/thruptos] (p. 420,\na. 1-8),--[Greek: eu)diai/retos, eu)o/listhos] (Themistius, pp. 116,\n117, Sp.)--\"quod facil\u00e9 diffluit\" (Trendelenburg, Comm. p. 384). He\nsays that for sonorous purposes air ought to be [Greek:\na)throu=n]--compact or dense: sound reverberates best from metals\nwith smooth surface, p. 420, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. viii. p. 419, b. 34 seq.:\n[Greek: ou(=tos d' (o( a)\u00ea\\r) e)sti\\n o( poi\u00f4=n a)kou/ein, o(/tan\nkin\u00eath\u00ea=| sunech\u00ea\\s kai\\ ei(=s;--psoph\u00eatiko\\n me\\n ou)=n to\\\nkin\u00eatiko\\n e(no\\s a)e/ros sunechei/a| me/chris a)ko\u00ea=s. a)ko\u00ea=| de\\\nsumphu\u00ea\\s a)\u00ea/r; dia\\ de\\ to\\ e)n a)e/ri ei)=nai, kinoume/nou tou=\ne)/x\u00f4 to\\ ei)/s\u00f4 kinei=. dio/per ou) pa/nt\u00ea| to\\ z\u00f4=|on a)kou/ei,\nou)de\\ pa/nt\u00ea| die/rchetai o( a)\u00ea/r; ou) ga\\r pa/nt\u00ea| e)/chei a)e/ra\nto\\ kin\u00easo/menon me/ros kai\\ e)/mpsuchon.--dia\\ ta\\s e(/likas] (p.\n420, a. 13).\n\nThe text of this passage is not satisfactory. It has been much\ncriticised as well as amended by Torstrick; see his Comment. p. 148\nseq. I cannot approve his alteration of [Greek: e)/mpsuchon] into\n[Greek: e)/mpsophon].]\n\n[Footnote 86: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. viii. p. 420, a. 9: [Greek: o(\nd' e)n toi=s \u00f4)si\\n e)gkat\u00f4|kodo/m\u00eatai pro\\s to\\ a)ki/n\u00eatos ei)=nai,\no(/p\u00f4s a)krib\u00f4=s ai)stha/n\u00eatai pa/sas ta\\s diaphora\\s t\u00ea=s\nkin\u00ea/se\u00f4s.]--p. 420, a. 14. [Greek: ou)d' (a)kou/omen) a)\\n \u00ea(\nm\u00ea/nigx ka/m\u00ea|, \u00f4(/sper to\\ e)pi\\ t\u00ea=| ko/r\u00ea| de/rma o(/tan ka/m\u00ea|.]]\n\nVoice is a kind of sound peculiar to animated beings; yet not\nbelonging to all of them, but only to those that inspire the air.\nNature employs respiration for two purposes: the first, indispensable\nto animal life,--that of cooling and tempering the excessive heat of\nthe heart and its adjacent parts; the second, not indispensable to\nlife, yet most valuable to the higher faculties of man,--significant\nspeech. The organ of respiration is the larynx; a man cannot speak\neither when inspiring or expiring, but only when retaining and using\nthe breath within. The soul in those parts, when guided by some\nphantasm or thought, impels the air within against the walls of the\ntrachea, and this shock causes vocal sounds.[87]\n\n[Footnote 87: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. viii. p. 420, b. 5-p. 421, a. 6.\n[Greek: \u00f4(/ste \u00ea( pl\u00eag\u00ea\\ tou= a)napneome/nou a)e/ros u(po\\ t\u00ea=s e)n\ntou/tois toi=s mori/ois psuch\u00ea=s pro\\s t\u00ea\\n kaloume/n\u00ean a)rt\u00eari/an\nph\u00f4n\u00ea/ e)stin. ou) ga\\r pa=s z\u00f4/|ou pso/phos ph\u00f4n\u00ea/, katha/per\nei)/pomen (e)/sti ga\\r kai\\ t\u00ea=| gl\u00f4/tt\u00ea| psophei=n kai\\ \u00f4(s oi(\nb\u00ea/ttontes) a)lla\\ dei= e)/mpsucho/n te ei)=nai to\\ tu/pton kai\\\nmeta\\ phantasi/as tino/s; s\u00eamantiko\\s ga\\r d\u00ea/ tis pso/phos e)sti\\n\n\u00ea( ph\u00f4n\u00ea/; kai\\ ou) tou= a)napneome/nou a)e/ros, \u00f4(/sper \u00ea( b\u00ea/x,\na)lla\\ tou/t\u00f4| tu/ptei to\\n e)n t\u00ea=| a)rt\u00eari/a| pro\\s au)t\u00ea/n.]]\n\nAristotle seems to have been tolerably satisfied with the above\nexplanation of sight and hearing; for, in approaching the sense of\nSmell with the olfacients, he begins by saying that it is less\ndefinable and explicable. Among the five senses, smell stands\nintermediate between the two (taste and touch) that operate by direct\ncontact, and the other two (sight and hearing) that operate through\nan external medium. Man is below other animals in this sense; he\ndiscriminates little in smells except the pleasurable and the\npainful.[88] His taste, though analogous in many points to smell, is\nfar more accurate and discriminating, because taste is a variety of\ntouch; and in respect to touch, man is the most discriminating of all\nanimals. Hence his great superiority to them in practical wisdom.\nIndeed the marked difference of intelligence between one man and\nanother, turns mainly upon the organ of touch: men of hard flesh (or\nskin) are by nature dull in intelligence, men of soft flesh are apt\nand clever.[89] The classifying names of different smells are\nborrowed from the names of the analogous tastes to which they are\nanalogous--sweet, bitter, tart, dry, sharp, smooth, &c.[90] Smells\ntake effect through air as well as through water; by means of a\npeculiar agency or accompaniment (mentioned above, called the\nTrans-Olfacient) pervading both one and the other. It is peculiar to\nman that he cannot smell except when inhaling air in the act of\ninspiration; any one may settle this for himself by making the\ntrial.[91] But fishes and other aquatic animals, which never inhale\nair, can smell in the water; and this proves that the trans-olfacient\nagency is operative to transmit odours not less in water than in\nair.[92] We know that the sense of smell in these aquatic animals is\nthe same as it is in man, because the same strong odours that are\ndestructive to man are also destructive to them.[93] Smell is the\nparallel, and in a certain sense the antithesis of taste; smell is of\nthe dry, taste is of the moist: the olfactory matter is a juicy or\nsapid dryness, extracted or washed out from both air and water by the\ntrans-olfacient agency, and acting on the sensory potentialities of\nthe nostrils.[94] This olfactory inhalation is warm as well as dry.\nHence it is light, and rises easily to the brain, the moisture and\ncoldness of which it contributes to temper; this is a very salutary\nprocess, for the brain is the wettest and coldest part of the body,\nrequiring warm and dry influences as a corrective. It is with a view\nto this correction that Nature has placed the olfactory organ in such\nclose proximity to the brain.[95] There are two kinds of olfactory\nimpressions. One of them is akin to the sense of taste--odour and\nsavour going together--an affection (to a great degree) of the\nnutritive soul; so that the same odour is agreeable when we are\nhungry, disagreeable when our hunger is fully satisfied. This first\nkind of impression is common to men with other animals; but there is\na second, peculiar to man, and disconnected from the sense of taste,\nviz., the scent of flowers, unguents, &c., which are agreeable or\ndisagreeable constantly and _per se_.[96] Nature has assigned this\nsecond kind of odours as a privilege to man, because his brain, being\nso large and moist, requires to be tempered by an additional stock of\ndrying and warming olfactory influence.\n\n[Footnote 88: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ix. p. 421, a. 7. De Sensu et\nSensili, v. p. 445, a. 6; iv. p. 441, a. 1. De Partibus Animal. II.\nxii. p. 656, a. 31; p. 657, a. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21: [Greek: kata\\\nde\\ t\u00ea\\n a(ph\u00ea\\n poll\u00f4=| t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n z\u00f4/|\u00f4n diaphero/nt\u00f4s a)kriboi=\n(o( a)/nthr\u00f4pos). dio\\ kai\\ phronim\u00f4/tato/n e)sti t\u00f4=n z\u00f4/|\u00f4n.\ns\u00eamei=on de\\ to\\ kai\\ e)n t\u00f4=| ge/nei t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n para\\ to\\\nai)sth\u00eat\u00ea/rion tou=to ei)=nai eu)phuei=s kai\\ a)phuei=s, _par' a)/llo\nde\\ m\u00eade/n_; oi( me\\n ga\\r skl\u00earo/sarkoi a)phuei=s t\u00ea\\n dia/noian,\noi( de\\ malako/sarkoi eu)phuei=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 9-19. [Greek: to\\ a)/neu tou= a)napnei=n m\u00ea\\\nai)stha/nesthai _i)/dion_ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n; d\u00ea=lon de\\\npeir\u00f4me/nois.] He seems to think that this is not true of any animal\nother than man.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 3-31; p.\n444, b. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ix. p. 421, b. 23. He instances\nbrimstone, [Greek: a)/sphaltos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 94: This is difficult to understand, but it seems to be\nwhat Aristotle here means.--De Anim\u00e2, II. ix. p. 422, a. 6: [Greek:\ne)/sti d' \u00ea( o)sm\u00ea\\ tou\\ x\u00earou=, \u00f4(/sper o( chumo\\s tou= u(grou=; to\\\nd' o)sphrantiko\\n ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea/rion duna/mei toiou=ton.]--De Sensu et\nSensili, v. p. 443, a. 1-9: [Greek: e)/sti d' o)sphranto\\n ou)ch \u00ea(=|\ndiaphane/s, a)ll' \u00ea)=| pluntiko\\n \u00ea)\\ r(uptiko\\n e)gchu/mou\nx\u00earo/t\u00eatos;--\u00ea( e)n u(gr\u00f4=| tou= e)gchu/mou x\u00earou= phu/sis o)sm\u00ea/,\nkai\\ o)sphranto\\n to\\ pa/thos, d\u00ea=lon e)k t\u00f4=n e)cho/nt\u00f4n kai\\ m\u00ea\\\ne)cho/nt\u00f4n o)sm\u00ea/n], &c. Also p. 443, b. 3-7.\n\nIn the treatise De Sensu et Sensili, there is one passage (ii. p.\n438, b. 24), wherein Aristotle affirms that smell is [Greek:\nkapn\u00f4/d\u00eas a)nathumi/asis, e)k puro/s]; but we also find a subsequent\npassage (v. p. 443, a. 21, seq.) where he cites that same doctrine as\nthe opinion of others, but distinctly refutes it.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 444, a. 10, 22, 24:\n[Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r t\u00ea=s o)sm\u00ea=s du/namis therm\u00ea\\ t\u00ea\\n phu/sin e)sti/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 96: Ibid. p. 443, b. 17; p. 444, a. 6. 15, 28: [Greek:\ni)/dion de\\ t\u00ea=s tou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou phu/se\u00f4/s e)sti to\\ t\u00ea=s o)sm\u00ea=s\nt\u00ea=s toiau/t\u00eas ge/nos dia\\ to\\ plei=ston e)gke/phalon kai\\\nu(gro/taton e)/chein t\u00f4=n z\u00f4/|\u00f4n \u00f4(s kata\\ me/gethos.]\n\nPlato also reckons the pleasures of smell among the pure and\nadmissible pleasures (Philebus, p. 51, E.; Tim\u00e6us, p. 65, A., p. 67,\nA.).]\n\nTaste is a variety of touch, and belongs to the lower or nutritive\nsoul, as a guide to the animal in seeking or avoiding different sorts\nof food. The object of taste is essentially liquid, often strained\nand extracted from dry food by warmth and moisture. The primary\nmanifestation of this sensory phenomenon is the contrast of drinkable\nand undrinkable.[97] The organ of taste, the tongue, is a mean\nbetween dryness and moisture; when either of these is in excess, the\norgan is disordered. Among the varieties of taste, there are two\nfundamental contraries (as in colour, sound, and the objects of the\nother senses except touch) from which the other contrasts are\nderived. These fundamentals in taste are sweet and bitter;\ncorresponding to white and black, acute and grave, in colours and\nsounds. The sense of taste is potentially sweet or bitter; the\ngustable object is what makes it sweet or bitter in actuality.[98]\n\n[Footnote 97: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. x. p. 422, a. 30-33. De Sensu et\nSensili, i. p. 436, b. 15; iv. p. 441, b. 17: [Greek: dia\\ tou=\nx\u00earou= kai\\ ge\u00f4/dous di\u00eathou=sa (\u00ea( phu/sis) kai\\ kinou=sa t\u00f4=|\ntherm\u00f4=| poio/n ti to\\ u(gro\\n paraskeua/zei. kai\\ e)/sti tou=to\nchumo\\s to\\ gigno/menon u(po\\ tou= ei)r\u00eame/nou x\u00earou= pa/thos e)n\nt\u00f4=| u(gr\u00f4=|.]--Ib. b. 24: [Greek: ou) panto\\s x\u00earou= a)lla\\ tou=\ntrophi/mou].]\n\n[Footnote 98: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. x. p. 422, b. 5-16; II. xi. p.\n422, b. 23: [Greek: pa=sa/ te ga\\r ai)/sth\u00easis mia=s e)nanti\u00f4/se\u00f4s\nei)=nai dokei=], &c.]\n\nThe sense of touch, in which man surpasses all other animals, differs\nfrom the other senses by not having any two fundamental contraries\ngiving origin to the rest, but by having various contraries alike\nfundamental. It is thus hardly one sense, but an aggregate of several\nsenses. It appreciates the elementary differences of body _qu\u00e2_\nbody--hot, cold, dry, moist, hard, soft, &c. It is a mean between\neach of these two extremes; being potentially either one of them, and\ncapable of being made to assimilate itself actually to either.[99] In\nthis sense, the tangible object operates when in contact with the\nskin; and, as has been already said, much of the superiority of man\ndepends upon his superior fineness and delicacy of skin.[100] Still\nAristotle remarks that the true organ of touch is not the skin or\nflesh, but something interior to the flesh. This last serves only as\na peculiar medium. The fact that the sensation arises when the object\ntouches our skin, does not prove that the skin is the true organ; for,\nif there existed a thin exterior membrane surrounding our bodies, we\nshould still feel the same sensation. Moreover, the body is not in\nreal contact with our skin, though it appears to be so; there is a\nthin film of air between the two, though we do not perceive it; just\nas, when we touch an object under water, there is a film of water\ninterposed between, as is seen by the wetness of the finger.[101] The\nskin is, therefore, not the true organ of touch, but a medium between\nthe object and the organ; and this sense does in reality agree with\nthe other senses in having a certain medium interposed between object\nand organ. But there is this difference: in touch the medium is close\nto and a part of ourselves; in sight and hearing it is exterior to\nourselves, and may extend to some distance. In sight and hearing the\nobject does not affect us directly; it affects the external medium,\nwhich again affects us. But in touch the object affects, at the same\ntime and by the same influence, both the medium and the interior\norgan; like a spear that, with the same thrust, pierces the warrior's\nshield and wounds the warrior himself.[102] Apparently, therefore,\nthe true organ of touch is something interior, and skin and flesh is\nan interposed medium.[103] But what this interior organ is, Aristotle\ndoes not more particularly declare. He merely states it to be in\nclose and intimate communication with the great central focus and\nprinciple of all sensation--the heart;[104] more closely connected\nwith the heart (he appears to think) than any of the other organs of\nsense, though all of them are so connected more or less closely.\n\n[Footnote 99: Ibid. xi. p. 422, b. 17 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Aristot. Histor. Animal. I. xv. p. 494, b. 17. Man is\n[Greek: leptodermo/tatos t\u00f4=n z\u00f4=|\u00f4n] (Aristot. De Partib. Animal.\nii. p. 657, b. 2), and has the tongue also looser and softer than any\nof them, most fit for variety of touch (p. 660, a. 20) as well as for\narticulate speech.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. xi. p. 423, a. 25-32.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Ibid. p. 423, b. 12-17: [Greek: diaphe/rei to\\ a(pto\\n\nt\u00f4=n o(rat\u00f4=n kai\\ t\u00f4=n psoph\u00eatik\u00f4=n o(/ti e)kei/n\u00f4n me\\n\nai)sthano/metha t\u00f4=| to\\ metaxu\\ poiei=n ti \u00ea(ma=s, t\u00f4=n de\\ a(pt\u00f4=n\nou)ch u(po\\ tou= metaxu\\ a)ll' a(/ma t\u00f4=| metaxu/, \u00f4(/sper o( di'\na)spi/dos pl\u00eagei/s; ou) ga\\r \u00ea( a)spi\\s pl\u00eagei=sa e)pa/taxen, a)ll'\na(/m' a)/mph\u00f4 sune/b\u00ea pl\u00eag\u00ea=nai.]\n\nThis analogy of the warrior pierced at the same time with his shield\nillustrates Aristotle's view of the eighth Category--_Habere_: of\nwhich he gives [Greek: \u00f4(/plistai] as the example. He considers a\nman's clothes and defensive weapons as standing in a peculiar\nrelation to him like a personal appurtenance and almost as a part of\nhimself. It is under this point of view that he erects _Habere_ into\na distinct Category.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. xi. p. 423, b. 22-26: [Greek:\n\u00ea(=| kai\\ d\u00ea=lon o(/ti e)nto\\s to\\ tou= a(ptou= ai)sth\u00eatiko/n.--to\\\nmetaxu\\ tou= a(ptikou= \u00ea( sa/rx.]]\n\n[Footnote 104: Aristot. De Partibus Animal. II. x. p. 656, a. 30; De\nVit\u00e2 et Morte, iii. p. 469, a. 12: De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a.\n23; De Sensu et Sensili, ii. p. 439, a. 2.]\n\nHaving gone through the five senses _seriatim_, Aristotle offers\nvarious reasons to prove that there neither are, nor can be, more\nthan five; and then discusses some complicated phenomena of sense. We\nperceive _that_ we see or hear;[105] do we perceive this by sight or\nby hearing? and if not, by what other faculty?[106] Aristotle replies\nby saying that the act of sense is one and the same, but that it may\nbe looked at in two different points of view. We see a coloured\nobject; we hear a sound: in each case the act of sense is one; the\nenergy or actuality of the _visum_, and _videns_, of the _sonans_ and\n_audiens_, is implicated and indivisible. But the potentiality of the\none is quite distinct from the potentiality of the other, and may be\nconsidered as well as named apart.[107] When we say: I perceive\n_that_ I see--we look at the same act of vision from the side of the\n_videns_; the _visum_ being put out of sight as the unnoticed\ncorrelate. This is a mental fact distinct from, though following\nupon, the act of vision itself. Aristotle refers it rather to that\ngeneral sentient soul or faculty, of which the five senses are\npartial and separate manifestations, than to the sense of vision\nitself.[108] He thus considers what would now be termed\n_consciousness of a sensation_, as being merely the subjective view\nof the sensation, distinguished by abstraction from the objective.\n\n[Footnote 105: In modern psychology the language would be--\"We _are\nconscious_ that we see or hear.\" But Sir William Hamilton has\nremarked that the word Consciousness has no equivalent usually or\nfamiliarly employed in the Greek psychology.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. ii. p. 425, b. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Ibid. b. 26; p. 426, a. 16-19.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Aristot. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 12-17; De\nAnim\u00e2, III. ii. with Torstrick's note, p. 166, and the exposition of\nAlexander of Aphrodisias therein cited. These two passages of\nAristotle are to a certain extent different yet not contradictory,\nthough Torstrick supposes them to be so.]\n\nIt is the same general sentient faculty, though diversified and\nlogically distinguishable in its manifestations, that enables us to\nconceive many sensations as combined into one; and to compare or\ndiscriminate sensations belonging to different senses.[109]\n\n[Footnote 109: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8-20.]\n\nWhite and sweet are perceived by two distinct senses, and at two\ndistinct moments of time; but they must be compared and discriminated\nby one and the same sentient or cogitant act, and at one moment of\ntime.[110] This mental act, though in itself indivisible, has yet two\naspects, and is thus in a certain sense divisible; just as a point\ntaken in the middle of a line, while indivisible in itself, may be\nlooked upon as the closing terminus of one-half of the line, and as\nthe commencing terminus of the other half. The comparison of two\ndifferent sensations or thoughts is thus one and the same mental\nfact, with two distinguishable aspects.[111]\n\n[Footnote 110: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. ii. p. 426, b. 17-29: [Greek:\nou)/te d\u00ea\\ kech\u00f4risme/nois e)nde/chetai kri/nein o(/ti e(/teron to\\\ngluku\\ tou= leukou=, a)lla\\ dei= e(ni/ tini a)/mph\u00f4 d\u00ea=la\nei)=nai.--dei= de\\ to\\ e(\\n le/gein o(/ti e(/teron; e(/teron ga\\r\nto\\ gluku\\ tou= leukou=.--a)ch\u00f4/riston kai\\ e)n a)ch\u00f4ri/st\u00f4|\nchro/n\u00f4|.] III. vii. p. 431, a. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. ii. p. 427, a. 10-14: [Greek:\n\u00f4(/sper \u00ea(\\n kalou=si/ tines stigm\u00ea/n, \u00ea(=| mia\\ kai\\ \u00ea(=| du/o,\ntau/t\u00ea| kai\\ a)diai/retos kai\\ diaire/t\u00ea; \u00ea(=| me\\n ou)=n\na)diai/reton, e(\\n to\\ kri=no/n e)sti kai\\ a(/ma, \u00ea(=| de\\ diai/reton\nu(pa/rchei, ou)ch e(/n; di\\s ga\\r t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| chr\u00ea=tai s\u00eamei/\u00f4|\na(/ma.]\n\nIt is to be remarked that, in explaining this mental process of\ncomparison, Aristotle three several times applies it both to [Greek:\nai)/sth\u00easis] and to [Greek: no/\u00easis], p. 426, b. 22-31; p. 427, a.\n9.]\n\nAristotle devotes a chapter to the enquiry: whether we can perceive\ntwo distinct sensations at once (_i.e._ in one and the same moment of\ntime). He decides that we cannot; that the sentient soul or faculty\nis one and indivisible, and can only have a single energy or\nactuality at once.[112] If two causes of sensation are operative\ntogether, and one of them be much superior in force, it will render\nus insensible to the other. He remarks that, when we are pre-occupied\nwith loud noise, or with deep reflection, or with intense fright,\nvisual objects will often pass by us unseen and unnoticed.[113] Often\nthe two simultaneous sensations will combine or blend into one\ncompound, so that we shall feel neither of them purely or\nseparately.[114] One single act of sensational energy may however\nhave a double aspect; as the same individual object may be at once\nwhite and sweet, though its whiteness and its sweetness are logically\nseparable.[115]\n\n[Footnote 112: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 447, a. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Ibid. a. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Ibid. b. 12-20.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Ibid. p. 449, a. 14.]\n\nTo the sentient soul, even in its lowest manifestations, belong the\nfeelings of pleasure and pain, appetite and aversion.[116] The\nmovements connected with these feelings, as with all sensation, begin\nand close with the central organ--the heart.[117] Upon these are\nconsequent the various passions and emotions; yet not without certain\nfaculties of memory and phantasy accompanying or following the facts\nof sense.\n\n[Footnote 116: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. iii. p. 414, b. 3-16; III. vii.\np. 431, a. 9; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 454, b. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Aristot. De Partibus Animalium, III. iv. p. 666, a.\n12.]\n\nAristotle proceeds by gradual steps upward from the Sentient soul to\nthe No\u00ebtic (Cogitant or Intelligent) soul, called in its highest\nperfection No\u00fbs. While refuting the doctrine of Empedokles,\nDemokritus, and other philosophers, who considered cogitation or\nintelligence to be the same as sensible perception, and while\ninsisting upon the distinctness of the two as mental phenomena, he\nrecognizes the important point of analogy between them, that both of\nthem include judgment and comparison;[118] and he describes an\nintermediate stage called Phantasy or Imagination, forming the\ntransition from the lower of the two to the higher. We have already\nobserved that, in the Aristotelian psychology, the higher functions\nof the soul presuppose and are built upon the lower as their\nfoundation, though the lower do not necessarily involve the higher.\nWithout nutrition, there is no sense; without sense, there is no\nphantasy; without phantasy, there is no cogitation or\nintelligence.[119] The higher psychical phenomena are not identical\nwith the lower, yet neither are they independent thereof; they\npresuppose the lower as a part of their conditions. Here, and indeed\nvery generally elsewhere, Aristotle has been careful to avoid the\nfallacy of confounding or identifying the conditions of a phenomenon\nwith the phenomenon itself.[120]\n\n[Footnote 118: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 427, a. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Ibid. b. 14: [Greek: phantasi/a ga\\r e(/teron kai\\\nai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s kai\\ dianoi/as].--Ib. vii. p. 431, a. 16: [Greek:\nou)de/pote noei= a)/neu phanta/smatos \u00ea( psuch\u00ea/].--De Memori\u00e2 et\nReminiscent. i. p. 449, b. 31: [Greek: noei=n ou)k e)/stin a)/neu\nphanta/smatos.]]\n\n[Footnote 120: Mill's System of Logic, Book V. ch. 3, s. 8.]\n\nHe proceeds to explain Phantasy or the Phantastic department of the\nsoul, with the phantasms that belong to it. It is not sensible\nperception, nor belief, nor opinion, nor knowledge, nor cogitation.\nOur dreams, though affections of the sentient soul, are really\nphantasms in our sleep, when there is no visual sensation; even when\nawake, we have a phantasm of the sun, as of a disk one foot in\ndiameter, though we _believe_ the sun to be larger than the\nearth.[121] Many of the lower animals have sensible perception\nwithout any phantasy: even those among them that have phantasy have\nno opinion; for opinion implies faith, persuasion, and some rational\nexplanation of that persuasion, to none of which does any animal\nattain.[122] Phantasy is an internal movement of the animated being\n(body and soul in one); belonging to the sentient soul, not to the\ncogitant or intelligent; not identical with the movement of sense,\nbut continued from or produced by that, and by that alone;\naccordingly, similar to the movement of sense and relating to the\nsame matters.[123] Since our sensible perceptions may be either true\nor false, so also may be our phantasms. And, since these phantasms\nare not only like our sensations, but remain standing in the soul\nlong after the objects of sense have passed away, they are to a great\ndegree the determining causes both of action and emotion. They are\nsuch habitually to animals, who are destitute of No\u00fbs; and often even\nto intelligent men, if the No\u00fbs be overclouded by disease or\ndrunkenness.[124]\n\n[Footnote 121: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 428, a. 5, b. 3; De\nSomno et Vig. ii. p. 456, a. 24: [Greek: kinou=ntai d' e)/nioi\nkatheu/dontes kai\\ poiou=si polla\\ e)gr\u00eagorika/, ou) me/ntoi a)/neu\nphanta/smatos kai\\ ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4/s tinos; to\\ ga\\r e)nu/pnio/n e)stin\nai)/sth\u00eama tro/pon tina/.]--Ibid. i. p. 454, b. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 428, a. 10, 22, 25.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 10-15; De Somniis, i. p. 459, a. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 428, b. 16: [Greek:\nkai\\ polla\\ kat' au)t\u00ea\\n] (_i.e._ [Greek: kata\\ t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an)\nkai\\ poiei=n kai\\ pa/schein to\\ e)/chon.]--Ibid. p. 429, a. 4:\n[Greek: kai\\ dia\\ to\\ e)mme/nein kai\\ o(moi/as ei)=nai (ta\\s\nphantasi/as) tai=s ai)sth\u00ea/sesi, polla\\ kat' au)ta\\s pra/ttei ta\\\nz\u00f4=|a], &c.]\n\nIn the chapter now before us, Aristotle is careful to discriminate\nphantasy from several other psychological phenomena wherewith it is\nliable to be confounded. But we remark with some surprise, that\nneither here, nor in any other part of his general Psychology, does\nhe offer any exposition of Memory, the phenomenon more nearly\napproaching than any other to phantasy. He supplied the deficiency\nafterwards by a short but valuable tract on Memory and Reminiscence;\nwherein he recognizes, and refers to, the more general work on\nPsychology. Memory bears on the past, as distinguished both from the\npresent and future. Memory and phantasy are in some cases so alike,\nthat we cannot distinguish clearly whether what is in our minds is a\nremembrance or a phantasm.[125] Both of them belong to the same\npsychological department--to the central sentient principle, and not\nto the cogitant or intelligent No\u00fbs. Memory as well as phantasy are\ncontinuations, remnants, or secondary consequences, of the primary\nmovements of sense; what in itself is a phantasm, may become an\nobject of remembrance directly and _per se_; matters of cogitation,\nbeing included or implicated in phantasms, may also become objects of\nremembrance, indirectly and by way of accompaniment.[126] We can\nremember our prior acts of cogitation and demonstration; we can\nremember that, a month ago, we demonstrated the three angles of a\ntriangle to be equal to two right angles; but, as the original\ndemonstration could not be carried on without our having before our\nmental vision the phantasm of some particular triangle, so neither\ncan the remembrance of the demonstration be made present to us\nwithout a similar phantasm.[127] In acts of remembrance we have a\nconception of past time, and we recognize what is now present to our\nminds as a copy of what has been formerly present to us, either as\nperception of sense or as actual cognition;[128] while in phantasms\nthere is no conception of past time, nor any similar recognition, nor\nany necessary reference to our own past mental states; the phantasm\nis looked at by itself, and not as a copy. This is the main point of\ndistinction between phantasm and remembrance:[129] what is remembered\nis a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of the past. Some\nof the superior animals possess both memory and phantasy. But other\nanimals have neither; their sensations disappear, they have no\nendurance; while endurance is the basis both of phantasy and\nmemory.[130]\n\n[Footnote 125: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 451, a. 5; p. 449,\na. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Ibid. p. 450, a. 22: [Greek: ti/nos me\\n ou)=n t\u00f4=n\nt\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s e)sti\\n \u00ea( mn\u00ea/m\u00ea, phanero\\n o(/ti ou(=per kai\\ \u00ea(\nphantasi/a; kai\\ e)/sti mn\u00eamoneuta\\ kath' au(ta\\ me\\n o(/sa e)sti\\\nphantasta/, kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s d' o(/sa m\u00ea\\ a)/neu phantasi/as.]]\n\n[Footnote 127: Aristot. De Memor. et. Rem. i. p. 449, b. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Ibid. b. 22: [Greek: a)ei\\ ga\\r o(/tan e)nerg\u00ea=| kata\\\nto\\ mn\u00eamoneu/ein, ou(/t\u00f4s e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| le/gei, o(/ti pro/teron\ntou=to \u00ea)/kousen \u00ea)\\ \u00ea)/|stheto \u00ea)\\ e)no/\u00easen.]--Ibid. p. 452, b.\n28.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 450, a. 30; p. 451, a. 15: [Greek: to\\\nmn\u00eamoneu/ein, \u00f4(s ei)ko/nos ou(= pha/ntasma, e(/xis]. Themistius\n**ad Aristot. De Memori\u00e2, p. 240, ed. Spengel.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Aristot. Analyt. Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 36: [Greek:\nmon\u00ea\\ tou= ai)sth\u00ea/matos]. It may be remarked that in the Topica\nAristotle urges a dialectical objection against this or a similar\ndoctrine (Topic. IV. iv. v. p. 125, b. 6-19), and against his own\ndefinition cited in the preceding note, where he calls [Greek:\nmn\u00ea/m\u00ea] an [Greek: e(/xis]. Compare the first chapter of the\nMetaphysica.]\n\nBut though some animals have memory, no animal except man has\nReminiscence. Herein man surpasses them all.[131] Aristotle draws a\nmarked distinction between the two; between the (memorial) retentive\nand reviving functions, when working unconsciously and instinctively,\nand the same two functions, when stimulated and guided by a\ndeliberate purpose of our own--which he calls reminiscence. This last\nis like a syllogism or course of ratiocinative inference, performable\nonly by minds capable of taking counsel and calculating. He considers\nmemory as a movement proceeding from the centre and organs of sense\nto the soul, and stamping an impression thereupon; while reminiscence\nis a counter-movement proceeding from the soul to the organs of\nsense.[132] In the process of reminiscence, movements of the soul and\nmovements of the body are conjoined,[133] more or less perturbing and\ndurable according to the temperament of the individual. The process\nis intentional and deliberate, instigated by the desire to search for\nand recover some lost phantasm or cognition; its success depends upon\nthe fact that there exists by nature a regular observable order of\nsequence among the movements of the system, physical as well as\npsychical. The consequents follow their antecedents either\nuniversally, or at least according to customary rules, in the\nmajority of cases.[134]\n\n[Footnote 131: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 8. He draws\nthe same distinction in Hist. Animal. I. i. p. 488, b. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, I. iv. p. 408, b. 17. De Memor. et\nRemin. i. p. 450, a. 30; ii. p. 453, a. 10: [Greek: to\\\na)namimn\u00ea/skesthai/ e)stin oi(=on sullo/gismo/s tis.]]\n\n[Footnote 133: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 14-23.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 451, b. 10: [Greek:\nsumbai/nousi d' ai( a)namn\u00ea/seis, e)peid\u00ea\\ pe/phuken \u00ea( ki/n\u00easis\n\u00ea(/de gene/sthai meta\\ t\u00ea/nde.]]\n\nThe consequent is either (1) like its antecedent, wholly or\npartially; or (2) contrary to it; or (3) has been actually felt in\njuxtaposition with it. In reminiscence, we endeavour to regain the\nforgotten consequent by hunting out some antecedent whereupon it is\nlikely to follow; taking our start either from the present moment or\nfrom some other known point.[135] We run over many phantasms until we\nhit upon the true antecedent; the possibility of reminiscence depends\nupon our having this within our mental reach, among our accessible\nstock of ideas: if such be not the case, reminiscence is\nimpracticable, and we must learn over again.[136] We are most likely\nto succeed, if we get upon the track or order wherein events actually\noccurred; thus, if we are trying to recollect a forgotten verse or\nsentence, we begin to repeat it from the first word; the same\nantecedent may indeed call up different consequents at different\ntimes, but it will generally call up what has habitually followed it\nbefore.[137]\n\n[Footnote 135: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dio\\ kai\\ to\\ e)phex\u00ea=s\nth\u00eareu/omen no\u00ea/santes a)po\\ tou= nu=n \u00ea)\\ a)/llou tino/s, kai\\ a)ph'\no(moi/ou \u00ea)\\ e)nanti/ou \u00ea)\\ tou= su/neggus.]\n\nAbout the associative property of Contraries see also De Somno et\nVigil. i. p. 453, b. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 452, a. 7: [Greek:\npolla/kis d' \u00ea)/d\u00ea me\\n a)dunatei= a)namn\u00easth\u00ea=nai, z\u00eatei=n de\\\ndu/natai kai\\ eu(ri/skei. tou=to de\\ gi/netai kinou=nti polla/, e(/\u00f4s\na)\\n toiau/t\u00ean kin\u00ea/s\u00ea| ki/n\u00easin, \u00ea(=| a)kolouth\u00ea/sei to\\ pra=gma.\nto\\ ga\\r memn\u00ea=sthai/ e)sti to\\ e)nei=nai duna/mei **t\u00ea\\n\nkinou=san; tou=to de/, \u00f4(st' e)x au)tou= kai\\ \u00f4(=n e)/chei kin\u00ea/se\u00f4n\nkin\u00eath\u00ea=nai, \u00f4(/sper ei)/r\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Footnote 137: Ibid. ii. p. 452, a. 2.]\n\nThe movements of Memory and of Reminiscence are partly corporeal and\npartly psychical, just as those of Sensation and Phantasy are. We\ncompare in our remembrance greater and less (either in time or in\nexternal magnitudes) through similar internal movements differing\nfrom each other in the same, proportion, but all on a miniature\nscale.[138] These internal movements often lead to great discomfort,\nwhen a person makes fruitless efforts to recover the forgotten\nphantasm that he desires; especially with excitable men, who are much\ndisturbed by their own phantasms. They cannot stop the movement once\nbegun; and, when their sensitive system is soft and flexible, they\nfind that they have unwittingly provoked the bodily movements\nbelonging to anger or fear, or some other painful emotion.[139] These\nmovements, when once provoked, continue in spite of the opposition of\nthe person that experiences them. He brings upon himself the reality\nof the painful emotion; just as we find that, after we have very\nfrequently pronounced a sentence or sung a song, the internal\nmovements left in our memories are sometimes so strong and so\npersistent, that they act on our vocal organs even without any\nvolition on our parts, and determine us to sing the song or pronounce\nthe sentence over again in reality.[140] Slow men are usually good in\nmemory, quick men and apt learners are good in reminiscence: the two\nare seldom found together.[141]\n\n[Footnote 138: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r e)n au)t\u00ea=| ta\\\no(/moia sch\u00ea/mata kai\\ kin\u00ea/seis.--pa/nta ga\\r ta\\ e)nto\\s e)la/tt\u00f4,\n\u00f4(/sper a)na/logon kai\\ ta\\ e)kto/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 139: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 22: [Greek:\no( a)namimn\u00easko/menos kai\\ th\u00eareu/\u00f4n s\u00f4matiko/n ti kinei=, e)n \u00f4(=|\nto\\ pa/thos.]]\n\n[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 453, a. 28: [Greek: e)/oike to\\ pa/thos toi=s\no)no/masi kai\\ me/lesi kai\\ lo/gois, o(/tan dia\\ sto/matos ge/n\u00eatai/\nti au)t\u00f4=n spho/dra; pausame/nois ga\\r kai\\ ou) boulome/nois\ne)pe/rchetai pa/lin a)/|dein \u00ea)\\ le/gein.]]\n\n[Footnote 141: Ibid. i. p. 449, b. 7.]\n\nIn this account of Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle displays an\nacute and penetrating intelligence of the great principles of the\nAssociation of Ideas. But these principles are operative not less in\nmemory than in reminiscence: and the exaggerated prominence that he\nhas given to the distinction between the two (determined apparently\nby a wish to keep the procedure of man apart from that of animals)\ntends to perplex his description of the associative process. At the\nsame time, his manner of characterizing phantasy, memory, and\nreminiscence, as being all of them at once corporeal and\npsychical--involving, like sensation, internal movements of the body\nas well as phases of the consciousness, sometimes even passing into\nexternal movements of the bodily organs without our volition--all\nthis is a striking example of psychological observation, as well as\nof consistency in following out the doctrine laid down at the\ncommencement of his chief treatise: Soul as the Form implicated with\nBody as the Matter,--the two being an integral concrete separable\nonly by abstraction.\n\nWe come now to the highest and (in Aristotle's opinion) most\nhonourable portion of the soul--the No\u00fbs or no\u00ebtic faculty, whereby\nwe cogitate, understand, reason, and believe or opine under the\ninfluence of reason.[142] According to the uniform scheme of\nAristotle, this highest portion of the soul, though distinct from all\nthe lower, presupposes them all. As the sentient soul presupposes the\nnutrient, so also the cogitant soul presupposes the nutrient, the\nsentient, the phantastic, the memorial, and the reminiscent.\nAristotle carefully distinguishes the sentient department of the soul\nfrom the cogitant, and refutes more than once the doctrine of those\nphilosophers that identified the two. But he is equally careful to\nmaintain the correlation between them, and to exhibit the sentient\nfaculty not only as involving in itself a certain measure of\nintellectual discrimination, but also as an essential and fundamental\ncondition to the agency of the cogitant, as a portion of the human\nsoul. We have already gone through the three successive\nstages--phantastic, memorial, reminiscent--whereby the interval\nbetween sensation and cogitation is bridged over. Each of the three\nis directly dependent on past sensation, either as reproduction or as\ncorollary; each of them is an indispensable condition of man's\ncogitation; moreover, in the highest of the three, we have actually\nslid unperceived into the cogitant phase of the human soul; for\nAristotle declares the reminiscent process to be of the nature of a\nsyllogism.[143] That the soul cannot cogitate or reason without\nphantasms--that phantasms are required for the actual working of the\nhuman No\u00fbs--he affirms in the most explicit manner.[144]\n\n[Footnote 142: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iv. p. 429, a. 10: [Greek:\nperi\\ de\\ tou= mori/ou tou= t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s \u00f4(=| gin\u00f4/skei te \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea\\ kai\\ phronei=.] He himself defines what he means by [Greek:\nnou=s] a few lines lower; and he is careful to specify it as [Greek:\no( t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s nou=s--o( a)/ra kalou/menos t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s nou=s\n(le/g\u00f4 de\\ nou=n, \u00f4(=| dianoei=tai kai\\ u(polamba/nei \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea/)]--a. 22.\n\nIn the preceding chapter he expressly discriminates [Greek: no/\u00easis]\nfrom [Greek: u(po/l\u00eapsis]. This last word [Greek: u(po/l\u00eapsis] is the\nmost general term for _believing_ or _opining_ upon reasons good or\nbad; the varieties under it are [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, do/xa, phro/n\u00easis\nkai\\ ta)nanti/a tou/t\u00f4n] (p. 427, b. 16-27).]\n\n[Footnote 143: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453 a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Ibid. p. 449, b. 31-p. 450, a. 12: [Greek: noei=n ou)k\ne)/stin a)/neu phanta/smatos--\u00ea( de\\ mn\u00ea/m\u00ea kai\\ \u00ea( t\u00f4=n no\u00eat\u00f4=n ou)k\na)/neu phanta/smato/s e)stin.]--De Anim\u00e2, III. vii. p. 431, a. 16.]\n\nThe doctrine of Aristotle respecting No\u00fbs has been a puzzle, even\nfrom the time of his first commentators. Partly from the obscurity\ninherent in the subject, partly from the defective condition of his\ntext as it now stands, his meaning cannot be always clearly\ncomprehended, nor does it seem that the different passages can be\ncompletely reconciled.\n\nAnaxagoras, Demokritus, and other philosophers, appear to have spoken\nof No\u00fbs or Intellect in a large and vague sense, as equivalent to\nSoul generally. Plato seems to have been the first to narrow and\nspecialize the meaning; distinguishing pointedly (as we have stated\nabove) the rational or encephalic soul, in the cranium, with its\ncircular rotations, from the two lower souls, **thoracic and\nabdominal. Aristotle agreed with him in this distinction (either of\nseparate souls or of separate functions in the same soul); but he\nattenuated and divested it of all connexion with separate corporeal\nlodgment, or with peculiar movements of any kind. In his psychology,\nthe brain no longer appears as the seat of intelligence, but simply\nas a cold, moist, and senseless organ, destined to countervail the\nexcessive heat of the heart: which last is the great centre of animal\nheat, of life, and of the sentient soul. Aristotle declares No\u00fbs not\nto be connected with, or dependent on, any given bodily organs or\nmovements appropriated to itself: this is one main circumstance\ndistinguishing it from the nutrient soul as well as from the sentient\nsoul, each of which rests indispensably upon corporeal organs and\nagencies of its own.\n\nIt will be remembered that we stated the relation of Soul to Body (in\nAristotle's view) as that of Form to Matter; the two together\nconstituting a concrete individual, numerically one; also that Form\nand Matter, each being essentially relative to the other, admitted of\ngradations, higher and lower; _e.g._ a massive cube of marble is\nalready _materia formata_, but it is still purely _materia_, relative\nto the statue that may be obtained from it. Now, the grand region of\nForm is the Celestial Body--the vast, deep, perceivable, circular\nmass circumscribing the Kosmos, and enclosing, in and around its\ncentre, Earth with the other three elements, tenanted by substances\ngenerated and perishable. This Celestial Body is the abode of\ndivinity, including many divine beings who take part in its eternal\nrotations, viz. the Sun, Moon, Stars, &c., and other Gods. Now, every\nsoul, or every form that animates the matter of a living being,\nderives its vitalizing influence from this celestial region. All\nseeds of life include within them a spiritual or gaseous heat, more\ndivine than the four elements, proceeding from the sun, and in nature\nakin to the element of the stars. Such solar or celestial heat\ndiffers generically from the heat of fire. It is the only source from\nwhence the principle of life, with the animal heat that accompanies\nit, can be obtained. Soul, in all its varieties, proceeds from\nhence.[145]\n\n[Footnote 145: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. iii. p. 736, b. 29:\n[Greek: pa/s\u00eas me\\n ou)=n psuch\u00ea=s du/namis e(te/rou s\u00f4/matos e)/oike\nkekoin\u00f4n\u00eake/nai kai\\ theiote/rou t\u00f4=n kaloume/n\u00f4n stoichei/\u00f4n; \u00f4(s\nde\\ diaphe/rousi timio/t\u00eati ai( psuchai\\ kai\\ a)timi/a| a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n,\nou(/t\u00f4 kai\\ \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea diaphe/rei phu/sis; pa/nt\u00f4n me\\n ga\\r e)n\nt\u00f4=| spe/rmati e)nupa/rchei, o(/per poiei= go/nima ei)=nai ta\\\nspe/rmata, to\\ kalou/menon thermo/n.]]\n\n\nBut though all varieties of Soul emanate from the same celestial\nsource, they possess the divine element in very different degrees,\nand are very unequal in comparative worth and dignity. The lowest\nvariety, or nutritive soul--the only one possessed by plants, among\nwhich there is no separation of sex[146]--is contained potentially in\nthe seed, and is thus transmitted when that seed is matured into a\nnew individual. In animals, which possess it along with the sensitive\nsoul and among which the sexes are separated, it is also contained\npotentially in the generative system of the female separately; and\nthe first commencement of life in the future animal is thus a purely\nvegetable life.[147] The sensitive soul, the characteristic of the\ncomplete animal, cannot be superadded except by copulation and the\nmale semen. The female, being comparatively impotent and having less\nanimal heat, furnishes only the matter of the future offspring; form,\nor the moving, fecundating, cause, is supplied by the male. Through\nthe two together the new individual animal is completed, having not\nmerely the nutritive soul, but also the sentient soul along with\nit.[148]\n\n[Footnote 146: Ibid. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. iii. p. 736, b. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Ibid. I. ii. p. 716, a. 4-17; xix. p. 726, b. 33; xx.\np. 728, a. 17; xxi. p. 729, b. 6-27.]\n\nBoth the nutritive and the sentient souls have, each of them\nrespectively, a special bodily agency and movement belonging to them.\nBut the No\u00fbs, or the no\u00ebtic soul, has no partnership with any similar\nbodily agency. There is no special corporeal potentiality (to speak\nin Aristotelian language) which it is destined to actualize. It\nenters from without, and emanates from a still more exalted influence\nof that divine celestial substance from which all psychical or\nvitalizing heat proceeds.[149] It is superinduced upon the nutritive\nand sentient souls, and introduces itself at an age of the individual\nlater than both of them. Having no part of the bodily organism\nspecially appropriated to it, this variety of soul--what is called\nthe No\u00fbs--stands distinguished from the other two in being perfectly\nseparable from the body;[150] that is, separable from the organized\nbody which it is the essential function of the two lower souls to\nactualize, and with which both of them are bound up. The No\u00fbs is not\nseparable from the body altogether; it belongs essentially to the\ndivine celestial body, and to those luminaries and other divine\nbeings by whom portions of it are tenanted. Theorizing\ncontemplation--the perfect, unclouded, unembarrassed, exercise of\nthe theoretical No\u00fbs--is the single mental activity of these\ndivinities; contemplation of the formal regularity of the Kosmos,\nwith its eternal and faultless rotations, and with their own\nperfection as participating therein. The celestial body is the body\nwhereto No\u00fbs, or the no\u00ebtic soul, properly belongs;[151] quite apart\nfrom the two other souls, sentient and nutritive, upon which it is\ngrafted in the animal body; and apart also from all the necessities\nof human action, preceded by balanced motives and deliberate\nchoice.[152]\n\n[Footnote 149: Ibid. II. iii. p. 736, b. 27: [Greek: lei/petai de\\\nto\\n nou=n mo/non thu/rathen e)peisie/nai, kai\\ thei=on ei)=nai\nmo/non; ou)the\\n ga\\r au)tou= t\u00ea=| e)nergei/a| koin\u00f4nei= s\u00f4matik\u00ea\\\ne)ne/rgeia.] The words [Greek: thei=on ei)=nai _mo/non_] must not be\nconstrued strictly, for in the next following passage he proceeds to\ndeclare that _all_ [Greek: psuch\u00ea/, psuchik\u00ea\\ du/namis] or [Greek:\na)rch\u00ea/], partakes of the divine element, and that in this respect\nthere is only a difference of degree between one [Greek: psuch\u00ea\\] and\nanother.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Ibid. p. 737, a. 10: [Greek: o( kalou/menos nou=s]. De\nAnim\u00e2, II. ii. p. 413, b. 25; iii. p. 415, a. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Respecting [Greek: to\\ a)/n\u00f4 s\u00f4=ma], see the copious\ncitations in Trendelenburg's note ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. vii.;\nComm. p. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. viii. p. 1178, b. 20:\n[Greek: t\u00f4=| d\u00ea\\ z\u00f4=nti tou= pra/ttein a)ph\u00ea|r\u00eame/n\u00f4|, e)/ti de\\\nma=llon tou= poiei=n, ti/ lei/petai pl\u00ea\\n the\u00f4ri/as? \u00f4(/ste \u00ea( tou=\ntheou= e)ne/rgeia, makario/t\u00eati diaphe/rousa, the\u00f4r\u00eatik\u00ea\\ a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea.]--See also Metaphysic. [Greek: L]. v. p. 1074, b. 26-35.]\n\nFrom this celestial body, a certain influence of No\u00fbs is transferred\nto some of the mortal inhabitants of earth, water, and air. Thus a\nthird or no\u00ebtic soul--or rather a third no\u00ebtic function--is added to\nthe two existing functions, sensitive and nutrient, of the animal\nsoul, which acquires thereby an improved aptitude for, and\ncorrelation with, the Formal and Universal. We have already stated\nthat the sensitive soul possesses this aptitude to a certain extent;\nit receives the impression of sensible forms, without being impressed\nby the matter accompanying them. The no\u00ebtic function strengthens and\nsharpens the aptitude; the soul comes into correlation with those\ncogitable or intellective forms which are involved in the sensible\nforms;[153] it rises from the lower generalities of the Second\nPhilosophy, to the higher generalities of the First Philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 153: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. viii. p. 432, a. 6: [Greek:\ne)n toi=s ei)/desi toi=s ai)sth\u00eatoi=s ta\\ no\u00eata/ e)stin.]]\n\nAs the sentient or percipient soul is the form or correlate of all\nperceivables, and thus identified with them in nature, all of them\nhaving existence only in relation to it,--so the cogitant or\nintellective soul is the form or correlate of all cogitables, all of\nwhich exist relatively to it, and only relatively.[154] It is in fact\nthe highest of all forms--the Form of Forms; the mental or subjective\naspect of all formal reality.\n\n[Footnote 154: Ibid. p. 432, b. 2: [Greek: o( nou=s ei)/dos ei)d\u00f4=n\nkai\\ \u00ea( ai)/sth\u00easis ei)=dos ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n.]]\n\nSuch at least is the tendency and purpose of that no\u00ebtic influence\nwhich the celestial substance imparts to the human soul; but it is\nrealized only to a very small degree. In its characteristic\ntheorizing efficacy, the godlike No\u00fbs counts for a small fraction of\nthe whole soul, though superexcellent in quality.[155] There are but\nfew men in whom it is tolerably developed, and even in those few it\nis countervailed by many other agencies.[156] The no\u00ebtic function in\nmen and animals exists only in companionship with the two other\npsychical functions. It is subservient to the limits and conditions\nthat they impose, as well as to the necessities of individual and\nsocial action; to all that is required for \"acting like a man,\"\naccording to the Aristotelian phrase. Man's nature is complex, and\nnot self-sufficing for a life of theorizing contemplation, such as\nthat wherein the celestial inmates pass their immortality of\nhappiness.[157]\n\n[Footnote 155: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. vii. p. 1177, b. 34: [Greek:\nei) ga\\r kai\\ t\u00f4=| o)/gk\u00f4| mikro/n e)sti, duna/mei kai\\ timio/t\u00eati\npolu\\ ma=llon pa/nt\u00f4n u(pere/chei.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 450, a. **18.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. vii. p. 1177, b. 26: [Greek:\no( de\\ toiou=tos a)\\n ei)/\u00ea bi/os krei/tt\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ kat'\na)/nthr\u00f4pon].--viii. p. 1178, b. 6: [Greek: de\u00ea/setai ou)=n toiou/t\u00f4n\npro\\s to\\ a)nthr\u00f4peu/esthai.]--ix. p. 1178, b. 33: [Greek: ou)k\nau)ta/rk\u00eas \u00ea( phu/sis pro\\s to\\ the\u00f4rei=n]. Compare similar\nsentiments in Aristot. Metaphys. A. ii. p. 983, a. 1.]\n\nWe have thus to study the no\u00ebtic function according to the\nmanifestations of it that we find in man, and to a certain extent in\nsome other privileged animals. Bees, for example, partake in the\ndivine gift to a certain extent; being distinguished in this respect\nfrom their analogues--wasps and hornets.[158]\n\n[Footnote 158: Aristot. De Gen. Animal. III. x. p. 760, a. 4: [Greek:\no)/ntos de\\ _perittou= tou=_ ge/nous kai\\ i)di/ou tou= t\u00f4=n\nmelitt\u00f4=n].--p. 761, a. 4: [Greek: ou) ga\\r e)/chousin] (wasps and\nhornets) [Greek: ou)de\\n thei=on, \u00f4(/sper to\\ ge/nos t\u00f4=n melitt\u00f4=n.]\nIt is remarkable that [Greek: peritto/s], the epithet here applied by\nAristotle to bees, is the epithet that he also applies to men of\ntheoretical and speculative activity, as contrasted with men prudent\nand judicious in action (see Metaphys. A. ii. p. 983, a. 2; also\nEthic. Nikom. VI. vii. p. 1141, b. 6). Elsewhere he calls bees\n[Greek: phro/nima] (Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 22). See a good note\nof Torstrick (on Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. p. 428, a. 10), p. 172 of\nhis Commentary. Aristotle may possibly have been one among the\nphilosophers that Virgil had in his mind, in Georgics, iv. 219:--\n  \"His quidam signis, atque h\u00e6c exempla secuti,\n  Esse apibus partem divin\u00e6 mentis, et haustus\n  \u00c6thereos dixere: Deum namque ire per omnes\n  Terrasque, tractusque maris, coelumque profundum,\" &c.]\n\nIn these and other animals, and in man to a still greater degree, the\ntheorizing activity exists; but it is either starved, or at least has\nto deal with materials obscure, puzzling, conflicting; while, on the\nother hand, the practical intellect becomes largely developed,\nthrough the pressure of wants and desires, combined with the teaching\nof experience. In Aristotle's view, sensible perception is a separate\nsource of knowledge, accompanied with judgment and discrimination,\nindependent of the no\u00ebtic function. Occasionally, he refers the\nintellectual superiority of man to the properly attempered\ncombination and antagonism of heat in the heart with cold in the\nbrain, each strong and pure;[159] all the highly endowed animals (he\nsays) have greater animal heat, which is the essential condition of a\nbetter soul;[160] he reckons the finer sense of touch possessed by\nman as an essential condition of the same intellectual result.[161]\nSensible perception in its five diverse manifestations, together with\nits secondary psychical effects--phantasy and memory, accumulates in\nthe human mind (and in some animals) a greater or less experience of\nparticular facts; from some of which inferences are drawn as to\nothers unknown, directing conduct as well as enlarging\nknowledge.[162]\n\n[Footnote 159: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. vi. p. 744, a. 11-31:\n[Greek: d\u00ealoi= de\\ t\u00ea\\n eu)krasi/an \u00ea( dia/noia; phronim\u00f4/taton ga/r\ne)sti t\u00f4=n z\u00f4=|\u00f4n a)/nthr\u00f4pos.] We may remark that Aristotle\nconsiders cold as in some cases a positive property, not simply as\nthe absence or privation of heat (De Partibus Animal. II. ii. p. 649,\na. 18). The heart is the part wherein the psychical fire (as it were)\nis kept burning: [Greek: t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s \u00f4(/sper e)mpepureume/n\u00eas e)n\ntoi=s mori/ois tou/tois] (Aristot. De Vit\u00e2 et Morte, iv. p. 469, b.\n16). Virgil, in the beautiful lines of his Second Georgic (483),\nlaments that he is disqualified for deep philosophical studies by the\nwant of heat round his heart:--&P \"Sin, has ne possim natur\u00e6 accedere\npartes, Frigidus obstiterit circum pr\u00e6cordia sanguis,\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Aristot. De Respirat. xiii. p. 477, a. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Aristot. Metaphys. A. i. pp. 980-1.]\n\nAll this process--a perpetual movement of sense and memory--begins\nfrom infancy, and goes on independently of No\u00fbs or the no\u00ebtic\nfunction properly so called; which grows up gradually at a later age,\naided by the acquisition of language and by instruction conveyed\nthrough language. The supervening No\u00fbs presupposes and depends upon\nwhat has been thus treasured up by experience. Though, in the\ncelestial body. No\u00fbs exists separately from human beings, and though\nit there operates _proprio motu_ apart from sense, such is not the\ncase with the human No\u00fbs; which depends upon the co-operation, and is\nsubject to the restrictions, of the complicated soul and body\nwherewith it is domiciled--restrictions differing in each individual\ncase. Though the no\u00ebtic process is distinct from sense, yet without\nsense it cannot take place in man. Aristotle expressly says: \"You\ncannot cogitate without a phantasm or without a continuous image.\"\nNow the phantasm has been already explained as a relic of movements\nof sense--or as those movements themselves, looked at in another\npoint of view.[163] \"When we cogitate\" (he says), \"our mental\naffection is the same as when we draw a triangle for geometrical\nstudy; for there, though we do not make use of the fact that the\ntriangle is determinate in its magnitude, we still draw it of a\ndeterminate magnitude. So in cogitation, even when we are not\ncogitating a determinate _quantum_, we nevertheless set before our\neyes a determinate _quantum_, but we do not cogitate it _quatenus_\ndeterminate.\"[164] We cannot even (he goes on to say) remember the\n_cogitabilia_ without \"a phantasm or sensible image; so that our\nmemory of them is only by way of concomitance\" (indirect and\nsecondary).[165] Phantasy is thus absolutely indispensable to\ncogitation: first to carrying on the process at all; next to\nremembering it after it is past. Without either the visible phantasm\nof objects seen and touched, or the audible phantasm of words heard\nand remembered, the No\u00fbs in human beings would be a nullity.[166]\n\n[Footnote 163: Aristot. De Somniis, i. p. 459, a. 15; De Anim\u00e2, III.\nvii. p. 431, a. 17; iii. p. 428, b. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 449, b. 30: [Greek:\ne)pei\\ de\\ peri\\ phantasi/as ei)/r\u00eatai pro/teron e)n toi=s peri\\\npsuch\u00ea=s, kai\\ noei=n ou)k e)/stin a)/neu phanta/smatos; sumbai/nei\nga\\r to\\ au)to\\ pa/thos e)n t\u00f4=| noei=n o(/per kai\\ e)n t\u00f4=|\ndiagra/phein; e)kei= te ga\\r ou)the\\n proschr\u00f4/menoi t\u00f4=| to\\ poso\\n\n\u00f4(risme/non ei)=nai to\\ trig\u00f4/nou, o(/m\u00f4s gra/phomen \u00f4(risme/non\nkata\\ to\\ poso/n; kai\\ o( no\u00f4=n \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s, ka)\\n m\u00ea\\ poso\\n no\u00ea=|,\nti/thetai pro\\ o)mma/t\u00f4n poso/n, noei= d' ou)ch \u00ea(=| poso/n.]\n\nThis passage appears to be as clear a statement of the main doctrine\nof Nominalism as can be found in Hobbes or Berkeley. In the sixteenth\nsection of the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge,\nBerkeley says:--\"And here it must be acknowledged that a man may\nconsider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the\nparticular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.--In\nlike manner we may consider Peter to far forth as man, or so far\nforth as animal, without framing the forementioned idea, either of\nman or animal, _inasmuch as all that is perceived is not\nconsidered_.\" Berkeley has not improved upon the statement of\nAristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 450, a. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 166: About sense and hearing, as the _fundamenta_ of\nintellect, see Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 1-17.]\n\nWe see that, though Aristotle recognizes a general distinction\nbetween phantasy and cogitation, and alludes to many animals as\nhaving the former without attaining to the latter, yet he also\ndeclares that in man, who possesses both, not only is cogitation\ndependent upon phantasy, but phantasy passes into cogitation by\ngradations almost imperceptible. In regard to the practical\napplication of No\u00fbs (_i.e._ to animal movements determined either by\nappetite or by reason), he finds a great difficulty in keeping the\ndistinction clearly marked. Substantially, indeed, he lets it drop.\nWhen he speaks of phantasy as being either calculating or perceptive,\nwe are unable to see in what respect _calculating phantasy_ (which he\nstates not to belong to other animals) differs from an effort of\ncogitation.[167] Indeed, he speaks with some diffidence respecting\nany distribution of parts in the same soul, suspecting that such\ndistribution is not real but logical: you may subdivide as much as\nyou choose.[168]\n\n[Footnote 167: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. x. p. 433, a. 9-b. 30: [Greek:\nei)/ tis t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an tithei/\u00ea \u00f4(s no/\u00easi/n tina--phantsi/a de\\\npa=sa \u00ea)\\ logistik\u00ea\\ \u00ea)\\ ai)sth\u00eatik\u00ea/; tau/t\u00eas me\\n ou)=n kai\\ ta\\\na)/lla z\u00f4=|a mete/chei.] Also vii. p. 431, b. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 23.]\n\nIt thus appears clear that Aristotle restricts the No\u00fbs or no\u00ebtic\nfunction _in man_ to the matters of sense and experience, physical or\nmental, and that he considers the phantasm to be an essential\naccompaniment of the cogitative act. Yet this does not at all detract\nfrom his view of the grandeur, importance, and wide range of survey,\nbelonging to the no\u00ebtic function. It is the portion of man's nature\nthat correlates with the abstract and universal; but it is only a\nportion of his nature, and must work in conjunction and harmony with\nthe rest. The abstract cannot be really separated from the concrete,\nnor the universal from one or other of its particulars, nor the\nessence from that whereof it is the essence, nor the attribute from\nthat of which it is the attribute, nor the genus and species from the\nindividuals comprehended therein; nor, to speak in purely\nAristotelian language, the Form from some Matter, or the Matter from\nsome Form. In all these cases there is a _notional_ or _logical_\ndistinction, impressing the mind as the result of various\ncomparisons, noted by an appropriate term, and remembered afterwards\nby means of that term (that is, by means of an audible or visible\nphantasm); but real separation there neither is nor can be. This is\nthe cardinal principle of Aristotle, repeated in almost all his\nworks--his marked antithesis against Plato. Such logical distinctions\nas those here noticed (they might be multiplied without number) it\nbelongs to No\u00fbs or the no\u00ebtic function to cognize. But the real\nobjects, in reference to which alone the distinctions have a meaning,\nare concrete and individual; and the cognizing subject is really the\nentire man, employing indeed the no\u00ebtic function, but employing it\nwith the aid of other mental forces, phantasms and remembrances, real\nand verbal.\n\nThe no\u00ebtic soul is called by Aristotle \"the place of Forms,\" \"the\npotentiality of Forms,\" \"the correlate of things apart from\nMatter.\"[169] It cogitates these Forms in or along with the\nphantasms: the cogitable Forms are contained in the sensible Forms;\nfor there is nothing really existent beyond or apart from visible or\ntangible magnitudes, with their properties and affections, and with\nthe so-called abstractions considered by the geometer. Hence, without\nsensible perception, a man can neither learn nor understand anything;\nin all his theoretical contemplations, he requires some phantasm to\ncontemplate along with them.[170]\n\n[Footnote 169: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iv. p. 429, a. 27, b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Ibid. vii. p. 431, b. 2: [Greek: ta\\ me\\n ou)=n ei)/d\u00ea\nto\\ no\u00eatiko\\n e)n toi=s phanta/smasi noei=.]--viii. p. 432, a. 3:\n[Greek: e)pei\\ de\\ ou)de\\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\\ ta\\ mege/th\u00ea,\n\u00f4(s dokei=, ta\\ ai)sth\u00eata\\ kech\u00f4risme/non, e)n toi=s ei)/desi toi=s\nai)sth\u00eatoi=s ta\\ no\u00eata/ e)sti, ta/ te e)n a)phaire/sei lego/mena,\nkai\\ o(/sa t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n e(/xeis kai\\ pa/th\u00ea; kai\\ dia\\ tou=to\nou)/te m\u00ea\\ ai)sthano/menos m\u00eathe\\n ou)the\\n a)\\n ma/thoi ou)de\\\nxunei/\u00ea; o(/tan de\\ the\u00f4r\u00ea=|, a)na/gk\u00ea a(/ma pha/ntasma/ ti\nthe\u00f4rei=n.]]\n\nHerein lies one of the main distinctions between the no\u00ebtic and the\nsentient souls. The sentient deals with particulars, and correlates\nwith external bodies; the no\u00ebtic apprehends universals, which in a\ncertain sense are within the soul: hence a man can cogitate whenever\nor whatever he chooses, but he can see or touch only what is\npresent.[171] Another distinction is, that the sentient soul is\nembodied in special organs, each with determinate capacities, and\ncorrelating with external objects, themselves alike determinate,\nacting only under certain conditions of locality. The possibilities\nof sensation are thus from the beginning limited; moreover, a certain\nrelative proportion must be maintained between the percipient and the\nperceivable; for extreme or violent sounds, colours, &c., produce no\nsensation; on the contrary, they deaden the sentient organ.[172] But\nthe no\u00ebtic soul (what is called the \"No\u00fbs of the soul,\" to use\nAristotle's language)[173] is nothing at all in actuality before its\nno\u00ebtic function commences, though it is everything in potentiality.\nIt is not embodied in any corporeal organ of its own, nor mingled as\na new elementary ingredient with the body; it does not correlate with\nany external objects; it is not so specially attached to some\nparticulars as to make it antipathetic to others. Accordingly its\npossibilities of cogitation are unlimited; it apprehends with equal\nfacility what is most cogitable and what is least cogitable. It is\nthoroughly indeterminate in its nature, and is in fact at first a\nmere unlimited cogitative potentiality;[174] like a tablet, upon\nwhich no letters have as yet been written, but upon which all or any\nletters _may be_ written.[175]\n\n[Footnote 171: Ibid. II. v. p. 417, b. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iv. p. 429, a. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: o( a)/ra kalou/menos t\u00ea=s\npsuch\u00ea=s nou=s (le/g\u00f4 de\\ nou=n \u00f4(=| dianoei=tai kai\\ u(polamba/nei\n\u00ea( psuch\u00ea/) ou)the/n e)stin e)nergei/a| t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n pri\\n noei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 174: Ibid. a. 21: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste m\u00ead' au)tou= ei)=nai\nphu/sin m\u00eademi/an a)ll' \u00ea)\\ tau/t\u00ean, o(/ti dunato/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 175: Ibid. p. 430, a. 1.]\n\nWe have already said that the No\u00fbs of the human soul emanates from a\npeculiar influence of the celestial body, which is the special region\nof Form in the Kosmos. Through it we acquire an enlarged power of\napprehending the abstract and universal; we can ascend above sensible\nforms to the cogitable forms contained therein; we can consider all\nforms in themselves, without paying attention to the matter wherein\nthey are embodied. Instead of considering the concrete solid or\nliquid before us, we can mentally analyse them, and thus study\nsolidity in the abstract, fluidity in the abstract. While our senses\njudge of water as hot and cold, our no\u00ebtic function enables us to\nappreciate water in the abstract--to determine its essence, and to\nfurnish a definition of it.[176] In all these objects, as\ncombinations of Form with Matter, the cogitable form exists\npotentially; and is abstracted or considered abstractedly, by the\ncogitant No\u00fbs.[177] Yet this last (as we have already seen) cannot\noperate except along with and by aid of phantasms--of impressions\nrevived or remaining from sense. It is thus immersed in the materials\nof sense, and has no others. But it handles them in a way of its own,\nand under new points of view; comparing and analysing; recognizing\nthe abstract in the concrete, and the universal in the particular;\ndiscriminating mentally and logically the one from the other; and\nnoting the distinction by appropriate terms. Such distinctions are\nthe _no\u00fcmena_, generated in the process of cogitation by No\u00fbs itself.\nThe No\u00fbs, as it exists in any individual, gradually loses its\noriginal character of naked potentiality, and becomes an actual\nworking force, by means of its own acquired materials.[178] It is an\naggregate of _no\u00fcmena_, all of them in nature identical with itself;\nand, while cogitating them, the No\u00fbs at the same time cogitates\nitself. Considered abstractedly, apart from matter, they exist only\nin the mind itself; in theoretical speculation, the _cognoscens_ and\nthe _cognitum_ are identical. But they are not really separable from\nmatter, and have no reality apart from it.\n\n[Footnote 176: Ibid. p. 429, b. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Ibid. p. 430, a. 2-9.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, II. v. p. 417, b. 23. Ibid. III.\niv. p. 429, b. 7: [Greek: o(/tan du/n\u00eatai e)nergei=n di' au(tou=.]]\n\nThe distinction, yet at the same time correlation, between Form and\nMatter, pervades all nature (Aristotle affirms), and will be found in\nthe No\u00fbs as elsewhere. We must recognize an _Intellectus Agens_ or\nconstructive, and an _Intellectus Patiens_ or receptive.[179] The\n_Agens_ is the great intellectual energy pervading the celestial\nbody, and acting upon all the animals susceptible of its operation;\nanalogous to light, which illuminates the diaphanous medium, and\nelevates what was mere potential colour into colour actual and\nvisible.[180] The _Patiens_ is the intellectual receptivity acted\nupon in each individual, and capable of being made to cogitate every\nthing; anterior to the _Agens_, in time, so far as regards the\nindividual, yet as a general fact (when we are talking of man as a\nspecies) not anterior even in time, but correlative. Of the two, the\n_Intellectus Agens_ is the more venerable; it is pure intellectual\nenergy, unmixed, unimpressible from without, and separable from all\nanimal body. It is this, and nothing more, when considered apart from\nanimal body; but it is then eternal and immortal, while the\n_Intellectus Patiens_ perishes with the remaining soul and with the\nbody. Yet though the _Intellectus Agens_ is thus eternal, and though\n_we_ have part in it, we cannot remember any of its operations\nanterior to our own maturity; for the concurrence of the _Intellectus\nPatiens_, which begins and ends with us, is indispensable both to\nremembrance and to thought.[181]\n\n[Footnote 179: Ibid. III. v. p. 430, a. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Ibid. a. 14: [Greek: kai\\ e)/stin o( me\\n toiou=tos\nnou=s t\u00f4=| pa/nta gi/nesthai, o( de\\ t\u00f4=| pa/nta poiei=n, \u00f4(s e(/xis\ntis, oi(=on to\\ ph\u00f4=s; tro/pon ga/r tina kai\\ to\\ ph\u00f4=s poiei= ta\\\nduna/mei o)/nta chr\u00f4/mata e)nergei/a| chr\u00f4/mata.] Aristotle here\nillustrates [Greek: nou=s poi\u00eatiko/s] by [Greek: ph\u00f4=s] and [Greek:\ne(/xis]; and we know what view he takes of [Greek: ph\u00f4=s] (De Anim\u00e2,\nII. vii. p. 418, b. 9) as the [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] or [Greek: e(/xis\ntou= diaphanou=s]--which _diaphanous_ he explains to be a [Greek:\nphu/sis tis e)nupa/rchousa e)n a)e/ri kai\\ u(/dati kai\\ e)n t\u00f4=|\na)i+di/\u00f4| t\u00f4=| a)/n\u00f4 s\u00f4/mati]. Judging by this illustration, it seems\nproper to couple the [Greek: nou=s poi\u00eatiko/s] here with his\ndeclaration in De Generat. Animal. II. p. 736, b. 28: [Greek: to\\n\nnou=n mo/non thu/rathen e)peise/nai kai\\ thei=on ei)=nai mo/non]: he\ncannot consider the [Greek: nou=s poi\u00eatiko/s], which is of the nature\nof Form, as belonging to each individual man like the [Greek: nou=s\npath\u00eatiko/s].]\n\n[Footnote 181: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. v. p. 430, a. 17: [Greek: kai\\\nou(=tos o( nou=s] (_i. e._ [Greek: poi\u00eatiko/s) ch\u00f4risto\\s kai\\\na)path\u00ea\\s kai\\ a)mig\u00ea/s, t\u00ea=| ou)si/a| \u00f4)\\n e)ne/rgeia; a)ei\\ ga\\r\ntimi\u00f4/teron to\\ poiou=n tou= pa/schontos, kai\\ \u00ea( a)rch\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=s\nu(/l\u00eas.]--Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: ch\u00f4risthei\\s d' e)sti\\ mo/non tou=th'\no(/per e)sti/, kai\\ tou=to mo/non a)tha/naton kai\\ a)i+/dion; ou)\nmn\u00eamoneu/omen de/, o(/ti tou=to me\\n a)pathe/s, o( de\\ path\u00eatiko\\s\nnou=s phtharto/s, kai\\ a)/neu tou/tou ou)the\\n noei=.] In this\nobscure and difficult chapter (difficult even to Theophrastus the\nfriend and pupil of the author), we have given the best meaning that\nthe words seem to admit.]\n\nWe see here the full extent of Aristotle's difference from the\nPlatonic doctrine, in respect to the immortality of the soul. He had\ndefined soul as the first actualization of a body having potentiality\nof life with a determinate organism. This of course implied, and he\nexpressly declares it, that soul and body in each individual case\nwere one and indivisible, so that the soul of Sokrates perished of\nnecessity with the body of Sokrates.[182] But he accompanied that\ndeclaration with a reserve in favour of No\u00fbs, and especially of the\ntheorizing No\u00fbs; which he recognized as a different sort of soul, not\ndependent on a determinate bodily organism, but capable of being\nseparated from it, as the eternal is from the perishable.[183] The\npresent chapter informs us how far such reserve is intended to go.\nThat the theorizing No\u00fbs is not limited, like the sentient soul, to a\ndeterminate bodily organism, but exists apart from that organism and\neternally--is maintained as incontestable: it is the characteristic\nintellectual activity of the eternal celestial body and the divine\ninmates thereof. But the distinction of Form and Matter is here\npointed out, as prevailing in No\u00fbs and in Soul generally, not less\nthan throughout all other Nature. The theorizing No\u00fbs, as it exists\nin Sokrates, Plato, Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Xenokrates,\n&c., is individualized in each, and individualized differently in\neach. It represents the result of the _Intellectus Agens_ or Formal\nNo\u00fbs, universal and permanent, upon the _Intellectus Patiens_ or\nno\u00ebtic receptivity peculiar to each individual; the co-operation of\nthe two is indispensable to sustain the theorizing intellect of any\nindividual man. But the _Intellectus Patiens_, or _Receptivus_,\nperishes along with the individual. Accordingly, the intellectual\nlife of Sokrates cannot be continued farther. It cannot be prolonged\nafter his sensitive and nutritive life has ceased; the no\u00ebtic\nfunction, as it exists in him, is subject to the same limits of\nduration as the other functions of the soul. The intellectual man is\nno more immortal than the sentient man.\n\n[Footnote 182: Ibid. II. i. p. 413, a. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Ibid. ii. p. 413, b. 24: [Greek: peri\\ de\\ tou= nou=\nkai\\ t\u00ea=s the\u00f4r\u00eatik\u00ea=s duna/me\u00f4s ou)de/n p\u00f4 phanero/n, a)ll' e)/oike\npsuch\u00ea=s ge/nos e(/teron ei)=nai, kai\\ tou=to mo/non e)nde/chetai\nch\u00f4ri/zesthai, katha/per to\\ a)i+/dion tou= phthartou=.]]\n\nSuch is the opinion here delivered by Aristotle. And it follows\nindeed as a distinct corollary from his doctrine respecting animal\nand vegetable procreation in general. Individuality (the being _unum\nnumero_ in a species) and immortality are in his view incompatible\nfacts; the one excludes the other. In assigning (as he so often does)\na final cause or purpose to the wide-spread fact of procreation of\nspecies by animals and vegetables, he tells us that every individual\nliving organism, having once attained the advantage of existence,\nyearns and aspires to prolong this for ever, and to become immortal.\nBut this aspiration cannot be realized; Nature has forbidden it, or\nis inadequate to it; no individual can be immortal. Being precluded\nfrom separate immortality, the individual approaches as near to it as\nis possible, by generating a new individual like itself, and thus\nperpetuating the species. Such is the explanation given by Aristotle\nof the great fact pervading the sublunary, organized\nworld[184]--immortal species of plants, animals, and men, through a\nsuccession of individuals each essentially perishable. The general\ndoctrine applies to No\u00fbs as well as to the other functions of the\nsoul. No\u00fbs is immortal; but the individual Sokrates, considered as\nno\u00ebtic or intellectual, can no more be immortal than the same\nindividual considered as sentient or reminiscent.\n\n[Footnote 184: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 20,\nseq.; De Anim\u00e2, II. iv. p. 415, a. 26, seq.; OEconomica, I. iii. p.\n1343, b. 23.]\n\nWe have already stated that No\u00fbs--Intellect--the no\u00ebtic function--is\nthat faculty of the soul that correlates with the abstract and\nuniversal; with Form apart from Matter. Its process is at once\nanalytical, synthetical, and retentive. Nature presents to us only\nconcretes and particulars, in a perpetual course of change and\nreciprocal action; in these the abstract and universal are immersed,\nand out of these they have to be disengaged by logical analysis. That\nthe abstract is a derivative from the concrete, and the universal\nfrom particulars--is the doctrine of Aristotle. Ascending from\nparticulars, the analysis is carried so far that at length it can go\nno farther. It continues to divide until it comes to _indivisibles_,\nor simple notions, the highest abstractions, and the largest\nuniversals. These are the elements out of which universal\npropositions are formed, the first premisses or _principia_ of\ndemonstration. Unphilosophical minds do not reach these indivisibles\nat all: but it is the function of the theorizing No\u00fbs to fasten on\nthem, and combine them into true propositions. In so far as regards\nthe indivisibles themselves, falsehood is out of the question, and\ntruth also, since they affirm nothing. The mind either apprehends\nthem, or it does not apprehend them: there is no other\nalternative.[185] But, when combined into affirmative propositions,\nthey then are true or false, as the case may be. The formal essence\nof each object is among these indivisibles, and is apprehended as\nsuch by the intellect; which, while confining itself to such essence,\nis unerring, as each sense is in regard to its own appropriate\nperceivables.[186] But, when the intellect goes father, and proceeds\nto predicate any attribute respecting the essence, then it becomes\nliable to error, as sense is when drawing inferences.\n\n[Footnote 185: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26: [Greek: \u00ea(\nme\\n ou)=n t\u00f4=n a)diaire/t\u00f4n no/\u00easis e)n tou/tois peri\\ a(\\ ou)k\ne)/sti to\\ pseu=dos; e)n oi(=s de\\ kai\\ to\\ pseu=dos kai\\ to\\\na)l\u00eathe/s, su/nthesi/s tis \u00ea)/d\u00ea no\u00eama/t\u00f4n \u00f4(/sper e(\\n\no)/nt\u00f4n.]--Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. x. p. 1051, b. 31: [Greek:\nperi\\ tau=ta ou)k e)/stin a)pat\u00eath\u00ea=nai, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ noei=n \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea/.]]\n\n[Footnote 186: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. vi. p. 430, b. 29. This\nportion of the treatise is peculiarly confused and difficult to\nunderstand.]\n\nOne of the chief functions that Aristotle assigns to No\u00fbs, or the\nno\u00ebtic function, is that the _principia_ of demonstration and\nknowledge belong to it; and not merely the _principia_, but also, in\ncases of action preceded by deliberation and balance of motives, the\nultimate application of _principia_ to action. So that he styles No\u00fbs\nboth beginning and end; also the beginning of the beginning; and,\nmoreover, he declares it to be always right and unerring--equal to\nScience and even more than Science.[187] These are high praises,\nconveying little information, and not reconcilable with other\npassages wherein he speaks of the exercise of the no\u00ebtic function\n([Greek: to\\ noei=n]) as sometimes right, sometimes wrong.[188] But,\nfor the question of psychology, the point to be determined is, in\nwhat sense he meant that _principia_ belonged to No\u00fbs. He certainly\ndid not mean that the first principles of reasoning were novelties\noriginated, suggested, or introduced into the soul by no\u00ebtic\ninfluence. Not only he does not say this, but he takes pains to\nimpress the exact contrary. In passages cited a few pages back, he\ndeclares that No\u00fbs in entering the soul brings nothing whatever with\nit; that it is an universal potentiality--a capacity in regard to\ntruth, but nothing more;[189] that it is in fact a capacity not\nmerely for comparing and judging (to both of which he recognizes even\nthe sentient soul as competent), but also for combining many into\none, and resolving the apparent one into several; for abstracting,\ngeneralizing, and selecting among the phantasms present, which of\nthem should be attended to, and which should be left out of\nattention.[190] Such is his opinion about the no\u00ebtic function; and he\nstates explicitly that the abstract and universal not only arise from\nthe concrete and particular, but are inseparable from the same\nreally--separable only logically.\n\n[Footnote 187: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. VI. xii. p. 1143, a. 25, b.\n10: [Greek: dio\\ kai\\ a)rch\u00ea\\ kai\\ te/los nou=s].--Analyt. Post. II.\nxviii. p. 100, b. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. iii. p. 427, b. 8: [Greek:\na)ll' ou)de\\ to\\ noei=n, e)n \u00f4(=| e)/sti to\\ o)rth\u00f4=s kai\\ m\u00ea\\\no)rth\u00f4=s--dianoei=sthai d' e)nde/chetai kai\\ pseud\u00f4=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 189: Ibid. I. ii. p. 404, a. 30, where he censures\nDemokritus: [Greek: ou) d\u00ea\\ chr\u00ea=tai t\u00f4=| n\u00f4=| \u00f4(s duna/mei tini\\\nperi\\ t\u00ea\\n a)l\u00ea/theian, a)lla\\ tau)to\\ le/gei psuch\u00ea\\n kai\\\nnou=n.]--Compare ibid. III. iv. p. 429, a. 21, b. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. vi. p. 430, b. 5: [Greek: to\\\nde\\ e(\\n poiou=n, tou=to o( nou=s e(/kaston].--Ibid. xi. p. 434, a.\n9.]\n\nHe describes, at the end of the Analytica Posteriora and elsewhere,\nthe steps whereby the mind ascends gradually from sense, memory, and\nexperience, to general principles. And he indicates a curious\ncontrast between these and the no\u00ebtic functions. Sense, memory,\nphantasy, reminiscence, are movements of the body as well as of the\nsoul; our thoughts and feelings come and go, none of them remaining\nlong. But the no\u00ebtic process is the reverse of this; it is an arrest\nof all this mental movement, a detention of the fugitive thoughts, a\nsubsidence from perturbation--so that the attention dwells steadily\nand for some time on the same matters.[191] Analysis, selection, and\nconcentration of attention, are the real characteristics of the\nAristotelian No\u00fbs. It is not (as some philosophers have thought) a\nsource of new general truths, let into the soul by a separate door,\nand independent of experience as well as transcending experience.\n\n[Footnote 191: Aristot. Physica, VII. iii. p. 247, b. 9: [Greek: \u00ea(\nd' e)x a)rch\u00ea=s l\u00ea=psis t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ge/nesis ou)k e)/stin; t\u00f4=|\nga\\r \u00ea)rem\u00ea=sai kai\\ st\u00ea=nai t\u00ea\\n dia/noian e)pi/stasthai kai\\\nphronei=n le/gomen.]--Also De Anim\u00e2, I. iii. p. 407, b. 32, and the\nremarkable passage in the Analytica Poster. II. xviii. p. 100,\na. 3-b. 5.]\n\nPassing now to the Emotions, we find that these are not\nsystematically classified and analysed by Aristotle, as belonging to\na scheme of Psychology; though he treats them incidentally, with\ngreat ability and acuteness, both in his Ethics, where he regards\nthem as auxiliaries or impediments to a rational plan of life, and in\nhis Rhetoric, where he touches upon their operation as it bears on\noratorical effect. He introduces however in his Psychology some\nanswer to the question, What is it that produces local movement in\nthe animal body? He replies that movement is produced both by No\u00fbs\nand by Appetite.\n\nSpeaking strictly, we ought to call Appetite alone the direct\nproducing cause, acted upon by the _appetitum_, which is here the\n_Primum Movens Immobile_. But this _appetitum_ cannot act without\ncoming into the intellectual sphere, as something seen, imagined,\ncogitated.[192] In this case the No\u00fbs or Intellect is stimulated\nthrough appetite, and operates in subordination thereto. Such is the\nIntellect, considered as Practical, the principle or determining\ncause of which is the _appetitum_ or object of desire; the Intellect\nmanifesting itself only for the sake of some end, to be attained or\navoided. Herein it is distinguished altogether from the Theoretical\nNo\u00fbs or Intellect, which does not concern itself with any _expetenda_\nor _fugienda_ and does not meddle with conduct. The _appetitum_ is\ngood, real or apparent, in so far as it can be achieved by our\nactions. Often we have contradictory appetites; and, in such cases,\nthe Intellect is active generally as a force resisting the present\nand caring for the future. But Appetite or Desire, being an energy\nincluding both soul and body, is the real and appropriate cause that\ndetermines us to local movement, often even against strong opposition\nfrom the Intellect.[193]\n\n[Footnote 192: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. x. p. 433, b. 11: [Greek:\npr\u00f4=ton de\\ pa/nt\u00f4n to\\ o)rekto/n (tou=to ga\\r kinei= ou) kinou/menon\nt\u00f4=| no\u00eath\u00ea=nai \u00ea)\\ phantasth\u00ea=nai).]]\n\n[Footnote 193: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, III. x. p. 433, a. 25, b. 19:\n[Greek: dio\\ e)n toi=s koinoi=s s\u00f4/matos kai\\ psuch\u00ea=s e)/rgois],\n&c.]\n\nAristotle thus concludes his scheme of Psychology, comprehending all\nplants as well as all animals; a scheme differing in this respect, as\nwell as in others, from the schemes of those that had preceded him,\nand founded upon the peculiar principles of his own First Philosophy.\nSoul is to organized body as Form to Matter, as Actualizer to the\nPotential; not similar or homogeneous, but correlative; the two being\nonly separable as distinct logical points of view in regard to one\nand the same integer or individual. Aristotle recognizes many\ndifferent varieties of Soul, or rather many distinct functions of the\nsame soul, from the lowest or most universal, to the highest or most\npeculiar and privileged; but the higher functions presuppose or\ndepend upon the lower, as conditions; while the same principle of\nRelativity pervades them all. He brings this principle prominently\nforward, when he is summing up[194] in the third or last book of the\ntreatise De Anim\u00e2:--\"The Soul is in a certain way all existent\nthings; for all of them are either Perceivables or Cogitables; and\nthe Cogitant Soul is in a certain way the matters cogitated, while\nthe Percipient Soul is in a certain way the matters perceived.\" The\nPercipient and its _Percepta_--the Cogitant and its _Cogitata_--each\nimplies and correlates with the other: the Percipient is the highest\nForm of all _Percepta_; the Cogitant is the Form of Forms, or the\nhighest of all Forms, cogitable or perceivable.[195] The Percipient\nor Cogitant Subject is thus conceived only in relation to the Objects\nperceived or cogitated, while these Objects again are presented as\nessentially correlative to the Subject. The realities of Nature are\nparticulars, exhibiting Form and Matter in one: though, for purposes\nof scientific study--of assimilation and distinction--it is necessary\nto consider each of the two abstractedly from the other.\n\n[Footnote 194: Ibid. viii. p. 431, b. 20, seq.: [Greek: nu=n de\\\nperi\\ psuch\u00ea=s ta\\ lechthe/nta sugkephalai\u00f4/santes, ei)/p\u00f4men pa/lin\no(/ti \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ ta\\ o)/nta p\u00f4/s e)sti pa/nta. \u00ea)\\ ga\\r ai)sth\u00eata\\\nta\\ o)/nta \u00ea)\\ no\u00eata/, e)/sti de\\ \u00ea( e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea me\\n ta\\ e)pist\u00eata/\np\u00f4s, \u00ea( d' ai)/sth\u00easis ta\\ ai)sth\u00eata/.]]\n\n[Footnote 195: Ibid. p. 432, a. 2: [Greek: o( nou=s ei)=dos ei)d\u00f4=n,\nkai\\ \u00ea( ai)/sth\u00easis ei)=dos ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n.]]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nETHICA.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe Ethics of Aristotle presuppose certain conditions in the persons\nto whom they are addressed, without which they cannot be read with\nprofit. They presuppose a certain training, both moral and\nintellectual, in the pupil.\n\nFirst, the reason of the pupil must be so far developed, as that he\nshall be capable of conceiving the idea of a scheme of life and\naction, and of regulating his momentary impulses more or less by a\nreference to this standard. He must not live by passion, obeying\nwithout reflection the appetite of the moment, and thinking only of\ngrasping at this immediate satisfaction. The habit must have been\nformed of referring each separate desire to some rational measure,\nand of acting or refraining to act according as such a comparison may\ndictate. Next, a certain experience must have been acquired\nconcerning human affairs, and concerning the actions of men with\ntheir causes and consequences. Upon these topics all the reasonings\nand all the illustrations contained in every theory of Ethics must\nnecessarily turn: so that a person thoroughly inexperienced would be\nincompetent to understand them.\n\nFor both these two reasons, no youthful person, nor any person of\nmature years whose mind is still tainted with the defects of youth,\ncan be a competent learner of Ethics or Politics (Eth. Nic. i. 7.\nCompare vii. 8). Such a pupil will neither appreciate the reasonings,\nnor obey the precepts (i. 3).\n\nAgain, a person cannot receive instruction in Ethics with advantage\nunless he has been subjected to a good practical discipline, so as to\nhave acquired habits of virtuous action, and to have been taught to\nfeel pleasure and pain on becoming occasions and in reference to\nbecoming objects. Unless the circumstances by which he has been\nsurrounded and the treatment which he has received, have been such as\nto implant in him a certain vein of sentiment and to give a certain\ndirection to his factitious pleasures and pains--unless obedience to\nright precepts has to a certain degree been made habitual with\nhim--he will not be able to imbibe, still less to become attached to,\neven the _principia_ of ethical reasoning (Eth. Nic. i. 4. 7). The\nwell-trained man, who has already acquired virtuous habits, has within\nhimself the [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\], or beginning, from which happiness\nproceeds: he may do very well, even though the reason on which these\nhabits were formed should never become known to him: but he will at\nleast readily apprehend and understand the reason when it is\nannounced. The [Greek: a)rchai\\] or beginnings to which ethical\nphilosophy points and from whence the conduct which it enjoins is\nderived, are obtained only by habituation, not by induction nor by\nperception, like other [Greek: a)rchai/]: and we ought in all our\ninvestigations to look after the [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\] in the way which\nthe special nature of the subject requires, and to be very careful to\ndefine it well (i. 4, i. 7).\n\nIn considering Aristotle's doctrine respecting the [Greek: a)rchai\\]\nof ethical and political science, and the way in which they are to be\ndiscovered and made available, we should keep in mind that he\nannounces the end and object of these sciences to be, not merely the\nenlargement of human knowledge, but the determination of human\nconduct towards certain objects: not theory, but practice: not to\nteach us what virtue is, but to induce us to practise it--\"Since then\nthe present science is not concerned with speculation, _like the\nothers_. For here we enquire, not in order that we may know what\nvirtue is, but in order that we may become good, otherwise there\nwould be no profit in the enquiry\" (ii. 2. _See_ also i. 2, i. 5, vi.\n5).\n\nThe remarks which Aristotle makes about the different ways of finding\nout and arriving at [Greek: a)rchai\\], are curious. Some principles\nor beginnings are obtained by _induction_--others by\n_perception_--others by habituation in a certain way--others again in\nother ways. Other modes of arriving at [Greek: a)rchai\\] are noticed\nby the philosopher himself in other places. For example, the [Greek:\na)rchai\\] of demonstrative science are said to be discovered by\nintellect ([Greek: nou=s])--vi. 6-7. There is a passage however in\nvi. 8 in which he seems to say that the [Greek: a)rchai\\] of the wise\nman ([Greek: so/phos]) and the natural man ([Greek: phusiko\\s]) are\nderived from experience: which I find it difficult to reconcile with\nthe preceding chapters, where he calls wisdom a compound of intellect\nand science ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]), and where he gives Thales and\nAnaxagoras as specimens of wise men. By vi. 6--it seems that wisdom\nhas reference to matters of demonstrative science: how then can it be\ntrue that a youth may be a mathematician without being a wise man?\n\nMoreover, Aristotle takes much pains, at the commencement of his\ntreatise on Ethics, to set forth the inherent intricacy and obscurity\nof the subject, and to induce the reader to be satisfied with\nconclusions not absolutely demonstrative. He repeats this observation\nseveral times--a sufficient proof that the evidence for his own\nopinions did not appear to himself altogether satisfactory (Eth. Nic.\ni. 3, i. 7, ii. 2). The completeness of the proof (he says) must be\ndetermined by the subject-matter: a man of cultivated mind will not\nask for better proof than the nature of the case admits: and human\naction, to which all ethical theory relates, is essentially\nfluctuating and uncertain in its consequences, so that every general\nproposition which can be affirmed or denied concerning it, is subject\nto more or less of exception. If this degree of uncertainty attaches\neven to general reasonings on ethical subjects, the particular\napplications of these reasonings are still more open to mistake: the\nagent must always determine for himself at the moment, according to\nthe circumstances of the case, without the possibility of sheltering\nhimself under technical rules of universal application: just as the\nphysician or the pilot is obliged to do in the course of his\nprofession. \"Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no\nfixed rule, just like the conditions of health. And if this is the\ncase with the universal theory, still more does the theory that\nrefers to particular acts present nothing that can be accurately\nfixed; for it falls not under any art or any system, but the actors\nthemselves must always consider what suits the occasion, just as\nhappens in the physician's and the pilot's art. But though this is\nthe case with the theory at present, _we must try to give it some\nassistance_\" ([Greek: peirati/on bo\u00eathei=n ]).--Eth. Nic. 2.\n\nThe last words cited are remarkable. They seem to indicate, that\nAristotle regarded the successful prosecution of ethical enquiries as\nall but desperate. He had previously said (i. 3)--\"There is so much\ndifference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable\nand just, of which political science treats, that these properties of\nhuman action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment, and\nnot by nature. And there is the same sort of error respecting what\nthings are good, because many persons have sustained injury from\nthem, some having already been brought to destruction through their\nwealth, others through their courage.\"\n\nOne cannot but remark how entirely this is at variance with the\nnotion of a moral sense or instinct, or an intuitive knowledge of\nwhat is right and wrong. Aristotle most truly observes that the\ndetails of our daily behaviour are subject to such an infinite\nvariety of modifications, that no pre-established rules can be\ndelivered to guide them: we must act with reference to the occasion\nand the circumstances. Some few rules may indeed be laid down,\nadmitting of very few exceptions: but the vast majority of our\nproceedings cannot be subjected to any rule whatever, except to the\ngrand and all-comprehensive rule, if we are indeed so to call it, of\nconforming to the ultimate standard of morality.\n\nSupposing the conditions above indicated to be realized--supposing a\ncertain degree of experience in human affairs, of rational\nself-government, and of habitual obedience to good rules of action,\nto be already established in the pupil's mind, the theory of ethics\nmay then be unfolded to him with great advantage (i. 3). It is not\nmeant to be implied that a man must have previously acquired the\nperfection of practical reason and virtue before he acquaints himself\nwith ethical theory; but he must have proceeded a certain way towards\nthe acquisition.\n\nEthics, as Aristotle conceives them, are a science closely analogous\nto if not a subordinate branch of Politics. (I do not however think\nthat he employs the word [Greek: \u00ca)thik\u00ea\\] in the same distinct and\nsubstantive meaning as [Greek: politik\u00ea\\ (e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea)], although he\nseveral times mentions [Greek: ta\\ \u00ea)thika\\] and [Greek: \u00ea)thikoi\\\nlo/goi].) Ethical science is for the individual what political\nscience is for the community (i. 2).\n\nIn every variety of human action, in each separate art and science,\nthe agents, individual or collective, propose to themselves the\nattainment of some _good_ as the end and object of their proceedings.\nEnds are multifarious, and good things are multifarious: but good,\nunder one shape or another, is always the thing desired by every one,\nand the determining cause of human action ([Greek: ou(= pa/nta\ne)phi/etai])--i. 1.\n\nSometimes the action itself, or the exercise of the powers implied in\nthe action, is the end sought, without anything beyond. Sometimes\nthere is an ulterior end, or substantive business, to be accomplished\nby means of the action and lying beyond it. In this latter class of\ncases, the ulterior end is the real good: better than the course of\naction used to accomplish it--\"the external results are naturally\n([Greek: pe/phuke]) better than the course of action\" (i. 1). Taking\nthis as a general position, it is subject to many exceptions: but the\nword [Greek: pe/phuke] seems to signify only that such is naturally\nand ordinarily the case, not that the reverse never occurs.\n\nAgain some ends are comprehensive and supreme; others, partial and\nsubordinate. The subordinate ends are considered with reference to\nthe supreme, and pursued as means to their accomplishment. Thus the\nend of the bridle-maker is subservient to that of the horseman, and\nthe various operations of war to the general scheme of the commander.\nThe supreme, or _architectonic_, ends, are superior in eligibility to\nthe subordinate, or _ministerial_, which, indeed, are pursued only\nfor the sake of the former.\n\nOne end (or one _good_), as subordinate, is thus included in another\nend (or another good) as supreme. The same end may be supreme with\nregard to one end different from itself, and subordinate with regard\nto another. The end of the general is supreme with reference to that\nof the soldier or the maker of arms, subordinate with reference to\nthat of the statesman. In this scale of comprehensiveness of ends\nthere is no definite limit; we may suppose ends more and more\ncomprehensive as we please, and we come from thence to form the idea\nof one most comprehensive and sovereign end, which includes under it\nevery other without exception--with reference to which all other ends\nstand in the relation either of parts or of means--and which is\nitself never in any case pursued for the sake of any other or\nindependent end. The end thus conceived is the _Sovereign Good of\nman_, or _The Good_--_The Summum Bonum_--[Greek: Ta)gatho\\n--To\\\na)/riston--Ta)nthr\u00f4/pinon a)gatho/n] (i. 2).\n\nTo comprehend, to define, and to prescribe means for realizing the\nSovereign Good, is the object of _Political Science_, the paramount\nand most architectonic Science of all, with regard to which all other\nSciences are simply ministerial. It is the business of the political\nruler to regulate the application of all other Sciences with\nreference to the production of this his End--to determine how far\neach shall be learnt and in what manner each shall be brought into\npractice--to enforce or forbid any system of human action according\nas it tends to promote the accomplishment of his supreme purpose--the\nSovereign Good of the Community. Strategical, rhetorical, economical,\nscience, are all to be applied so far as they conduce to this purpose\nand no farther: they are all simply ministerial; political science is\nsupreme and self-determining (i. 2).\n\nWhat _Political Science_ is for the community, _Ethical Science_ is\nfor the individual citizen. By this it is not meant that the\nindividual is to be abstracted from society or considered as living\napart from society: but simply that human action and human feeling is\nto be looked at from the point of view of the individual, mainly and\nprimarily--and from the point of view of the society, only in a\nsecondary manner: while in political science, the reverse is the\ncase--our point of view is, first as regards the society;--next, and\nsubordinate to that, as regards the individual citizen (_See_ Eth.\nNic. vii. 8).\n\nThe object of the Ethical Science is, the Supreme Good of the\nindividual citizen--the End of all Ends, with reference to his\ndesires, his actions, and his feelings--the end which he seeks for\nitself and without any ulterior aim--the end which comprehends all\nhis other ends as merely partial or instrumental and determines their\ncomparative value in his estimation (i. 2, i. 4).\n\nIt is evident that this conception of an End of all Ends is what Kant\nwould call an _Idea_--nothing precisely conformable to it, in its\nfull extent, can ever exist in reality. No individual has ever been\nfound, or ever will be found, with a mind so trained as to make every\nseparate and particular desire subservient to some general\npreconceived End however comprehensive. But it is equally certain\nthat this subordination of Ends one to another is a process performed\nto a greater or less degree in every one's mind, even in that of the\nrudest savage. No man can blindly and undistinguishingly follow every\nimmediate impulse: the impulse, whatever it be, when it arises, must\nbe considered more or less as it bears upon other pursuits and other\nobjects of desire. This is an indispensable condition even of the\nmost imperfect form of social existence. In civilized society, we\nfind the process carried very far indeed in the minds of the greater\nnumber of individuals. Every man has in his view certain leading\nEnds, such as the maintenance of his proper position in society, the\nacquisition of professional success, the making of his fortune, the\nprosecution of his studies, &c., each of which is essentially\nparamount and architectonic, and with reference to which a thousand\nother ends are simply subordinate and ministerial. Suppose this\nprocess to be pushed farther, and you arrive at the idea of an End\nstill more comprehensive, embracing every other end which the\nindividual can aspire to, and forming the central point of an\nall-comprehensive scheme of life. Such a maximum, never actually\nattainable, but constantly approachable, in reality, forms the Object\nof Ethical Science. _Quorsum victuri gignimur_!\n\nWhat is the Supreme Good--the End of all Ends? How are we to\ndetermine wherein it consists, or by what means it is to be\nattained--at least, as nearly attained as the limitations of human\ncondition permit? Ethical Science professes to point out what the end\nought to be--Ethical precepts are suggestions for making the closest\napproaches to it which are practicable. Even to understand what the\nend is, is a considerable acquisition: since we thus know the precise\npoint to aim at, even if we cannot hit it (i. 2).\n\nThe approaches which different men make towards forming this idea, of\nan End of Ends or of a Supreme Good, differ most essentially:\nalthough there seems a verbal agreement between them. Every man\nspeaks of _Happiness_ as his End of Ends ([Greek: o)no/mati\no(mologei=tai], i. 4): he wishes to live well or to do well, which he\nconsiders to be the same as being happy. But men disagree exceedingly\nin their opinions as to that which constitutes happiness: nay the\nsame man sometimes places it in one thing, sometimes in another--in\nhealth or in riches, according as he happens to be sick or poor.\n\nThere are however three grand divisions, in one or other of which the\nopinions of the great majority of mankind may be distributed. Some\nthink that happiness consists in a life of bodily pleasure ([Greek:\nbi/os a)polaustiko/s]): others, in a life of successful political\naction or ambition ([Greek: bi/os politiko/s]): others again, in a\nlife of speculative study and the acquisition of knowledge ([Greek:\nbi/os the\u00f4r\u00eatiko/s]). He will not consent to number the life of the\n([Greek: chr\u00eamatist\u00ea\\s]) money-maker among them because he attains\nhis end at the expense of other people and by a force upon their\ninclinations (this at least seems the sense of the words--[Greek: o(\nga\\r chr\u00eamatist\u00ea\\s bi/aio/s ti/s e)sti]), and because wealth can\nnever be the good, seeing that it is merely useful for the sake of\nulterior objects.\n\n(The reason which Aristotle gives for discarding from his catalogue\nthe life of the _money-seeker_, while he admits that of the\n_pleasure-seeker_ and the _honour-seeker_, appears a very\ninconclusive one. He believed them to be all equally mistaken in\nreference to real happiness: the two last just as much as the first:\nand certainly, if we look to prevalence in the world and number of\nadherents, the creed of the first is at least equal to that of the\ntwo last.)\n\nThe first of the three is the opinion of the mass, countenanced by\nmany Sovereigns such as Sardanapalus--it is more suitable to animals\nthan to men, in the judgment of Aristotle (i. 5).\n\nHonour and glory--the reward of political ambition, cannot be the\nsovereign good, because it is a possession which the person honoured\ncan never be sure of retaining: for it depends more upon the persons\nby whom he is honoured than upon himself, while the ideas which we\nform of the sovereign good suppose it to be something intimately\nbelonging to us and hard to be withdrawn (i. 5). Moreover those who\naspire to honour, desire it not so much on its own account as in\norder that they may have confidence in their own virtue: so that it\nseems even in their estimation as if virtue were the higher aim of\nthe two. But even virtue itself (meaning thereby the simple\npossession of virtue as distinguished from the active habitual\nexercise of it) cannot be the sovereign good: for the virtuous man\nmay pass his life in sleep or in inaction--or he may encounter\nintolerable suffering and calamity (i. 5).\n\nBesides, Happiness as we conceive it, is an End perfect, final,\ncomprehensive and all-sufficient--an end which we always seek on its\nown account and never with a view to anything ulterior. But neither\nhonour, nor pleasure, nor intelligence, nor virtue, deserves these\nepithets: each is an end special, insufficient, and not final--for\neach is sought partly indeed on its own account, but partly also on\naccount of its tendency to promote what we suppose to be our\nhappiness (i. 7). The latter is the only end always sought\nexclusively for itself: including as it always does and must do, the\nhappiness of a man's relatives, his children and his countrymen, or\nof all with whom he has sympathies; so that if attained, it would\nrender his life desirable and wanting for nothing--[Greek: o(\\\nmonou/menon, ai(reto\\n poiei= to\\n bi/on, kai\\ m\u00eadeno\\s e)ndea=] (i.\n7).\n\nThe remark which Aristotle here makes in respect to the final aim or\nhappiness of an individual--viz., that it includes the happiness of\nhis family and his countrymen and of those with whom he has\nsympathies--deserves careful attention. It shows at once the\nlargeness and the benevolence of his conceptions. We arrive thus at\nthe same end as that proposed by political science--the happiness of\nthe community: but we reach it by a different road, starting from the\npoint of view of the individual citizen.\n\nHaving shown that this Happiness, which is \"our being's end and aim,\"\ndoes not consist in any special acquisition such as pleasure, or\nglory, or intelligence, or virtue, Aristotle adopts a different\nmethod to show wherein it does consist. Every artist and every\nprofessional man (he says--i. 7), the painter, the musician, &c., has\nhis peculiar business to do, and the _Good_ of each artist consists\nin doing his business well and appropriately. Each separate portion\nof man, the eye, the hand and the foot, has its peculiar function:\nand in analogy with both these, man as such has his business and\nfunction, in the complete performance of which human Good consists.\nWhat is the business and peculiar function of Man, as Man? Not simply\nLife, for that he has in common with the entire vegetable and animal\nworld: nor a mere sensitive Life, for that he has in common with all\nAnimals: it must be something which he has, apart both from plants\nand animals--viz., an active life in conformity with reason ([Greek:\npraktik\u00ea/ tis tou= lo/gon e)/chontos]); or the exercise of Reason as\na directing and superintending force, and the exercise of the\nappetites, passions, and capacities, in a manner conformable to\nReason. This is the special and peculiar business of man: it is what\nevery man performs either well or ill: and the _virtue_ of a man is\nthat whereby he is enabled to perform it well. The Supreme Good of\nhumanity, therefore, consisting as it does in the due performance of\nthis special business of man, is to be found in the virtuous activity\nof our rational and appetitive soul: assuming always a life of the\nordinary length, without which no degree of mental perfection would\nsuffice to attain the object. The full position will then stand\nthus--\"Happiness, or the highest good of a human being, consists in\nthe working of the soul and in a course of action, pursuant to reason\nand conformable to virtue, throughout the full continuance of life.\"\n\n(The argument respecting a man's proper business ([Greek: e)/rgon])\nand virtue ([Greek: a)ret\u00ea\\]) seems to be borrowed from\nPlato--Republic, i. c. 23, p. 352; c. 24, p. 353. Compare also\nXenophon--Memorabilia, iv. 2, 14.)\n\nThis explanation is delivered by Aristotle as a mere outline, which\nhe seems to think that any one may easily fill up (i. 7). And he\nwarns us not to require a greater degree of precision than the\nsubject admits of: since we ought to be content with a rough\napproximation to the truth, and with conclusions which are not\nuniversally true, but only true in the majority of instances, such\nbeing the nature of the premisses with which we deal (i. 3).\n\nHaving determined in this manner what Happiness or the Supreme Good\nconsists in, Aristotle next shows that the explanation which he gives\nof it conforms in a great degree to the opinions previously delivered\nby eminent philosophers, and fulfils at least all the requisite\nconditions which have ever been supposed to belong to Happiness (i.\n8). All philosophers have from very early times agreed in\ndistributing good things into three classes--_Mental_, _Corporeal_,\nand _External_. Now the first of these classes is incomparably the\nhighest and most essentially _good_ of the three: and the explanation\nwhich Aristotle gives of happiness ranks it in the first class.\n\nAgain, various definitions of happiness have been delivered by\neminent authorities more or less ancient ([Greek: polloi\\ kai\\\npalaioi/]). Eudoxus laid down the principle that happiness consists\nin pleasure: others have maintained the opinion that it is entirely\nindependent both of pleasure and pain--that the former is no good,\nand the latter no evil (i. 12, vii. 11-13, x. 1. 2). Some have placed\nhappiness in virtue: others in prudence: others in a certain sort of\nwisdom ([Greek: sophi/a tis]): others have added to the definition\nthis condition, that pleasure or external prosperity should be\ncoupled with the above-mentioned objects (i. 8). The moral doctrines\npropounded by Zeno and Epicurus were therefore in no way new: how far\nthe reasonings by which these philosophers sustained them were new we\ncannot judge accurately, from the loss of the treatises of Eudoxus\nand others to which Aristotle makes reference.\n\nNow, in so far as virtue is introduced, the explanation of Happiness\ngiven by Aristotle coincides with these philosophers and improves\nupon them by substituting the active exercise of virtuous habits in\nplace of the mere possession of virtue. And in regard to pleasure,\nthe man who has once acquired habits of virtuous agency stands in no\nneed of pleasure from without, as a foreign accessory: for he finds\npleasure in his own behaviour, and he would not be denominated\nvirtuous unless he did so: \"Now (he says) their life stands in no\nneed of pleasure, like an extraneous appendage, but has pleasure in\nitself\" (ii. 8). Again, ii. 3, he says that \"the symptom of a perfect\nhabit is the pleasure or pain which ensues upon the performance of\nthe acts in which the habit consists: for the man who abstains from\nbodily pleasures and rejoices in doing so, is temperate, while he who\ndoes it reluctantly and painfully, is intemperate. And the man who\nsustains dangers with pleasure, or at least without pain, is\ncourageous: if with pain, he is a coward. For ethical virtue has\nreference to our pleasures and pains: it is on account of pleasure\nthat we commit vicious acts, and on account of pain that we shrink\nfrom virtuous performances. Wherefore, as Plato directs, we ought to\nbe trained at once from our infancy by some means or other so as to\nfeel pleasure and pain from the proper sources: for that is the right\neducation.\"\n\nMoreover, the man who is in the active exercise of virtue derives his\npleasure from the performance of that which is the appropriate\nbusiness of humanity, so that all his pleasures are _conformable to\nthe pleasures natural to man_ and therefore consistent with each\nother: whereas the pleasures of most people are contradictory and\ninconsistent with each other, because they are not conformable to our\nnature (i. 8).\n\nIt is not easy to understand perfectly what Aristotle means by saying\nthat the things agreeable to the majority of mankind are not things\nagreeable by nature. The construction above put upon this expression\nseems the only plausible one--that those pleasures which inhere in\nthe performance of the appropriate business of man, are to be\nconsidered as our natural pleasures; those which do not so inhere, as\nnot natural pleasures: inasmuch as they arise out of circumstances\nforeign to the performance of our appropriate business.\n\nThis however hardly consists with the explanation which Aristotle\ngives of [Greek: to\\ phu/sei]--in another place and with reference to\nanother subject. In the Magna Moralia (i. 34, pp. 1194-1195 Bek.), in\ndistinguishing between _natural_ justice ([Greek: to\\ di/kaion\nphu/sei]) and _conventional_ justice ([Greek: to\\ di/kaion no/m\u00f4|]),\nhe tells us that _the naturally just_ is that which most commonly\nremains just. (Similarly Ethic. Eudem. iv. 14, p. 1217 Bek.) That\nwhich exists by nature (he says) may be changed by art and practice;\nthe left hand may by these means be rendered as strong as the right\nin particular cases, but if in the greater number of cases and for\nthe longer portion of time the left remains left and the right\nremains right, this is to be considered as existing by nature.\n\nIf we are to consider that arrangement as natural which we find to\nprevail in the greatest number of cases and for the greatest length\nof time, then undoubtedly the pleasures arising out of virtuous\nactive behaviour must be regarded as less natural than those other\npleasures which Aristotle admits to form the enjoyment of the\nmajority of mankind.\n\nBut again there is a third passage, respecting nature and natural\narrangements, which appears scarcely reconcilable with either of the\ntwo opinions just noticed. In Eth. Nicom. ii. 1: \"Ethical virtue is a\nresult of habit, whence it is evident that not one of the ethical\nvirtues exists in us by nature. For none of those things which exist\nby nature is altered by habit. For example, the stone which naturally\nmoves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if a\nman should endeavour so to habituate it by throwing it upwards ten\nthousand times; nor in like manner fire downwards: nor can any other\nof the things formed by nature in one way be changed by habit to any\nother than that natural way. Virtues therefore are not generated in\nus either _by_ nature, or _contrary_ to nature; but we are formed by\nnature so as to be capable of receiving them, and we are perfected in\nthem through the influence of habit.\"\n\nIf it be true that nothing which exists in one manner by nature can\nbe changed by habit so as to exist in another manner, I do not see\nhow the assertion contained in the passage above cited out of the\nMagna Moralia can be reconciled with it, where we are told--\"For even\nthings which exist _by nature partake of change_. Thus if we all\nshould practise throwing with the left hand, we should become\nambidextrous: but still it is the left hand by nature, and the right\nhand is not the less better by nature than the left, although we\nshould do everything with the left as we do with the right.\" (Mag.\nMor. i. 34, _ut sup._) In the one case he illustrates the meaning of\nnatural properties by the comparative aptitudes of the right and left\nhand: in the other by the downward tendency of the stone. The idea is\nplainly different in the one case and in the other.\n\nOn the other hand, there seems to be not less variance between the\none passage quoted out of the Nicomacheian Ethics and the other. For\nin the passage last quoted, we are told that none of the ethical\nvirtues is generated in us by nature--neither by nature, nor contrary\nto nature: nature makes us fit to receive them, habit introduces and\ncreates them--an observation perfectly true and accurate. But if this\nwas the sentiment of Aristotle, how could he also believe that the\npleasures arising out of the active manifestation of ethical virtue\nwere the natural pleasures of man? If ethical virtue does not come by\nnature, the pleasures belonging to it cannot come by nature either.\n\nOn the whole, these three passages present a variance which I am\nunable to reconcile in the meaning which Aristotle annexes to the\nvery equivocal word--_nature_.\n\nAlthough Aristotle tells us that the active exercise of the functions\nof the soul according to virtue confers happiness, yet he admits that\na certain measure of external comfort and advantages must be\nsuperadded as an indispensable auxiliary and instrument. Disgusting\nugliness, bad health, low birth, loss of friends and relatives or\nvicious conduct of friends and relatives, together with many other\nmisfortunes, are sufficient to sully the blessed condition of the\nmost virtuous man ([Greek: r(upai/nousi to\\ maka/rion]--i. 8)--for\nwhich reason it is that some persons have ranked both virtue and good\nfortune as co-ordinate ingredients equally essential to happiness:\nand have doubted also whether it can ever be acquired either by\nteaching, or by training, or by any other method except chance or\nDivine inspiration. To suppose that so magnificent a boon is\nconferred by chance, would be an absurdity: it is a boon not unworthy\nindeed of the Divine nature to confer; but still the magnificence of\nit will appear equally great and equally undeniable, if we suppose it\nto be acquired by teaching or training. And this is really the proper\naccount to give of the way in which Happiness is acquired: for the\ngrand and primary element in it, is the virtuous agency of the soul,\nwhich is undoubtedly acquired by training: while external advantages,\nthough indispensable up to a certain limit, are acquired only as\nsecondary helps and instruments. The creation of these virtuous\nhabits among the citizens is one of the chief objects of political\nscience and legislation: when once acquired, they are the most\nlasting and ineffaceable of all human possessions: and as they are\ncreated by special training, they may be imparted to every man not\ndisqualified by some natural defect of organization, and may thus be\nwidely diffused throughout the community (i. 9).\n\nThis is an important property. If happiness be supposed to be derived\nfrom the possession of wealth or honour or power, it can only be\npossessed by a small number of persons. For these three considered as\nobjects of human desire, are essentially comparative. A man does not\nthink himself rich, or honoured, or powerful, unless he becomes so to\na degree above the multitude of his companions and neighbours.\n\nAristotle insists most earnestly that the only way of acquiring the\ncharacter proper for happiness is by a course of early and incessant\ntraining in virtuous action. Moral teaching, he says, will do little\nor nothing, unless it be preceded by, or at least coupled with, moral\ntraining. Motives must be applied sufficient to ensure performance of\nwhat is virtuous and abstinence from what is vicious, until such a\ncourse of conduct becomes habitual, and until a disposition is\ncreated to persevere in them. It is the business of the politician\nand the legislator to employ their means of working upon the citizens\nfor the purpose of enforcing this training. It is not with virtue (he\nsays) as it is with those faculties which we receive ready-made from\nnature, as for example, the external senses. We do not acquire the\nfaculty of sight by often seeing, but we have it from nature and then\nexercise it: whereas with regard to virtue, we obtain our virtues by\nmeans of a previous course of virtuous action, just as we learn other\narts. For those things which we must learn in order to do, we learn\nby actually doing: thus by building we become builders, and by\nharping we become harpers: by doing just and temperate and courageous\nactions, we become just and temperate and courageous. All legislators\ntry, some in a better and others in a worse manner, to _ethise_\n([Greek: e)thi/zontes])--to create habits among--the citizens for the\npurpose of making them good. \"In one word habits are created by\nrepeated action, wherefore our actions must be determined in a\nsuitable way, for according as they differ, so will our habits\ndiffer. Nor is the difference small whether we are _ethised_ in one\nway or in another, from our youth upwards: the difference is very\ngreat, or rather it _is everything_\" (ii. 1).\n\nNeither an ox, nor a horse, can acquire such habits, and therefore\nneither of them can be called happy: even a child cannot be called\nso, except from the hope and anticipation of what he will become in\nfuture years.\n\nIt may appear somewhat singular that Aristotle characterises a child\nas incapable of happiness, since in common language a child when\nhealthy and well treated is described as peculiarly happy. But\nhappiness, as Aristotle understands it, is something measured more by\nthe estimate of the judicious spectator than by the sentiment of the\nman in whose bosom it resides. No person is entitled to be called\n_happy_, whom the intelligent and reflective observer does not\n_macarise_ (or **_eud\u00e6monise_), or whose condition he would\nnot desire more or less to make his own. Now the life of a child,\neven though replete with all the enjoyments belonging to childhood,\nis not such as any person in the state of mind of a mature citizen\ncould bring himself to accept (i. 10, x. 3). The test to which\nAristotle appeals, either tacitly or openly, seems always to be the\njudgment of the serious man (i. 8, x. 5). It is no sufficient proof\nof happiness that the person who feels it is completely satisfied\nwith his condition and does not desire anything beyond. Such\nself-satisfaction is indeed necessary, but is not by itself\nsufficient: it must be farther confirmed by the judgment of persons\nwithout--not of the multitude, who are apt to judge by a wrong\nstandard--nor of princes, who are equally incompetent, _and who have\nnever tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasures_ (x. 6)--but\nof the virtuous and worthy, who have arrived at the most perfect\ncondition attainable by human beings (x. 5, x. 6, x. 8).\n\nThe different standard adopted by the many and by the more discerning\nfew, in estimating human happiness, is again touched upon in\nPolitica, vii. 1. It is in some respects treated more clearly and\nsimply in this passage than in the Ethics. Both the Many and the Few\n(he says) agree that in order to constitute Happiness, there must be\na coincidence of the three distinct kinds of Good things--The\nMental--The Corporeal--The External. But with respect to the\nproportions in which the three ought to be intermingled, a difference\nof opinion arises. Most persons are satisfied with a very moderate\nportion of mental excellence, while they are immoderate in their\ndesire for wealth and power (\"For of virtue they think that they have\na sufficiency, whatever be the quantity they have; but of wealth and\npossessions they seek the excess without bound.\"--Pol. vii. 1). On\nthe other hand, the opinion sanctioned by the few of a higher order\nof mind, and adopted by Aristotle, was, that Happiness was possessed\nin a higher degree by those who were richly set forth with moral and\nintellectual excellence and only moderately provided with external\nadvantages, than by those in regard to whom the proportion was\nreversed (_ib._). The same difference of estimate, between the few\nand the many, is touched upon Polit. vii. 13, where he says that men\nin general esteem external advantages to be the causes of happiness:\nwhich is just as if they were to say that the cause why a musician\nplayed well was his lyre, and not his proficiency in the art.\n\nIn this chapter of the Politica (vii. 13), he refers to the Ethica in\na singular manner. Having stated that the point of first importance\nis, to determine wherein happiness consists, he proceeds to say--\"We\nhave said also in the Ethics, _if there be any good in that treatise_\n([Greek: ei)/ ti t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n e)kei/n\u00f4n o)/phelos]), that it\n(happiness) is the active exertion and perfected habit of\nvirtue.\"--This is a singular expression--\"if there be any good in the\nEthics\"--it seems rather to fall in with the several passages in that\ntreatise in which he insists upon the inherent confusion and darkness\nof the subject-matter.\n\nThe definition of what happiness really is seems to be one of the\nweak points of Aristotle's treatise. In a work addressed to the\npublic, it is impossible to avoid making the public judges of the\npleasure and pain, the happiness and unhappiness of individuals. A\ncertain measure of self-esteem on the part of the individual, and a\ncertain measure of esteem towards him on the part of persons without,\ncome thus to be regarded as absolutely essential to existence.\nWithout these, life would appear intolerable to any spectator\nwithout, though the individual himself might be degraded enough to\ncling to it. But these are secured by the ordinary morality of the\nage and of the locality. The question arises as to degrees of virtue\nbeyond the ordinary level: Are we sure that such higher excellence\ncontributes to the happiness of the individual who possesses it?\nAssuming that it does so contribute, are we certain that the\naccession of happiness which he thereby acquires is greater than he\nwould have acquired by an increase of his wealth and power, his\nvirtue remaining still at the ordinary level? These are points which\nAristotle does not establish satisfactorily, although he professes to\nhave done so: nor do I think that they are capable of being\nestablished. The only ground on which a moralist can inculcate\naspirations after the higher degrees of virtue, is, the gain which\nthereby accrues to the happiness of others, not to that of the\nindividual himself.\n\nAristotle appeals to God as a proof of the superiority of an internal\nsource of happiness to an external source--vii. 1, \"using God as a\nwitness who is happy and blessed, yet not through any external good,\nbut through Himself and from His own nature.\" Again, vii. 3, \"For at\nleisure God would be happy, and the whole universe ([Greek:\nko/smos]), who have no external actions except such as are proper to\nthemselves\"--in proof of the superiority of a life of study and\nspeculation to a life of ambition and political activity. The same\nargument is insisted upon in Eth. Nic. x. 8. It is to be observed\nthat the [Greek: Ko/smos] as well as God is here cited as\nexperiencing happiness.\n\nThe analogy to which Aristotle appeals here is undoubtedly to a\ncertain extent a just one. The most perfect happiness which we can\nconceive--our Idea, to use Kant's phrase, of perfect happiness--is\nthat of a being who is happy in and for his own nature, with the\nleast possible aid from external circumstances--a being whose nature\nor habits dispose him only to acts, the simple performance of which\nconfers happiness. But is this true of the perfectly virtuous nature\nand habits? Does the simple performance of the acts to which they\ndispose us, always confer happiness? Is not the existence of a very\nhigh standard of virtuous exigency in a man's mind, a constant source\nof self-dissatisfaction, from the difficulty of acting up to his own\nideas of what is becoming and commendable?\n\nThat the most virtuous nature is in itself and essentially the most\nhappy nature, is a point highly questionable--to say the least of it:\nand even if we admit the fact, we must at the same time add that it\ncannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without. The internal\npleasures of a highly virtuous man cannot be properly appreciated by\nany person not of similar character. So that unless a person be\nhimself disposed to believe it, you could find no means of proving it\nto him. To a man not already virtuous, you cannot bring this argument\npersuasively home for the purpose of inducing him to become so.\n\nIn regard to prudence and temperance, indeed, qualities in the first\ninstance beneficial to himself, it is clear that the more perfectly\nhe possesses them, the greater and more assured will be his\nhappiness. But in regard to virtuous qualities, beneficial in the\nfirst instance to others and not to himself, it can by no means be\nasserted that the person who possesses these qualities in the highest\ndegree is happier than one who possesses them in a more moderate and\nordinary degree.\n\nAristotle indeed says that _the being just_ necessarily includes the\nhaving pleasure in such behaviour: for we do not call a man just or\nliberal unless he has a pleasure in justice or liberality (Eth. Nic.\ni. 8). But this does not refute the supposition, that another man,\nless just or liberal than he, may enjoy _greater happiness_ arising\nout of other tastes and other conduct.\n\nIn order to sustain the conclusion of Aristotle respecting the\nsuperior happiness of the virtuous man, it is necessary to assume\nthat the pleasures of self-esteem and self-admiration are generically\ndistinguished from other pleasures and entitled to a preference in\nthe eyes of every right judging person. And Aristotle does seem to\nassume something of this nature. He says--x. 3--\"Or that pleasures\ndiffer in kind? For the pleasures arising from the honourable are\ndifferent from those arising from the base; and it is not the case\nthat the unjust man experiences the pleasure of the just, or he that\nis unmusical that of the musician.\" The inherent difference between\nvarious pleasures is again touched upon x. 5--\"And since the\nfunctions differ in goodness and badness--some of them being objects\nof desire, others of them to be eschewed, and others of them\nneither--so is it likewise with the pleasures: for each function has\nits own pleasures. The pleasure then that is proper to the function\nof good is good, and that which is proper to the function of bad is\nbad; for the desires of things honourable are praiseworthy, those of\nthings base are to be blamed. And the pleasures attaching to them are\nmore proper to the functions than are the appetencies themselves.\" In\nthe next chapter, in that remarkable passage where he touches upon the\npredilections of men in power for the society of jesters and amusing\ncompanions (\"The many have recourse to the amusements of those that\nare accounted happy\")--\"For it is not in kingly power that you find\neither virtue or intellect, on which the higher functions of man\ndepend. Nay, not if princes _who have never tasted the relish of pure\nand liberal pleasure_, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, on\nwhich account these must be thought the more desirable. For children\nconsider those things to be best that are held in honour among\nthemselves.\"\n\nHere we have a marked distinction drawn between the different classes\nof pleasures--some being characterised as good, some bad, some\nindifferent. The best of all are those which the virtuous man enjoys,\nand which _he_ considers the best: the pleasures inseparably annexed\nto virtuous agency. These pleasures are thus assumed to be of a purer\nand more exalted character, and to deserve a decided preference over\nevery other class of pleasures. And if this be assumed, the superior\nhappiness of the virtuous man follows as a matter of course.\n\nI should observe that Aristotle considers happiness to consist in the\nexercise of the faculties agreeably to virtue ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia\nkat' a)ret\u00ea\\n])--the _pleasure_ ([Greek: \u00ea(don\u00ea\\]) is something\ndifferent from the exercise ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia])--inseparably\nattending it, indeed, yet not the same--\"conjoined with the functions\n([Greek: e)nergei/ais]), and the two are so inseparable as to raise a\nquestion whether the function is not identical with the pleasure\" (x.\n5). And he says, x. 7--\"We think that pleasure should be mixed up\n([Greek: paramemi/chthai]) with happiness.\"\n\nIt seems to be in the sense of self-esteem, which constitutes the\ndistinctive mark of virtuous agency, that Aristotle supposes\nhappiness to consist: the pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable\nconcomitant, but yet not the same. The self-esteem is doubtless often\nfelt in cases where a man is performing a painful duty--where the sum\ntotal of feelings accompanying the performance of the act is the very\nreverse of pleasurable. But still the self-esteem, or testimony of an\napproving conscience, is _per se_ always pleasurable, and is in fact\nthe essential pleasure inherent in virtuous behaviour. I do not see\nthe propriety of the distinction here taken by Aristotle. He puts it\nsomewhat differently, Polit. vii. 1--\"Living happily consists either\nin joy or in virtue to men, or in both.\" And Polit. viii. 5--\"For\nhappiness is a compound of both these (honour and pleasure).\" So\nPolit. viii. 3.\n\nHappiness (again he says--Polit. vii. 13, p. 440 E. p. 286) consists\nin the perfect employment and active exercise of virtue: and that\n_absolutely_ (or under the most favourable external conditions)--not\nunder limitation ([Greek: e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s]) or subject to very\ntrying and difficult circumstances. For a man of virtue may be so\nuncomfortably placed that he has no course open to him except a\nchoice of evils, and can do nothing but make the best of a bad\nposition. Such a man will conduct himself under the pressure of want\nor misfortune as well as his case admits: but happiness is out of his\nreach. (Compare Eth. Nic. i. 10.) To be happy, it is necessary that\nhe should be so placed as to be capable of aspiring to the\naccomplishment of positive good and advantage--he must be admitted to\ncontend for the great prizes, and to undertake actions which lead to\nnew honours and to benefits previously unenjoyed: he must be relieved\nfrom the necessity of struggling against overwhelming calamities.\n\nAristotle tells us in the beginning of the Ethics (Eth. Nic. i.\n3)--\"But there is so much difference of opinion and so much error\nrespecting what is honourable and just, of which political science\ntreats, that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by\npositive legal appointment, and not by nature. And there is the same\nsort of error respecting what things are good.\" If there be this\nwidespread error and dissension among mankind with respect to the\ndetermining of what is good and just, what standard has Aristotle\nestablished for the purpose of correcting it? I do not find that he\nhas established any standard, nor even that he has thought it\nnecessary to make the attempt. There are indeed a great number of\nobservations, and many most admirable observations in his Treatise,\non the various branches of Virtue and Vice: many which tend to\nconduct the mind of the reader unconsciously to the proper standard:\nbut no distinct announcement of any general principle, whereby a\ndispute between two dissentient moralists may be settled. When he\nplaces virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess on one side and\ndefect on the other, this middle point is not in any way marked or\ndiscoverable: it is a point not fixed, but variable according to the\nposition of the individual agent, and is to be determinable in every\ncase by right reason and according to the judgment of the prudent\nman--\"in the mean _with reference to ourselves_, as _it has been\ndetermined by reason_, and _as the prudent man_ ([Greek: o(\nphro/nimos]) _would determine it_\" (Eth. Nic. ii. 6). But though the\ndecision is thus vested in the prudent man, no mention is made of the\nprinciple which the appointed arbiter would follow in delivering his\njudgment, assuming a dispute to arise.\n\nIn a previous part of Chapter II., he defines \"the mean with\nreference to ourselves\" to be \"that which neither exceeds, nor falls\nshort of, _the rule of propriety_ ([Greek: tou= de/ontos]). But this\nis not one, nor is it the same to all.\"\n\nTo render this definition sufficient and satisfactory, Aristotle\nought to have pointed out to us how we are to find out that _rule of\npropriety_ ([Greek: to\\ de/on]) which marks and constitutes the\nmedium point, of actions and affections, _in relation to\nourselves_--this medium point being in his opinion _virtue_. To\nexplain what is meant by a medium _in relation to ourselves_, by the\nwords [Greek: to\\ de/on], _the rule of propriety_, is only a change\nof language, without any additional information.\n\nThus the capital problem of moral philosophy still remains unsolved.\n\nIt is remarkable that Aristotle in some parts of his treatise states\nvery distinctly what this problem is, and what are the points\nessential to its solution: he speaks as if he were fully aware of\nthat which was wanting to his own treatise, and as if he were\npreparing to supply the defect: but still the promise is never\nrealized. Take for example the beginning of Book VI. Eth. Nic.\n\n\"Since it has been already laid down, that we ought to choose the\nmiddle point and not either the excess or the defect--and since the\nmiddle point is that which right reason determines--let us\ndistinguish what that is. For in all the mental habits which have\nbeen described, as well as in all others also, there is a certain\naim, by a reference to which the rational being is guided either in\nrelaxing or in restricting: and there is a certain definite boundary\nof those medial points, which we affirm to exist between excess and\ndefect, determinable according to right reason. To speak thus,\nhowever, is indeed correct enough, but it gives no distinct\ninformation ([Greek: ou)the\\n de\\ saphe/s]): for in all other modes\nof proceeding which are governed by scientific principles it is quite\njust to say that you ought neither to work nor to rest more than is\nsufficient nor less than is sufficient, but to a degree midway\nbetween the two and agreeably to right reason. But a man who has only\nthis information would be no wiser than he was before it, any more\nthan he would know what things he ought to apply to his body, by\nbeing simply told that he must apply such things as medical science\nand as the medical practitioner directed. Wherefore, with respect\nalso to the habits of the soul we must not be content with merely\ngiving a general statement in correct language, but we must farther\ndiscriminate what right reason is, and what is its definition.\"\n\nThis is a very clear and candid statement of the grand and\nfundamental defect in Aristotle's theory of Ethics. He says very\ntruly that \"there is a certain end and aim ([Greek: sko/pos]), to\nwhich a rational being has reference when he either restricts or\nrelaxes any disposition.\" It was incumbent on Aristotle to explain\nwhat this [Greek: sko/pos] was; but this he never does, though he\nseems so clearly to have felt the want of it. We might have supposed\nthat after he had pointed out what was required to impart specific\nmeaning to correct but vague generalities, he would have proceeded at\nonce to fill up the acknowledged chasm in his theory: but instead of\nthis, he enters into an analysis of the intellect, speculative and\npractical, and explains the varieties of intellectual, as\ncontradistinguished from moral, excellence. This part of his work is\nhighly valuable and instructive: but I cannot find that he ever again\ntouches upon the [Greek: sko/pos], which had been admitted to be as\nyet undetermined. In a certain sense, it is indeed true that he\nendeavours \"to discriminate what right reason is, and what is its\ndefinition:\" for he classifies the intellectual functions into\nintellect ([Greek: nou=s]), science ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]), wisdom\n([Greek: sophi/a]), art ([Greek: te/chn\u00ea]), prudence ([Greek:\nphro/n\u00easis]): he states the general nature of each of these\nattributes, and the range of subjects to which it applies. He tells\nus that intellect and prudence have reference to human conduct--that\nprudence is \"concerned with things just and honourable and good for\nman\" (vii. 12)--\"with the things of man, and those things regarding\nwhich we deliberate\" (vii. 7)--\"prudence must needs be a true habit\naccording to reason, concerned with the good of man\" (vii. 5). In\nexplaining what prudence is, he tells us that it is _according to\nreason_: in explaining what is _right reason_, he tells us that it is\n_according to prudence_. He thus seems to make use of each as a part\nof the definition of the other. But however this may be, certain it\nis that he never fulfils the expectation held out in the beginning of\nthe Sixth Book, nor ever clears up the [Greek: ou)de\\n saphe\\s] there\nacknowledged.\n\nThere is one sentence at the beginning of vi. 5, which looks as if it\nconveyed additional information upon the difficulty in question--\"Now\nit seems to belong to the prudent man to be able to deliberate aright\nconcerning the things that are good and profitable to himself--not in\npart, as concerning the things that have a reference to health or\nstrength--but concerning the things that refer to the whole of\n_living well_\" ([Greek: pro\\s to\\ eu)= z\u00ea=|n]). But this in point of\nfact explains nothing. For _living well_ is the same as _happiness_:\nhappiness is _the active exercise of the soul according to virtue_:\ntherefore _virtue_ must be known, before we can know what _living\nwell_ is.\n\nI think that this [Greek: sko/pos] or end, which Aristotle alludes to\nin the beginning of the Sixth Book as not having been yet made clear,\nappears to be more distinctly brought out in a previous passage than\nit is in any portion of the Treatise after the beginning of the Sixth\nBook. In Book IV. 6, Aristotle treats of the virtues and defects\nconnected with behaviour in social intercourse: the _obsequious_ at\none extreme, the _peevish_ or _quarrelsome_ at the other: and the\nbecoming medium, though it had no special name, which lay between\nthem. Speaking of the person who adopts this becoming medium, he\nsays--\"We have said generally, then, that he will associate with\npeople as he ought; and having, moreover, a constant reference to\nwhat is honourable and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving\npain or at contributing pleasure.\"\n\nAgain in regard to Temperance--iii. 11--he states the [Greek:\nsko/pos] of the temperate man--\"What things have a reference to\nhealth or vigour, and are agreeable, these he desires in measure and\nas he ought; as well as the other agreeable things that are not\nopposed to these, either as being contrary to what is honourable or\nas being beyond his fortune. For he that desires things agreeable,\nwhich yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune,\nloves these pleasures more than they are worth. But not so with the\ntemperate man who lives according to right reason.\"\n\nThese passages are not very distinct, as an explanation of the proper\n[Greek: sko/pos]: but I cannot find any passages after the beginning\nof the Sixth Book which are more distinct than they: or perhaps,\nequally distinct.\n\nIn one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle refers, though somewhat\nobscurely, to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of\nmankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess\nor defect (vii. 7).\n\nAristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the\nend with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominated\n_good_ and _evil_. He says--vii. 11--\"To theorise respecting pleasure\nand pain, is the business of the political philosopher: for he is the\narchitect of that end with reference to which we call each matter\neither absolutely good or absolutely evil. Moreover, it is\nindispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them: for we have\nexplained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and\npains: and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure:\nfor which reason they have named [Greek: to\\ maka/rion a)po\\ tou=\nchai/rein].\"\n\nIn Book VIII. 9-10, the [Greek: sko/pos] is indeed stated very\nclearly, but _not as such_--not as if Aristotle intended to make it\nserve as such, or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which\nour estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found. In\nviii. 9-10, he tells us that all justice and benevolence ([Greek: to\\\ndi/kaion kai\\ \u00ea( phili/a]) is a consequence and an incident of\nestablished communion among human beings ([Greek: koin\u00f4ni/a])--that\nthe grand communion of all, which comprehends all the rest, is the\n_Political Communion_--that the end and object of the _Political\nCommunion_, as well that for which it was originally created as that\nfor which it subsists and continues, is _the common and lasting\nadvantage_ ([Greek: to\\ koin\u00ea=| su/mpheron])--that all other\ncommunions, of relations, friends, fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c.,\nare portions of the all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at\nrealizing some partial advantage to the constituent members. These\nchapters are very clear and very important, and they announce plainly\nenough _the common and lasting interest_ as the foundation and\nmeasure of justice as well as of benevolence. But they do not apply\nthe same measure, to the qualities which had been enumerated in the\nBooks prior to the Sixth, as a means of ascertaining where the middle\npoint is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue.\nNevertheless, Aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree\ndifficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue (ii. 9).\n\nIt might seem at first sight not easy for Aristotle, consistently\nwith the plan of his treatise, to point out any such standard or\nmeasure. For none can be mentioned, with any tolerable pretensions to\nadmissibility, except that of _tendency to promote happiness_--the\nhappiness both of the individual agent and of the society to which he\nbelongs. But as he had begun by introducing the ideas of reason and\nvirtue as media for explaining what happiness was, there would have\nbeen at least an apparent incongruity in reverting back to the latter\nas a means of clearing up what was obscure in the former. I say--_at\nleast an apparent incongruity_--because after all the incongruity is\nmore apparent than real. If we carefully preserve the distinction\nbetween the happiness of the individual agent and the happiness of\nthe Society to which he belongs, it will appear that Aristotle might\nwithout any inconsistency have specified the latter as being the\nobject to which reason has regard, in regulating and controlling the\nvarious affections of each individual.\n\nWherein consists the happiness of an individual man? In a course of\nactive exertion of the soul conformably to virtue: _virtue_ being\nunderstood to consist in a certain mediocrity of our various\naffections as determined by _right reason_.\n\nWhen we next enquire, to what standard does _right reason_ look in\nmaking this determination? it may without inconsistency be\nanswered--_Right reason_ determines the proper point of mediocrity by\na reference to _happiness generally_--that is, to the happiness of\nsociety at large, including that of the individual agent in\nquestion--in other words, to _the common and lasting advantage_,\nwhich Aristotle describes as the grand object of the statesman. There\nis no inconsistency in reverting to happiness, thus explained, as the\nstandard by which right reason judges in controlling our different\naffections.\n\nIn all moral enquiries, it is of the greatest importance to keep in\nview the happiness of the individual, and the happiness of the\nsociety at large, as two distinct and separate objects--which\ncoincide indeed [Greek: \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu/], in the majority of\ninstances and with regard to the majority of individuals--but which\ndo not coincide necessarily and universally, nor with regard to every\nindividual. A particular man may be placed in such a position, or\nanimated with such feelings, that his happiness may be promoted by\ndoing what is contrary to the happiness of the society. He will under\nthese circumstances do what is _good_ for himself but _bad_ for\nothers: he will do what is morally wrong, and will incur the blame of\nsociety. In speaking of _good_ and _evil_ it is always necessary to\nkeep in mind, that what is _good_ for an individual may be _bad_ for\nthe society: I mean, understanding the words _good for an individual_\nin the most comprehensive sense, as including all that he has to\nsuffer from the unfavourable sentiments of society. Much confusion\nhas arisen from moralists speaking of good and evil absolutely,\nwithout specifying whether they meant _good_ for the individual or\nfor the society: more particularly in the writings of the ancient\nphilosophers.\n\nFrom the manner in which Aristotle arrives at his definition of what\nconstitutes happiness, we might almost suppose that he would have\nbeen led to the indication of the happiness of society at large as\nthe standard for right reason to appeal to. For in examining what is\nthe proper business of man in general, he has recourse to the analogy\nof the various particular arts and professions--the piper, the\nstatuary, the carpenter, the carrier, &c. Each has his particular\nbusiness and walk of action, and in the performance of that business\nconsists _the good and the well_ in his case (i. 7). So in like\nmanner there is a special business for man in general, in the\nperformance of which we are to seek human good.\n\nNow this analogy of particular artists and professional men might\nhave conducted Aristotle to the idea of the general happiness of\nsociety as a standard. For the business of every artist or artisan\nconsists in conducing to the comfort, the protection, or the\ngratification of the public, each in his particular walk:\nprofessional excellence for them consists in accomplishing this\nobject perfectly. For every special profession therefore the\nhappiness of society at large, under one form or another, is\nintroduced as the standard by which good and excellence are to be\nmeasured.\n\nApply this analogy to man in general, taken apart from any particular\ncraft or profession. If each man, considered simply as such, has his\nappropriate business, in the good performance of which happiness for\nhim consists, the standard of excellence in respect to such\n**performance is to be found in its conduciveness to the\nhappiness of society at large. It can be found nowhere else, if we\nare to judge according to the analogy of special arts and\nprofessions.\n\nUntil this want of a standard or measure is supplied, it is clear\nthat the treatise of Aristotle is defective in a most essential\npoint--a defect which is here admitted by himself in the first\nchapter of the Sixth Book. Nor is there any other way of supplying\nwhat is wanting except by reference to the general happiness of\nsociety, the end and object (as he himself tells us) of the\nstatesman.\n\n\"What then,\" says Aristotle,\" prevents our calling him happy who is\nin the active exercise of his soul agreeably to perfect virtue, and\nis sufficiently well furnished with external goods, not for a casual\nperiod but for a complete lifetime?\" (i. 10). He thinks himself\nobliged to add, however, that this is not quite sufficient--for that\nafter death a man will still be affected with sympathy for the good\nor bad fortunes and conduct of his surviving relatives, affected\nhowever faintly and slightly, so as not to deprive him of the title\nto be called _happy_, if on other grounds he deserves it. The\ndeceased person sees the misfortunes of his surviving friends with\nsomething of the same kind of sympathetic interest, though less in\ndegree, as is felt by a living person in following the representation\nof a tragedy (i. 11). The difference between a misfortune, happening\nduring a man's life or after his death, is much greater than that\nbetween scenic representation of past calamities and actual reality\n(_ib._).\n\nIt seems as if Aristotle was reluctantly obliged to make this\nadmission--that deceased persons were at all concerned in the\ncalamities of the living--more in deference to the opinions of others\nthan in consequence of any conviction of his own. His language in the\ntwo chapters wherein he treats of it is more than usually hesitating\nand undecided: and in the beginning of Chapter XI., he says--\"To have\nno interest whatever in the fortunes of their descendants and\nfriends, seems exceedingly heartless and contrary to what we should\nexpect\"--he then, farther on, states it to be a great matter of doubt\nwhether the dead experience either good or evil--but if anything of\nthe kind does penetrate to them, it must be feeble and insignificant,\nso as to make no sensible difference to them.\n\n\nII.\n\nAristotle distributes _good things_ into three classes--the\n_admirable_ or worshipful--the _praiseworthy_--the _potential_.\n\n1. _Good_--as an End: that which is worthy of being honoured and\nvenerated in itself and from its own nature, without regard to\nanything ulterior: that which comes up to our idea of perfection.\n\n2. _Good_--as a means: that which is good, not on its own account nor\nin its own nature, but on account of certain ulterior consequences\nwhich flow from it.\n\n3. _Good_--as a means, but not a certain and constant means: that\nwhich produces _generally_, but _not always_, ulterior consequences\nfinally good: that which, in order to produce consequences in\nthemselves good, requires to be coupled with certain concomitant\nconditions.\n\n1. _Happiness_ belongs to the first of these classes: it is put along\nwith _the divine_, _the better_, _soul_, _intellect_, _the more\nancient_, _the principle_, _the cause_, &c. (Mag. Moral. i. 2). Such\nobjects as these, we contemplate with awe and reverence.\n\n2. _Virtue_ belongs to the second of the classes: it is good from the\nacts to which it gives birth, and from the end (happiness) which\nthose acts, when sufficiently long continued, tend to produce.\n\n3. _Wealth_, _power_, _beauty_, _strength_, &c., belong to the third\nclass: these are generally good because under most circumstances they\ntend to produce happiness: but they may be quite otherwise, if a\nman's mind be so defectively trained as to dispose him to abuse them.\n\nIt is remarkable that this classification is not formally laid down\nand explained, but is assumed as already well known and familiar, in\nthe Nicom. Ethics, i. 12: whereas it is formally stated and explained\nin the Magna Moralia, i. 2.\n\n_Praise_, according to Aristotle, \"does not belong to the best\nthings, but only to the second-best. The Gods are to be _macarised_,\nnot _praised_:\" the praise of the Gods must have reference to\nourselves, and must be taken in comparison with ourselves and our\nacts and capacities: and this is ridiculously degrading, when we\napply it to the majesty of the Gods. In like manner the most divine\nand perfect men deserve to be macarised rather than praised. \"No man\npraises happiness, as he praises justice, but _macarises_ (_blesses_)\nit as something more divine and better.\"\n\nHappiness is to be numbered amongst the perfect and worshipful\nobjects--it is the [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\] for the sake of which all of us\ndo everything: and we consider the principle and the cause of all\ngood things to be something divine and venerable (i. 12).\n\nSince then Happiness is the action of the soul conformably to perfect\nvirtue, it is necessary to examine what human virtue is: and this is\nthe most essential mark to which the true politician will direct his\nattention (i. 13).\n\nThere are two parts of the soul--the rational and the irrational.\nWhether these two are divisible in fact, like the parts of the body,\nor whether they are inseparable in fact, and merely susceptible of\nbeing separately dealt with in reasoning, like the concavity and\nconvexity of a circle, is a matter not necessary to be examined in\nthe present treatise. Aristotle speaks as if he considered this as\nreally a doubtful point.\n\nOf the irrational soul, one branch is, the nutritive and vegetative\nfaculty, common to man with animals and plants. The virtue of this\nfaculty is not special to man, but common to the vegetable and animal\nworld: it is in fact most energetic during sleep, at the period when\nall virtue special to man is for the time dormant (i. 13).\n\nBut the irrational soul has also another branch, the appetites,\ndesires, and passions: which are quite distinct from reason, but may\neither resist reason, or obey it, as the case may happen. It may thus\nin a certain sense be said to partake of reason, which the vegetative\nand nutritive faculty does not in any way. The virtue of this\ndepartment of the soul consists in its due obedience to reason, as to\nthe voice of a parent (i. 13).\n\nHuman virtue, then, distributes itself into two grand divisions--1.\nThe virtue of the rational soul, or Intellectual Virtue. 2. The\nvirtue of the semi-rational soul, or Ethical Virtue.\n\nPerhaps the word _Excellence_ more exactly corresponds to [Greek:\na)ret\u00ea\\], than _Virtue_.\n\nIntellectual excellence is both generated and augmented by teaching\nand experience. Ethical excellence by practical training. The\nexcellence is not natural to us: but we are susceptible of being\ntrained, and the training creates it. By training, according as it is\neither good or bad, all excellence is either created or destroyed:\njust as a man becomes a good or a bad musician, according as he has\nbeen subjected to a good or a bad mode of practice.\n\nIt is by doing the same thing many times that we acquire at last the\nhabit of doing it--\"For what things we have to learn to do, these we\nlearn by doing\" (ii. 1): according as the things we are trained to do\nare good or bad, we acquire good habits or bad habits. By building we\nbecome builders, by playing on the harp we become harpers--good or\nindifferent, according to the way in which we have practised. All\nlegislators wish and attempt to make their citizens good, by means of\ncertain habits: some succeed in the attempt, others fail: and this is\nthe difference between a good and a bad government. It is by being\ntrained to do acts of justice and courage that we become at last just\nand courageous--\"In one word, habits are generated by (a succession\nof) like operations: for this reason it is the character of the\noperations performed which we ought chiefly to attend to: for\naccording to the difference of these will be the habits which ensue.\nIt is therefore not a matter of slight difference whether immediately\nfrom our earliest years we are _ethised_ in one way or in another--it\nmakes a prodigious difference--or rather, it makes the whole\ndifference\" (ii. 1).\n\nUniform perseverance in action, then, creates a habit: but of what\nnature is the required action to be? In every department of our\nnature, where any good result is to be produced, we may be\ndisappointed of our result by two sorts of error: either an excess or\non the side of defect. To work or eat too much, or too little,\nprevents the good effects of training upon the health and strength:\nso with regard to temperance, courage and the other virtues--the man\nwho is trained to fear everything and the man who is trained to fear\nnothing, will alike fail in acquiring the genuine habit of courage.\nThe acquisition of the habit makes the performance of the action\neasy: by a course of abstinent acts, we acquire the habit of\ntemperance: and having acquired this habit, we can with the greater\nease perform the act of abstinence (ii. 2).\n\nThe symptom which indicates that the habit has been perfectly\nacquired, is the facility or satisfaction with which the act comes to\nbe performed (ii. 3). The man who abstains from bodily pleasures, and\nwho performs this contentedly ([Greek: au)t\u00f4=| tou/t\u00f4| chai/r\u00f4n]), is\nthe _temperate_ man: the man who does the same thing but reluctantly\nand with vexation ([Greek: a)chtho/nimos]) is _intemperate_: the like\nwith courage. Ethical excellence, or ethical badness, has reference\nto our pleasures and pains: whenever we do any thing mean, or shrink\nfrom any thing honourable, it is some pleasure or some pain which\ndetermines our conduct: for which reason Plato rightly prescribes\nthat the young shall be educated even from the earliest moment so as\nto give a proper direction to their pleasures and pains (ii. 3). By\noften pursuing pleasure and pain under circumstances in which we\nought not to do so, we contract bad habits, by a law similar to that\nwhich under a good education would have imparted to us good habits.\nEthical virtue then consists in such a disposition of our pleasures\nand pains as leads to performance of the best actions. Some persons\nhave defined it to consist in apathy and imperturbability of mind:\nbut this definition is erroneous: the mind ought to be affected under\nproper circumstances (ii. 3). (This seems to be the same doctrine\nwhich was afterwards preached by the Stoic school.)\n\nThere are three ingredients which determine our choice, _the\nhonourable_--_the expedient_--_the agreeable_: and as many which\noccasion our rejection--_the base_--_the inexpedient_--_the painful_\nor _vexatious_. In respect to all these three the good man judges\nrightly, the wicked man wrongly, and especially in regard to the\nlatter. Pleasure and pain are familiar to us from our earliest\nchildhood, and are ineffaceable from human nature: all men measure\nand classify actions ([Greek: kanoni/zomen ta\\s pra/xeis]) by\npleasure and pain: some men to a greater degree, others to a less\ndegree.\n\nAll ethical excellence, and all the political science, turns upon\npleasure and pain (ii. 3).\n\nA man becomes just and temperate by doing just and temperate actions,\nthus by degrees acquiring the habit. But how (it is asked) can this\nbe true? for if a man performs just and temperate actions, he must\nalready start by being just and temperate.\n\nThe objection is not well founded. A man may do just and temperate\nactions, and yet not be just and temperate. If he does them, knowing\nwhat he does, intending what he does, and intending to do the acts\nfor their own sake, then indeed he is just and temperate, but not\notherwise. The productions of art carry their own merit along with\nthem: a work of art is excellent or defective, whatever be the state\nof mind of the person who has executed it. But the acts of a man\ncannot be said to be justly or temperately done, unless there be a\ncertain state of mind accompanying their performance by the doer:\nthey may indeed be called just and temperate acts, meaning thereby\nthat they are such as a just and temperate man would do, but the man\nwho does them does not necessarily deserve these epithets. It is only\nby frequent doing of acts of this class that a man can acquire the\nhabit of performing them intentionally and for themselves, in which\nconsists the just and temperate character. To know what such acts\nare, is little or nothing: you must obey the precepts, just as you\nfollow the prescriptions of a physician. Many men think erroneously\nthat philosophy will teach them to be virtuous, without any course of\naction adopted by themselves (ii. 4).\n\nAristotle classifies the phenomena of the soul (the non-rational\nsoul) into three--Passions--Capacities or Faculties--States. The\nfirst are the occasional affections--anger, fear, envy, joy,\naversion--\"in short, everything that is accompanied by pleasure or\npain\" (ii. 5). The second are, the capacities of being moved by such\naffections--the affective faculties, if one may so call them (_ib._\nSo Eth. Eudem. ii. 2). The third are, those habits according to which\nwe are said to be well or ill disposed towards this or that\nparticular affection: to be disposed to violent anger or violent\nfear, is a bad habit. Virtues and vices are neither affections, nor\nfaculties, but habits, either good or bad. This is the genus to which\nthe virtues belong ([Greek: t\u00f4=| ge/nei]--Eth. Nic. ii. 5). Virtue is\nthat habit from the possession of which a man is called good, and by\nwhich he performs well his appropriate function (ii. 6). It consists\nin a certain medium between two extremes, the one of excess, the\nother of defect--a medium not positive and absolute, but variable and\nhaving reference to each particular person and each particular\ncase--neither exceeding nor falling short of what is proper (ii. 6).\nAll ethical virtue aims at the attainment of this middle point in\nrespect to our affections and actions--to exhibit each on the proper\noccasions, in the proper degree, towards the proper persons, &c. This\nmiddle point is but one, but errors on both sides of it are\nnumberless: it must be determined by reason and by the judgment of\nthe prudent man (ii. 6).\n\nVirtue therefore, according to its essence and generic definition\n([Greek: kata\\ me\\n t\u00ea\\n ousi/an, kai\\ to\\n lo/gon to\\n ti/ \u00ea)n\nei)=nai le/gonta]), is a _certain mediocrity_.\n\nBut there are some actions and some affections which do not admit of\nmediocrity, and which imply at once in their names evil and\nculpability (ii. 6)--such as impudence, envy, theft, &c. Each of\nthese names implies in its meaning a certain excess and defect, and\ndoes not admit of mediocrity: just as _temperance_ and _courage_\nimply in their meaning the idea of mediocrity, and exclude both\nexcess and defect.\n\nAristotle then proceeds to apply his general doctrine--that virtue or\nexcellence consists in a medium between two extremes, both\ndefects--to various different virtues. He again insists upon the\nextreme difficulty of determining where this requisite medium is, in\neach individual instance: either excess or defect is the easy and\nnatural course. In finding and adhering to the middle point consists\nthe _well_, the _rare_, the _praiseworthy_, the _honourable_ (ii. 9).\nThe extremes, though both wrong, are not always equally wrong: that\nwhich is the most wrong ought at any rate to be avoided: and we ought\nto be specially on our guard against the seductions of pleasure\n(_ib._), since our natural inclinations carry us in that direction.\n\nAristotle so often speaks of the propriety of following _nature_, and\nproduces _nature_ so constantly as an authority and an arbiter, that\nit seems surprising to find him saying--\"We must be on our guard with\nreference to the things whereto we ourselves are prone. For some of\nus are by nature disposed towards some things, others towards\nothers.\"--\"But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction\"\n(ii. 9).\n\nThere is a singular passage in the same chapter with respect to our\nmoral judgments. After having forcibly insisted on the extreme\ndifficulty of hitting the proper medium point of virtue, he says that\na man who commits only small errors on one side or on the other side\nof this point, is not censured, but only he who greatly deviates from\nit--he then proceeds--\"But it is not easy to define in general\nlanguage at what point a man becomes deserving of censure: nor indeed\nis it easy to do this with regard to any other matter of perception.\nQuestions of this sort depend upon the circumstances of the\nparticular case, and the judgment upon each _resides in our\nperception_\" (ii. 9).\n\nThe first five chapters, of the third Book of the Ethics, are devoted\nto an examination of various notions involved in our ideas of virtue\nand vice--_Voluntary_ and _Involuntary_--[Greek: e(kou/sion kai\\\na)kou/sion]--_Ignorance_--[Greek: a)/gnoia]--Choice or resolution,\nconsequent upon previous deliberation--[Greek: proai/resis].\n\nThose actions are _involuntary_, which are done either by compulsion,\nor through ignorance. An action is done by compulsion when the\nproximate cause of it (or beginning--[Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\]) is something\nforeign to the will of the agent--the agent himself neither\nconcurring nor contributing. Actions done from the fear of greater\nevils are of a mixed character, as where a navigator in a storm\nthrows his goods overboard to preserve the ship. Such actions as\nthis, taken as a class, and apart from particular circumstances, are\nwhat no one would do voluntarily: but in the particular circumstances\nof the supposed case, the action is done voluntarily. Every action is\n_voluntary_, wherein the beginning of organic motion is, the will of\nthe agent (iii. 1).\n\nMen are praised if under such painful circumstances they make a right\nchoice--if they voluntarily undergo what is painful or dishonourable\nfor the purpose of accomplishing some great and glorious result\n(_ib._): they are censured, if they shrink from this course, or if\nthey submit to the evil without some sufficient end. If a man is\ninduced to do what is unbecoming by the threat of evils surpassing\nhuman endurance, he is spoken of with forbearance: though there are\nsome crimes of such magnitude as cannot be excused even by the\ngreatest possible apprehension of evil, such as death and torture. In\nsuch trying circumstances, it is difficult to make a right choice,\nand still more difficult to adhere to the choice when it is made.\n\nWhat is done _through ignorance_, can never be said to be done\n_voluntarily_: if the agent shall be afterwards grieved and repentant\nfor what he has done, it is _involuntary_. If he be not repentant,\nthough he cannot be said to have done the deed _voluntarily_, yet\nneither ought it to be called involuntary.\n\nA distinction however is to be taken in regard to ignorance,\nconsidered as a ground for calling the action _involuntary_, and for\nexcusing the agent. A man drunk or in a violent passion, misbehaves,\n_ignorantly_ but not _through ignorance_: that is, ignorance is not\nthe cause of his misbehaviour, but drunkenness or rage. In like\nmanner, every depraved person may be ignorant of his true interest,\nor the rule which he ought to follow, but this sort of ignorance does\nnot render his behaviour _involuntary_, nor entitle him to any\nindulgence. It must be ignorance with regard to some particular\ncircumstance connected with the special action which he is\ncommitting--ignorance of the person with whom, or the instrument with\nwhich, or the subject matter in regard to which he is dealing.\nIgnorance of this special kind, if it be accompanied with subsequent\nsorrow and repentance, constitutes an action involuntary, and forms a\nreasonable ground for indulgence (**iii. 1).\n\nA _voluntary action_, then, is that of which the beginning is in the\nagent--he knowing the particular circumstances under which he is\nacting. Some persons have treated actions, performed through passion\nor through desire, as _involuntary_; but this is an error. If this\nwere true, neither children nor animals would be capable of voluntary\naction. Besides, it is proper, on some occasions, to follow the\ndictates both of anger and of desire: and we cannot be said to act\ninvoluntarily in these cases when we do exactly what we ought to do.\nMoreover sins from passions and sins from bad reasoning are alike\nvoluntary or alike involuntary: both of them ought to be avoided: and\nthe nonrational affections are just as much a part of human nature as\nreason is (**iii. 1).\n\nHaving explained the proper meaning of voluntary and involuntary as\napplied to actions, Aristotle proceeds to define [Greek:\n_proai/resis_] (deliberate choice); which is most intimately\nconnected with excellence, and which indeed affords a better test of\ndisposition than actions themselves can do (**iii. 2).\n\nAll premeditated choice is voluntary, but all voluntary action is not\npreconcerted. Children and animals are capable of voluntary action,\nbut not of preconcerted action: sudden deeds, too, are voluntary, but\nnot preconcerted. Premeditated choice is different from desire--from\npassion--from wishing--and from opinion. Desire and passion are\ncommon to animals, who are nevertheless incapable of _deliberate\npreference_. The incontinent man acts from desire, but not from\ndeliberate preference: the continent man acts from deliberate\npreference, but not from desire. Nor is premeditated choice the same\nas wishing: for we often wish for what is notoriously impracticable\nor unattainable, but we do not deliberately prefer any such thing:\nmoreover we _wish_ for the end, but we _deliberately choose_ the\nmeans conducting to the end. We wish to be happy: but it cannot with\npropriety be said that we deliberately choose to be happy. Deliberate\nchoice has reference to what it is or seems in our own power to\nachieve.\n\nAgain, deliberate choice is not to be regarded as a simple\nmodification of opinion. Opinions extend to everything: deliberate\nchoice belongs exclusively to matters within our grasp. Opinion is\neither true or false: deliberate choice is either good or evil. We\nare good or bad, according to the turn which our deliberate choice\ntakes: not according to our opinions. We deliberately choose to seek\nsomething or to avoid something, and our choice is praised when it\nfalls upon what is proper: the points upon which we form an opinion\nare, what such or such a thing is, whom it will benefit, and how: and\nour opinion is praised when it happens to be true. It often occurs,\ntoo, that men who form the truest opinions are not the best in their\ndeliberate preferences. Opinion may precede or accompany every\ndeliberate choice, but still the latter is something distinct in\nitself. It is in fact a determination of the will, preceded by\ndeliberate counsel, and thus including or presupposing the employment\nof reason (**iii. 2). It is an appetency, determined by previous\ncounsel, of some matter within our means, either really or seemingly,\nto accomplish--[Greek: bouleutik\u00ea\\ o(/rexis t\u00f4=n e)ph' \u00ea(mi=n]\n(**iii. 3).\n\nIt seems from the language of Aristotle that the various explanations\nof [Greek: Proai/resis] which he has canvassed and shown to be\ninadmissible, had all been advanced by various contemporary\nphilosophers.\n\n[Greek: Proai/resis], or _deliberate preference_, includes the idea\nof _deliberation_. A reasonable man does not deliberate upon all\nmatters--he does not deliberate respecting mathematical or physical\ntruths, or respecting natural events altogether out of his reach, or\nrespecting matters of pure accident, or even respecting matters of\nhuman design carried on by distant foreign nations. He only\ndeliberates respecting matters which are more or less within his own\nagency and control: respecting matters which are not certain, but of\ndoubtful issue. He does not deliberate about the end, but about the\nmeans towards the end: the end itself is commonly assumed, just as\nthe physician assumes the necessity of establishing good health and\nthe orator that of persuading his hearers. If there be more than one\nway of accomplishing the end, he deliberates by which out of these\nseveral means he can achieve it best and most easily: proceeding from\nthe end itself first to the proximate cause of that end, then to the\ncause immediately preceding that cause, and so backwards until he\narrives at the primary cause, which is either an action of his own,\nwithin his own means, or something requiring implements and\nassistance beyond his power to procure. This is a process of\nanalysis, similar to that which is pursued by geometricians in\nseeking the way of solving a problem: they assume the figure with the\nrequired conditions to be constructed: they then take it to pieces,\nfollowing back the consequences of each separate condition which it\nhas been assumed to possess. If by this way of proceeding they arrive\nat some known truth, their problem is solved; if they arrive at some\nknown untruth, the problem is insoluble. That step which is last\narrived at in the analysis, is the first in the order of production\n(iii. 3). When a man in carrying back mentally this deliberative\nanalysis arrives at something manifestly impracticable, he desists\nfrom farther deliberation: if he arrives at something within his\npower to perform, he begins action accordingly. The subject of\n_deliberation_, and the subject of _deliberate preference_, are the\nsame, but the latter represents the process as accomplished and the\nresult of deliberation decided.\n\nWe take counsel and deliberation (as has been said), not about the\nend, but about the means or the best means towards the end assumed.\nWe _wish for the end_ ([Greek: \u00ea( bou/l\u00easis tou= te/lous\ne)/sti]--iii. 4). Our wish is for good, real or apparent: whether for\nthe one or the other, is a disputed question. Speaking generally, and\nwithout reference to peculiar idiosyncrasies, the real good or _the\ngood_ is the object of human wishes: speaking with reference to any\nparticular individual, it is his own supposed or apparent good. On\nthis matter, the virtuous man is the proper judge and standard of\nreference: that which is really good appears good to him. Each\nparticular disposition has its own peculiar sentiment both of what is\nhonourable and of what is agreeable (iii. 4): the principal\nexcellence of the virtuous man is, that he in every variety of\ncircumstances perceives what is truly and genuinely good; whereas to\nmost men, pleasure proves a deception, and appears to be good, not\nbeing so in reality.\n\nBoth virtue and vice consists in _deliberate preference_, of one or\nof another course of action. Both therefore are voluntary and in our\nown power: both equally so. It is not possible to refer virtuous\nconduct or vicious conduct to any other beginning except to\nourselves: the man is the cause of his own actions, as he is the\nfather of his own children. It is upon this assumption that all legal\nreward and punishment is founded: it is intended for purposes of\nencouragement and prevention, but it would be absurd to think either\nof encouraging or preventing what is involuntary, such as the\nappetite of hunger and thirst. A man is punished for ignorance, when\nhe is himself the cause of his own ignorance, or when by reasonable\npains he might have acquired the requisite knowledge. Every man above\nthe limit of absolute fatuity ([Greek: komid\u00ea=| a)naisth\u00ea/tou]) must\nknow that any constant repetition of acts tends to form a habit: if\nthen by repetition of acts he allows himself to form a bad habit, it\nis his own fault. When once the bad habit is formed, it is true that\nhe cannot at once get rid of it: but the formation of such a habit\noriginally was not the less imputable to himself (iii. 5). Defects of\nbody also which we bring upon ourselves by our own negligence or\nintemperance, bring upon us censure: if they are constitutional and\nunavoidable, we are pitied for them. Some persons seem to have\ncontended at that time, that no man could justly be made responsible\nfor his bad conduct: because (they said) the end which he proposed to\nhimself was good or bad according to his natural disposition, not\naccording to any selection of his own. Aristotle seems to be somewhat\nperplexed by this argument: nevertheless he maintains, that whatever\ninfluence we may allow to original and uncontrollable nature, still\nthe formation of our habits is more or less under our own concurrent\ncontrol; and therefore the end which we propose to ourselves being\ndependent upon those habits, is also in part at least dependent upon\nourselves (iii. 5)--our virtues and our vices are both voluntary.\n\nThe first five chapters of the third Book (in which Aristotle\nexamines the nature of [Greek: to\\ e(kou/sion, to\\ a)kou/sion,\nproai/resis, bou/l\u00easis], &c.) ought perhaps to constitute a Book by\nthemselves. They are among the most valuable parts of the Ethics. He\nhas now established certain points with regard to our virtues\ngenerally.\n\n1. They are mediocrities ([Greek: meso/t\u00eates]).2. They are habits,\ngenerated by particular actions often repeated.3. When generated,\nthey have a specific influence of their own in facilitating the\nperformance of actions of the same class. 4. They are in our own\npower originally, and voluntary.5. They are under the direction of\nright reason.\n\nIt is to be observed that our actions are voluntary from the\nbeginning to the end--the last of a number of repeated actions is no\nless voluntary than the first. But our habits are voluntary only at\nthe beginning--they cease to be voluntary after a certain time--but\nthe permanent effect left by each separate repetition of the action\nis inappreciable (iii. 5).\n\nAristotle then proceeds to an analysis of the separate\nvirtues--Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnificence, Magnanimity,\nGentleness, Frankness, Simplicity, Elegant playfulness, Justice,\nEquity, &c. He endeavours to show that each of these is a certain\nmediocrity--excess lying on one side of it, defect on the other.\n\nThere are various passages of Aristotle which appear almost identical\nwith the moral doctrine subsequently maintained by the Stoic school:\nfor example--iii. 6--\"In like manner he ought not to fear penury, nor\nsickness, nor in any way such things as arise not from moral baseness\nnor are dependent on himself.\"\n\nThe courageous man is afraid of things such as it befits a man to\nfear, but of no others: and even these he will make head against on\nproper occasions, when reason commands and for the sake of _honour_,\nwhich is the end of virtue (iii. 7). To fear nothing, or too little,\nis rashness or insanity: to fear too much, is timidity: the\ncourageous man is the mean between the two, who fears what he ought,\nwhen he ought, as he ought, and with the right views and purposes\n(_ib._). The [Greek: moicho\\s] (adulterer) exposes himself often to\ngreat dangers for the purpose of gratifying his passion: but\nAristotle does not hold this to be courage. Neither does he thus\ndenominate men who affront danger from passion, or from the thirst of\nrevenge, or from a sanguine temperament--there must be deliberate\npreference and a proper motive, to constitute courage--the motive of\nhonour (iii. 8).\n\nThe end of courage (says Aristotle) is in itself pleasant, but it is\nput out of sight by the circumstances around it: just as the prize\nfor which the pugilist contends is in itself pleasurable, but being\nof small moment and encompassed with painful accessories, it appears\nto carry with it no pleasure whatever. Fatigue, and wounds and death\nare painful to the courageous man--death is indeed more painful to\nhim, inasmuch as his life is of more value: but still he voluntarily\nand knowingly affronts these pains for the sake of honour.\n\nThis is painful: \"but pleasure is not to be anticipated in the\nexercise of all the different virtues, except in so far as the\nattainment of the end is concerned\" (iii. 9).\n\n(This is perfectly true: but it contradicts decidedly the remark\nwhich Aristotle had made before in his first Book (i. 8) respecting\nthe inherent pleasure of virtuous agency.)\n\nCourage and Temperance are the virtues of the instincts ([Greek: t\u00f4=n\na)lo/g\u00f4n mer\u00f4=n]--iii. 10). Temperance is the observance of a\nrational medium with respect to the pleasures of eating, drinking,\nand sex. Aristotle seems to be inconsistent when he makes it to\nbelong to those pleasures in which animals generally partake (iii.\n10); for other animals do not relish intoxicating liquors: unless\nindeed these are considered as ranking under drink generally. The\ntemperate man desires these pleasures as he ought, when he ought,\nwithin the limits of what is honourable, and having a proper\nreference to the amount of his own pecuniary means: just as right\nreason prescribes (iii. 11). To pursue them more, is excess: to\npursue them less, is defect. There is however, in estimating excess\nand defect, a certain tacit reference to the average dispositions of\nthe many.\n\n\"Wherefore the desires of the temperate man ought to harmonize with\nreason; for the aim of both is the honourable. And the temperate man\ndesires what he ought, and as he ought, and when: and this too is the\norder of reason\" (iii. 12).\n\nAll virtuous acts are to be _on account of the honourable_--thus\nAristotle says that the donations of the [Greek: a)/s\u00f4tos] (prodigal)\nare not to be called liberal--\"Neither are their gifts liberal, for\nthey are not honourable, nor on account of this, nor as they ought to\nbe\" (iv. 1). Again about the [Greek: megaloprep\u00ea\\s] or _magnificent_\nman--\"Now the magnificent man will expend such things on account of\nthe honourable; for this is a condition shared in by all the virtues:\nand still he will do so pleasantly and lavishly\" (iv. 2). On the\ncontrary, the [Greek: ba/nausos] or _vulgar_ man, who differs from\nthe magnificent man in the way of [Greek: u(perbol\u00ea\\] or _excess_, is\nsaid to spend--\"Not for the sake of the honourable, but for the\npurpose of making a display of his wealth\" (iv. 2).\n\nWith respect to those epithets which imply praise or blame, there is\nalways a tacit comparison with some assumed standard. Thus with\nregard to the [Greek: philo/timos] (lover of honour), Aristotle\nobserves--\"It is evident that, as the term 'lover of such and such\nthings' is used in various senses, we do not always apply 'lover of\nhonour' to express the same thing; but when we praise, we praise that\nambition which is more than most men's, and blame that which is\ngreater than it ought to be\" (iv. 4).\n\nIn the fifth Book, Aristotle proceeds to explain wherein consist\n_Justice_ and _Injustice_.\n\nThese words are used in two senses--a larger sense and a narrower\nsense.\n\nIn the larger sense, _just behaviour_ is equivalent to the observance\nof law, generally: unjust behaviour is equivalent to the violation of\nlaw generally. But the law either actually does command, or may be\nunderstood to command, that we should perform towards others the acts\nbelonging to each separate head of virtue: it either actually\nprohibits, or may be understood to prohibit, us from performing\ntowards others any of the acts belonging to each separate head of\nvice. In this larger sense, therefore, _justice_ is synonymous\ngenerally with perfect virtue--_injustice_, with perfect wickedness:\nthere is only this difference, that _just_ or _unjust_ are\nexpressions applied to behaviour in so far as it affects other\npersons besides the agent: whereas _virtuous_ or _wicked_ are\nexpressions applied simply to the agent without connoting any such\nulterior reference to other persons. _Just_ or _unjust_, is\nnecessarily towards somebody else: and this reference is implied\ndistinctly in the term. Virtuous and vicious do not in the force of\nthe term connote any such relations, but are employed with reference\nto the agent simply--\"This justice then is perfect virtue; yet not\nabsolutely, but with reference to one's neighbour.--In one sense we\ncall those things _just_ that are productive and preservative of\nhappiness and its parts to the political communion\" (v. 1).\n\nJustice in this sense, is the very fulness of virtue, because it\ndenotes the actual exercise of virtuous behaviour towards others:\n\"there are many who behave virtuously in regard to their own personal\naffairs, but who are incapable of doing so in what regards others\"\n(_ib._). For this reason, justice has been called by some _the good\nof another and not our own_--justice alone of all the virtues,\nbecause it necessarily has reference to another: the just man does\nwhat is for the interest of some one else, either the magistrate, or\nthe community (v. 1).\n\n_Justice_ in the narrower sense, is that mode of behaviour whereby a\nman, in his dealings with others, aims at taking to himself his fair\nshare and no more of the common objects of desire: and willingly\nconsents to endure his fair share of the common hardships.\n_Injustice_ is the opposite--that by which a man tries to appropriate\nmore than his fair share of the objects of desire, while he tries to\nescape his fair share of the objects of aversion. To aim at this\nunfair distribution of the benefits of the society, either in one's\nown favour or in favour of any one else, is injustice in _the narrow\nsense_ (v. 2).\n\nJustice in this narrower sense is divided into two branches--1.\nDistributive Justice. 2. Corrective Justice.\n\nDistributive Justice has reference to those occasions on which\npositive benefits are to be distributed among the members of the\ncommunity, wealth and honours, &c. (v. 2). In this case, the share of\neach citizen is to be a share not absolutely of equality, but one\nproportional to his personal worth ([Greek: a)xi/an]): and it is in\nthe estimation of this personal worth that quarrels and dissension\narise.\n\n_Corrective Justice_ has reference to the individual dealings, or\nindividual behaviour, between man and man: either to the dealings\nimplying mutual consent and contract, as purchase, sale, loan, hire,\nsuretyship, deposit, &c.: or such as imply no such mutual\nconsent,--such as are on the contrary proceedings either by fraud or\nby force--as theft, adultery, perjury, poisoning, assassination,\nrobbery, beating, mutilation, murder, defamation, &c.\n\nIn regard to transactions of this nature, the citizens are considered\nas being all upon a par--no account is taken of the difference\nbetween them in point of individual worth. Each man is considered as\nentitled to an equal share of good and evil: and if in any dealings\nbetween man and man, one man shall attempt to increase his own share\nof good or to diminish his own share of evil at the expense of\nanother man, corrective justice will interpose and re-establish the\nequality thus improperly disturbed. He who has been made to lose or\nto suffer unduly, must be compensated and replaced in his former\nposition: he who has gained unduly, must be mulcted or made to\nsuffer, so as to be thrown back to the point from which he started.\nThe judge, who represents this _corrective justice_, is a kind of\nmediator, and the point which he seeks to attain in directing\nredress, is _the middle point between gain and loss_--so that neither\nshall the aggressive party be a gainer, nor the suffering party a\nloser--\"So that justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in\nvoluntary things,--it is the having the same after as before\" (v. 4).\nAristotle admits that the words _gain_ and _loss_ are not strictly\napplicable to many of the transactions which come within the scope of\ninterference from _corrective justice_--that they properly belong to\nvoluntary contracts, and are strained in order to apply them to acts\nof aggression, &c. (_ib._).\n\nThe Pythagoreans held the doctrine that justice universally speaking\nconsisted in simple retaliation--in rendering to another the precise\ndealing which that other had first given. This definition will not\nsuit either for distributive justice or corrective justice: the\ntreatment so prescribed would be sometimes more, sometimes less, than\njustice: not to mention that acts deserve to be treated differently\naccording as they are intentional or unintentional. But the doctrine\nis to a certain extent true in regard to the dealings between man and\nman ([Greek: e)n tai=s a)llaktikai=s koin\u00f4ni/ais])--if it be applied\nin the way of general analogy and not with any regard to exact\nsimilarity--it is of importance that the man who has been well\ntreated, and the man who has been illtreated, should each show his\nsense of the proceeding by returning the like usage: \"for by\nproportionate requital the State is held together\" (v. 5). The whole\nbusiness of exchange and barter, of division of labour and\noccupation,--the co-existence of those distinct and heterogeneous\ningredients which are requisite to constitute the political\ncommunion--the supply of the most essential wants of the citizens--is\nall founded upon the continuance and the expectation of this assured\nrequital for acts done. Money is introduced as an indispensable\ninstrument for facilitating this constant traffic: it affords a\ncommon measure for estimating the value of every service--\"And thus\nif there were no possibility of retaliation, there would be no\ncommunion\" (v. 5).\n\nJustice is thus a mediocrity--or consists in a just medium--between\ntwo extremes, but not in the same way as the other virtues. The just\nman is one who awards both to himself and to every one else the\nproper and rightful share both of benefit and burthen. Injustice, on\nthe contrary, consists in the excess or defect which lie on one side\nor the other of this medium point (v. 5).\n\n_Distributive justice_ is said by Aristotle to deal with individuals\naccording to geometrical ratio; _corrective justice_, according to\narithmetical proportion. _Justice_, strictly and properly so called,\nis _political justice_: that reciprocity of right and obligation\nwhich prevails between free and equal citizens in a community, or\nbetween citizens who, if not positively equal, yet stand in an\nassured and definite ratio one to the other (v. 6). This relation is\ndefined and maintained by law, and by judges and magistrates to\nadminister the law. Political justice implies a state of law--a\ncommunity of persons qualified by nature to obey and sustain the\nlaw--and a definite arrangement between the citizens in respect to\nthe alternation of command and obedience--\"For this is, as we have\nsaid ([Greek: \u00ea)=n]), according to law, and among those who can\nnaturally have law; those, namely, as we have said ([Greek: \u00ea)=san]),\nwho have an equality of ruling and being ruled.\" As the law arises\nout of the necessity of preventing injustice, or of hindering any\nindividual from appropriating more than his fair share of good things,\nso it is felt that any person invested with sovereign authority may\nand will commit this injustice. Reason therefore is understood to hold\nthe sovereign authority, and the archon acts only as the guardian of\nthe reciprocal rights and obligations--of the constitutional\nequality--between the various citizens: undertaking a troublesome duty\nand paid for his trouble by honour and respect (v. 6).\n\nThe relation which subsists between master and slave, or father and\nson, is not properly speaking that of justice, though it is somewhat\nanalogous. Both the slave, and the non-adult son, are as it were\nparts of the master and father: there can therefore be no injustice\non his part towards them, since no one deliberately intends to hurt a\npart of himself. Between husband and wife there subsists a sort of\njustice--_household justice_ ([Greek: to\\ oi)konomiko\\n\ndi/kaion])--but this too is different from political justice (v. 6).\n\nPolitical justice is in part _natural_--in part _conventional_. That\nwhich is _natural_ is everywhere the same: that which is conventional\nis different in different countries, and takes its origin altogether\nfrom positive and special institution. Some persons think that _all_\npolitical justice is thus conventional, and none natural: because\nthey see that rights and obligations ([Greek: ta\\ di/kaia]) are\neverywhere changeable, and nowhere exhibit that permanence and\ninvariability which mark the properties of natural objects. \"This is\ntrue to a certain extent, but not wholly true: probably among the\nGods it is not true at all: but with us that which is natural is in\npart variable, though not in every case: yet there is a real\ndistinction between what is natural and what is not natural. Both\nnatural justice and conventional justice, are thus alike contingent\nand variable: but there is a clear mode of distinguishing between the\ntwo, applicable not only to the case of justice but to other cases in\nwhich the like distinction is to be taken. For by nature the right\nhand is the stronger: but nevertheless it may happen that there are\nambidextrous men.--And in like manner those rules of justice which\nare not natural, but of human establishment, are not the same\neverywhere: nor indeed does the same mode of government prevail\neverywhere, though there is but one mode of government which is\neverywhere agreeable to nature--the best of all\" (v. 7).\n\n(The commentary of Andronicus upon this passage is clearer and more\ninstructive than the passage of Aristotle itself: and it is\nremarkable as a distinct announcement of the principle of utility.\n\"Since both natural justice, and conventional justice, are\nchangeable, in the way just stated, how are we to distinguish the one\nof these fluctuating institutions from the other? The distinction is\nplain. Each special precept of justice is to be examined on its own\nground to ascertain whether it be for the advantage of all that it\nshould be maintained unaltered, or whether the subversion of it would\noccasion mischief. If this be found to be the fact, the precept in\nquestion belongs to natural justice: if it be otherwise, to\nconventional justice\" (Andronic. Rh. v. c. 10).\n\nThe just, and the unjust, being thus defined, a man who does,\nwillingly and knowingly, either the one or the other, acts justly or\nunjustly: if he does it unwillingly or unknowingly, he neither acts\njustly nor unjustly, except by accident--that is, he does what is not\nessentially and in its own nature unjust, but is only so by accident\n(v. 8). Injustice will thus have been done, but no unjust act will\nhave been committed, if the act be done involuntarily. The man who\nrestores a deposit unwillingly and from fear of danger to himself,\ndoes not act justly, though he does what by accident is just: the man\nwho, anxious to restore the deposit, is prevented by positive\nsuperior force from doing so, does not act unjustly, although he does\nwhat by accident is unjust. When a man does mischief, it is either\ndone contrary to all reasonable expectation, in such manner that\nneither he nor any one else could have anticipated from his act the\nmischief which has actually ensued from it ([Greek: paralo/g\u00f4s]), and\nin this case it is a pure misfortune ([Greek: a)tu/ch\u00eama]): or he\ndoes it without intention or foreknowledge, yet under circumstances\nin which mischief might have been foreseen, and ought to have been\nforeseen; in this case it is a fault ([Greek: a(ma/rt\u00eama]): or he\ndoes it intentionally and with foreknowledge, yet without any\nprevious deliberation, through anger, or some violent momentary\nimpulse; in this case it is an unjust act ([Greek: a)di/k\u00eama]), but\nthe agent is not necessarily an _unjust or wicked_ man for having\ndone it: or he does it with intention and deliberate choice, and in\nthis case he is an unjust and wicked man.\n\nThe man who does a just thing, or an unjust thing, is not necessarily\na just or an unjust man. Whether he be so or not, depends upon the\nstate of his mind and intention at the time (v. 8).\n\nEquity, [Greek: to\\ e)pieike\\s], is not at variance with justice, but\nis an improvement upon justice. It is a correction and supplement to\nthe inevitable imperfections in the definitions of legal justice. The\nlaw wishes to comprehend all cases, but fails in doing so: the words\nof its enactment do not fully and exactly express its real\nintentions, but either something more or something less. When the\nlawgiver speaks in general terms, a particular case may happen which\nfalls within the rule as he lays it down, but which he would not have\nwished to comprehend if he had known how to avoid it. It is then\nbecoming conduct in the individual to whose advantage the law in this\nspecial case turns, that he should refrain from profiting by his\nposition, and that he should act as the legislator himself would\nwish, if consulted on the special case. The general rules laid down\nby the legislator are of necessity more or less defective: in fact,\nthe only reason why everything is not determined by law, is, that\nthere are some matters respecting which it is impossible to frame a\nlaw (v. 10). Such is the conduct of the equitable man--\"the man who\nrefrains from pushing his legal rights to the extreme, to the injury\nof others, but who foregoes the advantage of his position, although\nthe law is in his favour\" ([Greek: o( m\u00ea\\ a)kribodi/kaios e)pi\\\nchei=ron, a)ll' e)latt\u00f4tiko\\s, kai/per e)/ch\u00f4n to\\n no/mon\nbo\u00eatho/n]).\n\nA man may hurt himself, but he cannot act unjustly towards himself.\nNo injustice can be done to a man except against his own consent.\nSuicide is by implication forbidden by the law: to commit suicide is\nwrong, because a man in so doing acts unjustly towards the city, not\ntowards himself, which is impossible (v. 12).\n\nTo act unjustly--and to be the object of unjust dealing by\nothers--are both bad: but which is the worst? It is the least of the\ntwo evils to be the object of unjust dealing by others. Both are bad,\nbecause in the one case a man gets more than his share, in the other\nless than his share: in both cases the just medium is departed from.\nTo act unjustly is blameable, and implies wickedness: to be the\nobject of unjust dealing by others is not blameable, and implies no\nwickedness: the latter is therefore in itself the least evil,\nalthough by accident it may perhaps turn out to be the greater evil\nof the two. In the same manner a pleurisy is in itself a greater evil\nthan a trip and a stumble: but by accident it may turn out that the\nlatter is the greater evil of the two, if it should occur at the\nmoment when a man is running away from the enemy, so as to cause his\nbeing taken prisoner and slain.\n\nThe question here raised by Aristotle--which is the greater evil--to\nact unjustly or to be the object of unjust dealing--had been before\nraised by Plato in the Gorgias. Aristotle follows out his theory\nabout virtue, whereby he makes it consist in the observance of a\nmedium point. The man that acts unjustly sins on one side of this\npoint, the object of unjust dealing misses it on the other side: the\none is comparable to a man who eats or works too much for his health,\nthe other to a man who eats or works too little. The question is one\nwhich could hardly arise, according to the view taken by modern\nethical writers of the principles of moral science. The two things\ncompared are not in point of fact commensurable. Looking at the\nquestion from the point of view of the moralist, the person injured\nhas incurred no moral guilt, but has suffered more or less of\nmisfortune: the unjust agent on the contrary has suffered no\nmisfortune--perhaps he has reaped benefit--but at any rate he has\nincurred moral guilt. Society on the whole is a decided loser by the\nact: but the wrong done implies the suffering inflicted: the act is\nconsidered and called _wrong_ because it does inflict suffering, and\nfor no other reason. It seems an inadmissible question therefore, to\nask which of the two is the greater evil--the suffering undergone by\nA--or the wrong by which B occasioned that suffering: at least so far\nas society is concerned.\n\nBut the ancient moralists, in instituting this comparison, seem to\nhave looked, not at society, but at the two individuals--the wrong\ndoer and the wrong sufferer--and to have looked at them too from a\npoint of view of their own. If we take the feelings of these two\nparties themselves as the standard by which to judge, the sentence\nmust be obviously contrary to the opinion delivered by Aristotle: the\nsufferer, according to his own feeling, is worse off than he was\nbefore: the doer is better off. And it is for this reason that the\nact forms a proper ground for judicial punishment or redress. But the\nmoralist estimates the condition of the two men by a standard of his\nown, not by the feelings which they themselves entertain. He decides\nfor himself that a virtuous frame of mind is the primary and\nessential ingredient of individual happiness--a wicked frame of mind\nthe grand source of misery: and by this test he tries the comparative\nhappiness of every man. The man who manifests evidence of a guilty\nframe of mind is decidedly worse off than he who has only suffered an\nunmerited misfortune.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nPOLITICA.\n\n\nThe scheme of government proposed by Aristotle, in the two last books\nof his Politics, as representing his own ideas of something like\nperfection, is evidently founded upon the Republic of Plato: from\nwhom he differs in the important circumstance of not admitting either\ncommunity of property or community of wives and children.\n\nEach of these philosophers recognises one separate class of\ninhabitants, relieved from all private toil and all money-getting\nemployments, and constituting exclusively the citizens of the\ncommonwealth. This small class is in effect _the city_--_the\ncommonwealth_: the remaining inhabitants are not a part of the\ncommonwealth, they are only appendages to it--indispensable indeed,\nbut still appendages, in the same manner as slaves or cattle (vii.\n8). In the Republic of Plato this narrow aristocracy are not allowed\nto possess private property or separate families, but form one\ninseparable brotherhood. In the scheme of Aristotle, this aristocracy\nform a distinct caste of private families each with its separate\nproperty. The whole territory of the State belongs to them, and is\ntilled by dependent cultivators, by whom the produce is made over and\napportioned under certain restrictions. A certain section of the\nterritory is understood to be the common property of the body of\ncitizens (_i.e._ of the aristocracy), and the produce of it is handed\nover by the cultivators into a common stock, partly to supply the\npublic tables at which all the citizens with their wives and families\nare subsisted, partly to defray the cost of religious solemnities.\nThe remaining portion of the territory is possessed in separate\nproperties by individual citizens, who consume the produce as they\nplease (vii. 9): each citizen having two distinct lots of land\nassigned to him, one near the outskirts of the territory, the other\nnear the centre. This latter regulation also had been adopted by\nPlato in the treatise de Legibus, and it is surprising to observe\nthat Aristotle himself had censured it, in his criticisms on that\ntreatise, as incompatible with a judicious and careful economy (ii.\n3. 8). The syssitia or public tables are also adopted by Plato, in\nconformity with the institutions actually existing in his time in\nCrete and elsewhere.\n\nThe dependent cultivators, in Aristotle's scheme, ought to be slaves,\nnot united together by any bond of common language or common country\n(vii. 9, 9): if this cannot be, they ought to be a race of subdued\nforeigners, degraded into perioeci, deprived of all use of arms, and\nconfined to the task of labouring in the field. Those slaves who till\nthe common land are to be considered as the property of the\ncollective body of citizens: the slaves on land belonging to\nindividual citizens, are the property of those citizens.\n\nWhen we consider the scanty proportion of inhabitants whom Aristotle\nand Plato include in the benefits of their community, it will at once\nappear how amazingly their task as political theorists is simplified.\nTheir **commonwealth is really an aristocracy on a very narrow scale.\nThe great mass of the inhabitants are thrust out altogether from all\nsecurity and good government, and are placed without reserve at the\ndisposal of the small body of armed citizens.\n\nThere is but one precaution on which Aristotle and Plato rely for\nensuring good treatment from the citizens towards their inferiors:\nand that is, the finished and elaborate education which the citizens\nare to receive. Men so educated, according to these philosophers,\nwill behave as perfectly in the relation of superior to inferior, as\nin that of equal to equal--of citizen to citizen.\n\nThis supposition would doubtless prove true, to a certain extent,\nthough far short of that extent which would be requisite to assure\nthe complete comfort of the inferior. But even if it were true to the\nfullest extent, it would be far from satisfying the demands of a\nbenevolent theorist. For though the inferior should meet with\nkindness and protection from his superior, still his mind must be\nkept in a degradation suitable to his position. He must be deprived\nof all moral and intellectual culture: he must be prevented from\nimbibing any ideas of his own dignity: he must be content to receive\nwhatever is awarded, to endure whatever treatment is vouchsafed,\nwithout for an instant imagining that he has a right to benefits or\nthat suffering is wrongfully inflicted upon him. Both Plato and\nAristotle acknowledge the inevitable depravation and moral abasement\nof all the inhabitants excepting their favoured class. Neither of\nthem seems solicitous either to disguise or to mitigate it.\n\nBut if they are thus indifferent about the moral condition of the\nmass, they are in the highest degree exact and careful respecting\nthat of their select citizens. This is their grand and primary\nobject, towards which the whole force of their intellect, and the\nfull fertility of their ingenious imagination, is directed. Their\nplans of education are most elaborate and comprehensive: aiming at\nevery branch of moral and intellectual improvement, and seeking to\nraise the whole man to a state of perfection, both physical and\nmental. You would imagine that they were framing a scheme of public\neducation, not a political constitution: so wholly are their thoughts\nengrossed with the training and culture of their citizens. It is in\nthis respect that their ideas are truly instructive.\n\nViewed with reference to the general body of inhabitants in a State,\nnothing can be more defective than the plans of both these great\nphilosophers. Assuming that their objects were completely attained,\nthe mass of the people would receive nothing more than that degree of\nphysical comfort and mild usage which can be made to consist with\nsubjection and with the extortion of compulsory labour.\n\nViewed with reference to the special class recognized as citizens,\nthe plans of both are to a high degree admirable. A better provision\nis made for the virtue as well as for the happiness of this\nparticular class than has ever been devised by any other political\nprojector. The intimate manner in which Aristotle connects virtue\nwith happiness, is above all remarkable. He in fact defines happiness\nto consist in _the active exertion and perfected habit of virtue_\n([Greek: a)ret\u00ea=s e)ne/rgeia kai\\ chr\u00ea=si/s tis te/leios]--vi. 9.\n3.): and it is upon this disposition that he founds the necessity of\nexcluding the mass of inhabitants from the citizenship. For the\npurpose to be accomplished by the political union, is, the assuring\nof happiness to every individual citizen, which is to be effected by\nimplanting habits of virtue in every citizen. Whoever therefore is\nincapable of acquiring habits of virtue, is disqualified from\nbecoming a citizen. But every man whose life is spent in laborious\navocations, whether of husbandry, of trade, or of manufacture,\nbecomes thereby incapable of acquiring habits of virtue, and cannot\ntherefore be admitted to the citizenship. No man can be capable of\nthe requisite mental culture and tuition, who is not exempted from\nthe necessity of toil, enabled to devote his whole time to the\nacquisition of virtuous habits, and subjected from his infancy to a\nsevere and systematic training. The exclusion of the bulk of the\npeople from civil rights is thus founded, in the mind of Aristotle,\non the lofty idea which he forms of individual human perfection,\nwhich he conceives to be absolutely unattainable unless it be made\nthe sole object of a man's life. But then he takes especial care that\nthe education of his citizens shall be really such as to compel them\nto acquire that virtue on which alone their pre-eminence is built. If\nhe exempts them from manual or money-getting labours, he imposes upon\nthem an endless series of painful restraints and vexatious duties for\nthe purpose of forming and maintaining their perfection of character.\nHe allows no luxury or self-indulgence, no misappropriation of time,\nno ostentatious display of wealth or station. The life of his select\ncitizens would be such as to provoke little envy or jealousy, among\nmen of the ordinary stamp. Its hard work and its strict discipline\nwould appear repulsive rather than inviting: and the pre-eminence of\nstrong and able men, submitting to such continued schooling, would\nappear well deserved and hardly earned.\n\nOligarchical reasoners in modern times employ the bad part of\nAristotle's principle without the good. They represent the rich and\ngreat as alone capable of reaching a degree of virtue consistent with\nthe full enjoyment of political privileges: but then they take no\nprecautions, as Aristotle does, that the men so preferred shall\nreally answer to this exalted character. They leave the rich and\ngreat to their own self-indulgence and indolent propensities, without\ntraining them by any systematic process to habits of superior virtue.\nSo that the select citizens on this plan are at the least no better,\nif indeed they are not worse, than the remaining community, while\ntheir unbounded **indulgences excite either undue envy or\nundue admiration, among the excluded multitude. The select citizens\nof Aristotle are both better and wiser than the rest of their\ncommunity: while they are at the same time so hemmed in and\ncircumscribed by severe regulations, that nothing except the\nperfection of their character can appear worthy either of envy or\nadmiration. Though therefore these oligarchical reasoners concur with\nAristotle in sacrificing the bulk of the community to the\npre-eminence of a narrow class, they fail of accomplishing the end for\nwhich alone he pretends to justify such a sacrifice--the formation of\na few citizens of complete and unrivalled virtue.\n\nThe arrangements made by Aristotle for the good government of his\naristocratical citizens among themselves, are founded upon principles\nof the most perfect equality. He would have them only limited in\nnumber, for in his opinion, personal and familiar acquaintance among\nthem all is essentially requisite to good government (vii. 4. 7). The\nprincipal offices of the State are all to be held by the aged\ncitizens: the military duties are to be fulfilled by the younger\ncitizens. The city altogether, with the territory appertaining to it,\nmust be large enough to be [Greek: au)ta/rk\u00eas]: but it must not be so\nextensive as to destroy personal intimacy among the citizens. A very\nlarge body are, in Aristotle's view, incapable of discipline or\nregularity.\n\nTo produce a virtuous citizen, _nature_, _habit_, and _reason_ must\ncoincide. They ought to be endued with virtues qualifying them both\nfor occupation and for leisure: with courage, self-denial ([Greek:\nkarteri/a]), and fortitude, to maintain their independence: with\njustice and temperance, to restrain them from abusing the means of\nenjoyment provided for them: and with philosophy or the love of\ncontemplative wisdom and science, in order to banish ennui, and\nrender the hours of leisure agreeable to them (vii. 13. 17). They are\nto be taught that their hours of leisure are of greater worth and\ndignity than their hours of occupation. Occupation is to be submitted\nto for the sake of the quiet enjoyment of leisure, just as war is\nmade for the sake of procuring peace, and useful and necessary\nemployments undertaken for the sake of those which are honourable\n(vii. 13. 8). Aristotle greatly censures (see vii. 2. 5) (as indeed\nPlato had done before him) the institutions of Laced\u00e6mon, as being\ndirected exclusively to create excellent warriors, and to enable the\nnation to rule over foreigners. This (he says) is not only not the\nright end, but is an end absolutely pernicious and culpable. To\nmaintain a forcible sovereignty over free and equal foreigners, is\nunjust and immoral: and if the minds of the citizens be corrupted\nwith this collective ambition and love of power, it is probable that\nsome individual citizen, taught by the education of the State to\nconsider power as the first of all earthly ends, will find an\nopportunity to aggrandize himself by force or fraud, and to establish\na tyranny over his countrymen themselves (viii. 13. 13). The\nLaced\u00e6monians conducted themselves well and flourished under their\ninstitutions, so long as they were carrying on war for the\nenlargement of their dominion: but they were incapable of tasting or\nprofiting by peace: they were not educated by their legislator so as\nto be able to turn leisure to account ([Greek: ai)/tios d' o(\nnomothe/t\u00eas, ou) paideu/sas du/nasthai schola/zein]--vii. 13. 15).\n\nThe education of the citizen is to commence with the body: next the\nirrational portion of the soul is to be brought under\ndiscipline--that is, the will and the appetites, the concupiscent and\nirascible passions: thirdly, the rational portion of the soul is to\nbe cultivated and developed. The habitual desires are to be so moulded\nand tutored as to prepare them for the sovereignty of reason, when\nthe time shall arrive for bringing reason into action (vii. 13. 23).\nThey are to learn nothing until five years old (vii. 15. 4), their\ndiversions are to be carefully prepared and presented to them,\nconsisting generally of a mimicry of subsequent serious occupations\n(vii. 15. 15): and all the fables and tales which they hear recited\nare to be such as to pave the way for moral discipline (_ib._); all\nunder the superintendence of the P\u00e6donom. No obscene or licentious\ntalk is to be tolerated in the city (vii. 15. 7), nor any indecent\npainting or statue, except in the temples of some particular Deities.\nNo youth is permitted to witness the recitation either of iambics or\nof comedy (vii. 15. 9), until he attains the age which qualifies him\nto sit at the public tables. Immense stress is laid by the\nphilosopher on the turn of ideas to which the tender minds of youth\nbecome accustomed, and on the earliest combinations of sounds or of\nvisible objects which meet their senses (vii. 15. 10). [Greek: Pro\\s\npa/sas duna/meis kai\\ te/chnas e)stin a(\\ dei= propaideu/esthai kai\\\nproethi/zesthai pro\\s ta\\s e(ka/st\u00f4n e)rgasi/as, \u00f4(/ste d\u00ea=lon o(/ti\nkai\\ pro\\s ta\\s t\u00ea=s a)ret\u00ea=s pra/xeis] (viii. 1. 2).\n\nAll the citizens in Aristotle's republic are to be educated according\nto one common system: each being regarded as belonging to the\ncommonwealth more than to his own parents. This was the practice at\nLaced\u00e6mon, and Aristotle greatly eulogizes it (viii. 1. 3).\n\nAristotle does not approve of extreme and violent bodily training,\nsuch as would bring the body into the condition of an athlete: nor\ndoes he even sanction the gymnastic labours imposed by the\nLaced\u00e6monian system, which had the effect of rendering the Spartans\n\"brutal of soul,\" for the purpose of exalting their courage ([Greek:\noi( La/k\u00f4nes--th\u00eari\u00f4/deis a)perga/zontai toi=s po/nois, \u00f4(s tou=to\nma/lista pro\\s a)ndrei/an su/mpheron]). He remarks, first, that\ncourage is not the single or exclusive end to be aimed at in a civil\neducation: next, that a savage and brutal soul is less compatible\nwith exalted courage than a gentle soul, trained so as to be\nexquisitely sensible to the feelings of shame and honour (viii. 3.\n3-5). The most sanguinary and unfeeling among the barbarous tribes,\nhe remarks, were very far from being the most courageous. A man\ntrained on the Laced\u00e6monian system, in bodily exercises alone,\ndestitute even of the most indispensable mental culture (see below),\nwas a real [Greek: ba/nausos]--useful only for one branch of\npolitical duties, and even for that less useful than if he had been\ntrained in a different manner.\n\nUp to the age of 14, Aristotle prescribes ([Greek: \u00ea(/b\u00ea] means 14\nyears of age--see vii. 15. 11) that boys shall be trained in gentle\nand regular exercises, without any severe or forced labour. From 14\nto 17 they are to be instructed in various branches of knowledge:\nafter 17, they are to be put to harder bodily labour and to be\nnourished with a special and peculiar diet ([Greek:\na)nagkophagi/ais]). For how long this is to continue, is not stated.\nBut Aristotle insists on the necessity of not giving them at the same\ntime intellectual instruction and bodily training, for the one of\nthese, he says, counteracts and frustrates the other (viii. 4. 2-3).\n\nThe Laced\u00e6monians made music no part of their education: Isocrat.\nPanathen. Or. xii. p. 375, B.; they did not even learn 'letters'\n([Greek: gra/mmata]), but they are said to have been good judges of\nmusic (viii. 4. 6). Aristotle himself however seems to think it next\nto impossible that men who have not learned music can be good judges\n(viii. 6. 1).\n\nAristotle admits that music may be usefully learnt as an innocent\npleasure and relaxation: but he chiefly considers it as desirable on\naccount of its moral effects, on the dispositions and affections. A\nright turn of the pleasurable and painful emotions is, in his\nopinion, essential to virtue: particular strains and particular\nrhythms are naturally associated with particular dispositions of\nmind: by early teaching, those strains and those rhythms which are\nassociated with temperate and laudable dispositions may be made more\nagreeable to a youth than any others. He will like best those which\nhe hears earliest, and which he finds universally commended and\nrelished by those about him. A relish for the [Greek: o(moi\u00f4/mata] of\nvirtuous dispositions will tend to increase in him the love of virtue\nitself (viii. 6. 5. 8).\n\nAristotle enjoins that the youth be taught to execute music\ninstrumentally and vocally, because it is only in this way that they\ncan acquire a good taste or judgment in music: besides which, it is\nnecessary to furnish boys with some occupation, to absorb their\nrestless energies, and there is none more suitable than music. Some\npersons alleged that the teaching music as a manual art was banausic\nand degrading, lowering the citizen down to the station of a hired\nprofessional singer. Aristotle meets this objection by providing that\nyouths shall be instructed in the musical art, but only with the view\nof correcting and cultivating their taste: they are to be forbidden\nfrom making any use of their musical acquisitions, in riper years, in\nactual playing or singing (viii. 6. 3). Aristotle observes, that\nmusic more difficult of execution had been recently introduced into\nthe agones, and had found its way from the agones into the ordinary\neducation. He decidedly disapproves and excludes it (viii. 6. 4). He\nforbids both the flute and the harp, and every other instrument\nrequiring much art to play upon it: especially the flute, which he\nconsiders as not ethical, but orgiastical--calculated to excite\nviolent and momentary emotions. The flute obtained a footing in\nGreece after the Persian invasion; in Athens at that time it became\nespecially fashionable; but was discontinued afterwards (Plutarch\nalleges, through the influence of Alcibiades).\n\nThe suggestions of Aristotle for the education of his citizens are\nfar less copious and circumstantial than those of Plato in his\nRepublic. He delivers no plan of study, no arrangement of sciences to\nbe successively communicated, no reasons for preferring or rejecting.\nWe do not know what it was precisely which Aristotle comprehended in\nthe term \"philosophy,\" intended by him to be taught to his citizens\nas an aid for the proper employment of their leisure. It must\nprobably have included the moral, political, and metaphysical\nsciences, as they were then known--those sciences to which his own\nvoluminous works relate.\n\nBy means of the public table, supplied from the produce of the public\nlands, Aristotle provides for the full subsistence of every citizen.\nYet he is well aware that the citizens will be likely to increase in\nnumbers too rapidly, and he suggests very efficient precautions\nagainst it. No child at all deformed or imperfect in frame is to be\nbrought up: children beyond a convenient number, if born, are to be\nexposed: but should the law of the State forbid such a practice, care\nmust be taken to forestall consciousness and life in them, and to\nprevent their birth by [Greek: a)/mbl\u00f4sis] (vii. 14. 10).\n\nAristotle establishes two _agora_ in his city: one situated near to\nthe harbour, adapted to the buying, selling, and storing of goods,\nunder the surveillance of the agoranomus: the other called the _free\nagora_, situated in the upper parts of the city, set apart for the\namusement and conversation of the citizens, and never defiled by the\nintroduction of any commodities for sale. No artisan or husbandman is\never to enter the latter unless by special order from the\nauthorities. The temples of the Gods, the residences of the various\nboards of government functionaries, the gymnasia of the older\ncitizens, are all to be erected in this free agora (vii. 11). The\nThessalian cities had an agora of this description where no traffic\nor common occupations were permitted.\n\nThe moral tendency of Aristotle's reflections is almost always useful\nand elevating. The intimate union which he formally recognizes and\nperpetually proclaims between happiness and virtue, is salutary and\ninstructive: and his ideas of what virtue is, are perfectly just, so\nfar as relates to the conduct of his citizens towards each other:\nthough they are miserably defective as regards obligation towards\nnon-citizens. He always assigns the proper pre-eminence to wisdom and\nvirtue: he never overvalues the advantages of riches, nor deems them\nentitled on their own account, to any reverence or submission: he\nallows no title to the obedience of mankind, except that which arises\nfrom superior power and disposition to serve them. Superior power and\nstation, as he considers them, involve a series of troubles--some\nobligations which render them objects of desire only to men of virtue\nand beneficence. What is more rare and more creditable still, he\ntreats all views of conquest and aggrandizement by a State as immoral\nand injurious, even to the conquerors themselves.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nI.\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS.\n\n\nThe controversy respecting Universals first obtained its place in\nphilosophy from the colloquies of Sokrates, and the writings and\nteachings of Plato. We need not here touch upon their predecessors,\nParmenides and Herakleitus, who, in a confused and unsystematic\nmanner, approached this question from opposite sides, and whose\nspeculations worked much upon the mind of Plato in determining both\nhis aggressive dialectic, and his constructive theories. Parmenides\nof Elea, improving upon the ruder conceptions of Xenophanes, was the\nfirst to give emphatic proclamation to the celebrated Eleatic\ndoctrine, Absolute Ens as opposed to Relative Fientia: _i.e._ the\nCogitable, which Parmenides conceived as the One and All of reality,\n[Greek: e(\\n kai\\ pa=n], enduring and unchangeable, of which the\nnegative was unmeaning,--and the Sensible or Perceivable, which was\nin perpetual change, succession and multiplicity, without either\nunity, or reality, or endurance. To the last of these two departments\nHerakleitus assigned especial prominence. In place of the permanent\nunderlying Ens, which he did not recognize, he substituted a\ncogitable process of _change_, or generalized concept of what was\ncommon to all the successive phases of change--a perpetual stream of\ngeneration and destruction, or implication of contraries, in which\neverything appeared only that it might disappear, without endurance\nor uniformity. In this doctrine of Herakleitus, the world of sense\nand particulars could not be the object either of certain knowledge\nor even of correct probable opinion; in that of Parmenides, it was\nrecognized as an object of probable opinion, though not of certain\nknowledge. But in both doctrines, as well as in the theories of\nDemokritus, it was degraded, and presented as incapable of yielding\nsatisfaction to the search of a philosophizing mind, which could find\nneither truth nor reality except in the world of Concepts and\nCogitables.\n\nBesides the two theories above-mentioned, there were current in the\nHellenic world, before the maturity of Sokrates, several other veins\nof speculation about the Kosmos, totally divergent one from the\nother, and by that very divergence sometimes stimulating curiosity,\nsometimes discouraging all study as though the problems were\nhopeless. But Parmenides and Herakleitus, together with the\narithmetical and geometrical hypotheses of the Pythagoreans, are\nexpressly noticed by Aristotle as having specially contributed to\nform the philosophy of Plato.\n\nNeither Parmenides, nor Herakleitus, nor the Pythagoreans were\ndialecticians. They gave out their own thoughts in their own way,\nwith little or no regard to dissentients. They did not cultivate the\nart of argumentative attack or defence, nor the correct application\nand diversified confrontation of universal terms, which are the great\ninstruments of that art. It was Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides,\nthat first employed dialectic in support of his master's theory, or\nrather against the counter-theories of opponents. He showed by\narguments memorable for their subtlety, that the hypothesis of an\nAbsolute, composed of Entia Plura Discontinua, led to consequences\neven more absurd than those that opponents deduced from the\nParmenidean hypothesis of Ens Unum Continuum. The dialectic, thus\ninaugurated by Zeno, reached still higher perfection in the\ncolloquies of Sokrates; who not only employed a new method, but also\nintroduced new topics of debate--ethical, political, and social\nmatters instead of physical things and the Kosmos.\n\nThe peculiar originality of Sokrates is well known: a man who wrote\nnothing, but passed his life in indiscriminate colloquy with every\none; who professed to have no knowledge himself, but interrogated\nothers on matters that they talked about familiarly and professed to\nknow well; whose colloquies generally ended by puzzling the\nrespondents, and by proving to themselves that they neither knew nor\ncould explain even matters that they had begun by affirming\nconfidently as too clear to need explanation. Aristotle tells us[1]\nthat Sokrates was the first that set himself expressly and\nmethodically to scrutinize the definitions of general or universal\nterms, and to confront them, not merely with each other, but also, by\na sort of inductive process, with many particular cases that were, or\nappeared to be, included under them. And both Xenophon and Plato give\nus abundant examples of the terms to which Sokrates applied his\ninterrogatories: What is the Holy? What is the Unholy? What is the\nBeautiful or Honourable? What is the Ugly or Base? What is\nJustice--Injustice--Temperance--Madness--Courage--Cowardice--A City--A\nman fit for civil life? What is the Command of Men? What is the\ncharacter fit for commanding men? Such are the specimens, furnished\nby a hearer,[2] of the universal terms whereon the interrogatories of\nSokrates bore. All of them were terms spoken and heard familiarly by\ncitizens in the market-place, as if each understood them perfectly;\nbut when Sokrates, professing his own ignorance, put questions asking\nfor solutions of difficulties that perplexed his own mind, the answers\nshowed that these difficulties were equally insoluble by respondents,\nwho had never thought of them before. The confident persuasion of\nknowledge, with which the colloquy began, stood exposed as a false\npersuasion without any basis of reality. Such illusory semblance of\nknowledge was proclaimed by Sokrates to be the chronic, though\nunconscious, intellectual condition of his contemporaries. How he\nundertook, as the mission of a long life, to expose it, is\nimpressively set forth in the Platonic Apology.\n\n[Footnote 1: Metaphysica, A. p. 987, b. 2; M. p. 1078, b. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Xenophon Memorab. I. i. 16; IV. vi. 1-13.]\n\nIt was thus by Sokrates that the meaning of universal terms and\nuniversal propositions, and the relation of each respectively to\nparticular terms and particular propositions were first made a\nsubject of express enquiry and analytical interrogation. His\ninfluence was powerful in imparting the same dialectical impulse to\nseveral companions; but most of all to Plato, who not only enlarged\nand amplified the range of Sokratic enquiry, but also brought the\nmeaning of universal terms into something like system and theory, as\na portion of the conditions of trustworthy science. Plato was the\nfirst to affirm the doctrine afterwards called Realism, as the\nfundamental postulate of all true and proved cognition. He affirmed\nit boldly, and in its most extended sense, though he also produces\n(according to his frequent practice) many powerful arguments and\nunsolved objections against it. It was he (to use the striking phrase\nof Milton[3]) that first imported into the schools the portent of\nRealism. The doctrine has been since opposed, confuted, curtailed,\ntransformed, diversified in many ways; but it has maintained its\nplace in logical speculation, and has remained, under one phraseology\nor another, the creed of various philosophers, from that time down to\nthe present.\n\n[Footnote 3: See the Latin verses 'De Ide\u00e2 Platonic\u00e2 quemadmodum\nAristoteles intellexit'--\n  \"At tu, perenne ruris Academi decus,\n  H\u00e6c monstra si tu primus induxti scholis,\" &c.]\n\nThe following account of the problems of Realism was handed down to\nthe speculations of the medi\u00e6val philosophers by Porphyry (between\n270-300 A.D.), in his Introduction to the treatise of Aristotle on\nthe Categories. After informing Chrysaorius that he will prepare for\nhim a concise statement of the doctrines of the old philosophers\nrespecting Genus, Differentia, Species, Proprium, Accidens,\n\"abstaining from the deeper enquiries, but giving suitable\ndevelopment to the more simple,\"--Porphyry thus proceeds:--\"For\nexample, I shall decline discussing, in respect to Genera and\nSpecies, (1) Whether they have a substantive existence, or reside\nmerely in naked mental conceptions; (2) Whether, assuming them to\nhave substantive existence, they are bodies or incorporeals; (3)\nWhether their substantive existence is in and along with the objects\nof sense, or apart and separable. Upon this task I shall not enter,\nsince it is of the greatest depth, and requires another larger\ninvestigation; but shall try at once to show you how the ancients\n(especially the Peripatetics), with a view to logical discourse,\ndealt with the topics now propounded.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Porphyry, Introd. in Categor. init. p. 1, a. 1, Schol.\nBr.]\n\nBefore Porphyry, all these three problems had been largely debated,\nfirst by Plato, next by Aristotle against Plato, again by the Stoics\nagainst both, and lastly by Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists as\nconciliators of Plato with Aristotle. After Porphyry, problems the\nsame, or similar, continued to stand in the foreground of\nspeculation, until the authority of Aristotle became discredited at\nall points by the influences of the sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies. But in order to find the beginning of them, as questions\nprovoking curiosity and opening dissentient points of view to\ninventive dialecticians, we must go back to the age and the dialogues\nof Plato.\n\nThe real Sokrates (_i.e._ as he is described by Xenophon) inculcated\nin his conversation steady reverence for the invisible, as apart from\nand overriding the phenomena of sensible experience; but he\ninterpreted the term in a religious sense, as signifying the agency\nof the personal gods, employed to produce effects beneficial or\ninjurious to mankind.[5] He also puts forth his dialectical acuteness\nto prepare consistent and tenable definitions of familiar general\nterms (of which instances have already been given), at least so far\nas to make others feel, for the first time, that they did not\nunderstand these terms, though they had been always talking like\npersons that _did_ understand. But the Platonic Sokrates (_i.e._ as\nspokesman in the dialogues of Plato) enlarges both these discussions\nmaterially. Plato recognizes, not simply the invisible persons or\ngods, but also a separate world of invisible, impersonal entities or\nobjects; one of which he postulates as the objective reality, though\nonly a cogitable reality, correlating with each general term. These\nEntia he considers to be not merely distinct realities, but the only\ntrue and knowable realities: they are eternal and unchangeable,\nmanifested by the fact that particulars partake in them, and\nimparting a partial show of stability to the indeterminate flux of\nparticulars: unless such separate Universal Entia be supposed, there\nis nothing whereon cognition can fasten, and consequently there can\nbe no cognition at all.[6] These are the substantive, self-existent\nIdeas, or Forms that Plato first presented to the philosophical\nworld; sometimes with logical acuteness, oftener still with rich\npoetical and imaginative colouring. They constitute the main body and\ncharacteristic of the hypothesis of Realism.\n\n[Footnote 5: Xenophon, Memorab. I. iv. 9-17; IV. iii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Aristot. Metaphys. A. vi. p. 987, b. 5; M. iv. p. 1078,\nb. 15.]\n\nBut, though the main hypothesis is the same, the accessories and\nmanner of presentation differ materially among its different\nadvocates. In these respects, indeed, Plato differs not only from\nothers, but also from himself. Systematic teaching or exposition is\nnot his purpose, nor does he ever give opinions in his own name. We\nhave from him an aggregate of detached dialogues, in many of which\nthis same hypothesis is brought under discussion, but in each\ndialogue, the spokesmen approach it from a different side; while in\nothers (distinguished by various critics as the Sokratic dialogues)\nit does not come under discussion at all, Plato being content to\nremain upon the Sokratic platform, and to debate the meaning of\ngeneral terms without postulating in correlation with them an\nobjective reality, apart from their respective particulars.\n\nAt the close of the Platonic dialogue called Kratylus, Sokrates is\nintroduced as presenting the hypothesis of self-existent, eternal,\nunchangeable Ideas (exactly in the way that Aristotle ascribes to\nPlato) as the counter-proposition to the theory of universal flux and\nchange announced by Herakleitus. Particulars are ever changing (it is\nhere argued) and are thus out of the reach of cognition; but, unless\nthe Universal Ideas above them, such as the Self-beautiful, the\nSelf-good, &c., be admitted as unchangeable, objective realities,\nthere can be nothing either nameable or knowable: cognition becomes\nimpossible.\n\nIn the Tim\u00e6us, Plato describes the construction of the Kosmos by a\nDivine Architect, and the model followed by the latter in his work.\nThe distinction is here again brought out, and announced as capital,\nbetween the permanent, unalterable Entia, and the transient,\never-fluctuating Fientia, which come and go, but never really _are_.\nEntia are apprehended by the cogitant or intelligent soul of the\nKosmos, Fientia by the sentient or percipient soul; the cosmical\nsoul as a whole, in order to suffice for both these tasks, is made\nup of diverse component elements--Idem, correlating with the first of\nthe two, Diversum, correlating with the second, and Idem implicated\nwith Diversum, corresponding to both in conjunction. The Divine\nArchitect is described as constructing a Kosmos, composed both of\nsoul and body, upon the pattern of the grand pre-existent\nIdea--[Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on] or the Self-Animal; which included in\nitself as a genus the four distinct species--celestial (gods, visible\nand invisible), terrestrial, aerial, and aquatic.\n\nThe main point that Plato here insists upon is--the eternal and\nunchangeable reality of the cogitable objects called Ideas, prior\nboth in time and in logical order to the transient objects of sight\nand touch, and serving as an exemplar to which these latter are made\nto approximate imperfectly. He assumes such priority, without proof,\nin the case of the Idea of Animal; but, when he touches upon the four\nelements--Fire, Air, Water, Earth--he hesitates to make the same\nassumption, and thinks himself required to give a reason for it. The\nreason that he assigns (announced distinctly as his own) is as\nfollows: If Intellection (Cogitation, [Greek: Nou=s]) and true\nOpinion are two genera distinct from each other, there must clearly\nexist Forms or Ideas imperceptible to our senses, and apprehended\nonly by cogitation or intellection; but if, as some persons think,\ntrue opinion is noway different from intellection, then we must admit\nall the objects perceived by our senses as firm realities. Now the\nfact is (he proceeds to say) that true opinion is not identical with\nintellection, but quite distinct, separate, and unlike to it.\nIntellection is communicated by teaching, through true reasoning, and\nis unshakeable by persuasion; true opinion is communicated by\npersuasion and removed by counter-persuasion, without true reasoning.\nTrue opinion may belong to any man; but intellection is the privilege\nonly of gods and of a small section of mankind. Accordingly, since\nthe two are distinct, the objects correlating with each of them must\nalso be distinct from each other. There must exist, first, primary,\neternal, unchangeable Forms, apprehended by intellect or cogitation,\nbut imperceptible by sense; and, secondly, resemblances of these\nbearing the same name, generated and destroyed each in some place,\nand apprehended first by sense, afterwards by opinion. Thirdly, there\nmust be the place wherein such resemblances are generated; a place\nitself imperceptible by sense, yet postulated, as a receptacle\nindispensable for them, by a dreamy kind of computation.\n\nWe see here that the proof given by Plato, in support of the\nexistence of Forms as the primary realities, is essentially\npsychological: resting upon the fact that there is a distinct mental\nenergy or faculty called Intellection (apart from Sense and Opinion),\nwhich must have its distinct objective correlate; and upon the\nfarther fact, that intellection is the high prerogative of the gods,\nshared only by a few chosen men. This last point of the case is more\nlargely and emphatically brought out in the Ph\u00e6drus, where Sokrates\ndelivers a highly poetical effusion respecting the partial\nintercommunion of the human soul with these eternal intellectual\nrealities. To contemplate them is the constant privilege of the gods;\nto do so is also the aspiration of the immortal soul of man\ngenerally, in the pre-existent state, prior to incorporation with the\nhuman body; though only in a few cases is such aspiration realized.\nEven those few human souls, that have succeeded in getting sight of\nthe intellectual Ideas (essences without colour, figure, or tactile\nproperties), lose all recollection of them when first entering into\npartnership with a human body; but are enabled gradually to recall\nthem, by combining repeated impressions and experience of their\nresemblances in the world of sense. The revival of these divine\nelements is an inspiration of the nature of madness; though it is a\nvariety of madness as much better than uninspired human reason as\nother varieties are worse. The soul, becoming insensible to ordinary\npursuits, contracts a passionate devotion to these Universal Ideas,\nand to that dialectical communion, especially with some pregnant\nyouthful mind, that brings them into clear separate contemplation\ndisengaged from the limits and confusion of sense.\n\nHere philosophy is presented as the special inspiration of a few,\nwhose souls during the period of pre-existence have sufficiently\ncaught sight of the Universal Ideas or Essences; so that these last,\nthough overlaid and buried when the soul is first plunged in a body,\nare yet revivable afterwards under favourable circumstances, through\ntheir imperfect copies in the world of sense; especially by the sight\nof personal beauty in an ingenuous and aspiring youth, in which case\nthe visible copy makes nearest approach to the perfection of the\nUniversal Idea or Type. At the same time, Plato again presents to us\nthe Cogitable Universals as the only objects of true cognition, the\nSensible Particulars being objects merely of opinion.\n\nIn the Ph\u00e6don, Sokrates advances the same doctrine, that the\n**perceptions of sense are full of error and confusion, and can\nat best suggest nothing higher than opinion; that true\ncogitation can never be attained except when the cogitant mind\ndisengages itself from the body and comes into direct contemplation\nof the Universal Entia, objects eternal and always the same--The\nSelf-beautiful, Self-good, Self-just, Self-great, Healthy, Strong,\n&c., all which objects are invisible, and can be apprehended only by\nthe cogitation or intellect. It is this Cogitable Universal that is\nalone real; Sensible Particulars are not real, nor lasting, nor\ntrustworthy. None but a few philosophers, however, can attain to such\npure mental energy during this life; nor even they fully and\nperfectly. But they will attain it fully after death (their souls\nbeing immortal), if their lives have been passed in sober\nphilosophical training. And their souls enjoyed it before birth\nduring the period of pre-existence; having acquired, before junction\nwith the body, the knowledge of these Universals, which are forgotten\nduring childhood, but recalled in the way of Reminiscence, by\nsensible perceptions that make a distant approach to them. Thus,\naccording to the Ph\u00e6don and some other dialogues, all learning is\nmerely reminiscence; the mind is brought back, by the laws of\nassociation, to the knowledge of Universal Realities that it had\npossessed in its state of pre-existence. Particulars of sense\nparticipate in these Universals to a certain extent, or resemble them\nimperfectly; and they are therefore called by the same name.\n\nIn the Republic, we have a repetition and copious illustration of\nthis antithesis between the world of Universals or Cogitables, which\nare the only unchangeable realities and the only objects of\nknowledge,--and the world of Sensible Particulars, which are\ntransitory and confused shadows of these Universals, and are objects\nof opinion only. Full and real Ens is knowable, Non-Ens is altogether\nunknowable; what is midway between the two is matter of opinion, and\nin such midway are the Particulars of sense.[7] Respecting these\nlast, no truth is attainable: whenever you affirm a proposition\nrespecting any of them, you may with equal truth affirm the contrary\nat the same time. Nowhere is the contrast between the Universals or\nreal Ideas (among which the Idea of Good is the highest, predominant\nover all the rest), and the unreal Particulars, or Percepta, of\nSense, more forcibly insisted upon than in the Republic. Even the\ncelestial bodies and their movements, being among these Percepta of\nsense, are ranked among phantoms interesting but useless to observe;\nthey are the best of all Percepta, but they fall very short of the\nperfection that the mental eye contemplates in the Ideal--in the true\nFigures and Numbers, in the real Velocity and the real Slowness. In\nthe simile commencing the seventh book of the Republic, Plato\ncompares mankind to prisoners in a cave, chained in one particular\nattitude, so as to behold only an ever-varying multiplicity of\nshadows, projected, through the opening of the cave upon the wall\nbefore them, by certain unseen realities behind. The philosopher is\none among a few, who by training or inspiration, have been enabled to\nface about from this original attitude, and to contemplate with his\nmind the real unchangeable Universals, instead of having his eye\nfixed upon their particular manifestations, at once shadowy and\ntransient. By such mental revolution he comes round from the\nPerceivable to the Cogitable, from Opinion to Knowledge.\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Republic. v. pp. 477, 478.]\n\nThe distinction between these two is farther argued in the elaborate\ndialogue called The\u00e6tetus, where Sokrates, trying to explain what\nKnowledge or Cognition is, refutes three proposed explanations and\nshows, to his own satisfaction, that it is not sensible perception,\nthat it is not true opinion, that it is not true opinion coupled with\nrational explanation. But he confesses himself unable to show what\nKnowledge or Cognition is, though he continues to announce it as\ncorrelating with Realities Cogitable and Universal only.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. pp. 173, 176, 186. Grote's Plato, II.\nxxvi. pp. **320-395.]\n\nIn the passages above noticed, and in many others besides, we find\nPlato drawing a capital distinction between Universals eternal and\nunchangeable (each of them a Unit as well as a Universal),[9] which\nhe affirms to be the only real Entia,--and Particulars transient and\nvariable, which are not Entia at all, but are always coming or going;\nthe Universals being objects of cogitation and of a psychological\nfact called Cognition, which he declares to be infallible; and the\nParticulars being objects of Sense, and of another psychological fact\nradically different, called Opinion, which he pronounces to be\nfallible and misleading. Plato holds, moreover, that the Particulars,\nthough generically distinct and separate from the Universals, have\nnevertheless a certain communion or participation with them, by\nvirtue of which they become half existent and half cognizable, but\nnever attain to full reality or cognizability.\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Phil\u00eabus, p. 15, A. B.; Republic, x. p. 596, A.\nThe phrase of Milton, \"unus et universus,\" expresses this idea; also\nthe lines:--\n\n  \"Sed quamlibet natura sit communior,\n  Tamen seorsus extat ad modum unius,\" &c.]\n\nThis is the first statement of the theory of complete and unqualified\nRealism, which came to be known in the Middle Ages under the phrase\n_Universalia ante rem_ or _extra rem_, and to be distinguished from\nthe two counter-theories _Universalia in re_ (Aristotelian), and\n_Universalia post rem_ (Nominalism). Indeed, the Platonic theory goes\neven farther than the phrase _Universalia ante rem_, which recognizes\nthe particular as a reality, though posterior and derivative; for\nPlato attenuates it into phantom and shadow. The problem was now\nclearly set out in philosophy--What are the objects correlating with\nUniversal terms, and with Particular terms? What is the relation\nbetween the two? Plato first gave to the world the solution called\nRealism, which lasted so long after his time. We shall presently find\nAristotle taking issue with him on both the affirmations included in\nhis theory.\n\nBut though Plato first introduced this theory into philosophy, he was\nneither blind to the objections against it, nor disposed to conceal\nthem. His mind was at once poetically constructive and dialectically\ndestructive; to both these impulses the theory furnished ample scope,\nwhile the form of his compositions (separate dialogues, with no\nmention of his own name) rendered it easy to give expression either\nto one or to the other. Before Aristotle arose to take issue with\nhim, we shall find him taking issue with himself, especially in the\ndialogues called Sophistes and Parmenides, not to mention the\nPhil\u00eabus, wherein he breaks down the unity even of his sovereign\nIdea, which in the Republic governs the Cogitable World,--the Idea of\nGood.[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Phil\u00eabus, pp. 65, 66. See Grote's Plato, II.\nxxx. pp. 584, 585.]\n\nBoth in the Sophistes and in the Parmenides, the leading disputant\nintroduced by Plato is not Sokrates, but Parmenides and another\nperson (unnamed) of the Eleatic school. In both dialogues objections\nare taken against the Realistic theory elsewhere propounded by Plato,\nthough the objections adduced in the one are quite distinct from\nthose noticed in the other. In the Sophistes, the Eleatic reasoner\nimpugns successfully the theories of two classes of philosophers, one\nthe opposite of the other: first, the Materialists, who recognized no\nEntia except the Percepta of Sense; next, the Realistic Idealists,\nwho refused to recognize these last as real Entia, or as anything\nmore than transient and mutable Generata or Fientia, while they\nconfined the title of Entia to the Forms, cogitable, incorporeal,\neternal, immutable, neither acting on anything, nor acted upon by\nanything. These persons are called in the Sophistes \"Friends of\nForms,\" and their theory is exactly what we have already cited out of\nso many other dialogues of Plato, drawing the marked line of\nseparation between Entia and Fientia; between the Immutable, which\nalone is real and cognizable, and the Mutable, neither real nor\ncognizable. The Eleate in the Sophistes controverts this Platonic\ntheory, and maintains that among the Universal Entia there are\nincluded items mutable as well as immutable; that both are real and\nboth cognizable; that Non-Ens (instead of being set in glaring\ncontrast with Ens, as the totally incogitable against the infallibly\ncognizable)[11] is one among the multiplicity of Real Forms, meaning\nonly what is different from Ens, and therefore cognizable not less\nthan Ens; that Percepta and Cogitata are alike real, yet both only\nrelatively real, correlating with minds percipient and cogitant.\nThus, the reasoning in the Sophistes, while it sets aside the\ndoctrine of _Universalia ante rem_, does not mark out any other\nrelation between Universals and Particulars (neither _in re_ nor\n_post rem_). It discusses chiefly the intercommunion or reciprocal\nexclusion of Universals with respect to each other; and upon this\npoint, far from representing them as objects of infallible Cognition\nas contrasted with Opinion, it enrolls both Opinion and Discourse\namong the Universals themselves, and declares both of them to be\nreadily combinable with Non-Ens and Falsehood. So that we have here\nerror and fallibility recognized in the region of Universals, as well\nas in that of Particulars.\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478, 479.]\n\nBut it is principally in the dialogue Parmenides that Plato discusses\nwith dialectical acuteness the relation of Universals to their\nParticulars; putting aside the intercommunion (affirmed in the\nSophistes) or reciprocal exclusion between one Universal and another,\nas an hypothesis at least supremely difficult to vindicate, if at all\nadmissible.[12] In the dialogue, Sokrates is introduced in the\nunusual character of a youthful and ardent aspirant in philosophy,\ndefending the Platonic theory of Ideas as we have seen it proclaimed\nin the Republic and in the Tim\u00e6us. The veteran Parmenides appears as\nthe opponent to cross-examine him; and not only impugns the theory by\nseveral interrogatories which Sokrates cannot answer, but also\nintimates that there remain behind other objections equally serious\nrequiring answer. Yet at the same time he declares that, unless the\ntheory be admitted, and unless _Universalia ante rem_ can be\nsustained as existent, there is no trustworthy cognition attainable,\nnor any end to be served by philosophical debate. Moreover,\nParmenides warns Sokrates that, before he can acquire a mental\ncondition competent to defend the theory, he must go through numerous\npreliminary dialectical exercises; following out both the affirmative\nand the negative hypotheses in respect to a great variety of\nUniversals severally. To illustrate the course prescribed, Parmenides\ngives a long specimen of this dialectic in handling his own doctrine\nof Ens Unum. He takes first the hypothesis _Si Unum est_, next the\nhypothesis _Si Unum non est_; and he deduces from each, by ingenious\nsubtleties, double and contradictory conclusions. These he sums up at\nthe end, challenging Sokrates to solve the puzzles before affirming\nhis thesis.\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Parmenid. p. 129, E.; with Stallbaum's\nProlegomena to that dialogue, pp. 38-42.]\n\nApart from these antinomies at the close of the dialogue, the\ncross-examination of Sokrates by Parmenides, in the middle of it,\nbrings out forcibly against the Realistic theory objections such as\nthose urged against it by the Nominalists of the Middle Ages. In the\nfirst place, we find that Plato conceived the theory itself\ndifferently from Porphyry and the philosophers that wrote subsequently\nto the Peripatetic criticism. Porphyry and his successors put the\nquestion, Whether Genera and Species had a separate existence, apart\nfrom the Individuals composing them? Now, the world of Forms (the\nCogitable or Ideal world as opposed to the Sensible) is not here\nconceived by Plato as peopled in the first instance by Genera and\nSpecies. Its first tenants are _Attributes_, and attributes distinctly\n_relative_--Likeness, One and Many, Justice, Beauty, Goodness, &c.\nSokrates, being asked by Parmenides whether he admits Forms\ncorresponding with these names, answers unhesitatingly in the\naffirmative. He is next asked whether he admits forms corresponding\nto the names Man, Fire, Water, &c., and, instead of replying in the\naffirmative, intimates that he does not feel sure. Lastly, the\nquestion is put whether there are Forms corresponding to the names\nof mean objects--Mud, Hair, Dirt, &c. At first he answers\nemphatically in the negative, and treats the affirmative as\npreposterous; there exist no cogitable Hair, &c., but only the object\nof sense that we so denominate. Yet, on second thoughts, he is not\nwithout misgiving that there may be Forms even of these; though the\nsupposition is so repulsive to him that he shakes it off as much as\nhe can. Upon this last expression of sentiment Parmenides comments,\nascribing it to the juvenility of Sokrates, and intimating that, when\nSokrates has become more deeply imbued with philosophy, he will cease\nto set aside any of these objects as unworthy.\n\nHere we see that, in the theory of Realism as conceived by Sokrates,\nthe Self-Existent Universals are not Genera and Species as such, but\nAttributes--not Second Substances or Essences, but Accidents or\nAttributes, _e.g._ Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c., to use the\nlanguage afterwards introduced in the Aristotelian Categories; that\nno Genera or Species are admitted except with hesitation; and that\nthe mean and undignified among them are scarcely admissible at all.\nThis sentiment of dignity, associated with the _Universalia ante\nrem_, and emotional necessity for tracing back particulars to an\naugust and respected origin, is to be noted as a marked and lasting\nfeature of the Realistic creed; and it even passed on to the\n_Universalia in re_, as afterwards affirmed by Aristotle. Parmenides\nhere takes exception to it (and so does Plato elsewhere[13]) as\ninconsistent with faithful adherence to scientific analogy.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Sophist. p. 227, A. Politikus, p. 266, D.]\n\nParmenides then proceeds (interrogating Sokrates) first to state what\nthe Realistic theory is (Universals apart from\nParticulars--Particulars apart from Universals, yet having some\nparticipation in them, and named after them), next to bring out the\ndifficulties attaching to it. The Universal or Form (he argues) cannot\nbe entire in each of its many separate particulars; nor yet is it\ndivisible, so that a part can be in one particular, and a part in\nanother. For take the Forms Great, Equal, Small; Equal magnitudes are\nequal because they partake in the Form of Equality. But how can a part\nof the Form Equality, less than the whole Form, cause the magnitudes\nto be equal? How can the Form Smallness have any parts less than\nitself, or how can it be greater than anything?\n\nThe Form cannot be divided, nor can it co-exist undivided in each\nseparate particular; accordingly, particulars can have no\nparticipation in it at all.\n\nAgain, you assume a Form of Greatness, because you see many\nparticular objects, each of which appears to you great; this being\nthe point of resemblance between them. But if you compare the Form of\nGreatness with any or all of the particular great objects, you will\nperceive a resemblance between them; this will require you to assume\na higher Form, and so on upward without limit.\n\nSokrates, thus embarrassed, starts the hypothesis that perhaps each\nof these Forms may be a cogitation, and nothing more, existing only\nwithin the mind. How? rejoins Parmenides. Can there be a cogitation\nof nothing at all? Must not each cogitation have a real _cogitatum_\ncorrelating with it,--in this case, the one Form that is identical\nthroughout many particulars? If you say that particulars partake in\nthe Form, and that each Form is nothing but a cogitation, does not\nthis imply that each particular is itself cogitant?\n\nAgain Sokrates urges that the Forms are constant, unalterable,\nstationary in nature; that particulars resemble them, and participate\nin them only so far as to resemble them. But (rejoins Parmenides), if\nparticulars resemble the Form, the Form must resemble them;\naccordingly, you must admit another and higher Form, as the point of\nresemblance between the Form and its particulars; and so on, upwards.\n\nAnd farther (continues Parmenides), even when admitting these\nUniversal Forms as self-existent, how can we know anything about\nthem? Forms can correlate only with Forms, Particulars only with\nParticulars. Thus, if I, an individual man, am master, I correlate\nwith another individual man, who is my servant, and he on his side\nwith me. But the Form of mastership, the Universal self-existent\nMaster, must correlate with the Form of servantship, the Universal\nServant. The correlation does not subsist between members of the two\ndifferent worlds, but between different members of the same world\nrespectively. Thus the Form of Cognition correlates with the Form of\nTruth; and the Form of each variety of Cognition, with the Form of\nthe corresponding variety of Truth. But we, as individual subjects,\ndo not possess in ourselves the Form of Cognition; our cognition is\nour own, correlating with such truth as belongs to it and to\nourselves. Our cognition cannot reach to the Form of Truth, nor\ntherefore to any other Form; we can know nothing of the Self-good,\nSelf-beautiful, Self-just, &c., even supposing such Forms to exist.\n\nThese acute and subtle arguments are nowhere answered by Plato. They\nremain as unsolved difficulties, embarrassing the Realistic theory;\nthey are reinforced by farther difficulties no less grave, included\nin the dialectical antinomies of Parmenides at the close of the\ndialogue, and by an unknown number of others indicated as producible,\nthough not actually produced. Yet still Plato, with full\nconsciousness of these difficulties, asserts unequivocally that,\nunless the Realistic theory can be sustained, philosophical research\nis fruitless, and truth cannot be reached. We see thus that the\nauthor of the theory has also left on record some of the most\nforcible arguments against it. It appears from Aristotle (though we\ndo not learn the fact from the Platonic dialogues), that Plato, in\nhis later years, symbolized the Ideas or Forms under the denomination\nof Ideal Numbers, generated by implication of The One with what he\ncalled The Great and Little, or the Indeterminate Dyad. This last,\nhowever, is not the programme wherein the Realistic theory stands\nopposed to Nominalism.\n\nBut the dialogue Parmenides, though full of acuteness on the negative\nside, not only furnishes no counter-theory, but asserts continued\nallegiance to the Realistic theory, which passes as Plato's doctrine\nto his successors. To impugn, forcibly and even unanswerably, a\ntheory at once so sweeping and so little fortified by positive\nreasons, was what many dialecticians of the age could do. But to do\nthis, and at the same time to construct a counter-theory, was a task\nrequiring higher powers of mind. One, however, of Plato's disciples\nand successors was found adequate to the task--Aristotle.\n\nThe Realistic Ontology of Plato is founded (as Aristotle himself\nremarks) upon mistrust and contempt of perception of sense, as\nbearing entirely on the flux of particulars, which never stand still\nso as to become objects of knowledge. All reality, and all\ncognoscibility, were supposed to reside in the separate world of\nCogitable Universals (_extra rem_ or _ante rem_), of which, in some\nconfused manner, particulars were supposed to partake. The Universal,\napart from its particulars, was clearly and fully knowable,\nfurnishing propositions constantly and infallibly true: the Universal\nas manifested in its particulars was never fully knowable, nor could\never become the subject of propositions, except such as were\nsometimes true and sometimes false.\n\nAgainst this separation of the Universal from its Particulars,\nAristotle entered a strong protest; as well as against the subsidiary\nhypothesis of a participation of the latter in the former; which\nparticipation, when the two had been declared separate, appeared to\nhim not only untenable and uncertified, but unintelligible. His\narguments are interesting, as being among the earliest objections\nknown to us against Realism.\n\n1. Realism is a useless multiplication of existences, serving no\npurpose. Wherever a number of particulars--be they substances,\neternal or perishable, or be they qualities, or relations--bear the\nsame name, and thus have a Universal _in re_ predicable of them in\ncommon, in every such case Plato assumes a Universal _extra rem_, or\na separate self-existent Form; which explains nothing, and merely\ndoubles the total to be summed up.[14]\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. A. ix. p. 990, a. 34; M. iv. p. 1079,\na. 2. Here we have the first appearance of the argument that William\nof Ockham, the Nominalist, put in the foreground of his case against\nRealism: \"Entia non sunt multiplicanda pr\u00e6ter necessitatem.\"]\n\n2. Plato's arguments in support of Realism are either inconclusive,\nor prove too much. Wherever there is cognition (he argues), there\nmust exist an eternal and unchangeable object of cognition, apart\nfrom particulars, which are changeable and perishable. No, replies\nAristotle: cognition does not require the _Universale extra rem_; for\nthe _Universale in re_, the constant predicate of all the\nparticulars, is sufficient as an object of cognition. Moreover, if\nthe argument were admitted, it would prove that there existed\nseparate Forms or Universals of mere negations; for many of the\nconstant predicates are altogether negative. Again, if Self-existent\nUniversals are to be assumed corresponding to all our cogitations, we\nmust assume Universals of extinct particulars, and even of fictitious\nparticulars, such as hippocentaurs or chimeras; for of these, too, we\nhave phantasms or concepts in our minds.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaphys. A. ix. p. 990, b. 14; Scholia, p.\n565, b. 9, Br.]\n\n3. The most subtle disputants on this matter include Relata, among\nthe Universal Ideas or Forms. This is absurd, because these do not\nconstitute any Genus by themselves. These disputants have also urged\nagainst the Realistic theory that powerful and unsolved objection,\nentitled \"The Third Man.\"[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. A. ix. p. 990, b. 15: [Greek: oi(\na)kribe/steroi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n]. Both the points here noticed appear in\nthe Parmenides of Plato.\n\nThe objection called \"The Third Man\" is expressed by saying that, if\nthere be a Form of man, resembling individual men, you must farther\npostulate some higher Form, marking the point of resemblance between\nthe two; and so on higher, without end.\n\nThe authenticity of the Platonic Parmenides is disputed by Ueberweg\n(Untersuchungen \u00fcber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen\nSchriften, pp. 176-181), upon the ground (among others) that, while\nAristotle never cites the dialogue by its title, nor ever makes\nprobable allusion to it, the Parmenides advances against the theory\nof the Platonic Ideas this objection of Aristotle's, known under the\nname of \"The Third Man.\" Aristotle (says Ueberweg), if he had known\nthe Parmenides, would not have advanced this objection as his own. We\nmust therefore suppose that the Parmenides was composed later than\nAristotle, and borrowed this objection from Aristotle.\n\nIn reply to this argument I transcribe the passage of Aristotle\n(Metaphys. A. ix. p. 990, b. 15) to which Ueberweg himself refers:\n[Greek: e)/ti de\\ oi( a)kribe/steroi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n oi( me\\n t\u00f4=n pro/s\nti poiou=sin i)de/as, \u00f4(=n ou)/ phamen ei)=nai kath' au(to\\ ge/nos,\noi( de\\ to\\n tri/ton a)/nthr\u00f4pon le/gousin.] The same words (with the\nexception of [Greek: phasi/n] in place of [Greek: phame/n]) are\nrepeated in M. p. 1079, a. 11.\n\nNow these words plainly indicate that Aristotle does not profess to\nadvance the objection, called [Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthr\u00f4pos], as his\nown, or as broached by himself. He derives it from what he calls\n[Greek: oi( a)kribe/steroi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n]. The charge against\nAristotle, therefore, of advancing as his own an objection which had\nalready been suggested by Plato himself in the Parmenides, is\nunfounded. And it is the more unfounded, because Aristotle, in the\nfirst book of the Metaphysica, speaks in the language of a Platonist,\nand considers himself as partly responsible for the doctrine of\nIdeas: [Greek: dei/knumen, phame/n, oi)o/metha], &c. (Alexand. in\nSchol. p. 563, b. 27, Brand.)\n\nBut what are we to understand by these words--[Greek: oi(\na)kribe/steroi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n]--from which Aristotle derives the\nobjection? The words refer to certain expositions or arguments (oral,\nor written, or both) which were within the knowledge of Aristotle,\nand were of a peculiarly subtle and analytical character. Among them\nis very probably included the Platonic Parmenides itself,\ndistinguished as it is for extreme subtlety. (See Stallbaum's\nProlegg. pp. 249, 277, 337, who says, \"In uno fer\u00e8 Parmenide idearum\ndoctrina subtilius investigatur.\") I see no reason why it should not\nbe included within the fair and reasonable meaning of the words. And\nsuch being the case, I cannot go along with Ueberweg (and other\ncritics) who say that Aristotle has not even made an indirect\nallusion to the Parmenides.\n\nBut why did not Aristotle specify the Parmenides directly and by\nname? I do not know what was his reason. We may feel surprise (as\nStallbaum feels, p. 337) that he does not; but, when critics infer\nfrom the omission that he did not know the dialogue as a work of\nPlato, I contest the inference. We see that Alexander, in his\nelaborate commentary (p. 566, Schol. Brand.) makes no allusion to the\nParmenides, though he alludes to Eud\u00eamus, to Diod\u00f4rus, Kronus, and to\nthe manner in which the objection called [Greek: o( tri/tos\na)/nthr\u00f4pos] was handled by various Sophists. Now we are fully\nassured that the Parmenides was acknowledged as a work of Plato, long\nbefore the time of Alexander (since it is included in the catalogue\nof Thrasyllus); yet he, the most instructed of all the commentators,\nmakes no allusion to it. Why he did not, I cannot say, but his\nomission affords no ground for concluding that he did not know it, or\ndid not trust its authenticity.]\n\n4. The supporters of these Self-existent Universals trace them to two\n_principia_--The One, and the Indeterminate Dyad; which they affirm\nto be prior in existence even to the Universals themselves. But this\ncannot be granted; for the Idea of Number must be logically prior to\nthe Idea of the Dyad; but the Idea of Number is relative, and the\nRelative can never be prior to the Absolute or Self-existent.\n\n5. If we grant that, wherever there is one constant predicate\nbelonging to many particulars, or wherever there is stable and\ntrustworthy cognition, in all such cases a Self-existent Universal\nCorrelate _extra rem_ is to be assumed, we shall find that this\napplies not merely to Substances or Essences, but also to the other\nCategories--Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c. But hereby we exclude\nthe possibility of participation in them by Particulars; since from\nsuch participation the Particular derives its Substance or Essence\nalone, not its accidental predicates. Thus the Self-existent\nUniversal Dyad is eternal: but a particular pair, which derives its\nessential property of doubleness from partaking in this Universal\nDyad, does not at the same time partake of eternity, unless by\naccident. Accordingly, there are no Universal Ideas, except of\nSubstances or Essences: the common name, when applied to the world of\nsense and to that of cogitation, signifies the same thing--Substance\nor Essence. It is unmeaning to talk of anything else as\nsignified--any other predicate common to many. Well then, if the Form\nof the Universals and the Form of those Particulars that participate\nin the Universals be the same, we shall have something common to both\nthe one and the other, so that the objection called \"The Third Man\"\nwill become applicable, and a higher Form must be postulated. But, if\nthe Form of the Universals and the Form of the participating\nParticulars, be not identical, then the same name, as signifying both,\nwill be used equivocally; just as if you applied the same denomination\nman to Kallias and to a piece of wood, without any common property to\nwarrant it.\n\n6. But the greatest difficulty of all is to understand how these\nCogitable Universals, not being causes of any change or movement,\ncontribute in any way to the objects of sense, either to the eternal\nor to the perishable; or how they assist us towards the knowledge\nthereof, being not in them, and therefore not their substance or\nessence; or how they stand in any real relation to their\nparticipants, being not immanent therein. Particulars certainly do\nnot proceed from these Universals, in any intelligible sense. To say\nthat the Universals are archetypes, and that Particulars partake in\nthem, is unmeaning, and mere poetic metaphor. For where is the\nworking force to mould them in conformity with the Universals? Any\none thing may _be_ like, or may _become_ like, to any other\nparticular thing, by accident, or without any regular antecedent\ncause to produce such assimilation. The same particular substance,\nmoreover, will have not one universal archetype only, but several.\nThus, the same individual man will have not only the Self-animal and\nthe Self-biped, but also the Self-man, as archetype. Then again,\nthere will be universal archetypes, not merely for particular\nsensible objects, but also for Universals themselves; thus the genus\nwill be an archetype for its various species; so that the same which\nis now archetype will, under other circumstances, be copy.\n\n7. Furthermore, it seems impossible that what is Substance or Essence\ncan be separate from that whereof it is the substance or essence. How\nthen can the Universals, if they be the essences of sensible things,\nhave any existence apart from those sensible things? Plato tells us\nin the Ph\u00e6don, that the Forms or Universals are the causes why\nparticulars both exist at all, and come into such or such modes of\nexistence. But even if we assume Universals as existing, still the\nParticulars participant therein will not come into being, unless\nthere be some efficient cause to produce movement; moreover, many\nother things come into being, though there be no Universals\ncorrelating therewith, _e.g._ a house, or a ring. The same causes\nthat were sufficient to bring these last into being, will be\nsufficient to bring all particulars into being, without assuming any\nUniversals _extra rem_ at all.\n\n8. Again, if the Universals or Forms are Numbers, how can they ever\nbe causes? Even if we suppose Particulars to be Numbers also, how can\none set of Numbers be causes to the others? There can be no such\ncausal influence, even if one set be eternal, and the other\nperishable.[17]\n\n[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 991, b. 13. Several other\nobjections are made by Aristotle against that variety of the Platonic\ntheory wherein the Ideas were commuted into Ideal Numbers. These\nobjections do not belong to the controversy of Realism against\nNominalism.]\n\nOut of the many objections raised by Aristotle against Plato, we have\nselected such as bear principally upon the theory of Realism; that\nis, upon the theory of _Universalia ante rem_ or _extra\nrem_--self-existent, archetypal, cogitable substances, in which\nParticulars faintly participate. The objections are not superior in\nacuteness, and they are decidedly inferior, in clearness of enunciation,\nto those that Plato himself produces in the Parmenides. Moreover,\nseveral of them are founded upon Aristotle's point of view, and would\nhave failed to convince Plato. The great merit of Aristotle is, that\nhe went beyond the negative of the Parmenides, asserted this new\npoint of view of his own, and formulated it into a counter-theory. He\nrejected altogether the separate and exclusive reality which Plato\nhad claimed for his Absolutes of the cogitable world, as well as the\nderivative and unreal semblance that alone Plato accorded to the\nsensible world. Without denying the distinction of the two, as\nconceivable and nameable, he maintained that truth and cognition\nrequired that they should be looked at in implication with each\nother. And he went even a step farther, in antithesis to Plato, by\nreversing the order of the two. Instead of considering the Cogitable\nUniversals alone as real and complete in themselves, and the Sensible\nParticulars as degenerate and confused semblances of them, he placed\ncomplete reality in the Sensible Particulars alone,[18] and treated\nthe Cogitable Universals as contributory appendages thereto; some\nbeing essential, others non-essential, but all of them relative, and\nnone of them independent integers. His philosophy was a complete\nrevolution as compared with Parmenides and Plato; a revolution, too,\nthe more calculated to last, because he embodied it in an elaborate\nand original theory of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ontology. He was the\nfirst philosopher that, besides recognizing the equivocal character\nof those general terms whereon speculative debate chiefly turns,\nendeavoured methodically to set out and compare the different\nmeanings of each term, and their relations to each other.\n\n[Footnote 18: Aristotle takes pains to vindicate against both Plato\nand the Herakleiteans the dignity of the Sensible World. They that\ndepreciate sensible objects as perpetually changing, unstable, and\nunknowable, make the mistake (he observes) of confining their\nattention to the sublunary interior of the Kosmos, where, indeed,\ngeneration and destruction largely prevail. But this is only a small\nportion of the entire Kosmos. In the largest portion--the visible,\ncelestial, superlunary regions--there is no generation or destruction\nat all, nothing but permanence and uniformity. In appreciating the\nsensible world (Aristotle says) philosophers ought to pardon the\nshortcomings of the smaller portion on account of the excellences of\nthe larger; and not condemn both together on account of the smaller\n(Metaphys. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, a. 30).]\n\nHowever much the Ontology of Aristotle may fail to satisfy modern\nexigencies, still, as compared with the Platonic Realism, it was a\nconsiderable improvement. Instead of adopting Ens as a\nself-explaining term, contrasted with the Generated and Perishable\n(the doctrine of Plato in the Republic, Ph\u00e6don, and Tim\u00e6us), he\ndiscriminates several distinct meanings of Ens; a discrimination not\nalways usefully pursued, but tending in the main towards a better\ntheory. The distinction between Ens potential, and Ens actual, does\nnot belong directly to the question between Realism and Nominalism,\nyet it is a portion of that philosophical revolution wrought by\nAristotle against Plato--displacement of the seat of reality, and\ntransfer of it from the Cogitable Universal to the Sensible\nParticular. The direct enunciation of this change is contained in his\ndistinction of Ens into Fundamental and Concomitant ([Greek:\nsumbeb\u00eako/s]), and his still greater refinement on the same principle\nby enumerating the ten varieties of Ens called Categories or\nPredicaments.[19] He will not allow Ens (nor Unum) to be a genus,\npartible into species: he recognizes it only as a word of many\nanalogous meanings, one of them principal and fundamental, the rest\nderivative and subordinate thereto, each in its own manner. Aristotle\nthus establishes a graduated scale of Entia, each having its own\nvalue and position, and its own mode of connexion with the common\ncentre. That common centre Aristotle declared to be of necessity some\nindividual object--Hoc Aliquid, That Man, This Horse, &c. This was\nthe common subject, to which all the other Entia belonged as\npredicates, and without which none of them had any reality. We here\nfall into the language of Logic, the first theory of which we owe to\nAristotle. His ontological classification was adapted to that theory.\n\n[Footnote 19: In enumerating the Ten Categories, Aristotle takes his\ndeparture from the Proposition--_Homo currit_--_Homo vincit_. He\nassumes a particular individual as subject; and he distributes, under\nten general heads, all the information that can be asked or given\nabout that subject--all the predicates that can be affirmed or denied\nthereof. [See Ch. iii., especially p. 73, seq.]]\n\nAs we are here concerned only with the different ways of conceiving\nthe relation between the Particular and the Universal, we are not\ncalled on to criticize the well-known decuple enumeration of\nCategories or Predicaments given by Aristotle, both in his treatise\ncalled by that name and elsewhere. For our purpose it is enough to\npoint out that the particular sensible Hoc Aliquid is declared to be\nthe ultimate subject, to which all Universals attach, as determinants\nor accompaniments; and that, if this condition be wanting, the\nunattached Universal cannot rank among complete Entia. The subject or\nFirst Substance, which can never become a predicate, is established\nas the indispensable ultimate subject for all predicates; if that\ndisappears, all predicates disappear along with it. The Particular\nthus becomes the keystone of the arch whereon all Universals rest.\nAristotle is indeed careful to point out a gradation in these\npredicates: some are essential to the subject, and thus approach so\nnear to the First Substance that he calls them Second Substances;\nothers, and the most in number, are not thus essential; these last\nare Concomitants or Accidents, and some of them fall so much short of\ncomplete Entity that he describes them as near to Non-Entia.[20] But\nall of them, essential or unessential, are alike constituents or\nappendages of the First Substance or Particular Subject, and have no\nreality in any other character.\n\n[Footnote 20: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 21: [Greek: phai/netas\nga/r to/ sumbeb\u00eako\\s e)ggu/s ti tou= m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos].\n\nThere cannot be a stronger illustration of the difference between the\nPlatonic and the Aristotelian point of view, than the fact that Plato\napplies the same designation to all particular objects of sense--that\nthey are only midway between Entia and Non-Entia (Republic, v. pp.\n478-479).]\n\nWe thus have the counter-theory of Aristotle against the Platonic\nRealism. Instead of separate Universal Substances, containing in\nthemselves full reality, and forfeiting much of that reality when\nthey faded down into the shadowy copies called Particulars, he\ninverts the Platonic order, announces full reality to be the\nprivilege of the Particular Sensible, and confines the function of\nthe Universal to that of a predicate, in or along with the\nParticular. There is no doctrine that he protests against more\nfrequently than the ascribing of separate reality to the Universal.\nThe tendency to do this, he signalizes as a natural but unfortunate\nillusion, lessening the beneficial efficacy of universal\ndemonstrative reasoning.[21] And he declares it to be a corollary\nfrom this view of the Particular as indispensable subject along with\nthe Universal as its predicate--That the first principles of\nDemonstration in all the separate theoretical sciences must be\nobtained by Induction from particulars: first by impressions of sense\npreserved in the memory; then by multiplied remembrances enlarged\ninto one experience; lastly, by many experiences generalized into one\nprinciple by the No\u00fbs.[22]\n\n[Footnote 21: Aristot. Analyt. Poster. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 31, b. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 22: See the concluding chapter of the Analytica Posteriora.\n\nA similar doctrine is stated by Plato in the Ph\u00e6don (p. 96, B) as one\namong the intellectual phases that Sokrates had passed through in the\ncourse of his life, without continuing in them.]\n\nWhile Aristotle thus declares Induction to be the source from whence\nDemonstration in these separate sciences draws its first principles,\nwe must at the same time acknowledge that his manner of treating\nScience is not always conformable to this declaration, and that he\noften seems to forget Induction altogether. This is the case not only\nin his First Philosophy, or Metaphysics, but also in his Physics. He\nthere professes to trace out what he calls beginnings, causes,\nelements, &c., and he analyses most of the highest generalities. Yet\nstill these analytical enquiries (whatever be their value) are\nusually, if not always, kept in subordination to the counter-theory\nthat he had set up against the Platonic Realism. Complete reality\nresides (he constantly repeats) only in the particular sensible\nsubstances and sensible facts or movements that compose the aggregate\nKosmos: which is not generated, but eternal, both as to substance and\nas to movement. If these sensible substances disappear, nothing\nremains. The beginnings and causes exist only relatively to these\nparticulars. Form, Matter, Privation, are not real Beings, antecedent\nto the Kosmos, and pre-existent generators of the substances\nconstituting the Kosmos; they are logical fragments or factors,\nobtained by mental analysis and comparison, assisting to methodize\nour philosophical point of view or conception of those substances,\nbut incapable of being understood, and having no value of their own,\napart from the substances. Some such logical analysis (that of\nAristotle or some other) is an indispensable condition even of the\nmost strictly inductive philosophy.\n\nThere are some portions of the writings of Aristotle (especially the\nthird book De Anim\u00e2 and the twelfth book of the Metaphysica) where he\nappears to lose sight of the limit here indicated; but, with few\nexceptions, we find him constantly remembering, and often repeating,\nthe great truth formulated in his Categories: that full or\nsubstantive reality resides only in the Hoc Aliquid, with its\npredicates implicated with it, and that even the highest of these\npredicates (Second Substances) have no reality apart from some one of\ntheir particulars. We must recollect that, though Aristotle denies to\nthe predicates a _separate_ reality, he recognizes in them an\n_adjective_ reality, as accompaniments and determinants: he\ncontemplates all the ten Categories as distinct varieties of\nexistence.[23] This is sufficient as a basis for abstraction, whereby\nwe can name them and reason upon them as distinct objects of thought\nor points of view, although none of them come into reality except as\nimplicated with a sensible particular. Of such reasoning Aristotle's\nFirst Philosophy chiefly consists; and he introduces peculiar phrases\nto describe this distinction of reason between two different points\nof view, where the real object spoken of is one and the same. The\nfrequency of the occasions taken to point out that distinction marks\nhis anxiety to keep the First Philosophy in harmony with the theory\nof Reality announced in his Categories.\n\n[Footnote 23: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23: [Greek:\no)sach\u00f4=s ga\\r le/getai (ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata t\u00ea=s kat\u00eagori/as),\ntosautach\u00f4=s to\\ ei)=nai s\u00eamai/nei.]]\n\nThe Categories of Aristotle appear to have become more widely known\nthan any other part of his philosophy. They were much discussed by\nthe sects coming after him; and, even when not adopted, were present\nto speculative minds as a scheme to be amended.[24] Most of the\narguments turned upon the nine later Categories: it was debated\nwhether these were properly enumerated and discriminated, and whether\nthe enumeration as a whole was exhaustive.\n\n[Footnote 24: This is the just remark of Trendelenburg,\nKategorienlehre, p. 217.]\n\nWith these details, however, the question between Realism and its\ncounter-theory (whether Conceptualism or Nominalism) is not\nmaterially concerned. The standard against Realism was raised by\nAristotle in the First Category, when he proclaimed the Hoc Aliquid\nto be the only complete Ens, and the Universal to exist only along\nwith it as a predicate, being nothing in itself apart; and when he\nenumerated Quality as one among the predicates, and nothing beyond.\nIn the Platonic Realism (Ph\u00e6don, Tim\u00e6us, Parmenides) what Aristotle\ncalled Quality was the highest and most incontestable among all\nSubstances--the Good, the Beautiful, the Just, &c.; what Aristotle\ncalled Second Substance was also Substance in the Platonic Realism,\nthough not so incontestably; but what Aristotle called First\nSubstance was in the Platonic Realism no Substance at all, but only\none among a multitude of confused and transient shadows. It is in the\nFirst and Third Categories that the capital antithesis of Aristotle\nagainst the Platonic Realism is contained. As far as that antithesis\nis concerned, it matters little whether the aggregate of predicates\nbe subdivided under nine general heads (Categories) or under three.\n\nIn the century succeeding Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers altered\nhis Categories, and drew up a new list of their own, containing only\nfour distinct heads instead of ten. We have no record or explanation\nof the Stoic Categories from any of their authors; so that we are\ncompelled to accept the list on secondary authority, from the\ncomments of critics, mostly opponents. But, as far as we can make\nout, they retained in their First Category the capital feature of\nAristotle's First Category--the primacy of the First Substance or Hoc\nAliquid and its exclusive privilege of imparting reality to all the\nother Categories. Indeed, the Stoics seem not only to have retained\nthis characteristic, but to have exaggerated it. They did not\nrecognize so close an approach of the Universal to the Particular, as\nis implied by giving to it a second place in the same Category, and\ncalling it Second Substance. The First Category of the Stoics\n(Something or Subject) included only particular substances; all\nUniversals were by them ranked in the other Categories, being\nregarded as negations of substances, and designated by the term\nNon-Somethings--Non-Substances.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, I. vi. p. 420: [Greek:\n_ou)/tina_ ta)koina\\ par' au)toi=s le/getai]. &c.]\n\nThe Neo-Platonist Plotinus, in the third century after the Christian\nera, agreed with the Stoics (though looking from the opposite point\nof view) in disapproving Aristotle's arrangement of Second Substance\nin the same Category with First Substance.[26] He criticizes at some\nlength both the Aristotelian list of Categories, and the Stoic list;\nbut he falls back into the Platonic and even the Parmenidean point of\nview. His capital distinction is between Cogitables and Sensibles.\nThe Cogitables are in his view the most real (_i.e._ the Aristotelian\nSecond Substance is more real than the First); among them the\nhighest, Unum or Bonum, is the grand fountain and sovereign of all\nthe rest. Plotinus thus departed altogether from the Aristotelian\nCategories, and revived the Platonic or Parmenidean Realism; yet not\nwithout some Aristotelian modifications. But it is remarkable that in\nthis departure his devoted friend and scholar Porphyry did not follow\nhim. Porphyry not only composed an Introduction to the Categories of\nAristotle, but also vindicated them at great length, in a separate\ncommentary, against the censures of Plotinus; Dexippus, Jamblichus,\nand Simplikius, followed in the same track.[27] Still, though\nPorphyry stood forward both as admirer and champion of the\nAristotelian Categories, he did not consider that the question raised\nby the First Category of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism was\nfinally decided. This is sufficiently proved by the three problems\ncited above out of the Introduction of Porphyry; where he proclaims\nit to be a deep and difficult enquiry, whether Genera and Species had\nnot a real substantive existence apart from the individuals composing\nthem. Aristotle, both in the Categories and in many other places, had\ndeclared his opinion distinctly in the negative against Plato; but\nPorphyry had not made up his mind between the two, though he insists,\nin language very Aristotelian, on the distinction between First and\nSecond Substance.[28]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Simplikius, Schol. in Aristotel. Categ. p. 40, a, b,\nBrandis.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. xi. p. 634, n. 69.\nUpon this account Prantl finds Porphyry guilty of \"empiricism in its\nextreme crudeness\"--\"jene \u00e4usserste Rohheit des Empirismus.\"]\n\nThrough the translations and manuals of Bo\u00ebthius and others, the\nCategories of Aristotle were transmitted to the Latin Churchmen, and\ncontinued to be read even through the darkest ages, when the\nAnalytica and the Topica were unknown or neglected. The Aristotelian\ndiscrimination between First and Second Substance was thus always\nkept in sight, and Bo\u00ebthius treated it much in the same manner as\nPorphyry had done before him.[29] Alcuin, Rhabanus Maurus, and Eric\nof Auxerre,[30] in the eighth and ninth centuries, repeated what they\nfound in Bo\u00ebthius, and upheld the Aristotelian tradition unimpaired.\nBut Scotus Erigena (_d._ 880 A.D.) took an entirely opposite view,\nand reverted to the Platonic traditions, though with a large\nadmixture of Aristotelian ideas. He was a Christian Platonist,\nblending the transcendentalism of Plato and Plotinus with theological\ndogmatic influences (derived from the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and\nothers) and verging somewhat even towards Pantheism. Scotus Erigena\nrevived the doctrine of Cogitable _Universalia extra rem_ and _ante\nrem_. He declared express opposition to the arrangement of the First\nAristotelian Category, whereby the individual was put first, in the\ncharacter of subject; the Universal second, in the character only of\npredicate; complete reality belonging to the two in conjunction.\nScotus maintained that the Cogitable or Incorporeal Universal was the\nfirst, the true and complete real; from whence the sensible\nindividuals were secondary, incomplete, multiple, derivatives.[31]\nBut, though he thus adopts and enforces the Platonic theory of\nUniversals _ante rem_ and _extra rem_, he does not think himself\nobliged to deny that Universals may be _in re_ also.\n\n[Footnote 29: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. xii. p. 685;\nTrendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Ueberweg, Geschichte der Philosophie der scholastischen\nZeit, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, II. xiii, pp. 29-35.]\n\nThe contradiction of the Aristotelian traditions, so far as concerns\nthe First Category, thus proclaimed by Scotus Erigena, appears to\nhave provoked considerable opposition among his immediate successors.\nNevertheless he also obtained partizans. Remigius of Auxerre and\nothers not only defended the Platonic Realism, but carried it as far\nas Plato himself had done; affirming that not merely Universal\nSubstances, but also Universal Accidents, had a real separate\nexistence, apart from and anterior to individuals.[32] The\ncontroversy for and against the Platonic Realism was thus distinctly\nlaunched in the schools of the Middle Ages. It was upheld both as a\nphilosophical revival, and as theologically orthodox, entitled to\nsupersede the traditional counter-theory of Aristotle.\n\n[Footnote 32: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, II. xiii, pp. 44, 45-47.]\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nFIRST PRINCIPLES.\n\n\nA.--_Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle's Doctrine._\n\nIn reading attentively Hamilton's \"Dissertation on the Philosophy of\nCommon Sense\" (Note A, annexed to ed. of Reid's Works, p. 742, seq.),\nI find it difficult to seize accurately what he means by the term. It\nseems to me that he unsays in one passage what he says in another;\nand that what he tells us (p. 750, b.), viz. that \"philosophers have\nrarely scrupled, on the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of\nconsciousness, so often as these did not fall in with their\npre-adopted opinions; and on the other clamorously to appeal to them\nas irrecusable truths, so often as they could allege them in\ncorroboration of their own, or in refutation of a hostile,\ndoctrine\"--is illustrated by his own practice.\n\nOn page 752, a., he compares Common Sense to Common Law, and regards\nit as consisting in certain elementary feelings and beliefs, which,\nthough in possession of all, can only be elicited and declared by\nphilosophers, who declare it very differently. This comparison,\nhowever, sets aside unassisted Common Sense as an available\nauthority. To make it so we must couple with it the same supplement\nthat Common Law requires; that is, we must agree on some one\nphilosopher as authoritative exponent of Common Sense. The Common Law\nof one country is different from that of another. Even in the same\ncountry, it is differently construed and set forth by different\nwitnesses, advocates, and judges. In each country, a supreme tribunal\nis appointed to decide between these versions and to declare the law.\nThe analogy goes farther than Hamilton wishes.\n\nOn the same page, he remarks:--\"In saying (to use the words of\nAristotle) simply and without qualification, that this or that _is a\nknown truth_, we do not mean that it is in fact recognized by all,\nbut only by such as are of a sound understanding; just as, in saying\nabsolutely that a thing is wholesome, we must be held to mean, to\nsuch as are of a hale constitution.\" The passage of Aristotle's\nTopica here noticed will be found to have a different bearing from\nthat which Hamilton gives it.\n\nAristotle is laying down (Topica, VI. iv. p. 141, a. 23-p. 142, a.\n16) the various lines of argument which may be followed out, when you\nare testing in dialectical debate a definition given or admitted by\nthe opponent. There cannot be more than one definition of the same\nthing: the definition ought to declare the essence of the thing,\nwhich can only be done by means of _priora_ and _notiora_. But\n_notiora_ admits of two meanings: (1) _notiora simpliciter_; (2)\n_notiora nobis_ or _singulis hominibus_. Under the first head, that\nwhich is _prius_ is absolutely more knowable than that which is\n_posterius_; thus, a point more than a line, a line more than a\nplane, a plane more than a solid. But under the second head this\norder is often reversed: to most men the solid (as falling more under\nsense) is more knowable than the plane, the plane than the line, the\nline than the point. The first (_notiora simpliciter_) is the truly\nscientific order, suited to superior and accurate minds, employed in\nteaching, learning, and demonstration (p. 141, a. 29: [Greek:\nkatha/per e)n tai=s a)podei/xesin, ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r pa=sa didaskali/a\nkai\\ ma/th\u00easis e)/chei],--b. 16: [Greek: e)pist\u00eamonik\u00f4/teron ga\\r to\\\ntoiou=to/n e)stin]). The second (_notiora nobis_) is adapted to\nordinary minds, who cannot endure regular teaching, nor understand a\ndefinition founded on the first order. But definitions founded on the\nsecond alone (Aristotle says) are not satisfactory, nor do they\nreveal the true essence of the thing defined: there can be no\nsatisfactory definition unless what is _notius simpliciter_ coincides\nwith what is _notius nobis_ (p. 141, b. 24). He then proceeds to\nexplain what is meant by _notius simpliciter_; and this is the\npassage quoted by Hamilton. After having said that the _notiora\nnobis_ are not fixed and uniform, but vary with different\nindividuals, and even in the same individual at different times, he\ngoes on: \"It is plain therefore that we ought not to define by such\ncharacteristics as these (the _notiora nobis_), but by the _notiora\nsimpliciter_: for it is only in this way that we can obtain a\ndefinition one and the same at all times. Perhaps, too, the _notius\nsimpliciter_ is not that which is knowable to all, but that which is\nknowable to those who are well trained in their intelligence; just as\nthe absolutely wholesome is that which is wholesome to those who are\nwell constituted in their bodies\" ([Greek: i)/s\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ to\\\na(pl\u00f4=s gn\u00f4/rimon ou) to\\ pa=si gn\u00f4/rimo/n e)stin, a)lla\\ to\\ toi=s\neu)= diakeime/nois t\u00ea\\n dia/noian, katha/per kai\\ to\\ a(pl\u00f4=s\nu(gieino\\n to\\ toi=s eu)= e)/chousi to\\ s\u00f4=ma]--p. 142, a. 9).\n\nHamilton's translation misses the point of Aristotle, who here\nrepeats what he frequently also declares in other parts of his\nwritings (see Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, b. 33), namely, the contrast\nand antithesis between _notius simpliciter_ (or _natur\u00e2_) and _notius\nnobis_. This is a technical distinction of his own, which he had\nexplained very fully in the page preceding the words translated by\nHamilton; and the words are intended as a supplementary caution, to\nguard against a possible misunderstanding of the phrase. Hamilton's\nwords--\"saying simply, and without qualification, that this or that\nis a known truth,\" do not convey Aristotle's meaning at all; again,\nthe words--\"such as are of a sound understanding,\" fail equally in\nrendering what Aristotle means by [Greek: toi=s eu)= diakeime/nois\nt\u00ea\\n dia/noian]. Aristotle tells us distinctly (in the preceding part\nof the paragraph) that he intends to contrast the few minds\nscientific or prepared for scientific discipline, with the many minds\nunscientific or unprepared for such discipline: he does not intend to\ncontrast \"men of sound understanding\" with men \"not of sound\nunderstanding.\"\n\nIt appears to me that Hamilton has here taken a passage away from its\ngenuine sense in the Aristotelian context, and has pressed it into\nhis service to illustrate a view of his own, foreign to that of\nAristotle. He has done the like with some other passages, to which I\nwill now advert.\n\nWhat he says, pp. 764-766, about Aristotle's use of the term [Greek:\na)xi/\u00f4ma] is quite opposed to the words of Aristotle himself, who\nplainly certifies it as being already in his time a technical term\nwith mathematicians (Met. [Greek: G]. p. 1005, a. 20). On p. 766, a.,\nHamilton says that the word [Greek: a)xi/\u00f4ma] is not used in any work\nextant prior to Aristotle in a logical sense. This is true as to any\n_work_ remaining to us, but Aristotle himself talks of previous\nphilosophers or reasoners who had so used it; thus he speaks of\n[Greek: kata\\ to\\ Z\u00ea/n\u00f4nos a)xi/\u00f4ma] (Metaph. B. p. 1001, b.\n7)--\"according to the assumption laid down by Zeno as authoritative.\"\nOf this passage Hamilton takes no notice: he only refers to the Topica,\nintimating a doubt (in my judgment groundless and certainly professed\nby few modern critics, if any) whether the Topica is a genuine work\nof Aristotle. In the time of Aristotle, various mathematical teachers\nlaid down Axioms, such as, If equals be taken from equals, the\nremainders will be equal; In all propositions, either the affirmative\nor the negative must be true, &c. But the case of Zeno shows us that\nother philosophers also laid down Axioms of their own, which were not\nuniversally accepted by others. What Hamilton here says, about\nAxioms, has little pertinence as a contribution to the Philosophy of\nCommon Sense.\n\nAgain, Hamilton says, p. 770, a.: \"The native contributions by the\nmind itself to our concrete cognitions have, prior to their\nelicitation into consciousness through experience, only a\n_potential_, and in actual experience only an _applied_, _engaged_,\nor _implicate_, existence.\"\n\n\nThese words narrow the line of distinction between the two opposite\nschools so much, that I cannot see where it is drawn. Every germ has\nin it the _potentialities_ of that which it will afterwards become.\nNo one disputes that a baby just born has mental _potentialities_ not\npossessed by a puppy, a calf, or an acorn. What is the difference\nbetween cognitions _elicited through experience_, and cognitions\n_derived from experience_? To those who hold the doctrine of\nRelativity, both our impressions of sense and our mental activities\n(such as memory, discrimination, comparison, abstraction, &c.) are\nalike indispensable to experience. The difference, so far as I can\nsee, between Hamilton and the Inductive School, is not so much about\nthe process whereby cognitions are acquired, as about the mode of\ntesting and measuring the authority of those cognitions when\nacquired. Hamilton will not deny that many of the cognitions which he\ndescribes as elicited by experience are untrue or exaggerated. How\nare we to discriminate these from the true? The Inductive School\nwould reply: \"By the test of experience, and by that alone: if these\ncognitions, which have been elicited in your mind through experience,\nare refuted or not confirmed when tested by subsequent experience\ncarefully watched and selected for the purpose, they are not true or\ntrustworthy cognitions.\" But Hamilton would not concur in this\nanswer: he would say that the cognitions, though elicited _through_\nexperience, did not derive their authority or trustworthiness _from_\nexperience, but were binding and authoritative in themselves, whether\nconfirmed by experience or not. In speaking about Axioms, p. 764, b.,\nhe says: \"Aristotle limited\" (this is not correct: Aristotle did not\n_limit_ as here affirmed) \"the expression Axiom to those judgments\nwhich, on occasion of experience, arise naturally and necessarily in\nthe conscious mind, and which are therefore virtually prior to\nexperience.\" That they are not prior to experience in _order of\ntime_, is admitted in the words just cited from Hamilton himself: he\nmeans, therefore, prior in _logical authority_--carrying with them\nthe quality of _necessity_, even though experience may afford no\nconfirmation of them. This is what he says, on pp. 753-754, about\ncausality: metaphysical causality _must_ be believed, as a necessary\nand subjective law of the observer--though there is no warrant for it\nin experience.\n\nThe question between Hamilton and the Inductive School, I repeat, is\nnot so much about the psychological genesis of beliefs, as about the\ntest for distinguishing true from false or uncertified beliefs, among\nthose beliefs which arise, often and usually, in the minds of most\nmen. Is there any valid test other than experience itself, as\nintentionally varied by experiments and interpreted by careful\nInduction? Are we ever warranted in affirming what transcends\nexperience, except to the extent to which the inference from\nInduction (from some to all) always transcends actual observation?\nThis seems to me the real question at issue between the contending\nschools of Metaphysics. Hamilton, while he rejects experience as the\ntest, furnishes no other test whereby we can discriminate the\nerroneous beliefs \"which are elicited into consciousness through\nexperience,\" from the true beliefs which are elicited in like manner.\n\nIn discussing the doctrine which Hamilton and other philosophers\nentitle Common Sense (in the metaphysical import which they assign to\nit), it is proper to say a few words on the legitimate meaning of\nthis phrase, before it was pressed into service by a particular\nschool of metaphysicians. Every one who lives through childhood and\nboyhood up to man's estate will unavoidably acquire a certain amount\nof knowledge and certain habits of believing, feeling, judging, &c.;\ndiffering materially in different ages and countries, and varying to\na less degree in different individuals of the same age and country,\nyet still including more or less which is common to the large\nmajority. That fire burns; that water quenches thirst and drowns;\nthat the sun gives light and heat; that animals are all mortal and\ncannot live long without nourishment,--these and many other beliefs\nare not possessed by a very young child, but are acquired by every\nman as he grows up, though he cannot remember how or when he learnt\nthem. The sum total of the beliefs thus acquired, by the impressions\nand influences under which every growing mind might pass, constitutes\nthe Common Sense of a particular age and country. A person wanting in\nany of them would be considered, by the majority of the inhabitants,\nas deficient in Common Sense. If I meet an adult stranger, I presume\nas a matter of course that he has acquired them, and I talk to him\naccordingly. I also presume (being in England) that he has learnt the\nlanguage of the country; and that he is familiar with the forms of\nEnglish speech whereby such beliefs and their correlative disbeliefs\nare enunciated. If I affirm to him any one of these beliefs, he\nassents to it at once: it appears to him self-evident--that is,\nrequiring no farther or extraneous evidence to support it. Though it\nappears to him self-evident, however, the proposition may possibly be\nfalse. To a Greek of the Aristotelian age, no proposition could\nappear more self-evident than that of the earth being at rest. No\nterm can be more thoroughly relative than the term _self-evident_:\nthat which appears so to one man, will often not appear so to\nanother, and may sometimes appear altogether untrue.\n\nBut, if we suppose an individual to whom one of these beliefs does\nnot appear self-evident, and who requires proof, he will not be\nsatisfied to be told that every one else believes it, and that it is\na dictate of Common Sense. He probably knows that already, and yet,\nnevertheless, he is not convinced. Aristarchus of Samos was told\ndoubtless, often enough, that the doctrine of the earth being at rest\nwas the plain verdict of Common Sense; but he did not the less\ncontrovert it. You must produce the independent proof which the\nrecusant demands; and, if your doctrine is true and trustworthy, such\nproof can be produced. I will here remark that, in so far as Common\nSense can properly be quoted as an authority or presumptive\nauthority, it is such only in the sense proclaimed by Herakleitus and\nLa Mennais, as cited by Hamilton, pp. 770-771: \"as a magazine of\nready-fabricated dogmas.\" Hamilton finds fault with both of them; but\nit appears to me that they rightly interpret, and that he wrongly\ninterprets, what Common Sense, as generally understood, is; and\nmoreover, that most of the other authorities whom he himself quotes\nunderstand the phrase as these two understand it. Common Sense is \"a\nmagazine of ready-fabricated dogmas,\" as La Mennais (see p. 771, a.)\nconsiders it--dogmas assumed as self-evident, and as requiring no\nproof. It only becomes \"a source of elementary truths\" when analysed\nand remodelled by philosophers. Now philosophers differ much in their\nmode of analysing it (as Hamilton himself declares emphatically), and\nbring out of it different elementary truths; each of them professing\nto follow Common Sense and quoting Common Sense as warranty. It is\nplain that Common Sense is no authority for either one of two\ndiscrepant modes of analysis. Its authority counts for those dogmas\nout of which the analysis is made, in so far as Common Sense is\nauthoritative at all.\n\nHamilton cites or indicates thirteen different Aristotelian passages,\nin order to support his view that Aristotle is to be numbered among\nthe champions of authoritative Common Sense. It will be seen that\nmost of the passages prove nothing, and that only one proves much, in\nfavour of that view. I shall touch upon them _seriatim_.\n\n(_a_) \"First truths are such as are believed, not through aught else\"\n(say rather _through other truths_) \"but through themselves alone.\nFor, in regard to the first principles of science, we ought not to\nrequire the reason _Why_; for each such principle behoves to be\nitself a _belief_ in and of itself.\"[1] After the words _reason Why_,\nHamilton inserts the following additional words of his own in\nbrackets--\"but only the fact _That_ they are given.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Aristot. Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 30; Hamilton's Reid, p.\n772, a.]\n\nI demur to the words in brackets, as implying an hypothesis not\ncontained in Aristotle; who says only that the truth affirmed by the\nteacher must be such as the learner is prepared to believe without\nasking any questions. It may be an analytical truth (_sensu\nKantiano_), in which the predicate asserts only what the learner\nknows to be already contained in the definition of the subject. It\nmay be a synthetical truth; yet asserting only what he is familiar\nwith by constant, early, uncontradicted, obvious, experience. In\neither case, he is prepared to believe it at once; and thus the\nconditions of a First Scientific Truth are satisfied, as here\ndescribed by Aristotle; who says nothing about the truth _being\ngiven_.\n\nThe next passage cited (_b_) is from the Analytica Posteriora (the\nreference is printed by mistake _Priora_). According to Hamilton,\nAristotle says:--\"We assert not only that science does exist, but also\nthat there is given a certain beginning or principle of science, _in\nso far as_ (or, on another interpretation of the term [Greek:\n\u00ea(=|]--_by which_) we recognize the import of the terms.\"[2] I think\nHamilton has not exactly rendered the sense of the original when he\ntranslates it--\"we recognize the import of the terms;\" and he\nproceeds to add expository words of his own which carry us still\nfarther away from what I understand in Aristotle. If Hamilton's\nrendering is correct, all the _principia_ of Science would be\nanalytical propositions (_sensu Kantiano_), which I do not think that\nAristotle intended to affirm or imply. In the last chapter of the\nAnalytica Posteriora, Aristotle not only affirmed that there were\nFirst Principles of Science, but described at length the inductive\nprocess by which we reached them: referring them ultimately to the\ncognizance and approval of No\u00fbs or Intellect. What Aristotle means\nis, that, in ascending from propositions of lower to propositions of\nhigher universality, we know when we have reached the extreme term of\nascent; and this forms the _principium_.\n\n[Footnote 2: Aristot. Anal. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 23: [Greek:\ntau=ta/ t' ou)=n ou(/t\u00f4 le/gomen, kai\\ ou) mo/non e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean a)lla\\\nkai\\ a)rch\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ei)=nai/ tina/ phamen, \u00ea(=| tou\\s o(/rous\ngn\u00f4ri/zomen.]\n\nNeither Philoponus, nor Buhle, nor M. Barth\u00e9lemy St.-Hilaire,\ntranslate the words [Greek: tou\\s o(/rous gn\u00f4ri/zomen] in the same\nway as Sir W. Hamilton. It rather seems to me that the words mean\n_terms or limits of regress_, which coincides with the paraphrase of\nPhiloponus: [Greek: tou/t\u00f4| ga\\r (t\u00f4=| n\u00f4=|) ta\\s a)rchoeidesta/tas\nkai\\ oi(onei\\ o(/rous ou)/sas gn\u00f4ri/zomen] (Schol. p. 201, b. 13,\nBr.), as well as substantially with the note of M. St.-Hilaire.]\n\nSir W. Hamilton next gives us another passage (_c_) from the\nAnalytica Posteriora, in which Aristotle affirms that the First\nPrinciples must be believed in a superlative degree, because we know\nand believe all secondary truths through them:[3] a doctrine which\nappears to me to require both comment and limitation; but about which\nI say nothing, because, even granting it to be true, I do not see how\nit assists the purpose--to prove that Aristotle is the champion of\nauthoritative Common Sense. Nor do I find any greater proof in\nanother passage previously (p. 764, b.) produced from Aristotle: \"Of\nthe immediate principles of syllogism, that which cannot be\ndemonstrated, but which it is not necessary to possess as the\npre-requisite of all learning, I call _Thesis_: and that _Axiom_,\nwhich he who would learn aught, must himself bring (and not receive\nfrom his instructor). For some such principles there are; and it is to\nthese that we are accustomed to apply the name.\"[4] Such principles\nthere doubtless are, which the learner must bring with him; but\nAristotle does not assert, much less prove, that they are intuitions\ngiven by authoritative Common Sense. Nay, in the passage cited in my\nformer page, he both asserted and proved that the _principia_ of\nScience were raised from Sense by Induction. The learner, when he\ncomes to be taught, must bring some of these _principia_ with him, if\nhe is to learn Science from his teacher; just as he must also bring\nwith him a knowledge of the language, of the structure of sentences,\nof the forms for affirmation and denial, &c., and various other\nrequisites. A recruit, when first coming to be drilled, must bring\nwith him a certain power of walking and of making other movements of\nthe limbs. But these pre-requisites, on the part of the learner as\nwell as on that of the recruit, are not intuitive products or\ninspirations of the mind: they are acquirements made by long and\nirksome experience, though often forgotten in its details. We are not\nto reason upon the learner or the recruit as if they were children\njust born.\n\n[Footnote 3: Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 72, a. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 72, a. 17: [Greek: tou=to\nga\\r _ma/list'_ e)pi\\ toi=s toiou/tois ei)\u00f4/thamen o)/noma\nle/gein]--\"we are for the most part accustomed:\" Hamilton has not\ntranslated the word [Greek: ma/lista], which it would have been\nbetter for him to do, because he founds upon the passage an argument\nto prove that Aristotle limited in a certain way the sense of the\nword Axiom.]\n\nThe passages out of the Rhetorica and the Metaphysica (cited on p.\n772, b., and marked _d_ and _e_) are hardly worth notice. But that\nwhich immediately follows (marked _f_), out of the Nikomachean\nEthica, is the most pertinent of all that are produced. Hamilton\nwrites:--\"Arguing against a paradox of certain Platonists in regard\nto the Pleasurable, Aristotle says--'But they who oppose themselves\nto Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates were not a good, talk\nidly. For what _appears to all_, that we affirm _to be_; and he who\nwould subvert this belief, will himself assuredly advance nothing\nmore deserving of credit.'[5] Compare also L. vii. c. 13 (14). In his\nparaphrase of the above passage, the Pseudo-Andronicus in one place\nuses the expression _common opinion_, and in another all but uses\n(what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian,\nif indeed in Greek at all) the expression _common sense_, which D.\nHeinsius in his Latin version actually employs.\" Thus far Hamilton;\nbut the words of Aristotle which immediately follow are even\nstronger:--\"For, in so far as foolish creatures desire pleasure, the\nobjection taken would be worth something; but, when intelligent\ncreatures desire it also, how can the objectors make out their case?\nEven in mean and foolish creatures, moreover, there is perhaps a\ncertain good natural appetite, superior to themselves, which aims at\ntheir own good.\"[6] Or as Aristotle (according to some critics, the\nAristotelian Eudemus) states it in the Seventh Book of the\nNikomachean Ethica, referred to by Sir W. Hamilton without citing\nit:--\"Perhaps all creatures (brutes as well as men) pursue, not that\npleasure which they think they are pursuing, nor what they would\ndeclare themselves to be pursuing, but all of them the same pleasure;\nfor all creatures have by nature something divine.\"[7]\n\n[Footnote 5: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1172, b. 36: [Greek: o(\\\nga\\r pa=si dokei=, tou=t' ei)=nai/ phamen; o( d' a)nair\u00f4=n tau/t\u00ean\nt\u00ea\\n pi/stin, ou) pa/nu pisto/tera e)rei=.]]\n\n[Footnote 6: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1173, a. 2: [Greek: \u00ea(=|\nme\\n ga\\r ta\\ a)no/\u00eata o)re/getai au)t\u00f4=n, \u00ea)=n a)/n ti to\\ lego/men;\nei) de\\ kai\\ ta\\ phro/nima, p\u00f4=s a)\\n le/goie/n ti? i)/s\u00f4s de\\ kai\\\ne)n toi=s phau/lois e)sti/ ti _phusiko\\n_ a)gatho\\n _krei=tton \u00ea)\\\nkath' au(ta/, o(\\ e)phi/etai tou= oikei/ou a)gathou=_.] (I adopt here\nthe text as given by Michelet, [Greek: **\u00ea(=| me\\n] in place of\n[Greek: ei) me\\n], but not in leaving out [Greek: to\\] before [Greek:\nlego/menon].) I think the sentence would stand better if [Greek:\na)gatho\\n] were omitted after [Greek: phusiko/n].]\n\n[Footnote 7: Eth. Nikom. VII. xiv. p. 1153, b. 31: [Greek: i)/s\u00f4s de\\\nkai\\ di\u00f4/kousin ou)ch \u00ea)\\n oi)/ontai (\u00ea(don\u00ea/n) ou)d' \u00ea)\\n a)\\n\nphai=en, a)lla\\ t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea/n; _pa/nta ga\\r phu/sei e)/chei ti\nthei=on_.] The sentiment is here declared even more strongly\nrespecting the appetency of all animals--brutes as well as men.]\n\nIn this passage, Aristotle does really appear as the champion of\nauthoritative Common Sense. He enunciates the general principle: That\nwhich appears to all, that we affirm to be. And he proceeds to claim\n(with the qualification of _perhaps_) for this universal belief a\ndivine or quasi-divine authority; like Hesiod in the verses cited by\nSir W. Hamilton, p. 770, b., and like Dr. Reid in the motto prefixed\nto his 'Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common\nSense.' If Aristotle had often spoken in this way, he would have been\npre-eminently suitable to figure in Sir W. Hamilton's list of\nauthorities. But the reverse is the fact. In the Analytica and\nTopica, Aristotle is so far from accepting the opinion and belief of\nall as a certificate of truth and reality, that he expressly ranks\nthe matters so certified as belonging to the merely probable, and\nincludes them in his definition thereof. Universal belief counts for\nmore or less, as a certificate of the truth of what is believed,\naccording to the matter to which it refers; and there are few matters\non which it is of greater value than pleasure and pain. Yet even upon\nthis point Aristotle rejects the authority of the many, and calls\nupon us to repose implicit confidence in the verdict of the just and\nintelligent individual, whom he enthrones as the measure. \"Those\nalone are pleasures\" (says Aristotle) \"which appear pleasures to this\nman; those alone are pleasant things in which he takes delight. If\nthings which are revolting to him appear pleasurable to others, we\nought not to wonder, since there are many corruptions and\ndegenerations of mankind; yet these things are not really\npleasurable, except to these men and to men of like disposition.\"[8]\nThis declaration, repeated more than once in the Nikomachean Ethica,\nand supported by Analytica and Topica, more than countervails the\nopposite opinion expressed by Aristotle, in the passage where he\ndefends Eudoxus.\n\n[Footnote 8: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. v. p. 1176, a. 15: [Greek:\ndokei= d' e)n a(/pasi toiou/tois ei)=nai to\\ phaino/menon t\u00f4=|\nspoudai/\u00f4|. ei) de\\ tou=to kal\u00f4=s le/getai, katha/per dokei=, kai\\\ne)/stin e(ka/stou me/tron \u00ea( a)ret\u00ea\\ kai\\ o( a)gatho\\s \u00ea(=|\ntoiou=tos, kai\\ \u00ea(donai\\ ei)=en a)\\n ai( tou/t\u00f4| phaino/menai, kai\\\n\u00ea(de/a oi(=s ou(=tos chai/rei] &c. Ib. vi. p. 1176, b. 24: [Greek:\n_katha/per ou)=n polla/kis ei)/r\u00eatai_, kai\\ ti/mia kai\\ \u00ea(de/a e)sti\\\nta\\ t\u00f4=| spoudai/\u00f4| toiau=ta o)/nta.]]\n\nThe next passage (_g_) produced by Sir W. Hamilton is out of the\nEudemian Ethica. But this passage, when translated more fully and\nexactly than we read it in his words, will be found to prove nothing\nto the point which he aims at. He gives it as follows, p. 773,\na.:--\"But of all these we must endeavour to seek out rational grounds\nof belief, by adducing manifest testimonies and authorities. For it\nis the strongest evidence of a doctrine, if all men can be adduced as\nthe manifest confessors of its positions; because every individual\nhas in him a kind of private organ of the truth. Hence we ought not\nalways to look to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather\nto what appears [and is believed] to be.\" The original is given\nbelow.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Aristot. Eth. Eud. I. vi. p. 1218, b. 26: [Greek:\npeirate/on de\\ peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n pa/nt\u00f4n z\u00eatei=n t\u00ea\\n pi/stin dia\\ t\u00f4=n\nlo/g\u00f4n, marturi/ois kai\\ paradei/gmasi chr\u00f4/menon toi=s\nphainome/nois. kra/tiston me\\n ga\\r pa/ntas a)nthr\u00f4/pous phai/nesthai\nsunomologou=ntas toi=s pa/nt\u00f4s, o(/per metabibazo/menoi poi\u00ea/sousin;\ne)/chei ga\\r e(/kastos oi)kei=o/n ti pro\\s t\u00ea\\n a)l\u00ea/theian, e)x \u00f4(=n\na)nagkai=on deiknu/nai p\u00f4s peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n. e)k ga\\r t\u00f4=n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s\nme\\n legome/n\u00f4n, ou) saph\u00f4=s de/, proi+ou=sin e)/stai kai\\ to\\\nsaph\u00f4=s, metalamba/nousin a)ei\\ ta\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/tera t\u00f4=n ei)\u00f4tho/t\u00f4n\nle/gesthai sugkechume/n\u00f4s.] Then after an interval of fifteen lines:\n[Greek: kal\u00f4=s d' e)/chei kai\\ to\\ ch\u00f4ri\\s kri/nein to\\n t\u00ea=s\nai)ti/as lo/gon kai\\ to\\ deiknu/menon, dia/ te to\\ r(\u00eathe\\n a)rti/\u00f4s,\no(/ti prose/chein ou) dei= pa/nta toi=s dia\\ t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n, a)lla\\\npolla/kis ma=llon toi=s phainome/nois (nu=n d' o(/pot' a)\\n lu/ein\nm\u00ea\\ e)/ch\u00f4sin, a)nagka/zontai pisteu/ein toi=s ei)r\u00eame/nois), kai\\\ndio/ti polla/kis to\\ me\\n u(po\\ tou= lo/gou dedei=chthai dokou=n\na)l\u00eathe\\s me/n e)stin, ou) me/ntoi dia\\ tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n ai)ti/an di'\n\u00ea(/n ph\u00easin o( lo/gos. e)/sti ga\\r dia\\ pseu/dous a)l\u00eathe\\s dei=xai;\nd\u00ea=lon d' e)k t\u00f4=n A)nalutik\u00f4=n.]]\n\nThe following is a literal translation, restoring what Sir W.\nHamilton omits:--\"But, respecting all these matters, we must\nendeavour to seek belief through general reasoning, employing the\nappearances before us (_i.e._ the current _dicta_ and _facta_ of\nsociety) as testimonies and examples. For it is best that all mankind\nshould be manifestly in agreement with what we are about to say; but,\nif that cannot be, that at all events they should be in some sort of\nagreement with us; which they will come to be when brought round (by\nbeing addressed in the proper style). For every man has in him some\ntendencies favourable to the truth, and it is out of these that we\nmust somehow or other prove our conclusions. By taking our departure\nfrom what is said around us truly but not clearly, we shall by\ngradual advance introduce clearness, taking along with us such\nportion of the confused common talk as is most congruous to Science.\n. . . It is well also to consider apart the causal reasoning\n(syllogistic, deductive premisses), and the conclusion shown: first,\nupon the ground just stated, that we must not pay exclusive attention\nto the results of deductive reasoning, but often rather to apparent\nfacts, whereas it often happens now that, when men cannot refute the\nreasoning, they feel constrained to believe in the conclusion; next,\nbecause the conclusion, shown by the reasoning, may often be true in\nitself, but not from the cause assigned in the reasoning. For a true\nconclusion may be shown by false premisses; as we have seen in the\nAnalytica.\"\n\nWhoever reads the original words of Aristotle (or Eudemus) will see\nhow much Sir W. Hamilton's translation strains their true meaning.\n[Greek: Kra/tiston] does not correspond to the phrase--\"it is the\nstrongest evidence of a doctrine.\" [Greek: Kra/tiston] is the\nequivalent of [Greek: a)/riston], as we find in chap. iii. of this\nBook of the Eudemian Ethica (p. 1215, a. 3): [Greek: e)pei\\ d'\nei)si\\n a)pori/ai peri\\ e(ka/st\u00ean pragmatei/an oi)kei=ai, d\u00ea=lon\no(/ti kai\\ peri\\ _bi/ou tou= krati/stou_ kai\\ z\u00f4\u00ea=s t\u00ea=s a)ri/st\u00eas\nei)si/n.] Nor ought the words [Greek: oi)kei=o/n ti pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\na)l\u00ea/theian] to be translated--\"a kind of private organ of the\ntruth:\" they mean simply--\"something in him favourable or tending\ntowards the truth,\" as we read in chap. ii. of this same\nBook--[Greek: oi)kei=on pro\\s eu)exi/an] (p. 1214, b. 22). Moreover,\nHamilton has omitted to translate both the words preceding and the\nwords following; accordingly he has missed the real sense of the\npassage. Aristotle inculcates upon the philosopher never to neglect\nthe common and prevalent opinions, but to acquaint himself with them\ncarefully; because, though these opinions are generally full of\nconfusion and error ([Greek: ei)k\u00ea=| ga\\r le/gousi schedo\\n peri\\\na(pa/nt\u00f4n (oi( polloi/)]--Ethic. Eudem. I. iii. p. 1215, a. 1), he\nwill find in them partial correspondences with the truth, of which he\nmay avail himself to bring the common minds round to better views;\nbut, unless he knows pretty well what the opinions of these common\nminds are, he will not be able to address them persuasively. This is\nthe same reasonable view which Aristotle expresses at the beginning\nof the Topica (in a passage already cited, above), respecting the\nmanner of dealing proper for a philosopher towards current opinion.\nBut it does not at all coincide with the representation given by\nHamilton.\n\nThe next piece of evidence (_h_) which we find tendered is another\npassage out of the Eudemian Ethica. It will be seen that this passage\nis strained with even greater violence than the preceding. Hamilton\nwrites as follows, first translating the words of Aristotle, then\ncommenting on them:--\"The problem is this--What is the beginning or\nprinciple of motion in the soul? Now it is evident, as God is in the\nuniverse, and the universe in God, that [I read [Greek: kinei=n\nkai/]--W. H.] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the\nuniversal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not\nReason but something better. Now what can we say is better than even\nScience, except God?\"[10] So far Hamilton's translation; now follows\nhis comment:--\"The import of this singular passage is very obscure.\nIt has excited, I see, the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, of\nPomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raei, Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi,\n&c. But without viewing it as of pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is\ninclined to do, it may be interpreted as a declaration, that\nIntellect, which Aristotle elsewhere allows to be pre-existent and\nimmortal, is a spark of the Divinity; whilst its data (from which as\nprinciples more certain than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration,\nScience, must depart) are to be reverenced as the revelation of\ntruths which would otherwise lie hid from man: That, in short,\n\n\"'The voice of Nature is the voice of God.'\n\nBy the bye, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by any\nof those Aristotelian philosophers who endeavoured to identify the\nActive Intellect with the Deity.\"\n\n[Footnote 10: Ethic. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 24: [Greek: to\\ de\\\nz\u00eatou/menon tou=t' e)sti/, ti/s \u00ea( t\u00ea=s kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s a)rch\u00ea\\ e)n t\u00ea=|\npsuch\u00ea=|? d\u00ea=lon d\u00ea/, \u00f4(/sper e)n t\u00f4=| o(/l\u00f4| theo/s, kai\\ pa=n]\n(Fritzsche reads [Greek: e)n) e)kei/n\u00f4|. kinei= ga/r p\u00f4s pa/nta to\\\ne)n \u00ea(mi=n thei=on. lo/gou d' a)rch\u00ea\\ ou) lo/gos a)lla\\ ti krei=tton.\nti/ ou)=n a)\\n krei=tton kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ei)/poi pl\u00ea\\n theo/s?]\nInstead of [Greek: ei)/poi] (the last word but two) Fritzsche reads\n[Greek: ei)/\u00ea kai\\ nou=].\n\nThis is the passage translated by Sir W. Hamilton. The words of the\noriginal immediately following are these: [Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r a)ret\u00ea\\\ntou= nou= o)/rganon; kai\\ dia\\ tou=to oi( pa/lai\ne)/legon--\"eu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai, oi( a)\\n o(r\u00ea/s\u00f4si katopthou=sin\na)/logoi o)/ntes, kai\\ bouleu/esthai ou) sumphe/rei\nau)toi=s\"--e)/chousi ga\\r a)rch\u00ea\\n toiou/t\u00ean \u00ea( krei/tt\u00f4n tou= nou=\nkai\\ bouleu/se\u00f4s. oi( de\\ to\\n lo/gon; tou=to d' ou)k e)/chousi. kai\\\ne)nthousismoi/; tou=to d' ou) du/nantai; a)/logoi ga\\r o)/ntes\ne)pitugcha/nousi] (so Fritzsche reads in place of\n[Greek: a)potugcha/nousi]).]\n\nI maintain that this passage noway justifies the interpretation\nwhereby Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to Aristotle a doctrine so large and\nimportant. The acknowledged obscurity of the passage might have\nrendered any interpreter cautious of building much upon it: but this\nis not all: Sir W. Hamilton has translated it separately, without any\nallusion to the chapter of which it forms part. This is a sure way of\nmisunderstanding it; for it cannot be fairly construed except as\nbearing on the problem enunciated and discussed in that chapter.\nAristotle (or Eudemus) propounds for discussion explicitly in this\nchapter a question which had been adverted to briefly in the earlier\npart of the Eudemian Ethica (I. i. p. 1214, a. 24)--What is the\nrelation between good fortune and happiness? Upon what does good\nfortune depend? Is it produced by special grace or inspiration from\nthe Gods? This question is taken up and debated at length in the\nchapter from which Sir W. Hamilton has made his extract. It is\naverred, as a matter of notoriety, that some men are fortunate.\nThough fools, they are constantly successful--more so than wiser men;\nand this characteristic is so steady, that men count upon it and\ndenominate them accordingly. (See this general belief illustrated in\nthe debate at Athens recorded by Thukydides, vi. 17, the good fortune\nof Nikias being admitted even by his opponents.) Upon what does this\ngood fortune depend? Upon nature? Upon intelligence? Upon fortune\nherself as a special agent? Upon the grace and favour of the gods to\nthe fortunate individual? Aristotle (or Eudemus) discusses the\nproblem in a long and perplexed chapter, stating each hypothesis,\ntogether with the difficulties and objections attaching to it. As far\nas we can make out from an obscure style and a corrupt text, the\nfollowing is the result arrived at. There are two varieties of the\nfortunate man: one is, he who succeeds through a rightly directed\nimpulse, under special inspiration of the divine element within him\nand within all men; the other is, he who succeeds without any such\nimpulse, through the agency of Fortune proper. The good fortune of\nthe first is more constant than that of the second; but both are\nalike irrational or extra-rational.[11] Now the divine element in the\nsoul is the beginning or principle of motion for all the\nmanifestations in the soul--for reason as well as feeling: that which\ncalls reason into operation, is something more powerful than reason.\nBut in the intelligent man this divine mover only calls reason into\noperation, leaving reason, when once in operation, to its own force\nand guidance, of course liable to err; whereas in the fortunate man\n(first variety) the divine element inspires all his feelings and\nvolitions, without any rational deliberation, so that he executes\nexactly the right thing at the right time and place, and accordingly\nsucceeds.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: Eth. Eudem. VII. xiv. p. 1248, b. 3: [Greek: phanero\\n\nde\\ o(/ti du/o ei)/d\u00ea eu)tuchi/as, \u00ea( me\\n thei/a, dio\\ kai\\ dokei=\no( eu)tuch\u00ea\\s dia\\ theo\\n katorthou=n; ou(=tos d' e)sti\\n o( kata\\\nt\u00ea\\n o(rm\u00ea\\n diorth\u00f4tiko/s, o( d' e(/teros o( para\\ t\u00ea\\n o(rm\u00ea\\n;\na)/logoi d' a)mpho/teroi. kai\\ \u00ea( me\\n sunech\u00ea\\s eu)tuchi/a ma=llon,\nau(/t\u00ea d' ou) sunech\u00ea/s.]\n\nThe variety [Greek: o( para\\ t\u00ea\\n o(rm\u00ea\\n diorth\u00f4tiko/s] is\nexemplified in the Physica (II. iv. p. 196, a. 4), where Aristotle\nagain discusses [Greek: tu/ch\u00ea]: the case of a man who comes to the\nmarket-place on his ordinary business, and there by accident meets a\nfriend whom he particularly wished to see, but whom he never dreamt\nof seeing there and then.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Eth. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 27-32: [Greek:\neu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai], &c. Compare also ib. p. 1247, b. 18.]\n\nAristotle (or Eudemus) thus obtains a psychological explanation (good\nor bad) of the fact, that there are fools who constantly succeed in\ntheir purposes, and wise men who frequently fail. He tells us that\nthere is in the soul a divine principle of motion, which calls every\nthing--reason as well as appetite or feeling--into operation. But he\nsays nothing of what Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to him--about Intellect\nas a spark of the Divinity, or about data of Intellect to be\nreverenced as the revelation of hidden truths. His drift is quite\ndifferent and even opposite: to account for the success of\nindividuals _without intellect_ or reason--to bring forward a divine\nelement in the soul, which dispenses with intellect, and which\nconducts these unintelligent men to success, solely by infusing the\nmost opportune feelings and impulses. Sir W. Hamilton has\nmisunderstood this passage, by taking no notice of the context and\ngeneral argument to which it belongs.\n\nBesides, when Hamilton represents Aristotle here as declaring: \"That\nthe data of Intellect are to be reverenced as the revelation of\ntruths which would otherwise lie hid from man\"--how are we to\nreconcile this with what we read two pages before (p. 771, a.) as the\nview of Aristotle about these same data of Intellect, that \"they are\nthemselves pre-eminently certain; and, if denied in words, they are\nstill always mentally admitted\"? Is it reasonable to say that the\nMaxim of Contradiction, and the proposition, That if equals be\nsubtracted from equals, the remainders will be equal--are data \"to be\nreverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid\nfrom man\"? At any rate, I protest against the supposition that\nAristotle has ever declared this.\n\nThe next two passages cited from Aristotle have really no bearing\nupon the authority of Common Sense in its metaphysical meaning: they\nare (_i_) from Physic. VIII. iii. and (_k_) from De Gen. Animal. III.\nx. Both passages assert the authority of sensible perception against\ngeneral reasoning, where the two are conflicting. They assert, in\nother words, that general reasoning ought to be tested by experience\nand observation, and is not to be accepted when disallowed by these\ntests. (The only condition is, that the observation be exact and\ncomplete.) This is just, and is often said, though often disregarded\nin fact, by Aristotle. But it has no proper connexion with the\nproblem about the trustworthiness of Common Sense.\n\nNext Sir W. Hamilton refers us to (without citing) three other places\nof Aristotle. Of these, the first (De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 4-13,\nmarked _l_) is one which I am much surprised to find in a modern\nchampion of Common Sense: since it represents Common Sense as giving\nfull certificate to errors now exploded and forgotten. Aristotle had\nbegun by laying down and vindicating his doctrine of the First or\nCelestial Body, forming the exterior portion of the Kosmos, radically\ndistinct from the four elements; revolving eternally in uniform,\nperfect, circular motion, eternal, unchangeable, &c. Having stated\nthis, he proceeds to affirm that the results of these reasonings\ncoincide with the common opinions of mankind, that is, with Common\nSense; and that they are not contradicted by any known observations\nof perceptive experience. This illustrates what I have before\nobserved about Aristotle's position in regard to Common Sense. He\ndoes not extol it as an authority, or tell us that \"it is to be\nreverenced as a revelation\"; but, when he has proved a conclusion on\nwhat he thinks good grounds, he is glad to be able to show that it\ntallies with common opinions; especially when these opinions have\nsome alliance with the received religion.\n\nThe next passage (_m_) referred to (De Coelo, III. vii. p. 306, a.\n13) has nothing to do with Common Sense, but embodies a very just\nprotest by Aristotle against those philosophers who followed out\ntheir theories consistently to all possible consequences, without\ntroubling themselves to enquire whether those consequences were in\nharmony with the results of observation.\n\nThere follows one other reference (_n_) which was hardly worth Sir W.\nHamilton's notice. In Meteorologic. I. xiii. p. 349, a. 25,\nAristotle, after reciting a theory of some philosophers (respecting\nthe winds) which he considers very absurd, then proceeds to\nsay:--\"The many, without going into any enquiry at all, talk better\nsense than those who after enquiry bring forward such conclusions as\nthese.\" It is not saying much for the authority of Common Sense, to\naffirm that there have been occasionally philosophical theories so\nsilly as to be worse than Common Sense.\n\n. . . . . .\n\nB.--_Aristotle's Doctrine._\n\nIn regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined--\n\nI. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of\nCommon Sense?\n\nII. What doctrine does he lay down about the first _principia_ or\nbeginnings of scientific reasoning--the [Greek: a)rchai\\\nsullogistikai/]?\n\nI.--That Aristotle did not regard Cause, Substance, Time, &c., as\nIntuitions, is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he\nemploys to explain them, and by the censure that he bestows on the\nerroneous explanations and shortcomings of others. Indeed, in regard\nto Causality, when we read the great and perplexing diversity of\nmeaning which Aristotle (and Plato before him in the Ph\u00e6don)\nrecognizes as belonging to this term, we cannot but be surprised to\nfind modern philosophers treating it as enunciating a simple and\nintuitive idea. But as to Common Sense--taking the term as above\nexplained, and as it is usually understood by those that have no\nparticular theory to support--Aristotle takes up a position at once\ndistinct and instructive; a position (to use the phraseology of Kant)\nnot dogmatical, but critical. He constantly notices and reports the\naffirmations of Common Sense; he speaks of it with respect, and\nassigns to it a qualified value, partly as helping us to survey the\nsubject on all sides, partly as a happy confirmation, where it\ncoincides with what has been proved otherwise; but he does not appeal\nto it as an authority in itself trustworthy or imperative.\n\nCommon Sense belongs to the region of Opinion. Now the distinction\nbetween matters of Opinion on the one hand, and matters of Science or\nCognition on the other, is a marked and characteristic feature of\nAristotle's philosophy. He sets, in pointed antithesis,\nDemonstration, or the method of Science--which divides itself into\nspecial subjects, each having some special _principia_ of its own,\nthen proceeds by legitimate steps of deductive reasoning from such\n_principia_, and arrives at conclusions sometimes universally true,\nalways true for the most part--against Rhetoric and Dialectic, which\ndeal with and discuss opinions upon all subjects, comparing opposite\narguments, and landing in results more or less probable. Contrasting\nthem as separate lines of intellectual procedure, Aristotle lays down\na theory of both. He recognizes the procedure of Rhetoric and\nDialectic as being to a great degree the common and spontaneous\ngrowth of society; while Demonstration is from the beginning special,\nnot merely as to subject, but as to persons, implying teacher and\nlearner.\n\nRhetoric and Dialectic are treated by Aristotle as analogous\nprocesses. Of the matter of opinion and belief, with which both of\nthem deal, he distinguishes three varieties: (1) Opinions or beliefs\nentertained by all; (2) By the majority; (3) By a minority of\nsuperior men, or by one man in respect to a science wherein he has\nacquired renown. It is these opinions or beliefs that the rhetorician\nand the dialectician attack and defend; bringing out all the\narguments available for or against each.\n\nThe Aristotelian treatise on Rhetoric opens with the following\nwords:--\"Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic; for both of them\ndeal with such matters as do not fall within any special science, but\nbelong in a certain way to the common knowledge of all. Hence every\nindividual has his share of both, greater or less; for every one can,\nup to a certain point, both examine others and stand examination from\nothers; every one tries to defend himself and to accuse others.\"[13]\nTo the same purpose Aristotle speaks about Dialectic, in the\nbeginning of the Topica:--\"The dialectical syllogism takes its\npremisses from matters of opinion, that is, from matters that seem\ngood to (or are believed by) all, or the majority, or the\nwise--either all the wise, or most of them, or the most celebrated.\"\nAristotle distinguishes these matters of common opinion or belief\nfrom three distinct other matters:--(1) From matters that are not\nreally such, but only in appearance; in which the smallest attention\nsuffices to detect the false pretence of probability, while no one\nexcept a contentious Sophist ever thinks of advancing them; on the\ncontrary, the real matters of common belief are never thus palpably\nfalse, but have always something deeper than a superficial show; (2)\nFrom the first truths or _principia_, upon which scientific\ndemonstration proceeds; (3) From the paralogisms, or fallacious\nassumptions ([Greek: pseudograph\u00ea/mata]), liable to occur in each\nparticular science.\n\nNow what Aristotle here designates and defines as \"matters of common\nopinion and belief\" ([Greek: ta\\ e)/ndoxa]) includes all that is\nusually meant, and properly meant, by Common Sense--what is believed\nby all men or by most men. But Aristotle does not claim any warrant\nor authority for the truth of these beliefs, on the ground of their\nbeing deliverances of Common Sense, and accepted (by all or by the\nmajority) always as indisputable, often as self-evident. On the\ncontrary, he ranks them as mere probabilities, some in a greater,\nsome in a less degree; as matters whereon something may be said both\n_pro_ and _con_, and whereon the full force of argument on both sides\nought to be brought out, notwithstanding the supposed self-evidence\nin the minds of unscientific believers. Though, however, he\nencourages this dialectical discussion on both sides as useful and\ninstructive, he never affirms that it can by itself lead to certain\nscientific conclusions, or to anything more than strong probability\non a balance of the countervailing considerations. The language that\nhe uses in speaking of these deliverances of Common Sense is measured\nand just. After distinguishing the real Common Opinion from the\nfallacious simulations of Common Opinion set up (according to him) by\nsome pretenders, he declares that in all cases of Common Opinion\nthere is always something more than a mere superficial appearance of\ntruth. In other words, wherever any opinion is really held by a large\npublic, it always deserves the scrutiny of the philosopher to\nascertain how far it is erroneous, and, if it be erroneous, by what\nappearances of reason it has been enabled so far to prevail.\n\n[Footnote 13: Aristot. Rhetor. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1. Compare Sophist.\nElench. xi. p. 172, a. 30.]\n\nAgain, at the beginning of the Topica (in which he gives both a\ntheory and precepts of dialectical debate), Aristotle specifies four\ndifferent ends to be served by that treatise. It will be useful (he\nsays)--\n\n1. For our own practice in the work of debate. If we acquire a method\nand system, we shall find it easier to conduct a debate on any new\nsubject, whenever such debate may arise.\n\n2. For our daily intercourse with the ordinary public. When we have\nmade for ourselves a full collection of the opinions held by the\nmany, we shall carry on our conversation with them out of their own\ndoctrines, and not out of doctrines foreign to their minds; we shall\nthus be able to bring them round on any matter where we think them in\nerror.\n\n3. For the sciences belonging to philosophy. By discussing the\ndifficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discriminate truth\nand falsehood in each separate scientific question.\n\n4. For the first and highest among the _principia_ of each particular\nscience. These, since they are the first and highest of all, cannot\nbe discussed out of _principia_ special and peculiar to any separate\nscience; but must be discussed through the opinions commonly received\non the subject-matter of each. This is the main province of\nDialectic; which, being essentially testing and critical, is\nconnected by some threads with the _principia_ of all the various\nscientific researches.\n\nWe see thus that Aristotle's language about Common Opinion or Common\nSense is very guarded; that, instead of citing it as an authority, he\ncarefully discriminates it from Science, and places it decidedly on a\nlevel lower than Science, in respect of evidence; yet that he\nrecognizes it as essential to be studied by the scientific man, with\nfull confrontation of all the reasonings both for and against every\nopinion; not merely because such study will enable the scientific man\nto study and converse intelligibly and efficaciously with the vulgar,\nbut also because it will sharpen his discernment for the truths of\nhis own science, and because it furnishes the only materials for\ntesting and limiting the first _principia_ of that science.\n\nII. We will next advert to the judgment of Aristotle respecting these\n_principia_ of science: how he supposes them to be acquired and\nverified. He discriminates various special sciences (geometry,\narithmetic, astronomy, &c.), each of which has its own appropriate\nmatter, and special _principia_ from which it takes its departure.\nBut there are also certain _principia_ common to them all; and these\nhe considers to fall under the cognizance of one grand comprehensive\nscience, which includes all the rest; First Philosophy or\nOntology--the science of Ens in its most general sense, _quatenus_ Ens;\nwhile each of the separate sciences confines itself to one exclusive\ndepartment of Ens. The geometer does not debate nor prove the first\n_principia_ of his own science; neither those that it has in common\nwith other sciences, nor those peculiar to itself. He takes these for\ngranted, and demonstrates the consequences that logically follow from\nthem. It belongs to the First Philosopher to discuss the _principia_\nof all. Accordingly, the province of the First Philosopher is\nall-comprehensive, co-extensive with all the sciences. So also is the\nprovince of the Dialectician alike all-comprehensive. Thus far the\ntwo agree; but they differ as to method and purpose. The Dialectician\nseeks to enforce, confront, and value all the different reasons _pro_\nand _con_, consistent and inconsistent; the First Philosopher\nperforms this too, or supposes it to be performed by others, but\nproceeds farther: namely, to determine certain Axioms that may be\ntrusted as sure grounds (along with certain other _principia_) for\ndemonstrative conclusions in science.\n\nAristotle describes in his Analytica the process of Demonstration,\nand the conditions required to render it valid. But what is the point\nof departure for this process? Aristotle declares that there cannot\nbe a regress without end, demonstrating one conclusion from certain\npremisses, then demonstrating those premisses from others, and so on.\nYou must arrive ultimately at some premisses that are themselves\nundemonstrable, but that may be trusted as ground from whence to\nstart in demonstrating conclusions. All demonstration is carried on\nthrough a middle term, which links together the two terms of the\nconclusion, though itself does not appear in the conclusion. Those\nundemonstrable propositions, from which demonstration begins, must be\nknown without a middle term, that is, _immediately_ known; they must\nbe known in themselves, that is, not through any other propositions;\nthey must be better known than the conclusions derived from them;\nthey must be propositions first and most knowable. But these two last\nepithets (Aristotle often repeats) have two meanings: first and most\nknowable _by nature_ or _absolutely_, are the most universal\npropositions; first and most knowable _to us_, are those propositions\ndeclaring the particular facts of sense. These two meanings designate\ntruths correlative to each other, but at opposite ends of the\nintellectual line of march.\n\nOf these undemonstrable _principia_, indispensable as the grounds of\nall Demonstration, some are peculiar to each separate science, others\nare common to several or to all sciences. These common principles\nwere called Axioms, in mathematics, even in the time of Aristotle.\nSometimes, indeed, he designates them as Axioms, without any special\nreference to mathematics; though he also uses the same name to denote\nother propositions, not of the like fundamental character. Now, how\ndo we come to know these undemonstrable Axioms and other immediate\npropositions or _principia_, since we do not knew them by\ndemonstration? This is the second question to be answered, in\nappreciating Aristotle's views about the Philosophy of Common Sense.\n\nHe is very explicit in his way of answering this question. He\npronounces it absurd to suppose that these immediate _principia_ are\ninnate or congenital,--in other words, that we possess them from the\nbeginning, and yet that we remain for a long time without any\nconsciousness of possessing them; seeing that they are the most\naccurate of all our cognitions. What we possess at the beginning\n(Aristotle says) is only a mental power of inferior accuracy and\ndignity. We, as well as all other animals, begin with a congenital\ndiscriminative power called sensible perception. With many animals,\nthe data of perception are transient, and soon disappear altogether,\nso that the cognition of such animals consists in nothing but\nsuccessive acts of sensible perception. With us, on the contrary, as\nwith some other animals, the data of perception are preserved by\nmemory; accordingly our cognitions include both perceptions and\nremembrances. Farthermore, we are distinguished even from the better\nanimals by this difference--that with us, but not with them, a\nrational order of thought grows out of such data of perception, when\nmultiplied and long preserved. And thus out of perception grows\nmemory; out of memory of the same matter often repeated grows\nexperience, since many remembrances of the same thing constitute one\nnumerical experience. Out of such experience, a farther consequence\narises, that what is one and the same in all the particulars, (the\nUniversal or the One alongside of the Many), becomes fixed or rests\nsteadily within the mind. Herein lies the _principium_ of Art, in\nreference to Agenda or Facienda--of Science, in reference to Entia.\n\nThus these cognitive _principia_ are not original and determinate\npossessions of the mind, nor do they spring from any other mental\npossessions of a higher cognitive order, but simply from data of\nsensible perception; which data are like runaway soldiers in a panic,\nfirst one stops his flight and halts, then a second follows the\nexample, afterwards a third and fourth, until at length an orderly\narray is obtained. Our minds are so constituted as to render this\npossible. If a single individual impression is thus detained, it will\npresently acquire the character of a Universal in the mind; for,\nthough we perceive the particular, our perception is of the Universal\n(_i.e._, when we perceive Kallias, our perception is of man\ngenerally, not of the man Kallias). Again the fixture of these lowest\nUniversals in the mind will bring in those of the next highest order;\nuntil at length the Summa Genera and the absolute Universals acquire\na steady establishment therein. Thus, from this or that particular\nanimal, we shall rise as high as Animal universally; and so on from\nAnimal upwards.\n\nWe thus see clearly (Aristotle says) that only by Induction can we\ncome to know the first _principia_ of Demonstration; for it is by\nthis process that sensible perception engraves the Universal on our\nminds.[14] We begin by the _notiora nobis_ (Particulars), and ascend\nto the _notiora natur\u00e2_ or _simpliciter_ (Universals). Some among our\nmental habits that are conversant with truth, are also capable of\nfalsehood (such as Opinion and Reasoning): others are not so capable,\nbut embrace uniformly truth and nothing but truth; such are Science\nand Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]). Intellect is the only source more\naccurate than Science. Now the _principia_ of Demonstration are more\naccurate than the demonstrations themselves, yet they cannot (as we\nhave already observed) be the objects of Science. They must therefore\nbe the object of what is more accurate than Science, namely, of\nIntellect. Intellect and the objects of Intellect will thus be the\n_principia_ of Science and of the objects of Science. But these\nprinciples are not intuitive data or revelations. They are\nacquisitions gradually made; and there is a regular road whereby we\ntravel up to them, quite distinct from the road whereby we travel\ndown from them to scientific conclusions.\n\n[Footnote 14: Aristot. Anal. Post. II. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: d\u00ea=lon\nd\u00ea\\ o(/ti \u00ea(mi=n ta\\ pr\u00f4=ta e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=| gn\u00f4ri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\\\nga\\r kai\\ ai)/sth\u00easis ou(/t\u00f4 to\\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=]; also ibid. I.\nxviii., p. 81, b. 3, upon which passage Waitz, in his note, explains\nas follows (p. 347):--\"Sententia nostri loci h\u00e6c est. Universales\npropositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam in iis, qu\u00e6 a\nsensibus maxime aliena videntur, et qu\u00e6, ut mathematica ([Greek: ta\\\ne)x a)phaire/se\u00f4s]), cogitatione separantur a materia quacum\nconjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea qu\u00e6 de genere (_e.g._, de\nlinea vel de corpore mathematico), ad quod demonstratio pertineat,\npr\u00e6dicentur [Greek: kath' au(ta/] et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint.\nInductio autem iis nititur qu\u00e6 sensibus percipiuntur: nam res\nsingulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine\ninductione, non datur inductio sine sensu.\"]\n\nThe chapter just indicated in the Analytica Posteriora, attesting the\ngrowth of those universals that form the _principia_ of demonstration\nout of the particulars of sense, may be illustrated by a similar\nstatement in the First Book of the Metaphysica. Here, after stating\nthat sensible perception is common to all animals, Aristotle\ndistinguishes the lowest among animals, who have this alone; then, a\nclass next above them, who have it along with phantasy and memory,\nand some of whom are intelligent (like bees), yet still cannot learn,\nfrom being destitute of hearing; farther another class, one stage\nhigher, who hear, and therefore can be taught something, yet arrive\nonly at a scanty sum of experience; lastly, still higher, the class\nmen, who possess a large stock of phantasy, memory, and experience,\nfructifying into science and art.[15] Experience (Aristotle says) is\nof particular facts; Art and Science are of Universals. Art is\nattained, when out of many conceptions of experience there arises one\nuniversal persuasion respecting phenomena similar to each other. We\nmay know that Kallias, sick of a certain disease--that Sokrates,\nlikewise sick of it--that A, B, C, and other individuals besides,\nhave been cured by a given remedy; but this persuasion respecting\never so many individual cases, is mere matter of experience. When,\nhowever, we proceed to generalize these cases, and then affirm that\nthe remedy cures all persons suffering under the same disease,\ncircumscribed by specific marks--fever or biliousness--this is Art or\nScience. One man may know the particular cases empirically, without\nhaving generalized them into a doctrine; another may have learnt the\ngeneral doctrine, with little or no knowledge of the particular\ncases. Of these two, the last is the wiser and more philosophical\nman; but the first may be the more effective and successful as a\npractitioner.\n\n[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, a. 26, seq.: [Greek:\nphro/nima me\\n a)/neu tou= mantha/nein, o(/sa m\u00ea\\ du/natai t\u00f4=n\npso/ph\u00f4n a)kou/ein, oi(=on me/litta, kai\\ ei)/ ti toiou=ton a)/llo\nge/nos z\u00f4/|\u00f4n e)/stin.]\n\nWe remark here the line that he draws between the intelligence of\nbees--depending altogether upon sense, memory, and experience--and\nthe higher intelligence which is superadded by the use of language;\nwhen it becomes possible to teach and learn, and when general\nconceptions can be brought into view through appropriate names.]\n\nIn the passage above noticed, Aristotle draws the line of\nintellectual distinction between man and the lower animals. If he had\nconsidered that it was the prerogative of man to possess a stock of\nintuitive general truths, ready-made, and independent of experience,\nthis was the occasion for saying so. He says the exact contrary. No\nmodern psychologist could proclaim more fully than Aristotle here\ndoes the derivation of all general concepts and general propositions\nfrom the phenomena of sense, through the successive stages of memory,\nassociation, comparison, abstraction. No one could give a more\nexplicit acknowledgment of Induction from particulars of sense, as\nthe process whereby we reach ultimately those propositions of the\nhighest universality, as well as of the highest certainty; from\nwhence, by legitimate deductive syllogism, we descend to demonstrate\nvarious conclusions. There is nothing in Aristotle about generalities\noriginally inherent in the mind, connate although dormant at first\nand unknown, until they are evoked or elicited by the senses; nothing\nto countenance that nice distinction eulogized so emphatically by\nHamilton (p. 772, a. note): \"Cognitio nostra omnis \u00e0 mente primam\noriginem, \u00e0 sensibus exordium habet primum.\" In Aristotle's view, the\nsenses furnish both _originem_ and _exordium_: the successive stages\nof mental procedure, whereby we rise from sense to universal\npropositions, are multiplied and gradual, without any break. He even\ngoes so far as to say that we have _sensible perception_ of the\nUniversal. His language undoubtedly calls for much criticism here. We\nshall only say that it discountenances altogether the doctrine that\nrepresents the Mind or Intellect as an original source of First or\nUniversal Truths peculiar to itself. That opinion is mentioned by\nAristotle, but mentioned only to be rejected. He denies that the mind\npossesses any such ready-made stores, latent until elicited into\nconsciousness. Moreover, it is remarkable that the ground whereon he\ndenies it is much the same as that whereon the advocates of\nintuitions affirm it, viz., the supreme accuracy of these axioms.\nAristotle cannot believe that the mind includes cognitions of such\nvalue, without being conscious thereof. Nor will he grant that the\nmind possesses any native and inherent power of originating these\ninestimable _principia_.[16] He declares that they are generated in\nthe mind only by the slow process of induction, as above described;\nbeginning from the perceptive power (common to man with animals),\ntogether with that first stage of the intelligence (judging or\ndiscriminative) which he combines or identifies with perception,\nconsidering it to be alike congenital. From this humble basis men can\nrise to the highest grades of cognition, though animals cannot. We\neven become competent (Aristotle says) to have sensible perception of\nthe Universal; in the man Kallias, we see Man; in the ox feeding near\nus, we see Animal.\n\n[Footnote 16: Aristot. Anal. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 26: [Greek: ei)\nme\\n d\u00ea\\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei ga\\r a)kribeste/ras\ne)/chontas gn\u00f4/seis a)podei/xe\u00f4s lantha/nein.--phanero\\n toi/nun\no(/ti ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\\ m\u00eademi/an\ne)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai. a)na/gk\u00ea a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina\ndu/namin, m\u00ea\\ toiau/t\u00ean d' e)/chein \u00ea(\\ e)/stai tou/t\u00f4n timi\u00f4te/ra\nkat' a)kri/beian.] See Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1.\n\nSome modern psychologists, who admit that general propositions of a\nlower degree of universality are raised from induction and sense,\ncontend that propositions of the highest universality are not so\nraised, but are the intuitive offspring of the intellect. Aristotle\ndoes not countenance such a doctrine: he says (Metaphys. A. ii. p.\n982, a. 25) that these truths furthest removed from sense are the\nmost difficult to know of all. If they were intuitions they would be\nthe common possession of the race.]\n\nIt must be remembered that, when Aristotle, in this analysis of\ncognition, speaks of Induction, he means induction completely and\naccurately performed; just as, when he talks of Demonstration, he\nintends a good and legitimate demonstration; and just as (to use his\nown illustration in the Nikomachean Ethica), when he reasons upon a\nharper, or other professional artist, he always tacitly implies a\ngood and accomplished artist. Induction thus understood, and\nDemonstration, he considers to be the two processes for obtaining\nscientific faith or conviction; both of them being alike cogent and\nnecessary, but Induction even more so than Demonstration; because, if\nthe _principia_ furnished by the former were not necessary, neither\ncould the conclusions deduced from them by the latter be necessary.\nInduction may thus stand alone without Demonstration, but\nDemonstration pre-supposes and postulates Induction. Accordingly,\nwhen Aristotle proceeds to specify those functions of mind wherewith\nthe inductive _principia_ and the demonstrated conclusions correlate,\nhe refers both of them to functions wherein (according to him) the\nmind is unerring and infallible--Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) and\nScience. But, between these two he ranks Intellect as the higher, and\nhe refers the inductive _principia_ to Intellect. He does not mean\nthat Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) generates or produces these\nprinciples. On the contrary, he distinctly negatives such a\nsupposition, and declares that no generative force of this high order\nresides in the Intellect; while he tells us, with equal distinctness,\nthat they are generated from a lower source--sensible perception, and\nthrough the gradual upward march of the inductive process. To say\nthat they originate from Sense through Induction, and nevertheless to\nrefer them to Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) as their subjective\ncorrelate,--are not positions inconsistent with each other, in the\nview of Aristotle. He expressly distinguishes the two points, as\nrequiring to be separately dealt with. By referring the _principia_\nto Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]), he does not intend to indicate their\ngenerating source, but their evidentiary value and dignity when\ngenerated and matured. They possess, in his view, the maximum of\ndignity, certainty, cogency, and necessity, because it is from them\nthat even Demonstration derives the necessity of its conclusions;\naccordingly (pursuant to the inclination of the ancient philosophers\nfor presuming affinity and commensurate dignity between the\n_cognitum_ and the _cognoscens_), they belong as objective correlates\nto the most unerring cognitive function--the Intellect ([Greek:\nNou=s]). It is the Intellect that grasps these principles, and\napplies them to their legitimate purpose of scientific demonstration;\nhence Aristotle calls Intellect not only the _principium_ of Science,\nbut the _principium principii_.\n\nIn the Analytica, from which we have hitherto cited, Aristotle\nexplains the structure of the Syllogism and the process of\nDemonstration. He has in view mainly (though not exclusively) the\nmore exact sciences, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, &c. But he\nexpressly tells us that all departments of inquiry are not capable of\nthis exactness; that some come nearer to it than others; that we must\nbe careful to require no more exactness from each than the subject\nadmits; and that the method adopted by us must be such as will attain\nthe admissible maximum of exactness. Now each subject has some\n_principia_, and among them definitions, peculiar to itself; though\nthere are also some _principia_ common to all, and essential to the\nmarch of each. In some departments of study (Aristotle says) we get\nour view of _principia_ or first principles by induction; in others,\nby sensible perception; in others again, by habitual action in a\ncertain way; and by various other processes also. In each, it is\nimportant to look for first principles in the way naturally\nappropriate to the matter before us; for this is more than half of\nthe whole work; upon right first principles will mainly depend the\nvalue of our conclusions. For what concerns Ethics, Aristotle tells\nus that the first principles are acquired through a course of\nwell-directed habitual action; and that they will be acquired easily,\nas well as certainly, if such a course be enforced on youth from the\nbeginning. In the beginning of the Physica, he starts from that\nantithesis, so often found in his writings, between what is more\nknowable to us and what is more knowable absolutely or by nature. The\nnatural march of knowledge is to ascend from the first of these two\ntermini (particulars of sense) upward to the second or opposite,[17]\nand then to descend downward by demonstration or deduction. The fact\nof motion he proves (against Melissus and Parmenides) by an express\nappeal to induction, as sufficient and conclusive evidence. In\nphysical science (he says) the final appeal must be to the things and\nfacts perceived by sense. In the treatise De Coelo he lays it down\nthat the _principia_ must be homogeneous with the matters they belong\nto: the _principia_ of perceivable matters must be themselves\nperceivable; those of eternal matters must be eternal; those of\nperishable matters, perishable.\n\n[Footnote 17: See also Aristot. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1029, b. 1-14.]\n\nThe treatises composing the Organon stand apart among Aristotle's\nworks. In them he undertakes (for the first time in the history of\nmankind) the systematic study of significant propositions enunciative\nof truth and falsehood. He analyses their constituent elements; he\nspecifies the conditions determining the consistency or inconsistency\nof such propositions one with another; he teaches to arrange the\npropositions in such ways as to detect and dismiss the inconsistent,\nkeeping our hold of the consistent. Here the signification of terms\nand propositions is never out of sight: the facts and realities of\nnature are regarded as so signified. Now all language becomes\nsignificant only through the convention of mankind, according to\nAristotle's express declaration: it is used by speakers to\ncommunicate what they mean to hearers that understand them. We see\nthus that in these treatises the subjective point of view is brought\ninto the foreground--the enunciation of what we see, remember,\nbelieve, disbelieve, doubt, anticipate, &c. It is not meant that the\nobjective point of view is eliminated, but that it is taken in\nimplication with, and in dependence upon, the subjective. Neither the\none nor the other is dropped or hidden. It is under this double and\nconjoint point of view that Aristotle, in the Organon, presents to\nus, not only the processes of demonstration and confutation, but also\nthe fundamental _principia_ or axioms thereof; which axioms in the\nAnalytica Posteriora (as we have already seen) he expressly declares\nto originate from the data of sense, and to be raised and generalized\nby induction.\n\nSuch is the way that Aristotle represents the fundamental principles\nof syllogistic Demonstration, when he deals with them as portions of\nLogic. But we also find him dealing with them as portions of Ontology\nor First Philosophy (this being his manner of characterizing his own\ntreatise, now commonly known as the Metaphysica). To that science he\ndecides, after some preliminary debate, that the task of formulating\nand defending the axioms belongs, because the application of these\naxioms is quite universal, for all grades and varieties of Entia.\nOntology treats of Ens in its largest sense, with all its properties\n_quatenus_ Ens, including Unum, Multa, Idem, Diversum, Posterius,\nPrius, Genus, Species, Totum, Partes, &c. Now Ontology is with\nAristotle a purely objective science; that is, a science wherein the\nsubjective is dropt out of sight and no account taken of it, or\nwherein (to state the same fact in the language of relativity) the\nbelieving and reasoning subject is supposed constant. Ontology is the\nmost comprehensive among all the objective sciences. Each of these\nsciences singles out a certain portion of it for special study. In\ntreating the logical axioms as portions of Ontology, Aristotle\nundertakes to show their objective value; and this purpose, while it\ncarries him away from the point of view that we remarked as\nprevailing in the Organon, at the same time brings him into conflict\nwith various theories, all of them in his time more or less current.\nSeveral philosophers--Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Demokritus,\nProtagoras--had propounded theories which Aristotle here impugns. We\ndo not mean that these philosophers expressly denied his fundamental\naxioms (which they probably never distinctly stated to themselves,\nand which Aristotle was the first to formulate), but their theories\nwere to a certain extent inconsistent with these axioms, and were\nregarded by Aristotle as wholly inconsistent.\n\nThe two Axioms announced in the Metaphysica, and vindicated by\nAristotle, are--\n\n1. The Maxim of Contradiction: It is impossible for the same thing to\nbe and not to be; It is impossible for the same to belong and not to\nbelong to the same, at the same time and in the same sense. This is\nthe statement of the Maxim as a formula of Ontology. Announced as a\nformula of Logic, it would stand thus: The same proposition cannot be\nboth true and false at the same time; You cannot both believe and\ndisbelieve the same proposition at the same time; You cannot believe,\nat the same time, propositions contrary or contradictory. These\nlast-mentioned formulae are the logical ways of stating the axiom. They\npresent it in reference to the believing or disbelieving (affirming\nor denying) subject, distinctly brought to view along with the matter\nbelieved; not exclusively in reference to the matter believed, to the\nomission of the believer.\n\n2. The Maxim of Excluded Middle: A given attribute either does\nbelong, or does not belong to a subject (_i.e._, provided that it has\nany relation to the subject at all)--there is no medium, no real\ncondition intermediate between the two. This is the ontological\nformula; and it will stand thus, when translated into Logic: Between\na proposition and its contradictory opposite there is no tenable\nhalting ground; If you disbelieve the one, you must pass at once to\nthe belief of the other--you cannot at the same time disbelieve the\nother.\n\nThese two maxims thus teach--the first, that we cannot at the same\ntime _believe_ both a proposition and its contradictory opposite; the\nsecond, that we cannot at the same time _disbelieve_ them both.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: We have here discussed these two maxims chiefly in\nreference to Aristotle's manner of presenting them, and to the\nconceptions of his predecessors and contemporaries. An excellent view\nof the Maxims themselves, in their true meaning and value, will be\nfound in Mr. John Stuart Mill's Examination of the Philosophy of Sir\nW. Hamilton, ch. xxi. pp. 406-421.]\n\nNow, Herakleitus, in his theory (a theory propounded much before the\ntime of Protagoras and the persons called Sophists), denied all\npermanence or durability in nature, and recognized nothing except\nperpetual movement and change. He denied both durable substances and\ndurable attributes; he considered nothing to be lasting except the\nuniversal law or principle of change--the ever-renewed junction or\nco-existence of contraries and the perpetual transition of one\ncontrary into the other. This view of the facts of nature was adopted\nby several other physical philosophers besides.[19] Indeed it lay at\nthe bottom of Plato's new coinage--Rational Types or Forms, at once\nuniversal and real. The Maxim of Contradiction is intended by\nAristotle to controvert Herakleitus, and to uphold durable substances\nwith definite attributes.\n\n[Footnote 19: See 'Plato and other Comp. of Sokr.' I. i. pp. 28-38.]\n\nAgain, the theory of Anaxagoras denied all simple bodies (excepting\nNo\u00fbs) and all definite attributes. He held that everything was\nmingled with everything else, though there might be some one or other\npredominant constituent. In all the changes visible throughout\nnature, there was no generation of anything new, but only the coming\ninto prominence of some constituent that had before been\ncomparatively latent. According to this theory, you could neither\nwholly affirm, nor wholly deny, any attribute of its subject. Both\naffirmation and denial were untrue: the real relation between the two\nwas something half-way between affirmation and denial. The Maxim of\nExcluded Middle is maintained by Aristotle as a doctrine in\nopposition to this theory of Anaxagoras.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Ibid. pp. 49-57.]\n\nBoth the two above-mentioned theories are objective. A third, that of\nProtagoras--\"Homo Mensura\"--brings forward prominently the\nsubjective, and is quite distinct from either. Aristotle does indeed\ntreat the Protagorean theory as substantially identical with that of\nHerakleitus, and as standing or falling therewith. This seems a\nmistake: the theory of Protagoras is as much opposed to Herakleitus\nas to Aristotle.\n\nWe have now to see how Aristotle sustains these two Axioms (which he\ncalls \"the firmest of all truths and the most assuredly known\")\nagainst theories opposed to them. In the first place, he repeats here\nwhat he had declared in the Analytica Posteriora--that they cannot\nbe directly demonstrated, though they are themselves the _principia_\nof all demonstration. Some persons indeed thought that these Axioms\nwere demonstrable; but this is an error, proceeding (he says) from\ncomplete ignorance of analytical theory. How, then, are these Axioms\nto be proved against Herakleitus? Aristotle had told us in the\nAnalytica that axioms were derived from particulars of sense by\nInduction, and apprehended or approved by the [Greek: Nou=s]. He does\nnot repeat that observation here; but he intimates that there is only\none process available for defending them, and that process amounts to\nan appeal to Induction. You can give no ontological reason in support\nof the Axioms, except what will be condemned as a _petitio\nprincipii_; you must take them in their logical aspect, as enunciated\nin significant propositions. You must require the Herakleitean\nadversary to answer some question affirmatively, in terms significant\nboth to himself and to others, and in a proposition declaring his\nbelief on the point. If he will not do this, you can hold no\ndiscussion with him: he might as well be deaf and dumb: he is no\nbetter than a plant (to use Aristotle's own comparison). If he does\nit, he has bound himself to something determinate: first, the\nsignification of the terms is a fact, excluding what is contrary or\ncontradictory; next, in declaring his belief, he at the same time\ndeclares that he does not believe in the contrary or contradictory,\nand is so understood by the hearers. We may grant what his theory\naffirms--that the subject of a proposition is continually under some\nchange or movement; yet the identity designated by its name is still\nmaintained,[21] and many true predications respecting it remain true\nin spite of its partial change. The argument in defence of the Maxim\nof Contradiction is, that it is a postulate implied in all the\nparticular statements as to matters of daily experience, that a man\nunderstands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate\nsuch that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or\ntrustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. If the speaker\nboth affirms and denies the same fact at once, no information is\nconveyed, nor can the hearer act upon the words. Thus, in the\nAcharnenses of Aristophanes, Dik\u00e6opolis knocks at the door of\nEuripides, and inquires whether the poet is within; Kephisophon, the\nattendant, answers--\"Euripides is within and not within.\" This answer\nis unintelligible; Dik\u00e6opolis cannot act upon it; until Kephisophon\nexplains that \"not within\" is intended metaphorically. Then, again,\nall the actions in detail of a man's life are founded upon his own\nbelief of some facts and disbelief of other facts: he goes to Megara,\nbelieving that the person whom he desires to see is at Megara, and at\nthe same time disbelieving the contrary: he acts upon his belief both\nas to what is good and what is not good, in the way of pursuit and\navoidance. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and\naction in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through\nlike other persons; and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he\ncould neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any\naction upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own\nmind. Accordingly, the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says)\nrenounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his\nfinger.[22]\n\n[Footnote 21: This argument is given by Aristotle, Metaph. [Greek:\nG]. v. p. 1010, a. 7-25, contrasting change [Greek: kata\\ to\\ poso/n]\nand change [Greek: kata\\ to\\ poio/n].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, a. 12. Compare\nPlato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. pp. 179-180, about the aversion of the Herakleiteans\nfor clear issues and propositions.]\n\nThe Maxim of Contradiction is thus seen to be only the general\nexpression of a postulate implied in all such particular speeches as\ncommunicate real information. It is proved by a very copious and\ndiversified Induction, from matters of experience familiar to every\nindividual person. It is not less true in regard to propositions\naffirming changes, motions, or events, than in regard to those\ndeclaring durable states or attributes.\n\nIn the long pleading of Aristotle on behalf of the Maxim of\nContradiction against the Herakleiteans, the portion of it that\nappeals to Induction is the really forcible portion; conforming as it\ndoes to what he had laid down in the Analytica Posteriora about the\ninductive origin of the _principia_ of demonstration. He employs,\nhowever, besides, several other dialectical arguments built more or\nless upon theories of his own, and therefore not likely to weigh much\nwith an Herakleitean theorist; who--arguing, as he did argue, that\n(because neither subject nor predicate was ever unchanged or stable\nfor two moments together) no true proposition could be framed but was\nat the same time false, and that contraries were in perpetual\nco-existence--could not by any general reasoning be involved in\ngreater contradiction and inconsistency than he at once openly\nproclaimed.[23] It can only be shown that such a doctrine cannot be\nreconciled with the necessities of daily speech, as practised by\nhimself, as well as by others. We read, indeed, one ingenious\nargument whereby Aristotle adopts this belief in the co-existence of\ncontraries, but explains it in a manner of his own, through his much\nemployed distinction between potential and actual existence. Two\ncontraries cannot co-exist (he says) in actuality; but they both may\nand do co-exist in different senses--one or both of them being\npotential. This, however, is a theory totally different from that of\nHerakleitus; coincident only in words and in seeming. It does indeed\neliminate the contradiction; but that very contradiction formed the\ncharacteristic feature and keystone of the Herakleitean theory. The\ncase against this last theory is, that it is at variance with\npsychological facts, by incorrectly assuming the co-existence of\ncontradictory beliefs in the mind; and that it conflicts both with\npostulates implied in the daily colloquy of detail between man and\nman, and with the volitional preferences that determine individual\naction. All of these are founded on a belief in the regular sequence\nof our sensations, and in the at least temporary durability of\ncombined potential aggregates of sensations, which we enunciate in\nthe language of definite attributes belonging to definite substances.\nThis language, the common medium of communication among\nnon-theorizing men, is accepted as a basis, and is generalized and\nregularized, in the logical theories of Aristotle.\n\n[Footnote 23: This is stated by Aristotle himself, Metaph. [Greek:\nG]. vi. p. 1011, a. 15: [Greek: oi( d' e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| t\u00ea\\n bi/an\nmo/non z\u00eatou=ntes a)du/naton z\u00eatou=sin; e)nanti/a ga\\r ei)pei=n\na)xiou=sin, eu)thu\\s e)nanti/a le/gontes.] He here, indeed, applies\nthis observation immediately to the Protagoreans, against whom it\ndoes not tell, instead of the Herakleiteans, against whom it does\ntell. The whole of the reasoning in this part of the Metaphysica is\ndirected indiscriminately, and in the same words, against\nProtagoreans and Herakleiteans.]\n\nThe doctrine here mentioned is vindicated by Aristotle, not only\nagainst Herakleitus, by asserting the Maxim of Contradiction, but\nalso against Anaxagoras, by asserting the Maxim of Excluded Middle.\nHere we have the second _principium_ of Demonstration, which, if it\nrequired to be defended at all, can only be defended (like the first)\nby a process of Induction. Aristotle adduces several arguments in\nsupport of it, some of which involve an appeal to Induction, though\nnot broadly or openly avowed; but others of them assume what\nadversaries, and Anaxagoras especially, were not likely to grant. We\nmust remember that both Anaxagoras and Herakleitus propounded their\ntheories as portions of Physical Philosophy or of Ontology; and that\nin their time no such logical principles and distinctions as those\nthat Aristotle lays down in the Organon, had yet been made known or\npressed upon their attention. Now, Aristotle, while professing to\ndefend these Axioms as data of Ontology, forgets that they deal with\nthe logical aspect of Ontology, as formulated in methodical\npropositions. His view of the Axioms cannot be properly appreciated\nwithout a classification of propositions, such as neither Herakleitus\nnor Anaxagoras found existing or originated for themselves. Aristotle\nhas taught us what Herakleitus and Anaxagoras had not been taught--to\ndistinguish separate propositions as universal, particular and\nsingular; and to distinguish pairs of propositions as contrary,\nsub-contrary, and contradictory. To take the simplest case, that of\na singular proposition, in regard to which the distinction between\ncontrary and contradictory has no application,--such as the answer\n(cited above) of Kephisophon about Euripides. Here Aristotle would\njustly contend that the two propositions--Euripides is within,\nEuripides is not within--could not be either both of them true, or\nboth of them false; that is, that we could neither believe both, nor\ndisbelieve both. If Kephisophon had answered, Euripides is neither\nwithin nor not within, Dik\u00e6opolis would have found himself as much at\na loss with the two negatives as he was with the two affirmatives. In\nregard to singular propositions, neither the doctrine of Herakleitus\n(to believe both affirmation and negation) nor that of Anaxagoras (to\ndisbelieve both) is admissible. But, when in place of singular\npropositions we take either universal or particular propositions, the\nrule to follow is no longer so simple and peremptory. The universal\naffirmative and the universal negative are _contrary_; the particular\naffirmative and the particular negative are _sub-contrary_; the\nuniversal affirmative and the particular negative, or the universal\nnegative and the particular affirmative, are _contradictory_. It is\nnow noted in all manuals of Logic, that of two contrary propositions,\nboth cannot be true, but both may be false; that of two\nsub-contraries, both may be true, but both cannot be false; and that\nof two contradictories, one must be true and the other false.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nMETAPHYSICA.\n\n\n[The following Abstract--when not translation--of six books ([Greek:\nG], E, Z, \u00ca, [Greek: Th], [Greek: L]) out of the fourteen included\nunder the title 'Metaphysica,' may be said to cover the whole of\nAristotle's dogmatic exposition of First Philosophy. According to the\nview of Brandis, now in its main features generally accepted, the\nexposition continued through Books [Greek: G], E, Z, \u00ca, reaches back\nto Books A and B, and comes to an end with Book [Greek: Th]. Still it\nis only with Book [Greek: G] that the properly didactic treatment\nbegins, Book A being a historical review of previous opinion, and\nBook B a mere collection of [Greek: a)pori/ai] subjected to a\npreliminary dialectical handling; while, at the other end, Book\n[Greek: L], though it has no direct connection with Book [Greek: Th],\nis, especially in its latter part, of undeniable importance for\nAristotle's metaphysical doctrine.\n\nThe remaining books are known as [Greek: a], [Greek: D], I, K, M, N.\nThe short Book [Greek: a] is entirely unconnected with any of the\nothers, and most probably is not the work of Aristotle. Book [Greek:\nD] ([Greek: peri\\ t\u00f4=n posach\u00f4=s legome/n\u00f4n])--a vocabulary of\nphilosophical terms--is Aristotelian beyond question, being referred\nto occasionally in the chief books; but it lies quite apart from the\nexposition proper. Book I--dealing with Unity and Opposites--though\nit also has no place in the actual line of treatment, is truly\nontological in character, and probably was intended to fall within\nsome larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine; the like, as far as can\nbe judged, being true of Books M and N, containing together a\ncriticism of Pythagorean and Platonic theories. Finally, Book K,\nconsisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the Physica--hardly\nfrom the hand of Aristotle, gives otherwise only a sketch in outline\nof the argument of Books B, [Greek: G], E, and thus, although\nAristotelian, is to be discounted.\n\nThe author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the\nsix books for a preliminary Abstract; but the actual selection,\njoined to various indications in the Abstract and marginal notes in\nhis copies of the Metaphysica, leaves no doubt that he accepted the\nview of Brandis, more especially as set forth by Bonitz. On the whole\nquestion of the Canon of the Metaphysica, Bonitz's Introduction to\nhis Commentary may with advantage be consulted.]\n\nBook [Greek: G].\n\nIn this First Philosophy, Aristotle analyses and illustrates the\nmeaning of the _generalissima_ of language--the most general and\nabstract words which language includes. All these are words in common\nand frequent use; in the process of framing or putting together\nlanguage, they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the\nresult of many previous comparisons, gone through but afterwards\nforgotten, or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct\nconsciousness. Men employ these words familiarly in ordinary speech,\nand are understood by others when they do so. For the most part, they\nemploy the words correctly and consistently, in the affirmation of\nparticular propositions relating to topics of daily life and\nexperience. But this is not always or uniformly the case. Sometimes,\nmore or less often, men fall into error and inconsistency in the\nemployment of these familiar general terms. The First Philosophy\ntakes up the generalities and established phrases in this condition;\nfollowing back analytically the synthetical process which the framers\nof language have pursued without knowing or at least without\nrecording it, and bringing under conscious attention the different\nmeanings, more or fewer, in which these general words are used.\n\nPhilosophia Prima devotes itself, specially and in the first\ninstance, to Ens _quatenus_ Ens in all its bearings; being thus\ndistinguished from mathematics and other particular sciences, each of\nwhich devotes itself to a separate branch of Ens (p. 1003, a. 25). It\nsearches into the First Causes or Elements of Ens _per se_, not _per\naccidens_ (a. 31). But Ens is a commune, not generically, but\nanalogically; constituted by common relationship to one and the same\nterminus, as everything healthy is related to health. The Principle\n([Greek: a)rch\u00ea/]) of all Entia is Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); but\nsome Entia are so called as being affections of Essence; others, as\nbeing a transition to Essence, or as destruction, privation, quality,\nefficient or generative cause, of Essence or its _analoga_; others,\nagain, as being negations ([Greek: a)popha/seis]) thereof, whence,\nfor example, we say that Non-Ens _is_ Non-Ens (b. 6-10). There is one\nscience of all these primary, secondary, tertiary, &c., Entia; just\nas there is one science of all things healthy, of the primary, the\nsecondary, the tertiary, &c., _quatenus_ healthy. But, in all such\nmatters, that science bears in the first instance and specially\n([Greek: kuri/\u00f4s]) on the Primum Aliquid, from which all the\nsecondary and other derivatives take their departure, and upon which\nthey depend (b. 16). Accordingly, in the present case, since Essence\nis the Primum Aliquid, the province of First Philosophy is to\ninvestigate the causes and principles of Essences in all their\nvarieties (b. 18-22). Now whatever varieties there are of Ens, the\nlike varieties there are of Unum; for the two are always implicated\ntogether, though the words are not absolutely the same in meaning (b.\n24-35). Accordingly both Ens and Unum with all the varieties of each\nbelong to Philosophia Prima; likewise Idem, Simile, &c., and the\nopposites thereof. All opposites may be traced in the last analysis\nto this foundation--the antithesis of Unum and Multa (p. 1004, a. 1).\nWe must set forth and discriminate the different varieties--primary,\nsecondary, tertiary, &c.--of Idem and Simile, and also of their\nopposites, Diversum and Dissimile; and we must show how they are\nderived from or related to Primum Idem, &c., just as we must do in\nthe case of Ens and Unum. All this task belongs to First Philosophy\n(a. 20-30). Aristotle speaks of [Greek: o( philo/sophos], as meaning\nthe master of Philosophia Prima (b. 1; B. p. 997, a. 14).\n\nIf these investigations do not belong to the First Philosopher, to\nwhich among the other investigators can they belong? Who is to\nenquire whether Sokrates, and Sokrates sitting, is the same person?\nWhether Unum is opposite to Unum? In how many senses Opposite can be\nsaid? (p. 1004, b. 3). All these are affections _per se_ of Unum\n_quatenus_ Unum, and of Ens _quatenus_ Ens, not _quatenus_ numbers,\nor lines, or fire; that is, they are propria (_sensu logico_) of Ens\nand Unum (not included in the notion or definition, but deducible\ntherefrom--\"not\u00e6 consecutione notionis\"), just as odd and even,\nproportionality, equality, excess and defect, are propria of numbers;\nand there are other propria of solids, whether moved or unmoved,\nheavy or light. It is these propria of Ens and Unum that Philosophia\nPrima undertakes to explain (b. 7-16), and which others fail to\nexplain, because they take no account of [Greek: ou)si/a] (b. 10), or\nof the fundamental Ens or Essentia to which these belong as propria.\n\nThese Propria of Ens are the [Greek: oi)kei=a]--the special and\npeculiar matter or principles--of Philosophia Prima. That all of them\nbelong in this special way to the First Philosopher, we may farther\nsee by the fact that all of them are handled by the Dialectician and\nthe Sophist, who assume an attitude counterfeiting the Philosopher.\nAll three travel over the same ground, and deal with Ens, as a matter\ncommon to all (p. 1004, b. 20). But the Sophist differs from the\nPhilosopher in his purpose, inasmuch as he aims only at giving the\nfalse appearance of wisdom without the reality, while the\nDialectician differs from the Philosopher in his manner of handling\n([Greek: t\u00f4=| tro/p\u00f4| t\u00ea=s duna/me\u00f4s]--b. 24). The Dialectician\ndiscusses the subject in a tentative way, from many different points\nof view, suggested by current opinions; the Philosopher marches by a\nstraight and assured road from the appropriate principles of his\nscience to certain conclusions and cognitions.\n\nThe same view of the scope and extent of Philosophia Prima may be\nmade out in another way. Almost all philosophers affirm that Entia\nare composed of contraries, and may be traced back to opposite\nprinciples--odd and even, hot and cold, limit and the unlimited,\nfriendship and enmity, &c. Now these and all other contraries may be\ntraced back to Unum and Multa: this we may assume (p. 1005, a. 1;\naccording to Alexander Aph., it had been shown in the treatise De\nBono--Schol. p. 648, a. 38, Br.).\n\nThough it be true, therefore, that neither Ens nor Unum is a true\ngenus, nor separable, but both of them aggregates of analogical\nderivatives, yet since all these derivatives have their root in one\nand the same fundamentum, the study of all of them belongs to one and\nthe same science (p. 1005, a. 6-11). It is not the province of the\ngeometer to examine what is The Opposite, The Perfect, Ens, Unum,\nIdem, Diversum, except in their application to his own problems. The\ngeneral enquiry devolves upon the First Philosopher; who will\ninvestigate Ens _quatenus_ Ens, together with the belongings or\nappendages ([Greek: ta\\ u(pa/rchonta]) of Ens _quatenus_ Ens,\nincluding Prius, Posterius, Genus, Species, Totum, Pars, and such\nlike (a. 11-18).\n\nIt falls to the First Philosopher also to investigate and explain\nwhat mathematicians call their Axioms: the mathematician ought not to\ndo this himself, but to leave it to the First Philosopher. These\nAxioms are, in their highest generality, affirmations respecting Ens\n_quatenus_ Ens, all of which belong to the First Philosopher; from\nwhom the mathematician accepts them, and applies them as far as his\nown department requires (p. 1005, a. 20, seq.).\n\nIn First Philosophy, the firmest, best known, and most unquestionable\nof all principles is this: It is impossible for the same predicate at\nthe same time and in the same sense to belong and not to belong to\nthe same subject (p. 1005, b. 20). No one can at the same time\nbelieve that the same thing both is and is not; though Herakleitus\nprofessed to believe this, we must not suppose that he really did\nbelieve it (b. 25). No man can hold two contrary opinions at the same\ntime (b. 31). This is by nature the first principle of all other\naxioms; to which principle all demonstrations are in the last resort\nbrought back (b. 33: [Greek: phu/sei ga\\r a)rch\u00ea\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n\na)xi\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n au(/t\u00ea pa/nt\u00f4n]).\n\nAristotle then proceeds to explain and vindicate at length this\n[Greek: a)rch\u00ea/]--the Principle of Contradiction, which many at that\ntime denied. This principle is at once the most knowable, and noway\nassumed as hypothesis ([Greek: gn\u00f4rim\u00f4ta/t\u00ean kai\\ a)nupo/theton]--p.\n1005, b. 13). You cannot indeed demonstrate it to be true; the very\nattempt to demonstrate it would be unphilosophical: demonstration of\nevery thing, is an impossibility. You cannot march upwards in an\ninfinite progression of demonstrations; you must arrive ultimately at\nsome first truth which is not demonstrable; and, if any such first\ntruth is to be recognized, no one can point out any truth better\nentitled to such privilege than the Principle of Contradiction (p.\n1006, a. 11). But you can convict an opponent of self-contradiction\n([Greek: a)podei=xai e)legktik\u00f4=s], a. 12, 15), if he will only\nconsent to affirm any proposition in significant terms--that is, in\nterms which he admits to be significant to himself and which he\nintends as such to others; in other words, if he will enter into\ndialogue with you, for without significant speech there can be no\ndialogue with him at all (a. 21).\n\nWhen the opponent has shown his willingness to comply with the\nconditions of dialogue, by advancing a proposition in terms each\nhaving one definite signification, it is plain, by his own admission,\nthat the proposition does not both signify and not signify the same.\nFirst, the copula of the proposition (_est_) does not signify what\nwould be signified if the copula were _non est_; so that here is one\ncase wherein the affirmative and the negative cannot be both of them\ntrue (p. 1006, a. 30; see Alex. Schol. and Bonitz's note). Next, let\nthe subject of the proposition be _homo_; a term having only one\nsingle definite signification, or perhaps having two or three (or any\ndefinite number of) distinct significations, each definite. If the\nnumber of distinct significations be indefinite, the term is unfit\nfor the purpose of dialogue (a. 30-b. 10). The term _homo_ will\nsignify one thing only; it will have one determinate essence and\ndefinition--say _animal bipes_: that is, if any thing be a man, the\nsame will be _animal bipes_. But this last cannot be the essence and\ndefinition of _non-homo_ also: _non-homo_, as a different name, must\nhave different definition; _homo_ and _non-homo_ cannot be like\n[Greek: l\u00f4/pion] and [Greek: i(ma/tion], two terms having the same\nsignification, essence and definition; for _homo_ signifies one\nsubject of constant and defined nature, not simply one among many\npredicates applicable by accident to this same constant subject; it\nsignifies [Greek: mi/an phu/sin] and not [Greek: a)/ll\u00ean tina\\\nphu/sin] (Scholia, p. 656, b. 21). Since each name indeed is applied\nby convention to what it denominates, the name _non-homo_ may be\napplied elsewhere to that which we term _homo_; but this is a mere\ndifference of naming; what bears the name _homo_, and what bears the\nname _non-homo_, must always be different, if _homo_ is defined to\nsignify one determinate nature (b. 22). The one single nature and\nessence defined as belonging to _homo_, cannot be the same as that\nbelonging to _non-homo_. If any thing be _homo_, the same cannot be\n_non-homo_: if any thing be _non-homo_, the same cannot be _homo_ (b.\n25-34). Whoever says that _homo_ and _non-homo_ have the same\nmeaning, must say _\u00e0 fortiori_ that _homo_, _fortis_, _musicus_,\n_simus_, _pulcher_, &c., have the same meaning; for not one of these\nterms is so directly and emphatically opposite to _homo_, as\n_non-homo_ is. He must therefore admit that the meaning, not merely\nof all these words but also, of a host besides is the same; in other\nwords, that not merely Opposites are one, but all other things\nbesides, under different names ([Greek: o(/ti e(\\n pa/nta e)/stai\nkai\\ ou) mo/non ta\\ a)ntikei/mena]--p. 1007, a. 6).\n\nThis argument is directed against those who maintain that affirmative\nand negative are both true at once, but who still desire to keep up\ndialogue (Alex. Schol. p. 658, a. 26, Br.: [Greek: t\u00f4=| t\u00ea/n te\na)nti/phasin sunal\u00eatheu/ein le/gonti, kai\\ s\u00f4/zein boulome/n\u00f4| to\\\ndiale/gesthai]). No man who maintains this opinion, can keep his\nconsistency in dialogue, if he will only give direct answers to the\nquestions put to him, without annexing provisoes and gratuitous\nadditions to his answers. If you ask him, Whether it is true that\nSokrates is _homo_? he ought to answer plainly Yes, or No. He ought\nnot to answer: \"Yes, but Sokrates is also _non-homo_,\" meaning that\nSokrates is also the subject of many other accidental\npredicates--fair, flat-nosed, brave, accomplished, &c. He ought to\nanswer simply to the question, whether the one essence or definition\nsignified by the word man, belongs to Sokrates or not; he ought not\nto introduce the mention of these accidental predicates, to which\nthe question did not refer. These accidental predicates are infinite\nin number; he cannot enumerate them all, and therefore he ought not\nto introduce the mention of any of them. Sokrates is _homo_, by the\nessence and definition of the word; he is _non-homo_, ten thousand\ntimes over, by accidental predicates; that is, he is fair, brave,\nmusical, flat-nosed, &c., all of which are varieties of the general\nword _non-homo_ (p. 1007, a. 7-19).\n\nThose who contend that both members of the Antiphasis are at once\ntrue disallow Essentia altogether, and the distinction between it and\nAccidens (p. 1007, a. 21). When we say that the word _homo_ signifies\na certain Essentia, we mean that its Essentia is nothing different\nfrom this, and that the being _homo_ cannot be the same as the being\n_non-homo_, or the not being _homo_. Those against whom we are\nreasoning discard Essentia as distinguished from Accidens, and\nconsider all predicates as Accidentia. _Albus_ belongs to _homo_ as\nan accident; but the essence of _albus_ does not coincide with that\nof _homo_, and cannot be predicated of _homo_ (a. 32). Upon the\ntheory of these opponents, there would be no Prima Essentia to which\nall accidents are attached; but this theory is untenable. Accidents\ncannot be attached one to another in an infinite ascending series (b.\n1). You cannot proceed more than two steps upward: first one\naccident, then a second; the two being joined by belonging to one and\nthe same subject. No accident can be the accident of another\naccident. [Greek: To\\ leuko/n] may have the accident [Greek:\nmousiko/n], or [Greek: to\\ mousiko/n] may have the accident [Greek:\nleuko/n]; each of these may be called indifferently the accident of\nthe other; but the truth is, that [Greek: leuko/s] and [Greek:\nmousiko/s] are both of them accidents belonging to the common\nEssentia--_homo_. But, when we affirm _homo est musicus_, we\nimplicate the accident with the Essentia to which it belongs; that\nEssentia is signified by the subject _homo_. There must thus be one\nword which has signification as Essentia; and, when such is the case,\nwe have already shown that both members of the Antiphasis cannot be\npredicated at once (b. 5-18).\n\n(Alexander, in Scholia, p. 658, b. 40-p. 659, b. 14, Br., remarks on\nthis argument of Aristotle: Those who held the opinion here\ncontroverted by Aristotle--[Greek: t\u00ea\\n a)nti/phasin\nsunal\u00eatheu/ein]--had in their minds accidental propositions, in regard\nto which they were right, except that both members of the Antiphasis\ncannot be true at the same time. _Sokrates est musicus_--_Sokrates non\nest musicus_: these two propositions are both true, in the sense that\none or other of them is true only potentially, and that both cannot be\nactually true at the same time. One of them is true, and the other\nfalse, at the present moment; but that which is now false has been\ntrue in the past, and may become true in the future. Aristotle does\nnot controvert this theory so far as regards accidental propositions;\nbut he maintains that it is untenable about essential propositions,\nand that the theorists overlooked this distinction.)\n\nMoreover, if you say that both members of the Antiphasis are alike\ntrue respecting every predicate of a given subject, you must admit\nthat all things are one (p. 1007, b. 20). The same thing will be at\nonce a wall, a trireme, a man. Respecting every subject, you may\nalways either affirm or deny any given predicate; but, according to\nthis theory, whenever it is true to affirm, it is always equally true\nto deny. If you can say truly, _Homo non est triremis_, you may say\nwith equal truth, according to the theory before us, _Homo est\ntriremis_. And, of course, _Homo non est triremis_ may be said truly;\nsince (still according to this theory) the much more special\nnegative, _Homo non est homo_, may be said truly (b. 32).\n\nAgain, if this theory be admitted, the doctrine that every predicate\nmay be either affirmed or denied of any given subject, will no longer\nhold true. For, if it be true to say of Sokrates both _Est homo_ and\n_Est non-homo_: it must also be true to say of him both _Non est\nhomo_ and _Non est non-homo_. If both affirmative and negative may be\nalike affirmed, both may be alike denied (p. 1008, a. 2-7). If both\nmembers of the Antiphasis are alike true, both must be alike false\n(Alex. Schol. p. 663, a. 14-34).\n\nAgain, the theory that both members of the Antiphasis are alike true,\nis intended by its authors to apply universally or not universally.\nEvery thing is both white and not white, Ens and Non-Ens; or this is\ntrue with some propositions, but not with regard to others. If the\ntheorists take the latter ground and allow some exceptions, so far at\nleast as those exceptions reach, firm truth is left ([Greek: au(=tai\na)\\n ei)=en o(mologou/menai]--p. 1008, a. 11). But, if they take the\nformer ground and allow no exceptions, they may still perhaps say:\nWherever you can affirm with truth, we can also deny with truth; but,\nwherever we can deny with truth, we cannot in every case affirm with\ntruth (a. 15). Meeting them upon this last ground, we remark that at\nany rate some negative propositions are here admitted to be knowable,\nand we obtain thus much of settled opinion; besides, wherever the\nnegative is knowable, the corresponding affirmative must be still\nmore knowable (a. 18). If they take the former ground and say that,\nwherever the negative is true, the affirmative is true also, they\nmust either mean that each of them is true separately, or that\nneither of them is true separately but that both are true when\nenunciated together in a couple (a. 19). If they mean the latter,\nthey do not talk either of these things or of any thing else: there\nis neither speech nor speaker, nothing but non-entity; and how can\nnon-entity either speak or walk (a. 22)? Every thing would be\nconfounded in one. If they mean the former--that affirmative and\nnegative are each alike true taken separately, we reply that, since\nthis must be true as much respecting one subject as respecting\nanother, so there can be no distinction or difference between one\nsubject and another; all must be alike and the same; if there be any\ndifference of any kind, this must constitute a special and\nexceptional matter, standing apart from the theory now under\ndiscussion. Upon this view of the theory in question, then, as well\nas upon the preceding, we are landed in the same result: all things\nwould be confounded into one (a. 27). All men would speak truly and\nall men alike (including the theorist himself, by his own admission)\nwould speak falsely. Indeed in discussing with this theorist we have\nnothing to talk about; for he says nothing. He does not say, It is\nthus; he does not say, It is not thus; he says, It is both thus and\nnot thus: then, again, he negatives both, saying, It is neither thus\nnor not thus; so that there is nothing definite in what he says (a.\n32).\n\nAgain, let us ask, Does he who believes things to be so, believe\nfalsely, and he who believes things not to be so and so, believe\nfalsely also, while he who believes both at once, believes truly? If\nthis last person believes truly, what is meant by the common saying\nthat such and such is the constitution of nature? If you even say\nthat the last person does not indeed believe truly, but believes more\ntruly than he who believes the affirmative alone, or he who believes\nthe negative alone, we still have something definite in the\nconstitution of nature, something which is really true, and not true\nand false at the same time. But, if there be no more truly or less\ntruly--if all persons alike and equally speak truly and speak\nfalsely--speech is useless to such persons; what they say, they at\nthe same time unsay. If the state of their minds really corresponds\nto this description--if they believe nothing, but at once think so\nand so and do not think so and so--how do such persons differ from\nplants (b. 3-12; see Alexander's Scholion, p. 665, b. 9-17 Br., about\nthe explanation of [Greek: ma=llon], and the distinction between\n[Greek: le/gein] and [Greek: u(polamba/nein], p. 665, b. 31, seq.)?\n\nIt is certain, however, that these theorists are not like plants, and\ndo not act as such in matters of ordinary life. They look for water,\nwhen thirsty; they keep clear of falling into a well or over a\nprecipice. In regard to what is desirable or undesirable, at least,\nthey do not really act upon their own theory--That both members of\nthe Antiphasis are equally true and equally false. They act upon the\ncontrary theory--That one of the members is true, and the other\nfalse. But, if these theorists, admitting that they act thus, say\nthat they do not act thus with any profession of knowing the truth,\nbut simply on the faith of appearance and greater probability, we\nreply that this ought to impose upon them a stronger sense of duty in\nregard to getting at the truth. The state of Opinion stands to that\nof Knowledge in the same relation as that of sickness to health (p.\n1008, b. 12-31).\n\nFinally, to follow up this last argument, even if we grant to these\ntheorists that both members of the Antiphasis are true, still there\nare degrees of truth: the More and the Less pervades the constitution\nof nature (p. 1008, b. 32). We shall not surely affirm that two and\nthree are equally even; nor shall we say, when any one affirms four\nto be five, that he commits an equal error with one who affirms four\nto be a thousand. Clearly one of these persons is more near to the\ntruth, the other is less near to the truth. But, if there be such a\nthing as _being nearer to the truth_, there must surely be some truth\nto which you have come nearer; and, even if this be denied, yet at\nleast what we have already obtained (the [Greek: e)ggu/teron t\u00ea=s\na)l\u00eathei/as]) is something firmer and of a more truth-like character.\nWe shall thus have got rid of that unqualified theory which forbids\nall definite conceptions of the intellect ([Greek: ka)\\n ei) m\u00ea/\ne)stin, a)ll' \u00ea)/d\u00ea ge/ ti e)sti\\ bebaio/teron kai\\ a)l\u00eathin\u00f4/teron,\nkai\\ tou= lo/gou a)p\u00eallagme/noi a)\\n ei)/\u00eamen tou= a)kra/tou kai\\\nk\u00f4lu/onto/s ti t\u00ea=| dianoi/a| o(ri/sai]--p. 1009, a. 2).\n\nHaving thus completed his refutation of the \"unqualified theory,\"\nwhich declares both members of the Antiphasis to be alike true,\nAristotle passes to the examination of the Protagorean doctrine \"Homo\nMensura:\" he affirms that it proceeds from the same mode of thinking,\nand that the two must stand or fall together. For, if all things\nwhich appear true are true, all things must be at once true and\nfalse; since the opposition of men's opinions is a notorious fact,\neach man thinking his own opinions true and his opponent's opinions\nfalse (p. 1009, a. 16).\n\nAristotle here distinguishes between two classes of reasoners, both\nof whom he combats, but who require to be dealt with in a very\ndifferent manner: (1) Those who are sincerely convinced of what they\naffirm; (2) Those who have no sincere conviction, but merely take up\nthe thesis as a matter for ingenious argument ([Greek: lo/gou\ncha/rin]), and will not relinquish it until they are compelled by a\nstrong case made out against them. The first require persuasion, for\ntheir ignorance may be easily cured, and the difficulties whereby\nthey are puzzled may be removed; the second require to be constrained\nby a forcible Elenchus or refutation, which may correct their misuse\nof dialectic and language (p. 1009, a. 22).\n\nAristotle begins with the first class. The difficulties which perplex\nthem proceed from sensible things ([Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n]--p.\n1009, a. 23). They perceive contrary things generated by the same;\nand this leads them to believe that contraries are both alike real,\nand that the two members of the Antiphasis are alike true. For, since\nNon-Ens cannot be generated, both the two contraries must have\npre-existed together as Entia, prior to the generation in the thing\nas it then stood (a. 25). This is the opinion of Anaxagoras, who\naffirms that every thing is mixed in every thing; and of Demokritus,\nwho affirms that Plenum and Inane--in other words. Ens and\nNon-Ens--exist alike and together in every part (a. 28). To these\nreasoners we reply, that in a certain sense they are right, in a\ncertain sense wrong. The term Ens is used in two senses: the same\nthing may therefore be at once Ens and Non-Ens, but not in the same\nsense; moreover, from Non-Ens in one sense something may be generated,\nbut not from Non-Ens in the other. The same thing may be at once two\nopposites _in power_, but not _in act_ ([Greek: duna/mei me\\n ga\\r\ne)nde/chetai a(/ma tau)to\\ ei)=nai ta\\ e)nanti/a, e)ntelechei/a| d'\nou)/]--a. 35). We must farther remind these reasoners that the basis\non which they proceed is not universally admissible; for there are\nvarious Entia of completely distinct and different essence, in which\nthere is neither movement nor generation nor destruction of any sort\n(a. 38).\n\nThe doctrine held by Protagoras--That what appears true is truth,\ncomes from the same source as the other doctrine--That both members\nof the Antiphasis are true. Both doctrines proceed from the sensible\nworld ([Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ \u00ea( peri\\ ta\\ phaino/mena a)l\u00ea/theia\ne)ni/ois e)k t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n e)l\u00ea/luthen]--p. 1009, b. 2; [Greek:\no(moi/\u00f4s] refers back to a. 23--[Greek: au(/t\u00ea \u00ea( do/xa], the other\ndoctrine). Demokritus, Protagoras, and others observe that sensible\nphenomena are differently appreciated by different men, by other\nanimals, and even by the same animal or man at different times. They\ndo not think that truth upon these points of difference can be\ndetermined by a majority of voices. Demokritus says that either there\nis nothing true, or that we cannot know what it is (b. 10). These\nreasoners identified intelligence with sensible perception, and\nconsidered that this latter implied a change in the subject (b. 13):\nthey conceived that what appeared to sense was necessarily true.\nEmpedokles, Demokritus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Homer, &c., all lay\ndown the doctrine, that the intelligence of men is varied with and\ndetermined by their sensible perceptions. They thought that men of\nwrong intelligence were nevertheless intelligent men, though their\nintelligence did not carry them to the same conclusions (b. 30); that\nif, both in one case and in the other, there were acts of\nintelligence, there must be realities corresponding to both,\njustifying the affirmative as well as the negative (b. 33).\n\nThat sincere and diligent enquirers should fall into these errors is\nvery discouraging; but we must remark that their errors originated\nfrom this--that, while investigating the truth respecting Entia, they\nsupposed that Entia were only the Percepta or Percipibilia (p. 1010,\na. 2). Now in these Entia Perceptionis there is a great deal of the\nIndefinite and of mere Potential Entity (a. 3). Hence the theories of\nthese reasoners were plausible, though not true. They saw that all\nthe Entia Perceptionis were in perpetual movement, and they thought\nit impossible to predicate any thing with truth respecting what was\nat all times and in every way changing (a. 9). Kratylus and the\nHerakleitizers pushed this to an extreme. Even against their\nreasoning, we have something to say in reply. We grant that they have\nsome ground for imagining that what undergoes change does not exist\nat the moment when it changes (a. 16). Yet even here there is room\nfor dispute; for that which is in the act of casting off, still\nretains something of that which is being cast off; and of that which\nis being generated, something must already be in existence. As a\ngeneral doctrine, if something is in course of being destroyed,\nsomething must be in existence; and, if something is in course of\nbeing generated, there must exist something out of which it proceeds\nand by which it is being generated; nor can this go back _ad\ninfinitum_ (a. 22). Dropping this argument, however, let us advance\nanother. Change as to Quantity is not the same as change as to\nQuality or Form. Let us grant that, as to Quantity, there is change\ncontinuous and perpetual--growth or decay--no such thing as\nstationary condition. But all our knowledge relates to Quality or\nForm, in which there is no continuous change (a. 24: [Greek: kata\\\nme\\n ou)=n to\\ poso/n, e)/st\u00f4 m\u00ea\\ me/non; a)lla\\ kata\\ to\\ ei)=dos\na(/panta gign\u00f4/skomen.]--Compare Alex. Schol., p. 671, b. 5-22; p.\n670, a. 36: Bonitz has good remarks in his note, pp. 202-204**.).\n\nAgain, we have a farther reproach to make to these reasoners. Their\nargument is based only on the Percepta or Percipienda; yet, even as\nto these it is true only as to the minority and untrue as to the\nmajority. It is true merely as far as the sublunary Percepta; but as\nto the superlunary or celestial it is the reverse of truth. Our earth\nand its neighbourhood is indeed in continual generation and\ndestruction; but this is an insignificant part of the whole. In\naffirming any thing respecting the whole, we ought to follow the\nmajority rather than the minority (p. 1010, a. 28-31**).\n\nLastly, we must repeat against these reasoners the argument urged\njust now. We must explain to them, that there exists, apart from and\nbesides all generation, destruction, change, motion, &c., a certain\nImmovable Nature ([Greek: a)ki/n\u00eato/s tis phu/sis]--a. 34). Indeed\ntheir own doctrine--That all things both are and are not--would seem\nto imply an universal stationary condition rather than universal\nchange (a. 38). There can be no change; for there is no prospective\nterminus which can be reached by change. Every thing is assumed as\nalready existing.\n\nWe have now to remark upon the special doctrine of\nProtagoras--[Greek: pa=n to\\ phaino/menon a)l\u00eathe/s]. If we grant that\nperception is always true upon matters strictly belonging to it, still\nphantasy is not identical with perception and we cannot say that what\nappears to the phantasy is always true ([Greek: to\\\nphaino/menon]--which implies a reference to [Greek: phantasi/a]--p.\n1010, b. 2), Besides, it is strange that thinkers should puzzle\nthemselves about the questions: Whether the magnitude and colour of\nobjects is that which appears to a spectator near or to a spectator\nfar off? and to a spectator healthy or jaundiced? Whether the weight\nof an object is as it appears to a weak or to a strong man? Whether\nobjects are truly what they appear to men awake or to men asleep?\nTheir own actions show that they do not think there is any doubt; for\nif, being in Libya, they happen to dream that they are in Athens, none\nof them ever think of going to the Odeium (b. 5-11). Moreover,\nrespecting the future, as Plato remarks, the anticipations of the\nignorant man are not so trustworthy as those of the physician, whether\na patient will recover or not (b. 14). Then, again, in respect of\npresent sensations, the perception of sight is not equally trustworthy\nwith the perception of smell about a question of odour (b. 17); and\nthe perception of smell will never report at the same time and about\nthe same thing, that it is at once fragrant and not fragrant; nor,\nindeed, at different times about the affection itself, but only about\nthe subject to which the affection belonged (b. 20). The same wine\nwhich tasted sweet last month, may now taste not sweet; but the sweet\ntaste itself is the same now and last month, and the reports of the\nsense are never contradictory on this point. The sweet taste which is\nto come in the future will be of necessity like the sweet taste in\nthe past. Now such necessity is abrogated by all those reasonings\nwhich affirm at once the two members of the Antiphasis. These\nreasonings disallow all essence of every thing, and all necessity;\nfor whatever is necessary, cannot be at once both thus and not thus\n(b. 21-30).\n\nOn the whole, if nothing exist except Percepta, nothing can exist\nwithout animated beings; since without these last there can be no\nperception. It is indeed true, perhaps, that under such a supposition\nthere exist neither Percepta nor acts of Perception (which are\naffections of the Percipient); but that the Substrata which cause\nPerception should not exist even without Perception--is an\nimpossibility (p. 1010, b. 33: [Greek: to\\ de\\ ta\\ u(pokei/mena m\u00ea\\\nei)=nai, a(\\ poiei= t\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin, kai\\ a)/neu ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s,\na)du/naton]). Perception is not perception of itself; there exists\nbesides, apart from perception, something else which must necessarily\nbe prior to perception. For the Movens is by nature prior to the\nMotum; and this is not the less true, though each of these two is\nenunciated in relation to the other (b. 35).\n\nA difficulty is often started, and enquiry made, Who is to be the\njudge of health and sickness? Whom are we to recognize as the person\nto judge rightly in each particular case? Persons might as well raise\ndifficulty and make enquiry, Whether we are now awake or asleep? It\nis plain by men's actual conduct that they have no real doubt upon\nthe point in any particular case; and both these enquiries arise from\nthe same fundamental mistake--that men require to have every thing\ndemonstrated, and will recognize nothing without demonstration.\n(Alex. says in Scholia, p. 675, b. 3: [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r pro\\s a(\\\ne)k phu/se\u00f4s be/ltion e)/chomen \u00ea)\\ \u00f4(/ste dei=sthai t\u00ea=s peri\\\nau)t\u00f4=n a)podei/xe\u00f4s; e)/sti de\\ tau=ta ai(/ te ai)sth\u00ea/seis, kai\\\nta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata kai\\ ai( phusikai/ te kai\\ koinai\\ e)/nnoiai.]) Those\nwho sincerely and seriously feel this difficulty, may be expected to\nacquiesce in the explanation here given (p. 1011, a. 2-14). But those\nwho put forward the difficulty merely for the sake of argument, must\nbe informed that they require an impossibility. They require to have\na refutative case made out against them (which can only be done by\nreducing them to a [Greek: sullogismo\\s a)ntipha/se\u00f4s]); yet they\nthemselves begin by refusing to acknowledge this refutation as\nsufficient, for they maintain the thesis--That both members of the\nAntiphasis are alike and equally true (a. 16; compare Alex. Schol.,\np. 675, b. 20-28).\n\nThose who maintain this last-mentioned thesis say, in other words,\nThat every thing which appears true, is true. But this thesis of\ntheirs cannot be defended except by the admission that every thing is\nrelative, and that nothing is absolute. Accordingly they must take\ncare to announce their thesis, not in absolute terms as it now\nstands, but in terms strictly relative: Every thing which appears\ntrue, appears true to some individual--at a certain moment of\ntime--under certain circumstances and conditions (p. 1011, a. 24).\nFor, if they affirm, in absolute phrase, that all things are alike\nfalse and true, on the ground that what appears true is true, urging\nthat the same things do not appear true either to different persons,\nor to the same person at different times--nay, sometimes even to the\nsame person at the same time, as may be seen by handling a pebble\nbetween two crossed fingers ([Greek: e)n t\u00ea=| e)palla/xei t\u00f4=n\ndaktu/l\u00f4n]--a. 33), so that it appears two to the touch, but only\none to the sight;--we shall reply, that there is no such\ncontradiction of judgment, if they confine themselves to the same\nperson, the same time, and one and the same sense. In these cases,\nthere is only one affirmation which appears to be true, and\ntherefore, according to their theory, that affirmation is true.\nThey are not, therefore, justified in concluding that every thing\nis alike true and false (b. 1).\n\nThey can only escape this refutation by avoiding to say, This is\ntrue, and by saying, This is true to such an individual, at such a\ntime, &c.; that is, by making every affirmation relative to some\nperson's opinion or perception. Hence the inference is, that nothing\neither ever has occurred or ever will occur, without the antecedent\nopinion of some person ([Greek: m\u00eatheno\\s prodoxa/santos]--p. 1011,\nb. 6): if any thing ever has so occurred, it cannot be true that all\nthings are relative to opinion. Moreover, if the Relatum be one, it\nmust be relative to some one, some definite, Correlate; and, even if\nthe same Relatum be both half and equal, it will not be equal in\nreference to a double Correlate, but half in reference to a double,\nand equal in reference to an equal (b. 9). Moreover, if _homo_ and\n_conceptum_ have both of them no more than a relative existence--that\nis, if both of them exist only in correlation with a\n_concipiens_--then the _concipiens_ cannot be _homo_; it will be the\n_conceptum_ that is _homo_. And, if every individual thing have\nexistence only in relation to a _concipiens_, this _concipiens_ must\nform the Correlate to an infinite number of Relata (b. 12). (All this\nis very briefly and obscurely stated in Aristotle. The commentary of\nAlexander is copious and valuable: one might suppose that he had\nbefore him a more ample text; for it is difficult to find in the\npresent text all that his commentary states**.)\n\nLet thus much be said to establish the opinion, That the two members\nof the Antiphasis (the Affirmative and the Negative) are not both\ntrue at the same time. We have shown whence it arises that some\npersons suppose both to be true; and what are the consequences in\nwhich those who hold this opinion entangle themselves. Accordingly,\nsince both sides of the Antiphasis cannot be truly predicated of the\nsame subject, it is impossible that opposite attributes can belong at\nthe same time to the same subject (p. 1011, b. 17: [Greek: ou)de\\\nta)nanti/a a(/ma u(pa/rchein e)nde/chetai t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=|]). For one of\nthese opposites includes in itself privation, and privation of a\ncertain real essence; now privation is the negation of a certain\ndefinite genus. And, since affirmation and negation cannot be truly\napplied at the same time, it follows that opposite attributes cannot\nbelong at the same time to the same subject. At least it is only\npossible thus far: one may belong to it absolutely, the other\n_secundum quid_; or both of them _secundum quid_ only ([Greek: t\u00f4=n\nme\\n ga\\r e)nanti/\u00f4n tha/teron ste/r\u00easi/s e)stin ou)ch \u00ea(=tton,\nou)si/as de\\ ste/r\u00easis a)po/phasi/s e)stin a)po/ tinos \u00f4(risme/nou\nge/nous]--b. 20).\n\nBut, also, there can be nothing intermediate between the two members\nof the Antiphasis; we must of necessity either affirm or deny any one\nthing of any other (p. 1011, b. 24). This will appear clearly, when\nwe have first defined what is Truth and Falsehood. To say that Ens is\nnot, or that Non-Ens is, is false: To say that Ens is, or that\nNon-Ens is not, is true. Accordingly, he who predicates _est_--or he\nwho predicates _non est_--will speak truly or speak falsely, according\nas he applies his predicate to Ens or to Non-Ens. But he cannot,\neither in application to Ens or to Non-Ens, predicate _est aut non\nest_ (b. 29). Such a predication would be neither true nor false, but\nimproper and unmeaning. (I follow at b. 27 the text of the Berlin\nedition: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste kai\\ o( le/g\u00f4n ei)=nai \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ a)l\u00eatheu/sei\n\u00ea)\\ pseu/setai]--which seems to me here better than that of Bonitz,\nwho puts [Greek: \u00f4(/ste kai\\ o( le/g\u00f4n tou=to ei)=nai \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\\na)l\u00eatheu/sei \u00ea)\\ pseu/setai]--following Alexander's explanation,\nSchol., p. 680, a. 33, which I cannot think to be correct, though\nBonitz praises it much. Aristotle defines Truth and Falsehood: When\nyou say _Ens est_, or _Non-Ens non est_, you speak truth; when you\nsay _Ens non est_, or _Non-Ens est_, you speak falsehood.\nAccordingly, when you employ the predicate _est_, or when you employ\nthe predicate _non est_, you will speak truly or falsehood, according\nas the subject with which you join it is Ens or is Non-Ens. But\nneither with respect to the subject Ens nor with respect to the\nsubject Non-Ens, can you employ the disjunctive predicate--_est aut\nnon est_.**)\n\nAgain, a medium between the two horns of the Antiphasis must be\neither a medium between opposites, like grey between white and black,\nor like the neither between man and horse. If it be the latter, it\nwill never change; for all change is either from a negative to its\naffirmative (_non-bonum_ to _bonum_) or _vice vers\u00e2_: now that which\nis both _non-homo_ and _non-equus_ must change, if it change at all,\ninto that which is both _homo_ and _equus_; but this is impossible.\nWe see change always going on; but it is always change either into\none of the two extremes or into the medium between them. But can we\nassume that there is such a medium (so that the case supposed will\nbelong to the analogy of grey, halfway between white and black)? No,\nwe cannot assume it; for, if we granted it, we should be forced to\nadmit that there was change into white not proceeding from that which\nis not white: now nothing of the kind is ever perceived. There cannot\ntherefore be any admissible medium halfway between the two members of\nthe Antiphasis--something which is neither white nor not-white,\nneither black nor not-black (p. 1011, b. 35: [Greek: ei) d' e)/sti\nmetaxu/]--if such medium be admitted--[Greek: kai\\ ou(/t\u00f4s ei)/\u00ea a)/n\ntis ei)s leuko\\n ou)k e)k m\u00ea\\ leukou= ge/nesis; nu=n d' ou)ch\no(ra=tai]).\n\nFurthermore, whatever our intelligence understands or reasons upon,\nit deals with as matter affirmed or denied. The very definition of\ntruth and falsehood recognizes them as belonging only to affirmation\nor negation: when we affirm or deny in a certain way we speak truth;\nwhen in another way, we speak falsely. Nothing is concerned but\naffirmation and denial (_i.e._, there is no mental operation midway\nbetween the two--p. 1012, a. 2-5). If there be any such medium or\nmidway process, it is not confined to this or that particular\nAntiphasis, but belongs alike to all, and must lie apart from all the\ndifferent Antiphases--at least if it is to be talked of as a reality,\nand not as a mere possible combination of words; so that the speaker\nwill neither speak truth, nor not speak truth; which is absurd (a.\n7). It must also lie apart both from Ens and from Non-Ens; so that we\nshould be compelled to admit a certain mode of change of Essence,\nwhich yet shall neither be generation nor destruction; which is\nimpossible. **(According to Aristotle's definition, all change of\n[Greek: ou)si/a] must be either Generation, _i.e._, passage from\n[Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\\ o)/n], or Destruction, _i.e._,\npassage from [Greek: to\\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/n].--See Alex.\nSchol. p. 681, b. 30-40**.)\n\nAgain, there are certain genera in which negation carries with it the\naffirmation of an opposite; such as odd and even, in numbers. In such\ngenera, if we are to admit any medium apart from and between the two\nmembers of the Antiphasis, we should be forced to admit some number\nwhich is neither odd nor even (p. 1012, a. 11). This is impossible:\nthe definition excludes it. (Alexander gives this as the definition\nof number: [Greek: pa=s ga\\r a)rithmo\\s \u00ea)\\ a)/rtio/s e)stin \u00ea)\\\nperitto/s, kai\\ _a)rithmo/s e)stin o(\\s \u00ea)\\ a)/rtio/s e)stin \u00ea)\\\nperitto/s_]--Schol. p. 682, a. 16.)\n\nAgain, if the Antiphasis could be divided, and a half or intermediate\nposition found, as this theory contends, the division of it must be\nadmissible farther and farther, _ad infinitum_. After bisecting the\nAntiphasis, you can proceed to bisect each of the sections; and so\non. Each section will afford an intermediate term which may be denied\nwith reference to each of the two members of the original Antiphasis.\nTwo new Antiphases will thus be formed, each of which may be bisected\nin the same manner; and so bisection, with the formation of\nsuccessive new Antiphases, may proceed without end (p. 1012, a. 13).\n\nAgain, suppose a questioner to ask you, Is this subject white? You\nanswer, No. Now you have denied nothing else than the being-white:\nthis is the [Greek: a)po/phasis], or negative member of the\nAntiphasis. But you have neither denied nor affirmed the intermediate\nstage between the affirmative and the negative; nor is there any\nanswer possible by which you could do so. Therefore there is no real\nintermediate stage between them ([Greek: e)/ti o(/tan e)rome/nou ei)\nleuko/n e)stin ei)/p\u00ea| o(/ti ou)/, ou)the\\n a)/llo a)pope/ph\u00eaken \u00ea)\\\nto\\ ei)=nai; a)po/phasis de\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai]--p. 1012, a. 15; see\nAlex. Schol. p. 682, b. 15-38, and Bonitz's note. Bonitz suggests,\nthough timidly, [Greek: a)pope/ph\u00eaken] instead of the common reading\n[Greek: a)pope/phuken], which none of the commentators explain, and\nwhich seems unintelligible. I think Bonitz is right, though [Greek:\na)pope/ph\u00eaken] is an unknown tense from [Greek: a)po/ph\u00eami]: it is\nquite as regular as [Greek: a)poph\u00ea/s\u00f4] or [Greek: a)pe/ph\u00easa]**.).\n\nThe doctrines which we have been just controverting (Aristotle says)\narise, like other paradoxes, either from the embarrassment in which\nmen find themselves when they cannot solve a sophistical difficulty;\nor from their fancying that an explanation may be demanded of every\nthing. In replying to them, you must take your start from the\ndefinition, which assigns to each word one fixed and constant\nsignification. The doctrine of Herakleitus--That all things are and\nall things are not--makes all propositions true; that of\nAnaxagoras--That every thing is intermingled with every thing--makes\nall propositions false: such mixture is neither good, nor not good;\nneither of the members of the Antiphasis is true (a. 17-28). Our\npreceding reasonings have refuted both these doctrines, and have\nshown that neither of the two one-sided extremes can be universally\ntrue: neither the doctrine--Every proposition is true; nor\nthat--Every proposition is false; still less that which comprehends\nthem both--Every proposition is both true and false. Among these\nthree doctrines, the second might seem the most plausible, yet it\nis inadmissible, like the other two (b. 4).\n\nIn debating with all these reasoners, you must require them (as we\nhave already laid down), not to admit either existence or\nnon-existence but, to admit a constant signification for each word.\nYou must begin by defining truth and falsehood; each of them belongs\nonly to affirmation in a certain way. Where the affirmation is true\nthe denial is false; all propositions cannot be false; one member of\neach Antiphasis must be true, and the other member must be false.\nEach of these doctrines labours under the often-exposed defect--that\nit destroys itself (p. 1012, b. 14, [Greek: to\\\nthrullou/menon]--allusion to the The\u00e6tetus, according to Alexander).\nFor whoever declares all propositions to be true, declares the\ncontradictory of this declaration to be true as well as the rest, and\ntherefore his own declaration not to be true. Whoever declares all\npropositions to be false, declares his own declaration to be false as\nwell as all other propositions (b. 17). And, even if we suppose each\nof these persons to make a special exception in regard to the\nparticular propositions here respectively indicated, still this will\nnot serve. The man who declares all propositions to be false, will be\ncompelled to admit an infinite number of true propositions; because\nthe proposition declaring the true proposition to be true, must\nitself be true; a second proposition declaring this last to be true,\nwill itself be true; and so on to a third, a fourth, &c., in endless\nscale of ascent. The like may be said about the man who declares all\npropositions to be true: he too will be obliged to admit an infinite\nnumber of false propositions; for that which declares a true\nproposition to be false, must itself be false; and so on through a\nsecond, a third, &c., in endless scale of ascent as in the former\ncase (b. 22).\n\nIt follows from what has been just proved, that those who affirm\nevery thing to be at rest, and those who affirm every thing to be in\nmotion, are both alike wrong. For, if every thing were at rest, the\nsame propositions would be always true and always false. But this is\nplainly contrary to evidence; for the very reasoner who affirms it\nwas once non-existent, and will again be non-existent. On the other\nhand, if every thing were in motion, no proposition would be true,\nand all would be false: but we have proved above that this is not so.\nNor is it true that all things are alternately in motion or at rest;\nfor there must be something ever-moving and other things\never-moved--and this prime movent must be itself immovable (p. 1012,\nb. 22-30).\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook E.\n\nThe First Philosophy investigates the causes and principles of Entia\n_quatenus_ Entia (p. 1025, b. 3). It is distinguished from other\nsciences, by applying to all Entia, and in so far as they are Entia;\nfor each of the other sciences applies itself to some separate branch\nof Entia, and investigates the causes and principles of that branch\nexclusively. Each assumes either from data of perception, or avowedly\nby way of hypothesis, the portion or genus of Entia to which it\napplies; not investigating the entity thereof, but pre-supposing this\nprocess to have been already performed by Ontology: each then\ninvestigates the properties belonging _per se_ to that genus (b. 13).\nIt is plain that by such an induction not one of these sciences can\ndemonstrate either the essence of its own separate genus, nor whether\nthat genus has any real existence. Both these questions--both [Greek:\nei) e)/stin] and [Greek: ti/ e)stin]--belong to Ontology (b. 18).\n(The belief derived from perception and induction never amounts to\ndemonstration, as has been shown in the Analytica; you may always\ncontest the universality of the conclusion--Alex. p. 734, b. 16, Br.)\n\nApart from Ontology, each of these separate sciences is either\ntheoretical, or practical, or constructive (p. 1025, b. 21). Two of\nthe separate sciences are theoretical--Physics and Mathematics; and,\nas Ontology (or Theology) is also theoretical, there are three\nvarieties of theoretical science (p. 1026, a. 18).\n\nPhysical Science applies to subjects having in themselves the\nprinciple of mobility or change, and investigates, principally and\nfor the most part, the Essence or Form thereof; yet not exclusively\nthe Form, for the Form must always be joined with Matter. The subject\nof Physics includes Matter in its definition, like hollow-nosed, not\nlike hollow (p. 1025, b. 33). All the animal and vegetable world is\ncomprised therein; and even some soul, as far as soul is inseparable\nfrom Matter ([Greek: peri\\ psuch\u00ea=s **e)ni/as the\u00f4r\u00ea=sai tou=\nphusikou=, o(/s\u00ea m\u00ea\\ a)/neu t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas e)sti/n]--p. 1026, a. 5).\n\nMathematics is another branch of theoretical science; applying to\nsubjects immovable and in part inseparable from Matter; that is,\nseparable from Matter only in logical conception (p. 1026, a. 7-15).\n\nTheology, or First Philosophy, or Ontology, is conversant with\nsubjects self-existent, immovable, and separable from Matter (p.\n1026, a. 16).\n\nNow all causes are necessarily eternal; but these more than any\nother, because they are the causes active among the visible divine\nbodies; for, clearly, if the Divinity has any place, it must be found\namong subjects of that nature; and the most venerable science must\ndeal with the most venerable subjects (p. 1026, a. 19). The\ntheoretical sciences are more worthy than the rest ([Greek:\nai(ret\u00f4/terai]), and First Philosophy is the most worthy among the\ntheoretical sciences (a. 22). A man may indeed doubt whether First\nPhilosophy is distinguished from the other theoretical sciences by\nbeing more universal, and by comprehending them all as branches; or\nwhether it has a separate department of its own, but more venerable\nthan the others; as we see that Mathematics, as a whole, comprehends\nGeometry and Astronomy (a. 27). If there exist no other distinct\nEssence beyond the compounds of Nature ([Greek: para\\ ta\\s phu/sei\nsunest\u00eakui/as]--a. 28), Physics would be the first of all sciences.\nBut if there be a distinct immovable Essence, that is first;\naccordingly the science which deals with it is first, and, as being\nfirst, is for that reason universal ([Greek: kai\\ katho/lou ou(/t\u00f4s\no(/ti pr\u00f4/t\u00ea]--a. 30). It is the province of this First Philosophy to\ntheorize respecting Ens _qu\u00e2_ Ens--what it is and what are its\nproperties _qu\u00e2_ Ens (a. 32). (Alexander says the First Philosophy is\nmore universal than the rest, but does not comprehend the rest:\n[Greek: pr\u00f4/t\u00ea pa/nt\u00f4n kai\\ katho/lou \u00f4(s pro\\s ta\\s a)/llas, ou)\nperie/chousa e)kei/nas, a)ll' \u00f4(s pr\u00f4/t\u00ea]--Schol. p. 736, a. 27.)\n\nNow Ens has many different meanings:--\n\n1. Ens [Greek: kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s].\n\n2. Ens [Greek: \u00f4(s a)l\u00eathe/s]--Non-Ens [Greek: \u00f4(s pseu=dos].\n\n3. Ens [Greek: kata\\ ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata t\u00ea=s kat\u00eagori/as] (decuple).\n\n4. Ens [Greek: duna/mei kai\\ e)nergei/a|].\n\n1. Respecting the first, there can be no philosophical speculation\n(p. 1026, b. 3). No science, either theoretical, or practical, or\nconstructive, investigates Accidents. He who constructs a house, does\nnot construct all the accidents or concomitants of the house; for\nthese are endless and indeterminate. It may be agreeable to one man,\nhurtful to a second, profitable to a third, and something different\nin relation to every different Ens; but the constructive art called\nhouse-building is not constructive of any one among these\nconcomitants (b. 7-10). Nor does the geometer investigate the\nanalogous concomitants belonging to his figures; it is no part of his\nprovince to determine whether a triangle is different from a triangle\nhaving two right angles (b. 12). This is easy to understand: the\nConcomitant is little more than a name--as it were, a name and\nnothing beyond (b. 13). Plato came near the truth when he declared\nthat Sophistic was busied about Non-Ens; for the debates of the\nSophists turn principally upon Accidents or Concomitants, such as,\nWhether musical and literary be the same or different? Whether\nKoriskus or literary Koriskus, be the same or different? Whether\neverything which now is, but has not always been, has become; as in\nthe case of a man who being musical has become literary or being\nliterary has become musical? and such like debates (see Alexander,\nSchol. p. 736, b. 40). For the Concomitant or Accident appears\nsomething next door to Non-Ens ([Greek: e)ggu/s ti tou= m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos],\np. 1026, b. 21), as we may see by these debates. Of other Entia there\nis generation or destruction, but of Accidents there is none (b. 23).\n\nNevertheless, we shall state, as far as the case admits, what is the\nnature of the Accident, and through what cause it is ([Greek: ti/s \u00ea(\nphu/sis au)tou=, kai\\ dia/ tin' ai)ti/an e)sti/n;]--p. 1026, b. 25):\nwe shall perhaps at the same time explain why there can be no science\nrespecting it. Among Entia, some are always and necessarily the same,\nothers are usually but not always the same. These which come to pass\nin neither of these two ways, are called Accidents or Concomitants.\nOf the first two, the Constant and the Usual, there is always some\ndefinite cause; of the third, or Accidents, there is none: the cause\nof these is an Accident (p. 1027, a. 8). In fact, Matter is the cause\nof Accidents, admitting as it does of being modified in a way\ndifferent from the usual and ordinary way (a. 13). It is plain that\nthere can be neither science nor teaching of Accidents: the teacher\ncan teach only what is constant or usual, and nothing beyond (a. 20).\n\nNow of these Accidents, there is a certain principle or cause which\nit is indispensable to admit--Chance ([Greek: \u00ea( tou= o(po/ter'\ne)/tuchen]--p. 1027, b. 12). There must be principles and causes,\ngenerable and destructible, yet which never are either generated or\ndestroyed; if this were not so, all events would occur by necessity\n(p. 1026, b. 29-31). (Thus the builder, considered as cause of the\nhouse which he builds, has been generated, _i.e._, he has acquired\nthe art of building and the proper accessories; and he will be\ndestroyed, _i.e._, he will lose his art, and its conditions of being\nexercised. But, considered as the cause of the accidents belonging to\nthe house, of its being annoying or inconvenient to A or B, he has\nnot been generated nor will he be destroyed; _i.e._, he has neither\nacquired, nor will he lose, any skill or conditions tending to the\nproduction of this effect. As the contact of two substances is not\ngenerated, but appears of itself along with the substances when they\nare generated; as the limits of periods of time appear without\ngeneration along with the periods of time themselves; so the builder,\nwhen he acquires the power of building the house, stands possessed\nthereby, without any additional time or special generation, of the\npower to produce the concomitant accidents of the house. The house is\nthus produced by necessity; its concomitant accidents not by\nnecessity--Alex. Schol. p. 738, a. 19-33.)\n\nBut whether this [Greek: to\\ o(po/ter' e)/tuchen] is to be considered\nas referable to Matter, End, or Movent, is a point important to be\ndetermined (p. 1027, b. 15). Aristotle shows elsewhere that it is\nreferable to the last of the three--[Greek: to\\ poi\u00eatiko/n]\n(Asklepius, p. 738, b. 41).\n\nHaving now said enough upon Ens _per Accidens_, we proceed to touch\nupon the second variety of Ens--Ens as the True, Non-Ens as the\nFalse.\n\nThis variety of Ens depends upon conjunction and disjunction, and\nforms an aggregate of two portions separately exhibited and brought\ntogether in the Antiphasis. Such conjunction and disjunction is not\nin things themselves; but in the act of intelligence which thinks the\ntwo things together and not successively: in regard to simple matters\nand Essence, not even any special conjoining act of intelligence is\nrequired; such things must be conceived together, or not conceived at\nall (p. 1027, b. 27). The mental act of apprehension, in these cases,\nis one and indivisible: you either have it entire at once, or not at\nall.\n\nThe cause of this variety of Ens is to be found in a certain\naffection of the intelligence; that of the preceding variety of Ens\nis an undefined or indeterminate cause (b. 34). Both these two\nvarieties of Ens are peculiar, standing apart from what is most\nproperly and _par excellence_ Ens, _i.e._, from the Ens according to\nthe ten Categories, on which we shall now say something.\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook Z.\n\nWe have already stated that Ens is a [Greek: pollach\u00f4=s\nlego/menon]--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera\ncalled Categories. The first is [Greek: ti/ e)stin], or [Greek:\nou)si/a] (_sensu dignissimo_)--Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15).\nThe remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing\nit, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all\nof them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All\nthe other Categories are called Entia only because they are\nquantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man\nmay even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of\nthem is either _per se_ or separable. We ought hardly to say that a\nquality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all--such\nas _currere_, _sedere_, _sanitas_: we ought more properly to say that\n_currens equus_, _sedens homo_, _sanus miles_, are Entia, enunciating\nalong with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance\nto which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because\nthe subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27).\nEssentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation ([Greek:\nlo/g\u00f4|], a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the\nrest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition,\nbecause we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are\nable to answer _Quid est_? and say that it is _homo_ or _ignis_; not\nsimply when we are able to answer _Quale_ or _Quantum est_? So that\nin answering the great and often-considered question, _Quid est Ens_?\nwe shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (_hoc sensu\ndignissimo_), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, [Greek: peri\\ tou=\n_ou(/t\u00f4s_ o)/ntos]).\n\nEssentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most\nmanifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the\nparts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like,\nas well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and\nits parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these\nthe only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an\nerror to call _these_ Essences, and are all Essences really something\ndifferent from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that\nthe limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even\nmore than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all\nbeyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other\nEssences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for\nexample, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two\ndistinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the\nscale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number\nof Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers,\nMagnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct [Greek: a)rch\u00ea/] or principle\nfor each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the\nsame nature, and that there are other things coming near to these,\nsuch as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and\nthe Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these\ndoctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond\nthe Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any\nseparable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or\nwhether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague\noutline what Essence is generally ([Greek: u(potup\u00f4same/nois], b.\n31).\n\nThere are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia,\n[Greek: kuri/\u00f4s] or _sensu dignissimo_: (1) [Greek: to\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n\nei)=nai], (2) [Greek: to\\ katho/lou], (3) [Greek: to\\ ge/nos], (4)\n[Greek: to\\ u(pokei/menon].\n\nWe shall first speak about the fourth--Substratum--which is the\nsubject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any\nsubject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, [Greek:\nto\\ u(pokei/menon pr\u00f4=ton]. This name applies, in one point of view,\nto Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of\nthe two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): _e.g._, the brass, the\nfigure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the\nForm be _prius_, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will\nbe also _prius_ and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We\nget thus far in the adumbration of Essentia--that it is the subject\nof all predicates, but never itself a predicate.\n\nBut this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains\nobscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be\nnot so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing\nelse be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else\nare either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while\nlength, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence,\nQuantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First\nSubject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only\nthat something which these three circumscribe; in other words,\nMatter--that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither\nQuantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other\nCategories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of\nEssence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining\n_per se_ (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain\nneither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative\npredicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others\n(a. 25).\n\nUpon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet,\non the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the\nprincipal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc\nAliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter\ntogether, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may\nbe dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than\nMatter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the\ntwo components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the\nForm, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).\n\nWe shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which\nare acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this\nstarting-point to what is more cognizable ([Greek: pro\\ e)/rgou ga\\r\nto\\ metabai/nein ei)s to\\ gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron]--p. 1029, b. 3. These words\nought properly to come immediately after [Greek: z\u00eat\u00eate/on\npr\u00f4=ton]--p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in\nthe text, [Greek: e)pei\\ d' e)n a)rch\u00ea=|--peri\\ au)tou=], ought to be\ntransferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately\nbefore the words, [Greek: kai\\ pr\u00f4=ton ei)/p\u00f4men]--p. 1029, b. 12.\nBonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp.\n129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man\nlearns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by\nnature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business ([Greek:\ne)/rgon]) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to\nnature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical\nmatters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good\nby nature good also for each man's self. For it will often happen\nthat things first and most cognizable to each man's self, are only\nfaintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet\nstill, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by\nbeginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).\n\nTaking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for\nEssentia in them, we shall first advert to [Greek: ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai],\nwhich we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia,\nsaying something about the rational explanation or definition of it\n(p. 1029, a. 12). The [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of each subject is what is\naffirmed of it _per se_ ([Greek: e)/sti to\\ t.\u00ea.e. e(ka/st\u00f4| o(\\\nle/getai kath' au(to/]--a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical;\nyou are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are _by\nyourself_. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself.\nSurface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of\nsurface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white\nsurface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because\nwhite itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be\ntolerated. The definition, which explains [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], must not\ninclude the very word of which you intend to declare the [Greek:\nt.\u00ea.e.] If you intend to declare the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of white surface\nby the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only\ndeclare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).\n\nNow, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we\nmust enquire whether there is a [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] belonging to each of\nthese. Is there, for example, a [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] for white man? Let\nthe meaning of these two words be included in the single word\ngarment. Is there a [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] for garment? What is it to be a\ngarment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation _per\nse_ (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two\ndistinct sorts of enunciation _per se_: one including an addition\n([Greek: e)k prosthe/se\u00f4s]), the other, not? You may define by\nintimating something to which the matter defined belongs; _e.g._, in\ndefining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may\ndefine by intimating something which is not essential but accessory\nto the matter defined; _e.g._, garment signifying white man, you may\ndefine garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white\nman is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him\n(p. 1030, a. 1).\n\nBut can we in any way affirm that there is any [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] to\ngarment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is\nnone (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]\nis of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti] ([Greek: o(/per ga\\r to/de ti\ne)/sti to\\ t.\u00ea.e.]--a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, _i.e._, a particular\nconcrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say\nwhite man, this is not of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti], if [Greek:\nto/de ti] belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that\n[Greek: to/de ti] belongs to all those matters of which the rational\nexplanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of\na name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if\nthis were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be\ncalled a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary\nsomething; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something\nabout another (a. 10). There will be no [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], therefore,\nexcept for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is\nnot an affection or an accessory or by way of participation.\nRespecting every thing besides, there will be no [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] or\ndefinition, but there may be a rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos])\nof what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted\nin place of a simpler (a. 16).\n\nYet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that\nboth the one and the other are used in many different senses (p.\n1030, a. 18)? For the _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\\ ti/ e)stin]) signifies\nin one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the\nother Categories each respectively. To all of them _Est_ belongs,\nthough not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially\nto the rest; so also _Quid est_ belongs simply and directly to\nEssence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting\nQuale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire _Quid Est_? so that\nQuale also comes under the _Quid est_, though not absolutely or\ndirectly ([Greek: ou)ch a(pl\u00f4=s], a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens;\nfor some assert in words that _Est_ belongs to Non-Ens also though\nnot absolutely, viz., Non Ens _est_ Non-Ens--(a. 26).\n\nNow we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any\nparticular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine\nhow the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: [Greek: dei=\nme\\n ou)=n skopei=n kai\\ to\\ p\u00f4=s dei= le/gein peri\\ e(/kaston, ou)\nm\u00ea\\n ma=llo/n ge \u00ea)\\ to\\ p\u00f4=s e)/chei.] This contrast of [Greek: p\u00f4=s\ndei= le/gein] with [Greek: p\u00f4=s e)/chei] appears to refer to what had\nbeen said two lines before: [Greek: _logik\u00f4=s_ phasi/ tines ei)=nai\nto\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/n]--verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The\nphraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore\nrecognize that [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], as well as [Greek: ti/ e)sti],\nbelongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way\nto the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but [Greek: poi\u00f4=|\nt.\u00ea.e., po/s\u00f4| t.\u00ea.e.], &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the\nCategories to be simply _\u00e6quivoca_, or we must recognize this\naddition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the\nnon-cognizable cognizable ([Greek: \u00f4(/sper kai\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)pist\u00eato\\n\ne)pist\u00eato/n]--a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the\nScholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is,\nthat they are neither _\u00e6quivoca_ nor _univoca_, but in an\nintermediate grade of relation--not [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek:\npro\\s e(/n] (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they\nlike; but the truth is, that there is both [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] and\nDefinition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other\nCategories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you\nmay give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply\nin a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).\n\nThere is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define\nany matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more\nelements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness\nout of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and\nhollowness belonging to the nose _per se_, not as an affection or\naccessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male\nbelongs to animal, or equal to quantity, _i.e._, _per se_ (p. 1030,\nb. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and\nyou cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates\nbelong to their subject _per se_, but in a different sense (see\nBonitz's note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given\nabove (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be\nin a different sense: Definition and [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] being recognized\nboth of them as [Greek: pollach\u00f4=s lego/mena]. Definition therefore\nis the mode of explanation which declares the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], and\nbelongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily,\ndirectly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).\n\nWe have now to enquire--Whether each particular thing, and its\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This\nwill assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each\nthing is not different from its own Essence, and the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]\nis said to be the Essence of each thing.\n\nIn regard to subjects enunciated _per accidens_, the above two would\nseem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white\nman. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as\nthe being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that\nman, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the\nbeing a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this\nlast inference is not necessary; for _same_ is used in a different\nsense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you\nsay, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But\nperhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same _per\naccidens_ (_i.e._, by being truly predicated of the same subject);\nand that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white--Sokrates is\nmusical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the\nsame as the being musical. But this will be denied ([Greek: dokei= d'\nou)/]--p. 1031, a. 28).\n\nIn regard to subjects enunciated _per se_, the case is otherwise:\nhere each thing is the same with its [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] Suppose, _e.g._,\nthere exist any Essenti\u00e6 (such as Plato and others make the Ideas)\nprior to all others; in that case, if the [Greek: au)toagatho/n] were\ndistinct from [Greek: to\\ a)gath\u00f4=| ei)=nai], and the [Greek:\nau)toz\u00f4=|on] distinct from [Greek: to\\ z\u00f4/|\u00f4| ei)=nai], there must be\nother Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we\nbelieve [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia\nanterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover,\nif the Essenti\u00e6 or Ideas, and the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], be disjoined\n([Greek: a)polelume/nai]--p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be\nuncognizable, and the last will be non-existent ([Greek: ta\\ d' ou)k\ne)/stai]--b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] This will be alike true of all [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]; all\nof them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If [Greek:\nto\\ o)/nti ei)=nai] be not identical with [Greek: to\\ o)/n], neither\nis [Greek: to\\ a)gath\u00f4=| ei)=nai] identical with [Greek: to\\\na)gatho/n], &c. But that of which [Greek: to\\ a)gath\u00f4=| ei)=nai] is\nnot truly predicable, is not [Greek: a)gatho/n] (b. 11).\n\nHence we see that of necessity [Greek: to\\ a)gatho/n] is one and the\nsame with [Greek: to\\ a)gath\u00f4=| ei)=nai]; likewise [Greek: to\\\nkalo/n], with [Greek: to\\ kal\u00f4=| ei)=nai]; and so in all cases where\nthe term enunciates a subject primarily and _per se_, not a predicate\nof some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: [Greek: o(/sa m\u00ea\\\nkat' a)/llo le/g\u00eatai, a)lla\\ kath' au(ta\\ kai\\ pr\u00f4=ta]). This last is\nthe characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be\nnot admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b.\n14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato\ndeclares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot\nbe Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as\npredicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense,\nthey would be Essences _per participationem_; which is inconsistent\nwith what is said about them by Plato ([Greek: e)/sontai ga\\r kata\\\nme/thexin]--b. 18).\n\nThese reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated _per se_\nand not _per accidens_, is the same with its [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]; that to\nknow each thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]; that, if you\nproceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same ([Greek:\n\u00f4(/ste kata\\ t\u00ea\\n e)/kthesin a)na/gk\u00ea e(/n ti ei)=nai a)/mph\u00f4]--p.\n1031, b. 21; with Bonitz's explanation of [Greek: e)/kthesis] in his\nNote).\n\nBut that which is enunciated _per accidens_ (_e.g._, _album_,\n_musicum_) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], because it has a double signification: it signifies\nboth the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so\nthat in a certain aspect it is identical with its [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.],\nand in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26).\nThe being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the\nsubject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: [Greek: ou)\ntau)to\\, pa/thei de\\ tau)to/]--obscure). The absurdity of supposing,\nthat the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of a thing is different from the thing\nitself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] For there must be another [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] above this,\nbeing the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of the first [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]; and it would\nbe necessary to provide a new name for the second [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.];\nand so forward, in an ascending march _ad infinitum_. What hinders us\nfrom admitting some things at once, as identical with their [Greek:\nt.\u00ea.e.], if the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the\npreceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with\nits [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], but that the rational explanation ([Greek:\nlo/gos]) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and\nthe same not _per accidens_, but _per se_ (p. 1032, a. 2). If they\nwere different, you would have to ascend to a higher [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]\nof the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a.\n4).\n\nIt is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated _per se_ and\nprimarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its [Greek:\nt.\u00ea.e.] The refutations brought by the Sophists against this\ndoctrine, and the puzzles which they start, _e.g._, Whether Sokrates\nand the being Sokrates are the same,--may be cleared up by the\nexplanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference\nwhat particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve\nas another (a. 10).\n\nOf things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some\nSpontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something,\nby something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12).\nThe word _something_ applies to each and all the Categories. Natural\ngeneration belongs to all the things whose generation comes from\nNature ([Greek: e)k phu/se\u00f4s]); having [Greek: to\\ e)x ou(=]--what we\ncall Matter, [Greek: to\\ u(ph' ou(=]--one of the things existing by\nnature ([Greek: t\u00f4=n phu/sei ti o)/nt\u00f4n]--a. 17), and [Greek: to\\\nti/], such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in\nthe fullest sense ([Greek: ma/lista ou)si/as]). All things generated\neither by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them\nmay be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a.\n20). As an universal truth ([Greek: katho/lou]), Nature includes (1)\nThat _out of which_, or Matter; (2) That _according to which_\n([Greek: kath' o(/]), every thing which is generated having a\ndefinite nature or Form, such as plant or animal; That _by which_, or\nnature characterized according to the Form, being the same Form as\nthe thing generated but in another individual; for a man begets a man\n(a. 24).\n\nThe other generations are called Constructions ([Greek: poi\u00ea/seis]),\nwhich are either from Art, or from Power, or from Intelligence. It is\nwith these as with natural generations: some of them occur both by\nspontaneity and by chance ([Greek: kai\\ a)po\\ tau)toma/tou kai\\ a)po\\\ntu/ch\u00eas]--p. 1032, a. 29; the principle of these last is apparently\n[Greek: _du/namis_], the second of the three _principia_ announced\njust before (?)); both in the one and in the other, some products\narise without seed as well as with seed, which we shall presently\nadvert to.\n\nThe generations from Art are those of which the Form is in the mind.\nBy Form I mean the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of each thing and its First\nEssence ([Greek: t\u00ea\\n pr\u00f4/t\u00ean ou)si/an], p. 1032, b. 1). For, in a\ncertain way, the Form even of contraries is the same; since the\nessence of privation is the opposite essence: for example, health is\nthe essence of disease; for disease is declared or described as\nabsence of health, and health is the rational notion existing in the\nmind and in science. Now a healthy subject is generated by such an\nantecedent train of thought as follows ([Greek: gi/gnetai d\u00ea\\ to\\\nu(gie\\s no\u00ea/santos ou(/t\u00f4s]--b. 6):--Since health is so and so, there\nis necessity, if the subject is to attain health, that such and such\nthings should occur, _e.g._, an even temperature of the body, for\nwhich latter purpose heat must be produced; and so on farther, until\nthe thought rests upon something which is in the physician's power to\nconstruct. The motion proceeding from this last thought is called\nConstruction (b. 10), tending as it does towards health. So that, in\na certain point of view, health may be said to be generated out of\nhealth, and a house out of a house; for the medical art is the form\nof health and the building art the form of the house: I mean the\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], or the Essence without Matter, thereof (b. 14). Of\nthe generations and motions here enumerated, one is called Rational\nApprehension, viz., that one which takes its departure from the\nPrinciple and the Form; the other, Construction, viz., that which\ntakes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational\napprehension ([Greek: a)po\\ tou= teleutai/ou t\u00ea=s no\u00ea/se\u00f4s]--b. 17).\nThe like may be said about each of the intermediate steps: I mean, if\nthe patient is to be restored to health, he must be brought to an\neven temperature. But the being brought to an even temperature, what\nis it? It is so and so; it will be a consequence of his being warmed.\nAnd this last again--what is it? So and so; which already exists\npotentially, since it depends upon the physician to produce it, the\nmeans being at his command ([Greek: tou=to d' \u00ea)/d\u00ea e)p' au)t\u00f4=|]--b.\n21).\n\nWe see thus that the Constructive Agency ([Greek: to\\ poiou=n]) and\nthe point from which the motion towards producing health takes its\norigin, is, when the process is one of Art, the Form present in the\nmind; and, when the process is one of Spontaneity, it proceeds from\nthat which would be the first proceeding of the artist, if Art had\nbeen concerned. In the medical art, _e.g._, the artist begins by\nimparting warmth. He does this by rubbing. But this warmth might\nperhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by\nthe artist. The warmth is the prime agent, in the case of spontaneous\nproduction. The warmth is either a part of health, or a condition to\nthe existence of health, as bricks are to that of a house (p. 1032,\nb. 30).\n\nNothing can be generated, if nothing pre-existed--as has been already\nsaid before. Some part of what is generated must exist before: Matter\npre-exists, as in-dwelling and not generated ([Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r u(/l\u00ea\nme/ros; e)nupa/rchei ga\\r kai\\ gi/gnetai au(/t\u00ea]--p. 1033, a. 1. I do\nnot understand these last words: it ought surely to be--[Greek:\ne)nupa/rchei ga\\r kai\\ _ou)_ gi/gnetai au(/t\u00ea]. Bonitz's explanation\nsuits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual\ntext.).\n\nBut something of the Form or rational explanation ([Greek: t\u00f4=n e)n\nt\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|]) must also pre-exist. In regard to a brazen circle, if\nwe are asked, _Quid est_? we answer in two ways: We say of the\nMatter--It is brass; We say of the Form--It is such and such a\nfigure. And this is the genus in which it is first placed (p. 1033,\na. 4).\n\nThe brazen circle has Matter in its rational explanation. But that\nwhich is generated, is called not by the name of the Matter out of\nwhich it is generated, but by a derivative name formed therefrom; not\n[Greek: e)kei=no], but [Greek: e)kei/ninon]. A statue is called not\n[Greek: li/thos], but [Greek: li/thinos]. But, when a man is made\nhealthy, he is not said to be the Matter out of which the health is\ngenerated; because that which we call the Matter is generated out of\nPrivation along with the subject. Thus, both the man becomes healthy,\nand the patient becomes healthy; but the generation is more properly\nsaid to come out of Privation: we say, _Sanus ex \u00e6groto generatur_,\nrather than, _Sanus ex homine generatur_ (p. 1033, a. 12). In cases\nwhere the Privation is unmarked and unnamed, as, in the case of\nbrass, privation of the spherical, or any other, figure, and, in the\ncase of a house, the privation of bricks or wood, the work is said to\nbe generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man (a.\n14). Nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the\nmaterial out of which it is made, but by a paronym thereof; not\n[Greek: xu/lon] but [Greek: xu/linon] (a. 18). In strict propriety,\nindeed, we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass, nor\nthe house out of wood; for the _materia ex qu\u00e2_ ought to be something\nwhich undergoes change, not something which remains unchanged (a.\n21).\n\nIt was remarked that in Generation there are three things or aspects\nto be distinguished--\n\n1. [Greek: To\\ u(ph' ou(=, o(/then \u00ea( a)rch\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=s gene/se\u00f4s].\n\n2. [Greek: To\\ e)x ou(=]--rather [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] than [Greek:\nste/r\u00easis].\n\n3. [Greek: Ti/ gi/gnetai].\n\nHaving already touched upon the two first, I now proceed to the\nthird. What is it that is generated? Neither the Matter, nor the\nForm, but the embodiment or combination of the two. An artisan does\nnot construct either the brass or the sphere, but the brazen sphere.\nIf he be said to construct the sphere, it is only by accident\n([Greek: kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]), since the sphere in this particular\ncase happens to be of brass. Out of the entire subject-matter, he\nconstructs a distinct individual Something (p. 1033, a. 31). To make\nthe brass round, is not to make the round, or to make the sphere, but\nto make a something different: that is the Form (of sphericity)\nembodied in another thing (a. 32). For, if the artisan made the round\nor the sphere, he must make them out of something different,\npre-existing as a subject: _e.g._, he makes a brazen sphere, and in\nthis sense--that he makes out of that Matter, which is brass, this\ndifferent something, which is a sphere. If he made the sphere\nitself--the Form of sphere--he must make it out of some pre-existent\nsubject; and you would thus carry back _ad infinitum_ the different\nacts of generation and different pre-existent subjects (b. 4).\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that [Greek: to\\ ei)=dos], or by whatever\nname the shape of the percipiend is to be called, is not generated,\nnor is generation thereof possible; nor is there any [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]\nthereof; that is, of the Form abstractedly: for it is this very\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] which is generated or becomes embodied in something\nelse, either by nature, or by art, or by spontaneous power (p. 1033,\nb. 8). The artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist, for he makes it\nout of brass (Matter), and the sphere (Form): he makes or embodies\nthe Form into this Matter, and that is a brazen sphere (b. 11). If\nthere be any generation of the sphere _per se_ ([Greek: tou=\nsphaira=| ei)=nai]), it must be Something out of Something; for the\nGeneratum must always be resolvable into a certain Matter and a\ncertain Form. Let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points\nof the circumference are equidistant from the centre; here are three\nthings to be considered: (1) That in which what is constructed\nresides; (2) That which does so reside; (3) The entire Something\ngenerated or constructed--the brazen sphere. We see thus plainly that\nwhat is called the Form or Essence itself is not generated, but the\ncombination called _according to the Form_ is generated; moreover\nthat in every Generatum there is Matter, so that the Generatum is in\neach case this or that (b. 19).\n\nCan it be true, then, that there exists any sphere or house beyond\nthose which we see or touch (_i.e._, any Form or Idea of a sphere,\nsuch as Plato advocates)? If there existed any such, it could never\nhave become or been generated into Hoc Aliquid. It signifies only\n_tale_. It is neither This nor That nor any thing defined: but it (or\nrather the Constructive Agency) makes or generates _ex hoc tale_; and\nwhen this last has been generated, it is Tale Hoc (p. 1033, b. 22),\nand the entire compound is Kallias, or Sokrates, or _this_ brazen\nsphere, while man, animal, &c., are analogous to brazen sphere\ngenerally. Even if there exist Platonic Forms by themselves, they\ncould be of no use towards generation or the production of Essences.\nFrequently it is obvious that the Generans is like the Generatum,\nonly a different individual. There is no occasion to assume the\nPlatonic Form as an Exemplar; for the generating individual is quite\nsufficient of itself to be the cause of the Form in a new mass of\nMatter. The entire result is the given Form in these particular bones\nand flesh--called Kallias or Sokrates: each is different so far as\nMatter, but the same in the Form; for the Form is indivisible (p.\n1034, a. 7).\n\nBut how does it happen that there are some things which are generated\nsometimes by art, sometimes spontaneously (_e.g._, health), while in\nother things (_e.g._, a house) spontaneous production never takes\nplace? The reason is, that, in the first class of cases, the Matter\nwhich governs the work of generation by the artist, and in which\nitself a part of the finished product resides, is of a nature to be\nmoved or modified by itself, while, in the second, this is not the\nfact; and to be moved, besides, in a certain manner and direction;\nfor there are many things which are movable by themselves, but not in\nsuch manner and direction as the case which we are supposing\nrequires. For example, stones are incapable of being moved in certain\ndirections except by some other force, but they are capable of being\nmoved by themselves in another direction; the like with fire. It is\nupon this that the distinction turns between some results which\ncannot be realized without an artist, and others which may perhaps be\nso realized (a. 17).\n\nIt is plain from what has been said that, in a certain sense,\neverything is generated from something of the same name, as natural\nobjects are (_e.g._, a man); or from something in part bearing the\nsame name (as a house out of the ideal form of a house), or from\nsomething which possesses that which in part bears the same name; for\nthe first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing\ngenerated. The heat in the motion generates heat in the body; and\nthis is either health, or a part of health, or the antecedent of one\nor other of these; hence it is said to produce or generate health,\nbecause it produces that of which health is concomitant and\nconsequent (p. 1034, a. 30; see Bonitz's correction in his Note).\nEssence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all\ngenerations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or\nprinciple of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths\nof Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art\nconstructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form,\nand that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the\nsame name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find\n_all_ generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is\ngenerated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule--though\nthis is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b.\n3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in\nthat of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same\nmanner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved\nby itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from\nsimilar predecessors (b. 7, [Greek: e)x au)t\u00f4=n]--compare Bonitz's\nnote: \"non ex ipsis, sed [Greek: e)x au)t\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n poiou/nt\u00f4n]\").\n\nThis doctrine--That the Form is not generated, does not belong to\nEssence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike--Quality,\nQuantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality\n_per se_ which is generated, but _tale lignum_, _talis homo_: nor the\nForm Quantity _per se_, but _tantum lignum_ or _animal_ (b. 15). But,\nin regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as\ncompared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence,\nthere must pre-exist as generator another _actual_ and _complete_\nEssence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing\npre-existing beyond a _potential_ Quality or a _potential_ Quantity\n(b. 16).\n\nA difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a\nrational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the\nexplanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the\nthing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or\nnot, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in\nthe rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases\nit appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a\ncircle does not include that of its segments; but the rational\nexplanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters.\nMoreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle\nbe a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the\nacute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the\nman. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems\nprior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is\ngiven from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to\nexisting without the other, right angle and man seem _priora_. In\nfact the word _part_ is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings\nto call it--that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But\nlet us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is\nthat Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter,\n(2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be\nEssence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of\nsomething, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of\nview, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the\nrational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus,\nflesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness\nis generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness;\nthe brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the\nstatue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may\ndiscriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form\n(apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the\nmaterial part _per se_, or the statue considered as Matter only (a.\n7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain\nthat of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of\nthe syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters\nare parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form\nis superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the\nMatter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12):\nthey are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form\nof a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain\nway, indeed, it cannot be said that _all_ the letters are contained\nin the rational explanation of the syllables; _e.g._, the letters\ninscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those\nletters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable,\nin the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: [Greek:\n\u00f4(s u(/l\u00ea ai)sth\u00eat\u00ea/]). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to\nbones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the\nman is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of\nhis Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form,\nnor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly\nthey do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational\nexplanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or\nconcrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed\ninto the same _principia_ out of which they are formed; in other\ncases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in\nconjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen\ncircle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from\nMatter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (_i.e._, the\nconcretes) have thus both _principia_ and parts subordinate; but\nneither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The\nplaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle\ninto brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when\nunderstood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle\nis used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle,\nsometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular\ncircles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).\n\nThat which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to\nrecapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts\nof the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is\ndivided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the\nnotion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one\nof the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided;\nfor you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right\nangle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without\nintroducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the\nman--the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into\nwhich man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into\nwhich man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are\nprior to man--at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the\nsoul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being--b. 15)\nis the Essence and the Form and the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of a suitably\narranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be\ngiven, which does not include the function of that part, and this\ncannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows\nthat the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to\nthe entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case.\nBut the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and\ninto these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is\ndivided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire\nman, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all\nseparately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform\nits functions, _i.e._, unless it be animated by a central soul; it is\nnot a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs;\nafter death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There\nare, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the\nForm or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor\nposterior but _simul_ to the entire animal (b. 25).\n\nMan, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of\nparticular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given\nForm and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to\ncompose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest\nin the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that\nSokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b.\n30).\n\nThus, there are parts of the Form or [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], parts of the\nMatter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the\nparts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational\nexplanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for\ncircle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul--are one and\nthe same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular\ncircle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a\nparticular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely\nconceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular\ncircles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a.\n6. [Greek: Noei=n] here means the equivalent of [Greek: a)phairei=n =\nch\u00f4ri/zein t\u00ea=| dianoi/a|]--\"die Th\u00e4tigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch\nwelche das Mathematische gewonnen wird\"--Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p.\n101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or\nimagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or\nnot; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational\nexplanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: [Greek:\na)peltho/ntas d' e)k t\u00ea=s e)ntelechei/as ou) d\u00ea=lon po/tero/n pote/\nei)sin \u00ea)\\ ou)k ei)si/n, a)ll' a)ei\\ le/gontai kai\\ gn\u00f4ri/zontai t\u00f4=|\nkatho/lou lo/g\u00f4|.] I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the\n[Greek: ku/klos no\u00eato/s] only, not of the [Greek: ku/klos\nai)sth\u00eato/s] or [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos]. He had before told us\nthat, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek:\ne)ntele/cheia] or [Greek: phthei/retai], it passes into [Greek:\nchalko/s]. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the [Greek:\nchalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia], we do not\nclearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the [Greek:\nku/klos no\u00eato/s] or mathematical circle, he might well say that we\ndid not clearly know whether it existed at all under the\ncircumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say [Greek:\nei)s o(\\ phthei/retai]). Matter is unknowable _per se_ ([Greek: kath'\nau(t\u00ea/n]--a. 9, _i.e._, if altogether without Form). One variety of\nMatter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable\nmatter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in\nthe perceivable variety, but not _qu\u00e2_ perceivable--the mathematical\nfigures ([Greek: no\u00eat\u00ea\\ de\\ \u00ea( e)n toi=s ai)sth\u00eatoi=s u(pa/rchousa\nm\u00ea\\ \u00ea(=| ai)sth\u00eata/, oi(=on ta\\ math\u00eamatika/]--a. 12; _i.e._, making\nabstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by\nsense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving\nbehind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a\ngeometrical line).\n\nWe have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part,\nPrius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle,\nthe circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is\ndivided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely\neither Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying\nwhat we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19).\nIf by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by\nthe circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or\nEssence thereof,--then this Form is posterior in regard to the\nnotional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the\nparticular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the\nentire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures\nrealized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these\nis prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a.\n25).\n\nAnother reasonable doubt arises here ([Greek: a)porei=tai d'\nei)ko/t\u00f4s]--p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form\nalone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we\ncan define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the\nForm, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do\nnot, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30).\nNow, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters\ndiverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one\nsees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that\nneither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of\nthe circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But,\nif a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would\nhave more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass,\nand would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form\nof circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical\nground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for\nthe brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2).\nThis is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated\nwith flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form\nof man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are\nunable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it\nin conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility,\nand we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some\ntheorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and\napply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists\ncontend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by\nfigure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of\nthe Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of\nthe Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and\nthey affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of\na line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad\n[Greek: au)togramm\u00ea/] others call it the Form of a line; saying that\nin some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same,\nas the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about\nline. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only\nto differ in the phrase. [Greek: Au)togramm\u00ea/] means the same as\n[Greek: to\\ ei)=dos t\u00ea=s gramm\u00ea=s]: it seems to have been a peculiar\nphrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred\nto say [Greek: to\\ ei)=dos t\u00ea=s gramm\u00ea=s].) These reasonings have\nalready misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others\nalso: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same\nForm in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead\nus even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing\nbesides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real\nForm. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things\nas One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.\n\nWe see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the\ntheory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because\nsome persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing\nand in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include\nMatter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, _i.e._,\nthis along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b.\n22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make\nabout the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may\nbe without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass.\nBut this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by\nsense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not\nwithout bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand\nis not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but\nonly when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated;\nwhen not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the\nfirst Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the\ncompound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are\nas particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates\nas soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these\nwords are very obscure).\n\nRespecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the\n**parts parts of the notion of the whole? _e.g._, why is not the\nnotion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it\nwill be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable\nby sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things\neven not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and\nindeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]\nand Form [Greek: au)to\\ kath' au(to/]. The semi-circles are not\nincluded as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are\nparts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable\nand another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34.--Bonitz remarks that these\nwords from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper\nplace). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of\nthese Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form\nand Essence for them--such as numbers, must be reserved for future\nenquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters\nabout perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the\nprovince of Second Philosophy--of the physical theorist ([Greek: t\u00ea=s\nphusik\u00ea=s kai\\ deute/ras philosophi/as e)/rgon]--p. 1037, a. 15). The\nphysical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or\nnotional Essence even more (a. 17).\n\nWe are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the\nAnalytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17,\na. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the\ndefinition is One? We define man _animal bipes_: How is it that this\nis One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not\nbelong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the\nformer, the two are One--white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they\nare One [Greek: kata\\ pa/thos]. But the parts included in the\ndefinition are not One [Greek: kata\\ pa/thos], nor are they one\n[Greek: kata\\ me/thexin]; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of\nthe Differenti\u00e6. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake\nof Opposita, for the Differenti\u00e6 are Opposita to each other. And,\neven if we say that the Genus does partake of the Differenti\u00e6, the\nsame difficulty recurs, when the Differenti\u00e6 are numerous. The Genus\nmust partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all\nof them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them\nbelong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be\nincluded in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why\nor how those Differenti\u00e6 which are included in the definition\ncoalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the _definiend_\n[Greek: e(/n ti kai\\ to/de ti] (b. 27).\n\nIn answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition\nwhich arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b.\n28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the\nGenus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two\ncoalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of\nman--_animal bipes_--_animal_ is the Matter and _bipes_ the Form; so\nthat the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify\nthrough how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided\nit be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and\nappropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be\ncomplied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding,\nand will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You\ndivide the genus animal first into [Greek: z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun--z\u00f4=|on\na)pou=n]; you next divide [Greek: z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun] into [Greek:\nz\u00f4=|on u(po/poun di/poun--z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun polu/poun]; or perhaps\ninto [Greek: z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun schizo/pun--z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun\na)/schiston]. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to\n[Greek: z\u00f4=|on u(po/poun] should be founded upon some subordinate\ndifferentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: [Greek:\nau(=tai ga\\r diaphorai\\ podo/s; \u00ea( ga\\r schizopodi/a podo/t\u00eas tis]).\nIf it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new\nattribute (_e. g._, [Greek: pter\u00f4to/n, a)/pteron]), the division will\nbe unphilosophical. The last differentia [Greek: z\u00f4=|on di/poun]\nincludes the preceding differentia [Greek: u(po/poun]: to say [Greek:\nz\u00f4=|on u(po/poun di/poun] would be tautology. Where each differentia\nis a differentia of the preceding differenti\u00e6, the last differentia\nincludes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the\ngenus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation\narising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it\nvirtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: [Greek: o( o(rismo\\s\nlo/gos e)sti\\n o( e)k t\u00f4=n diaphor\u00f4=n, kai\\ tou/t\u00f4n t\u00ea=s teleutai/as\nkata/ ge to\\ o)rtho/n]).\n\nIn the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of\nparts; no subordination of _prius_ and _posterius_; all are equally\nessential and coordinate ([Greek: ta/xis d' ou)k e)/stin e)n t\u00ea=|\nou)si/a|]--p. 1038, a. 33).\n\nAs we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go\nback to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four\nvarieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The\nSubject--Substratum--Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two\ndifferent ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by\nvarious accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter\nimplicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form--Essence--the\n[Greek: t.\u00ea.e.]; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two;\n(4) The Universal ([Greek: to\\ katho/lou]). Of these four, we have\nalready examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.\n\nSome philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and\neminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems\nimpossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be\nEssence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to\nnothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many\nthings. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all\nor of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any\none, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the\nEssence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the\nEssence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the\nUniversal is always predicated of a subject.\n\nPerhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not\nidentical with [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], but is Essence which is immanent in\nor belongs to [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], as animal in man and horse. But this\ncannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or\nnot, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of\nsomething to which it belongs peculiarly, as _homo_ is the essence of\nman peculiarly; but, if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of\nman, it will be the essence of something to which it does not\npeculiarly belong; and this contradicts the definition of Essence (p.\n1038, b. 15-23. This passage is very obscure, even after Bonitz and\nSchwegler's explanatory notes. I incline to Schwegler, and to his\nremark, Comm. II. p. 115, that the text of b. 23 ought to be written\n[Greek: e)n \u00f4(=| _m\u00ea\\_ \u00f4(s i)/dion u(pa/rchei].).\n\nAgain, it is impossible that Essence, if composed of any elements,\ncan be composed of what is not Essence, as of Quality; for this would\nmake Quality _prius_ as regards Essence; which it cannot be, either\nin reason ([Greek: lo/g\u00f4|]), or in time, or in generation. If this\nwere so, the affections would be separable from Essences (p. 1038, b.\n28). Essence, if composed of any thing, must be composed of Essence.\n\nOnce more, if the individual man or horse are Essences, nothing which\nis in the definition of these can be Essence; nor apart from that of\nwhich it is Essence; nor in any thing else. There cannot be any man,\napart from individual men (p. 1038, b. 34).\n\nHence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are\nEssence: none of them signify Hoc Aliquid, but Tale. To suppose\notherwise, would open the door to many inadmissible consequences,\nespecially to the argument of the 'Third Man' (p. 1039, a. 2).\n\nAnother argument to the same purpose:--It is impossible that Essence\ncan be composed of different Essences immanent in one Entelechy. Two\nin the same Entelechy can never be One in Entelechy. If indeed they\nbe two _in potenti\u00e2_, they may coalesce into one Entelechy, like one\ndouble out of two potential halves. But Entelechy establishes a\nseparate and complete existence (p. 1039, a. 7); so that, if Essence\nis One, it cannot be made up of distinct Essences immanent or\ninherent. Demokritus, who recognized only the atoms as Essences, was\nright in saying, that two of them could not be One, nor one of them\nTwo. The like is true about number, if number be, as some contend, a\nsynthesis of monads. For either the dyad is not One; or else the\nmonads included therein are not monads [Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (a.\n14).\n\nHere however we stumble upon a difficulty. For, if no Essence can be\nput together out of Universals, nor any compound Essence out of other\nEssences existing as Entelechies, all Essence must necessarily be\nsimple and uncompounded, so that no definition can be given of it.\nBut this is opposed to every one's opinion, and to what has been said\nlong ago, that Essence alone could be defined; or at least Essence\nmost of all. It now appears that there can be no definition of\nEssence, nor by consequence of any thing else. Perhaps, however this\nmay be only true in a certain sense: in one way, definition is\npossible; in another way, not. We shall endeavour to clear up the\npoint presently (p. 1039, a. 22.--Schwegler says in his note upon\nthis passage: \"Die von Aristoteles h\u00e4ufig ber\u00fchrte, doch nie zur\nabschliessenden L\u00f6sung gebrachte, Grundaporie des aristotelischen\nSystems\"--Comm. II. p. 117).\n\nThose who maintain that Ideas are self-existent are involved in\nfarther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the Species\nis composed out of Genus and Differentia. For, suppose that these\nIdeas are self-existent and that [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on] exists both in\nman and horse: [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on] is, in these two, either the same\nor different numerically. It is, of course, the same in definition or\nnotion ([Greek: lo/g\u00f4|]); of that there can be no doubt. If it be\nnumerically same ([Greek: \u00f4(/sper su= saut\u00f4=|]) in man and in horse,\nhow can this same exist at once in separate beings, unless we suppose\nthe absurdity that it exists apart from itself (p. 1039, b. 1)?\nAgain, are we to imagine that this generic Ens, [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on],\npartakes at the same time of contrary differenti\u00e6--the dipod,\npolypod, apod? If it does not, how can dipodic or polypodic animals\nreally exist? Nor is the difficulty at all lessened, if, instead of\nsaying that the generic Ens partakes of differenti\u00e6, you say that it\nis _mixed_ with them, or _compounded_ of them, or _in contact_ with\nthem. There is nothing but a tissue of absurdities ([Greek: pa/nta\na)/toma]--b. 6).\n\nBut take the contrary supposition and suppose that the [Greek:\nau)toz\u00f4=|on] is numerically different in man, horse, &c. On this\nadmission, there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of\nwhom the [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on] is the Essence; man, for example, since\nanimal is not accidental, but essential, as a constituent of man (p.\n1039, b. 8). [Greek: Au)toz\u00f4=|on] will thus be Many (\"ein\nVielerlei\"--Schwegler); for it will be the Essence of each particular\nanimal, of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally\n([Greek: ou) ga\\r ka/t' a)/llo le/getai]--_i.e._, this is not a case\nwhere the predicate is something distinct from the subject). Moreover\nall the constituents of man will be alike Ideas (_e.g._, not merely\n[Greek: z\u00f4=|on], but [Greek: di/poun]): now the same cannot be Idea of\none thing and Essence of another; accordingly, [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on]\nwill be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals\n([Greek: di/poun, polu/poun], b. 14).\n\nAgain, whence comes [Greek: au)toz\u00f4=|on] itself, and how do the\nparticular animals arise out of it? How can the [Greek: z\u00f4=|on] which\nis Essence, exist apart from and alongside of [Greek: au)to\\ to\\\nz\u00f4=|on]? (p. 1039, b. 15.)\n\nThese arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any\nsuch Ideas as some philosophers affirm (p. 1039, b. 18).\n\nWe have already said that there are two varieties of Essence: (1) The\nForm alone, (2) The Form embodied in Matter. The Form or Essence in\nthe first meaning, is neither generable nor destructible; in the\nsecond meaning it is both. [Greek: To\\ oi)ki/a| ei)=nai] is neither\ngenerable nor destructible; [Greek: to\\ t\u00ea=|de t\u00ea=| oi)ki/a| ei)=nai]\nis both the one and the other (p. 1039, b. 25). Of these last,\ntherefore, the perceivable or concrete Essences, there can be no\ndefinition nor demonstration, because they are implicated with\nMatter, which is noway necessary, or unchangeable, but may exist or\nnot exist, change or not change. Demonstration belongs only to what\nis necessary; Definition only to Science, which cannot be to-day\nScience and to-morrow Ignorance. Neither Science, nor Demonstration,\nnor Definition, applies to such things as may be otherwise: these\nlatter belong to Opinion ([Greek: tou= e)ndechome/nou a)/ll\u00f4s\ne)/chein]--p. 1040, a. 1). You cannot have Science or Demonstration\nor Definition about particular or perceivable things, because they\nare destroyed and pass out of perception, so that you do not know\nwhat continues to be true about them; even though you preserve the\ndefinition in your memory, you cannot tell how far it continues\napplicable to them (a. 7). Any definition given is liable to be\noverthrown.\n\nUpon the same principle, there cannot be any definition of the\nPlatonic Ideas; each of which is announced as a particular, distinct,\nseparable, Ens (p. 1040, a. 8). The definition must be composed of\nwords--of the words of a language generally understood--and of words\nwhich, being used by many persons, are applicable to other\nparticulars besides the definiend (you define Alexander as white,\nthin, a philosopher, a native of Aphrodisias, &c., all of which are\ncharacteristics applicable to many other persons besides). The\ndefiner may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply\nto many things, but that the aggregate of all together will apply to\nnone except the definiend. We reply however, that [Greek: z\u00f4=|on\ndi/poun] must have at least two subjects to which it applies--[Greek:\nto\\ z\u00f4=|on] and [Greek: to\\ di/poun]. Of course this is all the more\nevident about eternal Entia like the Platonic Ideas, which are prior\nto the compound and parts thereof ([Greek: z\u00f4=|on] and [Greek:\ndi/poun] are each prior and both of them parts of [Greek:\nau)toa/nthr\u00f4pos]), and separable, just as [Greek: au)toa/nthr\u00f4pos] is\nseparable (a. 14-20); for either neither of them is separable, or\nboth are so. If neither of them is separable, then the Genus is\nnothing apart from the Species, and the Platonic assumption of\nself-existent Ideas falls to the ground; if both are separable, then\nthe Differentia is self-existent as well as the Genus (a. 21): there\nexist some Ideas prior to other Ideas. Moreover, the Genus and\nDifferentia, the component elements of the Species, are logically\nprior to the Species: suppress the Species, and you do not suppress\nits component elements; suppress these, and you _do_ suppress the\nSpecies (a. 21). We reply farther that, if the more compound Ideas\narise out of the less compound, the component elements (like [Greek:\nz\u00f4=|on di/poun]) must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects.\nIf this be not so always, how are we to distinguish the cases in\nwhich it is true from those in which it is not? You must assume the\nexistence of some Idea which can only be predicated of some one\nsubject, and no others. But this seems impossible. Every Idea is\nparticipable (a. 27).\n\nThese philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of\neternal Essences (which the Platonic Ideas are), especially in cases\nwhere the objects are essentially unique, as Sun, or Moon, or Earth\n(p. 1040, a. 29). When they try to define Sun, they are forced to use\nphrases which are applicable to many in common; but Sun, (and each\nIdea) is particular and individual, like Kleon or Sokrates. Why does\nnone of them produce a definition of an Idea? If any one tried, he\nwould soon see the pertinence of the above remarks (b. 3).\n(Alexander, Bonitz, and Schwegler, all observe incidentally that the\nreasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical.\nBonitz, p. 352, gives a good summary of the chapter, concluding: \"Hoc\ncapite non id ipsum demonstrat, res singulas non esse substantias,\nsed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam; nimirum\nquum substanti\u00e6 vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem\ndemonstratum sit, c. 4, hoc si comprobat, illud simul est\ncomprobatum.\")\n\nIt is farther evident that many apparent Essences are not strictly\nand truly Essences; for example, the parts of animals; since not one\nof them is separated from the whole ([Greek: ou)the\\n ga\\r\nkech\u00f4risme/non au)t\u00f4=n e)sti/n]--p. 1040, b. 6; Alexander says _ad\nloc._: [Greek: ou)si/as e)kei=na/ phamen o(/sa kath' au(ta\\ o)/nta\ndu/natai to\\ oi)kei=on e)/rgon a)potelei=n; ou)si/a ga\\r ou)de\\n\na)/llo e)sti\\n \u00ea)\\ to\\ a)ph' ou(= to\\ e(ka/stou e)/rgon\ne)kpl\u00earou=tai; ou)si/a ga\\r kai\\ ei)=dos S\u00f4kra/tous \u00ea( tou=\nS\u00f4kra/tous psuch\u00ea/, a)ph' \u00ea(=s au)t\u00f4=| to\\ tou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou \u00ea(=|\na)/nthr\u00f4pos e)/rgon e)kpl\u00earou=n]). When any one of them is separated,\nit exists only in the character of Matter--earth, fire, air; none of\nthem, in this separate condition, being an unity, but only like a\nheap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined\ninto one. We might suppose, indeed, that the parts of the body, and\nthe parts of the soul, of animated beings, come near to Essence, both\none and the other, alike potentially and actually (b. 12), because\nthey have principles of motion in their turnings ([Greek: kampai=s]),\nso that in some cases they continue separately alive after division.\nStill the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as\nnothing more than potential, wherever the oneness and continuity of\nthe whole is the work of Nature (b. 15), and not a mere case of\ncontact or forcible conjunction.\n\nNevertheless the being One, or Unity (p. 1040, b. 16), is not itself\nthe Essence of things. Unum is predicated in the same manner as Ens;\nthe two may always be predicated together: the Essence of Unum is\nOne; and things of which the Essence is Unum Numero, are themselves\nnumerically one. Neither Unum nor Ens is the Essence of things any\nmore than the being an Element, or the being a Principle, can be the\nEssence thereof: we have farther to enquire what the Principle is, in\norder to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape (b. 20). Unum\nand Ens are more near to Essence than either Element, Principle, or\nCause; nevertheless neither Unum nor Ens is Essence; for nothing\nwhich is common to many things is Essence. Essence belongs only to\nitself and to that which has itself. Farther, Unum cannot be in many\nplaces at once; but that which is common is in many places at once.\nIt is thus plain that nothing Universal exists apart or separate from\nparticulars (b. 27).\n\nThe advocates of the (Platonic) Ideas are right in affirming them to\nbe separate, if they be Essences; but they are wrong in calling that\nwhich is predicable of many things (the Universal) an Idea (p. 1040,\nb. 29). When asked, What are these indestructible Essences of which\nyou speak, as apart from the visible individual objects?--they had no\nintelligible answer to give. Accordingly they were forced to make\nthese Essences the same specifically with the destructible\n(individual) objects; for _these_ we do know (b. 33). They simply\nprefixed the word [Greek: au)to/] to the names of sensible\nobjects--[Greek: au)toa/nthr\u00f4pos, au)toi+/ppos]. But these Ideas\nmight still exist, even though we knew not what they were; just as\neternal Essences like the stars would still exist, even though we\nhad never seen them (p. 1041, a. 2).\n\nLet us again examine what we call Essence, and what sort of thing it\nis; and let us take another point of departure, which may perhaps\nhelp us to understand what that Essence is which is apart and\nseparate from perceivable Essences (p. 1041, a. 9). We know that\nEssence is a certain variety of Principle or Cause; and from this\npremiss we will reason (a. 10). Now the enquiry into Cause, or the\nWhy, always comes in this shape: Why does one thing belong to\nanother? The enquiry, Why a thing is itself? is idle. The fact--the\n[Greek: o(/ti]--must be assumed to be clear and known in the first\ninstance. You know that the moon is eclipsed, as matter of fact; you\nproceed to enquire into the cause thereof (a. 11-24). Why does it\nthunder? or, to enunciate the same question more fully, Why is there\nnoise in the clouds? The _qu\u00e6situm_ is always one thing predicated of\nanother (a. 26). Why are these materials, bricks and stones, a house?\nHere the answer sought is, the Cause; and that is the [Greek:\nt.\u00ea.e.], speaking in logical or analytical phraseology ([Greek:\n_logik\u00f4=s_]--_i.e._, that which belongs to the [Greek: _lo/gos_ t\u00ea=s\nou)si/as]). In some cases, this _qu\u00e6situm_ is a Final Cause, as in\nthe case of a bed or a house; in others, an Efficient or Movent\nCause; for that also is a variety of Cause, generally sought for in\nregard to things generated or destroyed; but the other (viz., [Greek:\nto\\ t.\u00ea.e.], \"ipsa rei forma ac notio, aut concepta in animo\nartificis, aut inclusa [Greek: duna/mei] in ips\u00e2 natur\u00e2 ac semine\nrei\"--Bonitz, Comm. p. 359) is sought for in regard to [Greek:\nei)=nai].\n\nThe true nature of the _qu\u00e6situm_ is often unperceived, when the\nproblem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and\npredicate in their mutual relations ([Greek: e)n toi=s m\u00ea\\\nkatall\u00ea/l\u00f4s legome/nois], p. 1041, a. 33). For example, [Greek:\na)/nthr\u00f4pos dia\\ ti/ e)stin?] is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation.\nAs it stands, it might be supposed to be intended as [Greek:\na)/nthr\u00f4pos dia\\ ti/ e)stin a)/nthr\u00f4pos?] which would be a question\nidle or null. To make it clear, you ought to distinguish the two\nmembers to which the real _qu\u00e6situm_ refers (b. 2), and say [Greek:\ndia\\ ti/ ta/de \u00ea)\\ to/de e)sti\\n a)/nthr\u00f4pos?] your real enquiry is\nabout the [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] or Matter, why it exists in this or that\nmanner. Why are these materials a house? Because the Essence of a\nhouse belongs to them (b. 6). Some [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], some sort of\n[Greek: ei)=nai], must belong to the Matter (b. 4). Why is this\nMatter a man? or why is the body disposed in this particular way a\nman? Here we enquire as to the Cause which acts upon a certain\nMatter; and that is the Form whereby the thing is; which again is the\nEssence (b. 8).\n\nHence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the Simple\nand the Compound. The enquiry above described, and the teaching above\ndescribed, cannot apply to the Simple, which must be investigated in\nanother way (p. 1041, b. 9). Compounds are of two sorts--aggregates\nlike a _heap_ (mechanical), and aggregates like a _syllable_ (organic\nor formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent\nelements, but something else besides (b. 16). The syllable _ba_ is\nsomething more than the letters _b_ and _a_; flesh is something more\nthan fire and earth, its constituent elements. Now this _something\nmore_ cannot be itself a constituent element; for, if that were so,\nflesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two,\nand we should still have to search for the _something beyond_, and\nthis ulterior process might be repeated _ad infinitum_ (b. 22). Nor\ncan the _something beyond_ be itself a compound of several elements,\nfor we should still have to find the independent something which\nbinds these into a compound. It is plain that this _something beyond_\nmust be in its nature quite distinct from an element, and must be the\ncause why one compound is flesh, another compound a syllable, and so\nabout all the remaining compounds. Now this is the Essence of each\ncompound--the First Cause of existence to each (b. 25). The Element\n([Greek: stoichei=on]) is that into which the compound is separated,\nas included Matter ([Greek: e)nupa/rchon \u00f4(s u(/l\u00ean]): _b_ and _a_,\nin the syllable _ba_ (b. 32). There are some things which are not the\nEssences of objects (white, for example, is not of the Essence of\nman, but an attribute); but, in all cases where compounds have come\ntogether according to Nature and by natural process, that Nature also\nwhich is not Element but Principle is the Essence (b. 28: [Greek:\ne)pei\\ d' e)/nia ou)k ou)si/ai t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n, a)ll' o(/sai ou)si/ai\nkata\\ phu/sin kai\\ phu/sei sunest\u00ea/kasi, phanei/\u00ea a)\\n kai\\ au(/t\u00ea \u00ea(\nphu/sis ou)si/a, \u00ea(/ e)stin ou) stoichei=on a)ll' a)rch\u00ea/.] Schwegler\nin his note, p. 135, proposes to correct this passage by striking out\n[Greek: kai/] before the words [Greek: au(t\u00ea\\ \u00ea( phu/sis ou)si/a].\nBut, if this were done, it would make the passage mean that [Greek:\nu(/l\u00ea] or [Greek: stoichei=on] is not [Greek: ou)si/a], and that the\nother [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: stoichei=on], is to be\nregarded exclusively as [Greek: ou)si/a]. Now this is certainly not\nthe doctrine of Aristotle, who expressly declares [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] to\nbe [Greek: ou)si/a]; see H, p. 1042, a. 32. Retaining the [Greek:\nkai/], the passage will then mean that not merely [Greek: u(/l\u00ea], but\n_also_ [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: u(/l\u00ea], is [Greek:\nou)si/a]).\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook [Greek: \u00ca].\n\nIn this Book, Aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and\ndiscussions of the preceding. His purpose had been declared to be the\ninvestigation of the Causes, Principles, and Elements of Essences.\nNow Essences are diverse: some universally admitted, as the natural\nelements and simple bodies, also plants, animals, and the parts of\neach, lastly, the heaven and the parts thereof; others not\nuniversally admitted, but advocated by some philosophers, as the\nIdeas and Mathematical Entia; others, again, which we arrive at by\ndialectical discussion, as [Greek: to\\ t.\u00ea.e.], the Substratum\n(Logical Entia--[Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n], p. 1042, a. 12), the Genus\nmore Essence than the Species, the Universal more Essence than\nParticulars. The (Platonic) Ideas make a near approach to the Genus\nand the Universal; they are vindicated as Essences upon similar\ngrounds. Next, since [Greek: to\\ t.\u00ea.e.] is Essence, and since the\nDefinition is the rational explanation of [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], we found\nit necessary to discuss Definition; and, since the Definition is a\nsentence having parts, we were called upon to examine these parts,\nand to explain what parts belonged both to Essence and to Definition.\nWe decided farther, after discussion, that the Universal and the\nGenus were not Essence; the Platonic Ideas and the Mathematical Entia\nwe postponed for the moment, and we confined ourselves to the\nperceivable Essences, recognized by all (a. 25).\n\nNow all these perceivable Essenti\u00e6 include Matter. The\nSubstratum--Matter in one way--is Essence; while, in another way, the\nForm and the [Greek: lo/gos] is Essence; and finally the Compound of\nthe two is Essence. Matter is Hoc Aliquid, not [Greek: e)nergei/a|]\nbut only [Greek: duna/mei]. Form is an Hoc Aliquid separable by reason\n([Greek: t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| ch\u00f4risto/n], p. 1042, a. 29). The Compound of\nthe two, the complete Hoc Aliquid, is capable of existing separably,\nin an absolute sense (which is true also of some Forms), and is\nliable alone to generation and destruction (a. 30).\n\nIt is clear that Matter also, not less than Form, is Essence; for in\nall changes from opposite to opposite, there is a certain substratum\nto such changes. Thus, in changes of Place, there is a substratum\nwhich is now here, presently there; in changes of Quantity, what is\nnow of such and such a size, is presently greater or less; in changes\nof Quality, what is now healthy is presently sick; in changes of\nEssence, what is now in course of generation is presently in course\nof destruction, or what is now the substratum of some given Form (and\nis thus Hoc Aliquid) is presently the substratum of Privation, and\nthus no longer Hoc Aliquid. Among these four varieties of change\n([Greek: kat' ou)si/an, kata\\ poso/n, kata\\ poio/n, kata\\ to/pon])\nthe three last are consequent upon the first, but the first is not\nconsequent upon all the three last; for we cannot maintain that,\nbecause a thing has Matter capable of local movement, it must\ntherefore have generable and destructible Matter (p. 1042, b. 6).\n\nHaving discussed the Essence of perceivable things so far forth as\n_potential_, we now proceed to the same Essence so far forth as\n_actual_ ([Greek: \u00ea( duna/mei ou)si/a--\u00ea( \u00f4(s e)ne/rgeia ou)si/a t\u00f4=n\nai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n]--p. 1042, b. 10). What is this last? Demokritus\nrecognizes a primordial body one and the same as to Matter, but\nhaving three differences--in figure, in position, in arrangement. But\nit is plain that this enumeration is not sufficient and that there\nare many other differences, to each of which corresponds a special\nacceptation of [Greek: e)/sti] ([Greek: to\\ e)/sti tosautach\u00f4=s\nle/getai]--b. 26). Some differences depend upon the mode of putting\ntogether constituent materials ([Greek: sunthe/sei t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas]--b.\n16), as mixture, tying, gluing, pegging, &c.; some upon position, as\nthreshold, coping, &c.; some upon time; some upon place; some upon\naffections of perceivable things, such as hardness, softness,\ndryness, moisture, density, rarity, &c.; some upon combinations of\nthe foregoing; some again simply upon excess or defect in quantity.\nTo one or other of these, [Greek: e)/stin] has reference in each\nparticular case. We say--This _is_ a threshold, because it lies in a\nparticular manner: _Is_ (or _To be_--[Greek: to\\ ei)=nai]) signifies\nin this case that particular manner of lying. To be ice, is to have\nbecome solidified in this particular manner (b. 28). We must\ntherefore look for the summa genera of the differences; in some cases\n[Greek: to\\ ei)=nai] will be defined by all these differences: thus\nmore or less dense, more or less rare, belong to the genus excess and\ndefect; differences of figure, smoothness, roughness, &c., belong to\nthe genus straight and curve; in other cases, to be, or not to be,\nwill depend upon mixture, as the genus (p. 1043, a. 1).\n\nIf then the Essence is the cause why each thing is what it is, we\nmust seek in these differences the cause why each thing is what it is\n(p. 1043, a. 3). None of these differences indeed is itself\nEssence,--not even when it is embodied or combined with Matter; but\nit is in each the analogue of Essence, and must be employed in\ndefining, just as in real and true Essence we define by predicating\nof Matter the Actuality or Formality ([Greek: \u00f4(s e)n tai=s ou)si/ais\nto\\ t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas kat\u00eagorou/menon au)t\u00ea\\ \u00ea( e)ne/rgeia]--a. 6). Thus,\nif we define a threshold, we say--a piece of wood or stone lying in\nthis particular way; if we define ice, we say--water frozen or\nsolidified in this particular way, &c. The Form or Actuality of one\nMatter is different from that of another; so also is the rational\nexplanation or Definition; in some cases it is composition, in others\nmixture, &c., and so forth. If any one defines a house by saying that\nit is stone or brick, he indicates only the potential house, for these\nare the Matter (a. 15); if he defines it--a vessel protecting bodies\nor property, he then assigns the Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeian]); if\nhe includes both of the above in his definition, he then gives the\nthird Essence completed out of the two together ([Greek: t\u00ea\\n tri/t\u00ean\nkai\\ t\u00ea\\n e)k tou/t\u00f4n ou)si/an]--a. 18). To define from the\ndifferences, is to define from the side of the Actuality or Form; to\ndefine from the included elements ([Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n e)nuparcho/nt\u00f4n])\nis to define from the side of the Matter (a. 20).\n\nWe see herefrom what perceivable Essence is, and how it is: partly,\nof the nature of Matter; partly, of Form and Actuality or Energy:\nagain, the third or Concrete, out of both combined (p. 1043, a. 28).\nSometimes, it is not clear whether the name signifies this third\nConcrete, or the Form and Energy. Thus, when you say a house, do you\nmean a protective receptacle built of bricks? or do you mean simply a\nprotective receptacle--the Form simply, without specifying the\nMatter? When you say a line, do you mean a dyad in length--Form in\nMatter? or simply a dyad--Form alone? When you talk of an animal, do\nyou mean soul in body? or simply soul, which is the Essence and\nActuality of a certain body? The word animal may be applied to both,\nnot indeed univocally, as implying generic resemblance, but\n(quasi-univocally, or semi-univocally) by analogical relationship to\na common term ([Greek: ou)ch \u00f4(s e(ni\\ lo/g\u00f4| lego/menon, a)ll' \u00f4(s\npro\\s e(\\n]--a. 36). This distinction however, though important in\nsome respects, is unimportant so far as regards the investigation\nabout perceivable Essence; for the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] belongs to the\nForm and the Actuality (a. 38). Soul, and the being soul, are\nidentical; but man, and the being man, are not identical; unless the\nsoul be called man. Thus this identity exists in some cases, but not\nin others (b. 4). A syllable is not composed merely of letters and\nsynthesis, nor is a house simply of bricks and synthesis; for the\nsynthesis or the mixture does not proceed out of the elements which\nare put together or mixed (b. 8). The like is true in other cases;\n_e.g._, if the threshold is a threshold by position, the position\ndoes not proceed out of the threshold, but rather the threshold out\nof the position. Nor again is man simply animal and biped. If these\ntwo are the Matter, there must be something apart from and beyond\nthem, something not itself an element nor proceeding out of an\nelement--the Essence; which is indicated by abstracting from the\nMatter (b. 13). This, as being the Cause of Existence and of Essence\n([Greek: ai)/tion tou= ei)=nai kai\\ t\u00ea=s ou)si/as]--b. 14) is what is\nmeant when Essence is spoken of.\n\nThis Essence or Form must be eternal; or at least, if destructible,\nit has never been destroyed; if generable, it has never been\ngenerated. For we have shown already that no one either constructs or\ngenerates Form: the Hoc Aliquid is constructed; the product of Form\nand Matter is generated (p. 1043, b. 18). As yet it has not been made\nclear whether the Essences of destructible things are separable or\nnot: in some cases at least, they certainly are not--in those cases,\nnamely, where there can exist nothing beyond the particular things,\nas a house or an implement (b. 21). Perhaps, indeed, these are not\ntruly Essences--neither these particular things nor any other things\nwhich have come together not by natural process; for we might\nindicate Nature alone as the Essence in destructible things ([Greek:\nt\u00ea\\n ga\\r phu/sin mo/n\u00ean a)/n tis thei/\u00ea t\u00ea\\n e)n toi=s phthartoi=s\nou)si/an])--b. 23. Aristotle seems to say in what precedes, that\nthere is no [Greek: ge/nesis] or [Greek: phthora/] of [Greek:\nou)si/a]; see Z. p. 1033, b. 17. But how is this to be reconciled\nwith K. p. 1060, b. 18: [Greek: ou)si/as me\\n ga\\r pa/s\u00eas\nge/nesi/s e)stin, stigm\u00ea=s d' ou)k e)/stin]? See Schwegler's Comm.\nexplaining [Greek: gigno/menon] and [Greek: phtheiro/menon], Pt. II.\npp. 82, 83).\n\nHence we see that the difficulty started by Antisthenes and others\nequally unschooled ([Greek: a)pai/deutoi]) is not without pertinence.\nThey say that, as a definition is a sentence of many words,\npredicating something of something, so you cannot define _Quid est_:\nyou can only define and inform persons _Quale Quid est_: you can only\ntell people what the definiend is like, not what it is in itself: you\ncan tell them that silver is like tin, but you cannot tell what\nsilver is. Upon this theory, definition may be given of Compound\nEssence, whether perceivable or cogitable; but not of the _primordia_\nof which the compound consists. The definition must predicate a\nsomething, which is of the nature of Form, of another something,\nwhich is of the nature of Matter (p. 1043, b. 31).\n\nIf Essences are (as the Platonists say) in a certain sense Numbers,\nthey are so in _this_ sense; not (as these philosophers affirm) in\nthe character of assemblages of Monads. For the definition is a sort\nof number, divisible into indivisible units; and the number is so\nlikewise. If you add any thing to, or deduct any thing from, a number\n(let the thing added or deducted be never so small), it will be no\nlonger the same number; in like manner, neither the definition nor\nthe [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.], will be the same, if any thing be added or\nsubtracted (p. 1044, a. 1). Each number must have something which\nmakes its component units coalesce into one number, though the\nPlatonic philosophers cannot tell what that something is; either the\nunits are a mere (uncemented) heap, or else you must say what is that\nsomething which makes them _one_ out of many (a. 5). The definition\nalso is one; yet these philosophers cannot explain what makes it one.\nThe units of the number and that of the definition, is to be\nexplained in the same way, and that of the Essence also; not as a\nmonad or a point, but in each case like an Entelechy and a peculiar\nnature ([Greek: ou)ch, \u00f4(s le/gousi/ tines, oi(=on mona/s tis ou)=sa\n\u00ea)\\ stigm\u00ea/, a)ll' e)ntele/cheia kai\\ phu/sis tis e(ka/st\u00ea]--a. 9). A\ngiven number admits of no degrees, more or less: neither does a given\nEssence, unless it be taken embodied in Matter (a. 10).\n\nRespecting the Material Essence ([Greek: peri\\ de\\ t\u00ea=s u(lik\u00ea=s\nou)si/as]--p. 1044, a. 15), we must not forget that, if there be one\nand the same First Matter common as a principle to all Generata or\nFientia, there is nevertheless a certain Matter special or peculiar\n(proximate) to each ([Greek: o(/m\u00f4s e)/sti tis oi)kei/a\ne(ka/stou]--a. 18; [Greek: oi)kei/a kai\\ prosech\u00ea/s]--Alexander).\nThus the Materia Prima of phlegm is, sweet or fat things; that of bile\nis, bitter things and such like. Perhaps these two come both from the\nsame Matter; and there are several different Matters of the same\nproduct, in cases where one Matter proceeds from another. Thus phlegm\nproceeds from fat and sweet, if fat proceeds from sweet; and even\nfrom bile, if bile be analysed into its First Matter from whence\nphlegm may proceed by a different road (a. 23). One thing may proceed\nfrom another in two different ways: either D may proceed from C,\nbecause C is its immediate Matter, already preformed up to a certain\npoint, and thus on the way to a perfectly formed state; or D may\nproceed from C, after the destruction of C and the resolution of C\ninto its Materia Prima ([Greek: dich\u00f4=s ga\\r to/d' e)k tou=de, \u00ea)\\\no(/ti pro\\ o(dou= e)/stai \u00ea)\\ o(/ti a)naluthe/ntos ei)s t\u00ea\\n\na)rch\u00ea/n]--a. 24). From one and the same Matter different products\nmay proceed, if the moving cause be different: from the same wood\nthere may proceed a box or a bed. What product shall emerge does not,\nhowever, depend only upon the Moving Cause, but often upon the Matter\nalso; thus a saw cannot be made out of wool or wood. If the same\nproduct can proceed out of different Matter, this is evidently\nbecause the Art or Moving Cause is the same: if this last be\ndifferent, and the Matter different also, the product will of course\nbe different (p. 1044, a. 32).\n\nWhen a man asks us, What is the Cause? we ought to reply, since the\nword has many senses, by specifying all the causes which can have a\nbearing on the case (p. 1044, a. 34). Thus, What is the Cause of man,\nas Matter? Perhaps the katamenia. What, as Movent? Perhaps the seed.\nWhat, as Form? The [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] What, as [Greek: ou(= e(/neka]?\nThe End. These two last are perhaps both the same (a. 36). Moreover\nwe ought to make answer by specifying the proximate causes (not the\nremote and ultimate). Thus, What is the Matter of man? We must answer\nby specifying the proximate matter; not fire and earth, the ultimate\nand elemental (b. 2).\n\nThis is the only right way of proceeding in regard to Essences\nnatural and generable; since the Causes are many, and are what we\nseek to know. But the case is different in regard to Essences\nnatural, yet eternal. Some of these last perhaps have no Matter at\nall; or at least a different Matter, having no attribute except local\nmovability (b. 8. Alexander says in explanation: [Greek: le/gei de\\\nt\u00ea\\n xu/mpasan t\u00f4=n o)kt\u00f4\\ sphair\u00f4=n e(na/da--u(/l\u00ean ou) genn\u00eat\u00ea\\n\nkai\\ phthart\u00ea\\n a)lla\\ mo/non kata\\ to/pon kin\u00eat\u00ea/n]--p. 527, 20-25,\nBon.).\n\nAgain, in regard to circumstances which occur by Nature, but not in\nthe way of Essence, there is no Matter at all: the subject itself is\nthe Essence. Thus in regard to an eclipse: What is its Cause? What is\nits Matter? There is no Matter, except the moon which is affected in\na certain way. What is the Cause, as Movent--here light-destroying?\nThe earth. Perhaps there is no [Greek: ou(= e(/neka] in the case. But\nthe Cause in the way of Form is the rational explanation or\ndefinition; and this must include a specification of the Movent\nCause, otherwise it will be obscure. Thus, the eclipse is, privation\nof light; and, when you add--by the earth intervening, you then\nspecify the Movent, and make your definition satisfactory (b. 15).\n\nIn defining sleep we ought to say what part of the system is first\naffected thereby; but this is not clear. Shall we indicate only the\nanimal (as substratum)? But this is not enough. We shall be asked,\nWhat part of the animal? Which part first? The heart, or what other\npart? Next, by what Cause? Lastly, how is the heart affected, apart\nfrom the rest of the system? To say--Sleep is a certain sort of\nimmobility, will not be a sufficient definition. We must specify from\nwhat primary affection such immobility arises (p. 1044, b. 20).\n\nSince some things exist, and do not exist, without generation or\ndestruction (as Forms, and Points, if there be such things as\nPoints), it is impossible that all Contraries can be generated out of\neach other, if every generation be both _aliquid_ and _ex aliquo_.\n_Albus homo ex nigro homine_ must be generated in a different way\nfrom _album ex nigro_. Now Matter is only to be found in those cases\nwhere there is generation and change into each other; in other cases,\nwhere no change takes place, there is no Matter. There is a\ndifficulty in understanding how the Matter of each substance stands\nin regard to the contrary modifications of that substance (p. 1044,\nb. 29). If the body is potentially healthy, and if disease is the\ncontrary of health, are we to say that both these states are\npotential? Is water potentially both wine and vinegar? Or are we to\nsay rather that the body is the Matter of health, and that water is\nthe Matter of wine, in the way of acquisition by nature and by taking\non the Form to which it tends; and that the body is the Matter of\nsickness, and wine the Matter of vinegar in the way of privation and\nof destruction contrary to nature (b. 34)? However, there is here\nsome difficulty: Since vinegar is generated out of wine, why is not\nwine the Matter of vinegar, and potentially vinegar? Why is not the\nliving man potentially a corpse? Is it not rather the truth, however,\nthat these are accidental or contra-natural destructions ([Greek:\nkata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s ai( phthorai/]--b. 36, _i.e._, not in the regular\nappetency and aspirations, according to which the destruction of one\nForm gives place to a better); and that through such destruction the\nsame Matter which belonged to the living man becomes afterwards the\nMatter of the corpse; likewise the Matter of wine becomes, through\nthe like destruction, Matter of vinegar--by a generation like that of\nnight out of day? Changes of this sort must take place by complete\nresolution into the original Materia Prima ([Greek: ei)s t\u00ea\\n u(/l\u00ean\ndei= e)panelthei=n]--a. 3); thus, if a living animal comes out of a\ndead one, the latter is first resolved into its elements, and then\nout of them comes the living animal. So vinegar is first resolved\ninto water, then out of the water comes wine (a. 5).\n\nWe shall now revert to the difficulty recently noticed, about\nDefinitions and Numbers. What is the cause that each number and each\ndefinition is One? In all cases where there are several parts not put\ntogether as a mere heap, but where there is a Whole besides the\nparts, there must be some cause of this kind. With some bodies,\ncontact is such cause; with others, viscosity ([Greek:\nglischro/t\u00eas]--p. 1045, a. 12), or some other affection. But the\ndefinition is one complex phrase, not by conjunction like the Iliad,\nbut One by being the definition of one subject (a. 14). Now what is\nit which makes the subject man, One? Why is he One and not Many, say\nanimal and a biped--more especially if there exist, as the Platonists\nsay, a Self-animal and a Self-biped? Why are not these two [Greek:\nau)ta/] the man ([Greek: dia\\ ti/ ga\\r ou)k e)kei=na au)ta\\ o(\na)/nthr\u00f4po/s e)sti?]--a. 17), so that individuals are men by\nparticipation not of one Self-man, but of the two--Self-animal,\nSelf-biped? On this theory altogether, it would seem that a man\ncannot be One, but must be Many--animal and biped. It is plain that\nin this way of investigation the problem is insoluble.\n\nBut if, as _we_ say (p. 1045, a. 23), there be on one side Matter, on\nthe other side Form--on one side that which is in Potency, on the\nother side that which is in Act (a. 24)--the problem ceases to be\ndifficult. The difficulty is the same as it would be if the\ndefinition of _himation_ were, round brass: the word _himation_ would\nbe the sign of that definition, and the problem would be, What is the\nCause why round and brass are One? But the difficulty vanishes, when\nwe reply that one is Matter, the other Form. And, in cases where\ngeneration intervenes, what is the Cause why the potential Ens is\nactual Ens, except the Efficient ([Greek: para\\ to\\ poi\u00ea=san]--a.\n31)? There is no other Cause why the sphere in potency is a sphere in\nactuality: such was the [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] of each ([Greek: tou=t' \u00ea)=n\nto\\ t.\u00ea.e. e(kate/r\u00f4|]--a. 33). Of Matter there are two varieties,\nthe Cogitable and the Perceivable; and, in the Definition, a part is\nalways Matter, a part is Form or Energy; as when we define the\ncircle--a plane figure. (Aristotle argues:--On the Platonic theory\nthat Ideas or Forms are Entia, separate from particulars,\nself-existent, and independent of each other, no cause can be assigned\nfor the coalescence of any two or more of them into one; _e.g._ animal\nand biped, into man. But upon my theory, Form and Matter, Power and\nAct, are in their own nature relative to each other. It is their own\ninherent nature to coalesce into one, or for Power to pass into Act.\nThis is the cause of their unity: no other cause can be found or is\nnecessary. See Alexander, p. 531.)\n\nIn those cases where there is no Matter, either cogitable or\nperceivable, as in the Categories, Hoc Aliquid, Quale, Quantum, &c.,\neach of them is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum (p. 1045,\nb. 2). Hence neither Ens nor Unum is included in the Definitions, and\nthe [Greek: t.\u00ea.e.] is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum. No\nother cause can be assigned why each of these is Ens and Unum; each\nof them is so, at once and immediately; yet not as if they were all\nincluded in Ens or Unum as common genera; nor as if they were apart\nand separable from particulars (b. 7).\n\nPhilosophers, who do not adopt this opinion, resort to various\nphrases, all unsatisfactory, to explain the coalescence or unity of\nthe elements included in the Definition. Some call it [Greek:\nme/thexis], but they give no cause of the [Greek: me/thexis]; others\n[Greek: sunousi/a], or [Greek: su/ndesmos], or [Greek:\nsu/nthesis]--of soul with body, as definition of life. But we might\njust as well use these phrases on other occasions, and say that to\nbe well was a synthesis of the soul with health; that the brazen\ntriangle was a [Greek: su/ndesmos] of brass with triangle; that\nwhite was a synthesis of superficies with whiteness (p. 1045, b. 15).\nThese phrases carry no explanation; and these philosophers get into\nthe difficulty by taking a wrong point of departure. They first lay\ndown Power as different from Entelechy, and then look for an\nexplanation which makes them one ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti duna/me\u00f4s\nkai\\ e)ntelechei/as z\u00eatou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\\n kai\\ diaphora/n]--p.\n1045, b. 16, Schwegler observes that the two last words are loosely\nput, and that the clear words to express what Aristotle means would\nbe: [Greek: z\u00eatou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\\n u(potithe/ntes\ndiaphora/n]--Comm. II. p. 154.). But the truth is that Power and\nEntelechy are not essentially two, but only different aspects of one\nand the same. The Last Matter and the Form are the same; but the\nfirst is in potency, the second in perfect actuality (\"Stoff und\nForm, Potenzielles und Actuelles, sind eins und dasselbe auf\nverschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen\"--Schwegler II. p. 151). To enquire\nin any particular case what is the cause of this One, is the same as\nto enquire generally the cause of Unity. Each thing is a certain One;\nthe Potential and the Actual are One, in a certain way (b. 20). So\nthat no other Cause can be found except the Movent or Efficient--that\nwhich moved the matter out of Potency into Actuality. As to those\nthings which have no Matter, each of them is One immediately and _per\nse_ (b. 23).\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook [Greek: Th].\n\nIn discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one [Greek: kata\\\ndu/namin kai\\ e)ne/rgeian] (apart from Ens according to the\nCategories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms [Greek:\ndu/namis] and [Greek: e(ntele/cheia = e)ne/rgeia] (p. 1045, b. 35).\n\nIt is elsewhere mentioned ([Greek: D]. p. 1019) that [Greek:\ndu/namis] has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.)\nare equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here\n(p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of [Greek:\ndu/namis], from which many others diverge in different directions of\nrelationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is--a\nprinciple of change _in alio vel quatenus aliud_, or a principle of\nchange _ab alio vel quatenus aliud_ ([Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ metabol\u00ea=s e)n\na)/ll\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(=| a)/llo--a)rch\u00ea\\ metabol\u00ea=s u(p' a)/llou \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(=|\na)/llo]--a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat\ndifferent at p. 1048, a. 28: [Greek: tou=to le/gomen dunato\\n o(\\\npe/phuke kinei=n a)/llo \u00ea)\\ kinei=sthai u(p' a)/llou, \u00ea)\\ a(pl\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\\ntro/pon tina/.] This Aristotle calls [Greek: \u00ea( kata\\ ki/n\u00easin\ndu/namis]--expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: \"agendi patiendive\nnisum quendam.\"). The notion of [Greek: du/namis] however extends\nmore widely than this first sense of [Greek: du/namis kata\\\nki/n\u00easin]. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is\n[Greek: duna/mei] in the wood, and that the half foot is [Greek:\nduna/mei] in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes\nthis last sense as M\u00f6glichkeit, from the first sense as Verm\u00f6gen, p.\n379).\n\nWe begin by speaking about the first and proper sense--[Greek:\ndu/namis \u00ea( kata\\ ki/n\u00easin]. One variety thereof is, when a thing has\npower of being passively affected so and so--when there resides in\nthe thing a principle of passive change ([Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ metabol\u00ea=s\npath\u00eatik\u00ea=s]--p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself\n_quatenus_ something else. (These last words are added because a sick\nman has the [Greek: du/namis] of being cured either by a physician,\nor by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is\nto be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as\npatient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.)\nAnother variety of [Greek: du/namis kata\\ ki/n\u00easin] is, when a thing\nhas power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any\nexterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes\nthis [Greek: du/namis] is restricted to the cases in which a person\ncan do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power\nof speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty\nwell (a. 18).\n\nIn all these varieties, the general notion of [Greek: du/namis kata\\\nki/n\u00easin] is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive\n[Greek: du/namis] are, in one sense, one and the same; in another\nsense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the\npatient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by\nnature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer\nfrom itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence ([Greek:\na)dunami/a]) is the privation contrary to this [Greek:\n**du/namis]. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).\n\nAmong these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate\nsubstances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally,\nbut also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38).\nAccordingly some [Greek: duna/meis] are Rational, others Irrational.\nAll arts and constructive sciences are [Greek: duna/meis] (or [Greek:\na)rchai\\ metabl\u00eatikai\\ e)n a)/ll\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(=| a)/llo]--b. 3). In the\nrational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the\nirrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively;\nthus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will\nproduce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is\nbased upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same\nrational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation\nthereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a\ncertain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the\npositive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of\nboth the contraries at once: namely, _per se_, of one side of the\nAntiphasis; not _per se_, of the other side; since the rational\nexplanation also declares, directly and _per se_, only one side,\nwhile it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly,\nmediately, _per accidens_--_i.e._, by negation and exclusion ([Greek:\na)popha/sei kai\\ a)pophora=|].--b. 14). For the Contrary is the\nhighest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of\nthe alternative ([Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r ste/r\u00easis \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea to\\ e)nanti/on,\nau(/t\u00ea d' a)pophora\\ thate/rou]--p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that\n[Greek: to\\ e)nanti/on] is the subject of this proposition, and\n[Greek: \u00ea( ste/r\u00easis] the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot\nreside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a [Greek:\ndu/namis] through rational explanation or reason in the soul which\nhas within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring\nto pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same\nrational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).\n\nThe Megaric philosophers recognize no [Greek: du/namis] apart from\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; affirming that no one has any power, except at\nthe moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are\nwrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30--p. 1047, a.\n20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to\nhappen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it\ndoes happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act\nsupervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will\nensue (a. 25). The name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], appended to that of\n[Greek: e)ntele/cheia] ([Greek: \u00ea( pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)ntele/cheian\nsuntitheme/n\u00ea]--a. 30), has come to be applied to other things\nchiefly from reference to motions; for motion is _par excellence_\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved,\nthough other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them\n[Greek: diano\u00eata/] and [Greek: e)pithum\u00eata/], but never [Greek:\nkinou/mena]; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction,\nsaying that things which are not [Greek: e)nergei/a|] are [Greek:\ne)nergei/a|]. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia\n[Greek: duna/mei]: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not\n[Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (b. 2).\n\nIf the definition above given of [Greek: to\\ dunato/n] be admitted,\nwe see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it\nwill never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).\n\nAmong all the various [Greek: duna/meis], some are congenital, such\nas the perceptive powers ([Greek: ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4n]--p. 1047, b. 31);\nothers are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by\nlearning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess\nwithout having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b.\n34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may\npossess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that\nwhich was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational\n[Greek: duna/meis] or capacities: the rational capacities belonging\nonly to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every [Greek:\ndunato/n] has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a\ngiven something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special\ntime, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational\ncapacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active\nand the passive conditions come together, because there is but one\nreality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily,\nbecause they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of\nwhich cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be\nbrought to reality, will depend upon another authority--the appetency\nor deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each\npossible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to\npass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable\ncondition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will\n_necessarily_ ([Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea]--a. 14) be brought to pass. We need\nnot formally enunciate the clause--\"if nothing extrinsic occurs to\nprevent it\": for this is already implied in the definition of [Greek:\ndu/namis] which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but\nalways under certain given conditions (a. 18: [Greek: e)/sti d' ou)\npa/nt\u00f4s, a)ll' e)cho/nt\u00f4n p\u00f4=s]). Accordingly the agent will not be\nable to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even\nthough appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a.\n21).\n\nHaving thus gone through the variety of [Greek: du/namis] called\n[Greek: \u00ea( kata\\ ki/n\u00easin], we shall now give some explanations of\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; in the course of which we shall be able to\nillustrate by contrast, the other variety of [Greek: du/namis], which\nwas indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). [Greek: E)ne/rgeia] is used\nwhen the thing exists, not [Greek: duna/mei]: meaning by [Greek:\nduna/mei] such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole\nyard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of\nparticulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must\ngroup into one view the analogies following ([Greek: ou) dei= panto\\s\no(/ron z\u00eatei=n, a)lla\\ kai\\ to\\ a)na/logon sunora=n]--a. 37): As the\nperson now actually building is to the professional builder not so\nengaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal\nseeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them\nclosed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter ([Greek:\nto\\ a)pokekrime/non]--b. 3); as the work completed is to the material\nyet unworked;--so is [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] to [Greek: du/namis]. The\nantithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there\nis a relationship or analogy pervading all ([Greek: \u00f4(s tou=to e)n\ntou/t\u00f4| \u00ea)\\ pro\\s tou=to, to/d' e)n t\u00f4=|de \u00ea)\\ pro\\s to/de]--b. 8).\nIn some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of [Greek:\nki/n\u00easis pro\\s du/namin]; in others, it is the same as that of\n[Greek: ou)si/a pro/s tina u(/l\u00ean] (b. 9). In one member of each\npair, we have [Greek: \u00ea( e)ne/rgeia a)ph\u00f4risme/n\u00ea]; in the other\n[Greek: to\\ dunato/n] (b. 5--[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] here is _reality\nsevered and determinate_, as contrasted with [Greek: du/namis]\n_potentiality huddled together and indeterminate_.--See Schwegler's\nnote: \"Potenzialit\u00e4t und Aktualit\u00e4t sind reine\nVerh\u00e4ltnissbegriffe\"--p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named\nexamples, that which is now [Greek: duna/mei] may come actually to\nbe [Greek: e)nergei/a|]: the person now sleeping may awake; the\nperson whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes\nnow in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real\nstatue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist\n[Greek: duna/mei] only, and can never come to exist [Greek:\ne)nergei/a|], or independently. The Infinite can exist [Greek:\ne)nergei/a|] only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection\nthereof is never exhausted--that we may go on dividing as long as\nwe choose--gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality,\nthough it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).\n\nWe must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a\nthing is [Greek: duna/mei], and in what cases it is not proper. You\ncannot properly say that earth is potentially a man: you may perhaps\nsay that the semen is potentially a man; yet even _this_ not\ncertainly, since other conditions besides semen are required (p.\n1049, a. 2). The physician cannot cure every patient, yet neither is\nthe cure altogether a matter of chance ([Greek: a)po\\ tu/ch\u00eas]--a.\n4): there is a certain measure of cure possible, and that is called\n[Greek: to\\ u(giai=non duna/mei]. The definition thereof, taken from\nthe side of the agent, would be--that which will come to pass if he\nwills it, without any impediment from without; from the side of the\npatient--when no impediment occurs from within him (a. 8). In like\nmanner, a house exists [Greek: duna/mei], when all the matter for it\nis brought together, without need either of addition or subtraction\nor change, and when there is no internal impediment; and so with\nother products of art, where the principle of generation is extrinsic\nto themselves. In natural products, where the principle of generation\nis intrinsic, we treat them as potentially existing, when this\nprinciple is in a condition to realize itself through itself,\nassuming no external impediments to interfere. Thus we do not call\nthe semen potentially a man, because, before it becomes such, it must\nundergo change in something else, and therefore stands in need of\nsome other principle; we call it so only when it is in such\nconditions that its own principle suffices. Earth is not said to be a\nstatue [Greek: duna/mei], until it has first been changed into brass\n(a. 17). We call the product not by the name of the Matter itself,\nbut by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent\nMatter; thus we call a box, not wood, but wooden: wood is then a box\n[Greek: duna/mei]. But we say this only of the proximate or immediate\nMatter, not of the remote or primary Matter. We must go back through\nsuccessive stages to the first or most remote Matter; thus wood is\nnot earth, but earthy: earth therefore is potentially wood. The earth\nmay be aeriform; the air may be fiery; the fire has no analogous\nadjective whereby it can be called, and is thus the first or last\nMatter. But it is not said to be potentially any thing except the\n[Greek: su/ntheton] combined with Form immediately above it. Matter\nmay be either proximate or remote: Potentiality is affirmed only of\nthe proximate Matter.\n\nSince all the different meanings of Prius have been enumerated and\ndistinguished, it is plain that in all those meanings Actuality is\n_prius_ as compared with Potentiality: whether the [Greek: du/namis]\nbe [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ metabl\u00eatik\u00ea\\ ( = kin\u00eatik\u00ea\\) e)n a)/ll\u00f4| \u00ea(=|\na)/llo], like Art; or [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ kin\u00eatik\u00ea\\ \u00ea)\\ statik\u00ea\\ e)n\nau)t\u00f4=| \u00ea(=| au)to/], like Nature (p. 1049, b. 5-10). Actuality is\n_prius_ both [Greek: lo/g\u00f4|] and [Greek: ou)si/a|]: it is also\n_prius_ [Greek: chro/n\u00f4|] in a certain sense, though not in a certain\nother sense.\n\nIt is _prius_ [Greek: lo/g\u00f4|], because the Actual is included in the\ndefinition of the Potential; that is, it must be presupposed and\nforeknown, before you can understand what the Potential is (p. 1049,\nb. 17). You explain [Greek: oi)kodomiko/s] or [Greek: o(ratiko/s] by\nsaying that he is [Greek: duna/menos oi)kodomei=n \u00ea)\\ o(ra=n]: you\nexplain [Greek: o(rato/n] by saying that it is [Greek: dunato\\n\no(ra=sthai]: [Greek: to\\ dunato/n], in its first and absolute\nmeaning, is [Greek: dunato/n] because it may come into Actuality (b.\n13).\n\nIt is _prius_ [Greek: chron\u00f4=|] in the sense that the Potential\nalways presupposes an Actual identical _specie_, though not identical\n_numero_, with that Actual to which the Potential tends. Take a man\nnow existing and now seeing, or corn now ripe in the field: these\ndoubtless, before they came into their present condition, must have\npre-existed in Potentiality; that is, there must have pre-existed a\ncertain matter--seed or a something capable of vision--which at one\ntime was not yet in a state of Actuality (p. 1049, b. 23). But prior\nto this matter there must have existed other Actualities, by which\nthis matter was generated: the Actual is always generated out of its\nPotential by a prior Actual, _e.g._, a man by a man, a musical man by\na musical man; there being always some prior movent, which must be\nitself already in Actuality (b. 27). We have already declared that\nevery thing generated is something generated out of something, and by\nsomething which is identical in species with the thing generated (b.\n29). Hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built\nnothing, no harper who has never harped; for the man who is learning\nto harp learns by harping (b. 32); which gave occasion to the\nsophistical puzzle--That one, who does not possess the knowledge,\nwill nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates. The learner\ndoes not possess the knowledge; yet still he must have possessed some\nfragments of the knowledge: just as, in every thing which is in\ncourse of generation, some fraction must have been already generated;\nin every thing which is moved, some fraction has been already moved\n(b. 36).\n\nLastly, Actuality is _prius_ as compared with Potentiality (not\nmerely [Greek: lo/g\u00f4|, kai\\ chro/n\u00f4| e)/stin \u00f4(/s], but also) [Greek:\nou)si/a|] (p. 1050, a. 4). In the first place, that which is latest\nin generation is first in Form and in Essence; a man compared with a\nchild, man as compared with semen. Man already possesses the Form,\nsemen does not. Next, every thing generated marches or gradually\nprogresses towards its principle and towards its end. The principle\nis the [Greek: ou(= e(/neka], and the generation is for the sake of\nthe end. Now the end or consummation is Actuality, and for the sake\nof this the Potentiality is taken on ([Greek: lamba/netai]--a. 10).\nAnimals do not see in order that they may have sight; they have sight\nin order that they may see: they do not theorize in order that they\nmay possess theoretical aptitude, but the converse; except indeed\nthose who are practising as learners. Moreover, Matter is said to\nexist potentially, because it may come into Form; but, when it exists\nactually, it is then in Form (a. 16). (Alexander says: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste\nka)\\n tou/t\u00f4| prote/ra (\u00ea( e)ne/rgeia) \u00f4(s _e)pheto\\n_ kai\\ ta/sson\nkai\\ ei)s ko/smon a)/gon duna/me\u00f4s]--p. 559, 10, Bon.) The case is\nthe same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion\n(_e.g._, dancing): the dancing-master has attained his end when he\nexhibits his pupil actually dancing. In natural productions this is\nno less true than in artificial: Nature has attained her end, when\nthe product comes into [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; that is, when it is\nactually at work, from whence the name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is derived\n([Greek: to\\ ga\\r e)/rgon te/los, \u00ea( de\\ e)ne/rgeia to\\ e)/rgon--kai\\\nsuntei/nei pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)ntele/cheian]--a. 23).\n\nIn some cases (as we have often remarked) the ultimatum is use,\nwithout any ulterior product distinct from the use, _e.g._, the act\nof seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power (p. 1050, a. 24); in\nother cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from\nthe building power. In the former of these cases, Actuality is the\nend of [Greek: du/namis]; in the latter it is more the end than\n[Greek: du/namis]. ([Greek: O(/m\u00f4s ou)the\\n \u00ea(=tton e)/ntha me\\n\nte/los e)/ntha de\\ ma=llon te/los t\u00ea=s duna/me\u00f4/s e)stin; \u00ea( ga\\r\noi)kodo/m\u00easis e)n t\u00f4=| oi)kodomoume/n\u00f4|, kai\\ a(/ma gi/gnetai kai\\\ne)/sti t\u00ea=| oi)ki/a|]--a. 29. This passage is obscure: see the\ncomments of Alexander, with the notes of Schwegler and Bonitz, who\naccuse Alexander of misunderstanding it; though it appears to me that\nneither of them is quite clear. I understand Aristotle to reason as\nfollows:--[Greek: O(/rasis] is the [Greek: te/los], the [Greek:\ne)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the visual power called [Greek:\no)/psis]; but [Greek: oi)kodo/m\u00easis], is not the [Greek: te/los], the\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the building power called\n[Greek: oi)kodomik\u00ea/]. This last has its [Greek: te/los], [Greek:\ne)ne/rgeia], consummation, in the ulterior product [Greek: oi)ki/a].\nNevertheless [Greek: oi)kodo/m\u00easis], residing as it does [Greek: e)n\nt\u00f4=| oi)kodomoume/n\u00f4|], and coming into existence simultaneously with\nthe house, is more the end, more akin to the end or consummation than\nthe building power called [Greek: oi)kodomik\u00ea/].)\n\nIn cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the\nexercise of the power, the Actuality (consummation) resides in that\nproduct (p. 1050, a. 31). In cases where is no such ulterior product,\nthe Actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides.\nThus sight resides in him who sees, and life in the soul. Hence also\nhappiness resides in the soul; for happiness is a certain kind of\nlife (b. 1).\n\nIt is thus plain that Actuality is the Essence and the Form, and that\nit is _prius_ [Greek: t\u00ea=| ou)si/a|] compared with Potentiality. And,\nas has been already remarked, one Actuality always precedes another,\nin time, up to the eternal Prime Movent (p. 1050, b. 5). Moreover,\n[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek: du/namis] in respect to\nspeciality and dignity ([Greek: kuri\u00f4te/r\u00f4s]--b. 6). For eternal\nthings are _priora_ in essence to destructible things, and nothing is\neternal [Greek: duna/mei], as the reason of the case will show us (b.\n8).\n\nAll Potentiality applies at once to both sides of the Antiphasis--to\nthe affirmative as well as to the negative. That which is not\npossible, will never occur to any thing; but every thing which is\npossible may never come to Actuality ([Greek: to\\ dunato\\n de\\ pa=n\ne)nde/chetai m\u00ea\\ e)nergei=n]--p. 1050, b. 10). That which is possible\nto be, is also possible not to be. Now that which is possible not to\nbe, may perhaps not be ([Greek: e)nde/chetai m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai]--b. 13);\nbut that which may not be, is destructible, either absolutely (that\nis, in respect to Essence), or in respect to such portions of its\nnature as may not be, that is, in respect to locality or quantity or\nquality. Accordingly, of those things which are absolutely, or in\nrespect to Essence, indestructible, nothing exists [Greek: duna/mei]\nabsolutely or in respect to Essence, though it may exist [Greek:\nduna/mei] in certain respects, as in respect to quality or locality);\nall of them exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (b. 18). Nor does any thing\nexist [Greek: duna/mei], which exists by necessity; yet the things\nwhich exist by necessity are first of all (_i.e._, _priora_ in regard\nto every thing else); for, if they did not exist, nothing would have\nexisted. Moreover, if there be any Eternal Motion, or any Eternal\nMotum, it cannot be Motum [Greek: duna/mei] except in respect to\nwhence and whither; in that special respect, it may have Matter or\nPotentiality (b. 21).\n\nAccordingly, the Sun, the Stars, and the whole Heaven, are always at\nwork, and there is no danger of their ever standing still, which some\nphysical philosophers fear ([Greek: a)ei\\ e)nergei= o( \u00ea(/lios]--p.\n1050, b. 22); nor are they fatigued in doing this. Motion with them\nis not a potentiality of both members of the Antiphasis, either to be\nmoved or not to be moved. If the fact were so--if their Essence were\nMatter and Power, and not Act--the perpetual continuity of (one side\nof the alternative) motion would be toilsome to them; but it is not\ntoilsome, since Actuality is their very Essence (b. 28). Likewise\nmutable things (which are destructible), such as earth and fire,\nimitate these indestructible entities, being ever at work; for these\nelements possess motion by themselves and in themselves, each\nchanging into another (b. 30; compare De Gen. et Corr. p. 337, a. 2).\nBut the other [Greek: duna/meis] are all potentialities of both sides\nof the Antiphasis, or of both alternatives. The rational [Greek:\nduna/meis] can cause motion in such and such way, or not in such and\nsuch way; the irrational [Greek: duna/meis] may be present or absent,\nand thus embrace both sides of the alternative (b. 33).\n\nHence we draw another argument for not admitting the Platonic\ndoctrine of Ideas, affirmed by the dialecticians ([Greek: oi( e)n\ntoi=s lo/gois]--p. 1050, b. 35). If there existed such Ideas, they\nwould be only [Greek: duna/neis**duna/meis] in respect to the [Greek:\ne)ne/rgeia] existing in their particular embodiments. Thus an\nindividual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than [Greek:\nau)toepist\u00ea/m\u00ea]; a particular substance in motion would be much more\nin motion than [Greek: ki/n\u00easis] or [Greek: au)toki/n\u00easis] itself.\nFor [Greek: au)toepist\u00ea/m\u00ea] or [Greek: au)toki/n\u00easis] are only\n[Greek: duna/meis] to the [Greek: e)pist\u00ea=mo/n ti] or the [Greek:\nkinou/meno/n ti], which belong to [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] (b. 36). (We\nmay remark that in the Platonic Parmenides, p. 134, C., an argument\nthe very opposite to this is urged. It is there contended that\nCognitio _per se_ (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate\nthan any cognition which _we_ possess.)\n\nIt is thus plain that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek:\ndu/namis], and to every principle of change (p. 1051, a. 2). It is\nalso better and more honourable than [Greek: du/namis] even in the\ndirection of good. We have already observed that [Greek: du/namis]\nalways includes both of two contraries, in the way of alternative:\none of these must be the good, the other the bad. Now the actuality\nof good is better than the potentiality of good; the actuality of\nhealth is better than the potentiality of health, which latter must\nalso include the potentiality of sickness, while the actuality of\nhealth excludes the actuality of sickness. On the other hand, the\nactuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil; for the\npotentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once\n(a. 17). Hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular\nthings; since it is posterior in its nature even to Potentiality:\nthere is therefore neither evil, nor error, nor destruction, in any\nof the principia or eternal Essences (a. 19). (The note of Bonitz\nhere is just:--\"Quem in hac argumentatione significavi\nerrorem--judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus,\na quibus illud est alienum--ei non dissimilem Arist. in proxim\u00e2\nargumentatione, si recte ejus sententiam intelligo, videtur\nadmisisse, quum quidem malum non esse [Greek: para\\ ta\\ pra/gmata],\nseorsim ac per se existens, demonstrare conatur.\" Aristotle here as\nelsewhere confounds the idea of Good, Perfection, Completeness, &c.,\nwith that of essential Priority. But what he says here--[Greek: ou)k\ne)/sti to\\ kako\\n para\\ ta\\ pra/gmata]--can hardly be reconciled with\nwhat he says in the Physica (pp. 189, 191, 192) about [Greek:\nste/r\u00easis], which he includes among the three [Greek: a)rchai/], and\nwhich he declares to be [Greek: kakopoio/s]--p. 192, a. 15.)\n\nLastly, we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams,\nand thus translating the Potentialities into Actuality. If these\ndiagrams were ready drawn for us by nature, there would be no\ndifficulty in seeing these truths; but, as the case stands, the\ntruths only inhere in the figures potentially (p. 1051, a. 23:\n[Greek: ei) d' \u00ea)=n di\u00ea|r\u00eane/na, phanera\\ a)\\n \u00ea)=n; nu=n d'\ne)nupa/rchei duna/mei]). If the triangle had a line ready drawn\nparallel to its side, we should have seen at once that its three\nangles were equal to two right angles. Potential truths are thus\ndiscovered by being translated into Actuality. The reason of this is,\nthat the Actuality is itself an act of cogitation, so that the\nPotentiality springs from Actuality ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti\nno/\u00easis \u00ea( e)ne/rgeia; \u00f4(/st' e)x e)nergei/as \u00ea( du/namis]--a. 30. It\nis not therefore true--what the Platonists say--that the mathematical\nbodies and their properties are [Greek: ou)si/ai kai\\ e)nergei=ai]:\nthey are only [Greek: duna/meis], and they are brought into being by\nour cogitation or abstraction). It is true that each individual\ndiagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it (a. 32).\n\nHaving gone through the discussion of Ens according to the first of\nthe ten Categories, and of Ens Potential and Actual, we have now to\nsay something about Ens as True or False in the strictest sense of\nthe words ([Greek: to\\ de\\ kuri\u00f4/tata o)\\n a)l\u00eathe\\s \u00ea)\\\npseu=dos]--p. 1051, b. 1). These words mean, in reference to things,\neither that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined. To speak\ntruth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in\nfact, are disjoined or conjoined; to speak falsely, the reverse. The\nappeal is to the fact: it is not because we truly call you white,\nthat you are white; it is because you really are white, that we who\ncall you white speak truth (b. 9). If there are some things which\nare always conjoined, others always disjoined, others again\nsometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined, propositions in reference\nto the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction, will\nbe always true or always false, while in reference to the third\nclass propositions may be either true or false, according to the\ncase (b. 10).\n\nBut what shall we say in regard to things Uncompounded? In respect to\nthem, what is truth or falsehood--to be or not to be? ([Greek: ta\\\na)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b. 18). If we affirm white of the wood, or\nincommensurability of the diagonal, such conjunction of predicate and\nsubject may be true or false; but how, if there be no predicate\ndistinct from the subject? Where there is no distinction between\npredicate and subject, where the subject stands alone,--in these\ncases, there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above:\nno other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject,\nor fails to do so. You either know the subject, or you do not know\nit: there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance; to be\ndeceived is impossible about the question _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\\\nme\\n thigei=n kai\\ pha/nai a)l\u00eathe/s, ou) ga\\r tau)to\\ kata/phasis\nkai\\ pha/sis, to\\ d' a)gnoei=n m\u00ea\\ thigga/nein; a)pat\u00eath\u00ea=nai ga\\r\nperi\\ to\\ ti/ e)stin ou)k e)/stin a)ll' \u00ea)\\ kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]--b.\n25. The last words are thus explained by Bonitz: \"nisi forte per\nabusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem\"--p. 411.).\nAll these uncompounded subjects exist actually, not potentially: if\nthe latter had been true, they would have been generated and\ndestroyed; but Ens Ipsum ([Greek: to\\ o)\\n au)to/]--b. 29) is neither\ngenerated nor destroyed; for, if it had been, it must have been\ngenerated out of something. Respecting all those things which exist\nin Essence and Actuality, you cannot be deceived: you may apprehend\nthem in cogitation, or fail to apprehend them. The essential question\nrespecting them is, whether they exist in such or such manner or not;\nas it is respecting the One and the Uncompounded--whether, being an\nexistent, it exists thus and thus or not (b. 35). Truth consists in\napprehending or cogitating them (p. 1052, a. 1): the contrary thereof\nis non-apprehension of them or ignorance ([Greek: a)/gnoia]), yet not\nanalogous to blindness; for that would be equivalent to having no\napprehensive intelligence ([Greek: \u00f4(s a)\\n ei) to\\ no\u00eatiko\\n o(/l\u00f4s\nm\u00ea\\ e)/choi tis]--a. 3; one is not absolutely without [Greek:\nno\u00eatiko/n], but one's [Greek: no/\u00easis] does not suffice for\napprehending these particular objects).\n\nRespecting objects immoveable and unchangeable, and apprehended as\nsuch, it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the When\n([Greek: kata\\ to/ pote/]--p. 1052, a. 5; _i.e._, a proposition which\nis true of them at one time cannot be false at another time). No man\nwill suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right\nangles at one time, but not at another. Even in these unchangeables,\nindeed, a man may mistake as to the What: he may suppose that there\nis no even number which is a prime number, or he may suppose that\nthere are some even numbers which are prime, others which are not so;\nbut, respecting any particular number, he will never suppose it to be\nsometimes prime, sometimes not prime (a. 10).\n\n(In respect to the meaning of [Greek: ta\\ a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b.\n17--Bonitz and Schwegler differ. Bonitz says, Comm. p. 409:\n\"Composit\u00e6 quas dicit non sunt intelligend\u00e6 e\u00e6 qu\u00e6 ex pluribus\nelementis coaluerunt, sed e\u00e6 potius, in quibus cum substantia\nconjungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens,\ndiagonalis irrationalis, et similia.\" Schwegler says, p. 187: \"Unter\nden [Greek: m\u00ea\\ sunthetai\\ ou)si/ai] versteht Arist. n\u00e4her diejenigen\nSubstanzen, die nicht ein [Greek: su/ntheton] oder [Greek: su/nolon]\nsondern [Greek: a)/neu u(/l\u00eas (ou) duna/mei)] und schlechthin [Greek:\ne)nergei/a|], also reine Formen sind, und als solche kein Werden und\nVergehen haben.\" Of these two different explanations, I think that\nthe explanation given by Bonitz is the more correct, or at least the\nmore probable.)\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook [Greek: L].\n\nWe have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in\nsearch of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18).\nIf we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part\nthereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units ([Greek:\nei) t\u00f4=| e)phex\u00ea=s], a. 20), even in that view [Greek: ou)si/a]\nstands first, [Greek: poio/n] next, [Greek: poso/n] third; indeed\nthese last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21)--I mean,\nfor example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as\nnot-white and not-straight; though we do talk of these last too as\nEntia, when we say _Est non-album_. Moreover Essence alone, and none\nof the other Categories, is separable. The old philosophers ([Greek:\noi( a)rchai=oi]) are in the main concurrent with us on this point,\nthat Essence is _prius_ to all others; for they investigated the\nprinciples, the elements, and the causes of Essence. The philosophers\nof the present day (Plato, &c.) declare Universals, rather than\nParticulars, to be Essences; for the genera are universal, which\nthese philosophers, from devoting themselves to dialectical\ndiscussions, affirm to be more properly considered as Principles and\nEssences (a. 28); but the old philosophers considered particular\nthings to be Essences, as fire and earth, for example, not the common\nbody or Body in general ([Greek: ou) to\\ koino\\n s\u00f4=ma]--a. 30).\n\nNow there are three Essences. The Perceivable includes two varieties:\none, the Perishable, acknowledged by all, _e.g._, animals and plants;\nthe other Eternal, of which we must determine the elements, be they\nmany or one. There is also the Immoveable, which some consider to be\nseparable ([Greek: a)/ll\u00ea de\\ a)ki/n\u00eatos kai\\ tau/t\u00ean tine\\s ei)=nai\nphasi ch\u00f4rist\u00ea/n]--p. 1069, a. 33; [Greek: ou)si/a no\u00eat\u00ea\\ kai\\\na)ki/n\u00eatos]--Schwegler's note): either recognizing two varieties\nthereof, distinct from each other--the Forms and Mathematical Entia;\nor not recognizing Forms as separable Entia, but only the\nMathematical Entia (a. 36). Now the first, or Perceivable Essences,\nbelong to physical science, since they are moveable or endued with\nmotion; the Immoveable Essences, whether there be two varieties of\nthem or only one, belong to a science distinct from physical. The\nPerceivable and the Immoveable Essences have no common principles\n(b. 2).\n\nThe Perceivable Essence is subject to change ([Greek: metabl\u00eat\u00ea/]).\nSince change takes place either out of Opposites or out of\nIntermediates, and not out of every variety of Opposites, but only\nout of Contraries ([Greek: e)k t\u00ea=s oi)kei/as a)popha/se\u00f4s, e)k t\u00ea=s\noi)kei/as ster\u00ea/se\u00f4s]--Alexander, pp. 644, 645, Bon.; the voice,\n_e.g._, is not white, yet change does not take place from voice to\nwhite, these being disparates, or of different genera: [Greek: ta\\\nge/nei diaphe/ronta ou)k e)/chei o(do\\n ei)s a)/ll\u00eala]--I. iv. p.\n1055, a. 6), there must of necessity be a certain Substratum which\nchanges into the contrary condition; for contraries do not change\ninto each other. The substratum remains, but the contraries do not\nremain: there is therefore a third something besides the contraries;\nand that is Matter (p. 1069, b. 9). Since then the varieties of\nchange are four: (1) [Greek: ge/nesis] and [Greek: phthora/ (kata\\\nto\\ ti/)], (2) [Greek: au)/x\u00easis kai\\ phthi/sis (kata\\ to\\ poso/n)],\n(3) [Greek: a)lloi/\u00f4sis (kata\\ to\\ pa/thos] or [Greek: kata\\ to\\\npoio/n]), (4) [Greek: phora/ (kata\\ to/pon] or [Greek: kata\\ to\\\npou=]), each of these changes will take place into its respective\ncontrary: the Matter will necessarily change, having the potentiality\nof both contraries (b. 14). Ens being two-fold, all change takes\nplace out of Ens Potenti\u00e2 into Ens Actu, _e.g._, out of potential\nwhite into actual white; and the like holds for Increase and\nDecrease. Thus not only may there be generation from Non-Ens\naccidentally but all generation takes place also out of Ens; that is,\nout of Ens Potenti\u00e2, not Ens Actu (b. 20). This Ens Potenti\u00e2 is what\nAnaxagoras really means by his Unum, which is a better phrase than\n[Greek: o(mou= pa/nta]; what Empedokles and Anaxagoras mean by their\n[Greek: mi=gma]; what Demokritus means when he says [Greek: o(mou=\npa/nta]. They mean that all things existed at once potentially,\nthough not actually; and we see that these philosophers got partial\nhold of the idea of Matter ([Greek: \u00f4(/ste t\u00ea=s u(/l\u00eas a)\\n ei)=en\n\u00ea(mme/noi]--b. 24). All things subject to change possess Matter, but\neach of them a different Matter; even the eternal things which are\nnot generated but moved in place, possess Matter--not generated, but\n_from whence whither_ (_i.e._, the Matter of local movement pure and\nsimple--direction: [Greek: kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)i+di/\u00f4n o(/sa m\u00ea\\ genn\u00eata\\\nkin\u00eata\\ de\\ phora=|, a)ll' ou) genn\u00eat\u00ea/n (u(/l\u00ean), a)lla\\ po/then\npoi=]--b. 26).\n\nSince there are three varieties of Non-Ens (p. 1069, b. 27; Alexander\nand Bonitz explain this [Greek: trich\u00f4=s] differently), it may seem\ndifficult to determine, out of which among the three Generation takes\nplace. But the answer is, that the Potential Ens is not potential of\nevery thing alike and at haphazard, but potential in each case from\nsomething towards something ([Greek: ei) d\u00ea\\ ti/ e)sti duna/mei,\na)ll' o(/m\u00f4s ou) tou= tucho/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron e)x e(te/rou]--b.\n29). Nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together\n([Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chr\u00ea/mata]--b. 30); for they differ in respect\nto Matter or Potentiality. If this were not so, how is it that they\nare of infinite diversity, and not all One? The No\u00fbs (_i.e._,\naccording to the theory of Anaxagoras) is One; so that, if the Matter\nwere One also, it would become in actuality that which it was at\nfirst in potentiality, and the result would be all One and the Same\n(b. 32).\n\nThe Causes are thus three and the Principles are three: the pair of\nContraries, one of them Form ([Greek: lo/gos kai\\ ei)=dos]), the\nother Privation, and the third Matter (p. 1069, b. 35). But we must\nkeep in mind that neither Materia Prima nor Forma Prima is generated.\nFor in all Change, there is something (the Matter) which undergoes\nchange; something by which the change is effected (the Prime Movent,\n[Greek: u(ph' ou(= me/n, tou= pr\u00f4/tou kinou=ntos]--p. 1070, a. 1);\nand something into which the change takes place (the Form). The brass\nbecomes round; but, if both the brass becomes and the round becomes,\nyou will be condemned to an infinite regression: you must stop\nsomewhere ([Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea d\u00ea\\ st\u00ea=nai]--a. 4). Moreover, every\nEssentia is generated out of another Essentia of the same name and\nform ([Greek: e)k sun\u00f4nu/mou]--a. 5). All generated things proceed\neither from Nature, Art, Fortune, or Spontaneity. It is Nature, where\nthe principle or beginning is in the subject itself; it is Art, where\nthe principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject;\nFortune is the privation of Art; Spontaneity is the privation of\nNature ([Greek: ai( de\\ loipai\\ ai)/tiai ster\u00ea/seis tou/t\u00f4n]--a. 9).\nEssenti\u00e6 are threefold: (1) Matter, which appears to be Hoc Aliquid\nbut is not so, for detached members or fragments, simply touching\neach other without coalescing, are matter and substratum (_i.e._,\nprepared for something ulterior); (2) Nature, which is really Hoc\nAliquid--a certain definite condition, into which generation takes\nplace ([Greek: \u00ea( de\\ phu/sis kai\\ to/de ti, ei)s \u00ea(/n, kai\\ e(/xis\ntis]--a. 12); (3) The Concrete of the two preceding--the individual\nobject called Sokrates or Kallias. In some cases there is no Hoc\nAliquid except in this Concrete or Compound; thus in artificial\nobjects or productions, such as a house or health, there is no Form\nexcept the Art itself: the ideal house, pre-existing in the mind of\nthe builder, is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the\nreal house. It is in the case of natural objects, if in any case,\nthat there exists a Hoc Aliquid independent of the concrete\nindividual (a. 17).\n\nHence Plato was not wrong in saying that Forms were coextensive with\nnatural objects ([Greek: o(po/sa phu/sei]--p. 1070, a. 18), if there\nare Forms distinct from these objects: such as fire, flesh, head,\nwhich are all properly Matter. The Last Matter (or that which has\ncome most under the influence of Form) belongs to that which is in\nthe fullest sense Essentia (or the individual concrete named Sokrates\nor Kallias--a. 20). The Moving Causes pre-exist, as real individual\nbeings or objects: the Formal Causes come into existence\nsimultaneously with the individual real compound. When the patient\nbecomes well, then health comes at the same time into existence: when\nthe brazen sphere comes, the sphericity of it comes at the same time\n(a. 24). Whether any thing of the Form continues after the\ndissolution of the individual compound, is a problem to be\ninvestigated (a. 25). In some cases nothing hinders but what it may\ncontinue; for example, the soul may be of such a nature: I do not\nmean every soul--for every soul perhaps cannot continue--but the\n[Greek: Nou=s] or rational soul (a. 27). Still it is plain that this\naffords no support to the theory of self-existent separate Ideas; for\nevery individual man is begotten by another individual man. In like\nmanner also with respect to the arts; for the medical art affords the\nForm or rational explanation of health (a. 30; _i.e._, health is\ngenerated, not by the Idea of Health, but by the medical art, or by\nthe artist in whom that art is embodied).\n\nCauses and principles, in one point of view, are different: different\nsubjects; but in another point of view, they are the same for all;\nthat is, if we speak generally and according to analogy (if we\nconfine ourselves to the most general terms, Form, Privation, Matter,\n&c.). In respect to Essentia, Relatio, and the remainder of the\nCategories, a difficulty arises to say whether the causes, elements,\nand principles of all the Categories are the same. It would be\nstrange if they were all the same; because then Essenti\u00e6, as well as\nRelata, would proceed out of the same causes and elements. For, what\ncan these latter be? They cannot be extra-categorical; since there\nexists no general class apart from or besides Essentia and the other\nCategories (p. 1070, b. 1). Nor can any one Category be the element\nof the others: for the element is _prius_ to that of which it is the\nelement. Nor again can Essentia be the element of Relata; nor is any\none of the nine Categories the element of Essentia. Again, how is it\npossible that the elements of all the Categories can be the same? No\nelement can be the same as that compound of which it is an element:\nneither B nor A can be the same as B A. If, therefore, there were\nsuch elements, they must be extra-categorical; which is impossible.\nNor can the element in question (the supposed one and the same) be\nany cogitable, such as Ens or Unum; for every individual Concrete is\nboth Ens and Unum and the element cannot be identical with the\ncompound put together out of it. Neither Essentia nor Relatio could\nbe said to exist, if Ens were the element out of which they are\ncomposed; but these Categories exist necessarily: therefore there is\nno one and the same element common to all the Categories (b. 9).\n\nYet we ought perhaps rather to repeat, what was observed before, that\nin one sense, the elements of all are the same; in another sense,\ndifferent. Take for example the perceivable bodies. We find here hot\nas the Form, cold as the Privation; as Matter, there is that which\nis, primarily and _per se_, both hot and cold potentially: the hot\nand the cold are both Essenti\u00e6; likewise other things of which these\nare the principles, _e.g._, flesh and bone, which of necessity are\ndifferent from the principles out of which they proceed (b. 15).\nFlesh and bone have these elements and principles; other things have\nother elements and principles. The same specific principles cannot be\nassigned to all, but only principles analogous to these in each case,\nas saying, in general terms, that there are three principles--Form,\nPrivation, Matter. Each of these is different in every different\ngenus; thus in colour, the principles are white, black, surface,\nlight, darkness, air, and out of these are generated day and night\n(b. 21).\n\nThe three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent ([Greek:\ne)nupa/rchonta]). But there are other causes also extrinsic, such as\nthe Movent. So that Principle and Element are not exactly identical;\nfor Principle as well as Cause includes all the four: [Greek: to\\\nkinou=n \u00ea)\\ i(sta/n] is a Principle, and is itself an Essentia (p.\n1070, b. 25). Thus the analogous Elements are three, while the\nPrinciples or Causes are four; but the four are specifically\ndifferent in each different case. Thus, health is Form; sickness is\nPrivation; body is Matter; the medical art is Movent. House is Form;\ndisorder of a certain sort is Privation; bricks are Matter; the\nbuilding art is Movent. We thus make out four Causes; yet, in a\ncertain sense, there will be only three (b. 32). For, in natural\nproducts, a man is the Movent Cause of a man; in artificial products\n([Greek: e)n toi=s a)po\\ dianoi/as]) the Movent is Form or Privation.\nIn a certain sense, the medical art is health, and the building art\nis the Form of a house, and a man begets a man. And farther, over and\nabove these special movent causes, there is the Primum Movens of all\n(b. 35).\n\nWe distinguish what is separable from what is not separable. Now\nEssenti\u00e6, and they only, are separable; accordingly they are the\ncauses of every thing else, since without Essenti\u00e6 there cannot be\neither affections or movements (p. 1071, a. 2). Such causes would be\nsoul and body, or reason, appetite, and body. Again, in another\nsense, the principles of all things are generically the same, though\nspecifically different; such are Potentia and Actus. In some cases,\nthe same thing exists now potentially, at another time actually; thus\nwine, though actually wine, is potentially vinegar; flesh is actually\nflesh, potentially a man, Potentia and Actus will merge in the\nabove-mentioned causes--Form, Privation, Matter, Movent (a. 7). For\nthe Form (if it be separable), the Concrete (of Form and Matter), and\nPrivation (like darkness or sickness)--all these exist actually;\nwhile Matter exists potentially, capable either of Form or Privation.\nThings differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference\nin the Matter, sometime through difference in the Form. Thus, the\ncause of a man is, in the way of Matter, the elements fire and earth;\nin the way of Form his own Form, and the same Form in another\nindividual--his father and besides these, the Sun with its oblique\nmotion; which last neither Matter, nor Form, nor Privation, nor the\nlike Form in another individual, but a Movent Cause ([Greek: a)lla\\\nkinou=nta]--a. 17).\n\nWe must remember, besides, that some things may be described in\ngeneral terms, others cannot be so described. The first principles of\nall things are, speaking in general terms, Hoc Primum Actu and Aliud\nPrimum Potenti\u00e2. These universals do not really exist (p. 1071, a.\n19), for the principium of all individuals is some other individual.\nMan indeed is the principium of the Universal Man but no Universal\nMan exists (a. 21). Peleus is the principium of Achilles; your\nfather, of you; this B, of that B A; B, the universal, of B A the\nuniversal. Next (after the Movent) come the Forms of Essences; but\nthe different genera thereof (as has been already stated), colours,\nsounds, essences, quantities, &c., have different causes and\nelements, though the same when described in general terms and by\nanalogy; also different individuals in the same species have\ndifferent causes and elements, not indeed different in species, but\ndifferent individually; that is, your Matter, your Movent, your Form,\nare different from mine, though in general terms and definition they\nare the same ([Greek: t\u00f4=| katho/lou de\\ lo/g\u00f4| tau)ta/]--a. 29).\n\nWhen therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of\nEssences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same\nor different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for\ndifference of meaning--[Greek: pollach\u00f4=s], p. 1071, a. 31), they are\nthe same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to\nparticulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following\nsense ([Greek: \u00f4(di/]--a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way\nof Analogy ([Greek: t\u00f4=| a)na/logon]). They are always Matter, Form,\nPrivation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all\nother things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears\nalong with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens\nActuale, common to all ([Greek: e)/ti to\\ pr\u00f4=ton e)ntelechei/a|]--a.\n36). In the following sense, again, they are different--when we cease\nto speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars:\nwherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health\nand sickness) and wherever there are different Matters ([Greek: kai\\\ne)/ti ai( u(=lai]--p. 1071, b. 1; [Greek: u(=lai] in the plural,\nrare).\n\nWe have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable\nEssences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and\nin what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two\nPhysical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last.\nThere exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For\nEssences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be\nperishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that\nMotion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it\nalways existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about\nTime: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing _prius_ and\nnothing _posterius_ (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus\neternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical,\nor Time is an affection ([Greek: pa/thos]) of Motion. Now no mode of\nMotion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for\nrectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a\nMovent or Producent Principle ([Greek: kin\u00eatiko\\n \u00ea)\\ poi\u00eatiko/n]--b.\n12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there\ncould not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere\npower may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such\neternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along\nwith them some principle of potential change ([Greek: ei) m\u00ea/ tis\nduname/n\u00ea e)ne/stai a)rch\u00ea\\ metaba/llein]--b. 15). Nor indeed will\neven that be sufficient (_i.e._, any principle of _merely potential_\nchange), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers--Schwegler) besides\nor along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this _principium_ shall not\ncome into Actuality ([Greek: ei) m\u00ea\\ e)nerg\u00ea/sei]--b. 17), the motion\nwhich we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it.\nNor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be\nsupposed to be in actuality or operation ([Greek: ou)d' ei)\ne)nerg\u00ea/sei], p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the\nmotion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists\npotentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles\ntherefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b.\n19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal,\notherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be\nessential Actualities (b. 22).\n\nHere however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing\nwhich is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every\nthing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into\nactuality: so that Potentiality seems the _prius_ of the two ([Greek:\ndokei= ga\\r to\\ me\\n e)nergou=n pa=n du/nasthai, to\\ de\\ duna/menon\nou) pa=n e)nergei=n]--p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1:\n[Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ ga\\r to\\ sunanairou=n]). But, if this were true, no\nEntia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not\nyet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we\nadopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take\ntheir departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who\nbegin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such\noriginal condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever\nbe put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality ([Greek:\nei) m\u00eathe\\n e)/stai e)nergei/a| ai)/tion]--b. 29)? Matter will never\ncause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter's art; nor\nwill the earth, but must wait for seed.\n\nIt is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and\nLeukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion\nhas always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor\nwhy that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at\nhaphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one\nway rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other\ncauses, such as violence or No\u00fbs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36).\nBut it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does\nassume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2--allusion to Plato Ph\u00e6drus 245,\nE), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in Tim\u00e6us 34, B) that the\nsoul is _posterius_, and co\u00e6val with the Kosmos. The doctrine just\nmentioned--That the Potential is prior to the Actual--is true in one\nsense, but not true in another; we have already explained _how_\n([Greek: ei)/r\u00eatai de\\ p\u00f4=s]--a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254,\nthat this [Greek: ei)/r\u00eatai] refers to what has been said in Book\n[Greek: Th], p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though\nBonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set\nforth in his Prooemium pp. 24, 25, that Book [Greek: L] is a separate\ntreatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the\nMetaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is\nstill possible that Book [Greek: Th] may have been written\npreviously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler\nsuppose**.).\n\nThat Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the\ndoctrine of Anaxagoras, No\u00fbs in his doctrine existing in Actuality;\nalso to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and\nagain, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So\nthat Chaos or Night (_i.e._, mere Potentiality) did not prevail for\nan infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in\nperpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine\nthat Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes\nround periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual,\nwhich perpetually actualizes in the same manner ([Greek: dei= ti\na)ei\\ me/nein \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s e)nergou=n]--p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if\ngeneration and destruction are to take place, we must assume\nsomething else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually\nchanging ([Greek: a)/llo dei= ei)=nai a)ei\\ e)nergou=n a)/ll\u00f4s kai\\\na)/ll\u00f4s]--a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes _per se_,\nsometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other\ninfluence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will\nnecessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus\nbe a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First\nActual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while\nthe other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of\nunceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why\nthen, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?\n\nNow, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may\nbe true ([Greek: e)pei\\ d' ou(/t\u00f4 t' e)nde/chetai]--p. 1072, a.\n18)--and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that\nevery thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or\nNon-Ens--we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something\nalways in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from\nreason, but from fact. The First Heaven (Aplan\u00eas or Fixed Star sphere)\nwill therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which\ncauses this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens\nImmobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three\nterms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer\nthat the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes\nthe motion of the Aplan\u00eas, is immoveable (a. **20-25.--This\npassage perplexes all the commentators--Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander,\n&c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the\ntext. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the\ndescription of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said\nfor Pierron and Z\u00e9vort's translation, p. 220: \"Comme il n'y a que\ntrois sortes d'\u00eatres--ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme\nentre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c'est un \u00eatre (_i.e._, this\nmiddle term is an \u00eatre) qui meut sans \u00eatre mu.\"--Bonitz disapproves\nthis interpretation of the word [Greek: me/son], and it is certainly\nsingular to say that between _Movens_ and _Motum_, the term _Movens\nsed non Motum_ forms a medium: _Motum sed non Movens_ would form just\nas good a medium**.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion\nwithout being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and\nmust be an Actuality.\n\nNow both the Appetibile ([Greek: to\\ o)rekto/n]) and the Cogitabile\n([Greek: to\\ no\u00eato/n]) cause motion in this way, _i.e._, without\nbeing moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum\nCogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that\nwhich appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is\nbeautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the\nprincipium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we\nwill so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we\nthink it good because we will it ([Greek: o)rego/metha de\\ dio/ti\ndokei=, ma=llon \u00ea)\\ dokei= dio/ti o)rego/metha]--a. 29). Now the\nCogitant Mind ([Greek: nou=s]) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in\nthe series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the\nseries are Cogitabilia _per se_ (while those of the other side are\nonly Cogitabilia _per aliud_--[Greek: no\u00eat\u00ea\\ d' \u00ea( e(te/ra\nsustoichi/a kath' au(t\u00ea/n]--a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.).\nThese Cogitabilia _per se_ are first as to Essentia (_i.e._, compared\nwith the Cogitabilia _per aliud_, they are logically _priora_): and\nagain, among Essenti\u00e6, that variety which is simple and actual comes\nfirst (_i.e._, it is logically _prius_, as compared with the compound\nand the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum\nsignifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex\ndenotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But\nthe Pulchrum and the Eligibile _per se_ belongs to the same side of\nthe series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia _per se_: and the Primum\nPulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own\nparticular ascending scale (b. 1).\n\nThat [Greek: to\\ ou(= e(/neka] is among the Immoveables, may be seen\nby our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and\nspecific distributions ([Greek: \u00ea( diai/resis d\u00ealoi=]--p. 1072, b. 2;\nsee the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by\nBonitz). For [Greek: to\\ ou(= e(/neka] is used in a double sense: in\none of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it\ndoes not ([Greek: e)/sti ga\\r ditto\\n to\\ ou(= e(/neka], b.\n3--[Greek: ditto/n] is Schwegler's correction, adopted by Bonitz). It\ncauses motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it\ncauses to move, causes motion in the other things ([Greek: kinei= de\\\n\u00f4(s e)r\u00f4/menon; to\\ de\\ kinou/menon ta)/lla kinei=]--b. 3; [Greek:\nto\\ de\\ kinou/menon] is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).\n\nNow, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in\na condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first\nactuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is\na possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even\nthough it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b.\n7).\n\nBut, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which\nexists in actuality, it is impossible that _that_ can be other than\nwhat it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of\nall changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is\nexactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess).\nIt exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which\nimplies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the\noriginating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity:\n(1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse;\n(2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That\nwhich is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise.\nFrom a principle of this nature (_i.e._, necessary in the two last\nsenses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).\n\nThe mode of existence ([Greek: diag\u00f4g\u00ea/]) of this Prime Movent is for\never that which _we_ enjoy in our best moments, but which we cannot\nobtain permanently; for its actuality itself is also pleasure (p.\n1072, b. 16). As actuality is pleasure, so the various actualities of\nwaking, perceiving, cogitating, are to us the pleasantest part of our\nlife; while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from\nthem (but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without\nintermittence). Cogitation _per se_ (_i.e._, cogitation in its most\nperfect condition) embraces that which is best _per se_; and most of\nall when it is most perfect. The No\u00fbs thus cogitates itself through\nparticipation of the Cogitabile: for it becomes itself cogitable by\ntouching the Cogitabile and cogitating: so that Cogitans and\nCogitabile become identical. For No\u00fbs in general (the human No\u00fbs\nalso) is in potentiality the recipient of the Cogitabile, and of\nEssentia or Forms; and it comes into actuality by possessing these\nForms. So that what the Prime Movent possesses is more divine than\nthe divine element which No\u00fbs in general involves; and the actuality\nof theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions ([Greek:\nno\u00eato\\s ga\\r gi/gnetai thigga/n\u00f4n kai\\ no\u00f4=n, \u00f4(/ste tau)to\\n nou=s\nkai\\ no\u00eato/n. to\\ ga\\r dektiko\\n tou= no\u00eatou= kai\\ t\u00ea=s ou)si/as\nnou=s. e)nergei= de\\ e)/ch\u00f4n; \u00f4(/st' e)kei=no ma=llon tou/tou o(\\\ndokei= o( nou=s thei=on e)/chein, kai\\ \u00ea( the\u00f4ri/a to\\ \u00ea(/diston kai\\\na)/riston]--b. 24. This is a very difficult passage, in which one\ncannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are\nperfectly satisfactory. The pronoun [Greek: e)kei=no] seems to refer\nto [Greek: \u00ea( no/\u00easis \u00ea( kath' au(t\u00ea/n]--three lines back. The\ncontrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and No\u00fbs in general,\nincluding the human No\u00fbs. [Greek: To\\ dektiko/n] cannot refer to the\nPrime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human\nNo\u00fbs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality.\n[Greek: Ma=llon] seems equivalent to [Greek: theio/teron]. The human\nNo\u00fbs has [Greek: thei=o/n ti], by reason of its potentiality to\ntheorize.).\n\nThus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that\nof our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better.\nYet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of No\u00fbs\nis life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is\nactuality _per se_ (or _par excellence_). We declare God to be an\nAnimal Optimum \u00c6ternum, so that duration eternal and continuous\n([Greek: ai)\u00f4\\n sunech\u00ea/s]) belongs to him: for _that_ is God\n([Greek: tou=to ga\\r o( theo/s]--p. 1072, b. 30).\n\nThe Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that\nOptimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating\nprinciple ([Greek: e)n a)rch\u00ea=|]); on the ground that the principles\nof plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and\nperfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the\nseed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is\nnot seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is\nprior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed,\nbut the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).\n\nFrom the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an\nEssence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable\nEssences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler's note) that this\nEssence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and\nindivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion\nfor an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For\nthis reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every\nmagnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as\ninfinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude\nat all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and\nwithout any affections ([Greek: a)pathe\\s kai\\ a)nalloi/\u00f4ton]). For\nall other varieties of change are posterior as compared with\nlocomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As\nthe Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt\nfrom the others (a. 13).\n\nWe must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or\nEssence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how\nmany? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our\npredecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines ([Greek:\na)popha/seis], p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes\nno peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call\nthese Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were\nan infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as\nreaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no\ndemonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall\nproceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding\ndefinitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The\nPrincipium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both _per se_ and\n_per accidens_: it causes motion in another subject, to which it\nimparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The\nMotum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must\nbe immoveable _per se_; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal\nMovent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over\nand above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which\nrotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there\nare also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular\nCelestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never\nat rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of\nthese rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable _per\nse_--by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in\ntheir nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself\neternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that\nwhich, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any\nthing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must\nnecessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature,\nimmoveable _per se_, and without magnitude, as Movents to the\nHeavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences\nare arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the\norder of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these\nrotations is, we must learn from Astronomy--that one among the\nmathematical sciences which is most akin ([Greek: oi)keiota/t\u00eas]) to\nthe First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence\nperceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat\nof any Essence at all ([Greek: peri\\ ou)demia=s ou)si/as]--b. 7).\nThat the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is\nknown to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the\nPlanets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what\nthe exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state\nupon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of\ninstruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to\nhis mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put\nquestions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the\nscientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he\nmust love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most\naccurately ([Greek: philei=n me\\n a)mphote/rous, pei/thesthai de\\\ntoi=s a)kribeste/rois]--b. 16).\n\nAristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the\nplanetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling ([Greek:\na)nelittou/sas]) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17--p.\n1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus\nbe forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the\nImmoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as\nwell as the perceivable spheres ([Greek: ai)sth\u00eata/s]--p. 1074, a.\n16): we say _reasonable_ ([Greek: eu)/logon]), for we shall leave to\nstronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be\nany rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the\nPlanets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence\nis exempt from extraneous affection and possessed _per se_ of the\nBest as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the\nforty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the _necessary_\ntotal of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they\nwould cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire\nto ([Greek: kinoi=en a)\\n \u00f4(s te/los ou)=sai phora=s]--a. 23); but it\nis impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that\nhave been enumerated.\n\nWe may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in\nrotation ([Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n pherome/n\u00f4n]--p. 1074, a. 24). For, if\nevery carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and\nif every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there\ncan exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of\nsome other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the\nPlanets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current\nexisted for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of\na third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way _ad infinitum_;\nand therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the\nDivine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).\n\nThat there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were\nmany heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be\none _in specie_, though the principia would be many _in numero_ (p.\n1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter,\nand are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there\nis one and the same Form ([Greek: lo/gos])--definition or rational\nexplanation: _e.g._, one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a.\n35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual\n([Greek: to\\ de\\ ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai ou)k e)/chei u(/l\u00ean to\\ pr\u00f4=ton;\ne)ntele/cheia **ga/r]--a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is\ntherefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the\nMotum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is One\nalso. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).\n\nNow it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most\nancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these\n(Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends\nall nature ([Greek: o(/ti theoi/ te/ ei)sin ou(=toi kai\\ perie/chei\nto\\ thei=on t\u00ea\\n o(/l\u00ean phu/sin]--b. 3). The other accompaniments of\nthe received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the\nmultitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest\n(b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to\nsome other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a\nman, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and\nfundamental truth--That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he\nwill consider it as a divine doctrine ([Greek: thei/\u00f4s a)\\n\nei)r\u00ea=sthai nomi/seien]--b. 9), preserved and handed down as\nfragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art\nand philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and\nrediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our\nfathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).\n\nThere are however various difficulties connected with the No\u00fbs; for\nit would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects,\nand yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p.\n1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of\nslumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it\n([Greek: ti/ a)\\n ei)/\u00ea to\\ semno/n]--b. 18)? And, if it cogitates\nsomething actually, yet if this process depends upon something\nforeign and independent (_i.e._, upon the Cogitatum), the No\u00fbs cannot\nbe the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in\nact, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to\nrespect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its\nEssence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, _what_ does\nit cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different\nfrom itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or\nsometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether\nits Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things\nwhich it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the No\u00fbs must cogitate what\nis most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it\ndid change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would\nat once ([Greek: \u00ea)/d\u00ea]) be a certain motion; whereas the No\u00fbs is\nessentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the\nNo\u00fbs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may\nreasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be\nfatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist\nsomething else more honourable than the No\u00fbs; namely, the Cogitatum;\nfor to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one\nwho cogitates the vilest object. If cogitation of vile objects be\ndetestable ([Greek: pheukto/n], b. 32)--for not to see some things is\nbetter than to see them--Cogitation cannot be the best of all things\n(_i.e._, Cogitation absolutely, whatever be the Cogitatum).\n\nSince the No\u00fbs is itself the best of all things, it must employ its\ncogitation upon itself and nothing else. Its cogitation will thus be\nCogitation of Cogitation ([Greek: au(to\\n a)/ra noei=, ei)/per e)sti\\\nto\\ kra/tiston, kai\\ e)/stin \u00ea( no/\u00easis no\u00ea/se\u00f4s no/\u00easis]--p. 1074,\nb. 35). Yet, if we look to the human mind, Cognition, Perception,\nOpinion, Mental Discourse, &c., appear always as having direct\nreference to something else, and as referring each to itself only in\nan indirect and secondary way ([Greek: a)ei\\ a)/llou--au(t\u00ea=s d' e)n\npare/rg\u00f4|]--b. 36); and farther, if to cogitate is one thing and to\nbe cogitated another thing, in which of the two points of view will\nthe _bene_ of the No\u00fbs consist? To be Cogitation, and to be a\nCogitatum, are not logically the same ([Greek: ou)de\\ ga\\r tau)to\\\nto\\ ei)=nai no\u00ea/sei kai\\ nooume/n\u00f4|]--b. 38).\n\nBut may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are\nsome things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum? that\nis, in those Cognita which are altogether exempt from Matter? In\nConstructive cognitions without Matter, the Form and the [Greek:\nt.\u00ea.e.] is both Cognitum and Cognitio; in Theoretical cognitions\nwithout Matter, the Notion and the Cogitation is itself the Cognitum\n([Greek: o( lo/gos to\\ pra=gma kai\\ \u00ea( no/\u00easis]). Since it appears,\ntherefore, that, wherever there is no Matter, Cogitatum and No\u00fbs are\nnot different, the same will be true of the divine No\u00fbs: its\nCogitatio and its Cogitatum will be identical (p. 1075, a. 5).\n\nOne farther difficulty remains, if we suppose the Cogitatum to be a\nCompound ([Greek: su/ntheton]); for, on that supposition, the\nCogitans would change in running through the different parts of the\nwhole. But the reply seems to be, that every thing which has not\nMatter is indivisible and not compound (p. 1075, a. 7). As the human\nNo\u00fbs, being that which deals with compounds, comports itself for a\ncertain time--for it does not attain its _bene_ in cogitating this or\nthat part of the compound, but in apprehending a certain total or\ncompletion which is something different from any of the parts--so\ndoes the divine No\u00fbs, engaged in cogitation of itself, comport itself\nin perpetuity (a. 10).\n\nAnother point to be considered is--in what manner the nature of the\nUniverse ([Greek: \u00ea( tou= o(/lou phu/sis]--p. 1075, a. 11) includes\nBonum and Optimum. Is Bonum included as something separate and as an\nadjunct by itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the\nwhole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both\nways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for, in this\nlatter, Bonum belongs both to the array and to the general, and\nindeed more to the latter, since the array is directed by the\ngeneral, not the general by the array. All things in the universe are\nmarshalled in a certain orderly way--the aquatic creatures, the\na\u00ebrial, and the plants; but all things are not marshalled alike. The\nuniverse is not such that there is no relation between one thing and\nanother: there is such a relation; for every thing is marshalled with\na view to one end, though in different degrees. As, in a family, the\nfreemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard, but\nall or most of their proceedings are regulated, while slaves and oxen\nare not required to do much towards the common good, but are left for\nthe most part to act at hazard,--in this way the principium of each\nis arranged by nature (a. 23). For example, every thing must\nnecessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to\nmake room for another: there are also some other facts and conditions\ncommon to all things in the universe ([Greek: le/g\u00f4 d' oi(=on ei)/s\nge to\\ diakrith\u00ea=nai a)na/gk\u00ea a(pa=sin e)lthei=n]--a. 23; see the\nexplanation of [Greek: diakrith\u00ea=nai], given by Bonitz, Comm. p.\n519--not very certain).\n\nIn concluding this exposition, we must not lose sight of the\nabsurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other, nor what\nis advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us, nor which\nof their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties (p. 1075,\na. 27).\n\nThat all things proceed from Contraries, all these philosophers agree\nin affirming. But it is not true that all things are generated, nor\nthat they are generated from contraries; for the celestial substance\nis not generated at all, nor has it any contrary. Moreover, in those\ncases where there really are contraries, these philosophers do not\nteach us how generation can take place out of them; for contraries\nthemselves have no effect upon each other. Now our doctrine solves\nthis difficulty reasonably, by introducing a _tertium quid_ (p. 1075,\na. 31)--Matter. Some of these philosophers erroneously consider\nMatter to be itself one of the contraries: they consider the Unequal\nas matter or substratum to the Equal; or the Many as matter or\nsubstratum to the One; (Evil, as opposed to Good). We resolve this in\nthe same way: our Matter is one, is contrary itself to nothing, but\nmay be potentially either of two contraries. Farthermore, if we admit\nthe doctrine that Evil itself is Matter or one of the elements, the\ninference will follow that every thing whatever, except the Unum\nitself, partakes of Evil (a. 6).\n\nSome philosophers do not admit either Good or Evil to be principles\nat all; but they are manifestly wrong; for in all things Good is most\nof all the principle (p. 1075, a. 37). Others again are so far right\nthat they recognize Good as a principle: but they do not tell us\n_how_ it is a principle--whether as End, or as Movent, or as Form.\n\nEmpedokles lays down a strange doctrine: he makes Friendship to be\nthe Good (p. 1075, b. 2). But, in his theory, Friendship is principle\npartly as Movent, for its function is to bring together ([Greek:\nsuna/gei ga\\r]--b. 3); partly as Matter, for it is itself a portion\nof the mixture ([Greek: mo/rion tou= mi/gmatos]--b. 4). Now, even\ngranting the possibility that the same thing may be _per accidens_\n([Greek: kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]--b. 5, _i.e._, by special coincidence in\nany one particular case) principle as Movent, and also principle as\nMatter, nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by\ndefinition. Under which of the two, therefore, are we to reckon\nFriendship? It is moreover another strange feature in the theory of\nEmpedokles, that he makes Enmity to be indestructible; for this very\nEnmity is with him the nature and principle of Evil (b. 8).\n\nAnaxagoras declares Good to be the principle as Movent; for, in his\ntheory, No\u00fbs causes motion; but it causes motion with a view to some\nend, which is of course different from itself; so that the real\nprinciple is different from No\u00fbs: unless indeed he adopted one of our\ntenets; for we too say that, in a certain sense, the medical art is\nhealth (p. 1075, b. 10; Z. vii. p. 1032, b. 10). It is moreover\nabsurd, that Anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to Good and\nto the No\u00fbs (b. 11). (Bonitz remarks, Comm. p. 522:--Aristotle means\nthat Anaxagoras was wrong, because he failed \"ad eam devenire\nrationem, ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius\n[Greek: te/los] esse statueret\"; farther, he remarks, on the line b.\n10--[Greek: a)/topon de\\ kai\\ to\\ e)nanti/on m\u00ea\\ poi\u00ea=sai t\u00f4=|\na)gath\u00f4=| kai\\ t\u00f4=| n\u00f4=|]: \"Quid enim? nonne pariter et eodem jure\n[Greek: nou=s a)mig\u00ea/s], quem posuit Anaxagoras, ab omni\ncontrarietate et oppositione immunis sit, ac primus motor apud\nAristotelem?\"--Aristotle would have replied to this: \"I recognize\nprinciples of Evil under the names of [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] and [Greek:\nste/r\u00easis]; the last of the two being directly opposed to Form\n(Regularity or Good), the first of the two being indifferent and\nequally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good. My Prime\nMovent acts like an [Greek: e)r\u00f4/menon] in causing motion in the\nCelestial Substance: the motion of this last is pure Good, without\nany mixture of Evil. But, when this motion is transmitted to the\nsublunary elements, it becomes corrupted by [Greek: u(/l\u00ea] and\n[Greek: ste/r\u00easis], so that Evil becomes mingled with the Good.\nAnaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles, analogous to\n[Greek: u(/l\u00ea] and [Greek: ste/r\u00easis], so that Evil, on his theory,\nremains unexplained.\")\n\nThose philosophers who lay down Contraries as their principles, do\nnot make proper use of these Contraries, unless their language be\nimproved or modified (p. 1075, b. 12). Nor do they tell us why some\nthings are destructible, other things indestructible; for they trace\nall things to the same principles. Some make all things to proceed\nfrom Non-Ens; others, to escape that necessity, make all things One\n(and thus recognize no real change or generation at all--the Eleates,\nb. 16). Again, not one of them tells us why generation must always\nbe, or what is the cause of generation. Once more, those who\nrecognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third\nsuperior to both (b. 18); and the Platonists with their Ideas are\nunder the like necessity. For they must assign some reason why\nparticular things partake of these Ideas.\n\nOther philosophers, moreover, must consistently with their theories\nrecognize something contrary to Wisdom and to the most venerable\nCognition. But we are under no such necessity; for there is nothing\ncontrary to the First ([Greek: t\u00f4=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4|]). All contraries involve\nMatter, and are in potentiality the same: one of the two contraries\nis ignorance in regard to the other; but the First has no contrary\n(p. 1075, b. 24).\n\nAgain, if there be no Entia beyond the Perceptibilia, there can be no\nbeginning, no arrangement in order, no generation, no celestial\nbodies or proceedings (_i.e._, all these will remain unexplained).\nThere will always be a beginning behind the beginning, _ad\ninfinitum_; as there is in the theories of all the theologians and\nphysical philosophers (p. 1075, b. 27). And, even if we recognize,\nbeyond the Perceptibilia, Ideas or Numbers, these are causes of\nnothing; or, if causes of any thing, they are certainly not causes of\nmotion. How, moreover, can Magnitude, and a Continuum arise out of\nthat which has no Magnitude? Number cannot, either as Movent or as\nForm, produce a Continuum (b. 30).\n\nAgain, (Contraries cannot be principles, because) no Contrary can be\nessentially Constructive and essentially Movent (p. 1075, b. 31); for\nContraries involve Matter and Potentiality, and may possibly,\ntherefore, not exist. And, if there be Potentiality, it will come\nprior to Actuality: upon that supposition therefore (_i.e._, of\nContraries as the fundamental principles) Entia could not be eternal.\nBut Entia are eternal; therefore these theories must be in part\namended: we have shown how (b. 34).\n\nFarther, none of these theories explains how it is that numbers\ncoalesce into One; or soul and body into One; or Form and Matter into\none Concrete. Nor can they explain this, unless they adopt our\ndoctrine, that the Movent brings about this coalition (p. 1075, b.\n37).\n\nThose philosophers (like Speusippus) who recognize many different\ngrades and species of Entia (first the Mathematical Number, &c.),\nwith separate principles for each, make the Essence of the Universe\nto be incoherent ([Greek: e)peisodi\u00f4/d\u00ea]--p. 1076, a. 1) and set up\nmany distinct principles; for none of these Essences contributes to\nor bears upon the remainder, whether it exists or does not exist. Now\nEntia are not willing to be badly governed ([Greek: ta\\ de\\ o)/nta\nou) bou/letai politeu/esthai kak\u00f4=s. \"ou)k a)gatho\\n polukoirani/\u00ea;\nei(=s koi/ranos.\"]--p. 1076, a. 4).\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nDE COELO.\n\n\nBook I.\n\nCH. 1.--The science of Nature has for its principal object--Bodies,\nMagnitudes, and the various affections and movements of Bodies and\nMagnitudes; also the beginnings or principles of this sort of\nEssence. The Continuous is that which is divisible into parts\nperpetually divisible: and Body is that which is divisible in every\ndirection. Of magnitudes, some (lines) are divisible only in one\ndirection; others (planes) only in two directions; others again\n(bodies) in three directions. This is the maximum: there is no other\nmagnitude beyond; for three are all, and to say \"in three directions\"\nis the same as to say \"in all directions.\" As the Pythagoreans say,\nThe Universe and All Things are determined by Three: in End, Middle,\nand Beginning, lies the number of the Universe, or the Triad. We have\nreceived these as laws from nature, and we accordingly employ this\nnumber (Three) for solemnities in honour of the Gods. Moreover, we\napply our predicates on the same principle; for we call Two, and The\nTwo--Both, but we do not call them all. Three is the first number to\nwhich we apply the predicate All. Herein (as was observed before) we\nfollow the lead of Nature herself. Since therefore these three\nphrases--All Things, The Universe, The Perfect or Complete--do not\nspecifically differ from each other, but are distinguished only in\nrespect of the matter or occasions on which they are applied. Body is\nthe only kind of magnitude which can be declared Perfect or Complete,\nthat is, All; for it is the only magnitude determined or defined by\nthe Three. Being divisible in three directions, it is divisible every\nway; other magnitudes are divisible either only in one way or only in\ntwo. Magnitudes are both divisible and continuous according to the\nnumber by which they are designated--continuous in one direction, in\ntwo, in three, or all. All divisible magnitudes are also continuous:\nwhether all continuous magnitudes are divisible, is not yet clear.\nBut what _is_ clear is--that there is no upward transition to a\nhigher genus beyond Body, as there is from line to surface, and from\nsurface to Body. If there were, Body would not be perfect or complete\nas a magnitude; for the transition would be made at the point of\ndeficiency; but the perfect or complete can have no deficiency: it\nstretches every way. Such is each body included as a part in the\nuniverse: it has dimensions in every direction. Yet each is\ndistinguished from its neighbour by contact, and each therefore in a\ncertain sense is many. But the Universe ([Greek: to\\ pa=n]) including\nall these parts is of necessity perfect and complete; extending not\nmerely in one way, and in another way not, but [Greek: pa/nt\u00ea|], as\nthe word literally means (ss. 1-4).\n\nCH. 2.--Respecting the nature of the Universe, we shall enquire\npresently whether in the aggregate it be infinite or of finite\nmagnitude. But first let us speak about its different constituent\nspecies, proceeding on the following basis. I affirm that all natural\nbodies and magnitudes are _per se_ locally moveable; and that Nature\nis to them a beginning or principle of motion. Now all Local Motion\n(known by the name of [Greek: phora/]) is either Rectilinear or\nCircular, or compounded of the two; for these two are the only simple\nmotions, by reason that the only two simple magnitudes are the\nrectilinear and the circular. The circular is motion round the\nCentre; the rectilinear is motion either downwards towards the centre\nor upwards from the centre. These three are the only simple modes of\nmotion or currents: as I said in the last chapter that body was made\ncomplete in the number three, so also the motion of body is made\ncomplete in the number three. Now, as there are some bodies (such as\nfire, earth, and their cognates) which are simple (_i.e._ which have\nin themselves a natural beginning or principle of motion), and others\nwhich are compounds of these, so also there must be simple motions\nbelonging to the former and compound motions belonging to the latter;\nsuch compound motions being determined by the preponderant element\ntherein. Since, therefore, circular motion is a simple mode of\nmotion, and since simple modes of motion belong only to simple\nbodies, there must of necessity be a particular variety of simple\nbody, whose especial nature it is to be carried round in circular\nmotion. By violence, indeed, one body might be moved in a mode\nbelonging to another; but not by nature. Moreover, since motion\nagainst nature is opposite to motion conformable to nature, and since\neach mode has one single opposite, simple circular motion, if it be\nnot conformable to the nature of this body, must be against its\nnature. If then the body rotating in a circle be fire or any of the\nother elements, its natural mode of motion must be opposite to\ncircular motion. But each thing has only one opposite; and up and\ndown are each other's opposites. If then the body which rotates in a\ncircle rotates thus against nature, it must have some other mode of\nmotion conformable to nature. But this is impossible: for, if the\nmotion conformable to its nature be motion upwards, the body must be\nfire or air; if motion downwards, the body must be earth or water\n(and there is no other simple mode of motion that it can have).\nMoreover, its rotatory motion must be a first motion; for the perfect\nis prior in nature to the imperfect. Now the circle is perfect; but\nno straight line is perfect: neither an infinite straight line, for\nin order to be perfect, it must have an end and a boundary; nor any\nfinite straight line, for each has something without it and may be\nprolonged at pleasure. So that, if motion first by nature belong to a\nbody first by nature, if circular motion (as being perfect) be prior\nto rectilinear motion, and if rectilinear motion belong to a first or\na simple body, as we see both in fire and in earth,--we may be sure\n_\u00e0 fortiori_ that circular motion belongs to a simple body, and that\nthere is, besides the four elements here, prior to them and more\ndivine than them, a different body cf special nature and essence.\nIndeed, since circular motion is against the nature of these four\nelements, there must be some other different body to whose nature it\nis conformable. There must thus be some simple and primary body,\nwhose nature it is to be carried round in a circle, as earth is\ncarried downwards and fire upwards. On the assumption that the\nrevolving bodies revolved against their own nature, it would be\nwonderful and even unreasonable that this one single mode of motion,\nbeing thus contrary to nature, should be continuous and eternal; for\nin all other things we see that what is contrary to nature dies away\nmost speedily. Now, if the revolving body were fire, as some affirm,\nthe revolving motion would be just as much contrary to its nature as\nmotion downwards; for the natural motion of fire is upwards or away\nfrom the centre. Reasoning from all these premisses, we may safely\nconclude that, distinct from all these bodies which are here around\nus, there exists a body whose nature is more honourable in proportion\nto its greater distance from us here (ss. 1-13).\n\nCH. 3.--We plainly cannot affirm that every body is either heavy or\nlight: meaning by heavy, that which is carried by its nature\ndownwards or towards the centre; by light, that which is carried by\nits nature upwards or away from the centre. Heaviest (or earth) is\nthat which underlies all other downward moving bodies, lightest\n(fire) is that which floats above all upward moving bodies. Air and\nwater are both light and heavy, relatively, but relatively to\ndifferent terms of comparison; thus, water is heavy as compared to\nair and fire, light as compared to earth. But that body whose nature\nit is to revolve in a circle, cannot possibly have either heaviness\nor levity; for it cannot move in a right line, either upwards or\ndownwards, nor either by nature or against nature. Not by nature,\nfor, in that case, it must be identical with some one of the four\nelements; not against nature, because, if it moved upwards against\nnature, this would prove that motion downwards was conformable to its\nnature, and it would thus be identical with earth: we have already\nseen that, if a body moves upwards against nature, it must move\ndownwards according to nature, and _vice vers\u00e2_. Now the same natural\nmotion which belongs to any body as a whole, belongs also to its\nminute fragments (to the whole earth and to any of its constituent\nclods). Accordingly the revolving body in its local movement of\nrevolution cannot possibly be dragged in any other direction, either\nupward or downward,--neither the whole nor any portion thereof. It is\nalike reasonable to conceive it as ungenerable, indestructible,\nincapable both of increase and of qualitative change ([Greek:\na)nauxe\\s kai\\ a)nalloi/\u00f4ton]). It cannot be generated, because\nevery thing generated comes out of a substratum and an opposite, into\nwhich it relapses on being destroyed. Now the revolving body has no\nopposite; for we have already seen that opposite bodies have their\ncurrents of motion opposite, and there is no current of motion\nopposite to that of circular rotation. Nature has rightly excepted\nthis ungenerable and indestructible substance from the action of\ncontraries, in which generation and destruction occur. It is also\nincapable of increase or diminution, because these processes take\nplace through the accession of new cognate materials; and in this\ncase there are none such. It is farther incapable of qualitative\nchange, because this always implies the being affected favourably or\nunfavourably ([Greek: pa/thos]); and this last never takes place, in\nplants or in animals, without some increase or diminution in quantity\n(ss. 1-5).\n\nThis Celestial Substance is thus eternal, ungenerable,\nindestructible, noway increased nor diminished, neither growing old\nnor capable of disturbing affections nor changeable in quality.\nHerein the evidence of reason and that of phenomena concur. For all\nmen, Hellenes and Barbarians, have some belief respecting the Gods,\nand all who believe Gods to exist assign to the divine nature the\nuppermost place in the Kosmos; an immortal place going naturally\nalong with immortal persons. Our perceptions confirm this\nsufficiently, at least when we speak with reference to human belief.\nFor not the smallest change has ever been observed in the celestial\nsubstance, throughout all past time. Under these impressions, the\nancients gave to it the name which it now bears; for the same\nopinions suggest themselves to us not once, nor twice, but an\ninfinite number of times**. Hence the ancients, regarding the First\nBody as something distinct from Fire, Earth, Air, or Water, called\nthe uppermost place \u00c6ther, from its being always running ([Greek:\na)po\\ tou= thei=n a)ei/]), the adverbial designation being derived\nfrom eternal duration. Anaxagoras employs this name improperly: he\ncalls Fire by the name of \u00c6ther (s. 6).\n\nIt is plain, from all we have said, that the simple bodies cannot be\nmore in number than those just indicated; for a simple body must of\nnecessity have a simple mode of motion, and there are only three\nsimple modes of motion--one circular and two rectilinear, one of\nthese being from the centre, the other towards the centre (s. 7).\n\nCH. 4.--That Circular Rotation has no motion opposed to it, may be\nshown by several different arguments. If there were any, it would\ncertainly be rectilinear motion; for convex and concave, though each\nrespectively opposed to the other, are, when both put together,\nopposed as a couple to rectilinear motion. But each variety of\nrectilinear motion has another variety of rectilinear motion opposed\nto it; and each thing has but one opposite. Moreover the oppositions\nbetween one motion (or one current--[Greek: phora/]) and another are\nfounded upon oppositions of place, which are three in number: (1)\nAbove and Below; (2) Before and Behind; (3) Right and Left. Now the\nmotion in circular rotation **from A to B is not opposite to that\nfrom B to A: the opposition of motion is along the straight line\nwhich joins the two; for an infinite number of different circles may\nbe drawn, not interfering with each other but all passing through the\nsame two points A and B. In the same circle, the opposition between\nthe current from A to B and that from B to A, is along the line of\ndiameter--not along the line of circumference. If one circular\ncurrent were really opposed to any other circular current, one or\nother of the two would have existed to no purpose; for both have the\nsame object. That is to say: what is carried round in a circle, let\nit begin from any point whatever, must necessarily come round equally\nto all the opposite places, above, below, before, behind, right,\nleft. If the two (presumed) opposite circular currents were equal,\nthey would neutralize each other, and there would be no motion at all\nof either of them. If one of the two were the more powerful, it would\nextinguish the other; so that to suppose the existence of both is to\nsuppose that one or both exists in vain (_i.e._, can never be\nrealized). We say that a sandal exists in vain ([Greek: ma/t\u00ean]),\nwhen it cannot be fastened on. But God and nature do nothing in vain\n(ss. 1-8).\n\nCH. 5.--Most of the ancient philosophers admitted an infinite body;\nbut this may be shown to be impossible. The question is very\nimportant; for the consequences which follow from admitting the\nInfinite as principium, affect our speculations concerning the whole\nof Nature (s. 1).\n\nEvery body is of necessity either simple or compound. The infinite\nbody therefore, if it exists, must of necessity be either one or the\nother. But there can be no infinite compound composed of simple\nbodies finite in magnitude and in number: so that, if an infinite\nbody exist, it must be simple. We shall first enquire whether the\nFirst Body, whose nature it is to move in a circle, can be infinite\nin magnitude. Now, if it were infinite, the radii thrown out from the\ncentre would be infinite, and the distance between them would also be\ninfinite; that is, no finite peripheral line can be found touching\nall the extremities of the radii without: if any such line be\nassumed, you may always assume a greater. We call Number infinite,\nbecause the greatest number cannot be given; and the like may be said\nabout this distance. Now, as an infinite distance cannot be passed\nover, no circular motion passing over it is possible, so as to come\nround to the point of departure. But we see plainly that the First\nBody or the Heaven does come round in a circle; and it has been shown\nby reasoning _\u00e0 priori_ that there _is_ a variety of body whose\nnature it is to move in a circle. Such a body therefore as the First\n(revolving) Body cannot be infinite (ss. 2, 3).\n\nFour other arguments are added, proving the same conclusion (s. 4,\nseq.). One of them is: That an infinite square, circle, or sphere, is\nan impossibility; each of these figures being defined or determined.\nAs there can be no infinite circle, so neither can an infinite body\nbe moved round in a circle (s. 7).\n\nCH. 6.--As the First Body cannot be infinite, so neither can those\nbodies be infinite whose nature it is to move to the centre and from\nthe centre--neither the centripetal nor the centrifugal body. For\nthese two currents are opposite in nature; opposite currents being\ncharacterized by the opposite places to which they tend. But of two\nopposites, if the one be fixed and determinate, the other must be\nfixed and determinate also. Now the centre is determined; for the\ncentripetal body, let it fall from what height it will, can never\nfall lower than the centre; and, since the centre is determined, the\nupper region or extremity must also be determined. The places at each\nextreme being thus determined, the intermediate space must be\ndetermined also; otherwise there would exist motion undetermined or\ninfinite, which has been shown in a former treatise to be impossible\n(Physica, VIII. viii.); and therefore that body which either is\ntherein, or may possibly be therein, must be determined. But it is a\nfact that the centripetal body and the centrifugal body can be\ntherein; for centripetality and centrifugality are of the nature of\neach respectively (ss. 1, 2).\n\nHence we see that there can be no infinite body. There are other\nreasons also. As the centripetal body is heavy, if it be infinite,\nits gravity must also be infinite; and, if gravity cannot be\ninfinite, neither can any heavy body be infinite. The like about any\nlight body, such as the centrifugal (s. 3).\n\nHe then shows (by a long process of reasoning, not easy to follow)\nfirst, that there cannot be an infinite body with finite gravity;\nnext, that there can be no infinite gravity. Accordingly there can be\nno infinite body at all, having gravity. At the end, he considers\nthat this is established, (1) by the partial arguments ([Greek: dia\\\nt\u00f4=n kata\\ me/ros]) immediately preceding; (2) by the general\nreasonings in his other treatises respecting first principles, in\nwhich he explained the Infinite--in what sense it existed and did not\nexist; (3) by an argument about the Infinite, upon which he touches\nin the next chapter (ss. 4-13).\n\nCH. 7.--Every body is of necessity either infinite or finite. If\ninfinite, it is as a whole either of like constituents or of unlike.\nIf the latter, either of a finite number of species, or of an\ninfinite number. The last is impossible, if our fundamental\nassumptions are allowed to stand. For since the simple modes of\nmotion are limited in number, the simple bodies must be alike\nlimited; each simple mode of notion belonging to its own special\nsimple body, and each natural body having always its own natural\nmotion. But, if the Infinite be composed of a finite number of\nspecies, each of these constituent parts must be infinite; that is,\nwater and fire must be infinite. Yet this too, is impossible; for we\nhave seen that there cannot be either infinite levity or infinite\ngravity (the attributes of fire and water). Moreover, if these bodies\nbe infinite, the places which they occupy, and the motions which they\nmake, must also be infinite; but this also we have shown to be\ninadmissible, if our fundamental assumptions are admitted. The\ncentripetal body cannot be carried to an infinite distance downward,\nnor the centrifugal body to an infinite distance upward. That which\ncannot come to pass, cannot be in course of coming to pass; thus, if\na thing cannot come to be white, or a cubit long, or domiciled in\nEgypt, it cannot be in course of becoming white, or a cubit long, &c.\nIt cannot be in course of being carried to a terminus which cannot be\nreached. It might be argued that fire, though discontinuous and\ndispersed, might still be infinite, in the sum total of its different\nmasses. But body is that which is extended in every direction: how\ncan there be many bodies unlike to each other, yet each of them\ninfinite? Each of them, if infinite at all, ought to be infinite in\nevery direction (ss. 1-5).\n\nWe thus see that the Infinite cannot consist of unlike constituents.\nBut neither can it consist of constituents all similar. For, first,\nthere are only three simple motions, and one of the three it must\nhave; but we have shown that it cannot have either centripetal or\ncentrifugal motion (_i.e._, that it cannot have either infinite\ngravity or infinite levity); nor can it again have circular motion,\nfor the Infinite cannot be carried in a circle: this would amount to\nsaying that the Heaven is infinite, which we have shown to be\nimpossible. The Infinite indeed cannot be moved in any way at all;\nfor, if moved, it must be moved either according to nature, or\ncontrary to nature (violently), and, if its present motion be\nviolent, it must have some other mode of motion which is natural to\nit. But, if it have any such, this assumes that there exists some\nother place belonging to it, into which it may be conveyed--an\nobvious impossibility (ss. 6, 7).\n\nFarthermore, the Infinite cannot act in any way upon the Finite, nor\nbe acted upon thereby (ss. 8-10). Nor can the Infinite be acted upon\nin any way by the Infinite (ss. 11-12).\n\nIf then every perceptible body possesses powers, as agent or patient\nor both, there can be no perceptible body which is infinite. But all\nbodies which are in any place are perceptible; therefore no body\nwhich is in any place can be infinite. There is no infinite body,\nindeed there can be no body at all, outside of the Heaven; for that\nwhich is outside of the Heaven is in a place. Even if perceivable\nonly up to a certain point ([Greek: me/chri tino/s]), even if merely\nintelligible, it would still be in a place, and would therefore come\nunder the foregoing argument--that there is no body outside of the\nHeaven (ss. 13, 14).\n\nThe foregoing reasoning may be summed up, in more general language\n([Greek: logik\u00f4/teron]), as follows:--The Infinite assumed as\nhomogeneous cannot be moved in a circle, since the Infinite has no\ncentre; nor in a straight line, since this would imply a second\ninfinite place into which it must be moved according to nature, and a\nthird infinite place into which it must be moved against nature, and\nsince in either case the force which causes it to be moved must be\ninfinite. But we have already argued, in treating of Motion (Phys.\nVIII. x.) that nothing finite can have infinite power, nothing\ninfinite can have finite power; and, if that which is moved according\nto nature can also be moved contrary to nature, there must of\nnecessity be two Infinites--Movens and Motum. Yet what can that be\nwhich causes the Infinite to move? If it cause itself to move, it\nmust be animated ([Greek: e)/mpsuchon]): but how can an infinite\nanimated being ([Greek: z\u00f4=|on]) exist? And, if there be anything\nelse which causes it to move, there must exist two Infinites, each\ndistinguished from the other in form and power (ss. 15-17).\n\nAgain, even if we admit the doctrine of Leukippus and\nDemokritus--That the whole is not continuous, but discontinuous,\natoms divided by intervening spaces--still the Infinite is\ninadmissible. For the nature and essence of these atoms is all the\nsame, though they are different from each other in figure and\narrangement; accordingly the motion of all must be the same: if one\nis heavy or centripetal, all must be so alike; if one is light or\ncentrifugal, all must be so alike. But either of these motions would\nimply the existence of centre and periphery; which does not consist\nwith an infinite whole. In the Infinite, there is neither centre nor\nperiphery; no terminus prefixed either for upward or downward motion;\nno _own place_ either for centripetal or centrifugal matter.\nTherefore in an infinite universe, there can be no motion at all\n(ss. 18, 19).\n\nCH. 8.--There cannot be more than one Kosmos. All things both rest\nand are moved, either by violence, or according to nature. In that\nplace to which it is carried by nature, it also rests by nature: in\nthat place to which it is carried by violence, it rests by violence.\nIf the current which we see towards the centre is by violence, the\nopposite current must be natural; if earth is carried by violence\nfrom thence hitherward, its natural current must be from hence\nthitherward; and, if being here it rests without violence, its\ncurrent towards here must be a natural one. For there is one only\nwhich is natural. Now, if there be many Kosmi, they must be alike in\ntheir nature, and must be composed of the same bodies, having the\nsame nature and powers--fire, earth, and the two intermediate\nelements: for, if the bodies here are not the same as those in other\nKosmi--if the same names are given in an equivocal sense and do not\nconnote the same specific attributes--the name Kosmos must be\nequivocal also, and there cannot be many true or real Kosmi, in the\nsame sense. To the parts or elements of each Kosmos, therefore, the\ncentripetal and **centrifugal currents are natural; for the simple\ncurrents are limited in number, and each element is so named as\nto connote one of them specially; and, if the currents are\nthe same, the elements must also be the same everywhere. If there\nwere another Kosmos, the earth in that would tend towards the centre\nof our Kosmos, and the fire in that would tend towards the periphery\nof our Kosmos. But this is impossible; since in that case the earth\nin that Kosmos would run away from the centre of its own Kosmos, and\nthe fire therein would run away from its own periphery. Either we\nmust not admit the same nature in the simple elements of the numerous\nKosmi; or, if we do admit it, we must recognize only one centre and\none periphery. This difficulty prevents our recognizing more than one\nKosmos (ss. 1-6).\n\nIt is unphilosophical to affirm that the nature of these simple\nelements becomes changed according as they are more or less distant\nfrom their own places. The difference is at best one of degree, not\none of kind. That they _are_ moved, we see plainly; there must\ntherefore be some one current of motion natural to them. Accordingly\nevery portion of the same element (or of elements the same in kind)\nmust tend towards the same numerical place--towards this actual\ncentre ([Greek: pro\\s to/de ti me/son]), or that actual periphery;\nand, if the tendency be towards one centre _specie_, but towards many\ncentres _numero_, because particulars differ _numero_ alone, and not\n_specie_, still the attribute will be alike in all, and will not be\npresent in some portions, absent in others: I mean that, if the\nportions of this Kosmos are relative to each other, those in another\nKosmos are in the like condition, and what is taken from this Kosmos\nwill not be different from what is taken from the corresponding\nelements of any other Kosmos. Unless these assumptions can be\noverthrown, it is indisputably certain that there can be only one\ncentre and one periphery; by consequence therefore, only one Kosmos\nand not more (ss. 7-10).\n\nThere are other reasons to show that there is a given terminus for\nthe natural current both of fire and of earth. A thing moved,\nspeaking generally, changes from something definite into something\nelse definite; but there are different species of such change: the\nchange called getting-well is from sickness to health; that called\ngrowth is from the little to great; that called local movement is\nfrom a terminus to another terminus, and local movements are\nspecifically different from each other, according as the terminus _a\nquo_ and the terminus _ad quem_ is defined in each. The terminus is\nalways a known and definite point: it is not accidental, nor\ndependent upon the arbitrium of the mover. Fire and earth therefore\ndo not move on to infinity, but to definite points in opposite\ndirections; and the local antithesis is between above and below:\nthese are the two termini of the respective currents. Earth is\ncarried with greater velocity, the nearer it approaches to the\ncentre; fire is carried with greater velocity, the nearer it\napproaches to the periphery. This shows that its current does not\nstretch to infinity; for its velocity would then increase infinitely.\nEarth is not carried downward by the force of any thing else, nor\nfire upwards: not by any violence, nor by squeezing out ([Greek:\ne)kthli/psei]), as some say. If this were so, a larger quantity of\nearth would move downward, and a larger quantity of fire upward, more\nslowly than a smaller. But the reverse is what occurs: the larger\nquantity of earth moves downward more rapidly than the smaller; if\nits motion had been caused by violence or by squeezing out, such\nmotion would have slackened as it became more widely distant from the\nmoving force (ss. 11-14).\n\nWe may deduce the same conclusion from the reasonings of the First\nPhilosophy, also from the fact of circular motion which of necessity\nis constant both here and everywhere. Further, it is clear that there\ncan be only one Kosmos; for, as there are three bodily elements, so\nthere are three special places of such elements: one the undermost,\nat the centre; another the uppermost, at the periphery, revolving in\na circular orbit; the third, in the intermediate place between the\ntwo, being the light or floating element ([Greek: to\\ e)pipo/lazon]);\nfor, if not there, it must be outside of the Kosmos, which is\nimpossible (ss. 15, 16).\n\nCH. 9.--We must however now examine some reasons, which have been\nalleged to prove the contrary; and which seem to show, not only that\nthere are many Kosmi, but even that there _must_ be many, and that\nthe hypothesis of one single Kosmos is inadmissible. It is urged that\nin all aggregates, natural as well as artificial, the Form by itself\nis one thing, and the Form implicated with Matter is another. When we\ndeclare the definition of a sphere or a circle, we do not include\ntherein gold or brass, for this makes no part of the essence: if we\nmention these metals, it is when we cannot conceive or grasp anything\nbeyond the particular case; for example, if we have one particular\ncircle before us. Nevertheless, even here the circle in the abstract\nis one thing, and this particular circle is another: the first is the\nForm by itself, the last is the Form along with Matter, one among\nparticular objects. Now, since the Heaven is perceivable by sense, it\nmust be one among particular objects; for every thing perceivable is\nimplicated with Matter. As such, it is _this_ Heaven: to be _this_\nHeaven (Form along with Matter) is one thing; to be the Heaven simply\nand absolutely (Form without Matter) is another. Now, wherever there\nis Form, there either are or may be many distinct particulars;\nwhether we admit (with Plato) that the Forms exist separately, or\nnot. In all things where the Essence is implicated with Matter, we\nsee that the particular manifestations are many and of indefinite\nnumber. Upon this reasoning therefore, there are or at least may be\nmany Heavens: the supposition that there can be no more than one, is\ninadmissible (ss. 1-2).\n\nBut we must see how far this reasoning will hold. That the Form\nwithout Matter differs from the Form with Matter, is perfectly true.\nBut this does not show that there must be many Kosmi; nor can there\nbe many, if this one Kosmos exhausts all the matter that exists. If\nthe matter of man were flesh and bone, and if a single man were\nformed, including all flesh and all bone indissolubly united; there\ncould not possibly exist any other man; and the like is true about\nother objects; for, where the essence is implicated with an\nunderlying matter, no object can come into existence unless some\nmatter be furnished. The Kosmos, or Heaven, is a particular object,\ncomposed partly out of appropriate matter: but if it absorbs all the\nappropriate matter, no second Kosmos can come to pass. We shall now\nshow that it does include all the appropriate matter (ss. 3-5).\n\nThe word Heaven has three different senses. 1. It means the essence\nof the extreme periphery of the universe, or the natural body which\nis there situated: we call this highest and farthest place Heaven,\nwhere we suppose all the divine agency to be situated ([Greek: e)n\n\u00f4(=| to\\ thei=on pa=n i(dru=sthai/ phamen]). 2. It means the body\ncontinuous ([Greek: to\\ suneche\\s s\u00f4=ma]) with the extreme periphery\nof the universe, wherein are contained Sun, Moon, and some of the\nStars (Planets); for these we affirm to be in the Heaven. 3. In a\nthird sense, it means the body circumscribed ([Greek:\nperiecho/menon]) by this extreme periphery: for we usually call the\nWhole and the Universe, Heaven.--These being the three senses of\nHeaven, the Whole circumscribed by the extreme periphery must by\nnecessity consist of all the natural and perceivable body existing,\nsince there neither is nor can be any such outside of the Heaven.\nFor, if there were any such outside of the Heaven, it must be either\none of the elements or a compound thereof--either by nature or\ncontrary to nature. For we have shown that each of the three\nelements--the circular, the centrifugal, and the centripetal--has its\nown special place by nature; and that, even if the place in which it\nnow is were not its natural place, that place would be the natural\nplace of another one among the three; for, if a place be contrary to\nnature in reference to one, it must be conformable to nature in\nreference to another. Neither of these three elements therefore can\nbe outside of the Heaven, nor, of course, any of their compounds. And\nthere exists no other body besides these; nor can **there exist\nany other (ss. 6, 7).\n\nWe see therefore plainly that there neither is nor can be any mass of\nbody ([Greek: s\u00f4=matos o)/gkon]) outside of the Heaven; and that the\nHeaven comprehends all matter--all body natural and perceptible. So\nthat there neither are, nor ever have been, nor ever can be, many\nHeavens: this one is unique as well as perfect. Nor is there either\nplace, or vacuum, or time, outside of the Heaven. There is no place\nor vacuum; because, if there were, body might be placed therein;\nwhich we have shown to be impossible. There is no time; because time\nis the number of motion, and there can be no motion without some\nnatural body; but there cannot exist any extra-celestial body.\nNeither, therefore, are the things outside of the Heaven in place,\nnor is there time to affect them with old age, nor do they undergo\nchange of any kind. They are without any change of quality and\nwithout susceptibility of suffering; they remain, throughout the\nentire \u00c6on, in possession of the best and most self-sufficing life.\nThe word \u00c6on is a divine expression proposed ([Greek: thei/\u00f4s\ne)/phthegktai]) by the ancient philosophers: they call the \u00c6on of\neach creature that end which circumscribes the natural duration of\nthe creature's life. Pursuant to this same explanation, the end of\nthe whole Heaven--the end comprising all time and the infinity of all\nthings--is \u00c6on, so denominated [Greek: a)po\\ tou= **a)ei\\\nei)=nai], immortal and divine. From this is suspended existence and\nlife for all other things; for some closely and strictly, for others\nfaintly and feebly. For it is a doctrine often repeated to us in\nordinary philosophical discourse ([Greek: e)n toi=s e)gkukli/ois\nphilosoph\u00ea/masi]) respecting divine matters--that the Divine, every\nthing primary and supreme, is by necessity unchangeable; and this\nconfirms what has been just affirmed. For there exists nothing more\npowerful than itself which can cause it to be moved (if there were,\n_that_ would be more divine); nor has it any mean attribute; nor is\nit deficient in any of the perfections belonging to its nature. Its\nunceasing motion too is easily explained. For all things cease to be\nmoved, when they come into their own place; but with the circular or\nrevolving body the place in which it begins and in which it ends is\nthe same (ss. 8-10).\n\nCH. 10.--We shall next discuss whether the Kosmos be generable or\nungenerable, and perishable or imperishable; noticing what others\nhave said on the subject before. All of them consider the Kosmos to\nbe generated: but some think it (although generated) to be eternal;\nothers look upon it as perishable, like other natural compounds;\nothers again--Empedokles and Herakleitus--declare it to be generated\nand destroyed in perpetual alternation. Now to affirm that it is\ngenerated and yet that it is eternal, is an impossibility: we cannot\nreasonably affirm any thing, except what we see to happen with all\nthings or with most things; and, in the case before us, what happens\nis the very reverse of the foregoing affirmation, for all things\ngenerated are seen to be destroyed. Again that which has no beginning\nof being as it is now--that which cannot possibly have been otherwise\npreviously throughout the whole \u00c6on--can never by any possibility\nchange; for, if it could ever change, there must exist some cause,\nwhich, if it had existed before, would have compelled what is assumed\nto be incapable of being otherwise, to be otherwise. To those who say\nthat the Kosmos has come together from materials previously existing\nin another condition, we may reply**: If these materials were always\nin this prior condition and incapable of any other, the Kosmos would\nnever have been generated at all; and, if it _has_ been generated, we\nmay be sure that the antecedent materials must have been capable of\ncoming into another condition, and were not under a necessity to\nremain always in the same condition; so that aggregations once\nexisting were dissolved, and disgregations brought into combination,\nmany times over before the present Kosmos; at least they possibly may\nhave been so: and this is enough to prove that the Kosmos is not\nindestructible (ss. 1-3).\n\nAmong those who maintain the Kosmos to have been generated yet to be\nindestructible, there are some who defend themselves in the following\nmanner. They tell us that the generation of which they speak is not\nmeant to be affirmed as a real past fact, but is a mere explanatory\nor illustrative fiction, like the generation of a geometrical figure,\nintroduced to facilitate the understanding by pupils. But such an\nanalogy cannot be admitted. For in geometry the conclusions are just\nthe same, if we suppose all the figures existing simultaneously; but\nit is not so with the demonstrations which they tender about the\ngeneration of the Cosmos, where the antecedent condition and the\nconsequent condition are the reverse of each other. Out of disorder\n(they tell us) things came into order: these two conditions cannot be\nsimultaneous; generation must be a real fact, and distinction of time\ncomparing the one condition with the other; whereas in geometrical\nfigures no distinction of time is required (ss. 4-6).\n\nTo assume alternate generation and dissolution, over and over again,\nis in fact to represent the Kosmos as eternal, but as changing its\nform; as if you should suppose the same person to pass from boyhood\nto manhood and then back again from manhood to boyhood--calling that\nby the name of generation and destruction. For, if the elements come\ntogether, the aggregation resulting will not be accidental and\nvariable but always the same, especially upon the assumptions of\nthese philosophers. So that, if the whole Kosmos, remaining\ncontinuous, is sometimes arranged in one way, sometimes in another,\nit is these arrangements which are generated and destroyed, not the\nKosmos itself (ss. 7, 8).\n\nTotal generation, and total destruction without any renovation, of\nKosmos might be possible, if there were an infinity of Kosmi, but\ncannot be possible with only one; for anterior to the moment of\ngeneration there existed the antecedent condition, which, never\nhaving been generated, could not be destroyed (s. 9).\n\nThere are some who think (with Plato in Tim\u00e6us) that the\nnon-generable may yet be destroyed, and that the generated may be\nindestructible. We have combated this opinion on physical grounds,\nrespecting the Heaven specially. We shall now treat the subject upon\nuniversal reasonings (_i.e._, belonging to Logic or\nMetaphysics--[Greek: pro\\s ou(\\s phusik\u00f4=s me\\n peri\\ tou= ou)ra/nou\nmo/non ei)/r\u00eatai; katho/lou de\\ peri\\ a(/pantos skepsame/nois,\ne)/stai kai\\ peri\\ tou/tou d\u00ea=lon]--s. 10).\n\nCH. 11.--In this reasoning, the first step is to point out that\nGenerable and Non-Generable, Destructible or Indestructible, are\nwords used in many different senses, which must be discriminated\n([Greek: pollach\u00f4=s lego/mena]). If a man uses these words in an\naffirmative proposition without such discrimination, his affirmation\nis indeterminate; you cannot tell in which of their many different\nsenses he intends to affirm. Non-Generable means: (1) That which now\nis, having previously not been, even though without either generation\nor change, as, to touch or to be moved; for, according to some\npersons, touching or being moved are not cases of generation; you\ncannot become touching, or become moved; you are moved, or you are\nnot moved; you touch, or you do not touch ([Greek: ou) ga\\r ei)=nai\ngi/nesthai/ phasin a(pto/menon, ou)de\\ kinou/menon.] He means, I\npresume, that to touch, and to be moved, are instantaneous acts,\nthough how they can be said to occur [Greek: a)/neu metabol\u00ea=s], I\ndo not see.). It means: (2) That which, though capable of coming to\npass or of having come to pass ([Greek: e)ndecho/menon gi/nesthai\n\u00ea)\\ gene/sthai]), nevertheless is not; for this too is\nnon-generable, since it might have come to be. Again, it means:\n(3) That which cannot by possibility sometimes exist, sometimes not\nexist. Impossible has two meanings: (1) That of which you cannot\ntruly say that it might be generated ([Greek: o(/ti ge/noit' a)/n]);\n(2) That which cannot be generated easily, or quickly, or well\n([Greek: kal\u00f4=s]). So also the Generable ([Greek: to\\ genn\u00eato/n])\nmeans: (1) That which, not existing previously, afterwards exists\nat one time and not at another, whether generated or not (he seems\nhere to point to [Greek: to\\ a(/ptesthai] or [Greek: to\\\nkinei=sthai]); (2) The possible, whether it be the strictly possible,\nor the easily possible; (3) That of which there is generation out of\nthe nonexistent into existence, whether it now does actually exist,\nor may exist hereafter. The Destructible and Indestructible ([Greek:\nphtharto\\n kai\\ a)/phtharton]) have similar differences of meaning\n(ss. 1-6).\n\nIf we say that a man can raise a weight of 100 pounds, or march 100\nstadia, we speak always with reference to a certain extreme, meaning\nto imply that he can also raise a weight of 50, 40, 30 pounds, and\nthat he can also walk 50, 40, 30 stadia. If we say that he cannot\nraise a weight of 100 pounds, we mean to imply, _\u00e0 fortiori_, that he\ncannot raise a weight of 110 pounds. In regard to sight and hearing,\nthe case is opposite; he who can see a small object, can certainly\nsee a large one; he who can hear a faint sound, can certainly hear a\nloud one. But he who can see a large object, is not necessarily able\nto see a small one; he who can hear a loud sound, is not necessarily\nable to hear a faint one. In sight and hearing, superior power is\nindicated by the less including the greater; in motion, by the\ngreater including the less (ss. 7-8).\n\nCH. 12.--If there are some things capable both of existence and of\nnonexistence, we must define on which falls the major portion of\ntime; for, if we cannot in either case define the time, and can only\nsay that it is greater than any assumed length of time and never less\nthan any assumed length,--the same thing will be capable both of\nexistence and of non-existence for an infinite time; which is an\nimpossibility. We must take our departure from this principle:\nImpossibility is one thing, Falsehood another. Both the impossible\nand the false are, however, either conditional (as when it is said to\nbe impossible that the triangle should have its three angles equal to\ntwo right angles, if such and such things are granted, and that the\ndiameter should be commensurate with the periphery, if such and such\npositions were true), or absolute. But there are matters absolutely\nfalse, which are not absolutely impossible. When you are standing, I\naffirm that you are sitting: this is absolutely false, but not\nabsolutely impossible. On the other hand, if I affirm that you are at\nthe same time sitting and standing, or that the diameter is\ncommensurable with the periphery, the proposition is not merely\nabsolutely false, but absolutely impossible. An assumption simply\nfalse is not the same thing as an assumption absolutely impossible:\nfrom an impossible assumption there follow other impossibilities. The\npower of sitting or standing means that you can do either one at any\ngiven time--one at one time, the other at another; but not that you\ncan do both at the same time. But, if any thing has throughout an\ninfinite time the power of doing more things than one, it must have\nthe power of doing more things than one at the same time; for this\ninfinite time comprehends its whole existence. Accordingly, if any\nthing existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible,\nthis means that it has the possibility not to exist. This being a\npossibility, let us imagine it realized: then the thing in question\nwill both exist actually for an infinite time and yet not exist;\nwhich is a consequence not only false, but impossible, and thus\nproves the premiss assumed to be impossible (_i.e._, that a thing\nexisting for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible). We thus\nsee that what exists always is absolutely indestructible (ss. 1-3).\nIt is also ungenerable; for, if generable, there will be a\npossibility that at some time or other it did not exist. That is\ngenerable, which may possibly have not existed at some anterior time,\nfinite or infinite: so that, if [Greek: to\\ a)ei\\ o)/n] cannot\npossibly not exist, it cannot be generable. Now that which is always\npossible to exist, has, for its correlate negative ([Greek:\na)po/phasis]), that which is not always possible to exist; and that\nwhich is always possible not to exist, has, for its contrary, that\nwhich is not always possible not to exist. These two negatives must\nof necessity be true of the same subject: there must be something of\nwhich we may truly say--It has no possibility always to exist--It has\nno possibility always not to exist. This therefore is something\nintermediate between that which always exists, and that which always\nexists not, viz., That which may exist and may not exist ([Greek:\nkai\\ ei)=nai me/son tou= a)ei\\ o)/ntos kai\\ tou= a)ei\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/ntos,\nto\\ duna/menon ei)=nai kai\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai]); for both the negative\npredicates will find application, if it do not exist always. The\npossible to exist, and the possible not to exist, must therefore be\nthe same thing--a mean between the two above-mentioned extremes (ss.\n4, 5).\n\nAfter a long metaphysical deduction, occupying from sections 6 to 17,\nAristotle proceeds as follows.\n\nWe may also discern in the following manner that nothing which has\nbeen once generated, can continue indestructible; nothing which is\nungenerable and which always existed heretofore, can ever be\ndestroyed. For it is impossible that any thing which arises\nspontaneously ([Greek: a)po\\ tou= au)toma/tou]) can be either\nindestructible or ungenerable. The Spontaneous, and the Casual\n([Greek: to\\ a)po\\ t\u00ea=s tu/ch\u00eas]), are in antithesis to the always\nor the most frequently Ens or Fiens ([Greek: para\\ to\\ a)ei\\ kai\\ to\\\n\u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu\\ \u00ea)\\ o)\\n \u00ea)\\ gino/menon]--s. 18); but that\nwhich has existed for an infinite or a very long tine, must belong to\nthis last category. Accordingly, such things must by nature sometimes\nexist, sometimes not exist. In them, both sides of the contradiction\nare alike true, owing to the matter of which they are composed: they\nexist, and they do not exist. But you cannot say with truth now that\nthe thing exists last year; nor could you say last year that it\nexists now. Having once been non-existent, it cannot be eternal for\nfuture time; for it will still possess in future time the possibility\nof non-existence, yet not the power of non-existing at the moment\nwhen it does exist, nor with reference to last year and to past time;\nthere being no power bearing upon past time, but only on present and\nfuture time. (Sections 21 and 22 are hardly intelligible to me.)\n\nOn physical grounds also it appears impossible that what is eternal\nin the past should be destroyed afterwards, or that what did not\nexist at some former time should afterwards be eternal. Those things\nwhich are destructible, are all of them generable and changeable\n([Greek: genn\u00eata\\ kai\\ a)lloi\u00f4ta\\ pa/nta]). Those things which\nexist by nature, are changed by their opposites and by their\ncomponent materials, and are destroyed by the same agencies (s. 23).\n\n. . . . . .\n\nBook II.\n\nCH. 1.--The Heaven has not been generated nor can it be destroyed, as\nsome (Plato) affirm: it is one and eternal, having neither beginning\nnor end of the whole \u00c6on, holding and comprehending in itself\ninfinite time. This we may believe not merely from the foregoing\nreasonings, but also from the opinion of opponents who suppose the\nCosmos to be generated. For, since their opinion has been shown to be\ninadmissible, and our doctrine is at least admissible, even thus much\nwill have great force to determine our faith in the immortality and\neternity of the Heaven. Hence we shall do well to assist in\npersuading ourselves that the ancient doctrines, and especially those\nof our own country, are true--That there is among the substances\nendowed with motion one immortal and divine, whose motion is such\nthat it has itself no limit but is rather itself the limit of all\nother motions, limit being the attribute of the circumscribing\nsubstance. The circular motion of the Heaven, being itself perfect,\ncircumscribes and comprehends all the imperfect motions which are\nsubject to limit and cessation. It has itself neither beginning nor\nend, but is unceasing throughout infinite time: in regard to other\nmotions, it is the initiatory cause to some, while it is the\nrecipient of the cessation of others (ss. 1, 2).\n\nThe ancients assigned Heaven to the Gods, as the only place which was\nimmortal, and our reasonings show that it is not merely\nindestructible and ungenerable, but also unsusceptible of all mortal\ndefect or discomfort. Moreover it feels no fatigue, because it is not\nconstrained by any extraneous force to revolve contrary to its own\nnature: if it were so, that would be tiresome, and all the more since\nthe motion is eternal; it would be inconsistent with any supremely\ngood condition. The ancients therefore were mistaken in saying that\nthe Heaven required to be supported by a person named Atlas: the\nauthors of this fable proceeded upon the same supposition as recent\nphilosophers; regarding the celestial body as heavy and earthy, they\nplaced under it, in mythical guise, an animated necessity ([Greek:\na)na/gk\u00ean e)/mpsuchon]), or constraint arising from vital force. But\nthey are wrong; and so is Empedokles, when he says that the Heaven is\nkept permanently in its place by extreme velocity of rotation, which\ncounteracts its natural inclination downwards ([Greek: oi)kei/as\nr(op\u00ea=s]). Nor can we reasonably suppose that it is kept eternally\nin its place (_i.e._, contrary to its own nature) by the compulsion\nof a soul or vital force ([Greek: u(po\\ psuch\u00ea=s a)nagkazou/s\u00eas]):\nit is impossible that the life of a soul thus acting can be painless\nor happy. The motion which it causes, being accompanied with violence\nand being also perpetual (as it is the nature of the First Body to\ncause motion continuously throughout the Kosmos), must be a tiresome\nduty, unrelieved by any reasonable relaxation; since this soul enjoys\nno repose, such as the letting down of the body during sleep affords\nto the soul of mortal animals, but is subjected to a fate like\nIxion's--ceaseless and unyielding revolution. Now our reasonings, if\nadmissible, respecting the First or Circular Motion ([Greek:\npr\u00f4/t\u00eas phora=s]) afford not merely more harmonious conceptions\nrespecting its eternity, but also the only way of speaking in\nlanguage which will be allowed as consistent with the vague\nimpressions respecting the Deity ([Greek: t\u00ea=| mantei/a| t\u00ea=| peri\\\nto\\n theo/n]). Enough, however, of this talk for the present\n(ss. 3-6).\n\nCH. 2.--Since the Pythagoreans and others recognize a Right and Left\nin the Heaven, let us enquire whether such [Greek: a)rchai/] can\nproperly be ascribed to the body of the Universe; for, if these can\nbe ascribed, much more may the other [Greek: a)rchai/] prior to them\nbe ascribed to it. Of [Greek: a)rchai/ kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s] (_termini a\nquibus_), there are three couples: (1) Upwards and Downwards;\n(2) Forward and Backward; (3) Right and Left. All the three exist in\nanimals; but the first alone is found in plants. All the three are in\nall perfect bodies, and in all animated bodies which have in\nthemselves a beginning of motion; but not in inanimate bodies, which\nhave not in themselves a beginning. Each of these three [Greek:\na)rchai/] or [Greek: diasta/seis] is true and appropriate as an\nattribute; but among the three, Upwards and Downwards comes first in\nthe order of nature, Right and Left, last. The Pythagoreans are to be\nblamed for dwelling on Right and Left, and not noticing the other two\npairs which are prior in the order of nature and more appropriate,\nand for supposing that Right and Left are to be found in every thing.\nUpward is the principle of length; Right, of breadth; Forward, of\ndepth. Again, from upward movement comes growth; movement from the\nright is local movement; movement from before is movement of sense\n([Greek: \u00ea( kata\\ t\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin]), or the line in which\nsensible impressions are propagated ([Greek: e)ph' \u00f4(=|\nai)sth\u00ea/seis]). Up is the source from whence motion originates\n([Greek: to\\ o(/then \u00ea( ki/n\u00easis]--s. 6); Right, the point from\nwhich the direction of the motion starts; Forward, the point towards\nwhich it goes ([Greek: to\\ e)ph' o(/]). In inanimate bodies (which\nare either not moved at all, or only moved in one manner and\ndirection, as fire only upwards, earth only downwards), we speak of\nabove and below, right and left, only with reference to ourselves,\nand not as attributes really belonging to these objects; for by\ninverting the objects these attributes will be inverted also, right\nwill become left, and left will become right. But in animated\nobjects, which have in themselves an [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\ kin\u00ea/se\u00f4s], a\nreal right and left, a real upward and downward, are to be\nrecognized: of course therefore in the Heaven, which is an animated\nobject of this character ([Greek: e)/mpsuchos]). For we must not make\nany difficulty in consequence of the spherical figure of the\nuniverse, or suppose that such a figure excludes real right and left,\nthe parts being all alike and all in perpetual motion. We must\nconceive the case as like that of a person having a real right and\nleft, distinct in attributes, but who has been enclosed in a hollow\nsphere: he will still have the real distinct right and left, yet to a\nspectator outside he will appear not to have it. In like manner, we\nmust speak of the Heaven as having a beginning of motion; for, though\nits motion never did begin, yet there must be some point from which\nit would have taken its departure, if it ever had begun, and from\nwhich it would recommence, if it ever came to a standstill. I call\nthe length of the Heaven, the distance between the poles--one of the\npoles above, the other below. Now the pole which is above us, is the\nlower pole; that which is invisible to us, is the upper pole. For\nthat is called right, in each object, from whence local movement\ntakes its departure, or where local movement begins. But the\nrevolution of the Heaven begins on the side where the stars rise;\nthis, therefore, is the true right, and the side on which they set,\nis left. If, therefore, it begins from the right, and revolves round\nto the right ([Greek: e)pi\\ ta\\ de/xia periphe/retai]), the invisible\npole must be the upper pole; for, if the visible pole were the upper,\nthe movement of the Heaven would be to the left, which we deny to be\nthe fact. The invisible pole is therefore the upper, and those who\nlive near it are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right ([Greek:\npro\\s toi=s dexi/ois]); we on the contrary are in the lower\nhemisphere, and to the left. The Pythagoreans are in error when they\nsay that we are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right, and that\ninhabitants of the southern hemisphere are in the lower hemisphere\nand to the left. But, speaking with reference to the second\nrevolution ([Greek: t\u00ea=s deute/ras periphora=s]) or that of the\nplanets, which is in the contrary direction to the first revolution\nor that of the First Heaven, it is we who are in the upper hemisphere\nand on the right side; it is the inhabitants of the southern\nhemisphere, who are in the lower hemisphere and on the left side:\nthat is, it is we who are on the side of the beginning of motion,\nthey who are on the side of the end (ss. 1-10).\n\nCH. 3.--I have previously laid it down, that circular movement is not\nopposite to circular. But, if this be the case, what is the reason\nthat there are many different revolutions in the Heaven? This is what\nI shall now enquire, fully aware of the great distance from which the\nenquiry must be conducted ([Greek: po/r)r(\u00f4then])--not so much a\ndistance in place, as owing to the small number of accompanying facts\nwhich can be observed by the senses respecting them.\n\nThe cause must be looked for in this direction. Every thing which\nperforms a work, exists for the sake of that work. Now the work of\nDeity is immortality, or eternal life; so that the divine substance\nmust of necessity be in eternal motion. The Heaven is a divine body\nand has for that reason the encyclical body, whose nature it is to be\nmoved for ever in a circle. But why is not the whole body of the\nHeaven thus constituted (_i.e._, encyclical)? Because it is necessary\nthat some portion of its body should remain stationary in the centre;\nand no portion of the encyclical body can possibly remain stationary,\neither in the centre or elsewhere. For, if it could, its natural\nmotion (_i.e._, the motion of that supposed portion) would be towards\nthe centre; whereas its natural motion is circular; and it cannot\nmove towards the centre contrary to its nature, because on that\nsupposition its motion would not be eternal: no motion contrary to\nnature can be eternal. Moreover that which is contrary to nature is\nposterior to that which is natural; it is a deviation therefrom\narising in the course of generation (s. 1).\n\nHence it is necessary that earth should exist, the nature of which it\nis to rest in the centre (_i.e._, the divine encyclical body will not\nsuffice alone, without adjuncts of different nature). I assume this\nfor the present; more will be said about it anon.\n\nBut, if earth exists, fire must exist also; for of two contraries, if\nthe one exist by nature, the other must exist by nature also. For the\nmatter of contraries is the same, and Form (positive and affirmable)\nis prior by nature to Privation (for example, hot is prior to cold);\nnow rest and gravity denote the privation of motion and lightness (s.\n2--_i.e._, fire is prior in nature to earth, as having the positive\nessences motion and levity, while earth has for its essence the\nprivation thereof).\n\nAgain, if fire and earth exist, the two other elements intermediate\nbetween them must also exist; for each of the four elements has its\npeculiar mode of contrariety with reference to each. At least let\nthis be assumed now: I shall show it at length presently.\n\nNow, these points being established, we see that generation must\nnecessarily come to pass, because no one of the four elements can be\neternal: they act upon each other, and suffer from each other, with\ncontrary effects; they are destructive of each other. Besides, each\nof them has a mode of motion natural and appropriate to it, but this\nmode of motion is not eternal (because it is either to the centre or\nto the circumference and therefore has a natural terminus). It is not\nreasonable to suppose that any Mobile can be eternal, whose natural\nmode of motion cannot be eternal (s. 3).\n\nThus the four elements are not eternal, but require to be renewed by\ngeneration; therefore generation must come to pass. But, if\ngeneration be necessary, more than one revolution of the celestial\nbody is indispensably required: two at least, if not more. For, if\nthere were no other revolution except that of the First Heaven, that\nis consistent only with a perfectly uniform condition of the four\nelements in relation to each other (s. 4).\n\nWhen the question is asked, therefore, Why there are (not one only\nbut) several encyclical bodies? I answer: Because generation _must_\ncome to pass. There must be generation, if there be fire; there must\nbe fire and the other elements, if there be earth; there must be\nearth, because something must remain stationary eternally in the\ncentre, if there is to be eternal revolution (s. 5).\n\nCH. 4.--The Heaven is by necessity spherical: this figure is at once\nboth most akin to its essence and first in its own nature. I shall\nbegin with some observations respecting figures generally--plane and\nsolid, as to which among them is the first. Every plane figure is\neither rectilinear or curvilinear; the former is comprehended by many\nlines, the latter only by one. Now, since in every department one is\nprior to many and simple to compound, the first of all plane figures\nmust be the circle. Moreover, since that is perfect which can receive\nnothing additional from without, and since addition can be made to\nevery straight line, but none whatever to the line circumscribing a\ncircle, it is plain that this latter is perfect; and therefore the\ncircle is the first of all plane figures, and the sphere of all solid\nfigures (ss. 1, 2). This doctrine appears most reasonable when we set\nout the different figures, each with a number belonging to it in\nnumerical order. The circle corresponds to One, the triangle to Two,\nsince its three angles are equal to two right angles; whereas, if we\nassign number One to the triangle and place that first, we can find\nno number fit for the circle: the circle will be no longer recognized\nas a figure (s. 4).\n\nNow, since the first figure belongs to the first body, which is that\nin the extreme or farthest circumference, this body which revolves\nconstantly in a circle, will be spherical in figure. That which is\ncontinuous with it even to the centre, will also be spherical; and\nall the interior parts are in contact and continuity with it: the\nparts below the sphere of the planets touch the sphere above them. So\nthat the whole revolving current, interior and exterior, will be\nspherical; for all things touch and are continuous with the spheres\n(s. 5).\n\nThere is another reason too why the universe is spherical in figure,\nsince it has been shown to revolve in a circle. I have proved before\nthat there exists nothing on the outside of the universe; neither\nplace nor vacuum. If the figure of the Kosmos, revolving as it does\nin a circle, were any thing else but spherical--if it were either\nrectilinear or elliptical--it could not possibly cover exactly the\nsame space during all its revolutions: there must therefore be place\nand vacuum without it; which has been shown to be impossible (s. 6).\n\nFarthermore, the rotation of the Heaven is the measure of motions,\nbecause it is the only one continuous and uniform and eternal. Now in\nevery department the measure is the least, and the least motion is\nthe quickest; accordingly the rotation of the Heaven will be the\nquickest of all motions (s. 7). But among all curved lines from the\nsame back to the same, the circumference of the circle is the\nshortest, and motion will be quickest over the shortest distance.\nAccordingly, since the Heaven revolves in a circle and with the\nquickest of all motions, its figure must be spherical (s. 8).\n\nWe may also draw the same conclusion from the bodies fixed in the\ncentral parts of the Kosmos. The Earth in the centre is surrounded by\nwater; the water, by air; the air, by fire. The uppermost bodies\nsurround the fire, following the like proportion or analogy; being\nnot continuous therewith, but in contact therewith. Now the surface\nof water is spherical; and that which is either continuous with the\nspherical or surrounds the spherical, must itself be spherical also\n(s. 9). That the surface of the water is truly spherical, we may\ninfer from the fact, that it is the nature of water always to flow\ntogether into the lowest cavities, that is, into the parts nearest to\nthe centre (s. 10).\n\nFrom all the foregoing reasonings, we see plainly that the Kosmos is\nspherical, and moreover turned with such a degree of exact sphericity\n([Greek: kata\\ a)kri/beian e)/ntornos ou(/t\u00f4s]), that no piece of\nhuman workmanship nor any thing ever seen by us on earth can be\ncompared to it. For none of the component materials here on earth is\nso fit for receiving perfect level and accuracy as the nature of the\nFirst or Peripheral Body; it being clear that, in the same proportion\nas water is more exactly spherical, the elements surrounding the\nwater become more and more spherical in proportion as they are more\nand more distant from the centre (s. 11).\n\nCH. 5.--Circular revolution may take place in two directions; from\nthe point A on one side towards B, or on the other side towards C.\nThat these two are not contrary to each other, I have already shown.\nBut, since in eternal substances nothing can possibly take place by\nchance or spontaneity, and since both the Heaven and its circular\nrevolution are eternal, we may enquire what is the reason why this\nrevolution takes place in one direction and not in the other. This\ncircumstance either depends upon some first principle, or is itself a\nfirst principle (s. 1). Perhaps some may consider it a mark either of\ngreat silliness, or great presumption, to declare any positive\nopinion at all upon some matters, or upon all matters whatever,\nleaving out nothing. But we must not censure indiscriminately all who\ndo this: we must consider what is the motive which prompts each\nperson to declare himself, and with what amount of confidence he\naffirms, whether allowing for human fallibility or setting himself\nabove it. Whenever a man can find out exact and necessary grounds for\nthe conclusions which he propounds, we ought to be grateful to him:\nhere we must deliver what appears to be the truth. Nature (we know)\nalways does what is best among all the practicable courses. Now the\nupper place is more divine than the lower, and accordingly among\nrectilinear currents, that which is directed upwards is the more\nhonourable. In the same manner, the current forwards is more\nhonourable than backwards; and the current towards the right more\nhonourable than that towards the left--as was before laid down. The\nproblem above started indicates to us that there is here a real Prius\nand Posterius--a better and a worse; for, when we recognize this, the\ndifficulty is solved. The solution is that this is the best\npracticable arrangement, viz., that the Kosmos is moved in a motion,\nsimple, never-ending, and in the most honourable direction ([Greek:\ne)pi\\ to\\ timi\u00f4/teron], s. 2).\n\nCH. 6.--I have now to show that this motion of the First Heaven is\nuniform and not irregular ([Greek: o(mal\u00ea\\s kai\\ ou)k a)n\u00f4/malos]):\nI speak only of the First Heaven and of the First Rotation; for in\nthe substances lower than this many rotations or currents have\ncoalesced into one. If the motion of the First Heaven be irregular,\nthere will clearly be acceleration and remission of its motion, and\nan extreme point or maximum ([Greek: a)km\u00ea/]) thereof. Now the\nmaximum of motion must take place either at the terminus _ad quem_,\nas in things moved according to nature; or at the terminus _a quo_,\nas in things moved contrary to nature; or during the interval\nbetween, as in things thrown ([Greek: e)n toi=s r(iptoume/nois]). But\nin circular motion, there is neither terminus _a quo_, nor terminus\n_ad quem_, nor middle between the two--neither beginning, nor end,\nnor mean; for it is eternal in duration, compact as to length or\nspace moved over, and unbroken ([Greek: t\u00f4=| m\u00ea/kei sun\u00eagme/n\u00ea\nkai\\ a)/klastos]). It thus cannot have any maximum or acceleration or\nremission; and of course, therefore, it cannot be irregular (s. 1).\n\nBesides, since every thing that is moved is moved by some thing, the\nirregularity, if there be such, must arise either from the Movens, or\nthe Motum, or both: the power of the Movens, or the quality of the\nMotum, or both, must undergo change. But nothing of the sort can\nhappen with the Motum, being in this case the Heaven; for it has been\nshown to be a First, simple, ungenerable, indestructible, and in\nevery way unchangeable. Much more then is it reasonable to believe\nthat the Movens is such; for that which is qualified to move the\nFirst, must be itself a First ([Greek: to\\ ga\\r pr\u00f4=ton tou=\npr\u00f4/tou kin\u00eatiko/n]); that which is qualified to move the simple,\nmust be itself simple, &c. If then the Motum, which is a body,\nundergoes no change, neither will the Movens, being as it is\nincorporeal (s. 2). Accordingly the current, or motion ([Greek:\nphora/]), cannot possibly be irregular. For, if it comes to pass\nirregularly, its irregularity either pervades the whole, the velocity\nbecoming alternately more or less, or certain parts only. But, in\nregard to the parts separately, there is certainly no irregularity:\nif there had been, the relative distances of the stars one from the\nother would have varied in the course of infinite time; now no such\nvariation in their distances has ever been observed. Neither in\nregard to the whole is there any irregularity. For irregularity\nimplies relaxation, and relaxation arises in every subject from\nimpotence. Now impotence is contrary to nature: in animals, all\nimpotences (such as old age or decay) are contrary to nature; for all\nanimals, perhaps, are compounds put together out of elements each of\nwhich has a different place of its own and not one of which is in its\nown place. In the First Bodies, on the other hand, which are simple,\nunmixed, in their own places, and without any contrary, there can be\nno impotence, and therefore neither relaxation nor intensification,\nwhich always go together ([Greek: ei) ga\\r e)pi/tasis, kai\\\na)/nesis], s. 3). Besides, we cannot with any reason suppose that the\nMovens is impotent for an infinite time, and then again potent for an\ninfinite time; nothing contrary to nature lasts for an infinite time,\nand impotence is contrary to nature; nor can it be for an equal time\ncontrary to nature and agreeable to nature--impotent and potent. If\nthe motion relaxes, it cannot go on relaxing for an infinite time,\nnor go on being intensified, nor the one and the other alternately.\nFor in that case the motion would be infinite and indeterminate;\nwhich is impossible, since every motion must be from one term to\nanother term and also determinate (s. 4: [Greek: a)/peiros ga\\r a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea kai\\ a)o/ristos \u00ea( ki/n\u00easis. a(/pasan de/ phamen e)/k tinos\nei)/s ti ei)=nai, kai\\ \u00f4(risme/n\u00ean]--_i.e._, all motion must be\ndetermined both in distance and direction).\n\nAgain, the supposition may be made that there is a minimum of time\nrequired for the revolution of the Heaven, in less than which the\nrevolution could not be completed; just as there is a minimum of time\nindispensable for a man to walk or play the harp. Admitting this\nsupposition, there cannot be perpetual increase in the intensity or\nvelocity of the motion (the increase has an impassable limit), and\ntherefore there cannot be perpetual relaxation; for both are on the\nsame footing (s. 5).\n\nIt might be urged, indeed, that intensification and relaxation go on\nalternately; each proceeding to a certain length, and then giving\nplace to the other. But this is altogether irrational--nothing better\nthan a gratuitous fiction. Besides, if there were this alternation,\nwe may reasonably assume that it could not remain concealed from us;\nfor contrasting conditions coming in immediate sequence to each other\nare more easily discerned by sense. What has been said, then, is\nsufficient to prove--That the Heaven or Cosmos is one and only one;\nthat it is ungenerable and eternal; that its motion is uniform (s.\n6).\n\nCH. 7.--Next in order, I have to speak of what are called the Stars\n([Greek: t\u00f4=n kaloume/n\u00f4n a)/str\u00f4n]). Of what are they composed?\nWhat is their figure? What are their motions?\n\nIt is consistent with the foregoing reasonings, as well as in itself\nthe most rational doctrine, to conceive each of the stars as composed\nof portions of that body in which its current of motion takes place;\nthat is, of that body, whose nature it is to move in a circle. For\nthose who affirm the stars to be fire say this because they believe\nthe upper body to be fire, assuming it as reasonable that each thing\nshould be composed of the elements in which it is; and I assume the\nsame also (s. 1). The heat and light of the stars arises from their\nfriction with the air in their current of motion. If it is the nature\nof motion to inflame pieces of wood, and stones, and iron, it is\nstill more reasonable that what is nearest to fire (that is, air)\nshould be so inflamed. We see that darts projected are so inflamed,\nthat their leaden appendages are melted; and, these being thus\ninflamed, the air around them must be modified in the same manner.\nNow objects like these darts are thus violently heated, because they\nare carried along in the medium of the air, which through the shock\ngiven by their motion becomes fire. But each of the upper bodies or\nstars is carried round (not in the air, but) in its appropriate\nsphere, so that they themselves are not inflamed; while the air which\nis under the sphere of the encyclical body becomes of necessity\nheated by the rotation of that sphere; and most of all at the point\nwhere the Sun has happened to be fastened in ([Greek: kai\\ tau/t\u00ea|\nma/lista, \u00ea(=| o( \u00ea(/lios tetu/ch\u00eaken e)ndedeme/nos]).\n\nLet it then be understood, that the stars are neither composed of\nfire, nor are they carried round in the medium of the fire (s. 2).\n\nCH. 8.--It is seen as a fact, that both the stars, and the entire\nHeaven, change their place ([Greek: methista/mena]). Now, in this\nchange, we must assume either that both continue at rest, or that\nboth are in motion, or that one is at rest, and the other is in\nmotion. Now it is impossible that both can be at rest, at least if we\nassume the earth to be at rest; for the facts which we see would not\nhave taken place, upon that supposition (s. 1). Either therefore both\nare in motion, or one is in motion and the other at rest. Now, if\nboth are in motion, it is against reason that the stars and the\ncircles in which they are fastened should have equal velocities of\nmotion. Each one of them must, be equal in velocity to the circle or\nsphere in which it is carried, since all come back round along with\ntheir circles to the same position; so that in one and the same time,\nthe star has gone round its circle, and the circle has completed its\nrevolution. It is not reasonable to suppose that the velocities of\nthe stars and the magnitudes of the circles should be in the same\nproportion. Comparing one circle with another, indeed, it is not only\nnot absurd, but even necessary, that the velocities should be in\nproportion to the magnitudes; but it is not reasonable that each of\nthe stars in these circles should be of such velocity. For, if it be\nnecessary that what is carried round in the larger circle should have\nthe greater velocity, the consequence would be that, if the stars in\none circle were transferred to another, their motions would become\naccelerated or retarded; which is equivalent to saying that they have\nno motion of their own at all, but are carried round by the\nrevolution of the circles (s. 2). If, on the contrary, it be not\nnecessary, but a spontaneous coincidence ([Greek: ei)/te a)po\\\ntau)toma/tou sune/pesen]) that what is carried round in the greater\ncircle has the greater velocity, neither upon this supposition is it\nreasonable that in all the circles without exception the\ncircumference should be greater, and the motion of the star fastened\nin the greater circle quicker, in the same proportion. That this\nshould happen with one or two of them, might be reasonably expected;\nbut that it should happen with all alike, savours of fiction.\nMoreover chance has no place in matters according to nature; nor is\nthat which occurs everywhere and belongs to all, ever the produce of\nchance (s. 3).\n\nSo much for the hypothesis, that both stars and circles are in\nmotion. Let us now assume that one is at rest, and the other in\nmotion; and first, let the circles be at rest, and the stars in\nmotion. This again will lead to absurdities; for we shall still be\nunable to explain how it happens that the outermost stars are moved\nmost quickly, and that their velocities are proportioned to the\nmagnitudes of the circles.\n\nSince then we cannot assume either that both are moved, or that the\nstar alone is moved, we must adopt the third supposition, that the\ncircles are moved, and that the stars, being themselves at rest, are\nfastened in the circles and carried round along with them. This is\nthe only hypothesis which entails no unreasonable consequences. For\nit is reasonable that, of circles fastened round the same centre, the\ngreater velocity should belong to the greatest. For, as in all the\nvarieties of body the heavier fragment is carried with greater\nvelocity than the lighter in its appropriate motion, so it happens\nwith the encyclical body. When two straight lines are drawn from the\ncentre, the segment of the greater circle intercepted between them\nwill be greater than the segment of the smaller; and it is consistent\nwith reason that the greater circle should be carried round in equal\ntime. This is one reason why the Kosmos is not split into separate\nparts; another reason is, because the universe has been shown to be\ncontinuous (s. 4, 5).\n\nNow we all agree that the stars are of spherical figure: and\nspherical bodies have two motions of their own--rolling and rotatory\n([Greek: ku/lisis kai\\ di/n\u00easis]). If they were moved of themselves,\nthey would be moved in one or other of these two ways; but we see\nthat they are so in neither. They do not rotate; for, if they did,\nthey would remain always in the same place, which contradicts\nuniversal observation and belief. Besides, it is reasonable to\nsuppose that all the stars move in the same manner, but the Sun is\nthe only one that is seen so to move, when he rises or sets; and he\ntoo, not by any movement of his own, but through the distance of our\nvision, which when stretched to a great distance, rotates from\nweakness (s. 6). This is perhaps the reason why the stars fastened\n(in the outer sphere) twinkle, while the planets do not twinkle; for\nthe planets are near to us, so that our vision reaches them while yet\nstrong; whereas in regard to the unmoved stars it is made to quiver\nin consequence of the great distance from being stretched out too\nfar, and its quivering causes the appearance of motion in the star.\nFor there is no difference between moving the vision and moving the\nobject seen ([Greek: ou)the\\n ga\\r diaphe/rei kinei=n t\u00ea\\n o)/psin\n\u00ea)\\ to\\ o(r\u00f4/menon]--s. 6).\n\nAgain, neither do the stars roll nor revolve forward. For that which\nrolls forward must necessarily turn round; but the same side of the\nmoon--what is called the face of the moon--is always clearly visible\nto us (s. 7).\n\nSince it is reasonable to believe, therefore, that, if the stars were\nmoved in themselves, they would be moved in their own special variety\nof motion (_i.e._, rolling or rotatory), and since it has been shown\nthat they are not moved in either of these two ways, we see plainly\nthat they cannot be moved in themselves (but are carried round in the\nrevolution of the Aplan\u00eas).\n\nBesides, if they were moved in **themselves, it is unreasonable that\nNature should have assigned to them no organ suitable for motion,\nsince Nature does nothing by haphazard; and that she should have been\nconsiderate in providing for animals, while she overlooked objects so\nhonourable as the stars. The truth rather is, that she has withheld\nfrom them, as it were by express purpose, all aids, through which it\nwas possible for them to advance forward in themselves, and has\nplaced them at the greatest possible distance from objects furnished\nwith organs for motion (s. 8).\n\nHence it would seem to be the reasonable doctrine--That the entire\nHeaven is spherical, and that each of the stars (fastened in it) is\nalso spherical. For the sphere is the most convenient of all figures\nfor motion in the same place, so that the Heaven being spherical\nwould be moved most rapidly and would best maintain its own place.\nBut for forward motion the sphere is of all figures the most\ninconvenient; for it least resembles self-moving bodies; it has no\noutlying appendage or projecting end, as rectilinear figures have,\nand stands farthest removed from the figures of marching bodies.\n\nSince therefore it is the function of ([Greek: dei=]) the Heaven to\nbe moved by a motion in the same place ([Greek: kinei=sthai t\u00ea\\n e)n\nau(t\u00f4=| ki/n\u00easin]), and that of the stars not to make any advance\nby themselves ([Greek: ta\\ a)/lla d' a)/stra m\u00ea\\ proi+e/nai di'\nau(t\u00f4=n]), it is with good reason that both of them are spherical.\nFor thus will the Heaven best be moved, and the stars will best be at\nrest.\n\nCH. 9.--From what I have said, it is plain that those who affirm that\nthe revolving celestial bodies emit in their revolutions sounds\nharmonious to each other, speak cleverly and ingeniously, but not\nconsistently with the truth. There must necessarily be sound (they\nsay) from the revolution of such vast bodies. Since bodies near to us\nmake sound in motion, the sun, moon, and stars, being so much larger\nand moving with so much greater velocity, must make an immense sound;\nand, since their distances and velocities are assumed to be in\nharmonic proportion, the sounds emitted in their revolution must also\nbe in harmony. To the question put to them--Why do we not hear this\nimmense sound? they reply, that we have been hearing it constantly\nfrom the moment of our birth; that we have no experience of an\nopposite state, or state of silence, with which to contrast it, and\nthat sound and silence are discriminated only by relation to each\nother ([Greek: \u00f4(/ste m\u00ea\\ dia/d\u00ealon ei)=nai pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)nanti/an\nsig\u00ea/n; pro\\s a)/ll\u00eala ga\\r ph\u00f4n\u00ea=s kai\\ sig\u00ea=s ei)=nai t\u00ea\\n\ndia/gn\u00f4sin]); that men thus cease to be affected by it, just as\nblacksmiths from constant habit cease to be affected by the noise of\ntheir own work (s. 1).\n\nThe reasoning of these philosophers (the Pythagoreans), as I have\njust said, is graceful and poetical, yet nevertheless inadmissible.\nFor they ought to explain, upon their hypothesis, not merely why we\nhear nothing, but why we experience no uncomfortable impressions\napart from hearing. For prodigious sounds pierce through and destroy\nthe continuity even of inanimate bodies; thus thunder splits up\nstones and other bodies of the greatest strength. The impression\nproduced here by the sound of the celestial bodies must be violent\nbeyond all endurance. But there is good reason why we neither hear\nnor suffer any thing from them; viz., that they make no sound. The\ncause thereof is one which attests the truth of my doctrine laid down\nabove--That the stars are not moved of themselves, but carried round\nby and in the circle to which they are fastened. Bodies thus carried\nround, make no sound or shock: it is only bodies carried round of\nthemselves that make sound and shock. Bodies which are fastened in,\nor form parts of, a revolving body, cannot possibly sound, any more\nthan the parts of a ship moving, nor indeed could the whole ship\nsound, if carried along in a running river. Yet the Pythagoreans\nmight urge just the same reasons to prove that bodies so large as the\nmast, the stern, and the entire ship, could not be moved without\nnoise. Whatever is carried round, indeed, in a medium not itself\ncarried round, really makes sound; but it cannot do so, if the medium\nitself be carried round continuously. We must therefore in this case\nmaintain that, if the vast bodies of the stars were carried round in\na medium either of air or of fire (whose motion is rectilinear), as\nall men say that they are, they must necessarily make a prodigious\nsound, which would reach here to us and would wear us out ([Greek:\ndiaknai/ein]). Since nothing of this nature occurs, we may be sure\nthat the stars are not carried round in a current of their own,\neither animated or violent. It is as if Nature had foreseen the\nconsequence, that, unless the celestial motions were carried on in\nthe manner in which they are carried on, nothing of what now takes\nplace near us ([Greek: t\u00f4=n peri\\ to\\n deu=ro to/pon]), could have\nbeen as it is now. I have thus shown that the stars are spherical,\nand that they are not moved by a motion of their own (ss. 2-5).\n\nCH. 10.--Respecting the arrangement of the stars--how each of them is\nplaced, some anterior others posterior, and what are their distances\nfrom each other--the books on astronomy must be consulted and will\nexplain. It consists with the principles there laid down, that the\nmotions of the stars (planets) should be proportional to their\ndistances, some quicker, others slower. For, since the farthest\ncircle of the Heaven has a revolution both simple and of extreme\nvelocity, while the revolutions of the other stars (planets) are many\nin number and slower, each of them being carried round in its own\ncircle in the direction contrary to that of the first or farthest\ncircle of the Heaven, the reasonable consequence is, that that planet\nwhich is nearest to the first and simple revolving circle takes the\nlongest time to complete its own (counter-revolving) circle, while\nthat which is most distant from the same circle takes the shortest\ntime, and the remaining planets take more or less time in proportion\nas they are nearer or farther. For the planet nearest to the first\nrevolving circle has its own counterrevolution most completely\nconquered or overpowered thereby; the planet farthest from the same,\nhas its own counterrevolution least conquered thereby; and the\nintermediate planets more or less in inverse proportion to their\ndistances from the same, as mathematicians demonstrate.\n\nCH. 11.--We may most reasonably assume the figure of the stars to be\nspherical. For, since we have shown that it is not their nature to\nhave any motion of their own, and since Nature does nothing either\nirrational or in vain, it is plain that she has assigned to the\nimmovables that figure which is least fit for motion; which figure is\nthe sphere, as having no organ for motion. Besides, what is true of\none is true of all ([Greek: e)/ti d' o(moi/\u00f4s me\\n a(/panta kai\\\ne(/n]): now the Moon may be shown to be spherical, first, by the\nvisible manifestations which she affords in her waxings and wanings,\nnext, from astronomical observations of the eclipses of the Sun.\nSince therefore one among the stars is shown to be spherical, we may\npresume that the rest will be so likewise.\n\nCH. 12.--I proceed to two other difficulties, which are well\ncalculated to perplex every one. We must try to state what looks most\nlike truth, considering such forwardness not to be of the nature of\naudacity, but rather to deserve respect, when any one, stimulated by\nthe thirst for philosophy, contents himself with small helps and\nfaint approximations to truth, having to deal with the gravest\ndifficulties.\n\n1. Why is it, that the circles farthest from the outermost circle (or\nAplan\u00eas) are not always moved by a greater number of motions than\nthose nearer to it? Why are some of the intermediate circles (neither\nfarthest nor nearest) moved by a greater number of motions than any\nof the others? For it would seem reasonable, when the First Body is\nmoved by one single rotatory current, that the one nearest to it\nshould be moved by two, the next nearest by three, and so on in\nregular sequence to those which are more distant. But we find that\nthe reverse occurs in fact: Sun and Moon have fewer movements than\nsome of the planets, which are nevertheless farther from the centre,\nand nearer to the First Body. In regard to some of the planets, we\nknow this by visual evidence; for we have seen the Moon when at\nhalf-moon passing under Mars, who was occulted by the dark part of her\nbody, and emerged on the bright side of it. The like is attested\nrespecting the other planets, by the Egyptians and Babylonians, the\nmost ancient of all observers.\n\n2. Why is it, that in the First Revolution (in the revolution of the\nFirst Heaven or First Body) there is included so vast a multitude of\nstars as to seem innumerable; while in each of the others there is\none alone and apart, never two or more fastened in the same current?\n\nHere are two grave difficulties, which it is well to investigate and\ntry to understand, though our means of information are very scanty,\nand though we stand at so great a distance from the facts. Still, as\nfar as we can make out from such data, these difficulties would not\nseem to involve any philosophical impossibility or incongruity. Now\nwe are in the habit of considering these celestial bodies as bodies\nonly; and as monads which have indeed regular arrangement, but are\ntotally destitute of soul or vital principle. (When Aristotle here\nsays _we_, he must mean the philosophers whose point of view he is\ndiscussing: for the general public certainly did not regard the Sun,\nMoon, and stars as [Greek: a)/psucha pa/mpan], but, on the contrary,\nconsidered this as blameable heresy, and looked upon them as\nGods**.) We ought, however, to conceive them as partaking of life\nand action ([Greek: dei= d' \u00f4(s metecho/nt\u00f4n u(polamba/nein\npra/xe\u00f4s kai\\ z\u00f4\u00ea=s]); and in this point of view the actual state\nof the case will appear nowise unreasonable (s. 2). For we should\nnaturally expect that to that which is in the best possible\ncondition, such well-being will belong without any agency at all; to\nthat which is next best, through agency single and slight; to such as\nare farther removed in excellence of condition, through action more\nmultiplied and diversified. Just so in regard to the human body: the\nbest constituted body maintains its good condition without any\ntraining at all; there are others which will do the same at the cost\nof nothing more than a little walking; there are inferior bodies\nwhich require, for the same result, wrestling, running, and other\nmotions; while there are even others which cannot by any amount of\nlabour attain a good condition, but are obliged to be satisfied with\nsomething short of it (s. 3). Moreover it is difficult to succeed in\nmany things, or to succeed often: you may throw one or two sixes with\nthe dice, but you cannot throw ten thousand; and, farther, when the\nconditions of the problem become complicated--when one thing is to be\ndone for the sake of another, that other for a third result, and that\nthird for a fourth, &c.--success, which may be tolerably easy when\nthe steps are only few, the more they are multiplied, becomes harder\nand harder.\n\nHence we must consider the agency of the stars as analogous to that\nof plants and animals. For here the agency of man is most\nmultifarious, since he is capable of attaining many varieties of\ngood, and accordingly busies himself about many things and about one\nthing for the sake of others. The agency of other animals on the\nother hand is more restricted; that of plants yet more so, being of\nslight force and only of one special character (s. 4). But that which\nexists in the best possible condition stands in no need of acting or\nagency; for it already possesses that for the sake of which action is\nundertaken. Now action always includes two elements--that for the\nsake of which and what is for the sake thereof--the end and the\nmeans: there is either some one end, which the agent may attain, as\nin the case of man; or there are many different matters all of which\nmay be used as means towards the best possible condition. Thus one\nagent possesses and partakes of the best possible condition; another\ncomes near to it with little trouble; a third, with much trouble; a\nfourth does not even aspire to the end, but is competent only to\narrive near to the last of the means. For example, let health be the\nend: one man is always in health; a second becomes so, by being\nstarved down; a third by that, combined with running exercise; a\nfourth is obliged to take some additional exercise, in order to\nqualify himself for running, so that his motions are multiplied; a\nfifth is incapable of arriving at health, but arrives only at the\nrunning and the being thinned down, one of which in this case serves\nas end. For it would be best for all, if they could attain the\nsupreme end--health; but, if that be impossible, then the next best\nthing is to get as near to the best as possible (ss. 5-7).\n\nFor this reason the Earth is not moved at all, and the matters near\nthe Earth are moved with few motions; since they do not arrive at the\nextreme best, but only as near as their ability permits to obtain or\nhit the supremely divine principle; while the First Heaven, on the\ncontrary, obtains or hits it at once, through one single motion; and\nthe bodies intermediate between the First Heaven and those which are\nlast (or nearest to the Earth), obtain it or arrive at it also, but\nonly through a greater number of motions.\n\nThere is the other difficulty also to be considered--that vast\nmultitude of stars are put all together in the one single First\nCurrent or Revolution, but each of the other stars (planets) has its\nown motions singly and apart. The principal reason of this we may\nfairly suppose to be that it follows as a natural consequence from\nthe vast superiority of the first, in each variety of life and in\neach beginning, over all posterior to the first. Here the First\nCurrent or Revolution, being one and by itself, moves many of the\ndivine bodies, while the others (secondary or countercurrents),\nnumerous as they are, move each only one; for each one of these\nwandering bodies or planets is carried by many different currents.\nThus Nature establishes equalization and a sort of symmetry, by\nassigning, in the one case, many bodies to one current, and in the\nother, many currents to one body (ss. 8-10). Beside this principal\nreason, there is also another. The other currents have each one body\nonly, because motion is given to many bodies by all of them prior to\nthe last which bears the one star. For the last sphere is carried\nround fastened into many spheres, and each sphere is a body (ss. 11,\n12. I do not clearly understand the lines that follow:--[Greek:\ne)kei/n\u00eas a)\\n ou)=n koino\\n ei)/\u00ea to\\ e)/rgon; au(/t\u00ea me\\n ga\\r\ne(ka/st\u00ea| \u00ea( i)/dios phu/sei phora/; au(/t\u00ea de\\ oi(=on\nproskei=tai. panto\\s de\\ peperasme/nou s\u00f4/matos pro\\s peperasme/non\n\u00ea( du/nami/s e)stin.]).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: [See Prantl's note on this difficult passage in his\nGerman translation of the De Coelo, p. 309 (Leipzig, 1857).]]\n\nCH. 13.--Having thus explained, respecting the Stars and Planets\nwhich are carried round in circular motion, what is their essence,\nfigure, current, and order of position, we now proceed to speak of\nthe Earth: What is its position? Whether is it at rest or in motion?\nWhat is its figure?\n\nPhilosophers differ respecting the position of the Earth. Most of\nthose who conceive the entire Kosmos as finite, declare the Earth to\nbe in its centre. But the Italian philosophers, called Pythagoreans,\nare of an opposite opinion; affirming that Fire is in the centre, and\nthat the Earth, being one of the stars revolving round the centre,\nmakes night and day. They assume moreover another Earth opposite to\nthis ([Greek: e)nanti/an a)/ll\u00ean tau/t\u00ea|])--which other they call\n_Antichthon_. Herein they do not adjust their theories and look out\nfor causes adapted to the phenomena; but, on the contrary, they\ndistort the phenomena so as to suit their own doctrines and\nreasonings, and try to constitute themselves auxiliary governors of\nthe Kosmos ([Greek: peir\u00f4/menoi sugkosmei=n]--s. 1). And, if we are\nto look for assurance not to the phenomena but to our own reasonings,\nmany others might agree with them, that it is not proper ([Greek:\nm\u00ea\\ dei=n]) to assign to the Earth the central place. They think\nthat the most honourable place belongs to the most honourable body,\nand that Fire is more honourable than Earth; that the two extremes,\ncentre and circumference, are more honourable than the parts\nintermediate between them. Upon these grounds they consider that Fire\nand not Earth is at the centre of the Universal Sphere; and they have\nanother reason, peculiar to themselves, for this conclusion: they\nhold that the centre is the most important place in the universe, and\nthat it ought as such to be the most carefully guarded; wherefore\nthey call it the watch of Zeus ([Greek: Dio\\s phulak\u00ea/n]), and\nregard it as occupied by Fire (s. 2).\n\nThis assumes that what is absolutely (_i.e._, without subjoining any\nqualifying adjunct), described as _the centre_, is at once centre of\nthe magnitude, centre of the object, and centre of nature. But we\nought rather to follow the analogy of animals, where the same point\nis not the centre of the animal and the centre of the body: the case\nis the same in the entire Kosmos. Hence the Pythagoreans need not\nfeel any anxiety about the Universe ([Greek: ou)the\\n au)tou\\s dei=\nthorubei=sthai peri\\ to\\ pa=n]), nor introduce a guard at the centre.\nThey ought rather to enquire where and of what character the middle\npoint is; for that middle point is the true beginning and the\nhonourable. The middle of the place occupied is rather like an end\nthan like a beginning; for that which is limited is the middle, that\nwhich limits is the boundary: now that which comprehends and is\nboundary, is more honourable than that which is bounded; the former\nis the Essence of the entire compound, the latter is only its Matter\n(s. 3).\n\nAs about the place of the Earth, so also about its motion or rest,\nphilosophers differ. The Pythagoreans and those who do not even place\nit at the centre, consider it to revolve in a circle, and they\nconsider the Antichthon to revolve in like manner. Some even think it\npossible that there may be many other bodies carried round the centre\nin like manner, though invisible to us, by reason of the obstructing\nbody of the Earth. Hence (they say) the eclipses of the moon are more\nfrequent than those of the Sun; since not only the Earth, but also\neach of these unseen bodies, causes the Moon to be eclipsed. For, the\nEarth not being a point, we on the circumference thereof, even\nassuming it to occupy the centre, are distant from the centre by the\nentire hemisphere of the Earth; yet we do not find out that we are\nnot in the centre, and astronomical appearances present themselves to\nus just as if we were so. Thus it happens (according to these\nphilosophers), the Earth not being in the centre at all: the\nappearances presented to us are just the same as if we were at the\ncentre.\n\nAgain, there are some who (like Plato in Tim\u00e6us) affirm that the\nEarth, though situated in the centre, is packed and revolves round\nthe axis stretched across the universe (s. 4).\n\nAbout the figure of the Earth, there is no less difference of\nopinion. Some say that it is spherical; others, that it is flat and\nin shape like a tambourine ([Greek: tumpanoeid\u00ea/s]). These last\nadduce as proof, that the Sun, at rising and setting, exhibits a\nrectilinear section or eclipse of his disk and not a circular one,\nwhen partially concealed by the Earth, and becoming invisible under\nthe horizon or visible above the horizon. They do not take proper\naccount of the vast distance of the Sun and the magnitude of his\ncircumference. The segment of a long circle appears from a distance\nlike a straight line. These philosophers further add, that the flat\ntambourine-like shape must be inferred of necessity from the fact\nthat the Earth remains stationary (s. 5).\n\nUpon this disputed question, a feeling of perplexity comes\nunavoidably upon every one. It would argue a very irrational mind not\nto wonder how a small piece of the Earth, if suspended in the air, is\ncarried downward and will not stop of itself, and the larger piece is\ncarried downward more quickly than the smaller; while nevertheless\nthe entire Earth, if suspended in like manner, would not be so\ncarried. In spite of its great weight, it remains stationary (s. 6).\nBut the solutions of this problem which some suggest are more strange\nand full of perplexity, and it is surprising that they have not been\nso considered. The Kolophonian Xenophanes affirmed that the lower\ndepths of the Earth were rooted downwards to infinity, in order to\nescape the troublesome obligation of looking for a reason why it\nremained stationary. Others say, that the Earth rests upon water,\nfloating thereupon like wood: this is an ancient doctrine promulgated\nby Thales; as if there were not as much perplexity about the water\nwhich supports the Earth, as there is about the Earth itself. For it\nis not the nature of water to remain suspended, but always to rest\nupon something (s. 7). Moreover, air is lighter than water, and water\nlighter than earth; how then can these men think that the substance\nnaturally lighter can lie below the substance naturally heavier?\nBesides, if it were the nature of the whole Earth to remain resting\non water, it must be the nature of each part of the Earth to do the\nsame; but this does not happen: each part of the earth is carried\ndown to the bottom, and the greater part more quickly than the less\n(s. 8).\n\nAll these philosophers carry their researches to a certain point, but\nnot to the bottom of the problem. It is indeed a habit with all of us\nto conduct our enquiries not with reference to the problem itself,\nbut with reference to our special opponents. If we have no opponent\nbut are conducting our investigations alone, we pursue them as far as\nthat point where we can make no farther objections to ourselves.\nWhoever therefore intends to investigate completely must take care to\nmake objections to himself upon all the points of objection which\nreally belong to the subject; and this he can only do after having\nthoroughly surveyed all the differences of opinion and doctrine (s.\n9).\n\nThe reason why the Earth remains at rest, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and\nDemokritus, declare to be its breadth or flatness ([Greek: to\\\npla/tos]): it does not (they say) divide the air beneath, but covers\nover the air like a lid ([Greek: ou) ga\\r te/mnein, a)ll'\ne)pip\u00f4mati/zein to\\n a)e/ra to\\n ka/t\u00f4then]); as we see that flat\nand spreading bodies usually do, being difficult to be moved and\nmaking strong resistance even against the winds. The Earth does the\nsame, through its flatness, against the air beneath, which remains at\nrest there (in the opinion of these philosophers) because it finds no\nsufficient place into which to travel, like water in a _klepsydra_:\nthey also produce many evidences to show that air thus imprisoned,\nwhile remaining stationary, can support a heavy weight (s. 10).\n\nNow, in the first place, these men affirm that, unless the shape of\nthe Earth were flat, it would not remain at rest. Yet on their own\nshowing it is not alone the flat shape of the earth which causes it\nto remain at rest, but rather its magnitude. For the air beneath\nremains _in situ_ by reason of its vast mass, finding no means of\nescape through the narrow passage: and the mass of the air is thus\nvast, because it is imprisoned inside by the great magnitude of the\nEarth; which effect will be produced in the same manner, even though\nthe Earth be spherical, provided it be of its present magnitude.\nMoreover, philosophers who hold this opinion about the motion of the\nEarth, think only of its motion as a whole, and take no account of\nits parts. For they ought to define at the first step whether bodies\nhave or have not one special mode of motion by nature; and, if none\nby nature, then whether they have any mode of motion violent or\ncontra-natural. I have already determined this point as well as my\npowers admitted, and shall therefore assume the results as settled.\nIf there be no special motion natural to bodies, neither will there\nbe any which is contra-natural or violent; and, if there be none\neither natural or violent, no body will be moved at all. I have\nalready shown that this is a necessary consequence; and, farther,\nthat (upon that supposition) there can be no body even at rest; for\nrest, like motion, is either natural or contra-natural; and, if there\nbe any special mode of motion which is natural, neither\ncontra-natural motion, nor contra-natural rest, can stand alone\n(ss. 11-13).\n\nLet us then assume (reasoning on the hypothesis of these\nphilosophers) that the Earth now remains in its present place\ncontrary to nature, and that it was carried into aggregation at the\ncentre by the revolution of the Kosmos (also contrary to\nnature--[Greek: kai\\ sun\u00ea=lthen e)pi\\ to\\ me/son pherome/n\u00ea dia\\ t\u00ea\\n\ndi/n\u00easin]--s. 14). For all those who recognize a generation of the\nKosmos assign this revolution as the cause which determined the\naggregation of the Earth at the centre, upon the analogy of particles\ncarried round in liquids or in air, where the larger and heavier\nparticles are always carried to the centre of the revolution. They\nprofess thus to know the cause which determined the Earth to _come\nto_ the centre; but what they seek to find out is the cause which\ndetermines it to remain there, and upon that they differ: some\nsaying, as has been stated just now, that its breadth and magnitude\nis the cause; others, with Empedokles, ascribing the fact to the\nrevolution of the Heaven, the extreme velocity of which checks the\nfall of the Earth downward, just as water in a cup may be whirled\nrapidly round without falling to the ground. But suppose absence of\nthese two causes: in which direction will the Earth be naturally\ncarried? Not to the centre; for (upon the doctrine which we are now\ncriticising) its motion to the centre, and its remaining at the\ncentre, are both of them contra-natural; but some special mode of\nmotion, natural to the Earth, there must necessarily be. Is this\nupward, or downward, or in what other direction? If there be no\ngreater tendency downward than upward, and if the air above does not\nhinder the Earth from tending upward, neither will the air beneath\nhinder it from tending downwards: the same causes produce the same\neffects, operating on the same matter (ss. 14, 15).\n\nA farther argument becomes applicable, when we are reasoning against\nEmpedokles. When the four elements were first separated out of their\nconfused huddle by the influence of Contention, what was the cause\nfor the Earth to remain still and _in situ_? Empedokles cannot claim\nto introduce then the agency of the cosmical revolution. Moreover, it\nis strange that he should not have reflected that in the first\ninstance the particles and fragments of the Earth were carried to the\ncentre. But what is the cause now that every thing having weight is\ncarried towards the Earth? It cannot be the revolution of the Heaven\nwhich brings these things nearer to us (s. 16).\n\nAgain, Fire is carried upward. What is the cause of this? The\nrevolution of the Heaven cannot cause it. But, if it be the nature of\nfire to be carried in one certain direction, it must be equally the\nnature of Earth to be carried in one certain direction. Light and\nheavy, also, are not discriminated by the heavenly revolution. There\nare matters originally heavy, and matters originally light: the\nformer are carried to the centre, the latter to the circumference,\neach by its own special motion. Even prior to the heavenly revolution\nthere existed things intrinsically light and intrinsically heavy;\nwhich are discriminated by certain attributes--a certain natural mode\nof motion and a certain place. In infinite space, there can be no\nupward and downward; and it is by this (local distinction) that light\nand heavy are discriminated (ss. 17, 18).\n\nWhile most philosophers insist upon the causes just noticed why the\nEarth remains stationary where it is, there are others, like\nAnaximander, among the ancients, who say that it remains so because\nof its likeness or equality ([Greek: dia\\ t\u00ea\\n o(moio/tera]--equal\ntendency in all directions). That which is situated in the centre\n(they say) and which has like relation to the extreme parts (_i.e._,\nlike to _all_ the extreme parts) ought not to be carried any more\nupward or downward or sideways; and it cannot be moved in opposite\ndirections at once; so that it remains stationary by necessity (s.\n19).\n\nThis doctrine is ingenious, but not true. For the property affirmed\nis noway peculiar to the Earth: the affirmation is, that every thing\nwhich is placed at the centre must of necessity remain there; so that\nFire also would remain there at rest, as well as Earth. But this\nnecessity must be denied. For it is shown by observation that the\nEarth not only remains at the centre, but is carried to the centre;\nsince each part of it is carried thither, and, whithersoever the\nparts are carried, the whole is carried necessarily to the same\npoint. The peculiar property of the earth therefore is, not (as this\nhypothesis declares) to have like relation to all the extreme\nparts--for that is common to all the elements--but to be carried\ntowards the centre (ss. 20, 21).\n\nMoreover, it is absurd to investigate why the Earth remains at the\ncentre, and not to investigate equally why Fire remains at the\nextremity. For, if you explain this last by saying that Fire has its\nnatural place at the extremity, the Earth must have its natural place\nsomewhere else. If the centre be not the natural place of the Earth,\nand if the Earth remains there through like tendency in all\ndirections, like the hair in equal tension or the man both hungry and\nthirsty between food and drink, you must equally assign the reason\nwhy Fire remains at the extremity. It is singular too that you should\ntry to explain only the _remaining at rest_ ([Greek: mon\u00ea=s]) of the\nEarth, and not also seek to explain the natural current ([Greek:\nphora/])--why Earth is carried downward, and Fire upward, when there\nis no opposing force (s. 22).\n\nNor can it be admitted that the doctrine is true. Thus much indeed is\ntrue by accident--that every thing which has no greater obligation to\nbe moved in this direction than in that, must necessarily remain at\nthe centre. But this is true only so long as it remains a compact\nwhole; for, according to the theory which we are discussing, it will\nnot remain stationary, but will be moved: not indeed as a whole, but\ndispersed into parts (s. 23: [Greek: a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\n ou)de\\ a)l\u00eathe/s\ne)sti to\\ lego/menon. kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako\\s me/ntoi tou=to/ ge\na)l\u00eathe/s, \u00f4(s a)nagkai=on me/nein e)pi\\ tou= me/sou pa=n, \u00f4(=|\nm\u00eathe\\n ma=llon deu=ro \u00ea( deu=ro kinei=sthai pros\u00ea/kei. a)lla\\\ndia/ ge tou=ton to\\n lo/gon ou) menei= a)lla\\ kin\u00eath\u00ea/setai; ou)\nme/ntoi o(/lon, a)lla\\ diespasme/non.]--I understand [Greek: kata\\\nsumbeb\u00eako/s] to mean, subject to the condition of its remaining a\ncompact whole). For the same reasoning would apply to Fire as well as\nto Earth: it would prove that Fire, if placed at the centre, will\nremain there just as much as Earth, because Fire will have like\nrelation to each point of the extreme periphery. Yet nevertheless it\nwill (not remain at the centre, but will) be carried away, if not\nimpeded, as we observe that it is carried in fact, to the periphery;\nonly not all to one and the same point of the periphery, but\ncorresponding portions of the Fire to corresponding portions of the\nperiphery: I mean, that the fourth part (_e.g._) of the Fire will be\ncarried to the fourth part of the periphery; for a point is no real\npart of bodies ([Greek: ou)the\\n ga\\r stigm\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n\ne)sti/n]). This is the only necessary consequence flowing from the\nprinciple of likeness of relation. As, if supposed to be put all\ntogether at the centre, it would contract from a larger area into a\nsmaller, so, when carried away from the centre to the different parts\nof the periphery, it would become rarer and would expand from a\nsmaller area into a larger. In like manner the Earth also would be\nmoved away from the centre, if you reason upon this principle of\nlikeness of relation, and if the centre were not the place belonging\nto it by nature (s. 24).\n\nCH. 14.--Having thus reported the suppositions of others respecting\nthe figure, place, rest and motion, of the Earth, I shall now deliver\nmy own opinion, first, whether it is in motion or at rest; for some\nphilosophers, as I have said, regard it as one of the stars (and\ntherefore not in the centre, but moving round the centre--the\nPythagorean theory); others (as Plato), though they place it in the\ncentre, consider it to be packed and moved round the middle of the\naxis of the Kosmos ([Greek: oi( de\\ e)pi\\ tou= me/sou the/ntes,\nei)lei=sthai kai\\ kinei=sthai/ phasi peri\\ to\\n me/son po/lon]).\n\nThat neither of these hypotheses is possible, we shall perceive if we\ntake as our point of departure--That, if the Earth be carried round,\nwhether in the centre or apart from the centre, such motion must\nnecessarily be violent or contra-natural. Such motion does not belong\nnaturally to the Earth itself; for, if such were the fact, it would\nbelong equally to each portion of the Earth, whereas we see that all\nthese portions are carried in a straight line to the centre. Being\nthus violent or contra-natural, it cannot possibly be eternal. But\nthe order of the Kosmos is eternal. Besides, all the bodies which are\ncarried round in a circular revolution (all except the First or\nOutermost Sphere--the Aplan\u00eas) appear to observation as lagging\nbehind and as being moved in more than one current. The like ought to\nhappen with the Earth, if moved round, whether on the centre or apart\nfrom the centre: it ought to be moved in two currents; and, as a\nconsequence thereof, there ought to be side-motions and back-turnings\nof the stars fastened in their sphere. But we see by observation that\nthis does not happen; and that the same stars always rise and set at\nthe same places of the Earth (s. 1).\n\nFarthermore, the natural current both of the entire Earth and of each\nof its parts is towards the middle of the universe: this is the\nreason why it is at the centre, even though it happens to be actually\nthere at present ([Greek: dia\\ tou=to ga\\r, ka)\\n ei) tugcha/nei\nkeime/n\u00ea nu=n e)pi\\ tou= ke/ntrou]--he means that though actually\nthere, it remains there not through any force of inertia or other\ncause, but because it has a natural current towards the centre). You\nmight start a doubt, indeed, since the centre of the Universe\ncoincides with the centre of the Earth, to which of the two it is\nthat the current of heavy bodies naturally tends: whether they tend\nthereto because it is the centre of the Universe, or because it is\nthe centre of the Earth. We must however necessarily suppose the\nformer; since Fire and light bodies, whose current is the contrary of\nthe current of heavy bodies, are carried to the extreme periphery of\nthe Universe, or of that place which comprehends and surrounds the\ncentre of the Universe (ss. 2, 3). But it happens ([Greek:\nsumbe/b\u00eake]: it is an accompanying fact) that the same point is\ncentre of the Universe and centre of the Earth; accordingly heavy\nbodies are carried by accident ([Greek: kata\\ sumbeb\u00eako/s]--by\nvirtue of this accompanying fact) to the centre of the Earth; and the\nproof that they are carried to this same point is, that their lines\nof direction are not parallel but according to similar angles (s. 4).\nThat the Earth therefore is at the centre, and that it is at rest, we\nmay see by the foregoing reasons, as well as by the fact, that stones\nthrown upwards to ever so great a height, are carried back in the\nsame line of direction to the same point (s. 5).\n\nWe may see farther the cause why the Earth remains at rest. For, if\nits natural current be from all directions towards the centre, as\nobservation shows, and that of Fire from the centre to the\nperiphery,--no portion of it can possibly be carried away from the\ncentre, except by violence. For to one body belongs one current of\nmotion, and to a simple body a simple current--not the two opposite\ncurrents; and the current _from_ the centre is opposite to the\ncurrent _to_ the centre. If, therefore, it be impossible for any\nportion of the Earth to be carried in a direction away from the\ncentre, it is yet more impossible for the whole Earth to be so; for\nthe natural current of each part is the same as that of the whole.\nAccordingly, since the Earth cannot be moved except by a superior\nforce or violence, it must necessarily remain stationary at the\ncentre (s. 6). The same conclusion is confirmed by what we learn from\ngeometers respecting astronomy; for all the phenomena of the\nHeavens--the changes in figure, order, and arrangement of the\nstars--take place as if the Earth were in the centre (s. 7).\n\nThe figure of the Earth is necessarily spherical. For each of its\nparts has gravity, until it reaches the centre; and the lesser part,\npushed forward by the greater, cannot escape laterally, but must\nbecome more and more squeezed together, one part giving place to the\nother, until the centre itself is reached. We must conceive what is\nhere affirmed as occurring in a manner like what some of the ancient\nphysical philosophers tell us, except that _they_ ascribe the\ndownward current to an extraneous force; whereas we think it better\nto state the truth, and to say that it occurs because _by nature_ all\nheavy bodies are carried towards the centre. Since, therefore, the\npreliminary Chaos or hotchpotch existed in power (or with its\ninherent powers existing though not exercised), the elements (those\nwhich had gravity), were carried from all sides equally towards the\ncentre ([Greek: e)n duna/mei ou)=n o)/ntos tou= mi/gmatos, ta\\\ndiakrino/mena e)phe/reto o(moi/\u00f4s pa/ntothen pro\\s to\\ me/son]--this\nis an allusion to the doctrine of Anaxagoras); indeed, whether\nbrought together at the centre equally from all the periphery or in\nany other manner, the result will be the same. If we suppose\nparticles to be brought together at the centre equally from all\nsides, it is plain that the mass so formed will be regular and\nspherical; and, even if not equally from all sides, this will make no\ndifference in the reasoning; for, since all portions of the mass have\nweight or tend to the centre, the larger portions will necessarily\npush the lesser before them as far as the centre (ss. 8, 9).\n\nA difficulty here presents itself, which may be solved upon the same\nprinciples. The Earth being spherical, and at the centre, suppose\nthat a vast additional weight were applied to either of its\nhemispheres. In that case, the centre of the Universe, and the centre\nof the Earth, would cease to coincide: either, therefore, the Earth\nwill not remain at the centre; or, if it would still remain at rest,\nwhile not occupying the centre, it is in its nature to be moved even\nnow (s. 10: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste \u00ea)\\ ou) menei= e)pi\\ tou= me/sou, \u00ea)\\\nei)/per \u00ea)rem\u00ea/sei ge kai\\ m\u00ea\\ to\\ me/son e)/chousa \u00ea)=|,\npe/phuke kinei=sthai kai\\ nu=n])--_i.e._, if the Earth _can_ be at\nrest when not at the centre, we must infer that the centre is not its\nnatural place, and therefore that its nature will be to be moved from\nthe centre towards that natural place wherever situated).\n\nSuch is a statement of the difficulty; but we shall see that it may\nbe cleared up with a little attention. We must distinguish what we\nmean when we affirm that every particle having weight is carried\ntowards the centre. We clearly do not mean that it will be so carried\nuntil the particles farthest from the centre shall touch the centre.\nWe mean that the greater mass must press with preponderating force\n([Greek: dei= kratei=n to\\ plei=on e(/\u00f4s a)\\n la/b\u00ea| t\u00f4=| au(tou=\nme/s\u00f4| to\\ me/son]) until its centre grasps the centre of the\nuniverse; up to this point its gravity will last; and this is equally\ntrue about any clod of earth as about the whole earth: large or small\nsize makes no difference. Whether the whole Earth were carried in a\nmass from any given position, or whether it were carried in separate\nparticles, in either case it would be carried onward until it\nembraced the centre equally on all sides; the smaller parts being\nequalized to the greater in gravitating tendency because they are\npushed forward by the greater ([Greek: a)nisazome/n\u00f4n t\u00f4=n\ne)latto/n\u00f4n u(po\\ t\u00f4=n meizo/n\u00f4n t\u00ea=| pro\u00f4/sei]--s. 11). If,\ntherefore, the Earth was ever generated, it must have been generated\nin this manner, and must thus acquire a spherical figure; and, even\nif it be ungenerable and stationary from everlasting, we must\nconceive its figure to be that which it would have acquired, if it\nhad been generable and generated from the first ([Greek: ei)/te\na)ge/nn\u00eatos a)ei\\ me/nousa, to\\n au)to\\n tro/pon e)/chein, o(/nper\nka)\\n ei) gignome/n\u00ea to\\ pr\u00f4=ton e)ge/neto]). That it must be\nspherical, we see not only from this reasoning, but also because all\nheavy bodies are carried towards it, not in parallel lines but, in\nequal angles. This is what naturally happens with what is either\nactually spherical, or by nature spherical. Now we ought to call\nevery thing such as it by nature wishes to become and to be: we ought\nnot to call it such as it is by force and contrary to nature (s. 12).\n\nThe same conclusion is established by the sensible facts within our\nobservation. If the Earth had been of any other than spherical\nfigure, the eclipses of the Moon would not have projected on the Sun\nthe outlines which we now see. The moon in her configurations\nthroughout the month takes on every variety of outline--rectilinear,\ndouble convex, and hollow. But in her eclipses the distinguishing\nline is always convex. Now this must necessarily be occasioned by the\ncircumference of the Earth being spherical, since the eclipses of the\nMoon arise from the interposition of the Earth (s. 13).\n\nFarthermore, we see from the visible phenomena of the stars not only\nthat the Earth is spherical, but also that its magnitude is not\ngreat. For, when we change our position a little as observers, either\nto the north or to the south, we find the celestial horizon to be\nmanifestly different. The stars at the zenith are greatly changed,\nand the same stars do not appear: some stars are visible in Egypt and\nCyprus, but become invisible when we proceed farther north; and those\nwhich are constantly visible in the northern regions, are found to be\nnot constantly visible, but to set, when the observer is in Egypt or\nCyprus. The bulk of the Earth must therefore be small, when a small\nchange of position is made so soon manifest to us (s. 14). Hence\nthose who hold that the regions near the pillars of Herakles join on\nwith India and that the ocean eastward and westward is one and the\nsame, must not be supposed to talk extravagantly ([Greek: m\u00ea\\ li/an\nu(polamba/nein a)/pista dokei=n]): they infer this from the presence\nof elephants alike at both extremities. Geometers who try to\ncalculate the magnitude of the Earth, affirm that its circumference\nis 400,000 stadia.\n\nIt follows necessarily from all these reasonings, that the body of\nthe Earth is not only of spherical form, but also not large compared\nwith the magnitude of the other Stars (ss. 15, 16).\n\n[The remaining two books of the treatise known by the title 'De\nCoelo,' while connected with the foregoing, are still more closely\nconnected with the two Books composing the treatise entitled 'De\nGeneratione et Corruptione.' The discussion carried on throughout the\ntwo treatises is in truth one; but, if anywhere broken, it is at the\nend of Book II. De Coelo, as above. From this point Aristotle\nproceeds to consider (in four Books) the particular phenomena\npresented by natural bodies--phenomena of Generation and Destruction\n(in the widest sense of these words)--dependent on the opposition of\nthe upward and downward motions; bodies, thus light or heavy, being\nthence seen to be ultimately reducible to four elements variously\ncombined. Treating of the Kosmos in its larger aspects, the first two\nBooks of De Coelo, here abstracted, are obviously those that alone\ncorrespond strictly to the name of the treatise.]\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\nEPIKURUS\n\n\nOur information from Epikurean writers respecting the doctrines of\ntheir sect is much less copious than that which we possess from Stoic\nwriters in regard to Stoic opinions. We have no Epikurean writer on\nphilosophy except Lucretius; whereas respecting the Stoical creed\nunder the Roman Empire, the important writings of Seneca, Epictetus,\nand Marcus Antoninus, afford most valuable evidence.\n\nThe standard of Virtue and Vice is referred by Epikurus to Pleasure\nand Pain. Pain is the only evil, Pleasure is the only good. Virtue is\nno end in itself, to be sought; vice is no end in itself, to be\navoided. The motive for cultivating virtue and banishing vice arises\nfrom the consequences of each, as the means of multiplying pleasures\nand averting or lessening pains. But to the attainment of this\npurpose, the complete supremacy of Reason is indispensable; in order\nthat we may take a right comparative measure of the varieties of\npleasure and pain, and pursue the course that promises the least\namount of suffering.\n\nThis theory (taken in its most general sense, and apart from\ndifferences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains), had\nbeen proclaimed long before the time of Epikurus. It is one of the\nvarious theories of Plato; for in his dialogue called Protagoras\n(though in other dialogues he reasons differently) we find it\nexplicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal\nspokesman, Sokrates, against the Sophist Protagoras. It was also held\nby Aristippus (companion of Sokrates along with Plato) and by his\nfollowers after him, called the Kyrenaics. Lastly, it was maintained\nby Eudoxus, one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with\nAristotle. Epikurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory;\nbut he had his own way of conceiving it, his own body of doctrine\nphysical, cosmological, and theological, with which it was\nimplicated, and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains.\n\nBodily feeling, in the Epikurean psychology, is prior in order of\ntime to the mental element; the former is primordial, while the\nlatter is derived from it by repeated processes of memory and\nassociation. But, though such is the order of sequence and\ngeneration, yet when we compare the two as constituents of happiness\nto the formed man, the mental element much outweighs the bodily, both\nas pain and as pleasure. Bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the\npresent; when not felt, it is nothing. But mental feelings involve\nmemory and hope, embrace the past as well as the future, endure for a\nlong time, and may be recalled or put out of sight, to a great\ndegree, at our discretion.\n\nThis last point is one of the most remarkable features of the\nEpikurean mental discipline. Epikurus deprecated the general habit of\nmankind in always hankering after some new satisfaction to come;\nalways discontented with the present, and oblivious of past comforts\nas if they had never been. These past comforts ought to be treasured\nup by memory and reflection, so that they might become as it were\nmatter for rumination, and might serve, in trying moments, even to\ncounterbalance extreme physical suffering. The health of Epikurus\nhimself was very bad during the closing years of his life. There\nremains a fragment of his last letter, to an intimate friend and\ncompanion, Idomeneus:--\"I write this to you on the last day of my\nlife, which, in spite of the severest internal bodily pains, is still\na happy day, because I set against them in the balance all the mental\npleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you.\nTake care of the children left by Metrodorus, in a manner worthy of\nyour demeanour from boyhood towards me and towards philosophy.\"\nBodily pain might thus be alleviated, when it occurred; it might be\ngreatly lessened in occurrence, by prudent and moderate habits;\nlastly, even at the worst, if violent, it never lasted long; if not\nviolent, it might be patiently borne, and was at any rate terminated,\nor terminable at pleasure, by death.\n\nIn the view of Epikurus, the chief miseries of life arose, not from\nbodily pains, but partly from delusions of hope and exaggerated\naspirations for wealth, honours, power, &c., in all which the objects\nappeared most seductive from a distance, inciting man to lawless\nviolence and treachery, while in the reality they were always\ndisappointments and generally something worse; partly, and still\nmore, from the delusions of fear. Of this last sort, were the two\ngreatest torments of human existence--fear of Death and of eternal\nsuffering after death, as announced by prophets and poets, and fear\nof the Gods. Epikurus, who did not believe in the continued existence\nof the soul separate from the body, declared that there could never\nbe any rational ground for fearing death, since it was simply a\npermanent extinction of consciousness. Death was nothing to us (he\nsaid): when death comes, _we_ are no more, either to suffer or to\nenjoy. Yet it was the groundless fear of this nothing that poisoned\nall the tranquillity of life, and held men imprisoned even when\nexistence was a torment. Whoever had surmounted that fear was armed\nat once against cruel tyranny and against all the gravest\nmisfortunes. Next, the fear of the gods was not less delusive, and\nhardly less tormenting, than the fear of death. It was a capital\nerror (Epikurus declared) to suppose that the gods employed\nthemselves as agents in working or superintending the march of the\nKosmos; or in conferring favour on some men, and administering\nchastisement to others. The vulgar religious tales, which represented\nthem in this character, were untrue and insulting as regards the gods\nthemselves, and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the\nhopes and fears of mankind. Epikurus believed sincerely in the gods;\nreverenced them as beings at once perfectly happy, immortal, and\nunchangeable; and took delight in the public religious festivals and\nceremonies. But it was inconsistent with these attributes, and\nrepulsive to his feelings of reverence, to conceive them as agents.\nThe idea of agency is derived from human experience: we, as agents,\nact with a view to supply some want, to fulfil some obligation, to\nacquire some pleasure, to accomplish some object desired but not yet\nattained--in short, to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our\nimperfect happiness: the gods already _have_ all that agents strive\nto get, and more than agents ever do get; their condition is one not\nof agency, but of tranquil, self-sustaining, fruition. Accordingly,\nEpikurus thought (as Aristotle[1] had thought before him) that the\nperfect, eternal, and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the\ngods excluded the supposition of their being agents. He looked upon\nthem as types of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction\nwhich was what he understood by pleasure or happiness, as objects of\nreverential envy, whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by\nassimilating his own temper and condition to theirs as far as human\ncircumstances allowed.\n\n[Footnote 1: Aristot. De Coelo, II. xii. p. 292, a. 22-b. 7: [Greek:\ne)/oike ga\\r t\u00f4=| me\\n a)/rista e)/chonti u(pa/rchein to\\ eu)= a)/neu\npra/xe\u00f4s, t\u00f4=| d' e)ggu/tata dia\\ o)li/g\u00eas kai\\ mia=s, toi=s de\\\npor)r(\u00f4ta/t\u00f4 dia\\ pleio/n\u00f4n,--t\u00f4=| d' \u00f4(s a)/rista e)/chonti ou)the\\n\ndei= pra/xe\u00f4s; e)/sti ga\\r au)to\\ to\\ ou(= e(/neka, \u00ea( de\\ pra=xis\na)ei/ e)stin e)n dusi/n, o(/tan kai\\ ou(= e(/neka \u00ea)=| kai\\ to\\\ntou/tou e(/neka.] &c. Ibid. iii. p. 286, a. 9: [Greek: theou= d'\ne)ne/rgeia a)thanasi/a; tou=to d' e)sti\\ z\u00f4\u00ea\\ a)i+/dos], &c.\n\nIn the Ethica, Aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the\ngods, as the only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme\nfelicity.]\n\nThese theological views were placed by Epikurus in the foreground of\nhis ethical philosophy, as the only means of dispelling **those fears\nof the gods that the current fables instilled into every one, and\nthat did so much to destroy human comfort and security. He proclaimed\nthat beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in\nthemselves nor caused vexation to others; neither showed anger nor\nfavour to particular persons. The doctrine that they were the working\nmanagers in the affairs of the Kosmos, celestial and terrestrial,\nhuman and extra-human, he not only repudiated as incompatible with\ntheir attributes, but declared to be impious, considering the\ndisorder, sufferings, and violence, everywhere visible. He disallowed\nall prophecy, divination, and oracular inspiration, by which the\npublic around him believed that the gods were perpetually\ncommunicating special revelations to individuals, and for which\nSokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful.\n\nIt is remarkable that Stoics and Epikureans, in spite of their marked\nopposition in dogma or theory, agreed so far in practical results,\nthat both declared these two modes of uneasiness (fear of the gods\nand fear of death) to be the great torments of human existence, and\nboth strove to remove or counterbalance them.\n\nSo far the teaching of Epikurus appears confined to the separate\nhappiness of each individual, as dependent upon his own prudence,\nsobriety, and correct views of Nature. But this is not the whole of\nthe Epikurean Ethics. The system also considered each man as in\ncompanionship with others: the precepts were shaped accordingly,\nfirst as to Justice, next as to Friendship. In both, these, the\nfoundation whereon Epikurus built was Reciprocity--not pure sacrifice\nto others, but partnership with others, beneficial to all. He kept\nthe ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one\ncomplex association: he did not expel or degrade either, in order to\ngive exclusive ascendancy to the other. The dictate of Natural\nJustice was, that no man should hurt another: each was bound to\nabstain from doing harm to others; each, on this condition, was\nentitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others\nwould do harm to him. Such double aspect, or reciprocity, was\nessential to social companionship: those that could not, or would\nnot, accept this covenant, were unfit for society. If a man does not\nbehave justly towards others, he cannot expect that they will behave\njustly towards him; to live a life of injustice, and expect that\nothers will not find it out, is idle. The unjust man cannot enjoy a\nmoment of security. Epikurus laid it down explicitly, that just and\nrighteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one's\ncomfort, and was the best means of attaining it.\n\nThe reciprocity of Justice was valid towards all the world; the\nreciprocity of Friendship went much farther: it involved indefinite\nand active beneficence, but could reach only to a select few.\nEpikurus insisted emphatically on the value of friendship, as a means\nof happiness to both the persons so united. He declared that a good\nfriend was another self, and that friends ought to be prepared, in\ncase of need, to die for each other. Yet he declined to recommend an\nestablished community of goods among the members of his fraternity,\nas prevailed in the Pythagorean brotherhood: for such an institution\n(he said) implied mistrust. He recommended efforts to please and to\nserve, and a forwardness to give, for the purpose of gaining and\nbenefiting a friend, and he even declared that there was more\npleasure in conferring favours than in receiving them; but he was no\nless strenuous in inculcating an intelligent gratitude on the\nreceiver. No one except a wise man (he said) knew how to return a\nfavour properly.[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Seneca, Epist. p. 81.]\n\nThese exhortations to active friendship were not unfruitful. We know,\neven by the admission of witnesses adverse to the Epikurean\ndoctrines, that the harmony among the members of the sect, with\ncommon veneration for the founder, was more marked and more enduring\nthan that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects. Epikurus\nhimself was a man of amiable personal qualities: his testament, still\nremaining, shows an affectionate regard both for his surviving\nfriends, and for the permanent attachment of each to the others as\nwell as of all to the school. Diogenes Laertius tells us--nearly 200\nyears after Christ, and 450 years after the death of Epikurus--that\nthe Epikurean sect still continued its numbers and dignity, having\noutlasted its contemporaries and rivals. The harmony among the\nEpikureans may be explained, not merely from the temper of the\nmaster, but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he\nrecommended. Ambition and love of power were discouraged; rivalry\namong the members for success, either political or rhetorical, was at\nany rate a rare exception; all were taught to confine themselves to\nthat privacy of life and love of philosophical communion which alike\nrequired and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood. In\nregard to politics, Epikurus advised quiet submission to established\nauthority, without active meddling beyond what necessity required.\n\nVirtue and happiness, in the theory of Epikurus, were inseparable. A\nman could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and\nthe fear of gods instilled by the current fables, which disturbed all\ntranquillity of mind; until he had banished those factitious desires\nthat pushed him into contention for wealth, power, or celebrity; nor\nunless he behaved with justice to all, and with active devoted\nfriendship towards a few. Such a mental condition, which he thought\nit was in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and\ncompanionship, constituted virtue; and was the sure as well as the\nonly precursor of genuine happiness. A mind thus undisturbed and\npurified was sufficient to itself. The mere satisfaction of the wants\nof life, and the conversation of friends, became then felt pleasures:\nif more could be had without preponderant mischief, so much the\nbetter; but Nature, disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices,\nrequired no more to be happy. This at least was as much as the\nconditions of humanity admitted: a tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous,\nnon-competitive fruition, which approached most nearly to the perfect\nhappiness of the Gods.\n\nWhen we read the explanations given by Epikurus and Lucretius of what\nthe Epikurean theory really was, and compare them with the numerous\nattacks upon it made by opponents, we cannot but remark that the\ntitle and formula of the theory was ill-chosen, and really a\nmisnomer. What Epikurus meant by Pleasure was not what most people\nmeant by it, but something very different--a tranquil and comfortable\nstate of mind and body; much the same as what Demokritus had\nexpressed before him by the phrase [Greek: eu)thumi/a]. This last\nphrase would have expressed what Epikurus aimed at, neither more nor\nless. It would at least have preserved his theory from much misplaced\nsarcasm and aggressive rhetoric.\n\nThe Physics of Epikurus was borrowed in the main from the atomic\ntheory of Demokritus, but modified by him in a manner subservient and\ncontributory to his ethical scheme. To that scheme it was essential\nthat those celestial, atmospheric, or terrestrial phenomena which the\npublic around him ascribed to agency and purposes of the gods, should\nbe understood as being produced by physical causes. An eclipse, an\nearthquake, a storm, a shipwreck, unusual rain or drought, a good or\na bad harvest--and not merely these, but many other occurrences far\nsmaller and more unimportant, as we may see by the eighteenth chapter\nof the 'Characters' of Theophrastus--were then regarded as\nvisitations of the gods, requiring to be interpreted by recognized\nprophets, and to be appeased by ceremonial expiations. When once a\nman became convinced that all these phenomena proceeded from physical\nagencies, a host of terrors and anxieties would disappear from the\nmind; and this Epikurus asserted to be the beneficent effect and real\nrecommendation of physical philosophy. He took little or no thought\nfor scientific curiosity as a motive _per se_, which both Demokritus\nand Aristotle put so much in the foreground.\n\nHe composed a treatise called 'Kanonicon' (now lost), which seems to\nhave been a sort of Logic of Physics--a summary of the principles of\nevidence. In his system, Psychology was to a great extent a\nbranch--though a peculiar and distinct branch--of Physics, since the\nsoul was regarded as a subtle but energetic material compound (air,\nvapour, heat, and another nameless ingredient), with its best parts\nconcentrated in the chest, yet pervading and sustaining the whole\nbody--still, however, depending for its support on the body, and\nincapable of separate or disembodied continuance.\n\nEpikurus recognized, as the primordial basis of the universe, Atoms,\nVacuum, and Motion. The atoms were material solid _minima_, each too\nsmall to be apprehended separately by sense; they had figure,\nmagnitude, and gravity, but no other qualities. They were infinite in\nnumber, and ever moving in an infinite vacuum. Their motions brought\nthem into various coalitions and compounds, resulting in the\nperceptible bodies of nature; each of which in its combined state\nacquired new, specific, different qualities. In regard to the\nprimordial movements of the atoms, out of which these endowed\ncompounds grew, Epikurus differed from Demokritus who supposed the\natoms originally to move with an indefinite variety of directions and\nvelocities, rotatory as well as rectilineal; whereas Epikurus\nmaintained that the only original movement common to all atoms was\none and the same--in the direction of gravity straight down, and all\nwith equal velocity in the infinite void. But it occurred to him\nthat, upon this hypothesis only, there could never occur any\ncollisions or combinations of the atoms--nothing but continued and\nunchangeable parallel lines. Accordingly he modified it by saying\nthat the line of descent was not strictly rectilinear, but that each\natom deflected a little from the straight line, each in its own\ndirection and degree; so that it became possible to assume\ncollisions, resiliences, adhesions, combinations, among them, as it\nhad been possible under the variety of original movements ascribed to\nthem by Demokritus. The opponents of Epikurus derided this auxiliary\nhypothesis, affirming that he invented the individual deflection of\neach atom without assigning any cause, and only because he was\nperplexed by the mystery of man's freewill. But Epikurus was not more\nopen to attack on this ground than other physical philosophers. Most\nof them (except perhaps the most consistent of the Stoic fatalists)\nbelieved that some among the phenomena of the universe occurred in\nregular and predictable sequence, while others were essentially\nirregular and unpredictable: each philosopher devised his hypothesis,\nand recognized some fundamental principle, to explain the latter\nclass of phenomena as well as the former; thus, Plato admitted an\ninvincible erratic necessity, Aristotle introduced Chance and\nSpontaneity, Demokritus multiplied indefinitely the varieties of\natomic movements. The hypothetical deflection alleged by Epikurus was\nhis way, not more unwarranted than the others, of providing a\nfundamental principle for the unpredictable phenomena of the\nuniverse. Among these are the volitional manifestations of men and\nanimals; but there are many others besides, and there is no ground\nfor believing that what is called the mystery of Free-Will (_i. e._,\nthe question whether volition is governed by motives, acting upon a\ngiven state of the mind and body) was at all peculiarly present to\nhis mind. Whatever theory may be adopted on this point, it is certain\nthat the movements of an individual man or animal are not exclusively\ndetermined by the general law of gravitation, or by another cause\nextrinsic to himself; but to a great degree by his own separate\nvolition, which is often imperfectly knowable beforehand and\ntherefore not predictable. For these and many other phenomena,\nEpikurus provided a fundamental principle in his supplementary\nhypothesis of atomic deflection; and indeed not for these only, but\nalso for the questions of opponents, how there could ever be any\ncoalition between the atoms, if all followed only one single law of\nmovement--rectilineal descent with equal velocity. Epikurus rejected\nthe inexorable and all-comprehensive fatalism contained in the\ntheories of some Stoics, though seemingly not construed in its full\napplication even by them. He admitted a limited range of empire to\nChance, or phenomena essentially irregular. But he maintained that\nthe will, far from being among the phenomena essentially irregular,\nis under the influence of motives; for no man can insist more\nstrenuously than he does (see the letter to Menoekeus) on the\ncomplete power of philosophy--if the student could be made to feel\nits necessity and desire the attainment of it, so as to meditate and\nengrain within himself sound views about the gods, death, and human\nlife generally--to mould our volitions and character in a manner\nconformable to the exigencies of virtue and happiness.\n\nAll true belief, according to Epikurus, rested ultimately upon the\nimpressions of sense, upon our internal feelings, and upon our\ncorrect apprehension of the meaning of terms. He did not suppose the\nsignificance of language to come by convention, but to be an\ninspiration of Nature, different among different people. The facts of\nsense were in themselves beyond all question. But truth, though\nfounded upon these evidences, included various inferences, more than\nsense could directly testify. Even the two capital points of the\nEpikurean physical philosophy--Atoms and Void--were inferences from\nsense, and not capable of direct attestation. It was in these\ninferences, and in the superstructure built upon sense, that error\nwas so frequently imposed upon us. We ought to test all affirmations\nor dogmas by the evidence of sensible phenomena; looking therein, if\npossible, for some positive grounds in support of them, but at any\nrate assuring ourselves that there were no grounds in contradiction\nof them, or, if there were such, rejecting the dogmas at once. Out of\nthe particular impressions of sense, when often repeated, remembered,\nand compared, there grew certain general notions or anticipations\n([Greek: prol\u00ea/pseis]), which were applied to interpret or illustrate\nany new case when it arose. These general notions were not inborn or\nintuitive, but gradually formed (as Aristotle and the Stoics also\nconceived them) out of frequent remembrances and association.\n\nBesides those conclusions which could be fully proved by the\nevidentiary data just enumerated, Epikurus recognized admissible\nhypotheses, which awaited farther evidence confirmative or refutative\n([Greek: to\\ pro/smenon]), and also other matters occult or as yet\nunexplained ([Greek: ta\\ a)/d\u00eala]). Along with the intermediate or\nhalf-explained class, he reckoned those in which plurality of causes\nwas to be invoked. A given effect might result from any one out of\ntwo, three, or more different causes, and there was often no\ncounter-evidence of sense to exclude either of them in any particular\ncase. This plural explanation ([Greek: to\\ pleonach\u00f4=s]) was not so\ncomplete or satisfactory as the singular ([Greek: to\\ monach\u00f4=s]);\nbut it was often the best that we could obtain, and was quite\nsufficient, by showing a possible physical agency, to rescue the mind\nfrom those terrors of ignorance, which drove men to imagine\nvisitations of the gods.\n\nEpikurus agreed with Demokritus in believing that external objects\nproduced their impressions on our senses by projecting thin images,\noutlines of their own shapes. He thought that the air was peopled\nwith such images, which passed through it and still more through the\ninfinite vacuum beyond it with prodigious velocity. Many of them\nbecame commingled, dissipated, recombined, during the transit, so\nthat, when they reached us, the impressions produced were not\nconformable to any real object; hence the phenomena of dreams,\nmadness, and the various delusions of waking men.\n\nIn setting forth the criterion of truth, Epikurus insisted chiefly\nupon the fundamental groundwork--particular facts of sense, as the\ndata for proving or disproving general affirmations; and he had the\nmerit of calling attention to refutative data as well as to\nprobative. But, respecting the process of passing from these\nparticulars to true generalities and avoiding the untrue, we can make\nout no clear idea from his writings that remain: his great work on\nPhysical Philosophy is lost. It is certain that he disregarded the\nlogical part of the process--the systematic study of propositions,\nand their relations of consistency with one another--which had made\nso prodigious a stride during his early years under Aristotle and\nTheophrastus. We can, indeed, detect in his remaining sentences one\nor two of those terms which Aristotle had stamped as technical in\nLogic; but he discouraged as useless all the verbal teaching and\ndiscussion of his day--all grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, beyond\nthe lowest minimum. He disapproved of the poets as promulgators of\nmischievous fables and prejudices, the rhetoricians as furnishing\nweapons for the misleading career of political ambition, the\ndialecticians as wasting their time in useless puzzles. None of them\nwere serviceable in promoting either the tranquillity of the mind, or\nthe happiness of life, or the acquisition of truth. He himself\ncomposed a great number of treatises and epistles, on subjects of\nethics and philosophy; but he is said to have written in haste,\nwithout taking time or trouble to correct his compositions. By the\nAlexandrine critic, Aristophanes of Byzantium, his style was censured\nas unpolished; yet it is declared to have been simple, unaffected,\nand easily understood. This last predicate is hardly applicable to\nthe three epistles which alone remain from his pen; but those\nepistles are intended as brief abstracts of doctrine, on topics which\nhe had already treated at length in formal works; and it is not easy\nto combine clearness with brevity.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\nTHE STOICS--A FRAGMENT.\n\n\nThe Stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy recognized and\nconspicuous at Athens during the three centuries preceding the\nChristian era and during the century or more following. Among these\nfour sects, the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between\nthe Stoics and the Epikureans.\n\nThe Stoics agreed with the Peripatetics (anterior to Epikurus, not\nspecially against _him_) that the first principle of nature is (not\npleasure or relief from pain, but) Self-preservation or Self-love; in\nother words, the natural appetite or tendency of all creatures is, to\npreserve their existing condition with its inherent capacities, and\nto keep clear of destruction or disablement. This appetite (they\nsaid) manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain\nis felt, and is moreover a fundamental postulate, pre-supposed in all\ndesires of particular pleasures, as well as in all aversions to\nparticular pains. We begin by loving our own vitality; and we come,\nby association, to love what promotes or strengthens our vitality; we\nhate destruction or disablement, and come (by secondary association)\nto hate whatever produces that effect.\n\nThis doctrine associated, and brought under one view, what was common\nto man not merely with the animal, but also with the vegetable world;\na plant was declared to have an impulse or tendency to maintain\nitself, without feeling pain or pleasure. Aristotle (in the tenth\nBook of the Ethica) says that he will not determine whether we love\nlife for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life; for\nhe affirms the two to be essentially yoked together and inseparable:\npleasure is the consummation of our vital manifestations. The\nPeripatetics, after him, put pleasure down to a lower level, as\nderivative and accidental. The Stoics went farther in the same\ndirection--possibly from antithesis against the growing school of\nEpikurus.\n\nThe primary _officium_ (in a larger sense than our word duty) of man\nis (they said) to keep himself in the State of Nature; the second or\nderivative _officium_ is to keep to such things as are according to\nnature, and to avert those that are contrary to nature; our gradually\nincreasing experience enables as to discriminate the two. The youth\nlearns, as he grows up, to value bodily accomplishments, mental\ncognitions and judgments, good conduct towards those around him,--as\npowerful aids towards keeping up that state of nature. When his\nexperience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and\nharmony of nature and human society, and to impress upon him the\ncomprehension of this great _id\u00e9al_, his emotions as well as his\nreason becomes absorbed by it. He recognizes this as the only true\nBonum or Honestum, to which all other desirable things are referable;\nas the only thing desirable for itself and in its own nature. He\ndrops or dismisses all these _prima natur\u00e6_ that he had begun by\ndesiring. He no longer considers any of them as worthy of being\ndesired in itself, or for its own sake.\n\nWhile, therefore, (according to Peripatetics as well as Stoics) the\nlove of self and of preserving one's own vitality and activity is the\nprimary element, intuitive and connate, to which all rational\npreference (_officium_) was at first referred, they thought it not\nthe less true that in process of time, by experience, association,\nand reflection, there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment\nor notion, a new and later light, which extinguishes and puts out of\nsight the early beginning. It was important to distinguish the feeble\nand obscure elements from the powerful and brilliant after-growth;\nwhich indeed was fully realized only in chosen minds, and in them\nhardly before old age. This idea, when once formed in the mind, was\nThe Good--the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake. The\nStoics called it the only good, being sufficient in itself for\nhappiness; other things being not good, nor necessary to happiness,\nbut simply preferable or advantageous when they could be had: the\nPeripatetics recognized it as the first and greatest good, but said\nalso that it was not sufficient in itself; there were two other\ninferior varieties of good, of which something must be had as\ncomplementary (what the Stoics called _pr\u00e6posita_ or _sumenda_).[1]\nThus the Stoics said about the origin of the Idea of Bonum or\nHonestum, much the same as what Aristotle says about ethical Virtue.\nIt is not implanted in us by nature; but we have at birth certain\ninitial tendencies and capacities, which, if aided by association and\ntraining, enable us (and that not in all cases) to acquire it.\n\n[Footnote 1: Aristotle and the Peripatetics held that there were\n_tria genera bonorum_: (1) Those of the mind (_mens sana_); (2) Those\nof the body; and (3) External advantages. The Stoics altered this\ntheory by saying that only the first of the three was _bonum_; the\nothers were merely _pr\u00e6posita_ or _sumenda_. The opponents of the\nStoics contended that this was an alteration in words rather than in\nsubstance.\n\nThe earlier Stoics laid it down that there were no graduating marks\nbelow the level of wisdom: all shortcomings were on a par. Good was a\npoint, Evil was a point; there were gradations in the _pr\u00e6posita_ or\n_sumenda_ (none of which were good), and in the _rejecta_ or\n_rejicienda_ (none of which were evil), but there was no more or less\ngood.]\n\nA distinction was made by Epictetus and other Stoics between things\nin our power and things not in our power. In our power are our\nopinions and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires,\nand aversions: not in our power are our bodies, wealth, honour, rank,\nauthority, &c., and their opposites; though, in regard to these last,\nit is in our power to _think_ of them as unimportant. With this\ndistinction we may connect the arguments between the Stoics and their\nopponents as to what is now called the Freedom of the Will. But we\nmust first begin by distinguishing the two questions. By things in\nour power, the Stoics meant things that we could do or acquire if we\nwilled: by things not in our power, they meant things that we could\nnot do or acquire if we willed. In both cases, the volition was\nassumed as a fact: the question what determined it, or whether it was\nnon-determined, _i. e._, self-determining, was not raised in the\nantithesis. But it was raised in other discussions between the Stoic\ntheorist Chrysippus, and various opponents. These opponents denied\nthat volition was determined by motives, and cited the cases of equal\nconflicting motives (what is known as the Ass of Buridan) as proving\nthat the soul includes in itself, and exerts, a special supervenient\npower of deciding action in one way or the other--a power not\ndetermined by any causal antecedent, but self-originating, and\nbelonging to the class of agency that Aristotle recognizes under the\ndenomination of automatic, spontaneous (or essentially irregular and\nunpredictable). Chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality of\nthis supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul, but also the\nreality of all that Aristotle called automatic or spontaneous agency\ngenerally. Chrysippus said that every movement was determined by\nantecedent motives; that in cases of equal conflict the exact\nequality did not long continue, because some new but slight motive\nslipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the\nother.[2] Here, we see, the question now known as the Freedom of the\nWill is discussed, and Chrysippus declares against freedom, affirming\nthat volition is always determined by motives.\n\n[Footnote 2: See Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, xxiii. p.\n1045.]\n\nBut we also see that, while declaring this opinion, Chrysippus does\nnot employ the terms Necessity or Freedom of the Will; neither did\nhis opponents, so far as we can see: they had a different and less\nmisleading phrase. By freedom, Chrysippus and the Stoics meant the\nfreedom of doing what a man willed, if he willed it. A man is free as\nto the thing that is in his power, when he wills it: he is not free\nas to what is not in his power, under the same supposition. The\nStoics laid great stress on this distinction. They pointed out how\nmuch it is really in a man's power to transform or discipline his own\nmind--in the way of controlling or suppressing some emotions,\ngenerating or encouraging others, forming new intellectual\nassociations, &c.; how much a man could do in these ways, if he\nwilled it, and if he went through the lessons, habits of conduct, and\n**meditations, suitable to produce such an effect. The Stoics\nstrove to create in a man's mind the volitions appropriate for\nsuch mental discipline, by depicting the beneficial consequences\nresulting from it, and the misfortune and shame inevitable, if the\nmind were not so disciplined. Their purpose was to strengthen the\ngoverning reason of his mind, and to enthrone it as a fixed habit and\ncharacter, which would control by counter suggestions the impulse\narising at each special moment--particularly all disturbing terrors\nor allurements. This, in their view, is a free mind; not one wherein\nvolition is independent of all motive, but one wherein the\nsusceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant\nreason, so as to give predominance to the better motive against the\nworse. One of the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce,\nwas the prudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony\nwith the schemes of Providence; which (they said) were always\narranged with a view to the happiness of the Kosmos on the whole. The\nbad man, whose volitions conflict with these schemes, is always\nbaulked of his expectations, and brought at last against his will to\nsee things carried by an over-ruling force, with aggravated pain and\nhumiliation to himself: while the good man, who resigns himself to\nthem from the first, always escapes with less pain, and often without\nany at all. As a portion of their view concerning Providence it may\nhere be mentioned that the earlier Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus,\nentertained high reverence for the divination, prophecy, and omens\nthat were generally current in the ancient world. They considered\nthat these were the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased\nto make known beforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes.\nHerein lay one among the marked points of contrast between Stoics and\nEpikureans.\n\nWe have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern\ntimes the Freedom of the Will (_i.e._, that volitions are\nself-originating and unpredictable), the Stoic theorists not only\ndenied it, but framed all their Ethics upon the assumption of the\ncontrary. This same assumption of the contrary, indeed, was made also\nby Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epikurus; in short, by all the\nethical teachers of antiquity. All of them believed that volitions\ndepended on causes; that, under the ordinary conditions of men's\nminds, the causes that volitions generally depended upon are often\nmisleading and sometimes ruinous; but that, by proper stimulation\nfrom without and meditation within, the rational causes of volition\nmight be made to overrule the impulsive. Plato, Aristotle, Epikurus,\nnot less than the Stoics, wished to create new fixed habits and a new\ntype of character. They differed, indeed, on the question what the\nproper type of character was; but each of them aimed at the same\ngeneral end--a new type of character, regulating the grades of\nsusceptibility to different motives. And the purpose of all and each\nof these moralists precludes the theory of free-will, _i.e._, the\ntheory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable.\n\nWhile the Epikureans declined, as much as possible, interference in\npublic affairs, the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of\nactive citizenship.[3] Chrysippus even said that the life of\nphilosophical contemplation (such as Aristotle preferred and\naccounted godlike) was to be placed on the same level with the life\nof pleasure; though Plutarch observes that neither Chrysippus nor\nZeno ever meddled personally with any public duty: both of them\npassed their lives in lecturing and writing. The truth is that both\nof them were foreigners residing at Athens, and at a time when Athens\nwas dependent on foreign princes. Accordingly, neither Zeno nor\nChrysippus had any sphere of political action open to them: they\nwere, in this respect, like Epictetus afterwards, but in a position\nquite different from Seneca, the preceptor of Nero, who might hope to\ninfluence the great imperial power of Rome, and from Marcus\nAntoninus, who held that imperial power in his own hands.\n\n[Footnote 3: Tacitus says of the Stoics (Ann. xiv. 57): 'Stoicorum\nsecta, qu\u00e6 turbidos et negotiorum appetentes facit.']\n\nMarcus Antoninus--not only a powerful emperor, but also the most\ngentle and amiable man of his day--talks of active beneficence both\nas a duty and a satisfaction. But in the creed of the Stoics\ngenerally, active beneficence did not occupy a prominent place. They\nadopted the four Cardinal Virtues--Wisdom, or the Knowledge of Good\nand Evil, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance--as part of their plan of\nthe virtuous life, the life according to Nature. Justice, as the\nsocial virtue, was placed above all the rest. But the Stoics were not\nstrenuous in requiring more than Justice, for the benefit of others\nbeside the agent. They even reckoned compassion for the sufferings of\nothers as a weakness, analogous to envy for the good fortune of\nothers.\n\nThe Stoic recognised the gods (or Universal Nature, equivalent\nexpressions in his creed) as managing the affairs of the world, with\na view to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole.\nTowards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from\nhim; but it was his duty and his strongest interest, to resign\nhimself to their plans, and to abstain from all conduct tending to\nfrustrate them. Such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested\nto him by the unreasonable appetites, emotions, fears, antipathies,\n&c., of daily life; all claiming satisfaction at the expense of\nfuture mischief to himself and others. To countervail these\nmisleading forces by means of a fixed rational character built up\nthrough meditation and philosophical teaching, was the grand purpose\nof the Stoic ethical creed. The emotional or appetitive self was to\nbe starved or curbed, and retained only as an appendage to the\nrational self; an idea proclaimed before in general terms by Plato,\nbut carried out into a system by the Stoics, though to a great extent\nalso by the Epikureans.\n\nThe Stoic was taught to reflect how much that appears to be\ndesirable, terror-striking, provocative, &c., is not really so, but\nis made to appear so by false and curable associations. And, while he\nthus discouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in\nhostility with others, he learnt to respect the self of another man\nas well as his own. Epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that\nhurts us either by word or deed; and advises it upon the following\nvery remarkable ground:--\"Recollect that in what he says or does, he\nfollows his own sense of propriety, not yours. He must do what\nappears to him right, not what appears to you: if he judges wrongly,\nit is he that is hurt, for he is the person deceived. Always repeat\nto yourself, in such a case: The man has acted on his own opinion.\"\n\nThe reason here given by Epictetus is an instance, memorable in\nethical theory, of respect for individual dissenting conviction, even\nin an extreme case; and it must be taken in conjunction with his\nother doctrine, that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little\nor no damage, except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by\nour irrational susceptibilities and associations. We see that the\nStoic submerges, as much as he can, the pre-eminence of his own\nindividual self, and contemplates himself from the point of view of\nanother, as only one among many. But he does not erect the happiness\nof others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit, beyond\nthe reciprocities of family, citizenship, and common humanity. The\nStoic theorists agreed with Epikurus in inculcating the reciprocities\nof Justice between all fellow-citizens; and they even went farther\nthan he did, by extending the sphere of such duties beyond the limits\nof city, so as to comprehend all mankind. But as to the reciprocities\nof individual Friendship, Epikurus went beyond the Stoics in the\namount of self-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the\nbenefit of a friend.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nA.\n\nAbduction (_Apagoge_), 202.\n\nAbstract, and Concrete, appellatives not used by Aristotle, 64.\n\nAbstraction, belongs to the No\u00ebtic function, 486, 487, 492.\n\n_Absurdum_, _Reductio ad_, _see_ _Reductio_.\n\nAccentuation, Fallacy of 385; rare, 408.\n\n_Accidens_, Ens _per_ &c., _see_ Accident, Ens.\n\n_Accidentis Fallacia_, 386; not understood among Aristotle's\nscientific contemporaries, 390; how to solve, 410.\n\nAccident, Ens by, 60, 424, 561, 593; modern definition of 62; an\nindividual, allowed by Aristotle, 63; no science of, 98; one of the\nPredicables, 276; thesis of, easiest to defend, hardest to upset,\n284, 353; thirty-seven dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 285 seq.; why\nno science of, 425, 593, 594; one, cannot be accident of another,\n586; opposed to the constant and the usual, 594; Chance, principle or\ncause of, 594; _see_ Concomitants.\n\nAction (_Agere_), Category, 65, 73.\n\nActuality, as opposed to Potentiality, 128, 456, 615 seq.\n\n_Adoxa_, opposed to _Endoxa_, 269.\n\n\u00c6on, of the Heaven, 636.\n\n\u00c6ther, derivation of the name, 632.\n\nAffirmation, conjunction of predicate with subject, 111; constituents\nof, 118; [Greek: e)k metathe/se\u00f4s] (Theophrastus), 122, 169.\n\nAkroamatic books, opposed to Exoteric, 50.\n\nAlcuin, followed Aristotle on Universals, 563.\n\nAlexander of Macedon, taught by Aristotle from boyhood, 5; came to\nthe throne, and went on his first Persian expedition, 6; his action\ntowards Athens, 8; correspondent, protector, patron, of Aristotle at\nAthens, 7, 8; later change in his character and alienation from\nAristotle, 9; his order for the recall of exiles throughout Greece,\n10; his death, 7, 12.\n\nAlexandrine, _literati_, their knowledge of Aristotle, 34, 38, 40,\n42.\n\n_Aliquid_, _Ad_, _see_ Relation; _Hoc_, or the definite individual,\n_see_ Essence.\n\nAlkm\u00e6on, his view of the soul, 449.\n\nAmmonius, put Relation above all the Categories, 84; his opinion on\nlast paragraph of De Interpretatione, 134.\n\nAmphiboly, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 407.\n\nAmyntas, king of Macedon, 2.\n\nAnalytica, referred to in Topica, 56; presuppose contents of\nCategori\u00e6 and De Interpretatione, 56; terminology of, differs from\nthat of De Interpretatione, 141; purpose of, 141.\n\nAnalytica Priora, different sections of Book I., 157, 163; relation\nof the two books of, 171.\n\nAnalytica Posteriora, applies Syllogism to Demonstration, 142, 207;\nrelation of, to the Metaphysica, 422.\n\nAnaxagoras, doctrine of, inconsistent with Maxim of Contradiction,\n429, 592; disregarded data of experience, 436; his view of the soul,\n449; Maxim of Excluded Middle defended by Aristotle specially\nagainst, 581; made intelligence dependent on sense, 588; doctrine of,\nmakes all propositions false, 592; must yet admit an infinite number\nof true propositions, 592; meant by his Unum--Ens Potenti\u00e2, and thus\ngot partial hold of the idea of Matter, 620; in his doctrine of the\nNo\u00fbs, makes Actuality prior to Potentiality, 623; declares Good to be\nthe principle as Movent, 628; called fire \u00c6ther, 632; his reason for\nthe stationariness of the Earth, 649.\n\nAnaximander, his reason for stationariness of the Earth, 650.\n\nAnaximenes, his reason for stationariness of the Earth, 649.\n\nAndronikus of Rhodes, source of our Aristotle, 35; sorted and\ncorrected the Aristotelian MSS. at Rome, 37, 39; Peripatetic\nScholarch, 39; difficulties of his task--the result appreciated, 43;\nplaced theological treatises first, 55; put Relation above all the\nCategories, 84.\n\nAnim\u00e2, Treatise de, referred to in the De Interpretatione, 109.\n\nAnonymus, his catalogue of Aristotle's works, compared with that of\nDiogenes and with the extant works, 29 seq.\n\nAntipater, friend and correspondent of Aristotle, 7, 8; victor in the\nLamian war, occupied Athens, 12; letter to, from Aristotle at\nChalkis, 16; letter of, in praise of Aristotle, 16; executor under\nAristotle's Will, 17.\n\n_Antiphasis_, pair of contradictory opposites, 111; rule of, as\nregards truth and falsity, 112, 113; made up of one affirmation and\none negation corresponding, 113; does not hold for events particular\nand future, because of irregularity in the Kosmos, 113 seq.;\nquaternions exhibiting each two related cases of, 118 seq., 170;\nforms of, in Modals, 127; involves determination of quantity, 135;\nnot understood before Aristotle, 136; the two members of, can neither\nbe both true nor both false, argued at length by Aristotle in\nMetaph**. [Greek: G]., ii. 586-92.\n\nAntisthenes, declared contradiction impossible, 136, 137; allowed\ndefinition only of compounds, 611.\n\nAntonius, Marcus, authority for Stoical creed, 654; on active\nbeneficence, 662.\n\n_Apagoge_ (Abduction), 202.\n\nApellikon, of Teos, a Peripatetic, bought Aristotle's MSS., &c., from\nheirs of Neleus, 36; exposed them at Athens and had copies taken, 36;\nwrote a biography of Aristotle, 37; library of, composite, 43.\n\n_Aplan\u00eas_, exterior sphere of the Kosmos, 114, 623.\n\n[Greek: A)po/phansis], Enunciation, name for Proposition in De\nInterpretatione, 141.\n\nAppetite, the direct producing cause of movement in animals, 492.\n\nArchytas, made _Habere_ fifth Category, 80.\n\nArguments, how to find, for different theses, 157.\n\nArimnestus, brother of Aristotle, 19.\n\nAristippus, anticipated Epikurus, 654.\n\nAristomenes, friend of Aristotle, 17.\n\nAristophanes, of Byzantium, arranged dialogues of Plato, 34; on the\nstyle of Epikurus, 658.\n\n'_Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus_,' work by V. Rose, 32.\n\nAristotle, birth and parentage, 1, 2; opportunities for physiological\nstudy, 2; an orphan in youth, became ward of Proxenus, 8; discrepant\naccounts as to his early life, 3; medical practice, 3; under Plato at\nAthens, 4; went to Atarneus, on Plato's death, 4; married Pythias, 5;\ndriven out to Mitylene, 5; invited by Philip of Macedon to become\ntutor to Alexander, 5; life in Macedon, 5; re-founded Stageira, 6;\ntaught in the Nymph\u00e6um of Mieza, 6; returned to Athens, and set up\nhis school in the Lykeium, 7; lecturing and writing, 7, 25;\ncorrespondence, 7; relation to Athenian polities, 8; protected and\npatronized at Athens by Alexander and Antipater, 8; in spite of\nestrangement between him and Alexander, regarded always as unfriendly\nto Athenian liberty, 9, 10; his relation to Nikanor, bearer of\nAlexander's rescript to the Greek cities, 11; indicted for impiety in\nhis doctrines and his commemoration of the eunuch Hermeias, 12, 13;\nretired to Chalkis, 14; died there, before he could return to Athens,\n15; wrote a defence against the charge of impiety, 15; his judgment\non Athens and Athenians, 16; his person, habits, manners, &c., 16;\nhis second wife, son, and daughter, 17; last testament, 17-19; his\ncharacter as therein exhibited, 19; reproaches against, 20; his\nopposition to Plato misrepresented by **Platonists, 20, 21; a student\nand teacher of rhetoric, 22; attacked Isokrates, 24; assailed by\nthree sets of enemies, 26; difficulty in determining the Canon of his\nworks as compared with Plato's, 27; extant works ascribed to, 27;\nancient authorities for his works, 28; catalogue and extent of his\nworks, according to Diogenes, 29; according to Anonymus, 29; the\ncatalogues compared with each other, and with list of his extant\nworks, 29, 30; ancient encomiums on his style, 30; his principal\nworks unknown to Cicero and others, 31, 40; dialogues and other works\nof, lost to us, 31; works in the catalogue are declared by V. Rose\nnot to belong to, 32; different opinion of E. Heitz, 32; allowance to\nbe made for diversity of style, subject, &c., in the works of, 33;\nworks in the catalogue to be held as really composed by, 34; extant\nworks of, whence derived, 35; fate of his library and MSS. on his\ndeath, till brought to Rome and cared for by Andronikus, 35 seq.;\nthrough Andronikus, became known as we know him, 40; not thus known\nto the Alexandrine librarians, 42; so-called Exoteric works of, 44;\nhis own use of the phrase \"exoteric discourses,\" 46 seq.; had not two\ndoctrines--the Exoteric and Esoteric, 52; the order of his extant\nworks uncertain, 54; his merit in noting equivocation of terms, 57;\nnot free from fascination by particular numbers, 74; first made\nlogical analysis of Ens, 97; first to treat Logic scientifically,\n130; what he did for theory of Proposition, 136, 139; claimed the\ntheory of Syllogism as his own work, 140, 153, 259, 420; his\nexpository manner, novel and peculiar, 141; specialized the meaning\nof Syllogism, 143; first to ask if a proposition could be converted,\n144; first used letters as symbols in exposition, 148; proceeded\nupon, but modified, Platonic antithesis of Science and Opinion, 207,\n264; specially claimed to be original in his theory of Dialectic,\n262, 418; attended to current opinion, drew up list of proverbs, 272,\n440; started in his philosophy from the common habit of speech, 434,\n440; continued the work of Sokrates, 439, 441; devised a First\nPhilosophy conformable to the habits of common speech, starting from\nthe definite individual or _Hoc Aliquid_, 445; psychology of, must be\ncompared with that of his predecessors, 446; rejected all previous\ntheories on Soul, 452; advance made in the Ontology of, 561; his view\nof pleasure, 660; ethical purpose of, 662.\n\nArithmetic, _pr\u00e6cognita_ required in, 212; abstracted from material\nconditions, 234; simpler, and therefore more accurate, than geometry,\n234.\n\nArt, Generation from, 598, 620.\n\nAsklepiads, traditional training of, 2.\n\nAssociation of Ideas, principles of, 477; Aristotle's account of,\nperplexed by his sharp distinction of Memory and Reminiscence, 478.\n\nAstronomy, the mathematical science most akin to First Philosophy,\n626.\n\nAtarneus, Aristotle there, 4.\n\nAttalid kings of Pergamus, Aristotle's library at Skepsis buried, to\nbe kept hidden from, 36.\n\nAxioms, assumed in Demonstration, 212, 215, 220; a part of\nDemonstration, 219; not always formally enunciated, 221; those common\nto all sciences, scrutinized by Dialectic, 221, 575; and by First\nPhilosophy, 221, 425, 575, 584; the common, not alone sufficient for\nDemonstration in the special sciences, 236; use of the word before,\nand by, Aristotle, 566, 575, 584.\n\nB.\n\nBees, partake in No\u00fbs, 483, 576.\n\nBelief, at variance with Knowledge, 182; founded on evidence either\nsyllogistic or inductive, 187.\n\nBerlin edition of Aristotle, 27, 30.\n\nBernays, his view of \"exoteric discourses,\" 49, 52.\n\nBody, animate and inanimate, 456; Matter with Aristotle may be, but\nis not necessarily, 456; thorough-going implication of Soul with, in\nanimated subject, 458 seq.; has three and only three dimensions, 630;\nno infinite, 633.\n\nBo\u00ebthius, translated Aristotle's Categori\u00e6 and defended its position,\n563.\n\nBo\u00eathus the Sidonian, student of Aristotle, 38; his recommendation as\nto order of studying the works, 55.\n\nBonitz, his view of the canon of the Metaphysica, 583.\n\nBrain, specially connected with the olfactory organ, 470; function of\nthe, 480.\n\nBrandis, refers catalogue of Diogenes to Alexandrine _literati_, 34,\n40; his view of the canon of the Metaphysica, 583.\n\nBryson, his quadrature of the circle, 381.\n\nC.\n\nCanon, Aristotelian, _see_ Aristotle.\n\nCategori\u00e6, the treatise, not mentioned in Analytica or Topica, 56;\nsubject of, how related to that of De Interpretatione, 57, 59, 108,\n109; deals with Ens in a sense that blends Logic and Ontology, 62,\n108; difference of Aristotle's procedure in, compared with Physica\nand Metaphysica, 65, 103; probably an early composition, 80; remained\nknown, when other works of Aristotle were unknown or neglected, 563.\n\nCategories, Ten, assumed in Analytica and Topica, 56; led up to by a\ndistinction of Entia (Enunciata), 59; blending together Logic and\nOntology, 62; Ens according to the, 61, 425, 594 seq. (Metaph. Z.,\n[Greek: \u00ca].); enumerated, 65; all embodied in First or Complete Ens,\n66, 595; each a Summum Genus, and some wider still, 66; not all\nmutually exclusive, 66, 73, 81, 89; may be exemplified, not defined,\n66; how arrived at, 66, 76 seq.; joined by later logicians with the\nPredicables, 73; stress laid by Aristotle upon the first four, 74;\nwhy Ten in number--might have been more, 74 seq.; obtained by logical,\nnot metaphysical, analysis, 76; heads of information or answers\nrespecting an individual, 77; inference **as to true character\nof, from case of _Habere_ and _Jacere_, 79; all, even **the first,\ninvolve Relativity, 80 seq.; Mr. J. S. Mill on, 90 n.; capital\ndistinction between the first and all the rest, 91 seq., 563, 594;\nTrendelenburg's view of their origin, 99, likely and plausible, 99;\ncompared with Categories of the Stoics, 100, 563, of Plotinus, 102,\n563, of Galen, 103.\n\nCause, Knowledge of, distinguished from knowledge of Fact, 223;\nknowledge of, the perfection of cognition, 224, 235; one of the four\nheads of Investigation, 238; nature of the question as to, 239, 608;\nsubstantially the same enquiry with _Cur_, _Quid_, and the Middle\nTerm, 240, 246; four varieties of, 245, 611, 621; relation among the\nvarieties of, 246; how far reciprocal with the _causatum_, 247, 254;\nhas an effect only one? 254; the General Notion viewed by Aristotle\nas a, 422.\n\nChance, source of irregularity in the Kosmos, 114, 206; affects the\nrule of Antiphasis, 115; Aristotle's doctrine of, challenged, 116;\nobjective correlate to the Problematical Proposition, 133, 205;\nprinciple or cause of Accidents, 594; Generations and Constructions\nproceeding from, 598, 620.\n\nChange, four varieties of, 609.\n\nChrysippus, on the determination of will by motives, 661; his\nreverence for divination, &c., 662; a foreigner at Athens, without a\nsphere of political action, 662.\n\nCicero, his encomium on Aristotle's style, 30, 41; how far he knew\nAristotle's works, 30, 31, 33, 40, 50; his use of the word\n\"exoteric,\" 44, 51.\n\nClaudian, referred to, 13.\n\nCoelo, Treatise de, connected with what\nother works, 54, 653.\n\nColour, object of vision, action of, 466; varieties of, proceeding\nall from white and black, 467.\n\nCommon Sense, or Opinion, opposed to Science in Plato and Aristotle,\n207; Sir W. Hamilton on, 565; legitimate meaning of, 567;\nauthoritative character of, in one place allowed by Aristotle, 569;\nAristotle's conception of, as devoid of scientific authority, 573,\n574.\n\nCompound, The ([Greek: to\\ su/nolon]), of Form and Matter, or the\nIndividual, 445, 456, 599 seq.\n\nConcealment, how to be practised by dialectical questioner, 356.\n\nConclusion, of Syllogism, indicates Figure, 152, 164, 167; when more\nthan one, 171; true, from false premisses, 172 use to demonstrate\npremisses, 173; reversed to refute premisses, 174; kinds of, in\nDemonstration, compared, 231.\n\nConcomitants, non-essential, no demonstration of, 219; no definition\nof, 220; near to Non-Entia, 561; little more than a name, 593; _see_\nAccident.\n\nConcrete, and Abstract, appellatives not used by Aristotle, 65; the,\nas compound of Form and Matter, 456 seq.; _see_ Compound.\n\nConjunction, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.\n\n_Consequentis Fallacia_, 388; not understood before Aristotle, 390;\nhow to solve, 412.\n\nConstruction, kind of Generation, 598.\n\nContradiction, Maxim or Axiom of, depends upon knowledge of quantity\nand quality of propositions, 137, 441; not self-evident, 144; among\nthe _pr\u00e6cognita_ of Demonstration, 212, 427; not formally enunciated\nin any special science, 221; discussion of, belongs to First\nPhilosophy, 422, 425, why, 426, 579; enunciated, as highest and\nfirmest of all principles, 425, 585; controverted by Aristotle's\npredecessors, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., 427, 429, 441;\nAristotle's indirect proof of, 427 seq., 585 seq.; applied in the\nSokratic Elenchus, 441; remarks on Aristotle's defence of, 442; can\nbe supported only by an induction of particular instances, 443;\nenunciated both as a logical and as an ontological formula, 579;\ndefended by Aristotle specially against Herakleitus, 579.\n\nContradictory Opposites, pair of, make Antiphasis, 111; distinguished\nfrom Contrary Opposites, 111, 124, 134; rule of, as to truth and\nfalsity, 112; related pairs of, set forth in quaternions, 118 seq.,\n170; distinction of from Contrary, fundamental in Logic, 137; _see_\n_Antiphasis_.\n\n_Contrariorum_, _Petitio_, in Dialectic, 372.\n\nContrary Opposites (terms), 104; Opposites (propositions),\ndistinguished from Contradictory, 111, 124, 134; rule of as to truth\nand falsity, 112.\n\nConversion (1) of Propositions, import of, 144; rules for, with\nAristotle's defective proof thereof, 144 seq.; can be proved only by\nInduction, 146, 147; (2) of Syllogism, 174.\n\nCopula, _Est_ as, 127, 591.\n\nCourage, definition of, 525.\n\nD.\n\nDebate, four species of, 377.\n\nDefinition, among the _pr\u00e6cognita_ assumed in Demonstration, 212,\n214, 220, 221; propositions declaring, attained only in First figure,\n224; of Essence that depends on extraneous cause, 240-44; of Essence\nwithout such middle Term, 245; three varieties of, 245; how to frame\na, 249; as sought through logical Division, 250; to exclude\nequivocation, 251; one of the Predicates, according to Aristotle,\n276; thesis of, easiest to attack, hardest to defend, 285, 353;\ndialectical Loci bearing on, 329 seq.; how open to attack or defence,\n330; defects in the setting out of, 330; faults in the substance of,\n332-48; the genuine and perfect, 333; general rule for dialectically\ntesting, 349; is primarily of Essences, of the other Categories not\ndirectly, 597; none, of particular Concretes, 602, 606; is of the\nUniversal or Form, 603; whence the unity of the, 604, 612; none, of\neternal Essences, 607; analogy of, to Number, 611.\n\nDelboeuf, Prof., on indemonstrable truths, 229 n.\n\nDemades, with Phokion at the head of the Athenian administration\nunder Alexander, 12.\n\nDemochares, nephew of Demosthenes, accuser of Aristotle, 14.\n\nDemokritus, disregarded experience, 436; his view of the soul, 449;\nmade intelligence dependent on sense, which is ever varying, 588;\nrecognized one primordial body with three differences--figure,\nposition, arrangement, 609; got partial hold of the idea of Ens\nPotenti\u00e2 or Matter, 620; atomic doctrine of, 634; his reason for the\nstationariness of the Earth, 649; how followed by Epikurus, 656-58.\n\nDemonstrative Science, _see_ Demonstration.\n\nDemonstration, ultimately reducible to two first modes of First\nfigure, 155; circular, 173, 215; subject of Analyt. Post. 207; how\nopposed to Dialectic, 209, 573; is teaching from _pr\u00e6cognita_\nassumed, 211, 214; undemonstrable principles of, 215; two doctrines\nof, opposed by Aristotle, 215, 228; necessary premisses of, 216;\nconclusion of, must be necessary, 218; none, of nonessential\nconcomitants, 219; the parts of, 219; premisses of, must be essential\nand appropriate, 220; requires admission of universal predicates,\n221; premisses for, obtained only from Induction, 226, 258, 260, 576;\nimplies some truths primary or ultimate, 227, 230; the unit in, 231;\nof the Universal better than of the Particular, 231; Affirmative\nbetter than Negative, 233; Direct better than Indirect, 234; is of\nthe necessary or customary, not of the fortuitous, 235, 606; none,\nthrough sensible perception, 235; in default of direct observation,\n230; relation of, to Definition, 240; _principia_ of, not innate,\n256; _principia_ of, how developed upon sensible perception, 256,\n575.\n\nDemophilus, joined in indicting Aristotle for impiety, 12.\n\nDemosthenes, reproached for conversing with the bearer of Alexander's\nrescript to the Greek cities, 11; suicide of, 12.\n\nDesire, _see_ Appetite.\n\nDexippus, vindicated Aristotle's Categories,103, 563.\n\nDialectic, how related to Science or Philosophy, 47, 210, 272, 273;\nform of putting questions in, 125, 275; theses in, variously liable\nto attack and defence, 156, 285, 352; as conceived by Plato, 208,\n263; by Aristotle placed with Rhetoric in the region of Opinion, 208,\n266, 573; opposed to Demonstrative Science and Necessary Truth, 209,\n573; concerned about the Common Axioms of all Science, 221, 272, 574,\n584; Aristotle claims to be specially original in his theory of, 262,\n418; as conceived and practised by Sokrates, 263, 436; opposed by\nAristotle to Didactic, 264, 377; province of, 266, 573; essentially\ncontentious, 266, 378, 397; uses of, 271, 574; propositions, how\nclassified in, 276; procedure of, in contrast with that of\nPhilosophy, 353, 584; conditions and aims of the practice of, 354,\n361, 378; to be practised as a partnership for common intellectual\nprofit, 355, 367; part of the questioner in, 355 seq.; part of the\nrespondent in, 361 seq.; respondent at fault in, 366; questioner at\nfault in, 367; four kinds of false argument in, 370; outfit for\npractice of, 372; one of four species of debate, 377; when and why\ncalled eristic or sophistic by Aristotle, 379; Aristotle's\ndistinction of Sophistic from, contested, 382, 393 seq.\n\nDialogues of Aristotle lost, 30, 32, 49.\n\nDiaphanous, action of the, in vision, 466.\n\n_Dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_,_Fallacia a_, 386; how to\nsolve, 412.\n\nDidactic, confounded by Plato with Dialectic, 264; distinguished from\nDialectic by Aristotle, 264, 377; species of Debate, 377; scope and\nconditions. Of, 377; _see_ also Demonstration.\n\nDifferences, study of, an organon of debate, 280.\n\nDifferentia, not _in_, but _predicated of_, a Subject, 68; ranked\nwith Genus in Aristotle's list of Predicables, 276; discriminated\nfrom Genus, 313; definition of Species through Genus and, 333, 601;\nis Form in the definition, 604; logically prior to the Species, 607.\n\nDiogenes of Apollonia, his view of the soul, 449.\n\nDiogenes Laertius, his catalogue of Aristotle's works, 28, compared\nwith that of Anonymus, 29; ignorant of the principal works of\nAristotle known to us, 31; catalogue of, probably of Alexandrine\norigin, 34, 41.\n\nDionysius, younger of Syracuse, visited by Plato, 4; corresponded\nwith Plato, 7.\n\nDionysodorus, the Sophist, 383.\n\nDioteles, friend of Aristotle, 17.\n\n[Greek: Dio/ti, To/], the _Why_, knowledge of, 223, one of the four\nheads of Investigation, 238; in search for a middle term, 239;\nrelation of, to the question _Quid_, 239; _see_ Cause.\n\nDisjunction, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.\n\nDivision Logical, weakness of, 163, 242; use of, to obtain a\ndefinition, 250.\n\nE.\n\nEar, structure of the, 468.\n\nEarth, opinions as to positions of, 648; opinions as to its state of\nmotion or rest, figure, &c., 649 seq.; at rest in the centre of the\nKosmos, 652; necessarily spherical, 652. 653; size of, 653.\n\nEclipse, lunar, illustration of Causation from, 254, 611.\n\nEducation of the citizen, 543.\n\nEfficient Cause, 245.\n\n\nElenchus, of Sokrates, 263, 437; in general, 376; the Sophistical,\n376, 404 directions for solving the Sophistical, 404.\n\nEmotions, not systematically treated by Aristotle as part of\nPsychology, but in Ethics and Rhetoric, 492.\n\n\nEmpedokles, his disregard of experience, 436; his view of the soul,\n449; criticized by Aristotle, 451; made intelligence dependent on\nsense, 588; got partial hold of the idea of Ens Potenti\u00e2 or Matter,\n620; his principle of Friendship, 623, 628; held the Kosmos to be\ngenerated and destroyed alternately, 637; held the Heaven to be kept\nin its place by extreme velocity of rotation, 639, 650.\n\nEnd, _see_ Final Cause.\n\n_Endoxa_, premisses of Dialectic, 269; not equivalent to the\nProbable, 270; collections to be made of, 275, as an _organon_ of\ndebate, 278.\n\nEnergy, _see_ Entelechy.\n\nEns, four kinds of, viewed with reference to Proposition, and as\nintroductory to the Categories, 59; _quatenus_ Ens, subject of First\nPhilosophy, 59, 422, 583; a homonymous, equivocal, or multivocal\nword, 60, 424, 594; not a _Summum Genus_, but a _Summum Analogon_,\n60, 584; four main aspects of, in Ontology, 60, 424; (1) _Per\nAccidens_, 593; (2) in the sense of Truth, 108, 594, 618; (3)\nPotential and Actual, 614-18 (Metaph. [Greek: Th]); (4) according to\nthe Categories, 594 seq. (Metaph. Z, [Greek: \u00ca]; relation among the\nvarious aspects of, 61, 424; aspects (1) and (2) lightly treated in\nMetaphysica, belonging more to Logic, 61; in aspect (4) Logic and\nOntology blended, 62; in the fullest sense, 66, 67, 96; first\nanalyzed in its logical aspect by Aristotle, 97; as conceived in\nearliest Greek thought, 97, 436; Plato's doctrine of, 552 seq.;\nAristotle's doctrine of, 561.\n\n_Enstasis_ (Objection), 202.\n\nEntelechy, Soul the first, of a natural organized body, 458; _see_\nActuality.\n\nEnthymeme, The, 202.\n\nEnunciative speech, 109; _see_ Proposition.\n\nEpictetus, authority for Stoical creed, 654; his distinction of\nthings in, and not in, our power, 661; his respect for dissenting\nconviction, 663.\n\nEpikurus, doctrine of, imperfectly reported, 654; his standard of\nVirtue and Vice, 654; ethical theory of, anticipated, 654;\nsubordinated bodily pain and pleasure to mental, 654; fragment of his\nlast letter, 654; his views on Death and the Gods, 655, 657; founded\nJustice and Friendship upon Reciprocity, 655; specially inculcated\nFriendship, 656; duration and character of his sect, 656; his theory\nmisnamed, and hence misunderstood, 656; modified atomic theory of\nDemokritus with an ethical purpose, 657; his writings, 657, 658;\nprovided by atomic deflection (not for Freedom of Will but) for the\nunpredictable phenomena of nature, 658; his view of the nature of\nTruth, 658; disregarded logical theory, 658.\n\nEquivocation, of terms, 57; detection of, an organon of debate, 279;\nFallacy of, 385; how to solve Fallacy of, 407; perhaps most frequent\nof all fallacies, 414.\n\nEric, of Auxerre, followed Aristotle on Universals, 563.\n\nEristic, given as one of the four Species of Debate, 377; really a\nvariety or aspect of Dialectic, 377, 379.\n\nError, liabilities to, in (the form of) Syllogism, 176; in the matter\nof premisses, 181; particular, within knowledge of the universal,\n183; three modes of, 184, modes of, in regard to propositions as\nImmediate or Mediate, 225.\n\nEsoteric doctrine, as opposed to Exoteric, 52.\n\nEssence (Substance), degrees of, 63, 561; first and fundamental\nCategory, 65, 67; First, or Hoc Aliquid, subject, never predicate,\n67, 18, 561; Second, _predicated of_, not _in_, First, 68; Third, 68;\nhas itself no contrary, but receives alternately contrary accidents,\n69, 83; relativity of, as a subject for predicates, 83, 91 seq.;\nFirst, shades through Second into quality, 91; priority of, as\nsubject over predicate, logical, not real, 93; treated in Metaphys.\nZ, 595 seq.\n\nEssence (Quiddity), propositions declaring, attained only in First\nfigure of Syllogism, 224; one of the four _qu\u00e6sita_ in Science, 238;\nnature of the question as to, 239; how related to the question _Cur_,\n240; in all cases undemonstrable, but declared through syllogism,\nwhere it has an extraneous cause, 244; variously given in the\nDefinition, 245; a variety of Cause (Formal) 245, 611; treated in\nMetaphys. Z, 595 seq.\n\nEssential predication, how distinguished by Aristotle from\nNon-Essential, 65.\n\n_Est_, double meaning of, 126.\n\nEthics, Aristotle's treatise on, analyzed, 495 seq.; uncertainty and\nobscurity of the subject, 497; Ethical science the supreme good of\nthe individual citizen, 500; fundamental defect in Aristotle's\ntheory, 514, 519; first principles how acquired in, 578.\n\nEubulides, wrote in reproach of Aristotle, 20.\n\n'Eud\u00eamus,' Dialogue of Aristotle's, 52.\n\nEud\u00eamus, disciple of Aristotle, knew logical works of his now lost,\n56; wrote on logic, 56; followed Aristotle in treating Modals, 144;\nhis proof of the convertibility of Universal Negative, 146; on the\nnegative function of Dialectic, 284.\n\nEudoxus, anticipated ethical theory of Epikurus, 654.\n\nEum\u00ealus, asserted that Aristotle took poison, 15.\n\nEurymedon, the Hierophant, indicted Aristotle for impiety, 12.\n\nEuthydemus, the Sophist, 383.\n\nExample, the Syllogism from, 191; Induction an exaltation of, 197;\nresults in Experience, 198.\n\nExcluded Middle, Maxim of, not self-evident, 144; among the\n_pr\u00e6cognita_ of Demonstration, 212; supplement or correlative of\nMaxim of Contradiction, 426; enunciated both as a logical, and as an\nontological, formula, 579; vindicated by Aristotle specially against\nAnaxagoras, 581, 590 seq.\n\nExistence, one of the four heads of Investigation, 238.\n\nExoteric, the works so called, how understood by Cicero, 44; how by\nthe critics, 45; \"discourse,\" meaning of in Aristotle himself, 46\nseq.; opposed to Akroamatic, 50; doctrine, as opposed to Esoteric,\n52.\n\n[Greek: E)x\u00f4terikoi\\ lo/goi], allusions to, in Aristotle, 46 seq.\n\nExperience, inference from Example results in, 198; place of, in Mr.\nJ. S. Mill's theory of Ratiocination, 199; basis of science, 199; is\nof particular facts, 576.\n\n_Expetenda_, dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 296 seq.\n\nEye, structure of the, 466.\n\nF.\n\nFact, knowledge of, distinguished from knowledge of Cause, 223, 235;\none of the four heads of Investigation, 238; nature of question as\nto, 239; assumed in question as to Cause, 239, 608.\n\nFallacies, subject of Sophistici Elenchi, 377; incidental to the\nhuman **intellect, often hard to detect, not mere traps, 383, 395,\n404; operated through language, 384; classified, 385; (1)\n_Dictionis_ or _In Dictione_, 385; (2) _Extra Dictionem_ 385 seq.;\nmay all be brought to _Ignoratio Elenchi_, 390; current among\nAristotle's contemporaries, 391; _In Dictione_, how to solve, 409\nseq. _Extra Dictionem_, how to solve, 410 seq.\n\nFalsehood, Non-Ens in the sense of, 60; &c.; _see_ Truth and Ens.\n\nFavorinus, 35.\n\n_Figura Dictionis_, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.\n\nFigure of Syllogism, 148; First, 148; alternative ways of\nenunciating, 148; Modes of, 149; valid modes of First, 149; invalid\nmodes of First, how set forth by Aristotle, 150; Second and its\nmodes, 151; Third and its modes, 152; superiority of First, 152, 153,\n224; indicated by the Conclusion, 153, 164, 167; all Demonstration\nultimately reducible to two first modes of First, 154; Reduction of\nSecond and Third, 168; in Second and Third, conclusion possible from\ncontradictory premisses, 175; knowledge of Cause, also propositions\ndeclaring Essence and Definition, attained in the first, 224.\n\nFinal Cause, 246, 611.\n\nForchhammer, his view of \"exoteric discourse,\" 49.\n\nForm, joint-factor with Matter, a variety of Cause, 245, 611; in the\nintellectual generation of the Individual, 445, 598 seq.; and Matter,\ndistinction of, a capital feature in Aristotle's First Philosophy,\n454, 594 seq. (from Metaph. Book Z onwards); relation of, to Matter,\n455; as the Actual, 455, 616; the Soul is, 457, 460; the Celestial\nBody, the region of, 480.\n\n_Fugienda_, dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 296 seq.\n\nG.\n\nGalen, his list of Categories, 103.\n\nGellius, A., his distinction of Exoteric and Akroamatic books, 50.\n\nGenerable, the senses of, 637.\n\nGeneration, the doctrine of, 598 seq., 620.\n\nGeneratione et Corruptione, Treatise de, connected with what other\nworks, 54, 653 n.\n\nGenus, is Second Essence, 63; or more strictly Third Essence, 67; in\na Demonstration, 219; division of a, 250; one of the Predicables,\n276, 284; dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 302 seq.; not often made\nsubject of debate, but important for Definition, 302; distinguished\nfrom Differentia, 312; perfect definition through, and Differenti\u00e6,\n333; easier to attack than to defend, 352; is Matter in a definition,\n604; logically prior to the Species, 607.\n\nGeometry, use of diagrams in, 167, 618; _pr\u00e6cognita_ required in,\n212.\n\nGorgias, style of, 22.\n\nGryllion, sculptor named in Aristotle's will, 19.\n\nGymnastics, as part of education, 544.\n\nH.\n\n_Habere_, Category, 66, 73; sometimes dropt by Aristotle, 74, 80;\nentitled with the others to a place, 78; refers primarily to a Man,\n79; is also understood more widely by Aristotle, 79, 103; exclusively\nso by some Aristotelians, 80; ranked fifth by Archytas, 80.\n\n_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, case of _Opposita_, 104, 105.\n\nHamilton, Sir W., on Modals in Logic, 130, 200; wavers in his use of\nthe term Common Sense, 565; points on which he misrepresents\nAristotle, 565, 566; real question between, and the Inductive School,\n567; the passages upon the strength of which he numbers Aristotle\namong the champions of authoritative Common Sense, examined\n_seriatim_, 568 seq.\n\nHappiness, Aristotle's definition of, examined, 501 seq.; happiness\nof the individual and of society distinct, 517.\n\nHearing, operated through a medium, 167.\n\nHeart, organ of Sensation generally, 464, 472, 474, specially of\nTouch, 472.\n\nHeaven (Kosmos), always in action, 617; uppermost place in, assigned\nto the Gods, 632; revolving in a circle, cannot be infinite, 633; no\nbody outside of, 634, 636; there cannot be more than one, 634;\ndifferent senses of, 636; ungenerated and indestructible, 637-39;\ndirections in the, 640; whence the number of revolutions in, 641;\nnecessarily spherical, 611, 645; motion of, uniform, 642.\n\nHeavy, distinguished from Light, 631.\n\nHeitz, Emil, takes ground against V. Rose on the catalogue of\nDiogenes, 32; refers it to Alexandrine _literati_, 34, 40.\n\nHerakleitus, philosophy of, inconsistent with the Maxim of\nContradiction, 427, 429, 592; disregarded data of experience, 436,\n444; position of, inexpugnable by general argument, 443; his view of\nthe soul, 449; his view of the world of sense and particulars, 551;\nnot a dialectician, 551; Maxim of Contradiction defended by Aristotle\nspecially against, 579; the doctrine of, makes all propositions true,\n592; must yet admit an infinite number of false propositions, 592;\nheld the Kosmos to be generated and destroyed alternately, 636.\n\nHermeias, despot of Atarneus and Assos, friend of Aristotle, 4;\ncommemorated after death by Aristotle in a hymn and epigram, 5, 12,\n13.\n\nHermippus, drew up catalogue of pupils of Isokrates, 21; probable\nauthor of the catalogue in Diogenes, 34, 35.\n\nHerpyllis, second wife of Aristotle, 17, 18.\n\nHipparchus, friend of Aristotle, 17.\n\nHippokrates, his quadrature of the circle, 381.\n\nHobbes, his definition of Accident, 62.\n\nHomer, made intelligence dependent on sense, 588.\n\n_Homo Mensura_, doctrine of Protagoras, held by Aristotle to be at\nvariance with Maxim of Contradiction, 430 seq., 580, 587 seq.\n\nHomonymous things, 57.\n\nHomonymy (Equivocation), Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 407.\n\nHypereides, executed, 12.\n\nHypothesis, Syllogisms from, 160, 168; as a principle of\nDemonstration, 215, 221.\n\nI.\n\nIamblichus, defended Aristotle's Categories, 563.\n\nIdeas, Platonic Theory of, not required for Demonstration, 221; as\nset forth by Plato himself, 553; psychological ground for, 554;\nobjections urged against, in Sophistes and Parmenides, 556 seq.;\nobjections urged by Aristotle against, 558; allusions to in books of\nthe Metaphysica, 595, 598, 600, 603, 606, 607, 612, 617, 619, 620.\n\n_Idem_, three senses of, 277, 350; a topic in First Philosophy, 584.\n\nIdentity, Maxim of, among the _pr\u00e6cognita_ of Demonstration, 212.\n\nIdomeneus, letter to, from Epikurus, 654.\n\n_Ignoratio Elenchi_, Fallacy of, 387; all fallacies may be brought\nto, 390; how to solve, 412.\n\nImmortality, not of the individual, 462, 489, 490.\n\nImmoveable, essence, subject of Ontology, also of Mathematics, 423,\n593, 619; Prime Movent, 624.\n\n_Impossibile_, _Reductio ad_, _see_ _Reductio_.\n\nImpossible, The, senses of, 638; differs from the False, 638.\n\nInduction, sole proof of the rules for converting propositions, 146,\n147; everything believed through Syllogism or upon, 187, 194, 226;\nthe Syllogism from or out of, 187 seq.; the opposite of genuine\nSyllogism, 190; plainer and clearer to us, than Syllogism, 191;\nAristotle's attempt to reduce, to syllogistic form, 192, 193; wanting\nin the first requisite of Syllogism--necessity of sequence, 193, 197;\npresupposed in Syllogism, 194; the antithesis of, to Syllogism,\nobscured by Aristotle's treatment, 198, 199; as part of the whole\nprocess of Scientific Inference, 199, 201; true character of,\napprehended by Aristotle, but not followed out, 199, 200; Logic of,\nneglected by the expositors after Aristotle till modern times, 200;\nrequisites to a Logic of, 201; supplies the premisses of\nDemonstration, starting from particulars of sense, 226, 258, 259,\n562, 576; repeated and uncontradicted, gives maximum of certainty,\n260; process of, culminates in the infallible No\u00fbs, 259-61; procedure\nby way of, in Dialectic, 358; most suitable to a young beginner in\nDialectic, 374.\n\nInductive School, exact question between the, and Sir W. Hamilton,\n567.\n\nInfinite, the, exists only potentially, not actually except in a\ncertain way for our cognition, 615; no body is, 632 seq.\n\nIntellect, _see_ No\u00fbs.\n\n_Intellectus Agens_, relation of, to the _Patiens_, 488, 489; eternal\nand immortal, but not in the individual, 488, 489.\n\n_Intellectus Patiens_, relation to the _Agens_, 488, 489; belongs to\nand perishes with the individual, 488, 489.\n\nInterpretatione, Treatise de, not named, but its contents\npresupposed, in Analytica and Topica, 56; subject of, how related to\nsubject of Categori\u00e6, 57, 59, 108, 109; last section of, out of\nconnection, 134; contains first positive theory of Proposition, 136;\nsummary of, 139.\n\nInterrogation in Dialectic and in Science, 222.\n\nIrregularity, principle of, in the Kosmos, _see_ Chance.\n\nIsokrates, corresponded with Nikokles, 7, 23; his rhetorical school,\n21; his style of composition and teaching, 22; attacked by Aristotle,\n24; defended by Kephisodorus, 24.\n\nJ.\n\n_Jacere_, Category, 66, 73; sometimes dropt by Aristotle, 74, 80;\nentitled with the others to a place, 78; refers primarily to a Man,\n79.\n\nJustice, definition of, 531; view of the Pythagoreans respecting,\n533.\n\nK.\n\nKallimachus of Alexandria, drew up tables of authors and their works,\n34.\n\nKallisthenes, recommended by Aristotle to Alexander, 9.\n\nKallistratus, his skolion on Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 13.\n\nKassander, pupil of Aristotle, 9.\n\nKephisodorus, defended Isokrates against Aristotle, 24, 272 n.\n\nKnowledge, of the Universal with error in particulars, 182; three\nmodes of, 184; two grades of--Absolute, Qualified, 212; of Fact, of\nCause, 223; proper, is of the Universal, 235; versus Opinion, 236,\n573.\n\nKosmos, principles of regularity and irregularity in, 114; _see_\nHeaven.\n\nKratylus refrained from predication, and pointed only with the\nfinger, 429 n., 580, 590.\n\nL.\n\nLa Mennais, on Common Sense, 567.\n\nLamian War, 12.\n\nLanguage, significant by convention only, 109; as subservient to the\ngrowth of intellect, 484, 576.\n\nLeukippus, affirmed motion to be eternal, 623; atomic doctrine of,\n634.\n\nLife, defined, 453; _see_ Soul.\n\nLight, distinguished from Heavy, 631.\n\nLight, takes no time to travel, 466.\n\n_Loci_, in Dialectic, nature of, 283; distribution of, according to\nthe four Predicables, 284; bearing on Accident, 285 seq.; bearing on\n_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_ as cases of Accident, 296 seq.; bearing on\nGenus, 302 seq.; bearing on Proprium, 313 seq.; bearing on\nDefinition, 329 seq.; belonging to Sophistic, 382, 403.\n\nLocomotion, Animal, produced by No\u00fbs and Appetite, 493.\n\nLogic, importance of Aristotle's distinction of the Equivocal in, 57;\ndeals with Ens in what senses, 61; blended with Ontology in the\nCategories, 62; connection of, with Psychology, 110; deals with\nspeech as Enunciative, 111; first presented scientifically by\nAristotle, 130; properly includes discussion of Modals, 130 seq.;\ndistinction of Contradictory and Contrary fundamental in, 136; use of\nexamples in, 167; Aristotle's one-sided treatment of, in\nsubordinating Induction, 200; as combining Induction and Deduction,\n201; Mr. J. S. Mill's system of, in relation to Aristotle's, 201;\nAristotle's claim to originality in respect of, 420; line between,\nand Ontology, not clearly marked by Aristotle, 422; Sokrates first\nbroke ground for, 426; subjective point of view chiefly taken by\nAristotle in, 578.\n\nLucian, uses word \"esoteric,\" 52.\n\nLucretius, only extant Epikurean writer, 654.\n\nM.\n\nMadvig, his view of \"exoteric discourse,\" 49.\n\nMathematics, theoretical science, subject of, 423, 593.\n\nMatter, a variety of Cause, 246, 611; joint-factor with Form in the\nintellectual generation of the Individual, 445, 598 seq.; and Form,\ndistinction, of, a capital feature in Aristotle's First Philosophy,\n454, 595 seq. (from Metaph. Book Z onwards); relation of, to Form,\n455, 456; as the Potential, 455, 615 seq.; various grades of, 456.\n\nMechanics, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54.\n\nMegarics, allowed no power not in actual exercise, 614.\n\nMemory, Tract on, and Reminiscence, 475; nature of, as distinguished\nfrom Phantasy, 475; distinguished from Reminiscence, 476; phenomena\nof, 477.\n\nMened\u00eamus, disallowed negative propositions, 136.\n\nMeno, Platonic, question as to possibility of learning in, 212.\n\nMenoekeus, letter to, from Epikurus, 654.\n\nMentor, Persian general, drove Aristotle from Mitylene, 5.\n\nMetaphysics, in modern sense, covers Aristotle's Physica and\nMetaphysica, 422.\n\nMetaphysica, name not used by Aristotle, 54, 59; relation of the, to\nthe Physica, 54, 422; characteristic distinction of the, 422.\n\nMeteorologica, connected with what other works, 54.\n\nMetrodorus, third husband of Aristotle's daughter, 20.\n\nMiddle term in Syllogism, literal signification of, 148; how to find\na, 157 seq.; the _Why_ of the conclusion in Demonstration, 219; power\nof swiftly divining a, 237; fourfold question as to, in Science, 239;\nas Cause, 246.\n\nMieza, school of Aristotle there, 6.\n\nMill, Mr. J. S., on the Ten Categories, 90 n.; his system of Logic,\nin relation to Aristotle's, 198-201; on indemonstrable truths, 229 n.\n\nMilton, his description of Realism, 552.\n\nMitylene, Aristotle spent some time there, 4.\n\nModal Propositions, form of Antiphasis in, 127; excluded by Hamilton\nand others from Logic, 130; place of, in Formal Logic vindicated,\n131; Aristotle's treatment of, not satisfactory, 133, 138; doctrine\nof, related to Aristotle's Ontology and Physics, 133;\ndisadvantageously mixed up with the Assertory, 138, 143, 154; in\nSyllogism, 204.\n\nModes of Figure, 149; _see_ Figure.\n\nMoon, spherical, 646; motions of, 647.\n\nMotion, Zeno's argument against, paradoxical, 365; the kinds of\nlocal, 593.\n\n_Motus_, under _Opposita_, 104.\n\nMovent, The Immovable Prime, 624 seq.\n\nMusic, necessary part of education, 545.\n\nMyrmex, slave or pupil of Aristotle, 19.\n\nN.\n\nNature, sum of the constant tendencies and sequences within the\nKosmos, 114, 117; objective correlate to the Necessary Proposition in\nLogic, 133; Generation from, 598.\n\nNaturalia Parva, complementary to the De Anim\u00e2, 54.\n\nNecessary, The, as a mode affecting Antiphasis, 126 seq.; relation\nof, to the Possible, 127, 205; a formal mode of Proposition, 131; why\nit may be given up as a Mode, 206.\n\nNecessity, in what sense Aristotle denies that all events happen by,\n116.\n\nNegation, disjunction of subject and predicate, 111; through what\ncollocations of the negative particle obtained strictly, 118 seq.,\n169; real and apparent, 122; _see_ Contradictory, _Antiphasis_.\n\nNeleus, inherited library of Theophrastus, and carried it away to\nSk\u00eapsis, 36; heirs of, buried his library for safety, 36.\n\nNikanor, son of Proxenus, ward and friend of Aristotle, bore\nAlexander's rescript to the Greek cities, 11; executor, and chief\nbeneficiary, under Aristotle's will, 17-20; married Aristotle's\ndaughter, 20.\n\nNikokles, correspondent of Isokrates, 7.\n\nNikomachus, father of Aristotle, medical author and physician to\nAmyntas, 2; son of Aristotle, 17, 18.\n\nNominalism, main position of, clearly enunciated by Aristotle, 481\nn.; scholastic formula of, 555.\n\n_Non Causa pro Caus\u00e2_, 388; how to solve, 413.\n\n_Non-Ens_, in the sense of Falsehood, 60, 108; Accident borders on,\n98, 593.\n\n_Non per Hoc_, the argument so called, 179; Fallacy of, 388.\n\nNotion, the general, as a cause and creative force, 422.\n\n_Notiora, nobis_ v. _natur\u00e2_, 197, 215, 239, 332.\n\nNoun, function of the, 109, 110, 130; the indefinite, 118, 124.\n\nNo\u00fbs, the unit of Demonstration or Science, 231; the _principium_ of\nScience or scientific Cognition, 236, 259; unerring, more so even\nthan Science, 259, 491, 577; stands with Aristotle as terminus and\ncorrelate to the process of Induction, 260, 578; (No\u00ebtic soul)\ndistinct from, but implying, the lower mental functions, 461, 479;\nindependent of special bodily organs, 479, 481, 487; how related to\nthe Celestial Body, 481, 487; the form or correlate of all\ncogitables--Form of Forms, 482, 486; limited in its function, as\njoined with sentient and nutritive souls, 482, 484; differently\npartaken of by man and animals, 483; growth of, 484; not clearly\nseparated by Aristotle from Phantasy, with which it is in its\nexercise bound up, 485; distinguished from Sense, 486; of the Soul,\nan unlimited cogitative potentiality, like a tablet not yet written\non, 487, 491; function of, in apprehending the Abstract, 488, 490;\nhas a formal aspect (_Intellectus Agens_) and a material (_Patiens_),\n489; in what sense immortal, 489; in what sense the _principia_ of\nScience belong to, 491; analysis, selection, and concentration of\nattention, the real characteristics of, 492; Theoretical, Practical,\n493; cogitation and _cogitatum_ are identical in, 627.\n\nNumber, analogy of Definition to, 611.\n\nNutritive soul, functions of, 461; origin of, 480.\n\nO.\n\nObjection (_Enstasis_), 202; response to false, in Dialectic, 366.\n\nOntology, starts from classification of Entia, 59, 61; Science of Ens\n_quatenus_ Ens, how named by Aristotle, 59; opposed as the universal\nscience to particular sciences, not to Phenomenology, 59; blended\nwith Logic in the Categories, 62; logical aspect of, as set forth by\nAristotle, 127; of Aristotle's predecessors, 97, 108, 551 seq.; has\nDialectic as a tentative companion, 273; not clearly distinguished\nfrom Logic and Physics by Aristotle, 422; highest of Theoretical\nSciences, subject of, 423, 593; treats of Ens in two senses\nspecially, 424, 425; also critically examines highest generalities of\nDemonstration, 425, 579; Aristotle's advance in, upon Plato, 445,\n561; an objective science, 579.\n\nOpinion, opposed to Science, in Plato, 207; in Aristotle, 207, 236,\n573; wanting to animals, 475.\n\n_Opposita_, four modes of, 104; included under, rather than\nincluding, _Relativa_, 104; should be called _Opposite-Relativa_,\n105.\n\nOpposition, Contradictory and Contrary, 111; squares of, Scholastic\nand Aristotelian, 137 n.\n\nOppositis, Treatise de, by Aristotle, lost, 134.\n\nOrganon, The, meaning of, as applied to Aristotle's logical\ntreatises, 55; what it includes, 56; not so specified by Aristotle,\n56; Aristotle's point of view throughout, 578.\n\n_Organa_, or Helps to command of syllogisms in dialectical debate,\n278; use of the, 282; relation of the, to the _Loci_, 283.\n\n[Greek: O(/ros], Term, applied both to subject and to Predicate in\nAnalytica, 141.\n\n[Greek: O(/ti, To/], _see_ Fact.\n\n[Greek: Ou)si/a], 67, _see_ Essence.\n\nP.\n\nParadeigmatic inference, 198; _see_ Example.\n\n_Paradoxa_, a variety of _Adoxa_, 269.\n\nParalogisms, Scientific, 267, 380; _see_ Fallacies.\n\nParmenides, eliminated Non-Ens, 136; uses equivocal names as\nunivocal, 414; his doctrine of Absolute Ens, 436, 551; not a\ndialectician, 551; made intelligence vary with sense, 588.\n\nParonymous things, 57.\n\nPart, relation of, to Whole, with a view to Definition, 601.\n\nParticular, The, _notius nobis_ compared with the Universal, 196;\ninferiority of, to the Universal, 231.\n\nPassion, _Pati_, Category, 65, 73.\n\nPeirastic, given as one of the four species of debate, 377; really a\nvariety or aspect of Dialectic, 377, 379.\n\n'Peplus,' work of Aristotle's, 32.\n\nPerception, sensible, _see_ Sensation.\n\nPergamus, kings of, their library, 36.\n\nPeripatetics, origin of the title, 7.\n\nPh\u00e6stis, mother of Aristotle, 2; directions for a bust to, in\nAristotle's will, 19.\n\nPhanias, disciple of Aristotle, knew logical works of his now lost,\n56; wrote on Logic, 56.\n\nPhantasy, nature of, 475; distinguished from Memory, 475;\nindispensable to, and passes by insensible degrees into, Cogitation,\n479, 484, 485.\n\nPhilip of Macedon, chose Aristotle as tutor to Alexander, 5;\ndestroyed Stageira, 6.\n\nPhilosopher, The, distinguished from the Dialectician, 354, 584; also\nfrom the Sophist, 584.\n\nPhilosophy, First, usual name for Science of Ens _quatenus_ Ens, 59,\n422, 584; _see_ Ontology.\n\nPhokion, at the head of the Athenian administration under Alexander,\n12; ineffectually opposed anti-Macedonian sentiment after Alexander's\ndeath, 12.\n\nPhysica, relation of the, to the Metaphysica, 54, 422.\n\nPhysics, theoretical science, subject of, 423, 593, 630.\n\nPindar, subject of his Odes, 13.\n\nPlace, in Dialectic, 283; none outside of the Heaven, 636.\n\nPlanets, number of the spheres of, 626; do not twinkle, why, 645;\n_see_ Stars.\n\nPlato, much absent from Athens, between 367-60 B.C., 4; died, 347\nB.C., 4; corresponded with Dionysius, 7; Aristotle charged with\ningratitude to, 20; attacked with Aristotle by Kephisodorus, 24;\nancients nearly unanimous as to the list of his works, 27, 42; his\nexposure of equivocal phraseology, 58; fascinated by particular\nnumbers, 74; on Relativity, 84; his theory of Proposition and\nNegation, 135, 427; called for, but did not supply, definitions, 141;\nhis use of the word Syllogism, 143; relied upon logical Division for\nscience, 162; opposed Science (Dialectic) to Opinion (Rhetoric), 208,\n263; explained learning from Reminiscence, 212; his view of No\u00fbs as\ninfallible, 260; character of his dialogues, 264; recognized\nDidactic, but as absorbed into Dialectic, 264; his use of the word\nSophist, 376; his psychology (in the Tim\u00e6us), 446-9, 451, 461; first\naffirmed Realism, 552; his Ontology and theory of Ideas, 553 seq.,\n_see_ Ideas; held Sophistic to be busied about Non-Ens, 593; his\nscale of Essences, 595, 620; his assumption of a self-movent as\n_principium_, 623; held that the non-generable may be destroyed, 637,\n639; on the position of the Earth, 649; in his Protagoras anticipated\nEpikurus, 654; admitted an invincible erratic necessity in Nature,\n657; ethical purpose of, 662.\n\n'Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates,' subject of the work, 1;\nreferred to, on subject of the Platonic Canon, 27.\n\nPlatonists, their view of Essences as Numbers, 611; _see_ Ideas.\n\nPlotinus, censured Categories of the Stoics, 100, 563; his list of\nCategories, 102, 563.\n\n_Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_, _Fallacia_, 389; how to solve,\n413.\n\nPlutarch does not appear to have known the chief Aristotelian works,\n31; authority for story of the fate of Aristotle's library, 35.\n\nPoetic, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; modes of speech\nentering into, 111, 130.\n\n[Greek: Poio/n], _see_ Quality.\n\nPolitical Science, the Supreme Science, 449.\n\nPolitics, place of in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; Aristotle's\nTreatise on, 539; founded on the Republic of Plato, 539; his\nconception of a republic, 539.\n\nPorphyry, disposed works of Plotinus in Enneads, 44; his Eisagoge,\n73, 101, 552; rejected last paragraph of De Interpretatione, 134; his\nstatement of the question as to Universals, 552, 564; defended\nAristotle's Categories against Plotinus, 563.\n\n[Greek: Poso/n], _see_ Quantity.\n\nPossible, The, as a Mode affecting Antiphasis, 127; relation of, to\nthe Necessary, 127, 205; three meanings of, given by Aristotle, 128;\neffective sense of, 129, 133, 205, 617, 638; truly a Formal Mode of\nProposition, 131; gradations in, 205.\n\nPoste, Mr., upon Aristotle's proof that Demonstration implies\nindemonstrable truths, 229; on the Theory of Fallacies, 383.\n\n_Posterius_, different senses of, 105; as between parts and whole,\n601-603.\n\nPost-pr\u00e6dicamenta, 79, 80, 104.\n\nPostulate, as a principle of Demonstration, 220.\n\nPotentiality (Power) as opposed to Actuality, 128, 456, 615 seq.;\nvarieties of, 613.\n\nPr\u00e6dicament, _see_ Categories.\n\nPredicables, four in Aristotle, five in later logicians, 276;\nquadruple classification of, how exhaustive, 276; come each under one\nor other of the Categories, 277.\n\nPredicate, in a proposition, 109; to be One, 120; called Term in\nAnalytica, 141.\n\nPredication, essential and non-essential, Aristotle's mode of\ndistinguishing, 63, 64.\n\nPremisses of Syllogism, 148; how to disengage for Reduction, 164;\ninvolving qualification, 166; false, yielding true conclusion, 172;\ncontradictory, yielding a conclusion in Second and Third figures, 175;\nnecessary character of, in Demonstration, 215; in Dialectic, 227.\n\nPrinciples of Science, furnished only by Experience, 162, 257;\nknowable in themselves, but not therefore innate, 178, 256; what,\ncommon to all, 212, 215; maintained by Aristotle to be\nindemonstrable, 215, 228; general and special, 236, 578; development\nof, 256; known by No\u00fbs upon Induction from particulars, 259, 562,\n577; discussed by First Philosopher, and by Dialectician, 575.\n\n_Principii Petitio_, Fallacy of, 156, 176; in Dialectic, 367, 371; in\nSophistic, 388; how to solve, 412.\n\n_Prius_, different senses of, in Post-pr\u00e6edicamenta, 105; in\nMetaphysica [Greek: D], 106; Aristotle often confounds the meanings\nof, 106; as between parts and whole, 601-603.\n\n_Privatio_ and _Habitus_, case of _Opposita_, 104, 105.\n\n[Greek: Proai/resis], definition of, 526.\n\nProbabilities, Syllogism from, 202.\n\nProbable, The, true meaning of, in Aristotle, 269.\n\nProblematical proposition, The, a truly formal mode, 131.\n\nProblems, for scientific investigation, 238; identical, 253; in\nDialectic, 273.\n\nProkles, second husband of Aristotle's daughter, 20.\n\nProof ([Greek: tekm\u00ea/rion]) distinguished from Sign, 203.\n\nPropositions, subject of De Interpretatione, 57, 109; Terms treated\nby Aristotle with reference to, 59; Ens divided with reference to,\n59; defined, 109; distinguished in signification from Terms, 109,\n110, also from other modes of significant speech, 111, 130; Simple,\nComplex, 111; Affirmative, Negative, 111, 122; Contradictory (pair\nof, making Antiphasis), Contrary, 111, 124, 134; Universal, Singular,\n111; about matters particular and future, 113; in quaternions\nillustrative of real Antiphasis, 118 seq.; subject of, and predicate\nof, to be each One, 125; function of copula in, 126; Simple\nAssertory, Modal (Possible or Problematical and Necessary), 127 seq.;\nsubjective and objective aspects of, 131; Aristotle's theory of,\ncompared with views of Plato and others, 135; summarized, 139; how\nnamed in Analytica, 141; named either as declaring, or as generating,\ntruth, 141; formally classified according to Quantity in Analytica,\n142; Universal, double account of, 142; Conversion of, taken singly,\n144; rules for Conversion of Universal Negative, Affirmative, &c.,\n144 seq.; comparison of, as subjects of attack and defence, 156;\nIndivisible or Immediate, and Mediate--modes of error with regard to,\n224 seq.; as subject-matter of Dialectic, 273; classified for\npurposes of Dialectic, 276.\n\nProprium, one of the Predicables, 276; thesis of, hardest, after\nDefinition, to defend, 285, 353; dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 313\nseq.; ten different modes of, 321.\n\n[Greek: Pro/s ti], _see_ Relation.\n\nProtagoras, his doctrine, \"Homo Mensura\" impugned by Aristotle as\nadverse to the Maxim of Contradiction, 430 seq., 587 seq.; true force\nof his doctrine, 431; misapprehended by Aristotle and Plato, 432.\n\n[Greek: Pro/tasis], name for Proposition in Analytica, 141.\n\nProxenus, of Atarneus, guardian of Aristotle at Stageira, 3;\nmentioned in Aristotle's will, 19.\n\nPseudographeme or Scientific Paralogism, 267; or pseudographic\nsyllogism, 380.\n\nPsychology, relation of, to Logic, 110; summary of Aristotle's, 493.\n\nPythagoras, disregarded experience, 436; _see_ Pythagoreans.\n\nPythagoreans had a two-fold doctrine--exoteric and esoteric, 52;\nfascinated by particular numbers, 74; their view of the soul, 449;\nwent astray in defining from numbers, 603; ascribed perfection and\nbeauty to results, not to their originating principles, 625; said the\nUniverse and all things are determined by Three, 630; recognized\nRight and Left in the Heaven, 610; erred in calling ours the upper\nhemisphere and to the right, 640; affirmed harmony of the spheres,\n646; placed Fire, not Earth, at the centre of the Kosmos, 648; made\nthe Earth and Antichthon revolve each in a circle, 648.\n\nPythias, wife of Aristotle, 5, 17, 20; daughter of Aristotle, 17-19.\n\nQ.\n\n_Qu\u00e6sita_, in science, four heads of, 238; order of, 239; the four,\ncompared, 240.\n\nQuality (_Quale_)**, third Category, treated fourth, 65, 72;\nvarieties of, 72; admits in some cases, contrariety and graduation,\n72; foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity, 73; illustrated from\n_Relata_, 73; First Essence shades through Second into, 91; to\nAristotle a mere predicate, highest of substances to Plato, 503; is\nhardly Ens at all, 593.\n\nQuantity (_Quantum_), second. Category, 65; Continual, Discrete, 70;\nhas no contrary, 70; a mere appendage to Essence, 595, 596.\n\nQuiddity, _see_ Essence.\n\nR.\n\nRealism, first affirmed by Plato, 552, 555; problems of, as set out\nby Porphyry, and discussed before and after, 552; scholastic formula\nof, 555; objections, urged against, by Plato himself in Sophistes and\nParmenides, 550 seq.; peculiarity in Plato's doctrine of, 557;\nimpugned by Aristotle, 558 seq.; character of Aristotle's objections\nto, 500; counter-theory to, set up by Aristotle, 500, 501; standard\nagainst, raised by Aristotle in his First **Category, 502;\nof Plotinus, 563; of J. Scotus Erigena, 564; of Remigius, 564.\n\nReciprocation, among Terms of Syllogism, 185.\n\nReduction, in Syllogism, 153; object and process of, 164 seq.\n\n_Reductio ad Impossibile_ or _Absurdum_, used in proving modes of\nSecond figure, 152; nature of, 155, 160, 168; a case of Reversal of\nConclusion for refutation, 175; abuse of, guarded against by the\nargument _Non per Hoc_, 179.\n\nRegularity, principle of, in the Kosmos, _see_ Nature.\n\n_Relata_, defined, 70.\n\nRelation, fourth Category, treated third, 65, 70; admits, in some\ncases, contrariety and graduation, 71; too narrowly conceived by\nAristotle, 80; covers all predicates, 82; covers even Essence as\nSubject, 83; an Universal comprehending and pervading all the\nCategories, rather than a Category itself, 84; understood at the\nwidest by some of the ancients, 84; comprehensiveness of, conceded by\nAristotle himself, 84, 88.\n\n_Relative-Opposita_, should rather stand _Opposite-Relativa_, 104,\n105.\n\nRelativity, or Relation, _see_ Relation; of knowledge, universal (in\nthe sense of Protagoras), impugned by Aristotle, 430 seq., 589 seq.;\nallowed by Aristotle to pervade all mind, 493.\n\nRemigius of Auxerre, went as far as Plato in Realism, 564.\n\nReminiscence, Plato's doctrine of, 212, 554; Aristotle's Tract on\nMemory and, 475; nature of, as distinguished from Memory, 470;\nphenomena of, 476.\n\nResemblances, study of, an organon of debate, 280.\n\nRespiration, organ and function of, 408.\n\nReversal of Conclusion, 174.\n\nRhabanus Maurus, followed Aristotle on Universals, 503.\n\nRhetoric, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; modes of speech\ndealt with in, 111, 131; opposed by Plato to Dialectic, 208, 203;\nopposed with Dialectic to Science by Aristotle, 208, 265, 266;\ndeveloped before Aristotle, 419.\n\nRose, Valentine, his view of the catalogue of Diogenes, 32.\n\nS.\n\nSagacity, in divining Middle Term, 237.\n\nSameness, three senses of, 277, 349.\n\nScholarchs, Peripatetic, their limited knowledge of Aristotle before\nAndronikus, 30, 38.\n\nScience, _see_ Knowledge.\n\nSciences, some prior and more accurate than others, 210, 234, 578;\nclassified as Theoretical, Practical, Constructive, 423, 593;\nTheoretical subdivided, 423, 593.\n\nSeneca, authority for Stoical creed, 654; a Stoic engaged in active\npolitics, 662.\n\nSensation, knowledge begins from the natural process of, 256, 483,\n492; consciousness of, explained, 473.\n\nSenses, the five, 465 seq.; cannot be more than five, 472.\n\nSentient soul, involves functions of the Nutritive with sensible\nperception besides, 461; distinguishes animals from plants, 462;\nreceives the form of the _perceptum_ without the matter, as wax an\nimpression from the signet; 462; communicated by male in generation,\nand is complete from birth, 463: differs from the No\u00ebtic, in\ncommuning with particulars and being dependent on stimulus from\nwithout, 463 seq., 486; grades of, 463; has a faculty of\ndiscrimination and comparison, 464, 483; heart, the organ of, 464;\ncannot perceive two distinct sensations at once, 473; at the lowest,\nsubject to pleasure and pain, appetite and aversion, 473; Phantasy\nbelongs to the, 475; Memory belongs to the, 475.\n\nSepulveda, his use of \"exoteric,\" 45.\n\nSigns, Syllogism from, 202; distinguished from Proof ([Greek:\ntekm\u00ea/rion]), 203; in Physiognomy, 204.\n\nSimplikius, defended Aristotle's Categories, 563.\n\n_Simul_, meaning of, 105; as between parts and whole, 602.\n\nSk\u00eapsis, Aristotle's books and manuscripts long kept buried there,\n36.\n\nSmell, operated through a medium, 467; stands below sight and\nhearing, 468; action of, 469; organ of, 470.\n\nSokrates, reference to his fate by Aristotle, 16; his exposure of\nequivocal phraseology, 58; called for, but did not supply,\ndefinitions, 141; his conception and practice of Dialectic, to the\nneglect of Didactic, 263; Elenchus of, 263, 437, 441; did nothing but\nquestion, 418; Greek philosophy before, 426; first broke ground for\nLogic, 426; his part in the development of Greek Philosophy, 436\nseq.; peculiarities of, according to Aristotle, 437; first inquired\ninto the meaning of universal terms, 551, 552.\n\nSokrates, the younger, false analogy of, in defining animal, 604.\n\nSolecism, sophistic charge of, 385; how to repel, 413.\n\nSophist, the, as understood by Aristotle, 376, 377, 381; as\nunderstood by Plato, 376; five ends ascribed to, 384; not really\ndistinguished by Aristotle from the Dialectician, 382, 393 seq.\n\nSophistes of Plato, theory of Proposition in, 135.\n\nSophistic, busied about accidents, 98, 593; as understood by\nAristotle, 376, 382; given as one of four species of debate, 377;\nAristotle's conception of, both as to purpose and subject matter,\ndisallowed, 382, 393 seq.; _Loci_ bearing on, 408; debate,\ndifficulties in, 416; borders on Dialectic, 417.\n\nSophistici Elenchi, last book of Topica, 56, 262; subject of, 376;\nlast chapter of, 417 seq.\n\nSorites, what was afterwards so called, 156.\n\nSoul, according to Plato, 446, 449, 451, 461; Alkm\u00e6on, 449;\nHerakleitus, 449; Diogenes of Apollonia, 449; Anaxagoras, 449;\nEmpedokles, 449; Pythagoreans, 450; Xenokrates, criticized by\nAristotle, 450; theory of Empedokles criticized, 451; theory of, as\npervading the whole Kosmos, 451; all the foregoing theories of,\nrejected by Aristotle, 452; requisites of a good theory of, 452;\nAristotle's point of view with regard to, 453; the problem of, stated\nto cover all forms of Life, 453; resolved by metaphysical distinction\nof Form and Matter, 454-7; defined accordingly, 458; not a separate\nentity in itself, 458; not really, but only logically, separable from\nbody, 458; thoroughgoing implication of, with Matter, 459, 478; is\nForm, Movent, and Final Cause, of the body as Matter, 460, 480; makes\nwith body the Living or Animated Body, 460, 480; varieties of, in an\nascending scale, 460, 481; the lowest or Nutritive, 461; the Sentient\n(also nutritive), 462-74, _see_ Sentient; higher functions of,\nconditioned by lower, 474; Phantastic department of, 474; the No\u00ebtic\nor Cogitant, 478, _see_ No\u00fbs, No\u00ebtic; all varieties of, proceed from\nthe region of Form or the Celestial Body, 480; No\u00fbs of the, 487; not\nimmortal, even the No\u00ebtic, in the individual, 489; is, in a certain\nway, all existent things, 493; two parts of, the rational and the\nirrational, 521.\n\nSound, cause of, 467.\n\nSpecies, is Second Essence, 63, 68; one of the Predicables in\nPorphyry's, not in Aristotle's, list, 276; logically posterior to\nGenus and to Differenti\u00e6, 607.\n\nSpeech, significant by convention only, 109, 111; Enunciative, and\nother modes of, 111.\n\nSpeusippus, succeeded Plato in the Academy, 7, 21; books of, at his\ndeath, bought by Aristotle, 35; held it impossible to define anything\nwithout knowing everything, 249; his enumeration of Essences, 595,\n629; ascribed beauty and perfection to results, not to their\noriginating principles, 625.\n\nSpinoza, his definition of Substance contrasted with Aristotle's, 93.\n\nSpontaneity, source of irregularity in the Kosmos, 115, 205; affects\nthe rule of Antiphasis, 115; objective correlate to the Problematical\nProposition, 133, 205; Generations and Constructions from, 598, 620.\n\nStageira, birthplace of Aristotle, 2; destroyed by Philip, restored\nby Aristotle, 6.\n\nStars, in their nature eternal Essences, 626; whence the heat and\nlight of, 644; themselves at rest, are carried round in their\ncircles, 644; spherical in figure, 645, 646; (not planets) twinkle,\nwhy, 645; rates of motion of (planets), as determined by their\nposition, 646; irregular sequence of (planets), in respect of\ncomplexity of motions, 646; partakers of life and action, 647; why so\nmany, in the one single First Current, 648.\n\nStilpon, merely disputed on Proposition, 136.\n\nStoics, Categories of the, 100, 563; their doctrine copiously\nreported, 654; points in which they agreed with the Epikureans, 655,\n663; fatalism of, 657; held Self-preservation to be the first\nprinciple of Nature, 660; inculcated as primary _officium_, to keep\nin the State of Nature, 660; their idea of the Good, 660; their\ndistinction of things in our power, and not in our power, 661; held\nthe will to be always determined by motives, 661; their view of a\nfree mind, 661; allowed an interposing Providence, 661; ethical\npurpose of,662; urged to active life, 662; subordinated beneficence,\nput justice highest, 662, 663; their respect for individual\nconviction, 663.\n\nStrabo, authority for story of the fate of\nAristotle's library, 35, 38.\n\nSubject, to be _predicated of_ a, distinguished from to be _in_ a,\n59, 62, 64; which is never employed as predicate, 63, 68, 157; which\nmay also be predicate, 63, 157; called Term in Analytica, 141.\n\nSubstance, _see_ Essence.\n\nSubstratum, 67, 595; _see_ Essence.\n\nSun, ever at work, 617; whence the heat and light of, 644; why seen\nto move at rising and setting, 644; motions of, 646.\n\nSylla, carried library of Apellikon to Rome, 37.\n\nSyllogism, principle of, indicated in Categori\u00e6, 65; theory of,\nclaimed by Aristotle as his own work, 140, 153; defined, 143, 426;\nPerfect and Imperfect, 143; meaning of, in Plato, specialized in\nAristotle, 143; conditions of valid, 148, 155; Premisses, Terms,\nFigures, &c., of, 148 seq.; Reduction of, 153; mediaeval abuse of,\n153; Direct or Ostensive, and Indirect, 155; has two (even number of)\npropositions, and three (odd number of) terms, 156; how to construct\na, 157; method of, superior to logical Division, 162; from an\nHypothesis, 168; plurality of conclusions from, 171; inversion of,\n173; conversion of, 174; liabilities to error in the use of, 176;\ncases of Reciprocation among terms of, 185; antithesis among terms\nof, 185 seq.; canons of, common to Demonstration, Dialectic,\nRhetoric, 186, 210, 265; the, from Induction, 187; prior and more\neffective as to cognition, than Induction, 191; the, from Example,\n191; relation of, to Induction, 192 seq.; varieties of Abduction,\nObjection, Enthymeme, &c., 202 seq.; Modal, 204; theory of,\napplicable both to Demonstration and Dialectic, 207, 265; the\nDemonstrative or Scientific, 215, 219, 265; of [Greek: o(/ti], and of\n[Greek: dio/ti], 223; the unit in, 231; scope and matter of the\nDialectical, 265, 267; the Eristic, 268, 380; the Elenchus, or\nRefutative, 376; the Pseudographic, 380; inquiry into Axioms of,\nfalls to First Philosophy, 426.\n\nSynonymous things, 57.\n\nT.\n\nTaste, operates through contact, 469; a variety of Touch, 471; organ\nof, 471.\n\nTautology, sophistic charge of, 385; how to repel, 413.\n\nTemperance, definition of, 531.\n\n[Greek: Tekm\u00ea/rion] (Proof), distinguished from Sign, 203.\n\nTerms, as such, subject of Categori\u00e6, 57; things denoted by,\ndistinguished as Homonymous (Equivocal), Synonymous (Univocal),\nParonymous--importance of the distinction, 57; viewed by Aristotle,\nas constituents of a Proposition, 59; distinguished from Proposition\nin signification, 109, 110; the word, used instead of Noun and Verb\nin Analytica, 141; Major, Middle, and Minor, in Syllogism, 148; in\nSyllogism, are often masked, 165; reciprocation of, in Syllogism,\n185; equivocation of, to be attended to in Dialectic, 278.\n\nThales, character of his philosophy, 435; supposed the Earth to float\nat rest on water, 649.\n\nThemison, correspondent of Aristotle, 7.\n\nThemistius, speaks of an \"army of assailants\" of Aristotle, 26; on\nthe order of the _Qu\u00e6sita_ in science, 238.\n\nTheodoras, developed Rhetoric, 419.\n\nTheology, alternative name for First Philosophy or Ontology, 59, 423.\n\nTheophrastus, left in charge of Aristotle's school and library, 15,\n35; directions to, in Aristotle's will, 17, 18; bought as well as\ncomposed books, 35; disposition of his library, 35, 42; wrote on\nLogic, 56; distinguished Affirmation [Greek: e)k metathe/se\u00f4s], 122,\n169; followed Aristotle in treating of Modals, 144; assumed\nconvertibility of Universal Negative, 146.\n\nTheses, how to find arguments for, 157; art of impugning and\ndefending, 180; in Dialectic, how open to be impugned, 284; chiefly\nUniversal Affirmative, 281; comparison of, as subjects of attack and\ndefence, 285, 352, 300.\n\nThrasyllus, canon of, 27, 41; tetralogies of, 44.\n\nThrasymachus, developed Rhetoric, 419.\n\nThomas Aquinas, his use of \"exoteric,\" 45.\n\n[Greek: Ti/ \u00ea)=n ei)=nai, To/], _see_ Essence (Quiddity).\n\nTim\u00e6us, Platonic, summary of the psychological doctrine in the,\n446-9.\n\nTimarchus, friend of Aristotle, 17.\n\nTime, none, outside of the Heaven, 277.\n\nTisias, first writer on Rhetoric, 419.\n\nTopica, referred to in Analytica, 56; presupposes contents of\nCategori\u00e6 and De Interpretatione, 56; part of one scheme with\nAnalytica, 142; design of, specially claimed by Aristotle as\noriginal, 262; subject of, 262, 265; First Book of, preliminary to\nthe _Loci_, 283; distribution of, 284.\n\nTorstrick, his view of \"exoteric discourse,\" 49.\n\nTouch, most wisely diffused sense, 464; operated through contact,\n468; _i.e._, apparently, 472; most developed in man, 471; an\naggregate of several senses, 471; organ of, 471.\n\nTrans-Olfacient, action of the, in Smell, 467.\n\nTrans-Sonant, action of the, in Hearing, 467.\n\nTrendelenburg, brings the Categories into relation with parts of\nspeech, 99.\n\nTruth, Ens in the sense of, 60, &c., _see_ Ens; a mental conjunction\nor disjunction of terms in conformity with fact, 60, 111, 591, 594,\n618; embodied in the Proposition or Enunciative Speech, 109, 130.\n\nTyrannion studied Aristotle's MSS. At Rome, 37-39, 43.\n\nU.\n\nUniversal, The, knowledge of, with error as to particulars, 183;\nknowledge of, better than of the Particular, 231; not perceivable by\nsense, 235; but cf. 258; reveals the Cause, 235; generated by a\nprocess of Induction from particulars, 260; controversy about, began\nwith Sokrates and Plato, 551; questions as to, set out by Porphyry,\n552; Plato's statements as to, collected, 553 seq.; scholastic\nformulae of the different theories of, 555; Aristotle's objection to\nPlato's Realistic theory of, 558 seq.; Aristotle's counter-theory as\nto, 560; is to Aristotle a predicate in or along with the Particular,\n561, 605; later history of the question of, till launched in the\nschools of the Middle Age, 562-4; given as one of the varieties of\nEssence, 595; arguments against its being Essence, 605.\n\n_Universalia Prima_, as premisses in Demonstrative Science, 216.\n\nUniverse, extends every way, 630.\n\nUnivocal terms, 57.\n\nV.\n\nVacuum, exists potentially only, 615; none, outside of the Heaven,\n636.\n\nVerb, function of the, 109, 110, 130; the indefinite, 118, 124.\n\nVirtue, Aristotle's definition of, examined, 521 seq.; intellectual\nand ethical, 521; is a medium between two extremes. 524.\n\nVision, most perfect sense, 465; colours, the object of, 465;\neffected through media having diaphanous agency, 466.\n\nVoice, The, 468.\n\nVoluntary and Involuntary actions, 525.\n\nW.\n\nWaitz, prints Sophistici Elenchi as last Book of Topica, 56.\n\nWhen, _Quando_, Category, 65, 73.\n\nWhere, _Ubi_, Category, 65, 73.\n\nWords, subjective and objective aspects of, 109.\n\nWorks of Aristotle, dates of, uncertain, 54; in what order to be\nstudied, 55; cross-references in the logical, 56.\n\nWyttenbach, started doubts as to Platonic Canon, 27.\n\nX.\n\nXenokrates, fellow-pupil of Aristotle, accompanied him to Atarneus,\n4; head of the Academy, 7; attached to Athenian democracy, 10;\ncharacter of, 25; his view of the soul, 450.\n\nXenophanes, improved on by Parmenides, 551; his reason for the\nstationariness of the Earth, 649.\n\nZ.\n\nZeller, his view of \"exoteric discourse,\" 49.\n\nZeno, the Eleatic, argument of, against Motion, paradoxical, 365;\nuses equivocal names as univocal, 414; defended the Parmenidean\ntheory dialectically, 551.\n\nZeno, the Stoic, a foreigner at Athens, without a sphere of political\naction, 662.\n\nZoological Treatises, place of the, among the other works of\nAristotle, 54.\n\n\n\n\nLONDON:\n\nPRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,\n\nSTAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.\n\n\n\n*************************************\nTranscriber's Note\n\nThere are several references in this text to Grote's previous book on\nPlato, 'Plato and the Other companions of Sokrates'. The 4-volume\nversion of this book is available in Project Gutenberg:\nVol. 1 - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40435\nVol. 2 - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40436\nVol. 3 - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40437\nVol. 4 - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40438.\n\nUnfortunately references in this text are to the 3-volume edition, so\npage numbers differ and in almost all cases chapter numbers are 2 less\nthan in the 4-volume version--as the advertisement says \"In the present\nEdition, with a view to the distribution into four volumes, there is a\nslight transposition of the author's arrangement. His concluding\nchapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled \"Other Companions of Sokrates,\"\nand \"Xenophon,\" are placed in the First Volume, as chapters III. and IV.\"\n\nThe text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.\n\nFor the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:\n) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute\naccent; \\ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.\nch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;\n\u00ea for eta and \u00f4 for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.\n\nCorrections to the text, indicated in text with **:\n\nLocation             Text of scan of 2nd edition   Correction\nPreface, after fn. 4 dialetical                    dialectical\nCh. 1 fn 5           ad.                           ad\nCh. 1 fn 10          mge/an                        me/gan\nCh. 1 fn 46          a)lla)                        a)lla\\\nCh. 1 fn 61          Quintillian                   Quintilian\nCh. 2 fn 15          Art                           Ar.\nCh. 2 before fn. 22  Theopharstus                  Theophrastus\nCh. 2 fn 40          a)ut\u00f4=n                       au)t\u00f4n\nCh. 2 fn 40          dia lektik\u00f4=s                 dialektik\u00f4=s\nCh. 2 fn 40          t\u00f4=n.                         t\u00f4=n\nCh. 2 fn 41          la\\r                          ga\\r\nCh. 3 after fn 49    e(te/r\u00f4/n                     e(te/r\u00f4n\nCh. 3 fn 54          e)pist\u00ea\\m\u00ea                    e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea\nCh. 3 fn 101         t\u00ea=n                          t\u00ea\\n\nCh. 3 before fn 111  Subiect                       Subject\nCh. 3 fn 112         ou                            o\u00f9\nCh. 3 fn 112         d\u00e9ja                          d\u00e9j\u00e0\nCh. 3 fn 112         Voila dont                    Voil\u00e0 donc\nCh. 3 fn 121         ad.                           ad\nCh. 3 fn 131         le/nos                        ge/nos\nCh. 3 fn 131         Stoic                         Stoics\nCh. 3 fn 132         deu/te/ron                    deu/teron\nCh. 3 fn 132         .                             ,\nCh. 3 fn 142         a)ntikei/me/na                a)ntikei/mena\nCh. 3 fn 142         o(\\then                       o(/then\nCh. 3 after fn 146   if                            of\nCh. 4 fn 9           Scholian                      Scholion\nCh. 4 after fn 25    justis                        justus\nCh. 4 fn 28          .                             ,\nCh. 4 before fn 38   Nons-Ens                      Non-Ens\nCh. 4 fn 48          lxii-lxviii.                  lxii.-lxviii.\nCh. 4 fn 52          no superscript\nCh. 5 fn 37          ad.                           ad\nCh. 5 fn 60          complet\u00e9ly                    completely\nCh. 5 fn 63-65       ;                             :\nCh. 5 before fn 81   faciliate                     facilitate\nCh. 6 before fn 4    the the                       the\nCh. 6 fn 14, 24      no superscript\nCh. 6 after fn 39    suscessively \t           successively\nCh. 6 fn 42          ad.                           ad\nCh. 6 fn 55          xxxiii. \t                   xxiii.\nCh. 6 fn 55          Sir.                          Sir\nCh. 6 fn 58                                        .\nCh. 6 fn 59 \t     Lokik \t                   Logik\nCh. 6 fn 60          e)pog\u00f4l\u00ea=s                    e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea=s\nCh. 6 fn 60          e)/st                         e)/sti\nCh. 6 fn 61          .                             ,\nCh. 6 fn 65          Sir.                          Sir\nCh. 6 fn 67 (twice)  ,                             .\nCh. 6 fn 67          :                             ;\nCh. 6 fn 71          seq                           seq.\nCh. 6 fn 74          Induction                     \"Induction\nCh. 7 fn 13          maximum                       maxim\nCh. 7 fn 19          tro\\pon                       tro/pon\nCh. 7 fn 35          .                             ,\nCh. 7 fn 39          .                             ,\nCh. 7 before fn 71   dialetical                    dialectical\nCh. 7 fn 75          .                             ,\nch. 7 fn 80          .                             ,\nCh. 8 fn 2           Schl.                         Schol.\nCh. 8 fn 2           attibute                      attribute\nCh. 8 fn 12          jusqu' \u00e0                      jusqu'\u00e0\nCh. 8 fn 18          ou)de                         ou)de\\\nCh. 8 fn 34          a                             a.\nCh. 8 fn 49          lanthanousi                   lantha/nousi\nCh. 8 fn 52          .                             ,\nCh. 8 fn 56          .                             ,\nCh. 8 fn 62          de                            de\\\nCh. 8 fn 70          primilibri                    primi libri\nCh. 9 fn 27          plei/on'                      plei/on\nCh. 9 fn 39          vii..                         viii.\nCh. 9 before fn 44   analgous                      analogous\nCh. 9 fn 71          to                            to\\\nCh. 9 before fn 113  usuage                        usage\nCh. 9 before fn 158  is respecting                 is) respecting\nCh. 9 before fn 161  more more                     more\nCh. 9 fn 210         la\\r                          ga\\r\nCh. 9 fn 211         la\\r                          ga\\r\nCh. 9 fn 211         dto\\                          to\\\nCh. 9 fn 229         ei)r\u00eamenon                    ei)r\u00eame/non\nCh. 9 before fn 283  impunging                     impugning\nCh. 9 before fn 298  defininition                  definition\nCh. 9 fn 367         poi=oume/nois                 poioume/nois\nCh. 9 fn 367         di\u00ea\\rthr\u00f4tai/                 di\u00ea/rthr\u00f4tai/\nCh. 9 fn 408         sugkrisin                     su/gkrisin\nCh. 9 before fn 436  revelant                      relevant\nCh. 9 before fn 444  you you                       you\nCh. 9 fn 464         gar                           ga\\r\nCh. 9 fn 464         proteinomen\u00f4n                 proteinome/n\u00f4n\nCh. 10 before fn 9   predominence                  predominance\nCh. 10 fn 85         Topic,                        Topica,\nCh. 10 fn 98         xxii.                         xvii.\nCh. 10 fn 98         Firman                        Firmin\nCh. 10 fn 112        b. 17;                        b. 17);\nCh. 10 fn 112        a. 10,.                       a. 10).\nCh. 10 before fn 129 philosphers                   philosophers\nCh. 10 before fn 138 tell                          tells\nCh. 11 after fn 9    confides                      confines\nCh. 11 after fn 28   that                          that,\nCh. 12 after fn 5    sperical                      spherical\nCh. 12 after fn 27   most most                     most\nCh. 12 fn 36         ad.                           ad\nCh. 12 fn 69         .                             ,\nCh. 12 before fn 75  accept                        except\nCh. 12 fn 129        and                           ad\nCh. 12 fn 139        t\u00ean                           t\u00ea\\n\nCh. 12 after fn 144  thoraic                       thoracic\nCh. 12 fn 156        88                            18\nCh. 13               end\u00e6monise                    eud\u00e6monise\nCh. 13               perforance                    performance\nCh. 13 (5 times)     ii.                           iii.\nCh. 14               commonweath                   commonwealth\nCh. 14               indulgencies                  indulgences\nApp. I               preceptions                   perceptions\nApp. I fn 8          370-395                       320-395\nApp. II fn 6         \u00ea|                            \u00ea(=|\nApp. III             ).                            .).\nApp. III             .)                            ).\nApp. III             ).                            .)\nApp. III             .                             .)\nApp. III             According                     (According\nApp. III             ).                            .)\nApp. III             ).                            .).\nApp. III             tni/as                        e)ni/as\nApp. III             parts                         parts parts\nApp. III             du/na/mis                     du/namis\nApp. III             duna/neis                     duna/meis\nApp. III             .)                            .).\nApp. III             2-025                         20-25\nApp. III             ).                            .).\nApp. III             ga\\r                          ga/r\nApp. IV              [stop omitted]                .\nApp. IV              from from                     from\nApp. Iv              contrifugal                   centrifugal\nApp. IV              their                         there\nApp. IV              a)ei=                         a)ei\\\nApp. IV              ;                             :\nApp. IV              them-themselves               themselves\nApp. IV              ).                            .)\nApp. V               the fears of those gods       those fears of\n                                                   the gods\nApp. VI              medita-tations                meditations\nIndex                Metaph                        Metaph.\nIndex                Platonist                     Platonists\nIndex                as as                         as\nIndex                the the                       the\nIndex                inteltellect                  intellect\nIndex                )                             ),\nIndex                Categorie                     Category","title":"Aristotle","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":387663}