{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46544/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46544","id":"gutenberg_46544","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46544","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Theism"],"text":"THE\n\nTHEISTIC CONCEPTION OF\n\nTHE WORLD.\n\n\n_AN ESSAY\n\nIN OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN TENDENCIES\n\nOF MODERN THOUGHT._\n\n\nBY B. F. COCKER, D.D., LL.D.,\n\nPROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN;\n\nAUTHOR OF \"CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\"\n\n\n\"Science discloses the method of the world, but not its cause; Religion,\n\nits cause, but not its method.\"--MARTINEAU.\n\n\nNEW YORK:\n\nHARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,\n\nFRANKLIN SQUARE.\n\n\nEntered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, by\n\nHARPER & BROTHERS,\n\nIn the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe present volume was announced in the preface to \"Christianity and\nGreek Philosophy\" as nearly ready for publication under the title of\n\"Christianity and Modern Thought.\"\n\nSeveral considerations have induced the author to delay its appearance,\nthe most influential of which has been the desire to await the\nculmination among a class of self-styled \"advanced thinkers\" of what\nthey have been pleased to call \"the tendency of modern thought.\" No\nextraordinary sagacity was needed to foresee the issue, or to predict\nthat it must soon be reached. The transition has been rapid from\nnegative criticism of the Christian religion to direct assault upon the\nvery foundation of all religion--the personality and providence of God.\nDistrust of a supernatural revelation, and denial of all authority to\nthe teaching of the sacred Scriptures, has been succeeded by doubt of\nthe existence of God in the proper import of that sacred name. The\nTheistic postulate is degraded to the rank of a mere hypothesis, which\nis pronounced inadequate to explain the universe. A \"law-governed\nCosmos, full of life and reason,\" eternal and infinite, must now take\nthe place of a personal God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe. This\nis the \"New Faith\" which is to supersede the Old.\n\nThe question, \"Are we still Christians?\" has received a final answer in\nthe words of Strauss: \"If we would speak as honest, upright men, we must\nacknowledge we are no longer Christians.\"[1] And in giving this answer\nhe is confident he speaks in the name of a large and rapidly increasing\nnumber of men who once believed in the truth of Christianity--\"The We I\nmean no longer counts only by thousands.\"[2] The further question, \"Have\nwe still a Religion?\" (understanding by religion \"the recognition and\nveneration of God, and the belief in a future life\") is also answered in\nthe negative. Religion \"is a delusion, to abolish which ought to be the\nendeavor of every man whose eyes are open to the truth.\"[3] The only\nquestion which now remains for the speculative intellect is, \"What is\nour conception of the Universe?\"--the conception which henceforth must\ntake the place of a personal God. The answer of Strauss is explicit, and\nin his estimation final: \"The conception of the Cosmos, instead of that\nof a personal God as the finality to which we are led by perception and\nthought, or as the ultimate fact beyond which we can not proceed, ...\nassumes the more definite shape of matter infinitely agitated, which, by\ndifferentiation and integration, develops itself to ever higher forms\nand functions, and describes an everlasting circle by evolution,\ndissolution, and then fresh evolution.\"[4]\n\nThis may be called pantheism or atheism, materialism or idealism, just\nas we please; Strauss has no solicitude about mere names. \"If this be\nconsidered pure, unmitigated materialism, I will not dispute it. In\nfact, I have always tacitly regarded the contrast so loudly proclaimed\nbetween materialism and idealism (or by whatever term one may designate\nthe view opposed to the former) as a mere quarrel about words. They have\na common foe in the dualism which pervaded the conception of the world\nthroughout the Christian era, dividing man into body and soul, his\nexistence into time and eternity, and opposing an eternal Creator to a\ncreated and perishable universe.\"[5]\n\nThe end is reached at last--no soul, no God, no providence, no\nimmortality! We have waited for a culmination, and now we are called\nupon to look, \"not into the golden Orient, but vaguely all around into a\ndim, copper firmament pregnant with earthquake and tornado.\" Or, rather,\nwe are called to look into an abyss, and, \"shouting question after\nquestion into the Sibyl-cave of Destiny, receive no answer\" save \"the\nEverlasting No.\" It only remains for us to listen to Strauss's _De\nProfundis_ and retire. \"The loss of the belief in providence belongs,\nindeed, to the most sensible deprivations which are connected with a\nrenunciation of Christianity. In the enormous machine of the universe,\namid the incessant whirl and hiss of its jagged iron wheels, amid the\ndeafening crash of its ponderous stamps and hammers, in the midst of\nthis whole terrific commotion, man--a helpless and defenseless\ncreature--finds himself placed, not secure for a moment that on some\nimprudent motion a wheel may not seize and rend him, or a hammer crush\nhim to powder. This sense of abandonment is at first something awful.\nBut, then, what avails it to have recourse to an illusion? Our wish is\nimpotent to refashion the world; the understanding clearly shows that it\nindeed is such a machine. But it is not merely this. We do not only find\nthe revolution of pitiless wheels in our world-machine, but also the\nshedding of soothing oil. Our God [the world-machine] does not, indeed,\ntake us into his arms from the outside, but he unseals the well-spring\nof consolation within our own bosoms.... He who can not help himself in\nthis matter is beyond help, is not yet ripe for our stand-point.\"[6]\n\nThere is a weighty and solemn lesson in this illustration of the\n\"tendency of modern thought\"--a lesson which even Strauss intended to\nteach the age, viz., that there is no discernible _via media_ between\n\"the Old Faith and the New\"--between the belief in a personal God and\nthe impersonal All. The \"New Faith\" must at last be the faith of all who\nreject _providence_, that providence which is pre-eminently revealed in\nhistory, instituting a kingdom of God upon earth by a supernatural\nguidance and grace.\n\nThe issue, now so sharply and clearly defined, between _a God and no\nGod_, has determined a change in the plan of our work, and justifies, we\ntrust, the attempt we have made to restate and defend \"The Theistic\nConception of the World.\"\n\nThose who have done me the honor to read \"Christianity and Greek\nPhilosophy\" will detect in the present volume a radical change of views\nconcerning the concepts Time and Space. This change of position is the\nresult of patient reconsideration of this branch of the discussion, and\nwe allude to it here simply to guard against the charge of unconscious\ninconsistency. The views presented in this volume must stand or fall on\ntheir own merits.\n\nThe author has to acknowledge many obligations to his friend, Dr.\nBernard Moses, for material aid rendered in getting this work through\nthe press.\n\n\nUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, _July, 1875_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n                                                         Page\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n THE PROBLEM STATED                                        13\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n GOD THE CREATOR                                           27\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n THE CREATION                                              56\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n CREATION.--THE GENESIS OR BEGINNING                       97\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n CREATION: ITS HISTORY                                    127\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD          172\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD          202\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN HUMAN HISTORY.--THE RELATION OF\n GOD TO HUMANITY                                          244\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n SPECIAL PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER                            292\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n MORAL GOVERNMENT.--ITS GROUNDS, THE CORRELATION BETWEEN\n GOD AND MAN                                              344\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n MORAL GOVERNMENT.--ITS NATURE, CONDITION, METHOD, AND\n END                                                      366\n\n\n\"To such readers as have reflected on man's life; who understand that\nfor man's well-being Faith is properly the one thing needful; how with\nit martyrs, otherwise weak, can cheerfully endure the shame and the\ncross; and without it worldlings puke up their sick existence by suicide\nin the midst of luxury: to such it will be clear that for a pure moral\nnature, the loss of religious belief is the loss of every thing.\n\n\"All wounds, the crush of long-continued destitution, the stab of false\nfriendship and of false love, all wounds in thy so genial heart, would\nhave healed again had not its life-warmth been withdrawn.\n\n\"Well mayest thou exclaim, 'Is there no God, then; but at best an\nabsentee God, sitting idle, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside\nof his universe and seeing it go?' 'Has the word Duty no meaning; is\nwhat we call Duty no Divine messenger and guide, but a false earthly\nphantasm made up of desire and fear?' 'Is the heroic inspiration we name\nVirtue but some passion; some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the\ndirection others profit by?' I know not; only this I know, If what thou\nnamest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all astray. 'Behold, thou\nart fatherless, outcast, and the universe is--the Devil's.'\"--CARLYLE.\n\n\nTHE THEISTIC\n\nCONCEPTION OF THE WORLD.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE PROBLEM STATED.\n\n\nAs Archimedes demanded only one fixed point in order to move the world,\nso Descartes desired to find one certain and indubitable principle upon\nwhich he could plant his feet and lift himself out of the universal\ndoubt which environed him. He found it in the proposition--I exist. This\nfor me is the most direct, immediate, and certain of all intuitions. I\ncan not doubt, I can not deny my own existence. Whatever else I doubt, I\ncan not doubt that I, the doubter, exist. This I that thinks, that is\nconscious, is the fundamental _reality_.[7]\n\nI see around me a plurality of personal existences who are\nself-conscious and self-manifesting beings--beings who think and feel,\nand display their activities in time and space, as I do; and I can no\nmore doubt their existence than I can doubt my own. This combination of\nthe content of external perception with that of internal perception\ngives the immediate consciousness of external _reality_.[8]\n\nBesides these personal existences analogous to my own, there are other\nobjects which exist in relation to my corporeal organism--relations of\nposition, distance, and direction, which are purely objective. These\nexistences offer resistance to my muscular effort to displace them in\nspace, and defy all my mental effort to reduce them to the category of\nsubjective phenomena. These objects have specific properties or exist in\ncertain conditions which, in their mutual relation with my sensitive\norganism, produce in me certain vital affections, as heat, light, color,\nand sound. These affections presuppose a force or energy outside of my\nconsciousness, and distinct from myself. Thus I am constrained to\nbelieve that the earth on which I tread, the heavens that shine upon me,\nthe forms and movements which surround me, are not vain shadows, unreal\nphantoms of my own creation, but real entities. The totality of\nexistence called the universe is for me a _reality_.\n\nThe phenomena of the universe are in ceaseless flow and change. Bodies\nare aggregated and dissolved. Plants are evolved from germs, they live\nand grow, then decay and perish. Animals and men are born and developed\nto maturity, then they sicken and die. The earth itself is in constant\nchange. The storms of heaven, the erosion of the atmosphere, the gnawing\nof the tidal wave, the mountain torrent, the flowing river, the\nearthquake and the volcano, are perpetually changing the aspect of the\nglobe. There is perpetual _genesis_, ceaseless _becoming_, incessant\n_change_.\n\nBeneath all these changes there is an enduring \"something.\" There are\nabiding constants as well as fleeting changes; enduring realities as\nwell as unstable phenomena. The same forms and relations, the same\nforces and laws, the same analogous functions, and the same archetypal\nideas, remain amid all individual changes. There is an enduring\n_substance_ which is the subject of all these changes. There is a\npermanent force, or _power_, which is the cause of all change. There are\nconstant numerical proportions, determinate geometrical forms, specific\nideal archetypes, and special ends, which give the law of all change.\nThe universe is not a mere aggregation of phenomena, a mere concourse of\nthings in time and space with accidental resemblances: it is a _unity_,\na cosmos, a harmonious whole, both in its contemporaneous and successive\nhistory.\n\nSo much is and always has been known, with more or less clearness and\ndistinctness by all men, and known by a spontaneous and immediate\nintuition. This intuition, like every intuition, even the commonest\nintuition of sense, has had a gradual development both in the\nconsciousness of the individual, and in the consciousness of the race.\nIt has always been immanent in human thought even when not articulately\nexpressed in human language. To the native common-sense of our race, the\nworld is a reality, not a dream; to the universal reason of mankind the\nuniverse is a harmony, not a chaos. Men have instinctively apprehended\nsome ideal relations, some causal connection, some adaptation and\npurpose in nature, and they have always had some intuition, however dim\nand shadowy, of an _all-pervading unity_, and an _ultimate causative\nprinciple_.\n\nBut when the universe has become the object of _reflective_ thought,\nwhen man has attempted a colligation of the individual facts, and an\nideal construction and rational interpretation of the phenomena, when he\nhas sought to grasp the manifoldness and diversity of nature in a higher\nunity of thought, and, above all, when he has attempted to pass beyond\nphenomena and their relations, and form a conception of _the absolute\nreality and ultimate cause_--then it is that difficulties have arisen\nand questions have presented themselves which have perplexed the\ndiscursive reason, and taxed the genius of the ablest thinkers of every\nage.\n\n\n1. First of all, there have arisen the fundamental questions: Has the\nuniverse always existed, or had the Cosmos, with its changes and\nconstants, its forces and laws, its forms and relations, a _Beginning_?\nIs its present condition but one link in an endless chain, one phasis in\na series of changes, which had no beginning and shall have no end? Is\nthe universe limited both in space and duration, or is it unlimited,\nunbeginning, and endless?\n\n\n2. If the universe had a beginning, what is the \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6--the originant,\ncausative Principle in which or from which it had its beginning? How are\nwe to conceive aright that First Principle of all existence and of all\nknowledge? is it material or spiritual, intelligent or unintelligent?\n\n\n3. What conception are we to form of the nature and mode of that\nbeginning? Was it a pure supernatural Origination--an absolute creation?\nor was it simply a Formation out of a first matter or first force--an\nartistic, architectonic, demiurgic creation? Was that beginning\ndetermined by necessity or by choice? Was it an unconscious emanation\nfrom, or a necessary development of, the First Principle; or was it a\nconscious forth-putting of power for the realization of a foreseen,\npremeditated, predetermined plan--a _mental_ Order.\n\n\n4. A supernatural Origination being assumed, then, from that first\ninitial act of absolute creation, has the process of formation been\ngradual, continuous, and uniform--a progressive _Evolution_ from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous, from lower to higher forms, according\nto a changeless law of uniformity and continuity? or have there been\nmarked, distinct, and successive stages of formation--creative epochs\nwhich may be called \"new beginnings?\" Is the historic unity of creation\na unity of Thought, an ideal consecution? or is it simply a physical\nunity grounded in a material nexus--a genetic connection resulting from\nthe necessary action of physical causes?\n\n\n5. What is the relation of the Creator to the existing creation? Is the\nDeity, in any sense, immanent in, or does he dwell altogether apart\nfrom, and out of all connection with, the universe? Has any finite thing\nor being an independent existence? Have the forces of nature any reality\napart from the Divine efficiency? Did the Creator, in the beginning,\ngive self-being to the substance of the universe, and endow it with\nproperties and forces, so that it can exist and act apart from, and\nindependently of, the First Cause? or is God still in nature upholding\nall substance, the power of all force, the life of all life, shaping all\nforms, and organizing all systems? Is God not only the Creator but the\n_Conservator_ of all things?\n\n\n6. Is there any Ethical meaning, any moral significance in the universe?\nIs the physical order of the universe subordinated to a moral order in\nwhich freedom exists? Are there any indications that the existence of\nmoral personality is the end toward which all the successive changes of\nnature have tended, and the progressive types of life have been a\npreparation and a prophecy? Was the earth designed to be a theatre for\nthe development of moral character, the education and discipline of\nmoral beings? Does the course of history reveal \"a power that works for\nrighteousness,\" and aims at the highest perfection of rational and free\nbeings? In a word, is there a _Providential_ Government of the world?\n\n\n7. Does man stand in a more immediate relation to God than the things of\nnature? Is each individual the charge of a providence, the subject of a\nmoral government, and the heir to a future retribution? Has man a\nspiritual and immortal nature? Has he the power so to determine his own\naction and character that he can justly be held accountable, and treated\nas the proper subject of reward and punishment? In the final issue of\nthings, will every human being meet his righteous deserts, and be\nrewarded or punished according to his works? In short, is man under\n_Moral Government_?\n\n\nThese are the great, the vital questions of to-day. In one form or\nanother they have engaged the attention and stimulated the earnest\nthought of the ablest and best of minds in past ages; and, whether from\nthe inherent demand of reason, or the promptings of instinctive\ncuriosity, they have a deeper hold on the mind of this, than of any\npreceding age.\n\n\nWe approach the discussion of these questions with a profound conviction\nof their magnitude and difficulty, and an oppressive foreboding that our\nessay will be pronounced ambitious and vain. Their vastness seems to\ndefy our admeasurement, and their complexity and difficulty may defeat\nour feeble efforts at solution. \"The mer-de-glace of the Infinite is\ncovered with myriads of philosophic insects which have been carried up\nthere and lost.\" May we hope for any better fate? Do the problems permit\nany solution at all?\n\nOf one thing, at any rate, we are sure: these questions are native to\nthe human mind. They arise spontaneously in presence of the facts of the\nuniverse. However much of human effort to solve these problems has ended\nin failure and defeat, the human mind has never lost confidence in the\npossibility of their ultimate solution, and humanity has never abandoned\nthem in despair.[9] A few impatient souls have plunged into Pyrrhonism\nand taken refuge in universal skepticism; while others have sought to\norganize nescience into a science. But patient, earnest souls have never\ncast away their faith in the integrity of universal reason, and have\nnever ceased to believe that its ideas and laws are, in truth, the ideas\nand laws of the universe. These problems are the great problems of all\nphilosophy, and all religion; and unless philosophy be a dream, and\nreligion an illusion, they are capable of such a solution as shall\nsatisfy the reason of man.[10] This conviction, which is common to the\nmass of thoughtful men, will justify every attempt of philosophy to\nattain to an ultimate unity of thought. The ultimate harmony of\nphysical, philosophical, and religious truth is the faith of all noble\nminds.\n\nThe signs of the times are propitious. To-day the conflict between\nreason and faith, science and religion, presents many hopeful\nindications of an approaching conciliation. Candid men in both fields\nare earnestly working, and patiently watching, and hourly catching\nclearer glimpses of the everlasting harmony which pervades the universe\nof being and of thought. Every, even the smallest, contribution made\nwith an honest purpose to give confidence and collimation to this\nmovement, will be welcome to all earnest minds. This may be our apology\nfor attempting a task that belongs to stronger intellects than ours.\n\nIt is obvious, at first thought, that the questions before us admit of\nno loose and desultory treatment. Abysses are not to be concealed by\nlaurel screens, or chasms bridged by flowers of rhetoric. If we are to\nreach any satisfactory conclusions, our procedure must be rigidly\nsystematic and logically exact. We must have a fixed point of departure,\nand, if possible, a faultless method of advance. The fundamental\nquestion must be determined. The central problem must be ascertained,\nand we must deal with all correlative questions in their logical\nconnection with the one fundamental inquiry.\n\nFirst of all, then, can we place that central problem clearly before\nour mental vision? Amid the diverse questions which spontaneously arise\nin presence of the diversified phenomena of nature, and the wonderful\nevolutions of humanity, can we fix upon the _one_ question in which all\nothers are involved--the grand underlying problem which comprehends them\nall?\n\nA little reflection will make it apparent that the problem of all\nproblems is this--\n\n_How shall we conceive aright the_ FIRST PRINCIPLE _and_ ORIGIN _of all\nthings, itself unoriginated and unbeginning, the source of all\nbeginnings? Or again, what is that_ FIRST PRINCIPLE _which, being\nassumed, shall be found a sufficient explanation of the motion and\nchange, the order and adaptation, the life and feeling, the\nconsciousness and reason, we call, collectively, the universe_?\n\nThis is clearly the fundamental question on which all the others are\ngrounded, and in the solution of which they have their solution.\n\nThe universe presents itself to sense and sense-perception as a\nperpetual genesis, \"a vast aggregation and history of phenomena\nconditioned in time and space which, by its diversity and mutability, is\ndisqualified from being regarded as independent and self-existent.\" To\nour experiential knowledge, to our physical science in its highest\ngeneralizations, the universe is a product, an _effect_. And it is an\neffect for which the reason demands an explanation and a cause. It is a\nmanifoldness and diversity which the logical understanding is\nceaselessly endeavoring to reduce to a unity. Indeed, every movement of\nthought, from the first rude attempt at classification on the simple\nbasis of resemblance, upward to the recognition of more profound ideal\nrelations and uniform laws, until its culmination in the highest\nintegration of reason, is but the effort of the mind to grasp the\nindividual facts of nature in a unity of thought, and interpret the\nuniverse according to principles and ideas which the reason supplies.\n\nThe moment reflective thought is directed to the phenomenal world, the\nquestions spontaneously arise--Out of what does the phenomenal come? By\nwhat agency or efficiency does it arise? Why does it present itself in\nthis order rather than another? Or, more specifically--What is the\nabiding _reality_ which sustains the array of phenomena? What is the\ninvisible _power_ which effects all the changes we see around us? What\nis that unseen _presence_ which determines the forms, relations, and\nadaptations which every where present themselves to the reason of man?\nIn a word, _What is that ultimate principle--the last or remotest in the\norder of analytic thought, the first in the order of being and of\nreason--which sustains and moves and organizes and governs all_--that\nfundamental, abiding PRIMUS which is everlastingly present behind the\nscenery and changes of the world--_that which always was, and now is,\nand ever shall be_ FIRST? Or if we permit ourselves to regard the\npresent order of things as a necessary out-birth from the past, still we\nare compelled by a laborious effort of regressive thought to climb\nupward through a series of changes to an absolutely FIRST of the series\nconditioning all the other members, but itself unconditioned. Few will\nnow claim that this is the natural and adequate cosmical conception;\nbut, even under this mode of conception, we can not but feel that a\ndevelopment without a beginning of the process, a series without a first\nterm, is impossible. \"The absolute infinity of a series is a\ncontradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably and\ninconceivably great, is impossible unless unity is given as its basis,\nso every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a first\nterm is given as its commencement.\" Therefore the question still\nreturns--What is that First Principle of all things?\n\nIn obedience to this demand of reason, or impelled by an innate\n\"wonder\"--\"the feeling of the philosopher\"--men have in all ages\nattempted an ideal construction and rational interpretation of the\nuniverse.[11] The Mythologies, Cosmogonies, Philosophies, Religions of\nthe ancient world were the simple products of this innate tendency.\nBeyond the circle of thought illuminated by Divine revelation, the first\nmovement of reflection was unmethodical and incomplete. Pursuing the\ninquiries objectively, that is, in the realm of outward nature, and not\nsubjectively in the realm of reason, the human mind was perpetually\nentangled with dualistic conceptions. There were contrarieties,\npolarities, antagonisms, which the logical understanding could not\ncancel. Hence we have, as an early, perhaps the earliest, form of\nconstruction, an Oriental Dualism--as in the Adonis and Moloch of the\nPh\u0153nicians, the Isis and Osiris of the Egyptians, the Ormuzd and\nAhriman of the Persians, the Chaos and Love of Orpheus, the Plenum and\nVacuum (Matter and Space) of Democritus, and even some lingering taint\nin the God and Necessity of Plato's \"Tim\u00e6us.\"\n\nBut all this was unsatisfactory to human reason, which is a _unity_, and\nwhich makes its imperious demand that _absolute unity_ shall stand at\nthe fountain-head of being. It has never been able to rest in an\nUltimate which was not an Absolute--that is, a _unity_ which by its very\nidea and conception is the negation of all plurality and mutability; a\n_unity_ which is unconditioned, and yet which conditions all; an\n\"eternal constancy,\" the voluntary cause of all genesis and all\nchange.[12] It is a law of reason, under which alone it can maintain its\nintegrity, that the _First Cause must be_ ONE, _and not many_. An\nabsolute cause must be one in order to be absolute; two absolutes is a\ncontradiction. With more or less clearness, men in all ages have\napprehended that \"the _First Principle must be one or nothing_.\"\n\nThis is tacitly conceded in all modern systems of thought. B\u00fcchner, the\nmaterialist; Spencer, the dynamist; Hegel, the idealist; Cousin and\nColeridge, the spiritualists, know no divergence here. Atheism,\nPantheism, and Theism alike commence with unity at the fountain-head of\nbeing--a unity which is incomposite, absolutely continuous, every where\npresent and eternal. Every system of philosophy is essentially an effort\nto show how the universe that now is has been originated by, or evolved\nout of, or has emanated from, a First Principle, an absolute Unity. To\ndetermine whether this absolute First Principle can be known, and, if\nknown, how conceived and expressed aright, is the ultimate problem of\nall philosophy and all religion.\n\nAll the answers which have been given, and, indeed, all which can be\nconceived, are contained in the following four propositions:\n\n1. _In the beginning was_ MATTER--matter as the original substance or\nsubstratum, with its inherent, essential, and necessary attribute of\nforce; this alone is eternal and infinite. \"No force without matter--no\nmatter without force.\" \"Matter and its immanent force is immortal and\nindestructible.\" \"The world is unlimited and infinite.\"[13] Matter, with\nits primary forces of attraction and repulsion, cohesion and affinity,\nis fully adequate to the explanation of all the phenomena of the\nuniverse, physical, vital, and mental.\n\n2. _In the beginning was_ FORCE--force homogeneous but unstable, and\nnecessarily tending to differentiation and heterogeneity; splitting into\nopposites, standing off into polarities, ramifying into attractions and\nrepulsions, light, heat, magnetism, and electricity; and mounting up\nthrough the stages of physical, vital, and neural to the mental life\nitself, with all its varied and endless phenomena, as revealed in the\nlanguages, laws, institutions, arts, sciences, and religions of the\nworld. Force is \"the ultimate of all ultimates,\" the \"Absolute Reality,\"\nthe \"Unconditioned Cause.\"[14]\n\n3. _In the beginning was_ THOUGHT--thought as an eternal process of\nself-manifestation and self-actualization, which in its necessary\nevolution reveals itself as force, and expresses itself in the varied\ntypes of existence and laws of phenomena, natural and spiritual. \"_The\nAbsolute Idea_,\" as a perpetual process, an eternal thinking, is the\nsupreme principle of all reality. \"The idea of the Absolute Spirit\ncomprehends the entire wealth of the natural and the spiritual world; it\nis the only substance and truth of this wealth, and nothing is true and\nreal except so far as it forms an element of its being.\"[15]\n\n4. _In the beginning was_ WILL--an unconditioned Will as the indivisible\nunity and perpetual differentiation of _Reason_ and _Power_ and _Love_.\nThis Unconditioned Will is the causative principle of all Reality, all\nEfficiency, and all Perfection--a causative principle containing,\npredetermining, and producing all the manifold forms and relations,\nforces and laws of the universe in reference to a final purpose. This\n_Absolute First Cause_ is a living personal Being, \"from whom, in whom,\nand to whom are all things.\"[16]\n\nThe first and second of these propositions coalesce with the creed of\n_Atheism_, the third with the creed of _Pantheism_, the fourth is the\ncreed of _Theism_, and, as we hope to prove in subsequent chapters, the\nonly rational and adequate explanation of the facts of the universe.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGOD THE CREATOR.\n\n\"In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth.\"--Gen. i. 1.\n\n\"GOD that made the world and all things therein.... He is Lord of heaven\nand earth.\"--Acts xvii. 24.\n\n\"The Eternal Will is the creator of the world as He is the creator of\nthe finite person.\"--FICHTE.\n\n\n_God is the first principle, the unconditioned cause of all existence._\nThis is the answer of Christian doctrine to the great problem presented\nfor solution in the preceding chapter. Whether this fundamental\npresupposition shall be finally accepted as the only adequate solution\nof the problem of existence will depend in a large degree upon our\napprehension of the Christian idea of God. We shall, therefore, open the\ndiscussion by asking the question--What is the content of our conception\nof God?\n\nDogmatic theology might rest satisfied with the simple affirmation,\n\"_God is_ GOD,\"[17] as against all the captious demands of science, were\nit not necessary to render an account to itself of what, at first sight,\nmight be pronounced a \"sublime tautology.\" For, while it is hereby\nconfessed that God in his essential being is incomprehensible and\nineffable, so that to the Christian as well as to the philosopher he is\n\"the great Unknown,\" still it is not hereby admitted that it is\nabsolutely impossible to know God. To affirm that God is absolutely \"the\nUnknowable\" is simply to assert his unreality. Mr. Martineau has finely\nobserved that this term is self-contradictory; for we affirm by the use\nof it that we know so much that He can not be known. Nay, it assumes the\nexistence of God, and in the same breath separates us from Him forever.\nBut if it be admitted that God _is_, it can not be absolutely impossible\nto know _what_ He is. The knowledge of existence and the form of\nexistence mutually condition each other. There must be something in the\nunderstanding answering to the term in the language of mankind, and\nthere must be something in the realm of being which is the ground of the\nidea in the reason of Man. The heathen have a presentiment, a dim\nintuition of the \"unknown God,\" and the inspired teacher may so \"declare\nHim\" in human language that his hearers may receive a definite notion,\nand attain to a practical knowledge of God.\n\nThe _idea_ of God is a common phenomenon of the universal intelligence\nof our race, and must have been present to the thought of man even\nbefore he uttered the _name_ of God.[18] The moment man becomes\nconscious of himself, and knows himself as distinct from the world, that\nsame moment he becomes conscious of a _Higher Self_--a living Power upon\nwhich both himself and the world depend. For this Higher Self all\nnations have found a name. All languages have a term cognate with the\nSaxon \"God,\" which expresses that spontaneous consciousness of a\nsupernatural power which is common to all minds--that intuition of a\nsupramundane existence which is the ground and reason of all other\nexistence. Even Polytheism has a name for the abstract of all the gods,\nwhich sets forth the ideas of being, power, causality, and personality.\nAnd in Christian lands the term God, without any periphrasis, at once\nrepresents the idea of a Being distinct from self and the world, who is\nthe Maker of the world and the Father of humanity. For all practical\nends it is enough to say God is _God_. It is only when reflective\nthought seeks to express some more specific and determinate conception\nof the Supreme Being that we find ourselves under the necessity of\nadding other expletives to this term God.\n\nIt is therefore desirable that we should set down, in a provisional\nform, the general conception of God as it exists in the mind of the\nTheist and the Christian. I can not do this better than by selecting\nfrom the writings of three men of diverse schools of thought--one a\nPhysicist, another a Metaphysician, the third a Theologian; and all in a\ngreater or less degree influenced by the teaching of the Christian\nScriptures.\n\nMy first selection will be from the \"Meditations\" of Descartes, who is\nregarded as \"the father of modern philosophy.\" \"By the name of God,\"\nsays he, \"I mean an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent,\nomniscient, omnipresent substance, by which I and all other things which\nare have been created and produced.\"[19]\n\nMy second selection is from the \"Principia\" of Sir Isaac Newton, a work\nwhich, by the general consent of the scientific world, is the greatest\ncontribution ever made to science. Sir Isaac Newton was a Physicist\nrather than a Metaphysician; he will therefore represent to us the\nconception of God entertained by the scientific Theist. At the close of\nthis his great work he writes: \"The true God is a living, intelligent,\npowerful Being, and, from His other perfections, it follows that He is\nSupreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and\nomniscient; that is, His duration reaches from eternity to eternity, His\npresence from infinity to infinity. He governs all things, and knows all\nthings that are or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but\neternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but He endures and is\npresent. He endures forever, and He is every where present; and by\nexisting always and every where, He constitutes [or causes] duration and\nspace. Since every particle of space is _always_, and every indivisible\nmoment of duration is _every where_, certainly the Maker and Lord of all\nthings can not be _never_ and _nowhere_.... God is the same God, always\nand every where. He is omnipresent, not _virtually_ [potentially] only,\nbut also substantially; for virtue can not subsist without substance. In\nHim all things are contained and moved, yet neither affects the other.\nGod suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance\nfrom the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God\nexists necessarily; and by the same necessity exists _always_ and _every\nwhere_.... We know Him only by His most wise and excellent contrivances\nof things and final causes; we admire Him for His perfections; but we\nreverence and adore Him on account of His dominion. A God without\ndominion, providence, and final causes is nothing else but Fate and\nNature. Blind mechanical necessity, which is certainly the same always\nand every where, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity\nof natural things which we find suited to different times and places\ncould arise from nothing but the _ideas_ and _will_ of a Being\nnecessarily existing.\"\n\nMy last selection is from the \"Grammar of Assent,\" by John Henry Newman,\nformerly a Protestant, now a Catholic divine. Prior to his change of\ntheological position he published a remarkable work \"On the Development\nof Christian Doctrine in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,\" the design of\nwhich is to exhibit the influence of philosophic thought upon the\nevolution of Christian doctrine, and to bring it into harmony with the\ntheories of Cosmical, Physiological, and Historical development, which\nseem for the present to be in the ascendant. For this reason I choose to\nemploy his words, as setting forth the conception of God which is\ngenerally entertained by thoughtful men. At page ninety-seven of his\nlast work, \"The Grammar of Assent,\" I read:\n\n\"There is one God, such and such in Nature and Attributes. I say 'such\nand such,' for, unless I explain what I mean by _one God_, I use words\nwhich may mean any thing or nothing. I may mean a mere _anima mundi_; or\nan initial principle which once was in action and now is not; or\ncollective humanity. I speak then of the one God of the Theist and of\nthe Christian: a God who is numerically One, who is Personal; the\nAuthor, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the Life of Law and\nOrder, the moral Governor. One who is Supreme and Sole; like Himself,\nunlike all things besides Himself, which all are but his creatures;\ndistinct from, independent of, them all. One who is self-existing,\nabsolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom nothing\nis past or future; who is all perfection, and the fullness and archetype\nof every possible excellence, the Truth itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice,\nHoliness; One who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent,\nIncomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives which\nI ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being whom I\ncall God.\"\n\nThese statements of the Theistic conception will be regarded by most men\nas adequate and satisfactory. They will be accepted by the scientific\nTheist and approved by the dogmatic Theologian. They present the idea of\nGod within the sphere of Christian thought; that is, reflective thought\ninformed and illuminated by the revelations of God which are given in\nthe Christian Scriptures. At the same time it must be confessed that\nthey are defective in scientific form, philosophical development, and\nlogical articulation. They do not present the conception of God in\nharmony with any _principles of Rational Integration_. They show no\nattempt to combine the various elements of this conception in the unity\nof an _Absolute Principle_, an _Ultimate and Fundamental Idea_.\n\nThe aim of all true philosophy is to attain to the insight of First\nPrinciples, yea, to the insight of the Absolute First Principle from\nwhich whatever now _is_ must be derived, and in which whatever _is_ must\nhave its intelligible ground and sufficient reason. There exists in man,\nas the essential characteristic of his humanity, a power or faculty of\nintelligence, best named the _Reason_, which awakens in him the desire\nand furnishes to him the law that enables him to fulfill the inherent\ndesire of combining all his manifold knowledges in the unity of such\n_Absolute First Principle_; and the one fundamental law of this faculty\nis the _Law of Sufficient Reason_, which has been thus enounced by\nLeibnitz: \"Whatever exists, or begins to be, must have a sufficient\nreason for its existence, and why it is as it is, and not otherwise;\"\nor, to give the principle a fuller, and at the same time a legitimate\nexpansion--For all genesis, or beginning, there must be an adequate\n_Cause_; beneath all appearance, all changeful and fleeting phenomena,\nthere must be a permanent _Being_ or _Reality_; beyond all the diverse\nand manifold, there must be an ultimate _Identity_, an incomposite\nindivisible _Unity_; and in all order and special adaptation, there must\nbe a unifying _Thought_, a definite _Purpose_ and _End_.\n\nThe Reason of man can find satisfaction and harmony only in the\nrecognition of an Absolute First Principle which shall comprehend and\nunite all these universal and necessary ideas which are the correlates\nof the facts of experience; that is, an Absolute First Principle which\nshall be the Ultimate Reality, the Ultimate Cause, the Ultimate Unity,\nand the Ultimate Reason of all existence. In other words, the Reason is\nnot and can not be satisfied without \"the clear insight of a _Causative\nPrinciple_ containing, predetermining, and producing all the actual\nresults we see around us, with their orderly relations in reference to a\nfinal purpose, reason, or end; and which causative principle exists not\nonly as the originative and constructive, but also as the conservative\nenergy of all things;\" a Being who \"is before all things, and by whom\nall things consist,\" \"from whom, in whom, and to whom are all things.\"\n\nAnd now what is this Absolute First Principle, causative of all\nexistence, which the spontaneous reason has always intuitively\napprehended, and which the reflective reason has always found to be the\nadequate, and only adequate explanation of the universe? I answer in a\nword, it is AN UNCONDITIONED WILL OR SELF-DIRECTIVE POWER, SEEING ITS\nOWN WAY, AND HAVING THE REASON AND LAW OF ITS ACTION IN ITSELF ALONE.\nThis always and every where has been intuitively apprehended, with more\nor less clearness, as standing at the fountain-head of all existence.\n\nThis, then, we shall postulate as the fundamental axiom of all rational\nintegration, viz., AN UNCONDITIONED WILL, _the principle of all Reality,\nall Efficiency, and all Perfection_.\n\n1. An unconditioned Will which realizes itself in IPS\u00cbITY--self-potency\nand self-affirmation; expresses itself in that august name of God \"I\nAM;\" and constitutes ABSOLUTE REALITY.\n\n2. An unconditioned Will which manifests itself in\nALTERITY--pluri-efficiency; utters itself in the \"I WILL\" of the\ncreative fiat; and constitutes INFINITE EFFICIENCY.\n\n3. An unconditioned Will which returns to itself in TOTALITY--a complete\nIdeal to be realized in Creation; which expresses its satisfaction in\npronouncing all things \"very good,\" and constitutes PERFECT PERSONALITY.\n\nThe changeless correlation and inherent harmony of these ideas of the\nreason (Reality, Efficiency, and Personality) may be rendered more\nobvious by the following formula, after the method of Coleridge's \"polar\nlogic.\"[20]\n\n\n                               _PROTHESIS_\n\n                          UNCONDITIONED WILL\n                                /  |  \\\n             /-----------------/   |   \\------------------\\\n _THESIS_   /                 _MESOTHESIS_                 \\_ANTITHESIS_\n           /                       |                        \\\n      IPS\u00cbITY-----Efficient     CAUSALITY     Efficient----ALTERITY\n           \\                       |                        /\n            \\                    Final                     /\n             \\-----------------\\   |   /------------------/\n                                \\  |  /\n                               TOTALITY\n\n                               _SYNTHESIS_\n\nPROTHESIS expresses the absolute identity or eternal co-inherence of\nReason, Love, and Power (the Divine Essence). THESIS expresses Power in\nthe form of Love (the Divine Self-sufficiency and Self-potency).\nANTITHESIS expresses Reason in the form of Power (the Divine\nEfficiency). SYNTHESIS expresses the diversity in unity of Reason, Love,\nand Power (the Divine Perfection). And MESOTHESIS expresses the\nessential correlations which integrate the whole (the Triunity of the\nmanifested God). Thus Absolute Reality, Infinite Efficiency, and Perfect\nPersonality are all, as a triplicity, contained in the fundamental unity\nof an unconditioned Will, which has Love as its motive, Power as its\nagent, and Reason as its light and law.\n\nAnd now let us retire within our own consciousness, and see if this\nfundamental axiom of rational integration--Will as the principle of all\nReality, Efficiency, and Perfection--is not reflected in our reason, and\nevolved in our inner experience. Do we not find that the central point\nof our consciousness--that which makes each man what he is in\ncontradistinction from every other man--that which expresses the _real\nessence of the soul_ apart from its formal processes and regulative\nlaws--is the WILL? Without Will man would fall back from the elevation\nwhich he now assumes to the level of impersonal nature: in a word, he\nwould be a _thing_, and not a _power_. Power, spontaneity, causality,\nwill--these, or similar forms, express, as nearly as can be, the\nessential nature or principle of the human soul.[21] Furthermore, it is\nobvious that mere Power or Energy does not suffice for the notion of\nWill--there must also be Reason and Affection.[22] Indeed, \"Will is\ncontemplated universally as the inseparable union and perpetual\ndifferentiation of Intelligence and originative Power, and as such the\nsole ground of the intelligibility of all causation.\"[23]\n\nA volitional act, a moral and responsible act, must be one which is\nperformed under the influence of motives, and for which, when called to\naccount, we can assign valid reasons. All true volition supposes a\npurpose or end to be realized, an inward appetency or motive which makes\nthe end desirable, and the selection and adaptation of means to\naccomplish that end. Power divorced from reason is simply _blind force_,\nand can not be dignified with the name of Will. The mind of man is\nsometimes in a predominant state of _knowing_, sometimes in a\npredominant state of _feeling_, and sometimes in a predominant state of\n_determination_. To call these separate faculties, however, is\naltogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed\nwithout some determination of the Ego, no act of determination without\nsome cognition, and no act of the one or the other without some amount\nof feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, while each mental state\nmay have its distinctive characteristics, there is unity at the\nroot--_the identical Ego, spirit_, WILL.[24]\n\nSensibility is the condition, Reason is the light, Will is the centre of\nhuman consciousness. Consciousness is a threefold phenomenon in which\nfeeling, knowing, and self-determination are reciprocal elements, and in\ntheir connection and simultaneousness, and at the same time their\ndifferentiation, they compose the entire intellectual life.[25] The\nfinite spirit or will unfolds itself, first, subjectively, in the\nspontaneous affirmation of self-being or self-potency (IPS\u00cbITY);\nsecondly, objectively, in the exertion of power to produce motion,\nchange, phenomena (EFFICIENCY); thirdly, synthetically, in the unity of\nmotive and intention, purpose and act, means and end (PERSONALITY).\n\nThus does \"Will present the middle point, which embraces _thought_ on\nthe one hand and _force_ on the other; and which yet, so far from\nappearing to us to be a _compound_ arising out of them as an effect, is\nmore easily conceived as the originative prefix (prothesis) of all\nmental phenomena.... It carries with it, in its very idea, the\nco-presence of thought as the necessary element within whose sphere it\nhas to manifest itself; its phenomena can not exist alone; it acts on\npreconceptions, which stand related to it, not however as its source,\nbut as its conditions, and are its co-ordinates in the effect, rather\nthan its generating antecedents.\"[26]\n\nPsychological analysis leads us inevitably to this conclusion, that all\nthings are issued by Will, whether in the sphere of the finite or the\ninfinite, and therefore we postulate an UNCONDITIONED WILL, A PERFECT\nMIND, at the source of all becoming. Thus, as Martineau truly remarks,\n_between the_ FORCE _of the physical atheist and the_ THOUGHT _of the\nmetaphysical pantheist_, _we fix upon_ WILL _as the true balancing-point\nof a moral theism_.\n\nThe intelligent reader scarce needs to be reminded that this is the\nconclusion reached by reflective thought in that best and fullest\nexhibition of it which is found in Greek philosophy. The great problem\nof Greek philosophy, as of all philosophy, was, \"What is the \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6, the\nFirst Principle--the ground and cause and reason of all existence?\" The\nfinal answer of that age is found in Plato, for Platonism was the\nculmination, the ripened fruit of the ages of earnest thought which\npreceded Plato. He gathered up, co-ordinated, and grasped into unity the\nresults bequeathed by the mental efforts of his predecessors. The\nPlatonic answer to this great question of philosophy is clear and\nunequivocal. A perfect MIND is the primal source of all being--a Mind in\nwhich Intellect, Efficiency, and Goodness are one and identical. \"Mind\nis the most worthy \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6.\" \"God is the most excellent of causes.\"[27]\n\"Mind is king of heaven and earth.\"[28] \"Motion and life and soul and\nmind are present with absolute being. We can not imagine being to be\ndevoid of life and mind, remaining in awful unmeaningness and\neverlasting fixture.\"[29]\n\n\"Whatever begins to be, must necessarily be produced by some cause; for\nnothing can have its generation without a cause.\" \"The Maker and Father\nof the universe ... had no beginning of his being.\" He formed the\nuniverse according to the eternal model or archetype which his own\nreason supplied, and for motives which his own essential goodness\nproposed. \"Let us now tell for what cause the Maker of this creation and\nthis universe made it as it is. He was _good_; and he who is good\ngrudges no advantage to any creature. Being thus free from envy, He\nwilled that the universe should be good like Himself; and this, the\nspecial ground of the creation and the world, which we receive from the\nwisest philosophers, we must accept.\"[30]\n\nIt would be easy to show that the recognition of intelligent Will, as\nstanding at the fountain-head of all the force which is manifested in\nthe universe, is common to the first Physicists of this age.\n\nGrove concludes his admirable essay on \"The Correlation of the Physical\nForces\" with these words: \"In all phenomena the more closely they are\ninvestigated the more are we convinced that, humanly speaking, neither\nmatter nor force can be created or annihilated, and that an essential\ncause is unattainable [by science]--_Causation is the_ WILL, _Creation\nis the act_, _of God_.\"[31] Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to\nexpress his conviction that \"it is but reasonable to regard the Force of\nGravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a\nWILL existing somewhere.\"[32] Dr. Carpenter, with his usual sagacity in\npenetrating to the essential point, remarks that the WILL \"is that form\nof Force which must be taken as the type of all the rest;\" \"Force must\nbe regarded as the direct expression of WILL.\"[33] \"If,\" says Wallace,\n\"we have traced one force, however minute, to an origin in our own WILL,\nwhile we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it does\nnot seem an improbable conclusion that _all force may be_ WILL-FORCE,\nand thus the whole universe is not only dependent on, but actually is\nthe will of higher intelligences or of one Supreme Intelligence.\"[34] In\nshort, the present attitude of science in relation to this great problem\nis, I think, fairly represented by the Duke of Argyll: \"Science, in the\nmodern doctrine of the Conservation of Energy and the Convertibility of\nForces, is already getting hold of the idea that all kinds of Force are\nbut forms and manifestations of some one Central Force issuing from\nsome one Fountain-head of Power.\" \"This one Force, into which all others\nreturn again, is itself but a mode of action of the Divine WILL.\"[35]\nEven Spencer concedes that \"the Force by which we ourselves produce\nchanges, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,\nis the final disclosure of all analysis ... all other modes of\nconsciousness are derived from our consciousness of exerting Force.\"[36]\n\"The order of nature is doubtless very imperfect, but its production is\nfar more compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent will than with\nthat of blind mechanism.\"[37] Physical science is surely coming into\nharmony with metaphysical thought. It looks upon nature with the eye of\nreason as well as the eye of sense. And it reduces the phenomena to\nunity, not simply by comparative abstraction, which classifies under\nresemblance, co-existence, and succession, but by that rational\nintegration which operates under the necessary laws of substance,\ncausality, intentionality, and absolute unity. It regards the forces of\nnature as the product or manifestation of a higher force--a force which\nis not merely dynamical in its nature--a force which can compass not\nmerely concurrent and antagonistic motions in space, but which is able\nso to adjust these concurrences and antagonisms as to construct agencies\nwhich shall realize designs--a force, therefore, which is thoughtful and\npercipient: in one word, intelligent--a force, in fine, which is not a\nmere mechanical dynamism in space and time, but a true Power existing in\nits type and fullness: in one word--God.[38]\n\nThus does all reflective thought, whether directed to the phenomena of\nthe human mind or the phenomena of nature, confirm the _\u00e0 priori_\nintuition of an unconditioned Will unfolding itself in Thought and\nPower, and completing itself in a harmonious Totality, as the First\nPrinciple and Originative Cause of all existences and of all relations,\nof all individual beings, and of that harmonious whole men call the\nCosmos.\n\nAnd now we pass to the important question--How are we to bring all our\nacquired conceptions of God into harmony with this fundamental idea?\nAssuming that we have certain conceptions of God which are derived from\nverbal instruction, and ultimately from Divine revelation, can we bring\nthese into unity under this First Principle? Or, in other words, can we\nlogically evolve the attributes and perfections of God out of this\nfundamental Idea, and find the result in harmony with the Christian\ndoctrine?\n\nAs the object of thought, even of Christian thought, God must\nnecessarily be conceived by us under the fundamental categories of\n_Being_, _Attribute_, and _Relation_. All objects of thought must come\nunder these categories, and out of or beyond these categories we can not\nthink at all. Furthermore, we can not think of God as the unconditioned\nBeing conditioning Himself, without conceiving Him as _Reality_,\n_Efficiency_, and _Personality_. These constitute the conception of the\nDivine essence whereby it is what it is. When we think of the Attributes\nof such a Being, we must necessarily conceive them as _Absolute_,\n_Infinite_, and _Perfect_.[39] And when we think of the Relations of\nGod to finite existences and finite consciousness, we are constrained to\nregard Him as the _Ground_ and _Cause_ and _Reason_ of all dependent\nbeing.\n\nIn the unity and completeness of this categorical scheme of thought, we\ncan not fail to recognize the following logical order:\n\n BEING (Essentia)               REALITY  }  EFFICIENCY }  PERSONALITY }\n ATTRIBUTE (Related Essence)    ABSOLUTE }  INFINITE   }  PERFECT     }\n RELATION (Free Determination)  GROUND      CAUSE         REASON OR END\n\nIn the Absolute Reality we have the ultimate ground; in the Infinite\nEfficiency we have the adequate cause; and in the Perfect Personality we\nhave the sufficient reason or final cause of all existence.\n\n1. BEING or ESSENCE, as _Reality_, _Efficiency_, and _Personality_. The\nintuition of Being is the most fundamental and the most abstract of all\nideas. After every property and relation has been eliminated, there\nstill remains the affirmation that something _is_. Non-existence, except\nas the negation of being, is inconceivable. But, at the same time, pure\nbeing is the most indeterminate of all ideas. Simple being, without\nattributes, and out of all relation to other ideas, is a notion without\ncontents, and consequently indescribable and unknowable. For us,\ntherefore, pure abstract being is equal to non-being, and the paradox of\nHegel has some truth: Pure Being = Nothing.\nDistinction--differentiation, determination--is the condition of all\nreality. Real being must be determined, only pure nothing can be\nundetermined. The least determined being is the least real; the most\ndetermined is the most real, the most perfect being. Exactly in\nproportion as the nature of beings is differentiated and complicated do\nthey rise in the scale of being. The vegetable has more determinations\nthan inanimate matter; the percipient animal has more determinations\nthan the vital plant; rational man has more determinations than the\npercipient animal, he is the most complicated, the most determined, and\ntherefore the most perfect being in creation. An absolutely perfect\nbeing must be the most determined of all beings; he must contain within\nhimself a fullness of determinations.\n\nThe pantheist Spinoza tells us that determination is negation--that is,\nlimitation. \"_Omnis determinatio negatio est._\" Nothing can be falser or\nmore arbitrary than this principle. Its fallacy consists in the\nconfusion of two things essentially different, namely, the _limits of a\nbeing_, and _its determinate characteristics_. A pure Ego, by\ndetermining itself to thought, affection, or action, is not thereby\nlimited. The limitation or the illimitation depends simply upon the\ncharacter of the thought, affection, or act as perfect or imperfect. \"I\nam an intelligent being, and my intelligence is limited; these are two\nfacts equally certain. The possession of intelligence is the\nconstitutive characteristic of my being which distinguishes me from the\nbrute. The limitation imposed upon my intellect, which can only see a\nsmall number of truths at a time, is my limit, and this is what\ndistinguishes me from the Absolute Being, from Perfect Intelligence\nwhich sees all truths at a glance. That which constitutes my\nimperfection is not certainly my being intelligent; therein, on the\ncontrary, lies the strength, the richness, and the dignity of my being.\nWhat constitutes my weakness and my nothingness is that this\nintelligence is inclosed in a narrow circle. Thus, inasmuch as I am\nintelligent, I participate in being and perfection; inasmuch as I am\nonly intelligent within certain limits, I am imperfect.\"[40]\nDetermination differs from limitation as much as being differs from\nnothing.\n\nThe Causative Principle of all reality must itself be _real_, that is,\nit must be a self-manifesting and self-conscious power, for there can be\nno reality without consciousness. Being which is not known to itself,\nand can not manifest itself, is as though it were not. Intuition, _sui\nconscia_, is the essence of reality. Here being and knowing are\nidentical. It must also contain within itself a fullness of\ndeterminations, must be rich in ideas, must be the archetype of all\npossible existences. All forms and relations, all ideas and laws, all\nindividual and special adaptations, all harmonious systems, must be\npresent to the Absolute Reality. \"Uncreated must be Mental Being. This\nseems an invincible necessity of all thought. Whatever else, or whatever\nmore it is, it must be Mental Being\" = REASON.\n\nThe Causative Principle of all efficiency must itself be _power_,\npluri-efficiency, it must be self-determined and self-moved, and\nperfectly adequate to the production of being, motion, change, life, and\nintelligence objective to itself; in a word, it must be adequate to the\nrealization of all the ideals which reason supplies; it must be\nunlimited Infinite Efficiency = SPIRIT.\n\nThe Causative Principle of all personality must itself be\n_personal_--that is, it must have a self-conceived, self-determined\npurpose; must freely choose and wisely adapt the means to realize that\npurpose; above all, it must have a worthy motive, a best and highest\nreason for both purpose and act; and must make all conform to and result\nin a moral order in harmony with the blessedness and worthy the\napprobation of the All-perfect One. Intuition and choice, affection and\nconscience--these are the grand momenta of personality.\n\nThe necessary demand of reason is that the first and originative cause\nof all finite personality shall be Himself a person. Consciousness can\nnot arise out of unconsciousness, reason can not be generated from\nunreason, personality can not have its birth from impersonality, no more\nthan something can be born of nothing. There must be intelligence\nanswering to our intelligence, freedom answering to our freedom, feeling\nresponding to our feeling, and moral sentiment unisonant with our moral\nsentiment: in short, personality correlated with our personality, in the\ncause and author of finite responsible being. That perfection which is\nmirrored in our finite personality exists in all its fullness in the\nunconditionally perfect Being, the Perfect Personality whose name is\nLOVE.[41]\n\n\nGod, then, is the Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect Being in whom, by\nwhom, and for whom the finite has existence and consciousness. He is\n_the unconditioned, conditionating Will_. The Divine Essence can not be\napprehended or expressed in a higher universal. This is the first dim\nintuition of spontaneous reason, and the final goal of all reflective\nthought. The Divine Being is He who is before all, and who originates,\ndestines, and conditions all. The Biblical idea of the unconditioned\nBeing is in perfect harmony with the philosophical idea. In the language\nof Scripture, \"the Will of God\" stands for the remotest, inmost essence\nof the Godhead--a will which is the absolute identity, the eternal\nco-inherence of reason, power, and love. The Divine Will as efficient\ncause is never dissociated from the Divine Will as the formal cause and\nthe final cause. That will is at once cause and law and reason of all\nthings. God \"effectuates all things according to the _counsel_ (\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd = deliberation, purpose, design) of his own Will\" (Eph. i.\n11). And not only according to the counsel, but \"according to the _good\npleasure_ (\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03bd = the benevolent affection) of his\nown will\" (ver. 5); a \"good pleasure which He hath PURPOSED (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf)\nin Himself\" (ver. 9). He \"created all things, and for his\nown _pleasure_ (\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 = will) they are and were created.\"\nHere \"Will\" is clearly more than power, more than efficiency: it is\nthought or purpose; it is reason or end; in a word, it is the identity\nand co-inherence of reason, power, and love. The unconditioned Will as\nrevealed to us in Scripture is an _intelligent_ Will--a will that\nthinks, deliberates, counsels, designs; and it is also a _benevolent_\nWill--a will that loves and delights in and desires the good of being.\nAnd in thinking and desiring it effectuates, for thinking and operating,\ndesiring and doing, are one with God. \"He speaks and it is done, He\ncommands and it stands fast.\" Creation is a speech of God, a language in\nwhich He reveals his thoughts, his purposes, his benevolent designs, his\nwill--that is, Himself. Every revelation of God is the development in us\n\nof the consciousness of the REAL BEING (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd). All the proofs of\nthe being of God--the etiological, the cosmological, the teleological,\nand the moral--are centred in the _ontological_: this is first and last.\nAnd just as our consciousness of the indivisible identical EGO as the\nunity and co-inherence of reason, feeling, and power is the exact\narresting-point of psychological science, beyond which thought can not\npass, so our intuition of the unconditioned BEING as the absolute\nidentity of Reason, Power, and Love is the exact arresting point of\nTheological science, beyond which nothing can be known. Spirit, Light,\nLove--these designate essence or being. \"GOD IS SPIRIT\" (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1 =\nSpirit, not a Spirit--John iv. 24), the self-moving, efficient,\nanimating principle, the unity and life-motion of the creative divine\nactivity; \u1f21 \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2--vita absoluta--underived, eternal Life (John v.\n26; xi. 25; 1 John v. 20). GOD IS LIGHT (1 John i. 5), the\nself-manifesting, intuitional, revealing principle = \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2; the\nEternal Reason, in which Spirit becomes objective to itself, and God is\nrevealed to Himself (John i. 1; 1 Tim. vi. 16). GOD IS LOVE (1 John iv.\n8, 16), the self-complete, self-sufficient, self-satisfying principle =\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, the Perfect One (Matth. v. 48). This Divine Love finds its\nfullest satisfaction in the \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2, the intelligible world as\nrevealed and rendered objective to Himself in \"the WORD.\" Reason,\nSpirit, Love are the simplest elements in the conception of the\nunconditioned Being: Reason as Reality, Spirit as Efficiency, and Love\nas Perfection.\n\nThe unconditioned Being is revealed, may we not say \"incarnated,\"[42] in\nthe \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2--the sensible world: 1, by the incarnation\nof the Spirit in the moving and animating forces of nature; 2, by the\nincarnation of the Reason in the typical forms and permanent laws or\nrelations of the universe, by which reality becomes known to finite\nminds; 3, by the incarnation of Love in the final causes, the benevolent\npurposes, which are realized in the completed Cosmos and the life of\nHumanity.[43]\n\n2. ATTRIBUTE OR RELATED ESSENCE. The knowledge of the Divine Essence is\nthe root of the knowledge of the Divine Attributes, for in every\nconception of an attribute the Divine Essence is, in some mode or other,\nsupposed. We may therefore define an attribute as a conception of the\nunconditioned Being under some relation to our consciousness. That\nconception may be either positive or negative, and the relation may\nconsequently be one of causation or abstraction.\n\nWhen we conceive of the Divine Essence as _reality_, our conception is\nin some measure determined by our consciousness of reality. The\nintuition of reality is immanent to our own consciousness. We know self\nas a reality, an indivisible, identical Ego--a unity, but yet a\nconditioned and dependent reality, which must have its ground and cause\nin an independent and unconditioned reality. Thus the pure intuition of\nreality is a preluding for the affirmation of absolute reality. We can\nnot, however, affirm such reality on purely subjective grounds. To the\neye of reason, which is the organ of necessary and absolute truth, the\nDivine Essence abstracts itself from the limits of space and time, and\nabsolves itself from all the determinations of objective being. It is a\nreality which is not conditioned by _kind_, a reality which is\nindependent of, absolved from, undetermined by any other antecedent or\ncontemporaneous being--absolute reality.\n\nFurthermore, when we conceive the Divine Essence as _power_ or\nefficiency, our conception is in some measure determined by our\nconsciousness of power. We know ourselves as a power, a cause of our own\nvolitions, and a power which can control and modify external nature, but\nyet a limited and finite cause. To the eye of reason the Divine\nefficiency transcends all limitation and mensuration. It is a power\nwhich is not conditioned by _quantity_. It is limitless power,\nspaceless, all-mighty presence, self-directive power, carrying its own\nlight and seeing its own way--infinite efficiency.\n\nAnd, finally, when we conceive of the Divine Essence as _personality_,\nagain our conception is in some measure determined by our consciousness\nof personality. We are conscious of desiring and purposing, of\ndetermining and doing, of approving and delighting in our artistic and\nethical creations, and in these we stand out from the plane of nature as\npersons and not things. But we are also conscious of limitation and\nimperfection. We fall short even of our own ideals; we feel we have\nunsatisfied longings and daily wants. The Divine Essence reveals itself\nto reason as exempt from all limitation by _degree_. \"Pure personality\nis no more limited than absolute being, but it is deeper by all the\ncontents of perfect consciousness.\" It is a personality which has no\ndefect and no want: unconditioned, unlimited perfection--perfect\npersonality.\n\nOur conception of the Attributes of God may thus be formed through some\nrelation to our consciousness, but by a process of immediate\nabstraction--the negation of all limitation by kind, by quantity, or by\ndegree.\n\n1. As related to our intuition of real being; by abstraction from all\nother being and personality--the _Immanent_ attributes of God.\n\n2. As causally related to finite, dependent existence; by elimination of\nall necessary limitation--the _Relative or Transitive_ attributes of\nGod.\n\n3. As ethically related to finite personality; by elimination of all\nimperfection--the _Moral_ attributes of God.\n\n\n1. _The_ IMMANENT _attributes_. The absolute reality (REASON) must\nnecessarily be conceived as First, Supreme, and Sole; must be underived,\nand therefore eternal; must be absolved from all necessary relation to\nother being, and therefore independent; must be above all law of change,\nand therefore immutable; must have incomposite unity, and therefore\nindivisible; and must be the only one, for two absolutes would limit\neach other, and are thus inconceivable. Finally, absolute reality must\nbe the fullness and archetype of all being in which every form and every\nrelation, every totality and every harmony, conceivable or possible,\nmust be ideally and eternally present.\n\nETERNITY (1 Tim. i. 17; vi. 15, 16; Rev. i. 4, 8; Heb. i. 8).\n\nIMMUTABILITY (James i. 17; Psalm cii. 26, 27; Heb. i. 12).\n\nUNITY (Isaiah xliv. 6; Eph. iv. 6; 1 Tim. ii. 5; John xvii. 3).\n\nIDEALITY (Psalm cxxxix. 16; Rom. xi. 36; Acts xv. 18).\n\nThese are the immanent attributes of God.\n\n\n2. _The_ TRANSITIVE OR RELATIVE _attributes_. The Infinite Efficiency\n(SPIRIT) must necessarily be conceived as all-mighty, all-present, and\nall-knowing. The Infinite Spirit fills, penetrates, moves, and vitalizes\nthe universe. He is in all, and through all, and transcends all. He can\nnot be bounded in space or limited in power, therefore He is spaceless\nand infinite. \"He is every where present, not virtually but\nsubstantially, for virtue can not subsist without substance.\" And as the\nAll-mighty is present every where, present to all things, so all things\nexist \"in Him,\" and are present to Him in an immediate and intuitive\nvision--He knows all things.\n\nOMNIPOTENCE (Psalm cxv. 3; Jer. xxxii. 27; Rom. xi. 36; 1 Cor. viii. 6).\n\nUBIQUITY (Psalm cxxxix. 7-13; Jer. xxiii. 23, 24; 1 Cor. xv. 28; Matth.\nx. 29).\n\nOMNISCIENCE (Psalm cxxxix. 1-6; Acts i. 24; Heb. iv. 13; Matth. vi. 8).\n\nThese are the relative or transitive attributes of God.\n\n\n3. _The_ MORAL _attributes_. Perfect Personality (LOVE) must by the very\nconception be wise and holy, righteous and blessed, for these are the\nattributes of personality, and may all be ultimately grounded in love.\nThe reason of all existence and all personality is found, not in\ninfinite causality, but in the free love of the perfect personality.\nThis is the final cause of all existence. And if perfect Love be the\nfinal cause of all existence, it must know the end, and ordain the law\nand means. The highest end of the world is the perfect fellowship of man\nwith God; the physical must therefore be subordinated to the moral order\nof the universe. The Perfect Personality must freely will to impart his\nfellowship to those who are obedient to his moral law; and it must be\nremoved from fellowship with and deny itself to evil, which is\nantagonistic to the ends of Love. Or, in other words, it must establish\na fixed and changeless relation between righteousness and blessedness in\nthe creature. It must approve the good and condemn the evil. And in\nmaking the righteous \"partakers of his joy,\" He must be \"well pleased.\"\nThe absolute blessedness of God is found in the fullness and harmony of\nthe Divine life. He has in Himself the eternal and absolutely worthy\nobject of his love. But there is a Divine satisfaction, \"a good pleasure\nof God,\" which is found in the communication of Himself to the creature.\n\"He rejoiceth in the habitable parts of the earth, and his delights are\nwith the sons of men.\" \"He taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, in\nthose that hope in his mercy.\"\n\nWISDOM (Job xii. 13; Rom. xi. 33, 34; Eph. iii. 9, 10).\n\nGOODNESS (Psalm xxxiii. 5; xxxiv. 8; cvii. 1, 8).\n\nHOLINESS (Deut. xxxii. 4; Psalm v. 5; James i. 13, 17).\n\nBLESSEDNESS (1 Tim. i. 11; vi. 15).\n\nThese are the moral attributes of God.[44] They are also called by\npre-eminence the Perfections of God, because they are free\ndeterminations of the Divine nature, an everlasting \"BECOMING,\" rather\nthan an eternal \"BEING.\" The immanent attributes of God are a necessary\ninbeing; the moral attributes of God are a voluntary outgoing, an\neternally free, alternative forth-putting of choice for the right and\nthe good.[45]\n\nThe doctrine concerning God above presented, in which we fain would\nhope that philosophy and Christian thought are brought into harmony, may\nnow be summarily presented in the following schema:\n\n _Fundamental Idea of Reason._    _Thought-Conceptions_\n                                _Founded on Relations._\n\n             (Essence)         {ETERNITY }\n     {as ABSOLUTE REALITY....  {IMMUTABILITY }   Immanent\n                               {UNITY }          Attributes.\n                               {IDEALITY }\n\n UNCONDITIONED                   {OMNIPOTENCE }    Transitive\n WILL  {as INFINITE EFFICIENCY.. {UBIQUITY }       or Causal\n                                 {OMNISCIENCE }    Attributes.\n\n                                 {WISDOM }   Moral Attributes\n       {as PERFECT PERSONALITY   {GOODNESS } (Relational).\n                                 {HOLINESS }\n                                 {BLESSEDNESS }\n\nThe references to the Sacred Scriptures already given will show the\nharmony between the conceptions of reason and the verbal revelations of\nGod. Reason and Scripture unite in proclaiming that God is \"the great\nand holy _One_ that inhabiteth eternity,\" who \"only hath immortality,\"\n\"with whom is no variableness,\" and who \"filleth all in all;\" to whom\n\"all his works are known from eternity,\" in whose book \"all our members\nwere written when as yet there was none of them,\" and whose \"purposes,\"\nideas, and plans are \"eternal.\" These are mainly the immanent attributes\nof God, conceptions which flow from the very idea of the Absolute and\nInfinite Being. They are evolved from Real Being by the negation of all\nlimit, all parts, all change; the canceling of time and space and\nmatter, the recognition of God as pure Reason, pure Spirit, pure Love.\n\nThe Scriptures, however, deal more immediately with the causal,\ntransitive, and relational aspects of the Divine attributes--that is,\nwith the conception of God in his voluntary relations to finite being\nand finite personality. They speak of God in his historically known\nexistence, as a Being who _voluntarily_ conditions his Omnipotence and\nSovereignty under concessions of self-reality, self-life, and freedom to\nfinite beings, without Himself being conditioned by any thing--a\n_self-limitation_ which in nowise detracts from the absoluteness and\ninfinity of God--an _unconditioned conditionating Will_.[46]\n\nThe relation which God sustains to his works is not a _necessary_\nrelation--it is a _voluntary_ and self-imposed relation. Free Love is\nthe highest determining principle for the efficiency of Divine\nOmnipotence. Power thus directed and conditioned by wisdom and love does\nnot, can not detract from the perfection of God. The substitution of\n_choice_ for necessity is, in fact, no real limitation; on the contrary,\nit ascribes to God the most _absolute perfection_.\n\nThe causal attributes of God, or those conceptions of God which are\nespecially grounded upon his relation to the world and humanity, are\nproperly divided into those which are Cosmical and those which are\nEthical. The first, of course, embrace his relation to the world, the\nsecond his relation to personal, responsible beings. The content of the\ncosmological conception is Omnipotence, Ubiquity, Omniscience. The\ncontent of the ethical conception is Wisdom, Goodness, Holiness, and\nBlessedness. God as the Creator and Sustainer of the world, God as the\nFather, Teacher, and Ruler of humanity, are the two grand manifestations\nof the one infinite and perfect Being, and \"_Elohim_\" and \"_Jehovah_\"\nare his expressive and distinctive names, the first denoting the\ncosmical activity of God, the latter his government and kingdom among\nmen.\n\nThese two grand aspects of the Divine manifestation are marked in the\nElohistic and Jehovistic portions of the first revelation given to the\nSemitic race. They are still more distinctly recognized in Paul's\ndiscourse before the assembled Athenian philosophers, where Christian\ntheology was for the first time presented to the Greek mind--God the\nCreator and Conservator of the world (Acts xvii. 24, 25); God the\nFather, Teacher, Ruler, and Judge of humanity (Acts xvii. 26-31).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE CREATION.\n\n\nGod is the Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect Being, in whom, through whom,\nand for whom are all things. This is the Christian conception of God;\nand it is the only conception which furnishes an adequate and\nsatisfactory explanation of all the facts of the universe. Here we have\na First Principle, an Originative Cause which is sufficient to account\nfor all existence.\n\nBut what conception are we to form of the nature and mode of this\nOrigination? Was it a pure, supernatural Origination, an absolute\nCreation? or was it simply a formation out of a first substance existing\ncoeval with and independent of God? Was that act of creation determined\nby necessity? was it an unconscious emanation from, or a necessary\ndevelopment of that First Principle? Or was it a conscious, free\nexertion of power for the realization of a foreseen and predetermined\nplan--a mental Order? What is the Biblical conception of Creation? This\nis the question we must now endeavor to answer.\n\nUntil very recently it has been the practice of theologians to attempt\nthe determination of the Biblical notion of Creation on purely\nphilological grounds. It is now generally conceded that this method is\ninadequate and inconclusive. The Greeks probably never conceived the\nidea of an absolute creation (commonly, though we judge incorrectly,\nstyled creation _ex nihilo_), and consequently the Greek language has no\nterms expressive of a primal origination, an absolute beginning of the\nworld. \u03a0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, the term employed in the LXX. (Gen. i. 1), and\nalso by St. Paul (Acts xvii. 24), means to endow with a certain quality\n(\u03c0\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2 = _qualis_)--to construct, make, form, build, and\nevidently conveys the notion of _formation_ rather than _origination_,\nthe production of qualitative phenomena rather than real entity; \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\nis also ordinarily used in the sense of forming, fashioning,\nbuilding, and seems to imply pre-existing materials.\n\nThere is also a wide difference of opinion among Oriental scholars with\nrespect to the precise import of the verbs \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0 (bara), \u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4 (aysah), and\n\u05d9\u05b4\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8 (yetsar), as employed in the Hebrew Scriptures. Some distinguished\ncritics, as Parkhurst, Clarke, Lange, and Delitzsch, assert that \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0\nmeans to originate _de novo_, to create in an absolute sense; and that\n\u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4 and \u05d9\u05b4\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8 strictly mean to fashion out of pre-existent materials.[47]\nBut Pusey, Kitto, Tayler Lewis, and some of the Rabbinical commentators\n(Aben Ezra especially), affirm that \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0, both by its etymology and its\nconnections, indicates _formation_ as much as origination, and is, in\nfact, indifferent and neutral either as to a supposed creation _ex\nnihilo_, or a creation, that is, a formation from pre-existing\nmaterials. Furthermore, it is affirmed that the three Hebrew verbs are\nused indiscriminately in the Mosaic record. It is said in Gen. i. 27\nthat God created \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0 man, and that statement is amplified and explained\nat ch. ii. 7: \"And the Lord God formed \u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4 man _out of the dust of the\nearth_.\"[48] An appeal to the merely verbal expressions of Scripture\ndoes not, therefore, promise any satisfactory and conclusive results.\n\nBy what method, then, are we to determine the Biblical notion of\nCreation? Clearly, not by a critical study of the several words which\nare employed to express the creative act--not by confining our attention\nto the visible embodiment of the Divine word, and neglecting the\ninforming thought. We must ground our conception of creation upon the\nfundamental ideas and principles of Divine revelation, and determine it\nin harmony with the Christian idea of God, and the Christian doctrine of\nthe relation of the world to God.\n\nThese fundamental principles we have already presented. They may be\nsuccinctly restated in the following propositions:\n\n(1.) God is the one only self-existent, independent, unconditioned\nBeing, \"who alone hath immortality,\" \"the incorruptible or immutable\nGod\" (\u1f00\u03c6\u03b8\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2), \"with whom is no variableness or shadow of\nchange.\"[49] (2.) God is the sole causality of the heavens and the\nearth, in the most absolute sense. Whatever is, and is not God, is the\ncreature of God. \"By Him were all things created which are in heaven and\nwhich are upon earth, things visible and things invisible\"--the objects\nof sense-perception and of rational intuition. The origin, development,\nand end, the principle, law, and reason of all existence, are in God and\nfrom God--\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u0398\u03b5\u1ff7, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0398\u03b5\u03cc\u03bd.[50] (3.) The all\nof the finite is in ceaseless and complete dependence on the Divine\ncausality--\"He upholdeth all things,\" and \"by Him all things consist.\"\n\nOur interpretation of the formal language of Scripture, especially of\nthe verbs which are employed to denote the act of creation, must\ntherefore be informed and determined by these fundamental principles. If\nGod is the unconditioned Cause of all existence, then the Creation must\nbe the absolutely _free_ and self-determined act of God. As such, it can\nnot have been conditioned by any immanent necessity in the Divine nature\nitself, nor by any necessary existence out of and extraneous to the\nDivine nature. By this conception of God, and of his relation to the\nworld, we are debarred from supposing the coeval existence of any thing\nbesides God (_e. g._, \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f44\u03bd of Plato, the \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 of Aristotle,\nthe \"matter\" of the modern Physicist) as the condition and medium of the\nDivine agency and manifestation. While, therefore, it is acknowledged\nthat in Gen. i. 21, 27, \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0 (bara) denotes the _formation_ of organic\nbodies out of pre-existent materials, we can not be restricted to this\nmeaning of the term when dealing with verse 1, \"In the beginning God\ncreated the heaven and the earth.\" We are compelled to believe that\n\"bara\" here means _origination_--origination _de novo_; first, because\nthe primal act of creation must have been a supernatural, miraculous\nproduction of something which had not previously existed under any\nform--an unconditioned creation antecedent to nature; and, secondly,\nbecause we are informed that after this primal act of creation, \"the\nearth was still _without form_ and void.\" No possible ingenuity of\ncriticism can construe that opening sentence of revelation to mean, \"In\nthe beginning God gave _form_ to pre-existing matter.\" That first\nbeginning is the _principium principiorum_, the beginning of all\nbeginnings, and must be distinguished from the six new beginnings of the\nsix days' work.[51] We must regard this sublime utterance, standing at\nthe head of all God's communications, as affirming this foundation-idea\nof revelation--that God is the sole causality of the heavens and the\nearth in an absolute sense, the efficient cause of time, and all\ntemporal relations; the all-mighty cause of space, and all spatial\nrelations; the originator of the primordial substance, and all its\nqualities--in a word, the unconditioned Creator of all finite being,\nquality, and relation--\"\u05d1\u05b0\u05bc\u05e8\u05b5\u05d0\u05e9\u05b4\u05d9\u05ea--\u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6--_in principio_--first of all\n(in the order of conception rather than the order of time) God\noriginated, laid the foundations of, the heavens and the earth.\"[52]\n\nAnd now that the Creation here affirmed was an absolute origination, a\nbringing into being of the primordial elements out of which the heavens\nand the earth were subsequently \"formed,\" is the doctrine of the best\nHebrew lexicographers. It is held by many of the best authorities that\nthe particle \u05d0\u05b5\u05ea (ayth) means \"the very substance of,\" \"the very or\nreal essence.\" F\u00fcrst, in his recently published Hebrew and Chaldee\nLexicon, gives \"being, essence, substance,\" as the meaning of \"ayth.\"\nGesenius, in his Hebrew Grammar, says \"'ayth' means being, substance\"\n(p. 216). And furthermore, he says \"'_ayth_' is a substantive derived\nfrom a pronominal stem, and signifies essence, substance, being.\" \"The\nparticle '_ayth_,'\" says Aben Ezra, \"signifies the substance of a\nthing.\" Kimchi, in his famous \"Book of Hebrew Roots,\" gives a similar\ndefinition. In the Syriac version, \"_yoth_\" takes the place of \"_ayth_,\"\nand is very appropriately rendered in Walton's Polyglot, \"_esse c\u0153li\net esse terr\u00e6_\"--the being or substance of the heavens and the earth. It\nis not, therefore, a fanciful and altogether unauthorized reading of\nthis opening sentence of Divine revelation which the Christian idea of\nGod, and of his relation to the world, seems to demand--\"_In the\nbeginning God originated, brought into being, the primordial elements of\nthe heavens and the earth._\"\n\n\nFor manageable clearness, in dealing with the Mosaic primeval history,\nwe shall find ourselves under the necessity of accepting the distinction\nmade by theologians between _creatio prima, immediata_, and _creatio\nmediata, formativa_.\n\n1. _An absolute Creation_, a pure supernatural origination--the\nBeginning of all beginnings.\n\n2. _An artistic, architectonic Creation_, a supernatural formation out\nof a first substance--the production of new things or beings by\naggregation, organization, and development according to pre-established\nlaws and archetypal ideas.\n\nThe first notion of Creation is grounded on the Omnipotence of God, the\nsecond on the Infinite Wisdom of God, and both are united in and\nultimately grounded on the unconditioned Will.\n\n\nAnd now let us confine our attention to the first conception of\nCreation--_creatio prima, immediata_, or ABSOLUTE CREATION.\n\nThe fundamental Theistic conception which lies at the very root of the\nBiblical doctrine of Creation, and clearly distinguishes it from all\nMaterialistic, Pantheistic, and Dualistic notions of the origin of the\nworld, is that God is the _Absolute Personality_--the eternally\nself-conscious, self-complete, self-sufficient Being, all the\ndeterminations of whose _nature_ and _action_ are grounded in his\nabsolute Will. The Divine essence, in its inmost, deepest ground, is not\ndetermined being, but _unlimited power of self-determination_. The\nprimitive, root idea of the Godhead is an _ever-living, unconditioned\nWill_--an unconditioned Will as the indivisible unity and perpetual\ndifferentiation of _reason_ and _power_, a will which realizes itself in\nself-affirmation (IPS\u00cbITY); manifests itself in self-determination and\nchoice (ALTERITY); and completes itself in the actualization of a final\npurpose (PERFECTION).[53] The _nature_ of God, as distinct from his\n_essence_, is absolutely his own act.[54] God, as the manifested God, is\nwhat He is by his own determination and choice. God is just, because He\nwills to be just; God is holy, because He wills to be holy; God is good,\nbecause He wills to be good, and not from any constraining, immanent\nnecessity, otherwise He could not be the object of praise, adoration,\nand love. If God is not good by virtue of his own determination and\nchoice, then there is nothing praiseworthy and adorable in his nature,\nand all the thanksgiving of sacred psalmody is meaningless; worship is\ngroundless, religion has no significance, and love to God is impossible.\nA necessitated goodness can no more command our moral esteem than the\nuniform revolution of the planetary orbs, and where there is no moral\nesteem, there can be no love, no worship, and no praise.[55]\n\nIf, then, God is a personal Being, the Absolute Personality, another\nbeing can not proceed from Him except in virtue of his own free\ndetermination. _Creation must therefore be a_ VOLUNTARY _act_.\n\nAnd for the full comprehension of this fundamental principle, we must\nremember that volition is something more than a simple efflux of power,\nsomething more than a mere developing tendency--an evolution or process\nwithout motive and without design. A voluntary act is a designed, an\n_intentional_ act, the act of a being who can previously contemplate the\nact in thought, who can have a reason or motive for the doing of the\nact, and who can determine and condition the deed. This conception of\ncreation as a voluntary act is unmistakably presented in the\noft-repeated language of the Mosaic record, \"God said, _Let there\nbe--and there was!_\" \"The speaking of God most certainly indicates the\nthinking of God, and it thence follows that all the works of creation\nare _thoughts_ of God (idealism). But it indicates also a will making\nitself externally known, an active operation of God; and thence it\nfollows that all the works of creation are _deeds_ of God (realism).\nThinking and operating, however, are one in the Divine speaking, the\nprimal source of language--his personality making Himself known\n(personalism).... Through creating, speaking, making, forming, the world\nis ever and again denoted as the _free deed_ of God.\"[56] Furthermore,\ncreation is a voluntary act in the most absolute sense--that is, it is\nan act of God to which He was not determined by any _inherent_ necessity\nor want of his own nature, and an act which was not conditioned, in a\nnecessary manner, by any thing out of, distinct from, and extraneous to\nthe Divine nature.\n\n1. _Creation was an act of God to which He was not determined by any\ninherent necessity or want of his own nature._\n\nIf God is the eternally self-conscious, self-complete, and\nself-sufficient Being, He is under no necessity to create other beings\nin order to realize perfect self-consciousness, or to secure his own\nperfect blessedness. He does not need \"otherness\"--that which is not\nHimself--in order to become manifest to Himself; neither does He \"crave\nbeings not Himself\"[57] in order to his complete felicity. The\nantithesis of self and non-self--the _ego_ and the _non-ego_--may be a\nnecessary condition of finite personality, but it can not be a necessary\ncondition of Absolute Personality. God is eternally revealed to Himself\nin an unconditioned manner as self-conscious Love, self-conscious\nReason, self-conscious Energy--the Father, the Word, the Spirit; and He\nis from all eternity \"the ever-blessed God,\" who has in the Divine\nTriunity the eternal and absolutely worthy object of his Love,\nindependent of every relation to the world and humanity--\"Thou lovedst\nMe _before_ the foundation of the world\" (John xvii. 24), \"before the\nworld was\" (ver. 5).[58]\n\nIf, then, creation be the act of an Absolute Personality, the act of a\nBeing who freely and unconditionally determines his own nature and\nconditionates all existence, then _the Will of God is the sole causality\nof the world_, and in his Will alone we have the unlimited, infinite\nground-principle of all reality. Absolute Personality tolerates no other\ntransition from the idea of God to the idea of the world than that of a\nWill which freely conditions itself by Love. This Free Love is the\nhighest determining principle for the Divine efficiency. Therefore, in\norder to derive the essential existence of the world from God, the\nScriptures postulate nothing beside or beyond an ever-living,\nintelligent Will which has its reason or motive, but not its\nnecessitating cause, in Love--\"_the benevolence_ (\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03b1) _of\nhis Will_\" (Eph. i. 5). The Creation is nothing else than the free\nself-communication of God, who is Himself eternally self-complete and\nself-sufficient, but who from love alone wills that other beings shall\nhave existence and, in fellowship with Him, eternal life.[59]\n\nIt is only by holding fast to these principles in all their integrity\nthat we can escape the seductions of Pantheism, that perpetual\ntemptation of metaphysical minds. The fundamental idea of Pantheism is\n\"an indeterminate principle which is _necessarily_ determined to become\nsuccessively every thing. Absolute necessity is the beginning, middle,\nand end.\"[60] We can escape its iron grasp only by distinctly\nrecognizing and firmly holding the Absolute Personality of God--that is,\nby affirming a perfect self-consciousness which is not conditioned by an\nantithetical not-self; a perfect self-determination which is not\nconditioned by an antecedent _natura naturans_; and a perfect\nself-sufficiency which knows no want. The first affirmation rejects the\ndialectical necessity of Hegel, the second excludes the mathematical\nnecessity of Spinoza, the third cancels the metaphysical necessity of\nCousin.[61]\n\n2. _Creation as the free act of God was not conditioned by any thing out\nof and foreign to the Divine nature._\n\nA moment's reflection will suffice to convince us that a _limitation\nposited from without_ would be as fatal to the idea of God as a supposed\ninherent necessity determining the Divine causality from within. The\nidea of God as the Being who is absolutely self-grounded,\nself-sufficient, and self-determined, equally excludes both. If God is\nthe sole causality of the heavens and the earth in an absolute\nsense--the efficient cause of time and all temporal succession--the\nall-mighty cause of space, and of all spatial relations--the sole\noriginator of the primordial substance, and of all its qualities, then\nthe creative act can not have been conditioned by _Time_ or _Space_ or\n_Matter_.\n\nIn his otherwise admirable essay on \"Nature and God,\" Mr. Martineau\nasserts that we can have no conception of even the possibility of a\ncreation except on the assumption of the coeval existence of something\nobjective to God as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and\nmanifestation. He therefore affirms the coeval and co-eternal existence\nof _Space_ and _Matter_, _Time_ and _Number_, \"with Him, and yet\nindependent of Him.\"[62] The idea of God's \"_supplying Himself_ with\nobjectivity\" is, in his judgment, \"discredited by modern science.\" The\ncreative act must therefore have been conditioned by something other\nthan God, and independent of God.\n\nNow it must be obvious to every thoughtful mind that this assumption\ntends to the invalidation of every proof of the existence of God. If it\ncan be shown that any one thing exists aside from and independent of\nGod--that any thing exists which was not created by God--then may we\nclaim equal independence for every other thing, and He who claims to be\nthe Creator of _all_ things is discredited. As Herbert Spencer urges,\nwith great force, \"If we admit that there can be something uncaused,\nthere is no reason to assume a cause for any thing.\"[63] With what\nreason can we say that some things do exist that never were created, but\nothers can not so exist? If substances are eternal, why not attributes?\nIf matter is self-existent, why not force? If space is independent, why\nnot form? And if we concede the eternity of matter and force, why not\nadmit the eternity of law--that is, uniformity of relations? And if so\nmuch is granted, why not also grant that a consequent order of the\nuniverse is also eternal? If we admit that any thing besides God is\nself-existent, that any thing exists independent of God as \"the\n_condition_ of the Divine agency and manifestation,\" then God is not the\nunconditioned Absolute Being. \"A limitation posited from without\ndirectly destroys the idea of God, for it contradicts the idea of the\nAbsolute.\"[64]\n\nMr. Martineau admits that the assumption of \"the coeval existence of\nmatter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency\" \"rests on quite\nother grounds than those which support our belief respecting space.\"[65]\nWe can conceive the non-existence of matter, but we can not conceive the\nnon-existence of space. The idea of space is absolutely necessary,\ntherefore \"no one asks a cause for the space of the universe.\"[66] In\nmaking this assertion, however, Mr. Martineau betrays some want of\nacquaintance with the history of the philosophy of space and time. Many\nable and thoroughly philosophic minds have \"asked a cause,\" and have\nassigned a cause for \"the space of the universe.\" Sir Isaac Newton held\nthat \"God endures always and is present every where, and by existing\nalways and every where _constitutes_ duration and space.\"[67] This\ndoctrine, thus generally stated, is held by Saisset to be\nincontestible.[68] McCosh also believes that time and space are not\nindependent of God: \"I am not necessarily obliged to believe that the\ninfinity of space and time is independent of the infinity of God.... Who\nwill venture to affirm that space and time, being dependent on God, may\nnot stand in some relation to God which is altogether indefinable and\nutterly incomprehensible by us.\"[69] Finally, Schleiermacher and Nitzsch\ndo not hesitate to teach that \"God is the all-mighty cause of space\" and\n\"the efficient cause of time.\"[70]\n\nThe question whether the idea of space is conditionally or\nunconditionally necessary can only be determined by the solution of the\ndeeper question whether space is a real entity or a relation. If space\nis a real entity, it must have properties or attributes, but what\nphilosopher of any reputation has ever attempted to set down the\nproperties or attributes of space? They who assert that space is an\nuncreated, independent, and indestructible entity, ought to be able to\ndefine it and tell _what_ it is. Dr. Porter tells us that space can not\nbe defined, \"We can not form a concept of this _entity_ by means of\ngeneralized attributes or relations.\"[71] Can that be for us an entity\nof which we can form no concept, and which we can not determine in\nthought by any attribute or relation? The writer of the article on \"The\nPhilosophy of Time and Space,\" in the _North American Review_,[72] is an\nearnest defender of the objective reality of space as an independent and\nindestructible entity, and he has defined and analyzed the concept.\n\"Space is _absolute vacuity_\" (p. 91). \"The idea of space is a triple\nsynthesis ... of three _negative_ notions--receptivity, unity, and\ninfinity; the first is the negation of matter, the second is the\nnegation of divisibility, the third is the negation of limitation\" (p.\n95). Do these words convey any knowledge? Absolute vacuity is void,\nempty, inane. Absolute vacuity is pure nothing, and of course there is\nnothing to be divided and nothing to be limited. Absolute vacuity is a\nnegation, and unity and infinity are negations of a negation--that is,\nthey are predicates of nothing. \"Negative notions\" must be predicates of\n_something_, otherwise they are a mere negation or absence of thought,\nand convey absolutely no knowledge. We may, if we please, assert with\nHegel, that \"Nothing is the same as Being,\" and then amuse ourselves\nwith making affirmations concerning vacuity, nihility, and unreality to\nthe disgrace of philosophy; but the common-sense of mankind will\nrepudiate our absurdities. We can not think about nothing; all thought\nmust be positive. Thought must have an object, and that object must be\neither an entity, or the attribute of an entity, or a relation between\nentities.\n\nIf pure space is regarded as \"_absolute vacuity_\"--pure nothing--then we\nmay readily dispose of the argument on which Prof. Stewart relies with\nso much confidence. \"Divine omnipotence can not annihilate space,\"[73]\ntherefore it must be an independent reality. We have simply to\nanswer--the notion of annihilating nihility is an absurdity and a\ncontradiction. There is nothing to be annihilated, and Omnipotence even\nmust be inadequate to the annihilation of nothing.\n\nIf, with Leibnitz, Lord Monboddo, Calderwood, and many modern\nphysicists,[74] we reject the notion of \"absolute vacuity\"--infinite\nspace--and regard space as a _relation_--the relation of position,\ndistance, direction--then, like all the quantitive relations of\nmathematics, it may be regarded as conditionally necessary--that is,\nbodies being given, they must necessarily have place, distance, and\ndirection.[75] Space as a necessary relation is a reality, but a reality\nwhich is conditioned and conditional, and \"God is the all-mighty cause\nof space.\" If all bodies were annihilated, there would be no position,\nno distance, no direction, and consequently space would be annihilated.\nThere would remain nothing but the timeless, spaceless, Infinite One,\nwho is the efficient cause of all existence, all qualities, and all\nrelations. This, again, would be a sufficient answer to the sophism of\nDr. Clark, quoted and indorsed by Stewart--\"God can not annihilate the\nspace in this room!\" Annihilate the room, and the relative space in the\nroom is no more--that is, the distance between the inclosing walls. Of\n\"pure space\" apart from the relations of bodies we have no conception,\ncan have no conception; for to annihilate all bodies, in thought, we\nmust annihilate our own body, and to a disembodied spirit there can be\nno _here_ and no _there_. Place is a relation belonging to extension,\nand extension is a property of matter only.[76]\n\nThere has been so much confusion of thought generated by the mere\nword-jugglery of philosophers in the use of the terms _time_ and\n_space_, _duration_ and _extension_, _eternity_ and _immensity_, that a\nrevision of the whole terminology in the interest of true science is\ndemanded. It is perilous to launch out upon this ocean of equivocal\nphraseology, called the philosophy of time and space, before taking our\nbearings, amid notions so closely related, yet so dissimilar, and\nendeavoring to fix some definite meaning to these terms, which, like\npoints of the compass, shall enable us to find our position.\n\n1. _Let us commence our effort with_ SPACE, EXTENSION, _and_ IMMENSITY.\nSome philosophers--Cousin,[77] Hamilton,[78] Spencer,[79] McCosh,[80]\nfor example--confound _space_ and _extension_, and all of them confound\nboth with absolute _immensity_.[81]\n\nNow if space is identical with extension, it must be cognized by the\nsenses and the sensuous imagination. This is unhesitatingly affirmed by\nHamilton: \"We _see_ extension,\" and \"by the name extension we designate\nour empirical knowledge of space.\"[82] So also McCosh: \"Of space in the\nconcrete we have an immediate knowledge by the senses, certainly by some\nof them, such as the touch and sight.\"[83] Space in this connection can\nnot therefore be regarded as an _\u00e0 priori_ cognition. It is equally\nobvious that if space is identical with extension, it must have color\nand form. This also is admitted by Hamilton: \"I can easily annihilate\nall corporeal existence [in imagination]. I can imagine _empty_ space.\nBut there are two attributes of which I can not divest it--that is,\nshape and color.\"[84] Now if space has \"shape,\" that is, figure, it must\nhave dimensions, and accordingly we find almost all philosophers\nspeaking of the three dimensions of space--length, breadth, and depth.\nThat which has length, breadth, and depth must be divisible, must have\nparts and proportions, must have susceptibilities of exact measurement,\nand therefore must be _finite_. This again is the doctrine of Hamilton:\n\"Space is finite, and a finite, that is, a bounded space constitutes a\nfigure\"--a sphere.[85] The fundamental doctrine of Hamilton is that\n\"space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain\ncorrelation of existence--of existence, therefore, _pro tanto_, _as\nconditioned_. _It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned._\"[86]\nBut if space be only a correlation of conditioned, and therefore finite\nexistence, how can he speak of it \"being conceived as infinite,\"[87]\nand, above all, how can he speak of \"the absolute totality\" and \"the\ninfinite immensity of space.\"\n\nMcCosh, also, though evidently with some hesitation, teaches that \"we\ncan conceive _proportion_ in space, and if we take any of these\nproportional sections, and divide it into two, thought will compel us to\nsay that the two make up the whole. In this sense the _parts_ make up\nthe whole--that is, the subsections make up the section. If the question\nbe extended beyond this, and it be asked, Is infinite space made up of\nparts? I answer, that as we can have no adequate notion of infinite\nspace, so we can not be expected to answer all the questions which may\nbe put regarding it. _It is certain that neither infinite space nor\nfinite space is made up of separate parts._ We can speak intelligibly\nof _proportions_ in finite space, and determine their relations to each\nother and the whole. I tremble to speak of the proportions of infinite\nspace, lest I be using language which has or can have no proper meaning,\nand the signification attached to which by me or others might be\naltogether inapplicable to such a subject. Still there are propositions\nwhich we might intelligibly use. It is self-evident that _any proportion\nof space must be less than infinite space_. And if infinite space can be\nconceived as having _proportions_, and we could conceive all these\nproportions, then these proportions would be equal to the _whole_!\"[88]\nWell may the author say that he is \"in a region dark and pathless;\" for\nthe language here employed \"can have no proper meaning\" in regard to\ninfinite space. Well may he \"tremble to speak of _the proportions of\ninfinite space_,\" for what can proportion (_pro_, for _portio_, a part)\nmean except a numerical relation of parts? Proportions--numerical\nrelations--are measurable quantities, therefore finite quantities, and\nno addition of finite quantities, can make the infinite. What confusion\nand contradiction is here wrought by this word-jugglery with \"the whole\nand parts\" of space!\n\nCousin, also, falls into the same inaccuracy and confusion. He tells us\nthat \"human reason can conceive of a space determined and limited,\"[89]\ntherefore divisible, measurable, and _finite_; and yet at the same time\nhe teaches that \"space is illimitable, absolutely continuous, an\nindivisible unity.\"[90]\n\nAnd now let us note the contradictions which flow from this confounding\nof space with extension, and both with immensity. Space is cognized _\u00e0\nposteriori_, space is cognized _\u00e0 priori_. Space has parts and\nproportions, space has no parts or proportions. Space is divisible,\nspace is indivisible--an absolute unity. Space is finite, space is\ninfinite. Space is susceptible of exact measurement, space is\nimmeasurable--that is, absolute immensity.\n\nSpace and extension are not identical. Extension is simply an attribute\nof body--the continuity of matter. Space is place, distance, direction,\nrelations of bodies. _Space is a certain correlation of finite\nexistences._ Immensity is the attribute of the unconditioned Being, the\nabsolute Spirit--that is, God. He is incorporeal, boundless, spaceless,\ninfinite.\n\n\n2. The same confusion pervades the writings of philosophers in regard to\nTIME, DURATION, _and_ ETERNITY.\n\nSuccession is confounded with duration,[91] duration with time,[92] and\ntime with eternity.[93]\n\nIf succession and duration are identical, then, there is no permanent\nsubstance underlying the fugitive phenomena of the outer world, and no\npersonal existence which remains the same through all the changes of our\nmental states. The human mind is simply \"a series of feelings,\" a\nsuccession of mental states without any enduring ground principle\nconstituting our personal identity, and we are thus landed in the\nconstructive Idealism of John Stuart Mill.[94] On the other hand, if\nthere be a permanent substance or essence underlying all mental\nphenomena, whose continuance in existence is measured by phenomenal\nchange, time succession, then duration can not be identical with time,\nany more than permanence can be the same as change. With finite duration\nthere is necessarily given change; the past is like the future--always a\nminus in relation to the present.\n\nFurthermore, if time is synonymous with eternity, then eternity is\ndivisible, measurable, it has limits and parts. Time, say the\nphilosophers, has one dimension, while space has three. \"We,\" says\nMcCosh, \"represent time as a line,\"[95] it must therefore be divisible,\nand, if divisible, it is legitimate to speak, with Hamilton, of \"time\nand its parts.\" \"Time has succession, or priority and posteriority.\"[96]\nAnd yet this same writer in the same work tells us, \"Time has no\nlimits,\" and \"Time can not be divided into separable parts.\"[97] If time\nand eternity are identical, eternity has a past, a present, and a\nfuture--\"eternity _ab ante_ and eternity _a post_.\"[98] The eternity\npast is bounded by the present, it _ends_ now; the eternity to come\n_begins_ now. We may with propriety ask, How can that which has\nsuccession, which is capable of exact measurement, which has a beginning\nand an end, be infinite? That which had a beginning can not be\nunbeginning, that which will come to an end can not be endless. Is not\nthe \"eternity of _time_\" a contradiction in terms? Is not \"absolute\ntime\" an absurdity?\n\nMark, then, the contradictions which flow from the confounding of\nsuccession and duration, time and eternity. Time has limits, time has no\nlimits. Time is divisible, time is indivisible. Time is finite, time is\ninfinite. Time is relative, time is absolute. Time is moving, \"it\nflows;\" time is immovable, \"it does not flow.\"[99]\n\nDuration and succession, eternity and time, are not identical. Duration\nis the continuance in existence of finite creatures, a continuance which\nis measured by the equable motion of planetary orbs, and imperfectly by\nphenomenal changes in our mental states. Succession is simply an order\nof phenomena, the recurrence, at regular or irregular intervals, of like\nchanges, or the series of different states in the same existence. _Time\nis a certain correlation of successive existences._ Eternity is an\nattribute of the absolute Being--the _timelessness_ of God. He is not\nsubject to the law of change, and therefore not to the law of time,\ntherefore his absolute being can not be measured by successive epochs.\n\nLet us now endeavor to dismiss from our thought all this perplexing\nnecromancy of words, and humbly pray, with Themistocles, for \"some sweet\nvoluptuous art of forgetting.\" Let us fix our mental gaze upon the\n_objects_ of thought which are denoted by the terms _time_ and _space_,\nand ask what are they? Are they existences or attributes, are they ideal\nor real, are they entities or relations? Have we any clear and definite\nnotions of which these are the unequivocal signs? The solution of these\nquestions is the essential condition of a true philosophy of time and\nspace.\n\nFirst of all, is it not self-evident that, if time and space are for us\nthe objects of thought, they must be conceived under the categories of\n_Being_ or _Quality_ or _Relation_? If they can not be thought as real\nexistences, or as attributes of existing things, or as relations among\nexisting things, they can not be thought at all--they are non-entities,\nand we can not think about nothing. \"Thought can only be realized by\nthinking _something_ ... this something must be thought as existing ...\nand we can only think a thing as existing, by thinking it as existing in\nthis or that determinate manner of existence; and whenever we cease to\nthink of something as existing--something existing in a determinate\nmanner of existence--we cease to think at all.\"[100]\n\nMcCosh asserts that time and space are \"neither substances, modes, nor\nrelations.\"[101] What, then, are they? He answers, \"They seem to be\nentitled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble substances,\nmodes, relations only in that they are _existences, entities,\nrealities_.\"[102] But if they are entitled to be put in a class by\nthemselves, what is the name of that class, and by what characteristic\nmarks shall we distinguish it? If they are realities, they must have\nbeing, or inhere in something that has being, or be relations of\nsomething in being. If they are existences, they must be the objects of\n_sense perception_, or _rational intuition_, or _immediate judgment_,\notherwise they can not be cognized at all, for \"the mind can not create\nobjects of its own cognition.\"\n\nWe ask again, What _are_ space and time? McCosh and Dr. Porter both\nanswer: 1. They are not substances. This no one will dispute. They are\nnot material substances having sensible qualities which can be the\nobjects of sense perception. Space and time are not perceived by the\nsenses.[103] Neither are they spiritual substances. We do not know them\nas having power and performing acts. 2. They both reply, They are not\nattributes or qualities of matter or spirit. This, also, no one will\ndispute, if the word \"time\" is not used as a synonym for \"eternity,\" and\nthe word \"space\" is not used as a synonym for \"immensity,\" because\n\"eternity\" and \"immensity\" are attributes of the absolute Spirit. 3.\nThey both assert, They are not relations. This is disputed by many: by\nLeibnitz, by Hamilton, by Saisset, by Calderwood, and by others.\nLeibnitz says, \"Space is the order of things co-existing. Time is the\norder of things successive.\"[104] Hamilton says, \"Space, like time, is\nonly the intuition or the conception of a certain correlation of\nexistence.\"[105] Calderwood defines time \"as a certain correlation of\nexistence,\" and \"space as the recognized relation of extended\nobjects.\"[106] And Saisset regards time and space as standing in the\nsame category with mathematical relations.[107] These are, to say the\nleast, distinguished names in philosophy. The opinions of men who have\nfor years pondered these profound problems are at any rate entitled to\nproper consideration, and if in opposition to their views it is affirmed\nthat time and space as understanding-concepts are _not_ relations, some\nreasons should be assigned. All the proof offered by Dr. McCosh is that\n\"we know no two or more things which by their relation could yield space\nand time\" (p. 211). We answer, promptly, _duration_ and _change_ do\nyield the relation of time. \"The consciousness of succession in our\nmental states is in reality our consciousness of time.\"[108] The\nco-existence of two or more extended objects must yield the relation of\nspace, for \"empty space is nothing more than the relative distance of\nextended objects from each other, measured on a standard similar to that\nwhich applies to the bodies themselves. In this way it is equally\naccurate to say that there is a certain specified _distance_ between the\nbodies, and that there is _nothing_ between them, because space is\nnothing but their relation to each other.\"[109] Annihilate all finite\nexistences, and what remains? Nothing but the immensity of God. Let one\natom of matter be created, and we have extension. Let a second atom be\ncreated, and there is now a relation of distance, position,\ndirection--that is, there is _space_.\n\nThe only remark made by Dr. Porter which has a direct bearing on this\nimportant discussion is that \"Space and time are neither relations nor\ncorrelations, but _correlates_ to beings and events\" (\"The Human\nIntellect,\" p. 568). It may seem an act of presumption in one who has\nspent much less time on these studies than Dr. Porter to offer a\ncriticism on this final deliverance. But when he tells us that space and\ntime are neither relations nor correlations, after having through four\npages \"On the relations of space and time concepts to motion\" labored to\nsustain the doctrine of Trendelenberg that \"the categories of space and\ntime are derived from the universal and all-pervading motion which is\ncommon to both\" (p. 526), we confess we are amazed. Let it be granted\nthat the spatial and temporal relations can be, in their last analysis,\nresolved into motion, still the question remains, How can we conceive of\nmotion except as the result of force?--that is, of power actually\nexerted somewhere. In the last analysis, therefore, the relations of\nspace, time, and motion are resolved into \"_the relation of\ncausality_.\" The conclusion seems inevitable that time and space are\n_correlations of finite existences_. Annihilate all finite existences\nand finite duration, and there is neither space nor time--that is, there\nis \"pure nothing.\" Or, more properly, there is the Omnipotence, the\nImmensity, the Eternity of God, whose causation may give existence to\nfinite beings with all their necessary as well as contingent relations.\n\"Whoever maintains a beginning of the world must also adopt _a beginning\nof time_, for only worldly being, which according to its notion has not\nits ground in itself, but is an originated being, can at all have time\nfor the form of its existence.\"[110]\n\nAnd now, in summing up, let us see if we can clearly disengage three\nclasses of distinct notions:\n\n1. The notion of concrete and finite EXTENSION as the essential quality\nof matter; and the notion of finite DURATION as a quality of changeful\ndependent existence.\n\n2. The notion of SPACE as the relation of co-existing material\nthings--that is, the relation of position, distance, direction,\nhereness, thereness; and the notion of time as the relation of\nsuccessive existence--that is, the relation of priority and\nposteriority, of past, present, and future.\n\n3. The notion of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY--that is, an absolute continuity\nand illimitability of being, the absence of all limit, all quantity, all\nbeginning and end, the attributes of the unconditioned Being. Let us\nendeavor sharply to define these notions, which unhappily are too often\nconfounded.\n\n1. The external senses in their different degrees, especially sight and\ntouch, give us the knowledge of objects that are _extended_ and figured.\nThe body I grasp with the hand or survey with the eye has limits,\noutlines, angles, surfaces--that is, it has more or less EXTENSION. The\ninner sense gives us the knowledge of the changes and successions of our\nmental life. But, amid all these changes, I am conscious there is a\nsomething which _endures_. What is that permanent something which I\napprehend under all the varying mental states? It is that principle of\npersonal identity which I call _I_--_myself_. To feel and know that I am\nthe same person under all modifications of my mental activity is to\n_endure_. Through the aid of memory, which enables me to recall past\nmental states, and the immediate consciousness of personal existence,\nthrough all these changes I obtain the notion of DURATION. The notions\nof Extension and Duration are clear to my mind.\n\n2. Besides the notion of extended bodies, I have also the notion of\nposition, distance, direction among extended bodies. They exist in\nvarious relations to each other; they are here or there, above or below,\nnear at hand or indefinitely remote. It may be the distance between two\nparticles of dust in the sunbeam, or the walls of the room, or between\nthe earth and the sun, or between the sun and the outermost planet of\nour system, or between the earth and the remotest star which twinkles at\nthe outposts of the universe. Position, distance, direction are all\n_relations_. And to all these relations I prefer, with Sir John\nHerschel, to give the generic name SPACE.[111] Then I have no confusion\nof thought, and no difficulty or contradiction in using the language of\nCousin, Hamilton, and McCosh, when they speak of \"determinate and\nlimited space,\" \"particular spaces,\" \"parts of space,\" and \"proportions\nof space.\"\n\nAlong with the notion of duration (and succession of different states in\nthe same existence), I am conscious that this duration is capable of\nadmeasurement by common standards, and ideally divided into periods of\nlonger or shorter duration. This duration may be measured by successive\nstates of consciousness, or facts of domestic history, or, better still,\nby the succession of day and night, or the relative position of the sun\nin the heavens, the revolutions of the moon around the earth, or of the\nearth around the sun. These are really world-measurements of duration.\nSince, then, duration can be measured from any point and in any\nproportions, it is clear that measurement is a purely relative thing--a\nrelation. Of any such thing as \"pure time\" or \"absolute time\" we have no\nknowledge. TIME _is the measure of finite duration_--the correlation of\nthings successive. And if I confine myself to this usage, I am under no\nnecessity of using the paradoxical language of many philosophers, \"time\nis eternity!\"\n\n3. We come, lastly, to the notions or ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY,\nand we ask, Are these necessary ideas of the reason, or can they be\nconfounded with the relations of co-existence and succession on the one\nhand, or with the attributes of finite extension and duration on the\nother?\n\nThis is not a mere question of systems of philosophy or theology--it is\na question of facts. Are the ideas of Absolute Infinity and Eternity\nnecessary intuitions of the reason? The world of sense-perception, the\nworld of science, is phenomenal and contingent. All that is offered to\nour observation is _limited_ and _temporal_. The universe surrendered to\nour science is one of quantities and quantitative relations. It is\nconditioned by number and form. Its extensions, spaces, and motions are\ncapable of admeasurement. Its worlds and systems are subject to\nnumeration. The phenomena of the universe are all subject to change,\nthey have beginning, succession, and end. But beyond the notions of the\nlimited and the temporal, we find in consciousness the ideas of the\n_illimitable_ and the _eternal_; the latter always appearing to reason\nas the necessary correlates of the former. The finite necessarily\nsupposes the infinite; the temporal necessarily supposes the eternal.\nThe two classes of notions are essentially different, and defy all\nattempts to generalize them under higher concepts. The infinite is not\nthe totality of finite existences; eternity is not the prolongation of\nfinite durations. Immensity and eternity are absolutely and\nunconditionally necessary ideas. I can easily conceive the non-existence\nof any finite thing. I can, without any contradiction, suppose the whole\nworld to be destroyed. All which has a derived and a dependent existence\nmay cease to be. But we can not conceive the source of all existence\nannihilated. There is one notion which it is impossible for me to\nannihilate in thought, and that is the notion of absolute\nbeing--underived, unconditioned, changeless, eternal being. Despite the\ndestruction of all determinate extension and all finite duration, there\nremains a Supreme Reality, unlimited, unbeginning, and endless, as an\nabsolute necessity of thought.\n\nHere, then, are two absolute ideas found in the depths of\nconsciousness--the ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY; ideas as real, as\nnatural, and as necessary as the notions of extension and duration.\nImmensity and Eternity are attributes of God. Extension and Duration are\nattributes of finite, dependent existence. Space and time are relations\nbetween co-existing things and successive events.\n\nIf by this somewhat abstruse and, perhaps, too lengthy discussion we\nhave succeeded in proving that Time and Space are simply relations\nbetween co-existent things and successive events, which, apart from\nthings and events, have no reality, and are \"nothing but the bare\npossibility of body and change,\" then we have disentangled the Christian\ndoctrine of absolute creation from the embarrassment occasioned by\nsupposing \"the coeval and co-eternal existence of Time and Space as the\n_necessary_ conditions of the Divine activity.\" If Time and Space are\nrelations between things and events, then God, as the almighty cause of\nthings and relations, is the efficient cause of space and time, and the\ncreative act was not conditioned by them.\n\nThe affirmation of the necessary existence of Space, Time, and Number as\nco-eternal with and independent of God,[112] prepared the way for and\nrendered plausible the further affirmation of \"the coeval existence of\nmatter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and\nmanifestation.\"[113] For if Space, Time, and Number are eternal, _why\nmay not Matter be eternal_? But why stop with the assertion of the\neternity of Space, Time, Number, and Matter? \"If we admit that there may\nbe something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause of\nanything.\" If we admit the eternity of Matter, how can we deny the\neternity of Force? We can not conceive of the existence of substance\nwithout some properties or qualities, and of all the properties of\nmatter, gravitation or weight seems to approach nearest to an essential,\nnecessary quality. And if we concede the eternity of matter and\ngravitating force, why not admit the eternity of law--that is,\n\"uniformity of properties and relations;\" uniformity in the results\narising from the motions and changes of matter? And when so much is\ngranted, why not grant that a consequent _Order_ of the universe must\nalso be eternal? why not grant that the universe is an infinite\nsuccession of orderly phenomena without a beginning and end? After the\nfirst concession that matter is uncreated and eternal, how can any one\nrefute the doctrine of Hume that the universe never had a beginning, and\nthat under some one or another possible phase--amid the infinite\npossibility of phases--it is both eternal and infinite? How, after this\nadmission, can we deny that the universe is \"a series of events existing\neternally in a state of order without a cause other than the eternally\ninherent laws of matter?\"\n\nIt would be easy to show that all those writers on \"Natural Theology\"\nwho have made the least concession in regard to this fundamental\nquestion have involved themselves in entanglements and difficulties from\nwhich they could not logically extricate themselves.\n\nDr. Chalmers contends that the mere existence of matter with its\nproperties and laws would not involve the affirmation of an Absolute\nFirst Cause. The proof, he says, lies solely in the disposition,\ncollocation, and arrangement of these properties and laws in their\nrelation to each other, so as to secure harmonious and beneficial\nresults. So far as the argument for the existence of God is concerned,\nhe provisionally concedes that _matter, with all its laws, may be\neternal_.[114] True, he says that he grants the eternity of matter\nsimply for the purposes of his argument. But what right has he to grant\nit for the purposes of his argument, and then to deny it in obedience to\nthe decisive affirmation of a \"well-accredited revelation?\" If Divine\nrevelation teaches the non-eternity of matter, this is for the Christian\na truth--a fundamental truth; and whoever surrenders or compromises a\nfundamental position must finally fail in his management of the Theistic\nargument. The intuitions of reason and the doctrines of revelation are\nbut separate rays from the one eternal fountain of light; and if we\nignore or compromise the fundamental truths of revelation, reason will\nrefuse to place her _imprimatur_ upon and give her indorsement to our\nlame and halting proofs. This is strikingly illustrated by Chalmers's\nfailure to \"construct an argument for a God\" that satisfies the reason,\nafter he has affirmed \"the eternity of matter for the purpose of\nbringing out his conclusion\" (p. 79). But Dr. Chalmers can not stop with\nthe simple concession that matter is eternal. Only grant its necessary\nexistence, and \"it is impossible to imagine that along with existence it\nshould not have _properties_ ... and _laws_\" (p. 75). Now, if the\nadmission that a finite, composite, divisible substance may be\nself-existent, and have eternal properties and laws, is not logically\ninconsistent, how can he show that these properties and laws in their\neternal action and reaction are not adequate to the production of a\nseries of phenomena which to our understanding may appear harmonious?\nCan eternal laws produce any thing but order? The existing order of\nthings is the only possible order that could arise from the _necessary_\noperation of eternal laws, and there can be no choice, design, or\npurpose in the universe. Collocation, arrangement, adaptation, are only\nsubjective anthropomorphic conceptions we impose upon nature. If matter\nand its laws are eternal, how will Chalmers extricate himself from this\ndilemma? By this admission he places a weapon in the hands of the\nanti-Theist, by which the latter may cut the teleological argument to\npieces.\n\nMy esteemed friend, Dr. Mahan, in his zeal to overthrow the ontological\nproof of the being of God, and to vindicate for the etiological proof\nthe sole claim to validity, has been betrayed into a similar\ninconsistency. That there is any _\u00e0 priori_ proof of the being of God is\nin his estimation a \"wild chimera.\" \"_Formation_ from pre-existing\nmaterials\" constitutes \"the exclusive basis\" of Natural Theology.[115]\nMatter, then, _may_ be eternal, and an infinite series of events\nexisting in a state of order is conceivable and possible. At page 85 of\nhis \"Natural Theology\" he writes: \"Mr. Hume has undeniably announced the\ntruth _as it is_ upon this subject, to wit, that the idea of a nature\neternally existing in a state of order without a cause other than the\neternally inhering laws of nature, is no more self-contradictory than\nthe idea of an eternally existing and infinite mind who originated this\norder--a mind existing without a cause.\" After several pages disfigured\nby a labored effort to prove the possibility and logical consistency of\nan \"infinite series of events existing in an orderly succession,\" he\nsums up with the imperious assertion that \"the argument against the\npossibility of an infinite series of events stands revealed as a\n_logical absurdity_\" (p. 88).\n\nIt is our deliberate conclusion, however, that the \"logical absurdity\"\nlies in the position of Dr. Mahan. \"The idea of order in the Finite\nwithout a cause is no more self-contradictory than the idea of order in\nthe Infinite without a cause.\" Mark the two points which stand out\nclearly in this strange assertion. First, the Finite here is\nnature--that is, matter and its laws. Secondly, the Infinite is the\nSupreme Mind. Dr. Mahan asserts that this _finite_ may be conceived as\n_eternally_ existing--that is, as existing through _infinite_ time; in\nother words, _the finite may be infinite_. For a thing or being, or for\na series of things or beings, to be at once \"finite\" and \"infinite\" Dr.\nMahan says \"is not self-contradictory.\" This is on a par with the logic\nof Hegel--\"Contradictory opposites are identical.\" Again, we ask, Is\nthere no difference between \"finite matter\" and \"Infinite Mind?\" Is not\nmatter composite, extended, divisible, and limited? Is not Infinite Mind\nunextended, incomposite, indivisible, and illimitable? The mere\nexistence of matter does not necessarily involve the idea of _Order_.\nThere are nebul\u00e6 existing in the universe \"utterly devoid of all\nsymmetry of form, ... irregular and capricious in their shapes and\nconvolutions to a most extraordinary degree.\"[116] Wherever order is\npresented, we instinctively and infallibly ascribe it to mind. Mind for\nall of us, and forever, is the analogon and exponent of Order in every\nsphere, irrespective of all knowledge on our part as to when or how it\nhad a beginning.\n\nFurthermore, on the main issue we affirm briefly--if matter is extended,\nit is measurable; if it is measurable, it must have definite limits; if\nit has definite limits, it can not be infinite. Now that which is\nfinite, limited, quantitive, conditioned, can not be self-existent, can\nnot be infinite. Infinitude is illimitation by kind, quantity, or\ndegree--illimitation by temporal, spatial, or numerical relations. An\n\"infinite series\" is therefore a contradiction _in adjecto_. \"As every\nnumber, although immeasurably and inconceivably great, is impossible\nwithout _unity_ as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is\nimpossible unless a _first term_ is given as its commencement.... Even\nif it should be allowed that the series has no _first term_, but has\noriginated _ab \u00e6terno_, it must always at each instant have a _last\nterm_; the series as a whole can not be infinite.\"[117] If one thing\nmore can be added to the number of existing things in the universe, then\nit is not infinite in number or in extent. In short, a series implies a\nsuccession of terms, or members, or links; if there is a last term,\nthere must be a first term; if there is a last link, there must be a\nfirst. Through an Unconditioned First Cause, originating and\nconditioning all the members thereof, is a series conceivable or\npossible. To apply to number or quantity the designation of infinitude\nis surely _the_ \"absurdity\" in presence of which all others pale. We\ngrant that the term \"infinite series\" is employed by mathematicians in a\nloose manner, to denote that which exceeds our powers of mensuration or\nconception, but which nevertheless has bounds or limits--the\n_indefinite_, but not the infinite;[118] such loose use of terms in\nphilosophy, however, is inadmissible. The final reply of Dr. Mahan,\n\"that the series under consideration is one which by hypothesis has no\nfirst,\" is the extreme of absurdity. It is as though a man should talk\nof a \"round square\" or a \"bilinear figure,\" and when remonstrated with\nas to the contradictory character of these phrases, should reply, \"Yes,\nbut the 'square' under consideration is one which by hypothesis is\n'round,' and the 'figure' is one which by hypothesis is formed by 'two\nlines!'\" Men may make all kinds of strange hypotheses, but the strangest\nof all is that of an infinite-finite.\n\nThese incautious writers of \"Natural Theology\" all assert, as a\nfundamental doctrine, that God is the Absolute and Unconditioned Cause.\nWe might ask, Whence do they derive this fundamental truth that God is\n\"absolute and unconditioned,\" if not by an _\u00e0 priori_ rational\nintuition? We let that pass, however, to press the more pertinent\nquestion--How can God be \"the absolute cause,\" if matter is coeval with\nand independent of Him? And how can He be the \"unconditioned cause,\" if\nspace, time, number, and matter necessarily exist as the _conditions_ of\nthe Divine agency and manifestation? If matter, with its essential\nproperties and laws, exist independent of the Deity, do not these impose\nconditions upon the action of the Deity, and determine it to certain\nnecessary modes? If so, God can not be the unconditioned Cause. Instead\nof one supreme, sole First Principle, there are at least two\nprinciples, God and Necessity, and may be more. No system of Natural\nTheology can maintain its integrity and consistency except by holding\nfast to the fundamental postulate--God is the Absolute and Unconditioned\nCause of all things, of matter and form, quality and relation, purpose\nand law.\n\nAnd now, in conclusion, we may properly ask, Whence arises the necessity\nfor assuming the coeval and co-eternal existence of matter besides and\nindependent of God? Why should the theologian feel himself under the\nnecessity of prejudicing the Biblical conception of Creation by any such\nconcession? The only reasons we have seen assigned are, first, that\n\"creation out of nothing is discredited by the discoveries of modern\nscience;\"[119] secondly, that \"an absolute origination is inconceivable\nand self-destructive.\"[120] In attempting an estimate of the weight of\nthese reasons, we would first suggest that the question of _absolute_\ncreation has been prejudiced by the persistent employment of the old\nformula of \"creation out of nothing,\" as though \"nothing\" contained the\ncause of existence, and the universe was developed out of nothing. The\nChristian Fathers, who first employed the phrase \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, never indulged in such representations. The idea they sought\nto express was that the production of \"_otherness_,\" the awarding of\nexistence to something besides Himself, was an absolutely free act of\nGod which was not conditioned by any thing external to Himself--in a\nword, that God is the positive original ground of all existence.\n\nBut who shall decide that this doctrine has been discredited by the\nprogress of science? What special discovery of modern science has so\nrevealed to us the ultimate constitution of matter, that we can affirm\nits absolute reality and its eternal existence? Nay, are the most\nadvanced physicists and physiologists agreed as to whether, apart from\nour subjective, ideal conceptions, matter has any reality? If we are not\nutterly mistaken, the entire tendency of science is to reduce matter\nfrom the rank of entities to the rank of phenomena. \"The old\nspeculations of Philosophy, which cut the ground from Materialism by\nshowing how little we know of matter, are now being daily reinforced by\nthe subtle analysis of the physiologist, the chemist, and the\nelectrician. Under that analysis matter dissolves and disappears,\n_surviving only as the phenomena of Force_.\"[121] We offer no opinion as\nto the validity of this new doctrine, but are sure it is the doctrine of\nmodern science as represented by Faraday, Owen, McVicar, Bayma, Exley,\nWallace, Poisson, Poyntong, Laycock, and, we think, Huxley. If modern\nscience has resolved all our external sensations, even the feeling of\nresistance, into \"phenomena of Force,\" then, according to the doctrine\nof Mr. Martineau, it had a beginning--\"_phenomena demand causation_....\nSupreme Entity needs no cause.\" \"The universe resolves itself into a\nperpetual genesis,\" and \"the Theist is perfectly justified in treating\nit as disqualified for self-existence.\"[122]\n\nSir William Hamilton contends that \"an absolute commencement\" is\ninconceivable. All the conception we can possibly form of Creation is\n\"merely as the evolution of new forms of existence by the fiat of the\nDeity.\" \"Let us suppose the very crisis of creation. Can we realize it\nto ourselves in thought, that the moment after the universe came into\nmanifested being there was a larger complement of existence in the\nuniverse and its Author together than there was the moment before in\nthe Deity himself alone? This we can not imagine.\"[123]\n\nThere are, we presume, very few Hamiltonians who are prepared to indorse\nthis bold statement of their master. Mansel, the editor and annotator of\nhis \"Lectures,\" has very distinctly and emphatically expressed his\ndissent. \"Whether it be true or not that we can not conceive the\nquantity of existence to be increased or diminished, there is at any\nrate no such inability as regards the _quantity of matter_. It may be\ntrue as a fact that no material atom has been added to the world since\nthe Creation; but the assertion, however true, is certainly not\nnecessary. The power which created once must be conceived as able to\ncreate again, whether that ability is actually exercised or not. The\nsame conclusion is still more evident when we proceed from the\nconsideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter, we maintain that the\ncreation of new portions is _perfectly conceivable_--as a result, at\nleast, if not as a process; of mind, we believe that such creation\nactually takes place. Every man who comes into the world comes into it\nas a distinct individual, having a personality and consciousness of his\nown, and that personality is a distinct accession to the number of\npersons previously existing.... Every new person that comes into the\nworld is a _new existence_.\"[124] Hence we are not justified in\nasserting that all actual existences are only different modes of one\nidentical reality. We can not merely conceive, but we _know_, as a\nprimary fact of consciousness, that the _sum_ of existence, of personal\nconscious being, which is the most fundamental reality, may be increased\nin the universe.[125]\n\nWe readily confess that the act of creation--that is, _causing wholly\nnew existence_--is utterly incomprehensible to us; so are thousands of\nother things. I am told by the physicist that eight hundred billions of\nether-impulses impinge on the retina of the eye in a second of time to\nproduce the sensation of deep violet;[126] and I believe it, but at the\nsame time it is to me incomprehensible. My reason affirms that the First\nCause must be infinite; and I believe it, but I can not comprehend\nInfinity. No logician of the present day teaches that comprehensibility\nis a test of truth. Is our finite capacity of conceiving or of doing a\nstandard for Omnipotence? The only question here involved is, Can\nInfinite Power produce that mode of being we call matter? Does such an\nexercise of Infinite Power involve a contradiction? I conscientiously\nsubmit this question to my own reason, and I confess I am unable to see\nany contradiction. To my experiential knowledge matter presents \"the\nessential characteristics at once of a _manufactured article_ and a\n_subordinate agent_.\"[127] \"This,\" says the distinguished Prof. Maxwell,\n\"precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent.... It must\nhave been _created_.\"[128] The notion of its origination by a Power\nwhich is unconditioned and every way unlimited, satisfies my reason, and\naffords the best solution of the problem of its existence. That it is\nself-existent, independent, eternal--\"a second other God\"--is directly\ncontradictory. The original, primitive fountain of existence is _Mind_.\nThis must stand at the fountain-head. God is the sole and absolute Cause\nof all things--of time, and all temporal relations; of space, and all\nspatial relations; of the primordial element, and all its properties.\n_The creative act was not conditioned by Time or Space or Matter._[129]\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nCREATION.--THE GENESIS OR BEGINNING.\n\n\"The laws of nature can not account for their own origin.\"--J. S. MILL.\n\n\nCreation was the absolutely free act of God, unconditioned by any\npre-existing thing. Matter with its properties and forms, its temporal,\nspatial, and numerical relations; Spirit with its life and feeling, its\nideas and laws--these had all their origin in the creative Word of God.\nWhatever is, and is not God, is the creature of God. This is the\nBiblical conception of Creation.\n\nOrigination and formation are so immediately and inseparably united in\nthe Biblical notion of Creation that the revelation of the one is the\nrevelation of the other, and we can not deny the former without\nlogically involving ourselves in the denial of the latter. He who gave\nto matter its forms must have given it its essential properties, upon\nwhich many of its forms depend; and He who gave to matter its essential\nproperties must have given it _origination_, for how can we conceive of\nsubstance devoid of all attributes? Whether, therefore, the account in\nGenesis \"be found to have in view, mainly or solely, a universal or a\npartial creation; whether the _principium_ there mentioned be the\nparticular beginning of the special work there described, or the\n_principium principiorum_,--the beginning of all beginnings--the Bible\nis in either case a protest against the dogma of the eternity of the\nworld, or of the eternity of matter.\"[130]\n\nThis notion of Creation as a pure supernatural origination is the only\none which reason can accept as adequate, satisfactory, and complete.\nFormation without origination is a conception of creation which is\nlogically incomplete. It fails to meet the demand of reason for an\nAbsolute First Principle adequate to the production and explanation of\nall existence. There are outlying elements of the problem which it can\nnot grasp in the unity of a Fundamental Idea. Matter with its\nproperties, Number, Time, and Space, with their relations, are still\nlying outside of its field, and setting themselves up as self-existent\nand independent realities, which by their apparent or conceded\nindependence must necessarily impose _conditions_ upon the Divine\nactivity, and perpetually embarrass the human mind in its effort to\nthink of God as the free and unconditioned Cause. Reason demands that\nabsolute unity shall stand at the fountain-head of being, and every\nsystem of philosophy which allows of more than one self-existent and\nindependent and underived reality bewilders and staggers the\nunderstanding, and vitiates all its processes of thought. After this\nconcession every argument for the being of God seems to us a _petitio\nprincipii_.\n\nReason and Revelation, then, are agreed in the affirmation that the\nUniverse, both as to its matter and form, had its origin in the creative\nWord and Will of God. How far this affirmation is sustained by the _\u00e0\nposteriori_ inductions of physical science is a question of the deepest\ninterest, and to this we now invite attention.\n\nThis question naturally divides itself into two subordinate inquiries,\none relating to the _form_, the other to the _matter_ of the universe,\nwhich may be thus presented:\n\n1. Had the existing _Order_ of the universe a beginning? Had the forms,\nrelations, laws, and harmonies of the universe a beginning?\n\n2. Had that which is the ground of all forms, the subject of all changes\nand relations, a beginning? Had the _Matter_ of the universe a\nbeginning?\n\nIn regard to the first question, we remark in general: _The common\nconviction of our race in all ages has been that the existing order of\nthe universe had a beginning, and will have an end._\n\nIt has been affirmed by some mental philosophers that mankind has an\nintuitive and natural belief in the uniformity of nature, and the\nconsequent stability and permanence of the universe. Reid, the father of\nthe Scottish school of philosophy, says, \"God has implanted in the human\nmind an original principle by which he believes in and expects the\ncontinuance of the course of nature.\" It is a matter of surprise that so\nacute a thinker should have fallen into so flagrant an error. He has\nevidently confounded our natural belief in causation with our acquired\nexperiences of uniformity. That \"like causes will always produce like\neffects\" is a native intuition; but that \"the same causes will always\ncontinue in operation, and always operate with the same intensity,\" is a\nmere presumption. Our faith in the uniformity and permanent stability of\nnature is an induction from experience, and not a natural and necessary\nintuition of the mind.[131]\n\nFar from entertaining a belief in the permanence and stability of the\npresent order of nature, the great mass of mankind in earlier times\nregarded the system of things as liable to constant interference on the\npart of supernatural powers. In all ages of the world the existing order\nof nature has been regarded as temporal, and the flow of terrestrial and\neven of cosmical events has been conceived as liable to be broken up by\nuniversal revolutions. The historical evidence of this universal belief\nin \"geological catastrophes\" has been fully brought forward by Dr.\nWinchell in his \"Sketches of Creation.\"[132] Traditions of a primal\nchaos and of periodic cataclysms are found among the Greeks, Egyptians,\nPh\u0153nicians, Chald\u00e6ans, Hebrews, Persians, Arabians, Hindoos, South\nSea Islanders, and the Aztecs. And among those nations in which the\nphysical sciences have been cultivated the same conceptions are still\nentertained. As science has extended our acquaintance with natural\nphenomena in all parts of the earth, and beyond the earth into the\ncelestial spaces, men have gradually attained a belief in the uniformity\nof nature. But the doctrine of periodical catastrophes has not been\nabandoned by scientific men. When men now speak of the uniformity of\nnature, they use that term in a very large sense, and even loose sense,\nas including catastrophes and convulsions of an intense and extensive\nkind;[133] and, as we shall presently see, the most advanced and exact\nmodern science teaches us to contemplate a grand final catastrophe in\nwhich all life will be extinguished on the earth, and the globe itself\nshall be \"ensepulchred in an extinguished sun.\" The attempt, therefore,\nto represent the belief in the uniformity of nature as a universal and\nnecessary truth is vain. We have no _\u00e0 priori_ ground for believing in\nthe permanence of the universe.\n\nThe common conviction of our race that the universe had a beginning,\nthat it has been the subject of great catastrophal changes, and that it\nwill finally come to an end, is not to be regarded as an insignificant\nfact. As Herbert Spencer justly remarks, \"We must presume that beliefs\nthat have long existed and have been widely diffused ... beliefs that\nare perennial and universal ... have some foundation, and some amount of\nverity.\"[134] Universal beliefs must rest on some common ground. That\ncommon ground can not be experience. A belief which was as clearly and\nconfidently held four thousand years ago as it is held to-day can not\nhave been gradually attained by successive generalizations. It is\ngrounded on the fundamental antithesis between Becoming and Being,\nphenomena and reality, the changeful and the permanent, the finite and\nthe infinite, the temporal and the eternal, which has been a necessary\nform of thought to all minds in all ages. The human mind has never been\nable to conceive these contradictory opposites as predicable of the same\nsubject. The universe as presented to sense is a perpetual genesis, a\nceaseless change; therefore it can not be permanent. It is a time-march\nof phenomena; therefore it can not be eternal. It is limited by quantity\nand quantitative relations; therefore it can not be infinite. Thus\nreason has always conceived the universe as having a _beginning_, and\nhas confidently predicted that it will come to an _end_. All systems of\nphilosophy, and, indeed, many systems of religion, have been attempts to\nexplain \"the beginning or origin of things\"--that is, they have been \"_\u00e0\npriori_ theories of the universe.\"[135] Even Atheism itself comes under\nthis definition: it is an attempt to explain the origin of the universe\nand of man on the _\u00e0 priori_ assumption of the self-existence of Matter,\nSpace, and Motion. Thus all systems of thought, ancient and modern, have\nhad their birth in the innate conviction that there is something to be\nexplained, and that human reason is adequate to the task of furnishing\nan explanation. They all assume that the universe had a beginning, and\ntheir one, central problem is, \"How are we to conceive aright the origin\nof things?\"\n\nIn what does this differ from the problem of modern science? It is true\nthat Comte would limit positive science to \"the study of phenomena in\ntheir orders of co-existence, resemblance, and succession,\" an idea\nwhich the word \"positive\" by no means conveys. And Tyndall asserts that\n\"the man of science, if he confine himself within his own limits, will\ngive no answer to the question\" as to the origin of things. At the same\ntime he admits that \"he can clearly show that the present state of\nthings _may_ be derivative.\"[136] The great masters of science, however,\nrefuse to acknowledge any such arbitrary limitations. \"The essence of\nscience,\" says Sir William Thomson, \"consists in inferring antecedent\nconditions, and anticipating future evolutions from phenomena which have\nactually come under observation.\"[137] If this be the _essence_ of\nscience, then we presume that it is competent to throw some light on the\nprimitive condition of the universe, and give some prevision of its\nfuture destiny. Did not Comte himself teach that the solar system was\nonce all nebula, and that it will yet collapse into an exhausted and\nextinguished sun?[138] Is it true, then, that physical science by its\ninductive inference of \"antecedent conditions,\" does really furnish a\nsolid confirmation of the _\u00e0 priori_ and native conviction of our race\nthat the universe had a beginning? Then most assuredly even physical\nscience is carrying us forward toward the ultimate unity of all truth--a\nunity which can be realized perfectly only by the constant mutual\ndetermination of _\u00e0 priori_ and empirical knowledge, a synthesis and\nequipoise of physical and metaphysical truths.\n\nThis is the most obvious tendency of modern science in its relation to\nthe question under consideration. Nothing is more remarkable in the\npresent aspect of physical research than what has been aptly called \"the\ntranscendental character of its results.\" As George Henry Lewes\nobserves, \"the fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental\nas any of the axioms of ancient philosophy.\"[139] Pal\u00e6tiological science\nin general has advanced by sure and steady steps, through careful\nobservation and experiment, inductive inference, and the application of\nexact mathematical calculus to the recognition of the truth long ago\nannounced by Paul: \"The things which are seen are _temporal_, the things\nwhich are not seen are _eternal_.\" Dynamical Geology, Astronomical\nPal\u00e6tiology, Cosmogony, Molecular Physics, Abstract Dynamics, have all\nlanded in the same inevitable conclusion that \"the existing order of\nthings had a beginning.\" Sir William Thomson's doctrine of the\n\"Dissipation of Energy\" leads us, by sure steps of deductive reasoning,\nto the necessary future of the universe--necessary, that is, if physical\nlaws remain unchanged--\"so it enables us distinctly to say that the\npresent order of things has not been evolved through infinite past time\nby the agency of laws now at work, but must have had a _distinctive\nbeginning_, a state beyond which we are totally unable to penetrate--a\nstate which must have been produced by _other than the now acting\ncauses_.\"[140]\n\nThe science of Geology reduces all terrestrial phenomena to the great\nlaw of finite duration. If there be one scientific induction which may\nbe fairly pronounced legitimate and irrefragable, it is this one--that\nthe existing terrestrial economy had a beginning. \"All organic\nexistence, recent or extinct, vegetable or animal, had a beginning;\nthere was a time when they were not. The geologist can indicate that\ntime, if not by years, at least by periods, and show what were its\nrelations to the periods that went before and that came after.\" He can\ncarry us back to the time when man did not exist upon the earth, when no\nmammals existed; to the time when no birds, no reptiles, no fishes\nexisted--when even Huxley's protoplasm had no being; \"when all creation,\nfrom its centre to its circumference, was a creation of dead inorganic\nmatter,\"[141] and when there was not one spore or monad or atom of life\nthroughout its dark domain. The form of the earth itself clearly reveals\nits history, and points us to that beginning. Its bulging equator and\nflattened poles, its pavement of congealed lava, which in some cases we\nname granite; nay, the oldest water-worn pavement composed of the\ndetritus of the igneous rocks--all attest the emergence of our planet\nfrom a molten condition, and a temperature[142] in which no life could\nexist; so that even Tyndall admits \"there are the strongest grounds for\nbelieving that during a certain period of its history the earth was not,\nnor was it fit to be, the theatre of life.\"[143]\n\nThe earth was once a molten mass heated to incandescence--a\nself-luminous globe. On this point there is scarcely any difference of\nopinion among scientific men. Furthermore, a large majority of modern\nscientists regard themselves as justified in the affirmation of a still\nanterior nebulous condition. If the nebular hypothesis is accepted, then\nwe are required to contemplate a period when the earth did not exist,\nand when even the matter which now enters into its constitution was an\nundistinguished part of the nebula from which the whole solar system was\nevolved.\n\nMany exact observations and mathematical computations as to the secular\ncooling of the earth give results which are in strict accordance with\nthis theory of its primitive igneous condition. The observed facts\nclearly indicate that the earth is becoming, on the whole, cooler from\nage to age, and that the natural current of events is carrying it\ninevitably to a state of total refrigeration.[144] The fossil remains\nnow found within the arctic circle indicate that at a period, not\nextremely remote, tropical vegetation flourished, and forms of animal\nlife subsisted there which are now confined to the torrid zone. Mammoths\nlived in the now uninhabited polar regions, and tree-ferns and the\ntropical shell-fish found there a home.[145] The surface of the earth\nwas then warmed by internal heat which since that period has waned; that\nheat has been gradually dissipated in the surrounding space, as a\nred-hot ball suspended even in the warm air of a room must, according to\nthe well-known laws of radiation and absorption, necessarily part with\nits heat.\n\nMany experiments carefully conducted in our time show that the\ntemperature of the earth increases with the depth to which we\npenetrate: \"In boring for the artesian well at Grenelle, which is 546\nmetres deep, it was observed that the temperature augmented at the rate\nof 1\u00b0 Centigrade for every 30 metres. The same result was obtained by\nobservations in the artesian well at Mondorf, in Luxemburg; this well is\n671 metres in depth, and its waters 34\u00b0 warm.\" As the result of many\ninvestigations in mines and borings, Sir William Thomson concludes that\nthe average inference may be thus stated--there is on the whole about 1\u00b0\nFahr. of elevation of temperature per 50 British feet of descent.[146]\nIf this increase is uniform--and we have no reason to suppose the\ncontrary--then at the depth of 50 miles there exists, says Helmholtz, a\nheat sufficient to fuse all our minerals.\n\nThe fact that the temperature of the earth increases with the depth\nnecessarily involves a continual loss of heat from its interior by\nconduction outward into and through the upper crust, according to a\nwell-known law of equilibrium of temperatures. \"Hence, since the upper\ncrust does not become hotter from year to year, there must be a secular\nloss of heat from the earth.\"[147] Thus it appears that from the surface\nof the earth and the ocean, from thermal springs, and from three hundred\nactive volcanoes, the internal heat of the globe is incessantly radiated\ninto space and is practically lost.\n\nNow this average loss of heat may be at least approximately measured,\nand data are thereby furnished for determining the probable _age_ of the\nearth, or, perhaps more correctly, its phase of life. If a man were to\nfind a hot ball of iron suspended in a room, and if he were carefully\nto observe the distribution of heat in the ball, he would be able easily\nto determine whether the ball were becoming hotter or cooler. If he\nfound that the inside were hotter than the outside, he would conclude\nthat the ball was cooling, and had therefore been hotter than when he\nfound it. So far common-sense would be his guide; but with the aid of\nmathematics, and some knowledge of the physical properties of iron and\nair, he could go much further, and be able to calculate how hot the ball\nmust have been at any given moment, if it had not been interfered with.\nThus he would be able to say, the ball must have been hung up less than,\nsay, five hours ago, for at that time the heat of the metal would have\nbeen such that it would have been in a state of fusion, and hence not\ncapable of hanging as a solid mass. Precisely analogous reasoning holds\nwith regard to the earth: it is such a ball; it is hotter inside than\noutside. The distribution of the heat near its surface is approximately\nknown--1\u00b0 Fahr. of elevation in temperature for 50 British feet of\ndescent.[148] The properties of the matter of which it is composed are\napproximately known. The temperature at which granite rocks are fusible\nhas been found to be about 7000\u00b0 Fahr. This must therefore have been the\ntemperature of the earth in its primitive igneous condition. From these\ndata, Sir William Thomson has, by rigid mathematical calculations,\nreached the conclusion that the consolidation of the earth's crust\ncommenced 98,000,000 years ago.[149] The rates of increase of\ntemperature _inward_ in a great amount of average rock at various\nperiods after the commencement of cooling, from the primitive heat of\n7000\u00b0 Fahr., are estimated by Sir William Thomson as follows:\n\n\"At    10,000 y'rs after commencement of cooling should have 2\u00b0 per ft.\n At     40,000  \"            \"              \"           \"        1\u00b0    \"\n At    160,000  \"            \"              \"           \"      1/2\u00b0    \"\n At  4,000,000  \"            \"              \"           \"     1/10\u00b0    \"\n At 100,000,000 \"            \"              \"           \"     1/50\u00b0    \"\n\nIt is therefore probable that for the last 96,000,000 years the rate of\nincrease of temperature under ground has gradually diminished from 1/10\nto about 1/50 of a degree Fahrenheit per foot, and that the thickness of\nthe crust through which any stated degree of cooling has been\nexperienced has gradually increased during that period from 1/5 of its\npresent thickness to what it now really is.\"[150]\n\nWe freely admit our inability to sit in judgment on the validity of Sir\nWilliam Thomson's conclusions. There are eminent geologists who\nentertain the opinion that the secular cooling of the earth has\nproceeded with much greater rapidity. It is, however, sufficient for our\npurpose that the most distinguished physicists of the day are agreed in\nteaching that _the existing terrestrial economy had a beginning_.\n\nThere are other terrestrial changes which engage the attention of the\ngeologist, and which force upon him the conclusion that the existing\nterrestrial order had a beginning and must have an end. The surface of\nthe earth has at intervals undergone great changes in the disposition of\nits land and water. That which is now dry land was once the ocean-bed,\nand the ocean waves now roll and murmur over what was once dry land.\nSudden, or comparatively sudden, catastrophes have extinguished the\nthen existing creations, and the earth has been repeopled by new orders\nof life. Changes are now in progress which are gradually reducing the\npopulous regions of the earth to the condition of the Sahara of Africa\nand the Desert of Arabia. Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, the seat of the\nancient monarchies of Chald\u00e6a, Assyria, and Babylonia, now present \"vast\ntracts of arid plain--yellow, parched, and sapless--which have now\nbecome a bare and uninhabited desert.\" That ancient continent drained by\nthe Colorado, once as fertile as the Valley of the Mississippi, is now\nthe Great American Desert. \"Every freshet burdens the streams with a\nload of sediment; and the Mississippi bears daily to the Gulf material\nsufficient for a cotton plantation. From the slopes of the Alleghanies\nand the Rocky Mountains, from the broad acres over which the Mississippi\nand the Ohio reach their silver fingers to filch from the land, the\nsediments are stolen and carried away to the sea. The Western States are\nslowly traveling toward the Gulf. The hills are melting, and even the\nmountain cliffs are lowering under the ceaseless conflict with storm and\nfrost. The summits of the Alleghanies have come down 3000 feet from\ntheir original altitudes. Give time enough, and the inequalities of the\nland will disappear. The ocean will be filled, and again assert a\ntriumph over the continents which in the beginning were wrested from his\ndominion.\" Thus by the storms of heaven, the erosion of the atmosphere,\nthe blasting power of frost, the gnawing of the tidal wave, the\nmountains are being leveled, and the rocks and soils carried onward by\nthe rivers to fill up the basin of the sea. The headlong rush of the\navalanche, the murmuring of the brook, the roaring of the sea, the voice\nof the storm--all proclaim, \"The things which are seen are\ntemporal!\"--\"The existing order of things had a beginning and must come\nto an end!\"[151]\n\nAstronomical Pal\u00e6tiology reduces all celestial phenomena to the same\ngreat law of finite duration. It teaches that planets, stars, systems,\nhave their birth, their process of formation, their maturity, and their\nslow, protracted decay. The ephemeron perishes in an hour, man endures\nhis three-score years and ten; continents and islands have their ages\nand \u00e6ons; the stars of heaven are not exempt from this universal law of\nchange and decay. According to the Nebular Hypothesis, the formation of\nthis our system of sun, planets, and satellites was a process of the\nsame kind as that which is still going forward in the heavens. One after\nanother, nebul\u00e6 condense into separate masses, which begin to revolve\nabout each other in obedience to dynamical laws, and form systems of\nwhich our system is a matured example. The present aspect of this\nplanetary system is, however, but a passing phase in the history of its\nfleeting life. Our planet was once a self-luminous orb; it has now\nbecome opaque, and shines only with a borrowed light. The moon is\nprobably in a state of total refrigeration; its lunar air and lunar seas\nhave been changed by intensity of cold into the solid form.[152] The sun\nitself is radiating heat into space in quantities incomparably greater\nthan it receives, and, as Helmholtz affirms, \"the inexorable laws of\nmechanics show that its store of heat must be finally exhausted.\"[153]\nThe planets in their motions encounter resistance from the interstellar\nether; they must, therefore, necessarily move in shorter and shorter\norbits, and at last fall into the sun. Thus the Nebular Hypothesis,\ncombined with the doctrine of a resisting medium, teaches us that the\nsolar system is wending its way, through successive changes, from a past\nof vaporous unity to a future of consolidated reunion. \"It was once all\nnebula; it will, if left to physical agencies alone, collapse into an\nextinguished and exhausted sun.\"\n\nThe astronomer who has been accustomed to regard every question relating\nto his favorite science as almost exclusively a problem in mathematics,\nwill pronounce the above \"a crude and adventurous\" attempt on the part\nof the physicist to solve a problem which belongs to \"the calculus of\nvariations.\" Is the universe a Conservative or a Dissipative system?\nUnder its present laws will it run on forever, or will these very laws\nin the end lead to its subversion? Will the mechanism of the heavens\nfinally run down as surely as the weights of a clock run down to their\nlowest position, or are we authorized on scientific grounds to assert\nthe permanent stability of the solar system? This question has been\nearnestly discussed by the most distinguished astronomers since the days\nof Newton. Until recently, the general conclusion--reached mainly on\nmathematical grounds--seems to have been that the universe is a\nthoroughly conservative system, and that the celestial machinery by a\nspecies of perpetual motion will run on forever. But must not all\napplied mathematical reasoning obtain its data from the exact\nobservation of material facts? The mathematician must also be a good\nnatural philosopher; he must lay his account with all the facts of the\nuniverse, otherwise his symbols have no contents, and his reasoning,\nhowever faultless in its processes, will be fallacious in its results.\nThe discoveries of the present century respecting the correlation of the\nvarious forms of energy, the nature of the solar light and heat, the\nmotions of comets, and especially the new doctrine of the \"Dissipation\nof Energy,\" have introduced new elements into the great problem, which\nseem to indicate that gravitation is by no means the only force by which\nthe motions of the heavenly bodies are influenced, and that causes are\nnow in operation which are slowly but surely undermining the system. We\nnow find, therefore, such high authorities as Whewell, Sir John\nHerschel, Sir William Thomson, Balfour Stewart, Prof. Maxwell, Dr. J. R.\nMayer, Helmholtz, Tyndall, Littrow, Comte, Adolph Fick, asserting that\nthe solar system is not a self-winding clock which may run forever, but\nthat it is a dissipative system which must ultimately lose all motion,\nunless some power capable of controlling the laws of material nature\ninterfere to preserve it. We have no more valid reason for concluding\nthat the Deity intended the system should be eternal than that He\nintended the earthly life of man should be eternal.[154] A few general\nstatements may assist the reader in appreciating the merits of the\ndiscussion.\n\nIt has been observed since the dawn of science that changes are taking\nplace in the motions of the heavenly bodies. The eccentricity of the\nearth's orbit has been gradually diminishing from the earliest\nobservations to the present time. The moon, also, has been moving faster\nand faster from the time of the first recorded eclipses, and is now in\nadvance by about four times her own breadth of what her place would have\nbeen had she not been affected by these accelerations.[155] In a few\nthousand years she will be half a month ahead of the place she would be\nin if her month were to remain constant. The moon is, therefore,\napproaching closer and closer to the earth; and if these changes go on\nuninterruptedly, without any reaction or adjustment, sooner or later the\nfinal catastrophe must come, and the moon be precipitated on the body of\nthe earth.\n\nToward the close of the last century, Laplace, in his great work, the\n\"M\u00e9chanique C\u00e9leste,\" attempted by certain mathematical computations to\nshow that, nevertheless, the solar system is stable and permanent. The\nplanets, by their mutual attractions, produce perpetual perturbations in\none another's movements. Laplace believed he could prove that these were\nperiodic; they reach a maximum value and then diminish, oscillating\nbetween very narrow extremes. He therefore taught that the machine would\ngo on by a kind of perpetual motion, without any winding up or\nadjustment from without; and, consequently, the eternal continuance of\nthe solar system is insured.\n\nAll the investigations of Laplace, and the computations of Lagrange,\nproceeded on two assumptions: first, that the planets are moving _in\nvacuo_; and, secondly, that they are solid throughout their entire mass.\nThe latter assumption is certainly in conflict with well-determined\ngeological facts; and there is no _\u00e0 priori_ ground for assuming that\nthe planetary spaces are void and empty. On the contrary, the general\nanalogies of nature would lead us to the very opposite conclusion, and\nall attempts at producing a perfect vacuum have hitherto failed.\nFurthermore, the great body of modern physicists, and nearly all modern\nastronomers, hold that the celestial spaces are filled with a \"material\nether,\" which must by its very nature offer some resistance to planetary\nmotion.\n\n\"Scientific men,\" says Mayer, \"do not doubt the existence of such an\nether.\" The presence of such \"material ether--dense, elastic, and\ncapable of motion--subject to and determined by mechanical laws,\"[156]\nis demanded for the explanation of radiant heat, light, and actinism. No\nother theory ever proposed has so beautifully and completely accounted\nfor all the facts. Its reality must be admitted, until the positions\nestablished by Huyghens, Young, Fresnel, Foucault, and Fiziau are shown\nto be untenable. All the prominent experimental physicists of the\npresent day agree in teaching that light and heat are transmitted by\nvibrations or wave-like motions in a material medium universally\ndiffused through space, and permeating all material bodies. Light and\nheat are the ceaseless thrill which the distant orbs collectively create\nin the ether, and which constitute what has been called the _temperature\nof space_. If the existence of such material medium as the assumed ether\nbe denied, we can not account in any conceivable or rational manner for\nthe transmission of light and heat from the sun. And now, if the space\nbetween the celestial bodies contain no other matter than that necessary\nfor the transmission of light, \"that alone,\" says Littrow, \"is\nsufficient, in the course of time, to alter the motion of the planets,\nand the arrangements of the solar system itself; the fall of all the\nplanets and comets into the sun, and the destruction of the present\nstate of the solar system, must be the final result of this\naction.\"[157]\n\nBut it is further claimed by Helmholtz, Mayer, and Sir William Thomson\nthat the phenomena presented by Encke's comet furnish \"direct proof\" of\nthe existence of such resisting medium. The observations on this comet\nmade during the past thirty or forty years show that the periods of its\nrevolution are continually diminishing at the rate of 0.11\u00b0 per\nrevolution of nearly 3-1/3 years. In other words, the comet's mean\ndistance from the sun is diminishing by slow and regular degrees. The\nsolution which Encke himself proposed, and which Herschel informs us \"is\ngenerally received,\"[158] is that resistance is experienced from the\nmedium in which the comet moves; such resistance diminishing its actual\nvelocity and also its centrifugal force, thus giving the sun greater\npower to draw it nearer. It will, therefore, fall into the sun. A\nsimilar fate, says Helmholtz, threatens all the planets. \"The analogies\nof nature, and the ascertained facts of physical science, forbid us to\ndoubt that _every star_, and, indeed, _every body of every kind_ moving\nin any part of space, has its relative motion impeded by the air, gas,\nvapor, medium, or whatever we call the substance occupying space\nimmediately around them, just as the motion of a rifle-bullet is impeded\nby the resistance of the air.\"[159]\n\nThere are also indirect resistances, the effects of tidal friction, on\nall bodies which, like the earth, have portions of their free surfaces\ncovered by liquids, which, so long as these bodies move relatively to\nneighboring bodies, must keep drawing off energy from their relative\nmotions. \"Thus, if we consider the action of the moon on the earth, with\nits oceans, lakes, and rivers, we perceive that it must tend to equalize\nthe period of the earth's rotation on its axis, and of the revolution of\nthe two bodies about their centre of inertia; because, so long as these\nperiods differ, the tidal action of the earth's surface must keep\nsubtracting energy from their motions.\"[160] As the tidal wave sweeps\nover the oceans and rushes into the numerous bays and estuaries, the\nmotions which it produces in the waters necessarily involve an\nexpenditure of power or _vis viva_ in overcoming the resistance from\nfriction. The energy of motion thus expended must be drawn from the set\nof machinery which produces the motions--that is, from the motion of\nrevolution of the moon, and the motion of rotation of the earth. It can\nnot be returned to the machinery, because all that is not spent in\ntriturating the sand and other materials composing the ocean-bed, is\ntransformed into heat and radiated into space.\n\nIt is true that in the present state of science we have not exact data\nfor estimating the relative importance of tidal friction, and of the\nresistance of the interstellar medium; but, whatever it may be, there\ncan be, says Thomson, \"but one ultimate result for such a system as that\nof sun and planets if continuing long enough under existing laws....\nThat result is _the falling together into one mass, which, although\nrotating for a time, must in the end come to rest relatively to the\nsurrounding medium_.\"[161]\n\nAnother evidence that the solar system is temporal, and that the present\ncosmical order must come to an end, is found in the fact that the sun is\nradiating heat into space in quantities incomparably greater than it\nreceives. If it were not so, we should receive, on the average, as much\nheat from every other quarter of the heavens as from the sun, and no\nvicissitudes of temperature would ever occur on the earth. Now, from\nwhat we know of the nature of heat, it is impossible that the supply\ncontained in the sun should be inexhaustible. There is no apparent\nreason why the sun should form an exception to the fate of all fires,\nits only difference being one of size and time. It is larger and hotter\nthan ordinary lamps, but is nevertheless a lamp in which invisible\nmolecular energy is consumed, and consumed, too, at a rate which baffles\nall conception. From every square foot of its surface the sun gives out\nenergy equal in amount to seven thousand horse-power. The total amount\nof heat sent off from the sun in _one minute_ is \"five thousand millions\nof millions of units\": a unit of heat being the quantity of heat\nrequired to raise one kilogramme--or about one quart--of water one\nCentigrade degree.[162] This enormous consumption of energy must finally\nexhaust the original stock. Were the sun a solid block of coal, and were\nit allowed a sufficient quantity of oxygen to enable it to burn at the\nrate necessary to produce the observed emission of heat, it would be\nutterly consumed in five thousand years. Or if we suppose, with Thomson,\nthat the initial form of the energy of the universe is the potential\nenergy of gravitation in matter diffused through space, and if this\npotential energy (energy of position) is transformed into heat\n(molecular kinetic energy) by condensation or contraction of the sun,\nand this energy of molecular motion (heat) is again transformed into\nradiant energy and diffused through infinite space, it is obvious that\nthis condensation can not be continued forever, and Thomson has shown in\nhis article on the \"Age of the Sun's Heat\" that its power of radiation\nmust come to an end. Various theories have been suggested for\nreplenishing the solar heat, one of the most plausible of which is the\nfalling of meteoric and cometary bodies into the sun. Prof. Thomson, who\nwas one of the first to adopt this view, has now abandoned it, or at\nleast has denied its adequacy to account for the maintenance of solar\nheat. Even were the hypothesis accepted as valid, the supply of fuel is\nstill finite. Time will drain the entire space inclosed by the orbit of\nthe planet Neptune of all the meteors and comets. Even the planets must\nat length be ensepulchred in the sun. \"As surely,\" writes Sir William\nThomson, \"as the weights of the clock run down to the lowest position,\nfrom which they can never rise again unless fresh energy is communicated\nto them from some source not yet exhausted, so surely must every planet\ncreep in, age after age, toward the sun.\" Not one can escape its fiery\nend. And, finally, the heat of the sun itself--that is, its molecular\nenergy--must be transformed into radiant energy, and diffused and lost\nas a working force in infinite space. \"Thus do the inexorable laws of\nmechanics indicate that the sun's store of heat, which can only suffer\nloss and not gain, must _be finally exhausted_.\"[163]\n\nThere are thus special geological and astronomical facts which have long\nbeen regarded as indicative of the principle that the existing order of\nthe material universe is _temporal_--it had a beginning, and must have\nan end. But the modern Theory of Energy,[164] with its three great laws\nof Conservation, Transformation, and Dissipation, must be regarded as a\ncomprehensive, complete, and final settlement of the question. It has\nbeen shown, first, that no system of machinery can _create_ force any\nmore than it can create matter; and that the amount of energy in the\nuniverse, or in any limited system which does not receive energy from\nwithout, or part with it to external matter, is a constant or invariable\nquantity. This is the _Law of the Conservation of Energy_. It has been\nproved, secondly, as an experimental fact that, in general, one form of\nenergy may, by suitable processes, be transformed wholly or in part to\nan equivalent amount of another form; and the sole and only function of\nall possible machines is the conversion or _transformation_ of energy.\nThis is the _Law of the Transformation of Energy_. This law of\nTransformation is, however, subject to the limitations which are imposed\nby the _Law of the Dissipation of Energy_, the discovery of which is\nmainly due to Sir William Thomson. He has shown that every machine does\nits work against friction. \"A material system can never be brought\nthrough any returning cycle of motions without spending more work\nagainst the mutual forces of its parts than it gained from these parts,\nbecause no relative motions can take place without meeting with\nfrictional or other forms of resistance.\" No known process of\ntransformation is exactly reversible. Whenever an attempt is made to\ntransform and retransform energy by an imperfect process, part of the\nenergy is converted into heat, and the heat is _dissipated_, so as to\nbecome useless because incapable of further transformation. It therefore\nfollows that, as energy is constantly in a state of transformation,\nthere is a constant degradation of energy to that final unavailable form\nof uniformly diffused heat; and this will go on as long as\ntransformations occur, until the whole energy of the universe has taken\nthis form.[165] The reader will find an extended discussion of this\ngreat question in Thomson and Tait's \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n188-304, in which it is shown that the present material system is not a\n_dynamically conservative_ but a _dissipative_ system, and therefore\nthat in such a system \"perpetual motion\" is an impossibility.\n\nIndeed, the Law of the Dissipation of Energy is an intelligent and\nwell-supported denial of the chimera of perpetual motion. There is a\nloose idea that perpetual motion is impossible to us, because we can not\navoid friction with its consequent loss of energy, but that nature works\nwithout friction, or that, in general, friction entails no loss, and so\nhere perpetual motion is possible; but nature no more works without\nfriction than we do, and friction entails a loss of available power. The\nsupply of invisible molecular energy in the sun is no more infinite than\nthe quantity of matter in the sun is infinite. The sun is daily lifting\nhuge masses of water from the sea to the skies, yearly lifting endless\nvegetation from the earth, setting breezes and hurricanes in motion,\ndragging the huge tidal wave round and round the earth; performing, in\nshort, the great bulk of the endless labor of this world and other\nworlds, so that the energy of the sun is continually being given away\nwithout any corresponding restoration. The loss of force in the shape of\nradiant light and heat can never be weaned back to any other mode of\navailable energy. Carnot, Clausius, Thomson, and Rankine have all from\ndifferent points of view been led to the same conclusion. We can make no\nuse whatever of the energy represented by equally diffused heat. If one\nbody is hotter than another, as the boiler of a steam-engine is hotter\nthan the condenser, then we can make use of the difference of\ntemperature to convert some of the heat into work; but if two substances\nare equally hot, even though their particles contain an enormous amount\nof molecular energy, they will not yield us a single unit of work.\nEnergy is thus of different qualities, mechanical energy being the\n_best_, and universal heat the _worst_; in fact, this latter description\nof energy may be compared to the waste heap of the universe, in which\nthe _effete_ forms of energy are suffered to accumulate without any\nfurther conversion.[166] If, then, when mechanical force passes into\nheat, _some_ of the heat can never be brought back to be mechanical\nforce, and if the change from mechanical force to heat be ever going on,\nall the force in the universe must at last take the form of radiant\nheat. But if that be so, then at last all differences of temperature\nmust disappear, and every thing end in a universal death.\n\n\"We are come,\" says Adolph Fick, \"to this alternative: either in our\nhighest, most general, most fundamental abstractions, some great point\nhas been overlooked, or the universe will have an END, and must have had\na BEGINNING; it could not have existed from Eternity, but must at some\ndate, not infinitely distant, have arisen from something not forming a\npart of the natural chain of causes--that is, IT MUST HAVE BEEN\nCREATED.\"[167]\n\n\nSo far, then, the deductions of science are found to be in striking\nharmony with the teaching of revelation--the existing order of the\nuniverse had a beginning; the forms, relations, laws, harmonies of the\nCosmos had a commencement in time. We may now proceed to the\nconsideration of the second question: Had that which is the _ground_ of\nall form, the _subject_ of all changes and relations, a beginning? Had\nthe _matter_ of the universe a beginning?\n\nThat we may fairly present the answer which modern science offers to\nthis question, we must premise, in general, that it confesses its\ninability, in the present stage of physical knowledge, to determine what\nis the ultimate or internal constitution of matter. Many scientists of\nto-day are of the opinion expressed by Grove[168] that \"probably man\nwill never know the ultimate structure of matter.\" Others, as, for\nexample, Thomson, Bayma, McVicar, and Challis, entertain the opinion\nthat physical science is competent to discover all the minuti\u00e6 of\nmolecular actions, and when this has been achieved, the question as to\nthe ultimate constitution of matter can be finally determined. There is\none guiding principle, recognized alike by the physicist and the\nmetaphysician, namely, that substances, ultimate entities, are known,\nand can only be known in and through their respective phenomena. An\nexact enumeration and careful colligation of all the phenomena are\ntherefore indispensable prerequisites to the solution of the problem.\n\nMeantime nothing is more remarkable, even in the present state of\nphysical science, than the fact that, under the subtile analysis of\nmodern physics, much that we have been accustomed to regard as phenomena\nof matter dissolves and disappears, surviving only as phenomena of\n_Force_. The phenomena of heat, light, color, sound, electricity, and\nmagnetism are now \"modes of motion\"--manifestations of one and the same\nomnipresent energy, which is transferred from one portion of matter to\nanother, and modified or transformed simply by the mechanical\narrangements and collocations of matter. The opinion is rapidly gaining\nground that even chemical action is a mode of motion, and Professor\nNorton does not hesitate in affirming that \"_all the phenomena of\nmaterial nature result from the action of force upon matter_.\"[169] All\nthat we mean by a Material Force \"is a force which acts _upon_ matter,\nand produces in matter its own appropriate effects.\"[170] It is not an\nattribute of matter, not a quality inherent in matter, but a mode or\nstate superimposed upon matter.\n\nThere is a large, influential, and daily increasing class of scientists,\namong whom may be named Faraday, Prof. Owen, Dr. Laycock, Wallace, Dr.\nWinslow, Prof. Huxley, who do not regard matter as an ultimate entity,\nand who believe that all the phenomena of matter (so called), even\nextension, resistance, and ultimate incompressibility, may be resolved\ninto phenomena of force. In other words, matter is only _phenomenal_,\nand, like all phenomena, demands a _cause_.[171] These men are perplexed\nwith no difficulties as to the _origin_ of matter. As a phenomenon it\nmust be a product of Creative Efficiency, and therefore had a beginning.\n\nIt is obviously unnecessary that we should here discuss the merits of\nthis hypothesis which resolves matter into force. We shall encounter it\nat a subsequent stage of our inquiry, and may then attempt to gauge its\nmerits. It is enough for our present purpose that Heat, Light, Color,\nSound, Electricity, Magnetism, are recognized as forms of molecular\nEnergy--phenomena of Force; that these forms of invisible molecular\nenergy, together with all the energy of visible motions and positions,\nare regarded as flowing from one great central force, or fountain-head\nof power; and that there is a remarkable unanimity among the first\nscientific men of our age in acknowledging this power as the Creative\nEfficiency of God. These forces uniformly work in obedience to Law; and\nLaw, whether viewed in the orderly movement of a planet or an atom, in\nthe symmetrical arrangement of a crystal of the definite proportions of\nchemical combination, in the organization of a worm or of an elephant,\nis intellect, is _reason_. This is the ultimate principle upon which\nevery condition of matter and form depends.\n\nThis conception of force will materially aid us in the conception of\nmatter. It is simply \"the recipient of impulses or energy\"[172]--the\nmere passive condition for the exercise of power. \"It does not generate\nthe phenomena which it manifests. It is only the substratum--it does\nabsolutely nothing but give to the phenomena their conditions of\nmanifestation.\"[173] Every molecule of matter, every aggregation of\nmolecules, every organism must be regarded as a machine upon which the\nforces of nature play, and by which they are transformed and rendered\navailable for the performance of work. Thus matter, by its very\nconception, must have been _created_, and fitted for the fulfillment of\na predetermined function. Before the mechanism of the universe was set\nin motion, there was a preparation and collocation of its materials, and\nan adjustment of its minutest parts. As Sir John Herschel justly\nremarks, \"Chemical analysis most certainly points to an origin, and\neffectually destroys the idea of an external self-existent matter, by\ngiving to each of its atoms the essential character, at once, of a\n_manufactured article_ and a _subordinate agent_.\"[174] The numerical\nrelations between chemical elements are the expression of creative\nideas. The maxim of the Pythagorean philosophers is daily receiving new\nillustration from science, \"The world is a living arithmetic in its\ndevelopment, a realized geometry in its repose.\" There can be no\narithmetic without an Arithmetician, no geometry without a Geometrician.\nThus in the very elements out of which the universe is built, the blocks\nof nature's temple, we see the indications not only of a fashioning but\nof an _originating_ intelligence--a Creating God. Design as truly\nappears in the primitive nature of matter as in its secondary\nformations. The primitive purpose is stamped on the primitive article.\n\n\"Every molecule throughout the universe bears impressed on it the stamp\nof a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives at\nParis, or the double royal cubit of the Temple of Karnac.\n\n\"No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of\nmolecules, for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the\nmolecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction.\n\n\"None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature began, have\nproduced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We\nare therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or\nthe identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes\nwhich we call _natural_.\n\n\"On the other hand, the exact quality of each molecule to all others of\nthe same kind gives it the essential character of a manufactured\narticle, and _precludes the idea of its being eternal and\nself-existent_.\"[175]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nCREATION: ITS HISTORY.\n\n\nThe universe had a beginning. It is not eternal either in its matter or\nform; it is neither self-originated nor self-sustained. The all of the\nfinite, with its relations and laws, its adaptations and harmonies, had\nits origin solely and absolutely in the unconditioned will of God. This\nis the Christian doctrine concerning the world.\n\nIn the preceding chapters we have endeavored to show that this doctrine\nis in perfect agreement with the teachings of sound philosophy, and we\nhave found that it is daily receiving fresh confirmation from the\ndiscoveries of modern science.\n\nIf the universe originated solely in the free determination of God, then\nwe are assured there must be a sufficient and ultimate reason for its\nexistence. This logically follows from the true conception of _Will_,\nfor will is not unconscious force, neither is it groundless\narbitrariness, but conscious, rational choice.\n\nIn the merely formal and indifferent sense of the word, an arbitrary\naction is one in which the agent yields to the blind impulse of caprice,\nand can assign no reason for his doing. An action is truly free only\nwhen the agent knows _what_ he wills, and _why_ he wills it. The\nself-conscious will is the only real will. Will is intrinsically\nsomething more than power, something more, even, than the power of\nspontaneous self-determination. Will involves precognition,\ndeliberation, and alternative choice: it is the living synthesis of\nreason and power. \"The mere moment of self-determination does not\nsuffice for the notion of will, for this, in a certain sense, we must\nascribe to unintelligent creatures, to the organic life of nature by\nvirtue of its development from its own principle. Self-determination\nonly thereby becomes will by its being a _conscious_ determination--that\nis, the conscious subject is able to present to its own mind that which\nit brings to reality by its self-determination.\"[176] All real volition\nsupposes a purpose or end to be realized, an inward motive or reason\nwhich renders the end desirable, and the choice and adaptation of means\nto accomplish that end. Consequently, if the universe is the product of\nthe Divine Will, it must, both in its origination and its history, be\nthe realization of an ultimate or final purpose, must have a perfect\nunity of plan; and the highest law of the universe must be a\n_teleological_ idea to which all nature-forces and all causal\nconnections are subordinated. This ultimate purpose forms, as it were, a\ncomplete network of higher teleological connections above the web of\nmere aiteological connections which pervades the universe.\n\nThis great principle that a teleological idea is the highest law of the\nuniverse has been recognized by all philosophers of the spiritualistic\nschool from the time of Plato to the present day. Even Mr. Mill admits\nthat \"Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends, may be termed, not improperly,\na principle of the practical reason;\"[177] and he advises those who\nwould prove the existence of God \"to stick to the argument from\n_design_.\" No saying of Bacon has been more often quoted or more grossly\nmisunderstood and misapplied than his remark on final causes: \"The\nsearch after final causes is barren, for like virgins consecrated to\nGod they produce nothing.\" If, however, we refer to his writings\n(\"Advancement of Learning,\" bk. ii. p. 142), we find him adding, \"_not\nbecause these final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired, being\nkept within their own province_.\" A fair consideration of the context\nclearly shows that the remark was intended to apply to Physics, and not\nat all to Metaphysics. All that he intends to say is that in purely\nphysical inquiries the search after final causes can have no practical\napplication; and the error he would guard against is the assumption that\nwhat appears to man a final cause must be the ultimate final cause to\nthe Infinite One.\n\nThe belief that a principle of adaptation to special ends pervades all\nexistence, and that it must be assumed as the ground of the scientific\nexplanation of the facts and phenomena of the universe, is avowed by the\nfirst scientists of the age. \"We can not be content,\" says Dr. Laycock,\n\"with simply determining the mere relations of things or events--an\nexistence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance--and not\ninquire into the _ends_ thereof. Such a doctrine applied to physiology\nwould, in fact, arrest all scientific research into the phenomena of\nlife; for the investigation of the so-called functions of organs is\nnothing more than a _teleological_ investigation.\"[178] \"_A law of\ndesign is the higher generalization of the great uniformities of\nnature._\"[179] In his inaugural address at the meeting of the British\nAssociation of Science at Edinburgh, Sir William Thomson said: \"I feel\nprofoundly convinced that the argument from design has been greatly lost\nsight of in recent speculations.... Overwhelmingly strong proofs of\nIntelligence and Benevolent Design lie all around us; and if ever\nperplexities, whether of a metaphysical or scientific character, turn us\naway for a time, they will come back upon us with irresistible force,\nshowing us through nature the influence of a _Free Will_, and teaching\nus that all living beings depend upon one ever-acting _Creator_ and\n_Ruler_.\"[180]\n\nEvery enlargement of our knowledge of organic nature is an addition to\nthe already numberless instances of recognized special adaptation which\ncrowd us on every hand; and all scientific discovery is but an\nillustration and a verification of the _\u00e0 priori_ intuition of the\nreason that a principle of design is co-extensive with and the highest\nlaw of the universe. Not merely of each individual existence, but of the\ngrand totality of existence, are we constrained to believe that it\nexists for a purpose. Above all special ends there is a great ultimate\ndesign of creation--a last or final end to which all intermediate ends\nare means; and though physical science can not fully compass that final\npurpose, yet in the light of its present knowledge of special ends it\nhas abundant reason for assuming that there _must_ be a final purpose,\nand that that final purpose is at once beneficent and wise.[181]\n\nBut while the final purpose of creation may not be discoverable by human\nscience, we know that it has been revealed in the Christian Scriptures.\n\nThe most fundamental doctrine of Christianity is that _God is Love_ (1\nJohn iv. 8, 16), and that Love is the highest determining principle of\nthe Divine efficiency. Creation, Providence, and Redemption are grounded\nin Love as the final cause (Gen. i. 31; Isa. lxiii. 9; John iii. 16).\n\nThe gravitating point of the Christian doctrine of \"God the Creator\" is\nnot Omnipotence, nor yet Wisdom, but always Love. Omnipotence, in\nitself considered, possesses no moving or determining principle. God\ndoes not create the world to reveal his infinite power. Infinite Wisdom\ndevises the best means and methods for the Divine efficiency, but it\ndoes not supply the ultimate reason why the world exists. The Love of\nGod is the moving principle of his wisdom and power in that it appoints\nthe _end_ to which omnipotence is related as the efficient, and wisdom\nas the formal cause. Whatever displays of power or of wisdom may be made\nin the created universe, they are all subordinated and made subservient\nto the purpose of Love. The highest law of the universe is Love. \"The\nconservation of Love is the loftiest conservation of Force.\"\n\nThe world, then, was created to be a revelation of God, and especially\nto be a revelation of the perfections of the Divine nature which are\ngrounded in and deducible from Love; and it exists as the\nself-manifestation and self-communication of God to personal creatures\nwho can know Him and love Him in return. \"That which can determine God,\nabsolutely sufficient in Himself, in the production of beings distinct\nfrom Himself, is _Love alone_; consequently the creation is nothing else\nthan the free self-communication of God Himself, who could be\nexclusively in Himself, but wills that others may have being and, in\nfellowship with Him, eternal life.\"[182] The world-creating,\nworld-preserving Love of God has this for its ultimate purpose, _that\nthere shall be beings who, in the completeness and perfection of\npersonal existence, shall know and love and resemble God, and have\nfellowship in his blessedness and joy_ (Matt. v. 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 2\nPeter i. 4; 1 John iii. 2).\n\nThe realization of a perfected humanity in fellowship with God is, then,\nthe final end of creation. We find some intimations of this grand\npurpose in the sublime record of creation which is given by Moses. We\nthere learn that every thing was created with a view to man--to \"man in\nthe image of God.\" The inorganic world exists for the vegetable kingdom,\nthe vegetable exists for the animal kingdom, and all exists for man (ch.\ni. 26-30). All its successive changes were a preparation for the\nappearance of man.[183] The more comprehensive revelation of the New\nTestament teaches that man exists for the realization of that perfected\nhumanity of which Christ is the model, and which is attained in and\nthrough Christianity. The idea of man is the teleological principle of\nthe world, the idea of Christ is the teleological principle of humanity.\nAll things were created _by_ Christ and for Christ. \"The good pleasure\n(\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 = the benevolent purpose) of the Divine Will\" is, in the\nfullness of time, to gather together in one all things both which are in\nheaven and which are on earth, even in Christ, that in the final\nconsummation _God may be all in all_ (Eph. i. 9, 10; 1 Cor. xv. 28).\n\nThis purpose of Divine Love is an \"_eternal purpose_,\" ordained before\nthe foundation of the world, and progressively unfolded in the creation,\ngovernment, and redemption of the world. Thus the world, as an actual,\ntemporal world, reposes on an eternal ideal world which has always been\npresent to the Divine cognition. The visible creation is but the\nrealization of the Divine ideal in such modes and under such conditions\nas shall constitute it a manifestation of God to finite\nintelligences--the external expression of the mind and character of God,\nthe language of the Deity.\n\n\nAssuming this as a fundamental principle of Christian theology that\nCreation is the self-manifestation of God, and that the final cause of\nthis manifestation is the communication of the Divine blessedness to\nintelligent, personal being, we may logically infer the following\nintermediate principles as _Laws of this Manifestation_.\n\n1. _This manifestation must be_ GRADUAL, _not instantaneous. In other\nwords, it must be unfolded in successive steps or phases, so as to be\nadapted to the nature and capabilities of the being to whom it is made.\nThe determinations of nature, like those of consciousness, must conform\nto the law of progressive development._\n\nDivine omnipotence was, no doubt, adequate to the production of new\nbeings without any pre-existing materials or any prearranged conditions;\nbut creation is not mainly or primarily a revelation of omnipotence. The\nDeity might have brought the phenomena of the universe into instant\nbeing without any succession and independent of all means, but a\nuniverse thus instantaneously produced and simultaneously presented\nwould reveal no purpose to, and could not be understood by, a finite\nmind. Finite consciousness can be developed only under conditions of\nplurality, difference, and succession, and therefore the objects of\ncognition must be successively presented. We may be sensible of the\nexternal reality by immediate intuition, but we can _understand_ only\nthrough experience; and experience supposes a gradual process--a\nsuccession not simply in our mental states, but a succession of external\nphenomena. This experience of succession constitutes our consciousness\nof _time_. Therefore, in order that the Divine manifestation may be\nunderstood, it must have a _history_.[184]\n\n2. _This manifestation must be_ CUMULATIVE--_that is, it must afford an\nincrease of knowledge through successive additions; it must be an\nadvancing revelation of new principles and laws in an ascending line of\ncreative acts._\n\nAn evolution which is absolutely continuous, and in which the present is\nthe necessary outcome of the past, and that by degrees infinitely small,\nmay be a manifestation of unconscious force, but can not be a\nmanifestation of living Will. If nature be a manifestation of God--the\nunfolding of an eternal purpose of Love--this manifestation must ever be\nopen to receive _new_ additions, the intercalation of new principles,\nand the superinduction of new laws working for a nobler end. All\nlimitations from the scientific stand-point are illogical and absurd.\nThis law would determine our conception of the universe as an\naggregation of combined evolutions from several intermediate principles\nor beginnings, rather than an evolution from a single first matter or\nfirst force. _The creation of the new_, whether as primordial element,\nor primary force, or principle of life, or rational soul, is the\nfundamental idea of the _supernatural_--that is, the production of\nsomething which is not a necessary out-birth from pre-existing\nconditions and laws.[185] Therefore what is commonly, though perhaps\nincorrectly, styled \"miraculous interposition,\" must itself be a law of\nthe Divine manifestation, and the law of uniformity must be subordinated\nto the more general law of progressive development, which subordinates\nthe inorganic to the organic, the physical to the moral world.\n\n3. _This manifestation must be_ CONSECUTIVE. _Not only must it be a\nsuccession of steps or phases, but the entire series must be so related\nand concatenated as to present an Order of Thought--an ascending\ndevelopment toward a foreseen and predetermined end._\n\nIf it were not so, every thing would be _isolated_ and _disconnected_,\nand consequently unintelligible. There would be a succession of\nphenomena, but no manifestation of thought; a series of dissolving views\npresented to the sense, but no revelation to the understanding. Isolated\nphenomenal changes might be continued through untold ages, but the past\nwould have no connection with the present, and would be unknown and lost\nto all the future. A revelation of the Infinite Mind to finite\nintelligences, made through the manifold and diversified phenomena of\nnature, must be a connected and related whole, so that from phenomena\nactually observed we may infer antecedent conditions, and anticipate\nfuture evolutions; otherwise it could not be understood. To be\nintelligible, a process of development must be the product of thought,\nand it must reveal thought--that is, it must be _consecutive_.[186]\n\n4. _This manifestation must be_ HARMONIOUS. _Notwithstanding its\nmultiplicity of parts and manifold stages, it must be a unity--a\nCosmos._\n\nBeings the most varied in endowment, things the most diversified in form\nand function, events the most remote from each other in time and space,\nmust all be related and connected in virtue of the ultimate and\nall-embracing purpose for which the universe exists. An external purpose\nrevealed under time-relations must be an _all-harmonious evolution_ and\nan _orderly totality_--a Cosmos.\n\nLet us now turn to the record of creation as given in the Sacred\nScriptures--the Mosaic Cosmogony--and see how that account conforms to\nthe laws which on logical grounds we have deduced as the Laws of the\nDivine Manifestation.\n\nThe fundamental prerequisite for a right interpretation of the sacred\nnarrative is a clear apprehension, first, of its general purpose, and,\nsecondly, of its special literary characteristics. On these two points,\ntherefore, we offer the following preliminary considerations:\n\n1. _The design of the sacred narrative is to teach Theology and not\nScience._ A cursory reading of the narrative will convince any one that\nits purpose is not to enlarge men's views of nature, but to teach them\nsomething concerning nature's God. It says nothing about the forces of\nnature, the laws of nature, the classifications of natural history, or\nthe size, positions, distances, and motions of the heavenly bodies. From\nfirst to last, every phenomenon and every law is linked immediately to\nsome act or command of God. It is God who creates, God who commands, God\nwho names, God who approves, and God who blesses. Strike out the\nallusions to God, and the narrative is meaningless. Clearly, it was\nnever intended to teach science. It has obviously one purpose, to reveal\nand keep before the minds of men the grand truth _that Jehovah is the\nsole Creator and Lord of the heavens and the earth_; and it leaves the\nscientific comprehension of nature to the natural powers with which God\nhas endowed man for that end.\n\nAll this is what we might legitimately expect. The narrative was\ndesigned primarily and mainly for the instruction of the masses of men\nwho knew nothing or scarcely any thing of science; and if designed for\ntheir instruction, it must be couched in language which they could\ncomprehend. A revelation made in the language of science would have been\nunintelligible to the race for nearly six thousand years of its history,\nand, practically, would have been no revelation at all. Scientific\nlanguage, moreover, is subject to modification and change as science\nadvances; but the narrative of Genesis was intended for all time, and\ntherefore needed to be couched in language not liable to change. \"The\nonly language which possesses these two requisites of general\nintelligibility and non-liability to change is the _language of\nappearances_. The facts set forth must be described as they would have\nseemed to the eye of man; that is, in a word, phenomenally, or the\ncosmogony would fail of its purpose. All scrutiny or objection in the\nmatter of unscientific, or scientifically inaccurate language, then,\nmust be put aside as irrelevant.\"[187]\n\nWhile earnestly maintaining that the inspired history of creation was\ngiven for the instruction of unscientific persons, and is therefore\ntheological and not scientific, we also believe that all truth is one,\nand that all revelation, whether in Scripture or in nature, must be\nultimately harmonious. Science in its last generalization must be\nTheology. Theology in its proper development must be Science. They are\ntwin children of heaven, vestal virgins which can not be wedded to\nerror. We are, therefore, justified in the expectation that the\nrevelation in Scripture, when rightly interpreted, will contain nothing\nthat is inconsistent with the scientific interpretation of nature. While\nwe hold that there are no untimely anticipations of scientific discovery\nin Genesis, yet we expect that when the scientific discoveries are made,\nthe congruity and dignity of the moral and religious lesson shall not be\ndefeated and marred. Nay, more, we maintain that the Mosaic cosmogony\npresents the great principles which really lie at the basis of a truly\nscientific interpretation of nature. It teaches that God is before all\nthings and the Creator of all things--that He alone is unbeginning, and\nthat all things had a beginning in his creative word and will. It\npresents the universe as one harmonious whole, the product of one\ndesigning Mind, the project of his thought, the transcript of his\nplan--a plan evolved through successive stages toward a foreseen\nterminus or goal. And, finally, it teaches that man is the end toward\nwhich creation was tending, that he is the last and crowning work of\nGod, and that he is the child and charge, not of a blind, impersonal\nforce, but of a living, loving God.\n\n2. _The sacred narrative is poetic, symbolical, and unchronological._ It\nis a noteworthy fact that the early literature of the most ancient\nnations was poetic--the natural, spontaneous product of that earliest\nstage of mental development in which the conceptions of God and of\nnature were determined by subjective feeling and native sentiment, and\nnot by reflective thought. The \"Vedas\" of the Hindus, the \"Iliad\" of the\nGreeks, the \"Eddas\" of the ancient Germans, were each the product of an\nage in which \"prose was unknown, as well as the distinction between\nprose and poetry.\" The earliest Hebrew compositions are of the same\ncharacter; and it is reasonable to assume that a primitive revelation to\nthe progenitors of our race would be accommodated to this earliest phase\nin the development of mind.\n\nThe Book of Genesis opens with a _Psalm_--\"the inspired Psalm of\nCreation\"[188]--\"a grand symbolical Hymn of Creation.\" \"The rhythmical\ncharacter of the passage, its stately style, its parallelisms, its\nrefrains, its unity within itself, all combine to show that it is a\n_poem_.\"[189] Here is the same organic unity which marks the 104th\nPsalm, or the Lord's Prayer, or the parable of the laborers in the\nvineyard. Or, if we go out of the Bible for illustration, it combines\nwith lyric breadth of treatment and stateliness of movement all the\ncompactness of a \"solemn sonnet freighted with a single thought from\nbeginning to end.\" Analysis of its interior structure exhibits a most\nartificial synthesis, founded upon well-known sacred numbers. It has,\nfirst, an _Exordium_, the proemial part. Then it is articulated into six\n_Strophes_. Finally there is the _Epode_, or peroration. The six\nstrophes separate naturally into two groups, in which there is a balance\nand correlation of parts celebrating the first three and the last three\nconcordant steps in the creative movement--the _Strophe_ and the\n_Antistrophe_.\n\nThe exordium states briefly the subject of the poem: \"In the beginning\nGod created the heavens and the earth.\"\n\nThe first three strophes unfold the creative development of the\nreceptacles:\n\n 1. A. The luminiferous ether.                      } \"The heavens\n 2. B. Waters and the firmament between the waters. } and the earth.\"\n 3. C. Dry land above the waters, with plants.      }\n\nThe second three strophes (or, more correctly, antistrophes) unfold the\ncreative development of the occupants:\n\n 4. A. The light-bearers: sun, moon, and stars. } \"And all the hosts\n 5. B. Water-animals and birds.                 } of them\" (Gen. ii. 1).\n 6. C. Land-animals and man.                    }\n\nThe epode, or peroration, fills up the sacred number 7--the symbol\nalways of permanence and repose. \"Thus the heavens and the earth (the\nreceptacles) were finished, and all the host of them (the occupants);\nand on the seventh day God put period to the work which he created by\nfashioning,\" etc.[190]\n\n\n_THE SYMBOLICAL HYMN OF CREATION._\n\n    EXORDIUM.\n\n    In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.\n\n    FIRST STROPHE.\n\n    And the earth was formless and empty;\n    And darkness was upon the face of the abyss.\n    And the Spirit of God brooded upon the face of the vapors.[191]\n    And God said, Let there be light:\n    And there was light.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw the light that it was good._\n\n    And God called the light Day:\n    And the darkness He called Night.\n            And there was evening and there was morning: one day.\n\n    SECOND STROPHE.\n\n    And God said, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters,\n    And let it be a division of waters from vapors.\n    And God made the expanse,\n    And divided the waters which were below the expanse from the waters\n     which were above the expanse:[192]\n    And it was so.\n    And God called the expanse Heavens.\n            And there was evening and there was morning: a second day.\n\n    THIRD STROPHE.\n\n    And God said, Let the waters under the heavens be gathered\n     into one place,\n    And let the dry ground appear:\n    And it was so.\n\n    And God called the dry ground Land;\n    And the gathering of the waters He called Seas.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._\n\n    And God said, Let the land shoot forth shoots:\n    Herbs yielding seed, fruit-trees yielding seed-inclosing fruit\n     after their kind upon the land;\n    And it was so.\n    And the land brought forth shoots;\n    Herbs yielding seed after their kind, and trees yielding\n     seed-inclosing fruit after their kind.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._\n\n            And there was evening and there was morning: a third day.\n\n    FOURTH STROPHE.\n\n    And God said, Let there be luminaries in the expanse of the heavens\n     to divide the day from the night;\n    And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years;\n    And let them be for light-bearers in the expanse of the heavens,\n     to give light upon the earth:\n    And it was so.\n    And God made the two great luminaries;\n    The greater luminary to rule the day;\n    The lesser luminary to rule the night.\n    He made the stars lights also;\n    And God appointed them in the expanse of the heavens\n     to give light upon the earth,\n    And to rule over the day and night,\n    And to divide the light from the darkness.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._\n\n            And there was evening and there was morning: a fourth day.\n\n    FIFTH STROPHE.\n\n    And God said, Let the waters swarm forth swarming things,\n     living souls;[193]\n    And let birds fly upon the land upon the face\n     of the expanse of the heavens.\n    And God created great leviathans,\n    And all living souls that creep, which the waters swarmed forth\n     after their kind;\n    And all birds of wing after their kind.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._\n\n    And God blessed them, saying:\n    Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea;\n    And let the birds multiply in the land.\n            And there was evening and there was morning: a fifth day.\n\n    SIXTH STROPHE.\n\n    And God said, Let the land bring forth living souls after their\n     kind:\n    Cattle, and creeping things, and land-animals after their kind:\n    And it was so.\n    And God made land-animals after their kind,\n    And cattle after their kind,\n    And all creeping things after their kind.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._\n\n    And God said, Let us make MAN in our image, after our likeness;\n    And let him have dominion over the fish of the sea,\n    And over the birds of the heavens,\n    And over the cattle,\n    And over the land,\n    And over all the creeping things that creep upon the land.\n    And God created MAN in his own image;\n    In the image of God created He him:\n    Male and female created He them.\n    And God blessed them; and God said unto them,\n    Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it;\n    And have dominion over the fishes of the sea,\n    And over the birds of the heavens,\n    And over all the animals that creep upon the land.\n    And God said, Behold, I have given you all herbs seeding seed\n     which are upon the face of all the land,\n    And every tree which has seed-inclosed fruit:\n    They shall be unto you for food.\n    And to all land-animals,\n    And to all the birds of the heavens,\n    And to all creeping things upon the land wherein is a living soul,\n    I have given every green herb for food:\n    And it was so.\n\n    REFRAIN--_And God saw every thing that He had made,\n               and behold it was very good._\n\n            And there was evening and there was morning: the sixth day.\n\n    EPODE.\n\n    Thus the heavens and the earth were finished,\n    And all the hosts of them.\n    And on the seventh day God put period to the work which He had made;\n    And He rested on the seventh day from all his work which He had\n     made.\n    And God blessed the seventh day, and hallowed it:\n    Because that in it He rested from all his works\n     which God by making created.\n\nWho can read this sublime composition without feeling that it is \"a\nsolemn sonnet freighted with a single thought from beginning to end?\" In\nour English Bible, broken up into verses, and split across into two\nchapters, it is like an image reflected in a shattered mirror; all its\nreal beauty is concealed. But he who can look upon it with a clear eye,\nand grasp its real unity, must recognize it as a Sacred Hymn composed\nprobably by Adam, and chanted in the tents of the patriarchs at their\nmorning and evening devotions for more than two thousand years, to\ncommemorate the fact and keep alive the faith that _the world is the\nwork of the triune God_.\n\nBesides being poetic, the sacred narrative is pre-eminently\n_symbolical_--must be symbolical, because the Divine reality could never\nbe intuitively known. The facts transcend all the possibilities of human\nexperience. Whatever knowledge the writer had in regard to the creative\nprocess must have been obtained in a preternatural way--that is, it must\nhave been revealed by Divine Omniscience. But such a revelation could\nnot have been communicated in mere vocables. Words are themselves but\nsigns--mere arbitrary signs of images and ideas--and can convey no\nmeaning unless the image or the idea be already before the mind. The\nonly natural hypothesis is that the knowledge was conveyed in a symbolic\nrepresentation--a vision of the past in a succession of scenic\nrepresentations with accompanying verbal announcements, like the visions\nof the future in the prophecies of Ezekiel and the apocalypse of John.\nThe original formless nebula--the primeval darkness--the brooding Spirit\nproducing motion--the consequent luminosity--the separation of the\naeriform fluid into atmosphere and water--the emergence of the solid\nland--the shooting forth of grass and plants--the appearance of the\nheavenly luminaries--the swarming of the waters with living things, and\nthe appearance of birds of wing in the expanse of heaven--the bringing\nforth of land-animals--and, finally, the creation of man--all pass\nbefore his mind in a succession of pictorial representations of the\nactual progress of creation. \"The sights seen, the voices heard, the\nemotions aroused, are just those adapted to bring out the very words the\n_seer_ actually uses, and in both cases the very best words that could\nhave been used for such a purpose. The description being given from the\nbarely optical rather than from any reflective scientific stand-point\nmore or less advanced, is on this very account the more vivid as well as\nthe more universal. It is a language read and understood by all.\" The\nwords of the inspired writer are descriptive of the \"vision pictures,\"\nand these were symbolic representations of the Divine realities.\n\nThe language of the sacred record must therefore be regarded as\n_anthropopathic_--the Divine idea being symbolized under the figure of\nhuman acts and affections; and from the analogy between the human and\nthe Divine we may conceive not what God is in Himself, nor yet the\nmanner of the Divine action, but the relation of God to the world. We\nmust, however, guard against substituting the human symbol for the\nDivine reality, and making the human analogy a measure for the infinite\nBeing. \"The Sacred Hymn is no more a _literal_ detail of the actual\nprocess of creation than the description of the New Jerusalem in\nRevelation is a _literal_ picture of the heavenly state.\"[194] God is\nforever above all finite relations. Finite acts and relations may be\nemployed as representative symbols of the Divine, but they can never be\nadequate representations. Divine creating and moving, commanding and\nnaming, seeing and approving, working and resting, must not be narrowed\ndown to the standard of our finite personality, and conceived under\nhuman limitations. The conception of the Deity as standing outside of\nmatter, and moving and fashioning it after the manner of a human\nartificer, as commanding and naming in human language, as being\nconditioned in his action by the time-measures which He himself\nappointed, as expending energy and then resting after the manner of a\nhuman laborer, is the rudest anthropomorphism. God is eternal; neither\nhis being nor his action are conditioned by finite measures of time. God\nis absolute immensity, essential omnipresence. He is \"in all and through\nall\" as truly as He is \"above and before all.\" He is a Living Power\nimmanent in all matter, as well as transcending all matter, moving it,\norganizing it, vitalizing it continually--a Living Power working from\n_within_, rather than a mechanical force acting from _without_.\n\nIf the primitive composition standing at the commencement of Genesis be\n\"the Symbolical Hymn of Creation,\" we are not permitted to regard it as\n_chronological_--that is, we are not justified in expecting that it\nshall conform to time-measures which had no existence prior to the\ncreative act, but which were consequent upon and determined by the\ncreative act. This is obvious both from the nature of things and the\ncharacter of the composition.\n\nThe 106th Psalm is an epic poem--that is, it is a narrative in poetic\nmeasure, a history in metrical form. Who will be so unreasonable as to\ndemand that this Psalm shall furnish any chronological data, or conform\nto any time-measures whatever? Psalms are composed to be sung and excite\nemotion, not to be merely read and criticised. The poet groups his\nmaterials for the best moral effect, and arranges his numbers to secure\nrhythm and harmony. It is simply absurd to demand that there shall be\nany chronology--nay, it spoils the grand effect to think of chronology\nin reading the \"Symbolical Hymn of Creation.\" In fact, we are forbidden\nto think of time at all by the first word of the exordium, which states\nthe subject of the poem. The Hebrew _bereshith_, the Greek \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6 = in\nBeginning (not in _the_ Beginning, for the article is not used), has _no\nrelation to succession in time_. It denotes _pretemporality_, and is\nrendered by Meyer, Keil, and others--\"before time or in eternity.\" It is\nthe same thought which is presented in John i. 1: \"In the beginning was\nthe Word;\" and Tholuck and Dean Alford both read the text, \"_Before the\nworld was, or before time was_.\" Indeed, the whole poem represents an\nideal conception, and not a time-march of phenomena. So assured are we\non this point that we confidently affirm that no one who endeavors to\nthink of the creation in its relation to God can ever fall into the\nanthropomorphic error of saying that \"God's ways are like unto our\nways,\" \"God's speaking is like unto our speaking,\" \"God's working and\nresting are like unto our working and resting,\" and \"God's days are like\nunto our days of twenty-four hours.\" As Dr. Whedon remarks, \"Our\ntraditional unscientific scientific constructions of this chapter are\nJaphetic interpretations of a Semitic text.\"\n\nThe men who persist in regarding \"the day of God\" as a natural day of\ntwenty-four hours are involved in numberless inconsistencies when they\nattempt to carry their rigid preconception throughout the whole Bible.\nHuman or finite measures of time, when applied to any thing God does,\ncan only be accommodated representations to meet our feeble\ncomprehension, and we are constantly guarded, in the Bible itself,\nagainst a literal and anthropomorphic conception. \"Hast thou eyes of\nflesh, or seest thou as man seeth? Are thy days as man's days?\" (Job x.\n4, 5.) To say that God's days of working are like our days is just as\nabsurd and as degrading a conception as to say that God's eyes are \"eyes\nof flesh,\" like ours. Our time-measures can not condition the Divine\naction. \"One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand\nyears as one day\" (2 Peter iii. 8); which means that time is as nothing\nwith God, that time does not condition the Divine life or the Divine\naction, but that it is the Divine action which makes and conditions all\ntime. _The beginning of the world is the beginning of time_, and time is\nthe duration of the world measured into equal parts by the equable\nmotion of bodies in space.[195] The attempt to measure the creating work\nof God by days of twenty-four hours is just as absurd as the attempt to\nmeasure immensity by a three-foot rule, or to estimate omnipotence by\nhorse-power.\n\nLet any one test the twenty-four-hour measure on such texts as the\nfollowing: \"Your father Abraham desired to see my _day_.\" \"The _day_ of\nthe Son of Man.\" \"I must work the works of him that sent me while it is\n_day_.\" \"If thou hadst known in this thy _day_.\" \"He shall rise again in\nthe resurrection at the last _day_.\" \"The _day_ of salvation.\" \"The\n_day_ of judgment.\" \"The terrible _day_ of the Lord.\" It would be a\nwholesome and profitable exercise to take up the Concordance and refer\nto all the texts in which the word \"day\" stands in any relation to the\ndeterminations or doings of God, and it will be found that it is always\nan indefinite period of longer or shorter duration, and may be\ntwenty-four hundred years, or twenty-four thousand years, just as well\nas twenty-four hours.\n\nThe Hebrew \u05d9\u05d5\u05dd (yom), first occurring in Gen. i. 5, is the name of\nan indefinite period, a cycle of time radically grounded on the\nprimitive conception of division or separation. Light is the first\n_separation_. It is \"divided from the darkness.\" \"And God called the\nlight _day_, and the darkness He called _night_.\" This is God's own\nnaming, and we must take it as our guide in the interpretation of the\nsubsequent \"days.\" Obviously, it is not the duration, but the\nphenomenon, the appearing itself which is for the first time called day.\nThen the term is used for a period, or the whole first cycle of events,\nwith its two great antithetical parts--\"And there was an evening, and\nthere was a morning, _one day_.\" We look into the sacred narrative to\nsee what corresponds to this naming. What was the night? Certainly the\n_darkness_ on the face of the waters. What was the day? Certainly the\n_light_ consequent on the brooding of the Spirit and the commanding\nword. How long was the day? How long was the night or the darkness? The\naccount tells us nothing about it. There is something on the face of it\nwhich seems to forbid such questions. Where are we to get twelve hours\nfor this first night? Where is the point of commencement when darkness\nbegan to be on the face of the deep? All is vast, sublime, immeasurable.\nThe time is as formless as the material. It has, indeed, a chronology of\nsome kind, but on a scale vastly different from that afterward appointed\n(ver. 14) to regulate the history of a completed and habitable world.\nWhoever thinks seriously on the impossibility of accommodating this\nfirst day to the measure of twenty-four hours needs no other argument.\nThe first day is, in this respect, the model of all the rest.[196]\n\nIt is equally impossible to reduce the \"seventh day\" to a chronological\nstandard of twenty-four hours. \"And God rested on the seventh day from\nall his works which He had made.\" Are we to presume that God \"rested\" as\nwe rest, because He was weary, and that He needed to rest just\ntwenty-four hours? Is not God \"resting\" still in the sense in which the\nword \"rest\" is here used, viz., _to cease doing_ a particular work? Is\nnot all time since the Creation God's grand Sabbath, in which he is not\ndoing works of Origination, but works of Love and Mercy to our race?\n\nIt is obvious that the first and the seventh days can not be days of\ntwenty-four hours; and, furthermore, a clear apprehension of the nature\nof the first day must open to us the true conception of all the rest.\nThe days are _new appearances, new manifestations, new developments_ in\nthe Creative Week--the great _day_ of God (Gen. ii. 4). According to the\nanalogy of the first day, the evening is the time of a peculiar or\npartially chaotic condition, like the glacial epoch which closed the\nCenozoic and opened the Phrenozoic day. The morning is a _new evolution\nof a new order of things_, which carries the world-formation to a higher\nstage. With each creative morning there comes a higher, fairer, richer\nstate of the earth, until it reaches the Sabbath of the world, the day\non which God rested or ceased from his world-creating work, that He\nmight educate and recreate and redeem and glorify the human race.\n\nIn these antithetical movements of each creative day we are not\nnecessitated to assume a sudden catastrophe, or any return to the chaos\nof the first day, any more than we now conceive of night as a sudden\nreturn to darkness, or of day as the sudden return of light. There is a\nsteady progression, an orderly movement in the history of each creative\nday, just as there is in the history of a single solar day. The light\ndoes not break suddenly upon the world--the sun rises gradually upon the\nearth. And so the creative day was a slow development, a gradual\nevolution out of a prior order of things, by the direct efficiency of\nGod.\n\nIt has been insinuated that this is an interpretation which has been\nforced upon us by the progress of modern science. Theology, it is said,\nhas been perpetually driven from her positions by science, and is now\ncompelled to take refuge in subterfuge and equivocation. The insinuation\nis as false as it is foul. This mode of interpretation was propounded\nages before the science of Geology was known, and was taught by Jewish\ndoctors and Christian fathers for fifteen hundred years. St. Augustine,\nthe father of Systematic Theology, who was born A.D. 354, asks the\nquestion, \"What mean these days--these strange sunless days? Does the\nenumeration of days and nights avail for a distinction between the\nnature that is not yet formed, and those which are made, so that they\nshall be called morning _propter speciem_ [_i. e._, in reference to\nappearing, receiving form or species], and evening _propter privationem_\n[_i. e._, in reference to non-appearance, formlessness, and want of\nsensible quality]?\" (\"De Genesi ad Literam,\" lib. ii. ch. 14.) Hence he\ndoes not hesitate to call them _natur\u00e6_, natures, births or growths;\nalso _mor\u00e6_, delays, or solemn pauses in the Divine work. They are _dies\nineffabiles_; their true nature can not be told. Hence they are called\ndays as the best symbol by which the idea could be expressed. They are\nGod-divided days and nights in distinction from sun-divided. Common\nsolar days are mere _vicissitudines c\u0153li_, mere changes in the\npositions of the heavenly bodies, and not _spatia morarum_, or\nevolutions in nature belonging to a higher chronology, and marking their\nepochs by a law of inward change instead of incidental outward\nmeasurement. As to how long or how short they were he gives no opinion,\nbut contents himself with maintaining that _day is not a name of\nduration_, the evenings and the mornings are to be regarded not so much\nas measuring the passing of time (_temporis pr\u00e6teritionem_) as marking\nthe boundaries of a periodic work or evolution. This is not the\nmetaphorical, but the real and proper sense of the word _day_, in fact\nthe original sense, inasmuch as it contains the idea of rounded\nperiodicity or self-completed time, without any of the mere accidents\nthat belong to the outwardly measured solar or planetary epochs, be they\nlonger or shorter.[197]\n\nThese are not the mere fancies of St. Augustine. This was the doctrine\nof the ablest Christian fathers--of Iren\u00e6us, Origen, Basil, and Gregory\nof Nazianzen. Nay more, it was the doctrine of many of the doctors of\nthe old Jewish Church. In more recent times we find Calmet, Burnet,\nStillingfleet, Henry More, Lord Bacon, Poole, and others, presenting\nsimilar views; and this long before Geology existed as a science, and\nirrespective of any supposed collision with physical induction. Their\nopinions and interpretations were therefore no shift for the avoidance\nof difficulties, but conclusions reached independently on sound\nprinciples of Biblical exegesis.\n\nDisregarding the chronology of Archbishop Usher printed in the margin of\nour Bible, and the division into chapters and verses made by Hugh de St.\nCher--both modern inventions which are no part of the sacred\nrecord--and purging our minds of those prepossessions which are\nincident to an uncritical faith, we can now contemplate the Symbolical\nHymn of Creation in its simple and original form, as a record of the\n_self-manifestation of God_, given in such order and under such\nconditions that it shall be apprehensible and interpretable by the\nfinite mind.\n\n1. _Creation was a gradual process._ God did not create a perfect\nuniverse at once, but built it up slowly, step by step. A consistent\ninterpretation of the record forbids us to regard \"the Creative Week\" as\na literal week composed of days of twenty-four hours each. Creation is\nthe work of God, and surely the Divine action can not have been\nconditioned by time-measures which did not exist before, but were\nconsequent upon the act of God. The great cyclical changes in nature\nproduced by the creative Word are the only measures of time. Therefore\nthe \"days\" of the Creative Week are _new appearances, new\nmanifestations, new developments_ in the creative purpose of God.\n\nThe first morning is the appearance of _luminosity_ in the aeriform\nfluid, or nebulous vapor, whatever science may finally determine that to\nhave been. The Hebrew \u05de\u05b7\u05d9\u05b4\u05dd (mayim), from the root \u05d9\u05dd, which denotes\n_tumultuous_, _tremulous_, or _undulatory_ movement, is used of the\nwaters of the ocean, of the waters above the firmament, of vapor and\nclouds, because of their susceptibility of tremulous, undulatory motion.\nThe first distinct creative formation was _heat_, or invisible molecular\nmotion, resulting from \"the Spirit of God brooding upon the face of the\nabyss;\" and this heat reveals itself in the phenomena of _light_.[198]\nHow closely the ideas of light and heat were united in the Hebrew mind\nis shown by the same word being used for both, with merely a slight\ndifference in pronunciation, \u05d0\u05d5\u05b9\u05e8 (\u014dr) and \u05d0\u05d5\u05bc\u05e8 (\u016br).\n\nThe second morning is the appearance of an _expanse_ in the midst of the\nvapors, dividing the vapors which were below the expanse from the vapors\nwhich were above the expanse. The Hebrew \u05e8\u05b3\u05e7\u05b4\u05d9\u05b9\u05e2\u05b7 (rakai), from \u05e8\u05b3\u05e7\u05b7\u05e2 (to\nstretch, to spread out), means properly an extension, an expanse. This\nis the translation adopted by Benisch, Kalisch, Delitzsch, Keil, and\nLange. After heat and light, the next creative formation is an\n_atmosphere_, with its auroral light and a cloudy canopy.\n\nThe third morning is the appearance of _land_ and _seas_, and the\nsprouting forth of _vegetation_, at first in its lowest forms--perhaps\nas marine plants. The Hebrew \u05d0\u05b6\u05e8\u05b6\u05e5 (eretz) has two significations,\n\"earth\" and \"land.\" Whenever it is used in a restricted sense, and\nespecially wherever it is contrasted with \"water,\" the most appropriate\nrendering is \"land.\" The third creative formation is _gross, ponderable\nmatter_, whether aggregated by molecular attraction, or compounded by\nelective affinity, or selected and organized by vital force.\n\nThe fourth morning is the appearance of _luminaries_ or _light-bearers_\nin the expanse of heaven, which are now \"set,\" or, more correctly,\n\"appointed to give light upon the earth,\" and to be time-measures in\nthe future world-history. The Hebrew word employed in ver. 14\n(\u05de\u05b0\u05d0\u05e8\u05b9\u05ea), which is unfortunately rendered \"lights\" in the Authorized\nVersion, is a different word from the \"light\" (\u05d0\u05d5\u05b9\u05e8) of vers. 3-5.\n\u05de\u05b0\u05d0\u05e8\u05b9\u05ea (meoroth) strictly means \"light-bearers,\" or bodies giving\nlight. This distinction is carefully observed in the LXX., DeWette,\nBenisch, Kalisch, Tuch, Knobel, Delitzsch, and Keil.[199] The fourth\ncreative formation was the establishment of such cosmical conditions or\nrelations as should enable the heavenly bodies to fulfill their\nlight-giving function to the earth. What those conditions were we may\nnot be able to say. The dense clouds and ceaseless showers of the \"Age\nof Rain,\" which had shut out the light of the heavenly bodies for a\ngeological age, had now passed away, the atmosphere becomes fitted for\nthe transmission of light, and the sun, moon, and stars are visible from\nthe earth. The conditions for a rapid development of vegetable life now\nexist, and this is regarded as pre-eminently \"the Age of Plant-growth.\"\n\nThe fifth morning is the appearance of _animal life_--life moving in the\nwaters and soaring in the air, marine animals, aquatic reptiles, and\nbirds.\n\nThe sixth morning is the appearance of a higher order of animal life,\n_mammals_, chiefly designed for the use of a still higher being--for\n_Man_, whose appearance is the noontide splendor of the sixth day.\n\nThe seventh morning is the commencement of the _Sabbath of God_, which\nis devoted to the moral and religious instruction of humanity--the New\nCreation of the moral world.\n\nThe following scheme, furnished by Dr. Winchell, presents at one view\nthe order of the Mosaic record, and at the same time sets forth the\nharmony between the _Mosaic_ and _Geologic_ records:[200]\n\n+----+------------------------------------------------------------------+\n|    |  Genesis,   | Brief announcement of chief events in the history: |\n|    |   ch. i.    |                                                    |\n|----+-------------+----------------------------------------------------|\n|    |             |   I. God the Creator of the Substance and Form     |\n|    | Vers. 1, 2. |       of the Universe.                             |\n|    |  EXORDIUM.  |  II. Terrestrial Chaos.                            |\n|    |             | III. Darkness on the face of the Deep.             |\n|    |             |  IV. Vivification of the Waters.                   |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|\n|DAYS|             |    GEOLOGY     | GEOLOGICAL AGES|                  |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------+---|\n|I.  |  Vers. 3-5. |  Igneous Vapor |     Age of     |}             |   |\n|    | Creation of |   condensing.  |      FIRE.     |}             |   |\n|    |   LIGHT.    |                |                |}             |   |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------|}             |   |\n|    |  Vers. 6-8. |  Gathering of  |                |} ABIOTIC.    |   |\n|    | Creation of |    Clouds.     |     Age of     |}             |   |\n|II. |  FIRMAMENT  |Descent of Rain.|      RAIN.     |}             |   |\n|    | or EXPANSE. |    Earliest    |                |}             | A |\n|    |             |   Sediments.   |                |}             | Z |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------| O |\n|    | Vers. 9-13. |    Uplift      |                |}             | I |\n|    | Creation of | of Continents. |     Age of     |}             | C |\n|III.| DRY LAND and|  Appearance    |    LAND and    |}             | . |\n|    |  of PLANTS. |   of Marine    |  PLANT-MAKING. |}             |   |\n|    |             |  Vegetation.   |                |}             |   |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------|} PROTOPHYTIC.|   |\n|    | Vers. 14-18.|   Dispersion   |                |}             |   |\n|    | Creation (or|   of Clouds.   |                |}             |   |\n|    | appointment)|   Appearance   |     Age of     |}             |   |\n|    |      of     |     of Sun,    |                |}             |   |\n|IV. | LUMINARIES: |    Moon, and   |  PLANT-GROWTH. |}             |   |\n|    |  sun, moon, |      Stars.    |                |}             |   |\n|    |  and stars. |                |                |}             |   |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------+---|\n|    |             | Appearance of  |     Age of     |                  |\n|    | Vers. 20-23.| Marine Animals |    MOLLUSKS,   |   PAL\u00c6OZOIC.     |\n|V.  | Creation of |  (mollusks,    |    FISHES,     |                  |\n|    |   AQUATIC   | fishes, etc.), |................|..................|\n|    | ANIMALS and |  and Aquatic   |    REPTILES,   |                  |\n|    |   BIRDS.    | Reptiles and   |    BIRDS.      |   MESOZOIC.      |\n|    |             |    Birds.      |                |                  |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|\n|    | Vers. 24-31.| Appearance of  |     Age of     |                  |\n|VI. | Creation of |  Mammals and   |    MAMMALS.    |   C\u00c6NOZOIC.      |\n|    | LAND-ANIMALS|     MAN.       |                |                  |\n|    |   and MAN.  |                |                |                  |\n|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|\n|    |Gen. ii. 2,3.|  Reign of Man. |     Age of     |                  |\n|VII.|   Sabbath   | The Sabbath of |      MAN.      |  PHRENOZOIC.     |\n|    |   of GOD.   |   Creation.    |                |                  |\n+----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------+\n\n\n2. Creation was _cumulative_--that is, it was a succession of beginnings\nor creative epochs, in which new entities or new forces were inserted\ninto the already existing sphere of nature, carrying it forward toward a\nnobler end.\n\nThis, we think, is the natural impression which the reading of Gen. i.\nmakes on the unbiased mind. Each creative word appears as the dynamical\nbasis of a real _principium_--a beginning of something intrinsically\nnew, and which can not be conceived as the physical result of any\npre-existing condition of things.[201] A new entity or a new force was,\nas it were, inserted in the order of nature; a new impulse was given to\nmatter, or a new direction to existing forces, and from that initial\npoint a new series of developments, which go on in accordance with\nlaw--a new succession of births and growths--flows on as a part of the\ngrand totality of effects we call \"nature.\" This is, obviously, the\nBiblical conception. Here creation does not present itself as a\nnecessary evolution from a first matter or a first force in unbroken\ncontinuity, and without any supernatural interposition. Here are clearly\ndefined creative epochs, new beginnings, which have their origin in the\ncreative will and word of God. What these beginnings were is a question\nof the deepest interest.\n\nA careful study of Gen. i. and ii. has led us to the conclusion that\nthere is something fundamental and radical in the distinction between\nthe creative words with _bara_ (\u05d1\u05b8\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0) and those with _yetsar_ (\u05d9\u05b8\u05e6\u05b7\u05e8) and\n_aysah_ (\u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4). It is, in reality, the distinction between Origination\n_de novo_ and Formation out of pre-existing materials. There are three\ninstances in which _bara_ occurs in Gen. i. We are fully convinced that\nin each case it denotes the origination of a new entity--a real addition\nto the sum of existence.\n\nFIRST ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 1): \"_In the beginning God created_\n[\u05d0\u05d4 = _the substance or essence of_] _the heavens and the\nearth._\" This is the reading of Parkhurst's Hebrew Grammar (1813), which\nhas since that time been approved by able lexicographers and\ncommentators. Some of these authorities have been already presented to\nthe reader.[202] But even aside from philological considerations, the\ncontext forbids us to regard _bara_ here as denoting \"formation,\" for\nthe product of that creative act was \"_formless_ and\n_matter-less_;\"[203] that is, it was homogeneous, non-differentiated,\nstructureless, and destitute of all sensible quality--an abyss of\ndarkness and death, exhibiting that sole condition of matter, \"perhaps\nits only true indication, namely, _inertia_.\"[204] The first created\nelement was the single omnipresent fluid _Ether_, out of which all gross\nmatter was built by the action of force. As we advance in this\ndiscussion we shall find that this is an opinion which is entertained by\nthe first physicists of the age, as, for example, Thomson, Tait,\nMaxwell, Challis, in England, and Norton and Hinrich in America.\n\nSECOND ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 21): \"_And God created the great monsters,\nand every living soul_ [\u05e0\u05b6\u05e4\u05b6\u05e9\u05c1 \u05d4\u05b7\u05d9\u05b8\u05bc\u05d4 = _soul of life_] _that moveth._\"\n\nThe first created animals are here most carefully denoted as \"living\nsouls,\" evidently to distinguish the life now first manifested in nature\nfrom the molecular, \"bioplasmic\" life which organizes the vegetable\ncell, and builds up the tissues of the animal body. The life here\nindicated has an _individuality_ which separates it from the universal\nlife of nature. There is now an immaterial entity--a soul, which is an\nindividualized and indivisible centre of force, a soul which has\nsensation, feeling, perception, and memory, none of which are properties\nof matter or products of organization. The animal soul is not material,\nneither is it a function or phenomenon of organized matter; it is a\ncreation, and therefore _bara_ is here significantly employed to denote\nthe origination of something new; a new power or principle is here\ninserted into the sphere of existing nature.\n\nThe second created entity is animal life--_Soul_--somatic life as\ndistinct and distinguishable from vegetable, molecular, bioplasmic life.\n\nTHIRD ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 27): \"_And God created man in his own image,\nin the image of God created He him._\"\n\nThe entire paragraph (vers. 26-29) is obviously the record of a\nsupernatural origination. There is a significance even in the change of\nthe _creative_ word. In regard to prior and inferior existences the\nlanguage is, \"Let the earth bring forth!\" \"Let the waters bring forth!\"\nas though there were some parturient power in nature, or as though\nnature co-operated with and furnished the conditions and means of the\nDivine efficiency. But when man is to be created the language is, \"Let\nus make man;\" thus placing the origin of man outside the chain of\nphysical causation, and ascribing it to the immediate agency of God.\nBesides, the creation here spoken of is the production of a _spiritual_,\nnot a material entity. \"God created man in _his own image_.\" This\ncreation can not be a formation out of a pre-existent matter, for no\nform of matter can possibly bear any resemblance to God (Acts xvii. 29).\n\"God is _spirit_\" and man can be like God only in so far as he is\nendowed with a spiritual nature. Spirit alone can bear the image of God.\nWhatever may be the teaching of Genesis as to the origin of the human\nbody, be it a formation or a development, there is no uncertainty in its\nlanguage as to the origin of the human spirit. It is an inbreathing from\nGod. It proceeded directly from Him. By no mere figure of speech, but by\na Divine reality God is \"the Father of spirits,\" and man is the\noffspring and the image of God. This likeness of God lifts man out of\nthe sphere of mere nature--it sets him apart in the essential\ncharacteristics and endowments of his being as _above_ nature, and in\nsome sense _divine_.\n\nThe third created entity is _Spirit_; spirit with its reason, its\nliberty, its conscience, its susceptibility of Divine inspiration, its\ncapacity for endless progression in knowledge and love.\n\nHere, then, are three entities, _matter_, _life_, and _mind_ (= body,\nsoul, and spirit), which had their beginning in an act of absolute\ncreation, and are therefore to be regarded as primordial things.[205]\nTheir existence is the necessary condition of all subsequent formative\nand developing production, inasmuch as all formation supposes a\nsomething to be formed, and all evolution a something involved. These\nprimordial entities are the substratum, or ground, of all the mediate\narchitectonic creation which is effected by the moving and informing\npresence and agency of the Spirit of God.\n\nThis leads us to the consideration of those creative words which are\n_formative_, and which always presuppose the existence of real entities\nas the condition of their efficiency; as, for example, \"Let there be\nlight;\" \"Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters;\" \"Let the\ndry land appear;\" \"Let there be luminaries in the expanse of heaven.\"\nAll the dividings, the gatherings, the organizings, the ordainings, and\ncollocations suppose the prior existence of matter.\n\nWe have seen that the first act of absolute creation--the beginning of\nall beginnings--was the origination of that mysterious entity which is\nthe recipient of impulse, or energy, and the physical substratum of all\nsensible phenomena. From this initial point, the first _formative_ act\nwas \"the moving or brooding of the Spirit of God upon the face of the\nabyss.\" All the qualities which matter presents to the senses, all\nphysical phenomena, are the result of this action of the Deity upon\nmatter--that is, _they are all manifestations of force_.[206] \"By\nvarious motions of the nature of eddies (vortices) the qualities of\ncohesion, elasticity, hardness, weight, mass, or other universal\nproperties of matter, are given to small portions of the fluid [ether]\nwhich constitute the _chemical atoms_, and these by modifications in\ntheir combination, form, and movement produce all the accidental\nphenomena of _gross matter_; and the primary fluid by other motions\ntransmits light, radiant heat, magnetism, and gravitation.\"[207]\n\nThe first distinct creative formation was _molecular_ and _radiant\nenergy_. \"And God said, Let there be light.\" By this \"light\" we are not\nto understand light in its technical sense as distinguished from heat,\nbut rather as including heat, such light, in fact, as we meet with in\nnature in the light of the sun, the same Hebrew word (\u05d0\u05d5\u05b9\u05e8) being\nused for both.\n\nThe second distinct creative formation was that wonderful mechanical\ncombination of chemical elements we call the _atmosphere_. \"And God\nsaid, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the vapors, and let it be\na division of vapors from vapors.\" The Creator has endowed the oxygen\nand nitrogen of the atmosphere with the power of retaining the aeriform\ncondition under all circumstances, while the aqueous vapor is liable to\nvery great fluctuation. Were there no air surrounding the globe, the\nquantity of vapor would adjust itself almost instantaneously to any\nvariation of temperature, and the maximum amount possible would always\nbe present at any given place; there could then be no clouds and no\ngenial showers of diffusive rain. \"An elevation of temperature would be\nattended by rapid evaporation, and the amount of water required to fill\nthe space would suddenly flash into vapor; while, on the other hand, a\ncorresponding depression of temperature would be accompanied by an\nequally sudden precipitation of the aqueous vapor, not in genial\nshowers, but terrific torrents.... The drops, falling without\nresistance, would be as destructive in their effects as volleys of\nleaden shot.\"[208] The presence of a dense medium, such as the\natmosphere, retards these sudden changes, and determines the formation\nof clouds. Thus \"the expanse\" is admirably adapted to the creative\npurposes of \"_dividing_ the waters from the waters.\"\n\nThe third creative formation was the _chemical compounds_ and their\nmolar aggregation in land and seas. \"And God said, Let the waters below\nthe expanse be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry ground\nappear.\" The chemical reactions, crystallizations, precipitations, and\nsedimentary accumulations involved in the creative formation are\nadmirably sketched in Ch. VI. of Dr. Winchell's \"Sketches of Creation.\"\nThe transmutation of the primary fluid into gross matter was something\nmore than a natural evolution--it was a \"_creative_ action,\"[209] and\nthe exact numerical proportions in which the chemical elements combine\nmust be the result of a distinct creative impulse.\n\nThe fourth creative formation was _bioplasm_, or that vitalized germinal\nmatter which is instrumental in building up the tissues and organs of\nplants (and animals). \"And God said, Let the land sprout forth sprouts;\nherbs seeding seed, fruit-trees producing fruit after their kind wherein\nis their seed.\" The vital force which is concerned in the formation of\nbioplasm (vitalized matter) must be regarded as distinct, on the one\nhand, from the physical forces which are efficient in the combinations\nand aggregations of non-living matter,[210] and, on the other hand, from\nthat sentient, percipient, self-moving principle which constitutes the\nanimal soul. \"The 'life' of a man or an animal is very different from\nwhat is termed the 'life' of a white blood, or a mucus, or a pus\ncorpuscle; inasmuch as many hundreds of white blood corpuscles, or\nelemental units of the tissues, might die in man without affecting the\n'life' of the man; moreover the man himself might perish, and some of\nthe corpuscles remain alive.... By the _life_ of a man (or an animal)\nsomething very different is meant from what we understand by the life of\neach elemental unit of the organism, _and the difference is not merely\nof degree but of kind_.\"[211] Bioplasm, or cell-life, is generic;\nsoul-life is specific, individual, and indivisible. The former we regard\nas the direct effect of the Divine life, immanent in nature; the latter\nis an individualized centre of force, \"a delegation of Divine power\nunder limits of necessity.\" The physical forces are the action of God\n_upon_ matter, the vital force is the immanence of God _in_ matter. The\nfirst is mechanical, the second is vito-dynamical.\n\nThe fifth creative formation was the adjustment of the cosmical\nrelations of the heavenly bodies, and the establishment of such\natmospheric conditions as rendered the sun and moon the _luminaries_, or\nlight-bearers, to the earth. \"And God said, Let there be luminaries in\nthe expanse of heaven to divide the day and night.\" What these\nadjustments and collocations were, we are not able to say. The ultimate\ncause of the sun's luminosity is yet an unsolved problem. No explanation\nthus far offered has been accepted as adequate by the majority of\nscientific men. The statement of Genesis, which ascribes \"the\nappointment of the sun and moon to be light-bearers to the earth\" to a\ndistinct creative formation of some kind, is not, therefore, invalidated\nby science.\n\nThe sixth creative formation was the _material organisms_ of the varied\nspecies of \"living souls\" which people the _waters_; the seventh, of\nthose which people the _air_; the eighth, of those which people the\n_land_. The final creative formation was the body of man, into which God\nbreathed the breath of _lives_, and in consequence of which he became\nnot merely a living soul, but a spiritual personality, a _spirit-being_.\n\nThe question whether the material organisms in which the varied species\nof \"living souls\" are embodied were each the product of a special\ncreation, or whether later and higher organisms were derived from prior\nand lower organisms by \"filiation,\" so that \"new species are new\nbirths,\" is of little consequence to the interpretation of Genesis. The\nessential element of species is a _spiritual_ entity. Specific existence\nis a positive existence, an immaterial existence,[212] \"a soul of life.\"\n\"It is not,\" says Dr. Winchell, \"a primordial organic form: _it is the\nlife embodied within that form_--the principle which rules its\nexistence, moulds its features, determines its instincts, and conserves\nits specific and individual identity. It is the principle embodied in\nthe ovum--often a mere microscopic organism--which unfailingly holds\nfast to the specific type, and through all embryonic and immature\nexistence guides the progress of development in one direction, toward\none end. Here is more than matter: here is a power which controls\nmatter, controls chemistry--manifests its superiority to body, and\nasserts its dignity as spirit.\" The establishment of a genetic\nconnection from the lowest to the highest material organism would not\ndecide the question as to \"the origin of species.\" The origin of species\nlies back of all material organisms. The species is a \"spiritual germ,\"\nwhich acts upon and fashions the material elements, and through them\nexpresses its own characteristics. That therefore which constitutes man\na distinct species is not to be sought in anatomical peculiarities, but\nin spiritual attributes. It is the image of God and the inspiration of\nGod which lifts man out of mere animal nature and makes him a _peculiar\nspecies_--\"one genus, and that genus the only one of the order.\"[213]\nNor would this title be affected by any theory about the mode of the\ncreation of his body. There would be nothing more derogatory to\nOmnipotence, or even to human nature, in the conjecture that man did not\nbecome \"a living personal spirit\" until he had passed through various\nstages of animal life, than in the doctrine that he was fashioned\nimmediately out of the dust of the earth. There is as much dignity, or,\nif the reader please, as much humility of origin in the one case as in\nthe other. The former is an extraordinary birth, consequent on some\nmysterious action of the Deity on the course of nature; the latter is a\nmiraculous formation. The Hebrew text is as favorable to the one\nhypothesis as to the other. The preposition \"of,\" or \"out of,\" is not\nauthorized by the original. Dr. Whedon reads the whole passage as\nfollows: \"And God developed [\u05d5\u05b7\u05d9\u05b4\u05bc\u05d9\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8] the man--dust of the earth--and\nbreathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, and the man became to a\nliving person.\"[214] If the body of the second Adam, the Divine Man, was\na birth (a miraculous birth), we do not see that any one need be shocked\nat the suggestion that the body of the first Adam was also an\nextraordinary or supernatural birth. Science may have free scope to\nsettle the problem on purely inductive grounds.\n\nThe following scheme will exhibit our conception of the cumulative\ncharacter of the creative development:\n\n ORIGINATIONS.|(\u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0)                |FORMATIONS (\u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4 = \u05d9\u05b4\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8).\n              |                     |\n Primal       |\"The Spirit of God   |\n Element.     |MOVED _upon_ the face|\n              |  of the abyss.\"     |\n              |                     |\n              |MECHANICAL}..........|ENERGY.\n              |FORCE,    }          |\n              |     .               |\n              |       .             |{ Vortex  }\n              |         .           |{ Motion, } CHEMICAL ATOMS.\n              |           .         |{\n              |             .       |{Molecular} SENSIBLE AND\n              |               .     |{ Energy, } LATENT HEAT.\n  ETHER.......|.....................|{ Radiant }\n              |                     |{ Energy, } RADIANT HEAT AND LIGHT.\n              |                     |{\n              |                     |{ Molar   {AIR,\n              |                     |{ Energy, {WATER,\n              |                     |          {LAND and SEAS.\n              |                     |\n              |VITAL FORCE..........|Vitality.....BIOPLASM = PLANTS.\n              |                     |\\_________  __________/\n              |                     |          \\/\n              |                     |           .     {MOLLUSKS,\n              |                     |             .   {FISHES,\n LIVING}......|.....................|................ {REPTILES,\n SOUL, }      |                     |                 {BIRDS,\n              |                     |                 {MAMMALS,\n              |                     |                  \\__  __/\n              |                     |                     \\/\n              |                     |                      |..}\n RATIONAL}....|.....................|.........................}MAN.\n SPIRIT, }    |  INSPIRATION.       |\n\n3. _Creation was consecutive._ The creative epochs follow each other in\na manifest Order of Thought. The reasons for this order are obvious on\nthe face of the sacred narrative, so that we are constrained to regard\nthe creative process as the realization of a purpose, the development\nof a foreseen and predetermined plan.\n\nThis is clearly manifest from the aptly styled \"pauses of contemplation\"\nwhich occur in the progress of the sacred narrative. At each stage of\nthe creative work the Deity is represented as surveying that already\nfinished, and pronouncing it \"_good_\" (\u05d8\u05d5\u05b9\u05d1 = \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd, fair and good). This\nmay seem strange when viewed apart from the completed plan. What good,\none might ask, is the light when there is no eye to see? What good the\nexpanse of heaven, the land and seas, with none to inhabit them? What\ngood the plants with none to use them? But the Intelligence that foresaw\nthe end toward which the creative process was tending could recognize\nthe fitness and the beauty of each new element of creation as\ncontributing to that completed whole, which, when realized, is\npronounced \"_very good_.\" Thus each stage of the advancing work of\ncreation is pronounced \"good\" in view of its subordination to the\nultimate purpose, which is the highest \"good.\" Each is a step upward and\nonward, and is \"good\" as a preparation and a means for a better that is\nyet to come. Thus the reading of the sacred Hymn of Creation leaves the\ndecided impression that a chain of subordination and interdependence\nruns through the entire organic and inorganic creation, binding the\nwhole together in an ideal unity. All the laws and results of the past\nare brought forward, and become a prelude and a preparation for the\nfuture developments. The earlier stages of the creation furnish the\nconditions for the later stages, and are in some sense a prophecy of\nwhat is to come. The successive stages of creation are thus results, in\npart, of a \"nature\"--a constitution and order of things already\nestablished, and in part of a new impulse carrying nature forward toward\nthe predestinated goal.\n\nThe more extended our acquaintance with the actual economy of nature,\nthe more does the subordination and interdependence of the creative\nepochs become manifest, and the more are we convinced that \"the law of\nconsecution\" which reveals itself in the sacred narrative is a real law\nof the universe.\n\nThe existence of radiant energy (heat and light), is the fundamental\nprecondition of all the subsequent creative formations. It is more\nuniversal than gravitation, and absolutely co-extensive with the\nuniverse,[215] the connecting bond between all worlds. It determines the\ntemperature of space, of the atmosphere, and of the earth, and, in fact,\nmost of the phenomena of meteorology. It is essential to the life and\ngrowth of the plant, and ultimately of the animal; without it, indeed,\nno life could exist upon the earth. Next in importance is the\natmosphere, which has peculiar relations to light and heat. It softens\nthe intensity of light, and diffuses it in every direction; it absorbs\nand retains heat, and, infolding the earth as with a mantle, keeps it\nwarm. It conditions the formation of clouds, and determines the fall of\ngenial showers. It is the medium in which combustion and change, and all\nthe phenomena of life, take place. Its oxygen has been the chief\nworld-builder, and its nitrogen has been aptly styled the _zo\u00f6gen_ or\ngenerator of life. The gathering of the waters into lakes and seas, the\nphenomena of aqueous circulation, the formation of soils through its\nagency--these were all preconditions of vegetable life. \"Reasoning\ndeductively, it is equally presumable that vegetable life preceded\nanimal life in order of appearance.... Vegetation is capable of drawing\nits sustenance from the mineral world, while animals rely exclusively\nupon organic food. The vegetable stands between the animal and the\nmineral, performing a sort of commissary function in behalf of the\nanimal. The animal--even the carnivorous animal--implies the vegetable.\nAll things considered, we are led to believe that plant life had a\nhistory upon our earth a full epoch before the existence of\nanimals.\"[216] Finally, all geological preparations and ideas converge\nin man. \"The beneficent provisions of the earth's crust not only\nprophesy man, but they reach their finality in man. It was only for\nhuman uses that the coal was treasured in the recesses of the earth; for\nhuman uses alone the mountains have lifted up their burdens of iron; for\nhuman uses only the grandest movements of geological history elaborated\nand distributed the soils. It is only for man that the forests yield\ntheir abundant supplies of timber and fuel. For man the edible and\nmedicinal vegetables were provided. For man the natures of the domestic\nanimals were moulded, and their domestic attachments are directed to no\nother being.\"[217] Thus through the long ages of geological time the\nearth was preparing for the dwelling-place of man, and in the earliest\nforms of animal life his coming was prefigured and foretold.\n\n4. _The completed creation is a Divine harmony._ This is the abiding\nimpression which the sublime Psalm of Creation leaves upon our minds as\nwe close the book. It has taught us this final lesson, that the universe\nis the manifestation of _one grand creative thought_, as comprehensive\nin the diversity of its parts as it is complete in the unity of its\nplan. We learn, not merely that God made all the parts of the universe,\nbut that He made each part for a specific purpose, and that all the\nseparate and successive parts are chords in nature's music, parts of\ncreation's anthem of perpetual praise. The Symbolical Hymn of Creation,\nwith its striking parallelisms, its balance and correlation of parts,\nits harmonic numbers (3 and 7 and 10, the symbols of perfection), its\npauses and refrains, its rhythm and unity symbolizes the universal\nprevalence of _Law_ in nature; reveals a changeless _Order_ in respect\nto space and time, to number and form; suggests harmonious _relations_\nbetween terrestrial conditions and cosmical adjustments, between organic\nand inorganic existence, and accords with the wonderful rhythm which\npervades the Cosmos.\n\nThe glorious mansion is first built, then furnished. A triad of days is\ndevoted to its architecture, a triad to its occupants. The former\ndescribes a series of _dividings_ and _combinings_, the latter portrays\na series of _formations_ and _vivifications_. \"The last day of each era\nincludes one work typical of the era, and another related to it in\nessential points, but also prophetic of the future. Vegetation, while,\nfor physical reasons, a part of the creation of the third day, was also\nprophetic of the future Organic era, in which the progress of life was\nthe grand characteristic. The record thus accords with the fundamental\nprinciple in history that the characteristic of an age has its\nbeginnings within the age preceding. So, again, man, while like other\nmammals in structure, even to the homologies of every bone and muscle,\nwas endowed with a spiritual nature which looked forward to another era,\nthat of spiritual existence. The seventh \"day,\" the day of rest from the\nwork of creation, is man's period of preparation for that new existence,\nand it is to promote this special end that, in strict parallelism, the\nSabbath follows man's six days of work.\"[218]\n\nThe following scheme will exhibit the completeness of the parallelism:\n\n      INORGANIC ERA.                ORGANIC ERA.\n\n   I. Day.....LUMINOSITY.     IV. Day....LUMINARIES\n\n  II. Day....{WATER,           V. Day...{MARINE ANIMALS, REPTILES,\n             {ATMOSPHERE.               {BIRDS.\n\n III. Day.....DRY LAND        VI. Day....MAMMALS\n\n              VEGETATION.                MAN.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNOTE.\n\n_The Principle of Teleology not affected by the Theory of\nEvolution._--\"It is necessary to remark that there is a wider teleology\nwhich is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based\nupon the fundamental proposition of evolution.... The teleological and\nthe mechanical views of nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive;\non the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more\nfirmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all\nthe phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more\ncompletely thereby is he at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always\ndefy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not\n_intended_ to evolve the phenomena of the universe.\"--Prof. Huxley, in\n_The Academy_ for October, 1869, No. 1, p. 13.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nCONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.\n\n\"The relations which unite the creature and the Creator compose a\nproblem obscure and delicate, the two extreme solutions of which are\nequally false and perilous: on the one hand, a God so passes into the\nworld that He seems to be absorbed in it; on the other hand, a God so\nseparated from the world, that the world has the appearance of going on\nwithout Him; on both sides there is equal excess, equal danger, equal\nerror.\"--COUSIN.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapters we have endeavored to present the Christian\ndoctrine concerning God, and concerning the world as the work of God.\nGod is a _person_--the unconditioned Personality, all of whose\ndeterminations are from Himself. And creation is the voluntary act of\nGod, who freely chooses to award existence to other beings distinct from\nHimself. If our scientific conceptions are in harmony with this\ndoctrine, we are safe from the temptations of materialism on the one\nhand, and proof against the seductions of pantheism on the other.\nHenceforth we must regard the unconditioned Being as essentially\ndistinct from the material universe. Matter with its phenomena is\nlimited in extent and duration, God is infinite and eternal. Extension\nis not an attribute of the Divine substance. Succession is not a mode of\nGod's eternity. The Divine life infinitely transcends the dynamical life\nof the universe.\n\nStill there is some connection, some relation between God and the world.\nOf this we have the fullest assurance, however incapable we may be of\ncomprehending the mode. The material universe is the product of the\nDivine efficiency, and therefore the first and most fundamental relation\nof God to the world is that of _causality_. The universe exists solely\nthrough the will of God. It had a beginning, and the beginning of the\nworld was the beginning of time. Prior to that beginning there was no\nsuccession, no limitation, no finite existence; only the eternal and\ninfinite One. The creative efficiency was put forth, and matter, as the\nstatical condition necessary to the manifestation of physical phenomena,\nbegan to be. The Spirit of God moved upon the formless abyss, and\nphenomenal change commenced its history. With motion and consequent\nsuccession there arose the relations of time. With the differentiation\nand collocation of matter there arose the relations of space. And the\nwealth and fullness of inorganic and organic nature sprang up under the\ndirective, formative, and vitalizing energy of the Spirit of God.\n\nBut is there no further relation of God to the world, beyond that which\nis involved in the primary and solitary fact of creative causality? Did\nthe connection of God with his works terminate in an event which belongs\nto the inapproachable past? Did the Creator, in the beginning, give\nself-being to the substance of the universe, and endow it with active\nforces, so that it can exist and act apart from and independent of God?\nHave the laws of nature a real efficiency, so that the further agency of\nGod is dispensed with, and the universe can pursue a fixed and\ninevitable path of self-development without his control and oversight?\nOr is God still immanent in nature, upholding all substance, the power\nof all force, the life of all life, shaping all forms, and organizing\nall systems? In a word, has the Divine efficiency remained, since the\nfirst creative act, in sublime repose, or does \"the Father work\nhitherto,\" sustaining, moving, vitalizing, and perfecting the\nuniverse--the _Conservator_, as well as the Creator, of all things? This\nis the living question of our times, whether viewed from the scientific\nor the theological stand-point. The mental posture we assume in relation\nto this question must determine our systems of philosophy and religion.\n\nThe language of Scripture on this point is direct and explicit, and\nunless our interpretation thereof needs to be modified in order to place\nit in harmony with the general spirit and tenor of Christian teaching,\nor with the unquestionable facts of nature, which are also a revelation\nof God, there can be no difficulty in determining the Christian doctrine\nof God's relation to the world. It teaches us, not only that all things\nwere made by God, but that all things are _sustained_ by God. God is\nstill the first and immediate cause of all existence. \"He giveth to all\nlife, and breath, and all things\" (Acts xvii. 25). The created universe\nis in complete and ceaseless dependence on the Divine causality; it\nconsists by the same will and the same word by which it was first\noriginated. He who made all things, continues to \"uphold all things by\nthe word of his power\" (Heb. i. 3). \"He is before all things, and by Him\nall things consist\" (Col. i. 17). The universe is not self-existent, nor\nself-evolved, neither has it any inherent power of self-perpetuation.\nNotwithstanding the individuality and self-life conceded to the\ncreature, it has no independent existence apart from God, \"for of Him,\nand through Him, and for Him are all things, to whom be glory forever.\"\n(Rom. xi. 36.)\n\nThe recognition of a real presence of God in nature, and of the\nimmediate agency of God in the production of all natural phenomena, has\nbeen a characteristic of the religious consciousness in all ages. This\nconsciousness of the presence of God embracing and sustaining all\nworldly being is, in fact, an essential content of all vital piety. \"It\nis only a mechanical deism, a barren rationalistic theology, or a piety\nmeagre in the last degree, which has interposed a chasm between God and\nhis creatures.\" The religious spirit is remarkably developed in the\nPsalms of David, and here all the operations of nature are spoken of as\nthe operations of Deity. The thunder is \"the voice of God.\" The\nlightnings are \"his arrows.\" The earthquakes and volcanoes are produced\ndirectly by Him. \"He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth; He toucheth\nthe hills, and they smoke.\" \"He giveth snow like wool, He scattereth the\nhoar-frost like ashes, He casteth forth his ice like morsels; who can\nstand before his cold? He causeth his winds to blow, and the waters\nflow.\" \"He covereth the heavens with clouds, He prepareth rain for the\nearth.\" \"He watereth the hills from his chambers, the earth is satisfied\nwith the fruit of his work.\" \"He causeth grass to grow for the cattle,\nand herb for the service of man.\" \"He giveth to the beast his food, and\nto the young ravens which cry.\" \"All creatures wait upon Him, and He\ngiveth them their meat in due season. He openeth his hand, they are\nfilled with good. He hideth his face, and they are troubled. He taketh\naway their breath, they die and return to the dust. _He sendeth forth\nhis Spirit, and they are created_; and He reneweth the face of the\nearth.\" To the eye of the inspired writer, the agency of God is\nconcerned in every process and every product of nature. \"There are\ndiversities of operations, but _it is the same God who worketh all in\nall_.\" His will and his power are the only real forces in nature.\n\nThe interpretation which the Church has given of this teaching of the\nSacred Scriptures has been remarkably uniform through the ages. She has\nalways taught that the continuance of the world, no less than its\norigination, has its ground in the Divine causality; and every theory of\nthe relation of God to the world which has sacrificed the doctrine of\nthe all-embracing, all-sustaining presence of God in the universe, as an\nimmediate and real efficiency, has always been rejected as Pelagian,\nRationalistic, or Deistic. The conception of the Divine conservation of\nthe world as the simple, uniform, and universal agency of God sustaining\nall created substances and powers in every moment of their existence and\nactivity, is the catholic doctrine of Christendom. In attempting the\ndifficult, perhaps impossible task of conceiving the _mode_ of this\nDivine conservation, different theories have been developed. But\nwhatever the conception formed, whether that of the Divine\n_co-operation_ (_concursus Dei generalis_), as taught by St. Augustine\nand the Schoolmen; or that of a Divine intermediate _impulse_ (_impulsus\nnon cogens_), as taught by Luther; or that of the Divine _sustentation_\n(_sustentatio Dei_), as held by the Arminians; or even that of the\n_superintendence_ and _control_ of the Deity, as adopted by some modern\nreligious scientists,[219] they all repose on the ultimate truth that\nwhatever is created can have no necessary or independent existence; the\nsame power which called it into being must continue to uphold it in\nbeing; and were God to withdraw his conserving efficiency the creature\nwould be immediately annihilated.[220]\n\nSt. Augustine, \"the father of systematic theology,\" conceived the Divine\nconservation of the world as a _continual creation_ (_creatio\ncontinua_). He taught that the life and activity of the creatures,\ncollectively and individually, are ceaselessly and absolutely dependent\non and conditioned by the almighty and omnipresent agency of God. \"Were\nHe to withdraw from the world his creative power, it would straightway\nlapse into nothingness.\"[221] Thomas Aquinas, \"the Angelical Doctor,\"\nwho is regarded as having brought Scholastic theology to its highest\ndevelopment, held the same views on this subject as Augustine. He taught\nthat \"preservation is an ever-renewed creation.\"[222] All creaturely\ncauses derive their efficiency directly and continually from the First\nCause.[223]\n\nTheological writers of more recent times have assented to these views\nwith notable uniformity. Dr. Samuel Clarke, the intimate friend of\nNewton, whose \"Lectures on the Being and Attributes of God,\" and on the\n\"Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion,\" secured for him a European\nrenown as a Christian philosopher, states the doctrine of the immediate\nagency of the Deity with remarkable explicitness. \"All things that are\ndone in the world are done either immediately by God Himself, or by\ncreated intelligent beings. Matter being evidently not capable of any\nlaws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence,\nexcept only this one negative power, that every part of it will of\nitself always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or\nmotion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we\ncommonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of\nmotion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will\nspeak strictly and properly) _the effect of God's acting upon matter\ncontinually and every moment_, either immediately by Himself, or\nmediately by some created intelligent beings.... Consequently there is\nno such thing as what we commonly call the _course of nature_, or the\n_power of nature_. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is\nnothing else but the will of God, producing certain effects in a\ncontinued, regular, constant, and uniform manner.\"[224]\n\nDr. Clarke may properly be regarded as the representative of the\nmetaphysico-theological thought of the seventeenth century. No apology\nis needed at this hour for presenting John Wesley as the best\nrepresentative of the evangelical movement of the eighteenth century\nwhich adhered firmly to the _ipsissima verba_ of the sacred writers. He\nexpresses the evangelical conception with admirable clearness and force:\n\"God is also the supporter of all the things which He has made. He\nbeareth, upholdeth, sustaineth all created things by the word of his\npower; by the same powerful word which brought them out of nothing. As\nthis was absolutely necessary for the beginning of their existence, it\nis equally so for the continuance of it; were his almighty influence\nwithdrawn, they could not subsist a moment longer.... He preserves them\nin their several relations, connections, and dependencies, so as to\ncompose one system of beings, to form one entire universe, according to\nthe counsel of his will.... He is the true author of all the motion in\nthe universe. All matter of whatever kind is absolutely and totally\n_inert_. It does not, can not in any case move itself.... Neither the\nsun, moon, nor stars move themselves. _They are moved every moment by\nthe Almighty hand that made them._\"[225] These views are earnestly\nmaintained by Nitzsch and M\u00fcller, Chalmers and Harris, Young and Whedon,\nChanning and Martineau.\n\nThe religious life of the present age, in all its purest and most\nvigorous manifestations, still clings with passionate ardor to the\nbelief that God is every where present, and that the ceaseless, uniform,\nand direct agency of God is still upholding, moving, vivifying, and\ncontrolling all things. The harp of David is restrung and swept with a\nfirmer hand. It rings with nobler conceptions, and swells into diviner\nharmonies. God is recognized as \"_above_ all, _through_ all, and _in_\nall.\" \"In Him we live and move, and have our being.\" The Christian\nstill believes, with a fuller and richer assurance, that God's\npresence--\n\n    \"Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze.\n    Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees.\"\n\nHe still hears the voice of God in the thunder at midnight, and in the\nrustling of the forest leaves at noonday. He sees the beauty of God in\n\"the silent faces of the clouds,\" and in the virgin blush of the\nsolitary flower. He sees the life of God in the activities of organic\nnature, and marks his power and presence in the falling rain and\nnoiseless dew, the flowing river and the restless ocean. The seasons, as\nthey come round to him in their grateful vicissitudes, bring to him\nfresh tokens of the goodness of God, and inspire him with perennial joy.\n\n    \"These as they change, Almighty Father, these\n    Are but the varied God. The rolling year\n    Is full of Thee....\n    But wandering oft, with brute, unconscious gaze,\n    Man marks not Thee, marks not the mighty hand\n    That, ever busy, wheels the silent spheres;\n    Works in the secret deep; shoots, steaming, thence\n    The fair profusion that o'erspreads the spring;\n    Flings from the sun direct the flaming day;\n    Feeds every creature, hurls the tempest forth;\n    And, as on earth this grateful change revolves,\n    With transport touches all the springs of life.\"[226]\n\nA discussion of the Christian doctrine of the relation of God to the\nworld can scarcely be regarded as adequate and complete which keeps not\nconstantly in view the theories of certain \"advanced thinkers\" that\nconflict with the views here presented. We do not now refer to the\nextreme opinions of the Atheists, who deny the existence of God,\nproclaim the eternity of matter, and regard force as an inherent and\nessential attribute of matter, by which all the phenomena of nature and\nhumanity are necessarily evolved; nor of the Pantheists, on the other\nhand, who deny the personality of God, and represent the Deity as an\neternal _natura naturans_, which by a spontaneous and unconscious\ndevelopment is forever emerging as the _natura naturata_. For these\nthinkers there can be no conceivable Providence. \"Science has shown us\nthat we are under the dominion of general laws, and that there is no\nspecial Providence. Nature acts with fearful uniformity; stern as fate,\nabsolute as a tyrant, merciless as death; too vast to praise; too\ninexplicable to worship; too inexorable to propitiate; it has no ear for\nprayer, no heart for sympathy, no arm to save.\"[227]\n\nAt present we are to deal with the theories of a class of scientists who\nbelieve in the existence of God--of a personal God, and who profess the\ngreatest reverence for the Sacred Scriptures, but whose God is clearly\nnot the God the Bible reveals. This general class of thinkers may be\nsubdivided into subordinate schools, as they verge toward one or the\nother of the extremes above indicated.\n\n1. One school is represented by such writers as Prof. Tyndall, Dr. H.\nBence Jones, and Dr. Bastian. Their fundamental principle is \"the\nabsolute inseparability of matter and force;\" consequently they do not\nrecognize the Divine Will as the sole and immediate cause of the motion\nand life of the universe. Molecular attractions and repulsions are the\nprimal forces communicated to matter at the Creation, and from \"the\nself-activity of these primary forces\" result all the forms of energy in\nnature, whether organic or inorganic. \"Our idea of the grandeur, the\nunity, and the power of the first cause,\" writes Dr. H. Bence Jones,\n\"will surely not be lessened if we can show that one law of the union of\nmatter and force and of the conservation of energy obtains throughout\nthe organic as well as the inorganic creation.\"[228] Here we have a\nclose approximation, if not intentionally, yet logically, to the\nAtheistic extreme. The transition seems easy, if not inevitable, to the\nrecognition of force as an inherent and necessary attribute of matter\nwhich _may_ be eternal. Then what need of a God, or what place for one,\nif the forces and laws of matter are adequate to the explanation of all\nphenomena? As Martineau aptly suggests, \"These properties and powers\nonce installed in the cosmic executive are too apt, like mayors of the\npalace, to set up for themselves,\" and eject the real Lord and God.\n\n2. Another school is represented by such men as Professors Owen, Huxley,\nand Baden Powell, who deny the ultimate distinction between matter and\nforce, and regard both as phenomenal manifestations of some \"unknown\nsubstratum\"--a supramaterial PHYSIS (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) which is identical with the\nDivine substance, the _natura naturans_ of Spinoza. To these minds the\nuniverse discloses nothing but immutable law, absolute continuity, and\nnecessary development. \"The grand principle of the _self-evolving powers\nof nature_\"[229] and \"the grand inductive conclusion of universal and\n_eternal_ order,\"[230] are the bases of all rational theology. Here we\nencounter a phase of thought which verges toward the extreme of\nPantheism. The Deity himself is conditioned in his action by the eternal\nand immutable laws of nature, and can not be conceived as a living Will\nexercising control over and subordinating these laws to higher moral\nideas and ends. This doctrine, Prof. Powell admits, \"summarily overrides\nthe Mosaic creation, renders miracles irrational, excludes a special\nprovidence, and, we may add, dismisses prayer as a useless absurdity.\"\n\n3. A third and intermediate school assumes the existence of a plastic\nnature (_vis formativa_) intermediate between the Creator and his work,\nby which the phenomena of nature are produced. This hypothesis was\npropounded by Cudworth, and has lately been reproduced by Dr. Laycock\nand Mr. Murphy under the name of \"unconscious organizing intelligence,\"\nto explain those facts of organic nature which come under the relation\nof means and ends, or structure and function. This hypothesis must\ndeflect toward one or other of the extremes indicated, when it attempts\nto decide in what subject this \"unconscious intelligence\" inheres. If it\nbe said that it inheres in matter, the tendency must be toward Atheism:\nthat it inheres in spirit, then the tendency is toward Pantheism.\n\nCommon to all these hypotheses is the denial of the direct, immediate,\nand voluntary agency of God in nature as _the only real and efficient\nforce_. They are all attempts to account for the conservation of the\nworld by \"the conservation and transformation of energy,\" that is, by\nsecondary causes, which in reality are only conditions and not real\ncauses. They interpose a chasm between God and the world. The universe\nis a self-supporting, self-evolving machine, and God is an isolated,\nincommunicable abstraction.\n\nIt is to be deplored that certain Christian writers have deemed it\nnecessary, on what they consider moral grounds, to give countenance to\ntheories which in one form or another ascribe a real efficiency to\nnatural laws, and dispense with the immediate and ceaseless agency of\nGod in the conservation of the world. They imagine that some such\nhypothesis is needed to vindicate the Divine honor and righteousness. In\ntheir imagination, it derogates from the Divine majesty to be\nceaselessly concerned and busied with the minute and insignificant\noperations of nature, or even cognizant of them. His eternal serenity\nwould be disturbed, and his unsullied purity compromised by any\nconnection therewith, and He would become responsible for the disorders\nand abnormities, the evils and sufferings, which appear in the world. He\nmust, therefore, be released from a constant and direct connection with\nthe universe. He must leave nature to the necessary predestinated course\nof self-evolution, or, if He interpose at all, it must be in some\nexceptional, extraordinary, and supernatural way; so that, if there be a\nprovidential administration, every act and incident thereof must be a\n_miracle_.\n\nWe respect the motives, but we can not approve the procedure or commend\nthe logic of these theologians. The moral difficulties they would by\nthese hypotheses evade still remain in all their force. \"Any hypothesis\nwhich essays to relieve these difficulties from pressing against\nProvidence only transfers and leaves them to press with equal force\nagainst an original creation.\"[231] The Supreme Intelligence which\noriginally endowed matter with its properties, and ordained the laws of\nforce, must have foreseen all possible combinations, interactions, and\nconsequences, and, if it be proper to speak of responsibilities in this\nconnection, must be as responsible for these consequences as though they\nwere the direct effect of immediate volition. An agent is accountable\nnot only for his acts, but for all the foreseen consequences of his\nacts. The solution of these difficulties must be sought in another\nfield.\n\nMeantime it may be observed that these theologians affect a concern for\nthe Divine honor which even revelation itself does not confess. It\nteaches that all the operations of nature are the operations of God, and\nno apologies are offered for consequences which, to short-sighted men,\nmay appear to conflict with righteousness or love. Does the earthquake\ntear the mountain asunder, and spread devastation and death throughout\nthe surrounding country? it is the Lord who roareth from Zion, and\nuttereth his voice from Jerusalem; He causeth the habitation of the\nshepherds to mourn, and the top of Carmel to wither.[232] The people bow\ntheir heads with reverence, and in their chastening sorrows see the hand\nof God. But these philosophic theologians must correct the language of\nScripture, and tone it down in harmony with the capricious demands of\nmodern scientists. The language of the ancient Prophet of God is simply\nthe expression of a childlike and subjective conception of nature which\nmodern science has emptied of all its significance. The earthquake was\nthe product of \"secondary causes\"--of inherent nature-forces which now\nexist and act independent of the agency and control of God. To maintain\nthe consistency of their hypothesis, they will even affirm that the\ncatastrophe was unforeseen, and did not come within the purview of the\ncreative plan. The exuberance of the Oriental imagination has thrown a\nhaze of unreality over all the descriptions of natural phenomena, and\ntherefore the language of the inspired Psalmist must be amended. When he\ntells us that God \"covereth the heavens with clouds, and prepareth rain\nfor the earth,\" we must paraphrase after the following fashion: \"In the\nbeginning God gave to water those properties, and determined those\ncosmical conditions which, when coincident, result in the formation of\nclouds and the descent of rain!\" This, we are told, is the\ninterpretation which modern science demands. Conservation is simply \"the\nindestructibility of matter and the persistence of force,\" and\nProvidence is \"the uniformity of natural law.\" We must no longer believe\nthat God is a present, immanent, and diffusive Power and Life in nature.\nTo find the connection between God and nature we must remount by a\nprocess of regressive thought to the first, and, indeed, the last act of\ncreation--the primal origination of matter and motion. So that if now\npiety would stand face to face with its supreme object, it is compelled\nto fling itself back into the abyss of duration, before the mountains\nwere brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were formed.\n\nPractically, this conception gives us a universe without a God; for the\nworld, once created, and stocked with the necessary forces and\nadjustments and laws, will henceforth govern itself. It will run its\npredestinated course in obedience to an original impulse, and realize a\nperpetual motion without further oversight or care or control. The world\nis a huge soulless machine, and theology is reduced to Mechanical Deism!\nBut surely no one pretends that this theory satisfies the demands of\nScripture language, and fills up the complement of its idea.\nPractically, it renders the Word of God of no effect.\n\nThis theory is equally inadequate to satisfy the cravings of the human\nheart. \"The heart demands a present God--a God who is never far from any\none of us; it demands the immediate presence and constant care of a\nheavenly Father; it demands, when it looks upon nature, to feel that God\nis there, not in his laws only, but in conscious and perpetual action;\nnot in the sense of a Wisdom and Goodness, embodied in arrangements\ncontrived and perfected long ago, as the mind of an artificer may be\nsaid to be present in the work of his hands, but in the sense of a Love\nco-present to every aspect of nature, and a Will inworking in every\nevent that takes place.\"[233] \"Reacting against the usurpation of\nsecondary causation, wearied of its distance from the Fountain-head, it\nflings itself back with pathetic repentance into the arms of the Primary\nInfinitude.\"\n\nThe relation of God to the world, however, is a problem which can not be\nsolved by an appeal to sentiment. The religious consciousness may be the\ncounter-proof, but it can not be the starting-point of a philosophy\nwhich aims at the explanation of things--that is, of their origin and\ncontinuance--by principles and ideas of the reason. For what is meant by\n_understanding_, but translation into ideas, and comprehending under\nnecessary principles? Any theory which essays such explanation of things\nmust therefore commend itself to the logical understanding, and be\ncapable of logical construction.\n\nNow the various hypotheses which seek to dispense with the immediate\nagency of God, and to explain the conservation of the world by\n\"secondary\" or natural agencies, when critically examined do not satisfy\nthe understanding. However convenient for the evasion of difficulties,\nhowever plausible for their simplicity and manageable clearness, on a\ncloser inspection they are found to be inadequate.\n\n1. _There is the hypothesis of natural law._ The world is governed by\ngeneral laws which are fixed and immutable. These laws were impressed\nupon matter at the beginning, and in obedience to them the universe has\ngradually evolved itself in rigid continuity and necessary order. No\nroom, therefore, is left for special direction or providential control,\nand if the term \"providence\" is at all permissible, it is only as a\nsynonym for natural law.\n\nIt is affirmed by the advocates of this hypothesis that \"the grand\nprinciple of the uniformity and constancy of natural causes is _a\nprimary law of belief_ so strongly entertained by the truly inductive\ninquirer that he can not conceive the _possibility_ of its\nfailure.\"[234] As science extends her domain and pushes her discoveries\ninto new regions, cases that once seemed anomalous are found to be\nconformable to this general rule, and therefore we are justified in\nassuming the absolute uniformity and inviolability of natural law\nthrough all the realms of time and space. Thus we reach \"the grand\ninductive conclusion of the universal and _eternal_ order of nature.\"\nBut an _overruling_ providence must step beyond _ordinary rule_: it must\ncontrol, interrupt, modify, or in some manner give a new direction to\nthe action of nature, and thus become _super_natural--that is,\nmiraculous. So that were we even to concede the phenomenal reality of\nthe miracles recorded in the New Testament, and to accept them as\n\"objects of faith, but not as the evidences of faith,\" still modern\nscience would forbid us to believe that any supernatural interposition\ncan _now_ take place. Not a single instance of counteraction or control\nof natural law can now be authenticated, and therefore we must regard\nspecial providence as incredible and impossible.\n\nThe first error, and indeed the fundamental error, of this hypothesis is\nthe assumption that the absolute uniformity and permanence of nature is\n\"_a primary law of belief_,\" and therefore the natural philosopher\n\"must set out with clear ideas of the _possible_ and the _impossible_.\"\n\nNow we grant that had we such _\u00e0 priori_ conviction of the permanence\nand immutability of nature, then it would be impossible to prove that\nthe order of nature had a beginning, or that there could be any\ninterference with the agencies or laws of nature by a supernatural\npower. \"No evidence adduced in favor of a creation or of Divine\ninterposition could ever be so strong as to overcome the necessary\nbelief in direct opposition to it.\"[235] But the truth is, we have no\nsuch intuitive conviction. Our belief has none of the characteristics of\nan _\u00e0 priori_ intuition: it is neither self-evident nor universal nor\nnecessary. John Stuart Mill has successfully shown that this belief is\nthe result of experience, that it is entertained only by the cultivated\nand educated few, and that even among such it has been of slow growth.\nTherefore he properly concludes that \"the uniformity in the succession\nof events ... must be received, _not as the law of the universe, but of\nthat portion only which is within the range of our means of\nobservation_, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent\ncases.\"[236]\n\nBelief in the uniformity of nature is an induction from _experience_,\nand not a primary intuition. And by the word experience, in this\nconnection, we must understand not the experience of one man only, or of\none generation, but the accumulated experience of mankind in all ages as\nregistered in books or transmitted by tradition. But how limited, at\nbest, is human experience--how circumscribed both in time and space!\nCompared with the vastness and duration of the universe, it is narrowed\ndown to a mere point. All experience, be it that of the individual or\nof mankind, is only finite. To infer a universal law from a limited\nnumber of instances is to violate to the uttermost the fundamental canon\nof logic that \"no conclusion must contain more than was contained in the\npremises from which it is drawn.\"[237] Inductive science can only give\nus the contingent and the relative, it can never attain to the necessary\nand the absolute. By abstraction, comparison, and generalization it may\nfurnish us with _general_ notions, but it can not give us _universal_\nprinciples. \"Experience can not conduct us to universal and necessary\ntruths--not to universal, because she has not tried all cases; not to\nnecessary, because necessity is not a matter to which experience can\ntestify.\"[238] The intuitive reason, we doubt not, is furnished with\nnecessary and universal principles which may illuminate the pathway of\nexperience, and give meaning and law to the facts of sensation, so that\nman may become \"the Interpreter of Nature;\" but certainly the absolute\nuniformity of nature is not one of these ideas.\n\nNotwithstanding the boasted mathematical precision of the inductive\nmethod, and the rigid exactness of its results, scientific men are not\nwholly exempt from the common infirmity of hasty generalization. They\nare perpetually liable to the temptation to draw immense conclusions\nfrom premises that are too narrow and inadequate. The history of science\nis a record of the correction of hasty generalizations by future\ndiscoveries, and leads to the final conviction that there are no laws of\nnature which can lay claim to absolute universality. Since the time of\nNewton, the law of gravitation has been regarded by many as strictly\nuniversal. But now we are told by Herschel that \"our evidence of the\nexistence of gravitation fails us beyond the region of the double stars,\nor leaves us at best only a _presumption_ amounting to moral conviction\nin its favor.\" Furthermore, in regard to the luminiferous ether, he\ntells us that \"we are freed from the necessity of any mental reference\nto the actual weight or specific gravity of the material, which in this\ncase is the more necessary, as, though we suppose the ethereal molecules\nto possess inertia, _we can not suppose them affected by the force of\ngravitation_.\" \"Beyond all doubt, the widest and most interesting\nprospect of future discovery ... is that distinction between\n_gravitating_ and _levitating_ matter, that positive and unrefutable\ndemonstration of the existence of a repulsive force ... enormously more\npowerful than the attractive force of gravity.\"[239]\n\nUntil recently the presence of free oxygen as the necessary condition of\nlife has been regarded as a universal biological law. \"But the latest\nresearches of Pasteur have shown that, so far from oxygen being\nessential to the life of the simplest living beings, there are certain\nforms of infusoria which not only pass their lives without oxygen, but\nare killed by its presence.\"[240]\n\nOther illustrations might be adduced, but these are sufficient for our\npurpose. The truth is, there is not a phenomenon known to man that can\nproperly be said to be the result of the action of _one_ invariable and\nuniversal force, not even the falling of a stone to the earth; for some\nforce must have previously been exerted to raise the stone from the\nearth, which force is represented by energy of position, or \"potential\nenergy.\"[241] And this potential energy is the exact numerical\nequivalent of the energy of motion which it acquires in falling--_i.\ne._, the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. Every event,\nevery change in nature, is due to \"some _variable_ combinations of\ninvariable forces.\"[242] Material causes are always complex. Every law\nof nature is liable to counteraction and modification by other laws, and\nthe most fundamental fact of the universe is that material forces are\nadjusted, combined, and modified in endless modes in order to the\nfulfillment of purposes and ends. The phenomena of life present a vast\nseries of such adjustments and modifications. The mechanical and\nchemical forces are controlled and subordinated by the vital force, so\nthat life has been defined as \"a _resistance_ to the physical forces of\nmatter\"[243]--a resistance which Liebig regards as in a certain degree\ninvincible. Living matter is the seat of energy, and so long as it is\nliving, can overcome the primary law of the _inertia_ of matter, and\nmoves spontaneously.[244] Living matter overcomes the attraction of\ngravitation, and resists, suspends, and modifies the action of chemical\naffinity.[245] It is in direct opposition to chemical affinity that\norganized beings exist.\n\nThus the various forms of energy are mutually conditioned. The\nmechanical, chemical, and electrical energies are counteracted by the\nvital force. And all the forces and energies of nature are controlled\nand subordinated by a higher force which orders means to ends, and\nadapts structure to function, viz., an _Intelligent Will_. The\nconviction finally becomes irresistible that nature is a system of\nthings designed to be subject to Mind, and that a law of design is the\nhighest law of the universe.\n\nIt must now be obvious that we can reach no definite conclusion in\nregard to the question under discussion--the uniformity of\nnature--unless we have a clear and precise conception of the meaning of\nthe term \"nature.\" The word is employed, even by men of science, in a\nvery loose and ambiguous sense. At one time it is used to denote the\ntotality of sensible phenomena; at another, the conditions or causes of\nphenomena; again, the relations of phenomena; and often, all these\ncollectively. We must endeavor to extricate ourselves from this\nconfusion.\n\nAccording to its derivation, nature (_natura_--_nascitur_) means that\nwhich is born or produced--_the becoming_; that which has a beginning\nand an end; that which has not the cause of its existence in itself, and\nthe cause of which must be sought in something antecedent to and beyond\nitself--that is, nature is _the phenomenal_. This the word itself\nexpresses in the strongest manner. That which begins to be, as the\nnecessary consequence of antecedent conditions, is _natural_. The\nco-existence, resemblance, and succession of phenomena constitute the\n_order of nature_; and the uniformity of these relations among phenomena\nare the _laws of nature_. So much is clear from the stand-point of mere\nempirical science. Now if law is \"the uniformity of relations among\nphenomena,\"[246] then it is equally clear that the phrase \"uniformity of\nnatural law\" is meaningless, for, by the definition, the uniformity\nitself is the law, and the expression is simply equivalent to \"the\nuniformity of the uniformity,\" which is absurd. Furthermore, if \"nature\"\nis the phenomenal--the becoming--then the word can not be properly\nemployed to denote the causes of that becoming, unless by causes we\nunderstand antecedent conditions, which, as we shall presently see, are\nnot real causes. Nature, or the sum-total of phenomena, is an\n_effect_--an effect which demands a cause. There can be no phenomena\nwithout change, no change without motion, no motion without force, no\nforce without Spirit, for Spirit-force is the only force of which we\nhave any knowledge or consciousness. A rational Will, and not a blind\nnecessity, must stand at the fountain-head of being, and uniformity in\nnature must be the result of _reason_ and _choice_.\n\nBut suppose we are permitted to employ the term \"nature\" to denote the\nessential properties of matter, and the various forms of energy,[247]\npotential and kinetic; and suppose we admit that matter is\nindestructible, and that the amount of energy in the world is unchanged,\nthe sum of the actual and potential energies being a constant quantity;\nstill we are not entitled from these premises to infer the absolute\nuniformity in the succession of events--that is, the uniformity of the\nphenomenal. We have already seen that no phenomenon known to man is the\nresult of a single property of matter or a single form of energy. \"All\nissues in nature are the effects produced upon matter by the resultant\nof component forces.\" The phenomena of nature are the result of\nadjustments, combinations, and distributions of matter and of force in\nendless variety and complexity. Hence we have in nature the variable,\nthe contingent, the particular, as well as the invariable, the uniform,\nand the general. This is admitted by Comte: \"That which engenders this\n_irregular variability_ of the effect is the great number of different\nagents determining at the same time the same phenomena; and from which\nit results, in the most complicated phenomena, _that there are no two\ncases precisely alike_. We have no occasion, in order to find such\ncomplexity, to go to the phenomena of living beings. It presents itself\nin bodies without life, for example, in studying meteorological\nphenomena.... _Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly\nvariable as if every cause had not been subject to any precise\ncondition._\"[248]\n\nThus we are led by various lines of thought to the same conclusion. It\nis certain that we can only learn what the uniformities (the laws) of\nnature are by _experience_, and in order to determine whether all the\nsuccessions of events have been and now are universally uniform, we must\nhave a _universal_ experience. If there have been deviations from\ngeneral laws under peculiar conditions--if one form of energy has been\ncounteracted and modified by another form of energy, or even by an\nintelligent Will, so as to give a _particular_ result--experience (=\nobservation and testimony) must be just as adequate to attest the\nreality of that particular deviation as it is to attest the prevalence\nof general laws.[249] We have no intuitive and necessary conviction of\nthe uniformity of nature, and therefore we can not affirm in an _\u00e0\npriori_ manner what is _possible_ or _impossible_. Those scientists who\nadopt the maxim of Faraday, that in the investigation of new and\npeculiar phenomena \"we must set out with clear ideas of the possible\nand the impossible,\" are doomed to move in a vicious circle. They can\nnot be sure that a fact of experience is a real fact until they have\nascertained the laws of nature in the case, and they can not ascertain\nwhat the laws of nature are until they have ascertained the facts. They\nmust not profess to have learned any thing until they have ascertained\nthat it is possible, and they can not decide that it is possible until\nthey have learned every thing, because the single item of knowledge they\nare deficient in may be the very principle which warrants a belief in\nthe possibility of the fact. The maxim is obviously absurd. In its\ntheological bearings it is repudiated even by Professor Tyndall, the\npupil and successor of Faraday at the Royal Institution. \"You never hear\nthe really philosophical defenders of the doctrine of uniformity\nspeaking of _impossibilities_ in nature. They never say ... that it is\nimpossible for the Builder of the universe to alter his work. Their\nbusiness is not with the possible, but with the actual.\"[250]\n\nThe hypothesis under discussion is further vitiated by the assumption\nthat laws are _causes_ adequate in themselves to the production of all\nphenomena. So that now Creation by Law (Nomogeny) is the watchword of\nthis school of thinkers. The men who have defined law as \"the uniformity\nof relations among phenomena\"--as \"an observed order of facts\"--now\nspeak of laws as having in themselves a real efficiency; as producing,\nregulating, and governing powers. Under this high-sounding\nphrase--\"Creation by Law\"--there is not only the artful concealment of a\ndifficulty, but there is also the interpolation of a positive error. The\n_uniformities_ of natural phenomena are the _causes_ of phenomena, or,\nin other words, the order of nature is its own cause, which is not only\nerroneous but self-contradictory.\n\nHere, again, we encounter the perplexity consequent on the use of\nambiguous phraseology. The term \"Law\" is employed in an equivocal sense,\nas denoting, indifferently, property and relation, condition and cause,\nantecedent and consequence. In such an atmosphere of verbal haze it is\nimpossible to see clearly or think correctly. We must feel our way\ntoward a purer light, and find a less wavering stand-point.\n\nThe primary and generic conception of law is \"_the authoritative\nexpression of Will_.\" This is the most natural, the most obvious, and\nthe most legitimate conception. The true notion of Will is the synthesis\nof Reason and Power. Power exerted in the forms of reason is\nself-consciousness. Reason manifested in the forms of power is\nself-determination. Self-consciousness and self-determination are the\ntwo elements of personality. More explicitly, we may therefore define\nlaw as \"_the idea of the Reason enforced by Power_.\" The subjects of\nlegislation are:\n\n1. _The actions of Free Beings._ To ascertain the laws in this case is\nto answer the question, What _ought_ to be done?\n\n2. _The processes of Thought._ To ascertain the laws in this case is to\nanswer the questions, Why do we judge or affirm this or that? and, What\nare the grounds and criteria of certitude?\n\n3. _The facts or events of Nature._ To ascertain the laws in this case\nis to answer the questions, _What_ are the facts in their observed\norder? _How_ or from what causes do they arise? _Why_ or for what end do\nthey exist?\n\nIt is under the last division that we encounter the secondary and\nsymbolical senses in which the term law has come to be used by\nscientific men, which have well-nigh supplanted the primary and only\nlegitimate signification.\n\nThat which lies nearest to sense--the phenomena of nature--first engages\nthe awakening intellect. If the attention is confined solely to the\nphenomena of nature, the simple question propounded is, _What_ is the\nobserved order of the facts? At this stage science can be no more than a\nclassification of phenomena according to their relations of\nco-existence, resemblance, and succession, and law must be defined as\n\"_the uniformity of relations among phenomena_.\"[251] Here the term is\ntaken _objectively_, and the facts are simply conceived as perceived by\nthe senses.\n\nBut the human mind can never rest in the bare knowledge of phenomena.\nThe reason intuitively recognizes the uniformities of nature as the\nsuggestive signs of properties or powers which are not perceptible to\nsense, and the question arises, _How_--that is, from what adjustment of\nantecedent conditions and physical agencies--does the order of nature\narise? And now the term law comes to indicate more than an observed\norder of facts; it denotes an order resulting from the coincidence of\nsome permanent properties, qualities, or forces which are conceived as\nlying back of the phenomena, and pushing them into the objective field.\nAccordingly, laws are now defined as \"_the necessary relations which\nspring from the [inner] nature of things_.\"[252] Here the phrase is\ntaken _subjectively_, as the expression of a mental conception, and not\nof a sense perception. \"It has relation to us as _understanding_, rather\nthan to the materials of which the universe consists as obeying certain\nrules.\"[253]\n\nFinally, the human mind approaches the question--_Why_ have these\nphysical agencies been so collocated or adjusted? What relation does\nthis adjustment bear to _purpose_, _intention_, or _end_? Law is now\n_the reason or end for which an orderly arrangement exists_. Here the\nphrase is taken ideally or _rationally_ as a revelation of the intuitive\nreason, in the light of which the phenomena of nature find their only\nsatisfactory interpretation.\n\nBy this route we are led back to the primary and universal conception of\nlaw as \"_the idea of the Reason enforced by Power_.\" All government,\nhuman or Divine, is the enforcement of ideas by authority, and \"Natural\nLaw\" is the actualization of the Divine idea by the Divine efficiency.\nAs Bunsen remarks, \"Law is the supreme rule of the universe, and this\nlaw is Intellect, is _Reason_, whether viewed in the formation of a\nplanetary system or the organization of a worm.\"\n\nLaws and ideas are thus correlated. Viewed in respect to the reason as\nconceiving, originating, and projecting, we speak of the _idea_. Viewed\nin respect to the sphere of determinate movement and action in which\nideas are realized and actualized, we speak of _law_. Hence Plato often\ncalls ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato, describes the laws\nof the material world as ideas: \"_Quod in natur\u00e2 naturat\u00e2 lex, in natur\u00e2\nnaturante idea dicitur_.\"\n\nIt is obvious, then, that laws are not attributes of matter, but of\nintelligence. It is equally obvious that laws are not efficient causes,\nand can not execute themselves. They are the ideas and purposes of\nreason, and the rules or methods according to which the ideas are\nactualized. Law, therefore, presupposes a _Lawgiver_ and an _Executive_.\nLaw without a lawgiver is the merest abstraction, and law without an\nagent to realize and execute it is, in fact, not a law, but an idea. To\nmaintain that the universe is governed by laws, without ascending to the\nsuperior reason and source of these laws--to talk of laws, and yet not\nto recognize that every law implies a legislator, and an executor to put\nit in force--is to hypostatize laws, to make beings of them, and to\nsubstitute mythical and fabulous divinities in the place of the one\nliving and true God, the source of all power and all law.\n\nFew men of recent times can claim a larger acquaintance with the history\nand the philosophy of the Inductive Sciences than the late Professor\nWhewell, and he may be fairly regarded as expressing the doctrine of the\nbest scientists. \"A law supposes an _agent_ and a _power_: for it is a\nmode according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an\nagent, of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the law\ndepends, producing the effects which the law prescribes, the law can\nhave no efficiency, no existence. Hence we infer that the intelligence\nby which the law is ordained, the power by which it is put in action,\nmust be present in all places where the effects of the law occur; that\nthus the knowledge and agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion\nof the universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and\nchange. _The laws of nature are the laws which He in his wisdom\nprescribes to his own acts_; his universal presence is the necessary\ncondition of any course of events, his universal agency the only origin\nof any efficient force.\"[254]\n\nWe grant that the term law may, by metonymy, be employed to designate\n\"the uniformity of relations among phenomena,\" but then it must not be\nforgotten that here the effect is put for the cause, the consequence of\nlaw for the law itself. It may be that this is the only conception of\nlaw which is legitimate within the sphere of strictly physical science,\nand to limit the scientists solely to the knowledge of phenomena and\ntheir relations would simply be to take them at their word. The inquiry\nconcerning Causes and First Principles must then, by common consent, be\nsurrendered to pure metaphysics and theology. But if, after this truce,\nthe scientist still persists in speaking of laws as efficient causes,\nand claiming for them \"an eternal and necessary uniformity,\" thus\nvirtually denying the liberty and personality of God, and the\npossibility of Creation and Providence, the Christian Theist must be\npermitted in the name of polemic fairness and logical consistency to\nprotest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nCONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.\n\n(_Continued._)\n\n\nOf the various hypotheses which seek to dispense with the immediate\nagency of God, and to explain the conservation of the world by\n\"secondary\" or natural agencies, the second is that of _active Force\ncommunicated to matter at its creation_. This force being transformable,\nand at the same time indestructible, is regarded as adequate to the\nconservation of the universe.\n\nThis hypothesis must not be confounded with the Dynamical theory of\nmatter propounded by Leibnitz, and more fully elaborated by Boscovich,\nwhich regards matter as a mere phenomenon or function of force; on the\ncontrary, it conceives of matter as a distinct entity moving under the\naction of a primary impulse communicated by \"the Creator's fiat at the\nbeginning.\" This hypothesis in its fundamental conception and its\nfurther elaboration is purely mechanical. It represents the universe as\na machine first set in motion by the Deity, and conserved by the actions\nand reactions of its several parts. All subsequent motions, changes, and\nconfigurations are the prolonged results of the original impulse,\nwithout any further direct action or control on the part of the Creator.\n\nA more precise and accurate statement would require that the term\n\"Energy\" should be substituted for \"Force.\" In the language of modern\nphysics, _Force_ is \"that which _originates_ or tends to originate\nmotion or change,\" and \"is _wholly expended_ in the action it\nproduces.\"[255] All energy has its origin in force, but force can not\npass into energy except under conditions in which it is at liberty to\nact. For instance, the _force_ of gravity produces the _energy_ of\nmotion of a falling body, but gravity can not produce motion unless\nthere is space through which the body can fall. _Energy_, therefore, is\ndefined as \"the power of doing work.\"[256] The work done is the\nresistance overcome, and in overcoming resistance the energy is\ntransformed, but not annihilated. In every case in which energy is lost\nby resistance, heat is generated; and we learn from Joule's\ninvestigations that the quantity of heat generated is a perfectly\ndefinite equivalent for the energy lost. It is therefore claimed that\nthe total quantity of energy in the universe is constant, and that the\nmaterial system is dynamically conservative. The universe is a\nself-acting and self-sustained machine, and perpetual motion is a\nnecessary consequence.\n\nA little reflection, however, ought to convince any one that this\nconception of the universe--as a machine which is kept in perpetual\nmotion by the reciprocal action of its parts--is a false analogy. And\nits fallacy is apparent from this, that the moving force of every\nmachine is not inherent in the machine, but some natural primary force\ndistinct from the machine, such as gravity, or the primary atomic forces\nof attraction and repulsion; and consequently the very idea of mechanism\n_assumes_ the existence of those primary forces of which it is the\nprofessed object of a mechanical theory of the universe to give an\nexplanation. A machine \"can no more create energy than it can create\nmatter;\" its sole function is \"to transform energy into a kind most\nconvenient for us.\"[257] \"We may with the greatest ease convert\nmechanical work into heat, but we can not by any means convert all the\nenergy of heat back again into mechanical work. In the steam-engine we\ndo what can be done in this way, but it is a very small portion of the\nwhole energy of the heat that is convertible into work, for a large\nportion is dissipated, and will continue to be dissipated however\nperfect our engine may become. Let the greatest care be taken in the\nconstruction and working of a steam-engine, yet we shall not succeed in\nconverting one fourth of the whole energy of the heat of the coals into\nmechanical work.\"[258] It is impossible to construct a machine that can\ndo work without parting with energy; and when the energy is all parted\nwith, any machine whatever must necessarily cease to do any more work\nunless a fresh supply of energy be brought in from without. It is\nimpossible to make a water-mill work without a constantly renewed supply\nof water, or to make a steam-engine work without a constantly renewed\nsupply of fuel. \"Every one who understands mechanics knows that any such\ninexhaustible supply of energy is impossible by means of merely\nmechanical arrangements; but it is equally true, though not perhaps\nequally so evident, that it is impossible by means of any arrangement of\nthermal, electric, or chemical forces.\"[259]\n\nBut we are told that modern science has proved that the law of the\nConservation of Energy is an absolute law of the universe, and that\nthough man can not construct a machine which will realize the dream of\nperpetual motion, the material universe is in reality such a machine.\nIt becomes us to speak with some degree of diffidence in regard to a\nquestion which lies outside of our special department of study.\nNevertheless we must confess that we have a growing suspicion of all\nso-called \"absolute laws\" in the domain of physical nature. And we are\nconfirmed in this mistrust by the fact that physicists themselves are\nnot agreed in regarding this law of conservation of energy as\nuniversally true. \"That the amount of energy in the world is\nunchangeable, the sum of the actual or kinetic and potential energies\nbeing a constant quantity, has been by some writers overstrained. It may\nbe taken as a postulate, and is probably true, but it is a proposition\nequally incapable of proof and of disproof.\"[260] \"This principle,\" says\nSir J. Herschel, \"so far as it rests upon any scientific basis as a\nlegitimate conclusion from dynamical laws, is no other than the\nwell-known dynamical theorem of the conservation of _vis viva_ (or of\n'energy,' as some prefer to call it), _supplemented to save the truth of\nits verbal enunciation_ by the introduction of what is called 'potential\nenergy,' a phrase which I can not help regarding as unfortunate,\ninasmuch as it goes to substitute a truism for the announcement of a\ndynamical fact. No such conservation, in the sense of an identity of\ntotal amount of _vis viva_ at all times and in all circumstances, in\nfact, exists. So far as a system is maintained by the mutual actions and\nreactions of its constituent elements _at a distance_ (_i. e._, by\nforce), _vis viva_ may temporarily disappear, and be subsequently\nreproduced between certain limits. Collision, indeed, between its\nultimate particles or atoms, regarded as absolutely rigid, and therefore\ninelastic (_for that which can not change its figure can have no\nresilience_), can not take place without producing a permanent\ndestruction of it, which there exists no means of repairing.... If,\nindeed, we could be assured _\u00e0 priori_ that the system [of the universe]\nis one of simple or compound periodicity, in which a certain lapse of\ntime will restore every molecule to identically the same relative\nsituation with respect to all the rest, we should then be sure that in\nthe nature of things there would take place, so to speak, a winding up\nfrom a lower to a higher state of potential energy, to be subsequently\nexchanged for newly created _vis viva_. But, as we can have no such _\u00e0\npriori_ assurance, can only assume such restoration to be possible, and\ncan see no means of effecting it, if possible, otherwise than by\nforesight and prearrangement; the one equally with the other is an\nunknown function, variable within unknown limits, and susceptible of\nfluctuation to an unknown extent; nor can we have any, the smallest,\nright to assert that what is expended in one form _is_ necessarily laid\nup for further use in the other. It would be very difficult, I\napprehend, to show whether, in the winding up of a clock or the building\nof a pyramid, taking into consideration all the various modes in which\n_vis viva_ disappears and reappears in the expenditure of muscular\npower, the evolution of animal heat, the consumption of the materials of\nour tissues, the propagation of vibratory motions, and a thousand other\nmodes of transfer, the total _vis viva_ of this our planet is increased\nor diminished. That it should remain absolutely unchanged during the\nprocess is in the last degree inconceivable. The amount of _vis viva_\nlatent in the form of heat or molecular motion in the sun and planets in\nour immediate system may bear, and probably does bear, a by no means\ninappreciable ratio to that more distinctly patent in the form of bodily\nmotion in the periodic circulation of the planets round the sun, and\nthe sun and planets round their axes. The latter amount fluctuates to\nand fro according to laws easily calculable, _but the former we have no\nmeans whatever of computing, and to what extent, or within what limits,\nit may be variable, we are altogether ignorant_.\"[261]\n\nThe two dynamical laws of Conservation of Energy and Transformation of\nEnergy can not therefore be regarded as universal and absolute laws;\nthey are particular and derivative laws subject to limitations which are\nsupplied by the third dynamical law--the Dissipation of Energy. The law\nof the conservation of energy simply asserts \"that the whole amount of\nenergy in the universe, or in any limited system which does not receive\nenergy from without, or part with it to external matter, is invariable;\"\nin other words, that every material system subject to no other forces\nthan actions and reactions between its parts is a dynamically\nconservative system. But Sir William Thomson has shown that \"in nature\nthis hypothetical condition is apparently violated in all circumstances\nof motion. A material system can never be brought through any returning\ncycle of motion without spending more work against the mutual forces of\nits parts than is gained from these forces, because no relative motion\ncan take place without meeting with frictional or other forms of\nresistance.\"[262] \"There can be but one ultimate result for such a\nsystem as that of the sun and planets, if continuing long enough under\nexisting laws, and not disturbed by meeting with other moving masses in\nspace. That result is the falling together of all into one mass, which,\nalthough rotating for a time, _must in the end come to rest relatively\nto the surrounding medium_.\"[263]\n\nThe law of the transformation of energy is \"the enunciation of the\nempirical fact that in general any one form of energy may by suitable\nprocesses be transformed, wholly or in part, to an equivalent amount in\nany other given form.\" This law, however, is subject to limitations\nwhich are supplied by the dissipation of energy. \"No known natural\nprocess is exactly reversible, and whenever an attempt is made to\ntransform and retransform energy by an imperfect process, part of the\nenergy is necessarily transformed into heat and _dissipated_, so as to\nbe incapable of further useful transformation. It therefore follows\nthat, as energy is constantly in a state of transformation, there is a\nconstant _degradation_ of energy to the final unavailable form of\nuniformly diffused heat, and that will go on until the whole energy of\nthe universe has taken this final form.\"[264] No mechanical work can be\ndone by heat in a state of equilibrium; as a dynamical agent it is\n_dead_. \"Thus the inexorable laws of mechanics indicate that the store\nof force in our planetary system, which can only suffer loss and not\ngain, must be finally exhausted.\"[265]\n\nSo far, then, as the conservation of energy has any scientific meaning,\nit is inadequate to account for the origin or explain the continuance of\nthe existing order of nature. It is true we may conceive that every atom\nof matter was endowed at the Creation with a certain store of potential\nenergy--\"the potential energy of gravitation\"[266]--which it has ever\nsince given out; but as every motion which has resulted from its action\nhas been attended with the expenditure of a certain amount of the\noriginal endowment, it must have been continually undergoing a\ndiminution. There is, says Professor Norton, no escaping this conclusion\nbut by taking the ground that _the primary atomic forces_ (as\ngravitation, and the atomic repulsion and attraction by which atoms are\naggregated into bodies of sensible magnitude) are correlated with the\n_living forces_ (or various forms of energy) which are involved in the\nmotions that have resulted from the previous operation of the primary\natomic forces. \"But,\" he says, \"_no evidence has been obtained of any\nsuch correlation_.\" The primary force of attraction (if it be regarded\nas a primary force) may be the cause of motion in bodies which are\nseparated in space, and part of that energy of motion may be transformed\ninto the energy of heat or light or electricity, but the primary force\nof attraction is not transformed. Energy is convertible into other forms\nof energy, but heat, light, and electricity are not transformable into\nprimary force. The correlation of force and energy is therefore a\nscientific heresy.[267]\n\nModern physicists are agreed that visible motion, heat, electricity,\nmagnetism, and radiance (radiant light and heat) are forms of actual\n_energy_ which are correlated and capable of mutual conversion. Any one\nform may, by suitable processes, be transformed, wholly or in part, to\nan equivalent amount of any other form of energy. So much is generally\naccepted by scientific men.\n\nBut in regard to the primary _force_ or forces in which these forms of\nenergy have their origin, there is not the same agreement among\nphysicists. Some regard gravitation, cohesion, and chemical affinity as\nthe three primary forces of nature; while others suggest that the last\ntwo are related with and probably derived from the first.\n\nThere is also a respectable school of physicists who teach that atomic\nattractions and repulsions are the universal cosmic forces which\noriginate all molecular and mechanical motions. Then, again, each of\nthese forms of force have their special advocates. On the one side it is\naffirmed, as an important generalization, that all primary force is\n_attractive_; \"there is no such thing in nature as a primary repulsive\nforce.\"[268] Universal attraction is the one world-forming and\nworld-conserving energy. On the other side it is contended that\ngravitation is not a primary, but a secondary and derivative force, and\nthat the grand primal force is a universal force of _repulsion_.[269]\n\nIt is beyond our province to discuss the merits of these conflicting\ntheories. Our position is that no purely physical hypothesis is adequate\nto account for the conservation of the universe, and therefore it is of\nlittle consequence to our argument which of the above theories may find\nmost favor with scientific men. The tendency of modern scientific\nthought is toward the conception of \"one primordial form of matter, and\nbut one primary form of force,\" as the simplest basis upon which a\nphysical theory of inanimate nature can be erected. The ultimate nature\nof this one primary force is a question for pure metaphysics. From the\nstand-point of physical science it can only be thought \"as a _pull_ or a\n_push_ in a straight line.\"[270] Universal attraction or universal\nrepulsion must be the ultimate dynamical conception for the pure\nphysicist.\n\n1. Let us consider the first hypothesis. It is claimed that gravitation,\nor universal attraction, is the great conserving and sustaining\nprinciple of the universe. A stone falls to the earth, a round body\nrolls along a plane inclined toward the horizon; a liquid mass, as a\nbrook or a large river, flows on the sloping surface which forms its\nbed. All these phenomena are the varied manifestation of a universal\n_tendency_ in all bodies to fall one toward the other. In virtue of this\ntendency the great orbs which hang suspended in space gravitate toward\none another; the moon and the earth fall toward each other, and they\nboth gravitate toward the sun. All the planets of our solar system\ncontinually act one on the other, and on the immense sphere which shines\nat their common focus. By its enormous mass, the sun keeps all of them\nin their orbits. If we ask why one body _falls_ toward another which is\nmore than ninety millions of miles off, in preference to moving in any\nother direction, the answer given is that, \"Every particle of matter in\nthe universe _attracts_ every other particle with a force whose\ndirection is that of the line joining the two, and whose magnitude is\ndirectly as the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of\ntheir distance from each other.\" This force of attraction is the\nuniversal bond which holds the universe together, and sustains its\nphysical life.\n\nTo the superficial thinker, the language of the Newtonian philosophy\nappears to sanction the materialistic notion that gravitation and\nattraction are active powers essential to and inherent in matter. Such,\nhowever, was by no means the doctrine of Newton, and he was careful to\nguard his readers against any such misapprehension of his meaning. \"The\nwords attraction, repulsion, or tendencies of whatever kind toward a\ncentre, I use indifferently and without distinction for each other,\nconsidering these forces not physically but metaphysically. Wherefore\nlet not the reader suppose that by words of this kind I any where mean\na species or mode of action, or cause, or physical reason; or that I\nreally and in a physical sense assign forces to centres (which are only\nmathematical points), even though I may say that centres _attract_, or\nthat _forces belong to centres_.\"[271]\n\nThe history of scientific opinion on the point before us furnishes a\nstriking illustration of the manner in which language reacts on the\nideas which it is intended to express, and thus men fall into the habit\nof talking nonsense without knowing it. The conception of atoms having\nthe property of exerting various forces across a void space seemed to\nfollow as a matter of course from the discovery of the law of\ngravitation, and from the language in which it is expressed. After\nNewton a school arose which taught that atoms have the property of\n_exerting force at a distance_, and that this property must be inherent\nin the atoms, just as Lucretius taught that hardness and elasticity were\noriginal indefeasible properties of the primordial elements, the \"semina\nrerum,\" or seeds of things. But Newton did not teach this; he stated a\nfact, but did not devise an hypothesis; he attempted no explanation of\nthe law of gravitation.\n\n\"The law of gravitation considered as a _result_ is beautifully simple;\nin a few words it expresses a fact from which most numerous and complex\nresults may be deduced by mere reasoning--results found invariably to\nagree with the records of observation; but this same law of gravitation\nlooked upon as an axiom or first principle is so astonishingly far\nremoved from all ordinary experience as to be almost incredible. What!\nevery particle in the whole universe is actively attracting _every other\nparticle_ [that is, every particle in the universe with the same force,\nwithout any expenditure of force], through void, without the aid of any\ncommunication by means of matter, or otherwise--each particle, unchecked\nby distance, unimpeded by obstacles, throws this miraculous influence to\ninfinite distance without the employment of any means![272] No particle\ninterferes with its neighbor, but all these wonderful influences are\nco-existent in every point in space! The result is apparent at each\nparticle, but the condition of intermediate space is exactly the same as\nthough no such influence were being transmitted across it! Earth\nattracts Sirius across space, and yet the space between is as if neither\nEarth nor Sirius existed! Can these things be? We think not; and Newton\nhimself did not affirm this.\"[273] On the contrary, he earnestly rejects\nany such hypothesis. \"It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter\nshould, without the mediation of something else _which is not material_,\noperate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must\ndo if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential to and\ninherent in matter.... That gravitation should be innate, inherent, and\nessential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a\ndistance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by\nand through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to\nanother, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in\nphilosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into\nit. _Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to\ncertain laws._\"[274]\n\nThe ancient axiom that \"Matter can not act where it is not any more\nthan when it is not,\" was universally believed till Newton's time, and\nNewton himself regarded it as a self-evident truth. Some of his\ndisciples asserted that gravitation must be considered as an essential\nproperty of matter, and they were under the necessity of assuming that\natoms can exert a force upon one another across a void. This to Leibnitz\nwas either miraculous or absurd; and in modern times the doctrine is\nrejected by the first physicists--by Faraday, Helmholtz, Thomson, Tait,\nand Maxwell.[275] Sir William Thomson, the Newton of modern physics,\nsays emphatically, \"I have no faith whatever in attractions and\nrepulsions _acting at a distance_ between centres of force according to\nvarious laws.\"[276] And Clerk Maxwell, in his lecture on \"Action at a\nDistance,\"[277] explains how Faraday, by his discovery of magnetic\nrotation of polarized light, and by his showing how lines of force arise\nin media, \"rudely shook the theory of attraction and repulsion at a\ndistance across a void.\"\n\nIf, now, \"direct action at a distance\" is rejected by scientific men as\ninconceivable and absurd, how can it be that the sun _pulls_ the earth\ntoward it, and holds the planets in their orbits? The verbal statement\nof the law of gravitation is no answer to this question. It expresses a\nfact, but it does not assign a cause. Gravitation is a phenomenon which\ndemands an explanation, and some of the first scientists of the day are\nengaged in devising a theory which shall afford a rational answer to the\nquestion, What is the _cause_ of gravity?[278]\n\nThe first and most fundamental presupposition for any physical\nhypothesis which seeks to explain the action of gravitation is that some\n_medium_ of communication exists. This is suggested by every physical\nanalogy. Sound is communicated through a medium. The influence which is\nexerted at a distance by heat, light, electricity, and magnetism is\neffected through media. The most plausible suggestion yet made is that\n\"a single omnipresent fluid, _ether_, fills the universe,\" which by\nvarious forms or modes of motion transmits light, radiant heat,\nmagnetism, and electricity.[279] May not gravitation, it is asked, be\ntransmitted by the _same_ fluid? may it not consist of or result from\nactual recurring impulses propagated in ethereal waves?\n\nThe hypothesis that gravitation is transmitted through the same medium\nas light, or indeed through any medium, is encumbered with serious if\nnot insuperable difficulties. All transmission of whatever kind--of a\nletter by the post, a gunshot, a sound, a wave of light, an\nelectro-magnetic disturbance--_occupies time_. It has a\nvelocity--sometimes a very great one, as in the case of light; still it\nis a measurable velocity. But, according to Herschel, the pull which the\nsun exerts on the earth is delivered _instantaneously_. Were it not so\nthere would be \"a continually progressive increase of the major axis of\nthe earth's orbit, and therefore of the length of the year.\"[280] Surely\nit must be obvious to every one that the _instantaneous_ transmission of\nthe sun's attractive force to the planet Neptune, three thousand\nmillions of miles distant, through a physical medium like the ether,\nwould be as great a miracle as action at a distance through a perfect\nvoid. But the advocates of this hypothesis have not thereby escaped the\ndifficulties of action at a distance. The majority of physicists regard\nthe luminiferous ether as consisting of \"discrete\nparticles\"--\"elementary molecules of inconceivable minuteness and\ntenuity.\" These ultimate particles or atoms of highly attenuated matter\nmust have some magnitude, some extension, however inconceivably minute.\nIf extended, they must have some form, and must occupy separate\npositions in space. If they are capable of motions--undulatory,\nrotatory, or spiral motions--they can not be in mutual contact.\nConceive, then, two such atoms, and draw around each an imaginary\ncircle. Let these circles touch at the middle point between the two, and\nask yourself the question, What exists there? On the hypothesis under\nconsideration you are bound to answer pure, empty space--that is, pure\nnothing. \"But if there is no matter between the atoms, then all their\nactions, one upon the other, must be exerted across a void--that is,\nthrough a medium of nothingness;\" in other words, through no medium at\nall. Now the size of the interval makes no difference in the argument.\n\"Whether that interval be the 92 billionth of an inch, or the 92\nmillions of miles or thereabouts between the earth and the sun, it is\nstill action at a distance, and no escape.\"[281]\n\nThe physicist who regards the ether as consisting of discrete particles\nnot in bodily or actual contact, and at the same time finds himself\nlogically compelled to reject this \"mystical action at a distance,\" has\nno alternative but to accept the doctrine of Newton that the action of\none particle of matter upon another is mediated by an agent which is not\n_material_. \"If it be true that the conception of _force_ as the\noriginator of motion in matter without bodily contact ... is essential\nto the right interpretation of phenomena; and if it be equally true, on\nthe other hand, that its exertion makes itself manifest to our personal\nconsciousness by that peculiar sensation of _effort_ which is not\nwithout its analogue in purely intellectual acts of the mind, it [_i.\ne._, force] comes not unnaturally to be regarded as affording a point of\ncontact, a connecting link between these two great departments of\nbeing--between mind and matter--the one as the _originator_, the other\nas the _recipient_ of force.\"[282]\n\nThere are distinguished physicists--as Helmholtz, Thomson, Challis, and\nMaxwell--who seek to escape the difficulties of action at a distance by\nthe assumption that the ether is absolutely continuous (and therefore\ndoes not consist of atoms)--a perfectly homogeneous, incompressible,\nfrictionless fluid which fills the universe. This fundamental\npresupposition as the basis of a physical theory of the universe\nnecessitates the further assumption that \"_motion is the very essence of\nwhat has been hitherto called matter_.\"[283] All quantitative and\nqualitative phenomena, all statical and dynamical phenomena, are due\nsolely to varied modes of motion in the primordial fluid. \"By various\nmotions of the nature of eddies [ring-vortices], the qualities of\nmatter--cohesion, elasticity, hardness, weight, mass, or other universal\nproperties of matter--are given to small _portions_ of the fluid which\nconstitute the _chemical atom_, and these, by modifications in their\ncombinations, form, and motion, produce the accidental phenomena of\n_gross matter_.... On this view, gross matter would be merely an\nassemblage of _parts_ of the medium moving in a peculiar way, groups of\nring-vortices having inertia.... The primary fluid by other motions\ntransmits light, radiant heat, magnetism, and _gravitation_.\"[284]\n\nIt may be regarded as an act of presumption in an obscure critic to\noffer an opinion of the theories of these great masters in science. We\nventure, however, to suggest that most men will find a difficulty in\nconceiving how space absolutely full of matter can be made to contain\nmore, or how a truly continuous substance can be capable of\ncondensation. The most tenuous ether, if it be absolutely continuous,\noccupies the whole of the space in which it lies--that is, there is no\npoint of the space which is not occupied by a point of matter.[285] But\nthe hardest iron can do no more than this, and, therefore, on this\nhypothesis it seems impossible to account for its greater density. It is\nsuggested that if molecules are mere assemblages of parts of the ether\nmoving in a peculiar way, then greater density may be due to a\nmodification in the motion of molecules, and not merely to the greater\nfrequency of the eddying molecules in a given space. But how can a truly\ncontinuous substance have _parts_, and how can relative motion occur in\nan absolute plenum? The very notion of particles is quite inconsistent\nwith the continuity of matter; and in a universe absolutely full no\nmotion whatever would be possible. We are told that Sir William Thomson\nand Professor Tait find no difficulty in all these, to our minds,\ncontradictory conceptions, and therefore we must conclude that our\nintellect is not properly \"focussed so as to give definition without\nprenumbral haze.\"\n\nGranting, then, the absolute continuity of all matter, and the\npossibility of motion in an absolute plenum, the question which concerns\nus most in this essay is, How is motion generated and sustained? One of\nthe greatest lights of this new school tells us that \"all we can affirm\nof matter is that it is the _recipient_ of impulse and of energy.\"[286]\nThey no longer regard the atom \"as a mystic point endowed with inertia\nand the attribute of _attracting_ and _repelling_ other such centres\nwith forces depending on the intervening distances.\"[287] They have \"no\nfaith whatever in _attractions_ and _repulsions_ acting at a distance\nbetween centres of force.\"[288] Force, then, is not regarded by these\nleading physicists as an inherent attribute of matter. The primary\nfluid, originally inert and motionless, must have been set in motion by\nsome force, by some agency external to and distinct from itself. An\n\"original impetus\" _from without_, according to Maxwell,[289] or a\n\"pressure\" of the universal ether \"from somewhere _outside_ the world of\nstars,\" according to Challis,[290] must be the source of all motion and\nall forms of energy in the universe.\n\nIt is a fundamental principle of dynamics that \"force is wholly expended\nin the action it produces,\"[291] therefore, if all the forms of energy\nin the universe are the result of pressure, that pressure must be\n_continuous_; if they are the result of impulses, these impulses must be\n_incessantly renewed_, and must recur with immeasurable rapidity. On\neither supposition, \"the universe is not even temporarily automatic,\nbut must be fed from moment to moment by an agency external to itself,\"\nand \"the preservation of the universe is effected only by the unceasing\nexpenditure of enormous quantities of work;\"[292] that is, it is\nceaselessly sustained by Divine Omnipotence--\"He upholdeth all things by\nthe word of his power.\"\n\nSo much with respect to the first form of this hypothesis which regards\natomic _attraction_ as the sole world-forming and world-conserving\nforce. We turn now to that form of the hypothesis which considers atomic\n_repulsion_ as the grand primal force in which all the other physical\nforces, even gravitation itself, have their origin.\n\nThis view is presented by Professor W. A. Norton, in his articles \"On\nCosmical and Molecular Physics\" in the _American Journal of Science and\nArts_. His theory rests essentially upon the following principles:\n\n1. The doctrine of _inertia_ applied to all matter.\n\n2. The existence of a single primary force of _repulsion_ exerted by\nevery atom upon every other atom.\n\n3. The existence of but one primary form of _elementary matter_, viz.,\nthe universal or luminiferous ether; the atoms, so called, of ordinary\nmatter, and of the electric ether being but different masses of\ncondensed luminiferous ether.\n\n4. The doctrine of the _interception of force_ by matter. This is a\nnecessary consequence of the fact that a certain portion of the\npropagated force is instantly expended in imparting motion to the\nmolecules or atoms which it encounters, and is therefore abstracted from\nthis force.\n\n5. The primary force of repulsion is made up of _impulses recurring with\nan immeasurable rapidity_. This is no new hypothesis. In all treatises\non Mechanics, gravity and all incessant forces are conceived to consist\nof an indefinitely great number of impulses taking effect in a finite\ninterval of time.[293] \"The ever-recurring pulses of the primary\ncosmical force, emanating from all the atoms of the one primary form of\nmatter, are directly _consumed_ in communicating opposite movements, or\nvirtual movements, to every atom in the universe. It is, as I conceive,\nbecause in the existing condition of things the distribution of matter\nis unequal in different directions round a point, and therefore the\npartial interception of the impulses of the cosmical force along the\ndifferent lines of direction is unequal, that an effective gravitating\nforce exists.[294] The entire amount of the cosmical force consumed in\nany interval of time is the amount intercepted by all the atoms of\nmatter, and is independent of the motions that result from the\ninequalities just noticed. Gravitation, and molecular and chemical\nattractions, which originate in the gravitation of electric ether toward\natoms of ordinary matter, are then _derivative_ forces incidental to the\ndirect actions exerted by the cosmical force upon the atoms.\"[295]\n\nIn a communication from Professor Norton to the author, he furnishes the\nfollowing further exposition of his theory: \"If, as I conceive, the\nprimary atomic force is of the nature of a perpetual emanation from each\natom, and is expended in the act of producing motion, we must thence\ninfer that the atom is an entity through which a stream of force is\n_perpetually flowing from the Infinite Source of all power and all\nexistence_. That the primary force is a force of repulsion, and that the\nimmediate source of all the forces that are known to take effect upon\nordinary matter is the action of recurring repulsive impulses upon the\natoms of the universal ether, and their subsequent propagation and\npartial interception by the atoms which they encounter, I infer from the\nfact that this conception furnishes a rational explanation of all the\nknown forces and phenomena of inanimate nature.\"\n\nIt will thus be seen that the theory of Professor Norton gives no\ncountenance to the materialistic tendencies of the physical science of\nthe age. He is decidedly of the opinion that \"force is _not_ an inherent\nand essential attribute of matter,\" and he \"devoutly acknowledges that\nin following the chain of cause and effect into the precincts of that\nmost deeply hidden of all mysteries, the origin of force, _we have come\ninto the presence of the Infinite Spirit who puts forth unceasingly,\nfrom every point in the realms of space, his creative and sustaining\npower upon the subtile matter that fills all space, and is the essential\nsubstance of all worlds_.\"[296]\n\n3. The third hypothesis is that of a _plastic nature_, intermediate\nbetween God and the material universe, by which all the phenomena of\nvisible nature are produced.\n\nThis hypothesis was first presented (at least in modern times) by Ralph\nCudworth, in his \"True Intellectual System of the Universe.\"[297] In\nopposition to Democritus, who explained all phenomena by means of matter\nand motion; and also in opposition to Strato, who taught that matter is\nthe only substance, but at the same time a living and active force,\nCudworth maintains that there is a _plastic nature_--a vital and\nspiritual, but unconscious energy, distinct from and created by the\nDeity, which \"doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence which\nconsisteth in the regular and orderly motion of matter,\"[298] and in the\norganization and development of plants and animals, \"according to laws\nprescribed for it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it.\"[299]\nThis _plastic nature_ is an \"inferior kind of life or soul,\" destitute\nof all consciousness,[300] which, though it \"acts for the sake of ends,\"\ndoes \"not know the reason of what it does,\" and therefore operates\n\"fatally and sympathetically.\"[301]\n\nThe arguments urged by Cudworth in support of this hypothesis are mainly\nof a negative character. On the one hand he endeavors to show that force\nand vitality are not essential attributes of matter, and on the other\nhand that the motion and life of the universe can not be properly\nregarded as the direct action of the Deity upon matter. It is with this\nlatter part of the argument that we are here immediately concerned. He\nurges (1) that if every thing in nature were done immediately by God, it\nwould render Divine Providence \"oporose, solicitous, and distractious;\"\nand, furthermore, it would be unbecoming the Divine Majesty, and\n\"indecorous,\" for God \"immediately to do all the meanest and triflingest\nthings Himself drudgingly.\" He maintains (2) that if God do all things\nimmediately, then he does them \"_miraculously_\"--that is, \"forcibly and\nviolently.\" And (3) that the immediate agency of God is inconsistent\nwith that slow and gradual development of things we see in nature, which\nwould seem to be a \"trifling formality\" if the agent were omnipotent,\nand especially inconsistent with \"those errors and bunglings which are\ncommitted when the matter is inept and contumacious.\" \"Wherefore it may\nbe concluded that there is a plastic nature under God which, as an\ninferior agent, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence\nwhich consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter, yet so that\nthere is also a higher providence, which, _presiding_ over it, doth\noften supply the defects of it, and sometimes _overrule_ it; forasmuch\nas the plastic nature can not act electively nor with discretion.\" So\nthat, after all, as Plato says, God \"is the beginning and end and middle\nof all things,\" and therefore their being is \"_as much to be ascribed to\nhis causality as if Himself had done all things immediately_ without the\nconcurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause.\"[302]\n\nThere is nothing original in this hypothesis of a plastic nature except\nperhaps the name. It is the old _anima mundi_ of the Platonic physics, a\nvital soul of the world, distinct from but created by the Supreme God.\nIt has reappeared under various names in the history of natural science,\nespecially in that department which is now comprehended under the\ngeneral name of Biology. The \"_motus tonico-vitalis_\" of Stahl, the\n\"animating principle\" of Harvey, the \"_materia vit\u00e6_\" of John Hunter,\nthe \"organic force\" of M\u00fcller, and the \"organic agent\" of Dr. Prout, are\nall but separate names \"for an imaginary principle, or entity,\npossessing powers and properties which (however men may try to impress\nthemselves with a contrary notion) would entitle it to rank as an\nintelligent agent. It is true that, according to most of the advocates\nof this doctrine, this power is supposed to be superintended and\ncontrolled by the Deity himself, and by this supposition they have\nscreened themselves against the accusation of attributing to a creature\nthe powers of the Creator.\"[303]\n\nCudworth's hypothesis of a plastic nature has been recently reproduced,\nwithout the slightest recognition of its paternity, by Joseph John\nMurphy, under the name of \"_unconscious intelligence_\"--\"a power\ntranscending the ordinary properties of matter and adapting means to\npurposes, presiding over all vital actions, whether formative, motor, or\nmental, directing each action to its specific end.\"[304] Mr. Murphy is\nvery solicitous that we should not understand him to teach that \"the\nformative intelligence\" which in nature adapts structure to function is\nDivine. \"I believe,\" he says, \"that the Creator has not separately\norganized every structure, but has endowed vitalized matter with\nintelligence, under the guidance of which it organizes itself.\"[305]\nThis \"unconscious intelligence,\" which builds the tissues and fashions\nthe organs of plants and animals, becomes conscious of itself in the\ndeliberate thought of man.[306]\n\nIt is worthy of note that this hypothesis commends itself to the mind of\nMurphy by considerations akin to those which are urged by Cudworth; and\nespecially because it is supposed to relieve certain moral difficulties\nconnected with the belief of a Divine purpose in creation--as, for\nexample, the existence of parasitic worms which inflict pain and disease\non beings endowed with sensation and consciousness, and the presence of\n\"immoral instincts\" in higher forms of animal life.[307]\n\nWe readily grant that the relation of God to the existing order and\neconomy of the world is mysterious; and we believe that no conceivable\nhypothesis can deprive it of this mysteriousness. There are numerous\ndifficulties which arise from the imperfection of our knowledge and the\nlimited range of our powers. We see through an obscure medium, and we\nknow only in part. There are also difficulties peculiar to individual\nminds--intellectual, ethical, emotional difficulties--which are the\nproducts of a peculiar culture, or the offspring of certain theoretical\nprepossessions. Some of these difficulties may be relieved by the\nhypothesis of \"unconscious intelligence,\" but on a further examination\nit will be found that this hypothesis is embarrassed with still greater\ndifficulties and open to more serious objections both intellectual and\nmoral.\n\nFirst, there is the difficulty of forming any conception of\n\"_unconscious_ intelligence.\" This has been felt by the ablest minds.\n\"The hypothesis,\" says Wallace, \"has the double disadvantage of being\nboth unintelligible and incapable of any kind of proof.\"[308] Mivart\nobserves that the phrase will \"to many minds appear to be little less\nthan a contradiction in terms; the very first condition of an\nintelligence being that, if it know any thing, it should at least know\nits own existence.\"[309] Mr. Murphy tells us that this unconscious\nintelligence \"adapts means to ends,\" \"it presides over all vital\nactions, directing each action to its specific end.\"[310] But an\nintelligence adapting means to ends without any knowledge\n(consciousness) of either the ends to be secured or the means to be\nemployed to secure the end surpasses all comprehension and all belief.\nWe can readily believe, with Hamilton, that the human mind \"exerts\nenergies and is the subject of modifications\" of which it is not\nimmediately conscious, the combined results of which are manifested in\nthe complex fact of consciousness. But to call that _intelligence_\nwhich never had a perception, a thought, an emotion; which has no\nknowledge of self or of any thing else; in short, which is not and never\nwas conscious, is to reduce philosophic terminology to chaos, and\ntantalize thought by meaningless words. An intelligent agent is one who\n_understands_, who distinguishes between subject and object, who knows\nthings in their relations, who can unite the terms of a relation in\nthought, and judge of their congruity or incongruity, all of which are\nconscious operations. Intelligence is consciousness (conscientia =\nrelational knowledge); unconscious intelligence is unconscious\nconsciousness, unintelligent intelligence, which is a contradiction and\nan absurdity.\n\nSecondly, in endeavoring to find the mental stand-point of Mr. Murphy,\nin order that we may fairly estimate his hypothesis, we encounter the\nstill more serious difficulty of conceiving how unconscious intelligence\ncan exist apart from some _subject_ or substratum in which it inheres.\n\nWe are aware that \"the tendency of modern thought\" is to hypostatize\nforce and intelligence, and conceive them as entities. We have\nconscientiously made the attempt again and again to realize this\nconception, but we must confess we can only conceive of force and\nintelligence as properties or attributes of some subject. It is beyond\nour ability, and we imagine it is beyond the ability of Mr. Murphy, to\nconceive of force without something that exerts force, of intelligence\nwithout a being who is intelligent. Indeed, Mr. Murphy concedes that\n\"where there are properties there must be a _substance_,\"[311] and by\nsubstance, he says, he understands \"_underlying reality_.\"[312]\nUnconscious intelligence, if there be such a thing, must be an\nattribute or quality inherent in some underlying substance. But Mr.\nMurphy asserts \"there is no scientific basis for the old belief in a\ndistinct _mental substance_\"[313]--that is, if we understand him aright,\nso far as finite mind is concerned. On the other hand, he distinctly\naffirms that this unconscious intelligence is not Divine intelligence.\nThe power and intelligence which work in the world of matter and mind\n\"are not the Divine power and intelligence.\"[314] Unconscious\nintelligence, then, must be an \"endowment of vitalized matter;\"[315] and\n\"life has its origin in no secondary cause, but in the direct action of\ncreative power.\"[316] Now the question arises, What is matter? On this\npoint we must be careful not to misunderstand or misrepresent Mr.\nMurphy. \"Matter, whether viewed from a metaphysical or from an inductive\npoint of view, is known only as a function of force, and can be\ndescribed only in terms of force. In other words, _the universe is\nnothing but a manifestation of force_.\" And now we ask, Of what force?\n\"Force,\" says Mr. Murphy, \"is known to us by immediate consciousness as\na function of our own mind and will; that is to say, the mind, acting in\nwill, is conscious of itself as a force--and we are able to conceive of\nforce in no other way; the only conception of force which we are able to\nframe is that of voluntary force, or the exertion of will. _Either the\nforce manifested in the universe is the force of a Creative Will, or we\nare able to form no conception of it whatever._\"[317] Can there be any\npossibility of misunderstanding this language? Matter itself is not an\nentity, not a _substance_; it is a phenomenon, not a reality. Matter is\n\"a function of force.\" Force is a \"fact of mind, and therefore\nspiritual.\" Consequently \"matter can only be conceived as\n_spiritual_.\"[318] And now let us recall the statement of Mr. Murphy\nthat there is no finite, created, underlying reality for the phenomena\nof mind and will--\"_no distinct mental substance_.\" If we hold to this\ndoctrine, then we must say with Mr. Murphy again that \"the powers of\nmatter and mind alike are the result and expression of a Living\nWill--and if a Living Will, then also an Intelligent Will.\"[319] The\nfinal and only conclusion is that God, \"the Self-existent Being,\" is the\none only underlying reality or _substance_ in the universe; all the\nforce in the universe is \"the force of the Creative Will,\" and all the\nintelligence in the universe a modification of the Divine Thought.\n\nThis, however, is Pantheism, even according to that very defective\ndefinition of Pantheism given by Mr. Murphy: \"Pantheism is the\nidentification of the Divine power and intelligence with the powers and\nintelligences that work in the world of matter and mind.\"[320] Still,\nMr. Murphy declares, \"I am not a Pantheist;\" and we are bound to accept\nhis disclaimer--\"the power and intelligence which work in nature are not\nidentical with the Divine power and intelligence.\" Be it so; then there\nis power, and there is intelligence in nature, which are not attributes\nof any reality, and which do not inhere in any substance; and we come\nround to the original difficulty of conceiving of an attribute apart\nfrom a subject.\n\nThe reader can not have failed to see that Mr. Murphy has been leading\nus round a vicious circle. \"Force is a function of matter, and matter is\na function of force.\"[321] \"Matter is only explicable as a function of\nforce, force only explicable as a function of conscious mind,\"[322] and\nmind is \"one of the functions of matter.\"[323] \"It is perfectly\ncertain,\" says Mr. Murphy, \"that inductive psychology gives no hint of\nany mental _substance_ as distinguished from the material substance of\nthe brain.\"[324] But the material substance of the brain after all is\nnot material; \"matter can only be conceived as _spiritual_\"[325]--that\nis, as _force_. There is no underlying reality which men call \"matter,\"\nand there is no underlying reality which men call \"spirit.\" Matter is\nspirit, spirit is matter; but in reality neither the one nor the other\nhas any substantial reality. If all finite existences are but modes of\nthe Infinite Being, we have a consistent Pantheism at any rate. But if\nall finite existences are simply phenomena without any underlying\nreality, then \"perception is a dream, and my existence the dream of that\ndream.\"\n\nThirdly, the hypothesis of an \"_unconscious intelligence_,\" distinct\nfrom the Supreme Intelligence, which does \"the drudgery of Providence,\"\nand to which the defects and disorders and \"immoralities\" of nature are\nascribed, is neither adequate nor satisfactory.\n\nThe conceit of Cudworth that it is unbecoming the Divine Majesty to be\nimmediately concerned in every thing that takes place in nature is\nscarcely worthy of consideration: \"If it were not congruous in respect\nof the state and majesty of Xerxes, the king of Persia, that he should\ncondescend to do all the meanest offices himself, much less can this be\nthought decorous in respect of God.\"[326]\n\nHuman conceptions of what is great or small, dignified or indecorous,\nare merely relative conceptions which vary with our knowledge, culture,\nand taste; but--\n\n    \"There is no great and no small\n    To the soul that maketh all.\"--_Emerson_.\n\nFor the Creator of all things an atom is an ample field in which to\ndisplay the resources of his omnipotence. The more the microscope and\nspectroscope reveal of the \"infinitely little,\" the more do we see of\nthe greatness and glory of God. So of men's conceptions of what is\ndignified or indecorous; it may be that, in a land and an age where\nlabor is held in contempt, it becomes the state of an Eastern monarch\nthat he should live in voluptuous ease, but the followers of Him who\nsaid, \"My Father worketh hitherto, and I work,\" have learned to believe\nin the dignity of labor, and to regard all true work as divine. An\nimperfect human ruler can not do every thing, therefore he must employ\nagents and ministers; the Omnipotent Ruler of the universe can do all\nthings, and needs no subordinate ministry. A finite mind can not know\nevery thing, and often staggers beneath the burden of its limited\nacquisitions; the Infinite Mind _must_ know all things, and can not be\nperplexed amid the boundless profusion of its own creations. It is only\na childish impotence or a barbaric vanity which sees the need of\nsupplementary agencies to add to the splendor and efficiency of the\nDivine government of the world. \"Are not two sparrows sold for a\nfarthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your\nFather.\" \"The very hairs of your head are all numbered.\" Such views\nexalt rather than diminish our reverence for the majesty of God. But\nthere is neither congruity nor dignity in the hypothesis that God has\nassociated with Himself an agent which is \"_unconscious_,\" whose action\nHe must direct,[327] and whose \"shortcomings and defects\" He must\nsupply.[328] Dr. Mosheim, the annotator of Cudworth's \"Intellectual\nSystem,\" pertinently remarks: \"That master has enough to do who must\ncontinually take care that the servants he employs, unskillful and\ndevoid of reason, do not err; who must preside over the actions of his\nagents, and continually remedy the defects and mischiefs they\noccasion.... That master is the happier man who possesses the power of\nconducting his own affairs, who can do all things himself, and needs no\nservants whatever.\" But if subordinate agents are needed, or if it\nplease the Supreme Being to employ them, the presumption is certainly in\nfavor of rational conscious agents, rather than blind unconscious forces\nwhich can neither conceive a purpose nor adapt means to secure it. If we\nmust have formative agents, we prefer the \"junior divinities\" of Plato\nor the \"higher intelligences\" of Mr. Wallace.[329]\n\nBut even admitting there are \"defects, deformities, and superfluities\"\nin nature, we are at a loss to conceive how the hypothesis of an\n\"unconscious intelligence,\" working necessarily, removes the blame (if\nthere be any blame) from the Author of nature. Does not every theist\nbelieve that the Creator of matter \"saw and knew every purpose which\nevery particle and atom of matter should subserve in all suns and\nsystems, and through all coming \u00e6ons of time?\" Must not that Intelligent\nWill, which is the fountain-head of all the force that sweeps like a\ntide of life through the universe, have known every form of energy which\ncould result therefrom, and foreseen all the possible effects which\nwould arise from the composition of any and all systems of forces? Did\nnot He who created this supposed \"organizing force,\" who ordained all\nits laws, and who directs and controls all its actions, know with\nmathematical precision every consequence which could possibly arise from\nits prearranged and necessitated adaptations? If God is the creator of\nthis unconscious, necessitated \"plastic nature,\" if He always observes\nwhat it does, if He directs and overrules it, if He supplies some of its\ndefects and corrects most of its mistakes, must not He be regarded as\nthe real cause of all things which, in popular language, are said to be\ndone by nature? If we believe with Mr. Murphy that\n\n    \"Nature is but the name for an effect\n    Whose cause is God,\"\n\nwe shall find no relief from the difficulties and mysteries of Divine\nprovidence by interposing between the first creative volition and the\nlast phenomenal result a series of secondary causes which are themselves\nonly effects of the primal creative act. It were better far to leave the\nmystery untouched, and take refuge in faith; better to confess the\ndifficulties are insoluble, and\n\n    \"Still trust that God is love indeed,\n        And love Creation's final law;\n        Though nature, red in tooth and claw\n      With ravin, shrieks against our creed.\"\n\nWe are brought finally to the question whether, in reality, there is any\nthing defective or any thing superfluous in the normal products of\norganic nature? or, in other words, whether the Author of nature has\nmade any thing inadequate to its purpose, or which fulfills no purpose\nwhatever? We venture to suggest that inductive science is not in\npossession either of the facts or the principles which are necessary to\na correct judgment. To be competent to deal with this question, science\nshould not only know all the purposes which may be fulfilled by a single\norganism, but also the ultimate purpose which is subserved by the\nwondrous play of all the means and relative ends which constitute the\nentire cosmos. Far be it from us to depreciate the achievements or dare\nto set limits to the possibilities of inductive science. But, assuredly,\nthe most enthusiastic scientist will admit that, compared with the\nvastness and complexity of natural phenomena, human knowledge is\nexceedingly limited and very imperfect. As to the final purpose of\ncreation--the ultimate end of the Creator in the existence of the\nuniverse--modern science does not even claim to have an opinion.[330]\nWith no knowledge of the ultimate purpose of creation, with a limited\nacquaintance with the general plan of the universe, with an imperfect\nknowledge of the reasons and ends of individual existences, it seems\nlittle less than impertinence for science to sit in judgment on the\nworks of God, and unceremoniously condemn this as defective and that as\nunnecessary. As Baden Powell observes, \"How can we undertake to affirm,\namid all the possibilities of things of which we confessedly know so\nlittle, that a thousand ends and purposes may not be answered, because\nwe can trace none, or even imagine none, which seem to our short-sighted\nfaculties to be answered.\"[331] In view of the fact that hitherto the\nbelief in \"purpose\" or \"final cause\" has been the guiding light of\nscience, and the further fact that science is every day making new\ndiscoveries as to the utility of existences and organs of which before\nwe were ignorant, scientific men might learn a profitable lesson, and\nmanifest less \"audacity.\"[332] Meantime we shall be content with the\nassurances of Scripture that \"the works of God are _perfect_,\" and that\n\"He hath made nothing _in vain_.\"\n\n\nWe may now gather up the several threads of thought which run through\nthis essay, and state our final conclusions:\n\n1. Matter is the merely passive or statical condition for the action of\nforce.[333] The most fundamental condition or characteristic of matter,\n\"perhaps its only true indication, is _inertia_.\"[334] \"All that we can\naffirm of it is that it is the _recipient_ of impulse and of\nEnergy.\"[335] All the attempts which have been made to reduce matter to\na function or phenomenon of force have ended in failure. Motion\nnecessarily implies a _something_ which is moved by the action of force.\nEven that most wonderful and subtile of all \"modes of\nmotion\"--light--necessarily implies an entity which is moved. \"The\nmagnetic rotation of the plane of polarized light, discovered by\nFaraday, implies an _actual_ rotatory motion of something.\" \"The seeing\nintellect,\" says Mr. Tyndall, \"when properly focused, must realize this\nconception at last.\" Matter must consist of ultimate continuous atoms or\nmolecules possessing inertia and capable of being moved in space. By\nvirtue of its extension and inertia it can intercept force, transform\nforce into energy, and transmit energy. The various forms of energy\n(heat, light, electricity, magnetism, etc.) are transformations of force\nresulting directly or indirectly from the interception of force by inert\nmatter, and \"all the phenomena of material nature result from the action\nof force _upon_ matter.\"[336] \"Matter,\" says M. Claude Bernard, \"does\nnot generate the phenomena which it manifests. It is only the\nsubstratum, and does absolutely nothing but give to phenomena the\nconditions of its manifestation.\"[337]\n\n2. Force is that which originates or tends to originate motion, or\nchanges or tends to change the state of a body with regard to motion. It\nis not and can not be a property of matter. The doctrine that force is\nan attribute of matter is disproved by the fact of inertia. Inert matter\ncan have no spontaneous power--it can not change its own state of motion\nor rest. Neither is motion capable _per se_ of producing motion. It is a\nfundamental axiom of natural philosophy that motion can not be generated\nby motion itself, any more than by the negation of motion. Inertness and\nexertion, passivity and activity, are contradictory attributes, and can\nnot be affirmed of the same subject. To say that matter is inert, and at\nthe same time that it can exert force, is to violate the law of\nnon-contradiction to the uttermost.\n\nForce is an attribute of mind or spirit, and of mind or spirit alone.\nSpirit-force is the only force in the universe. It is a doctrine as old\nas the hills that mind is the first cause of motion. \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2.[338] It is a doctrine toward which all modern science tends\nwith remarkable unanimity that all motion is the product of mind; and,\nthough continued and transformed and transmitted through various means,\nit never commences except in a volition either of the Supreme Mind or of\na created mind. \"The deep-seated instincts of humanity and the\nprofoundest researches of philosophy alike point to _Mind as the one and\nonly source of power_.\"[339] \"The conception of force as the originator\nof motion in matter, without bodily contact or the intervention of any\nintermedium, is essential to the right interpretation of physical\nphenomena;... its exertion makes itself manifest to our personal\nconsciousness by the peculiar sensation of _effort_;... and it [force]\naffords a point of contact, a connecting link between the two great\ndepartments of being--between mind and matter--the one as its\n_originator_, the other as its _recipient_.\"[340]\n\n3. All the forms of energy manifested in the universe are only\ntransformations of the one omnipresent force issuing from the one\nfountain-head of power--_the Divine Will_. The final disclosure of\nmodern science is the convertibility and homogeneity of all forms of\nphysical energy--\"a dynamical self-identification masked by\ntransmigration.\" Of this wonderful transformation of energy many\nstriking illustrations may be given; we select the following from the\n\"Lecture Notes\" of Dr. A. F. Mayer (p. 64): \"The heat developed by the\n'falling force' of a weight striking the terminals of a compound thermal\nbattery (formed by pieces of iron and German-silver wire twisted\ntogether at alternate ends) caused a current of electricity through the\nwire which, being conducted through a helix, magnetized a needle (which\nthen attracted iron particles), caused light to appear in a portion of\nthe circuit formed of Wollaston's fine wire, decomposed iodide of\npotassium, and finally moved the needles of a galvanometer.\"[341] Here\nwe have visible kinetic energy transformed into sensible heat, then\nabsorbed heat converted into electricity, then electricity transformed\ninto magnetism, also into light, and still further into the energy of\nchemical separation, while some portion of it returns to the form of\nvisible energy of motion. Of course, some of the energy is dissipated in\nthe form of radiance (radiant light and heat), but no energy is either\ncreated or destroyed. All the various forms of energy are thus reducible\nto _unity_; they are one force transformed by mechanical arrangements.\n\"Electricity and magnetism, heat and light, muscular energy and chemical\naction, motion and mechanical work, are only different forms of one and\nthe same power.... Moreover, chemical union of the elements of matter,\nthe attraction of gravitation in all the bodies of the universe, are but\nvaried forms of this universal motive force.\"[342] If it be asked, What\nis that one form of force which is to be taken as the type of all the\nrest? the explicit answer of the first scientists of the age is, \"Force\nmust be regarded as the direct expression of that mental state which we\ncall _Will_. All force is of one type, and that type is mind.\"[343] This\nis conceded even by Herbert Spencer: \"The force by which we ourselves\nproduce changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in\ngeneral, is the final disclosure of analysis.\"[344] The whole\nconception is summed up in one comprehensive statement by Professor\nNorton, of Yale College: \"I regard the primary force of repulsion as\nincessantly outstreaming in every direction from every ethereal atom\n(which is incessantly renewed), and as it spreads outward ever tending\ntoward evanescence on each radiating line by the mere result of its own\nexpansion--_a perpetual stream of force flowing from the Infinite Source\nof all power_, vanishing ultimately by diffusion in the infinite expanse\nof the universe. It breaks incessantly against the atoms of bodies, and\nso furnishes the secondary streams of force that maintain the\nconstitution and determine the phenomena of the material universe.\"[345]\nForce, then, is the act of the immanent Deity, who puts forth\nunceasingly from every point in the realm of space his creative and\nsustaining power.\n\n4. All the phenomena of molecular life (bioplasmic phenomena) are the\nresult of the immediate presence and direct agency of God.[346]\n\nThis is the doctrine which must finally be accepted, whether vitality be\nregarded as a mode of energy--a transformation of chemico-physical\nforces--or as a distinct and special force. Dr. Carpenter has long held\nthat the physical and vital forces are mutually convertible, but he\nregards both as the result of the direct action of the Deity. \"Believing\nthat all force which does not emanate from the will of created sentient\nbeings _directly and immediately proceeds from the will of the\nOmnipotent and Omnipresent Creator_; and looking on the (what we are\naccustomed to call) physical forces as so many _modi operandi_ of one\nand the same agency, the creative and sustaining will of the Deity, I do\nnot feel the validity of the objections urged against the idea of the\nabsolute metamorphosis or conversion of forces.\"[347] Inasmuch, however,\nas the advocates of this theory have failed to establish either a\n_quantitative_ or a _qualitative_ relation between the vital and\nphysical forces, but, on the contrary, the most exact and careful\nbiological researches show them to be inconvertible and antagonistic, we\nare constrained still to hold the doctrine maintained by Dr. Beale.\n\nThe ancient doctrine that \"Life is the cause, and not the consequence of\norganization,\"[348] still maintains its ground against all assaults.\nHarvey's famous maxim, _Omne vivum ex ovo_--as amended by Charles Robin,\n_Omne vivum ex vivo_--stands yet unrefuted; and, as Sir William Thomson\nremarked in his inaugural address before the British Association of\nScience, \"This seems to me as sure a teaching of science as the law of\ngravitation. I confess to being deeply impressed by the evidence put\nbefore us by Professor Huxley, and I am ready to adopt it as an article\nof scientific faith--true through all space and all time--that _life\nproceeds from life, and nothing but life_.\"[349] Life has its origin in\nno secondary cause, but in the immediate presence and direct action of\nthe Deity. God is the author and giver of Life--the constant sustainer\nof all vitality; \"in Him we live and move and are.\"\n\nThe final conclusion to be drawn from these propositions is that God is\nnot simply the _transitive_ but the _immanent_ cause of the universe.\nHe is in nature, not merely as a _regulative_ principle impressing laws\nupon matter, but as a _constitutive_ principle, the ever-present source\nand ever-operating cause of all its phenomena. If by the term nature we\nunderstand the totality of necessary and uniform phenomena, God is the\nimmediate cause of all uniform and necessary phenomena. If by nature we\nunderstand the varied forms of energy which underlie the phenomena, and\nare manifested in the phenomena, these forms of energy are but various\nmodes in which the omnipresent power of God reveals itself. God is\nimmanent in matter, and his ceaseless energy produces all the phenomena\nof nature. Nature is more than matter: it is matter swayed by Divine\npower, and organized and animated by the Divine life.\n\nBut the question may be here raised, Is not this identification of the\ndynamical life of the universe with God, Pantheism? We answer in the\nlanguage of James Martineau: \"It certainly would be so if we also turned\nthe proposition round and identified God with no more than the life of\nthe universe, and treated the two terms as for all purposes\ninterchangeable. If in affirming the Divine _immanency_ in nature we\ndeny the Divine _transcendency_ beyond nature, and pay our worship to\nthe aggregate of all its powers, the law of its laws, the unity of its\norganism,... then undoubtedly we do pass from part to whole, and rest in\na dream of future science instead of emerging into immediate\nreligion.\"[350] The theory which represents the Deity as the transitive\ncause of the universe--a \u0394\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2 mechanically fashioning the\nmaterials supplied to his hands, and then leaving it to the working of\nits own inherent forces--is rank Deism. The hypothesis which regards\nthe Deity as _no more_ than the dynamical life of the universe--an\ninforming and organizing soul associated with matter--is naked\nHylozoism. The theory that reduces all existence, material and mental,\nto phenomenal manifestations of one eternal self-existent substance\nwhich evolves itself according to an inward law of necessity, and which\nis elusively called God, is Pantheism. But the doctrine which embraces\nthe two conceptions of _transcendence_ and _immanence_, and while it\nteaches the immanence of God in matter, proclaims the infinite\ndistinctness in essence between matter and God, and the infinite\nomnipresence of a personal God above and beyond the limitations of\nmatter, is Christian Theism.[351]\n\nAnd now, in conclusion, may we not say that this dictum of faith that\nthe universe exists only in virtue of the continued Will of its Creator,\nis coming more and more to be recognized as a scientific fact. The will\nof God is the one primal force which streams forth in ever-recurring\nimpulses with an immeasurable rapidity at every point in space--an\nincessant pulse-beat of the Infinite Life.[352] The disposition and\ncollocations of matter are simply the conditions necessary to the\nmanifestation of this primal force. The chemical atom, \"already quite a\ncomplex little world,\"[353] is a mechanism for the interception,\ntransformation, and transmission of force. All the varied forms of\nenergy are but secondary and derivative streams of force--forms of\nenergy which are conceivable only as effects, and which by mere\naccommodation we may be permitted to call \"causes,\" yet with this\nspecific reservation that \"they are not vicegerents outside of the\nDivine Will, but are held within the Divine Will.\" \"The word '_cause_'\nmay be used in a secondary and concrete sense as meaning antecedent\nforces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable; we can not\npredicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly the cause of\nanother; and if, for the sake of convenience, the language of secondary\ncausation be permissible, it should only be with reference to the\nspecial phenomena referred to, as it can never be generalized.\" \"The\ncommon error, if I am right in supposing it to be such, consists in the\nabstraction of cause, and in supposing in each case a general secondary\ncause--a something which is not the First Cause, but which, if we\nexamine it carefully, _must have all the attributes of a first cause,\nand an existence independent of and dominant over matter_.\" \"CAUSATION\nIS THE WILL OF GOD.\"[354] The Divine conservation of the world is the\n_simple, universal, uniform efficiency of God_.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN HUMAN HISTORY.\n\n     \"He hath made of one blood all the nations of mankind to dwell upon\n     the face of the whole earth, and ordained to each the appointed\n     seasons of their existence and the bounds of their habitation, that\n     they should seek God.\"--ST. PAUL.\n\n     \"Divine providence, which conducts all things marvelously, rules\n     the series of human generations from Adam to the end of the world\n     _like one man_, who, from his infancy to his old age, furnishes\n     forth his career in time in passing through all its ages.\"--ST.\n     AUGUSTINE.\n\n     \"The right education of the human race, so far as concerns the\n     people of God, like that of a single man, advances through certain\n     divisions of time, as that of the individual through the\n     consecutive ages of human life.\"--ST. AUGUSTINE.\n\n     \"Les nations sont r\u00e9gies par les m\u00eames lois que les\n     individus.\"--LAURENT.\n\n\nFrom the central and fundamental truth that God is the Creator and\nConservator of the universe, Christian theology advances to the still\nmore practical truth that He determines and presides over the\ndevelopment of the human race, leading it toward a foreseen and\npredestinated goal.\n\nThis is the natural and logical order of thought. If nature and man were\ncreated and are still conserved by an intelligent power, there must be\nsome reason or end for which they exist; for intelligent power can only\nbe conceived as a power which works toward ends. The existence of the\nworld and of man being given, the question concerning the purpose or end\nfor which they exist becomes unavoidable and necessary; and though\nphysical science may proclaim \"its inability to disclose the final\npurpose of creation,\" and speak contemptuously of all such inquiries, it\ndoes not by any means follow that Christian doctrine can furnish no\nsatisfactory answer to this inevitable question. As the reference of the\ndependent universe to the efficient ground of its existence gives the\nconcepts of _Creation_ and _Conservation_ with which the idea of power\nis pre-eminently associated, so the reference of the same to the\nultimate reason of its existence gives the concepts of _Providence_ and\n_Moral Government_ with which the idea of all-wise love is immediately\ncorrelated.\n\nThe Christian doctrine of Providence in human history is succinctly\nstated in the words of St. Paul: \"God hath made of one blood all the\nnations of mankind to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, and\nordained to each the appointed times of their existence and the bounds\nof their habitation, that they should seek after, and indeed feel after,\nand find the Lord.\" He has endowed man with intelligence and freedom by\nwhich he may achieve the conquest of nature, and be able to maintain his\nexistence and ascendency in every part of the habitable globe. A new and\nsubtile force appears in the arena of nature, which is superior to\nnature, which can control and regulate its action, and subordinate the\nforces of nature to the higher purposes and needs of spiritual and moral\nbeing. By travel and observation, by reasoning and invention, by\ninterchange of ideas and products, man may continually enlarge the\nsphere of his knowledge, and multiply the means of improvement and\nhappiness.[355] God has also \"determined beforehand the _time_ of each\nnation's existence, and the geographical _boundaries_ of their\nhabitation.\" Divine providence has decreed and presided over the\ndispersions and migrations of the human race, and in the plan of history\nfixed the time when and the people by which each continent and island\nshall be inhabited. And the ultimate purpose of this providential\narrangement and supervision is that men \"may seek God, and feel after\nand really find Him,\" who for all dependent rational existence is the\nchief good.\n\nThis, then, is the explicit teaching of Christian theology: The\nappearance of rational existence on the earth constitutes a distinct\ncreative epoch; the final cause of all rational existence is to know\nGod, consciously to feel after and find Him; and the whole of God's\naction upon humanity has been an inspiration, guidance, and education\ntoward this end. _The progress of the human race, the course of human\nhistory, is therefore a revelation of the Providence of God._\n\n\"The consideration of nature,\" says Niebuhr, \"shows an inherent\nintelligence, which may be also considered as coherent in nature; so\ndoes history, on a hundred occasions, show an intelligence distinct from\nnature which conducts and determines those things which may seem to us\naccidental; and it is not true that history weakens our belief in Divine\nprovidence. History is, of all kinds of knowledge, the one which tends\nmost decidedly to that belief.\"[356] \"History,\" observes Richter, \"has,\nlike nature, the highest value (if studied philosophically) in so far as\nwe by means of it, as by means of nature, can divine and read the\nInfinite Spirit who, with nature and history as with letters, legibly\nwrites to us. He who finds a God in the physical world will also find\none in the moral world--which is history. Nature forces on our hearts a\nCreator; history, a Providence.\" To the student of history it becomes\napparent that the hand of God has been guiding humanity toward the\nfulfillment of its destiny. God has presided over the development of\nhuman society and government. Throughout the ages He has been the\nEducator of the race--leading, instructing, chastening, and blessing the\nnations. \"Man holds relations to God not merely at the moment of\ncreation; he does not cease to be in connection with his Creator through\nthe endless duration of his existence. The incessant action of God on\nman is grace; the incessant action of God on humanity is providential\ngovernment.\"[357] \"History is the manifestation of God's supervision of\nhumanity, and the judgments of history are the judgments of God.\"[358]\n\nIf we have here the true conception of history, if it is a manifestation\nof Divine supervision, direction, and discipline, then the question is\nat once legitimate and practical, What is the end of this discipline?\nwhat is the foreseen and predestinated goal toward which, through\nconflict and pain and travail, Divine providence is leading the human\nrace?\n\nIt must be conceded on all hands that the adequate and final answer can\nonly be given by that Divine prescience which \"sees the end from the\nbeginning.\" The study of the past and of the present moral and religious\nphenomena of the world may afford to the philosophic mind some prevision\nof the future, but it is obvious that revelation alone can supply the\nprinciples which must constitute the light of history--the light in\nwhich even its darkest chapters may be interpreted, and its true\nphilosophy evolved.\n\nThe general answer which speculative thought has furnished to this\nquestion is that the goal of history is _the highest perfection of\nhumanity_. Aristotle clearly recognizes that there must be an end or\nfinal cause of human existence and action--a \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 (_summum\nbonum_), or chief end.[359] He therefore addresses himself to the\ninquiry, What is the chief good, or highest end of man? The conclusion\nwhich he reaches is, that it is the absolute satisfaction of his whole\nnature--that which men have agreed to call _happiness_. This happiness,\nhowever, is not mere sensual pleasure. The brute shares this in common\nwith man, therefore it can not constitute the happiness of man. Human\nhappiness must express the _completeness_ of rational existence, or, as\nhe expresses it, \"a perfect practical activity in a perfect life.\"[360]\nThis \"complete and perfect life\" is the complete satisfaction of our\nrational nature. It is the realization of the Divine in man, and\nconstitutes the absolute and all-sufficient good.[361] A good action is\nthus \"an end in itself,\" inasmuch as it tends to secure the _perfection_\nof our nature.\n\nThe human mind can not, however, rest in the general and vague idea of\nperfection; we are therefore pressed with the further question, In what\ndoes the highest perfection of humanity consist? by what standard are we\nto judge of this perfection? what is the _ideal_ toward which the\nprogress of humanity may be presumed to tend, and which we hope it will\nultimately attain? The following considerations may furnish the answer:\n\n1. That ideal must be the same for the race as for the individual, the\nsame for the nation as for the man. For, on the one hand, society exists\nfor the sake of the individual, and it is only in society that\nindividual existences can be preserved, developed, and perfected; on the\nother hand, national character is but the expression of the collective\nor average character of the individual citizens.\n\nIn seeking for the ideal of individual perfection, we must take account\nof all the capacities, powers, and relations of man. We must have in\nview, not simply his physical and intellectual, but also his moral and\nreligious nature. We must think of the relation in which he stands to\nhis fellow-beings and to his God, as well as the relation in which he\nstands to himself--that is, to the liberty and intelligence which are in\nhim, and which he must develop. Now no man can be said to be complete,\nto be _perfect_, no man can be said to have reached his \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, or end,\nuntil he has developed in his thought and realized in his life the idea\nof the useful, the true, the just, the good, the pure, the Divine.\nLoyalty to God and the truth, justice and charity toward men,\nself-control and purity of mind, intellectual discipline and cultivated\ntaste--these are the characteristics of the perfect man. Judged from the\nChristian stand-point, he is the perfect man who has attained to that\nideal of moral and spiritual excellence which was exhibited in the human\nlife of Christ, that grand embodiment of all that is \"pure and true and\njust and lovely and of good report.\" The realization of this ideal in\nthe collective life of humanity must be the goal of history.\n\n2. Further light is shed upon this problem by the consideration of the\nChristian idea of God. The gravitating point of Christian theology is\nfound in the Divine declaration, \"_God is Love_\" (1 John iv. 8, 16).\nThis is the most fundamental revelation of the Divine nature, so that\nnothing can pertain to his perfections or his works which is not\nultimately resolvable into love. \"If ever the idea of Divine justice\nshall obtain consistency [in our systems of theology], it must be in\ngeneral through the relation of infinite holy love to the spontaneous\nand self-determining capacity of the personal being, or the relation of\nDivine perfection to the existence of the economy in the universe.\"[362]\nThe fact that God creates worlds and gives birth to personal existences\nis not grounded in his omnipotence, but in his love. Divine love is the\ndeterminative principle of Divine efficiency--the final cause or\nultimate reason of all existence. Creation must therefore be conceived\nas the free self-communication of God, who is Himself eternally\nself-complete and self-sufficient, but who, from love alone, wills that\nother intelligences shall have existence who can \"know God,\" and in\nfellowship with Him attain that fullness and fruition of being which is\ncalled \"Eternal Life.\"[363] If, then, the Divine mind has always had\nthis end in view--the perfection and blessedness of personal being in\nfellowship with Himself--it must be regarded by us as the consummation\ntoward which his providence is leading humanity.\n\n3. The explicit declarations of Scripture are in perfect accord with\nthese inferences drawn from the nature of man and the idea of God. We\nlearn from the words of St. Paul that the aim of Divine providence is to\nlead the race to the practical recognition of the personal dignity of\nman as \"the offspring of God;\" to the practical recognition of the\nuniversal brotherhood of man, as \"of one blood,\" with equal rights to\nplace, provision, and free self-development in \"every part of the\nearth;\" finally, to the practical recognition of our relation to God as\nhis dependent creatures, in fellowship with whom we have eternal\nlife.[364] God's great end in the whole course and discipline of\nprovidence is to unite all men in bonds of mutual affection and aid, and\nto unite the race to Himself in bonds of loyalty and love. Then\n\"whatsoever things are true and pure and honest and lovely and of good\nreport\" will be revered and practiced among the nations of the earth.\n\nThese views of Divine providence can scarcely be said to have had any\nplace or any recognition in the ancient schools of philosophy. The\nStoics taught that an invincible necessity rules in the realm of history\nas well as in the field of nature, to which God and man are equally\nsubject. \"God is the reason of the world (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5); the\nlaws of the world are as necessary as the laws of eternal reason. This\nnecessity is at once _fate_ (\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7), and the _providence_ (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1)\nwhich governs all things.\"[365] The Epicureans reduced all existence to\nthe plane of mere physical nature, and represented humanity as a\ndevelopment from the lower forms of life by the agency of blind,\nunconscious force. If they recognized the existence of any god or gods,\nthey removed them far away from all intercourse with humanity, and all\nsupervision of or concern in human affairs. \"They admitted their\nexistence in words,\" says Cicero, \"but denied it in act.\" These two\nforms of error are combined by the modern deniers of providence. Human\nsociety, languages, laws, institutions, arts, sciences, are all the\nproducts of matter and force. The succession of events, the progress of\ncivilization, and the religious phenomena of the world, have not been\ndetermined by an intelligent Will, or presided over by a conscious\nPersonality. In the last analysis, matter is resolved into a function of\nforce, and a process of necessary evolution, which has no design and no\nfinal purpose, is substituted for Divine providence. The ultimate\ndestination of the world and humanity is unknown, or, if conjecture is\npermissible, is chaos and death.\n\nIn opposition to these cold and cheerless speculations Christianity\naffirms the doctrine of Divine providence in human history.[366]\n\nBy Providence we understand intelligent _forethought_ and timely\n_provision_ for all contingencies. The term supposes a precognized\n_plan_, a constant supervision of its development, and the control and\nsubordination of all finite powers and agencies in order to its\ncompletion. From nature, strictly considered as the empire of mechanical\nnecessity, nothing can proceed but that which is posited in it by the\nimmediate act of God; and consequently, considered apart from man, there\ncan be no contingency, and, properly speaking, no providence in this\nsphere. The existence of mere nature, however, can not be regarded as an\nend in itself. The whole interest and significance of nature is found in\nthe conception that it exists as a means for a higher end. As matter is\nsimply the condition for the manifestation of force, as the physical\nforces are subordinated to the vital force, and the vital is\nsubordinated to the mental, so is it a legitimate assumption, which we\nshall justify in the sequel, that all these are subordinated to the\n_moral_ and _spiritual_. It is only in the sphere of spiritual\nbeing--that is, of self-conscious and self-determined being--and in the\n_relation of nature to spiritual being_, that contingency can arise and\nprovidence find place.\n\nThe uniform teaching of Scripture is that human history is the special\nfield of Divine providence. In fact, the historic portions of the Bible\nare nothing else than a record of the control and direction and\nsubordination of human agencies, and of external physical conditions in\ntheir relation to personal beings, by the hand of God. This primitive\nrevelation throws light upon the cradle of human civilization. It points\nto a period when man, at his departure from the hand of God, received\nthose intellectual, moral, and spiritual endowments which raise him in\nthe scale of being immeasurably above the animal creation, and fit him\nfor a progress, a development to which no conceivable limits can be\nassigned.[367] The Bible is the history of Divine providence from that\nsignal commencement to the planting of the Christian Church, where we\ncan clearly see all the lines along which the race advanced, converging\nupon \"the Kingdom of God.\" It is a history of Divine interposition in\nhuman affairs, and of supernatural guidance toward a higher development\nand a nobler destiny. Indeed, to the eye of the observant and\nconscientious student of all history, whether secular or ecclesiastical,\nthere are undeniable evidences of the presence of Intelligence,\ndisposing and collocating the conditions of human progress, and\ndirecting humanity toward a nobler civilization.\n\nConsidering the earth in its relation to man, we must recognize the\nprovidence of God in the physical universe. The earth was unquestionably\nmade for man. It was created, and has been especially adapted to be the\ntheatre of human history. This is the doctrine of Scripture (Gen. i.\n28-31; Psa. cxv. 16)--I believe it is also the doctrine of science. The\ngeological changes through which the earth has passed indicate \"a\nprocess of preparation\" for the inhabitation of man. This process of\npreparation is fully recognized by Agassiz. \"There has been,\" he says,\n\"a manifest progress in the succession of beings on the surface of the\nglobe. This progress consists in an increasing similarity to the living\nfauna, and, among the vertebrates especially, in the increasing\nresemblance to man. But this connection is not the consequence of a\ndirect lineage between the faunas of different ages. The fishes of the\nPal\u00e6ozoic are in no respect the ancestors of the reptiles of the\nSecondary age, nor does man descend from the mammals of the Tertiary\nage. The link by which they are connected is of an immaterial nature,\nand their connection is to be sought in the thought of the Creator\nHimself, whose _aim_ in forming the earth, in allowing it to pass\nthrough the successive changes which Geology has pointed out, and in\ncreating successively all the different types of animals which have\npassed away, was to introduce man upon the surface of the globe. Man is\nthe end toward which all the animal creation has tended.\"[368] The\nlanguage of Prof. Owen is equally explicit: \"The recognition of an ideal\nexemplar in the vertebrated animals proves that the knowledge of such a\nbeing as man existed before man appeared; for the Divine Mind which\nplanned the archetype also foresaw all its modifications. The archetype\nidea was manifested in the flesh long prior to the existence of those\nanimal species that actually exemplify it.\"[369] \"Of the nature of the\ncreative acts by which the successive races of animals were called into\nbeing, we are ignorant. But this we know, that as the evidence of unity\nof plan testifies to the oneness of the Creator, so the modifications of\nthe plan for different modes of existence illustrate the benevolence of\nthe Designer. Those structures, moreover, which are at present\nincomprehensible as adaptations to a special end, are made\ncomprehensible on a higher principle, and a _final purpose_ is gained in\nrelation to human intelligence.\"[370] That these views are still held by\nProf. Owen is evident from his remarks in the fortieth chapter of his\n\"Anatomy of the Vertebrates:\" \"Of all the quadrupedal servants of man,\nnone have proved of more value to him, in peace or war, than the horse;\nnone have co-operated with the advanced races more influentially in\nman's destined mastery over the earth and its lower denizens.... I\nbelieve the horse to have been predestinated and prepared for man. It\nmay be a weakness; but, if so, it is a glorious one, to discern, however\ndimly, across our finite prison-wall, evidence of 'the Divinity that\nshapes our ends,' abuse the means as we may.\"[371]\n\nLong before the appearance of man upon the earth, the providence of God\nlaid up in its strata those vast treasures of granite, sandstone, lime,\nmarble, coal, salt, petroleum, and the various metals, the product of a\nlong succession of ages and revolutions, thus making an inexhaustible\nprovision for the necessities of man, and furnishing ample resources for\nthe development of his genius and skill.[372] In the vegetable life\nwhich appeared on the globe immediately prior to and contemporaneous\nwith the advent of man, we can recognize a providential arrangement made\nfor man. In the flora of the Pal\u00e6ozoic and Secondary periods we can not\nfail to observe the absence of all those plants which are adapted for\nhuman food. Even in the Tertiary epoch, which immediately precedes the\nAdamic or human period, so far as Geology reveals, there were few or no\nplants yielding the appropriate supplies for the sustentation of man.\nThere are few indications of any of those vegetables from which man may\nderive food and valuable fibre, and, in a word, of species which support\nand clothe by far the larger portion of the human race. \"Scarcely any\ngrasses appear in the list of extinct vegetation, and there is reason\nto believe that the principal cereals which are characteristic of the\nhuman period--as barley, wheat, oats, rye, millet, Indian corn, and\nrice\"--had no existence.[373] When the fullness of time was come, and\nall things were ready for the reception of man, then God called him into\nbeing, and invested him with dominion over nature.\n\nPhysical geography also indicates, not only a state of preparation for\nman, but also a special adaptation of the fixed forms of the earth's\nsurface for securing the perfect development of man according to the\nDivine ideal. And as the land which man inhabits, the food he eats, the\nair he breathes, the mountains and rivers and seas which are his\nneighbors, the skies that overshadow him, the diversities of climate to\nwhich he is subject, and indeed all physical conditions, exert a\npowerful influence upon his tastes, pursuits, habits, and character--we\nmay presume that not only are all these conditions predetermined by God,\nbut continually under his control and supervision.\n\nThe distribution of terrestrial areas--the continents, islands, and\nseas; the disposition of the climate, soil, and vegetation, apparently\naccidental, have played an important part in the moral history of our\nrace. There is a close relation between nature and history, between the\nearth and man. The soul of man is distinct from, but not totally\nindependent of the body and of external physical conditions. To deny\nthis would be to reject all the lessons of experience. The relation of\nman to nature is not, however, a relation of cause and effect, but, as\nCousin remarks, \"Man and nature are two great effects which, coming from\nthe _same_ cause, bear the same characteristics, so that the earth and\nhe who inhabits it, man and nature, are in perfect harmony.\"[374] \"A\nliving God,\" says Ritter, \"is at the head of the physical and moral\nworld.\"[375] The earth was created for man, not simply to be a\ndwelling-place, but a _school-house_[376]--made to be a theatre for the\neducation, the development, and the perfection of the human race. And as\nthe moral and intellectual culture of the child is materially affected\nby the physical conditions with which he is surrounded, and as these are\nconsequently the subject of care and forethought on the part of the\nintelligent and prudent parent and teacher, so the external physical\nconditions of a nation exert a powerful influence on its intellectual\nand moral development, and therefore must be presumed to be the subject\nof forethought and providence on the part of God, \"the Father of the\nfamilies of all the earth.\" God has superintended the peopling of the\nearth, the dispersions and migrations of nations, guiding the footsteps\nof the \"covenant, educating, and missionary nations\" to those countries\nbest adapted to their highest development. In a word, He has ordained\nthe progress of empire and the course of civilization.\n\nThus nature and history are the two great factors of Divine providence;\nin their relations and harmonies we have a revelation of the purposes\nand plans of God.[377]\n\nThat geographical conditions do exert a powerful influence on the\ncharacter of nations can not be denied. \"The bodily constitution of a\npeople, their temperament, modes of life, habitations, customs,\nlanguages, and even religious opinions have been formed or modified\nunder the influence of that magic circle of nature which surrounds them,\nand which so powerfully affects what is individual in national\ncharacter.\" So that, could we fully grasp all the characteristics of a\ncountry--its position, configuration, climate, scenery, and natural\nproducts--we could, with tolerable accuracy, determine what are the\ncharacteristics of the people who inhabit it. We have discussed this\ntopic at some length in \"Christianity and Greek Philosophy,\" and shall\nhere simply recall such of the general facts and principles as may be\nneeded for a clear understanding of the present discussion.\n\n1. _The habits and characteristics of the dwellers in the Temperate Zone\ndiffer widely from those of the dwellers in the Torrid Zone._ This is an\nobvious fact; and the causes of this difference are equally obvious to\nthe observant mind. In the tropical regions the powers of vegetable and\nanimal life are stimulated to the highest degree, and here nature\ndisplays her fullest energy, her greatest variety, and her richest\nsplendors. Excessive heat enfeebles and enervates man. It induces\nlassitude, dreaminess, effeminacy, and tempts to quietude and indolence.\nWhere nature pours her fullness into the lap of ease, forethought and\nprovidence are little needed. Here is none of that struggle for\nexistence which awakens sagacity and develops industry. Nothing calls\nman to that effort for the conquest of nature by which the intellect is\naroused and the reasoning faculties are developed. Consequently the mere\nlife of the body, the powers of the physical nature of man, overmaster\nthe faculties of the mind. The instincts predominate over the reason.\nSimple spontaneity of thought is manifested, but little or no analytic\nreflection. Feeling, imagination, sentiment, predominate over intellect,\nreason, and science. In a temperate climate all is reversed. The\nalternations of heat and cold render man more vigorous, and impart more\nphysical tone. Where there is less profusion and lavishment of nature's\ngifts, there is more room and motive for industry. The change of\nseasons, and an annual period of dormancy, demand forethought and\nprudence. The preservation of life demands, not merely physical toil,\nbut some degree of contrivance, and, indeed, the vigorous exertion of\nthe intellectual powers. And here, though nature is not prodigal of her\ngifts, she grants to industry and skill something more than the bare\nnecessities of life. She allows man to lay up a store for the future,\nand furnishes some leisure for the culture of the mind. The active\npowers of man, his reason and judgment, rule his instincts, and control,\nmore or less, his appetites and emotions. Here man becomes a careful\nobserver of events; he treasures up the results of experience, compares\none fact with another, notes their relations, and makes new experiments\nto test his conclusions. Thus science has its birth in the Temperate\nZone.[378]\n\n2. _There is a marked difference between the mental habits and modes of\nthought of the peoples who dwell in the interior of an immense continent\nand those who dwell on the margin of the sea._ Vast continents, unbroken\nby lakes and inland seas, and extended plains where broad deserts and\nhigh mountain ranges separate the populations, are the seats of\nimmobility. The inhabitants are isolated from the rest of the world, and\nexcluded from a stimulating and profitable intercourse with the nations\nof the earth. They have comparatively no navigation, their commerce is\nlimited to the bare necessities of life, and there are no inducements to\nmovement, to travel, and to enterprise. Society is therefore stationary,\nas in China; the habits, manners, and usages of social and civil life\nremain as they were two thousand years ago. Infolded and imprisoned\nwithin the overwhelming vastness and illimitable sway of nature, man is\nalmost unconscious of his freedom and personality. He surrenders himself\nto the disposal of a mysterious \"fate,\" and yields readily to the\nabsolute control of rulers who are regarded as of supernatural origin\nand endowed with superhuman powers. The forms of government remain\nunchanged from age to age, and the state is the reign of fixed and\ninexorable laws--\"The laws of the Medes and Persians are unalterable.\"\nThe rights of the person are scarcely recognized, and the individual is\nlost in the mass.\n\nExtended border-lands on the margin of great rivers and inland seas are,\non the contrary, the theatre of movement, activity, and life. Here man\nis set free from the bondage imposed by the overpowering magnitude and\nvastness of continental and oceanic forms. Here industry is not\nstationary, but progressive; and commerce thrives because the rivers and\ninland seas furnish the means of easy transit, and the opportunity for a\nfree interchange of commodities. Along with the exchange of commodities\nthere will be an exchange of ideas, because ideas flow along the\nchannels of commerce. Here also the arts will be cultivated, first for\npurposes of gain, and subsequently for the gratification of taste. And,\nwhere there is freedom of movement, where there is creative industry,\nwhere nature is subjugated by man, the idea of personal liberty will be\ndeveloped, and the rights of the individual will be regarded. These\nideas of personal liberty and rights will become incorporated with the\nlaws and institutions of society, and the government will tend toward a\ndemocracy. Finally, this freedom of movement and action will engender\nfreedom of thought. Reflection will commence, the speculative and\ncritical spirit will arise, and philosophy will be born.[379]\n\n3. _There is also an acknowledged difference between the mental\ncharacter of the inhabitants of a bright and sunny climate who breathe\nan elastic atmosphere, and are surrounded by the most inspiring scenery,\nand that of the people who dwell under a gray and sombre sky, and daily\nlook upon the more stern and rugged aspects of nature._ The dwellers in\nthe former climate are ardent, vivacious, and mercurial; the inhabitants\nof the latter are slow, deliberate, persistent, and conservative. One\nnation will be speculative, enamored of plausible hypotheses, and prone\nto hasty and brilliant generalization; the other will be practical,\nintolerant of hypotheses, and clamorous for facts and logical inferences\nfrom facts. In the former climate the fine arts will be enthusiastically\ncultivated, and elegance and taste, and all that is graceful in\nsentiment and action, will find a congenial home; in the latter, the\nexact sciences and the useful arts will be cultivated with persistence\nand zeal. Under the former conditions, a religion of poetry, of\nsentiment, of artistic display and imposing ceremonial, will sway the\npopular mind; under the latter, a religion of personal duty and purity,\nof social righteousness, of active beneficence, and of universal\ncharity, will command respect.\n\nThese principles constitute what may be designated the _statics_ of\nhistory--the more or less stable and permanent _conditions_ under which\nthe living forces of humanity are developed.\n\nThe _dynamics_ of history are the fundamental powers and rational ideas\nof human nature. There are certain primary ideas of the reason which are\nrevealed in the universal consciousness of our race under the\nconditions of experience--the exterior conditions of physical nature and\nsensational life. Such are the ideas of substance and cause, of unity\nand infinity, which govern all the processes of discursive thought, and\nlead us to the recognition of the uncreated and unconditioned Being;\nsuch the ideas of right, of duty, of accountability, and of retribution\nwhich regulate all the conceptions we form of our relations to other\nmoral beings, and constitute _morality_; such the ideas of order,\nproportion, and harmony which preside in the realm of art, and\nconstitute the beau-ideal of _\u00e6sthetics_; such the ideas of God, the\nsoul, and immortality which rule in the domain of _religion_, and\nconstitute man a religious being. In addition to these, there are the\npowers of observation, of abstraction, of generalization, of inference,\nthe capacity of symbolic conception and expression, the faculty of\ncreative imagination, the powers of invention, of foresight, and of\nscientific prevision. These are the living forces of humanity,\nfundamentally the same under all circumstances, but modified in their\nintensity and development by geographical, climatal, and scenic\nconditions. The providential adjustment and harmonious relation of the\nexterior conditions with the inherent powers of humanity is the problem\nof history.\n\nBefore attempting to trace the hand of Divine providence in the original\nlocation and subsequent migrations of the historic races, let us briefly\nreproduce the sentences which express the _conditions_ most favorable to\nthe development and perfection of humanity. 1. While the tropical\nclimate of Southern Asia, of Africa, and of South America is unfavorable\nto the highest intellectual and moral development, the temperate climate\nof Western Asia, of Europe, and of North America is peculiarly adapted\nto minister to the advancement and perfection of the human race. 2. The\nmassive, unbroken continents of the South, shut in by immense oceans and\nimpassable mountain ranges, are the seats of immobility and the home of\ndespotic power; but the deeply indented and elaborately articulated\ncontinents of the North, with their inland seas and large navigable\nrivers, are the theatre of activity, of progress, and of liberty. 3. The\nsunny skies and glowing landscapes and inspiring scenery of the south of\nEurope are most congenial to poetry and music, and painting and\nsculpture, and all that is graceful in expression and action; the deeper\ntone and sterner features of the northern portion of Europe, \"whose\nskies are sombre, and whose mountains are rugged and gray,\" determine it\nto be the home of practical industry and useful arts, of benevolent\nenterprises and philanthropic deeds. Bearing in mind these principles,\nwe turn to history in the belief that we shall find that Divine\nprovidence has at successive periods placed the historic races in such\ngeographical relations and amid such physical conditions as have been\nmost favorable to their intellectual and moral development.\n\n1. The first historic fact to which we would now direct attention is\n_that the human race really commenced its history in the midst of the\ncontinents of the Temperate Zone_. Western Asia was unquestionably the\ncradle of the human race, the grand centre whence the different families\nor races commenced their migrations.\n\nWhatever views may be entertained of the doctrine supposed to be taught\nin Gen. i.-iv. that the whole human race originally descended from a\nsingle pair, or whatever method of interpretation in regard to that\nancient document may finally prevail--even should we adopt the theory of\nDr. McCausland[380] that the Biblical account is concerned only with\nthe origin of a covenant and redemptive race (the Adamite or Edenic\nrace), which was to be the instructor and benefactor of the pre-Adamite\nraces--there can be no question that the sacred historian traces the\nsource of the great historic nations to the family of Noah (Gen. ix.\n19). Whatever difficulties there may be in determining the site of\nEden--and they are confessedly great, if not insurmountable--there is no\ndifficulty in locating the second geographical centre from whence the\ngreat historic races departed to overspread the earth. Ararat is, no\ndoubt, in its Biblical import, the Armenian highlands, the lofty plateau\nwhich overlooks the plains of the Araxes on the north and Mesopotamia on\nthe south. This \"Armenian plateau stands equidistant from the Euxine and\nthe Caspian seas on the north, and between the Persian Gulf and the\nMediterranean Sea on the south. With the first it is connected by the\nAcampsis, with the second by the Araxes, with the third by the Tigris\nand the Euphrates, the latter of which serves as an outlet toward the\ncountries on the Mediterranean coast. These seas were the highways of\nprimitive colonization, and the plains watered by these rivers were the\nseats of the most powerful nations of antiquity--the Assyrians, the\nBabylonians, the Medes, and the Colchians. Viewed with reference to the\ndispersion of the nations, Armenia is the true \u1f40\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2--the\nmiddle part--of the earth; and it is a significant fact that at the\npresent day Ararat is the great boundary-stone between the empires of\nRussia, Turkey, and Persia.\"[381]\n\nThe Scripture account, which certainly authorizes us to fix upon the\nhighlands of Armenia as the new centre whence the descendants of Noah\nwent forth to people the earth, is confirmed by the most ancient\ntraditions and the most reliable historic records. Josephus tells us\nthere was in Armenia a city which was called \u1f08\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd--the\nPlace of Descent[382]--\"for the ark being saved in that place, its\nremains are shown by the inhabitants to this day.\"[383] He further adds\nthat \"all the writers of the barbarian histories make mention of the\nflood, and of this ark, among whom is Berosus, the Chald\u00e6an,[384] who,\nwhen he goes on to describe the circumstances of the flood, remarks, 'it\nis said there is still some part of this ship in Armenia, at the\nmountain of the Cordy\u00e6ans;' Hieronymus, the Egyptian, who wrote the\nPh\u0153nician antiquities, and Manases, and indeed a great many others,\nalso make mention of the same. Nay, Nicholas of Damascus, in his\nninety-sixth book, hath a particular relation about them, where he\nspeaks thus: 'There is a great mountain in Armenia, over Minyas, called\nBaris, upon which, it is reported,... that one who was carried in an ark\ncame on shore upon the top of it, and that the remains of the timber\nwere a great while preserved.'\"[385]\n\nThis concurrent testimony of sacred and profane history, which\ndesignates Western Asia as the cradle of the historic nations, has\nreceived additional confirmation from the researches of modern\nethnologists and philologists. In the tenth chapter of Genesis, the\nsacred historian sketches the nations of the earth at his time of\nwriting, indicates their ethnic affinities, and marks to some extent\ntheir geographical positions. The professor of ancient history in the\nUniversity of Oxford, George Rawlinson, remarks that \"the _Toldoth Beni\nNoah_ (the Generations of Noah) has excited the admiration of modern\nethnologists, who continually find in it the anticipations of their\ngreatest discoveries.\"[386] Sir Henry Rawlinson assures us that \"the\nToldoth Beni Noah is undoubtedly the _most authentic_ record we possess\nof the affiliations of the human race which sprang from the triple stock\nof the Noachid\u00e6.\"[387] The same distinguished Oriental scholar in an\nessay \"On the Ethnic Affinities of the Nations of Western Asia,\"\nfurther remarks: \"In Western Asia, the cradle of the human race, the\nseveral ethnic branches of the human family were more closely\nintermingled and more evenly balanced than in any other portion of the\nancient world. Semitic, Indo-European, and T\u00e2tar or Turanian races not\nonly divided among them this portion of the earth's surface, but lay\ninterspersed and confused upon it in a most remarkable entanglement. It\nis symptomatic of this curious intermixture that the Persian monarchs,\nwhen they wished to communicate to their Asiatic subjects in such a way\nthat it should be generally intelligible, had to put it out not only in\nthree different languages, but in three languages belonging to the\n_three principal divisions of human speech_. Hence the trilingual\ninscriptions of Behistun, Persepolis, etc., which consist of an\nIndo-European, a T\u00e2tar, and a Semitic column.\"[388]\n\nThus do all the varied lines of evidence proceeding from history,\nethnology, and philology converge upon Western Asia as the cradle of the\nhuman race--the centre from which the families of mankind departed to\npeople the earth; and we are constrained to regard the early populations\nof that region as furnishing the _typical_ standard or average sample of\nour species.\n\nProceeding from a purely zoological stand-point, we should be led to an\nopposite conclusion. Looking to the general phenomena of the\ngeographical distribution of animals, and the natural rather than the\nartificial conditions of human existence, and arguing solely on\nnaturalistic grounds, we should be constrained to place the centre of\nour race in the tropics; and of the intertropical regions those which\nare the habitat of the anthropoid (or anthropomorphic) ape, as Western\nAfrica and the southern extremity of Asia. In the protoplasts of his\nspecies the mere zoologist sees but so many naked bipeds, with the\ncapabilities, indeed, of working out for their future behoof the\nessentials of clothing, the use of fire, and the like, but in the first\ninstance unfit for any climate except the mildest, and incapable of\nsustenance on any soil except the most luxuriant. He consequently fixes\nupon the tropics as the cradle of our race; and those who assume the\nlineal descent of the human species from the quadrumana fix upon those\nintertropical points which are the habitats of the anthropomorphic apes.\n\nThe law which governs the distribution and development of vegetable and\nanimal life would also lead us to fix upon the tropical regions as the\ngeographical centre of our race. That law may be thus stated: _The\ndegree of perfection of the types of life, and the diversity and number\nof species, are proportional to the intensity of heat._ In this\nprogress, as Humboldt has remarked, we find organic life and vigor\ngradually augmenting with the increase of temperature. And the number of\nspecies increases as we approach the equator, and decreases as we retire\nfrom it.[389]\n\nIn the Frigid Zone life seems almost extinguished during the greater\npart of the year by the rigors of an almost perpetual winter. The\nvegetation of the polar regions is stunted, dull, and monotonous in\ncolor, and inadequate to sustain animal life. The plains are covered\nwith mosses and lichens, and here and there a few herbs and shrubs\n(saxifrages, gentians, papaver, etc.), but no stately forest trees. In\nshort, the general characteristic of these cold regions is the\npreponderance of cryptogamous plants. In the Temperate Zone we have a\nmarked superiority in vegetable life. Here we have grassy pastures,\ncerealia, and dicotyledonous trees--the oak, ash, beech, maple,\nchestnut, walnut, the apple, pear, plum, etc. The number of genera and\nspecies is greatly increased, and the superior types acquire a fuller\ndevelopment. The preponderance of phanerogamous plants, the richer\ncoloring, and the appearance of evergreen trees, are the signs of an\nimmense progress. But the soft tints, the medium forms, and the wintry\nsleep extending through half the year, clearly indicate that the\nperfection of physical nature is not attained.[390] It is in the heat of\nthe Torrid Zone where nature puts forth all her energy, and displays her\ngreatest resources. \"The cryptogamous plants attain, in arborescent\nforms, the proportions of our forest trees. The grasses which we know in\nour climates only under the humble forms they put on in our fields,\nrise, in the elegant and majestic bamboo, to the height of sixty or\nseventy feet. A single tree is a garden, wherein a hundred different\nplants intertwine their branches, and display their brilliant flowers on\na ground of verdure, where their varied hues and forms of leaves are\nrichly blended.\" And here the perfection of vegetable life is attained\nin the graceful palms which stand at the head and crown the vegetable\nkingdom. This is the region of a perpetual summer, where nature makes\nample provision for the support of animal life, and the date, the\ncocoa-nut, the banana, the plantain, the sugar-cane, the pine-apple,\nsupply all the wants of uncivilized man.\n\nThe same gradation is marked in the animal kingdom. The most\ncharacteristic feature of the arctic fauna is its dull uniformity. The\nspecies are few in number, their forms are regular, and their tints are\ndusky as the northern heavens. The most conspicuous animals are the\nreindeer, the white bear, and the various seals; but the most important\nare the whales, which rank lowest of all the mammals. The preponderance\nof marine animals clearly indicates an inferior development. The faunas\nof the temperate regions are much more varied than in the Arctic Zone.\nInstead of consisting mainly of aquatic tribes, we have a considerable\nnumber of terrestrial animals of graceful form, animated appearance, and\nvaried coloring, though less brilliant than those found in tropical\nregions. It is in the tropics that animal life attains its highest\ndevelopment. The boundless variety of species, the richness of the\ncolors, the diversity of forms, the size and strength of the great\npachyderms that people the forests and rivers, the fleetness and vigor\nof the ferocious denizens of the jungle and the plain, all attest that\nthis is the privileged zone. And here only are found the quadruman\u00e6,\nwhich stand at the head of the animal kingdom.\n\nSuch, then, is clearly the law of the physical world. \"Nature goes on\nadding perfection to perfection from the polar regions to the Temperate\nZone, and from the Temperate Zone to the region of the greatest heat.\"\nAnimal life increases in strength and development; the types are\nimproved; intelligence enlarges; the form approaches nearer the human\nfigure; the ourang-outang occasionally stands erect; and the presence of\nthe mastoid and styloid processes, the development of the heel-bone, and\nthe form of the pelvis, together with the shape of the ears and a higher\nfrontal development, give the gorilla a startling resemblance to man.\nFollowing, then, the ascending series (especially if man be regarded as\nthe lineal descendant of the anthropomorphic apes), we might reasonably\nsuppose that here would be found the proper home and habitat of man,\nand that the tropical man would be the highest type of humanity, and,\nphysically speaking, the most beautiful of the species.\n\nBut this, as every one knows, is not the case. While all the types of\nplants and of animals go on increasing in perfection from the polar to\nthe equatorial regions in proportion to the increase of temperature,\n\"man presents to our view his purest, his most perfect type at the very\ncentre of the temperate continents, at the centre of Asia-Europe, in the\nregion of Iran, of Armenia, and of the Caucasus;, and, departing from\nthis geographical centre in the three grand directions of the lands, the\ntypes gradually lose the beauty of their forms in proportion to their\ndistance, even to the extreme points of the southern continents, where\nwe find the most deformed and [physically] degenerated races, and the\nlowest in the scale of humanity.\"[391]\n\nThe distribution of the human race over the face of the earth has thus\nbeen governed by a different law from that which has governed the\ndistribution of plants and animals.\n\nIn the latter case, the degree of perfection of the types is exactly\nproportional to the intensity of heat and other material conditions\nfavorable to the development of physical life. _This is the law of a\nphysical order._\n\nIn the former case, in man, the degree of perfection of the types is in\nproportion to the degree of intellectual and moral improvement, and to\nthe physical conditions favorable to intellectual and moral development.\n_This is the law of a moral order._\n\nThis difference between the two laws has its ground and reason in the\nessential difference between the nature and destination of these\ndifferent orders of being. The plant and the animal are not destined to\nbecome a different thing from what they already are. The end of their\nexistence is already attained. The development of each individual is\nbound to an immutable necessity of nature. Therefore vegetable life and\norganization are ceaselessly uniform; there are always the same cellular\nstructures and the same morphological forms. Unreasoning and instinctive\nlife never leaves its sphere. The beaver builds its dam, lives, and\ndies, just as it did six thousand years ago. The bee builds the same\nhexagonal cell she built before the flood. There is an all-pervading\norder in the physical world, But with man it is quite otherwise. Man,\ncreated in the image of God, is a free moral being. He is not solely\nunder the dominion of mere nature-conditions, and he is therefore a\nprogressive being. The physical man is not the true man; the body is not\nan end, but a means. There is another man--the intellectual, the moral,\nthe spiritual man--which grows up with the body, and to which the\nphysical man is a servant and minister. The unfolding, the development,\nthe perfection of this spiritual nature is the grand end of man. This\ndevelopment can only take place under freedom; this nature be unfolded\nonly by education; the maturity and the perfection of man secured only\nby the exercise and discipline of his spiritual powers.[392]\n\nWho does not see a plan, a purpose, a Providence in this fact that the\ncradle of the human race was placed in the midst of the continents of\nthe north and not at the centre of the tropical regions? The balmy but\nenervating atmosphere of the equatorial regions would have lulled man\nto sleep, and he would have made no progress. With an abundant supply\nfor his natural wants, there would have been no motive to industry, to\nenterprise, and to the development of his intellectual powers. Unable to\nendure the rigors of a colder climate, and to live on a less luxuriant\nsoil, he could not have been induced to migrate to less favorable\nregions, and, crowded on a narrow area, the race must have been finally\nexterminated. But planted in the Temperate Zone, in the midst of the\ncontinents of the North, so well adapted by their forms, their highly\narticulated peninsulas, and their climate to stimulate the active powers\nof man, to promote enterprise, to favor commerce, and hasten individual\ndevelopment and social organization, he was surrounded by conditions\nmost favorable to the fulfillment of his destiny.\n\n\nIt is also worthy of being noted that Western Asia was not only the\ngeographical centre of the human race, but also the grand centre of\nreligious light--the cradle of man's spiritual nature. It was here in\nthe midst of the six great nations of antiquity--the Babylonians, the\nAssyrians, Medes, Persians, Ph\u0153nicians, and Egyptians--that for ages\n\"the living oracles\" proclaimed the \"Truth of God,\" and patriarchs and\nprophets and seers were received into intercourse with the higher world.\nAnd it was in Palestine, the centre of the three continents of the Old\nWorld, and near five great seas--the highways of the world's travel and\ncommerce--that Jesus of Nazareth taught \"the glad tidings of great joy\"\nfor the nations, and sent forth his apostles \"into all the world to\npreach that Gospel to every creature.\"\n\n\n2. Another important fact which history enables us very distinctly to\nrecognize is _that those epochs of civilization which represent the\nhighest degree of culture attained by man at different periods in his\nhistory have not succeeded one another in the same place, but have\npassed from one country to another_.\n\nIt is an undoubted historic fact, as we have already seen, that Asia was\nthe cradle of the human race. Western Asia is the theatre of the\nearliest civilization of which we have any historic records. Then a\nnewer and higher form appears on the peninsula of Greece. The centre of\ncivilization again changes place, and Rome embraces and improves upon\nthat of the ancient world. Then passing the Alps, still further to the\nwest, it spreads over France and Germany and the British Isles, and\nassumes a nobler form; and finally it crosses the Atlantic Ocean, and\ndevelops its highest type in the New World. This order may be called the\ngeographical march of civilization.\n\nIn the principle we enounced at the opening of this chapter, that the\nearth is the school-house of man--its highest function being to aid in\nhis intellectual and moral training, and furnish the conditions in which\nhe may fulfill his noble destiny--we can recognize at once the reason\nand the law of this remarkable progression. And as no single continent\nfurnishes all the conditions necessary to the complete development of\nman, and each of the three northern continents, by virtue of its\nstructure and climate and physical conditions, has a special function to\nfulfill in the education of mankind, so God, in his providence, has led\nthe human family from east to west, over the continents of the Temperate\nZone, in order to secure the education, the moral advancement, and the\nfinal perfection of our race.\n\nThe education of the race has, no doubt, proceeded very much in the same\nmanner as the education of the individual. The general law observable in\nthe development of one human mind may be traced in the development of\nhumanity as a whole. That which takes place on the limited field of\nindividual consciousness may also be found upon the larger field of\nuniversal consciousness, which is the theatre of history; and as one\nepoch succeeds another in the progress of the individual, so must it be\nin the progress of nations. What, then, are the clear and obvious stages\nin the development of the human mind? Do we not clearly recognize the\nfollowing order?\n\n1. _The period of submission to absolute authority._ This is the first\ncondition of infancy. The child is controlled absolutely by the will of\nthe parent. It is almost passive amid surrounding conditions, and\nparental authority is its only law of movement and action.\n\n2. _The discipline of the conscience._ This is the era of childhood. The\nideas of the right and the good are developed in the mind. An internal\nlaw of duty begins to reveal itself. The child begins to discriminate\nbetween what he ought and ought not to do. And in the education of the\nchild the object of a wise and virtuous parent is to strengthen this\ntendency by urging him to act upon these ideas.\n\n3. _The development of personal liberty_--that is, of independent\nthought and self-originated action. This is the period of youth. The\nyouth passes from the control of his parents and teachers, and begins to\nthink and act for himself.\n\n4. _The training and discipline of the will under social law_--that is,\nthe voluntary obedience to laws imposed by society, submission to\nregulations imposed for the public good. This is the period of manhood.\nThe young man passes into society, he becomes a member of the body\npolitic, and freely acts, not simply as an individual, but as a member\nof a corporation and of a state.\n\n5. _The development of active philanthropy._ The man advances beyond the\nclaims of social law, and acts from the promptings of love and good-will\ntoward all men. Passing through all the varied stages in the progressive\ndevelopment of human character, and retaining the results of each, he\nbecomes the perfect man.\n\nAnd now it will be promptly recognized that this has been the order of\nprogress in humanity as a whole--that is, the progress of history and of\ncivilization. The first corresponds with _Oriental_, the second with\n_Hebrew_, the third with _Greek_, the fourth with _Roman_, and the last\nwith _Christian_ civilization.\n\nIt will also be observed that each epoch in the development of the\nindividual has demanded new conditions, and has taken place in a new\nsphere. The first stage in the development of individual character is\ninfoldment in the arms of the parent. He is still held, as it were,\nwithin the circle of maternal life. He is bewildered by the vastness and\nvariety of external nature, and he sinks back into his mother's arms.\nThe second sphere is in the bosom of the family and amid the scenes of\ndomestic life, where he recognizes relations and becomes conscious of\nduties. The third is in the school and the outer world, where thought\nawakens, and, enjoying more freedom of movement, he becomes more\nconscious of his personal liberty. The fourth is in society, the state,\nthe arena of political life, where his movements must be regulated by\nlaw; and the pursuit of his own pleasure or aggrandizement must not\ninterfere with the rights of his fellow-man. The fifth and last is in\nthe church, the home of religious life, where he is called to ascend\nfrom the region of mere law to that of holy love. So also each epoch in\nthe development of humanity has had its separate sphere and its new\nconditions, first in Asia proper, next in Palestine, on the borders of\nthe Mediterranean Sea, then on the peninsula of Greece, then in Italy,\nand lastly in Continental Europe, England, and America.\n\n1. Asia, as we have seen, was the cradle of the race. Here, in the\ninfancy of humanity, Oriental Civilization dawns. Amid the extended\nplains and lofty mountains of Asia, those stupendous and massive forms\nof Oriental nature, man felt himself absolutely dependent. To the river\nhe looked as the fertilizer of the soil; to the animal which roamed in\nthe desert, and the almost spontaneous vegetation of the earth, for his\nfood; to the sun, as the fountain of light and heat, the giver of life\nand death.[393] He was environed and overpowered by nature. Almost\nunconscious of his own freedom, he lay in her bosom, as the child\nreposes in the arms of its mother. Underlying all the massive forms of\nOriental nature he recognized an invisible Power and Presence, and he\nworshiped nature as an impersonation of God. Every thing inspired him\nwith the sense of the Infinite, the consciousness of dependence on an\nabsolute Will. The patriarchal government, imposed by nature, restrained\nhis personal liberty. His property and life were at the disposal of his\nchief--an absolute autocrat, who exercised over him an unlimited power.\nOriental civilization unquestionably represents the _infancy_ of man.\n\n2. In Hebrew civilization we have, as an especial feature, the\ndiscipline of the conscience. The child-man comes more directly under\nthe power of moral culture. The government and discipline to which he is\nnow subjected aim to develop in his mind the idea of the just, the\nright, the pure. He is receiving instruction in what he ought and ought\nnot to do. His conceptions of the moral character of God are to be\nenlarged, the idea especially of the holiness of God is to be developed\nin his mind through the medium of material symbols and religious rites.\nThe call of Abraham sets forth at once the central lesson of faith in an\nunseen personal God. The history of the patriarchs brings into clearer\nlight the sovereignty of God as opposed to the mere dominion of nature\nand fate. A nation grows up in presence of Egyptian culture, and after\nthe purpose of God in the discipline of Egypt is accomplished, they are\nled into the wilderness, and God now reveals Himself as a Lawgiver and\nJudge, and a ritual is given which teaches at once the holiness of God\nand the exceeding sinfulness of sin.[394]\n\nFor the achievement of this object a new sphere is demanded--the\nseclusion and isolation of family life. Accordingly Abraham was called\nto leave Chald\u00e6a, the scene of Oriental civilization, and led into\nCanaan, that he might become the father of a great nation, and the\nsource of a new and better civilization. The mountainous region of\nPalestine was admirably fitted to be the theatre of this new\ncivilization. No other land on the globe was so peculiarly fitted to\nfulfill this office. The northern half of Syria was not so favorable a\nlocality; for traversed as it was by the great highway from Asia Minor\nto Assyria, it was subject to the influence of foreign travel from the\nearliest times. But Palestine lay surrounded by populous countries, and\nyet isolated from them. In the midst of the six great nations of\nantiquity--the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians,\nPh\u0153nicians, and Egyptians--it was separated from them all.[395] Thus\nsecluded and isolated from the rest of mankind, the Hebrews dwelt alone\nas one great _family_. The first form of government was a\npatriarchy--the father of the family and of the tribe being the ruler.\nThe second was a theocracy, in which God, the Father of the families of\nall the earth, becomes the immediate ruler. The third was a\nmonarchy--the government of a man appointed and sustained in his\nauthority by God. And the history of this nation is little else than one\nof instruction, discipline, and chastisement--a tutelage in which the\npeople were under law and not under grace. The Hebrew civilization\nrepresents the _childhood_ of humanity.\n\nAnd the lessons here taught were not lost to the race. They were carried\nto Assyria and Babylonia during the period of the two captivities; and\nin the colonies which were founded in Asia Minor, Rome, and Alexandria\nthe influence exerted by Judaism was considerably greater than that\nwhich was exerted upon it. The union of Judaism and Platonism is fully\nrepresented in Philo the Alexandrian Jew.\n\n3. In Grecian civilization we have the development of personal freedom\nof thought and action. The Divine discipline of the Jews, as we have\nseen, was essentially a moral discipline--a discipline of the\nconscience. This, however, was not a complete discipline of our whole\nnature. The reason demands culture as well as the conscience. The\nprocess and the issue in the two cases were widely different, but they\nwere in some sense complementary; and the one succeeds the other in the\norder of time. The Divine kingdom of the Jews was just overthrown when\nfree speculation arose in the Ionian colonies of Asia; and the teaching\nof the last prophet nearly synchronizes with the death of Socrates.[396]\n\nThis new civilization could not be achieved on the continent of Asia,\nand therefore a new theatre is prepared. \"Europe may be called a\ncontinuation of Central Asia. It surpasses its Oriental neighbor in the\nadvantage of having no internal mountain barrier to divide its north and\nsouth. Thus Europe has been able to develop itself more independently\nand freely in consequence of the number of its peninsular forms.... The\nthree characteristic features in the formation of Europe that are the\nphysical grounds of the development of its nations are its large extent\nof seaboard, its peninsular forms, and the number of its islands.\"[397]\nOn the peninsula of Greece, on the shores of the \u00c6gean and Ionian seas,\nthere was freedom of movement, facility of intercourse with the\nsurrounding nations, and inducements to maritime enterprise. These\nconditions were undoubtedly favorable to a higher development. \"The\ninland sea, the magnificent river,\" says Cousin, \"is the natural symbol\nof _movement_.\" These represent the activity of nature, and they become\nnatural centres of progress. The sea is the highway of commerce, and\ncommerce is the grand channel of ideas, the medium through which the\nknowledge acquired by one people can flow readily into other lands.\nAmid such conditions the mind awakes to activity, and the _period of\nyouth_ commences. Awakening thought is first directed to the outer\nworld, and attempts an explanation of its phenomena. Greek philosophy\nthus becomes, at its first appearance, a philosophy of nature, and the\nIonian school was a school of physicists. Here the great names which\nappear at the dawn of mental activity are Thales, Anaximander,\nAnaximenes, Heraclites, and Diogenes. From the study of nature the human\nrace advances to the study of man. The new school is a school of moral\nand mental philosophy, or, more correctly, of psychology and ethics,\nadorned by such immortal names as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In\nGreece, philosophy, poetry, eloquence, the fine arts, were extensively\ncultivated. As this was an age of great activity of thought, so it was\nalso an age of great political freedom. The government was in many\nrespects a government of the people, a democracy. \"Every thing, in fact,\nin Greece bears evidence of the preponderance of human personality, and\nthe energy of individual character.\"[398] Grecian civilization\nrepresents the _youth_ of humanity.\n\nThe results of this culture were carried to other lands by the conquests\nof Alexander, and subsequently by the conquering Romans. The poets, the\narchitects, the sculptors, the historians, the philosophers of Greece,\nare still the guides and models of the men of thought and taste in all\ncultivated nations. The Greek is still, in a peculiar sense, the teacher\nof the world.\n\n4. In Roman civilization we have the discipline of the will under social\nand civil law, the more perfect organization of society and of\ngovernment, the development of the science of jurisprudence.\n\nThis social and political organization was a new work, a higher\ncivilization, and it demanded a new and, in fact, a larger sphere. The\ncentre of the civilized world now changes place, and, moving westward,\nestablishes itself in the peninsula of Italy. By successive conquests\nits circumference enlarges, and finally it embraces at once the South\nand the East and the West. The place which Rome occupied, in the very\nmiddle of the basin of the Mediterranean Sea, seemed to foreshadow that\nshe was destined to become the metropolis of all the civilized nations\nwho dwelt upon its shores. Rome extended its conquests to Spain, Gaul,\nBritain, Illyria, Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, Africa, and the islands of\nthe Mediterranean--over, in fact, six hundred thousand square leagues of\nthe most fertile country; and all but realized the dream of the world's\ngreat conquerors--a universal empire. It was defended by a regular army\nof five hundred thousand men, ranged in the order of the famous legions,\nwhich constituted the most effective military organization known. The\ngovernment of an empire of such vast proportions and diversity of\npopulations demanded the greatest political skill. To establish durable\nties between these diverse peoples, and to combine in the same social\nnetwork all the civilized nations of the world, demanded the highest\nlegislative talent, and gave birth to the science of jurisprudence,\nwhich, next to that of theology, is the most important and useful to\nman. The inability of the Greek to achieve this great work is clearly\nevinced by the terrible Peloponnesian War and the lamentable history of\nthe empire of Alexander and his successors. Greece represents\nindividuality; Rome, association, unity, and, in some degree, the\nequality of all races of men.\n\nThis was unquestionably a marvelous development: \"In public law, the\nextension, step by step, through many a civil commotion, of the full\nrights of citizenship from the narrow circle of a few score of favored\nfamilies to the entire sphere of the free subjects of the empire; in\nprivate law, the equal communication among various classes of the rights\nof property and dominion over the national soil; the abolition of\nterritorial privileges; the readjustment, by gradual and peaceful\nmanipulation, of the cadastral map of the empire; the relaxation, by\nslow and experimental process, of the patriarchal authority of the head\nof the family; of the father over the son, whom at first he might\npunish, sell, or slay; of the husband over the wife, whom at first he\nreceived from her parents as the spoil of his own spear, and ruled as\nthe chattel he had plundered;[399] of the master over the slave,\nabsolute at first, final and irresponsible to law, custom, or\nconscience; the gradual replacement of the strictly national and tribal\nideas on these subjects by views of right, justice, and virtue to\nmankind in general; the slow but constant growth of principles of\nnatural and universal law, and their application, searchingly and\nthoroughly, to every subject of jurisprudence, and to all the dealings\nof man with man.\"[400]\n\nThis vast Roman Empire combined all the elements of civilization\ncharacteristic of former periods. The philosopher, the lawyer, and the\nstatesman were united in the person of her great men, as Cicero and\nCato, and sometimes also the warrior, as in the case of the first of the\nC\u00e6sars. The days of the Roman Republic present the most brilliant social\nand political epoch in the history of the ancient world. The life of a\nRoman citizen was emphatically a public life. The love of country was\ncarried to the highest pitch, and was paramount to every other\nconsideration. The laws and jurisprudence of Ancient Rome have furnished\nmodels for the whole civilized world. \"The world-wide elastic system of\njurisprudence by which the great Roman Empire, with all its boundless\nvariety of races, creeds, and manners, was for ages harmoniously and\nequitably governed; which was accepted and ratified as an eternal\npossession by the same empire when it became Christian; and has been\nproved to satisfy the principles of law and justice announced by a\nreligion which alone proclaimed the unity and equality of man;...\nfinally, a jurisprudence which has been incorporated into the particular\nlegal systems of, I suppose, every modern nation in Christendom,\" marks\na high degree of civilization, and justifies us in regarding Roman\ncivilization as representing the _manhood_ of our race.\n\n5. And now comes, last of all, the Christian civilization, or the age of\nphilanthropy. When the Roman Empire had attained its zenith, and all\ncivilized nations were brought under one government; and the world was\nat peace; and the philosophy of Greece and the jurisprudence of Rome had\nprepared the way for a higher and a nobler civilization, then, \"in the\nfullness of time\"--the ripeness and maturity of the ages or\ndispensations--\"God sent his Son, made under the law, to redeem them\nthat are under the law, that we might receive the _adoption of sons_.\"\nHe came to exhibit completely the truth which had been partially\nrevealed to Plato, that \"_God is Love_\"--that \"Love is creation's final\nlaw\"--and that the completeness and perfection of humanity is\n\"_resemblance to God_.\"[401] He came to announce and enforce the\nbrotherhood of mankind, and the equality of all classes and races in\nthe sight of God. He proclaimed the equal worth of all human souls in\nthe estimation of the heavenly Father; and to prove that all men are\nalike the objects of Divine care and solicitude, He laid down his life\nas \"a propitiation for the sins of the whole world.\" For the reception\nof this gospel of universal brotherhood and equal rights the Grecian and\nRoman civilizations had prepared the way. And now He gives to the race\nthe \"new commandment,\" which is the fundamental law of the Kingdom of\nGod, and is finally to become the universal law for all nations, that\n\"_Men should love one another, as He loved all men, and laid down his\nlife for them._\" The whole spirit and tendency of this crowning form of\ncivilization can not be misapprehended. Its sympathies are all with the\npoor, the suffering, and the oppressed; it can not fail to overthrow\ncastes and aristocracies, to destroy tyranny, oppression, and slavery,\nand at last to unite all men in bonds of love to each other and to God.\n\nAnd now to what people shall be committed the office of diffusing and\nperpetuating this noblest and highest civilization? Not to the Jewish\nnation, for it was exclusive and selfish; not to the Greek, for it had\nbecome effete; not to the Roman, for it had become corrupt.\nChristianity, it is true, was born on Jewish soil, but it was soon\ntransferred to a more favorable clime. The Church was early planted in\nRome, but achieved its grandest conquests among another people. The\nfierce Germanic tribes of the North conquer the Roman Empire, and are\nconquered by its Christianity. Already the Germans had the conception of\nan illimitable Deity, toward whom they looked with solemn and\nreverential awe.[402] Having penetrated into the midst of the Roman\nEmpire, they came fully into the presence and under the influence of\nChristianity. Their conversion was speedy and comparatively complete.\nThe constant intercourse now maintained between Rome and Central and\nNorthern Europe in a short time carried this new civilization across the\nAlps; the circle rapidly widens, and embraces all Europe in a common\nfaith.\n\nAll the rich treasures of the past are appropriated by Christianity--the\nmoral culture of the Hebrew, the poetry and philosophy of Greece, the\njurisprudence of Ancient Rome. All these--in so far as they are pure and\ngood--are absorbed by Christianity, and ennobled and baptized by the\nChristian spirit. In Christian Europe poetry, philosophy, science\nflourished as they had never flourished in any preceding age, and they\nlay their richest tribute at the feet of Christ, the Divine King of the\nworld. Nature, also, herself becomes more and more subject to man, and\nto the religion of the God-man. Science multiplies the means of\ndiffusing knowledge and the facilities of intercourse among the nations\nof the earth. The discovery of the art of printing opens the Book of\nLife to the millions of our race. Space has been annihilated by\nrailroads; by the help of steam continents are united; the electric\ntelegraph is binding the nations in one. And now the genius of\nChristianity begins more signally to reveal itself as a power acting on\nthe social life of man. The forms and conditions of his earthly lot are\nbeing wonderfully transformed and improved. Science is emancipating\nlabor, and constantly overcoming the sources of human suffering.\nHygienic science is preserving life and extending the term of human\nexistence. Mankind is rising above the sphere of mere law, into the\nsphere of noble love. Philanthropic institutions are being daily\nmultiplied, humanitarian and Christian enterprises most vigorously\nprosecuted, and a noble benevolence is rapidly supplanting the ignoble\nselfishness of former ages. Chalmers, Howard, Wilberforce, Hitchcock,\nAmos Lawrence, Elizabeth Fry, Florence Nightingale, Mrs. Gladstone, are\nrepresentative men and women of the new age.\n\nChristian civilization is no longer the property of any one nation\nalone. Now it embraces in its purposes and plans the evangelization of\nall the nations of the earth. The world is now its field. The\naccumulated waves of light and power from Hebrew and Grecian and Roman\ncivilizations, to which Christianity has added a new life and force, are\ndestined to roll back a tide of blessing upon the remnants of those\nancient nations, and sweep northward and southward--\n\n    \"Till like a sea of glory,\n    It spreads from pole to pole.\"\n\nThe crowning achievement of a Christian civilization will be the\npolitical regeneration of the nations--the establishment of all human\ngovernments on the principles of human equality, natural rights, and the\nbrotherhood of man. The glory of this achievement, in all its fullness,\nis not, however, the work of Europe. She inherits too positively the\nmartial spirit of Ancient Rome. Ancient customs and prescriptions,\nhereditary castes, aristocracies, and kings, and an ecclesiastical\npolity moulded by these, stand in the way of a Christianity of equality,\nof freedom, and of universal brotherhood. Europe has her roots too\ndeeply infixed in the past to adapt herself, fully and readily, to the\nenlarged principles of a thoroughly Christian civilization. A new\ncountry is therefore needed, a _New World_, where Christianity can\nremodel human society, and reconstruct human governments upon her own\nprinciples, and the human race can enter upon the last stage in its\nprogress toward the now visible portals of its final goal. \"The East,\"\nsays Ritter, \"represents _hope_, the West, _fulfillment_.\" That new\ncontinent was discovered just at the proper hour. Had North America been\ndiscovered earlier, it would have been peopled by Catholic nations, and\nthe noble civilization which Christianity was designed to achieve would\nhave been cramped and fettered by the hand of an ecclesiastical\nhierarchy. The New World reposed quietly in the bosom of a yet\nuntraversed ocean awaiting the advent of the Protestant Reformation.\nLuther drew the Bible from its concealment in the library of the\nUniversity of Erfurt at the same time (1502) that Columbus discovered\nthe American continent.[403]\n\nThe first settlers in New England were eminently Protestant. They were\nmen who loved the Word of God, and they sought to organize society in\nthis new country upon its holy principles. This new colonization had its\nbirth amid the agonizing throes of martyrdom. The \"Pilgrim Fathers\" had\nbeen persecuted and driven from home for Christ's sake. They sought the\ndesert that they might have freedom to worship God according to the\ndictates of their own consciences; and they braved the dangers of the\nalmost untraveled deep, and the perils of an inhospitable shore in\nmid-winter, to lay the foundations of a new empire which should be the\nhome of liberty, and the sanctuary of piety for themselves and their\nchildren. The Puritan love of freedom and reverence for religion has\nleft its impress on the mind and character of the American people, upon\ntheir modes of thought, and upon the institutions of their country. The\nideas of universal liberty and equal justice are interwoven in her\nConstitution, and, in general, the spirit of her legislation has been in\naccordance therewith. A relic of barbarism landed at Jamestown, in\nVirginia, which after a fierce struggle of years was finally conquered,\nand the rank offense was expiated by tears and blood. God has destroyed\nslavery in America by \"the breath of his mouth,\" and its death-knell has\nsounded all over the globe. The cause of freedom is stronger in Europe\nas the reflex of her triumphs here.\n\nFinally, a remarkable characteristic of the civilization of the New\nWorld is the emancipation of man from the dominion of nature. By an\namazing fertility of mechanical contrivance man is here rapidly\n\"subduing the earth.\" Released from merely local and hereditary ties, he\nspreads freely over the vast territory, and rapidly multiplies the means\nof easy locomotion. The soil is being extensively cultivated; the\nclimate, even, modified; the physiognomy of nature changed by the\nintelligence of man; and a regenerated earth is to be, at last, the\nconsequence of a regenerated race. Physical nature sympathizes with the\nintellectual and moral condition of man. Science is anticipating the\ntime \"when the earth will only produce cultivated plants and domestic\nanimals; when man's selection shall have supplanted 'natural selection;'\nand when the ocean alone will be the only domain in which that power can\nbe exerted which for countless cycles of ages ruled supreme over the\nearth.\"[404] \"The whole creation has groaned and travailed together in\npain until now,... waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God.\"\n\n\"Verily there is a God\" that not only judges in the earth, but guides\nand instructs the nations, and who in the development of the earth and\nof history \"worketh all things according to his eternal counsel and\npurpose,\" that for the rational creation \"God may be all in all.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nSPECIAL PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER.\n\n     \"England's thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only\n     temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of metaphysics lie at\n     the root of all science.\"--J. S. MILL.\n\n\nThe most sharply defined issue between Science and Religion--in fact,\nthe only real issue at the present time--is in regard to the doctrine of\nSpecial Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.\n\nThese are not in reality two distinct questions: they are but opposite\nphases of one and the same question. The doctrine of special providence\nis the _theoretic_ aspect, and the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is\nthe _practical_ aspect of the Christian doctrine of the relation of God\nto nature and man. We can not, therefore, discuss the practical question\napart from the theoretic; neither can we reach any decisive conclusions\nin regard to either unless we start with clear and well-defined\nconceptions of the fundamental relations between God and nature, and\nbetween God and man.\n\nWe shall assume the existence of God as the common postulate of all\nreligion and of all philosophy. If this be denied, then all discussion\nof the present question is useless, because we have no common\nstarting-point. But it will not be denied, we think, that the vast\nmajority of scientific men are agreed that the idea of God is the\nnecessary presupposition of all those branches of science which concern\nthemselves with \"genetic problems\"--that is, with problems of origin;\nand which, strictly speaking, are not problems of science, but of\nphilosophy. These scientists may not all choose to employ the term\n\"God,\" but they will all recognize, with Mr. Spencer, the existence of\n\"an unconditioned Cause\" as \"the ultimate of all ultimates,\" and they\nwill admit with him that the First Cause must be infinite, absolute, and\nperfect, \"including within itself all power and transcending all\nlaw.\"[405] Mr. Spencer calls this idea of a First Cause \"a datum of\nconsciousness;\" and he asserts that this \"inexpugnable consciousness, in\nwhich religion and philosophy are at one with common-sense, is likewise\nthat on which all exact science is founded.\"[406]\n\nTaking this fundamental presupposition as generally conceded--namely,\nthe existence of a Power which is unoriginated and independent; a Power\nwhich is conscious of itself and determines itself; a Power which\ntranscends all law and is the source of all law--the question at issue\nmay be thus stated--_Have our prayers any influence with this Power?_\nCan they in any way affect the Divine feeling and action toward us? Do\nthey have any indirect influence upon that succession of events in\nnature and history which is effectuated and determined by that Supreme\nPower? This is the real question at issue between science and religion.\n\nNothing need be said to deepen our sense of the importance of this\nissue. We all regard it as one of the vital questions of the hour, the\nmost vital question for religious men, yea, the most vital question for\nscientific men, inasmuch as there are moments of sadness and sorrow, of\ndoubt and mystery, when man feels that his only refuge is in prayer,\nand, science or no science, he must pray. But if there is no living God\nto sympathize with us in our sorrow and help us in our deepest need, or,\nwhich amounts to the same thing, if God is so completely environed by\nlaws which He has Himself enacted, and so imprisoned in his own works\nthat He can do nothing to aid us, then prayer is an illusion, and\ninstead of being in any way beneficial to us, it inflicts a deep and\nirreparable injury upon our intellectual and moral life. If there is\nnothing in the universe but mechanical force and necessary law; if there\nis no freedom and no moral purpose, then prayer for help and succor and\nguidance is a conscious or unconscious deception practiced by the soul\nupon itself, and the sooner we are undeceived the better; for of all\ndeception the most pernicious and depraving is that which a man\npractices upon himself. We could not even accept the cold apology for\nprayer which was made by David Hume, that it may have a wholesome reflex\ninfluence upon the mind of the worshiper, and be a good way of preaching\nto ourselves.[407] There can be nothing useful or helpful in the belief\nand practice of a lie. No accession of moral force or moral purity can\ncome from doing any thing in which we do not believe. If there is any\nmoral value and any real helpfulness in prayer, it must be based upon a\n_rational_ belief that the Divine mind is accessible to the supplication\nof his creature, and that the Divine will is moved thereby. \"He that\ncometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them\nthat diligently seek Him.\"\n\nHumbly professing this belief without any reservation, and regarding it\nas a perfectly rational belief, we proceed to defend it against certain\nso-called scientific objections, and to consider certain difficulties\nwhich present themselves to the minds of scientific men.\n\nWe have said that there is a _real_ issue between science and religion\nas to the efficacy of prayer. The statement is not strictly correct, and\nwe amend it by saying that the issue is not between science and\nreligion, but between certain men who study and teach science and\ncertain men who study and teach religion. For, as Mr. Murphy observes,\n\"The antagonism between science and religion themselves is purely\nimaginary. The antagonism between the men who study and teach science\nand the men who study and teach religion is unfortunately sometimes\nreal, though it is the fashion [just now] to exaggerate it; but so far\nas it is real it is an accident of the present time, which will\ndisappear, and indeed is already visibly disappearing.\"[408]\n\nNo man is in a position to affirm that there is an antagonism between\nscience and religion until he has first clearly determined the sphere\nand function of each, and can say distinctly _what science is and what\nreligion is_. He may have utterly misconceived the nature of religion,\nor he may have misapprehended the function of science, and therefore the\nsupposed antagonism may be purely imaginary. For example, Herbert\nSpencer says, \"Every religion may be defined as an _\u00e0 priori_ theory of\nthe universe.\"[409] If this definition were correct, we could easily\nconceive how religion and modern science might come into collision,\nbecause the tendency of science at the present time is to occupy itself\nwith \"questions of origin\"--that is, with \"theories of the origin of\nthings,\" instead of being, as Spencer defines it, \"a systematic\ncollection of facts, ascertained with precision, and so classified and\ngeneralized as to reveal the uniform relations of co-existence and\nsuccession among phenomena, and thus give _prevision_.\" This is the\nlegitimate sphere of all that science which can lay any claim to be\nregarded as \"exact science.\" When it transcends this limit it ceases to\nbe science and becomes philosophy--a philosophy which will be more or\nless valid and legitimate as it recognizes the authority and submits to\nthe guidance of _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of the reason.\n\nBut is Mr. Spencer's definition of religion correct? We think not.\nIndeed, it would be difficult to give a definition of religion wider\nfrom the mark. He might with just as much propriety have said that\nreligion is an _\u00e0 priori_ theory of the origin of language, of\ngovernment, of trade, or of music. Either Mr. Spencer must have made\nthis definition for an unworthy purpose, or he must be in utter darkness\nas to the nature of religion. One needs only to cast a hasty glance over\nthe history of ancient religions, or to consider with an unprejudiced\nmind any of the contemporaneous forms of religion, to be convinced that\nreligion is, and always has been, a mode of life determined by the sense\nof dependence upon a Supreme Power.[410] Religion has always been a\nmatter of practical interest and personal concernment, and has no more\nto do with \"theories of the universe\" than with theories of light, or\ntheories of electricity, or theories of political economy.\n\nThe separate spheres of religion and science have been admirably defined\nby James Martineau in a few words--\"Science discloses the _Method_ of\nthe world but not its cause; religion [or theology] discloses the\n_Cause_ of the world but not its method. There is no conflict between\nthem except when either forgets its ignorance of what the other alone\ncan know.\"[411] This is well said, and directly to the point. Religion,\nor more properly theology (for theology is the objective correlate and\npiety the subjective correlate of religion), teaches _what God is_, what\nare his attributes, what are the moral and spiritual relations which\nsubsist between God and man, and what are the duties which arise out of\nthese relations. Science teaches _what nature is_, and what are the\nrelations and laws of natural phenomena. Science is the co-ordination of\nphenomena. Here no conflict can arise. The truths which are taught by\neach rest on their own appropriate evidence, and they are capable of\nverification by direct or indirect reduction to experience--the facts of\nscience to external experience, and the facts of religion to internal\nexperience. These experiences can not, in the nature of the case, be\ncontradictory, because religion deals with one class of facts and\nscience with another. Such being the case, the scientist may be as\ncertain of the reality of religion as of the reality of science--that\nis, he may be directly and immediately conscious of the same feeling of\nreverence, the same sense of dependence, the same feeling of obligation,\nand the same loyalty of soul toward the unseen \"Power which makes for\nrighteousness,\"[412] which is experienced by the unscientific believer.\nThis is frankly avowed by Dr. Tyndall. He says, \"The facts of religious\nfeeling are to me as certain as the facts of physics;\" and he refers\nwith evident emotion to a period in his earlier years when he \"prized\nthe conscious strength and pleasure derived from moral and religious\nfeeling.\" \"Give me,\" he says, \"their health, and there is no spiritual\nexperience of those earlier years, no resolve of duty or work of mercy,\nno act of self-denial, no solemnity of thought, no joy in the life and\naspect of nature which would not still be mine.\"[413] We doubt not that\nthere are thousands of scientific men who to-day might bear the same\ntestimony.\n\nHere the question will suggest itself, How, then, comes it to pass that\nthere exists any antagonism between the teachers of science and the\nteachers of religion? We answer, the antagonism has arisen on that\ndebatable ground which lies between the two, where speculative thought,\nwhether from the stand-point of religion or the stand-point of science,\nseeks to form definite conceptions of the relation between God and\nnature, to bring our outer and inner experiences into a higher unity of\nreason, and to construct \"_\u00e0 priori_ theories of the origin of things.\"\n\nWe do not presume to say that these metaphysical speculations are either\nfutile or improper. But what we do insist upon, and beg the reader\ndistinctly to note, is that these speculations are neither _scientific_\nnor _religious_, and that neither true science nor true religion is\nresponsible for them. They are not religious, even though indulged in by\ntheologians; because religion is solely concerned with the personal\nconsciousness of our relation to God, and the discharge of our personal\nduty to God, and not in the remotest sense with any theory as to the\nmethod of causation in the world around us. It is equally certain that\nthese speculations are not scientific, even though indulged in by\nscientists; because science deals only with phenomena, and the laws of\nphenomena; and it is a fundamental canon of all scientific induction\nthat no problem is to be mooted unless it can be presented in terms of\nexperience, and no principles are to be admitted which can not be\nverified by experiment. But the modern speculations respecting the\n_origin_ of motion, of life, and of mind can not be presented in terms\nof sensible experience, and can not be verified by actual experiment. So\nfar as sensible experience goes, every case of physical motion is a\ntransformation of energy, and every new physiological unit or\naggregation of units is derived from pre-existent bioplasm. And so Dr.\nTyndall, in the speculations in which he indulges, in the now celebrated\n\"Inaugural Address\" delivered at Belfast, particularly in regard to the\norigin of life, admits that he \"_oversteps the boundary of the\nexperimental evidence_;\" therefore, by his own admission, these\nspeculations are _unscientific_.[414] These discussions are inevitable,\nand even valuable. We would protest as earnestly as Dr. Tyndall against\nthe attempt of any man to set limits to human thought, but we would\nequally protest against the attempt to pass off the results of\nspeculative thinking in any direction as \"exact science.\" True science\nis itself dishonored and discredited by all such attempts.\n\nWe have said that it is solely within the field of speculative thought\nthat all controversy has arisen concerning the doctrine of special\nprovidence and the efficacy of prayer. This will be apparent from the\nconsideration of the fact that from the dawn of speculative thought to\nthe present hour two radically opposite theories of the origin of things\nhave prevailed--one _mechanical_, the other _vital_.\n\nThe vital theory regards nature as the product and the continued work of\nan ever-living and ever-creating Spirit, who is the immediate fountain\nof all force, and the immanent life of all that lives. It looks upon the\nuniverse \"as the manifestation and the abode of a Free Mind like our\nown,\" who realizes his thoughts in its collocations and adjustments,\nembodies his ideals in its typical forms, and by his free volition\nsubordinates nature to the higher purposes of intellectual and moral\nlife--the formation of noble human characters. In a world so constituted\nprayer is a real power, and human character is a free development\nthrough the power of prayer which influences that ever-present Will that\nsustains our life.\n\nThe mechanical theory regards the world as a huge machine supplied with\nmotor power in the primal act of creation, and then left to make its own\nhistory according to rigid laws of mechanics and \"the multiplication\ntable.\" There is no \"Power which makes for righteousness,\" and no\npurpose of love mingling in the necessary order of things. Evolution is\nthe only law of creation; there is nothing spontaneous, nothing free.\nAll the processes of nature, all the forms of life, all the facts of\nconsciousness, all the sympathies, sacrifices, joys, and sorrows of\nsocial life, and all the noble or ignoble deeds of history, are only\nmechanical functions which can be weighed or measured, and catalogued\nin tables of statistics. Inflexible necessity, inexorable law, absolute\nuniformity, unbroken continuity tell the story of the universe. In such\na world there is no place for prayer, or at most it is but the cry of\nanguish wrung from the lips of those who are being mangled and crushed\nby the ponderous mechanism, which floats away into the infinite spaces,\nand never finds a living ear or touches a compassionate heart. Then, as\nDr. Hedge puts the melancholy case, \"We must rough it as best we can\nwith driving-wheel and fly-wheel, and trust that the power may not fail\nand the gearing foul in our short day.\"\n\nThis is the position of some, but by no means of the majority of the\nscientists of our time. We venture the assertion that it is no part of\nthe doctrine of modern science, neither does it follow as a logical\nconsequence from any of the accepted principles of modern science, nor\ndoes it reflect the real feeling of the best exponents of modern\nscience.\n\nDr. Tyndall stands as one of the most popular exponents of scientific\nknowledge, and may be regarded as a fair representative of the feelings\nof many scientific men. And in his estimation \"the problem of problems\nof our day is to find a legitimate satisfaction for the religious\nemotions.\" He admits that these religious emotions are inexpugnable\nfacts of human nature, as certain and as incontestable as the facts of\nphysics. Now what is meant by a _legitimate_ satisfaction of the\nreligious emotions? Does it not mean that human reverence must have a\n_real_ and a worthy Object? that for human duty there must be an\nimperative ground of obligation? that for true loyalty of soul to truth\nand right there must be an eternal reason? and that the instinctive\ntrust of the soul in everlasting righteousness and everlasting love\nmust have a rational vindication? Where shall we look for this object?\n\"May we look upward and onward, or have we nothing to do but yield to\nthe pressure from behind and below?\" What conception are we to form of\nthat mysterious Power or Principle which stands in necessary correlation\nwith the religious nature of man? Dr. Tyndall permits us \"to fashion\nthis conception as we will\"--with that \"he has nothing to do;\" only he\ndemands that in doing so we observe two conditions: 1. \"Be careful that\nyour conception is not an unworthy one;\" \"invest it with your highest\nand holiest thoughts.\" 2. Allow \"no intrusion of purely creative power\ninto any series of phenomena,\" no arbitrary interference with the order\nof nature \"for special purposes.\" The first condition would be violated\nby our conceiving that Power as purely _mechanical_, for then the\nsublimest interests of our moral and spiritual life would be surrendered\nto the action of the same force as that which draws a stone to the\nearth. The conception of unconscious and unmoral force is not our\nhighest and holiest thought--it can not inspire reverence and loyalty\nand love. The second condition would be violated by our regarding that\nPower as _arbitrary_--that is, as following no law; for that would be\nopposed to all the inductions of modern science, and would invalidate\nall conclusions based on the assumed permanence of natural laws. The\nproblem, then, is to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of mechanism\nand arbitrariness, and find the open sea where freedom may move in\nharmony with law, and where, in the grand hierarchy of laws the physical\norder of the world may be co-ordinated with, perhaps subordinated to,\nthe higher reign of righteousness and love.\n\nThe solution of this problem can only be reached through the discussion\nof the following questions: 1. What are \"the facts of religious feeling\"\ninvolved in this problem, and what are the necessary correlatives of\nthese facts? 2. What are the facts concerning the order of nature\ninvolved in the problem, and what are the logical inferences from these\nfacts? 3. How can the conception of the _Force_ which is manifested in\nthe phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of _God_\nas revealed in the religious consciousness?\n\n1. First, then, what are the facts of religious feeling which \"as\nexperiences of consciousness are perfectly beyond the assaults of\nlogic,\" and what are the necessary correlatives of these facts?\n\nWe present first of all the incontestable fact that _prayer is natural\nto_ man. Like our instinctive belief in the being of God, the\naccountability of man, and the immortality of the soul, we have also an\ninstinctive prompting to pray, and an instinctive belief in the efficacy\nof prayer. This is an essentially human characteristic; it is common to\nall men. Man has been defined in many ways, as \"a rational animal,\" \"a\nsocial animal,\" \"a tool-using animal,\" \"a language-speaking animal;\"\nwith more justice may he be called \"a _praying_ animal,\" for prayer is a\nuniversal characteristic and fundamental differentia of man. Never has\nthe traveler yet found a people which did not pray. Tribes of men have\nbeen found without houses, without raiment, without letters, without\nscience, but never without prayer any more than without speech. This was\nremarked by Plutarch eighteen centuries ago,[415] and the researches and\nexplorations of modern travelers and ethnologists have added\nconfirmation to its truth. The flow of prayer from human lips is just as\nnatural as the flow of speech. Is man in danger or in sorrow, his most\nnatural and spontaneous refuge is in prayer. The suffering, bewildered,\nterror-stricken soul that knows not where to fly, flies to God. There\nare few men, probably no men, who in moments of extreme peril or intense\nanguish can resist the impulse to pray. Nature is stronger than all our\nlogic; and, science or no science, the cry for help will rise from the\nlips of even skeptical men.[416]\n\nWe ask that these facts may be fully considered and fairly estimated.\nThe instinctive tendency to pray is a universal fact of human nature, as\nvalid and as significant as any fact in physics. It presents as rightful\na claim to be taken account of in our theories of the ultimate\nconstitution of the universe as the First Law of Motion or the\nConservation of Energy. If we disregard it, our _Systema Mundi_ will be\none-sided and partial, and, instead of being a philosophy, will be only\na caricature.\n\nWe do not claim that the presence in man of this instinctive tendency\nto pray proves the efficacy of prayer--that is, proves the existence of\na living God and Father who hears and answers prayer. But it does\nestablish a strong presumption in favor of the doctrine; for how comes\nit to pass that the sentiment is so perennial and so universal? Either\nit was originally implanted in the soul of man by the Creator, or there\nexists something in the constitution of nature--the \"relation between\nthe organism and its environment\"--which determines this feeling in man,\nand in either case it must be regarded as normal, and as essential to\nhumanity. If nature teaches us to pray, and, as it were, compels us to\npray, then we are justified in the assumption that there is nothing in\nthe ultimate constitution of nature which can contradict her own\nordinances and render prayer an absurdity.\n\nThe next fact to which we desire to direct attention is that _prayer is\nan essential element of life_--we do not mean physical life, but that\nwhich gives significance and value and completeness to human\nexistence--namely, ethical and spiritual life. That religion is deeply\nseated in the nature of man, and, in fact, ineradicable, is conceded by\nDr. Tyndall. \"No atheistical reasoning,\" he says, \"can dislodge religion\nfrom the heart of man. Logic can not deprive us of life, and religion is\nlife to the religious. As an experience of consciousness, it is\nperfectly beyond the assaults of logic.\"[417] This general admission\nthat man has a religious nature, a religious consciousness, is\nimportant. The bearing of this upon our argument will be obvious when we\nhave considered more particularly the nature and content of this\n\"religious consciousness.\" In what does it consist? Into what elements\nis it resolvable by psychological analysis? We answer, religious\nconsciousness is a consciousness conditioned by the idea of God, and\ninvolves a sense of dependence; a feeling of reverence; a sense of\nobligation; a sentiment of loyalty; a conscious community of nature; and\na longing for a deeper fellowship with the _Divine_.\n\nEvery thing around us and every thing within us makes us conscious of\nlimitation and dependence. We know that our own existence is not\nself-originated or self-sustained. We have the sense of an immanent\nall-pervading Life which sustains and conditions our life. We have the\nsentiment of an overshadowing Power and Presence which compasses us\nbehind and before, and lays its hand upon us, and we are constrained to\nbow in reverence and awe before that Power which controls our destiny.\nWith the sense of dependence is associated the feeling of obligation to\nconform our conduct to the will of this Supreme Being, and to\nsubordinate the ruling purpose of our life to the Divine purpose of\ncreation so far as that purpose can be known. There is also more or less\nloyalty of soul to what is just and true, a natural and constitutional\nsympathy of reason with the law of God--\"it delights in that law,\" and\n\"consents that it is good.\" Finally, there is the consciousness of some\ncommunity of nature between God and man, and some living susceptibility\nto the influences and inspirations of the higher world which authorizes\nthe belief that there may be a communion of thought, a relation of\nconscience, and an approach of affection between the Divine and human\nthat shall purify and elevate our nature, and lift us up into a\nresemblance to God.\n\nThe bearing of all that we have just said on the necessity of prayer\nwill have already suggested itself to the reader. The feeling of\ndependence, the sense of feebleness will prompt man to pray. Man is not\nsufficient for himself. He is not fit to be his own all in all. He has\nnot resources within himself to supply his own spiritual wants. He needs\nsome external succor, some support to the will, some inspiration from\nwithout. And he can become a strong man and a noble man only by aspiring\nand striving after something beyond and above himself--\n\n    \"Unless above himself he can\n    Erect himself, how mean a thing is man!\"\n\nWhen his affections and cares and thoughts all centre upon himself, his\nsoul shrivels down to a dreary selfishness, and becomes a dry\nmicroscopic point, or else a mass of putrid sensuality. Man needs a\nlofty object above himself, after which he may aspire and upon which he\nmay lay hold and lift himself into a nobler form of life. That lofty\nobject is the ideal of a _perfect, noble human character_. \"The\nformation of noble human character,\" says Mr. Murphy, \"is the highest\nwork that man or, so far as we know, that God can be engaged in.\"[418]\nThe thoughtful mind recognizes that there is a purpose to be fulfilled\nin life which is nobler than mere enjoyment. Who has dared to say that\nour highest duty is to be happy? But every one must feel that it is our\nhighest duty to form a nobler character and let the happiness take care\nof itself.\n\nAnd now is it not a fact of experience that the more a man strives after\na pure and noble life, the more does he become conscious of the need of\nsuperhuman strength and grace? He finds that he has to wage an\nuncompromising, sometimes even agonizing warfare against hereditary\n\"taints of blood,\" against morbid instincts and low passions, against\ninherent selfishness and meanness, against tyrant habits engendered in\nthe recklessness of youth, against the temptations of designing men and\nabandoned women, and the false sentiment, despotic opinion, and\narbitrary customs of modern fashionable society. In the presence of\nthese giants of evil with their fetters of iron he stands appalled, and\nagainst himself, against his temptations and sins, even against society\nitself, he feels he must _call upon God for help_. Through Divine\nstrength he may conquer; without it--never. There are those who hope to\nconquer evil through a certain inherent force of nature, or a certain\nself-caused and self-attained culture. We do not dare to say that they\nwill utterly fail, or that what they achieve is utterly valueless. But\nwe do say that the character they develop is not the highest style of\nexcellence. There is in it a boldness bordering on audacity, a\nself-sufficiency akin to haughtiness, and an arbitrariness which is\nrepulsive. The very basis of a noble character, the very essence of that\nprophetic power which has exerted the mightiest influence on the\ndestinies of man, is humility. The loftiest and finest minds have been\neminently trustful--men of heroic confidence who derived their\ninspiration and confessed their dependence on the light and strength\nwhich come from above. These are the men who really shape the history of\nthe world,[419] these are the men who command the esteem and win the\nreverence even of unbelievers. We can not illustrate this point better\nthan by quoting the words of Dr. Tyndall in regard to Michael Faraday.\nFaraday, it is well known, was one of the greatest of modern\nscientists--it ought also to be as widely known that he was a devout\nChristian. Tyndall dined with Faraday, and on that occasion Faraday\n\"said grace.\"\n\nTyndall writes: \"I am almost ashamed to call his prayer a 'saying' of\ngrace. In the language of Scripture, it might be described as the\npetition of a son into whose heart God had sent the Spirit of his Son,\nand who, with absolute trust, asked a blessing from his father. We dined\non roast beef, Yorkshire pudding, and potatoes; drank sherry, talked of\nresearch and its requirements, and of his habit of keeping himself free\nfrom the distractions of society. He was bright and joyful--boylike, in\nfact--though he is now sixty-two. His work excites my admiration, but\ncontact with him warms my heart. Here surely is a _strong_ man. I love\nstrength, but let me not forget the example of its union with _modesty_,\n_tenderness_, and _sweetness_ in the character of Faraday.\"[420]\n\nThis, then, is the point we desire to emphasize. It is a fact of\nexperience that prayer can give calmness, purity, and strength of soul.\nIt can lighten perplexity and sorrow. It can empower us to resist\ntemptation, and enable us to overcome sin. It can give \"modesty,\ntenderness, and sweetness\" to character. In a word, it can aid us\nmaterially in the formation of a noble human character.\n\nNoble character can only be formed under two conditions. First, it can\nonly be formed under the condition of _freedom_. The unfree is the\nunmoral.[421] There can be no dignity and no moral worth in action which\nresults from mere mechanical force. Personality alone has\nresponsibility, dignity, and worth. If, then, moral personality has true\nfreedom and self-determination, we are free to pray, and God is free to\nanswer prayer. We may believe that the physical world is held in iron\nbands of necessary causation, but we can not believe that the moral\nworld is so bound. The human will is free, and the Divine will is free.\n\"The First Cause,\" says Mr. Spencer, \"includes within itself all\npower\"--therefore alternative power--\"and transcends all law\"--therefore\nit can not be necessitated. We can not doubt that Mr. Tyndall would\nfreely accord this position. He might hesitate, he would unquestionably\nrefuse to unite in \"prayer for rain,\" for example, because he holds that\nthe fall of rain is governed by changeless physical laws, and \"no act of\nhumiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven;\"\nthis would be a miracle, and \"the age of miracles is past.\"[422] But we\ndo not see how he could refuse to unite in the prayers of the National\nChurch for the forgiveness of sins, for strength to overcome sin, for\nfortitude to endure, and for consolation under the afflictions and\nsorrows incident to human life.\n\nThe second condition necessary to the development of noble character is\nthat man shall be capable of receiving inspiration from the great source\nof all life, especially of all spiritual life. The universal belief of\nour race that there is a community of nature between God and man,\nexpressed alike in the words of Aratus, the Asiatic poet, Cleanthes, the\nStoic philosopher, and Paul, the Christian teacher--\"_We are the\noffspring of God_\"--justifies the further expectation and hope that\nthere may be a real communion between the human and the Divine. Of\ncourse this is fundamentally \"a question between Theism and Atheism,\nbetween a God and no God,\" between a conscious Being and an unconscious\nForce. If there is a personal God, then He may communicate with our\nsouls which dwell, as it were, within the ocean of his immensity, and\nare surrounded and interpenetrated by his living presence. Then there\nmay be a real sympathy, a loving fellowship, and a sanctifying\ncommunion. Even should science forbid the Author of nature to interpose\nin the slightest degree in the procession of phenomena or modify in the\nleast the action of the so-called natural forces, surely it will not be\nso \"audacious\"[423] as to forbid that He shall come near to human souls,\nand interpose in the moral order of the world to deliver man from sin\nand purify and elevate human society. Here at any rate science is out of\nits place. It is guilty of that very presumption with which it is\nevermore charging the theology of the Middle Ages, viz., the attempt to\nmonopolize the whole field of human knowledge and experience. If the\ngood man does feel that God is with him and in him, if he knows by\nexperience that prayer is an act of Divine communion--that it opens to\nhim an unfailing fountain of refreshment, solace, and strength; if he is\nconscious that it does lift him up to a larger and more blessed life,\nthen even science, which boasts its rigid adherence to the inductive\nmethod, and its unswerving loyalty to fact and experience, must obey the\nDivine injunction--\"Be still, and know that I am God.\" \"I dwell with him\nthat is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the\nhumble, and to revive the heart of the contrite.\"\n\n2. We come now to the consideration of the second question, What are the\nfacts concerning the order of nature which have been placed beyond\ncontroversy by the inductions of science, and what are the logical\ninferences from these facts?\n\nThe facts concerning the order of nature which it is claimed are placed\nbeyond controversy may be stated in the following words: Now of all the\nresults of science, none is more universal and more emphatic than this:\nthat there is no arbitrariness in the series of events which constitute\nour experience; but that a perfect order or uniformity prevails through\nthem all, an order which our intellect can apprehend under the form of\ncause and effect, or _permanent_ force and _necessary_ phenomena, or,\nbetter, a constant persistency of amount both of matter and force in the\nuniverse.[424] This statement of the scientist is accepted by many\ntheologians (of the Calvinistic school), who say with Rev. William\nKnight, \"The doctrine of the persistence of physical force and the\ninvariability of natural law, is a physical truth of which the\ntheological phase or corollary is the uniformity of Divine operation and\nthe inviolableness of Divine love. 'The permanence of the order of\nnature' is the scientific equivalent of the Divine constancy--'the same\nyesterday, to-day, and forever.'\"[425] How far and in what sense we\naccept this doctrine will be seen as we advance in the discussion.\n\nAt the beginning of this chapter we remarked that if the Christian\ndoctrine of the efficacy of prayer is disputed, whether on _theoretical_\nor _experiential_ grounds, an adequate and complete defense can only be\nmade by falling back upon the fundamental conception of God, and the\nrelation of God to nature and humanity presented in the preceding\nchapters of this volume. Is there a God in the proper and commonly\naccepted sense of the term--a conscious, free, personal First Cause, the\nCreator of the world and man? Is He the immanent Conservator of the\nuniverse--is his omnipotence the _force_, his reason the _law_, and his\nomnipresence the _life_ of all nature? These are the questions which\nmust be settled before we can successfully deal with the problem of the\nefficacy of prayer. If we are not agreed on these points, the debate\nmust be adjourned until we have settled the first principles which\nunderlie the discussion. This will be obvious to all who are acquainted\nwith the history of the controversy. If it can be proved that there is\nno conscious, free, personal God, the creator and conservator of the\nuniverse, the question is settled; then prayer can be of no avail, and\nmust \"be abandoned to the domain of recognized superstitions.\" But if it\nbe admitted that there is a God, in the proper import of that term, then\nthe question may be debated whether the Christian doctrine of the\nefficacy of prayer is consistent with the scientific conception of\nmaterial nature as \"the living garment of God.\"[426]\n\nDr. Tyndall is the fairest and ablest representative of that class of\nscientific men who to-day are denying the efficacy of prayer--that is,\nof such prayer the answer to which would seem to involve the\ninterference of personal volition in the economy of nature; and he\nbelieves in the existence of a God. He has again and again repelled with\nfeeling the imputation of atheism which the English theologians have\ninconsiderately and unfairly cast upon him. He is a frank, outspoken\nman, and he admits that in \"his hours of weakness and doubt\" he has\ntemptations to material atheism. \"But,\" he says, \"I have noticed that it\nis not in hours of clearness and vigor that this doctrine commends\nitself to my mind, and that in presence of stronger and healthier\nthoughts it ever disappears as offering no solution of the mystery in\nwhich we dwell and of which we form a part.\"[427] He also expresses his\nconviction that \"the Power which works for righteousness is\n_intelligent_ as well as ethical.\"[428] And furthermore he asserts that\n\"it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural\nphenomena _a universal Father_ who, in answer to the prayers of his\nchildren, alters the currents of those phenomena. Thus far theology and\nscience go hand in hand.\"[429] Let it, then, be distinctly remembered\nthat we are arguing with men who believe in the existence of God.\n\nIn an article which appeared in the _Fortnightly Review_ for August,\n1872, entitled \"Statistical Inquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer,\" by\nFrancis Galton, a species of guerrilla warfare is opened on this\ndoctrine from the stand-point of experience.\n\nMr. Galton assumes that \"the efficacy of prayer is a perfectly\nappropriate and legitimate subject of scientific inquiry.\" It must be\nassumed to be subject to unvarying laws, and, like all physical\nproblems, may be brought to the test of rigid mathematics. By the\nmarshaling of very incomplete and partial statistics, drawn chiefly from\nChalmers's \"Biographical Dictionary,\" he endeavors to show that praying\nmen, especially clergymen, are no healthier, recover from sickness no\nbetter, and do not live any longer than the men who do not pray.\nInsurance companies make no distinction between the prayerful and the\nprayerless; they regard them as equal risks. Furthermore, praying men do\nnot make any better statesmen, any more successful men of business, or\nany better physicians and lawyers than prayerless men. On the contrary,\n\"it is a common week-day opinion of the world that praying men are not\npractical.\" Finally, the children of praying parents are no better\nendowed intellectually, and do not turn out any better morally than the\nrest of mankind. His gentle impeachment is that they are somewhat below\nthe common average. By this \"scientific method,\" as he is pleased to\ncall it, the writer flatters himself that he has routed the army of\nbelievers in the efficacy of prayer, and that the practice of prayer\nwill soon become \"obsolete;\" \"just as the Water of Jealousy and the Urim\nand Thummmin of the Mosaic law did in the times of the later Jewish\nkings.\"\n\nBut Mr. Galton's fusillade did not produce the effect he expected. True,\nit made some noise, and for a brief season commanded attention; but it\nwas soon discovered to be a mere discharge of rhetorical blank-cartridge\nwhich hit nothing. His parade of argument was found to be utterly\ninconsequential. The dullest mind could perceive that the attempt to\nsolve moral problems by statistical averages was a practical folly,\nbecause it began by unceremoniously assuming the very point it ought to\nprove, namely, that _the determinations of will, whether Divine or\nhuman, are governed by necessary laws_ as surely as the revolution of\nplanets and the vibration of molecules. It is precisely because personal\nacts are _not_ reducible to any fixed laws, or capable of representation\nby any numerical calculations, that statistical averages acquire any\nvalue as substitutes. \"No one dreams of applying statistical averages to\ncalculate the period of the earth's rotation, by showing that four and\ntwenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's or one\nyear's revolutions with another's. It is only where the individual\nmovements are irregular that it is necessary to aim at a proximate\nregularity by calculating in masses.\"[430] The comparison of large\naverages may approach equality and furnish a basis of probability as to\nthe future, but the contingency of each individual case remains still a\ncontingency.\n\nIn no department of human inquiry is there so much temptation and so\nmuch opportunity for plausible sophistry as in the now somewhat popular\napplication of statistics to ethological problems. By a skillful\nmanipulation of figures, Mr. Buckle[431] flatters himself that he has\nmade it apparent that \"individual felons only carry into effect the\nnecessary consequences of preceding circumstances;\" that marriages are\nregulated by the price of wheat; and that the number of suicides is\ndetermined by the rise and fall of the barometer; in a word, that the\nwhole of man's social and moral life is part and parcel of nature, and\nsubject to the same necessary mechanical laws.\n\nThe logic of statistics, or rather the sophistry of statistics by which\nMr. Galton proves the uselessness of prayer, would, if skillfully\nmanaged, be equally efficacious in proving that sobriety and integrity,\nhonor and honesty, are unprofitable and useless virtues--at least so far\nas this life is concerned; and we might say of each of them what\nShakespeare's \"Murderer\" says of conscience: \"It fills one full of\nobstacles.... It beggars any man that keeps it. It is turned out of all\ntowns and cities for a dangerous thing; and every man that means to live\nwell endeavors to trust himself, and live without it.\" Dishonest men are\nas healthy, recover as well from sickness, and live as long as honest\nmen. Wicked men prosper in the world, they succeed in business and\nincrease in riches better, it may be, than good and godly men.\nDishonorable and unprincipled politicians climb into place and power\nwith more facility than men of honor and integrity. Distinguished\nlawyers and skillful physicians have not been strictly temperate; and\nstatistical tables may be easily produced which show that the\nlongest-lived men have been such as did not go to bed sober for the last\nfifty years of their lives. Therefore sobriety, honesty, integrity,\nveracity are not profitable virtues, and, weighed in the same scales and\nby the same standards as are used by Mr. Galton to test the weight and\nworth of prayer, they are practically valueless and do not pay.\n\nSimultaneous with Mr. Galton's article, there appeared a communication\nin the _Contemporary Review_ entitled \"The Prayer for the Sick: Hints\ntoward a serious attempt to estimate its value,\" with the indorsement of\nDr. Tyndall. The proposal contained in this communication came to be\ngenerally known in newspaper slang as \"Tyndall's Prayer-gauge,\" though\nTyndall was not its author. The proposition was that \"One single ward or\nhospital under the care of first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing\na number of patients afflicted with those diseases which have been best\nstudied, and of which the mortality rates are best known, should be,\nduring a period of not less than three to five years, made the subject\nof special prayer by the whole body of the faithful, and that at the end\nof that period the mortality rates should be compared with the past\nrates, and also with those of other leading hospitals similarly well\nmanaged during the same periods.\" This experiment, the writer thinks,\noffers \"to the faithful an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless an\nimperishable record of the power of prayer.\"\n\nThere was a tone of moderation and candor in this proposition which for\na moment beguiled the popular mind, and there were Christian ministers\nso injudicious as to admit that the proposal should be entertained and\nthe experiment tried. But its superficial fairness was delusive, and\nits plausibility concealed a snare. The writer must have been\nsufficiently conversant with the Christian doctrine concerning prayer to\nknow that the acceptance of his challenge would be a theological\nblunder; for there are no unconditional assurances in the Word of God\nthat prayers for health and long life shall always be answered. We\npresume also that he must have been sufficiently acquainted with medical\nscience to perceive that the acceptance of his challenge would be a\nscientific blunder, for there are elements in the problem which can not\nbe scientifically appreciated, measured, and recorded. Such, for\nexample, are the temperament, idiosyncrasy, hereditary diathesis,\nprevious habits of life, and mental characteristics of the patients;\nsuch the variety in skill, care, sympathy, and almost inspiration among\nphysicians and nurses; such also the differences of climatal, sanitary,\nand hospital conditions; all these elements, whose varied degrees of\npotency are incapable of being estimated, enter into the problem and\naffect the results. The multiplicity and complexity of these elements\nrender the effects as irregularly variable as if each cause had not been\nsubject to any previous conditions.[432] The problem is not even capable\nof being scientifically presented in terms of experience, and until that\nis done it can not be subjected to experiment. Suppose the experiment to\nbe tried in the manner proposed by the writer, and the mortality rates\nto be in favor of the hospital for which prayer had been offered, it\nwould still be open for the scientific skeptic to affirm that the causes\nof the difference are to be found in those elements whose varying values\nhad not been enumerated in the statement of the problem, and not in any\nDivine interposition in answer to prayer.[433] He might claim that the\npatients were not all of the same age or temperament, the physicians\nwere not all of equal skill, the nurses were not all alike attentive,\nthe climatal and sanitary conditions were not equal, and the question\nwould be left in precisely the same condition as before.\n\nWhatever may be the award of a thoughtless derision, we do not hesitate\nin saying that the proposition is an improper one, and can not be\nentertained. Especially because there is one party concerned in this\nmatter for whom no human being is authorized to make any engagements,\nand that is \"the Hearer and Answerer of Prayer.\" There is only one class\nof blessings for which He has given us any warrant to pray\nunconditionally, and these are _spiritual_ blessings. For strength to\nresist temptation, to endure affliction, and perform well our appointed\nwork in life; for grace to purify our nature, elevate our aims, conquer\nour selfishness and pride, and help us to form a noble character, God\nhas authorized and commanded us to pray. But for the blessings of this\nlife, for deliverance from danger and suffering, for restoration from\nsickness and for long life, we are taught to pray in submission to that\nhighest wisdom which knows what is best for us, and to append to every\nsupplication, however ardent our desire and intense our solicitude,\n\"Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt.\" This submission is the\nloftiest attitude of prayer.\n\nAt the same time we shrink not from the distinct avowal of the Christian\ndoctrine that it is reasonable and proper to offer prayer for recovery\nfrom sickness, and that such prayer, offered in submission to the Divine\nwill, may be answered. We are not ashamed of the good old faith--\"the\nAberglaube,\" or superstition, as some are pleased to call it--that \"_the\nprayer of faith shall save the sick_.\" The calmness and serenity of mind\nwhich the prayer of faith supplies is favorable to recovery. In fact, as\n\"the systematic excitation of a definite expectation and hope,\" it has a\nlegitimate place in psycho-therapeutics, as Feuchtersleben has shown,\nand even as Dr. Tuke concedes in his work on the \"Influence of the Mind\non the Body.\"[434] This \"definite expectation and hope\" is not a mere\nillusion. We have the assurance of Scripture that there is a Divine\nblessing which \"giveth wisdom to the wise and knowledge to men of\nunderstanding,\" and which may descend upon the head and the heart of the\nmost skillful physician in answer to prayer. Furthermore, it is\ngenerally admitted by medical men that \"as in health certain mental\nstates may induce disease, so in disease certain mental states may\nrestore health.\"[435] Now these \"mental states\" may be the subject of\nDivine influence. Science has not dared to shut out the Spirit of God\nfrom the realm of mind, and therefore restoration to health may be\ngiven, in this manner at least, in answer to prayer. But no man would\npropose to make the prevalence of such prayer the subject of statistical\naverages. Prayer for the sick can not always result in their recovery,\nfor then they would never die. Our lives are in the hands of God, and we\nshall live until our work is done, or until we have clearly shown that\nwe will not do our work, and our life is a failure and a defeat.\n\nFinally, in the name of our holy religion, we repel with scorn the\nattempt of certain scientists to test the value of prayer, and with it\nalso the value of a life of self-denial, purity, and piety, by merely\ntemporal, secular, and visible results which may be weighed and measured\nand set down in statistical tables. Christianity teaches that the\npresent life is a probationary scene. It is a state of trial and\ndiscipline with a view to the formation of moral character. Therefore\nour principles and our virtues must be put to the test. Temptation tries\nour fortitude; affliction ascertains our submission; suffering purifies\nour souls; doubt and mystery give energy to our faith. Amid the good and\nthe evil of the present our character has to be developed and perfected.\nThere is much to be encountered, much to be endured. But as Richard\nWinter Hamilton has said, \"This discipline is salutary. The furnace heat\npurities the gold by its rigorous assay. The vine prunes until it bleeds\nthat it may bear its richer clusters. A theatre is raised for lofty\nstruggle and celestial dint.\" The end of all is to make us pure and\nnoble and heroic souls.\n\nThe scientists of this age, who are so enamored of inert matter and\ninsensate force, may have no eye to see, no heart to sympathize with,\nand no competent faculty by which to estimate the value of this blessed\nvintage; but there are souls to whom honor is dearer than life, and\nwisdom more precious than rubies, and purity more desirable than fine\ngold, who will continue to pray--\"Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by\nthe inspiration of thy Holy Spirit, that we may perfectly love Thee and\nworthily magnify thy holy name.\"\n\nSo much for the argument against the efficacy of prayer from the\nexperiential stand-point. We are compelled to pronounce it a failure.\nThere seems good reason to believe that Dr. Tyndall regards it as a\nfailure, for we do not find that he any where denies the efficacy of\nprayer for spiritual blessings. But, like a second Ajax Telemon, he\nmakes haste to interpose his ample shield for the defense of his\nunfortunate friends; he is careful, however, to change the entire mode\nof warfare, and he opens the attack on the efficacy of prayer from the\n_theoretical_ stand-point.\n\nDr. Tyndall begins by observing that \"the idea of direct personal\nvolition mixing itself in the economy of nature is retreating more and\nmore\" in presence of advancing science, and among educated and\nscientific communities there is a growing conviction that \"nature is\nabsolutely uniform,\" and that her laws are changeless and permanent. He\ntakes the ground that all prayer for Divine interposition \"to produce\nchanges in external nature,\" such, for example, as \"prayer for rain or\nfor fair weather,\" is irrational, because the answer to such prayer\nwould be \"a violation of the order of nature,\" \"a manifest contradiction\nto natural laws,\" and in fact \"a _miracle_.\" \"The dispersion of the\nslightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal would be as great\na miracle ... as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of the St.\nLawrence up the Falls of Niagara. No act of humiliation, individual or\nnational, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a\nsingle beam of the sun.\"[436]\n\nWe have characterized this attack of Dr. Tyndall's as an attack on the\nefficacy of prayer from the _theoretical_ stand-point: 1. Because he\ndoes not claim that the belief in the changeless uniformity of nature is\na _self-evident_ truth--a direct intuition, either of sense or of\nreason, which needs no proof. 2. Because he does not assert that the\nabsolute uniformity of nature has been _inductively_ proved, or is even\ncapable of verification by experience, since all experience, whether of\nthe individual or the race, is necessarily limited, and can not,\ntherefore, give a universal truth. All that he can say of it is that it\nis \"an _assumption_\"--an assumption which all carefully conducted\nexperiments have justified, and upon which all successful scientific\nresearch has been based. The majestic fabric of modern science has been\nreared upon this foundation.\n\nBut mark, it is still \"_an assumption_,\"[437] and the central question\naround which the battle must be fought is, _What ground have we for the\nassumption that the order of nature is so absolutely persistent and\nchangeless that it never has been and never can be interfered with by an\nact of intelligent volition?_\n\nDr. Tyndall has attempted an answer to this question. We shall endeavor,\nfirst, clearly to comprehend his answer, and, secondly, to estimate its\nlogical validity.\n\n1. He tells us that the belief in a changeless order of nature \"is a\nkind of inspiration.\" \"The passage from facts to principles (that is,\nthe passage from our limited experience of uniformity to the affirmation\nof universal and permanent order) is called induction, which in its\nhighest form is inspiration.\"[438] This, however, is poetry, and not\nscience. This inductive inference embraces vastly more in the conclusion\nthan is contained in the premises; the antecedent is limited, the\nconsequent is unlimited; and the only warrant that Dr. Tyndall has for\nthe violation of the most fundamental logical canon is \"inspiration.\"\nBut, whatever Dr. Tyndall may understand by this ambiguous phrase, it is\ncertain that his own mind is not satisfied, and so he tries again.\n\n2. He tells us that this belief rests upon the long-continued\nobservations, registered experiences, and experimental verifications of\na succession of scientific men, as Galileo, Torricelli, Pascal, Kepler,\nand Newton. But here again the experiences are limited, and do not\njustify a universal conclusion; and Dr. Tyndall himself is not\nsatisfied. He says, \"The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere\nregistration of sequences in nature. The further question obtrudes\nitself with resistless might, _Whence come the sequences?_ What is it\nthat binds the consequent with the antecedent in nature?\" What is it, we\nask with redoubled earnestness and emphasis, which authorizes our\ndrawing a universal conclusion from particular premises? \"The truly\nscientific intellect never can attain rest until it reaches the FORCES\nby which the observed succession is produced.... Not until the relation\nbetween the forces and the phenomena has been established is the _law of\nthe reason_ rendered concentric with the _law of nature_, and not until\nthis is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in\npeace.\"[439] Here we have \"the law of the reason\" substituted for \"the\nhighest form of inspiration,\" and we are curious to learn what this \"law\nof the reason\" is. Is it the principle, or law of causality--namely,\nthat \"all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of\n_power_, and refer us to a causal ground?\" But this law of the reason\nsays nothing about uniformity. The same power may produce a diversity of\neffects. \"Infinitely numerous and various universes might have been\nfashioned by the various distribution of the original nebulous matter,\nalthough the particles of matter should obey the one law of\ngravity.\"[440]\n\n3. And, finally, Dr. Tyndall tells us that \"The expectation of likeness\n[_i. e._, uniformity] in the procession of phenomena is not that on\nwhich the scientific mind founds its belief in the order of nature. If\nthe force is _permanent_, the phenomena are _necessary_ whether they\nresemble or do not resemble any thing that has gone before. Hence in\njudging of the order of nature our inquiry eventually relates to the\npermanence of force,\"[441] or, as he elsewhere styles it, \"the\nconservation of energy,\" which means \"that no power can make its\nappearance in nature without an equivalent expenditure of some other\npower; that natural agents are so related as to be mutually convertible,\nbut that no new agency is created.\"[442] Whether this is or is not a\ncorrect statement of the principle of the conservation of energy we\nshall see by and by. And now, after having hunted the game through many\ntortuous passages to its final burrow, what have we found? That the\nultimate principle which justifies the belief or \"assumption\" that the\nlaws of nature are so rigidly inflexible and the order of nature is so\nabsolutely uniform that \"personal volition can not mingle in or\ninterfere with the economy of nature\" _is the principle of the\nconservation of energy_.\n\nThe answer of Dr. Tyndall is now fully and clearly before our mental\nview, and we are prepared for the consideration of its logical validity.\nThis answer may be conveniently divided into two propositions. First,\npersonal volition, human or Divine, can not intermingle or in any way\ninterfere with the economy of nature because her laws are inflexible and\nher order is uniform. Second, the ultimate principle which justifies the\nassumption that the laws of nature are absolutely inflexible and the\norder of nature is absolutely uniform is the principle of the\nconservation of energy. We shall consider this latter proposition first.\n\nThere are in this proposition three ambiguous terms, which have hitherto\nbeen the source of serious misapprehension; and unless we can attain to\nclearer and more definite conceptions, which shall be mutually accepted,\nthe controversy will be interminable. These are the terms \"nature,\"\n\"laws of nature,\" and \"uniformity of the order of nature.\" We have made\nthe attempt in a previous chapter[443] to give precision and\ndefiniteness to the concepts which these terms should connote. Referring\nthe reader to the chapter indicated, we shall here simply restate our\nresults.\n\n1. _Nature_ is the aggregate or totality of all material or physical\nphenomena.[444] \"Nature (_nascor_, to be born) means that which is\nproduced or born.\"[445]\n\n2. _A Law of Nature_ is the statement of a certain uniformity observed\nin the relations among phenomena.[446] The laws of nature are \"simply\nexpressions of phenomenal uniformities, having no _coercive_ power\nwhatever.\"[447]\n\n3. _The Uniformity of the Order of Nature_ may mean either \"uniformity\nof co-existence\" or \"uniformity of succession.\" \"Uniformity of\nco-existence\" means that the same substances must always have the same\nessential properties[448] and the same permanent relations to other\nsubstances, as, for example, every molecule of hydrogen must have the\nsame properties, the same definite mass, the same periodic vibrations,\nand the same chemical affinities. If these were to be altered in the\nleast, it would no longer be a molecule of hydrogen.[449] This is\nuniformity in the ultimate _constitution_ of nature. \"Uniformity of\nsuccession\" means that the same or similar consequents will always be\nfound to follow similar antecedents, or \"the same causes will always be\nfollowed by the same effects,[450] as, for example, the combination of\ncarbon and oxygen will always be followed by the evolution of heat, and\nheat will always melt ice.\" This is uniformity in the _course_ of nature\nor the procession of phenomena. Belief in the constancy of the course of\nnature or the uniformity of causation is the general expectation that\n\"the future will resemble the past.\"[451]\n\nWith a clearer apprehension of the terms, we may now discuss the first\nproposition with more precision, and hope to reach a logical conclusion.\nWe approach the discussion by remarking--\n\n1. The constancy of the _course_ of nature or the uniformity of\ncausation is not a self-evident and necessary truth. In so far as it is\na scientific truth it is purely an induction from experience, an\nexperience which is necessarily limited, and therefore does not warrant\na universal conclusion. There is no rational _\u00e0 priori_ ground for the\nassumption that the same or similar causes (even if we understand by\nphysical causes all antecedent conditions) shall necessarily produce the\nsame effects. In other words, there is no authority for the assertion\nthat the course of nature or the procession of phenomena must be\nabsolutely uniform. Science has succeeded in establishing a strong\nprobability, but it is beyond her power to demonstrate an absolute\ncertainty. This is generally conceded, alike by physicists and\nmetaphysicians. J. S. Mill says, \"The uniformity in the course of events\n... must be received, not as a law of the universe, but of that portion\nof it which is within the range of our means of observation, with a\nreasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases.\"[452] \"The uniformity\nof causation,\" says Murphy, \"is not a truth of the reason, it is known\nby experience only; and the truth of a conclusion from experience can\nnever be free from all possibility of limitation or exception.\"[453] And\nProfessor Jevons asserts, \"The conclusions of scientific inference\nappear to be always of a hypothetical and purely provisional nature.\nGiven certain experience, the theory of probability yields us the true\ninterpretation of that experience, and is the surest guide open to us.\nBut the best calculated results which it can give us are never absolute\nprobabilities: they are purely relative to the extent of our\ninformation. It seems to be impossible for us to judge how far our\nexperience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and\nof all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein.\"[454]\n\n2. It is an immediate fact of consciousness that the will is a cause\nwhich is adequate to the production of a diversity of effects. Whatever\nmay be true of the world of matter, it is certain that within the sphere\nof our conscious personality the relation of cause and effect is not a\nrelation of invariable and necessary sequence. Further, it is certain\nthat a self-determining agent exists. \"Every event in the universe of\nmatter is determined by the events which precede it, but physical\nreasonings make it certain that the chain of causes and effects can not\nhave been of absolutely endless length through past time. There must\nhave been a first link of the chain; there must have been a first act of\ncausation; and this act must have been determined, not by any previous\nact of causation when as yet there was none, but by the free\nself-determining power of the agent. The first act of causation we call\nCreation; the freely self-determining agent we call God.\"[455]\n\n3. Physical science itself does not teach that the course of nature is\nabsolutely uniform; on the contrary, all the conclusions of science lead\nto the conviction \"that the universe is ever changing, and that,\nnotwithstanding secular recurrences which would _prim\u00e2 facie_ seem to\nreplace matter in its original position, nothing in fact ever returns or\ncan return to a state of existence _identical_ with a previous\nstate.\"[456] Every theory of the origin of things is compelled to assume\nthat an innate tendency to _variability_ is a fundamental fact of\nnature. This is made apparent by the reasoning in Spencer's chapters on\n\"The Instability of the Homogeneous\" and \"The Multiplication of\nEffects.\"[457] The advocates of Natural Selection are very emphatic in\nthe assertion of this \"Law of Variation,\" as the cardinal fact upon\nwhich turns their doctrine of the origin of species, and the whole\nsystem on which organic life has been developed from the lowest to the\nhighest forms.[458] \"There is,\" says Comte, \"an irregular variability of\neffect engendered by the great number of different agents determining at\nthe same time the same phenomena [meteorological, social, and vital],\nfrom which it results in the most complicated phenomena that _there are\nnot two cases precisely alike_.\" \"The multiplicity [of the agents]\nrenders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had not\nbeen subjected to any previous conditions.\"[459] Dr. Tyndall himself is\nin fact compelled to surrender the doctrine of uniformity in the\nsuccession of phenomena. He says \"if the force be permanent, the\nphenomena are necessary whether they _resemble_ or do not resemble any\nthing that has gone before.\"[460] But if the phenomena do not resemble\nany thing that has gone before, how can there be \"uniformity\" in the\nsuccession of phenomena?\n\n4. The uniformity of the _constitution_ of material nature, or the\nprinciple that the same substances must always have the same essential\nproperties, is undoubtedly a self-evident and necessary truth, an _\u00e0\npriori_, rational intuition. It is simply a statement in concrete form\nof the principle or law of identity (A = A, or A is not equal to non-A).\nAs we have already observed, a substance which ceases to have the same\nessential properties ceases to be the same substance; for substances are\nonly known to us through their properties. But this \"uniformity of\nco-existence\" is distinct from \"uniformity of succession,\" and we can\nnot infer the latter from the former. Admitting that the same substance\nmust always have the same properties, we can not affirm that the same\nsubstances will always be collocated in the same manner, or distributed\nin space with the same uniformity. In fact, \"we can discover nothing\nregular in the distribution of matter through space; we can reduce it to\nno uniformity, to no law.\"[461] Matter is never replaced in its original\nposition; \"nothing repeats itself, because nothing can be placed in the\nsame conditions; the past is irrevocable.\"[462]\n\nEven should we say with Sir William Thomson that \"motion constitutes the\nvery essence of what is commonly called matter,\" still we know with\ninfallible certainty that there must be a _something_ that moves, and\nthat this something which moves must have ultimately a definite _mass_\n(inertia) and a measurable _velocity_, and that the _energy of motion_\nto which the power of doing work is due is proportionate to the mass\nmultiplied into the square of the velocity. Matter, then, is something\nmore than motion.[463] We know further that there are different \"modes\nof motion\"--transitive, rotatory, vibratory, pulsatory, gyratory--and\nthat these are undergoing perpetual transformation or conversion one\ninto the other. And, finally, we know that the quantities of visible\nmolar energy, and of invisible molecular energy (as heat, light,\nelectricity, magnetism), are not uniform; on the contrary, the quantity\nof mechanical energy is being continually dissipated--that is,\ntransformed into radiant heat, \"which may be compared to the wasteheap\nof the universe,\"[464] and uniformly diffused heat will not yield a\nsingle unit of work.\n\nThe principle of the conservation of energy is therefore subject to\nlimitations which are supplied by the principle of the dissipation of\nenergy. It simply asserts that, so far as our observation extends, the\nwhole amount of potential and kinetic energy in the universe is\ninvariable, but it can not determine whether the amount of vital force,\nor of psychic force, is invariable; and it is certainly incompetent to\nfix a limitation to the exercise of Creative Power. \"It is nothing more\nthan an intelligent and well-supported denial of the chimera of\nperpetual motion, and that a machine can no more create work than it can\ncreate matter.\"[465] In the words of Grove, we can not conceive of the\nproduction of any new force in the universe \"_without the interposition\nof Creative Power_.\"[466]\n\nDr. Tyndall, in his solicitude to exclude all Divine interposition in\nthe economy of nature, has stated the law of the conservation of energy\nin a form quite different from that of his scientific brethren. He says,\n\"The principle of conservation is, _no creation_ but infinite\nconversion;\"[467] and he seems desirous to convey the impression that\nany interposition of God to answer prayer would be a creation of\nphysical force, and as much a miracle as the rolling of the waters of\nthe St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara. Dr. Tyndall does not here\ndisplay his usual fairness and candor. Surely he would not assert that\nthe qualitative and quantitative combination of the different natural\nagents--such as light, heat, electricity, elasticity of vapors, and\naerial currents--which determine the fall of a shower of rain, would be\na _creation_ of energy; or that the disposition of the meteorological,\nphysical, chemical, vital, and psychical conditions which result in the\ncure of the sick, would be as much a miracle as \"the stoppage of an\neclipse;\" for these natural agents are more or less under the control of\nman. But suppose it were granted that all interposition of God in the\neconomy of nature must be regarded as _miraculous_, would he deny the\npossibility of miracles even if they should involve a creation of\nenergy? Because we can not by any of our mechanical arrangements create\nenergy, does it therefore follow that God can not create energy? Dr.\nTyndall will not say this. \"If you ask who is to limit the outgoings of\nAlmighty power, my answer is--not I.\"[468]\n\nIt will be seen presently that Dr. Tyndall admits that the interference\nof personal volition in the economy of nature is not forbidden by the\nlaw of the conservation of energy. The point we now insist upon is that\nhe has not succeeded in showing that this principle is an absolute and\nuniversal law of nature. We have already seen that it is limited and\nconditioned by the law of the dissipation of energy, and that in reality\n\"it is merely a kind of _movable equilibrium_ between supply and\ndestruction.\"[469] By no experimental evidence has it been shown that it\nholds true in the realm of vital dynamics and psycho-dynamics. There are\nable scientific men who question its absolute certainty even in the\nrealm of physics. Professor Brooke says that \"the amount of energy in\nthe world is unchanged, the sum of the actual or kinetic and potential\nenergies being a constant quantity has been by some writers\noverstrained. It may be taken as a postulate, and is probably true; but\nit is a proposition equally incapable of proof and of disproof.\"[470]\nTo the same effect are the words of Sir John Herschel,[471] and still\nmore recently of Professor Jevons.[472]\n\n\"Nature,\" says Dr. Cohn, of Breslau, \"is an equation with very many\nunknown quantities. It is the work of natural science to determine the\nvalue of these quantities. Some believe it never will be possible to\nsolve the equation, since in it factors occur which can not be\ndetermined.\" Until this is done, it is simply presumptuous for Dr.\nTyndall to pretend to know all the antecedents which determine the\ncomplex phenomena of nature, and dogmatically to affirm that \"no new\nagency is created,\" and no \"interference of Divine agency\" can be\npermitted. \"Our knowledge of things is finite, while our ignorance is\ninfinite; and we must consequently regard all known lines of causation\nas being liable to be cut through by unknown ones.\" For aught we know to\nthe contrary one of the unknown factors in the equation may be \"personal\nvolition,\" may be the ceaseless energy of the Divine Will sustaining and\ncarrying nature forward through successive stages toward a predestinated\ngoal. The foremost physicists do not deny that there may possibly be\nforms of energy which are neither potential nor kinetic.[473] We venture\nto assert with Prof. Challis that will, or personal energy, is neither\nthe one nor the other, but the source of both. Mind is the originator,\nand matter is the recipient of force.[474]\n\nWe sum up what has been said in the preceding paragraphs on the\nuniformity of nature in the following words: We admit that the\nuniformity of the _constitution_ of nature is a self-evident and\nnecessary truth. We admit also that, so far as our experience extends,\nthe uniformity of the _course_ of nature must be admitted as a\nscientific truth, for to deny this would be to deny the possibility of\nall science, inasmuch as all science is _prevision_. But at the same\ntime we maintain that the conclusions of scientific inference must\nalways be of a hypothetical and purely provisional character, because it\nis impossible for us to judge with absolute certainty how far our\nexperience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and\nof all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein.[475] The\nconservation of energy, for example, is a very probable hypothesis which\naccords satisfactorily with the experiments of scientific men during a\nfew years past, but it would be a gross misconception of the nature of\nscientific inference to suppose that it is certain in the same sense\nthat a proposition in geometry is certain, or that any fact of immediate\nconsciousness is certain.[476]\n\nAdmitting the principle of the uniformity of nature as a hypothetical\ninference from a limited experience, we advance to the main position of\nDr. Tyndall, namely, _that personal volition can not mingle in or\ninterfere with the procession of phenomena in nature_.\n\nDr. Tyndall admits the reality of \"personal volition.\" We have not\ndiscovered in his writings any indications of the tendency manifested\nby some of his scientific associates to reduce volition to a form of\nphysical energy. He grants \"the power of free-will in man,\"[477] but he\nseems unwilling to admit that free-will can exert any controlling,\nmodifying, or determining influence on the procession of phenomena.\n\"Assuming the efficacy of prayer to produce changes in external nature,\nit necessarily follows that natural laws are more or less at the mercy\nof man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the assumed permanence\nof those laws would be worthy of confidence.\"[478] But are not natural\nlaws more or less subject to man's volition? Does he not act _upon_ the\nchain of cause and effect in nature, and _alter_ the procession of\nphenomena on earth? Certainly he can and does control and direct the\nforces of nature. He can so collocate and adjust the properties and\nforces of matter as to accomplish the purposes of his intelligence, and\nbring about _new_ results which would not otherwise have been produced.\nThat man has materially modified the physical geography of the globe can\nnot be denied. He has altered the climatal condition of whole tracts of\ncountry, and changed the physiognomy of the globe. The rain-fall has\nbeen changed by the felling of timber or the planting of trees.[479] He\nhas extended or circumscribed the geographical boundaries of plants and\nanimals. He has learned to control the mechanical, chemical, and\nelectric forces. When he lifts a stone from the earth and suspends it in\nthe air, or locks it in the arch that spans the river, the law of\ngravitation is subordinated to the higher law of intelligent purpose. By\nthe collocation and adjustment of mechanical forces he overcomes the\nresistance of winds and tides, and guides his vessel across the\ntrackless deep. He seizes the lightning in the clouds and guides it\nharmless to the earth, and sends the electric current along the\ntelegraphic wire to chronicle his deeds and report his thoughts at the\nends of the earth. He loosens the most intricate combinations of\nelementary substances, and recomposes them in new forms of the highest\nvalue in medicine and the fine arts. He solidifies carbonic acid;\nfreezes water at the tropics, and even in red-hot crucibles in the\nTemperate Zone. He also modifies and changes the development of\nvegetable life, obliterating thorns and spines, altering the color and\nsize of flowers, and the flavor and nutritive character of fruits. And,\nfinally, he has wrought marvelous changes in the form, size, habits, and\ninstincts of the animal creation.[480] Thus in numberless ways does man\ncontrol, modify, and subordinate nature to accomplish the purposes of\nhis intelligence; but we can not see with Dr. Tyndall how this renders\nscientific \"conclusions founded on the assumed permanence of natural law\nunworthy of confidence.\"\n\nThere is a vacillation in Dr. Tyndall's treatment of this aspect of the\nsubject which renders it difficult to fix his exact position. Does he\nintend to assert that \"personal volition\" can not in the slightest\ndegree change the succession of phenomena? Will he say that man does\nnot, and that God can not control and modify and subordinate natural\nforces so as to bring about _new_ and _special_ results? Unless he is\nprepared to assert this in the most unequivocal manner, the whole\nsuperstructure of his argument falls to the ground. If it is granted\nthat human volition can change the procession of phenomena, and \"alter\nwithin certain limits the current of events,\" then _\u00e0 fortiori_ we may\nconclude that Divine volition may also interfere in the economy of\nnature to answer prayer. At one time Dr. Tyndall insinuates that \"our\nnotion\" (that is, the Christian's conception) \"of the Power which rules\nthe universe\" is a \"mere fanciful or ignorant enlargement of human\npower,... a _mythologic imagination_ which pictures a being able and\nwilling to do any and every conceivable thing.\"[481] At another time he\nadmits that \"the theory that the system of nature is under the control\nof a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men\nis, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one.... It is a matter of\nexperience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and\ntender, listens to the requests of his children, and if they do not ask\namiss, takes pleasure in granting their requests. We know also that this\ncompliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the\ncurrent of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our\nexperience, it is no departure from scientific method to place behind\nnatural phenomena a universal Father, who in answer to the prayers of\nhis children alters the currents of phenomena. Thus far theology and\nscience go hand in hand. The conception of an ether, for example,\ntrembling with the waves of light, is suggested by the ordinary\nphenomena of wave-motion in water and in air; and in like manner the\nconception of personal volition in nature is suggested by the ordinary\naction of man upon earth. I therefore urge no _impossibilities_, though\nyou constantly charge me with doing so. I do not even urge\ninconsistency, but, on the contrary, frankly admit that you have as good\na right to place your conception at the root of phenomena as I have to\nplace mine.\"[482]\n\nIf this concession is made in good faith, and really means any thing at\nall, it covers the whole ground. It is neither unscientific nor\nirrational to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father who\nalters the current of phenomena in answer to prayer. But this is not the\nconception which Dr. Tyndall places behind the phenomena of nature. His\nconception is that of a _permanent force_, which is \"under the\ncircumstances _necessary_,\" producing \"an unerring order which in our\nexperience knows no exception.\" This brings us to the third and last\nquestion.\n\n3. How can the scientific conception of the _force_ which is manifested\nin the phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of\n_God_ as revealed in the religious consciousness?\n\nWe are now in the very heart of what we have characterized as the\ndebatable ground which lies between science and religion, where\nquestions are mooted concerning the relation between God and nature.\n\nOn the one side we have the facts of external sensible experience--the\n_statical_ phenomena of nature as mass, extension, position, and\ndistance--conditions essential to the action or manifestation of force;\nthen the _dynamical_ phenomena of nature as rotatory, vibratory,\npulsatory, gyratory, and transitive motion, which to our reason, not to\nour senses, are manifestations of force. Science observes the uniformity\nof relations among these phenomena--uniformities of resemblance,\nco-existence, and succession, and calls these uniformities _laws of\nnature_. This is all that science can do, all that men of exact science\nclaim to be able to do.\n\nOn the other side we have the facts of internal experience--the\nconsciousness of effort, the sense of power and freedom, the idea of\nright and wrong, the feeling of dependence, of duty, and of obligation,\nthe consciousness of moral responsibility and of moral desert, and the\nanticipation of a future retribution. These to our reason are the\nrevelation of a righteous Lawgiver and Ruler who is over us; by whom we\nare obliged, and to whom we must account. This is the theoretic basis\nand necessary presupposition of all religion.\n\nAnd now speculative philosophy steps in and endeavors to reduce these\nconcepts of science and religion to an ultimate unity. It endeavors to\nconstrue in thought the nature of that relation between the force\nmanifested in nature and the moral Ruler revealed in conscience.\nTherefore it asks the questions, What is force? What is life? What is\nmind?\n\nIf we say that force is as inherent and essential to matter as extension\nand inertia are, and that life and mind are but modes of force, we are\non the high-road to mechanical Deism, if not _material Atheism_. If we\nsay that matter is itself only a function of force, and that force is\nthe ultimate of all ultimates, then the distinction between finite\nexistence and the infinite Being is a merely verbal distinction, and we\nmust yield to the seductions of _Pantheism_, which under this aspect of\nit is but another name for Atheism. But if we say that Spirit is the\noriginator and matter the recipient of force, or \"the recipient of\nimpulse and energy,\" and that the immanent God is the life of all\nnature, we are pure _Theists_. We have now a \"workable theory\" by which\nwe can satisfactorily interpret the universe.\n\nThis, however, is not the conception of Dr. Tyndall. The power which he\nsees in nature is a force which is inherent and essential to matter, and\n\"in that matter he sees the promise and the potency of all _terrestrial_\nlife,\" but not of all life, for \"religion is life.\" The Power which is\nrevealed as the object of the \"religious emotions\" is a Power which\nworks for \"righteousness,\" and is \"intelligent\" as well as \"ethical.\"\nThis Power he seems to regard as distinct from the force which produces\nthe necessary phenomena of nature. But whence does he obtain this\nconception of force? He writes as though he had seen force, or cognized\nforce, by some one of the senses. We claim that force is \"a subtile\nmental conception, and not a sensuous perception or phenomenon;\"[483] it\nis a metaphysical idea, \"a postulate of reason applied to nature.\" We\nventure the assertion that the physicist has not the remotest conception\nof force except as a datum of consciousness. The senses give us only\nphenomena. All we perceive is motion, change, succession. \"All we know\nor see is the effect; we do not see force.\"[484] So say all physicists\nas well as all metaphysicians. \"Experiences of force are not derived\nfrom any thing else,... and the force by which we ourselves produce\nchanges, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,\nis the final disclosure of all analysis.\"[485] Whenever, therefore, Dr.\nTyndall attempts to account for motion and change in external nature by\nassuming the existence of invisible, imponderable forces, he is\ninterpreting nature in terms of consciousness--we mean that\nconsciousness of personal causation which we have when we put forth\n_effort_ with an _intention_ thereby to accomplish an end. Force is\nknown to us by immediate consciousness as a function of our own\nmind--that is, mind acting in will is conscious of itself as a force. We\nare able to conceive of force in no other way. \"Force dissociated from\npersonality and will must be forever incomprehensible by us, because it\nwould be something contradictory to our consciousness.\"[486] If we may\nnot regard will-force as \"the type of all the force in nature,\" then the\nphysicist knows nothing about it, does not know there is any force, and\nthe only consistent course is to unite with Comte in eradicating the\nword from the vocabulary of science.\n\nIn the only case in which we are admitted into any immediate personal\nknowledge of the origin of force, we find it connected with volition,\nwith will, with motion, with intellect, and with all the attributes of\nmind in which personality consists.[487] We must, therefore, conclude\nthat all force is mind-force, is spirit-force, and that the forces which\nanimate nature are spiritual. Either the force manifested in the\nuniverse is the force of a self-existent and self-determining\nIntelligent Will, or we can form no conception of it whatever.\n\nWhen we have once arrived at the conception of force as an expression of\nwill, which we derive from our experience of its production, \"the\nuniversal and constantly sustaining agency of the Deity is recognized in\nevery phenomenon of the universe.\"[488] \"The laws of nature are the laws\nwhich God in his wisdom prescribes to his own acts. His universal\npresence is the necessary condition of any course of events. His\nuniversal agency the only origin of all efficient force.\"[489] The\npersistence of force is the permanence of the Divine agency, and the\ndeepest ground of our faith in the uniformity and changelessness of\nnatural laws is the immutability of God.\n\nWe come, then, at last, to this, that the Power which is manifested in\nnature is the God who is revealed in consciousness, and that He is at\nonce a God of power, of righteousness, and of love. In prayer, the\nintelligent believer does not invoke a different Power from that which\nis manifested in all the forms of physical energy which were manifested\nin nature; he does but invoke the _same_ Power and the _only_ Power\nwhich is the source of all causation and produces all the processions of\nphenomena.\n\nThe perpetual immanence and ceaseless action of God in nature is the\nsource of all _force_ and all _law_. There is no force and no law\nbesides and apart from this. All our conceptions of necessity and\nuniformity, of special providence and miracle, are merely relative\nconceptions which result from our imperfect vision. These are all\nswallowed up and lost in the Divine Immensity. God is Power. God is Law.\nGod is Love. Love is the motive, Law is the method, and Power is the\nhand manifested in all the changes of the universe. \"The devout feel\nthat wherever God's hand is, _there_ is miracle; and it is simply an\nundevoutness which imagines that only where miracle is can there be the\nhand of God.\"\n\nLet us say with Goethe, \"Nature is the living garment of God,\" which at\nonce reveals and conceals his mysterious splendors. In our days of\ndarkness and sorrow and danger there are vouchsafed to us clearer\ngleamings of the Creative Spirit through the veil of nature in answer to\nprayer. These we may call \"special providences,\" and even \"miracles,\"\nif we please, but let us not fall into the error of supposing that we\nhave seen more of God than in the budding of the leaf or the blooming of\nthe flower in the time of spring. \"There are diversities of operations,\nbut it is the _same_ God which worketh all in all.\"[490]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nMORAL GOVERNMENT.\n\nI. ITS GROUND.--THE CORRELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MAN.\n\n    \"That they may seek the Lord, and truly feel after Him and find\n    Him, though He is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live\n    and move and are; as certain of your own poets have said, '_For we\n    are his offspring_.'\"--ST. PAUL.\n\n    \"Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball;\n    All need his aid, his power sustains us all--\n    For we his offspring are.\"--ARATUS.\n\n    \"Thou art able to enforce obedience from all frail mortals,\n    Because we are all thine offspring.\"--CLEANTHES.\n\n\nFrom the fundamental truth that God is the Creator and Conservator of\nthe universe, and that his providence presides over and directs the\nhistoric development of humanity, Christian doctrine advances, in a\nnatural and logical order, to the recognition of the more direct and\npersonal relations between God and each individual human soul. \"He is\nnot far from _any one_ of us, for in Him we live and move and are.\" God\nis intimately near to the human soul. God is the immanent ground of\nmen's spiritual being. God is the Father of the human spirit. Therefore\nGod is manifested _in_ man--in the constitution of his moral nature, and\nin the susceptibilities, the aspirations, the longings, the hopes and\nfears of his spiritual being; and God manifests Himself _to_ man by an\ninward illumination--\"the true _light_ which lighteth every man that\ncometh into the world.\" Contemplate these relations on the Divine side,\nand you have the foundation of all moral government; study them on the\nhuman side, and you have the foundation of all religion, for religion is\na mode of thought, of feeling, and of action determined by the\nconsciousness of our relations to God.\n\nAll Christian teaching proceeds upon the assumption that there exist in\nall men the elements of a _religious consciousness_. The recognition of\nsome relation to an unseen moral Personality is a universal fact of\nhuman nature. The feeling of dependence, the sense of obligation, the\nsentiment of reverence, the tendency to worship, the apprehension of a\nfuture reward or punishment--these are the common characteristics of\nman. The untutored savage, the half-civilized pagan, the ancient\nphilosopher, the modern scientist, all alike betray the consciousness of\nsome mysterious bond which holds them fast to the unseen Power which\ncontrols the destinies of men. With this sentiment of the Divine there\nis associated in all human minds an instinctive yearning after the\nInvisible, a conscious susceptibility of our spiritual nature to the\ninfluences of the higher world, and a reaching out of the human spirit\ntoward the Infinite, which prompt man to seek for a fuller knowledge and\na deeper communion. Christianity assures us that this religious\nconsciousness may, by a loving reception of the truth and a loyal\nallegiance to duty, be raised into a living _koinonia_--a living\nfellowship with and a conscious participation of the Divine life. Man\nmay know God, not simply by verbal instruction, not merely through the\nsymbolism of nature, or the providential unfoldings of human history, or\neven the moral attributes of his own spiritual being, but by an exalted\nand immediate consciousness. \"The pure in heart shall _see_ God\" by an\ninward vision of wondrous power and glory, in which they shall know\nGod, and be as fully assured of his personal love and guidance as of the\nlove and guidance of any human friend.\n\nNow there is a natural order in which the knowledge of God is clearly\ndifferentiated and fully developed in the human mind; and this order is\ndistinctly recognized and noted in the words of St. Paul--\"That they may\n_seek_ God, and truly _feel_ God, and actually _find_ God.\"\n\n1. There is an earnest _inquiry_ (\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd)--a search after God. This is\nthe effort of reflective thought to attain a more exact and definite\nconception of that Power and Intelligence which the spontaneous\nconsciousness of man immediately and instinctively affirms as the ground\nand cause and law of the created universe.\n\n2. There is a real _feeling_ (\u03c8\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03c6\u1fb6\u03bd) of God--an awakening\nconsciousness of some near relation to God, excited by the voice of\nconscience and the spiritual affinities and yearnings of the soul. There\nis, as it were, a \"_touching_\" of the living God[491]--the sense of a\nliving bond which holds man to God, not merely by a consciousness of\ndependence and obligation, but a spiritual nexus, a real filiation,\nwhich enables man to articulate the wondrous words, \"_We are the\noffspring of God_.\"\n\n3. There is an actual _finding_ (\u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd) of God--that higher\nreligious consciousness in which the pure and earnest soul attains a\npersonal knowledge, and enters into a beatifying communion with \"the\nFather of the human spirit.\" This direct \"manifestation of God\" in its\nhighest form is the peculiar glory of that new and divine life of the\nsoul communicated through Christian faith, for which all antecedent\nknowledges and experiences, whether of the individual mind or of\ncollective humanity, are a preparation and a discipline.\n\nThis inspired statement of the order in which the conception of God as a\ndeterminate mode of thought is evolved in the human mind is exactly\nverified by the history of reflective thought as presented in Greek\nphilosophy. Reflective thought began with Thales in Asia Minor and\nPythagoras in Lower Italy. The Ionian and Italian schools commenced most\nnaturally with the objective phenomena of nature, and sought for the\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae--the first principle and cause of all that appears. Their\nquestion was not, _Is_ there a first principle and cause? but _What_ is\nthe first principle and cause? The orderly phenomena of the universe\npresented themselves to their minds as the expression of _power_ and\n_thought_ as certainly as they do to ours; and their endeavor was to\nconstrue this intuition in logical form and give it articulate\nexpression. It is true their method was at first defective, and the\nresults attained were consequently often erroneous. Still their mental\neffort must have been unconsciously governed by those fixed laws of\ncognition which constrain all minds to regard all phenomena as the\nexpression of power, and all orderly arrangement as the utterance of\nthought. If in the realm of objective things they fixed upon a single\nelement as that out of which all things else were evolved, that first\nseed of things was either a living, potential energy, or it was\nassociated with and animated by a living soul.[492] Or if guided by\nanalogy, they conceived the universe as a living organism,\n\n    \"Whose body nature is, and God the soul.\"\n\nThe informing principle was still an _intelligent_ Power. So that at the\nend of this period of inquiry we find that Anaxagoras distinctly\narticulates the word which his countrymen had half unconsciously\nrecognized, \"the \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae, or first principle, is mind, intellect,\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\"\n\nFrom this point we date a new era in philosophy. The Socratic school\nturned from the contemplation of external nature, and commenced the\nstudy of mind. Man finds his rational nature in changeless correlation\nto a moral law. There are within his spiritual nature the ideas of\njustice, of truth, of purity, and of goodness. These ideas of the human\nreason reflect the character of its Author and Source, and we can not\nrefrain from ascribing these attributes in their most perfect form to\nthe Maker of the human soul. God is now regarded as the Moral Ruler of\nthe world. Man becomes conscious of obligation to a personal Lawgiver,\nand of accountability to a personal Judge. He feels that he has\nspiritual susceptibilities and longings for a Divine inspiration. He\nbelieves that man \"may become conscious of the wisdom and the love of\nthe Deity,\" and that there are \"Divine secrets which may not be\npenetrated by man, but which are imparted to those who consult, who\nadore, and who obey God.\"[493] Yielding to these spiritual affinities of\nthe soul, he seeks God in prayer.[494] He desires to come near to God,\nto feel his presence and inspiration, and to become \"assimilated to\nGod,\" by \"becoming holy, just, and wise.\"[495]\n\nWhether any of the ancient philosophers attained to that high religions\nconsciousness in which God is actually \"found,\" so that He becomes the\nobject of a real love and confidence, and a refuge amid the storms and\nadversities of life, is a question we may not be competent to answer.\n\nTo attempt an answer may be deemed presumptuous. If the Divine\ndeclaration that \"_every one_ that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh\nfindeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened,\" is of universal\napplication, then it may, at least, be hoped that the prayer of Socrates\nwas answered, and the desire of Plato was fulfilled, and the aspiration\nof Epictetus was satisfied in some degree. Socrates certainly expressed\nthe belief that \"he was moved by a certain Divine and spiritual\nimpulse.\"[496] Plato held that the highest form of philosophy is the\nlove of the Supreme Good--that is, God; and that \"a man who is just and\npious and entirely good is loved of God.\"[497] And Epictetus taught that\n\"if we always remember that in all we do God stands by as a witness, we\nshall not err in our prayers and actions, and _we shall have God\ndwelling with us_.\" Do not these utterances remind us vividly of the\nSaviour's promise--\"If _a man_ love me, he will keep my words, and my\nFather will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with\nhim?\" Can we doubt that these words express the Divine feeling and the\nDivine procedure toward the heathen world? Was not God their Father as\nwell as ours? Was not Christ their Saviour as well as our Saviour? May\nwe not hope that the redeeming Word enlightened their minds, and the\nsanctifying Spirit touched their hearts?\n\nIt will be obvious to the thoughtful reader that this order, in which\nthe definite knowledge of God is attained, is the reverse of that in\nwhich the idea of God is manifested in the spontaneous consciousness of\nthe individual and the race. The former is analytical, the latter is\nsynthetical. The _idea_ of God as the ground and cause and reason of all\nexistence is immediately given in spontaneous thought.\n\nThe _conception_ of God as pure Spirit, as the eternal Reason, the\nrighteous Will, the supreme Good, the omnipresent Ruler of the universe,\nand the Father of humanity, is gradually developed in reflective\nthought. The first is a metaphysical _datum_, standing at the\ncommencement of all inquiry, the second is a logical _qu\u0153situm_ which\nis reached at the end of a process of rational inquiry. Spontaneous\nconsciousness begins with an indeterminate feeling, a mysterious\npresentiment of the Divine; it proceeds through simple intuition, and\nends with affirmative thought. Reflective consciousness begins by\nquestioning our primitive beliefs, and asking for their logical grounds;\nit proceeds by analytic and inductive reasoning, and may result in the\nunion of logical convictions, with determinate affections--an\nintelligent reverence and an appreciating love. Spontaneous thought is\ninvoluntary, and must necessarily result in faith. Reflective thought is\nvoluntary, and may result in error, doubt, and skepticism. Therefore the\nmethod by which we attain to a clear and determinate knowledge of\nGod--by which we really _feel_, and actually _find_ God--may be\ndefeated, interrupted, and marred by sin. Unholy passion and a perverted\nwill may materially vitiate the process by which the human reason\nreaches a logical conviction of the being of a God. The ungodly man may\ndesire that the First Cause shall have no moral attributes. The sinner\nmay imagine that the Deity is \"altogether such an one as himself.\" The\nfool may say in his heart, \"There is no God.\" While the idea of God\npresents itself naturally and necessarily in spontaneous thought, there\nmay be an \"unwillingness to retain God in the knowledge.\" And even where\nGod is known, He may not be honored and gratefully recognized; and, as a\nconsequence, the \"understanding may be darkened.\" Swallowed up of\nuncleanness and lust, the abandoned man may \"barter the truth of God for\nlies,\" and eventually \"worship and serve the creature _more_ than the\nCreator.\" Still man can not utterly relegate himself from all sense of\nobligation, and all feeling of dependence upon God. He can not sever the\nlink which binds him to his Maker. He can not wholly extinguish in his\nheart the sense of the Divine, nor eradicate from his reason the ideas\nwhich, in their spontaneous, unimpeded development, reveal to him the\npersonal Lawgiver and Judge. Where there is any rectitude of purpose,\nany sincere love for truth, there will be, in a proportionate measure,\nthe true knowledge of God. And the pure mind may assuredly rise to that\nhigher religious consciousness in which doubt and uncertainty are\nswallowed up in an inward vision of his glory.\n\nHere, then, we have the rational foundation for moral government, and\nthe ultimate ground of all religion. The possibility of knowing God, the\nobligation to reverence and obey God, the power to do the will of God,\nthe susceptibility of the human heart for Divine inspiration and Divine\ncommuning, are all grounded upon the _correlations between God and man_.\n\"God is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live and move and are;\nas certain of your own poets have said, '_For we are his offspring_.\"'\n\n1. _The relation between God and man is a relation of contiguity._ God\nis perpetually near to man. \"He is not far from any one of us.\" The\nsacred Scriptures not only teach the ubiquity of God, but they emphasize\nthe immediateness of the Divine presence in relation to man. \"Whither\nshall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?\nIf I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell,\nbehold, Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in\nthe uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and\nthy right hand shall hold me. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and\nlaid thine hand upon me.\" No man can escape from God. We may retire to\nthe remotest parts of the earth, and take up our abode in the most\nsolitary isle; we may press our way into the deepest recesses of the\nprimeval forest, to spots where the foot of man has never trod, and on\nwhich the light of heaven has never shone, and where solitude has held\nits undisturbed reign ever since the morning of creation, and the\nconviction that \"God is in this place\" will relieve the loneliness, and\nhold us fast within the grasp of his government and laws. Let human\nthought take to itself the wings of imagination and pierce the heavens,\nlet it travel on through the immensity of space until it has reached the\nconfines of the universe, let it alight on one of the outermost stars\nwhich seem to stand as sentinels at the very outposts of creation, and\nlooking out upon the depths of space, there shall be heard the voice of\nGod toning on throughout the fathomless abyss, \"Can any hide himself in\nsecret places that I shall not see?\" \"Do not I fill heaven and earth?\nsaith the Lord.\" God is not far from any one of us. He is the \"_Ever\nNear_.\" Nearer to us than the air we breathe, nearer than the light\nwhich reveals surrounding objects, nearer than our body, the living\nvesture of the soul, is God. In the words of the Persian oracle, \"God is\nnearer to thee than thou art unto thyself.\" As the Infinite Mind is\npresent to all rational beings, so are they all present to Him. God is\nomniscient. The thoughts, feelings, and actions of all men are\nimmediately and directly known by Him. \"O Lord, thou hast searched me\nand known me. Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising, Thou\nunderstandest my thought afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying\ndown, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my\ntongue, but lo, O Lord, Thou knowest it altogether.\" The first condition\nof a moral government is found in the nearness, the contiguity of God to\nevery human soul, and the immediate and infallible knowledge which He\nconsequently must possess of every human thought and act.\n\n2. _The relation between God and man is a relation of immanency._ \"In\nHim we live and move and are\" (\u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd, = have conscious being).\nOur life, our power, our consciousness are _from_ God, _through_ God,\nand _in_ God. This relation is manifestly something more immediate than\nthe relation of contiguity. It is the present, instant, ceaseless\nrelation of Divine _efficiency_. This is involved in the very idea of\nthe creature. If man is the creature of God, he has not only his\nbeginning, but his continuance of existence by a real and immediate\ncausality. God alone possesses true life--\"life in Himself\"--He alone is\nreally self-existent, our life and our being are continually derived\nfrom Him. If we were without God, and entirely isolated from Him, we\ncould not live or move or even exist. God is every where, not virtually\nbut actually. He pervades and interpenetrates all existences without\ndisplacing them in space or disturbing their operations. His infinite\nessence underlies all the principles and powers of all created\nexistences; they all move within the range of his presence, and act\nwithin the sphere of his energy. And God is not only present immediately\nto man, but his mighty will sustains man in existence every moment,\nvitalizing his organism, endowing him with power, illuminating his\nreason, and inspiring him with knowledge. God is immanent in man, and\nman is immanent in God. \"To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom\nare all things, and we _in_ Him.\"[498]--\"One God and Father of all, who\nis above all, and _through_ all, and _in_ you all.\"[499]--\"The same God\nwho worketh _all_ in _all_.\"[500] Our life is from God and in God. Our\npower to energize is from God and constantly sustained by God. We\nconsciously know in and through God, who so illuminates our reason that\nwe can interpret the symbolism of nature. \"God teacheth man knowledge.\"\n\"He giveth wisdom to the wise and prudence to men of understanding.\"\n\"There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth\nhim understanding.\" The reason of man is a beam of the eternal reason.\n\"The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord.\" All good desires, all\nnoble impulses, all power to resist temptation and perform heroic acts\nof endurance and suffering, are from God. \"Every good and every perfect\ngift cometh down from above, from the Father of Lights.\"[501]\n\nThe constant, ceaseless dependence of all rational existence on God for\nvitality, for power, and for consciousness must be maintained, if we\nwould be faithful to the plain language of Scripture. We are aware that\nfears of a pantheistic perversion has led some men, without reason, to\nrefine upon the language of Scripture. By the expression \"_in_ Him\"\n(\u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7), we are, they say, to understand \"_with_ Him.\" But\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 does not mean \"_with_ Him\" or \"_through_ Him.\" The most\nnatural grammatical construction is \"_in_ Him,\" and this suits best the\nlogical connection. The Uncreated is the only self-existent being. All\nother existences are derived and dependent, and therefore can not be\nself-existent. The Supreme can not communicate the attribute of\nself-existence any more than the attribute of infinity. A finite\nexistence can not be at once dependent and independent. Of mind, as well\nas of matter, it is equally true that the sole ground of its continuing\nto be, as well as its beginning to be, is in the Almighty will and power\ndirectly and ceaselessly put forth. The direct agency of God sustaining\nconscious life is a universal, constant, profound _reality_.[502]\n\nIt may be objected that in maintaining these views we are in danger of\nsacrificing the personality of man. It may be asked, How can we sustain\nthe antithesis between the I and Thou of a commandment or of a prayer?\nHow can we reconcile human self-determination with absolute dependence\nupon God? How can we conceive the possibility of sin--the possibility of\na creature dependent every moment on God for power, acting in opposition\nto the mind and will of God?\n\nThese are questions of profound significance; they are also questions of\nextreme difficulty. Our reason staggers under their weight. We tremble\nin the presence of the mystery of evil. It is obvious that these\nquestions involve the deeper question as to the causal connection of God\nwith his creation, which all men confess is an insoluble and\nimpenetrable mystery. The feeling of dependence on the one hand, as well\nas the sense of personal power and freedom on the other, are primitive\nfacts of consciousness. That we live and move and have our being in God,\nand that we have a real determinate selfhood, a finite personality, a\nresponsible spirit-life, are both affirmed in Scripture. That a holy God\nmade the world, and still actually upholds it; and that sin, as\nlawlessness (\u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1), as a real antagonism to the will and nature of\nGod, exists in his world, can not be denied by Christian men. These are\nequally truths. To our conception, they may appear antithetical, if not\ncontradictory. But truth is often of a dual character; like the magnet,\nit may have opposite poles. And many of the differences which agitate\nthe world are often to be traced to the exclusiveness with which\ndifferent parties affirm one half of the duality in forgetfulness of the\nother half. We must accept both aspects of the truth, even though we can\nnot at present effect their real conciliation in thought, and wait for\nfurther light.\n\nA profound faith in the unity of all truth will inspire the hope that\nreason may yet attain to ultimate principles in which shall be found the\nharmony of facts and subordinate principles that to-day seem\nirreconcilable. Underlying the above apparently antithetical truths we\ncan even now dimly discern still more fundamental principles which\nprophesy a solution. If Divine Love will that there shall be other\nexistences who shall resemble God, and be capable of fellowship with Him\nin knowledge and in love--in other words, shall be _perfect_ so far as\nis consistent with the notion of dependent existence--these beings must\nhave a real selfhood, a conscious personality, a conditioned freedom.\nFor impersonal being, even though it may by its absolute dependence\nreveal the eternal power, and in some degree reflect the thought of God,\ncan not in any sense be the _image_ of God, who is absolute Personality.\nAbove all, that which can not know itself, can not know God, and can not\nlove God. That which can not freely determine itself, can not obey God\nor resemble God. The highest form of spirit-life \"is the conscious\nreturn, by a free identification, of every delegated power into harmony\nwith its source.\" Real being and real life in God must therefore\ninvolve, not only a consciousness of dependence and obligation, but also\nself-consciousness and self-determination. Resemblance to God and\nfellowship with God are possible only through these fundamental elements\nof personality. Moral union requires dynamical separation. And because\nGod wills this highest unity, He creates the highest individuality, and\ngives being to a will under concessions of freedom.\n\nWe conceive of the Divine conservation of the world and man as \"the\nsimple, universal, uniform efficiency of God which sustains the created\npowers in every moment of their activity, and thereby keeps them bound\nto Himself. As such it makes itself the basis of all individual\nefficiencies in the life and movement of the world, _without indeed\nitself, as such, giving to the efficiency of creaturely powers any\nparticular direction_.\" The conserving activity of God moves in\nprearranged lines, and according to laws and measures determined by the\ninfinite wisdom of God, and conserves, therefore, all individual\nexistence only within the boundaries which are fixed by these\narrangements, and through the relations of the powers of the world. Thus\nas the world-conserving activity of God leaves all creatures just as it\nfinds them, and equally embraces irrational as well as rational beings,\n\"the evil as well as the good\" (Matt. v. 45), it can in nowise remove\nthe answerableness of man for his sins, or in any way taking part in the\nsame. The world-conserving efficiency of God sustains man every moment\nin being, and conditions the activity of his moral powers even when they\nare exerted in an evil choice, just as it sustains the universe\naccording to a predetermined plan and in harmony with fixed laws; but it\ndoes not thereby give to the activity of the moral creature any\ndeterminate direction whatever, either good or evil. The general power\nto will and do is received immediately and constantly from God, but it\nis a delegation of power under concessions of freedom and conditions of\naccountability. The specific determinations of that power are from man\nhimself. He may give an evil direction to his derived and dependent\nactivities, and thus commit sin. The responsibility for that evil\ndetermination rests upon himself alone, even though he is every moment\npervaded and sustained by the conserving efficiency of God. Alternative\npower is a talent loaned out by God to man. But it is a talent which\nstill belongs to God, for the proper or improper use of which man is\naccountable.\n\nIt has been urged by the captious critic, who would fain cast upon God\nall responsibility for the presence of evil in the world, that \"if God\ndoes not actually determine the evil, He delegates to man the power to\nactualize evil; let Him only refuse his conserving efficiency to the\nwill of man, and thus prevent the evil!\" The reckless objector knoweth\nnot what he saith. In order to render evil impossible, it is demanded\nthat God shall rob man of his personality, and degrade him to the level\nof impersonal nature; for the possibility of evil is inseparable from\nthe notion of free, self-determined existence. \"The momentary\nwithdrawment of the conserving activity of God from the moral creature\nwere the immediate annihilation of its existence.\"[503] Liberty is not\nonly a good, but it is the necessary condition of all goodness. It is\nthe sphere of all great virtues, noble deeds, and heroic acts. There can\nbe no virtue, no praiseworthiness, no godlikeness, no real felicity,\nwhere there is no freedom. Shall we reproach God for having made us free\npersonalities? Shall we complain because God has honored us by\ncommitting to us a sacred trust, and placed our happiness and well-being\nlargely under our own control? Who would surrender his conscious power\nand freedom, and sacrifice the infinite possibilities of good which lie\nbefore him, to escape the possibility of failure and suffering and\ndefeat? Will any rational man exchange his position for that of the ant\nor the beaver? \"What,\" exclaims Rousseau, \"to render man incapable of\nevil, would we have him lowered to mere brute instinct? No! God of my\nsoul, I will not reproach Thee for having made me in thine image, so\nthat I might be good and free and happy like Thyself.\"\n\nThe ceaseless dependence of man on the conserving efficiency of God\nimposes upon him the obligation to determine himself, and to regulate\nhis action in conformity with the will of God. Here, then, we have found\na still deeper ground for moral government.\n\n3. _The relation of God to man is a relation of paternity; the relation\nof man to God is a relation of childship._ \"We are his offspring;\" and\nas the offspring of God we must have a kindred nature, and, in some\nsense, \"resemble God.\"\n\nGod is \"the Father of the human spirit\" by no mere figure of speech, but\nby a Divine reality; and man, in virtue of that rational and spiritual\nnature inbreathed and, as it were, begotten within him by the \"Eternal\nWord of God,\" is \"the likeness and image of God.\" It is one of the\nchangeless laws of all derived and dependent existence that the\noffspring shall resemble the parent. And just as every seed must produce\nits own kind, just as every offspring must be of the same species as its\nparent, so must man bear the image of God.[504] This image of God can\nhave no reference to the body of man, nor to any qualities or attributes\nwhich belong to matter. Spirit is the only thing which does bear or is\ncapable of bearing any resemblance to God. The all-pervading personality\nof God is mirrored in the finite personality of man. The four grand\nelements of personality are _intelligence_, _will_, _affection_, and\n_conscience_, and these in man reflect the character of God. Elevated to\nabsolute perfection, they become the august attributes of Omniscience,\nOmnipotence, All-lovingness, and All-holiness. \"One God,\" says Cousin,\n\"is doubtless the author of the world, and as his workmanship it must\nreflect, in some measure, his perfections. But He is especially the\nFather of humanity. His intelligence and his personality are therefore\nof the same kind with our intelligence and our personality, to which we\nadd infinity by a necessary law of thought.\" So that our knowledge, our\nfreedom, our charity, our justice, give us the idea of Divine wisdom,\nDivine freedom, Divine justice, and Divine charity.[505] These\nconclusions of philosophy are in striking harmony with the positive\nstatements of Scripture. Here we are taught that the image of God in man\nconsists in _power_, _knowledge_, _righteousness_, and _benevolence_\n(\u1f41\u03c3\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2)[506]--\u1f45\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, from \u05d7\u05b6\u05e1\u05b4\u05d9\u05d3 = kind, merciful, benevolent.\n\nInasmuch, then, as man is the \"offspring of God,\" he may know _that_ God\nis, and he may, in some measure at least, know _what_ God is, and what\nare the duties which he owes to God. Selfhood or personality in man is\nthe primordial germ of the idea of God. The self-consciousness, the\nintelligence, the free activity, the potential righteousness and charity\nof man must have their origin in a cause which is itself a full and\nadequate explanation. We accept the ancient philosophic maxim \"_ex\nnihilo nihil_,\" and apply it rigorously to the case in hand. \"That which\nis can not have arisen out of that which is not.\" \"Out of nothing\nnothing can arise.\" Consciousness can not arise out of unconsciousness.\nReason can not arise out of unreason. Self-activity can not arise out of\nabsolute passivity and eternal rest. Justice, righteousness, charity,\ncan not be generated from brute matter, or born in the abyss of\nnothingness. The Creator of man, of the reason that is in man, of the\nmoral liberty of man, of the ideas of justice and benevolence which\ndwell in the conscience of man, must Himself be intelligent, free, just,\nand good. Such is the logic of Scripture and of common-sense. \"He that\nplanted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not\nsee? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall not He correct? He that\nteacheth man knowledge, shall not He know?\" He that made man a sentient,\npercipient, self-conscious personality, shall not He be percipient and\nself-conscious? He that hath given man reason, is He not the Eternal\nReason? He that hath planted in the hearts of men the principles of\njustice, must not He be a righteous Being? He that inspires man with\ncompassion, must not his nature be Love? \"If the First Cause be\ndestitute of these qualities, then for us, at least, He is as though He\nwere not.\" He is a thousand times inferior to us--inferior even in his\ninfinity and his eternity to one hour of our finite existence, if during\nthat fugitive hour we can _know_ and _think_ and _love_. A finite moral\npersonality, even though it be the most perfect form of _dependent_\nexistence, points, with an infallible logic, to a being beyond and above\nitself, and suggests an Infinite Personality who is absolute\nperfection--that is, a Being of perfect knowledge, perfect freedom,\nperfect righteousness, and perfect love.\n\nThis community of nature between man and God is not only the ground and\ncondition of our knowing God, but it is also the living, everlasting\nbond which holds man to God, even in his sins. It involves much more\nthan obligation--obligation to an omnipotent Master, and submission to\nan omnipresent Lord. Such sense of obligation may be developed within\nthe sphere of instinctive and unreasoning life. But the kinship of souls\nto God brings man within the sphere of _moral_ life, with its eternal\nand immutable laws. It endows man with the power and imposes upon him\nthe duty to reverence, adore, and love the heavenly Father. Wonderful\nand awful, this idea of the paternity of God and the childship of human\nsouls! This paternity of God is suggestive at once of the highest form\nof authority and the most sacred form of duty that can be conceived by\nthe human mind. \"The power of a sovereign, however extensive it may be,\nis, after all, only conventional; it admits of being circumscribed or\nsuspended.... All earthly forms of authority, which belong to the\npolitical, civil, or social relation of men, are accidental and\nofficial, created by men for their own purposes, and may be modified or\nabolished by the power that created them. But the authority of a father\nover his child is founded in nature and established by God. This is not\na voluntary arrangement among men themselves, which they are at liberty\nto continue or to terminate as they please; but, on the contrary, it is\na Divine constitution. Such authority as a father possesses over his\nchild--so natural, so real, so Divine--no human being besides can\npossess over another. This, accordingly, is the selected type of the\nsupreme rights of God, and of the essential sovereignty which belongs to\nthe Father of minds. No other explains, as this does, the _foundation_\nand _nature_ of Divine authority. There are, indeed, other terms which\nindicate the mere fact of sovereignty in God, and do so more pointedly\nand directly than this. For example: He is compared to a _king_--a name\nwhich belongs to the highest secular office and the highest secular\nauthority on earth. 'The Lord is king forever.' His creatures are his\nsubjects; He gives them wise and righteous laws, and they must answer to\nHim for obedience and disobedience. The comparison is obviously just up\nto a certain limit; but it is obvious that in many essential respects it\nentirely fails. The king and his people are connected together only by\none bond--that of authority and corresponding subjection.\" The relation\nis purely a contingent relation, and may be maintained by arbitrary\npower. But the relation between God and his rational creatures is a\nnatural and a necessary relation. All that is denoted by the word\n_king_--authority, power, law--is really contained in the word _father_;\nbut there is much more conveyed in the word _father_ than can be\npossibly expressed by the word _king_. God is a king, but He is a\nFather-king; his subjects are his own children, and his government of\nthem--in its origin, its spirit, its laws, and even its penalties--is\nstrictly paternal. God's kingship is a _figure_, his fatherhood is the\nprofoundest _reality_.[507]\n\nThis correlation between the spirit of man and the spirit of God is the\nliving indissoluble bond which has ever held, and shall forever hold\nthe hearts of men to the living God. Humanity has not been enchained to\nthe throne of God by servile fear, and held in subjection to his\ngovernment by the dread of future punishment. Fear never made men\nvirtuous, never can insure virtue. Man has been held to God by spiritual\naffinities and a conscious kinship. Men have always felt that the Ruler\nof the world is merciful and just, and that his claim upon their\nallegiance and loyal obedience is reasonable and right. Therefore they\nhave in all ages hoped in his mercy, and confided in the righteousness\nof his administration. This has been the consolation of the wise and\ngood in seasons of danger and adversity. To this Being innocence and\nweakness under oppression and wrong have made their proud appeal, like\nthat of Prometheus to the elements, to the witnessing world, to coming\nages, to the just ear of Heaven. When, therefore, Paul at Athens\nannounced that \"God is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live\nand move and are,\" he touched a chord which vibrated in every heart. For\nin every age men have had a presentiment of some nearer relation to God\nthan the rest of creation--a relation not of dependence only, but of\nkinship and sonship. In moments of deep feeling the poets, who are the\nbest interpreters of nature, have given oracular utterance to the native\nfeeling of the human heart:\n\n    \"We are all thine offspring,\n    The image and the echo of thy eternal voice.\"--CLEANTHES.\n\n    \"All need his aid, his power sustains us all--\n    For we his offspring are.\"--ARATUS.\n\nFinally, as the spiritual nature of man is derived from and correlated\nto God, he may become inwardly conscious of the Divine favor, or may be\nsensible of the Divine displeasure. These are the sanctions of the moral\nlaw--the reward and the penalty awarded to men. The smile of God is\nheaven, the frown of God is hell. Here we have found the deepest ground\nof a Divine government--the paternity of God.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nMORAL GOVERNMENT.\n\nII. ITS NATURE, CONDITIONS, METHOD, AND END.\n\n     \"The times of this ignorance God overlooked, but now commandeth all\n     men every where to repent; because He hath appointed a day in the\n     which He will judge the world in righteousness.\"--ST. PAUL.\n\n\nThe relations existing between God and man, especially the correlations\nof paternity and filiation, constitute the ultimate foundations of Moral\nGovernment. This is the conclusion of the preceding discussion. If God\nis intimately near to man--if He is immanent in man, and man is immanent\nin God--if God is \"the Father of the human spirit,\" and man \"the\noffspring of God,\" then man must bear some resemblance to God--he must\nhave a spiritual and immortal nature, must be a free personality, must\nbe capable of knowing and loving God, and therefore must be under solemn\nresponsibility to God, and within the sphere of the eternal and\nimmutable laws of moral life; in a word, he must be the subject of\n_moral_ government.\n\nWe proceed now to consider, more especially, the _nature_, the\n_conditions_, the _methods_, and the _ends_ of moral government.\n\nI. _The nature of moral government._--Government, in general, is\ncontrol--control with a view to the maintenance of order. This may be\neffected by direct coaction or forceful compulsion; or by the reaction\nof natural consequences; or by the pervasive influence of moral\nmotives. The first is constraint, the second is restraint, the third is\nauthoritative direction. We must, therefore, distinguish between\nphysical, natural, and moral government.\n\nThe _physical_ government of God is the absolute control which He\nexercises over the material creation. He is the Fountain-head of all the\nforces, and the Author of all the laws according to which passive,\nunconscious matter is resistlessly impelled; and because his power and\nwisdom are infinite, and his purposes are immutable, therefore material\nnature is uniform, and there is an all-pervading order in the physical\nworld.\n\nThe _natural_ government of God is that constitution of nature, and of\nman in so far as he is a part of nature, by which the sensations of\npleasure and pain result directly and necessarily from the actions of\nman; and inasmuch as he is able by an induction from experience to\nforesee these consequences, and to determine his own conduct in view of\nthem, they are not improperly called rewards and punishments. Thus it is\nfound by experience that disease and suffering result from acts of\nintemperance and licentiousness, and men are restrained from the\ncommission of these acts by the fear of their foreseen results. This is\ncontrol by the reaction of natural consequences in that intermediate\nsphere which we may designate the physico-moral order of the world.\n\nThe _moral_ government of God is that kind of control which a wise and\nvirtuous parent exercises over his family, or a just and equitable\nmagistrate over his subjects.[508] It is a government by laws or rules\naddressed to the reason, by moral motives which appeal to the\nconscience, and by moral sanctions which appeal to the emotions. It is\na constitution in which God has declared his will to man, and taught\nhim, prior to the experience of retributive consequences, what is right\nand what is wrong; a constitution under which man is endowed with the\ncapacity of perceiving the inherent righteousness of the Divine law, of\nfeeling the imperative claims of duty, and of apprehending a future\nretribution, and also a real causative power of self-determination and\nchoice. Finally, it is an economy in which ample scope is afforded for\nthe development of responsible character. It is a probation in which\nthere are tests and temptations, in which forbearance is exercised and\nconsequences are delayed, in which remedial agencies are plied and\nopportunities are afforded for repentance and reformation, and in the\nfinal consummation of which virtuous character shall receive its meet\nreward, and sinful character its merited punishment. This is the ideal\norder of moral life.\n\nThis twofold distinction between the _physical_ and the _spiritual_, and\nbetween the _natural_ and the _moral_, runs through the entire domain of\nexistence and action, of being and becoming.\n\nThe terms _physical_ and _spiritual_ are employed as collective terms to\nconnote the essential, changeless, and permanent attributes of certain\nentities or realities which are regarded as ultimate, viz., matter and\nspirit. The attributes of matter are extension, divisibility, absolute\nincompressibility, and inertia; the attributes of spirit are\nsensitivity, reason, power, spontaneity, and memory. The term physical\nis further employed to denote certain \"affections of matter\"--that is,\nmechanical effects which are the result of the action of force upon\nmatter. It is true we often speak of \"physical forces,\" as though force\nwere an essential attribute of matter. But this is one of the many\nambiguities of language. All that we mean by physical force is a force\nwhich acts upon matter, and produces in the motions and collocations of\nmatter its appropriate effects.[509] Spirit-force is the only force in\nthe universe; all that our physical science deals with is \"forms of\nenergy which have their origin in force.\" \"Mind,\" says Dr. Carpenter,\n\"is the one and only source of power.\"[510]\n\nThe terms _natural_ and _moral_ are employed to denote opposite modes of\naction and classes of effects. In the one case the mode of action is\nfixed and uniform, and the effect is necessary; in the other case the\nmode of action is free and volitional, and the effect is contingent and\nvariable. The first is the order of nature where force reigns, the\nsecond is the order of moral life where freedom prevails. \"Whatever is\ncomprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and effect, of course\nnecessitated, and having its necessity in some other thing antecedent or\nconcurrent, this is said to be _natural_, and the aggregate and system\nof all such things is nature.\"[511] While, on the contrary, that which\nlies within the agent's power, and to which he determines himself by an\nact of free choice; and especially that which the agent knows he _ought_\nto do, and in choosing which he is conscious of power to put forth, in\nthe same unchanged circumstances, a different volition instead, is\ncalled _moral_.\n\nThus does morality commence with \"the sacred distinction\" between\n_thing_ and _person_. \"On this distinction all legislation, human and\nDivine, proceeds.\" That which fundamentally distinguishes a person from\na mere thing of nature is _free causality_--that is, \"the power or\nimmunity to put forth in the same circumstances either of several\nvolitions.\" A thing is unconscious, involuntary, and powerless, and\nconsequently limited to one sole possible eventuation. A thing has no\nresponsibility for its movements, which it has not willed, and of the\nnature and consequences of which it is ignorant. A person alone is\nresponsible, because he is intelligent and free; that is, he can foresee\nthe consequences of his action, and freely determines himself to its\nperformance. A thing has no dignity; dignity attaches only to\npersonality. Personality is inalienable, sacred, and inviolable; it can\nnot be abrogated, surrendered, or transferred, and it demands to be\nrespected. In a word, it has both duties and rights, while things have\nneither.[512]\n\nThus do we find that all dignity, all sacredness, all responsibility,\nall morality belong to and are predicable only of the personal being,\nbecause intelligence and freedom are the essential moments of\npersonality.\n\nFurthermore, the sphere of the _moral_ is to be determined by another\nimportant limitation. Not all the actions of men are personal and\nresponsible acts. Sensation is not a voluntary operation. When the\nexternal object is brought into proper relation with the animated\norganism, perception necessarily occurs. The intuitive apperceptions of\nthe reason are impersonal; when a change transpires, the reason\nnecessarily affirms the existence of a cause. Reflex nervous action is\ninvoluntary. Many muscular movements are spontaneous, but not\nvolitional. A responsible action is an _intentional_ action--that is, an\nact performed to realize an end which lies within the agent's\ncontemplation. Spontaneity or self-determination only thereby becomes\n_will_. A moral act is consequently a premeditated, intentional,\nvoluntary act, and the merit or demerit of an agent is as his actual\nintention.\n\nThe last and most important limitation of the moral sphere is to those\nvoluntary actions which have relation to personality, human and Divine.\n\"The peculiar distinction of moral actions, moral character, moral\nprinciples, moral habits, as contrasted with the intellectual and other\nparts of man's nature, lies in this, that they always imply a relation\nbetween two persons.\"[513] Morality is the relation of person to person.\n\nWe sum up what has been said in the preceding paragraphs in these words:\nThe moral government of God is a _legislation_ which has respect to\npersonality, especially the relations of person to person; and it is an\n_administration_ under which the subjects have power to resist and\nviolate its requirements, but which is provided with ample means to\nvindicate its authority, and maintain the moral order of the universe.\n\nII. _The subjective conditions of moral government._--It will be\napparent from what has been already said that the following conditions\nare essential to moral government:\n\n(1.) The subject of moral government must be _intelligent_. He must be\nable to understand the Divine requirements, to perceive their inherent\nrightness, and to feel the sense of obligation to comply therewith. He\nmust also be susceptible of certain pleasurable or painful _emotions_\nwhich follow as the direct consequences of his actions, and secure an\nadequate retribution. In a word, he must have a moral consciousness, or,\nbriefly, a _conscience_.\n\n(2.) The subject of moral government must be a _free power_. He must be\nthe efficient cause of his own action, and he must be conscious of this\npower of self-determination--that is, he must be conscious of power to\nput forth, in the same unchanged circumstances, either of several\nvolitions. In short, he must have a _free will_.\n\nThese, then, are the essential conditions of moral agency--the\npossession of a _conscience_, and the _power to obey or disobey_ the\nrequirements of moral law. Both these conditions of accountability exist\nin man. By virtue of his constitution as a spiritual being made in the\nimage of God, he is capable of perceiving what is inherently right,\njust, and good. His reason intuitively apprehends the good, and affirms\nthe imperative obligation to choose the good. His judgment pronounces\nupon the relation of human conduct to the law of right, affirming man\nhas or has not done right. And his emotive nature yields him complacence\nand joy as the reward of well-doing, or inflicts pain and remorse as the\npunishment of wrong-doing. In the words of Chalmers, \"he is endowed with\na conscience which performs within his bosom all the offices of a\nlawgiver and a judge.\"\n\nThe possession of this faculty necessarily supposes the existence of\npower in the agent to comply or not to comply with its behests. A moral\nlaw is designed only for the government of a free being, and nothing is\nmoral or immoral which is not voluntary. If there is no\nself-determination, there is no proper personality to which the law of\nreason can attach. Remorse, on the one hand, satisfaction on the other,\nare emotions which are inconceivable and impossible in a being who is\nnot consciously free.\n\n_The nature and authority of conscience_ is a question which is\nearnestly discussed. Among philosophers and theologians there are\ndiverse and conflicting opinions. It has been variously characterized as\na _witness_ of our past actions; as a _judgment_ passed upon our\nactions; or as a _feeling_ arising in view of our actions. By one,\nconscience is regarded as an _appetite_--a craving for the right, but\nnot a faculty intuitively perceiving the right. Another defines it \"as a\n_capacity_ and a _tendency_ to inquire into duty, but not as supplying a\nlaw of duty.\"[514] While a third regards it as a state of the\n_sensibility_--\"a simple feeling, emotion, or vivid sentiment which\narises immediately in the mind in presence of certain actions, and to\nwhich we give the name of moral approbation.\"[515]\n\nThese definitions of conscience may all be regarded as containing some\ntruth. They are all defective, however, in this one respect--_they fail\nto recognize an internal law which constitutes a subjective standard of\nright_, and an intuitive perception of moral distinctions and qualities\nin human action.\n\nAs an essay toward a clearer apprehension of the nature of conscience,\nwe present the following propositions:\n\n1. _Conscience is not a distinct faculty of the mind._ Conscience\n(_conscientia_ = joint or double knowledge) is the knowledge of self in\nrelation to a known law of right and wrong. Conscience and consciousness\nmay therefore be regarded as, in some respects, identical. The terms in\ntheir etymology and their general import are synonymous. There is,\nhowever, a technical distinction to be made. Consciousness expresses\nself-knowledge in general. Conscience expresses self-knowledge relative\nto responsibility. Consciousness is the recognition by the thinking\nsubject of its own states and affections. Conscience is the knowledge of\nan act or an affection as having some moral quality--as being right or\nwrong.\n\n2. _Conscience is, like consciousness, a complex phenomenon_, the\nresult of the simultaneous action of the primary powers of the mind. The\nsimplest fact of consciousness is a synthesis of sensation and reason in\na primitive psychological judgment. Sensation alone is not knowledge,\nand it becomes consciousness only as it is illuminated and informed by\nthe reason. And so a mere state of the sensibility--a mere feeling of\napprobation or disapprobation--does not constitute conscience until it\nis informed by the reason. Conscience is the unity of feeling and reason\nin a judgment which has respect to voluntary action.\n\n3. _Conscience is the common field in which is revealed the result of\nthe operation of all our faculties in their especial relation to moral\nlaw._ As consciousness is the common field in which the results of the\noperation of all our faculties come to light, so conscience is that\ndepartment of the same field in which is revealed the action of the mind\nin relation to the unchangeable principles of order and right which\ndwell in the bosom of the Infinite. Conscience is pre-eminently the\nGodward side of our mental being, which reflects the moral character of\nGod, and brings us into relationship with Him. It is that which carries\nus _per saltum_ to the immediate recognition of a God, the Lawgiver and\nthe Judge who is over man, and which holds him in mysterious but\nindissoluble bonds of obligation. Conscience is therefore,\n\n(1.) The _reason_ intuitively apprehending universal moral ideas and\nlaws. It furnishes _the idea of the good_. It affirms that the good is\nuniversally _obligatory_. It asserts that the good has _desert_,\nworthiness, and dignity. And it demands for the good an appropriate\nrecognition and a just reward.\n\n(2.) The _understanding_ apprehending the relations in which we stand to\nGod, to our fellow-beings, and to self as a moral personality endowed\nwith reason and freedom.\n\n(3.) The _judgment_ comparing the acts of a voluntary agent existing in\ncertain relations with the immutable ideas and laws of the reason, and\naffirming this is _right_ and worthy of praise and reward, or that is\n_wrong_ and deserving of blame and punishment.\n\n(4.) A particular state of the _sensibility_--the painful or pleasurable\nemotions which spontaneously arise in presence of right or wrong in our\nown actions or in the actions of our fellow-men.\n\nThus conscience is, as it were, the focal point at which are united and\nblended the varied acts and states of the soul in its immediate relation\nto the moral law. It is the synthesis of moral ideas, cognitions, and\nfeelings in a moral judgment.\n\nThe co-operation of these powers and susceptibilities of the soul in\ntheir relation to the _good_ has a parallel and an illustration in their\noperation in relation to the _beautiful_.\n\nThe ideas of order, proportion, harmony, fitness, and unity in variety\nare unquestionably fundamental and necessary ideas of the _reason_. In\nthe Divine reason these ideas have always existed as the laws in\naccordance with which He fashioned the material universe. And inasmuch\nas the human reason is configured to the Divine, these ideas must also\nexist in the human mind. Like statuary in the inner palaces of the soul,\nthey are the models by which we recognize and the standards according to\nwhich we judge the forms of beauty in the external world. The\ncorrespondence between these external forms and the inner ideals of the\nreason is recognized by the _judgment_. And the delight we experience in\npresence of the beautiful in nature and art is a particular direction\nof the _sensibility_.\n\nThis is not, however, the chronological order in which the idea of the\nbeautiful is developed in the mind. The sense of beauty first reveals\nitself in the spontaneous consciousness in presence of the order and\nharmony and fitness which pervade the universe. We experience delight\nwithout being able to specialize the precise causes of our pleasure. But\nthe reflective consciousness, which is pre-eminently analytic, brings\nout into clear light the fundamental ideas of order, harmony, fitness,\nand unity, which had a prior existence in the reason, and have now\nrecognized themselves as mirrored in the universe. The repeated\nobservation of the forms of beauty around us, and the comparison of\nthese with the standard ideas of the reason, will result in the\nbeau-ideal of a pure and correct taste--true \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd.\n\nSo in relation to the idea of the _good_. It does not stand forth to the\neye of consciousness, in the first instance, as an abstract conception.\nThe _moral sense_--the affection of the sensibility in presence of\nvoluntary and responsible action--is first revealed in the spontaneous\nconsciousness. When we behold an act of justice, of kindness, of\nbeneficence, we experience the fullest satisfaction. We admire and\nesteem the actor. We feel that his conduct is praiseworthy, and that he\nis deserving of honor and reward. These sentiments spring up\nspontaneously and involuntarily in our bosoms long before we have\ndefined their reason and law. The reflective consciousness subsequently\nelicits the rational ideas which underlie these emotions--the ideas of\nthe useful, the just, the beneficent, the noble, and the perfect, all\nwhich are finally embraced in the idea of the _good_. And the repeated\ncomparison of the conduct of voluntary agents existing under certain\nrelations, with the fundamental ideas of the reason, these standards of\nright erected in the soul, will result in an ideal of moral\nexcellence--a true \u1f10\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd.\n\nIf this doctrine of conscience be the product of a true psychological\nmethod, it will enable us to account for the apparent want of uniformity\nin its suffrages in individual cases, and the varied phenomena presented\nin different men.\n\nConscience, like consciousness, has its gradual development. Though\nnatural and necessary to every human soul whose powers are normally\ndeveloped, it is not exercised at the beginning of its existence, but\nonly after certain conditions of growth and stages of growth have been\nattained. This development may be arrested or it may be perverted. The\nabsence of proper conditions, the lack of suitable discipline and\nculture in any one of the faculties whose operation enters into the\nconcrete phenomena, will modify the general result. An excess of\n_sensibility_ will give a morbid conscience; the lack of sensibility, a\nslumbering conscience. A defective apprehension of the relations in\nwhich we stand to God and to our fellow-men will prevent our seeing our\nspecific duties. Inattention to the character of our own motives, or\nignorance of the real intentions of other men, may mislead the\n_judgment_ in discriminating between the quality of actions. There are\nalso natural differences in the soundness and accuracy of the judgments\nof individual men. We meet those who with a limited acquaintance with\nparticular facts and abstract notions are nevertheless endowed with\nsound practical judgment; while others, with a larger knowledge of facts\nand general principles, are strangely defective in judgment. Finally,\nunless men accustom themselves to reflection, to analysis, the ideas of\nthe just, the right, the good, do not come clearly into the light of\nconsciousness. Hence the different manifestations of conscience in\nindividual men.\n\nWe claim, however, that the moral ideas of the reason are in all men\n_identical_; that they exist and operate, even though unconsciously, in\nall minds, determining their moral judgments; and that _when the same\nrelations of personality are clearly before the mind the moral judgments\nof men are uniform_.\n\nIn spite of all the topical moralities to which factitious circumstances\nmay have given birth, there is unquestionably _a universal and immutable\nmorality_. In every nation under heaven, veracity, justice, and\nbeneficence are separated by a clear, unmistakable line from falsehood,\ninjustice, and cruelty; nor can all the casuistry and sophistry in the\nuniverse transpose or confound them. Custom, prescription, conventions\nof human opinion, factitious circumstances, can never blur over and\nobliterate these lines which separate right and wrong. Beneath all these\napparent differences, the conscience will make her voice heard in the\ndepth of the soul, in the common sentiments of mankind, and in the\nstatutes of universal jurisprudence. The great ideas of justice and\nright were prominent and well defined among the nations of antiquity.\n\"Nemesis and Themis were not only their abstractions and deities--they\nwere embodied in their systems of jurisprudence. Law secured property\nand sanctified life. Law guarded every relation and ordered every act.\nLaw was the theme of their philosophy and the burden of their song. We\nare not unacquainted with the jealousies and disputes of their schools\nof philosophy. They placed the good of man and the reason of morality in\nthe most incongruous things, but _they never differed concerning the\nconduct which was right_. Epicurus and Zeno knew no divergence\nhere.\"[516] Indeed, they asserted the immutability of moral law for all\ntimes and places--\n\n    \"The unwritten laws of God that know not change;\n    They are not of to-day nor yesterday,\n    But live for ever.\"[517]\n\n\"There is,\" says Cicero, \"one true and original law, conformable to\nnature and reason, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls\nto the fulfillment of duty and to abstinence from injustice, and which\ncalls with that irresistible voice which is felt in all its authority\nwherever it is heard. This law can not be curtailed or abolished, nor\naffected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a whole\npeople, can not dispense with its paramount obligation. It requires no\ncommentator to render it distinctly intelligible, nor is it different at\nRome, at Athens, now and in ages before and after, but in all ages and\nall nations it is and has been and will be one and everlasting--one as\nthat God, its author and promulgator, who is the common Sovereign of all\nmankind, is Himself one. Man is truly man as he yields himself to this\nDivine influence. He can not resist it but by flying, as it were, from\nhis own bosom, and laying aside the general feelings of humanity, by\nwhich very act he must already have inflicted on himself the severest of\npunishments, even though he were to avoid what is usually accounted\npunishment.\"[518]\n\nAmong the most savage tribes, as among the most refined and polished\nnations, are also to be found the same common principles of morality.\nTheft, murder, adultery are offenses condemned and punished by every\nnation under heaven. The high qualities of virtue are the things which\nwin esteem and command respect in every country, however rude. Were\nproof demanded, we might bring it at once from the darkest corners of\nthe earth. The savage Fijian regards theft, adultery, abduction,\nincendiarism, and treason as serious crimes.[519] And Dr. Livingstone\ntells us that, \"On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to\ntheir former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of a future state,\nthey have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a\ntolerably clear conception on all these subjects. Respecting their sense\nof right and wrong, they profess that nothing we indicate as sin ever\nappeared to them as otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to\nhave more wives than one.\"[520]\n\nWe conclude that the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in\nhuman history, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony\nto the fact that the ideas of right, duty, accountability, and moral\ndesert are native to the human mind; and consequently the existence of\nthe first condition of moral government--namely, the possession by its\nsubject of a _conscience_--is an unquestionable fact.\n\nThe _second_ condition of moral government is the existence, in the\nsubject, _of free self-determining power_: the agent must be the real\ncause and the sole cause of his own actions; he must have freedom both\n_to_ and _from_ the act.\n\nUnder a reign of necessity there can be no moral government and no just\nretribution. It is, at best, a mere physical or natural government; for\nmoral government must be of beings who are free and self-determined, and\nnot of mere machines. To blame a necessitated thing is irrational, to\npunish it is a cruelty and an injustice. The necessitarian himself is\nunable to conceal his conscious embarrassment in presence of these\ndifficulties, and to save his theory he becomes reckless in assertions.\nHe affirms that \"the whole system of morality--its duties and\nresponsibilities; the whole scheme of moral government, with its rewards\nand punishments--remains, on his theory, as entire and stable as\never.\"[521] This affirmation runs athwart all the dictates of\ncommon-sense, and collides with the universal conviction of humanity. He\nis the only consistent necessitarian who rejects the Christian doctrine\nof sin, denies all accountability and retribution, and reduces the\ngovernment of God to mere physical impulsion and the management of a\nuniversal mechanism. The necessitarian dogma can not be made to quadrate\nwith our primitive convictions; it is out of harmony with all our\ninstinctive beliefs. The innate idea of right, the native sense of duty\nand accountability, the consciousness of sin, our faith in the justice\nof God, our religious hopes and fears, all impel us onward to find a\nrational and valid basis for human responsibility and moral government\nin the freedom of the will.\n\nThat man does possess an alternative power of self-determination and\nchoice is evident:\n\n1. _From the direct testimony of consciousness._ We _know_ that any\ndoing of ours might have been reserved--we _feel_, by that same direct\nconsciousness which certifies our existence and our reason, that we have\nthe fullest power of choice. No subtlety, no abstraction of argument,\ncan convince us that we are otherwise than free. \"Men are not conscious\nof compulsion of any kind, not conscious of certain mental states,\ncalled choices, which are either wholly or partially independent of\ntheir free agency; but they are perfectly and distinctly conscious of\nentire liberty, and of complete inward power to choose.\"[522]\n\nThat we have a direct consciousness of freedom is the doctrine of most\nof the writers on moral science. Cousin is emphatic in the assertion of\nthis doctrine: \"I am conscious of this sovereign power of the will. I\nfeel in myself, before its determination, the force that can determine\nitself in such a manner or in such another. At the same time that I will\nthis or that I am equally conscious of the power to will the opposite; I\nam conscious of being master of my resolution, of the ability to arrest\nit, continue it, repress it.\"[523] The distinguished Professor of Moral\nPhilosophy in the University of Edinburgh, Dr. Calderwood, teaches the\nsame doctrine: \"It is in our consciousness of self-control for the\ndetermination of activity that we obtain our only knowledge of\ncausation. Every one knows himself as the cause of his own actions. In\nthe external world we continue ignorant of causes, and are able only to\ntrace uniform sequence, as Hume and Comte have insisted. But in\nconsciousness we distinguish between sequence and causality. We are\nconscious of our own causal energy by knowing the origin of our activity\nin self-determination.\"[524]\n\nThe direct consciousness of freedom is denied by Sir William Hamilton.\nThis denial is a necessary consequence of his doctrine of relativity. If\nwe are not conscious of self as a reality, but only of certain modes or\naffections, then, of course, we can not be conscious of self as a free\npower. But as Mansel has forcibly replied: \"Does it not rather appear a\nflat contradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of\nmyself, but only of my sensations or volitions? Who, then, is the _I_\nthat is conscious; and how can _I_ be conscious of such states as\n_mine_? In this case it would surely be more accurate to say, not that I\nam conscious of my sensations, but that the sensation is conscious of\nitself; but, thus worded, the glaring absurdity of the theory would\ncarry with it its own refutation.... Self-personality is revealed to us\nwith all the clearness of an original intuition.\"[525] With an\ninconsistency which shows the fallacy of Sir William Hamilton's whole\ntheory of relativity, he admits that, \"As clearly as I am conscious of\nexisting, so clearly am I conscious at every moment of my existence that\nthe conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification, nor a series of\nmodifications of any other subject, but that it is itself something\ndifferent from all its own modifications, and a _self-subsistent\nentity_.\"[526]\n\nIf, then, we admit, as we must admit, the existence of an immediate\nconsciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of the personal\nself as actively and passively related to them, we must also admit the\ndirect testimony of conscience to the fact of liberty. \"I am conscious\nnot merely of the phenomenon of volition, _but of myself as producing\nit, and as producing it by choice, with a power to choose the opposite\nalternative_.\"\n\nThe necessitarians are all compelled to concede that the universal\nconviction of our race is, and always has been, that man is free. They\nhave, however, asserted that this dictate of common-sense is not to be\naccepted as philosophically true. Lord Kames admits the natural\nconviction of freedom from necessity, though he declares it to be an\nillusion:\n\n    \"Man fondly dreams that he is free to act;\n    Naught is he but the powerless, worthless plaything\n    Of the blind force that in his will itself\n    Works out for him a dread necessity.\"\n\nAnd Hommel, certainly one of the ablest and most decided of fatalists,\nsays, \"I must believe that I have a feeling of liberty, at the very\nmoment I am writing against liberty, upon grounds which I regard as\nincontestable. Zeno was a fatalist only in theory; he did not act in\nconformity with his convictions.\"[527]\n\nThe possession of alternative power is a fact of consciousness as clear\nand indubitable as the fact of personal existence. It is admitted by the\nnecessitarians that all men have \"a natural conviction of freedom;\" they\nbelieve themselves to be free beings, and they act upon this belief in\nall the relations of life. If this fact of consciousness is an illusion,\nthen our existence is also an illusion, for that same intuition which\ncertifies to me that I exist certifies also that I am free. If the\ntestimony of consciousness is invalidated, there is no criterion for\ntruth. If one of its deliverances is found to be false, how can we\nvindicate the veracity of any? \"Our faculties are bestowed upon us as\nthe instruments of deception; the root of our nature is a lie, and\nuniversal skepticism is the only goal.\"\n\n2. _The idea of moral obligation necessarily presupposes the freedom of\nthe will._ This is a principle so obvious that it needs no elucidation.\nIf man have duties, he must possess the power of fulfilling them. He\nought to be free if he ought to obey law, or human nature is in\ncontradiction with itself. The direct certainty of obligation implies\nthe corresponding certainty of freedom. Hence Kant's well-known canon,\n\"_I ought, therefore I can._\" Though denying the direct consciousness of\nfreedom, Kant maintained with earnestness that the fact of liberty is\nguaranteed by the existence of the moral law, whose categorical\nimperative _thou shalt_ necessarily implies a corresponding _thou\ncanst_. To the same effect are the words of Sir William Hamilton: \"The\nfact that we are free is given to us in the consciousness of an\nuncompromising law of duty.... Our consciousness of the moral law, which\nwithout a moral liberty in man would be a mendacious imperative, gives a\ndecided preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of\nfate.\"[528] Physical causation and moral obligation can not coexist side\nby side. In proportion as we extend the domain of necessity we must\ndiminish that of duty.\n\n3. _The sense of responsibility presupposes the freedom of the will._\nThis sense of responsibility is native to the human mind. Every man\nfeels himself to be accountable for his own conduct, not only at the bar\nof his own conscience, but before the moral judgment-seat of his\nfellow-men. Every where he recognizes the right of his fellow-men to\ninquire into his character, to sit in judgment upon his conduct, and to\nesteem and treat him accordingly. We necessarily impute blame when an\nunjust action is performed by another; we feel conscious of guilt and\nunworthiness when a wrong is done by ourselves. These are facts of\nuniversal consciousness. But these sentiments are irrational and absurd\nif man is a mere machine impelled by natural causes, and has no\nself-determining power.[529] Whatever disasters may overtake us in the\ncourse of nature, however we may suffer by the wild tornado or the\nblighting mildew, how much soever of our property may be swallowed up by\nthe ocean tempest or the devouring flame, we impute no blame; and we\nexperience here emotions essentially different from those which we\nexperience when a wrong is intentionally inflicted upon us by our\nfellow-men. \"Suppose yourself to have been the victim of some act of\ninjustice and villainy by which you were reduced to penury, and your\nfamily to want and indigence. By what philosophy can you eradicate the\nsense of wrong or cease to impute blame to the man whose perfidy has\ndespoiled your life? You may forgive him, and follow him with your\nprayers to the last hour of your life, but you will still pray for him\nas a guilty man whose crime has been the burden of your life.\" Now what\nis this radical and fundamental difference between the events of the\nmaterial universe and the actions of men? and what is the rational basis\nfor the different feelings we experience and the diverse judgments we\npass in regard to them?\n\nThere is only one answer to this question. The ultimate\nground-difference is found in the fact that one class of events is\n_necessary_--there is no adequate power in the thing to be or do\notherwise; the other class of actions is _free_--they need not have been\nperformed, the actor had full power for a contrary choice. In the world\nof nature _force_ reigns; in the world of moral life _liberty_ prevails.\nThe fundamental principle of difference is the _freedom of the will_.\n\nThis second condition of moral government--namely, the possession of\n_free alternative power_ on the part of the subject to comply, or refuse\nto comply, with the requirements of moral law--is thus established,\nfirst, by the direct testimony of consciousness, from which there can be\nno appeal, and, secondly, by necessary inference from collateral facts\nof consciousness, which can not be invalidated by counter-proofs.\n\nUnhappily, the restlessness of speculative minds, the necessities of\nfalse theories in philosophy, or the unwarrantable assumptions of\ndogmatic theologians, have led to the disregard of the affirmations of\nuniversal consciousness. Men have asked, How can freedom be possible in\na dependent creature? How can it be consistent with our belief in the\nprinciple of universal causation? How can it be harmonized with the fact\nthat man always acts under the influence of motives? How can it be\nreconciled with the omnipotence and absolute prescience of God?\n\nWe shall now address ourselves to the consideration of the arguments\nagainst the doctrine of the freedom of the will which are suggested by\nthese queries.\n\n\n1. The first is the _Metaphysical or Causational Argument_. The rational\nintuition that \"every event must have a cause\" is a universal and\nnecessary truth. It must therefore be rigorously applied to all mental\nas well as to all physical phenomena. Every volition must have a cause,\nand if caused it can not be _free_. This is the grand argument upon\nwhich the necessitarian mainly relies, and it is urged with eloquence\nand force by Edwards, Chalmers, and McCosh.\n\nNow that \"every event must have a cause\" is an _\u00e0 priori_ truth, which\nis as readily accorded by the freedomist as it is vehemently insisted\nupon by the necessitarian. No philosophic writers have more ably and\nclearly enounced this law of causality than the freedomists Reid,\nStewart, and Cousin. They rely upon it as one of the main pillars of the\nTheistic argument. And they apply it, in all its integrity, to mental as\nwell as to physical phenomena. They hesitate not to say that \"_every\nvolition must have a cause_.\" That cause is the efficient creative power\nwhich resides in a free, spiritual personality. And that power is not,\nlike a material or physical cause, shut up to one sole mode of\neffectuation: it is an _alternative_ power, a pluri-efficient cause.\nWhere, then, is the discrepancy between the universal principle of\ncausality and the doctrine of alternative causation? Is the infinite\nFirst Cause confined to one solely possible mode of effectuation? If so,\nhow will you account for the endlessly varied effects which appear in\nthe physical universe? God is the Eternal _One_; whence the plurality\nand diversity of his creative acts if He be not an equipotent cause? And\nyet, of all the events which have transpired in the universe, whether\nnatural or supernatural, we affirm \"every event must have had a\ncause.\"[530] The endless diversity of effects which originate in the\nalternative causation of God is in perfect harmony with this universal\nlaw of causality.\n\nBut on a closer examination it will be found that when the necessitarian\nattempts to invalidate our consciousness of alternative power by the\napplication of the causational argument he adroitly shifts his ground.\nHe assumes another proposition, which is neither equivalent to the above\naxiom, nor in itself axiomatic and self-evident, nor justifiably\nassumed without proof. McCosh says \"the doctrine of necessity is founded\non the intellectual intuitions of man's mind, which lead us, in mental\nas in material phenomena, to anticipate the _same_ effects to follow the\n_same_ causes\"[531]--that is, every cause is inalternative or unipotent;\none effect, and only one can follow.\n\nNow that a given phenomenon must have a cause is one assertion; that the\n_same_ cause will again and forever produce the _same_ effect is\nanother. The first is an axiom, the second is an induction. That \"every\nevent must have a cause\" is a rational intuition. That \"like causes will\nproduce always like effects\" is a generalization from our limited\nexperience, and on a further analysis will be found to apply only to our\ncognitions of the _material_ universe. It is grounded simply on what we\nknow empirically of the uniformity of nature. Now we have no _\u00e0 priori_\nintuitive conviction of the uniformity of nature. As the result of\nmaturer thought, McCosh admits this in his work on the \"Intuitions of\nthe Mind:\" \"It is vain to speak of the belief in the uniformity of\nnature as a self-evident, a necessary, or a universal truth\" (page 276).\nIt is perfectly conceivable that the world might have been so\nconstituted that there should have been no regularity in the succession\nof events. The causes of all the events in nature might have been\n_supernatural_, and consisted in the immediate free volitions of the\nDeity, or subordinate angelic agencies.[532] They might have been all\n\"miraculous,\" and yet the true law of causality would not have been\nviolated, or in any way invalidated. And so when man, in the exercise of\nhis free alternative power, produces a new succession of events in\nphysical nature, or moves disorder and \u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 into the moral sphere,\nthis is no way inconsistent with the axiom that \"every event has a\ncause.\"\n\n\"In our very definition of freedom of will we assume in the volitional\nsphere the inapplicability of the maxim that 'like causes ever and\nalways produce like effects.' We assume that _either_ one of several\neffects is legitimate from the _same_ cause. And while we admit that in\nnon-volitional causation the law that 'every event must have a cause'\nmeans that every event must have its own peculiar cause, adequate for\nitself alone, in volitional causation an event may have a cause adequate\neither for it or for other event; and whichever event exists, the\n_demands of the laws of causation are completely satisfied_.\"[533]\n\nDriven from this boasted stronghold, the necessitarian resorts to his\nfavorite dialectic strategy. He demands the explanation of equipotent\ncausation, how one cause can be adequate to several effects. He asks,\n_What causes the will to put forth one particular volition rather than\nanother?_\n\nNow when we have shown that, as a fact of consciousness and experience,\na personal, _spiritual_ cause is adequate to several results, we are\nentitled in reason and justice to protest against any attempt to push\nthe inquiry a step farther. We have attained an ultimate fact, and we\nhave no right to cast doubt upon its authority by raising perplexing\nquestions as to the _how_ or _why_ of that which _is_. This is precisely\nthe method by which the atheist Holyoake would invalidate the argument\nfor the existence of the infinite First Cause. He subjects the Deity to\nthis universal law of causality, and asks, What caused the Creator to\ncreate? \"The atheist holds that the universe is an endless series of\ncauses and effects _ad infinitum_, and therefore the idea of a _first_\ncause is an absurdity and a contradiction.\" The \"infinite series\" of\nEdwards and of Holyoake are constructed on the same principle. They both\nask _a_ cause for _the_ cause.\n\nWhen, therefore, it is asked, What causes the will to effect one\nvolition rather than another? our answer is, _Nothing whatever!_\n\n\"Of its own effect, WILL, in its proper conditions, is not a partial,\nbut a full and adequate cause. Put your finger upon any effect\n(volition) and ask, What caused this result exclusively of the others?\nand the reply is, The will, or the agent in willing. Ask then what\ncaused the will in its conditions to cause the volition, and the reply\nis, NOTHING. Nay, you are a bad philosopher in asking; for for its own\neffect will or the willing agent is a complete cause: as complete a\ncause as any cause whatever; _and every complete cause produces its\neffect_ UNCAUSEDLY. The volition, like every other effect, is completely\naccounted for when a complete cause is assigned. To ask what caused the\ncomplete cause to produce the effect is to ask the cause of\ncausation.\"[534]\n\nBut such an \"alternative\" power, the necessitarian affirms, is\nincomprehensible and inexplicable. To which we need only reply in the\nlanguage of Hamilton, \"The scheme of freedom is not more\nincomprehensible than the scheme of necessity.\"[535] \"_Omnia exeunt in\nmysterium_\"--there is nothing the absolute ground of which is not a\nmystery. In saying so much, however, we by no means grant the\naffirmation of Hamilton that \"we are unable to conceive an absolute\ncommencement [of being or motion]; we can not therefore conceive a free\nvolition.\"[536] This is not admitted by Mansel, the disciple and\nannotator of Hamilton, as flowing even from his mental \"law of the\nconditioned.\" \"It may be true, as a fact, that no material atom has been\nadded to the world since the first creation; but the assertion, however\ntrue, is certainly not _necessary_. The Power which created once must be\nconceived as able to create again, whether that ability is actually\nexercised or not. The same conclusion is still more evident when we\nproceed from the consideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter we\nmaintain that the creation of new portions is perfectly conceivable as a\nresult, if not as a process. Every man who comes into the world comes\ninto it as a distinct individual, having a personality and consciousness\nof his own; and that personality is a distinct accession to the number\nof persons previously existing.... I believe that every new person that\ncomes into the world is, as a person, a new existence.\"[537] So a\nvolition is a _new_ existence, an absolute origination, \"a beginning of\nmotion\" which has its source in the primordial power of the human spirit\nas spirit. The _fact_ is undeniable, the _mode_ is inexplicable. But the\ninconceivability of the mode in which the will creates a volition no\nmore renders the fact doubtful than the impossibility of conceiving how\na new and distinct self-conscious personality comes into existence\ninvalidates the fact that \"I exist, and know myself as a distinctly\nexisting being.\"\n\n\n2. _The Psychological Argument._--This may be briefly stated in the\nfollowing terms:\n\nIt is a fact of observation and experience that _motives_ do stand to\nthe will in the relation of _causes_ which necessitate volition. They\nhave an exact mathematical commensurability, and their prevalence is in\nthe precise ratio of their antecedent intrinsic _strength_. If motives\nare wanting, there can be no choice; but when the same motives are\npresented to the same mind, it obeys them with such remarkable\n_uniformity_ that human actions may be reduced to statistical tables as\nreliable and as accurate as tables of mortality.\n\nWe might here at once, and with justice, enter our caveat against the\nattempt to invalidate a primitive datum of consciousness by alleged\ndeductions from the exterior phenomena of human life and history. A\nprimitive datum of consciousness is unquestionable and infallible. A\nprocess of induction is liable to the interpolations of error. The\nlatter is therefore a lesser authority than the former, and a merely\nderivative assurance can not be argued against an ultimate fact. We must\nregard it as a philosophic canon that an experience cognition can not\nconflict with an intuitive belief. The exterior phenomena of life and\nhistory, properly interpreted, must harmonize with the interior facts\nand laws of the human mind, for what is _history_ but the development,\nunder the conditions and relations of time, of the primitive powers,\nideas, and laws of humanity? If, then, consciousness attests the\npresence in man's spiritual nature of a power, in the same\ncircumstances, to choose either of several ways, we may confidently\nexpect that the phenomena of the moral world will not belie that\ntestimony. Now it is a palpable fact that an unbroken law of continuity\nand uniformity pervades the material universe. It is locked up in an\nunchangeable status. There is no deviation and no progression. All\nthings remain as they were since the beginning. The fundamental fact\nlying at the basis of this undeviating uniformity of nature is that\nmaterial causes are unipotent, and shut up to one solely possible mode\nof effectuation.[538] And it is equally palpable that the phenomena of\nthe moral world, the sphere of human life and history, reveal\ncontingency, diversity, alteriety, and progression. Humanity has not\nrevolved in cycles, neither has it run in the inflexible grooves of an\nanterior causation, nor remained in the dead-lock of an unchangeable\nstatus. History is not an inflexible frame-work in which all events have\nbeen shaped by necessity; it is a development of the inherent powers and\ncapabilities of humanity, and it teaches us that new trains of causes\nhave been originated, and new conditions have been superinduced by man.\nThe ground-fact which underlies all the diversity, contingency, and\nprogress which appear in the moral world is that volitional causes are\nequipotent and efficient for any one of the several results.[539] In\nmoral development the progressive principle is just the freedom of the\nwill. The facts of the inner and outer world are therefore in harmony.\n\nThe theory of the necessitarian assumes that the will is a mere\npassivity, a simple conductor of the impulse which motive power exerts,\na mere transition-point where ideal force is transformed into physical\nforce, and desires, inclinations, moral convictions, divine influences\nbecome necessary acts. Motives thus prevail by their antecedent\nintrinsic power just as physical forces prevail in mechanical and vital\ndynamics. And, proceeding upon this assumption, he labors to construct a\nscience of Ethology in which he would anticipate human action by\nstatistics, and show how individual character _must_ be in accordance\nwith physical and mental causation. Whereas consciousness asserts that\nthe will \"is not a bleak mechanical thing.\" It is a free alternative\npower. It is a full, complete, adequate cause. It is _spirit_, not\nmatter.\n\nNow it is freely granted that the mind acts in view of motives, acts in\naccordance with motives, acts in a certain qualified sense under the\ninfluence of motives; _but the freedomist emphatically denies that the\nwill is necessitated to action by motives_. Motives may be reason _for_\naction, conditions under which will acts, but they are not causes _of_\naction. They may solicit, invite, urge to action, but they can not\nconstrain, compel, and force action.[540]\n\nMotives have no fixed correlation to the will. They address themselves\nto the feelings, the judgment, the conscience, and not directly and\nimmediately to the will. They may awaken desire, fear, inclination,\npreference, a sense of obligation; but these are all states of the\nintellect and sensibility, and may coexist in the same mind with a state\nof indetermination and non-differentiation in the will. That which is\ndesirable may appeal to the feelings, that which is eligible to the\njudgment, that which is obligatory to the conscience, and these may\nexcite the mind in different degrees of intensity; but none of them have\npower to move the will. We may be able intellectually to perceive that\nsome motives are intrinsically \"higher\" than others, that some have a\nprevolition power to excite all minds more intensely than others; but\nthey do not prevail and secure action in any ratio with their supposed\n_\u00e0 priori_ strength. They can only become real motives for the will by\nits voluntary placing its interest in them and making them objects of\nits choice.[541] All the actual strength which a motive has is derived\nfrom the action of the will. On this subject we offer the following\npropositions:\n\n(1.) _The so-called strength of a motive is the degree of probability\nthat the will will act in accordance with or on account of it._ \"And it\nis most important to remark that the _result_ is not always, nor in most\ncases, necessarily as the _highest probability_. The will may choose for\nthe higher or for the lower. And as the will may choose for a lower\nrather than a higher probability, so the will may choose on account of\nwhat is called antecedently a _weaker_ over a _stronger_ motive. And\nhereby is once for all established the difference between mechanical\nforce and motive influence--that whereas in the former, by necessity,\nthe greater effect results from the greater force, in the latter the\nless is possible from the greater, the greater from the less.\"[542] That\nresult is not as the highest probability Dr. Whedon has shown most\nconclusively from the doctrine of Contingencies or Probabilities. And on\nthis he grounds his doctrine of _contingent motive probability_. \"This\ncontingent character of motive influence is correspondent with the\nalternative character of that which is its sole possible object--will.\nAn alternative will and a contingent motive influence are correlatives.\nThey mutually explain and sustain each other. To admit either is to\nadmit both. And so a unipotent will and a necessary motive influence are\ncorrelatives. He who is compelled to admit one is compelled to admit the\nother. It will be a mere controversy about a word to say that an\ninfluence which does not produce effect is no influence. That may\nlegitimately be called an influence, it is important to add, which is\nconceived as _possessing an intrinsic probability for result, though the\nhigher probability be a contingency_ for which there exists power of\n_failure_. If so, then the doctrine of contingent motive influence is\nestablished, and the doctrine of volitional necessity is at an end. The\nrelation between physical force and effect is _necessity_. The relation\nbetween motive and volition is _contingency_.\"[543]\n\n(2.) _The so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence\nwhich the will assigns to it by its own action._ It is impossible to\nerect any standard by which the intrinsic \"strength\" of motives can be\ndetermined previous to volition. \"A cold intellection is not\nintrinsically commensurable with a deep emotion, nor a sentiment of\ntaste with a feeling of obligation, nor a physical appetite with a sense\nof honor.\" Now by what standard can the comparative force of these\ninfluences be determined? There is no more commensurability between them\nthan between \"the brightness of day and the force of magnetic\nattractions.\" Or if we could possibly determine, by some rational _\u00e0\npriori_ method, that a feeling of obligation is intrinsically stronger\nthan a physical appetite, or that the love of life is stronger _per se_\nthan a sense of duty, we can not affirm that the one or the other shall\ntherefore uniformly and necessarily prevail. These influences derive all\ntheir prevalency, and consequently their comparative strength of motive,\n_from the will alone_. The will places its interest in the one or the\nother. It decides the mental position. \"It settles the question of\npreferences between alternatives, dismisses the counter-motive from\nview, and closes the debate.\"[544]\n\nThe \"strength\" of a motive, in its relation to the will, can only be\nknown by the test of _prevalency_. This is unwittingly conceded by the\nnecessitarian. He says \"the strongest motive prevails because that is\nthe strongest which the will chooses.\" This really concedes the\nposition assumed by Dr. Whedon, that \"the strength of a motive is the\ncomparative prevalence which the will, in its own action, assigns to it,\nor the nearness to which the will comes to acting on account of it.\" Men\ndo not always choose that which is most _desirable_, nor that which is\nmost _eligible_, nor that which appears most _obligatory_. But from\nwhatever motive men may choose to act, however base and unworthy, the\nnecessitarian affirms it was intrinsically the strongest motive\n_because_ it was chosen; which simply amounts to this--the strongest\nmotive is always chosen because the motive chosen is always the\nstrongest motive.\n\nThe attempts of the necessitarian to fix upon some standard by which to\nestimate the antecedent strength of motives have all signally failed.\nThe most plausible is that of Edwards. He asserts that the volition is\nalways as the greatest _apparent_ good. But by what standard is that\ngood estimated, by which faculty is it recognized and pronounced _good_?\nby the reason, the conscience, the judgment, or the appetites? Can that\nbe pronounced _good_ which is chosen in obedience to passion and lust?\nDoes the man who inflicts a premeditated injury upon his neighbor choose\nthe greatest apparent good? Does the murderer believe that in taking\naway the life of his fellow-man \"the volition is as the greatest\napparent good?\" Certainly not. \"Never,\" says Bushnell, \"was there a case\nof wrong, a sinful choice, in which the agent believed he was choosing\nfor the strongest, weightiest, or most valuable motives.\" The great mass\nof sinful men are conscious of choosing sinful indulgence against their\n\"highest good.\"\n\n(3.) _Motives are the conditions, but not the causes of volition._ \"Of\nvolition the cause, the sole cause, is will. Motives are collateral\nconditions ... for the volition to be; with which there is adequate\npower for the volition not to be.... The motive is only the _occasion_,\nand all its acts of excitement amount to no more than this, that they\nstand as _probable conditions_ opening the way toward which the will\nthereby acquires opportunity to act with full adequate power of not\nacting.\"[545] The relation between motive and volition is not a\nnecessary but a contingent relation. The will is the controlling\nconscious self in the exercise of direct causative power in producing\nvolition.\n\nSome modern writers of the necessitarian school, McCosh for example,\nadmit the existence of \"self-activity\" in the will. But what can be the\nmeaning of \"self-activity\" if the will have not the power of either\nresisting or yielding to motives presented, and in the same unchanged\ncircumstances of choosing a different alternative? To be moved\nabsolutely by motives is not _self_-movement. A power to move in only\none given direction is a mere nature-force; it can not be self-activity.\nThe distinguished writer above named also admits that \"_causation in the\nwill is entirely different from causation in other actions_.\"[546] If he\nmean that motives act upon the will in a manner \"entirely different\"\nfrom that by which physical causes secure action or change in the\nmaterial world, what right has he to call it _causation_ at all? And if\nhe mean that volitional causation is \"alternative,\" and not, like\nphysical causation, \"unipotent,\" then the controversy is at an end.\n\n(4.) _We have no such experience of \"uniformities of volition\" as shall\nenable us to generalize a universal law of volitional causation._ The\nfacts of uniformity which present themselves in the continuous life of\nsome men who were absorbed in one great life-purpose, as also in the\nconduct of aggregate masses of men, are not denied. We affirm that the\ncorrect definition of a free will supposes that it may choose in a\ngenerally uniform manner. Much of the uniformity in the life of an\nindividual may be accounted for by corporeal nature--disposition,\nstandard purpose, and habit. \"Upon a basis of corporeal, psychological,\nand mental nature are overlaid a primary stratum of dispositions\nblending the natural and the volitional, and a secondary formation of\ngeneric purposes wholly volitional, and formed by repetition into a\ntertiary of habits; and thus we have, in his mingled constitution of\nnecessitation and freedom, an agent prepared for daily free responsible\naction.\"[547]\n\nNow it may be readily granted that character forms a basis of reliable\n_probability_ as to how in given circumstances a man will act. We may be\nable to judge, with some degree of accuracy, how a man will work in his\nfreedom; but we can never calculate with absolute certainty, because we\nhave numberless examples of men acting strangely \"out of character,\" and\ndisappointing our most confident expectations.\n\n\"There is often the action, great or small, which reverses the record of\na life or a protracted course of action. He who well watches his\nneighbor, however blind he may be to his own practical\nself-contradictions, is sure to find, even in the life most uniform in\nits great outline, plenty of minor inconsistencies. Or as M\u00fcller, in his\n'Doctrine of Sin,' well says, that both our observation and our\nsubject's temptation may occur just at the moment of one of his great\nvolitional turning-points. From the apostasy of the first angels and the\nfall of man, through the whole course of human history, we have\ninnumerable instances of revolutionary volitions, not only _out of the\nprevious character_, but shaping a _new_ character. The one disastrous\nsin of Moses, the one great complicated crime of David, the apostasy of\nSolomon, the wisest of men, are all proofs how, not only in contrasted\ntraits, but in revolutionary acts, a man may be\n\n    'The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind.'\"[548]\n\nStatistics are cited by Buckle, in his \"History of Civilization in\nEngland,\" showing that crimes, suicides, marriages, etc., occur with\nremarkable uniformity, as the result of general conditions of human\nsociety; and he thence infers that all the actions of men are governed\nby a uniform law of causation. This uniformity may, however, be as\neasily accounted for on the doctrine of freedom as on the doctrine of\nnecessity. In the calculations of contingencies, while results of\ncompared large aggregates in the same conditions may approach equality,\nthe _contingency of each individual case remains still a contingency_.\nThe actuary of an insurance company can assert with accuracy the average\nduration of human life in different countries; but were he to attempt to\npredict the duration of any one individual life he had insured, he would\ncertainly fail. The insured may falsify his predictions by a voluntary\nact of suicide. So though large aggregations of free volitions,\nsurrounded by the same motives, may approach equality, the _freedom of\nthe individual will remains_.[549]\n\nAnd as Mansel very justly remarks, \"it is precisely because individual\nactions are not reducible to any fixed law, or capable of representation\nby any numerical calculation, that the statistical averages acquire\ntheir value as substitutes. No one dreams of applying statistical\naverages to calculate the period of the earth's rotation by showing that\nfour-and-twenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's\nor one year's revolution with another's. It is only when individual\nmovements are irregular that it is necessary to aim at a proximate\nregularity by calculating in mass.\"[550]\n\n\n3. _The Theological Argument._--The main points of the theological\nargument may be thus presented: Freedom in a created being is\nincompatible with the absolute sovereignty and prescience of God. To\nsuppose a being capable of acting either of several ways is to suppose a\nbeing out of the control of God. And a free agent can not possess power\nto do otherwise than God foreknows he will do.\n\nIn regard to the first of these supposed incompatibilities, we need only\nremark that if the Deity, in order to the existence of an equitable\nmoral government, and the consequent possibility of free responsible\naction by the creature, shall please to subject his omnipotence to\nconditional limitations, the necessitarian has no business to\nobject.[551] We need feel no solicitude about the Divine sovereignty.\nGod will take care of his own honor and defend his own high and holy\nprerogatives. Such self-limiting laws prescribed by Divine wisdom and\nlove do not place man beyond Divine control. The necessitarian will not\ndeny that such self-limitation is essential to the very existence of the\nkingdom of nature. God has established an order in nature, a uniformity\nof antecedence and sequence, with which Omnipotence shall not interfere.\n\"Such a Divine law of non-usance of power is still more necessary in the\nkingdom of living agents, and most of all in the realm of responsible\nagents; it being observable that the more close the Divine\nself-restraint, and the larger the amount of powers in the agent left\nuntouched, the more the creative system rises in dignity, and the higher\nGod appears as a sovereign. Even in the system of living _necessitated_\nagents, as necessitarians must admit, God forbids Himself to disturb the\nagent's uniform and perpetual acting according to strongest motive.\"\n\nThe second of these incompatibilities is really predicated upon our\nignorance, and not upon our knowledge. We can not understand _how_ the\nDivine Intelligence foreknows all future events. To enable us to\nunderstand the exact manner in which an Infinite Intelligence\ncontemplates succession in time, it would be necessary that we should be\ninfinite also. The _fact_ that God foreknows all future events is all\nthat is revealed to us; the _manner_ of it He has left in darkness, and\nwe can throw no light upon it by our verbal speculations.\n\nOf one thing we may rest assured, that as perception precedes volition\nin the finite intelligence, so knowledge must precede determination in\nthe Divine Mind. God can not will or act in absolute darkness. Divine\npredestination must be conditioned on Divine foreknowledge.[552] His\nforeknowledge does not depend upon his will, or on the adjustment of\nmotives to make us will thus and thus; but He foreknows every thing\nfirst conditionally, in the world of possibility, before He creates, or\ndetermines any thing to be, in the world of fact. Otherwise, all his\npurposes would be grounded in ignorance, not in wisdom, and his\nknowledge would consist in following after his will, to learn what it\nhad blindly determined.[553]\n\nAnother important principle clearly and vigorously maintained by Dr.\nWhedon is \"that the freeness of an act is not affected by the\nconsideration of its being foreknown.\" First, because the Divine\nknowledge must always correspond to the reality. A free action must be\nknown as _free_. \"If there be in the free agent, ascertainable by\npsychology, or required by intuition, or supposably seen by the Divine\neye, the power of putting forth the volition with full power of\nalteriety, then God knows that power.\"[554] Secondly, the occurrence of\nan event or act may be _certain_ to Divine foreknowledge, and yet\nperfectly _contingent_ in itself. Foreknowledge renders nothing\n_necessary_; _it is the consequence, not the cause of events_.\n\nIf there be a necessity at all in the case, \"the necessity lies not upon\nthe free act, but upon the foreknowledge. The foreknowledge must see to\nits own accuracy. Pure knowledge, temporal or eternal, must conform\nitself to the fact, not the fact to the knowledge.\"[555] The real\ndifficulty is, not how an act can be a free act and yet be foreknown\n(for the act of knowledge can not change the object of knowledge), but\nhow God can possibly know with certainty a future contingency which may\nor may not happen.\n\nIt is a clear and immediate revelation of consciousness that man has a\nfree power of self-determination. No revelation can contradict this\nrevelation. This fact of consciousness can not be invalidated by any\nconceptions of the logical understanding in regard to the omnipotence or\nprescience of God, for these by their very nature transcend all human\ncomprehension.\n\nIII. _The method of moral government._--We have seen that government, in\ngeneral, is control exercised with a view to the maintenance of order.\nIn the material world, order is secured by the direct compulsion of\nomnipotent force. The things of nature are inertly passive under the\nhand of God. They can offer no resistance to the Divine control, and\nconsequently, in the sphere of nature, there can be no real disorder.\nBut in the realm of self-determining powers there is the possibility of\ncollision, because there is the power to resist the will of God. And, as\na matter of fact, we know there is opposition, lawlessness, and sin. In\nthat sphere, where above all others the demand of the reason is for\norder, there is the presence of _disorder_--that is, there is\ndisconformity to law and consequent suffering.\n\nAnd now the question arises, By what _method_ is order to be maintained\nin the sphere of freedom? How are beings that have the power to\ndetermine for themselves what they will choose and do, to be brought to\nact in harmony with the eternal laws of righteousness and love?\n\nThere are inconsiderate souls who dream that this may be achieved by\nforce. God, say they, is omnipotent; if He will the non-extension of\nevil, He is able to destroy it; if He desire the maintenance of moral\norder, He can compel it. Such reckless declaimers know not what they\nsay.\n\nHad it so pleased God, He could have made beings in human form without\nany sense of moral right and wrong, and without any power to commit sin;\nbut they would not have been _rational_ beings, would not have been\n_free_ beings, would not have been _moral_ beings; neither could they,\nin any high and proper sense, be _happy_ beings, because they could\nexperience no sense of rectitude, no approval of conscience, no delight\nin moral excellence, no blessedness in duty and sacrifice. God, indeed,\nhas made many such creatures that can not sin. The bee, the ant, the\nswine, the ape--these can not sin; but they are mere things, not free\npowers; they have no sense of dignity and moral worth, no approving\nconscience, no joy of sacrifice, and no immortal hopes. Lived there ever\na sane man who would change his lot with one of these, even though in\nbeing a man he has the fearful power to sin, and in sinning, the fearful\nsusceptibility to suffer--yea, to suffer eternally? Is there any thing\non earth whose value does not fade away when compared with the priceless\nvalue of being capable of duty, of virtue, of devotion, and of\nsacrifice? In the eyes of God, the humblest of moral beings is worth\nmore than all the firmament of stars, and all the teeming myriads of\nbrutal forms of sense that dwell upon the earth. Because God preferred\nto rule over free powers, and not mere things--free powers that could be\ngoverned by truth and reason and love; because He loves moral character,\nand cares for it more than all the things \"that can be piled in the\ninfinitude of space, even though they were diamonds,\" therefore He\nbestowed on man this high capacity of character--the capacity to know,\nto choose, to love, to enjoy, and in a conscious communion with God to\nbe blessed forever.\n\nBut when God thus determines to create a rational and free being--to\nmake \"man in his own image\"--He determines to make a being who in acting\nfreely may act in opposition to the mind of God, and in violation of his\nholy law. In creating a free self-determined being who shall be the\ncause of his own action, God puts his own omnipotence under conditional\nlimitations, and renders it morally impossible for Him, by mere force,\nto constrain the will of man. The notion of a free will, which is an\nefficient cause, being governed by force, is a contradiction.\nOmnipotence may, if it please, annihilate man, but it can not control\nman in the sphere of his freedom. \"Powers governed by the absolute force\nor fiat of omnipotence would in that fact be uncreate and cease.\"[556]\n\nThe moral government of God must deal with man _as man_, must treat him\nas intelligent and free, and must govern him solely by moral influences.\nHe must be controlled by the voice of reason and the sense of duty, by\npersuasion and sympathy, by hope and fear; in short, by motives\naddressed to the judgment, the conscience, and the heart. A\nself-determined being can be brought into harmony with the Divine order\nonly by \"the schooling of his consent.\" He can be perfected--that is,\nfully established in harmony with the character and will of God--by the\ndiscipline of the will. He must, therefore, be placed in such\ncircumstances as invite consent, and at the same time permit resistance.\nHe is to be trained, furnished, and perfected, and to this end he must\nbe carried through just such experiences, changes, and trials as will\nbest help the formation of a noble human character, and will best\nprepare man for the plenitude and blessedness of that life for which the\npresent is a course of education and discipline.[557]\n\nFurthermore, God's moral government of the world must deal with the\n_actual man_--that is, with man as he exists in society with certain\nhereditary taints that are not his fault, and under certain unfavorable\nconditions in which he has been placed without his consent. With\nreverence, we affirm that God Himself is under moral obligation to treat\nman equitably, to take account of the weakness which he inherits, the\nperverted education that has been given him, and the depraved\nassociations that surround him, and graduate his responsibility on the\nscale of his available light. Finally, the moral government of God must\ndeal with _the man that will be_--with that fixed character which may be\nformed by man in the exercise of his free power of self-determination,\namid the circumstances of his earthly probation. This character must\ncontain within itself the elements of a blessed or a wretched\nfuturition, and thus a retribution be secured by fixed nature, and\ninflicted by an inflexible necessity.\n\nThat the moral government of God is a probationary economy, in which\nample scope is afforded for the development of character, and in which\nwe are in the act of being _proved_, is evident,\n\n(1.) From the fact _that all our future interests are dependent upon our\npresent conduct_. God has endowed us with some degree of foresight, and\nhas thus made us provident beings. We have a native tendency to take\naccount of and forecast the future. By the aid of reason we can, in some\nmeasure, foresee the tendencies of our actions; we can lay our plans for\nthe future, and anticipate events which are yet remote. We can also\nbring to our aid the lessons of experience, and from this also we can\nlearn that our present action will have a powerful influence upon our\nfuture condition. We know that the circumstances which surround us\nto-day have been in a large degree created or moulded by ourselves, and\nthat many of our misadventures and our miseries may be easily traced\nback to particular acts of imprudence and folly on our own part as the\ncause. So that there is no truth we more certainly know than this, that\nour future happiness of the next moment, and of every succeeding stage\nof our living, is dependent upon our present conduct.\n\n(2.) This is further evident from the fact _that the present scene is\nfilled with moral tests and temptations_. There is in the present life\nan admixture of _good_ and _evil_. On the one hand there are numerous\nsolicitations to evil; on the other there are motives and inducements to\nvirtue, the plain intention of which is to prove us. In the words of\nBishop Butler, \"We have here free scope and opportunity for that good or\nevil conduct which God will reward or punish hereafter.\" This is\nnecessary to moral government, because moral government can not exist\nwithout freedom of choice, and consequently the existence of those\ncircumstances in which that freedom can be exercised. That we have\nfreedom of choice we know; and our every-day experience of the\ntemptations to wrong-doing, and of the difficulties in the way of a\nuniform adherence to virtue, teaches us that we are in a state of trial,\nwhere our principles are being continually put to the test.\n\n(3.) That our present life is a probation for a future life is evident\nfrom the fact _that in the present life punishment is deferred,\nconsequences are delayed, to give play to the exercise of moral\nmotives_.\n\nBy \"moral motives\" we mean regard for what is right and just, _because\nit is right and just_, respect for the voice of conscience, and\nreverence for the will and requirements of God. If the consequences of\nour moral conduct were to follow immediately on the heels of the act, if\nreward or punishment were instantly to ensue, then moral motives could\nhave no exercise. If there were no delay--no interval between sin and\nits punishment, moral government would cease, and a merely natural\ngovernment would remain, such as prevails over irrational creatures. Man\nwould then be influenced purely by motives of personal interest or\nsafety or enjoyment, and his obedience would not be the result of moral\nmotives, consequently neither virtuous nor vicious. God has, therefore,\nput the consequences of much of our conduct into the future, that we may\nhave room for free deliberate choice, while just so much of consequence\nis permitted to appear as will clearly indicate that we are under moral\ngovernment, and awaken the anticipation that _all_ our conduct will be\nbrought into judgment.\n\n(4.) That our present life is a probation for a future life is more\nfully proved by the fact _that as a moral economy the present life is\nincomplete_. The present is a sphere too contracted for the equitable\nadministration of rewards and punishments, because some of the _last_\nactions of men's lives, some of their _best_ actions or some of their\n_basest_ actions, would come under neither. The blood of the martyrs who\ndied for the faith, or of the patriot who bled for his country, would\ncry alike in vain for vengeance or reward. The man who first took away\nhis brother's life, and then his own, has evaded justice, and escaped\npunishment. The hand of violence has robbed the virtuous man of his\npresent reward; and the suicide, by breaking in upon the sanctuary of\nhis own life, has defied and defeated the government of God, if there be\nno future life.\n\nIn the present life retribution fails in uniformity. It is a proposition\nwhich the reason of every man must approve--that the government of God\nmust be perfectly equitable, and that under it every man must receive\nhis just due. But men do not receive their requital in this life,\nconsequently we are bound to affirm that in the present life the Divine\nadministration is _incomplete_. We can not conceal from ourselves the\nfact that events occur in the present life which we can not conceive as\nbenevolently or righteously consummated. These events lift the tyrant to\npower, and trample down the patriot and the freeman. The orphan eats the\nbitter bread of misery, while the man who has robbed him of the paternal\ninheritance revels in luxury. The ungodly prosper in the world, \"their\neyes stand out with fatness, they have more than heart could wish,\"\nwhile the righteous suffer affliction, and are in need. And if there is\nno future life in which God will balance accounts with the universe, and\nrender to every man according to his works, then moral government is\nincomplete, injustice has triumphed, wrong has prevailed. An imperfect\nretribution and an unequal providence demand a future life for their\nvindication--a future life both for the good and the bad, so that God\nmay reckon with all of them--and teach most convincingly that the\npresent life is a probation. The experiences, changes, conflicts, trials\nof a probationary economy, are all intended to prove men, to test their\nprinciples and make manifest their real character.\n\nThe government of God is a _moral discipline_ by which men are trained\nin the practice and confirmed in the habits of virtue, and thus brought,\nby the \"schooling of their own consent,\" into harmony with the Divine\norder.\n\nIt is a question which may be properly entertained, whether a free\nself-determined being can be made perfect in moral character in any\nother manner than by the discipline of the will. There certainly can be\nno created moral desert. Responsible character must be the product of\nfree choice. A man can no more become virtuous without the discipline of\nthe will than he can become intelligent without the discipline of the\nunderstanding. For wherein consists the virtue of a self-determined\nbeing? Is it not in his free choice of what is right and good, his\nresistance to temptation, his voluntary submission to the Divine will?\nIs it not in his integrity, his patience, his fortitude, and his\nresignation? But how can these virtues exist, how can they be exercised,\nand how brought to maturity, except in the midst of difficulties and\nhinderances? Where can patience and resignation and fortitude and\nsympathy have a place, if there are no sufferings to be endured? How can\nfirmness and diligence and courage be developed, if there are no\ndifficulties and hinderances to the practice of virtue?\n\nTherefore, in order that men may be trained and educated and perfected,\nthey are placed amid such scenes, experiences, and trials as shall draw\nout the moral powers of the soul, shall strengthen and confirm the will\nin goodness, and establish them in the law of their being, so that their\nmoral future is secure. \"Life, thus ordered, is a magnificent scheme to\nbring out the value of law, and teach the necessity of right as the only\nconserving principle of order and happiness; teaching the more\npowerfully, if so it must, by disorder and sorrow.\" Suffering is a\nchastisement which is wholesome: it teaches the blessedness of purity\nand the sinfulness of sin; and it may develop into \"a godly sorrow\"\nwhich shall heal and purify the soul.\n\nThe moral government of God is an equitable administration, in which\nresponsibility is graduated on the scale of available light and\nopportunity. \"This is the condemnation that _light_ is come into the\nworld.\" Light is the symbol of knowledge, because it _reveals_ the right\nand clearly manifests what duty is. Light is consequently the exact\nmeasure of responsibility. Our knowledge of what we ought to do, or\nought not to do, determines the degree of our accountability. An\nabsolute and involuntary ignorance would be the most perfect plea of\ninnocence. The imputation of sin in such a case would be made void, but\nthereby the completeness of human nature be destroyed. That which would\nrelegate man from the sphere of responsibility would also banish him\nfrom the sphere of rationality.\n\nSt. Paul distinctly recognizes an alleviation of responsibility and\nguilt in the \"ignorance\" of heathen life, and speaks of a Divine\n\"overlooking of the times of that ignorance\"--a non-imputation of sins\ncommitted in ignorance. But he does not by any means account the sinning\nheathen as free from _all_ guilt. He shows that they were not in utter\nignorance, and that much of their ignorance was voluntary. He refers to\nthe original consciousness of God, and to the fact that this\nconsciousness is kept alive by the revelation of God in nature; and he\nshows that the disorder of their religious and moral life resulted from\nthe voluntary suppression of this consciousness--\"When they knew God,\nthey glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in\ntheir imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.\" He also\nappeals to the no less definite power of conscience in the heart of the\nheathen, \"which shows the works required by the law to be written on\ntheir hearts, their consciences also bearing witness to this law, and\ntheir thoughts approving or condemning each other,\" and their civil laws\n\"adjudging their crimes as worthy of death.\" So far as their ignorance\nwas involuntary it was an alleviation of guilt, though not an excuse for\nall sin. Whatever light they had, be it little or much, it was the\nstandard and measure of their accountability.\n\nThe Founder of Christianity distinctly recognized this principle of\nmoral government. \"If I had not come and spoken unto them, _they had not\nhad sin_, but now they have no cloak for their sin\"--clearly teaching\nthat ignorance would be a negation of guilt, and knowledge an\naggravation of guilt. Not that we are to suppose that the Jews, without\nthe light which Christ supplied, were absolutely guiltless; their\nignorance was a mitigation of their guilt. Christ lays it down as a\nuniversal principle that knowledge of the Divine law or ignorance of the\nDivine law by the person who violates it is the ground of a distinction\nin the different degrees of culpability. \"That servant which _knew_ his\nlord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his\nwill, shall be beaten with _many_ stripes. But he that _knew not_, and\ndid commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with _few_\nstripes.\"[558] This is the uniform rule of the Divine government among\nall nations.\n\nIncrease of light and knowledge necessarily enhances human\nresponsibility. \"To whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much\nrequired.\" More is expected of the man than of the child. More is\ndemanded at the hands of the man who has been blessed with the\nadvantages of a Christian civilization than from the untutored savage.\nThe man who has been favored with a liberal education is held to a more\nrigid account than the man who has been cradled in ignorance and\nschooled in vice. And when the kingdom of God comes nigh to men, human\nresponsibility must be enlarged in commensuration with its blessings.\nThere is a holier, richer trust, and consequently a deeper obligation.\nThere is a greater light and a greater condemnation.\n\n\"Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty\nworks which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would\nhave repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, It\nshall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than\nfor you. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be\nbrought down to hell: for if the mighty works which have been done in\nthee had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But\nI say unto you, That it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in\nthe day of judgment than for thee.\"[559]\n\nThis aspect of the Divine government, which Dr. Whedon has felicitously\nstyled \"the equation of probational advantages,\" relieves our sadness in\nview of the moral condition of the world. \"The Judge of all the earth\nwill do right\" in the case of every human soul that has passed through\nthis probationary scene. His omniscient eye can take in at one view all\nthe influences and circumstances, favorable or unfavorable, which have\nsurrounded each individual, and fix the precise amount of\nresponsibility. He will \"overlook\" the \"defect of doubt and taints of\nblood,\" the faults of education and sins of ignorance, and He will make\na due allowance for the power of temptation, the trammels of evil\nassociations, and an enfeebled and perverted nature. \"He is full of\ncompassion, and his tender mercies are over all his works.\" \"He knows\nour frame, and He remembers that we are dust.\" We may safely conjecture\nthat a negro hamlet in Central Africa, however inferior in its temporal\nmoral aspects, may, in its prospect for an eternal destiny, be superior\nto many an American village. And in the dregs of our large cities there\nare numbers who are excluded as effectually from the knowledge of the\ntruth as the heathen, and are scarcely developed to the level of\nresponsibility. These may be the least in the kingdom of heaven, but by\nthe law of moral equation they can not be excluded.[560] In every nation\nunder heaven, he that has feared God and wrought righteousness,\naccording to his knowledge and ability, will be \"_accepted of God_.\"\n\nThe moral government of God secures an infallible and equitable\nretribution by binding _character_ and _consequence_ in indissoluble\nbonds, and evolving a reward or a punishment out of that permanent moral\nstate of the soul which has been induced by the free self-determination\nof man.\n\n\"Character,\" says Novalis, \"is a completely fashioned will (_vollkommen\ngebildeter Wille_). It is that ultimate stress and determination of the\nsoul which results from the coherence and complexure of habits, and\nhabit is the result of repeated acts of voluntary choice. From the\npersistence of habit a fixed disposition and cast of the inner man is\nevolved which constitutes his _moral individuality_.\"\n\nEven in this formative process we can discern the workings of the law of\nretribution. One good deed handsels a second, and renders its\nperformance more easy and pleasurable. The man who obeys his conscience\nfeels that he can respect himself. He has a consciousness of growing\npower; a sense of dignity and moral worth. The moral law is for him \"a\nlaw of liberty.\" On the other hand, one sinful deed involves a second,\nand drags it after it. One lie demands another to maintain its\nconsistency. One act of injustice emboldens to the next. Self-respect is\nbroken down by license, and the path is prepared and cleared for further\niniquity. Thus, by the repetition of sinful deeds, restraints are\noverborne, depraved habits are engendered, vice acquires a mastery over\nthe man, and he becomes a slave. There is a deep humiliation in this\nsense of degradation and unworthiness. The sinner despises himself\nbecause of his weakness, and blushes in secret places at the remembrance\nof his own debasement.\n\nThe principal happiness or misery of man consists in the settled state\nof his own heart, and not in the outward conditions of his daily life.\nAll human plaudits are as naught compared with the approval of one's own\nconscience; and no penal inflictions can compare with the anguish of\nremorse. The inward peace of the righteous soul, the disquietude and\nmisery of the sinful soul, are the blossom and the fruitage of the seed\nwhich has been sown, and the stem and branches which have been nurtured\nby the voluntary choices and acts of man. \"He that soweth to his flesh\nshall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit\nshall of the spirit reap life everlasting.\" The connection between sin\nand punishment is no arbitrary or accidental connection. It is just as\nmuch a relation between cause and effect as the relation between sowing\nand reaping in the physical world. \"To cause the mind to punish itself,\nto work a retribution out of ourselves, to secure it by fixed nature, to\ninflict it by inflexible necessity, to convert the capacity of sin into\nthe instrument of suffering, is the prerogative of Divine rule.\"[561]\n\nIV. _The end of moral government._--We have said that the end of\ngovernment, in general, is the maintenance of order. The end of moral\ngovernment is the maintenance of _moral order_ in the realm of free\nself-determined powers. The moral order must consist in conformity to\nthe idea of the _absolute good_. The personality of God (the essential\nmomenta of which are reason and freedom, holiness and love) is _per se_,\nin its totality, the absolute good. Infinite Personality is but another\nname for Absolute Perfection.\n\nThe highest good for a created dependent personality is \"to resemble\nGod\" in all those attributes or perfections which constitute\npersonality. It is to be fully established in harmony with God's moral\ncharacter, unified with Him in will, glorified with Him in holiness, and\nperfected with Him in the blessedness of love. The highest perfection of\npersonal being is moral order, and therefore human personality,\nconceived in its purity and perfection, is the end of the Divine\ngovernment.[562]\n\nThis we have called \"the ideal order of moral life,\" because it is not\nyet realized in the world. We must believe, however, that the final\ntriumph of goodness is a part of the great world-plan. We must not only\nbelieve, but know, that the great design of creation, the reason for\nwhich the world exists at all, is that in it goodness may come to its\nfinal realization. And this conviction is grounded on the fact that the\nmoral life of humanity has its source in the same Being who called the\nworld into existence, and who is conducting this present dispensation to\na glorious consummation, in which He shall \"reconcile all things unto\nHimself,... whether they be things in earth or things in heaven,\" and\n\"gather together in one all things in Christ,\" that \"God may be all in\nall.\"\n\nChristianity bases all the obligations and sanctions of morality on the\ngreat truths that God is near to man, that He sustains him every moment\nin life, that He is the Father of the human spirit, and that He governs\nman in order to perfect his nature and bring him into an everlasting\nfellowship with Himself. Christianity knows nothing of \"a science of\nmorals\" which is not based upon the correlations between man and God,\nnor of a morality which forgets God and disregards the most sacred and\nfundamental of all duties, namely, the duties we owe to God. A morality\nbased solely upon the relations in which we stand to our fellow-men is\nat best but secular and utilitarian. A morality which is grounded upon\nthe relation of volition to the state of the sensibility, and regards\n\"happiness as our being's end and aim,\" is egoistic and selfish. A\nmorality which rests upon our relation to God, the absolute good, and\nwhich looks backward rather than forward for its motive, is unselfish\nand Christian.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\n A.\n\n Absolute creation, 62.\n\n Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect, relation of these terms, 41, 42.\n\n Action at a distance denied by Newton, 214;\n   by Leibnitz, Faraday, Helmholtz, Thomson, Tait, Maxwell, 214.\n\n Agassiz on species, 164;\n   on the preparation of the earth for man, 254.\n\n Attraction of gravitation not a primary force, 210-220;\n   not an essential attribute of matter, 211-213.\n\n Attribute or related essence, 48-52.\n\n Augustine, St., on the days of creation, 150, 151;\n   his conception of Divine conservation, 176, 177.\n\n\n B.\n\n Beale, Dr., on distinction between cell-life and soul-life, 163;\n   on life, 192, 240.\n\n Being or essence, as reality, efficiency, and personality, 42-48.\n\n Bioplasm, or cell-life, 162, 163.\n\n Brooke, Prof., on conservation of energy, 205.\n\n B\u00fcchner, Dr., asserts the eternity of matter and force, 24.\n\n\n C.\n\n Calderwood, Prof., on consciousness of freedom, 382.\n\n Carpenter, Dr., on will as the type of all force, 39, 237;\n   on distinction between molecular and somatic life, 163, 236;\n   on the forces of nature as modes of the Divine action, 240.\n\n Catastrophes, common belief in, 100;\n   sustained by science, 101, 102.\n\n Categories, universal, 41.\n\n Causative principle, the, must be real, efficient, and personal, 44.\n\n Chalmers's, Dr., incautious concession as to the eternity of matter,\n  86.\n\n Character, the formation of perfect, noble--the highest end, 306,\n   can only be attained under conditions of freedom, 308,\n   and through the inspiration of a higher life, 309, 310.\n\n Christian civilization the age of philanthropy, 285-290.\n\n Cicero on a universal and immutable moral law, 379.\n\n Civilization, each epoch of, has had a different theatre, 275;\n   stages of development in, 277-290.\n\n Clarke, Dr. Samuel, on immediate agency of God in conservation, 178.\n\n Cohn, Dr., on nature, 333.\n\n Coleridge on nature, 325;\n   on the natural, 369.\n\n Comte on irregular variability in nature, 195, 329.\n\n Conditions of moral government, 371, 372.\n\n Conscience, its nature and authority, 372-377;\n   its gradual development, 377.\n\n Consciousness, religions, 304, 305, 345;\n   natural order of its development, 346-349.\n\n Conservation, Biblical doctrine of, 174, 175;\n   conceptions of the mode of conservation, 176.\n\n Conservation by secondary causes or agencies, 181, 182;\n   (1) hypothesis of natural law, 187-201;\n   (2) hypothesis of active force inherent in matter, 202-222;\n   (3) hypothesis of plastic nature, 222-235.\n\n Conservation of energy not an absolute law, 205, 206;\n   limited by the law of dissipation of energy, 207;\n   not fairly stated by Dr. Tyndall in his discussion on prayer, 331,\n    332;\n   no evidence that it holds in the realm of vital dynamics\n    and psycho-dynamics, 332;\n   is not absolute in the realm of physics, 332.\n\n Continuity of the ether, 217.\n\n Correlation between God and man, 344.\n\n Creation, Biblical account of, not designed to teach science, 136-138;\n   poetic, symbolical, and unchronological, 138-151.\n\n Creation by law, 196.\n\n Creation _ex nihilo_, how understood by the Christian Fathers, 92;\n   not discredited by the progress of science, 93.\n\n Creation, its history, 126-171;\n   a gradual process, 152-155;\n   cumulative, 156-166;\n   consecutive, 166-171;\n   harmonious, 169, 170;\n   final purpose of creation, 130-133.\n\n Creation, the conception of, 56;\n   the Biblical conception of, can not be determined\n    on philological grounds, 56-58;\n   how to be determined, 58-61;\n   distinction between absolute and architectonic, 61;\n   an origination _de novo_, 60, 61;\n   a voluntary act of God, 63-68;\n   not determined by any inherent necessity, 64;\n   not conditioned _ab extra_, 66.\n\n Cudworth on a plastic nature, 222-225.\n\n\n D.\n\n Days of the creative week, 145-151.\n\n Defects in nature, supposed, not removed by hypothesis\n  of unconscious intelligence, 232, 233;\n   this supposition based upon our ignorance of nature\n    as a whole, 233-235.\n\n Descartes, his conception of God, 29.\n\n Dissipation of mechanical energy, 120, 121, 207-209.\n\n Dualism, Oriental, 23.\n\n Duration not identical with time, 77;\n   nor with eternity, 77;\n   a quality of dependent existence, 81;\n   a fact of consciousness, 82.\n\n\n E.\n\n Earth, secular cooling of the, 105-108;\n   indications of surface transformations of the, 108, 109.\n\n Earth, the, a school-house for man, 258.\n\n End of moral government, 417-419.\n\n Energy, conservation, transformation, and dissipation of, 118, 119;\n   defined, 194;\n   distinction between force and energy, 203;\n   laws of conservation and transformation limited by\n    the law of dissipation, 207-209;\n   cases of transformation, 237;\n   all the forms of energy are transformations of one\n    Omnipresent force, 237.\n\n Eternity an attribute of God, 77, 83, 84.\n\n Ether, hypothesis of the, 113;\n   a resisting medium, 114, 115;\n   absolute continuity of the, 217, 218.\n\n Experience can not attain to a universal truth, 190.\n\n Extension a quality of matter, 81;\n   not a predicate of space, 79;\n   a percept of sense, 81.\n\n\n F.\n\n Faraday on the possible and the impossible, 195;\n   on action at a distance, 214.\n\n Final purpose of creation revealed in Scriptures, 130-133;\n   not discoverable by science, 234, 245.\n\n Force defined, 203, 236;\n   the ultimate of all ultimates, according to Spencer, 25;\n   theory that matter is a phenomenon of force, 123;\n   the power of God, 123;\n   distinct from energy, 203;\n   not inherent in matter, 219, 236;\n   tendency of modern scientists to hypostatize, 227;\n   spirit-force the only force, 236, 237, 341;\n   a metaphysical idea, 340;\n   the expression of will, 341.\n\n Forces, primary, of nature, 209;\n   a perpetual stream of power from the Infinite Spirit, 221, 222.\n\n Foreknowledge of God and human freedom, 402-405.\n\n Formation implies origination, 97.\n\n Free self-determining power of the will, 380, 387;\n   arguments against--(1) Metaphysical or causational, 387, 392;\n   (2) Psychological, 392-402;\n   (3) Theological, 402-405;\n   conceded by Dr. Tyndall, 335.\n\n Freedom of God, absolute, 63.\n\n\n G.\n\n Galton on the efficacy of prayer, 313.\n\n Geographical conditions, their influence on the character\n  of nations, 258-264.\n\n Geology points back to a beginning, 104-110.\n\n Geological changes indicate a preparation for man, 254-257.\n\n God, omnipotence of, and human freedom, 355-359.\n\n God the author and giver of life, 240.\n\n God, the existence of, the fundamental postulate of all\n  philosophy and all religion, 291, 292.\n\n God, the fatherhood of, 359-365.\n\n God the first principle and unconditioned cause of all existence, 27;\n   the content of our conception of, 27;\n   the idea of, a phenomenon of the universal intelligence\n    of our race, 28;\n   idea and concept of, 350;\n   harmony of the Biblical and philosophic conception of, 46, 47;\n   distinction between the nature and essence of, 62, 63;\n   not necessarily but freely just and good, 63;\n   immanence of, in nature, 174, 175, 240, 241.\n\n Government of God, distinction between physical, natural,\n  and moral, 367, 368.\n\n Gravitation--attraction not a universal and necessary attribute\n  of matter, 191, 211-213;\n   must have a cause, 214;\n   transmitted by the ether, 215;\n   instantaneous, 215;\n   cause of, not material, 216;\n   a derivative force, 221.\n\n Grecian civilization the youth of humanity, 280-282.\n\n Grove on causation, 39;\n   on force, 340.\n\n\n H.\n\n Hamilton, Sir William, confounds space and extension, 72;\n   also space and immensity, 73;\n   confuses the concepts time, duration, and eternity, 76;\n   on the inconceivability of an absolute commencement, 93.\n\n Harmony between the philosophic conception of force and the\n  religious conception of God, 338-343.\n\n Hebrew civilization the childhood of humanity, 278-280.\n\n Hedge, Dr., on the immanence of God in nature, 186.\n\n Hegel on Thought as the supreme reality, 25.\n\n Helmholtz denies direct action at a distance, 214.\n\n Herschel, Sir John, his conception of matter, 95, 125, 237;\n   on force, 39, 341;\n   on universal gravitation, 191;\n   on law, 198;\n   on conservation of energy, 205, 206.\n\n History a revelation of Divine providence, 246;\n   the goal of, is the perfection of humanity, 248;\n   the especial field of Divine providence, 253.\n\n Human race commenced its history in the Temperate Zone, 264-268;\n   distribution of the, not governed by the same law as the distribution\n    of plants and animals, 272;\n   distribution of, indicates a Providential guidance, 273.\n\n Human freedom and Divine omnipotence, 355-359;\n   and Divine prescience, 402-405.\n\n Humanity, perfection of, in what does it consist? 248, 249.\n\n\n I.\n\n Immanence of God in nature, 174, 175, 240, 241;\n   the doctrine of, not pantheistic, 241, 242.\n\n Immanent attributes of God, 50;\n   an eternal and necessary in being, 52.\n\n Immensity an attribute of God, 75, 81, 83, 84.\n\n Inertia of matter, 220, 235.\n\n Infinite series a contradiction _in adjecto_, 90.\n\n Interception of force by matter, 220.\n\n\n L.\n\n Laplace on the stability of the solar system, 113.\n\n Laurent on Providence, 247.\n\n Law, creation by, 196;\n   meaning of the term, 197-200.\n\n Laycock, Dr., on the law of design, 129;\n   on life, 192;\n   on science, 195.\n\n Life, distinction between molecular and individual, 163;\n   molecular, the result of the immediate presence and agency of God,\n    239;\n   the cause, not the consequence of organization, 240.\n\n Love the highest, determining principle of the Divine\n  efficiency, 130, 131.\n\n\n M.\n\n Mahan, Dr. A., his fatal concession to Hume, 88;\n   on an infinite series, 88;\n   rejects the _\u00e0 priori_ argument for the being of God, 88-91.\n\n Mansel on the conceivability of a commencement of existence, 94.\n\n Martineau asserts the coeval and coeternal existence of something\n  objective to God, 67;\n   if true, would invalidate every proof of the existence of God, 67,\n    68;\n   on the separate spheres of religion and science, 296.\n\n Matter a created entity, 95, 125.\n\n Matter, eternity of, affirmed by Martineau, 67;\n   a fatal admission, which imperils the Theistic argument, 85-92.\n\n Matter, theory that, is a phenomenon or a function\n  of force, 123, 124, 228, 236;\n   a real entity, 235.\n\n Maxwell, Prof., on the nature of matter, 124;\n   regards matter as a created entity, 125, 126;\n   rejects the doctrine of action at a distance, 214;\n   on the origin of motion, 219.\n\n McCosh concedes that space and time are not independent of God, 68;\n   on proportions of infinite space, 74;\n   on causation in the will, 399.\n\n Mechanical theory of the origin of things, 299, 300.\n\n Method of the Divine government, 405-407;\n   a probationary economy, 408-411;\n   a moral discipline, 411, 412;\n   an equitable administration, in which responsibility is graduated\n    on the scale of available light and opportunity, 412-416;\n   secures an infallible and equitable retribution\n by connecting character and consequence, 416, 417.\n\n Mill, J. S., on Teleology, 128;\n   on uniformity of nature, 189.\n\n Mind, stages of development of, in the individual, 276, 277.\n\n Mind the primal source of all being, 38;\n   the first cause of motion, 236;\n   the one and only source of power, 237.\n\n Mivart on unconscious intelligence, 226.\n\n Montesquieu, his definition of law, 198.\n\n Moral attributes or perfections of God, 51;\n   an everlasting voluntary becoming, 52, 63.\n\n Moral government, its grounds, 351-365;\n   its nature, 366-371;\n   its subjective conditions, 371, 404;\n   its end, 417-419.\n\n Moral ideas of the reason identical in all men, 378-380.\n\n Motion, origin of, 219.\n\n Motives, moral, do not act causally on the will, 393-396;\n   the so-called _strength_ of motives discussed, 397-402.\n\n M\u00fcller on Divine love as the highest determining principle\n  of the Divine efficiency, 131.\n\n Murphy, J. J., on unconscious intelligence, 225;\n   on matter and force, 227-229;\n   his doctrine involves Pantheism, 229, 230.\n\n\n N.\n\n Natural and moral distinguished, 369-371.\n\n Nature, meaning of the term, 193, 325;\n   course of, 326;\n   constitution of, 326, 329;\n   controlled and modified by man, 335, 336;\n   therefore also controlled by God, 337.\n\n Nebular hypothesis implies a beginning, 110, 111.\n\n Necessitarians, theory of, 394, 395.\n\n Newman, John Henry, his conception of God, 31.\n\n Newton, Sir Isaac, his conception of God, 29;\n   teaches that God constitutes space and duration, 68;\n   denies action at a distance, 214;\n   denies that gravity is inherent in and essential to matter, 211, 213.\n\n Niebuhr on Divine providence, 246.\n\n Nitzsch teaches that God is the cause of space and time, 69.\n\n Norton, Prof., on Atomic Forces, 209;\n   his doctrine that atomic repulsion is the primary force, 220;\n   teaches that the Infinite Spirit is the primal source\n    of all force, 221, 222.\n\n\n O.\n\n Omnipotence of God and human freedom, 355-359.\n\n Order of nature, facts concerning the, which are\n  supposed to conflict with the efficacy of prayer, 310.\n\n Order of the universe had a beginning, 98.\n\n Oriental civilization the infancy of humanity, 275.\n\n Origin of things, mechanical theory of the, 299, 300;\n   vito-dynamical theory of, 299.\n\n Origination and formation, 97.\n\n Owen, Prof. R., on the preparation of the earth for man, 255, 256.\n\n\n P.\n\n Pantheism, the doctrine of unconscious intelligence ends in, 229, 230.\n\n Perfect personality of God, 51.\n\n Permanence of substance, force, and law, 15.\n\n Permanence of the universe, no _\u00e0 priori_ ground for\n  belief in the, 100, 188, 189.\n\n Phenomena of the universe in ceaseless change, 14.\n\n Physical and spiritual distinguished, 368.\n\n Physical geography indicates a preparation of the earth for man, 257.\n\n Plastic nature, theory of a, 183, 222-235.\n\n Plato taught that a perfect mind is the primal source\n  of all existence, 38.\n\n Porter, Dr., regards space as an entity, 69.\n\n Prayer--have our prayers any influence with the Supreme Power? 292;\n   importance of this question, 292, 293;\n   natural to man, 302-304;\n   an essential element of life, 304-310;\n   necessary to the formation of noble character, 306-308;\n   attacks on the efficacy of, from the stand-point\n    of experience, 313-321;\n   from the theoretic stand-point, 321-338.\n\n Prayer-gauge, the, not presented in terms of experience, and therefore\n  not capable of experimental application, 317, 318.\n\n Problem, the central, specifically stated, 21, 22.\n\n Procter on Divine supervision and control, 176.\n\n Providence, statement of the Christian doctrine of, 245, 246;\n   the course of human history a revelation of, 246, 247;\n   defined, 252;\n   in the physical universe, 254;\n   nature and history the two great factors of Divine providence, 258.\n\n\n R.\n\n Reality of the external world, 14.\n\n Relation between God and man--(1) contiguity, 351-353;\n   (2) immanency, 353-359;\n   (3) paternity and filiation, 359-365.\n\n Religion, the sphere of, 294-297;\n   inadequate definition of, by Spencer, 298;\n   true conception of, 295.\n\n Religious consciousness, the content of, 304, 305;\n   order of development of, 346-349.\n\n Religious feeling, the facts of, as incontestible as the\n  facts of Physics, 296;\n   statement of the facts of, 302-310.\n\n Repulsion the primary force, 220.\n\n Richter on the providence of God in history, 247.\n\n Roman civilization the manhood of the race, 282-285.\n\n\n S.\n\n Schleiermacher on the cause of space and time, 69.\n\n Science and Religion, the apparent antagonism between them, 297, 298.\n\n Science, modern, its metaphysical tendency, 103;\n   the sphere of science, 294-297.\n\n Self, the fundamental reality of, 13.\n\n Solar heat, dissipation of, 116, 117;\n   must be finally exhausted, 118.\n\n Space--what is space? 69-78;\n   is absolute vacuity, 69, 70;\n   is an entity, 69;\n   is a relation, 71-75;\n   confusion of thought in regard to, 71;\n   confounded with extension, 72\n     --by Hamilton, 72, 73\n     --by McCosh, 73\n     --by Cousin, 74;\n   confounded with immensity, 74;\n   the relation of coexistence among extended bodies, 82.\n\n Special providence and the efficacy of prayer, the present\n  issue between science and religion, 291.\n\n Species, the essential element of, a spiritual entity, 164.\n\n Spencer asserts that force is the ultimate of all ultimates, 25;\n   his definition of law, 198;\n   admits that will-force symbolizes the cause of all change, 40, 341.\n\n Spinoza, his assertion that all determination is negation, 43.\n\n Spirit-force the only force in the universe, 236.\n\n Stewart, Dugald, on the impossibility of annihilating space, 70;\n   answer thereto, 71.\n\n Sufficient reason, the law of, 31.\n\n Symbolical Hymn of Creation, 140-142.\n\n\n T.\n\n Tait, Prof., rejects direct action at a distance, 214.\n\n Teleological idea the highest law of the universe, 128-130;\n   not invalidated by the doctrine of evolution, 171.\n\n Temperate Zone, the human race commenced its history in the, 264-268;\n   purely zoological data would lend us to fix that starting-point in\n    the Torrid Zone, 268-272;\n   a providence here revealed, 273, 274.\n\n Temporal character of the universe, 98;\n   the order of the universe had a beginning, 98;\n   this has been the common belief of all ages, 99;\n   all philosophers have recognized a beginning, 101;\n   modern science sustains this belief, 102, 103;\n   Geology points back to a beginning, 104-110;\n   astronomical paletiology confirms the law of finite duration,\n    110-118;\n   Physics especially sustains the belief, 118-121.\n\n Thomas Aquinas, his notion of conservation, 177.\n\n Thomson, Sir William, on secular cooling of the earth, 107, 108;\n   on dissipation of energy, 119, 120;\n   on the argument from design, 129;\n   rejects direct action at a distance, 214;\n   on life, 240.\n\n Tidal friction dissipates mechanical energy, 115.\n\n Time or Succession, what is it? 78;\n   confounded by most philosophers with duration, 75,\n     and with eternity, 75;\n   consequences of this confusion, 76;\n   answer of McCosh, 78;\n   of Dr. Porter, 80;\n   time the measure of finite duration, 83.\n\n Transformation of energy, 208;\n   illustrations of, 237.\n\n Transitive or relative attributes of God, 50.\n\n Tyndall on impossibilities in nature, 196;\n   on the certainty of the facts of religious experience, 296;\n   admits that the great problem of the age is to find a legitimate\n    satisfaction for the religious emotions, 300;\n   prescribes the conditions under which it must be solved, 301;\n   admits that religion can not be dislodged from the heart of man, 304;\n   believes in the existence of God, 312;\n   his attack on the efficacy of prayer from the stand-point\n    of science, 321-338;\n   does not deny that God may create energy, 332;\n   admits the interference of personal volition in nature, 332-334;\n   grants that the conception of a universal Father who controls the\n    phenomena of nature is not unscientific, 337;\n   distinguishes between the force which animates nature and the God\n    who answers prayer, 338-340.\n\n\n U.\n\n Unconditioned Will the principle of all reality, efficiency,\n  and perfection, 34, 41-48.\n\n Unconscious intelligence, doctrine of, 225;\n   impossibility of forming any conception of, 226, 227;\n   no difficulties relieved by this hypothesis, 232-235.\n\n Uniformity of Nature, meaning of the term, 193-196, 325-330.\n\n Uniformity of the course of nature not an intuitive\n  belief, 99, 188-190, 321, 326;\n   an assumption, 322;\n   what ground is there for this assumption? 322-324.\n\n Unity, demand of the reason for, 23.\n\n Unity of the Cosmos, 15.\n\n Universal beliefs, authority of, 100, 101.\n\n Universal Father controlling nature a scientific conception, 336, 337.\n\n Universe an effect, 21;\n   had a commencement in time, and will therefore have an end, 98-121;\n   not a conservative but a dissipative system, 118-121;\n   dependent on the Divine conservation every moment, 174-177.\n\n\n V.\n\n Vito-dynamical theory of the origin of things, 299.\n\n Volition, reality of personal, 334.\n\n\n W.\n\n Wallace on unconscious intelligence, 226;\n   regards all force as will-force, 39.\n\n Wesley on Divine conservation of the world, 179.\n\n Whedon, Dr., on causation in the will, 390-391;\n   on the so-called strength of motives, 396, 397, 399, 400;\n   on Divine foreknowledge, 404;\n   on equation of probational advantages, 415.\n\n Whewell, Prof., on law and cause, 200;\n   on the origin of force, 341.\n\n Will the fountain-head of all force, 38;\n   so recognised by scientists, 39, 40;\n   this doctrine the balancing-point of a moral theism, 37.\n\n Will, the freedom of the, 380-387;\n   direct testimony of consciousness, 381-384;\n   presupposed by the idea of moral obligation, 384, 385;\n   and by the sense of obligation, 385, 386.\n\n Will the real essence of the soul, 35, 36;\n   is more than mere power of energy, 35;\n   the synthesis of reason and power, 197.\n\n Will, the unconditioned, 34;\n   the absolute first principle, 25;\n   the Divine will the source of all the forms of force in the\n   universe, 237.\n\n Winchell, Dr., on surface transformations of the earth, 109;\n   on molar aggregation, 162;\n   on species, 164;\n   on the harmony between the Mosaic and geological records, 155.\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: \"The Old Faith and the New,\" vol. i. p. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ibid. vol. i. p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ibid. vol. i. p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 4: \"The Old Faith and the New,\" vol. ii. p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ibid. vol. ii. p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 6: \"The Old Faith and the New,\" vol. ii. p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ueberweg's \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Ueberweg's \"Logic,\" p. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 9: This is mournfully conceded by Geo. Henry Lewes (an avowed\nComtean): \"No army of argument, no accumulation of contempt, no\nhistorical exhibition of the fruitlessness of its effort, has sufficed\nto extirpate the tendency toward metaphysical speculation. Although its\ndoctrines have become a scoff (except among the valiant few), its method\nstill survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads\nsome men of science. In vain History points to the failure of twenty\ncenturies; the metaphysician admits the fact, but appeals to History in\nproof of the persistent passion which no failure can dismay; and hence\ndraws confidence in ultimate success. A cause which is vigorous after\ncenturies of defeat is a cause baffled but not hopeless, beaten but not\nsubdued. The ranks of its army may be thinned, its banners torn and\nmud-stained; but the indomitable energy breaks out anew, and the fight\nis continued.\"--\"Problems of Life and Mind,\" p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 10: \"Every religion may be defined as an _\u00e0 priori_ theory of\nthe universe. The surrounding facts being given, some form of agency is\nalleged which, in the opinion of these alleging it, accounts for these\nfacts.... Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of\nall religion--even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for\nit, too, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion,\nwhich it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an _\u00e0\npriori_ theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible.\"--Spencer,\n\"First Principles,\" p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 11: \"Philosophy begins in wonder: he was not a bad genealogist\nwho said that Isis, the messenger of Heaven, is the child of Thaumas\n(Wonder); for Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher.\"--Plato,\n\"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 155.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, \"Tim\u00e6us,\" \u00a7 9.]\n\n[Footnote 13: B\u00fcchner, \"Matter and Force,\" pp. 1-27.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" pp. 235, 236.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Hegel, \"Philosophy of Religion,\" vol. i. p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 16: \"Spiritual Philosophy of Coleridge,\" by Green, vol. i. pp.\n1, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Isaiah xliii. 13; Exod. iii. 14: \"I am that I am.\"]\n\n[Footnote 18: \"We can see the sun, we can greet it in the morning and\nmourn for it in the evening, without necessarily naming it, that is to\nsay, comprehending it under some general notion. It is the same with the\nperception of the Divine. It may have been perceived, men may have\nwelcomed it or yearned after it, long before they knew how to name\nit.\"--Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" 2d Series, p. 454.]\n\n[Footnote 19: \"Meditations,\" vol. i. p. 313.]\n\n[Footnote 20: \"Works,\" vol. i. p. 218; vol. v. p. 18; Hamilton's\n\"Philosophy,\" p. 176; Murphy's \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Morell, \"Philosophy of Religion,\" p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 22: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Green, \"Spiritual Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Morell, \"Psychology,\" p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Cousin, \"Elements of Psychology,\" p. 452.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Martineau's \"Essays,\" p. 188, 2d Series.]\n\n[Footnote 27: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 28: \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 50.]\n\n[Footnote 29: \"Sophist,\" \u00a7 72.]\n\n[Footnote 30: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix. x.]\n\n[Footnote 31: \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 32: \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" pp. 233-4; also \"Familiar\nLectures on Scientific Subjects,\" pp. 462, 475.]\n\n[Footnote 33: \"Human Physiology,\" p. 542; also art. \"On Mutual Relation\nof Vital and Physical Forces,\" _Philosophical Transactions_, p. 730.]\n\n[Footnote 34: \"Natural Selection,\" p. 368. See Mivart, \"Genesis of\nSpecies,\" p. 298; Laycock, \"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. pp. 225, 304;\nMurphy, \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 35: \"Reign of Law,\" pp. 123, 129; Cooke, \"Religion and\nChemistry,\" p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 36: \"First Principles,\" p. 235. See also Challis, \"Principles\nof Mathematics and Physics,\" p. 681.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Comte, \"L'Ensemble du Positivisme,\" p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 38: M'Vicar, \"Sketch of Philosophy,\" p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 39: These terms are frequently and somewhat loosely employed\nas synonymous; but in reality each has its own peculiar shade of\nmeaning. Here we employ the term _Absolute_ to denote the underived,\nindependent, incomposite, and immutable. _Infinite_ is employed to\ndenote the absence of all limitation--that which can not be bounded,\nmeasured, quantified. _Perfect_ is employed to denote that which is\ncomplete, finished, self-sufficient--that which has no defect and no\nwant. _The unconditioned_ is a genus, of which the Infinite, Absolute,\nand Perfect are species--not conditioned by quantity, kind, or degree.\nFor the Infinite there are no limits; for the Absolute no parts, no\nequals, and no change; for the Perfect no wants. See Calderwood,\n\"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 179; _North American Review_, Oct.\n1864, pp. 407, 417.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Saisset, \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. ii. p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 41: \"The idea of God is the unity of three factors--the\nlogical (intelligence), the ethical (love), and the physical\n(might).\"--Dr. Martensen, \"Die Christliche Ethik,\" \u00a7 19.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Dr. Whedon, _Meth. Qu. Review_, Jan. 9, 1871, p. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 43: As related to the purpose of Redemption. God the Father is\nthe moving or actuating cause of Redemption, God the Son is the\nrevealing and actualizing cause, and God the Spirit is the active and\nefficient cause. Father = Love; Logos = Revealer; Spirit = Life.]\n\n[Footnote 44: The Justice, Truth, and Faithfulness of God are not\nproperly regarded as attributes of the Divine nature, but as modes of\nDivine conduct or action, determined by the Holiness and Goodness of\nGod. So Grace, Mercy, Compassion are but modifications of Divine Love\nviewed in relation to sinful, guilty, and suffering creatures, and their\nconsideration belongs not to the doctrine of Creation, but of\nRedemption.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Whedon, \"On the Freedom of the Will,\" p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 46: For an exhaustive discussion of this subject, see M\u00fcller,\n\"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. pp. 199-215.]\n\n[Footnote 47: We make no pretensions to critical acquaintance with the\nHebrew, but will hazard this suggestion, \u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4 (aysah) is the most\ngeneral term; its fundamental meaning is _to do, to perform, to work_,\nand may embrace both origination and formation. \u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0 (bara) and \u05d9\u05b4\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8\n(yetsar) are more specific, the former denoting the origination of a\nnew essence or substance, the latter formation or fashioning out of\npre-existing materials. Thus we read in Gen. ii. 7: \"And the Lord God\nformed [\u05d9\u05b4\u05e6\u05b6\u05e8] man [_i. e._, the body of man] out of the dust of the\nearth.\" Here we have pre-existing matter. But in Gen. i. 27 we read,\n\"And God created [\u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0] man [_i. e._, the soul of man] in his own\nimage.\" Here we have no pre-existing material, for matter can not bear\nthe image of God. (See Acts xvii. 29.) _Bara_ must therefore here mean\norigination. Even in Gen. i. 21, where _bara_ is employed in regard to\nthe production of _living creatures_, we have the origination of\nsomething new: for _vitality_, _sensitivity_, _perception_ are not\nproperties of matter, neither can they be educed from any organization\nof matter.]\n\n[Footnote 48: We can not help regarding this mode of reasoning as\nsuperficial and misleading. Gen. i. 27, \"So God created [\u05d1\u05b8\u05bc\u05e8\u05b8\u05d0]\nman in _his own image_,\" refers to the spiritual nature of man which\nalone can bear the \"image of God,\" and must mean _origination_. Gen. ii.\n7, \"And the Lord God formed [\u05e2\u05b8\u05e9\u05b8\u05c2\u05d4] man out of the dust of the\nearth,\" refers solely to the body of man. This distinction can scarcely\nbe accidental.]\n\n[Footnote 49: James i. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Rom. xi. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Lange's \"Commentary,\" Introduction.]\n\n[Footnote 52: We can not overlook the connection between Gen. i. 1 and\nJohn i. 1, and close our eyes to the light which the later announcement\nthrows upon the former. It is most probable that by \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc7 John means\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b9, in eternity--that is, before all time-succession began. \u1f08\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae\nhere can have no relation to time. And why may we not accept the\nPlatonic notion of \"a creation in eternity,\" which itself constituted a\nbeginning of time? Prior to finite succession and change, there can be\nno time.]\n\n[Footnote 53: \"God being limited neither _in_ nor _by_ any other\nexistence, is infinite in a positive sense, inasmuch as _his will alone_\nimposes all limitation.\"--Ulrici, \"Gott und die Natur,\" 1862, p. 535.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Natura_--that which is produced or born, that which is\nalways _becoming_. _Essentia_--the fundamental, permanent _being_. See\nnote 1 (Next footnote.)]\n\n[Footnote 55: \"We Arminians hold that God is freely good from eternity\nto eternity, just as man is good freely and alternatively for one hour.\nInfinite knowledge does not insure infinite goodness. Infinite knowledge\n(which is a very different thing from infinite _wisdom_) is not an\nanterior cause of infinite goodness; but both Infinite Wisdom and\nInfinite Holiness _consist in_ and result from God's volitions\neternally, and absolutely, perfectly coinciding with, not the Wrong, but\nthe Right. God's infinite knowledge = omniscience, is an eternal, fixed,\nnecessary _be_-ing; God's wisdom and holiness are an eternal volitional\nBECOMING; an eternally free, alternative _putting forth_ of choices for\nthe Right. God's omniscience is self-existent; God's wisdom and holiness\nare self-made, or eternally and continuously _being made_. God is\nnecessarily omnipotent and all-knowing through eternity, but God is\n_truly_ wise and holy through all eternity, but no more _necessarily_\nthan a man through a single hour. God is holy therefore, not\nautomatically, but freely; not merely with infinite excellence, but with\ninfinite meritoriousness.\"--Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Lange, \"Commentary\" on Gen. i., p. 180.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Poynting, quoted by Martineau in \"Nature and God,\" p.\n153.]\n\n[Footnote 58: See also Heb. i.]\n\n[Footnote 59: See M\u00fcller's \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. p.\n146.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Saisset, \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. ii. p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 61: \"History of Modern Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 62: \"Essays,\" 1st Series, pp. 158, 161.]\n\n[Footnote 63: \"First Principles,\" p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 64: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 65: \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 66: \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 67: \"Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et\nubique durationem et spatium, \u00e6ternitatem et infinitatem\n_constituit_.\"--_Principia_, _Schol. Gen._]\n\n[Footnote 68: \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. i. p. 180.]\n\n[Footnote 69: \"Intuitions,\" p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 70: \"System of Christian Doctrine,\" by Nitzsch, pp. 156-7.]\n\n[Footnote 71: \"The Human Intellect,\" p. 565.]\n\n[Footnote 72: July, 1864.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Stewart's Dissertation in \"Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica,\" vol.\ni. p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Even physical science rejects the notion of \"pure space,\"\nand it may be reasonably doubted whether \"absolute vacuity\" has any\nplace in the universe of God. As a question of science, the existence of\nthe \"vacuum\" is doubtful. \"It may be safely asserted that hitherto all\nattempts at producing a perfect vacuum have failed.\"--Grove,\n\"Correlation of Physical Forces,\" p. 134. The general tendency of\nscience is toward a denial of its existence (p. 137). As a question of\nmetaphysics, the human reason can only find satisfaction in believing in\na spiritual Being, a living Will which \"inhabiteth eternity and\nimmensity,\" and \"filleth all in all\" with living and life-giving\nfullness, so that \"in Him we live and move and have being.\"--McCosh,\n\"Intuitions of the Mind,\" p. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 75: \"By empty space I mean _distance_, I mean _direction_:\nthat steeple is a mile off, and not _here_ where I sit, and it lies\nsoutheast and not north.\"--Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Scientific\nSubjects,\" p. 455.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Taylor, \"Physical Theory of Another Life,\" p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 77: \"The idea of space--the idea of extension--is the logical\ncondition of the admission of the idea of the body.\"--\"History of\nPhilosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 78: \"Extension is only another name for space.\"--\"Lectures on\nMetaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 79: \"Space and extension are convertible terms.\"--\"First\nPrinciples,\" p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 80: See \"Intuitions,\" p. 223, where the terms are employed as\nsynonymous.]\n\n[Footnote 81: \"L'immensit\u00e9 ou l'unit\u00e9 de l'espace.\"--Cousin, \"Histoire\nde la Philosophie du xviii^me Si\u00e8cle,\" p. 121. \"Infinity of\nextension.\"--McCosh, \"Intuitions,\" p. 223. \"Infinite immensity of\nspace.\"--Hamilton, \"Discussions,\" p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 82: \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. pp. 114, 167.]\n\n[Footnote 83: \"Intuitions,\" p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 84: \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 85: \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. p. 170]\n\n[Footnote 86: \"Discussions,\" etc., p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 87: \"Philosophy,\" p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 88: \"Intuitions,\" p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 89: \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 90: \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 91: \"When the succession of ideas ceases, our perception of\nduration ceases with it.\"--Locke, \"Essays\" (bk. ii. ch. xiv. \u00a7 4).]\n\n[Footnote 92: Time and duration are confounded by McCosh (\"Intuitions,\"\np. 223), by Mahan (\"Intellectual Philosophy,\" p. 22), and by Cousin\n(\"History of Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 229).]\n\n[Footnote 93: \"Absolute time is eternity\" (Cousin, \"History of\nPhilosophy,\" vol. i. p. 77). \"L'\u00e9ternit\u00e9 ou l'unit\u00e9 de temps\" (\"Histoire\nde la Philosophie du xviii^{me} Si\u00e8cle,\" p. 121). \"Eternity is the\nsynonym of pure time\" (_North American Review_, April, 1864, p. 115).]\n\n[Footnote 94: \"Mind is nothing but the series of our feelings as they\nactually occur, with the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling\"\n(\"Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 253).]\n\n[Footnote 95: \"Intuitions,\" p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 96: \"Intuitions,\" p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 97: \"Intuitions,\" p. 252.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Hamilton's \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. p. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 99: McCosh, \"Intuitions,\" p. 205; Saisset, \"Mod. Pantheism,\"\nvol. i. p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Hamilton's \"Logic,\" p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 101: \"Intuitions,\" p. 211. See also Porter's \"Human\nIntellect,\" p. 567.]\n\n[Footnote 102: \"Intuitions,\" p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Strange as it may sound, Dr. McCosh says, at p. 202, that\n\"we have an immediate knowledge of space in the concrete by the senses,\"\nand here he asserts that \"space is not a substance,\" and therefore can\nnot be perceived.]\n\n[Footnote 104: \"Opuscula,\" p. 752.]\n\n[Footnote 105: \"Discussions,\" p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 106: \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" pp. 319, 331.]\n\n[Footnote 107: \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. i. p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 108: \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 109: \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 110: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 111: \"Familiar Lectures,\" p. 455.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Martineau's \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Martineau's \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 114: \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. pp. 76, 79.]\n\n[Footnote 115: \"Natural Theology,\" p. 23.\n\nThe practice so common among writers of Natural Theology of fixing upon\none line of proof of the being of God as the only valid method, and then\ndisparaging and endeavoring to show the invalidity of all others, is\nhighly reprehensible. The strongest arguments employed by the Atheists\nhave been culled from the writings of these eccentric theologians. In\nthe celebrated public discussion between Mr. Holyoake, the leader of the\nSecularists in England, and Mr. Brindley, \"On the existence of God,\" the\nmost telling arguments of Mr. Holyoake were drawn from the standard\nworks on Natural Theology. How much more rational and commendable is the\ncourse of the philosopher: \"There are different proofs of the existence\nof God. The consoling result of my studies is that these different\nproofs are more or less strict in form, but they have all a depth of\ntruth which needs only to be disengaged and put in a clear light in\norder to give incontestable authority. Every thing leads to God. There\nis no bad way of arriving at Him, but we go to Him by different\npaths.\"--Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 418.\n\nThe argument for the being of a God in its completeness is at once\nOntological and Cosmological, Etiological and Teleological. It is in the\nconcurrence and synthesis of these separate but harmonious lines of\nproof that we have an unanswerable demonstration. For ourselves, we are\nconvinced, with Neitzsch, that the Ontological proof is first and last;\nthey who seek to invalidate this cut the ground from under all the\nrest.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Herschel's \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 117: _North American Review_, October, 1864, p. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 118: \"By finite we generally mean that which is within reach,\nor may be brought within reach of our senses.... The powers, therefore,\nof our senses and mind place the limit to the finite, but those\nmagnitudes which severally transcend these limits, by reason of their\nbeing too great or too small, we call _infinite_ and\n_infinitesimal_.\"--Price, \"Infinitesimal Calculus,\" vol. i. pp. 12, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Martineau, \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Hamilton, \"Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 539.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 122: \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 123: \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. p. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 124: \"Prolegomena,\" p. 267-269.]\n\n[Footnote 125: See Locke's \"Human Understanding,\" bk. iv. ch. x., where\na similar line of argument is pursued.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Schellen, \"Spectrum Analysis,\" p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Sir John Herschel, \"Natural Philosophy,\" \u00a7 28.]\n\n[Footnote 128: \"On Molecules,\" Lecture at the British Association at\nBradford, in _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 129: \"God is not merely spirit, but He has upon Himself a\nrealistic _nature_. God did not create the world out of an absolute\nnothing. The something out of which God created it are his eternal\n_potentialities_--not merely logical (merely conceived by God), but at\nthe same time also _physical_ (essentially in God existing)\npotentialities. In these \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 God possesses both the something out\nof which He makes the world, and also the forces, instruments, and means\nby which He produces it. In this sense it is literally true: _All things\nare of God_ (Rom. xi. 33). This admission of a supramaterial physis in\nGod--this spiritual realism--furnishes not only an escape from the\nerrors of a lifeless materialism and of an abstract spiritualism, but is\nthe synthesis of the partial truth that is in both.\"--_Bibliotheca\nSacra_, January, 1873, p. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Lange's Commentary, \"Preliminary Essay,\" p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 131: See Whewell's \"History of Scientific Ideas,\" vol. ii. p.\n287.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Ch. XXXIV.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Whewell's \"History of Inductive Sciences,\" vol. ii. p.\n593.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 136: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Inaugural Address before the British Association of\nScience, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 138: \"Positive Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 139: \"Philosophy of Aristotle,\" p. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Prof. P. G. Tait, M.A., opening Address at the Edinburgh\nMeeting of the British Association of Science, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p.\n271. See also Prof. Maxwell's Address at the Liverpool Meeting, in\n_Nature_, vol. ii. p. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Miller's \"Testimony of the Rocks,\" p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Sir William Thomson supposes that temperature to have\nbeen at least 7000\u00b0 Fahr. See Thomson and Tait's \"Natural Philosophy,\"\nvol. i. p. 716.]\n\n[Footnote 143: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 714.\nWinchell, \"Sketches of Creation,\" p. 407.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Mayer, \"Celestial Dynamics: Correlation and Conservation\nof Forces,\" p. 315. The pal\u00e6obotanist Heer has described many species of\ntropical plants from Greenland, Alaska, and Spitzbergen.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 714.\nObservations on over forty artesian wells in Central Alabama show an\naverage increase of temperature of 1\u00b0 for every 47 feet of descent.--Dr.\nWinchell, in \"Proceedings of American Association,\" part ii. p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 714.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Pouillet estimates that the heat which reaches the\nsurface of the earth from its interior at 200 cubic miles per diem. A\ncubic mile is the quantity of heat necessary to raise a cubic mile of\nwater 1\u00b0 Centigrade in temperature.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 716.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 721.]\n\n[Footnote 151: See Winchell's \"Sketches of Creation,\" chap. xxxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Proctor, \"Other Worlds than Ours,\" p. 193. \"More likely\nthese have been totally absorbed by the lunar rocks.\"--Dr. Winchell.]\n\n[Footnote 153: \"Correlation and Conservation of forces,\" p. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 154: _North American Review_, Oct., 1861, pp. 372-3.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Mitchell's \"Planetary and Stellar Worlds,\" p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Tyndall, \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Quoted by Mayer, \"Celestial Dynamics: Correlation and\nConservation of Forces,\" p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 158: \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" p. 308.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 191.\nBalfour Stewart, \"Treatise on Heat,\" p. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 194;\nalso Helmholtz, in \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Winchell, \"Sketches of Creation,\" p. 422. If the whole\nsolar radiation were employed in dissolving a layer of ice inclosing the\nsun, it would dissolve a stratum ten miles and a half thick in one day.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Helmholtz, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p.\n245.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Energy_ is now defined as \"_the power of doing work_,\"\nthat is, the power, in _virtue of its position_ (as a head of water, a\nraised mass, a coiled spring) or in _virtue of its motion_ (as a falling\nmass, a current of wind, a projectile), to do work. The first is called\n_Potential_, the second _Kinetic_ Energy. Besides these instances of\n_Visible_ Energy, there is also _Invisible_ Molecular Energy, divided\ninto, (_a_) the Energy of electricity in motion; (_b_) the Energy of\nradiant heat and light; (_c_) the kinetic Energy of absorbed heat; (_d_)\nmolecular potential Energy; (_e_) potential Energy caused by electrical\nseparation; (_f_) potential Energy caused by chemical separation. Of\nthese different _kinds_ of Energy, the most available for work is\nMechanical Energy, or Energy of visible motions and positions; the least\navailable is universal heat, or radiant Energy.]\n\n[Footnote 165: See article \"Energy,\" in _North British Review_, May,\n1864, and Balfour Stewart's \"Treatise on Heat,\" p. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Stewart's \"Elements of Physics,\" p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 167: \"Die Naturkr\u00e4fte in ihrer Wechselbeziehung,\" p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 168: \"Correlation of Physical Forces,\" p. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _American Journal of Science_, July, 1864.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Sir Isaac Newton entertained a similar opinion. \"We may\nbe able,\" he said, \"to form some rude conception of the _creation of\nmatter_, if we suppose that God by his power had prevented the entrance\nof any thing into a certain portion of pure space which is of its nature\npenetrable,... from henceforward this portion of space will be endowed\nwith _impenetrability_, one of the essential qualities of matter; and as\npure space is absolutely uniform, we have only to suppose that God\ncommunicated the same impenetrability to another portion of space, and\nwe should obtain in a certain sort the notion of _mobility_, another\nquality which is essential to matter.\"--M. Coste, Note in the 4th\nEdition of his \"French Translation of Locke's Essay.\" (M. Coste reports\nthe above from Newton's lips.)]\n\n[Footnote 172: Prof. Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 173: M. Claude Bernard, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 1867.]\n\n[Footnote 174: \"Dissertation on the Study of Natural Philosophy,\" \u00a7 28.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Prof. Clerk Maxwell, F.R.S., \"Lecture delivered before\nthe British Association at Bradford,\" in _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 176: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 177: \"Logic,\" vol. ii. p. 527, 4th edition.]\n\n[Footnote 178: \"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. pp. 107-8.]\n\n[Footnote 179: \"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 181: See Murphy, \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. i. p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 182: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 183: That man is the final end of the material creation is a\nprinciple recognized by scientific men. \"The aim of the Creator in\nforming the earth, in allowing it to undergo the successive changes\nwhich geology has pointed out, and in creating successively all the\ndifferent types of animals, was to introduce man upon the earth. Man is\nthe end toward which all the animal creation has tended from the\nappearance of the Pal\u00e6ozoic fishes.\"--Agassiz and Gould, \"Principles of\nZoology,\" p. 238. See Dr. Winchell's \"Sketches of Creation,\" pp. 373,\n374; Owen's \"Anatomy of the Vertebrates,\" vol. iii. pp. 796, 808.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 185: See M\u00fcller's \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p.\n237.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 187: G. Warrington, \"The Week of Creation,\" p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Rorison, \"Creative Week,\" in Replies to \"Essays and\nReviews.\"]\n\n[Footnote 189: Dr. Whedon, in _Methodist Quarterly Review_, July, 1862,\np. 528.]\n\n[Footnote 190: See \"Creative Week,\" by Rorison, in Replies to \"Essays\nand Reviews.\"]\n\n[Footnote 191: \"The waters of verse 2 is quite another thing than the\nwater proper of the third creative day: it is the fluid (or gaseous)\nform of the earth itself in its first condition.\"--Lange.]\n\n[Footnote 192: \"We must beware of thinking of a mass of elementary\nwater.... Here is meant the gaseous fluid as it forms a unity with the\nair.\"--Lange, p. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 193: \u05e0\u05b6\u05e4\u05b6\u05e9\u05c1 \u05d4\u05b7\u05d9\u05b8\u05bc\u05d4 = soul of life.--Lange.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Whedon.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Hence \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd, time, or the all of time, is used\nto express the all of the finite, the universe. See Heb. i. 2, xi. 3,\nwhere \u03b1\u1f30\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 is equivalent to universe.]\n\n[Footnote 196: See Special Introduction by Prof. T. Lewis, in Lange's\n\"Commentary.\"]\n\n[Footnote 197: Lange's \"Commentary\" on Genesis, Introduction, p. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 198: \"In a conversation held some years ago by the author (Sir\nJ. Herschel) with his lamented friend, Dr. Hawtrey, Head-Master and late\nProvost of Eton College, on the subject of Etymology, I happened to\nremark that the syllable _Ur_ or _Or_ must have some very remote origin,\nhaving found its way into many languages, conveying the idea of\nsomething absolute, solemn, definite, fundamental, or of unknown\nantiquity, as in the German _Ur-alt_ (primeval), _Ur-satz_ (a\nfundamental proposition), _Ur-theil_ (a solemn judgment)--in the Latin\n_Oriri_ (to arise), _Origo_ (the origin), _Aurora_ (the dawn)--in the\nGreek \u1f4c\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 (a boundary, the extreme limit of our vision, whence\nour horizon), \u1f4c\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 (an oath or solemn obligation, etc.). 'You\nare right,' was his reply, 'it is the oldest word of all words: the\nfirst word ever recorded to have been pronounced. It is the Hebrew for\n_Light_'\" (\u05d0\u05d5\u05b9\u05e8, AOR).--\"Familiar Lectures on Scientific\nSubjects,\" p. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 199: See \"Week of Creation,\" by Geo. Warrington, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 200: The critical reader will discover a slight difference of\nopinion between Dr. Winchell and myself in regard to how much of chapter\ni. is to be regarded as the \"Exordium\" of the Hymn of Creation. Dr.\nWinchell includes verses 1 and 2; I incline, however, to the opinion\nthat it is embraced in verse 1. The reasons which weigh with me are the\nfollowing: 1. The chaos or the darkness of verse 2 is clearly recognized\nas \"the _evening_\" of the first day, \"And God called the light Day, and\nthe darkness He called Night; and there was evening and morning: one\nday.\" I do not see how on a fair interpretation of the sacred poem we\ncan escape the conclusion that the _first_ day embraces \"the evening and\nmorning\"--that is, the primal darkness of verse 2, and the creation of\ndawning light. This conception furthermore harmonizes with the Hebrew\nusage, which always regarded the preceding night as part of the one\nnatural day. The Hebrew Sabbath commenced at six o'clock on Friday\nevening. Thus we read in Leviticus xxiii. 32, \"From even to even shall\nye celebrate your Sabbath.\" Hence also the evening--morning = day\n(\u03bd\u03c5\u03c7\u03b8\u03ae-\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd)--of Daniel viii. 14. 2. The division I have made is the\none which has been followed by the best Hebrew scholars, whose opinion\nis entitled to the highest deference in this connection. The independent\ncharacter of the opening sentence of Genesis was affirmed by such\njudicious and learned men as Calvin, Bishop Patrick, and Dr. D.\nJennings. The early fathers of the Church, as St. Gregory of Nazianzen,\nSt. Justin Martyr, Origen, St. Augustine, and others, held that there\nwas a considerable interval between the creation related in the first\nverse, and that of which an account is given in the third and following\nverses. See \"The Pre-Adamite Earth,\" by Dr. Harris, p. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Breman Lectures, M. Fuchs \"On Miracles,\" p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 202: See _ante_, p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Lange, _in loco_.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Faraday.]\n\n[Footnote 205: \"Three direct acts of the Deity may be recognized, viz.,\nthe creation of matter, of life, and of mind.\"--Prof. Hinrich, _American\nJournal of Science and Arts_, vol. xxxix. p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 206: See M. Claude Bernard, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, December\n15, 1867; Prof. Norton, _American Journal of Science_, July, 1864;\nCooke, \"Religion and Chemistry,\" p. 330.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _North British Review_, March, 1868, p. 127. This is the\ndoctrine of the first physicists of the age, of Sir William Thomson (see\n_Nature_, vol. i. p. 551; vol. ii. p. 421; and especially vol. iv. pp.\n265-6), of Prof. Maxwell (see _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421), of Prof. Tait\n(see _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 271), also of Clausius and Rankine. See also\nProf. Hinrich, \"On Planetology,\" in _American Journal of Science_, vol.\nxxxix. p. 283; and Prof. Norton, \"On Molecular and Cosmical Physics,\"\n_American Journal of Science_, vol. xlix. pp. 24, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Cooke's \"Religion and Chemistry,\" p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 209: _North British Review_, March, 1868, p. 127; also Prof.\nTait, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 210: See Beale, \"Protoplasm,\" pp. 69-71, 88, 108; Carpenter,\n\"Human Physiology,\" pp. 46, 865-6.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Beale, \"Protoplasm,\" pp. 67-8.]\n\n[Footnote 212: See Agassiz's \"Methods of Study in Natural History,\" p.\n287; also Grindon, \"Life, its Nature,\" etc., pp. 189-190.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Cuvier, \"Animal Kingdom,\" p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 214: _Methodist Quarterly Review_, January, 1867, p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 218;\n\"Outlines of Astronomy,\" \u00a7 599; _North British Review_, 1868, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Dr. Winchell, \"Sketches of Creation,\" pp. 66, 67.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Dr. Winchell, \"Sketches of Creation,\" p. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Dana, \"Geology,\" pp. 745, 746.]\n\n[Footnote 219: The theory of \"Divine superintendence and control\" falls\nvery little, if any thing, short of the ever-present and pervading\nenergy which we advocate. At least, the arguments which would establish\nsuch a relation of the Deity to the material universe as amounts to\n\"superintendence and control,\" would go far to establish the doctrine of\na real presence and agency of God pervading and upholding all nature.\nSuperintendence and control imply some agency, some efficiency, and some\n_intervention_ of righteousness or mercy to secure other ends than those\nsecured by the established course of nature, for whoever _overrules_\nsteps on a field beyond his ordinary _rule_. The physical laws are,\ntherefore, simply God's uniform mode of governing the world. This is the\nconclusion which is reached by Proctor (\"Other Worlds than Ours\"). In\nhis chapter on \"Supervision and Control\" (ch. xiii.), he says: \"Thus we\nare led to the conclusion that all things happen according to set\nphysical laws; and without, by any means, adopting the view that the\nAlmighty exercises no special control over his universe, we see strong\nreason to believe that the laws which He has assigned to it are\nsufficient for the control of all things. Indeed, as far as all things\ntake place in accordance with laws which the Almighty must assuredly\nhave Himself ordained, we may say that _every event which has happened\nor will happen throughout infinite time is the direct work and indicates\nthe direct purpose and will of Almighty God_\" (pp. 329, 332); and\nfurther, \"_He who made the laws may annul or suspend them at his\npleasure_\" (p. 333).]\n\n[Footnote 220: St. Augustine's \"De Civitate Dei,\" xii. 25, 26; Neander's\n\"Church History,\" vol. ii. p. 605; Nitzsch, \"System of Christian\nDoctrine,\" p. 193; M\u00fcller's \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p. 248;\nHarris's \" Pre-Adamite Earth,\" p. 103; Young's \"Creator and Creation,\"\npp. 57, 58; Chalmers's \"Astronomical Discourses,\" Dis. iii. pp. 91, 98.]\n\n[Footnote 221: \"De Civitate Dei,\" xii. 25; xiii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Contra Gentiles, ii. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 223: \"Summa Universalis,\" pt. i. q. 105, art. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 224: \"Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion,\" Prop. xiv.\nDugald Stewart, after quoting the above, adds, \"My opinion on this\nsubject coincides with that of Dr. Clarke\" (\"Philosophy of the Active\nand Moral Powers of Man,\" vol. ii. p. 29).]\n\n[Footnote 225: \"Sermons,\" vol. ii. pp. 178, 179.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Thomson's \"Seasons.\"]\n\n[Footnote 227: Holyoake, \"Discussion with Townley,\" p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Croonian Lecture, \"On Matter and Force,\" p. 94. Is it not\nsignificant that Dr. Jones must write his \"First Cause\" without the\ninitial capitals?]\n\n[Footnote 229: Powell, \"Essays and Reviews,\" p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Powell, \"Christianity and Judaism,\" p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Dr. Harris, \"Pre-Adamite Earth,\" p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Amos i. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Hedge, \"Reason and Religion,\" p. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 234: \"Essays and Reviews,\" p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 235: McCosh, \"Intuitions,\" p. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 236: \"Logic,\" vol. ii. pp. 117, 118.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Hamilton's \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Whewell, \"Novum Organon Renovatum,\" p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 239: \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" pp. 218, 284, 140.]\n\n[Footnote 240: \"Physiological Anatomy,\" by Todd, Bowman, and Beale, p.\n19; Nicholson's \"Biology,\" p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Jevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. pp. 433, 434.]\n\n[Footnote 242: Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Laycock, \"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. p. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Beale, \"Protoplasm,\" pp. 39, 42, 109.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Beale, \"Protoplasm,\" pp. 104, 117; Laycock, \"Mind and\nBrain,\" vol. i. pp. 222, 224; Liebig, \"Organic Chemistry,\" p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 247: By _Energy_ we understand \"the power of doing work,\" or\novercoming resistance, which in nature is something perfectly\nintelligible and measurable, equivalent in all cases to the product of\nthe mass into the square of the velocity. By _Force_ we understand \"that\nwhich originates motion.\" All the forms of Energy have therefore their\norigin in Force, and Force has its origin in the Will of the Deity.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Quoted from \"Positive Philosophy,\" by Dr. McCosh, \"Divine\nGovernment,\" p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Science has been defined as the \"knowledge of these\n_deviations_ from the great laws of nature formularized in contingent or\nderivative laws.\"--Laycock, \"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 250: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 251: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Montesquieu, \"Spirit of Laws,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Herschel, \"Natural Philosophy,\" \u00a7 27.]\n\n[Footnote 254: \"Astronomy and Physics,\" p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 164;\nMayer, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 335.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Stewart's \"Physics,\" p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Stewart's \"Physics,\" pp. 114, 353.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Stewart's \"Physics,\" p. 356.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Murphy, \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. i. p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Professor Charles Brooke, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 261: \"Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects,\" pp. 469-472.]\n\n[Footnote 262: \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp. 190, 191.]\n\n[Footnote 263: Ibid. p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 264: _North British Review_, vol. xl. pp. 182, 183.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Helmholtz, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p.\n245.]\n\n[Footnote 266: This is the hypothesis of Helmholtz, Mayer, and Thomson.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Tyndall, \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 31; Murphy, \"Habit\nand Intelligence,\" vol. i. p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Murphy, \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. i. p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Professor Norton, \"On Molecular Physics;\" _American\nJournal of Science and Arts_, vol. iii, 3d Series, pp. 329-331.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Tyndall, \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 271: \"Principia,\" Def. viii. p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 272: \"Does every grain of salt and pepper in a million\nsalt-cellars and pepper-casters individually and separately pull and\nactually move the sun and fixed stars?\"--De Morgan.]\n\n[Footnote 273: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. March, 1868, p.\n125.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Third Letter to Bentley.]\n\n[Footnote 275: _Nature_, vol. iii. p. 51; vol. ii. p. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 276: _Nature_, vol. i. p. 551.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Delivered at the Royal Institution, and reported in\n_Nature_, vol. vii. Nos. 174, 175.]\n\n[Footnote 278: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. March, 1868;\n\"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 368; _Amer. Jour. of\nScience and Arts_, vol. xlix. p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 279: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. p. 127; _Nature_,\nvol. vii. p. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 280: \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 281: Picton, \"Mystery of Matter,\" p. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 282: Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Sir William Thomson, \"Papers on Electrostatics and\nMagnetism,\" p. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 284: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 285: We do not by any means assert that two substances can not\noccupy the same point in space at the same moment in time. We accept the\nHegelian maxim that \"two substances may occupy the same point in space\nat the same time _provided their qualities are essentially different_.\"\nIf the qualities of the ether are essentially different from gross\nmatter, then to call ether \"matter\" is to confound and mislead the mind.\nMay not ether be a \"tertium quid\" between matter and mind?]\n\n[Footnote 286: Prof. Clerk Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 287: Sir William Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Sir W. Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. i. p. 551.]\n\n[Footnote 289: _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 290: _Philosophical Magazine_, 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Thomson and Tait, \"Natural Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 292: _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 280; also Challis, \"Principles of\nMathematics and Physics,\" pp. 685-687.]\n\n[Footnote 293: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. pp.\n32, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 294: How gravitation may result from the interception of the\nCosmic Force of Repulsion is explained by Prof. Norton at pp. 26-28, and\nstill more fully in vol. iii. 3d Series, May, 1872, pp. 332, 336.]\n\n[Footnote 295: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. p.\n34.]\n\n[Footnote 296: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. p.\n33.]\n\n[Footnote 297: See vol. i. pp. 217-284.]\n\n[Footnote 298: \"Intellectual System of the Universe,\" vol. i. p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 299: Ibid. p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 300: Ibid. p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 301: Ibid. p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 302: \"Intellectual System of the Universe,\" vol. i. pp.\n223-4.]\n\n[Footnote 303: Todd, Bowman, and Beale, \"Physiological Anatomy and\nPhysiology of Man,\" p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 304: \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 305: Ibid. p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 306: Ibid. p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 307: Ibid. pp. 6, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 308: \"On Natural Selection,\" p. 360.]\n\n[Footnote 309: \"Genesis of Species,\" p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 310: \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 311: \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 312: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 313: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 314: \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. pp. 4, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 315: Ibid. p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Ibid. vol. i. p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 317: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" pp. 351, 352.]\n\n[Footnote 318: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" pp. 46, 47.]\n\n[Footnote 319: Ibid. pp. 51, 52.]\n\n[Footnote 320: \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. p. 7. \"Pantheism\nasserts the absolute UNITY and permanence of SUBSTANCE with its two\nattributes of _matter_ and _force_(= extension and thought), and their\ninnumerable modifications which go to form all the phenomena of the\nuniverse.\"--Dr. Cohn. Under this definition, Mr. Murphy must be ranked a\nPantheist. He knows but of ONE SUBSTANCE underlying all phenomena.]\n\n[Footnote 321: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 322: Ibid. p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 323: Ibid. p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 324: Ibid. p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 325: Ibid. p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 326: \"Intellectual System of the Universe,\" vol. i. p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 327: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 328: \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 329: \"On Natural Selection,\" p. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 330: Tyndall, \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 331: \"Unity of Worlds,\" p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 332: Tyndall.]\n\n[Footnote 333: By the statical properties of matter we understand\nextension, limit, position, impenetrability, and _inertia_. We have no\nidea that there is a _vis inerti\u00e6_ in matter. Vis inerti\u00e6 is a\n_forceless force_, which is an absurdity. Inertness in matter is not a\nforce, but the opposite of a force--a passivity which requires a force\nin order to change.]\n\n[Footnote 334: Faraday, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p.\n368.]\n\n[Footnote 335: Clerk Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421; Herschel,\n\"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 336: Professor Norton, in the _American Journal of Science and\nArts_, July, 1864, p. 64; Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p.\n467; Dr. Carpenter, \"Human Physiology,\" p. 542.]\n\n[Footnote 337: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 1867.]\n\n[Footnote 338: Anaxagoras.]\n\n[Footnote 339: Dr. Carpenter, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 340: Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 341: For other illustrations, see Cooke's \"Religion of\nChemistry,\" pp. 326-8; Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\"\npp. 116, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 342: Dr. Cohn, of the University of Breslau, in _Nature_, vol.\nvii. p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 343: Carpenter, \"Human Physiology,\" p. 542; Herschel,\n\"Outlines of Astronomy,\" pp. 233, 234; Wallace, \"On Natural Selection,\"\np. 368; Murphy, \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 51; Laycock, \"Mind and\nBrain,\" vol. i. pp. 225, 258-9, 304.]\n\n[Footnote 344: \"First Principles,\" p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 345: Letter to the author.]\n\n[Footnote 346: The distinction made by Dr. Carpenter between _molecular_\n(bioplasmic) and _somatic_ (individual) life is important: molecular\nlife is a cosmic force, somatic life is an individualized force; the\nformer is the direct action of Deity, the second is the indwelling of a\ncreated but yet dependent spiritual entity in a vitalized organism.]\n\n[Footnote 347: \"On the Mutual Relation of the Vital and Physical\nForces,\" _Philosophical Transactions_, 1850, p. 730. See also Laycock,\n\"Mind and Brain,\" vol. i. p. 304; Wallace, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p.\n285.]\n\n[Footnote 348: Huxley, \"Introduction to the Classification of Animals.\"]\n\n[Footnote 349: _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 350: \"God in Nature,\" in _Old and New_, 1872, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 351: _Methodist Quarterly Review_, July, 1871, p. 499.]\n\n[Footnote 352: \"All atomic forces are incessant forces that are made up\nof impulses which are renewed every instant.\"--Professor Norton, in the\n_American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. iii. 3d Series, p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 353: Sir W. Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 354: Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" pp. 15,\n18, 199. See also the words of Dr. Mayer in the same volume, p. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 355: Mr. Wallace, the author of the theory of natural\nselection, denies its applicability to man. Man is \"a being apart,\" a\n\"being superior to nature.\" \"He has not only escaped 'natural selection'\nhimself, but he is actually able to take away some of that power from\nnature which, before his appearance, she universally exercised\" (\"On\nNatural Selection,\" pp. 325, 326). See also Lubbock's \"Prehistoric\nTimes,\" last chapter.]\n\n[Footnote 356: \"Lectures on the History of Rome,\" vol. ii. p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 357: Laurent, \"\u00c9tudes sur l'Histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9,\" vol. v.\np. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 358: Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 359: \"Nichomachean Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 360: Ibid. bk. i. ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 361: Ibid. bk. x. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 362: Nitzsch, \"System of Christian Doctrine,\" p. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 363: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 364: Acts xvii. 25-28.]\n\n[Footnote 365: Laurent, \"\u00c9tudes sur l'Histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9,\" vol. v.\np. 12. Not all the Stoics seem to have understood this \"necessity\" in so\nrigorous a sense. Cleanthes would exempt the evil actions of men from\nnecessity: \"Nothing takes place without Thee, O Deity, except that which\nbad men do through their own want of reason; but even that which is evil\nis overruled by Thee for good, and is made to harmonize with the plan of\nthe world.\"--_Hymn to Zeus._]\n\n[Footnote 366: Laurent, \"\u00c9tudes sur l'Histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9,\" vol. v.\np. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 367: The statement of the text will remain unaffected by any\ntheory as to the derivation of the material organism of the primitive\nman. If the hypothesis be true that \"man is the descendant of some\npre-existent generic type, the which, if it were now living, we would\nprobably call an ape,\" this can only be affirmed of the body of man, and\nthe statement is still correct that \"God formed man of the dust of the\nearth.\" The body of the ape and the body of man are formed of the same\nmaterials. But, as Prof. Cope, a thorough-going Evolutionist, remarks,\nthis material nature can not bear or be \"the image of God,\" for \"God is\na spirit,\" and \"a spirit hath not flesh and bones\" (Luke xxiv. 39). The\nimage of God must inhere in that spiritual nature which was inbreathed\nby God, and consists in reason, conscience, and moral liberty. (See\nCope, \"On the Hypothesis of Evolution,\" pp. 33, 34.) This theory as to\nthe descent of man's material organism from some pre-existent generic\ntype does not by any means involve the conclusion of Sir J. Lubbock that\n\"the primitive condition of mankind was one of _utter barbarism_.\" We\nmay grant that the primitive condition of man was one of childhood\nignorance and inexperience, a state in which his intellectual and moral\nnature was undeveloped; but this is not \"Savagism.\" Barbarism is the\nlapse and deterioration of man. Even if it could be shown that primeval\nman was destitute of the industrious arts, \"it would not afford the\nslightest presumption that he was also ignorant of duty or ignorant of\nGod\" (\"Primeval Man,\" by the Duke of Argyll, p. 132). \"Whenever we can\ntrace back a religion to its first beginnings, we find it free from many\nblemishes that affect it in its later stages\" (Max M\u00fcller, \"Chips from a\nGerman Workshop,\" vol. i., preface). The most ancient form of religion\nwas the Monotheistic (Grimm, \"Deutsche Mythologie,\" p. xliv. 3d ed.).\nSee also \"Les Origines Indo-Europ\u00e9ennes,\" vol. ii. p. 720, by M. Adolphe\nPictet.]\n\n[Footnote 368: Agassiz and Gould's \"Zoology,\" p. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 369: \"On Limbs,\" p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 370: \"On the Skeleton and Teeth,\" p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 371: \"Anatomy of the Vertebrates,\" vol. iii. p. 796.]\n\n[Footnote 372: \"The Harmonies of Nature,\" by Dr. C. Hartwig, pp. 46,\n47.]\n\n[Footnote 373: \"Typical Forms and Special Ends,\" R. McCosh and Dr.\nDickie, p. 352.]\n\n[Footnote 374: \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 375: \"Geographical Studies,\" p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 376: Ritter, \"Geographical Studies,\" p. 314; Guyot, \"Earth and\nMan,\" p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 377: Ritter, \"Geographical Studies,\" p. 34; Guyot, \"Earth and\nMan,\" p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 378: See Guyot, \"Earth and Man\", pp. 268-270.]\n\n[Footnote 379: Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp. 169-170.]\n\n[Footnote 380: \"Adam and the Adamites.\"]\n\n[Footnote 381: Article \"Ararat,\" in Smith's Dictionary.]\n\n[Footnote 382: It is called in Ptolemy _Naxuana_, and by Moses\nChorenensis, the Armenian historian, _Idsheuan_, but at the place itself\n_Nachidsheuan_, which signifies \"the first place of descent.\" See\nWhiston's note on p. 87, vol. i. of Josephus.]\n\n[Footnote 383: \"Antiquities,\" bk. i. chap. iii. \u00a7 5.]\n\n[Footnote 384: Ibid. bk. i. chap. iii. \u00a7 6. Scaliger was the first to\ndraw the attention of scholars to the writings of Berosus. In his work\n\"De Emendatione Temporum\" he has collected his fragments, and vindicated\ntheir authenticity. Berosus is always quoted with respect by English\ndivines, and Niebuhr has sustained his claims to be regarded as a\nreliable authority. In more than one place he speaks of Armenia as the\nresting-place of the ark. See Rawlinson's \"Historical Evidences,\" p. 63,\nand note liii.]\n\n[Footnote 385: \"Antiquities,\" bk. i. chap, iii. \u00a7 6.]\n\n[Footnote 386: \"For instance, in the very second verse, the great\ndiscovery of Schlegel, which the word Indo-European embodies--the\naffinity of the principal nations of Europe with the Arian or\nIndo-Persic stock--is sufficiently indicated by the conjunction of the\nMadai or Medes (whose native name is Mada) with Gomer of the Cymry, and\nJavan of the Ionians. Again, one of the most recent and unexpected\nresults of modern linguistic inquiry is the proof which it has furnished\nof an ethnic connection between the Ethiopians or Cushites, who adjoined\non Egypt, and the primitive inhabitants of Babylonia; a connection which\nwas positively denied by an eminent ethnologist only a few years ago,\nbut which has now been sufficiently established from the cuneiform\nmonuments. In the tenth chapter of Genesis (vers. 8-10) we find this\ntruth thus briefly stated: 'And Cush begat Nimrod,' the 'beginning of\nwhose kingdom was Babel' (ver. 11). So we have had it recently made\nevident from the same monuments that 'out of that land went forth\nAsshur, and builded Nineveh'--or that the Semitic Assyrians proceeded\nfrom Babylonia and founded Nineveh long after the Cushite foundation of\nBabylon. Again, the Hamitic descent of the early inhabitants of Canaan,\nwhich had often been called in question, has recently come to be looked\nupon as almost certain, apart from the evidence of Scripture; and the\ndouble mention of Sheba, both among the sons of Ham, and also among\nthose of Shem (vers. 7 and 28), has been illustrated by the discovery\nthat there are two races of Arabs--one (the Joktanian) Semitic, the\nother (the Himyaric) Cushite or Ethiopic.\"--Rawlinson's \"Historical\nEvidences,\" pp. 71, 72.]\n\n[Footnote 387: _Asiatic Society's Journal_, vol. xv.]\n\n[Footnote 388: Rawlinson's \"Herodotus,\" vol. i. p. 523.]\n\n[Footnote 389: \"Cosmos,\" vol. i. p. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 390: Article \"Botany,\" _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, vol. v.;\nalso \"Geographical Botany;\" and Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 391: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 392: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" pp. 264, 265; Wallace, \"On\nNatural Selection,\" pp. 324-6; Martineau, \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 393: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 394: See Article \"Philosophy,\" in Smith's \"Dictionary of the\nBible.\" See also Shairp, \"Culture and Religion,\" pp. 40-46.]\n\n[Footnote 395: \"Palestine was from the beginning an isolated land, as\nIsrael was an isolated people, and therefore for thousands of years both\nhave been unintelligible to the world at large. No great highway led\nthrough Palestine from people to people; all passed _by_ it, and not\n_over_ it; all its coast was without favorable harbors. No one of the\npagan states of antiquity could come into close geographical,\nmercantile, political, and religious relations with a people existing\nunder the sway of Jehovah.\"--Ritter, \"Geographical Studies,\" p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 396: Article \"Philosophy,\" in Smith's \"Dictionary of the\nBible.\"]\n\n[Footnote 397: Ritter, \"Geographical Studies,\" pp. 342, 343.]\n\n[Footnote 398: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 399: \"The conjugal tie was held sacred, and polygamy\nprohibited.\"--De Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 400: Merivale, \"Conversion of the Roman Empire,\" p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 401: \"God,\" said Plato, \"is supremely good\" (\"Republic,\" book\nii. ch. 18); and \"virtue is likeness or assimilation to God\"\n(\"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 384).]\n\n[Footnote 402: Milman, \"Latin Christianity,\" vol. i. p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 403: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 404: Wallace, \"On Natural Selection,\" p. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 405: \"First Principles,\" p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 406: Ibid. p. 496.]\n\n[Footnote 407: Buchanan, \"Modern Atheism,\" p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 408: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 409: \"First Principles,\" p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 410: Without referring to the writings of theologians, we may\ntake any definition of religion which incidentally occurs in general\nliterature. For example, Froude defines religion as \"the attitude of\nreverence in which noble-minded men instinctively place themselves\ntoward the Unknown Power which made man and his dwelling-place. It is\nthe natural accompaniment of their lives, the sanctification of their\nactions and their acquirements. It is what gives to man in the midst of\nthe rest of Creation his special elevation and dignity\" (\"History of\nEngland,\" vol. xii. p. 560).]\n\n[Footnote 411: \"Essays,\" 1st Series, p. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 412: Preface to the seventh edition of the Address before the\nBritish Association of Science at Belfast.]\n\n[Footnote 413: Preface to the seventh edition of the Address before the\nBritish Association of Science at Belfast.]\n\n[Footnote 414: Dr. Tyndall subsequently defends his course by saying,\n\"The kingdom of science cometh not by observation and experiment alone,\nbut is completed by fixing the roots of observation and experiment in _a\nregion inaccessible to both_, and in dealing with which we are forced to\nfall back upon the picturing power of the\nmind\"--\"_Einbildungskraft_\"--the force of imagination (Preface to\nseventh edition). Are we then to believe that the imagination is the\nsource of scientific principles, that it has any \"power of intuition, or\ncan in any way create its own objects?\" Why does he not fall back on his\n\"_Anschauungsgabe_,\" or faculty of rational intuition, and admit that he\nis in the region of the metaphysical? See \"Fragments of Science,\" p.\n130.]\n\n[Footnote 415: \"\u03a0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u039a\u03bf\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd,\" xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 416: This is admitted even by those who regard prayer for\nphysical change, as, for example, the averting of disease or the fall of\nrain, to be \"irrational and unconsciously irreverent.\" \"I repeat that no\ntheory of the universe, no philosophy of human nature, and no conclusion\nof science can ever lay an arrest upon the instincts of the universal\nheart in the presence of calamity, and with the prospect of its\nincrease. Let men philosophize as they will, and let science march where\nit will (conquering realm after realm, and reducing all under the rigor\nof law), the human spirit will always 'cry unto God' in times of crisis,\nand will find immeasurable solace in 'committing its causes' unto Him;\nfor the instinct to pray for relief in times of anxiety or of peril is\none which can never be exorcised from the heart of man. But it does not\nfollow that it will always (or that it ought ever) to imagine that by so\ndoing it can deflect the order of nature or induce God to alter his\nprearrangements. The relief obtained is in the act of _submission_ and\nof filial trust, not in the notion of being able to persuade an\ninfinitely powerful and sympathetic Listener\" (\"Prayer: 'The Two\nSpheres:' They _are_ Two,\" by the Rev. William Knight, _Contemporary\nReview_, December, 1873, p. 35). Of course we have no reason to expect\nthat Dr. Tyndall should yield his judgment to the authority of\nScripture, but we may legitimately expect the Rev. William Knight, of\nthe Free Church of Scotland, to defer in some measure to James v.\n13-18.]\n\n[Footnote 417: Preface to the seventh edition of Dr. Tyndall's\n\"Address.\"]\n\n[Footnote 418: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 419: \"When ten men are so in earnest on one side that they\nwill sooner be killed than give way, and twenty are earnest enough on\nthe other to cast their votes for it but will not risk their skins, the\nten will give the law to the twenty in virtue of the robuster faith, and\nof the strength that goes along with it.\"--Froude, \"History of England,\"\nvol. xii. p. 562.]\n\n[Footnote 420: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 421: \"Only in the domain of Freedom can there exist the\nmoral.\"--Martensen, \"Christian Ethics,\" p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 422: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 423: \"Questions such as these derive their present interest in\ngreat part from their _audacity_.\"--Tyndall.]\n\n[Footnote 424: See \"Fragments of Science,\" pp. 38 and 64-65.]\n\n[Footnote 425: _Contemporary Review_, December, 1873, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 426: Tyndall, \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 427: Preface to the Address before the British Association of\nScience at Belfast.]\n\n[Footnote 428: Preface to the seventh edition.]\n\n[Footnote 429: _Contemporary Review._]\n\n[Footnote 430: Mansel, \"Prolegomena Logica,\" p. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 431: \"History of Civilization.\"]\n\n[Footnote 432: Comte, \"Positive Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 433: \"No record of _coincidences_ can prove a causal\nconnection, or even suggest it--unless the instances are exceptionally\nnumerous, and unless other causes leading to the result are excluded by\nthe rigid methods of verification.\"--\"Prayer: 'The Two Spheres:' They\n_are_ Two,\"_Contemporary Review_, Dec., 1873, p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 434: See pp. 386-7.]\n\n[Footnote 435: Dr. Tuke, \"Influence of the Mind on the Body in Health\nand Disease,\" p. 351.]\n\n[Footnote 436: \"Fragments of Science,\" pp. 36-39.]\n\n[Footnote 437: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 40: \"The _assumed_ permanence\nof natural laws.\"]\n\n[Footnote 438: Ibid., p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 439: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 440: Jevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 434.]\n\n[Footnote 441: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 442: Ibid. p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 443: \"On the Relation of God to the World,\" pp. 187-201.]\n\n[Footnote 444: See Coleridge, \"Works,\" vol. i. pp. 152, 263; Hamilton,\n\"Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 445: Fleming, \"Vocabulary of Philosophy,\" _in loco_.]\n\n[Footnote 446: See Jevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 440;\nSpencer, \"First Principles,\" p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 447: Carpenter, \"Mental Physiology,\" p. 692; see Lewes,\n\"Problems of Life and Mind,\" vol. i. p. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 448: Essential properties \"are those which admit neither of\nintension nor remission of degrees.\"--Newton, _Regula Tertia\nPhilosophandi_, \"Principia,\" lib. iii]\n\n[Footnote 449: Maxwell, \"Theory of Heat,\" p. 310; and also in _Nature_,\nvol. ii. p. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 450: By \"causes\" is here meant nothing more than all the\nantecedent conditions. The statement makes no real distinction between\n\"causes\" and \"conditions.\" \"We can not predicate of any physical agency\nthat it is abstractedly the cause of another.\" \"_Causation is the will\nof God._\"--Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" pp. 15,\n199.]\n\n[Footnote 451: See Murphy, \"Habit and Intelligence,\" vol. ii. p. 157;\n\"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" pp. 75, 76; J. S. Mill, \"Logic,\" vol. ii.\nch. xxii. \u00a7 1.]\n\n[Footnote 452: \"Logic,\" bk. iii. ch. xvi. See also McCosh, \"Intuitions,\"\npp. 275-7.]\n\n[Footnote 453: \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 454: \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 465.]\n\n[Footnote 455: Murphy, \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" pp. 80 and 49-51;\nJevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 456: Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 457: \"First Principles,\" chs. xiii. and xiv.]\n\n[Footnote 458: Wallace, \"On Natural Selection,\" p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 459: \"Positive Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 153-156.]\n\n[Footnote 460: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 461: Jevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 434.]\n\n[Footnote 462: Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 463: \"There is one wonderful condition of matter, perhaps its\nonly true indication, namely, inertia.\"--Faraday, \"Correlation and\nConservation of Forces,\" p. 368; Maxwell, \"Theory of Heat,\" p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 464: Stewart, \"Physics,\" p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 465: Ibid. p. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 466: \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 467: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 468: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 420.]\n\n[Footnote 469: _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 470: _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 471: \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 469.]\n\n[Footnote 472: \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii. p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 473: Maxwell, \"Theory of Heat,\" p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 474: Challis's \"Mathematical Principles of Physics,\" p. 107;\nHerschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 475: \"It is pretty much the same to the greater number even of\nthe instructed hearers whether a man of science say 'I know' or 'I\nsuppose;' they only ask after the result and the authority by which it\nis supported, not the grounds of the _doubts_. It is thus not to be\nwondered at if earnest investigators _do not willingly shock the\nconfidence of their readers in what the former may think true and\ndemonstrable by the enumeration of ideas of the correctness of which\nthey do not feel themselves quite secure_.\"--Helmholtz, \"On John\nTyndall,\" in _Nature_, vol. x. p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 476: Jevons, \"Principles of Science,\" vol. ii, p. 466.]\n\n[Footnote 477: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 478: Ibid. p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 479: Marsh, \"Man and Nature,\" chs. i. and iii.; Lyell,\n\"Principles of Geology,\" pp. 713-717.]\n\n[Footnote 480: Wallace, \"On Natural Selection,\" pp. 324-326; Lyell,\n\"Principles of Geology,\" pp. 681-688, 579-590.]\n\n[Footnote 481: \"Fragments of Science,\" p. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 482: _Contemporary Review_, July, 1872.]\n\n[Footnote 483: Grove, \"Correlation and Conservation of Forces,\" p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 484: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 485: Spencer, \"First Principles,\" pp. 235, 252.]\n\n[Footnote 486: Challis, \"Mathematical Principles of Physics,\" p. 681.]\n\n[Footnote 487: Herschel, \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p. 461.]\n\n[Footnote 488: Carpenter, \"Mental Physiology,\" p. 703.]\n\n[Footnote 489: Whewell, \"Astronomy and Physics,\" p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 490: 1 Cor. xii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 491: \"\u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5 \u03c8\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\" = truly feel or\ntouch Him.]\n\n[Footnote 492: See Ritter, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 493: \"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 494: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. viii.; also \"Second Alcibiades,\" which is a\ndiscourse on prayer.]\n\n[Footnote 495: \"Laws,\" bk. v. ch. i.; bk. x. ch. xii.; \"The\u00e6stetes,\" \u00a7\n83.]\n\n[Footnote 496: \"Apology,\" \u00a7 19.]\n\n[Footnote 497: \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 84.]\n\n[Footnote 498: 1 Cor. viii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 499: Eph. iv. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 500: 1 Cor. xii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 501: \"Without God there is no great man. It is He who inspires\nus with great ideas and exalted designs. When you see a man superior to\nhis passions, happy in adversity, calm amid surrounding storms, can you\nforbear to confess that these qualities are too exalted to have their\norigin in the little individual whom they ornament? A god inhabits every\nvirtuous man, and without God there is no virtue.\"--Seneca, \"Epistles,\"\n41, 73.]\n\n[Footnote 502: See \"Creator and the Creation,\" by Dr. Young, pp. 57,\n58.]\n\n[Footnote 503: See M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. pp. 248,\n249.]\n\n[Footnote 504: Some theologians affirm that this \"image of God\" was\nutterly and totally lost in the fall. Such an unqualified statement does\nnot, however, seem warranted by Scripture. After the fall, the sanctity\nof human life is still grounded upon the fact that man is \"made in the\n_image_ of God\" (Gen. ix. 6), and Paul affirms of man, as man, that he\nis \"the _image_ and glory of God\" (1 Cor. xi. 7).]\n\n[Footnote 505: \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 506: See Psa. viii. 6; 1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv.\n24.]\n\n[Footnote 507: See Dr. Young's \"Christ of History,\" pp. 136-138.]\n\n[Footnote 508: Butler's \"Analogy,\" pt. i. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 509: \"Reign of Law,\" by the Duke of Argyll, p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 510: _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 511: Coleridge's Works, vol. i. p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 512: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" pp. 287-289.]\n\n[Footnote 513: Sewell's \"Christian Morals,\" p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 514: R. W. Hamilton.]\n\n[Footnote 515: Dr. Thomas Brown.]\n\n[Footnote 516: R. W. Hamilton.]\n\n[Footnote 517: Sophocles, \"Antigone,\" v. 450-460.]\n\n[Footnote 518: Quoted by Dr. Brown from \"Lucani Pharsalia,\" bk. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 519: \"Fiji and the Fijians,\" by Williams and Calvert, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 520: \"Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa,\" p.\n153.]\n\n[Footnote 521: Chalmers's \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. ii. p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 522: \"The Creator and the Creation,\" by John Young. LL.D., pp.\n101-2. See also \"Man Primeval,\" by Dr. Harris, p. 109; Hamilton's\n\"Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments,\" p. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 523: \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" p. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 524: \"Hand-book of Moral Philosophy,\" p. 184. See also\nCairns's \"Treatise on Moral Freedom,\" p. 222; and Hazard on \"Causation\nand Freedom in Willing,\" p. 7; Dr. Alexander, \"Outlines of Moral\nScience,\" p. 125: Sir John Herschel's \"Familiar Lectures on Science,\" p.\n461; Carpenter's \"Human Physiology,\" p. 543; Wallace, \"On Natural\nSelection,\" p. 367; Beale's \"Protoplasm,\" p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 525: \"Prolegomena Logica,\" p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 526: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 373; also Porter's\n\"Human Intellect,\" p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 527: Quoted by Hamilton in \"Notes on Reid,\" p. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 528: \"Discussions,\" p. 587.]\n\n[Footnote 529: \"The feeling of responsibility is unmeaning unless it\npresupposes the reality of freedom.\"--Murphy, \"Scientific Basis of\nFaith,\" p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 530: \"The miraculous interpositions recorded in the Scriptures\nare not inconsistent with this fundamental axiom, for they are effects\nof the will of God as the _cause_.\"--McCosh, \"Divine Government,\" p.\n113.]\n\n[Footnote 531: \"Divine Government,\" p. 541.]\n\n[Footnote 532: See McCosh's \"Divine Government,\" p. 113, and Mill's\n\"Logic,\" p. 114, vol. ii., English edition.]\n\n[Footnote 533: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 534: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 92. \"Every intelligent\neffort is an exercise of _originating creative power_ which makes the\nfuture different from what it would have been but for the exercise of\nthis power.\"--Hazard, \"On Causation,\" p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 535: \"Philosophy,\" p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 536: \"Philosophy,\" p. 508.]\n\n[Footnote 537: \"Prolegomena Logica,\" App., note C.]\n\n[Footnote 538: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 539: Ibid., p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 540: See Calderwood's \"Hand-book of Moral Philosophy,\" pp.\n196, 197.]\n\n[Footnote 541: M\u00fcller's \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 542: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 543: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 544: Ibid., p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 545: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 546: \"Intuition,\" etc., p. 472.]\n\n[Footnote 547: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 171.]\n\n[Footnote 548: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 549: \"So long as there are fluctuations at all, even though\nthey be of infinitesimal magnitude as compared with the total,\nstatistical regularity does not exclude all room for freedom.\"--Murphy,\n\"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 550: \"Prolegomena Logica,\" p. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 551: On self-limitation of the Divine will, see M\u00fcller,\n\"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. pp. 208-212.]\n\n[Footnote 552: This is unquestionably the doctrine of Scripture, \"Whom\nHe _foreknew_, them also He did predestinate.\"]\n\n[Footnote 553: Bushnell, \"Nature and the Supernatural,\" p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 554: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 273; M\u00fcller, \"Christian\nDoctrine of Sin,\" vol. ii. pp. 236-247.]\n\n[Footnote 555: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" p. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 556: Bushnell, \"Nature and the Supernatural,\" p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 557: Ibid., p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 558: Luke xii. 47, 48.]\n\n[Footnote 559: Matt. xi. 21-24.]\n\n[Footnote 560: Whedon, \"Freedom of the Will,\" pp. 355-357.]\n\n[Footnote 561: Hamilton, \"Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments,\"\np. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 562: \"The formation of noble human characters is the highest\nwork that man, or, so far as we know, that God can be engaged\nin.\"--Murphy, \"Scientific Basis of Faith,\" p. 39.]\n\n\nVALUABLE AND INTERESTING WORKS\n\nFOR\n\nPUBLIC & PRIVATE LIBRARIES,\n\nPUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK.\n\n\n     _For a full List of Books suitable for Libraries published by_\n     HARPER & BROTHERS, _see_ HARPER'S CATALOGUE, _which may be had\n     gratuitously on application to the publishers personally, or by\n     letter enclosing Nine Cents in Postage stamps_.\n\n     HARPER & BROTHERS _will send their publications by mail, postage\n     prepaid, on receipt of the price_.\n\n     MACAULAY'S ENGLAND. 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