{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45971/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45971","id":"gutenberg_45971","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45971","summary":null,"tags":["Art","Category: Art","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Ethics","Science -- Philosophy"],"text":"PARALLEL PATHS\n\n    _All Rights Reserved_\n\n    PARALLEL PATHS\n\n    A STUDY IN\n    BIOLOGY, ETHICS, AND ART\n\n    BY\n\n    T. W. ROLLESTON\n\n    \u201cIl faudrait, en un mot, suivre la grande route si profond\u00e9ment\n    creus\u00e9e ... mais il serait n\u00e9cessaire aussi de tracer en l\u2019air un\n    chemin parallele, une autre route, d\u2019atteindre les en de\u00e7a et les\n    apr\u00e8s, de faire, en un mot, un naturalisme spiritualiste; ce serait\n    autrement fier, autrement complet, autrement fort.\u201d\n\n                                                        J. K. Huysmans.\n\n    LONDON\n    DUCKWORTH & CO.\n\n    3, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN\n    1908\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nIn a recent work by an eminent man of science, Dr. J. Reinke, Professor\nof Botany at the University of Kiel, there occurs a passage which\nI cannot do better than place in the forefront of this book as an\nindication of its aim.\n\n    \u201cPhysiology,\u201d writes Professor Reinke, \u201chas become the study of\n    the movements which, taken together, make up life. There is no\n    manner of doubt that nourishment, metabolism,[1] reproduction,\n    development, and sensation rest on processes of movement which\n    depend on material systems of peculiar molecular conformation. For\n    the bodies of plants and of animals are material systems whose\n    conformation is of a most intricate character.\n\n    \u201cSo far as physiology has at present advanced in the analysis\n    of these phenomena of movement, their problems have fallen\n    naturally into two groups. The first of these groups of phenomena\n    is comparatively transparent, and stands in agreement with the\n    general processes of the material world; it can be investigated by\n    observation and experiment. We may, therefore, hope to decipher\n    it completely, and to reduce it, in the end, to chemico-physical\n    processes. Of this kind are the phenomena of nutrition, taking\n    that word in its widest sense. But behind these processes there\n    stand the facts of development and of reproduction, and here, in\n    all investigations, and in spite of every attempt to demonstrate a\n    basis of physical energy, research finds itself confronted by an\n    _X_, a factor which mocks every effort to explain it by physics\n    or chemistry. And this _X_ which lurks in all the phenomena of\n    development takes a part in the nutritive processes also; so\n    essential a factor does it appear in all the processes of life that\n    chemical and physical forces alone would not suffice to keep alive\n    even the most rudimentary of organisms, not to mention creating\n    such an organism out of non-living chemical constituents.\u201d[2]\n\nIf this _X_ force exists and can be established, it will give us the\nclue, I believe, to much more than the operations of physical nature.\nThe following pages are an attempt to establish it, to define its\ncharacter, and to indicate the lines on which this unknown factor\nin evolution seems to bring into a rational unity the phenomena of\nthe physical world and the moral and \u00e6sthetic faculties of man. The\ntime appears to have come for such an attempt. The fermentation of\nmind produced by Darwin\u2019s massive and victorious promulgation of the\nevolution theory is beginning to subside; it is now possible in some\nmeasure to take stock of what has been destroyed, of what has been left\nintact, by the immense tidal wave of new thought which then swept over\nthe world. Some conceptions which were thought to have been submerged\nfor ever are reappearing in more or less altered shapes, and science\nis called on to reconstruct a universe less one-sided, less aridly\nsimple, than that which Darwinism, as at first understood, appeared\nto have left us. The result, so far as it is successful, will be the\nestablishment of a spiritual view of the universe on a natural basis.\nIt is an attempt which is at present occupying many minds, and which\nwill doubtless have to occupy many more before complete success is\nattained.\n\nI propose, in the following pages, to take the reader over the most\nmaterial and significant part of the ground by which I have myself\ntravelled towards certain conclusions. Much of this ground lies in\nthe region of biological science. No doubt to readers acquainted with\nthat science I shall often seem to delay too long in well-trodden\nand familiar paths. But I have had to consider the fact that English\neducation is still very much specialized. It is either literary or\nit is scientific. In the great majority of cases it is literary.\nAnd though scientific problems and theories are understood by every\neducated man and woman to be of deep importance and interest, and\nthough questions like those discussed in the present work are questions\non which all such persons are well entitled, and many feel themselves\nbound, to have an opinion, very few, comparatively, have even the\nelementary knowledge of science and its terminology necessary to\nenable them to take up the discussion at an advanced point. When it\nis announced from time to time that some chemist has again succeeded\nin forming an organic compound out of inorganic chemical constituents\nin his laboratory,[3] how many readers are there out of the small\ncircle of trained chemists who would not be far more impressed if they\nheard that he had made a diamond? It is for these persons\u2014the layman\nand the lay-woman in point of science\u2014that I mainly write, and my own\ntraining having been philosophical and literary rather than scientific\nI think I understand most of their difficulties. I have, therefore,\ntried to \u2018begin at the beginning\u2019; and I hope that this book, besides\nwhatever value its conclusions may have, will prove useful to some\nreaders by putting them in a position to appreciate the extraordinarily\ninteresting and fruitful discoveries of biology in recent years.\n\n\u201cThe lotus of physics,\u201d as Schopenhauer says, \u201cis rooted in the soil\nof metaphysics,\u201d and if these studies pretended to offer a complete\nexplanation of the riddle of existence, the metaphysical basis for\nthe speculations contained in them would have to be elaborated at\nconsiderable length. But, after all, the conclusions reached would\nonly be those which most people are willing to accept as a necessary\nassumption, if all thought on the constitution of the universe is\nnot to be a pure futility. Suffice it to say Man is here regarded\nas an organic part of Nature, and his consciousness as Nature\u2019s way\nof mirroring herself to herself. Since, like other natural things,\nthe soul is not a complete and unalterable entity, but is part of\nthe eternal Becoming, it never can be claimed that its reflection of\nthe world is absolutely pure and complete, yet some reality, some\nsignificance this reflection must surely have. The fact that man is\nnot something different from the world, observing it from outside,\nbut is vitally related to it, would alone entitle us to believe that,\nhowever much his observations may need to be purified and corrected,\nand however false may be the argumentative deductions sometimes drawn\nfrom them, he is still capable of a real and fruitful apprehension of\nthe phenomena by which he is surrounded, and of their relations to\neach other and to himself. All sincere thought must therefore tend to\nbrighten a little the mirror of the human soul. If this book should\ndo so in any degree, were it merely by provoking other minds to more\nsuccessful labours, the writer will thankfully say, like Apollo\u2019s\ntemple-sweeper in the play of Euripides, Fair is the service of Light.\n\nT. W. ROLLESTON.\n\nGlenealy, Co. Wicklow.\n\n_I have to thank The Macmillan Co. for permission to reproduce two\nillustrations (Figs. 1 and 2) from Wilson\u2019s_ The Cell in Development\nand Inheritance, _and Mr. Edward Arnold for a similar favour in regard\nto Fig. 3 from Weismann\u2019s_ The Evolution Theory.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n    PART I. BIOLOGY\n\n\n    CHAPTER I\n\n    The Argument from Design\n\n                                                                   PAGE\n\n    Paley and the Watch                                               1\n\n    The Analogy Inapplicable                                          4\n\n    Paley\u2019s Conception of Design                                      8\n\n    The Evolutionary Conception                                      11\n\n    Conquest of Nature by the Evolution Theory                       16\n\n    The Philosophic Basis of Nature-study                            17\n\n\n    CHAPTER II\n\n    The Wheel of Life\n\n    Continuity of Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral Life                21\n\n    Characters of Organic Life                                       23\n\n    Living Matter: Its Functions                                     24\n\n    Its Substance                                                    27\n\n    Its Structure                                                    28\n\n\n    CHAPTER III\n\n    De Minimis\n\n    Growth and Development                                           32\n\n    Development a Cell-problem                                       33\n\n    The Mechanical Conception of Life                                34\n\n    The Cell and its Structure                                       38\n\n    Cell-division and Heredity                                       40\n\n    Reproductive Cells and Body-cells                                45\n\n    The Origin of Conjugation                                        46\n\n    The Mechanism of Conjugation                                     51\n\n    Significance of Elementary Vital Processes                       59\n\n    Adaptability, a Fundamental Character of Life                    63\n\n\n    CHAPTER IV\n\n    The Mechanical Theory of Evolution: the\n      Darwin-Lamarck Explanation\n\n    The Fixity of Species, how Maintained                            66\n\n    The Mutability of Species                                        67\n\n    Lamarck\u2019s Explanation of the Origin of Species                   68\n\n    Natural Selection of Innate Variations                           72\n\n    Difficulties of Lamarckism                                       77\n\n    Need of a deeper Explanation                                     89\n\n\n    CHAPTER V\n\n    The Mechanical Theory of Evolution: the\n      Darwin-Weismann Explanation\n\n    Lamarck, or \u2018Metaphysics\u2019?                                       91\n\n    Weismann\u2019s Escape                                                93\n\n    The Struggle among the Determinants                              95\n\n    Chance-Variations and Co-adaptation                              97\n\n    Other Difficulties of the Chance-Variation Theory                99\n\n    Natural Selection                                               103\n\n    Impossible before Competition Existed                           104\n\n    Co-operation and Competition                                    104\n\n    Protective Mimicry, Inexplicable by Chance-Variations and\n      Natural Selection                                             106\n\n    Innate Capacities of Life                                       109\n\n    Outline of Preceding Arguments                                  111\n\n\n    CHAPTER VI\n\n    The Directive Theory of Evolution\n\n    Nature\u2019s Power of Response                                       115\n\n    Reinke\u2019s Theory of Dominants                                     120\n\n    Cases of their Action in Evolution                               123\n\n    Law and Directivity                                              128\n\n    Intelligence and Directivity                                     130\n\n    The Analogy of Social Evolution                                  131\n\n    The Analogy of Language                                          133\n\n    Synthetic Movement of the Cosmic Reason                          137\n\n    Objections from Imperfect Adaptations and Regressive Forms\n      Stated                                                         143\n\n    Mechanical and Psychic Agencies, how Distinguished               146\n\n    Science versus \u2018Mysticism\u2019                                       150\n\n    Reply to Objection from Imperfect Adaptations, etc.              152\n\n    Man, the Growing-point of Earthly Life                           154\n\n    Immanence or Transcendence of the Cosmic Reason?                 155\n\n    Man\u2019s Relations to the Whole                                     157\n\n\n    PART II. ETHICS\n\n\n    CHAPTER VII\n\n    Law, Free Will, Personality\n\n    Free Will and Determinism                                       161\n\n    The Determinist Position                                        163\n\n    The Free Will Position                                          164\n\n    Conditions necessary for Free Will                              168\n\n    Has the Will an Ethical Bias?                                   169\n\n    Limitations of Free Will                                        172\n\n    Evolution of the Will                                           174\n\n    Free Will and Monism                                            176\n\n    Free Will and Brain-structure                                   177\n\n    Relations of Mind and Matter                                    186\n\n    Immortality                                                     189\n\n\n    CHAPTER VIII\n\n    The Ethical Criterion\n\n    The Visible and the Invisible Worlds                            194\n\n    Dualism and Monism                                              195\n\n    Monism and the Moral Law                                        198\n\n    The Hedonistic Basis of Morals                                  200\n\n    The Natural Basis of Morals                                     203\n\n\n    CHAPTER IX\n\n    The Ethical Sanction\n\n    The Individual and the Whole                                    208\n\n    A Scale of Motives                                              210\n\n    Conscience and its Commands, how respectively Derived           211\n\n    Results of Duty and of Self-indulgence Compared                 212\n\n    The False and the True Asceticism                               214\n\n    Ethics for Life: Implications of this Doctrine                  220\n\n    Is Life Dependent on Matter?                                    222\n\n    The Cosmic Life gives Immortality to the Individual             225\n\n    And Demands his Allegiance                                      226\n\n    Ethics Originates in the Visible Order, but does not\n      end there                                                     228\n\n    Hence, Ethics is for Death as well as Life                      229\n\n    The Martyrdoms of Socrates and of Christ                        230\n\n    Outline of the Conclusions arrived at                           233\n\n\n    PART III. ART\n\n\n    CHAPTER X\n\n    Art and Life\n\n    Tolstoy\u2019s Account of the Nature of Art                          236\n\n    Of the Standard of Art                                          241\n\n    Of the Purpose of Art                                           241\n\n    Criticism of his Conclusions                                    245\n\n    Art, Man\u2019s expression of Life                                   246\n\n    Art and Beauty                                                  251\n\n    Order and Change as Principles of Life and Art                  253\n\n    Classification of the Arts                                      254\n\n    Examples of the Presentative Arts\u2014(_a_) Architecture            256\n\n      (_b_) Ornament                                                259\n\n      (_c_) Music                                                   261\n\n    The Representative Arts\u2014(_a_) The Plastic Arts                  265\n\n      (_b_) Dancing                                                 270\n\n    The Evocative Art: Literature                                   271\n\n    The Union of Music and Poetry                                   272\n\n    Conclusion                                                      273\n\n\n    APPENDIX A\n\n    _Sum ergo Cogito_                                               275\n\n\n    APPENDIX B\n\n    Co-operation and Competition                                    279\n\n\n    APPENDIX C\n\n    Is Life worth Living?                                           282\n\n\n    APPENDIX D\n\n    St. Francis the Poet                                            285\n\n\n    APPENDIX E\n\n    Isabella and Claudio                                            288\n\n\n    Index                                                           295\n\n\n\n\nPARALLEL PATHS\n\n\n\n\nPART I: BIOLOGY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN\n\n    \u201cThe wisdom of the divine rule is apparent not in the perfection\n       but in the improvement of the world.\u201d\u2014Lord Acton.\n\n\nPaley\u2019s Natural Theology though not by any means an epoch-making\nmay perhaps be called an epoch-marking book. It was the crown of\nthe endeavour of eighteenth-century religious philosophy to found a\ntheology on the evidences of external nature. According to such exact\nknowledge of Nature\u2019s operations as was then generally available,\nPaley\u2019s attempt might well be thought to have succeeded. He opens his\nargument with a striking and effective illustration. He imagines a\nwayfarer crossing a heath who strikes his foot against a stone, and who\nasks himself how it came into being. Paley thinks he might be content\nwith vaguely supposing that it was there \u2018always.\u2019 But suppose that\nwhat he had found at his foot was not a stone but a watch and that he\nnow saw such an instrument for the first time. He would then certainly\nhave not been so easily contented with an answer to the riddle of\nits existence. He would, if he examined it minutely, have observed\nthat it was a structure intended for a certain purpose, and having\nall its parts arranged for that object, and mutually interdependent\nThe different substances of which it was composed would be discovered\nto have each its special appropriateness for the fulfilling of some\nparticular function in the economy of the whole. Though unacquainted\nwith watches he would, if he was a man of sense and cultivation,\ninfallibly conclude that he had before him an instrument intelligently\nconstructed with a certain object in view\u2014the object of measuring the\nflight of time. He would feel assured of this, even though he should\nfind that the object of the mechanism were not attained with absolute\naccuracy, and even though there were some parts of it whose functions\nwere not clear to him. The watch would be rightly regarded as a work of\ndesign; and the observer would be justified in arguing from it to the\nexistence of a designer, endowed with the faculties of intelligence and\nconscious purpose, by whom the watch must have been put together.\n\nThe rest of Paley\u2019s Natural Theology is an application of this analogy\nto the question of the origin of the universe. Ranging over the whole\nfield of animate and inanimate nature he points to instance after\ninstance of what appears to be the minute and thoughtful adaptation\nof means to ends, the co-ordination of part with part in the interest\nof the whole, and he has no difficulty, from this point of view,\nin showing the world of nature to be a piece of mechanism far more\nwonderfully and ingeniously constructed than any watch, and bearing\n_prima facie_ evidence of the most convincing kind of its construction\nby a Being possessed of intelligence, purpose and foresight precisely\nresembling those attributes as displayed by man, but vastly heightened\nand enlarged. As the watch must have been made by man, so a manlike\nbeing, endowed with the necessary powers and faculties, must be\npostulated as the maker of the material universe. And thus the\nexistence of a God made in the image of man appeared to have been\ndemonstrated to the satisfaction of eighteenth-century theology.\n\nBut minds of real philosophic depth have always shrunk from pressing\nhome deductions of this sort. They have felt that the matter is\nprobably not quite so simple as it might appear on the surface, and\nthey have recognised that if one is allowed to argue from the phenomena\nof nature to the qualities of the author of nature one cannot draw an\narbitrary line including only those facts which testify to wisdom,\npower and goodness, and excluding from view all those which reveal\nimperfection of design and execution, or which would convict a man, if\nhe were their author, of inhumanity and injustice. If the universe is\nreally analogous to a watch one is entitled to examine it throughout\nas one would examine a watch. All watches testify to intelligence and\ndesign, but besides good watches there are bad ones, there are those\nwhich are made of cheap materials, rudely put together, with showy\nexteriors and unreliable works. Every watch, if examined by experts in\nmechanism, in art, and so forth, would reveal the characteristics of\nits designer and maker, and these characteristics would not always be\nadmirable. They would rarely, in fact, be altogether admirable. If we\napply these methods of inquiry to a universe which contains malarial\nmosquitoes, slave-making ants, snakes, earthquakes, and all the pests\nwhich blight and deform life without calling forth any strong or noble\nqualities to carry on the contest with them, we shall go where Paley\ncertainly never intended to lead us, but we shall go there by Paley\u2019s\nroad. The fact is that these methods are altogether fantastic and\ninapplicable. The universe is not made like a watch. When we observe a\nhuman being or one of the higher animals we say, \u2018He has such and such\nqualities; he is faithful, false, brave, cowardly, diligent, indolent,\nstrong, weak, beautiful or ugly,\u2019 but we do not think of referring\nhis qualities back to certain attributes of an unknown maker of his\nphysical and mental organism. A philosophy worthy of the name has\nalways tended to regard the world as in some sense a vital organism,\nand has asked \u2018What is it?\u2019 rather than \u2018What does it prove about some\nother being?\u2019 \u201cHow green must be the maker of all grass\u201d was quite\na legitimate satire on all such attempts to deduce the qualities of\na hypothetical creator from the phenomena of the universe. Thus the\nmistake of Paley and his school was fundamental. It was the mistake of\nseeking God in fragmentary phenomena\u2014the same mistake, essentially, as\nthat rebuked by Christ, by which every calamity or material blessing\nis regarded as a \u2018judgment\u2019 or a reward. His method, if applied with\nthorough-going consistency, destroys its own basis, for the One and\nthe Many, the Whole and the Parts, cannot be apprehended at one and\nthe same time by one and the same faculty of any human mind. Looking\nat phenomena alone, and thinking in that sphere, we cannot say that\nGod made the world but rather that the world is becoming divine.\nPhilosophically and religiously, God is all in all\u2014historically, He is\nnot the beginning, He is rather the end, the end in which the whole\nhistory is resumed.\n\n\nPaley\u2019s elaborate argument was felt by the orthodox of his time to be\ncalled for, even though at this period his way of thinking was popular.\nThe conception of the world as a vital organism was as yet, indeed,\nvery vague, and unsupported by any detailed, scientific scrutiny of the\nfacts of nature, but it was in the air\u2014it had always been in the air;\nit always held the minds of cautious students back from a complete\nsurrender to the facile but illusory way of thinking typified by\nPaley\u2019s famous analogy of the universe and the watch. Bacon knew that\nspecies could be transformed by the action of a new environment.[4]\nGoethe had a clear conception of the evolution theory, based on a study\nof organic structure. Erasmus Darwin, in 1794, had uttered the great\nand final word: \u201cThe world has been generated rather than created.\u201d[5]\nLamarck\u2019s Philosophie Zoologique was not published till 1809, nine\nyears after Paley\u2019s Natural Theology, but his conception of the\ndevelopment of special characteristics by habitual exercise and their\ntransmission by inheritance had been freely mooted in Paley\u2019s day, for\nPaley frequently takes occasion to combat it. Even the conception of\nnatural selection as an agency in the formation of types of being may\nbe traced in a fantastic form as far back as to Empedocles,[6] while\nPlato, or whoever composed a striking couplet attributed to him in the\nGreek Anthology, had divined the plasticity of natural forms. \u201cTime,\u201d\nhe wrote, \u201csways the whole world; time has power in its prolonged\nlapse to change the names and shapes, the nature and the destiny of\nthings.\u201d[7]\n\nFifty years after the appearance of Paley\u2019s work, the grandson of\nErasmus Darwin wrote \u2018No thoroughfare\u2019 on the entrance to Paley\u2019s line\nof speculation, and closed it to mankind for ever. He did this in two\nways\u2014first by marshalling from his studies of comparative anatomy and\nof embryology an extraordinary volume of convincing evidence for the\n_fact_ of the mutability of natural forms, and secondly by his attempt\nto establish a plausible _method_ by which the change and development\nof organs and types might actually have taken place. The method, summed\nup in the phrases \u2018natural selection\u2019 and \u2018survival of the fittest,\u2019\nwas what really caught the attention of the world, and gave his\ndoctrine the wings which carried it into almost every sphere of human\nthought. However we take it, it was certainly an immense contribution\nto the organization of knowledge, but whether it is really what it\nfirst seemed to be, the basic fact at the bottom of all the phenomena\nof evolution, is coming to look more and more doubtful in the light of\nlater researches.[8]\n\nThis question will have to be considered later on in the course of\nthis study, and in relation to its main inquiry, which is this: What\nprecisely was the change in philosophic and religious outlook brought\nabout by the full and final establishment of the doctrine of evolution?\nWhere has evolution left the argument from design? Must we study nature\nas a mass of unrelated phenomena, or can we discern, through these, any\nfundamental unity to which they stand in organic relation; and if we\ncan, what is the nature of this unity?\n\n\nIt will be useful in the first place to have before us a typical\nspecimen of Paley\u2019s method. I shall choose as an example the case which\nhe considered so striking that he deemed it almost sufficient in itself\nto bear the whole weight of his argument In his ninth chapter, \u2018On the\nMuscles,\u2019 he writes:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe next circumstance which I shall mention under this head of\n    muscular arrangement is so decisive a mark of intention, that it\n    always appeared to me to supersede, in some measure, the necessity\n    of seeking for any other observation upon the subject; and that\n    circumstance is, the tendons which pass from the leg to the foot\n    being bound down by a ligament to the ankle. The foot is placed at\n    a considerable angle with the leg. It is manifest, therefore, that\n    flexible strings, passing along the interior of the angle, if left\n    to themselves, would, when stretched, start from it. The obvious\n    preventive is to tie them down. And this is done, in fact. Across\n    the instep, or rather just above it, the anatomist finds a strong\n    ligament, _under_ which the tendons pass to the foot. The effect of\n    the ligament as a bandage can be made evident to the senses; for if\n    it be cut, the tendons start up. The simplicity, yet the clearness\n    of this contrivance, its exact resemblance to established resources\n    of art, place it amongst the most indubitable manifestations of\n    design with which we are acquainted.\n\n    \u201cThere is also a further use to be made of the present example, and\n    that is, as it precisely contradicts the opinion that the parts of\n    animals may have been formed by what is called _appetency_, _i.e._\n    endeavour perpetuated and imperceptibly working its effect through\n    an incalculable series of generations. We have here no endeavour\n    but the reverse of it\u2014a constant renitency and reluctance. The\n    endeavour is all the other way. The pressure of the ligament\n    constrains the tendons; the tendons react upon the pressure of the\n    ligament. It is impossible that the ligament should ever have been\n    generated by the exercise of the tendon, or in the course of that\n    exercise, forasmuch as the force of the tendon perpendicularly\n    resists the fibre, which confines it, and is constantly\n    endeavouring not to form, but to rupture and displace, the threads\n    of which the ligament is composed.\u201d\n\nPaley\u2019s account of the function of the annular ligament at the ankle is\ncorrect, and strikingly put. A similar ligament occurs at the wrist,\nand navvies who have hard muscular work to do in digging and shovelling\nare wont to reinforce this ligament and to keep it from rupture by a\nleather strap round the wrist. The strap performs exactly the same\nfunction as the ligament, and from Paley\u2019s point of view one is as\nartificial, as much a \u2018contrivance,\u2019 as the other. But his point of\nview is wrong. He conceives the Creator as having at his disposal\nfully formed elements or materials\u2014sinews, bones, ligaments, and the\nlike\u2014and assembling them into a working mechanism. In fact, however,\nnone of these things is now what it was originally\u2014time, as Plato says,\nhas changed its \u201cname and shape.\u201d The annular ligaments are recognized\nby modern anatomists as having originated in special thickenings of\nthe fascial sheaths of the adjoining muscles of the wrist and ankle.\nThey had a function which was not originally connected with keeping\ndown the long tendons that run along the interior angle of the leg and\nfoot. Contractility, as biologists tell us, is a fundamental property\nof living protoplasm; and it is easy to imagine that, at the very\nbeginning of the formation of muscular structure and bone articulation,\ntwo lines of contractile force might cross each other and thus permit\nthe gradual evolution of the present arrangement, nature continually\nvisiting with disability and extinction those individuals in whom\nthe resisting power of the muscles which were eventually to form the\nannular ligament was unduly feeble, and giving a better chance of life,\nand of the propagation of their kind, to those in whom it was strong.\nThe instance, in fact, is one of those in which the explanation of\ndevelopment by natural selection is most obvious and plausible.\n\nIn his second paragraph Paley touches on the theory of \u201cappetency,\u201d the\nsupposed tendency of natural structure to alter and adapt itself on the\nlines indicated by the actual exercise of function, and in consequence\nof that exercise. This is practically the theory since identified with\nthe name of Lamarck. Paley scarcely does it justice, for no Lamarckian\nwould suggest that a muscle could, in the course of its exercise,\ndevelop the ligament whose function is to restrain it. The ligament\nwould be developed by its own exercise. But as Lamarckism will be\ndiscussed later on, the issue as between these rival theories need not\nbe debated here.\n\nLet us set beside Paley\u2019s argument on the annular ligament of the\nankle a passage from a modern scientific work, Strasburger\u2019s Text\nBook of Botany. It will introduce us, from the side of the strictest\nscientific observation and of the fullest acceptance of the evolution\ntheory, to the same kind of problems as those discussed in Paley\u2019s\nNatural Theology, and it will raise in a very distinct and unevadable\nfashion the question, what we are to think of the power manifested in\nthe operations of Nature. In the introduction to his work, in which\nDr. Strasburger had associated with him three other eminent German\nbotanists, we find the following remarkable passage dealing with\ncircumstances observed to exist in the \u2018phylogenetic\u2019 or tribal (as\nopposed to the \u2018ontogenetic\u2019 or individual) history of plant species:\u2014\n\n    \u201cAlthough the great importance of natural selection in the\n    development of the organic world has been fully recognised by\n    most naturalists, the objection has been raised that it alone is\n    not a sufficient explanation of all the different processes in\n    the phylogeny of an organism. Attention has been called to such\n    organs as would be incapable of exercising their function until\n    in an advanced stage of development, and so could not originally\n    have been of any advantage in a struggle for existence. How could\n    natural selection tend to develop an organ which would be useless\n    so long as it was still in a rudimentary condition? This objection\n    has led to the supposition of an internal force residing in the\n    substance of the organisms themselves and controlling their\n    development in certain definite directions. Many naturalists indeed\n    have gone so far as to affirm that only the less advantageous\n    qualities have been affected by the struggle for existence, while\n    the more advantageous have been uninfluenced by it\u201d[9]\n\nOne can easily imagine what a modern Paley bent on reconciling\northodoxy and evolution would say to this. He would cry, Design,\nforethought, intelligence\u2014here is the clearest evidence of it!\nAnd indeed there are many modern biologists who do not shrink from\nthe admission that the processes of nature must ultimately be\ninterpreted in terms of will or intention, not in terms of chance or\nblind mechanism. Thus, to the Darwinian argument that organs can be\nand are, demonstrably, formed by gradual adaptation to surrounding\nconditions without assuming the necessity of purposeful design, it\nis often replied that the very fact of adaptability is itself one of\nthe strongest evidences if not of design at least of purpose. And J.\nv. Uexk\u00fcll, who describes life as consisting essentially in the fact\nthat it proceeds according to design (_planm\u00e4ssig_), has the following\nremarkable passage in his Experimental Biology[10]:\u2014\n\n    \u201cWhen we look backwards, every phase in the process of development\n    seems to us to have proceeded in a strictly causal manner from\n    physico-chemical processes. But when we turn to look forward, it\n    is certain that the physico-chemical processes if left to their\n    own causality must immediately bring about the destruction of the\n    organism. In fact, the clearest definition we can give of dying\n    is to say of an organism that its processes now go on no longer\n    teleologically (_zweckm\u00e4ssig_) but only causally.\u201d[11]\n\nYet the modern Paley would be rash in arguing from facts like these\n(supposing them fully established) to the conscious, intelligent\ncontrivance of a single foreseeing Mind. For very few things in this\nuniverse appear to be done as a presiding, conscious intelligence\nwould do them. Conscious intelligence would not have evolved the\ngiant armadillo only that the whole species might be destroyed by\nthe sabre-toothed tiger, and would not have armed the sabre-toothed\ntiger for the attack on the armadillo in such a way that when he had\nexterminated the victim-species the formation of his teeth rendered\nit impossible for him to prey on any other animal.[12] Conscious\nintelligence would not have allowed the relic of a disused organ, in\nthe shape of the vermiform appendix, to be a constant source of danger\nand suffering to countless generations of men\u2014danger against which no\nexercise of prudence or energy can secure them.\n\nLet us examine a couple of other crucial cases. The embryo of every\nmammalian animal is prepared in the womb for the life it is to live\nunder wholly different conditions. Lungs are formed when there is no\nair for them to breathe, eyes when there is no light, a digestive\nsystem when nourishment is derived as yet direct from the mother\u2019s\nblood. This capacity for anticipatory development during a period\nof gestation or incubation becomes absolutely necessary for the\nmaintenance of life as soon as animals, ceasing to multiply by merely\ndividing in two, become more highly organized and have to devote\nspecial germ-cells to reproductive purposes. Here is certainly purpose,\nor, as I should prefer to call it, _directivity_\u2014here we recognize\nwhat Reinke calls the X-factor in nature. But conscious, intelligent\ncontrivance? We must recollect how many of these embryos are destined\nto perish at birth or before attaining any appreciable degree of\nindependent life. Would not intelligence foresee that, and bring to\nbirth only what was destined to endure?\n\nAgain, there are certain species of butterflies which have put\non a coloration and a form the effect of which is to aid them in\nevading the attacks of birds. They were not created so; they have\nbecome so; and the precise manner of the becoming will be fully\ndiscussed in a later chapter. Let us assume for the moment that this\nadaptation did not occur by a series of lucky accidents or by any\nmerely mechanical process. Are we, then, bound to attribute it to\nintelligent contrivance? The question will be best answered by simply\nputting a case which admits of no doubt. Suppose there were an island\nin which there were no birds, except such as prey on fishes or on\neach other, but never on insects. The butterflies on this island, if\nthere were any, would certainly show no trace of protective form or\ncoloration. But at some time or other insect-eating birds might be\nintroduced to the island, as the English sparrow has been introduced\nin Australia. Then, if the extermination of the butterflies did not\nproceed too rapidly, we might expect, in the course of generations, to\nsee protective adaptations assumed. But could we expect to see them\nassumed _in anticipation_ of the advent of the destroyers? We could\nnot. Naturalists, however much they may differ, as they do differ, upon\nthe question as to how protective adaptations actually take place,\nwould all agree that they could not possibly take place in anticipation\nof needs not yet present. If they did, we should have a miracle, and\nwhere miracle comes in knowledge goes out. The cases where conscious,\nintelligent contrivance would be unmistakably recognizable are just the\ncases which never occur. The signal service rendered by the champions\nof the evolution theory,\n\n    Quos nec fama De\u00fbm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti\n    Murmure compressit C\u0153lum,\n\nis that they conquered the realm of organic nature for true knowledge,\nand gave the drama of its development a new and profound interest,\nby showing with an uncompromising courage only equalled by the\nextraordinarily minute and patient research which justified it, that\nthe _apparent_ instances of divine contrivance with which nature teems\nmust be explained by the responsiveness, the adaptability, of living\nprotoplasm. Needless to say, this demonstration does not in the least\n_disprove_ the existence of God as a supreme, conscious, personal\nIntelligence.[13] But it does forbid us to deduce the existence of such\na Being from the observation of natural phenomena. A living, developing\nuniverse has been set in the place of a Divine Mechanician operating on\ndead matter.\n\n\nThe question, what conception we are to form of the forces of\nevolution, will be more fully discussed in the succeeding chapters on\nBiology, as a foundation for views which will afterwards be put forward\nin relation to Ethics and to Art.\n\nBut first we must clear the ground a little by considering what it\nreally is that we are to study, and if it be possible to study it at\nall. Nature-study if it is to be possible must begin, and if it is to\nbe fruitful must end, in something which is not strictly the study of\nnature, but which we call Philosophy.\n\nOne of the most brilliant examples of that union of philosophic\nspeculation with nature-study which is so marked a feature of the\nGerman thought of our day is H. von Keyserling\u2019s work, The Structure of\nthe World.[14] Keyserling begins by laying it down as a postulate of\nthinking that \u201cThe Universe is a rounded, inwardly coherent Whole.\u201d\n\nA postulate of thinking this is indeed, and more than that\u2014it\nis a postulate of living. If under all the variety and apparent\ndiscontinuity of the universe there does not lie _One_ all-pervading\nand unifying Power, then meditation and action are alike vain, for none\ncan tell the hour when some incursion of the unknown may not shatter\nour cosmos into chaos, or leave us in a new universe with the edifice\nof our past experience, the familiar home of the spirit, lying in ruins\naround us. Every one assumes, consciously or unconsciously, that there\nis such a Power, that the universe is One, that however mysterious,\nhowever little known or understood it may be, it is not essentially\ndeceptive or incalculable. The savage and the philosopher alike assume\nthis, and act upon the assumption. It is perhaps possible not merely\nto assume but to prove it. For let us try to imagine what would be the\ncase if it were not true. If the Principle, the ultimate Reality of the\nuniverse, be not one it must be at least dual. There must be not less\nthan two principles. Now there are only three ways in which these two\nprinciples\u2014and what we say will hold good for any greater number\u2014can\nbe related to each other. They must either (1) be identical, or (2)\nthey must be complementary, each possessing something which the other\nis lacking in, or (3) they must negate each other and be mutually\ncontradictory and exclusive. But two absolutely identical principles,\nif we can conceive such a thing, are indistinguishable from one. Two\nor more complementary principles, again, make up, when taken together,\nbut a single whole, as in the Christian Trinity. Therefore if the\nuniverse be really dual, its two principles must negate and contradict\neach other. Now these two hostile principles must either be equal\nin force or one must be more powerful than the other. In the latter\nevent, seeing that they divide between them the sum total of existence\nand thus stand in naked and essential antagonism, with no place for\nevasion, and no auxiliary or modifying forces to call in, it follows\nof necessity that if one surpassed the other by even the smallest\nconceivable excess, it must, in eternity, master it and reduce it to\nimpotence. So by this road we come back to unity again. If, however, we\nsuppose our two forces to be co-equal and co-eternal, we have to ask\nourselves what we mean by supposing them to be antagonistic. Antagonism\ncan only arise when there is action. But two equal forces acting in\ndirect contradiction to each other must mutually cancel each other, and\nthe result is zero. On such an hypothesis the universe could never have\ncome into being. It may also be pointed out that the hypothesis itself\nseems to be irrational. For action means the production of a change of\nsome kind, change in the nature or situation of objects. But if one\nof our forces is producing changes of a certain kind and the other\nproducing changes of another kind, then they are not contradictory\nbut complementary. The only real antagonism between two ultimate\nprinciples must consist in one of them being identified with action,\nchange, life, the other with immobility and death. But a principle of\nimmobility and death, if there could be such a thing, could not also be\na principle of action, not even of destructive action, for to act at\nall would be a contradiction of its own nature. It would begin and end\nin total _in_action, and the field would be clear for the other Power,\njust as if nothing else existed. It follows that, in the living and\nmoving universe around us, there cannot be any such thing as an active\nprinciple of destruction and death. We are obliged to perceive Being\nunder the guise of Becoming and Becoming under the guise of Change and\nProgression. This is a process taking place in the visible and temporal\norder of things and capable, under certain conditions, of partial\narrest or retrogression. But the Whole, regarded as a whole, can be\nand can contain nothing but life, and must under all its diversity\n(which is an aspect of life) be One. It is this unity which alone can\nmake intelligible and rational the diversity of which every study of\nlife must treat. It is my endeavour in the present work to bring into\nclear light some important aspects of this unity, as revealed in the\ninter-relations of the parts of which, to our eyes, it seems to be\ncomposed.[15]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE WHEEL OF LIFE\n\n    I heard them in their sadness say\n    The earth rebukes the thought of God;\n    We are but embers wrapped in clay,\n    A little nobler than the sod.\n\n    But I have touched the lips of clay;\n    Mother, thy rudest sod to me\n    Is thrilled with fire of hidden day,\n    And haunted by all mystery.\u2014A.E.\n\n\nIt has long been known that no definite line of demarcation can be\ndrawn between the animal and the vegetable worlds. There are lowly\norganisms which cannot be decisively referred either to the one or\nto the other. It has been more recently shown that the apparently\nmore strongly marked line between the living and the non-living also\ngrows wavering and indistinct in places. Metals are known to respond\nto stimuli and to show \u2018fatigue\u2019 in a manner commonly attributed only\nto the nervous system of animals,[16] while some of the phenomena of\ncrystallization strongly resemble those of vitality.[17] Le Dantec has\nuttered the latest word of physics on this subject, where he insists on\nthe \u201cabsence of all essential difference and all absolute discontinuity\nbetween living and non-living matter.\u201d[18] Indeed, one may say of\nnature-study in general, that if, as Plato said, the beginning of\nknowledge is in definitions and classification, the end of it lies in\ngetting rid of them. There is probably no such thing as a universally\napplicable definition of any group of natural phenomena. _There is\ncertainly no condition of matter of which we are entitled to say that\nLife is impossible without it._ Still, natural groups have well-marked\ncentral features, even if at their margins they melt into something\nelse. Now the things which in the ordinary sense of the word we call\nLiving are marked by these characters: Their chemical constituents\nare always compounds of carbon. These compounds are what is called\n\u2018unstable\u2019\u2014they \u2018consume\u2019 or disintegrate by combining with oxygen in\nair or water. In this process organisms obtain the energy necessary\nfor assimilation and growth. The above characters (carbon-compounds,\nchemical instability, and faculty of assimilation) apply to plants and\nanimals alike. But we find, in general, that plants are able, from\ninorganic mineral constituents such as carbonic acid, water, nitrates,\nsulphates, etc.,[19] to build up the organic compounds like proteid,\nalbumin, the carbohydrates, alcohol, fat; while animals use for their\nnourishment not the inorganic substances but only organic compounds\nalready formed by plants or by other animals. A well-developed\nvegetable world must therefore, it would seem, have preceded the\nappearance of animal life on the globe.[20] It was long believed that\nthese organic compounds of carbon could only be formed by the vital\naction of living vegetation. One of the epochs in the history of modern\nchemistry has been the demonstration (first by W\u00f6hler, in 1828,) that\nmany of them can be produced in the laboratory from inorganic chemical\nconstituents. But this is only effected by circuitous and difficult\nways, and\u2014a circumstance often overlooked\u2014it only resembles what is\naccomplished in nature if we include under nature the directive agency\nrepresented by the chemist himself, as well as the materials with which\nhe deals.\n\nThe characteristic colour of living vegetation is green. This is also\nthe rarest of colours among the higher animals.[21] It is due in\nvegetables to the presence in their cells of grains of the substance\nknown as chlorophyll, which very few animals possess or have need\nof. It is developed normally under the action of sunlight, and plays\na most important part in the economy of the plant. The usual method\nby which any organism obtains the energy necessary for its vital\nfunctions is through the oxidization, _i.e._ the slow burning, of its\nsubstance, by combination with the oxygen of the air. The process is\nto all intents the same as the more rapid oxidization, under great\nheat, of coal in a steam-engine. If a plant can obtain sugar, which\noxidizes easily in contact with atmospheric oxygen, it has thus a fund\nof energy to draw on for all the processes of its life. Now sugar is\ncomposed of carbon and water. Carbon exists in the air, in combination\nwith oxygen, in the form known as carbonic acid. Chlorophyll, in some\nway as yet unexplained, enables plants, when acted upon by light, to\ntake in carbonic acid from the air and to disintegrate it into its\nconstituents, carbon and oxygen. The oxygen disappears again in the\nair, and the released carbon combines with water in the plant to form\nsugar,[22] thus giving the plant its needed store of potential energy.\nAll it does with this energy is to live, grow, and reproduce its kind;\ntill at length a time comes when the assimilative energy weakens\nrelatively to the forces of decay, and the plant dies; it is again\nresolved into the chemical constituents from which it was built up;\nbut not without having passed on the flame of life to burn afresh in\nits descendants.\n\nPlants which have no chlorophyll, like certain bacteria and moulds, and\nwhich, therefore, cannot decompose the carbonic acid in the air for\ntheir nourishment, offer an interesting example of the manner in which\nNature contrives to get her way, if not by the normal instruments, then\nby the utilization of others. They acquire their first store of energy\nsometimes like animals, from other organic compounds, or they take\ncarbon from acetates and tartrates. The nitro-bacteria appear to depend\non ammonia derived from decaying animal matter, and the moulds draw\ntheir energy from sugar, which (as in our jams, etc.) they find already\nformed.\n\nThere are other plants, such as the fly-eating _Drosera_, which feed\nupon organic substances with the aid of digestive juices, exactly as\nanimals do; and there are animals, such as _Hydra_ and others, of very\nprimitive form,[23] which produce chlorophyll and are thereby enabled,\nlike plants, to feed upon carbonic acid. The distinction therefore\nwhich has been drawn between the two kingdoms as regards their modes of\nnourishment must, like other definitions of natural groups, be taken\nto apply to central and typical forms and not to constitute a distinct\nboundary line. Allowing for these exceptional cases, we may say\nbroadly that the wheel of life makes its full circle in passing from\ninorganic matter through plants to animals and thence back to gases and\nminerals again. The process of taking in fresh matter, transforming it\nchemically into living tissue, and thus repairing the waste occasioned\nby the decomposition of the carbon-compounds of that tissue, is\ntechnically known as Metabolism. This is the typical and characteristic\nfunction of organic life.\n\nNow this function of living matter, or Protoplasm, depends upon two\nelements: first, its Substance; secondly, its Structure. As regards\nthe former, we are in this serious difficulty, that living matter can\nnever be chemically investigated by any means at present known, for\nit dies immediately in presence of any of the reagents which are used\nto ascertain its chemical composition. It is known that there are no\n_elementary_ substances in living matter which are not also found\nin the world of inorganic matter, but it is also known that their\nsynthetic combination in living is different from that which obtains in\ndead tissue,[24] and it is precisely through this factor\u2014that of the\ngrouping or synthesis of elements\u2014that the most remarkable forms of\nenergy are developed.\n\nThe secret of life, therefore, cannot be stated in terms of chemistry,\nbecause we cannot surprise the secret of its chemical synthesis. Even\nif we could do this we should still be unable to say why certain\nsyntheses should appear in living matter and resolve themselves into\nothers at death.\n\nWe find, however, in the investigation of organic tissue (plant or\nanimal) by such means as are available, that one substance is common\nto all the organic and is never found (as such) in the inorganic\nworld. This is called Proteid. It is composed of five elements\u2014Carbon,\nHydrogen, Sulphur, Nitrogen, and Oxygen, which are combined in\nproportions not at present ascertained. Subject to the limitations just\nset forth we may say that proteid is the essential stuff of organic\ntissue. The two other usual (though not, like proteid, universal)\nconstituents of this tissue\u2014the Carbohydrates (sugar, starch, etc.) and\nthe Fats\u2014are, it is believed, formed partly from the products of the\nmetabolism of proteid.\n\nWhen we come to deal with the essential Structure of life we are\nin much the same difficulty as that in which we found ourselves in\ninvestigating its chemical Substance. We can observe living cells under\nthe microscope, but the most powerful microscope has never reached\nthe limits beyond which we can say that there is no structure. There\nis another limitation too. The microscope has revealed the fact that\nall living tissue is made up of cells, but the internal structure of\nthe cell, beyond the fact that it is composed of a fluid substance\nwithin which a darker coloured nucleus is usually embedded, could not\nbe ascertained until the recent device of staining the object with\naniline dyes had been thought of. Different substances in the cell are\nfound to take these dyes differently, and thus a world of structure\nof the most singular kind has been revealed in what formerly seemed a\nsimple, semi-transparent fluid. Some parts of this structure hover, as\nit were, upon the very edge of perceptibility, the most suitable dyes\nfor bringing them under observation not having been as yet discovered.\nThere may be others which no dye can reveal, but which are yet active\nand necessary parts of the organism. Moreover, here too the cell is\nkilled by the means taken to observe it, and the processes in which its\nstructure is engaged can only as a rule be deduced from the observation\nof a great number of cells in which their internal movements are\narrested at different stages of completion.\n\nIt has been practically demonstrated that all organic life must\nbe at least duplex if not multiplex in its constituent elements.\nIn its simplest known form it consists of Protoplasm and Nucleus.\nWe know that the carrying-on of all vital functions depends on\npeculiar relations existing between these two elements, but what\nthese relations exactly are is still quite obscure. Both protoplasm\nand nucleus are compounds of proteid with other chemical substances\nnot yet fully determined. Protoplasm is a fluid, and has been shown\nby the epoch-making observations of B\u00fctschli[25] to have a structure\nresembling that of an exceedingly minute foam. The nucleus usually\nexists in the form of a single definite body, but it may be scattered\nthrough the protoplasm of the organism in little granules. In the\nlowliest of organisms, the _Am\u0153b\u00e6_, we have simply a speck of\nprotoplasm containing a nucleus, but with no surrounding wall of the\nharder substance which protoplasm builds up for itself in the cells\nbelonging to higher forms of life. Such am\u0153boid forms are the white\ncorpuscles in the human blood, whose slow changes of form we can\nobserve under the microscope, and which play so important a part in our\neconomy by feeding on the noxious bacteria which produce the various\nforms of blood-poisoning and zymotic disease.\n\nA more detailed account of the functions and structure of the cell must\nbe reserved for the next chapter. In considering these and all other\nphenomena of vitality let me again recall the warning expressed in the\ntaunt of Mephistopheles to the young student: the lines are as true\nto-day as they were when Goethe wrote them over a hundred years ago:\u2014\n\n    \u201cIf some living thing you would learn about,\n    You begin by driving its Spirit out;\n    There lie the parts of it, one by one,\n    But the binding Spirit, alas, is gone!\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nDE MINIMIS\n\n    Immense have been the preparations for me,\n    Faithful and friendly the arms that have help\u2019d me.\n       *       *       *       *       *\n    \u201cBefore I was born out of my mother generations guided me,\n    My embryo has never been torpid, nothing could overlay it.\u201d\n\n                                                Walt Whitman.\n\n\nThere are two functions of organic life which are often confused\ntogether, but which it is well to keep distinct in our thought. These\nare Growth and Development. The mark of growth is that an organism, by\nassimilation from the outside world, becomes _larger than it was_. But\nin development it becomes _different from what it was_. The history of\nan embryo in the womb presents a succession of phenomena which, when\none comes to realize them, almost stagger thought; for, while remaining\nthe _same thing_ all through, it is continually becoming a _different\nclass of thing_\u2014first two cells, then one cell, then a fish, a\nquadruped, ultimately a human being. This is Development. Once born, it\nis laid hold of by the principle of Growth which lasts until maturity.\nNow in the groups called Species, as well as in individuals, we observe\nexactly the same distinction. The members of a species multiply and\nincrease their numbers. This is Growth. But under certain conditions,\nwhich we have now to investigate, they vary in type and ultimately give\nrise to new species differing widely from that from which they sprang.\nThis we call Development or, in the more popular term for the process\nwhen applied to species, Evolution.\n\nThe investigation of this process in all its details has been the\nmaster-impulse of biology ever since the fact of the process was\nestablished by the researches of Darwin.\n\nIn Darwin\u2019s time the study of evolution was mainly an affair of\nwhat is called Natural History But it has now been realized that\nfully to comprehend the processes involved\u2014so far as they can\never be comprehended\u2014it is necessary to find out of what kind of\nmaterial living beings are composed, and how their fundamental\nprocesses take place. \u201cThe ultimate problems of sex, fertilization,\ninheritance, and development,\u201d says Wilson, have been now \u201cshown to be\n_cell-problems_.\u201d[26] Before going further, therefore, we must give\nsome account of the leading facts connected with the structure and\nvital action of the cell.\n\n\nSince the publication of the Origin of Species, probably the most\nimportant contribution to biological theory is to be found in the\nresearches of Dr. A. Weismann, and particularly in his large work, The\nEvolution Theory, of which a masterly English translation has recently\nappeared.[27] Weismann, on one side, represents an heroic attempt to\nbring back to the strictly mechanical principles of Darwinism the tide\nof biological speculation, which has been flowing more and more in\nthe direction of recognizing an essential and not a merely fortuitous\nconnexion between the goal of the evolution of natural forms and the\nmeans taken by nature to attain it. On another side he has brought the\nphysiology of the cell into true relation with the natural history of\nthe organism and of the species, and has become the author, or at least\nthe first great expounder and systematizer, of a theory of heredity\u2014the\nnow famous Germ-Plasm theory\u2014much of which seems a solid, permanent,\nand deeply important contribution to knowledge. But this theory seems\nto lead straight to a non-mechanical or psychic conception of the\ndriving-force of evolution, and Weismann has therefore supplied the\nother part which, in the view of the present writer and of many others\nbetter qualified to judge, seems to be of the nature of a baseless and\nimprobable hypothesis, devised to find a means of avoiding recourse to\nany non-mechanical conception of the ultimate nature of evolutionary\nprocesses.\n\nAs we shall be much concerned with Weismann\u2019s views, let us place at\nthe head of our study of them a couple of passages in which his general\nattitude towards the phenomena of vital processes is expressed.\n\n\u201cIn our time,\u201d he writes, \u201cthe great riddle has been solved\u2014the riddle\nof the origin of what is best suited to its purpose without the\nco-operation of purposive forces.\u201d[28] \u201cWe must certainly assume,\u201d he\ndeclares, \u201cthat the mechanical theory of life is correct.\u201d[29]\n\nA longer passage shows us what he understands by \u2018mechanical\u2019:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe living machine differs essentially from other machines in the\n    fact that it constructs itself; it arises by development from a\n    cell, by going through numerous stages of development, but none of\n    these stages is a dead thing, each in itself is a living organism\n    whose chief function is to give rise to the next stage. Thus\n    each stage of the development may be compared to a machine whose\n    function consists in producing a similar but more complex machine.\n    Each stage is thus composed, just like the complete organism, of\n    a number of such \u2018constellations\u2019 of elementary substances and\n    elementary forces, whose number in the beginnings is relatively\n    small, but increases rapidly with each new stage.\u201d[30]\n\nIt would have been simpler, but it would not have suited Weismann\u2019s\nconception of nature, to say that the \u201cliving machine\u201d differs\nessentially from other machines in not being a machine at all, or\nanything in the least like one. No machine constructs itself. No\nmachine can do anything but repeat a certain series of movements, each\nseries exactly similar to the last. What Weismann has described is\n_not_ a machine, just because it is a living organism. It is surely as\ntrue in biology as it is in mechanics that in any purely physical chain\nof sequences you cannot by any possibility get more out at the end than\nyou put in at the beginning, unless you take it in upon the way.\n\n\u201cDevelopment,\u201d writes Weismann, \u201cis an expression of life.\u201d[31] But\n\u201clife,\u201d again, is merely \u201ca chemico-physical phenomenon.\u201d[32] To say\nthat development is an expression of a chemico-physical phenomenon does\nnot seem a very illuminating or helpful generalization. The fact is\nthat the statement that life is a chemico-physical phenomenon does not\ntake us further towards an understanding of the subject than when we\nsay, what is equally true, that chemical and physical phenomena are a\nmanifestation of life. Life is everywhere. We use it as a convenient\nterm for the energies associated with \u2018living\u2019 protoplasm, because\nwe observe that when it is present protoplasmic structures act and\nreact (as in the phenomena of nutrition, for instance) in certain\nchemico-physical ways, while, if it be absent, the same protoplasm\nacts in other ways, also chemico-physical, but quite different from\nthe former, and analogous to the ways of minerals and of gases into\nwhich dead protoplasm finally resolves itself. The chemico-physical\nactions and reactions appear in a living plant or animal to be under\nthe direction of a force devoted to the preservation of that particular\norganism. The smallest atom of organic life includes not only a\nchemical compound but a chemist. In the mineral world we may say\nbroadly that there is no individuality of parts.[33] With protoplasmic\nstructure, therefore, a stage is reached in the evolution of life which\nwe may rightfully call \u2018life\u2019 _par excellence_, but there has been no\nbreach of continuity, and it is highly probable, as Weismann himself\nsuggests, that far below the limits of microscopic observation the\ntransformation of \u2018dead\u2019 into \u2018living\u2019 matter is continually going\nforward. When, therefore, we speak of the action of living protoplasm\nthe distinction is rather between this action and that of a piece of\nmechanism than between protoplasm and minerals or gases.\n\nThe phenomena of cell-growth, reproduction, and heredity are those\nwhich lie at the basis of all organized protoplasmic life, and in\nall the forms of that life, vegetable as well as animal, they are\nextraordinarily similar; there is, in fact, nothing which all the\nspecies of living things have so much in common. One of the most\nwonderful and fascinating chapters in the whole range of science is\nthat which contains the account of these processes, and it is only\nwithin the last few years that it has been possible to write it.\nWeismann, in a certain section of his Evolution Theory, has brought the\nfacts together in a manner which, for its lucidity and mastery of the\nsubject-matter, deserves to be called a classic example of scientific\nexposition.[34] To understand the basis of the higher manifestations\nof life, these processes, as we have said, must first be understood,\nand an account of them, based on Weismann, and accepting his germ-plasm\ntheory so far as it seems to accord with established facts, will be\ngiven, of course only in the broadest outlines.[35] At the same time\nit will be attempted, here and there, to throw some light on the\n_rationale_ of the processes described.\n\n\nAll animal and vegetable structure arises from cellular tissue, and in\nfact _is_ either cellular tissue or, as in the case of bones, scales,\netc., the mineral deposit formed by the action of cells. The simplest\nliving forms are composed of single cells, and the most complex and\nhuge of them were each once nothing more than a single cell, possessed\nof the powers of development and growth. In multicellular organisms,\nthis single originating cell is usually formed by the fusion of two\nimperfect cells by what is indifferently called conjugation, sexual\nreproduction, or \u2018amphimixis.\u2019 All cells, whether they are the product\nof conjugation or not, grow, when they do grow, fundamentally in the\nsame way, and this way must now be described.\n\nThe contents of the typical cell are broadly differentiated into (1)\na more or less hardened envelope containing (2) a substance called\ncytoplasm (Gk. \u03ba\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, a cell), and (3) a small, rounded, dark-coloured\nbody called the nucleus. Until recently nothing more than this was\nknown of the structure of the cell, and nothing at all of the functions\nof the nucleus. Now, keener microscopic research and better instruments\nhave thrown a flood of light on cell-organization, and the nucleus\nis revealed as a powerful factor in the vital processes of the cell\nand the bearer of its hereditary substance[36]\u2014that which makes it a\ncell of some particular organism, plant or animal, and of no other.\nThis hereditary substance, divined by the botanist N\u00e4geli, and since\nobserved by Weismann and others, is called \u2018chromatin\u2019 (from the fact\nthat it is observed by means of the stain it takes from the addition of\nan aniline dye), or \u2018idioplasm\u2019 (N\u00e4geli\u2019s appellation), which might be\nrendered the \u2018selfhood substance\u2019 of the cell.\n\nCellular structure begins, as has long been known, by the division\nof a cell into two, each of the parts then proceeding to grow by the\nassimilative power of protoplasm and in due time to divide in its\nturn. A mass of these cells is called \u2018cellular tissue.\u2019 The so-called\n\u2018budding\u2019 of a small cell from the side of the parent is, of course,\nsimply a form of division. The process of division and redivision\ngoes on, accompanied by a differentiation in the shape and function\nof the different cells or groups of cells which are formed, until the\nstructure of the plant or animal is completed. In these operations\nthe nucleus plays the principal part. The division of the cell is\nessentially the division of the nucleus. A detached portion of a cell\nwhich contains nothing of the nucleus can reproduce itself no more; it\nperishes.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. I.\n\nThis illustration, which (by permission of The Macmillan Co.) I take\nfrom Wilson\u2019s work, The Cell, is one of remarkable interest, for in it\nthe microscope has caught, in a piece of actual tissue from the skin\nof the salamander, _Amblystoma_, three nuclei in different stages of\nmitotic division. Most of the nuclei, which are seen as large, roundish\nobjects in their respective cells, show the chromatin in its \u2018resting\u2019\ncondition interspersed through the nucleus. The nucleus under _a_ shows\nthe chromatin gathered into chromosomes. At _b_ the centrosomes with\ntheir astral figures (which can barely be detected) have been formed,\nthe chromosomes have carried out their longitudinal division, and are\nbeing attracted half towards one centrosome and half towards the other.\nA little above this the process has been carried further, and the sides\nof the cell are beginning to contract, preparatory to forming two new\nones. In Fig. 2 will be found a clear representation of the astral\nfigures.\n\n_To face p. 40._]\n\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2.\n\nThe above illustration from Wilson\u2019s The Cell shows in more or\nless diagrammatic form the stage of nuclear division in which the\nchromosomes, as yet undivided, have arranged themselves in the centre\nof the nucleus. The centrosomes with their astral figures have been\nformed, and have taken their places near each pole of the nucleus. The\nnext stage is represented at _b_ in Fig. 1.]\n\n\nWhen a cell is about to divide, an organ of recent discovery, termed\nthe \u2018centrosome,\u2019 comes into play. This appears as the core of a sort\nof rayed or star-like figure, and it takes up its position beside the\nnucleus. When the cell is resting, the chromatin is dispersed through\nthe nucleus in a mass of broken lines, forming a kind of network. When\ndivision begins, this broken-up substance forms itself into a series of\nsmall threads, sometimes straight, sometimes looped or curved. These\nare called \u2018chromosomes.\u2019 There are always a definite and invariable\nnumber of chromosomes for every species of plant or animal\u2014the cell\nof a man has so many,[37] of a grasshopper so many, of a lily so\nmany. The chromosomes range themselves in a belt across the centre of\nthe nucleus, and the centrosome breaks into two parts, which take up\na position one at each end of the nucleus. Regarding the nucleus as\na tiny globe, we may say that the chromosomes lie in the equatorial\nplane, while the two parts of the centrosome move towards the North and\nSouth Poles respectively.\n\nThe centrosomes, at the two poles of the nucleus, are surrounded each\nwith a halo of ray-like processes (the centrosphere), and on the sides\nnext each other these rays penetrate the nucleus and join, forming a\nspindle-shaped figure with a centrosphere at each end. This spindle\nfigure appears to be the organ by which the division is accomplished,\nfor each of the chromosomes now splits itself in two longitudinally,\nas one cleaves a log of wood, and one half passes over to each\ncentrosphere, thus making an exact division of the whole chromatin or\nhereditary substance. An indentation now appears in the outer wall of\nthe cell and also in the nucleus\u2014it deepens and deepens, and finally\ntwo cells appear instead of one, each with a nucleus, a centrosome, and\na supply of chromatin, the latter now breaking up into its original\ncondition of diffusion through the nucleus. In multicellular organisms\nthe two new cells, of course, do not separate, but a wall is formed\nbetween them. Some plant-cells contain several nuclei; in this case\ndivision of the nucleus is not necessarily followed by that of the\ncell.[38]\n\nThroughout the processes of cell division it is apparent that the\nutmost care is taken to ensure an exact partition of the chromatin\nbetween the two new cells. This partition has to be qualitative as well\nas quantitative; for one chromosome may, and no doubt does, differ in\nfunction and influence from another, and has various elements within\nitself. The _longitudinal_ division of each chromosome, in which\nthe elements are arranged like beads on a rosary, ensures that the\ndifferent elements of the whole hereditary substance shall appear in\neach new cell in exactly the same relative proportion as in the parent\ncell; just as if two persons had to divide between them a dozen apples\nof different varieties, and secured perfect equality, not by taking\nsix apples each, but by dividing every apple in two. _This is the\nfundamental cause of the fixity of species_, which means the production\nof offspring having the same specific characteristics as their parents.\nHow, under these conditions, the _mutability_ of species is brought\nabout must be discussed later. It is first of all necessary to inquire\nmore closely into the composition of the chromatin, and to study the\nspecial phenomena of cell-growth in connexion with conjugation, where\nnew and extraordinary features come to light.\n\n\nA chromosome is not, or is not usually, a simple body. In all but the\nvery lowest organisms it is composed, as we have said, of a number\nof elements. Each of these elements is styled a \u2018determinant,\u2019 and\nit controls the form, colour, and function of some definite part of\nthe future plant or animal. Weismann believes the determinants to be\ngrouped into complex bodies called \u2018ids,\u2019 each id containing all the\ndeterminants necessary for a whole being, and each chromosome being\ncomposed of a number of ids. These ids are microscopically visible;\nthey form the beads on the rosary already referred to; but their\nexact composition and potency are largely conjectural at present.\nHow far the subdivision of determinants may go, it is, of course,\nimpossible to ascertain. We cannot say, for instance, whether there\nis a determinant for every hair of the head, or one for the hirsute\ncovering in general, or one for each of the different sections of the\nscalp. But the division is very minute. Each of the ids may be a very\ncomplex body, as we see by the manner in which, in some families,\nsmall physical signs like a patch of hair differing from the colour of\nthe rest, or a tiny pit or mole on the skin of a certain part of the\nbody, may be handed down, in that precise position, for generations.\nThere may be, and, in fact, in the higher plants and animals there\n_must_ be, a number of determinants for each part of the structure,\nand the final characteristics of that part must be the resultant of\na blend of all these determinants, the more powerful predominating\nin proportion to their vitality and force. The whole body of the\nchromosomes may therefore be said to represent one or more complete\nbeings in diagrammatic form, each part of the complete animal or plant\nbeing represented by some part of a chromosome, though of course not\nphysically resembling it. And we thus strike on the very curious and\nstartling fact that, as far as we can see, _every_ cell in every\norganism throughout the world of life contains all the elements of the\nwhole being to which it belongs, and is, potentially, that being.[39]\nAll the higher organisms possess two kinds of cells\u2014reproductive cells\nwhich have the faculty of fusing together to reproduce their kind,\nand \u2018somatic\u2019 or body cells, which, although they all originate in a\nreproductive cell, multiply only by division, and have the function of\nforming the various parts of the bodily structure. Of the nucleus of a\ngerm cell \u201cwe cannot say that it differs in any essential or definite\nway from the nucleus of any other cell.\u201d[40] All possess the chromatin\nor hereditary substance of the organism, though, according to Boveri,\nthe germ cells alone receive _all_ the chromatin of the parent cell,\nthe derived somatic cells having to part with some of it.[41] There may\nbe some distinction, though on what it may be based it is at present\nimpossible to say, between cells that are capable of developing into a\ncomplete organized creature and those that are not.\n\nEvery somatic cell is doomed to perish, but every reproductive cell\nnow upon the globe is united, not metaphorically, not by a chain\nof successive originations or impulses, but by actual identity of\nsubstance, with the first beginnings of protoplasmic life in the abyss\nof time; and it has before it a potential immortality commensurate with\nlife itself. It is not, as used to be thought, a physiological product\nof the organism in which it dwells; it is a part of the original\nreproductive cell from which that organism sprang.\n\nTo understand these conceptions we must now study the phenomena of\nreproduction in the light of recent discoveries.\n\n\nThe lowest form of the reproductive process is, of course, by simple\ndivision and redivision. This is characteristic of many of those\norganisms which consist only of a single cell, and it may co-exist,\neven in these, with a considerable degree of structural complexity,\nas in the \u2018trumpet animalcule,\u2019 _Stentor raselii_. But among the\nlowest of these unicellular organisms a curious process is sometimes\nobserved to take place, in which we may doubtless recognize the origin\nof sexual reproduction. Two, three, or more _Am\u0153b\u00e6_[42] approach\neach other, partially coalesce, and remain united for some time. They\nthen separate again. No new creatures are formed by this contact;\nthere are no visible results at all. But that _something_ which is\nfor the advantage of the organisms takes place during this period of\nunion is certain, and in the light of what is known of processes in\nother organisms we can make a very good guess at what this something\nis. Each _Am\u0153ba_ parts with some of its chromatin to some other and\nreceives an equivalent in exchange. The creature is thus reconstituted.\nThe element of _change_, which always provides so marked a stimulus\nto vital processes, has been obtained. The process has actually been\nobserved in a certain Infusorian, _Noctiluca_. Two _Noctilucas_\ncoalesce, and then proceed to divide _at right angles to the plane of\ncontact_. This necessarily has the effect of giving to each of the\ntwo new _Noctilucas_ which result from the division half the nucleus\nand chromatin of one parent and half of the other. There is, however,\nno actual new birth or multiplication of beings; there are only two\n_Noctilucas_ as before.\n\nWe can now imagine that if a certain class of unicellular organisms\nare in the habit of approaching each other for the purpose of this\ninterchange of portions of their chromatin, they might occasionally,\nunder the influence of the approaching conjugation, expel those\nportions of chromatin _before_ another cell was in a position to\nreceive it. What would happen if two cells, each of which had thus got\nrid of half its chromatin, were to come into contact? Plainly, they\nwould fuse together; they would not separate again; they would become a\nnew organism. Each would have supplied just what the other lacked.\n\nThis process, forming the bridge from mere cell division to sexual\nreproduction, is a hypothetical one; it has not, I believe, been\nactually observed in unicellular organisms, but it is exactly what we\nfind to be taking place when we reach the stage of sexual reproduction\namong multicellulars. Multicellular organisms of more or less elaborate\nstructure plainly cannot, without breaking up, fuse together like\nsingle cells. How, then, are they, as a species, to gain the advantages\nof the temporary union and interchange of elements which we have\nobserved in the low unicellular organisms? Only in one way\u2014by producing\nspecial cells for this purpose. These cells must represent the whole\nparent, they must be capable of shedding half their chromatin, and,\nwhen they have fused, must be capable of growing into a complete\norganism like the parent. When these specialized cells have been\nformed, the others, the somatic cells, will at the same time have\nbeen specialized for other functions, and will thus naturally lose\nthe original capacity for interchanging chromatin with other cells,\n_i.e._ for conjugation. We see the significance, then, of Weismann\u2019s\nremark, \u201cgerm cells made their appearance along with the multicellular\nbody.\u201d[43] They are an instance of that differentiation of structure\nand function which takes place in all highly organized life. We\nmust note also that the benefits of conjugation which are realized\n_individually_ by the lowest unicellular forms are only realized _as a\nspecies_ by the multicellulars. A species must, then, be regarded as in\nsome sense an organic whole, and not as a mere aggregate of individuals.\n\nIn some very curious cases which stand on the borderland between\nsexual and non-sexual reproduction, the same organism is capable of\nemploying both methods. Thus, among the lower seaweeds (_Alg\u00e6_), the\ngenus _Pandorina_ consists of a colony of sixteen green cells contained\nin a kind of gelatinous matrix which the cells excrete. Each cell is\nordinarily capable of recreating the whole organism by division. But\nafter this process has gone on for some time, the need of conjugation\nis felt, the colony breaks up and cells begin to fuse with each other,\nthough never with those of the same colony. In _Pandorina_ the two\nconjugating cells are similar in appearance, but in the genus _Volvox_\nwe begin to see a difference in the appearance of the two kinds of\nconjugating cells. What may be called the \u2018female\u2019 cells (germ cells)\nare large and quiescent; the \u2018male\u2019 (sperm cells) are smaller and\nactive. The primary meaning of this is that the larger cells have\nstored up a supply of nutriment for the young organism, and are\ntherefore bulkier and less active, while the others contain only the\nbare elements of cell-structure and are therefore able, as they are\nobliged, to be active in order to search out their quiescent mates.\nA strictly vegetable organism, in this stage, may therefore possess\norgans of locomotion, and be as free-moving as a fish. A remarkable\nfact has come to light respecting those organisms (like some _Alg\u00e6_\namong vegetables and Infusorians among animals), which are capable\nboth of conjugation and of reproduction by division, namely, that the\nsupply of nutriment often determines which method shall be followed.\nIf nutriment is abundant, division is practised; if it becomes\nscanty, an impulse appears to be given to conjugation. Infusorians,\nwhich ordinarily conjugate at pretty regular intervals, can be kept\nindefinitely from doing so, and confined to division, by the simple\nprocess of supplying abundance of nutritive matter in the water in\nwhich they live.\n\n    \u201cAs far as we can see from an a priori point of view,\u201d writes\n    Dr. E. B. Wilson in his great work on cell structure and cell\n    phenomena, \u201cthere is no reason why, barring accident, cell-division\n    should not follow cell-division in endless succession in the stream\n    of life. It is possible, indeed probable, that such may be the\n    fact in some of the lower and simpler forms of life where no form\n    of sexual reproduction is known to occur. In the vast majority of\n    living forms, however, the series of cell-divisions tends to run\n    in cycles in each of which the energy of division gradually comes\n    to an end and is only restored by an admixture of living matter\n    derived from another cell. This operation, known as fertilization,\n    or fecundation, is the essence of sexual reproduction, and in it we\n    behold a process by which, on the one hand, the energy of division\n    is restored, and by which, on the other hand, two independent lines\n    of descent are blended into one. Why this dual process should take\n    place we are as yet unable to say.\u201d[44]\n\nThe actual mechanism of sexual reproduction is essentially the same\nwherever it occurs, whether in a seaweed or a human being. Two cells\nhave to play their part in it, the Germ cell and the Sperm cell, and\nthese, in the higher orders of organized beings, come to be located\nrespectively in distinct classes or sexes of individuals. Reproduction\nbegins by the fusion of a sperm, or male cell with a germ, or female\ncell.\n\nThese cells originally resemble the other cells of the same species,\ncontaining the same number of chromosomes. If this number was, say,\nsixteen, which is believed to be the number in man, then a fusion of\ntwo complete cells, if it were possible, would produce a cell with\nthirty-two chromosomes, and that would mean a different species of\nanimal. What happens is that each of the reproductive cells, male\nand female, prepares itself for conjugation by getting rid of half\nits chromosomes. Two divisions of the nucleus take place, _not_ as\nin the ordinary fashion of cell-division, when the chromosomes split\nlongitudinally, but in such a way that, in each division, four of\nthe sixteen chromosomes are bodily expelled from the nucleus and\nfrom the cell, when they either perish or, in some cases, appear to\nhelp in forming an envelope of nutritive matter round the germ cell.\nThese divisions are called \u2018maturation divisions,\u2019 and until they\nare accomplished, fecundation is impossible. When a sperm cell after\nmaturation comes into the neighbourhood of a germ cell, it penetrates\ninto its substance, using the long _flagellum_, or tail-like process,\nwith which it is equipped as an organ of locomotion. The two nuclei\ncome into contact and coalesce, and we have thus a new cell with its\nsixteen chromosomes complete. This cell is the origin of the new being.\nIt divides in two, and each part divides and redivides, different cells\ngradually differentiating themselves as muscular tissue, cartilage,\nblood-corpuscles, nerves, reproductive cells, and so forth, until the\nwhole animal is built up and is ready for birth. One point of cardinal\nimportance must here be noted. The originating cell, as we have seen,\nhas eight of its sixteen chromosomes from one parent and eight from\nanother. When division takes place, these chromosomes, as we have seen,\nsplit longitudinally, and the result is that each new cell gets exactly\nthe same mixture of chromatin as that of the originating cell\u2014half\nfrom each parent. This principle of division is carried on throughout\nthe whole process of building up the new being\u2014every cell of the\nlatter, down to the minutest details of its structure, containing an\nexactly equal quantity of hereditary elements from each of its parents.\n\nIt will be seen from the above account that the old conception of the\ngerm-cell as a passive body, incapable of a change till \u2018fertilized\u2019 by\na male or sperm cell, was altogether wrong. Both male and female cells\nprepare themselves for conjugation long before it takes place, and\nneither of them can be said to be a more active agent in fertilization\nthan the other. Not \u2018fertilization\u2019 but \u2018fusion\u2019 is the keyword of the\nprocess. The mystical conception, as old as Plato, of the male and\nfemale as representing respectively the two halves of a complete being,\nturns out to be no poetic metaphor. As regards the essential features\nof reproduction, it is a literal fact.\n\nIf we now ask why and by what mysterious law all these exact and\nelaborate choric movements take place Weismann and his school refer us\nto \u201cchemotactic forces,\u201d the nature of which is yet unknown. Chemotaxis\nmeans simply the effect of the _presence_ of certain substances on\nvital organisms without specific chemical action. The really essential\nfact is that these special chemotactic forces are working _in living\nprotoplasm_. Life is not the product or the slave of any chemotactic\nforces, but their maker and steersman.\n\nThe following passage from a work of the late Prof. Geo. Rolleston may\nbe pertinently quoted here:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThere exists, as is well known, a tendency to resolve all\n    physiological into physico-chemical phenomena: undoubtedly many\n    have been, and some more may still remain to be, so resolved; but\n    the public may rest assured that in the kingdom of Biology no\n    desire for a rectification of frontiers will ever be called out by\n    any such attempts at, or successes in the way of, encroachment; and\n    that where physics and chemistry can show that physico-chemical\n    agencies are sufficient to account for the phenomena, there their\n    claim upon the territory will be acceded to, as in the cases\n    we have been glancing at [certain animal poisons], and where\n    such claims cannot be established and fail to come up to the\n    quantitative requirements of strict science, as in the cases of\n    continuous and of discontinuous development or self-multiplication\n    of a contagious germ, and in some others, they will be\n    disallowed.\u201d[45]\n\nThis was written in 1870. A generation later the attempt to reduce\nlife to a physico-chemical phenomenon had not made much way, as may\nbe judged by the following passage from Strasburger\u2019s Text Book of\nBotany:\u2014[46]\n\n    \u201cVital phenomena are essentially bound up with the living\n    protoplasm. No other substance exhibits a similar series of\n    remarkable and varied phenomena, such as we may compare with\n    the attributes of life. As both physics and chemistry have been\n    restricted to the investigation of lifeless bodies, any attempt to\n    explain vital phenomena solely by chemical and physical laws could\n    only be induced by a false conception of their real significance,\n    and must lead to fruitless results. The physical attributes of\n    air, water, and of the glasses and metals made use of in physical\n    apparatus, can never explain qualities like nutrition, respiration,\n    growth, irritability and reproduction.\u201d\n\nAnd Wilson concludes his work by the admission that\n\n    \u201cthe study of the cell has on the whole seemed to widen rather than\n    to narrow the enormous gap that separates even the lowest forms of\n    life from the inorganic world.\u201d[47]\n\n\u201cThe lowest _observed_ forms of life\u201d would have been a more exact way\nof stating the fact.\n\n\nMany questions of detail will occur to the reader at this point, which\nhe will find answered in the pages of Weismann or other investigators.\nHere we must confine ourselves to what has a distinct bearing on the\nobjects of this study. One of the points which may be briefly touched\non is the question how it comes that two germ cells, once having\npassed through their maturation divisions, cannot fuse and form a\nnew being; nor can two sperm cells. Were this possible we might have\n\u2018self-fertilization,\u2019 and virginal conception or parthenogenesis,\nwhenever two germ cells in the ovary of a female animal or in that of\na plant happened to come into contact. But since the object of fusion\nis the union of (more or less) _unlike_, and not closely related,\nelements, we find that even when a kind of self-fertilization occurs,\nas in some plants, the sperm or pollen cells are differentiated\nvisibly, and probably still more invisibly, from the germ cells. But,\napart from this, the object of preventing the union of reproductive\ncells of the same sex is mechanically attained by a very curious\ndevice. The cell-organ by which division is carried out is the\ncentrosome. But in the course of the two maturation divisions of the\ngerm cell, that cell _loses its centrosome_, which seems to be absorbed\ninto the protoplasmic substance of the cell when once its task is\naccomplished. No fusion of any number of such cells can therefore lead\nto any further change or growth, for growth is based on cell division,\nand the centrosome is the organ of division. The sperm cell, on the\nother hand, does not lose its centrosome; it retains it to form the\norgan of division for the new cell after conjugation. But, reduced\nas it is to little more than a bare nucleus without any envelope of\nnutritive matter, the sperm cell cannot support the intense vital\nactivity called for in the initial stages of the life of a new being,\nand therefore sperm cells, like the germ cells, though for a different\nreason, would be incapable of mutual conjugation, even if the element\nof mutual attraction existed among them.\n\nAnother point of interest is the question of the determination of sex.\nThe known facts afford a strong corroboration of the general theory of\nreproduction outlined above. It has not been ascertained, nor is it,\nperhaps, ascertainable, whether the sperm cells of the male contain in\ntheir chromatin a preponderance of male, while the germ cells provide\nchiefly the female determinants.[48] However this may be, it is certain\nthat determinants which severally control the formation both of male\nand of female structure are _always_ present in every combination of\nthe sperm and germ cells, those which exhibit the greatest energy and\nvitality probably prevailing in the determination of the sex of the\nfuture being. This accounts at once not only for the cases (rare in\nthe higher animals) of actual hermaphroditism, when the sex is really\nindistinguishable, but for the universal occurrence in all male animals\nof rudimentary female organs (such as mamm\u00e6) and in all females of\nrudimentary male organs. Both sets of determinants are always present;\nthe more powerful prevail, but the weaker have a deflecting influence\non the total result. When the primary sexual characters of the embryo\nare determined, they appear to communicate a stimulus which starts into\nactivity the appropriate secondary characters, such as colouring and\nother modifications not directly sexual. An extraordinary case, which\nI take from Beddard\u2019s Animal Coloration,[49] is that of a chaffinch\nwhich was found to have on the left side of its body the plumage of a\nhen bird and on its right that of a cock. On dissection the meaning of\nthis freak of physiology was revealed. The bird was an hermaphrodite,\nhaving the female organs of generation on the left side of its body and\nthe male on the right. Hermaphroditism is not in itself a very uncommon\nphenomenon in birds (though here it is a monstrosity, not, as in slugs\nand snails, a natural and useful condition); but the way in which in\nthis instance it governed the distribution of colour is most peculiar;\nand of course it strongly reinforces Weismann\u2019s conception of distinct\ndeterminants for the various details of bodily structure.[50]\n\nThis brings us to the recognition of a _competition among determinants_\nwhich is an important, indeed a cardinal, feature in Weismann\u2019s theory\nof evolution. He makes, as I am forced to believe, an illegitimate\nand extravagant use of it, but the principle may really exist and\nbe operative without furnishing the master-word to the riddle of\norganized being. The master-word, as I shall try to show, is nature\u2019s\nwill to live. But before going fully into this argument, let us fix\nin our minds the _rationale_ of those processes of elementary organic\nlife which have been described in this chapter. Protoplasmic life may\nbe supposed to have originated, and perhaps to be still originating,\nin certain molecular combinations of matter. In other words, the\ncombination, when it took place, developed certain peculiar forces\nthrough which it was enabled to maintain itself and to grow, by the\nprocesses called assimilation and nutrition. These forces, then, were\npotentially present in nature before the molecules combined to evoke\nthem. They are among the latent powers of life. They waited, ready\nto be called into action when the required external form should be\narrived at in the play of molecular energy. Life first originated, no\ndoubt, in unconnected and inconceivably small units of protoplasm.\nBetween the units thus formed and their combination into the elaborate\nstructure which we now know a cell to be\u2014packed as full of varied\nenergies, it has been said, as an ironclad is of machinery\u2014there is\nevidently a very wide gap. All we know is that when we have got the\ncell, we find it in possession of a complex apparatus for subdivision,\nwhich, taken together with the faculties of nutrition and growth,\nenable any one cell to multiply indefinitely by producing replicas of\nitself. To _life_ and _growth_, then, has been added the faculty for\n_multiplication_. Here we strike on a veritable mystery. Why should\nany new movement ever take place? Why should a cell ever divide in\ntwo? We can only say that it is its property to do so.[51] It does\nso because it is alive. Did this property first arise as one of a\nmultitude of aimless movements\u2014the only one which ensured permanence\nand multiplicity to the organisms which exhibited it? If so, then\nNature, at the time when life began on the earth, behaved in a manner\nmost unlike that in which she behaves at present. If we are to\ninterpret the processes hidden in the remote past by the light of what\nwe see at present, we shall conclude that, at bottom, the will to live\nmade molecular action\u2014and the same force incorporated itself in the\ncombinations which originated protoplasmic life, ordered the structure\nof the cell, and gave it the need and the power to multiply. Nature is\nfor ever changing, for ever straining after new life, after more life.\n\nHaving arrived at the cell with its powers of division, the next step\nwas the power of conjugation between cells with their interchange of\nvital substance, bringing about, in Weismann\u2019s words, \u201ca wealth and\ndiversity of organic architecture which without it would have been\nunattainable.\u201d It takes place by means of physical energies, but the\nprocess is entirely inexplicable unless we assume that it exists to\nsatisfy a need, a _Drang_, for life. And this need, although of course\nit displays itself in physical processes, is not in itself a physical\nprocess. At the very beginnings of structural life, if not before it,\nwe are obliged to pass beyond physics in order to comprehend physical\nphenomena. Whenever we find an aggregate of living units, such as a\n_Pandorina_ colony, living with a communal life which is other than\nthe sum-total of the lives of the individual units, we are in presence\nat once of the necessity for a metaphysical conception, to render\nintelligible the unity in diversity which we perceive.\n\nThe response of living protoplasm to the stimuli it receives from the\noutside world is normally directed to the maintenance of the life and\nform of the organism. The response of what is called \u2018lifeless\u2019 matter\nis of another nature; not because it is really lifeless, for if it\nwere it would not respond at all, but because it has no organisms to\nprotect and foster. We all know the nature of the action of gravity on\nNewton\u2019s apple. It was treated as a dead substance, like a stone, and\ngravity acted upon it as upon all other ponderable matter. But when\nit had fallen to the earth, had decayed, and one of its pips began to\ngrow, the action of gravity began to be manifested in a quite different\nand very peculiar fashion. It has been ascertained by a series of\ningenious experiments that gravity is the force which obliges the roots\nof a plant to sink downwards into the earth. This does not, of course,\nmean that the roots are drawn downwards by attraction of the earth,\nbut that the pull of gravitation gives a certain stimulus to the cells\nconcerned which makes them grow in that direction. Precisely the same\nstimulus communicated to the cells of the stem has the very opposite\neffect\u2014these it causes to grow upright into the air and light. Thus\nthe roots are, as it is termed, positively, and the stems negatively,\ngeotropic. The substance of the root cells and of the stem cells is\nthe same, the stimulus is the same, but the effects on growth agree\nin only one point, that they are respectively what the plant requires\nthem to be. There is no doubt that if a species of plants were placed\nin such a position that it would serve them for the roots to grow\nupwards, then upward-growing roots would eventually be evolved; in\nfact, this is actually the case in the lateral underground roots of\ncertain mangroves which rise to the surface and become modified as\nbreathing organs, and in the aerial roots of various orchids, etc.[52]\nWhen a change of habitat takes place calling for new developments of\nstructure to meet new conditions, these developments are not, as a\nmatter of actual observation, found to be mechanically \u2018selected\u2019 from\na mass of random movements and modifications of tissue\u2014they reach their\ngoal, it is true, by a series of _gradual_ approximations, but the\ngoal is in sight from the beginning. In other words, _adaptability is\na fundamental character of life_. Hence the fact that multicellular\norganisms which cannot, as a whole, fuse with others, adapt themselves\nto these conditions by the allotment of special cells for that purpose;\nwhile, again, the production of multicellular organisms is itself an\nadaptation to Nature\u2019s need for the higher organization of life.\n\n    \u201cThe botanist Reinke,\u201d writes Weismann, \u201chas recently called\n    attention once again to the fact that machines cannot be directly\n    made up of primary physico-chemical forces or energies, but that,\n    as Lotze said, forces of a superior order are indispensable, which\n    so dispose the fundamental chemico-physical forces that they must\n    act in the way aimed at by the purpose of the machine.... Organisms\n    also [according to Reinke] are machines which perform a particular\n    and purposeful kind of work, and they are only capable of doing\n    so because the energies which perform the work are forced into\n    definite paths by superior forces; these superior forces are thus\n    \u2018the steersmen of the energies.\u2019\u201d[53]\n\nWeismann admits that there is \u201cundoubtedly a kernel of truth in this\nview,\u201d but he is content with this perfunctory acknowledgment. His\nmain efforts are devoted to the substitution of fortuitously developed\n\u201cconstellations\u201d of molecular energy for any force which can be deemed\nto have the slightest tincture of intelligence or purpose. \u201cIn our\ntime,\u201d as he writes, \u201cthe great riddle has been solved\u2014the riddle\nof the origin of what is best suited to its purpose without the\nco-operation of purposive forces.\u201d The nature of the proposed solution\ncan be best described and discussed in another chapter, when we shall\nbe in a position to consider it in relation to the whole history\nof organic development from its origin in protoplasmic life to the\nevolution of species in plants and animals.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n    THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF EVOLUTION: THE DARWIN-LAMARCK EXPLANATION\n\n    \u201cQuelle est donc cette nature sujette \u00e0 \u00eatre effac\u00e9e? La coutume\n    est une seconde nature qui detruit la premi\u00e8re. Pourquoi la coutume\n    n\u2019est elle pas naturelle? J\u2019ai bien peur que cette nature ne soit\n    elle-m\u00eame qu\u2019une premi\u00e8re coutume, comme la coutume est une seconde\n    nature.\u201d\u2014Pascal.\n\n\nWe now approach the _arcana_ of Evolution. The processes we have to\ndeal with in this chapter are not, and probably never will be, the\nsubjects of direct observation. All we can hope to do is to generalize\nfrom the results which have risen to the surface of life about the\nunseen forces from which they spring. The problem is to find (if\npossible) a generalization which will cover all the facts relating to\nthat modification of natural forms, habits, and instincts which, when\nit reaches a certain point, means the establishment of a new species.\nWe know that the thing happens, but we shall not understand _how_ it\nhappens until either the mechanism of the process is laid bare, or\nuntil it is clear that we are in presence of an agency not entirely\ndefinable in terms of mechanical action.\n\nThe fixity of species is maintained by a number of conditions, chief\namong which must be reckoned the law of reproduction by conjugation,\nwith the consequent intermixture of numerous different lines of\ndescent. From one point of view conjugation, as Weismann so often\ninsists, greatly favours the adaptability of the organism to new and\nvaried conditions of life, inasmuch as it results in the mingling\ntogether in each individual of a great number of varied determinants.\nBut when the conditions are constant, conjugation has also the\nobvious effect of constantly reabsorbing, as it were, any heritable\nabnormalities which may occur in individuals or the species, and\nbringing them back to type. An individual possessing some abnormality\nof structure will be most unlikely to find a mate possessing the same\nabnormality\u2014the mate will be either an ordinary individual or will\npossess, if any, some quite different variation. Their descendants\nwill, therefore, usually show more resemblance to the normal type\nthan to the one abnormal parent, and in their descendants again, for\nthe same reason, the abnormal feature will be still further reduced,\nuntil finally it disappears. It is only by the careful selection of\nmates extending over many generations that pigeon-fanciers, to take\none prominent instance, are able to establish a new type. Left to mate\nuncontrolled among themselves we should never have had the great\nvariety of breeds which have been produced by the art of the fancier\nfrom the original rock-pigeon. The small variations which form the\nstarting points of his operations would, under natural conditions, have\nsoon been resolved into the normal type. What is it in nature, then,\nthat sometimes appears to play the part of the intelligent breeder and\nto urge the plastic forms of life into new moulds?\n\n\nThe goal of the breeder is some new form which it pleases him\nto produce, either for its use, or its beauty, or for its mere\nsingularity. The goal of nature, at least the apparent and immediate\ngoal, is the adaptation of each species to the circumstances of its\nlife. And the first thing that strikes the investigator is the way,\noften indeed not perfect, but usually most impressive in its apparent\nthoughtfulness and care, in which the organs of plants and animals are\nfashioned to secure the most favourable results. But all this is the\nresult of development. The whale is a creature excellently adapted for\nits present mode of life, but we know that it was once a furry land\nanimal with four legs; the legs are all there still, in modified or\nrudimentary form, and the fur appears at a certain stage of embryonic\ndevelopment. When we ask, How did this extraordinary transformation\ncome about? what we really mean is, How did the determinants composing\nthe chromatin in the reproductive cells of the original land animal\nso come to alter as to produce the characteristics of the whale? For\nnew species can only be evolved by means of structural modifications\n_capable of being transmitted by inheritance_; and nothing can be\ninherited except through the action of the determinants. A modification\nwhich does not affect the reproductive cells has no significance in the\nevolution of species.\n\nTo this question Darwinism has given us our choice of two answers,\nwhich may be termed respectively the Darwin-Lamarck and the\nDarwin-Weismann theories. Lamarck explained the origin of species by\nthe accumulated effect of the inheritance, through many generations, of\nmodifications acquired by the exercise, or the disuse, of the modified\norgans. Observing that living protoplasm responds to demands upon it\n(thus, for instance, a muscle when systematically exercised attracts\nmore nourishment from the blood and grows stronger, and callosities\nform to protect the skin of the hands of a manual worker), he assumed\nthat modifications so acquired might be transmitted by inheritance.\nEach new generation, then, would start with a slightly better equipment\nin this particular respect than the former one had when it started;\nand so, by slow degrees, a new organ, or one markedly differing from\nthe original form, might be built up. The world, since protoplasmic\nlife first appeared upon it, has gone through many changes, and has\nalways presented a vast variety of climatic and other conditions,\ncalling for the most varied types of organic structure. As animal\nlife gradually spread over the earth and sea, the effort to cope with\nthe different conditions it met with would gradually, by the combined\naction of exercise, of disuse, and of heredity, produce multitudes\nof different types; and these are what we know as families, orders,\ngenera, and species. When a species is fairly well adapted to its\nsurroundings and way of life it may go on indefinitely without change.\nBut should any members of it be obliged to migrate, from scarcity\nof food or any other reason, to some new locality where somewhat\ndifferent conditions prevail, structural alterations would soon begin\nto appear to suit those new conditions. Thus the giraffe, if we could\ntrace its ancestry back, would probably be found to have originated in\nsome animal not differing from the vast majority of quadrupeds in the\nrelative proportions of its fore and hind quarters. But some members\nof this original species\u2014or the whole species, owing to some change\nin their surroundings\u2014found themselves obliged to rely largely for\nfood on leaves growing at a considerable height. They stretched up to\nreach them, and a prolongation of the bones of the neck (the giraffe\nhas only the usual seven cervical vertebr\u00e6) and of the fore-legs would\nensue, especially in the young; this prolongation would be handed on\nby inheritance, and so by degrees the new type of animal would be\nevolved. The horn of the rhinoceros, the antlers of the stag, the\ncanine teeth of beasts of prey, the flat grinders of ruminants, the\nflippers of the whale, the proboscis of the honey-feeding butterfly,\nthe jaws of the ant or the beetle, and a host of other adaptations\nwhich seem obviously to owe their origin to the exercise of their\nfunctions, occur to the mind in confirmation of this theory.\n\nBesides Adaptation, we have what appears the strikingly confirmatory\ncase of what is called Co-adaptation, where the variation of one\norgan or structure in an animal puts a strain upon other parts, which\naccordingly respond by auxiliary adaptations. Such co-adaptations are\nnumerous in every animal structure, and, as we cannot suppose them to\nhave all originated simultaneously and by chance, the conclusion drawn\nby Lamarckians is that one was produced by use, and, in the course of\nits development, produced the others in the same way. A typical case is\nthat of the Irish elk. The enormous antlers of this beast, sometimes\nweighing a hundredweight, must have needed (besides other structural\nchanges) a cervical ligament of immense size and power to support\nthem, and from the peculiar structure of the cervical vertebr\u00e6 it is\ndemonstrable that such a ligament must have existed. What more natural\nthan to suppose that the antlers were developed by fighting wild beasts\nof prey, combats between male elks, etc., and that then in their\ngradual growth, as the species was evolved, the ligament and the bony\nstructure associated with it responded to the increasing strain. That\nis exactly what would happen in an individual. We have only to assume\nthe heritability of modifications acquired by use to understand how\nthese co-adaptations became constant characters in a species.\n\nNot less apparent cogency for the argument for modifications by use\nhave those cases where the modification has been apparently due to\ndisuse. It is well known that living creatures found in the total\ndarkness of great limestone caverns, like those at Kentucky, are\nblind, through imperfections of one kind or another in the organs of\nsight. But the rudimentary structures which remain tell us that these\ncreatures had ancestors which were once fully equipped in this respect,\nand which had wandered into the caverns from the sunlit outer world.\nThus the case of a crab has been noted, in which the stalks on which\na crab\u2019s eyes are set were preserved, while the eyes had disappeared:\nit is, as Darwin observes, as if the stand of a telescope had been\nretained while the telescope itself had gone. Sometimes the eyes\nof cave-fishes are covered with a horny layer, sometimes the whole\nstructure is atrophied and withered. But never is an animal found\nunder these conditions which has retained its power of sight. The\nconclusion seems obvious. In individuals, a muscle or other organ is\nknown to strengthen and develop by use and to atrophy by disuse. As use\nand disuse appear to be invariably accompanied by precisely the same\neffects in the species as in the individual, and as there seems no way\nof accounting for this by any known physiological law without assuming\nthat modifications acquired by the individual are transmitted to its\nprogeny, the case for the inheritability of such modifications appears,\nat first sight, irresistible.[54]\n\nSo matters stood when Darwin\u2019s Origin of Species carried the argument\nfor evolution a long step further. Accepting fully the views of\nLamarck, Darwin attempted, by his doctrine of Natural Selection, first\nto reinforce those views, secondly to explain much that they could\nnot be made to cover. It is plain that _if we assume the existence of\na severe competition for livelihood among the members of a species_,\nany favourable variations of structure or instinct which may occur\namong certain members of the species will give their type an advantage\nover the normal type in the struggle for existence. They will, on the\naverage, live longer and produce more offspring. Ultimately, as the\nstruggle for life is always most severe among nearly related organisms,\nwhich seek a living from the same sources, the less perfectly equipped\ntype will be extinguished, and so on, until a species exhibiting the\nmost complete form of adaptation has been evolved. The variations\non which Natural Selection has to work are produced, according to\nDarwin, not only by the exercise of particular organs as in Lamarck\u2019s\ntheory, but also and more potently by \u201cinnate variations\u201d originating\nfrom unascertained causes in the reproductive cells. Variations, it\nis indisputable, are always occurring; probably no two members of\nany species exactly resemble each other. Among low and primitive\norganisms, such as the _Foraminifera_, Dr. W. B. Carpenter (I quote\nfrom A. R. Wallace\u2019s Darwinism) found, on careful examination, the\nrange of variation so great that characteristics typical not merely\nof species but of genera and even of orders were liable to vary,[55]\nwhile at the other end of evolution, in man, to give only one instance,\nMr. J. Wood is stated by Darwin to have observed no less than five\nhundred and fifty-eight variations in the muscular structure of\nthirty-six subjects examined.[56] The cause of these variations is\noften quite obscure, but it is certain that some kinds of them are\ncapable of arising as the natural response of the organism to changed\nconditions of food or habitat Conditions such as these, affecting\nthe whole constitution of the organism, have been proved capable of\naffecting the reproductive cells, and thus of giving rise to hereditary\ncharacteristics. Natural Selection, then, by preserving and encouraging\nthe better fitted as opposed to the less fit, acts as a spur to the\nLamarckian principles of development by exercise of function, while\nit also lays hold of and intensifies all kinds of other favourable\nvariations occurring either casually or in consequence of change of\nhabitat, and weeds out the types in which such variations happen to\nbe unfavourable. According to Darwin, therefore, given (1) constant\nvariations of structure arising from use, disuse, or from other known\nor unknown causes, (2) the capacity to transmit by inheritance these\nvariations _whether innate or acquired_, (3) a constant struggle for\nexistence among organisms both against each others\u2019 competition and\nagainst the general conditions of life[57]\u2014given these simple data,\nthe secret springs of evolution are laid bare, and the vast complexity\nof natural forms upon the globe is adequately accounted for without\ncalling in the agency of special creations. But variations are\nthe starting-point in the process: Natural Selection can originate\nnothing\u2014it can only act on what is presented to it by some quite\ndifferent force. The relative parts played by the various agencies at\nwork are, with characteristic moderation of statement, thus described\nby Darwin:\u2014\n\n    \u201cOn the whole I think we may conclude that habit, use, and disuse,\n    have, in some cases, played a considerable part in the modification\n    of the constitution, and in the structure of various organs; but\n    that the effects of use and disuse have often been largely combined\n    with, and sometimes overmastered by the natural selection of innate\n    variations.\u201d[58]\n\nTo explain evolution, then, we must first explain _the occurrence\nof appropriate variations_, strong enough and widespread enough\nto maintain themselves against the constant reducing influence of\npromiscuous intercrossing, and they must be variations _capable of\nbeing transmitted by inheritance_. This, we now see, is the true field\nof the inquiry.\n\n\nThe new factors introduced by Darwin into the process of\nevolution\u2014Natural Selection and Innate Variations\u2014were destined\nin our day to have the whole weight of the argument for evolution\nsuddenly thrown upon them. The inheritability of variations acquired\nby the individual through use and disuse when subjected to fresh\ninvestigation by the younger school of biologists has turned out to be\nopen to the gravest doubts, both theoretically, on account of the great\ndifficulty of reconciling it with what has now been ascertained of the\nnature of the reproductive mechanism in plants and animals, and also on\nthe score of a closer consideration of the facts commonly adduced as\nevidence for the law. To take these points separately: The reproductive\ncells in every living creature are now believed to be formed directly\nfrom the reproductive cells of its parents. They are not a product\nof the organism in which they find themselves. They are nourished\nby its blood, and are therefore liable to be affected by anything\nwhich produces a broad general effect on the constitution of the\nbeing in whom they are lodged, but it is difficult to see how special\nmodifications of individual parts of that being could affect them so\nas to influence the determinants in the direction of reproducing that\nmodification. How, for example, could the habit of grubbing for roots\nin an animal of the pig tribe so affect its reproductive cells as to\nensure the birth of an offspring with callosities on their snouts?\nThe physiological mechanism by which such a result could be produced\nseems hardly conceivable\u2014at any rate no one has yet offered a plausible\nconception of it. Of course if the _fact_ were indisputably proved\none would only have to accept it, and endeavour, if possible, to\ndiscover the why and how. But the fact, which once looked so solidly\nestablished, is taking on a more and more insubstantial appearance in\nthe light of closer investigation.\n\nThe argument against Lamarckism rests on the basis (1) artificial\nexperiment, (2) of observation of nature under normal conditions.\n\nAs to the evidence from experiment, opinions fluctuated for some\ntime\u2014Darwin was disposed at one time to deny, at another to admit the\nalleged proofs it offered. In the present day opinion is overwhelmingly\nagainst the validity of these proofs. The cases where artificially\nproduced mutilations are said to have been inherited have, when\ninvestigated, turned out to be by no means as clear and trustworthy\nas was supposed, nor can one place much reliance on a few cases of\nstriking coincidence such as are certain to occur from time to time.[59]\n\nThe adverse instances are very clear indeed. Chinese girls are never\nborn with abnormally small feet. Jews are not born circumcised. Among\ntribes where tattooing is practised, no traces of this embellishment\nare ever found to be inherited. If it is a physiological law that the\ndisuse of an organ not only atrophies it in the individual but (by\ninheritance of the atrophy) eliminates it from the species, there is\nno apparent reason why this law should not operate in cases where the\norgan is artificially removed. Yet it rarely or never seems to do so.\nExperiments upon animals, such as breeding for many generations from\nmice whose tails have been cut off, have never resulted in producing a\nclear case of inherited mutilation. A strong presumption is therefore\nraised that the effects apparently due to use and disuse under natural\nconditions (as in the eyeless fishes of the Kentucky caves) must be set\ndown to some other cause. The queens in colonies of ants and bees have\nnever exercised the functions of workers for thousands of centuries,\nyet they transmit these functions unimpaired.\n\nThere is, indeed, a case often referred to in this connexion which\nmust be here mentioned. Dr. Brown-S\u00e9quard found that by injuring or\ncompressing the sciatic nerve in guinea-pigs epilepsy was produced, and\nthat the descendants of animals so injured had a marked tendency to\nepileptic fits. This is undoubtedly a very significant and important\nfact in biology, but it gives no support to the Lamarckian theory.\nWhat is inherited by the guinea-pigs is not the injury to the nerve\nbut the pathological condition resulting therefrom. It remains to\nbe discovered how, precisely, this takes place, and the experiment\nmay end in illuminating a very obscure region in physiology, but on\nLamarckism it has no bearing at all. A better case is that of atrophy\nof a toe, which is said to have been inherited in consequence of its\noriginal production by severance of the sciatic nerve, but, again,\nwhat is inherited is not an actual injury but an effect of it. It is\nclear, however, that bodily conditions of a large and comprehensive\nkind produced naturally or artificially in an individual may have an\neffect on the reproductive cells, especially when the nervous system is\naffected.\n\nComing to the observation of what happens under natural conditions,\nwe are struck at the outset by the fact that the inheritance of\nacquired characteristics, if it works at all, must work under some\nsystem of salutary control and not as a blind physiological law. For\nif each generation starts with some measure at least of what the\nformer generation had acquired, and adds to it by its own activity,\nthen all acquired characteristics would ere long attain a monstrous\ndevelopment, and the species would perish under them. But nothing of\nthe kind is observed to happen. The continual use of the muscles in the\nlabouring classes has not made men stronger than they were thousands\nof generations ago. The habit of handling the spade and hoe has never\nproduced a peasant child born with callosities on its hands. The horn\nof the rhinoceros, which on Lamarckian principles we must regard as\ndeveloped by the gradual increase of a callosity formed by grubbing for\nroots, does not grow beyond a certain size, however the species may go\non grubbing. The Lamarckian law, then, if it has any real effect at\nall, can only express half the truth about the action of heredity on\nacquired characteristics. As the column of water in a fountain hovers\nabout a certain height, so the action of heredity in the accumulation\nof the effects produced by the use of organs seems to have a limit\nbeyond which it cannot pass. May it not be that heredity is really as\nfalse an expression for the phenomenon as the popular superstition\nabout \u2018water seeking its own level\u2019 is for the upspringing of a\nfountain?\n\nThe cases of co-adaptation, where one organ appears to be developed\nby use and others by the use of that, as in the case of the Irish\nelk referred to above, are met by instances just as striking where\nthe elements of modification by use cannot come into play. Weismann\nmentions the case of the ingenious brush arrangement on the anterior\nlegs of the bee, which the insect uses for cleansing its antenn\u00e6. Two\nadaptations are here developed\u2014a little semicircular notch in the leg,\nset with small bristles, and a movable projection or flap used for\npressing the antenna into the notch as it is drawn through. The bee, no\ndoubt, would naturally try to clean its antenn\u00e6 with its fore-legs, but\nhow could this process develop the special arrangements referred to in\nthe hard or scaly covering of its limbs? It is not until the shell of\nthe insect has grown quite hard and incapable of further vital changes\nthat the arrangement comes into use. Again, the stridulating noise\nproduced by the legs of the grasshopper is due to serrations occurring\non different joints of the limb. Serrations on one joint would in\nno way tend to develop them on the other, but rather the contrary,\nyet there they are, in harmonious co-operation. If Nature can obtain\nthese effects, as she does in numberless instances, without the aid of\nLamarck\u2019s principle, we cannot help asking whether that principle is\never operative at all.\n\nThe three instances which we shall next consider seem to offer very\nserious obstacles to the Lamarckian theory.\n\nA modification of structure caused by the special use of a certain\norgan takes place in probably over 90 per cent of the whole human race,\nmale and female. The records of art, of language, and the evidence\nof actual remains, tend to show that the habitude in question, with\nthe attendant modification, goes back to very ancient, even perhaps\nto pal\u00e6olithic times.[60] I refer to the preferential use of the\nright hand and the enlargement of structure thus brought about in\nthe right hand and arm. Every right-handed adult man and woman shows\nthis enlargement of bony and muscular structure. The origin of the\nhabitude does not concern us here. Let us suppose it due, as Dr. D.\nJ. Cunningham suggests, to \u201ca transmitted functional pre-eminence\nof the left brain,\u201d[61] which is larger than the right, and which\ngoverns the movements of the right side of the body. However this may\nbe, it is clear that if bodily characteristics acquired by exercise\nare transmissible by inheritance the new-born child of right-handed\nancestry ought to show some appreciable preponderance in weight and\nsize of the right over the left limb. There could hardly be a more\ncrucial test of the validity of the Lamarckian principle. What do the\ninvestigations of the dissecting-room reveal? I shall quote the two\nmost recent authorities who have studied this interesting question. Dr.\nCunningham, in the lecture already referred to, writes:\u2014\n\n    \u201cAlthough the matter has not been investigated so fully as to place\n    the question outside the region of dispute, the evidence at our\n    disposal distinctly favours the view that at birth the two upper\n    limbs start upon their individual duties equally endowed in so far\n    as strength of muscle and size of bones are concerned. Both in mass\n    and weight the two limbs are to all intents and purposes similar at\n    birth, and the preponderance in bulk and strength which later on\n    distinguishes the right arm is acquired during life, and is caused\n    by the greater amount of work it is called upon to perform.\u201d[62]\n\nDr. T. G. Moorhead, Chief Demonstrator in Anatomy in Trinity College,\nDublin, after giving the results of the researches of various other\ninquirers, writes:\u2014\n\n    \u201cFrom this mass of conflicting evidence I am forced to the\n    conclusion that no real differences exist.. .. After weighing as\n    a whole the limbs of eight foetuses I was unable to detect any\n    constant difference.\u201d[63]\n\nThese results appear to conflict most seriously with the theory of the\ntransmissibility of acquired modifications.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3.\n\n_Kallima paralecta_, as it appears at rest, with wings closed.\n\nFrom Weismann\u2019s The Evolution Theory.\n\nK, the head; B, the limbs.]\n\nEvery one is familiar with the fact that species of animals which\nare preyed on by others, or which require to be inconspicuous\nfor the purpose of preying, are very apt to take the colour of\ntheir habitual surroundings. Individuals of the same species will\neven differ according to their special habitat. Perhaps the most\nmarvellous instances of this kind of adaptation are to be found in\ncertain tropical butterflies, such as the Indian butterfly, _Kallima\nparalecta_, here illustrated. We have here, painted on the butterfly\u2019s\nwing, the picture of a leaf belonging to a shrub which it frequents\u2014a\npicture, when seen under natural conditions, capable of baffling all\nbut the closest inspection. The different parts\u2014the midrib, the lateral\nveinings, the little blotches and spots which represent patches of\nmould or drops of water, even the outer contour of the wing itself\u2014all\nform an harmonious whole composed of related parts which have\nseparately no meaning or use. They certainly did not all appear in full\ndevelopment at the same time. Nor could any one of them, if it appeared\nfirst, have exercised the smallest influence on the appearance of the\nothers, as the antlers of the elk were supposed to have influenced\nthe development of the _ligamentum nuch\u00e6_. The early stages must have\nbeen anticipatory of the later ones, but exercise could have had\nnothing to do with the result from first to last. The butterfly never\npractised looking like a leaf. Nor can any large chemical and elemental\ninfluences have been at work. If nature is capable of producing such\neffects as this without the agency of Lamarck\u2019s principle, are there\nnot excellent grounds for seeking for some other agency which will\ncover all the phenomena alike?\n\nFinally let us take the case of the slave-owning \u2018Amazon\u2019 ants,\n_Polyergus rufescens_. Here we have a case which at the first blush\nlooks like a perfect picture of an evolutionary process conducted on\nthe principles of Lamarck\u2019s theory. These ants, it may be supposed,\nwere originally of the ordinary type of that industrious and\nrespectable insect, but they were led by the weakness of some of their\nneighbours of another species to make occasional attacks on them for\nthe purpose of carrying off their immature brood, the _pup\u00e6_, as food.\nSome of these _pup\u00e6_, near maturity at the period of their capture,\nwould come out while stored-up in the nest of the conquerors, and when\nthey did so would immediately set about doing the household work of\nthe hive as if they were at home. _Polyergus rufescens_ ultimately\nbecame aware that a life of aristocratic leisure awaited him if he\nonly captured enough _pup\u00e6_ of another species of ant to do his work.\nHe accordingly confined himself entirely to piratical expeditions of\nthis nature, and in the course of time underwent a moral and physical\ntransformation of a most remarkable kind. The ordinary ant instincts\nhave disappeared in this variety. They do not make their nests, they\ndo not gather stores, they do not mind their young, they do not even\nfeed themselves\u2014an Amazon ant will perish of starvation in the presence\nof food if there is not a slave ant to put it into his mouth. But\nthey fight ferociously in their slave-raids, and the form of their\nmandible has changed to suit their mode of life. It has become a pair\nof sabre-like nippers, excellent for slaying a foe, but ill-adapted\nfor carrying objects and other industrial occupations. Corresponding\nchanges have taken place in the head and in the chitinous and muscular\nstructure.\n\nWe have before us, then, what would seem to an uninformed observer,\na striking picture of the acquirement of a certain bodily form and a\ncertain set of instincts by use, and the total loss of other traits by\ndisuse, and of the fixing of these characters in a species by heredity.\nYet the picture is altogether an illusion. However we are to explain\nthe facts\u2014of which more anon\u2014we cannot do so by Lamarckism, for the\nsimple reason that the peculiar instincts and bodily structure of the\nAmazon ants are confined to the so-called \u2018worker,\u2019 or in this case\n\u2018soldier,\u2019 caste, which are sexless, and incapable of reproducing their\nkind. If these were the individuals which originally started the slave\nsystem among the species, they could not possibly have transmitted the\nmodifications, moral and physical, which they acquired. The queen-ants,\nwhich normally are the only fertile ants, transmit them, but do not\npossess them, and neither do the drones.\n\nThe case of these mysterious communities of insects, composed largely\nof neuters which do the work of the community but do not reproduce\ntheir kind, was one of the difficulties in the way of Darwin\u2019s theory\nof evolution which, he said, staggered him every time he reflected\non it.[64] It is not surprising, therefore, that this difficulty\ncame to be the battlefield, or a main position thereof, in a most\ninteresting and illuminating controversy on Natural Selection _versus_\nLamarckism, waged between Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Weismann in the\nyears 1893-4.[65] Spencer considered the inheritance of acquired\ncharacteristics a factor in evolution of the very first importance;\nand so, indeed, from his point of view it is. \u201cEither,\u201d he declared,\n\u201cthere has been inheritance of acquired characteristics, or there has\nbeen no evolution.\u201d Met by the case, among others, of the slave-making\nants, his explanation is substantially as follows: It was not the\nworkers (soldiers) which originally acquired military traits, but the\nqueens, the fully developed females, which lost them. There was once,\nas every one admits, a time when all ants, bees, etc. were sexually\nmature. There were only males and females. At this stage, possibly, the\nAmazon ants were already predatory. It was _then_ that they may have\nacquired the military habits and structure, which they were then able\nto perpetuate by inheritance.\n\nHow, then, did the queens lose these traits? \u201cFrom the queens,\u201d replies\nSpencer, \u201cthey have slowly disappeared by inheritance of the effects\nof disuse.\u201d The obvious and unanswerable rejoinder made by Weismann\nand his followers was that Spencer had only shifted the difficulty\nto another ground\u2014from the workers to the queens. If the queens (and\ndrones) lost the military characteristics by disuse, how do they come\nto transmit them unimpaired to the workers? It is the very essence of\nLamarckism that whatever modifications are produced by use or by disuse\nshall be transmissible by inheritance.\n\nIn this controversy, however, there was another string to the\nLamarckian bow. Worker-ants, bees, etc. are imperfectly developed\nfemales. They have four or five egg-tubes where the queen has two\nhundred, but they cannot be fertilized by the drones. It occasionally\nhappens, however, that these neuter insects do lay a few eggs. These\nunfertilized eggs always develop into drones. One of these drones\nmight, it was suggested, now and then fertilize a genuine queen, and\nthus hand on the traits of the worker from which it sprang. But apart\nfrom the fact that an occasional occurrence of this sort would hardly\nsuffice to maintain the worker-characteristics unimpaired throughout\nthe ages, there is the decisive answer, as Weismann points out, that\nwe know at least one species of ant in which the evolution of a\nneuter caste is absolutely complete, for the workers of _Tetramorium\ncaespitum_ possess no egg-tubes at all. Yet the transmission of\ncharacteristics from queens and drones who never exercise them to\nworkers who cannot pass them on, goes forward in this species of any\nant just as in any other.\n\nNature, therefore, while doing in the case of these insect communities\nexactly what she appears to be doing elsewhere by the accumulation\nof acquired characteristics, must, in reality, have been working on\nentirely different lines. If we can discover what those lines were,\nthey will cover the apparently Lamarckian cases as well, but the\nLamarckian principle certainly will not cover these.\n\nIn the next chapter we shall review the alternative explanation offered\nby Darwinism, the explanation of Weismann; and we shall see whether\nSpencer was not as successful in demolishing it as Weismann was in\nshowing that, if evolution exists at all, some other basis must be\nfound for it than that on which it was so largely rested by Herbert\nSpencer.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n    THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF EVOLUTION: THE DARWIN-WEISMANN EXPLANATION\n\n    \u201cChance guides all things: mind and forethought must call it God\n    alone!\u201d\u2014Menander.\n\n    \u201cIn the end,\u201d writes M. Edmond Perrier, \u201cevery imaginable theory of\n    evolution must lead up to one or other of two absolute doctrines,\n    essentially antagonistic to each other. Either the inheritance\n    of acquired characteristics must be admitted in its full scope\n    (_dans toute sa g\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9_), or else we must believe in the\n    predestination of protoplasm, developing by virtue of its own\n    internal forces. But in the latter case we pass from the domain of\n    pure science to enter that of metaphysics.\u201d[66]\n\n\nWe have now to consider the most conspicuous attempt made in recent\ntimes to escape from this tragic dilemma.\n\nIf the acquired and inherited variations of the Lamarckian theory drop\nout as a contribution to the explanation of evolution, we are reduced\nto two forces only\u2014_innate_, or germinal, variability of offspring,\nand natural selection. Indeed it might be said that we are reduced\nto variability alone, since natural selection can do nothing until\nsuitable variations are presented to it. The suitable variations do,\nhowever, turn up, and the question is, what causes them? The real\ndifficulty for the school of biologists who, like Weismann, \u201cassume\nthe mechanical theory of the world to be correct,\u201d is how to reconcile\nthe aptness and apparent purposefulness of these variations with any\nmechanical theory.\n\n    \u201cWe are justified in inquiring,\u201d writes Weismann, \u201cwhether the\n    assumption of \u2018chance\u2019 germinal variations, which we have hitherto\n    made with Darwin and Wallace, affords a sufficient basis for\n    selection. Osborn says very neatly in this connection, \u2018We see with\n    Weismann and Galton the element of chance; but the dice appear to\n    be loaded, and in the long run turn \u201csixes\u201d up. Here arises the\n    question, What loads the dice?\u2019\u201d[67]\n\nWhat loads the dice? There is the great question in which the realms of\nbiology and of philosophy meet each other! Through that borderland no\ndefinite frontier has ever been traced, for in thought as in matter the\nsaying is true that natural groupings have nuclei, but no boundaries.\nIt is all the more essential that men of science should understand\nphilosophy and its methods, and that philosophers should understand\nscience. It is to be feared that at present the second of these\ndesiderata is much more fully realized than the first.\n\nHowever, we have to see now what Weismann, protagonist among\ncontemporary biologists of the mechanical theory of the world, has to\nanswer to the crucial question which he has allowed Osborn to set him.\n\n\nThe problem is to discover how innate, germinal variations can come\nabout, of such a nature as to adapt an organism with striking accuracy\nto its surroundings and way of life, without our assuming either (1)\nthat the exercise of function had any influence in causing heritable\nvariations, or (2) that they were caused by any non-mechanical power,\nwhich, so to speak, had in view the objects which they fulfil. For\nthe variations are to be regarded, on Weismann\u2019s theory of life, as\ncompletely _fortuitous_ in respect of the objects they serve. How,\nthen, do they come to serve them, in most cases, so admirably well?\n\nThe general nature of Weismann\u2019s explanation may be summed up in a\ncurious illustration given by him in The Evolution Theory.[68] Let\nus suppose, he says, a snow-field surrounded by precipices on all\nsides, but with a narrow track leading away from it at one point.\nScattered about on the snow-field are a number of persons. A sleigh is\nnow projected among them from some outside point. Each person, when\nthe sleigh comes near him, gives it a push, but he has no object in\npushing it anywhere in particular, and simply sends it flying off in\nwhatever direction he chances to be looking. What will happen under\nthese circumstances? After more or less bandying about, the sleigh\nwill, in the vast majority of cases, fall into one of the abysses round\nthe snow-field and be lost But another is then launched on to the\nsnow-field, and then another and another without end; and so, at last,\nit may happen that a series of pushes will take place which will send\nthe sleigh over the narrow track to its goal.\n\nThe goal is supposed to represent some condition to which the\norganism (the sleigh) has to adapt itself. The random pushes which\nit receives are the multitude of variations constantly occurring in\nthe reproductive cells. Most of these variations have no decisive\ntendency, favourable or unfavourable. If a series of unfavourable\nones should occur, leading to some development which markedly impairs\nthe chances of the organism for success in life, it, or its line of\nsuccession, dies out, and the unfavourable variation is, therefore, not\nperpetuated. This is illustrated by the sleigh going into the abyss.\nBut if a favourable variation occurs, and is increased till it reaches\n\u2018selection value,\u2019 _i.e._ till it gives the organisms possessing it\na distinct advantage over others in the battle of life, then this\nfavoured type will ultimately, by the action of natural selection,\ndrive out the less favoured, and will establish itself as the sole\nrepresentative of the species. Having reached this level, of course the\nsame process will go on further indefinitely.\n\nBefore criticizing this conception of evolutionary processes, we\nmust inquire into the vital point of how the variations, the random\npushes given to the sleighs, ever rise to such intensity as to\nhave selection-value, and to make head against the influence of\nintercrossing. The explanation is certainly ingenious, but is so purely\nhypothetical and has an air so fantastic that it has commended itself\nto very few students of biology. Weismann would have us suppose that\nthe determinants of which the hereditary substance in the reproductive\ncells is made up are carrying on with each other an incessant struggle\nfor nutriment. If one of them succeeds in getting a little more than\nits neighbours it thereby grows stronger, and is able to attract\nstill more nutriment to itself, and to impoverish those around it. It\nis thus launched, as it were, on an ascending scale, and will go on\nautomatically if the variation caused by it proves favourable to the\nspecies. If it proves unfavourable (which _ex hypothesi_ it is just\nas likely to do) its career will be put a stop to by the extinction\nof the line of descent which inherits this variation. Weismann\u2019s\ntheory of \u201cGerminal Selection\u201d is therefore simply an application to\nthe reproductive cell and its contents of the Darwinian principle of\nNatural Selection.\n\nThe theory is one which plainly makes immense demands upon our\nfaith. As regards the existence of a continual competition among\nthe determinants, there may be reason to accept it, but hardly in\nthe Weismann sense. Suppose two parents to unite, one healthy,\nwell-nourished, full-blooded, the other starved and weakly, it is\nvery likely that, in the resulting offspring, other things being\nequal, the determinants coming from the well-nourished frame will be\nseen to have surpassed in potency those from the weakly one. For the\ndeterminants are living protoplasm\u2014they depend on nourishment derived\nfrom the blood of the organism in which they are lodged, and they\nare capable, no doubt, of being well-nourished or ill-nourished or\npossibly over-nourished, according to the constitution and history of\nthat organism. But this is a very different thing from supposing that\none determinant can begin to grow in _the same cell_ at the expense\nof another, when both are absolutely embedded in an ocean of the same\nnutritive matter. There is not\u2014of course in the nature of things\nthere cannot be\u2014a particle of evidence for the supposition. It is a\npure imaginative hypothesis, and on the face of it a most improbable\none. It is difficult to believe that it could ever have been adopted\nsave as a desperate attempt to break through the ever-narrowing ring\nof evidence which is forcing investigation more and more towards a\nnon-mechanical explanation of the processes of life. But even if it\nwere true, what is gained by it? \u201cAppropriate variational tendencies,\u201d\nwrites Weismann, \u201cnot only _may_ present themselves, they _must_ do so,\nif the germ-plasm contains determinants at all by whose fluctuations in\na plus or minus direction the appropriate variation is attainable.\u201d[69]\nBut why _must_ they? There is no \u2018must\u2019 about Chance, unless one\nextends its operations to infinity. Why is it so certain that the\ninequalities of nutriment, on which hereditary variability is supposed\nto depend, must necessarily run the gamut of all possible variations?\nThere is no \u2018must\u2019 in this theory, except that it is the last ditch\nof the \u201cmechanical conception of the economy of life.\u201d It \u2018must\u2019 be\ntrue\u2014or that conception must quit the field.\n\nWere evolution to depend on the occurrence, by pure chance, of a\nfew appropriate variations among a vast multitude of indifferent or\ndisadvantageous ones, is it conceivable that we should find in nature\nanything like the infinite wealth of closely and beautifully adapted\nstructure which is actually present? In particular, how are we to\naccount for the cases in which a number of parts are so modified as\nto work together in harmonious co-adaptation? Each of these parts,\naccording to Weismann, originates quite independently of the others.\nTake the case of the Indian leaf-butterfly already referred to.[70]\nThe first beginnings of the midrib on Weismann\u2019s theory had nothing to\ndo with the rest of the rib, nor had any of the veinings with this, or\nwith one another; and the contour of the leaf, sending out a little\nprojection like a stalk _exactly where the midrib starts_, originated\nquite independently of that marking, and equally so of the leaf it\nmimics! To explain co-adaptations like this on Weismann\u2019s theory is\nreally much the same as to suppose that a picture could be painted by\nsimply plastering the scrapings of a palette on a canvas, if only one\ncontinued the process long enough. And the marvel in question, the\nco-adaptation of various parts, has not been attained once or twice\nbut, to a greater or less degree, in _every_ organism possessing any\nstructural complexity.\n\nThe difficulty, of course, has not escaped Weismann. His explanation\ndepends on some conception of the potentialities of conjugation and\nintercrossing which I confess I cannot understand. He finds the key to\nthe mystery in the mingling and constant recombination of determinants\nfrom different individuals produced by promiscuous intercrossing. \u201cIt\nis only through amphimixis [conjugation] that simultaneous harmonious\nadaptation of many parts becomes possible.\u201d[71] But surely this\ncontinual mingling and recombination would, _prim\u00e2 facie_, be just as\nlikely to break up co-adaptations already forming as to give rise to\nnew ones? Amphimixis, as we have seen, is one of the most potent forces\nagainst which the evolution of a new species has to contend. Evolution\nhas to make head against the constant tendency of intercrossing to\nobliterate individual distinctions. True, if parents exhibiting\nthe same heritable variation unite, their offspring will have that\nvariation in a strongly marked form, and will transmit it further. But\nthis, to be of value for evolution, presupposes the same variation\noccurring simultaneously in a number of individuals within reach of\neach other. Weismann had indeed good reason to ascribe to the action of\nintercrossing \u201ca wealth and diversity of organic architecture otherwise\nunattainable,\u201d but were it not supplemented by an architectural\ninstinct of nature, the only architecture attainable would be that of\nthe child when it empties its bricks on the floor.\n\nConsider the theory of germinal selection in the light of the following\nvery curious case.[72] Most people have seen an example of the kind\nof spectacles having what are called bifocal lenses. Each lens is\ndivided across the centre, and the focal lengths of the upper and\nthe lower halves are different. They are intended for persons who see\nindistinctly both at near and at far distances\u2014the upper half of the\nlens is used for looking at distant objects and the lower for reading,\netc., so as to avoid the inconvenience of having a different pair of\nglasses for each requirement. Now there is a fish, named _Anableps_\n(the Uplooker), living in estuaries on the east coast of South America\nwhich actually has its eye-lenses constructed on this principle. The\npupil of the eye is divided laterally by prolongations from the iris.\nThe significance of this extraordinary arrangement is that the fish\nis in the habit of swimming near the surface, and often has its eyes\nwholly or partly out of water, presumably to look out for attacks from\nbirds of prey. The upper half of the eye has become adapted for vision\nin the air and the lower for vision in the water.\n\nAccording to Weismann, the habits and needs of the fish could have\nhad no influence whatever in producing this peculiar adaptation as an\ninherited characteristic of a species. Any other fish or mammal would\nhave been just as likely as _Anableps_ to begin the development of a\nbifocal eye. How does it come, then, that from the thousands of species\nof eyed animals one, and one only, possesses this bifocal eye, and that\nprecisely the one which so greatly needs it? Weismann\u2019s answer would\ndoubtless be that, in the case of other creatures, Natural Selection\nwould not have acted in protecting the individuals which possessed\nthe bifocal eye and penalizing those which did not. But can we imagine\nthat this principle acted very strongly when the bifocal arrangement\nin _Anableps_ was in a mere rudimentary stage, as it must at first\nhave been? And should we not occasionally see at least traces of the\narrangement in the eyes of other creatures, if its full development in\n_Anableps_ was merely the result of Natural Selection laying hold of\nand perfecting an originally quite fortuitous variation?\n\nA case still more curious and convincing occurs in connexion with\nthe hermaphroditism exhibited by a whole class of animals belonging\nto many different orders, but alike in the one respect that it is\nspecially desirable for them to have both sexes comprised in the same\nindividual. These are animals capable only of sluggish movement, the\ndifferent sexes of which have therefore some difficulty in finding\neach other out. Terrestrial snails and slugs are an example. All these\ncreatures are double-sexed; any two snails which meet can conjugate,\nsince each can act either as male or as female at will. Oysters are\nanother instance, though in this case the two sexes follow each other\nat different periods in the life-history of each individual. Clearly,\nthis faculty gives to snails and slugs twice as many opportunities of\nreproducing their kind as if the sexes were distinct. It is certain\nfrom general biological considerations that they were distinct\noriginally. One can easily understand how, if any small group of the\noriginal species from which all the present tribes are descended,\nhappened to throw up these bisexual peculiarities, their progeny would\nmultiply faster than the rest and might ultimately exterminate them\nby the operation of natural selection. _But exactly the same might be\nsaid of any other tribe of unisexual animals._ Any of these might,\n_a priori_, on the \u201cmechanical conception of the economy of life,\u201d\nbe just as reasonably expected to develop bisexuality; for no one\nsupposes that there is any physical connexion between sluggishness\nand hermaphroditism, or swiftness and distinction of the sexes; and\nthe causes which have operated to extend and confirm the type in\nsluggish and sedentary animals would have the same effect in swift\nones. Yet this remarkable adaptation occurs just wherever there is\nspecial need for it; there always and there only. What mechanism can\naccount for such a phenomenon as this? No; the dice are loaded. Nature\ngains her end slowly and not without hesitations and failures, but the\nphenomena are wholly unlike the results of the play of uncontrolled\nand fortuitous forces. Imagine a blindfolded archer shooting arrows\nupwards, downwards, and all around him in every direction as it may\ntake his fancy. There is, unknown to him, a target some distance\noff. If he went on long enough it is conceivable, though by no means\nnecessary, that some arrow would hit the bull\u2019s eye. But the facts\nplainly point not to the above analogy, but rather to an aim at a\ndesired object. Some of the arrows miss, some light near the mark,\nothers hit it precisely. The flight, on the whole, is in the right\ndirection, as the immense proportion of complete or partial successes\nplainly proves.\n\n\nThe two pillars of Weismann\u2019s theory of evolution are _germinal\nvariation_ and _natural selection_. The one is supposed to originate\nceaseless changes of structure, the other to eliminate those changes\nwhich are useless[73] or unfavourable and to foster and confirm the\nfavourable. We have seen, if the foregoing considerations are sound,\nthat fortuitous variations do not provide the material with which\nnatural selection can build up a universe of organic life like ours. We\nhave now to turn our attention to the other prop of the system and to\ninquire whether natural selection can play and does play the part which\nDarwin and his school assign to it in the economy of nature.\n\nNatural selection is supposed to depend for its efficacy on the\nexistence of a state of strenuous competition for nourishment, or\nfor the avoidance of foes, in the type out of which the favourable\nvariations emerge. But in recent times the fact of any such\ncompetition has been gravely doubted. Let us look back to the\nbeginnings of animal life in the world. The first primitive animal\norganisms found themselves swimming in a boundless sea of nourishment\nand had no foes at all! Yet they developed into higher and higher\ngrades of life. Competition did not aid in the development of these\nhigher grades\u2014it was they which ultimately created the state of\ncompetition. What Nature then achieved without competition she is\nequally able to perform now. Even now when the earth is swarming with\nvaried life competition plays a much smaller part than was taken for\ngranted in the first flush of Darwinism. Creatures of the same type but\non different grades of organization, like the hive-bee and the humble\nbee, are constantly found side by side, drawing their nourishment\nfrom the same sources, but each holding its own without difficulty.\nFacts like these were not unobserved by Darwin, who met them by the\nsupposition that competition came chiefly into play at exceptional\nperiods, during a drought, an inundation, a severe winter, or the like,\nin which the less fitted members of the race perished wholesale. But,\nas Kropotkin, in his interesting work, Mutual Aid among Animals, has\nremarked,\n\n    \u201cIf the evolution of the animal world were based exclusively, or\n    even chiefly, upon the survival of the fittest during periods of\n    calamities; if natural selection were limited in its action to\n    periods of exceptional drought, or sudden changes of temperature,\n    or inundations, retrogression would be the rule in the animal\n    world. Those who survive a famine, or a severe epidemic of cholera,\n    or small-pox, or diphtheria, such as we see them in uncivilized\n    countries, are neither the strongest, nor the healthiest, nor the\n    most intelligent. No progress could be based on such survivals\u2014the\n    less so as all survivors usually come out of the ordeal with an\n    impaired health, like the Transbaikalian horses just mentioned,\n    or the Arctic crews, or the garrison of a fortress which has been\n    compelled to live for a few months on half rations, and comes out\n    of its experience with a broken health, and subsequently shows a\n    quite abnormal mortality.\u201d[74]\n\nKropotkin\u2019s book shows good reason to believe that the principle of\nmutual aid and support plays at least as great a part in the animal\nworld as does that of mutual competition and extermination.\n\nThat the competition of organisms, animal and vegetable, for\nnourishment and for protection may favour certain types, and depress or\neven exterminate others, is of course indisputable. We see it when the\nJapanese worker and the Californian meet in industrial rivalry on the\nPacific slopes\u2014we see it when the willows planted by New Zealand rivers\ndestroy the weed which infested them, by absorbing the nourishment\nfrom the river-bed on which it lived.[75] What we have to consider,\nhowever, is the efficacy of competition in giving predominance and\npermanence to a type differing but slightly in the initial stages\nfrom that of the rest of the species, and differing but in a very few\nindividuals. We have to consider, in fact, whether natural selection is\nnot a consequence rather than a cause of evolution. On no mechanical\ntheory of evolution can we suppose that the first leaf-markings of the\nbutterfly, _Kallima paralecta_, were either at all pronounced in their\nmimicry, or that they originated simultaneously in any large group of\nthe original species from which _Kallima paralecta_ sprang. Therefore,\nwith very small advantage in the way of protection from enemies, and\nwith the constant and powerful influence of intercrossing ever tending\nto obliterate the distinctive leaf-marks, how could natural selection\nalone enable the new, the mimicking type, to assert and develop itself,\nas it has done not only in this particular species of butterfly but in\nhundreds of species of the _Lepidoptera_ and other insects?\n\n    \u201cA considerable initial resemblance,\u201d writes Mr. Beddard in his\n    most valuable though somewhat chaotic work on this subject,[76]\n    \u201cmay be fairly set down to other causes [than natural selection];\n    because it is impossible to believe that a slight move in the\n    required direction would be of sufficient importance to serve as\n    material for the action of natural elimination.\u201d\n\nThe most convinced Darwinian will hardly deny that the problem involved\nin this case is a serious one.\n\nAnother singular fact to be noted in this connexion is the \u201cconclusion\narrived at by the study of mimetic butterflies in all parts of the\nworld\u2014that the females are far more liable to assume this method of\ndefence than the males.\u201d[77] An instance in point, which has been\nthe subject of much discussion, is that of the yellow and black\nswallow-tailed butterfly, _Papilio meriones_, found in Madagascar.\nThe island is supposed to be the original home of the species, and\nhere both sexes are much alike. On the mainland of South Africa,\nhowever, while the male has undergone the very slight transformations\nrepresented by the species _P. merope_ and _P. cenea_, the females\nimitate closely three different species of the _Danais_ butterfly\nwhich is protected by its disagreeable taste from the usual enemies of\nthe tribe, and which is altogether unlike in shape and coloration to\nthe swallow-tail. \u201cThe new forms,\u201d writes Mr. Poulton, \u201chave arisen\nat so recent a date that many of the intermediate stages can still be\nseen, while the parent form has been preserved unchanged in a friendly\nland, where the keener struggle of continental areas is unknown.\u201d[78]\nThe significance of such a fact as this is obvious. If mimicry arose\nfrom fortuitous variations of colouring and of form, males alone\nmight show it in some species, females alone in others, and both in\nyet others, but it is difficult to understand how we could arrive\nat the actual condition, and find it either common to both sexes or\npractically confined to the female. If, on the other hand, mimicry\nand other similar adaptations are ultimately to be interpreted as the\ncommon response of the species to the attack of its foes, it is quite\nnatural that the female, as the egg-bearer, the most important factor\nin the continuance of the species, should be specially protected. It is\nprobable also that she is most in need of protection, as her functions\nmay render her rather more exposed than the male to attack. That\nnatural selection cannot have been the dominant factor in the case we\nare considering seems clear; for how could it have acted at all without\na somewhat vigorous weeding out of unprotected forms? And, in that\ncase, what would have become of the unprotected males of the species?\n\nDifficulties of this kind have, in different cases, been raised again\nand again since the publication of the Origin of Species, and have had\nto be answered so often that there seems good _prima facie_ ground\nfor doubting whether they have ever really been answered at all. The\nstrongest advocates of the pure mechanical theory are obliged, as we\nhave seen, to admit that the drift of contemporary scientific opinion\nis to place little reliance on casual variation and natural selection\nand to look for the driving force of evolution in other directions.[79]\nIn the introduction to Strasburger\u2019s Text Book of Botany[80] we find\nthis important passage:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe tendency is to assume the existence of a development of\n    the organic world due to original, innate capabilities of the\n    living substance and not dependent on selection. The origin of\n    the large subdivisions of the animal and vegetable kingdoms,\n    the \u2018Archetypes,\u2019 would be due to this sort of evolution. These\n    archetypes have been, and are still, continually influenced by\n    the environment, and, by their reaction to external conditions,\n    organisms become more or less directly adapted.... The progressive\n    evolution of the archetypes, as well as the direct adaptations to\n    external conditions shown by them, is independent of selection.\n    The latter does, however, exert an influence on the process of\n    evolution of the organic world, though to a much more limited\n    extent than was formerly supposed.\u201d\n\nIt is clear that in these _original innate capabilities of the living\nsubstance_ we have a power which alone _may_ fully account for the\nevolution of the organic world, though natural selection can emphasize\nand hasten its action. Its nature and limits are still undetermined.\nBiologists are very chary of expressing this power save in terms of\nchemistry and physics. Men of science are afraid\u2014sometimes I venture to\nthink even morbidly afraid\u2014of opening any door by which the fantastic\nhorde of arbitrary dogmas and superstitions which they have cast out\nwith so much toil and peril might find their way back into the temple\nof Knowledge. But philosophy must warn them that in shutting out\nall forces that cannot be weighed and measured in a laboratory they\nmay be shutting out life itself. And those who strenuously insist on\nreducing nature to a mechanism often find themselves obliged to let\nin the mysterious life-force by some more or less clandestine entry\nin order to make their mechanism work. Thus N\u00e4geli, the originator\nof the theory of heredity which Weismann has developed, attributes\nthe phenomena of growth and evolution not to natural selection but\nto \u201cinternal forces.\u201d[81] He disclaims for these forces any but a\nphysical and chemical significance; but Professor Eimer, in spite of\nall disclaimers, cannot get rid of the suspicion, well justified in\nmy opinion, that there is in these forces, as conceived by N\u00e4geli,\nsomething purposeful and teleological\u2014admit them, he says in effect,\nand who knows what we shall next be asked to believe?[82] Yet for Eimer\nhimself we find that, as Schopenhauer says, \u201cthe lotus of physics\nis rooted in metaphysics.\u201d Twice in his work on organic evolution,\nhe refers with approval to the view of \u201cour profound philosopher,\nOken,\u201d[83] who regarded all existing beings as members or organs of\nsome vast and transcendental organism whose development conditioned\ntheirs. Eimer even makes a somewhat daring application of this\nprinciple to a concrete instance in the physical world, one which we\nhave already referred to, the problem of the inheritance of qualities\nin ants, bees, etc., when these qualities are possessed and exercised\nonly by individuals who cannot transmit them.\n\n    \u201cWe must regard,\u201d he writes, \u201cthe different forms of bees, queens,\n    drones, workers, as _discontinuous organs of one whole_, which have\n    been evolved from a single indifferent ancestral form.... Only\n    thus can we explain to ourselves the fact that the peculiarities\n    of the workers, notwithstanding that they do not reproduce, are\n    inherited.\u201d[84]\n\nWhen we are asked to believe in physico-chemical laws of such a\nnature that they enable the habits of life of a worker-ant or bee to\nreact upon the germ-cells of the queen, just as the exercise of an\norgan, on Lamarckian principles, affects the reproductive cells of\nthe creature to which it belongs, it becomes plain enough that for\nmodern investigators the so-called mechanical and the so-called psychic\nconceptions of the universe are really running out at the same point.\nThe gulf between these conceptions, which seemed to yawn so widely\nafter Darwinism, was a mere illusion, arising from a point of view now\nleft behind.\n\n\nTo resume the argument of the foregoing chapters. We have seen that at\nthe basis of all theories of evolution lies the fact of the responsive\npowers of living protoplasm. _But what does it respond to?_ That is the\nquestion of questions. To put it accurately in relation to the process\nof evolution we must ask, To what do the determinants in the germinal\ncells of plants and animals respond? To what call did unicellular\norganisms respond when they first began to interchange chromatin with\neach other? To what, when they began to divide and form new organisms?\nTo what, when multicellular organisms began to specialize certain cells\nfor reproduction, and these cells to mature themselves for fusion by\nthrowing out half their chromosomes? And when the higher plants and\nanimals came on the scene, reproducing their kind under conditions\nwhich make strongly for the fixity of species, how are we to interpret\nthe response of protoplasm when we see organs and structures melt away,\nand others grow, giving rise to the innumerable types which yield us\nthe existing world with its overwhelming richness and variety of life?\nWeismann tells us that the response is only to differences in the\namount of nutriment obtainable by the various determinants of the germ\ncell, and has but a fortuitous connexion with the results attained.\nWe have seen the inadequacy of this theory, in the light of the many\nadaptations such as that of which the fish, _Anableps_, with its\nbifocal eyes, and the double sexual organs of terrestrial snails, are\ntypes. Lamarck and Darwin, besides the belief in fortuitous variation,\nheld that heritable characters arise from exercise of function.\nInnumerable cases can be quoted in favour of this explanation, but\nwe have seen instances in which it is absolutely untenable, and yet\nwhere the required response takes place just the same. The influence\nof light and colour tells on the colouring of animals, and impartially\nprotects them when they are preyed upon, or helps them to secure their\nprey; and this influence is frequently explainable by chemical or\nelectric agencies originating in the environment of the animal, acting\non the blood, and thus influencing pigmentation of the skin,[85] but\nchemistry is helpless to account for the manner in which nature shapes\nthe contour of the wing of a tropical butterfly and paints upon it\nthe veinings of a leaf, or protects a harmless fly by giving it a\nresemblance to a stinging one, or protects a caterpillar by making it\nlook like a vicious and dangerous reptile. Yet all these protective\narrangements are evidently, at bottom, facts of the same order.\nProtoplasm lives and responds not only discretely in the lowest unit\nperceptible by the microscope, but collectively in the connected groups\nof these units called multicellular organisms, and in the disconnected\ngroups of these organisms called species. It really responds not to the\nexercise of function or to the play of physical forces, but to vital\ntendencies of the organism. There seems an expansive force in nature\nwhich, though working strictly under the dominion of physical laws, is\ncapable of using the combinations brought about by those laws for the\npreservation and development of life. It is in love with life, it is\never pressing toward action and self-realization, and all roads are one\nto it if they lead to that end. In it are included the very chemical\nand physical agencies which it obeys, and also that something beyond\nwhich eludes the analysis of the laboratory.\n\nHow it acts, under what conditions, what limitations, why here in one\nway, there in another, are questions of profound interest, the fringe\nof which philosophy has hardly begun to touch. Nor is philosophy yet\nin a position to do more, for the scientific conception of nature is\nbut a recent birth of thought; much remains to do in the collection and\norganization of the facts with which the framework must be filled in,\nand a philosophy which does not keep closely in touch with scientific\nfact can have no message for the modern world. But it does seem\npossible to discern, and it shall now be our endeavour to set forth,\nin broad outline, certain principles of deep significance from which\nwe may obtain an answer to the question: What can we learn from the\nphysical universe that has a bearing on the spiritual life of man?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE DIRECTIVE THEORY OF EVOLUTION\n\n    \u201cWho is there that cannot distinguish between the actual cause\n    of a thing and that without which the cause could never be a\n    cause?\u201d\u2014Plato, Ph\u00e6do.\n\n\nThe problem set at the close of our first chapter was to find a fit\nexplanation of the guiding power apparent in natural phenomena. We\nhave not been able to interpret this guiding power either in terms of\nconscious, intelligent contrivance or in terms of blind, mechanical\nlaw. The investigations which followed have led us up to another\nexplanation. We have seen that the vivifying, transforming, progressive\npower in nature may be conceived as a power of Response. Every particle\nof matter, organic and inorganic, has this power. Every particle of\nmatter can react and respond to some stimulus. The more it can respond\nto, the higher it is in the scale of being. And we have found, as I\nthink, one constant and universal stimulus to which both the fixity of\nnature\u2019s laws and the plasticity of her mysterious substance may be\nconceived as a response. This stimulus is the call of Life. Stimulus\nand response taken together constitute the directive force in obedience\nto which the world unfolds itself in the evolutionary process. We have\nbeen led to interpret nature as the concrete expression of the will to\nlive, a will which for the first time comes into rational consciousness\nin man. Having brought this conception, I hope, into clear light, it\nis the aim of the present chapter to illustrate and enforce it in more\ndetail, and thus to gain a secure foundation for the application of\nthe conception to the more strictly human problems with which we have\nultimately to deal.\n\nIt must be confessed that the existence in nature of any directive\npower transcending and utilizing the mechanical forces and relations\nof matter, call it \u2018vital force,\u2019 the \u2018hand of Providence,\u2019 the \u2018_X_\u2019\nof evolution, or what one will, has never readily been admitted by\nscientific naturalists. They feel that, if once admitted, it offers a\nprompt and facile explanation of every difficulty, and is available as\nthe cheap resource of all those who study nature with a view to the\ngrinding of their moral or religious axes, rather than to the discovery\nof truth. Those who feel obliged to believe in the existence of some\nsuch power are therefore bound to be more than ordinarily on their\nguard against all loose thinking. They must not be content with vague\ngeneralities, but must be prepared to indicate as exactly as possible\nthe distinction existing between the mechanical and the non-mechanical\nor transcendental agencies in nature. It does not follow that one\u2019s\naccount of the matter will prove to be exactly true in every detail.\nOne must always speak in such matters with that wise reservation of\nSocrates, \u201cIf this be not the truth, something of the kind is.\u201d But it\nis not allowable to fall back on that \u201csomething of the kind\u201d until an\nattempt has been made definitely to establish the \u201ckind,\u201d by searching\ninto the inmost heart of the fact.\n\nThe fact here is the responsive power of living protoplasm. It will be\nwell to examine it first in its operation in an individual organism\nbefore we consider it in relation to the species.\n\nReaction or response of a chemical and mechanical type takes place\nalike in dead matter and in living organisms, but certain stimuli\nwill induce action in an organism which they could not possibly\ninduce in a mineral. For in every cell, as Reinke well says, there\nare a chemist and an architect who guide its energies, and who have\nsomething quite different from chemistry and physics in view. Consider\nthe following case. Every tuber of a potato plant is covered with\na light skin composed of a corky substance intended to protect the\ninternal structure from injury. This skin is produced by the action of\nthe surface cells of the tuber. Chemically and physically these cells\nare just the same as the cells in the interior of the tuber. But the\ninterior cells do not produce this corky substance, because it would\nbe injurious to the plant if they did. The cells below the surface\nof the tuber, though they are by no means secluded from the chemical\ninfluences of the earth around them, behave quite differently from\nthose actually in contact with the earth.\n\nNow let us take our tuber, slice it in half, and replace it in the\nearth again. If we look at it again in a few days we shall find that\nthe interior cells, now exposed by the cutting, have done what they\ncould not or did not do before\u2014they have produced a layer of skin to\ncover the exposed surface of the tuber just as if they had been surface\ncells from the outset.\n\nThis kind of response seems to take us quite out of the region of\nchemical and physical action as understood in the case of inorganic\nmatter. It is a response directed to maintaining as far as possible the\nlife and form of the organism, a thing which mere chemical action in\nmineral substances never does.\n\nIt may perhaps, however, be argued that the actual contact with the\nearth has a possible chemical stimulus which is not communicable to\ncells even a hair\u2019s-breadth below the surface, and that the cells laid\nbare by slicing react as they do simply because they are exposed to\nthis stimulus. Let us take, then, another common and typical case of\nresponse to altered conditions in plant life.\n\nThe taproot of a tree, as we have seen,[86] grows straight downwards\ntowards the centre of the earth in obedience to the stimulus given\nby the pull of gravitation. The same stimulus impels the stem to\nshoot upwards, and the other roots and the branches to grow more or\nless laterally. New growth always takes place at the extreme tip of\nthe shoot or root. Lay bare the taproot, cut away this growing tip,\nand that root can grow no more; no fresh tip charged with vegetative\nvitality can form itself over the scar. But mark what happens!\nThe nearest lateral root, instead of pursuing its normal course,\nstraightway begins to bend downwards and takes the place of the\nmutilated taproot. Similarly if the leading shoot of the stem is nipped\noff, the nearest lateral branch will turn upwards. In this case the\nlateral root or shoot has not been subjected to any new influences\nwhatever, or at least to none of a chemical or physical nature. Yet it\nresponds, not to anything affecting itself, but to the needs of the\norganism as a whole.[87]\n\nNone of the forces which living organisms have in common with minerals\nwill account for this kind of response.\n\nHow are we to represent to our minds the nature of the forces which\napply to the innumerable cases of which the above is a type? Reinke,\nwho deals exhaustively with this question, conceives the vitality of\nliving things, manifested in growth, development, and reproduction,\nas lodged in what he calls \u201cDominants.\u201d[88] These dominants exist\nin all parts of the organism, and govern those processes which\nordinary physical laws do not explain, _i.e._ the phenomena which\nare specifically vital. They are not themselves chemical or physical\nenergies, but they guide these energies toward the fulfilment of the\nobjects of life.\n\n    \u201cDominants,\u201d he writes,[89] \u201care those secondary[90] forces in the\n    organism whose existence we recognize in their operations, but\n    which we cannot further analyse. Thus I understand under this form\n    that principle of control which takes effect in every organism and\n    which sways whatever energies are available just as men use tools\n    and machines. Since this control is manifold in its manifestations,\n    one is obliged, when seeking for a technical designation for\n    it, to express it in the plural. The dominants are therefore an\n    abstraction; a symbol for phenomena, just like the conceptions,\n    Force, Matter, the Atom, etc.; the term has been devised in order\n    to provide a short explanatory description of certain essential\n    processes.\n\n    \u201cI therefore repel the objection, if anyone should make it, that\n    the dominants are a fiction, a troop of ghosts with which I have\n    peopled the cells and organs of animals and plants. They are, in\n    some sense, merely a paraphrase of the description of certain\n    phenomena, a personification of forces not to be ranged under the\n    conception of energy\u2014the _directive_ impulses in the animal and\n    vegetable world.\u201d\n\nTo continue Reinke\u2019s explanation: Two different classes of dominants\nare to be recognized. These are the operative and the formative. The\nformer control principally the chemical activities of the organism, as\nwhen a plant turns inorganic substances into sugar, albumen, etc.; the\nlatter are the invisible architects in the organism who control its\nform and structure. Both are heritable, and are capable of modification\nwithin certain limits. Closely bound up with matter and energy, they\nare neither matter nor energy. They can be indefinitely multiplied and\n(to all appearance) totally destroyed. Their multiplication does not\nabstract energy from other known sources, nor does their destruction\nrestore it; they do not therefore come (visibly) under the law of the\nconservation of energy. They operate entirely within the framework of\nnatural laws, and can only utilize what energies are available for\nthem at the given time and place. Every cell has its dominants; and as\nan organism is a synthesis, not a mere aggregate, of cells, so its\nindividual dominant is a synthesis of the dominants of its parts. The\nevolution of species, like the development of an embryo, is under the\ncontrol of dominants. The conditions under which they work for this end\nare material and physical; these conditions can, to a great extent, be\nascertained and defined, but the driving force lies beyond scientific\nanalysis.\n\nSuch is the conception of Reinke; and taken as he presents it, that is\nto say, merely as a kind of working hypothesis, as a means of making\nintelligible a vast and various mass of phenomena, it seems admirably\nsuited to its purpose. It remains to add, though Reinke himself does\nnot say so, that this conception of the dominants appears to harmonize\nremarkably with what has been put forward in regard to cell-structure\nand reproduction. The chromosomes are probably the material vehicles\nof the dominants; in fact, Weismann\u2019s determinants seem to be the\nsame thing under another name, though Weismann conceives them rather\nfrom the point of view of the scientist, and Reinke from that of the\nmetaphysician.\n\n\nWe have now arrived at an intellectual conception under which to range\nthe phenomena (not the ultimate nature) of vital response. Let us apply\nit to the question of evolution. The following passage from Henslow\u2019s\nOrigin of Plant Structures[91] may serve to introduce this part of our\ndiscussion:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe question ... resolves itself into this: which probability or\n    hypothesis do _the facts_ of the case seem to favour most, viz.\n    that _indefinite_ variations arise from some assumed internal\n    causes, of which variations only those in harmony with the\n    environment survive, and are said, therefore, metaphorically,\n    to be selected by it; or is it that the external forces of the\n    environment excite the variability which is inherent in plants,\n    and call into action the responsive power of the protoplasm in the\n    various species of plants, which thus _all_ tend to put on the\n    same, or similar, or at least adaptive and _definite_ variations\n    of one sort or another, so that there are _no_ indiscriminate or\n    wasted variations[92] at all? I know an abundance of facts which\n    support the latter contention, but none whatever in illustration of\n    the former hypothesis.\u201d\n\nHere is the action of the dominants in evolution placed in the\nclearest light. To prove the truth of Professor Henslow\u2019s contention\nit is necessary not only to study organisms in situations where they\nhave been established for many generations or centuries, but to see\nhow they behave on transportation to a new kind of environment. The\ncases which can be adduced are numerous and convincing. Thus Mr. D.\nDewar reported to Mr. Henslow that on introducing at Kew a cress,\n_Arabis anachortica_, found in cave-like situations in the Alps, and\nhaving very thin, papery leaves, it turned, when raised from seed,\ninto a different species, _Arabis alpina_. The change took only three\ngenerations to accomplish.[93]\n\nBulbous roots have it among their functions to store up moisture\nfor the plant they belong to. Haeckel has shown that the grass _Poa\nbulbosa_, on being cultivated in moist soil, almost lost its bulbous\ncharacter. Contrariwise we find that many plants not bulbous elsewhere\nare observed to be so when growing on the dry Karoo in South Africa.[94]\n\nSpines on a plant are usual accompaniments of dryness in soil or\natmosphere. _Ononis spinosa_ has an excessively spiny variety, termed\n_horrida_, which is found on maritime sands. Grown in very rich moist\nsituations, it gradually loses its spines and they ultimately disappear\nentirely.[95]\n\nIn the animal world experimental cultivation is not at all so easy,\nbut the facts observed all go to support the view that the response to\nenvironment is direct and definite. The small shrimp-like crustacean,\n_Artemia salina_ is a case frequently quoted. It lives in salt pools\nby the Black Sea, and it has been found that by breeding it in water\nof which the salinity is gradually decreased, the creature in a few\ngenerations assumes a type commonly assigned not merely to a different\nspecies but to a different genus\u2014_Branchipus stagnalis_.[96]\n\nPerhaps the most remarkable instance of a transformation produced\nby the influence of environment is that of the Mexican water-newt,\nAxolotl. When gradually accustomed to live on dry land, this creature\nusually throws off its gills, develops lungs, alters the shape of its\ntail, and takes on all the characteristics of a terrestrial instead of\nan aquatic reptile. This transformation does not take generations to\naccomplish\u2014it happens in one individual in the course of a few weeks\nor months. When found in the terrestrial form, the Axolotl is called\n_Amblystoma tigrinum_, and is classed among the salamanders. Its\nprogeny are then _Amblystomas_, and they do not naturally revert to the\nAxolotl type, although under certain circumstances the steps of this\namazing transformation can be retraced. The Axolotl is not a larva in\nthe ordinary sense of the word, for it is not an imperfect creature;\nit is sexually mature, and in most cases, in nature, probably never\ndevelops into an _Amblystoma_, nor do the progeny of the _Amblystomas_\nbegin as Axolotls. What we have here is probably, as Weismann plausibly\nsuggests, a case of a species which has almost reached the stage of\nevolution from an aquatic into a terrestrial form, so that a sufficient\nimpulse from its environment suffices to send it over the border.\nInternal forces have evidently prepared the way for the change, and\nthe process does not in the least resemble the mechanical selection of\nsuitable characters from a crowd of fortuitous variations.[97]\n\nThe case of the Porto Santo rabbit may also be quoted in this\nconnexion. In the year 1419 the young born of a tame Spanish rabbit\nwere put ashore on the island of Porto Santo near Madeira. No rabbits\nthen existed on the island. They have since increased enormously, and\nhave quite changed their appearance. They have acquired a peculiar\ncolour, are very small, rat-like in shape, have nocturnal habits, and\nare noted for their extreme wildness. They no longer pair with the\nEuropean rabbit. The case was observed by Haeckel, who styled the new\nspecies _Lepus Huxleyi_.[98]\n\n\nCases like the foregoing show the organism affected during its process\nof transformation by large elemental influences, and the response to\nthese influences is so familiar that often it does not surprise us. We\nveil the real mystery of the process by talking of the chemical and\nother physical properties of protoplasm which render this response\npossible. But when we come to the protective mimicry of stinging\ninsects by stingless ones, of leaves by butterflies, and so forth,\nthese physical explanations manifestly fail us. The explanation\nwhich assumes the building up of these extraordinary resemblances\nbit by bit, through natural selection working upon a multitude of\nfortuitous variations, fails us as completely. It would be difficult\nto accept it if only a single species of insect showed these mimetic\nmarkings. The unlikelihood of their production by mere chance in the\ncase not of one but of hundreds of species of butterflies, flies, and\ncaterpillars is stupendous, and defies all calculation. It must, we\nrepeat, always be borne in mind that, if chance variations are all we\ncan postulate, these variations must at first be confined to one or\nfew individuals, and that the influence of intercrossing would always\nbe at work to obliterate individual peculiarities before they could\ndevelop to the point of affording any protection worth mentioning. We\nare bound, therefore, so far as I can see, to conclude, first, that\nthese mimetic markings originate not in individuals but in the species\nas a whole, and are an expression of the communal life of the species;\nsecondly, that they are a real and direct response to the external\nconditions of danger from attacks of birds, etc., and of protection\nafforded by deceiving these foes through mimicry of something which\nthey do not care to attack. They can only originate in the dominants\nof the reproductive cells, and there, where undoubtedly forces and\naffinities of which we have no conception are ever at work, the\ninitial changes take place. These changes, no doubt, take place by\nforming new combinations or modifications of existing dominants. The\ndirective force must have something to work on. It does not follow\nthat because some things are possible to it therefore all things are.\nIt is not to be expected, for instance, that human beings, although it\nwould be a great advantage to them to fly, could ever develop wings,\nlike the conventional angels of medi\u00e6val art, for that would violate\nthe essential character of the archetypal form. It is true, however,\nthat life is ultimately responsible for the material with which it\nworks as well as the directive agency that breathes through it. This\npoint is of importance and must be made perfectly clear. The view of\ncosmic action here put forward does not contemplate \u2018interventions\u2019\nin the order of nature from a source outside it. There never was a\nmoment when, if _law_ prevailed, one result would take place, while\nanother result actually does occur in obedience to some mysterious\nlife-force. No; it is the life-impulse which makes the law, obeys it\nand utilizes it. One can never say, \u201cSuch and such would have happened\nif the life-force had not been in action, but, as it was, the event\nwas so-and-so\u201d; for if it were not in action nothing would ever happen\nat all\u2014the Universe would be the Eternal Nothing. One might as well\nspeculate as to what would happen in a game of whist if nobody held\na trump. The voluntary limitations under which nature works resemble,\nin the conception here put forward, the playing of a game, say a game\nof \u2018Patience,\u2019 where there is only one player, who plays the game with\nhimself. There are laws to be obeyed, combinations which are necessary,\nbut a guiding force can take advantage of the conditions as they arise\nand lead them to a certain end. If there were no laws and conditions\nthere would be no game. If, on the other hand, matter were absolutely\nplastic life could not realize itself; nature\u2019s game would be finished\nere it was begun. A concrete illustration may, while we are on this\ntopic, serve to suggest the kind of limitations under which nature\nseems to work.[99] During the last century or so the African elephant\nhas been ruthlessly hunted down for its ivory, and since rifles and\nexpanding bullets came into play the process of extermination has been\ngreatly hastened. Elephants are now, I believe, protected by law over\na great part of South Africa, but if it were not for this the species\nwould at present be in considerable danger of extinction. The case is\nvery like that of the _Kallima_ butterfly and similar mimetic forms\nbefore they acquired their protective markings. Now, how might we\nexpect nature to attempt the protection of the elephant? Doubtless by\nincreased fleetness, cunning, watchfulness, capacity of one kind or\nanother for concealing itself from hostile observation. But could we\nlook for any such development as, for example, a deterioration in the\nquality of the ivory? Suppose, for example, the interior structure of\nthe tusk were to become spongy and cellular instead of being dense.\nThe tusk, if coated with hard enamel, might be almost if not quite as\nuseful to the elephant, but it would cease to be of any use for most\nof the purposes to which it is now applied by man. The protection\nwould be most effective; yet we know that nothing of this kind can\npossibly take place, though intrinsically the process would be far less\nremarkable than the painting of the butterfly\u2019s wing. It cannot take\nplace because it would either imply a supernatural knowledge on the\npart of the evolution-dominants of the elephant tribe of the _reasons_\nwhy it is hunted, or a conscious supervising and co-ordinating power\nabove nature, a manlike Deity, omnipotent and omniscient, such as Paley\nassumed; to both of which explanations the actual processes of nature\nstand uncompromisingly opposed.\n\n\nIt is much easier to say what the life-impulse is not than what it is.\nI cannot, for my own part, conceive it as personal or conscious, in\nthe sense in which I feel myself a conscious person. If we ask, Has\nit or has it not the quality of intelligence? we shall find both the\naffirmative and the negative answers equally hard to square with the\nfacts. Our own intelligences working in a mysterious relation to a\nbodily organism are perhaps fundamentally incapable of forming a clear\nidea of the nature of the cosmic intelligence which is revealed to\nus in the outside world, \u201clike the dim view of a country seen in the\ntwilight, with forms half extricated from the darkness, with broken\nlines, and isolated masses.\u201d[100]\n\nBut those who find it difficult to believe that anything having\nthe nature of intelligence is at work in the physical world might\nreflect on the striking analogy which that world offers to a certain\nsphere where it is quite certain that the human spirit, including its\nintelligence as well as its appetites and instincts, is the governing\npower. Social institutions are a product of the human spirit. Yet the\ndevelopment of these institutions is extraordinarily like that of the\nfunctions and structures of an animal or vegetable organism. The value\nof Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s philosophic system may be disputed on many\npoints, but his elaborate analysis of the phenomena of social life and\nhis exposition of the minute analogies they exhibit to the processes\nof evolution in nature must always remain a landmark indicating the\nconquest of a great territory of human thought.[101] Here, as in\nnature, we find a principle of movement and progress conflicting with\na principle of inertia. We find all grades of development existing at\nthe same time. We see the gradual progression, by means of all kinds\nof by-ways, to a goal which one might have expected intelligence to\nattain simply and directly. We see parallels in human societies to\narteries, nerves, to co-ordinating and ruling brain-centres, to the\nspecialization of different members or organs for different tasks;\nand we see all these things growing up slowly, from point to point,\nin obedience to immediate and pressing requirements. We find, both\nin nature and in society, survivals of past structures, whose use is\ngone, carried forward into new stages of development. A particularly\ninteresting analogy is that of structures which develop to meet one\nkind of requirement, and, on the cessation of that, persist into a\nfurther stage and are then modified to meet quite other requirements.\nThus the swim-bladder of the fish became, it is supposed, the lung\nof the terrestrial animal. We may compare this with the development\nof municipal institutions. Originally intended to enable bodies of\ncraftsmen and merchants to make head against the aggressions of a\nfeudal aristocracy they have survived the fall of feudalism, and have\nbecome more important than ever as independent agencies for carrying on\nthe functions of social administration and education.\n\nThus, operations in the physical world which certainly do not look as\nif they were the work of intelligence, as we understand it, are seen to\nbe closely paralleled by transactions in the history of man\u2019s social\nlife. The development of life, in fact, is carried forward when the\nplane of human consciousness is reached on just the same lines as those\nwhich prevailed on the vegetable and the animal plane: there is no\nbreach of continuity in the broad outlines of evolutionary progress. It\nis difficult to over-estimate the significance of this fact.\n\nPerhaps nothing that man has evolved is so purely a work of mind as\nLanguage. Here, the analogy with the phenomena of physical evolution is\nvery close and very illuminating. As in nature, the ultimate origins\nare obscure\u2014we can only form hypotheses as to how language came to\narise from the cries of animals, as we can only form hypotheses\nhow life arose from the play of molecular forces. But when both\nare once established on the earth we see in them the same general\nfeatures\u2014unity, in a few leading types, branching out into infinite\nmodifications in subordinate groups. Greek, Erse, German, Russian,\nSanskrit are all Aryan tongues and have all a common ancestry. They\ndiffer widely among each other, but all alike are marked off from\nthe Semitic or the Mongolian families. So a man, a snake, a bear, a\nfish are all vertebrates, and belong to a type essentially distinct\nfrom that of a lobster or a snail. As in nature, we find all stages\nof development existing at the same time\u2014some lines of development\nshow a rapid advance, some a very slow one. Some types have, in both\ncases, perished completely\u2014there are fossil languages as there are\nfossil species. A new invention, an advance _per saltum_, without\nthe utilization of existing constituents, is almost as rare in the\nevolution of language as in that of species. Just as the lung is\ndeveloped from the swim-bladder, so the human mind, in the development\nof language, takes hold of whatever existing form will suit its purpose\nand transforms it to another end, as when it takes a word for \u2018breath\u2019\nand makes it \u2018spirit.\u2019 There are laws governing the development of\nroot-forms, linguistic or physical, in various different orders or\nspecies. The same osseous framework yields us in one class of animal a\nhand, in another a hoof, in another a paw, in another (as in bats) a\nwing. So in language the same root yields us the words, in different\nlanguages, for _shining_, _showing_, _speaking_, _proving_, _a face_,\n_a story_, _whiteness_. Another gives us, _young_, a _stepmother_,\na certain _musical string_, a _messenger_.[102] Contrariwise we see\nboth in nature and in language forms which have grown from entirely\ndifferent roots into a close external and functional similarity. What\nunlearned observer would suspect that a whale was not a fish, and that\nit descends from a furry land animal with four legs, or that the Latin\n_Deus_ and the Greek _Theos_ with their perfect identity of meaning and\ntheir almost perfect identity of sound have probably a widely divergent\netymological pedigree?[103]\n\nOn the other hand, the etymological identity of such words as _\u00e9v\u00eaque_\nand _bishop_ is as obscure on the surface as would probably be the\nrelationship of a greyhound with a bull-dog to an anatomist who saw\nthem only in fossil form.\n\nAgain we note that languages, like species, when they send out a\nmigratory colony, are capable of gradual transformation to meet new\nconditions, and of marked divergence from the parent stock. Thus\nEnglish, as spoken and written in the United States, in spite of\nthe retaining influence of a common literary tradition, is steadily\ndiverging from the English of Great Britain.[104] So with the French\nof Canada, the Spanish of South America, and the Dutch of the Cape. We\nnote also in both cases that curious phenomenon, the survival of the\nuseless relics of earlier structure, e.g. in the silent letters which\nreveal the historic origin of innumerable English words, which are\nparalleled in nature by the vermiform appendix of man, or the splint\nbones in a horse, or the rudimentary legs of the whale or the python.\n\nBut analogies of detail like these, interesting as they are, are not\nthe main thing. The main thing is the _organic likeness_ prevailing\nbetween the work of nature and this work of man\u2014the likeness of growing\nand developing structures, with their response to immediate needs,\ntheir development by specialization of function, their lack of a\nstrict logical scheme, their anomalies and capricious variations, and\ntheir control of these variations within certain archetypal forms. The\nsubstance of language is sound, as the substance of life is protoplasm.\nPhonetic laws govern the one as mechanical and chemical laws do the\nother. But phonetic laws and the capability of producing sound could\nnever have made a language. The evolution of language is urged forward\nby the constant pressure and expansion of human thought; and on human\nthought, in its turn, it reacts, giving the stimulus and the starting\nground for fresh expansion. We have the heart of the analogy before\nus now. _As thought acts on language so the pressure and expansion\nof the life-impulse acts on the forms of matter._ Let us see whither\nthe comparison leads us. Language is a product of the human mind, but\nnot of _a_ mind. When a human mind consciously applies itself to the\nfashioning of a language it produces Esperanto. If we were living in\nan Esperanto universe, such as Paley makes out this to be, we might\ndraw Paley\u2019s easy conclusions as to its Maker; but the reality is\nvery unlike that. On the other hand, if mind has produced the natural\nlanguages which we see, with all their anomalies, imperfections, and\nslow organic growth, then the corresponding phenomena in nature, as the\nevolution doctrine has brought them out, are evidently no bar to the\nbelief that mind has had a part in this work also. I should go farther\nand say that the facts compel a belief in the existence in nature of\nsomething that can only be described in terms of mind. In other words,\nthe universe is, at bottom, rational.\n\n\nIt is true that the cosmic Reason acts not as a single personal\nbeing, but more or less independently at a multitude of points. But\nit must not be forgotten that it is observed, up to a certain point,\nto act through groups as well as through units. Even the life and\nstructure of a single cell show us distinct parts acting in harmonious\nsubordination to the interests of the whole. An organism composed of\nmany of these cells exhibits a series of syntheses or groupings rising\nin comprehensiveness and complexity till the individual is complete and\nthe wheel of development has come full circle, beginning with a single\nunit and ending with a complex unit. But the synthetic movement of\ncosmic control does not end there,[105] for aggregates of individuals\ncan be collectively animated by it. The numerous cases of co-operation\namong animals of the same species are an instance of this. All animals\nwhich live in communities exhibit this co-operation habitually, and\nmany others do so occasionally. When Professor Eimer, as we have seen,\nreflected on the phenomena of reproduction and heredity in ants and\nbees, he was driven, like Oken, to account for them by regarding these\ncreatures as \u201cdiscontinuous organs\u201d of one being, having the same\npower of affecting each other as have the distinct, though connected,\nparts of any single animal or plant.[106] As an illustrative analogy,\nhelping us to understand the invisible bond of the communal life of a\nspecies, this conception is of service, but I hardly think that we are\nin a position at present to affirm it in any exact and literal sense.\nCan we, however, trace the analogy, as Oken did, beyond species, and\nshow anything of the nature of an adaptation of one order of beings\nto the use of another? To do so convincingly, it is evident that\nthe adaptation must be of _no_ use to the creature possessing it;\nfor, if it were, we might expect to see it evolved, whether it were\nincidentally of use to a neighbour species or not. Honey, for instance,\nthough apparently of no _direct_ use to flowers, is secreted by them\nbecause it attracts insects, and insects fertilize the flowers. If\nflowers secreted honey solely for insects\u2019 use, deriving no benefit\nfrom their visits, we should have a case of a synthesis of communal\nlife wider than that of the species. Are there such cases, or does\nevery species fight exclusively for its own hand?\n\n    \u201cIf,\u201d wrote Darwin, \u201cit could be proved that any part of the\n    structure of any one species had been formed for the exclusive good\n    of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could\n    not have been produced through natural selection.\u201d[107]\n\nCertainly it could not, but neither could other adaptations. Natural\nselection, as Darwin knew well enough, does not \u201cproduce\u201d anything\u2014all\nit can do is to depress the less favourable variations presented to\nit in favour of the more favourable ones. As Darwin never professed\nto have sounded the depths of the problem of variation, it is not\nclear why variations favourable to another species than the one in\nwhich they occur should be presumed to be impossible. It is true that\nthey would not illustrate or come under the operation of natural\nselection, but neither would they contradict it\u2014they would simply be\noutside it. Individuals unquestionably exhibit modifications intended\nnot for their own personal benefit, but for that of the species\u2014for\ninstance, the maternal instincts. The modification of a part in the\ninterest of the whole to which it belongs may, perhaps, turn out to\nhave the same essential significance whether the part is an organ\nor instinct belonging to the synthesis called an individual, or an\nindividual belonging to the synthesis called a species, or a species\nbelonging to some fauna or flora of the globe. In any case, the\nquestion where synthesis is arrested, and where the fight for one\u2019s\nown hand begins, is one of great interest and must be here briefly\ndiscussed. Cases such as those of which Darwin rejected the possibility\ncertainly appear to be rare, if they exist at all. The naturalists of\nthe older school, of course, saw them everywhere\u2014the rattlesnake\u2019s\nrattle was to warn its victims, the colouring of flowers was to give\npleasure to man, and so forth. Most of these cases have been exploded\nby modern research. The modern naturalists, however, may not be right\nin refusing to see them anywhere. The question demands much special\nstudy and observation. Reverting to the case of flowers and their\nsecretion of honey, one is struck by the fact that in the _Viola_\nfamily there exist flowers more or less conspicuous, and endowed\nwith scent and with honey-filled nectaries, which usually do not\nplay any part at all in fertilization. The process of fertilization\nin _Viola_ is carried on by small flowers hidden under the leaves\nwhich never open, and which fertilize themselves. Again, at the base\nof the laurel leaf, on each side of the midrib, there are two small\nglands filled with honey, and bees may be observed biting into these\nin the early part of the year before flower-honey is plentiful.\nN\u00e4geli has an ingenious argument to show the existence, not exactly\nof disinterested aid among species, but of something which would make\nsuch aid look more possible than it does, of a mutual responsiveness,\nnamely, between the form of the honey-receptacles of certain flowers\nand the probosces of the insects which frequent them. Taking a short\nhoney-tube as the normal and original condition among plants, and a\nshort proboscis among insects, he argues that the honey-tube could\nnot have lengthened without depriving the species in which it did so\nof the chances of insect-fertilization unless the insect-proboscis\nin certain species lengthened _simultaneously_.[108] Cases also have\nbeen noticed of sea-anemones, which attach themselves to the shells\nof hermit crabs and by their poisonous tentacles repel attacks on the\ncrab.[109] The crab is no doubt useful to its guest by providing it\nwith the means of locomotion. Still, the case of mutual help between\ntwo such different orders of beings is remarkable. A very peculiar case\nis that of the waterfern, _Azolla_, which has certain roomy cavities\non the underside of its leaves. These are always found to be occupied\nby a small unicellular organism of the _Alga_ order (_Anab\u00e6na_). It\nis of no apparent use to the _Azolla_, which provides it a home. The\narrangement must have been of immensely long standing, for it occurs in\nall the four species of _Azolla_, one of which is found in America, two\ndistributed over Australia, Asia, and Africa, and one only in the Nile.\nIt must, therefore, have arisen before the original species split into\nfour.[110]\n\nIt would be rash to conclude from these and some similar curiosities\nthat we are really in the presence of the phenomenon of disinterested\naid given by one species to another. The question needs more\ninvestigation. But an important general consideration arises in this\nconnexion. It is clear that there could be no advance in evolution if\nnature consisted solely of a multitude of independent units of life,\nfiercely competing against or warring with each other. It is equally\nclear that no advance could take place if every organism found an\nenvironment so perfectly adapted to it as to call for the very minimum\nof effort and strain in the maintenance of life. Between the chaos of\nthe first supposition and the lubberland of the second there must be a\ncondition of nature in which synthetic organization is carried just to\nthe point at which life will have the maximum power to perfect and to\nrealize itself. Looking at the conditions of nature as we know them,\nand at the majestic expression of material and spiritual life which\nthose conditions have permitted, we may well be content to believe\nthat both the synthetic process, as far as it goes, and its _apparent_\nsuspension at a certain point in the ascending scale, are the outcome\nof one and the same motive and have one and the same significance\u2014they\nboth alike mean and make for the conservation, the development, the\nenrichment of life.\n\n\nAgainst this view there is an argument which has hitherto only been\nglanced at, but which must now be discussed in more detail. It is\nrepresented in a recent work by Prof. Conrad G\u00fcnther, one of the latest\nchampions of the theory of chance variations and natural selection\nas the sole explanation of evolution, who has assembled a number of\ninstances to show that the \u201cpurposive force\u201d which biologists are now\ncoming to believe in \u201coften fails in living beings.\u201d Such are, for\nexample, the fact that an _Am\u0153ba_ seeking nourishment will take in a\nparticle of stone or anything that comes in its way;[111] that the\nmutual relations of flowers and insects are often unsuitable; that a\nbee will sting a human being just as it will another insect, although\nthe sting, only meant for the latter kind of use, cannot be withdrawn\nfrom the human skin; that embryos often go astray during development;\nthat a cricket which tries to escape in the open by burying itself\nin the earth will act similarly if you set it on a glass plate; and\nso forth. Nature, of course, teems with such cases\u2014one might add the\nsingular degeneration of the slave-making ants already described in\nsome detail.[112] \u201cIf,\u201d he concludes, \u201cthe purposive reaction in\nthe vital force of animals were independent of the external world,\nthey would be armed against all contingencies, and that is not the\ncase.\u201d[113]\n\nThus, too, Prof. Eimer, who in dealing with cases where the alleged X\nfactor in Nature has gone wrong, writes:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe zoologist can hardly accept the existence of such a\n    dominant inner factor ever pushing toward advance, when he recalls\n    the host of regressive structures which he has to see.\u201d[114]\n\n\nNow when the cause of physico-chemical _versus_ vital agencies comes to\nbe tried, not in the laboratory but in the study, not by science but\nby philosophy, the first question that will be asked is, What, then,\nis your distinction between \u2018vital\u2019 and \u2018physico-chemical\u2019 energies?\nHow are we to recognize when we are in presence of the one or of the\nother? The usual answer to this searching question is that in vital\nagency we find a directive, a purposeful, a psychic element, whereas\nphysico-chemical energies seem to be nothing but the play of a blind,\nindifferent mechanism. But, it will be rejoined, how can any one affirm\nthat physico-chemical energies are not also vital, directive, psychic?\nIs there not, in fact, something psychic in the very conception of\nenergy? To these questions there seems to me no conceivable reply. When\na \u2018vital\u2019 energy has been reduced to a \u2018physico-chemical,\u2019 we have\nevidently explained nothing\u2014we have only exchanged one mystery for\nanother.\n\nYet if there is no difference in essential nature between one kind\nof energy and another, there does appear a marked difference when\nwe come to consider them in relation to particular results of their\noperation. Let us take an example. We explain that classic instance of\ngravitation, the fall of an apple, by reference to the law formulated\nby Newton which extends to every particle of matter in the visible\nuniverse. But we also find that the fall of the apple is, for apples,\na necessity of life; if the seed did not fall to the ground when\nripe there would be no more apple trees. Yet gravitation acts quite\nindifferently to the life of the apple. Whether the branches overhang\na river, or a street, or a plot of fertile ground, the apple will fall\nstraight towards the centre of the earth. The fulfilment, therefore,\nof the vital needs of the apple is plainly a by-product of the force\nof gravitation. In this relation, gravity has no directive or psychic\nelement. Yet in larger relations, we have to take note of the fact\nthat if there were no such thing as gravity, there would be no apples\nand no earth. Thus the law of gravitation is a condition of life as we\nnow know it. The fact that it acts mechanically, without selection or\npurpose, in relation to particular occurrences is quite consistent with\nthe view that it, or the conditions of the ether from which it possibly\narises, may be directive and psychic in relation to life as a whole,\nor rather to what we recognize as the manifestation of life in the\nmaterial universe.\n\nWe have now got hold of a valid distinction between mechanical and\ndirective agencies. We can distinguish them not by their nature but\nin relation to the particular phenomenon we are considering. We call\nthem mechanical where that phenomenon is a by-product of the agency,\nand directive where, if the agency were conscious, we should say that\nthis was its main intent. I can see no more fundamental distinction. It\nfollows from this that the same action can be at once both mechanical\n(physico-chemical) and directive. The old distinction between vital and\nmechanical energy disappears. The question resolves itself simply into\nthat of the number of distinct agencies which are deemed necessary to\naccount for the universe.\n\nNow the true way of dealing with this problem of the unity or\nmultiplicity of agencies in nature is, I would suggest, to assume the\nexistence of a single power which is of course psychic and directive\nbut which can only be communicated to matter by degrees and under\ncertain conditions still very obscure. These conditions it itself both\ncreates and uses. Its development in Time and that of matter go on,\nas it were, on parallel paths, eternally apart (to our limited view)\nyet eternally inseparable. The key to the course of its development\nin nature lies in the word Synthesis.[115] Here we seem to have the\nexplanation of the apparent difference between the so-called \u2018vital\u2019\nand the physico-chemical forces. When matter has been so grouped as\nto form not a mere aggregate of particles but a synthesis, then that\nsynthesis is enabled to make use of energy in a manner not open to\nits parts. Synthesis is a condition of the discovery of liberation\nof unsuspected forces. Thus a synthesis of molecules produces the\nstage for Life, a synthesis of living particles produces the Cell,\na synthesis of cells produces an organism, a synthesis of organisms\nis a species\u2014for the evidence (most notably that derived from the\nconsideration of bee and ant communities) seems to show that material\ndiscontinuity in the members does not preclude the existence of a true\nsynthetic union.[116] The characteristic power gained by a species\nis that of evolutionary development working in the obscure region of\ngerminal combination and variation. Of course, I am aware that all this\nis merely a way of representing facts so as to make them intelligible\nto and manageable by the mind. If any one should object that we do not\nknow what kind of grouping a synthesis is, except precisely through\nthat very organic activity which I have described as its product or\naccompaniment, I entirely agree. All these terms are intellectual\nforms\u2014like atoms, molecules, and other concepts of physics. They do\nnot reveal anything; they merely help us to comprehend. In the region\nof the controversy of Vitalism _versus_ Mechanism, the conceptions\nwhich I have been trying to explain enable us, without introducing\na multiplicity of different energies, to understand how an organism\nsynthetized by life may exhibit directive action which looks entirely\ndifferent from any action possible in dead matter. Yet it works under\nlaws of its own, and no doubt the particles of such an organism, if\nthey were conscious, would be unaware that any but physico-chemical\nprocesses were in operation; in fact, I should have no hesitation in\nagreeing with the statement with which the great physiologist, Verworn,\nconcludes an exhaustive analysis of this obscure subject: \u201cThe general\nfact must be regarded as established, that all the work of the organism\nis based finally upon chemical energy.\u201d[117] But what directs the\nchemical energy? Something which is not itself a chemical energy and\nwhich is associated with the organic synthesis which that energy serves\nto maintain. Verworn\u2019s statement, it must be borne in mind, is as true\nof the composition of the Iliad as it is of the digestive process of an\nanimalcule.\n\nThe explanations above suggested are purely tentative; but so, it must\nbe remembered, are the theories which they combat. No one pretends\nthat the mechanical explanation of the universe, including the\nphenomena of organic life, is at present made out so as to cover the\nknown facts, or even that expert opinion is at all unanimous in the\nbelief that it can ever do so.\n\nI know no single work in which the present position of the controversy\nis so well set forth as in Professor V. L. Kellogg\u2019s Darwinism\nTo-day.[118] A great array of scientific authorities will there be\nfound mustered, and the verdict of Professor Kellogg (reluctantly\ngiven, for he clings to the mechanical explanation of the universe)\nis that evolution is not explained by any mechanical force at\npresent known to science. \u201cWith Osborn,\u201d he concludes, \u201clet us join\nthe believers in the unknown factors in evolution.\u201d[119] He does\nnot, however, contemplate their remaining unknown\u2014we have to say\n_Ignoramus_, not _Ignorabimus_; and by \u2018known\u2019 he means apparently,\nreducible to a mechanical process. He will have nothing to say to\nany internal force directing the energies of matter, such as the\n_Vervollkomnungsbewegung_ of N\u00e4geli.[120]\n\n    \u201cSuch an assumption,\u201d he writes, \u201cof a mystic, essentially\n    teleologic force, wholly independent of and dominating all the\n    physico-chemical forces and influences that we do know, and the\n    reactions and behaviour of living matter to their influences\n    which we are beginning to recognize and understand with some\n    clearness and fulness\u2014such a surrender of all our hardly won actual\n    scientific knowledge in favour of an unknown, unproved, mystic,\n    vital force we are not prepared to make.\u201d[121]\n\nThe above passage is very well fitted to be the pivot of the whole\ncontroversy. We shall examine it therefore in some detail.\n\nIt is, in the first place, hardly correct to say that the _X_\nfactor in life and evolution is supposed by thinkers like Driesch,\nReinke, and N\u00e4geli to be \u2018wholly independent of\u2019 and to \u2018dominate\u2019\nall the physico-chemical forces that we do scientifically know.\nMan, for example, cannot be said to be \u2018wholly independent\u2019 of the\nphysico-chemical energies of which he makes use for a multitude of\nobjects. He is very dependent, both on those outside him and those\nin his own organism. He cannot _originate_ the smallest quantum of\nphysical energy. Yet he is unquestionably capable of directive action\nupon matter.\n\nIn the second place it must be pointed out that the _X_ factor,\nconceived as it is in this book, though Prof. Kellogg may call it\n\u2018mystic\u2019 if he likes, is certainly anything but \u2018unknown.\u2019 There is\nnothing more mystic than the human spirit\u2014does not mysticism mean the\nattribution of spiritual significance to material things?\u2014but there\nis nothing more real and certain. The very act of knowing, however\nmaterial or mechanical may be the object of knowledge, is an act of the\nspirit, and we know the spirit itself better than anything else. How\ndid this spirit come into active being? There are only two conceivable\nways. Either it was at a certain moment projected into the universe\nfrom without by a Supreme Spirit, or it was, like everything else,\nevolved. If we accept the former view we may say good-bye to science.\nMiraculous interventions will explain anything, and if we admit them in\none case they may be valid everywhere. But if we take the second view,\nas do practically all men of science, we are bound to admit that spirit\nhad from the beginning some constant and natural relation to matter,\nfor evolution does not work miracles\u2014it cannot make something out of\nnothing. If, then, we regard Man not as an outside observer of the\nuniverse but as an organic part of it\u2014and I believe no thinking about\nnature can be of any value until we have grasped and fully realized\nthat position\u2014then there can be nothing to surprise us if we find\ntraces of a directive control in the elementary processes of life and\ndevelopment. It would be more surprising if we did not. If we reduce\nthe whole universe, apart from the human spirit, to physico-chemical\nprocesses we are at once confronted with the problem of evolving the\nhuman spirit out of such processes; and that, on the face of it, is a\nsheer impossibility. All physical and all chemical phenomena as such\nare reducible to the movements and groupings of atoms and molecules.\nThese movements and groupings can affect the spirit which finds itself\nmysteriously implicated in their activity, and the spirit can affect\nthem. But that molecular movements can _create_ spirit is unthinkable\nby any one who realizes what spirit is and what movement. Rather should\nwe say that in the power of movement, in action, change of any kind, we\nare to see the evidences of spirit.\n\nWe are now in a position to discuss the difficulty raised by Eimer and\nby G\u00fcnther, when they point to instances where the supposed psychic\nforce in nature has failed to achieve its end. It fails because,\non its mechanical side, it sometimes encounters obstacles which on\nthe psychic side were not provided for. The law of gravitation is a\ncondition of life, but it will kill a man who falls over a precipice.\nThe adaptability of protoplasm is a necessary condition of evolution,\nbut circumstances will occur in which the adaptation means degeneracy\nfor the organism as a whole. Eimer\u2019s argument is good, indeed,\nagainst the mythological conception of a supreme Creator, perfect in\nprescience and in power, who orders the goings-on of the universe\nfrom his throne above and outside it. But we seek for no such being\nin natural phenomena. Perfection is no attribute of anything that\noperates in Time, and so far as we regard the divine life as working\nin Time we must regard it as becoming, not as being, perfect. Again,\nEimer\u2019s objection shows that he conceives the psychic force against\nwhich he is arguing as in itself something mechanical, a mechanized\nkind of vitality, which ought to achieve its end with a flawless\nexactitude. Of this, also, nature knows nothing. The universe is what\nit is precisely because the Power behind its phenomena is neither blind\nChance on the one hand nor rigid determination on the other\u2014because it\nis vital, progressive, and free. This power is certainly capable of\nmaking imperfect adaptations and of diverging into false side-tracks\nof development. That is a fact of much significance, but it is no\nargument against the existence of such a power\u2014it merely reveals its\ncharacter. A special study of regressive structures and of the laws and\nprinciples which lead to them would have extreme interest, both for\nbiology and for philosophy. But it could not affect the significance of\nthe broad fact that, in a world where the highest living being was once\na particle of shapeless protoplasm, we have now Man, a being lamentably\nunfit, indeed, to be the last birth of Time, but uniquely great by his\nvery consciousness of that unfitness.\n\nIn contemplating this wonderful ascending movement let us not forget\nthat the warrant for its continuance rests in ourselves. The false\ntracks, the regressive forms, which meet us in nature prove at least\nthis: that the line of development which we observe on earth may\nconceivably end in a disaster which would bear to the course of Life\nin general just such a relation as the degeneration of the Amazon\nants does to life on this globe. We are by no means entitled to sit\nstill and expect that the current of evolution will bear mankind along\nirresistibly to its goal. With the development of the conscious will\n_we_ are made responsible for the advance of life in the only sphere\nwhich we know and which our actions can affect. Man is, as it were,\nthe growing-point of that progressive life. If his strange passion\nfor the perfection which he has never seen should be smothered in the\nstruggle for mere existence, or corrupted by brutal luxury, then growth\nwill be at an end, atrophy or degeneration will set in. The vision of\na nobler, freer, more humane life than is anywhere widely possible on\nearth at present cannot be realized without the strenuous help of men\nand women who have learned to subdue the Ego with its fierce egotisms\ninto harmony with the purposes of the divine Whole. But this much we\nmay say\u2014that they will not fight alone. No one ever pursued a high and\nworthy aim without finding that he had drawn to himself those \u2018great\nallies\u2019 of whom Wordsworth has written so greatly; powers implicit\nin the nature of the world, and always waiting to be unlocked by the\nheroic Will.\n\n\nThe Power, some of whose workings it has been attempted to trace in the\nforegoing pages, is a controlling and directive force, making, through\ncountless varieties of being, for one clear and definable end\u2014the\nrealization of life. It may be asked, Are we to regard this divine\nPower as wholly immanent in matter or as partly transcending it and\ngoverning it from without?\n\nThe nature of the divine principle, so far as we are able to discern\nit, cannot be fully discussed until we come to consider it in the\nhighest sphere of manifestation yet known to us, that of the human\nsoul. But with the question which has just been raised we are now in\nsome measure able to deal, and the consideration of it may bring this\nsection of our study to a close.\n\nIn the world of inorganic matter, the tendency of units to form\nthemselves into groups having relation to other groups is already\nvisible. A force immanent in the atom clearly becomes transcendent _in\nrelation to the atom_ when atoms group themselves into molecules. And\nwhen molecular affinities come into play, and obey definite laws of\nform, as in the wonderful phenomena of crystallization, we see that\nthe force immanent in each molecule becomes transcendent, as regards\nthe molecules taken separately, when we look at them from the point\nof view of the completed group. Crystallization is a process which\ntrembles on the very verge of vital action. And in vital action the\nalternation of immanence and transcendence in an ever-ascending scale\nbecomes still clearer and more significant. Every cell is a collection\nof forces controlled by a power which transcends each one of them, or\nany number of them below the whole. Every cell colony, like the _Alga_\ndescribed in an earlier chapter,[122] has a life which is immanent in\nthe colony but transcendent as regards its component members. Definite\ngroups of cells make up the structure of the highly organized plant\nor animal, and exhibit the same combination of forces immanent in the\nparts and transcendent, as regards those parts, in the whole. Again,\neach whole, each individual, is moved by life-impulses immanent in\nitself but transcendent in so far as they represent the communal life\nof the species to which it belongs. This communal life of the species\nbecomes immanent again when we regard it as embraced in the life of\nthe totality of beings on the globe. The thought must at once occur,\nas the ascending series passes out of reach of man\u2019s intelligence:\nWhither, then, does it lead us in the end? Is there any end? And is our\nknowledge of Being absolutely limited to those parts of it which lie\n_beneath_ us?\n\nWe are, I think, able, without going beyond the limits of observation\nand experience, to frame a synthesis of all physical nature, and to\nexpress its character in terms of Life and Response. But at the next\nstep we have to embrace man with his moral nature, his intelligence,\nhis personal consciousness, and there may for aught we know be beings\nfar higher than man who must also be included. Now here we are not only\n_in_ the synthesis and therefore unable to grasp and survey it, but we\nare also quite unaware of its contents and limits. We ask, Is the All\nof Things personal? is It conscious? has It a manlike intelligence? and\nso forth, and I confess I see no way of answering these questions with\nour present capacities. We can only say\u2014but this is much\u2014that as the\nuniverse is one, the part of it which we do not see cannot stand in any\nessential contradiction to that which we do.\n\nFurthermore we must remember that since, in that aspect of us which\nobserves and studies, we are distinct personalities, we are obliged, in\nso observing and studying, to regard things as outside of ourselves.\nThis is the core of the whole difficulty. At bottom, the relativity\nof human knowledge does not depend on the fact that time, space, and\ncausality are, as Kant has taught us, modes of thought imposed upon\nour \u2018I,\u2019 with nothing external answering to them; it goes deeper,\nit depends on the ultimate fact that I _am_ an \u2018I,\u2019 and _therefore_\nseparate (as such) from what I observe, and _therefore_ only capable\nof studying my own states as affected by external things, not the very\nthings themselves. Real knowledge, then, must consist in getting out\nof this prison of \u2018I\u2019-hood and entering into actual union with what we\nobserve. Could we do that, we should at once live not in our \u2018selves\u2019\nbut in the Whole. The question then is, whether it is ever possible so\nto escape, and how?\n\nWe must note, however, that no one who has done this could ever tell\nus precisely what he has done. For the moment he begins to put his\nexperiences into an intellectual form, the laws of the mind reassert\nthemselves, things externalize themselves again, the \u2018I\u2019 reappears, the\ngulf yawns again between subject and object.\n\nAnd yet the instinctive language of man shows that he does regard\nit as possible to _lose himself_ in the contemplation of something\ntranscending his powers of ordinary intellectual apprehension. Why\nshould he not? If a transcendent Reality exists, as it must, then the\nfaculty of entering into conscious relation with it is one which Time\nwould surely some day bring to birth.\n\nAnd although no man, as I have said, can ever express to other minds in\nterms of the intellect the reality he has thus witnessed, he has found\nmeans to do better than this\u2014he can help them to share his vision.\nThese means we call Poetry, Art, and Religion which is the poetry of\nEthics. Through these it is that man most truly lives, because united\nin spirit with a larger life than his \u2018self\u2019 and his senses are aware\nof. Through them it is that while the eye sees the sunrise, the spirit\nsees the glory, that while the intellect apprehends Truth, the soul\nis ready to die for it, that while self-interest bands men together\nin communities for mutual service, Love prompts to the services that\nwill never be recompensed. We are not then, it seems, absolutely\nimprisoned in our \u2018I,\u2019 strait as the bonds may seem. But this must be\nadded, that they will never seem so strait as when we fancy that we can\nget out of them by any purely intellectual conception of the Ultimate\nReality. \u201cGod,\u201d says \u00c6schylus most nobly, \u201cis the Air, God is the\nEarth, God is the Heavens; yea, God is all things, and That which is\nabove them.\u201d[123] There is always a \u2018beyond\u2019 for the explorations of\nthe intellect. The function of the intellect is to combine and reduce\nto order the experiences of sense, thus guiding us with definite aim\nthrough the bewildering wonders of life. But let us not dream that\nit can ever guide us to any goal or terminus. The goal is at once\ninfinitely distant and nearer than our breath and blood. The search\nfor it will last as long as Time. It is of the essence of the view of\nthe universe here put forward that the intellect can never embrace it\nin any closed system of thought. Turn as we may to one after another\nof these closed systems as each grows out of harmony with advancing\nknowledge and insight, the true conclusion, at least for readers who\nhave followed these pages with assent, will be to stand cheerfully\nready to renounce all systems, trusting in the last resort to no\nformulas, but to the play of eternal Powers on the imagination, the\nheart, the will:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThey bring none to his or her terminus or to be content and full,\n    Whom they take they take into space to behold the birth of stars,\n      to learn one of the meanings,\n    To launch off with absolute faith, to sweep through the ceaseless\n      rings and never be quiet again.\u201d[124]\n\n\n\n\nPART II: ETHICS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nLAW, FREE WILL, PERSONALITY\n\n    \u201c\u2014\u2014And this main miracle that thou art thou,\n    With power on thine own act and on the world.\u201d\n\n                                        Tennyson.\n\n\nThere is, according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, a question lying at the\nroot of all ethics, a question which must be \u201cdefinitely raised and\nanswered before entering on any ethical discussion.\u201d[125] This is \u201cthe\nquestion of late much agitated, Is life worth living?\u201d[126] I confess\nthat this question does not seem to me at all a radical or pressing one\nin comparison with another of which Mr. Spencer, in his Data of Ethics,\ntakes no account whatever\u2014the question whether we have any real choice\nin the way we ought to live so as to make life of value, or in other\nwords whether there is an \u2018ought\u2019 in the business at all. Can any man\nregulate his own living? Is he not, even while he lives and thinks,\n\n    Rolled round in Earth\u2019s diurnal course\n      With rocks and stones and trees,\n\nas much a helpless victim of external forces as they are? Does the\nrealm of natural _law_ extend to human actions and volitions; and if\nso, must it not be an illusion to suppose that these can possess any\nethical quality whatever?\n\nA great deal of the perplexity attaching to the old problem, how to\nreconcile human free will with divine predestination and omniscience,\nhas, it seems to me, been carried forward quite needlessly into the new\nproblem of the reconciliation of free will with the reign of natural\nlaw. The problem in the old form which occupied Milton\u2019s rebel angels\nhas scarcely any meaning for modern thought. Human actions are a part\nof the world of phenomena, existing in time and space. When we think\nin that sphere of things we conceive the Deity as the synthesis of\nall things, and as the intellect can never arrive at this synthesis,\nit follows that we can never represent the Deity in terms of the\nintellect. An infinitely wise, infinitely good and powerful Being _has\nno definable relation to the phenomenal world at all_. Therefore there\ncan be no question either of reconcilement or of opposition between\nthe attributes of each. God has not planned beforehand the course of\nthe world because (speaking in this sphere) God _is_ the world\u2014past,\npresent, and to come; and His being is in process of completion by\nthe world\u2019s development. In another sphere, behind the veils of space\nand time, of causality and of sense, resides the Eternal Beauty, the\nEternal Wisdom, the Eternal Love, approachable indeed by those who\ncome to it \u201cas a little child,\u201d but evading the questionings of the\nintellect.\n\nBut the modern problem of Determinism and Free Will has meaning enough\nfor us all, without bringing any transcendental relation into the\nquestion. Let us state briefly the position of the Determinists. It\nis held by them that every human thought\u2014in fact, every mental change\nwhether of the nature of volition, thought, or emotion\u2014is a necessary\neffect of certain antecedent causes, just like every change in the\nmaterial world. Every act of will is, on this view, the mechanically\naccurate resultant of two forces: (_a_) the particular nature of the\nman who wills; (_b_) the circumstances which supplied the occasion for\nthe volition. It would seem to follow from this that no man can be held\nmorally accountable for his actions. Were we sufficiently acquainted\nwith his nature and with the course of external circumstances, we could\npredict his action throughout his whole lifetime as surely as we can\nforetell an eclipse. He is what he has been made by the circumstances\nof his life acting on the whole mental and temperamental make-up which\nhe inherited from his parents. He does good or ill as a tree bears\ngood fruit or bad according to its nature and to the treatment it has\nreceived.\n\nThe old theory of Free Will, which was content to declare that each\nman\u2019s choice in any ethical situation presented to him by life was not\nimposed on him by the will of a Deity but was _his own_ choice, thus\nmaking him responsible to God and man for his acts, evidently requires\nto be restated in view of the conception of scientific Determinism\njust described, which does not seek to impose on man the will of any\nother personal being. But when we come to restate it, the distinction\nbetween Free Will and Determinism appears to be by no means so clear\nand intelligible as it seemed at first sight. The essence of the\nDeterminist theory is simply that the same man will always, under the\nsame set of external circumstances, act in exactly the same way. But\nhow far does the advocate of Free Will really deny this? Imagine a man\nwhom we regard as a type of honour and integrity, a General Gordon, for\ninstance, in the position of being offered a bribe to betray a trust\nreposed in him. We are quite assured that he would reject it, and that\nhe would reject it again and again to the end of the chapter. So long\nas his mind and character remained unchanged, his action would never\nvary. Was his will therefore not free? And if so, how do we distinguish\nits freedom from scientific Determinism?\n\nWe shall find that while the statement of the Determinist position is\nquite easy and simple, the statement of Free Will, the explanation of\nwhat we really mean when we talk of the will being \u2018free,\u2019 is, when we\nlook closely into it, a matter of much intricacy. Believers in Free\nWill, says J. S. Mill in his essay \u2018On Social Freedom,\u2019 are those who\n\u201cbelieve, in fact, that they themselves can, within certain limits,\ndo what they please.\u201d[127] This is, indeed, the answer which comes at\nonce to the lips of the average man when Socratically interrogated as\nto what he means by Free Will. But the nature of the limits is just\nthe critical part of the question. I cannot fly because I please. I\ncannot write a line of poetry because I please. Can I live a saintly\nlife because I please? Perhaps not, it may be replied; but after all\nFree Will does not essentially mean the external fact of doing, it\nmeans the internal act of choosing\u2014let us substitute the word \u2018choose\u2019\nfor the word \u2018do\u2019 and see what we arrive at. Very well, then; I can\nchoose what I please: let us try this formula. But at once we perceive\nthat this is a tautological expression, for what I \u2018please\u2019 to do is\nsimply what I choose. So the formula is finally stripped to this bare\nexpression, \u2018I can choose.\u2019 But now the Determinist will say, \u2018Who\ndenies it?\u2019 The psychological process known as \u2018choosing\u2019 is within\nevery one\u2019s experience. The question as to what governs the choice\nremains untouched. The core of the problem, then, has been found to\nlie not in the word \u2018do,\u2019 not in the word \u2018please,\u2019 not in the word\n\u2018choose.\u2019 Where is it then? It is not in \u2018can,\u2019 for \u2018I can choose\u2019 adds\nnothing philosophically to the contents of \u2018I choose.\u2019\n\n_The core of the problem is the word \u2018I.\u2019_ And until we have settled\nwhat \u2018I\u2019 am, we shall not reach a clear issue between Free Will and\nDeterminism.\n\nSo the test which we have applied to human actions with a view to\nfinding out whether they conform to law as do physical phenomena or\nnot\u2014the test, namely, whether they always come out the same under the\nsame circumstances or not\u2014breaks down. The \u2018circumstances\u2019 include the\nman himself, and the question \u2018What is a man?\u2019 turns out to be the real\npoint at issue.\n\nThe Determinist usually belongs to a school which has a clear and\nsimple answer to this question. Man, for him, is a complex of vessels,\nnerves, ganglia, and molecular configurations of brain matter\nresponding to external stimuli as uniformly and inevitably as a plant.\nConsciousness is merely a sort of by-product of this mechanism, which\nwould go on just the same without it.[128]\n\nBut this view is in direct contradiction to the deepest and clearest\ndeliverance of human consciousness, which affirms that I am a\ndeliberative and ruling Mind, and bids me regard my Will as Reason in\naction. I seem to know this so intimately and profoundly that if it\nis an illusion there appears to be nothing else in the world of which\nI can ever venture to feel sure. We know the outside world only at two\nremoves. The external object has first to impress itself in some as yet\nunexplained manner on our physical organism, and the latter has then\nin a manner equally mysterious to produce a state of consciousness in\nthe observer. But consciousness, in Man, can turn upon and interrogate\nitself; it is subject and object in one; and its deliverances, so far\nas they go, so far as they are pure deliverances of consciousness with\nno argumentative deduction subtly mingled with them, are the truest\nthings we know or ever can know. I do not see how they can possibly be\nbrought to the test by any other kind of knowledge: _they_ are the test\nof everything.\n\nWe find, then, that when we talk of \u2018free\u2019 choice as the prerogative\nof man what we mean at bottom is the choice of a self-determining\nMind. We find, also, that while for every event in the physical world\nwe are obliged to assume an antecedent cause, we are under no such\nobligation as regards Mind. When we have traced any sequence of causes\nand effects up to a Mind, we require to go no further. We can conceive\na self-determining Mind. If man is such, or so far as he is such, his\nwill is what we call free.\n\nBut to say that we are profoundly conscious of the existence of our\nwill does not by any means get rid of the difficulties connected with\nthis belief, and it is incumbent on us either to attempt a solution of\nthem or frankly to dismiss them as, for the present, insoluble.\n\n\nIf possible, to begin with, we must obtain a clear idea of the\ndifference of the will from other forms of vital action.\n\nAt one end of the ascending scale of organic life we see an animalcule\nswimming in the direction in which it is attracted by food. At the\nother end, we find a man in the full flush of conscious life going\ndeliberately to a shocking death rather than deny his faith or break\na trust. What is the essential difference between the action of\nthe animalcule and that of the martyr? To the Determinist there is\nnone. Both are alike the inevitable response to certain stimuli from\nthe outside world acting on a certain nervous system. But there is\none difference in the _circumstances_ of the action which will be\nadmitted by all. The animalcule has no _choice_. The martyr has. The\nanimalcule-consciousness has not been developed to the point at which\nit can take in alternative courses of action and compare them with\none another. It is doubtful to me whether any of the lower animals or\neven of the lower races of man can really do this. At any rate there\ncan clearly be no Will where there is no distinct consciousness of\nat least two possible courses of action. The Will, therefore, must\nbe regarded as coming for the first time into action when a certain\nstage in the development of consciousness has been reached, the stage\nat which man is fully conscious of more than one motive. Furthermore,\neven when the consciousness has been developed to this point we cannot\nrecognize a true act of will unless, _on that particular occasion_,\ntwo or more motives were fully present. For instance, a lad brought\nup in a thieves\u2019 kitchen, when he sees an opportunity for stealing a\npurse, cannot properly be said to have any counter-motive to the theft.\nAnd common sense, without having philosophically analyzed the matter,\nquite recognizes this position of affairs and graduates the moral\nresponsibility of every criminal action roughly in accordance with the\nfacilities which the subject has had for \u2018knowing better.\u2019\n\nTwo or more motives, then, fully present to consciousness, form the\nconditions under which alone the Will can be said to act. This is in\naccord with the whole scheme of evolution. The presence of certain\nconditions gradually evokes the faculty or organ which deals with them.\nBut here an important question arises. When these motives differ from\neach other morally, can the Will be said ever to choose the evil one?\nHas it any moral bent? And if not, what is the use of it?\n\nThere is no doubt that the ascription to the Will of a certain moral\ncharacter, and that a very lofty one, is characteristic of nearly\nall thinkers who accept its existence at all. \u201cIll for him,\u201d writes\nTennyson in lines of Sophoclean dignity,\n\n            \u201cWho, bettering not with time\n    Corrupts the strength of heaven-descended Will,\u201d\n\nas though evil came from the corruption and slackness of Will, not from\nits wrong direction.\n\nIn the ethics of Plato it was a cardinal principle that men did evil\nonly through ignorance. Make the soul conscious of goodness, and\nit could not fail to follow it. Yet it seems that this doctrine,\nstrongly as it appeals to the moral sense of man, would, if held with\nphilosophic rigour, really make the Will unfree. No man can truly\nchoose the good who is unable to choose the evil. The Platonic doctrine\nmay, however, be fully accounted for, and even put in a form in which\nit can, to a great extent, be justified, if we give weight to the\nfollowing considerations. Moral action is usually recognized in the\nrenunciation of a strong personal gratification for the sake of some\nsocial or other altruistic end. Now in such cases we are always sure\nthat the two motives have been duly present, the moral motive, for\notherwise it would not have been followed, and the personal motive,\nfor these are common to all living things, they are at the base of our\nbeing, and our own experience tells us only too well how insistent\nand powerful such motives are. The volitional character of such an\nact is therefore manifest. But if the lower motive be followed, the\nsignificance of the event is more obscure. For we all understand these\nlower motives,[129] and they are fairly uniform over the whole of\nhumanity. We can always take for granted that they are present in full\nforce. The martyr undoubtedly hates the idea of being burnt. But we are\nnot so sure of the other class of motives. We cannot in every case feel\ncertain (unless the event has verified it) that _they_ were distinctly\nin view, for man\u2019s moral nature is still only at the beginning of its\ndevelopment, we are still far from having evolved anything like a\nuniversal moral code, not to speak of the instincts for obeying it. We\nare inclined to assume, therefore, and I think we are perfectly right\nin assuming, that when the Will appears in human action it is far more\noften to good purpose than to evil. In order that it may be free to act\non any ethical question, there must be a sufficient degree of ethical\ndevelopment; the character of moral worth must have been impressed upon\nthe spirit. In the strength and stay which it affords to such a spirit,\nthe faculty of Will is most clearly recognized and honoured.\n\nWe are now in a position to meet one of the gravest of the objections\nwhich have been brought against the doctrine of Free Will. If\ntemperament and circumstance, it is urged, determine human action,\nthere is, of course, no place for the Will\u2014it is a mere illusion.\nBut if Will is present and is supreme, how can temperament and\ncircumstance play the part they manifestly do\u2014how does the history of\nman come to present, as we have seen, an aspect so strikingly similar\nto that of the orderly evolution of physical organisms under natural\nlaw? If you bring in Will at all as an arbiter of human action, do you\nnot thereby drive out everything else?\n\nThe answer will be clear to those who accept the foregoing analysis of\nthe elements of choice. The Will is neither a faculty of perception\nnor a faculty of judgment, but a power of free choice. Free as it\nis, _it can only act on what is presented to it_; and here, beyond\nquestion, it is subject to serious limitations. Every man has round\nhis soul, as it were, a refracting medium, through which the external\nobjects that excite the Will to action must normally pass before they\nreach the centres of decision and control. And this medium is probably\nnever quite the same in any two individuals. Often it is very widely\ndifferent. The sight of an unguarded heap of treasure may appear to\none man simply in the aspect of a perfectly legitimate opportunity for\nenriching himself. To another man it may come as a violent temptation\nto do what he knows in his soul to be wrong. A third, equally needy,\nequally capable of enjoying all that wealth represents, may never have\na thought on the subject except that of protecting the treasure for its\ntrue owner. The object is the same, the physical perception of it is\nthe same, but the \u2018apperception\u2019 in each case is as different as Peter\nBell\u2019s perception of the \u201cprimrose by the river\u2019s brim\u201d was from that\nof Wordsworth. This difference is caused by the modifying influence\nof temperament, training, all that forms a man\u2019s disposition, whether\nacquired or inherited. It is as though each man moved in an atmosphere,\nan _aura_ of his own which colours all the objects of his thought.\nWhether _every_ invitation to action that can be presented to the Will\nmust necessarily pass through this _aura_ is a very obscure question\nand one on which I do not at present wish to dogmatize. But it is\ncertain that the great majority pass through it.\n\nThus on every occasion where the Will is exercised, it has to act not\nonly on the facts which are perceived but _as_ they are perceived. Now\nso far as the influence of what is called apperception is concerned\nwe are in the realm of natural law. Each man, to that extent, is\nunquestionably under the dominion of his environment, that is to say of\ngeographic, historic, social, and other influences which affect whole\ncommunities, and which vary but slowly when they vary at all. The Will,\nin fact, acts within the framework of nature and its laws exactly as\ndoes that directive agency to which, in the view of the writer, is to\nbe attributed the phenomenon of progressive evolution from lower forms\nof life to higher forms, that is, from forms which admit of less life\nto those which admit of more. The Will is really this directive agency\ncoming into consciousness in Mind.\n\nIn all life, whether human, animal, or material, there is an element\nof change and an element of constancy. Between these poles it moves\nand has its being, nor could life, as we know it, exist for a moment\nif either of these two opposing but complementary principles were\nwithdrawn. We have now seen that with a full belief in the innovating\nand incalculable quality of the Will, with the infinite vistas which\nthat belief opens up to human hope and effort, there is yet ample room\nfor the opposing and equally necessary element in life, the element\nof constancy, uniformity, law. Human Will does not come into nature\nas a catastrophic force\u2014it develops _pari passu_ with the development\nof consciousness; and it will naturally be found in its highest\ndevelopment where the whole nature is most wholesomely attuned to the\npurposes of the cosmic Will.\n\n\nWe have now to notice certain grave objections which every student\nof modern science and philosophy will expect to see dealt with by a\ndefender of the principle of Free Will.\n\nIt has been objected from the evolutionist standpoint that, as no\none attributes Free Will to the lower forms of animal life, it is\nimpossible to conceive it as having arisen in man except by a miracle.\nAt what point, it is asked, did it first appear? And if one cannot\nfix the point, the presumption is supposed to be that it has never\nappeared at all. It will be remembered that some scientific thinkers\nsuch as Mr. A. R. Wallace, and one may add Prof. Reinke, have been so\nmuch impressed by the mental difference between man and the beasts that\nthey have assumed the gulf to have been bridged by a catastrophic or\nmiraculous act and not by any evolutionary process.\n\nNow I quite admit that one cannot conceive mind being evolved from\nnot-mind. But neither can I conceive life being evolved from not-life,\nnor, in fact, when one looks into the process minutely, can I believe\nin anything whatever, physical or spiritual, turning into something\nelse. I conceive the evolutionary process strictly as the \u2018unfolding\u2019\nof latent capacities, faculties, organs, by means of psychic agencies\nacting within the framework of the fixed relations which we call\nnatural law. The fact that one cannot lay one\u2019s finger on the exact\npoint in the history of nature where mind and will began to be is not\nrelevant to the question whether they are now present or not. As well\nmight one be challenged to fix the moment when the embryo becomes a\nman. There are _no_ such exact points in nature. If there were, nature\nwould be discontinuous, and the smallest real discontinuity in nature\nwould be enough to shatter the frame of the universe.\n\nFrom another side it has been urged that the conception of the\ncontinuity or oneness of the universe is fatal to Free Will. The\nMonist, according to that brilliant champion of chaos, Mr. William\nJames,[130] must believe in a universe fixed like cast-iron in all its\nparts, for, being all interrelated, not one of them can be different\nwithout altering the whole structure of things.\n\nBut does not Mr. James here overlook the fact that essential oneness\nis not incompatible with temporal incompleteness? The universe is one,\ntrue\u2014but this one universe comprises not only all that has been and\nthat is, but all that will be. It is to be conceived at present as\na growing organism; it will not be a fixed and completed whole till\ntime is at an end. On this basis I see no difficulty in fitting into a\nMonistic scheme of thought Mr. James\u2019s admirable statement of the Free\nWill position:\u2014\n\n    \u201cOur acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make\n    ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we are\n    closest, the parts of which our knowledge is most intimate and\n    complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value? Why may\n    they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places _of the\n    world_\u2014why not the workshop of being where we catch _fact_ in the\n    making?\u201d[131]\n\nThe next and last objection I propose to deal with cuts closer to\nthe heart of the question and will have to occupy us, I hope not\nunfruitfully, for some time.\n\nI instanced some time ago the case of martyrdom as one in which every\none would recognize the action of the Will, if it can be recognized\nanywhere. Let me recall that extremest form of martyrdom which John\nStuart Mill once declared himself ready to face rather than outrage\nhis moral sense. Speaking in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton\u2019s\nPhilosophy of what passed in his day for the \u2018orthodox\u2019 conception of\nthe Supreme Being he wrote:\u2014\n\n    \u201cWhatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing\n    which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I\n    will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that\n    epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me\n    to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.\u201d[132]\n\nMill, as we see, relied on his personal freedom of Will to stiffen\nhis neck against any homage to a Power whom his moral sense declared\nunworthy of reverence. But a modern physiologist would tell him\u2014and\neven if the fact be not fully demonstrated at present, it would,\nI think, be very rash for any psychologist to deny it\u2014that by a\nslight change in the molecular configuration of the brain cells the\nheroic recusant could have been turned into a devout worshipper of\nany being who was able to exhibit the credentials of superior force.\nSuch a change would certainly not be beyond the powers of a being who\nhad heaven and hell at his disposal; even a skilful surgeon might\naccomplish it. What, then, is the freedom of the Will worth (it may\nbe asked) if the direction it takes is at the mercy of the physical\nconfiguration of our brain-matter? And the \u2018I\u2019 which, we say, wills\u2014if\nmaterial changes can thus profoundly alter its character, how can we\nattribute to it any kind of real and independent existence? Must not\nthe complete dispersal of the molecules of the brain at death cause\nthe \u2018I\u2019 to vanish altogether like a blown-out flame? Must it not be at\ntheir mercy during the brief illusion of existence?\n\nOur discussion has thus plunged us into the intricate question of the\nrelations of mind and matter, and we must pause to dwell on it for a\nwhile.\n\nWhat is matter? Nobody can tell. It is that which resists when we\npush against it\u2014a tactile or muscular sensation. It is that of which\ntwo portions cannot occupy the same space at the same time\u2014a visual\nsensation. It is the source of certain sensations; and the most recent\nphysical investigations points to its being composed of innumerable\ncentres of _force_. But force manifesting itself in orderly and\nharmonious fashion is Reason. If, then, Reason is at the base of\nthings, Matter ceases to be a bogey.\n\nStill the fact remains that it is not I and it is not You, and the real\ncogency of the physiological argument against Free Will and the soul\n(which, as we saw, must stand or fall together) is that something done,\nperhaps by mere accident, to this Not-me, can, it appears, powerfully\ninfluence and change the Me in spite of all the will I can exert to the\ncontrary. The fact that I, the innermost I, can be got at through my\nbrain, means philosophically exactly the same as the old superstition\naccording to which I can be got at by an enemy who sticks a waxen image\nof me full of pins and dissolves it before a fire. And _normally_\n(there seem to me good reasons for not going further than that),\n_normally_, it is _only_ through Matter that the Me can be reached and\ninfluenced at all, even by the other Me\u2019s in the universe. Now Matter,\nwhatever else we may say about it, is certainly under the law of\ncausation.\n\nFrom the other, the spiritualistic, side of the argument, it has been\nsought to meet the above considerations by an interesting analogy.\nMatter (the brain in this case) may, it is urged, be regarded as the\ninstrument by which, under present conditions, Thought manifests itself\nand acts. You can take a piano and put it out of tune or otherwise\ndamage it, so as to render it incapable of conveying the real mind of\nthe performer, who, nevertheless, remains quite unaffected. The soul\nis the invisible performer. You can damage the brain so that the soul\n_can no longer express itself_ under the conditions of our present\nexistence, but it is an entirely unwarrantable inference to say that\nyou have thereby damaged or destroyed the soul itself. The analogy of\nphysical energy will make this clear. You can make an engine work by\nthe oxidization of coal, but this process can only loosely be described\nas the source of the energy which is manifested by the engine. All that\none does by burning the coal is to turn potential energy into active or\nkinetic energy. When the engine goes to pieces, or the coal burns out,\nnot a particle of energy is lost; it merely goes back into the shape of\npotential energy again.\n\nI think this reply is substantially a sound and effective one. At the\nsame time it must be allowed that the physiological argument is more\nsubtle than is usually recognized by those who try to meet it as above.\nYou may so damage a piano as to render it incapable of being properly\nplayed on\u2014you may get from it the incoherent janglings of insanity,\nwithout affecting our belief in the existence of a real musician\nbehind these unintelligible manifestations. But how if it can be shown\nthat certain mechanical alterations will result, not in nonsense but,\nlet us say, in bringing out mere Offenbach when the performer has\nalways hitherto been wont to play Beethoven? A simple injury to the\ninstrument, it may justly be argued, has no such vital significance as\nthis change in the nature of the thing expressed. Shall we not have to\nconclude that the man really _is_ the instrument, that the mind is a\nphenomenon accompanying the temporary combination of certain material\nconstituents, lasting only as long as that combination shall endure and\nvarying _pro tanto_ with everything that causes it to vary?\n\nNow, for my own part, I must confess that if mind with all its nobler\nmanifestations such as Will, Love, Duty, and so forth, be a mere\nrainbow hovering above the cataract of material force, it does not seem\nto me worth while to discuss anything, for we, mere particles that\nglimmer for a moment, can never affect anything, and must soon be where\nnothing can any longer affect us. It is happily quite true as Santayana\nsays in his Reason in Science,[133] that people who do not think about\nthese matters at all may \u201cknow how to live cheerily and virtuously for\nlife\u2019s own sake\u201d on the strength of the normal source of vitality which\nhas made for its own ends from the beginning of things without the aid\nof our consciousness or criticism. But this consciousness, turning\ninward as well as outward, this questioning and speculative spirit,\nare themselves forms of vitality, phases in the gradual conquest of\nNothingness (_i.e._ undifferentiated Being) by Life. We stunt and maim\nourselves if we try to keep them aloof. It is true that in encouraging\nthem we may often seem to be turning the terrible, two-edged weapon\nof Analysis against our own higher life. Be it so! We have taken that\nsword in hand; we have cut down with it a hundred forms of superstition\nand wrong; and the time to sheath it is not yet. Whatever dangers there\nmay be in it, we must face those dangers; and though it may be left to\nanother generation completely to overcome them, let that generation,\nat least, say of us that we did not drop our weapons on the field of\nbattle, even if our own life-blood sometimes flowed upon the blade.[134]\n\nLet us now return to that analogy of the piano and the unseen player\nand see if we can get some more light from it than has yet appeared. In\nview of the last considerations which were urged in this connexion\u2014the\npossibility of effecting not merely the ruin of the instrument but\nthe more vital change of the character of the music it will perform,\nwe must slightly alter one of the terms of the comparison. The analogy\nwill be a strikingly close and suggestive one if we bring into view\nthe latest development in musical mechanism, the pianola. Suppose that\nthe music-rolls of a pianola were made of different sizes and shapes\naccording to the different classes of music. There would then, let\nus say, be one kind of roll for classical music, another for Italian\nopera, another for Palestrinian polyphony, another for music-hall\nditties, and subvarieties of all these. Now let us suppose that\neach pianola were so constructed as to take some particular type of\nmusic easily, other types with more difficulty, and others, again,\nnot at all, and let us assume that all these types are continually\nbeing presented for performance. The construction of the pianola\nwill then correspond to the physical constitution of the brain.\nThis constitution, in each case, is the material equivalent of the\ndominance of a particular kind of personality, or what we have called\nabove _aura_. But the records which have lately been so much studied\nof cases of what is called \u2018multiple personality\u2019 tend to show that\nin each of us there _are_ several distinct personalities\u2014or if that\nword seems to beg an important question as to the unitary character of\npersonality, let us say streams of consciousness\u2014which are pressing\nfor manifestation. The brain selects automatically among these,\nand normally keeps one particular type to the front. But just as a\nmechanical alteration in our hypothetical pianola might entirely change\nthe type of music it would play, so a lesion or shock of any kind might\nchange, more or less, the type of personality which a particular brain\nwas fitted to express; and such cases are, of course, well known to\noccur.\n\nBut now we come to a fact than which none is better known, none\nmore absolutely verifiable in experience, but to which there is\nnothing in the least analogous in the pianola or any other piece of\nmechanism taken by itself. I can, with time and toil, with patience\nand resolution, _change the structure of my brain_ and make easy\nfor it that which before was difficult or impossible. Within limits\nwhich cannot be defined (because human life is too short), I can even\nadapt it to the expression of a new type of personality. No musical\ninstrument can do that to itself. One would have to call in for that\npurpose the initiating and controlling force of the man who made\nit.[135]\n\nA conscious pianola, even if we supposed it to possess the endowment of\nmemory, would only recognize itself as a succession of sensations. The\nhegemonic faculty, the sense of command and control, which Plato[136]\nlaid his finger on, as indicating the difference between a human\npersonality and a musical mechanism, and which Hermann Lotze,[137] in\nthe full light of modern science, still thought valid for the same\npurpose, would be wanting. Man does not live in the moment. As Goethe\nwrote in some of his greatest lines\u2014lines that read like hammer-strokes\nnailing up the charter of human right:\u2014\n\n    Nur allein der Mensch\n    Vermag das Unm\u00f6gliche;\n    Er unterscheidet,\n    W\u00e4hlet und richtet;\n    Er kann dem Augenblick\n    Dauer verleihn.[138]\n\nBehind the mechanism of the pianola, behind the mechanism of the brain,\nthere stands this living directive force of which we can give no\nscientific account whatever\u2014we can only say that it is there. Indeed,\nit is just at this point that all comparison between mechanism, as\nusually understood, and vital action of any kind must break down. But\nthe fact is that mechanism is usually not understood at all. I spoke\nabove of a piece of mechanism taken by itself. But in truth we cannot\ntake it by itself. Nothing in nature can be truly isolated, it only\nexists in relation to other things. Every machine has a soul, the soul\nof the man who made or who works it. Without that it would be merely\nscrap-iron; and even as scrap-iron it has relations with things about\nit\u2014air, water, acids, and the like. In these relations we detect the\nsoul of nature. Nothing exists by itself\u2014nor even, permanently, _as_\nitself. The living universe of our experience is not a Being but an\nActing and a Becoming. It is precisely this fact which, on the one\nhand, imposes a mysterious limit on the intellect, and, on the other,\nopens a boundless horizon before the will.\n\n\nThe human brain, the most highly organized form of protoplasm known to\nus, may be called in one sense a machine through which the personal\nwill, the moral emotions, the \u00e6sthetic sense, the faculties of\nreasoning, have to assert themselves in action. But to say that they\nwould never have existed but for this special form of protoplasm is to\nsay that they were created by it out of nothing. And, no doubt, one\ncan say that, one can _say_ anything; but one cannot think it. I do\nnot see how to represent the matter to our thought except by supposing\nthat every stage in physical evolution is accompanied by what has been\ncalled \u2018involution,\u2019 a drawing in, from the potentialities of Being,\nof powers and faculties of living for which the opportunity to become\nactual had ripened.\n\nAn image may make clearer what I mean, and I offer it only for this\npurpose, well knowing that \u201cthe best in this kind are but shadows.\u201d\nSuppose that a man were enclosed in a sheath composed of metal having\ncertain peculiar properties: it is opaque when cold, but when heated\nit becomes transparent, and the hotter it is the more transparent it\ngrows. Such a substance might easily exist, at any rate it is entirely\nconceivable. We must assume in addition that the heat is not such as\nto be injurious to the occupant. Now a man enclosed in such a sheath\nwould, when it was at the proper temperature, see what was going on\naround him; he could also be seen, he could hold communication with\nother men, and direct operations which he wished carried out. If the\nsheath, in addition to being transparent at the right temperature,\nwere also, under the same conditions, flexible, and fitted him like a\nskin, he could do things himself. If it got cold, however, and thereby\nbecame, in the measure of its coolness, opaque and rigid, the man\nwould be shut off from all communication or interaction with the world\noutside, he would be what we call dead.\n\nI suggest that Consciousness with all its attendant phenomena is\nrepresented by the man, the sheath is Matter, the heat is Life. Matter,\nhistorically, precedes the manifestation of consciousness, but as it is\nnever without a certain degree of life, so, even in the nebular form in\nwhich it exists before it has cohered into worlds and systems, it is\nnot without the element of directivity, of harmonious inter-relation\nand interaction. A higher organization of life makes possible the\nsubtler sensitiveness of the vegetable kingdom. The most vital, the\nmost highly organized form of matter we know is the human brain and\nnervous system. Here the sheath has assumed a considerable degree of\ntransparency and flexibility. But doubtless a far higher degree of\norganization is possible, and when this is reached the capacities of\nconsciousness will have developed to an extent altogether inconceivable\nto us at present, though every now and then some exceptionally\nconstituted individual gives us a hint of stages of development as yet\nfar beyond the capacities of the race in general.\n\nWe may conceive matter, then, as being constantly fanned up into the\nheat of life, _i.e._ as elaborating forms into which consciousness can\nenter and through which it can act. And we observe that consciousness,\nwhen it has found a suitable form, can act on it and improve it. Two\nquestions now arise. The first is: Why should consciousness have need\nof these forms at all? And the second is: If it has this need, what\nbecomes of the individual consciousness when the form has grown\nfinally cold in death and is resolved into its inorganic elements?\n\nTo the first question I cannot suggest any answer, except the obvious\none that an individual consciousness must have some forms through\nwhich it can have relations with things not itself. In the world, as\nwe have it, it is _generally_ true\u2014it would be unwise to venture any\nabsolute statement on the subject\u2014that consciousness only enters into\nrelation with another consciousness, or with matter, by means of the\npeculiarly organized form of matter which we call a brain. I must leave\nthe question there. Thought and research, and the advance in physical\norganization which I have referred to, may, in the near or distant\nfuture, throw further light upon it. It is not a difficulty, but it is\ncertainly a mystery.\n\nAs regards the second question, that of personal immortality, all\nwe are justified in concluding on the negative side is that when a\ncertain body and brain have perished, consciousness can express itself\nthrough _that_ form no more. But consciousness itself cannot be less\nindestructible than everything else that exists. We may, so far as I\ncan see, either conceive an individual consciousness at death as being\nresolved into the general consciousness from which it sprang, even\nas the matter composing any organic being is resolved into inorganic\nmatter, or we may suppose that, having won and consolidated its\nselfhood by what it has done and what it has endured in the flesh, the\nselfhood is thenceforth capable of an independent existence under forms\nat present beyond our ken.\n\nEither of these conceptions implies what we call the \u2018immortality\u2019 of\nthe soul, the real and permanent significance of the experiences of the\nsoul. Here a little further elucidation may be desirable. I have spoken\nof the possibility of the soul or self being resolved into something\nwhich one can only describe as a general spiritual substance related\nto individual souls as matter in general is related to particular\nmaterial organisms. But the parallel with matter must not be pushed\ntoo far. A material organism, being composed of different substances,\ncan be disintegrated. But consciousness cannot, strictly speaking,\nsuffer disintegration, for it has no different substances into which\nto disintegrate. It can, however, as we see, appear in the form of\na number of different personalities; and this, the normal existing\ncondition, is the psychical analogue to physical disintegration.\nIf these personalities are again to merge into one impersonal\nconsciousness, the process would not be comparable to disintegration;\nit would be the very reverse; it would be reintegration; and the\nprocess, therefore, implies nothing resembling the loss or dissipation\nof any form of psychic being.\n\nFurther, we have to observe that when a material organism perishes\nand is disintegrated, there is, so far as we can see, an utter and\ncomplete end of it. The human brain, for example, quite apart from its\nassociation with a consciousness, has in the course of its development\nand activity gone through a marvellous chain of processes, in which\nelectric and molecular force, undulations, radiations, and probably\nother physical factors of which we have no conception at present,\nhave played a part. Yet when the brain dies and is resolved into so\nmuch ammonia, phosphorus, carbon, gases, and what not, these elements\ndiffer in no whit from other ammonia, phosphorus, and carbon in the\nworld. For any ulterior purpose they are neither better nor worse;\nthey are wholly unchanged, by all the extraordinary history which\nthey have passed through under the spell of life. This is equally\ntrue of the elements, nervous and other, of any living being. But the\nphysical system of every living being below man is organized for two\nends only: (1) the upkeep, during its lifetime, of its own physical\npowers; (2) the reproduction and multiplication of its kind.[139]\nWhen an organism has fulfilled these functions, it is justified; the\nobject of life has been attained. These functions, of course, persist\nin man, but he has added to them many others; his brain has to serve\nhim for ethics, art, philosophy, religion, and is therefore organized\nwith a subtlety quite unknown in the animal world. Here, then, is a\nkind of organic action which has no significance whatever _except in\nrelation to consciousness_. If it have none there it has none at all,\nit is absolutely irrational and futile. Now the molecular and other\naction of a beast\u2019s brain has reference to its physical life, and it\npasses on this physical life to its descendants. But the action, or\na great part of the action, of a man\u2019s brain has reference to his\nconsciousness, and of this he passes on at most the potentiality. A\nlion\u2019s cub is a lion; a philosopher\u2019s child is not necessarily or even\nprobably a philosopher. That path of development, whatever we may say\nabout the lion, must have its goal elsewhere. We must, if the universe\nis not irrational, believe that in some way consciousness, whether\nafter the death of the body it persists in individual form or not,\n_carries forward into the new state the results of its experiences,\nits acquisitions, its losses, in the bodily relation_. These are not\ntransitory, not indifferent; \u201cgreat or small they furnish their parts\ntoward the soul.\u201d\n\n\nThe reader will have probably noticed that one consideration of the\ngreatest moment has been left untouched. I have spoken of matter and\nconsciousness as of two separate things, and of the former as prior to\nthe latter. This is a form of thought imposed upon us by the space and\ntime relations by which our being is conditioned. But it is evident\nthat the interaction of the two cannot be fortuitous. We cannot suppose\nthat matter pursued its long course of evolution, refining and\nsubtilizing at every stage to admit more and more of the activity of\nconsciousness, in total disconnexion with that consciousness. The two\nmust be co-ordinated in some higher synthesis. Could we escape from the\nlimitations of our thought we should see them, therefore, not as two,\nbut one, and we should see that the meanest form of being has an aspect\nin which it belongs to eternity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE ETHICAL CRITERION\n\n    \u201cThings have life\u2014God is life.\u201d\u2014Spinoza.\n\n    \u201cI am come that they may have life, and that they may have it more\n    abundantly.\u201d\u2014Rabbi Bar-elahin.\n\n\nThe view of the meaning and purpose of cosmic development set forth in\nthe preceding chapters must clearly have a bearing on the principles\nof human conduct. Men above a certain stage of culture do not live\nby blind instinct. They endeavour to harmonize their lives with\nsome conception of the _ratio essendi_ of the world in which they\nfind themselves, and in so doing they are most truly men. The Stoic\nexpressed this attempt in the simple formula, \u2018Live according to\nNature.\u2019 But nature is not simple, and the endeavour to interpret\nnature has led to some very divergent ideals of human conduct.\n\nEvery one who has meditated on the subject at all has become\naware that the world which we see and hear and feel, the world of\nsense-perception, is not all that we have to do with. Behind the\nvisible and material world there lies the invisible, the _X_ world,\nwhich we cannot weigh and analyze, but the existence and potency\nof which we are compelled to assume. It is the literal truth to say\nthat no man can take a single step even in the most mundane and\npractical affairs of life without a belief, implicit or explicit, in\nthe spiritual unity and reality underlying the fleeting panorama of\nsense-impressions. Nothing else can give him any assurance of the\nconstancy, the orderly inter-relation, of the phenomena with which he\nhas to deal, and with which he could not deal intelligently did not\nthis constancy exist. Now when man begins to be aware that there is\nsomething more in the world than is immediately apparent to sense,\nhis thinking on the subject may take several different lines, but it\nis probable that all of them may be referred to one or other of two\nmain divisions, the Dualistic and the Monistic.[140] The Dualist will\nregard the world of sense-perception, whether originally produced and\norganized by the invisible or not, as now more or less independent of\nthe latter, or even hostile to it, and he will generally interpret\nhis own being as something properly belonging to the invisible world\nbut for a time mysteriously and unhappily entangled, through the\nflesh, with the other. This is Platonic theology, carried by Paul into\nChristianity, and it eventuates, when driven to its conclusion by a\nrigorous and inhuman logic, in Asceticism. Instead of the Stoic, \u2018Live\naccording to Nature\u2019 (a formula in complete harmony, it may be noted,\nwith the Stoic Pantheism), we get, as the formula for ideal conduct,\n\u2018Deny Nature, think the flesh a burden and a shame, fit yourself for\nthe time when your real self will cast it off as a filthy garment.\u2019\n\nOn the other hand the Monistic view represented in ancient Europe by\nthe great Stoic school, and in modern times by names such as those of\nSpinoza, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Walt Whitman, refuses to separate\nthe visible and the invisible worlds. The former _is_ the latter, made\npartially accessible to our minds. Man is a part of nature, bound\nup in all his being with the framework of the Universe. The flesh\nis not a bond on the spirit but an instrument of life, and what we\nacquire through it is just as valuable and as eternal as anything\nelse. \u201cObjects gross and the unseen soul are one,\u201d says Whitman\u2014the\ndistinction between subject and object, the perceiver and the\nperceived, as Schopenhauer argues, is but a mode of cognition.\n\nThat the human mind can rest only in some kind of Monism, that Dualism\nmust be regarded as a natural but a passing phase of thought, based on\na hasty interpretation of certain aspects of man\u2019s moral experience,\nwould seem to follow from what has been urged previously from the _a\npriori_ side of the question.[141] Indeed, it may be doubted whether\nthere are any thinkers who seriously maintain the Dualistic view as\na philosophic doctrine. Many, however, including the whole school of\nCatholic theology, with its ascetic ideal and its doctrine of eternal\nhell, turn practically Dualist in the sphere of ethics, while they\nwould be horrified at a suspicion of anything but the purest Monism in\ntheir conception of the ultimate reality of being. The cause of this\ninconsistency is evident. We feel instinctively that no distinction in\nthe world of our present experience goes deeper than the distinction\nbetween moral good and moral evil. We feel the danger of obliterating\nthis distinction, and setting loose the greedy and violent passions of\nman to work their will unchecked by any sense of right and wrong. And\nundoubtedly the Monistic principle might, by a shallow interpretation\nof it, be held to obliterate the distinction. If God is One, it\nmight be argued, and God is All, then evil is justified in the world\nequally with goodness, and the sense of duty is, what shall we say? an\nillusion, a superstition, a relic of fetishism. Hence the practical\nDualism on the ethical and eschatological side which has found its\nway into Monistic thought. It is brought in to save morality. But\ninconsistencies like this do not last for ever; they can only persist\nwhere thought has become atrophied, and Dualism is now rapidly\ndisappearing from the religious thought of Europe. What is to take its\nplace? The problem before us is to discover a basis for ethics on the\nMonistic hypothesis without the slightest acceptance of the facile\nsolutions offered by Dualism. If we succeed in that, and establish a\nreal Monistic meaning for the terms _right_ and _wrong_, we shall next\nhave to deal with the sanction of the law of righteousness, and to show\n_why_ it should be obeyed even, if necessary, at the cost of pain and\ndeath.\n\n\nAnd first, let us unreservedly admit that on the Monistic view the\ndistinction between right and wrong, moral good and moral evil, is not\nfundamental. Both must be regarded as moving towards comprehension in\nsome unity as yet unimaginable by man. Without renouncing his faith,\nthe Monist can never escape from that position, and he must be true\nto the light whatever the apparent consequences may be. A greater\nPower than he will look after the consequences: \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\nBut, on the other hand, this distinction may be just as real and vital\nas any other in the world of experience. Nobody thinks that pleasure\nand pain are indifferent because they are both necessary forms of\nactive life, or that beauty and ugliness are indifferent, or that\nsuccess and failure are indifferent. How we strain for success in a\ngame, for instance, although we are perfectly well aware that the game\nis the real object, not the triumph! Yet without the possibilities of\ntriumph or defeat, there would be no game. The problem is really part\nof the primal mystery of the origin of cosmic life. If we assume at\nthe beginning of things (so far as we can conceive a beginning) one\ninfinite, homogeneous, absolutely undifferentiated Existence, and then\nconceive this Existence as impelled to act, and to become conscious of\nitself, it is plain that to do so it must differentiate itself. There\nmust arise within it the relations of subject and object, simple and\ncomplex, better and worse, and all that is involved in change, variety,\nprogression. And this applies as much to the moral life as to the\nlife of the senses. It has often been pointed out that if there were\nno Wrong to strive with there would be no visible and active Right.\nWere there no hate, love would be incapable of the noblest part of its\nministry. Were there no weakness, strength could never have been called\non for the strain by which it is developed. And if good should ever\novercome and absorb evil the stage thus attained will assuredly reveal\nsome new contrast of pursuit and avoidance perhaps as strange to us now\nas moral distinctions would be to the lower animals.\n\nThe Monist will also urge that nature, as we behold it, is not a\nfixed and rounded entity, but is something in process of completion.\nWe must therefore interpret nature not alone by its contents at any\ngiven moment, but by its drift and tendency. This is precisely the\nconsideration which separates Pantheism as enlightened by science from\nthe Pantheism of a primitive nature-worship. In it, the Greek and the\nHebrew ideals are blended and reconciled.\n\nBut what, for ethical purposes, _is_ this drift and tendency? What\nsignificance do I mean to attach to the terms moral good and moral\nevil? It is hardly necessary to say that I do not propose in a couple\nof chapters of one short book to elaborate an ethical system with all\nits groundwork, and with details ramifying into every branch of ethical\naction, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has essayed to do in his Data of Ethics.\nAll I can do here, or in any section of this book, is to indicate a\n_way_ of looking at things\u2014at nature, at human life, at art\u2014in which\nthe meaning of the universe has seemed to become intelligible and\nsatisfying to my own thought. Having found the way, every one must use\nit for himself or herself. I can, in the present work, go no further\ninto detail than is necessary to make my meaning clear; to set whatever\nreaders I may find at my point of view. If I can at all succeed in\ndoing this, let them use their own eyes: they will find a wonderful\nlandscape, vital, fresh and boundless, opening before them.\n\nThe conception of ethical law which I wish to put forward differs\nfrom what is commonly understood as evolutionary or scientific ethics\nat the present day. This system appears ultimately to rest on Jeremy\nBentham as its founder, but Bentham\u2019s later disciples have modified\nhis doctrine at various points by a deeper appreciation of the\ndifficulties of the position. They have approximated more closely to\nwhat I consider to be the truth, but they have never shaken off the\nentanglement of the original false position of the modern founder\nof the school. Bentham, who pursued \u201cthe greatest happiness of the\ngreatest number\u201d through the medium of the most depressing system of\nphilosophy which the world has ever known, made Pleasure the ultimate\ncriterion of moral action and declared for the summary striking out\nof the word \u2018ought\u2019 from the language of morals, as corresponding to\nan idea which, so far as it rested on any reality, was merely a relic\nof primitive superstition.[142] But J. S. Mill saw that the sentiment\nof duty and moral obligation was based on something deeper and more\ninstinctive than a word misunderstood, and that it often survived in\npersons singularly free from superstition. He sought its origin in the\npsychology and physiology of man, and interpreted it, on the principle\nof association of ideas, as a survival of the deep impression made by\npunishments and rewards attached respectively to different classes\nof actions in each man\u2019s early life.[143] The position was a more\nrational and scientific one than that of Bentham, but it still failed\nto account for the _a priori_ character of the moral sense, the ready\nresponsiveness with which early training evokes in man the sentiment of\nduty.\n\nIt seemed, as it were, to have been somehow _prepared beforehand_ and\nto lie latent awaiting only the right touch to spring into action.\nFinally, Herbert Spencer, who may be said to have brought all this\nline of thinking to its climax, seized on the evolution doctrine as\nexplaining this intuitive and innate quality of ethical feeling. It\n_was_ prepared beforehand, far back in the ancestry of the race. Not\nthe punishments and rewards applied to the modern individual in his own\nperson, but those which affected his near and remote progenitors, had,\nin the course of countless generations, built up \u201cmoral perceptions\u201d\nresulting from \u201cinherited modifications caused by accumulated\nexperiences.\u201d[144] The moral sense, therefore, is _now_ really innate\nbecause inherited, but was once acquired by the operation of pleasures\nand pains arising from man\u2019s intercourse with nature and with his\nfellows. And the ultimate moral criterion in the present day remains\nsimply the striking of a balance between pleasure and pain.[145]\n\nIt is clear that if the Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of\nacquired characteristics is a delusion, the bottom is at once knocked\nout of the Spencerian system of ethics. But apart from this, that\nsystem, on the historical side at least, is vitiated by the cardinal\ndefect in Mr. Spencer\u2019s mind\u2014his failure to appreciate the true nature\nof the data with which he had to deal. The philosophic mind is not\na mere logic-machine. It must include the faculty of vision, the\nvital perception of the objects of thought, as well as the faculty\nof observing and of generalizing about their action and reaction on\neach other, and from this point of view Mr. Spencer\u2019s deficiency as a\nphilosopher is enormous. A vital perception of the object in this case\nmakes us at once aware that you cannot evolve a sense of Duty, \u201cstern\ndaughter of the voice of God,\u201d out of pleasures and pains. Pleasures\nand pains _per se_ will yield nothing to the end of the chapter but the\nsense or the recollection of pleasure and of pain. It is as impossible\nin psychology as it is in mechanics to juggle more power out of the end\nof a sequence of causes and effects than you put in at the beginning.\n\nBut what has a natural ethics to put in the place of pleasure as the\ngoal of right action? The question is answered when we ask, What does\nNature herself put? Nature is said to have no morals, yet a mother bird\nwill imperil and often lose its life for the sake of its young. Is it\nseeking pleasure then? Certainly not\u2014it is protecting and fostering\nlife, the life of the race. And here, as we have insisted so often,\nis the master-impulse of nature. We are taking a false and contracted\nview when we assume that a living thing can have no other goal of\naction except pleasure. Far earlier than the appearance of man in\nthe world is the appearance of the social instinct which prompts the\nindividual to live, and if necessary to die, for the larger life of\nthe race. What really begins in man is the power to think of himself,\nto choose, to analyze, the power to say, Why? To this question the\nscience of ethics must provide an answer if it can\u2014that, in fact, is\nits origin and function. But if it binds itself to provide an answer\nin terms of pleasure, it is entering the lists with naked Egotism at\na fatal disadvantage. On that ground, it seems to me, Egotism must\nalways win. But it is not the only ground. Nature knows a whole world\nof impulse and effort which has nothing to do with pleasure. _Nature\ndoes not directly want pleasure at all, but is resolved, at the cost\nof pleasure and everything else, to have life._ Now life is maintained\nat its highest point by _harmony_\u2014a harmony of the faculties with\neach other and, as a whole, with the mighty life outside them. And,\nas Santayana admirably says, \u201charmony when made to rule in life gives\nreason a noble satisfaction which we call happiness. Happiness is\nimpossible and even inconceivable to a mind without scope and without\npause, a mind driven by craving, pleasure, and fear.\u201d[146] In this\nsense we may say that happiness is organically connected with right\naction.[147] But right action in itself is simply the action which best\nsubserves the central purpose of nature. If that purpose is summed up\nin the one word Life, we must think of the moral sense, if we would\nnot go astray and be bewildered, in terms of living and not in terms\nof enjoying. To take the greatest of exemplars, who can venture to\naffirm that Christ had more pleasure living as he did and uttering to\nthe last syllable the message that was given him to deliver, than if\nhe had prudently restrained himself and led the life of a decent and\nrespectable artisan in his Syrian village? Indeed, even if we take very\nlong views, who can affirm that, on the whole, he has by his life and\ndeath increased the sum of pleasure in the world? I doubt it very much.\nNo one can deny that it is most questionable. To think of the matter in\nterms of pleasure seems to lead to nothing but perplexity and doubt.\nBut there can be no doubt whatever that he lived to the full the life\nthat it was in him to live, and that he immensely deepened and enriched\nthe spiritual life of man. When we fix our minds on life as the goal\nand depth and fulness of life as the criterion, we come out at once\ninto the clear light where high inspirations are born and justified.\nBut it is not only the conception of life as existing for pleasure that\nI think a true ethics will repudiate. We must clear our minds of the\nidea that life has any goal outside itself\u2014pleasure, moral discipline,\nor what not. We must fully realize the conception of life as its own\ngoal, its own complete satisfaction and justification. Whoever has done\nthis will feel as if he had escaped from a jungle of contradiction\nand gloom, where man can only live at all by clearing some little\nspace for his church and his homestead, and giving up the rest to the\npowers of darkness. Yet a step brings him to a point of view from which\nthe physical, the animal and the human features of the world\u2019s vast\nlandscape seem to flow into a happy and organic union, where every part\nbecomes luminous with meaning and charged with divine purpose.\n\nMoral action then, I conceive, as a _certain kind_ of life-promoting\naction. It is action which promotes life in the whole as opposed to the\npart, which sacrifices the lower, narrower, more immediate life for the\nfuller, nobler, more permanent life, whenever they are found to clash.\nIt does not differ in kind from other wholesome vital action, but it\ndiffers in the heightening, the saliency, the intention conferred upon\nit by the circumstances under which it is taken. And if we ask how it\nwas evolved in man, the answer is that it was there already in the\ninstincts of the lower animals, which are never, as man often so sadly\nis, at odds with their true functions and duties. It is not morality\nwhich has been evolved in man, but the capacity for immorality, due to\nhis personal self-consciousness.\n\nThe ultimate question, then, as regards the abstract morality of any\nact or class of acts must be, Does it make for life? Does it tend to\nhelp man towards the maximum development _of all his faculties and\ncapacities_? These faculties and capacities are what the universe\nhas now evolved at the highest level of which we have any knowledge.\nNone of them is evil, except in so far as it may thwart and stunt the\ndevelopment of others. In the harmony of the whole range of man\u2019s\npowers of sense and spirit lies the golden ideal which none of us\nmay realize, but for which each of us may strive; or\u2014for such is the\nsupreme and fatal prerogative of man\u2014which he may set himself to\ndishonour and deny.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE ETHICAL SANCTION\n\n    \u201cFar, far, how far? from o\u2019er the gates of Birth,\n    The faint horizons, all the bounds of earth.\u201d\n\n                                             Tennyson.\n\n\nEthical philosophy centres on two main points\u2014the ethical criterion\nand the ethical sanction. We have to ask ourselves, What kind of life\nought I to live, and secondly, Why ought I to live it? The first of\nthese questions we have answered simply thus: Life is self-justified;\nin merely living we fulfil the whole purpose of nature; and as life\nis a thing admitting of degrees it follows that that life is best in\nwhich there is most of life. But this does not mean apparent life for\nthe individual at the present moment. It means most life for the Whole,\nso far as the individual acts upon the Whole. And he acts on it in two\nways\u2014first (one which is often overlooked) by _living his own life_\nwhich is equally a part of that Whole whether he lives on a desert\nisland or in the heart of a city; and secondly by the influence he\nradiates on other lives with which his own is socially related.\n\nThis, it is clear, is quite the same thing as to say that the right\nlife for any man is that in which _for him_ there is most of life\u2014the\nrichest and the fullest life\u2014_if he were to go on living indefinitely_.\nFor whatever depresses or exalts life in the Whole must ultimately\ndepress or exalt it in the individual also; the two interests are\nclearly identical _in the long run_. This \u2018long run\u2019 or universal\npoint of view, which makes identical the interests of the Whole\nand the interests of the individual, gives to a natural ethics the\ncriterion for all human action. It gives the contents, though not the\ncogency\u2014with this we have to deal in the present chapter\u2014of the word\n\u2018ought.\u2019\n\nBy the mere fact of his social relations with other men each individual\nis continually being trained to take this view, to harmonize together\nhis egoistic and his altruistic instincts; and is continually amassing\na store of social experiences out of which a universal moral code is\ngradually shaping itself. \u201cLife,\u201d it has been well said, \u201chas saved up\nmuch wisdom.\u201d Ethical wisdom, in this regard, will clearly involve such\nkind of action, of organization, as will afford to each individual the\nfullest opportunities for vital development in mind and body.\n\nThe life in which there is most of life! By holding fast to this clue\nwe shall, I think, see our way through many of the obscurities in\nwhich, partly by the search for an extra-natural basis of morality,\npartly by the reactionary attempt to base morality simply on the\nstriking of a balance between pleasures and pains, the philosophy\nof right and wrong has been involved. We get a natural basis for\nestablishing a scale in human action, a distinction between \u2018higher\u2019\nand \u2018lower,\u2019 without which a philosophic ethics is clearly impossible.\nI do not, of course, mean to say that it is possible to apply a\nmechanical rule and measure to moral action in the manner of Catholic\ncasuistry, according to which it is a venial sin to steal 19s. 6d. but\na mortal sin to steal \u00a31.[148] Still, the existence of a natural scale\nis evident at once when we consider the fact that man is constantly\nbeing placed in positions in which his action may either thwart and\ndepress life, or simply maintain it, or markedly enrich and extend\nit. The ethical quality of his action appears to arise from the fact\nthat it is possible for him, under the impulse of immediate personal\ngratification, to do things which if commonly done by men would destroy\nthe beauty and order of human life. The interests of the whole and of\nthe individual may be identical, as we have said, in the long run, but\nat the moment they are often in violent conflict. Allowing for the\nfact that it is never possible in nature to draw a sharp dividing\nline between different classes of being, and to say absolutely that\nthings are _thus_ on one side of it and _thus_ on the other, we may\nrepeat that this opposition between the long-run or universal and the\nmomentary or personal interest is a characteristic of human life as\nopposed to that of the lower animals. It arises from the strong sense\nof individuality, of selfhood, which emerges in man and of which the\nanimals know little or nothing. In itself it is a new and noble power\nof life, but it has its fatal and mischievous aspect. Without it we\nshould know neither good nor evil. Personality is at once man\u2019s pride\nand his fall.\n\nWith this sense of selfhood there have grown up in humanity the\nfaculties of Conscience and of Will. Conscience I interpret as the\nsense of what is due to the Whole, to the nobler and more permanent\nself. Inasmuch as man is only gradually discovering what it really\nis that the Whole demands of us, it follows that the utterances of\nconscience may be misdirected, and that they need to be corrected and\npurified by intelligence and experience. We see here an example of\nthat principle of the combination of evolution and involution which\nalone seems to make intelligible the development of life. Never, by\norganizing into a social system a multitude of individual appetencies,\ncan one produce a moral sense, a conscience. But neither is conscience\nconcerned to give the true laws of that organization. It adds its\npeculiar _numen_, its sanctity, to every effort to Set up a mark of\neverlasting light Above the howling senses\u2019 ebb and flow, and though\nthe mark itself may, indeed must, shift and be transformed with the\nripening insight of man, yet, as between it and the temptations of\nsense, conscience must always be obeyed. Now as nature is organically\none, we should expect to find this truth not dependent merely on an\nintuitive perception but written in the experiences of life. And is\nnot this exactly what we do find? The ethical ideals of Judaism, of\nHinduism, and of Roman Catholicism, with their extreme reliance on\nexternal observance and ritual, are lower, no doubt, than those of\nChristianity as conceived, say, by St. Paul. Yet let a Jew or a Hindu\nturn Christian, or a Catholic turn Protestant or Freethinker, for the\nmere sake of material advantages or an easier way of living, and a\ngeneral moral deterioration seems at once to set in.[149] Whenever a\nman allows his sense of personal ease and gratification to overpower\nhis sense of what is due to his fellow man, to his own higher self,\nto his God, he weakens his will and his capacity for living the nobler\nlife. Ultimately he destroys the capacity altogether, and with it\nvanishes even that for which he sinned, the capacity for pleasure\nitself. The poison of self-indulgence will slacken and corrupt\nevery fibre of his moral and physical being. To grasp at pleasure\nindiscriminately, recklessly, greedily is a way that makes not for\nlife but death. On the other hand, the capacity for renunciation and\nself-control, the following of the law of love, the passion for justice\nand equality, not only grow strong by exercise but, far from injuring\nthe other capacities which it may, on occasion, be right to suppress\nfor their sake, they rather intensify these. As self-indulgence\ncorrupts and fatigues the whole man, even on the self-indulgent side,\nso duty and righteousness vitalize and brace the whole man, both on\ntheir own side and the other. For Nature is one\u2014sweet and mighty are\nthe powers which conspire to create the harmony she loves in the\nspirits faithful to her world-wide revelation.\n\nNow since the moral faculties bear this common stamp upon them,\nthat they are those which oppose to the temptations of personal\ngratification the sense of duty to something outside ourselves, and\nsince, when these two clash, the claim of the moral law is always to\nbe obeyed, it is inevitable that men will sometimes take the denial of\npersonal gratification for an end _per se_ and attach to it a notion\nof peculiar holiness and purity. And this error will be intensified by\nthe ancient and inveterate habit of regarding the Supreme Being as a\nmalignant Power, to be propitiated by suffering. Thus we get the false\nsanction with its Ascetic ideal which has appeared so often in history.\nIt is the other extreme to licence, and rests equally on disregard\nfor the rational ideal of Sophrosyne or Temperance which lies between\nthem. Yet it may truly be said that asceticism has its due place in\nthe world. The ascetic life cannot indeed be the ideal life for any\none who holds that plenitude of life is the true ideal. But it may be\nthe best life for this or that individual. A nature maimed or scathed\nfrom birth, or by unhappy fortune, may best be able to realize itself\nin complete withdrawal from the interests of ordinary social life. Such\nwithdrawal may also be necessary for the pioneer or leader of a cause,\nfor a great reformer, for a teacher absorbed in his mission.\n\nPhilosophy, in fact, has its saints and ascetics as well as any\nreligion that rests on extra-natural sanctions. But in each case the\nascetic ideal rests on quite a different basis.\n\nLooking broadly at the part which religious Orders have played in the\nreligious and intellectual history of Europe, it may well be doubted\nwhether even the most gracious and human figure in the history of\nasceticism, Francis of Assisi, would not have better served his time\nand land by the natural development, in secular life and activity, of\nthe beautiful if sometimes wildly ebullient character portrayed in the\nrecords of his youth, than by cutting away half his life in order to\nforce the other half into a distorted rarity. In recognizing the beauty\nand sweetness of his nature let us not be misled into attributing it\nin any degree to the influence of that fatal miasma from a faith more\nancient than any religion which has a name and place on earth to-day,\nthe dim terror of the unseen which has embodied itself for ages in\nexpiatory sacrifices and rites of blood and pain.\n\nHad Francis not been a saint he would certainly have been one of his\ncountry\u2019s greatest poets.[150] Different minds will probably estimate\ndifferently the loss and gain. As a poet he produced the \u2018Canticle of\nthe Sun\u2019; as an ascetic, the Franciscan Order. Now it is fair to point\nout that this, like other Orders of his church, must not be judged\nby what it is like in times when it is surrounded by watchful and\nby no means adorant eyes. A Catholic religious Order in a Catholic\ncountry naturally lives and moves in an atmosphere of veneration.\nTo preserve this atmosphere pure from the sceptical thought which,\nfrom the monastic point of view, would vitiate it so dangerously,\nis naturally a prime object of every religious community; hence the\nbigotries, superstitions, and tyrannies of which these communities\nhave so often been the sources or agents, from the days of Hypatia to\nthe days of Dreyfus. Such communities, developing themselves under\nsuch circumstances, cannot attract many men of intellect and character\nto join them. They rapidly deteriorate, and European literature from\nBoccaccio and Chaucer to Erasmus shows us the repute in which they\ncome to be held by the uncloistered intellect. A false ideal may\nstimulate, but it poisons. St. Francis, dreaming that he serves God\nby making himself blind to God\u2019s world through a course of pitiless\nausterities,[151] produces an Order whose licence in one generation\nafter his death has become a scandal to Christendom.[152]\n\nLet us turn now to the theory of asceticism as conceived by the\nhumane and rational spirit of Stoic philosophy. Epictetus\u2014to my mind\nthe greatest ethical thinker of antiquity\u2014has a valuable and carefully\nreasoned chapter on the subject in his Dissertations. In reading this\nafter, let us say, The Little Flowers of St. Francis, one seems to\npass from the drugged atmosphere of a medi\u00e6val church to the free air\nand sunlight of the world. The ascetic, or Cynic as he was called in\nStoic phraseology, is painted for us as a man who adventures himself to\nthe extreme limit of abnegation, not from any mystic sentiment of the\nholiness of pain and poverty, but simply to help himself and others to\nrealize the soul\u2019s independence of external things. It was a cardinal\ndoctrine of Stoicism (as it was of the Christianity of Christ) that the\nthings which a man wrought and thought, the things under the control\nof his will, were the only things that really mattered. What happened\nto a man from outside was, indeed, of great importance in regard to\nhow he dealt with it; in itself it was of none; it was like a ball\nin a game which you have to do your best to catch, knowing well that\nyou do so not for the sake of the ball but of the game. Such was the\nStoic view of life, and the Cynic represented not the perfected Stoic,\nnot an ideal towards which all should tend\u2014for the ideal was that of\ncitizenship and well-ordered social life\u2014but simply the method of\nverification which consists in taking an extreme case and showing that\none\u2019s theory will fit in with it. And so Diogenes lived in a barrel\ninstead of a house, and asked nothing of Alexander except to stand out\nof his light. It is not more pleasing to God, not better in any way,\nthat a man should live in a barrel rather than in a house, that he\nshould be single rather than married, poor rather than rich; yet in the\nchances and changes of this mortal life all these things may happen to\na man, will he, nill he, and the point is to show that he may still\nbe confident and cheerful, knowing that his true self is untouched by\nthese calamities. And while St. Francis and the more devoted of his\nfollowers so tortured and wrecked the body which St. Paul had called\nthe temple of the Holy Spirit that many of them perished or had to\nlinger out their lives in the infirmary,[153] with the Cynic the\ncultivation of the body and its faculties was a part of his discipline.\n\n    \u201cFor,\u201d says Epictetus,[154] \u201cif he shall appear consumptive, meagre\n    and pale, his witness hath not the same emphasis. Not only by\n    showing forth the things of the spirit must he convince foolish\n    men that it is possible, without the things that are admired of\n    them, to be good and wise, but also in his body must he show that\n    plain and simple and open-air living are not mischievous even to\n    the body: \u2018Behold, even of this I am a witness, I and my body.\u2019 So\n    Diogenes was wont to do, for he went about radiant with health, and\n    with his very body he turned many to good. But a Cynic that men\n    pity seems to be a beggar\u2014all men turn away from him, all stumble\n    at him. For he must not appear squalid; so that neither in this\n    respect shall he scare men away; but his very austerity should be\n    cleanly and pleasing.\u201d\n\nHow sane and wholesome, how wisely adapted to the fundamental facts of\nlife, is the Stoic ideal as compared with the monastic! In it we see\nthat there is a place in a natural ethics for a rational asceticism.\nOf such there will always be need\u2014we must admit, whatever we may think\nof the \u2018spirituality\u2019 of self-destruction, that there are, and are\nalways likely to be, many more men and women who deteriorate in soul\nand body through petty acts of self-indulgence than who do so by an\nexcess of austerity. And this makes it all the more necessary that the\nmatter should be conceived rightly, reasonably, from the side of a\nreverence for life and its manifestations, not from that of disdain and\nrepulsion; that we should take hold of it (to quote Epictetus again)\nby the handle by which it can be carried, not that by which theory and\nexperience alike have shown that it never can. When Tennyson wrote\n\u201cMove upward, working out the beast,\u201d he was not so well inspired as\nin some of his other appreciations of modern science. The religious\nascetic aims at working out the beast\u2014not so Nature, who does not\nprogress by substituting one form of living for another, but by growing\nfrom a central core and continually harmonizing the old radical\nelements of being with the new assimilations. One _can_, perhaps,\nwork out the beast\u2014what cannot the will achieve? But the beast surely\navenges himself, and often in terrible fashion.\n\n\nWhen, however, we have recognized the false sanction and the false\nideal associated with it, we have still the more difficult problem of\nestablishing the true. If Righteousness\u2014to use that term for all kinds\nof action ethically right\u2014is to be followed in the interests of life,\nhow can it ever be required that much suffering, and even death itself\nmay have to be faced for its sake? Man is a part of a Whole\u2014in the\neffective realization of that conception all ethics is summed up\u2014but he\nis also an individual. Why should the individual give way to the Whole\nif their interests seem to clash? In other words, though we have the\ncontents, the static significance of the word \u2018ought,\u2019 we have still to\nfind its dynamic significance, its cogency.\n\nEvery beast does what it \u2018ought\u2019 without any question, and this\nconstantly involves acts of co-operation or self-sacrifice for the\ninterests of the race. In man, ethical action has a greater value for\nlife, simply because, unlike the beast, he is able to question its\ngrounds and to forgo it if he chooses. He observes, as we have said,\nthat the \u2018long run\u2019 or universal point of view is often in conflict\nwith the individual point of view. \u201cLet us eat and drink, for to-morrow\nwe die\u201d is the extreme expression of the individual point of view. It\nhas been called a \u2018pig-philosophy,\u2019 and if the expression is just, it\nis not because the pig will die to-morrow, for it will probably live as\nlong as anything else, but because no matter how long it lives it is,\n_qua_ pig, incapable of any other form of life.\n\nBut a man is capable of other forms of life, and to realize these he\nmust keep the pig-life in check, not despising or disowning it, but\nrestraining it, lest it should throw him out of harmony. Unchecked, it\nwill do that in the long run; but what if he is to have no long run?\nWhere the lower life can yield an hour of delight, why deny it for the\nsake of a higher life, if in the next hour both must end together?\n\nI confess that I see no escape from the implied conclusion if the\npremiss is true. But if the view of life outlined in these pages be\ntrue, then this premiss is palpably false. Neither the higher nor the\nlower life can ever have any end, though no doubt they may pass into\nforms outside the category of Time, in which the terms beginning and\nend have no longer any meaning. Life is not dependent on its visible\nand tangible forms. The question here involved is one on which the\ndrift of certain modern speculations in physics obliges us to dwell for\na little.\n\nThe question of the present inhabitability of Mars or other planets has\nbeen much debated of late, pro and con. Opinions differ on this point;\nbut there is a very general agreement among physicists that the state\nof the moon, cold, dead, and barren as a burnt-out cinder, must, by the\nequalization of energy, be sooner or later the necessary fate of every\nplanet and of every sun in the universe. Science has thus apparently\ncome to justify by its solemn verdict that cry of the Latin poet, more\ncharged with the pathos of eternal death than perhaps any other human\nutterance:\u2014\n\n    \u201cSoles occidere et redire possunt:\n    Nobis, cum semel occidit brevis lux,\n    Nox est perpetua una dormienda.\u201d[155]\n\nThe conditions under which life is possible will then no longer exist.\nOne nothingness awaits the saint, the sage, the ox, the oak tree, and\nthe fungus. \u201cLife,\u201d says Le Dantec, \u201chas not always existed on the\nearth\u201d; we are to regard it as merely \u201ca surface accident in the\nhistory of the thermic evolution of the globe.\u201d[156]\n\nThis remark, which is one that a thermometer might be expected to make\nif it could talk, is in Le Dantec\u2019s mouth probably no more than a\nlittle rhetorical fling at orthodoxy, for it is really answered by his\nwhole book. His main thesis is \u201cthe absence of all essential difference\nand all absolute discontinuity between living and not-living matter.\u201d\n\u201cA surface accident\u201d can hardly be a reasonable description of a\ndevelopment thus prepared for in the essential nature of the substance\nof the world. But other physicists have lately cut deeper, and will not\nallow the suns of Catullus, even when cold, to set and rise again for\never. According to the very interesting and apparently well-supported\nspeculations of Gustave Le Bon,[157] all matter is at present engaged\nin that process of disintegration of which radium offers the most\nconspicuous example. The energy which produces life and response of all\nkinds is explained as simply the result of this long, disintegrating\nprocess, and may be compared to the action of a released spring,\nseeking its state of quiescence and immobility.[158] When the process\nis complete, matter will be resolved into the primordial Something\nfrom which it somehow originated. And where will the saint and the\nsage, or anything that we can recognize as life, be then?\n\nThe answer to all this rises to the mind at once when we abandon\nthe point of view of the thermometer and place ourselves at that of\nrational Man. This Matter, on whose states life is supposed to be\ndependent, is, after all, known to us only through the fact that we\nare living to observe it. If it disappeared, no doubt we should cease\nto see it, and if it were transformed we should see it otherwise, but\nto make the life which sees dependent on our seeing anything exactly\nas it appears now on this globe is surely the wildest of assumptions.\nWe observe that life makes use of certain conditions of matter\u2014a\ncertain range of temperature, the presence of certain minerals and\ngases\u2014in order to express itself. We regard these conditions as the\nproduct of a Power which desires life and has produced them to obtain\nit. But there may be many other conditions too. All we can tell is\nthat beyond certain physical limits our senses cannot perceive life\nor get responses from it. M. Le Dantec would, no doubt, treat as an\nillusion the belief that man can communicate with and be responded to\nby a Power, a Life, transcending that of which the senses inform us. I\nam, with the multitude of men, profoundly convinced that we can. But\nleaving this entirely aside, is it not evident that, even as there are\ninvisible rays in the spectrum which are now and then discovered by\nsome unexpected chemical or electrical action, so there may be modes\nof living of which none of our present senses can give us the faintest\nconception? Whoever may deny this possibility, and on whatever grounds,\nit certainly cannot be denied on any grounds that physics or biology\nare aware of. And to those who believe that life is the central thing,\nand that matter exists only for it, the possibility is a certainty,\nfor life must have been when as yet matter was not\u2014life set it going.\nTo convey the idea that everything that exists, however it may be\ntransformed, is part of a divine Whole which cannot die because it is\nessential Life, we say that it is \u2018immortal,\u2019 and conceive ourselves\nas existing after death in a spiritual form just as the body exists\nafter the bodily death in other bodily forms. Whether time and space,\nor even personality, will exist for us after death we dare not say;\nwe are totally unable to imagine the conditions of such an existence.\nBut we can perfectly grasp the broad fact that whatever we do and are,\nwhatever we think, whatever transacts itself even in the unconscious\nsphere of our existence, must have eternal endurance and significance\nbecause it is knit with the eternal Whole.\n\n    \u201cTo the foot,\u201d says Epictetus, \u201cI shall say that it is according to\n    Nature that it be clean; but if you take it as a foot, and not as a\n    solitary thing, it shall beseem it to go into the mud, and to tread\n    on thorns, and perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole;\n    otherwise it is no longer a foot.\n\n    \u201cAnd some such thing we should suppose about ourselves also. What\n    art thou? A man. Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is\n    according to Nature for thee to live to old age, to grow rich, and\n    to keep good health. But if thou look upon thyself as a man, and as\n    a part of a certain whole, for the sake of that whole it may become\n    thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas, and run into\n    peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time.\n\n    \u201cWhy, then, dost thou bear it hard? Knowest thou not that, as the\n    foot, alone, is not a foot, _so thou, alone, art not a man_.\u201d[159]\n\nThe broad fact on which a system of natural ethics must be based, if\nit is to have any ethical quality at all, is that _the individual\nlife finds its goal in the cosmic life_, not in pleasure, or any\nother term by which we may choose to express a sensation of personal\nenjoyment. The distinction between the _bonum honestum_ and the _bonum\ndelectabile_ is really a valid one\u2014it is no invention of moralists\n\u201csuckled in a creed outworn,\u201d but is revealed by a study of life and\nits manifestations to have been deeply rooted in nature from a period\nfar anterior to the advent of man upon the earth. In man, the _bonum\nhonestum_ takes the form mainly of what Epictetus calls the sense of\n\u201cnatural fellowship\u201d among men, and what Christ expressed in the\nword which gave to the ideas of Stoicism the penetrating power they\nhad lacked, the great and divine word, Love. But we must never forget\nthat even this word will not take us to our end and sum up a system of\nethical thought unless we rightly conceive the ultimate object to which\nit is directed. This is not the visible community of men, nor even that\nof all nature, now existing or to exist in the future. It is the ideal,\neternal community, of which every man remains equally an organic part,\nwhether he has any means of physical communication with his fellows or\nnot. It is that without which the visible community, with all its laws\nand inter-relations, would never have come into being. It is the \u201ccity\nof God,\u201d builded without hands, the Universal Polity whose \u201ctroubled\nimage,\u201d as Plato says, we discern in the polity we know.\n\nWhen Socrates, after his sentence, lay in prison awaiting the summons\nto die, his friends gathered round him entreating him to make his\nescape, and explaining to him the safe and easy means they had provided\nfor that end. Freely and cheerfully as was his wont, delighting in the\nplay of dialectical fence, he debated the matter with them. Then he\nlaid dialectics aside, and spoke to them from the heights of vision.\nRightly or wrongly, he declared, the laws of his mother-city, to\nwhich he owed all he had and all he was, had bidden him die. Whatever\nhappened now, there could be no escape in the end. Some day he must\nface death, and stand before the Laws of the Underworld. What answer\nshould he make to Them when they demanded how he had dealt in life by\ntheir brethren in the world above?\n\nThis grand impersonation of the eternal Laws in their kinship with\nthe laws of the visible world illumines a whole region of thought,\nextending far beyond the limits of the particular moral question which\nevoked it. It strikes the note of all high thinking on man\u2019s duty to\nman. The laws, written or unwritten, that govern societies of men can\nclaim no reverence from the individual who does not feel that they are\nthe shadows or copies of laws belonging to the sphere of the eternal.\n\nIt is one thing to admit that the social relations of mankind give the\nstart to ethical feeling, provide it with a wide and varied field of\naction, and with a criterion as to what is right and what is not. It is\nquite another to argue that this ethical feeling is merely a product of\nthese relations, and has, apart from them, no meaning or purpose. This\nis another case of the principle which I have described before[160] in\nspeaking of Evolution and Involution. Without both of these I cannot\nsee how any movement from one state of being to another is to be\naccounted for. People, or even animals, living in communities find that\nmutual aid is useful to them, and they practise it. The utilitarian\nschool think, when they have demonstrated this, that the whole ethical\nquestion is solved. But in reality they have not even approached it.\nMutual aid is useful? Well, then, it is useful. How are we going to\nget any further? How are we going to account for love, duty, fidelity,\nself-sacrifice? Because certain things appear in the world under\ncertain conditions we have, many of us, got into a slipshod way of\nsaying that they are the product of these conditions, but a strict\nexamination of the terms will frequently show that they are nothing\nof the kind. There is no valid reason why social life and mutual aid\nshould not go on for ever without producing anything higher than the\nsense of mutual advantage. The nobler passions do indeed come into life\nwhen the proper stage of social evolution has been reached, but their\nsource is not within the bounds of the visible order, nor do I see how\nthey can ever justify themselves with reference to it alone. Neither,\non the other hand, can they be realized without it. The divine air\nwhich we breathe on the mountain height is not made by the mountain,\nbut we must climb the mountain to breathe it. Every step we take\nupwards in the visible order is, as it were, the discovery of something\nin that invisible order which is its spiritual counterpart and gives it\nits spiritual significance.\n\n\nI have said that ethics is for life; but to the individual it must\nsometimes appear to be rather for death than for life, unless he knows\nthat there is a life beyond the visible life. In this faith only\u2014in\nwhatever varied forms the intellect of man has embodied and expressed\nit\u2014are martyrdoms possible. And martyrdoms have been so often the great\nturning-points and inspirations of human history that an ethics which\ncannot justify them would seem to be an ethics at odds with nature.\nConsider from our point of view the significance of the two martyrdoms\nof history which have most deeply impressed and influenced the minds of\nmen.\n\nSocrates had no gospel, no new truth to proclaim. He dissociated\nhimself from the \u2018rationalistic\u2019 theories of his time, not indeed\nbecause he was particularly attached to ancient ideas in religion, but\nbecause theorizing on these subjects had no interest for him.[161] On\nhis trial he expressly disclaimed heretical views on religion. It is\nclear that these were only charged against him because the real offence\nwas no crime in Athenian or any other law. The real offence was that\nSocrates was a relentless critic, within reach of whose tongue no\npatriotic rhetorician could feel himself confident and comfortable.\nIt was a time of rhetorical patriotism in Athens. From the bitter\nhumiliation of the Peloponnesian War had arisen an impulse towards\nnational regeneration, a genuine and worthy impulse in itself, but\none which unfortunately took shape not in a manly facing of facts, a\ncourageous march forward to the future, but rather in a panic-stricken\nretreat to old conservative formulas and bigotries, to the abandonment\nof which by cultivated Athenians was ascribed all the evil that had\nfallen on the city. Socrates, however, delighted in taking popular\nconvictions and reducing them by a series of ingenious interrogations\nto their verifiable residuum of truth, if there happened to be any.\nThey commonly emerged from the ordeal in a dilapidated condition. At a\ntime when the whole city was high strung with patriotic fervour while\ninwardly very uncertain about its principles of action, the presence of\na thinker like Socrates, with his pitiless arraignment of every gaudy\nfallacy before the bar of Reason, was a continual scandal and offence,\nand was easily interpreted as a public danger. Had he consented to\nkeep silent, and affected to fall in with the general trend of public\nsentiment, he would, as he well knew, have been safe. But he refused\nall compliance and compromise, and declared with absolute truth that\nAthens would do better to reward him for stinging it into a perception\nof realities than to punish him for the wholesome pain of the process.\nSo he went with clear-sighted deliberation to his death, and that\ndeath, so wonderfully recorded for us by the greatest prose writer\nof all time, has ennobled all criticism, all sceptical thought,\nthenceforward. None can think lightly of what Socrates thought it worth\nhis while to die for.\n\nTurn to the death of Christ, and into how different an atmosphere\nwe seem to pass! No philosopher has here recorded for us the death\nof a philosopher. Myth and legend have clustered round the great\nevent\u2014the Jewish conception of an expiatory sacrifice\u2014the truer and\nprofounder myth of a slain and re-arisen God\u2014and these have wrapped\nthe Crucifixion in such a cloud of mystical light and colour that the\noutlines of the historical fact are lost to view. When this cloud is\npierced, however, an intelligible human transaction remains. In Christ\nthe luminous purity of Greek reason was so blended with the religious\nfervour of the Eastern mind that he may justly be called the ideal\nman, the Son of Man and of God, the incarnation of the divine thought.\nUnlike Socrates, he was distinctly a heretic in his place and time.\nHe appeared among a people deeply religious but one in whom religion\nhad taken the form of an immense fabric of ceremonial and observance,\nguarded and administered by a special caste who conceived themselves as\nthe appointed vehicle of the will of God for the untaught multitude.\nTo this multitude Christ went direct. He led them straight to the\nancient founts of light and life, disregarding the narrow channels\nhewn by Pharisaic formalism. He bade them open their eyes and see for\nthemselves; he taught them that the truth was for all men; beside the\nconceptions of the authorized religion he set new conceptions which\nmade the old seem barren or ludicrous. The people heard him gladly,\nand the great fabric of Pharisaism was manifestly tottering. The fury\nof a monopolist caste was aroused. There is no more merciless anger\nthan the anger of the religious monopolist who sees his monopoly\nthreatened, and to this anger Christ fell a victim. As Socrates died\nfor the right to disbelieve, so Christ died for the right to believe,\nand whatever the churches have made of him he has inspired every\nrevolt against priestcraft and authority ever since. No creed is worth\nliving for which is not worth dying for. Christ\u2019s death and spiritual\nresurrection[162] set the seal on this truth and gave the world the\nmost signal instance in history of triumph arising out of defeat and\ndeath.\n\nVolumes of argument and analysis could not confute an ethical system so\neffectually and so severely as the bare fact that it looked paltry or\nincongruous beside such lives and deaths as these.\n\n\nThe conclusions we have reached in this discussion of the basis of a\nnatural ethics may now be summed up. We have interpreted the object of\nphenomenal Being as Life.\n\nThe ethical quality of life lies in its conscious and active harmony\nwith the Whole.\n\nThe motive for ethical action lies in the fact that we are a part of\nthat Whole. The sense of this relation is as deep a part of man\u2019s\nnature as the sense of his selfhood, or deeper.\n\nTo live for Others, then, is no more the true epitome of a natural\nethics than is, to live for Self. The true epitome is, Live for the\nWhole\u2014the Whole which includes both others and yourself, which is\ngreater than all humanity, yet is capable of being faithfully served in\nthe silence of one human breast.\n\nWe have now before us, therefore, a clear conception of the criterion\nand the sanction of ethical action. The criterion is applied when we\nask of anything done by man, \u201cDoes it further life in the Whole?\u201d The\nsanction is found in the fact that each of us is an organic part of\nthat Whole. The richest and fullest life is evidently to be won by the\nmost complete development of all our faculties which is allowed us by\nour opportunities. Ethics, therefore, exists for life, not life for\nethics. This simple proposition arises inevitably from the scientific\nconception of the world. The greatest of fallacies is to conceive life\nas existing for any other object whatsoever, or to define its aim as\nsomething more or less remote from our present existence. Our \u2018eternal\nlife\u2019 is not something to come\u2014we are living it here and now. This is\nnot a pilgrimage or a place of preparation; it leads us to no heaven,\nno hell, no distant judgment seat. We are before that judgment seat\nevery hour; the heaven and the hell which it dispenses are the daily\nexperiences through which we move; and the saints and prophets of this\nfaith are those who have felt most deeply and revealed most profoundly\nthe great realities of existence, hidden from us not so much by the\ndarkness of the grave as by the impalpable veils of use and wont. The\ngrave has mystery indeed but no terror of gloom for those who realize\nthat the universe is but an eddy on the stream of life. By that eddy we\nsee the stream, we feel its power and movement; and we know that the\nsubstance of which it is made is the stuff of life itself.\n\n\n\n\nPART III: ART\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nART AND LIFE\n\n    \u201cLike a living thing, one and whole.\u201d\u2014Aristotle.[163]\n\n\nThe third chapter of Tolstoy\u2019s book, What is Art? contains a summary\nof the opinions of some sixty modern writers (taken chiefly from\nSchasler\u2019s Kritische Geschichte der Aesthetik) on the essential meaning\nof the terms Art and Beauty. All these opinions, after having been\nduly paraded across the stage, are dismissed by Tolstoy as a mass of\n\u201cenchanted confusion and contradictoriness,\u201d and he then proceeds to\nbuild up his own theory of art. As the latest critical treatment of\nthe subject on a large scale by a thinker and an artist who has made a\ndeep impression on the minds of men, his conclusions deserve careful\nattention on the part of any later writer who desires to deal with the\nperennially attractive but very obscure problems of \u00e6sthetics. Let me\nbegin by quoting the passage with which Tolstoy closes the fourth\nchapter of his work:\u2014\n\n    \u201cTo the question What is this Art, to which is offered up the\n    labour of millions, the very lives of men, and even morality\n    itself? we have extracted replies from the existing \u00e6sthetics\n    which amount to this\u2014that the aim of art is beauty, that beauty is\n    recognized by the enjoyment it gives, and that artistic enjoyment\n    is a good and important thing because it _is_ enjoyment. In a\n    word, that enjoyment is good because it is enjoyment. Thus, what\n    is considered the definition of art is no definition at all, but\n    only a shuffle to justify existing art. Therefore, however strange\n    it may seem to say so, in spite of the mountains of books written\n    about art, no exact definition of art has been constructed. And the\n    reason of this is that the conception of art has been based on the\n    conception of beauty.\u201d[164]\n\nNow in one point at least, that which is embodied in the last sentence,\nthese words of Tolstoy\u2019s appear to me to go straight to the mark.\nArt can no more be founded on beauty than morality can be founded on\npleasure. A greater than Tolstoy has spoken the same truth in a couple\nof his mighty lines. The great masters, says Whitman,\n\n    ... do not seek beauty, they are sought,\n    Forever touching them or close upon them follows beauty,\n      longing, fain, love-sick.\n\nBut let us see what Tolstoy would set up in place of what he throws\ndown. Art, he tells us, is \u201cone of the means of intercourse between\nman and man.\u201d \u201cBy words a man transmits his thoughts to another, by\nmeans of art he transmits his feelings.\u201d But the transmission must, if\nit is art, be intentional, premeditated. \u201cArt begins when one person\nwith the object of joining another or others to himself in one and the\nsame feeling expresses that feeling by certain external indications.\u201d\nThe \u201cindications\u201d may, of course, be a certain kind of language, or\ngesture, or plastic representation, or sound. If, by such means, a man\nhas succeeded in making his own feeling _infectious_, and affecting\nothers by it, he has, to that extent achieved art. Art is therefore \u201ca\nmeans of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings,\nand is indispensable for the life and progress towards well-being of\nindividuals and of humanity.\u201d[165]\n\nCertainly one cannot but admire the strong clear-headedness and common\nsense with which Tolstoy blows away the mists into which he had plunged\nus in his third chapter, and brings us into a region of daylight\nrealities, with firm earth under our feet. Undoubtedly if man does\nwant to get into real contact with his fellow-men he must not merely\ntell them what he feels, he must make them feel the same thing. And\nart, produced with \u201cindividuality, clearness and sincerity\u201d has this\nproperty, to use Tolstoy\u2019s own term, of infectiousness. Moreover it\nis of enormous antiquity and has exceedingly primitive forms. There\nmay have been art before there was speech\u2014there was certainly art\nbefore there was writing, before there was anything remotely resembling\nintellectual culture or religion. The metaphysical definitions of\nHegel, \u201cThe Idea shining through Matter,\u201d or of Knight, \u201cThe union of\nobject and subject, the drawing forth from nature of that which is\ncognate to man,\u201d and of the rest of the sixty and odd philosophers,\ndo, I think, look a little irrelevant when we think of the cave-man\nscratching his bit of mammoth ivory. But Tolstoy\u2019s account of the\nmatter glows with reality. The cave-artist was struck with something in\nnature\u2014the reindeer drinking at a pool, the mammoth swinging through\nthe jungle\u2014he longed to express it, to make others see. It can hardly\nbe doubted that this was the origin of art _as art_.[166] I think it\nis its fundamental quality even now, though we must include among the\nobjects rendered things not in external nature but in the artist\u2019s own\nimagination.\n\nThe questions then arise, What is it that the artist is trying to\ninfect other people with? Is art quite indifferent to the nature of the\nfeeling communicated? Is there any common feeling expressed by things\napparently so diverse as a strain of music, a piece of pottery, a\ncathedral, a lyric, a statue, and a landscape painting?\n\nTolstoy does not overlook these questions; he has, in fact, a great\ndeal to say about them. But here, in his analysis of the \u00e6sthetic\nfaculty, the obsession with the exclusively ethical view of things\nwhich has so much impaired his own art seems to have led him on a false\ntrack. Having decided that infectiousness is the common quality of all\nart, he is struck with the fact that this quality varies very much in\ndifferent works, and he uses it to obtain a scale of merit:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNot only,\u201d he writes, \u201cis infection a sure sign of art, but the\n    degree of infectiousness is also the sole measure of excellence\n    in art. The stronger the infection the better is the art, as art,\n    speaking now apart from its subject matter, _i.e._ not considering\n    the quality of the feelings it transmits.\u201d[167]\n\nThis statement is obviously meaningless unless you define the nature\nof the person who is to be infected. Infection is as much a matter of\nthe mind infected as of the agent which infects. \u201cThe stronger the\ninfection for such and such an audience ...\u201d is what we shall have to\nread. The audience must be a constant element if the definition is to\nconvey any distinct meaning. Perceiving this, as so acute a mind could\nnot fail to do, Tolstoy falls back on exactly the same criterion as\nthat of Bishop Butler when he endeavoured to get a universal standard\nof right and wrong. Butler set up as final judge in these matters the\n\u201cplain honest man.\u201d[168] You were to appeal to the unsophisticated\nconscience of this ideal being, and that ended the matter. So, with\nTolstoy, you are to get the \u201cunperverted\u201d man who, like an animal,\n\u201cunerringly finds what he needs.\u201d[169] Most people in our society,\nsays Tolstoy, \u201care quite unable to distinguish a work of art from the\ngrossest counterfeit.\u201d They like, or pretend to like, Beethoven better\nthan a peasant folk-song! But the peasant\u2019s, _i.e._ the untaught,\nappreciation, which is merely bewildered by Beethoven, is right.[170]\nThis, we ultimately find, simply means that the \u201cplain honest man,\u201d as\nconceived by Tolstoy, is one who appreciates the _moral_ contents of a\nwork of art, provided that it has any, and that it has infection enough\nto get them into his mind. And Tolstoy (the art-critic) does not care\nabout anything except these moral contents.\n\nThis is clear when he comes to deal with the element which he mentions\nabove as having been omitted from his consideration of the comparative\nvalue of art-work, namely the quality of the feeling transmitted by\nthe medium of art. Here he lays it down that the object of all art is\nto unite mankind, and to make them feel at one with God and with each\nother.[171] This may pass very well if by uniting is meant enabling\nus to enter with sympathy into the life of man, and even of things\nthat are not man. Even so a drawing by Nettleship can make us feel\nat one with a python or a tigress. But Tolstoy does not mean that.\nHis uniting is a moral and practical idea based on the doctrine that\ncombat, and everything that could lead to combat, is wrong. Ancient\nreligious perceptions, he argues, confined the sense of unity to the\ntribe or nation, and art had to glorify solely the might or greatness\nof the people who produced it. Modern religion, on the contrary, takes\naccount of all humanity without exception. \u201cAnd therefore the feelings\ntransmitted by the art of our time not only cannot coincide with the\nfeelings transmitted by former art, but must run counter to them.\u201d[172]\nOnly two kinds of art, according to Tolstoy, \u201ccan be considered good\nart in our time.\u201d These are first, \u201cart transmitting feelings flowing\nfrom a religious perception of man\u2019s position in the world in relation\nto God and to his neighbours,\u201d and secondly, \u201cart transmitting the\nsimplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible\nto all men in the whole world\u2014the art of common life\u2014the art of a\npeople\u2014universal art.\u201d[173] As instances of these types of good modern\nart, Tolstoy gives his amazing list\u2014Schiller\u2019s Robbers, Les Mis\u00e9rables,\nDickens\u2019s and Dostoievsky\u2019s novels, Uncle Tom\u2019s Cabin, and Adam Bede.\nIn painting we are to take as types of excellence \u201cthe drawing by\nKramskoy (worth many of his finished pictures), showing a drawing-room\nwith a balcony past which troops are marching in triumph on their\nreturn from the war. On the balcony stands a wet-nurse holding a baby\nand a boy. They are admiring the procession of the troops, but the\nmother, covering her face with a handkerchief, has fallen back on the\nsofa, sobbing.\u201d Or one may turn to \u201ca picture by the French artist,\nMorlon, depicting a lifeboat hastening in a heavy storm to the relief\nof a steamer that is being wrecked.\u201d[174]\n\nIt is easy to make fun of this headlong descent to the level of the\nparish magazine, but it is not so easy to challenge the position from\nwhich Tolstoy deduces his criticisms of individual works, or to deny\nthat he has again and again struck home with incomparable force against\nthe factitious art so current in the present day. His book is a piece\nof genuine thinking, and in this it has few rivals among contemporary\nworks of \u00e6sthetic criticism, especially in English. Most of these works\nare either p\u00e6ans of praise for what the critic finds attractive and\nstimulating to his own temperament, or attacks conducted with every\nresource of satire and ridicule on what he does not understand or care\nfor. But a serious attempt like that of Tolstoy to discover and to\napply a true principle of art criticism is very much to seek; and I\nventure to think that many critics who are horrified at the notion of\nputting Uncle Tom\u2019s Cabin above King Lear would find it by no means so\neasy as they suppose to give a rational account of the faith that is in\nthem. Tolstoy\u2019s conclusions, like those of Plato in The Republic (which\nthey very much resemble), are wrong-headed, but his manner of thinking\nis that of a massive and nobly ordered intellect, and is well worthy of\nrespectful imitation at whatever distance lesser powers can contrive to\nfollow it.\n\nI know nothing whatever (I regret to say) about the art of Kramskoy or\nof Morlon, but one imagines, from Tolstoy\u2019s way of talking about the\nworks referred to, that they are attempts to capture admiration for a\nwork of art by the aid of something which is not art, but sentiment.\nAt any rate, that is just what Tolstoy desires them to do. Is art,\nthen, entirely indifferent to subject, as some of the philosophers of\nthe Impressionist school contend? Not at all\u2014so long as the subject\nis something _in the picture_, and capable of being expressed in the\nmedium of that branch of art. A crew of men pulling a boat through a\nheavy sea may be a good subject for a painting, but to the artist it\ndoes not matter a pin\u2019s point whether they are going to rescue life or\nto board an enemy or to catch lobsters. Under the circumstances they\nwill all look just the same. The wreck in the offing has its value\nin the design of the picture, no more and no less. And those who are\nalways on the look out for false values, sentimental values, will never\nlearn what art really has to teach them, what art alone can teach. What\nis this?\n\n\nThe master key with which we have tried to open certain doors in\nbiology and in ethics will, I hope, serve us also in discovering the\nprinciples of art. I accept fully Tolstoy\u2019s postulate of infectiousness\nas a primary quality of art. There can be no art which does not\ncommunicate to others the feeling of the artist. This implies that the\nartist must have a distinct and sincere feeling to communicate. But\nit does not at all imply that the finest art is that which is most\nwidely or powerfully communicable at its first appearance or at any\ngiven period in history. To say that infectiousness is an essential\ncharacteristic of art is not the same thing as to say that the more\nit infects, either extensively or intensively, the better art it is.\nOne might as well say that if, as has been done, you define man as \u2018a\npolitical animal,\u2019 it would follow that the more strenuously political\nhe was the more he fulfilled the purpose of his being as a man. But\npolitics and art are both of them simply ways in which man endeavours\nto remould his universe \u201cnearer to the heart\u2019s desire.\u201d How does he\nmake use of political methods _for his true purpose_? How does he make\nuse of art and its infectiousness _for his true purpose_? These are the\nreal, the decisive questions.\n\nWhat is the essential thing communicated in art? The question is\nanswered at once if we reflect that as life can have no ulterior\nobject beyond life, and is satisfied when the maximum of living is\nattained,[175] so life must be the ultimate object of art also. It is\nthe _quality_ of art to communicate feeling; it is the _object_ of\nart to communicate a feeling for life. _Art is man\u2019s expression of\nlife_; and he delights in art precisely because and in so far as he\ndelights in life. But if this be all, it may be objected, why, with\nlife in full glow and activity all around him, should man turn to this\nreflection or rendering of it which he calls art? What place does the\nreality leave for the enjoyment of the shadow? This was substantially\nPlato\u2019s indictment of art in the last book of The Republic. All things\nexist, according to his well-known doctrine of ideas, in an ideal\nor archetypal form, a \u201cpattern laid up in heaven.\u201d There is such a\npattern, let us say, of a Bed, and this is the real, the archetypal\nBed. Copying some reflection of this in his own mind, the carpenter\nmakes a material, individual bed.\n\nThen comes in the painter, who copies the bed of the carpenter, and who\nis thus at two removes from Reality; art, in Plato\u2019s view, being simply\nimitation, and therefore somewhat despicable.[176]\n\nThere are some minor, yet by no means trivial, reasons which might be\ngiven in answer to this objection; as, for instance, that art enables\none to assemble together in small compass the expressions of a great\nvariety of life not to be directly enjoyed, save at wide intervals of\ntime and place. But the primary and fundamental reasons are our main\nconcern here.\n\nIn the first place, the material world around us, or such portion of\nit as we are able to perceive, is not, as it stands, a pure expression\nof life. Holding as we do with Cleanthes in his majestic Hymn to Zeus\nthat all things redundant have their place in the Whole, and that in\nit all things ugly have their beauty and all things hateful their share\nof love,[177] it is still true that the world as we see it presents\nus with a pell-mell of varied forms\u2014some mature and beautiful, some\nin process of transition, some in decay, some stationary, unchanging,\ndead. The inner harmony which holds them together is rarely perceptible\nin any one fragment of actual life. But the artist adds this harmony,\nthis completeness; his work, within its own limits, is a whole. He\ngives us something which nature cannot give. Taking some aspect of\nlife which he wishes to convey by means of line, colour, or tone, he\nsuppresses, alters, composes, emphasizes, till he has expressed his\nfeeling in its purity, with everything immaterial left out and with\nthe things essential to his conception lifted clearly into view. His\nwork is therefore greater and more vital than nature, that is to say\nthan any fragment of nature, for he is looking at the part he renders\n_sub specie aeternitatis_, in the light of the Whole. And living in the\nconception of a great work of art, we live in the Whole; the individual\nhas sunk from view.\n\nZola has finely said, \u201cArt is a bit of Nature seen through the medium\nof a temperament.\u201d This temperament means the artist\u2019s personal way of\nseeing life; it means all that makes his art different from a mere\nrecord. And the audience who see or hear his work become acquainted\nwith this temperament\u2014there is no other way in which the artist can\nexpress it so well. The artist, then, is giving us himself along with\nhis subject, and this is the greatest thing he can give. Whether the\nwars of Troy ever happened is of very little consequence compared with\nHomer\u2019s way of imagining them. And when we have learned Homer\u2019s way we\ncan and do apply it for ourselves, for has he not \u2018infected\u2019 us with\nit? The artist opens our eyes, and leaves us in a world infinitely\nmore significant and beautiful than without his aid we should ever\nhave known it to be. His function is thus the liberation within us of\nfaculties, of powers of living, which otherwise might never have risen\ninto consciousness. We commonly call this \u2018idealizing the facts of\nlife.\u2019 It would be nearer the mark to say that it makes them real. Art\nturns our formal, sensible, external perceptions of things into real\nand vital perceptions, and thus enormously increases the range and\nvolume of life of which those who apprehend it are capable. The glory\nof light, the music of winds and waters, the dignity of man\u2019s common\noccupations, the wonder and sweetness of the love of men and women, all\nthese have been revealed to us by the artist, \u201ca man speaking to men\n... pleased with his own passions and volitions, who rejoices more than\nother men in the spirit of life that is within him.\u201d[178]\n\nThe essential purpose of any art-work, then, is to be _expressive of\nlife_\u2014more expressive than the raw facts of life ever can be. The\npractical problem for every artist in every kind of material is how\nto make his work expressive; only thus can it be what Tolstoy calls\n\u201cinfectious.\u201d To do this, besides the acquirement of technique, he\nmust clearly have something to express. Let us not imagine, however,\nas the \u201cplain honest man\u201d is apt to do, that this must necessarily be\nsomething capable of being put into terms of the intellect\u2014a fact,\na story, a \u201ccriticism of life.\u201d Art is rather an exploration than a\ncriticism of life.[179] And life is very great and manifold. Primarily\nthe painter is a man who likes to apprehend life in colour, the\nsculptor one who apprehends it in the form of masses, the musician in\nsound, the poet in actions, emotions, ideas. Each may, and probably\nmust, have some of the gifts and faculties of the others, but as\npainter, musician, or whatever he may be, he thinks and feels in the\nmaterial of his own art, and he uses that material to express its own\nvirtues, not to imitate those of another.\n\n\nThe question of the relation of art to beauty, and the meaning of\nbeauty itself, may now be considered. What is this mysterious element\nabout the nature of which such a torrent of opinion has been poured out\nsince man first began to reflect on his own states of mind? Between\nthe view which holds it to be an absolute and ultimate principle,\nrecognized in, rather than arising from, experience, and that which\ndenies it any right to be called a principle at all, referring it\nsimply to the effect of habit, and refusing to see any essential\ndifference between the Hottentot conception of beauty and the Greek,\nwe can find, I think, a position in strict accordance both with the\nhistorical facts of the evolution of the conception and with the claims\nof the Idealists.\n\nLet us look back a moment to the analysis of moral action which we\nmade in the preceding chapters. We found then that while all healthy\naction tends to maintain and promote life, there are circumstances\nunder which this life-promoting quality comes more saliently into view\nthan is usual. This happens in general when mere personal desires are\nsubjected to the larger life of the Whole, or when a lower form of\nliving is subjected to a higher. This heightening and intensification\nof life-promoting action we called moral action. And we drew no sharp\nand distinct line between it and ordinary healthy action, for nature\nknows no such distinctions, and the philosophy which tries to establish\nthem is stamped with unreality.\n\nIn regard to Beauty we have only to take up the same point of view as\nwe did in regard to Ethics, and the mystery lies clear before us at\nonce. All nature is in some sense expressive of life, even when it\nseems most desolate or most degraded; for life as we know it means\nchange, variety, contrast, and, under the conditions of space and time,\none can no more have life without death and decay than one can have\nheight without depth. But all nature does not equally express life,\nand much of it, as we have seen, does not express it at all to our\nperceptions. Beauty arises, then, when we find a certain heightening,\na saliency, an intensity in the expression or vitality, whether by\nexternal nature or, in art, by man. Thus Life, not Beauty, is the mark\nof art, but beauty is the signal that the mark has been hit.\n\nAs with the moral, so with the \u00e6sthetic sense\u2014we find it in all stages\nof development. A man or a race whose range of life is contracted\nto a few physical enjoyments and pains will set the idea of beauty\nin whatever expresses or is associated with these enjoyments.\nA wider, loftier, subtler conception of life will bring forth a\nnobler beauty. We are not, on this theory, abandoned to a mere\nsubjective and arbitrary preference, according as we are trained and\naccustomed to this type or to that. There is a perfectly valid and\nobjective criterion in the question, Which represents the fullest and\nstrongest life? The Greek ideal surpasses the Hottentot\u2014to take two\nextremes\u2014because the Greek is capable of all that the Hottentot can\ndo or feel\u2014he takes it all up into his larger life; but the Hottentot\ncan only live in a small sector of the sphere occupied by the Greek.\nInstead, therefore, of the two opposing battlecries of \u2018Art for Morals\u2019\nand \u2018Art for Art,\u2019 let us set that of \u2018Art for Life.\u2019 For Life is\ngreater than either art or morals; it includes and justifies them both.\n\nThe characteristics of Beauty will be further discussed in connexion\nwith some of the individual arts, which we have now to range under our\ngeneral principle.\n\n\nThe more deeply life is studied and felt, the more strongly do two\ngreat and cardinal principles of it come into view. These are opposed\nto each other, but complementary; and thus life in general appears to\nexhibit that singular quality of polarity which seems so intimately\nto pervade all its separate manifestations; everything which lives\nand moves appearing to do so by virtue of the action of two opposing\nforces. These two poles of the axis of life are, on the one hand, what\nwe call Order, Continuity, Rhythm; and on the other, Change, Variety,\nContrast. If Order were not, Change would become chaos. If Change\nwere not, Order would become death. In neither case would growth and\ndevelopment be possible.\n\nAn art, therefore, however abstract, like Music or like the decorative\npattern in a Celtic MS., which expressed the union of these two\nprinciples might be profoundly expressive of life. It need not set\nbefore us any definite living thing provided it expresses the cardinal\nprinciples of all life. It will do this the better the more intimately\nthese principles are blended, as in nature, into a vital unity.\n\nOn the other hand, art does, of course, frequently represent individual\nobjects, and probably had its first distinguishable beginnings in so\ndoing.[180] We may, then, get a broad classification of the arts by\nplacing on one side those which deal with objects of sense, and on\nthe other those which convey life under forms devised by the artist\nhimself, and not found in the external world. One is tempted to call\nthese respectively Imitative and Creative. But, after all, what is\nessentially artistic in the first category is just the fact that it is\n_not_ purely imitative, for, as Mr.\n\nWhistler observed, to suppose that you can get art by copying nature is\nequivalent to thinking that you can get music by sitting on the piano.\nOn the other hand, it does not seem fitting to use so exalted a word\nas creation with reference to the pattern which a Zu\u00f1i Indian draws on\na piece of pottery, while denying it to a painting by Titian. Instead,\ntherefore, of using the words Creative and Imitative\u2014now that we know\nwhat we mean by them\u2014we shall contrast those arts which are directly\nPresentative with those which are Representative. In the one case the\nartist presents us with the whole artistic product, form and substance,\nas devised by himself. In the other, he represents to us forms already\npresented by nature, but re-composed, re-presented, and harmonized by\nhim for an \u00e6sthetic purpose.\n\n\nThe Presentative arts fall into two classes. In one of these Music\nstands alone. Here the artistic purpose is not only dominant but (I\nspeak, of course, of music in its highest and most characteristic\ndevelopment) there is no other purpose whatever. The forms elaborated\nby combinations and sequences of sound have no object except that of\nart and mean nothing apart from that. Hence Music has been called \u2018pure\nstyle.\u2019 We shall recur to this subject when we have dealt with the\nother class, that of the Decorative arts, the essence of which it is\nto add an expression of rhythm, of world-harmony, to objects whose\nprimary purpose is something different\u2014a building, a vase, a piece of\nfurniture, or a hanging. This class, again, can be subdivided into arts\nwhich attain this effect by the structure of the object, and those\nwhich do so by the application of ornament to its surface; both being,\nof course, often combined in the same object.\n\nIn structure the expression of life is gained by so arranging the\nlines and masses as to give an impression that power is at work\u2014that\nsomething is being done\u2014done triumphantly yet not without strain and\neffort. Every object of utility does something\u2014art shows it to us in\nthe act. An example may help to make clear what I mean, and may show\nhow the principle can be applied to any kind of object which may be the\nsubject of artistic treatment.\n\nA Greek temple in its simplest external aspect consists of a\nquadrilateral group of columns surrounding a walled shrine and\nsupporting a low-pitched roof. Nothing could well be simpler than the\nstructural conditions thus expressed. But the artistic expression of\nthem is not so simple. This depends in the main upon the proportion\nobserved between the pillars and the weight, or apparent weight, above\nthem. If the pillars are too massive or too numerous there will be no\nsense of strain, and if they are too slender or too few there will be\nno sense of security. In either case the expression of vital energy in\nthe structure will be imperfect, and beauty, which waits on the golden\nmoment of the perfect adaptation of means to ends, will not dwell in\nthat structure. There is nothing more inartistic than superfluity;\nand there is no lesson more emphatically taught by nature than this.\nThe avoidance of insufficiency is generally enforced in practice on\nutilitarian grounds, but its artistic justification is equally evident.\nThe golden mean is what we call Just Proportion.\n\nThe kind of vitality expressed in Greek architecture is quite different\nfrom that expressed in Gothic, but the \u00e6sthetic basis of both styles is\nthe same; the principle we have in view will justify any art in which\nthere is the spirit of life. A Greek temple shows us power, braced and\nconscious, but in repose. There is nothing daring or sensational in its\nconstruction. Stress and thrust answer each other directly, simply,\nmassively. The stately calm of such a structure might easily become\ndull and monotonous were it not for the delicate sense of proportion\ngoverning the relations of the parts, for the introduction of slight\ndeviations from strict rectangularity and symmetry,[181] and for the\nbeautiful decoration in form and colour on frieze, pediment, and\ncapital.\n\nThe principle of the arch was known in very early times to Pelasgians\nin Greece and to Etruscans in Italy, both of whom, no doubt, derived\nit from the East. But it was valued more for its utility in certain\nconstructions than for its artistic quality, and Greek classical\narchitecture knows nothing of it. It was freely used in Rome, and here\nits extraordinary effect of vital energy as a supporter of weight first\nbegan to be perceived. When Romanesque and Gothic architecture seized\non this principle, the strength of stonework, heretofore essentially\nplacid, leapt into vehement life and action. A Gothic cathedral is the\nexpression of a war of mighty forces held in equilibrium by their own\nantagonism. Every part seems to threaten destruction to some other.\nThere is, of course, a war of forces in a Greek temple also, but there\nthe weight and thrust answer each other, as we have said, directly; a\nvertical column supports a horizontal architrave, and _must_ support\nit, for nothing can give way without crumbling to pieces. In Gothic\nbuilding the counter-stresses meet indirectly, a dead weight or a\nthrust is met by the springing curve of an arch; the whole structure\nwould fall to ruin were it not for something in the stone which is not\nmere solidity, which arises from something vital and energetic in the\nscheme of the structure. The expression of conflict, therefore, as\ncompared with Greek architecture, is greatly intensified; the serenity\nof power has given place to the play of forces rushing into eager and\noften tempestuous action, and saved from being mutually destructive by\nthe control of a far-seeing design.[182]\n\nTo treat fully the various ways in which structure may be made\nexpressive of life would need a volume rather than a chapter. Enough\nhas however been said to indicate the principle and to suggest a\ncriterion by which good and bad structure may be judged. Let us turn\nto the question of ornament. In European art it is very common for\nornament to be used as a kind of adjunct to structure; it follows the\nlines of structure and accentuates them. In Japanese art, however,\nthe contours of an object often appear to determine the ornament\napplied to it as little as a window-frame determines the landscape\nwe see through it. The apparent insouciance of Japanese ornament is,\nhowever, carefully calculated in relation to the field which is to be\ncovered. In either case ornament as such\u2014that is to say, apart from\nwhatever charm of colour and rhythm its individual forms may have\u2014is\nto be interpreted as an attempt to give life by introducing what is\nso characteristic of life\u2014the element of change and variety. Popular\nlanguage has hit the mark when it talks of a \u2018dead\u2019 wall, meaning\nthereby a wall whose surface is unbroken by openings or ornament.\nRuskin has somewhere spoken of the magnificent work of Ghiberti on the\nbronze doors of the Baptistery in Florence as having been primarily\ndesigned to produce \u201ca pleasant bossiness of surface.\u201d The breaking up\nof the surface will not, however, be pleasant unless the forms of the\ndecoration are in themselves good and instinct with life.\n\nThe beauty which so often arises from the effects of use and exposure\nmay perhaps seem in some cases hard to reconcile with the principle\nwhich it is here sought to establish. If aptness for use, it may be\nasked, is an element in the beauty of an object of use, how are we\nto account for the strong appeal which the ruin of a noble building\ncertainly makes to the sense of beauty? For my own part I am inclined\nto think that the taste for ruins is often a sign of a want of taste\nfor art. A beautiful thing is better whole and sound than in decay.\nYet the spectacle of the silent struggle of strength and grace with\ndestructive forces has in it a sense of action, of drama, to which\nbeauty cannot be denied. Apart from the question of actual decay, every\none feels the \u00e6sthetic gain which has been made when a thing ceases\nto be blankly new. A natural adornment has then been added to it. A\nroom that has been lived in, a piece of silver that has been rubbed\nand handled for a lifetime, the steps of an ancient building worn\nby thousands of passing feet, a wall whose angles are softened and\nwhose surface is stained by having fronted the sun and rain for many\nyears\u2014all these have the natural and inimitable charm produced by the\ntouch of life\u2014they no longer stand in crude isolation, they are related\nto the goings-on of the world.\n\n\nOf all the arts there is none which seems to evade analysis so much\nas Music; none whose power is at once so mighty and so mysterious.\nSaying nothing it seems to mean everything. We can think of nothing in\nthe world so lofty, so sweet, so profound as to be the fit embodiment\nof what Music conveys to us. Closely analogous in its outward form to\nwhat in line and colour is called Pattern, we are yet evidently far\nshort of expressing the whole character of Music when we say, what in\nitself is quite true, that it is beautiful pattern in sound. It has\nmore of humanity about it than pattern can have. It neither gives us\nrepresentations of objects of sense, nor even definite emotions, but\nit has a unique power over the moods of the soul. This power seems to\narise first from its complete control over the resources of movement\nand rhythm, secondly from the fact that by virtue of certain acoustic\nlaws it can excite the sense of fulfilment, of suspense, of unexpected\nsweetness, unexpected failure and depression, in a way open to no\nother art which appeals directly to the senses. But rhythm and movement\nare the main things in Music, and the nature of the power which it\nexercises by means of them must now be considered.\n\nRhythm and movement are closely related to each other, but they are not\nquite the same thing. The term rhythm is given to any kind of movement\nwhich is marked by the regular recurrence of stresses, undulations,\nbeats. This is the essential character of the movement of life. Action\nand reaction, systole and diastole, the vibrations of the atom, the\nbreaking of sea-waves, the changes of day and night, the alternations\nof the seasons\u2014wherever we look, into things great or small, we\nfind the same principle of rhythmic movement pervading all. Man has\nfound out how to turn this principle to account in his mechanical\ncontrivances, indeed in all ways in which he endeavours to exercise\nforce on matter. Once get your force to work rhythmically, and it will\ndo ten times the work it is capable of when evenly continuous. Our own\nbodies and nervous systems are attuned to the same law. Under the spell\nof rhythm the mind is capable of moods and emotions which without it\ncould never have been evoked into consciousness. And that makes the\ndifference between telling a thing in verse and in prose. Verse arouses\nthe mood in which the subject has emotional value and significance.\nEven prose always becomes more or less rhythmic when impassioned.\n\nNow Music has a control unrivalled among the arts over this element of\nrhythm. Other arts can suggest rhythm, Music actually _is_ rhythm\u2014it\nis the very pulse of life. It can produce rhythm, moreover, in a\ngreat variety of ways. The mere succession of sounds is rhythm, but\nmusic also has at command the varying stresses or accents of notes,\nalternations in volume of sound, alternations in pitch and quality of\nsound. And since a sequence of notes will cling to the memory, Music\ncan put into rhythmical relations, not only single notes, but groups of\nnotes, _i.e._ musical phrases, and chords, which are musical phrases\nplayed all at once. Music can therefore not only thunder upon the brain\nwith mighty shocks of sound, but can enchant it with the most delicate\ncomplexities. The range of its power over rhythm is incomparably\ngreater and subtler than that of the only two other arts in which\nrhythm works directly on the senses\u2014dancing and metrical verse.\n\nThe element of beauty in a rhythmical phrase seems to depend mainly\non the kind of mood it awakens. There are moods of meditation,\nmoods of tenderness, moods of ardour, moods of yearning, moods of\ngaiety\u2014all these and many more are under the control of rhythmic\nphrases. And there are common-place, self-assertive, bouncing rhythms\nwhich produce corresponding moods, and which may therefore be called\nugly. The precise connexion of certain phrases with certain moods\ndepending, as it does, on a world of dim associations stretching\nfar beyond our personal, conscious life, is probably incapable of\nscientific statement. In the last result I think we should find\nthat the characters of different rhythms are associated with bodily\nmovements, attitudes, gestures, in short with dancing; but a host of\nother associations, branching out from this in many directions, have\nintroduced a complexity of meaning which defies analysis.\n\nTo turn to the consideration of Movement in art, we find that the\npower of rendering this characteristic of life is shared by Music only\nwith Dancing and with Literature. By movement in an art-work I mean\nmovement whose sequences have proportion and design, progressing by\nstages linked to each other through natural and organic associations\ntowards a significant conclusion. In nature, movement can be immensely\nvaried in character. It can be slow or swift, rough and laboured or\nsmooth and fluent, massive and voluminous or arrowy and intense; it\ncan leap or undulate, march or dance, soar or swoop, and each of these\nkinds of movement means something to the spirit of man. All these Music\ncontrols, and can order and harmonize at will. It can represent that\nin the movement of nature which goes beyond and overmasters Rhythm;\nfor Rhythm in itself does not involve Progression; in fact, a perfect\nrhythm would forbid it. If Action and Reaction were always precisely\nequal, we should have a universe as stationary as a spinning top\u2014it\nmight be in vehement action, but it would never develop into something\nnew.[183] Music by its complete command of the phases of movement can\nillustrate the progressive force, the life-impulse in nature, and this\nnot merely by symbols and intellectual forms, but by playing directly\non the nervous system as a harp-player on the strings of his instrument.\n\nNo art is more sensuous than Music, and none more abstract, more\nremoved from what are called realities, in the substance of what it\nconveys. Its entire independence of objects of sense as given in\nexperience, combined with its mastery of the inner law, the spiritual\nsignificance, of life has led to its being ranked by some as the\nhighest of the arts. I doubt if such comparisons are profitable, but it\nis easy to recognize a sense in which Schopenhauer speaks truth when he\nsays that the other arts deal with the shadows of life, Music, however,\nwith its essence.[184]\n\n\nLet us now consider the Representative Arts in the light of the\nprinciple which we are trying to establish. Since they depend on the\nportrayal of objects actually found in nature and not created by the\nartist, their relation to life is obvious. There are, however, some\nminor problems of great interest and intricacy connected with them, and\nthese we must briefly touch on.\n\nA great school of artists and art critics has in recent times\nmaintained that Painting is concerned with nothing except harmonies of\nlight and colour, and that subject is therefore completely indifferent\nto it save in so far as it affords opportunity for the rendering of\nsurfaces variously illuminated and composed. The sun falling on a heap\nof refuse is on this theory as much to the artist as when it lights up\nthe features of Cordelia under her tragic fate. A champion of this,\nas it is called, Impressionist school has explained its particular\npoint of view by suggesting the manner in which two painters, one of\nthe older type and one an Impressionist, would treat such a subject\nas the death of Agamemnon. The former would think of the magnitude of\nthe event and the greatness of the characters of those concerned in\nit\u2014the Impressionist would probably try to fix the attention of the\nspectator on some note of colour such as the red robe which a character\nin the scene might be wearing.[185] Can we judge between these rival\nconceptions of the function of the representative arts?\n\nLet us revert to our formula\u2014Art is the expression of Life. In the\nRepresentative Arts it is the expression of visible life. If one wishes\nto paint the death of Agamemnon it will not do to rely for one\u2019s\neffect upon the spectator\u2019s knowledge of that bit of Greek history and\nto make one\u2019s art impressive simply because its allusions are freely\nrecognizable. So far undoubtedly the Impressionists are right. But on\nthe other hand, the assassination of a great man is a bit of life and\na very notable and memorable one. The visible world is, after all, not\nentirely summed up in the texture of surfaces under light. Character\nand spirit have also their visible manifestations, and the painter who\ncan render them, as well as the aspects of physical life by which they\nare accompanied, is surely cutting a wider swathe of life than he who\nthinks only of the red robe of the actor in a tragic scene. Goethe\nsatirized a whole false theory of art when he remarked in a well-known\nepigram that \u201cpictures which work miracles are mostly very poor\npaintings.\u201d Yet one is reminded of his own feeling before the painting\nof St. Agatha, by Raphael, which he saw on his first Italian journey\nat Bologna. \u201cI have marked this figure well,\u201d he writes. \u201cI shall one\nday read my Iphigenia before her in spirit, and shall put no words\nin the mouth of my heroine which might not have been spoken by this\nsaint.\u201d Was there not something here for Goethe, for all of us, beyond\npainting for the sake of light and colour?\n\nIn considering the plastic arts in relation to subject, the large\nquestion of their function as illustration comes into view. An immense\nrange of art, from that which deals with religion and history down\nto the drawings in our comic journals, evidently presupposes in the\nspectator\u2019s mind a background of information with which the work of\nart itself does not and cannot furnish him. A work of this kind must\ncertainly be said to rely for part of its interest upon something\nwhich is not in the picture. It is therefore not a pure art product;\nit is a complex of artistic with historical or religious or critical\ninterest; but so long as we do not confuse the different elements it\nwould be absurd to say that they may not be legitimately united. Still,\nthe subject of a picture, as a picture, remains always something which\nis in the picture. It would therefore be a contradiction in terms to\nspeak of a poor picture on a great subject. If the painting be poor,\nthe subject is poor\u2014the painter\u2019s intention may have been great, but\nhe has not expressed it. A reference to portraiture may help to make\nthe matter clear. An indifferent portrait of a person held in special\nlove or veneration by me would, if it were not so bad as to belie him,\nhave an interest and value for me which it would entirely lack in the\ncase of one who knew or cared nothing for the person represented. This\nsuperadded interest, the interest which travels through the painting\nto some concrete person or thing behind it, must be thought away before\na work of art can be judged as a work of art. The application to\nreligious or historical art is obvious. Here is a painting in which an\nuninformed observer sees a woman and an angel. What is he to make of\nit? The painter is evidently representing a moment of great exaltation\nand significance. The woman is receiving a message; and the painter can\ntell us, within the limits of his art, not what the message is, but of\nwhat kind it is\u2014sad, or solemn, or joyful, or tragic. He can make all\nthe accessories of the theme, the lighting, colour, etc., reinforce\nhis conception, and the observer can discern, if he has intelligence\nin such things, that the painter is putting before us his conception\nof the way in which a soul conceives a mighty destiny. _That is the\nsubject_; the universal idea, although the label on the frame be \u2018The\nAnnunciation.\u2019\n\nI hope it will not be thought that I am in any degree seeking to\ndisparage the beautiful art of the Impressionists in maintaining that\nthe highest art is that in which there is most of life. Life is so\nabundant and rich that one can find it almost anywhere in sufficient\nmeasure to delight and to enchant. Moreover, the great laws by which\nlife acts and endures, the laws of rhythm, contrast, harmony, can be\namply suggested in the plastic arts even when dealing with the most\nfamiliar things of earth, and these exalt and glorify any theme.\n\nI remember to have heard once of a visitor to an exhibition of\npaintings by\u2014I need not name him\u2014a certain well-known purveyor of\nsensuous religiosities, a kind of nineteenth-century Carlo Dolci. On\nentering he met two ladies passing out through the ante-room, which\nhappened to be hung with landscapes by an artist whom I need not\nhesitate to name, Mr. Mark Fisher. One of them wished to pause over\nthese. The other, who walked with wet eyes and flushed cheek, cried,\n\u201cTrees, trees! Do you want me to look at trees after having had my soul\nuplifted?\u201d This little anecdote will bear some thinking over. Can we\ncall an art bad which has power to uplift the soul? But we have to ask,\nWas it really the art which did so, or the allusions in the art? And\nagain, as in the case of Tolstoy and his canon of infectiousness, we\nmust ask, What soul? It is difficult to imagine that the soul capable\nof being uplifted by the art of the painter in question would be very\nquick to recognize the signs of nobility and heroic passion in real\nlife. To recognize that the trees of Mr. Mark Fisher might be worth\nmany Martyrdoms would be at least a sound beginning of an artistic\neducation.\n\n\nDancing, so far as it is an art, must be classed under the\nRepresentative Arts. Unlike most of these it can render movement;\nand its art is to display movements in a progressive and a rhythmic\nsequence. It is sculpture in motion. Unless when combined with Music,\nhowever, its range of artistic expression is not great, beautiful\neffects are not under strict control, and in their rapid change the\neye cannot properly take them in. The impression left by a succession\nof attitudes seems more confused and more transitory than that of a\nmusical phrase.\n\n\nThe question of the place of Literature in the scheme is one of some\ndifficulty. Unlike all the other arts, its subject matter is not\nbrought directly before the senses, but evoked by conventional symbols\nwhich have in themselves no \u00e6sthetic value whatever. Thus in one sense\nit may be called the only strictly national art in existence. The most\nbeautiful poem in the world, though it were graven in Egyptian basalt,\nwould be a collection of meaningless scratches if the language in\nwhich it was written were lost. If, however, the language be known,\nLiterature has not only the power of evoking the conceptions desired\nby the maker, but also that of working directly on the senses by means\nof the rhythmic qualities of speech. Still the range of rhythmic\nexpression in language is so limited that in itself (_i.e._ as we might\nfeel it if spoken in an unknown tongue) it may be regarded as quite\nsubordinate to the matter conveyed. Strictly, therefore, we ought\nperhaps to call Literature neither a Presentative nor a Representative,\nbut an Evocative art. Within its own circle, however, it falls\nnaturally into classes corresponding to those of the other arts, for\nnarrative literature and drama, which deal with actions and images\ntaken from external life, are clearly Representative in character,\nwhile lyrical and meditative poetry, which place the maker\u2019s mind,\nmood, or passion directly before us, are Presentative.\n\nLiterature has one great superiority over the plastic arts. Like\nMusic, it can render the movement of life. In the dramatic form this\nmovement can be brought to bear directly upon the senses. It resembles\nPainting and Sculpture in being able to deal with concrete objects of\nsense, though, as we have seen, its method of dealing with them is not\nstrictly representative. It stands absolutely alone in the fact that it\ncan render thoughts[186] as well as passions or moods. I should, then,\nbe inclined to reckon Drama as the greatest of all the arts in its\nrange of expression, while at the same time it cannot be claimed for it\nthat it approaches Music in the control of moods or in the intensity\nof effect which audible rhythm alone seems to command. The conclusion\ndrawn by Wagner, that the supreme art must be sought in a combination\nof Music and Drama, is a tempting one, but I doubt its validity. The\nquestion arises whether in this combination one or other of the united\narts does not surrender much of its own special power. So at least\none great poet seems to have felt. \u201cC\u2019est defendu,\u201d announced Victor\nHugo about his dramas, \u201cde mettre des notes de musique le long de ces\nvers.\u201d The poetic use of language has its own conventions and laws,\nand these, when used by a master, are so subtle and so powerful that\nto set his words to music is often to produce an effect of distortion.\nWhat is most truly poetic in the language is turned into an empty mask\nby withdrawing the underlying substance to place it under the control\nof another convention, another law. One can, no doubt, as in the case\nof a Greek chorus, set great poetry to the measure of a simple chant,\nor one can unite rhythmic diction of a broad and simple character with\ngreat music, but the highest poetry and the highest music do not seem\nto combine to good purpose.\n\n\nIn this rapid survey of the arts there are, of course, large and\nattractive fields of exploration which have not been even glanced at.\nIt has been sought on the present occasion merely to give the clue\nby which the arts may be related to the main thesis of this book.\nEthics and Art constitute the two great fields of what we may call the\ndisinterested activity of man. They engage his highest powers, they set\nhim on fire with ardour and sympathy, yet they do nothing, directly\nat least, towards satisfying the primary and personal needs of his\nnature. Our problem has been to relate them to life, and to give them\na place in a scheme of organic unity. Both have been seen to have that\nplace only by reference to something which in one sense is immanent in\nnature, and clearly perceptible there, but which in another aspect is\noutside \u201cthe realm of clock-time and measuring rod,\u201d the transcendent\nWhole. All spiritual ethics, all art which is not of the nature of a\nmere record, must in the last resort rely on this wholeness of things\nfor their justification. But in the earlier parts of this study we have\ntried to show that even the physical organization of nature must rely\non it too; for the driving force of evolution, as well as the framework\nof law in which it works, have been both interpreted as a manifestation\nof the Will to live, to act; of the impulse towards the richest and\nfullest development of the material, animal, and spiritual life. It is\nin this life-impulse that God reveals Himself in the world of time and\nspace. This is the visible aspect of His all-embracing unity; this is\nHis essential relation to earthly things; and this is the clue to their\nrational interpretation as parts of a divine cosmic Order. To learn\nto apprehend the vast Purpose with conscious intelligence, to further\nit with conscious will and with deliberate faith, is the sweet and\nwholesome gospel which Nature preaches to all who have ears to hear.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX A\n\nSUM ERGO COGITO\n\n\nNot to encumber the text with too much abstruse metaphysics, I place\nhere what seem to me some important corollaries of the position stated\nat the close of Chapter I.\n\nIf the Universe is not a mere aggregate but a coherent Whole, then\nit follows of necessity that the units which compose it will have\nrelations not only with each other but also with the Whole. When any\nof these units reaches the stage of consciousness it may be expected\nthat it will become conscious of these relations, and that this\nconsciousness will, like other things, develop in time to greater and\ngreater fulness.\n\nBut here, from the analytic side of the Kantian philosophy, comes the\nwarning which tells us that all we can really know is the stream of\nsensation which passes through our mind and which derives the order\nand coherence it seems to possess from the laws of that mind. How can\nwe transcend this apprehension of fleeting appearances, and attain\nknowledge of the One, the Real, and of our relations with It?\n\nTo answer this question we must look a little deeper into the basis of\nthis doctrine of the subjectivity of human knowledge.\n\nThis subjectivity, when we examine it closely, does not (as it is\noften, I think, supposed) appear to be a special and inexplicable\ncondition imposed in some external way on human consciousness. It is\na condition absolutely bound up with the state of existence implied\nin being a Person, an \u2018I.\u2019 The moment the mind is able to turn inward\nupon itself and to separate the thing known or felt from that which\nknows and feels, in that moment the Thing stands a whole infinity away\nfrom the \u2018I\u2019; they are separated by the analytic faculty of the Ego and\nthey can never _by that faculty_ be reunited. The state of being an\n\u2018I\u2019 is essentially a state of analytic consciousness. The intuitions\nof space and time are simply the instruments by which the analytic\nfaculty works, for it is only by their relations in space and time that\nthings in the world can be divided and distinguished by the intellect.\nThis analytic faculty has, it must be noted, an unbounded power of\ndisintegration. It does not spare even the Ego itself, which it reduces\nto a mere flux of sensations. There is no answer to its destructive\nlogic except the sufficient one, that this boundless power of analysis\nin both directions, inward and outward, is simply a function inevitably\nbound up with being an \u2018I\u2019 at all\u2014it is because of that function that\nI am an \u2018I.\u2019 Every being possessing \u2018I\u2019-hood must, _eo ipso_, be\ncapable of reducing all external things to its own sensations, and of\nexternalizing its own self. One cannot be an \u2018I\u2019 on any other terms.\n\nNow let us suppose that this analytic faculty did not exist, and that\nconsciousness went on, as perhaps it does in beasts, by acts of pure\nintuition, without ever turning inward to regard itself, without ever\nmaking distinctions between external objects, save as a matter of\nunreasoned sense-responsiveness; what would the consequences be then?\n\nClearly in that case object and subject would be one, and knowledge,\n_so far as it went_, would be absolute knowledge. But it would neither\nbe true nor false, since without analysis and comparison there could\nbe no criterion of truth and falsity. Nor, similarly, could the\nactions springing from this state of what may be called Impersonal\nConsciousness be either ethically good or bad in relation to the\ncreature which performed them. In this state, things in space and time\nwould be seen simply as they really are\u2014as moments in the life of the\nSpirit.\n\nOur relations with the Whole, then, must be sought in this region of\npure impersonal consciousness, which implies entire forgetfulness of\nSelf, entire surrender to the life-movement of the universe. We can\nunderstand now why man has always had yearnings for this state, and has\nso often sought to attain it by false means, by the trance or ecstasy\nproduced through self-hypnotism, drugs, etc.; means ultimately and\nnecessarily destructive of their object since a self-regarding motive\nlies at the root of them.\n\nIf there are illegitimate ways of attaining this state what, it may be\nasked, are the legitimate ones? The difficulty of this question lies\nin the fact that the state of impersonal consciousness disappears the\nmoment we begin to think about it. We live in it, in fact, a great deal\nmore than, in our states of analytic self-consciousness, we have any\nidea of. But as a rule we only live in it with a part of our nature\u2014the\ninstinctive, animal part. To enter it with our whole nature, to live\nin it as Man, two ways have been found and these we call the way of\nReligion and the way of Art; or, if we describe them by the faculties\nrespectively dominant in each, as the way of Love and the way of\nBeauty. Through these essentially harmonizing and synthesizing powers\nMan can for a while merge himself in the vast ocean of Being, and\nreturn from it, renewed and purified, to the narrow confines of his\nselfhood.\n\nBut return he must; for selfhood is not an accident or a deformity,\nnot a thing to be despised and shuffled off the moment we can get rid\nof it. It, also, is a power of life, and through it we are enabled to\nharvest an immense store of experiences. Through the Ego, no doubt,\nwith its rapacious egotisms, come sin and wrong into the world; but,\nas Heracleitus finely says, \u201cMen would not have known the name of\nJustice if these things had not been.\u201d Moreover, man has to act as\nwell as to be and to feel. For all complex action, regarding distant\nends and involving choice and discrimination, the faculty of analysis,\nwith which selfhood is bound up, is absolutely essential. Man is not\nto be raised in the scale of being by cutting away any part of his\nnature, but by developing the whole harmoniously; and the analytic\nself-consciousness is harmonized with the impersonal consciousness when\nthe one is used to translate into its own sphere the experiences of the\nother\u2014to fashion in the visible and material life some counterpart of\nthe realities known in the spirit.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX B\n\nCO-OPERATION AND COMPETITION\n\n\nIn Kropotkin\u2019s Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution, it seems to me (for\nall that it finds little favour with some men of science) that real\nlight has been thrown on certain principles of cardinal importance\nwhich had been obscured in the too exclusive contemplation of the\nDarwinian principle of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for\nlife. Ample proof is given by Kropotkin of the truth of the following\npassage:\u2014\n\n    \u201cAs soon as we study animals\u2014not in laboratories and museums\n    only, but in the forest and the prairie, in the steppe and the\n    mountains\u2014we at once perceive that though there is an immense\n    amount of warfare and extermination going on amidst various\n    species, and especially among various classes of animals, there is,\n    at the same time, as much, or perhaps even more, of mutual support,\n    mutual aid, and mutual defence amidst animals belonging to the same\n    species, or, at least, to the same society. Sociability is as much\n    a law of nature as mutual struggle. Of course it would be extremely\n    difficult to estimate, however roughly, the relative numerical\n    importance of both these series of facts. But if we resort to an\n    indirect test, and ask Nature: \u2018Who are the fittest: those who\n    are continually at war with each other, or those who support one\n    another?\u2019 we at once see that those animals which acquire habits\n    of mutual aid are undoubtedly the fittest. They have more chances\n    to survive, and they attain, in their respective classes, the\n    highest development of intelligence and bodily organization. If\n    the numberless facts which can be brought forward to support this\n    view are taken into account, we may safely say that mutual aid is\n    as much a law of animal life as mutual struggle, but that, as a\n    factor of evolution, it most probably has a far greater importance,\n    inasmuch as it favours the development of such habits and\n    characters as ensure the maintenance and further development of the\n    species, together with the greatest amount of welfare and enjoyment\n    of life for the individual, with the least waste of energy\u201d (pp. 5,\n    6. 1903).\n\nFrom the mass of facts which Kropotkin has adduced in support of the\nabove-quoted view, I cannot forbear quoting one, an observation of his\nown, relating to a creature of by no means high organization:\u2014\n\n    \u201cAs to the big Molucca crab (_Limulus_), I was struck (in 1882, at\n    the Brighton Aquarium) with the extent of mutual assistance which\n    these clumsy animals are capable of bestowing upon a comrade in\n    case of need. One of them had fallen upon its back in a corner of\n    the tank, and its heavy, saucepan-like carapace prevented it from\n    returning to its natural position, the more so as there was in the\n    corner an iron bar which rendered the task still more difficult.\n    Its comrades came to the rescue, and for one hour\u2019s time I watched\n    how they endeavoured to help their fellow-prisoner. They came two\n    at once, pushed their friend from beneath, and after strenuous\n    efforts succeeded in lifting it upright; but then the iron bar\n    would prevent them from achieving the work of rescue, and the crab\n    would again fall heavily upon its back. After many attempts, one\n    of the helpers would go in the depth of the tank and bring two\n    other crabs, which would begin with fresh forces the same pushing\n    and lifting of their helpless comrade. We stayed in the Aquarium\n    for more than two hours, and, when leaving, we again came to cast a\n    glance upon the tank: the work of rescue still continued! Since I\n    saw that, I cannot refuse credit to the observation quoted by Dr.\n    Erasmus Darwin, namely, that \u2018the common crab during the moulting\n    season stations as sentinel an unmoulted or hard-shelled individual\n    to prevent marine enemies from injuring moulted individuals in\n    their unprotected state\u2019\u201d (pp. 10, 12). #/\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX C\n\nIS LIFE WORTH LIVING?\n\n\nThis grave question is, according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, one which\nmust be \u201cdefinitely raised and answered before entering on any ethical\ndiscussion\u201d (Data of Ethics, \u00a7 9). He goes on to restate it in the\nform: Does life yield \u201ca surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful\nfeeling?\u201d and he argues that \u201cgoodness or badness can be ascribed to\nacts which subserve life or hinder life only on this supposition\u201d (\u00a7\n10). But can one really strike a balance between pleasures and pains in\nhuman life? Mr. Spencer himself admits, later on, that pleasures and\npains, \u201cunlike in their kinds, intensities and times of occurrence,\nare incommensurable\u201d (\u00a7 57). Moreover, the maintenance of life in the\npresent day means passing it on for countless generations ahead, and\nhow can we feel satisfied that the conditions then existing will make\nmore for pleasure than for pain, even assuming that they do so now?\nThe question, then, whether it is good to maintain life does not seem\ncapable of philosophic decision on this ground.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s sense of logic, however, seems to me to be here at fault\nas well as his fundamental conception of ethics. The question which\nhe begins by asking is not the question which he ends by answering.\nIn the original question, Is life worth living? a comparison is set\nup between living and not-living. But we find this merging, in Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s mind, into the quite different comparison of one _kind_ of\nliving with another kind of living\u2014the pleasurable and the painful.\nLet us translate the original question into the language of Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s ethical system. In that system \u201cthe good is universally the\npleasurable\u201d (\u00a7 10). The word \u2018worth,\u2019 then, connotes pleasure, and the\nquestion resolves itself simply into this, Is it more pleasurable to\nlive than not to live? Seeing that in not-living there is no pleasure\nat all, the only possible answer is an affirmative\u2014the question answers\nitself. And in fact this must always be the case whatever connotation\nwe attach to the word \u2018worth,\u2019 for life has at any rate possibilities,\nwhereas not-living has none. The question, then, \u201cof late so much\nagitated,\u201d is really a nonsense question, and the reason why it is\nnecessarily devoid of meaning will appear at once when we analyze the\nterms. For \u2018worth,\u2019 \u2018goodness,\u2019 \u2018blessedness,\u2019 \u2018pleasure,\u2019 and so\nforth, are simply _terms of life_ and have no significance whatever\napart from it. So the question, Is it better to live than not to live?\nis merely the same thing as to ask, Is there more life in living than\nin not living? Instead, therefore, of the unverifiable assumption on\nwhich Spencer bases his system of ethics, that life yields on the whole\na surplus of pleasure over pain, we merely affirm the indubitable\nproposition that it yields a surplus of life.\n\nFrom another side than that of the Spencerian ethics, however, it may\nbe argued, against the conception which we are trying to substitute\nfor it, that, if Life is something more than the physical phenomena\nattending it on earth, if, in fact, it is what we call \u2018immortal,\u2019 we\nneed be at no pains to preserve it for ourselves or others in the form\nin which we find it going on here, since death can merely have the\neffect of translating it into another form.\n\nTrue; but suppose us to hold as lightly by _that_ form as we are urged\nto do by this\u2014suppose us to show no persistence in _any_ of the forms\nof being into which our life may pass, what kind of life would be\nrealizable under such conditions of eternal volatility? Could life\never have risen above the stage of the _Am\u0153ba_ if the _Am\u0153ba_ had not\nthe instinct to maintain itself on earth? Can Man ever hope to rise to\nanything higher without a strong element of continuity, of fixity, of\n\u2018fighting it out on these lines\u2019 in his feeling about the form of life\nin which he actually finds himself? It is through the thousand ties of\nduty and service, love and joy, which we form with the visible world\naround us that we realize the highest life of which we are at present\ncapable. A light-minded readiness to snap those ties would imply an\nincapacity for forming them. Here, as always, we find that Nature tells\nus nothing to any good purpose unless we look at her as an organic\nwhole. One cannot live by any isolated principle or factor, however\ngreat and true.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX D\n\nST. FRANCIS THE POET\n\n\nNo one can read St. Francis\u2019s one poem, the _Canticle of the Sun_,\nwithout feeling that had poetry claimed and won him in time, his might\nhave been one of the greatest and sweetest of Italian voices. The story\nof its composition has a touching beauty. Towards the end of his life,\nwhen in the deepest dejection over the failure of his Order to live\nthe life of joyful humility, unworldliness, and poverty to which he\nhad pledged it, he came, blind and ill, to S. Clare\u2019s Convent at St.\nDamien, on his way to Rieti, where his malady was to be treated. In\nthis darkest hour of his life the untroubled faith and loving sympathy\nof his old friend brought consolation and peace to his torn spirit. She\nmade him, it is said, a cell of reeds in the convent garden, where he\ncould be free to come and go as he wished. \u201cLittle by little,\u201d writes\nPaul Sabatier in his Vie de S. Fran\u00e7ois, \u201cthe man of ancient days\nrevived in him, and at times the Sisters heard the echo of strange\nchants, which mingled with the murmuring of the pines and olives, and\nwhich seemed to come from the cell of reeds.\u201d One day, after a long\nconversation with Clare, he had sat down at the monastery table for\nrefection. Scarcely had he begun to eat when he fell into a kind of\ntrance. \u201cPraise be to God!\u201d he cried, on coming to himself. He had\ncompleted the _Canticle of the Sun_.\n\nIt is said that for a week afterwards he forgot his breviary, and\npassed his days in repeating to himself the strophes of his wonderful\npoem\u2014a work in which, for all its religious ardour, the note of\nasceticism is little apparent; unless one sees it in his usual quaint\nadoption of the things of creation into a religious community! I append\na literal translation, omitting two later verses composed for special\noccasions and not belonging to the first pure inspiration. It is\nwritten in unrhymed irregular stanzas:\u2014\n\nCANTICLE OF THE SUN\n\n    Most high, all-powerful, good Lord,\n        thine are praises, glory, honour and all benediction.\n        To Thee alone, Most high, they are due,\n        and no man is worthy to name Thee.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, with all Thy creatures,\n        especially Brother my Lord the Sun.\n        He gives the day, and by him Thou showest light,\n        and he is beautiful and radiant, with great splendour.\n        Of Thee, Most High, he is the symbol.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, for Sister Moon and for the Stars;\n        in the sky Thou hast formed them, bright, precious and beautiful.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, for Brother Wind,\n        and for the Air and the Clouds, and for the clear sky, and for\n          every kind of weather,\n        by which Thou givest sustenance to all Thy creatures.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, for Sister Water\n        who is so serviceable and humble and precious and chaste.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, for Brother Fire,\n        by whom Thou dost illuminate the night.\n        He is handsome and gay, bold and strong.\n\n    Have praise, Lord, for Sister our Mother, the Earth,\n        who nourishes and takes care of us,\n        and brings forth divers fruits with coloured flowers,\n          and the grass.\n\n    Praise ye and bless the Lord and render thanks to Him,\n        and serve Him with great humility!\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX E\n\nISABELLA AND CLAUDIO\n\n\nThe ethics of sex-relations has always formed a crucial question in\nethical systems. Let me recall a remarkable debate upon it which\ntook place recently between a champion of the Spencerian system, Dr.\nSaleeby, and Mr. W. S. Lilly, who represented, of course, the view of\nCatholic orthodoxy.\n\nMr. Lilly, in an article on Shakespere\u2019s Religion contributed to\nthe _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1904, was led to dwell on \u201cthe\nstrikingly Catholic ethos of the play Measure for Measure, informed\nas it is by the idea, quite alien from the Protestant mind, of the\nsurpassing excellence and sacrosanct character of virginal chastity.\u201d\nHazlitt, whom Mr. Lilly takes to represent the typical Protestant view,\nhad declared himself \u201cnot greatly enamoured\u201d of Isabella\u2019s inflexible\npurity, and had expressed his want of \u201cconfidence in the virtue that is\nsublimely good at another\u2019s expense.\u201d Mr. Lilly added that Spencer\u2019s\nteaching would have countenanced Hazlitt\u2019s judgment and enjoined upon\nIsabella compliance with Angelo\u2019s desire. Dr. Saleeby having denounced\nthis as an \u201coutrageous\u201d perversion of Spencer\u2019s meaning, Mr. Lilly\nvindicates himself in a letter to the _Fortnightly_ as follows:\u2014\n\n    \u201cI pointed, in a letter appearing in your July number, to Mr.\n    Spencer\u2019s express declaration, in the _Data of Ethics_, that the\n    elements out of which the conceptions of right and wrong are\n    framed are pleasures and pains, and that \u2018conduct is considered\n    by us as good or bad, according as its aggregate results to self\n    or others, or both, are pleasurable or painful.\u2019 I concluded,\n    therefore, that if we are to go by Mr. Spencer\u2019s \u2018scientific\n    ethics,\u2019 Isabella ought to have been willing to make the sacrifice\n    of her virginity in order to prevent the disagreeable feeling\n    which would be caused to herself through the loss of a beloved\n    brother, to Claudio through the process of decapitation, and to\n    Angelo through disappointed desire, and thus to have procured, as\n    \u2018aggregate results,\u2019 a great balance of pleasure over pain to all\n    concerned\u201d (_Fortnightly Review_, September, 1906).\n\nDr. Saleeby\u2019s answer to this is the obvious one that the Spencerian\nethics do not contemplate immediate personal pleasures and pains, but\nrather ultimate utility to the race at large, and that \u201cIsabella\u2019s\nvirtue, if merely by example alone, would make for the strengthening\nof the society in which she found herself.\u201d Mr. Lilly then practically\nsurrenders his first position\u2014he admits that Spencer\u2019s \u201cscientific\nethics\u201d are intended to have little or no concern with the immediate\nsensations of Isabella, Claudio, and Angelo, but he turns to confront\nDr. Saleeby and Spencer from a new and much stronger position. What\nclaim, he asks, have \u201cscientific ethics\u201d on the individual? Ultimate\nutility for the race might (if one could estimate it correctly) be\ntaken as giving us the _what_ of moral action, but can it ever give\nus the _why_? Isabella was not thinking of \u201cultimate utility\u201d in\nher refusal, but of the laws that Sophocles wrote of so memorably,\n\u201cunwritten and invincible laws which ever live, and no man knows their\nbirthplace.\u201d She was not thinking of the effect of her example\u2014her\naction would have been, and ought to have been, just the same though\nshe had had the most complete assurance that none but Angelo and\nherself would ever know the reason for Claudio\u2019s pardon. The motive\nwhich constrained her was derived from the system of ethics which\nSpencer\u2019s was constructed to replace. This new system has never\nsucceeded in supplying an answer to the demand of the individual man or\nwoman, \u2018What is the advantage of the race to me that I should sacrifice\nthe least of my inclinations for its sake?\u2019 But till that piercing\nquestion is answered, all hedonistic systems, however elaborate and\nperfect their fabric, are building on \u201cwood, hay, stubble.\u201d Touch their\nfoundations with the pitiless edge of that question, and in a moment\nthey are in the dust. So far, in effect, Mr. Lilly.\n\nBefore we go on to deal with these conflicting views of the ethical\nproblem in Measure for Measure, let us take a parallel presentation in\nliterature of the same problem, in which the implied judgment of the\ndramatist appears entirely different. Maeterlinck, in his Monna Vanna,\nshows us a beautiful and high-souled woman, the loving and faithful\nwife of the commandant of the city of Pisa. The city is beleaguered\nby foes, its power of defence is at an end, an assault is imminent,\nand the inhabitants will be exposed to all the havoc and outrage which\nattended warfare in the days when the conceptions so much prized by Mr.\nLilly held undisputed sway. The captain of the besieging Florentine\nforces, a great soldier of fortune named Prinzivalle, had been an\nancient playmate of Monna Vanna, and, unknown to her, had been her\nardent lover. Being entreated for mercy, he sends an ultimatum. Let\nMonna Vanna spend a night in his tent, and he will provision the city\nand withdraw his army next day. Amid the indignation and distraction\nwhich the cruel dilemma causes in the household of the prince, Monna\nVanna\u2019s resolve shapes and hardens itself. She decides to sacrifice\nherself for the city. But Prinzivalle finds her a woman of marble.\nHer soul is so high-strung with heroic devotion that she regards her\nbody as little as a cast-off rag\u2014she is become as incapable of fear\nor shrinking as she is of base desire. His passion is chilled by the\nicy completeness of her self-surrender, while all that is noble in him\nresponds to her nobility, and the city is saved without the terrible\nsacrifice which she was ready to perform.\n\nSuch is the tale of Monna Vanna, so far as it concerns our present\ndiscussion. In reading it, it is impossible not to feel that she was\nright, just as in reading Measure for Measure it is impossible not to\nfeel that Isabella was right. What has a system of natural ethics, a\nsystem based on the conception of life and nature put forward in this\nbook, to say upon the searching ethical question involved in these two\ngreat dramas? It is not an easy nor a pleasant question to subject to\nphilosophic analysis, but it is a very important and critical one.\n\nIn the first place neither science nor sense will, I think, agree with\nMr. Lilly\u2019s estimate of \u201cthe surpassing excellence and sacrosanct\ncharacter of virginal chastity.\u201d Virginity, _in itself_ and apart\nfrom all qualifying circumstances, is the reverse of excellent and\nadmirable. It means death, not life; it violates nature. What is really\nsound doctrine in this connexion is not the sanctity and excellence\nof virginity, but the deep degradation of making sexual relations a\nsubject of barter. Wherever this prevails, whatever the church and the\nlaw may or may not have had to do with the transaction, the beauty and\nromance of life is blighted and destroyed. There is no conquest of\nculture which should be guarded more devotedly than the dignity and\nsweetness which are brought into the relations of man and woman by\nlove, as the great poets have understood that word, love moving in its\nguarded circle of mutual trust and intimacy. A life is well lost in\ndefence of this most sacred treasure of the spirit.\n\nIsabella and Monna Vanna both felt this truth in the depths of their\nnature as all good women do. Yet absolute laws of action can rarely,\nif ever, be laid down to cover every individual case. One can conceive\neither of them deciding as Monna Vanna actually did. But in the realm\nof high tragedy which we are now dealing with, where principles and\nactions have a simplicity and integrity rarely found in common life,\nit must be felt that neither of them could have taken up life again as\nif nothing had happened. Had they recognized that there were higher\nreasons stringent enough to compel them to tread the way to that\nsacrifice, they would, I think, like the Roman Lucretia, have solemnly\nmarked it with their life-blood as an expiation, and as a warning, were\nit only to Prinzivalle or Angelo, that such a thing must not be done\nsave at the most terrible cost that man can pay. For Isabella, then,\nthe problem would practically resolve itself into the question whether\nshe should surrender her own life for that of a single worthless\nrelative. There was no moral obligation on her to do that. Had she\nloved him so intensely as to go willingly to her doom for his sake, no\none could have blamed her; no one could blame her if she refused, and\nbade him summon up his manhood to die for his own sin.\n\nBut in Monna Vanna\u2019s case it was not a single life that was at stake,\nbut the life and honour of a multitude of men and women with whose\nprotection, moreover, she was, in part, charged by the high position\nshe held in their midst. If right and wrong are to be interpreted as\nMr. Lilly would interpret them, solely with regard to the arbitrary\ncommands of a supernatural Power, then the _extent_ to which a given\naction may influence life can hardly be a matter of any moment. On the\nother hand, in Spencer\u2019s scheme, with its criterion of the greatest\nultimate pleasure of the greatest number, hardly anything else can\nmatter except precisely this question of the extent or area affected\nby our action. In the scheme of natural ethics which I am trying\nto commend, and which, if I am right, grows logically out of the\nconception of a living universe, the element of _extent_ has its due\nplace in determining action, but none in fixing the character of the\naction. And this, it may be observed, is just what the good sense of\nhumanity has practically arrived at in its daily judgments and doings.\nNo ordinary man would be required by any ethical law to lay down his\nlife as a substitute for another who had no claim on him. But for a\ncommunity, or a man such as a sovran, who for the time represents a\ncommunity and embodies its interests, it would be thought base not to\ndie if occasion demanded it. And so Monna Vanna might rightly feel\nherself constrained to do for her city what Isabella was in no way\nrequired to do for a brother, but the quality of the action would\nremain in each case the same, and the tragedy could have ended nobly\nonly in the one stern way.\n\nOn the general question of the ordering of sex-relations, it needs no\nargument to show that the conditions fixed by nature forbid them, in\nthe interests of life, to be casual and fleeting. On the other hand\nto require that, when these relations have once been entered into, no\nvices, no cruelty, no variance of any kind on either side would justify\nthe dissolution of the connexion and the formation of a new one, is\nsurely a superstitious exaggeration of a principle in itself right and\nsound. Probably the law and practice in England at the present day\nare as good a rough approximation to a sound marriage system as man\nhas yet devised; with, however, this large qualification, that cases\nof divorce when they come before the law should be heard _in camera_.\nThe Anglo-Saxon has not yet got rid of all his superstitions, and his\nbelief in salvation by publicity is distinctly one of them.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] Metabolism: see p. 27.\n\n[2] J. Reinke. Die Welt als Tat, p. 173. The term \u2018development\u2019\n(_Entwicklung_) includes both what we commonly understand by that term\n(as, the transformation of an embryo into a complete animal) and also\nwhat we call Evolution, the development of one species into another.\n\n[3] See p. 24.\n\n[4] Sylva Sylvarum, Century VI.\n\n[5] Zoonomia, Vol. II, p. 247, third edition, 1801. Darwin is here\nadopting David Hume\u2019s conjecture, which is worked out in some detail in\nthe Zoonomia, the conclusion being that probably \u201cone and the same kind\nof living filaments is and has been the cause of all organic life\u201d (p.\n244). He attributed evolution to internal forces impressed on living\nmatter by the Creator.\n\n[6] He taught that nature had produced a multitude of disconnected\nparts which afterwards combined and recombined at random until the\nappropriate parts had come together and remained stable.\n\n[7]\n       \u0391\u1f30\u1f7c\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9. \u03b4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c7\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f36\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n       \u039f\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f20\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd.\n                                   Jac. Anth., II, 20.\n\n[8] \u201cIt has lately become the fashion, at least among the younger\nschool of biologists, to attach small value to natural selection, if\nnot, indeed, to regard it as a superseded formula.\u201d (A. Weismann, The\nEvolution Theory, Engl. trans., II, 391.)\n\n[9] Text Book of Botany, p. 3. English translation by Dr. H. C. Porter,\n1898. In the fifth German edition, which served as the basis of a\nrevised English translation (1903), another passage (taking note of De\nVries\u2019 Mutations Theory) is substituted for the above quoted, but the\nessential meaning is the same.\n\n[10] Leitfaden in das Studium der experimentellen Biologie der\nWassertiere, p. 67. The subject is ably treated by Keyserling, Das\nGef\u00fcge der Welt, p. 190.\n\n[11] For instance, the development of an embryo in the womb takes place\nin strict accordance with physico-chemical laws. But withdraw the\nelement which we call _life_ and how different a set of processes would\nat once supervene! Yet the physical energies in the embryo would remain\nin amount exactly what they were before.\n\n[12] See Weismann, The Evolution Theory, II, 358.\n\n[13] For my own part, I may say I have a difficulty in conceiving the\nDivine under the human and limited category of intelligent personality.\n\n[14] Das Gef\u00fcge der Welt, Hermann Graf v. Keyserling, 1906.\n\n[15] See Appendix A.\n\n[16] See Jagadis Chunder Bose, Response in the Living and the\nNon-Living, _passim_. The following passage sums up the results of\nmany delicate experiments in the response to electrical stimulus.\n\u201cWe have seen,\u201d writes the Indian physicist, \u201cthat the criterion by\nwhich vital response is differentiated is its abolition by the action\nof certain reagents\u2014the so-called poisons. We find, however, that\n\u2018poisons\u2019 also abolish the response in plants and metals. Just as\nanimal tissues pass from a state of responsiveness while living to\na state of irresponsiveness when killed by poisons, so also we find\nmetals transformed from a responsive to an irresponsive condition by\nthe action of similar poisonous reagents\u201d (p. 188).\n\n[17] At a meeting of the British Association in 1905, Professor H.\nA. Miers, in a lecture on \u2018The Growth of a Crystal,\u2019 is reported to\nhave said, The most wonderful feature of crystals was the manner\nin which they grew, just as though they were living things. Two\nfeatures deserved special attention. The first was the remarkable\npower crystals possessed of healing themselves when mutilated. If a\ngrowing crystal were removed from a solution, broken at one of its\ncorners, and re-immersed in the solution, it would continue to grow,\nand as it grew would restore the missing part, and become once more a\ncompletely symmetrical figure. This power of continuing to grow was\npossessed by a crystal even after countless ages, so soon as it was\nimmersed into the appropriate solution. In this sense the crystal was\nimmortal, for it never lost its vitality, or power of growing. The\nother remarkable feature was the growth of crystals in over-saturated\nsolutions. In solutions only slightly over-saturated, no spontaneous\ngeneration of crystals was possible. It was true that a solution only\nslightly over-saturated would often begin to crystallize, apparently\nspontaneously, when exposed to the air, but this was because there were\nminute crystal fragments of the dissolved substance floating about in\nthe air which got into the solution with the dust and so inoculated\nthe solution with crystal germs, just as the human body might be\ninoculated with disease by a disease germ. If these germs were kept\nout, the solution would not crystallize until it was very strongly\nover-saturated, and then, at a certain strength, it would suddenly\nbegin to crystallize spontaneously and with great rapidity.\u2014_Times_,\nAugust 5, 1907.\n\n[18] The Nature and Origin of Life (Eng. trans.), p. 250.\n\n[19] It is not to be assumed, however, that these substances are merely\npassive objects in the process. The life which is in them has doubtless\nas much to do with the result as the life which is in the plant. This\nis a side of the question which calls for further investigation.\n\n[20] It is however suggested by Professor E. Ray Lankester, in his\narticle, \u2018Protozoa,\u2019 in the Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, that the most\nprimitive forms of organic life did not possess chlorophyll but fed on\nalbuminoids, etc., which constituted the earliest steps in their own\nevolution.\n\n[21] In Beddard\u2019s Animal Coloration note is taken of the green fur of\nthe sloth as a most uncommon if not unique phenomenon. It has been\nascertained that the sloth has grooved or fluted hairs, which form the\nhabitat of a minute green fungus to which the colour is due.\n\n[22] Or starch, which easily decomposes into sugar, and which is\ncomposed of the same elements.\n\n[23] Ray Lankester, _op. cit._\n\n[24] Verworn, General Physiology, pp. 102, 478: \u201cPhysiological\nchemistry has shown that between the two kinds of substance very\nessential chemical differences exist, which prove that living substance\nexperiences in dying pronounced chemical changes. A widespread\ndifference between the two consists in their reaction. The reaction\nof living substance is almost without exception alkaline or neutral,\nand with death changes usually to acid.... Physiological chemistry has\nshown similar changes in death in great number. All these facts prove\nthat in the death of living cell-substance certain chemical compounds\nundergo transformations; hence substances exist in it which are not to\nbe found in dead cell-substance.\u201d\n\n[25] In 1892. An English translation of B\u00fctschli\u2019s work on Microscopic\nFoams and Protoplasm, by E. A. Minchin, appeared in 1894. The nucleus\nis really a form of protoplasm, chiefly differentiated from the\n\u2018cytoplasm,\u2019 or protoplasm of the cell, by containing a large amount of\nphosphorus.\n\n[26] The Cell in Development and Inheritance, 2nd edition, p. 9.\n\n[27] By J. A. and M. R. Thomson, 1904.\n\n[28] The Evolution Theory, II, p. 391.\n\n[29] _Ibid._, I, p. 368.\n\n[30] _Ibid._, I, p. 404.\n\n[31] The Evolution Theory, I, p. 353.\n\n[32] _Ibid._, II, p. 52.\n\n[33] But note the transition stage exemplified in the natural history\nof crystals (_vide_ p. 22).\n\n[34] \u201cIt has been Weismann\u2019s great service to place the keystone\nbetween the work of the evolutionists and that of the cytologists, and\nthus to bring the cell-theory and the evolution-theory into organic\nconnexion\u201d (E. B. Wilson, The Cell, p. 13).\n\n[35] Prof. Wilson\u2019s work on the cell (see note on p. 33) may be\nreferred to for a comprehensive and detailed statement of all that is\nknown at present on this subject.\n\n[36] According to Wilson (_op. cit._) this was guessed by Haeckel in\n1866, and confirmed in 1884-5 by the almost simultaneous discoveries of\nO. Hertwig, Strasburger, K\u00f6lliker, and Weismann.\n\n[37] Sixteen have been counted in the human cell. A grasshopper has\ntwelve, a lily twenty-four. The number is almost always an even one,\nbut as with everything in Nature there are exceptions to the rule.\n\n[38] The process briefly described above is that of \u2018mitotic\u2019 division\n(\u03bc\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, a thread, from the appearance of the chromosomes). Amitotic\ndivision, in which the cell and nucleus simply divide in two without\nthe formation of chromosomes, also occurs under certain conditions, but\nis usually an abnormal or degenerative process (cf. Wilson, The Cell,\npp. 116-119).\n\n[39] \u201cEvery animal appears as a sum of vital entities, each of\nwhich bears within itself the complete character of life\u201d (Virchow,\nCellular-pathologie, p. 12, 1858).\n\n[40] Weismann, The Evolution Theory, I, 251.\n\n[41] It is cast out into the cytoplasm\u2014the substance surrounding the\nnucleus\u2014where it degenerates (see Wilson, The Cell, p. 147).\n\n[42] _Am\u0153b\u00e6._ See p. 30.\n\n[43] The Evolution Theory, I, 265.\n\n[44] The Cell, p. 178.\n\n[45] Scientific Papers and Addresses, II, pp. 862-3.\n\n[46] English trans., 2nd edition (1903), p. 159.\n\n[47] The Cell, p. 434.\n\n[48] Against this view might be quoted the fact that the unfertilized\neggs sometimes laid by the workers (imperfect females) of bee and ant\ncommunities always develop into drones.\n\n[49] Pp. 262-3. The bird was examined by Prof. Max Weber, of Amsterdam,\nand Mr. Beddard refers to the _Zoologischer Anzeiger_ for 1890, p. 508,\nfor Weber\u2019s account of the case.\n\n[50] The now famous Mendelian Law of Inheritance, first discovered in\n1865 by Mendel, an Augustinian monk and Abbott of Br\u00fcnn, and completely\nignored till the year 1900, when it was rediscovered by De Vries and\nothers, is also strongly confirmatory of Weismann\u2019s analysis of the\nprinciple of heredity. According to this law it is possible, as it\nwere, to isolate any particular characteristic of a species or even\n(if heritable) of an individual, and by a definite system of crossing\nto attach this characteristic _alone_ to any other variety capable\nof crossing with the first. This means that inheritance is governed\nby separable units of formative energy. These units are Weismann\u2019s\ndeterminants. The discovery of the methods of turning this principle\nto practical account is obviously of great importance for agriculture\nand stockbreeding. The law has some inexplicable limitations which are\nnow closely engaging the attention of biologists. It is impossible to\nenter upon the subject more fully here, but a good account of it will\nbe found in Lock\u2019s Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, and in a\nbrochure, An Address on Mendelian Heredity, by W. Bateson, reprinted\nfrom _Brain_, pt. cxiv, 1906.\n\n[51] The actual stimulus which prompts the division is probably to be\nfound in the disturbance of equilibrium which arises when the cell is\ntaking in more nutriment than its digestive system can deal with. This,\nof course, does not explain why it should divide instead of dying of\nindigestion.\n\n[52] See Strasburger, _loc. cit._\n\n[53] The Evolution Theory, I, 402-3.\n\n[54] The subject of degenerated and lost organs is very fully treated\nby M. Edmond Perrier in his Trait\u00e9 de Zoologie, pp. 325 _sqq._ It may\nbe noted that animals which are _fixed_ usually lack eyes, even in\nlight. In the depths of the sea, where total darkness reigns except\nfor the phosphorescence emitted by certain animals, it is found that\nsome creatures have completely lost their organs of sight, while others\nhave them extraordinarily developed. Those which have lost them are the\nwalkers (_Crustace\u00e6_); those which show an exceptional development are\nthe swimmers. This goes to show that the needs of the animal, rather\nthan the external conditions, are the determining cause.\n\nCave fishes are all extremely sensitive to light, which affects them\ndisagreeably, even when the optic nerve is wholly destroyed. See Armand\nVir\u00e9, La Faune Actuelle des Cavernes, _Revue des Id\u00e9es_, March 15,\n1905, and La Faune Souterraine de France, 1900.\n\n[55] A. R. Wallace, Darwinism, chapters III. and XV.\n\n[56] Origin of Species, chapter II.\n\n[57] Sexual selection\u2014the competition of males and females for their\nmates\u2014is merely a form of natural selection, and need not be specially\ndealt with here.\n\n[58] Origin of Species, chapter V.\n\n[59] See Eimer, Organic Evolution (Eng. trans.), pp. 173-184, for a\nfull discussion of the question from the Lamarckian standpoint.\n\n[60] \u2018Right-handedness and Left-brainedness\u2019 by D. J. Cunningham: the\nHuxley Lecture for 1902. Printed in the _Journal of the Anthropological\nInstitute_, Vol. XXXII, pp. 273-95. I may refer also to a brochure\nby Dr. Geo. Sigerson, F.R.U.I., Consideration of the Structural and\nAcquisitional Elements in Dextral Pre-eminence, Dublin, 1884. Dr.\nSigerson believes that primitive man was ambidextrous, and that\n\u2018dexterity\u2019 is a case of specialization of function, and has supported\nthis view by a novel and interesting line of pathological observation.\n\n[61] _Op. cit._, p. 285.\n\n[62] _Ibid._, pp. 284-5.\n\n[63] _Journal of Anatomy and Physiology_, Vol. XXXVI, p. 401. \u2018On the\nrelative weights of the right and left sides of the body in the foetus.\u2019\n\n[64] Origin of Species, chap. VI.\n\n[65] \u2018The Inadequacy of Natural Selection,\u2019 Herbert Spencer.\n_Contemporary Review_, February and March, 1893.\n\n\u2018Prof. Weismann\u2019s Theories,\u2019 Herbert Spencer. _Contemporary Review_,\nMay, 1893.\n\n\u2018The All-Sufficiency of Natural Selection,\u2019 Aug. Weismann.\n_Contemporary Review_, September, 1893.\n\n\u2018A Rejoinder to Prof. Weismann,\u2019 Herbert Spencer. _Contemporary\nReview_, December, 1893.\n\nThe Romanes Lecture for 1894, by Aug. Weismann (Frowde).\n\n[66] \u2018Lamarck et le Transformisme actuel\u2019: Mus\u00e9um d\u2019Histoire Naturelle,\nCentenaire; Vol. Commemoratif, 1903, p. 508. M. Perrier adds that\nthe metaphysical alternative \u201cest, en effet, \u00e0 quoi le professeur A.\nWeismann, de Fribourg, a \u00e9t\u00e9 conduit.\u201d This, I think, can only be M.\nPerrier\u2019s way of saying that he finds Weismann unintelligible, for\nWeismann\u2019s ostensible object is certainly to steer between the Scylla\nof Lamarckism and the Charybdis of \u2018metaphysics.\u2019 With what success he\nattempts this feat we shall see.\n\n[67] The Evolution Theory, II, p. 78.\n\n[68] II, p. 330 _sqq._\n\n[69] The Evolution Theory, II., 346.\n\n[70] See p. 83.\n\n[71] The Evolution Theory, II, 264.\n\n[72] I take this from J. T. Cunningham\u2019s Sexual Dimorphism, p. 16.\n\n[73] Useless structures and organs are regarded by Weismann, and I\nthink with justice, as in some degree unfavourable. They make demands\non the organism for nourishment, and are thus in the position of\nnon-productive members of a working family.\n\n[74] _Op. cit._, p. 73. See Appendix B.\n\n[75] Wallace, Darwinism, p. 24.\n\n[76] Animal Coloration, p. 252.\n\n[77] Poulton, The Colours of Animals, p. 238.\n\n[78] _Ibid._, p. 237.\n\n[79] See p. 7, note 2.\n\n[80] Eng. trans. revised from fifth German edition, 1903, p. 3.\n\n[81] Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre. 1884.\n\n[82] See especially Organic Evolution, pp. 52, 3.\n\n[83] Organic Evolution, pp. 225, 433. Eimer is a believer in the\ninheritance of acquired characteristics; hence Oken\u2019s conception,\n_taken literally_, offers him a ready method of disposing of the\nant-problem dealt with on p. 85, _sqq._\n\n[84] Organic Evolution, p. 268.\n\n[85] See Eimer, Organic Evolution, p. 135 _sqq._\n\n[86] p. 62.\n\n[87] \u201cIt is,\u201d writes Wilson, \u201cbecoming more and more clearly apparent\n... that Schwann went too far in denying the influence of the totality\nof the organism upon the local activities of the cells. It would\nof course be absurd to maintain that the whole can consist of more\nthan the sum of its parts. Yet, as far as growth and development are\nconcerned, it has now been clearly demonstrated that only in a limited\nsense can the cells be regarded as co-operating units. They are rather\nlocal centres of a formative power pervading the growing mass as a\nwhole\u201d (The Cell, pp. 58, 9).\n\nWhat Prof. Wilson, absorbed like most scientists in the consideration\nof ponderable and visible masses, assumes to be \u201cabsurd\u201d is of course\nthe very thing which he is proving to be a fact The whole can be not\nmerely the \u201csum\u201d but the synthesis of its parts.\n\n[88] Die Welt als That., chap. XXIV.\n\n[89] _Loc. cit._\n\n[90] Kr\u00e4fte zweiter Hand. The primary forces are the chemical and\nmechanical forces, the secondary are those which control and guide\nthese for certain ends.\n\n[91] Pp. 9, 10. The italics are Prof. Henslow\u2019s.\n\n[92] This statement taken literally is, of course, quite too sweeping.\nProfessor Henslow clearly means here by \u201cvariations\u201d those alone which\nare important enough to have selection-value, favourable or otherwise.\nInsignificant variations are always occurring.\n\n[93] Henslow, Origin, etc., p. 102.\n\n[94] _Ibid._, p. 80.\n\n[95] _Ibid._, p. 40.\n\n[96] A. R. Wallace, Darwinism (1890), p. 427.\n\n[97] Marie v. Chauvin, \u2018Ueber die Verwandlungsf\u00e4higkeit des\nmexikanischen Axolotl.\u2019 _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Zoologie_,\nXLI, p. 385. See also The Cambridge Natural History, _sub voce_.\n\n[98] Haeckel, History of Creation (English trans.), I, p. 150.\n\n[99] See also pp. 15, 16.\n\n[100] J. H. Newman.\n\n[101] See Principles of Sociology, Part II.\n\n[102] See Curtius, Griechische Etymologie, s.v., \u03c6\u03b7\u03bc\u03ae, \u03bd\u03ad\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[103] _Deus_ descends from a root meaning \u2018to shine,\u2019 hence the Day,\nthe Sun, God; \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2 is referred by Curtius to a root \u03b8\u03b5\u03c2, to desire,\npray\u2014God is \u201cder Angeflehte.\u201d\n\n[104] Are there many Englishmen who would understand the following\nsentence which I lately came across in a St. Louis paper? \u201cThis graft\nwas one of the scrap-head variety, and it was hard therefore to get the\nboodlers good.\u201d\n\n[105] The \u2018wheel\u2019 is really a spiral\u2014the line of all natural growth.\n\n[106] See p. 111.\n\n[107] Origin of Species, chapter VI.\n\n[108] Mechanisch-Physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre, p. 150.\n\n[109] Weismann, The Evolution Theory, I, p. 162.\n\n[110] _Ibid._, I, p. 177.\n\n[111] So the cogwheels of a machine designed for some useful purpose\nwill lacerate the hand of a man who gets in their way.\n\n[112] See p. 85.\n\n[113] Darwinism and the Problems of Life, 1904. Eng. transl. by J.\nMcCabe, 1905, pp. 354 _sqq._\n\n[114] Orthogenesis der Schmetterlinge (1897). The passage will be found\nin Kellogg\u2019s Darwinism To-day, p. 285. Instances of \u2018regression,\u2019 etc.,\nare given by Kellogg, _op. cit._, p. 227.\n\n[115] When Heracleitus wrote \u201cThe One arises from the All and the\nAll from the One\u201d (Frag. LIX. Bywater) he was stating with his usual\npregnant brevity a position of deep significance for modern scientific\nthought.\n\n[116] It must be borne in mind that strict physical continuity does not\nexist in nature. Sir Oliver Lodge has somewhere remarked that science\nis entirely at a loss to explain how it comes that when one picks up a\nstick by one end the rest of the stick comes up with it.\n\n[117] General Physiology, p. 550.\n\n[118] Published by Bell & Son, 1907.\n\n[119] Darwinism To-day, p. 377, quoting H. F. Osborn\u2019s The Unknown\nFactors of Evolution. Osborn, like the writer (see p. 90), holds\nSpencer and Weismann to be mutually destructive. \u201cIf acquired\nvariations are transmitted there must be therefore some unknown\nprinciple in heredity; if they are not transmitted there must be some\nunknown factor in evolution.\u201d\n\n[120] Mechanisch-Physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre. See\nespecially pp. 132, and 340 _sqq._\n\n[121] Darwinism To-day, p. 278.\n\n[122] p. 49.\n\n[123]\n         \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u1f74\u03c1, \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b3\u1fc6, \u0396\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2,\n         \u0396\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c7\u1f65\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b4' \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\n                                         Frag., 295.\n\n[124] Walt Whitman, \u2018The Answerer.\u2019\n\n[125] Data of Ethics, 29.\n\n[126] See Appendix C.\n\n[127] _Oxford and Cambridge Review_, June, 1907. _Sic_ also Bishop\nBerkeley, Alciphron, Dial. VII, 19, \u201cA man is said to be free, so far\nforth as he can do what he will.\u201d Berkeley\u2019s analysis of this statement\nis substantially the same as that in the text.\n\n[128] Herbert Spencer, translating these physical terms into their\npsychic equivalents, declares that the illusion of Free Will \u201cconsists\nin supposing that at each moment the _ego_ is something more than\nthe aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then\nexists\u201d (Psychology, I, p. 500). The pivot of the doctrine is the word\n_aggregate_. We have seen that the most primitive living organism is\nsomething more than that. _Cf._ p. 119 _note_.\n\n[129] Of course they are only relatively lower\u2014there are no essentially\n\u2018low\u2019 motives in life at all.\n\n[130] The Will to Believe\u2014\u2018The Dilemma of Determinism,\u2019 p. 145 _sqq._\n\n[131] Pragmatism, pp. 287-8. Compare Bishop Berkeley. \u201cTo me it\nseems, that if we begin from Things particular and concrete, and\nthence proceed to general Notions and Conclusions, there will be no\nDifficulty in this Matter. But if we begin with Generalities, and lay\nour Foundation in abstract Ideas, we shall find ourselves entangled\nand lost in a Labyrinth of our own making.\u201d Alciphron, Dial. vii. 20.\nBerkeley had fully apprehended the Determinist position; see vii. 16.\n\n[132] p. 129, 5th edition, 1878. There is an evident fallacy in Mill\u2019s\nposition. The Deity who could make a hell and sentence men to it for\nnot worshipping him could not also have created the conscience which\nwould resist him. The authorship of the moral sense and of hell are not\nto be combined in our conception of the divine. But Mill, of course, in\nthis flash of rhetoric, was merely taking popular religious conceptions\nas he found them.\n\n[133] p. 298.\n\n[134] Plato, in that great dialogue, the Phaedo, has a noteworthy\npassage on those who when once betrayed by Reason are apt to fall into\nunbelief or superstition, just as those who, when they have found bad\nfaith among men, may fall into cynicism:\u2014\n\n\u201cWould it not, Phaedo,\u201d said Socrates, \u201cbe a lamentable condition, when\na certain thesis is true, firm, and intelligible, if a man supporting\nsomething of the kind should find arguments which seemed true at one\ntime to be false at another, and in the end, instead of blaming himself\nor his own want of skill, should, in his ill-temper, make haste to\nshuffle off the blame from his own shoulders to Reason itself, and\nspend the rest of his life in hating and slandering it, being deprived\nof the truth and science of things?\u201d\n\n\u201cBy Zeus,\u201d said I, \u201cit would be lamentable.\u201d\n\n\u201cLet us take heed then, before all else, that we never admit into our\nminds the idea that there can be no soundness in reasonings, but rather\nbelieve that we ourselves are not yet sound, and study manfully and\nwith a will how to be so\u201d (\u00a7 xxxix).\n\n[135] Every mental acquisition, such as the knowledge of a new\nlanguage, results in a definite alteration in a certain locality of\nthe brain. The human brain, as an instrument of thought and knowledge,\nis, in fact, built up by a long series of purposeful efforts beginning\nin early infancy. These efforts do not, of course, originate in the\nmatter of the brain itself, nor can the different nerves, which bring\nit messages from the outside world, carry with them anything of the\nnature of conscious purpose and will. These arise from Personality. I\nmay refer for a full and very interesting treatment of this subject to\nDr. W. H. Thomson\u2019s work, Brain and Personality (1907).\n\n[136] In the Phaedo, xliii.\n\n[137] Microcosmus, Bk. II, Chaps. II and V.\n\n[138]\n         Man, and man only\n         Can do the impossible;\n         He can Distinguish,\n         Choose, and give Judgment;\n         He to the moment lends\n         Power to endure.\n\n\n[139] This includes the nourishment and protection of its young while\nhelpless.\n\n[140] This word is, I believe, used by Prof. Haeckel to describe his\nsystem of philosophy. I am very imperfectly acquainted with that\nsystem, and therefore think it well to note here that the term must not\nbe taken with any special implications which Haeckel may have attached\nto it.\n\n[141] See pp. 17-20.\n\n[142] Deontology, I, p. 32.\n\n[143] Examination of Hamilton, pp. 586 _sqq._\n\n[144] Data of Ethics, \u00a720.\n\n[145] \u201cI conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce,\nfrom the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of\naction necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce\nunhappiness\u201d (Data of Ethics, \u00a721). Happiness is always taken by\nSpencer as equivalent to pleasurable feeling.\n\n[146] Reason in Science, p. 252.\n\n[147] See Data of Ethics, p. 36. It has been proved by exact\nphysiological experiment that happiness promotes healthy vital action\nin the living organism, and that sorrow and pain depress it. But of\ncourse human life is not conducted solely on the physiological plane.\n\n[148] _Sic_, Fr. Slater, S.J., in the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_,\nFebruary, 1905. \u201cIf such a sum [\u00a3l] could be stolen without grave sin,\nits amount would prove too great a temptation for the virtue of large\nnumbers of people who wish to save their souls, but make little of\nvenial sins\u201d (p. 109). But Fr. Ojetti is much more liberal to persons\nof the class described, and gives them up to \u00a34 (p. 100).\n\n[149] I may draw attention in this connexion to a striking and valuable\nstudy of the effect of American democracy on Jewish immigrants\npublished in the _Times_ of January 4, 1908. As regards Catholicism, it\nappears from a comparison of the statistics of emigration from Ireland\nwith those of Catholicism in the U.S.A. that about 50 per cent of the\nIrish Catholics abandon their religion in the New World. The Irish\nare also shown by the criminal statistics of the States as well as by\nthe observation of students of the criminal classes like Mr. Josiah\nFlynt, to furnish a far greater proportion of criminals in that country\nthan obtains in the case of any other nationality contributing to its\npopulation. Yet they also give to American life some of its very best\nelements, and they are notoriously the most crimeless of people at\nhome. The degradation of character commonly produced by Christianizing\nthe Hindu is so uniformly attested by residents in India that it\ncannot be discredited. See, in this reference, an article entitled\n\u2018The Failure of Christian Missions in India,\u2019 by Dr. Josiah Oldfield,\n_Hibbert Journal_, April, 1903. Of course it may be said that the\noriginal error lies in the identification of ritual and observance with\nreligion and morality.\n\n[150] See Appendix D.\n\n[151] \u201cPer l\u2019 asprezza della penitenza e continuo piagnere, era\ndiventato quasi cieco, e poco vedea.\u201d\u2014Fioretti, III. He had \u201cwholly\nshattered his body,\u201d says Thomas of Celano (Second Life of St. F., Ch.\nCLX.).\n\n[152] A discussion of the subject, with special reference to the\nrapid decay of the Franciscan Order, will be found in Mr. G. G.\nCoulton\u2019s paper \u2018The Failure of the Friars,\u2019 in the _Hibbert Journal_\nfor January, 1907. See also criticisms on this paper by two English\nFranciscans, Friar Cuthbert and Friar Stanilaus, in the same journal\nfor April, 1907, and Mr. Coulton\u2019s rejoinder, July, 1907.\n\n[153] When the ascetic ideal is regarded as admirable in a saint, it\nnaturally leads to still more lamentable perversions by being practised\nby persons who have never withdrawn themselves from ordinary social\nrelations. Thus a Catholic priest has lately given as an instance of\nthe \u201cspiritual tendency and unworldliness of the Irish peasant\u201d the\ncase of a farmer\u2019s wife, the mother of a large family, who, by a long\ncourse of secret austerities, brought herself \u201cto an untimely grave,\nand, no doubt,\u201d adds the reverend author, \u201ca martyr\u2019s crown.\u201d To keep\nherself in health and do her duty to her husband and children would,\nit appears, have been \u201cworldliness.\u201d Such cases, we are told, are not\nuncommon. (Scenes and Sketches in an Irish Parish, by the Rev. J.\nGuinan, C.C., 4th ed., 1906, p. 87.)\n\n[154] The Teaching of Epictetus, by T. W. Rolleston, p. 36.\nDissertations, III, xxii.\n\n[155]\n         Suns that have set return as bright,\n         But we, when sets our little light,\n         Sleep on through one eternal night.\u2014Catullus, V.\n\n[156] The Nature and Origin of Life, by Felix Le Dantec, p. 22 (Engl.\ntrans., 1907).\n\n[157] The Evolution of Matter.\n\n[158] Of course the question remains, What compressed the spring? If\nMatter and Motion are continually wasting, it follows that they must\nat some time have been originated, and that the power which originated\nthem is not dependent on them.\n\n[159] The Teaching of Epictetus, p. 103. Dissertations, II, v, 24, etc.\n\n[160] See pp. 186, 187.\n\n[161] See, _e.g._, the opening of the Ph\u00e6drus.\n\n[162] For a discussion of this subject I may refer the reader to an\narticle by the writer in the _Hibbert Journal_ for April, 1906: \u2018The\nResurrection: A Layman\u2019s Dialogue.\u2019\n\n[163] \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f13\u03bd \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd. Poetics, XXIII, 1. He is speaking\nof the design of a narrative poem.\n\n[164] What is Art?, by Leo Tolstoy. English translation by Aylmer\nMaude, pp. 44-5.\n\n[165] What is Art?, chap. v.\n\n[166] I do not mean to exclude the possibility that man may have first\nlearned his _capacity_ for art by making signs intended for quite other\npurposes, such as identification of tribehood, etc.\n\n[167] What is Art?, p. 153.\n\n[168] Fifteen Sermons, III.\n\n[169] What is Art?, p. 146.\n\n[170] _Ibid._, p. 148.\n\n[171] What is Art?, p. 163.\n\n[172] _Ibid._, p. 161. How wide of the mark all this is becomes clear\nwhen we think, for instance, of the sympathetic treatment of the\nTrojans in Homer, or the nobility of feeling about the Moors which\nruns through The Cid. A great art may glorify battle, but cant and\nfanaticism are hateful to it.\n\n[173] What is Art?, p. 166.\n\n[174] _Ibid._, p. 167.\n\n[175] As, of course, it never can be in Time.\n\n[176] It is very hard to understand why, when Athens was producing\nsome of the greatest art of the world and the profoundest philosophic\nthought, the attempt to develop a philosophy of the arts should not\nhave succeeded better than it did. Plato felt instinctively that he\nhad entangled himself in a chain of false logic, and he appeals to\nArt to vindicate its truth, if it can. He would yield himself to its\n\u201cenchantment\u201d only too gladly were it not \u201ca sin to betray what seems\nto us the cause of truth.\u201d But it never occurs to him that what the\npainter is really copying is not the carpenter\u2019s bed, but the heavenly.\nAristotle, on the other hand, well knew that there is something\ncreative about art. Witness his famous saying that \u201cPoetry is both a\nmore philosophic and a higher thing than History, since Poetry looks at\nthings in a universal, History only in a particular aspect\u201d (Poetics,\nIX, 3). He was, however, still too much under the control of the\npopular view of Art as Imitation to be able to see the full scope of\nhis own principle. Thus, he excluded Architecture from the realm of Art\nbecause it did not imitate anything in nature.\n\n[177]\n         \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03a3\u1f7a \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c3\u1f70 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n         \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1 \u03a3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd.\n\n[178] Preface to Wordsworth\u2019s Lyrical Ballads.\n\n[179] \u201cI have not been afraid of the charge of obscurity,\u201d says Walt\nWhitman, \u201cin either of my two volumes, because human thought, poetry\nor melody, must leave dim escapes and outlets\u2014must possess a certain\nfluid, aerial character, akin to Space itself, obscure to those of\nlittle or no imagination, but indispensable to the highest purposes.\nPoetic style, when address\u2019d to the Soul, is less definite form,\noutline, sculpture, and becomes vista, music, half-tints, and even less\nthan half-tints. True, it may be architecture; but again it may be the\nforest wild-wood, or the best effects thereof, at twilight, the waving\noaks and cedars in the wind, and the impalpable odour\u201d (Preface to Two\nRivulets, p. 13).\n\nLet me set beside this a passage from that singularly beautiful book,\nKakasu Okakura\u2019s Ideals of the East: \u201cShakaku in the fifth century lays\ndown six canons of pictorial art, in which the idea of the depicting\nof Nature falls into a third place, subservient to two other main\nprinciples. The first of these is \u2018the Life-movement of the Spirit\nthrough the Rhythm of Things.\u2019 For art is to him the great Mood of\nthe Universe, moving hither and thither amidst those harmonic laws of\nmatter which are Rhythm\u201d (p. 52).\n\n[180] I may refer in passing to the researches of A. C. Haddon and\nHenry Balfour, who have made it seem at least highly probable that all\ndecorative forms originated in the copying of natural objects.\n\n[181] F. C. Penrose showed in 1851 that all the quasi-horizontal lines\nin the Parthenon are really arcs of circles, that the \u2018entasis\u2019 or\nswelling of every pillar is the true arc of an hyperbola, and that\nthere is not a true right-angle nor a strictly vertical column in the\nbuilding. All good Greek buildings are similarly full of \u201ccurves,\nleaning faces, irregular spacings, and other optical refinements\u201d\n(Investig. of the Princs. of Athenian Architecture). This principle,\ncalled by Ruskin \u2018life\u2019 (Seven Lamps) and by some \u2018symmetrophobia,\u2019 was\nmost daringly applied in medi\u00e6val building. A very striking and well\nillustrated series of articles on the subject was contributed by Mr. W.\nH. Goodyear to the _Architectural Record_, Vol. VI, 1896-7.\n\n[182] I am indebted in connexion with these remarks on Gothic\narchitecture to a very interesting paper by Mr. L. March Phillipps in\nthe _Contemporary Review_ for September, 1907.\n\n[183] For example, when molecules first grouped themselves (supposing\nthat was how it came about) into the form which resulted in living\nprotoplasm, their action was one of a chemico-physical nature, but the\nresponse is not expressible in purely chemico-physical terms. Similarly\nwhen sensation first appeared in protoplasm.\n\n[184] Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Drittes Buch, _Die\nPlatonische Idee das Objekt der Kunst_.\n\n[185] Camille Mauclair, French Impressionists. \u201cLight,\u201d writes M.\nMauclair, \u201cbecomes the sole subject of the picture; the interest of\nthe object upon which it plays is secondary. Painting thus conceived\nbecomes a purely optic art\u201d (p. 32). \u201cThe principal person in a\npicture,\u201d said Manet, \u201cis the light\u201d (p. 42).\n\n[186] No one who has seen \u201cLe Penseur,\u201d by Rodin, will doubt that\nplastic art can render Thought. But literature alone could tell us what\nhe is thinking.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n_When a subject is treated on more than one consecutive page, reference\nis usually made to the first page only._\n\n\n  Action and Reaction, 264\n\n  Adaptability, 13, 63\n\n  Adaptation, in nature, how regarded by Paley, 3;\n    argument from imperfect adaptations, 4, 14, 136, 143, 152;\n    how conceived by evolution theory, 10, 12;\n    Lamarck\u2019s theory of, 68;\n    Weismann\u2019s theory, 93 _sqq._;\n    Darwin\u2019s explanation, 72;\n    directive theory, 115 _sqq._;\n    effects of new environment, 123 _sqq._\n    See Co-adaptation\n\n  \u00c6schylus, 159\n\n  _Amblystoma_, 40 (illustration facing), 125\n\n  _Am\u0153ba_, 30, 47, 143\n\n  Amphimixis, 39, 98\n\n  _Anab\u00e6na_, 141\n\n  _Anableps_, 100, 112\n\n  Ants, 78, 85, 89, 111, 154\n\n  Apperception and Free-will, 172\n\n  Arch, effect of, in architecture, 258\n\n  Aristotle, 247 _note_\n\n  Art, 158;\n    and Beauty, 237, 251;\n    origin of, 239;\n    question of subject in, 244, 268;\n    an expression of life, 246, 250;\n    Greek and Hottentot ideals of, 253;\n    classification of the arts, 254;\n    art in structure, 256;\n    in ornament, 259;\n    artistic effect of use and service, 260.\n    See Music, Dancing, Literature, etc.\n\n  Asceticism, 214 _sqq._, 218 _note_\n\n  Axolotl, 125\n\n  _Azolla_ fern, 141\n\n\n  Bacon, F., 6\n\n  Becoming, the universe a, 20, 186;\n    Deity conceived as \u2018becoming,\u2019 5\n\n  Beddard, F. E., 24 _note_, 58, 106\n\n  Bentham, J., 200\n\n  Berkeley, Bp., 165 _note_, 176 _note_\n\n  Bifocal eyes in fish, 99\n\n  Bisexuality, significance of, in _Mollusca_, 101\n\n  Bose, J. C., 21 _note_\n\n  Brain-structure and Will, 178, 184\n\n  Brown-S\u00e9quard, 78\n\n  Butler, Bp., 241\n\n  B\u00fctschli, O., 30\n\n  Butterflies, protective colouring of, 15, 83, 98, 106, 113, 127\n\n\n  Catullus, 222\n\n  Cave-animals, 71, 72 _note_, 78\n\n  Cell, the, 29, 38;\n    division of, 40 _sqq._;\n    germ and sperm\n    cells, 45, 51;\n    fusion of, in reproduction, 53\n\n  Chaffinch, case of hermaphrodite, 58\n\n  Chlorophyll, 24;\n    in animals, 26\n\n  Christ, 205;\n    martyrdom of, 232\n\n  Chromatin, 39 _sqq._\n\n  Cleanthes, 247\n\n  Co-adaptation, 70, 80, 98, 138\n\n  Competition, 58, 105\n\n  Conjugation, 47\n\n  Conscience, 211\n\n  Co-operation among animals, 104, _Appendix B_;\n    among species, 138\n\n  Crabs, hermit, 141;\n    Molucca, 280\n\n  Crystallization, 22 _note_, 156\n\n\n  Dancing, 270\n\n  Darwin, Erasmus, 6, 281\n\n  Darwin, Francis, 7, 33, 72, 87, 138\n\n  Death, significance of, for the spirit, 190, 235\n\n  Deity, the end, not beginning of nature, 5;\n    personality of, 14, 17;\n    immanent or transcendent? 155;\n    defined by \u00c6schylus, 159;\n    an infinite, not related to phenomena, 162;\n    how approached by man, 159, 162, _Appendix A_\n\n  Determinants, 44;\n    competition among, 98;\n    significance of, in evolution, 68, 96\n\n  Determinism, doctrine of, 163 _sqq._\n\n  Development contrasted with growth, 32\n\n  Dice, of nature loaded, 92, 102\n\n  Dominants. See Reinke\n\n  Drama, 272\n\n  Dualism, 195\n\n  Duty, sense of, not created by pleasures and pains, 203;\n    effects of, compared with those of self-indulgence, 212\n\n\n  Ego, the, 157, 207, _Appendix A_\n\n  Eimer, G., 77 _note_, 110, 113 _note_, 137, 143, 152\n\n  Elk, the Irish, 70\n\n  Energy, how obtained by plants, 25;\n    developed by synthesis, 27, 147;\n    vital and mechanical, how distinguished, 144, 146, 148;\n    supposed effects of the equal distribution of, 222\n\n  Epictetus, 218, 226\n\n  Ethics, how affected by determinism, 162-3;\n    ethical development a condition of Free-will, 171;\n    the problem of evil, 199, 207;\n    utilitarian systems of, 201;\n    goal of ethical action, 203 _sqq._;\n    sanction of ethical action, 234;\n    ethics epitomized, 234;\n    ethics of sex relations, _Appendix E_\n\n  Evolution, change in point of view produced by, 7, 8, 16, 17;\n    produced competition, 104;\n    unknown factors in, 149;\n    evolution and involution, 186, 228.\n    See Adaptation, species\n\n\n  Fisher, M., 270\n\n  Francis of Assisi, 215, _Appendix D_\n\n  Free-will, position stated, 164 _sqq._;\n    reason in action, 166;\n    Spencer on, 166 _note_;\n    conditions of, 169;\n    moral bias of, 169 _sqq._;\n    limitations of, 171 _sqq._;\n    how evolved, 174;\n    can it be reconciled with Monism? 175;\n    will and brain, 177 _sqq._\n\n\n  Germinal Selection, 93, 96\n\n  Goethe, 6, 31, 185, 267\n\n  Goodyear, W. H., 258 _note_\n\n  Gravity, action of, on plants, 62, 145\n\n  Guinan, Rev. J., 218 _note_\n\n  G\u00fcnther, C., 142, 152\n\n\n  Haeckel, E., 39 _note_, 124, 126, 196, 239\n\n  Henslow, G., 123\n\n  Heracleitus, 146 _note_, 278\n\n  Hermaphroditism, 58, 101\n\n  Hugo, V., 273\n\n  Hume, D., 6 _note_\n\n  _Hydra_, 26\n\n\n  Ids, 44\n\n  Immortality, 189, 225, 283\n\n  Imperfections in nature, 4, 14, 143, 152\n\n  Impressionist school, 266\n\n  Intelligence in nature, 14, 16, 130, 157\n\n  Irish, the, in the U.S.A., 212 _note_\n\n  Isabella and Claudio, problem of, _Appendix E_\n\n\n  James, W., on Free-will, 176\n\n\n  Kakasu Okakura, 250 _note_\n\n  _Kallima paralecta_, 83, 129\n\n  Kellogg, V. L., 144 _note_, 149\n\n  Keyserling, H. v., 13 _note_, 17\n\n  Knight, W., 239\n\n  Kramskoy, 243\n\n  Kropotkin, P., 104, _Appendix B_\n\n\n  Lamarck, J. B., 6, 68;\n    arguments against his theory, 75, 112, 202;\n    Lamarckism the only alternative to \u2018metaphysics,\u2019 91\n\n  Language, evolution of, 133\n\n  Lankester, Ray, 24 _note_\n\n  Le Bon, G., 223\n\n  Le Dantec, F., 22, 222\n\n  _Lepus Huxleyi_, 126\n\n  Life, universality of, 21;\n    characteristics of organic, 23;\n    mechanical conception of, 35, 92, 97;\n    continually being produced, 37;\n    innate capabilities of, 109;\n    final cause of, 206, 208;\n    the individual and the cosmic, 226;\n    the goal of nature, 114, 246;\n    polarity of, 253\n\n  Literature, 271\n\n  Lodge, O., 147 _note_\n\n  Lotze, H., 185, 196\n\n\n  Maeterlinck, M., 290\n\n  Manet, E., 266 _note_\n\n  Man, the growing-point of life, 154\n\n  Martyrdoms, significance of, for ethics, 230, 233;\n    of Socrates, 230;\n    of Christ, 232\n\n  Matter, its nature unknown, 178;\n    transmitter of consciousness, 188;\n    relation with consciousness not fortuitous, 192;\n    known only through life, 224\n\n  Mauclair, C., 266 _note_\n\n  Mendel, Abbott, 58 _note_\n\n  Metabolism, 27\n\n  Metaphysics, physics rooted in, 110\n\n  Miers, H. A., 22\n\n  Mill, J. S., 164, 177, 201\n\n  Mind, 137, 167.\n    See Spirit, Intelligence\n\n  Mitosis, 42 _note_\n\n  Monism, 17 _sqq._;\n    compatible with Free-will, 176;\n    dualism and, 195\n\n  Moorhead, T. G., 83\n\n  Morlon, 243\n\n  Movement, in music, 262, 264;\n    in literature, 272\n\n  Music, 261 _sqq._, 272\n\n  Mysticism, 150\n\n\n  N\u00e4geli, C. v., 39, 110, 140, 149\n\n  Natural Selection, a \u2018superseded formula,\u2019 7 _note_;\n    meaning of, 72;\n    originates nothing, 75;\n    a pillar of Weismann\u2019s theory, 103;\n    effect, not cause, of evolution, 104;\n    a real though not the main force, 105, 109;\n    in relation to mimetic markings, 106 _sqq._;\n    and to mutual aid among species, 138\n\n  Neuter insects. See Ants\n\n  _Noctiluca_, 47\n\n  Nucleus, of cell, 30, 39.\n\n\n  Ojetti, Fr., 210 _note_\n\n  Oken, L., 110, 137\n\n  Oldfield, J., 213 _note_\n\n  Osborn, H. F., 149 _note_\n\n  \u2018Ought,\u2019 Bentham on the word, 201;\n    contents of the word, 209\n\n  Oysters, bisexuality in, 101\n\n\n  Paley, W., his analogy of the watch, 1 _sqq._;\n    on the annular ligament, 8;\n    his conception of an \u2018Esperanto\u2019 universe, 136\n\n  _Pandorina_, 49, 61, 156\n\n  _Papilio meriones_, 107\n\n  Parthenogenesis, 55\n\n  Penrose, F. C., 257 _note_\n\n  Perrier, E., 72 _note_, 91\n\n  Personality, 157, 166, 207, 211, _Appendix A_\n\n  Pianola, analogy of, 183\n\n  \u2018Pig-philosophy,\u2019 221\n\n  Plato, 6, 170, 182 _note_, 185, 195, 227, 244, 246\n\n  Poetry, 158.\n    See Literature\n\n  Porto Santo rabbit, 126\n\n  Potato, response to mutilation, 117\n\n  Poulton, E. B., 107\n\n  Proteid, 23, 28\n\n  Protoplasm, the substance of life, 27;\n    structure of, 30;\n    distinguished from minerals, 37;\n    response in, 61, 112, 113, 117, 119 _note_, 144;\n    a synthesis of molecules, 147\n\n\n  Reinke, J., on the _X_ factor in life, 1, 63, 117;\n    his theory of dominants, 120, 175\n\n  Religion, 159, 212, 277\n\n  Reproduction, 39, 46;\n    in multicellular organisms, 48;\n    sexual, 51\n\n  Response, 61, 112, 115.\n    See, Life, Protoplasm\n\n  Rhythm, 254, 262\n\n  Right-handedness, 81\n\n  Rolleston, Geo., 54\n\n  Ruskin, J., 258 _note_\n\n\n  Saleeby, C. W., 288\n\n  Sanction, ethical, 214, 220, 226 _sqq._, 234\n\n  Santayana, G., 181, 204\n\n  Schopenhauer, A., 110, 196, 265\n\n  Selection. See Natural Selection, Germinal Selection\n\n  Sex, determination of, 57;\n    ethical problems connected with, _Appendix E_\n\n  Sigerson, G., 81 _note_\n\n  Sins, mortal and venial, 210 _note_\n\n  Slater, Fr., 210 _note_\n\n  Sloth, green fur of, 24 _note_\n\n  Snails, bisexuality in, 101\n\n  Species, fixity of, 43, 66;\n    mutability of, 67;\n    origin of, not modification of structure by use, ch. IV.;\n    not chance variations, ch. V.;\n    due to directive or psychic factor, ch. VI.;\n    species an organic whole, 49, 138, 147.\n    See Adaptation, Evolution\n\n  Spencer, H., controversy with Weismann, 87, 149 _note_;\n    on social institutions, 131;\n    on Free-will, 166 _note_;\n    his ethical system, 202, _App. C & E_\n\n  Spinoza, B., 196\n\n  Spirit, the human, how accounted for, 151, 175;\n    relations to Matter, 178;\n    death not a disintegration of, 190\n\n  Socrates, 227, 230\n\n  Stoicism, ethical formula of, 194;\n    conception of Asceticism, 217;\n    what Stoicism lacked, 227\n\n  Strasburger, E., 11, 54, 109\n\n  Synthesis, principle of, in nature, 119 _note_, 137, 142, 146, 157\n\n\n  Tennyson, A., 170, 219\n\n  Thomson, W. H., 184\n\n  Tolstoy, L., on Art, 236 _sqq._\n\n  Tree, response of roots and shoots to mutilation in, 119\n\n\n  Uexk\u00fcll, J. v., 13\n\n  Unity of nature, 17, 157\n\n  Useless structures, 103 _note_\n\n  Utilitarian school of ethics, 200, 229, _Appendices C & E_\n\n\n  Variations, in reproduction cells, 73, 75;\n    do chance variations afford basis for selection? 92, 94 _sqq._\n\n  Verworn, Max, 27 _note_, 148\n\n  _Viola_, 140\n\n  Virchow, R., 45 _note_\n\n  Vir\u00e9, A., 72 _note_\n\n  _Volvox_, 49\n\n\n  Wagner, R., 272\n\n  Wallace, A. R., 105, 125 _note_, 175\n\n  Watch, Paley\u2019s analogy of, 1 _sqq._\n\n  Weed, in New Zealand, destroyed by willows, 105\n\n  Weismann, A., 7 _note_, 34, 48, 61, 63;\n    controversy with Spencer, 87;\n    his alternative to Lamarckism, 93;\n    his determinants equivalent to Reinke\u2019s dominants, 122\n\n  Whale, evolution of, 67\n\n  Whitman, Walt, 160, 196, 237, 250 _note_\n\n  Whole, the, its demands on the individual, 220;\n    what it gives to the individual, 225;\n    the universe a, 17;\n    a whole more than the sum of its parts, 119 _note_;\n    consciousness, etc., of the, 157\n\n  Wilson, E. B., 33, 38 _notes_, 41, 50, 55, 119 _note_\n\n  W\u00f6hler, 24\n\n  Wordsworth, W., 249\n\n\n  _X_ factor in life, 1;\n    directive character of, 63, 113, 116, 128.\n    See Adaptation, Intelligence, Language\n\n\n  Zola, E., 248\n\n\nPRINTED BY\nWILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD.\nPLYMOUTH\n\n\n_\u201cA model of what a scientific work for the general public ought to\nbe.\u201d_\n\nLIFE AND EVOLUTION\n\nBY\n\nF. W. HEADLEY, F.Z.S.\n\nWith upwards of 100 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 8s. net.\n\n\n_Extract from Preface._\u2014\u201cEverything has been done, by means of headings\nto sections, references to pages in the table of contents, and a fairly\ncomplete index, to make it easy to find one\u2019s way about in the book.\u201d\n\n    CHAPTER\n       I. Plants and Animals.\n      II. The Sea and its Inhabitants.\n     III. Gills and Lungs.\n      IV. Reptiles and their Kin.\n       V. From a Reptile to a Bird.\n      VI. The Flight of Birds.\n     VII. The Minds of Men and Animals.\n    VIII. The Struggle for Existence.\n      IX. Natural Selection.\n\n_These are the headings to the chapters, but each chapter is subdivided\ninto a number of sections, with marginal references, so as to make the\nbook of value as a work of reference._\n\n    _Lancet._\u2014\u201cWe consider this small book with its big title extremely\n    well done.\u201d\n\n    _Tribune._\u2014\u201cThe book is remarkable for its extreme lucidity. It\n    is alluring and instructive, and is supplemented by a set of\n    illustrations which correspond in every way to the merits of the\n    text.\u201d\n\n    _Guardian._\u2014\u201cThese interesting questions are dealt with by one who\n    understands them, and has investigated many of them experimentally\n    in a lucid, almost conversational style, but in good and attractive\n    English, so that we can heartily recommend this volume to all who\n    desire to learn something of what evolution really means, but are\n    deterred by the technicalities of text-books.\u201d\n\n    _Outlook._\u2014\u201cMr. Headley\u2019s volume on Evolution is a charming book,\n    not simply indeed for the student who wants an introduction to the\n    theory of evolution, but for the general reader. It is a model of\n    what a scientific work for the general public ought to be, readable\n    and interesting, but withal accurate and well informed, and in\n    this case full of touches of the imagination of the kind which\n    illuminate knowledge.\u201d\n\n\nLondon: DUCKWORTH & CO., 3 Henrietta Street,\nCOVENT GARDEN, W.C.\n\nDuckworth & Co.\u2019s Publications.\n\n\n_GOODWIN, W._\n\n    +THE SCIENTIFIC FEEDING OF ANIMALS.+ By W. Goodwin. Crown 8vo.\n\n[_In Preparation._\n\n\n_PERCIVAL, JOHN._\n\n    +AGRICULTURAL BOTANY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.+ By John Percival,\n    M.A., F.L.S., Professor of Botany at the South-Eastern Agricultural\n    College, Wye. Crown 8vo, with 265 illustrations by the Author. 7s.\n    6d. net. +Third Edition.+\n\n    _Nature._\u2014\u201cWe have no hesitation in recommending it as _the_\n    elementary handbook for the agricultural student. The chapters on\n    weeds and on diseases of farm-plants are distinctly better than\n    those in any previous English works dealing with agricultural\n    botany.\u201d\n\n\n_HILL, M. D., and WEBB, WILFRED MARK._\n\n    +ETON NATURE-STUDY AND OBSERVATIONAL LESSONS.+ By M. D. Hill and\n    Wilfred M. Webb. With numerous illustrations from photographs, line\n    drawings and wash drawings. In two parts. 3s. 6d. net each.\n\n    The book deals in a systematic way with such subjects as the use\n    and misuse of \u201ccollections,\u201d the migrations of birds, the effects\n    of the action of water on the conformation of landscape, as well as\n    with the life histories of flowers, trees, insects, reptiles, birds\n    and mammals.\n\n\n_WEBB, WILFRED MARK, and SILLEM, CHARLES._\n\n    +THE BRITISH WOODLICE: Being a Monograph of the Terrestrial Isopod\n    Crustacea.+ By Wilfred Mark Webb, F.L.S., and Charles Sillem. With\n    25 plates and 59 figures in the text. Large crown 8vo. 6s. net.\n\n\n_OWEN, J. A., and BOULGER, PROFESSOR._\n\n    +THE COUNTRY MONTH BY MONTH.+ By J. A. Owen (Collaborator in\n    all the Work signed \u201cA Son of the Marshes\u201d) and Professor G. S.\n    Boulger. New Edition, with Notes by the late Lord Lilford. In one\n    volume. Demy 8vo. 500 pp. 6s. net.\n\n\nLondon: DUCKWORTH & CO., 3 Henrietta Street,\nCOVENT GARDEN, W.C.\n\n_MASSEE, GEORGE._\n\n    +A TEXT-BOOK OF PLANT DISEASES+, caused by Cryptogamic Parasites.\n    By George Massee, Mycologist and Principal Assistant, Royal\n    Herbarium, Kew. With 92 illustrations, drawn from Nature by the\n    Author. Crown 8vo. 6s. net. +Third Edition.+\n\n    _Farmers\u2019 Gazette._\u2014\u201cThe information is fully up to date, and\n    gathered from the latest British, German, French, and American\n    authorities. The book deserves to become the leading English\n    text-book on the subject.\u201d\n\n\n_By the Same Author._\n\n    +A TEXT-BOOK OF FUNGI+, including Morphology, Physiology,\n    Pathology, and Classification. By George Massee, Mycologist and\n    Principal Assistant, Royal Herbarium, Kew. With no illustrations.\n    Crown 8vo. 6s. net.\n\n    Gardeners\u2019 Chronicle.\u2014\u201cThe \u2018Text-book of Fungi\u2019 is an important\n    addition to our literature, and it ought to find a place on the\n    shelves not merely of the fungologist, but also of every one\n    who studies botany. Students preparing for the National Diploma\n    for Agriculture or University Examinations will find the book\n    especially useful and up to date in those general principles which\n    it is so important they should grasp clearly.\u201d\n\n\n_By the Same Author._\n\n    +EUROPEAN FUNGUS FLORA: AGARICACE\u00c6.+ By George Massee. Crown 8vo.\n    6s. net.\n\n    _Nature._\u2014\u201cThe method is excellent and the work well done,\n    fully indexed and carefully arranged. As a field-book it can be\n    recommended.\u201d\n\n\n_JACKSON, B. DAYDON._\n\n    +A GLOSSARY OF BOTANIC TERMS+, with their derivation and accent.\n    By Benjamin Daydon Jackson, Secretary of the Linnean Society of\n    London. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net. +New and Enlarged Edition.+\n\n    _Gardeners\u2019 Chronicle._\u2014\u201cA much-needed glossary. Should find a\n    place in every garden library.\u201d\n\n    _Nature._\u2014\u201cExceedingly valuable.\u201d\n\n    _Science Gossip._\u2014\u201cNo botanist can afford to dispense with this\n    work.\u201d\n\n\n_MOYLE ROGERS, THE REV. W._\n\n    +A HAND-BOOK OF BRITISH RUBI.+ By the Rev. W. Moyle Rogers, F.L.S.\n    Demy 8vo. 5s. net.\n\n\n3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C.\n\n_FAIRLESS, MICHAEL._\n\n    +THE ROADMENDER.+ By Michael Fairless. A New and Illustrated\n    Edition. Eleventh impression. With Six Full-page Drawings and\n    Cover-design by Will G. Mein. 5s. net.\n\n    +THE ROADMENDER.+ Fcp. 8vo. Bound in Limp Leather, Cover Design,\n    fully gilt. 3s. 6d. net.\n\n    +THE ROADMENDER.+ Eighteenth impression. Fcp. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d.\n    net.\n\n    _St. James\u2019s Gazette._\u2014\u201cStraight to the reality and beauty of\n    things with a touch often recalling R. L. Stevenson\u2019s.\u201d\n\n\n_By the Same Author._\n\n    +THE GREY BRETHREN+: and other Fragments in Prose and Verse. By\n    Michael Fairless. Uniform with \u201cThe Roadmender.\u201d Second impression.\n    Fcp. 8vo. Bound in Limp Leather, 3s. 6d. net. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.\n\n\n_ANONYMOUS._\n\n    +A MODERN MYSTIC\u2019S WAY.+ (Dedicated to Michael Fairless.) Uniform\n    with the above. 2s. 6d. net.\n\n\n_CRIPPS, ARTHUR._\n\n    +MAGIC CASEMENTS.+ By Arthur Cripps. Uniform with the above. 2s.\n    6d. net.\n\n\n_McCURDY, EDWARD._\n\n    +LEONARDO DA VINCI\u2019S THOUGHTS AS RECORDED IN HIS NOTE-BOOKS.+\n    Edited by Ed. McCurdy. Uniform with \u201cThe Roadmender.\u201d\n\n\n_BROOKE, REV. STOPFORD A._\n\n    +THE SEA CHARM OF VENICE.+ By the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke. Uniform\n    with \u201cThe Roadmender.\u201d 2s. 6d. net.\n\n\n_BUCKLEY, ARTHUR._\n\n    +GOD\u2019S THOROUGHFARE+: A Way of New Dimensions. By ARTHUR BUCKLEY.\n    Being an investigation made by a Logician, a Scientist and a\n    Theologian in the Forest of Science and other places, resulting in\n    a discovery of New Dimensions which form a Way of Being leading to\n    the Spiritual. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.\n\n    \u201cIf we seclude space, there will remain in the world but matter and\n    mind, body and spirit.\u201d\n\n    \u201cAnd a highway shall be there, and a way.\u201d\n\n\nLondon: DUCKWORTH & CO., 3 Henrietta Street,\nCOVENT GARDEN, W.C.","title":"Parallel Paths: A Study in Biology, Ethics, and Art","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":77976}