{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46129/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46129","id":"gutenberg_46129","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46129","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics, Evolutionary"],"text":"Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this\n      file which includes the original illustration.\n      See 46129-h.htm or 46129-h.zip:\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46129/pg46129-images.html)\n      or\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46129/46129-h.zip)\n\n\n      Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive. See\n      https://archive.org/details/dataofethic00spenuoft\n\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: HERBERT SPENCER.]\n\n\nTHE DATA OF ETHICS\n\nby\n\nHERBERT SPENCER\n\nAuthor of \"First Principles,\" \"Education,\" etc.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration]\n\nA. L. Burt Company,\nPublishers, New York\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR'S PREFACE.\n\n\nA reference to the programme of the \"System of Synthetic Philosophy\"\nwill show that the chapters herewith issued constitute the first\ndivision of the work on the _Principles of Morality_, with which the\nSystem ends. As the second and third volumes of the _Principles of\nSociology_ are as yet unpublished, this installment of the succeeding\nwork appears out of its place.\n\nI have been led thus to deviate from the order originally set down by\nthe fear that persistence in conforming to it might result in leaving\nthe final work of the series unexecuted. Hints, repeated of late years\nwith increasing frequency and distinctness, have shown me that health\nmay permanently fail, even if life does not end, before I reach the\nlast part of the task I have marked out for myself. This last part of\nthe task it is to which I regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary.\nWritten as far back as 1842, my first essay, consisting of letters on\nThe _Proper Sphere of Government_, vaguely indicated what I conceived\nto be certain general principles of right and wrong in political\nconduct, and from that time onward my ultimate purpose, lying behind\nall proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles\nof right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific basis. To leave\nthis purpose unfulfilled, after making so extensive a preparation for\nfulfilling it, would be a failure the probability of which I do not\nlike to contemplate, and I am anxious to preclude it, if not wholly,\nstill partially. Hence the step I now take. Though this first division\nof the work terminating the Synthetic Philosophy, cannot, of course,\ncontain the specific conclusions to be set forth in the entire work,\nyet it implies them in such wise that, definitely to formulate them\nrequires nothing beyond logical deduction.\n\nI am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I cannot complete,\nthis final work, because the establishment of rules of right conduct\non a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now, that moral injunctions\nare losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the\nsecularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen\nmore disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no\nlonger fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown\nup to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed appear\nto assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may safely be\nthrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling\nagency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that in\nthe absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist: divine\ncommandments they think the only possible guides. Thus, between these\nextreme opponents, there is a certain community. The one holds that\nthe gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need\nnot be filled by a code of natural ethics, and the other holds that it\ncannot be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes\nand the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to\nbring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing,\nthose who believe that the vacuum can be filled, and that it must be\nfilled, are called on to do something in pursuance of their belief.\n\nTo this more special reason I may add a more general reason. Great\nmischief has been done by the repellent aspect habitually given\nto moral rule by its expositors, and immense benefits are to be\nanticipated from presenting moral rule under that attractive aspect\nwhich it has when undistorted by superstition and asceticism. If a\nfather, sternly enforcing numerous commands, some needful and some\nneedless, adds to his severe control a behavior wholly unsympathetic;\nif his children have to take their pleasures by stealth, or, when\ntimidly looking up from their play, ever meet a cold glance or more\nfrequently a frown, his government will inevitably be disliked, if\nnot hated, and the aim will be to evade it as much as possible.\nContrariwise, a father who, equally firm in maintaining restraints\nneedful for the well-being of his children or the well-being of other\npersons, not only avoids needless restraints, but, giving his sanction\nto all legitimate gratifications and providing the means for them,\nlooks on at their gambols with an approving smile, can scarcely fail\nto gain an influence which, no less efficient for the time being,\nwill also be permanently efficient. The controls of such two fathers\nsymbolize the controls of Morality as it is and Morality as it should\nbe.\n\nNor does mischief result only from this undue severity of the ethical\ndoctrine bequeathed us by the harsh past. Further mischief results from\nthe impracticability of its ideal. In violent reaction against the\nutter selfishness of life as carried on in barbarous societies, it has\ninsisted on a life utterly unselfish. But just as the rampant egoism of\na brutal militancy was not to be remedied by attempts at the absolute\nsubjection of the ego in convents and monasteries, so neither is the\nmisconduct of ordinary humanity, as now existing, to be remedied by\nupholding a standard of abnegation beyond human achievement. Rather\nthe effect is to produce a despairing abandonment of all attempts at\na higher life. And not only does an effort to achieve the impossible\nend in this way, but it simultaneously discredits the possible. By\nassociation with rules that cannot be obeyed, rules that can be obeyed\nlose their authority.\n\nMuch adverse comment will, I doubt not, be passed on the theory of\nright conduct which the following pages shadow forth. Critics of a\ncertain class, far from rejoicing that ethical principles otherwise\nderived by them, coincide with ethical principles scientifically\nderived, are offended by the coincidence. Instead of recognizing\nessential likeness they enlarge on superficial difference. Since the\ndays of persecution, a curious change has taken place in the behavior\nof so-called orthodoxy toward so-called heterodoxy. The time was\nwhen a heretic, forced by torture to recant, satisfied authority by\nexternal conformity: apparent agreement sufficed, however profound\ncontinued to be the real disagreement. But now that the heretic can\nno longer be coerced into professing the ordinary belief, his belief\nis made to appear as much opposed to the ordinary as possible. Does\nhe diverge from established theological dogma? Then he shall be an\natheist; however inadmissible he considers the term. Does he think\nspiritualistic interpretations of phenomena not valid? Then he shall be\nclassed as a materialist; indignantly though he repudiates the name.\nAnd in like manner, what differences exist between natural morality\nand supernatural morality, it has become the policy to exaggerate\ninto fundamental antagonisms. In pursuance of this policy, there will\nprobably be singled out for reprobation from this volume, doctrines\nwhich, taken by themselves, may readily be made to seem utterly wrong.\nWith a view to clearness, I have treated separately some correlative\naspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue\nif divorced from the other; and have thus given abundant opportunity\nfor misrepresentation.\n\nThe relations of this work to works preceding it in the series are such\nas to involve frequent reference. Containing, as it does, the outcome\nof principles set forth in each of them, I have found it impracticable\nto dispense with re-statements of those principles. Further, the\npresentation of them in their relations to different ethical theories,\nhas made it needful, in every case, briefly to remind the reader what\nthey are, and how they are derived. Hence an amount of repetition which\nto some will probably appear tedious. I do not, however, much regret\nthis almost unavoidable result; for only by varied iteration can alien\nconceptions be forced on reluctant minds.\n\n    _June_, 1879.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n  CHAPTER I.                                PAGE.\n\n  Conduct in General                            1\n\n\n  CHAPTER II.\n\n  The Evolution of Conduct                      7\n\n\n  CHAPTER III.\n\n  Good and Bad Conduct                         23\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV.\n\n  Ways of Judging Conduct                      54\n\n\n  CHAPTER V.\n\n  The Physical View                            75\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI.\n\n  The Biological View                          88\n\n\n  CHAPTER VII.\n\n  The Psychological View                      121\n\n\n  CHAPTER VIII.\n\n  The Sociological View                       157\n\n\n  CHAPTER IX.\n\n  Criticisms and Explanations                 178\n\n\n  CHAPTER X.\n\n  The Relativity of Pains and Pleasures       206\n\n\n  CHAPTER XI.\n\n  Egoism versus Altruism                      221\n\n\n  CHAPTER XII.\n\n  Altruism versus Egoism                      237\n\n\n  CHAPTER XIII.\n\n  Trial and Compromise                        258\n\n\n  CHAPTER XIV.\n\n  Conciliation                                285\n\n\n  CHAPTER XV.\n\n  Absolute and Relative Ethics                304\n\n\n  CHAPTER XVI.\n\n  The Scope of Ethics                         332\n\n\n\n\nTHE DATA OF ETHICS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nCONDUCT IN GENERAL.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The doctrine that correlatives imply one another--that a father\ncannot be thought of without thinking of a child, and that there can be\nno consciousness of superior without a consciousness of inferior--has\nfor one of its common examples the necessary connection between the\nconceptions of whole and part. Beyond the primary truth that no idea of\na whole can be framed without a nascent idea of parts constituting it,\nand that no idea of a part can be framed without a nascent idea of some\nwhole to which it belongs, there is the secondary truth that there can\nbe no correct idea of a part without a correct idea of the correlative\nwhole. There are several ways in which inadequate knowledge of the one\ninvolves inadequate knowledge of the other.\n\nIf the part is conceived without any reference to the whole, it\nbecomes itself a whole--an independent entity; and its relations to\nexistence in general are misapprehended. Further, the size of the part\nas compared with the size of the whole must be misapprehended unless\nthe whole is not only recognized as including it, but is figured in\nits total extent. And again, the position which the part occupies in\nrelation to other parts, cannot be rightly conceived unless there is\nsome conception of the whole in its distribution as well as in its\namount.\n\nStill more when part and whole, instead of being statically related\nonly, are dynamically related, must there be a general understanding\nof the whole before the part can be understood. By a savage who has\nnever seen a vehicle, no idea can be formed of the use and action of a\nwheel. To the unsymmetrically-pierced disk of an eccentric, no place or\npurpose can be ascribed by a rustic unacquainted with machinery. Even\na mechanician, if he has never looked into a piano, will, if shown a\ndamper, be unable to conceive its function or relative value.\n\nMost of all, however, where the whole is organic, does complete\ncomprehension of a part imply extensive comprehension of the whole.\nSuppose a being ignorant of the human body to find a detached arm. If\nnot misconceived by him as a supposed whole, instead of being conceived\nas a part, still its relations to other parts, and its structure, would\nbe wholly inexplicable. Admitting that the co-operation of its bones\nand muscles might be divined, yet no thought could be framed of the\nshare taken by the arm in the actions of the unknown whole it belonged\nto; nor could any interpretation be put upon the nerves and vessels\nramifying through it, which severally refer to certain central organs.\nA theory of the structure of the arm implies a theory of the structure\nof the body at large.\n\nAnd this truth holds not of material aggregates only, but of immaterial\naggregates--aggregated motions, deeds, thoughts, words. The moon's\nmovements cannot be fully interpreted without taking into account the\nmovements of the Solar System at large. The process of loading a gun\nis meaningless until the subsequent actions performed with the gun are\nknown. A fragment of a sentence, if not unintelligible, is wrongly\ninterpreted in the absence of the remainder. Cut off its beginning and\nend, and the rest of a demonstration proves nothing. Evidence given\nby a plaintiff often misleads until the evidence which the defendant\nproduces is joined with it.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Conduct is a whole; and, in a sense, it is an organic whole--an\naggregate of inter-dependent actions performed by an organism. That\ndivision or aspect of conduct with which Ethics deals, is a part of\nthis organic whole--a part having its components inextricably bound\nup with the rest. As currently conceived, stirring the fire, or\nreading a newspaper, or eating a meal, are acts with which Morality\nhas no concern. Opening the window to air the room, putting on an\novercoat when the weather is cold, are thought of as having no ethical\nsignificance. These, however, are all portions of conduct. The behavior\nwe call good and the behavior we call bad, are included, along with\nthe behavior we call indifferent, under the conception of behavior at\nlarge. The whole of which Ethics forms a part, is the whole constituted\nby the theory of conduct in general; and this whole must be understood\nbefore the part can be understood. Let us consider this proposition\nmore closely.\n\nAnd first, how shall we define conduct? It is not co-extensive with the\naggregate of actions, though it is nearly so. Such actions as those of\nan epileptic in a fit are not included in our conception of conduct:\nthe conception excludes purposeless actions. And in recognizing this\nexclusion, we simultaneously recognize all that is included. The\ndefinition of conduct which emerges is either acts adjusted to ends, or\nelse the adjustment of acts to ends, according as we contemplate the\nformed body of acts, or think of the form alone. And conduct in its\nfull acceptation must be taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts\nto ends, from the simplest to the most complex, whatever their special\nnatures and whether considered separately or in their totality.\n\nConduct in general being thus distinguished from the somewhat larger\nwhole constituted by actions in general, let us next ask what\ndistinction is habitually made between the conduct on which ethical\njudgments are passed and the remainder of conduct. As already said,\na large part of ordinary conduct is indifferent. Shall I walk to the\nwaterfall to-day? or shall I ramble along the sea-shore? Here the\nends are ethically indifferent. If I go to the waterfall, shall I go\nover the moor or take the path through the wood? Here the means are\nethically indifferent. And from hour to hour most of the things we do\nare not to be judged as either good or bad in respect of either ends or\nmeans.\n\nNo less clear is it that the transition from indifferent acts to acts\nwhich are good or bad is gradual. If a friend who is with me has\nexplored the sea-shore, but has not seen the waterfall, the choice\nof one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent. And if, the\nwaterfall being fixed on as our goal, the way over the moor is too\nlong for his strength, while the shorter way through the wood is not,\nthe choice of means is no longer ethically indifferent. Again, if a\nprobable result of making the one excursion rather than the other,\nis that I shall not be back in time to keep an appointment, or if\ntaking the longer route entails this risk while taking the shorter\ndoes not, the decision in favor of one or other end or means acquires\nin another way an ethical character; and if the appointment is one of\nsome importance, or one of great importance, or one of life-and-death\nimportance, to self or others, the ethical character becomes\npronounced. These instances will sufficiently suggest the truth that\nconduct with which Morality is not concerned, passes into conduct which\nis moral or immoral, by small degrees and in countless ways.\n\nBut the conduct that has to be conceived scientifically before we can\nscientifically conceive those modes of conduct which are the objects\nof ethical judgments, is a conduct immensely wider in range than that\njust indicated. Complete comprehension of conduct is not to be obtained\nby contemplating the conduct of human beings only; we have to regard\nthis as a part of universal conduct--conduct as exhibited by all\nliving creatures. For evidently this comes within our definition--acts\nadjusted to ends. The conduct of the higher animals as compared with\nthat of man, and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that\nof the higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of acts to\nends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete. And as in other\ncases, so in this case, we must interpret the more developed by the\nless developed. Just as, fully to understand the part of conduct which\nEthics deals with, we must study human conduct as a whole; so, fully\nto understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part\nof that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in\ngeneral.\n\nNor is even this whole conceived with the needful fullness, so long\nas we think only of the conduct at present displayed around us. We\nhave to include in our conception the less-developed conduct out of\nwhich this has arisen in course of time. We have to regard the conduct\nnow shown us by creatures of all orders, as an outcome of the conduct\nwhich has brought life of every kind to its present height. And this\nis tantamount to saying that our preparatory step must be to study the\nevolution of conduct.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. We have become quite familiar with the idea of an evolution of\nstructures throughout the ascending types of animals. To a considerable\ndegree we have become familiar with the thought that an evolution of\nfunctions has gone on _pari passu_ with the evolution of structures.\nNow, advancing a step, we have to frame a conception of the evolution\nof conduct, as correlated with this evolution of structures and\nfunctions.\n\nThese three subjects are to be definitely distinguished. Obviously the\nfacts comparative morphology sets forth, form a whole which, though it\ncannot be treated in general or in detail without taking into account\nfacts belonging to comparative physiology, is essentially independent.\nNo less clear is it that we may devote our attention exclusively to\nthat progressive differentiation of functions, and combination of\nfunctions, which accompanies the development of structures--may say no\nmore about the characters and connections of organs than is implied\nin describing their separate and joint actions. And the subject of\nconduct lies outside the subject of functions, if not as far as this\nlies outside the subject of structures, still, far enough to make it\nsubstantially separate. For those functions which are already variously\ncompounded to achieve what we regard as single bodily acts, are\nendlessly recompounded to achieve that co-ordination of bodily acts\nwhich is known as conduct.\n\nWe are concerned with functions in the true sense, while we think of\nthem as processes carried on within the body; and, without exceeding\nthe limits of physiology, we may treat of their adjusted combinations,\nso long as these are regarded as parts of the vital _consensus_. If we\nobserve how the lungs a\u00ebrate the blood which the heart sends to them;\nhow heart and lungs together supply a\u00ebrated blood to the stomach, and\nso enable it to do its work; how these co-operate with sundry secreting\nand excreting glands to further digestion and to remove waste matter;\nand how all of them join to keep the brain in a fit condition for\ncarrying on those actions which indirectly conduce to maintenance\nof the life at large; we are dealing with functions. Even when\nconsidering how parts that act directly on the environment--legs, arms,\nwings--perform their duties, we are still concerned with functions in\nthat aspect of them constituting physiology, so long as we restrict our\nattention to internal processes, and to internal combinations of them.\n\nBut we enter on the subject of conduct when we begin to study such\ncombinations among the actions of sensory and motor organs as are\nexternally manifested. Suppose that instead of observing those\ncontractions of muscles by which the optic axes are converged and the\nfoci of the eyes adjusted (which is a portion of physiology), and\nthat instead of observing the co-operation of other nerves, muscles\nand bones, by which a hand is moved to a particular place and the\nfingers closed (which is also a portion of physiology), we observe\na weapon being seized by a hand under guidance of the eyes. We now\npass from the thought of combined internal functions to the thought of\ncombined external motions. Doubtless, if we could trace the cerebral\nprocesses which accompany these, we should find an inner physiological\nco-ordination corresponding with the outer co-ordination of actions.\nBut this admission is consistent with the assertion, that when we\nignore the internal combination and attend only to the external\ncombination, we pass from a portion of physiology to a portion of\nconduct. For though it may be objected that the external combination\ninstanced is too simple to be rightly included under the name conduct,\nyet a moment's thought shows that it is joined with what we call\nconduct by insensible gradations. Suppose the weapon seized is used to\nward off a blow. Suppose a counter-blow is given. Suppose the aggressor\nruns and is chased. Suppose there comes a struggle and a handing him\nover to the police. Suppose there follow the many and varied acts\nconstituting a prosecution. Obviously the initial adjustment of an\nact to an end, inseparable from the rest, must be included with them\nunder the same general head; and obviously from this initial simple\nadjustment, having intrinsically no moral character, we pass by degrees\nto the most complex adjustments and to those on which moral judgments\nare passed.\n\nHence, excluding all internal co-ordinations, our subject here is the\naggregate of all external co-ordinations; and this aggregate includes\nnot only the simplest as well as the most complex performed by human\nbeings, but also those performed by all inferior beings considered as\nless or more evolved.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. Already the question: What constitutes advance in the evolution of\nconduct, as we trace it up from the lowest types of living creatures to\nthe highest? has been answered by implication. A few examples will now\nbring the answer into conspicuous relief.\n\nWe saw that conduct is distinguished from the totality of actions by\nexcluding purposeless actions; but during evolution this distinction\narises by degrees. In the very lowest creatures most of the movements\nfrom moment to moment made, have not more recognizable aims than have\nthe struggles of an epileptic. An infusorium swims randomly about,\ndetermined in its course not by a perceived object to be pursued or\nescaped, but, apparently, by varying stimuli in its medium; and its\nacts, unadjusted in any appreciable way to ends, lead it now into\ncontact with some nutritive substance which it absorbs, and now\ninto the neighborhood of some creature by which it is swallowed and\ndigested. Lacking those developed senses and motor powers which higher\nanimals possess, ninety-nine in the hundred of these minute animals,\nseverally living for but a few hours, disappear either by innutrition\nor by destruction. The conduct is constituted of actions so little\nadjusted to ends, that life continues only as long as the accidents of\nthe environment are favorable. But when, among aquatic creatures, we\nobserve one which, though still low in type, is much higher than the\ninfusorium--say a rotifer--we see how, along with larger size, more\ndeveloped structures, and greater power of combining functions, there\ngoes an advance in conduct. We see how by its whirling cilia it sucks\nin as food these small animals moving around; how by its prehensile\ntail it fixes itself to some fit object; how by withdrawing its outer\norgans and contracting its body, it preserves itself from this or that\ninjury from time to time threatened; and how thus, by better adjusting\nits own actions, it becomes less dependent on the actions going on\naround, and so preserves itself for a longer period.\n\nA superior sub-kingdom, as the Mollusca, still better exemplifies this\ncontrast. When we compare a low mollusc, such as a floating ascidian,\nwith a high mollusc, such as a cephalopod, we are again shown that\ngreater organic evolution is accompanied by more evolved conduct.\nAt the mercy of every marine creature large enough to swallow it,\nand drifted about by currents which may chance to keep it at sea, or\nmay chance to leave it fatally stranded, the ascidian displays but\nlittle adjustment of acts to ends in comparison with the cephalopod;\nwhich, now crawling over the beach, now exploring the rocky crevices,\nnow swimming through the open water, now darting after a fish, now\nhiding itself from some larger animal in a cloud of ink, and using\nits suckered arms at one time for anchoring itself and at another\nfor holding fast its prey; selects and combines and proportions its\nmovements from minute to minute, so as to evade dangers which threaten,\nwhile utilizing chances of food which offer: so showing us varied\nactivities which, in achieving special ends, achieve the general end of\nsecuring continuance of the activities.\n\nAmong vertebrate animals we similarly trace up, along with advance in\nstructures and functions, this advance in conduct. A fish roaming about\nat hazard in search of something to eat, able to detect it by smell\nor sight only within short distances, and now and again rushing away\nin alarm on the approach of a bigger fish, makes adjustments of acts\nto ends that are relatively few and simple in their kinds; and shows\nus, as a consequence, how small is the average duration of life. So few\nsurvive to maturity that, to make up for destruction of unhatched young\nand small fry and half-grown individuals, a million ova have to be\nspawned by a cod-fish that two may reach the spawning age. Conversely,\nby a highly-evolved mammal, such as an elephant, those general actions\nperformed in common with the fish are far better adjusted to their\nends. By sight as well, probably, as by odor, it detects food at\nrelatively great distances; and when, at intervals, there arises a\nneed for escape, relatively great speed is attained. But the chief\ndifference arises from the addition of new sets of adjustments. We\nhave combined actions which facilitate nutrition--the breaking off of\nsucculent and fruit-bearing branches, the selecting of edible growths\nthroughout a comparatively wide reach; and, in case of danger, safety\ncan be achieved not by flight only, but, if necessary, by defence\nor attack: bringing into combined use tusks, trunk and ponderous\nfeet. Further, we see various subsidiary acts adjusted to subsidiary\nends--now the going into a river for coolness, and using the trunk as a\nmeans of projecting water over the body; now the employment of a bough\nfor sweeping away flies from the back; now the making of signal sounds\nto alarm the herd, and adapting the actions to such sounds when made\nby others. Evidently, the effect of this more highly-evolved conduct\nis to secure the balance of the organic actions throughout far longer\nperiods.\n\nAnd now, on studying the doings of the highest of mammals, mankind,\nwe not only find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more\nnumerous and better than among lower mammals, but we find the same\nthing on comparing the doings of higher races of men with those of\nlower races. If we take any one of the major ends achieved, we see\ngreater completeness of achievement by civilized than by savage;\nand we also see an achievement of relatively numerous minor ends\nsubserving major ends. Is it in nutrition? The food is obtained more\nregularly in response to appetite; it is far higher in quality; it is\nfree from dirt; it is greater in variety; it is better prepared. Is\nit in warmth? The characters of the fabrics and forms of the articles\nused for clothing, and the adaptations of them to requirements from\nday to day and hour to hour, are much superior. Is it in dwellings?\nBetween the shelter of boughs and grass which the lowest savage\nbuilds, and the mansion of the civilized man, the contrast in aspect\nis not more extreme than is the contrast in number and efficiency\nof the adjustments of acts to ends betrayed in their respective\nconstructions. And when with the ordinary activities of the savage\nwe compare the ordinary civilized activities--as the business of the\ntrader, which involves multiplied and complex transactions extending\nover long periods, or as professional avocations, prepared for by\nelaborate studies, and daily carried on in endlessly varied forms, or\nas political discussions and agitations, directed now to the carrying\nof this measure and now to the defeating of that--we see sets of\nadjustments of acts to ends, not only immensely exceeding those seen\namong lower races of men in variety and intricacy, but sets to which\nlower races of men present nothing analogous. And along with this\ngreater elaboration of life produced by the pursuit of more numerous\nends, there goes that increased duration of life which constitutes the\nsupreme end.\n\nAnd here is suggested the need for supplementing this conception of\nevolving conduct. For besides being an improving adjustment of acts to\nends, such as furthers prolongation of life, it is such as furthers\nincreased amount of life. Reconsideration of the examples above given\nwill show that length of life is not by itself a measure of evolution\nof conduct; but that quantity of life must be taken into account. An\noyster, adapted by its structure to the diffused food contained in the\nwater it draws in, and shielded by its shell from nearly all dangers,\nmay live longer than a cuttle-fish, which has such superior powers\nof dealing with numerous contingencies; but then, the sum of vital\nactivities during any given interval is far less in the oyster than\nin the cuttle-fish. So a worm, ordinarily sheltered from most enemies\nby the earth it burrows through, which also supplies a sufficiency of\nits poor food, may have greater longevity than many of its annulose\nrelatives, the insects; but one of these during its existence as larva\nand imago, may experience a greater quantity of the changes which\nconstitute life. Nor is it otherwise when we compare the more evolved\nwith the less evolved among mankind. The difference between the average\nlengths of the lives of savage and civilized is no true measure of\nthe difference between the totalities of their two lives, considered\nas aggregates of thought, feeling and action. Hence, estimating life\nby multiplying its length into its breadth, we must say that the\naugmentation of it which accompanies evolution of conduct, results from\nincrease of both factors. The more multiplied and varied adjustments of\nacts to ends, by which the more developed creature from hour to hour\nfulfills more numerous requirements, severally add to the activities\nthat are carried on abreast, and severally help to make greater the\nperiod through which such simultaneous activities endure. Each further\nevolution of conduct widens the aggregate of actions while conducing to\nelongation of it.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. Turn we now to a further aspect of the phenomena, separate from,\nbut necessarily associated with, the last. Thus far we have considered\nonly those adjustments of acts to ends which have for their final\npurpose complete individual life. Now we have to consider those\nadjustments which have to their final purpose the life of the species.\n\nSelf-preservation in each generation has all along depended on\nthe preservation of offspring by preceding generations. And in\nproportion as evolution of the conduct subserving individual life is\nhigh, implying high organization, there must previously have been a\nhighly-evolved conduct subserving nurture of the young. Throughout\nthe ascending grades of the animal kingdom, this second kind of\nconduct presents stages of advance like those which we have observed\nin the first. Low down, where structures and functions are little\ndeveloped, and the power of adjusting acts to ends but slight, there\nis no conduct, properly so named, furthering salvation of the species.\nRace-maintaining conduct, like self-maintaining conduct, arises\ngradually out of that which cannot be called conduct: adjusted actions\nare preceded by unadjusted ones.\n\nProtozoa spontaneously divide and sub-divide, in consequence of\nphysical changes over which they have no control; or, at other times,\nafter a period of quiescence, break up into minute portions which\nseverally grow into new individuals. In neither case can conduct be\nalleged. Higher up, the process is that of ripening, at intervals,\ngerm-cells and sperm-cells, which, on occasion, are sent forth into\nthe surrounding water and left to their fate: perhaps one in ten\nthousand surviving to maturity. Here, again, we see only development\nand dispersion going on apart from parental care. Types above these,\nas fish which choose fit places in which to deposit their ova, or as\nthe higher crustaceans which carry masses of ova about until they are\nhatched, exhibit adjustments of acts to ends which we may properly call\nconduct, though it is of the simplest kind. Where, as among certain\nfish, the male keeps guard over the eggs, driving away intruders, there\nis an additional adjustment of acts to ends; and the applicability of\nthe name conduct is more decided.\n\nPassing at once to creatures far superior, such as birds, which,\nbuilding nests and sitting on their eggs, feed their broods for\nconsiderable periods, and give them aid after they can fly; or such as\nmammals which, suckling their young for a time, continue afterward to\nbring them food or protect them while they feed, until they reach ages\nat which they can provide for themselves; we are shown how this conduct\nwhich furthers race-maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct\nwhich furthers self-maintenance. That better organization which makes\npossible the last, makes possible the first also.\n\nMankind exhibit a great progress of like nature. Compared with brutes,\nthe savage, higher in his self-maintaining conduct, is higher too in\nhis race-maintaining conduct. A larger number of the wants of offspring\nare provided for; and parental care, enduring longer, extends to the\ndisciplining of offspring in arts and habits which fit them for their\nconditions of existence. Conduct of this order, equally with conduct of\nthe first order, we see becoming evolved in a still greater degree as\nwe ascend from savage to civilized. The adjustments of acts to ends in\nthe rearing of children become far more elaborate, alike in number of\nends met, variety of means used, and efficiency of their adaptations;\nand the aid and oversight are continued throughout a much greater part\nof early life.\n\nIn tracing up the evolution of conduct, so that we may frame a true\nconception of conduct in general, we have thus to recognize these two\nkinds as mutually dependent. Speaking generally, neither can evolve\nwithout evolution of the other; and the highest evolutions of the two\nmust be reached simultaneously.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. To conclude, however, that on reaching a perfect adjustment of\nacts to ends subserving individual life and the rearing of offspring,\nthe evolution of conduct becomes complete, is to conclude erroneously.\nOr rather, I should say, it is an error to suppose that either of these\nkinds of conduct can assume its highest form, without its highest form\nbeing assumed by a third kind of conduct yet to be named.\n\nThe multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill the earth, cannot\nlive wholly apart from one another, but are more or less in presence\nof one another--are interfered with by one another. In large measure\nthe adjustments of acts to ends which we have been considering, are\ncomponents of that \"struggle for existence\" carried on both between\nmembers of the same species and between members of different species;\nand, very generally, a successful adjustment made by one creature\ninvolves an unsuccessful adjustment made by another creature, either\nof the same kind or of a different kind. That the carnivore may live\nherbivores must die; and that its young may be reared the young of\nweaker creatures must be orphaned. Maintenance of the hawk and its\nbrood involves the deaths of many small birds; and that small birds\nmay multiply, their progeny must be fed with innumerable sacrificed\nworms and larv\u00e6. Competition among members of the same species has\nallied, though less conspicuous, results. The stronger often carries\noff by force the prey which the weaker has caught. Monopolizing certain\nhunting grounds, the more ferocious drive others of their kind into\nless favorable places. With plant-eating animals, too, the like holds:\nthe better food is secured by the more vigorous individuals, while the\nless vigorous and worse fed, succumb either directly from innutrition\nor indirectly from resulting inability to escape enemies. That is to\nsay, among creatures whose lives are carried on antagonistically, each\nof the two kinds of conduct delineated above, must remain imperfectly\nevolved. Even in such few kinds of them as have little to fear from\nenemies or competitors, as lions or tigers, there is still inevitable\nfailure in the adjustments of acts to ends toward the close of life.\nDeath by starvation from inability to catch prey, shows a falling short\nof conduct from its ideal.\n\nThis imperfectly-evolved conduct introduces us by antithesis to conduct\nthat is perfectly evolved. Contemplating these adjustments of acts\nto ends which miss completeness because they cannot be made by one\ncreature without other creatures being prevented from making them,\nraises the thought of adjustments such that each creature may make\nthem without preventing them from being made by other creatures. That\nthe highest form of conduct must be so distinguished, is an inevitable\nimplication; for, while the form of conduct is such that adjustments\nof acts to ends by some necessitate non-adjustments by others, there\nremains room for modifications which bring conduct into a form avoiding\nthis, and so making the totality of life greater.\n\nFrom the abstract let us pass to the concrete. Recognizing men as the\nbeings whose conduct is most evolved, let us ask under what conditions\ntheir conduct, in all three aspects of its evolution, reaches its\nlimit. Clearly while the lives led are entirely predatory, as those of\nsavages, the adjustments of acts to ends fall short of this highest\nform of conduct in every way. Individual life, ill carried on from\nhour to hour, is prematurely cut short; the fostering of offspring\noften fails, and is incomplete when it does not fail; and in so far\nas the ends of self-maintenance and race-maintenance are met, they\nare met by destruction of other beings of different kind or of like\nkind. In social groups formed by compounding and re-compounding\nprimitive hordes, conduct remains imperfectly evolved in proportion as\nthere continue antagonisms between the groups and antagonisms between\nmembers of the same group--two traits necessarily associated; since\nthe nature which prompts international aggression prompts aggression\nof individuals on one another. Hence the limit of evolution can be\nreached by conduct only in permanently peaceful societies. That perfect\nadjustment of acts to ends in maintaining individual life and rearing\nnew individuals, which is effected by each without hindering others\nfrom effecting like perfect adjustments, is, in its very definition,\nshown to constitute a kind of conduct that can be approached only as\nwar decreases and dies out.\n\nA gap in this outline must now be filled up. There remains a further\nadvance not yet even hinted. For beyond so behaving that each achieves\nhis ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the\nmembers of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends.\nAnd if, either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly\nby volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make easier for one another\nthe adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still\nhigher phase of evolution; since whatever facilitates the making of\nadjustments by each, increases the totality of the adjustments made,\nand serves to render the lives of all more complete.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. The reader who recalls certain passages in _First Principles_, in\nthe _Principles of Biology_, and in the _Principles of Psychology_,\nwill perceive above a restatement, in another form, of generalizations\nset forth in those works. Especially will he be reminded of the\nproposition that Life is \"the definite combination of heterogeneous\nchanges, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with\nexternal co-existences and sequences;\" and still more of that abridged\nand less specific formula, in which Life is said to be \"the continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations.\"\n\nThe presentation of the facts here made differs from the presentations\nbefore made, mainly by ignoring the inner part of the correspondence\nand attending exclusively to that outer part constituted of visible\nactions. But the two are in harmony; and the reader who wishes\nfurther to prepare himself for dealing with our present topic from\nthe evolution point of view, may advantageously join to the foregoing\nmore special aspect of the phenomena, the more general aspects before\ndelineated.\n\nAfter this passing remark, I recur to the main proposition set forth in\nthese two chapters, which has, I think, been fully justified. Guided\nby the truth that as the conduct with which Ethics deals is part of\nconduct at large, conduct at large must be generally understood before\nthis part can be specially understood; and guided by the further truth\nthat to understand conduct at large we must understand the evolution of\nconduct, we have been led to see that Ethics has for its subject-matter\nthat form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages\nof its evolution. We have also concluded that these last stages in\nthe evolution of conduct are those displayed by the highest type of\nbeing, when he is forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and\nmore in presence of his fellows. And there has followed the corollary\nthat conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities,\nbecoming less and less militant and more and more industrial, are such\nas do not necessitate mutual injury or hinderance, but consist with,\nand are furthered by, co-operation and mutual aid.\n\nThese implications of the Evolution-Hypothesis, we shall now see\nharmonize with the leading moral ideas men have otherwise reached.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nGOOD AND BAD CONDUCT.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. By comparing its meanings in different connections and observing\nwhat they have in common, we learn the essential meaning of a word; and\nthe essential meaning of a word that is variously applied, may best be\nlearned by comparing with one another those applications of it which\ndiverge most widely. Let us thus ascertain what good and bad mean.\n\nIn which cases do we distinguish as good, a knife, a gun, a house?\nAnd what trait leads us to speak of a bad umbrella or a bad pair of\nboots? The characters here predicted by the words good and bad, are\nnot intrinsic characters; for apart from human wants, such things\nhave neither merits nor demerits. We call these articles good or bad\naccording as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends.\nThe good knife is one which will cut; the good gun is one which carries\nfar and true; the good house is one which duly yields the shelter,\ncomfort, and accommodation sought for. Conversely, the badness alleged\nof the umbrella or the pair of boots, refers to their failures in\nfulfilling the ends of keeping off the rain and comfortably protecting\nthe feet, with due regard to appearances.\n\nSo is it when we pass from inanimate objects to inanimate actions. We\ncall a day bad in which storms prevent us from satisfying certain of\nour desires. A good season is the expression used when the weather has\nfavored the production of valuable crops.\n\nIf from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones, we\nsimilarly find that these words in their current applications refer\nto efficient subservience. The goodness or badness of a pointer or a\nhunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all other attributes of these\ncreatures, refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for\neffecting the ends men use them for, and in the other case to the\nqualities of their flesh as adapting it to support human life.\n\nAnd those doings of men which, morally considered, are indifferent,\nwe class as good or bad according to their success or failure. A good\njump is a jump which, remoter ends ignored, well achieves the immediate\npurpose of a jump; and a stroke at billiards is called good when the\nmovements are skillfully adjusted to the requirements. Oppositely,\nthe badness of a walk that is shuffling and an utterance that is\nindistinct, is alleged because of the relative non-adaptations of the\nacts to the ends.\n\nThus recognizing the meanings of good and bad as otherwise used, we\nshall understand better their meanings as used in characterizing\nconduct under its ethical aspects. Here, too, observation shows that\nwe apply them according as the adjustments of acts to ends are, or are\nnot, efficient. This truth is somewhat disguised. The entanglement of\nsocial relations is such that men's actions often simultaneously affect\nthe welfares of self, of offspring, and of fellow-citizens. Hence\nresults confusion in judging of actions as good or bad; since actions\nwell fitted to achieve ends of one order, may prevent ends of the other\norders from being achieved Nevertheless, when we disentangle the three\norders of ends, and consider each separately, it becomes clear that the\nconduct which achieves each kind of end is regarded as relatively good;\nand is regarded as relatively bad if it fails to achieve it.\n\nTake first the primary set of adjustments--those subserving individual\nlife. Apart from approval or disapproval of his ulterior aims, a man\nwho fights is said to make a good defense, if his defense is well\nadapted for self-preservation; and, the judgments on other aspects\nof his conduct remaining the same, he brings down on himself an\nunfavorable verdict, in so far as his immediate acts are concerned, if\nthese are futile. The goodness ascribed to a man of business, as such,\nis measured by the activity and ability with which he buys and sells\nto advantage; and may co-exist with a hard treatment of dependents\nwhich is reprobated. Though, in repeatedly lending money to a friend\nwho sinks one loan after another, a man is doing that which, considered\nin itself is held praiseworthy; yet, if he does it to the extent of\nbringing on his own ruin, he is held blameworthy for a self-sacrifice\ncarried too far. And thus is it with the opinions we express from hour\nto hour on those acts of people around which bear on their health and\npersonal welfare. \"You should not have done that;\" is the reproof\ngiven to one who crosses the street amid a dangerous rush of vehicles.\n\"You ought to have changed your clothes;\" is said to another who has\ntaken cold after getting wet. \"You were right to take a receipt;\" \"you\nwere wrong to invest without advice;\" are common criticisms. All such\napproving and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion that,\nother things equal, conduct is right or wrong according as its special\nacts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or do not further the\ngeneral end of self-preservation.\n\nThese ethical judgments we pass on self-regarding acts are ordinarily\nlittle emphasized; partly because the promptings of the self-regarding\ndesires, generally strong enough, do not need moral enforcement, and\npartly because the promptings of the other-regarding desires, less\nstrong, and often overridden, do need moral enforcement. Hence results\na contrast. On turning to that second class of adjustments of acts\nto ends which subserve the rearing of offspring, we no longer find\nany obscurity in the application of the words good and bad to them,\naccording as they are efficient or inefficient. The expressions good\nnursing and bad nursing, whether they refer to the supply of food, the\nquantity and amount of clothing, or the due ministration to infantine\nwants from hour to hour, tacitly recognize as special ends which ought\nto be fulfilled, the furthering of the vital functions, with a view\nto the general end of continued life and growth. A mother is called\ngood who, ministering to all the physical needs of her children, also\nadjusts her behavior in ways conducive to their mental health; and\na bad father is one who either does not provide the necessaries of\nlife for his family or otherwise acts in a manner injurious to their\nbodies or minds. Similarly of the education given to them, or provided\nfor them. Goodness or badness is affirmed of it (often with little\nconsistency, however) according as its methods are so adapted to\nphysical and psychical requirements, as to further the children's lives\nfor the time being, while preparing them for carrying on complete and\nprolonged adult life.\n\nMost emphatic, however, are the applications of the words good and bad\nto conduct throughout that third division of it comprising the deeds\nby which men affect one another. In maintaining their own lives and\nfostering their offspring, men's adjustments of acts to ends are so apt\nto hinder the kindred adjustments of other men, that insistance on the\nneedful limitations has to be perpetual; and the mischiefs caused by\nmen's interferences with one another's life-subserving actions are so\ngreat that the interdicts have to be peremptory. Hence, the fact that\nthe words good and bad have come to be specially associated with acts\nwhich further the complete living of others and acts which obstruct\ntheir complete living. Goodness, standing by itself, suggests, above\nall other things, the conduct of one who aids the sick in re-acquiring\nnormal vitality, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of\nmaintaining themselves, defends those who are threatened with harm in\nperson, property, or reputation, and aids whatever promises to improve\nthe living of all his fellows. Contrariwise, badness brings to mind, as\nits leading correlative, the conduct of one who, in carrying on his own\nlife, damages the lives of others by injuring their bodies, destroying\ntheir possessions, defrauding them, calumniating them.\n\nAlways, then, acts are called good or bad according as they are well\nor ill adjusted to ends; and whatever inconsistency there is in our\nuses of the words arises from inconsistency of the ends. Here, however,\nthe study of conduct in general, and of the evolution of conduct,\nhave prepared us to harmonize these interpretations. The foregoing\nexposition shows that the conduct to which we apply the name good,\nis the relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is the name\nwe apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved. We saw that\nevolution, tending ever toward self-preservation, reaches its limit\nwhen individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth;\nand now we see that, leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the\nconduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending\nto self-destruction. It was shown that along with increasing power\nof maintaining individual life, which evolution brings, there goes\nincreasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny, and\nthat in this direction evolution reaches its limit when the needful\nnumber of young, preserved to maturity, are then fit for a life that is\ncomplete in fullness and duration; and here it turns out that parental\nconduct is called good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this\nideal result. Lastly, we inferred that establishment of an associated\nstate, both makes possible and requires a form of conduct such that\nlife may be completed in each and in his offspring, not only without\npreventing completion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in\nothers; and we have found above, that this is the form of conduct most\nemphatically termed good. Moreover, just as we there saw that evolution\nbecomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves\nthe greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow\nmen; so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the conduct\nconceived as best, when it fulfills all three classes of ends at the\nsame time.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. Is there any postulate involved in these judgments on conduct?\nIs there any assumption made in calling good the acts conducive to\nlife, in self or others, and bad those which directly or indirectly\ntend toward death, special or general? Yes; an assumption of extreme\nsignificance has been made--an assumption underlying all moral\nestimates.\n\nThe question to be definitely raised and answered before entering on\nany ethical discussion, is the question of late much agitated: Is life\nworth living? Shall we take the pessimist view? or shall we take the\noptimist view? or shall we, after weighing pessimistic and optimistic\narguments, conclude that the balance is in favor of a qualified\noptimism?\n\nOn the answer to this question depends entirely every decision\nconcerning the goodness or badness of conduct. By those who think life\nis not a benefit but a misfortune, conduct which prolongs it is to be\nblamed rather than praised; the ending of an undesirable existence\nbeing the thing to be wished, that which causes the ending of it must\nbe applauded; while actions furthering its continuance, either in self\nor others, must be reprobated. Those who, on the other hand, take an\noptimistic view, or who, if not pure optimists, yet hold that in life\nthe good exceeds the evil, are committed to opposite estimates; and\nmust regard as conduct to be approved that which fosters life in self\nand others, and as conduct to be disapproved that which injures or\nendangers life in self or others.\n\nThe ultimate question, therefore, is: Has evolution been a mistake;\nand especially that evolution which improves the adjustment of acts\nto ends in ascending stages of organization? If it is held that there\nhad better not have been any animate existence at all, and that the\nsooner it comes to an end the better; then one set of conclusions with\nrespect to conduct emerges. If, contrariwise, it is held that there\nis a balance in favor of animate existence, and if, still further, it\nis held that in the future this balance may be increased; then the\nopposite set of conclusions emerges. Even should it be alleged that\nthe worth of life is not to be judged by its intrinsic character, but\nrather by its extrinsic sequences--by certain results to be anticipated\nwhen life has passed--the ultimate issue reappears in a new shape. For\nthough the accompanying creed may negative a deliberate shortening of\nlife that is miserable, it cannot justify a gratuitous lengthening of\nsuch life. Legislation conducive to increased longevity would, on the\npessimistic view, remain blameable, while it would be praiseworthy on\nthe optimistic view.\n\nBut now, have these irreconcilable opinions anything in common? Men\nbeing divisible into two schools differing on this ultimate question,\nthe inquiry arises--Is there anything which their radically opposed\nviews alike take for granted? In the optimistic proposition, tacitly\nmade when using the words good and bad after the ordinary manner;\nand in the pessimistic proposition overtly made, which implies that\nthe words good and bad should be used in the reverse senses; does\nexamination disclose any joint proposition--any proposition which,\ncontained in both of them, may be held more certain than either--any\nuniversally asserted proposition?\n\n\n\u00a7 10. Yes, there is one postulate in which pessimists and optimists\nagree. Both their arguments assume it to be self-evident that life\nis good or bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus\nof agreeable feeling. The pessimist says he condemns life because\nit results in more pain than pleasure. The optimist defends life\nin the belief that it brings more pleasure than pain. Each makes\nthe kind of sentiency which accompanies life the test. They agree\nthat the justification for life as a state of being, turns on this\nissue--whether the average consciousness rises above indifference-point\ninto pleasurable feeling or falls below it into painful feeling. The\nimplication common to their antagonist views is, that conduct should\nconduce to preservation of the individual, of the family, and of the\nsociety, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery.\n\nChanging the venue cannot alter the verdict. If either the pessimist,\nwhile saying that the pains of life predominate, or the optimist,\nwhile saying that the pleasures predominate, urges that the pains\nborne here are to be compensated by pleasures received hereafter; and\nthat so life, whether or not justified in its immediate results, is\njustified in its ultimate results; the implication remains the same.\nThe decision is still reached by balancing pleasures against pains.\nAnimate existence would be judged by both a curse, if to a surplus of\nmisery borne here were added a surplus of misery to be borne hereafter.\nAnd for either to regard animate existence as a blessing, if here its\npains were held to exceed its pleasures, he must hold that hereafter\nits pleasures will exceed its pains. Thus there is no escape from the\nadmission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and\nbad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that\nlife is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that\nconduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable\nor painful.\n\nOne theory only is imaginable in pursuance of which other\ninterpretations of good and bad can be given. This theory is that men\nwere created with the intention that they should be sources of misery\nto themselves; and that they are bound to continue living that their\ncreator may have the satisfaction of contemplating their misery.\nThough this is not a theory avowedly entertained by many--though\nit is not formulated by any in this distinct way; yet not a few do\naccept it under a disguised form. Inferior creeds are pervaded by the\nbelief that the sight of suffering is pleasing to the gods. Derived\nfrom bloodthirsty ancestors, such gods are naturally conceived as\ngratified by the infliction of pain: when living they delighted in\ntorturing other beings; and witnessing torture is supposed still to\ngive them delight. The implied conceptions long survive. It needs but\nto name Indian fakirs who hang on hooks, and Eastern dervishes who\ngash themselves, to show that in societies considerably advanced are\nstill to be found many who think that submission to anguish brings\ndivine favor. And without enlarging on facts and penances, it will\nbe clear that there has existed, and still exists, among Christian\npeoples, the belief that the Deity whom Jephthah thought to propitiate\nby sacrificing his daughter, may be propitiated by self-inflicted\npains. Further, the conception accompanying this, that acts pleasing\nto self are offensive to God, has survived along with it, and still\nwidely prevails; if not in formulated dogmas, yet in beliefs that are\nmanifestly operative.\n\nDoubtless, in modern days such beliefs have assumed qualified forms.\nThe satisfactions which ferocious gods were supposed to feel in\ncontemplating tortures, has been, in large measure, transformed into\nthe satisfaction felt by a deity in contemplating that self-infliction\nof pain which is held to further eventual happiness. But clearly\nthose who entertain this modified view, are excluded from the class\nwhose position we are here considering. Restricting ourselves to this\nclass--supposing that from the savage who immolates victims to a\ncannibal god, there are descendants among the civilized, who hold that\nmankind were made for suffering, and that it is their duty to continue\nliving in misery for the delight of their maker, we can only recognize\nthe fact that devil-worshipers are not yet extinct.\n\nOmitting people of this class, if there are any, as beyond or beneath\nargument, we find that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the\nfinal justification for maintaining life can only be the reception from\nit of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling; and that\ngoodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve life or\nhinder life only on this supposition.\n\nAnd here we are brought round to those primary meanings of the words\ngood and bad, which we passed over when considering their secondary\nmeanings. For on remembering that we call good and bad the things which\nimmediately produce agreeable and disagreeable sensations, and also\nthe sensations themselves--a good wine, a good appetite, a bad smell,\na bad headache--we see that by referring directly to pleasures and\npains, these meanings harmonize with those which indirectly refer to\npleasures and pains. If we call good the enjoyable state itself, as a\ngood laugh--if we call good the proximate cause of an enjoyable state,\nas good music--if we call good any agent which conduces immediately or\nremotely to an enjoyable state, as a good shop, a good teacher--if we\ncall good considered intrinsically, each act so adjusted to its end as\nto further self-preservation and that surplus of enjoyment which makes\nself-preservation desirable--if we call good every kind of conduct\nwhich aids the lives of others, and do this under the belief that life\nbrings more happiness than misery; then it becomes undeniable that,\ntaking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons, the\ngood is universally the pleasurable.\n\n\n\u00a7 11. Sundry influences--moral, theological, and political--conspire\nto make people disguise from themselves this truth. As in narrower\ncases so in this widest case, they become so pre-occupied with the\nmeans by which an end is achieved, as eventually to mistake it for the\nend. Just as money, which is the means of satisfying wants, comes to\nbe regarded by a miser as the sole thing to be worked for, leaving the\nwants unsatisfied; so the conduct men have found preferable because\nmost conducive to happiness has come to be thought of as intrinsically\npreferable, not only to be made a proximate end (which it should be),\nbut to be made an ultimate end, to the exclusion of the true ultimate\nend. And yet cross-examination quickly compels every one to confess\nthe true ultimate end. Just as the miser, asked to justify himself, is\nobliged to allege the power of money to purchase desirable things, as\nhis reason for prizing it; so the moralist who thinks this conduct\nintrinsically good and that intrinsically bad, if pushed home, has\nno choice but to fall back on their pleasure-giving and pain-giving\neffects. To prove this it needs but to observe how impossible it would\nbe to think of them as we do, if their effects were reversed.\n\nSuppose that gashes and bruises caused agreeable sensations, and\nbrought in their train increased power of doing work and receiving\nenjoyment; should we regard assault in the same manner as at present?\nOr suppose that self-mutilation, say by cutting off a hand, was both\nintrinsically pleasant and furthered performance of the processes by\nwhich personal welfare and the welfare of dependents is achieved;\nshould we hold as now, that deliberate injury to one's own body is to\nbe reprobated? Or again, suppose that picking a man's pocket excited\nin him joyful emotions, by brightening his prospects; would theft be\ncounted among crimes, as in existing law-books and moral codes? In\nthese extreme cases, no one can deny that what we call the badness of\nactions is ascribed to them solely for the reason that they entail\npain, immediate or remote, and would not be so ascribed did they entail\npleasure.\n\nIf we examine our conceptions on their obverse side, this general\nfact forces itself on our attention with equal distinctness. Imagine\nthat ministering to a sick person always increased the pains of\nillness. Imagine that an orphan's relatives who took charge of it,\nthereby necessarily brought miseries upon it. Imagine that liquidating\nanother man's pecuniary claims on you redounded to his disadvantage.\nImagine that crediting a man with noble behavior hindered his social\nwelfare and consequent gratification. What should we say to these\nacts which now fall into the class we call praiseworthy? Should we not\ncontrariwise class them as blameworthy?\n\nUsing, then, as our tests, these most pronounced forms of good and bad\nconduct, we find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness\nand badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty\nor probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere.\nAnd this truth is brought out with equal clearness by examining the\nstandards of different moral schools; for analysis shows that every\none of them derives its authority from this ultimate standard. Ethical\nsystems are roughly distinguishable according as they take for their\ncardinal ideas (1) the character of the agent; (2) the nature of\nhis motive; (3) the quality of his deeds; and (4) the results. Each\nof these may be characterized as good or bad; and those who do not\nestimate a mode of life by its effects on happiness, estimate it by\nthe implied goodness or badness in the agent, in his motive, or in\nhis deeds. We have perfection in the agent set up as a test by which\nconduct is to be judged. Apart from the agent we have his feeling\nconsidered as moral. And apart from the feeling we have his action\nconsidered as virtuous.\n\nThough the distinctions thus indicated have so little definiteness that\nthe words marking them are used interchangeably, yet there correspond\nto them doctrines partially unlike one another; which we may here\nconveniently examine separately, with the view of showing that all\ntheir tests of goodness are derivative.\n\n\n\u00a7 12. It is strange that a notion so abstract as that of perfection,\nor a certain ideal completeness of nature, should ever have been\nthought one from which a system of guidance can be evolved; as it was\nin a general way by Plato and more distinctly by Jonathan Edwardes.\nPerfection is synonymous with goodness in the highest degree; and,\nhence, to define good conduct in terms of perfection, is indirectly\nto define good conduct in terms of itself. Naturally, therefore, it\nhappens that the notion of perfection like the notion of goodness can\nbe framed only in relation to ends.\n\nWe allege imperfection of any inanimate thing, as a tool, if it\nlacks some part needful for effectual action, or if some part is so\nshaped as not to fulfill its purpose in the best manner. Perfection\nis alleged of a watch if it keeps exact time, however plain its case;\nand imperfection is alleged of it because of inaccurate time-keeping,\nhowever beautifully it is ornamented. Though we call things imperfect\nif we detect in them any injuries or flaws, even when these do not\ndetract from efficiency; yet we do this because they imply that\ninferior workmanship, or that wear and tear, with which inefficiency\nis commonly joined in experience: absence of minor imperfections being\nhabitually associated with absence of major imperfections.\n\nAs applied to living things, the word perfection has the same meaning.\nThe idea of perfect shape in a race-horse is derived by generalization\nfrom those observed traits of race-horses which have usually gone\nalong with attainment of the highest speed; and the idea of perfect\nconstitution in a race-horse similarly refers to the endurance which\nenables him to continue that speed for the longest time. With men,\nphysically considered, it is the same: we are able to furnish no other\ntest of perfection than that of complete power in all the organs to\nfulfill their respective functions. That our conception of perfect\nbalance among the internal parts, and of perfect proportion among\nthe external parts, originates thus, is made clear by observing that\nimperfection of any viscus, as lungs, heart, or liver, is ascribed\nfor no other reason than inability to meet in full the demands which\nthe activities of the organism make on it; and on observing that the\nconception of insufficient size, or of too great size, in a limb, is\nderived from accumulated experiences respecting that ratio among the\nlimbs which furthers in the highest degree the performance of all\nneedful actions.\n\nAnd of perfection in mental nature we have no other measure. If\nimperfection of memory, of judgment, of temper, is alleged, it is\nalleged because of inadequacy to the requirements of life; and to\nimagine a perfect balance of the intellectual powers and of the\nemotions, is to imagine that proportion among them which ensures an\nentire discharge of each and every obligation as the occasion calls for\nit.\n\nSo that the perfection of man considered as an agent, means the being\nconstituted for effecting complete adjustment of acts to ends of\nevery kind. And since, as shown above, the complete adjustment of\nacts to ends is that which both secures and constitutes the life that\nis most evolved, alike in breadth and length; while, as also shown,\nthe justification for whatever increases life is the reception from\nlife of more happiness than misery; it follows that conduciveness to\nhappiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature. To be\nfully convinced of this it needs but to observe how the proposition\nlooks when inverted. It needs but to suppose that every approach toward\nperfection involved greater misery to self, or others, or both, to\nshow by opposition that approach to perfection really means approach to\nthat which secures greater happiness.\n\n\n\u00a7 13. Pass we now from the view of those who make excellence of being\nthe standard to the view of those who make virtuousness of action\nthe standard. I do not here refer to moralists who, having decided\nempirically or rationally, inductively or deductively, that acts of\ncertain kinds have the character we call virtuous, argue that such\nacts are to be performed without regard to proximate consequences:\nthese have ample justification. But I refer to moralists who suppose\nthemselves to have conceptions of virtue as an end, underived from any\nother end, who think that the idea of virtue is not resolvable into\nsimpler ideas.\n\nThis is the doctrine which appears to have been entertained by\nAristotle. I say, appears to have been, because his statements are far\nfrom consistent with one another. Recognizing happiness as the supreme\nend of human endeavor, it would at first sight seem that he cannot be\ntaken as typical of those who make virtue the supreme end. Yet he puts\nhimself in this category by seeking to define happiness in terms of\nvirtue, instead of defining virtue in terms of happiness. The imperfect\nseparation of words from things, which characterizes Greek speculation\nin general, seems to have been the cause of this. In primitive thought\nthe name and the object named are associated in such wise that the\none is regarded as a part of the other--so much so, that knowing a\nsavage's name is considered by him as having some of his being, and a\nconsequent power to work evil on him. This belief in a real connection\nbetween word and thing, continuing through lower stages of progress,\nand long surviving in the tacit assumption that the meanings of words\nare intrinsic, pervades the dialogues of Plato, and is traceable even\nin Aristotle. For otherwise it is not easy to see why he should have\nso incompletely disassociated the abstract idea of happiness from\nparticular forms of happiness.\n\nNaturally where the divorcing of words as symbols, from things as\nsymbolized, is imperfect, there must be difficulty in giving to\nabstract words a sufficiently abstract meaning. If in the first stages\nof language the concrete name cannot be separated in thought from the\nconcrete object it belongs to, it is inferable that in the course of\nforming successively higher grades of abstract names, there will have\nto be resisted the tendency to interpret each more abstract name in\nterms of some one class of the less abstract names it covers. Hence,\nI think, the fact that Aristotle supposes happiness to be associated\nwith some one order of human activities, rather than with all orders of\nhuman activities. Instead of including in it the pleasurable feelings\naccompanying actions that constitute mere living, which actions he says\nman has in common with vegetables; and instead of making it include\nthe mental states which the life of external perception yields, which\nhe says man has in common with animals at large, he excludes these\nfrom his idea of happiness, and includes in it only the modes of\nconsciousness accompanying rational life. Asserting that the proper\nwork of man \"consists in the active exercise of the mental capacities\nconformably to reason,\" he concludes that \"the supreme good of man\nwill consist in performing this work with excellence or virtue: herein\nhe will obtain happiness.\" And he finds confirmation for his view in\nits correspondence with views previously enunciated; saying, \"our\nnotion nearly agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue; for we\nsay that it consists in the action of virtue; that is, not merely in\nthe possession, but in the use.\"\n\nNow the implied belief that virtue can be defined otherwise than in\nterms of happiness (for else the proposition is that happiness is\nto be obtained by actions conducive to happiness) is allied to the\nPlatonic belief that there is an ideal or absolute good, which gives\nto particular and relative goods their property of goodness; and\nan argument analogous to that which Aristotle uses against Plato's\nconception of good, may be used against his own conception of virtue.\nAs with good so with virtue--it is not singular but plural: in\nAristotle's own classification, virtue, when treated of at large, is\ntransformed into virtues. Those which he calls virtues must be so\ncalled in consequence of some common character that is either intrinsic\nor extrinsic. We may class things together either because they are made\nalike by all having in themselves some peculiarity, as we do vertebrate\nanimals because they all have vertebral columns; or we may class them\ntogether because of some community in their outer relations, as when we\ngroup saws, knives, mallets, harrows, under the head of tools. Are the\nvirtues classed as such because of some intrinsic community of nature?\nThen there must be identifiable a common trait in all the cardinal\nvirtues which Aristotle specifies, \"Courage, Temperance, Liberality,\nMagnanimity, Magnificence, Meekness, Amiability or Friendliness,\nTruthfulness, Justice.\" What now is the trait possessed in common\nby Magnificence and Meekness? and if any such common trait can be\ndisentangled, is it that which also constitutes the essential trait\nin Truthfulness? The answer must be, No. The virtues, then, not being\nclassed as such because of an intrinsic community of character, must\nbe classed as such because of something extrinsic; and this something\ncan be nothing else than the happiness which Aristotle says consists in\nthe practice of them. They are united by their common relation to this\nresult; while they are not united by their inner natures.\n\nPerhaps still more clearly may the inference be drawn thus: If virtue\nis primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should\nbe any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is\npleasure-giving in its total effects on self, or others, or both; and\nif there is not a necessary correspondence, it is conceivable that\nthe conduct classed as virtuous should be pain-giving in its total\neffects. That we may see the consequence of so conceiving it, let us\ntake the two virtues considered as typically such in ancient times\nand in modern times--courage and chastity. By the hypothesis, then,\ncourage, displayed alike in self-defence and in defence of country,\nis to be conceived as not only entailing pains incidentally, but as\nbeing necessarily a cause of misery to the individual and to the\nstate; while, by implication, the absence of it redounds to personal\nand general well-being. Similarly, by the hypothesis, we have to\nconceive that irregular sexual relations are directly and indirectly\nbeneficial--that adultery is conducive to domestic harmony and the\ncareful rearing of children; while marital relations, in proportion\nas they are persistent, generate discord between husband and wife and\nentail on their offspring, suffering, disease and death. Unless it\nis asserted that courage and chastity could still be thought of as\nvirtues though thus productive of misery, it must be admitted that\nthe conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of\nhappiness-producing conduct; and that as this holds of all the virtues,\nhowever otherwise unlike, it is from their conduciveness to happiness\nthat they come to be classed as virtues.\n\n\n\u00a7 14. When from those ethical estimates which take perfection of\nnature, or virtuousness of action, as tests, we pass to those which\ntake for test rectitude of motive, we approach the intuitional theory\nof morals; and we may conveniently deal with such estimates by a\ncriticism on this theory.\n\nBy the intuitional theory I here mean, not that which recognizes\nas produced by the inherited effects of continued experiences, the\nfeelings of liking and aversion we have to acts of certain kinds; but\nI mean the theory which regards such feelings as divinely given, and\nas independent of results experienced by self or ancestors. \"There\nis, therefore,\" says Hutcheson, \"as each one by close attention and\nreflection may convince himself, a natural and immediate determination\nto approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them;\" and\nsince, in common with others of his time, he believes in the special\ncreation of man, and all other beings, this \"natural sense of immediate\nexcellence\" he considers as a supernaturally derived guide. Though\nhe says that the feelings and acts thus intuitively recognized as\ngood, \"all agree in one general character, of tending to the happiness\nof others;\" yet he is obliged to conceive this as a pre-ordained\ncorrespondence. Nevertheless, it may be shown that conduciveness to\nhappiness, here represented as an incidental trait of the acts which\nreceive these innate moral approvals, is really the test by which these\napprovals are recognized as moral. The intuitionists place confidence\nin these verdicts of conscience simply because they vaguely, if not\ndistinctly, perceive them to be consonant with the disclosures of that\nultimate test. Observe the proof.\n\nBy the hypothesis, the wrongness of murder is known by a moral\nintuition which the human mind was originally constituted to yield; and\nthe hypothesis, therefore, negatives the admission that this sense of\nits wrongness arises, immediately or remotely, from the consciousness\nthat murder involves deduction from happiness, directly and indirectly.\nBut if you ask an adherent of this doctrine to contrast his intuition\nwith that of the Fijian, who, considering murder an honorable action,\nis restless until he has distinguished himself by killing some one;\nand if you inquire of him in what way the civilized intuition is to\nbe justified in opposition to the intuition of the savage, no course\nis open save that of showing how conformity to the one conduces to\nwell-being, while conformity to the other entails suffering, individual\nand general. When asked why the moral sense which tells him that it is\nwrong to take another man's goods, should be obeyed rather than the\nmoral sense of a Turcoman, who proves how meritorious he considers\ntheft to be by making pilgrimages to the tombs of noted robbers\nto make offerings, the intuitionist can do nothing but urge that,\ncertainly under conditions like ours, if not also under conditions like\nthose of the Turcomans, disregard of men's claims to their property\nnot only inflicts immediate misery, but involves a social state\ninconsistent with happiness. Or if, again, there is required from him\na justification for his feeling of repugnance to lying, in contrast\nwith the feeling of an Egyptian, who prides himself on skill in lying\n(even thinking it praiseworthy to deceive without any further end\nthan that of practicing deception), he can do no more than point to\nthe social prosperity furthered by entire trust between man and man,\nand the social disorganization that follows universal untruthfulness,\nconsequences that are necessarily conducive to agreeable feelings and\ndisagreeable feelings respectively.\n\nThe unavoidable conclusion is, then, that the intuitionist does not,\nand cannot, ignore the ultimate derivations of right and wrong from\npleasure and pain. However much he may be guided, and rightly guided,\nby the decisions of conscience respecting the characters of acts, he\nhas come to have confidence in these decisions because he perceives,\nvaguely but positively, that conformity to them furthers the welfare\nof himself and others, and that disregard of them entails in the long\nrun suffering on all. Require him to name any moral-sense judgment by\nwhich he knows as right some kind of act that will bring a surplus of\npain, taking into account the totals in this life and in any assumed\nother life, and you find him unable to name one: a fact proving that\nunderneath all these intuitions respecting the goodness or badness\nof acts there lies the fundamental assumption that acts are good or\nbad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or\nincrease their misery.\n\n\n\u00a7 14. It is curious to see how the devil-worship of the savage,\nsurviving in various disguises among the civilized, and leaving as\none of its products that asceticism which in many forms and degrees\nstill prevails widely, is to be found influencing in marked ways men\nwho have apparently emancipated themselves, not only from primitive\nsuperstitions but from more developed superstitions. Views of life and\nconduct which originated with those who propitiated deified ancestors\nby self-tortures enter even still into the ethical theories of many\npersons who have years since cast away the theology of the past, and\nsuppose themselves to be no longer influenced by it.\n\nIn the writings of one who rejects dogmatic Christianity, together\nwith the Hebrew cult which preceded it, a career of conquest costing\ntens of thousands of lives is narrated with a sympathy comparable to\nthat rejoicing which the Hebrew traditions show us over destruction\nof enemies in the name of God. You may find, too, a delight in\ncontemplating the exercise of despotic power, joined with insistance\non the salutariness of a state in which the wills of slaves and\ncitizens are humbly subject to the wills of masters and rulers--a\nsentiment also reminding us of that ancient Oriental life which\nbiblical narratives portray. Along with this worship of the strong\nman--along with this justification of whatever force may be needed for\ncarrying out his ambition--along with this yearning for a form of\nsociety in which supremacy of the few is unrestrained and the virtue\nof the many consists in obedience to them, we not unnaturally find\nrepudiation of the ethical theory which takes, in some shape or other,\nthe greatest happiness as the end of conduct: we not unnaturally find\nthis utilitarian philosophy designated by the contemptuous title of\n\"pig-philosophy.\" And then, serving to show what comprehension there\nhas been of the philosophy so nicknamed, we are told that not happiness\nbut blessedness must be the end.\n\nObviously, the implication is that blessedness is not a kind of\nhappiness; and this implication at once suggests the question--What\nmode of feeling is it? If it is a state of consciousness at all, it is\nnecessarily one of three states--painful, indifferent, or pleasurable.\nDoes it leave the possessor at the zero point of sentiency? Then it\nleaves him just as he would be if he had not got it. Does it not leave\nhim at the zero point? Then it must leave him below zero or above zero.\n\nEach of these possibilities may be conceived under two forms. That\nto which the term blessedness is applied may be a particular state\nof consciousness--one among the many states that occur; and on this\nsupposition we have to recognize it as a pleasurable state, an\nindifferent state, or a painful state. Otherwise, blessedness is\na word not applicable to a particular state of consciousness, but\ncharacterizes the aggregate of its states; and in this case the average\nof the aggregate is to be conceived as one in which the pleasurable\npredominates, or one in which the painful predominates, or one in which\npleasures and pains exactly cancel one another. Let us take in turn\nthese two imaginable applications of the word.\n\n\"Blessed are the merciful;\" \"Blessed are the peacemakers;\" \"Blessed is\nhe that considereth the poor;\" are sayings which we may fairly take\nas conveying the accepted meaning of blessedness. What now shall we\nsay of one who is, for the time being, blessed in performing an act\nof mercy? Is his mental state pleasurable? If so the hypothesis is\nabandoned: blessedness is a particular form of happiness. Is the state\nindifferent or painful? In that case the blessed man is so devoid\nof sympathy that relieving another from pain, or the fear of pain,\nleaves him either wholly unmoved, or gives him an unpleasant emotion.\nAgain, if one who is blessed in making peace receives no gratification\nfrom the act, then seeing men injure each other does not affect him\nat all, or gives him a pleasure which is changed into a pain when he\nprevents the injury. Once more, to say that the blessedness of one who\n\"considereth the poor\" implies no agreeable feeling, is to say that his\nconsideration for the poor leaves him without feeling or entails on him\na disagreeable feeling. So that if blessedness is a particular mode of\nconsciousness temporarily existing as a concomitant of each kind of\nbeneficent action, those who deny that it is a pleasure, or constituent\nof happiness, confess themselves either not pleased by the welfare of\nothers or displeased by it.\n\nOtherwise understood, blessedness must, as we have seen, refer to the\ntotality of feelings experienced during the life of one who occupies\nhimself with the actions the word connotes. This also presents the\nthree possibilities--surplus of pleasures, surplus of pains, equality\nof the two. If the pleasurable states are in excess, then the blessed\nlife can be distinguished from any other pleasurable life only by\nthe relative amount, or the quality, of its pleasures: it is a life\nwhich makes happiness of a certain kind and degree its end; and the\nassumption that blessedness is not a form of happiness, lapses. If\nthe blessed life is one in which the pleasures and the pains received\nbalance one another, so producing an average that is indifferent; or\nif it is one in which the pleasures are outbalanced by the pains, then\nthe blessed life has the character which the pessimist alleges of life\nat large, and therefore regards it as cursed. Annihilation is best, he\nwill argue, since if an average that is indifferent is the outcome of\nthe blessed life, annihilation at once achieves it; and if a surplus of\nsuffering is the outcome of this highest kind of life called blessed,\nstill more should life in general be ended.\n\nA possible rejoinder must be named and disposed of. While it is\nadmitted that the particular kind of consciousness accompanying conduct\nthat is blessed, is pleasurable, it may be contended that pursuance\nof this conduct and receipt of the pleasure, brings by the implied\nself-denial, and persistent effort, and perhaps bodily injury, a\nsuffering that exceeds it in amount. And it may then be urged that\nblessedness, characterized by this excess of aggregate pains over\naggregate pleasures, should nevertheless be pursued as an end, rather\nthan the happiness constituted by excess of pleasures over pains. But\nnow, defensible though this conception of blessedness may be when\nlimited to one individual, or some individuals, it becomes indefensible\nwhen extended to all individuals; as it must be if blessedness is taken\nfor the end of conduct. To see this we need but ask for what purpose\nare these pains in excess of pleasures to be borne. Blessedness being\nthe ideal state for all persons, and the self-sacrifices made by each\nperson in pursuance of this ideal state, having for their end to\nhelp all other persons in achieving the like ideal state, it results\nthat the blessed though painful state of each, is to be acquired by\nfurthering the like blessed though painful states of others: the\nblessed consciousness is to be constituted by the contemplation of\ntheir consciousnesses in a condition of average suffering. Does any\none accept this inference? If not, his rejection of it involves the\nadmission that the motive for bearing pains in performing acts called\nblessed, is not the obtaining for others like pains of blessedness, but\nthe obtaining of pleasures for others, and that thus pleasure somewhere\nis the tacitly implied ultimate end.\n\nIn brief, then, blessedness has for its necessary condition of\nexistence, increased happiness, positive or negative, in some\nconsciousness or other, and disappears utterly if we assume that the\nactions called blessed are known to cause decrease of happiness in\nothers as well as in the actor.\n\n\n\u00a7 15. To make clear the meaning of the general argument set forth in\nthis chapter, its successive parts must be briefly summarized.\n\nThat which in the last chapter we found to be highly-evolved conduct,\nis that which, in this chapter, we find to be what is called good\nconduct; and the ideal goal to the natural evolution of conduct there\nrecognized we here recognize as the ideal standard of conduct ethically\nconsidered.\n\nThe acts adjusted to ends which, while constituting the outer visible\nlife from moment to moment further the continuance of life, we saw\nbecome, as evolution progresses, better adjusted, until finally they\nmake the life of each individual entire in length and breadth, at the\nsame time that they efficiently subserve the rearing of young, and do\nboth these, not only without hindering other individuals from doing\nthe like, but while giving aid to them in doing the like. And here\nwe see that goodness is asserted of such conduct under each of these\nthree aspects. Other things equal, well-adjusted, self-conserving acts\nwe call good; other things equal, we call good the acts that are well\nadjusted for bringing up progeny capable of complete living; and other\nthings equal, we ascribe goodness to acts which further the complete\nliving of others.\n\nThis judging as good, conduct which conduces to life in each and all,\nwe found to involve the assumption that animate existence is desirable.\nBy the pessimist, conduct which subserves life cannot consistently\nbe called good: to call it good implies some form of optimism. We\nsaw, however, that pessimists and optimists both start with the\npostulate that life is a blessing or a curse, according as the average\nconsciousness accompanying it is pleasurable or painful. And since\navowed or implied pessimists, and optimists of one or other shade,\ntaken together constitute all men, it results that this postulate\nis universally accepted. Whence it follows that if we call good the\nconduct conducive to life, we can do so only with the implication that\nit is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains.\n\nThe truth that conduct is considered by us as good or bad, according\nas its aggregate results, to self or others or both, are pleasurable\nor painful, we found on examination to be involved in all the\ncurrent judgments on conduct: the proof being that reversing the\napplications of the words creates absurdities. And we found that every\nother proposed standard of conduct derives its authority from this\nstandard. Whether perfection of nature is the assigned proper aim, or\nvirtuousness of action, or rectitude of motive, we saw that definition\nof the perfection, the virtue, the rectitude, inevitably brings us down\nto happiness experienced in some form, at some time, by some person, as\nthe fundamental idea. Nor could we discover any intelligible conception\nof blessedness, save one which implies a raising of consciousness,\nindividual or general, to a happier state; either by mitigating pains\nor increasing pleasures.\n\nEven with those who judge of conduct from the religious point of view,\nrather than from the ethical point of view, it is the same. Men who\nseek to propitiate God by inflicting pains on themselves, or refrain\nfrom pleasures to avoid offending him, do so to escape greater ultimate\npains or to get greater ultimate pleasures. If by positive or negative\nsuffering here, they expected to achieve more suffering hereafter, they\nwould not do as they do. That which they now think duty they would not\nthink duty if it promised eternal misery instead of eternal happiness.\nNay, if there be any who believe that human beings were created to\nbe unhappy, and that they ought to continue living to display their\nunhappiness for the satisfaction of their creator, such believers are\nobliged to use this standard of judgment; for the pleasure of their\ndiabolical god is the end to be achieved.\n\nSo that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a\ndesirable state of feeling called by whatever name--gratification,\nenjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being\nor beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much\na necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of\nintellectual intuition.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nWAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT.\n\n\n\u00a7 17. Intellectual progress is by no one trait so adequately\ncharacterized as by development of the idea of causation, since\ndevelopment of this idea involves development of so many other ideas.\nBefore any way can be made, thought and language must have advanced\nfar enough to render properties or attributes thinkable as such,\napart from objects; which, in low stages of human intelligence, they\nare not. Again, even the simplest notion of cause, as we understand\nit, can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped\ninto a simple generalization; and through all ascending steps, higher\nnotions of causation imply wider notions of generality. Further, as\nthere must be clustered in the mind concrete causes of many kinds\nbefore there can emerge the conception of cause, apart from particular\ncauses, it follows that progress in abstractness of thought is implied.\nConcomitantly, there is implied the recognition of constant relations\namong phenomena, generating ideas of uniformity of sequence and of\nco-existence--the idea of natural law. These advances can go on only as\nfast as perceptions and resulting thoughts are made definite by the use\nof measures, serving to familiarize the mind with exact correspondence,\ntruth, certainty. And only when growing science accumulates examples\nof quantitative relations, foreseen and verified, throughout a\nwidening range of phenomena, does causation come to be conceived as\nnecessary and universal. So that though all these cardinal conceptions\naid one another in developing, we may properly say that the conception\nof causation especially depends for its development on the development\nof the rest; and therefore is the best measure of intellectual\ndevelopment at large.\n\nHow slowly, as a consequence of its dependence, the conception of\ncausation evolves, a glance at the evidence shows. We hear with\nsurprise of the savage who, falling down a precipice, ascribes the\nfailure of his foothold to a malicious demon; and we smile at the\nkindred notion of the ancient Greek, that his death was prevented by\na goddess who unfastened for him the thong of the helmet by which his\nenemy was dragging him. But daily, without surprise, we hear men who\ndescribe themselves as saved from shipwreck by \"divine interposition,\"\nwho speak of having \"providentially\" missed a train which met with a\nfatal disaster, and who called it a \"mercy\" to have escaped injury\nfrom a falling chimney-pot--men who, in such cases, recognize physical\ncausation no more than do the uncivilized or semi-civilized. The Veddah\nwho thinks that failure to hit an animal with his arrow resulted\nfrom inadequate invocation of an ancestral spirit, and the Christian\npriest who says prayers over a sick man in the expectation that the\ncourse of his disease will so be stayed, differ only in respect of the\nagent from whom they expect supernatural aid and the phenomena to be\naltered by him: the necessary relations among causes and effects are\ntacitly ignored by the last as much as by the first. Deficient belief\nin causation is, indeed, exemplified even in those whose discipline\nhas been specially fitted to generate this belief--even in men of\nscience. For a generation after geologists had become uniformitarians\nin Geology, they remained catastrophists in Biology: while recognizing\nnone but natural agencies in the genesis of the earth's crust, they\nascribed to supernatural agency the genesis of the organisms on its\nsurface. Nay more--among those who are convinced that living things\nin general have been evolved by the continued interaction of forces\neverywhere operating, there are some who make an exception of man; or\nwho, if they admit that his body has been evolved in the same manner\nas the bodies of other creatures, allege that his mind has been not\nevolved but specially created. If, then, universal and necessary\ncausation is only now approaching full recognition, even by those whose\ninvestigations are daily re-illustrating it, we may expect to find it\nvery little recognized among men at large, whose culture has not been\ncalculated to impress them with it; and we may expect to find it least\nrecognized by them in respect of those classes of phenomena amid which,\nin consequence of their complexity, causation is most difficult to\ntrace--the psychical, the social, the moral.\n\nWhy do I here make these reflections on what seems an irrelevant\nsubject? I do it because on studying the various ethical theories I am\nstruck with the fact that they are all characterized either by entire\nabsence of the idea of causation, or by inadequate presence of it.\nWhether theological, political, intuitional, or utilitarian, they all\ndisplay, if not in the same degree, still, each in a large degree, the\ndefects which result from this lack. We will consider them in the order\nnamed.\n\n\n\u00a7 18. The school of morals properly to be considered as the still\nextant representative of the most ancient school, is that which\nrecognizes no other rule of conduct than the alleged will of God. It\noriginates with the savage whose only restraint beyond fear of his\nfellow man, is fear of an ancestral spirit; and whose notion of moral\nduty as distinguished from his notion of social prudence, arises from\nthis fear. Here the ethical doctrine and the religious doctrine are\nidentical--have in no degree differentiated.\n\nThis primitive form of ethical doctrine, changed only by the gradual\ndying out of multitudinous minor supernatural agents and accompanying\ndevelopment of one universal supernatural agent, survives in great\nstrength down to our own day. Religious creeds, established and\ndissenting, all embody the belief that right and wrong are right and\nwrong simply in virtue of divine enactment. And this tacit assumption\nhas passed from systems of theology into systems of morality; or\nrather let us say that moral systems in early stages of development,\nlittle differentiated from the accompanying theological systems, have\nparticipated in this assumption. We see this in the works of the\nStoics, as well as in the works of certain Christian moralists. Among\nrecent ones I may instance the _Essays on the Principles of Morality_,\nby Jonathan Dymond, a Quaker, which makes \"the authority of the Deity\nthe sole ground of duty, and His communicated will the only ultimate\nstandard of right and wrong.\" Nor is it by writers belonging to so\nrelatively unphilosophical a sect only that this view is held; it is\nheld with a difference by writers belonging to sects contrariwise\ndistinguished. For these assert that in the absence of belief in a\ndeity, there would be no moral guidance; and this amounts to asserting\nthat moral truths have no other origin than the will of God, which, if\nnot considered as revealed in sacred writings, must be considered as\nrevealed in conscience.\n\nThis assumption, when examined, proves to be suicidal. If there are\nno other origins for right and wrong than this enunciated or intuited\ndivine will, then, as alleged, were there no knowledge of the divine\nwill, the acts now known as wrong would not be known as wrong. But if\nmen did not know such acts to be wrong because contrary to the divine\nwill, and so, in committing them, did not offend by disobedience;\nand, if they could not otherwise know them to be wrong, then they\nmight commit them indifferently with the acts now classed as right:\nthe results, practically considered, would be the same. In so far as\nsecular matters are concerned, there would be no difference between\nthe two; for to say that in the affairs of life any evils would arise\nfrom continuing to do the acts called wrong, and ceasing to do the\nacts called right, is to say that these produce in themselves certain\nmischievous consequences and certain beneficial consequences; which is\nto say there is another source for moral rules than the revealed or\ninferred divine will: they may be established by induction from these\nobserved consequences.\n\nFrom this implication I see no escape. It must be either admitted or\ndenied that the acts called good and the acts called bad, naturally\nconduce, the one to human well-being and the other to human ill-being.\nIs it admitted? Then the admission amounts to an assertion that the\nconduciveness is shown by experience; and this involves abandonment\nof the doctrine that there is no origin for morals apart from divine\ninjunctions. Is it denied that acts classed as good and bad differ in\ntheir effect? Then it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs would go\non just as well in ignorance of the distinction; and the alleged need\nfor commandments from God disappears.\n\nAnd here we see how entirely wanting is the conception of cause. This\nnotion that such and such actions are made respectively good and bad\nsimply by divine injunction, is tantamount to the notion that such and\nsuch actions have not in the nature of things such and such kinds of\neffects. If there is not an unconsciousness of causation there is an\nignoring of it.\n\n\n\u00a7 19. Following Plato and Aristotle, who make State enactments the\nsources of right and wrong; and following Hobbes, who holds that there\ncan be neither justice nor injustice till a regularly constituted\ncoercive power exists to issue and enforce commands; not a few modern\nthinkers hold that there is no other origin for good and bad in conduct\nthan law. And this implies the belief that moral obligation originates\nwith acts of parliament, and can be changed this way or that way by\nmajorities. They ridicule the idea that men have any natural rights,\nand allege that rights are wholly results of convention: the necessary\nimplication being that duties are so too. Before considering whether\nthis theory coheres with outside truths, let us observe how far it is\ncoherent within itself.\n\nIn pursuance of his argument that rights and duties originate with\nestablished social arrangements, Hobbes says:\n\n  \"Where no covenant hath proceeded, there hath no right been\n  transferred, and every man has a right to everything; and\n  consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made,\n  then to break it is _unjust_; and the definitions of _injustice_\n  is no other than _the not performance of covenant_. And whatsoever\n  is not unjust, is _just_. Therefore, before the names of just and\n  unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel\n  men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of\n  some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of\n  their covenant.\"[A]\n\nIn this paragraph the essential propositions are: justice is\nfulfillment of covenant; fulfillment of covenant implies a power\nof enforcing it: \"just and unjust _can_ have no place\" unless men\nare compelled to perform their covenants. But this is to say that\nmen _cannot_ perform their covenants without compulsion. Grant that\njustice is performance of covenant. Now suppose it to be performed\nvoluntarily: there is justice. In such case, however, there is justice\nin the absence of coercion; which is contrary to the hypothesis. The\nonly conceivable rejoinder is an absurd one--voluntary performance of\ncovenant is impossible. Assert this, and the doctrine that right and\nwrong come into existence with the establishment of sovereignty is\ndefensible. Decline to assert it, and the doctrine vanishes.\n\nFrom inner incongruities pass now to outer ones. The justification\nfor his doctrine of absolute civil authority as the source of rules\nof conduct, Hobbes seeks in the miseries entailed by the chronic war\nbetween man and man which must exist in the absence of society; holding\nthat under any kind of government a better life is possible than in\nthe state of nature. Now whether we accept the gratuitous and baseless\ntheory that men surrendered their liberties to a sovereign power of\nsome kind, with a view to the promised increase of satisfactions;\nor whether we accept the rational theory, inductively based, that a\nstate of political subordination gradually became established through\nexperience of the increased satisfactions derived under it; it equally\nremains obvious that the acts of the sovereign power have no other\nwarrant than their subservience to the purpose for which it came into\nexistence. The necessities which initiate government, themselves\nprescribe the actions of government. If its actions do not respond to\nthe necessities, they are unwarranted. The authority of law is, then,\nby the hypothesis, derived; and can never transcend the authority of\nthat from which it is derived. If general good, or welfare, or utility,\nis the supreme end, and if State enactments are justified as means to\nthis supreme end, then, State enactments have such authority only as\narises from conduciveness to this supreme end. When they are right,\nit is only because the original authority endorses them; and they are\nwrong if they do not bear its endorsement. That is to say, conduct\ncannot be made good or bad by law; but its goodness or badness is to\nthe last determined by its effects as naturally furthering, or not\nfurthering, the lives of citizens.\n\nStill more when considered in the concrete, than when considered in\nthe abstract, do the views of Hobbes and his disciples prove to be\ninconsistent. Joining in the general belief that without such security\nfor life as enables men to go fearlessly about their business, there\ncan be neither happiness nor prosperity, individual or general, they\nagree that measures for preventing murder, manslaughter, assault,\netc., are requisite; and they advocate this or that penal system as\nfurnishing the best deterrents: so arguing, both in respect of the\nevils and the remedies, that such and such causes will, by the nature\nof things, produce such and such effects. They recognize as inferable\n_\u00e0 priori_, the truth that men will not lay by property unless they\ncan count with great probability on reaping advantages from it; that\nconsequently where robbery is unchecked, or where a rapacious ruler\nappropriates whatever earnings his subjects do not effectually hide,\nproduction will scarcely exceed immediate consumption; and that\nnecessarily there will be none of that accumulation of capital required\nfor social development, with all its aids to welfare. In neither case,\nhowever, do they perceive that they are tacitly asserting the need\nfor certain restraints on conduct as deducible from the necessary\nconditions to complete life in the social state; and are so making the\nauthority of law derivative and not original.\n\nIf it be said by any belonging to this school that certain moral\nobligations, to be distinguished as cardinal, must be admitted to have\na basis deeper than legislation, and that it is for legislation not to\ncreate but merely to enforce them--if, I say, admitting this, they go\non to allege a legislative origin for minor claims and duties; then\nwe have the implication that whereas some kinds of conduct do, in the\nnature of things, tend to work out certain kinds of results, other\nkinds of conduct do not, in the nature of things, tend to work out\ncertain kinds of results. While of these acts the naturally good or\nbad consequences must be allowed, it may be denied of those acts that\nthey have naturally good or bad consequences. Only after asserting\nthis can it be consistently asserted that acts of the last class\nare made right or wrong by law. For if such acts have any intrinsic\ntendencies to produce beneficial or mischievous effects, then these\nintrinsic tendencies furnish the warrant for legislative requirements\nor interdicts; and to say that the requirements or interdicts make them\nright or wrong is to say that they have no intrinsic tendencies to\nproduce beneficial or mischievous effects.\n\nHere, then, we have another theory betraying deficient consciousness\nof causation. An adequate consciousness of causation yields the\nirresistible belief that from the most serious to the most trivial\nactions of men in society, there must flow consequences which, quite\napart from legal agency, conduce to well-being or ill-being in greater\nor smaller degrees. If murders are socially injurious whether forbidden\nby law or not--if one man's appropriation of another's gains by force\nbrings special and general evils, whether it is or is not contrary\nto a ruler's edicts--if non-fulfillment of contract, if cheating, if\nadulteration, work mischiefs on a community in proportion as they are\ncommon, quite irrespective of prohibitions; then, is it not manifest\nthat the like holds throughout all the details of men's behavior? Is\nit not clear that when legislation insists on certain acts which have\nnaturally beneficial effects, and forbids others that have naturally\ninjurious effects, the acts are not made good or bad by legislation;\nbut the legislation derives its authority from the natural effects of\nthe acts? Non-recognition of this implies non-recognition of natural\ncausation.\n\n\n\u00a7 20. Nor is it otherwise with the pure intuitionists, who hold that\nmoral perceptions are innate in the original sense--thinkers whose view\nis that men have been divinely endowed with moral faculties; not that\nthese have resulted from inherited modifications caused by accumulated\nexperiences.\n\nTo affirm that we know some things to be right and other things to be\nwrong, by virtue of a supernaturally given conscience; and thus tacitly\nto affirm that we do not otherwise know right from wrong; is tacitly to\ndeny any natural relations between acts and results. For if there exist\nany such relations, then we may ascertain by induction, or deduction,\nor both, what these are. And if it be admitted that because of such\nnatural relations, happiness is produced by this kind of conduct, which\nis therefore to be approved, while misery is produced by that kind\nof conduct, which is therefore to be condemned; then it is admitted\nthat the rightness or wrongness of actions are determinable, and must\nfinally be determined, by the goodness or badness of the effects that\nflow from them; which is contrary to the hypothesis.\n\nIt may, indeed, be rejoined that effects are deliberately ignored\nby this school; which teaches that courses recognized by moral\nintuition as right, must be pursued without regard to consequences.\nBut on inquiry it turns out that the consequences to be disregarded\nare particular consequences, and not general consequences. When,\nfor example, it is said that property lost by another ought to be\nrestored, irrespective of evil to the finder, who possibly may, by\nrestoring it, lose that which would have preserved him from starvation,\nit is meant that in pursuance of the principle, the immediate and\nspecial consequences must be disregarded, not the diffused and remote\nconsequences. By which we are shown that though the theory forbids\novert recognition of causation, there is an unavowed recognition of it.\n\nAnd this implies the trait to which I am drawing attention. The\nconception of natural causation is so imperfectly developed that there\nis only an indistinct consciousness that throughout the whole of human\nconduct necessary relations of causes and effects prevail, and that\nfrom them are ultimately derived all moral rules, however much these\nmay be proximately derived from moral intuitions.\n\n\n\u00a7 21. Strange to say, even the utilitarian school, which, at first\nsight, appears to be distinguished from the rest by recognizing natural\ncausation, is, if not so far from complete recognition of it, yet very\nfar.\n\nConduct, according to its theory, is to be estimated by observation\nof results. When, in sufficiently numerous cases, it has been found\nthat behavior of this kind works evil while behavior of that kind\nworks good, these kinds of behavior are to be judged as wrong and\nright respectively. Now though it seems that the origin of moral\nrules in natural causes, is thus asserted by implication, it is but\npartially asserted. The implication is simply that we are to ascertain\nby induction that such and such mischiefs or benefits _do_ go along\nwith such and such acts; and are then to infer that the like relations\nwill hold in future. But acceptance of these generalizations and the\ninferences from them does not amount to recognition of causation in\nthe full sense of the word. So long as only _some_ relation between\ncause and effect in conduct is recognized, and not _the_ relation,\na completely scientific form of knowledge has not been reached. At\npresent, utilitarians pay no attention to this distinction. Even when\nit is pointed out they disregard the fact that empirical utilitarianism\nis but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to rational\nutilitarianism.\n\nIn a letter to Mr. Mill, written some sixteen years ago, repudiating\nthe title anti-utilitarian, which he had applied to me (a letter\nsubsequently published in Mr. Bain's work on _Mental and Moral\nScience_), I endeavored to make clear the difference above indicated;\nand I must here quote certain passages from that letter.\n\n  The view for which I contend is, that Morality, properly\n  so-called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to\n  determine _how_ and _why_ certain modes of conduct are detrimental,\n  and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot\n  be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution\n  of things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science\n  to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence,\n  what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and\n  what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions\n  are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to\n  irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.\n\n  Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its\n  early stages, planetary Astronomy consisted of nothing more than\n  accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions of\n  the sun and planets; from which accumulated observations it came\n  by-and-by to be empirically predicted, with an approach to truth,\n  that certain of the heavenly bodies would have certain positions at\n  certain times. But the modern science of planetary Astronomy consists\n  of deductions from the law of gravitation--deductions showing why\n  the celestial bodies _necessarily_ occupy certain places at certain\n  times. Now, the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient\n  and modern Astronomy is analogous to the kind of relation which, I\n  conceive, exists between the Expediency-Morality and Moral Science,\n  properly so called. And the objection which I have to the current\n  Utilitarianism is, that it recognizes no more developed form of\n  Morality--does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of\n  Moral Science.\n\nDoubtless if utilitarians are asked whether it can be by mere chance\nthat this kind of action works evil and that works good, they will\nanswer--No: they will admit that such sequences are parts of a\nnecessary order among phenomena. But though this truth is beyond\nquestion; and though if there are causal relations between acts and\ntheir results, rules of conduct can become scientific only when they\nare deduced from these causal relations; there continues to be entire\nsatisfaction with that form of utilitarianism in which these causal\nrelations are practically ignored. It is supposed that in future, as\nnow, utility is to be determined only by observation of results: and\nthat there is no possibility of knowing, by deduction from fundamental\nprinciples, what conduct _must_ be detrimental and what conduct _must_\nbe beneficial.\n\n\n\u00a7 22. To make more specific that conception of ethical science here\nindicated, let me present it under a concrete aspect, beginning with a\nsimple illustration and complicating this illustration by successive\nsteps.\n\nIf, by tying its main artery, we stop most of the blood going to\na limb, then, for as long as the limb performs its function, those\nparts which are called into play must be wasted faster than they\nare repaired: whence eventual disablement. The relation between due\nreceipt of nutritive matters through its arteries, and due discharge\nof its duties by the limb is a part of the physical order. If, instead\nof cutting off the supply to a particular limb, we bleed the patient\nlargely, so drafting away the materials needed for repairing not one\nlimb but all limbs, and not limbs only but viscera, there results both\na muscular debility and an enfeeblement of the vital functions. Here,\nagain, cause and effect are necessarily related. The mischief that\nresults from great depletion, results apart from any divine command, or\npolitical enactment, or moral intuition. Now advance a step. Suppose\nthe man to be prevented from taking in enough of the solid and liquid\nfood containing those substances continually abstracted from his blood\nin repairing his tissues: suppose he has cancer of the esophagus and\ncannot swallow--what happens? By this indirect depletion, as by direct\ndepletion, he is inevitably made incapable of performing the actions\nof one in health. In this case, as in the other cases, the connection\nbetween cause and effect is one that cannot be established, or altered,\nby any authority external to the phenomena themselves. Again, let\nus say that instead of being stopped after passing his mouth, that\nwhich he would swallow is stopped before reaching his mouth; so that\nday after day the man is required to waste his tissues in getting\nfood, and day after day the food he has got to meet this waste, he is\nforcibly prevented from eating. As before, the progress toward death\nby starvation is inevitable--the connection between acts and effects\nis independent of any alleged theological or political authority. And\nsimilarly if, being forced by the whip to labor, no adequate return\nin food is supplied to him, there are equally certain evils, equally\nindependent of sacred or secular enactment.\n\nPass now to those actions more commonly thought of as the occasions\nfor rules of conduct. Let us assume the man to be continually robbed\nof that which was given him in exchange for his labor, and by which he\nwas to make up for nervo-muscular expenditure and renew his powers.\nNo less than before is the connection between conduct and consequence\nrooted in the constitution of things; unchangeable by State-made law,\nand not needing establishment by empirical generalization. If the\naction by which the man is affected is a stage further away from the\nresults, or produces results of a less decisive kind, still we see the\nsame basis for morality in the physical order. Imagine that payment\nfor his services is made partly in bad coin; or that it is delayed\nbeyond the date agreed upon; or that what he buys to eat is adulterated\nwith innutritive matter. Manifestly, by any of these deeds which we\ncondemn as unjust, and which are punished by law, there is, as before,\nan interference with the normal adjustment of physiological repair\nto physiological waste. Nor is it otherwise when we pass to kinds of\nconduct still more remotely operative. If he is hindered from enforcing\nhis claim, if class-predominance prevents him from proceeding, or if\na bribed judge gives a verdict contrary to evidence, or if a witness\nswears falsely, have not these deeds, though they affect him more\nindirectly, the same original cause for their wrongness?\n\nEven with actions which work diffused and indefinite mischiefs it\nis the same. Suppose that the man, instead of being dealt with\nfraudulently, is calumniated. There is, as before, a hinderance to the\ncarrying on of life-sustaining activities; for the loss of character\ndetrimentally affects his business. Nor is this all. The mental\ndepression caused partially incapacitates him for energetic activity,\nand perhaps brings on ill-health. So that maliciously or carelessly\npropagating false statements tends both to diminish his life and to\ndiminish his ability to maintain life. Hence its flagitiousness.\n\nMoreover, if we trace to their ultimate ramifications the effects\nwrought by any of these acts which morality called intuitive\nreprobates--if we ask what results not to the individual himself only,\nbut also to his belongings--if we observe how impoverishment hinders\nthe rearing of his children, by entailing under-feeding or inadequate\nclothing, resulting perhaps in the death of some and the constitutional\ninjury of others; we see that by the necessary connections of things\nthese acts, besides tending primarily to lower the life of the\nindividual aggressed upon, tend, secondarily, to lower the lives of all\nhis family, and thirdly, to lower the life of society at large; which\nis damaged by whatever damages its units.\n\nA more distinct meaning will now be seen in the statement that the\nutilitarianism which recognizes only the principles of conduct reached\nby induction, is but preparatory to the utilitarianism which deduces\nthese principles from the processes of life as carried on under\nestablished conditions of existence.\n\n\n\u00a722. Thus, then, is justified the allegation made at the outset,\nthat, irrespective of their distinctive characters and their special\ntendencies, all the current methods of ethics have one general\ndefect--they neglect ultimate causal connections. Of course I do not\nmean that they wholly ignore the natural consequences of actions; but\nI mean that they recognize them only incidentally. They do not erect\ninto a method the ascertaining of necessary relations between causes\nand effects, and deducing rules of conduct from formulated statement of\nthem.\n\nEvery science begins by accumulating observations, and presently\ngeneralizes these empirically; but only when it reaches the stage\nat which its empirical generalizations are included in a rational\ngeneralization, does it become developed science. Astronomy has already\npassed through its successive stages: first collections of facts; then\ninductions from them; and lastly deductive interpretations of these, as\ncorollaries from a universal principle of action among masses in space.\nAccounts of structures and tabulations of strata, grouped and compared,\nhave led gradually to the assigning of various classes of geological\nchanges to igneous and aqueous actions; and it is now tacitly admitted\nthat Geology becomes a science proper, only as fast as such changes\nare explained in terms of those natural processes which have arisen in\nthe cooling and solidifying earth, exposed to the sun's heat and the\naction of the moon upon its ocean. The science of life has been, and\nis still, exhibiting a like series of steps; the evolution of organic\nforms at large is being affiliated on physical actions in operations\nfrom the beginning; and the vital phenomena each organism presents are\ncoming to be understood as connected sets of changes, in parts formed\nof matters that are affected by certain forces and disengage other\nforces. So is it with mind. Early ideas concerning thought and feeling\nignored everything like cause, save in recognizing those effects of\nhabits which were forced on men's attention and expressed in proverbs;\nbut there are growing up interpretations of thought and feeling as\ncorrelates of the actions and reactions of a nervous structure, that\nis influenced by outer changes and works in the body adapted changes:\nthe implication being that Psychology becomes a science as fast as\nthese relations of phenomena are explained as consequences of ultimate\nprinciples. Sociology, too, represented down to recent times only by\nstray ideas about social organization, scattered through the masses of\nworthless gossip furnished us by historians, is coming to be recognized\nby some as also a science; and such adumbrations of it as have from\ntime to time appeared in the shape of empirical generalizations, are\nnow beginning to assume the character of generalizations made coherent\nby derivation from causes lying in human nature placed under given\nconditions. Clearly then, Ethics, which is a science dealing with the\nconduct of associated human beings, regarded under one of its aspects,\nhas to undergo a like transformation; and, at present undeveloped,\ncan be considered a developed science only when it has undergone this\ntransformation.\n\nA preparation in the simpler sciences is pre-supposed. Ethics has a\nphysical aspect; since it treats of human activities which, in common\nwith all expenditures or energy, conform to the law of the persistence\nof energy: moral principles must conform to physical necessities. It\nhas a biological aspect; since it concerns certain effects, inner and\nouter, individual and social, of the vital changes going on in the\nhighest type of animal. It has a psychological aspect; for its subject\nmatter is an aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and\nguided by intelligence. And it has a sociological aspect; for these\nactions, some of them directly and all of them indirectly, affect\nassociated beings.\n\nWhat is the implication? Belonging under one aspect to each of these\nsciences--physical, biological, psychological, sociological--it can\nfind its ultimate interpretations only in those fundamental truths\nwhich are common to all of them. Already we have concluded in a general\nway that conduct at large, including the conduct Ethics deals with, is\nto be fully understood only as an aspect of evolving life; and now we\nare brought to this conclusion in a more special way.\n\n\n\u00a7 23. Here, then, we have to enter on the consideration of moral\nphenomena as phenomena of evolution; being forced to do this by finding\nthat they form a part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution has\nwrought out. If the entire visible universe has been evolved--if the\nsolar system as a whole, the earth as a part of it, the life in general\nwhich the earth bears, as well as that of each individual organism--if\nthe mental phenomena displayed by all creatures, up to the highest, in\ncommon with the phenomena presented by aggregates of these highest--if\none and all conform to the laws of evolution; then the necessary\nimplication is that those phenomena of conduct in these highest\ncreatures with which Morality is concerned, also conform.\n\nThe preceding volumes have prepared the way for dealing with morals\nas thus conceived. Utilizing the conclusions they contain, let\nus now observe what data are furnished by these. We will take in\nsuccession--the physical view, the biological view, the psychological\nview, and the sociological view.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE PHYSICAL VIEW.\n\n\n\u00a7 24. Every moment we pass instantly from men's perceived actions to\nthe motives implied by them; and so are led to formulate these actions\nin mental terms rather than in bodily terms. Thoughts and feelings are\nreferred to when we speak of any one's deeds with praise or blame; not\nthose outer manifestations which reveal the thoughts and feelings.\nHence we become oblivious of the truth that conduct as actually\nexperienced consists of changes recognized by touch, sight and hearing.\n\nThis habit of contemplating only the psychical face of conduct, is so\nconfirmed that an effort is required to contemplate only the physical\nface. Undeniable as it is that another's behavior to us is made up of\nmovements of his body and limbs, of his facial muscles, and of his\nvocal apparatus, it yet seems paradoxical to say that these are the\nonly elements of conduct really known by us, while the elements of\nconduct which we exclusively think of as constituting it, are not known\nbut inferred.\n\nHere, however, ignoring for the time being the inferred elements in\nconduct, we have to deal with the perceived elements--we have to\nobserve its traits considered as a set of combined motions. Taking\nthe evolution point of view, and remembering that while an aggregate\nevolves, not only the matter composing it, but also the motion of that\nmatter, passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite\ncoherent heterogeneity, we have now to ask whether conduct as it rises\nto its higher forms, displays in increasing degrees these characters;\nand whether it does not display them in the greatest degree when it\nreaches that highest form which we call moral.\n\n\n\u00a7 25. It will be convenient to deal first with the trait of increasing\ncoherence. The conduct of lowly-organized creatures is broadly\ncontrasted with the conduct of highly-organized creatures in having\nits successive portions feebly connected. The random movements which\nanimalcule makes have severally no reference to movements made a\nmoment before; nor do they affect in specific ways the movements made\nimmediately after. To-day's wanderings of a fish in search of food,\nthough perhaps showing by their adjustments to catching different\nkinds of prey at different hours, a slightly-determined order, are\nunrelated to the wanderings of yesterday and to-morrow. But such more\ndeveloped creatures as birds, show us in the building of nests, the\nsitting on eggs, the rearing of chicks, and the aiding of them after\nthey fly, sets of motions which form a dependent series, extending over\na considerable period. And on observing the complexity of the acts\nperformed in fetching and fixing the fibres of the nest or in catching\nand bringing to the young each portion of food, we discover in the\ncombined motions, lateral cohesion as well as longitudinal cohesion.\n\nMan, even in his lowest state, displays in his conduct far more\ncoherent combinations of motions. By the elaborate manipulations gone\nthrough in making weapons that are to serve for the chase next year,\nor in building canoes and wigwams for permanent uses--by acts of\naggression and defense which are connected with injuries long since\nreceived or committed, the savage exhibits an aggregate of motions\nwhich, in some of its parts, holds together over great periods.\nMoreover, if we consider the many movements implied by the transactions\nof each day, in the wood, on the water, in the camp, in the family, we\nsee that this coherent aggregate of movements is composed of many minor\naggregates that are severally coherent within themselves and with one\nanother.\n\nIn civilized man this trait of developed conduct becomes more\nconspicuous still. Be his business what it may, its processes involve\nrelatively numerous dependent motions; and day by day it is so carried\non as to show connections between present motions and motions long gone\nby, as well as motions anticipated in the distant future. Besides the\nmany doings, related to one another, which the farmer goes through in\nlooking after his cattle, directing his laborers, keeping an eye on his\ndairy, buying his implements, selling his produce, etc., the business\nof getting his lease involves numerous combined movements on which the\nmovements of subsequent years depend; and in manuring his fields with a\nview to larger returns, or putting down drains with the like motive, he\nis performing acts which are parts of a coherent combination relatively\nextensive. That the like holds of the shopkeeper, manufacturer,\nbanker, is manifest; and this increased coherence of conduct among the\ncivilized will strike us even more when we remember how its parts\nare often continued in a connected arrangement through life, for the\npurpose of making a fortune, founding a family, gaining a seat in\nParliament.\n\nNow mark that a greater coherence among its component motions broadly\ndistinguishes the conduct we call moral from the conduct we call\nimmoral. The application of the word dissolute to the last, and of the\nword self-restrained to the first, implies this--implies that conduct\nof the lower kind, constituted of disorderly acts, has its parts\nrelatively loose in their relations with one another; while conduct\nof the higher kind, habitually following a fixed order, so gains a\ncharacteristic unity and coherence. In proportion as the conduct is\nwhat we call moral, it exhibits comparatively settled connections\nbetween antecedents and consequents; for the doing right implies that\nunder given conditions the combined motions constituting conduct\nwill follow in a way that can be specified. Contrariwise, in the\nconduct of one whose principles are not high, the sequences of motions\nare doubtful. He may pay the money or he may not; he may keep his\nappointment or he may fail; he may tell the truth or he may lie. The\nwords trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, as used to characterize\nthe two respectively, sufficiently imply that the actions of the one\ncan be foreknown while those of the other cannot; and this implies that\nthe successive movements composing the one bear more constant relations\nto one another than do those composing the other--are more coherent.\n\n\n\u00a7 26. Indefiniteness accompanies incoherence in conduct that is little\nevolved; and throughout the ascending stages of evolving conduct there\nis an increasingly definite co-ordination of the motions constituting\nit.\n\nSuch changes of form as the rudest protozoa show us, are utterly\nvague--admit of no precise description; and though in higher kinds the\nmovements of the parts are more definable, yet the movement of the\nwhole in respect of direction is indeterminate: there is no adjustment\nof it to this or the other point in space. In such coelenterate animals\nas polypes we see the parts moving in ways which lack precision; and in\none of the locomotive forms, as a medusa, the course taken, otherwise\nat random, can be described only as one which carries it toward the\nlight, where degrees of light and darkness are present. Among annulose\ncreatures the contrast between the track of a worm, turning this way or\nthat at hazard, and the definite course taken by a bee in its flight\nfrom flower to flower or back to the hive, shows us the same thing;\nthe bee's acts in building cells and feeding larv\u00e6 further exhibiting\nprecision in the simultaneous movements as well as in the successive\nmovements. Though the motions made by a fish in pursuing its prey have\nconsiderable definiteness, yet they are of a simple kind, and are\nin this respect contrasted with the many definite motions of body,\nhead, and limbs gone through by a carnivorous mammal in the course of\nwaylaying, running down, and seizing a herbivore; and further, the fish\nshows us none of those definitely adjusted sets of motions which in the\nmammal subserve the rearing of young.\n\nMuch greater definiteness, if not in the combined movements forming\nsingle acts, still in the adjustments of many combined acts to various\npurposes, characterizes human conduct, even in its lowest stages. In\nmaking and using weapons and in the maneuverings of savage warfare,\nnumerous movements, all precise in their adaptations to proximate ends,\nare arranged for the achievement of remote ends, with a precision not\nparalleled among lower creatures. The lives of civilized men exhibit\nthis trait far more conspicuously. Each industrial art exemplifies\nthe effects of movements which are severally definite; and which are\ndefinitely arranged in simultaneous and successive order. Business\ntransactions of every kind are characterized by exact relations between\nthe sets of motions constituting acts, and the purposes fulfilled,\nin time, place, and quantity. Further, the daily routine of each\nperson shows us in its periods and amounts of activity, of rest, of\nrelaxation, a measured arrangement which is not shown us by the doings\nof the wandering savage, who has no fixed times for hunting, sleeping,\nfeeding, or any one kind of action.\n\nMoral conduct differs from immoral conduct in the same manner and in a\nlike degree. The conscientious man is exact in all his transactions.\nHe supplies a precise weight for a specified sum; he gives a definite\nquality in fulfillment of understanding; he pays the full amount he\nbargained to do. In times as well as in quantities, his acts answer\ncompletely to anticipations. If he has made a business contract he\nis to the day; if an appointment he is to the minute. Similarly in\nrespect of truth: his statements correspond accurately with the facts.\nIt is thus too in his family life. He maintains marital relations that\nare definite in contrast with the relations that result from breach\nof the marriage contract; and as a father, fitting his behavior with\ncare to the nature of each child and to the occasion; he avoids the\ntoo much and the too little of praise or blame, reward or penalty.\nNor is it otherwise in his miscellaneous acts. To say that he deals\nequitably with those he employs, whether they behave well or ill, is\nto say that he adjusts his acts to their deserts; and to say that he\nis judicious in his charities, is to say that he portions out his aid\nwith discrimination instead of distributing it indiscriminately to\ngood and bad, as do those who have no adequate sense of their social\nresponsibilities.\n\nThat progress toward rectitude of conduct is progress toward\nduly-proportioned conduct, and that duly-proportioned conduct is\nrelatively definite, we may see from another point of view. One of\nthe traits of conduct we call immoral, is excess; while moderation\nhabitually characterizes moral conduct. Now excesses imply extreme\ndivergences of actions from some medium, while maintenance of the\nmedium is implied by moderation; whence it follows that actions of the\nlast kind can be defined more nearly than those of the first. Clearly\nconduct which, being unrestrained, runs into great and incalculable\noscillations, therein differs from restrained conduct of which, by\nimplication, the oscillations fall within narrower limits. And falling\nwithin narrower limits necessitates relative definiteness of movements.\n\n\n\u00a7 27. That throughout the ascending forms of life, along with\nincreasing heterogeneity of structure and function, there goes\nincreasing heterogeneity of conduct--increasing diversity in the sets\nof external motions and combined sets of such motions--needs not be\nshown in detail. Nor need it be shown that becoming relatively great\nin the motions constituting the conduct of the uncivilized man, this\nheterogeneity has become still greater in those which the civilized man\ngoes through. We may pass at once to that further degree of the like\ncontrast which we see on ascending from the conduct of the immoral to\nthat of the moral.\n\nInstead of recognizing this contrast, most readers will be inclined to\nidentify a moral life with a life little varied in its activities. But\nhere we come upon a defect in the current conception of morality. This\ncomparative uniformity in the aggregate of motions, which goes along\nwith morality as commonly conceived, is not only not moral but is the\nreverse of moral. The better a man fulfills every requirement of life,\nalike as regards his own body and mind, as regards the bodies and minds\nof those dependent on him, and as regards the bodies and minds of his\nfellow-citizens, the more varied do his activities become. The more\nfully he does all these things, the more heterogeneous must be his\nmovements.\n\nOne who satisfies personal needs only, goes through other things equal,\nless multiform processes than one who also administers to the needs\nof wife and children. Supposing there are no other differences, the\naddition of family relations necessarily renders the actions of the\nman who fulfills the duties of husband and parent, more heterogeneous\nthan those of the man who has no such duties to fulfill, or, having\nthem, does not fulfill them; and to say that his actions are more\nheterogeneous is to say that there is a greater heterogeneity in\nthe combined motions he goes through. The like holds of social\nobligations. These, in proportion as a citizen duly performs them,\ncomplicate his movements considerably. If he is helpful to inferiors\ndependent on him, if he takes a part in political agitation, if he aids\nin diffusing knowledge, he, in each of these ways, adds to his kinds of\nactivity--makes his sets of movements more multiform; so differing from\nthe man who is the slave of one desire or group of desires.\n\nThough it is unusual to consider as having a moral aspect, those\nactivities which culture involves, yet to the few who hold that due\nexercise of all the higher faculties, intellectual and \u00e6sthetic,\nmust be included in the conception of complete life, here identified\nwith the ideally moral life, it will be manifest that a further\nheterogeneity is implied by them. For each of such activities,\nconstituted by that play of these faculties which is eventually\nadded to their life-subserving uses, adds to the multiformity of the\naggregated motions.\n\nBriefly, then, if the conduct is the best possible on every occasion,\nit follows that as the occasions are endlessly varied the acts will\nbe endlessly varied to suit--the heterogeneity in the combinations of\nmotions will be extreme.\n\n\n\u00a7 28. Evolution in conduct considered under its moral aspect, is, like\nall other evolution, toward equilibrium. I do not mean that it is\ntoward the equilibrium reached at death, though this is, of course, the\nfinal state which the evolution of the highest man has in common with\nall lower evolution; but I mean that it is toward a moving equilibrium.\n\nWe have seen that maintaining life, expressed in physical terms, is\nmaintaining a balanced combination of internal actions in face of\nexternal forces tending to overthrow it; and we have seen that advance\ntoward a higher life, has been an acquirement of ability to maintain\nthe balance for a longer period, by the successive additions of\norganic appliances which by their actions counteract, more and more\nfully, the disturbing forces. Here, then, we are led to the conclusion\nthat the life called moral is one in which this maintenance of the\nmoving equilibrium reaches completeness, or approaches most nearly to\ncompleteness.\n\nThis truth is clearly disclosed on observing how those physiological\nrhythms which vaguely show themselves when organization begins, become\nmore regular, as well as more various in their kinds, as organization\nadvances. Periodicity is but feebly marked in the actions, inner\nand outer, of the rudest types. Where life is low there is passive\ndependence on the accidents of the environment; and this entails\ngreat irregularities in the vital processes. The taking in of food by\na polype is at intervals now short, now very long, as circumstances\ndetermine; and the utilization of it is by a slow dispersion of\nthe absorbed part through the tissues, aided only by the irregular\nmovements of the creature's body; while, such \u00e6ration as is effected\nis similarly without a trace of rhythm. Much higher up we still find\nvery imperfect periodicities; as in the inferior molluscs which, though\npossessed of vascular systems, have no proper circulation, but merely\na slow movement of the crude blood, now in one direction through the\nvessels and then, after a pause, in the opposite direction. Only\nwith well-developed structures do there come a rhythmical pulse and\na rhythm of the respiratory actions. And then in birds and mammals,\nalong with great rapidity and regularity in these essential rhythms,\nand along with a consequently great vital activity and therefore great\nexpenditure, comparative regularity in the rhythm of the alimentary\nactions is established, as well as in the rhythm of activity and rest;\nsince the rapid waste to which rapid pulsation and respiration are\ninstrumental, necessitates tolerably regular supplies of nutriment, as\nwell as recurring intervals of sleep during which repair may overtake\nwaste. And from these stages the moving equilibrium characterized\nby such interdependent rhythms, is continually made better by the\ncounteracting of more and more of those actions which tend to perturb\nit.\n\nSo is it as we ascend from savage to civilized and from the lowest\namong the civilized to the highest. The rhythm of external actions\nrequired to maintain the rhythm of internal actions becomes at once\nmore complicated and more complete, making them into a better moving\nequilibrium. The irregularities which their conditions of existence\nentail on primitive men, continually cause wide deviations from the\nmean state of the moving equilibrium--wide oscillations; which imply\nimperfection of it for the time being, and bring about its premature\noverthrow. In such civilized men as we call ill conducted, frequent\nperturbations of the moving equilibrium are caused by those excesses\ncharacterizing a career in which the periodicities are much broken; and\na common result is that the rhythm of the internal actions being often\nderanged, the moving equilibrium, rendered by so much imperfect, is\ngenerally shortened in duration. While one in whom the internal rhythms\nare best maintained is one by whom the external actions required to\nfulfill all needs and duties, severally performed on the recurring\noccasions, conduce to a moving equilibrium that is at once involved and\nprolonged.\n\nOf course the implication is that the man who thus reaches the limit\nof evolution, exists in a society congruous with his nature, is a man\namong men similarly constituted, who are severally in harmony with that\nsocial environment which they have formed. This is, indeed, the only\npossibility. For the production of the highest type of man can go on\nonly _pari passu_ with the production of the highest type of society.\nThe implied conditions are those before described as accompanying the\nmost evolved conduct--conditions under which each can fulfill all his\nneeds and rear the due number of progeny, not only without hindering\nothers from doing the like, but while aiding them in doing the like.\nAnd evidently, considered under its physical aspect, the conduct of the\nindividual so constituted, and associated with like individuals, is one\nin which all the actions, that is the combined motions of all kinds,\nhave become such as duly to meet every daily process, every ordinary\noccurrence, and every contingency in his environment. Complete life in\na complete society is but another name for complete equilibrium between\nthe co-ordinated activities of each social unit and those of the\naggregate of units.\n\n\n\u00a7 29. Even to readers of preceding volumes, and still more to other\nreaders, there will seem a strangeness, or even an absurdity, in this\npresentation of moral conduct in physical terms. It has been needful\nto make it, however. If that re-distribution of matter and motion\nconstituting evolution goes on in all aggregates, its laws must be\nfulfilled in the most developed being as in every other thing; and his\nactions, when decomposed into motions, must exemplify its laws. This\nwe find that they do. There is an entire correspondence between moral\nevolution and evolution as physically defined.\n\nConduct, as actually known to us in perception, and not as interpreted\ninto the accompanying feelings and ideas, consists of combined motions.\nOn ascending through the various grades of animate creatures, we\nfind these combined motions characterized by increasing coherence,\nincreasing definiteness considered singly and in their co-ordinated\ngroups, and increasing heterogeneity; and in advancing from lower to\nhigher types of man, as well as in advancing from the less moral to\nthe more moral type of man, these traits of evolving conduct become\nmore marked still. Further, we see that the increasing coherence,\ndefiniteness, and heterogeneity, of the combined motions, are\ninstrumental to the better maintenance of a moving equilibrium. Where\nthe evolution is small this is very imperfect and soon cut short;\nwith advancing evolution, bringing greater power and intelligence, it\nbecomes more steady and longer continued in face of adverse actions; in\nthe human race at large it is comparatively regular and enduring; and\nits regularity and enduringness are greatest in the highest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE BIOLOGICAL VIEW.\n\n\n\u00a7 30. The truth that the ideally moral man is one in whom the moving\nequilibrium is perfect, or approaches nearest to perfection, becomes,\nwhen translated into physiological language, the truth that he is one\nin whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled. Each function\nhas some relation, direct or indirect, to the needs of life: the fact\nof its existence as a result of evolution, being itself a proof that it\nhas been entailed, immediately or remotely, by the adjustment of inner\nactions to outer actions. Consequently, non-fulfillment of it in normal\nproportion is non-fulfillment of a requisite to complete life. If there\nis defective discharge of the function, the organism experiences some\ndetrimental result caused by the inadequacy. If the discharge is in\nexcess, there is entailed a reaction upon the other functions, which in\nsome way diminishes their efficiencies.\n\nIt is true that during full vigor, while the momentum of the organic\nactions is great, the disorder caused by moderate excess or defect of\nany one function, soon disappears--the balance is re-established. But\nit is none the less true that always some disorder results from excess\nor defect, that it influences every function, bodily and mental, and\nthat it constitutes a lowering of the life for the time being.\n\nBeyond the temporary falling short of complete life implied by\nundue or inadequate discharge of a function there is entailed, as\nan ultimate result, decreased length of life. If some function is\nhabitually performed in excess of the requirement, or in defect of\nthe requirement; and if, as a consequence, there is an often repeated\nperturbation of the functions at large, there results some chronic\nderangement in the balance of the functions. Necessarily reacting on\nthe structures, and registering in them its accumulated effects, this\nderangement works a general deterioration; and when the vital energies\nbegin to decline, the moving equilibrium, further from perfection than\nit would else have been, is sooner overthrown: death is more or less\npremature.\n\nHence the moral man is one whose functions--many and varied in their\nkinds, as we have seen--are all discharged in degrees duly adjusted to\nthe conditions of existence.\n\n\n\u00a7 31. Strange as the conclusion looks, it is nevertheless a conclusion\nto be here drawn, that the performance of every function is, in a\nsense, a moral obligation.\n\nIt is usually thought that morality requires us only to restrain such\nvital activities as, in our present state, are often pushed to excess,\nor such as conflict with average welfare, special or general; but\nit also requires us to carry on these vital activities up to their\nnormal limits. All the animal functions, in common with all the higher\nfunctions, have, as thus understood, their imperativeness. While\nrecognizing the fact that in our state of transition, characterized\nby very imperfect adaptation of constitution of conditions, moral\nobligations of supreme kinds often necessitate conduct which is\nphysically injurious; we must also recognize the fact that, considered\napart from other effects, it is immoral so to treat the body as in any\nway to diminish the fullness or vigor of its vitality.\n\nHence results one test of actions. There may in every case be put the\nquestions--Does the action tend to maintenance of complete life for\nthe time being? and does it tend to prolongation of life to its full\nextent? To answer yes or no to either of these questions, is implicitly\nto class the action as right or wrong in respect of its immediate\nbearings, whatever it may be in respect of its remote bearings.\n\nThe seeming paradoxicalness of this statement results from the\ntendency, so difficult of avoidance, to judge a conclusion which\npresupposes an ideal humanity, by its applicability to humanity as\nnow existing. The foregoing conclusion refers to that highest conduct\nin which, as we have seen, the evolution of conduct terminates--that\nconduct in which the making of all adjustments of acts to ends\nsubserving complete individual life, together with all those subserving\nmaintenance of offspring and preparation of them for maturity, not only\nconsist with the making of like adjustments by others, but furthers\nit. And this conception of conduct in its ultimate form implies\nthe conception of a nature having such conduct for its spontaneous\noutcome--the product of its normal activities. So understanding the\nmatter, it becomes manifest that under such conditions any falling\nshort of function, as well as any excess of function, implies deviation\nfrom the best conduct or from perfectly moral conduct.\n\n\n\u00a7 32. Thus far in treating of conduct from the biological point\nof view, we have considered its constituent actions under their\nphysiological aspects only; leaving out of sight their psychological\naspects. We have recognized the bodily changes and have ignored the\naccompanying mental changes. And at first sight it seems needful for\nus here to do this; since taking account of states of consciousness\napparently implies an inclusion of the psychological view in the\nbiological view.\n\nThis is not so however. As was pointed out in the _Principles of\nPsychology_, \u00a7\u00a7 52, 53, we enter upon psychology proper only when\nwe begin to treat of mental states and their relations considered\nas referring to external agents and their relations. While we\nconcern ourselves exclusively with modes of mind as correlatives of\nnervous changes, we are treating of what was there distinguished as\n\u00e6stho-physiology. We pass to psychology only when we consider the\ncorrespondence between the connections among subjective states and the\nconnections among objective actions. Here, then, without transgressing\nthe limits of our immediate topic, we may deal with feelings and\nfunctions in their mutual dependencies.\n\nWe cannot omit doing this; because the psychical changes which\naccompany many of the physical changes in the organism are biological\nfactors in two ways. Those feelings, classed as sensations, which,\ndirectly initiated in the bodily framework, go along with certain\nstates of the vital organs and more conspicuously with certain states\nof the external organs, now serve mainly as guides to the performance\nof functions, but partly as stimuli, and now serve mainly as stimuli,\nbut in a smaller degree as guides. Visual sensations which, as\nco-ordinated, enable us to direct our movements, also, if vivid, raise\nthe rate of respiration; while sensations of cold and heat, greatly\ndepressing or raising the vital actions, serve also for purposes of\ndiscrimination. So, too, the feelings classed as emotions, which are\nnot localizable in the bodily framework, act in more general ways,\nalike as guides and stimuli--having influences over the performance\nof functions more potent even than have most sensations. Fear, at the\nsame time that it urges flight and evolves the forces spent in it,\nalso affects the heart and the alimentary canal; while joy, prompting\npersistence in the actions bringing it, simultaneously exalts the\nvisceral processes.\n\nHence, in treating of conduct under its biological aspect, we are\ncompelled to consider that interaction of feelings and functions which\nis essential to animal life in all its more developed forms.\n\n\n\u00a7 33. In the _Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 124, it was shown that\nnecessarily, throughout the animate world at large, \"pains are the\ncorrelatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are\nthe correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare;\" since \"it is\nan inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution, that races\nof sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other\nconditions.\" The argument was as follows:\n\n  If we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase--a\n  feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there,\n  and if we substitute for the word Pain the equivalent phrase--a\n  feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out;\n  we see at once that if the states of consciousness which a creature\n  endeavors to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and\n  if the states of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the\n  correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through\n  persistence in the injurious, and avoidance of the beneficial. In\n  other words, those races of beings only can have survived in which,\n  on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with\n  activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable\n  and habitually avoided feelings went along with activities directly\n  or indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been,\n  other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals\n  among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were\n  the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.\n\nFit connections between acts and results must establish themselves in\nliving things, even before consciousness arises; and after the rise\nof consciousness these connections can change in no other way than\nto become better established. At the very outset, life is maintained\nby persistence in acts which conduce to it, and desistance from acts\nwhich impede it; and whenever sentiency make its appearance as an\naccompaniment, its forms must be such that in the one case the produced\nfeeling is of a kind that will be sought--pleasure, and in the other\ncase is of a kind that will be shunned--pain. Observe the necessity of\nthese relations as exhibited in the concrete.\n\nA plant which envelops a buried bone with a plexus of rootlets, or\na potato which directs its blanched shoots toward a grating through\nwhich light comes into the cellar, shows us that the changes which\nouter agents themselves set up in its tissues are changes which aid the\nutilization of these agents. If we ask what would happen if a plant's\nroots grew not toward the place where there was moisture, but away from\nit, or if its leaves, enabled by light to assimilate, nevertheless\nbent themselves toward the darkness, we see that death would result\nin the absence of the existing adjustments. This general relation is\nstill better shown in an insectivorous plant, such as the _Dionoea\nmuscipula_, which keeps its trap closed round animal matter, but not\nround other matter. Here it is manifest that the stimulus arising from\nthe first part of the absorbed substance itself sets up those actions\nby which the mass of the substance is utilized for the plant's benefit.\n\nWhen we pass from vegetal organisms to unconscious animal organisms, we\nsee a like connection between proclivity and advantage. On observing\nhow the tentacles of a polype attach themselves to, and begin to close\nround, a living creature, or some animal substance, while they are\nindifferent to the touch of other substance, we are similarly shown\nthat diffusion of some of the nutritive juices into the tentacles,\nwhich is an incipient assimilation, causes the motions effecting\nprehension. And it is obvious that life would cease were these\nrelations reversed.\n\nNor is it otherwise with this fundamental connection between contact\nwith food and taking in of food, among conscious creatures, up to the\nvery highest. Tasting a substance implies the passage of its molecules\nthrough the mucous membrane of the tongue and palate; and this\nabsorption, when it occurs with a substance serving for food, is but\na commencement of the absorption carried on throughout the alimentary\ncanal. Moreover, the sensation accompanying this absorption, when it\nis of the kind produced by food, initiates at the place where it is\nstrongest, in front of the pharynx, an automatic act of swallowing, in\na manner rudely analogous to that in which the stimulus of absorption\nin a polype's tentacles initiates prehension.\n\nIf from these processes and relations that imply contact between a\ncreature's surface and the substance it takes in, we turn to those set\nup by diffused particles of the substance, constituting to conscious\ncreatures its odor, we meet a kindred general truth. Just as, after\ncontact, some molecules of a mass of food are absorbed by the part\ntouched, and excite the act of prehension, so are absorbed such of its\nmolecules as, spreading through the water, reach the organism; and,\nbeing absorbed by it, excite those actions by which contact with the\nmass is effected. If the physical stimulation caused by the dispersed\nparticles is not accompanied by consciousness, still the motor changes\nset up must conduce to survival of the organism, if they are such as\nend in contact; and there must be relative innutrition and mortality\nof organisms in which the produced contractions do not bring about\nthis result. Nor can it be questioned that whenever and wherever the\nphysical stimulation has a concomitant sentiency, this must be such as\nconsists with, and conduces to, movement toward the nutritive matter:\nit must be not a repulsive but an attractive sentiency. And this which\nholds with the lowest consciousness, must hold throughout; as we see it\ndo in all such superior creatures as are drawn to their food by odor.\n\nBesides those movements which cause locomotion those which effect\nseizure must no less certainly become thus adjusted. The molecular\nchanges caused by absorption of nutritive matter from organic substance\nin contact, or from adjacent organic substance, initiate motions\nwhich are indefinite where the organization is low, and which become\nmore definite with the advance of organization. At the outset, while\nthe undifferentiated protoplasm is everywhere absorbent and everywhere\ncontractile, the changes of form initiated by the physical stimulation\nof adjacent nutritive matter are vague, and ineffectually adapted\nto utilization of it; but gradually, along with the specialization\ninto parts that are contractile and parts that are absorbent, these\nmotions become better adapted; for necessarily individuals in which\nthey are least adapted disappear faster than those in which they are\nmost adapted. Recognizing this necessity we have here especially to\nrecognize a further necessity. The relation between these stimulations\nand adjusted contractions must be such that increase of the one causes\nincrease of the other; since the directions of the discharges being\nonce established, greater stimulation causes greater contraction, and\nthe greater contraction causing closer contact with the stimulating\nagent, causes increase of stimulus and is thereby itself further\nincreased. And now we reach the corollary which more particularly\nconcerns us. Clearly as fast as an accompanying sentiency arises, this\ncannot be one that is disagreeable, prompting desistance, but must be\none that is agreeable, prompting persistence. The pleasurable sensation\nmust be itself the stimulus to the contraction by which the pleasurable\nsensation is maintained and increased; or must be so bound up with\nthe stimulus that the two increase together. And this relation which\nwe see is directly established in the case of a fundamental function,\nmust be indirectly established with all other functions; since\nnon-establishment of it in any particular case implies, in so far,\nunfitness to the conditions of existence.\n\nIn two ways then, it is demonstrable that there exists a primordial\nconnection between pleasure-giving acts and continuance or increase\nof life, and, by implication, between pain-giving acts and decrease\nor loss of life. On the one hand, setting out with the lowest living\nthings, we see that the beneficial act and the act which there is\na tendency to perform, are originally two sides of the same; and\ncannot be disconnected without fatal results. On the other hand, if\nwe contemplate developed creatures as now existing, we see that each\nindividual and species is from day to day kept alive by pursuit of the\nagreeable and avoidance of the disagreeable.\n\nThus approaching the facts from a different side, analysis brings us\ndown to another face of that ultimate truth disclosed by analysis in a\npreceding chapter. We found it was no more possible to frame ethical\nconceptions from which the consciousness of pleasure, of some kind,\nat some time, to some being, is absent, than it is possible to frame\nthe conception of an object from which the consciousness of space is\nabsent. And now we see that this necessity of thought originates in the\nvery nature of sentient existence. Sentient existence can evolve only\non condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts.\n\n\n\u00a7 34. Notwithstanding explanations already made, the naked enunciation\nof this as an ultimate truth, underlying all estimations of right and\nwrong, will in many, if not in most, cause astonishment. Having in\nview certain beneficial results that are preceded by disagreeable\nstates of consciousness, such as those commonly accompanying labor; and\nhaving in view the injurious results that follow the receipt of certain\ngratifications, such as those which excess in drinking produces; the\nmajority tacitly or avowedly believe that the bearing of pains is on\nthe whole beneficial, and that the receipt of pleasures is on the whole\ndetrimental. The exceptions so fill their minds as to exclude the rule.\n\nWhen asked, they are obliged to admit that the pains accompanying\nwounds, bruises, sprains, are the concomitants of evils, alike to\nthe sufferer and to those around him; and that the anticipations\nof such pains serve as deterrents from careless or dangerous acts.\nThey cannot deny that the tortures of burning or scalding, and the\nmiseries which intense cold, starvation, and thirst produce, are\nindissolubly connected with permanent or temporary mischiefs, tending\nto incapacitate one who bears them for doing things that should be\ndone, either for his own welfare or the welfare of others. The agony of\nincipient suffocation they are compelled to recognize as a safeguard\nto life, and must allow that avoidance of it is conducive to all that\nlife can bring or achieve. Nor will they refuse to own that one who is\nchained in a cold, damp dungeon, in darkness and silence, is injured in\nhealth and efficiency, alike by the positive pains thus inflicted on\nhim and by the accompanying negative pains due to absence of light, of\nfreedom, of companionship.\n\nConversely, they do not doubt that notwithstanding occasional excesses\nthe pleasure which accompanies the taking of food goes along with\nphysical benefit; and that the benefit is the greater the keener the\nsatisfaction of appetite. They have no choice but to acknowledge that\nthe instincts and sentiments which so overpoweringly prompt marriage,\nand those which find their gratification in the fostering of offspring,\nwork out an immense surplus of benefit after deducting all evils. Nor\ndare they question that the pleasure taken in accumulating property,\nleaves a large balance of advantage, private and public, after making\nall drawbacks. Yet many and conspicuous as are the cases in which\npleasures and pains, sensational and emotional, serve as incentives to\nproper acts and deterrents from improper acts, these pass unnoticed;\nand notice is taken only of those cases in which men are directly or\nindirectly misled by them. The well-working in essential matters is\nignored; and the ill-working in unessential matters is alone recognized.\n\nIs it replied that the more intense pains and pleasures, which have\nimmediate reference to bodily needs, guide us rightly; while the weaker\npains and pleasures, not immediately connected with the maintenance\nof life, guide us wrongly? Then the implication is that the system of\nguidance by pleasures and pains, which has answered with all types\nof creatures below the human, fails with the human. Or rather, the\nadmission being that with mankind it succeeds in so far as fulfillment\nof certain imperative wants goes, it fails in respect of wants that are\nnot imperative. Those who think this are required, in the first place,\nto show us how the line is to be drawn between the two; and then to\nshow us why the system which succeeds in the lower will not succeed in\nthe higher.\n\n\n\u00a7 35. Doubtless, however, after all that has been said, there will\nbe raised afresh the same difficulty--there will be instanced the\nmischievous pleasures and the beneficent pains. The drunkard, the\ngambler, the thief, who severally pursue gratifications, will be\nnamed in proof that the pursuit of gratifications misleads; while the\nself-sacrificing relative, the worker who perseveres through weariness,\nthe honest man who stints himself to pay his way, will be named in\nproof that disagreeable modes of consciousness accompany acts that are\nreally beneficial. But after recalling the fact pointed out in \u00a7 20,\nthat this objection does not tell against guidance by pleasures and\npains at large, since it merely implies that special and proximate\npleasures and pains must be disregarded out of consideration for\nremote and diffused pleasures and pains; and, after admitting that in\nmankind, as at present constituted, guidance by proximate pleasures and\npains fails throughout a wide range of cases; I go on to set forth the\ninterpretation Biology gives of these anomalies, as being not necessary\nand permanent, but incidental and temporary.\n\nAlready, while showing that among inferior creatures, pleasures and\npains have all along guided the conduct by which life has been evolved\nand maintained, I have pointed out that since the conditions of\nexistence for each species have been occasionally changing, there have\nbeen occasionally arising partial misadjustments of the feelings to\nthe requirements, necessitating readjustments. This general cause of\nderangement, operating on all sentient beings, has been operating on\nhuman beings in a manner unusually decided, persistent, and involved.\nIt needs but to contrast the mode of life followed by primitive men,\nwandering in the forests and living on wild food, with the mode of\nlife followed by rustics, artisans, traders, and professional men in a\ncivilized community, to see that the constitution, bodily and mental,\nwell-adjusted to the one, is ill-adjusted to the other. It needs but\nto observe the emotions kept awake in each savage tribe, chronically\nhostile to neighboring tribes, and then to observe the emotions which\npeaceful production and exchange bring into play, to see that the\ntwo are not only unlike, but opposed. And it needs but to note how,\nduring social evolution, the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the\nmilitant activities carried on by coercive co-operation have been at\nvariance with the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the industrial\nactivities, carried on by voluntary co-operation, to see that there has\never been within each society, and still continues, a conflict between\nthe two moral natures adjusted to these two unlike modes of life.\nManifestly, then, this readjustment of constitution to conditions,\ninvolving readjustment of pleasures and pains for guidance, which all\ncreatures from time to time undergo, has been in the human race during\ncivilization especially difficult, not only because of the greatness\nof the change from small nomadic groups to vast settled societies, and\nfrom predatory habits to peaceful habits, but also because the old life\nof enmity between societies has been maintained along with the new life\nof amity within each society. While there co-exist two ways of life\nso radically opposed as the militant and the industrial, human nature\ncannot become properly adapted to either.\n\nThat hence results such failure of guidance by pleasures and pains as\nis daily exhibited, we discover on observing in what parts of conduct\nthe failure is most conspicuous. As above shown, the pleasurable and\npainful sensations are fairly well adjusted to the peremptory physical\nrequirements: the benefits of conforming to the sensations which prompt\nus in respect of nutrition, respiration, maintenance of temperature,\netc., immensely exceed the incidental evils, and such misadjustments\nas occur may be ascribed to the change from the outdoor life of the\nprimitive man to the indoor life which the civilized man is often\ncompelled to lead. It is the emotional pleasures and pains which are\nin so considerable a degree out of adjustment to the needs of life as\ncarried on in society, and it is of these that the readjustment is made\nin the way above shown, so tardy because so difficult.\n\nFrom the biological point of view, then, we see that the connections\nbetween pleasure and beneficial action and between pain and detrimental\naction, which arose when sentient existence began, and have continued\namong animate creatures up to man, are generally displayed in him also\nthroughout the lower and more completely organized part of his nature;\nand must be more and more fully displayed throughout the higher part of\nhis nature, as fast as his adaptation to the conditions of social life\nincreases.\n\n\n\u00a7 36. Biology has a further judgment to pass on the relations of\npleasures and pains to welfare. Beyond the connections between acts\nbeneficial to the organism and the pleasures accompanying performance\nof them, and between acts detrimental to the organism and the pains\ncausing desistance from them, there are connections between pleasure\nin general and physiological exaltation, and between pain in general\nand physiological depression. Every pleasure increases vitality; every\npain decreases vitality. Every pleasure raises the tide of life; every\npain lowers the tide of life. Let us consider, first, the pains.\n\nBy the general mischiefs that result from submission to pains, I do\nnot mean those arising from the diffused effects of local organic\nlesions, such as follow an aneurism caused by intense effort spite of\nprotesting sensations, or such as follow the varicose veins brought on\nby continued disregard of fatigue in the legs, or such as follow the\natrophy set up in muscles that are persistently exerted when extremely\nweary; but I mean the general mischiefs caused by that constitutional\ndisturbance which pain forthwith sets up. These are conspicuous when\nthe pains are acute, whether they be sensational or emotional.\n\nBodily agony long borne produces death by exhaustion. More frequently,\narresting the action of the heart for a time, it causes that temporary\ndeath we call fainting. On other occasions vomiting is a consequence.\nAnd where such manifest derangements do not result, we still, in the\npallor and trembling, trace the general prostration. Beyond the actual\nloss of life caused by subjection to intense cold there are depressions\nof vitality less marked caused by cold less extreme--temporary\nenfeeblement following too long an immersion in icy water; enervation\nand pining away consequent on inadequate clothing. Similarly is it with\nsubmission to great heat: we have lassitude reaching occasionally to\nexhaustion; we have, in weak persons, fainting, succeeded by temporary\ndebilitation; and in steaming tropical jungles Europeans contract\nfevers which, when not fatal, often entail life-long incapacities.\nConsider, again, the evils that follow violent exertion continued in\nspite of painful feelings--now a fatigue which destroys appetite or\narrests digestion if food is taken, implying failure of the reparative\nprocesses when they are most needed; and now a prostration of the\nheart, here lasting for a time and there, where the transgression has\nbeen repeated day after day, made permanent: reducing the rest of life\nto a lower level.\n\nNo less conspicuous are the depressing effects of emotional pains.\nThere are occasional cases of death from grief; and in other cases\nthe mental suffering which a calamity causes, like bodily suffering,\nshows its effects by syncope. Often a piece of bad news is succeeded\nby sickness; and continued anxiety will produce loss of appetite,\nperpetual indigestion and diminished strength. Excessive fear, whether\naroused by physical or moral danger, will, in like manner, arrest for\na time the processes of nutrition; and, not unfrequently, in pregnant\nwomen brings on miscarriage; while, in less extreme cases, the cold\nperspiration and unsteady hands indicate a general lowering of the\nvital activities, entailing partial incapacity of body or mind or both.\nHow greatly emotional pain deranges the visceral actions is shown us by\nthe fact that incessant worry is not unfrequently followed by jaundice.\nAnd here, indeed, the relation between cause and effect happens to\nhave been proved by direct experiment. Making such arrangements that\nthe bile-duct of a dog delivered its product outside the body, Claude\nBernard observed that so long as he petted the dog and kept him in good\nspirits, secretion went on at its normal rate; but on speaking angrily,\nand for a time so treating him as to produce depression, the flow of\nbile was arrested.\n\nShould it be said that evil results of such kinds are proved to occur\nonly when the pains, bodily or mental, are great, the reply is that\nin healthy persons the injurious perturbations caused by small pains,\nthough not easily traced, are still produced; and that in those whose\nvital powers are much reduced by illness, slight physical irritations\nand trifling moral annoyances, often cause relapses.\n\nQuite opposite are the constitutional effects of pleasure. It\nsometimes, though rarely, happens that in feeble persons intense\npleasure--pleasure that is almost pain--gives a nervous shock that is\nmischievous; but it does not do this in those who are undebilitated by\nvoluntary or enforced submission to actions injurious to the organism.\nIn the normal order, pleasures, great and small, are stimulants to the\nprocesses by which life is maintained.\n\nAmong the sensations may be instanced those produced by bright light.\nSunshine is enlivening in comparison with gloom--even a gleam excites a\nwave of pleasure; and experiments have shown that sunshine raises the\nrate of respiration: raised respiration being an index of raised vital\nactivities in general. A warmth that is agreeable in degree favors the\nheart's action, and furthers the various functions to which this is\ninstrumental. Though those who are in full vigor and fitly clothed can\nmaintain their temperature in winter, and can digest additional food\nto make up for the loss of heat, it is otherwise with the feeble; and,\nas vigor declines, the beneficence of warmth becomes conspicuous. That\nbenefits accompany the agreeable sensations produced by fresh air, and\nthe agreeable sensations that accompany muscular action after due rest,\nand the agreeable sensations caused by rest after exertion cannot be\nquestioned. Receipt of these pleasures conduces to the maintenance of\nthe body in fit condition for all the purposes of life.\n\nMore manifest still are the physiological benefits of emotional\npleasures. Every power, bodily and mental, is increased by \"good\nspirits,\" which is our name for a general emotional satisfaction. The\ntruth that the fundamental vital actions--those of nutrition--are\nfurthered by laughter-moving conversation, or rather by the pleasurable\nfeeling causing laughter, is one of old standing; and every dyspeptic\nknows that in exhilarating company, a large and varied dinner,\nincluding not very digestible things, may be eaten with impunity,\nand, indeed, with benefit, while a small, carefully chosen dinner of\nsimple things, eaten in solitude, will be followed by indigestion. This\nstriking effect on the alimentary system is accompanied by effects,\nequally certain though less manifest, on the circulation and the\nrespiration. Again, one who, released from daily labors and anxieties,\nreceives delights from fine scenery or is enlivened by the novelties he\nsees abroad, comes back showing by toned-up face and vivacious manner,\nthe greater energy with which he is prepared to pursue his avocation.\nInvalids especially, on whose narrowed margin of vitality the influence\nof conditions is most visible, habitually show the benefits derived\nfrom agreeable states of feeling. A lively social circle, the call of\nan old friend, or even removal to a brighter room, will, by the induced\ncheerfulness, much improve the physical state. In brief, as every\nmedical man knows, there is no such tonic as happiness.\n\nThese diffused physiological effects of pleasures and pains, which are\njoined with the local or special physiological effects, are, indeed,\nobviously inevitable. We have seen (_Principles of Psychology_,\n\u00a7\u00a7 123-125) that while craving, or negative pain, accompanies the\nunder-activity of an organ, and while positive pain accompanies its\nover-activity, pleasure accompanies its normal activity. We have seen\nthat by evolution no other relations could be established; since,\nthrough all inferior types of creatures, if defect or excess of\nfunction produced no disagreeable sentiency, and medium function no\nagreeable sentiency, there would be nothing to insure a proportioned\nperformance of function. And as it is one of the laws of nervous\naction that each stimulus, beyond a direct discharge to the particular\norgan acted on, indirectly causes a general discharge throughout the\nnervous system (_Prin. of Psy._, \u00a7\u00a7 21, 39), it results that the rest\nof the organs, all influenced as they are by the nervous system,\nparticipate in the stimulation. So that beyond the aid, more slowly\nshown, which the organs yield to one another through the physiological\ndivision of labor, there is the aid, more quickly shown, which mutual\nexcitation gives. While there is a benefit to be presently felt by the\nwhole organism from the due performance of each function, there is an\nimmediate benefit from the exaltation of its functions at large caused\nby the accompanying pleasure; and from pains, whether of excess or\ndefect, there also come these double effects, immediate and remote.\n\n\n\u00a7 37. Non-recognition of these general truths vitiates moral\nspeculation at large. From the estimates of right and wrong habitually\nframed, these physiological effects wrought on the actor by his\nfeelings are entirely omitted. It is tacitly assumed that pleasures\nand pains have no reactions on the body of the recipient, affecting\nhis fitness for the duties of life. The only reactions recognized\nare those on character; respecting which the current supposition is,\nthat acceptance of pleasures is detrimental and submission to pains\nbeneficial. The notion, remotely descended from the ghost-theory of\nthe savage, that mind and body are independent, has, among its various\nimplications, this belief that states of consciousness are in no wise\nrelated to bodily states. \"You have had your gratification--it is\npast; and you are as you were before,\" says the moralist to one. And\nto another he says, \"You have borne the suffering--it is over; and\nthere the matter ends.\" Both statements are false. Leaving out of view\nindirect results, the direct results are that the one has moved a step\naway from death and the other has moved a step toward death.\n\nLeaving out of view, I say, the indirect results. It is these indirect\nresults, here for the moment left out of view, which the moralist has\nexclusively in view, being so occupied by them that he ignores the\ndirect results. The gratification, perhaps purchased at undue cost,\nperhaps enjoyed when work should have been done, perhaps snatched\nfrom the rightful claimant, is considered only in relation to remote\ninjurious effects, and no set-off is made for immediate beneficial\neffects. Conversely, from positive and negative pains, borne now in the\npursuit of some future advantage, now in discharge of responsibilities,\nnow in performing a generous act, the distant good is alone dwelt on\nand the proximate evil ignored. Consequences, pleasurable and painful,\nexperienced by the actor forthwith, are of no importance; and they\nbecome of importance only when anticipated as occurring hereafter to\nthe actor or to other persons. And further, future evils borne by the\nactor are considered of no account if they result from self-denial,\nand are emphasized only when they result from self-gratification.\nObviously, estimates so framed are erroneous; and obviously, the\npervading judgments of conduct based on such estimates must be\ndistorted. Mark the anomalies of opinion produced.\n\nIf, as the sequence of a malady contracted in pursuit of illegitimate\ngratification, an attack of iritis injures vision, the mischief\nis to be counted among those entailed by immoral conduct; but if,\nregardless of protesting sensations, the eyes are used in study too\nsoon after ophthalmia, and there follows blindness for years or for\nlife, entailing not only personal unhappiness, but a burden on others,\nmoralists are silent. The broken leg which a drunkard's accident causes\ncounts among those miseries brought on self and family by intemperance,\nwhich form the ground for reprobating it; but if anxiety to fulfill\nduties prompts the continued use of a sprained knee spite of the pain,\nand brings on a chronic lameness involving lack of exercise, consequent\nill-health, inefficiency, anxiety, and unhappiness, it is supposed that\nethics has no verdict to give in the matter. A student who is plucked\nbecause he has spent in amusement the time and money that should have\ngone in study, is blamed for thus making parents unhappy and preparing\nfor himself a miserable future; but another who, thinking exclusively\nof claims on him, reads night after night with hot or aching head, and,\nbreaking down, cannot take his degree, but returns home shattered in\nhealth and unable to support himself, is named with pity only, as not\nsubject to any moral judgment; or rather, the moral judgment passed is\nwholly favorable.\n\nThus recognizing the evils caused by some kinds of conduct only, men\nat large, and moralists as exponents of their beliefs, ignore the\nsuffering and death daily caused around them by disregard of that\nguidance which has established itself in the course of evolution. Led\nby the tacit assumption common to Pagan stoics and Christian ascetics,\nthat we are so diabolically organized that pleasures are injurious and\npains beneficial, people on all sides yield examples of lives blasted\nby persisting in actions against which their sensations rebel. Here is\none who, drenched to the skin and sitting in a cold wind, pooh-hoohs\nhis shiverings and gets rheumatic fever, with subsequent heart-disease,\nwhich makes worthless the short life remaining to him. Here is another\nwho, disregarding painful feelings, works too soon after a debilitating\nillness, and establishes disordered health that lasts for the rest of\nhis days, and makes him useless to himself and others. Now the account\nis of a youth who, persisting in gymnastic feats spite of scarcely\nbearable straining, bursts a blood-vessel, and, long laid on the shelf,\nis permanently damaged; while now it is of a man in middle life who,\npushing muscular effort to painful excess, suddenly brings on hernia.\nIn this family is a case of aphasia, spreading paralysis and death,\ncaused by eating too little and doing too much; in that, softening of\nthe brain has been brought on by ceaseless mental efforts against\nwhich the feelings hourly protested; and in others, less serious brain\naffections have been contracted by over-study continued regardless\nof discomfort and the cravings for fresh air and exercise.[B] Even\nwithout accumulating special examples, the truth is forced on us by the\nvisible traits of classes. The careworn man of business too long at\nhis office, the cadaverous barrister pouring half the night over his\nbriefs, the feeble factory hands and unhealthy seamstresses passing\nlong hours in bad air, the an\u00e6mic, flat-chested school-girls, bending\nover many lessons and forbidden boisterous play, no less than Sheffield\ngrinders who die of suffocating dust, and peasants crippled with\nrheumatism due to exposure, show us the wide spread miseries caused\nby persevering in actions repugnant to the sensations and neglecting\nactions which the sensations prompt. Nay, the evidence is still more\nextensive and conspicuous. What are the puny malformed children, seen\nin poverty-stricken districts, but children whose appetites for food\nand desires for warmth have not been adequately satisfied? What are\npopulations stinted in growth and prematurely aged, such as parts of\nFrance show us, but populations injured by work in excess and food in\ndefect: the one implying positive pain, the other negative pain? What\nis the implication of that greater mortality which occurs among people\nwho are weakened by privations, unless it is that bodily miseries\nconduce to fatal illnesses? Or once more, what must we infer from\nthe frightful amount of disease and death suffered by armies in the\nfield, fed on scanty and bad provisions, lying on damp ground, exposed\nto extremes of heat and cold, inadequately sheltered from rain, and\nsubject to exhausting efforts; unless it be the terrible mischiefs\ncaused by continuously subjecting the body to treatment which the\nfeelings protest against?\n\nIt matters not to the argument whether the actions entailing such\neffects are voluntary or involuntary. It matters not from the\nbiological point of view whether the motives prompting them are high or\nlow. The vital functions accept no apologies on the ground that neglect\nof them was unavoidable, or that the reason for neglect was noble. The\ndirect and indirect sufferings caused by non-conformity to the laws\nof life are the same whatever induces the non-conformity; and cannot\nbe omitted in any rational estimate of conduct. If the purpose of\nethical inquiry is to establish rules of right living; and if the rules\nof right living are those of which the total results, individual and\ngeneral, direct and indirect, are most conducive to human happiness;\nthen it is absurd to ignore the immediate results and recognize only\nthe remote results.\n\n\n\u00a7 38. Here might be urged the necessity for preluding the study of\nmoral science by the study of biological science. Here might be dwelt\non the error men make in thinking they can understand those special\nphenomena of human life with which Ethics deals, while paying little or\nno attention to the general phenomena of human life, and while utterly\nignoring the phenomena of life at large. And, doubtless, there would be\ntruth in the inference that such acquaintance with the world of living\nthings, as discloses the part which pleasures and pains have played in\norganic evolution, would help to rectify these one-sided conceptions of\nmoralists. It cannot be held, however, that lack of this knowledge is\nthe sole cause, or the main cause, of their one-sidedness. For facts of\nthe kind above instanced, which, duly attended to, would prevent such\ndistortions of moral theory, are facts which it needs no biological\ninquiries to learn, but which are daily thrust before the eyes of all.\nThe truth is, rather, that the general consciousness is so possessed by\nsentiments and ideas at variance with the conclusions necessitated by\nfamiliar evidence that the evidence gets no attention. These adverse\nsentiments and ideas have several roots.\n\nThere is the theological root. As before shown, from the worship of\ncannibal ancestors who delighted in witnessing tortures, there resulted\nthe primitive conception of deities who were propitiated by the bearing\nof pains, and, consequently, angered by the receipt of pleasures.\nThrough the religions of the semi-civilized, in which this conception\nof the divine nature remains conspicuous, it has persisted, in\nprogressively modified forms, down to our own times; and still colors\nthe beliefs, both of those who adhere to the current creed and of those\nwho nominally reject it.\n\nThere is another root in the primitive and still-surviving militancy.\nWhile social antagonisms continue to generate war, which consists in\nendeavors to inflict pain and death while submitting to the risks of\npain and death, and which necessarily involves great privations, it is\nneedful that physical suffering, whether considered in itself or in\nthe evils it bequeaths, should be thought little of, and that among\npleasures recognized as most worthy should be those which victory\nbrings.\n\nNor does partially developed industrialism fail to furnish a root.\nWith social evolution, which implies transition from the life of\nwandering hunters to the life of settled peoples engaged in labor,\nand which therefore entails activities widely unlike those to which\nthe aboriginal constitution is adapted, there comes an under-exercise\nof faculties for which the social state affords no scope, and an\novertaxing of faculties required for the social state; the one implying\ndenial of certain pleasures and the other submission to certain pains.\nHence, along with that growth of population which makes the struggle\nfor existence intense, bearing of pains and sacrifice of pleasures is\ndaily necessitated.\n\nNow always and everywhere, there arises among men a theory conforming\nto their practice. The savage nature, originating the conception of a\nsavage deity, evolves a theory of supernatural control sufficiently\nstringent and cruel to influence his conduct. With submission to\ndespotic government severe enough in its restraints to keep in order\nbarbarous natures, there grows up a theory of divine right to rule, and\nthe duty of absolute submission. Where war is made the business of life\nby the existence of warlike neighbors, virtues which are required for\nwar come to be regarded as supreme virtues; while, contrariwise, when\nindustrialism has grown predominant, the violence and the deception\nwhich warriors glory in come to be held criminal. In like manner,\nthen, there arises a tolerable adjustment of the actually accepted\n(not the nominally accepted) theory of right living, to living as it\nis daily carried on. If the life is one that necessitates habitual\ndenial of pleasures and bearing of pains, there grows up an answering\nethical system under which the receipt of pleasures is tacitly\ndisapproved and the bearing of pains avowedly approved. The mischiefs\nentailed by pleasures in excess are dwelt on, while the benefits which\nnormal pleasures bring are ignored; and the good results achieved by\nsubmission to pains are fully set forth, while the evils are overlooked.\n\nBut while recognizing the desirableness of, and indeed the necessity\nfor, systems of ethics adapted, like religious systems and political\nsystems, to their respective times and places, we have here to regard\nthe first as, like the others, transitional. We must infer that like a\npurer creed and a better government, a truer ethics belongs to a more\nadvanced social state.\n\nLed, _\u00e0 priori_, to conclude that distortions must exist, we are\nenabled to recognize as such the distortions we find: answering in\nnature, as these do, to expectation. And there is forced on us the\ntruth that a scientific morality arises only as fast as the one-sided\nconceptions adapted to transitory conditions are developed into\nboth-sided conceptions. The science of right living has to take account\nof all consequences in so far as they affect happiness, personally or\nsocially, directly or indirectly; and by as much as it ignores any\nclass of consequences, by so much does it fail to be science.\n\n\n\u00a7 39. Like the physical view, then, the biological view corresponds\nwith the view gained by looking at conduct in general from the\nstandpoint of Evolution.\n\nThat which was physically defined as a moving equilibrium, we define\nbiologically as a balance of functions. The implication of such a\nbalance is that the several functions, in their kinds, amounts, and\ncombinations, are adjusted to the several activities which maintain and\nconstitute complete life; and to be so adjusted is to have reached the\ngoal toward which the evolution of conduct continually tends.\n\nPassing to the feelings which accompany the performance of functions,\nwe see that of necessity during the evolution of organic life,\npleasures have become the concomitants of normal amounts of functions,\nwhile pains, positive and negative, have become the concomitants\nof excesses and defects of functions. And though in every species\nderangements of these relations are often caused by changes of\nconditions, they ever re-establish themselves: disappearance of the\nspecies being the alternative.\n\nMankind, inheriting from creatures of lower kinds, such adjustments\nbetween feelings and functions as concern fundamental bodily\nrequirements; and daily forced by peremptory feelings to do the things\nwhich maintain life and avoid those which bring immediate death; has\nbeen subject to a change of conditions unusually great and involved.\nThis has considerably deranged the guidance by sensations, and has\nderanged in a much greater degree the guidance by emotions. The result\nis that in many cases pleasures are not connected with actions which\nmust be performed, nor pains with actions which must be avoided, but\ncontrariwise.\n\nSeveral influences have conspired to make men ignore the well-working\nof these relations between feelings and functions, and to observe\nwhatever of ill-working is seen in them. Hence, while the evils which\nsome pleasures entail are dilated upon, the benefits habitually\naccompanying receipt of pleasures are unnoticed; at the same time that\nthe benefits achieved through certain pains are magnified while the\nimmense mischiefs which pains bring are made little of.\n\nThe ethical theories characterized by these perversions are products\nof, and are appropriate to the forms of social life which the\nimperfectly-adapted constitutions of men produce. But with the progress\nof adaptation, bringing faculties and requirements into harmony, such\nincongruities of experience, and consequent distortions of theory,\nmust diminish; until, along with complete adjustment of humanity to\nthe social state, will go recognition of the truths that actions\nare completely right only when, besides being conducive to future\nhappiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable, and\nthat painfulness, not only ultimate but proximate, is the concomitant\nof actions which are wrong.\n\nSo that from the biological point of view, ethical science becomes a\nspecification of the conduct of associated men who are severally so\nconstituted that the various self-preserving activities, the activities\nrequired for rearing offspring, and those which social welfare demands,\nare fulfilled in the spontaneous exercise of duly proportioned\nfaculties, each yielding when in action its quantum of pleasure, and\nwho are, by consequence, so constituted that excess or defect in any\none of these actions brings its quantum of pain, immediate and remote.\n\n  NOTE TO \u00a7 33. In his _Physical Ethics_, Mr. Alfred Barratt has\n  expressed a view which here calls for notice. Postulating Evolution\n  and its general laws, he refers to certain passages in the\n  _Principles of Psychology_ (1st Ed. Pt. III. ch. viii. pp. 395, sqq.\n  cf. Pt. IV. ch. iv.) in which I have treated of the relation between\n  irritation and contraction which \"marks the dawn of sensitive life;\"\n  have pointed out that \"the primordial tissue must be differently\n  affected by contact with nutritive and with innutritive matters\"--the\n  two being for aquatic creatures respectively the soluble and the\n  insoluble; and have argued that the contraction by which a protruded\n  part of a rhizopod draws in a fragment of assimilable matter \"is\n  caused by a commencing absorption of the assimilable matter.\" Mr.\n  Barratt, holding that consciousness \"must be considered as an\n  invariable property of animal life, and ultimately, in its elements,\n  of the material universe\" (p. 43), regards these responses of animal\n  tissue to stimuli, as implying feeling of one or other kind. \"Some\n  kinds of impressed force,\" he says, \"are followed by movements of\n  retraction and withdrawal, others by such as secure a continuance\n  of the impression. These two kinds of contraction are the phenomena\n  and external marks of pain and pleasure respectively. Hence the\n  tissue acts so as to secure pleasure and avoid pain by a law as truly\n  physical and natural as that whereby a needle turns to the pole,\n  or a tree to the light\" (p. 52). Not without questioning that the\n  raw material of consciousness is present even in undifferentiated\n  protoplasm, and everywhere exists potentially in that Unknowable\n  Power which, otherwise conditioned, is manifested in physical\n  action (_Prin. of Psy._, \u00a7 272-3), I demur to the conclusion that\n  it at first exists under the forms of pleasure and pain. These, I\n  conceive, arise, as the more special feelings do, by a compounding\n  of the ultimate elements of consciousness (_Prin. of Psy._, \u00a7\u00a7 60,\n  61): being, indeed, general aspects of these more special feelings\n  when they reach certain intensities. Considering that even in\n  creatures which have developed nervous systems, a great part of the\n  vital processes are carried on by unconscious reflex actions, I see\n  no propriety in assuming the existence of what we understand by\n  consciousness in creatures not only devoid of nervous systems but\n  devoid of structures in general.\n\n  NOTE TO \u00a7 36. More than once in the _Emotions and the Will_, Dr.\n  Bain insists on the connection between pleasure and exaltation of\n  vitality, and the connection between pain and depression of vitality.\n  As above shown, I concur in the view taken by him; which is, indeed,\n  put beyond dispute by general experience as well as by the more\n  special experience of medical men.\n\n  When, however, from the invigorating and relaxing effects of pleasure\n  and pain respectively, Dr. Bain derives the original tendencies to\n  persist in acts which give pleasure and to desist from those which\n  give pain, I find myself unable to go with him. He says: \"We suppose\n  movements spontaneously begun, and accidentally causing pleasure;\n  we then assume that with the pleasure there will be an increase of\n  vital energy, in which increase the fortunate movements will share,\n  and thereby increase the pleasure. Or, on the other hand, we suppose\n  the spontaneous movements to give pain, and assume that, with the\n  pain, there will be a decrease of energy, extending to the movements\n  that cause the evil, and thereby providing a remedy\" (3d Ed. p.\n  315). This interpretation, implying that \"the fortunate movements\"\n  merely _share_ in the effects of augmented vital energy caused by\n  the pleasure, does not seem to me congruous with observation. The\n  truth appears rather to be that though there is a concomitant general\n  increase of muscular tone, the muscles specially excited are those\n  which, by their increased contraction, conduce to increased pleasure.\n  Conversely, the implication that desistance from spontaneous\n  movements which cause pain, is due to a general muscular relaxation\n  shared in by the muscles causing these particular movements, seems\n  to me at variance with the fact that the retractation commonly takes\n  the form not of a passive lapse but of an active withdrawal. Further,\n  it may be remarked that depressing as pain eventually is to the\n  system at large, we cannot say that it at once depresses the muscular\n  energies. Not simply, as Dr. Bain admits, does an acute smart produce\n  spasmodic movements, but pains of all kinds, both sensational and\n  emotional, stimulate the muscles (_Essays_, 1st series, p. 360, 1,\n  or 2d ed. Vol. I. p. 211, 12). Pain, however (and also pleasure when\n  very intense), simultaneously has an inhibitory effect on all the\n  reflex actions; and as the vital functions in general are carried on\n  by reflex actions, this inhibition, increasing with the intensity\n  of the pain, proportionately depresses the vital functions. Arrest\n  of the heart's action and fainting is an extreme result of this\n  inhibition; and the viscera at large feel its effects in degrees\n  proportioned to the degrees of pain. Pain, therefore, while directly\n  causing a discharge of muscular energy as pleasure does, eventually\n  lowers muscular power by lowering those vital processes on which the\n  supply of energy depends. Hence we cannot, I think, ascribe the\n  prompt desistance from muscular movements causing pain, to decrease\n  in the flow of energy; for this decrease is felt only after an\n  interval. Conversely, we cannot ascribe the persistence in a muscular\n  act which yields pleasure to the resulting exaltation of energy; but\n  must, as indicated in \u00a7 33, ascribe it to the establishment of lines\n  of discharge between the place of pleasurable stimulation and those\n  contractile structures which maintain and increase the act causing\n  the stimulation--connections allied with the reflex, into which they\n  pass by insensible gradations.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW.\n\n\n\u00a7 40. The last chapter, in so far as it dealt with feelings in their\nrelations to conduct, recognized only their physiological aspects:\ntheir psychological aspects were passed over. In this chapter,\nconversely, we are not concerned with the constitutional connections\nbetween feelings, as incentives or deterrents, and physical benefits to\nbe gained, or mischiefs to be avoided; nor with the reactive effects\nof feelings on the state of the organism, as fitting or unfitting it\nfor future action. Here we have to consider represented pleasures\nand pains, sensational and emotional, as constituting deliberate\nmotives--as forming factors in the conscious adjustments of acts to\nends.\n\n\n\u00a7 41. The rudimentary psychical act, not yet differentiated from a\nphysical act, implies an excitation and a motion. In a creature of\nlow type the touch of food excites prehension. In a somewhat higher\ncreature the odor from nutritive matter sets up motion of the body\ntoward the matter. And where rudimentary vision exists, sudden\nobscuration of light, implying the passage of something large, causes\nconvulsive muscular movements which mostly carry the body away from\nthe source of danger. In each of these cases we may distinguish\nfour factors. There is (_a_) that property of the external object\nwhich primarily affects the organism--the taste, smell, or opacity;\nand connected with such property there is in the external object\nthat character (_b_) which renders seizure of it, or escape from it,\nbeneficial. Within the organism there is (_c_) the impression or\nsensation which the property (_a_) produces, serving as stimulus; and\nthere is connected with it, the motor change (_d_) by which seizure or\nescape is effected.\n\nNow Psychology is chiefly concerned with the connection between the\nrelation _a b_, and the relation _c d_, under all those forms which\nthey assume in the course of evolution. Each of the factors, and each\nof the relations, grows more involved as organization advances. Instead\nof being single, the identifying attribute _a_, often becomes, in the\nenvironment of a superior animal, a cluster of attributes; such as the\nsize, form, colors, motions, displayed by a distant creature that is\ndangerous. The factor _b_, with which this combination of attributes\nis associated, becomes the congeries of characters, powers, habits,\nwhich constitute it an enemy. Of the subjective factors, _c_ becomes a\ncomplicated set of visual sensations co-ordinated with one another and\nwith the ideas and feelings established by experience of such enemies,\nand constituting the motive to escape; while _d_ becomes the intricate\nand often prolonged series of runs, leaps, doubles, dives, etc., made\nin eluding the enemy.\n\nIn human life we find the same four outer and inner factors, still more\nmultiform and entangled in their compositions and connections. The\nentire assemblage of physical attributes _a_, presented by an estate\nthat is advertised for sale, passes enumeration; and the assemblage\nof various utilities, _b_, going along with these attributes, is\nalso beyond brief specification. The perceptions and ideas, likes\nand dislikes, _c_, set up by the aspect of the estate, and which,\ncompounded and recompounded, eventually form the motive for buying\nit, make a whole too large and complex for description; and the\ntransactions, legal, pecuniary, and other, gone through in making\nthe purchase and taking possession, are scarcely less numerous and\nelaborate.\n\nNor must we overlook the fact that as evolution progresses, not only\ndo the factors increase in complexity, but also the relations among\nthem. Originally, _a_ is directly and simply connected with _b_, while\n_c_ is directly and simply connected with _d_. But eventually, the\nconnections between _a_ and _b_, and between _c_ and _d_, become very\nindirect and involved. On the one hand, as the first illustration shows\nus, sapidity and nutritiveness are closely bound together; as are also\nthe stimulation caused by the one and the contraction which utilizes\nthe other. But, as we see in the last illustration, the connection\nbetween the visible traits of an estate and those characters which\nconstitute its value, is at once remote and complicated; while the\ntransition from the purchaser's highly composite motive to the numerous\nactions of sensory and motor organs, severally intricate, which effect\nthe purchase, is through an entangled plexus of thoughts and feelings\nconstituting his decision.\n\nAfter this explanation will be apprehended a truth otherwise set forth\nin the _Principles of Psychology_. Mind consists of feelings and the\nrelations among feelings. By composition of the relations, and ideas\nof relations, intelligence arises. By composition of the feelings,\nand ideas of feelings, emotion arises. And, other things equal, the\nevolution of either is great in proportion as the composition is great.\nOne of the necessary implications is that cognition becomes higher in\nproportion as it is remoter from reflex action; while emotion becomes\nhigher in proportion as it is remoter from sensation.\n\nAnd now of the various corollaries from this broad view of\npsychological evolution, let us observe those which concern the motives\nand actions that are classed as moral and immoral.\n\n\n\u00a7 42. The mental process by which, in any case, the adjustment of acts\nto ends is effected, and which, under its higher forms, becomes the\nsubject-matter of ethical judgments, is, as above implied, divisible\ninto the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive,\nand the thought or thoughts through which the motive is shaped and\nfinally issues in action. The first of these elements, originally an\nexcitement, becomes a simple sensation; then a compound sensation;\nthen a cluster of partially presentative and partially representative\nsensations, forming an incipient emotion; then a cluster of exclusively\nideal or representative sensations, forming an emotion proper; then a\ncluster of such clusters, forming a compound emotion; and eventually\nbecomes a still more involved emotion composed of the ideal forms\nof such compound emotions. The other element, beginning with that\nimmediate passage of a single stimulus into a single motion, called\nreflex action, presently comes to be a set of associated discharges of\nstimuli producing associated motions, constituting instinct. Step by\nstep arise more entangled combinations of stimuli, somewhat variable in\ntheir modes of union, leading to complex motions similarly variable in\ntheir adjustments; whence occasional hesitations in the sensori-motor\nprocesses. Presently is reached a stage at which the combined clusters\nof impressions, not all present together, issue in actions not all\nsimultaneous; implying representation of results, or thought. Afterward\nfollow stages in which various thoughts have time to pass before the\ncomposite motives produce the appropriate actions. Until at last arise\nthose long deliberations during which the probabilities of various\nconsequences are estimated, and the promptings of the correlative\nfeelings balanced, constituting calm judgment. That under either of\nits aspects the later forms of this mental process are the higher,\nethically considered as well as otherwise considered, will be readily\nseen.\n\nFor from the first, complication of sentiency has accompanied better\nand more numerous adjustments of acts to ends; as also has complication\nof movement, and complication of the co-ordinating or intellectual\nprocess uniting the two. Whence it follows that the acts characterized\nby the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all\nalong been of higher authority for guidance. Some examples will make\nthis clear.\n\nHere is an aquatic creature guided by the odor of organic matter\ntoward things serving for food; but a creature which, lacking any\nother guidance, is at the mercy of larger creatures coming near. Here\nis another which, also guided to food by odor, possesses rudimentary\nvision; and so is made to start spasmodically away from a moving body\nwhich diffuses this odor, in those cases where it is large enough\nto produce sudden obscuration of light--usually an enemy. Evidently\nlife will frequently be saved by conforming to the later and higher\nstimulus, instead of to the earlier and lower.\n\nObserve at a more advanced stage a parallel conflict. This is a beast\nwhich pursues others for prey, and, either lacking experience or\nprompted by raging hunger, attacks one more powerful than itself,\nand gets destroyed. Conversely, that is a beast which, prompted by a\nhunger equally keen, but either by individual experience or effects of\ninherited experience, made conscious of evil by the aspect of one more\npowerful than itself, is deterred from attacking, and saves its life by\nsubordinating the primary motive, consisting of craving sensations, to\nthe secondary motive, consisting of ideal feelings, distinct or vague.\n\nAscending at once from these examples of conduct in animals to examples\nof human conduct, we shall see that the contrasts between inferior\nand superior have habitually the same traits. The savage of lowest\ntype devours all the food captured by to-day's chase, and, hungry on\nthe morrow, has perhaps for days to bear the pangs of starvation. The\nsuperior savage, conceiving more vividly the entailed sufferings if no\ngame is to be found, is deterred by his complex feeling from giving way\nentirely to his simple feeling. Similarly are the two contrasted in the\ninertness which goes along with lack of forethought, and the activity\nwhich due forethought produces. The primitive man, idly inclined, and\nruled by the sensations of the moment, will not exert himself until\nactual pains have to be escaped; but the man somewhat advanced, able\nmore distinctly to imagine future gratifications and sufferings, is\nprompted by the thought of these to overcome his love of ease: decrease\nof misery and mortality resulting from this predominance of the\nrepresentative feelings over the presentative feelings.\n\nWithout dwelling on the fact that among the civilized, those who lead\nthe life of the senses are contrasted in the same way with those whose\nlives are largely occupied with pleasures not of a sensual kind, let me\npoint out that there are analogous contrasts between guidance by the\nless complex representative feelings, or lower emotions, and guidance\nby the more complex representative feelings, or higher emotions. When\nled by his acquisitiveness--a re-representative feeling which, acting\nunder due control, conduces to welfare--the thief takes another man's\nproperty; his act is determined by certain imagined proximate pleasures\nof relatively simple kinds, rather than by less clearly imagined\npossible pains that are more remote and of relatively involved kinds.\nBut in the conscientious man, there is an adequate restraining motive,\nstill more re-representative in its nature, including not only ideas\nof punishment, and not only ideas of lost reputation and ruin, but\nincluding ideas of the claims of the person owning the property, and\nof the pains which loss of it will entail on him: all joined with a\ngeneral aversion to acts injurious to others, which arises from the\ninherited effects of experience. And here at the end we see, as we saw\nat the beginning, that guidance by the more complex feeling, on the\naverage, conduces to welfare more than does guidance by the simpler\nfeeling.\n\nThe like holds with the intellectual co-ordinations through which\nstimuli issue in motions. The lowest actions, called reflex, in which\nan impression made on an afferent nerve causes by discharge through an\nefferent nerve a contraction, shows us a very limited adjustment of\nacts to ends: the impression being simple, and the resulting motion\nsimple, the internal co-ordination is also simple. Evidently when there\nare several senses which can be together affected by an outer object;\nand when, according as such object is discriminated as of one or other\nkind, the movements made in response are combined in one or other way;\nthe intermediate co-ordinations are necessarily more involved. And\nevidently each further step in the evolution of intelligence, always\ninstrumental to better self-preservation, exhibits this same general\ntrait. The adjustments by which the more involved actions are made\nappropriate to the more involved circumstances, imply more intricate,\nand, consequently, more deliberate and conscious co-ordinations; until,\nwhen we come to civilized men, who in their daily business, taking into\naccount many data and conditions, adjust their proceedings to various\nconsequences, we see that the intellectual actions, becoming of the\nkind we call judicial, are at once very elaborate and very deliberate.\n\nObserve, then, what follows respecting the relative authorities of\nmotives. Throughout the ascent from low creatures up to man, and\nfrom the lowest types of man up to the highest, self-preservation\nhas been increased by the subordination of simple excitations to\ncompound excitations--the subjection of immediate sensations to\nthe ideas of sensations to come--the overruling of preservative\nfeelings by representative feelings, and of representative feelings\nby re-representative feelings. As life has advanced, the accompanying\nsentiency has become increasingly ideal; and among feelings produced\nby the compounding of ideas, the highest, and those which have evolved\nlatest, are the re-compounded or doubly ideal. Hence it follows that\nas guides, the feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees\nin which they are removed by their complexity and their ideality from\nsimple sensations and appetites.\n\nA further implication is made clear by studying the intellectual sides\nof these mental processes by which acts are adjusted to ends. Where\nthey are low and simple, these comprehend the guiding only of immediate\nacts by immediate stimuli--the entire transaction in each case,\nlasting but a moment, refers only to a proximate result. But with the\ndevelopment of intelligence, and the growing ideality of the motives,\nthe ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclusively\nimmediate. The more ideal motives concern ends that are more\ndistant; and with approach to the highest types, present ends become\nincreasingly subordinate to those future ends which the ideal motives\nhave for their objects. Hence there arises a certain presumption in\nfavor of a motive which refers to a remote good, in comparison with one\nwhich refers to a proximate good.\n\n\n\u00a7 43. In the last chapter I hinted that besides the several influences\nthere named as fostering the ascetic belief that doing things which\nare agreeable is detrimental while bearing disagreeable things is\nbeneficial, there remained to be named an influence of deeper origin.\nThis is shadowed forth in the foregoing paragraphs.\n\nFor the general truth that guidance by such simple pleasures and pains\nas result from fulfilling or denying bodily desires, is, under one\naspect, inferior to guidance by those pleasures and pains which the\ncomplex ideal feelings yield, has led to the belief that the promptings\nof bodily desires should be disregarded. Further, the general truth\nthat pursuit of proximate satisfactions is, under one aspect, inferior\nto pursuit of ultimate satisfactions, has led to the belief that\nproximate satisfactions must not be valued.\n\nIn the early stages of every science, the generalizations reached are\nnot qualified enough. The discriminating statements of the truths\nformulated, rise afterward, by limitation of the undiscriminating\nstatements. As with bodily vision, which at first appreciates only\nthe broadest traits of objects, and so leads to rude classings, which\ndeveloped vision, impressible by minor differences, has to correct,\nso with mental vision in relation to general truths, it happens that\nat first the inductions, wrongly made all-embracing, have to wait for\nscepticism and critical observation to restrict them, by taking account\nof unnoticed differences. Hence, we may expect to find the current\nethical conclusions too sweeping. Let us note how, in three ways, these\ndominant beliefs, alike of professed moralists and of people at large,\nare made erroneous by lack of qualifications.\n\nIn the first place, the authority of the lower feelings as guides is\nby no means always inferior to the authority of the higher feelings,\nbut is often superior. Daily occur occasions on which sensations\nmust be obeyed rather than sentiments. Let any one think of sitting\nall night naked in a snow-storm, or going a week without food, or\nletting his head be held under water for ten minutes, and he will see\nthat the pleasures and pains directly related to maintenance of life\nmay not be wholly subordinated to the pleasures and pains indirectly\nrelated to maintenance of life. Though in many cases guidance by the\nsimple feelings rather than by the complex feelings is injurious, in\nother cases guidance by the complex feelings rather than by the simple\nfeelings is fatal; and throughout a wide range of cases their relative\nauthorities as guides are indeterminate. Grant that in a man pursued,\nthe protesting feelings accompanying intense and prolonged effort,\nmust, to preserve life, be overruled by the fear of his pursuers; it\nmay yet happen that, persisting till he drops, the resulting exhaustion\ncauses death, though, the pursuit having been abandoned, death would\nnot otherwise have resulted. Grant that a widow left in poverty must\ndeny her appetite that she may give enough food to her children to keep\nthem alive; yet the denial of her appetite pushed too far may leave\nthem not only entirely without food but without guardianship. Grant\nthat, working his brain unceasingly from dawn till dark, the man in\npecuniary difficulties must disregard rebellious bodily sensations in\nobedience to the conscientious desire to liquidate the claims on him;\nyet he may carry this subjection of simple feelings to complex feelings\nto the extent of shattering his health, and failing in that end\nwhich, with less of this subjection, he might have achieved. Clearly,\nthen, the subordination of lower feelings must be a conditional\nsubordination. The supremacy of higher feelings must be a qualified\nsupremacy.\n\nIn another way does the generalization ordinarily made err by\nexcess. With the truth that life is high in proportion as the\nsimple presentative feelings are under the control of the compound\nrepresentative feelings, it joins, as though they were corollaries,\ncertain propositions which are not corollaries. The current conception\nis, not that the lower must yield to the higher when the two conflict,\nbut that the lower must be disregarded even when there is no conflict.\nThis tendency which the growth of moral ideas has generated, to\ncondemn obedience to inferior feelings when superior feelings protest,\nhas begotten a tendency to condemn inferior feelings considered\nintrinsically. \"I really think she does things because she likes to\ndo them,\" once said to me one lady concerning another: the form of\nexpression and the manner both implying the belief not only that such\nbehavior is wrong, but also that every one must recognize it as wrong.\nAnd there prevails widely a notion of this kind. In practice, indeed,\nthe notion is very generally inoperative. Though it prompts various\nincidental asceticisms, as of those who think it alike manly and\nsalutary to go without a great-coat in cold weather, or to persevere\nthrough the winter in taking an out-of-door plunge, yet, generally,\nthe pleasurable feelings accompanying due fulfillment of bodily needs,\nare accepted: acceptance being, indeed, sufficiently peremptory. But\noblivious of these contradictions in their practice, men commonly\nbetray a vague idea that there is something degrading, or injurious,\nor both, in doing that which is agreeable and avoiding that which is\ndisagreeable. \"Pleasant but wrong,\" is a phrase frequently used in a\nway implying that the two are naturally connected. As above hinted,\nhowever, such beliefs result from a confused apprehension of the\ngeneral truth that the more compound and representative feelings are,\non the average, of higher authority than the simple and presentative\nfeelings. Apprehended with discrimination, this truth implies that the\nauthority of the simple, ordinarily less than that of the compound but\noccasionally greater, is habitually to be accepted when the compound do\nnot oppose.\n\nIn yet a third way is this principle of subordination misconceived. One\nof the contrasts between the earlier evolved feelings and the later\nevolved feelings, is that they refer respectively to the more immediate\neffects of actions and to the more remote effects; and speaking\ngenerally, guidance by that which is near is inferior to guidance by\nthat which is distant. Hence has resulted the belief that, irrespective\nof their kinds, the pleasures of the present must be sacrificed to the\npleasures of the future. We see this in the maxim often impressed on\nchildren when eating their meals, that they should reserve the nicest\nmorsel till the last: the check on improvident yielding to immediate\nimpulse, being here joined with the tacit teaching that the same\ngratification becomes more valuable as it becomes more distant. Such\nthinking is traceable throughout daily conduct; by no means indeed in\nall, but in those who are distinguished as prudent and well regulated\nin their conduct. Hurrying over his breakfast that he may catch the\ntrain, snatching a sandwich in the middle of the day, and eating a late\ndinner when he is so worn out that he is incapacitated for evening\nrecreation, the man of business pursues a life in which not only the\nsatisfactions of bodily desires, but also those of higher tastes and\nfeelings, are, as far as may be, disregarded, that distant ends may\nbe achieved; and yet if you ask what are these distant ends, you find\n(in cases where there are no parental responsibilities) that they are\nincluded under the conception of more comfortable living in time to\ncome. So ingrained is this belief that it is wrong to seek immediate\nenjoyments and right to seek remote ones only, that you may hear from\na busy man who has been on a pleasure excursion a kind of apology for\nhis conduct. He deprecates the unfavorable judgments of his friends by\nexplaining that the state of his health had compelled him to take a\nholiday. Nevertheless, if you sound him with respect to his future, you\nfind that his ambition is by-and-by to retire and devote himself wholly\nto the relaxations which he is now somewhat ashamed of taking.\n\nThe general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct, sub-human\nand human, that for the better preservation of life the primitive,\nsimple, presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved,\ncompound, and representative feelings, has thus come, in the course of\ncivilization, to be recognized by men; but necessarily at first in too\nindiscriminate a way. The current conception, while it errs by implying\nthat the authority of the higher over the lower is unlimited, errs\nalso by implying that the rule of the lower must be resisted even when\nit does not conflict with the rule of the higher, and further errs by\nimplying that a gratification which forms a proper aim if it is remote,\nforms an improper aim if it is proximate.\n\n\n\u00a7 44. Without explicitly saying so, we have been here tracing the\ngenesis of the moral consciousness. For unquestionably the essential\ntrait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or\nfeelings by some other feeling or feelings.\n\nAmong the higher animals we may see, distinctly enough, the conflict\nof feelings and the subjection of simpler to more compound; as when a\ndog is restrained from snatching food by fear of the penalties which\nmay come if he yields to his appetite; or as when he desists from\nscratching at a hole lest he should lose his master, who has walked on.\nHere, however, though there is subordination, there is not conscious\nsubordination--there is no introspection revealing the fact that one\nfeeling has yielded to another. So is it even with human beings when\nlittle developed mentally. The pre-social man, wandering about in\nfamilies and ruled by such sensations and emotions as are caused by the\ncircumstances of the moment, though occasionally subject to conflicts\nof motives, meets with comparatively few cases in which the advantage\nof postponing the immediate to the remote is forced on his attention;\nnor has he the intelligence requisite for analyzing and generalizing\nsuch of these cases as occur. Only as social evolution renders the life\nmore complex, the restraints many and strong, the evils of impulsive\nconduct marked, and the comforts to be gained by providing for the\nfuture tolerably certain, can there come experiences numerous enough\nto make familiar the benefit of subordinating the simpler feelings to\nthe more complex ones. Only then, too, does there arise a sufficient\nintellectual power to make an induction from these experiences,\nfollowed by a sufficient massing of individual inductions into a\npublic and traditional induction impressed on each generation as it\ngrows up.\n\nAnd here we are introduced to certain facts of profound significance.\nThis conscious relinquishment of immediate and special good to\ngain distant and general good, while it is a cardinal trait of\nthe self-restraint called moral, is also a cardinal trait of\nself-restraints other than those called moral--the restraints that\noriginate from fear of the visible ruler, of the invisible ruler, and\nof society at large. Whenever the individual refrains from doing that\nwhich the passing desire prompts, lest he should afterward suffer\nlegal punishment, or divine vengeance, or public reprobation, or all\nof them, he surrenders the near and definite pleasure rather than risk\nthe remote and greater, though less definite, pains, which taking it\nmay bring on him; and, conversely, when he undergoes some present\npain, that he may reap some probable future pleasure, political,\nreligious, or social. But though all these four kinds of internal\ncontrol have the common character that the simpler and less ideal\nfeelings are consciously overruled by the more complex and ideal\nfeelings; and though, at first, they are practically co-extensive\nand undistinguished, yet, in the course of social evolution,\nthey differentiate; and, eventually, the moral control, with its\naccompanying conceptions and sentiments, emerges as independent. Let us\nglance at the leading aspects of the process.\n\nWhile, as in the rudest groups, neither political nor religious rule\nexists, the leading check to the immediate satisfaction of each\ndesire as it arises, is consciousness of the evils which the anger of\nfellow-savages may entail, if satisfaction of the desire is obtained\nat their cost. In this early stage the imagined pains which constitute\nthe governing motive are those apt to be inflicted by beings of like\nnature, undistinguished in power: the political, religious, and\nsocial restraints are as yet represented only by this mutual dread of\nvengeance.\n\nWhen special strength, skill, or courage, makes one of them a leader in\nbattle, he necessarily inspires greater fear than any other, and there\ncomes to be a more decided check on such satisfactions of the desires\nas will injure or offend him. Gradually as, by habitual warfare,\nchieftainship is established, the evils thought of as likely to arise\nfrom angering the chief, not only by aggression upon him, but by\ndisobedience to him, become distinguishable both from the smaller evils\nwhich other personal antagonisms cause, and from the more diffused\nevils thought of as arising from social reprobation. That is, political\ncontrol begins to differentiate from the more indefinite control of\nmutual dread.\n\nMeanwhile there has been developing the ghost theory. In all but the\nrudest groups the double of a deceased man, propitiated at death and\nafterward, is conceived as able to injure the survivors. Consequently,\nas fast as the ghost theory becomes established and definite, there\ngrows up another kind of check on immediate satisfaction of the\ndesires--a check constituted by ideas of the evils which ghosts may\ninflict if offended; and when political headship gets settled, and the\nghosts of dead chiefs, thought of as more powerful and relentless than\nother ghosts, are especially dreaded, there begins to take shape the\nform of restraint distinguished as religious.\n\nFor a long time these three sets of restraints, which their\ncorrelative sanctions, though becoming separate in consciousness,\nremain co-extensive, and do so because they mostly refer to one\nend--success in war. The duty of blood-revenge is insisted on even\nwhile yet nothing to be called social organization exists. As the\nchief gains predominance, the killing of enemies becomes a political\nduty; and as the anger of the dead chief comes to be dreaded, the\nkilling of enemies becomes a religious duty. Loyalty to the ruler while\nhe lives and after he dies is increasingly shown by holding life at\nhis disposal for purposes of war. The earliest enacted punishments\nare those for insubordination and for breaches of observances which\nexpress subordination--all of them militant in origin. While the divine\ninjunctions, originally traditions of the dead king's will, mainly\nrefer to the destruction of peoples with whom he was at enmity, and\ndivine anger or approval are conceived as determined by the degrees in\nwhich subjection to him is shown, directly by worship and indirectly by\nfulfilling these injunctions. The Fijian, who is said on entering the\nother world to commend himself by narrating his successes in battle,\nand who, when alive, is described as sometimes greatly distressed if he\nthinks he has not killed enemies enough to please his gods, shows us\nthe resulting ideas and feelings, and reminds us of kindred ideas and\nfeelings betrayed by ancient races.\n\nTo all which add that the control of social opinion, besides being\ndirectly exercised, as in the earliest stage, by praise of the brave\nand blame of the cowardly, comes to be indirectly exercised with a\nkindred general effect by applause of loyalty to the ruler and piety\nto the god. So that the three differentiated forms of control which\ngrow up along with militant organization and action, while enforcing\nkindred restraints and incentives, also enforce one another; and their\nseparate and joint disciplines have the common character that they\ninvolve the sacrifice of immediate special benefits to obtain more\ndistant and general benefits.\n\nAt the same time there have been developing under the same three\nsanctions, restraints and incentives of another order, similarly\ncharacterized by subordination of the proximate to the remote. Joint\naggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there\nare many aggressions of man on man within the society. War implies\nco-operation; and co-operation is prevented by antagonisms among those\nwho are to co-operate. We saw that in the primitive ungoverned group,\nthe main check on immediate satisfaction of his desires by each man,\nis the fear of other men's vengeance if they are injured by taking the\nsatisfaction; and through early stages of social development this dread\nof retaliation continues to be the chief motive to such forbearance\nas exists. But though long after political authority has become\nestablished the taking of personal satisfaction for injuries persists,\nthe growth of political authority gradually checks it. The fact that\nsuccess in war is endangered if his followers fight among themselves,\nforces itself on the attention of the ruler. He has a strong motive\nfor restraining quarrels, and therefore for preventing the aggressions\nwhich cause quarrels; and as his power becomes greater he forbids the\naggressions and inflicts punishments for disobedience. Presently,\npolitical restraints of this class, like those of the preceding class,\nare enforced by religious restraints. The sagacious chief, succeeding\nin war partly because he thus enforces order among his followers,\nleaves behind him a tradition of the commands he habitually gave. Dread\nof his ghost tends to produce regard for these commands; and they\neventually acquire sacredness. With further social evolution come, in\nlike manner, further interdicts, checking aggressions of less serious\nkinds; until eventually there grows up a body of civil laws. And then,\nin the way shown, arise beliefs concerning the divine disapproval\nof these minor, as well as of the major, civil offences: ending,\noccasionally, in a set of religious injunctions harmonizing with,\nand enforcing, the political injunctions; while simultaneously there\ndevelops, as before, a social sanction for these rules of internal\nconduct, strengthening the political and religious sanctions.\n\nBut now observe that while these three controls, political, religious,\nand social, severally lead men to subordinate proximate satisfactions\nto remote satisfactions; and while they are in this respect like\nthe moral control, which habitually requires the subjection of\nsimple presentative feelings to complex representative feelings and\npostponement of present to future; yet they do not constitute the moral\ncontrol, but are only preparatory to it--are controls within which the\nmoral control evolves. The command of the political ruler is at first\nobeyed, not because of its perceived rectitude, but simply because\nit is his command, which there will be a penalty for disobeying. The\ncheck is not a mental representation of the evil consequences which\nthe forbidden act will, in the nature of things, cause: but it is a\nmental representation of the factitious evil consequences. Down to our\nown time we trace in legal phrases, the original doctrine that the\naggression of one citizen on another is wrong, and will be punished,\nnot so much because of the injury done him, as because of the implied\ndisregard of the king's will. Similarly, the sinfulness of breaking\na divine injunction was universally at one time, and is still by\nmany, held to consist in the disobedience to God, rather than in the\ndeliberate entailing of injury; and even now it is a common belief\nthat acts are right only if performed in conscious fulfillment of the\ndivine will: nay, are even wrong if otherwise performed. The like\nholds, too, with that further control exercised by public opinion. On\nlistening to the remarks made respecting conformity to social rules, it\nis noticeable that breach of them is condemned not so much because of\nany essential impropriety as because the world's authority is ignored.\nHow imperfectly the truly moral control is even now differentiated\nfrom these controls within which it has been evolving, we see in the\nfact that the systems of morality criticized at the outset, severally\nidentify moral control with one or other of them. For moralists of\none class derive moral rules from the commands of a supreme political\npower. Those of another class recognize no other origin for them than\nthe revealed divine will. And though men who take social prescription\nfor their guide do not formulate their doctrine, yet the belief,\nfrequently betrayed, that conduct which society permits is not\nblameworthy, implies that there are those who think right and wrong can\nbe made such by public opinion.\n\nBefore taking a further step we must put together the results of this\nanalysis. The essential truths to be carried with us, respecting these\nthree forms of external control to which the social unit is subject,\nare these: First, that they have evolved with the evolution of society,\nas means to social self-preservation, necessary under the conditions;\nand that, by implication, they are in the main congruous with one\nanother. Second, that the correlative internal restraints generated\nin the social unit are representations of remote results which are\nincidental rather than necessary--a legal penalty, a supernatural\npunishment, a social reprobation. Third, that these results, simpler\nand more directly wrought by personal agencies, can be more vividly\nconceived than can the results which, in the course of things, actions\nnaturally entail; and the conceptions of them are, therefore, more\npotent over undeveloped minds. Fourth, that as with the restraints thus\ngenerated is always joined the thought of external coercion, there\narises the notion of obligation; which so becomes habitually associated\nwith the surrender of immediate special benefits for the sake of\ndistant and general benefits. Fifth, that the moral control corresponds\nin large measure with the three controls thus originating, in respect\nof its injunctions; and corresponds, too, in the general nature of the\nmental processes producing conformity to those injunctions; but differs\nin their special nature.\n\n\n\u00a7 45. For now we are prepared to see that the restraints, properly\ndistinguished as moral, are unlike these restraints out of which\nthey evolve, and with which they are long confounded, in this--they\nrefer not to the extrinsic effects of actions but to their intrinsic\neffects. The truly moral deterrent from murder is not constituted by\na representation of hanging as a consequence, or by a representation\nof tortures in hell as a consequence, or by a representation of the\nhorror and hatred excited in fellow men; but by a representation\nof the necessary natural results, the infliction of death-agony on\nthe victim, the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness,\nthe entailed sufferings to his belongings. Neither the thought of\nimprisonment, nor of divine anger, nor of social disgrace, is that\nwhich constitutes the moral check on theft; but the thought of injury\nto the person robbed, joined with a vague consciousness of the general\nevils caused by disregard of proprietary rights. Those who reprobate\nthe adulterer on moral grounds have their minds filled, not with ideas\nof an action for damages, or of future punishment following the breach\nof a commandment, or of loss of reputation; but they are occupied with\nideas of unhappiness entailed on the aggrieved wife or husband, the\ndamaged lives of children, and the diffused mischiefs which go along\nwith disregard of the marriage tie. Conversely, the man who is moved\nby a moral feeling to help another in difficulty, does not picture to\nhimself any reward here or hereafter; but pictures only the better\ncondition he is trying to bring about. One who is morally prompted to\nfight against a social evil has neither material benefit nor popular\napplause before his mind, but only the mischiefs he seeks to remove and\nthe increased well-being which will follow their removal. Throughout,\nthen, the moral motive differs from the motives it is associated\nwith in this, that instead of being constituted by representations\nof incidental, collateral, non-necessary consequences of acts, it is\nconstituted by representations of consequences which the acts naturally\nproduce. These representations are not all distinct, though some of\nsuch are usually present; but they form an assemblage of indistinct\nrepresentations accumulated by experience of the results of like acts\nin the life of the individual, superposed on a still more indistinct\nbut voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects of such\nexperiences in progenitors, forming a feeling that is at once massive\nand vague.\n\nAnd now we see why the moral feelings and correlative restraints have\narisen later than the feelings and restraints that originate from\npolitical, religious, and social authorities, and have so slowly, and\neven yet so incompletely, disentangled themselves. For only by these\nlower feelings and restraints could be maintained the conditions under\nwhich the higher feelings and restraints evolve. It is thus alike with\nthe self-regarding feelings and with the other-regarding feelings. The\npains which improvidence will bring, and the pleasures to be gained by\nstoring up things for future use, and by laboring to get such things,\ncan be habitually contrasted in thought, only as fast as settled social\narrangements make accumulation possible; and that there may arise such\nsettled arrangements, fear of the seen ruler, of the unseen ruler, and\nof public opinion, must come into play. Only after political, religious\nand social restraints have produced a stable community can there be\nsufficient experience of the pains, positive and negative, sensational\nand emotional, which crimes of aggression cause, as to generate\nthat moral aversion to them constituted by consciousness of their\nintrinsically evil results. And more manifest still is it that such a\nmoral sentiment as that of abstract equity, which is offended not only\nby material injuries done to men, but also by political arrangements\nthat place them at a disadvantage, can evolve only after the social\nstage reached gives familiar experience, both of the pains flowing\ndirectly from injustices, and also of those flowing indirectly from the\nclass privileges which make injustices easy.\n\nThat the feelings called moral have the nature and origin alleged is\nfurther shown by the fact that we associate the name with them in\nproportion to the degree in which they have these characters--firstly,\nof being re-representative; secondly, of being concerned with indirect\nrather than with direct effects, and generally with remote rather\nthan immediate; and thirdly, of referring to effects that are mostly\ngeneral rather than special. Thus, though we condemn one man for\nextravagance and approve the economy shown by another man, we do not\nclass their acts as respectively vicious and virtuous. These words are\ntoo strong; the present and future results here differ too little in\nconcreteness and ideality to make the words fully applicable. Suppose,\nhowever, that the extravagance necessarily brings distress on wife\nand children--brings pains diffused over the lives of others as well\nas of self, and the viciousness of the extravagance becomes clear.\nSuppose, further, that prompted by the wish to relieve his family from\nthe misery he has brought on them, the spendthrift forges a bill or\ncommits some other fraud. Though, estimated apart, we characterize\nhis overruling emotion as moral, and make allowance for him in\nconsideration of it, yet his action, taken as a whole, we condemn as\nimmoral: we regard as of superior authority the feelings which respond\nto men's proprietary claims--feelings which are re-representative in\na higher degree and refer to more remote diffused consequences. The\ndifference, habitually recognized, between the relative elevations of\njustice and generosity, well illustrates this truth. The motive causing\na generous act has reference to effects of a more concrete, special,\nand proximate kind than has the motive to do justice, which, beyond\nthe proximate effects, usually themselves less concrete than those\nthat generosity contemplates, includes a consciousness of the distant,\ninvolved, diffused effects of maintaining equitable relations. And\njustice we hold to be higher generosity.\n\nComprehension of this long argument will be aided by here quoting a\nfurther passage from the before-named letter to Mr. Mill, following the\npassage already quoted from it.\n\n  \"To make any position fully understood, it seems needful to add that,\n  corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral\n  Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race,\n  certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral\n  intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility,\n  gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite\n  independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I\n  believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual,\n  to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all\n  antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly developed\n  nervous organizations--just as I believe that this intuition,\n  requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal\n  experiences, has practically become a form of thought, apparently\n  quite independent of experience; so do I believe that the experiences\n  of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations\n  of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous\n  modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation,\n  have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition--certain\n  emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no\n  apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold\n  that just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations\n  of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified\n  by them; so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of\n  Moral Science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and\n  verified by them.\"\n\nTo this, in passing, I will add only that the evolution-hypothesis\nthus enables us to reconcile opposed moral theories, as it enables us\nto reconcile opposed theories of knowledge. For as the doctrine of\ninnate forms of intellectual intuition falls into harmony with the\nexperiential doctrine, when we recognize the production of intellectual\nfaculties by inheritance of effects wrought by experience; so the\ndoctrine of innate powers of moral perception becomes congruous\nwith the utilitarian doctrine, when it is seen that preferences and\naversions are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of\npleasurable and painful experiences in progenitors.\n\n\n\u00a7 46. One further question has to be answered--How does there arise\nthe feeling of moral obligation in general? Whence comes the sentiment\nof duty, considered as distinct from the several sentiments which\nprompt temperance, providence, kindness, justice, truthfulness, etc.?\nThe answer is that it is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner\nanalogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated.\n\nThe idea of each color had originally entire concreteness given to it\nby an object possessing the color; as some of the unmodified names,\nsuch as orange and violet, show us. The dissociation of each color\nfrom the object specially associated with it in thought at the outset,\nwent on as fast as the color came to be associated in thought with\nobjects unlike the first, and unlike one another. The idea of orange\nwas conceived in the abstract more fully in proportion as the various\norange-colored objects remembered, cancelled one another's diverse\nattributes, and left outstanding their common attribute.\n\nSo is it if we ascend a stage and note how there arises the abstract\nidea of color apart from particular colors. Were all things red the\nconception of color in the abstract could not exist. Imagine that\nevery object was either red or green, and it is manifest that the\nmental habit would be to think of one or other of these two colors in\nconnection with anything named. But multiply the colors so that thought\nrambles undecidedly among the ideas of them that occur along with any\nobject named, and there results the notion of indeterminate color--the\ncommon property which objects possess of affecting us by light from\ntheir surfaces, as well as by their forms. For evidently the notion of\nthis common property is that which remains constant while imagination\nis picturing every possible variety of color. It is the uniform trait\nin all colored things; that is--color in the abstract.\n\nWords referring to quantity furnish cases of more marked dissociation\nof abstract from concrete. Grouping various things as small in\ncomparison either with those of their kind or with those of other\nkinds, and similarly grouping some objects as comparatively great, we\nget the opposite abstract notions of smallness and greatness. Applied\nas these are to innumerable very diverse things--not objects only, but\nforces, times, numbers, values--they have become so little connected\nwith concretes, that their abstract meanings are very vague.\n\nFurther, we must note that an abstract idea thus formed often acquires\nan illusive independence; as we may perceive in the case of motion,\nwhich, dissociated in thought from all particular bodies and velocities\nand directions, is sometimes referred to as though it could be\nconceived apart from something moving.\n\nNow all this holds of the subjective as well as of the objective; and\namong other states of consciousness, holds of the emotions as known\nby introspection. By the grouping of those re-representative feelings\nabove described, which, differing among themselves in other respects,\nhave a component in common, and by the consequent mutual cancelling\nof their diverse components, this common component is made relatively\nappreciable, and becomes an abstract feeling. Thus is produced the\nsentiment of moral obligation or duty. Let us observe its genesis.\n\nWe have seen that during the progress of animate existence, the later\nevolved, more compound and more representative feelings, serving to\nadjust the conduct to more distant and general needs, have all along\nhad an authority as guides superior to that of the earlier and simpler\nfeelings--excluding cases in which these last are intense. This\nsuperior authority, unrecognizable by lower types of creatures which\ncannot generalize, and little recognizable by primitive men who have\nbut feeble powers of generalization, has become distinctly recognized\nas civilization and accompanying mental development have gone on.\nAccumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that guidance\nby feelings which refer to remote and general results is usually more\nconducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately\ngratified. For what is the common character of the feelings that\nprompt honesty, truthfulness, diligence, providence, etc., which men\nhabitually find to be better prompters than the appetites and simple\nimpulses? They are all complex, re-representative feelings, occupied\nwith the future rather than the present. The idea of authoritativeness\nhas, therefore, come to be connected with feelings having these traits:\nthe implication being that the lower and simpler feelings are without\nauthority. And this idea of authoritativeness is one element in the\nabstract consciousness of duty.\n\nBut there is another element--the element of coerciveness. This\noriginates from experience of those several forms of restraint that\nhave, as above described, established themselves in the course of\ncivilization--the political, religious, and social. To the effects\nof punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on conduct of\ncertain kinds, Dr. Bain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation. And\nI agree with him to the extent of thinking that by them is generated\nthe sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes,\nand which the word obligation indicates. The existence of an earlier\nand deeper element, generated as above described, is, however, I\nthink, implied by the fact that certain of the higher self-regarding\nfeelings, instigating prudence and economy, have a moral authority in\nopposition to the simpler self-regarding feelings: showing that apart\nfrom any thought of factitious penalties on improvidence, the feeling\nconstituted by representation of the natural penalties has acquired an\nacknowledged superiority. But accepting in the main the view that fears\nof the political and social penalties (to which, I think, the religious\nmust be added) have generated that sense of coerciveness which goes\nalong with the thought of postponing present to future and personal\ndesires to the claims of others, it here chiefly concerns us to note\nthat this sense of coerciveness becomes indirectly connected with the\nfeelings distinguished as moral. For since the political, religious and\nsocial restraining motives, are mainly formed of represented future\nresults; and since the moral restraining motive is mainly formed of\nrepresented future results; it happens that the representations,\nhaving much in common, and being often aroused at the same time, the\nfear joined with three sets of them becomes, by association, joined\nwith the fourth. Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act,\nexcites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects\nof the act are thought of; and being thus linked with these intrinsic\neffects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion. Emerging as the moral\nmotive does but slowly from amidst the political, religious and social\nmotives it long participates in that consciousness of subordination\nto some external agency which is joined with them; and only as\nit becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated\nconsciousness--only then does the feeling of obligation fade.\n\nThis remark implies the tacit conclusion, which will be to most very\nstartling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory,\nand will diminish as fast as moralization increases. Startling\nthough it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. Even\nnow progress toward the implied ultimate state is traceable. The\nobservation is not infrequent that persistence in performing a duty\nends in making it a pleasure; and this amounts to the admission that\nwhile at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last\nthis element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without\nany consciousness of being obliged to perform it. The contrast between\nthe youth on whom diligence is enjoined, and the man of business so\nabsorbed in affairs that he cannot be induced to relax, shows us\nhow the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it\n_ought_ to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accompanying\nconsciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation comes to be reversed;\nand the man of business persists in work from pure love of it when told\nthat he ought not. Nor is it thus with self-regarding feelings only.\nThat the maintaining and protecting of wife by husband often result\nsolely from feelings directly gratified by these actions, without any\nthought of _must_; and that the fostering of children by parents is in\nmany cases made an absorbing occupation without any coercive feeling\nof _ought_; are obvious truths which show us that even now, with some\nof the fundamental other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has\nretreated into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree so\nwith other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness has in\nmany outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is\njoined with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there\nto be found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social\ncompulsion, when he discharges an equitable claim on him, but he is\nwithout thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a\nsimple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient\nif anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it.\n\nEvidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that\nelement in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word\nobligation, will disappear. The higher actions required for the\nharmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are\nthose lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper\ntimes and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men\njust as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations. And\nthough, joined with their regulating influence when this is called\nfor, will exist latent ideas of the evils which nonconformity would\nbring; these will occupy the mind no more than do ideas of the evils of\nstarvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a\nmeal.\n\n\n\u00a7 47. This elaborate exposition, which the extreme complexity of the\nsubject has necessitated, may have its leading ideas restated thus:\n\nSymbolizing by _a_ and _b_, related phenomena in the environment, which\nin some way concern the welfare of the organism; and symbolizing by\n_c_ and _d_, the impressions, simple or compound, which the organism\nreceives from the one, and the motions, single or combined, by which\nits acts are adapted to meet the other; we saw that psychology in\ngeneral is concerned with the connection between the relation _a\nb_ and the relation _c d_. Further, we saw that by implication\nthe psychological aspect of Ethics, is that aspect under which\nthe adjustment of _c d_ to _a b_, appears, not as an intellectual\nco-ordination simply, but as a co-ordination in which pleasures and\npains are alike factors and results.\n\nIt was shown that throughout Evolution, motive and act become\nmore complex, as the adaptation of inner related actions to outer\nrelated actions extends in range and variety. Whence followed the\ncorollary that the later evolved feelings, more representative and\nre-representative in their constitution, and referring to remoter and\nwider needs, have, on the average, an authority as guides greater than\nhave the earlier and simpler feelings.\n\nAfter thus observing that even an inferior creature is ruled by a\nhierarchy of feelings so constituted that general welfare depends on\na certain subordination of lower to higher, we saw that in man, as\nhe passes into the social state, there arises the need for sundry\nadditional subordinations of lower to higher: co-operation being\nmade possible only by them. To the restraints constituted by mental\nrepresentations of the intrinsic effects of actions, which, in their\nsimpler forms, have been evolving from the beginning, are added the\nrestraints caused by mental representations of extrinsic effects, in\nthe shape of political, religious, and social penalties.\n\nWith the evolution of society, made possible by institutions\nmaintaining order, and associating in men's minds the sense of\nobligation with prescribed acts and with desistances from forbidden\nacts, there arose opportunities for seeing the bad consequences\nnaturally flowing from the conduct interdicted and the good\nconsequences from the conduct required. Hence eventually grew up\nmoral aversions and approvals: experience of the intrinsic effects\nnecessarily here coming later than experience of the extrinsic effects,\nand therefore producing its results later.\n\nThe thoughts and feelings constituting these moral aversions and\napprovals, being all along closely connected with the thoughts and\nfeelings constituting fears of political, religious, and social\npenalties, necessarily came to participate in the accompanying sense\nof obligation. The coercive element in the consciousness of duties at\nlarge, evolved by converse with external agencies which enforce duties,\ndiffused itself by association through that consciousness of duty,\nproperly called moral, which is occupied with intrinsic results instead\nof extrinsic results.\n\nBut this self-compulsion, which at a relatively high stage becomes more\nand more a substitute for compulsion from without, must itself, at a\nstill higher stage, practically disappear. If some action to which\nthe special motive is insufficient, is performed in obedience to the\nfeeling of moral obligation, the fact proves that the special faculty\nconcerned is not yet equal to its function--has not acquired such\nstrength that the required activity has become its normal activity,\nyielding its due amount of pleasure. With complete evolution then, the\nsense of obligation, not ordinarily present in consciousness, will be\nawakened only on those extraordinary occasions that prompt breach of\nthe laws otherwise spontaneously conformed to.\n\nAnd this brings us to the psychological aspect of that conclusion\nwhich, in the last chapter, was reached under its biological aspect.\nThe pleasures and pains which the moral sentiments originate will,\nlike bodily pleasures and pains, become incentives and deterrents so\nadjusted in their strengths to the needs that the moral conduct will be\nthe natural conduct.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW.\n\n\n\u00a7 48. Not for the human race only, but for every race, there are laws\nof right living. Given its environment and its structure, and there\nis for each kind of creature a set of actions adapted in their kinds,\namounts, and combinations, to secure the highest conservation its\nnature permits. The animal, like the man, has needs for food, warmth,\nactivity, rest, and so forth, which must be fulfilled in certain\nrelative degrees to make its life whole. Maintenance of its race\nimplies satisfaction of special desires, sexual and philoprogenitive,\nin due proportions. Hence there is a supposable formula for the\nactivities of each species, which, could it be drawn out, would\nconstitute a system of morality for that species. But such a system of\nmorality would have little or no reference to the welfare of others\nthan self and offspring. Indifferent to individuals of its own kind, as\nan inferior creature is, and habitually hostile to individuals of other\nkinds, the formula for its life could take no cognizance of the lives\nof those with which it came in contact; or rather, such formula would\nimply that maintenance of its life was at variance with maintenance of\ntheir lives.\n\nBut on ascending from beings of lower kinds to the highest kind\nof being, man; or, more strictly, on ascending from man in his\npre-social stage to man in his social stage, the formula has to\ninclude an additional factor. Though not peculiar to human life\nunder its developed form, the presence of this factor is still, in\nthe highest degree, characteristic of it. Though there are inferior\nspecies displaying considerable degrees of sociality, and, though, the\nformulas for their complete lives would have to take account of the\nrelations arising from union, yet our own species is, on the whole, to\nbe distinguished as having a formula for complete life which specially\nrecognizes the relations of each individual to others, in presence of\nwhom, and in co-operation with whom, he has to live.\n\nThis additional factor in the problem of complete living is, indeed, so\nimportant that the necessitated modifications of conduct have come to\nform a chief part of the code of conduct. Because the inherited desires\nwhich directly refer to the maintenance of individual life are fairly\nadjusted to the requirements, there has been no need to insist on\nthat conformity to them which furthers self-conversation. Conversely,\nbecause these desires prompt activities that often conflict with the\nactivities of others; and because the sentiments responding to other's\nclaims are relatively weak, moral codes emphasize those restraints on\nconduct which the presence of fellow men entails.\n\nFrom the sociological point of view, then, Ethics becomes nothing else\nthan a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the\nassociated state, in such wise that the lives of each and all may be\nthe greatest possible, alike in length and breadth.\n\n\n\u00a7 49. But here we are met by a fact which forbids us thus to put in\nthe foreground the welfares of citizens, individually considered, and\nrequires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society as a\nwhole. The life of the social organism must, as an end, rank above the\nlives of its units. These two ends are not harmonious at the outset;\nand, though the tendency is toward harmonization of them, they are\nstill partially conflicting.\n\nAs fast as the social state establishes itself, the preservation of\nthe society becomes a means of preserving its units. Living together\narose because, on the average, it proved more advantageous to each\nthan living apart; and this implies that maintenance of combination\nis maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the\ncombined persons would otherwise have. Hence, social self-preservation\nbecomes a proximate aim taking precedence of the ultimate aim,\nindividual self-preservation.\n\nThis subordination of personal to social welfare is, however,\ncontingent: it depends on the presence of antagonistic societies. So\nlong as the existence of a community is endangered by the actions\nof communities around, it must remain true that the interests of\nindividuals must be sacrificed to the interests of the community,\nas far as is needful for the community's salvation. But if this is\nmanifest, it is, by implication, manifest, that when social antagonisms\ncease, this need for sacrifice of private claims to public claims\nceases also; or rather, there cease to be any public claims at variance\nwith private claims. All along, furtherance of individual lives has\nbeen the ultimate end; and, if this ultimate end has been postponed to\nthe proximate end of preserving the community's life, it has been so\nonly because this proximate end was instrumental to the ultimate end.\nWhen the aggregate is no longer in danger, the final object of pursuit,\nthe welfare of the units, no longer needing to be postponed, becomes\nthe immediate object of pursuit.\n\nConsequently, unlike sets of conclusions respecting human conduct\nemerge, according as we are concerned with a state of habitual or\noccasional war, or are concerned with a state of permanent and general\npeace. Let us glance at these alternative states and the alternative\nimplications.\n\n\n\u00a7 50. At present the individual man has to carry on his life with due\nregard to the lives of others belonging to the same society; while\nhe is sometimes called on to be regardless of the lives of those\nbelonging to other societies. The same mental constitution, having to\nfulfill both these requirements, is necessarily incongruous; and the\ncorrelative conduct, adjusted first to the one need and then to the\nother, cannot be brought within any consistent ethical system.\n\nHate and destroy your fellow-man is now the command; and then the\ncommand is, love and aid your fellow-man. Use every means to deceive,\nsays the one code of conduct; while the other code says, be truthful in\nword and deed. Seize what property you can and burn all you cannot take\naway, are injunctions which the religion of enmity countenances; while\nby the religion of amity, theft and arson are condemned as crimes.\nAnd as conduct has to be made up of parts thus at variance with one\nanother, the theory of conduct remains confused.\n\nThere co-exists a kindred irreconcilability between the sentiments\nanswering to the forms of co-operation required for militancy and\nindustrialism respectively. While social antagonisms are habitual,\nand while, for efficient action against other societies, there needs\ngreat subordination to men who command, the virtue of loyalty and\nthe duty of implicit obedience have to be insisted on; disregard of\nthe ruler's will is punished with death. But when war ceases to be\nchronic, and growing industrialism habituates men to maintaining their\nown claims while respecting the claims of others, loyalty becomes\nless profound, the authority of the ruler is questioned or denied in\nrespect of various private actions and beliefs. State dictation is in\nmany directions successfully defied, and the political independence of\nthe citizen comes to be regarded as a claim which it is virtuous to\nmaintain and vicious to yield up. Necessarily during the transition,\nthese opposite sentiments are incongruously mingled.\n\nSo is it, too, with domestic institutions under the two _r\u00e9gimes_.\nWhile the first is dominant, ownership of a slave is honorable, and in\nthe slave submission is praiseworthy; but as the last grows dominant,\nslave-owning becomes a crime and servile obedience excites contempt.\nNor is it otherwise in the family. The subjection of women to men,\ncomplete while war is habitual but qualified as fast as peaceful\noccupations replace it, comes eventually to be thought wrong, and\nequality before the law is asserted. At the same time the opinion\nconcerning paternal power changes. The once unquestioned right of the\nfather to take his children's lives is denied, and the duty of absolute\nsubmission to him, long insisted on, is changed into the duty of\nobedience within reasonable limits.\n\nWere the ratio between the life of antagonism with alien societies,\nand the life of peaceful co-operation within each society, a constant\nratio, some permanent compromise between the conflicting rules of\nconduct appropriate to the two lives might be reached. But since\nthis ratio is a variable one, the compromise can never be more than\ntemporary. Ever the tendency is toward congruity between beliefs and\nrequirements. Either the social arrangements are gradually changed\nuntil they come into harmony with prevailing ideas and sentiments; or,\nif surrounding conditions prevent change in the social arrangements,\nthe necessitated habits of life modify the prevailing ideas and\nsentiments to the requisite extent. Hence, for each kind and degree\nof social evolution determined by external conflict and internal\nfriendship, there is an appropriate compromise between the moral code\nof enmity and the moral code of amity: not, indeed, a definable,\nconsistent compromise, but a compromise fairly well understood.\n\nThis compromise, vague, ambiguous, illogical, though it may be, is\nnevertheless for the time being authoritative. For if, as above shown,\nthe welfare of the society must take precedence of the welfares of its\ncomponent individuals, during those stages in which the individuals\nhave to preserve themselves by preserving their society, then such\ntemporary compromise between the two codes of conduct as duly regards\nexternal defense, while favoring internal co-operation to the greatest\nextent practicable, subserves the maintenance of life in the highest\ndegree; and thus gains the ultimate sanction. So that the perplexed\nand inconsistent moralities of which each society and each age shows\nus a more or less different one, are severally justified as being\napproximately the best under the circumstances.\n\nBut such moralities are, by their definitions, shown to belong to\nincomplete conduct; not to conduct that is fully evolved. We saw that\nthe adjustments of acts to ends which, while constituting the external\nmanifestations of life, conduce to the continuance of life, have been\nrising to a certain ideal form now approached by the civilized man.\nBut this form is not reached so long as there continue aggressions of\none society upon another. Whether the hinderances to complete living\nresult from the trespasses of fellow-citizens, or from the trespasses\nof aliens, matters not; if they occur there does not yet exist the\nstate defined. The limit to the evolution of conduct is arrived at\nby members of each society only when, being arrived at by members\nof other societies also, the causes of international antagonism end\nsimultaneously with the causes of antagonism between individuals.\n\nAnd now having from the sociological point of view recognized the need\nfor, and authority of, these changing systems of ethics, proper to\nchanging ratios between warlike activities and peaceful activities, we\nhave, from the same point of view, to consider the system of ethics\nproper to the state in which peaceful activities are undisturbed.\n\n\n\u00a7 51. If, excluding all thought of danger or hinderances from causes\nexternal to a society, we set ourselves to specify those conditions\nunder which the life of each person, and therefore of the aggregate,\nmay be the greatest possible, we come upon certain simple ones which,\nas here stated, assume the form of truisms.\n\nFor, as we have seen, the definition of that highest life accompanying\ncompletely evolved conduct, itself excludes all acts of aggression--not\nonly murder, assault, robbery, and the major offences generally,\nbut minor offences, such as libel, injury to property and so forth.\nWhile directly deducting from individual life, these indirectly\ncause perturbations of social life. Trespasses against others rouse\nantagonisms in them; and if these are numerous the group loses\ncoherence. Hence, whether the integrity of the group itself is\nconsidered as the end, or whether the end considered is the benefit\nultimately secured to its units by maintaining its integrity, or\nwhether the immediate benefit of its units taken separately is\nconsidered the end, the implication is the same: such acts are at\nvariance with achievement of the end. That these inferences are\nself-evident and trite (as indeed the first inferences drawn from the\ndata of every science that reaches the deductive stage naturally are)\nmust not make us pass lightly over the all-important fact that, from\nthe sociological point of view, the leading moral laws are seen to\nfollow as corollaries from the definition of complete life carried on\nunder social conditions.\n\nRespect for these primary moral laws is not enough, however. Associated\nmen pursuing their several lives without injuring one another but\nwithout helping one another, reap no advantages from association\nbeyond those of companionship. If, while there is no co-operation for\ndefensive purposes (which is here excluded by the hypothesis) there is\nalso no co-operation for satisfying wants, the social state loses its\n_raison d'\u00eatre_--almost, if not entirely. There are, indeed, people\nwho live in a condition little removed from this: as the Esquimaux.\nBut though these, exhibiting none of the co-operation necessitated by\nwar, which is unknown to them, lead lives such that each family is\nsubstantially independent of others, occasional co-operation occurs.\nAnd, indeed, that families should live in company without ever yielding\nmutual aid, is scarcely conceivable.\n\nNevertheless, whether actually existing or only approached, we must\nhere recognize as hypothetically possible a state in which these\nprimary moral laws are conformed to; for the purpose of observing,\nin their uncomplicated forms, what are the negative conditions to\nharmonious social life. Whether the members of a social group do or\ndo not co-operate, certain limitations to their individual activities\nare necessitated by their association; and, after recognizing these as\narising in the absence of co-operation, we shall be the better prepared\nto understand how conformity to them is effected when co-operation\nbegins.\n\n\n\u00a7 52. For whether men live together in quite independent ways,\ncareful only to avoid aggressing; or whether, advancing from passive\nassociation to active association, they co-operate, their conduct must\nbe such that the achievement of ends by each shall at least not be\nhindered. And it becomes obvious that when they co-operate there must\nnot only be no resulting hinderance but there must be facilitation;\nsince, in the absence of facilitation, there can be no motive to\nco-operate. What shape, then, must the mutual restraints take when\nco-operation begins? or rather--What, in addition to the primary\nmutual restraints already specified, are those secondary mutual\nrestraints required to make co-operation possible?\n\nOne who, living in an isolated way, expends effort in pursuit of an\nend, gets compensation for the effort by securing the end, and so\nachieves satisfaction. If he expends the effort without achieving\nthe end there results dissatisfaction. The satisfaction and the\ndissatisfaction are measures of success and failure in life-sustaining\nacts; since that which is achieved by effort is something which\ndirectly or indirectly furthers life, and so pays for the cost of the\neffort; while if the effort fails there is nothing to pay for the cost\nof it, and so much life is wasted. What must result from this when\nmen's efforts are joined? The reply will be made clearer if we take the\nsuccessive forms of co-operation in the order of ascending complexity.\nWe may distinguish as homogeneous co-operation (1) that in which like\nefforts are joined for like ends that are simultaneously enjoyed. As\nco-operation that is not completely homogeneous we may distinguish\n(2) that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that are not\nsimultaneously enjoyed. A co-operation of which the heterogeneity is\nmore distinct is (3) that in which unlike efforts are joined for like\nends. And lastly comes the decidedly heterogeneous co-operation (4)\nthat in which unlike efforts are joined for unlike ends.\n\nThe simplest and earliest of these in which men's powers, similar\nin kind and degree, are united in pursuit of a benefit which, when\nobtained, they all participate in, is most familiarly exemplified in\nthe catching of game by primitive men: this simplest and earliest\nform of industrial co-operation being also that which is least\ndifferentiated from militant co-operation; for the co-operators are\nthe same, and the processes, both destructive of life, are carried on\nin analogous ways. The condition under which such co-operation may be\nsuccessfully carried on is that the co-operators shall share alike\nin the produce. Each thus being enabled to repay himself in food for\nthe expended effort, and being further enabled to achieve other such\ndesired ends as maintenance of family, obtains satisfaction: there is\nno aggression of one on another, and the co-operation is harmonious.\nOf course the divided produce can be but roughly proportioned to the\nseveral efforts joined in obtaining it, but there is actually among\nsavages, as we see that for harmonious co-operation there must be, a\nrecognition of the principle that efforts when combined shall severally\nbring equivalent benefits, as they would do if they were separate.\nMoreover, beyond the taking equal shares in return for labors that are\napproximately equal, there is generally an attempt at proportioning\nbenefit to achievement, by assigning something extra, in the shape of\nthe best part or the trophy, to the actual slayer of the game. And\nobviously, if there is a wide departure from this system of sharing\nbenefits when there has been a sharing of efforts, the co-operation\nwill cease. Individual hunters will prefer to do the best they can for\nthemselves separately.\n\nPassing from this simplest case of co-operation to a case not quite so\nsimple--a case in which the homogeneity is incomplete--let us ask how a\nmember of the group may be led without dissatisfaction to expend effort\nin achieving a benefit which, when achieved, is enjoyed exclusively\nby another? Clearly he may do this on condition that the other shall\nafterward expend a like effort, the beneficial result of which shall be\nsimilarly rendered up by him in return. This exchange of equivalents\nof effort is the form which social co-operation takes while yet there\nis little or no division of labor, save that between the sexes. For\nexample, the Bodo and Dhimals \"mutually assist each other for the\nnonce, as well in constructing their houses as in clearing their plots\nfor cultivation.\" And this principle--I will help you if you will help\nme--common in simple communities where the occupations are alike in\nkind, and occasionally acted upon in more advanced communities, is one\nunder which the relation between effort and benefit, no longer directly\nmaintained, is maintained indirectly. For whereas when men's activities\nare carried on separately, or are joined in the way exemplified above,\neffort is immediately paid for by benefit, in this form of co-operation\nthe benefit achieved by effort is exchanged for a like benefit to\nbe afterward received when asked for. And in this case as in the\npreceding case, co-operation can be maintained only by fulfillment of\nthe tacit agreements. For if they are habitually not fulfilled, there\nwill commonly be refusal to give aid when asked; and each man will\nbe left to do the best he can by himself. All those advantages to be\ngained by union of efforts in doing things that are beyond the powers\nof the single individual, will be unachievable. At the outset, then,\nfulfillment of contracts that are implied if not expressed, becomes a\ncondition to social co-operation, and therefore to social development.\n\nFrom these simple forms of co-operation in which the labors men\ncarry on are of like kinds, let us turn to the more complex forms in\nwhich they carry on labors of unlike kinds. Where men mutually aid in\nbuilding huts or felling trees, the number of days' work now given by\none to another is readily balanced by an equal number of days' work\nafterward given by the other to him. And no estimation of the relative\nvalues of the labors being required, a definite understanding is little\nneeded. But when division of labor arises--when there come transactions\nbetween one who makes weapons and another who dresses skins for\nclothing, or between a grower of roots and a catcher of fish--neither\nthe relative amounts nor the relative qualities of their labors admit\nof easy measure; and with the multiplication of businesses, implying\nnumerous kinds of skill and power, there ceases to be anything like\nmanifest equivalence between either the bodily and mental efforts set\nagainst one another, or between their products. Hence the arrangement\ncannot now be taken for granted, as while the things exchanged are like\nin kind: it has to be stated. If A allows B to appropriate a product\nof his special skill, on condition that he is allowed to appropriate a\ndifferent product of B's special skill, it results that as equivalence\nof the two products cannot be determined by direct comparison of their\nquantities and qualities, there must be a distinct understanding as to\nhow much of the one may be taken in consideration of so much of the\nother.\n\nOnly under voluntary agreement, then, no longer tacit and vague,\nbut overt and definite, can co-operation be harmoniously carried on\nwhen division of labor becomes established. And as in the simplest\nco-operation, where like efforts are joined to secure a common\ngood, the dissatisfaction caused in those who, having expended their\nlabors do not get their shares of the good, prompts them to cease\nco-operating; as in the more advanced co-operation, achieved by\nexchanging equal labors of like kind expended at different times,\naversion to co-operate is generated if the expected equivalent of labor\nis not rendered; so in this developed co-operation, the failure of\neither to surrender to the other that which was avowedly recognized\nas of like value with the labor or product given, tends to prevent\nco-operation by exciting discontent with its results. And evidently,\nwhile antagonisms thus caused impede the lives of the units, the life\nof the aggregate is endangered by diminished cohesion.\n\n\n\u00a7 53. Beyond these comparatively direct mischiefs, special and general,\nthere have to be noted indirect mischiefs. As already implied by the\nreasoning in the last paragraph, not only social integration but also\nsocial differentiation, is hindered by breach of contract.\n\nIn Part II of the _Principles of Sociology_, it was shown that the\nfundamental principles of organization are the same for an individual\norganism and for a social organism; because both consist of mutually\ndependent parts. In the one case as in the other, the assumption\nof unlike activities by the component members, is possible only on\ncondition that they severally benefit in due degrees by one another's\nactivities. That we may the better see what are the implications in\nrespect of social structures, let us first note the implications in\nrespect of individual structures.\n\nThe welfare of a living body implies an approximate equilibrium\nbetween waste and repair. If the activities involve an expenditure not\nmade good by nutrition, dwindling follows. If the tissues are enabled\nto take up from the blood enriched by food, fit substances enough to\nreplace those used up in efforts made, the weight may be maintained.\nAnd if the gain exceeds the loss, growth results.\n\nThat which is true of the whole in its relations to the external\nworld, is no less true of the parts in their relations to one another.\nEach organ, like the entire organism, is wasted by performing its\nfunction, and has to restore itself from the materials brought to it.\nIf the quantity of materials furnished by the joint agency of the\nother organs is deficient, the particular organ dwindles. If they are\nsufficient, it can maintain its integrity. If they are in excess, it\nis enabled to increase. To say that this arrangement constitutes the\nphysiological contract, is to use a metaphor which, though not true in\naspect is true in essence. For the relations of structures are actually\nsuch that, by the help of a central regulative system, each organ is\nsupplied with blood in proportion to the work it does. As was pointed\nout (_Principles of Sociology_, \u00a7 254) well-developed animals are so\nconstituted that each muscle or viscus, when called into action, sends\nto the vaso-motor centers through certain nerve-fibers, an impulse\ncaused by its action; whereupon, through other nerve-fibers, there\ncomes an impulse causing dilatation of its blood-vessels. That is to\nsay, all other parts of the organism, when they jointly require it to\nlabor, forthwith begin to pay it in blood. During the ordinary state\nof physiological equilibrium, the loss and the gain balance, and the\norgan does not sensibly change. If the amount of its function is\nincreased within such moderate limits that the local blood-vessels can\nbring adequately-increased supplies, the organ grows: beyond replacing\nits losses by its gains, it makes a profit on its extra transactions;\nso being enabled by extra structures to meet extra demands. But if the\ndemands made on it become so great that the supply of materials cannot\nkeep pace with the expenditure, either because the local blood-vessels\nare not large enough, or for any other reason, then the organ begins\nto decrease from excess of waste over repair: there sets in what\nis known as atrophy. Now, since each of the organs has thus to be\npaid in nutriment for its services by the rest, it follows that the\ndue balancing of their respective claims and payments is requisite,\ndirectly for the welfare of each organ, and indirectly for the welfare\nof the organism. For in a whole formed of mutually dependent parts,\nanything which prevents due performance of its duty by one part reacts\ninjuriously on all the parts.\n\nWith change of terms these statements and inferences hold of a society.\nThat social division of labor which parallels in so many other\nrespects the physiological division of labor, parallels it in this\nrespect also. As was shown at large in the _Principles of Sociology_,\nPart II, each order of functionaries and each group of producers,\nseverally performing some action or making some article not for direct\nsatisfaction of their own needs but for satisfaction of the needs of\nfellow-citizens in general, otherwise occupied, can continue to do this\nonly so long as the expenditures of effort and returns of profit are\napproximately equivalent. Social organs, like individual organs, remain\nstationary if there come to them normal proportions of the commodities\nproduced by the society as a whole. If because the demands made on an\nindustry or profession are unusually great, those engaged in it make\nexcessive profits, more citizens flock to it and the social structure\nconstituted by its members grows; while decrease of the demands and\ntherefore of the profits, either leads its members to choose other\ncareers or stops the accessions needful to replace those who die, and\nthe structure dwindles. Thus is maintained that proportion among the\npowers of the component parts which is most conducive to the welfare of\nthe whole.\n\nAnd now mark that the primary condition to achievement of this result\nis fulfillment of contract. If from the members of any part payment\nis frequently withheld, or falls short of the promised amount, then,\nthrough ruin of some and abandonment of the occupation by others, the\npart diminishes; and if it was before not more than competent to its\nduty, it now becomes incompetent, and the society suffers. Or if social\nneeds throw on some part great increase of function, and the members\nof it are enabled to get for their services unusually high prices;\nfulfillment of the agreements to give them these high prices, is the\nonly way of drawing to the part such additional number of members as\nwill make it equal to the augmented demands. For citizens will not come\nto it if they find the high prices agreed upon are not paid.\n\nBriefly, then, the universal basis of co-operation is the proportioning\nof benefits received to services rendered. Without this there can\nbe no physiological division of labor; without this there can be\nno sociological division of labor. And since division of labor,\nphysiological or sociological, profits the whole and each part; it\nresults that on maintenance of the arrangements necessary to it, depend\nboth special and general welfare. In a society such arrangements are\nmaintained only if bargains, overt or tacit, are carried out. So that\nbeyond the primary requirement to harmonious co-existence in a society,\nthat its units shall not directly aggress on one another; there comes\nthis secondary requirement, that they shall not indirectly aggress by\nbreaking agreements.\n\n\n\u00a7 54. But now we have to recognize the fact that complete fulfillment\nof these conditions, original and derived, is not enough. Social\nco-operation may be such that no one is impeded in the obtainment of\nthe normal return for effort, but contrariwise is aided by equitable\nexchange of services; and yet much may remain to be achieved. There\nis a theoretically possible form of society, purely industrial in its\nactivities, which, though approaching nearer to the moral ideal in its\ncode of conduct than any society not purely industrial, does not fully\nreach it.\n\nFor while industrialism requires the life of each citizen to be such\nthat it may be carried on without direct or indirect aggressions on\nother citizens, it does not require his life to be such that it shall\ndirectly further the lives of other citizens. It is not a necessary\nimplication of industrialism, as thus far defined, that each, beyond\nthe benefits given and received by exchange of services, shall give and\nreceive other benefits. A society is conceivable formed of men leading\nperfectly inoffensive lives, scrupulously fulfilling their contracts,\nand efficiently rearing their offspring, who yet, yielding to one\nanother no advantages beyond those agreed upon, fall short of that\nhighest degree of life which the gratuitous rendering of services makes\npossible. Daily experiences prove that every one would suffer many\nevils and lose many goods did none give him unpaid assistance. The life\nof each would be more or less damaged had he to meet all contingencies\nsingle-handed. Further, if no one did for his fellows anything more\nthan was required by strict performance of contract, private interests\nwould suffer from the absence of attention to public interests. The\nlimit of evolution of conduct is consequently not reached, until,\nbeyond avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others, there are\nspontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others.\n\nIt may be shown that the form of nature which thus to justice adds\nbeneficence, is one which adaption to the social state produces. The\nsocial man has not reached that harmonization of constitution with\nconditions forming the limit of evolution, so long as there remains\nspace for the growth of faculties which, by their exercise, bring\npositive benefit to others and satisfaction to self. If the presence\nof fellow-men, while putting certain limits to each man's sphere of\nactivity, opens certain other spheres of activity in which feelings,\nwhile achieving their gratifications, do not diminish, but add to\nthe gratifications of others, then such spheres will inevitably be\noccupied. Recognition of this truth does not, however, call on us to\nqualify greatly that conception of the industrial state above set\nforth, since sympathy is the root of both justice and beneficence.\n\n\n\u00a7 55. Thus the sociological view of Ethics supplements the physical,\nthe biological, and the psychological views, by disclosing those\nconditions under which only associated activities can be so carried on,\nthat the complete living of each consists with, and conduces to, the\ncomplete living of all.\n\nAt first the welfare of social groups, habitually in antagonism with\nother such groups, takes precedence of individual welfare; and the\nrules of conduct which are authoritative for the time being, involve\nincompleteness of individual life that the general life may be\nmaintained. At the same time the rules have to enforce the claims of\nindividual life as far as may be, since on the welfare of the units the\nwelfare of the aggregate largely depends.\n\nIn proportion as societies endanger one another less, the need for\nsubordinating individual lives to the general life, decreases; and\nwith approach to a peaceful state, the general life, having from the\nbeginning had furtherance of individual lives as its ultimate purpose,\ncomes to have this as its proximate purpose.\n\nDuring the transitional stages there are necessitated successive\ncompromises between the moral code which asserts the claims of the\nsociety _versus_ those of the individual, and the moral code which\nasserts the claims of the individual _versus_ those of the society.\nAnd evidently each such compromise, though for the time being\nauthoritative, admits of no consistent or definite expression.\n\nBut gradually as war declines--gradually as the compulsory co-operation\nneedful in dealing with external enemies becomes unnecessary, and\nleaves behind the voluntary co-operation which effectually achieves\ninternal sustentation, there grows increasingly clear the code of\nconduct which voluntary co-operation implies. And this final permanent\ncode alone admits of being definitely formulated, and so constituting\nethics as a science in contrast with empirical ethics.\n\nThe leading traits of a code, under which complete living through\nvoluntary co-operation is secured, may be simply stated. The\nfundamental requirement is that the life-sustaining actions of each\nshall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally\nachieved by them, and this implies firstly that he shall suffer no\ndirect aggressions on his person or property, and, secondly, that he\nshall suffer no indirect aggressions by breach of contract. Observance\nof these negative conditions to voluntary co-operation having\nfacilitated life to the greatest extent by exchange of services under\nagreement, life is to be further facilitated by exchange of services\nbeyond agreement: the highest life being reached only when, besides\nhelping to complete one another's lives by specified reciprocities of\naid, men otherwise help to complete one another's lives.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nCRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS.\n\n\n\u00a7 56. Comparisons of the foregoing chapters, with one another, suggest\nsundry questions which must be answered partially, if not completely,\nbefore anything can be done toward reducing ethical principles from\nabstract forms to concrete forms.\n\nWe have seen that to admit the desirableness of conscious existence is\nto admit that conduct should be such as will produce a consciousness\nwhich is desirable--a consciousness which is as much pleasurable and\nas little painful as may be. We have also seen that this necessary\nimplication corresponds with the _\u00e0 priori_ inference, that the\nevolution of life has been made possible only by the establishment\nof connections between pleasures and beneficial actions, and between\npains and detrimental actions. But the general conclusion reached\nin both of these ways, though it covers the area within which our\nspecial conclusions must fall, does not help us to reach those special\nconclusions.\n\nWere pleasures all of one kind, differing only in degree; were pains\nall of one kind, differing only in degree; and could pleasures be\nmeasured against pains with definite results, the problems of conduct\nwould be greatly simplified. Were the pleasures and pains serving as\nincentives and deterrents, simultaneously present to consciousness\nwith like vividness, or were they all immediately impending, or\nwere they all equi-distant in time; the problems would be further\nsimplified. And they would be still further simplified if the pleasures\nand pains were exclusively those of the actor. But both the desirable\nand the undesirable feelings are of various kinds, making quantitative\ncomparisons difficult; some are present and some are future, increasing\nthe difficulty of quantitative comparison; some are entailed on self\nand some are entailed on others; again increasing the difficulty. So\nthat the guidance yielded by the primary principle reached is of little\nservice unless supplemented by the guidance of secondary principles.\n\nAlready, in recognizing the needful subordination of presentative\nfeelings to representative feelings, and the implied postponement of\npresent to future throughout a wide range of cases, some approach\ntoward a secondary principle of guidance has been made. Already, too,\nin recognizing the limitations which men's associated state puts to\ntheir actions, with the implied need for restraining feelings of some\nkinds by feelings of other kinds, we have come in sight of another\nsecondary principle of guidance. Still, there remains much to be\ndecided respecting the relative claims of these guiding principles,\ngeneral and special.\n\nSome elucidation of the questions involved will be obtained by here\ndiscussing certain views and arguments set forth by past and present\nmoralists.\n\n\n\u00a7 57. Using the name hedonism for that ethical theory which makes\nhappiness the end of action, and distinguishing hedonism into the two\nkinds, egoistic and universalistic, according as the happiness sought\nis that of the actor himself, or is that of all, Mr. Sidgwick alleges\nits implied belief to be that pleasures and pains are commensurable. In\nhis criticism on (empirical) egoistic hedonism he says:\n\n  \"The fundamental assumption of Hedonism, clearly stated, is that all\n  feelings considered merely as feelings can be arranged in a certain\n  scale of desirability, so that the desirability or pleasantness of\n  each bears a definite ratio to that of all the others.\"--_Methods of\n  Ethics_, 2d ed., p. 115.\n\nAnd asserting this to be its assumption he proceeds to point out\ndifficulties in the way of the hedonistic calculation; apparently\nfor the purpose of implying that these difficulties tell against the\nhedonistic theory.\n\nNow, though it may be shown that by naming the intensity, the duration,\nthe certainty, and the proximity, of a pleasure or a pain, as traits\nentering into the estimation of its relative value, Bentham has\ncommitted himself to the specified assumption; and, though, it is,\nperhaps, reasonably taken for granted that hedonism, as represented\nby him, is identical with hedonism at large; yet it seems to me that\nthe hedonist, empirical or other, is not necessarily committed to this\nassumption. That the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains ought to\nbe the end of action is a belief which he may still consistently hold\nafter admitting that the valuations of pleasures and pains are commonly\nvague and often erroneous. He may say that though indefinite things do\nnot admit of definite measurements, yet approximately true estimates\nof their relative values may be made when they differ considerably,\nand he may further say, that even when their relative values are not\ndeterminable, it remains true that the most valuable should be chosen.\nLet us listen to him.\n\n\"A debtor who cannot pay me offers to compound for his debt by making\nover one of sundry things he possesses--a diamond ornament, a silver\nvase, a picture, a carriage. Other questions being set aside I assert\nit to be my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable of these,\nbut I cannot say which is the most valuable. Does the proposition that\nit is my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable, therefore,\nbecome doubtful? Must I not choose as well as I can, and if I choose\nwrongly must I give up my ground of choice? Must I infer that in\nmatters of business I may not act on the principle that, other things\nequal, the more profitable transaction is to be preferred, because, in\nmany cases, I cannot say which is the more profitable, and have often\nchosen the less profitable? Because I believe that of many dangerous\ncourses I ought to take the least dangerous, do I make 'the fundamental\nassumption' that courses can be arranged according to a scale of\ndangerousness, and must I abandon my belief if I cannot so arrange\nthem? If I am not by consistency bound to do this, then I am no more by\nconsistency bound to give up the principle that the greatest surplus\nof pleasures over pains should be the end of action, because the\n'commensurability of pleasures and pains' cannot be asserted.\"\n\nAt the close of his chapters on empirical hedonism, Mr. Sidgwick\nhimself says he does \"not think that the common experience of mankind,\nimpartially examined, really sustains the view that Egoistic Hedonism\nis necessarily suicidal;\" adding, however, that the \"uncertainty of\nhedonistic calculation cannot be denied to have great weight.\" But here\nthe fundamental assumption of hedonism, that happiness is the end of\naction, is still supposed to involve the assumption that \"feelings can\nbe arranged in a certain scale of desirability.\" This we have seen it\ndoes not: its fundamental assumption is in no degree invalidated by\nproof that such arrangement of them is impracticable.\n\nTo Mr. Sidgwick's argument there is the further objection, no less\nserious, that to whatever degree it tells against egoistic hedonism,\nit tells in a greater degree against universalistic hedonism, or\nutilitarianism. He admits that it tells as much; saying \"whatever\nweight is to be attached to the objections brought against this\nassumption [the commensurability of pleasures and pains] must of\ncourse tell against the present method.\" Not only does it tell, but it\ntells in a double way. I do not mean merely that, as he points out,\nthe assumption becomes greatly complicated if we take all sentient\nbeings into account, and if we include posterity along with existing\nindividuals. I mean that, taking as the end to be achieved the greatest\nhappiness of the existing individuals forming a single community,\nthe set of difficulties standing in the way of egoistic hedonism,\nis compounded with another set of difficulties no less great, when\nwe pass from it to universalistic hedonism. For if the dictates of\nuniversalistic hedonism are to be fulfilled, it must be under the\nguidance of individual judgments, or of corporate judgments, or of\nboth. Now any one of such judgments issuing from a single mind, or from\nany aggregate of minds, necessarily embodies conclusions respecting\nthe happiness of other persons; few of them known, and the great mass\nnever seen. All these persons have natures differing in countless ways\nand degrees from the natures of those who form the judgments; and the\nhappiness of which they are severally capable differ from one another,\nand differ from the happinesses of those who form the judgments.\nConsequently, if against the method of egoistic hedonism there is\nthe objection that a man's own pleasures and pains, unlike in their\nkinds, intensities, and times of occurrence, are incommensurable; then\nagainst the method of universalistic hedonism it may be urged that to\nthe incommensurability of each judge's own pleasures and pains (which\nhe must use as standards) has now to be added the much more decided\nincommensurability of the pleasures and pains which he conceives to be\nexperienced by innumerable other persons, all differently constituted\nfrom himself and from one another.\n\nNay more--there is a triple set of difficulties in the way of\nuniversalistic hedonism. To the double indeterminateness of the end\nhas to be added the indeterminateness of the means. If hedonism,\negoistic or universalistic, is to pass from dead theory into living\npractice, acts of one or other kind must be decided on to achieve\nproposed objects; and in estimating the two methods we have to consider\nhow far the fitness of the acts respectively required can be judged.\nIf, in pursuing his own ends, the individual is liable to be led by\nerroneous opinions to adjust his acts wrongly, much more liable is he\nto be led by erroneous opinions to adjust wrongly more complex acts to\nthe more complex ends constituted by other men's welfares. It is so if\nhe operates singly to benefit a few others; and it is still more so\nif he co-operates with many to benefit all. Making general happiness\nthe immediate object of pursuit, implies numerous and complicated\ninstrumentalities officered by thousands of unseen and unlike persons,\nand working on millions of other persons unseen and unlike. Even the\nfew factors in this immense aggregate of appliances and processes which\nare known, are very imperfectly known, and the great mass of them are\nunknown. So that even supposing valuation of pleasures and pains for\nthe community at large is more practicable than, or even as practicable\nas, valuation of his own pleasures and pains by the individual; yet\nthe ruling of conduct with a view to the one end is far more difficult\nthan the ruling of it with a view to the other. Hence, if the method of\negoistic hedonism is unsatisfactory, far more unsatisfactory for the\nsame and kindred reasons, is the method of universalistic hedonism, or\nutilitarianism.\n\nAnd here we come in sight of the conclusion which it has been the\npurpose of the foregoing criticism to bring into view. The objection\nmade to the hedonistic method contains a truth, but includes with it an\nuntruth. For while the proposition that happiness, whether individual\nor general, is the end of action, is not invalidated by proof that it\ncannot under either form be estimated by measurement of its components;\nyet it may be admitted that guidance in the pursuit of happiness by a\nmere balancing of pleasures and pains, is, if partially practicable\nthroughout a certain range of conduct, futile throughout a much wider\nrange. It is quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate\naim of action, and at the same time to deny that it can be reached\nby making it the immediate aim. I go with Mr. Sidgwick as far as the\nconclusion that \"we must at least admit the desirability of confirming\nor correcting the results of such comparisons [of pleasures and pains]\nby any other method upon which we may find reason to rely;\" and then I\ngo further, and say that throughout a large part of conduct guidance\nby such comparisons is to be entirely set aside and replaced by other\nguidance.\n\n\n\u00a7 58. The antithesis here insisted upon between the hedonistic end\nconsidered in the abstract, and the method which current hedonism,\nwhether egoistic or universalistic, associates with that end; and the\njoining acceptance of the one with rejection of the other; commits us\nto an overt discussion of the two cardinal elements of ethical theory.\nI may conveniently initiate this discussion by criticizing another of\nMr. Sidgwick's criticisms on the method of hedonism.\n\nThough we can give no account of those simple pleasures which the\nsenses yield, because they are undecomposable, yet we distinctly know\ntheir characters as states of consciousness. Conversely, the complex\npleasures formed by compounding and re-compounding the ideas of simple\npleasures, though theoretically resolvable into their components, are\nnot easy to resolve; and in proportion as they are heterogeneous in\ncomposition, the difficulty of framing intelligible conceptions of\nthem increases. This is especially the case with the pleasures which\naccompany our sports. Treating of these, along with the pleasures of\npursuit in general, for the purpose of showing that \"in order to get\nthem one must forget them,\" Mr. Sidgwick remarks:\n\n  \"A man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, fixing his aim\n  on his own pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the chase;\n  his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to\n  the pleasure its highest zest and flavor. Here comes into view what\n  we may call the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the impulse\n  toward pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim. This effect\n  is not visible, or at any rate is scarcely visible, in the case of\n  passive sensual pleasures. But of our active enjoyments generally,\n  whether the activities on which they attend are classed as 'bodily'\n  or as 'intellectual' (as well as of many emotional pleasures), it\n  may certainly be said that we cannot attain them, at least in their\n  best form, so long as we concentrate our aim on them.\"--_Methods of\n  Ethics_, 2d ed., p. 41.\n\nNow I think we shall not regard this truth as paradoxical after we\nhave duly analyzed the pleasure of pursuit. The chief components\nof this pleasure are: First, a renewed consciousness of personal\nefficiency (made vivid by actual success and partially excited by\nimpending success) which consciousness of personal efficiency,\nconnected in experience with achieved ends of every kind, arouses\na vague but massive consciousness of resulting gratifications; and\nsecond, a representation of the applause which recognition of this\nefficiency by others has before brought, and will again bring. Games\nof skill show us this clearly. Considered as an end in itself, the\ngood cannon which a billiard player makes yields no pleasure. Whence\nthen does the pleasure of making it arise? Partly from the fresh proof\nof capability which the player gives to himself, and partly from the\nimagined admiration of those who witness the proof of his capability:\nthe last being the chief, since he soon tires of making cannons\nin the absence of witnesses. When from games which, yielding the\npleasures of success, yield no pleasure derived from the end considered\nintrinsically, we pass to sports in which the end has intrinsic value\nas a source of pleasure, we see substantially the same thing. Though\nthe bird which the sportsman brings down is useful as food, yet his\nsatisfaction arises mainly from having made a good shot, and from\nhaving added to the bag which will presently bring praise of his skill.\nThe gratification of self-esteem he immediately experiences; and the\ngratification of receiving applause he experiences, if not immediately\nand in full degree, yet by representation; for the ideal pleasure is\nnothing else than a faint revival of the real pleasure. These two\nkinds of agreeable excitement present in the sportsman during the\nchase constitute the mass of the desires stimulating him to continue\nit; for all desires are nascent forms of the feelings to be obtained\nby the efforts they prompt. And though while seeking more birds these\nrepresentative feelings are not so vividly excited as by success just\nachieved, yet they are excited by imaginations of further successes;\nand so make enjoyable the activities constituting the pursuit.\nRecognizing, then, the truth that the pleasures of pursuit are much\nmore those derived from the efficient use of means than those derived\nfrom the end itself, we see that \"the fundamental paradox of hedonism\"\ndisappears.\n\nThese remarks concerning end and means, and the pleasure accompanying\nuse of the means as added to the pleasure derived from the end, I\nhave made for the purpose of drawing attention to a fact of profound\nsignificance. During evolution there has been a superposing of new and\nmore complex sets of means upon older and simpler sets of means, and a\nsuperposing of the pleasures accompanying the uses of these successive\nsets of means, with the result that each of these pleasures has itself\neventually become an end. We begin with a simple animal which, without\nancillary appliances, swallows such food as accident brings in its\nway; and so, as we may assume, stills some kind of craving. Here we\nhave the primary end of nutrition with its accompanying satisfaction,\nin their simple forms. We pass to higher types having jaws for seizing\nand biting--jaws which thus, by their actions, facilitate achievement\nof the primary end. On observing animals furnished with these organs,\nwe get evidence that the use of them becomes in itself pleasurable\nirrespective of the end: instance a squirrel which, apart from food\nto be so obtained, delights in nibbling everything it gets hold of.\nTurning from jaws to limbs we see that these, serving some creatures\nfor pursuit and others for escape, similarly yield gratification by\ntheir exercise; as in lambs which skip and horses which prance. How the\ncombined use of limbs and jaws, originally subserving the satisfaction\nof appetite, grows to be in itself pleasurable, is daily illustrated in\nthe playing of dogs. For that throwing down and worrying which, when\nprey is caught, precedes eating, is, in their mimic fights, carried\nby each as far as he dares. Coming to means still more remote from\nthe end, namely, those by which creatures chased are caught, we are\nagain shown by dogs that when no creature is caught there is still a\ngratification in the act of catching. The eagerness with which a dog\nruns after stones, or dances and barks in anticipation of jumping\ninto the water after a stick, proves that apart from the satisfaction\nof appetite, and apart even from the satisfaction of killing prey,\nthere is a satisfaction in the successful pursuit of a moving object.\nThroughout, then, we see that the pleasure attendant on the use of\nmeans to achieve an end, itself becomes an end.\n\nNow if we contemplate these as phenomena of conduct in general, some\nfacts worthy of note may be discerned--facts which, if we appreciate\ntheir significance, will aid us in developing our ethical conceptions.\n\nOne of them is that among the successive sets of means, the later are\nthe more remote from the primary end; are, as co-ordinating earlier and\nsimpler means, the more complex; and are accompanied by feelings which\nare more representative.\n\nAnother fact is that each set of means, with its accompanying\nsatisfactions, eventually becomes in its turn dependent on one\noriginating later than itself. Before the gullet swallows, the\njaws must lay hold; before the jaws tear out and bring within the\ngrasp of the gullet a piece fit for swallowing, there must be that\nco-operation of limbs and senses required for killing the prey;\nbefore this co-operation can take place, there needs the much longer\nco-operation constituting the chase; and even before this there must\nbe persisted activities of limbs, eyes, and nose in seeking prey.\nThe pleasure attending each set of acts, while making possible the\npleasure attending the set of acts which follows, is joined with a\nrepresentation of this subsequent set of acts and its pleasure, and\nof the others which succeed in order; so that along with the feelings\naccompanying the search for prey, are partially aroused the feelings\naccompanying the actual chase, the actual destruction, the actual\ndevouring, and the eventual satisfaction of appetite.\n\nA third fact is that the use of each set of means in due order,\nconstitutes an obligation. Maintenance of its life being regarded as an\nend of its conduct, the creature is obliged to use in succession the\nmeans of finding prey, the means of catching prey, the means of killing\nprey, the means of devouring prey.\n\nLastly, it follows that though the assuaging of hunger, directly\nassociated with sustentation, remains to the last the ultimate end; yet\nthe successful use of each set of means in its turn is the proximate\nend--the end which takes temporary precedence in authoritativeness.\n\n\n\u00a7 59. The relations between means and ends thus traced throughout the\nearlier stages of evolving conduct, are traceable throughout later\nstages: and hold true of human conduct, up even to its highest forms.\nAs fast as, for the better maintenance of life, the simpler sets of\nmeans and the pleasures accompanying the uses of them, come to be\nsupplemented by the more complex sets of means and their pleasures,\nthese begin to take precedence in time and in imperativeness. To use\neffectually each more complex set of means becomes the proximate end,\nand the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate gratification\nsought; though there may be, and habitually is, an associated\nconsciousness of the remoter ends and remoter gratifications to be\nobtained. An example will make clear the parallelism.\n\nAbsorbed in his business the trader, if asked what is his main end,\nwill say--making money. He readily grants that achievement of this\nend is desired by him in furtherance of ends beyond it. He knows that\nin directly seeking money he is indirectly seeking food, clothes,\nhouse-room, and the comforts of life for self and family. But while\nadmitting that money is but a means to these ends, he urges that the\nmoney-getting actions precede in order of time and obligation, the\nvarious actions and concomitant pleasures subserved by them; and he\ntestifies to the fact that making money has become itself an end, and\nsuccess in it a source of satisfaction, apart from these more distant\nends.\n\nAgain, on observing more closely the trader's proceedings, we find\nthat though to the end of living comfortably he gets money, and though\nto the end of getting money he buys and sells at a profit, which so\nbecomes a means more immediately pursued, yet he is chiefly occupied\nwith means still more remote from ultimate ends, and in relation\nto which even the selling at a profit becomes an end. For leaving\nto subordinates the actual measuring out of goods and receiving of\nproceeds, he busies himself mainly with his general affairs--inquiries\nconcerning markets, judgments of future prices, calculations,\nnegotiations, correspondence: the anxiety from hour to hour being to\ndo well each one of these things indirectly conducive to the making of\nprofits. And these ends precede in time and obligation the effecting of\nprofitable sales, just as the effecting of profitable sales precedes\nthe end of money-making, and just as the end of money-making precedes\nthe end of satisfactory living.\n\nHis bookkeeping best exemplifies the principle at large. Entries to the\ndebtor or creditor sides are being made all through the day; the items\nare classified and arranged in such way that at a moment's notice\nthe state of each account may be ascertained; and then, from time to\ntime, the books are balanced, and it is required that the result shall\ncome right to a penny: satisfaction following proved correctness and\nannoyance being caused by error. If you ask why all this elaborate\nprocess, so remote from the actual getting of money, and still more\nremote from the enjoyments of life, the answer is that keeping accounts\ncorrectly is fulfilling a condition to the end of money-making, and\nbecomes in itself a proximate end--a duty to be discharged, that there\nmay be discharged the duty of getting an income, that there may be\ndischarged the duty of maintaining self, wife and children.\n\nApproaching as we here do to moral obligation, are we not shown its\nrelations to conduct at large? Is it not clear that observance of\nmoral principles is fulfillment of certain general conditions to\nthe successful carrying on of special activities? That the trader\nmay prosper, he must not only keep his books correctly, but must\npay those he employs according to agreement, and must meet his\nengagements with creditors. May we not say, then, that conformity\nto the second and third of these requirements is, like conformity\nto the first, an indirect means to effectual use of the more direct\nmeans of achieving welfare? May we not say, too, that as the use of\neach more indirect means in due order becomes itself an end, and a\nsource of gratification; so, eventually, becomes the use of this\nmost indirect means? And may we not infer that though conformity to\nmoral requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to other\nrequirements; yet that this imperativeness arises from the fact that\nfulfillment of the other requirements, by self or others, or both, is\nthus furthered?\n\n\n\u00a7 60. This question brings us round to another side of the issue before\nraised. When alleging that empirical utilitarianism is but introductory\nto rational utilitarianism, I pointed out that the last does not\ntake welfare for its immediate object of pursuit, but takes for its\nimmediate object of pursuit conformity to certain principles which,\nin the nature of things, casually determine welfare. And now we see\nthat this amounts to recognition of that law, traceable throughout the\nevolution of conduct in general, that each later and higher order of\nmeans takes precedence in time and authoritativeness of each earlier\nand lower order of means. The contrast between the ethical methods thus\ndistinguished, made tolerably clear by the above illustrations, will be\nmade still clearer by contemplating the two as put in opposition by the\nleading exponent of empirical utilitarianism. Treating of legislative\naims, Bentham writes:\n\n  \"But justice, what is it that we are to understand by justice: and\n  why not happiness but justice? What happiness is, every man knows,\n  because, what pleasure is, every man knows, and what pain is, every\n  man knows. But what justice is--this is what on every occasion is the\n  subject-matter of dispute. Be the meaning of the word justice what\n  it will, what regard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of\n  happiness.\"[C]\n\nLet us first consider the assertion here made respecting the relative\nintelligibilities of these two ends, and let us afterward consider what\nis implied by the choice of happiness instead of justice.\n\nBentham's positive assertion that, \"what happiness is every man\nknows, because, what pleasure is, every man knows,\" is met by\ncounter-assertions equally positive. \"Who can tell,\" asks Plato, \"what\npleasure really is, or know it in its essence, except the philosopher,\nwho alone is conversant with realities.\"[D] Aristotle, too, after\ncommenting on the different opinions held by the vulgar, by the\npolitical, by the contemplative, says of happiness that, \"to some it\nseems to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a kind of wisdom:\nto some again, these, or some one of these, with pleasure, or at least,\nnot without pleasure; others again include external prosperity.\"[E]\nAnd Aristotle, like Plato, comes to the remarkable conclusion that\nthe pleasures of the intellect, reached by the contemplative life,\nconstitute the highest happiness![F]\n\nHow disagreements concerning the nature of happiness and the relative\nvalues of pleasures, thus exhibited in ancient times, continue down\nto modern times, is shown in Mr. Sidgwick's discussion of egoistic\nhedonism, above commented upon. Further, as was pointed out before, the\nindefiniteness attending the estimations of pleasures and pains, which\nstands in the way of egoistic hedonism as ordinarily conceived, is\nimmensely increased on passing to universalistic hedonism as ordinarily\nconceived; since its theory implies that the imagined pleasures and\npains of others are to be estimated by the help of these pleasures and\npains of self already so difficult to estimate. And that any one after\nobserving the various pursuits into which some eagerly enter, but which\nothers shun, and after listening to the different opinions concerning\nthe likeableness of this or that occupation or amusement, expressed\nat every table, should assert that the nature of happiness can be\nfully agreed upon, so as to render it a fit end for direct legislative\naction, is surprising.\n\nThe accompanying proposition that justice is unintelligible as an end\nis no less surprising. Though primitive men have no words for either\nhappiness or justice, yet even among them an approach to the conception\nof justice is traceable. The law of retaliation, requiring that a death\ninflicted by one tribe on another, shall be balanced by the death\neither of the murderer or some member of his tribe, shows us in a vague\nshape that notion of equalness of treatment which forms an essential\nelement in it.\n\nWhen we come to early races who have given their thoughts and feelings\nliterary form we find this conception of justice, as involving\nequalness of action, becoming distinct. Among the Jews, David expressed\nin words this association of ideas when, praying to God to \"hear the\nright,\" he said, \"Let my sentence come forth from thy presence; let\nthine eyes behold the things that are equal;\" as also, among early\nChristians, did Paul when to the Colossians he wrote, \"Masters, give\nunto your servants that which is just and equal.\" Commenting on the\ndifferent meanings of justice, Aristotle concludes that \"the just will,\ntherefore, be the lawful and the equal, and the unjust the unlawful\nand the unequal. But since the unjust man is also one who takes more\nthan his share,\" etc. And that justice was similarly conceived by\nthe Romans they proved by including under it such meanings as exact,\nproportionate, impartial, severally implying fairness of division, and\nstill better by identification of it with equity, which is a derivative\nof _\u00e6quus_: the word _\u00e6quus_ itself having for one of its meanings\njust or impartial.\n\nThis coincidence of view among ancient peoples respecting the nature\nof justice, has extended to modern peoples; who by a general agreement\nin certain cardinal principles which their systems of law embody,\nforbidding direct aggressions, which are forms of unequal actions, and\nforbidding indirect aggressions by breaches of contract, which are\nother forms of unequal actions, one and all show us the identification\nof justice with equalness. Bentham, then, is wrong when he says--\"But\nwhat justice is--this is what on every occasion is the subject-matter\nof dispute.\" He is more wrong, indeed, than has thus far appeared. For,\nin the first place, he misrepresents utterly by ignoring the fact in\nninety-nine out of every hundred daily transactions between men, no\ndispute about justice arises; but the business done is recognized on\nboth sides as justly done. And in the second place if, with respect to\nthe hundredth transaction there is a dispute, the subject matter of it\nis not \"what justice is,\" for it is admitted to be equity or equalness;\nbut the subject matter of dispute always is what, under these\nparticular circumstances, constitutes equalness?--a widely different\nquestion.\n\nIt is not then self-evident, as Bentham alleges, that happiness is an\nintelligible end while justice is not; but contrariwise examination\nmakes evident the greater intelligibility of justice as an end. And\nanalysis shows why it is more intelligible. For justice, or equity,\nor equalness, is concerned exclusively with _quantity_ under _stated\nconditions_; whereas happiness is concerned with both _quantity_ and\n_quality_ under _conditions not stated_. When, as in case of theft,\na benefit is taken while no equivalent benefit is yielded--when, as\nin case of adulterated goods bought or base coin paid, that which\nis agreed to be given in exchange as of equal value is not given,\nbut something of less value--when, as in case of broken contract,\nthe obligation on one side has been discharged while there has\nbeen no discharge, or incomplete discharge, of the obligation on\nthe other; we see that, _the circumstances being specified_, the\ninjustice complained of refers to the relative amounts of actions,\nor products, or benefits, the natures of which are recognized only\nso far as is needful for saying whether _as much_ has been given, or\ndone, or allowed, by each concerned, as was implied by tacit or overt\nunderstanding to be _an equivalent_. But when the end proposed is\nhappiness, _the circumstances remaining unspecified_, the problem is\nthat of estimating both quantities and qualities, unhelped by any such\ndefinite measures as acts of exchange imply, or as contracts imply, or\nas are implied by the differences between the doings of one aggressing\nand one aggressed upon. The mere fact that Bentham himself includes as\nelements in the estimation of each pleasure or pain, its intensity,\nduration, certainty, and proximity, suffices to show how difficult is\nthis problem. And when it is remembered that all pleasures and pains,\nnot felt in particular cases only but in the aggregate of cases, and\nseverally regarded under these four aspects, have to be compared\nwith one another and their relative values determined, simply by\nintrospection; it will be manifest both that the problem is complicated\nby the addition of indefinite judgments of qualities to indefinite\nmeasures of quantities, and that it is further complicated by the\nmultitudinousness of these vague estimations to be gone through and\nsummed up.\n\nBut now passing over this assertion of Bentham that happiness is a\nmore intelligible end than justice, which we find to be the reverse of\ntruth, let us note the several implications of the doctrine that the\nsupreme legislative body ought to make the greatest happiness of the\ngreatest number its immediate aim.\n\nIt implies, in the first place, that happiness may be compassed by\nmethods framed directly for the purpose, without any previous inquiry\nrespecting the conditions that must be fulfilled; and this pre-supposes\na belief that there are no such conditions. For if there are any\nconditions without fulfillment of which happiness cannot be compassed,\nthen the first step must be to ascertain these conditions with a view\nto fulfilling them; and to admit this is to admit that not happiness\nitself must be the immediate end, but fulfillment of the conditions to\nits attainment must be the immediate end. The alternatives are simple:\nEither the achievement of happiness is not conditional, in which case\none mode of action is as good as another, or it is conditional, in\nwhich case the required mode of action must be the direct aim and not\nthe happiness to be achieved by it.\n\nAssuming it conceded, as it will be, that there exist conditions\nwhich must be fulfilled before happiness can be attained, let us next\nask what is implied by proposing modes of so controlling conduct as\nto further happiness, without previously inquiring whether any such\nmodes are already known? The implication is that human intelligence\nthroughout the past, operating on experiences, has failed to discover\nany such modes; whereas present human intelligence may be expected\nforthwith to discover them. Unless this be asserted, it must be\nadmitted that certain conditions to the achievement of happiness have\nalready been partially, if not wholly, ascertained; and if so, our\nfirst business should be to look for them. Having found them, our\nrational course is to bring existing intelligence to bear on these\nproducts of past intelligence, with the expectation that it will\nverify the substance of them while possibly correcting the form. But\nto suppose that no regulative principles for the conduct of associated\nhuman beings have thus far been established, and that they are now to\nbe established _de novo_, is to suppose that man as he is differs from\nman as he was in an incredible degree.\n\nBeyond ignoring the probability, or rather the certainty, that past\nexperience generalized by past intelligence, must by this time have\ndisclosed partially, if not wholly, some of the essential conditions\nto the achievement of happiness, Bentham's proposition ignores the\nformulated knowledge of them actually existing. For whence come the\nconception of justice and the answering sentiment. He will scarcely\nsay that they are meaningless, although his proposition implies as\nmuch; and if he admits that they have meanings, he must choose between\ntwo alternatives either of which is fatal to his hypothesis. Are they\nsupernaturally caused modes of thinking and feeling, tending to make\nmen fulfill the conditions to happiness? If so their authority is\nperemptory. Are they modes of thinking and feeling naturally caused\nin men by experience of these conditions? If so, their authority is\nno less peremptory. Not only, then, does Bentham fail to infer that\ncertain principles of guidance must by this time have been ascertained,\nbut he refuses to recognize these principles as actually reached and\npresent to him.\n\nAnd then after all, he tacitly admits that which he overtly denies, by\nsaying that--\"Be the meaning of the word justice what it will, what\nregard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of happiness?\" For\nif justice is a means having happiness as its end, then justice must\ntake precedence of happiness, as every other means takes precedence\nof every other end. Bentham's own elaborate polity is a means having\nhappiness as its end, as justice is, by his own admission, a means\nhaving happiness as an end. If, then, we may properly skip justice,\nand go directly to the end happiness, we may properly skip Bentham's\npolity, and go directly to the end happiness. In short, we are led\nto the remarkable conclusion that in all cases we must contemplate\nexclusively the end and must disregard the means.\n\n\n\u00a7 61. This relation of ends to means, underlying all ethical\nspeculation will be further elucidated if we join with some of the\nabove conclusions, certain conclusions drawn in the last chapter. We\nshall see that while greatest happiness may vary widely in societies\nwhich, though ideally constituted, are subject to unlike physical\ncircumstances, certain fundamental conditions to the achievement of\nthis greatest happiness, are common to all such societies.\n\nGiven a people inhabiting a tract which makes nomadic habits necessary,\nand the happiness of each individual will be greatest when his nature\nis so molded to the requirements of his life, that all his faculties\nfind their due activities in daily driving and tending cattle, milking,\nmigrating and so forth. The members of a community otherwise similar,\nwhich is permanently settled, will severally achieve their greatest\nhappiness when their natures have become such that a fixed habitat, and\nthe occupations necessitated by it, supply the spheres in which each\ninstinct and emotion is exercised and brings the concomitant pleasure.\nThe citizens of a large nation, industrially organized, have reached\ntheir possible ideal of happiness, when the producing, distributing,\nand other activities, are such in their kinds and amounts, that each\ncitizen finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while\nhe obtains the means of satisfying all his desires. Once more we may\nrecognize as not only possible but probable, the eventual existence\nof a community, also industrial, the members of which, having natures\nsimilarly responding to these requirements, are also characterized by\ndominant \u00e6sthetic faculties, and achieve complete happiness only when a\nlarge part of life is filled with \u00e6sthetic activities. Evidently these\ndifferent types of men, with their different standards of happiness,\neach finding the possibility of that happiness in his own society,\nwould not find it if transferred to any of the other societies.\nEvidently, though, they might have in common such kinds of happiness\nas accompany the satisfaction of vital needs, they would not have in\ncommon sundry other kinds of happiness.\n\nBut now mark that while, to achieve greatest happiness in each of\nsuch societies, the special conditions to be fulfilled must differ\nfrom those to be fulfilled in the other societies, certain general\nconditions must be fulfilled in all the societies. Harmonious\nco-operation, by which alone in any of them the greatest happiness\ncan be attained, is, as we saw, made possible only by respect for\none another's claims: there must be neither those direct aggressions\nwhich we class as crimes against person and property, nor must there\nbe those indirect aggressions constituted by breaches of contracts. So\nthat maintenance of equitable relations between men is the condition\nto attainment of greatest happiness in all societies, however much the\ngreatest happiness attainable in each may differ in nature, or amount,\nor both.\n\nAnd here a physical analogy may fitly be used to give the greatest\ndefiniteness to this cardinal truth. A mass of matter, of whatever\nkind, maintains its state of internal equilibrium, so long as its\ncomponent particles severally stand toward their neighbors in\nequi-distant positions. Accepting the conclusions of modern physicists,\nwhich imply that each molecule moves rhythmically, then a balanced\nstate implies that each performs its movements within a space bounded\nby the like spaces required for the movements of those around. If\nthe molecules have been so aggregated that the oscillations of some\nare more restrained than the oscillations of others, there is a\nproportionate instability. If the number of them thus unduly restrained\nis considerable, the instability is such that the cohesion in some part\nis liable to fail, and a crack results. If the excesses of restraint\nare great and multitudinous, a trifling disturbance causes the mass to\nbreak up into small fragments. To which add that the recognized remedy\nfor this unstable state is an exposure to such physical condition\n(ordinarily high temperature) as enables the molecules so to change\ntheir relative positions that their mutual restraints become equal on\nall sides. And now observe that this holds whatever be the natures of\nthe molecules. They may be simple; they may be compound; they may be\ncomposed of this or that matter in this or that way. In other words,\nthe special activities of each molecule, constituted by the relative\nmovements of its units, may be various in their kinds and degrees; and\nyet, be they what they may, it remains true that to preserve internal\nequilibrium throughout the mass of molecules, the mutual limitations of\ntheir activities must be everywhere alike.\n\nAnd this is the above-described prerequisite to social equilibrium,\nwhatever the special natures of the associated persons. Assuming that\nwithin each society such persons are of the same type, needing for\nthe fulfillment of their several lives kindred activities, and though\nthese activities may be of one kind in one society and of another kind\nin another, so admitting of indefinite variation, this condition to\nsocial equilibrium does not admit of variation. It must be fulfilled\nbefore complete life, that is greatest happiness, can be attained in\nany society; be the particular quality of that life, or that happiness,\nwhat it may.[G]\n\n\n\u00a7 62. After thus observing how means and ends in conduct stand to one\nanother, and how there emerge certain conclusions respecting their\nrelative claims, we may see a way to reconcile sundry conflicting\nethical theories. These severally embody portions of the truth; and\nsimply require combining in proper order to embody the whole truth.\n\nThe theological theory contains a part. If for the divine will,\nsupposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally\nrevealed end toward which the Power manifested throughout Evolution\nworks; then, since Evolution has been, and is still, working toward the\nhighest life, it follows that conforming to those principles by which\nthe highest life is achieved, is furthering that end. The doctrine that\nperfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is\nin one sense true; for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being\nwhich the highest life implies, and to which Evolution tends. There is\na truth, also, in the doctrine that virtue mast be the aim; for this\nis another form of the doctrine that the aim must be to fulfill the\nconditions to achievement of the highest life. That the intuitions of\na moral faculty should guide or conduct, is a proposition in which\na truth is contained; for these intuitions are the slowly organized\nresults of experiences received by the race while living in presence\nof these conditions. And that happiness is the supreme end is beyond\nquestion true; for this is the concomitant of that highest life which\nevery theory of moral guidance has distinctly or vaguely in view.\n\nSo understanding their relative positions, those ethical systems which\nmake virtue, right, obligation, the cardinal aims, are seen to be\ncomplementary to those ethical systems which make welfare, pleasure,\nhappiness, the cardinal aims. Though the moral sentiments generated\nin civilized men by daily contact with social conditions and gradual\nadaptation to them, are indispensable as incentives and deterrents; and\nthough the intuitions corresponding to these sentiments have, in virtue\nof their origin, a general authority to be reverently recognized;\nyet the sympathies and antipathies hence originating, together\nwith the intellectual expressions of them, are, in their primitive\nforms, necessarily vague. To make guidance by them adequate to all\nrequirements, their dictates have to be interpreted and made definite\nby science; to which end there must be analysis of those conditions to\ncomplete living which they respond to, and from converse with which\nthey have arisen. And such analysis necessitates the recognition of\nhappiness for each and all, as the end to be achieved by fulfillment of\nthese conditions.\n\nHence, recognizing in due degrees all the various ethical theories,\nconduct in its highest form will take as guides innate perceptions of\nright duly enlightened and made precise by an analytic intelligence,\nwhile conscious that these guides are proximately supreme solely\nbecause they lead to the ultimate supreme end, happiness special and\ngeneral.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nTHE RELATIVITY OF PAINS AND PLEASURES.\n\n\n\u00a7 63. A truth of cardinal importance as a datum of Ethics, which was\nincidentally referred to in the last chapter, must here be set forth at\nfull length. I mean the truth that not only men of different races, but\nalso different men of the same race, and even the same men at different\nperiods of life, have different standards of happiness. Though there is\nsome recognition of this by moralists, the recognition is inadequate,\nand the far-reaching conclusions to be drawn when the relativity of\nhappiness is fully recognized, are scarcely suspected.\n\nIt is a belief universal in early life--a belief which in most people\nis but partially corrected in later life, and in very few wholly\ndissipated--that there is something intrinsic in the pleasantness of\ncertain things, while other things are intrinsically unpleasant. The\nerror is analogous to, and closely allied with, the error crude realism\nmakes. Just as to the uncultured mind it appears self-evident that the\nsweetness of sugar is inherent in sugar, that sound as we perceive it\nis sound as it exists in the external world, and that the warmth from\na fire is in itself what it seems; so does it appear self-evident that\nthe sweetness of sugar is necessarily grateful, that there is in a\nbeautiful sound something that must be beautiful to all creatures, and\nthat the agreeable feeling produced by warmth is a feeling which every\nother consciousness must find agreeable.\n\nBut as criticism proves the one set of conclusions to be wrong, so\ndoes it prove to be wrong the other set. Not only are the qualities of\nexternal things as intellectually apprehended by us, relative to our\nown organisms; but the pleasurableness or painfulness of the feelings\nwhich we associate with such qualities, are also relative to our own\norganisms. They are so in a double sense--they are relative to its\nstructures, and they are relative to the states of its structures.\n\nThat we may not rest in a mere nominal acceptance of these general\ntruths, but may so appreciate them as to see their full bearings on\nethical theory, we must here glance at them as exemplified by animate\ncreatures at large. For after contemplating the wide divergences of\nsentiency accompanying the wide divergences of organization which\nevolution in general has brought about, we shall be enabled the better\nto see the divergences of sentiency to be expected from the further\nevolution of humanity.\n\n\n\u00a7 64. Because they can be most quickly disposed of, let us first deal\nwith pains: a further reason for first dealing with pains being that\nwe may thus forthwith recognize, and then leave out of consideration,\nthose sentient states the qualities of which may be regarded as\nabsolute rather than relative.\n\nThe painfulness of the feelings produced by forces which tend to\ndestroy organic structures, wholly or in part, is of course common\nto all creatures capable of feeling. We saw it to be inevitable that\nduring evolution there must everywhere be established such connections\nbetween external actions and the modes of consciousness they cause,\nthat the injurious ones are accompanied by disagreeable feelings and\nthe beneficial ones by agreeable feelings. Consequently, pressures or\nstrains which tear or bruise, and heats which burn or scald, being in\nall cases partially or wholly destructive, are in all cases painful.\n\nBut even here the relativity of the feelings may in one sense be\nasserted. For the effect of a force of given quantity or intensity\nvaries partly with the size and partly with the structure of the\ncreature exposed to it. The weight which is scarcely felt by a large\nanimal crushes a small one; the blow which breaks the limb of a\nmouse produces little effect on a horse: the weapon which lacerates\na horse leaves a rhinoceros uninjured. And with these differences of\ninjuriousness doubtless go differences of feeling. Merely glancing\nat the illustrations of this truth furnished by sentient beings in\ngeneral, let us consider the illustrations mankind furnish.\n\nComparisons of robust laboring men with women or children show us\nthat degrees of mechanical stress which the first bear with impunity,\nproduce on the others injuries and accompanying pains. The blistering\nof a tender skin by an amount of friction which does not even redden\na coarse one, or the bursting of superficial blood-vessels, and\nconsequent discoloration, caused in a person of lax tissues by a\nblow which leaves in well-toned tissues no trace, will sufficiently\nexemplify this contrast.\n\nNot only, however, are the pains due to violent incident forces,\nrelative to the characters or constitutional qualities of the parts\ndirectly affected, but they are relative in equally marked ways, or\neven in more marked ways, to the characters of the nervous structures.\nThe common assumption is that equal bodily injuries excite equal pains.\nBut this is a mistake. Pulling out a tooth or cutting off a limb, gives\nto different persons widely different amounts of suffering; not the\nendurance only, but the feeling to be endured, varies greatly; and the\nvariation largely depends on the degree of nervous development. This\nis well shown by the great insensibility of idiots--blows, cuts, and\nextremes of heat and cold, being borne by them with indifference.[H]\nThe relation thus shown in the most marked manner where the development\nof the central nervous system is abnormally low, is shown in a less\nmarked manner where the development of the central nervous system is\nnormally low; namely, among inferior races of men. Many travelers\nhave commented on the strange callousness shown by savages who have\nbeen mangled in battle or by accident; and surgeons in India say that\nwounds and operations are better borne by natives than by Europeans.\nFurther, there comes the converse fact that among the higher types of\nmen, larger brained and more sensitive to pain than the lower, the\nmost sensitive are those whose nervous developments, as shown by their\nmental powers, are the highest; part of the evidence being the relative\nintolerance of disagreeable sensations common among men of genius,[I]\nand the general irritability characteristic of them.\n\nThat pain is relative not to structures only, but to their states as\nwell, is also manifest--more manifest indeed. The sensibility of an\nexternal part depends on its temperature. Cool it below a certain point\nand it becomes, as we say, numb; and if by ether spray it is made very\ncold, it may be cut without any feeling being produced. Conversely,\nheat the part so that its blood-vessels dilate, and the pain which any\ninjury or irritation causes is greater than usual. How largely the\nproduction of pain depends on the condition of the part affected, we\nsee in the extreme tenderness of an inflamed surface--a tenderness such\nthat a slight touch causes shrinking, and such that rays from the fire\nwhich ordinarily would be indifferent become intolerable.\n\nSimilarly with the special senses. A light which eyes that are in good\norder bear without disagreeable feeling, cannot be borne by inflamed\neyes. And beyond the local state, the state of the system as a whole,\nand the state of the nervous centers, are both factors. Those enfeebled\nby illness are distressed by noises which those in health bear with\nequanimity; and men with overwrought brains are irritated in unusual\ndegrees by annoyances, both physical and moral.\n\nFurther, the temporary condition known as exhaustion enters into the\nrelation. Limbs overworn by prolonged exertion, cannot without aching\nperform acts which would at other times cause no appreciable feeling.\nAfter reading continuously for very many hours, even strong eyes begin\nto smart. And noises that can be listened to for a short time with\nindifference, become, if there is no cessation, causes of suffering.\n\nSo that though there is absoluteness in the relation between positive\npains and actions that are positively injurious, in so far that\nwherever there is sentiency it exists; yet even here partial relativity\nmay be asserted. For there is no fixed relation between the acting\nforce and the produced feeling. The amount of feeling varies with the\nsize of the organism, with the character of its outer structures, with\nthe character of its nervous system; and also with the temporary states\nof the part affected, of the body at large, and of the nervous centers.\n\n\n\u00a7 65. The relativity of pleasures is far more conspicuous; and the\nillustrations of it furnished by the sentient world at large are\ninnumerable.\n\nIt needs but to glance round at the various things which different\ncreatures are prompted by their desires to eat and are gratified in\neating--flesh for predaceous animals, grass for the herbivora, worms\nfor the mole, flies for the swallow, seeds for the finch, honey for the\nbee, a decaying carcass for the maggot--to be reminded that the tastes\nfor foods are relative to the structures of the creatures. And this\ntruth, made conspicuous by a survey of animals in general, is forced\non our attention even by a survey of different races of men. Here\nhuman flesh is abhorred, and there regarded as the greatest delicacy;\nin this country roots are allowed to putrefy before they are eaten,\nand in that the taint of decay produces disgust: the whale's blubber\nwhich one race devours with avidity, will in another by its very odor\nproduce nausea. Nay, without looking abroad we may, in the common\nsaying that \"one man's meat is another man's poison,\" see the general\nadmission that members of the same society so far differ, that a taste\nwhich is to these pleasurable is to those displeasurable. So is it with\nthe other senses. Assafoetida, which by us is singled out as typical\nof the disgusting in odor, ranks among the Esthonians as a favorite\nperfume, and even those around us vary so far in their likings that the\nscents of flowers grateful to some are repugnant to others. Analogous\ndifferences, in the preferences for colors, we daily hear expressed.\nAnd in a greater or less degree the like holds with all sensations down\neven to those of touch: the feeling yielded by velvet, which is to most\nagreeable, setting the teeth on edge in some.\n\nIt needs but to name appetite and satiety to suggest multitudinous\nfacts showing that pleasures are relative not only to the organic\nstructures but also to their states. The food which yields keen\ngratification when there is great hunger ceases to be grateful when\nhunger is satisfied, and if then forced on the eater is rejected with\naversion. So, too, a particular kind of food, seeming when first\ntasted so delicious that daily repetition would be a source of endless\nenjoyment, becomes, in a few days, not only unenjoyable but repugnant.\nBrilliant colors which, falling on unaccustomed eyes give delight,\npall on the sense if long looked at, and there is relief in getting\naway from the impressions they yield. Sounds sweet in themselves and\nsweet in their combinations which yield to unfatigued ears intense\npleasure, become, at the end of a long concert, not only wearisome but,\nif there is no escape from them, causes of irritation. The like holds\ndown even to such simple sensations as those of heat and cold. The\nfire so delightful on a winter's day is, in hot weather, oppressive;\nand pleasure is then taken in the cold water from which, in winter,\nthere would be shrinking. Indeed, experiences lasting over but a few\nmoments suffice to show how relative to the states of the structures\nare pleasurable sensations of these kinds; for it is observable that on\ndipping the cold hand into hot water, the agreeable feeling gradually\ndiminishes as the hand warms.\n\nThese few instances will carry home the truth, manifest enough to all\nwho observe, that the receipt of each agreeable sensation depends\nprimarily on the existence of a structure which is called into play;\nand, secondarily, on the condition of that structure, as fitting it or\nunfitting it for activity.\n\n\n\u00a7 66. The truth that emotional pleasures are made possible, partly by\nthe existence of correlative structures and partly by the states of\nthose structures, is equally undeniable.\n\nObserve the animal which, leading a life demanding solitary habits,\nhas an adapted organization, and it gives no sign of need for the\npresence of its kind. Observe, conversely, a gregarious animal\nseparated from the herd, and you see marks of unhappiness while the\nseparation continues, and equally distinct marks of joy on joining\nits companions. In the one case there is no nervous structure which\nfinds its sphere of action in the gregarious state, and in the other\ncase such a structure exists. As was implied by instances cited in\nthe last chapter for another purpose, animals leading lives involving\nparticular kinds of activities, have become so constituted that\npursuance of those activities, exercising the correlative structures,\nyields the associated pleasures. Beasts of prey confined in dens, show\nus by their pacings from side to side the endeavor to obtain, as well\nas they can, the satisfactions that accompany roaming about in their\nnatural habitats, and that gratification in the expenditure of their\nlocomotive energies, shown us by porpoises playing round a vessel, is\nshown us by the similarly unceasing excursions from end to end of its\ncell which a captured porpoise makes. The perpetual hoppings of the\ncanary from bar to bar of its cage, and the ceaseless use of claws and\nbill in climbing about its perch by the parrot, are other activities\nwhich, severally related to the needs of the species, have severally\nthemselves become sources of agreeable feelings. Still more clearly are\nwe shown by the efforts which a caged beaver makes to build with such\nsticks and pieces of wood as are at hand, how dominant in its nature\nhas become the building instinct, and how, apart from any advantage\ngained, it gets gratification by repeating, as well as it can, the\nprocesses of construction it is organized to carry on. The cat which,\nlacking something to tear with her claws, pulls at the mat with them,\nthe confined giraffe which, in default of branches to lay hold of wears\nout the upper angles of the doors to its house by continually grasping\nthem with its prehensile tongue, the rhinoceros which, having no enemy\nto fight, plows up the ground with his horn--all yield us analogous\nevidence. Clearly, these various actions performed by these various\ncreatures are not intrinsically pleasurable, for they differ more or\nless in each species and are often utterly unlike. The pleasurableness\nis simply in the exercise of nervo-muscular structures adapted to the\nperformance of the actions.\n\nThough races of men are contrasted with one another so much less than\ngenera and orders of animals are, yet, as we saw in the last chapter,\nalong with visible differences there go invisible differences, with\naccompanying likings for different modes of life. Among some, as\nthe Mantras, the love of unrestrained action and the disregard of\ncompanionship, are such that they separate if they quarrel, and hence\nlive scattered; while among others, as the Damaras, there is little\ntendency to resist, but instead, an admiration for any one who assumes\npower over them. Already when exemplifying the indefiniteness of\nhappiness as an end of action, I have referred to the unlike ideals\nof life pursued by the nomadic and the settled, the warlike and the\npeaceful--unlike ideals which imply unlikenesses of nervous structures\ncaused by the inherited effects of unlike habits accumulating through\ngenerations. These contrasts, various in their kinds and degrees among\nthe various types of mankind, every one can supplement by analogous\ncontrasts observable among those around. The occupations some delight\nin are to those otherwise constituted intolerable; and men's hobbies,\nseverally appearing to themselves quite natural, often appear to their\nfriends ludicrous and almost insane: facts which alone might make us\nsee that the pleasurableness of actions of this or that kind, is due\nnot to anything in the natures of the actions but to the existence of\nfaculties which find exercise in them.\n\nIt must be added that each pleasurable emotion, like each pleasurable\nsensation, is relative not only to a certain structure but also to\nthe state of that structure. The parts called into action must have\nhad proper rest--must be in a condition fit for action; not in the\ncondition which prolonged action produces. Be the order of emotion what\nit may, an unbroken continuity in the receipt of it eventually brings\nsatiety. The pleasurable consciousness becomes less and less vivid,\nand there arises the need for a temporary cessation during which the\nparts that have been active may recover their fitness for activity,\nand during which also the activities of other parts and receipt of the\naccompanying emotions may find due place.\n\n\n\u00a7 67. I have insisted on these general truths with perhaps needless\niteration, to prepare the reader for more fully recognizing a corollary\nthat is practically ignored. Abundant and clear as is the evidence, and\nforced though it is daily on every one's attention, the conclusions\nrespecting life and conduct which should be drawn, are not drawn,\nand so much at variance are these conclusions with current beliefs,\nthat enunciation of them causes a stare of incredulity. Pervaded as\nall past thinking has been, and as most present thinking is, by the\nassumption that the nature of every creature has been specially created\nfor it, and that human nature, also specially created, is, like other\nnatures, fixed--pervaded too as this thinking has been, and is, by the\nallied assumption that the agreeableness of certain actions depends on\ntheir essential qualities, while other actions are by their essential\nqualities made disagreeable; it is difficult to obtain a hearing for\nthe doctrine that the kinds of action which are now pleasurable will,\nunder conditions requiring the change, cease to be pleasurable, while\nother kinds of action will become pleasurable. Even those who accept\nthe doctrine of Evolution mostly hear with scepticism, or at best\nwith nominal faith, the inferences to be drawn from it respecting the\nhumanity of the future.\n\nAnd yet as shown in myriads of instances indicated by the few above\ngiven, those natural processes which have produced multitudinous\nforms of structure adapted to multitudinous forms of activity, have\nsimultaneously made these forms of activity pleasurable. And the\ninevitable implication is that within the limits imposed by physical\nlaws, there will be evolved, in adaptation to any new sets of\nconditions that may be established, appropriate structures of which the\nfunctions will yield their respective gratifications.\n\nWhen we have got rid of the tendency to think that certain modes of\nactivity are necessarily pleasurable because they give us pleasure, and\nthat other modes which do not please us are necessarily unpleasing;\nwe shall see that the remolding of human nature into fitness for\nthe requirements of social life, must eventually make all needful\nactivities pleasurable, while it makes displeasurable all activities\nat variance with these requirements. When we have come fully to\nrecognize the truth that there is nothing intrinsically more gratifying\nin the efforts by which wild animals are caught, than in the efforts\nexpended in rearing plants, and that the combined actions of muscles\nand senses in rowing a boat are not by their essential natures more\nproductive of agreeable feeling than those gone through in reaping\ncorn, but that everything depends on the co-operating emotions, which\nat present are more in accordance with the one than with the other; we\nshall infer that along with decrease of those emotions for which the\nsocial state affords little or no scope, and increase of those which\nit persistently exercises, the things now done with dislike from a\nsense of obligation will be done with immediate liking, and the things\ndesisted from as a matter of duty will be desisted from because they\nare repugnant.\n\nThis conclusion, alien to popular beliefs and in ethical speculation\nhabitually ignored, or at most recognized but partially and\noccasionally, will be thought by the majority so improbable that I must\ngive further justification of it: enforcing the _\u00e0 priori_ argument by\nan _\u00e0 posteriori_ one. Small as is the attention given to the fact,\nyet is the fact conspicuous that the corollary above drawn from the\ndoctrine of Evolution at large, coincides with the corollary which\npast and present changes in human nature force upon us. The leading\ncontrasts of character between savage and civilized, are just those\ncontrasts to be expected from the process of adaptation.\n\nThe life of the primitive man is passed mainly in the pursuit of\nbeasts, birds and fish, which yields him a gratifying excitement;\nbut though to the civilized man the chase gives gratification, this\nis neither so persistent nor so general. There are among us keen\nsportsmen, but there are many to whom shooting and fishing soon\nbecome wearisome, and there are not a few to whom they are altogether\nindifferent or even distasteful.\n\nConversely, the power of continued application, which in the primitive\nman is very small, has among ourselves become considerable. It is\ntrue that most are coerced into industry by necessity; but there\nare sprinkled throughout society men to whom active occupation is a\nneed--men who are restless when away from business and miserable\nwhen they eventually give it up; men to whom this or that line of\ninvestigation is so attractive that they devote themselves to it day\nafter day, year after year; men who are so deeply interested in public\naffairs that they pass lives of labor in achieving political ends they\nthink advantageous, hardly giving themselves the rest necessary for\nhealth.\n\nYet again, and still more strikingly, does the change become manifest\nwhen we compare undeveloped with developed humanity in respect of the\nconduct prompted by fellow-feeling. Cruelty rather than kindness is\ncharacteristic of the savage, and is in many cases a source of marked\ngratification to him; but though among the civilized are some in whom\nthis trait of the savage survives, yet a love of inflicting pain is not\ngeneral, and besides numbers who show benevolence, there are those who\ndevote their whole time and much of their money to philanthropic ends,\nwithout thought of reward either here or hereafter.\n\nClearly these major, along with many minor, changes of nature, conform\nto the law set forth. Activities appropriate to their needs which\ngive pleasures to savages have ceased to be pleasurable to many of\nthe civilized; while the civilized have acquired capacities for other\nappropriate activities and accompanying pleasures which savages had no\ncapacities for.\n\nNow, not only is it rational to infer that changes like those which\nhave been going on during civilization, will continue to go on, but\nit is irrational to do otherwise. Not he who believes that adaptation\nwill increase is absurd, but he who doubts that it will increase is\nabsurd. Lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall\nharmonize its nature with its conditions, adds but another to the\ncountless illustrations of inadequate consciousness of causation. One\nwho, leaving behind both primitive dogmas and primitive ways of looking\nat things, has, while accepting scientific conclusions, acquired those\nhabits of thought which science generates, will regard the conclusion\nabove drawn as inevitable. He will find it impossible to believe\nthat the processes which have heretofore so molded all beings to the\nrequirements of their lives that they get satisfactions in fulfilling\nthem, will not hereafter continue so molding them. He will infer that\nthe type of nature to which the highest social life affords a sphere\nsuch that every faculty has its due amount, and no more than the due\namount, of function and accompanying gratification, is the type of\nnature toward which progress cannot cease till it is reached. Pleasure\nbeing producible by the exercise of any structure which is adjusted\nto its special end, he will see the necessary implication to be that,\nsupposing it consistent with maintenance of life, there is no kind of\nactivity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued; and\nthat therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action\ndemanded by social conditions.\n\nThis corollary I here emphasize because it will presently play an\nimportant part in the argument.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nEGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM.\n\n\n\u00a7 68. If insistance on them tends to unsettle established systems of\nbelief, self-evident truths are by most people silently passed over;\nor else there is a tacit refusal to draw from them the most obvious\ninferences.\n\nOf self-evident truths so dealt with, the one which here concerns us\nis that a creature must live before it can act. From this it is a\ncorollary that the acts by which each maintains his own life must,\nspeaking generally, precede in imperativeness all other acts of which\nhe is capable. For if it be asserted that these other acts must\nprecede in imperativeness the acts which maintain life; and if this,\naccepted as a general law of conduct, is conformed to by all, then by\npostponing the acts which maintain life to the other acts which makes\nlife possible, all must lose their lives. That is to say, Ethics has to\nrecognize the truth, recognized in unethical thought, that egoism comes\nbefore altruism. The acts required for continued self-preservation,\nincluding the enjoyment of benefits achieved by such acts, are the\nfirst requisites to universal welfare. Unless each duly cares for\nhimself, his care for all others is ended by death; and if each thus\ndies, there remain no others to be cared for.\n\nThis permanent supremacy of egoism over altruism, made manifest by\ncontemplating existing life, is further made manifest by contemplating\nlife in course of evolution.\n\n\n\u00a7 69. Those who have followed with assent the recent course of thought,\ndo not need telling that throughout past eras, the life, vast in amount\nand varied in kind, which has overspread the earth, has progressed in\nsubordination to the law that every individual shall gain by whatever\naptitude it has for fulfilling the conditions to its existence. The\nuniform principle has been that better adaptation shall bring greater\nbenefit; which greater benefit, while increasing the prosperity of the\nbetter adapted, shall increase also its ability to leave offspring\ninheriting more or less its better adaptation. And, by implication,\nthe uniform principle has been that the ill-adapted, disadvantaged in\nthe struggle for existence, shall bear the consequent evils: either\ndisappearing when its imperfections are extreme, or else rearing fewer\noffspring, which, inheriting its imperfections, tend to dwindle away in\nposterity.\n\nIt has been thus with innate superiorities; it has been thus also with\nacquired ones. All along the law has been that increased function\nbrings increased power; and that therefore such extra activities as\naid welfare in any member of a race, produce in its structures greater\nability to carry on such extra activities: the derived advantages\nbeing enjoyed by it to the heightening and lengthening of its life.\nConversely, as lessened function ends in lessened structure, the\ndwindling of unused faculties has ever entailed loss of power to\nachieve the correlative ends: the result of inadequate fulfillment of\nthe ends being diminished ability to maintain life. And by inheritance,\nsuch functionally produced modifications have respectively furthered or\nhindered survival in posterity.\n\nAs already said, the law that each creature shall take the benefits and\nthe evils of its nature, be they those derived from ancestry or those\ndue to self-produced modifications, has been the law under which life\nhas evolved thus far; and it must continue to be the law however much\nfurther life may evolve. Whatever qualifications this natural course of\naction may now or hereafter undergo, are qualifications that cannot,\nwithout fatal results, essentially change it. Any arrangements which in\na considerable degree prevent superiority from profiting by the rewards\nof superiority, or shield inferiority from the evils it entails--any\narrangements which tend to make it as well to be inferior as to be\nsuperior, are arrangements diametrically opposed to the progress of\norganization and the reaching of a higher life.\n\nBut to say that each individual shall reap the benefits brought to him\nby his own powers, inherited and acquired, is to enunciate egoism as an\nultimate principle of conduct. It is to say that egoistic claims must\ntake precedence of altruistic claims.\n\n\n\u00a7 70. Under its biological aspect this proposition cannot be contested\nby those who agree in the doctrine of Evolution; but probably they\nwill not at once allow that admission of it under its ethical aspect\nis equally unavoidable. While, as respects development of life, the\nwell-working of the universal principle described is sufficiently\nmanifest; the well-working of it as respects increase of happiness may\nnot be seen at once. But the two cannot be disjoined.\n\nIncapacity of every kind and of whatever degree causes unhappiness\ndirectly and indirectly--directly by the pain consequent on\nthe overtaxing of inadequate faculty, and indirectly by the\nnon-fulfillment, or imperfect fulfillment, of certain conditions\nto welfare. Conversely, capacity of every kind sufficient for the\nrequirement conduces to happiness immediately and remotely--immediately\nby the pleasure accompanying the normal exercise of each power that is\nup to its work, and remotely by the pleasures which are furthered by\nthe ends achieved. A creature that is weak or slow of foot, and so gets\nfood only by exhausting efforts, or escapes enemies with difficulty,\nsuffers the pains of over-strained powers, of unsatisfied appetites,\nof distressed emotions; while the strong and swift creature of the\nsame species delights in its efficient activities, gains more fully\nthe satisfactions yielded by food as well as the renewed vivacity this\ngives, and has to bear fewer and smaller pains in defending itself\nagainst foes or escaping from them. Similarly with duller and keener\nsenses, or higher and lower degrees of sagacity. The mentally-inferior\nindividual of any race suffers negative and positive miseries; while\nthe mentally-superior individual receives negative and positive\ngratifications. Inevitably, then, this law in conformity with which\neach member of a species takes the consequences of its own nature;\nand in virtue of which the progeny of each member, participating in\nits nature, also takes such consequences; is one that tends ever\nto raise the aggregate happiness of the species, by furthering the\nmultiplication of the happier and hindering that of the less happy.\n\nAll this is true of human beings as of other beings. The conclusion\nforced on us is that the pursuit of individual happiness within those\nlimits prescribed by social conditions, is the first requisite to the\nattainment of the greatest general happiness. To see this it needs but\nto contrast one whose self-regard has maintained bodily well-being,\nwith one whose regardlessness of self has brought its natural results;\nand then to ask what must be the contrast between two societies formed\nof two such kinds of individuals.\n\nBounding out of bed after an unbroken sleep, singing or whistling\nas he dresses, coming down with beaming face ready to laugh on the\nsmallest provocation, the healthy man of high powers, conscious of\npast successes and by his energy, quickness, resource, made confident\nof the future, enters on the day's business not with repugnance, but\nwith gladness; and from hour to hour experiencing satisfactions from\nwork effectually done, comes home with an abundant surplus of energy\nremaining for hours of relaxation. Far otherwise is it with one who is\nenfeebled by great neglect of self. Already deficient, his energies\nare made more deficient by constant endeavors to execute tasks that\nprove beyond his strength, and by the resulting discouragement. Besides\nthe depressing consciousness of the immediate future, there is the\ndepressing consciousness of the remoter future, with its probability\nof accumulated difficulties and diminished ability to meet them.\nHours of leisure which, rightly passed, bring pleasures that raise\nthe tide of life and renew the powers of work, cannot be utilized:\nthere is not vigor enough for enjoyments involving action, and lack\nof spirits prevents passive enjoyments from being entered upon with\nzest. In brief, life becomes a burden. Now if, as must be admitted,\nin a community composed of individuals like the first, the happiness\nwill be relatively great, while in one composed of individuals like the\nlast, there will be relatively little happiness, or rather much misery;\nit must be admitted that conduct causing the one result is good, and\nconduct causing the other is bad.\n\nBut diminutions of general happiness are produced by inadequate egoism\nin several other ways. These we will successively glance at.\n\n\n\u00a7 71. If there were no proofs of heredity--if it were the rule that\nthe strong are usually begotten by the weak, while the weak usually\ndescend from the strong, that vivacious children form the families\nof melancholy parents, while fathers and mothers with overflowing\nspirits mostly have dull progeny, that from stolid peasants there\nordinarily come sons of high intelligence while the sons of the\ncultured are commonly fit for nothing but following the plow--if there\nwere no transmission of gout, scrofula, insanity, and did the diseased\nhabitually give birth to the healthy and the healthy to the diseased,\nwriters on Ethics might be justified in ignoring those effects of\nconduct which are felt by posterity through the natures they inherit.\n\nAs it is, however, the current ideas concerning the relative claims\nof egoism and altruism are vitiated by the omission of this all\nall-important factor. For if health, strength and capacity, are usually\ntransmitted; and if disease, feebleness, stupidity, generally reappear\nin descendants; then a rational altruism requires insistance on that\negoism which is shown by receipt of the satisfactions accompanying\npreservation of body and mind in the best state. The necessary\nimplication is that blessings are provided for offspring by due\nself-regard, while disregard of self carried too far provides curses.\nWhen, indeed, we remember how commonly it is remarked that high health\nand overflowing spirits render any lot in life tolerable, while chronic\nailments make gloomy a life most favorably circumstanced, it becomes\namazing that both the world at large and writers who make conduct their\nstudy, should ignore the terrible evils which disregard of personal\nwell-being inflicts on the unborn, and the incalculable good laid up\nfor the unborn by attention to personal well-being. Of all bequests\nof parents to children the most valuable is a sound constitution.\nThough a man's body is not a property that can be inherited, yet his\nconstitution may fitly be compared to an entailed estate; and if he\nrightly understands his duty to posterity, he will see that he is\nbound to pass on that estate uninjured if not improved. To say this\nis to say that he must be egoistic to the extent of satisfying all\nthose desires associated with the due performance of functions. Nay,\nit is to say more. It is to say that he must seek in due amounts the\nvarious pleasures which life offers. For beyond the effect these have\nin raising the tide of life and maintaining constitutional vigor, there\nis the effect they have in preserving and increasing a capacity for\nreceiving enjoyment. Endowed with abundant energies and various tastes,\nsome can get gratifications of many kinds on opportunities hourly\noccurring; while others are so inert, and so uninterested in things\naround, that they cannot even take the trouble to amuse themselves. And\nunless heredity be denied, the inference must be that due acceptance of\nthe miscellaneous pleasures life offers, conduces to the capacity for\nenjoyment in posterity; and that persistence in dull monotonous lives\nby parents, diminishes the ability of their descendants to make the\nbest of what gratifications fall to them.\n\n\n\u00a7 72. Beyond the decrease of general happiness which results in this\nindirect way, if egoism is unduly subordinated, there is a decrease\nof general happiness which results in a direct way. He who carries\nself-regard far enough to keep himself in good health and high spirits,\nin the first place, thereby becomes an immediate source of happiness\nto those around, and, in the second place, maintains the ability to\nincrease their happiness by altruistic actions. But one whose bodily\nvigor and mental health are undermined by self-sacrifice carried too\nfar, in the first place becomes to those around a cause of depression,\nand, in the second place, renders himself incapable, or less capable,\nof actively furthering their welfare.\n\nIn estimating conduct we must remember that there are those who by\ntheir joyousness beget joy in others, and that there are those who by\ntheir melancholy cast a gloom on every circle they enter. And we must\nremember that by display of overflowing happiness a man of the one\nkind may add to the happiness of others more than by positive efforts\nto benefit them, and that a man of the other kind may decrease their\nhappiness more by his presence than he increases it by his actions.\nFull of vivacity the one is ever welcome. For his wife he has smiles\nand jocose speeches; for his children stores of fun and play; for his\nfriends pleasant talk interspersed with the sallies of wit that come\nfrom buoyancy. Contrariwise, the other is shunned. The irritability\nresulting now from ailments, now from failures caused by feebleness,\nhis family has daily to bear. Lacking adequate energy for joining in\nthem, he has at best but a tepid interest in the amusements of his\nchildren, and he is called a wet blanket by his friends. Little account\nas our ethical reasonings take note of it, yet is the fact obvious\nthat since happiness and misery are infectious, such regard for self\nas conduces to health and high spirits is a benefaction to others, and\nsuch disregard of self as brings on suffering, bodily or mental, is a\nmalefaction to others.\n\nThe duty of making one's self agreeable by seeming to be pleased, is,\nindeed, often urged, and thus to gratify friends is applauded so long\nas self-sacrificing effort is implied. But though display of real\nhappiness gratifies friends far more than display of sham happiness,\nand has no drawback in the shape either of hypocrisy or strain, yet it\nis not thought a duty to fulfill the conditions which favor the display\nof real happiness. Nevertheless, if quantity of happiness produced is\nto be the measure, the last is more imperative than the first.\n\nAnd then, as above indicated, beyond this primary series of effects\nproduced on others there is a secondary series of effects. The\nadequately egoistic individual retains those powers which make\naltruistic activities possible. The individual who is inadequately\negoistic loses more or less of his ability to be altruistic. The truth\nof the one proposition is self-evident, and the truth of the other is\ndaily forced on us by examples. Note a few of them.\n\nHere is a mother who, brought up in the insane fashion usual among the\ncultivated, has a physique not strong enough for suckling her infant,\nbut who, knowing that its natural food is the best, and anxious for\nits welfare, continues to give it milk for a longer time than her\nsystem will bear. Eventually the accumulating reaction tells. There\ncomes exhaustion running, it may be, into illness caused by depletion;\noccasionally ending in death, and often entailing chronic weakness. She\nbecomes, perhaps for a time, perhaps permanently, incapable of carrying\non household affairs; her other children suffer from the loss of\nmaternal attention; and where the income is small, payments for nurse\nand doctor tell injuriously on the whole family.\n\nInstance, again, what not unfrequently happens with the father.\nSimilarly prompted by a high sense of obligation, and misled by current\nmoral theories into the notion that self-denial may rightly be carried\nto any extent, he daily continues his office work for long hours\nregardless of hot head and cold feet; and debars himself from social\npleasures, for which he thinks he can afford neither time nor money.\nWhat comes of this entirely unegoistic course? Eventually a sudden\ncollapse, sleeplessness, inability to work. That rest which he would\nnot give himself when his sensations prompted, he has now to take in\nlong measure. The extra earnings laid by for the benefit of his family\nare quickly swept away by costly journeys in aid of recovery, and by\nthe many expenses which illness entails. Instead of increased ability\nto do his duty by his offspring, there comes now inability. Life-long\nevils on them replace hoped-for goods.\n\nAnd so is it, too, with the social effects of inadequate egoism. All\ngrades furnish examples of the mischiefs, positive and negative,\ninflicted on society by excessive neglect of self. Now the case is that\nof a laborer who, conscientiously continuing his work under a broiling\nsun, spite of violent protest from his feelings, dies of sunstroke;\nand leaves his family a burden to the parish. Now the case is that of\na clerk whose eyes permanently fail from over-straining, or who, daily\nwriting for hours after his fingers are painfully cramped, is attacked\nwith \"scrivener's palsy,\" and, unable to write at all, sinks with aged\nparents into poverty which friends are called on to mitigate. And now\nthe case is that of a man devoted to public ends who, shattering his\nhealth by ceaseless application, fails to achieve all he might have\nachieved by a more reasonable apportionment of his time between labor\non behalf of others and ministration to his own needs.\n\n\n\u00a7 73. In one further way is the undue subordination of egoism to\naltruism injurious. Both directly and indirectly unselfishness pushed\nto excess generates selfishness.\n\nConsider first the immediate effects. That one man may yield up to\nanother a gratification, it is needful that the other shall accept it;\nand where the gratification is of a kind to which their respective\nclaims are equal, or which is no more required by the one than by\nthe other, acceptance implies a readiness to get gratification at\nanother's cost. The circumstances and needs of the two being alike,\nthe transaction involves as much culture of egoism in the last as\nit involves culture of altruism in the first. It is true that not\nunfrequently, difference between their means or difference between\ntheir appetites for a pleasure which the one has had often and the\nother rarely, divests the acceptance of this character; and it is true\nthat in other cases the benefactor manifestly takes so much pleasure\nin giving pleasure, that the sacrifice is partial, and the reception\nof it not wholly selfish. But to see the effect above indicated we\nmust exclude such inequalities, and consider what happens where wants\nare approximately alike and where the sacrifices, not reciprocated at\nintervals, are perpetually on one side. So restricting the inquiry all\ncan name instances verifying the alleged result. Every one can remember\ncircles in which the daily surrender of benefits by the generous to\nthe greedy, has caused increase of greediness, until there has been\nproduced an unscrupulous egoism intolerable to all around. There are\nobvious social effects of kindred nature. Most thinking people now\nrecognize the demoralization caused by indiscriminate charity. They\nsee how in the mendicant there is, besides destruction of the normal\nrelation between labor expended and benefit obtained, a genesis of the\nexpectation that others shall minister to his needs; showing itself\nsometimes in the venting of curses on those who refuse.\n\nNext consider the remote results. When the egoistic claims are so\nmuch subordinated to the altruistic as to produce physical mischief,\nthe tendency is toward a relative decrease in the number of the\naltruistic and therefore an increased predominance of the egoistic.\nPushed to extremes, sacrifice of self for the benefit of others leads\noccasionally to death before the ordinary period of marriage; leads\nsometimes to abstention from marriage, as in sisters of charity; leads\nsometimes to an ill-health or a loss of attractiveness which prevents\nmarriage; leads sometimes to non-acquirement of the pecuniary means\nneeded for marriage; and in all these cases, therefore, the unusually\naltruistic leave no descendants. Where the postponement of personal\nwelfare to the welfare of others has not been carried so far as to\nprevent marriage, it yet not unfrequently occurs that the physical\ndegradation resulting from years of self-neglect causes infertility;\nso that again the most altruistically natured leave no like natured\nposterity. And then in less marked and more numerous cases, the\nresulting enfeeblement shows itself by the production of relatively\nweak offspring; of whom some die early, while the rest are less likely\nthan usual to transmit the parental type to future generations.\nInevitably, then, by this dying out of the especially unegoistic, there\nis prevented that desirable mitigation of egoism in the average nature\nwhich would else have taken place. Such disregard of self as brings\ndown bodily vigor below the normal level, eventually produces in the\nsociety a counterbalancing excess of regard for self.\n\n\n\u00a7 74. That egoism precedes altruism in order of imperativeness, is\nthus clearly shown. The acts which make continued life possible, must,\non the average, be more peremptory than all those other acts which\nlife makes possible, including the acts which benefit others. Turning\nfrom life as existing to life as evolving, we are equally shown this.\nSentient beings have progressed from low to high types, under the law\nthat the superior shall profit by their superiority and the inferior\nshall suffer from their inferiority. Conformity to this law has been,\nand is still, needful, not only for the continuance of life but for the\nincrease of happiness: since the superior are those having faculties\nbetter adjusted to the requirements--faculties, therefore, which bring\nin their exercise greater pleasure and less pain.\n\nMore special considerations join these more general ones in showing\nus this truth. Such egoism as preserves a vivacious mind in a\nvigorous body furthers the happiness of descendants, whose inherited\nconstitutions make the labors of life easy and its pleasures keen;\nwhile, conversely, unhappiness is entailed on posterity by those\nwho bequeath them constitutions injured by self-neglect. Again, the\nindividual whose well-conserved life shows itself in overflowing\nspirits, becomes, by his mere existence, a source of pleasure to all\naround; while the depression which commonly accompanies ill-health\ndiffuses itself through family and among friends. A further contrast\nis that whereas one who has been duly regardful of self retains the\npower of being helpful to others, there results from self-abnegation\nin excess, not only an inability to help others but the infliction\nof positive burdens on them. Lastly, we come upon the truth that\nundue altruism increases egoism, both directly in contemporaries and\nindirectly in posterity.\n\nAnd now observe that though the general conclusion enforced by these\nspecial conclusions is at variance with nominally accepted beliefs,\nit is not at variance with actually accepted beliefs. While opposed\nto the doctrine which men are taught should be acted upon, it is in\nharmony with the doctrine which they do act upon and dimly see must\nbe acted upon. For omitting such abnormalities of conduct as are\ninstanced above, every one, alike by deed and word, implies that in the\nbusiness of life personal welfare is the primary consideration. The\nlaborer looking for wages in return for work done, no less than the\nmerchant who sells goods at a profit, the doctor who expects fees for\nadvice, the priest who calls the scene of his ministrations \"a living,\"\nassumes as beyond question the truth that selfishness, carried to the\nextent of enforcing his claims and enjoying the returns his efforts\nbring, is not only legitimate but essential. Even persons who avow a\ncontrary conviction prove by their acts that it is inoperative. Those\nwho repeat with emphasis the maxim, \"Love your neighbor as yourself,\"\ndo not render up what they possess so as to satisfy the desires of all\nas much as they satisfy their own desires. Nor do those whose extreme\nmaxim is, \"Live for others,\" differ appreciably from people around in\ntheir regards for personal welfare, or fail to appropriate their shares\nof life's pleasures. In short, that which is above set forth as the\nbelief to which scientific ethics leads us, is that which men do really\nbelieve, as distinguished from that which they believe they believe.\n\nFinally, it may be remarked that a rational egoism, so far from\nimplying a more egoistic human nature, is consistent with a human\nnature that is less egoistic. For excesses in one direction do not\nprevent excesses in the opposite direction; but rather, extreme\ndeviations from the mean on one side lead to extreme deviations on\nthe other side. A society in which the most exalted principles of\nself-sacrifice for the benefit of neighbors are enunciated, may be\na society in which unscrupulous sacrifice of alien fellow-creatures\nis not only tolerated but applauded. Along with professed anxiety\nto spread these exalted principles among heathens, there may go the\ndeliberate fastening of a quarrel upon them with a view to annexing\ntheir territory. Men who every Sunday have listened approvingly to\ninjunctions carrying the regard for other men to an impracticable\nextent, may yet hire themselves out to slay, at the word of command,\nany people in any part of the world, utterly indifferent to the right\nor wrong of the matter fought about. And as in these cases transcendent\naltruism in theory co-exists with brutal egoism in practice, so\nconversely, a more qualified altruism may have for its concomitant a\ngreatly moderated egoism. For asserting the due claims of self, is, by\nimplication, drawing a limit beyond which the claims are undue; and is,\nby consequence, bringing into greater clearness the claims of others.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM.\n\n\n\u00a7 75. If we define altruism as being all action which, in the normal\ncourse of things, benefits others instead of benefiting self, then,\nfrom the dawn of life, altruism has been no less essential than egoism.\nThough, primarily, it is dependent on egoism, yet, secondarily, egoism\nis dependent on it.\n\nUnder altruism, in this comprehensive sense, I take in the acts by\nwhich offspring are preserved and the species maintained. Moreover,\namong these acts must be included not such only as are accompanied by\nconsciousness but also such as conduce to the welfare of offspring\nwithout mental representation of the welfare--acts of automatic\naltruism as we may call them. Nor must there be left out those lowest\naltruistic acts which subserve race-maintenance without implying even\nautomatic nervous processes--acts not in the remotest sense psychical,\nbut in a literal sense physical. Whatever action, unconscious or\nconscious, involves expenditure of individual life to the end of\nincreasing life in other individuals, is unquestionably altruistic in a\nsense, if not in the usual sense, and it is here needful to understand\nit in this sense that we may see how conscious altruism grows out of\nunconscious altruism.\n\nThe simplest beings habitually multiply by spontaneous fission.\nPhysical altruism of the lowest kind, differentiating from physical\negoism, may, in this case, be considered as not yet independent of\nit. For since the two halves which, before fission, constituted the\nindividual, do not on dividing disappear, we must say that though the\nindividuality of the parent infusorium or other protozoon is lost in\nceasing to be single, yet the old individual continues to exist in each\nof the new individuals. When, however, as happens generally with these\nsmallest animals, an interval of quiescence ends in the breaking up of\nthe whole body into minute parts, each of which is the germ of a young\none, we see the parent entirely sacrificed in forming progeny.\n\nHere might be described how among creatures of higher grades, by\nfission or gemmation, parents bequeath parts of their bodies, more\nor less organized, to form offspring at the cost of their own\nindividualities. Numerous examples might also be given of the ways in\nwhich the development of ova is carried to the extent of making the\nparental body little more than a receptacle for them: the implication\nbeing that the accumulations of nutriment which parental activities\nhave laid up, are disposed of for the benefit of posterity. And\nthen might be dwelt on the multitudinous cases where, as generally\nthroughout the insect-world, maturity having been reached and a new\ngeneration provided for, life ends: death follows the sacrifices made\nfor progeny.\n\nBut leaving these lower types in which the altruism is physical only,\nor in which it is physical and automatically psychical only, let\nus ascend to those in which it is also, to a considerable degree,\nconscious. Though, in birds and mammals, such parental activities, as\nare guided by instinct, are accompanied by either no representations or\nbut vague representations of the benefits which the young receive, yet\nthere are also in them actions which we may class as altruistic in the\nhigher sense. The agitation which creatures of these classes show when\ntheir young are in danger, joined often with efforts on their behalf,\nas well as grief displayed after loss of their young, make it manifest\nthat in them parental altruism has a concomitant of emotion.\n\nThose who understand by altruism only the conscious sacrifice of self\nto others among human beings, will think it strange, or even absurd, to\nextend its meaning so widely. But the justification for doing this is\ngreater than has thus far appeared. I do not mean merely that in the\ncourse of evolution, there has been a progress through infinitesimal\ngradations from purely physical and unconscious sacrifices of the\nindividual for the welfare of the species, up to sacrifices consciously\nmade. I mean that from first to last the sacrifices are, when reduced\nto their lowest terms, of the same essential nature: to the last, as at\nfirst, there is involved a loss of bodily substance. When a part of the\nparental body is detached in the shape of gemmule, or egg, or foetus,\nthe material sacrifice is conspicuous: and when the mother yields milk\nby absorbing which the young one grows, it cannot be questioned that\nthere is also a material sacrifice. But though a material sacrifice\nis not manifest when the young are benefitted by activities on their\nbehalf; yet, as no effort can be made without an equivalent waste of\ntissue, and as the bodily loss is proportionate to the expenditure that\ntakes place without reimbursement in food consumed, it follows that\nefforts made in fostering offspring do really represent a part of the\nparental substance; which is now given indirectly instead of directly.\n\nSelf-sacrifice, then, is no less primordial than self-preservation.\nBeing in its simple physical form absolutely necessary for the\ncontinuance of life from the beginning; and being extended under its\nautomatic form, as indispensable to maintenance of race in types\nconsiderably advanced; and being developed to its semi-conscious and\nconscious forms, along with the continued and complicated attendance\nby which the offspring of superior creatures are brought to maturity,\naltruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism. As was pointed\nout in an early chapter, the same superiorities which have enabled\nthe individual to preserve itself better, have enabled it better to\npreserve the individuals derived from it; and each higher species,\nusing its improved faculties primarily for egoistic benefit, has spread\nin proportion as it has used them secondarily for altruistic benefit.\n\nThe imperativeness of altruism as thus understood, is, indeed, no less\nthan the imperativeness of egoism was shown to be in the last chapter.\nFor while, on the one hand, a falling short of normal egoistic acts\nentails enfeeblement or loss of life, and therefore loss of ability to\nperform altruistic acts, on the other hand, such defect of altruistic\nacts as causes death of offspring or inadequate development of them,\ninvolves disappearance from future generations of the nature that is\nnot altruistic enough--so decreasing the average egoism. In short,\nevery species is continually purifying itself from the unduly egoistic\nindividuals, while there are being lost to it the unduly altruistic\nindividuals.\n\n\n\u00a7 76. As there has been an advance by degrees from unconscious parental\naltruism to conscious parental altruism of the highest kind, so has\nthere been an advance by degrees from the altruism of the family to\nsocial altruism.\n\nA fact to be first noted is that only where altruistic relations in\nthe domestic group have reached highly-developed forms, do there arise\nconditions making possible full development of altruistic relations in\nthe political group. Tribes in which promiscuity prevails, or in which\nthe marital relations are transitory, and tribes in which polyandry\nentails in another way indefinite relationships, are incapable of\nmuch organization. Nor do peoples who are habitually polygamous show\nthemselves able to take on those high forms of social co-operation\nwhich demand due subordination of self to others. Only where monogamic\nmarriage has become general and eventually universal--only where there\nhave consequently been established the closest ties of blood--only\nwhere family altruism has been most fostered, has social altruism\nbecome conspicuous. It needs but to recall the compound forms of the\nAryan family, as described by Sir Henry Maine and others, to see that\nfamily feeling, first extending itself to the gens and the tribe, and\nafterward to the society formed of related tribes, prepared the way for\nfellow feeling among citizens not of the same stock.\n\nRecognizing this natural transition, we are here chiefly concerned\nto observe that throughout the latter stages of the progress, as\nthroughout the former, increase of egoistic satisfactions has depended\non growth of regard for the satisfactions of others. On contemplating\na line of successive parents and offspring, we see that each, enabled\nwhile young to live by the sacrifices predecessors make for it,\nitself makes, when adult, equivalent sacrifices for successors, and\nthat, in default of this general balancing of benefits received by\nbenefits given; the line dies out. Similarly, it is manifest that in\na society each generation of members, indebted for such benefits as\nsocial organization yields them to preceding generations, who have by\ntheir sacrifices elaborated this organization, are called on to make\nfor succeeding generations such kindred sacrifices as shall at least\nmaintain this organization, if they do not improve it: the alternative\nbeing decay and eventual dissolution of the society, implying gradual\ndecrease in the egoistic satisfactions of its members.\n\nAnd now we are prepared to consider the several ways in which, under\nsocial conditions, personal welfare depends on due regard for the\nwelfare of others. Already the conclusions to be drawn have been\nforeshadowed. As in the chapter on the biological view were implied the\ninferences definitely set forth in the last chapter, so in the chapter\non the sociological view were implied the inferences to be definitely\nset forth here. Sundry of these are trite enough, but they must,\nnevertheless, be specified, since the statement would be incomplete\nwithout them.\n\n\n\u00a7 77. First, to be dealt with comes that negative altruism implied by\nsuch curbing of the egoistic impulses as prevents direct aggression.\n\nAs before shown, if men instead of living separately are to unite for\ndefense or for other purposes, they must severally reap more good\nthan evil from the union. On the average, each must lose less from\nthe antagonisms of those with whom he is associated than he gains by\nthe association. At the outset, therefore, that increase of egoistic\nsatisfactions which the social state brings, can be purchased only by\naltruism sufficient to cause some recognition of others' claims: if not\na voluntary recognition, still, a compulsory recognition.\n\nWhile the recognition is but of that lowest kind due to dread of\nretaliation, or of prescribed punishment, the egoistic gain from\nassociation is small, and it becomes considerable only as the\nrecognition becomes voluntary--that is, more altruistic. Where, as\namong some of the wild Australians, there exists no limit to the right\nof the strongest, and the men fight to get possession of women while\nthe wives of one man fight among themselves about him, the pursuit\nof egoistic satisfactions is greatly impeded. Besides the bodily\npain occasionally given to each by conflict, and the more or less of\nsubsequent inability to achieve personal ends, there is the waste of\nenergy entailed in maintaining readiness for self-defense, and there\nis the accompanying occupation of consciousness by emotions that are\non the average of cases disagreeable. Moreover, the primary end of\nsafety, in presence of external foes, is ill-attained in proportion\nas there are internal animosities, such furtherance of satisfactions\nas industrial co-operation brings cannot be had, and there is little\nmotive to labor for extra benefits when the products of labor are\ninsecure. And from this early stage to comparatively late stages we\nmay trace in the wearing of arms, in the carrying on of family feuds,\nand in the taking of daily precautions for safety, the ways in which\nthe egoistic satisfactions of each are diminished by deficiency of that\naltruism which checks overt injury of others.\n\nThe private interests of the individual are on the average better\nsubserved, not only in proportion as he himself refrains from direct\naggression, but also, on the average, in proportion as he succeeds\nin diminishing the aggressions of his fellows on one another. The\nprevalence of antagonism among those around, impedes the activities\ncarried on by each in pursuit of satisfactions; and by causing disorder\nmakes the beneficial results of activities more doubtful. Hence, each\nprofits egoistically from the growth of an altruism which leads each to\naid in preventing or diminishing others' violence.\n\nThe like holds when we pass to that altruism which restrains the undue\negoism displayed in breaches of contract. General acceptance of the\nmaxim that honesty is the best policy, implies general experience that\ngratification of the self-regarding feelings is eventually furthered\nby such checking of them as maintains equitable dealings. And here, as\nbefore, each is personally interested in securing good treatment of his\nfellows by one another. For in countless ways evils are entailed on\neach by the prevalence of fraudulent transactions. As every one knows,\nthe larger the number of a shop-keeper's bills left unpaid by some\ncustomers, the higher must be the prices which other customers pay. The\nmore manufacturers lose by defective raw materials or by carelessness\nof workmen, the more must they charge for their fabrics to buyers. The\nless trustworthy people are, the higher rises the rate of interest,\nthe larger becomes the amount of capital hoarded, the greater are the\nimpediments to industry. The further traders and people in general\ngo beyond their means, and hypothecate the property of others in\nspeculation, the more serious are those commercial panics which brings\ndisasters on multitudes and injuriously affect all.\n\nThis introduces us to yet a third way in which such personal welfare\nas results from the proportioning of benefits gained to labors given,\ndepends on the making of certain sacrifices for social welfare. The man\nwho, expending his energies wholly on private affairs refuses to take\ntrouble about public affairs, pluming himself on his wisdom in minding\nhis own business, is blind to the fact that his own business is made\npossible only by maintenance of a healthy social state, and that he\nloses all round by defective governmental arrangements. Where there\nare many like-minded with himself--where, as a consequence, offices\ncome to be filled by political adventurers and opinion is swayed by\ndemagogues--where bribery vitiates the administration of the law and\nmakes fraudulent State transactions habitual, heavy penalties fall on\nthe community at large, and, among others, on those who have thus done\neverything for self and nothing for society. Their investments are\ninsecure; recovery of their debts is difficult, and even their lives\nare less safe than they would otherwise have been.\n\nSo that on such altruistic actions as are implied, firstly in being\njust, secondly in seeing justice done between others, and thirdly, in\nupholding and improving the agencies by which justice is administered,\ndepend, in large measure, the egoistic satisfactions of each.\n\n\n\u00a7 78. But the identification of personal advantage with the advantage\nof fellow-citizens is much wider than this. In various other ways the\nwell-being of each rises and falls with the well-being of all.\n\nA weak man left to provide for his own wants, suffers by getting\nsmaller amounts of food and other necessaries than he might get were he\nstronger. In a community formed of weak men, who divide their labors\nand exchange the products, all suffer evils from the weakness of their\nfellows. The quantity of each kind of product is made deficient by the\ndeficiency of laboring power; and the share each gets for such share\nof his own product as he can afford to give, is relatively small. Just\nas the maintenance of paupers, hospital patients, inmates of asylums,\nand others who consume but do not produce, leaves to be divided among\nproducers a smaller stock of commodities than would exist were there\nno incapables; so must there be left a smaller stock of commodities to\nbe divided, the greater the number of inefficient producers, or the\ngreater the average deficiency of producing power. Hence, whatever\ndecreases the strength of men in general restricts the gratifications\nof each by making the means to them dearer.\n\nMore directly, and more obviously, does the bodily well-being of his\nfellows concern him; for their bodily ill-being, when it takes certain\nshapes, is apt to bring similar bodily ill-being on him. If he is not\nhimself attacked by cholera, or small-pox, or typhus, when it invades\nhis neighborhood, he often suffers a penalty through his belongings.\nUnder conditions spreading it, his wife catches diphtheria, or his\nservant is laid up with scarlet fever, or his children take now this\nand now that infectious disorder. Add together the immediate and remote\nevils brought on him year after year by epidemics, and it becomes\nmanifest that his egoistic satisfactions are greatly furthered by such\naltruistic activities as render disease less prevalent.\n\nWith the mental, as well as with the bodily, states of fellow-citizens,\nhis enjoyments are in multitudinous ways bound up. Stupidity like\nweakness raises the cost of commodities. Where farming is unimproved,\nthe prices of food are higher than they would else be; where antiquated\nroutine maintains itself in trade, the needless expense of distribution\nweighs on all; where there is no inventiveness, every one loses the\nbenefits which improved appliances diffuse. Other than economic\nevils come from the average unintelligence--periodically through the\nmanias and panics that arise because traders rush in herds all to\nbuy or all to sell; and habitually through the mal-administration\nof justice, which people and rulers alike disregard while pursuing\nthis or that legislative will-o'-the-wisp. Closer and clearer is the\ndependence of his personal satisfactions on others' mental states,\nwhich each experiences in his household. Unpunctuality and want of\nsystem are perpetual sources of annoyance. The unskillfulness of the\ncook causes frequent vexation and occasional indigestion. Lack of\nforethought in the housemaid leads to a fall over a bucket in a dark\npassage. And inattention to a message or forgetfulness in delivering\nit, entails failure in an important engagement. Each, therefore,\nbenefits egoistically by such altruism as aids in raising the average\nintelligence. I do not mean such altruism as taxes ratepayers that\nchildren's minds may be filled with dates, and names, and gossip about\nkings, and narratives of battles, and other useless information, no\namount of which will make them capable workers or good citizens; but\nI mean such altruism as helps to spread a knowledge of the nature of\nthings and to cultivate the power of applying that knowledge.\n\nYet again, each has a private interest in public morals and profits by\nimproving them. Not in large ways only, by aggressions and breaches of\ncontract, by adulterations and short measures, does each suffer from\nthe general unconscientiousness; but in more numerous small ways. Now\nit is through the untruthfulness of one who gives a good character to\na bad servant; now it is by the recklessness of a laundress who, using\nbleaching agents to save trouble in washing, destroys his linen; now\nit is by the acted falsehood of railway passengers who, by dispersed\ncoats, make him believe that all the seats in a compartment are taken\nwhen they are not. Yesterday the illness of his child due to foul\ngases, led to the discovery of a drain that had become choked because\nit was ill-made by a dishonest builder under supervision of a careless\nor bribed surveyor. To-day workmen employed to rectify it bring on him\ncost and inconvenience by dawdling; and their low standard of work,\ndetermined by the unionist principle that the better workers must not\ndiscredit the worse by exceeding them in efficiency, he may trace to\nthe immoral belief that the unworthy should fare as well as the worthy.\nTo-morrow it turns out that business for the plumber has been provided\nby damage which the bricklayers have done.\n\nThus the improvement of others, physically, intellectually and morally,\npersonally concerns each; since their imperfections tell in raising the\ncost of all the commodities he buys, in increasing the taxes and rates\nhe pays, and in the losses of time, trouble and money, daily brought on\nby others' carelessness, stupidity, or unconscientiousness.\n\n\n\u00a7 79. Very obvious are certain more immediate connections between\npersonal welfare and ministration to the welfare of those around.\nThe evils suffered by those whose behavior is unsympathetic, and the\nbenefits to self which unselfish conduct brings, show these.\n\nThat any one should have formulated his experience by saying that\nthe conditions to success are a hard heart and a sound digestion, is\nmarvelous considering the many proofs that success, even of a material\nkind, greatly depending as it does on the good offices of others, is\nfurthered by whatever creates good will in others. The contrast between\nthe prosperity of those who, to but moderate abilities join natures\nwhich beget friendships by their kindliness, and the adversity of those\nwho, though possessed of superior faculties and greater acquirements,\narouse dislikes by their hardness or indifference, should force upon\nall the truth that egoistic enjoyments are aided by altruistic actions.\n\nThis increase of personal benefit achieved by benefiting others is\nbut partially achieved where a selfish motive prompts the seemingly\nunselfish act: it is fully achieved only where the act is really\nunselfish. Though services rendered with the view of some time\nprofiting by reciprocated services, answer to a certain extent; yet,\nordinarily, they answer only to the extent of bringing equivalents of\nreciprocated services. Those which bring more than equivalents are\nthose not prompted by any thoughts of equivalents. For obviously it\nis the spontaneous outflow of good nature, not in the larger acts of\nlife only but in all its details, which generates in those around the\nattachments prompting unstinted benevolence.\n\nBesides furthering prosperity, other regarding actions conduce to\nself-regarding gratifications by generating a genial environment.\nWith the sympathetic being every one feels more sympathy than with\nothers. All conduct themselves with more than usual amiability to a\nperson who hourly discloses a lovable nature. Such a one is practically\nsurrounded by a world of better people than one who is less attractive.\nIf we contrast the state of a man possessing all the material means to\nhappiness, but isolated by his absolute egoism, with the state of an\naltruistic man relatively poor in means but rich in friends, we may\nsee that various gratifications, not to be purchased by money, come in\nabundance to the last and are inaccessible to the first.\n\nWhile, then, there is one kind of other regarding action, furthering\nthe prosperity of fellow-citizens at large, which admits of being\ndeliberately pursued from motives that are remotely self-regarding--the\nconviction being that personal well-being depends in large measure\non the well-being of society--there is an additional kind of other\nregarding action having in it no element of conscious self-regard,\nwhich nevertheless conduces greatly to egoistic satisfactions.\n\n\n\u00a7 80. Yet other modes exist in which egoism unqualified by altruism\nhabitually fails. It diminishes the totality of egoistic pleasure by\ndiminishing in several directions the capacity for pleasure.\n\nSelf gratifications, considered separately, or in the aggregate,\nlose their intensities by that too great persistence in them which\nresults if they are made the exclusive objects of pursuit. The law\nthat function entails waste, and that faculties yielding pleasure by\ntheir action cannot act incessantly without exhaustion and accompanying\nsatiety, has the implication that intervals during which altruistic\nactivities absorb the energies, are intervals during which the capacity\nfor egoistic pleasure is recovering its full degree. The sensitiveness\nto purely personal enjoyments is maintained at a higher pitch by those\nwho minister to the enjoyments of others than it is by those who devote\nthemselves wholly to personal enjoyments.\n\nThis which is manifest even while the tide of life is high, becomes\nstill more manifest as life ebbs. It is in maturity and old age that\nwe especially see how, as egoistic pleasures grow faint, altruistic\nactions come in to revive them in new forms. The contrast between the\nchild's delight in the novelties daily revealed, and the indifference\nwhich comes as the world around grows familiar, until, in adult life,\nthere remain comparatively few things that are greatly enjoyed, draws\nfrom all the reflection that as years go by pleasures pall. And to\nthose who think it becomes clear that only through sympathy can\npleasures be indirectly gained from things that have ceased to yield\npleasures directly. In the gratifications derived by parents from\nthe gratifications of their offspring, this is conspicuously shown.\nTrite as is the remark that men live afresh in their children, it is\nneedful here to set it down as reminding us of the way in which, as\nthe egoistic satisfactions in life fade, altruism renews them while it\ntransfigures them.\n\nWe are thus introduced to a more general consideration--the egoistic\naspect of altruistic pleasure. Not, indeed, that this is the place\nfor discussing the question whether the egoistic element can be\nexcluded from altruism, nor is it the place for distinguishing between\nthe altruism which is pursued with a foresight of the pleasurable\nfeeling to be achieved through it, and the altruism which, though\nit achieves this pleasurable feeling, does not make pursuit of it a\nmotive. Here we are concerned with the fact that, whether knowingly or\nunknowingly gained, the state of mind accompanying altruistic action,\nbeing a pleasurable state, is to be counted in the sum of pleasures\nwhich the individual can receive, and in this sense cannot be other\nthan egoistic. That we must so regard it is proved on observing that\nthis pleasure, like pleasures in general, conduces to the physical\nprosperity of the ego. As every other agreeable emotion raises the\ntide of life, so does the agreeable emotion which accompanies a\nbenevolent deed. As it cannot be denied that the pain caused by the\nsight of suffering depresses the vital functions--sometimes even to\nthe extent of arresting the heart's action, as in one who faints on\nseeing a surgical operation, so neither can it be denied that the joy\nfelt in witnessing others' joy exalts the vital functions. Hence,\nhowever much we may hesitate to class altruistic pleasure as a higher\nkind of egoistic pleasure, we are obliged to recognize the fact that\nits immediate effects in augmenting life and so furthering personal\nwell-being, are like those of pleasures that are directly egoistic. And\nthe corollary drawn must be that pure egoism is, even in its immediate\nresults, less successfully egoistic than is the egoism duly qualified\nby altruism, which, besides achieving additional pleasures, achieves\nalso, through raised vitality, a greater capacity for pleasures in\ngeneral.\n\nThat the range of \u00e6sthetic gratifications is wider for the altruistic\nnature than for the egoistic nature is also a truth not to be\noverlooked. The joys and sorrows of human beings form a chief element\nin the subject-matter of art, and, evidently, the pleasures which\nart gives increase as the fellow-feeling with these joys and sorrows\nstrengthens. If we contrast early poetry occupied mainly with war and\ngratifying the savage instincts by descriptions of bloody victories,\nwith the poetry of modern times, in which the sanguinary forms but a\nsmall part while a large part, dealing with the gentler affections,\nenlists the feelings of readers on behalf of the weak; we are shown\nthat with the development of a more altruistic nature there has been\nopened a sphere of enjoyment inaccessible to the callous egoism of\nbarbarous times. So, too, between the fiction of the past and the\nfiction of the present, there is the difference that while the one was\nalmost exclusively occupied with the doings of the ruling classes, and\nfound its plots in their antagonisms and deeds of violence, the other,\nchiefly taking stories of peaceful life for its subjects, and to a\nconsiderable extent the life of the humbler classes, discloses a new\nworld of interest in the every-day pleasures and pains of ordinary\npeople. A like contrast exists between early and late forms of plastic\nart. When not representing acts of worship, the wall sculptures and\nwall-paintings of the Assyrians and Egyptians, or the decorations of\ntemples among the Greeks, represented deeds of conquest; whereas in\nmodern times, while the works which glorify destructive activities\nare less numerous, there are an increasing number of works gratifying\nto the kindlier sentiments of spectators. To see that those who care\nnothing about the feelings of other beings are, by implication, shut\nout from a wide range of \u00e6sthetic pleasures, it needs but to ask\nwhether men who delight in dog-fights may be expected to appreciate\nBeethoven's _Adelaida_, or whether Tennyson's _In Memoriam_ would\ngreatly move a gang of convicts.\n\n\n\u00a7 81. From the dawn of life, then, egoism has been dependent upon\naltruism as altruism has been dependent upon egoism, and in the course\nof evolution the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing.\n\nThe physical and unconscious self-sacrifice of parents to form\noffspring, which the lowest living things display from hour to hour,\nshows us in its primitive form the altruism which makes possible the\negoism of individual life and growth. As we ascend to higher grades\nof creatures, this parental altruism becomes a direct yielding up of\nonly part of the body, joined with an increasing contribution from the\nremainder in the shape of tissue wasted in efforts made on behalf of\nprogeny. This indirect sacrifice of substance, replacing more and more\nthe direct sacrifice as parental altruism becomes higher, continues\nto the last to represent also altruism which is other than parental;\nsince this, too, implies loss of substance in making efforts that do\nnot bring their return in personal aggrandizement.\n\nAfter noting how among mankind parental altruism and family altruism\npass into social altruism, we observed that a society, like a species,\nsurvives only on condition that each generation of its members shall\nyield to the next, benefits equivalent to those it has received\nfrom the last. And this implies that care for the family must be\nsupplemented by care for the society.\n\nFullness of egoistic satisfactions in the associated state, depending\nprimarily on maintenance of the normal relation between efforts\nexpended and benefits obtained, which underlies all life, implies an\naltruism which both prompts equitable conduct and prompts the enforcing\nof equity. The well-being of each is involved with the well-being of\nall in sundry other ways. Whatever conduces to their vigor concerns\nhim, for it diminishes the cost of everything he buys. Whatever\nconduces to their freedom from disease concerns him, for it diminishes\nhis own liability to disease. Whatever raises their intelligence\nconcerns him, for inconveniences are daily entailed on him by others'\nignorance or folly. Whatever raises their moral character concerns him,\nfor at every turn he suffers from the average unconscientiousness.\n\nMuch more directly do his egoistic satisfactions depend on those\naltruistic activities which enlist the sympathies of others. By\nalienating those around, selfishness loses the unbought aid they can\nrender; shuts out a wide range of social enjoyments, and fails to\nreceive those exaltations of pleasure and mitigations of pain which\ncome from men's fellow-feeling with those they like.\n\nLastly, undue egoism defeats itself by bringing on an incapacity for\nhappiness. Purely egoistic gratifications are rendered less keen by\nsatiety, even in the earlier part of life, and almost disappear in\nthe later; the less satiating gratifications of altruism are missed\nthroughout life, and especially in that latter part when they largely\nreplace egoistic gratifications; and there is a lack of susceptibility\nto \u00e6sthetic pleasures of the higher orders.\n\nAn indication must be added of the truth, scarcely at all recognized,\nthat this dependence of egoism upon altruism ranges beyond the limits\nof each society, and tends ever toward universality. That within each\nsociety it becomes greater as social evolution, implying increase\nof mutual dependence, progresses, needs not be shown; and it is a\ncorollary that as fast as dependence of societies on one another is\nincreased by commercial intercourse, the internal welfare of each\nbecomes a matter of concern to the others. That the impoverishment\nof any country, diminishing both its producing and consuming powers,\ntells detrimentally on the people of countries trading with it, is\na commonplace of political economy. Moreover, we have had of late\nyears, abundant experience of the industrial derangements through\nwhich distress is brought on nations not immediately concerned by\nwars between other nations. And if each community has the egoistic\nsatisfactions of its members diminished by aggressions of neighboring\ncommunities on one another, still more does it have them diminished by\nits own aggressions. One who marks how, in various parts of the world,\nthe unscrupulous greed of conquest cloaked by pretences of spreading\nthe blessings of British rule and British religion, is now reacting\nto the immense detriment of the industrial classes at home, alike\nby increasing expenditure and paralyzing trade, may see that these\nindustrial classes, absorbed in questions about capital and labor, and\nthinking themselves unconcerned in our doings abroad, are suffering\nfrom lack of that wide-reaching altruism which should insist on just\ndealings with other peoples, civilized or savage. And he may also see\nthat beyond these immediate evils, they will for a generation to come\nsuffer the evils that must flow from resuscitating the type of social\norganization which aggressive activities produce, and from the lowered\nmoral tone which is its accompaniment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nTRIAL AND COMPROMISE.\n\n\n\u00a7 82. In the foregoing two chapters the case on behalf of Egoism and\nthe case on behalf of Altruism have been stated. The two conflict; and\nwe have now to consider what verdict ought to be given.\n\nIf the opposed statements are severally valid, or even if each of them\nis valid in part, the inference must be that pure egoism and pure\naltruism are both illegitimate. If the maxim, \"Live for self,\" is\nwrong, so also is the maxim, \"Live for others.\" Hence, a compromise is\nthe only possibility.\n\nThis conclusion, though already seeming unavoidable, I do not here set\ndown as proved. The purpose of this chapter is to justify it in full,\nand I enunciate it at the outset because the arguments used will be\nbetter understood, if the conclusion to which they converge is in the\nreader's view.\n\nHow shall we so conduct the discussion as most clearly to bring out\nthis necessity for a compromise? Perhaps the best way will be that\nof stating one of the two claims in its extreme form, and observing\nthe implied absurdities. To deal thus with the principle of pure\nselfishness would be to waste space. Every one sees that an unchecked\nsatisfaction of personal desires from moment to moment, in absolute\ndisregard of all other beings, would cause universal conflict and\nsocial dissolution. The principle of pure unselfishness, less obviously\nmischievous, may therefore better be chosen.\n\nThere are two aspects under which the doctrine that others' happiness\nis the true ethical aim presents itself. The \"others\" may be conceived\npersonally, as individuals with whom we stand in direct relations, or\nthey may be conceived impersonally, as constituting the community. In\nso far as the self-abnegation implied by pure altruism is concerned,\nit matters not in which sense \"others\" is used. But criticism will be\nfacilitated by distinguishing between these two forms of it. We will\ntake the last form first.\n\n\n\u00a7 83. This commits us to an examination of \"the greatest happiness\nprinciple,\" as enunciated by Bentham and his followers. The doctrine\nthat \"the general happiness\" ought to be the object of pursuit, is\nnot, indeed, overtly identified with pure altruism. But as, if general\nhappiness is the proper end of action, the individual actor must regard\nhis own share of it simply as a unit in the aggregate, no more to be\nvalued by him than any other unit, it results that since this unit is\nalmost infinitesimal in comparison with the aggregate, his action, if\ndirected exclusively to achievement of general happiness, is, if not\nabsolutely altruistic, as nearly so as may be. Hence, the theory which\nmakes general happiness the immediate object of pursuit may rightly be\ntaken as one form of the pure altruism to be here criticised.\n\nBoth as justifying this interpretation and as furnishing a definite\nproposition with which to deal, let me set out by quoting a passage\nfrom Mr. Mill's _Utilitarianism_:\n\n  \"The Greatest Happiness Principle,\" he says, \"is a mere form of\n  words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness,\n  supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind),\n  is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being\n  supplied, Bentham's dictum, 'everybody to count for one, nobody for\n  more than one,' might be written under the principle of utility as an\n  explanatory commentary\" (p. 91).\n\nNow, though the meaning of \"greatest happiness,\" as an end, is here\nto a certain degree defined, the need for further definition is felt\nthe moment we attempt to decide on ways of regulating conduct so as\nto attain the end. The first question which arises is, must we regard\nthis \"greatest happiness principle\" as a principle of guidance for the\ncommunity in its corporate capacity, or as a principle of guidance\nfor its members separately considered, or both? If the reply is that\nthe principle must be taken as a guide for governmental action rather\nthan for individual action, we are at once met by the inquiry, what\nis to be the guide for individual action? If individual action is not\nto be regulated solely for the purpose of achieving \"the greatest\nhappiness of the greatest number,\" some other principle of regulation\nfor individual action is required, and \"the greatest happiness\nprinciple\" fails to furnish the needful ethical standard. Should it be\nrejoined that the individual in his capacity of political unit is to\ntake furtherance of general happiness as his end, giving his vote or\notherwise acting on the legislature with a view to this end, and that\nin so far guidance is supplied to him, there comes the further inquiry,\nwhence is to come guidance for the remainder of individual conduct,\nconstituting by far the greater part of it? If this private part of\nindividual conduct is not to have general happiness as its direct aim,\nthen an ethical standard other than that offered has still to be found.\n\nHence, unless pure altruism as thus formulated confesses its\ninadequacy, it must justify itself as a sufficient rule for all\nconduct, individual and social. We will first deal with it as the\nalleged right principle of public policy; and then as the alleged right\nprinciple of private action.\n\n\n\u00a7 84. On trying to understand precisely the statement that when taking\ngeneral happiness as an end, the rule must be--\"everybody to count for\none, nobody for more than one,\" there arises the idea of distribution.\nWe can form no idea of distribution without thinking of something\ndistributed and recipients of this something. That we may clearly\nconceive the proposition we must clearly conceive both these elements\nof it. Let us take first the recipients.\n\n\"Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one.\" Does this mean\nthat, in respect of whatever is proportioned out, each is to have the\nsame share whatever his character, whatever his conduct? Shall he if\npassive have as much as if active? Shall he if useless have as much as\nif useful? Shall he if criminal have as much as if virtuous? If the\ndistribution is to be made without reference to the natures and deeds\nof the recipients, then it must be shown that a system which equalizes,\nas far as it can, the treatment of good and bad, will be beneficial.\nIf the distribution is not to be indiscriminate, then the formula\ndisappears. The something distributed must be apportioned otherwise\nthan by equal division. There must be adjustment of amounts to deserts;\nand we are left in the dark as to the mode of adjustment--we have to\nfind other guidance.\n\nLet us next ask what is the something to be distributed? The first\nidea which occurs is that happiness itself must be divided out among\nall. Taken literally, the notions that the greatest happiness should\nbe the end sought, and that in apportioning it everybody should count\nfor one and nobody for more than one, imply that happiness is something\nthat can be cut up into parts and handed round. This, however, is an\nimpossible interpretation. But after recognizing the impossibility\nof it, there returns the question--What is it in respect of which\neverybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one?\n\nShall the interpretation be that the concrete means to happiness are\nto be equally divided? Is it intended that there shall be distributed\nto all in equal portions the necessaries of life, the appliances to\ncomfort, the facilities for amusement? As a conception simply, this\nis more defensible. But passing over the question of policy--passing\nover the question whether greatest happiness would _ultimately_ be\nsecured by such a process (which it obviously would not) it turns out\non examination that greatest happiness could not even _proximately_\nbe so secured. Differences of age, of growth, of constitutional need,\ndifferences of activity and consequent expenditure, differences of\ndesires and tastes, would entail the inevitable result that the\nmaterial aids to happiness which each received would be more or less\nunadapted to his requirements. Even if purchasing power were equally\ndivided, the greatest happiness would not be achieved if everybody\ncounted for one and nobody for more than one; since, as the capacities\nfor utilizing the purchased means to happiness would vary both with the\nconstitution and the stage of life, the means which would approximately\nsuffice to satisfy the wants of one would be extremely insufficient to\nsatisfy the wants of another, and so the greatest total of happiness\nwould not be obtained: means might be unequally apportioned in a way\nthat would produce a greater total.\n\nBut now if happiness itself cannot be cut up and distributed equally,\nand if equal division of the material aids to happiness would not\nproduce greatest happiness, what is the thing to be thus apportioned?\nWhat is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody\nfor more than one? There seems but a single possibility. There remain\nto be equally distributed nothing but the conditions under which each\nmay pursue happiness. The limitations to action--the degrees of freedom\nand restraint, shall be alike for all. Each shall have as much liberty\nto pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to\npursue their ends by others; and one as much as another shall have the\nenjoyment of that which his efforts, carried on within these limits,\nobtain. But to say that in respect of these conditions everybody shall\ncount for one and nobody for more than one, is simply to say that\nequity shall be enforced.\n\nThus, considered as a principle of public policy, Bentham's principle,\nwhen analyzed, transforms itself into the principle he slights. Not\ngeneral happiness becomes the ethical standard by which legislative\naction is to be guided, but universal justice. And so the altruistic\ntheory under this form collapses.\n\n\n\u00a7 85. From examining the doctrine that general happiness should be\nthe end of public action, we pass now to examine the doctrine that it\nshould be the end of private action.\n\nIt is contended that from the standpoint of pure reason, the happiness\nof others has no less a claim as an object of pursuit for each than\npersonal happiness. Considered as parts of a total, happiness felt by\nself and like happiness felt by another, are of equal values; and hence\nit is inferred that, rationally estimated, the obligation to expend\neffort for others' benefit, is as great as the obligation to expend\neffort for one's own benefit. Holding that the utilitarian system of\nmorals, rightly understood, harmonizes with the Christian maxim, \"Love\nyour neighbor as yourself,\" Mr. Mill says that \"as between his own\nhappiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as\nstrictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator\" (p.\n24). Let us consider the alternative interpretations which may be given\nto this statement.\n\nSuppose, first, that a certain quantum of happiness has in some way\nbecome available, without the special instrumentality of A, B, C, or\nD, constituting the group concerned. Then the proposition is that each\nshall be ready to have this quantum of happiness as much enjoyed by one\nor more of the others as by himself. The disinterested and benevolent\nspectator would clearly, in such a case, rule that no one ought to have\nmore of the happiness than another. But here, assuming as we do that\nthe quantum of happiness has become available without the agency of\nany among the group, simple equity dictates as much. No one having in\nany way established a claim different from the claims of others, their\nclaims are equal; and due regard for justice by each will not permit\nhim to monopolize the happiness.\n\nNow suppose a different case. Suppose that the quantum of happiness has\nbeen made available by the efforts of one member of the group. Suppose\nthat A has acquired by labor some material aid to happiness. He decides\nto act as the disinterested and benevolent spectator would direct. What\nwill he decide?--what would the spectator direct? Let us consider the\npossible suppositions, taking first the least reasonable.\n\nThe spectator may be conceived as deciding that the labor expended by\nA in acquiring this material aid to happiness, originates no claim to\nspecial use of it; but that it ought to be given to B, C, or D, or that\nit ought to be divided equally among B, C, and D, or that it ought to\nbe divided equally among all members of the group, including A who has\nlabored for it. And if the spectator is conceived as deciding thus\nto-day, he must be conceived as deciding thus day after day; with the\nresult that one of the group expends all the effort, getting either\nnone of the benefit or only his numerical share, while the others get\ntheir shares of the benefit without expending any efforts. That A\nmight conceive the disinterested and benevolent spectator to decide in\nthis way, and might feel bound to act in conformity with the imagined\ndecision, is a strong supposition; and probably it will be admitted\nthat such kind of impartiality, so far from being conducive to the\ngeneral happiness, would quickly be fatal to every one. But this is\nnot all. Action in pursuance of such a decision would in reality be\nnegatived by the very principle enunciated. For not only A, but also B,\nC, and D, have to act on this principle. Each of them must behave as\nhe conceives an impartial spectator would decide. Does B conceive the\nimpartial spectator as awarding to him, B, the product of A's labor?\nThen the assumption is that B conceives the impartial spectator as\nfavoring himself, B, more than A conceives him as favoring himself, A;\nwhich is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Does B, in conceiving the\nimpartial spectator, exclude his own interests as completely as A does?\nThen how can he decide so much to his own advantage, so partially, as\nto allow him to take from A an equal share of the benefit gained by A's\nlabor, toward which he and the rest have done nothing?\n\nPassing from this conceivable, though not credible, decision of the\nspectator, here noted for the purpose of observing that habitual\nconformity to it would be impossible, there remains to be considered\nthe decision which a spectator really impartial would give. He would\nsay that the happiness, or material aid to happiness, which had been\npurchased by A's labor, was to be taken by A. He would say that B,\nC, and D had no claims to it, but only to such happiness, or aids to\nhappiness, as their respective labors had purchased. Consequently, A,\nacting as the imaginary impartial spectator would direct, is, by this\ntest, justified in appropriating such happiness or aid to happiness as\nhis own efforts have achieved.\n\nAnd so under its special form as under its general form, the principle\nis true only in so far as it embodies a disguised justice. Analysis\nagain brings out the result that making \"general happiness\" the end\nof action, really means maintaining what we call equitable relations\namong individuals. Decline to accept in its vague form \"the greatest\nhappiness principle,\" and insist on knowing what is the implied\nconduct, public, or private, and it turns out that the principle is\nmeaningless save as indirectly asserting that the claims of each should\nbe duly regarded by all. The utilitarian altruism becomes a duly\nqualified egoism.\n\n\n\u00a7 86. Another point of view from which to judge the altruistic theory\nmay now be taken. If, assuming the proper object of pursuit to be\ngeneral happiness, we proceed rationally, we must ask in what different\nways the aggregate, general happiness, may be composed; and must then\nask what composition of it will yield the largest sum.\n\nSuppose that each citizen pursues his own happiness independently, not\nto the detriment of others, but without active concern for others; then\ntheir united happinesses constitute a certain sum--a certain general\nhappiness. Now suppose that each, instead of making his own happiness\nthe object of pursuit, makes the happiness of others the object of\npursuit; then, again, there results a certain sum of happiness. This\nsum must be less than, or equal to, or greater than, the first. If it\nis admitted that this sum is either less than the first, or only equal\nto it, the altruistic course of action is confessedly either worse\nthan, or no better than, the egoistic. The assumption must be that the\nsum of happiness obtained is greater. Let us observe what is involved\nin this assumption.\n\nIf each pursues exclusively the happiness of others; and if each is\nalso a recipient of happiness (which he must be, for otherwise no\naggregate happiness can be formed out of their individual happinesses);\nthen the implication is that each gains the happiness due to altruistic\naction exclusively; and that in each this is greater in amount than the\negoistic happiness obtainable by him, if he devoted himself to pursuit\nof it. Leaving out of consideration for a moment these relative amounts\nof the two, let us note the conditions to the receipt of altruistic\nhappiness by each. The sympathetic nature gets pleasure by giving\npleasure; and the proposition is that if the general happiness is\nthe object of pursuit, each will be made happy by witnessing others'\nhappiness. But what in such case constitutes the happiness of others?\nThese others are also, by the hypothesis, pursuers and receivers of\naltruistic pleasure. The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is\nto depend on the display of pleasures by others; which is again to\ndepend on the display of pleasures by others; and so on perpetually.\nWhere, then, is the pleasure to begin? Obviously there must be egoistic\npleasure somewhere before there can be the altruistic pleasure caused\nby sympathy with it. Obviously, therefore, each must be egoistic in due\namount, even if only with the view of giving others the possibility of\nbeing altruistic. So far from the sum of happiness being made greater\nif all make greatest happiness the exclusive end, the sum disappears\nentirely.\n\nHow absurd is the supposition that the happiness of all can be achieved\nwithout each pursuing his own happiness, will be best shown by a\nphysical simile. Suppose a cluster of bodies, each of which generates\nheat, and each of which is, therefore, while a radiator of heat to\nthose around, also a receiver of heat from them. Manifestly each will\nhave a certain proper heat irrespective of that which it gains from\nthe rest; and, each will have a certain heat gained from the rest\nirrespective of its proper heat. What will happen? So long as each\nof the bodies continues to be a generator of heat, each continues to\nmaintain a temperature partly derived from itself and partly derived\nfrom others. But if each ceases to generate heat for itself and depends\non the heat radiated to it by the rest, the entire cluster becomes\ncold. Well, the self-generated heat stands for egoistic pleasure; the\nheat radiated and received stands for sympathetic pleasure; and the\ndisappearance of all heat if each ceases to be an originator of it,\ncorresponds to the disappearance of all pleasure if each ceases to\noriginate it egoistically.\n\nA further conclusion may be drawn. Besides the implication that before\naltruistic pleasure can exist, egoistic pleasure must exist, and\nthat if the rule of conduct is to be the same for all, each must be\negoistic in due degree; there is the implication that, to achieve the\ngreatest sum of happiness, each must be more egoistic than altruistic.\nFor, speaking generally, sympathetic pleasures must ever continue\nless intense than the pleasures with which there is sympathy. Other\nthings equal, ideal feelings cannot be as vivid as real feelings.\nIt is true that those having strong imaginations may, especially in\ncases where the affections are engaged, feel the moral pain if not\nthe physical pain of another, as keenly as the actual sufferer of\nit, and may participate with like intensity in another's pleasure;\nsometimes even mentally representing the received pleasure as greater\nthan it really is, and so getting reflex pleasure greater than the\nrecipients' direct pleasure. Such cases, however, and cases in which\neven apart from exultation of sympathy caused by attachment, there\nis a body of feeling sympathetically aroused equal in amount to the\noriginal feeling, if not greater, are necessarily exceptional. For\nin such cases the total consciousness includes many other elements\nbesides the mentally-represented pleasure or pain--notably the luxury\nof pity and the luxury of goodness; and genesis of these can occur but\noccasionally; they could not be habitual concomitants of sympathetic\npleasures if all pursued these from moment to moment. In estimating the\npossible totality of sympathetic pleasures, we must include nothing\nbeyond the representations of the pleasures others experience. And\nunless it be asserted that we can have other's states of consciousness\nperpetually reproduced in us more vividly than the kindred states of\nconsciousness are aroused in ourselves by their proper personal causes,\nit must be admitted that the totality of altruistic pleasures cannot\nbecome equal to the totality of egoistic pleasures. Hence, beyond the\ntruth that before there can be altruistic pleasures there must be the\negoistic pleasures from sympathy with which they arise, there is the\ntruth that to obtain the greatest sum of altruistic pleasures, there\nmust be a greater sum of egoistic pleasures.\n\n\n\u00a7 87. That pure altruism is suicidal may be yet otherwise demonstrated.\nA perfectly moral law must be one which becomes perfectly practicable\nas human nature becomes perfect. If its practicableness decreases as\nhuman nature improves; and if an ideal human nature necessitates its\nimpracticability, it cannot be the moral law sought.\n\nNow opportunities for practicing altruism are numerous and great in\nproportion as there is weakness, or incapacity, or imperfection. If\nwe passed beyond the limits of the family, in which a sphere for\nself-sacrificing activities must be preserved as long as offspring\nhave to be reared; and if we ask how there can continue a social\nsphere for self-sacrificing activities, it becomes obvious that the\ncontinued existence of serious evils, caused by prevalent defects of\nnature, is implied. As fast as men adapt themselves to the requirements\nof social life, so fast will the demands for efforts on their behalf\ndiminish. And with arrival at finished adaptation, when all persons\nare at once completely self-conserved and completely able to fulfill\nthe obligations which society imposes on them, those occasions for\npostponement of self to others, which pure altruism contemplates,\ndisappear.\n\nSuch self-sacrifices become, indeed, doubly impracticable. Carrying on\nsuccessfully their several lives, men not only cannot yield to those\naround the opportunities for giving aid, but aid cannot ordinarily\nbe given them without interfering with their normal activities, and\nso diminishing their pleasures. Like every inferior creature, led by\nits innate desires spontaneously to do all that its life requires,\nman, when completely molded to the social state, must have desires so\nadjusted to his needs that he fulfills the needs in gratifying the\ndesires. And if his desires are severally gratified by the performance\nof required acts, none of these can be performed for him without\nbalking his desires. Acceptance from others of the results of their\nactivities can take place only on condition of relinquishing the\npleasures derived from his own activities. Diminution rather than\nincrease of happiness would result, could altruistic action in such\ncase be enforced.\n\nAnd here, indeed, we are introduced to another baseless assumption\nwhich the theory makes.\n\n\n\u00a7 88. The postulate of utilitarianism as formulated in the statements\nabove quoted, and of pure altruism as otherwise expressed, involves the\nbelief that it is possible for happiness, or the means to happiness, or\nthe conditions to happiness, to be transferred. Without any specified\nlimitation the proposition taken for granted is, that happiness in\ngeneral admits of detachment from one and attachment to another--that\nsurrender to any extent is possible by one and appropriation to any\nextent is possible by another. But a moment's thought shows this to be\nfar from the truth. On the one hand, surrender carried to a certain\npoint is extremely mischievous and to a further point fatal; and on the\nother hand, much of the happiness each enjoys is self-generated and can\nneither be given nor received.\n\nTo assume that egoistic pleasures may be relinquished to any extent,\nis to fall into one of those many errors of ethical speculation which\nresult from ignoring the truths of biology. When taking the biological\nview of ethics we saw that pleasures accompany normal amounts of\nfunctions, while pains accompany defects or excesses of functions;\nfurther, that complete life depends on complete discharge of functions,\nand therefore on receipt of the correlative pleasures. Hence, to yield\nup normal pleasures is to yield up so much life; and there arises\nthe question--To what extent may this be done? If he is to continue\nliving, the individual _must_ take certain amounts of those pleasures\nwhich go along with fulfillment of the bodily functions, and _must_\navoid the pains which entire non-fulfillment of them entails. Complete\nabnegation means death; excessive abnegation means illness; abnegation\nless excessive means physical degradation and consequent loss of\npower to fulfill obligations, personal and other. When, therefore, we\nattempt to specialize the proposal to live not for self-satisfaction\nbut for the satisfaction of others, we meet with the difficulty that\nbeyond a certain limit this cannot be done. And when we have decided\nwhat decrease of bodily welfare, caused by sacrifice of pleasures and\nacceptance of pains, it is proper for the individual to make, there\nis forced on us the fact that the portion of happiness, or means to\nhappiness, which it is possible for him to yield up for redistribution,\nis a limited portion.\n\nEven more rigorous on another side is the restriction put upon the\ntransfer of happiness, or the means to happiness. The pleasures\ngained by efficient action--by successful pursuit of ends, cannot by\nany process be parted with, and cannot in any way be appropriated by\nanother. The habit of arguing about general happiness sometimes as\nthough it were a concrete product to be portioned out, and sometimes\nas though it were co-extensive with the use of those material aids to\npleasure which may be given and received, has caused inattention to the\ntruth that the pleasures of achievement are not transferable. Alike in\nthe boy who has won a game of marbles, the athlete who has performed\na feat, the statesman who has gained a party triumph, the inventor\nwho has devised a new machine, the man of science who has discovered\na truth, the novelist who has well delineated a character, the poet\nwho has finely rendered an emotion, we see pleasures which must, in\nthe nature of things, be enjoyed exclusively by those to whom they\ncome. And if we look at all such occupations as men are not impelled\nto by their necessities--if we contemplate the various ambitions which\nplay so large a part in life; we are reminded that so long as the\nconsciousness of efficiency remains a dominant pleasure, there will\nremain a dominant pleasure which cannot be pursued altruistically but\nmust be pursued egoistically.\n\nCutting off, then, at the one end, those pleasures which are\ninseparable from maintenance of the physique in an uninjured state; and\ncutting off at the other end the pleasures of successful action; the\namount that remains is so greatly diminished as to make untenable the\nassumption that happiness at large admits of distribution after the\nmanner which utilitarianism assumes.\n\n\n\u00a7 89. In yet one more way may be shown the inconsistency of this\ntransfigured utilitarianism which regards its doctrine as embodying the\nChristian maxim--\"Love your neighbor as yourself,\" and of that altruism\nwhich, going still further, enunciates the maxim--\"Live for others.\"\n\nA right rule of conduct must be one which may with advantage be adopted\nby all. \"Act according to that maxim only, which you can wish, at the\nsame time, to become a universal law,\" says Kant. And clearly, passing\nover needful qualifications of this maxim, we may accept it to the\nextent of admitting that a mode of action which becomes impracticable\nas it approaches universality, must be wrong. Hence, if the theory of\npure altruism, implying that effort should be expended for the benefit\nof others and not for personal benefit, is defensible, it must be shown\nthat it will produce good results when acted upon by all. Mark the\nconsequences if all are purely altruistic.\n\nFirst, an impossible combination of moral attributes is implied. Each\nis supposed by the hypothesis to regard self so little and others\nso much, that he willingly sacrifices his own pleasures to give\npleasures to them. But if this is a universal trait, and if action\nis universally congruous with it, we have to conceive each as being\nnot only a sacrificer but also one who accepts sacrifices. While he\nis so unselfish as willingly to yield up the benefit for which he has\nlabored, he is so selfish as willingly to let others yield up to him\nthe benefits they have labored for. To make pure altruism possible\nfor all, each must be at once extremely unegoistic and extremely\negoistic. As a giver, he must have no thought for self; as a receiver,\nno thought for others. Evidently, this implies an inconceivable mental\nconstitution. The sympathy which is so solicitous for others as\nwillingly to injure self in benefiting them, cannot at the same time\nbe so regardless of others as to accept benefits which they injure\nthemselves in giving.\n\nThe incongruities that emerge if we assume pure altruism to be\nuniversally practiced, may be otherwise exhibited thus. Suppose that\neach, instead of enjoying such pleasures as come to him, or such\nconsumable appliances to pleasure as he has worked for, or such\noccasions for pleasure as reward his efforts, relinquishes these to a\nsingle other, or adds them to a common stock from which others benefit,\nwhat will result? Different answers may be given according as we assume\nthat there are, or are not, additional influences brought into play.\n\nSuppose there are no additional influences. Then, if each transfers\nto another his happiness, or means to happiness, or occasions for\nhappiness, while some one else does the like to him, the distribution\nof happiness is, on the average, unchanged; or if each adds to a common\nstock his happiness, or means to happiness, or occasions for happiness,\nfrom which common stock each appropriates his portion, the average\nstate is still, as before, unchanged. The only obvious effect is that\ntransactions must be gone through in the redistribution; and loss of\ntime and labor must result.\n\nNow suppose some additional influence which makes the process\nbeneficial; what must it be? The totality can be increased only if the\nacts of transfer increase the quantity of that which is transferred.\nThe happiness, or that which brings it, must be greater to one who\nderives it from another's efforts than it would have been had his own\nefforts procured it; or otherwise, supposing a fund of happiness,\nor of that which brings it, has been formed by contributions from\neach, then each, in appropriating his share, must find it larger\nthan it would have been had no such aggregation and dispersion\ntaken place. To justify belief in such increase two conceivable\nassumptions may be made. One is that though the sum of pleasures, or of\npleasure-yielding things, remains the same yet the kind of pleasure,\nor of pleasure-yielding things, which each receives in exchange from\nanother, or from the aggregate of others, is one which he appreciates\nmore than that for which he labored. But to assume this is to assume\nthat each labors directly for the thing which he enjoys less, rather\nthan for the thing which he enjoys more, which is absurd. The other\nassumption is that while the exchanged, or redistributed pleasure\nof the egoistic kind, remains the same in amount for each, there\nis added to it the altruistic pleasure accompanying the exchange.\nBut this assumption is clearly inadmissible if, as is implied, the\ntransaction is universal--is one through which each becomes giver and\nreceiver to equal extents. For if the transfer of pleasures, or of\npleasure-yielding things, from one to another or others, is always\naccompanied by the consciousness that there will be received from him\nor them an equivalent; there results merely a tacit exchange, either\ndirect or roundabout. Each becomes altruistic in no greater degree\nthan is implied by being equitable; and each, having nothing to exalt\nhis happiness, sympathetically or otherwise, cannot be a source of\nsympathetic happiness to others.\n\n\n\u00a7 90. Thus, when the meanings of its words are inquired into, or\nwhen the necessary implications of its theory are examined, pure\naltruism, in whatever form expressed, commits its adherents to various\nabsurdities.\n\nIf \"the greatest happiness of the greatest number,\" or in other words,\n\"the general happiness,\" is the proper end of action, then not only\nfor all public action but for all private action, it must be the end;\nbecause, otherwise, the greater part of action remains unguided.\nConsider its fitness for each. If corporate action is to be guided\nby the principle, with its interpreting comment, \"everybody to count\nfor one, nobody for more than one,\" there must be an ignoring of all\ndifferences of character and conduct, merits and demerits, among\ncitizens, since no discrimination is provided for, and, moreover, since\nthat in respect of which all are to count alike cannot be happiness\nitself, which is indistributable, and since equal sharing of the\nconcrete means to happiness, besides failing ultimately would fail\nproximately to produce the greatest happiness; it results that equal\ndistribution of the conditions under which happiness may be pursued\nis the only tenable meaning: we discover in the principle nothing but\na round-about insistance on equity. If, taking happiness at large as\nthe aim of private action, the individual is required to judge between\nhis own happiness and that of others as an impartial spectator would\ndo, we see that no supposition concerning the spectator save one\nwhich suicidally ascribes partiality to him, can bring out any other\nresult than that each shall enjoy such happiness, or appropriate such\nmeans to happiness, as his own efforts gain: equity is again the sole\ncontent. When, adopting another method, we consider how the greatest\nsum of happiness may be composed, and, recognizing the fact that\nequitable egoism will produce a certain sum, ask how pure altruism\nis to produce a greater sum; we are shown that if all, exclusively\npursuing altruistic pleasures, are so to produce a greater sum of\npleasures, the implication is that altruistic pleasures, which arise\nfrom sympathy, can exist in the absence of egoistic pleasures with\nwhich there may be sympathy--an impossibility; and another implication\nis that if, the necessity for egoistic pleasures being admitted, it\nis said that the greatest sum of happiness will be attained if all\nindividuals are more altruistic than egoistic, it is indirectly said\nthat as a general truth, representative feelings are stronger than\npresentative feelings--another impossibility. Again, the doctrine of\npure altruism assumes that happiness may be to any extent transferred\nor redistributed; whereas the fact is that pleasures of one order\ncannot be transferred in large measure without results which are fatal\nor extremely injurious, and that pleasures of another order cannot be\ntransferred in any degree. Further, pure altruism presents this fatal\nanomaly, that while a right principle of action must be more and more\npracticed as men improve, the altruistic principle becomes less and\nless practicable as men approach an ideal form, because the sphere for\npracticing it continually decreases. Finally its self-destructiveness\nis made manifest on observing that for all to adopt it as a principle\nof action, which they must do if it is a sound principle, implies that\nall are at once extremely unegoistic and extremely egoistic--ready to\ninjure self for others' benefit, and ready to accept benefit at the\ncost of injury to others: traits which cannot co-exist.\n\nThe need for a compromise between egoism and altruism is thus made\nconspicuous. We are forced to recognize the claims which his own\nwell-being has on the attention of each by noting how, in some\ndirections we come to a deadlock, in others to contradictions, and\nin others to disastrous results, if they are ignored. Conversely, it\nis undeniable that disregard of others by each, carried to a great\nextent, is fatal to society, and carried to a still greater extent is\nfatal to the family, and eventually to the race. Egoism and altruism\nare therefore co-essential.\n\n\n\u00a7 91. What form is the compromise between egoism and altruism to\nassume? how are their respective claims to be satisfied in due degrees?\n\nIt is a truth insisted on by moralists and recognized in common life,\nthat the achievement of individual happiness is not proportionate to\nthe degree in which individual happiness is made the object of direct\npursuit; but there has not yet become current the belief that, in like\nmanner, the achievement of general happiness is not proportionate to\nthe degree in which general happiness is made the object of direct\npursuit. Yet failure of direct pursuit in the last case is more\nreasonably to be expected than in the first.\n\nWhen discussing the relations of means and ends, we saw that as\nindividual conduct evolves, its principle becomes more and more that\nof making fulfillment of means the proximate end, and leaving the\nultimate end, welfare or happiness, to come as a result. And we saw\nthat when general welfare or happiness is the ultimate end, the same\nprinciple holds even more rigorously; since the ultimate end under its\nimpersonal form is less determinate than under its personal form, and\nthe difficulties in the way of achieving it by direct pursuit still\ngreater. Recognizing, then, the fact that corporate happiness still\nmore than individual happiness, must be pursued not directly, but\nindirectly, the first question for us is--What must be the general\nnature of the means through which it is to be achieved.\n\nIt is admitted that self-happiness is, in a measure, to be obtained\nby furthering the happiness of others. May it not be true that,\nconversely, general happiness is to be obtained by furthering\nself-happiness? If the well-being of each unit is to be reached partly\nthrough his care for the well-being of the aggregate, is not the\nwell-being of the aggregate to be reached partly through the care of\neach unit for himself? Clearly, our conclusion must be that general\nhappiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of\ntheir own happiness by individuals; while, reciprocally, the happiness\nof individuals are to be achieved in part by their pursuit of the\ngeneral happiness.\n\nAnd this is the conclusion embodied in the progressing ideas and usages\nof mankind. This compromise between egoism and altruism has been\nslowly establishing itself; and toward recognition of its propriety,\nmen's actual beliefs, as distinguished from their nominal beliefs,\nhave been gradually approaching. Social evolution has been bringing\nabout a state in which the claims of the individual to the proceeds of\nhis activities, and to such satisfactions as they bring, are more and\nmore positively asserted; at the same time that insistance on others'\nclaims, and habitual respect for them have been increasing. Among\nthe rudest savages personal interests are very vaguely distinguished\nfrom the interests of others. In early stages of civilization the\nproportioning of benefits to efforts is extremely rude: slaves and\nserfs get for work arbitrary amounts of food and shelter: exchange\nbeing infrequent, there is little to develop the idea of equivalence.\nBut as civilization advances and status passes into contract there\ncomes daily experience of the relation between advantages enjoyed\nand labor given: the industrial system maintaining, through supply\nand demand, a due adjustment of the one to the other. And this growth\nof voluntary co-operation, this exchange of services under agreement,\nhas been necessarily accompanied by decrease of aggressions one upon\nanother, and increase of sympathy: leading to exchange of services\nbeyond agreement. That is to say, the more distinct assertions\nof individual claims, and more rigorous apportioning of personal\nenjoyments to efforts expended, has gone hand in hand with growth of\nthat negative altruism shown in equitable conduct and that positive\naltruism shown in gratuitous aid.\n\nA higher phase of this double change has in our own times become\nconspicuous. If, on the one hand, we note the struggles for political\nfreedom, the contests between labor and capital, the judicial reforms\nmade to facilitate enforcement of rights, we see that the tendency\nstill is toward complete appropriation by each of whatever benefits are\ndue to him, and consequent exclusion of his fellows from such benefits.\nOn the other hand, if we consider what is meant by the surrender of\npower to the masses, the abolition of class-privileges, the efforts\nto diffuse knowledge, the agitations to spread temperance, the\nmultitudinous philanthropic societies; it becomes clear that regard for\nthe well-being of others is increasing _pari passu_ with the taking of\nmeans to secure personal well-being.\n\nWhat holds of the relations within each society holds to some extent,\nif to a less extent, of the relations between societies. Though,\nto maintain national claims, real or imaginary, often of a trivial\nkind, the civilized still make war on one another; yet their\nseveral nationalities are more respected than in past ages. Though\nby victors portions of territory are taken and money compensations\nexacted; yet conquest is not now, as of old, habitually followed\nby entire appropriation of territories and enslavement of peoples.\nThe individualities of societies are in a larger measure preserved.\nMeanwhile the altruistic intercourse is greater: aid is rendered on\noccasions of disaster by flood, by fire, by famine, or otherwise.\nAnd in international arbitration as lately exemplified, implying the\nrecognition of claims by one nation upon another, we see a further\nprogress in this wider altruism. Doubtless there is much to be said\nby way of set-off; for in the dealings of the civilized with the\nuncivilized little of this progress can be traced. It may be urged that\nthe primitive rule, \"Life for life,\" has been developed by us into the\nrule, \"For one life many lives,\" as in the cases of Bishop Patteson\nand Mr. Birch, but then there is the qualifying fact that we do not\ntorture our prisoners or mutilate them. If it be said that as the\nHebrews thought themselves warranted in seizing the lands God promised\nto them, and in some cases exterminating the inhabitants, so we, to\nfulfill the \"manifest intention of Providence,\" dispossess inferior\nraces whenever we want their territories; it may be replied that we do\nnot kill many more than seems needful, and tolerate the existence of\nthose who submit. And should any one point out that as Attila, while\nconquering or destroying peoples and nations, regarded himself as \"the\nscourge of God,\" punishing men for their sins, so we, as represented\nby a High Commissioner and a priest he quotes, think ourselves called\non to chastise with rifles and cannon, heathens who practice polygamy;\nthere is the rejoinder that not even the most ferocious disciple of\nthe teacher of mercy would carry his vengeance so far as to depopulate\nwhole territories and erase scores of cities. And when, on the other\nhand, we remember that there is an Aborigines Protection Society,\nthat there are Commissioners in certain colonies appointed to protect\nnative interests, and that in some cases the lands of natives have been\npurchased in ways which, however unfair, have implied some recognition\nof their claims; we may say that little as the compromise between\negoism and altruism has progressed in international affairs, it has\nstill progressed somewhat in the direction indicated.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nCONCILIATION.\n\n\n\u00a7 92. As exhibited in the last chapter, the compromise between the\nclaims of self and the claims of others seems to imply permanent\nantagonism between the two. The pursuit by each of his own happiness\nwhile paying due regard to the happiness of his fellows, apparently\nnecessitates the ever-recurring question--How far must the one end be\nsought and how far the other: suggesting, if not discord in the life of\neach, still, an absence of complete harmony. This is not the inevitable\ninference however.\n\nWhen, in the _Principles of Sociology_, Part III, the phenomena\nof race-maintenance among living things at large were discussed,\nthat the development of the domestic relations might be the better\nunderstood, it was shown that during evolution there has been going\non a conciliation between the interests of the species, the interests\nof the parents, and the interests of the offspring. Proof was given\nthat as we ascend from the lowest forms of life to the highest,\nrace-maintenance is achieved with a decreasing sacrifice of life,\nalike of young individuals and of adult individuals, and also with a\ndecreasing sacrifice of parental lives to the lives of offspring. We\nsaw that, with the progress of civilization, like changes go on among\nhuman beings; and that the highest domestic relations are those in\nwhich the conciliation of welfares within the family becomes greatest,\nwhile the welfare of the society is best subserved. Here it remains to\nbe shown that a kindred conciliation has been, and is, taking place\nbetween the interests of each citizen and the interests of citizens at\nlarge; tending ever toward a state in which the two become merged in\none, and in which the feelings answering to them respectively, fall\ninto complete concord.\n\nIn the family group, even as we observe it among many inferior\nvertebrates, we see that the parental sacrifice, now become so moderate\nin amount as to consist with long-continued parental life, is not\naccompanied by consciousness of sacrifice; but contrariwise, is made\nfrom a direct desire to make it: the altruistic labors on behalf of\nyoung are carried on in satisfaction of parental instincts. If we\ntrace these relations up through the grades of mankind, and observe\nhow largely love rather than obligation prompts the care of children,\nwe see the conciliation of interests to be such that achievement of\nparental happiness coincides with securing the happiness of offspring:\nthe wish for children among the childless, and the occasional adoption\nof children, showing how needful for attainment of certain egoistic\nsatisfactions are these altruistic activities. And further evolution,\ncausing along with higher nature diminished fertility, and therefore\nsmaller burdens on parents, may be expected to bring a state in which,\nfar more than now, the pleasures of adult life will consist in raising\noffspring to perfection while simultaneously furthering the immediate\nhappiness of offspring.\n\nNow though altruism of a social kind, lacking certain elements of\nparental altruism, can never attain the same level, yet it may be\nexpected to attain a level at which it will be like parental altruism\nin spontaneity--a level such that ministration to others' happiness\nwill become a daily need--a level such that the lower egoistic\nsatisfactions will be continually subordinated to this higher egoistic\nsatisfaction, not by any effort to subordinate them, but by the\npreference for this higher egoistic satisfaction whenever it can be\nobtained.\n\nLet us consider how the development of sympathy, which must advance as\nfast as conditions permit, will bring about this state.\n\n\n\u00a7 93. We have seen that during the evolution of life, pleasures and\npains have necessarily been the incentives to, and deterrents from,\nactions which the conditions of existence demanded and negatived. An\nimplied truth to be here noted is, that faculties which, under given\nconditions, yield partly pain and partly pleasure, cannot develop\nbeyond the limit at which they yield a surplus of pleasure: if beyond\nthat limit more pain than pleasure results from exercise of them, their\ngrowth must be arrested.\n\nThrough sympathy both these forms of feeling are excited. Now a\npleasurable consciousness is aroused on witnessing pleasure; now a\npainful consciousness is aroused on witnessing pain. Hence, if beings\naround him habitually manifest pleasure and but rarely pain, sympathy\nyields to its possessor a surplus of pleasure; while, contrariwise,\nif little pleasure is ordinarily witnessed and much pain, sympathy\nyields a surplus of pain to its possessor. The average development of\nsympathy must, therefore, be regulated by the average manifestations of\npleasure and pain in others. If the life usually led under given social\nconditions is such that suffering is daily inflicted, or is daily\ndisplayed by associates, sympathy cannot grow: to assume growth of it\nis to assume that the constitution will modify itself in such way as to\nincrease its pains and therefore depress its energies; and is to ignore\nthe truth that bearing any kind of pain gradually produces insensibilty\nto that pain, or callousness. On the other hand, if the social state\nis such that manifestations of pleasure predominate, sympathy will\nincrease; since sympathetic pleasures, adding to the totality of\npleasures enhancing vitality, conduce to the physical prosperity of the\nmost sympathetic, and since the pleasures of sympathy exceeding its\npains in all, lead to an exercise of it which strengthens it.\n\nThe first implication is one already more than once indicated. We have\nseen that along with habitual militancy and under the adapted type\nof social organization, sympathy cannot develop to any considerable\nheight. The destructive activities carried on against external\nenemies sear it; the state of feeling maintained causes within the\nsociety itself frequent acts of aggression or cruelty; and further,\nthe compulsory co-operation characterizing the militant _r\u00e9gime_\nnecessarily represses sympathy--exists only on condition of an\nunsympathetic treatment of some by others.\n\nBut even could the militant _r\u00e9gime_ forthwith end, the hinderance to\ndevelopment of sympathy would still be great. Though cessation of war\nwould imply increased adaptation of man to social life, and decrease\nof sundry evils, yet there would remain much non-adaptation and\nmuch consequent unhappiness. In the first place, that form of nature\nwhich has generated and still generates wars, though by implication\nraised to a higher form, would not at once be raised to so high a\nform that there would cease all injustices and the pains they cause.\nFor a considerable period after predatory activities had ended, the\ndefects of the predatory nature would continue: entailing their slowly\ndiminishing evils. In the second place, the ill-adjustment of the human\nconstitution to the pursuits of industrial life, must long persist,\nand may be expected to survive in a measure the cessation of wars: the\nrequired modes of activity must remain for innumerable generations in\nsome degree displeasurable. And in the third place, deficiencies of\nself-control such as the improvident show us, as well as those many\nfailures of conduct due to inadequate foresight of consequences, though\nless marked than now, could not fail still to produce suffering.\n\nNor would even complete adaptation, if limited to disappearance of the\nnon-adaptations just indicated, remove all sources of those miseries\nwhich, to the extent of their manifestation, check the growth of\nsympathy. For while the rate of multiplication continues so to exceed\nthe rate of mortality as to cause pressure on the means of subsistence,\nthere must continue to result much unhappiness; either from balked\naffections or from overwork and stinted means. Only as fast as\nfertility diminishes, which we have seen it must do along with further\nmental development (_Principles of Biology_, \u00a7\u00a7 367-377), can there go\non such diminution of the labors required for efficiently supporting\nself and family, that they will not constitute a displeasurable tax on\nthe energies.\n\nGradually then, and only gradually, as these various causes of\nunhappiness become less can sympathy become greater. Life would be\nintolerable if, while the causes of misery remained as they now are,\nall men were not only in a high degree sensitive to the pains, bodily\nand mental, felt by those around and expressed in the faces of those\nthey met, but were unceasingly conscious of the miseries everywhere\nbeing suffered as consequences of war, crime, misconduct, misfortune,\nimprovidence, incapacity. But, as the molding and re-molding of man\nand society into mutual fitness progresses, and as the pains caused by\nunfitness decrease, sympathy can increase in presence of the pleasures\nthat come from fitness. The two changes are indeed so related that\neach furthers the other. Such growth of sympathy as conditions permit,\nitself aids in lessening pain and augmenting pleasure: and the greater\nsurplus of pleasure that results makes possible further growth of\nsympathy.\n\n\n\u00a7 94. The extent to which sympathy may develop when the hinderances\nare removed, will be better conceived after observing the agencies\nthrough which it is excited, and setting down the reasons for expecting\nthose agencies to become more efficient. Two factors have to be\nconsidered--the natural language of feeling in the being sympathized\nwith, and the power of interpreting that language in the being who\nsympathizes. We may anticipate development of both.\n\nMovements of the body and facial changes are visible effects of feeling\nwhich, when the feeling is strong, are uncontrollable. When the feeling\nis less strong, however, be it sensational or emotional, they may\nbe wholly or partially repressed; and there is a habit, more or less\nconstant, of repressing them; this habit being the concomitant of a\nnature such that it is often undesirable that others should see what\nis felt. So necessary with our existing characters and conditions are\nconcealments thus prompted, that they have come to form a part of\nmoral duty; and concealment for its own sake is often insisted upon\nas an element in good manners. All this is caused by the prevalence\nof feelings at variance with social good--feelings which cannot be\nshown without producing discords or estrangements. But in proportion\nas the egoistic desires fall more under control of the altruistic, and\nthere come fewer and slighter impulses of a kind to be reprobated,\nthe need for keeping guard over facial expression and bodily movement\nwill decrease, and these will with increasing clearness convey to\nspectators the mental state. Nor is this all. Restrained as its use is,\nthis language of the emotions is at present prevented from growing.\nBut as fast as the emotions become such that they may be more candidly\ndisplayed, there will go, along with the habit of display, development\nof the means of display; so that besides the stronger emotions, the\nmore delicate shades and smaller degrees of emotion will visibly\nexhibit themselves; the emotional language will become at once more\ncopious, more varied, more definite. And obviously sympathy will be\nproportionately facilitated.\n\nAn equally important, if not a more important, advance of kindred\nnature, is to be anticipated. The vocal signs of sentient states\nwill simultaneously evolve further. Loudness of tone, pitch of tone,\nquality of tone, and change of tone, are severally marks of feeling;\nand, combined in different ways and proportions, serve to express\ndifferent amounts and kinds of feelings. As elsewhere pointed out,\ncadences are the comments of the emotions on the propositions of the\nintellect[J]. Not in excited speech only, but in ordinary speech, we\nshow by ascending and descending intervals, by degrees of deviation\nfrom the medium tone, as well as by place and strength of emphasis,\nthe kind of sentiency which accompanies the thought expressed. Now the\nmanifestation of feeling by cadence, like its manifestation by visible\nchanges, is at present under restraint; the motives for repression act\nin the one case as they act in the other. A double effect is produced.\nThis audible language of feeling is not used up to the limit of its\nexisting capacity; and it is to a considerable degree misused, so as\nto convey other feelings than those which are felt. The result of this\ndisuse and misuse is to check that evolution which normal use would\ncause. We must infer, then, that as moral adaptation progresses, and\nthere is decreasing need for concealment of the feelings, their vocal\nsigns will develop much further. Though it is not to be supposed that\ncadences will ever convey emotions as exactly as words convey thoughts,\nyet it is quite possible that the emotional language of the future may\nrise as much above our present emotional language, as our intellectual\nlanguage has already risen above the intellectual language of the\nlowest races.\n\nA simultaneous increase in the power of interpreting both visible\nand audible signs of feeling must be taken into account. Among those\naround we see differences both of ability to perceive such signs and\nof ability to conceive the implied mental states, and their causes;\nhere, a stolidity unimpressed by a slight facial change or altered\ntone of voice, or else unable to imagine what is felt; and there,\na quick observation and a penetrating intuition, making instantly\ncomprehensible the state of mind and its origin. If we suppose both\nthese faculties exalted--both a more delicate perception of the signs\nand a strengthened constructive imagination--we shall get some idea of\nthe deeper and wider sympathy that will hereafter arise. More vivid\nrepresentations of the feelings of others, implying ideal excitements\nof feelings approaching to real excitements, must imply a greater\nlikeness between the feelings of the sympathizer and those of the\nsympathized with; coming near to identity.\n\nBy simultaneous increase of its subjective and objective factors,\nsympathy may thus, as the hinderances diminish, rise above that now\nshown by the sympathetic as much as in them it has risen above that\nwhich the callous show.\n\n\n\u00a7 95. What must be the accompanying evolution of conduct? What must the\nrelations between egoism and altruism become as this form of nature is\nneared?\n\nA conclusion drawn in the chapter on the relativity of pleasures and\npains, and there emphasized as one to be borne in mind, must now be\nrecalled. It was pointed out that, supposing them to be consistent\nwith continuance of life, there are no activities which may not become\nsources of pleasure, if surrounding conditions require persistence\nin them. And here it is to be added, as a corollary, that if the\nconditions require any class of activities to be relatively great,\nthere will arise a relatively great pleasure accompanying that class\nof activities. What bearing have these general inferences on the\nspecial question before us?\n\nThat alike for public welfare and private welfare sympathy is essential\nwe have seen. We have seen that co-operation and the benefits which it\nbrings to each and all, become high in proportion as the altruistic,\nthat is the sympathetic, interests extend. The actions prompted by\nfellow-feeling are thus to be counted among those demanded by social\nconditions. They are actions which maintenance and further development\nof social organization tend ever to increase, and, therefore, actions\nwith which there will be joined an increasing pleasure. From the laws\nof life it must be concluded that unceasing social discipline will\nso mold human nature that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be\nspontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and\nall. The scope for altruistic activities will not exceed the desire for\naltruistic satisfactions.\n\nIn natures thus constituted, though the altruistic gratifications\nmust remain in a transfigured sense egoistic, yet they will not be\negoistically pursued--will not be pursued from egoistic motives.\nThough pleasure will be gained by giving pleasure, yet the thought of\nthe sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy consciousness,\nbut only the thought of the pleasure given. To a great extent this\nis so now. In the truly sympathetic, attention is so absorbed with\nthe proximate end, others' happiness, that there is none given to the\nprospective self-happiness which may ultimately result. An analogy will\nmake the relation clear.\n\nA miser accumulates money, not deliberately saying to himself, \"I\nshall by doing this get the delight which possession gives.\" He thinks\nonly of the money and the means of getting it, and he experiences\nincidentally the pleasure that comes from possession. Owning property\nis that which he revels in imagining, and not the feeling which\nowning property will cause. Similarly, one who is sympathetic in the\nhighest sense, is mentally engaged solely in representing pleasure\nas experienced by another, and pursues it for the benefit of that\nother, forgetting any participation he will have in it. Subjectively\nconsidered, then, the conciliation of egoism and altruism will\neventually become such that though the altruistic pleasure, as being a\npart of the consciousness of one who experiences it, can never be other\nthan egoistic, it will not be consciously egoistic.\n\nLet us now ask what must happen in a society composed of persons\nconstituted in this manner.\n\n\n\u00a7 96. The opportunities for that postponement of self to others which\nconstitutes altruism as ordinarily conceived, must, in several ways, be\nmore and more limited as the highest state is approached.\n\nExtensive demands on the benevolent presuppose much unhappiness.\nBefore there can be many and large calls on some for efforts on\nbehalf of others, there must be many others in conditions needing\nhelp--in conditions of comparative misery. But, as we have seen\nabove, the development of fellow-feeling can go on only as fast\nas misery decreases. Sympathy can reach its full height only when\nthere have ceased to be frequent occasions for anything like serious\nself-sacrifice.\n\nChange the point of view, and this truth presents itself under another\naspect. We have already seen that with the progress of adaptation\neach becomes so constituted that he cannot be helped without in some\nway arresting a pleasurable activity. There cannot be a beneficial\ninterference between faculty and function when the two are adjusted.\nConsequently, in proportion as mankind approach complete adjustment\nof their natures to social needs, there must be fewer and smaller\nopportunities for giving aid.\n\nYet again, as was pointed out in the last chapter, the sympathy which\nprompts efforts for others' welfare must be pained by self-injury on\nthe part of others; and must, therefore, cause aversion to accept\nbenefits derived from their self-injuries. What is to be inferred?\nWhile each, when occasion offers, is ready, anxious even, to surrender\negoistic satisfactions; others, similarly natured, cannot but resist\nthe surrender. If any one, proposing to treat himself more hardly than\na disinterested spectator would direct, refrains from appropriating\nthat which is due; others, caring for him if he will not care for\nhimself, must necessarily insist that he shall appropriate it. General\naltruism then, in its developed form, must inevitably resist individual\nexcesses of altruism. The relation at present familiar to us will be\ninverted, and instead of each maintaining his own claims, others will\nmaintain his claims for him: not, indeed, by active efforts, which will\nbe needless, but by passively resisting any undue yielding up of them.\nThere is nothing in such behavior which is not even now to be traced\nin our daily experiences as beginning. In business transactions among\nhonorable men there is usually a desire on either side that the other\nshall treat himself fairly. Not unfrequently there is a refusal to\ntake something regarded as the other's due, but which the other offers\nto give up. In social intercourse, too, the cases are common in which\nthose who would surrender their shares of pleasure are not permitted by\nthe rest to do so. Further development of sympathy cannot but make this\nmode of behaving increasingly general and increasingly genuine.\n\nCertain complex restraints on excesses of altruism exist, which, in\nanother way, force back the individual upon a normal egoism. Two may\nhere be noted.\n\nIn the first place, self-abnegations often repeated imply on the part\nof the actor a tacit ascription of relative selfishness to others\nwho profit by the self-abnegations. Even with men as they are there\noccasionally arises a feeling among those for whom sacrifices are\nfrequently made, that they are being insulted by the assumption that\nthey are ready to receive them, and in the mind of the actor also,\nthere sometimes grows up a recognition of this feeling on their part,\nand a consequent check on his too great or too frequent surrenders of\npleasure. Obviously, in more developed natures, this kind of check must\nact still more promptly.\n\nIn the second place, when, as the hypothesis implies, altruistic\npleasures have reached a greater intensity than they now possess,\neach person will be debarred from undue pursuit of them by the\nconsciousness that other persons, too, desire them, and that scope for\nothers' enjoyment of them must be left. Even now may be observed among\ngroups of friends, where some competition in amiability is going on,\nrelinquishments of opportunities for self-abnegation that others may\nhave them. \"Let her give up the gratification, she will like to do so;\"\n\"Let him undertake the trouble, it will please him;\" are suggestions\nwhich, from time to time, illustrate this consciousness. The most\ndeveloped sympathy will care for the sympathetic satisfactions of\nothers as well as for their selfish satisfactions. What may be called a\nhigher equity will refrain from trespassing on the spheres of others'\naltruistic activities, as a lower equity refrains from trespassing on\nthe spheres of their egoistic activities. And by this checking of what\nmay be called an egoistic altruism, undue sacrifices on the part of\neach must be prevented.\n\nWhat spheres, then, will eventually remain for altruism as it is\ncommonly conceived? There are three. One of them must to the last\ncontinue large in extent; and the others must progressively diminish,\nthough they do not disappear.\n\nThe first is that which family life affords. Always there must be a\nneed for subordination of self-regarding feelings to other-regarding\nfeelings in the rearing of children. Though this will diminish with\ndiminution in the number to be reared, yet it will increase with the\ngreater elaboration, and prolongation of the activities on their\nbehalf. But as shown above, there is even now partially effected a\nconciliation such that those egoistic satisfactions which parenthood\nyields are achieved through altruistic activities--a conciliation\ntending ever toward completeness. An important development of family\naltruism must be added: the reciprocal care of parents by children\nduring old age--a care becoming lighter and better fulfilled, in which\na kindred conciliation may be looked for.\n\nPursuit of social welfare at large must afford hereafter, as it does\nnow, scope for the postponement of selfish interests to unselfish\ninterests, but a continually lessening scope; because as adaptation\nto the social state progresses the needs for those regulative actions\nby which social life is made harmonious become less. And here the\namount of altruistic action which each undertakes must inevitably\nbe kept within moderate bounds by others; for if they are similarly\naltruistic, they will not allow some to pursue public ends to their own\nconsiderable detriment that the rest may profit.\n\nIn the private relations of men, opportunities for self-sacrifice\nprompted by sympathy, must ever in some degree, though eventually in a\nsmall degree, be afforded by accidents, diseases, and misfortunes in\ngeneral; since, however near to completeness the adaptation of human\nnature to the conditions of existence at large, physical and social,\nmay become, it can never reach completeness. Flood, fire, and wreck\nmust to the last yield at intervals opportunities for heroic acts; and\nin the motives to such acts, anxiety for others will be less alloyed\nwith love of admiration than now. Extreme, however, as may be the\neagerness for altruistic action on the rare occasions hence arising,\nthe amount falling to the share of each must, for the reasons given, be\nnarrowly limited.\n\nBut though in the incidents of ordinary life, postponements of self to\nothers in large ways must become very infrequent, daily intercourse\nwill still furnish multitudinous small occasions for the activity of\nfellow feeling. Always each may continue to further the welfare of\nothers by warding off from them evils they cannot see, and by aiding\ntheir actions in ways unknown to them; or, conversely putting it, each\nmay have, as it were, supplementary eyes and ears in other persons,\nwhich perceive for him things he cannot perceive himself: so perfecting\nhis life in numerous details, by making its adjustment to environing\nactions complete.\n\n\n\u00a7 97. Must it then follow that eventually, with this diminution of the\nspheres for it, altruism must diminish in total amount? By no means.\nSuch a conclusion implies a misconception.\n\nNaturally, under existing conditions, with suffering widely diffused\nand so much of effort demanded from the more fortunate in succoring the\nless fortunate, altruism is understood to mean only self-sacrifice; or,\nat any rate, a mode of action which, while it brings some pleasure, has\nan accompaniment of self-surrender that is not pleasurable. But the\nsympathy which prompts denial of self to please others is a sympathy\nwhich also receives pleasure from their pleasures when they are\notherwise originated. The stronger the fellow-feeling which excites\nefforts to make others happy, the stronger is the fellow-feeling with\ntheir happiness however caused.\n\nIn its ultimate form, then, altruism will be the achievement of\ngratification through sympathy with those gratifications of others\nwhich are mainly produced by their activities of all kinds successfully\ncarried on--sympathetic gratification which costs the receiver nothing,\nbut is a gratis addition to his egoistic gratifications. This power of\nrepresenting in idea the mental states of others, which, during the\nprocess of adaptation has had the function of mitigating suffering,\nmust, as the suffering falls to a minimum, come to have almost wholly\nthe function of mutually exalting men's enjoyments by giving every one\na vivid intuition of his neighbor's enjoyments. While pain prevails\nwidely, it is undesirable that each should participate much in the\nconsciousnesses of others; but with an increasing predominance of\npleasure, participation in others' consciousnesses becomes a gain of\npleasure to all.\n\nAnd so there will disappear that apparently permanent opposition\nbetween egoism and altruism, implied by the compromise reached in the\nlast chapter. Subjectively looked at, the conciliation will be such\nthat the individual will not have to balance between self-regarding\nimpulses and other-regarding impulses; but, instead, those\nsatisfactions of other-regarding impulses which involve self-sacrifice,\nbecoming rare and much prized, will be so unhesitatingly preferred\nthat the competition of self-regarding impulses with them will\nscarcely be felt. And the subjective conciliation will also be such\nthat though altruistic pleasure will be attained, yet the motive of\naction will not consciously be the attainment of altruistic pleasure;\nbut the idea present will be the securing of others' pleasures.\nMeanwhile, the conciliation objectively considered will be equally\ncomplete. Though each, no longer needing to maintain his egoistic\nclaims, will tend rather when occasion offers to surrender them, yet\nothers, similarly natured, will not permit him in any large measure\nto do this, and that fulfillment of personal desires required for\ncompletion of his life will thus be secured to him; though not now\negoistic in the ordinary sense, yet the effects of due egoism will be\nachieved. Nor is this all. As, at an early stage, egoistic competition,\nfirst reaching a compromise such that each claims no more than his\nequitable share, afterward rises to a conciliation such that each\ninsists on the taking of equitable shares by others; so, at the latest\nstage, altruistic competition, first reaching a compromise under\nwhich each restrains himself from taking an undue share of altruistic\nsatisfactions, eventually rises to a conciliation under which each\ntakes care that others shall have their opportunities for altruistic\nsatisfactions: the highest altruism being that which ministers not to\nthe egoistic satisfactions of others only, but also to their altruistic\nsatisfactions.\n\nFar off as seems such a state, yet every one of the factors counted on\nto produce it may already be traced in operation among those of highest\nnatures. What now in them is occasional and feeble, may be expected\nwith further evolution to become habitual and strong; and what now\ncharacterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to\ncharacterize all. For that which the best human nature is capable of,\nis within the reach of human nature at large.\n\n\n\u00a7 98. That these conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance\nis improbable. Neither with current ideas nor with current sentiments\nare they sufficiently congruous.\n\nSuch a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the spreading\ndisbelief in eternal damnation; nor to those who follow the apostle of\nbrute force in thinking that because the rule of the strong hand was\nonce good it is good for all time; nor to those whose reverence for\none who told them to put up the sword, is shown by using the sword to\nspread his doctrine among heathens. From the ten thousand priests of\nthe religion of love, who are silent when the nation is moved by the\nreligion of hate, will come no sign of assent; nor from their bishops\nwho, far from urging the extreme precept of the master they pretend to\nfollow, to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, vote for acting\non the principle--strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be\nfelt by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their trespasses\nas they forgive the trespasses of others, forthwith decide to attack\nthose who have not trespassed against them, and who, after a Queen's\nSpeech has invoked \"the blessing of Almighty God\" on their councils,\nimmediately provide means for committing political burglary.\n\nBut, though men who profess Christianity and practice Paganism can feel\nno sympathy with such a view, there are some, classed as antagonists\nto the current creed, who may not think it absurd to believe that a\nrationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually be acted\nupon.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS.\n\n\n\u00a7 99. As applied to Ethics, the word \"absolute\" will by many be\nsupposed to imply principles of right conduct that exist out of\nrelation to life as conditioned on the Earth, out of relation to\ntime and place, and independent of the Universe as now visible to\nus, \"eternal\" principles as they are called. Those, however, who\nrecall the doctrine set forth in _First Principles_, will hesitate\nto put this interpretation on the word. Right, as we can think it,\nnecessitates the thought of not right, or wrong, for its correlative,\nand hence, to ascribe rightness to the acts of the Power manifested\nthrough phenomena, is to assume the possibility that wrong acts may be\ncommitted by this Power. But how come there to exist, apart from this\nPower, conditions of such kind that subordination of its acts to them\nmakes them right and insubordination wrong. How can Unconditioned Being\nbe subject to conditions beyond itself?\n\nIf, for example, any one should assert that the Cause of Things,\nconceived in respect of fundamental moral attributes as like ourselves,\ndid right in producing a Universe which, in the course of immeasurable\ntime, has given origin to beings capable of pleasure, and would have\ndone wrong in abstaining from the production of such a Universe; then,\nthe comment to be made is that, imposing the moral ideas generated in\nhis finite consciousness, upon the Infinite Existence which transcends\nconsciousness, he goes behind that Infinite Existence and prescribes\nfor it principles of action.\n\nAs implied in foregoing chapters, right and wrong as conceived by us\ncan exist only in relation to the actions of creatures capable of\npleasures and pains; seeing that analysis carries us back to pleasures\nand pains as the elements out of which the conceptions are framed.\n\nBut if the word \"absolute,\" as used above, does not refer to the\nUnconditioned Being--if the principles of action distinguished as\nabsolute and relative concern the conduct of conditioned beings,\nin what way are the words to be understood? An explanation of\ntheir meanings will be best conveyed by a criticism on the current\nconceptions of right and wrong.\n\n\n\u00a7 100. Conversations about the affairs of life habitually imply the\nbelief that every deed named may be placed under the one head or the\nother. In discussing a political question, both sides take it for\ngranted that some line of action may be chosen which is right, while\nall other lines of action are wrong. So, too, is it with judgments on\nthe doings of individuals; each of these is approved or disapproved on\nthe assumption that it is definitely classable as good or bad. Even\nwhere qualifications are admitted, they are admitted with an implied\nidea that some such positive characterization is to be made.\n\nNor is it in popular thought and speech only that we see this. If not\nwholly and definitely, yet partially and by implication, the belief\nis expressed by moralists. In his _Methods of Ethics_ (1st Ed., p.\n6) Mr. Sidgwick says: \"That there is in any given circumstances some\none thing which ought to be done and that this can be known, is a\nfundamental assumption, made not by philosophers only, but by all who\nperform any processes of moral reasoning.\"[K] In this sentence there\nis specifically asserted only the last of the above propositions;\nnamely, that, in every case, what \"ought to be done\" \"can be known.\"\nBut though that \"which ought to be done\" is not distinctly identified\nwith \"the right,\" it may be inferred, in the absence of any indication\nto the contrary, that Mr. Sidgwick regards the two as identical; and\ndoubtless, in so conceiving the postulates of moral science, he is\nat one with most, if not all, who have made it a subject of study.\nAt first sight, indeed, nothing seems more obvious than that if\nactions are to be judged at all, these postulates must be accepted.\nNevertheless they may both be called in question, and I think it may\nbe shown that neither of them is tenable. Instead of admitting that\nthere is in every case a right and a wrong, it may be contended that in\nmultitudinous cases no right, properly so-called, can be alleged, but\nonly a least wrong; and further, it may be contended that in many of\nthese cases where there can be alleged only a least wrong, it is not\npossible to ascertain with any precision which is the least wrong.\n\nA great part of the perplexities in ethical speculation arise from\nneglect of this distinction between right and least wrong--between\nthe absolutely right and the relatively right. And many further\nperplexities are due to the assumption that it can, in some way, be\ndecided in every case which of two courses is morally obligatory.\n\n\n\u00a7 101. The law of absolute right can take no cognizance of pain, save\nthe cognizance implied by negation. Pain is the correlative of some\nspecies of wrong--some kind of divergence from that course of action\nwhich perfectly fulfills all requirements. If, as was shown in an early\nchapter, the conception of good conduct always proves, when analyzed,\nto be the conception of a conduct which produces a surplus of pleasure\nsomewhere; while, conversely, the conduct conceived as bad proves\nalways to be that which inflicts somewhere a surplus of either positive\nor negative pain; then the absolutely good, the absolutely right,\nin conduct, can be that only which produces pure pleasure--pleasure\nunalloyed with pain anywhere. By implication, conduct which has any\nconcomitant of pain, or any painful consequence, is partially wrong;\nand the highest claim to be made for such conduct is that it is the\nleast wrong which, under the conditions, is possible--the relatively\nright.\n\nThe contents of preceding chapters imply throughout that, considered\nfrom the evolution point of view, the acts of men during the transition\nwhich has been, is still, and long will be, in progress, must, in most\ncases, be of the kind here classed as least wrong. In proportion to\nthe incongruity between the natures men inherit from the pre-social\nstate, and the requirements of social life, must be the amount of pain\nentailed by their actions, either on themselves or on others. In so far\nas pain is suffered, evil is inflicted; and conduct which inflicts any\nevil cannot be absolutely good.\n\nTo make clear the distinction here insisted upon between that perfect\nconduct which is the subject-matter of Absolute Ethics, and that\nimperfect conduct which is the subject-matter of Relative Ethics, some\nillustrations must be given.\n\n\n\u00a7 102. Among the best examples of absolutely right actions to be named\nare those arising where the nature and the requirements have been\nmolded to one another before social evolution began. Two will here\nsuffice.\n\nConsider the relation of a healthy mother to a healthy infant. Between\nthe two there exists a mutual dependence which is a source of pleasure\nto both. In yielding its natural food to the child, the mother receives\ngratification; and to the child there comes the satisfaction of\nappetite--a satisfaction which accompanies furtherance of life, growth\nand increasing enjoyment. Let the relation be suspended, and on both\nsides there is suffering. The mother experiences both bodily pain and\nmental pain, and the painful sensation borne by the child brings as\nits result physical mischief and some damage to the emotional nature.\nThus the act is one that is to both exclusively pleasurable, while\nabstention entails pain on both; and it is consequently of the kind we\nhere call absolutely right.\n\nIn the parental relations of the father we are furnished with a kindred\nexample. If he is well constituted in body and mind, his boy, eager\nfor play, finds in him a sympathetic response, and their frolics,\ngiving mutual pleasure, not only further the child's physical welfare,\nbut strengthen that bond of good feeling between the two which makes\nsubsequent guidance easier. And then if, repudiating the stupidities of\nearly education as at present conceived and unhappily State-enacted,\nhe has rational ideas of mental development, and sees that the\nsecond-hand knowledge gained through books should begin to supplement\nthe first-hand knowledge gained by direct observation, only when a\ngood stock of this has been acquired, he will, with active sympathy,\naid in the exploration of the surrounding world which his boy pursues\nwith delight; giving and receiving gratification from moment to moment\nwhile furthering ultimate welfare. Here, again, are actions of a kind\npurely pleasurable alike in their immediate and remote effects--actions\nabsolutely right.\n\nThe intercourse of adults yields, for the reason assigned, relatively\nfew cases that fall completely within the same category. In their\ntransactions from hour to hour, more or less of deduction from pure\ngratification is caused on one or other side by imperfect fitness to\nthe requirements. The pleasures men gain by laboring in their vocations\nand receiving in one form or other returns for their services usually\nhave the drawback that the laborers are in a considerable degree\ndispleasurable. Cases, however, do occur where the energies are so\nabundant that inaction is irksome; and where the daily work, not too\ngreat in duration, is of a kind appropriate to the nature; and where,\nas a consequence, pleasure rather than pain is a concomitant. When\nservices yielded by such a one are paid for by another similarly\nadapted to his occupation, the entire transaction is of the kind\nwe are here considering: exchange under agreement between two so\nconstituted becomes a means of pleasure to both, with no set-off of\npain. Bearing in mind the form of nature which social discipline is\nproducing, as shown in the contrast between savage and civilized, the\nimplication is that ultimately men's activities at large will assume\nthis character. Remembering that in the course of organic evolution,\nthe means to enjoyment themselves eventually become sources of\nenjoyment; and that there is no form of action which may not through\nthe development of appropriate structures become pleasurable; the\ninference must be that industrial activities, carried on through\nvoluntary co-operation, will in time acquire the character of absolute\nrightness as here conceived. Already, indeed, something like such a\nstate has been reached among certain of those who minister to our\n\u00e6sthetic gratifications. The artist of genius--poet, painter, or\nmusician--is one who obtains the means of living by acts that are\ndirectly pleasurable to him, while they yield, immediately or remotely,\npleasures to others.\n\nOnce more, among absolutely right acts may be named certain of those\nwhich we class as benevolent. I say certain of them, because such\nbenevolent acts as entail submission to pain, positive or negative,\nthat others may receive pleasure, are, by the definition, excluded.\nBut there are benevolent acts of a kind yielding pleasure solely. Some\none who has slipped is saved from falling by a by-stander: a hurt is\nprevented and satisfaction is felt by both. A pedestrian is choosing\na dangerous route, or a fellow-passenger is about to alight at the\nwrong station, and, warned against doing so, is saved from evil: each\nbeing, as a consequence, gratified. There is a misunderstanding between\nfriends, and one who sees how it has arisen explains, the result being\nagreeable to all. Services to those around in the small affairs of\nlife, may be, and often are, of a kind which there is equal pleasure\nin giving and receiving. Indeed, as was urged in the last chapter, the\nactions of developed altruism must habitually have this character.\nAnd so, in countless ways suggested by these few, men may add to one\nanother's happiness without anywhere producing unhappiness--ways which\nare therefore absolutely right.\n\nIn contrast with these consider the many actions which from hour to\nhour are gone through, now with an accompaniment of some pain to the\nactor and now bringing results that are partially painful to others,\nbut which nevertheless are imperative. As implied by antithesis with\ncases above referred to, the wearisomeness of productive labor as\nordinarily pursued, renders it in so far wrong; but then far greater\nsuffering would result, both to the laborer and his family, and\ntherefore far greater wrong would be done, were this wearisomeness not\nborne. Though the pains which the care of many children entail on a\nmother form a considerable set-off from the pleasures secured by them\nto her children and herself, yet the miseries immediate and remote,\nwhich neglect would entail, so far exceed them that submission to such\npains up to the limit of physical ability to bear them becomes morally\nimperative as being the least wrong. A servant who fails to fulfill an\nagreement in respect of work, or who is perpetually breaking crockery,\nor who pilfers, may have to suffer pain from being discharged;\nbut since the evils to be borne by all concerned if incapacity or\nmisconduct is tolerated, not in one case only but habitually, must\nbe much greater, such infliction of pain is warranted as a means to\npreventing greater pain. Withdrawal of custom from a tradesman whose\ncharges are too high, or whose commodities are inferior, or who gives\nshort measure, or who is unpunctual, decreases his welfare, and perhaps\ninjures his belongings; but as saving him from these evils would imply\nbearing the evils his conduct causes, and as such regard for his\nwell-being would imply disregard of the well-being of some more worthy\nor more efficient tradesman to whom the custom would else go, and as,\nchiefly, general adoption of the implied course, having the effect that\nthe inferior would not suffer from their inferiority nor the superior\ngain by their superiority, would produce universal misery, withdrawal\nis justified--the act is relatively right.\n\n\n\u00a7 103. I pass now to the second of the two propositions above\nenunciated. After recognizing the truth that a large part of human\nconduct is not absolutely right, but only relatively right, we have\nto recognize the further truth that in many cases where there is no\nabsolutely right course, but only courses that are more or less wrong,\nit is not possible to say which is the least wrong. Recurrence to the\ninstances just given will show this.\n\nThere is a point up to which it is relatively right for a parent to\ncarry self-sacrifice for the benefit of offspring, and there is a point\nbeyond which self-sacrifice cannot be pushed without bringing, not only\non himself or herself, but also on the family, evils greater than\nthose to be prevented by the self-sacrifice. Who shall say where this\npoint is? Depending on the constitutions and needs of those concerned\nit is in no two cases the same, and cannot be by any one more than\nguessed. The transgressions or short-comings of a servant vary from the\ntrivial to the grave, and the evils which discharge may bring range\nthrough countless degrees from slight to serious. The penalty may be\ninflicted for a very small offense, and then there is wrong done, or,\nafter numerous grave offenses, it may not be inflicted, and again there\nis wrong done. How shall be determined the degree of transgression\nbeyond which to discharge is less wrong than not to discharge? In like\nmanner with the shopkeeper's misdemeanors. No one can sum up either the\namount of positive and negative pain which tolerating them involves,\nnor the amount of positive and negative pain involved by not tolerating\nthem, and in medium cases no one can say where the one exceeds the\nother.\n\nIn men's wider relations frequently occur circumstances under which a\ndecision one or other way is imperative, and yet under which not even\nthe most sensitive conscience, helped by the clearest judgment, can\ndecide which of the alternatives is relatively right. Two examples will\nsuffice.\n\nHere is a merchant who loses by the failure of a man indebted to him.\nUnless he gets help he himself will fail, and if he fails he will bring\ndisaster not only on his family but on all who have given him credit.\nEven if by borrowing he is enabled to meet immediate engagements, he\nis not safe; for the time is one of panic, and others of his debtors\nby going to the wall may put him in further difficulties. Shall he ask\na friend for a loan? On the one hand, is it not wrong forthwith to\nbring on himself, his family, and those who have business relations\nwith him, the evils of his failure? On the other hand, is it not wrong\nto hypothecate the property of his friend, and lead him too, with his\nbelongings and dependents, into similar risks? The loan would probably\ntide him over his difficulty, in which case would it not be unjust to\nhis creditors did he refrain from asking it? Contrariwise, the loan\nwould very possibly fail to stave off his bankruptcy, in which case is\nnot his action in trying to obtain it, practically fraudulent? Though,\nin extreme cases, it may be easy to say which course is the least\nwrong, how is it possible in all those medium cases where even by the\nkeenest man of business the contingencies cannot be calculated?\n\nTake, again, the difficulties that not unfrequently arise from\nantagonism between family duties and social duties. Here is a tenant\nfarmer whose political principles prompt him to vote in opposition to\nhis landlord. If, being a Liberal, he votes for a Conservative, not\nonly does he by his act say that he thinks what he does not think, but\nhe may perhaps assist what he regards as bad legislation: his vote\nmay by chance turn the election, and on a Parliamentary division a\nsingle member may decide the fate of a measure. Even neglecting, as too\nimprobable, such serious consequences, there is the manifest truth that\nif all who hold like views with himself are similarly deterred from\nelectoral expression of them, there must result a different balance of\npower and a different national policy; making it clear that only by\nadherence of all to their political principles can the policy he thinks\nright be maintained. But now, on the other hand, how can he absolve\nhimself from responsibility for the evils which those depending on him\nmay suffer if he fulfills what appears to be a peremptory public duty?\nIs not his duty to his children even more peremptory? Does not the\nfamily precede the State; and does not the welfare of the State depend\non the welfare of the family? May he, then, take a course which, if\nthe threats uttered are carried out, will eject him from his farm; and\nso cause inability, perhaps temporary, perhaps prolonged; to feed his\nchildren. The contingent evils are infinitely varied in their ratios.\nIn one case the imperativeness of the public duty is great and the\nevil that may come on dependents small; in another case the political\nissue is of trivial moment and the possible injury which the family may\nsuffer is great; and between these extremes there are all gradations.\nFurther, the degrees of probability of each result, public and private,\nrange from the nearly certain to the almost impossible. Admitting,\nthen, that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the State; and\nadmitting that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the family,\nwe have to recognize the fact that in countless cases no one can decide\nby which of the alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be\ndone.\n\nThese instances will sufficiently show that in conduct at large,\nincluding men's dealings with themselves, with their families, with\ntheir friends, with their debtors and creditors, and with the public,\nit usually happens that whatever course is taken entails some pain\nsomewhere; forming a deduction from the pleasure achieved, and making\nthe course in so far not absolutely right. Further, they will show that\nthroughout a considerable part of conduct, no guiding principle, no\nmethod of estimation, enables us to say whether a proposed course is\neven relatively right; as causing, proximately and remotely, specially\nand generally, the greatest surplus of good over evil.\n\n\n\u00a7 104. And now we are prepared for dealing in a systematic way with the\ndistinction between Absolute Ethics and Relative Ethics.\n\nScientific truths, of whatever order, are reached by eliminating\nperturbing or conflicting factors, and recognizing only fundamental\nfactors. When, by dealing with fundamental factors in the abstract, not\nas presented in actual phenomena, but as presented in ideal separation,\ngeneral laws have been ascertained, it becomes possible to draw\ninferences in concrete cases by taking into account incidental factors.\nBut it is only by first ignoring these and recognizing the essential\nelements alone that we can discover the essential truths sought. Take,\nin illustration, the progress of mechanics from its empirical form to\nits rational form.\n\nAll have occasional experience of the fact that a person pushed on\none side beyond a certain degree loses his balance and falls. It is\nobserved that a stone flung, or an arrow shot, does not proceed in a\nstraight line, but comes to the earth after pursuing a course which\ndeviates more and more from its original course. When trying to break\na stick across the knee, it is found that success is easier if the\nstick is seized at considerable distances from the knee on each side\nthan if seized close to the knee. Daily use of a spear draws attention\nto the truth that by thrusting its point under a stone and depressing\nthe shaft, the stone may be raised the more readily the further\naway the hand is toward the end. Here, then, are sundry experiences,\neventually grouped into empirical generalizations, which serve to guide\nconduct in certain simple cases. How does mechanical science evolve\nfrom these experiences? To reach a formula expressing the powers of\nthe lever, it supposes a lever which does not, like the stick, admit\nof being bent, but is absolutely rigid, and it supposes a fulcrum\nnot having a broad surface, like that of one ordinarily used, but a\nfulcrum without breadth, and it supposes that the weight to be raised\nbears on a definite point, instead of bearing over a considerable\nportion of the lever. Similarly with the leaning body, which, passing\na certain inclination, overbalances. Before the truth respecting the\nrelations of center of gravity and base can be formulated, it must be\nassumed that the surface on which the body stands is unyielding, that\nthe edge of the body itself is unyielding, and that its mass, while\nmade to lean more and more, does not change its form--conditions not\nfulfilled in the cases commonly observed. And so, too, is it with the\nprojectile: determination of its course by deduction from mechanical\nlaws, primarily ignores all deviations caused by its shape and by the\nresistance of the air. The science of rational mechanics is a science\nwhich consists of such ideal truths, and can come into existence\nonly by thus dealing with ideal cases. It remains impossible so long\nas attention is restricted to concrete cases presenting all the\ncomplications of friction, plasticity and so forth.\n\nBut now, after disentangling certain fundamental mechanical truths, it\nbecomes possible by their help to guide actions better, and it becomes\npossible to guide them still better when, as presently happens, the\ncomplicating elements from which they have been disentangled are\nthemselves taken into account. At an advanced stage the modifying\neffects of friction are allowed for, and the inferences are qualified\nto the requisite extent. The theory of the pulley is corrected in its\napplication to actual cases by recognizing the rigidity of cordage;\nthe effects of which are formulated. The stabilities of masses,\ndeterminable in the abstract by reference to the centers of gravity\nof the masses in relation to the bases, come to be determined in the\nconcrete by including also their characters in respect of cohesion. The\ncourses of projectiles, having been theoretically settled as though\nthey moved through a vacuum, are afterward settled in more exact\ncorrespondence with fact by taking into account atmospheric resistance.\n\nAnd thus we see illustrated the relation between certain absolute\ntruths of mechanical science, and certain relative truths which involve\nthem. We are shown that no scientific establishment of relative\ntruths is possible until the absolute truths have been formulated\nindependently. We see that mechanical science, fitted for dealing with\nthe real, can arise only after ideal mechanical science has arisen.\n\nAll this holds of moral science. As by early and rude experiences\nthere were inductively reached, vague but partially true notions\nrespecting the overbalancing of bodies, the motions of missiles,\nthe actions of levers; so by early and rude experiences there were\ninductively reached, vague but partially true notions respecting\nthe effects of men's behavior on themselves, on one another, and on\nsociety: to a certain extent serving in the last case, as in the\nfirst, for the guidance of conduct. Moreover, as this rudimentary\nmechanical knowledge, though still remaining empirical, becomes\nduring early stages of civilization at once more definite and more\nextensive; so during early stages of civilization these ethical ideas,\nstill retaining their empirical character, increase in precision and\nmultiplicity. But just as we have seen that mechanical knowledge\nof the empirical sort can evolve into mechanical science only by\nfirst omitting all, qualifying circumstances, and generalizing in\nabsolute ways the fundamental laws of forces; so here we have to see\nthat empirical ethics can evolve into rational ethics only by first\nneglecting all complicating incidents, and formulating the laws of\nright action apart from the obscuring effects of special conditions.\nAnd the final implication is that just as the system of mechanical\ntruths, conceived in ideal separation as absolute, becomes applicable\nto real mechanical problems in such way that making allowance for all\nincidental circumstances there can be reached conclusions far nearer\nto the truth than could otherwise be reached; so a system of ideal\nethical truths, expressing the absolutely right, will be applicable to\nthe questions of our transitional state in such ways that, allowing for\nthe friction of an incomplete life and the imperfection of existing\nnatures, we may ascertain with approximate correctness what is the\nrelatively right.\n\n\n\u00a7 105. In a chapter entitled \"Definition of Morality\" in _Social\nStatics_, I contended that the moral law, properly so-called, is\nthe law of the perfect man--is the formula of ideal conduct--is the\nstatement in all cases of that which should be, and cannot recognize\nin its propositions any elements implying existence of that which\nshould not be. Instancing questions concerning the right course to\nbe taken in cases where wrong has already been done, I alleged that\nthe answers to such questions cannot be given \"on purely ethical\nprinciples.\" I argued that:\n\n  \"No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as depend\n  upon truths that are themselves absolute. Before there can be\n  exactness in an inference, there must be exactness in the antecedent\n  propositions. A geometrician requires that the straight lines with\n  which he deals shall be veritably straight; and that his circles, and\n  ellipses, and parabolas shall agree with precise definitions--shall\n  perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations. If you put\n  to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with,\n  he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise is it with the\n  philosophical moralist. He treats solely of the _straight_ man. He\n  determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the\n  straight man comports himself; shows in what relationship he stands\n  to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is\n  constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly\n  to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating\n  all his conclusions. A problem in which a _crooked_ man forms one of\n  the elements is insoluble to him.\"\n\nReferring to this view, specifically in the first edition of the\n_Methods of Ethics_, but more generally in the second edition, Mr.\nSidgwick says:\n\n  \"Those who take this view adduce the analogy of Geometry to show that\n  Ethics ought to deal with ideally perfect human relations, just as\n  Geometry treats of ideally perfect lines and circles. But the most\n  irregular line has definite spatial relations with which Geometry\n  does not refuse to deal: though of course they are more complex\n  than those of a straight line. So in Astronomy, it would be more\n  convenient for purposes of study if the stars moved in circles, as\n  was once believed; but the fact that they move not in circles but in\n  ellipses, and even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses, does not take\n  them out of the sphere of scientific investigation: by patience and\n  industry we have learned how to reduce to principles and calculate\n  even these more complicated motions. It is, no doubt, a convenient\n  artifice for purposes of instruction to assume that the planets\n  move in perfect ellipses (or even--at an earlier stage of study--in\n  circles): we thus allow the individual's knowledge to pass through\n  the same gradations in accuracy as that of the race has done. But\n  what we want, as astronomers, to know is the actual motion of the\n  stars and its causes: and similarly as moralists we naturally inquire\n  what ought to be done in the actual world in which we live.\" (P. 19,\n  Sec. Ed.)\n\nBeginning with the first of these two statements, which concerns\nGeometry, I must confess myself surprised to find my propositions\ncalled into question; and after full consideration I remain at a loss\nto understand Mr. Sidgwick's mode of viewing the matter. When, in a\nsentence preceding those quoted above, I remarked on the impossibility\nof solving \"mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked\nlines and broken-backed curves,\" it never occurred to me that I should\nbe met by the direct assertion that \"Geometry does not refuse to deal\"\nwith \"the most irregular line.\" Mr. Sidgwick states that an irregular\nline, say such as a child makes in scribbling, has \"definite spatial\nrelations.\" What meaning does he here give to the word \"definite?\"\nIf he means that its relations to space at large are definite in the\nsense that by an infinite intelligence they would be definable, the\nreply is that to an infinite intelligence all spatial relations would\nbe definable: there could be no indefinite spatial relations--the word\n\"definite\" thus ceasing to mark any distinction. If, on the other hand,\nwhen saying that an irregular line has \"definite spatial relations,\"\nhe means relations knowable definitely by human intelligence, there\nstill comes the question, how is the word \"definite\" to be understood?\nSurely anything distinguished as definite admits of being defined;\nbut how can we define an irregular line? And if we cannot define\nthe irregular line itself, how can we know its \"spatial relations\"\ndefinite? And how, in the absence of definition, can Geometry deal with\nit? If Mr. Sidgwick means that it can be dealt with by the \"method of\nlimits,\" then the reply is that in such case, not the line itself is\ndealt with geometrically, but certain definite lines artificially put\nin quasi-definite relations to it, the indefinite becomes cognizable\nonly through the medium of the hypothetically definite.\n\nTurning to the second illustration, the rejoinder to be made is that in\nso far as it concerns the relations between the ideal and the real, the\nanalogy drawn does not shake but strengthens my argument. For whether\nconsidered under its geometrical or under its dynamical aspect, and\nwhether considered in the necessary order of its development or in the\norder historically displayed, Astronomy shows us throughout that truths\nrespecting simple, theoretically-exact relations, must be ascertained\nbefore truths respecting the complex and practically inexact\nrelations that actually exist can be ascertained. As applied to the\ninterpretation of planetary movements, we see that the theory of cycles\nand epicycles was based on pre-existing knowledge of the circle: the\nproperties of an ideal curve having been learned, a power was acquired\nof giving some expression to the celestial motions. We see that the\nCopernican interpretation expressed the facts in terms of circular\nmovements otherwise distributed and combined. We see that Kepler's\nadvance from the conception of circular movements to the conception\nof elliptic movements was made possible by comparing the facts as they\nare with the facts as they would be were the movements circular. We\nsee that the subsequently-learned deviations from elliptic movements\nwere learned only through the presupposition that the movements are\nelliptical. And we see, lastly, that even now predictions concerning\nthe exact positions of planets, after taking account of perturbations,\nimply constant references to ellipses that are regarded as their normal\nor average orbits for the time being. Thus, ascertainment of the actual\ntruths has been made possible only by preascertainment of certain ideal\ntruths. To be convinced that by no other course could the actual truths\nhave been ascertained, it needs only to suppose any one saying that\nit did not concern him, as an astronomer, to know anything about the\nproperties of circles and ellipses, but that he had to deal with the\nSolar System as it exists, to which end it was his business to observe\nand tabulate positions and directions and to be guided by the facts as\nhe found them.\n\nSo, too, is it if we look at the development of dynamical astronomy.\nThe first proposition in Newton's _Principia_ deals with the movement\nof a single body round a single center of force; and the phenomena\nof central motion are first formulated in a case which is not simply\nideal, but in which there is no specification of the force concerned:\ndetachment from the real is the greatest possible. Again, postulating\na principle of action conforming to an ideal law, the theory of\ngravitation deals with the several problems of the Solar System in\nfictitious detachment from the rest; and it makes certain fictitious\nassumptions, such as that the mass of each body concerned is\nconcentrated in its center of gravity. Only later, after establishing\nthe leading truths by this artifice of disentangling the major factors\nfrom the minor factors, is the theory applied to the actual problems in\ntheir ascending degrees of complexity; taking in more and more of the\nminor factors. And if we ask whether the dynamics of the Solar System\ncould have been established in any other way, we see that here, too,\nsimple truths holding under ideal conditions, have to be ascertained\nbefore real truths existing under complex conditions can be ascertained.\n\nThe alleged necessary precedence of Absolute Ethics over Relative\nEthics is thus, I think, further elucidated. One who has followed the\ngeneral argument thus far, will not deny that an ideal social being\nmay be conceived as so constituted that his spontaneous activities\nare congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment\nformed by other such beings. In many places, and in various ways, I\nhave argued that conformably with the laws of evolution in general,\nand conformably with the laws of organization in particular, there has\nbeen, and is, in progress, an adaptation of humanity to the social\nstate, changing it in the direction of such an ideal congruity. And the\ncorollary before drawn and here repeated, is that the ultimate man is\none in whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence\nbetween all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of\nhis life as carried on in society. If so it is a necessary implication\nthat there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behavior\nof the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society.\nSuch a code is that here called Absolute Ethics as distinguished\nfrom Relative Ethics--a code the injunctions of which are alone to\nbe considered as absolutely right in contrast with those that are\nrelatively right or least wrong; and which, as a system of ideal\nconduct, is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, as well\nas we can, the problems of real conduct.\n\n\n\u00a7 105. A clear conception of this matter is so important that I must\nbe excused for bringing in aid of it a further illustration, more\nobviously appropriate as being furnished by organic science instead\nof by inorganic science. The relation between morality proper and\nmorality, as commonly conceived, is analogous to the relation between\nphysiology and pathology; and the course usually pursued by moralists\nis much like the course of one who studies pathology without previous\nstudy of physiology.\n\nPhysiology describes the various functions which, as combined,\nconstitute and maintain life; and in treating of them it assumes that\nthey are severally performed in right ways, in due amounts, and in\nproper order; it recognizes only healthy functions. If it explains\ndigestion, it supposes that the heart is supplying blood and that\nthe visceral nervous system is stimulating the organs immediately\nconcerned. If it gives a theory of the circulation, it assumes that\nblood has been produced by the combined actions of the structures\ndevoted to its production, and that it is properly \u00e6rated. If the\nrelations between respiration and the vital processes at large are\ninterpreted, it is on the presupposition that the heart goes on sending\nblood, not only to the lungs and to certain nervous centers, but to the\ndiaphragm and intercostal muscles. Physiology ignores failures in the\nactions of these several organs. It takes no account of imperfections,\nit neglects derangements, it does not recognize pain, it knows nothing\nof vital wrong. It simply formulates that which goes on as a result\nof complete adaptation of all parts to all needs. That is to say, in\nrelation to the inner actions constituting bodily life, physiological\ntheory has a position like that which ethical theory, under its\nabsolute form as above conceived, has to the outer actions constituting\nconduct. The moment cognizance is taken of excess of function, or\narrest of function, or defect of function, with the resulting evil,\nphysiology passes into pathology. We begin now to take account of wrong\nactions in the inner life analogous to the wrong actions in the outer\nlife taken account of by ordinary theories of morals.\n\nThe antithesis thus drawn, however, is but preliminary. After observing\nthe fact that there is a science of vital actions normally carried on,\nwhich ignores abnormal actions, we have more especially to observe\nthat the science of abnormal actions can reach such definiteness as is\npossible to it only on condition that the science of normal actions has\npreviously become definite; or rather, let us say that pathological\nscience depends for its advances on previous advances made by\nphysiological science. The very conception of disordered action implies\na preconception of well-ordered action. Before it can be decided that\nthe heart is beating faster or slower than it should its healthy\nrate of beating must be learned; before the pulse can be recognized\nas too weak or too strong, its proper strength must be known, and so\nthroughout. Even the rudest and most empirical ideas of diseases,\npre-suppose ideas of the healthy states from which they are deviations,\nand, obviously, the diagnosis of diseases can become scientific only as\nfast as there arises scientific knowledge of organic actions that are\nundiseased.\n\nSimilarly, then, is it with the relation between absolute morality, or\nthe law of perfect right in human conduct, and relative morality which,\nrecognizing wrong in human conduct, has to decide in what way the\nwrong deviates from the right, and how the right is to be most nearly\napproached. When, formulating normal conduct in an ideal society, we\nhave reached a science of absolute ethics, we have simultaneously\nreached a science which, when used to interpret the phenomena of real\nsocieties in their transitional states, full of the miseries due to\nnon-adaptation (which we may call pathological states) enables us to\nform approximately true conclusions respecting the natures of the\nabnormalities, and the courses which tend most in the direction of the\nnormal.\n\n\n\u00a7 106. And now let it be observed that the conception of ethics thus\nset forth, strange as many will think it, is one which really lies\nlatent in the beliefs of moralists at large. Though not definitely\nacknowledged it is vaguely implied in many of their propositions.\n\nFrom early times downward we find in ethical speculations, references\nto the ideal man, his acts, his feelings, his judgments. Well-doing\nis conceived by Socrates as the doing of \"the best man,\" who, \"as a\nhusbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, the\nduties of the medical art; in political life, his duty toward the\ncommonwealth.\" Plato, in _Minos_, as a standard to which State law\nshould conform, \"postulates the decision of some ideal wise man,\" and\nin _Laches_ the wise man's knowledge of good and evil is supposed to\nfurnish the standard: disregarding \"the maxims of the existing society\"\nas unscientific, Plato regards as the proper guide, that \"Idea of the\nGood which only a philosopher can ascend to.\" Aristotle (_Eth._ Bk.\niii. ch. 4), making the decisions of the good man the standard, says:\n\"For the good man judges everything rightly, and in every case the\ntruth appears so to him.... And, perhaps, the principal difference\nbetween the good and the bad man is that the good man sees the truth in\nevery case, since he is, as it were, the rule and measure of it.\" The\nStoics, too, conceived of \"complete rectitude of action\" as that \"which\nnone could achieve except the wise man\"--the ideal man. And Epicurus\nhad an ideal standard. He held the virtuous state to be \"a tranquil,\nundisturbed, innocuous, non-competitive fruition, which approached most\nnearly to the perfect happiness of the gods,\" who \"neither suffered\nvexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others.\"[L]\n\nIf, in modern times, influenced by theological dogmas concerning the\nfall and human sinfulness, and by a theory of obligation derived from\nthe current creed, moralists have less frequently referred to an ideal,\nyet references are traceable. We see one in the dictum of Kant--\"Act\naccording to the maxim only, which you can wish, at the same time, to\nbecome a universal law.\" For this implies the thought of a society in\nwhich the maxim is acted upon by all and universal benefit recognized\nas the effect: there is a conception of ideal conduct under ideal\nconditions. And though Mr. Sidgwick, in the quotation above made from\nhim, implies that Ethics is concerned with man as he is, rather than\nwith man as he should be; yet, in elsewhere speaking of Ethics as\ndealing with conduct as it should be, rather than with conduct as it\nis, he postulates ideal conduct and indirectly the ideal man. On his\nfirst page, speaking of Ethics along with Jurisprudence and Politics,\nhe says that they are distinguished \"by the characteristic that they\nattempt to determine not the actual but the ideal--what ought to exist,\nnot what does exist.\"\n\nIt requires only that these various conceptions of an ideal conduct,\nand of an ideal humanity, should be made consistent and definite, to\nbring them into agreement with the conception above set forth. At\npresent such conceptions are habitually vague. The ideal man having\nbeen conceived in terms of the current morality, is thereupon erected\ninto a moral standard by which the goodness of actions may be judged;\nand the reasoning becomes circular. To make the ideal man serve as a\nstandard, he has to be defined in terms of the conditions which his\nnature fulfills--in terms of those objective requirements which must\nbe met before conduct can be right; and the common defect of these\nconceptions of the ideal man is that they suppose him out of relation\nto such conditions.\n\nAll the above references to him, direct or indirect, imply that\nthe ideal man is supposed to live and act under existing social\nconditions. The tacit inquiry is, not what his actions would be\nunder circumstances altogether changed, but what they would be under\npresent circumstances. And this inquiry is futile for two reasons. The\nco-existence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible;\nand could the two co-exist, the resulting conduct would not furnish the\nethical standard sought.\n\nIn the first place, given the laws of life as they are, and a man\nof ideal nature cannot be produced in a society consisting of men\nhaving natures remote from the ideal. As well might we expect a child\nof English type to be borne among Negroes, as expect that among the\norganically immoral, one who is organically moral will arise. Unless\nit be denied that character results from inherited structure, it must\nbe admitted that since, in any society, each individual descends from\na stock which, traced back a few generations, ramifies everywhere\nthrough the society, and participates in its average nature, there\nmust, notwithstanding marked individual diversities, be preserved such\ncommunity as prevents any one from reaching an ideal form while the\nrest remain far below it.\n\nIn the second place, ideal conduct such as ethical theory is concerned\nwith, is not possible for the ideal man in the midst of men otherwise\nconstituted. An absolutely just or perfectly sympathetic person, could\nnot live and act according to his nature in a tribe of cannibals.\nAmong people who are treacherous and utterly without scruple, entire\ntruthfulness and openness must bring ruin. If all around recognize\nonly the law of the strongest, one whose nature will not allow him to\ninflict pain on others, must go to the wall, There requires a certain\ncongruity between the conduct of each member of a society and other's\nconduct. A mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of\naction cannot be successfully persisted in--must eventuate in death of\nself, or posterity, or both.\n\nHence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in\nthe ideal social state. On the evolution hypothesis, the two presuppose\none another; and only when they co-exist can there exist that ideal\nconduct which Absolute Ethics has to formulate, and which Relative\nEthics has to take as the standard by which to estimate divergencies\nfrom right, or degrees of wrong.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nTHE SCOPE OF ETHICS.\n\n\n\u00a7 107. At the outset it was shown that as the conduct with which\nEthics deals is a part of conduct at large, conduct at large must be\nunderstood before this part can be understood. After taking a general\nview of conduct, not human only but sub-human, and not only as existing\nbut as evolving, we saw that Ethics has for its subject-matter the most\nhighly-evolved conduct as displayed by the most highly-evolved being,\nMan--is a specification of those traits which his conduct assumes\non reaching its limit of evolution. Conceived thus as comprehending\nthe laws of right living at large, Ethics has a wider field than is\ncommonly assigned to it. Beyond the conduct commonly approved or\nreprobated as right or wrong, it includes all conduct which furthers\nor hinders, in either direct or indirect ways, the welfare of self or\nothers.\n\nAs foregoing chapters in various places imply, the entire field\nof Ethics includes the two great divisions, personal and social.\nThere is a class of actions directed to personal ends, which are\nto be judged in their relations to personal well-being, considered\napart from the well-being of others: though they secondarily affect\nfellow-men these primarily affect the agent himself, and must be\nclassed as intrinsically right or wrong according to their beneficial\nor detrimental effects on him. There are actions of another class\nwhich affect fellow-men immediately and remotely, and which, though\ntheir results to self are not to be ignored, must be judged as good or\nbad mainly by their results to others. Actions of this last class fall\ninto two groups. Those of the one group achieve ends in ways that do\nor do not unduly interfere with the pursuit of ends by others--actions\nwhich, because of this difference, we call respectively unjust or just.\nThose forming the other group are of a kind which influence the states\nof others without directly interfering with the relations between\ntheir labors and the results, in one way or the other--actions which\nwe speak of as beneficent or maleficent. And the conduct which we\nregard as beneficent is itself subdivisible according as it shows us a\nself-repression to avoid giving pain, or an expenditure of effort to\ngive pleasure--negative beneficence and positive beneficence.\n\nEach of these divisions and sub-divisions has to be considered first as\na part of Absolute Ethics and then as a part of Relative Ethics. Having\nseen what its injunctions must be for the ideal man under the implied\nideal conditions, we shall be prepared to see how such injunctions are\nto be most nearly fulfilled by actual men under existing conditions.\n\n\n\u00a7 108. For reasons already pointed out, a code of perfect personal\nconduct can never be made definite. Many forms of life, diverging from\none another in considerable degrees, may be so carried on in society\nas entirely to fulfill the conditions to harmonious co-operation. And\nif various types of men, adapted to various types of activities, may\nthus lead lives that are severally complete after their kinds, no\nspecific statement of the activities universally required for personal\nwell-being is possible.\n\nBut, though, the particular requirements to be fulfilled for perfect\nindividual well-being, must vary along with variations in the material\nconditions of each society, certain general requirements have to be\nfulfilled by the individuals of all societies. An average balance\nbetween waste and nutrition has universally to be preserved. Normal\nvitality implies a relation between activity and rest falling within\nmoderate limits of variation. Continuance of the society depends on\nsatisfaction of those primarily personal needs which result in marriage\nand parenthood. Perfection of individual life hence implies certain\nmodes of action which are approximately alike in all cases, and which,\ntherefore, become part of the subject matter of Ethics.\n\nThat it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to scientific\ndefiniteness, can scarcely be said. But ethical requirements may here\nbe to such extent affiliated upon physical necessities, as to give\nthem a partially scientific authority. It is clear that between the\nexpenditure of bodily substance in vital activities, and the taking\nin of materials from which this substance may be renewed, there is a\ndirect relation. It is clear, too, that there is a direct relation\nbetween the wasting of tissue by effort, and the need for those\ncessations of effort during which repair may overtake waste. Nor is\nit less clear that between the rate of mortality and the rate of\nmultiplication in any society, there is a relation such that the last\nmust reach a certain level before it can balance the first, and prevent\ndisappearance of the society. And it may be inferred that pursuits of\nother leading ends are, in like manner, determined by certain natural\nnecessities, and from these derive their ethical sanctions. That it\nwill ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct\nin conformity with such requirements, may be doubted. But the function\nof Absolute Ethics in relation to private conduct will have been\ndischarged when it has produced the warrant for its requirements as\ngenerally expressed; when it has shown the imperativeness of obedience\nto them; and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately\nconsidering whether the conduct fulfills them as well may be.\n\nUnder the ethics of personal considered in relation to existing\nconditions, have to come all questions concerning the degree in which\nimmediate personal welfare has to be postponed, either to ultimate\npersonal welfare or to the welfare of others. As now carried on, life\nhourly sets the claims of present self against the claims of future\nself, and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the\ninterests of other individuals, taken singly or as associated. In many\nof such cases the decisions can be nothing more than compromises; and\nethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do no more than aid\nin making compromises that are the least objectionable. To arrive at\nthe best compromise in any case, implies correct conceptions of the\nalternative results of this or that course. And, consequently in so\nfar as the absolute ethics of individual conduct can be made definite,\nit must help us to decide between conflicting personal requirements,\nand also between the needs for asserting self and the needs for\nsubordinating self.\n\n\n\u00a7 109. From that division of Ethics which deals with the right\nregulation of private conduct, considered apart from the effects\ndirectly produced on others, we pass now to that division of Ethics\nwhich, considering exclusively the effects of conduct on others, treats\nof the right regulation of it with a view to such effects.\n\nThe first set of regulations coming under this head are those\nconcerning what we distinguish as justice. Individual life is possible\nonly on condition that each organ is paid for its action by an\nequivalent of blood, while the organism as a whole obtains from the\nenvironment assimilable matters that compensate for its efforts; and\nthe mutual dependence of parts in the social organism, necessitates\nthat, alike for its total life and the lives of its units, there\nsimilarly shall be maintained a due proportion between returns and\nlabors: the natural relation between work and welfare shall be\npreserved intact. Justice, which formulates the range of conduct and\nlimitations to conduct hence arising, is at once the most important\ndivision of Ethics and the division which admits of the greatest\ndefiniteness. That principle of equivalence which meets us when we\nseek its roots in the laws of individual life, involves the idea of\n_measure_; and on passing to social life, the same principle introduces\nus to the conception of equity or _equalness_, in the relations of\ncitizens to one another: the elements of the questions arising are\n_quantitative_, and hence the solutions assume a more scientific form.\nThough, having to recognize differences among individuals due to age,\nsex, or other cause, we cannot regard the members of a society as\nabsolutely equal, and therefore cannot deal with problems growing out\nof their relations with that precision which absolute equality might\nmake possible; yet, considering them as approximately equal in virtue\nof their common human nature, and dealing with questions of equity on\nthis supposition, we may reach conclusions of a sufficiently definite\nkind.\n\nThis division of Ethics considered under its absolute form, has to\ndefine the equitable relations among perfect individuals who limit\none another's spheres of action by co-existing, and who achieve their\nends by co-operation. It has to do much more than this. Beyond justice\nbetween man and man, justice between each man and the aggregate of\nmen has to be dealt with by it. The relations between the individual\nand the State, considered as representing all individuals, have to be\ndeduced--an important and a relatively difficult matter. What is the\nethical warrant for governmental authority? To what ends may it be\nlegitimately exercised? How far may it rightly be carried? Up to what\npoint is the citizen bound to recognize the collective decisions of\nother citizens, and beyond what point may he properly refuse to obey\nthem?\n\nThese relations, private and public, considered as maintained under\nideal conditions, having been formulated, there come to be dealt with\nthe analogous relations under real conditions--absolute justice being\nthe standard, relative justice has to be determined by considering how\nnear an approach may, under present circumstances, be made to it. As\nalready implied in various places, it is impossible during stages of\ntransition which necessitate ever changing compromises, to fulfill the\ndictates of absolute equity; and nothing beyond empirical judgments\ncan be formed of the extent to which they may be, at any given\ntime, fulfilled. While war continues and injustice is done between\nsocieties, there cannot be anything like complete justice within\neach society. Militant organization no less than militant action,\nis irreconcilable with pure equity; and the inequity implied by it\ninevitably ramifies throughout all social relations. But there is at\nevery stage in social evolution, a certain range of variation within\nwhich it is possible to approach nearer to, or diverge further from,\nthe requirements of absolute equity. Hence these requirements have ever\nto be kept in view that relative equity may be ascertained.\n\n\n\u00a7 110. Of the two subdivisions into which beneficence falls, the\nnegative and the positive, neither can be specialized. Under ideal\nconditions the first of them has but a nominal existence; and the\nsecond of them passes largely into a transfigured form admitting of but\ngeneral definition.\n\nIn the conduct of the ideal man among ideal men, that self-regulation\nwhich has for its motive to avoid giving pain, practically disappears.\nNo one having feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect\nothers, there can exist no code of restraints referring to this\ndivision of conduct.\n\nBut though negative beneficence is only a nominal part of Absolute\nEthics, it is an actual and considerable part of Relative Ethics.\nFor while men's natures remain imperfectly adapted to social life,\nthere must continue in them impulses which, causing in some cases\nthe actions we name unjust, cause in other cases the actions we name\nunkind--unkind now in deed and now in word; and in respect of these\nmodes of behavior which, though not aggressive, give pain, there arise\nnumerous and complicated problems. Pain is sometimes given to others\nsimply by maintaining an equitable claim; pain is at other times given\nby refusing a request; and again at other times by maintaining an\nopinion. In these and numerous cases suggested by them, there have to\nbe answered the questions whether, to avoid inflicting pain, personal\nfeelings should be sacrificed, and how far sacrificed. Again, in cases\nof another class, pain is given not by a passive course, but by an\nactive course. How far shall a person who has misbehaved be grieved by\nshowing aversion to him? Shall one whose action is to be reprobated\nhave the reprobation expressed to him or shall nothing be said? Is it\nright to annoy by condemning a prejudice which another displays? These\nand kindred queries have to be answered after taking into account the\nimmediate pain given, the possible benefit caused by giving it, and\nthe possible evil caused by not giving it. In solving problems of\nthis class, the only help Absolute Ethics gives, is by enforcing the\nconsideration that inflicting more pain than is necessitated by proper\nself-regard, or by desire for another's benefit, or by the maintenance\nof a general principle is unwarranted.\n\nOf positive beneficence under its absolute form nothing more specific\ncan be said than that it must become co-extensive with whatever\nsphere remains for it; aiding to complete the life of each as a\nrecipient of services and to exalt the life of each as a renderer of\nservices. As with a developed humanity the desire for it by every\none will so increase, and the sphere for exercise of it so decrease,\nas to involve an altruistic competition, analogous to the existing\negoistic competition, it may be that Absolute Ethics will eventually\ninclude what we before called a higher equity, prescribing the mutual\nlimitations of altruistic activities.\n\nUnder its relative form, positive beneficence presents numerous\nproblems, alike important and difficult, admitting only of empirical\nsolutions. How far is self-sacrifice for another's benefit to be\ncarried in each case?--a question which must be answered differently\naccording to the character of the other, the needs of the other, and\nthe various claims of self and belongings which have to be met. To what\nextent under given circumstances shall private welfare be subordinated\nto public welfare?--a question to be answered after considering\nthe importance of the end and the seriousness of the sacrifice.\nWhat benefit and what detriment will result from gratuitous aid\nyielded to another?--a question in each case implying an estimate of\nprobabilities. Is there any unfair treatment of sundry others, involved\nby more than fair treatment of this one other? Up to what limit may\nhelp be given to the existing generation of the inferior, without\nentailing mischief on future generations of the superior? Evidently to\nthese and many kindred questions included in this division of Relative\nEthics, approximately true answers only can be given.\n\nBut though here Absolute Ethics, by the standard it supplies, does not\ngreatly aid Relative Ethics, yet, as in other cases, it aids somewhat\nby keeping before consciousness an ideal conciliation of the various\nclaims involved; and by suggesting the search for such compromise among\nthem, as shall not disregard any, but shall satisfy all to the greatest\nextent practicable.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[A] _Leviathan_, ch. xv.\n\n[B] I can count up more than a dozen such cases among those personally\nwell known to me.\n\n[C] _Constitutional Code_, chap. xvi, Supreme Legislative--Section vi.\n_Omnicompetence_.\n\n[D] _Republic_, Bk. ix.\n\n[E] _Nicomachean Ethics_, Bk. i, chap 8.\n\n[F] Bk. x, chap. 7.\n\n[G] This universal requirement it was which I had in view when choosing\nfor my first work, published in 1850, the title _Social Statics_.\n\n[H] _On Idiocy and Imbecility_, by William W. Ireland, M. D., p. 255-6.\n\n[I] For instances see _Fortnightly Review_, Vol. XXIV (_New Series_),\np. 712.\n\n[J] See Essay on \"The Origin and Function of Music.\"\n\n[K] I do not find this passage in the second edition; but the omission\nof it appears to have arisen not from any change of view, but because\nit did not naturally come into the recast form of the argument which\nthe section contains.\n\n[L] Most of these quotations I make from Dr. Bain's _Mental and Moral\nScience_.\n\n\n\n\n      *      *      *      *      *      *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unpaired\nquotation marks were retained.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nThere are two Section 14's, 22's and 105's; and no Section 16.\n\nPage 94: \"pharynx\" was misprinted as \"phayrnx\".; changed here.\n\nPage 111: \"pouring half the night\" may be a misprint for \"poring\".\n\nPage 200: Missing closing quotation mark added after 'a means of\nhappiness?'. The text from this was quoted ends in a period, not a\nquestion mark.\n\nPage 226: \"this all all-important factor\" was printed with the word\n\"all\" duplicated and was not corrected.","title":"The Data of Ethics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":92994}