{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46630/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46630","id":"gutenberg_46630","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46630","summary":null,"tags":["Bible. New Testament -- Evidences, authority, etc.","Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - Religious","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Miracles","Revelation","Supernatural in the Bible"],"text":"The Supernatural in the New Testament\n\n                    Possible, Credible, and Historical\n\n   Or: An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against\n                   Christianity as a Divine Revelation\n\n                                  By the\n\n                        Rev. Charles A. Row, M.A.\n\n                         Prebendary of St. Paul\u2019s\n\nAuthor of \u201cThe Jesus of the Evangelists,\u201d \u201cThe Nature and Extent of Divine\n      Inspiration,\u201d \u201cThe Moral Teaching of the New Testament,\u201d Etc.\n\n                                  London\n\n                             Frederic Norgate\n\n                                   1875\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nDedication.\nChapter I. Introduction. The Position of the Controversy Between the\nOpponents and the Defenders of Christianity.\nChapter II. Definitions of Terms.\nChapter III. The Supernatural Elements Contained in the New Testament: In\nWhat Do They Consist? And What View Do Its Writers Take Respecting Them?\nChapter IV. Miracles, What Do They Prove?\nChapter V. The Antecedent Improbability of Miracles.\u2014The Unknown and\nUnknowable God.\nChapter VI. The Objection That Miracles Are Contrary To Reason Considered.\nChapter VII. The Allegation That No Testimony Can Prove The Truth Of A\nSupernatural Event.\nChapter VIII. The Objection That The Defenders Of Christianity Assume\nCertain Facts The Truth Of Which Can Only Be Known By Revelation, And Then\nReason From Those Facts To The Truth Of The Bible, Considered.\nChapter IX. Demoniacal Miracles\u2014General Considerations.\nChapter X. The Existence And Miracles Of Satan.\nChapter XI. Possession: Is The Theory That It Was Madness Subversive Of\nThe Historical Value Of The Gospels Or Inconsistent With The Veracity Of\nChrist?\nChapter XII. Possession, If An Objective Reality, Neither Incredible Nor\nContrary To The Ascertained Truths Of Mental Science.\nChapter XIII. The Alleged Credulity Of The Followers Of Jesus.\nChapter XIV. The Love Of The Marvellous\u2014Its Bearing On The Value Of\nTestimony To Miracles.\nChapter XV. Our Summary Rejection Of Current Supernaturalism Considered In\nIts Bearing On The Evidence For Miracles.\nChapter XVI. General Objections To Miracles As Credentials Of A\nRevelation.\nChapter XVII. The Historical Evidence On Which The Great Facts Of\nChristianity Rest\u2014General Considerations.\nChapter XVIII. The Testimony Of The Church, And Of St. Paul\u2019s Epistles, To\nThe Facts Of Primitive Christianity. Their Historical Value Considered.\nChapter XIX. The Evidence Furnished By The Epistles To The Facts Of Our\nLord\u2019s Life, And To The Truth Of The Resurrection.\nChapter XX. The Resurrection Of Jesus Christ An Historical Fact.\nChapter XXI. The Historical Value Of The Gospels As Deduced From Previous\nConsiderations.\nChapter XXII. The Historical Character Of The Gospels As Deduced From\nTheir Internal Structure.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                               [Cover Art]\n\n[Transcriber\u2019s Note: The above cover image was produced by the submitter\nat Distributed Proofreaders, and is being placed into the public domain.]\n\n\n\n\n\nDEDICATION.\n\n\nTo The Committee Of The Christian Evidence Society.\n\nMy Lords and Gentlemen,\n\nHaving undertaken to compose this work at your request, I beg permission\nto dedicate it to you. In doing so I feel that it is a duty which I owe\nboth to you and to myself that I should state the position which we\nrespectively occupy with regard to it. Your responsibility is confined to\nhaving requested me to compose a work in refutation of certain principles\nnow widely disseminated, which impugn the supernatural elements contained\nin the New Testament. For the contents of the work and for the mode of\ntreatment I alone am responsible. When I considered the position of the\npresent controversy, I felt that it was impossible to treat the subject\nsatisfactorily except on the principle that the responsibility for the\nmode of conducting the argument and of answering the objections should\nrest with the writer alone. In dealing with a subject so complicated,\ninvolving as it does questions of philosophy and science as well as the\nprinciples of historical criticism, I can scarcely venture to hope that\nevery position which I have taken will prove acceptable to all the various\nshades of theological thought. I have endeavoured to take such as seemed\nto me to be logically defensible without any reference to particular\nschools of theological opinion. As the entire question is essentially\nhistorical, I have done my utmost to exclude from it all discussions that\nare strictly theological. Modern unbelief however puts in two objections\nwhich if valid render all historical evidence in proof of the occurrence\nof miracles nugatory, namely that they are both impossible and incredible.\nIn meeting these I have been compelled to appeal to what appear to me to\nbe the principles of a sound philosophy. In all other respects I have\nviewed the question before me as exclusively one of historical evidence.\n\nIf the Resurrection of our Lord is an actual occurrence, it follows that\nChristianity must be a divine revelation. If it is not, no amount of other\nevidence will avail to prove it to be so. As it has been strongly affirmed\nthat for this great fact, which constitutes the central position of\nChristianity, the historical evidence is worthless, I have devoted the\nlatter portion of this volume to the consideration of this question, with\na view of putting before the reader the value of the New Testament when\ncontemplated as simple history. Using the Epistles as the foundation of my\nargument, I have endeavoured to prove that the greatest of all the\nmiracles recorded in the Gospels rests on an attestation that is\nunsurpassed by any event recorded in history. For this purpose I have used\nthe Epistles as simple historical documents, and I have claimed for them\nprecisely the same value which is conceded to other writings of a similar\ndescription. The feeling among Christians that these writings contain the\ngreat principles of the Christian faith has occasioned it to be overlooked\nthat they are also contemporary historical documents of the highest order.\nAs such I have used them in proof of the great facts of Christianity,\nabove all in proof of the greatest of them, the Resurrection of our Lord.\n\nWith these observations I now present you the following work, with the\nhope that it may prove the means of removing many of the difficulties with\nwhich recent controversial writers have endeavoured to obscure the\nsubject. Trusting that it maybe accepted by the great Head of the Church,\nthe reality of whose life and teaching as they are recorded in the Gospels\nit is designed to establish,\n\nI remain, my Lords and Gentlemen,\nYour\u2019s faithfully,\nC. A. Row.\n\nLondon, January, 1875.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. THE POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE\nOPPONENTS AND THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nAlthough every portion of the Bible is vehemently assailed by the various\nforms of modern Scepticism, it is clear that the real turning point of the\ncontroversy between those who affirm that God has made a supernatural\nrevelation of himself to mankind, and those who deny it, centres in those\nportions of the New Testament which affirm the presence of the\nsupernatural. The question may be still further narrowed into the inquiry\nwhether the person and actions of Jesus Christ, as they are depicted in\nthe Gospels, are historical facts, or fictitious inventions. If the\nopponents of Revelation can prove that they are the latter, the entire\ncontroversy will end in their favour. It would in that case be utterly\nuseless to attempt to defend any other portion of the Bible; and the\ncontroversy respecting the Old Testament becomes a mere waste of labour.\nIf, on the other hand, Christians can prove that the narratives of the\nfour Gospels, or even of any one of them, are a true representation of\nhistorical facts, then it is certain that God has made a revelation of\nhimself, notwithstanding the objections which may be urged against certain\npositions which have been taken by Ecclesiastical Christianity, and the\ndifficulties by which certain questions connected with the Old Testament\nare surrounded.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the historical truth of the facts narrated in\nthe Gospels constitutes the central position of the entire controversy. It\nis not my purpose on the present occasion to discuss the general question,\nwhether the delineation of Jesus Christ which the Gospels contain is one\nof an ideal or an historical person. That question I have already\nconsidered in \u201cThe Jesus of the Evangelists.\u201d But as the various forms of\nmodern unbelief are making the most strenuous efforts to prove that the\nsupernatural elements of the New Testament are hopelessly incredible, and\nthat the attestation on which the supernatural occurrences mentioned in it\nrests, is simply worthless, it is my intention to devote the present\nvolume to the consideration of this special subject, and to examine the\nquestion of miracles, and their historical credibility.\n\nModern scepticism makes with respect to supernatural occurrences (under\nwhich more general term I include the miracles of the New Testament), the\nthree following assertions, and endeavours to substantiate them by every\navailable argument:\n\n1st. That all supernatural occurrences are impossible.\n\n2nd. That, if not impossible, they are incredible; that is, that they are\ncontrary to reason.\n\n3rd. That those which are narrated in the New Testament are devoid of any\nadequate historical attestation, and owe their origin to the inventive\npowers of the mythic and legendary spirit.\n\nIt is my purpose, in the course of the present work, to traverse each of\nthese three positions, and to show:\n\n1st. That miracles and supernatural occurrences are not impossible; and\nthat the arguments by which this has been attempted to be established are\nwholly inconclusive.\n\n2nd. That they are neither incredible, nor contrary to reason; but are\nentirely consistent with its dictates.\n\n3rd, That the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the New\nTestament, and which, if an actual historical occurrence, is sufficient to\ncarry with it all the others, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, rests on\nthe highest form of historical testimony.\n\nSuch is my position.\n\nA recent writer, who has ably advocated the principles of modern\nscepticism, the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion,\u201d has in the opening\npassage of his work clearly placed before us the real point at issue. He\nstates the case as follows:\n\n\u201cOn the very threshold of inquiry into the origin and true character of\nChristianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. It is\nimpossible, without totally setting aside its peculiar and indispensable\nclaim to be a direct external revelation from God of truths which\notherwise human reason could not have discovered, to treat Ecclesiastical\nChristianity as a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man. Not\nonly in form does it profess to be the result of divine communication, but\nin its very essence, in its principal dogmas it is either superhuman or\nuntenable. There is no question here of mere accessories, which are\ncomparatively unimportant, and do not necessarily affect the essential\nmatter, but we have to do with a scheme of religion claiming to be\nmiraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence. This\nreligion cannot be accepted without an emphatic belief in supernatural\ninterposition, and it is absurd to imagine that its dogmas can be held,\nwhilst the miraculous is rejected. Those who profess to hold the religion,\nwhilst they discredit the supernatural element, and they are many at the\npresent day, have widely receded from Ecclesiastical Christianity. It is\nmost important that the inseparable connection of the miraculous with the\norigin, doctrines, and the evidence of Christianity should be clearly\nunderstood, in order that inquiry may pursue a logical and consistent\ncourse.\u201d\u2014_Supernatural Religion, page 1._(1)\n\nI fully accept all the chief positions laid down in this passage as an\nadequate statement of the points at issue between those who affirm and\nthose who deny that Christianity is a divine revelation. A few minor\npoints require a slight modification, as incurring the danger of confusing\nideas that ought to be carefully distinguished.\n\nThe writer before me also raises no minor issue. Although the work is\nentitled \u201cSupernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the reality of divine\nrevelation,\u201d its object, which is consistently carried out throughout it,\nis to impugn the historical character of the Gospels, and to prove that\nthe supernatural occurrences which are recorded in them are fictitious.\nThe title of the work might have justified the writer in assailing other\nportions of the Bible; but he clearly sees that to adopt this course is\nonly to attack the outworks of Christianity, and to leave the key of the\nentire position unassailed. In doing so he has pursued a far nobler course\nthan that which has been adopted by many of the opponents of the Christian\nfaith. He has directed his attack against the very centre of the Christian\nposition, the historical credibility of the supernatural actions\nattributed to Jesus Christ in the Gospels, being well aware that a\nsuccessful assault on this position will involve the capture of all the\noutworks by which it is supposed to be protected; while it by no means\nfollows that a successful assault on any of the latter involves the\ncapture of the citadel itself. This writer does not take up a bye\nquestion, but he goes direct to the foundation on which Christianity\nrests. In doing so, it must be acknowledged that he has taken a\nstraightforward course, and one which must bring the question of the truth\nor falsehood of Christianity to a direct issue.\n\nI fully agree with the chief position taken in the quotation before us,\nthat Christianity involves the presence of the supernatural and the\nsuperhuman, what in fact is generally designated as the miraculous, or it\nis nothing. To remove these elements out of the pages of the New\nTestament, is not to retain the same religion, but to manufacture another\nquite different and distinct from it. In the first place, we have the\ngreat central figure in the Gospels, the divine person of Jesus Christ our\nLord, and the entire body of his actions and his teaching. He, although\ndepicted as human, is at the same time depicted as superhuman and\nsupernatural, not merely in his miraculous works, but in his entire\ncharacter. To remove the divine lineaments of Jesus Christ out of the\nGospels is simply to destroy them. Besides this, we have a large number of\nmiraculous actions attributed to him. These are inextricably interwoven\nwith the entire narrative, which, when they are taken away, loses all\ncohesion. Lives of Jesus which have been set forth, deprived of their\nsupernatural and superhuman elements, are in fact nothing better than a\nnew Gospel composed out of the subjective consciousness of the writers.\nVarious attempts have been made to pare down the supernatural and\nsuperhuman elements in the Gospels to the smallest possible dimensions.\nStill they obstinately persist in remaining. If everything else is struck\nout of the Gospels, except their moral teaching, we are left in the\npresence of teaching which is raised at an immense elevation above the\nthoughts and conceptions of the age that produced it; and of a teacher,\nwho while distinguished by the marks of pre\u2010eminent holiness and greatness\nof mind, is also distinguished by a degree of self\u2010assertion in his\nutterances of moral truth, which is without parallel, even among the most\npresumptuous of men. Deal with the Gospels as we will, while we allow any\nportions of them to remain as historical, we are still in the presence of\nthe superhuman.\n\nAs the narrative now stands it is at least harmonious. The lofty\npretensions of the teacher bear the most intimate correlation to the\nsupernatural and superhuman facts that are reported of him. The one are\nthe complement of the other. If the facts are true, the lofty self\u2010\nassertion of the teacher is justified; if they are not true, his\npretensions conflict with the entire conception of his holiness and\nelevation of mind. The use which a wide spread school of modern criticism\nso freely makes of the critical dissecting knife, for the purpose of\namputating the supernatural from the Gospels, can only be attended by the\nfatal termination of destroying the entire Gospels as of the smallest\nhistorical value. It is marvellous that persons who retain any respect for\nChristianity as a system of religious and moral teaching, should have\nattempted to throw discredit on this element in the Gospels with a view of\nsaving the remainder.\n\nNor is the case different with the other portions of the New Testament.\nChristianity, as enunciated by its writers, does not profess merely to\nteach a new and improved system of morality. If this was its only\npretension, it would certainly have but little claim to be viewed as a\ndivine revelation. In morals its teaching is both unsystematic and\nfragmentary; though it is an unquestionable fact, that a great system of\nmoral teaching may be deduced from the principles it unfolds. But if one\nthing is plainer than another on the face of the New Testament, it is that\nthe great purpose sought to be effected by Christianity is to impart a new\nmoral and spiritual power to mankind. It professes to be, not a body of\nmoral rules, but a mighty moral force, which is concentrated in the person\nof its Founder. The acceptance of it had generated a new power or energy,\na moral and spiritual life, which raised those who had embraced it above\ntheir former selves; and which it professes to be able to impart to all\ntime. This supernatural element, concentrated as I have said that it is in\nthe person of its founder, runs through the entire epistles, and\nconstitutes their most distinguishing feature. If the supernatural\nelements in the person of Jesus Christ be removed from their teaching\nnothing remains but a number of moral precepts robbed of all their\nvitality. In one word, the whole system of teaching simply collapses.\n\nIn a similar manner, if we eliminate every thing supernatural out of the\nNew Testament, with a view of arriving at a residuum of truth, we are\nbrought into immediate contact with the most unique fact in the history of\nman, the creation of the Church of Jesus Christ, the greatest institution\nwhich has ever affected the destinies of our race, and which has for\neighteen centuries exerted a most commanding influence on human happiness\nand civilization. This is professedly based on a miraculous fact, the\nResurrection of Jesus Christ. If, therefore, we remove the supernatural\nelements out of Christianity, this institution, mighty for good in its\ninfluence on the progress of our race, has been based on an unreality and\na delusion. Here again we encounter something which has very much the\nappearance of the supernatural.\n\nOn these accounts, therefore, I cordially accept the position which is\nlaid down by the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d as a correct statement\nof the case, that Christianity involves the presence of the Supernatural,\nor it is nothing. We must either defend the chief supernatural elements of\nthe New Testament or abandon it as worthless.\n\nBut there is an expression which occurs in this quotation, and which is\nfrequently made use of in subsequent parts of the work, which requires\nconsideration, \u201cEcclesiastical Christianity.\u201d What is intended by it? The\nmeaning is nowhere defined, and unless we come to a clear understanding\nwith respect to it, we shall be in danger of complicating the entire\nquestion. The expression is ambiguous. If by it is meant any other form of\nthought, than that which is contained in the pages of the New Testament;\nif, in fact, by it is intended a systematic arrangement of doctrinal\ntruth, which has been elaborated at a subsequent period, I emphatically\nassert that those who are called upon to defend the divine character of\nthe Christian Revelation have nothing to do with it. The only thing which\nthose who maintain that the New Testament contains a divine revelation can\nbe called on to defend, is the express statements of the book itself, and\nnot a system of thought which subsequent writers may have attempted to\ndeduce from it.\n\nThis point is so important, that I must make the position which I intend\ntaking with respect to it clear. It involves the distinction between\nrevelation and theology. The religious and moral teaching which is\ncontained in the New Testament is in a very unsystematic form. Not one of\nits writings is a formal treatise on theology, nor does one of them\ncontain a systematised statement of what constitutes Christianity. Its\nteaching of religious truth is incidental, and is called forth by the\nspecial circumstances of the writer. The plain fact is that four of the\nwritings which comprise the New Testament are religions memoirs. One is an\nhistorical account of the foundation of the Church. Twenty\u2010one are\nletters, written to different Churches and individuals, and all called\nforth by special emergencies. These all partake of the historical\ncharacter. The only one which does not participate in this character is\nthe Apocalypse, which, being a vision, is utterly unlike a formal or\nsystematic treatise on Christianity. The result of the form in which the\nNew Testament is composed is that its definite teaching is always\nincidental, called forth to meet special circumstances and occasions in\nthe history of Churches and individuals, and never formal. It is also\nuniversally couched in popular, as distinct from scientific or technical\nlanguage. Not one of its writers makes an attempt to formulate a system of\nChristian theology.\n\nThe person of Jesus Christ constitutes Christianity in its truest and\nhighest sense. Three of the Gospels embody the traditionary teaching of\nthe Church on this subject. The fourth is the work of an independent\nwriter. The epistles may be received as a set of incidental commentaries\non the person and work of Jesus Christ, called forth by the special\noccasions which gave them birth, and embodying the author\u2019s general views\nas to his work and teaching as adapted to a number of special\ncircumstances and occasions.\n\nBetween the contents of the New Testament and what is commonly understood\nby Ecclesiastical Christianity the difference is extremely wide. The New\nTestament contains a divine revelation. Ecclesiastical Christianity is a\nbody of religious teaching in which Christianity has been attempted to be\npresented in a systematised form, or, in other words, it is a theology\nmore or less complete.\n\nIt is necessary that we should have a clear appreciation of the\ndifference. Theology is an attempt of the human intellect to present to us\nthe truths communicated in Revelation in a systematised form. It is in\nfact the result of the human reason investigating the facts and statements\nof Revelation. Theology therefore is a simple creation of human reason\nerected on the facts of divine revelation. As such it is subject to all\nthe errors and imperfections to which our rational powers are obnoxious.\nIt can claim no infallibility more than any other rational action of the\nhuman mind. Theology is a science, and is subject to the imperfections to\nwhich all other sciences are liable. It stands to the facts of\nChristianity in the same relation as philosophy and physical science stand\nto the works of nature. In the one the human intellect investigates the\ndivine revelation contained in the works of nature, and endeavours to\nsystematise its truths: in the other it does the same with respect to the\ndivine revelation which in accordance with the assertions of the New\nTestament has been made in the person of Jesus Christ.\n\nWhat I am desirous of drawing attention to is that theology is not\nrevelation. Systems of theology may be accurate deductions of reason from\nRevelation; or they may be inaccurate and imperfect ones. It is very\npossible that a system of theology which has been evolved by human reason,\nalthough it may have attained a wide acceptance, may be as inadequate an\nexplanation of the facts of revelation, as the Ptolemaic system of\nastronomy was of the facts of the material universe. Objections which were\nraised against the latter were no real objections against the structure of\nthe universe itself. In the same way objections which may be raised\nagainst a particular system of theology, may leave the great facts of\nrevelation entirely untouched.\n\nIf we look into the history of Christianity, we shall find that as soon as\nthe Church began to consolidate itself into a distinct community, the\nreason of man began to exert itself on the facts of revelation, and to\nattempt to reduce its teaching to a systematic form. From this source have\nsprung all the various systems of theology which have from time to time\npredominated in the Church. It has been a plant of gradual growth, and as\nsuch may bear a fair comparison with the slow growth of philosophy or\nphysical science. Such an action of reason on the facts of revelation was\ninevitable and entirely legitimate. What I am desirous of guarding against\nis the idea that when reason is exerted on the facts of revelation, it is\nmore infallible than when exerted on any other subjects which come under\nits cognisance.\n\nI am not ignorant that there is another theory respecting the nature of\ntheology. A large branch of the Christian Church holds that a body of\ndogmatic statements has been handed down traditionally from the Apostles\nand other inspired teachers, which has been embodied in the system of\ntheology which is accepted by this Church, and that this was intended to\nbe an authoritative statement of the facts of the Christian revelation. It\nis also part of the same theory that the Church as a collective body has\nin all ages possessed an inspiration, which enables it to affirm\nauthoritatively and dogmatically, what is and what is not Christian\ndoctrine, and that which it thus authoritatively affirms to be so, must be\naccepted as a portion of the Christian revelation as much as the contents\nof the New Testament itself.\n\nI fully admit that those who assume a position of this kind are bound to\nact consistently, and to defend every statement in their dogmatic creeds\nas an integral portion of Christianity. Nor is it less certain, if this\nprinciple is true, that if any portion of such dogmatic creeds can be\nsuccessfully assailed as contrary to reason, as for instance the\nformulated doctrine of transubstantiation, it would imperil the position\nof Christianity itself. Those, however, who have taken such positions,\nmust be left to take the consequences of them. It is not my intention in\nundertaking to defend the historical truth of the supernatural elements in\nthe New Testament, to burden myself with an armour which seems only fitted\nto crash beneath its weight the person who attempts to use it.\n\nIt has been necessary to be explicit on this point, in order that the\nargument may be kept free from all adventitious issues. The introduction\ninto it of the expression, \u201cEcclesiastical Christianity,\u201d brings with it\nno inconsiderable danger of diverting our attention from what is the real\npoint of controversy. I must therefore repeat it. Ecclesiastical\nChristianity is a development made by reason from the facts of the New\nTestament, and is a thing which is entirely distinct from the contents of\nthe New Testament. With its affirmations therefore I have nothing to do in\nthe present discussion. It will not be my duty to examine into its\npositions, with a view of ascertaining whether they are developments of\nChristian teaching which can be logically deduced from its pages; still\nless to accept and to defend them as authoritative statements of its\nmeaning. In defending the New Testament as containing a divine revelation,\nI have only to do with the contents and assertions of the book itself, and\nwith nothing outside its pages. What others may have propounded respecting\nits meaning can form no legitimate portion of the present controversy. The\nreal point at issue is one which is simple and distinct. It is, are the\nsupernatural incidents recorded in it historical events or fictitious\ninventions? As that is the question before us, I must decline to allow any\nother issue to be substituted in the place of it. Our inquiry is one which\nis strictly historical.\n\nAnother statement made by the author before me requires qualification. He\nsays that \u201cChristianity is a scheme of religion which claims to be\nmiraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence.\u201d This\nstatement I must controvert. Christianity does not profess to be divine on\nall points. On the contrary, it contains a divine and a human element so\nintimately united, that it is impossible to separate the one from the\nother. It is also far from clear to me how it can be miraculous in form\nwhen it is contained in a body of historical writings. I shall have\noccasion to show hereafter, that although miracles form an important\nportion of the attestation on which it rests, they are not the only one.\n\nWith these qualifications I fully accept the position taken by this writer\nas a correct statement of the points at issue between those who affirm,\nand those who deny the claims of Christianity to be a divine revelation,\nand accept his challenge to defend the supernatural elements in the New\nTestament, or to abandon it as worthless. To maintain that any of its\ndogmas can be accepted as true while its miraculous elements are abandoned\nseems to me to involve a question which is hopelessly illogical.\n\nModern unbelief rejects every supernatural occurrence as utterly\nincredible. Before proceeding to examine into the grounds of this, it will\nbe necessary to lay down definitely the bearing of the present argument on\nthe principles of atheism, pantheism, and theism.\n\nAs far as the impossibility of supernatural occurrences is concerned,\npantheism and atheism occupy precisely the same grounds. If either of them\npropounds a true theory of the universe, any supernatural occurrence,\nwhich necessarily implies a supernatural agent to bring it about, is\nimpossible, and the entire controversy as to whether miracles have ever\nbeen actually performed is a foregone conclusion. Modern atheism, while it\ndoes not venture in categorical terms to affirm that no God exists,\ndefinitely asserts that there is no evidence that there is one. It follows\nthat if there is no evidence that there is a God, there can be no evidence\nthat a miracle ever has been performed, for the very idea of a miracle\nimplies the idea of a God to work one. If therefore atheism is true, all\ncontroversy about miracles is useless. They are simply impossible, and to\ninquire whether an impossible event has happened is absurd. To such a\nperson the historical enquiry, as far as a miracle is concerned, must be a\nforegone conclusion. It might have a little interest as a matter of\ncuriosity; but even if the most unequivocal evidence could be adduced that\nan occurrence such as we call supernatural had taken place, the utmost\nthat it could prove would be that some most extraordinary and abnormal\nfact had taken place in nature of which we did not know the cause. But to\nprove a miracle to any person who consistently denies that he has any\nevidence that any being exists which is not a portion of and included in\nthe material universe, or developed out of it, is impossible.\n\nNor does the case differ in any material sense with pantheism. When we\nhave got rid of its hazy mysticism, and applied to it clear principles of\nlogic, its affirmation is that God and the Universe are one, and that all\npast and present forms of existence have been the result of the Universe,\n_i.e._ God, everlastingly developing himself in conformity with immutable\nlaw. All things which either have existed or exist are as many\nmanifestations of God, who is in fact an infinite impersonal Proteus, ever\nchanging in his outward form. From him, or to speak more correctly, from\nit (for he is no person), all things have issued as mere phenomenal\nbabbles of the passing moment, and by it will be again swallowed up in\nnever\u2010ending succession. Such a God must be devoid of everything which we\nunderstand by personality, intelligence, wisdom, volition or a moral\nnature. It is evident therefore that to a person who logically and\nconsistently holds these views the occurrence of a miracle is no less an\nimpossibility than it is to an atheist, for the conception of a miracle\ninvolves the presence of personality, intelligence, and power at the\ndisposal of volition. All that the strongest evidence could prove to those\nwho hold such principles, is that some abnormal event had taken place of\nwhich the cause was unknown.\n\nIt is evident, therefore, that the only course which can be pursued with a\nprofessed atheist or pantheist, is to grapple with him on the evidences of\ntheism, and to endeavour to prove the existence of a God possessed of\npersonality, intelligence, volition, and adequate power, before we attempt\nto deal with the evidences of miracles. Until we have convinced him of\nthis all our reasonings must be in vain.\n\nThere are four modes of reasoning by which the being of a God may be\nestablished. I will simply enumerate them. First, the argument which is\nfounded on the principle of causation; second, that which rests on the\norder of the universe; third, that from its innumerable adaptations;\nfourth, that which is derived from the moral nature and personality of\nman. If the argument from causation fails to prove to those with whom we\nare reasoning that the finite causes in the universe must have a first\ncause from whence they have originated; if that from the orderly\narrangements in the universe fails to prove that there must be an\nintelligent being who produced them; if its innumerable adaptations fail\nto establish the presence of a presiding mind; and if the moral nature of\nman fails to prove that must be a moral being from whom that nature\nemanated, and of whom it is the image, it follows that the minds must be\nso differently constituted as to offer no common ground or basis of\nreasoning on this question. The whole involves an essential difference of\nprinciple, which no argumentation can really reach. To attempt to prove to\na mind of this description the occurrence of a miracle, is simply a waste\nof labour.\n\nA work, therefore, on the subject of miracles can only be addressed to\ntheists, because the very conception of a miracle involves the existence\nof a personal God. To take this for granted in reasoning with a pantheist\nor atheist is simply to assume the point at issue. It is perfectly true,\nthat a legitimate body of reasoning may be constructed, if the pantheist\nor the atheist agrees to assume that a God exists for the purpose of\nsupplying a basis for the argument. We may then reason with him precisely\nin the same way as we would with a theist. But the contest will be with\none who has clad himself in armour which no weapon at our disposal can\npenetrate. After the strongest amount of historical evidence has been\nadduced, and after all alleged difficulties have been answered, he simply\nfalls back on his atheism or his pantheism, which assumes that all\nsupernatural occurrences must be impossible, and therefore that alleged\ninstances of them are delusions.\n\nThis is not unfrequently the case in the present controversy. A\nconsiderable number of objections which are urged against the supernatural\nelements of Christianity, derive whatever cogency they possess from the\nassumption that there is a God who is the moral Governor of the universe.\nThese are not unfrequently urged by persons who deny the possibility of\nmiracles on atheistic or pantheistic grounds. It is perfectly fair to\nreason against Christianity on these grounds; it is equally so for a\nperson who holds these opinions, to attempt to prove that the historical\nevidence adduced in proof of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is\nworthless as an additional reason why men should cease to believe in them.\nBut it is not conducive to the interests of truth to urge objections which\nhave no reality except on the supposition that a God exists who is the\nmoral Governor of the universe, and then to fall back on reasonings whose\nwhole force is dependent on the data furnished by pantheism or atheism. I\nshall have occasion to notice a remarkable instance of this involved mode\nof reasoning hereafter.\n\nI shall now proceed briefly to state the mode in which I propose to treat\nthe present subject. The point which I have to defend is not any\nconceivable body of miracles or their evidential value, but specially the\nsupernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament. I must therefore\nendeavour to ascertain what is the extent of the supernaturalism asserted\nin the New Testament, and what is the degree of evidential value which its\nwriters claim for it.\n\nIt has been asserted by many writers that the sole and only evidence of a\nrevelation must be a miraculous testimony. Whether this be so or not, this\nis not the place to enquire. But in relation to the present controversy\nthe plain and obvious course is to ask the writers of the New Testament\nwhat is the precise evidential value of the supernatural occurrences which\nthey have narrated. This is far preferable to falling back on any\nassertions of modern writers, however eminent, on this subject. They may\nhave over\u2010estimated, or under\u2010estimated their evidential value. The\nwriters of the New Testament must be held responsible, not for the\nassertions of others, but only for their own. I must therefore carefully\nconsider what it is that they affirm to be proved by miracles.\n\nOne primary objection against the possibility of miracles is founded on\nthat peculiar form of theoretic belief, which affirms that both\nphilosophy, science, and religion alike point to the existence of a Cause\nof the Universe, which is the source of all the forces which exist, and of\nwhich the various phenomena of the universe are manifestations, and\ndesignates this cause by the name of God. But while it concedes his\nexistence, it proclaims him to be Unknown and Unknowable. If this position\nis correct, the inference seems inevitable, that any thing like a real\nrevelation of him is impossible. It will be necessary therefore for me to\nexamine into the validity of this position.\n\nA vast variety of arguments have been adduced both on philosophic grounds\nand from the principles established by physical science, for the purpose\nof proving that the occurrence of any supernatural event is contrary to\nour reason. If this be true, it is a fatal objection against the entire\nmass of supernatural occurrences that are recorded in the New Testament.\nThe most important points of these reasonings will require a careful\nconsideration.\n\nA very important objection has been urged against the Christian mode of\nconducting the argument from miracles. It is alleged that it involves\nreasoning in a vicious circle, and that Christian apologists endeavour to\nprove the truth of doctrines which utterly transcend reason by miraculous\nevidence, and then endeavour to prove the truth of the miracles by the\ndoctrines. If this allegation is true, it is no doubt a fatal objection to\nthe argument. I shall endeavour to show that it is founded on a\nmisapprehension of the entire subject.\n\nAn attempt has been made to re\u2010affirm the validity of Hume\u2019s argument that\nno amount of evidence can avail to prove the reality of a miracle unless\nthe falsehood of the evidence is more miraculous than the alleged miracle.\nIt will be necessary to consider the validity of the positions which have\nbeen lately assumed respecting it.\n\nA very formidable objection has been urged against the truth of the\nsupernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament on the ground that\nthe followers of Jesus were a prey to a number of the most grotesque\nbeliefs respecting the action of demons, and that their superstition and\ncredulity on this point was of so extreme a character as to deprive their\nhistorical testimony, on the subject of the supernatural of all value. As\nthis objection is not only one which is widely extended, but has been\nurged with great force by the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion,\u201d I shall\ndevote four chapters of this work to the examination of the question of\npossession and demoniacal action as far as it affects the present\ncontroversy.\n\nThe entire school of modern unbelief found a very considerable portion of\ntheir arguments against the historical character of the Gospels, on the\nalleged credulity and superstition of the followers of our Lord. This is\nalleged to have been of a most profound character, and it forms the weapon\nwhich is perhaps in most constant use with the assailants of Christianity.\nAll difficulties which beset their arguments are met by attributing the\nmost unbounded credulity, superstition and enthusiasm to the followers of\nJesus. It has also been urged that the belief in supernatural occurrences\nhas been so general, that it renders the attestation of miracles to a\nrevelation invalid. I purpose examining into the validity of this\nobjection. As this may be said to be the key of the position occupied by\nmodern unbelief, I must examine into the reality of the affirmation, and\nalso how far the love of the marvellous in mankind affects the credit of\nthe testimony to miracles. This I propose discussing in two distinct\nchapters.\n\nIt is an unquestionable fact that in these days we summarily reject whole\nmasses of alleged supernatural occurrences, as utterly incredible, without\ninquiry into the testimony on which they rest. It will be necessary to\ninquire into the grounds on which we do this, and how far it affects the\ncredibility of the miracles recorded in the New Testament.\n\nThe historical value of the testimony which has been adduced for the truth\nof the miracles recorded in the New Testament, has been assailed by every\nweapon which criticism can supply. It is affirmed in the strongest manner\nthat they are utterly devoid of all reliable historical evidence. The\nGospels are pronounced to consist of a bundle of myths and legends, with\nonly a few grains of historic truth hidden beneath them. They are affirmed\nto be late compositions, and that we are utterly devoid of all\ncontemporaneous attestation for the facts recorded in them, and that the\ntrue account of the origin of Christianity is buried beneath a mass of\nfiction. If this be true, there cannot be a doubt that it is a most\nserious allegation, which affects the entire Christian position. It is\nfurther urged that while the defenders of Christianity publish works in\nwhich they attempt to prove that miracles are possible and credible, they\ncarefully avoid grappling with the real point of the whole question by\nshowing that any historical evidence can be produced for a single miracle\nrecorded in the Gospels, which will stand the test of such historical\ncriticism, and it is loudly proclaimed that no real evidence can be made\nforthcoming. Such a charge as this, it is impossible to pass over in\nsilence.\n\nI propose, therefore, to examine into the general truth of these\nallegations, and to consider the nature of the historical evidence which\nunbelief, after it has exhausted all its powers of criticism, still leaves\nus unquestionably in possession of.\n\nThis consists of the epistles of the New Testament viewed as historical\ndocuments. Their value as such has been greatly overlooked by both sides\nto the controversy, especially by the Christian side. Christians have been\nin the habit of viewing them as inspired compositions, and have studied\nthem almost exclusively on account of the doctrinal and moral teaching\nwhich they contain, and each sect has viewed them as a kind of armoury\nfrom which to draw weapons for the establishing its own particular\nopinions. In doing this they have forgotten that they are also historical\ndocuments of the highest order, the great majority of which even the\nopponents of Christianity concede to have been composed prior to the\nconclusion of the first century of the Christian era, and many of them at\na much earlier period.\n\nOf these writings four are universally admitted to be genuine, and to have\nbeen composed prior to the year 60 of our era. Four more are genuine\nbeyond all reasonable doubt, and of two more the evidence in favour of\ntheir authenticity is very strong. The Apocalypse, which is also admitted\nto be genuine, although not strictly an historical document, can be\nrendered valuable for the purposes of history. Of the remaining writings\nthe genuineness is disputed; but whether genuine or not, it is impossible\nto deny their antiquity, and that they are faithful representations of the\nideas of those who wrote them. In fact the names of their authors are of\nno great importance in the present controversy, when the writings\nthemselves bear so decisively the marks of originality. Thus the epistle\nof James, by whomsoever written, bears the most unquestionable marks of\nthe most primitive antiquity. It is in fact a document of the earliest\nform of Christianity,\u2014in one word, the Jewish form, before the Church was\nfinally separated from the synagogue.\n\nSuch are our historical materials. Little justice has been done to their\nvalue in the writings of Christian apologists. As included in the Canon of\nthe New Testament, it has been for the most part the practice to view them\nas standing in need of defence, rather than as being the mainstay of the\nargument for historical Christianity, and constituting its central\nposition.\n\nIt will be admitted that it will be impossible for me to do full justice\nto such a subject in a work like the present. To bring out all the\ntreasures of evidence respecting primitive Christianity, and the\nfoundation of the Christian Church which these writings contain, the whole\nsubject would require to be unfolded in a distinct and separate treatise\nexclusively devoted to the subject. Still, however, this work would be\nvery incomplete if I did not accept the challenge so boldly thrown down to\nus, and show that Christianity rests on an historical attestation of the\nhighest order. To this I propose devoting the six concluding chapters of\nthis work.\n\nI intend, therefore, in the first place to examine the value of the\nhistorical documents of the New Testament, and show that several of the\nepistles take rank as the highest form of historical documents, and\npresent us with what is to all intents and purposes a large mass of\ncontemporaneous evidence as to the primitive beliefs, and the original\nfoundation of the Christian Church. In doing so I propose to treat them in\nthe same manner as all other similar historical documents are treated.\n\nI shall then show that these documents afford a substantial testimony to\nall the great facts of Christianity, and especially to the existence of\nmiraculous powers in the Church, and that the various Churches were from\nthe very earliest period in possession of an oral account of the actions\nand teachings of Jesus Christ substantially the same as that which is now\nembodied in the Gospels; and that this oral Gospel was habitually used for\nthe purposes of instruction. Further, that this oral Gospel was a\nsubstantial embodiment of the beliefs of the primitive followers of Jesus,\nand that the Church as a community was a body especially adapted for\nhanding down correctly the account of the primitive beliefs respecting its\norigin, and that the peculiar position in which it was placed compelled it\nto do so.\n\nI shall further show on the evidence furnished by those epistles, the\ngenuineness of which unbelievers do not dispute, that from the earliest\ncommencement of Christianity the whole body of believers, without\ndistinction of sect or party, believed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ\nas a fact, and viewed it not only as the groundwork on which Christianity\nrested, but as the one sole and only reason for the existence of the\nChristian Church. I shall be able also to prove on the same evidence that\na considerable number of the followers of Jesus were persuaded that they\nhad seen him alive after his crucifixion, and that his appearance was an\nactual resurrection from the dead. The same writings prove to\ndemonstration that this was the universal belief of the whole Christian\ncommunity, and that the Church was established on its basis.\n\nThese things being established as the basis for my reasonings, I shall\nproceed to prove that it is impossible that these beliefs of the Church\ncould have owed their origin to any possible form of delusion; but that\nthe resurrection of Jesus Christ was an historical fact, and that no other\nsupposition can give an adequate account of the phenomenon.\n\nHaving proved that the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in\nthe Gospels is an historical fact, I have got rid of the _\u00e0 priori_\ndifficulty with which the acceptance of the Gospels as genuine historical\naccounts is attended; but further, if it is an historical fact that Jesus\nChrist really rose from the dead, it is in the highest degree probable\nthat other supernatural occurrences would be connected with his person. I\nshall therefore proceed to restore the Gospels to their place as history,\nand to show that even on the principles of the opponents of Christianity,\nthey have every claim to be accepted as true accounts of the action and\nteaching of Jesus Christ as it was transmitted by the different Churches,\npartly in an oral, and partly in a written form. I shall also show that\neven if they were composed at the late dates which are assigned to them by\nopponents, they were yet written within the period which is strictly\nhistorical, while tradition was fresh and reminiscences vivid, and long\nbefore it was possible that a great mass of facts which must have formed\nthe basis of the existence of the Christian Church could have been\nsuperseded by a number of mythic and legendary creations. Having placed\nthese facts on a firm foundation, I shall proceed to consider their\naccounts of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to estimate its\nhistorical nature.\n\nThe proof that the greatest miracle recorded in the Gospels, the\nResurrection of Jesus Christ, is an event which has really occurred,\nplaces the remainder of them in point of credibility in the same position\nas the facts of ordinary history; and they must be accepted and regarded\nin conformity with the usual methods of testing evidence.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS.\n\n\nNothing has more contributed to import an almost hopeless confusion of\nthought into the entire controversy about miracles than the ambiguous\nsenses in which the most important terms connected with it have been\nemployed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of\nrevelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words \u201cnature,\u201d\n\u201cnatural\u201d, \u201claw,\u201d \u201cforce,\u201d \u201csupernatural,\u201d \u201csuperhuman,\u201d \u201cmiracle,\u201d and\n\u201cmiraculous,\u201d are the most conspicuous. It is quite clear that unless we\nuse these terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be fighting the\nair. The neglect to do so has thrown the greatest obscurity over the\nentire subject. This vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to\nwriters on theological subjects, but is diffused over a large number of\nscientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay\ndown strictly accurate definitions of all the terms used in the\ncontroversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is\nhardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite meaning to those\nwhich it will be necessary for me to employ, and to draw attention to some\nof the fallacies which a vague use of language has introduced.\n\nFirst: No terms are more frequently used in this controversy than the\nwords \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural.\u201d They are constantly used as if their meaning\nwas definite and invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the\nexpression \u201claws of nature,\u201d and to speak of miracles as involving\ncontradictions, violations, and suspensions of the laws and order of\nnature, as though there was no danger of our falling into fallacies of\nreasoning by classing wholly different orders of phenomena under a common\nname.\n\nWhat do we mean by the terms \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural\u201d? It is evident that no\nsatisfactory result can come from reasonings on this subject, unless the\nparties to the discussion agree to attach to those words a steady and\nconsistent meaning. Are we in fact under the expression \u201cnature\u201d to\ninclude both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is\nnature to include all things which exist, including their causes; laws,\nand forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its laws and forces? Or\nis it to include all things that exist, except God? I need hardly observe\nthat the laying down some clear and definite principles on this subject is\nvital to the present controversy.\n\nAgain: What do we mean by the laws of nature? How do we distinguish\nbetween the laws and the forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the\nsense in which that expression is used by science, possess any efficient\npower whatever; or ought not efficiency to be predicated only of the\nforces of nature, and never of its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of\nnature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces,\nor do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and\non whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy\nabout miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the\norder of nature? Is it its material order; or does it include the order of\nthe moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a definite meaning to\nthese expressions, to argue that miracles are contrary to nature, or\ninvolve a suspension of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to\naffirm the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this I may almost\nsay is the present aspect of the controversy.\n\nAgain: What do we intend, when we use the different expressions,\n\u201cmiracles,\u201d \u201csupernatural,\u201d \u201csuperhuman,\u201d or events occurring out of the\norder of nature? It is evident that whether they point to any real\ndistinctions or not, it is necessary to employ them with consistency.\n\nThe mere enumeration of these questions makes it clear that by a vague and\nindefinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they\ncannot accurately be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume the entire\nquestion at issue.\n\nFirst: With respect to the terms \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural.\u201d What do we\ninclude under them? Bishop Butler considers that the latter term is\nsatisfied by attaching to it the meaning \u201cusual.\u201d Nature then would mean\nthe ordinary course of things. But such a meaning would by no means\nsatisfy the requirements of modern science, philosophy, or theology.\n\nOne obvious sense to attach to the word \u201cnature\u201d is to use it to denote\nthe entire mass of phenomena as contemplated by physical science. In this\npoint of view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, and\nembrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is\nnecessary; and into the conception of which neither volition nor freedom\nenters. If \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural\u201d had been used only in this sense, it\nwould have saved us from a great mass of inconclusive reasoning. But this\nis far from being the case. Not only are they used to include matter, its\nlaws and forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind.\n\nTo this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has given no inconsiderable\ncountenance in his admirable work, \u201cThe Reign of Law,\u201d especially in the\nsixth chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to the operations\nof mind and matter, and this of course implies that the whole of our\nmental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to\nthis, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word\n\u201cnatural\u201d as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The\nquestion may fairly be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in nature,\nor is not the building of its nest by a bird, or of its comb by the bee, a\nnatural operation? If so, man, bird, and bee, must form a portion of\nnature, and their various actions, of its order.\n\nIn a popular point of view such expressions involve no difficulty, and as\na mere verbal distinction the whole question would not be worth the labour\nof discussion. But in a question like the one now under consideration,\nwhich requires the utmost accuracy both of thought and reasoning, the case\nis far different. The classing together of phenomena which differ so\nentirely as mind and matter, under a common term, leads to the inference\nthat there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the\noutset a _petitio principii_ of the entire question under definition. I\nshall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the\nnumber of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the\nquestion about the possibility and the credibility of miracles by thus\nincluding under a common term phenomena utterly different in character. It\nwould be far better to get rid of words so vague as \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural\u201d\nin this discussion, and substitute for them terms of which it is\nimpossible to mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses which are\nsimply ambiguous and misleading. But of this more hereafter.\n\nWhat then are we to do with man? Is he a part of nature and its order? I\nreply that man is within material nature as far as regards his bodily\norganization; but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs to a\ndifferent order, as far as his rational action, his volition, and his\nmoral powers are concerned. All that I am contending for is that a clear\ndistinction must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces\nof material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must\nbe used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and\nlaws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular\nmanner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual\nI am not concerned, but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent can\nact or forbear acting; matter cannot. This distinction is of the highest\nimportance, and must not be lost sight of behind a confused use of such\nterms as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied indeterminately\nto the necessary action of material agents, and the voluntary action of\nmoral ones.\n\nIt will doubtless be objected by a certain order of philosophy that all\nmental and moral force is only some special modification of material\nforce, and consequently that there is no distinction between material and\nmoral action, or between material and moral force, and that the words\n\u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural\u201d are correctly applied to both alike, as being\nsimple manifestations of the same original force. To this it will be\nsufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, and never has\nbeen nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all\nour certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that\nwe live under a law of freedom, wholly different from the necessary laws\nof material nature. Thirdly: that it contradicts the universal experience\nof mankind, as embodied in the primary laws of human language and human\nthought. To assume this at the commencement of the argument is to take for\ngranted the point which requires to be proved.\n\nIt would be quite out of place in a treatise like the present to attempt\nto discuss the question of the origin of the free agency and the moral\nnature of man. It is sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however\nvoluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple fact that it exists\nin the universe, and that its phenomena belong to an order of its own. It\nis no mere theory, but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying\nthe action of the forces of the material universe, but that he has\nmodified them, and has produced results utterly different from those which\nwould have followed from their simple action. To use terms in this\ncontroversy which overlook this plain and obvious fact, can lead to no\nsatisfactory result.\n\nAre then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, properly designated as\nnatural? In a popular use of language the question may be one purely\nverbal; but when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate thought,\nit is in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not\nconfound the distinct phenomena of mind and matter under a common\ndesignation. Both together compose the universe; but each belongs to a\ndifferent order of phenomena. The whole difficulty proceeds from the fact\nthat both material forces which act in conformity with necessary laws, and\nmoral ones which act in conformity with those of freedom, are united in\nthe person of man.\n\nAnother order of thought uses the term \u201cnature\u201d as including everything\nthat exists, even God; or in other words, it affirms that every thing\nwhich has existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this theory\ninvolves the denial of the personality of the Divine Being, it stands\nexcluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of\nmiracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption of the\nexistence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while\ntheism affirms that God and the universe, whether material or moral, are\ndistinct, it fully recognises the fact that God is immanent in both the\nworlds of mind and matter, while at the same time he transcends them both.\nThis is an important consideration, which is too often overlooked by both\nparties to the discussion.\n\nSecondly: a still greater confusion has been introduced by a vague and\nindefinite use of the term \u201claw,\u201d and by confusing a number of utterly\ndiverse phenomena under the designation of the \u201claws of nature.\u201d It is\nabsolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Duke of\nArgyll tells us in his \u201cReign of Law\u201d that there are five different senses\nat least in which this word is habitually used even in scientific\nwritings. They are as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cFirst, we have law as applied simply to an observed order of facts.\u201d\n\n\u201cSecondly, to that order as involving the action of some force or forces\nof which nothing more can be known.\u201d\n\n\u201cThirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation\nhas been more or less defined or ascertained.\u201d\n\n\u201cFourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces which have reference\nto the fulfilment of purposes or the discharge of functions.\u201d\n\n\u201cFifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the mind\u2014not corresponding\nwith any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought,\nnecessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction\nof the phenomena, not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of\nthought.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese leading significations of the word Law,\u201d says the Duke, \u201call circle\nround the three great questions which science asks of nature, the what,\nthe how, and the why.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat are the facts in their established order?\u201d\n\n\u201cHow, _i.e._ from what physical causes does that order come to be? What\nrelation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the\ndischarge of function?\u201d\n\nSuch are the multiform acceptations attached by scientific men to the term\n\u201claw,\u201d yet the Duke is not quite certain whether they may not be even more\nnumerous. It is evident that if they are all imported into the question of\nthe credibility of miracles, our position must resemble that of persons\nwho are compelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an\noccurrence is natural or supernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a\nviolation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which\nenter into this controversy must be without definite meaning. It is clear\nthat unless we can restrict the word \u201claw\u201d to one, or at most, two\ndefinite meanings, we shall get into hopeless confusion, or to speak more\ncorrectly, we shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any number\nof fallacies.\n\nThe primary conception implied by the term \u201claw\u201d is unquestionably one\nwhich is strictly applicable to man and his actions, and can only be\napplied metaphorically, and in some systems of thought after a\nconsiderable change of meaning, to the facts and phenomena of the material\nuniverse. A law is a rule of action for human conduct and nothing more.\nSuch rules of conduct for the most part pre\u2010suppose that they are imposed\nby some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce\nobedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward\nfeeling that it is right to do so, and knows that his conscience will\nreproach him for the omission. But law, strictly speaking, is simply the\nrule of action itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in\npractice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some kind, our\nconception of a law is also united with that of a lawgiver, who has both\nthe right and the power to enforce it.\n\nIt follows therefore that such a conception is essentially a moral one. It\nis also intimately united with the knowledge that we possess the power to\nact or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer\nit, of taking the consequences of disobedience. But when such a conception\nis transferred to material nature it loses a considerable portion of its\noriginal significancy.\n\nIn its application therefore to physical science, it may with strict\npropriety be used to denote an invariable order of events: and if the\nhuman analogy could hold in physics it might be used to include the power\nwhich originated and enforced them. But as the consideration of will or\npurpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly\nexcluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the\ninvariable order of sequences, and not to include the forces which\ngenerate them. Unless this distinction is carefully observed, we shall be\nin danger of introducing into our reasonings human analogies to which\nthere is nothing corresponding in nature viewed as a mere body of\nunintelligent forces.\n\nThe use of the term \u201claw\u201d in physical science ought to be confined to\ndenote the invariable sequences of the material phenomena. Physicists\nprofess to know nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver standing\noutside his laws and possessing power to enforce them. The whole question\nof intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province.\nLaw, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of\na set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents. Of any\ninherent efficacy in these antecedents to produce their consequents, it\ncan affirm nothing. A very popular philosophy even denies the power of the\nhuman mind to penetrate beyond this, and affirms that its entire knowledge\nis limited to phenomena.\n\nBut physical science also deals with forces. These, and not its laws, are\nits true principles of causation. Mere invariable sequences can effect\nnothing; but forces, such as gravitation, heat, electricity, and the\nentire body of chemical forces, or whatever force they may ultimately be\nresolved into, can effect much. They are in fact the antecedents of which\nthe invariable order of events are the consequents. Respecting the\nultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, or how it is\ndirected, or came to be, physical science is silent. All that it can do is\nto observe the order of their occurrence, measure their quantities, and\ntabulate their results. By this means it rises to the conception of what\nare called the laws of nature.\n\nIf in the present controversy the word law had been used in this sense\nonly, it would have been wholly unexceptionable. But it becomes far\notherwise when the idea of force or efficiency is introduced into it.\nNothing is more common in the reasonings of those who attempt to prove\nthat miracles are impossible, than to import into the term law the idea of\nforce, or efficient causation, even at the very time when the presence of\nintelligent action is denied. It is this which imparts to this class of\nreasonings their entire speciousness. The laws of material nature are\ncontinually spoken of as though they were forces which are energetic in\nthe universe, and to the energy of which all things owe their present\nform; or in other words, it is assumed that the laws of nature are causes\nwhich have produced by their unintelligent action the present order of the\nuniverse.\n\nNothing however can be clearer than that a law of nature, in the sense in\nwhich purely physical science can take cognizance of one, can effectuate\nnothing. What can an invariable order of sequences effect? Before the idea\nof efficiency can be attached to law, the conception of force must be\nintroduced into it. Modern controversy, however, is constantly in the\nhabit of speaking of the laws of nature as though they were efficient\nagents. We hear of creation by law, evolution by law, of results brought\nabout by the action of invariable laws, and a countless number of\nassertions of a similar description. To such expressions in a popular\nsense when no accuracy of expression is required, there is no objection;\nbut when they are introduced into the controversy respecting the\ncredibility of miracles, they create nothing but confusion. What is really\nmeant is, that such results are brought about by the action of forces\nwhich act in conformity with invariable laws, but the idea of intelligence\nand volition is carefully excluded from the conception. It is clearly\ninaccurate to speak of laws reigning. Laws do not reign even in political\nsocieties; but only the power which is able to enact and enforce them. In\nmaterial nature the only things which possess efficiency are its forces.\n\nThere can be no objection to the use of the expression, \u201cthe laws of\nmind,\u201d when care is taken to use language which clearly distinguishes\nbetween them and unintelligent and necessary sequences of material nature.\nBut when the term \u201claw\u201d is without any qualification applied to both sets\nof phenomena alike, it is certain either to lead to fallacious reasoning,\nor to involve the assumption of the point at issue. Whatever may be the\norigin of the moral and spiritual in man, it is certain that as they at\npresent exist in him, they stand out in the strongest contrast with the\nforces which act upon material things, and with the laws of their action.\nNothing can be more entirely different in character than the force of\ngravitation and the principles of volition and self\u2010consciousness, or than\nthe unconscious forces of material nature and those principles which\nconstitute our rationality. If we affirm that the forces of mind act in\nconformity with law, it ought to be clearly understood that they act in\nconformity with a law of their own, which affords free action to the\nprinciple of volition. Otherwise there is the greatest danger that the\nexpression will involve the covert assumption of the truth of the doctrine\nof philosophical necessity, or in other words, that all mental and\nmaterial forces are of the same character, that is to say, that they are\nboth equally necessary. This involves the assumption of the very point on\nwhich the entire controversy turns, for if moral and material forces and\nlaws are all alike, it destroys the conception of a God, and the\nsignificance of a miracle.\n\nThis brings us to the conception of force, what is it? Various definitions\nof it have been given sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. It\nshould be observed however that physical science can know nothing of it\nexcept as a phenomenon. The determination of its nature, and its ultimate\ncause lie entirely beyond its limits. Many facts respecting it, have been\nascertained and tabulated. Many of its manifestations, which bear a\ndifferent phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained to be capable of\ntransmutation into one another. But it must never be forgotten that it is\nable to affirm nothing respecting the source in which the forces of the\nuniverse originate. All that it can affirm is, that they do exist. The\noriginal conception of force is one, however, which we derive, not from\nthe material universe, but from the action of our own minds. We are\nconscious that we are efficient agents, and that definite results follow\nthe action of our wills. This gives us the conception of force. We apply\nit in a metaphorical sense to certain things which we observe in the\nmaterial universe and call them forces, having abstracted from our primary\nidea of force the conception of volition. But all that we really know\nabout force tends to prove that its origin is mental and not material.\n\nIt is of the utmost importance to preserve a clear distinction between the\nunconscious forces of matter and the intelligent ones of mind; otherwise\nwe shall inevitably be misled by such expressions as \u201cthe forces of\nnature.\u201d It is impossible to argue the question unless the distinction is\nadmitted as a fact, whatever theory may be held about their origin. It is\nabsurd to confound principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or\nelectricity, with those which produce the most disinterested moral\nactions, and designate them by the common term \u201cnatural forces.\u201d In common\nlanguage we are in no danger of error when we speak of the force of\nconscience, or the force of a motive; but in discussions like the present,\nwhere such expressions really involve the assumption of the whole\ncontroversy, it is absurd to classify such phenomena, and the\nunintelligent forces of matter under a common designation, unless it can\nbe demonstrated that they are all manifestations of the same power.\n\nWe come now to the much vexed question as to the meaning to be attached to\nthe words \u201cmiracle\u201d and \u201cmiraculous;\u201d and the terms closely allied to\nthem, \u201csupernatural\u201d and \u201csuperhuman.\u201d Is there any valid distinction\nbetween miracles and supernatural occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles\nsupernatural occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? The\ndetermination of this question is closely connected with an important\npoint which will be considered hereafter, viz., whether a miracle could\nhave any evidential value if it were brought about by a special adaptation\nof the known or unknown forces of material nature.\n\nLet it be observed that we are not discussing this question as a purely\nabstract one, but in reference to the truth of Christianity. What miracles\nmay be in themselves, I shall not inquire; but in relation to the question\nbefore us, what we mean when we call an occurrence a miracle ought to be\nmade sufficiently clear and distinct. In this controversy it would greatly\ntend to precision if we used the term \u201cmiracle\u201d as distinguished from an\noccurrence which is supernatural or superhuman, to denote only those\nsupernatural occurrences which have an evidential value in connection with\nthe evidences of a divine revelation, since there may be supernatural\noccurrences which would not be in any proper sense evidential.\n\nBut the further question arises, Is it necessary in order to constitute an\nevent a miracle that it should be one which transcends the known or the\nunknown forces of material nature to have produced? It is clear that to\nconstitute an event a miracle it must involve supernatural or superhuman\nagency of some kind; that is to say, it must be either supernatural in the\nmode of its production as an objective fact, or superhuman in its\nproductive elements, by which I mean, that it must be preceded by an\nannouncement that it is going to occur, which must be beyond the sphere of\nhuman knowledge. In order to render a supernatural event evidential, or in\nother words to constitute it a miracle, it must not only consist of an\nexternal objective fact, but its occurrence must be unknown beforehand,\nand take place at the bidding of the agent. Such previous announcement, or\nprediction, is necessary to render even a supernatural occurrence in the\nstrictest sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some occurrence\nin physical nature previously unknown may therefore convert such an event\ninto an evidential miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere\nobjective fact may have been brought about by some known or unknown forces\nof material nature. To render it such it would be necessary that the\nknowledge of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds of\nexisting knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the science of astronomy was\nutterly unknown, had announced beforehand the day and the hour of the\noccurrence of the next two transits of Venus, and the various places on\nthe earth\u2019s surface in which they would be visible, and if the events had\ntaken place accordingly, this would have unquestionably proved the\npresence of superhuman knowledge. The only question which in such a case\nwould require to be determined would be whether such a knowledge must have\nbeen communicated by God, or by some being inferior to God. As however\nnone of the miracles recorded in the New Testament have the smallest\nappearance of being of this character, I need not further discuss a\nsupposed case. My only reason for referring to it is, that if it is\nsupposable that any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament could,\nat some future day, be shown to have been due to a combination of physical\nforces, their occurring instantly at the direct command of the agent would\nstill give them an evidential value.\n\nBut it is clear that the miracles recorded in the New Testament, if caused\nby material forces at all, could not have been due to their ordinary\naction. They must have been due either to an unknown combination of known\nforces, or to the calling of unknown forces into activity, or to the\nimmediate agency of the divine mind. It is clear therefore that their\noccurrence as objective facts proves the presence of mind acting in some\nway on the material forces of nature. To determine the mode in which this\naction mast have taken place has nothing to do with the question of\nmiracles, or the reality of their occurrence.\n\nA miracle therefore may, for all practical purposes of this argument, be\ndefined as an occurrence which cannot be effectuated by the ordinary\naction of the known material forces of the Universe, and could only have\nbeen brought about by the agency of intelligent volition; and which is\npreceded by an announcement on the part of the agent that it is about to\nhappen or takes place directly on his bidding. The latter element, as I\nhave observed, is essential to constitute the occurrence an evidential\nmiracle. Otherwise in our ignorance of what unknown forces may exist in\nthe universe, we could have no certainty that the event was not a mere\nunusual occurrence effected by some already existing but unknown forces.\nTo the highest form of the miracles in the New Testament, however, such an\nidea would be inapplicable.\n\nIt may perhaps here be objected that in laying down this definition of a\nmiracle, I have not sufficiently identified its performance with the\ngoverning power of the universe, _i.e._ God; but that if supernatural\nagents exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; and\nconsequently that it may not be evidential of a divine commission. This\nobjection will be fully considered in a subsequent portion of this work.\n\nA supernatural event is one which exceeds and which cannot be effected by\nany force existing in material nature. But there must always be a\ndifficulty in determining whether an occurrence, viewed as a bare\nobjective fact, belongs to that class of events which is supernatural, or\nonly to that which is unusual. This will always be the case until our\nknowledge of the forces of the universe is so complete that we can\nascertain for certain what are the limits of their possible action, and\nwhether it is possible to bring into action any forces that may exist, but\nare unknown to us. In strict language therefore, it is impossible to be\ncertain whether an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural,\nuntil we are acquainted with the possible action of every force that\nexists in the universe. This difficulty, however, is one that is entirely\ntheoretical, and has not the smallest practical importance with respect to\nthe miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several thousand years\u2019\nexperience of what can be effected by the ordinary forces of material\nnature. Occurrences which lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the\npresence of intelligence and volition. The introduction of an unknown\nforce can only be accomplished by a being who, although he may be immanent\nin nature, is yet capable of controlling its material forces. Occurrences\ntherefore which transcend the power of the known forces existing in the\nuniverse to accomplish, whether they are material or human, may for all\npractical purposes be viewed as supernatural; that is to say, they denote\nthe presence and agency of a being who is possessed of power,\nintelligence, and volition. Whether that being be human, superhuman, or\ndivine, must be determined by an intelligent exercise of our reason.\n\nIt is useless to discuss this question further. We are dealing with a very\ndefinite question, the miraculous events recorded in the Gospels. With\nrespect to the great majority of them, there can be no doubt as to their\nbeing supernatural occurrences, if they took place precisely as they are\nrecorded. We know enough of the ordinary forces of material nature to be\ncertain that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man by a word\ndoes not lie within the sphere of their operation. Such an event must\ndenote the special interposition of an extremely high degree of\nintelligence and power. Common sense will affirm that it could only be\nbrought about by the intervention of the supreme power of the universe,\n_i.e._ God.\n\nIn this sense every supernatural occurrence may be said to be likewise\nevidential, when we have ascertained for certain that it is due to\nsupernatural causes, and that it cannot have been brought about by the\naction of unintelligent forces, or by those which are capable of being\nmodified by the agency of man. But in that case it would only prove the\npresence and intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the\nunintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I have observed,\nis to prove the supernatural nature of the occurrence. But although, if it\nwas certainly supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a\nsupernatural agent, it would say nothing as to the purpose for which such\nan intervention took place. It follows therefore, that to constitute a\nsupernatural occurrence in the strict sense of the term a miracle, it must\ntake place after an announcement that it is going to happen, and take\nplace at the bidding of the agent who performs it.\n\nIt is highly important, in considering the miracles of the Gospels, that\nthe distinction between a merely supernatural event and an evidential\nmiracle should be kept steadily in view. All creative acts would be\nsupernatural events, but they would not necessarily be evidential\nmiracles. The incarnation, and other occurrences mentioned in the New\nTestament, are supernatural ones; but to mix them up with evidential\nmiracles is simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class of\nsupernatural occurrences mentioned in the New Testament seem to have been\nwrought, not for purposes directly evidential, but to awaken attention;\nand another class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, to render it\npossible to lay deep in human society the foundations of the Church as a\nvisible and permanent institution. Such occurrences are not directly but\nindirectly evidential, and it will be necessary carefully to distinguish\nbetween them and occurrences brought about for directly evidential\npurposes. To keep this distinction clear, I shall designate the last by\nthe term \u201cmiracle.\u201d A miracle is supernatural in two ways: namely, in the\nagency which produced the objective fact, and in the announcement of its\noccurrence.\n\nThe common definition of a miracle, as a violation or a suspension of the\nlaws of nature, is open to very grave objections. The question, as I have\nobserved, at once arises, what is included under nature? It also assumes\nthat we are acquainted with the mode in which miraculous agency must be\nexerted; which we are not. Other definitions which have been proposed take\nfor granted positions which those who undertake to prove the credibility\nof miracles ought never to concede. The plain fact is, that we are simply\nignorant of the mode in which God acts on material nature; and every\ndefinition must be faulty which assumes that we have that knowledge. To\nsay that miracles must involve even a suspension of the laws of nature\nintroduces a needless difficulty. No law or force of nature need be\nsuspended in its action to render the occurrence of a supernatural event\npossible. All that is necessary is that forces should be introduced which\nare capable of overbalancing the action of opposing forces. It is\nextremely inaccurate to affirm that the force of gravitation must be\nsuspended in order to render possible either walking on the water, or an\nascent into the sky.\n\nIt is equally unwise and unphilosophical to affirm that God cannot work a\nmiracle by the use of intermediate agencies, _i.e._ by the partial\nemployment of the forces of the material universe. It is true that in most\nof the miracles recorded in the New Testament we cannot affirm the use of\nsuch media, although we observe an economy in the use of divine power:\n_i.e._ no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to produce the\nparticular result in question. But in the Old Testament the use of such\nmedia is unquestionably affirmed. To lay down in our definition of a\nmiracle a particular theory as to the mode in which it must be\naccomplished, involves the whole subject in needless difficulties.\n\nThis question has been obscured by representing a miracle as performed by\nthe intervention of a higher law, superseding the action of a lower one.\nThis introduces the conception of force into the idea of law, and leads to\nconfusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable sequences between phenomena,\nare neither forces nor powers. The counteraction of one force by another\nis an event of daily occurrence. All that is needful for the working of a\nmiracle is the intervention of a force or mental energy which is capable\nof acting on matter, and of overbalancing those ordinary forces which\nwould produce a contrary result.\n\nIt has also been urged that miracles may obey a law of miracles. The best\nillustration of this idea is that which has been supplied from the\nsupposed operations of Mr. Babbage\u2019s calculating machine. He supposes that\na machine might be constructed which could go on grinding out a particular\nset of results for a long, yet definite period of time; then by the\noperation of the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; and\nafterwards that it might revert to the original one; and that this\noperation might be continued for ever. If therefore the great Author of\nnature had so planned the machine of the universe that whenever a miracle\nwas requisite in His scheme of Providence this abnormal event occurred,\nlike the new series introduced into the calculating mill, in that case\nmiracles might be said to follow a definite law, which might be designated\nthe law and order of miraculous intervention.\n\nIt is impossible to deny the ingenuity of this theory, but unfortunately\nit is not only one which takes for granted that the perfection of\nmechanical contrivance is the only thing that the Creator had in view in\nthe production of the universe, but even if this were an unquestionable\nfact, it could afford us no help with respect to all the most important\nmiracles recorded in the New Testament. How is it possible, I ask, to\naccount for many of our Lord\u2019s miracles on such a supposition? It is\nexpressly affirmed that this supernatural energy was frequently made to\ndepend on the faith of the person who invoked His help. Could any miracle\u2010\nworking mill be even conceived of, which could bring out, as part of the\nnormal law of its operations, the cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by\na word, or effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension\ninto Heaven? Such occurrences could not be produced by the action of any\nmachine which has the smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further:\nsuch an operation would be impotent to answer the purposes of a miracle,\nunless the particular result was announced beforehand by one who was\ncompletely ignorant that the machine was capable of producing such\nextraordinary results. This ignorance would likewise have to be extended\nto those to whom the announcement was made. It would also be necessary\nthat the announcer should proclaim that on a particular day and hour the\nmachine would grind out the particular result of the cure of a blind man,\nor a resurrection from the dead. The ability to do this would be utterly\nabnormal, and impossible ever to be ground out by the self\u2010acting agency\nof any conceivable machine, however cleverly constructed. Mr. Babbage\u2019s\nmiracle\u2010working mill, however ingenious a conception, must therefore be\ndismissed as incapable of affording us the smallest help in the present\nargument.\n\nThe term \u201csuperhuman\u201d remains to be considered. It need not detain us\nlong. Superhuman implies a result brought about by the intervention of a\nbeing superior to man. Whether such an agent be divine or otherwise can\nonly be determined by the exercise of our reason. It has been objected\nthat the agency which produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that\nis, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: but this has no\nbearing on the subject under discussion. When we use the word \u201csuperhuman\u201d\nwe always mean by it, not the action of the unintelligent forces of\nmaterial nature, but of a being possessed of intelligence and will.\n\nThere is a large number of other subjects having an intimate bearing on\nthe correct definition of the terms habitually used in this controversy,\nand which greatly modify their meaning. These however will best be\nconsidered when I enter on the direct discussion of the possibility and\nthe credibility of miracles.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. THE SUPERNATURAL ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: IN\nWHAT DO THEY CONSIST? AND WHAT VIEW DO ITS WRITERS TAKE RESPECTING THEM?\n\n\nBefore entering on the general question of miracles, it is only reasonable\nto inquire of the writers of the New Testament what they have to say on\nthe subject. Their opinion of the nature and character of the supernatural\noccurrences which they have reported is certainly of more value than that\nof all other writers put together. St. John and St. Paul must have been in\nthe habit of coming in contact with unbelievers. It would be most\nimportant if we could ascertain the mode adopted by them of commending\nChristianity to their acceptance, and what use was made by them of the\nsupernatural power with which they professed to be endowed.\n\nFirst: It is impossible to read the New Testament without arriving at the\nconclusion that the superhuman character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ\nis perfectly unique, and differs entirely from that which is ascribed to\nany other person. Others wrought miracles; but they were men like\nourselves. But in the person of Jesus Christ the supernatural is\nrepresented as inherent. To say that he possessed the power of working\nmiracles, is an inadequate statement of the fact. Although he embodies the\nperfection of human nature with all its finite limitations, the\nsupernatural and the divine take up their abode in his personality.\nWhenever our Lord is represented as working miracles, he is always\nrepresented as performing them by a power which was inherent in himself.\nThis is never once attributed to his followers. The supernatural action\nwhich is ascribed to Jesus Christ must be viewed, as a case distinct and\nseparate, by itself. The miracles performed by him are not only\nevidential, but also portions of his supernatural manifestation.\n\nAccording to the author of the fourth Gospel, our Lord himself rarely\ndesignated them by either of the three terms by which miracles are usually\ndesignated in the New Testament, viz., signs, wonders, and mighty works\n(\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2). He almost uniformly called them \u201cWorks\u201d\n(\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1). An important distinction is here intended. Our Lord did not view\nhis miracles as a separate class of actions by themselves, but as portions\nof his ordinary superhuman working, and as having a distinct relation to\nhis entire character. Four passages will be sufficient to show this\nclearly. \u201cThe works that I do in my Father\u2019s name, they bear witness of\nme.\u201d \u201cMy Father worketh hitherto, and I work.\u201d \u201cIf ye believe not me,\nbelieve the works.\u201d \u201cMany good works have I showed you from my Father; for\nwhich of those works do ye stone me?\u201d When contemplated by others only,\nthey assume the form of signs and wonders: \u201cExcept ye see signs and\nwonders, ye will not believe.\u201d It is highly important that we should keep\nsteadily in view that the divine character attributed to Jesus is by no\nmeans restricted to the performance of miracles; but that it extends\nthroughout his entire working, and that the two together constitute an\nharmonious whole. It pertains no less to its moral and spiritual aspects,\nthan to the displays which he made of a power capable of controlling\nnature. Even in this portion of his working, he draws special attention to\nits moral and spiritual aspects. According to his view of his own mighty\nworks, they not only exhibited a power of controlling nature, but were\nuniformly invested with a moral and spiritual environment. Throughout the\nGospels he is represented as exhibiting a greatness and dignity, a purity,\nholiness, humility and benevolence, so far transcending that of other men,\nas to constitute him what may be almost designated a moral and spiritual\nmiracle. Perfection in the moral and spiritual world is as essentially\nsuperhuman, as power over nature is supernatural. In considering the\nmiracles which have been attributed to Jesus Christ, it is important to\nbear in mind the manner in which they stand related to his entire\nsuperhuman character. Otherwise we shall fail to observe the double aspect\nwhich they bear. They were manifestations of the divine, which dwelt\nwithin him, and also they possessed an evidential value.\n\nI shall occasionally use the term \u201csuperhuman\u201d instead of \u201cdivine,\u201d as\napplied to Jesus Christ, because for the purposes of this argument it will\nbe unnecessary for me to define the precise degree of divine character\nwhich the evangelists intended to attribute to him. To ascertain this is\nthe proper function of the theologian, by comparing together the facts and\nstatements of the New Testament. It is sufficient for my present purpose\nto observe that the perusal of the Gospels leaves the inevitable\nimpression on the mind that it was the purpose of their writers to depict\na divine character in union with a human one\u2014a supernatural power acting\nwithin the regions of the natural. This covers alike the aspects of\ncharacter presented of him both in the Synoptic and the Johannine Gospels.\n\nAlthough our Lord speaks of his actions by the common name of \u201cworks\u201d\n(\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1), when the sacred authors speak generally of miracles, they apply to\nthem, as I have observed, three distinct terms, signs, mighty works, and\nwonders (\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1, \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1). Each of these denotes different\naspects in which they contemplated miracles. The sign included the\nsupernatural fact wrought on external nature with the whole of its moral\nenvironment. In this point of view, the \u201csign\u201d was the direct proof of a\ndivine mission. It is worthy of observation that the author of the fourth\nGospel has uniformly described the supernatural actions which he has\nascribed to Jesus Christ by this term. The expression \u201cmighty works\u201d is\nintended to bring under our notice the power which was displayed in the\nperformance of a miracle, thereby directly connecting it with a superhuman\nagency. The term \u201cwonder\u201d contemplates a supernatural event in its simple\naspect as an occurrence pre\u2010eminently fitted to command attention to the\nperson who was capable of performing it. We may therefore conclude that\nthe writers of the New Testament considered that these were the three\nspecial functions of miracles. It is quite possible that the same miracle\nmight have fulfilled all three at the same time: but as three such\nfunctions of supernatural occurrences are distinctly stated, it is quite\nconceivable that there were occasions when they were limited to some one\nof these in particular.\n\nIt is evident that our Lord attached the highest importance to a miracle\ncontemplated as a \u201csign,\u201d _i.e._ to the moral environment with which it\nwas connected. This, although more definitely brought out in St. John\u2019s\nGospel, is also distinctly borne witness to by the Synoptics. It forms the\nground of the reiterated refusal of our Lord to comply with the demand of\nthe Pharisees that he would show some sign from heaven, as a proof of his\ndivine mission. His miracles combined in one the two conceptions of signs\nand mighty works. None of them were mere prodigies devoid of a moral\naspect.\n\nIt is worthy of consideration whether our Lord\u2019s primary purpose in\nperforming supernatural actions was always directly evidential. I have\nalready drawn attention to their twofold aspect, as divine manifestations,\nand as evidential miracles. A considerable number of the miracles recorded\nin the Gospels are represented as performed by him because he was moved\nwith compassion. These evidently belong to the former class of his\nsupernatural workings. But although this was their primary object it did\nnot deprive them of an evidential value. But there is also another\nremarkable class of supernatural actions attributed to him, viz., those in\nwhich he is recorded to have expressly forbidden the persons whom he\nhealed to publish the fact. As it is evident that these miracles could\nonly have become extensively known by the persons cured disobeying his\norders, it is clear that they could not have been directly performed for\nevidential purposes, but were the manifestations of the divine which\nresided in his person.\n\nSuch are the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus Christ in the New\nTestament, respecting which as a whole, whether performed for purposes\navowedly evidential or not, he himself affirms, that they bore witness of\nhim, that the Father had sent him. Two other classes of miracles, affirmed\nto have been performed by his followers, require notice.\n\nThe whole of these are stated to have been performed by a delegated power\nand commission. The great majority of them are described as having been\nperformed in the name of Jesus Christ. They are affirmed to have been\nperformed for two purposes; to prove the divine commission of those who\nwrought them, and to attest the reality of their Master\u2019s resurrection, by\ngiving exhibitions of his present power. These therefore are distinctly\naffirmed to have been evidential miracles. A few others were providential\ninterferences in favour of the infant Church. There is also another class\nof supernatural actions referred to in the Acts of the Apostles, such as\nthe passing of St. Peter\u2019s shadow, and the supposed supernatural effects\nresulting from it, and the conveyance from St. Paul\u2019s person of\nhandkerchiefs and aprons to the sick, and one or two other instances.\nThese involve special manifestations of supernatural power, and belong to\nsupernatural occurrences in their aspect of wonders, or very extraordinary\nevents, and as such were specially adapted for drawing attention to the\nmessage of the Apostles. But the New Testament also affirms another and\nvery peculiar form of the manifestation of the supernatural, as then\nactually existing in the Apostolic Church. I need hardly say that I allude\nto the various gifts of the Spirit, with which large numbers of its\nmembers believed themselves to be endowed. I shall not consider them any\nfurther here, as it will be necessary for me to enter largely on the\nsubject in a subsequent portion of this work. Their use and purpose was to\nlay deep the foundations of the Christian Church. All that will be\nnecessary in this place is to draw attention to them as a distinct order\nof supernatural manifestations, to the existence of which the writers of\nthe New Testament are pledged.\n\nThere is also one further form of supernatural manifestation affirmed by\nthem, namely, a great moral and spiritual transformation effected in those\nwho cordially embraced the Gospel. This is most positively stated by St.\nPaul to have been a fact constantly taking place under his own\nobservation. It is only necessary for me to notice its existence, as it is\na form of supernatural manifestation, the truth or falsehood of which\nforms no portion of the present controversy.\n\nSuch then are the various forms of the supernatural, to the existence of\nwhich the writers of the New Testament are pledged as objective facts. To\nthese only, and not to any conceivable or possible ones, is the defender\nof Christianity committed. If their occurrence can be shown to have been\nimpossible, either on grounds of science or philosophy, or because human\ntestimony is of so fallible a character that it cannot establish the truth\nof a supernatural occurrence, it follows that the whole of Christianity\nmust have been an invention of a purely human origin, that it can have no\nclaim to the designation of a divine revelation, and that it is hardly\npossible to free its inventors from the charge of fraud. No mere paring\ndown of its supernatural elements will enable us to escape from this\nconclusion.\n\nI must now proceed to consider whether the writers of the New Testament\nrest the truth of Christianity on the evidence of miracles alone, and what\nposition they occupy respecting it.\n\nIf we assume for the sake of argument that the fourth Gospel is the work\nof the Apostle John, it is evident that neither Jesus Christ nor the\nApostle accepted the theory which has been propounded by some divines, and\nreadily accepted by unbelievers, that the evidence of his divine mission\nwas exclusively founded on the testimony of miracles. To state the point\ndistinctly:\u2014This Gospel places the evidence afforded by our Lord\u2019s own\ndivine person, _i.e._ the moral evidence of his mission, in the first\nrank, and his miraculous works in the second.\n\nAs this is a point of considerable importance, and one to which its proper\nweight has been seldom attached, I will enumerate the chief statements\nmade in this Gospel on this subject.\n\nFirst: The author of the Gospel directly affirms that Jesus is \u201cthe light\nof men;\u201d and he himself distinctly affirms of himself, \u201cHe that seeth me\nseeth Him that sent me.\u201d \u201cI am come a light into the world, that whosoever\nbelieveth on me should not abide in darkness.\u201d (John xii. 45, 46.) Again,\n\u201cI am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in\ndarkness, but shall have the light of life.\u201d (John viii. 12.) It is\nimpossible to read these and kindred passages without feeling that our\nLord appealed to something else besides his miraculous works, viewed as\nmere objective facts, as a proof of his divine mission. He evidently\nplaces the highest proof of it in his great moral and spiritual\nmanifestation. He asserts the possession of an inherent illumination in\nhis own divine Person in union with the great truths which he enunciated,\nand the entire course of his divine working. To a mind capable of\nappreciating a manifestation of holiness, his person and divine working\nwould be self\u2010evidential. \u201cHe that seeth me, seeth Him that sent me.\u201d It\nis evident therefore that he considered the moral aspect of even his\nsupernatural works as an important portion of the evidence that he came\nfrom God.\n\nThe fourth chapter of this Gospel contains an account of our Lord\u2019s visit\nto the Samaritans. He performed no miracle on this occasion. The\nEvangelist tells us that many of them accepted him as the Messiah; and\nexpressly states that they affirmed that this was not on account of the\nreport of the woman as to his supernatural insight into her character; but\nbecause they themselves had heard him, and on this account they had\narrived at the persuasion that was the Christ. There was something\ntherefore in his moral manifestation, even apart from his miracles, which\nproduced this persuasion. The Evangelist accepts this position as a\ncorrect one. He has even gone further, and has attributed it in the same\nchapter to our Lord himself. He makes him address the nobleman who came to\nsolicit his interference in behalf of his sick son with these remarkable\nwords: \u201cExcept ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.\u201d (John iv.\n48.) These words can only imply that, in the opinion of the speaker, there\nwas a moral and spiritual attestation of his divine mission, which stood\nhigher than objective miracles; and that those who witnessed it ought to\nhave received it as such.\n\nIn John vi. 30, ff., a remarkable dialogue is described as taking place\nbetween our Lord and the Jews on this very subject. The Jews demand of him\nto work some distinct sign in proof of his divine mission. Let it be\nobserved that the demand of a sign, here stated to have been made, is of\nprecisely the same character as similar statements which are made by the\nSynoptics on the same subject, and shows that a common conception,\nunderlies them all. \u201cWhat sign,\u201d say they, \u201cshowest thou then, that we may\nsee and believe thee? what dost thou work?\u201d They then proceed to define\nthe particular sign which they wish to see exhibited, by making an\ninvidious comparison between his miracles and those of Moses, viewed as\nmere objective facts. In reply our Lord does not appeal directly to even\nthe miracle of which the Evangelist had just described the performance;\nbut throughout the remainder of the chapter, he proceeds to draw attention\nto the moral and spiritual aspects of his working. \u201cMoses gave you not\nthat bread from Heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from\nHeaven; for the bread of God is he which cometh down from Heaven, and\ngiveth life unto the world,\u201d &c.\n\nIn chapter vii. (17, 18) our Lord affirms: \u201cIf any man will do his will,\nhe shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of\nmyself. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory; but he that\nseeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness\nis in him.\u201d Here the affirmation is clear and distinct that there is a\nmoral and spiritual element in our Lord\u2019s person and teaching, which\njointly with his miraculous works bear witness to his divine character.\nThe testimony given by the one is convergent with that of the other. This\nthe following affirmation of our Lord most strongly asserts. \u201cI am one who\nbear witness of myself, and the Father who sent me hath borne witness of\nme,\u201d that is to say, His moral and spiritual manifestation is in a certain\nsense evidential; and the Father who sent him bore a concurrent testimony\nof his supernatural work.\n\nOn similar principles our Lord reasons with the Jews in the eighth chapter\nof this Gospel. In reply to the charge that he performed miracles by the\naid of the evil one he affirms, that his own absolute sinlessness,\nconstitutes a complete answer to it. \u201cWhich of you convinceth me of sin?\nand if I say the truth why do ye not believe me?\u201d (v. 46.) We have here a\ndirect appeal to men\u2019s moral and spiritual perception, as an independent\nwitness to the truth of his teaching; and the affirmation that a being who\nis not simply good and holy, but perfectly sinless, is worthy of absolute\ncredence. In other words, he does not rest the truth of his teaching on\nmiracles wrought to confirm his different utterances, but on the inherent\ntruthfulness of a sinless character. The moral aspect of his works is the\npredominant one.\n\nIn the fourteenth chapter of this Gospel we have the following remarkable\ndeclaration, which puts the whole subject in the clearest light. Philip\nsays to him; \u201cShow us the Father, and it sufficeth us.\u201d Jesus said unto\nhim, \u201cHave I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me,\nPhilip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father: Believest thou not that\nI am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you,\nI speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the\nworks. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me, or else\nbelieve me for the very works\u2019 sake.\u201d (vs. 8\u201011.)\n\nThis passage contains several most important considerations directly\nbearing on this subject. I will mention them in order. First\u2014\n\nPhilip asks for his complete conviction, a visible miracle in the form of\nan appearance of God, such as was recorded in the Old Testament as having\ntaken place at Sinai.\n\nSecondly. Our Lord affirms that the manifestations of his character made\nin his person and work during his previous acquaintance with him were the\ntruest manifestations of the person, character and being of the Father.\n\nThirdly. That the words which he spake and his entire working, possessed\nan evidential character as proving that he came from the Father: and that\nhis moral and spiritual perfections were such as to entitle his\naffirmation to be received on his own word.\n\nFourthly. That if Philip was unable to receive them on this evidence,\nwhich occupied the highest place, then he was entitled to be believed on\nthe evidence of his supernatural works, \u201cIf ye believe not me, _believe\nthe works_.\u201d\n\nThis entire passage makes it clear that in the mind of our Lord the moral\nevidence afforded by him constituted a most important portion of the\nattestation of his divine mission. Nor was its value confined to those who\nwitnessed it during the time of his personal ministry, but he viewed it as\nextending to all time. This is made clear by his reply to Thomas in\nreference to his demand to be allowed to handle his risen body. \u201cThomas,\nbecause thou hast seen me, thou hast believed, Blessed are they who have\nnot seen, and yet have believed.\u201d (xx. 29.)\n\nWith these statements before us, unless we reject the authority of this\nGospel, it is clear that those Christian writers who have asserted that\nthe evidence of the Christian revelation rests exclusively on miracles as\nobjective facts are in error.\n\nBut the same Gospel refers us no less distinctly to the miracles of our\nLord as very important evidences of his divine mission, although they are\nsubordinated to those we have been considering. One or two further\nreferences will be sufficient.\n\nWe have several declarations on this subject in the fifth chapter. \u201cMy\nFather worketh hitherto, and I work. The Son can do nothing of himself,\nbut what he seeth the Father do; for whatsoever things he doeth, these\nalso doeth the Son likewise.\u201d (vs. 17, 19.) \u201cThe works which the Father\nhath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me that\nthe Father hath sent me.\u201d (ver. 36.)\n\nHere a plain parallel is drawn between the whole course of our Lord\u2019s\nworking and that of the Father. In this working he evidently intended to\ninclude his miracles. Taken in combination with his entire character the\nspeaker affirms that they form a conclusive proof that the Father had sent\nhim. He subsequently draws attention to the evidence afforded by his\nmiracles as such, \u201cand the Father himself which hath sent me hath borne\nwitness of me.\u201d (ver. 37.)\n\nSo again in the tenth chapter, \u201cThe works that I do in my Father\u2019s name,\nthey bear witness of me,\u201d (ver. 25.) A little further on the moral aspect\nof his miracles, and their close connection with his entire working is\ndistinctly brought forward. \u201cMany good works have I showed you from my\nFather; for which of those works do ye stone me?\u201d (vs 37, 38.) \u201cIf I do\nnot the works of my Father, believe me not, but if I do, _though ye\nbelieve not me, believe the works_, that ye may know and believe, that the\nFather is in me, and I in him.\u201d (vs. 37, 38.) No words can bring out more\nstrongly the weight which our Lord attached to the moral aspect of his\nmiracles as proofs of his divine mission.\n\nIn the fifteenth chapter we have our Lord\u2019s own reflections on the\nevidences which he had afforded of his Messianic character, during his\nentire ministry. \u201cIf I had not done among them the works which none other\nman did, they had not had sin; but now they have both seen and hated both\nme and my Father.\u201d (ver. 24.) Here the miracles are classed with the other\nexhibitions of our Lord\u2019s divine character; and attention is especially\ndrawn to the moral aspect of his entire working as in the highest degree\nevidential. \u201cThey have seen and hated both me and my Father.\u201d It is worthy\nof remark that while our Lord uniformly spoke of his miracles as part of\nhis general working, by which he manifested his divine character, the\nEvangelist himself almost invariably calls them \u201csigns.\u201d This is brought\nout when he gives us his own reflections on the results of his public\nministry. \u201cThough he had done so many signs(2) before them yet they\nbelieved not on him.\u201d (xii. 37.) So again, \u201cmany other signs truly did\nJesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this\nbook: but these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the\nChrist, the Son of God.\u201d (xx. 30, 31.) In both these passages our Lord\u2019s\nmiracles are evidently referred to. They are pronounced to be both\nevidential of his divine mission, and at the same time to be\nmanifestations of his character. The Evangelist while contemplating them\nas miracles never loses sight of their moral aspect.\n\nIn the Synoptic Gospels one allusion is made to the evidential purpose of\na particular miracle which is worthy of notice. Generally speaking they\nare viewed by the authors of these Gospels as simple manifestations of his\ndivine character. On this occasion, when his power to forgive sins was\nquestioned, he directly performed a miracle to prove that he possessed it.\n\u201cBut that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive\nsins, he saith to the sick of the palsy, I say unto thee, arise, and take\nup thy bed and go thy way into thine house.\u201d In this case it is clear that\nthe purpose of performing the miracle was not to prove the truth of any\ndoctrinal statement which he had made; but to establish the reality of his\ndivine authority and commission.\n\nWhile it is quite true that the authors of the Synoptic Gospels have not\nenunciated the purpose of our Lord\u2019s miracles in the formal manner in\nwhich it is done in St. John\u2019s Gospel, it is clear that they must have\ntaken the same view of their general character. In fact the evidential\npurpose of their performance is less clearly stated in them than in the\nfourth Gospel. All four Gospels view his miracles only as a portion of his\nsuperhuman manifestation, and are ignorant of that broad distinction which\nhas been laid down between them and the other portions of his divine\nworking. They are in fact included under it; and it is the concurrence of\nboth together, and the moral aspect thereby impressed on the whole, which\nproves him to be the Christ.\n\nIt has been important to ascertain what are the views of the writers of\nthe New Testament on this subject, because it has been strongly asserted\nby authors on both sides of the controversy that the doctrines of\nChristianity are proved by miracles, and that they can rest for their\nattestation on no other evidence. The precise value of this position I\nwill consider in the following chapter. It must, however, be observed that\nthis is not the view taken by the writers of the New Testament. There is\nnot a single miracle recorded in it which is alleged to have been\nperformed with the direct purpose of proving the truth of a single\ndoctrine properly so called. Those wrought by our Lord are uniformly\nrepresented as having been performed in proof of his divine mission, or as\nan essential portion of the manifestation of the divine which dwelt within\nhim. As such they were signs, precisely in the same manner as the\nperformance of those actions which can only be performed by man are signs;\nthat is, they are proofs of the presence of man. In the same manner the\nactions performed by our Lord are signs and proofs of the presence of the\ndivine man Jesus Christ. If our Lord was in truth what he asserted himself\nto be, supernatural manifestations would be the concomitants of his\npresence.\n\nIn exact conformity with these facts as we find them in the Gospels is the\ndirect dogmatic statement made by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews\non this subject. After having asserted in the first chapter that divine\nrevelation is made in the person of Jesus Christ, and that God speaks to\nman under the Christian dispensation \u201cin him, who is the brightness of his\nglory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by\nthe word of his power,\u201d the author proceeds to compare it with the former\ndispensation, and to give us his views of the evidence on which it rests.\n\u201cHow,\u201d says he, \u201cshall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which\nat the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by\nthem that heard him. God also bearing them witness both by signs and\nwonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according\nto his own will.\u201d (ii. 3, 4.)\n\nThese words distinctly inform us what were the writer\u2019s opinions as to the\nnature of the evidences on which Christianity rests. First, it reposes on\nthe testimony of Christ respecting himself. Secondly, it is confirmed by a\nnumber of miracles wrought by God. This view is strictly in accordance\nwith our Lord\u2019s own affirmation respecting it as recorded in the fourth\nGospel, \u201cI am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent me\nhath borne witness of me.\u201d (viii. 18.)\n\nWith respect to numerous miracles recorded in the Acts of the Apostles,\nthey are affirmed to have been performed for purposes directly evidential,\nnot however to prove the truth of any doctrine, but of our Lord\u2019s\nMessianic character. The affirmations on this point are express. \u201cIn the\nname of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk.\u201d (iii. 6.) \u201cHis name,\nthrough faith in his name, hath made this man strong.\u201d (iii. 16.)\n\u201cTherefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made\nthat same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.\u201d (ii. 36.)\nOf the fact of the resurrection, they affirm that they were witnesses; and\nthat the miraculous powers imparted to them were the consequence of that\nevent, and a proof of its truth.\n\nThe nature of the other supernatural occurrences affirmed in the New\nTestament must be fully considered hereafter. There remain however two\nfurther statements, made by the sacred writers respecting this subject,\nwhich require to be briefly noticed here. First, although the Gospels\naffirm that John the Baptist had a divine commission to announce the\nimmediate setting up of the kingdom of the Messiah, and even to point him\nout, they expressly assert that he performed no objective miracle in\nconfirmation of it. His prophetical assertions rested for their\nverification on their fulfilment only, _i.e._ on the immediate appearance\nof a person who united in himself all the attributes of the Messiah. The\nfollowing was the line of argument adopted by those who believed his\ntestimony: \u201cJohn did no miracle, but all things that John spoke of this\nman were true.\u201d Secondly, while in the Apostolic Epistles, miracles are\nstated to have been performed by our Lord, and supernatural powers no less\nclearly asserted to have been at that very time actually present in the\nChurch, there is only one miracle which is directly referred to in proof\nof the divine mission of Christ. I need not say that this is the greatest\nof all the miracles recorded in the Gospels, viz. his resurrection from\nthe dead. On this their unanimous testimony affirms that Christianity\nrests. This is the one final and decisive proof of our Lord\u2019s divine\nmission. On its truth they affirm that their claims as divine teachers\nstand or fall. His resurrection from the dead puts all his other miracles\nin the back ground in point of evidential value. According to their\nstatements it constitutes the one great assurance that God has given unto\nall men that Jesus of Nazareth is Lord and Christ.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that if this one miracle can be proved to have been\nan historical fact, it carries with it the entire force of all the\nremaining miracles of the New Testament. But it leaves entirely untouched\nthe moral aspects of our Lord\u2019s divine character. These, I may say,\nconstitute a standing miracle which will continue to speak for itself in\nall time. This evidence is again and again referred to by the writers of\nthe Apostolic Epistles. The two constitute one harmonious whole. To the\nlatter of these it is impossible to do more than refer in the present\nwork; I have already devoted a distinct volume to the examination of its\nevidential value, in which I have examined Christ\u2019s witness to himself;\nhere I must confine myself to the consideration of the witness borne to\nhim by the Father.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. MIRACLES, WHAT DO THEY PROVE?\n\n\nHaving considered the direct assertions in the New Testament in reference\nto the supernatural, it will be necessary to take a brief view of the\nquestion in relation to modern difficulties and objections.\n\nThe following subjects present themselves for our consideration:\u2014\n\n1st. To what extent, and in what sense are miracles the proofs of a\nrevelation?\n\n2nd. Are supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral environment capable\nof affording such proof?\n\n3rd. Can doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by miracles?\n\n4th. Are miracles objects of faith merely, or if not, how are they related\nto our reason; and if in any sense they are objects of faith, how can they\nbe the media of proof?\n\nIt will be evident that these questions will immediately lay open a number\nof the most important considerations. They can only be adequately dealt\nwith in the subsequent portions of this work. The natural place to discuss\nthem will be when I come to consider the objections that can be urged\nagainst the possibility and credibility of miracles. A few preliminary\nobservations, however, will be necessary for the purpose of putting the\nreader in possession of some of the most important points of debate and of\nthe positions which I intend to assume respecting them. They will also\nhelp to clear the way for the solution of the various difficulties by\nwhich the subject has been attempted to be obscured.\n\nThe manner in which Christianity claims to be a divine revelation, as we\nhave seen in the former chapter, in its most proper and distinctive sense\nis that the person of Jesus Christ constitutes that revelation. It is the\nmanifestation of the divine character and perfections by means of the\nvarious acts and deeds of his earthly life and ministry. It is a\nrevelation of the divine shining forth in the human. I have already\nadduced some of the affirmations of the sacred writers on this subject. It\nwould be easy to multiply them indefinitely. Perhaps it would be\nimpossible to express the position which they take on this subject in more\ndistinct language than by citing two brief passages in St. Paul\u2019s epistle\nto the Colossians: \u201cWho is,\u201d says the Apostle, \u201cthe image of the invisible\nGod;\u201d \u201cin him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.\u201d Both\npassages affirm, as the writer\u2019s view, that all revelation is made in the\nperson of Jesus Christ.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the Christian revelation in its highest sense\nis not a body of abstract dogmas, but that it consists of an objective\nfact, the Incarnation. As God has manifested his eternal power and Godhead\nin the material creation, so he has manifested himself as a moral and\nspiritual being, 1st, imperfectly in the moral nature of man, and\nafterwards perfectly, in the perfect man who unites in himself the divine\nand human, Jesus Christ. God, when he effected the work of creation, made\na manifestation of himself which chiefly revealed his power and wisdom.\nWhen he effected the Incarnation he made an additional manifestation of\nhimself which chiefly revealed his moral character and perfections. The\nfour Gospels contain the historical account of this manifestation, as made\nin the actions and teaching of Jesus Christ. As this revelation consists\nof a number of historical facts, all that was necessary was that his life\nand actions should be correctly reported. The remaining books of the New\nTestament are historical in character, with one exception, and as far as\nthey treat of doctrines, they may be viewed as commentaries on the Divine\nfact of the Incarnation.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the essence of Christianity consists of a\nsuperhuman or divine fact, the Incarnation. In this point of view the\nsupernatural is not only a concomitant of Christianity, but it constitutes\nits essence. It is the manifestation of a supernatural and superhuman\nbeing appearing within the sphere of the natural and the human. It cannot\nbe too carefully observed throughout this entire controversy that the\ncharacter which is ascribed to Jesus Christ, while it embraces every\nperfection of man, is no less superhuman than the powers which are\nattributed to him are supernatural. In this sense the supernatural is not\nmerely an evidence of revelation, but its essence.\n\nThe Incarnation has frequently been designated a miracle. To do so seems\nto me to incur the danger of involving the whole controversy in confusion\nof thought. In a loose way of speaking, the creative acts of God may be\ncalled miracles: that is, they involve a deviation from the previous order\nof existing things, and the introduction of a new one; all such results\nare unquestionable manifestations of supernatural agency, but they differ\nwholly in conception from what we usually designate by the term miracle.\nThe Incarnation, therefore, ought not to be placed on the same footing as\nmiracles, which are supernatural occurrences, having a definite evidential\nvalue, but with God\u2019s creative acts, being the highest manifestation of\nhimself which he has made to man. It is perfectly true, as I have already\nobserved, that the miracles of Jesus Christ stand in a double aspect, as\npart of his supernatural manifestation, and as possessing an evidential\nvalue.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that a supernatural event such as the Incarnation,\nif evidential, can only be self\u2010evidential. It was not wrought for the\npurpose of proving anything. But, as we have seen, the sacred writers and\nour Lord himself assert that in a certain sense it was self\u2010evidential.\n\u201cFor the life was manifested, and we have seen it and bear witness, and\nshow unto you that eternal life which was with the Father and was\nmanifested unto us.\u201d\n\nA recent writer affirms that Christianity professes to be a revelation of\nsupernatural truths utterly inconceivable to reason, and that such truths\ncan only be proved by miracles. I can understand what is meant by a truth\nderived from a supernatural source of information, or one respecting a\nsupernatural being or occurrence: but what a supernatural truth can be\ncontradistinguished from other kinds of truth is far from evident.\nRevelation may disclose truths which reason alone would have been unable\nto discover; but this does not make the truths themselves, when they are\ndiscovered, either supernatural or incomprehensible.\n\nI will now proceed to consider whether there is any real ground for\naffirming that occurrences which we designate as miracles are the only\nproofs of a divine revelation.\n\nThe same writer, whose object is to prove that Christianity is utterly\ndestitute of all claims to our acceptance as a divine revelation,\nendeavours to show that miracles, viewed as bare objective facts, are the\nonly evidence which can substantiate such a mass of incredible assertions\nas those contained in the New Testament, and that their moral environment\ncannot be taken into account in estimating their evidential value. For\nthis purpose he quotes the following passage from Dr. Mozley\u2019s Bampton\nLectures: \u201cDr. Mozley,\u201d says he, \u201csupposes the case, that if a person of\nevident integrity and loftiness of character had appeared eighteen\ncenturies ago announcing himself as pre\u2010existing from all eternity, the\nSon of God, the maker of the world, who had come down from heaven, and had\nassumed the nature of man, in order to be the Lamb of God that taketh away\nthe sins of the world, and so on, enumerating the other doctrines of\nChristianity; Dr. Mozley then adds, what would be the inevitable\nconclusion of sober reason respecting that person? The necessary\nconclusion of sober reason would be that he was disordered in his\nunderstanding.... By no rational being would a just and a benevolent life\nbe accepted as a proof of such announcements. Miracles are the necessary\ncomplements of the truth of such announcements, which without them are\npowerless and abortive, the fragments of a design which is nothing unless\nit is the whole. They are necessary to the justification of such\nannouncements, which unless they are supernatural truth are the wildest\ndelusions.\u201d\u2014_Supernatural Religion_.\n\nIn justice to Dr. Mozley, the passage which is omitted in this citation\nfrom his lectures ought to be quoted. It is as follows: \u201cWhat other\ndecision could be come to when a man, looking like one of our own selves,\nand only exemplifying in his life and circumstances the ordinary course of\nnature, said this about himself, but that when reason had lost its balance\na dream of supernatural and unearthly, grandeur might be the\nresult.\u201d\u2014_Bampton Lectures._\n\nSome expressions in this passage leave it open to the assumption which\nthis writer wishes to fasten on it that Dr. Mozley intended to affirm that\nthe only adequate proof of such affirmations as were made by Jesus Christ\nrespecting himself would have been visible miracles wrought in\nconfirmation of them. This, however, is not necessarily its meaning, for\nthe omitted passage above cited, distinctly affirms that the person who is\nsupposed to make such assertions is only an ordinary good and holy but\nimperfect man.\n\nBut the assertions in question were not made by an ordinary man like\nourselves, but by one who is described as possessed of superhuman\ngreatness and holiness and of profound spiritual insight into truth. He is\nuniformly depicted as speaking with the fulness of knowledge of the\nsubject on which he speaks. I cannot therefore admit, supposing the\ncharacter of Jesus to have been historical, that if he had made such\nassertions respecting himself prior to the performance of his first\nmiracle at Cana, they would have been utterly unworthy of serious\nattention. It must be readily admitted that if they had been affirmed of\nhimself by an ordinary man like ourselves, no affirmation of his would\nhave been a guarantee of their truth, for the simple reason that they\nwould have been self\u2010contradictory. Nor would the performance of a miracle\nhave made them one atom more credible. But the credibility of such an\nassertion, if it had been made by such a person as Jesus Christ even prior\nto his performance of a single miracle, is a wholly different question.\n\nIt follows, therefore, on the supposition that the delineation given us in\nthe Gospels is that of an historical reality, that his assertions\nrespecting himself would stand in a wholly different position from those\nof any other man. He could neither deceive nor be deceived. When he made\nassertions respecting himself he must have known whether they were true.\nThe assertions of such a person therefore would be worthy of all\nacceptation.\n\nMiracles are not the means of substantiating assertions respecting the\ntruth of unseen realities, nor are they used for such purposes in the New\nTestament. The whole question is one of adequate knowledge. If we have the\nmeans of knowing that a person has a complete acquaintance with truths of\nwhich we are ignorant, we can rationally accept them as true on his\nassurance that they are so, exactly on the same principles as we accept\nthe truths of physical science although we ourselves are ignorant of the\nprocesses by which they are arrived at. To state the position generally,\nit is quite rational to accept the affirmations of those who possess full\nknowledge of any subject of which we ourselves are profoundly ignorant.\nThe only thing necessary is to attain an assurance that the knowledge of\nour informant is adequate to justify his assertions. It is on the ground\nof the fulness of his knowledge that we accept the assertions of Jesus\nChrist, and not because he wrought a miracle for the purpose of proving\nthat his assertions were true.\n\nLet us now consider in what sense miracles are a proof of the truth of a\ndivine revelation.\n\nI lay down that the proper function of miracles is to establish the truth\nof a divine commission. From this we argue to the truth of the assertions\nof the persons who are intrusted with it.\n\nIf an ordinary man, such as a prophet or an apostle, were to affirm that\nhe had a communication from God which he was directed to make to others,\nor in other words that he had a divine commission, it is evident that no\none would be bound to believe him on his mere affirmation. The simple and\nobvious reply would be, Give us some proof of the reality of the fact.\nYour claim is far too lofty to be admitted as valid on your simple\naffirmation. The question then is, how is such a claim to be tested? I\nreply by the person who makes it performing some action which is adequate\nto prove that the Great Governor of the Universe ratifies this claim. He\nmust do something analogous to what all persons who claim to be acting\nunder commissions from others do, _i.e._ he must produce some direct and\nformal credentials from the authority in whose name he claims to be\nacting. In this case the authority is God. He must therefore perform some\naction which directly identifies himself with God.\n\nHow is this to be accomplished? I answer by the performance of an\nunequivocal miracle which will directly connect him with the Great\nGovernor of the Universe. I say unequivocal miracle, because if there were\nany doubt as to its supernatural character it would be useless. Nor would\nit be of any avail if it were a bare objective fact in external nature,\ndevoid of its moral and spiritual environment. What is required is some\ndirect manifestation of the divine on the sphere of the human and the\nnatural. It must, in fact, exactly fulfil the character so often assigned\nto miracles in the Gospels. It must be a \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, or indication of the\npresence of God, resembling as it were the Great Seal which is affixed to\nstate documents as the final mark of sovereign authority. Of such a\ncharacter are all the chief miracles recorded in the Gospels.\n\nThe question about miracles has been beclouded by debating it in an\nabstract instead of in a concrete form; thus forgetting that it is not\nevery conceivable form of alleged supernatural occurrence with which we\nhave to deal, but the miracles recorded in the New Testament. By\ndiscussing it in this form it has been possible to raise a number of\ndifficulties which may be abstractedly conceivable, but which have no\nbearing whatever on the miracles in question. Thus it has been frequently\nurged that to enable us to be certain that an alleged miracle is really\ndue to supernatural agency, a jury of savants ought to be impanelled,\nbefore whom the worker of the miracle should exhibit his miraculous\noperation. They are to subject it to a variety of scientific tests. Even\nthen if they have failed to discover error, they are to demand a second\nand a third performance, in order that it may be again and again submitted\nto the same process of scientific scrutiny. Until miracles can be\nsubmitted to and verified by tests of this description they have been\naffirmed to be unworthy of credit, even on the strongest ordinary\ntestimony.\n\nI shall discuss this and kindred questions more fully in the subsequent\nportions of this volume, when I consider the nature of the evidence which\nis adequate to prove the performance of a miracle. For the present I shall\nonly observe that the entire plausibility of this position arises from its\nbeing stated in an abstract or general form. We cannot help seeing in\nreference to the chief miracles recorded in the New Testament, such as the\ncare of blind, lame or leprous persons, instantaneously by a word or a\ntouch, that common sense is fully adequate to determine that such\noccurrences must belong to the regions of the supernatural and to no\nother.\n\nTwo things are necessary to establish the reality of a supposed miracle.\nFirst, that the alleged fact should not only have been brought about by\nsupernatural causes but previously announced by him who performs it:\nsecondly, that the fact actually happened as it appeared to happen.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the power of juggling and sleight of hand, to\nperform actions which would be supernatural, if they were only what they\nappear to be, is considerable, and the difficulty of detection is great.\nEnthusiasm also when once excited, is capable of generating various unreal\nappearances which if actual, would be supernatural. It is also mighty in\nthose regions where the union takes place between mind and matter, but the\nchief miracles recorded in the Gospels belong to a wholly different order\nof occurrence. If they took place as they are reported, no one possessed\nof common sense can doubt as to whether they were due to supernatural\nagency. It is no less clear that such miracles were occurrences in which\nsuccessful imposture was impossible. What is required to prove them is the\nevidence of common sense, and not of scientific analysis. Let it be\nobserved that it is not my intention to affirm that the whole of the\nsupernaturalism recorded in the New Testament is of the same unequivocal\ncharacter.\n\nThe evidential value of a miracle viewed as a matter of common sense maybe\nbriefly stated thus. A person comes to me who affirms that he has a divine\nmessage to communicate. I ask him to prove it. He lays his hand on one\nwhom I have known to be blind for the last twenty years, tells him in the\nname of Jesus Christ to receive his sight, and he forthwith receives it.\nThere is probably no person gifted with ordinary understanding who would\nnot consider such an act to be an adequate proof of divine agency, all\ntheoretical or metaphysical difficulties to the contrary notwithstanding.\n\nIt will doubtless be objected that such an act would prove only the\npresence of a superhuman instead of a divine power. This point will be\nfully considered hereafter. For my present purpose it will be sufficient\nto fall back on the decision of common sense, that he who can restore\nsight to the sightless eye\u2010ball, by no other apparent instrumentality than\na word or a touch, can be no other than the Maker of the Universe.\n\nI must now consider whether supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral\nenvironment, are capable of proving a divine commission.\n\nIt has frequently been the habit, both of the opponents and the defenders\nof Christianity, to discuss the subject of the evidential value of\nmiracles apart from all reference to their moral environment. As, however,\nthe overwhelming majority of the miracles recorded in the New Testament\nprofess such an environment, the question of the value of supposed\nmiracles which are destitute of it, forms no legitimate portion of the\nsubject before us. What might or might not be proved by them, even if it\ncould be determined satisfactorily, is quite foreign to the present\ndiscussion, which is limited to the truth or falsehood of those contained\nin the New Testament. The most important of these are not mere displays of\npower, but have an unquestionable moral environment impressed upon them,\nand they profess to have been wrought for a definite end and purpose. This\nis less distinctly marked in some of the miracles recorded in the Old\nTestament, but with them I have no present concern. It will be sufficient\nto observe that while many of them were unquestionably performed in\nattestation of a divine mission, as a class they bear another distinctive\npurpose, viz. that of correcting the polytheistic tendencies of the age.\nHence their leading impress is that of power. The necessity of\ncounteracting the tendency which I have referred to, rendered it necessary\nemphatically to assert the Lordship of one God over universal nature, in\nopposition to that conception of it so widely diffused throughout the\nancient world, which saw a distinct power exerted in every combination of\nmaterial forces.\n\nThe very conception of a miracle as a supernatural occurrence, brought\nabout for the purpose of authenticating a revelation, distinguishes such\nan action from one which involves only a simple exhibition of power. All\nacts of moral agents must display a purpose of some kind. No conception of\nGod is of the smallest religious value which does not contemplate him as\nbeing a moral agent and a being on whose actions a moral character of some\nkind must be impressed. Consequently an act entirely devoid of all moral\naspect cannot prove that it has resulted from direct divine intervention.\nThe difficulty has originated from dividing into three separate parts an\naction which is essentially one, and contemplating separately the\nobjective fact in the supernatural action, the circumstances attending its\nperformance, and the purpose for which it was performed. It is the union\nof all these which constitutes the occurrence in question an evidential\nmiracle.\n\nLet me now offer a few observations on a very important point for our\nconsideration. Can abstract doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved\nby miracles?\n\nI have already observed that as far as the miracles of the New Testament\nwere wrought for directly evidential purposes, they were performed, not to\nprove particular doctrines, but as the credentials of a divine mission, or\nthat they formed a part of the superhuman manifestation of our Lord. The\napparent exceptions are those which were performed to attract attention to\nthe divine message, to assist in the foundation of the Church, or to bear\nwitness to the truth of the Resurrection. These last were in fact\nattestations to the reality of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ,\nwhich is the highest conceivable form of a divine mission, on which\nmiracle the truth of Christianity is directly pledged by the sacred\nwriters. A mere statement of the facts of the New Testament is a practical\nsolution of the difficulty. It nowhere affirms that a miracle was ever\nperformed to bear witness to the truth of an abstract doctrine.\n\nI will now endeavour to lay down some general principles as to the\nrelation in which doctrinal statements stand to supernatural\nmanifestations. As on such a subject it will be impossible to lay down a\ngeneral rule which will be applicable to every supernatural event, it will\nbe necessary to consider each case by itself.\n\nFirst, that of our Lord.\n\nWe believe his statements about unknown truths, on the ground that he was\nperfectly veracious, and had the most perfect knowledge of the subject on\nwhich he spoke. The actions which he performed (I mean by these, not his\nmiracles merely, but the entire course of his working) are evidences of\nhis divine character. He himself avers that he possessed the most intimate\nknowledge of God, and of the great realities of the spiritual world. \u201cWe\nspeak,\u201d says he, \u201cthat we do know, and testify that we have seen.\u201d \u201cI\nspeak that which I have seen with my Father.\u201d Throughout the Synoptics\nlikewise he is represented as having the most entire knowledge of both\nspiritual and moral truth, and as teaching direct from his own insight. We\nbelieve the assertions, not because he confirmed their truth by the\nperformance of a miracle, but because he afforded evidence that he was a\nveracious witness, and fully acquainted with the subject on which he\nspoke. His miraculous actions proved that he was God\u2019s messenger, and as\nsuch were additional attestations to his veracity.\n\nThe acceptance of such affirmations as worthy of the highest credit may be\ncorrectly designated as acts of faith; but let us never forget that such\nacts of faith are also high exercises of reason. Writers in opposition to\nChristianity are never wearied in running a contrast between reason and\nfaith, and in representing the two as standing in opposition to each\nother, and belonging to wholly different regions of thought. Nor can it be\ndenied that they have received much encouragement to do this by the\nindistinct or misleading statements of some Christian writers on the\nsubject. Between them no little confusion has been introduced into the\ncontroversy, and a general idea has become prevalent that reason and faith\nare two distinct, if not opposing faculties, each of which acts within a\nsubject matter of its own. The effect of this confusion has been\ndisastrous.\n\nMy contention is that faith is only another name for reason when operating\non a particular class of phenomena. To enter on an elaborate proof of this\nwould be out of place here; a few illustrations must therefore suffice. To\naccept information from persons who have knowledge of subjects which we\nhave not studied, or who have mental powers of insight or perception of\nwhich we are destitute, or who have seen phenomena which we have not seen,\nis an act in conformity with our highest reason. A constant effort has\nbeen made by unbelievers to confound faith with credulity: Faith is not\ncredulity, but the acceptance of truth on adequate evidence, and the\nrejection of mere affirmation, when the evidence is inadequate. On the\nother hand multitudes of Christians have assiduously laboured to decry\nreason as the instrument for the investigation of truth. I admit that it\nis not a perfect instrument, but it is the only one which we have. The\nlight of a candle may not be all that we can wish, but if we have no other\nwe shall not improve our condition by extinguishing it.\n\nLet me illustrate this subject by a few examples. We believe the\nassertions of Dr. Livingstone about the interior of Africa, although we\nhave no means of verifying them by ocular observation, because we know\nthat he has travelled there, and we are persuaded that he is a veracious\nwitness. We accept the higher truths of astronomy, not because we have\nstudied them, or are even able to appreciate the nature of the processes\nby which they have been arrived at, but because they are affirmed by\npersons who have afforded evidence that they possess a high order of\nknowledge on that subject. The same is true throughout the whole of the\nhigher departments of science. We may call this an act of faith if we\nlike, but it is also an act of our reason. The same thing is true\nthroughout every department of human knowledge. It is astonishing how\nsmall a part of it is the result of our own personal observation. It\nfollows therefore that the attempts which are so constantly made to\nseparate faith and reason, and to erect an impassable wall between them,\nare suicidal alike both to faith and reason.\n\nAs therefore we accept the affirmations of others on subjects within the\nlimits of their own knowledge, although we ourselves are ignorant of the\nprocesses by which it has been arrived at, so we accept the affirmations\nof such a person as the Jesus of the Evangelists on those subjects on\nwhich he affirms that he possesses the fullest knowledge.\n\nBut it will be objected that some of these assertions are made respecting\nhigh mysteries incomprehensible to the human intellect. Can we accept such\ntruths?\n\nI answer that we are only capable of accepting propositions the two terms\nof which we are able to comprehend with more or less distinctness. Nothing\nhas been the subject of greater abuse than the word \u201cmystery\u201d in\nconnection with revelation. It is frequently represented as denoting\nsomething which from end to end is utterly incomprehensible, like the\nunknowable God of a certain system of philosophy. In the New Testament the\nmeaning of the word \u201cmystery\u201d is not an incomprehensible proposition, but\na truth which once was hidden in the divine counsels, and has been\nrevealed by the Gospel. That which is actually unthinkable is incapable of\naffirmation or denial. None of the affirmations of Jesus Christ partake of\nthis character. They are mysteries only in the sense that they ran up into\nspheres of thought which transcend the limits of human knowledge. But this\nis done by all ultimate philosophical and scientific truths. If it be\nurged that some of them are difficult or incapable of definition, the same\nis true of not a few of the conceptions of science. It is also true that\nthey respect truths with which we could not be acquainted apart from such\na revelation as that made in the person of Jesus Christ; but this is true\nof the phenomena of Creation likewise. We do not acquire a knowledge of\nits phenomena by reasoning, but by observation, or from the statements of\nothers when they lie beyond the limits of our own observation. The\nIncarnation, including as it does the divine actions and the teaching of\nJesus Christ, is not the revelation of a dogma, but the manifestation of a\nnew fact. This fact, like all other phenomena, although undiscoverable by\nour reasoning powers without the exercise of observation, becomes after\nobservation a fact on which reason may justly exercise its powers. If he\nbe really what he professed to be, then his statements about himself give\nas an account of his previous history, before he came under human\nobservation.\n\nLet me now consider the relation in which miracles stand to the\naffirmations of those who claimed a commission from Jesus Christ to\npublish his religion in the world, and to lay the foundation of the\nChurch.\n\nI must here also adhere to my original position that miraculous powers are\nnever described in the New Testament as being used for the direct proof of\ndogmas, but for the proof of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, or\nof the divine commission of those who wrought them. The truth of the\nassertions of its writers rests on no other foundation than the fulness of\ntheir knowledge of the subjects on which they spake, whether acquired by\nordinary or by supernatural means, and on their veracity, when they affirm\nthat particular truths were within the limits of their knowledge. Thus St.\nPaul claims acceptance for the things which he asserted because he had\nbeen taught them by Revelation from Jesus Christ, not because he had\nproved their truth, by working miracles in confirmation of them. This\ncourse is uniformly adopted by him throughout his epistles. The object of\nthe mighty works that were wrought by him was to prove his own apostleship\nor the fact of the resurrection.\n\nI must not allow myself to enter on the question of inspiration, its\nnature and limitations, or the degree of supernatural guidance afforded to\nthe apostles and their followers. Such an inquiry would be foreign to the\npresent subject, which is strictly historical. It is of course a direct\nand necessary inference that when the miracles proved the reality of the\ncommission of those who performed them, they also proved that they were\nfully instructed in its terms, and entitled to credit within its limits.\nBut the extent of their enlightenment can only be inferred from the nature\nof the commission itself, and from the facts and phenomena of the New\nTestament. It has been an idea widely spread that inspiration must confer\na general infallibility. The inference that a man is rendered infallible\nin general matters because he is invested with a limited and definite\ncommission, and with endowments adequate to render him competent to fulfil\nthe purposes of his mission, is one which the premises will not justify.\nThe utmost that the possession of such a commission can prove is that its\npossessor is enlightened up to its subject matter, but no further.\n\nBut in the present discussion I need not go beyond the affirmations of the\nNew Testament. The actions performed by Jesus Christ proved him to be the\nMessiah. The miracles wrought by the apostles, were performed either to\nprove the fact of his resurrection, _i.e._ that he was the Messiah, or\ntheir own divine mission, which was dependent on its truth, or to draw\nattention to their message. The supernatural gifts so frequently referred\nto in the epistles, are affirmed to have been designed for the building up\nof the Church into a distinct community, and when that purpose was\naccomplished they were to cease. Being functional, the enlightenment\ncommunicated by them was necessarily limited to the special subject matter\non which they were exercised. In this point of view miracles may be viewed\nas attestations of the veracity of the persons who performed them, and of\nthe sufficiency of their knowledge on the subjects they were specially\ncommissioned to communicate.\n\nBut the question still remains for consideration, Can miracles prove moral\ntruths?\n\nI answer emphatically in the negative. If dogmas, which may be viewed as\nintellectual truths, are incapable of a direct proof by miracles, still\nmore so are moral truths. Such truths can rest only on a moral basis. With\nrespect to the miracles recorded in the New Testament, the question is\nnugatory, for it nowhere affirms that its miracles were wrought for such a\npurpose. It is true that Jesus Christ, as the great legislator of the\nkingdom of heaven, gave an authoritative utterance to many moral precepts\nas the laws of his kingdom. This royal right of legislation was inherent\nin his Messiahship. But to give utterance to moral truths in a legislative\ncapacity, has no connection with attempting to prove them by authority.\nOrdinary human legislation has its authoritative utterances. But when it\ndoes this, it does not rest the truths themselves on authority, or base\nthem on adventitious testimony. Our Lord and his apostles uniformly\nappealed to the internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual nature as\nthe only ground on which moral obligation rests.\n\nLet it be observed, however, that this by no means pre\u2010supposes the truth\nof the absurd proposition, that every man, however imperfect or degraded,\nis capable of reasoning out all moral truth for himself. On the contrary,\ndefinite moral knowledge requires to be communicated, as all other kinds\nof knowledge. Its great principles require to be enunciated, and to be\nworked out to their special applications. But the principles themselves,\nas far as their binding power is concerned, must ultimately rest on the\ninternal perceptions of our moral and spiritual being. A miracle,\ntherefore, can communicate to them no higher degree of certainty or\nobligation. The only thing which it can aid in establishing is, that one\ninvested with a divine commission may have a right to claim obedience to\nspecial precepts on the authority of God, in whom all moral obligation\ncentres.\n\nBut even in this case, the ground on which the obligation rests is a moral\none, which no miracle can possibly prove or even confirm. A moral teacher\ncan only appeal to that in man which we variously designate as conscience,\nmoral sense, or the principles which are the foundation of our moral\nperceptions. The fact that many men through a long course of evil get\nmorally blinded does not alter the case. It only exemplifies a remarkable\nsaying of our Lord, \u201cIf the light that is in thee be darkness, how great\nis that darkness.\u201d When the light within us has become darkness, there is\nnothing left to which an appeal to the sense of duty or obligation can be\nmade.\n\nThe objection urged against Christianity, that because a miracle cannot\nprove a moral truth it is therefore useless, is quite beyond the question\nat issue. The special function of the Christian revelation is one far\nhigher than the mere laying down of rules for the regulation of human\nconduct. Its great purpose is to impart to man a moral and spiritual\npower, which is able to make obedience to the moral law a possibility; to\nsupply a motive of sufficient potency to make us capable of resisting the\nvehemence of our passions; and one which is able to lift the morally\ndegraded from their degradation, and to strengthen the holy in their\nholiness. According to the teaching of the New Testament, this constitutes\nthe great distinctive purpose of Christianity, and the end of all divine\nrevelation. This most important truth has been greatly overlooked in the\npresent controversy. It entirely disposes of the objection that if moral\ntruth cannot be proved by miracles, they must be valueless. To such a\nrevelation the presence of the supernatural is essential.\n\nBut it by no means follows because miracles are unable to impart to us a\nsense of moral obligation, that a duly commissioned moral teacher would be\nuseless. They might prove his superior knowledge, or as attesting a divine\ncommission, enable him to bring obligations already existing to bear on\nthe mind with superior power. Thus it by no means follows that because men\npossess in their mental constitution the great principles on which\nscientific truths are based, each man is able to reason them out for\nhimself. The most highly gifted man would make slow progress without a\nteacher. As I have already observed, moral truth is capable of being\ntaught like all other truth; and although a miracle cannot prove it, it\nmay establish the fact that the worker of one is a man eminently entitled\nto be heard on the great subjects of moral obligation, or that he is able\nto communicate knowledge which is capable of acting mightily on our moral\nbeing.\n\nI must now proceed to offer a few observations on the question, Are\nmiracles objects of faith? and if they are so in any sense, how can they\nbe the media of proof of a revelation?\n\nThe author of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d starts the following difficulty in\nconnection with this subject: \u201cConsciousness of the difficulties which\nbeset miracles in the present age has led many able men to deal thus\nillogically with them, and to represent them alternately as evidence and\nas objects of faith.\u201d He then proceeds to refer to Dr. Arnold, Professor\nBaden Powell, and Archbishop Trench, as having been in various degrees\nguilty of making this confusion.\n\nI am not prepared to deny that many Christian writers have expressed\nthemselves with great indistinctness on this subject, especially in works\nwhere miracles have been only referred to incidentally, and which only\npartially treat of the supernatural elements of Christianity. This\nquestion will be discussed more fully when we consider his definite\nobjections; but it will tend to a clearer understanding of the subject if\nin the present place, I lay down the following propositions:\u2014\n\nI. That it is impossible to believe in any assertion which contradicts the\nfirst principles of our reason, even if it were supposable that a miracle\ncould be wrought in confirmation of it.\n\nII. That, although the illumination which reason imparts is imperfect, yet\nas it is the only instrument that we possess for the investigation of\ntruth, attempts to disparage it are absurd.\n\nIII. So far is faith from standing in opposition to reason, that it is a\nlegitimate branch of it when exercised on a special subject matter.\n\nIV. That beliefs which reason refuses to authorise do not originate in\nfaith but in credulity.\n\nV. That even those who entertain irrational convictions are compelled to\nbase them on evidence of some kind which is satisfactory to themselves:\nthat is to say, on the dictates of their own imperfect reason.\n\nVI. That, while we can believe in nothing that is contrary to our reason,\nyet it is perfectly rational to believe in many things which our reason\nwould have been unable to discover.\n\nVII. That extraordinary facts which lie beyond the limits of human\nexperience are not contrary to our reason: and it is perfectly rational to\nbelieve them whenever they are adequately attested.\n\nVIII. That a large portion of our beliefs on subjects scientific,\nphilosophical, historical, moral, and religious, rest on testimony; the\nbelief in them is highly rational, when the knowledge of those from whom\nwe derive our information is adequate: and consequently that faith is a\nprinciple co\u2010extensive with the activities of the human mind, and is by no\nmeans confined to subjects simply religious, however intimately it may be\nconnected with them.\n\nA few brief observations will suffice in this part of our subject.\n\nIt will be observed that I have included under the term \u201creason\u201d the whole\nof our mental processes which are necessary for the cognition and the\ndiscovery of truth. These include, not only our powers of inductive and\ndeductive reasoning, but our intuitions, our forms of thought, those\npowers of our mind, which whether intuitional or instinctive, form the\nfoundation of many of our most important convictions and our moral\nconceptions. These constitute our reason as distinct from our reasoning\npowers. No little confusion has been introduced into this controversy from\nthe want of attending to this distinction.\n\nIt has been asserted that we can accept things as matters of faith which\nto our reason would be utterly incredible. This assertion has arisen from\nthe confusion of things which differ widely, viz. things which our reason\nmight have been unable to discover, but which when discovered may be\nperfectly rational, and things directly contradictory to reason. The\nexistence for example of a square circle is a thing absolutely incredible,\nand while thus contradictory to reason, it is impossible to accept it by\nfaith. So would any doctrine which in a similar manner contradicted the\nfirst principles of our rational convictions. No more pernicious principle\ncan be laid down than that things which are contradictory to our reason\ncan be accepted by the principle of faith. Such a principle would divide\nthe human mind into two hostile camps, and if carried to its logical\nconsequences, must land us in universal scepticism.\n\nIt by no means follows that things which transcend our rational powers to\ndiscover must be contrary to our reason when they have been discovered. We\ncan only arrive at the knowledge of unknown facts by observation, or\naccept them on the testimony of others. Until they have been brought\nwithin our knowledge in this way, no amount of reasoning could lead to\ntheir discovery. In a similar manner with respect to several of the facts\nin the New Testament connected with the Incarnation, our reason might\nnever have discovered them, but when they have been discovered, they may\nform suitable subjects on which to exert its energies.\n\nThe whole of the confusion in which this question has become involved has\noriginated in the assumption that faith is a faculty of the mind distinct\nand separate from our reason, and in a certain sense opposed to it; and\nthat things which cannot be subjects of rational conviction may yet be the\nobjects of faith. Whatever opinions may have been held by divines upon\nthis subject, I can discover nothing which countenances them in the New\nTestament.\n\nTo what class of truths is the word \u201cfaith\u201d properly applied? I answer to\nthose which we accept on testimony. It has been asserted that some of the\nfirst principles of our rational convictions, such as our belief in the\nexistence of an external world, or in the truth of experience, is an act\nof faith. This, however, is to introduce a confusion of thought. Such\nconvictions can be only acts of faith as far as we believe in ourselves.\n\nViewing faith as the acceptance of truth on adequate testimony, it follows\nthat all our knowledge of things, whether natural or supernatural, that is\nnot the result of the action of our own minds, but which we accept on the\ntestimony of others, is an act of faith. Our acceptance of them depends on\nthe validity of the testimony that can be adduced for them. The important\nquestion for determination is, is the subject on which it is given within\nthe knowledge of the informant? If it respects a fact, has he witnessed\nit, or received it from others who have? Are his powers of observation\ngood and his judgment sound? Is he worthy of credit? The determination of\nthese and similar points is the proper office of our rational powers, yet\nthe acceptance of the fact is an act of faith. When our reason is\nsatisfied on all these points, faith becomes an act of reason. To assert\nthat the acceptance of supernatural facts belongs to a faculty of our\nminds which we designate faith, and that our acceptance of others is the\nresult of the action of our reason, is to lay down a distinction entirely\nof our own creation. In both cases the evidences must form the subject of\nrational investigation, and they must be accepted or rejected as they\napprove themselves to our reason.\n\nIt will perhaps be urged, that the acceptance of propositions, such as the\ndoctrinal statements of the New Testament, is an act of faith which stands\nout in manifest contra\u2010distinction to an act of reason. It would be so\nunquestionably, if we accepted them on insufficient evidence; but when we\ndo so with the knowledge that others have a full acquaintance with the\nsubject on which they speak, it is in the highest degree rational to\naccept and to act on their testimony. A large portion of the business of\nlife is conducted on this principle. A man is ignorant on some subject, or\nhe distrusts his own judgment respecting it: he consults one who knows, or\non whose judgment he relies. For example: let us suppose that I have a\nbottle full of a certain substance; I do not know whether it is a medicine\nthat I am in need of, or a deadly poison. I consult my chemist, and\nwithout hesitation I act on his opinion. In all such cases (and they are\nspread over the entire sphere of life) we act on faith; but it is a faith\nwhich is in conformity with the dictates of reason. The function of the\nlatter is to ascertain the adequate knowledge and the veracity of the\nperson whose assurance we accept. If it is a rational act thus to receive\ntruths on the testimony of man, whose knowledge must be imperfect, it must\nbe still more so to accept them on the authority of him who knows all\nthings, _i.e._ God.\n\nI am aware that certain writers have given such a representation of faith\nas to produce the impression that it is one of its special functions to\naccept certain dogmas, the terms of which are extremely obscure, or\nabsolutely incomprehensible. But no rational evidence can be adduced in\nsupport of this position. To exert actual belief in a proposition the\nterms of which are incomprehensible, is an impossibility, and we only\ndeceive ourselves when we imagine that we can. All that we can do in such\ncases is to repeat words, but if they have no definite meaning we cannot\nbelieve them: for the act of faith or conviction is founded on the\naffirmation that the two terms of a particular proposition agree. It is\nquite true that the facts and statements of the New Testament run up into\nprinciples which transcend our limited power of reason; but this is common\nto it, and every system of science or philosophy; and forms no peculiarity\nof religion. I am far from wishing to affirm that theologians have not\nfallen into this practice; but my concern is not with them, but with the\nstatements of the New Testament. One of the most important acquisitions\nmade to our mental science in the present day is that we have ascertained\nthat there are limits to our mental powers beyond which we cannot\npenetrate. This was imperfectly realized by many of the reasoners of\nearlier times, and the result has been that they have fallen into a hazy\nmysticism, or logomachy.\n\nEqually pernicious is the view that there is something particularly\nmeritorious in accepting truth on little or no evidence, and that to do so\nis a high act of faith. Not only is this founded on no rational principle,\nbut it is entirely unsupported by any account of faith as given in the New\nTestament, which again and again assumes the contrary position. Faith is\nthe acceptance of truths which lie beyond the sphere of our personal\nknowledge on an adequate attestation. If an astronomer should happen to be\nignorant of chemistry, and accept its truths on the testimony of one who\nwas an eminent master of it, this would constitute an act of faith. Surely\nsuch an act is one which is highly rational.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that although our belief in miracles being founded,\nas it now must be, on testimony, is an act of faith, yet it is also an act\nof our reason. It is, therefore, by no means absurd to speak of miracles\nas objects of faith, and at the same time as possessing an evidential\nvalue. We accept them as we do all other adequately attested facts, and\nreason on them in the same manner as we do on other facts. This is the\nprecise course which will be pursued by the overwhelming majority of\nastronomers who will be unable to witness the coming transit of Venus.\nThey will accept the facts on adequate testimony, and afterwards use them\nas media of proof.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. THE ANTECEDENT IMPROBABILITY OF MIRACLES.\u2014THE UNKNOWN AND\nUNKNOWABLE GOD.\n\n\nThe proof on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds that an event is either possible or\nprobable, cannot establish that it has actually occurred. This must rest\non its own particular evidence. To prove that a revelation is both\npossible and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by miracles, may\nform an essential portion of our general argument, because the degree of\nprobability of the occurrence of a particular fact affects the amount of\npositive evidence necessary to establish its truth. But the proof that a\nrevelation has actually been given, or a miracle wrought, can only be\neffected through the same media as those through which other facts are\nestablished. To prove that a revelation is probable will not be of the\nsmallest avail to prove that one has been actually given, without adequate\nproof of the fact itself.\n\nStill the examination of the antecedent question is in this case\nparticularly important, because modern unbelief boldly affirms that a\nrevelation and its attestation of miracles are both impossible and\nincredible. If this can be demonstrated, the discussion of the evidence\nthat can be adduced for them as facts is a useless expenditure of our\nreasoning powers; for no evidence can prove the occurrence of that which\nis impossible. It may be assumed, however, that those who make this\naffirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of their reasonings;\nbecause, after having demonstrated, as they allege, that miracles are\nimpossible, they proceed to attack the evidence of those narrated in the\nGospels, and pronounce it worthless. As, therefore, the opponents of\nChristianity boldly affirm that both a supernatural revelation and\nmiracles are impossible, it is necessary that the defender of Christianity\nshould examine the validity of the assertion.\n\nOur opponents constantly charge us with reasoning in a circle, or assuming\nthe fact which ought to be proved. To avoid even the appearance of this, I\nlay down the following positions:\u2014\n\nIf direct atheism is a just conclusion from the phenomena of the Universe,\nit follows that a divine revelation is impossible. Nor are miracles in any\nproper sense of the word less so, because they are not merely facts\noccurring in external nature, but facts in the production of which we\nrecognize intelligence and will. With the principles of atheism the\noccurrence of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because as it\ncannot rise to any higher knowledge than that of phenomena, the knowledge\nof the invariability of past phenomena is incapable of giving the fact\nthat all future phenomena will resemble the past. Still the occurrence of\na fact, however extraordinary, would not constitute a miracle, and would\nprove only the existence of an unknown force in the universe, or the\npredominance of chance.\n\nThe same remark is equally applicable to that form of modern atheism which\ndoes not affirm that no God exists, but contents itself with the denial\nthat there is any evidence that there is one.\n\nNor is the case altogether different with regard to pantheism. According\nto this system, God is only another name for nature, which works out every\nform of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of unconscious\nself\u2010evolution. The essence of its affirmation is, that God has no\nconscious personal existence, but that He is only another name for the\nblind unconscious forces of the universe. Such a being (if it is possible\nto conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly\nmaking a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the\nresult of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously\nonly to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not\nsay, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into\nunconsciousness. Prior to their evolution this mighty \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd must have\nbeen everlastingly making manifestations of itself, without a single being\nin existence capable of recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such\ntheories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if pantheism be a\nrational account of the order of the universe, a revelation and miracles,\nin any sense in which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible.\n\nNo less applicable is the same remark to that form of pantheism held by\nMr. Herbert Spencer, which, while it affirms the existence of a cause of\nall things, as alike required by the demands of philosophy, science, and\nreligion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, and that every\nthing which is knowable, although a manifestation of that great unknown\ncause, yet conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. In one\nword, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, and incapable of\nbecoming the subject of rational thought. The intellect cannot help\nassuming the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it can\naffirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; and that everything\nwithin the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of\nhis existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory,\nwhile it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and\natheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God\nout of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can\nneither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of\nconscious self\u2010manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited\nand finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists\nbeyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned respecting Him, to a\nprofound and perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such a being\nby the name of God, but it would be to use the term in a sense peculiar to\nthose who thus employ it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the\nintellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for my present\npurpose to observe that it is impossible for the unknown and the\nunknowable to make a revelation of himself. Consequently St. Paul\u2019s\naffirmation with respect to the unknown God at Athens, \u201cWhom therefore ye\nignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you\u201d (Acts xvii. 23), is untrue. To\nsuch a God a revelation of Himself, and miracles to confirm it, are alike\nimpossible.\n\nIt is evident, therefore, that if either of these principles can be\ndemonstrated to be a true account of the nature of things, all further\ndiscussion as to the truth of a revelation or of miracles is useless. Let\nus take the most favourable hypothesis, that of Mr. Spencer. It concedes\nthat the necessities of reason compel us to assume the existence of an\nunknown cause of all things, which may be called God. But He is\nunknowable; He is inscrutable. No conception of Him can be realized in\nthought; it follows, therefore, that no revelation of such a being can be\nmade to the finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could be\nmade, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, the person who attempts to\nreason out the truth of Christianity is placed under a difficulty.\nChristianity assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of moral\nattributes. This is the very truth, the evidence of which these systems\nassert to be wanting. The Christian advocate, therefore, has only two\ncourses before him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but\nuniversal belief of mankind, that a personal God exists; and then to argue\nfor the truth of Christianity, and to answer the objections urged against\nit. When we do this, objectors affirm that we beg the question. Or,\nSecondly, To prove the existence of a personal God; and then to argue for\nthe truth of revelation. If he adopts the latter course, he is compelled\nto adduce the proof on which the belief in theism rests, and to answer the\nobjections to it\u2014or, in other words, to compose a bulky volume, before he\ncan get at the immediate subject of inquiry.\n\nNow I affirm that the defender of Christianity is no more open to the\ncharge of begging the question when he assumes the existence of a personal\nGod as the foundation of his reasonings, than the author of a treatise on\ntrigonometry is, who takes for granted the truth of Euclid\u2019s propositions.\n\nThe author of the work to which I have already referred does his utmost to\nfasten on the modern defenders of Christianity the charge that they begin\nand end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous language has\nbeen used on this subject, but I trust I shall show that the charge is\nutterly unfounded. I must briefly notice a few of his reasonings.\n\nAt page 68 he writes as follows: \u201cDr. Mozley is well aware that the\nassumption of a \u2018personal\u2019 God is not susceptible of proof; indeed, this\nis admitted in the statement that the definition is an assumption.\u201d\n\nAn assumption, I ask, in what sense? Is it a simple assumption without\nevidence, taken for granted for the bare purposes of argument; or is it\none which, though taken for granted in the present case, rests on a\nsubstantial basis of evidence previously established, and which bears the\nsame relation to the question of miracles which the truths of Euclid do to\nthose of trigonometry? The latter is the fact though the mode in which the\nwriter puts it implies the former. Without referring to the authority of\nany particular author, is he not fully aware that theists maintain that\ntheir belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which commends\nitself to their reason? Have not numbers of men, endowed with the highest\npowers of intellect, accepted it as satisfactory? Yet he seeks to imply\nthat, after all, it is an assumption. It is true that in the argument for\nmiracles we take it for granted; but we do so, because the proof has\ncommended itself to our highest reason.\n\nI admit that Dr. Mozley has used, in speaking of this subject, language\nwhich I cannot but think is wanting in precision. Still it does not bear\nthe meaning that this author seeks to fasten on it. \u201cIt is then to be\nadmitted,\u201d says he, \u201cthat historically, and looking to the general actual\nreception of it, this conception of God was derived from revelation. Not\nfrom the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity in the world\ndo we see in mankind at large any belief in such a Being.\u201d The learned\nauthor then states, at considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar\nviews entertained of God, and shows their inadequacy and imperfection, and\nconcludes as follows: \u201cBut although this conception of the Deity has been\nreceived through the channel of the Bible, what communicates a truth is\none thing, what proves it is another.\u201d He then proceeds to summarize the\ngeneral proof.\n\nI cannot think this statement altogether free from ambiguity. Whatever may\nhave been the precise forms in which the ideas of the vulgar or the\nphilosopher were embodied, there is strong proof that a higher and better\nconception of God, though indefinite and indistinct, underlay them all.\nThe most degraded polytheist has indistinct conceptions of a Supreme God\nabove all the degraded objects of his worship. It seems to me impossible\nthat such a conception of God can have been attained from revelation. It\nmay, in a certain sense, be said, looking at the precise form in which it\nis embodied, that it has been derived by us historically from the Jewish\nrace. But it must have had a prior origin. St. Paul considered that the\nmaterial universe manifested His eternal power and Godhead. The primitive\nform of all the great oriental religions contained in them the idea of\nGod. It is simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the Bible. It\nis true that the existence of a primitive revelation anterior to the Bible\nhas often been assumed to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare\nassumption of which we have no proof, and whose only basis is conjecture.\nJudaism and Christianity have been instrumental in widely spreading\ncorrect conceptions of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet if the\nconception had not existed in the mind at least implicitly, no formal\nrevelation could have put it there, for every such revelation must be\nconveyed in language, and all language is meaningless, unless the mind can\nrealize its conceptions. The assertion, therefore, that the conception of\nGod has been first communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is\nafterwards proved by reason, seems to me to be one not devoid of danger.\nOn the contrary, our belief that God exists is the very pre\u2010condition of\nour being able to believe that He has revealed Himself. This conception\nrevelation may modify, invest with a higher moral character, and import\ninto it definiteness and precision, but it cannot create it. It is on such\ngrounds that the author in question seeks to involve his reasoning and\nthat of all other defenders of Christianity in a vicious circle. I fully\nadmit that the conception of God has been elevated and purified by the\ninfluence of Christianity, and that the teaching of Christianity on this\nsubject is in conformity with our highest reason. But it is absurd to\naffirm that this is reasoning in a circle, and that the Christian argument\ninvolves reasoning from Theism to Christianity and from Christianity back\nto Theism.\n\nThe following passage, cited by Professor Mozley from Baden Powell, is\nreferred to by this author as a proof that all our reasonings on this\nsubject are a simple argument from reason to revelation, and from\nrevelation to reason. The passage itself is a clear statement of the\ngrounds of the charge, and requires our careful consideration. \u201cEverybody\nmay collect from the order and harmony of the physical universe the\nexistence of a God; but in acknowledging a God, we do not thereby\nacknowledge this peculiar or doctrinal conception of a God. We see in the\nstructure of nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only\noperates and expresses itself by law. Nature only does and can inform us\nof mind in nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to the\nexistence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a universal mind out of\nnature, nature says nothing; and of an omnipotence which does not possess\nan inherent limit in nature, she says nothing either. And therefore that\nconception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent\nof the physical universe, and able from a standing\u2010point external to\nnature, to interrupt its order, is a conception of God for which we must\ngo elsewhere. That conception is attained from revelation, which is\nasserted to be proved by miracles. But that being the case, this doctrine\nof theism rests itself upon miracles, and therefore miracles cannot rest\non this doctrine of theism.\u201d\n\nIt will be necessary carefully to point out the inaccurate reasoning of\nthis passage.\n\nFirst: The author speaks of nature as another expression for the forces,\nlaws, and phenomena of the physical universe, and for these alone. To this\nI have no objection, for it would greatly conduce to clearness if it was\nalways confined to this meaning. But while he uses it thus, he nowhere\ntells us in what relation man, including his faculties, intellectual and\nmoral, and above all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or\nexcluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a part of it? If they are\nincluded in nature, then there are other facts in nature bearing on the\nbeing of a God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If they are\nexcluded, then the reasoning is inadequate to sustain his conclusion. Our\nreasonings respecting God are founded not only on the forces and laws of\nphysical nature, but on man, his reason, his conscience, and his will.\nWhat makes this fallacy the more plausible is that the term nature is very\nfrequently used to include man, as well as the forces and laws of the\nmaterial universe.\n\nAs far as the physical universe is concerned, the mind infers the\nexistence of a God from its order and its harmonies; that is to say,\nhaving observed that order and harmony have been produced by intelligence\nwithin the sphere of our own observation, and being deeply convinced on\nother grounds of reasoning that they are incapable of resulting from any\nother source, we infer that the results we behold in nature are due to a\nsimilar principle which we experience in ourselves. Such an inference is\nnot due to simple observation of the order of the universe only, but\nunites with it an act of reasoning founded on our own self\u2010conscious\nbeing. But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we are\ncognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We therefore infer from\nthe order and harmonies of nature, not simply the conception of a God,\nsuch as the God of pantheism; but, if they are valid to prove anything at\nall, of a God who is possessed of intelligence adequate to arrange the\norder, and of purpose adequate for its production. If the inference of the\nexistence of a God from the works of nature is valid, it must be of a God\npossessed of the attributes in question, for all our inferences on such a\nsubject derive their validity from applying to them the analogies of our\nreason.\n\nIt is quite true that in the structure of the material universe we see\nonly the indications of a mind operating and expressing itself by law;\nthat is to say, we observe in the physical universe no instances of its\nviolation. But WE, that is the reasoning, rational beings, whether\nexisting in nature or outside it, have inferred from the structure of the\nuniverse the existence of mind, and we know of no mind which is not\npossessed of conscious intelligence and will. If our reasoning from the\norder of the material universe is valid to prove the presence of mind,\nwhich is a conception entirely derived from our consciousness of\nourselves, it must be equally so to prove the existence of purpose and\nvolition, for we know nothing of mind which is devoid of these attributes.\nThe material universe proves that its order and harmony is the result of\nthe action of mind; but it cannot prove that the mind which produced this\norder and harmony is unable to introduce a different one. But if our minds\nform part of nature, then they are a proof that the author of nature has\nproduced something else in nature besides the order and harmonies of the\nphysical universe. If they are outside nature, then we have direct\nevidence of the existence of beings outside and above nature, _i.e._ above\nthe physical forces of the universe. It follows that if finite beings\npossessed of intelligence and will, exist within nature or without it, a\nGod who possesses similar powers may exist also.\n\nIn a narrow and restricted sense it may be quite true that nature, _i.e._\nmatter and its phenomena, only informs us of the presence of mind in\nnature, the partner and correlative of organized matter. But let us here\nguard against a latent fallacy in this mode of statement. We learn the\npresence of mind, not from material nature, but by the application of our\nown reason to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. This is\noverlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly true that as a mere\nmatter of phenomenal appearance, we do not actually behold in natural\nphenomena manifestations of mind acting outside nature. In fact we do not\nsee mind at all, but simply infer its presence from the phenomena before\nus through the agency of our own reason; and this inference carries along\nwith it all the other attributes of mind.\n\nThe writer before me is one of those who affirm that the utmost our minds\ncan infer from the contemplation of nature, in which he includes every\nspecies of vital organism, is the presence of order and harmony; and that\nany inference that its phenomena testify to the presence of adaptation,\ncontrivance and design is invalid. I reply that this affirmation is only\nvalid on the assumption of a principle which altogether denies that from\nnatural phenomena we can infer the existence of mind. But we also observe\nin natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable structures,\nthat the results effected are produced, not by simple forces, but by the\ncareful adjustment of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying the\naction of another, and by forces intersecting one another at precisely the\nright time and place. Had any of these occurred otherwise, the result\nwould have been different. Throughout nature we observe innumerable\ninstances in which various forces have thus combined to produce a definite\nresult. This we usually designate by the word \u201cadaptation.\u201d Adaptation\nimplies intelligence and purpose. We are quite as much justified in\nascribing this purpose to the power manifested in nature, as any other\nquality whatever, even the possession of mind.\n\nI fully concede that natural phenomena and even the phenomena of the mind\nof man, only testify directly to the existence of a power adequate to\ntheir production, and that we cannot directly infer from them the presence\nof omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about words. For the power\nmanifested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make\nno distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly\ninfers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this\nuniverse and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which\nis possible. To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our reason\nascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. Such a power it is\nincapable of conceiving as inherent in material forces; it therefore\nassumes that this power exists outside nature, and is capable of\ncontrolling it.\n\nIt follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, which asserts that\nthe conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit\nindependent of the physical universe, and able from a standing\u2010point\nexternal to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception which we must\nseek from revelation, and cannot be arrived at by any exertion of our\nrational powers on the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent\nplausibility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either\nin nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature,\nman\u2019s reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that,\nindependently of man\u2019s moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its\nforces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to\ngo to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and\nthe phenomena of his rational, self\u2010conscious, and voluntary agency. It\nfollows, therefore, that the affirmation that in conducting the Christian\nargument we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to God, is\nutterly disproved. Yet the writer before me has ventured to affirm that,\nwhen we commence with the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our\nreasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption.\n\nThe philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also pressed into the service\nfor the purpose of discrediting the evidences of Christianity, and, I own,\nwith considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has also invoked\nthem in confirmation of his theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He\nrefers to them in the following words: \u201cHere I cannot do better than avail\nmyself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the\ndoctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in his \u2018Limits of Religious\nThought.\u2019 And I gladly do this, not only because his mode of presentation\ncannot be improved, but because writing as he does in defence of current\ntheology, his reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of\nreaders.\u201d\n\nBefore referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable authority on this\nsubject, it would only have been candid in both writers to have informed\ntheir readers that not only have his principles been repudiated by a\nconsiderable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been\ncarefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who\ngives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious\nprinciples. It is absurd to urge principles, though they have been\nmaintained by an eminent Christian writer, which an eminent unbeliever has\npronounced unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against\nChristianity.\n\nThe work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth\nof Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may\nbe briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as\nHe is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the\nconceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self\u2010\ndestructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes\nare wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means\nfollows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure\nof the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other\nattributes. It is affirmed that because they are the attributes of an\ninfinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human\nthought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different\nmanifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm\nthe inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it\nexists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are\nrelative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to\nChristianity, regulative; _i.e._ fitted to regulate our conduct, but not\nto illuminate our understanding.\n\nUpon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of\nthe Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless\ncontradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable\nof forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a\nnecessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only\ncapable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas\ndo not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct,\n_i.e._ we are to act upon them as if they were true. _E.g._ God is\nrevealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception\nof it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine\nholiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of\nbenevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise\nwith respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God\nmay differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing\nfollows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel\u2019s premises with respect\nto all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the\nposition to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the\ntruthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness is as\nit exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being.\nIt follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate\nrepresentation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that\nthe divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is\ncertainly a very startling position.\n\nIf, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence on the part of\nman in the divine character is impossible. It is impossible to love a\nbeing who does not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence\none who does not present to us an aspect capable of exciting this emotion;\nor to feel trust in a being of whose justice we have no certainty that it\nresembles our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of one\nwhose veracity may differ from our own. Such feelings cannot be made to\norder. They can only be generated by the contemplation of a being who is\nholy, benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation of these\nwords. They cannot be excited by any merely regulative ideas. We love,\nreverence, and trust, not ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing\nmoral attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative ideas of God,\nthe assertion that \u201cGod is love,\u201d loses all its value, if God is not what\nI mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I\nknow not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, \u201cThou shalt\nlove the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength,\u201d\nbecomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created\nby the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose\nclaims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to\nwhom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a\nvoluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire\nof devotion to Him to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him?\nHow shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how\nshall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or\nholiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of them?\nNay, more: the theory in question lays the axe to the root of the\nChristian revelation itself. There is no affirmation of the New Testament\nmore decisive than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality\nis the image of the invisible God, as far as His moral perfections are\nconcerned. Are the perfections of the character of Jesus Christ only\nregulative, or are they real representations of these attributes as they\nexist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, benevolence, or\njustice, adequately represented by the manifestations of them, as made by\nJesus Christ? If we accept the testimony of St. John\u2019s Gospel, our Lord\nhimself has expressly affirmed, \u201cHe that hath seen me hath seen the\nFather\u201d (John xiv. 9). But this is impossible if our conceptions of God\u2019s\nmoral attributes are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness is\nno adequate representation of the divine.\n\nHowever erroneous a system may be, yet if it has been elaborated by a\npowerful mind, it has generally some foundation in reason, and I am far\nfrom affirming that, with considerable qualifications, some important\nelements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. Mansel. It is well that\nwe should be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which\nthe human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of\nmetaphysics which an imperfect measuring\u2010line cannot reach. But placing\nthe matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to\nMr. Mill for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions of Dr.\nMansel\u2019s system. When unbelievers quote the authority of Dr. Mansel, why\ndo they not also tell their readers that there was at least one unbeliever\nof very high logical power, who wrote against the validity of his system.\n\nIt is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to the depths of the\nDeity, and that after we have raised our thoughts to the highest, there is\nsomething higher still; and quite another to affirm that our highest\nthoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of a fashionable\nphilosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of\nHim can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely\nunthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from\ndiscussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in\na concrete form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the profound\ndepths involved in these questions; but a few observations will be\nnecessary for the purpose of clearing away the difficulties in which our\nopponents seek to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine myself\nto our conceptions of the Infinite.\n\nIt is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can be framed in\nthought; that it is therefore unthinkable, and transcends the limits of\nhuman knowledge; that it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is\nunable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is\nincompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we speak of\nGod as a person who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region\nwhere human thought is invalid, and respecting which all affirmation\ninvolves a contradiction.\n\nBut when we are told that the infinite transcends thought, we are entitled\nto demand that we should not be kept playing with an abstraction, and to\nask, what is infinite? In what sense does it transcend thought? Does this\nmean that it is absolutely unthinkable; or only partially so; or that our\nconception of it is imperfect? Is it simply unknowable, or does it consist\nof something which we know, _plus_ something that has not come within the\nlimits of our knowledge, but which something is of a similar character to\nthe known? It will be at once seen that the determination of these\nquestions is at the root of the whole controversy. If then by the infinite\nwe mean something known _plus_ something unknown, to speak of God as\nunknowable and unthinkable is absurd. Our knowledge of Him may not be\nfull, but yet real so far as it goes. When it is affirmed that God is a\nbeing who exists, but is unthinkable by man, the effect is to place Him\nbeyond the bounds of human knowledge, and thereby free us from all\nnecessity of troubling ourselves about Him. We know that He exists in the\nprofundities of the unknown; and that is all. For the purposes of thought\nand of morality, He is thus made of less value than an algebraic _x_.\n\nWhen it is affirmed that the infinite is unknowable, I again ask, what\ninfinite? The infinite as an abstract idea has no real existence; but\nsomething that is infinite. The conception itself is an essentially\nquantitative conception, and is only strictly applicable to number and\nextension. When I speak therefore of an infinite number, what do I mean?\nThe only answer possible is, \u201cThe greatest number I can conceive, _plus_\nall possible number without limit.\u201d Does my adding on the latter factor\ninvalidate the reality of my conception of the former? Is that which is\nadded on anything else than number? Surely here I have a valid conception.\nThe same is true when we speak of the infinity of space. I mean by it the\ngreatest space I can conceive, _plus_ space without limit. Is the idea of\nspace rendered unthinkable, because I add the conception of space without\nlimit? Does it cease to be space? But space is conceivable. It follows\ntherefore that neither infinite number nor infinite extension is\nabsolutely unthinkable. We speak of the infinite divisibility of matter.\nDoes matter, because it goes on to be divided for ever, cease to be\nmatter?\n\nIn the same manner we speak of God, and call Him infinite. It would be far\nmore correct to speak of Him as a Being who has infinite attributes. Here,\nhowever, if accuracy of thought is to be preserved, a distinction must be\nmade. Some attributes of God may be viewed as quantitative; others cannot.\nIt is to the former only that the term infinite properly applies. A moral\nattribute cannot have a quantitative measure applied to it. It is\ntherefore not infinite, but perfect.\n\nWhen we speak of God as a being possessed of infinite power, what do we\nmean? The thing intended is, that He is a being who possesses such power\nas enabled Him to create the universe, and that He is capable of exerting\nevery other degree of power which is possible. We may call this, if we\nlike, power without limit; though there is always one limit to possible\npower, viz., that of working contradictions. Of course we are ignorant of\nwhat are the limits of possible power.\n\nBut when we make this addition to our finite conception, we mean by it\npower similar to that exhibited in the universe\u2014it and all other power\nbeyond it. Must such a conception be banished outside the limits of\nrational thought? Is the idea of a being who possesses power sufficient to\nbuild the universe, and all possible power besides, unthinkable? Again, we\nspeak of God as infinitely wise. What do we mean by it? We affirm that He\nknows all things actual and possible. The knowledge is none the less\nknowledge, because to the knowledge of the actual we add on the knowledge\nof the possible. Such a being is certainly not unthinkable.\n\nAgain: God is often spoken of, not only as a being possessing infinite\nattributes and perfections, but as the Infinite Being. Here the attempt is\nmade to entangle us in a puzzle. It is argued: if He be the infinite\nBeing, there can be no being beyond Him. He must therefore include all\nbeing, both actual and possible. If this be so, He must also include the\nfinite, otherwise there would be a being which is not included in infinite\nbeing\u2014or in other words, being without limit would not include all being,\nwhich is self\u2010contradictory. Several other self\u2010contradictions may be\neasily adduced by reasoning on the same principles.\n\nI reply that the term \u201cBeing\u201d is used here in a sense so intensely\nabstract, that we have removed it out of all those conceptions of which\nquantity can legitimately be predicated. Of material being we can affirm\nthat it is quantitative, but of no other. The adding on the word\n\u201cinfinite,\u201d and calling God the infinite Being, is to use words which have\nno validity as conceptions.\n\nBut it is also common to speak of God\u2019s moral attributes as infinite, such\nas His benevolence, holiness, justice and truth. This again is inaccurate,\nand its result is to plunge us into hopeless confusion of thought. Such\nattributes admit of no quantitative measures. They are perfect, not\ninfinite. To speak of God\u2019s truthfulness as infinite is simply absurd. A\nthing is true, or not true. A moral being is truthful or not truthful.\nBenevolence may be perfect or imperfect; but it cannot be measured by\nnumber or by line. These conceptions can only mean what we mean by them,\nand nothing else, even when applied to God, or we are attempting to pass\noff forged notes for genuine ones. The only possible additional idea which\nwe introduce when thus ascribing them to God, is that in Him they are\nperfect, free from the imperfections with which they exist in us. To\naffirm that when we say that God is perfectly benevolent, or perfectly\ntruthful, we introduce into the conception, as applied to Him, a new\nfactor, beyond the meaning of benevolence and truthfulness as used in\nhuman language, and that this new factor can make the divine benevolence\ndifferent from our human conception of it, or can lead God to actions\nwhich man can by no possibility view as benevolent or true; and then to\nsay that God is benevolent or true, is an abuse of language, or, to use\nMr. Mill\u2019s words, an offensive flattery.\n\nBut it has been urged that the moral attributes of God, even if we view\nthem not as infinite but as perfect, must be beyond the limits of human\nthought, and therefore may produce results different in character from the\ncorresponding principles in man, because they are the attributes of an\ninfinite being. I have already disposed of this objection. Benevolence,\nholiness, and truth cannot be other than benevolence, holiness, and truth,\nto whatever being we may attribute them.\n\nIt is therefore no necessary consequence, because we ascribe to God some\nattributes which are infinite, and others which are perfect, that God must\ntherefore be unknowable or unthinkable. We may know much about Him,\nwithout knowing all things. Our not knowing all about things does not\nrender them either unknowable or unthinkable. Our knowledge may be\nimperfect; but as far as it goes it maybe real. If we were to affirm that\nwe only know that which we know perfectly, or were unable to reason on\nimperfect knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a standstill. Nor\nis it right to affirm that we are only reasoning in a circle when we\nreason from His moral attributes as displayed in the government of the\nworld in favour of the probability of a revelation; or if because a\nrevelation which claims to be from God, bears the impress of His\ncharacter, we employ this fact as an evidence that it comes from Him. To\naffirm that He is unknowable or unthinkable is to proclaim that man has no\nconcern with God, and that all revelation is impossible; therefore, the\nobjections urged against the evidence of supernatural religion on these\ngrounds are untenable.\n\nBut there are the difficulties about the Absolute and the First Cause. It\nhas been urged that the Absolute is that which is out of relation to every\nthing else\u2014perfectly independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if\nGod be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can\nonly be a cause by its being in relation to that of which it is the cause.\nFor similar reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the Absolute.\nBut as He is both, He must therefore be unknowable and unthinkable.\n\nIt is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into such profound\nmetaphysical questions. For my present purpose, I can safely refer to Mr.\nMill\u2019s discussion on this subject. As far as the views in question bear\nadversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is\nnot fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of\nChristianity, without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever\nas Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, or even alluding to the\nfact that he has pronounced them untenable.\n\nThere is no point which reasoners of this class have laboured more\ndiligently to prove than that it is impossible for human reason to think\nof God as a person. The assumption of the personality of God is the\nfoundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the\noccurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would have\nno evidential value. It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of\nattaining the knowledge of the personality of God be from revelation, we\nare arguing in a vicious circle.\n\nBriefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: God is the\ninfinite Being. Personality is a conception which necessarily involves the\nfinite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows\ntherefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the same time as a\nperson, involves a contradiction.\n\nIt is an unquestionable fact that the only beings whom we are directly\nacquainted with as persons are finite beings, _i.e._ men. No less certain\nis it that the only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom and\nintelligence are finite beings, _i.e._ men, and those various classes of\nanimals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally\nvalid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite\nbeings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in\nthe first Cause of all things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He\nis wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same argument is no less\nvalid against ascribing any moral perfection to Him, or in fact any other,\nfor all our knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and derived\nfrom finite beings.\n\nBut it even goes further than this. If, as the positive philosophy lays\ndown, our real knowledge of things is confined to direct subjects of\ncognition; as the only beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and\nintelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary to sound reasoning\nto infer that these qualities can be possessed by any other class of\nfinite beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are\nnot human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could\nreason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the\nexistence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an\nunwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the\nassumption of the existence in nature of an unconscious wisdom and\nintelligence. This assumption is open to the most formidable objections;\nbut even on their own principles it is utterly invalid; for if on the\ngrounds which they allege it is impossible to ascribe personality to God,\nthe same reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom and\nintelligence to unconscious nature.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows because our direct\nknowledge of personality is confined to human beings, and is derived from\nthem, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property\nbelonging to any other than human beings. It is absurd to maintain that\nthe qualities of things must be confined to those things from which we\nlearn their existence.\n\nBut it will be objected that the very essential notion of personality is\nlimitation; consequently that although it may be conceived of as belonging\nto limited beings, it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as\nthe attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; that is to say,\nthat although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being\nwho had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the\npower may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the\npossession of all possible power, the conception of personality becomes\nunthinkable. This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our\nreasonings are to be confined within the region of abstractions. But we\nhave no assurance that such reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them\nto the test of some concrete form of thought.\n\nNext: It by no means follows because our conception of personality is\nderived from finite beings, that it is necessarily limited to them; and\nthat it cannot be thought of in connection with a being, some of whose\nattributes are infinite and others perfect; in other words, that the idea\nof finiteness is necessarily involved in that of personality. What are the\nconceptions that make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, the\npower to affirm \u201cI\u201d of one\u2019s own being\u2014the possession of will\u2014the power of\nself\u2010consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions\nwe undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but\nthere is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If\nthe conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is\nso constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is\npossible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, which certainly\ncontain in them nothing quantitative, should not be applicable to such a\nbeing. The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently finite,\nbecause they have nothing in them of a quantitative character,\u2014they are\nonly derived from a being whose manifestation in space we conceive of\nunder the form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither infinite\nnor perfect.\n\nI must call attention to the remark already made that the correct\nrepresentation of God in thought is not that of a pure abstraction, the\ninfinite Being, but of a being who possesses attributes, some of which are\ninfinite and others perfect. To affirm that such a being is a person, is\nnot to attempt to think that which is unthinkable. When we affirm that God\npossesses the power adequate to build the universe, and all possible power\nbeside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which it is impossible to\npredicate the possession of will or self\u2010consciousness. When we affirm\nthat such a being exists now, that he has existed in all past known times,\nand that no limits in point of time are conceivable of him, there is\nnothing contradictory in ascribing to such a Being personality. It is\nquite thinkable that an ultimate particle may never have had a beginning\nand never will have an end; no less so is it that such a particle may be\npossessed of personality, for it is finite. Surely therefore there is\nnothing in the ascription to God of existence without beginning and\nwithout end, which destroys the idea of His personality.\n\nIt has been necessary to enter thus far into this subject, because in\nreasoning on the Christian revelation we must assume the existence of a\npersonal God, unless all such treatises, in addition to their own proper\nsubject\u2010matter, must likewise contain an elaborate work on the principles\nof theism, and a refutation of those of pantheism and atheism. The\ndefender of Christianity is charged with reasoning in a circle, as though\nhe first assumed the existence of a personal God, and then derived the\nidea of his existence from revelation. This charge would undoubtedly be\ntrue if the idea of God being a person is unthinkable. I am at a loss to\nconceive how it becomes one atom more thinkable if communicated by a\nrevelation. Much obscurity has undoubtedly been thrown on this subject by\nChristian writers who have fancied that the more they can invalidate our\nreason the greater gain accrues to Revelation. This is not only unwise but\nirrational. Our reason doubtless is but an imperfect light, but its\nextinction is to leave us to grope in darkness. I affirm therefore that\nthe assumption of the divine personality as the groundwork of our argument\ninvolves no _petitio principii_, or reasoning in a circle.\n\nOne more remark and I will bring this portion of the subject to a close.\nThe affirmation made by this philosophy that certain things are\nunthinkable is fallacious. What do we mean by \u201cunthinkable\u201d? It may mean\nmany things; first, that the subject cannot be made in any sense an object\nof thought. This, in fact, is the only legitimate use of the word. But in\nthis sense the affirmation cannot be true of even Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s\nunknown and unknowable God, for it is evident that he does manage to\nreason and think about him somehow. It may mean a being respecting whom we\nmay know much and attain a knowledge continually progressing, but\nrespecting whom there is much which is unknown. This unknown is called\nunthinkable. But it is not unthinkable. It has only not yet become the\nsubject of our knowledge, and is no more unthinkable than any other\nunknown truth. Or that may be pronounced to be unthinkable respecting\nwhich our conceptions are wanting in definiteness and precision. But to\ndesignate such things as unthinkable is an abuse of language. Or that may\nbe designated as unthinkable of which our conceptions fail fully to\nrepresent the reality. As far as they go, they may be true, but there may\nbe something beyond of a similar kind, which they do not embrace. This is\nthe only sense in which it can be affirmed that God is unthinkable, but\nthe assertion is altogether misleading. The only correct meaning of the\nexpression is when some particular thing is affirmed to exist and at the\nsame time contradictions co\u2010exist in it. The actual co\u2010existence of these\ntwo contradictions is unthinkable, but nothing more. Thus the existence of\na round square is unthinkable, so would the affirmation that the divine\npower was at the same time both limited and unlimited. But in no other\nsense is a conception unthinkable. To affirm that the cause of all things\nis unthinkable because our conceptions of Him do not measure the entire\ndepths of His being is simply misleading.\n\nI have gone into this question because it is evident that if God is\nunthinkable a revelation of Him is impossible, and if a revelation of Him\nis impossible, all miracles affirmed to have been wrought in attestation\nof one must be delusions.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. THE OBJECTION THAT MIRACLES ARE CONTRARY TO REASON CONSIDERED.\n\n\nUnder this head are included the whole of that class of objections which\nextend from the direct assertion of the impossibility of miracles to the\naffirmation that even if their possibility is conceded, they are so\nextremely improbable that it is a violation of the first principles of our\nreason to believe in their actual occurrence. They are alleged to be\nviolations and contradictions of the laws of nature, and as such to be\nincredible, as the stability of its laws is founded on a universal\nexperience. This unquestionably forms the most formidable difficulty in\nthe way of the acceptance of miracles, as actual occurrences, at the\npresent day, and therefore demands a careful consideration.\n\nThe question of the abstract impossibility of miracles need not occupy us\nlong. Such an affirmation can only be made on the assumption that our\nreason is inadequate to affirm the existence of such a being as a personal\nGod. If this can be established, the whole argument is ended for all\npractical purposes. It may be conceded that the occurrence of some\nanomalous event as a bare objective fact is quite possible, even on the\nprinciples of pantheism or atheism. But such objective fact would be no\nmiracle in any sense in which the word can be used in this discussion. If\nthe evidence was sufficiently strong to attest it as a fact, it would be\nexplicable on the supposition of some unknown force in nature, or even as\na purely chance occurrence. A miracle, in any sense in which it enters\ninto the present argument, is not only an abnormal objective fact, but one\nwhich takes place at the bidding of a moral agent. It is the union of\nthese two which imparts to a miracle any power to attest a revelation. If,\ntherefore, there is no evidence of the existence of a God, miracles may be\npronounced impossible for all practical purposes in this controversy, and\nwe need not further discuss the question.\n\nThe whole argument as to whether the occurrence of a miracle is or is not\ncontrary to reason must proceed on the assumption of the existence of a\npersonal God. It is also a proposition so clear as to render all proof of\nit superfluous, that if a personal God exists who has created the universe\nand governs it by His Providence, miracles are possible.\n\nFirst, I observe that a miracle cannot be pronounced incredible, on the\nground that it is an effect without an adequate cause. On this point I may\nrefer to the high authority of Mr. Mill, that the idea of a miracle\ncontradicts no law of causation. \u201cIn order,\u201d says he, \u201cthat any alleged\nfact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be\nnot simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect,\nfor that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the\nabsence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged\nmiracle the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that the effect\nwas defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence, of a counteracting\ncause, viz., a direct interposition of an act of will of some being who\nhas power over nature; and in particular of a being whose will being\nassumed to have induced all the causes, with the powers by which they\nproduce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them.\u201d\n(_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 167.)\n\nA miracle therefore may not be the result of the action of any force which\nfalls within the range of our knowledge. It may be necessary for its\nperformance to neutralize the action of all existing forces by the calling\ninto energy of more powerful ones. But their operation need not even be\nsuspended. An adequate force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what\nname we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the power which\nrules the universe, _i.e._ God. As Mr. Mill justly observes, the only\nquestion which can be raised if the existence of God is assumed, is, not\nthe want of the presence of an adequate cause, for the supposition pre\u2010\nsupposes the presence of one, but the want of will on the part of God to\nbring about the result. Thus it may be fairly argued that God will not\nwork a miracle, from the fact that He has not done so in the course of\nprevious observation.\n\nIt has been frequently affirmed that a miracle is an act which is contrary\nto the laws of nature, or a violation of them, or a suspension of them, or\na violation of the order of nature; and that its occurrence is therefore\nincredible, as being contrary to reason. A miracle need involve neither of\nthese. The laws of nature as conceived by physical science are a set of\nantecedents followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle does\nnot interfere with this. Its very conception involves a new antecedent\nfollowed by its consequent. The utmost that can be urged is that we have\nnever before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent and\nconsequent, or that the antecedents which we have witnessed have been\nfollowed by totally different consequents. The only mode in which such a\nlaw could be violated would be, if a particular antecedent was present and\nno other capable of modifying its action, and it failed to be attended\nwith its proper consequent. But this is not involved in the conception of\na miracle.\n\nLet us now suppose that the expression \u201claws of nature\u201d is extended so as\nto comprise the forces of nature as well as its invariable sequences. Such\na use of the term is very common. In this point of view, it is impossible\nto affirm that the laws of nature are violated by the performance of a\nmiracle. This could only be the case if they were made to produce the\nopposite results to those which they actually produce. Thus, if a boiler\nwere filled with water and a fire kindled under it, and no other force was\npresent capable of neutralizing the action of the fire; if, instead of the\ntemperature of the water being raised, it gradually froze, there would be\na clear violation of the laws of nature, _i.e._ its forces would cease to\nproduce their usual results. But there is nothing in the idea of a miracle\nthat involves this. It postulates the presence of a force or forces which\nare adequate to counteract the action of those already in existence, and\nto produce the adequate result.\n\nIt will be objected that we have never recognized the existence of such\nforces in our previous experience. Such an objection would be valid only\non the assumption that there is no force in the universe besides those\nwhich have been already recognized by us. This, however, science will in\nthe present state of our knowledge hardly venture to affirm. Besides, it\nis contrary to the supposition with which we started, viz. the existence\nof a power able to control nature, that is, God.\n\nNor is the assertion correct that the performance of a miracle necessarily\ninvolves even a suspension of the laws of nature. This may be the mode of\nthe divine acting; but it is most important to observe that it by no means\nfollows that it must be so. A miracle may be performed by the introduction\nof a force which has sufficient power to counteract the forces of nature\neven while they are in the fullest operation. To take an illustration: It\nhas been frequently said that the force of gravity must have been\nsuspended in favour of Peter\u2019s body when he walked on the water, and in\nfavour of that of our Lord when he ascended into heaven. But this is by no\nmeans the case. The mere suspension of the law of gravitation would not in\neither case have effected the results in question. The presence of other\nforces was necessary. The law of gravitation might have been in the\nfullest operation, and the miracle might have been performed by the action\nof other forces adequate to neutralize it. The narrative itself implies\nthat this force was so far from being suspended, that it was in full\noperation at the time when the miracle was performed, for the moment the\npower which supported Peter\u2019s body ceased to act he began to sink.\n\nBut further: even if we assume that any natural forces have been suspended\nin the performance of a miracle, we are not called on to assume their\ngeneral suspension, but only in favour of the particular case in question.\nThis observation is rendered necessary because it has been frequently\nurged against the possibility of miracles that their performance must have\nthrown the whole mechanism of the universe into confusion, and involved an\nextensive reconstruction of the processes of nature. This would\nunquestionably be the case if the working of a miracle involved the\ndifficulty in question. But I have shown that it need not involve even the\nsuspension of any natural law whatever, and if such suspension took place\nin any particular case, the force might have been acting with full energy\neverywhere else.\n\nThe counteraction or modification of one force by the agency of another is\nan event which we witness every day. The force of gravity is in the\nfullest operation whenever we lift a weight from the ground\u2014it is not\nsuspended for a single moment. The ability to modify the results of the\naction of one force by the agency of another, or to combine many forces so\nas to produce a definite result, constitutes the essence of all mechanical\ncontrivance. The self\u2010determining power of the human will is that which\ncalls all these particular modifications of existing forces into activity.\nBy means of it, the entire aspect of external nature has been changed from\nthe appearance which it would have presented, if no other agency had\nexisted besides the forces of nature which belong to matter. Man has been\na power manifested in the midst of them. I am quite aware that he can\ncreate no new force, and that he can only control or modify the action of\nthose which exist, but is never capable of suspending them. Yet this power\nhas produced marvellous results on the external world, so that it presents\na wholly different aspect from that which it would have done if the forces\nof nature had simply continued acting uncontrolled by the influence of\nmind. Even in material nature itself, we meet with repeated instances of\nsuch modifications of the results of one force by the action of another,\nas for example when the force of gravitation is counteracted by that of\nmagnetism, or of capillary attraction. The action of no force is\nsuspended, it is only modified.\n\nThe assertion therefore is inaccurate which affirms that the performance\nof a miracle involves the suspension of a single force in nature. It is\nconsequently so far no violation of any natural law. All that the idea of\nit involves is the presence of a force which is capable in a particular\ninstance of counteracting the action of those forces which would produce a\ncontrary result if left to themselves. It is quite unnecessary for us to\ndetermine, in reference to the subject under consideration, whether the\nresult may be brought about by a combination of forces which energize\nwithin the visible sphere of things, or by bringing into action some\nlatent force, or one which only occasionally manifests itself, or by the\nimmediate action of the divine mind, which, having in itself all the\nforces necessary to produce the universe, must possess those which are\nnecessary to effect the miracle.\n\nIt is a fact worthy of observation that in the case of the miracles\nrecorded in the Bible, the materials out of which the new results were\nproduced already existed in nature, as in the miracle of the\nmultiplication of the loaves and fishes. No act of creation was necessary.\nAll that was required was the presence of a force or forces, able to build\nup these materials into the forms in question. God does this in ordinary\ncourse by what we designate natural forces, by means of which corn is\ngrown and flesh produced. Can it be pretended that no other forces are\nunder the control of, or exist in God, which are able to produce these\nresults in a different manner, even while the ordinary forces of nature\ncontinue in activity?\n\nIt has been further urged that a miracle involves a violation of the laws\nof nature, because as it cannot be effected by any of the forces of nature\nwith which we are acquainted, the presence of an unknown force adequate to\nproduce one must be a violation of the laws of nature.\n\nI reply that any apparent force which this objection may possess is due to\nan ambiguous use of the word \u201claw.\u201d It is here used to denote the order of\nthe various occurrences in nature, and not its antecedents and invariable\nconsequents. If there are forces in nature beyond those with which we are\nacquainted, how can their action be a violation of nature\u2019s order? If God\nis always present energizing in nature\u2019s forces, how can any fresh putting\nforth of his energy be a violation of nature\u2019s laws? In a certain sense of\nthe words the order of nature may be said to be violated whenever one of\nits forces is modified by the action of another, that is to say, an order\nof events results from the modified action different from that which would\nhave resulted from the unmodified one. In this sense man is daily\nviolating the order of nature. But this has no bearing whatever on the\nquestion at issue.\n\nIt will perhaps be urged that the resurrection of a dead man, or the cure\nof a man born blind by a word is a violation of the laws of nature.\nWhether this be so can only be determined when we are acquainted with the\nmeans by which such an event may be brought about. The assertion itself is\na mere general statement that, as far as human observation has gone, dead\nmen have never returned to life; and that blindness has never been cured\nat any person\u2019s command.\n\nBut with respect to a resurrection it may be objected that it is an\nobserved fact amounting to a complete induction, that all men die and that\nafter death has taken place it is a fact no less universal that with the\nexception of a few alleged instances to the contrary no resurrection has\never taken place. It may therefore be said to be a law of nature that all\nmen die, and that death is followed by no resurrection. This, however, if\nput into other language amounts to the following proposition. That it is a\nlaw of nature that these results must follow, as long as the present\nforces which we observe and no others are in energy. But it would cease to\nbe so as soon as any others capable of producing such a result were\nbrought into activity. The truth is that death is a phenomenon which is\ncaused by the joint action of a multitude of natural forces. But if these\nwere overborne by any force of nature, or by the Author of nature calling\nany unknown force into activity, or even by the energy of his own creative\nwill, it would be absurd to call such an event either a violation of the\nlaws or of the order of nature, and therefore to affirm that it was\nincredible. Death is the result of the action of the natural forces which\nwe observe around us. No natural force with which we are acquainted can\neffect a resurrection. If it be affirmed that in this sense a resurrection\nis contrary to the laws and order of nature, the expression is ambiguous\nand misleading, for it is intended to be inferred that such a violation\nwould be contrary to reason and therefore incredible.\n\nBut the affirmation that a miracle is contrary to the order of nature\nrequires further consideration. What do we intend to affirm when we speak\nof an order of nature or of an event being contrary to it?\n\nIn a scientific sense the order of nature can only mean the results of\nforces energizing in conformity with invariable law. Every event which\noccurs is the result of a combination of such forces and the product of\ntheir joint action. These results necessarily follow an orderly\narrangement; _i.e._ the orderly result always occurs when precisely the\nsame antecedents and no other are present, and is invariably altered\nwhenever the antecedents are modified to the precise extent of the\nmodification. As far then as the results in nature are the effect of known\nforces unmodified in their action by other forces, they follow a definite\norder. Thus all the motions of the heavenly bodies present themselves to\nthe scientific mind as the perfection of order, because they are the\nresults of the action of known forces acting in conformity with invariable\nlaw. Whenever a fact is observed which deviates from the order which these\nknown forces would produce, the action of another force which has hitherto\nbeen unknown is inferred. The order of nature therefore means that the\nsame forces always produce the same results. There is nothing inconsistent\nwith this in the correct conception of a miracle. Viewed as a physical\nevent only, it would be due to the action of a force which has hitherto\nbeen outside the sphere of our observation.\n\nIt is clear therefore that whenever a fresh combination of forces takes\nplace, their combined action will modify the result, and a very different\norder of events will take place from that which would have resulted from\ntheir unmodified action. Such modification therefore must produce a\ndifferent order of nature from that which would have otherwise resulted.\nBut such modifications frequently take place through the agency of man. It\ntherefore follows that man has the power of effecting modifications in the\norder of nature, without causing any violation of nature\u2019s laws.\n\nBut various other influences, and among them those usually designated as\nchances, exert a powerful influence in changing the order of nature. It is\nnecessary that its forces should not only be combined, but combined at the\nright time and place, or the effect which is due to their combination will\nnot take place; _i.e._ a different order of natural events would have\nhappened. An illustration will make this clear. Let us take the case of a\ndisintegrating rock; according as the different forces, which act on it,\nmeet at the suitable time and place, the progress of disintegration is\ngreatly lengthened or shortened. Such concurrences of events are what we\nview as pure contingencies. _E.g._ water penetrates into one of its\nfissures; this takes place in summer, and no appreciable result follows.\nBut if in winter a frost happens immediately afterwards, it will produce\nan order of events widely different from that which would have happened if\neither no rain had fallen or frost occurred. By their joint agency the\nfissure is widened, or the rock split asunder. It follows therefore that\nthe concurrence of these two forces is necessary at a particular time and\nplace to produce the particular result. Such concurrences, though due to\nnatural causes, are what we call fortuitous. Yet their occurrence or non\u2010\noccurrence occasions a different order of natural events.\n\nFurther, let us suppose that a bird with a seed in its mouth, in the\ncourse of its flight casually drops it into a fissure in the rock, which\nhas been opened by the frost; and also that another concurrence of forces\nhas supplied the conditions suitable for its taking root and growth. This\nproduces a new series of events, which occasions a more rapid\ndisintegration, and modifies the whole of the results which follow. If the\ncasual act of the bird had taken place at any other time or place, the\nwhole series would have been different, varying with the causes which\nproduced the seed, and the contingencies which brought the bird to the\nspot, and induced it to drop it. Let us now suppose that man with his\nrational agency intervenes. He deliberately watches for the prospect of a\nfrosty night, pours water into the fissures, and plants seeds in fissures\nwhere he knows that suitable material has been prepared for their growth.\nHere a new order of events has been introduced, which, originating in\nhuman agency, entirely modify the order of the results.\n\nIt is important to observe that all theories which attempt to account for\nthe production of living organisms by the principle of development are\ncompelled at almost every step of the process to postulate the concurrence\nof forces of this description at the suitable time and place to render\ntheir production possible. These must have taken place in past time in\nnumbers passing all comprehension. In the case of many vegetable\nstructures the result has been entirely modified by the contingency of\nsome insect choosing to enter one flower and not to enter another; and\naccording as this takes place a wholly different order of events follows.\nWhether we choose to designate such concurrences of events at the suitable\ntime and place fortuitous or not, the law which regulates them is wholly\nunknown, even if they are regulated by law. So far it is impossible to\naffirm that these results follow a known and definite order in nature. The\nconcurrence of two or more such causes introduces a new series, and\noccasions a break in the previously existing order of nature.\n\nStill more completely has this happened when man with his reason and\npowers of volition is introduced on the scene. It will doubtless be\nobjected by our materialistic philosophers, that the forces which energize\nin mind act with the same uniformity as those that energize in matter, and\nthat volition exerts no appreciable influence on the results of our\nactions. These theories, however, contradict the experience of an\noverwhelming majority of mankind. Such as do so require that the strongest\nproof should be given before their truth can be considered as established.\nSuch proof certainly yet remains to be given. Its advocates, however, tell\nus that it will be forthcoming at some future time. In the meanwhile the\nfact is sufficient for our purpose that man is capable of acting on nature\nand of producing most important changes in the results of the action of\nits forces. This being so, it is certain that an order of events takes\nplace through the interference of man, quite different from that which\nwould have taken place apart from his interference. But these\ninterferences take place in conformity with no known law, and their\nresults occasion a break in the previously existing series of events, by\nthe introduction of a new one. Man, therefore, is capable of interfering\nwith and effecting changes in the order of nature. It will be objected\nthat all the agencies by which such results are brought about are forces\nenergizing in nature in conformity with invariable law, and consequently\nthat the order of nature is preserved intact. It is unquestionably true\nthat the actual forces at work are forces in nature. But there is another\nprinciple at work which interferes with the regular course of their\naction, and brings out a series of results quite different to that which\nwould have been produced if they had not been interfered with. This is\nman\u2019s reason and intelligent volition. It is impossible to reduce the\naction of this to any known law of invariable sequence. It follows\ntherefore that man is a power either in or out of nature, which is capable\nof interfering with the order of the results of its material forces, or,\nin the language of those with whom I am reasoning, of violating the order\nof nature.\n\nBut it will be further objected that man in his action on nature can only\nuse or combine such natural forces as come within his knowledge; and this\nproves nothing about the possibility of the action of a power outside\nnature which is able to employ its known and unknown forces for the\npurpose of producing such results as miracles. I answer that this\nobjection can have no validity unless it is first assumed that man is a\nportion of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of it. But the\nproof of this has certainly yet to be given. By the word \u201cnature,\u201d as it\nis used by this philosophy, is meant the sum total of known material\nforces, acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; that is to\nsay, of forces which are devoid of intelligence and volition. It is\nimpossible in this sense of the word to include man in it, until his\nentire intellectual and moral being can be shown to be the result of\nmaterial forces. Nor even if this could be done, would it avail for the\npresent argument; for however it may have originated, man\u2019s power to\nmodify the action of material forces is an existing fact, and produces\nresults quite different in kind from the action of the unintelligent\nforces of nature.\n\nThe fact that the mind acts through a material organism, and is incapable\nof calling into existence any new force, does not alter the position above\ntaken. I am quite ready to take either of the following alternatives. Man\nis either in nature, or he is outside of it. If he is in it, then a power\nexists within it which is capable of compelling its unintelligent forces\nto effectuate the determinations of rational volition. If he is outside\nnature, then a power exists outside it which is capable of effectuating\nthese results. It follows, therefore, that in either case a power exists\nwhich is capable of modifying the order of nature. Now it would be absurd\nto deny that whatever man can effect, God is able also to effect; and that\nHe is so much the more able, in proportion as His knowledge is more\nperfect. Whether, therefore, God works in nature, or outside it, a power\nexists which is capable of varying the order of nature without\ninterrupting the action of any of its forces, or violating its laws. He\nalso must have other forces at His command beyond those which are known to\nman, and can combine them and thereby modify their action in conformity\nwith His pleasure. He must also be the primary force everywhere underlying\nnature, which imparts to every other force its energy and power. It\nfollows that He can work a miracle without even suspending any of the\nexisting forces of nature, and that the allegation that miracles are\ncontrary to reason, because they are contrary to nature, and a violation\nof its laws and order, is disproved.\n\nI will now proceed to adduce examples of these contradictions to our\nreason which are said to be involved in the occurrence of a miracle, for\nthe purpose of illustrating the confusion arising from the various senses\nin which the words \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural law,\u201d and other similar\nexpressions have been employed. Although the instances will be taken from\nthe opponents of Revelation, I by no means wish to imply that they alone\nhave been guilty of this ambiguous use of language. Its defenders are\nequally obnoxious to the charge.\n\nAfter quoting a brief passage from Dr. Newman, the author of \u201cSupernatural\nReligion\u201d urges the following objections: \u201cMiracles are here described as\n\u2018beside, beyond, and above\u2019 nature, but a moment\u2019s consideration will show\nthat in so far as these terms have any meaning at all, they are simply\nevasions, and not solutions of a difficulty. If the course of nature be\ninterrupted in any way, whether the interruption be said to proceed from\nsome cause which is said to be beyond, or beside, or above nature, it is\ncertain that the interruption is not caused by nature itself; and every\ndisturbance of the order of nature, call it by whatsoever name we may, is\ncontrary to nature, whose chief characteristic is invariability of law. It\nis clearly unnatural for the ordinary course of nature to be disturbed,\nand indeed were this not the case, the disturbance would be no miracle at\nall.\u201d\n\nIt is by no means my purpose to defend Dr. Newman\u2019s use of the\nexpressions, \u201cnatural,\u201d \u201cbeside nature,\u201d \u201cbeyond nature,\u201d or \u201cabove\nnature.\u201d But while the author criticises Dr. Newman, it is clear that in\nthis passage he has fallen into a number of very singular confusions of\nthought.\n\nFirst: The words \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural,\u201d are used as though they had one\nclear, simple, and invariable meaning, whereas in this passage they are\nused so as to include phenomena which widely differ from one another. We\nare not told what is included under the term \u201cnature,\u201d whether it is\nrestricted to matter, its forces, and its laws, or whether it also\nincludes mind and all its phenomena. When we speak of interruptions in the\norder of nature, we usually intend it to be assumed that volition is the\ncause of these interruptions. This being so, the author has included in\nnature phenomena which differ so widely from one another as those of mind\nand matter. He then speaks of the chief characteristic of nature being\ninvariability of law. The laws and forces which regulate matter are\ndistinguished by this invariability. But the action of mind is very\ndifferent. All men habitually speak of some portions of it as capricious.\nWhether they are so or not, nothing is more certain than that many of our\nmental phenomena have not been reduced to the action of known laws.\n\nWhen, therefore, such expressions as \u201cbeside, beyond, and above nature,\u201d\nand \u201cnatural,\u201d are used, I ask what nature is intended? Is it matter, its\nforces and laws; or mind, including the principle of volition; or both? If\nman is included in nature, then there is a power in nature which is\ncapable of controlling other portions of nature, and even of acting on\nitself. If man is excluded from nature, then there must exist a power\noutside nature, which is \u201cbeyond and above nature,\u201d and is capable of\nacting on it. But if by nature is meant the sum total of all the forces\nwhich exist, whether material or immaterial, then it is clear that a power\nmust exist in nature which is capable of controlling the forces of\nmaterial nature, and of compelling them to effectuate its purposes.\nWhichever point of view we take of it, the objection falls to the ground.\n\nBut, says the author, \u201cIf the course of nature be interrupted in any way,\nwhether the interruption proceed from a cause beyond, beside, or above\nnature, such interruption cannot be caused by nature; and every\ndisturbance in the order of nature is contrary to nature.\u201d This passage\nseems to imply that an interruption in the order of nature cannot proceed\nfrom nature itself. But this is certainly incorrect. Natural forces, that\nis to say, material ones, modify one another; and by their combined\naction, they produce a series of events quite different from what would be\nthe result of their separate action. Such a new series of events is to all\nintents and purposes an interruption of the previous order of nature and\nthe introduction of a new one. Such results are produced by fortuitous\ncombinations taking place, in the manner which I have already illustrated,\nat the right time and place. The fortuitous combination of forces in\nnature is capable of producing a new order \u201ccontrary to\u201d the previous\norder of nature.\n\nThis, as I have shown, is still more evidently the case if we include the\nphenomena of mind in nature.\n\nBut it is affirmed, \u201cif the interruption be due to a cause either beyond,\nbeside, or above nature, the interruption cannot be caused by nature.\u201d\nThis is of course a self\u2010evident truth. But then it is inferred that such\ninterruption is a disturbance of the order of nature; and that every\ndisturbance of its order is contrary to nature. The inference which the\nreader is left to draw, and which is directly stated in other parts of the\nwork, is, that what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; that a\nmiracle is thus contrary to nature, and therefore contrary to reason.\n\nI observe that, although the interruption here referred to cannot be\ncaused by nature (for it is contrary to the conditions of the case that it\nshould be), yet it by no means follows that it is a breach of the order of\nnature in any other sense than that which I have already discussed. Such\ndisturbances occur every day. It is, therefore, misleading to designate\nthem as contrary to nature, as they neither necessarily suspend any\nnatural force nor violate any natural law. I have already proved that\nthere is nothing in such disturbances, or, if we persist in so designating\nthem violations of the order of nature, that is contrary to reason. Such a\nuse of the terms \u201ccourse and order of nature\u201d is full of ambiguities and\ncertain to betray us into fallacious reasonings.\n\nBut, adds the writer, \u201cit is clearly unnatural that the ordinary course of\nnature should be disturbed.\u201d Here the ambiguity of the expressions used,\nand the consequent fallacy of the reasonings, are brought to a\nculmination.\n\nWhat, I ask, is intended by the ordinary course of nature? Is it the\ninvariable action of its forces, or the invariable sequences of their\nresults, or the orderly arrangement of its parts; or does it include mind\nand all its phenomena, of the precise nature of the forces, laws and order\nof which we are ignorant, and its action on the physical universe? What,\nagain, is the precise meaning which can be attached to the word\n\u201cunnatural\u201d in such a context, where it is evident that its meaning must\nvary according as we include in nature one, several, or all of these\nphenomena? If by the word \u201cunnatural\u201d the meaning intended to be conveyed\nis unusual or impossible, it is then clearly not unnatural that the course\nof nature should be interrupted in the manner I have previously pointed\nout. Nor if man is included in nature, is it unnatural that the results\nproduced by its physical forces should be greatly modified by his action?\n\nThe remark of the author in connection with this subject is perfectly\ntrue, that a grain could never of itself, nor according to the law of\nnatural development, issue in a loaf of bread; but it is wholly aside from\nthe issue which he raises. It is unquestionable that forces purely\nphysical could not effect this result; but does it follow from this that\nthe production of a loaf of bread is an event contrary to nature? The\nresult can only be produced by the combination and controlling of a number\nof material forces by human reason. The grain of wheat must be planted by\nman at the proper season. It must be cared for by him. Various physical\nforces must contribute to the growth and development of the plant. The\nears produced must be reaped in harvest\u2010time. This process must be\nrepeated until the grains are sufficient in number to produce our intended\nloaf. Then they must be threshed, ground, prepared for the oven, baked. In\none word, the miller and the baker must be invoked to control, combine,\nmodify and give a new direction to the forces of nature under the\ndirection of intelligence. All this involves something more than the\naction of material forces. The forces of nature carry on the work to a\ncertain point. Then man takes it up and interrupts their order, although\nhe does so by compelling other forces to effectuate the purposes of his\nwill. The ordinary course of material nature is disturbed in the\nproduction of a loaf of bread. A new order of events is introduced. Man is\neither within or without nature. In either case a power exists which is\ncapable of producing innovations in its order.\n\nBut how stands the case of the feeding of five thousand persons on seven\nloaves and two fishes? The seven loaves and two fishes had been previously\nproduced, by the action of material forces out of materials already\nexisting in the ground, in water, and in the air. Of such materials there\nwas abundance at hand to produce the requisite amount of food for the\nfeeding of the multitude. The only question was how to build them up into\nthe forms of bread and fish. There was no occasion to create one single\nparticle of matter. As to the nature of the forces employed to work the\nmiracle the narrative says nothing. Nor does it imply that one of the\nordinary forces of nature was suspended on the occasion. All that it\nasserts is the presence of a force adequate to build up the materials\nalready existing into the forms of bread and fish, that force being God.\nIn the manufacture of the loaves and in the catching of the fish, man had\ninterfered with nature\u2019s order by the blending of her powers. God\ninterfered with nature\u2019s order at a higher stage by building up the\nparticular forms of bread and fish out of materials already in existence,\nby means of forces differing from those which come under our cognisance.\nThe act of man is evidence of the presence of a being who is able to\ncontrol the forces of external nature for his own purposes. The miracle\nwould be evidence of the presence of a Being who is able to exert a\nmightier influence over them in order to effect his own.\n\nEqual ambiguity prevails in the use of the term \u201claw.\u201d What do we mean by\nlaw when we apply the term to nature? In physical philosophy, the Duke of\nArgyll tells us it is used in a great variety of senses. Its proper\nmeaning is to denote an invariable sequence of phenomena. It is frequently\nmade to include the conception of the forces at work which produce the\nphenomena. This ambiguous use of the word has been a source of endless\nconfusion. The following quotation will furnish us with an example:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf in animated beings we have the solitary instance of an efficient cause\nacting among the forces of nature and possessing the power of initiation,\nthis efficient cause produces no disturbance of physical law. Its\nexistence is as much a recognised part of the infinite variety of form\nwithin the order of nature, as the existence of a crystal or a plant; and\nalthough the character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly\nunderstood, its effects are regulated by the same laws as govern all the\nother forces of nature. If the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of\nlife, each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical\nlaw is suspended in precisely the same manner and to an equivalent degree,\neach time another physical law is called into action. The law of\ngravitation, for instance, is suspended by the law of magnetism each time\na magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case a law is successfully\nresisted precisely to the extent of the force employed.... No exercise of\nwill can overcome the law of gravitation or any other law to a greater\nextent than the actual force exerted, any more than a magnetic current can\ndo so beyond the action of the battery. Will has no power against\nexhaustion. Even Moses in the sublimest moments of faith could not hold up\nhis arms to heaven after his physical force was consumed.\u201d P. 44, vol. i.\n\nFirst: it is alleged \u201cthat an efficient cause\u201d (man for example) \u201cacting\namong the forces of nature, and possessing the power of initiation,\nproduces no disturbance of physical law.\u201d What is here meant by\ndisturbance of physical law? It is plain that physical forces would work\nout a wholly different result apart from the action of man upon them.\nThough he suspends no physical force, the action of man has produced an\norder of events in nature different from that which would have taken place\nwithout it, but by balancing one against the other he modifies their\naction. What is more, he possesses a power of self\u2010determination. Other\nforces are unintelligent. Man is an intelligent force capable of\nintroducing an order of nature quite different from that which the\nmaterial forces of nature would have produced without his intervention.\n\nNext: we are told that the existence of man \u201cis as much a recognised part\nof the infinite variety of form within the order of nature as the\nexistence of a plant or a crystal.\u201d I again ask, what nature? Is the order\nspoken of that of blind unintelligent forces, or does it include\nintelligence and free agency? Unless man is a blind unintelligent force,\nalthough he be supposed to exist within nature, he belongs to an order\nwholly different from that of a plant or a crystal. To assert the contrary\nis to assume the whole question. The results produced by intelligent\nvolition differ completely in character from those effected by the\nunintelligent forces of nature. The one follows an order of necessity: the\nother of freedom. The affirmation that the results of the latter belong to\nthe same order as those of the former is directly contrary to facts.\n\nAgain: \u201cthe laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life.\u201d If laws are\nthe invariable sequences of phenomena how is it possible that one law can\nsuspend another law? It is not even true that one force can suspend\nanother force. All that it can do is to neutralize its action. Physical\nphilosophy is constantly attributing to laws what can only be true of\nforces, and even frequently ascribes to them what is only true of\nintelligent forces. It must never be overlooked in this controversy that\nthe laws of nature can effectuate nothing. Forces, not laws, produce\nresults. The following sentence will be a correct expression of a truth,\nif we substitute \u201cforce\u201d for \u201claw:\u201d \u201cThe law of gravitation is overcome by\nthe law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air.\u201d\nImmediately after, we are told that the arm falls in obedience to law. It\nfalls by the force of gravitation. When theologians use metaphors of this\ndescription they are charged with anthropomorphism. Such a charge is\nequally valid against the language in which physical philosophy expresses\nitself.\n\nAgain: The author affirms \u201cthat the solitary instance of an efficient\ncause, if it be distinguished from the other forces of nature by the\npossession of an initiatory impulse, is from the moment when that power is\nexerted subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there is no\ninstance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose\neffects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The\noccurrence of anything opposed to these laws is incredible.\u201d p. 48.\n\nWhat is meant, I ask, by \u201cthe intimate ruling of the laws of nature\u201d? Even\nif we substitute forces for laws, the meaning is sufficiently obscure.\nProbably the expression is intended to mean the combined result effected\nby the energy of all the forces in nature. If these include all mental as\nwell as all material forces, then the assertion is a simple truism, that\nnothing can be contrary to itself. But if they exclude mental force, then\nthe results which they produce are clearly opposed to the ultimate ruling\nof the forces of unintelligent nature. Numerous instances are not only\nlogically conceivable, but actually producible. The occurrence, therefore,\nof anything opposed to the ultimate rulings of these unintelligent\nphysical forces is not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only\nproduce results through the agency of these physical forces; but he can\nmodify their results, and so use them as to make them the means of\neffectuating his purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur opposed\nto the forces of nature; that is to say, that, while the force of\ngravitation is in energy, and no other force is present capable of\novercoming its power, the ascension of a human body into heaven is\nimpossible. But who has ever affirmed that it was possible? Those who\naffirm that an ascension has taken place, also assert that another force\nwas in active energy, which was capable of counteracting the force of\ngravitation. This assertion, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the point\nat issue.\n\nThe consideration of the next question before us may very properly be\nintroduced, by quoting the following passage of the same author:\n\n\u201cOur highest attainable conception of infinite power and wisdom is based\non the universality and invariability of law, and inexorably excludes as\nunworthy and anthropomorphistic any idea of its fitful suspension.\u201d\n\nThis at once raises the very important question, whether there is anything\nin the performance of a miracle inconsistent with the divine character and\nperfections. It has been often alleged by those who deny the possibility\nof miracles, that God energizes in the universe in conformity with\ninvariable laws, which express the uniform mode of the divine working.\nFrom these, as the result of his wisdom, He will never deviate. To alter\nor vary from this mode of acting implies that the machinery of the\nuniverse, through which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He has\nworked a miracle therefore involves the assumption that He has ceased from\none mode of action and adopted another; or, in other words, that the\nforces of the universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the whole\nmachine has got out of order and requires rectification. Any action of\nthis kind in the case of a Being possessed of all power, is a reflection\nboth on his wisdom and his immutability. Still further: it is affirmed by\nsome that the love of order is an attribute so inherent in Deity, that it\nis inconceivable that any alteration in the existing order of the universe\nshould take place under his government.\n\nOne objection raised in the above quotation I may dismiss summarily, viz.\nthe idea that God interposes with any fitful interventions in the\nuniverse. The idea of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the\nconception of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament as one of\nthe means by which he realizes his deliberate purposes. I shall elsewhere\ndisprove the allegation that Revelation is an intervention of the Creator\nto rectify a miscarriage in his creative work.\n\nIt will also be desirable in this place to answer the charge of\nanthropomorphism so frequently urged against the defenders of\nChristianity. When they speak of God as a person, they are charged with\nmanufacturing a gigantic man. When they ascribe to Him a moral character,\nor describe Him as acting in nature, they are then accused of making a God\nout of a number of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if it\nbe one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of science, and\ntheologians. The plain fact is, that man has no conceptions but human\nones. To abandon these is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers\nand men of science speak of nature, they are obliged to apply to it\nconceptions which are strictly true only of man. We are obliged to do\nprecisely the same with respect to God. So far all thought, the most\nelevated and the most ordinary, is anthropomorphic. The term can be fairly\nused as a reproach only when certain material conceptions or degraded\npassions are directly affirmed to exist in the divine mind.\n\nThe author, in the following passage, places the objection before us in a\nstill more striking light: \u201cBeing therefore limited to reason for our\nfeeble conceptions of the divine Being of which we are capable, and reason\nbeing totally opposed to an order of nature so imperfect as to require or\npermit repeated interference, and rejecting the supposition of arbitrary\nsuspension of law, such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by\ntheologians must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory to the wisdom\nand perfection which we recognize in the invariable order of nature. It is\nimpossible for us to conceive the supreme Being acting otherwise than we\nactually see in nature; and if we recognize in the universe the operation\nof his infinite wisdom and power, it is in the immutable order and\nregularity of all phenomena, and the eternal prevalence of law that we see\ntheir highest manifestation.\u201d\n\nIt is asserted by this writer and a great number of others, that the most\nperfect conception of the universe is that of a machine, which when once\nset into action shall go on eternally grinding out its results without the\nsmallest occasion for the intervention of its Maker. According to this\nview, all the He has to do for the future after the machine is once set\ninto operation, is to retire from the scene of His creative work, and to\ncontemplate the results of its wonderful operations. Any intervention on\nHis part would imply a defect in the construction of the machine. It\nfollows therefore that the most perfect conception of God (if there be\none) is that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally formed\nmatter with its properties and forces acting in conformity with invariable\nlaw, and that this has been done by Him with such perfection, that they\nhave gone on ever since evolving whatever has existed, without the need of\nHis intervention or supervision; or to put it in other words, after the\noriginal act of creation, His presence in the universe may be dispensed\nwith as unnecessary. The universe is therefore a self\u2010acting machine which\ngoes on in an eternal series of self\u2010evolutions.\n\nSuch a conception may be the most worthy one that we can form of a perfect\nmechanist or chemist, though it may be doubtful how far the idea of having\nhis services dispensed with for the future would be wholly satisfactory to\nhim. It is far from clear, however, that it is the most perfect conception\nwe can form of God. The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are\ndestitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral nature,\nconscience, and spiritual affections. They may therefore when completed be\nleft to themselves; and the more perfect the irrational machine may be,\nthe more perfectly it will grind out its results. But many of the\nconstructions of God possess attributes, which exhibit other qualities in\ntheir maker than those of a perfect mechanist or chemist. It follows,\ntherefore, that this is not the most perfect nor the most worthy\nconception which we can form of God.\n\nBut it will be objected that even if we concede that the Creator is ever\npresent energizing in the works of nature, and even if the forces of\nnature are viewed as the expressions of His energy, His action in\nconformity with unchanging order is the worthiest conception of Him, and\nto assert that He ever has varied from this mode of action is to degrade\nHim. Such being the case, to affirm that miracles have been wrought by\nHim, is to introduce a degraded view of the character of God, one alike\ninconsistent with His wisdom, immutability and power.\n\nI reply: that the objection overlooks the existence of purpose in the\ndivine mind, and that it may not be confined to the realization of a\nmechanical result. The purpose or idea of creation in God includes the\nproduction of both the material and the moral worlds. If this be so, one\nharmonious purpose, including the divine manifestations, both in the\nmaterial and moral universe, may be carried out by a succession of\nprogressive manifestations, each forming a portion of one great divine\nplan. A miracle, therefore, as a part of such a moral intervention, would\nbe no interruption of the orderly action of the divine mind, but a portion\nof it.\n\nBut further: if God exists, He must have other attributes besides those of\na mechanist or a chemist. He has created not only the material universe,\nbut a moral one. God, therefore, must be a moral being, and a person, for\nmoral attributes can only be conceived of as belonging to a being who is\npossessed of personality. It follows, therefore, that manifestations of\nHimself, under aspects suitable to moral beings, are as much to be\nexpected as manifestations of His power or of His wisdom addressed to an\nintellectual nature. The supposition, therefore, that all His\nmanifestations can only be made through the laws of material nature, and\nin an unchanging series, and that it is not a portion of His purpose to\nmanifest Himself as a moral being, is only valid on the denial that He is\none. It involves the absurdity of denying to God that freedom from the\ntrammels of necessary law which as matter of fact He has bestowed on man.\n\nIf therefore God be a moral being and not an impersonal force, it is\nperfectly consistent with the highest conceptions of Him, that He should\nmanifest Himself in the moral as well as in the material universe. This is\nthe more necessary, because philosophy is never wearied with telling us,\nthat we can know little or nothing of His moral attributes from material\nnature. As a part of such manifestation a miracle is addressed to our\nhighest reason.\n\nIt is absurd to argue on the assumption that there is a God, and then to\nfound our reasonings on principles which are inconsistent with it. If\nthere is a God, He must be the creator of the universe. It must,\ntherefore, have been consistent with His perfection and immutability to\ncreate. It follows, therefore, even on the assumption of the truth of the\nDarwinian theory of creation, that a new order must have been introduced,\nwhen God first breathed life into the lowest forms of matter. But if He\nintroduced a new order then, that is to say, when He first deviated from\nthe previous order of His existence, and performed His first creative act,\nhow can it possibly be contrary to reason to affirm that He has repeated\nit. A miracle would be such a repetition, or, in other words, the\nintroduction of a new series of events.\n\nI fully admit that reason is opposed to the supposition of such an order\nof nature as to require repeated interferences with it, assuming that what\nis intended is a frequent meddling with it to set it right, not constant\npresence and superintendence. Still more is it opposed to the idea of\narbitrary interruption of law. The entire validity of these reasonings\nwhich we have been considering proceeds on the assumption that the\nargument requires this. I care not what some Christian apologists may have\nsaid on this subject. The New Testament affirms in the most unequivocal\nlanguage that revelation is the steady carrying out of a pre\u2010determined\npurpose in God to make a manifestation of Himself not only to man, but to\nother rational beings besides man. The objection therefore falls to the\nground.\n\nThe assertion that it is impossible to conceive of the supreme Being\nacting otherwise than we see him act in nature, may be met by a direct\ndenial. On the contrary the presence of evil, moral and physical, forms\nthe greatest difficulty connected with the belief in theism. The elder\nMill was so capable of conceiving that if a supreme Being existed, the\norder of the universe would have been so wholly different from its present\norder, that it led him to affirm that the proof of His existence was\naltogether wanting.(3) But intelligent Christians fully recognize in the\nimmutable order and regularity of the universe and the eternal prevalence\nof law, the operation of His infinite wisdom and power. Unless there was\nsuch a general regularity and order in the universe, the evidential force\nof miracles would be deprived of all value.\n\nIt follows therefore, whichever views we may take of the mode in which a\nmiracle may be performed, that there is nothing in the idea of it which is\ncontrary to our reason. Whenever it is affirmed to be so, the assertion\noriginates in an ambiguity in the use of terms, or in partial views of\nnature, or of the mode of the divine working, or from confounding under a\ncommon name phenomena so different in character as those of mind and\nmatter, or by making assumptions respecting the divine operations which\ncontradict the laws of the universe, or respecting the divine character,\nwhich reason refuses to endorse. How far the known or unknown forces of\nnature may be employed in the performance of a miracle is an abstract\nquestion that we have no means of determining. The agency of some of the\nknown forces of nature is unequivocally asserted in the Old Testament to\nhave been the media employed in the performance of some of its miracles.\nNo such affirmation is made in the New Testament. Still there is not one\nword to imply that any of the forces of material nature were for a single\nmoment suspended in their action. The only assertion made is the presence\nand active energy of a force capable of producing them. That force is the\nCreator of the universe bearing witness to the divine mission of Jesus\nChrist. \u201cThe Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of\nme.\u201d \u201cThe works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works\nthat I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.\u201d (John v. 36,\n37.)\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. THE ALLEGATION THAT NO TESTIMONY CAN PROVE THE TRUTH OF A\nSUPERNATURAL EVENT.\n\n\nHume\u2019s position, which affirmed that it is impossible to prove the truth\nof a supernatural event by any amount of testimony however strong, is\ncertainly one of the most plausible that have ever been assumed by\nunbelief. Stated briefly and in his own words, it is as follows: \u201cA\nmiracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and\nunalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a\nmiracle from the nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from\nexperience can possibly be imagined.\u201d Again: \u201cNo testimony is sufficient\nto establish a miracle unless the testimony is of such a kind that its\nfalsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to\nestablish.\u201d The fallacy of these positions, notwithstanding the plausible\narguments by which they are supported, has already been pointed out by a\nmultitude of writers. Mr. Mill himself has practically abandoned Hume\u2019s\nargument as either a harmless truism, or, in another point of view, one\nthat requires to be modified to such an extent as to deprive it of any\nreal cogency. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, it might be passed\nover in silence.\n\nBut the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d has endeavoured to rehabilitate\nit even against Mr. Mill. He affirms that Christian \u201cApologists find it\nmuch more convenient to evade the simple but effective arguments of Hume,\nthan to answer them; and where it is possible, they dismiss them with a\nsneer, and hasten on to less dangerous ground.\u201d He then endeavours to show\nthat Mr. Mill has been partly misapprehended, and is partly inaccurate;\nand he proceeds to address himself to Paley\u2019s argument against Hume, as\nthough it was relied on by modern apologists as entirely conclusive. No\nother writer is even noticed by him. In the recent work of the late Mr.\nWarington, \u201cCan I believe in miracles?\u201d one chapter is devoted to the calm\nand dispassionate examination of Hume\u2019s argument. It is perhaps the ablest\ndissection of it in existence. Yet this writer, who charges Christian\napologists with evasion, and even with getting rid of its force by a\nsneer, has left Mr. Warington\u2019s crushing reply to Hume completely\nunnoticed. The position taken by him renders a few general observations\nnecessary. As it will be useless to repeat arguments that have been fully\nelaborated elsewhere, I shall content myself with briefly stating the\npositions which have been firmly established on this subject.\n\nFirst: Experience consists of two kinds; 1st, That which has fallen under\nour own direct cognizance, which from the nature of the case must have\nbeen very limited. 2dly, The general experience of all other men, as far\nas we have the means of knowing it. This latter experience we become\nacquainted with exclusively by testimony, and it rests entirely on its\nvalidity. The two together constitute what we mean when we say that a\nthing is, or is not, contrary to experience.\n\nSecondly: There is a sense in which miracles are contrary to our\nexperience. They would be destitute of all evidential value, if they were\nnot so. But while this is freely admitted, we must lay down clearly in\nwhat sense we use the words. They are not so, in the sense that we have\nhad direct evidence of their non\u2010occurrence. They are contrary to our\nexperience only in the sense that we have never witnessed them, and that\nthe order of events which we have witnessed is always different; for\ninstance, we have witnessed as a matter of experience that men die, and\nthat none return again to life; or that blind men, when cured, are never\ncured by a word or a touch. In this sense alone it is that the\nresurrection of a dead man, and the cure of a blind man by a touch, is\ncontrary to our experience.\n\nThirdly: It is not true that an occurrence which in this sense is contrary\nto our experience cannot be believed on adequate testimony. If it were so,\nall additions to our knowledge that lie beyond the limits of our past\nexperience, ought to be rejected. Every extraordinary occurrence must be\nat once pronounced incredible.\n\nFourthly: The experience of one age differs from that of another. That\nwhich lies outside the experience of one century becomes within the\nexperience of the next. The truth is that the sum of human experience is\nreceiving continual additions, in proportion as the sphere of observation\nenlarges. If it is true that we ought to reject everything contrary to\nexperience, it follows that if many of the inventions of the present age\nhad been reported in a previous one, they ought to have been rejected as\nincredible. For example: if a century ago it had been affirmed that a\nmessage had actually been conveyed one thousand miles in five minutes, the\nassertion ought on this principle to have been rejected as contrary to the\nuniversal experience of mankind. In an earlier age, no miracle could have\nbeen more difficult to believe. Yet although contrary to prior experience,\nit has been established as a fact. The principle, therefore, as laid down\nby Hume, leads to an absurd conclusion.\n\nFifthly: The experience of each individual is limited by his own\nobservation and what he has learned respecting that of others. This\nconstitutes as far as he is concerned the experience of mankind. Now,\nunder the Equator the experience of man is that each day and night is\ntwelve hours long. Neither he, nor his ancestors, nor any person whom he\ntrusts, have ever had any other experience than this. To him, therefore,\nthe affirmation that there is a place on the earth where each day and\nnight is six months long, is contrary to experience, and ought to be\nrejected as a fable.\n\nSixthly: If we confine experience to scientific experience, extraordinary\ndiscoveries are made and facts established in one age which are contrary\nto that of a former one. On this principle, the ground on which Herodotus\nrejected the story of the Ph\u0153nician navigators that they had sailed round\nAfrica was satisfactory. It was contrary to his experience that they\nshould have seen the sun in the position in which they affirmed that they\nhad seen it, though it is not contrary to ours.\n\nSeventhly: Miracles viewed as mere _phenomena_ stand on exactly the same\nground as very unusual occurrences, or very wonderful discoveries. As far\nas they are contrary to past experience, they are alike credible or\nincredible. They are events of which the cause is unknown, but may or may\nnot hereafter be discovered. It is quite true that any extraordinary\nphenomenon requires a stronger testimony to render it credible than an\nordinary occurrence. But this involves no question of abstract possibility\nor impossibility, but is one purely of evidence, each case having to be\ndecided on its own merits. It must be carefully observed that when we\naffirm that this or that matter lies within human knowledge, or is\ncontrary to it, experience has to do with phenomena alone. All questions\nof causation lie entirely beyond its cognizance.\n\nEighthly: The moment we view an event otherwise than as a mere phenomenon,\nand take into consideration the causes producing it, however unusual it\nmay be, it is impossible to affirm that it is contrary to experience. When\nwe take these into consideration the entire character of the event is at\nonce changed, and the probability of the occurrence must be estimated on\nwholly different grounds. Under such circumstances, an extremely\nimprobable event, which we might otherwise justly reject as contrary to\nexperience, becomes simply one of which we have had no experience. Thus it\nis contrary to experience that men can live for one hour under water, but\nwhen we take into consideration and thoroughly understand the contrivance\nof the diving\u2010bell, the event becomes one of a different order from that\nof which we supposed that we had experience. Before this apparatus was\ninvented, the assertion that men could live an hour under water would have\nbeen rejected as fabulous. The invention has introduced a fresh condition\ninto the case. The event has now become a portion of our experience; but\nprior to the discovery of the apparatus it was merely an event lying\noutside our experience, and not to be rejected as being contrary to it. In\na similar way, a miracle, as a mere phenomenon, may be said to be contrary\nto our experience; but the moment that we take into account its true\ncharacter, viz. that its very conception implies the presence of a force\nof some kind with which we were previously unacquainted, then such an\nevent is no longer one which we can pronounce contrary to our experience,\nbut merely one which lies beyond or outside it. In the case of miracles,\ntherefore, the position of Hume is inapplicable.\n\nNinthly: It is not true that in estimating the truth of testimony, we\nsimply balance probability, against probability, as stated in Hume\u2019s\nargument. The form in which it has been put by him is too abstract to\nadmit of application to individual cases; nor does any man, in estimating\nthe truth of testimony for practical purposes, set down and deliberately\nbalance probabilities against probabilities. The whole process is of a far\nmore instantaneous character, and a number of minute considerations are\ninvolved, which do not admit of statement in the form of general\npropositions. Thus, if an event lying outside my present experience is\nreported to me by a friend on whose veracity and powers of judgment I have\nimplicit reliance, I accept the truth of his statement, notwithstanding a\ngreat degree of abstract improbability; it being assumed that the event\nwas one in which it was impossible that he should be deceived. In\nestimating this latter point, we never balance the probabilities as to the\ntruth or falsehood of human testimony, but we consider the individual\ncircumstances of the case, whether they are of such a nature that our\nfriend could be deceived about them. If on consideration we are convinced\nthat deception was impossible, we yield assent to his known veracity,\nalthough, as far as we know, the event reported by him has never before\ncome within the range of human experience.\n\nLet me remove the question from an abstract into a concrete form. There\nare numberless events in which it happens that men of unquestionable\njudgment and veracity are deceived. There are others in which no deception\ncan be possible. An instance of one class is the alleged case of persons\nliving a considerable time without food. Here astuteness may impose on the\nvigilance of the most wary. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man\nborn blind. One informant, on whose veracity we have the fullest reliance,\ntells us that he has known the man from his birth; that, up to a certain\nday, his blindness was established beyond all reasonable doubt to every\none who knew him, that on that day, he saw a person touch the eyes of the\nblind man, who not only instantly received his sight, but could use his\neyes as perfectly as those who had enjoyed the use of them from birth. I\nadmit that this case is a supposed one, and does not exactly represent any\ncase recorded in the Gospels. But though an assumed one, it is perfectly\nvalid for the purposes of argument. In it deception would be impossible.\nIf all this was affirmed to have come under the direct knowledge of one,\nof whose veracity and judgment we were assured, we should accept his\nstatement as true, without balancing the abstract probability of the truth\nof evidence against the probability of its falsity, although the event\nnarrated lay outside the range of our experience. Our knowledge of the\njudgment and veracity of the informant is the essential element in judging\nof the truth of evidence. It is only when our means of forming this\njudgment are deficient that we attempt to balance abstract probabilities.\n\nTenthly: The question of the truth of testimony as against past experience\nand the alleged greater probability that testimony should be false, than\nthat past experience should be unreliable, is greatly modified by the\nconsideration that an overwhelming amount of the sum total of past\nexperience rests for its acceptance on the validity of testimony itself.\nThat portion which is not the result of our own individual experience\nrests for its truth exclusively on the validity of human testimony, and\nmust be unreliable in proportion as testimony is invalid. It must be\nobserved, however, that I by no means deny that testimony is much more\nfrequently invalid in its narrations of extraordinary events than of\nordinary ones.\n\nEleventhly: While it is freely conceded that the evidence to prove the\ntruth of a very extraordinary occurrence must be far stronger than that\nwhich is required to prove an ordinary one, it must never be forgotten\nthat the amount of evidence necessary to prove any particular fact always\nvaries with the amount of the antecedent probability of its occurrence.\nThe very same action may be credible or otherwise, just in proportion as\nwe can discern an adequate purpose for its performance, or infer the\npresence of a particular motive. If, for example, it were reported that a\nman of the highest character had been seen during the hours of early\nmorning issuing from one of the lowest haunts of vice in London, those who\nknew him well would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to\nestablish the truth of the assertion. They would undoubtedly fall back on\nthe question of abstract probability, and argue that it was more likely\nthat it was either a case of mistaken identity (a very common error), or a\ndeliberate falsehood, than that the statement should be true. But, if, on\nthe contrary, it could be shown that he had been sent for to visit a dying\nperson, and had gone at his particular request, the whole of the\nantecedent improbability would vanish, and the otherwise incredible\ntestimony would become perfectly credible. It follows, therefore, that the\ncredibility of testimony varies with our knowledge of the motive for the\nperformance of the action.\n\nThis consideration ought to have due weight in considering the evidence of\nmiracles. Viewed as mere phenomena, their abstract improbability is great.\nWhen they are viewed as deviations from the ordinary course of nature,\ntheir improbability becomes still greater. But those who believe in the\nexistence of a personal God energizing in the universe at every moment,\nand in every place, postulate the presence of a force fully adequate to\nwork them, for this is involved in the idea of God. But the question\narises, Will He? Until a well\u2010attested miracle has actually been\nperformed, the antecedent probability derived from our experience of the\norder of nature is against the supposition that He will, and throws on the\nreporter the necessity of giving a stronger proof than we require for an\nordinary fact. But in proportion as we can show that it is probable that\nGod will make a revelation, the antecedent improbability of a miracle is\ndiminished; and if it can be shown that it is very probable that He will\ndo so, it wholly disappears.\n\nIt will be readily admitted that such an argument can only have weight\nwith a believer in the existence of a God, who is the moral Governor of\nthe Universe. To him, however, it is of the utmost value, for on the\nsupposition in question, the probability of some higher manifestation of\nthe divine character than that displayed in the material universe does not\nrest on theory, but on the facts of man and his condition. Looking at the\npast history of the world, it is matter of fact that God has made higher\nand higher manifestations of himself. So far it is antecedently probable\nthat He will continue to do so. His last manifestation has been in the\nproduction of a being possessed of a moral nature, with powers capable of\nimmense elevation. It is also no theory, but a fact, that this moral being\nnow is, and ever has been within the historical periods in a state of\ngreat imperfection. It is therefore highly probable that the Creator will\nadopt means for elevating the moral being whom He has created, and that He\nwill effect this by acting, not on matter, but on mind. Contemplating the\nactual state of man, the known law of the Creator\u2019s previous action, and\nthe moral character of God, the antecedent probability that God will make\na further manifestation of himself is established quite independently of\nthe facts or assertions in the Bible.\n\nTwelfthly: Whatever be the supposed antecedent improbability of an\noccurrence, it is capable of being overcome by an amount of evidence which\ncan leave no reasonable doubt in a mind endowed with common sense.\nTheoretical objections may be adduced against any evidence which can be\nbrought in proof of particular facts, but the ultimate appeal must be, not\nto a multitude of abstract theories, but to the common sense of mankind.\nOf this character is all historical evidence. It rests on the same\nprinciples as those which guide us in the affairs of daily life. There is\na certain amount of evidence which leaves no doubt on the common sense of\nmankind, although it may be open to many theoretical objections. Such\nevidence is capable of proving a fact against a very high degree of\nantecedent improbability. Mr. Mill may be considered as a witness whose\npredilections were all in favour of unbelief. Yet his clear logical mind\nhas led him to state the case fairly as far as the _\u00e0 priori_ probability\nor improbability of miracles is concerned. His conclusions are adverse to\nthe position assumed by the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion.\u201d I will\nbriefly state the most important of Mr. Mill\u2019s positions.\n\nFirst. He points out that a miracle involves nothing contradictory to any\nlaw of causation. He well remarks that to prove such a contradiction, it\nis not only necessary that the cause should exist without producing the\neffect, but that no contravening cause should be present. But the very\nidea of a miracle presupposes an adequate contravening cause, _i.e._ God.\nThe possibility of a miracle therefore cannot be denied on the ground that\nit does not presuppose the presence of a force adequate to produce it. Mr.\nMill states, \u201cOf the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no\ndoubt, and the only antecedent improbability that can be objected to a\nmiracle, is the improbability that any such cause existed,\u201d that is to\nsay, the whole controversy resolves itself into the question between\nPantheism and Atheism on the one hand, and Theism on the other.\n\nSecondly. He observes: \u201cAll therefore that Hume has made out, and this he\nmust be considered to have made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect\nstate of our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it always\npossible that some of the physical antecedents may have been hidden from\nus) no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously\nbelieve in the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power, or\nwho believes himself to have full proof that the character of the being\nwhom he recognises is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere\non the occasion in question. If we do not already believe in supernatural\nagencies, no miracle can prove to us their existence. The miracle itself,\nconsidered as an extraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by\nour senses, or by testimony; but nothing can ever prove that it is a\nmiracle: there is still another possible hypothesis, that of its being the\nresult of some unknown cause; and this possibility cannot be so completely\nshut out, as to leave no alternative but that of admitting the existence\nof a being superior to nature. Those, however, who already believe in such\na being have two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural and an unknown\nnatural agency; and they have to judge which of the two is the most\nprobable in this particular case.\u201d\n\nIt is impossible to deny that this is a correct statement of the question.\nHume\u2019s position is a generalized statement, that no evidence can establish\nthe reality of a miracle, on the ground that our experience of the\nuniformity of nature\u2019s laws is so firm and unalterable, that no amount of\ntestimony can establish a fact in opposition to it; or as he elsewhere\nputs it, \u201cunless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would\nbe more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.\u201d He\naffirms this to be equally true on the principles of Atheism, Pantheism,\nor Theism, for the only thing that he takes into account is the inadequacy\nof the testimony, and not the inadequacy of the cause. Mr. Mill therefore\nsays correctly that all that this argument avails to prove is, that it is\nimpossible to prove a miracle, except to persons who are already convinced\nthat a being or beings exist who are possessed of supernatural powers, and\nthat it is in conformity with their character to work one. If this is the\nonly intelligible meaning of Hume\u2019s position (and it is evident that it\nis), it reduces his argument against miracles to a very harmless one. The\nconception of a miracle as distinct from an unusual phenomenon implies\npurpose. Purpose is only conceivable of a being possessed of personality\nand will. To those therefore who either deny the existence of any such\nbeing higher than man, or who affirm that we have no evidence of his\nexistence, it is impossible to prove a miracle _as a miracle_. The utmost\nthat could be done would be to prove that an event had taken place in\nnature which in the present state of our knowledge could be assigned to no\nknown cause. In such a case the Pantheist and the Atheist have always the\nalternative of believing that the event in question must be due to the\noperation of some unknown force in nature, but which in the gradual\ndevelopment of knowledge we may hereafter be able to detect. This is a\nposition that no defender of revelation worthy of the name can be anxious\nto dispute. Let it further be observed that Mr. Mill does not deny, but\naffirms, that the occurrence of an extraordinary event analogous to a\nmiracle viewed simply as a phenomenon, may be satisfactorily certified by\nour senses or by testimony. To affirm the contrary would be simply absurd,\nas involving the stereotyping of human thought, and making the wisdom of\nour ancestors the only standard of truth. There was a time when the earth\nwas believed to be an extended plain. If at that time any one had asserted\nthat by continually sailing westward he had at last arrived at the place\nfrom which he started, or, in other words, had circumnavigated the globe,\nthis affirmation ought to have been rejected, not only as founded on\ntestimony contrary to all previous experience, but as intrinsically\nimpossible. Yet if Hume\u2019s dictum has any value as an argument against the\npossibility of a miracle, it must affirm the impossibility of establishing\nsuch an occurrence by any amount of evidence whatever. Mr. Mill\u2019s mind was\nfar too logical not to perceive that such a position is altogether\nuntenable.\n\nMr. Mill, however, affirms that there is one ground on which the argument\nmight be tenable against a theist, not because the evidence is\ninsufficient to prove the occurrence of an extraordinary fact, as a mere\nphenomenon, but because it could not prove it to be a miracle. It is not\nonly necessary, says he, in order to render this proof valid, that one\nshould believe in the existence of a supernatural being who is able to\nbring about the occurrence, but also that \u201cthe character of this Being is\nnot inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in\nquestion.\u201d Thus a man may be a believer in the existence of God, and yet\nbe persuaded that it was not consistent with his character to interfere\nwith the course of natural phenomena at all, or in such a manner as the\nconception of a miracle pre\u2010supposes. To such a theist the utmost that\nevidence could prove would be, that the extraordinary event had been\nbrought about by the action of an unknown force. Again, the same principle\nacts, and acts reasonably, on the minds of multitudes of intelligent\nChristians, who summarily reject a certain class of reported miracles\nwithout inquiring into their evidence, on the ground that the working of\nsuch miracles is inconsistent with their conceptions of the divine\ncharacter; that is to say, they think it more probable that the stories\nshould be untrue, than that God should work in the way in question. But to\ngive this argument any validity against the miracles wrought in\nattestation of Christianity, it must be proved that it is inconsistent\nwith the divine character to make a revelation, or to introduce a\ndeviation from what is to us the ordinary mode of His working; or that the\nmiracles recorded in the Gospels are repugnant to the character of God.\n\nMr. Mill\u2019s general position is therefore incontrovertible, that those who\nbelieve in the existence of God \u201chave two hypotheses to choose from, viz.\na supernatural, or an unknown natural agency;\u201d and that they must judge\nwhich of these two is the more probable; and that, in forming their\njudgment, a most important consideration must be the character of God, and\nthe conformity of the supposed event to that character. This position\nevery intelligent Christian will readily accept.\n\nMr. Mill adds: \u201cBut with the knowledge which we now possess of the general\nuniformity of the course of nature, religion, following in the wake of\nscience, has been compelled to acknowledge the government of the universe,\nas being on the whole carried on by general laws, and not by special\ninterpositions. To whosoever holds this belief, there is a general\npresumption against any supposition of divine agency, not operating\nthrough general laws; or, in other words, there is an antecedent\nimprobability in every miracle, which in order to outweigh it, requires an\nextraordinary strength of antecedent probability derived from the special\ncircumstances of the case.\u201d These observations require consideration.\n\nThere is no doubt that the polytheistic religions postulated the existence\nof a vast number of superhuman beings by whose agency and caprice many\nnatural occurrences were brought about. Such a belief indicates a very\nimperfect conception of \u201corder\u201d in nature. But these supposed\ninterferences with it would by no means realize the notion of what we now\ndesignate a miracle, the very idea of which implies an order in nature to\nwhich the miracle forms an exception. If there is no order in nature,\nthere can be no miracle.\n\nThe Hebrew monotheism involved conceptions directly opposite to this. It\nviewed the action of God as the foundation of all the forces in nature.\nWhilst above and outside nature, He was everywhere present in nature. Its\nforces were the expressions of the energy of His will. Its order (for the\nHebrew recognised a high order in nature) was the result of His good\npleasure, and due to His constant working. In the Old Testament the\ncommonest events in nature are no less ascribed to God than those which we\ndesignate miraculous. A Hebrew never conceived of a miracle as a deviation\nfrom the divine order, but as a consistent carrying out of a divine\npurpose in the government of the world. A modern conception of theism\ndiffers from this in supposing that there are certain forces in material\nnature which, when once called into action, go on energizing without any\ndirect intervention of God. But when this conception comes to be minutely\nanalysed, if we believe in a God, it is impossible to conceive of force,\nat least in its ultimate form, except as a direct expression of the divine\nenergy.\n\nScience has so far modified religious thought on this subject, that while\nit still continues to hold that the various forces in nature are modes of\nthe divine acting, it nevertheless believes that God does not deviate from\nhis predetermined course for the purpose of meeting what we are pleased to\ncall special contingencies. The divine action is, in fact, not altered to\nmeet man\u2019s convenience, and His government is carried on as far as it lies\nwithin our cognisance by the general forces of nature. God acts in nature\nin conformity with a definite law, and from that He will not deviate,\nwhatever consequences man\u2019s ignorance or disregard of his mode of action\nmay bring upon him. Mr. Mill observes that to any person holding this\nbelief, there is a general presumption against any supposition of divine\nagency, not operating through general laws. That is to say, we have had a\nconstant experience of his acting through general laws; and no experience\nof his acting otherwise. But the idea of a revelation introduces a factor\ninto the case, entirely different from anything of which we have had\nprevious experience. It forms part of a great purpose existing in the\ndivine mind, and is in its nature analogous to the first introduction of\nlife, or the first creation of a free moral agent. Respecting the laws by\nwhich God regulates his creative acts, we are ignorant. Yet the theist\nfirmly believes in creative acts of some kind, and that they are regulated\nby law. In this ignorance of God\u2019s law of creation, it is impossible to\naffirm that it is antecedently improbable that in making a fresh\nmanifestation of himself, he will operate only through those general laws,\nwhich are the ordinary manifestations of his will.\n\nThere is some want of clearness in Mr. Mill\u2019s expression, that in order to\noutweigh the antecedent improbability of miracles, arising from those\nmodes of the divine action which fall within the limits of our experience,\nan extraordinary strength of antecedent probability, derived from the\nspecial circumstances of the case, is required. If by this antecedent\nprobability he means something such as has been above referred to, there\ncan be no objection to his statement. He ought to have observed, however,\nthat the antecedent improbability which may be supposed to belong to\nmiracles, only attaches to them while contemplated as phenomena, and that\nsuch an improbability readily yields to positive evidence. This is\nvirtually admitted in a subsequent sentence. \u201cAccording as this\ncircumstance, viz. the unknown cause, not having previously manifested\nitself in action, or the falsity of the testimony, appears more\nimprobable; that is, conflicts with an approximate generalization of a\nhigher order, we believe the testimony or disbelieve it with a stronger or\nweaker degree of conviction, according to the preponderance, at least\nuntil we have sifted the matter further.\u201d \u201cThis,\u201d says the author of\n\u201cSupernatural Religion,\u201d \u201cis precisely Hume\u2019s argument, weakened by the\nintroduction of reservations which have no cogency.\u201d We say, this is\nprecisely what Hume\u2019s argument is _not_, for, if it be valid, the whole\nquestion of miracles may be summarily dismissed without any inquiry into\nthe evidence on which they rest.\n\nStill, however, as the author affirms and endeavours to prove that Mr.\nMill\u2019s position leave Hume\u2019s argument untouched, a few further\nobservations will be necessary. Hume\u2019s statement is, \u201cA miracle is a\nviolation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience\nhas established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the nature of\nthe fact, is as entire as any argument from experience which can possibly\nbe imagined.\u201d\n\nI reply, that the conception of a miracle does not involve any necessary\nviolation of the laws of nature. All that it implies is the presence of\nanother force different from those which have come under our cognisance:\nand this may act so as to produce the miracle without violating one of\nnature\u2019s laws. But, it is added, \u201cuniform and unalterable experience has\nestablished these laws.\u201d What has this experience really established? It\nis this, and this only, Given the presence of certain forces, _and no\nothers_, certain results invariably follow. But experience cannot tell us\nanything, as to what would be the law of nature, if some other force were\nin action; nor is it able to say one word as to the non\u2010existence of any\nforce which has not come under its observation. Abstractedly, it is true\nthat the argument against a miracle is as entire as any argument from\nexperience can be imagined, because experience really supplies us with no\nbasis for argumentation in the case. Prior to the invention of railways\nand the discovery of the uses to which steam can be applied, the argument\nfrom experience was equally valid against the possibility of travelling in\na carriage not propelled by animal force. In each case a new force enters\ninto the conditions, of which experience is unable to take cognisance.\n\n\u201cWhy is it more probable that all men must die?\u201d asks this writer, \u201cor\nthat lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; or that fire\nconsumes wood, and is extinguished by water, unless it be that these\nevents are found agreeable to nature, and there is required a violation of\nits laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent them?\u201d I answer that it\nis probable that all men must die, because we observe under the action of\nthe known forces of nature that all men do die. But this says nothing as\nto what must take place if another force was present; or a combination of\nexisting forces was discovered sufficiently potent to counteract the\naction of those which in the present state of things bring about the\ndissolution of man\u2019s frame. There is no necessity, for the purpose of\neffecting this, that one of the existing forces should be suspended. The\ntime was, when certain forms of disease invariably resulted in death. The\nadvance of medical science has averted this result. Ought the discovery to\nhave been rejected because it pretended to produce a fact contrary to\nprior experience? Are any of the laws of nature violated, or are its\nforces suspended in such a case? What has taken place? Man has discovered\nagencies which have neutralized the effect of other agencies. Our belief\nthat all men must die rests on the assumption that no force can or will at\nany future time be brought into action which will counteract the forces\nnow in operation by which that event is produced.\n\nThe same remark applies to the other three cases. To the second of them\nthe author has himself supplied the answer: \u201cLead cannot of itself remain\nsuspended in the air.\u201d Doubtless, it cannot _of itself_. Who ever supposed\nthat it could? But it can be suspended when a force adequate to counteract\nthat of gravitation is present. So fire will always consume wood, or be\nextinguished by water, as long as no other forces but the usual ones are\nin operation. But man has already invented the means of producing\ncombustion under water. No violation of nature\u2019s laws is required in any\nof these cases. Nor is there any required in a miracle. The fact is, that\nthere is an assumption in all arguments of this kind, which for obvious\nreasons is not openly avowed, but which alone imparts to them an apparent\nvalidity. \u201cNo such force can exist,\u201d which translated into other language\nis identical with the proposition, \u201cThere is no God.\u201d To keep this\nassumption in the background, when the very basis of the argument for\nmiracles is the assumption that there is one, is a course which can lead\nto no good result.\n\nBut the author remarks further: \u201cThere must, therefore, be a uniform\nexperience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event could not\nmerit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof,\nthere is hence a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact,\nagainst the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed,\nor the miracle rendered credible, by any opposite proof which is\nsuperior.\u201d\n\nHere again we encounter the same faults of reasoning, which amount to a\nvirtual assumption of the point at issue. \u201cThere must be a uniform\nexperience against any miraculous event, otherwise it would not merit the\nappellation\u2014doubtless.\u201d But what is the nature of this uniform experience?\nExactly this, that the ordinary forces acting around us being present, and\nnone other, the event has not, and therefore cannot take place. But this\nis not involved in the idea of a miracle. It assumes the presence of\nanother force, viz. God. But what then? The objector will urge that we\nhave had no experience of the existence of any such force. Is it to be\nurged, that no force can exist, except those of which we have had\nexperience, or any combination of forces now in action, different from the\npresent? The men of a former century were equally entitled to make the\nsame assumption. If they had done so, it would follow, that if the\ndiscoverers of America had found our present railway system in full\noperation, and reported it to be so, the contemporaries of Columbus would\nhave been justified in treating him as an impostor.\n\nBut the author further observes: \u201cMr. Mill qualifies his admission\nrespecting the effect of the alleged counteracting cause, by the all\nimportant words \u2018_if present_;\u2019 for in order to be valid, the reality of\nthe alleged counteracting cause must be established, which is impossible;\ntherefore the objection falls to the ground. No one knows better than Mr.\nMill, that the assertion of a personal deity working miracles, upon which\na miracle is allowed for a moment to come into court, cannot be proved;\nand therefore, that it cannot stand in opposition to a complete induction\nwhich Hume takes as his standard.\u201d\n\nThis passage strikes us as an extraordinary one to have been written by\nany one who possesses the logical powers of the author. We are dealing\nwith a formal argument with a view of testing its validity, we have the\nfullest right to test it by a supposed case. That supposed case is the\npresence of an unknown cause, or an unknown combination of known causes,\nor the presence of a personal deity. If the argument breaks down under the\napplication of these tests, it is worthless. Does the author mean to say,\nthat it is necessary to prove every assumption to be a fact, before it can\nbe used in argument? How about the assumptions in Euclid? I submit that\nthe reasoning is by no means vitiated by the assumption, and consequently\nthat by the application of the same principles of reasoning, Hume\u2019s\nargument falls to pieces. In one sense the words \u201cif present\u201d are all\nimportant, yet it is not necessary to prove the fact in order to establish\nthe validity of the reasoning, which is entirely independent of the truth\nof the assumption. Has the author never heard of contingent reasoning in\nwhich both antecedent and consequent may be false, but the proposition\nvalid?\n\n\u201cNo one knows,\u201d again says the author, \u201cbetter than Mr. Mill, that the\nallegation of a personal God working miracles, upon which a miracle is for\na moment allowed to come into court, cannot be proved.\u201d It seems then\nafter all that we are reasoning with a person who rejects theism; although\nhe has been dealing with the question on principles which assume its\ntruth. In arguing a question of this kind it is necessary to be\nconsistent, and take our stand either on the principles of theism, or on\nthose of pantheism or atheism, and not to fall back on either as the\nexigencies of the case demand. Least of all should this be done by a\nwriter who charges the defenders of Christianity with shifting their\nground to suit the necessities of their argument.\n\nBut is the case correctly stated? No doubt that the conception of a\npersonal God is essential to it. But that of a personal God actually\nworking miracles forms no portion of it. If this were assumed, the entire\nreasoning would be a _petitio principii_. We are considering whether\nmiracles are possible; or if, supposing one to be wrought, it can be\nestablished by evidence. All that we assume is, that God _can_ work\nmiracles, not that He has wrought them. Whether we can prove by good\nevidence that He has wrought miracles, is quite independent of the present\nquestion.\n\n\u201cNo one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the assertion of a personal deity\nworking miracles cannot be proved.\u201d It is perfectly true that Mr. Mill\nbelieved that the evidence adduced to prove the being of a personal God\nwas insufficient, and that respecting the origin of all things, nothing\ncan be known. But yet it is impossible to treat the existence of a\npersonal God as a bare assumption. \u201cIt is impossible to be proved,\u201d says\nthe author. But to whom? To minds constituted like Mr. Mill\u2019s. The\nevidence that a personal God exists has appeared irresistible to an\noverwhelming majority of mankind, including a great majority of minds\ngifted with equal, and even with greater powers than that of Mr. Mill. One\nmight imagine from the mode in which this point is here represented, that\nthe belief in the existence of a personal God was exploded among all men\nof intellect, and that the proofs adduced for it were unworthy of\nattention. Surely the question of miracles has a legitimate place in the\ncourt which tries the issue of their truth or falsehood.\n\nOne more point requires notice. Hume says, \u201cThough the being, to whom the\nmiracle is attributed be in this case Almighty, it does not on that\naccount become a whit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know\nthe attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the\nexperience which we have of his productions in the usual course of\nnature.\u201d\n\nThis position involves an evident fallacy. It is also one which underlies\none or two of the statements of Mr. Mill, whose philosophical theory of\nnecessity was one almost certain to involve him in it. The statement is,\nthat it is impossible to know either the attributes or the actions of such\na being, except from our experience of his productions in the course of\nnature. What is the course of nature here intended? does it include mind\nas well as matter? If the former is included, and we attain our knowledge\nof God from that source\u2014and every theist maintains that our chief\nknowledge of God is derived from it\u2014then the experience we have of man\nleads us to infer the presence of certain moral attributes in God; and\nthere is nothing in that experience which renders the performance of a\nmiracle inconceivable or impossible\u2014but as far as that experience is\nconcerned, it is rendered antecedently probable. What is included, I again\nask, in nature? Are _we_, the percipient beings ourselves? Whether we are\nregarded as included or excluded from nature, it is evident that a\nconsiderable portion of our knowledge of the divine character is derived\nfrom the contemplation of our own being. God is more manifested in our\nrationality, \u201cpersonality,\u201d freedom, and conscience, than in the material\nforces and laws of nature. To perform a miracle therefore is consistent\nwith what we know of His character.\n\nThese observations will render it unnecessary for me to examine in detail\nthe writer\u2019s observations on Paley\u2019s arguments against Hume. Even if his\narguments are not perfectly conclusive, their failure does not establish\nthe truth of Hume\u2019s positions, or invalidate the refutation of them by\nothers. As the object of this author is to re\u2010establish the validity of\nHume\u2019s argument, he ought not to have confined himself to Paley, whose\nmind was little adapted to the investigation of purely logical or\nmetaphysical questions, but to have noticed the argument of the numerous\nsubsequent writers who have more fully handled the subject.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. THE OBJECTION THAT THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY ASSUME\nCERTAIN FACTS THE TRUTH OF WHICH CAN ONLY BE KNOWN BY REVELATION, AND THEN\nREASON FROM THOSE FACTS TO THE TRUTH OF THE BIBLE, CONSIDERED.\n\n\nIt has been objected that the very idea of such a revelation as that of\nChristianity implies a defect on the part of the Creator in the original\nconstruction of the Universe, and that He has been under the necessity of\ninterposing for the purpose of correcting this defect. It is affirmed that\ndivines endeavour to prove that a revelation was probable by first\nassuming a number of the most irrational propositions, which, if true, can\nonly be proved to be so by the authority of the Bible, and then arguing\nback again that it is highly probable that God would interfere to remedy\nthe defects of his creative work by a supernatural revelation; in other\nwords, that they assume a state of things which reason would pronounce to\nbe incredible, unless their truth was asserted in the Bible, and then\nargue on the principles of that reason whose validity they deny, that it\nis probable that the Creator would interfere to remedy a state of things\nthe existence of which reason pronounces to be incredible.\n\nThe author of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d has strongly urged this argument,\nand placed the difficulty clearly before us. Although the entire passage\nis too long for quotation, yet as it is important that we should have the\nquestion which he raises before us in his own words, I will cite a portion\nof it.\n\n\u201cHere again the argument is based on an assumption. The supposition of a\ndivine design in a revelation is the result of a foregone conclusion in\nits favour, and not suggested by antecedent probability. Divines assume\nthat a communication of this nature is in accordance with reason, and was\nnecessary for the salvation of the human race simply because they believe\nthat it took place, and no evidence worthy of the name is ever offered in\nsupport of the assumption. A revelation having, it is supposed, been made,\nthat revelation is consequently supposed to have been contemplated, and to\nhave justified any suspension of the order of nature. The proposition for\nwhich evidence is demanded is necessarily employed as evidence for itself.\nThe considerations involved in the assumption of the necessity and\nreasonableness of such a revelation, however, are antecedently incredible\nand contrary to reason. We are asked to believe that God made man in His\nown image, pure and sinless, and intended him to continue so; but scarcely\nhad His noblest work left the hand of his Creator, than man was tempted\ninto sin by Satan, the all\u2010powerful and persistent enemy of God, whose\nexistence and antagonism to a being in whose eyes sin is an abomination,\nare not accounted for and are incredible. Adam\u2019s fall brought a curse upon\nthe earth, and incurred the penalty of death for himself and for the whole\nof his posterity. The human race thus created perfect and without sin,\nthus disappointed the expectations of the Creator, and became daily more\nwicked, the evil spirit having succeeded in frustrating the designs of the\nAlmighty, so that God repented that he had made man, and at length he\ndestroyed by a deluge all the inhabitants of the earth, with the exception\nof eight persons who feared him. This sweeping purification, however, was\nas futile as the original design, and the race of man soon became more\nwicked than ever.\u201d Here follows a statement of what may be regarded as a\nplan of salvation as held by some modern Churches, and the apparent\ncontradiction of the whole to the divine character and perfections is\nelaborately pointed out. He then concludes as follows: \u201cWe are asked to\nbelieve in the frustration of the divine design of creation, and in the\nfall of man into a state of wickedness hateful to God, requiring and\njustifying the divine design of a revelation, and such a revelation as\nthis, as a preliminary to the further proposition that on the supposition\nof such a design miracles would not be contrary to reason.\u201d To this\nfollows an elaborate piece of reasoning, by which the author attempts to\nprove that every proposition in this so\u2010called plan of salvation is\nthoroughly contrary to reason.\n\nThe general positions laid down in this passage (omitting points of\ndetail) are as follows: Certain incredible occurrences in the past history\nof man are assumed by divines to be facts on the authority of the Bible.\nThese include the complete breaking down of the divine plan in the\ncreation of man through the agency of a being who has frustrated the\npurposes of the Almighty. Next it is asserted on the same authority that\nanother series of events has taken place which are in the highest degree\ncontrary to reason, for the purpose of remedying this failure of the\noriginal plan. Then it is alleged that the probability of a divine\ninterference, in order to remedy a state of things which reason pronounces\nto be incredible, is argued on the authority of reason for the purpose of\nproving the occurrence of another state of things equally repugnant to\nreason. Such a line of argument is affirmed to begin in irrational\nassumptions, and to terminate in a vicious circle.\n\nI have before observed that the work from which the above passage is\ntaken, although entitled \u201cSupernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the\nreality of Divine Revelation,\u201d is really an attack on the central position\nof the New Testament, the historical value of the Gospels. In taking this\ncourse the author raises an intelligible issue instead of spreading the\nargument over an endless mass of controversial matter. If the historical\ncharacter of the Gospels cannot be maintained, the whole controversy as to\nwhether Christianity is a divine revelation is ended. This forms the key\nof the Christian position, to which the other parts of the controversy\nstand in the relation of mere outworks. If the events recorded in the\nGospels are historical, Christianity must be a divine revelation,\nnotwithstanding the difficulties connected with certain statements of the\nOld Testament. The real point at issue between those who believe and those\nwho deny that God has made a supernatural revelation of Himself, is\nconfined to the following question: Are the contents of the Gospels\nhistorically credible? Is the character of Jesus Christ as depicted in\nthem the delineation of an ideal conception or of an historical reality?\nThe author discerns clearly that this is the turning point of the\ncontroversy, and has accordingly addressed himself to prove that the\nGospels are valueless as historical documents. This line of argument is\ncandid, and one which, if adhered to, will save an immense expenditure of\nreasoning power.\n\nNow the question of the historical character of the Gospels is quite\ndistinct from that of the truth or falsehood of any system of\nEcclesiastical Christianity, which asserts that its theology is a\ndeduction from the Gospels and the other portions of the New Testament. It\nis not revelation itself but a system erected by the application of reason\nto the facts of revelation. It is most important that this distinction\nshould be kept in view. The truth is, that the facts of revelation stand\nin the same relation to theology as the facts of nature do to physical\nscience. Incorrect reasonings respecting both the one and the other are\nalike possible. The Ptolemaic theory was propounded as an adequate\nsolution of the facts and phenomena of the universe, and although utterly\nincorrect in all its parts, it for ages held unlimited sway over the human\nmind. In a similar manner various theories have been propounded as\nsolutions of the facts of revelation, but it by no means follows because\nthey have attained a wide acceptance that they afford the true solution.\nIn examining the claims of the Gospels to be viewed as historical, it is\nquite as much out of place to make them responsible for all the theories\nwhich Ecclesiastical Christianity has propounded respecting the plan of\nsalvation, as it would be to make the facts and phenomena of the universe\nanswerable for all the theories which have been propounded for their\nsolution. In examining the claims of the Gospels to be accepted as\nhistorical documents, it is most unreasonable to make them responsible for\ntheories which were not formulated in the Church until centuries after\ntheir publication.\n\nMost of the positions affirmed in the above quotation were not formulated\nuntil a late period of the Church\u2019s history. Certainly they are nowhere\ndirectly laid down in the New Testament. The utmost which can be asserted\nof them is, that they are alleged to be derived inferentially from its\nteaching. They form no portion of the Apostles\u2019 or of the Nicene Creeds,\nwhich are the only formularies outside of the New Testament which can be\nrepresented as embodying the creed of the universal Church. Nor can they\nbe found even in the Athanasian creed. In discussing the claims of the\nGospels to be esteemed as historical, they can only be made fairly\nresponsible for what they actually contain. To bring into such a\ncontroversy positions only affirmed in recent attempts to formulate a body\nof Christian doctrine, as though they had any bearing on the claims of the\nNew Testament to be viewed as containing a divine revelation, can lead to\nno satisfactory result.\n\nI now return to the consideration of the difficulties above referred to.\nIt is important to take a careful survey of the entire question, because\nthey are not only put with great force in the passage which I have quoted,\nbut I believe that in different forms they weigh heavily on the minds of\nmany thoughtful men. I will first offer a few observations on the general\nprinciple.\n\nNothing is easier than to affirm that the introduction of moral evil into\nthe universe is a marring of the Creator\u2019s plan in its formation. The\nargument is founded on the supposition that an Almighty God exists, who is\nwise, holy, and benevolent, and who intended to manifest these attributes\nthrough the rational beings which he has created. It is affirmed that the\nexistence of moral evil in man is a failure of this purpose on the part of\nGod. But it is the most certain of facts that moral evil does exist in the\nworld, and that it exists quite independently of Christianity. The\nobjection therefore is not one directed solely against the Christianity of\nthe New Testament, but bears with equal weight against every form of\ntheism, which admits that the universe has been created, and is governed\nby a God who is almighty, wise, holy, and benevolent.\n\nIf there be a God who is the Creator of the Universe, it is clear that He\nmust have been the Creator of man, and that man could only have come into\nbeing in conformity with His pleasure. Now, if we decline to admit that\nman was created morally perfect, yet as he must have been created a moral\nagent, it is clear that the first man must have sprung into being either\nwith the moral faculties of a savage, or in some intermediate condition\nbetween these and a state of moral perfection. It follows, therefore, that\nman must have been made capable of moral progress. This is affirmed by all\nthose who assert that he was first produced in a savage state. But the\npossibility of moral progress involves also the possibility of\nretrogression. The truth of this is borne witness to by the most palpable\nfacts of daily experience. Men of the highest mental powers are capable of\nabusing them to the worst purposes, and thus of sinking fearfully low in\nthe moral scale. The case of a man like Fouch\u00e9 will illustrate my\nargument, a man gifted with high intellectual powers, but who sunk into\nthe lowest condition of moral turpitude. Such a man is incomparably worse\nthan the first original savage. I submit, therefore, that whatever view we\nmay take of the condition in which man was originally created, even if he\nwere created a savage, yet he was made a moral being capable of elevation\nor degradation; and that, to use a human metaphor, the purpose of a holy\nGod must have been his elevation. Yet this involves the possibility of his\nmoral degradation. This degradation has also become a fact. It is clear,\ntherefore, that the difficulty is one which is inseparable from every\npossible form of theistic belief, and is no peculiarity of Christianity.\n\nI shall not attempt to enter on so profound a question as the origin of\nevil, and how its existence is consistent with the perfection of a holy\nGod. It is a subject quite beyond the issue before us, and lies not at the\nfoundations of Christianity, but of theism, the truth of which is taken\nfor granted in the objections which the author adduces against the popular\nview of the scriptural account; for if there is no God the objections are\nvalueless. Still he ought to have informed his readers that it is urged as\na partial explanation of those difficulties by the defenders of\nChristianity, that it is highly probable that the creation of a moral\nbeing possessed of free agency, but who at the same time is not capable of\nsinking into a state of moral degradation, involves as great a\ncontradiction as the conception of a circle which should possess the\nproperty of concavity and not of convexity. No rational man believes that\nit is within the compass, even of omnipotence, to work contradictions. If\nthis be so, it follows that the possibility of the existence of moral evil\nis a necessary condition of the existence of free agency. The production\nof a free moral agent capable of yielding a willing obedience to the moral\nlaw is a more glorious work than anything in the material universe, even\nthan that universe itself. It might, therefore, have been the good\npleasure of the wise, holy, and benevolent Creator to create free moral\nagents, even if it involved the existence of moral evil. I am far from\npropounding this as a complete solution of the difficulty, but when it is\nthus used unsparingly against Christianity, it would have been only candid\nto have told the reader that it bore with equal weight against every form\nof theism, and to have given the partial explanation which has been\npropounded by theologians.\n\nIn reply to the definite statements before us, I affirm that nowhere in\nthe Gospels, or in any other portion of the New Testament is it asserted\nor even implied that revelation was rendered necessary by the frustration\nof the divine purpose in creation, or that redemption was a kind of\nafterthought in the divine mind rendered necessary by such a failure. On\nthe contrary, the synoptic Gospels make no affirmation whatever on the\nsubject. The fourth Gospel contains several statements about the end and\npurposes of the Incarnation, but of a description totally different from\nthose which are alleged in the above quotation to constitute the\ngroundwork of Christianity. As I have already shown, the Gospel of St.\nJohn speaks of its great purpose as being a revelation of the moral\ncharacter of God in the person of Jesus Christ. According to its theology\nGod has already manifested himself in creation; in the Gospel He makes a\nstill higher and nobler manifestation of His moral character in the person\nof our Lord. The author of the first Epistle ascribed to St. John, whom I\nmust assume to have been the author of the Gospel, makes the following\ndirect affirmation on the subject. \u201cThat which was from the beginning,\nwhich we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have\nlooked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life; for the life\nwas manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you\nthat eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us;\nthat which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may\nhave fellowship with us: and truly our fellowship is with the Father and\nwith his Son Jesus Christ.\u201d In these words it is evidently the intention\nof the writer to set forth the divine purpose of the Incarnation. It is\ntrue that in other passages he assumes the existence of evil in the\nuniverse, and declares it to be the work of the devil, and that one of the\npurposes of this divine manifestation was its destruction. Still he drops\nno hint of any failure in the Creation, or that it was the purpose of the\nIncarnation to mend a marred scheme. On the contrary, the great truth set\nforth in the Epistle and in the Gospel is that Creation and Redemption\nform portions of one great whole; and that the latter is a manifestation\nof the divine glories beyond God\u2019s previous manifestations of himself,\nwhether in creation or in history.\n\nSimilar are the views of the Apostle Paul. According to him, while many\nother purposes were effected by the Incarnation, there is one great\npurpose running through all divine revelation. In several passages he\naffirms that its influence extends far beyond that which it exerts on the\nrace of man. He again and again asserts that it was the gradual unfolding\nof an idea or purpose which existed from eternity in the divine mind. Thus\nhe writes: \u201cAnd to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery\nwhich from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God who created all\nthings by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now unto the principalities and\npowers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom\nof God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus\nour Lord.\u201d (Eph. iii. and ix.) \u201cHaving made known to us the mystery of His\nwill, according to His good pleasure, which He purposed in Himself, that\nin the dispensation of the fulness of times He might gather in one all\nthings in Christ, both which are in heaven and in earth, even in Him.\u201d\n(Eph. i. 9, 10.) \u201cAnd having made peace by the blood of His cross, by Him\nto reconcile all things unto Himself: by Him, I say, whether they be\nthings in earth or things in heaven.\u201d (Col. i. 20.) I fully admit that the\nApostle affirms that the design of bringing man into union with God was a\nportion of this purpose. Nothing however is more foreign to the ideas of\nSt. Paul than that revelation is an afterthought adopted as a remedy for a\nmarred plan.\n\nNor are the views of the other writers of the New Testament different. St.\nPeter tells us that the angels desire to look into the redemption wrought\nby Christ. St. James assures us that, \u201cknown unto God are all His works\nfrom the foundation of the world.\u201d The author of the Epistle to the\nHebrews speaks to the same effect: \u201cGod, who at sundry times and in divers\nmanners spake in times past unto the fathers in (by) the prophets, hath in\nthese last days spoken unto us in His Son.\u201d So far from its being the idea\nof the sacred writers that redemption is an afterthought designed to\nremedy the failure of the original purpose of creation, that both of them\nare viewed as parts of the same whole; both are purposes which have\nexisted in the divine mind during the eternal ages, and have been\ngradually evolved in time. Nothing is further from their mind than that\nthe divine mode of working is by fits or starts, or sudden interventions.\nMan was the last form of life which God has introduced into the world, and\nin that sense He is said to have rested from His creative work. But God is\nno less distinctly affirmed to be always working in nature and in\nprovidence, so that Sabbath days form no exception: \u201cMy Father worketh\nhitherto and I work.\u201d\n\nSuch being the views of the writers of the New Testament on this subject,\nthe whole of those objections, as far as they are founded on the assertion\nthat revelation is intended to remedy the failure of God\u2019s creative\npurpose, fall to the ground. My present supposition is that I am reasoning\nwith believers in theism. If God has gradually evolved creation, each\nsuccessive stage of the evolution forms a part of one great and\ncomprehensive whole. At each stage the work is incomplete, but its\nincompleteness is no proof of failure. A period has existed when the only\nbeings in the world were devoid of rationality. If an objector could have\ncontemplated it in this stage, he might have urged that the plan of\ncreation was a failure, while in reality it was only incomplete. Man came\nin at the next stage of the great design. The next stage, according to the\nNew Testament, is the Incarnation of the Son of God, intended as a higher\nmanifestation of the moral glories of the Creator for the purpose of\nraising man to a higher moral and spiritual elevation. To the attainment\nof this purpose all the previous events in man\u2019s history have been made\nsubservient. Surely those persons with whom I am reasoning ought to be the\nlast to object that there is anything inconsistent with the divine\ncharacter in such a gradual unfolding of the divine purposes. We might as\nwell object that every advancing stage of the great design of Creation was\nintroduced to remedy a preceding defect as assert that Christianity\noriginated in this cause. The world was in a most unfinished state when it\nwas only tenanted by the lower forms of life, and great fault might have\nbeen found with its construction. But a higher came, and a higher, then\nman, then Christ our Lord, the second Adam, as St. Paul designates him,\n\u201cfrom heaven heavenly.\u201d Whatever may have been the assertions of certain\nclasses of theologians who have attempted to fathom the divine mind by\ntheir own short sounding line, the sacred writers take no narrow view of\nthe purposes of the Incarnation. It is declared that they will be realized\nin the yet distant future, towards which consummation they are gradually\nbeing carried out in time.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the New Testament affirms that a purpose is\nconsistently carried out in the history of redemption far different from\nthat which has been here placed before us as the assumptions of\nEcclesiastical Christianity. The author has placed these in their most\nobjectionable form; and if Christian apologists have affirmed on such\npremises as those above stated that a divine interposition was rendered\nprobable, I shall not attempt to defend them. To establish the probability\nof a revelation additional to that afforded by creation we have no\noccasion to appeal to theories, but to facts.\n\nThe existing moral and spiritual condition of mankind is universally\nadmitted to be imperfect. Both believers and unbelievers in revelation\nalike acknowledge that the attempt to improve it is desirable. No less\ncertain is it that man possesses faculties which can only receive their\nperfect development in a higher condition of things than the present.\nThese as much point to a higher development of man as the organization of\nthe lower forms of animal life points to the higher and more perfect ones.\nIf, therefore, God be the Creator and moral Governor of the world, a\nfurther manifestation of Him is rendered highly probable.\n\nThis probability may be reasoned out by analogies in the history of the\npast. Higher developments from lower forms have been the rule. Are they\nthen to cease with man in his present state of imperfection? How man came\nto be thus imperfect, how his moral degradation has originated, is a\nquestion which does not fall within the present argument. It is a fact, by\nwhatever theory it may be attempted to be accounted for. If a rational\nbeing had existed in those ages during which there was manifested nothing\nbut the lower forms of life, and had come to the conclusion that the world\nas it then existed was the work of an intelligent Creator, he would have\npronounced it highly probable that the resources of creative power would\nyet receive a more glorious manifestation. When vertebrate life was first\nintroduced into the world, a careful examination of the state of things\nwould have led to a similar conclusion. But the lower forms of vertebrate\nlife are typical of the higher, and the higher point to man. Before man\nentered the world a being capable of comprehending the condition of things\nas then existing would have pronounced it highly probable that there would\nbe yet a further manifestation of creative energy, and that the work\nrequired for its consummation the production of rationality.\n\nSuch and far more numerous have been the actual stages of creative action.\nAre we entitled to call them a failure because they were relatively\nimperfect, or any fresh intervention of divine power an interference to\nremedy a previous failure? On the contrary, these so\u2010called interventions\nare the persistent carrying out of a determined purpose. The acts of Deity\nare inaccurately designated interventions. He is always working with the\nmost perfect knowledge of the means which He employs, and the most perfect\ncontroul over them. Failure with Him is impossible. The word\n\u201cintervention\u201d as applied to the operations of God conveys the idea of a\nmachine which He originally constructed, and then left to its own\noperations. Such a machine will in course of time get out of order, or\nperform its work imperfectly, and require to be supplemented by additional\ncontrivances. Thus when the clock ceases to go there arises a necessity\nfor the intervention of the clockmaker. He constructs his clock and leaves\nit to itself. But creation is no mere machine; the Divine worker is always\npresent in His works. The last idea which would have occurred to the\nauthors of the Bible was that God was obliged to be making a number of\nspecial interventions to cure defects in the results of His operations. As\nthe Bible cannot help using the language of man, expressions derived from\nthe defects of human language are at times used in it, but the one\nprevalent idea is that God is always present working in the kingdoms of\nnature and of grace, that all His actions are the constant carrying out of\na predetermined purpose, and that with Him is no variableness neither\nshadow of turning.\n\nIf the possibility of the introduction of moral evil into the universe is\na necessary condition of the creation of a free moral agent, or in other\nwords, if the contrary supposition involves a contradiction, the Creator\nmust have viewed the production of such a free agent as so desirable, that\nit formed a part of His purpose to create him notwithstanding this\npossibility. If then moral evil became a fact, it involved no failure in\nthe purposes of God. He must have viewed the existence of such beings as\ndesirable, even if this contingency became a fact. Why, I ask, may not a\nfurther manifestation of Himself, by means of which moral evil might be\nreduced to the smallest dimensions, or even ultimately removed, while\nfreedom is still preserved, form a portion of the same great purpose of\nthe divine mind? If this be possible, the assertion that Redemption is a\nspecial intervention of God for the purpose of remedying the breaking down\nof his creative plan, is disproved, and with it all the other inferences\nof the numerous writers whose views I am considering.\n\nIn affirming the probability of a revelation, the Christian apologist need\nnot go beyond the region of actual facts. He has no occasion to rest his\nproof on any statement made by a supposed revelation the truth of which is\nthe point at issue. To do so would be to assume the thing which requires\nto be proved. But facts as they exist, independently of any statements in\nthe Bible, are quite sufficient. Man exists. He is possessed of powers and\naspirations which this state of things does not gratify. He is capable of\nmoral action, and there is something within him which affirms that he\nought to obey the moral law. Yet its realization by him is of the most\nimperfect character. Does the actual condition of man afford satisfaction\neven to the unbeliever, account for it as he may? Is there not a great\namount of moral evil in the world? Do not considerable numbers of men,\ninstead of progressing to higher degrees of moral perfection degenerate\nthrough various stages of moral corruption? Does not moral evil cause a\ngreat amount of physical suffering? Are not vast numbers of men the prey\nof ignorance and superstition\u2014great evils doubtless, and of which\nunbelievers heavily complain? In one word, when we contemplate the present\ncondition of mankind, does not the sternest reason affirm that it is\ninconceivable that this can be the final condition of God\u2019s creative work?\nYet these things are no theories but obvious facts, and on the supposition\non which we are reasoning, facts in the universe of God.\n\nIt follows therefore, that facts such as these, when contemplated by\nreason, establish the probability, nay almost the certainty of a further\ndivine action. Of course this is based on the assumption that there is a\nwise and holy God who is the author of the universe, but both the\nopponents and believers in revelation can only argue this subject at all\non the supposition that God exists. Any fresh mode of divine action will\nprobably differ from the preceding ones, because man exists as a moral and\nspiritual being. It is therefore probable that such divine action will be\nmoral rather than physical; or, in other words, the divine purpose of\ncreation includes within it a yet further manifestation of the divine\ncharacter and perfections. This is what the New Testament affirms to have\ntaken place in the Incarnation. This is my position.\n\nI shall only add one or two more brief remarks. Those who charge\ntheologians with making unfounded assumptions should be guiltless of\nmaking them themselves. The warning against falling into this error may be\nprofitably taken to heart by both parties to this controversy. It is\naffirmed that the constitution of nature bears everywhere the indications\nof systematic upward progression. I ask, is this systematic upward\nprogression everywhere true of man? Are there no where indications of\nretrogression? Europeans generally during the last two thousand years have\nprogressed, although even this is not universally true, for some of the\nfine arts attained to greater perfection in the ancient than in the modern\nworld. But has the Hindoo race progressed during the last three thousand\nyears? Have the Chinese? Is it not true that the progress of these two\nraces has been one of considerable retrogression? Where is the progress\nmade by the Negro races from the first dawnings of their history? Yet\nthese three races form more than half of the human family. Again, have the\nArab races progressed since the days of Abraham? Are the Mahommedan races\nin a state of gradual improvement? These are questions to which a definite\nanswer must be returned before the proposition above referred to can be\nesteemed a solution of all the problems of human history.\n\nIt will perhaps be replied that nature is gradually extinguishing these\nunprogressive races, under the pressure of her inexorable laws. Yet they\nconstitute an overwhelming majority of the human race, and it is strange\nto talk of this progressive improvement of the human race as a great law\nof nature, if the mode of improvement be the extinction of the great\nmajority of mankind. But are the Hindoo, Chinese, Negro, and other\nunprogressive races less numerous than they were three thousand years ago?\nThe evidence is all the other way. We want present facts and not theories\nof the future. It has been affirmed, that \u201cThe survival of the fittest is\nthe stern law of nature. The invariable action of law of itself eliminates\nthe unfit. Progress is necessary to existence. Extinction is the doom of\nRetrogression.\u201d These assertions may receive their fulfilment in some\nperiod of the distant future, but they certainly do not agree with the\npast history of man. Whatever progress the European races may be capable\nof, certain conditions of climate form an inexorable barrier to their\nsupplanting the Negro, the Hindoo, or the Chinese, and we know that\nEuropean blood in certain climates has actually degenerated.\n\nAgain, it is stated \u201cthat the highest effect contemplated by the supposed\nrevelation is to bring man into harmony with law; and this is insured by\nlaw acting on intelligence, and even on instinct.\u201d Where, I ask, is the\nproof of this derived from the history of man? Is the moral condition of\nthe races above referred to higher than it was three thousand years ago?\nDid the moral condition of the Greek race progress or retrograde during\nthe four centuries which preceded the Advent? Which was the more elevated\ncondition of Roman morality, that of the century which preceded and\nfollowed the conquest of Italy, or that of the empire and its crumbling\ninstitutions?\n\nAgain, we are told that \u201cthere is not in reality a gradation of breach of\nlaw that is not followed by an equivalent gradation of punishment.\u201d This\nmay be the case in some Utopia in which the author lives, but it certainly\nneither is nor ever has been the condition of this world. Does villany, I\nask, always receive adequate punishment in this world? It has been the all\nbut universal opinion of mankind that it does not. Did not Fouch\u00e9 die\nquietly in his bed, possessed of wealth and honours, and a darkened\nconscience? Did not Philip II. of Spain, after all his crimes, die under\nthe delusions of self\u2010approbation? In a controversy like this the most\nconfident assertions will not supply the want of facts on which to ground\nour reasonings.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the assertion that the Christian argument\ninvolves reasoning in a circle, or else that it assumes the point at\nissue, is disproved.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. DEMONIACAL MIRACLES\u2014GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.\n\n\nIt has been objected that the admission which the New Testament is alleged\nto make as to the reality of demoniacal miracles weakens, if it does not\ndestroy, the value of miracles as an attestation of a revelation. In order\nto do full justice to the force of this objection I will state it in the\nwords of the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion:\u201d\u2014\n\n\u201cThe necessity of asserting the dependence of miracles on doctrines is\nthrust upon divines by the circumstance, that the Bible narrates so many\ncases of false miracles, and contains so many warnings against them.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe first thought which must occur to any unprejudiced mind is amazement\nthat an Almighty God should select as a guarantee of his supposed\ncommunications signs and wonders which can be so easily imitated by\nothers, that there must always be a doubt whether the message be from the\nkingdom of heaven, or from the kingdom of lies. It seems _\u00e0 priori_\nabsolutely incredible that a divine revelation which is so important, and\nwhich it is intended that man should believe, should be made in such\nobscure language, and with such doubtful attestation. That heaven should\ncondescend to use the same arguments as hell, and with so little\ndifference in the degree of the power exhibited, that man can scarcely, if\nat all, discriminate between them, is a theory of the most startling\ndescription.\u201d\n\n\u201cDoes not the necessity of this theory of false miracles, of the power of\nGod thus placed on a level with the power of Satan, in a matter where the\ndistinct purpose is to authenticate by miraculous testimony a miraculous\nrevelation, rather betray the unreality of miracles altogether, and\nindicate that the idea of such supernatural intervention originates solely\nfrom the superstitious ignorance of men in ages when every phase of nature\nwas attributed to direct supernatural interference, and ascribed with\narbitrary promptness to God or to the devil? It is certain that as\nmiracles are represented as being common both to God and Satan, they\ncannot be considered as a distinctive attestation of a divine revelation.\u201d\n\nAfter quoting Dr. Mozley to the effect that \u201cMiraculous evidence cannot\noblige us to accept any doctrine contrary to our moral nature\u201d\u2014an\nabstractly true statement, but quite inapplicable to the New Testament,\nwhich no where affirms that miracles have been wrought in attestation of\ndoctrines\u2014the author continues: \u201cThe assertion that evidence emanating\nfrom God is in some cases to be rejected is a monstrous proposition; and\nthe evidential force of miracles is totally destroyed by the logical\ninference from it, and from the double character of miracles as Divine and\nSatanic; that God is not only capable of exerting supernatural power to\nattest what is true, but that Satan equally possesses and exercises the\nsame power in opposition to God for purposes of deception. If miraculous\nevidence is indifferently employed to certify truth and error, it is at\nonce degraded by such common service into contempt.\u201d\n\nThese passages put us in possession of the author\u2019s views, and perhaps it\nwould be impossible to state the objections more strongly. I have quoted\nthem thus fully, not only as embodying the views of this particular\nwriter, but as placing before us in a clear and distinct light the chief\nobjections which can be urged against the attestation that miracles give\nto the truth of the Christian revelation, on the assumption that\ndemoniacal miracles have been performed, or even on the admission that\nthey are possible.\n\nBefore I enter on the general question, I must briefly draw attention to\nthe statements and assumptions contained in this remarkable passage.\n\n1. The assertion that miracles are alleged in proof of doctrines, and that\ndivines, when the necessities of their position compel them, affirm the\ndirect converse of this, viz. that miracles are dependent for their truth\non doctrines, is an entire misapprehension of the Christian argument. Its\ntrue position will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.\n\n2. The assertion that the miracles of Almighty God can be imitated by\nSatan is a gratuitous assumption. Nowhere is this affirmed in the New\nTestament. On the contrary, our Lord uniformly declares that His works\nwere clearly distinguishable from the working of Satan, and could only\nmaliciously be confounded with them.\n\n3. While the Bible speaks of false miracles, its language is quite\nconsistent with the fact that they were impositions practised on the\nsenses, like the acts of jugglers.\n\n4. The word \u201cmiracle\u201d is here used to denote a supernatural fact in\nexternal nature devoid of all moral environment. I have already pointed\nout the inaccuracy of this position; and shall have much to say on this\nsubject hereafter. To strip a superhuman occurrence of its moral aspect is\nsimply to assume the question at issue.\n\n5. It is not correct that the essence of a miracle consists in the degree\nof power manifested in the performance of the outward act. The performance\nof a miracle does not necessarily involve a greater exertion of power than\nis manifested in the ordinary occurrences of nature. A miracle is not only\nan act of power, but it involves the elements of prediction and of\npurpose.\n\n6. The affirmation that the Christian argument involves the position that\nheaven must condescend to use the same arguments as hell, if demoniacal\npossession is supposed to be possible, is altogether inaccurate.\n\n7. The Christian argument nowhere involves the assumption that evidence\nemanating from God is under certain circumstances to be rejected. It is\nquite conceivable that a real miracle may have been wrought, which was\nadequately attested when it was performed, but that the evidence has\nbecome imperfect by lapse of time.\n\n8. Even if it be supposed that demoniacal miracles are possible, there is\nnothing in that assumption which renders it necessary to take for granted\nthat Satan is allowed to ramble over the universe and work miracles at his\npleasure, and to imitate the miracles of God. The New Testament uniformly\nasserts that whatever agency he can exert is a permitted one, which is\nconfined within definite limits.\n\nIn considering the question of demoniacal miracles it must be kept in mind\nthat the language employed by the writers of the Bible is invariably\nphenomenal. They describe events as they appeared to the eye of the\nbeholder. Hence it by no means follows, when they refer to the arts of\nmagic and other similar practices which were so prevalent in the ancient\nworld, and say that the magicians did such and such things, that they\nmeant to affirm the reality of their performance. Their language is always\ntaken from the observer\u2019s point of view. As far as he saw, they did so. We\nfrequently speak in the same way of modern feats of conjurors. Thus, when\nit is said that the magicians brought forth frogs, the language is quite\nconsistent with the act being a delusion successfully practised on the\nsenses.\n\nIt is affirmed by the author that the Bible asserts the reality of such\nmiracles. I reply that it makes no such assertion, but merely describes\nthem as they appeared to the eye of the beholder. Its strong denunciations\nof such practices is no evidence that they were anything else than\ndeceptions which the performers endeavoured to palm off for wicked\npurposes. The precept of Moses, \u201cThou shalt not suffer a witch to live,\u201d\nhas been urged as affording proof that the Bible in unqualified terms\nasserts the reality of witchcraft. Whether the art was real or simulated,\nthe sentence of the lawgiver would have been equally just, for impostors\nwho practise such arts for the purpose of delusion, are far more injurious\nto society than many kinds of criminals who have undergone the severest\npunishment. In the New Testament \u201clying wonders\u201d are occasionally referred\nto. The expression may legitimately mean one of two things, either a\nsupernatural act performed for the attestation or propagation of a lie, or\nan apparent miracle, which is in itself a lie. It cannot be denied that\nthe language of the New Testament will honestly bear this interpretation.\nI will quote the strongest passage to be found in it. St. Paul, writing to\nthe Thessalonians, in speaking of the manifestation of a great anti\u2010\nchristian power, says, \u201cWhose coming is after the working of Satan, with\nall power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all the deceivableness\nof unrighteousness, in them that perish, because they receive not the love\nof the truth that they might be saved.\u201d This language is quite consistent\nwith the idea that the works here spoken of were not supernatural, but\ndeceptions wrought for the propagation of a system of falsehood.\n\nThere can be no question that impositions of this kind have been\nsystematically practised in later times in support of a great system of\necclesiastical power, and to attest doctrines in connection with it. But\nit is worthy of observation that the demoniacal supernaturalism which we\nread of in the New Testament, is not represented as having been employed\nfor the attestation of any system of doctrine whatever. Elymas, the\nsorcerer, practised his art for the purpose of establishing an influence\nover Sergius Paulus, but for aught that appears he was a simple impostor.\nAll the other cases of Satanic supernaturalism referred to in the Gospels\nresolve themselves into cases of possession, or the occasional production\nof a disease.\n\nIt is further to be observed that nowhere throughout the New Testament is\na miracle, properly so called, ascribed to Satanic action. Possession is a\nphenomenon entirely different from a miracle. I admit that there is one\napparent exception, namely in the history of our Lord\u2019s temptation. This\nif it is intended to be a description of an objective fact, is undoubtedly\nan instance of direct interference with the action of the forces of\nnature; Satan is here represented as possessing and exercising the power\nof counteracting the force of gravitation by transporting the body of our\nLord from place to place. As this is the one solitary instance in the New\nTestament in which such power is ascribed to him, it demands especial\nconsideration. We are told that during one period of his temptation our\nLord was carried by Satan to an exceeding high mountain; and again, that\nhe was placed on a pinnacle of the temple. These acts involve such an\nexercise of supernatural power as may justly be put in comparison with his\nwalking on the water. It becomes therefore a very important question\nwhether this account is intended to be taken as a literal narrative. The\nfact of its being the only recorded instance of its kind affords a\ncontrary presumption, for if the writers had believed that there was\nnothing in such interference with the physical forces inconsistent with\nthe ordinary course of Satanic action it is hardly possible that they\ncould have viewed this as a solitary instance of the exercise of such\npower, especially when the case of the demoniacs afforded so many\nopportunities for its manifestation. It is clear from the narrative itself\nthat the only source of information regarding the temptation must have\nbeen an account given by our Lord himself to his disciples, as it was an\noccurrence of which there could have been no witnesses. Otherwise it must\nbe assumed to be a mere fiction. It is also clear that the three\ntemptations into which the narrative is divided are intended to describe\nthree great crises through which our Lord\u2019s mind passed. According to\nMark\u2019s account he is represented as undergoing temptations during the\nwhole period of forty days. Matthew and Luke present us with the general\nresults of the entire temptation. If our Lord gave an account of it to his\ndisciples, there can be no reason why he should not have embodied its\nresults in a narrative form, as is the course which he adopted in his\nparables. If the parables were not usually introduced with the formula \u201che\nspake a parable,\u201d we might easily mistake them also for narratives of\nactual occurrences. But although this is the usual form, it is not the\nonly one, as appears in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. It is therefore\nquite conceivable that on giving his disciples an account of the crises\nthrough which his mind passed during the period of the temptation he may\nhave put it into a parabolic form, of which himself was the centre, as one\nwhich would be most adapted to the level of their apprehensions; otherwise\nit would have assumed the character of a number of abstract disquisitions.\n\nBut we are not left to infer from mere probabilities that the narrative\nwas not intended to be understood literally. One portion of it places it\nbeyond doubt that it was intended to contain a visionary or parabolic\nelement of some kind. In the account of the temptation to fall down and\nworship Satan, it is expressly stated that the Devil transported our Lord\nto an exceeding high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the\nworld and the glory of them. The narrative of Luke adds that all this was\ndone in a moment of time, which shows clearly that it was not intended to\nbe from one end to the other a literal statement of facts. It is therefore\nabsolutely necessary to assume the presence of a visionary element\nsomewhere; the only question is, where, and to what extent? If we attach\nthe meaning usually assigned by the writers in the New Testament to the\nword \u201cworld,\u201d it is impossible to imagine that any amount of credulity can\nhave believed that there was any mountain from whose top such a view could\nhave been attained by the unaided power of the human eye. But further, it\nis asserted not only that the kingdoms of the world were rendered visible,\nbut _their glory_; that is to say, the spectator was able to see their\ngreat cities, their buildings, and all their signs of outward\nmagnificence, for the sight of their glory was obviously intended to add\nforce to the temptation. Yet even the most credulous people possess some\nmoderately correct idea as to the extent of view which the eye can reach\nand would feel quite certain that without the interposition of a miracle\nsuch a survey in a moment of time would be impossible.\n\nIt may probably be urged by some that the first part of the account only\nis intended to be a description of an objective fact, and that the last\ntemptation was visionary. To this I reply that the entire narrative is\ncouched in language of fact, and the latter portion quite as much so as\nthe former. Besides, if the sight of the kingdoms of the world and their\nglory was a visionary representation, then the reason for conveying Jesus\nto a lofty mountain ceases, for such a vision might equally well have been\npresented to him in a plain; whereas if we take it as an account of a\nliteral fact, it is clear that the reason for conveying him to the\nmountain was to afford him an extensive view. It is therefore impossible\nto draw a distinction between the two portions of the narrative.\n\nEvery consideration therefore proves that the entire narrative is either\nparabolic or an account of a visionary transaction, precisely similar to\nmany of those described in the Old Testament, and not of an actual\noccurrence. This being so, we arrive at the inference that nowhere in the\nNew Testament is Satanic influence described as interfering with the\nordinary action of the forces of nature, by a direct exertion of power.\n\nIt may however be objected that there were probably reasons why he was\npermitted to do so on this particular occasion; but on such a question I\nshall not enter. I shall only repeat that it is impossible to view the\nlatter portion of the narrative as an account of an objective fact; and\nthis being the case it is far more probable that the whole partakes of the\nsame character. At any rate it is the single instance in the New Testament\nin which the possession of such power is ascribed to Satan.\n\nThis has a very important bearing on the argument. The author affirms that\nthe writers of the New Testament attributed to Satan a general power of\ninterfering with the forces of nature, and of working miracles which may\nfairly be contrasted with the miracles of God. But whatever may have been\nthe opinions of others on this subject, it is clear that such opinions\nwere not held by them. If they had believed that Satanic agency was\nconstantly exerted in the affairs of the visible universe, there is every\nreason why they should have invented numerous stories of this description,\nand ascribed them to Satanic intervention. The writer to whom I am\nreferring, urges in the strongest manner, that the belief in magic, and in\nfrequent exertions of demoniacal power over the external universe, was\nuniversal among the Jews at the time of the Advent. To prove this, he has\nadduced a number of opinions entertained by the writers of the Talmud and\nothers, involving the most grovelling superstitions, and asserts that\nindications of the same are to be found in the Gospels. As an instance, he\nfavours us with the following story told by Josephus, who declares that he\nwas an eye\u2010witness of the fact.\n\n\u201cJosephus had seen a countryman of his own, named Eliezer, release people\npossessed of devils in the presence of the Emperor Vespasian and his sons,\nand of his army. He put a ring containing one of the roots prescribed by\nSolomon, into the nose of a demoniac, and drew the demon out of his\nnostrils, and in the name of Solomon, and reciting one of his\nincantations, he adjured him to return no more. In order to demonstrate to\nthe spectators that he had power to cast out demons, Eliezer was\naccustomed to set a pitcher of water a little way off, and he commanded\nthe demon, as he left the body of the man, to overturn it, by which means\nthe skill and wisdom of Solomon was made very manifest.\u201d\n\nThe object for which this and kindred stories are referred to, is to prove\nthat the Jewish mind was so intensely credulous and superstitious on the\nsubject of demoniacal action at the time of our Lord, that there was\nnothing so monstrous, which it was not in the habit of accepting as fact.\nWe are also repeatedly informed that the followers of Jesus shared in this\nunbounded credulity. It may be even inferred from the assertion before us,\nthat they were far more credulous. The argument which this writer adduces\nis plausible, and it may be stated thus. If a writer like Josephus, who\nwas extensively acquainted with Greek literature, and the Talmudists who\nbelonged to the _\u00e9lite_ of the nation, could narrate such follies as\nfacts, what must have been the beliefs of the vulgar herd? We must not\nforget that the followers of Jesus were chiefly from the lower orders.\n\u201cThe common people heard him gladly.\u201d The inference which the reader is\nallowed to draw is that they must have been addicted to yet more gross\ncredulity.\n\nWhat were the reasons which induced Josephus, a man who had seen the wide\nworld, to relate this monstrous story I shall not inquire. One can hardly\nbelieve that he was a dupe; his reporting it, however, no more proves that\nsuch beliefs were universal when he wrote, than the existence of a wide\u2010\nspread spiritualistic literature proves that a belief in spirit\u2010rapping\nprevails generally among all classes of society at the present day,\nalthough many of the believers in spiritualism belong to the educated\nclasses, and readily accept absurdities which the sound sense of\nmultitudes of artisans would immediately repudiate.\n\nThe argument before me tells in a direction precisely opposite to that\nwhich is intended by those who have invoked it, and it is marvellous that\nthey do not perceive that it is destructive of their own case. I put it as\nfollows: If the authors of the Gospels entertained the views of demoniacal\nagency which this author represents them to have held, their narratives,\nwhich directly lead them to refer to that subject, would have contained\nnumerous references to stories of the type of that quoted from Josephus.\nLet me illustrate this argument by an example. The Arabs and other\nOrientals believe in the power of demons and magicians over external\nnature. They consider this action to be of frequent occurrence. Their\nliterature therefore abounds with accounts of such monstrous\ninterventions. But the Gospels, with the exception of the history of the\nTemptation, do not contain an account of a single marvel wrought by the\nagency of demons on external nature. Demoniacal agency is repeatedly\nmentioned by them; but it belongs to an order of phenomena of an entirely\ndifferent character. What, I ask, is the only legitimate inference? That\nthe authors of the Gospels were free from the superstitions in question.\n\nBefore going further it will be necessary to ascertain what is the precise\nnature and character of that demoniacal supernaturalism which is\napparently asserted in the pages of the New Testament. Without doing so,\nit will be impossible to form a correct opinion on the subject under\nconsideration.\n\nThe New Testament apparently ascribes to Satanic agency not only a power\nof suggesting temptations to the minds of men, but also in certain cases\nof depriving them of the supremacy of their wills, of enslaving their\nintellectual and moral powers, of interfering with the use of their bodily\norgans, and, in one instance, of imparting an unusual strength. These\nphenomena constitute what is designated as \u201cpossession,\u201d and bear no\ninconsiderable resemblance to different forms of insanity.\n\nBut the New Testament also makes mention of lunacy as well as possession.\nHow far they were distinguishable from each other we have no sufficient\ndata to enable us to determine. At one time they are spoken of as the same\ndisease; at others they are clearly distinguished from each other.\n\nThe language of the Gospels seems to imply that some maladies were\nbelieved to be produced by the influence of possession. In one or two\ninstances language is used which may imply that a bodily disease was\nbrought on by Satanic agency without actual possession. Whatever may have\nbeen the belief of the Jews on this subject, it is certain that the cases\nreferred to in the Gospels are very few; and although the mention of\ndiseases is very common, nothing is said about their being due to\ndemoniacal influence. Not a single case occurs in which ordinary accidents\nare referred to this influence, although such is affirmed to have been the\ncommon belief of the Jews. In the Acts of the Apostles only two cases of\npossession are mentioned, one that of the damsel at Philippi, and the\nother the occasion when certain Jewish exorcists undertook to exorcise\ndemoniacs at Ephesus in the name of Jesus.\n\nThe former case is of some importance. The girl is described as possessed\nby a spirit of Pytho, _i.e._ she pretended to practise the art of\ndivination by the inspiration of the god Apollo, and in many respects she\npractised the arts of the modern fortune\u2010teller. Such persons were not\nuncommon at the time. The Pythia at Delphi professed to prophesy under the\ninfluence of a similar inspiration. Whatever may have been the real causes\nby which this mental condition was brought about, the paroxysms were so\nreal that one is recorded to have died under their influence. Her state\nwhen under prophetic influence, is described as one of phrensied\nexcitement. St. Paul is represented by the historian as addressing himself\nto the spirit, and commanding him to come out in the name of Jesus Christ.\nThe powers of such persons were confined to diving into the secrets of the\nfuture; but to other kinds of supernatural power they made no claims.\n\nIf the language here employed be other than phenomenal, it seems to imply\nthat in St. Paul\u2019s opinion certain practices of the ancient world which\nwere far from uncommon, were connected with demoniacal agency. These were\nusually combined with certain forms of religious phrensy, such as even in\nthe present day manifest themselves in connection with the more degraded\nforms of religion. At no period was this class of phenomena more prevalent\nthan during the century which preceded, and that which followed the\nAdvent, when human nature was stirred to its profoundest depths.\n\nThere are also a few passages in St. Paul\u2019s writings which seem to affirm\na connection between demoniacal agency and pagan worship. Whatever may\nhave been his own opinions on this subject, it is evident that the action\nwhich he supposed to have been exerted was entirely mental. Not one word\nis uttered by him which implies that he regarded this mode of demoniacal\naction as involving a power of interfering with the forces of the material\nuniverse.\n\nSuch is a general statement of the facts as they appear in the New\nTestament in connection with possession, and demoniacal action. It has\nbeen necessary thus distinctly to state them, in order that we may keep\nthe subject clear of all adventitious issues with which it has been\nattempted to obscure it. That form of demoniacal action involved in the\nsupposed power possessed by demons of tempting men to evil does not fall\nwithin the limits of the present controversy.\n\nBut the opponents of Christianity are not content to reason on the facts\nrespecting demoniacal action as they are presented to us in the pages of\nthe New Testament. They charge its writers with a number of the most\ngrotesque beliefs on this subject, for which the book itself furnishes us\nwith no evidence. This course has been taken for the purpose of fastening\non them a boundless credulity, and thereby destroying their claim to be\naccepted as credible reporters of historical facts. I will cite one or two\nexamples of this mode of reasoning, in order that we may be able to form a\ncorrect estimate of its value.\n\nAfter having given a detailed account of a number of monstrous beliefs\ngleaned from the Talmud and other sources respecting angels, the author of\n\u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d then proceeds: \u201cThe belief in demons at the time\nof Jesus was equally emphatic and comprehensive, and we need not mention\nalso that the New Testament is full of it. They are in the air, on earth,\nin the bodies of men and animals, and even at the bottom of the sea. They\nare the offspring of the fallen angels who loved the daughters of men.\nThey have wings like angels, and can fly from one place in the earth to\nanother. They attain a knowledge of the future by listening behind the\nveil of the temple of God. Their numbers are infinite. The earth is so\nfull of them, that if man had the power to see, he could not exist on\naccount of them; there are more demons than men, and they are about as\nclose as the earth thrown up out of a new made grave. It is stated that\neach man had 10,000 demons on his right hand, and 1000 on his left.... The\ncrush on the Sabbath in the synagogue arises from them; also the dresses\nof the Rabbins become so soon worn through their rubbing; in like manner\nalso they cause the tottering of the feet. He who wishes to discover these\nspirits must take sifted ashes, and strew them about his bed, and he will\nperceive their footprints upon them like a cock\u2019s tread.\u201d Here follow a\nnumber of the most ineffable absurdities, unsurpassed by anything\ncontained in the Arabian Nights, which I need not cite. The author then\nproceeds: \u201cDemons, however, take more especial delight in foul and\noffensive places, and an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the\nworld. Demons haunt deserted places, ruins, graves, and certain kinds of\ntrees. We find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels.\nThe possessed are represented as dwelling among the tombs, and being\ndriven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, and the demons can find no\nrest in clean places. Demons also frequented springs and fountains. The\nepisode of the angel who was said to descend at certain times and trouble\nthe water of the pool of Bethesda, so that he that first stepped in was\nhealed of whatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned here in passing,\nalthough the passage is not found in the older manuscripts of the fourth\nGospel, and was certainly a late addition.\u201d Here follow further citations\nof Rabbinical absurdities. The author then proceeds: \u201cThe Talmud and other\nRabbinical writings are full of references to demoniacal possession, but\nwe need not enter into details on this point, as the New Testament itself\npresents sufficient evidence respecting it. Not only could one spirit\nenter into a body, but many took possession of the same individual. There\nare many instances mentioned in the Gospels, such as Mary Magdalene, out\nof whom went seven demons (\u1f11\u03c0\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1), and the man whose name was\nlegion, because many demons (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1) had entered into him. Demons\nlikewise entered into the bodies of animals, and in the narrative to which\nwe have just referred, the demons, on being expelled from the man,\nrequested to be allowed to enter into the herd of swine, which being\npermitted, \u2018the demons went out of the man into the swine, and the herd\nran violently down the cliff into the lake and were drowned,\u2019 the evil\nspirits, as usual, taking pleasure only in the destruction and injury of\nman and beast. Besides possession, all the diseases of men and animals are\nascribed to the action of the devil and demons. In the Gospel, for\ninstance, the woman with a spirit of infirmity is described as bound by\nSatan, although the case was not one of demoniacal possession.\u201d The author\nthen proceeds to enumerate a large number of grotesque beliefs as held by\nthe Jews at the time of the Advent.\n\nI regret the necessity which has compelled me to cite so lengthy a\npassage, but it is absolutely necessary that the reader should be enabled\nto see, beyond the possibility of misapprehension, the nature of the\nobjections which are urged against the historical credibility of the\nGospels, and the reasonings by which they are attempted to be supported.\nThe general principle that underlies them may be stated in a few words,\nthat the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels were a prey to\nsuch a multitude of degrading superstitions on the subject of demonology\nas wholly to destroy the value of their historical testimony.\n\nThe effect of this passage with its context is to produce the impression\non the mind of the reader, not only that these absurd beliefs were\ngenerally entertained by the Jews at the time of the Advent, but that they\nconstituted the form of thought of the followers of Jesus. It may be urged\nthat the object of the author is to prove the general superstition of the\ntimes; and that he does not intend to affirm that it was shared in by\nevery one of the followers of Jesus. This may be correct; but if it is not\nintended to be asserted that the followers of Jesus were the prey of equal\nsuperstitions, the reference to this mass of credulity can have no bearing\non the present argument, and is simply misleading. To what purpose, I ask,\nis it made, unless it is intended to implicate our Lord\u2019s followers in\nthese beliefs? Unless it were so, the fact that others entertained them\nwould not in the smallest degree affect the value of their historical\ntestimony. But on this point we are not left to inferences; not only are\npassages in the Gospels referred to, but we are repeatedly informed that\nthe followers of Jesus did share in these popular delusions.\n\nThe position, therefore, which is taken by the author is clear. His\nreaders are invited to believe that the followers of our Lord were a prey\nto the belief in a number of ineffable absurdities respecting demons such\nas he has enumerated. If this can be established, the conclusion is\ninevitable, that their historical testimony is valueless.\n\nLet us now consider the mode in which the proof of this is attempted to be\nestablished. The authorities quoted are chiefly the Talmudical writers;\nthat is to say, persons who wrote as late as from A.D. 200 to A.D. 500,\nare cited as the proof that such opinions were universally entertained by\nthe Jews in the time of Jesus Christ. Equally valid would it be to quote\nthe writers of modern spiritualism to prove that such opinions were held\nby our ancestors in the time of the Stuarts or the Plantagenets. On the\nstrength of this and kindred evidence, such opinions are ascribed to the\noriginal propagators of Christianity, and to the authors of the Gospels.\n\nBut this is not all. The only correct method of ascertaining the\nsuperstition and credulity of any particular writer is carefully to\nexamine the contents of his book, and to note the various instances which\nwe find in it of what we consider to be superstitions; and then proceed to\nestimate their value, and, if needful, to compare them with other\ncontemporary authorities. This course, however, is not that pursued by\nthis writer. On the contrary, he quotes the absurdities which we have seen\nfrom the Talmudical writers, and refers in the midst of them to nearly\nevery passage in the Gospels which can be made to bear even a remote\nreference to the views in question. I submit that such a mode of reasoning\nis not conducive to the interests of truth.\n\nA few examples of this mode of conducting the argument require notice.\n\nAfter referring to a number of monstrous superstitions, he tells us that\nthe Jews believed that \u201cdemons took especial delight in foul and offensive\nplaces, and that an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the\nworld. Demons haunted deserted places, ruins, graves, and certain kinds of\ntrees. We find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels.\nThe possessed are represented as dwelling among the tombs, and as being\ndriven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, and demons can find no rest\nin clean places.\u201d\n\n\u201cWe find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels.\u201d To\nthis observation I invite the reader\u2019s attention. Is it meant to be\naffirmed that any indication can be found in the Gospels that the writers\nbelieved that a demon inhabited every private closet in the world? Two\ninstances only are referred to in the text, in one of which the demoniac\nof Gadara is represented as dwelling among the tombs, and as having been\ndriven into the wilderness; and the other the parable of the unclean\nspirit going out of the man, and finding no rest when walking through dry\nplaces. Do these two cases prove the truth of the sweeping assertions\nabove referred to? Does the parabolic representation that the expelled\ndemon found no rest in dry or clean places prove that the disciples of\nJesus believed that they took especial delight in foul or offensive ones?\nDoes the fact that the demoniac of Gadara had been driven by the evil\nspirit into the wilderness prove that it was a universal belief that\ndeserts and graves were haunted by demons?\n\nIn proof also of these assertions we are referred in a note to five\npassages in the Gospels, viz. Matt. viii. 28; xii. 43; Mark v. 3\u20105; Luke\nviii. 27\u201029; xi. 24. Five passages are very few to justify the assertion\nthat we find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels. On\nexamining them, however, the five references are reduced to two, three\nbelong to the account of the demoniac at Gadara, reported by each of the\nSynoptics; and two to the twofold report of the same parable as given by\nMatthew and Luke! This is a very slender foundation on which to ground the\nassertion that the followers of Jesus believed that \u201cdemons took especial\ndelight in foul and offensive places, that they inhabited every private\ncloset in the world, and that they haunted deserted places, graves, ruins,\nand certain kinds of trees, and that we find indications of these\nsuperstitions _throughout the Gospels_.\u201d\n\nStill more extraordinary is the next reference. \u201cDemons haunted springs\nand fountains,\u201d says the author. To this he adds, \u201cthe episode of the\nangel who was said to descend at certain seasons and trouble the water of\nthe pool of Bethesda, so that he who first stepped in was cured of\nwhatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned in passing.\u201d\n\nWhy, I ask, mention it at all? Is the visit of an angel to this particular\npool for the purpose of working a miracle, a proof that the followers of\nour Lord believed that demons inhabited springs and fountains?\n\nBut our astonishment at the author\u2019s reference to it is increased when we\nread the following words: \u201c_Although the passage is not found in the\noldest manuscripts of the Fourth Gospel, and it is certainly a late\ninterpolation_.\u201d\n\nI must put the question again in real earnestness. This being so, why\nmention it here? The author admits that it formed no portion of the\noriginal Gospel of St. John, and that it is certainly a late\ninterpolation. Now the Gospel of St. John, according to the opinion of the\nmost eminent unbelievers, was not published before A.D. 170. If this was\nthe case (the author himself evidently assigns to its composition a very\nlate date) a late interpolation could not have found its way into its\npages until about the year 250, at the earliest 200. What then is the\nnature of the reasoning before us? We are referred for proof that the\nfollowers of Jesus held these opinions to an authority which the author\nhimself admits to have been a late interpolation, which could not have\nbeen introduced into this Gospel earlier than 180 years after the ministry\nof our Lord, as a proof that his original followers believed that demons\ninhabited springs and fountains. Such reasonings furnish their own\nrefutation.\n\nThe exposure of one more fallacy of this description will be sufficient.\nWe are told that, \u201cNot only one evil spirit entered into a body, but many\ntook possession of the same individual. There are _many instances\nmentioned in the Gospels_, such as Mary Magdalene, out of whom went seven\ndemons, and the man whose name was legion, because many demons had entered\ninto him.\u201d\n\nI ask, where are these \u201cmany instances\u201d? The plain fact must be stated,\nthat the two here referred to, constitute the only ones which are\nmentioned as facts by the Evangelists. Besides these there is the parable\nof the unclean spirit going out of the man above alluded to, who, when he\ncould find no rest returned to his former habitation in company with seven\nother spirits more wicked than himself. It should be observed that in two\nof the cases the number given is the mystical number \u201cSeven\u201d; and that one\nof them occurs in a parable, the moral of which is, to warn the Jews, that\nalthough they had got rid of the evil spirit of idolatry, they were in\ndanger of falling into the greater evil of Phariseeism and hypocrisy.\n\nBut to return to the argument. The great mass of the author\u2019s citations\nfor the purpose of proving that the Jews at the time of the Advent, and\namong them the followers of Jesus, were a prey to these grotesque beliefs\nrespecting the action of demons, are made from authors who are separated\nby an interval of centuries from the ministry of our Lord. I submit,\ntherefore, that such authorities are utterly valueless to prove that His\ndisciples and early followers were a prey to these gross delusions. Nor\nhas he adduced an atom of valid proof from the New Testament itself. The\nreferences above referred to have either been made in a most careless\nmanner, or have been used to assist in proving a foregone conclusion.\n\nBut let us suppose for the sake of argument that the Jews at the time of\nour Lord did generally entertain these monstrous demoniacal beliefs: to\nwhat conclusion, I ask, would such a fact, if true, indubitably point?\nCredulous and superstitions people, invariably invent stories that are the\ncounterparts of their own credulity. This is proved by the whole mass of\nexisting mythology. Mythological inventions give us the precise measure of\nthe beliefs of those who have originated them. If then the demonology of\nthose who have elaborated these portions of the Gospels was of the\ncharacter that this writer and others assert it to have been, the Gospels\nwould have contained an embodiment of such demoniacal beliefs as those\nwhich the author has so industriously collected, and has endeavoured to\nfasten upon their writers.\n\nNow the idea of demonology having been present in the minds of the\nwriters, it is obvious that they did not omit all reference to these\nabsurd beliefs, merely because they were outside the subject on which they\nwere writing. But while demoniacal action is repeatedly alluded to, it is\nan undeniable fact that no stories of the description given by this writer\nare to be found in them. The author therefore has furnished the most\nconclusive proof, without intending to do so, that these forms of thought,\nto whomsoever else they may have appertained, were neither those of the\noriginal followers of Jesus, nor of the authors of the Gospels.\n\nIt follows therefore that this attempt to prove that the followers of our\nLord and the authors of the Gospels were a prey to such a mass of\ngrotesque beliefs respecting demons, as to invalidate their historical\ntestimony, falls to the ground, and that the data on which this has been\nattempted to be established, afford proof on the contrary that they did\nnot entertain the beliefs in question.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. THE EXISTENCE AND MIRACLES OF SATAN.\n\n\nI fully admit that a difficulty is involved in the idea that a being like\nSatan is permitted to perform actions which bear even a remote analogy to\ndivine miracles. I have already shown that the New Testament only\napparently ascribes to him a supernatural action of a very limited and\nspecial kind, differing widely from our usual conception of a miracle. I\nnow proceed to inquire how far this limited action, thus attributed to\nhim, if we suppose that possession was an objective fact, and not a form\nof madness, interferes with the validity of the attestation of miracles to\nthe Christian revelation.\n\nThe existence of a being like Satan is alleged as constituting an enormous\ndifficulty against the statements of the New Testament. A numerous class\nof writers dismiss the idea of his existence as unworthy of serious\nargument, and endeavour to dispose of it with a sneer. This world however\ncontains numerous analogous cases of very evil men endowed with the\nhighest mental powers, who have exerted the most injurious influences on\nothers. Their existence is a fact; and the difficulties attending it\ncannot be got rid of by any kind of evasion. The objections that have been\nurged in connection with this subject are not founded on the facts of the\nmoral universe as they exist; but on _\u00e0 priori_ principles alone. It has\nbeen affirmed to be incredible that Almighty God should have permitted the\nexistence of such a being as Satan; or if his existence is permitted, that\nhe can be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men.\n\nIn dealing with this question it is evident that I must proceed on the\nsupposition that I am reasoning with theists only. The whole question is\nirrelevant on the principles of Pantheism or Atheism, or, to put the case\nmore distinctly, on such principles there is no greater difficulty in\nsupposing that nature has evolved evil beings superior to men in their\nfaculties and powers in some other part of the universe, than that it has\nevolved evil men, who are gifted with high forms of intelligence in this;\nor even that such beings should be capable of interfering in human\naffairs. If Pantheism or Atheism is a correct account of the facts of the\nuniverse, it is impossible to say what kind of beings nature may have\nevolved in the past, or may evolve in the future from her prolific womb.\n\nBut if it is once conceded that a personal God exists, who is the moral\nGovernor of the Universe, the affirmation that the existence of such\nbeings is inconsistent with his attributes, is only another form of\nasserting that the existence of moral evil is incompatible with them. The\nground of its existence has been a problem, into which the human mind has\nstriven to penetrate from the earliest dawn of thought, without ever\napproaching to its solution; but into this question it is useless to\nenter. In the present argument we are dealing with facts, and the\nexistence of aggravated forms of moral evil in the universe is a fact. If\nthere be a God, it must be consistent with his attributes. The real\ndifficulty lies in its existence at all in the universe of a God who is\nall\u2010powerful and good.\n\nBut since it does exist, the existence of a being like Satan is a mere\nquestion of degree. It is an unquestionable fact, whether we can explain\nit or not, that many men of the worst moral principles have been gifted\nwith the highest intellectual powers, and have been placed in positions in\nsociety which have enabled them to inflict the greatest evil on others.\nHistory is full of such cases. The most extreme forms of human corruption\nhave been not inaptly designated as \u201cSatanic.\u201d If therefore under the\nmoral government of God it is a fact that such forms of human wickedness\nexist; and if it is supposable, that there are other rational beings in\nthe universe endowed with higher powers than man, how can it be\ninconceivable that they may differ in moral character, precisely in the\nsame way as men do; and that some may be eminently virtuous, and others\nfearfully corrupt? It is clear that the difficulty centres in the\nexistence of moral evil in the universe of a God who is possessed of\nalmighty power, and perfect holiness and goodness. Why has He permitted\nit? Is its existence a necessary condition of the creation of a free moral\nagent? If so, might not the amount of it have been greatly diminished? The\nutmost light that reason can throw on these questions consists of a few\nvery imperfect glimmerings. The fact is undeniable, that a large mass of\nmoral evil exists, and in very fearful forms. If there be a Creator of the\nuniverse, it is plain that the present state of things must be consistent\nwith his attributes. The only mode of escaping from this difficulty is by\ntaking refuge in the vastly greater ones of pantheism or atheism.\n\nMany theists, pressed by these difficulties, have attempted to evade them\nby endeavouring to reduce the amount of moral evil in the universe, the\nexistence of which they cannot deny, to indefinitely small proportions,\nand then affirming that it will be ultimately swallowed up in the ocean of\nuniversal good. But the mere diminishing of its amount by no means solves\nthe difficulty. The real question is, how has it come even into temporary\nexistence? But there is also a still more grave objection to this course\nof reasoning. It renders it necessary that we should close our eyes to the\nmost obvious facts. So far is it from being the case that the amount of\nmoral evil in the world is small, that it is very large. This fact is\nindisputable. The whole course of history tells us that it has existed in\nall past ages and in very aggravated forms. To try to get rid of the\ndifficulty in this manner is simply to close our eyes, and refuse to see\nit.\n\nBut not only does moral, but physical evil exist. This is another\nunquestionable fact, and its existence bears directly on my argument. Many\nand vain have been the attempts to explain it away. It has been affirmed\nthat pain after all is no such great matter. I strongly suspect that those\nwho have asserted this, have experienced but little of it. It is true that\nit may ultimately result in good under God\u2019s government, but taken by\nitself, it is undeniably an evil. Do not frightful sufferings abound? Do\nnot most painful diseases afflict our frames? Is it not possible to suffer\nterribly from causes quite independent of our own conduct? Is not a great\nearthquake a terrible calamity to those who suffer from its effects,\nalthough it may be attended with beneficial results to those who do not?\nPains may be said to be useful warnings; but surely the warning might have\nbeen given without the extremity of the suffering. They are also affirmed\nto be the penalties of ignorance, and this may be partially true: but the\nignorance is in a vast majority of cases unavoidable. It is a simple fact,\nthat a great amount of physical suffering exists, the reason of which we\nare wholly unable to explain.\n\nBut further: moral evil propagates itself, and inflicts calamities on\nthose who are not implicated in its guilt. Is it not true that men have\nexisted both in the ancient and modern world, whose actions have inflicted\nthe greatest evils on mankind for generation after generation? Can any one\ndoubt that descendants suffer for the sins of remote ancestors, and\nchildren for those of their parents? Facts are facts, and they will not\nbecome less so by our refusing to look at them. The evil wrought by such a\nman as Philip II. of Spain, is a fact, and it has extended its baneful\ninfluence to our own times. Is not a large portion of the evils under\nwhich France has groaned, traceable to the misdeeds of two of her\nsovereigns? These were quietly sleeping in their graves, when the evils\nthey had occasioned burst on the head of their guiltless successor. But it\nis needless to quote examples. History is one long succession of them.\nWhether we like it or not, the old saying is an accurate account of the\nmoral order of the universe as it exists, \u201cVisiting the sins of the\nfathers on the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that\nhate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep\nmy commandments.\u201d These are facts which the theist equally with the\nChristian must face, for they exist in the universe of that God, in whose\nmoral perfections both believe. I repeat, therefore, that the only way of\nescaping from them is by rushing into the far greater difficulties of\npantheism or atheism.\n\nThese reasonings might be indefinitely extended. The result which follows\nfrom them is clear, that if we attempt to reason from abstract principles\nto the constitution of a universe, we shall produce one utterly unlike\nthat which actually exists. It follows, that as they cannot account for\nthe facts of the universe, as they come under our observation, they are\nunsafe guides on all similar questions. Consequently they are unable to\nshow that the existence of evil beings possessed of superhuman powers, is\ninconsistent with the perfections of God.\n\nNor is there any greater force in the objection, that if such beings exist\nat all, it is inconsistent with our conceptions of the divine government,\nthat they should be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men. I reply,\nthat it is equally inconceivable, that God should have allowed a man, to\nwhom he has imparted the greatest mental endowments, and whom he has\nplaced in an elevated position in society, who lived centuries ago, to\nexert an evil influence on the present generation. The difficulty that a\npowerful influence for evil can be exerted by men on those who have never\nseen them, and of whose existence they have never heard, is just as great\nas the one under consideration. Yet it is one of the most undeniable of\nfacts, that men do exert the most powerful influence on one another, and\nthat such influence can be exerted by generations long since passed away\non those who live ages afterwards; and that it can be exerted\nunconsciously.\n\nI am far from wishing to deny, that the difficulty is a real one. On the\ncontrary, I fully admit it; and that it is one which our present faculties\nare unable to explain. But it is one which is not peculiar to\nChristianity, nor has it originated in it. The interference of superhuman\nbeings in human affairs for the purposes of evil, would be only another\nform of the same difficulty.\n\nPrecisely similar reasonings to those which have been employed to prove\nthat the existence of a being like Satan is impossible, when they are\napplied to other subjects, bring us into direct collision with realities.\nThere can be no doubt, that if the constitution of the universe had been\nplaced in our hands, its phenomena would have been very different. But our\nfunction is a far humbler one. It is not to erect a universe according to\nour conceptions of what is best, but to learn the order of that in which\nwe live, and to accept facts on sufficient evidence, however strongly they\nmay conflict with abstract theories.\n\nI now proceed to consider the real difficulty connected with this subject,\nand which has been very strongly urged by the author of \u201cSupernatural\nReligion.\u201d It is this. \u201cIf it is conceivable that beings exist who possess\nsuperhuman knowledge and power; and that they are capable of interfering\nas the New Testament affirms, in the affairs of men, how can the\nperformance of a miracle be the guarantee of a divine commission? May not\ninferior agents, who possess superhuman knowledge and power, be able to\nproduce results which would to all outward appearance be miraculous? Might\nnot an evil being, who was possessed of the highest intelligence like\nSatan, perform such actions as would be equivalent to miracles, for the\npurpose of authenticating falsehoods? All that such actions prove is the\npresence of superhuman knowledge and power; but they would leave it quite\nuncertain whether the power was divine or Satanic.\u201d Such is the objection,\nand it demands an adequate solution.\n\nI reply, that if we view the question merely as an abstract one, it is\nquite possible, if a superhuman being of high intelligence is permitted to\ninterfere in the affairs of men, that he should be able to perform actions\nwhich might have all the appearance of being supernatural. Such results\nmight be even brought about by a superior acquaintance with the existing\nforces of nature, and by a successful combination of them, without the\nintroduction of any new force whatever. For such results we need not\ninvoke the aid of a supernatural being. They have been frequently effected\nby a superior human intelligence acting on an inferior one. We all know\nhow Columbus used his superior knowledge of astronomy, to predict an\neclipse, and the ignorant natives of America mistook this as denoting the\npresence of a superhuman being. Such results may be always produced, when\nsuperior knowledge acts on ignorance; and such is the origin of no\ninconsiderable number of impositions which have been practised on mankind.\nIt is therefore quite conceivable, as an abstract question, that as men\nwho possess a very superior intelligence, are capable of producing results\nwhich to an inferior intelligence would have the appearance of being\nsupernatural, without really being so, in the same manner, if Satan is\nsupposed to possess an intelligence greater than that of the wisest of\nmankind, and if his interference in human affairs is permitted, he may be\nable to perform actions which would have the appearance of being\nsupernatural, by a skilful use of the existing forces of nature.\n\nBut to such power there must be a limit. There are certain results which\nplainly lie beyond the power of any mere combination of the forces of\nnature to produce. Of these, many of the miracles recorded in the Gospels\nare instances, such as the cure of blind or leprous men by no other\nvisible instrumentality than a word or a touch. Actions of this kind\ndiffer wholly in character from those which we are now considering. If a\nmiracle was a more objective fact taking place in external nature, and\nnothing more, it might be open to question whether its performance was\nowing to supernatural agency, or to some combination of known or unknown\nforces. But the miracles with which we are concerned in this controversy,\ninvolve a great deal more than more objective facts in material nature.\n\nBut assuming, as I cannot help doing in an argument like the present, the\nexistence of a God, who is the Creator and Governor of the universe, the\nquestion is not a mere abstract one, what a Being like Satan, if he is\nsupposed to exist, might be capable of doing; but it becomes entirely one\nof permitted agency. It is plain, that if there is a God, every being in\nthe universe, however powerful or intelligent, can only act within a\ncertain definite sphere of operation, which the Governor of the universe\nhas assigned to him. Within what limits then is he allowed act? Are\nsubordinate agents permitted to interfere with the material forces of\nexternal nature? and if so, within what bounds? Can they wander over the\nuniverse at their mere will and pleasure, and interfere with its\noperations? How far is their interference permitted in the moral and\nspiritual worlds? The question before as is even reduced to one of far\nnarrower limits. Our only direct knowledge of the existence of such an\nagency is derived from Revelation. The real point therefore which concerns\nus is, to what extent is such permitted agency affirmed in the New\nTestament. Do the Satanic interventions there described interfere with\ndivine miracles as attestations of a divine commission? We have nothing\nwhatever to do with abstract propositions or with what Rabbinical writers\nmay have affirmed on this subject, but with the assertions of the New\nTestament alone.\n\nIf there is a God, it is certain that the present order of nature must be\na manifestation of His will. So must be the energy of its forces in\nconformity with invariable law. Whatever power He has delegated to\nsubordinate agents, must form a portion of this universal order, and be\nexercised in conformity with the divine purposes. It is inconceivable that\nsubordinate agents can be allowed to break in upon it at their will and\npleasure, for the general permanence of its order forms an essential\ncondition for the exercise of moral agency. If they are allowed to do so,\nit must be only within clear and definite limits, which ultimately\neffectuate the purposes of the Creator. Such is the nature of the power\nwhich man can exert over material nature. It can only modify results, by\ngiving a new direction to its forces. In the case of man this power is\nlimited to the world in which he lives. In a similar manner, if beings\nsuperior to him in power and intelligence exist, their interference must\nbe subject to definite limitations. Such is the uniform affirmation of the\nwriters of the New Testament. Even if we take their language in the most\nliteral sense, the supernatural interventions which they attribute to\nSatan, are confined to a very definite order of phenomena. In one word,\nthe sacred writers have described Satanic intervention as limited to the\nworld of mind; and as capable, through its action on the mind, of\nproducing certain results on the bodily organization. To this there is one\nexception, the apparent ascription of a few diseases to Satanic agency.\nThis I shall consider hereafter.\n\nIt is a remarkable fact, and one worthy of particular attention, that the\nsupernatural action attributed to Satan in the New Testament, with the\nexception above referred to, is a mental one. It is through the action on\nmen\u2019s minds alone, that demoniacal agency produces any results on their\nbodily frame. No direct action on the material forces of nature is ever\nattributed to it. We find nothing in the smallest degree resembling the\nact of a demon overturning a pitcher of water. The kind of influence\nattributed to Satan is of a similar character, though much higher in\ndegree, to that which one man can exert over another. One man of superior\nmental power is capable of exerting an influence over a weaker mind to\nsuch a degree, as almost to enthral it. We call this a species of\nfascination. In the New Testament the similar but mightier Satanic\ninfluence is Possession. One mind, by getting a powerful hold on another,\ncan exert an influence on the body, as in mesmerism. The Satanic influence\nexerted in possession is only a more powerful one.\n\nIt is certain that the extent to which one human mind can act on another\nis bounded by no narrow limits; what is more, it is one which is\nfrequently exerted for evil. It is evidently within the purposes of the\nCreator to permit this. Why it is allowed to the extent to which it is, is\nbeyond our powers to discover. But the wide extent to which it not only\ncan be, but actually is exerted, is a fact that cannot be denied. It is\nalso an influence that can be exerted secretly. The difference between\nthis power and that which is supposed to be attributed to Satan in the New\nTestament is far more one of degree than of kind; and the latter is one\nwhich is bounded by clear and definite limits. Between a Satanic\npossession and a miracle performed by Jesus the distinction is\nunmistakable.\n\nIt follows from the foregoing considerations, that the Satanic\nsupernaturalism, which we have to consider, as far as if stands in\nopposition to the miracles of God, is reduced to very narrow limits. It\nconsists almost exclusively of possession and its phenomena. No other kind\nof action bearing even a remote analogy to a miracle, with the single\nexception of the history of the temptation, is anywhere attributed to\nSatan in the New Testament.\n\nIn estimating the evidential character of miracles, it has been a far too\ncommon practice with those who deny the historical character of the\nGospels, to keep out of view their moral aspect as an important portion of\ntheir evidential value. It has been affirmed that a miracle must be\nestimated as an act of power quite apart from its moral impress. The\nauthor before me even goes the length of supposing, that, if Satan is as\ncunning as he is represented in the New Testament, he may even turn\nhimself into an angel of light and perform works bearing the impress of\nholiness for the purpose of furthering the interests of the kingdom of\nlies.\n\nSuch an idea receives no countenance from anything which is affirmed by\nSt. Paul. The passage in which allusion is made to Satan transforming\nhimself into an angel of light is as follows: \u201cFor such are false\napostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of\nChrist. And no marvel, for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of\nlight. Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers should be\ntransformed as the ministers of righteousness.\u201d It is quite clear that\nnothing was further from the Apostle\u2019s mind than the idea of Satanic\nmiracles bearing the impress of holiness as wrought in support of the\nkingdom of falsehood. He is simply speaking of Judaizing teachers, who\nclaimed the support of apostolical authority, for the purpose of\ndisseminating their unchristian views.\n\nThe idea is absurd and ridiculous, but we know that it occurred to the\nopponents of our Lord, who charged him with working miracles by Satanic\nagency. The special instance in which they made this charge was that of\nhis supposed expulsion of demons. Our Lord met it by the decisive\nargument, \u201cHow can Satan cast out Satan? If Satan be divided against\nhimself, how shall his kingdom stand?\u201d In a word, he appealed to the moral\naspect of his miracles as a convincing proof that their accusation could\nonly have been instigated by deliberate malice.\n\nThe same objection was doubtless urged against his other miracles,\nalthough it is nowhere stated in express terms in the Gospels. But\nwhatever absurd beliefs may have been entertained by the learned Rabbis,\nthey were easily met by the common sense of the people. \u201cWe know,\u201d said\nthe Rabbis, \u201cthat this man is a sinner.\u201d \u201cHow can a man that is a sinner\nperform such miracles?\u201d is the reply. \u201cWhether he be a sinner, I know not,\nbut one thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see.\u201d \u201cCan a devil\nopen the eyes of the blind?\u201d It is evident that the difficulties suggested\nby the author of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d as to the evidential value of\nmiracles being nullified by the views which prevailed respecting\ndemoniacal action were not appreciated when the fourth Gospel was\ncomposed, although according to this theory they ought to have been at\nthat time in full force. But apart from the peculiar character ascribed to\nSatanic supernaturalism in the New Testament, the entire idea that there\ncould have been any danger of confounding Satanic miracles with the\nmiracles of God, rests on the fallacy of confounding a mere objective fact\nwith an action of a moral agent. A miracle does not consist merely in the\noutward event, which is caused by him, but in the occurrence united with\nthe character and purpose of the agent. The actions of holy beings must\nbear the impress of their holiness; those of evil ones, of the contrary.\nIf, therefore, evil moral agents are capable of performing actions which\nare analogous to miracles, they cannot fail to be stamped with the evil of\ntheir characters. Such would always form a discriminating mark between\nDivine and Satanic miracles, even on the supposition that the latter are\npossible.\n\nThis precisely represents the case as it stands in the New Testament. All\nthe miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, bear a definite impress\nof character and purpose. The supernaturalism ascribed to Satan is no less\ndefinitely marked. The one clearly comes from above. The indications that\nthe other, if real, must have come from below, are equally distinct. The\nmoral impress which the two series of events bear, is fully sufficient to\ndiscriminate the one from the other.\n\nThe attempt to distinguish between the miraculous act and its moral\nenvironment, is absurd. It has been affirmed that one miraculous act is as\ngood as another, quite apart from the circumstances with which they are\nattended. Such a principle would destroy the distinction between a highly\nmeritorious act and the foulest crime. A, for example, has killed B. The\noutward act may be the same; but the accompanying circumstances make all\nthe distinction between a justifiable homicide, and a most atrocious\nmurder. It is ridiculous to affirm that principles which are legitimate in\ncommon life become invalid only when they are applied to the evidences of\nChristianity. Why, in the name of common sense, may not one miracle be as\nclearly distinguishable from another by its moral environment, as an event\nin ordinary life is similarly distinguished? The affirmation, therefore,\nthat the supposition of the possibility of Satanic miracles must\ninvalidate the miracles of God is absurd.\n\nOur Lord, therefore, was right in appealing to the character of his works\nas affording a conclusive proof of the source whence they originated, and\nin contrasting them with the species of supernaturalism which was\npopularly attributed to Satan. \u201cHow can Satan cast out Satan? If I do not\nthe works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not\nme, believe the works, that ye may see and believe that the Father is in\nme and I in Him.\u201d\n\nThis is conclusive reasoning. It is only possible to darken the question\nby treating it as one of bare possibilities, as to what kind of actions a\nbeing like Satan might be capable of performing, if he is allowed to\ninterfere with the arrangements of the universe at his pleasure. Such a\nsupposition is foreign to the question at issue, which is whether the\nsupernaturalism which the New Testament is supposed to attribute to him\ncan interfere with the evidential value of the miracles wrought by Jesus.\nMy reply is, Examine and compare the two. When this has been done, no\ndoubt can remain on any reasonable mind that the latter, if real, are from\nabove; and the former from below. The affirmation therefore that if\nSatanic miracles, such as possession, are possible, it invalidates the\nevidence of those wrought by God in attestation of the truth of a divine\ncommission is disproved.\n\nEqually invalid is the objection against a miraculous attestation to a\ndivine commission, on the ground that such testimony can be easily\nimitated. I reply, that the great mass of the miracles recorded in the New\nTestament do not easily admit of a fraudulent imitation. I by no means\ndeny that the art of legerdemain is capable of producing results which to\nan ignorant observer have the appearance of being supernatural. But this\nclass of actions bears not the smallest analogy to the miracles recorded\nin the New Testament. No art of legerdemain can persuade a man who has\nbeen for many years blind to believe that he has recovered his sight, and\nenable him to act accordingly.\n\nBut it has been argued; if God is the moral Governor of the universe, is\nHe not bound to prevent a being like Satan from acting for the purposes of\nevil in the affairs of men? This question may be best answered by asking\nanother. Is He not equally bound to hinder evil men from exerting such\nterrible influences on others, even long after they are dead? Is He not\nbound to hinder the possibility of the bringing up of children by their\nparents in various forms of vice, so as to render them in after life, more\nwicked than themselves? Yet it is an indubitable fact that such an\ninfluence is exerted under the moral government of God. Human life abounds\nwith such cases, which bear a close analogy to Satanic action exerted in\nthe affairs of men. When we can fully fathom the reason for the permission\nof the one, we shall have made considerable progress in understanding\nthose of the other. The case may be simply stated. There are difficulties\nin the moral government of the universe, into the grounds of which we\ncannot penetrate. These press equally on every form of theism. The Satanic\nsupernaturalism described in the New Testament presents a precisely\nanalogous difficulty. This therefore can form no reason why one who\nbelieves that God is the moral Governor of the universe, as it now exists,\nshould reject Christianity because the difficulties are of a similar\norder, and press equally on both. The only escape from them, as I have\nalready said, is the inevitable position assumed by atheism, or pantheism,\nand the dreary prospect which they afford to the aspirations of the human\nmind.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI. POSSESSION: IS THE THEORY THAT IT WAS MADNESS SUBVERSIVE OF\nTHE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE GOSPELS OR INCONSISTENT WITH THE VERACITY OF\nCHRIST?\n\n\nThere can be no doubt that the subject of possession is attended with real\ndifficulties, whichever view we may take of its actual character.\n\nThe symptoms which are alleged to have accompanied it present many of the\nusual phenomena of madness. No possession is believed to take place now,\nbut such phenomena are attributed to causes purely natural. The supposed\npossessions therefore which are mentioned in the New Testament or in other\nancient writings are said to be due only to ignorance of natural causes.\nMany very eminent defenders of Christianity have been so deeply impressed\nby these and other reasons that they have admitted that possession is only\na form of madness, and that the language respecting it in the New\nTestament is based on the current ideas of the day.\n\nIt is desirable that the difficulty should be put in the strongest light.\nI will therefore state it in the words of the author of \u201cSupernatural\nReligion.\u201d \u201cIt would be an insult to the understanding of those who are\nconsidering this question, to pause here to prove that the historical\nbooks of the New Testament, speak in the clearest and most unmistakable\nterms of actual demoniacal possession.\u201d Now what has become of this theory\nof disease? The Archbishop of Dublin is probably the only one who asserts\nthe reality of demoniacal possession formerly, and in the present day; and\nin this way we must say that he is consistent. Dean Milman, on the other\nhand, who spoke with the enlightenment of the 19th century, \u201chas no\nscruple in averring his opinion on the subject of demoniacal possession to\nbe that of Joseph Mede, Lardner, Dr. Mead, Paley, and all the learned\nmodern writers. It was a kind of insanity, and nothing is more probable\nthan that lunacy would take the turn, and speak the language of the\nprevailing superstition of the times.\u201d The Dean, as well as \u201call the\nlearned modern writers\u201d to whom he refers, felt the difficulty, but in\nseeking to evade it, they sacrifice the Gospels. They overlook the fact,\nthat the writers of these narratives, not only themselves adopt \u201cthe\nprevailing superstition of the times,\u201d but represent Jesus as doing so\nwith equal completeness. There is no possibility, for instance, of evading\nsuch statements as those in the miracle of the country of the Gadarenes,\nwhere the objectivity of the demons is so fully recognised, that on being\ncast out of the man, they are represented as requesting to be allowed to\ngo into the herd of swine, and being permitted by Jesus to do so, the\nentry of the demons into the swine is at once signalised by the herd\nrunning violently down the cliff into the lake and being drowned. (p.\n131.) The author might have strengthened his case, as far as modern\nauthorities are concerned, by drawing attention to the fact, that even Dr.\nFarrar, who seems to maintain the objective reality of demoniacal\npossessions in his recently published \u201cLife of Christ,\u201d admits that in the\nstatement that the demons locally passed from the man into the swine, some\ninaccuracy has crept into the narrative of the Evangelists.\n\nIt will be at once seen that the all\u2010important point in this objection is\nthe apparent acceptance by our Lord of demoniacal possession, as being a\ncorrect account of an objective fact. I fully agree with this writer, that\nthose who affirm that it was madness and nothing else are bound, when they\npropose this solution of the difficulty, to point out distinctly how it\naffects the question of our Lord\u2019s veracity, and the historical character\nof the Gospels.\n\nIn approaching this question, let me at once observe that while I\nentertain a definite opinion as to the nature of the inspiration of the\nNew Testament derived not from _\u00e0 priori_ assumptions, but from a careful\nstudy of its facts and phenomena, yet the question at issue is not what is\nthe nature or the extent of the inspiration, but the reality of the\nsupernatural events recorded in the Gospels. This issue is one which is\npurely historical, and therefore I have simply to examine it on historical\ngrounds, and not to defend any particular theory of inspiration. Our\nbusiness is first to ascertain what are the facts of the New Testament\nwhich are supported by historical evidence; when we have ascertained\nthese, we shall be in a position to propound a theory of inspiration in\naccordance with the facts and assertions; still, however, it will be\nnecessary to find out how a certain state of the facts will affect the\ncharacter which the Gospels attribute to our Lord.\n\nThe following facts are plain on the surface of the Gospels. First, that\nthe followers of our Lord believed that the demoniacal possessions there\nrecorded were objective facts, and not mere forms of disease.\n\nSecondly, that our Lord himself, if the words attributed to Him are\ncorrectly reported, used language which seems to imply that He shared in\nthis belief.\n\nThirdly, that in a particular instance, not only do the Evangelists affirm\nthat our Lord addressed a demoniac, but also the demons who possessed him,\nand that He permitted their departure into a herd of swine, thereby\napparently confirming the objective reality of the possession.\n\nThe question is a far more serious one, as it affects our Lord, than those\non whose reports the statements of the Gospels are founded. He is\nrepresented as being a divine person, and as possessed in His human\nnature, not of infinite but of superhuman knowledge. His apparent sanction\nof an erroneous view is therefore a very different thing from the apparent\nsanction of it by an author of a Gospel, or from the mistaken views which\nhis followers might have entertained as to the causes of a bodily disease.\n\nI should find no difficulty in adopting the theory of the eminent writers\nabove named, that the demoniacal possessions mentioned in the New\nTestament, were nothing but forms of insanity, if it were not that our\nLord has apparently recognised their reality. It has been urged that if\npossession was nothing but insanity, there is an end of the miracle. But\nthis is not the case, for the cure of a madman is quite as much a\nsupernatural act as the expulsion of a demon.\n\nLet me now assume for argument\u2019s sake, that possession was simple madness.\nHow does such a supposition affect the veracity of the authors of the\nGospels, and their judgment as credible historians of the events of our\nLord\u2019s life?\n\nIf we assume that possession was madness, it is evident from the language\nwhich the Evangelists have employed that they must have shared in the\nignorance of the times in which they lived as to the true causes of the\ncomplaint. When however we speak of the ignorance of any particular\nperiod, it should be observed that the expression is an indefinite one. We\nhave no right to impute to any body of authors opinions on particular\nsubjects of which their writings contain no traces. It has been affirmed,\nas we have seen, that the Jews of the apostolic age held a number of\nopinions on the subject of possession of the most grotesque and monstrous\ndescription. I have already shown that to impute these opinions to them,\nwhen no trace of them can be found in their writings is a most unfair mode\nof reasoning.\n\nWhen, therefore, I use the expression that they must have shared in the\nignorance of the age respecting the causes of this disease, I must guard\nagainst the danger of ascribing to them a greater degree of ignorance than\nthat which they have actually shown. The expression, \u201cignorance of the\nage,\u201d denotes no uniform quantity of ignorance shared in by every\nindividual alike. In an ignorant or superstitious age, one person may be\nfar more so than another. It is quite conceivable that two thousand years\nhence human improvement may have become so great, that those who live in\nthe present century may be designated as ignorant. It may be hereafter\nasserted that such writers as Huxley, Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, and Mill\nshared in the ignorance of the age in which they lived on some important\nphysical facts. But from this it would be absurd to draw the conclusion\nthat they were believers in the alleged facts of spiritualism because\nlarge numbers of their contemporaries were known to have believed in them,\nand spiritualistic publications enjoy a large circulation both in Europe\nand America in this nineteenth century.\n\nAs far as the Evangelists are concerned, the supposition that I am now\nconsidering involves nothing more than that they held a false theory as to\nthe cause of a particular form of disease, and that they have used\nlanguage respecting it that embodies this theory. In this point of view\nthey would not differ from writers of every age who have entertained false\ntheories as to the causes of physical phenomena. In such cases it is easy\nto separate the fact from the incorrect view as to what were the causes of\nthat fact. Ancient philosophical writers held many false theories as to\nthe place of the local habitation in our bodies of certain affections of\nour moral nature. These can be traced very distinctly in the language of\nthe present day. Thus we say that a man is devoid of heart, and talk of\nmaking appeals to the heart. These, and multitudes of similar expressions\nwhich occur both in ancient and modern writings, involve false\nphilosophical theories; but it is easy to separate the facts intended from\nthe theories. Thus, if the authors of the Gospels inform us that our Lord\ncured a demoniac, and give an account of the demoniac\u2019s outcries, as\nthough they were the utterances of a demon, we have only to substitute\nmadman for demoniac, and the correct state of the case is easily\ndiscovered.\n\nThe real difficulty which is felt on this subject, arises not from the\nnarratives as ordinary histories, but on the supposition that the writers\npossessed an inspiration which ought to have guarded them from such\nerrors. Popular theories of inspiration unquestionably render such an\nassumption necessary, but I can see no ground for it, either in the\nstatements of the Gospels, or any other portion of the New Testament.\nNowhere is it affirmed that its writers were to be guided into all truth,\nscientific, philosophical, or even historical. All that is affirmed is\nthat they possessed a degree of supernatural enlightenment adequate to\ncommunicate the Christian revelation to mankind. Neither is there a hint\ngiven, nor can a fact be adduced, to show that their supernatural\nillumination extended beyond this. The spiritual gifts bestowed no\nenlightenment beyond the special function of those gifts. This the\naffirmation of St. Paul in the Epistles to the Corinthians makes clear. A\nperson having the gift of tongues, if he had not also that of\ninterpretation was unable to interpret his own utterances, and the\npossession of the high gift of prophecy by no means exempted the possessor\nfrom the danger of using it in a manner to create confusion in the Church.\nEven the highest apostolic gifts conferred no infallibility, but were\nstrictly limited to their proper functions of communicating the great\ntruths of the Christian revelation. The idea that they conferred a general\ninfallibility is no statement of the New Testament, but a pure figment of\nthe imagination.\n\nIt therefore by no means follows because the writers of the New Testament\nhad an illumination sufficient for their functions that they had any other\nthan their ordinary enlightenment beyond that limit. They might have been\ngood teachers of religious truth, and yet utterly ignorant of physical\nscience. The assertion may be correct that St. Luke possessed a\nsupernatural guidance sufficient to enable him to compose the third\nGospel, and yet it may be no less true, that as a physician he had no\nmedical knowledge beyond that of his time, and that he shared in all its\nerrors as to the causes and cure of physical disease. A man may be a good\nphysician of the soul, and at the same time a very ignorant physician of\nthe body. It is quite conceivable, therefore, even if the Evangelists or\nthose followers of Christ from whom they derived their accounts possessed\nvarious degrees of supernatural enlightenment on matters directly\naffecting Christianity, that they possessed none whatever as to the causes\nof disease, and that they may have viewed madness as a result of\ndemoniacal action, and described it accordingly. The facts would remain\nthe same; the symptoms might have been exhibited, and the cure actually\neffected.\n\nBut the New Testament likewise affirms that our Lord imparted to His\nfollowers the power of expelling demons, as well as that of healing\ndiseases. Now, on the supposition that these demoniacs were simple\nmaniacs, how does this affect the credibility of the narrative?\n\nI reply that during the mission of the Apostles and the Seventy (for these\nare the cases alluded to) there is no promise made them of supernatural\nenlightenment. They were simply sent out to announce a specific fact, the\nnear approach and setting up of the kingdom of heaven, and to work\nmiracles in confirmation of it. It is true that in His address to them,\nour Lord told them that a time was coming when they would have to testify\nto Him before princes and kings, and that He promises them, that they\nshould receive supernatural assistance, suitable to the emergency. But\nthis never arose during the mission in question. They were commanded to\ncure the reputed demoniac in confirmation of their mission. This would be\nan equally miraculous sign whether he was one possessed or a simple\nmaniac. In this case, therefore, there was no reason why they should be\nsupernaturally enlightened as to the causes of this disease, more than of\nany other. No doubt the theories then prevalent as to the causes of\ndisease generally were very faulty. It could not be otherwise in the state\nof medical science at that period. So they must always have been while\nsuch a truth as the circulation of the blood was unknown. But the object\nof Christianity was not to communicate scientific knowledge, or to teach\nthe true causes of disease, but to discover truths mightily operative in\nthe moral and spiritual worlds. It follows, therefore, that the ignorance\nof the disciples as to the actual causes of mania no more affects the\ncredibility of the narrative than their ignorance of the causes of\nparalysis or leprosy.\n\nIt is also evident from the statements of the Gospels, that there were a\nconsiderable number of persons who practised exorcisms of various kinds,\nand who fully believed that the persons on whom they operated were\npossessed by demons. It seems also probable from the allusions made to\nthem, that these exorcisms were occasionally successful in effecting a\ncure; and it may be, more frequently, in mitigating the symptoms. This,\nhowever, was not always the case; for the Evangelists describe the\ndisciples as entirely unsuccessful in the case of the child, out of whom\nthey invoked the demon to depart in the name of Jesus. It is worthy of\nobservation, that in this instance, the father of the demoniac describes\nhis son\u2019s case as a combination of lunacy and possession, \u201cHe is lunatic\nand sore vexed.\u201d Their failure is directly attributed to want of faith,\n_i.e._ that there was something wanting in their mental state which\nprevented them from exerting the requisite influence over the lunatic\nyouth. The want of success with which exorcists were not unfrequently\nattended is strikingly set before us in the account given in the Acts of\nthe Apostles, of the attempt made by certain Jewish exorcists to cure the\ndemoniac at Ephesus. In this case it not only ended in a complete failure,\nbut in an aggravation of the malady.\n\nNow when we consider the various forms which mania assumes, it is quite\ncredible that exorcisms may have exerted a favourable influence on it,\naltogether apart from any supernatural power possessed by the operator. It\nis clear that the supposed maniacs imagined themselves under the influence\nof demoniacal possession. When we consider the powerful influence that one\nmind is capable of exerting over another under these circumstances we can\nsee that the presence of superior mental power was an influence exactly\nsuited to produce a favourable result. In our modern treatment of mania\n(whatever may be the opinions as to its physical origin) it is now\nuniversally admitted that moral means are the most efficacious. Some\nobvious physical causes can be dealt with and removed, while others\ncannot. But the most successful operator on these forms of lunacy is he\nwho applies to them the most effective moral treatment, under which in\nmany cases its symptoms have gradually disappeared. One of these modes of\ntreatment is never to cross the patient on the subject of his delusions.\nNothing is more remarkable than the influence which the efficient\npractitioner can exert over persons suffering from these forms of madness,\nby the mere energy of his will; a display of mental power analogous to\nthat of strong faith. This will often produce a calm among maniacs which\npersons of inferior endowments utterly fail to excite. It is an\nunquestionable fact that high mental and moral power is capable of\nproducing striking results on different forms of maniacal disease.\n\nThis being so, it follows that exorcists might be capable of exerting upon\nmaniacs a powerful influence favourable to cure. In the ancient world the\nusual treatment was that of extreme harshness. The demoniac of Gadara had\nbeen bound with chains and fetters. This is now known to have a direct\ntendency to aggravate the disease, rather than to cure it. It is no\nwonder, therefore, if the exorcist, by adopting an opposite mode of\ntreatment, and even by sympathizing with the sufferer\u2019s delusions, was\ncapable of alleviating the symptoms of the complaint, if not of effecting\na cure. The whole result may have been due to moral influence and\nspiritual power, which may have been taken for the expulsion of a demon.\nIn whatever way it was effected, the cure or the alleviation was no less\nreal.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the exorcists of the ancient world were far\nfrom necessarily being a set of impostors, even on the supposition that\npossession was simple mania. They may have been able to effect real\nalleviations or even cures of the complaint, although they were ignorant\nas to its cause, or how their exertions produced a successful result.\nThere is nothing inconsistent with their general honesty, if they\nthemselves were under the belief that they were expelling demons, while\nthey were really curing ordinary mania. It should also be observed, that a\nreal power of exerting an influence on madmen was one which in those times\nof ignorance, both of mental and physical science, admitted of fearful\nabuse, and if exercised for evil purposes, was capable of producing many\nof the worst results with which the practice of witchcraft and sorcery\nhave been attended. A large portion of these latter operations no doubt\nresulted from the successful practice of ocular deception, but another\nportion of them unquestionably resulted from the mighty influences that a\npowerful mind can exert over a weak, imaginative, and superstitious one.\nThere are many depths of human nature into which science has as yet failed\nto penetrate; and among these are the entire phenomena of mania and\nreligious frenzy.\n\nThese facts and considerations are sufficient to vindicate the credibility\nof the writers of the New Testament in their statement, that a power of\nexorcism was known and exercised in their time, and that its exercise was\nat times attended with favourable results. The statement on this subject\nattributed to our Lord, \u201cIf I by Satan cast out devils, by whom do your\nsons cast them out? therefore shall they be your judges,\u201d is plainly an\n_ad hominem_ argument. It amounts to no more than this; You Pharisees\naccuse me of casting out demons through Beelzebub. You assert that your\ndisciples exercise a power of exorcism; and that they do this in virtue of\na divine power communicated to them. On what principle of common sense can\nyou affirm that the power which I exercise is demoniacal, and that which\nyour disciples exercise is divine?\u2014There is no assertion made one way or\nthe other as to the reality of the acts in question; nor is there any\ndifficulty in supposing that our Lord recognised that some of the\ninfluences thus exerted were genuine.\n\nI have hitherto, in treating this part of the subject, been dealing with\nthe supposition that our Lord\u2019s disciples mistook maniacs for demoniacs,\nand the consequences of such a mistake on the authenticity of the Gospel\nnarratives. I must now address myself to the far more important question\nas to the consequences which follow from our Lord\u2019s apparent recognition\nof the existence of demoniacal possession on the supposition that it was\nsimple mania.\n\nThe facts as they appear in the Gospels are unmistakable. It was the\ndistinct opinion of their authors that our Lord recognised the phenomena\nwhich they have reported as the results of demoniacal possession and not\nof simple mania. In proof of this it will be needless to refer to every\ninstance they have recorded. The account of the demoniac at Gadara and\nthat of the lunatic youth are among the most remarkable, and on them the\ncase may be allowed to rest. In the former case the words of St. Mark,\nwhose description of the scene abounds in those details which are rarely\nseen except in narratives derived from direct ocular testimony, are: \u201cAnd\nall the demons besought him, saying, Send us into the swine that we may\nenter into them. And forthwith Jesus gave them leave. And the unclean\nspirits went out and entered into the swine, &c.\u201d In the case of the\ndemoniac child the Evangelist describes the Apostles as asking Jesus, \u201cWhy\ncould not we cast him out?\u201d The following words are ascribed to our Lord:\n\u201cThis kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.\u201d It is undeniable,\ntherefore, that the Evangelists have ascribed to Jesus a belief in the\nreality of demoniacal possession.\n\nI am not concerned in the present argument with the words and actions\nwhich they have attributed to the demoniacs; but with the words and\nactions attributed to Jesus. We know that some madmen labour under the\ndelusion, not only that they are emperors and kings, but even in a few\ninstances that they are God himself. This being so, it is quite possible\nthat a maniac may confuse his personality with one or more demons; and\nspeak and act consistently with the delusion. The maniacs may have given\nutterance to exclamations resulting from mere delusions; but the\nEvangelists in recording these utterances gave simple statements of facts.\nIt is quite possible, that the demoniac of Gadara may have imagined\nhimself possessed by a legion of demons, and have spoken and acted\naccordingly, whilst he was at the same time labouring under simple mania.\n\nNow, on the assumption that possession was simple mania and nothing more,\nthe following suppositions are the only possible ones.\n\nFirst, that our Lord really distinguished between mania and possession;\nbut that the Evangelists have inaccurately reported his words and actions,\nthrough the media of their own subjective impressions, or, in short, have\nattributed to Him language that He did not really utter.\n\nSecond, that our Lord knew that possession was a form of mania, and\nadopted the current notions of the time in speaking of it, and that the\nwords were really uttered by Him.\n\nThird, that with similar knowledge, He adopted the language in question as\npart of the curative process.\n\nFourth, that He accepted the validity of the distinction, and that it was\na real one during those times.\n\nThese alternatives demand our careful consideration, not for the purpose\nof determining which is the correct one, but of estimating the results\nwhich flow from either of them on the central character of the Gospels.\nThe position which I take must be clearly stated. It is this: If\npossession be mania, there is nothing in the language which the\nEvangelists have attributed to our Lord which compromises the truthfulness\nof his character. If, on the other hand, we assume that possession was an\nobjective fact, there is nothing in our existing scientific knowledge of\nthe human mind which proves that the possessions of the New Testament were\nimpossible.\n\nLet us consider the first alternative.\n\nA careful examination of the phenomena presented by the synoptic Gospels\nleads to the irresistible conclusion that they largely consist of accounts\nwhich had been handed down by oral tradition, for a considerable time\nprior to their being committed to writing, and that these have been in\nvarious degrees supplemented by information derived from other sources.\nAssuming this to have been the case it gives an adequate account of the\ndifferences of form which they present, their variations in minor\ncircumstances, and that most remarkable of all their phenomena, the\nsamenesses of expression interwoven with considerable diversities, which\nis presented alike by the parallel narratives and discourses. The\nthreefold and more frequently twofold form in which several of the\ndiscourses have been handed down to us, prevent us from believing that\nthese discourses were intended to be rigid reproductions of the verbal\nutterances of our Lord. All they can be is an accurate account of the\nsense and very frequently of his words. The important question for our\npresent consideration is, Have the Evangelists, in reporting the\ndiscourses of Jesus, imparted to them a colouring derived from their own\nsubjective impressions or do they accurately convey to us his meaning and\nhis meaning only? Or with respect to the point before us, Have the\nEvangelists in reporting the utterances of Jesus to the demoniacs and his\nobservations on possession to his disciples given us the substance of what\nHe actually said, or their own impressions of what He might have said?\n\nI reply, the internal grounds for assuming their accuracy are strong. This\nis vouched for by the fact that while we have a three or twofold report of\nthe same discourse, varying very considerably in words and arrangement,\nand while we have whole sentences in one Evangelist which materially aid\nin determining the meaning, either omitted in one or inserted in another,\nstill with all these variations in expression, the variations in sense are\nof the smallest possible importance. This being the case the whole aspect\nof the discourses leads us to infer that they are altogether unaffected by\nthe subjective impressions of those who reported them. They are indelibly\nstamped with the mind of Jesus himself and with his alone. There are many\npoints on which his teaching ran strongly counter to the subjective\nimpressions of those who reported it. Here then if such impressions had\nintruded themselves we should be certain to find indications of such\nintrusion, and that in no doubtful form. But there are none. The theory\ntherefore of the introduction of the subjective impressions of the\nfollowers of our Lord into the discourses has no foundation in their\ncontents, and therefore it is wholly illegitimate to assume it for the\nsolution of a difficulty.\n\nThe phenomena which distinguish St. Mark\u2019s Gospel strongly display the\nmarks of autoptic testimony. This greatly increases the difficulty of the\nsupposition in question, for these expressions are found in that Gospel,\nand in it we also find the remarkable saying, \u201cThis kind goeth not out but\nby prayer and fasting.\u201d It seems therefore impossible to doubt the\nEvangelist\u2019s assertion that such words were uttered by our Lord.\n\nBut I must now inquire whether Dr. Farrar\u2019s supposition is tenable, that\nsome misapprehension has crept into the narrative when it affirms that the\ndemons in objective reality left the body of the man and entered into the\nswine.\n\nI answer that there is nothing in the Evangelists which requires us to\nconsider their words as an accurately scientific statement of the mode in\nwhich the demon acted on the mind of the possessed.\n\nIt is true that they repeatedly say that they entered in and out of the\nman, but this may well be in conformity with popular ideas on the subject,\nwithout intending to assert as a scientific fact, that the demons made\neither the body or the spirit of the man their local habitation. The New\nTestament attempts to determine nothing respecting the _modus operandi_ of\nspirits. God is said to dwell in a holy man, but it is ridiculous to\naffirm that the omnipresent Spirit makes the man his local habitation.\nThere is a case in point as to the use of such language in the narrative\nof the woman who was healed of the issue of blood. The effect produced on\nher is described by our Lord and the Evangelists by the words \u201cPower\n(\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2) has gone out of me.\u201d Yet no one who considers the mode in which\nthe Gospels are composed, will affirm that our Lord by using these words\nintended to convey a scientific truth as to his _modus operandi_ in\nperforming the miracle, or that it was actually performed by some subtle\nemanation called \u201cPower,\u201d which issued from his person. With those who\nassume that neither our Lord nor his Apostles could use popular\nexpressions of this kind, but were bound to use terms of strict scientific\naccuracy all reasoning is thrown away. If the strictest verbal accuracy\nmust be observed on every occasion it would be incorrect to say that a\nphysician has cured a lunatic, for the idea on which the term lunacy is\nfounded is scientifically inaccurate. It follows therefore that the terms\nwhich are so constantly applied to demons in the New Testament, that they\nentered into, departed out of, or possessed a man may well be popular\nexpressions, denoting that they exerted a mighty, nay, an overwhelming\ninfluence upon him, which in the shattered state of his physical or moral\ncondition he was unable to shake off, without determining anything as to\nthe mode in which that influence was exerted. Thus, in St. John\u2019s Gospel,\nthe devil is described as having put it (\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2) _into the heart_ of\nJudas Iscariot to betray our Lord. After the giving of the sop, Satan is\nsaid to have entered into him. Surely the only fact which these words are\nintended to convey is that Judas allowed his whole moral and spiritual\nbeing to be overpowered by the influence of the evil one. It is quite\npossible that the Evangelists might have thought that the influence was\nexerted by actually going in or coming out of a man. But this is a mere\nphysical theory as to the mode of action, and certainly is not a point on\nwhich the writings of the New Testament anywhere affirm that a\nsupernatural knowledge was imparted to their authors.\n\nIt follows therefore that the expressions \u201cgoing out from the man,\u201d and\n\u201centering into the swine,\u201d may only denote the cessation of the influence\nof the demons over the man, and its exertion on the swine, without\ndetermining the mode in which that influence was exerted. Surely when our\nLord promised that He would come to the man who loved him and make his\nabode with him, that did not imply a local indwelling of his person but an\nindwelling of influence.\n\nWith such expressions in abundance before us, in which it is obvious that\nthey were never intended to denote anything local, it is absurd to fix it\non the sacred writers in this particular case. They nowhere assert that\nthe demons were seen to pass from the man and enter the swine. It was\nsimply a matter of inference from the facts which they witnessed that they\nhad done so. The man ceased to rave and became a rational creature. The\nswine rushed down into the lake and perished. They also affirm that the\nresult took place by the permission of Jesus. Yet it is somewhat\nremarkable that it is only Matthew who attributes to him the word \u201cGo.\u201d\nMark and Luke only mention the request of the demons, and the result which\nfollowed. There is nothing therefore derogatory to the character of the\nEvangelists as historians in supposing that the facts received a colouring\nfrom their own subjective impressions, though it would be so if under such\ncircumstances they had allowed those impressions to assign a different\nmeaning to our Lord\u2019s words from that which he actually conveyed.\n\nThis conclusion at which we have arrived, that our Lord\u2019s meaning is\naccurately reported by the Evangelists, disposes of the first alternative.\nWe will now proceed to examine the second, viz., that our Lord knew that\npossession was mania, and that He adopted the current notions of the times\nin speaking of it. The all important question is, how far does this affect\nhis veracity?\n\nOn this point Archbishop Trench has laid down the following position\nbroadly: \u201cIf Jesus knew that the Jewish belief in demoniacal possession\nwas baseless and that Satan did not exercise such power over the bodies or\nspirits of men there would be in such language that absence of agreement\nbetween thoughts and words in which the essence of a lie consists.\u201d\n\nIf this position is correct it involves a principle far more extensive\nthan the case immediately before us. It is nothing less than that our Lord\nneither in his formal teaching nor in his conversation should have used\nlanguage which was other than scientifically correct. It might be argued,\nthat if He had done so He would have lent his sanction to the error which\nit involved. Even if the principle thus laid down could be confined to\nreligious truth (which it cannot), it would then have been necessary that\nwhenever the current ideas, or the mode of conception of the day contained\nan assumption involving an incorrect theory or endangering a religious\nerror, our Lord ought to have corrected it in the course of his teaching.\nIf we admit that demoniacal possession was a real agency there can be no\ndoubt that the Jews would confound many cases of ordinary mania with it.\nThis being so, if the principle is correct, our Lord ought to have pointed\nout the distinction. Again, even if it is assumed that demoniacal agency\nwas sometimes manifested in the phenomena of witchcraft, there can be no\ndoubt that much of it was due to human imposture. On the principle laid\ndown by the Archbishop our Lord ought to have corrected every error that\nwas prevalent on that subject. On the same principle it would have been\nimpossible for him to have used an _ad hominem_ argument or in fact any\nform of expression founded on an erroneous conception. It is therefore\nevident that the principle, if accepted at all, can only be accepted under\nvery considerable qualifications, or we shall convert our Lord from the\nrevealer of truth and teacher of Christianity into one whose duty it was\nto combat every erroneous opinion of the day. On such a theory it is\ndifficult to see how our Lord was not bound to correct every erroneous\nopinion then current respecting the first and second chapters of Genesis,\nand to point out their true relation to the modern discoveries of geology,\nfor He expressly referred to the second chapter in his teaching. He also\nreferred to the flood, respecting which many erroneous opinions were\nundoubtedly current. If the principle is good it might be urged that He\nsanctioned those errors by his silence.\n\nThe same principle must also have been applicable to many other erroneous\nopinions which the Jews entertained respecting the interpretation of the\nOld Testament. In fact it would be difficult to assign any limits to our\nLord\u2019s duty of correcting popular errors which had any kind of bearing on\nreligious truth.\n\nBut to return to the demoniacs. Is there any thing inconsistent with our\nLord\u2019s truthfulness, if we suppose that they were lunatics and nothing\nmore, in his using the current language of the day respecting them? Let it\nbe observed that two considerations are really involved; first, our Lord\nis represented as conversing directly with the demoniac. Secondly, He also\noccasionally speaks of demoniacal possession in his ordinary teaching in\nthe current language of the day. Now if it be admitted to be consistent\nwith his truthfulness to address such language to the maniac, is it\nequally so to employ such language in his discourses to others?\n\nI observe first, that if possession was mania, the real ground of the\npopular error was an erroneous opinion as to the cause of a natural\ndisorder. The popular belief in fact ascribed it to supernatural instead\nof natural causes. So far, but no farther, it touched religious questions.\nTo correct the error involved not merely the teaching of religious truth,\nbut in this particular case the enunciation of sounder principles of\nmental philosophy. I think that I may fearlessly affirm that the teaching\nof scientific truth, either mental or material, did not come within the\nscope of our Lord\u2019s divine mission. Political truth is a part of moral\ntruth, and moral truth is closely allied to religious truth. Now although\nChristianity is a power which will ultimately reform the political world,\nour Lord expressly affirmed that it was no part of his mission to\nenunciate political truth.\n\nIn the same manner it may have formed no direct portion of his mission to\nteach correct views respecting the origin of mania, or to counteract the\nopinions which ascribed it to supernatural causes.\n\nIf this principle is correct, there is nothing inconsistent with his\ntruthfulness if when our Lord conversed with a supposed demoniac, He\naddressed him in language which took for granted the truth of his\ndelusions. Even if it is supposed that truthfulness required that He\nshould have exposed a popular delusion, surely it was no occasion for\ndoing so, when He was addressing a madman. Who would affirm that a\nphysician is wanting in truthfulness if he addresses his patient in terms\nof his own delusions, or imagines that it is his duty to enter into a\ndiscussion with a madman as to the causes of his malady?\n\nOn these principles it is quite consistent with our Lord\u2019s truthfulness to\nsuppose that the dialogue with the demoniac of Gadara actually occurred,\nwhile He himself knew that possession was nothing but mania. Let us\nsuppose that the man was a raving madman. He had been treated cruelly. He\nrushed towards Jesus and was awed by the greatness of his character. The\ndialogue takes place, as it is described by the Evangelist. I see no want\nof truthfulness on our Lord\u2019s part, nor can I conceive any necessity for\nexplaining to the man that he was not possessed by a multitude of demons;\nor if the madman requested that the demons by whom he imagined himself\npossessed might be allowed to go into the swine, that our Lord should\nexplain to him that it was impossible that they should do so because the\nidea of the demoniac was a delusion. The case would be one of confused or\ndouble personality, and accordingly the narrator has described the demons\nand the man as alternately speaking, and our Lord as addressing them. In\nsuch a case the form of the narrative would be modified by the subjective\nimpressions of the narrator.\n\nBut the words which our Lord is described as addressing to the demoniac\nlad also require consideration. St. Mark describes them as follows. Jesus\nrebuked the foul spirit, saying unto him, \u201cThou deaf and dumb spirit, I\ncharge thee come out of him, and enter no more into him; and the spirit\ncried, and rent him sore and came out of him.\u201d Let us suppose that the\ndisease was mania, and that our Lord knew it to be so, but that the\nfather, as well as the maniac and the others who were present believed\nthat it was caused by the action of an evil spirit. What was there\ninconsistent with veracity in addressing the maniac in terms of his own\ndelusions? If it is urged that the belief in possession was a\nsuperstition, and that to use such language tended to confirm the belief,\nI reply that if we assume that our Lord was bound not to use the language\nwhich was common among his hearers in speaking of such diseases, or that\nHe ought to have given explanations of their true causes, then we assume\nthat his character as a revealer of Christianity rendered it necessary\nthat in the course of his public ministry He should correct all the errors\nwhich He encountered, and never use language which had originated in them.\n\nThe words which are ascribed to our Lord by the Evangelist when He stilled\nthe tempest will throw light on this subject. St. Mark gives them as\nfollows: \u201cHe rebuked the winds and said to the sea, Peace, be still.\u201d The\nword here rendered \u201cBe still\u201d is in the Greek far more emphatic, _Be\ngagged_ (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03c3\u03bf). In the case of the demoniac our Lord is represented as\nrebuking the evil spirit. Here He rebukes the waves. Now it is only\npossible to rebuke rational agents. Such an expression would therefore be\nonly accurate if addressed to a being who was capable of hearing it, and\nwho was uttering load cries. It may be objected that the expression\nfavours the notion that the speaker supposed the roaring of the waves to\nbe the voice of an evil spirit, who was exciting the tempest, or, in other\nwords, that He gave countenance to the heathen belief, that it was the\nvoice of \u00c6olus, the spirit of the storm. Whatever amount of superstition\nmay be attributed to the Jews at the time of the Advent, it will scarcely\nbe urged that the followers of Jesus attributed the roaring of the gale to\nthe voice of a demon. Still it may be urged on the principles above\nreferred to that the words uttered by our Lord tended to confirm\nsuperstitions notions as to the nature and origin of storms. I argue, on\nthe other hand, that these expressions prove indisputably that the\nlanguage used by Him was not always intended to be a literal description\nof fact, any more than the numerous similar addresses to the inanimate\ncreation which we find in the Psalms.\n\nBut in the case of the demoniac, the real difficulty consists in the\nresults which are alleged to have happened to the swine. I have already\nobviated some portion of this as far as the form of the narrative is\nconcerned. But there remains the fact that the swine are stated to have\nrushed into the lake and perished. As to the reality of such an occurrence\nthere can have been no mistake. The mere mode of expression offers no\nexplanation, nor can a mistake respecting such an occurrence have\noriginated in any possible deception of the imagination. _If it was not a\nfact it must have been a fictitious invention._ Can any explanation of it\nbe given? It has been suggested that the swine were driven down the cliff\nby the madman. Against this supposition, it has been urged that no animals\nare less easily driven than swine. How then could it have been possible to\ndrive two thousand of them into the water? But there is no necessity to\nassume that they were driven at all. The scene as it is described by the\nEvangelists was well calculated to inspire animals with fright. It would\nhowever have been impossible to frighten two thousand of them. Granted:\nbut large herds of animals follow their leaders implicitly. When under\nexcitement one makes a leap, the others will follow. All that would have\nbeen necessary, if we suppose that the herd was near the edge of the\ncliff, was that the leaders should have received the requisite impulse\nfrom the madman, and under its influence rushed wildly down the cliff, and\nbeen followed by their companions.\n\nBut the case is different when our Lord speaks to others, and not to the\ndemoniacs themselves. His observations to the Pharisees on this subject I\nhave already considered. There remains the striking one addressed to the\ndisciples: \u201cThis kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.\u201d The\ncircumstances of the case are these. The disciples had failed to cure the\nyouth, whether a demoniac or a simple lunatic. They ask our Lord why it\nwas that they had failed. He tells them that it was because of their\nunbelief. Now it is impossible for us to say what was the nature of the\ninfluence of faith in affecting miraculous cures, and why the want of it\nprevented success. It is sufficient to draw attention to the fact that it\nis uniformly laid down in the New Testament, that in the case of\nsubordinate agents working miracles faith was necessary for their\naccomplishment. Our Lord also usually required faith in the recipients of\nhis cures, but not always. But to his disciples when they attempted to\nperform a miracle faith was indispensable to their success. The question\nwas not what was the nature of the disease, but why in this particular\ncase they had failed to cure it. Our Lord replied that in this instance\nnot only was faith necessary to effect the cure, but a very unusual degree\nof it. If the question had been what was the cause of the child\u2019s disease,\nand if our Lord know that it was not possession, but mania, it is quite\npossible that He would have refused to answer it, as He did on other\noccasions when curious questions were put to him, and would have deduced\nsome moral lesson from the fact. This it will be remembered was the course\nwhich He pursued when He was asked whether only a few would be saved. But\nthe inquiry was not what caused the disease, but why the attempt to cure\nit had proved a failure. Such being the question, there is nothing\ninconsistent with truthfulness in our Lord\u2019s answer. He avoided entering\ninto an explanation as to what was a physical cause of the disease, which\nwas quite foreign to his divine mission. He therefore simply told them\nthat their failure was owing to their unbelief, and then added, in\nlanguage couched in their own forms of thought, and which would not\ntherefore open a discussion on subjects foreign to the purposes of his\nmission, \u201cThis kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.\u201d\n\nThose who lay stress on difficulties of this kind are in the habit of\noverlooking the plain fact, that our Lord\u2019s teaching was specifically\naddressed to the living characters of the day, and to their existing lines\nof thought, and cannot without reference to them be directly translated\ninto our own. This remark is no less true of the moral teaching contained\nin the Gospels, than of their historical statements. It is even more so,\nfor a great number of the moral precepts of Christ cannot be applied as\npractical guides until they have been adapted to the altered conditions of\nthought and of society.(4) They are in fact principles given in the form\nof precepts. If our Lord\u2019s words had been reported so as to make them\nsquare with the lines of thought of every age, they would have given us,\nnot his actual teaching but a modification of it. It is our duty by a\ncareful study of the great principles on which it is based to apply it to\nour present wants. It may appear to some far more desirable that it should\nhave been capable of a direct instead of an indirect application, yet the\nfact is as I have stated it. Want of attention to this has occasioned no\ninconsiderable number of the difficulties of the New Testament.\n\nOne or two remarks will be all that is necessary for illustrating the\nposition which some have adopted that our Lord\u2019s mode of dealing with\ndemoniacs was intended by Him as part of the process of cure. I should not\nhave alluded to this subject at all unless the view in question had been\npropounded by a very eminent writer. I have already considered its main\nprinciples under the previous head.\n\nIt ought to be observed that the care of demoniacs, whatever view we may\ntake of possession, belongs to a class of our Lord\u2019s miracles which are\ndistinct from all others. All the others are described as wrought on the\nhuman body, or on external nature. The Evangelists do not record a single\nmiracle beside these that was wrought on the human mind. This is a\nremarkable fact. In the course of his ministry He encountered every form\nof moral and spiritual disease, from the weaknesses of his disciples and\nattached friends to the opposition of his most avowed enemies. Now,\nalthough He emphatically asserted that He was the physician of the soul,\nand although for the spiritual diseases of men He felt the most profound\nsympathy, never once is Jesus represented as exerting his supernatural\npower for their care. On the contrary, He is uniformly represented as\nhaving recourse to moral and spiritual means and not to miracles to effect\nit. Physical diseases He cures instantaneously, moral ones slowly and with\neffort. This fact is worthy of deep attention as showing that our Lord\nuniformly acted in conformity with the laws of the moral universe. If the\nGospels are fictions, why is the Great Physician of Souls never\nrepresented as performing a sudden or miraculous cure in the moral and\nspiritual worlds, in the same manner as He does in the material? The need\nof miraculous intervention to secure Simon Peter from the moral and\nspiritual danger which surrounded him was as great as to prevent him from\nsinking in the water. Yet no other than moral and spiritual influences\nwere called into action.\n\nThe following is the bearing of this fact on the question before us. If\nthe cure of a demoniac was the expulsion of a demon, it involved the\nliberation of a moral nature from its thraldom, and at the same time the\ncure of the bodily organisation as far as its disordered condition enabled\nthe demon to exert his power. If, on the other hand, it was the cure of\nsimple mania, still the act had a direct bearing on the moral nature of\nthe sufferer. In either case the use of moral means as well as\nsupernatural agency would be especially appropriate. If demoniacs were\nmadmen, our Lord was fully justified in displaying towards them the\nhighest degree of sympathy, and in bringing to bear on them the mighty\nmoral and spiritual forces which abode in his lofty personality. The same\nremark would be equally true if the sufferer was held in thrall by\ndemoniacal power. Each class of miracles in the mode of their performance\nis exactly suited to the condition of those on whom our Lord was\noperating. On either supposition He was dealing not merely with physical\nforces, but with moral agency, and He dealt with it accordingly.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that if it may be taken as established that\npossession involved nothing but simple mania, there is nothing in the\nfacts as they are recorded in the New Testament inconsistent with that\nsupposition, or which affects the credit of the Gospels as historical\nnarratives. Nor are they inconsistent with the idea that their writers\nwere favoured with such supernatural assistance in composing them as was\nadequate for the purpose of giving us such an account of the actions and\nteachings of Jesus as was necessary for communicating all the great truths\nof the Christian revelation. Nor is the supposition inconsistent, as it\nhas been alleged to be, with His divine character and truthfulness.\n\nI will examine in the next chapter the supposition that possession was not\nmania, but an actual objective fact.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. POSSESSION, IF AN OBJECTIVE REALITY, NEITHER INCREDIBLE NOR\nCONTRARY TO THE ASCERTAINED TRUTHS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.\n\n\nI now proceed to the consideration of the remaining alternative, the truth\nof which the form of the narrative seems most to favour, viz., that our\nLord accepted the distinction between possession and mania; and that\nduring those times possessions were actual occurrences.\n\nIn considering this subject, it will be necessary to pay attention to the\ndistinction to which I have referred in the previous chapter, that even if\nmany of the phenomena that accompanied possession were due to superhuman\nagency, the Gospels are by no means pledged to any particular theory of\nthe _modus operandi_ by which the phenomena were brought about. What I\nmean is that these phenomena might have been due to a superhuman agency,\nwithout involving the fact that the demon had a local habitation either in\nthe body or the spirit of the man. All that the Gospels can be taken to\naffirm is, that the evil spirit in some way or other, of which we are\nignorant, held the man in a state of thraldom, made his mental powers the\nsubject of a divided consciousness, overpowered the functions of his\nreason and his will, and through his action on the mind used for his own\npurposes the organs of his body. The writers of the New Testament are\npledged to no theory as to how such results were effected. They have\nsimply reported the phenomena as they presented themselves to their\nobservation. In doing this, the language which they have employed denotes\nlocal habitation; but the words used in stilling the storm make it quite\nclear that the literal meaning cannot be pressed. Considering the general\ncharacter of these narratives, it is impossible to pledge them to the\nparticular mode in which these results were brought about.\n\nOne circumstance seems to militate against the supposition that possession\ninvolved nothing but simple mania, namely, the numbers of those who are\nspoken of as possessed. If the Gospel narratives are historical, it would\nappear that such cases were numerous. Not only are several miracles of\nthis description definitely recorded, but the Evangelists several times\naffirm that our Lord cured demoniacs in considerable numbers, without\nfurnishing us with the details. Now it is difficult to believe that\nmaniacs existed in such large numbers in a country of the size and\npopulation of Jud\u00e6a. Yet all the phenomena of possession point to\nmaniacal, and not to harmless lunacy. The number of the cases of mania\nthat occur bears but a small proportion to those of the latter form of\nderangement. It is true that at times of popular excitement various forms\nand numerous cases of frenzy manifest themselves; but these differ from\nmania, though they not unfrequently terminate in it. I have made these\nobservations, because, in discussing such a subject, it is only right to\nstate fully the difficulties with which particular theories are attended.\nIt is very probable, however, that as the symptoms so closely resembled\neach other, many cases of actual mania would be confounded in popular\nestimation with possession, and, therefore, that cases of actual\npossession may not have been so numerous as at first sight would appear.\n\nOn the supposition that possession was a reality, we have no means of\ndetermining what moral or physical preconditions were necessary for its\nmanifestation. It is clear that the authors of the Gospels must have\nconsidered that it was owing to some predisposing causes, physical or\nmoral, though they have not described them. Unless this was the case, the\nevil, instead of being partial, would have been universal. Various moral\ncauses would naturally form a suitable precondition for its manifestation.\nThere can be no doubt that a number of vices, when indulged in beyond a\ncertain point, reduce man\u2019s moral being to a wreck and render him\nobnoxious to the action of external agency. The power of self\u2010control may\nbe indefinitely weakened. If vice is carried to its extreme forms, it\nproduces phenomena hardly, if at all, distinguishable from madness. Such a\nstate of man\u2019s moral nature would form a suitable precondition to enable a\nsuperhuman being to overpower the reason and the will, the supremacy of\nwhich was already impaired by an influence from within. In such cases\npossession would have been rendered possible by a man\u2019s self\u2010induced moral\ncorruption.\n\nThe testimony of history proves that during the century which preceded and\nthat which followed the Advent, the state of moral corruption was extreme.\nMen were sated with the old, and craving for new and unheard of forms of\nsensual gratification. The old class of ideas, moral and religious, were\ngradually dying out, and men were eagerly seeking for something to fill\nthe void. There consequently never was a time when a greater number of\nabnormal forms of thought burst on the human mind, which was shaken to its\nutmost depths. The outbreak of fanaticism combined with moral wickedness,\nwhich displayed itself forty years after in the Jewish war of\nindependence, is probably without a parallel in the history of man. For\nthis there must have been years of preparation. A somewhat similar state\nof things existed in the Pagan world, which led to the production of\nnumerous religious charlatans and impostors. The times were characterised\nby an extravagance of thought on almost every subject, philosophy itself\nforming no exception. Such an abnormal mental condition was peculiarly\nsuited to the reception of external mental influences, if we suppose them\npossible.\n\nBut I am bound to admit that the facts recorded in the Gospels prove that\npossession was not always the result of moral degradation. This is proved\nby the case of the youth, whose possession the father directly connects\nwith lunacy, and says that it had seized him from a child. In this case\nthe cause which rendered the possession possible must have been physical,\nprobably a derangement of the nervous system.\n\nIf I understand rightly the position which is taken by those who affirm\nthat possession was mania, and nothing else, it is as follows. It is\nalleged that at certain periods of history, the belief in possession has\nbeen widely spread. Possessions are unknown in modern times; and all the\ninstances which have been alleged are either cases of mania or delusion.\nThe belief in it has gradually died away as knowledge has advanced. In\nformer times it generated a number of grotesque stories, which were pure\ninventions of the imagination heated by enthusiasm. Such facts as were\nreal may be referred to madness as their cause. The others are simply\ndisbelieved. Under the influence of increasing knowledge, there has arisen\na widespread belief in modern times, that there is nothing superhuman in\nthe causes of such phenomena, but that they are due to influences existing\nwithin the mind itself. This, as it is affirmed, being true of all the\nalleged instances of possession in the modern world, it is inferred that\nsimilar ones in the ancient world are equally unreal; and if we had the\nrequisite data before us, we should be able to refer them all to ordinary\nhuman causes.\n\nWith respect to the general fact, there can be no doubt that advancing\nknowledge has caused a general disbelief in the reality of any modern form\nof possession, or of witchcraft. The supreme grotesqueness of the\nphenomena of the latter has caused the belief in it to perish under the\ninfluence of common sense, aided by an increased acquaintance with sound\nprinciples of causation, and the stability of the operations of nature.\nStill it is incorrect to affirm that the prevalence of such beliefs has\nbeen due to no other cause than universal ignorance. The belief in\nwitchcraft produced its most unhappy results during the reigns of\nElizabeth and the Stuarts, in the very age of Bacon, Shakespeare, and\nRaleigh. Such beliefs originate in certain principles of our minds whose\ngratification consists in the contemplation of the marvellous, the action\nof which I shall consider hereafter. They have existed in every condition\nof society, and only changed the form of their manifestation. Those who\nboast of our freedom from such delusions, owing to the superior light of\nthe nineteenth century, seem to have forgotten the existence at the\npresent day of a belief in spiritualism, which is little, if at all, less\nabsurd than witchcraft, though the former has encountered a less severe\ntreatment than the latter. This has been more due to the improvement of\nour humanity than to our knowledge of physical science. It is a fact that\nspiritualism is believed in by multitudes; and its votaries belong far\nmore to the cultivated class of society than to the ignorant and the\nvulgar. What the witch mania was to the sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies, spiritualism is to the nineteenth. It is the peculiar form\nrather than the possibility of such delusions that has passed away.\n\nIt should be observed also that the demoniacal supernaturalism of the\nmonastic writers, and of the middle ages, differs from that of the New\nTestament to such a degree that they cannot fairly be compared. In the\nformer the apparition of demons and departed spirits was a thing of\nconstant occurrence; in the latter, never. To the monks the devil was\ncontinually appearing in the most phantastic forms, and performing the\nmost grotesque miracles. To this form of demonology modern spiritualism\ncan put in very strong claims to be esteemed the genuine successor. The\nheated imagination of even such a man as Luther suggested to him that he\nsaw Satan in visible reality. It is worthy of remark that St. Paul knew\nnothing of visible Satanic manifestations. With him they were invariably\nspiritual.\n\nIt is important to keep steadily in view the fact, that the New Testament\ninvariably represents possession as consisting in the action of a stronger\nmind on a weaker one. The influence which the demon exerted on the bodily\norgans might have been effected through the agency of the man himself. It\nis never described as involving a visible manifestation of the demon, but\nhis action is one which is purely mental and spiritual. His presence and\nhis departure were simply judged of by their effects.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the denial of the possibility of an influence\nof this kind must rest on a very wide principle. It cannot be confined to\nsuch action alone, but must go to the extent of denying the possibility of\nthe action of all spiritual beings on the mind of man. The only principle\non which the denial can rest is, that our mental science has so far\nsucceeded in analyzing all the past and present operations of the human\nmind, that it is justified in affirming that they all originate entirely\nwithin the mind itself; and are never brought about by an action on it\nfrom without by any invisible agent. If this is the principle on which the\ndenial rests, it will be equally valid to exclude the action of God on our\nminds, as well as that of all other invisible beings. It will doubtless be\nurged that it is only intended to deny the action of invisible evil\nbeings. But if it is true that our mental philosophy has ascertained that\nall our thoughts originate either in the mind itself, or in the mind acted\non by external nature, or by other men, the principle must be valid for\nproving that all other spiritual agency exerted on the mind is impossible,\nand that all supposed instances of it are delusions. It is impossible on\nthis principle to exclude the evil agency, and not to exclude the good\nalso.\n\nIt is evident that this principle is far too broad to be used for the\npurpose of affirming the impossibility of the action of external evil\nagents only. It is based on the supposition that our mental philosophy is\nso complete as to be able to assign even the most abnormal portions of our\nmental action to definite and known forces, all of which originate within\nthe mind itself, and are never due to external influences. If mental\nphilosophy could establish this as a fact, it would doubtless prove that\npossession was impossible; but it could prove a great deal more, even that\nGod never acted on or influenced the spirit of man. But if there is any\none phenomenon of the mind, of the origin of which we are ignorant, the\nwhole principle is vitiated, for that very phenomenon may be caused by the\naction of an external power. The real point of the controversy therefore\nis, Is our mental science thus complete? Has it been able to reduce all\nour mental phenomena, including the most abnormal of them, to the action\nof known forces? Has it analyzed our mental powers to their inmost depths?\nUntil it has done this, it is impossible to affirm that the abnormal\nactions of the mind may not be occasioned by an external agency.\n\nIt will probably be urged, that although our philosophy has not yet\nsucceeded in assigning all our mental phenomena to the action of known\nforces, it hopes to accomplish this hereafter; and that its past conquests\nought to be accepted as a pledge of its future performances; and that the\ntime will certainly come, when it will be able to refer every mental\nphenomenon to a cause originating in the mind itself, and acting in\nconformity with invariable law. Promises, however, are not performances;\nwhat is requisite to impart validity to wide affirmations is present\nactual knowledge, not the hope that future scientific conquests will be\nextended over the entire regions of the unknown. Science professes to walk\nby sight and not by faith. In a subject of this kind it is most\nunphilosophical to assume that the possibilities of the future are the\nrealities of the present; and to enunciate propositions whose validity\nrests solely on the fact that they are so.\n\nI will now definitely state the principle which can alone give any\nscientific value to the assertion, that such demoniacal action as that\nwhich is described in the New Testament, is unbelievable. It is as\nfollows: that we have so completely ascertained the nature of the forces\nwhich act on our minds, and the laws which regulate them, that we know as\na scientifically established truth, that they all originate either in our\nown mental organization, or in the action of other men on our minds. The\nstatement of the principle in this distinct form at once shows that it is\ninvalid.\n\nIt is impossible for one moment to affirm that our knowledge is so\ncomplete, that we have a scientific acquaintance with the causes of all\nour varied mental phenomena, and the laws which regulate them. We have\nascertained the nature of several of our mental processes; but how small a\nportion of man\u2019s mental activity do they embrace. I need only\nparticularize a few of which we are in complete ignorance, as to the\nforces which generate them, and the laws which regulate their action.\n\nFirst, with respect to Genius. Genius is a mental power which manifests\nitself only on rare occasions. Who can affirm that we have ascertained the\nlaw which regulates its birth? We may judge from analogy that this, as\nother things, follows a law of some kind; but respecting the causes which\ngive it birth our philosophy is profoundly ignorant. Nor have we any\nknowledge of its mode of action. It manifests itself in various forms.\nThere is the genius which makes the poet, the philosopher, the scientific\ndiscoverer, the orator, the politician, and many others. How those who are\npossessed of this power effectuate their mental operations, or how their\ngreat ideas originate in their minds is a subject which exceeds the limits\nof our scientific knowledge. Take for example the genius of the poet.\nWhence came, and what was the nature of that intuitive power with which\nShakespeare was endowed, or how was it called into exercise? We call such\npowers intuitions. We say that a great poet is endowed with a species of\ninspiration. What is this but to confess our entire ignorance both of the\norigin and the mode of his mental operations. Probably the poet himself\nwould be unable to give us any analysis of the origin of his own thoughts,\nor of the laws that regulate them. How then can we venture to affirm that\nthey must all originate in the mind itself, and not be due to the action\nof some external power? The habit of speaking of his inspirations, from\nwhich scientific men are not exempt, proves our complete ignorance both of\nits nature and origin.\n\nBut to descend to a humbler sphere\u2014our own minds. We are all conscious\nthat thoughts rush into them in a most unbidden manner, and that we pass\nthrough mental states which our analysis is unable to explain. Can any man\naffirm, however deep may be his philosophy, that the known laws of\nassociation of ideas are adequate to account for all the mental phenomena\nof which he has been conscious? Who has not had experience of severe\nefforts to realize something in thought, which have ended in failure, and\nthat the right thing has suddenly come into his mind uncalled and\nunbidden? Not unfrequently has a sudden thought entered the mind (we know\nnot whence it came) which has entirely changed the whole current of a\nprevious life. Still more frequently has a happy idea occurred to us, the\norigin of which it is impossible to trace. Who again has not had\nexperience of the sudden rushing of a temptation into his mind with an all\nbut overwhelming force, even while his thoughts were occupied with\nsubjects in no way allied to the suggestion? Many of our mental phenomena\nmay be explained by the principle of association of ideas and other known\nmental powers; but who can venture to affirm that they are adequate to\naccount for all the various states of which he has been conscious, or that\nsome of them have not originated in suggestions from without? Scientific\nknowledge is certainly able to make no such affirmation.\n\nNext: there are numerous abnormal conditions to which the mind is\nunquestionably subject. Who will venture to affirm that he has penetrated\nto their depths, or ascertained the laws which regulate their action?\nThese have a most important bearing on the present subject. They are best\ndesignated by the term phrenzy. Their aspect is very varied. They differ\nin many respects from mania, though they are closely allied to it. They\nare confined to no one race of men, but are co\u2010extensive with human\nnature. They were prevalent in the ancient world, and connected with\nvarious forms of religious belief. They display themselves with peculiar\nviolence in the religious rites of savages. In Oriental countries at the\npresent day, they frequently manifest themselves and assume a great\nvariety of aspects. Examples might be easily adduced. The phrenzied\nfanatic often presents indications of his mind being acted on by an\noverwhelming external influence; and when under the influence of the rites\nof a degraded religion, the symptoms present no little resemblance to\nthose which accompanied demoniacal possession.\n\nI have no wish to affirm that such phenomena must be due to an action of\nthis kind, but to draw attention to the fact that we are ignorant of the\npower in which they originate, and that such being the case, it is quite\npossible that their most violent and terrible forms may be aroused by the\ninfluence of a power external to the mind itself. Equally ignorant are we\nof the causes of even their milder manifestations. Whatever may be the\nhopes which are entertained of the future triumphs of science, it is not\ntoo much to assert, that it has not yet reduced these abnormal conditions\nof the mind to any thing like a scientific law, and that it has not\nsucceeded in tracing the phenomena to the exclusive operation of a force\nacting within the mind itself. In truth our mental science is ignorant of\ntheir causes: and for aught that it can affirm to the contrary, many of\nthem may be due to causes human, superhuman, or a combination of the two.\nIn cases where we are profoundly ignorant, dogmatical assertions should be\ncarefully avoided. While such phenomena are incapable of explanation by\nthe action of known mental forces, the students of mental science are not\njustified in affirming that possession contradicts its known truths.\n\nI fully admit, however, that there is a system of professed mental\nscience, which, if its truth could be proved, would establish the fact\nthat possession was impossible. I need hardly say that I allude to that\nwhich affirms that thought is the result of a function of the brain, and\nnothing else. According to the views of these philosophers, the brain\nsecretes thought as a gland secretes its own peculiar secretion. Until\nthis philosophy has succeeded in proving the truth of its first\nprinciples, it is useless to consider its bearing on this particular\nquestion.\n\nThere is another abnormal mental condition, the existence of which is\nunquestionable, and which has a close connection with the present\nquestion, namely, the ecstatic state. The forms in which this has\nmanifested itself have been extremely various, and it is impossible for\nany one to assert that our mental philosophy has fully fathomed them, and\nhas succeeded in assigning them to forces originating within the mind\nitself. On the contrary it is not too much to affirm that it has as yet\nwholly failed to analyze its nature, or to account for the abnormal powers\ndisplayed by the mind when in this condition. In the ancient world this\nstate of mind was closely connected with the manifestations of the\nprophetic power, the reality of which was recognized by many of its\nphilosophers. It will of course be observed that I am not speaking of this\npower as it existed in the Jewish church, but of its supposed\nmanifestations in the heathen world. Similar ecstatic states have\nfrequently displayed themselves in modern times. When in this condition\nthe mind is especially liable to be acted on by external influences. Is it\npossible, I ask, in the present state of our mental philosophy, to assert\nthat we know their nature, or the forces which produce them? The ecstatic\nin union with a phrenzied state of the mind was apparently the condition\nof the Delphian priestess when she delivered oracles to those who\nconsulted her. According to all the accounts that we possess, she\npresented the appearance of being subject to an overpowering external\ninfluence. Every other description which we possess of the manifestation\nof this prophetic power, (and we have several) describes it as presenting\nphenomena closely allied to raving madness, an influence of some kind\napparently overpowering the prophet\u2019s personality. Until the forces which\nproduced these phenomena in the ancient world, and the somewhat similar\nones which have been manifested in modern times, can be shown to owe their\norigin to forces originating in the mind itself, and to nothing else, it\nis absurd to affirm that such a phenomenon as possession is in\ncontradiction to our scientific knowledge of the human mind.\n\nThere is another point which demands our attention, namely, the close\nconnection between the extreme forms of moral wickedness, and madness. It\nis an unquestionable fact that nothing is more difficult than to draw the\nprecise line where moral wickedness ends, and madness begins. In their\ngreat outlines they are easily distinguishable, but in the more advanced\nstages of moral evil, the one passes into the other by insensible degrees.\nSo difficult is it to lay down the precise line which separates them, that\nscientific men are not wanting, who affirm that every extreme case of\nmoral wickedness is a species of mania. Consistently with this theory\nfrequent efforts are made to save the most abandoned criminals from the\nconsequences of their crimes. If the principle is correct, it is\nimpossible not to assign lesser degrees of moral evil to the same cause.\nSuch a principle logically leads to the denial of any distinction between\nmoral and physical action. Happily however, although this conclusion is\none which has been arrived at by a considerable number of physicists, it\nis one which the common sense of mankind steadily refuses to accept. It is\nsufficient for the present purpose, that extreme forms of moral evil shade\noff into mania by insensible degrees; and that ultimately they are capable\nof producing insanity. If insanity can be produced by moral causes, it\nfollows that a superhuman influence powerful for evil, acting on a\ndegraded moral nature, may be attended with a similar result, and produce\nsuch a phenomenon as possession.\n\nBut further: while madness is produced by physical causes, it is a certain\nfact that it is frequently occasioned by causes purely mental. Of this the\ninstances are innumerable. These mental causes react on the brain and the\nnervous system; and thus they superinduce disease on those parts of our\nbodily organization by means of which the mind exercises its powers. Still\nthe disease itself originates in causes that are not seated in the body,\nbut in the mind. The mind is therefore capable of acting powerfully on our\nbodily frame. If therefore possession be viewed as the action of one mind\non another, there is no reason why it should not be able to superinduce\nthose forms of bodily derangement which exhibited themselves in the\ndemoniacs by the simple action of the mind upon the body. The mental\ncauses capable of producing mania are, as we know, of a varied\ndescription; and among them is the action and influence which one mind is\ncapable of exerting on another. As, therefore, in certain states of our\nminds, or of our nervous system, mania with all its results can be\nproduced by the simple action of mind on mind, and through the action of\nthe mind disorder may be produced in our bodily organization, there can be\nno reason why possession with all its attendant phenomena should not\noriginate in similar causes. There is nothing to imply that the superhuman\nagency manifested in possession was directly exerted on the body of the\npossessed. An agency which was entirely mental was fully adequate to\nproduce all the phenomena with which it was accompanied.\n\nIn cases of mania produced by mental action the removal of the exciting\ncause is the precondition of its cure, and in many cases effects it.\nSimilarly, in cases of possession the removal of the exciting cause would\nproduce similar results.\n\nIt follows, therefore, from the foregoing considerations, that the\nallegation that the possessions described in the New Testament are\nincredible, because they contradict the known truths of mental science, is\ndisproved.\n\nThe question really resolves itself into the following one: Do evil\nbeings, other than men, exist in the universe? Or, if they exist, is it\ncredible that they are allowed to interfere in the affairs of men? This\nquestion we have already considered in a former chapter, and we have\narrived at the conclusion that if we free ourselves from the trammels of\n_\u00e0 priori_ theories, and judge only by the facts of the universe as it\nexists, neither their existence nor their intervention in human affairs is\ncontrary to our reason.\n\nTwo things, however, must be steadily kept in mind. First: that if such\ninterventions in human affairs are facts, the agency which can be exerted\nis only a permitted agency, and only capable of being exerted in\nsubordination to the divine purposes in the government of the universe. A\nlarge number of the difficulties with which the subject is attended have\noriginated in the wholly inaccurate idea that a power is attributed in the\nNew Testament to Satan, of interfering both in the material and the moral\nuniverse at his own will and pleasure. This, however, is altogether\ncontrary to the fact. Whatever power is attributed to him is an entirely\npermitted one, and exercised in subordination to the general purposes of\nGod. Secondly, that although the disorder in the moral world might lead us\nto suspect the presence of an evil agency, different from that of man; yet\nas it is not a visible one, but confined to the regions of the mind, it is\none which cannot come under our distinct observation, and could therefore\nonly become known to us by revelation.\n\nOne more difficulty has to be considered. It is alleged that possession\nnever takes place now. It is therefore inferred that it never took place\nat all.\n\nI reply first, if we grant that demoniacal action, in the form of\npossession has now ceased, it by no means follows that it was not once\nreal. The objection overlooks the fact that its action was a permitted\none; and could only be exercised within the limits assigned to it. There\nmay have been reasons at the time of the Advent why the exercise of a\nSatanic agency should be permitted at that particular period to a greater\nextent than it ever has been before or since.\n\nSecondly: certain moral and physical conditions were necessary for its\nexercise. These may be no longer in existence, but they may have passed\naway with many other abnormal conditions of human nature which existed in\nthe ancient world.\n\nThirdly: it is not possible to affirm with certainty that, even at the\npresent day, no supernatural agencies bearing an analogy to possession,\nare exerted on the mind. This will be only possible, when all those\nabnormal phenomena which manifest themselves in connection with various\ndebased forms of religion and other cases of phrenzied excitement can be\ntraced to known forces, originating solely in the mind itself.\n\nThere is one further objection which requires a brief consideration. It is\nurged that the writers of the New Testament entertained the belief, that\ndiseases were generally occasioned by demoniacal action, quite\nindependently of possession; and that this belief has received the\nsanction of our Lord. One case only is alleged in proof of this, that of\nthe woman with the spirit of infirmity. She was no demoniac, but an\nordinary diseased person, and the disease is asserted to have been\noccasioned by demoniacal action.\n\nI reply, that considering the large number of diseases of various kinds\nmentioned in the New Testament, in none of which is there any allusion to\ndemoniacal agency as their cause, a single example is a narrow foundation\non which to build the affirmation that the followers of our Lord held such\na theory as to the origin of disease in general. I admit that\ndisorganization of the bodily functions is mentioned among the phenomena\nof possession. But this differs widely from a bodily evil superinduced\nwithout the agency of possession. Let us inquire whether the special\ninstance affords any justification for this wide assertion.\n\nThe Evangelist states that the woman was bowed down by a spirit of\ninfirmity, and could in no wise lift herself up. Here it is just as absurd\nto fasten on him the intention to describe a scientific fact, as when on\nanother occasion it is said that \u201c_power_\u201d went out of our Lord \u201cand\nhealed them all.\u201d The one stands on the same ground as the other.\n\nIn effecting the cure, our Lord uses the words, \u201cWoman, thou art loosed\nfrom thine infirmity.\u201d Here there is no reference to Satanic agency\nwhatever. The only mention of it occurs in his argument with the ruler of\nthe synagogue on the lawfulness of effecting such cures on the Sabbath\nday. The words are, \u201cThou hypocrite, ought not this woman, who is a\ndaughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to\nbe loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day?\u201d\n\nThese words are addressed to the ruler in answer to the objection that our\nLord was no prophet, because he effected his cures on the Sabbath. If so,\nas the reality of the miracle was not denied, it was intended to be\nimplied that it had been wrought by the power of Satan, of which the\nviolation of the Sabbath was the proof. The real point of controversy\ntherefore was the lawfulness of effecting cures on this day, not the\nSatanic origin of the complaint. Was there any conceivable reason why our\nLord should not discuss the point with the ruler on his own principles?\nWhy was it necessary to raise a wholly different issue, viz. the Satanic\nor non\u2010Satanic origin of the disease, instead of confining it strictly to\nthe point, which was the all\u2010important one, that His curing this woman on\nthe Sabbath day was so far from being a proof that He did not come from\nGod, that it was a strong reason for believing that He did so? To have\nentered on a discussion as to what was the cause of the complaint, would\nnot only have diverted attention from the real question, but would have\nintroduced one wholly foreign to the purposes of His divine mission.\n\nTwo suppositions only are possible respecting possession. It must have\nbeen either a form of madness produced by natural causes, or a\nmanifestation of superhuman power. As the facts on which a judgment can be\nformed are meagre, I have not ventured to determine which of these two\ntheories is alone consistent with the facts and phenomena of the New\nTestament. I have therefore taken either alternative, and shown, that\nneither does the theory that it was mania interfere with the claims of the\nGospels to be accepted as historical documents, nor is the language\nattributed to our Lord contrary to the truthfulness of His character; nor\ndoes the supposition that it was due to superhuman causes contradict the\nestablished truths of mental science.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII. THE ALLEGED CREDULITY OF THE FOLLOWERS OF JESUS.\n\n\nThe allegation that the followers of Jesus, and the early Christians\ngenerally, were a body of intensely credulous and superstitious people,\nmay be considered as not only the stronghold of those who impugn the\nhistorical character of the Gospels, but also as the arsenal from which\nthey draw no small number of their weapons of attack. A credulity which\nknew no limits is liberally ascribed to them as showing how every\nmiraculous narrative might have been invented. They have even been\ncredited with a facility of inventing fictions, and then deluding\nthemselves into the belief that they were facts which they had actually\nwitnessed. Thus it has been asserted that it was their firm belief that\nthe Messiah ought to have wrought miracles; that Jesus himself may not\neven have professed to perform them; but that the fervid imaginations of\nHis followers invented a set of miracles, attributed them to Him, and\nended with the belief that they had seen Him perform them. On the other\nhand, whenever these objectors are pressed by a difficulty in accounting\nfor the origin of particular phenomena in the Gospels, they retire on the\ncredulity of the followers of Jesus as into a kind of citadel, in which\nthey consider themselves so strongly entrenched that they may defy every\nattack. There is also another important purpose which it is made to serve.\nIt is asserted that it renders worthless the testimony of the followers of\nJesus as to the actual occurrence of miracles.\n\nThe allegation takes two forms:\n\n1st. That the followers of Jesus were the prey of a credulity and\nsuperstition which greatly exceeded the limits of the ordinary credulity\nof mankind; and that therefore the value of their historical testimony is\ndestroyed.\n\n2nd. That the ordinary credulity of mankind with respect to the occurrence\nof supernatural events is so great and widespread, as to render the\ninvention of miraculous narratives easy, and to destroy the credit of all\nnarratives containing them.\n\nI propose to consider these subjects in this and the following chapter.\n\nNothing is easier than to charge a body of men with intense credulity and\nsuperstition. Before, however, such charges deserve to have any notice\ntaken of them, they should be substantiated by direct proof. It is\nimpossible to meet them if urged in a mere general form. Fortunately, the\nauthor of \u201cSupernatural Religion\u201d makes a number of specific and definite\ncharges, in which he endeavours to fasten an unspeakable degree of\ncredulity and superstition on the immediate followers of Jesus and the\nauthors of the Gospels, and refers to authorities in support of his\nassertions. I will state his general position in his own words.\n\n\u201cWe have given a most imperfect sketch of some of the opinions and\nsuperstitions prevalent at the time of Jesus, and when the books of the\nNew Testament were written. These, as we have seen, are continued with\nlittle or no modification throughout the first centuries of our era. It\nmust however be remembered that the few details that we have given,\nomitting much of the grosser particulars, are the views absolutely\nexpressed by the most educated and intelligent part of the community; and\nthat it would have required infinitely darker colours adequately to have\nportrayed the dense ignorance and superstition of the mass of the Jews. It\nis impossible to receive the report of supposed marvellous occurrences\nfrom an age and people like this, without the gravest suspicion. Miracles\nwhich spring from such a hot\u2010bed of superstition are too natural in such a\nsoil to be the object of surprise; and in losing their exceptional\ncharacter, their claims on attention are proportionally weakened, if not\naltogether destroyed. Preternatural interference with the affairs of life\nand with the phenomena of nature was the rule in those days, not the\nexception, and miracles in fact had apparently lost all novelty, and\nthrough familiarity had become degraded into mere commonplace.\u201d\n\n\u201cThere can be no doubt that the writers of the New Testament shared in the\npopular superstitions of the Jews.\u201d\n\nBefore proceeding further, I must draw the reader\u2019s attention to three\naffirmations in this important passage.\n\n1st. That the educated Jews of the time of Jesus were a prey to the\nsuperstitions in question.\n\n2nd. That the common class of Jews were a prey to yet grosser\nsuperstitious.\n\n3rd. That the followers of Jesus, who were chiefly Jews of the lower\nclasses, and the authors of the Gospels, shared in these superstitions.\n\nThe author devotes not less than fifty pages to a minute description of\nthe superstitions of the educated classes. These are alleged to have been\nof so gross a nature, that the reader will get but a very imperfect\nconception of the point at issue, unless I give a brief sketch of some of\nthem.\n\nI. The Jews are affirmed to have believed in an innumerable multitude of\nangels, whose agency was continually displayed in the ordinary phenomena\nof nature. They presided over and energized in its ordinary operations, as\nfor instance, in thunder, lightning, the winds, the seas, frost, hail,\nrain, mists, heat, light, &c.; heaven and earth in fact are filled with\nthem, and they are also continually busying themselves in human affairs,\nof which minute details are given.\n\nII. They are alleged to have believed in a demonology of the most\nphantastic description. To this I have elsewhere sufficiently alluded.\n\nIII. They are likewise affirmed to have believed that the sun, moon and\nstars are rational beings, and traces of this belief are distinctly\naffirmed to exist in the New Testament.\n\nIV. The belief in sorcery, witchcraft and magic is affirmed to have been\nuniversal among them. To give the reader an idea of the grossness of these\nbeliefs, to which even the educated classes are affirmed to have been a\nprey, I must quote the following passage:\n\n\u201cAmulets consisting of seals, or pieces of paper, with charms written upon\nthem, were hung round the necks of the sick, and considered efficacious\nfor their cure. Charms, spells and mutterings were constantly said over\nwounds, against unlucky meetings, to make people sleep, to heal diseases,\nand to avert enchantments; against mad dogs for instance, against the\ndemon of blindness and the like, as well as formul\u00e6 for averting the evil\neye, and mutterings over diseases.\u201d Here follow several pages of\nunutterable absurdities. It is not too much to say, that there was hardly\nan occurrence in nature, and hardly an event of daily life, which was not\ninfluenced by these supernatural powers, and very frequently in a manner\nunspeakably grotesque. If such were the beliefs of educated people, urges\nthe author (and he tells us that he has omitted the grosser forms of\nthem), what must have been those of the lower orders, and the extent of\ntheir degraded superstition? It must be kept constantly in mind that the\nfollowers of Jesus chiefly consisted of persons taken from the lower\nstrata of society. But the author in express words charges them with\nsharing in such beliefs. If they did not, the reference to them would have\nno bearing on the argument.\n\nWe have therefore in this portion of the work a definite issue raised for\nour consideration. It is no vague charge of general boundless credulity\nand superstition, such as is generally urged against the followers of\nJesus and the authors of the Gospels. It is presented to us in a clear and\ndefinite form. I fully allow that if this charge could be substantiated,\nit would deprive the Evangelists of all historical credit.\n\nThe issue which is thus raised is consequently one of the highest\nimportance. It will be necessary therefore for us carefully to examine the\nmode in which it is attempted to establish the truth of these charges. The\nprocess is an extremely singular one.\n\nWhen we have a set of writings before us and endeavour to estimate the\namount of credulity and superstition to which their authors were a prey,\nthe only legitimate mode of proceeding is to subject these writings to a\nthorough and minute examination as to the indications of credulity and\nsuperstition contained in them. Having done this, it then becomes our duty\nto ascertain the amount of general good sense or the want of it which is\ndisplayed by them in these or in other subjects, and then to form a\ngeneral conclusion by fairly balancing the indications of credulity and\ngood sense against each other. The author, however, seems not to have had\nthe smallest idea that it is the duty of the critic to ascertain what are\nthe facts of the case as presented by the writings, and to form a general\nconclusion by a careful review of the entire evidence. On the contrary,\nhis mode of reasoning is to quote a number of opinions held by various\nwriters, widely separated from each other in time, to charge them on the\ncontemporaries of our Lord, and refer to nearly every passage in the New\nTestament which has even the remotest bearing on the subject, for the\npurpose of fastening these superstitions on the followers of Jesus. Such a\nmode of reasoning can only avail to establish a foregone conclusion.\n\nAgain: In forming a judgment on such a subject, it also behoves us most\ncarefully to consider whether the subject\u2010matter of the writings is or is\nnot of such a character, that if their authors had been addicted to such\ngross superstitions, there would not of necessity have been frequent\nexamples of them in their pages? Also whether the absence of such\nreferences, when the subject on which they were writing was certain to\nhave suggested them to their minds, does not constitute a strong proof\nthat these superstitions were not held by them? In one word, it is absurd\nto attempt to charge writers with boundless credulity and superstition, on\nthe ground that a multitude of grotesque beliefs were prevalent in their\nday. No author can be held responsible for beliefs other than those which\nappear in his pages, especially when subject\u2010matter of his writings would\nhave been certain to call them into activity if he had entertained them.\n\nThe course pursued by the author is directly opposite to this. He has been\ncompelled to adopt it, because it is the only method by which extreme\ncredulity and superstition can be fastened on the writers of the Gospels.\nThe available contemporary literature, besides that contained in the New\nTestament, which can throw light on the opinions of the followers of\nJesus, is very small. The point which requires proof is that the entire\nJewish nation, _without any exception_, was a prey to the basest\nsuperstition and credulity. Unless this can be established, the charge\nagainst the authors of the Gospels falls to the ground, except so far as\nit can be proved by the Gospels themselves. The contemporary proof of it,\nhowever, failing, he endeavours to substantiate his position by quoting\nthe opinions of writers separated from the times of Jesus by several\ncenturies, and affirming that they were held by the entire body of His\ncontemporaries. Such a mode of reasoning is useless to support anything\nbut a foregone conclusion.\n\nA brief reference to the authorities relied upon will at once expose the\nfallacy of the argument. First, certain differences existing between the\nSeptuagint and the Hebrew Scriptures are pressed into the service, which\nare no instances of either credulity or superstition. Then the frequent\nidolatries which prevailed among the Jews prior to the captivity are\nadduced as a proof of the superstitious tendencies of the Jewish mind, as\nif superstitions prevalent at the time of Becket were any evidence of the\ncondition of English thought at the present day. Next the absurdities in\nthe Apocryphal Book of Tobit are put in as evidence, although the contrary\nevidence afforded by the other books of the Apocrypha, which contain no\ntraces of such superstitions, is left without mention. The writings of an\nAssyrian Jew who lived about three hundred and fifty years before the\nChristian era are about as valid to prove the opinions held by Christ and\nhis followers as the opinions of Cicero would be in evidence of the\nbeliefs of Constantine. Then reference is made to the angelology and\ndemonology contained in the writings of Philo, who was unquestionably a\ncontemporary of our Lord; but not the smallest hint is given to the reader\nthat he was deeply tinged with the principles of the Neo\u2010Platonic\nphilosophy, a mode of thought wholly alien from that of the Palestinian\nJews, or that Philo was himself an Alexandrian Jew. Next the book of Enoch\nis quoted, which (whenever it was written, for its date is uncertain) is\nunquestionably not the work of a Palestinian Jew. This book, which is an\nApocalypse, contains a monstrous angelology and demonology, and abounds\nwith extravagances. Although part of it was written prior to the Advent,\nother portions are clearly subsequent to it. Its author is unknown; but it\nis highly probable from certain resemblances of expression between it and\nthe New Testament, that he was acquainted with portions of the latter; or,\nto state the theory of unbelievers, that the authors of the New Testament\nborrowed from it. If this view is true, then it is evident that they must\nhave rejected its angelology and demonology, for that contained in the New\nTestament is utterly dissimilar in character to that which we read in the\nbook of Enoch. As far, therefore, as the evidence of this book is\nconcerned, it affords a distinct proof that they were not a prey to its\nmonstrous superstitions. This remark is equally applicable to the book of\nTobit, and the writings of Philo.\n\nBut there is a reference made to Philo which deserves particular notice as\nan exemplification of the mode adopted by those who endeavour to fix the\ncharge of unbounded credulity on the authors of the Gospels. I cite the\nauthor.\n\n\u201cThe belief that the sun, moon and stars were living entities possessed of\nsouls was generally held by the Jews at the beginning of our era, along\nwith Greek philosophers, and we shall presently see it expressed by the\nfathers. Philo Jud\u00e6us considers the stars spiritual beings full of virtue\nand perfection, and that to them is granted lordship over other heavenly\nbodies, not absolute, but as viceroys under the Supreme Being. We find a\nsimilar view expressed regarding the nature of the stars in the\nApocalypse, and it constantly occurs in the Talmud and Targums.\u201d\n\n\u201cWe find,\u201d says the author, \u201ca similar view expressed regarding the nature\nof the stars in the Apocalypse,\u201d _i.e._ that the stars are spiritual\nbeings full of virtue and perfection, and that they hold lordship over\nother heavenly bodies. No quotation is made from this book, but four\npassages are referred to in a note as proving this. They are as follows:\n\u201cThe mystery of the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, and\nthe seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are the angels of the seven\nchurches, and the seven candlesticks which thou sawest are the seven\nchurches.\u201d (Rev. i. 20.) With as good reason may it be said that the book\nof Revelation teaches the rationality of candlesticks.\n\n\u201cThese things saith He that hath the seven Spirits of God, and the seven\nstars.\u201d (Rev. iii. 1.) It is difficult to see how this proves that the\nauthor of the Revelation was of opinion that the stars were rational\nentities. The next passage referred to (Rev. iv. 5) makes no mention of\nstars at all, but of \u201cseven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which\nare the seven Spirits of God.\u201d The last reference is: \u201cI saw a star fall\nfrom heaven unto the earth; and to him was given the key of the bottomless\npit.\u201d (Rev. ix. 1.) Here a star is spoken of as a living agent; but to\nrefer in proof of this to a book which is full of symbols and is an avowed\nvision is ridiculous and misleading. On the contrary, the New Testament\nsupplies the most unquestionable evidence that its writers were free from\nthis superstition, into which even philosophers had fallen.\n\nThe next writer referred to, to prove that the followers of Jesus were a\nprey to credulity and superstition, is Josephus, in his narrative of the\nsigns which preceded the destruction of Jerusalem.\n\nTo what extent Josephus embellished these signs may be a question. Most of\nthem have a very heathen aspect, and it is unquestionable that he was much\ndisposed to conciliate his heathen readers. It is sufficient to observe\nthat the pages of the New Testament contain nothing resembling them.\n\nBut the chief source whence these ineffable puerilities are derived, and\ncharged on the contemporaries of our Lord, and through them on the writers\nof the New Testament, is the Talmud. Probably there are no writings in\nexistence from which a more monstrous set of absurdities can be collected\nthan from those of the Talmudists. But how does this prove that this mass\nof nonsense was believed in by the Jewish nation in our Lord\u2019s day? One\nportion of the Talmud, the Mishna, was composed between A.D. 180 and A.D.\n200, or some years after the date assigned by unbelievers to the Fourth\nGospel. The lateness of this date is urged by them as conclusive proof\nthat that Gospel does not embody the real traditions of the early\nfollowers of Jesus. How then can it be urged with any thing like\nconsistency that the Mishna adequately represents their views respecting\nthe order of nature? But the other portion of the Talmud, the Gemara, was\nnot put forth in a written form prior to A.D. 500. To quote works thus\nremote in time as proofs of the superstitions of the followers of Jesus,\nis to adopt a course which if applied generally to history, would reduce\nit to a tissue of falsehoods. Bishop Jewell was a believer in witchcraft;\nbut it would be absurd if some future writer were to quote the writings of\nmodern spiritualists as a proof that he believed in their doctrines.\n\nNor is it true that the opinions of the masses of a nation are at all\nadequately represented by those of its learned men, especially when\nlearning, as in the case in question, assumed the most unbounded licence\nof speculation. In most cases the common sense of the masses who are\nbrought into contact with the hard facts of daily life will preserve them\nfrom puerilities, into which learning, which draws exclusively on the\nimagination, is certain to fall. There is sufficient evidence of the\nsuperstition of the masses during the middle ages; but nothing would be\nmore absurd than to quote some monstrous opinions held by the great\nscholastic writers to prove that they were the current opinions of the\nvulgar. Yet the principle here adopted is to adduce opinions propounded by\nlearned writers, who lived centuries afterwards, as a proof that they were\ncurrent among the entire Jewish race at the time of Jesus Christ.\n\nThe remaining references in proof of this position are still more\nnoteworthy. To establish the superstition of the Jews at the time of the\nAdvent, a set of opinions are adduced which were held by Christian\nFathers, whose writings cover a period of not less than four centuries. A\nlist of them will be sufficient. The apocryphal Barnabas and Hermas,\nJustin Martyr, Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, Tertullian,\nCyprian, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, Lactantius, Eusebius, and\nCyril of Jerusalem. A number of grotesque opinions are collected from\nthese writers, as though they could have any possible bearing on the\nquestion whether the followers of Jesus were able correctly to report what\nthey saw and heard.\n\nI submit therefore that the facts adduced utterly fail to establish the\ncharge of intense superstition and credulity against the followers of\nJesus. But I go further, and affirm that they furnish the means of giving\na most conclusive proof of the contrary.\n\nThese quotations furnish us with a clear and conclusive proof, which is\nalso furnished by the entire range of literature, that when writers are\nthe prey of a definite class of superstitions, their pages will afford\nabundant evidence not only of their existence, but of their nature and\ncharacter. This, of course, must be qualified by the supposition that the\nsubject\u2010matter on which they wrote is one suitable to call their latent\nsuperstitions into activity. This always happens when the works are of a\nreligious character. In such cases they will faithfully reflect the\nsuperstitions entertained by their authors. This is pre\u2010eminently the case\nwith all the writings in question. They are all on religious subjects, on\nwhich they allowed their imaginations to run riot. They entertained a\nnumber of grotesque opinions, and accordingly we find in their writings a\ngrotesque super\u2010naturalism, exactly corresponding to the peculiar ideas of\neach individual writer. On the principle that \u201cout of the abundance of the\nheart the mouth speaketh,\u201d we may be quite certain that when an author is\nextremely credulous and superstitious, it will find expression in his\npages whenever he is writing on a subject on which his imagination gives\nscope to exhibit them.\n\nI put the argument as follows: all writers exhibit in their pages the\nsuperstitions to which they are a prey. The writers of the New Testament\ndo not exhibit the superstitions in question. It follows therefore that\nfrom these particular superstitions they are free. Consequently the charge\nagainst them of intense superstition and credulity falls to the ground, as\nfar as it rests on the evidence in question.\n\nThe amount of subject\u2010matter in the New Testament which, independently of\na general belief in miracles, the opponents of Christianity can designate\nas superstitious, is of a very limited and definite nature. It may be said\nto be almost exclusively confined to a belief in the reality of\npossession;\u2014a few cases of disease occasioned by Satanic agency;\u2014an\noccasional intervention of angels, and their power to act on nature;\u2014and\nperhaps that demonology and heathenism were in some way connected with\neach other. This is the sum total of such beliefs which appear on the face\nof the New Testament. They appear in unequal degrees in the works of\ndifferent writers; and viewing them as mere human compositions, we have no\nright to charge on one writer the beliefs of another. The book of\nRevelation, and its imagery as professedly merely seen in a vision, cannot\nfairly be introduced into this controversy.\n\nIf then we concede, for the sake of argument, that the Jews in the time of\nChrist were a prey to the extravagant superstitions referred to; if they\nbelieved that the whole course of nature and human life was incessantly\ninterfered with by an army of spirits in numbers passing all\ncomprehension, and that these interferences were of the most grotesque and\nphantastic character; if they universally believed in magic, charms and\nincantations, the non\u2010appearance of such phenomena in the pages of the New\nTestament is a proof that its authors were not a prey to the current\nsuperstitions of the day. No inconsiderable number of supernatural events\nare recorded in their pages, but unbelief itself is compelled to admit\nthat they are all of a dignified character, with perhaps the exception of\nthe entrance of the demons into the swine, and the discovery of the piece\nof money in the mouth of the fish. From what is monstrous, grotesque and\nphantastic, they are absolutely free.\n\nIf it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that miracles are possible,\nthen it cannot be denied that those of the New Testament, taken as a\nwhole, stand out in marked contrast to the current supernaturalism of\nsuperstition. Their whole conception is lofty; there is in them nothing\nmean or contemptible; they subserve a great purpose; they are worthy of\nthat great character to whom they are ascribed, Jesus Christ. I put the\nquestion boldly: how is it, if the followers of Jesus were a prey to the\ndegrading superstitions above referred to, that we find no indications of\nthem in their pages? Also: how is it possible that men of such a character\nshould have invented such a number of noble creations? Let unbelievers\naccount for this on any principle which a sound philosophy can recognise.\n\nBut further: the Gospels mention a certain number of possessions, and\ntheir cures effected by our Lord. Here then we are in the very presence of\na demonology such as was actually believed in by the followers of Jesus.\nHere, therefore, is the very condition of mind and outward circumstances\nwhere, if they had been a prey to the phantastic and disgusting beliefs\nabout demons above referred to, such beliefs would certainly have made\ntheir appearance in their pages. But, as I have shown, the demonology of\nthe Gospels stands in marked contrast to that of the Talmud, of Josephus,\nand of the Christian Fathers. We have no fumigations of demoniacs with the\nliver of a fish, we hear nothing of a demon drawn out of a man\u2019s nose, and\noverturning a basin of water, nothing of a demon inhabiting every private\ncloset. On the contrary, their action is described as mental, and, through\nthe mind, affecting the body, with the exception of a few doubtful cases.\nI am not here arguing whether a belief in the reality of demoniacal\npossession is a superstition or not. But I affirm that if the writers of\nthe New Testament had been a prey to the superstitions with which they are\ncharged, these are the narratives in which they could not have failed to\nmake their appearance. Again: It has been affirmed that they held a\nmonstrous angelology. I reply that although angels are unquestionably\nstated to have appeared, and their existence is affirmed by the writers of\nthe New Testament, still their recorded appearances are rare. They are\nconfined to a few very remarkable occasions, viz.: the Annunciation and\nbirth of our Lord, the temptation, the agony in the garden, and the\nresurrection. Surely this does not look as if the authors of the Gospels\nthought that they were always interfering with the course of nature or the\nevents of life. In the Acts of the Apostles, they appear at the Ascension;\nonce to liberate St. Peter, and at another time the Apostles, from prison;\nto direct Philip to preach to the eunuch; twice in a vision to St. Paul;\nand Herod Agrippa is also said to have been smitten by the ministry of an\nangel. There were certainly many occasions when, if the writers had\nbelieved in the habitual intervention of angels, we should have found them\nintroduced. Thus an angel is not sent to deliver Paul from prison, or to\nstill the tempest, but simply to assure him of his safety. St. Paul\nenumerates in a passage of some length the various dangers which beset him\nin his missions, especially mentioning the perils he encountered in\ntravel. But neither he nor St. Luke once refers to an angelic intervention\nin his favour. In numerous passages he refers to dangers and persecutions\nwhich he encountered. But it is our Lord, and not angels, who delivered\nhim. Is this consistent with a belief in their habitual intervention in\nnature? If he was the visionary which he has been asserted to have been,\nwould he not have been continually seeing visions of angels for his\nprotection?\n\nIn St. Paul\u2019s writings we are in the presence of documents which are in\nthe highest degree historical. Even those who endeavour to prove that the\nGospels and the Acts were not written until the second century, are\nobliged to allow that at least four of the most important of his letters\nwere written within 30 years after the Crucifixion, and that the evidence\nthat four of the remainder are his, vastly preponderates. Here then we are\nin the presence of historical documents of the highest order, compared\nwith which such a writing as the book of Enoch is worthless, and the\nTalmud and the Fathers are modern compositions. What light then do these\nletters throw on the opinions of St. Paul and the Pauline Churches? Much\nevery way: they let us into the secret of their inner life. They tell us\nthat these Christians thought they possessed certain supernatural gifts;\nthat St. Paul asserted that he wrought miracles; that demons by an\ninvisible agency tempted men to sin, and opposed the progress of the\nGospel; but beyond this there is scarcely a trace of angelology or\ndemonology in them. With these epistles in our hands, is it credible that\ntheir writer, or those to whom he wrote, held a multitude of monstrous and\nphantastic beliefs on this subject? Are not these writings characterized\nby supreme good sense? Do they not in this point of view marvellously\ncontrast even with those of the earliest Fathers? The writer undoubtedly\nbelieved that unseen spiritual agencies were capable of acting on the mind\nof man, and that they were active agents in the production of moral evil;\nbut where is the evidence that he considered that external nature was\nunder their control, or that they made themselves visible to the mortal\neye? Although he affirms that he possessed a supernatural illumination on\nreligious subjects, only on two occasions does he refer to visions as\nactually seen by him; and he directly affirms that he had the power of\ndistinguishing the ecstatic from the ordinary condition of his mind. Even\nwith the aid of the Acts of the Apostles, we can only add a few more to\nthe number. Surely this is not the mental condition of a man who was a\nprey to unbounded superstition. Contrast the amount of good sense in the\nepistles of St. Paul with an equal number of consecutive pages from the\nFathers and the Talmud, and the difference is enormous. Where are the\nineffable puerilities found in these writings even hinted at in those of\nSt. Paul?\n\nAgain: if we include in our examination the other writings of the New\nTestament, they wholly fail to supply us with any evidence of the\nsuperstition or credulity of their authors. On the contrary they are\ncharacterized by the marks of uniform good sense. It will be doubtless\nobjected that they, as well as St. Paul, were bad logicians, and that\ntheir applications of the Old Testament Scriptures are inapt: but this\ndoes not affect their trustworthiness as historians. They were undoubtedly\nmen of great religious fervour, yet they are both sparing in the use of\nmiracles, and when they report them, the miraculous action is never\nrepresented as extending beyond the necessities of the case. Their\nmiracles consist of simple acts, as for instance the cure of diseases, but\nall marvellous superadditions are wanting. It has been urged that in\ncomparing the miracles of the Gospels with other miraculous narratives, we\nhave no right to do more than compare the external miracle of the one with\nthe external miracle of the other; as for instance a resurrection with a\nresurrection, or a cure of blindness recorded in one with a similar case\nrecorded in another; and not to take into account either the external\ncircumstances or the moral aspect of the miracle. I have elsewhere proved\nthat this position is untenable. But for the purpose of the argument let\nus here assume that all the circumstances may be the invention of the\nnarrator. If it be so, it proves at any rate the soundness of his judgment\nand the elevation of his ideas, _i.e._ that it is impossible that he could\nhave been either intensely superstitious or credulous. How is it possible,\nI ask, for minds which were a prey to such monstrous beliefs as those\nwhich we have been considering, to have dramatized miraculous narratives\nof the elevated type of those contained in the Gospels? Would not all the\ncircumstances with which they invested them be the counter\u2010part of their\nown degraded conceptions?\n\nBut there is one most distinctive phenomenon presented by the Gospels\nwhich affords a conclusive proof that neither their authors nor the\nfollowers of Jesus could have been a prey to either degrading superstition\nor credulous fanaticism. I allude to the fact that, whatever theory may be\npropounded to account for their origin, the Gospels, as a matter of fact,\nunquestionably contain a delineation of the greatest of all characters,\nwhether actual or ideal, that of Jesus Christ. I shall hereafter draw\nattention to the portraiture of this character for the purpose of proving\nthat they are veritable historical documents. In this place I refer to it\nsimply for the purpose of proving that their authors and those who\ninvented the alleged fictions of which their contents consist, were\npossessed of a soundness of judgment which is wholly inconsistent with the\ntruth of the assertion that they were a prey to boundless superstition or\ncredulity.\n\nFor the purpose of the argument I must assume that this character is a\nfictitious one, because to assume that it is a delineation of an actual\nhistorical character, would be to take for granted the entire question at\nissue. If the Jesus of the Evangelists is an historical personage, there\ncan be no doubt respecting the claims of the Gospel to be a divine\nrevelation. But even if we make the assumption above mentioned, it is\nquite clear that those persons who invented the character, or who put it\ntogether out of the number of legendary stories floating about in the\nChurch, must have been possessed of a sound judgment, and the highest\nappreciation of what was great and noble. The character we have before us,\nand it is confessedly the noblest which can be found either in history or\nfiction. The inventors, whoever they were, have succeeded in portraying a\ngreat harmonious whole. Such a character could only have been delineated\nby men possessed of sound discriminating judgment. The more the Gospels\nare depreciated as histories the more does this depreciation establish the\ncredit of their authors as the successful delineators of an ideal\ncharacter, to which they have succeeded in imparting a naturalness which\nmen of the most exalted genius have mistaken for an historical reality.\nThey must have been, therefore, consummate masters of the art of ideal\ndelineation. The mental powers adequate to effect such results are those\nof high genius, to which in this case must have been added a very elevated\nconception of morality. Such mental qualities are never exhibited by men\nwho are the prey of gross credulity and superstition. The great ideal\ndelineations of poets have been only capable of being produced by the\n_\u00e9lite_ of the human race. On the other hand, if we assume that the\ncharacter is a fictitious one, and its inventors men of the mental calibre\nwhich they are affirmed to have been by those against whom I am reasoning,\nit would have been inevitable that its proportions should be marred by the\nintroduction into it of traits marked by meanness, puerility, and\nmonstrosity.\n\nIn support of this assertion we have no occasion to appeal to theories but\nto facts. Happily antiquity has preserved to us several delineations of a\nmythical Jesus on which the inventors have stamped the most unmistakable\nimpress of their own credulity and superstition. I need not say that I\nallude to the Apocryphal Gospels, the delineations of Jesus which they\ncontain, and above all to their miraculous narratives. Those who reiterate\nthese charges against the authors of the Canonical Gospels, are very slow\nto draw attention to their bearing on this portion of the argument. In the\nApocryphal Gospels we are brought face to face with the legendary spirit\nexerting itself in the invention of miraculous stories. There can be no\ndoubt that their authors were both extremely credulous and superstitious;\nand their miraculous narratives give us the precise measure of their\ncredulity. There is every reason to believe that two of these compositions\nwere written as early as the second century. What, I ask, is the general\ncharacter of the miracles which they have attributed to Jesus? There can\nbe only one answer. They are mean, ridiculous, degraded, burlesque,\ndestitute of all trait of moral grandeur. If the authors of the four\nGospels, or the inventors of their miraculous narratives, whoever they may\nhave been, had been a prey to similar credulity and superstition, the\nmarks of them would have been indelibly stamped on their pages.\n\nThese documents also contain accounts of miracles wrought by Jesus, some\nof which, as bare facts, are precisely the same as some recorded in the\nCanonical Gospels, _i.e._ they contain accounts of resurrections from the\ndead, and the cure of diseases. I ask, do their accompanying circumstances\nand moral aspect stand as nothing in our estimate of the credibility of\ntheir authors? Compare the account of the resurrection of Lazarus, or that\nof our Lord himself, with the resurrections in the Apocryphal Gospels, and\nmark the difference. Compare likewise the other miracles, which, as bare\nfacts, resemble one another. The one have the stamp of historical\nprobability, and precisely fit in with the lofty character of Jesus; the\nother of an unbelievable legend, in which the character is degraded to a\nlevel with the conceptions of the inventors.\n\nLet not unbelievers, therefore, decline to grapple with the question. Let\nthem cease to pass it over in silence. I propose to them the following\nquestions for solution. If both sets of Gospels originated with minds\nintensely credulous and superstitious, whence has come the difference\nbetween them? Why is the one set of miracles dignified, and the other\nmean? Whence the entire difference of their moral aspect? Why is the Jesus\nof the Canonical Gospels the most elevated personage in history, and the\nJesus of the Apocryphal ones, one of the most mean and silly? If two of\nthe Apocryphal and the four Canonical Gospels are the production of the\nsuperstition and credulity of the same century, whence the marvellous\ncontrast between them? Which of the Fathers of the second or third century\nwas equal to the task of reducing a mass of floating legends, the\ncreations of numbers of superstitious men, into their present form, as\nthey stand in our Canonical Gospels? Would they not certainly have\ncoloured the events with their own absurdities? If, on the other hand, it\nbe allowed that the Canonical Gospels are the production of the first\ncentury, and the Apocryphal Gospels of subsequent ones, how came the\ncredulous followers of Jesus to produce fictions dramatized with such\nadmirable taste in the first century, and the same spirit in subsequent\ncenturies to present so striking a contrast? The only possible answer\nwhich can be returned to these questions is that the phenomena of the\nCanonical Gospels are inconsistent with the supposition that their\nmiraculous narratives are the invention of men who were the prey either of\ncredulity or dense superstition; they must have been men well able to\ndistinguish between a genuine miracle and a mythic parody of one.\n\nBut it has been urged that the dignified character of Jesus induced the\ncompilers of our present Gospels to select all the miraculous stories of a\nhigh type which were current in the hotbed of Christian fanaticism, and to\nattribute them to Jesus, and to suppress all of a contrary description. If\nthis be the true solution of the facts, then it certainly follows that the\ncompilers of the Gospels must have been free from the superstitions of the\ntimes in which they lived. Otherwise, how came they to select all the\nelevated stories and attribute them to Jesus, and to consign those of a\nlower type to a well\u2010merited oblivion? Is it not a fact that credulous and\nsuperstitious people have often attributed what is contemptible and mean\nto elevated characters? Let the Apocryphal Gospels bear witness. It\nfollows, therefore, that even on this supposition the question must be\ndecided in favour of the authors of our present Canonical Gospels, that\nthey must have been free from the degraded superstitious to which their\nfellow\u2010believers were a prey.\n\nBut there is yet another problem, even if we assume the above supposition\nto be true, which urgently demands solution. If, among the mass of legends\nwith which the history of Jesus was incrusted, a certain portion of the\nmiraculous stories were of an elevated type, who among His credulous and\nsuperstitious followers were the inventors of them? Were they men of like\ncredulity with the remainder? There are only two alternatives. They were,\nor they were not. If they were, I ask, how came they to invent elevated\nstories? If they were not, then it follows that there were persons among\nHis followers who were neither intensely credulous nor superstitious. If\nthe latter be the alternative adopted, then the theory which I have been\nconsidering, which attributes to the followers of Jesus such a degree of\nthose qualities as to render their historical testimony valueless, falls\nto the ground.\n\nIt follows, therefore, on a careful consideration of the position, that\nthe data on which the charge which we have been considering is made\nagainst the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels utterly fail\nto establish it; and that the phenomena of the New Testament prove the\ncontrary to have been the fact.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV. THE LOVE OF THE MARVELLOUS\u2014ITS BEARING ON THE VALUE OF\nTESTIMONY TO MIRACLES.\n\n\nIt has been objected that the love of the marvellous has in every age\nconstituted so remarkable a phase of human nature as greatly to weaken, if\nnot entirely to invalidate the testimony to the performance of miracles.\nIt is alleged that the great historians of ancient times have recorded a\nnumber of supernatural occurrences which are now summarily rejected as\nincredible: and it is therefore argued that all narratives of miraculous\noccurrences must share the same fate. This objection differs from that\nwhich I have considered in the former chapter, in that it avoids the\nnecessity of imputing to the followers of Jesus and the authors of the\nGospels a degree of superstition and credulity greatly in excess of that\nwhich characterizes the majority of mankind. It will be therefore\nnecessary to give this subject a careful consideration.\n\nIt is an unquestionable fact that the human mind has been in all ages\ndisposed to accept a number of narratives of supernatural occurrences upon\nvery insufficient testimony, and which the principles of sound reason lead\nus to reject as untrue. Such beliefs have been peculiar to no one period\nof the world\u2019s history, but have been co\u2010extensive with the human race;\nand they form one of the most remarkable facts in our nature. Many of the\nancient historians have reported such occurrences without apparent\nsuspicion; or if they entertained any doubts respecting their truth, they\ndid not venture even to whisper them into the popular ear. What is still\nmore; eminent men of the ancient world did not scruple to act in matters\nof this kind a part which they knew to be deceptive, because they held the\nopinion that such beliefs, though they might be laughed at by\nphilosophers, were necessary to act as restraints on the vulgar. Thus we\nknow, on the most indubitable authority, that a Roman Augur could gravely\nact his part before the public at the very time that he was secretly\nlaughing in his sleeve at the ridiculousness of his art. It does not\ntherefore follow because the ancient historians have reported numbers of\noccurrences of this nature with considerable gravity, that they accepted\nthem as facts. They were frequently influenced by the spirit of\naccommodation, thinking it necessary for the welfare of society to keep up\nthe vulgar ideas on the subject. It would be inaccurate therefore to\nattribute all the accounts of such things which we meet with in ancient\nwriters to simple credulity, or to infer from them that they did not\nbelieve in an inviolable order of nature of some kind. With respect to the\narts of magic, however, one feels that even the greatest of the ancient\nwriters contemplated them with a kind of bated breath. This would appear\nto have been the state of mind even of Tacitus, with one exception the\ngreatest historian of the ancient world, and one who was intimately\nacquainted with the various systems of its philosophy. Conscious as he was\nthat vast numbers of the professors of magic were impostors, he seems\nhardly able to realize the fact that the whole art was a delusion.\n\nIt has been affirmed that the progress of physical science has destroyed\nin this nineteenth century all belief in the actual occurrence of the\nsupernatural, and that it now prevails only in some of the dark corners of\nChristendom. The widespread belief in the phenomena of spiritualism, which\nis certainly very far from being confined to religious men, and from which\nsome students of physical science have not been exempt, is a striking\nproof of the contrary. All that can be affirmed with truth is that, in\nthese modern times, these forms of belief have taken a new direction.\nModern science has done much to establish and spread the belief that the\noperations of all natural, _i.e._ material forces are uniform. Many of its\nstudents have even brought themselves to the belief that the occurrence of\nany event whose existence is due to the action of any other than the known\nforces of nature, is impossible: though this is far from being the\ninvariable, and is certainly not the necessary result of its study. Still,\nprobably, the most ardent votary of these opinions would find it difficult\nto keep himself wholly free from terrors arising from unseen causes, if\nthey were aroused by a suitable apparatus. The study of physical science\nis far from being a universal safeguard against the invasions of\nsuperstition. Its causes lie far more deeply rooted in our nature than the\nprinciples of physical science can reach. Nor is it able to guard against\nan extravagant use of the imagination.\n\nWhether, in the present state of our philosophy, we have fully penetrated\nto the depths of this principle thus working in the mind of man, may admit\nof doubt; but its presence there, as an essential portion of our nature,\nis an unquestionable fact. We are not without the means of getting a\ngeneral idea of its character. It is doubtless intimately connected with\nthose principles of our nature which constitute man a religious being, and\nwhich form a fundamental part of his mental constitution. As such it must,\nlike all our other faculties, have a legitimate and an illegitimate\naction. It points, as we shall see, to the existence of the supernatural.\nA rational religion forms the object for its appropriate exercise.\nWhenever man has been destitute of this, and his reason has been weak,\nthis principle, devoid of its proper object, has always manifested itself\nin various forms of extravagance. So powerful is it in the human mind that\neven avowed atheism has not been proof against its power. Julius C\u00e6sar was\nan atheist, and possessed one of the most powerful minds that ever\ninhabited the human frame. Yet, on the great day of his triumph, he\nascended the steps of the Capitol for the purpose of averting an avenging\nNemesis. Napoleon the First was no atheist, though few persons who have\never lived have been more free from the restraints of religion or\nsuperstition. Although he possessed a mighty intellect and was no stranger\nto the truths of modern science, yet even he believed in his star. Many\nother instances of men of powerful intellect who disbelieved in religion,\nyet who entertained singular superstitions, might be easily adduced. I\nrefer to them for the purpose of proving that the principle out of which\nsuch things originate must be one which is deep\u2010seated in the nature of\nman, and therefore an essential portion of it. If it is founded on a\nfundamental principle of our mental constitution, it follows that it must\nhave a legitimate subject\u2010matter on which to exercise its powers, and that\nthe abnormal forms of it which are so frequently manifested are the\nresults of some disorder in its action. What then is its nature?\n\nThere are certain principles deeply\u2010seated within us, which form as\ndefinite a portion of ourselves as even our rational faculties, and which\ndirectly prompt to the belief in the supernatural, and therefore point to\nits existence. Among these, the faculties of imagination, wonder,\nreverence and awe, hold a conspicuous place. It is impossible to deny that\nthey form portions of the actual constitution of our minds, however we may\naccount for their origin. Is it then our duty to eradicate them because\nthey prompt us to the belief in something which transcends the visible\norder of nature? This will hardly be affirmed by the most thorough\u2010going\nsceptic; for if it be our duty to do so, the human mind must be a mass of\ndisorder in the midst of a universe of order. If we were to make the\nattempt (for indeed it has been attempted) the result would be to upset\nthe balance of our mental constitution, and it would terminate in failure.\nHuman nature, taken as it is, constitutes a whole. These faculties hold in\nit a place subordinate to reason and to conscience. When our rational, our\nimaginative, and our moral powers act harmoniously together, they\nconstitute man a religious being.\n\nBut, for the purposes of the present argument, I have simply to draw\nattention to the fact that imagination, wonder, reverence and awe form an\nessential portion of our being. It would be in the highest degree\nundesirable to get rid of them, even if we were able. How mighty is the\ninfluence of the first of these principles! It lies at the foundation of\neverything that is great and noble in man. To it are due the magnificent\ncreations of poetry; in fact everything which adorns life, and much of\nthat which raises us above the mechanical forces of nature. Destitute of\nit, our reason could not act; nay, it could not even exist; and we should\nbe reduced to the mere mechanical action of the understanding, the wheels\nof which would be in danger of rusting. Nor has the faculty of wonder a\nless definite place in our being. It is closely connected with our\nimagination, which supplies it with objects fitted to excite it, and ought\nto be exercised under the guidance of reason. Its object is the great and\nthe vast, shall I not say, the infinite? Regulated by reason and united\nwith awe, it produces reverence. Reverence points to the existence of some\nobject which is really worthy of veneration. Veneration can only be\nlegitimately exercised on that which is truly venerable. As such it\ndirectly points to a personal God, and refuses to rest in anything short\nof Him as able fully to gratify its aspirations. Viewing them as a whole,\nthe legitimate object of these faculties, and the subject from which they\ncan receive their fullest gratification, is that Great Being who\neverywhere manifests Himself in this glorious universe. But when man has\nceased to contemplate in nature a rational power guiding and controlling\nit, the principle of wonder has frequently prompted him to gratify its\naspirations by peopling it with a multitude of phantastic creations. When\nunder the influence of awe, he has contemplated it in its terrible\naspects, unguided by a being who possesses a moral character, these\nfeelings have prompted the imagination to fill it with beings who excite\nthe feeling of superstitious dread.\n\nAlthough the vastness of the material universe and the energy of its\nforces can excite the feeling of wonder, yet that of reverence refuses to\nfind in the mere extension of space, or the might of material forces, any\nobject adequate to its demands. The vastness of the material universe may\nfill the mind with wonder and admiration; but even wonder refuses to rest\nsatisfied with a vastness of which the limits are known. It demands\nsomething which is conceivable, which yet runs up into the regions of the\ninconceivable. But even here the feeling of reverence can find nothing on\nwhich to energize. It directly points to a moral being in whom it can find\na centre, and it will find its gratification in nothing short of one. To\ntalk, as many Pantheists do, of feeling reverence for an impersonal\nUniverse, is a misuse of language. What! to reverence a Being, if the\nimpersonal Universe can be called a Being, which is everlastingly casting\nup the bubbles of existence in the form of moral agents, and is\neverlastingly devouring them, devoid alike of consciousness, volition, and\na moral nature!\n\nIt follows, therefore, if these principles form a constituent portion of\nour nature, that like all our other faculties, they must admit of a right\nand a perverted use. It is therefore absurd to lay down as a general\nprinciple, because they admit of an illegitimate use, that the whole class\nof phenomena connected with them are worthy of nothing but summary\nrejection, without exercising our reason on the evidence on which they\nstand. All that their existence can prove in reference to this subject is\nsomething which is very like a truism; that mankind, being liable to all\nkinds of mistakes and errors, and having frequently fallen into them, no\nclass of phenomena ought to be accepted as facts, until evidence of their\noccurrence has been adduced which is capable of satisfying our reason. But\nthis is a very harmless proposition.\n\nThere can be no doubt that to a perverted use of these faculties is due\nthe belief in a kind of current supernaturalism, which in various forms\nruns through the entire history of man. This has owed its origin to the\nefforts of the imagination to supply objects for its gratification when\nthe reason is feeble and the moral faculties have become perverted. Hence\nthe readiness of large masses of mankind to accept narratives of marvels\nwithout regard to the evidence on which they rest. They are accepted\nsimply as gratifying the principle of wonder. This is the cause of what I\nhave designated by the term \u201cCurrent Supernaturalism.\u201d\n\nBut because all our faculties admit of abuse, and the higher they are, the\ngreater, this forms no reason for rejecting their legitimate use, or the\nentire subject\u2010matter on which they operate. As I have observed, the\nprinciple is found energizing wherever man exists. Although in one age it\nmay be more active than in another, it is alike the inheritance of the\ncivilized man and the savage. It has displayed itself in the creations of\nthe poet and the writer of fiction; in the various forms of religious\nthought; in the production of ghost\u2010stories and pictures of the under\u2010\nworld; in the creation of the various forms of demonology, witchcraft and\nmagic; in the milder form of fairy\u2010tales; in charms and incantations, and\nin efforts to pry into the future. Even in philosophy and science we may\ntrace its influence, not only in aiding and suggesting their great\ndiscoveries, but in propounding multitudes of startling theories, erected\non the smallest basis of fact. These not only gratify this feeling, but\npromise an apparently royal road to knowledge, which avoids the long and\ntedious one of only propounding theories after a careful investigation of\nfacts. But in the regions of intellectual pursuit, its abnormal\nmanifestations are pre\u2010eminently in the science of historical criticism,\nin those numerous departments of historical inquiry where the facts are\nfew and vague. Here nothing is easier than to supply the absence of facts\nby theory, and to erect a magnificent edifice on a foundation of sand. The\nancient soothsayer gratified vulgar curiosity by guessing at the events of\nthe future. There is a species of modern soothsaying which expends its\nenergies in guessing at the events of the past. Such guessing presents an\nunspeakable fascination to a large number of minds, by its happy mixture\nof fiction and fact, and is the true analogue to many of the forms of\nancient thought. It has been necessary to draw attention to these things\nfor the purpose of proving the widespread influence of this principle on\nhuman nature. Its action has manifested itself in different forms in\ndifferent ages; but the cause is the same in all, the existence in man of\na principle which points to the existence of God, and which can only\nreceive its adequate gratification in Him.\n\nThe action of similar principles produces in man the love of the\nextraordinary, the unusual and the novel. This is so powerful that unless\nit is kept in subordination to reason, it produces a number of fictitious\nbeliefs. So strong is it, that it may be truly said of large numbers of\nmankind that they spend all the time which they are not compelled to\ndevote to the serious realities of life, in little else than hearing and\nspeaking of some new thing. It is undoubtedly the cause of a large number\nof fictitious beliefs, and produces, in minds where the rational powers\nare weak, a ready acceptance of the unusual, the strange, and the\nwonderful. The same principle, acting in conjunction with others, when\nuncontrolled by reason, has occasioned many of the exaggerations which are\nto be found in history.\n\nStill, as one of the fundamental principles of our minds, it cannot but\nhave a legitimate sphere of action. United with curiosity, it is the chief\nsource of all mental activity. It is that which produces the earnest\ndesire to penetrate into the regions of the unknown. As such, it is\nessential to the activity of our rational faculties, and has been the\nexciting cause which has rendered all our great discoveries possible.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that if these principles form part of our mental\nconstitution, the objection that they destroy the value of miracles as a\ntestimony to a revelation is absurd. We might as well argue that because\nthe love of the marvellous has generated a belief in a number of fictions\nas facts in ordinary history, it invalidates its testimony to events which\nhave really happened, or renders all unusual occurrences incredible. I\nwill illustrate this by an example. Herodotus tells us in his history that\nthere were certain tribes who dwelt in wooden habitations erected over\nlakes, and he gives us several particulars as to their manner of life.\nThis fact, until a comparatively recent period, might have been pronounced\nincredible, and have been supposed to have originated in the simple love\nof the marvellous, either in the author or in his informants. I own that\nwhen I first read the historian, this was the opinion which I formed\nrespecting it. But we now know that he reported an actual fact. On the\nother hand it is certain that a great portion of the details of the\nScythian expedition of Darius must have originated in the undue activity\nof the mental faculties to which I have referred, _i.e._ that they are\ninventions. But if the principle of summarily rejecting narratives of\nevents which lie beyond our experience is valid, because the abnormal\nactivity of certain faculties has urged men to invent, and believe in a\nmultitude of fictions, the account of the lake\u2010dwellings given by the\nhistorian ought to have been rejected as equally unworthy of credit, with\nsome of the occurrences of the Scythian expedition. It is impossible to\ndeal with the events of history on any general _\u00e0 priori_ principles; they\nmust stand or fall on their own intrinsic evidence.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that if these principles admit of an abnormal\naction, we are still by no means justified in a summary rejection of all\nunusual occurrences. It only forms an adequate reason for closely\nscrutinizing the evidence on which the credibility of history rests. The\nfaculty of imagination, instigated by that of wonder, has produced\nwidespread beliefs in a mass of supernatural events which are utterly\nincredible. But as that faculty must have a legitimate action somewhere,\nit is clear that its abuse can be no valid reason for the rejection of all\nsupernatural occurrences, unless for other reasons they are proved to be\nincredible. The whole must be a question of evidence and of reason. If it\nformed a valid ground for the rejection of miracles, it is clear that the\nprinciple on which it is founded cannot be confined to any such narrow\nlimits, but must have a wide and general application, and extend to all\nthat is wonderful and unusual.\n\nIt is an unquestionable fact that a large proportion of mankind in every\nage have eagerly sought the means of affording gratification to the\nfeeling of wonder, and that this has been the means of introducing into\nhistory a considerable number of fictions of various kinds. But does this\ninvalidate its testimony? Does it justify us in rejecting whole classes of\nphenomena as unworthy of consideration? We have already seen that whatever\nprinciple is applied to miracles must be equally applied to all\nextraordinary events, because as phenomena there is no difference between\nthem. We admit that many fictions have got into history. These it is the\nduty of the critical historian to detect and displace. Will anyone affirm\nthat their introduction invalidates the events in the history of the past,\nwhich rest on an adequate attestation? What that is, I shall consider\nhereafter. Whatever effect this may have exerted on the minor details of\nhistory, will anyone affirm that its great outlines do not rest on a\nsubstantial basis of truth? It is impossible to lay down on these subjects\na wide and comprehensive canon which will save us the trouble of careful\nand accurate investigation. All reports of extraordinary events, marvels,\nand miracles, must stand or fall with the adequacy of the evidence which\ncan be adduced for their occurrence, and cannot be decided by any\nartificial rule. If the evidence is good, they must be accepted,\nnotwithstanding the fact that extensive classes of marvels have been\naccepted by mankind on testimony wholly insufficient to establish their\ntruth. If the evidence fails, they must be regarded as the result of the\nabnormal exercise of faculties which yet have a legitimate place in our\nmental constitution.\n\nNothing is more common than the assertion that at certain periods of\nhistory, mankind have been ignorant that there is an order in nature; and\nthat this ignorance has given these faculties such unbounded play as to\nrender all reports of supernatural occurrences unworthy of credit,\nnotwithstanding any amount of evidence which may be alleged in their\nfavour. It is urged that, if men are ignorant that there is an order in\nnature, to such a state of mind nothing would be really supernatural; but\nevery event, whether supernatural or otherwise, would be viewed as a\nmatter of ordinary occurrence. To this state of mind a miracle would\nconvey no meaning, and therefore it would be valueless as evidence of a\ndivine revelation. In other words, it has been affirmed that there have\nbeen certain conditions of mankind in which the love of the marvellous has\nbeen so powerful, and the action of reason so weak, as to destroy all\nsense of the distinction between a natural and a supernatural occurrence.\n\nI reply that the Christian revelation was not addressed to such a\ncondition of the human mind. On the contrary, it was made after a long\ncourse of preparation for its introduction. After the whole course of\nprevious history, under the controlling providence of God, had prepared\nthe way for His Advent, Jesus Christ appeared. The Gospel was not preached\nto men in the lowest state of barbarism, but to civilized man. What may\nhave been the ideas of degraded savages, at some early period of the\nhistory of our race, it will be needless to inquire. With mankind in such\na condition we have nothing to do in the present controversy, but with the\nstate of thought in the Roman Empire during the first century of our era.\nThis was no period of mental darkness or of boundless credulity. In the\nearly ages, when every phenomenon of nature was viewed as due to the\naction of some capricious god, the belief in an order of nature must have\nbeen in a high degree vague and uncertain. But such a state of things,\nwhatever it might once have been, had long since passed away. The period\nof history now under consideration was one of widespread intelligence,\nvarying greatly in different parts of the empire, but still one of\nintelligence and civilization.\n\nIt is impossible for men to attain a degree of progress necessary for the\nexistence of civilization, and still to remain ignorant that a large class\nof natural occurrences follow an order which does not admit of deviation.\nCivilization would be impossible unless this were generally recognized. It\nis in fact founded on its recognition. At the same time, there is a class\nof phenomena which are not recognized by the ordinary mind as following a\ndefinite order. It is within this alone that the beliefs of current\nsupernaturalism exert their activity. But the supernatural occurrences\nnarrated in the New Testament do not belong to this ambiguous order of\nevents, and are therefore unaffected by them.\n\nThere is a large class of events which civilized man cannot help\nrecognizing as belonging to a definite order and sequence, and where the\nbelief in the marvellous exerts little or no influence. The violation of\nthis order he views as impossible. Thus he cannot fail to recognize the\nfact that men cannot walk on the water without support; that thousands of\npersons cannot be fed by a few loaves and fishes; that diseases never\nleave us instantaneously by no other agency than that of a touch or a\nword; and that men who have been actually dead have never returned to\nlife. No amount of the love of the marvellous has ever induced men to\nconsider such occurrences possible. Whatever may have been the current\nsupernaturalism of the ancient world, it did not embody beliefs of this\ndescription. This is proved by the entire course of ancient history. Its\nsupernaturalism is of a wholly different order. The love of the\nmarvellous, therefore, has never so confounded the distinction between the\nnatural and the supernatural among civilized men, as to have deprived a\nmiracle of its significance.\n\nSuch an assertion respecting any part of the Roman Empire, during the\ncentury which preceded and that which followed the Advent, would be\ncontrary to fact. On the contrary, certain classes of events which were\nreported to have happened, were invariably believed to have been really\nsupernatural. They were so far from being considered as devoid of meaning,\nthat persons supposed to be skilled in the art of interpreting them were\nhabitually consulted as to what they were intended to denote. The only\nexceptions to this were those occurrences which were supposed to have been\nbrought about by the art of magic. These seem to have been viewed as in\nsome measure due to the existence of occult powers in nature, the results\nof which the professors of the art had succeeded in mastering. It may be\nsafely affirmed that at no portion of this period was the love of the\nmarvellous so prevalent in any portion of the Roman Empire as to have\ndeprived a real miracle of its signification.\n\nIt follows therefore that it is impossible to lay down any abstract rule\nwhich will save us the trouble of investigating the evidence of miracles,\nbecause mankind has in all ages been greatly influenced by the love of the\nmarvellous, and under its influence has invented a number of occurrences\nwhich reason pronounces incredible. The action of this principle is far\nfrom being confined to subjects connected with religion, but extends over\nthe whole range of literature. While it is quite true that, under the\ninfluence of various principles of this description, numbers of fictions\nhave been reported by ancient historians, this forms a valid reason only\nfor rejecting those which rest on no adequate attestation. The adoption of\nthe other principle would render all knowledge of the past impossible. All\nthe faculties of our minds admit of a legitimate and an illegitimate use.\nTo reject the results of the right use of our faculties, because they are\ncapable of a wrong one, is absurd.\n\nBut an opposite view may be taken of the entire question, and one which is\ndictated by the principles of reason.\n\nSeveral principles in man directly point to the existence of the\nsupernatural. Among these veneration and conscience occupy a conspicuous\nplace. These acting in conjunction with reason constitute man a religious\nbeing. Man alone of all living beings is capable of religion. The\nprinciple of reverence finds its only adequate gratification in the\ncontemplation of moral perfection. Moral perfection is inconceivable where\npersonality and volition are not. This principle therefore forms the\ncounterpart in man which is directly correlated to the being and the\nperfections of a personal God. It follows that instead of these principles\ninvalidating the existence of the supernatural, they establish it. The\nconception of immensity is the adequate subject\u2010matter on which our\nfaculty of wonder works. The highest conception of greatness is realized\nin God. In Him therefore this faculty receives its most perfect\nrealization. Reverence points to greatness united with supreme moral\ngoodness. The imperfection of man will not satisfy it. It therefore impels\nman to bow down before the throne of One who transcends the imperfections\nof the created universe. If there be a personal God, supremely good, who\nis the Creator and moral Governor of the universe, nothing is more in\nconformity with our highest reason than that He should make a further\nmanifestation of Himself to man, in addition to that which He has made in\nthe material universe.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV. OUR SUMMARY REJECTION OF CURRENT SUPERNATURALISM CONSIDERED IN\nITS BEARING ON THE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES.\n\n\nThere can be no doubt that there is an enormous mass of supernatural\nbeliefs which we feel at once justified in rejecting without troubling\nourselves to inquire into the evidence on which they rest. Others also we\nreject because on investigation we find them altogether destitute of\nevidence. Others again which rest on evidence which would be sufficient to\nestablish an ordinary fact, we reject notwithstanding this attestation, on\nthe ground of their inherent improbability. It has been objected that our\nsummary rejection of the great mass of current supernaturalism puts the\ncase of miracles out of court, and renders them so improbable, that it is\nunnecessary minutely to examine the evidence which can be adduced in\nsupport of them. I propose therefore in this chapter to consider the\nreasons for our summary rejection of the great mass of current\nsupernaturalism, and its bearing on the credibility of the miracles in the\nNew Testament.\n\nFirst: I observe that the stories of current supernaturalism are not the\nonly ones which we reject in a summary manner. We treat in the same way a\ngreat number of other stories which offend against the principles of\ncommon sense. It is clear that in these latter cases, we do not reject\nthem merely because they are supernatural, but because they are generally\nincredible. The fact therefore that we thus reject a number of absurd\nnarratives without inquiry into the evidence on which they rest, cannot be\nurged as a reason for rejecting other occurrences which are not involved\nin any such absurdity. If the principle is valid against miracles, it must\nbe equally so against other extensive classes of facts. To assert that\nmiracles are thus absurd or ridiculous is to assume the point which ought\nto be proved.\n\nSecondly: We reject the great mass of current supernaturalism because it\nis unable to assign any adequate reason for its existence. When it is\nalleged that a miracle has been performed as an attestation of a\nrevelation, if it forms a necessary portion of such attestation, this is\nan adequate reason for the miracle. But the great mass of current\nsupernaturalism is utterly unable to assign any reason for its existence;\nor if reasons have been given, they are quite inadequate. Of this the case\nof magic is an example. If it were a reality, it would not only interfere\nwith the order of nature, but no reason could be given for this\ninterference. If, on the other hand, its phenomena were alleged to be due\nto secret forces in nature, then they would belong to an order of\ngrotesque and monstrous phenomena, which we are justified at once in\nrefusing to believe to be due to the action of intelligence or goodness;\nand on the supposition that there is a moral Governor of the universe, it\nis utterly incredible that they would occur either by his agency or with\nhis permission.\n\nPerhaps the best attested occurrences of current supernaturalism are the\nphenomena of spiritualism. It will tend to the illustration of this\nsubject, if we consider the grounds on which we reject a large portion of\nits reported phenomena quite irrespectively of the evidence produced in\nfavour of their reality, and ascribe the belief in them to the effect of\nan excited imagination, and in some cases to imposture. In considering\nthis subject, it is not necessary to examine whether the phenomena alleged\nby spiritualists, if true, would be really supernatural, or belong to an\norder of nature hitherto unknown.\n\nMany of the manifestations of spiritualism possess a grotesqueness which\nwe see in no other class of natural phenomena. If they are alleged to be\nthe results of the action of natural forces previously unknown, then they\nmust belong to a class of forces which contrast in a most remarkable\ndegree with all known ones; that is to say, the known and the unknown\nforces of nature must be utterly out of harmony with one another. I am now\nspeaking on the supposition that such forces are merely natural ones, not\nunder the guidance of intelligence. In that case they must have been\nalways in existence, only latent; yet they now for the first time manifest\nthemselves under very special circumstances and conditions, such as are\nhighly favourable to the existence of delusion. The abnormal character of\nthese phenomena, so entirely at variance with the known order of nature,\nforms the strongest ground for the conviction that they cannot be the\nresults of the action of unknown natural forces. It would require an\noverwhelming amount of evidence to convince us that these two sets of\nnatural forces, distinguishable by the strongest possible contrasts, (viz.\nthose which produce the visible phenomena of nature, and those which\nproduce another class, intermittent in their action, of which\ngrotesqueness and monstrosity are the most striking characteristics, and\nwhich only manifest their existence under circumstances calculated to\nthrow a suspicion on their reality), can be the results of the action of\nforces which have been present in nature during all past time.\n\nBut further: these phenomena, if natural, must belong to an order of\nnature which is not only unlike the visible order, but would throw its\naction into confusion. I am here reasoning on the supposition that the\nmoral order of the universe is due to the action of nothing but physical\nforces. If this be so, it must form a portion of the existing order of\nnature. But the forces which, on the supposition of the truth of\nspiritualism, must be capable of being brought into activity, would\ninterrupt that moral order of which we are actually conscious. Their\naction, if real, would interrupt the entire course of the moral world. No\nman would be safe from their intrusion. Even in our deepest retirement we\nshould never be free from the invasion of their prying curiosity. Such a\npower would be incompatible with the moral order of society. It follows,\ntherefore, that an unknown order of nature, presenting the most violent\ncontrast to the visible one, whose phenomena do not follow an invariable\nbut an intermittent law, and are only alleged to manifest themselves under\nconditions favourable to imposture, possesses such a degree of inherent\nimprobability as to justify its rejection, even by those who recognise the\naction of none but material forces in the universe.\n\nBut to those who recognise the present order of nature as due to the\naction of a wise and intelligent Creator, it becomes absolutely incredible\nthat forces such as the phenomena of spiritualism require for their\nproduction, can form a portion of that order which He has created, as they\ncontradict every conception which we can rationally form of his character.\n\nBut if these phenomena are viewed as due to the action of supernatural\nagency, the reality of their occurrence becomes still more inconceivable.\nIf such agency is capable of being exerted, we can only conceive that its\nexertion is permitted for the realization of some known end. Yet the\nphenomena of spiritualism serve no purpose whatever. Spiritualists have\nbeen holding their _s\u00e9ances_ for many years; but no one practical result\nhas yet been realized by them. The spirits of the departed have been\ninvoked, but they have never yet given a single useful response. Surely if\nthere be a spirit world, its occupations cannot be the production of the\nabnormal, the mean and the grotesque. Its employments must possess some\npretensions to be esteemed dignified. It has been alleged that such\nmanifestations help to convince the incredulous of the reality of the\nimmortality of man. On the contrary, the idea that spirits can be guilty\nof such phantastic tricks can only help to throw discredit on the\ndoctrine. It follows, therefore, that if the phenomena of spiritualism are\nviewed as due to supernatural causes, it is utterly incredible either that\nthe Governor of the Universe would permit such a course of action, or that\nthe spirits themselves, unless deprived of reason, would exhibit\nthemselves in such a variety of phantastic forms, and for no other\napparent purpose than to effect a number of capricious interferences with\nthe visible order of nature. This incredibility is so great as to entitle\nus summarily to reject the idea that the reputed phenomena can be actual\noccurrences. In addition to this, the alleged manifestations are made\nunder circumstances pre\u2010eminently suited to excite suspicion.\n\nThe phenomena of modern spiritualism are a fair illustration of the\ngeneral character of the current supernaturalism of the ancient world. It\nwas for the most part equally senseless and absurd. The attestation to its\nactual occurrence was of a very inferior character to that which can be\nurged in favour of the alleged facts of spiritualism. I have merely taken\nnotice of these latter as an illustration of the general aspect of the\nphenomena of current supernaturalism, and as placing before us the reasons\nwhich fully justify us in rejecting a large portion of it without minutely\ninquiring into its evidence.\n\nI will now proceed to contrast the entire mass of current supernaturalism\nwith the miracles of the New Testament for the purpose of still further\nillustrating the grounds on which we reject it, while we claim for the\nlatter that their reality must be tested by the evidence which can be\nadduced in favour of their actual occurrence.\n\nLet me again draw attention to the fact that the only correct conception\nof a miracle in connection with this controversy, is that of an event\nwrought in external nature with a definite moral aim and purpose.\nExtraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and purpose can be\nassigned, may be unusual occurrences, but are in no proper sense of the\nwords evidential miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary\nnature, and an event marked with a definite moral purpose, are two wholly\ndifferent things. The one may be credible, and the other wholly\nincredible. We habitually recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and\nit entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an event. We esteem\nthe action of a particular person quite credible under one set of\ncircumstances, which we should reject as incredible under another. Thus if\nwe were informed that a friend with whom we were intimately acquainted,\nhad precipitated himself from a height into the water, supposing him to be\nsane, we should not believe it. But if we received the information that he\nhad done it to save a person from drowning, and we knew that he was a man\nof courage, we should accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On\nthis account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged miracle is of the\nutmost importance; and it is necessary for its correct conception that it\nshould not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external nature, but\nthat it should take place at the bidding of another, and in order to\nrender it credible, that it should be calculated to effectuate some\ndefinite moral purpose.\n\nAlleged supernatural events, which are destitute of these accompaniments,\nare always liable to a very high degree of _\u00e0 priori_ suspicion. In fact\nit would be difficult to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be\naffirmed respecting them would be that they were very unusual occurrences,\nwhich it was impossible to account for by the action of any known force.\nIf the universe is under the government of God, all supernatural action\nmust either be the result of His agency or permission. If He interferes\nwith the order of occurrences, it is evident that such interference cannot\nbe capricious, but must have a definite purpose. We are justified,\ntherefore, in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, which are\ndestitute of all appearance of purpose in their performance.\n\nBut further: the alleged miracle must be consistent with the character of\nGod, before it is possible to attribute it to Him as wrought by His direct\nagency. This rests on the same principle on which we refuse to credit the\nreports of actions performed by men which are contradictory to their well\nknown characters. But this is far more certain with respect to God than it\ncan be of man. Human characters can at best be but imperfectly known, and\nthere are unseen depths in the human heart which sometimes render actions\npossible, which stand in striking contrast to the general character of the\nagents. To state the truth generally, as it is impossible that man can act\nin opposition to the inmost principles of his moral being, so in a far\nhigher degree is it impossible that God can contradict the perfections of\nHis moral nature. This being so, it follows that we are entitled to reject\nall miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, which are contrary to\nHis moral attributes; all which are low, mean, or grotesque, and unfitted\nto realize an elevated moral purpose.\n\nIt will here be objected that if these positions are true, demoniacal\nmiracles are rendered impossible. I have already pointed out that if\ndemoniacal supernaturalism is affirmed in the New Testament to be an\nactuality, its action is described as being limited to the human mind, and\nthat whatever permitted activity is conceded to it, always bears the most\ndistinctive marks of being from beneath. There is no possibility of\nmistaking between such supernatural occurrences and the miracles of God.\n\nSuch then are our general principles, the truth of which can hardly be\ncontested. If they are true, the great mass of current supernaturalism is\nworthy of rejection for the following reasons.\n\n1. While it claims to be the result of supernatural agency, it is\ndestitute of all definite moral purpose, and such moral impress as it\nbears is mean and degraded. What end, I ask, was it designed to serve? It\ninvolved an almost continual interference with the order of nature; or if\nat times it claimed to be due to occult forces, they were only suited to\nconfound the visible order of the universe. I am reasoning on the\nsupposition that there is a God who rules the world. This being so, it is\nimpossible to conceive that such a mode of acting can be His. Under this\nhead of supernaturalism fall all the monstrous and the grotesque, and the\nentire range of magical phenomena.\n\n2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in contradiction to\neverything which we can conceive of the moral character of God. Let us\ntake as an illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who can believe that\nGod employed the entrails of slaughtered beasts as the means of revealing\nthe future? or that it was consistent with his character to manifest his\nwill through a multitude of monstrous portents? There is perhaps not a\nsingle occurrence of ancient supernaturalism which does not offend against\nour primary conception of the Divine character; and, therefore, the whole\nis worthy of summary rejection.\n\n3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences to no cause adequate\nto produce them. Those who asserted its reality, referred it to the action\nof deities who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers in\nnature. Such occult powers we now know to have no existence, and the power\nattributed to the supposed deities was far too limited to be capable of\nproducing the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged cause\nof which is unable to produce them, we are entitled to reject without\nfurther investigation.\n\n4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested on no evidence\nwhatever. Of those portions for which any reasons were alleged, the\nevidence itself was of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this\nkind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected with the state\nreligions. These were in the hands of men who used them for the purpose of\nacting on the vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report of\nanything, however incredible, which could subserve their end. Other\nportions were palpable impostures worked for the basest and most selfish\npurposes. A very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence on\nwhich it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting it without\nentering on any inquiry as to its details.\n\nSuch being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, it is absurd\nto argue that its existence is a reason for rejecting along with it\nanother order of supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in every\nparticular. We might as well urge the existence of a vast number of\ncounterfeits as a reason for rejecting everything which is genuine. We do\nnot reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is utterly\nincredible. A statement of a few particulars will exhibit the contrast\nbetween it and the supernaturalism of the New Testament in a striking\npoint of view.\n\n1. Christian supernaturalism alleges that its occurrences are the result\nof the action of a force which, if present, is certainly adequate to\nproduce them. Ancient supernaturalism alleges no cause whatever, or one\nwholly inadequate.\n\n2. Christian supernaturalism alleges a perfectly adequate purpose for its\nproduction; that purpose being the attestation of the divine mission of\nJesus. Ancient supernaturalism alleges either no purpose at all, or a\ndegraded one.\n\n3. Christian supernaturalism is made to centre around the greatest and\nmost exalted character that has ever appeared in history. Ancient\nsupernaturalism, instead of being connected with the most eminent\ncharacters of the times, directly connects itself with the most\nquestionable.\n\n4. Christian supernaturalism is stamped throughout with a high moral\ncharacter and aspect. This is wholly wanting in the supernaturalism of the\nancient world.\n\n5. Christian supernaturalism belongs to an elevated order and type; the\nobjects realized by it were for the most part benevolent. The mode of its\naction was dignified and the effects produced by it were instantaneous,\nfollowing directly on the word of the agent. The mode in which its\nmiracles were performed is characterized by the utmost simplicity,\ndestitute alike of anything scenic or fantastic, entirely in harmony with\nthe great character who performed them. The supernaturalism of the ancient\nworld is marked by the opposite characteristics.\n\n6. Christian supernaturalism, or to speak more correctly, the greatest\nsupernatural occurrence which Christianity records, namely the\nResurrection of Christ, has not only left a mighty impression on history,\nbut has created a civilization of its own which embraces all the\nprogressive nations of the world, and exerts a powerful influence even on\nthose who deny its truth. The only result wrought by the supernaturalism\nof the ancient world was the moral degradation of those among whom it\nprevailed.\n\n7. The supernaturalism of Christianity rests on an attestation which even\nunbelievers would allow to be quite sufficient to establish the truth of\nany ordinary facts. The other rests either on no testimony at all, or on\none which is open to the gravest suspicion.\n\nSuch are some of the striking contrasts which distinguish the\nsupernaturalism of the New Testament from that of the ancient world. When\ntwo series of events present such opposite features, it is the duty of a\nsound philosophy to trace these distinctions to their causes, and to show\nwhat is the nature of the forces which have impressed on each series its\nown peculiar characteristics. Instead of this, however, we are invited to\npronounce both alike incredible; that is to say, because one series of\nevents is deeply impressed with characteristics which render them\nincredible, we are invited to pronounce a similar condemnation on another\nseries, which is distinguished by the most opposite features, and which\nhas only this point in common with the former, that both belong to an\norder of events which we designate as supernatural. Nothing can be more\nunphilosophical than such a mode of reasoning. We reject the one series in\na mass, not because the events which it contains are supernatural, but\nbecause they are absolutely incredible. A similar rule we apply to\nordinary, no less than supernatural occurrences.\n\nBut it will doubtless be objected that there is another series of\nsupernatural occurrences which rational men, with a few exceptions, greet\nwith an equally summary rejection, viz. the long series of ecclesiastical\nmiracles which extends in an almost unbroken succession from the second\ncentury of our era nearly to the present day. These, it has been urged,\nare alleged to have been wrought in attestation of Christianity, and bear\nsome remarkable analogy, as facts wrought in external nature, to the\nmiracles recorded in the Gospels. It is argued that if we reject the one,\nwe are for the same reason bound to reject the others.\n\nThe following points may be considered as admitted.\n\nFirst; That every century from the second downwards has been characterized\nby a considerable amount of pretension to the possession of supernatural\npower; and during this period one section of the Christian Church claims\nto have actually wrought miracles.\n\nSecondly; Several of these miracles, viewed merely as phenomena in outward\nnature, are precisely similar to those recorded in the New Testament.\n\nThirdly; When a miracle is alleged to have been performed at the present\nday, as has recently been the case in a neighbouring country, not only all\nunbelievers in the possibility of supernatural occurrences, but also all\nrational Christians concur in its summary rejection, not merely on the\nground that the evidence is insufficient, but that the event is in itself\nincredible.\n\nFourthly; That rational men reject in a similar manner and for similar\nreasons the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles as unworthy of serious\ninquiry into their attestation.\n\nWith respect to the second point, I have already observed that if we view\nmiracles merely as phenomena in external nature, and if a similar belief\nin a current supernaturalism, which we have seen to be one of the\nphenomena of human nature, prevailed in the Church, it was to be expected\nthat the current forms of ecclesiastical supernaturalism would adopt those\nof the New Testament for their basis, and consequently that it would\nabound in narratives of resurrections from the dead and the cures of\nvarious diseases. This is actually the case. It may also not only excite\nour wonder that the model was not far more exactly copied, but that\necclesiastical, and especially monkish miracles, which constitute an\noverwhelming majority of the miracles of Church history, abound so largely\nin features which stand in such marked contrast to the miracles of the New\nTestament, their peculiar characteristics being the same as those of\nancient supernaturalism, viz. the monstrous and the grotesque. This point\nis one which demands the serious consideration of unbelievers; for if, as\nthey aver, they are both due to the action of the same causes, this\ndiversity requires to be accounted for. The truth is, that with the\nexception that both series contain reports of miracles which are similar\nor mere objective occurrences, in other respects their characteristics\ndiffer widely.\n\nWith respect to the fact that rational men concur in the rejection of\nmodern miracles, it should be observed that this is not because all\nsupernatural events are believed to be incredible; but because the reputed\nevents themselves possess characteristics which excite in us the gravest\nsuspicions of their truth; and especially because by far the greatest\nnumber of them are well known not to have originated in mere credulity,\nbut in actual imposture. Men or communities who have once lent themselves\nto the deliberate coining of miracles, are of blasted reputations, and\nwhenever marvellous occurrences are reported by such persons, we are\njustified in rejecting them without further inquiry. It is evident that\nthese are the grounds on which such stories are rejected, and not simply\nbecause they are supernatural, since those who believe in the\nsupernaturalism of the New Testament concur with those who disbelieve in\nit, in thus rejecting them.\n\nI must now briefly consider the general grounds on which we reject the\ngreat mass of ecclesiastical miracles, while we accept those in the\nGospels as actual occurrences.\n\nThe general ground of our rejection of them is precisely the same as that\non which we reject the supernaturalism of the ancient world. The only\nthing which distinguishes them from the latter, is that they contain a\nnumber of events which viewed as bare facts are similar to those recorded\nin the Gospels. In every other respect the contrast is complete. I shall\nonly draw attention to a few considerations which might otherwise escape\nthe notice of the reader.\n\nThe ecclesiastical miracles were not wrought in attestation that the\nperson working them had a divine commission, but that a divine power\npermanently abode in the Church. The qualification which was thought\nnecessary for the exhibition of this power was the possession of a great\ndegree of reputed sanctity. The exercise of miraculous power was supposed\nto prove, not that its possessor had a divine commission, but that he was\na saint. The saint was supposed to have in himself some inherent power of\nworking miracles, bearing a considerable analogy to that which the woman\nwith the issue of blood believed to be possessed by our Lord. A miraculous\npower in the shape of a virtue issued from the saint. Hence the\nsupernatural power which was ascribed to dead men\u2019s bones and to relics.\nSuch a supernatural power is devoid of everything which presupposes a\ndivine purpose, and of all evidential value. Its frequency would destroy\nthe nature of a miracle as an attestation of a divine commission, and\ninvolve an interference with the order of nature, which would destroy the\nsense of its regularity, the knowledge of which is so essential to our\nwell being, as well as to the conception of a miracle. Moreover, the\nsupernatural agency is not supposed to be due to the direct intervention\nof God, but to some imaginary virtue residing in man.\n\nThe ecclesiastical miracles of which we have anything like a detailed\naccount, when they are not simply regarded as due to the direct sanctity\nof the person performing them, are never alleged to be performed in proof\nof a divine commission; but when they are asserted to have been\nevidential, they are affirmed to have been wrought in proof of some\ndoctrine, or in favour of some particular party in the Church; or, what\ninvests them with a still greater degree of suspicion, in favour of the\npower of a particular order. The last class of alleged miracles may at\nonce be dismissed as due to simple imposture. The first are strongly\ncontrasted with those of the New Testament, where we cannot find the\naccount of a single miracle wrought in attestation of a doctrine, the one\nor two apparent exceptions being really performed to attest a divine\ncommission. But when a miracle is wrought to prove an irrational doctrine,\nthe credibility of the miracle perishes with the truth of the doctrine. We\nare, therefore, justified in rejecting the miracles whenever we have\nsufficient evidence that the doctrines which they were alleged to attest\nare untrue. Again: whenever a particular party alleges a divine\nattestation in its favour, its character may be known by its works. The\nparties in the Church who have claimed such miraculous attestation, have\nproved by their actions that the idea of a divine interference in their\nfavour is incredible, as being inconsistent with the divine character.\n\nIt is perfectly true that at the present day all rational men, with few\nexceptions, concur in rejecting almost the entire mass of ecclesiastical\nmiracles. They do this, however, not because they believe miracles to be\nimpossible, but because they are persuaded that God will not work one on a\nlight or trivial occasion, and because the great mass of such pretended\nmiracles are characterised by marks which are inconsistent with the idea\nthat they have been wrought by God. With our larger acquaintance with the\norder of nature, we no longer believe that it is possible for miracles to\nbe wrought by any inherent virtue in things themselves, but that if\nperformed at all, it can only be by the direct agency or permission of the\nAuthor of Nature. In a word, the general incredibility of the\necclesiastical miracles, and their repugnance to our conception of the\nmode of the divine acting is the reason why we reject them altogether.\n\nIt is also unquestionably true that at the present day a great majority\neven of religious persons would receive with no little incredulity the\nreport of a miracle, while such incredulity would not have existed at a\nformer period. This is due to two causes: first, our increased knowledge\nof the permanence of the forces of material Nature; and secondly, our\nbelief that supernatural occurrences can only take place by the direct\nagency and permission of God, and not by means of my supernatural power\ninherent in particular persons. From this we draw the inference that\nalmost all the alleged ecclesiastical miracles must be rejected as\ninconsistent with the divine character. We are of opinion, therefore, that\na miracle wrought for any other purpose than the attestation of a\nrevelation is not credible; and as from the nature of the case revelations\nmust be rare, we summarily reject all reports of supernatural occurrences\nas impostures, or the offspring of a heated and undisciplined imagination.\n\nNow although this is generally the case, yet it is unquestionable that if\na miracle was reported to us with a pre\u2010eminently strong attestation, no\nrational person would refuse to give a serious consideration to the\nevidence merely because the event was supernatural. A reported miracle\nwould doubtless be attended with no inconsiderable degree of antecedent\nimprobability; but if a man with whom we were intimately acquainted, of\nsound intellect, and high moral character were to allege that he had\nperformed an act which, if real, must have been indisputably miraculous,\nit would be altogether irrational to reject his assertion summarily as\nunworthy of consideration merely because in all ages miraculous stories\nhave been extensively believed. The application of such a principle would\nlead us into the grossest error.\n\nThis question has a very important bearing on the subject before us. It\nhas been alleged that while nothing has been more common than the\nascription of miracles to eminent men, it is impossible to find a man of\nsound judgment and high moral character who has deliberately affirmed that\nhe has performed one himself. That such affirmations have been very rare\nis certain, and for the simple reason, that miracles have been very rare\noccurrences. But the assertion that no such cases are to be found is\ninaccurate. One, at all events, exists, although probably the only one,\nbut it is that of a man of the most undoubted veracity, the Apostle Paul.\nAs I have already observed, four of the most important writings which have\nbeen attributed to him are admitted by a vast majority of those\nunbelievers who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, to be his\ngenuine productions. These are before us, and we can form from them a full\njudgment as to the character of the man. In them he distinctly tells us\nthat he performed miracles. He writes: \u201cI have therefore whereof I may\nglory in those things which pertain to God. For I will not dare to speak\nof any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me to make the\nGentiles obedient by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by\nthe power of the Spirit of God; so that from Jerusalem, and round about\nunto Illyricum, I have fully preached the Gospel of Christ.\u201d (Rom. xv. 18,\n19.) Here at least we have a direct affirmation on the subject. It is not\nthe only one made by him. But there is also one which is equivalent to\nanother affirmation made by One whom unbelievers must admit to have been\nthe greatest man who ever lived, Jesus Christ Himself. Those with whom I\nam reasoning allow that the discourses in the Synoptic Gospels are\naccounts of His real utterances. In them He directly affirms that He\nperformed miracles.\n\nEven those against whose opinions I am arguing, will concede that the\ncharacters of Christ and St. Paul stand at the greatest height of moral\nelevation. If there are any other persons whose utterances have been\nhanded down to us, who have deliberately made this affirmation, their\nnumbers are unquestionably few. Certainly no other thoroughly great and\nelevated character has done so. This is a remarkable fact and well worthy\nof consideration. While many of the Fathers have affirmed that miracles\nwere performed by others, not one of them has affirmed that he has wrought\nany himself. The supernaturalism of the New Testament differs, as we have\nseen, from all other alleged kinds of supernatural occurrences. It differs\nmoreover in this respect, that one of the persons through whose agency\nthese miracles are declared to have been performed, has made a deliberate\naffirmation that he wrought them; and that the founder of Christianity, in\nrecorded utterances which are admitted to be genuine, has likewise\nasserted that miracles were wrought by Him.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that our summary rejection of all the current\nsupernaturalism which has been alleged to have taken place at various\nperiods of history, is quite consistent with our accepting as true the\nseries of supernatural events recorded in the New Testament, which are\ndistinguished by characteristics of an entirely different order.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO MIRACLES AS CREDENTIALS OF A\nREVELATION.\n\n\nWhile considering this subject, it will be necessary to keep steadily in\nview that miracles are not alleged in the New Testament to have been\nperformed to prove the truth of doctrines, but that a particular person\npossesses a divine commission; or in attestation of particular facts, such\nas the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.\n\nThe truth of a divine commission being established, it follows that the\ndivinely\u2010appointed messenger must have some message to communicate. We\nfurther infer that God will not intrust a message to any person whom He\nhas not previously fully enlightened as to the subject which he has to\ncommunicate, and who would not truthfully communicate the message with\nwhich he is intrusted. A miracle is therefore not only an attestation to\nthe divine commission of the person performing one, but also to the\nadequate information and veracity of the messenger. Although a miracle is\nnot wrought to prove the truth of a particular doctrine, but that a\nparticular person is intrusted with a divine commission, we accept a\ndoctrinal statement as true, when made by a messenger thus attested,\nwithin the limits of the message with which he affirms himself to be\nintrusted, on the ground that such a messenger must both be truthful, and\npossess adequate knowledge. In other words, our belief in the doctrinal\nstatement does not rest on the miracle, but on the veracity of God.\n\nThis is the affirmation made in the New Testament respecting the most\nimportant class of the miracles which it records. As I have elsewhere\nobserved, not a single instance occurs in it of a miracle wrought for the\npurpose of proving that a doctrine is true. Our Lord\u2019s distinct\naffirmation is, \u201cThe same works that I do, bear witness of me that the\nFather hath sent me.\u201d (John v. 36.) \u201cIf I say the truth, why do ye not\nbelieve me?\u201d (John viii. 46.) The miracles which are alleged to have been\nperformed by the Apostles for directly evidential purposes, were wrought\nin proof of the Resurrection of Christ, and of their own divine\ncommission, which directly depended on it.\n\nLet it also be observed that it by no means follows that every miracle\nrecorded in the New Testament was performed exclusively for evidential\npurposes. This point I shall consider hereafter.\n\nIf these principles are correct, they will at once dispose of two\nobjections which are alleged against miracles: first, that they cannot\nprove a doctrine; and secondly, that they cannot prove a moral truth. I\nfully accept the statement that moral truths cannot be proved by the\nevidence of miracles, but must rest on their own inherent evidence; and\nthat all positive duties rest on the command of God, to whom we feel, on\nother grounds, that all love, reverence, and adoration are due. The truth\nof doctrines also cannot be established by the performance of a miracle;\nbut when we accept them on external authority, they rest on the testimony\nof God, and our full persuasion that He must be in possession of all\ntruth. Although, therefore, I accept as correct these principles, on which\nthe objection is founded, they have no bearing on the point at issue; for\nthe New Testament nowhere affirms that its miracles were wrought to prove\neither doctrinal statements or moral truths, but facts.\n\n1. It is objected that the prevalence of supernatural beliefs renders the\nexistence of miracles \u201cso hackneyed as scarcely to attract the notice of\nthe nation to whom the Christian revelation was in the first instance\naddressed.\u201d (_Supernatural Religion._)\n\nI reply that this objection contains two inaccuracies. First, it is not\ntrue that the miracles of Jesus scarcely attracted the notice of those\namong whom they were performed. The only authority on this point is the\nNew Testament itself, and this assertion contradicts its express\nstatements. Numerous passages in the Gospels directly affirm that the\nmiracles of our Lord attracted very general attention, and produced a\nprofound astonishment; and that those who had witnessed them considered\nthat there was a wide distinction between them and the miraculous\npretensions then current. His fame is represented as having been spread by\nthem in regions beyond Palestine; and great multitudes are stated to have\ncollected, both for the purpose of hearing Him and of being healed of\ntheir diseases. The fourth Gospel represents our Lord as rebuking the\nmultitudes, for attending on Him for sordid purposes. It is quite true,\nthat notwithstanding the miracles, the body of the Jewish nation\nultimately rejected Christianity, though the epistles bear witness that\nthe Jewish element which was attracted into the Christian Church was\nlarge. The assertion, therefore, is simply contrary to fact, that miracles\nwere in those days so common and hackneyed as to attract little or no\nattention to him who professed to work them.\n\nEqually inaccurate is the assertion that the evidence of miracles as the\nattestation to a revelation was a \u201chackneyed\u201d one. The Old Testament\nprofessed to rest on miraculous evidence. This being the case, the Jews\nwere fully entitled to expect that if God made a further revelation of His\nwill, it would be accompanied by a miraculous attestation. But Judaism was\nthe only religion of the ancient world which professed to be founded on\nthe evidence of miracles. A belief in a current supernaturalism was no\ndoubt mixed up with the ancient religions, but its wonders were not\nalleged to have been wrought in attestation of the fact that they were\nrevelations, nor even as attestations to their truth. The religion of the\nGreeks possessed both priests and prophets; but they performed no miracles\nin attestation of a divine commission. The only attestation of this kind\nwhich they claimed was the utterance of obscure or mendacious oracles. I\nam not aware that anyone who pretended to be a revealer of the divine will\nin ancient times ever professed to perform visible and palpable miracles\nin proof of his assertions. Similar is the position of the old religions\nwhich still exist in the modern world. Many of them abound in stories of\nthe most fantastic manifestations of their gods in ancient times. Their\nvotaries believe in the efficacy of magic, charms, and incantations. But\nnone of these things have been affirmed to have been wrought in\nattestation of a divine commission. Mahometanism claims, in the strictest\nsense, to be a divine revelation; yet the Koran even offers apologies for\nthe fact that its founder wrought no miracles in attestation of his claim\nto be a divine messenger. So far therefore is it from being the fact that\nmiracles are so generally alleged by religions in vindication of their\nclaim to be revelations, that Judaism and Christianity are absolutely\nunique in this respect. The idea of working a miracle in attestation of a\ndivine commission is so far from being a \u201chackneyed\u201d one, that it has the\nstrongest claims to originality.\n\n2. It is urged by the same writer that \u201cevery marvel and every narrative\nof supernatural interference seemed a matter of course to the\nsuperstitious credulity of the age. However much miracles are the\nexception to the order of nature, they have always been the rule in the\nhistory of ignorance. In fact the excess of belief in them throughout many\ncenturies of darkness, is almost fatal to their claims to credence now.\nThey have been limited to periods of ignorance and superstition, and are\nunknown to ages of enlightenment. The Christian miracles are rendered\nalmost as suspicious from their place in a long series of similar\noccurrences, as they are by their being exceptions to the sequence of\nnatural phenomena. It would be extraordinary if cycles of miracles\noccurring before and since those of the Gospels, and in connection with\nevery religion, could be repudiated as fables, and these alone maintained\nas genuine.\u201d\n\nThe principles which I have laid down in a former chapter fully meet the\nchief points raised in these objections. A few additional observations on\nthem, therefore, are all that will be necessary.\n\nFirst: the assertion that every marvel or narrative of supernatural\ninterference seemed a matter of course to the superstitious credulity of\nthe age, is inaccurate. If they had been of habitual or constant\noccurrence, they would have ceased to be marvels at all. In such a case\nthe trade of the impostor would have gone, for it would not have paid him.\nThe entire plausibility of such reasonings arises from confounding under a\ncommon name phenomena wholly different in character. I ask emphatically,\ndid the current supernaturalism of any age or nation accept as matters of\ncourse such events as the resurrection of Christ, or the cure of a blind\nman, or a man full of leprosy, by a word or a touch? Have not heathen\nwriters pronounced actual resurrections from the dead to be\nimpossibilities? Were such occurrences ever believed to be within the\npower of magic to effect? Belief in the possibility of such occurrences\nbecame current only under the influence of Christianity.\n\n2. It is not correct to assert that the belief in miracles has been\nconfined to ages of ignorance. Will it be affirmed that the most\nflourishing period of Grecian literature was an age of ignorance? Yet a\nbelief in a current supernaturalism prevailed in it. Was the Augustan age\nan age of ignorance? Both ages were ignorant of physical science: but\nduring few periods has the human intellect been equally active. Each age\ncontained men endowed with common sense sufficient to make them adequate\njudges whether the supernatural occurrences above referred to were\npossible or not.\n\n3. It is inaccurate to affirm that the Christian miracles are interposed\nbetween two similar series of supernatural occurrences. There is only one\npoint in common between them; the claim to be supernatural. As I have\nproved, in every other respect they are strongly contrasted. It is,\ntherefore, by no means extraordinary that a series of supernatural\noccurrences, which have the highest moral impress, and possess other\ndistinguishing characteristics, should be true; and that the others, one\nof which took place before and the other after that in question, and which\nare stamped with the very opposite characteristics, should be false.\n\nThe same author adduces the following objections, as lying at the root of\nmiraculous testimony to a revelation: \u201cSurely supernatural evidence of so\ncommon and prodigal a nature betrays great want of force and divine\noriginality. How could that be considered as special evidence for a new\nrevelation, which was already so well known to all the world, and which\nwas scattered broadcast over so many centuries, as well as successfully\nsimulated by Satan.\u201d Again: \u201cInstead of a few evidential miracles taking\nplace at one epoch of history, and filling the world with surprise at such\nnovel and exceptional phenomena, we find miracles represented as taking\nplace in all ages and in all countries. The Gospel miracles are set in the\nmidst of a series of similar wonders which commenced many centuries before\nthe dawn of Christianity, and continued without interruption fifteen\ncenturies after it. No divine originality characterized the evidence\nselected to accredit the divine revelation.\u201d (P. 192.)\n\nI reply, First: It behoves those who except against the plan of attesting\na divine revelation by miracles, to inform us in what other way it is\npossible that the truth of a divine commission can be attested. It is\ndoubtless possible for God to make a special revelation of His will to\neach individual man; yet even this would involve supernatural agency of\nsome kind; and it is very questionable whether to do so would be\nconsistent with the plan of God\u2019s moral government which comes under our\nactual observation. But the Christian revelation is founded on the idea of\nmaking a divine manifestation additional to, and of a different order\nfrom, that which is made by the created universe; and not simply of\nimparting so much additional information to each individual. This\nmanifestation professes to be made by the Incarnation. How, I ask, was\nsuch a manifestation to be made except by a supernatural action of some\nkind? It is clear, therefore, that every manifestation of God differing\nfrom that made by the ordinary forces of nature, or by the moral nature of\nman, must be supernatural. There can be no doubt as to the means which\nmust be employed. The only question which can be raised is one which I\nhave considered elsewhere, namely: whether it is the purpose of God to\nmake such a manifestation of Himself.\n\nIt will be objected that such a manifestation might have been made self\u2010\nevident to the moral nature of man, and consequently it would have\nrequired no additional attestation. To this I reply that, on the\nsupposition that it is God\u2019s purpose to make such an additional\nmanifestation of Himself, He must be allowed to be the only adequate judge\nof the right mode of accomplishing it.\n\nBut even if a revelation involved no such manifestation of God, but only a\ncommunication of truth to man, it is incumbent on those who object to its\nattestation by miracles, to find some other method by which the reality of\na divine commission could be attested, and to show that this mode would be\npreferable to an attestation by miracles.\n\nBut further: if we regard a miracle as a supernatural occurrence wrought\nin attestation of a divine commission, which is the unquestionable aspect\nof a considerable number of those recorded in the New Testament, the fact\nthat there was a wide\u2010spread belief in the existence of supernatural\nevents is far from interfering with its efficacy. What did the current\nbeliefs imply? That there existed beings, other than the blind forces of\nnature, who interfered in human affairs; and that they were in some way or\nother capable of communicating with man. What is the very conception\nimplied by a revelation? That a God exists, who is the moral Governor of\nthe universe, who cares for man, and is capable of holding communications\nwith him. Both conceptions rest on a common ground\u2014the existence of\nsupernatural beings capable of manifesting themselves by outward\nindications. Why then should not the moral Governor of the universe, if it\nwas His purpose to make a revelation, employ media, which were all but\nuniversally recognized? No inconsiderable number of the objections of\nunbelievers rest on the assumption, that if there be a God, it is\nderogatory to His character to suppose that He is capable of condescending\nto the weaknesses and imperfections of man. A God who neither will nor can\ndo so may be a very grand conception; but one who is very ill adapted to\nthe wants of human nature, and who is incapable of exciting human\nsympathies. The only thing that would be necessary, on the supposition\nthat it was His purpose to make such a revelation, would be that His mode\nof manifesting His presence should be one clearly distinguishable from the\nevents of current supernaturalism. What was requisite would have been to\nafford evidence that the manifestation in question was due to no other\nbeing than Himself; that is to say, that the miracles should bear the\nunquestionable impress of His own perfections. The subject of alleged\ndemoniacal miracles I have considered elsewhere. The simple question\nbefore us is\u2014Are the supernatural events recorded in the Gospels clearly\ndistinguishable in their general character from the supernaturalism which\nwas current previous to the Advent? I have already shown that it contains\nno doubtful indications as to who the agent must have been, if we suppose\nthe facts to have been actual occurrences.\n\nBut further: if the objection has any validity, it presupposes that God\nought not to make a revelation in ages of superstition and ignorance; but\nmust wait until knowledge has cleared away the mists of ignorance and\nerror, and supplied us with the means of infallibly discriminating between\ntrue miracles and false ones; or, in other words, we must wait for the\nmuch\u2010talked\u2010of jury of scientific men, who can submit His alleged miracles\nto the whole range of scientific tests. Happily, however, God has gifted a\nconsiderable number of men with common sense, which is quite adequate to\ndetermine whether a certain class of events wrought under certain\ncircumstances are miraculous operations, or mere natural occurrences, or\ndue to imposture. If this be so, what is there, I ask, unworthy of God, in\nmaking a revelation at such times as man stands in special need of one?\n\nIt is further objected that a miraculous attestation to a divine\ncommission shows a want of force and divine originality. I ask, how? The\nfact is that with the exception of Judaism, no ancient religion professed\nto be so attested; and the Jew would naturally expect that any fresh\nrevelation would be attested in a manner similar to that which he believed\nin as divine.\n\nThe objection that because the belief in supernaturalism was so general,\ntherefore miracles must be worthless as evidence, I have already shown to\nbe fallacious.\n\nBut it is also objected: \u201cInstead of a few evidential miracles taking\nplace at one particular period of history and filling the world with\nsurprise at such novel and exceptional phenomena, we find them represented\nas taking place in all ages and in all countries.\u201d\n\nThis is the old objection of the Jews who demanded of our Lord a sign from\nHeaven. Both demand a particular class and order of miracle, viz.:\nsomething stupendous, or terrific. The value of each objection lies in\nconceiving of a miracle as a mere objective fact in external nature,\nstript of all its moral accompaniments. In one word, it contemplates the\nmiracle in its most vulgar aspect, as a bare act of power, a portent, a\nprodigy. A great light everywhere appearing in the heavens might have\nappeared to vulgar minds a greater miracle, and have attracted more\nattention than the cure of a man full of leprosy by the utterance of a\nword. But it would not have presented stronger evidences of having been\nwrought by the power of God.\n\nBut with respect to the general question, I ask, Is not the resurrection\nof Jesus Christ in every respect an exceptional event? Where are\nresurrections to be found in the history of current supernaturalism? Who\never pretended, before or since, to have a divine commission which was\nattested by his own resurrection from the dead? This miracle is at any\nrate absolutely unique; and it must never be forgotten that it is the only\none recorded in the New Testament on the truth of which its writers stake\nthe claim of Christianity to be regarded as a divine revelation. Although\nthey refer to other miracles, wonders and signs which God wrought by Him,\nyet whenever they adduce the full and conclusive evidence of His divine\nmission, they always appeal to the fact that God had raised Him from the\ndead.\n\nBut a further objection is urged as invalidating this kind of testimony:\n\u201cAt the very time when the knowledge of the laws of nature began to render\nmen capable of judging of the reality of miracles, these wonders entirely\nceased. This extraordinary cessation of miracles at a time when their\nevidence ought to have acquired value from an appeal to persons capable of\nappreciating them, is perfectly unintelligible, if they are viewed as the\nsupernatural credentials of a divine revelation.\u201d\n\nThis passage contains several fallacies. One, to which I have repeatedly\ndrawn attention, runs through it, viz., the classing together every kind\nof alleged supernatural occurrence, from the miracles of Jesus to the\nfantastic performances of the magician, as though they all stood on the\nsame level. I need not further allude to the fallacy of such reasoning.\n\n2. It is affirmed that miracles entirely ceased when the knowledge of the\nlaws of nature began to render men capable of judging of their reality. I\nconclude that by the word \u201cmiracles\u201d in this passage, the author means\necclesiastical miracles, viz., those which have been alleged to be wrought\nin attestation of the established system of belief. If it is meant to be\nasserted that all belief in a current supernaturalism has now ceased, the\naffirmation is inaccurate, as the wide\u2010spread belief in spiritualism\nabundantly testifies.\n\nBut if the assertion is intended to be confined to ecclesiastical\nmiracles, it involves an inaccuracy as to a matter of history. They had\nbecome thoroughly discredited long before the birth of modern physical\nscience. The cure of blind and leprous persons by a touch, or the feeding\nof five thousand persons on seven loaves and a few fishes, require nothing\nelse than sound common sense for the appreciation of their supernatural\ncharacter, or the testing of their reality. The assertion, therefore, that\nmiracles ceased precisely at the time when their evidence would have been\nmost valuable, by their being able to be tested by those persons best\ncapable of appreciating them, is entirely inaccurate.\n\nI fully admit that a belief in a current supernaturalism, as for instance\nin the absurdities of witchcraft, survived the Reformation. What the\nReformation destroyed was a belief in a divine order of miracles wrought\nin support of an ecclesiastical system. The belief in this current\nsupernaturalism has been gradually diminishing ever since, under the\ncombined influence of the increase of the knowledge of physical science,\nand common sense. The objection raised is simply irrelevant to the point\nat issue.\n\nBut there is another subject which demands consideration. Hitherto we have\nbeen dealing with the evidential character of miracles. But although all\nmiracles have an evidential value, if they can be adequately attested, it\nby no means follows that every miracle recorded in the New Testament was\nintended to subserve this purpose alone. It was necessary not only that a\nrevelation should be communicated, and receive an adequate attestation,\nbut that it should be propagated among mankind. To render this possible,\nit was necessary that its messengers should be armed with some means of\ninsuring that their message should be heard with attention. There was also\nanother object to be effected; namely, the establishment in the world of\nthat great institution, the Christian Church, which was intended so\nlargely to influence its destinies.\n\nIt will be quite clear to any person who carefully considers the various\nsupernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament that they are not\nall of equal evidential value. The highest class of them are directly\naffirmed to have been performed for the purpose of attesting the divine\nmission of Jesus Christ, and as a portion of His supernatural\nmanifestation. To this class belong the miracles wrought by Himself, and\nseveral of those performed by the Apostles. But there is another class\nreferred to in the Acts of the Apostles, of which the primary object seems\nto have been to awaken attention to the Apostolic message, though even\nthese were not destitute of evidential value. There is also another order\nof manifestations frequently referred to in the Epistles, viz., the\nsupernatural gifts of the Spirit, one of the declared purposes of which\nwas to lay deep the foundations of the Christian Church. As divine\ninterpositions, they were all to a certain extent evidential; but it will\nbe important to observe that there is an order of supernatural\nmanifestations mentioned in the New Testament, whose apparent primary\nintention was to subserve a different purpose.\n\nLet it be observed therefore, that at the introduction of Christianity,\ntwo distinct purposes had to be effected: first, to attest the truth of\nthe revelation; secondly, to establish the Church.\n\nI will briefly draw attention to this latter portion of the subject, as\nfar as it affects certain portions of the supernatural action affirmed in\nthe New Testament. I allude to a certain class of miracles, such as the\ncure of the cripple at Lystra, those wrought by the passing of Peter\u2019s\nshadow, and by garments brought from Paul\u2019s person, and some others; also\nto the entire class of the supernatural gifts mentioned in the Acts of the\nApostles, and so frequently referred to in the Epistles.\n\nOne of the greatest difficulties which beset the missionary is to obtain a\nhearing in the midst of the hostile elements by which he is surrounded.\nYet to obtain this is the necessary condition of carrying on his work. In\nthis respect, the modern missionary possesses great advantages compared\nwith the primitive missionary of Christianity. He belongs to a superior\ncivilization, and is therefore able to bring to bear the whole force of a\nhigher on a lower one. This was exactly reversed in the case of the\nprimitive missionaries. Instead of being able to bring to bear the\nprestige of a high civilization on those among whom they laboured, they\nbelonged to a despised race; or if the missionary himself was a member of\nthe race whom he addressed, he belonged to the lower sections of society.\nHow was this enormous deficiency to be supplied? How was a man thus\ndespised to obtain a hearing for the message with which he was charged?\nThe New Testament affirms that the deficiency was supplied by imparting to\nthe early Church a certain number of supernatural endowments, which, when\nonce communicated, acted like our ordinary faculties; also that a\nsupernatural gift of curing certain diseases was imparted to particular\nindividuals, a gift which was exactly suited to obtain an attentive\nhearing for their message.\n\nAmong the supernatural gifts which St. Paul affirms to have been\ncommunicated to the Church, there were two of which he asserts that the\noperation was distinct, but which are merged in the modern idea of\nmiracles. These he designated by the expressions \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd, or\nthe inworking of powers; and \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f30\u03b1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, endowments of healing\npowers. The distinction in function between these powers is affirmed by\nhim no less than three times; what it consisted in, we are only able to\njudge from the terms themselves, and the nature of the case. There is\nevery probability that the distinction points to a higher and a lower\nexercise of supernatural power; the one being the evidential miracle\nproperly so called, and the other a supernatural knowledge of how to\neffect cures\u2014a gift which would be exactly suited to enable the missionary\nto obtain that attentive hearing of his message which he so urgently\nrequired. The Epistle of St. James furnishes us with a general idea of the\nnature of the gift, when he directs, that in case a person was sick, the\nelders of the Church were to be sent for, who were to pray over the sick\nman, and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord; \u201cAnd the prayer of\nfaith,\u201d says he, \u201cshall save the sick; and the Lord shall raise him up.\u201d\n(James v. 15.) The whole description points to a cure which, although in a\nmeasure supernatural, was not instantaneous; the latter point being one\nwhich would be required to make a miracle in the proper sense of the word\nevidential. A power of effecting cures, however, whether by a knowledge of\nnatural means supernaturally acquired, or by supernatural agency, would be\none which would obtain for the despised Jewish missionary a hearing in\nGentile cities, which otherwise he would be unable to obtain.\n\nTo such a class of supernatural operations would belong such cures as\nthose effected by the conveyance of handkerchiefs and aprons from St.\nPaul\u2019s body to the sick. These are only asserted to have taken place on\none occasion, at Ephesus, a city greatly addicted to the arts of magic.\nThey were adapted to the circumstances of the place, where the Apostle had\nto encounter a particular form of supernaturalism; and they would have\nbeen exactly suited to meet the difficulty in question. The historian\ntells us that the success was great, for many of those who had used\nmagical arts came forward and confessed their deeds, collected together\ntheir magical books, which were worth a considerable sum of money, and\npublicly burned them. The same observations apply to Peter\u2019s shadow.\nAlthough the historian does not tell us that cures were wrought by it, yet\nthe narrative presupposes that a large outburst of supernatural power took\nplace in connection with Peter\u2019s person. Although the cure of the cripple\nat Lystra belongs to a class of miracles which is strictly evidential, yet\nthe immediate occasion of its performance seems to have been with the view\nof arousing the attention of an ignorant heathen population.\n\nBut not only had a revelation to be communicated and attested, not only\nhad converts to be made and instructed, but it was also necessary that the\nfoundations of the Church, the visible kingdom of Christ, should be firmly\nlaid, and that it should be established among the visible institutions of\nthe earth. Sufficient attention has not been paid to this portion of the\nsubject in considering the question of supernatural intervention. The\nestablishment of the Church as a visible institution, which was intended\ngradually to leaven mankind with the great principles of His revelation,\nis again and again affirmed by Jesus Christ to have been one of the great\npurposes of His coming. A description of its character and functions forms\nthe subject of no inconsiderable number of His parables, and it is the\ngreat end and purpose for which He gave the great final Apostolic\ncommission to go and gather it together out of all the nations of the\nearth.\n\nThe Church of Christ had therefore to be formed into a community out of\nthe most heterogeneous elements. It was destined not for a momentary\nexistence, but for a continuous growth, so as to leaven human nature with\nits influences. The creation of such a society was a conception so bold\nthat it had never previously entered the head of either poet or\nphilosopher. Those with whom I am reasoning will not deny that the attempt\nwas a very arduous, and to all appearance a most chimerical one.\n\nYet it is the most certain of facts that the Church of Christ is now in\nthe nineteenth century of its existence. The boldness of the undertaking\nwill be more fully estimated when we reflect that the Church was intended\nto be a society which, while existing in the world, should differ in its\nessential character from all the other societies on the earth. Its action\nwas to be entirely spiritual and moral. Its founder intended it to be\ninvested with no coercive powers. The appeal was to be, not to force, but\nto conscience.\n\nThose who offered to enroll themselves as the subjects of Christ\u2019s\nspiritual kingdom had to be formed into a social organization. Unless this\ncould be effected, one of the great objects for which the revelation was\ngiven must have proved a failure. The elements of which it had to be\ncomposed were of the most unpromising description. The first converts\nconsisted of no small number of Jews and proselytes, who were extensively\nleavened with the narrowest prejudices of Judaism. When the Gentiles began\nto join the new community, its members were chiefly derived from the lower\nranks of society, including a considerable number of slaves. The infant\nChurch embraced a great diversity of opinions and characters. When\nconverts were made, the time for their instruction was short. Yet such an\ninstitution had to contend with mighty civilization, the habits and\nprejudices of existing society, the self\u2010interest of a corrupt religion,\nand the opposition of a powerful government.\n\nSuch were some of the difficulties which had to be surmounted before this\nnew institution could be firmly planted among the existing societies of\nthe world, and expand itself with the life which was peculiarly its own.\nIf the primitive followers of Jesus were animated by the credulous\nsuperstition which unbelievers delight in attributing to them, none should\nbe better qualified than they to form a judgment of the difficulties which\nmust have beset their path. Yet these have been surmounted. To this fact\nthe vigorous life of the Church during eighteen centuries testifies. It\nhas not only held its ground, but it has succeeded in leavening all\nexisting civilizations with its influences. How has this been\naccomplished? The Apostolic Epistles return an answer. They affirm that\nthe early converts were endowed with a number of supernatural gifts,\nexactly fitted to qualify them for the various functions which they were\ncalled upon to discharge. I subjoin a list of them, as they are directly\naffirmed by St. Paul to be then existing in the Corinthian Church. They\nwere nine in number, each of which is asserted by him to have had a\ndistinct and separate function and subject\u2010matter: the gifts of wisdom,\nknowledge, faith, working of miracles, endowments of healing powers,\nprophecy, discerning of spirits, tongues, and interpretation. It does not\nappear whether this last is meant to be exhaustive of the supernatural\nmental endowments which the members of the early churches supposed\nthemselves to possess, or whether they were varied for the purpose of\nmeeting particular exigences. Nor do I ask those with whom I am reasoning\nto accept this statement as a true account of an objective fact; but only\nthat they were supposed to be so by the Apostle and those to whom he\nwrote. It is plain, however, that these supernatural endowments, if real,\nwere precisely such as the Church was in urgent need of, as the\ninstrumentality for welding together the discordant elements of which it\nwas composed, and enabling it firmly to plant itself in the soil of human\nnature.\n\nThese supernatural gifts of the Spirit, with two exceptions, produced no\nresults on external nature. They constituted enlargements of the powers of\nthe human mind. As such, they cannot with strict propriety be said to\nbelong to the class of evidential miracles, although like all other\nsupernatural operations of which God is the Author, they cannot fail to be\nindirectly evidential. It is important to observe that they belong to a\nseparate class of supernatural phenomena, which were as necessary in\nreference to the Christian revelation, contemplating as it did the\ninstitution of a divine society, as the order of supernatural\nmanifestations which directly attested the divine mission of Jesus Christ\nand His Apostles. If this was their end and purpose we can understand why\nthey were withdrawn at a very early period, before they could be submitted\nto the tests of our modern _savants_. They were given for a special\npurpose, and they were withdrawn when they had accomplished it. The\nApostle who affirms their existence asserts that they were not intended\npermanently to continue in the Church.\n\nThere is one more allegation which is occasionally urged against the\nmiracles of the New Testament, and which I must briefly consider. It is\nalleged that pious frauds have been very general in all ages of Christian\nhistory; that many good men have not hesitated to participate in them; and\nthat literary forgeries were very abundant in the first ages of\nChristianity, and were even common in the days of the Apostles. It is\ninsinuated that this state of mind throws great suspicion on the alleged\nmiracles of the apostolic age.\n\nAs the charge of pious fraud is not made against Jesus himself or his\nimmediate followers, it is difficult to meet so indefinite an objection.\nIt seems to be put in to add force to others, rather than for its\nintrinsic value. Modern unbelievers express a nearly unanimous concurrence\nin endeavouring to account for the miracles of the New Testament, by\nassuming that the followers of Jesus were the victims of the most intense\nenthusiasm, superstition, and credulity. It is difficult to comprehend, on\nthe assumption that the existence of the supernatural portions of the New\nTestament is due to these causes, how direct fraud could have anything to\ndo with the concoction of these miraculous stories. Intense enthusiasm and\nfanaticism, and deliberate fraud, are usually opposite poles of character;\nand if we call in one to account for these miracles, we must exclude the\nother from exerting an influence on their origination. To make the charge\nof any avail against the narratives of the Gospel, it is necessary not to\nprove that pious frauds were common in the second, third, or fourth\ncentury, or even in the first, but to establish directly either that Jesus\nprofessed to work miracles while He knew that they were not such, or that\nHis followers deliberately invented a number of miraculous stories and\nattributed them to Him, well knowing that He had performed none. The\ncharge that the miracles of the New Testament originated in enthusiasm and\ncredulity is a definite one, and can be definitely met. So is the one that\nthey originated in deliberate fraud. So would be the charge that the\ninnocent followers of Jesus were imposed upon by fraudulent impostors. But\nto combine the charge of intense enthusiasm and credulity with that of\nconscious fraud, is a mode of reasoning which contains the grounds of its\nown refutation.\n\nIt is no doubt a fact, that the practice of literary forgery was not\nunknown to the early ages of Christianity. St. Paul seems to have thought\nthat there were in the world impostors daring enough to attempt to forge a\nletter in his name, and to try to foist it on the churches which he had\nplanted, as a genuine production. But the existence of such impostors has\nno bearing whatever on the question whether the miracles recorded in the\nNew Testament are facts or fiction. Did not St. Paul himself assert that\nhe had performed miracles? Was he an impostor? Did he not believe that\nJesus Christ in veritable reality rose from the dead? What have such\nbeliefs to do with the existence of a set of daring literary impostors?\nHappily, however, the whole of this class of ancient writers were utter\nbunglers in the art of fictitious composition. It is a universal\ncharacteristic of them, that they were entirely unable to throw themselves\ninto the spirit of former times, or of the persons whose names they\nassumed. In their references to history, geography, manners, customs, and\ncharacter, they lay themselves open at almost every point to certain\ndetection. There is good reason for believing that no forger or writer of\nfiction in the ancient world has succeeded in his art. In investing\nfiction with apparent probability, the modern world has completely\noutstript the ancient. Still, however, even in the most perfect works,\nwhen the fictions are extended over a wide sphere of action, no amount of\ngenius will protect a writer from leaving some weak point unguarded. It is\nprobably not too much to say that neither in ancient nor modern times, has\na fictitious work or a forgery been able to maintain its ground against\nthe apparatus which can be brought to bear on it by a sound and rational\ncriticism.\n\nMost of the other objections which are adduced against the miracles of the\nNew Testament have been answered in principle under the foregoing heads. I\nmust now adduce some of the most important considerations which prove them\nto have been historical facts.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE GREAT FACTS OF\nCHRISTIANITY REST\u2014GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.\n\n\nIt has been urged by opponents, that the defenders of historical\nChristianity rest content with endeavouring to prove that miracles are\npossible or probable; but that they neglect an all\u2010important part of their\nduty, viz.: that of adducing historical proof that miracles have been\nactually performed. If the fact is as here stated, there can be no doubt\nthat works which profess to discuss the subject of miracles, and omit to\ngive a clear statement of the chief points of the evidence which can be\nadduced to prove that they have actually occurred, must be unsatisfactory.\nTo answer the objections which are urged to prove that miracles are\nimpossible, or which affirm on general principles that all evidence in\ntheir favour is unworthy of credit, is an essential preliminary to the\nconsideration of the historical evidence which can be adduced to prove\ntheir actual occurrence. But to afford proof, that as facts they rest upon\nan adequate attestation, is the essential duty of every one who asserts\ntheir reality. To this portion of the work I will now proceed to address\nmyself.\n\nWhat then is the position occupied by the Christian advocate? Is it\nrequisite in order to establish the truth of Christianity, that he should\ngive an historical proof of everyone of the miracles recorded in the New\nTestament? I answer this question emphatically in the negative, and for\nthe following reason. The New Testament itself, while it affirm that many\nmiracles have been performed, rests the truth of Christianity on one\nmiracle alone, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. This is the\ngreat event which, according to the Acts of the Apostles, the early\nmissionaries urged as the distinctive proof of their Master\u2019s divine\nmission. The views expressed in the Apostolic Epistles are precisely\nsimilar. In them, the entire evidence of the truth of our Lord\u2019s divine\nmission is made to centre in the fact of His resurrection. Not only is the\ngreat fact referred to either directly or indirectly in almost every page,\nbut St. Paul has distinctly rested the truth of Christianity on the\nreality of its occurrence. Such a statement is made respecting no other\nmiraculous event recorded in the New Testament. It is the miracle of\nmiracles, unique and alone, by which the seal of God was affixed to the\ndivine mission of Jesus Christ. It formed the _locus standi_ of the\nChurch, and the sole ground of its existence. If it was not an objective\nfact, those who testified to its occurrence must have been false\nwitnesses, and the whole of Christianity either a delusion or an\nimposture.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that this great miracle forms the very key of the\nChristian position. Everything else is an outwork, an important one it may\nbe, but yet an outwork. If this position can be successfully assailed, the\nentire fortress of Christianity must surrender at discretion. If, on the\nother hand, the most determined unbeliever could be convinced that there\nis good historical evidence that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, he would\nfind no difficulty in accepting the Gospels as historical documents, and\nthe whole _\u00e0 priori_ objection against them would disappear.\n\nAgain: If the Resurrection of Christ is a fact, Christianity must be a\ndivine revelation. The perfect historical accuracy of the Gospels in\nminute details may be still open to question; deep thought and careful\ninvestigation may be necessary for ascertaining the precise amount of\ntruth communicated by that revelation; past ages may have erred in its\ninterpretation, or in their deductions from it; many questions as to the\nrelation in which revelation stands to science or history may be open\nones\u2014all this is both conceivable and possible\u2014but still, if Jesus Christ\nrose from the dead, his entire manifestation, work, and teaching, must be\na communication from God to man.\n\nThis then is my position. The real question stands within very narrow\nlimits. The miracle that requires strong historical proof is the\nResurrection. The other supernatural occurrences recorded in the Gospels\nare important portions of the revelation made by Christ. They were\nimportant evidences to those who witnessed them. But to us in these latter\ntimes the one great question is: Is the Resurrection capable of being\nestablished as an actual occurrence? If it is, it will carry with it all\nthe others. If it is not, the proof of the others will fall along with it.\n\nLet us examine the historical conditions of the case. Christianity differs\nfrom all other religions in professing not to consist of a mass of\nabstract dogmatic statements, but to be founded on, and largely to consist\nof, a number of historical facts. There are unquestionably a considerable\nnumber of dogmatic statements in the pages of the New Testament; but they\nprofess to grow out of the facts and to be explanations of them. The facts\nform, so to say, the essence of the religion. The Christianity of the New\nTestament is a growth which encircles itself around the person of its\nfounder in a manner in which no other system of thought or religion, which\nhas existed among men, has ever done. If we take the person of Jesus\nChrist out of the New Testament, the whole system of its teaching crumbles\ninto nothingness. If we remove the person of its founder from every other\nsystem of human thought\u2014its great religions form no exception\u2014the system\nremains intact. This is a very striking peculiarity in Christianity. In\nthis respect it stands absolutely unique.\n\nBut as Christianity is founded on an historical person, who lived in a\nparticular age, so He is the founder of a great historical institution,\nthe Christian Church. This institution differs from every other society\nwhich has ever existed, in that both its origination and its continued\nexistence are inextricably bound up with the person of its founder. Other\nsocieties could exist even if it could be proved that their reputed\nfounders were creations of the imagination; but this would be fatal to the\nlife of the Church of Christ. If it could be proved that Jesus Christ was\na myth, or nothing but a learned Rabbi, the Christian Church, mighty\nsociety as it is, would certainly collapse. The Christian Church without\nChrist would be far more out of place than the play of Hamlet with the\npart of Hamlet omitted. In this respect it is a institution unique among\nall those which the world has ever seen, whether political or religious.\n\nThis great society, which now comprehends a vast majority of the\nintelligence of mankind, and all the progressive nations of the world, had\na definite beginning in historical times. It differs wholly from a\nphilosophic sect, whose bond of union consists in the acceptance of a body\nof dogmatic teaching. It is and ever has been an organized society with\nspecific purposes and aims, and one which has ever meditated schemes of\nconquest. It differs widely from all political institutions, and yet ever\nsince its birth it has taken a place beside them.\n\nThe origin of this society is not lost, like that of many others, in the\nmists of the hoary past. History enables us to assign a definite time when\nthis society was certainly not in existence. It no less definitely marks\nout a period when it not only was in existence, but had entered on a\ncondition of active growth. Its origin did not take place in the cloud\u2010\nland of the mythic or the semi\u2010mythic period of history, but in the reign\nof Tiberius C\u00e6sar, and in a country occupied by Roman garrisons, and\npresided over by Roman governors.\n\nIt will be objected that our only accounts of the causes which led to the\norganization of this society are writings composed by its own members. In\nthis there is nothing peculiar; for until societies have grown\nsufficiently powerful to attract the attention of the world outside them,\nthere can be no other source of information. Still the fact can be\nascertained on the most unquestionable authority, that at a certain date\nthis society was not in existence, and that within a certain number of\nyears afterwards, it was not only in existence, but rapidly increasing;\nand that it originated in Jesus Christ, who was put to death by the Roman\ngovernment.\n\nThis society, therefore, came into existence at a definite period of time.\nIts early writers give us an account of how it originated. They affirm\nthat its founder was Jesus Christ; and that, having been interrupted by\nHis death, it was called into a new existence by His resurrection. To this\ngreat event they most positively affirm that the origin of the Church, as\nan institution, was due. To the belief in it as a fact, it has certainly\nowed its gradual enlargement, until it has attained its present dimensions\nafter more than eighteen centuries of existence. To this belief is due the\ngreat moral power which it has exercised on mankind; and if its members\ncould be persuaded that the belief in the Resurrection of its founder was\na mere delusion, great as this society is, it would certainly perish.\n\nThere are five facts connected with the origin of this society, which no\none who believes in the possibility of historic truth will dispute.\n\nFirst: That at the year A.D. 25, this society had no existence.\n\nSecondly: That in A.D. 40, it was in a state of vigorous growth.\n\nThirdly: That it was founded by Jesus Christ.\n\nFourthly: That His crucifixion by the Roman government caused its\ntemporary collapse.\n\nFifthly: That an event of some kind, which took place shortly after His\ndeath, imparted to it a new vitality, which it has never lost to the\npresent hour, and which has caused it to exert a mightier influence on\nmankind than any other community, whether political or religious, that has\never existed.\n\nThe problem, therefore, which history has to solve, is to account for the\nrenewed life, the marvellous progress, the intense vitality of this\nsociety, and the mighty influence which it has exerted on the destinies of\nmankind; originating as it did in the smallest possible beginnings, and in\na manner differing from all other existing institutions.\n\nThe Christian Church has propounded, from the first commencement of its\nrenewed life, its own solution of this problem. It is: that its founder,\nafter having been crucified, rose again from the dead. This account has\nthis clear and obvious advantage, that if it be true, it sufficiently\naccounts for all the phenomena whose existence we have to solve. His\nresurrection was a power adequate to revive the society after its\ntemporary collapse, to impart to it its mighty moral and spiritual energy,\nand to impress on the original work and teaching of Jesus, a new and\npeculiar aspect. In short, assuming the Resurrection to have been a fact,\nit assigns a cause adequate to account for all the phenomena which have\nbeen presented by the Church. Here then we have firm ground on which to\ntake our stand; viz., the belief of this society as to its origin, capable\nof being traced historically to the first hour of its renewed life, and\nwhich also, if true, affords a rational account of it.\n\nBut further; besides this account which the Church has given of its own\norigin, there is no rival account of it in existence. As far as historical\ndocuments are concerned, there is no other. All others are founded on\nconjecture.\n\nOur opponents, however, affirm that the alleged fact which the Church\nasserts to have been the cause of its existence is incredible, because all\nmiracles are impossible. Then, leaving _\u00e0 priori_ grounds, they also\naffirm that the evidence to prove the Resurrection to have been an\nhistorical fact is insufficient for the purpose.\n\nThe Church, however, is clearly in possession of a vantage\u2010ground, from\nwhich it is not easy to dislodge her. The cause which she alleges is\nadequate to account for all the phenomena.\n\nThe _onus probandi_ therefore clearly rests on the opponents of\nChristianity. If they deny the truth of the fact which the Church has ever\nhanded down as the true account of her origin, they are bound not only to\nshow that it is devoid of historical attestation, but to propound a theory\nwhich will adequately account for all the facts to which history\ntestifies. It is clear that nothing short of this is required of them as\nphilosophical historians. Certain facts are plain and undeniable. A\nsociety, of a very special character, sprang into existence at a definite\npoint of history, and has exerted a mightier influence than any other on\nthe destinies of man. If therefore they reject the account which the\nChurch herself gives, they are bound to supply a rational account of how\nthis great society came into being; how the phenomena which constitute its\nhistory have been brought about; and what it was that imparted to it its\nvitality and power. We are in the presence of the greatest institution\nwith which history is acquainted, founded as it is on the greatest ideal\nconception (if it is not historical) which the human mind has ever\nsucceeded in inventing. Both these came into existence, not in pre\u2010\nhistoric times, but in the midst of a period of contemporaneous history.\nRespecting the times, the modes of thought, and the general character of\nthe period, we have extensive historical data. The religious, moral, and\nphilosophical opinions, and the general line of thought, are well known.\nThe various forces which were then in activity we are able to appreciate.\nWith all these data before him, it is incumbent on the philosophical\nhistorian to give us an account of the moral and religious forces in\nactivity at this period, which were capable of creating the Christian\nChurch, and generating its conception of the ideal Christ. If it is\nalleged that after the utmost investigation it is impossible to account\nfor their origin by the action of any known moral or spiritual forces\nacting on the human mind, this would be at once to confess that the origin\nof Christianity and the Church is entirely abnormal, or in other words,\nthat it is a moral and spiritual miracle.\n\nTo do unbelievers justice, they have not been slow to recognize the fact\nthat if they reject the account which the Church has given of its origin,\nthey are bound to give us a rational one of how Christianity came into\nexistence. Accordingly, theory after theory has been propounded on this\nsubject. No intellectual exertion has been spared to point out how\nChristianity and the Church have succeeded in getting into existence, and\nin effecting their religious and moral conquests, by forces purely human,\nand without the aid of any supernatural intervention.\n\nOne thing respecting these theories is worthy of particular attention. No\nunbeliever has as yet been able to suggest one which has succeeded in\ncommanding, I will not say the universal, but even the general assent of\nthe unbelieving world. Theory after theory has been propounded and\nabandoned. It is therefore clear that the difficulty of accounting for the\norigin of Christianity and the Church through the action of the ordinary\nforces that operate on the human mind, is extreme. There is no analogous\ncase in the whole history of man. Let me briefly enumerate the chief\nprinciples which have been invoked to aid in the solution of this problem.\n\nFirst, it has been attempted to get rid of the supernatural elements\ncontained in the Gospels by representing them as distorted representations\nof real facts. This has been justly abandoned as childish. Then came the\nmythic and legendary theories. These, having been found inadequate, have\nbeen supplemented by various theories of development of ideas; and the\nsupposition of a violent party spirit existing in the Church, which under\nthe influence of a spirit of accommodation produced various compromises; a\nmass of varied and often contending opinions seething in the bosom of a\nsociety continually threatened with disruption, until they somehow\nsucceeded in welding themselves together; enthusiasm, fanaticism,\nboundless credulity, aided by a prodigious power of mythic and legendary\ninvention, and whenever occasion so required, the presence of a moral\natmosphere, which on great emergencies did not shrink from deliberate\nimposture. All these, in ever varying degrees and proportions, have been\npressed into the service of creating the Church, the ideal Christ, and the\nChristianity of the New Testament. It is impossible in a work like the\npresent to examine these various theories, and show their inadequacy as\nphilosophical explanations of the fact. This I have already done in a\nformer work,(5) to which I must refer the reader for their refutation. A\nfew observations only will be necessary in this place.\n\nFirst: The positions taken by unbelievers are theories, which rest on the\nsmallest basis of historical evidence. I readily admit that where there is\na known fact, but the recollection of the events which would give an\naccount of its origin has perished, if a theory can be propounded which\nfully accounts for the fact, then it has a right to take its place as an\nhistorical event which rests on evidence of the highest probability. An\nexample derived from the mode in which the study of comparative philology\ndiscloses the history of the past will explain my meaning. We have before\nus the facts of language. The history of those who formerly used it has\nperished; the accounts of their migrations have nowhere been preserved.\nBut certain facts of comparative philology justify the assumption that\ncertain primitive races of men must have migrated in particular\ndirections. These assumed migrations are really a theory, but one which is\nexactly adequate to account for the facts which language unquestionably\npresents. Thus the facts of the Indo\u2010Germanic languages justify the\nassumption that in the pre\u2010historic ages, migrations westward must have\ntaken place, of which history contains no record. Still the theory affords\nso perfect an explanation of the facts, that the occurrence of the\nmigrations is as certain as if they had been recorded by contemporaneous\nwriters. On similar grounds it has been inferred with a degree of\nprobability so high as to be equal to certainty, that a language earlier\nthan the Sanskrit, and from which both it and the Indo\u2010Germanic family of\nlanguages have been derived, was spoken by a previous race. Investigations\nof this kind are largely adding to our historical knowledge.\n\nLet us observe the basis on which such arguments rest. In all these cases\nwe have before us not mere conjectures, but a distinct and positive fact,\nor set of facts. The connecting links are missing. By the aid of\nconjecture we propound a theory; or in other words, we suppose a set of\nevents to have occurred, which, if they really happened, would be adequate\nto account for the facts in question. When they thus account for them, and\nfor them alone, and no other conjectural occurrence will do so, the\nassumed fact is fully entitled to take its place in history as an event\nwhich has actually happened. The reason of this is, that it can stand the\ntest of historical verification.\n\nA problem similar to that above referred to is the one which those who\ndeny the historical truth of the Gospels are called upon to solve. We are\nin the presence of certain unquestionable historical facts, viz., the five\nabove referred to, and many others. The denial of the truth of the\nChristian account leaves them without the connecting link which once\nunited them. What was that link? It can only be supplied by conjecture.\nBut to enable such a conjectural fact or facts to take rank as historical\nevents, they must be adequate to account for the facts, and be true to\nhuman nature, and to the circumstances of the case; in other words, they\nmust be capable of enduring a rigid historical verification. Theories\nwhich cannot endure this are no better than ropes of sand. This is the\ncharacter of the theories which have been propounded to account for the\nChristianity of the New Testament.\n\nLet me illustrate this by one of the favourite theories used by\nunbelievers for this purpose. We are told that a number of extremely\nhostile factions divided the primitive Church. Of these the followers of\nJames, Peter, and Paul may be taken as fairly representative. These were\nin a state of great hostility to each other, and went on gradually\nelaborating a Christianity that was in conformity with their own views and\ntastes. After a while it occurred to these hostile parties that it would\nbe advantageous to compromise their differences. An influential person,\nsuch as we may suppose the author of the Acts of the Apostles to have\nbeen, composed a history, for the purpose of making matters smooth, and to\nafford a common ground of union among the contending factions. This\nprocess was repeated as often as was necessary; and in good time, by the\naid of myth and legend, and the whole of the needful apparatus, appeared\nthe Christianity of the New Testament, and the Church was consolidated out\nof these varied elements.\n\nSuch theories grievously offend against the logic of history, and are in\ndirect variance with the facts of human life. We are here in the midst of\na whole mass of conjectural facts, each of which is imagined to account\nfor the existence of the other; and the whole of them taken together fail\nto give an adequate solution of the phenomena before us. They are both\nuntrue to human nature and unable to account for either the facts of\nChristianity or the existence of the Church. I must content myself with\nselecting one of them for illustration. We are asked to believe that the\nChurch was divided into a number of parties, the opposition between whom\nwas violent; and that these effected a number of compromises, out of which\nwas ultimately evolved a common Christianity. This result is in direct\ncontradiction to the testimony of the religious history of man. Religious\nparties do not effect compromises, but go on contending and widening their\ndifferences, until their enthusiasm wears out and they die of inanition.\nTo this the history of all sects bears ample testimony, and the greater\nthe enthusiasm and not unfrequently the lesser the grounds of difference,\nthe greater the animosity. Compromises between hostile sects, in the rare\ncases in which they have taken place, have been brought about by means of\nexternal coercion. The religious history of mankind presents no example of\nfurious religious parties, while animated by a living enthusiasm,\nvoluntarily coalescing on the general principle of compromise. Witness the\nunsuccessful attempts at compromise between the Eastern and Western\nChurches, even when it was urged by the strongest external pressure.\nWitness the sects which grew out of the Reformation. Compromises have\nfrequently originated among politicians, but these have in vain tried\ntheir healing influences among contending sects. Occasionally they have\nbeen brought about by the aid of pressure exerted by the temporal power,\nas in the Church of England. Nothing more strongly illustrates the\ndifficulty with which compromise between religious parties can be effected\nthan the failure of the attempts to reconcile the Church of England and\nthe Methodists. The compromiser who will effect this union exists only in\nthe hopes of the future. But we need not confine ourselves to the\nmanifestations of sectarian spirit in connection with Christianity. The\nMahometan Church is also divided by sectarian differences. Is there any\ntendency to produce a common Mahometanism, erected on the basis of\ncompromise? Do Buddhism and Brahminism show any disposition to compromise\ntheir differences by fusing them into a common Pantheism which shall suit\nboth parties? The idea of producing a Christianity by a succession of\nhappy compromises entered into by violently hostile parties in the early\nChurch, is a dream which, however plausible it may have seemed in the\ncloset, is rudely dissipated the moment we come in contact with the stern\nrealities of life.\n\nBut further: the wide separation of the early Churches from each other;\nand, according to the opinions of those against whom I am reasoning, their\nwant of a governing power acknowledged by all, must have rendered\nagreement on the basis of mutual compromise impossible. Compromises are\nthe results of considerations of policy, and are unheard of among\nfanatics, such as my opponents assert the early followers of Jesus to have\nbeen. But what further renders this theory untenable is, that it is\ncompelled to imagine a number of developments accompanied by corresponding\ncompromises between hostile parties, before we can succeed in evolving the\nChristianity of the New Testament. Not only does it contradict the history\nof man; not only is it an assumption made to form the connecting link\nbetween other established facts, but it is itself founded on other\nassumptions. Among these are the assertions made as to the evidence of the\nparty spirit existing in the Church, and the opposition between its\nleaders. Party spirit we know to have existed, but not with the violence\nwhich this theory is compelled to postulate. The statement also that the\ndoctrinal opposition between these parties was of so declared a type is\nnot founded on the evidence that we possess, but on a highly exaggerated\nview of it, distorted for the purpose of adding strength to the theory;\nor, in other words, it is founded on a set of unwarranted assumptions. The\npassages in the New Testament alleged to prove the declared opposition\nbetween the leaders of the Church, which this theory is compelled to pre\u2010\nsuppose, can only be made to do so by taking it for granted that they do.\nFor example, the assertion that the person denounced in the Epistles to\nthe Seven Churches in the book of Revelation, is St. Paul, is a simply\ngratuitous one, the only evidence for which is the will and pleasure of\nthose who make it. The theory, therefore, not only contradicts the history\nof man, but is based upon a number of alleged facts which are either\nabsolute assumptions or exaggerations, and fail to give any account of the\norigin of Christianity which will stand the test of the scrutiny of a\nsound philosophy.\n\nThe mythic and legendary theories are equally unable to account for the\nfacts as they stand in the New Testament. I cannot here attempt to follow\nthem in their innumerable windings. Taken by themselves they are not now\naccepted as adequate accounts of them, but other theories are called in to\naid them. Still, whatever assistance these are supposed to impart, myth\nand legend must always hold a prominent place in the systems of those who\nendeavour to account for the origin of the Gospels on purely human\nprinciples. As they contain a large supernatural element, it is certain\nthat if this is not historical, it must have originated in some species of\nfiction, _i.e._ either in the mythic and legendary spirit, or in pure\ninvention. Hence the use of myths and legends must always be freely\ninvoked by those who, while they deny the historical character of the\nGospels, do not go to the length of accusing the original followers of\nJesus of deliberate invention.\n\nI must here draw attention to one particular portion of the evidence, the\nfull significance of which I have described elsewhere. Whatever opinions\nmay be formed as to the unhistorical character of the Gospels, there is\none fact respecting them as to which believers and unbelievers must alike\nagree, namely that they contain a delineation of the most perfect\nconception ever formed by the mind of man, the character of Jesus Christ.\nThere it is, beyond the power of contradiction; the overwhelming majority\nof men possessed of the most powerful minds have recognized it as the\ngreatest of ideals, as well as the millions of ordinary men to whom it has\nbeen the object of supreme admiration and attraction. The following\nquestions respecting it therefore urgently demand an answer.\n\nIf the Gospels are a mere collection of mythic and legendary stories,\ngenerated and put together in the manner affirmed by those who deny their\nhistorical character, how got this great character there? If the fables of\nwhich they are composed are the inventions of many minds, whence its\nunity? If their inventors were credulous enthusiasts and fanatics, whence\nits perfection? If they were implicated in all the superstitions of the\nage, whence its moral elevation? Of what order of thought then existing is\nit the embodiment? How could the credulity which was necessary for the\nacceptance of such fictions, or how could the spirit which invented them,\nhave conceived these moral elements? There the character is\u2014let us be\ndistinctly informed how it was put together; how much of it is fact, and\nhow much fiction; how the fictions were welded together with the facts so\nas to compose the whole; and what class or order of minds in the early\nChurch was equal to its elaboration. This delineation must have been made\nat an early period, and could not have been a late invention; for it is\nsubstantially the same as that contained in those Epistles of St. Paul,\nwhich are acknowledged to have been written within thirty years of the\ndate of the Crucifixion. A distinct answer to these questions is demanded\nof those who affirm that the Gospels have no value as histories. It is\nimpossible to deny that they have a most important bearing on the present\nquestion. Why do not unbelievers set themselves to grapple with this\nproblem?\n\nBut the value to be assigned to the Gospels as histories must be a matter\nfor subsequent consideration. At present I need simply draw attention to\nthe fact that while the opponents of Christianity fully recognize the\nnecessity of propounding a rational theory of its origin, the more we\nexamine their various theories in detail, the more apparent becomes their\ninadequacy to account for the phenomena. The fact, already alluded to,\nthat unbelievers cannot come to any agreement among themselves on this\nsubject, shows that they find the problem extremely difficult of solution.\nThe plausibility of their theories is due to the abstract and general form\nin which they are presented. Various causes are held up without any\ndiscrimination as to what each of them is capable of effecting; and the\nwished\u2010for result is ascribed to their combined action. But when we\nanalyse the various forces at their command, ascertain the mode of their\naction, the difficulties they would have to encounter before they could\neffectuate their results, and examine whether they are true to the facts\nof human nature as testified to by the long course of history, it is not\ntoo much to affirm that all the investigations of unbelievers have\ncompletely failed to give an account of the origin of Christianity which\ncan take the place of that handed down to us by the Church. Until this can\nbe given, notwithstanding all the expenditure of intellect on the\nquestion, we are justified in affirming that the problem is insoluble,\nalthough Christianity originated in a period unquestionably historical, in\nthe midst of the Roman Empire over which it rapidly spread, despite the\nopposition of the government and the entire organization of society.\n\nBefore proceeding to the direct considerations by which the great fact of\nChristianity is attested, I must take a general glance at the nature of\nthe materials which we have at our command, and at their historical value.\n\nI shall take as my starting\u2010point the five facts already mentioned, the\nhistorical certainty of which it is needless to prove. My starting\u2010point,\ntherefore, is the continuous existence of the Church, which came into\nbeing at a definite period of time, to which it can be traced up in one\nunbroken succession. This society has always affirmed that its corporate\nexistence, as well as the life of its individual members, is due to the\nResurrection of its founder. I shall also carefully examine and estimate\nthe contemporaneous evidence afforded by the Epistles of St. Paul,\nespecially those which are acknowledged to be genuine, as well as that of\nthe other writings of the New Testament, for the purpose of estimating the\nvalue of their testimony on this subject. Even if some of these writings\nare not allowed by unbelievers to be the productions of the persons whose\nnames they bear, still they are all of a very early date, and\nunquestionably reflect the thoughts and ideas of those who wrote them, and\nof the persons to whom they are addressed. But before I enter on my\nimmediate subject, it will be necessary to lay down the leading principles\nof historical evidence, and to estimate the value of tradition as a\ntestimony to historical facts.\n\nI am fully prepared to abide by the chief principles laid down by Sir G.\nC. Lewis on this subject in his great work on the _Credibility of Early\nRoman History_. They are generally considered to be sufficiently severe\nand exacting. By many they are viewed as of far too stringent a character.\nThe evidence on which the great fact of the Resurrection rests, will\nendure their most rigid application. They have this great advantage, that\nthey are laid down for the investigation of a subject purely secular, with\nwhich religion has nothing to do. They are therefore wholly free from\nreligious bias, and are simply the principles for testing the claims of\nordinary facts on our belief. If the chief facts of Christianity can stand\nthis scrutiny, it is impossible to affirm that they are not supported by\nthe strongest historical testimony.\n\n1. Every alleged fact, in order to be entitled to our belief, must be\nshown to rest on direct contemporaneous testimony, or that which is its\nhistorical equivalent.\n\nThis rule is by no means intended to affirm that every fact for which\ncontemporaneous testimony can be adduced is true; but only that it is to\nbe accepted as such when there is no reason for disbelieving it. We must\nhave some means to enable us to form a judgment of the knowledge and\nveracity of the informant. It remains for consideration, when the direct\ntestimony of a contemporary is not to be had, as must be frequently the\ncase with events long past, what may be considered as its historical\nequivalent?\n\nIt must be kept in mind that one of the most valuable forms of\ncontemporaneous testimony, if not the most valuable of all, is a set of\nletters which contain various and definite allusions to the current\nevents, habits, and modes of thought of the time. For certain purposes\nthese are far more valuable than formal histories. The latter are\nfrequently written under the influence of party spirit, partiality, or\nbias. The writer of a history is usually on his guard, has carefully\nconsidered what he says, and affords us but little opportunity of\ninterrogating him. But the writer of a letter, unless he has special\nreasons for being guarded, places before his correspondent his entire\nmind. We are therefore capable of interrogating him. He often lets us into\nthe secret causes of events. He also makes a number of incidental\nallusions to events which are passing. These form testimony of a most\nvaluable kind. We can in a manner almost converse with him. As a\nconfirmation of the facts which formal histories narrate, and as letting\nus into the secret springs of events, a series of letters, written by\npersons who were actively engaged in them, are historical documents of the\nhighest order. Their value is increased when they bear all the appearance\nof coming from the writer\u2019s heart. Nothing is more striking than the happy\nresults which have accrued from the extensive use made by modern\nhistorians of original correspondence. It is not too much to say that it\nhas largely modified our view of events, as they have been reported in\nformal histories. Another very high form of contemporaneous testimony is\nthe existence of institutions and monuments which can be certainly traced\nup to a particular period, and which owed their existence to events of\nthat period. These form a species of living witnesses to the truth of the\nfacts out of which they have originated, and as far as their testimony\ngoes, it is incapable of falsehood. The most valuable testimony of this\nkind is a great institution of which we possess definite evidence that it\noriginated in a particular event, or in the belief of it. This kind of\nevidence Christianity possesses in the highest form, in the continued\nexistence of that great institution, the Christian Church.\n\n2. Testimony has a general credibility, subject of course to the knowledge\nand honesty of the informant, when the reports are derived from those who\nlived during the generation in which a particular event occurred,\nsupposing it to have been one of sufficient notoriety to attract\nattention, and that the reporter possessed adequate means of information,\nand investigated it with sufficient care. We are always justified in\nassuming that he tells the truth unless there are reasons for suspecting\nthe contrary.\n\n3. Narratives of events which a man has heard from his father or his\ncontemporaries, but which happened before his own recollection, are for\nthe purpose of history, (but subject to the requisite qualifications) fair\nrepresentations of contemporaneous testimony.\n\nHistory admits hearsay testimony under proper restrictions. The knowledge\nof the past would be impossible, if it were to allow itself to be fettered\nby the technical rules which have been introduced into the administration\nof justice. The all\u2010important considerations with the historian, are the\nnotoriety of the fact and the truthfulness of the informant. Facts that a\nman may have heard detailed by his grandfather or his contemporaries as\nhaving happened in their time stand as representations of contemporaneous\ntestimony in the same position as those derived from the earlier\ngeneration.\n\n4. But when a third stage is interposed in the transmission of events, as\nfor instance when we learn from our fathers or grandfathers what they have\nlearnt from theirs, an element of uncertainty is introduced. Still an\nhistorian, writing after such an interval of time, if he sifted evidence\nwith care, would be able to report with accuracy all the great events,\nwhatever difficulty he might have in ascertaining the minor details.\nWithin this period abundance of sources of accurate information exist on\nall points of importance, although the details gradually fade out of\npeople\u2019s recollections. After this interval, the accounts of events are\nlikely to receive a certain amount of colouring, according to the\nprejudices of the narrators; but the interval is too short, and the\nremembrance of them too recent, to allow of their becoming incrusted with\nimportant mythical additions. All the materials for investigation are in\nexistence, and within the reach of the honest historian. He might find\ndifficulty in arranging the details in historical sequence; but if he does\nnot give an accurate account of the great outlines, it is owing, not to\nthe want of historical materials, but to the absence of a desire to\ninvestigate and report the truth.\n\n5. The limits of time during which tradition can be considered as a\nsufficiently accurate medium for preserving the memory of events, may be\nput generally at from one hundred to one hundred and twenty years. Within\nthis period careful investigation and inquiry will enable the historian to\nreport the main features of events with substantial truth, from the\ntestimony of those who were contemporaries, or who derived their\ninformation from those who were. Beyond this period, when the knowledge of\noccurrences has to pass through three or four media of transmission,\ntradition becomes an uncertain and untrustworthy informant, and after the\nlapse of a greater interval, it is utterly unreliable, affording no means\nof checking the introduction of legendary narratives. There may be a few\nexceptional cases which have impressed themselves deeply on the public\nrecollection. Occasionally the protracted lives of a few individuals may\nlengthen the period of trustworthy transmission, but this is an event of\nsuch rare occurrence as but slightly to modify the general rule.\n\nIt must be observed that there are two cases in which the traditional\nknowledge of events is transmitted with far more accuracy, and over far\nlonger intervals of time than in ordinary ones, viz., those of families\nwhich have an historical importance derived from the actions of their\nancestors, and those of bodies of men who have a kind of corporate life,\nsucceeding one another in unbroken succession, especially when this\ncorporate life is founded on the events themselves. This latter case\npresents the means best adapted for the traditionary transmission of\nfacts, and one in which it is hardly possible that they should fail of\nbeing accurately transmitted within a reasonable interval of time. This\nwas precisely the position occupied by the Christian Church during the\nfirst century of its existence respecting the chief events in the life of\nits founder.\n\nAn example will illustrate this: If there had been no written memorials of\nthe life of John Wesley, there can be no doubt that the society which he\nfounded would have handed down to the present day an account of the chief\nevents of his life, which would have been accurate in its main outlines.\nThousands of persons are now living who have conversed with those who have\nheard him preach; I myself have done so. It would therefore be impossible\nto impose upon them a wholly mythic account in place of that which would\nhave been handed down by the Wesleyan body. Yet this society is founded on\na set of dogmas, not on the historical facts of its founder\u2019s life. The\nChristian Church therefore was in a far superior position for preserving a\nsubstantially accurate account of the chief events in the life of Jesus\nChrist, yet the interval which separates us from the death of Wesley is\ngreater than that which elapsed between the death of Christ, and the\npublication of the latest of the Synoptic Gospels, even if we accept the\ndates which are assigned to them by our opponents.\n\n6. When the knowledge of past events has perished, it is impossible to re\u2010\nconstruct them by the aid of conjecture, except within the limits to which\nI have previously alluded. These limits must be strictly defined,\notherwise that which is propounded as history becomes nothing else than a\nstatement of our subjective impressions. Conjectures which cannot stand\nthe test of historical verification cannot be accepted as facts of\nhistory.\n\nNothing is easier than, when facts are wanting, to invent them, and thus\nbridge over the intervals which lie between others, the connecting links\nof which have perished. But how are we to know that such conjectural\nevents were real facts, and not mere creations of the imagination? Clearly\nthis can be determined in no other way than by subjecting them to a rigid\nverification. If they will not endure this, they must be rejected.\nHistorical conjectures have no higher claims for acceptance than\nscientific ones. Both must be subject to the same tests, and must share\nthe same fate. I do not deny that many such conjectures may have a\nconsiderable degree of plausibility; but, unless we rigidly reject from\nthe rank of historic facts those that break down under the test of\nverification, histories will be converted into novels or poems. If our\nknowledge of the connecting links between events in the history of the\npast has perished, we shall not improve it by imagining facts, and calling\nthe result by the name of history.\n\nWe cannot be too guarded in this particular subject, because an almost\nboundless license has been introduced into the present controversy. Pure\ncreations of the imagination, which it is impossible to verify, are\nconstantly propounded as facts in the history of the past. I by no means\nwish to deny that both parties must plead guilty to the charge of this\nspecies of historical forgery. The fact may be unpleasant, but we shall do\nno good by refusing to recognize it. When the knowledge of past events has\nperished, and our conjectures break down under the test of verification,\nwe have nothing to do but to remain content with our ignorance.\n\nIf these principles are correct, a considerable number of recently\npublished lives of Jesus, and other similar compositions, have no claim to\nthe designation of historical writings. They are mere novels evolved out\nof the self\u2010consciousness of their authors. They are nothing but simple\nimaginations of what, under certain conjectural circumstances, might have\nhappened, but are destitute of all evidence that they actually occurred.\nIf history is thus degraded, it must become devoid of all scientific\nvalue. I have pressed this point because nowhere is this license of\nconjectural guessing at events more largely indulged in, than in questions\nconnected with the Bible and its criticism.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII. THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH, AND OF ST. PAUL\u2019S EPISTLES, TO\nTHE FACTS OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. THEIR HISTORICAL VALUE CONSIDERED.\n\n\nI have in the preceding chapter drawn attention to the chief principles of\nhistorical evidence, and to the importance of certain classes of\nhistorical documents; also to the important bearing which the continued\nexistence of a great institution like the Christian Church has on this\nsubject, especially as its origin can be traced up to a definite period of\nhistory. I have further shown that as the Church gives a definite account\nof its origin, which, if true, is an adequate one; it is incumbent on\nthose who reject this account to propound another which shall be able to\nstand the application of the principles of a sound philosophy of human\nnature. I must now consider the evidence which the existence of the Church\nas a visible institution, and the Epistles of St. Paul, afford to the\ngreat facts on which Christianity is based.\n\nIf it can be proved beyond question that the Church immediately after it\nassumed a distinctive form not only believed in the Resurrection of Jesus\nChrist, as one among many miraculous facts, but affirmed that the belief\nin its truth was the one sole ground of its corporate existence, within a\nvery short interval after the date of His crucifixion, it must be\nadmitted, even by unbelievers, to involve a question of the most serious\nimportance. It proves for certain that the belief in one miracle, and that\nthe greatest of all recorded in the Gospels, was neither a mythic nor a\nlegendary creation. It further follows that if the original followers of\nJesus thought that He had risen from the dead, it may be taken as a moral\ncertainty that they must have believed that other supernatural actions\nwere performed by Him during His life. The solution which unbelievers\npropound as the account of the origin of the miraculous narratives in the\nGospels is that they are a gradual creation of a mythic and legendary\nspirit. Hence their efforts to assign them to the latest possible date. If\ntheir publication can be deferred to the early years of the second\ncentury, they consider that this would afford the requisite time for\nsurrounding the history of Jesus with a halo of mythic and legendary\nenvironment. But if it can be shown that the new\u2010born Christian Church,\nwithin a short interval after the Crucifixion, affirmed that the sole\nground of its renewed life was the belief in the Resurrection of its\nfounder, the possibility that such belief could have been either mythic or\nlegendary is taken away. Whatever may be urged about the other parts of\nthe story, there remains one miracle (and that the greatest of all), which\nit is impossible to affirm to have been either a mythical or a legendary\ncreation. If the Church accepted it as the sole ground of its existence,\nand if that belief can be traced to the hour of its birth, it must have\nbeen due either to some species of delusion, or to a fact. If Jesus was\nthus believed to have risen from the dead, it is useless to assign the\nbelief in His other miracles to a later legendary spirit.\n\nBut further: The Church, within a short number of years from the date of\nits birth, must have had all the consciousness that it was a young\nsociety. It was engaged in a constant struggle for existence, and had\nbefore it the alternative of enlarging its numbers, or perishing. A new\nsociety constantly struggling for existence could not fail within this\ninterval of time to have the most lively consciousness of what it was to\nwhich it owed its origin, and which formed the bond of union among its\nmembers. It must have been to them a constantly recurring thought. Every\none must have known that it was an alleged miraculous fact, a supposed\nResurrection of one who had been crucified. Was it possible for the\nmembers of such a society to avoid looking back with anxiety on the\nalleged ground of its existence? It was no dogma capable of endless\ndiscussion, but a fact. The bond of union was allegiance to a living\nperson. Is it conceivable that this person was not the object of daily\ninterest to its members, or that they did not make His history the subject\nof earnest inquiry? Can we suppose for one moment that any of them were\nignorant of or had forgotten the grounds on which they had joined the new\ncommunity, or which formed the basis of its life? The recollections of the\nmembers of a society which is only between twenty and thirty years old\nmust be fresh.\n\nBut it may be said, these people were very credulous. Be it so. Credulous\npeople placed in the circumstances of the Christian Church are never\ndeficient in curiosity. Even if the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus\nhad originated in credulity, the first principles of human nature would\nhave urged them to get all the information which they could respecting it.\nThey were in the exact position to enable them to do this. Within ten,\ntwenty, thirty, or forty years, there must have been plenty of information\nat hand to enable them to ascertain whether the society to which they\nbelonged did or did not owe its existence to this belief, and to get full\ninformation as to the general outline of the story on which it was\nfounded. It is impossible for members of a society whose origin was so\nrecent to have remained ignorant of the circumstances which gave it birth.\nThey must have been handed down by a lively tradition. I conclude\ntherefore, that it would have been simply impossible for the members of\nthe Church, within this short time, to be mistaken as to whether its\nexistence and continued life was due to the belief that its founder had\nrisen from the dead, or whether He was supposed to have worked miracles\nduring His life; and that its belief could not have been due to mythic or\nlegendary causes.\n\nThe question before us then, becomes clear and definite, freed from the\nvagueness with which it has been endeavoured to obscure it. If it can be\nproved that the Christian Church owed its origin to its belief in the\nResurrection of Jesus Christ, and that its renewed life began within the\nbriefest interval after His crucifixion, the whole discussion becomes\nnarrowed into the following issue: Is it possible that such a belief,\nwithin so short a time after His death, could have originated in a\nfiction? Three alternatives are open for our acceptance, and three only;\neither:\n\nJesus did not really die, while his followers supposed that He had, and\nthey mistook some appearance of Him after His crucifixion for a\nresurrection:\n\nOr they imagined that He appeared to some of them after His death, but the\nappearance was a delusion of their imaginations:\n\nOr He rose from the dead as an objective fact.\n\nOther alternatives there are none; and with respect to this particular\nmiracle, the whole apparatus of myth, legend, development and compromise,\nwhich is so liberally used to account for the supernatural portions of the\nGospels, is simply worthless as a rational account of the origin of the\nstory.\n\nA very bold affirmation has been made, that no contemporary testimony can\nbe adduced for the performance of any miracle recorded in the New\nTestament. This assertion is founded on the supposition that none of the\nGospels can be proved to have been written earlier than the end of the\nfirst, or the beginning of the second century. It is alleged that they are\nof very uncertain authorship, that two of them do not profess to\ncommunicate anything but second\u2010hand information; and the proof of the\nearly composition of the other two utterly fails. The three first Gospels\nbeing thus quietly assigned to the region of myths and legends, and the\nfourth affirmed to be a forgery, it is asserted that contemporary evidence\nfor the truth of the supernatural narratives of the Gospels wholly\ndisappears.\n\nWhat then is contemporaneous testimony to a fact? Few persons who actually\nwitness events compose histories of them. There is scarcely an account of\na great battle which has been composed by the general who commanded in it;\nand when such accounts have been published by persons who were actually\npresent, they could have witnessed but a small portion of the events which\nthey describe. Such is the case with the great mass of facts which\nconstitute the history of the past. The chief actors in them are seldom\nthe historians.\n\nBut although such persons rarely compose narratives of events at which\nthey were actually present, yet it is quite possible to possess testimony\nwhich for all practical purposes is of equal value. As I have already\npointed out, such testimony consists of historical documents composed by\npersons who lived during the time in question, and who had ample means of\nprocuring information from those who must have known the truth of the\noccurrences.\n\nWe possess contemporaneous testimony of the highest order in the Epistles\nof St. Paul. I have already observed that no documents are of higher\nhistorical value than letters composed by persons actively engaged in the\nevents to which they refer. I must now point out specifically the\nimportance of these letters as historical documents.\n\nFirst: four of the longest of them are admitted, by every school of\nunbelievers, who have given any consideration to the subject, to be the\ngenuine productions of the Apostle. The evidence, both external and\ninternal, of his authorship, is of the highest character. If it is not\nvalid to prove that they were written by him, all historical certitude is\nrendered impossible. They are the two to the Corinthians, and those\naddressed to the Romans and the Galatians. Their importance is greatly\nenhanced by their presenting to us a more distinct picture of the\ninnermost life of the Apostle than any others which have been attributed\nto him. To these may be added four more, viz. the two to the\nThessalonians, and those to the Philippians and to Philemon, which,\nalthough doubted by some, are yet fully admitted by other unbelievers,\namong whom is Renan, to be genuine. The internal evidence that the\nEpistles to the Philippians and to Philemon were written by the same\nperson who composed those to the Corinthians and Galatians, is as strong\nas such evidence can possibly be. The whole form of thought is instinct\nwith the presence of the same mind. Nor can the two to the Thessalonians\nadmit of any reasonable doubt. To these follow the two to the Colossians\nand the Ephesians, for which the evidence is certainly less strong; but\nRenan admits that it greatly preponderates on the side of their being\ngenuine productions of St. Paul. Altogether, then, we have eight letters\nwhich are undoubtedly his, and two more which are probably so; instinct\nwith his mind, and placing before us a vivid picture of the innermost life\nof the early Church.\n\nSecondly, as to their date. Six of them were unquestionably written within\ntwenty\u2010eight years after the crucifixion, by the most active agent in the\npropagation of Christianity, who had been employed in this work for a\nperiod of at least eighteen years previously. Let us consider what such a\nperiod of time really means. Twenty\u2010eight years is about the period which\nlies between the present year and the repeal of the corn\u2010laws. While some\nof those who effected it have passed away, many of those who took a most\nactive part in it are still living. All the events connected with it lie\nwithin the period of the most lively historical recollection. Many persons\nare still alive who can look back with the most perfect reminiscence to\nthe great events of the anti\u2010corn\u2010law agitation. While these persons live,\nit will be impossible to encircle the chief actors in it with a halo of\nmyth or legend. In precisely the same position must multitudes have stood\nto the ministry of Jesus Christ, and the foundation of the Christian\nChurch, when these Epistles were written. The fact is worthy of our\ndeepest attention, that when we read these letters and the various\nstatements they contain, we are in the immediate presence of some of the\nmost important events in history.\n\nAlthough St. Paul had never seen Jesus himself, yet his age was such when\nhe wrote these letters, that his recollection was good for many years\nbefore the commencement of His ministry. Great numbers of persons also\nwere alive whose recollections of events that occurred at a much earlier\ndate must have been distinct and clear. With the early followers of Jesus\nhe had for not less than twenty years every facility for holding\ncommunication. Is it to be believed that a man whose entire being was\nswallowed up in one continuous sacrifice of himself to Jesus Christ, and\nwho was penetrated with the profoundest love towards Him, had not\naccurately informed himself of the great facts of His earthly life, when\nduring the last twenty years he had enjoyed every means of obtaining\ninformation from His followers, and previously had investigated it with\nthe keen scent of an angry persecutor? The idea is incredible. In these\nletters of St. Paul therefore, as far as they throw light on this subject,\nwe are in the presence of contemporaneous historical evidence of the\nhighest order.\n\nThirdly: Although these letters were written within so brief an interval\nafter the Crucifixion as from twenty\u2010five to thirty years, yet they afford\nevidence which carries us up to a much earlier period. St. Paul\u2019s\nconversion dates at least eighteen years earlier than the earliest of\nthem. His testimony therefore is good as to the general nature of the\nbeliefs of the Christian Church during the whole period of his ministry.\nIt proves, among many other things, this all\u2010important point, that the\nResurrection of Christ was believed by the whole Christian community, and\nformed the groundwork of the existence of the Church, within less than ten\nyears after the crucifixion. But the Apostle\u2019s hostile connection with the\nChristian sect dates still earlier. As a persecutor he must have\nascertained what were the leading subjects of the Christian belief, and\nmust have subjected the whole matter to a rigid investigation. Above all,\nhe could not have failed to know whether the belief in the Resurrection of\nChrist was or was not from its commencement the ground of the renewed life\nof the Christian Church.\n\nEvery consideration must have induced him when a persecutor to make this\nentire question the subject of a most careful investigation. Nothing was\nmore important than that he should ascertain whether any considerable\ninterval had elapsed between the Crucifixion of Christ and the propagation\nof the report of His Resurrection; and his means of ascertaining the truth\nabout it must have been complete. To determine this for certain would have\nbeen most important in his work of convicting the founders of the new sect\nof imposture; for if any considerable time had elapsed between the death\nand reported resurrection, it would have afforded that of which all the\ntheories of unbelief stand in need, a sufficient interval for the delusion\nto grow and propagate itself; or, if the belief was the result of fraud,\nfor the imposition to be concocted and spread. St. Paul\u2019s testimony\ntherefore affords the most conclusive proof that the belief in the\nResurrection as a fact was contemporaneous with the foundation of the\nChurch; that it was the cause of its renewed vitality; that no interval\ncould have elapsed between the death of Jesus and His reported\nresurrection, sufficient for the growth of myth or legend, the fabrication\nof an imposture, or the gradual spreading of the hallucinations of a\nsingle individual among a multitude of persons. In one word, if the belief\nin the Resurrection originated in the conversion of some subjective\ndelusion into an objective fact, it must have been one which spread with\nincomprehensible rapidity.\n\nThese letters also form the most convincing proof, not only that the\nResurrection was universally believed as a fact by the communities to\nwhich they were addressed, but that it was accepted by the individual\nmembers of these Churches from the first commencement of their\nChristianity. Although two of these Churches had been planted by St. Paul,\nthat of the Romans was not planted by him, and was of considerable\nstanding when he wrote the letter. Its fame had spread throughout the\nwhole Christian world. Everything in the Epistle denotes that its\nChristianity was of no recent growth. Many of these Churches, especially\nthe Jewish portions of them, could carry their recollections up to a much\nearlier time. It should be carefully observed that the interval of twenty\u2010\neight years from the foundation of a sect is a period wholly insufficient\nfor the growth of an hereditary and otiose faith. The majority of the\nmembers of these Churches were beyond all doubt actual converts, who had\nonce been either Jews or Pagans. However credulous we may suppose them to\nhave been, their conversion must have been due to an inquiry of some kind.\nThe short period which had elapsed since the foundation of the Church and\nthe supreme interest which the whole of the events and circumstances must\nhave excited in the converts, were precisely what was requisite for\npreserving traditionary recollections with the utmost soundness. There\ncould have been no doubt in any of their minds whether or not the belief\nin the Resurrection was the groundwork of their Christianity. They must\nhave known therefore whether it was a story which had gradually spread, or\nhad existed from the beginning; or whether the peculiar form of it was an\ninvention of St. Paul; or whether it was the foundation of the convictions\nof those by whom they had been converted. The manner in which the fact of\nthe Resurrection is referred to in these Epistles proves that the belief\nwas of no recent growth, but had existed from the beginning. The Epistle\nto the Romans opens with these words:\u2014\u201cConcerning His Son Jesus Christ ...\nwho was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit\nof holiness, _by the resurrection from the dead_.\u201d It is impossible that a\nwriter could have made such a reference as this at the opening of his\nletter, unless he had been certain that the belief in the Resurrection had\nbeen accepted as a fact by those whom he addressed, and by the whole\nChristian community with whom they were acquainted.\n\nBut further: it is utterly incredible that if the converts accepted the\nfact of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as the foundation of their\nChristianity, they should have contentedly remained ignorant of the facts\nof His previous history, at a period when there must have been abundant\nmeans of obtaining an acquaintance with it.\n\nFourthly: the value of these letters as historical documents is greatly\nincreased by the fact that a strong spirit of party existed in the\nChurches. None are more ready to accept the fact that the Church was\ndivided into a number of parties than the opponents of Christianity. Not\nonly have they admitted it, but for their own purposes they have greatly\nexaggerated it. But it is a weapon which can be used in defence of\nChristianity more efficaciously than in opposition to it. It is clear on\nthe face of these letters not only that the Churches were divided into\nparties, but that party\u2010spirit existed in them with considerable violence.\nIt is needless for the purpose of the present argument to ascertain the\nnumber of the parties into which some of the Churches were divided; but\nthese letters, confirmed as they are by incidental references in the Acts\nof the Apostles, leave no doubt that the opposition between St. Paul and\nthose who followed his teaching, and a powerful Judaizing party in the\nChurch, was of a very decided character; that this party had a great\ndislike to the person of the Apostle; and that he himself denounced them\nas corrupters of the fundamental principles of the Gospel. They make it\nquite clear that even in the Churches of which he was the founder, the\nApostle was far from having it all his own way. Judaizing teachers had\nmade very considerable progress in alienating the Galatian Churches from\nhim. His letter to these Churches discusses the entire question between\nhim and his opponents, who actually went the length of denying his\napostolical authority. In the Church of Corinth also there was a powerful\nJudaizing party, who affirmed that he was no true Apostle. In this Church\nthere were also other parties who designated themselves by the names of\nparticular leaders in various degrees of opposition to St. Paul. It is\nevident that these parties must have derived their views of Christianity\nfrom a source quite independent of the Apostle. Portions of the first and\nnot less than half of the second Epistle are occupied by St. Paul in\nsetting forth his claims in opposition to these leaders. It is altogether\na mistake to suppose that these Churches were disposed to accept his\nassertions without question, as equivalent to oracles from Heaven. On the\ncontrary, Judaizing teachers habitually followed his steps, and to some\nextent succeeded in subverting the faith even of his own converts.\n\nNothing can more enhance the value of these letters as historical\ndocuments than the existence of this party\u2010spirit in the Churches to which\nthey were addressed. If St. Paul had written them to none but devoted\nadmirers, as is frequently the case with the leaders of religious sects,\nhis assertions might have been open to grave suspicion. It might have been\nurged that such persons were ready to accept anything and everything which\nhe affirmed. But nothing is more keen\u2010eyed than religious party\u2010spirit in\ndetecting and denouncing the false positions of an opponent, even when it\nis sufficiently ready to accept everything which makes in its own favour.\nSo strong was the opposition to the Apostle, that in two of these\nChurches, as we have seen, a powerful party existed who went the extreme\nlength of denying his right to the apostolic office. Yet these letters\nwere not only intended to be read to the whole Church, but portions of\nthem are directly addressed to the opponents in question. What guarantee\nof the truthfulness of statements can compare with this? The Apostle\u2019s\nletters are openly read in the presence of the opposing party, before the\nassembled Church, challenging them to impugn his statements. It will\nperhaps be objected that we have no record of the discussion which\nfollowed the reading of his letters, and of the results attending it. The\nsecond Epistle to the Corinthians has preserved some of those results,\nthough it is plain that an opposing party still continued. This Epistle is\na very strenuous attack on them. The man who had the moral courage to\nwrite such letters as the second to the Corinthians and that to the\nGalatians, to be openly read in the presence of his adversaries, must have\nbeen well assured of the goodness of his cause. Common sense alone would\nhave suggested to him not to make in them statements which were sure to\nreceive direct and instant contradiction.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that certain points on which these letters make\nvery definite statements must have been held in common by St. Paul and his\nopponents. If it had not been so, it is impossible that the letters could\nhave been written in their present form. The Christianity on which the two\nparties agreed beyond all doubt, concentrated itself around the Messianic\ncharacter of Jesus. The letters themselves make the points on which they\ndisagreed sufficiently obvious, centering as they did on the necessity of\nobserving the rites of the Mosaic law in the Christian Church. But the\nEpistles contain a vast number of allusions to other subjects, not a few\nof which are of a very incidental character. What is the only legitimate\ninference which can be deduced from this circumstance? Obviously that the\nApostle wrote them with the fullest conviction that his statements on\nthese subjects would be accepted by his opponents as part of their joint\nbelief; and not only by them, but by all the members of the Church. It is\ninconceivable that a man of the mental calibre of St. Paul should have\nwritten letters such as those to the Corinthians and Galatians, abounding\nas they do with references to facts and doctrines, if he had not been\nfully persuaded that they constituted the common faith of himself and\nthose to whom he wrote.\n\nIt is impossible to over\u2010estimate the historical importance of letters\nlike these, when in this incidental manner they contain numerous\nreferences to facts and opinions, and to the actual controversies then\nexisting in the Church. The form in which they are made constitute us\nalmost as adequate judges of their value as if we were able to interrogate\ntheir author. We have him, in fact, in the witness\u2010box before us, and can\nnarrowly scrutinize his mental character. They can leave no doubt on our\nminds as to whether the allusions were incidental, or made for a purpose.\nThe value of letters, written by persons who have impressed on them the\nimage of their own inner life and character, and referring at the same\ntime to current events and opinions, is now universally acknowledged as\nthe best means of correcting the mistakes and misrepresentations of formal\nhistories. But when we take into consideration that these letters of St.\nPaul are outpourings of his inmost mind, intended not only for admiring\nfriends, but for scrutinizing opponents, we have before us historical\nevidence of the highest order.\n\nFifthly: The Apostle presents himself to us in these letters in the\nfullest outbursts of his heart. We have the whole man before us,\nintellectually, morally, and religiously. Probably no eight letters exist\nin all literature, from which it is possible to construct in equal fulness\nthe mental portraiture of the writer. Nowhere can we find stronger bursts\nof feeling. He was a man of deep sensibility, united with the firmest\nresolve. His sacrifice of self, and complete freedom from all selfish\naims, is exceeded by only one character in history. Who can read these\nletters through, and question the sincerity of the writer? Can any one\nbelieve that he was not true to his convictions, or that he was capable of\ndeliberately stating what he knew to be false? If the facts were not as he\nhas stated them, the only possible alternative is that he was the prey of\nan hallucination. Yet in every detail of business, and in disposing of all\npractical questions, his judgment was of the soundest character.\n\nThere is one remarkable fact which these letters bring out distinctly,\nwhich is probably true of no other man that ever lived. The Apostle\nclaimed to decide certain questions authoritatively in virtue of a divine\nguidance which he possessed. He gave that decision on two points, having\nthe closest bearing on the daily life of the Christians of that day, and\nwhich excited deep conscientious scruples. These were: whether the\nobligation of observing certain days was binding on the Christian\nconscience, and whether it was unlawful to eat meat which had been offered\nin sacrifice to a heathen god. On each of these points he gives his own\napostolical decision; yet in the very act of doing so, he directly enjoins\nthat the conscientious scruples of those who could not acquiesce in it\nshould be respected. Can this be said of any other man who thought that he\npossessed a supernatural guidance? Enthusiastic he was; but his was an\nenthusiasm which did not blind his judgment. He was a man, too, of a\nhighly delicate mind, yet capable of using a refined sarcasm in dealing\nwith his opponents. We have the whole man before us, and his entire\ncharacter renders him a witness of the highest order.\n\nAs modern unbelievers refuse to allow us to appeal to the Gospels as\nhistorical documents, it becomes a matter of the highest importance to\nascertain what facts in connection with the origin of Christianity and the\nbeliefs of the earliest followers of Jesus can be established with the aid\nof these letters. Unbelievers cannot dispute that they are the authentic\nwritings of the most active agent in the propagation of Christianity, who\nhas contributed more to its permanent establishment than any other of the\ndisciples of Jesus. This being so, it is impossible to deny that they are\ncontemporary historical records of the highest value. Our opponents demand\ncontemporary testimony, and we present them with the Epistles of St. Paul.\nIn pursuing this argument, it will be my duty to forget that we Christians\nconsider that the man who wrote them had a supernatural guidance, and to\nuse them as I would the letters of Cicero. I will proceed to examine their\ntestimony.\n\nFirst: It has been asserted, with a view of weakening the evidence of the\nsupernatural portions of the New Testament, that although its writers have\nreported miracles as wrought by others, not one of them has affirmed that\nhe himself ever performed one.\n\nI reply that St. Paul distinctly affirms that he believed he wrought\nmiracles. \u201cTruly,\u201d says he, \u201cthe signs of an apostle were wrought among\nyou in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds.\u201d (2 Cor.\nxii. 12.) He here affirms that such a power was possessed not only by\nhimself, but by other Apostles also. The power to perform \u201csigns, wonders,\nand mighty deeds\u201d was directly connected with the apostolic office.\n\nAgain, he says to the Galatians (iii. 5), \u201cHe that ministereth to you the\nSpirit, and worketh miracles among you.\u201d In this reference he evidently\nmeans himself, and affirms that he had performed miracles in Galatia.\n\nIn the Epistle to the Romans he makes the following affirmation: \u201cFor I\nwill not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath not\nwrought by me, to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and deed, through\nmighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God; so that from\nJerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the\nGospel of Christ.\u201d (Rom. xv. 18, 19.) Here then we have St. Paul\u2019s direct\naffirmation that in his own opinion, throughout the mission in question,\nhe had been in the habit of performing \u201cmighty signs and wonders.\u201d After\nthese passages it is needless to quote further. The Apostle deliberately\naffirms to the Corinthians and Galatians that he performed miracles, and\nthe whole passage makes it clear that he supposed they would fully\nrecognize the fact of his having done so. Of course this affirmation does\nnot prove that they were real miracles; but it does prove that he and\nthose to whom he wrote thought that they were so. Not less distinct is his\naffirmation to the Romans. These passages further distinctly prove that it\nwas an accepted belief in the Churches when the Apostle wrote, and even at\na much earlier period, that supernatural manifestations attended the early\npreaching of Christianity. It follows therefore that the invention of\nmiraculous stories was not due to a later mythic and legendary spirit.\nThis the statement made by the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans\ndistinctly proves; for he evidently considered that he had been in the\nhabit of performing miracles up to the very time when he wrote the letter,\nand during the whole course of his preceding ministry. Also the\naffirmation that miracles were the signs of an Apostle, and admitted to be\nsuch, is a strong corroboration of the statement made by the Synoptics\nthat our Lord was supposed to have conferred such powers on the Apostles;\nand as it is simply incredible that any should have believed that He\nconferred on the Apostles powers which He did not exercise himself, it\ncarries up the belief of the Church that Jesus was a professed worker of\nmiracles to the very first years of Christianity. I am quite aware that\nthese beliefs of the Church do not prove these miracles to have been real\nones. But they do prove that the belief in their actual performance was\ncontemporary with the birth of Christianity itself. They therefore could\nnot have originated, as the opponents of Christianity are never weary of\nassuming, in a mythic or legendary spirit; for myths and legends require a\nconsiderable time to grow; and it is impossible that they can encircle an\neminent character with an unreal halo till after those who witnessed his\nactions and personally know him are silent in the grave. But in the case\nbefore us we have affirmations of St. Paul respecting himself, which put\nthe whole apparatus of myths and legends out of the question. If then this\nbelief in the manifestation of a supernatural power in connection with\nChristianity dates thus early, there are only three modes in which it is\npossible to account for it, viz. that it was due to deliberate and\nconscious imposture; or that Jesus and His immediate followers laboured\nunder a delusion when they thought that they performed miracles; or that\nthey were really wrought. As no one now\u2010a\u2010days pretends to maintain the\ntruth of the first alternative, we may dismiss it from further\nconsideration.\n\nBut it will be asserted that St. Paul does not mention any specific\nmiracles which he considered that he had performed, and that his\nstatements are merely general. I reply that such a mode of statement is\nprecisely what we should expect to find in a letter of this kind, and is\njust the one which would be adopted by a person who was satisfied that\nthose to whom he was writing were as firmly convinced of the fact as he\nwas himself.... A formal and distinct description of the miracles which he\nhad performed would have been quite out of place in a reference of this\nkind, and would have implied that doubts respecting them existed on one\nside or the other. Besides, the words which he uses embrace all the\ndifferent expressions by which the various kinds and aspects of miracles\nare designated in the New Testament.\n\nSecondly: These letters also afford unquestionable evidence that at the\ntime when they were written both the writer and those to whom he addressed\nthem, were firmly convinced that there was then actively operating in the\nChurch a number of supernatural manifestations of a very peculiar\ncharacter, and widely different from any species of supernatural belief\nwhich has been current before or since. I allude to the gifts of the\nSpirit, to which the Apostle has so frequently alluded in these Epistles,\nand of the nature of which he has in those to the Corinthians given a\ndistinct account, together with definite rules to regulate their use. The\nreason why he has given us a far more definite account of this class of\nmanifestations than of the other is obvious. In the Church in question\nthey had become the subjects of ambitious rivalry, and under its influence\nsome of them had been perverted to pernicious uses. The whole subject is\ndefinitely treated of in the 12th, 13th, and 14th chapters of the first\nEpistle to the Corinthians, besides a number of distinct references to it\nin other portions of his writings. These assertions on the part of St.\nPaul that both he and those to whom he wrote were fully of opinion that\nsupernatural powers were then manifested in the Church, are so clear that\nthey require a most careful consideration. The following points respecting\nthem are proved by this Epistle.\n\n1. That St. Paul, and the various parties in the Corinthian Church,\nhowever much they might disagree on other points, fully believed that\nthese supernatural powers were _then and there_ manifesting themselves in\nthe Church. This belief might have been a delusion, but the letter proves\nbeyond doubt that it was entertained by the whole Church, including all\nits various parties.\n\n2. That these gifts were earnestly coveted by the various members of this\nChurch; that many of them made a very ostentatious use of them; and that\nstringent rules were required to prevent their use from degenerating into\nan abuse.\n\n3. Nine of these supernatural endowments are enumerated by the Apostle. It\nis not clear whether the list is intended to be exhaustive. Probably it is\nnot; but it is evident that the writer intended to enumerate the chief of\nthem. They are as follows: the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, faith; gifts of\nhealing (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f30\u03b1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd); working of miracles (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd);\nthe gift of prophecy, those of discerning spirits; tongues and\ninterpretation. This list of gifts in a slightly altered form is repeated\nno less than three times in the same chapter. They are affirmed to be\nsupernatural endowments, qualifying the possessor for distinct functions\nin the Church. It is worthy of particular remark, as showing how free the\nApostle was from contemplating the subject with the eye of a credulous\nenthusiast, that he distinctly asserts that they were designed for a\ndefinite purpose only, and that when that was effected they were to cease.\nA fanatic would certainly have considered that they were destined to\ncontinue for ever. This point is worthy of our deepest attention.\n\n4. The existence of a marked distinction between these gifts is definitely\naffirmed by the Apostle. They were not confined to a particular order of\nmen, but were spread over the entire community. They also differed not\nonly in kind but in degree. Some of them subserved higher, others humbler\npurposes. The reason for which they were given was the building up of the\nChurch into a distinctive community. When that was effected they were to\ncease.\n\n5. The Apostle also most carefully points out that a distinction of\nfunction existed between these various supernatural endowments. This is a\nvery important consideration. Whether we view them as realities, or as\ndelusions, it is plain that this distinction of function must have pointed\nto some corresponding facts well known in the Church, at the time when the\nEpistles were written. The possession of one of them by no means implied\nthat of another, although the subject\u2010matter upon which they operated was\nclosely akin. Thus the possession of the gift of tongues (whatever it may\nhave been), did not imply the possession of the gift of interpretation. On\nthe contrary, the rules which the Apostle gives for the regulation of\nthose gifts, as well as his statements respecting them, prove that they\nwere a set of distinct manifestations, and were possessed very often by\ndifferent persons, and that the presence of the one power by no means\nimplied that of the other. This must unquestionably point to the existence\nof a remarkable phenomenon of some kind. Even if it is supposed that St.\nPaul and those to whom he wrote were labouring under a delusion, it proves\nthat the Apostle possessed a power of discrimination which is not\nexhibited by an ordinary enthusiast or fanatic.\n\nA distinction which St. Paul affirms to have existed between two of these\ngifts, viz. between the gifts of healing and of miracles, deserves special\nattention. That a real distinction existed between them is affirmed three\ntimes over in the same chapter. Both of these gifts, according to our\npresent mode of viewing the subject, would be confounded under the\ndesignation of a power of working miracles. But it is clear from the\nApostle\u2019s statement, that he, and those to whom he wrote, saw an\nappreciable distinction between them. \u201cTo another,\u201d says he, \u201care given\nthe gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of\nmiracles.\u201d \u201cBut all these worketh that one and the self\u2010same Spirit,\n_dividing to every man severally as he will_.\u201d (1 Cor. xii. 9\u201011.) Again,\nin summing up their relative importance, he says: \u201cthirdly teachers, after\nthat miracles, _then gifts of healing_,\u201d (ver. 28); and again, as\nqualifying individuals for particular offices: \u201cAre all apostles? are all\nprophets? _are all workers of miracles? Have all the gifts of healing?_\u201d\n(ver. 29, 30.) Now although we may deny that these phenomena were\nsupernatural in their character, it is plain that there must have been\nsomething in existence in this Church corresponding to them, and of which\nthey were the supposed manifestation. The Apostle and those to whom be\nwrote evidently understood one another.\n\nWhat this distinction was it is now impossible accurately to determine. As\nI have already observed, it probably had reference to a higher and lower\nclass of miracles; those which were in the proper sense evidential; and\nthose which might in various degrees have resembled the act mentioned by\nSt. James, the anointing a sick man with oil in the name of the Lord, the\noffering fervent prayer for his recovery, and the gradual cure of his\ncomplaint. Such would belong to a lower class of miracles to which I have\nelsewhere alluded, as rather fitted to procure a favourable attention to\nthe missionary than for evidential purposes. Be the distinction what it\nmay, and even supposing that St. Paul and the Corinthians were under a\ndelusion as to their supernatural character, it is plain that some real\ndifference, which was clearly distinguishable, must have existed in the\noutward manifestations. This is a fact of very considerable importance, as\nit proves that both the Apostle and the Corinthians were in a state of\nmind in which they were capable of exercising a clear discrimination\nbetween these gifts, which is the last thing of which visionary and\ncredulous enthusiasts ever think.\n\n6. These gifts were likewise clearly separate in respect to the subject\u2010\nmatter on which they operated. The Apostle and the Corinthians supposed\nthat they communicated a supernatural illumination of some kind; but the\nillumination conferred by one might leave the possessor completely in the\ndark with respect to the special subject\u2010matter of the other. This is\ndefinitely affirmed with respect to the gift of tongues, and\ninterpretation. A person might possess the former and yet be altogether\ndestitute of the latter. There can be no doubt that the same analogy ran\nthrough them all. This is affirmed when St. Paul asserts that all these\ngifts were the work of one and the same Spirit _dividing to every man\nseverally as he will_ (1 Cor. xii), and is implied by the comparison which\nhe institutes between them and the members of the human body and their\nrespective functions. Thus: the power of seeing furnishes no information\nin matters of sound; nor the latter on the perceptions we derive through\nthe sense of smell. Equally functional were these gifts, each being\nconfined to its own proper subject\u2010matter. If the idea was that the\npossessor had an inspiration, as far as respects the subject\u2010matter of his\ngift, it conferred on him no supernatural knowledge on matters outside its\nspecial function. Thus a man who had the gift of tongues might remain\nperfectly ignorant of the interpretation of them, if he had not the latter\ngift. One who possessed the power of discerning of spirits might have been\ndestitute of the power of working miracles. One who had the gift of\nprophecy might have had no illumination with respect to that special\nknowledge which was conferred by the gift of wisdom. The inspiration which\nwas supposed to be conferred by them, conferred no general\ninfallibility\u2014it was strictly functional and did not extend beyond the\nlimits of the gift.\n\nAll these points are of the highest importance in an historical point of\nview. Whether we think that St. Paul and the Corinthians were, or were\nnot, under delusions about this matter, they clearly prove that there must\nhave been phenomena of some kind which were supposed to be the results of\nthe gifts in question; and that the persons who believed that they\npossessed them exercised a discriminating judgment respecting them. It is\nno less clear that they did believe that they actually possessed them.\nSome of them were of such a nature that it is difficult to comprehend how\nthe possessor could be under delusion on the subject. Take for example the\npower of discerning spirits. Once the possessor had it not. Afterwards he\nmust have believed that he possessed a supernatural insight into the\ncharacter of others. It is difficult to comprehend how a man\u2019s\nconsciousness could be deceived on a point like this. He must have surely\nknown whether within a definite period of time he had obtained an insight\ninto character, which he did not possess before. Everywhere in the account\ngiven us of these gifts we seem to be dealing with facts. The distinctions\nlaid down as existing between them, and the separateness of their\nfunctions are truly philosophical, supposing the gifts to have been real,\nand were the last things which were likely to have occurred to credulous\nenthusiasts.\n\n7. These gifts admitted of being abused. The possession of them was not\nsufficient to confer any infallibility in the use of them. This fact is\nworthy of deep attention, not only as pointing to the reality of the\nmanifestations but to the soundness of the Apostle\u2019s judgment. If these\ngifts had been mere inventions of a credulous imagination they would have\nbeen represented as guarded from the possibility of abuse by the\nsupernatural power in which they originated. Even at the present day it is\na very common idea that the gift of inspiration cannot possibly be a\nfunctional one which is limited to a definite subject\u2010matter, but that it\nmust confer a general infallibility. Very different were the views of St.\nPaul and of the Churches to which he wrote. The Apostle was of opinion\nthat when they had been once conferred, they were subject to the control\nof the will, and capable of a good or bad use in the same manner as our\nordinary faculties. His statement is clear that in this Church they were\nused in a manner little conducive to edification. In order to suppress\nthis abuse he adopted some stringent rules. No person was to be allowed in\nthe congregation to use the gift of tongues (a gift which he was so far\nfrom underrating that he thanked God that he possessed it more largely\nthan any other member of the Church), unless there was some one present\nwho had the gift of interpretation. The gift of prophecy held the second\nrank in point of importance. Yet from the eagerness of its possessors to\nuse it, confusion arose in the congregation; and the Apostle was compelled\nto prescribe rules for limiting its exercise and enforcing order among the\nprophets. The more the account is studied the stronger must be the\nconviction that it points to actual phenomena, which were exhibited in the\nApostolic Churches; and that St. Paul, in his description of them,\nexhibits the strongest indications of a sound judgment.\n\nSuch were the phenomena which the Apostle, and those to whom he wrote,\nconsidered to be supernatural manifestations. I observe respecting them:\n\nFirst: That it is clear that when St. Paul wrote these Epistles, both he\nand those whom he addressed were fully persuaded that certain supernatural\nmanifestations were then habitually present in the Church. It is\nimpossible to attribute this belief to the presence of the mythic or\nlegendary spirit.\n\nSecondly: It is clear from other statements in the Epistles, not only that\nSt. Paul firmly believed that he himself was endowed with several of these\nsupernatural gifts, but that he had been the means of imparting them to\nothers.\n\nThirdly: If we consider the nature of some of these gifts, it is difficult\nto conceive that a man like St. Paul could have been deceived respecting\ntheir reality. Several of them involved accessions of mental power, as for\nexample the gift of wisdom, knowledge, and discerning of spirits. He must\nhave known that at one time he had nothing but his natural endowments. At\na later period he must have believed that his wisdom, knowledge, and power\nof discerning character was increased. These must have been definite facts\nof his mental consciousness. It is difficult to conceive how delusion was\npossible, when in his treatment of the entire subject he displays such\nclear indications of sound judgment and common sense.\n\nFourthly: It is necessary to suppose not only that St. Paul was a prey to\ndelusion on this subject\u2014if we deny that the gifts were real\u2014but that a\nsimilar delusion was spread over the entire Church. Its individual members\nbelieved that they possessed them, no less than the Apostle. Those who\npossessed only the lower gifts were emulously desirous of possessing the\nhigher ones. They also made an ostentatious use of them. Such are not the\nphenomena presented by enthusiasm. Was it possible that considerable\nnumbers of persons should be deceived in supposing that they had acquired\nparticular mental endowments of which they well knew that they had been\npreviously destitute?\n\nFifthly: While the phenomena under consideration were unquestionably\nbelieved both by St. Paul and the Corinthian Church to be supernatural\nmanifestations, yet it is a supernaturalism which differs in its entire\naspect and character from any other which has been believed in by man. We\nmay wander over the entire regions of history and fable, and we shall fail\nto find any belief in the supernatural, bearing the smallest resemblance\nto it. It is most definitely contrasted with that which has been ascribed\nto the contemporaries of our Lord; and which I have considered in the\nearlier portions of this work. Whence has come this most striking\ncontrast? If St. Paul and the members of the Corinthian Church were a prey\nto the superstitious beliefs above referred to, how was it possible for\nthem to have considered themselves to be living in the midst of an\natmosphere which presented so marvellous a contrast. The gifts, if real,\nwere precisely suited to the wants of the Church, for building it up into\nthe great institution which it became. It required accessions to its\nnumbers from the populations in the midst of which it lived. The two\nmiraculous gifts, even if they were not evidential, were fitted to draw\nattention to its claims. Collected as its members were from Judaism and\nHeathenism, without sufficient means for their definite instruction, those\nwho performed this office were qualified for it by two gifts conferring\nvarious degrees of enlightenment. Then there was the prophet, who as an\ninspired preacher expounded and enforced the truths of Christianity. Its\nmembers were ill\u2010qualified for public offices, owing to the low condition\nof the society from which they sprang. Here again were two mental\nendowments to supply the need, the power of discerning spirits and the\nsupernatural gift of faith. All these gifts here enumerated, were the very\nendowments suited for the building up of a body of converts taken from\nsuch unpromising sources, into the great society to which it speedily\ngrew. A new society had to be formed of a wholly different character from\nany previously existing. It was designed to leaven by new influences the\nstate of religious, moral, and political thought out of which it\noriginated. The old social organization met it with determined opposition.\nThe problem was how was it to be erected on such a basis as would give it\npermanence? The Church of Jesus Christ was to be a new moral creation in\nthe midst of effete society. An extensive communication of endowments,\nsuch as are referred to in the Pauline Epistles, was the very thing which\nwas requisite to accomplish this purpose. It came into existence; it grew;\nit struggled; it conquered; it subverted the old forms of civilization; it\ncreated new ones. These are facts which require to be accounted for. The\nforces referred to in these Epistles as in active energy before the eyes\nof St. Paul and the members of these Churches, were adequate to have\neffected this. Without some such moral creation attending the first\nplanting of Christianity, the formation of this unique society out of the\nvarious elements of which it was composed, and their welding together into\nan organization instinct with life, which has imbued with its principles\nall existing institutions, must remain a problem which baffles all the\nattempts of philosophy to solve.\n\nLastly: These letters prove on the highest historical evidence that a\nsupernatural power was believed to be manifested in the Church at the date\nof their composition, wholly different from any kind of ordinary current\nsupernatural belief. Through the Acts of the Apostles, its existence can\nbe traced up to a still earlier period. Two of these gifts, but two only,\ninvolved a power which we should now designate as essentially miraculous.\nThis being so, the testimony of St. Paul, involving as it does that of the\nentire Church, is express as to the belief of contemporaries that miracles\nwere actually performed. We can trace this belief up to the first origin\nof Christianity. If Jesus was believed to have endowed His followers with\nthis power, it is impossible to believe that He was not supposed to have\npossessed it himself. These Epistles therefore are evidence that the\nearliest followers of Jesus believed that He was a worker of miracles. So\nfar the proof is complete that the ascription of miracles to Jesus and His\noriginal followers was not due to the imagination of subsequent\ngenerations.\n\nThe careful perusal of these Epistles can leave only one impression on the\nmind of the reader, that he is in the presence of facts of an\nunquestionably historical character.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX. THE EVIDENCE FURNISHED BY THE EPISTLES TO THE FACTS OF OUR\nLORD\u2019S LIFE, AND TO THE TRUTH OF THE RESURRECTION.\n\n\nI have proved in the last chapter that St. Paul and those to whom he wrote\nhis Epistles firmly believed that a number of supernatural manifestations\nwere displaying themselves in the Church under their immediate\nobservation, and that their presence can be traced up to a much earlier\ndate. I have also shown that St. Paul asserts in the most positive\nlanguage that he was persuaded that he wrought miracles during the whole\ncourse of his mission. It is therefore in the highest degree probable that\nthe servant was convinced that he did by the divine power of his Master\nthat which he believed that his Master had accomplished before him; in\nother words, that he was a worker of miracles. But as it has been asserted\nthat St. Paul knew only of a divine, and scarcely anything of a human\nJesus, that is to say, that he was to a great extent ignorant of the\nevents of our Lord\u2019s life, I must inquire what light the Epistles throw on\nthis subject; for if it can be shown that St. Paul allowed himself to be\nignorant of the human life of Jesus, it lowers the value of his testimony\nto the fact of the Resurrection.\n\nThe ground of this affirmation is that the direct references to the events\nof our Lord\u2019s life are few, and that he chiefly dwells on the glorified\naspect of it after His Resurrection. The only passage, as far as I am\naware, which has been adduced as proving this strange position is the\nfollowing:\u2014\u201cHe died for all, that they which live should not henceforth\nlive unto themselves, but unto him which died for them and rose again.\nWherefore, henceforth know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have\nknown Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more.\nTherefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are\npassed away; behold all things are become new.\u201d 2 Cor. v. 15\u201017. The\nutmost that this passage can be made to prove is, that the belief in the\nResurrection of Christ had thrown an entirely new aspect over His human\nlife. The persons who had witnessed it had not seen its true significance.\nThis is what the Synoptic Gospels plainly affirm to have been the case\neven with the Apostles during His public ministry. They had witnessed the\nevents, but they had failed to penetrate into their inner life. This is\nwhat the Apostle means by \u201cknowing Christ after the flesh,\u201d _i.e._\naccording to the uniform meaning of that expression in the New Testament,\nthe knowing the events of His life merely externally, as so many bare\nobjective facts devoid of spiritual significance. This he affirms would be\nthe mode in which neither he nor the Church would in future contemplate\nthis subject. The very words which he uses imply that he and others had\nhad this knowledge of Jesus. But such a knowledge would have been\nimpossible without an intimate acquaintance with the events of His human\nlife. What he affirms is, that he will contemplate them in future in their\nmoral and religions aspect.\n\nThe affirmation that St. Paul was not thoroughly acquainted with the\ndetails of our Lord\u2019s ministry, and that after his conversion he was\nsimply absorbed in the contemplation of a divine Christ is incredible.\nWhen we are asked to accept a startling proposition, it is necessary that\nit should not offend against the first principles of human nature. That a\nman like St. Paul did not make accurate inquiries into the facts of his\nMaster\u2019s life is inconceivable. In his eyes His human was the\nmanifestation of His divine life. Did not the persecutor Saul thoroughly\ninform himself respecting the life and actions of Him whose divine mission\nhe denied, and whom he believed to be an impostor? Was not this the\nobvious course to take, in order to enable him to expose imposition, and\nto destroy the Church? On the other hand, the converted Paul was animated\nby a more intense love for Jesus than one man ever felt for another. Is it\nconceivable that such love did not impel him to treasure up in his bosom\nevery reminiscence which fell within his reach, and to inquire with the\nmost profound interest into the life and actions of him who was become the\nobject of his adoration? Is it conceivable that the man who was\nincessantly inquiring into the condition of his converts, made no inquiry\nabout the life and actions of his Master?\n\nThe position of St. Paul, the ardour of his temperament, the fierceness of\nhis opposition, and the intense self\u2010sacrifice with which he afterwards\nconsecrated himself to Jesus Christ, falling into communication as he must\nwith persons who had witnessed His earthly ministry, are sufficient proof\nthat the Apostle had used every available means of becoming acquainted\nwith the facts of His life. But in the Epistles themselves, although owing\nto the circumstances which called them forth, they contain few direct\nreferences to it, the indirect allusions are quite sufficient to prove\nthat St. Paul and those whom he addressed, were in possession of a number\nof facts respecting their Master\u2019s life which formed the subject of a\ncommon Christology. I am quite ready to admit that when the Apostle wrote,\nnone of our present Gospels were in existence. The converts had to receive\ntheir instruction orally, or from short written memoranda. But instruction\nof some kind they must have had. Without it, converts from Paganism could\nhave known nothing about Him to whom in the act of joining the Church they\nprofessed allegiance; Jewish converts living in Gentile cities, but\nlittle. As Christianity was not a mere body of dogmas, like a philosophy,\nbut consisted in direct adhesion to a person, it is clear that it could\nnot be propagated at all without at the same time communicating\ninformation respecting His history. The early missionaries announced that\nJesus was the Christ. Such an announcement would have been meaningless\nunless they had given an account of who Jesus was, what He had done to\nclaim the homage of those addressed, and what was the nature of His\noffice. These considerations establish the fact that an oral account of\nHis life must have been handed down in the Church prior to the publication\nof written Gospels, sufficiently definite to constitute the Christianity\nof the converts. The intimations contained in the Epistles prove that such\nwas the fact.\n\nFirst let us consider St. Paul\u2019s own positive assertions. The most\nimportant is in 1 Cor. xv. \u201cMoreover, brethren, I declare unto you\n(\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9, I remind you of, or refresh your memories respecting) the Gospel\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) which I preached unto you, which also ye have received,\nand wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory\nwhat I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I delivered\nunto you first of all (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, as matter of prime importance) that\nwhich I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the\nScriptures; and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day\naccording to the Scriptures.\u201d\n\nLet it be observed that the subject which the Apostle was here discussing\nwith certain members of this Church\u2014the possibility of a resurrection of\nthe dead\u2014led him to refer to the first principles of Christianity as he\nhad taught them. They denied the truth of a material resurrection. St.\nPaul draws their attention to the fact that Christianity as taught by him\nconsisted of a body of facts. The following points are clearly deducible\nfrom the passage before us.\n\n1. The \u03b5\u1f50\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, or message of good news, which the Apostle had\nannounced at his first preaching at Corinth, consisted of a body of facts\nas distinct from mere doctrinal teachings; and that whatever doctrines he\ntaught were built on them as a foundation.\n\n2. Among the facts of prime importance which he announced, was the death,\nburial, and resurrection of Christ.\n\n3. He states that in his preaching there were matters of prime importance,\nof which Christ\u2019s death and resurrection was one. It follows therefore\nthat there were other matters of prime importance, which his present\nargument did not require him to notice. This is obvious from the nature of\nthe case: the announcement of Christ\u2019s death and resurrection would have\nbeen scarcely intelligible without the addition of a great many other\nfacts to give it meaning. But further, the assertion that there were facts\nof prime importance, implies that there were also points of secondary\nimportance, which he must have announced likewise, or in other words, that\nthe Gospel which he proclaimed must have consisted of an account, more or\nless full, of the human life of Jesus.\n\n4. This account the Apostle says that he delivered to the Corinthian\nChurch. The words imply that he committed it in a formal manner to their\nkeeping, as the ground of their Christian instruction. This he likewise\naffirms that he had no less formally received.\n\n5. As his statement respecting the Resurrection is somewhat minute, the\ninference is, that the other facts of prime importance were communicated\nwith equal detail. It is also fairly presumable that in his oral\ncommunications the Apostle did not give a bare list of the appearances of\nJesus after his Resurrection, but a detailed account of them; and so with\nrespect to his other facts. This his converts would naturally have\nrequired him to do, if we suppose that they were only animated by common\ncuriosity. The less important facts would be necessary to connect together\nthose of primary importance. In short, the Apostle\u2019s narrative must have\nbeen what we may call a brief Gospel.\n\n6. As St. Paul states that one of the facts which he committed to the\nChurch was that Christ died for our sins, it follows that he must have\ngiven an account of his death more or less resembling those in our present\nGospels.\n\n7. One of the great facts which he delivered to the Church, was that of\nthe Resurrection of Christ. This is the great miracle of Christianity; the\none to which it is expressly affirmed that the Church owes its being. The\nApostle\u2019s Gospel therefore contained a detailed account of one great\nmiracle. It is also fairly presumable that among his other facts of\nprimary or secondary importance were accounts of supernatural occurrences\nin the life of Jesus.\n\n8. The Apostle does not leave us without the means of judging respecting\nthe amount of matter in these narratives of events in the life of Christ\nwhich he committed to the Church. He has given us (in 1 Cor. xi. 23\u201025) a\nformal account of the institution of our Lord\u2019s Supper, quite as full as\nthat contained in either of our Gospels. This account he prefaces by the\nsame words which we have already considered, as denoting the form or mode\nin which he received it, and delivered it to the Church: \u201cFor I have\nreceived of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, that the Lord\nJesus the same night in which He was betrayed took bread; and when He had\ngiven thanks He brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is My body which is\nbroken for you. This do in remembrance of Me. After the same manner also\nHe took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament\nin My blood: this do ye as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.\u201d This\naccount varies in words, but it is equal in minuteness, and substantially\nagrees with those in our present Gospels; although it more nearly\napproaches, while it is not precisely identical with that of Luke, who is\nasserted in the Acts to have been the companion of the Apostle. Judging\ntherefore by this example, the historical details which St. Paul committed\nto the Church respecting the life of Jesus must have been of considerable\nminuteness.\n\n8. Another fact in the life of our Lord is directly referred to in these\nletters, His descent from the family of David. \u201cWho was made,\u201d says the\nApostle, \u201cof the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared to be\nthe Son of God with power according to the spirit of holiness, by the\nresurrection from the dead.\u201d These words prove that St. Paul was in\npossession of an account of the birth of Jesus, which in this particular\npoint was in agreement with that in St. Matthew\u2019s and St. Luke\u2019s Gospels,\nand that it was known to the members of the Church at Rome, and received\nby them as true. He does not positively affirm that the birth was\nsupernatural; but his language clearly implies it. It would be absurd in\nspeaking of an ordinary human birth to say that the person born was\ndescended from his ancestors, \u201caccording to the flesh.\u201d The natural\nmeaning of such an expression is that both the writer and those whom he\nwas addressing were well acquainted with an account of the supernatural\nbirth of Jesus, and accepted it as true. So far their accounts and that in\nthe Gospels agreed in the main issue.\n\n9. One more reference must be added: \u201cJesus Christ,\u201d says the Apostle,\n\u201cwas made a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm\nthe promises made unto the fathers; and that the Gentiles might glorify\nGod for His mercy.\u201d This passage not only proves that the Apostle and\nthose to whom he wrote were in possession of an account of the\ncircumcision of Christ, but also that they well knew that His ministry had\nbeen confined to the Jewish people, but with the ultimate purpose of His\nbeing manifested to the Gentiles. In these particulars it exactly\ncorresponded with the account given in our Gospels.\n\n10. There are also several passages in which the Apostle directly refers\nto our Lord\u2019s teaching, and clearly distinguishes it from his own. These\nreferences uniformly agree with that which is attributed to Jesus in the\nSynoptic Gospels, and prove that the Apostle and the Church were in\npossession of details of it.\n\nSuch are the direct references to the life of Jesus in these Epistles. But\nthere are numerous indirect references which prove that the Apostle and\nthose to whom he wrote must have been acquainted with accounts of the life\nof its Founder, which went into a considerable degree of detail. I shall\ngive a few instances:\n\n1. His preaching of the Gospel to the Thessalonians is described as a\nproclamation that Jesus was the Christ or Messiah. In one of the Epistles\nto this Church he speaks of them as having been so powerfully influenced\nthat in consequence of it \u201cthey had turned to God _from idols_ to serve\nthe living and true God,\u201d and \u201cas having become _followers of him and of\nthe Lord_.\u201d Among persons thus utterly ignorant of Christianity, as they\nwere when he first preached to them, it would have been impossible to make\nan announcement of this kind, or to set forth the Messianic claims of\nJesus, without laying before them a great many of the details of His human\nlife. The expression above quoted, implies clearly that he had put his\nconverts in possession of such an account of the life of Christ as to\nenable them to become \u201cfollowers of the Lord.\u201d\n\n2. These Epistles contain many definite assertions as to the duty of\nimitating Christ. \u201cPut ye on the Lord Jesus Christ;\u201d \u201cAs many as have been\nbaptized into Christ have put on Christ;\u201d \u201cLet every one of us please his\nbrother for his good unto edification, for even so Christ pleased not\nhimself;\u201d \u201cThe God of patience and consolation grant you to be like minded\none toward another, according to Christ Jesus;\u201d \u201cI beseech you by the\nmeekness and gentleness of Christ;\u201d \u201cYe have not so learned Christ;\u201d \u201cBe\nye followers of me, as I am of Christ.\u201d Many other similar expressions\nmight be cited, but these are sufficient.\n\nFirst: I observe that the exhortation to put on the character of another\nis meaningless, unless the persons so exhorted were known to have been\nthoroughly acquainted with the life and actions of him whom they are urged\nto imitate. The same observation is true when we are deliberately\nrecommended to make another person our example. Again, the exhortation to\nlay ourselves out in efforts to please others for their good to\nedification, on the ground that Christ pleased not himself, would be\nwithout meaning, unless the writer felt assured that those whom he\naddressed were in possession of facts in the life of Christ, which\nexhibited Him in the character of a sacrificer of self. So again, the\nexhortation to patience, after the example of Christ, is founded on the\nassumption that those whom the Apostle was addressing were acquainted with\ndetails which exhibited him as a model of patience. The same remark is\ntrue with respect to the entreaty addressed to the Corinthians by the\nmeekness and gentleness of Christ. They must have been acquainted with\nactions of His which exhibited Him as supremely meek and gentle. These and\nother indirect references form an indisputable proof that the churches to\nwhom St. Paul wrote must have been in possession of a very considerable\nnumber of details of the human life of Jesus, in which a large portion of\nthe instruction given to those Churches consisted. This imparts to them a\nfar higher value than if they had been direct. It is the mode universally\nadopted in genuine letters, where the writer, and those to whom he writes,\nare freely communicating to each other their inmost thoughts. When one\nparty is firmly persuaded that the other is well acquainted with a certain\nset of events, they never detail them formally, but simply refer to them\nin passing allusions. Such allusions are the strongest possible evidence\nthat the events in question are the common property of the writer and of\nthose whom he is addressing.\n\nThe whole of these Epistles contain a continuous body of references to the\nvarious aspects of our Lord\u2019s divine and human character as it is depicted\nin the four Gospels. The references to the former are very numerous. They\ncontain a Christianity of so advanced a character as to resemble in all\nits great features that which we read of in St. John\u2019s Gospel, and which\nare only distinguishable from it, if distinguishable at all, by the aid of\nminute criticism. I have treated this subject at length in another work in\nreference to its evidential value, and therefore need not discuss it here.\nI shall only observe that the incidental references in these Epistles to\nthese subjects form the strongest historical proofs that St. Paul and\nthose to whom he wrote were in possession of a sufficient number of facts\nrespecting the life of Jesus to enable them to found on them a definite\nChristology; and that there must have been well known in the Churches a\ngeneral outline of His human life, which must have been to their members\nas recent converts a subject of the profoundest interest. I fully admit\nthat if Paul and the early Christians, while centering their highest\naffections on the glorified Christ, had been contented to remain in\nignorance of the facts of His human life, the value of their testimony to\nthe truth of the Resurrection would have been greatly weakened. But the\nsupposition is not only untrue to human nature, but is contradicted by the\nfacts of the Epistles, which it is impossible not to admit as documents of\nthe highest historical value.\n\nI will now proceed to examine the evidence which these Epistles afford to\nthe truth of the Resurrection. The references which they contain to this\ngreat miracle of Christianity are extremely numerous, occurring in some\nform or other in almost every page. Shall I not say that their entire\ncontents are written on the supposition of its reality? They are of the\nmost direct as well as of the most incidental character. They make it\nclear that the belief in it lay at the foundation of the existence of the\nChurch; that it was that which was supposed to communicate its moral power\nto Christianity, and that it was the source of the new spiritual life of\nevery individual believer. In the following passage St. Paul distinctly\npledges the truth of Christianity on the reality of the fact: \u201cAnd if\nChrist be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also\nvain; yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have\ntestified of God that he raised up Christ, whom he raised not up, if so be\nthat the dead rise not, ... and if Christ be not raised, your faith is\nvain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in\nChrist are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are\nof all men most miserable.\u201d (1 Cor. xv. 14, etc.) Whatever opinion may be\nformed as to the genuineness of the other writings of the New Testament,\nthey give one consistent testimony that the belief in the Resurrection was\nco\u2010extensive with the Church, and constituted the only ground of its\nexistence. How could it be otherwise? The Church, as a community, was\nfounded on the belief of the personal Messiahship of Christ; a dead\nMessiah would have been utterly worthless to it. Without a living Messiah\nto form its centre the whole superstructure must collapse.\n\nThe following are some of the most important points which these letters\nprove as matters of fact respecting the Resurrection.\n\nFirst: That the belief in it was co\u2010extensive with the entire Church. It\nwas not the belief of any single party in it, but of the whole community.\n\nThis they establish on the most indisputable evidence. The existence of\nvarious parties in the Church in direct opposition to St. Paul proves\nbeyond the possibility of contradiction that it was the one belief\nrespecting which there was not the smallest diversity of opinion. If these\nparties had not existed, it might have been urged with some degree of\nplausibility that the testimony of these letters was inconclusive, because\nall the members of the Churches received servilely whatever St. Paul chose\nto dictate. But as we have already seen, a powerful party existed in both\nthe Corinthian and Galatian Churches, who summarily rejected his claim to\napostolic authority, maintaining that the twelve were the only genuine\nApostles. Nevertheless, the Epistles make it clear that they must have\nbelieved in the Resurrection quite as strongly as St. Paul did himself.\n\nLet us suppose for a moment that they doubted it. How is it conceivable\nthat St. Paul should have addressed to them such letters as those to the\nCorinthians, abounding everywhere with both direct and incidental\nallusions to it as an acknowledged truth and as the foundation of his\nreasonings? Would anyone in his senses have thus exposed himself to\ninstant denunciation if he had supposed that there was the smallest doubt\nrespecting its reality in the minds of his opponents? Would they not at\nonce, if they had entertained it, have made short work with the Apostle\nand his reasonings? But the point is almost too clear to need any\nargument.\n\nIn one of the passages where he is discussing with them the reality of his\napostleship he urges as the foundation of his claim to this office: \u201cHave\nnot I seen Jesus Christ our Lord?\u201d This reasoning is evidently founded on\nthe supposition that all the other Apostles professed to have seen Him;\nand that none could have a valid claim to the office who had not seen Him.\nBut Paul could only have seen Christ after the Resurrection; and it was in\nvirtue of an appointment from the risen Jesus that he claimed to hold the\noffice. If there had been the smallest doubt in the minds of his opponents\nas to the reality of the Resurrection, or if they had not been persuaded\nthat the Apostles, whose claims they set up against those of St. Paul,\naffirmed that they had seen Him also, this would at once have settled the\ncontroversy and covered the Apostle with confusion before the assembled\nChurch.\n\nBut if this reasoning requires any additional confirmation, it is afforded\nby the Epistle to the Galatians. The opposition leaders in this Church\nwere yet more hostile to St. Paul than those at Corinth. His denunciation\nof them is very severe. They are described as \u201cfalse apostles, deceitful\nworkers,\u201d and subverters of the Gospel. Yet in the very opening words of\nhis address to this Church in which he thus sharply denounces his\nopponents, the Apostle writes: \u201cPaul, an Apostle, not of man nor by man,\nbut by Jesus Christ, and God the Father _who raised him from the dead_.\u201d\nIs it conceivable, I ask, that St. Paul should have used such language,\nunder such circumstances, in addressing this Church, unless he was\nabsolutely certain that his opponents accepted the Resurrection of Christ\nas a fact? We shall see hereafter that these assertions and allusions of\nthe Apostle not only prove that the Resurrection was believed in by every\nsection of the Christian community at the time when he wrote these\nletters, but that they enable us to carry up the date of this belief to\nthe very commencement of Christianity.\n\nSecondly: The Epistle to the Romans sets before us the state of this\nbelief in a Church which St. Paul had not visited. Of the exact date of\nthe foundation of this Church we have no record; but the entire contents\nof the Epistle prove that it had been in existence for many years before\nthe Apostle addressed to them this letter. The general impression produced\nby it is that this was one of the most important Christian communities\nthen in existence. We learn from it that among its members were persons\nattached to the household of Nero. As the intercourse between Rome and\nJud\u00e6a was very considerable, there can be no doubt that the Church\noriginated at an early period, either by Christian Jews visiting the\nimperial city, or by Roman Jews visiting Jud\u00e6a and having thus become\nconverted. At any rate its Christianity must have been derived from a\nsource entirely independent of St. Paul. The evidence afforded by this\nEpistle as to the importance and universal prevalence of the belief in the\nResurrection, and to its early origin is conclusive. The allusions to it\nare more numerous than in any other of St. Paul\u2019s Epistles. Most of them\nare of an entirely incidental character, and their general nature proves\nbeyond the possibility of question that both the writer and those to whom\nhe wrote must have viewed the fact as the fundamental groundwork of\nChristianity. The reference to a few passages will render this point\nindubitable.\n\nAn allusion of a most incidental character as forming the ground of the\nwriter\u2019s apostleship occurs in the very opening words of the Epistle: \u201cAnd\ndeclared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of\nholiness, _by the resurrection from the dead_; by whom we have _received\ngrace and apostleship_ for obedience to the faith among all nations for\nhis name.\u201d It is inconceivable that St. Paul should have thus addressed a\nbody of strangers, at the very commencement of his letter, unless he had\nbeen certain that they accepted this belief as an unquestionable fact.\n\nBesides several references in the intermediate chapters, there are three\nallusions to it in the sixth chapter of the most incidental character, in\nwhich the belief in the Resurrection is directly connected with baptism,\nand affirmed to lie at the very foundation of Christianity, and to be the\ndivine power exhibited in the renewed Christian life. \u201cKnow ye not that as\nmany of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his\ndeath? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death, that like\nas Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even we\nalso should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together\nin the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his\nresurrection: knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that\nthe body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve\nsin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ,\nwe believe we shall also live with him: knowing that Christ being raised\nfrom the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in\nthat He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto\nGod. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but\nalive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord.\u201d\n\nIt is impossible to read this passage without feeling that it is\nconclusive of the question before us: the whole community to whom it was\naddressed must have accepted the Resurrection as a fact, and that\nacceptance must have been contemporary with the very commencement of their\nChristianity. A portion of the baptismal rite to which they had all\nsubmitted was viewed by them as symbolical of their Master\u2019s death: the\nother portion, of His Resurrection. His death and resurrection were\nconsidered by them as setting forth their cessation from their old habits,\nprinciples and character, in which they had lived as Jews or Pagans; and\ntheir entrance into that new moral life into which they were brought by\nChristianity. The Apostle directly appeals to the recollection of those\nwhom he is addressing, to say whether it was not a certain fact that their\nentire Christianity, including all its moral influence, centered in this\ntruth. His words therefore carry this belief up to the first origin of\nthis Church. They go, moreover, a step further, and involve the belief and\ntestimony of those by whom its first members had been converted.\n\nBut further: the Apostle, throughout this chapter, speaks of the\nResurrection of Christ as being the great moral and spiritual power of\nChristianity. The members of the Church had entered on a new moral and\nreligious life. They had died to their former sinful habits and practices.\nThey were living to God, and were reaping the fruits of holiness instead\nof receiving the wages of sin. That these facts were true, the Apostle\nappeals to their consciousness to witness. Was this a fact or was it not?\nIt would have been impossible for St. Paul to write in this manner unless\nhe had been assured that those to whom he wrote thought so. This power had\nfor its centre the belief in the Resurrection of Christ. It was caused by\ntheir connection with Him as a living person to whom all their regards\nwere due.\n\nIt is impossible to have stronger historical evidence that this belief was\nesteemed by the Church to be fundamental to Christianity when this letter\nwas written. I shall therefore only quote two more passages as showing the\npurely incidental character of the allusions:\u2014\n\n\u201cWho shall lay anything to the charge of God\u2019s elect? It is God that\njustifieth; who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather,\nthat is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh\nintercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?\u201d (Rom.\nviii. 38, &c.) Again: \u201cHe that regardeth the day regardeth it unto the\nLord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard\nit. He that eateth, eateth to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he\nthat eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth God thanks. For\nnone of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we\nlive, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord....\nFor to this end Christ both died and rose, and revived, that He might be\nLord both of the dead and living.\u201d It is impossible that any words could\nmake it clearer than these do that the belief in the Resurrection formed\nthe centre of the daily life of Christians at the time when the Apostle\nwas writing. The Christian was a man who was consecrated to the service of\nChrist as to a living person, who had a right to his supreme regard.\n\nIt is therefore established beyond the possibility of a doubt that the\nbelief in the Resurrection of Christ was universal in the Church when St.\nPaul wrote these letters, _i.e._ within less than thirty years after the\nevent. At this period of time the traditional recollection of it,\naccording to the principles laid down by Sir G. C. Lewis, would have\nformed the best material for history. All the other writings of the New\nTestament, whatever be their supposed date, give a uniform testimony in\ncomplete agreement with this. One of them demands a special notice\u2014the\nbook of Revelation.\n\nUnbelievers do not dispute that this is a contemporaneous document, the\nwork of the Apostle John, and freely use it to support their own theories\nas to the intensity of the opposition between the Jewish Apostles and St.\nPaul. I am quite sensible that a book which is professedly an apocalypse\nmust be used with caution as an historical document, or we may fall into\nnumerous errors in drawing inferences from obscure allusions contained in\nvisions. But if there is one point more than another which this book makes\nclear, it is the strength of the author\u2019s belief in the Resurrection of\nJesus. The frequent allusions to it, and to Jesus as being the Christ, put\nthis beyond all dispute. We have here the testimony of a book which\nunbelievers concur in considering to have been composed not later than a\nyear after the death of Nero, and allow it to be the one solitary writing\nin the New Testament composed by one of the twelve Apostles.\n\nAccording to the opinions of the opponents of the historical character of\nthe Gospels, St. John was the most Judaizing of the original apostles of\nChrist. Of this they think that they discern very distinct traces in the\nbook of Revelation. His opposition to St. Paul was in their opinion\nextreme; and they think that he is actually referred to in the second and\nthird chapters as teaching the Jewish Christians to apostatize. To discuss\nthe truth or falsehood of these opinions can form no portion of the\npresent work; but it is plain that in either case we cannot have a more\nunexceptionable witness. If these views are correct, the Apostle may be\nconsidered as the spokesman of the Jewish Christians. At any rate he was\none of the original followers of Jesus. Now there is no book in the New\nTestament which testifies more strongly to the completeness of the belief\nin the Resurrection of Christ, and of His continued Messianic life in the\nheavenly world. The writer had conversed with Him before His crucifixion.\nThe vision is to a considerable extent a description of His resurrection\nlife.\n\nThis testimony alone carries with it the belief of the primitive Church at\nJerusalem, and proves that on this point at least they and St. Paul were\nat one. This his Epistles place beyond the possibility of question. The\nparties in opposition were beyond all doubt Judaizing Christians.\nAccording to those against whom I am reasoning, they represented the\nopinions and claimed to act under the authority of St. James and the\nChurch at Jerusalem. But as these Judaizing teachers were at one with Paul\nabout the fact of the Resurrection, it follows that the leaders of that\nChurch concurred with him in opinion also. If their opposition was as\nstrenuous as has been attested, if there had been any difference between\nSt. Paul and the twelve on so fundamental a point, it is impossible that\nthey could have avoided adducing it to the Apostle\u2019s prejudice.\n\nThe strength of St. Paul\u2019s assurance, that there was no diversity of\nopinion in the Church respecting this fact is remarkably illustrated by a\npassage in 1 Cor. xv. Had it not been so, his reasoning would have been\nsimply absurd. There were persons in that Church who denied the fact of a\nfuture Resurrection. Yet they must have admitted the truth of the\nResurrection of Christ. This is clear from the following words:\u2014\u201cIf there\nbe no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen.\u201d The reply to\nthis argument is so obvious that it could not have escaped the dullest\napprehension; if those who denied the reality of a future resurrection of\nthe dead had entertained the smallest doubt as to the Resurrection of\nChrist, they would have had nothing to do but to affirm that the fact was\ndoubtful, and the whole argument would fall to pieces. On the contrary,\nhowever, St. Paul thought that they were so fully persuaded of the truth\nof Christ\u2019s Resurrection, that he could safely use the fact to prove the\npossibility of that future resurrection which they denied. It is clear,\nthat unless the belief was of the firmest character, no logical position\ncould be more dangerous than this line of argument.\n\nThe Epistle to the Romans establishes the same conclusion. The belief of\nthis Church in the Resurrection as the fundamental fact of Christianity\ncan be traced up, as I have already observed, not only to the commencement\nof their own Christianity, which was palpably of many years\u2019 standing, but\neven to the birth of Christianity itself. Of this, one brief incidental\nallusion offers decisive proof: \u201cSalute,\u201d says St. Paul, \u201cAndronicus and\nJunia, my kinsmen, and my fellow\u2010prisoners, who were of note among the\nApostles, who were also in Christ before me.\u201d\n\nThis passage makes the following points clear. Andronicus and Junia were\nconverted to Christianity before St. Paul, _i.e._ within less than ten\nyears from the date of the Crucifixion. They must therefore have been\nmembers of the Jerusalem Church. They were of note among the Apostles.\nThis expression cannot mean less than that they were highly esteemed by\nthe original twelve, and by the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem. Yet\nthe Apostle wrote this Epistle in the fullest confidence that they would\naccept his Christology, including his account of the Resurrection. This\nproves that both they and the Church at Jerusalem, including all its chief\nleaders, accepted the Resurrection as a fact within a very short interval\nafter its supposed date. But it does more: it proves that its importance\nas vital to Christianity was fully recognized; or, in other words, it\nproves that the belief must have been contemporaneous with the origin of\nthe Church.\n\nEqually decisive is the proof afforded by the Epistle to the Galatians. It\nmentions two visits which the writer made to Jerusalem. One in which he\npaid Peter a visit of fifteen days, during which time he communicated with\nJames. On the second occasion he went up to Jerusalem as a member of an\nembassy from the Church at Antioch, for the purpose of settling points\nunder dispute between the Jewish and Gentile converts. On this occasion he\ntells us that he had a formal interview with the leaders of the Jewish\nChurch, of which Peter, James, and John were esteemed the pillars. He\nexpressly informs us that he communicated to them the leading points of\nthe Gospel which he preached among the Gentiles; and that he received from\nthem the right hand of fellowship, which can only mean that they\nsanctioned his views and fundamental principles. It is true that the\nResurrection is not expressly mentioned as one of these; but it is\nimpossible that the statement that he communicated his Gospel to them can\nbe true, if this was not one of the facts which he imparted to them.\n\nIt is a very important fact, and worthy of special notice, that in the\naccount given in the Epistle to the Corinthians of the appearances of\nJesus after His Resurrection, St. Paul expressly affirms that the risen\nJesus was seen by Peter and by James; the latter appearance being\nmentioned nowhere else: and the former only referred to in the exclamation\nwhich greeted Cleopas and his companion on their return from Emmaus. It\nseems, therefore, morally certain that St. Paul had heard an account of\nthese two appearances from the Apostles in question. If so, it brings us\ndirectly into contact with two of the most important of the apostolic\nbody, who must have believed that they had actually seen him. Respecting\nthe belief of St. John, the third pillar of the Church at Jerusalem, the\ntestimony of the book of Revelation leaves no room for doubt. These\nwritings enable us to affirm that three of the original Apostles believed\nthat they had seen Jesus, risen from the dead. It is evident, therefore,\nthat this brings us into the presence of historical evidence of the first\norder, quite independently of the affirmations of the Gospels.\n\nIf the first Epistle of St. Peter is genuine (and there is nothing but\nsurmises and _\u00e0 priori_ assumptions about the opposition of his views to\nthose of St. Paul on which the doubts respecting its genuineness are\nbased) then we have the affirmation of the fulness of his belief in the\nResurrection under his own hand. Besides the strong external testimony\nthat it was written by St. Peter, there is one proof of its genuineness\nwhich is almost conclusive, and to which sufficient weight has not been\nattached by either the defenders or the opponents of Christianity. It is\nhardly possible to read this Epistle carefully without feeling that the\nwriter of it is the same man as the Peter of the Gospels; the one being\nseparated from the other by a considerable interval of time; the Peter of\nthe Epistle being in fact a mellowed form of the Peter of the Gospels. But\nthis has not only a direct bearing on the evidence of the Resurrection,\nbut also a most important one, which I shall notice hereafter, on the\nhistorical character of the Gospels themselves.\n\nOne more writing of the New Testament must be alluded to, because whoever\nwas its author it belongs to a school of thought distinct from the other\nwritings of the New Testament. I need hardly say that I allude to the\nEpistle to the Hebrews. The testimony of this writing to the fact that the\nbelief in the Resurrection of Jesus was fundamental to Christianity is no\nless decisive; it not only proves what were the individual opinions of the\nwriter, but of the school of Christian thought for whom it was intended.\nIt affords abundant proof that the writer knew that their opinions on the\nsubject were entirely in accordance with his own.\n\nI have now shown on the strongest historical evidence that it is\nimpossible that the belief in the Resurrection can have grown up slowly\nand only succeeded in gradually establishing itself. On the contrary, I\nhave proved that it was coeval with the birth of the Church, and that it\nformed the one sole ground of its existence. I have also proved that the\nbelief in it was universal, and that it was accepted by the entire\nChristian community without distinction of party; and that their belief\ncan be traced up as the sole cause of the renewed life of the Church after\nthe crucifixion. I shall consider in the following chapter the bearing of\nthese facts on the truth of the Resurrection, and show that the facts\nbefore us are inconsistent with any other supposition but that of its\nobjective occurrence, and that it is impossible to account for it by any\ntheory which endeavours to explain it on the supposition that the belief\noriginated in the credulity and enthusiasm of the followers of Jesus.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX. THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST AN HISTORICAL FACT.\n\n\nI have proved in the preceding chapter, on the testimony of the highest\norder of historical evidence:\u2014\n\n1. That the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was universal in the\nChurch when St. Paul wrote these Epistles.\n\n2. That this belief was held by every section in the Church, by the\nstrongest opponents no less than by the admiring friends of St. Paul.\n\n3. That the Churches holding this belief were separated from each other by\na wide geographical area, and consisted of a great diversity of character,\nthereby affording the greatest obstacle to the spreading of an absurd\nstory.\n\n4. That these Churches did not merely accept the Resurrection as a bare\nfact, but that they considered that their existence as communities was\nbased on its truth.\n\n5. That they viewed the fact of the Resurrection not only as the great\nbond of union, but as the source of the moral power of the Christianity\nwhich they professed, and fully believed that their acceptance of it had\nexercised a mighty influence in turning them from the low and debasing\npursuits of their previous life.\n\n6. That their belief in the Resurrection was closely bound up with all the\npursuits of their daily life.\n\n7. That these Epistles not only afford indisputable proof that this state\nof things existed in the Churches within less than twenty\u2010eight years\nafter the crucifixion, but they no less clearly show that the earliest\nChristian communities, such as the Churches of Antioch and Jerusalem,\nentertained similar beliefs.\n\n8. That it is an unquestionable historical fact that the belief in the\nResurrection was co\u2010eval with the restored life of the Church which had\nbeen extinguished by the crucifixion.\n\n9. That the three pillar Apostles of the Church of Jerusalem believed that\nthey had seen Jesus after His Resurrection, and that the entire body\nentertained a similar opinion.\n\n10. That as late as A.D. 57 or 58 more than 250 persons were still living\nwho believed that they had seen Jesus after His Resurrection; and that\noriginally more than five hundred persons entertained a similar\npersuasion.\n\nSuch are plain facts of history. The question now before us is, how are\nthey to be accounted for? Only three possible alternatives present\nthemselves. Either:\n\nSome of the followers of Jesus must have fancied that they saw Him risen\nfrom the dead, and have communicated this delusion to the rest. Or:\n\nThat He did not actually die, when He was supposed to have done so; and\nthat His subsequent appearance, when partially recovered, was mistaken for\na resurrection. Or:\n\nThat He rose from the dead in veritable reality, and was seen by His\nfollowers, and conversed with them.\n\nI omit another possible supposition, that the belief in the Resurrection\nwas due to a deliberate fraud, because no one capable of appreciating\nmoral or historical evidence ventures to affirm it. The idea that the\ngreatest and purest of human institutions can owe its origin to a\ndeliberate imposture is a libel on human nature.\n\nAround one or other of these alternatives the contest lies. It is useless\nto attempt to becloud the question with a number of barren and indefinite\ngeneralities, such as myths and legends, vague charges of enthusiasm,\nfanaticism, and credulity, or general assertions of developments brought\nabout by a succession of compromises between hostile parties. We are here\nin the presence of stern historical facts, which require a clear and\ndefinite solution. The Christian Church exists as a fact. We can trace it\nup to its first origin. It asserts that its existence is due to the\nResurrection of Jesus Christ, and to nothing else. If unbelievers affirm\nthat the fact is false, they are bound to offer some theory which is true\nto human nature, and lies within the possibilities of things, to show us\nhow this belief originated, and how it was able to consolidate the life of\nthis new community.\n\nThe idea that the greatest moral power which has ever appeared among\nmankind has had no other origin than a baseless delusion is supremely\nmelancholy. That Christianity has been such a moral power will be disputed\nby few; and a large number of unbelievers will allow that notwithstanding\nthe faults which they attribute to it, nothing has equally contributed to\nthe civilization and elevation of the race. Yet if it be a delusion, it\nmust be recognised as such, and we must submit to our hard fate. Still it\nis a terrible proposition to realize, that the noblest of human\ninstitutions has originated in a lie, even if it be one which was not\ndeliberately intended as such.\n\nIt is evident that however great may be the general credulity of mankind,\nit is a very difficult matter to get any number of men to accept as a fact\nthe assertion that a person who has actually died has returned again to\nbodily life. Such a belief will only be effected by the production of\nevidence which, if not true, is at all events in the highest degree\nplausible. This, as I have already observed, is fully established by the\nhistory of the past, for however numerous the narratives of marvellous\noccurrences may be, whether in histories or fictions, it is next to\nimpossible to find reports of beliefs in the actual occurrence of a\nresurrection, or even in the possibility of one prior to that of Jesus\nChrist. Now St. Paul\u2019s conversion cannot be dated later than within ten\nyears of the crucifixion; most probably it was earlier. It is clear that,\nprior to his conversion, communities of Jewish Christians must have\nexisted in considerable numbers\u2014in such numbers, in fact, as to raise his\nwrath and indignation to the highest point. The spirit of persecution is\naroused by a sense of danger. It is clear, therefore, from the fact of the\npersecution, that the persons in power saw danger from the progress of the\nnew sect, and that its numbers most have been considerable. From St.\nPaul\u2019s testimony, it is also certain that Christianity had spread at least\nto one place beyond Jud\u00e6a. The inference, therefore, seems irresistible\nthat in the period which elapsed between the crucifixion and St. Paul\u2019s\nconversion, the number of the believers in the Resurrection of Jesus had\nincreased to several thousands. Those, therefore, against whom I am\nreasoning, cannot help admitting that an interval of eight or ten years is\na very short one for the conversion of such a large number of persons to\nthe belief that a man who had been publicly executed, in the very city in\nwhich many of them lived, had been restored to life.\n\nIt is impossible that this belief could have been entertained by only a\nfew solitary individuals who treasured it up secretly in their bosoms. On\nthe contrary, the conditions of the case prove that it must have spread\nrapidly. It was not sufficient for the creation of the Church that a few\nsolitary enthusiasts should believe that their Master was risen from the\ndead, but it was necessary that the Society, which Jesus had formed in his\nlife\u2010time, should be immediately reorganized on the basis of this belief.\nThe belief in the Messiahship of Jesus constituted the original bond of\nunion. A dead Messiah was, in the eyes of a Jew, an absurdity; still more\nso one who had been publicly crucified. With the death of Jesus,\ntherefore, the bond of union among His followers must have been severed.\nUnless the Church was to perish in His grave, it was absolutely necessary\nthat it should be re\u2010constructed on the basis of His renewed life. The\nslowness with which any large number of even credulous people will accept\nthe fact of a resurrection from the dead, must have formed an obstacle,\nthe force of which it is impossible to over\u2010estimate. Yet the work was\ndone, and, within a period of seven or eight years, the belief had spread\nso widely that its adherents could be numbered by thousands. The truth of\nthe Resurrection, founded on the direct testimony of a considerable number\nof persons who had had sufficient opportunity of testing it by the\nevidence of their senses, would fully account for the rapid growth of the\nbelief. If, however, it originated in the brain of one or two crazed\nfanatics, if the belief of so prodigious an event could propagate itself\nat all, a considerable interval of time was absolutely necessary for its\ndoing so. The memory of the Crucifixion was fresh and recent. What would\nhave been the natural effect of announcing the fact of His Resurrection?\nIncredulity! What has become of His body? Why does He not appear to His\nformer friends? The strangeness of the event must have prompted even the\nmost credulous to make some inquiry about the matter, and the inquiry must\nhave dissipated the delusion. Such a belief could only readily propagate\nitself after recent memories had grown dim, and a long interval of time\nhad elapsed, sufficient for the Founder of Christianity to become\nsurrounded with a halo of imaginary glory.\n\nLet us now consider the position in which the followers of Jesus must have\nfound themselves on the night of the Crucifixion, and during the following\ndays. Their hopes had been based on Him as the Messiah, who was to reign\nin the kingdom promised by the prophets; and they expected important\nplaces in that kingdom as the reward of their fidelity. These hopes must\nhave been annihilated. The Messiah whom they expected to reign had\nperished at the hands of His enemies. What was to be hoped for more? Many\ncould not help thinking that he had been a self\u2010deceiver, if not an\nimpostor. Was there any ground for hoping that He could be raised from the\ndead? Many of the prophets of the ancient Church had perished by the\nauthority of former governments, or by the violence of the mob. But God\nhad never interfered to vindicate the cause of one of them by raising him\nfrom the dead. The utmost that He had done was to raise up some new\nprophet to take his place. But this man was more than a prophet\u2014he was the\nMessiah. Did not all the old prophets promise Him a kingdom and a glory\nand a mighty triumph? Yet He had been cut off by His enemies, instead of\ntriumphing over them; and His dead body was silent in the grave. Any hint\nthat the Gospels allege Jesus to have given His followers of His own\nResurrection is, according to the theory of those with whom I am\nreasoning, a late invention. On the days, therefore, which followed the\nCrucifixion, the Church must have presented the stillness of death, broken\nonly by a few utterances of loving despair.\n\nBut the Church did not perish; it set itself to the work of\nreconstruction. It expanded and grew. Within the space of eight years\nafter the Crucifixion, the believers in the Resurrection could be numbered\nby thousands. This is an indisputable fact. Again it expanded and grew,\nand it never ceased to grow until in less than three hundred years after\nthe public execution of its Founder by the authority of the Roman\ngovernment, one of its professed adherents mounted the imperial throne,\nand found its strength sufficient to enable him to make it one of the\ninstitutions of the State. These facts are without a parallel in history.\nHow are they to be accounted for? The followers of Jesus affirmed that\ntheir Master rose from the dead; and that He thus resumed His place as the\nMessiah of His Church. Unbelievers, in the face of the evidence before us,\ncannot deny that the great body of His followers must have believed that\nHe had done so within the short interval of a few months after His public\nexecution. Our documents on this point are distinct and definite. They\naffirm that He was not only seen but handled by many of His disciples\nafter His Resurrection, that He ate with them, and that they had\ninterviews with Him individually and collectively. I must now examine the\nalternative positions; and first, that His supposed appearances were\ndelusions of the imagination.\n\nThe loose and general affirmation has been made that the followers of\nJesus were so enthusiastically attached to Him that the idea of His death\nwas simply unbearable, and that they attempted to get rid of the fact by\nsupposing that He had risen from the dead.\n\nI reply first: that all such general statements are worthless. We have\nspecific facts before us; and these can only be accounted for by facts\nwhich are equally definite, and not mere fancies. The assertion before me\nis not only a bare supposition without one atom of evidence to rest upon,\nbut it contradicts all the known facts of the case. So far is it from\nhaving been the case that the disciples were in such a state of\nenthusiastic exultation, that our own documents inform us that they had\nfallen into the lowest state of despondency.\n\nBut further: when a theory is propounded to account for an historical\nfact, the possibility of the supposition must be supported by some\nanalogous cases in the history of man, more or less resembling it. All\ntheories which are devoid of this support are worthless as history. Let\nthose, therefore, who would urge this on our acceptance as an account of\nthe origin of the greatest event in history, show that something like it\nhas occurred in the records of the past. Let them show us one instance of\na body of men whose enthusiasm for their leader was so great that, when he\nhad been put to death by the authority of the government of the country,\nthey got over this by fancying that he had been raised from the dead, and\nthen took to persuading others of its truth. The enthusiasm of followers\nfor their leaders has urged them to form plots, and even to make attempts\nto rescue them from the hands of their enemies. Such enthusiasm, however,\nis not even hinted at in the case of the disciples of Christ. No whisper\nof tradition has reached us that any of them formed a plot, or made a\nsolitary attempt to rescue their Master. Are we then to believe that they\nimagined a resurrection to repair the damage of His Crucifixion? Such\nimaginative conceits would never have made a single convert to their\nstory. They left their Master to perish in His agony, and when He had\nexpired under the hands of His executioners, restored Him to an ideal life\nby imagining that He was risen from the dead. Such fictions may be safely\ndismissed without further notice.\n\nSecondly: Let us suppose that some one of His disciples thought that he\nactually saw Him, and in the height of his enthusiasm converted a fancy\ninto a fact; and persuaded the other disciples that He was risen from the\ndead: that these too, in turn, were wrought up into so high a state of\nenthusiasm that they likewise fancied that they saw Him: thus the delusion\nspread. I reply:\u2014\n\nFirst: As I have already observed, we are entitled to demand that some\nanalogous case should be adduced before we can be rationally asked to\naccept such theories as to the solution of an unquestionable historical\nfact. Surely, if such are the workings of human nature under influences so\ngeneral as enthusiasm and credulity, some similar occurrence must be no\nuncommon event in history. Let one therefore be adduced.\n\nSecondly: Nothing is easier to affirm than that some credulous and\nenthusiastic follower of Jesus mistook a fancy of his imagination for a\nfact, thought that he had seen Him alive, and communicated his enthusiasm\nto the rest. Whatever may be said as to the possibility in fits of\nenthusiasm of a few half\u2010crazy fanatics mistaking fancies for facts, it is\nclear that to communicate this enthusiasm to others is a very difficult\nundertaking, especially when they are in a depressed state of mind. As I\nhave already shown, it is in the highest degree difficult, if not\nimpossible, to persuade even very credulous persons of the occurrence of\nan actual resurrection, as all history and fiction prior to the Advent\ntestify. A case of a person who professed to have seen, touched,\nconversed, and eaten with one who was raised from the dead is not on\nrecord. The belief in ghost stories and apparitions of the departed is to\nbe met with at every turn. Sorcery professed to be able to bring departed\nspirits from the under\u2010world, but it never attempted to restore to life a\nbody which once was dead.\n\nBetween these two classes of facts the distinction is most important. The\nenthusiasm or credulity which easily creates the one belief, refuses to\naccept the other. What we have to account for in this case is, not that\nsome imaginative follower thought that he had seen the spirit of the\ncrucified Jesus, come from the under\u2010world to make a communication to his\nfollowers, and that the other disciples credulously accepted the report:\nbut that the appearance was that of his body restored to the functions of\nanimal life\u2014in one word, a _Resurrection_, able to repair the damage which\nhad been occasioned by his Crucifixion.\n\nBut for the purpose of arguing the question we must suppose that some one\nof the enthusiastic followers of Jesus fancied that he saw Him after His\ndeath, and mistook that fancy for a fact. I own that it is very difficult\neven to assume the existence of enthusiasm in the present instance,\nbecause all the known facts as well as the conditions of the case prove\nthat whatever enthusiasm had once existed, it was at a very low ebb on the\nmorning of the supposed Resurrection. Still, however, the assumption must\nbe made, or argument will be impossible. As one enthusiast will be as good\nas another, let us assume that our supposed enthusiast was Mary Magdalene,\nwho went early to the sepulchre, found the stone gone, saw the gardener in\nthe dim light, mistook him for Jesus, and went and told her friends that\nshe had seen Him risen from the dead: or to put the case more simply, that\nher excited brain created some spectral illusion; and that under its\ninfluence she thought she saw Him, and proceeded to convey the report to\nher friends.\n\nIt at once strikes us as most unaccountable that, enthusiastic as she must\nhave been, she did not do something to assure herself of the reality of\nthe bodily presence of her Master. It was hard even for an enthusiast to\nbelieve that it was He. If she had spoken, and it was the gardener, she\nwould have been at once cured of her delusion. If she had attempted to\nembrace Him and it had been a phantom, the same result would have\nfollowed. Surely the intensity of her love, however credulous or fanatical\nshe might be, would not have allowed her to leave the spot without some\nsuitable demonstration. Equally incredible is it that she should have left\nHim, without inquiring whither He intended to betake Himself, or obtaining\nthe promise of some future meeting at which His disconcerted friends might\nsee Him. However enthusiastic she may have been, it is simply untrue to\nhuman nature, that she should have thought that her much loved Master had\nappeared to her in bodily reality, and that she should neither have spoken\nto Him, touched Him, nor endeavoured to ascertain the place of His\nproposed retreat, nor what His intentions were about the future. If she\nhad done any of these things, it would have dissipated her delusions.\n\nLet us suppose, however, that all these difficulties do not exist, and\nthat she is gone to publish among the friends of Jesus that she had seen\nHim risen from the dead. His death had proved to them a stunning blow; but\nlet us suppose that they were still eagerly desirous of the occurrence of\nsomething which might renew their old faith in their Master\u2019s Messiahship.\nIt is clear that nothing short of a belief in His resurrection could have\naccomplished this. Yet however desirous they may have been of His return\nto life, they were confronted with the stern fact that He had been\npublicly executed, and that the credulity of the past had not succeeded in\nrestoring dead men to life. Their despondency occasioned by the events of\nthe last three days was extreme. Let us suppose that Mary Magdalene rushes\nin with the announcement: \u201cI have seen the Lord,\u2014the tomb is empty,\u2014He is\nrisen from the dead.\u201d However desirous they might be that the news should\nbe true, it is evident that such an announcement must have filled the\nminds of even the most credulous with astonishment. What! not the\napparition of His departed spirit, but a bodily reality, the very man\nhimself? Is it possible that none of them suspected that it was the dream\nof an enthusiastic woman? Is it conceivable that men or women,\npassionately attached to their Master, asked her no questions about the\ninterview; what He had said to her; where He was to be found? Some replies\nto these and kindred questions were inevitable; and unless they were\ndistinct and satisfactory, the rising enthusiasm must have been checked.\nIs it true to human nature that the most enthusiastic credulity could have\naccepted these things as facts, or that the dead Jesus could have\nstraightway assumed His place of Messianic dignity in their minds, if He\nhad made no appointment where He could meet His friends; or if that\nappointment was created by the imagination of the Magdalene, but when\ntested by the attempt to see him, it proved a delusion?\n\nBut even credulity, when united with profound love and attachment to a\ndeparted friend, must have some farther satisfaction than a fancied sight.\nIf the disciples, in the height of their enthusiasm, imagined that they\nsaw Him, they surely would have spoken to Him. Could they have helped\nembracing Him on his return to life after His cruel sufferings and\nignominious death? Above all, what about the future? Was He going to teach\nagain in public? Was He not going to bring confusion on His enemies? Was\nHe actually going to retire from public view out of their way? And if He\ndid so, what about His Messianic claims? Who was to head the party for the\nfuture? Could they have no secret interviews with Him? If He henceforth\nretired into obscurity, what announcement were His friends to make to His\nopponents? The most fanatical enthusiasts must have asked some of these\nquestions.\n\nEither no answer was returned, and the delusions must have been\nimmediately dispelled; or the enthusiasm which generated a phantom, and\nmistook it for a reality, invented an answer likewise. Any reply which\nfell short of a promise to appear for the future at their head, and either\nconvince or confound His adversaries, must have extinguished their belief\nin His Messiahship. They either fancied they saw Him again, or they did\nnot. If the former was the case, they must have had repeated interviews,\nall created by the imagination, at which something definite must have been\nsupposed to have passed sufficient to establish the belief that He was a\nMessiah returned to them from the grave. If His old Messianic character\nhad ceased, some definite plan must have been propounded of the mode in\nwhich He was going to enter on a new one. If, however, we accept the\nalternative that He saw them no more, we shall possibly be told that His\nfollowers accounted for His absence by imagining that He had for a time\nbeen taken up into heaven, whence He was shortly coming again to destroy\nHis enemies. But in that case it must have been a cruel blow to\nenthusiastic love. What! their much loved Master, for whom they had\nsacrificed their all, to afford them one mute interview after His\nresurrection, immediately to go into heaven, and leave them without a\nhead, exposed to the assaults of the opponents who had murdered Him?\n\nBut let us imagine all these difficulties got over, and that they fancied\nthat they caught one solitary glimpse of Him, and that He was taken up\ninto heaven, whence He would come again to revive His sinking cause. Was\nHe to return in a few days, or months, or years? If the days became\nmonths, and the months years, what was to be done with the Church in the\nmeantime? Was it to organize itself? If so, on what new basis? Was it to\nconfront His foes? Was it to make converts; or quietly to await His\nreturn? If the latter, as months and years passed away, the Church must\nhave simply died of inanition, and we should have heard no more of\nChristianity. If the former hypothesis be preferred, then it is plain that\nHis followers must have determined to start His Messiahship on a new\nbasis. But what was this? How was it to be propounded to the world? How\nwere His other disciples to be persuaded to accept it? Instead of an\nearthly, the Church for the future must be headed by a heavenly Messiah,\nwho was coming at some future day to take vengeance on His foes. Such a\nchange of tactics must have been resolved upon, and that speedily; the\nwhole plan must have been conceived and executed by a few credulous\nenthusiasts, or the belief in the Messiahship of Jesus must have been\nextinguished in His grave.\n\nBut further; the necessity of converting the other disciples to this\nbelief was most urgent; for until this could be done, the society was\ndissolving into its individual elements. How was it to be accomplished? It\nis easy to say that these enthusiasts communicated their enthusiasm to the\nrest. But this little sentence conceals behind it whole mountains of\ndifficulty. Every one to which I have already alluded, must have had to be\nsurmounted in each individual case. There must have been many other\ndisciples who dearly loved their Master. What must have been their\nfeelings on hearing that He had appeared to only four or five of them, and\nhad gone up into heaven? What! He, whom we loved, who dearly loved us,\nrisen from the dead, and gone to heaven without affording us the\nconsolation of a parting interview? Such a thought was enough to chill all\nordinary enthusiasm. Was His mother one of those who fancied they saw Him\ncome again from the grave? If she was, could she have been mistaken? If\nshe did not see Him, what must have been her feelings at the thought that\nHe had left the world, without allowing her to behold Him? What would have\nbeen the feelings of the women, whose beneficence had contributed to His\nsupport, or of His intimate friends among the Apostles? Surely all these\nwould have thought it more certain that their companions\u2019 report\noriginated in a heated imagination, than that Jesus should have acted\nthus.\n\nBut the idea that a few fanatics only fancied that they saw Jesus alive\nafter His Crucifixion is negatived by an historical fact distinctly\naffirmed by St. Paul in the face of his opponents in the Corinthian\nChurch. Having mentioned His appearance to Peter and the twelve, St. Paul\nasserts: \u201cAfter that, He was seen of above five hundred brethren at once,\nof whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen\nasleep.\u201d\n\nHere then we are in possession of direct contemporaneous testimony. This\nassertion is boldly made in the face of the powerful party who denied St.\nPaul\u2019s apostleship. It is clear that if they had not believed in the truth\nof his assertion, they would not have lost such an opportunity of throwing\ndiscredit upon him by convicting him of falsehood. The Apostle affirms in\nthe presence of his adversaries that there were then living more than 250\npersons who believed that they had seen Jesus Christ after He had risen\nfrom the dead; and not only so, but that upwards of 500 persons had seen\nHim on one and the same occasion. If this assertion was false, nothing was\neasier than for the opponents of the Apostle to refute it.\n\nOn the supposition, therefore, that the belief in the Resurrection\noriginated in a delusion, it must have been one on a prodigiously large\nscale. Unless St. Paul, and the opposing section of the Corinthian Church,\nwho must have represented the opinions of the Church at Jerusalem, were\nmisinformed on this subject, it is necessary to frame an hypothesis which\nshall not only account for three or four fanatics, fancying that they saw\nJesus Christ alive, when it was nothing but the creation of a disordered\nimagination, but for the fact that more than five hundred persons laboured\nunder a similar delusion. The assertion of the Apostle is express, not\nthat more than five hundred persons were persuaded to believe that some\nothers had seen Jesus Christ after He was risen from the dead, but that\nthey had actually seen Him themselves.\n\nThe only way of evading the force of this testimony is either by directly\nimpugning St. Paul\u2019s veracity, or by supposing that he made an assertion\nbased on a vulgar rumour. The whole character of the Apostle renders the\nsupposition of a deliberate falsehood incredible, besides the danger\nalready alluded to of certain detection by his opponents. Nor is the other\nalternative more tenable, that on such a subject he adopted a mere idle\nrumour. No subject more occupied his mind than the Resurrection of Jesus\nChrist. For Him he sacrificed everything. To Him he devoted his entire\nlife. Is it conceivable that such a man would not, under the influence of\ncommon curiosity, have inquired into the alleged facts of his Master\u2019s\nResurrection? But these letters prove that he was a man of far more than\nordinary curiosity. It is clear from them that he kept himself acquainted\nwith the details of the events which took place in the Churches which he\nhad planted. Messengers were sent by him to supply him with all necessary\ninformation. Even in so distant a Church as that of Rome, which he had not\neven visited, he knew no small number of the chief Christians by name, and\ntook the deepest interest in their affairs. Are we to believe that such a\nman received such a fact connected with the dearest interests of his life\nwithout taking the trouble to ascertain its truth? Moreover, his former\ncharacter as a persecutor must have rendered it necessary that he should\ninstitute a diligent inquiry into the alleged Resurrection of one whom he\nconsidered an impostor, and whose adherents he was endeavouring to compel\nto renounce their allegiance. We must, therefore, conclude that what St.\nPaul here affirms must have been true, that on one definite occasion\nseveral hundreds of persons thought that they had seen Jesus Christ after\nHe was risen from the dead.\n\nBut if it is in the highest degree difficult to account for the\npossibility of three or four of the disciples of Jesus fancying they saw\ntheir risen Master, when they saw nothing but a creation of their own\nimagination, what theory can be framed to account for the fact of several\nhundreds of persons having become the prey of a similar delusion? Large\nnumbers of persons do not fall into delusions of this kind. Are we to\nsuppose that some of them affirmed that some distant object which they saw\nwas Jesus, and that the remainder accepted the assertion without inquiry?\nIf He had not come near to them, would they not have rushed up to a man,\nwho was believed to have come up again from the grave, and endeavoured to\nconverse with him? Let all history be searched for any fact at all like\nthis. Until something like it can be found, we are justified in\npronouncing such a delusion impossible. Nay: however common the belief in\nghost stories, it would be impossible to find a case of several hundred\npersons who believed that, on some one definite occasion, when they were\nall assembled, they had seen the ghost of a person who had recently been\nexecuted, appear before them, and on the strength of this belief,\nconstituted themselves into a new society;\u2014a society which has endured\nthrough eighteen centuries? However cynical our views may be, it is\nimpossible to believe that human nature is a lie.\n\nAgain: If for the purposes of the argument we accept the impossible\nsupposition that a few deluded fanatics persuaded themselves that they had\nseen their Master risen from the dead, and that they set themselves to\npersuade others that this was a fact, then it is clear that the wish of\nmaking converts to their belief must have been a very gradual and slow\nprocess. This, in the face of all the evidence supplied by history, does\nnot require further proof. It would be impossible to make converts at all,\nwithout adducing some overwhelming evidence of the truth of their\nassertion. But on the supposition that it was a delusion of the\nimagination, such evidence could not be forthcoming. Such beliefs are only\npossible after the lapse of very considerable intervals of time, if they\nare possible even then.\n\nBut in the present case recollections were all fresh. Will the attempt to\npersuade persons who live in the city where a public execution has taken\nplace, that the man executed is alive again, succeed? Will it succeed\nanywhere in the neighbourhood, while the events are still in everybody\u2019s\nrecollection? Living actors must have died out, memories of the past must\nhave become faint, before such things can be made to wear even the\nsemblance of possibility. But the plain historical facts refuse to concede\nthe requisite interval during which such a belief could slowly grow up.\nWhile the belief was growing, the Church would have been perishing from\nwant of a Messiah to step into the place of the dead Jesus. On the\ncontrary, the growth of the belief was rapid. The Church speedily rose\nfrom its ruins. Before St. Paul\u2019s conversion, it had increased to such\nnumbers as to be worth persecuting. There was a Church at Jerusalem; there\nwere Churches in Jud\u00e6a; there were Christians in Damascus. Before this\nevent the small knot of deluded fanatics had persuaded thousands; they had\nformed the Society which subverted the religion and institutions of the\nRoman empire, and of which all the progressive races of men profess\u2014now in\nthe 19th century of its existence\u2014to be still members. The facts of\nunquestionable history utterly refuse to the advocates of this theory the\ntime necessary for imparting to it even a passing plausibility.\n\nI infer, therefore, that the theory that one or more credulous enthusiasts\namong the disciples of Jesus fancied that they saw their Master risen from\nthe dead, while in reality they were labouring under some mental\nhallucination, and that they communicated their enthusiasm to the rest,\nand that these created the Christian Church, is unsound in philosophy,\ncontradicts the facts of history, and the phenomena of human nature, as\ntestified to by past experience, and is destitute of the possibility of\nverification, and also is contrary to analogy. It follows, therefore, that\nthis portion of the alternative before us must be pronounced utterly\ninadequate as a solution of the facts.\n\nLet us now consider the other alternative, that Jesus did not actually\ndie, but, although He had been crucified, escaped with His life; that His\ndisciples saw Him after His crucifixion; and, being persuaded that He had\nexpired, mistook His appearance for a restoration to life.\n\nThis alternative need not detain us long. It is involved in a considerable\nnumber of the difficulties which are connected with the assumption that\nsome one or more of the disciples fancied that they saw Him when they did\nnot really see Him, and that they persuaded the others that He was risen\nfrom the dead. These difficulties I have already disposed of. But it has\nin addition some difficulties peculiarly its own, which I will now briefly\nnotice.\n\nI admit that it was possible to recover from the effects of crucifixion,\nif taken down from the cross in time. This we learn from Josephus, who, on\nhis return one day from going to examine a place for the encampment of the\nRoman forces, found that three of his friends had been crucified during\nhis absence. By his entreaties, he obtained the orders of Titus for their\nbeing taken down. Two died under cure; one recovered. Josephus is silent\nas to whether they had been scourged before they were crucified. This was\nno doubt an important point in reference to the possibility of recovery.\nSuch was the usual practice; although when the Romans crucified the Jews\nin large numbers, as they had now been in the habit of doing for some\ntime, it may be a question whether it was always inflicted. These persons\nhad probably been suspended on the cross for some hours before they were\ntaken down. They were treated with the utmost care, with a view to their\nrecovery; yet two out of the three died. Such are the facts, as related by\nJosephus.\n\nIt has been suggested that Jesus was only in a swoon when taken down from\nthe cross; that in the sepulchre He recovered His consciousness, to which\nthe large quantity of spices used at His burial might have contributed;\nthat He managed to creep out of the grave to some place of security, where\nHe was seen by a few of His disciples, but that He died not long after.\nThis, it is said, the disciples mistook for a Resurrection, and that it\nformed the basis of the renewed life of the Church. Let it be observed\nthat there would be the same difficulties in re\u2010constituting the Church on\nsuch a basis, and in procuring converts to this belief, as there would\nhave been on the other alternative, which I have shown to be untenable.\nThese, therefore, I need not consider.\n\nThis theory pre\u2010supposes not only that the body of Jesus was interred, but\nthat it was committed to the custody of His friends. This fact we have\nfrom the Gospels; as well as the additional fact that the time during\nwhich He was suspended on the cross did not exceed six hours at the\nutmost. But we also learn from them that, before Pilate ordered the body\nto be delivered up, he took care to ascertain, from those in charge, the\ncertainty of the death; and the fourth Gospel affirms that one of the\nsoldiers, in order to remove all doubt on the subject, pierced his side\nwith a spear. Now without the aid of the Gospels it would not have been\nknown that the body was committed to the custody of His friends. If,\ntherefore, their historical testimony is good for this fact, it is absurd\nto refuse them credence when they testify to the other facts. We say\ndistinctly: if the truth of the one set of facts is denied, because the\nGospels are unhistorical, the truth of the other set (for the Gospels are\nthe sole authorities) must not be assumed on their testimony. Apart from\nthis, we are only at liberty to assume that the crucifixion was conducted\nin the usual manner; and that the bodies were disposed of accordingly,\n_i.e._ that, if the crucified persons were buried at all, they were buried\nignominiously. It has also been affirmed that Pilate sacrificed Jesus by\ncompulsion, and that the centurion on guard was not ill\u2010disposed towards\nhim. This again, I say, we only learn from our present Gospels, and I must\nagain protest against the practice of accepting their testimony on one\nside and ignoring it on the other. The Romans, moreover, were not the sort\nof men to allow a crucified victim to be taken down from the cross until\nthey were well assured that he had hung there long enough to extinguish\nlife; and from the frequency of such executions they would learn how long\nit would require, and what on such occasions were the symptoms of death;\nnor did they concede to persons so executed an honourable burial.\n\nBut further: It never occurred to the Jews that it was possible that the\ncrucified Jesus had escaped with His life, and that this fact was really\nat the bottom of the announcement of His resurrection. If it was known to\nany person concerned that He had thus escaped, nothing could have been\nmore dangerous on the part of His followers than to announce that He was\nrisen from the dead. This was the very thing to promote inquiry, and to\narouse a suspicion among His enemies that He had not really died, and thus\nto induce them to make every effort to ascertain the place of His retreat.\nThe quickest way to put an end to the story of the Resurrection was to\nproduce the living Jesus, weak and exhausted from His wounds; or, if He\nhad really died, to produce His body. But not a single whisper has come\ndown to us from the opponents of Christianity that He did not really die.\nIf such an idea had afforded even a probable account of the story of the\nResurrection, it would certainly have occurred to Paul when a persecutor,\nand he would have had recourse to it as a means of dissipating the\ndelusion. Such are some of the first difficulties which surround this mode\nof accounting for the story of the Resurrection. A sepulchre was a place\nill\u2010fitted for a man, exhausted by scourging and crucifixion, to recover\nin; nor was there a retreat at hand. But, as we scrutinize the matter more\nclosely, these difficulties become impossibilities.\n\nIt is clear that from the hour of His supposed death on the cross, Jesus\ndisappears from history, except in the form of Jesus the Messiah raised\nagain from the dead, the great Founder of the Christian Church. If,\ntherefore, His supposed Resurrection was nothing but a recovery from a\nswoon, one of two things is certain: either He died shortly after from\nexhaustion, or He lived somewhere in deepest retirement, only receiving\nvisits from those of His followers who were in the secret, and in due\ncourse He expired. Perhaps it may be urged that His friends succeeded in\ncarrying Him off into some distant country, and that some one or more of\nHis followers, who had seen Him slowly recovering, mistook this for a\nresurrection, and propagated the story.\n\nWe must keep steadily in view that what we have to account for is not a\nmere story of a resurrection propagated by a crazed fanatic, but the\nerection of the Christian Church on its basis. It is a plain fact that\nJesus appeared no more in public, and that His earthly history ends with\nHis crucifixion. What became of Him? It is impossible to over\u2010estimate the\nimportance of this question.\n\nLet us take the first supposition that He recovered from a swoon, but died\nshortly afterwards from exhaustion. This theory involves the necessity\nthat some one or more of His followers should have seen Him alive and\ndying of exhaustion. Was it possible, I ask, for the most deluded\nfanaticism to mistake such a condition for a resurrection from the dead?\nWas this a basis on which to revive the hopes of the disciples, and to re\u2010\nconstruct the Church? Would any amount of enthusiastic credulity mistake\nsuch a person for the Messiah of the future? If He died shortly\nafterwards, what became of His Messiahship? Did His other followers pay\nHim no visits during His illness? Did they see Him die, or attend His\nburial? Surely such positions do not require serious argument.\n\nBut let us suppose that He recovered, lived in retirement and only\nreceived the secret visits of a few followers, and that out of this the\nstory of the Resurrection grew. How grew? I again ask. Such growths\nrequire considerable periods of time, and these, history utterly refuses\nto grant. Would it be possible, I ask, for any deluded follower to mistake\nsuch facts for a resurrection from the dead? Could Jesus himself have so\nmistaken it? or, however well the secret might be kept, would a Messiah,\nliving in privacy, out of the sight of friends and foes, be a possible\nMessiah, who could impart a new life to the Church? In such a case it is\nimpossible to exonerate the persons concerned from fraud, even the Great\nTeacher himself. Are we to suppose that He himself actually mistook His\nrecovery from a swoon for a resurrection, and justified His followers in\npublishing a report of it? Why then did He not appear in public and assert\nHis Messianic claims? But could His followers have persuaded themselves\nthat a man who must have shown distinct indications of slow recovery, and\nwho never ventured to appear again in public, was raised again from the\ndead to continue His Messianic work? If this is the true account of the\nmatter, it was not a delusion but an imposture. If we suppose that a few\nfriends only visited Him, what did His other disciples say about the\nmatter? Did the few, with the concurrence of their Master, propagate the\nbelief that He was gone into heaven, knowing that He was still on earth?\nBe these things as they may (and those who have started the idea should\nsolve it), if the real basis of the story of the Resurrection be a\nrecovery from a swoon and a subsequent life of privacy, Jesus must have\nshared the common fate of humanity and died. This must have been known to\nthose with whom He lived; it must have been known to those who visited\nHim. His death must have dispelled their delusions. Henceforth the\npropagation of their story must have been due to wilful fraud\u2014a fraud for\nwhich it is impossible to assign a motive, and which it is not the modern\npractice to charge on the first propagators of Christianity.\n\nThe remaining supposition, that Jesus, after having been seen by one or\ntwo of His followers alive and slowly recovering, was conveyed away to\nsome distant place, where they saw Him no more, and that out of this grew\nthe story of His Resurrection and Ascension into Heaven, is not only in\nitself intrinsically incredible, but it offends against every one of the\nprinciples which I have established. I need not, therefore, discuss it\nfurther.\n\nThe existence of the Church is a fact. It is professedly based on another\nfact, namely, the Resurrection of Christ. If this be true, it fully\naccounts for the existence, origin, and growth of the Church. No other\ntheory can account for it. The Resurrection is a fact, or a delusion. If\nit is not a fact, two suppositions respecting its origin are alone\npossible. These have been proved, on the strongest historical evidence, to\nbe impossible. It follows, therefore, that the only remaining alternative\nis the true one: that JESUS CHRIST ROSE FROM THE DEAD. Its attestation is\nstronger than that of any other fact in history.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI. THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM PREVIOUS\nCONSIDERATIONS.\n\n\nI have proved in the preceding chapters that one of the miracles recorded\nin the Gospels is substantiated by the highest form of historical\ntestimony, on evidence quite independent of their contents. I have adopted\nthis course because unbelievers affirm that the miraculous narratives\ncontained in them are alone sufficient to prove them to be unhistorical.\nIt has therefore become necessary to prove the truth of the greatest\nmiracle which they narrate, without any reference to their assertions.\nChristianity unquestionably existed before the Gospels were written, and\nthe all\u2010important fact on which it rests can be substantiated without\ntheir aid, on data which are conceded by our opponents. Its truth or\nfalsehood therefore does not rest on any mere question as to what was\ntheir actual date, or who were their authors. Still they are the only\nrecords of the life of Jesus Christ that the Church possesses. The\nquestion therefore as to whether they are true in all their chief\noutlines, is one of such importance as to render a few observations on\nthis subject indispensable.\n\nThere can be no doubt that no one would have ever thought of denying their\ngeneral authenticity, except on account of the miraculous narratives they\ncontain. This has made them the battle\u2010field of Christianity, because it\nhas been supposed that if their historical character can be shaken,\nChristianity would be disproved as resting on no other basis. For this\npurpose every variation in them, even the smallest, has been noted, and\nthese variations have been magnified into contradictions. There is no\nweapon which criticism has not employed for the purpose of impugning their\nveracity. But the real ground of offence is the miraculous narrative. As,\nhowever, I have proved that the most important miracle recorded in them\ncan be established on grounds quite independent of their testimony, we can\nnow approach their consideration with this great antecedent difficulty\nremoved. If the Resurrection of Jesus is an actual occurrence, the other\nmiraculous events recorded in them no longer stand in the way of their\nacceptance as genuine histories. This one miracle is sufficient to carry\nall the rest; not, of course, that it proves that they occurred, but it\ngets rid of the entire _\u00e0 priori_ difficulty with which their acceptance\nis attended. Nay, further, if Christ rose from the dead, it is more\nprobable than not, that this was not the only miracle connected with Him:\nor, in other words, if the authors of the Gospels attributed to Him no\nother miraculous action, it would rather afford a presumption against them\nas credible historians. It follows therefore, that although the proof of\nthe Resurrection does not by itself establish the reality of the other\nmiracles recorded as having been performed by Him, it renders them so far\nprobable, that the same amount of evidence, which is sufficient to\nestablish the ordinary facts of history, is sufficient to establish the\ngeneral truth of the events recorded in the Gospels. I do not mean to\naffirm that some miracle may not have been incorrectly attributed to\nChrist in the traditions of the Church, from which the narratives in the\nGospels have been derived, in the same manner as some inaccurate reports\nof facts have obtained admission into ordinary histories. But as these\nlatter do not affect the general credibility of history, so errors of this\ndescription would not affect the general credibility of the Gospel\nnarratives. All that I claim for them is that they should be both alike\ntried by the historical canons of criticism applicable to the same species\nof documents. Let me state once for all the position that I occupy. I am\nnot called upon to prove that no error can have crept into their accounts;\nthat events are all arranged in their true order of sequence; that\nvariations do not exist in them which with our present knowledge of the\ndetails, it is difficult to reconcile, or even that the Evangelists\nthemselves may not have misconceived their true order, or grouped them in\none that was the result of religious considerations. The determination of\nsuch questions may affect our views as to the nature of the inspiration\nunder which we suppose the Gospels to have been written, but it is one\nwholly foreign to an historical discussion. The question which I have to\nconsider is, not the extent of the inspiration of their authors; but\nwhether they do or do not contain genuine history; and if they do, to what\nclass of historical writings they belong, and to estimate their testimony\naccordingly.\n\nI will consider this last question first. The Gospels most distinctly\naffirm that they do not belong to the class of professed histories, but to\nthat of memoirs. This is a very important consideration; for if they only\nclaim to be memoirs and not histories it is absurd to demand of them an\naccuracy of arrangement and of detail, which would be essential to a\nhistory, but which forms no portion of the plan of a memoir. But they not\nonly affirm that they are memoirs, but memoirs of a peculiar character;\nthat is to say, religious memoirs, composed with a double purpose, viz.\nthat of setting forth the events of a life, and at the same time of\nteaching a religion.\n\nThis point is so important, and is so generally overlooked in the\narguments both of those who affirm and of those who deny their historical\ncharacter, that it will be necessary to prove it. It is not only evident\nfrom the general nature of their contents, but three of the Evangelists\ndirectly affirm it, and two of them, Luke and John, in express terms. The\nformer distinctly asserts that he composed his Gospel in order that a\nperson called \u201cTheophilus\u201d might know the certainty of the things in which\nhe had been instructed. \u201cForasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth\na declaration of these things that are most surely believed among us; even\nas they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye\nwitnesses and ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, having\nperfect understanding of all things from the first, to write unto thee in\norder, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of\nthose things in which thou hast been instructed.\u201d (Luke i. 1\u20104.)\n\nHere we have the purpose of the writer definitely affirmed. It is to set\nforth a statement of the leading facts of the life of Jesus, for the\npurpose of communicating instruction in the Christian religion. In one\nword, the author proposed to teach a religion by means of a narrative of\nfacts. It is hardly possible to give a more accurate description of a\nmemoir as distinguished from a history. He also tells us that he meant to\ncompose it in an orderly arrangement, but he does not tell us whether the\norder was intended to be strictly chronological, or merely regulated by\nthe avowed religious purpose of the work. It is quite possible for a\nwriter to adopt an orderly arrangement, who arranges his matter as much by\nreligious considerations as by chronological ones. According to the\nstatement of this preface, the religious purpose is clearly the\npredominant one; and it is therefore only reasonable to suppose that it\nhas exerted considerable influence on the grouping.\n\nWe learn also from this preface that the things most surely believed among\nChristians consisted of a number of facts, which had been delivered to\nthem by persons who from the beginning were eye\u2010witnesses and ministers of\nthe word. Several persons had already set forth written accounts of them\nbefore the author composed this Gospel. It is implied that he did so\nbecause he possessed better and more accurate sources of information than\nprevious writers. The object, however, is clear; it was that Theophilus\nmight know the certainty of those things, _i.e._ the great facts on which\nthe Christianity, in which he had been instructed, was based.\n\nThe assertion of this religious purpose in the composition of the fourth\nGospel, and that the materials are a selection from a large mass of others\nis even more distinct and definite. \u201cMany other signs truly did Jesus in\nthe presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book, but\nthese are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of\nGod, and that believing ye may have life through his name.\u201d (John xx. 30,\n31.)\n\nWords could hardly have been framed which more definitely assert that this\nGospel is a memoir, and not a history; and that the religious purpose, in\nits composition, was the predominant idea of the writer.\n\nThe assertions of the author of St. Mark\u2019s Gospel, although not equally\nfull, are sufficiently definite. He designates it as \u201cThe beginning of the\ngladsome message of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.\u201d Here, again, the\nreligious idea is plainly the predominant one in the writer\u2019s mind, and\nthe obvious conclusion is that he intended his work to be a memoir, and\nnot a history.\n\nWe have no such direct affirmation by the author of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel,\nunless the opening words, \u201cThe book of the generations of Jesus Christ,\nthe Son of David, the Son of Abraham,\u201d are intended to cover the entire\nwork. The nature of its contents, however, leave not the smallest doubt\nthat his design in writing was precisely the same as that of the other\nEvangelists, viz. to teach Christianity by setting forth a memoir of the\nlife of Jesus Christ.\n\nSuch, then, is the avowed purpose of the authors of the four Gospels. Each\nof them is a religious memoir. This being so, it is absurd to demand of\nsuch writings what can only be found in regularly composed histories.\n\nIn what, then, does a history differ from a memoir? The object of the\nhistorian is not only to give an account of the events which he narrates\nprecisely as they occurred; but the order of his narrative is regulated by\nthe definite sequences of time and place. The writer of a memoir, on the\ncontrary, is not bound to observe this order, but he is entitled to vary\nit in reference to the special object he has in view, and the points which\nhe requires to illustrate.\n\nBut the religious purpose is most definitely affirmed to have been the\npredominant one in the minds of the authors of the Gospels. It would\ntherefore have an important influence on their arrangement of their\nmaterials. We should expect to find them grouped far more in reference to\nthis end, than to the mere sequences of time and place. When certain of\nthe actions or portions of the teaching of our Lord illustrated the\nparticular subject which each Evangelist had before him, he would neglect\nthe exact historical order, and group them in reference to this special\npurpose.\n\nIn writings of this description, therefore, while all the chief points of\nhis life and his discourses ought to present a substantial agreement, we\nshould naturally expect to find a considerable number of minor\ndivergencies. While we have the fullest right to expect that the facts\nwill be accurately reported, we have no right to demand that the writer\nshould observe no other order in his narrative than the mere sequences of\ntime and place. It is on the assumption that the authors of the Gospels\nintended to set forth an exact historical account of the ministry of\nChrist, instead of taking them for what they have affirmed them to be,\nreligious memoirs of that ministry, that no inconsiderable number of their\nalleged discrepancies have originated.\n\nThe presence of variations, or if it is preferred to call them\ncontradictions, in writings of this description by no means invalidates\ntheir historical character. It has been well observed by a writer in the\n\u201cWestminster Review,\u201d that they are to be found in every historical\nwriting from Herodotus to Mr. Froude. As these discrepancies in the\nGospels are so largely dwelt on by unbelievers, I subjoin a passage from\nDean Stanley\u2019s account of the murder of Thomas a Becket, in his \u201cMemorials\nof Canterbury Cathedral,\u201d as showing the existence of such inaccuracies\neven in the accounts of persons who were actual eye\u2010witnesses of events in\nwhich they were deeply interested. Speaking of the number of existing\naccounts of the murder, he says:\u2014\n\n\u201cOf these thirty narrators, four, Edward Grimes, William Fitzstephen, John\nof Salisbury, who unfortunately supplies but little, and the anonymous\nauthor of the Lambeth manuscript, claim to have been eye\u2010witnesses. Three\nothers were monks of the convent, and although not present at the\nmassacre, were probably somewhere in the precincts. Three others, though\nnot in England at the time, had been on terms more or less intimate with\nBecket, and two of them seem to have taken the utmost pains to ascertain\nthe truth of the facts which they narrate. From these several accounts, we\ncan recover the particulars of the death of Archbishop Becket to the\nminutest details. It is true that having been written by monastic and\nclerical historians, after the national feeling had been raised to\nenthusiasm in his behalf, allowance must be made for exaggeration,\nsuppression, and every kind of false colouring which could set off their\nhero to advantage. It is true, also, that _in some points the various\nauthorities are hopelessly irreconcilable_. But still a minute comparison\nof the narrators with each other, and with the localities, leads to a\nconviction that on the whole the facts have been substantially preserved;\nand as often happens, the truth can be ascertained in spite and even in\nconsequence of attempts to distort and suppress it.\u201d\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that the presence of variations, nay even\n_hopeless contradictions_ in such narratives, does not interfere with\ntheir general historical character. It appears that from narratives which\ncontain \u201cexaggeration, suppression, and every kind of false colouring,\u201d we\ncan ascertain the particulars of the death of Becket to the minutest\nparticular. Why do not unbelievers apply the same rule to the Gospels? Why\nare their minor variations in details alleged to prove that the entire\nnarrative is unhistorical? One thing respecting them is clear: instead of\npresenting indications of \u201cexaggeration, suppression, and false\ncolouring,\u201d they are characterized by a uniform sobriety in their\nstatements. They offer no comments, and allow the facts to produce their\nown impression on the reader.\n\nIt follows therefore that if the Gospels were ordinary biographies, the\nvariations in them would not interfere with their historical character,\nand that differences in mere details would leave the main facts\nunaffected. Still more true is this with respect to memoirs, and\nespecially with those composed with the object of teaching a religion.\nAttention to this obvious fact will get rid of a large number of the\nobjections which have been so pertinaciously urged against them.\n\nWith respect to their general credibility, it is important to observe that\neven if the date of the Synoptics be placed as late as that assigned to\nthem by those critics who deny their historical character, viz. somewhere\nbetween A.D. 90 and 115, still the time when they must have been composed\nlies, according to the rule of Sir G. C. Lewis, within the period of\ntrustworthy historical tradition. In this case the earliest of them would\nbear date about sixty, and the latest of them about eighty\u2010five years\nafter the events they narrate. Renan is of opinion that their internal\nevidence proves them to have been composed before the destruction of\nJerusalem. Be this as it may; even at the date assigned to them by the\nmost sceptical critics, good traditionary information lay within the reach\nof their respective authors. The interval is about the same in the one\ncase as that which separates us from the invasion of France by the allies\nin 1814, and in the other case from the outbreak of the French Revolution.\nMany persons are still alive who can remember the former event; and\nalthough nearly everyone who could remember the latter has passed away,\nyet large numbers of the existing generation, whose recollections will be\ngood for twenty years to come, have conversed with those who took the\ndeepest interest in the scenes in question. While this generation lives,\nit would be impossible for the whole outline of the facts to become\nfalsified. Minor errors might creep into the details; their precise order\nand sequence might not be accurately preserved; yet their general outline\nwould be handed down correctly, and it would be impossible to hide the\ntrue history behind a set of legends. If the authors of the Synoptic\nGospels were only separated by this interval of time from the events that\nthey narrate, they must have had all the materials of true history within\ntheir reach. Persons must have been living when the first Gospel was\nwritten who could accurately remember the events in question; and even at\nthe latest date which can be assigned to the other Gospels, large numbers\nof persons must have been living who had heard narratives of them from\ntheir fathers, which, as unspeakably interesting, they would treasure up\nwith the liveliest recollection.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that even if we assume the latest date which has\nbeen assigned for the publication of the Synoptic Gospels it lies\nconsiderably within the period of accurate historical recollection, even\nif we suppose that their authors composed them from traditional sources\nonly, and were not assisted by written documents. But the existence of\ndocuments is expressly asserted by the author of St. Luke\u2019s Gospel. And\neven if we were devoid of this testimony, we might infer it from the\ninherent probability of the case. This was inevitable, as the basis of the\nreligion was placed on a personal history. The system of instruction must\nhave involved a constant reference to the details of that history. When,\ntherefore, the members of the Churches heard them from the lips of\noriginal witnesses, the interest of the subject must have induced those\nwho were able to write, to compose brief memoranda for the purpose of\nassisting their recollections. In this way a considerable amount of\nChristian literature in connection with the life of Jesus must have grown\nup in the course of years, and the necessity for it would become the more\nurgent in proportion as the original disciples who had heard His\ndiscourses and seen His actions passed away from the scene. This is\nexactly in conformity with the statement made by the author of St. Luke\u2019s\nGospel.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that even if the publication of our present\nGospels did not take place before the time assigned to them by\nunbelievers, the historical materials at the command of their authors must\nhave been ample. It would have been impossible that facts and legendary\ninventions should have become blended together within so short a period.\nConsequently nothing but neglect to use the materials at hand, or a\ndeliberate purpose of falsification could have prevented them from giving\nan account of the ministry of Jesus which would be substantially accurate\nin all its main features. If on the other hand we suppose these Gospels to\nhave been written for the purpose of falsification, then their\ncontradiction to the accounts which had been hitherto accepted by the\nChurch must have destroyed their credit. It would have been impossible for\nthe authors to have succeeded in concealing the facts behind a mass of\nmyths and legends while they formed the very groundwork of the daily life\nof the community. Under the peculiar circumstances of the Christians of\nthe first century some portion of the events of the life and teaching of\nChrist must have been brought to their minds every day. The hostility of\nthe Pagan world around them was alone sufficient to ensure this. Moreover,\nthe religion was not one which was committed to the custody of a caste or\npriesthood; but it appealed directly to the individual. As distinguished\nfrom the other religions of the world Christianity may be not incorrectly\ndefined as the religion of the individual. It awoke emotions of the\nprofoundest nature in the hearts of even its humblest followers,\naddressing itself both to their consciences and their affections. These\nemotions were all centered in a personal life. If one fact is more certain\nthan another, it is that Jesus was viewed by the early Christians as their\nreligious King, to whom they owed a personal allegiance. This must have\nrendered it necessary for them to treasure up all the facts of His history\nwith the deepest care.\n\nFurther: the early Christians not only lived in the midst of a society\nextremely hostile to them, but were also zealous proselyters. This alone\nwould have been sufficient to compel them to keep in lively remembrance\nthe chief events in the history of Jesus. How else was it possible for\nthem to persuade others that He was the Christ? The Church was not a\nschool of philosophy, but consisted of a body of men whose bond of union\nwas adherence to a leader. To make converts to such a religion would have\nbeen impossible without an accurate acquaintance with the facts on which\nHis claims were grounded.\n\nCorporate bodies possess a power of handing down a traditionary knowledge\nof events in a far greater degree than individuals. The Christian Church\nconsisted of a set of communities which had not only an individual, but\nalso the strongest corporate life. Although it contained no priesthood,\nproperly so called, the cohesion of these communities, placed as they were\nin the midst of a hostile population, in Jewish or Gentile cities, was of\nthe strongest character, and in proportion to their smallness, the action\nof each individual member would be important. Each separate Church\ntherefore formed a corporation as opposed to the Jewish and heathen world\nby which it was surrounded; and each separate unit felt himself animated\nby a similar life, which dictated to him the necessity of conquering or\nperishing. From this arose an intense desire of making new converts and of\nincreasing the number of the faithful. How was this to be accomplished? An\norganization was necessary. Each of the communities had one which was\nsuitable to its need. One of its most important functions must have been\nto instruct new converts in its principles, and to keep actively burning\nthe zeal of its original members. But as the existence of the community\nwas founded on an adhesion to a person, the course of instruction must\nhave consisted to a considerable extent of details of the actions and\nteaching of Jesus. \u201cHow shall they believe on him of whom they have not\nheard?\u201d was a pertinent question of St. Paul, \u201cor how shall they hear\nwithout a preacher?\u201d No society has ever existed in the world which has\nhad an equal inducement to hand down accurately the events of its\nfounder\u2019s life, or had equal facilities for detecting any attempt to\nsubstitute a fictitious account of him for the true one.\n\nIt follows therefore that at the period in question it would have been\nsimply impossible that a fictitious or legendary account of the life of\nJesus should have taken the place of the one which these Churches had\naccepted at the time when they first came into existence. I have already\nproved that the Epistles of St. Paul put it beyond the possibility of\nquestion that an account of the chief facts in the ministry of Jesus\nformed the foundation of the religious life of the Churches at the time\nwhen he wrote them, and that it had done so from the first. The difficulty\ntherefore of introducing an entirely new version of it must have been\ninsurmountable. A doubtful fact or two might have become incorporated, but\nwhile the religious life of the community was thus strong, it would have\nbeen utterly impossible to give a new colouring to the whole.\n\nBut further: this difficulty must have been greatly increased by the wide\nseparation of such Churches as those of Rome, Corinth, Galatia, Jerusalem,\nand others, from one another. Each Church must have had an account of its\nown of the chief facts of our Lord\u2019s ministry. If one of them could have\nbeen induced to accept a new set of facts, there would have been the\ngreatest difficulty in persuading the others to follow its example. Daily\nexperience teaches us how very slow religious bodies are in changing the\nfundamental articles of their belief. However much the sentiments of\nindividuals may have changed, the original confessions of faith are\nretained with the utmost tenacity, even after they have ceased to embody\nthe religious life of the community. What confessions of faith are to\nmodern Churches, the chief facts of the ministry of our Lord must have\nbeen to the primitive one; the only difference being that these latter\nlived with a far greater tenacity in the minds of the early Christians\nthan the former have in modern Churches. If therefore a single Church\ncould have been induced to accept a new version of its Founder\u2019s life, the\nseparation of these different communities from one another, would have\nplaced an insuperable barrier in the way of imposing such an account on\nthe other Churches. The inquiry must have at once arisen, Whence has this\nChurch derived its new Gospel, thus fundamentally different from that\nwhich has from the first formed the basis of our religious life?\n\nIt is clear therefore that even if we accept the latest date which had\nbeen assigned to the publication of the Synoptic Gospels, their authors\nmust have been in possession of abundance of materials for setting forth\nan account of the ministry of Jesus, which would have been correct in all\nits great outlines; and that even if they had been so minded it would have\nbeen impossible for them to have succeeded in palming off a previously\nunknown set of facts in place of those which had hitherto formed the\ngroundwork of the life of the different Churches. We have seen also that\nwhen St. Paul wrote his Epistles, the different Churches were in\npossession of an outline of the ministry of Jesus Christ which contained\nwithin it, as a matter of the highest importance, the most remarkable\nmiraculous fact which is recorded in the Gospels. Is it to be believed\nthat this was the only one; or, is it possible that a set of miraculous\nnarratives could have succeeded in taking the place of the account of His\nlife and teaching which was in possession of the Churches, within the\ninterval of time which separates St. Paul\u2019s Epistles from the publication\nof the first of the Synoptic Gospels?\n\nI conclude, therefore, that the original narratives must have attributed a\nnumber of miracles to Jesus Christ; that the accounts of them must have\nbeen handed down to the time when our opponents allow that the Gospels\nwere published, and that by this means they have been incorporated into\nthem. Not only has the alleged late date of the publication of the Gospels\nbeen urged as a reason for discrediting them as reports of historical\nfacts, but also the uncertainty of their authorship. It will not fall\nwithin the scope of this work to examine the value of the testimony by\nwhich each Gospel has been assigned to its respective author. It will be\nsufficient here to observe that it is as strong as that by which the\nauthorship of any other ancient writing is ascertained. The internal\ncharacter of two of these Gospels fully agrees with the traditionary\naccount. Although the assertions of the early Fathers vary as to the\nprecise relation in which Mark stood to Peter, the ancient traditions are\nunanimous in connecting him in some way or other with the Apostle. The\nphenomena of this Gospel are precisely such as we should expect if this\nwas the case. In nearly every case where we can ascertain, either from\nthis or from one of the other Gospels, that Peter was an eye\u2010witness of an\nevent recorded in it, St. Mark gives precisely such a description of it as\nwe might expect would be given by a man of the peculiar temperament of\nSimon Peter. We know, both from the Acts of the Apostles and from the\nEpistles of St. Paul, that St. Luke was a companion of that Apostle. The\npeculiarities of the Gospel that bears his name are precisely such as we\nshould have expected if its author was a companion of the great Apostle of\nthe Gentiles. There is also every reason for believing that Luke was not\nan eye\u2010witness of the ministry of Jesus. The author of the Gospel affirms\nthat he was not an eye\u2010witness. In conformity with this the Gospel bears\nthe most distinctive marks of compilation. So far the internal structure\nof these two Gospels entirely agrees with the external testimony as to\ntheir authorship. We know also on the authority of the early Fathers that\nMatthew composed a Gospel in the Hebrew language which was designed for\nthe use of Jewish Christians. Now whoever is the author of the present\nGreek Gospel which bears his name, it is distinguished by precisely the\nsame characteristics as those which are described as appertaining to the\nHebrew Gospel of St. Matthew, that is to say, that the proportion which\nthe discourses bear to the narrative portions of it is very large; and its\ncontents make it evident that it was chiefly designed for the use of\nChristians of the Jewish race. If therefore our present Gospel was not set\nforth by the Apostle himself in Greek, both the external testimony and the\ninternal evidence prove that it is a representation of its contents\nsufficiently accurate for all the practical purposes of history.\n\nBut the question as to the names of the persons who actually set forth our\nGospels has been made of far more importance than it deserves, both by the\ndefenders and the opponents of Christianity. The all important point is,\nare they faithful accounts of the primitive traditions of the Church\nrespecting the chief events of its Founder\u2019s ministry; and were they\ncomposed within that period of time, when the recollections of it must\nhave been so fresh as to render it impossible to substitute a body of\nfictitious and legendary narratives in place of those which had been\nhanded down in the Church from the beginning? Unless we know enough about\nan author from external sources of information, to enable us to form a\ndefinite opinion as to his judgment and means of information, our mere\nknowledge of his name will help us little. The information which\necclesiastical tradition affords us respecting the authors of the Synoptic\nGospels is little beyond that which is contained in the New Testament\nitself, and is insufficient to enable us to form a judgment respecting\ntheir character. That judgment must be formed exclusively from the\nwritings themselves, and can only be arrived at after a careful\nexamination of their contents.\n\nIt will be urged that if our present Greek Matthew could be shown to have\nbeen the work of the Apostle, we should then have the testimony of an eye\u2010\nwitness of the ministry of Jesus; and if we have no certain evidence that\nit was composed by him, then none of the events recorded in the Synoptics\nrest on autoptic testimony. The truth of this position I entirely deny.\nThe real question is, do the events recorded in them faithfully represent\nthe traditions of the Church? Have we evidence that the traditions which\nwere current when these Gospels were composed, are accurate\nrepresentations of the accounts of the ministry of Jesus, which were\nhanded down by our Lord\u2019s original disciples? If so, they must rest on\nautoptic testimony, as they could only have been derived from our Lord\u2019s\ncompanions. The mere knowing the name of one of them, unless we knew a\ngreat deal about his judgment and discretion, is of far less importance\nthan the assurance that we are in possession of the general testimony of\nthe entire body. Nor does it necessarily follow that any one follower of\nJesus, even an Apostle, was in constant attendance on His person. We know\nfrom the Gospels themselves that this was not always the case. If such a\nperson had narrated events which occurred during his absence, he must have\nbeen indebted for his knowledge of them to the testimony of others. If\ntherefore the present Greek Matthew could be proved to be the work of the\nApostle, still it by no means follows that he was an eye\u2010witness of every\none of the events recorded in it. If, however, it was set forth in its\npresent form by some other hand, I fully admit that neither of the\nSynoptics was composed by an Apostle. But this is a wholly different point\nfrom the consideration whether they do or do not embody the testimony of\nthe eye\u2010witnesses of the ministry of Jesus Christ. This does not depend on\nour knowledge of the names of their respective authors, but whether we\nhave good evidence that they faithfully embody the primitive apostolical\ntraditions.\n\nA careful perusal of the Synoptics will convince the reader that neither\nof them professes to embody a set of personal reminiscences. On the\ncontrary, they bear the strongest indications of being a collection of\napostolic traditions. Of this I shall offer distinctive proof in the next\nchapter. The only Gospel which embodies such personal reminiscences as\nindicate the authorship of an eye\u2010witness is that of St. John. But the\nindications of the presence of an individual personality in St. Matthew\u2019s\nGospel are almost entirely wanting. In its general structure it forms a\nstriking contrast to that of John. Supposing it to have been composed by\nthe Apostle, he has entirely hidden his individuality in his narrative.\n\nThe question, therefore, really turns on the conclusion at which we are\nable to arrive as to whether the Synoptic Gospels are faithful\nrepresentations of the primitive apostolic traditions. I have proved that\neven at the latest date to which opponents assign their publication, they\nmust have been written within the period when all the requisite materials\nexisted for composing a substantially correct account of all the leading\nfacts; that such a traditionary account was certainly handed down in the\nChurch; that it formed the ground\u2010work of its existence; that it must have\nbeen derived from apostolic men, who had ample means of knowing the facts;\nthat the Church possessed the means of transmitting them accurately, such\nas were never possessed by any other Society; and that it was under the\nnecessity of doing so as the condition of its life; and that while this\naccount remained fresh in the recollections both of the community and of\nits individual members, it would have been impossible to foist on them a\nfictitious story. I shall now proceed to inquire how far the phenomena of\nthe Gospels tend to establish these positions.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII. THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM\nTHEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURE.\n\n\nThis subject is an extremely extensive one. The utmost, therefore, that I\ncan do is to notice a few of the most important points which bear on the\nargument. I have already shown that the general principles of historical\nevidence point to the conclusion that the Synoptic Gospels are three\ndifferent versions of the primitive apostolical traditions respecting the\nactions and the teaching of Jesus Christ, and that even on the assumption\nthat the dates assigned to them by the opponents are the correct ones\n(which however I would by no means be understood as conceding, for all the\ninternal evidence points to a much earlier period), they were still\ncomposed within the period when such traditions possess the highest\nhistorical value. I must now inquire whether the general structure of\nthese Gospels confirms this conclusion.\n\nThe question therefore at once arises, what is their general character? Do\nthey present the marks of traditionary history; or of being three works\ncomposed by three different authors, who not only wrote independently of\neach other, but who used no common source of information? Do their\nnarratives present us with the characteristics of historical truth or of\nfictitious invention? The facts before us are ample, and they ought to\nenable us to return a definite answer to these questions.\n\nThe most remarkable trait which first strikes the reader is the presence\nof a common narrative interwoven with a considerable amount of matter\npeculiar to each Gospel. Many of the events, and several of the discourses\nare narrated by all three Evangelists; others by only two. Besides these\ncommon narratives and discourses, which form the larger portion of the\nGospels, each of them contains narratives and discourses peculiar to\nitself. While they possess much that is common, it is clear that each\nwriter had a distinct object in view in the compilation of his Gospel;\nthat of St. Matthew being chiefly designed for Jewish Christians; that of\nSt. Luke for Gentile converts, and that of St. Mark occupying an\nintermediate place between the two. It was also obviously the object of\nthe author of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel to set forth the discourses; of that of\nSt. Mark\u2019s to give a graphic description of the actions of our Lord. Each\nof these Gospels is also distinguished by a number of minor peculiarities.\n\nWhen the common narrative comes to be closely scrutinized, it presents us\nwith phenomena more remarkable than any that can be found elsewhere in\nliterature. These narratives are couched to a considerable extent in the\nsame words and phrases, closely interwoven with a number of most singular\nvariations, which have an important bearing on their historical character.\nAs far as the words are identical, they force on us the conclusion that\nthey must have been derived from some common origin. These identities are\nmore striking in the narrative than in the discourses. Three independent\nwriters, if they intended to hand down the general sense of a body of\ndiscourses, on the supposition that they were in possession of accurate\ninformation, would repeat them to a great extent in the same words. But\nthat three independent writers, who used no common source of information\nin narrating the same occurrences, should have employed the same words to\nthe extent to which it has been done by the authors of these Gospels is\nsimply impossible.\n\nBut if they had all copied from the same document, these identities of\nexpression must inevitably have been more complete. It would have been\nimpossible that they could have been of the capricious character which\nthey present to us in the pages of the Evangelists. Even in the\nnarratives, frequent as is the use of the same words, the variations are\nnumerous; nor are they much less so in the discourses. They are of the\nmost singular character, and without the smallest apparent purpose.\nSometimes they are simple changes in grammatical construction, or a word\nof nearly the same meaning is substituted for another. Then we find one or\nmore lines, sometimes a whole sentence, transposed. Sometimes words or\nlines which are inserted by one Evangelist are omitted by another, the\nomission obscuring, and the insertion throwing light on the sense. At\nother times, a whole incident is omitted which, if it had been inserted,\nwould have made an obscure context plain. In the discourses it\noccasionally happens that a part of one which we read in the same context\nin another Evangelist, and which seems to be required by the connection,\nis omitted, when words of nearly the same import have been attributed to\nour Lord elsewhere. Again: sayings are reported in which, while many words\nare the same, others are varied without any conceivable reason for the\nvariation. In one or two instances, when words are put into the mouths of\npersons different from those to whom they are attributed by another\nEvangelist, the grammatical structure is altered to suit the variation. Of\nthis we have two remarkable examples in the account of the healing of the\nCenturion\u2019s servant, and in the narrative of the request which the two\nsons of Zebedee and Salome presented to our Lord. The words are precisely\nthe same, while the grammatical forms differ, according as the one or the\nother is regarded as the speaker.\n\nSuch are the chief phenomena. But the full extent and character of these\nvariations, in the closest union as they are with identities of\nexpression, can only be appreciated by a careful comparison of the\nparallel narrative of the Gospels. Numerous, however, as are the\nvariations, it must be observed that they exert scarcely any appreciable\ninfluence on the general sense. They utterly negate the idea that they can\nhave originated in any set or deliberate purpose. Let us take for example\nthe account of the feeding of the five thousand. The Synoptics employ the\nvery remarkable expression, that after the performance of the miracle, our\nLord _constrained_ the disciples to embark, without giving us a hint of\nthe reason of so unusual an occurrence. We turn to St. John\u2019s Gospel; he\nsays not one word about our Lord\u2019s constraining the disciples to embark,\nbut tells us that the multitude were designing to come and take Jesus by\nforce and make Him a king. This notice, which is of the most incidental\ncharacter, gives as the fullest explanation of an event which would\notherwise have been extremely obscure.\n\nBut further: in the account of the miracle itself, one of the Evangelists\ntells us, that the numbers who were fed were about five thousand, besides\nwomen and children. How then were the numbers ascertained? and how came it\nto pass that the men only were numbered, and neither the women, nor\nchildren? Another Evangelist tells us that the multitude were directed to\nsit down in companies by hundreds and by fifties. This at once explains\nhow the numbers were arrived at. But if this was the case, how came it to\nbe known that the men were about five thousand; and how came it to pass,\nthat the women and children were excluded from the total enumeration? Here\nagain another Evangelist comes to our help; and informs us that although\nthe order was given to the whole multitude to sit down in companies, those\nwho actually did so were the \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 not the \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, _i.e._ that the men\nonly sat down, but the women and children did not. This is told us in the\nmost incidental form, appearing only in the Greek.\n\nThis last case is perhaps the most remarkable example in the Gospels, of\nthe manner in which an incidental variation in one Evangelist throws light\non the obscurities of another. Can such a narrative be otherwise than\nhistorical? This note of veracity is so entirely incidental that it has in\nall probability escaped the notice of nine hundred and ninety\u2010nine out of\nevery thousand of its readers. There are many others, though less\nstriking, all of which are of the same incidental character, and it is\nimpossible to attribute them to design. Surely this can only have resulted\nfrom our being in the presence of facts and not of fiction.\n\nBut the variations in the discourses require a further notice. When\nvariations occur in highly important discourses, it is open to the\nsuspicion that they have originated in the deliberate purpose of giving a\ndifferent doctrinal meaning to the words. But when we closely examine\nthose in the Gospels, although they are very numerous, we find them of a\npurely incidental character, exerting a very inconsiderable influence on\nthe sense. I am aware that attempts have been made to show that some few\nof these variations have originated in design; but these attempts only\nprove the straits to which those who make them are driven. Thus in the\naccount of the Sermon on the Mount as we read it in St. Matthew, the\npassage runs: \u201cBlessed are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of\nheaven.\u201d In the corresponding passage in St. Luke it runs: \u201cBlessed are\n_ye_ poor,\u201d _i.e._ the poor people who were our Lord\u2019s disciples, for the\nEvangelist expressly tells us that these words were addressed, not to the\nmultitude generally, but to them. The supposition that this variation\nindicates the presence of something resembling communistic views in the\nauthor of St. Luke\u2019s Gospel is too absurd to be worthy of serious\ndiscussion. Taking them as a whole, these discrepancies create no\nappreciable difference in the teaching of Jesus as reported by the\ndifferent Evangelists.\n\nOne thing respecting them is clear\u2014they bear the strongest testimony to\nthe historical character of the writings which contain them. It is simply\ninconceivable that the authors of the Gospels made them deliberately. They\nmust have found them in the sources from which they drew their\ninformation. They form one of the strongest proofs that neither a forger,\nnor an accommodater of facts for the purpose of making them fit in with\nparticular doctrinal theories, has had any hand in originating them. In\nsimple changes in grammatical structure, purpose or design is\ninconceivable.\n\nBut the variations in narratives, such as those above referred to, are\neven more important as constituting an attestation of their historical\nreality than variations in discourses. Four separate versions of a\nfictitious incident fail to clear up one another\u2019s obscurities. But the\nability to do so is the distinctive mark of imperfect narratives of facts,\ntold by different witnesses. When two things of a complicated mechanical\nconstruction exactly dovetail into each other, it is a proof that they\nhave originated in the same mind. In a similar manner, when a number of\ndistinct narratives, each of which is more or less incomplete, exactly fit\ninto each other, this constitutes a proof, that they did not originate in\na fiction but in a fact.\n\nAn illustration will aid in showing the force of this reasoning. The early\nhistory of Rome is unquestionably of a highly legendary character. We have\ntwo versions of it, one by Livy, and another by Dionysius. These writers\ndo not give us direct accounts of the primitive legends, but their\nnarratives are compiled from authors of a much earlier date, who first\nreduced them to writing. Still these historians may be viewed as\nsubstantially accurate reporters of the legendary history, as it was\ncompiled by the earlier writers. An important question therefore arises,\ndoes the twofold account which we possess of these legends, after all the\nefforts made by Livy and Dionysius to weave them into a consistent whole,\nbear the smallest analogy to the narratives contained in four Evangelists?\nIt is clear that great disagreements existed among the original\nauthorities. Let us take any account of the supposed events of three\nyears\u2014do the variations in the two accounts bear the smallest resemblance\nto the singular phenomena which we find in the Evangelists? Will they\ndovetail into one another? Will the small additions in one throw light on\nthe obscurities of the other? Do the speeches present any indications of\nbeing copies of a common original? All these questions must be answered in\nthe negative. Whence then comes this difference between the narratives of\nthe Evangelists and the legendary accounts of the origin of the Roman\npower? I answer, because the one is founded on fact and the other on\nfiction.\n\nIt is not my intention to discuss the innumerable theories that have been\npropounded as to the origin of the Gospels, for the purpose of accounting\nfor the common narrative, its variations, and the additions peculiar to\neach. Many of these theories violate the principle of common sense; and if\nthe contrary were not known to be the fact they would suggest the idea\nthat their authors had never practised the art of literary composition.\nAmong them I shall only notice the theories which suppose that the\nEvangelists had before them one common document when writing their\nGospels; or that one of them had before him the Gospel of another; that\nthey deliberately copied the common words and phrases, and no less\ndeliberately made the alterations, additions, and transpositions which the\ncommon narrative presents. Let us take for an illustration the supposition\nthat the author of Mark\u2019s Gospel had that of Matthew before him, or the\nconverse. In the one case he must have deliberately retained all the\ncommon words and phrases, after making the most capricious variations and\nsuppressions. Next, he must have inserted all the little additions which\ndistinguish the Gospel of St. Mark from that of St. Matthew, and made the\nrequisite transpositions. But what is still more remarkable, he must also\nhave taxed his invention to insert in the midst of its impersonal\nnarrative all those graphic descriptions which impart to Mark\u2019s Gospel the\nappearance of ocular testimony. Besides all this he must of set purpose\nhave omitted nearly all the discourses in which Matthew\u2019s Gospel is so\nfull, or have placed them in a different context. If, on the other hand,\nwe suppose that Mark\u2019s Gospel is the original and Matthew\u2019s the copy, the\nwhole process must be reversed, and above all the author must have\ndeliberately struck out the graphic portions of Mark, except in one or two\ninstances, when he has added some of his own. All theories which are\nfounded on the supposition that the authors of either Gospel used a common\ndocument and deliberately altered it, or that one of them formed his\nGospel out of that of another by a number of additions and subtractions\naxe simply incredible.\n\nBut the common narrative exists with the identities of expression\ninterwoven with its variations. How are we to account for this remarkable\nfact? The identities of expression must have had a common origin. But what\ndo the variations prove? Evidently that the narrative had passed through a\nperiod of oral transmission. No other theory can adequately account for\nthem.\n\nSuch variations would naturally spring up in the course of oral\ntransmission. We have already seen that the circumstances of the Church\nrendered such a mode of transmission necessary, as details of our Lord\u2019s\nlife must have formed regular portions of Christian instruction. In doing\nthis, variations would inevitably arise. After a while they would assume a\ndistinctive type in different Churches. If then the Synoptic narratives\nare three versions of an oral Gospel handed down in as many Churches, and\nput together with additions by their respective authors, this affords a\nreasonable explanation of the phenomena which the common narrative\npresents. In this case the only thing which involves a difficulty is the\nlarge number of identities preserved by the Evangelists. This proves the\nstrong hold which the words must have had on the minds of the members of\nthe different Churches.\n\nThe existence of a traditionary narrative is still further proved by the\nfourth Gospel. No one can deny that this is an independent record, and\nthat its origin must have been wholly different from that of the other\nthree. Yet in those portions which cover common ground with the Synoptics\nwe meet with phenomena of a similar order, all proving that there must\nhave been a narrative in existence which had impressed itself indelibly on\nthe mind of the Church; so much so that an entirely independent writer\nfell into the same mode of expression when his subject led him to narrate\nincidents common to the other three.\n\nEvery consideration which can be brought to bear on this subject tends to\nprove the existence of a traditionary narrative of the actions and\nteaching of Jesus which was handed down in the Churches prior to the\npublication of either of the Synoptic Gospels, and that their common\nmatter must have passed through a period of oral transmission. It follows\ntherefore that our three Synoptics are three different versions of the\nsame oral Gospel modified in the course of transmission and supplemented\nby additional information introduced by their respective authors. We know\nas a fact that a traditionary narrative maintained its place in the Church\nfar into the second century. Papias deliberately expressed his preference\nfor it as compared with written records; and the writings of other Fathers\nshow their acquaintance with it.\n\nIt is clear therefore that a number of traditionary narratives existed in\nthe Church; and that if a number of persons had set themselves to reduce\nthese accounts to writing, they would have presented phenomena analogous\nto those of the Synoptic Gospels. I have also shown that these Gospels\npresent all the phenomena which distinguish this species of narrative. The\nsubstantial agreement of the three, both as to facts and as to the\ndiscourses, is a guarantee that the actual traditions of the Church have\nbeen accurately reported. Their diversities also afford the strongest\nproof that these reports were composed in perfect independence of each\nother.\n\nIt is remarkable that the great majority of those against whom I am\nreasoning admit that the discourses in the Synoptic Gospels are fairly\naccurate representations of the actual utterances of Jesus, although they\nmust have passed through a period of oral transmission. Yet it is certain\nthat the accurate transmission of discourses by oral tradition is far more\ndifficult than that of a report of facts through the same medium. The\ndifficulty of preventing the intrusion of foreign elements is much\ngreater. Slight alterations may materially affect their meaning. Yet the\ndiscourses recorded in the Synoptics bear the indelible impress of a\nsingle mind, that of Jesus Christ.(6) It follows therefore that if the\ntraditions of the Church were able to hand down accurately the discourses\nof our Lord until the time when they were reduced to writing, still more\neasily would they transmit a correct account of His acts as narrated by\nHis original followers. Except on account of the antecedent difficulty\nwith which the miraculous element in the narrative is supposed to be\nattended, it would be absurd to accept the one and to reject the other as\nmere legendary invention. But having once established the fact of the\nResurrection, the antecedent difficulty of the miracles is effectually\ndisposed of, and the facts resume their place in history.\n\nIt forms no objection to the general argument that some of the Synoptics\ncontain narratives of considerable length, which are omitted by others. It\nwas precisely what was to be expected that the traditionary accounts would\nvary in this respect, and have incidents reported by different witnesses\nof our Lord\u2019s ministry incorporated into them. They abound in the Gospel\nof St. Luke, who distinctly states that it is a compilation.\n\nA careful study of the Gospel of St. Matthew must lead to the conclusion\nthat its narrative portions are derived from the same general sources as\nthose of the other two. We find in it precisely the same verbal identities\nwhich have been already noticed as affording proof of the existence of a\ncommon source of information, and the same variations which prove that it\nmust have passed through a period of oral transmission. Nor are the\nindications of autoptic testimony stronger in Matthew than in the other\ntwo Evangelists; in fact, they are less so than in Mark. The discourses in\nMatthew, viewed as a whole, are a far more complete collection of the\nsayings of our Lord, than those in Mark or Luke. It seems to have been one\nof the chief purposes of the author of this Gospel to make a collection of\nthem, and to unite them by a brief narrative of events. But even in the\ndiscourses, some of the variations found in Mark and Luke possess stronger\nclaims to be regarded as the original form of the utterances of our Lord,\nthan the corresponding ones in Matthew. In the parts which are common to\nthe Synoptics, they are evidently founded on one common source of\ninformation; and in this respect neither of them can put in a higher claim\nto originality than the other.\n\nSuch are some of the chief characteristics of these Gospels, which have\nthe most intimate bearing on their claims to be regarded as genuine\nhistorical productions. They are accounts of the traditions of the Church\nrespecting the life and teaching of its Founder at the time when they were\ncomposed. I have already shown, that if they were composed at any time\nbetween the ministry of Jesus Christ and the first twenty years of the\nsecond century, it would have been impossible to have substituted a\nlegendary narrative for the account which was handed down in the Church. I\nam not concerned to prove that no inaccuracies could have crept into these\ntraditionary accounts. The only question of the smallest importance is,\nare they substantially historical? On this question mere minor details,\nthe order and arrangement of events, or even the introduction of two or\nthree erroneous accounts, has no more bearing than it has on the general\ncredit of other histories. Our question is, what is their value as sources\nof history? This must be kept perfectly distinct from the question as to\nthe nature and extent of the inspiration of the writers.\n\nWith respect to a large number of alleged discrepancies, their whole force\nas objections to the historical character of the Gospels is disposed of by\nthe simple consideration that their authors assert them to be memoirs, and\nnot histories. No small number of others can be shown to exist only in the\nimagination of those who allege them. A few real difficulties will\nprobably remain; but these no more invalidate their historical character,\nthan similar ones which are to be found in every writer \u201cfrom Herodotus to\nMr. Froude.\u201d\n\nIt must not be forgotten that a careful examination of the Gospels\ndiscloses a mass of additional evidence on this subject which is\ninconsistent with the idea that their narratives are a mere congeries of\nlegendary inventions. It would be impossible to investigate it in a work\nlike the present, or even to give an idea of its value, as shown in the\nintimate acquaintance of the authors with the events, ideas, customs, and\ngeneral circumstances of the times. To compose such stories out of any\nmaterials which could have been at his hand at the beginning of the second\ncentury, supposing him to have been devoid of all personal knowledge on\nthe subject, would defy any modern writer of fiction, even one possessed\nof the highest genius; not to speak of the incompetence of the ancient\nworld in this class of literature, rendering the attempts of such writers\nas existed among the early Christians simply hopeless.\n\nThere are two additional points to which I must draw attention here, in\nthe internal structure of the Gospels, as establishing their historical\ncharacter.\n\nThe strongest evidence which the Gospels afford of their being historical\nnarratives is the unquestionable fact that they contain a delineation of\nthe greatest of all characters, Jesus Christ our Lord. This character is\nthere depicted, even in the opinion of unbelievers of the greatest\neminence, with a matchless perfection. Why will they not grapple with the\nquestion of its origin, and show how it is possible that such a character\nshould ever have found a place in the Gospels, on any theory which they\nhave propounded to account for their origin? It does not originate in any\nformal sketch or delineation. This the Evangelists have nowhere given. It\nis the combined result of all the facts and the discourses which they\ncontain. The whole subject matter of the Gospels is in fact the material\nout of which this great character is delineated. How came it there if the\nGospels consist only of a mass of mythic and legendary stories which\ngradually accumulated in the Church? How is it possible that a bundle of\nlegends thus thrown together can have created the perfect character of\nJesus Christ, forming, as it does, an harmonious whole? How has it come to\npass that the authors of our Gospels, if they each composed their\nnarratives from a mass of fictions which grew up during a period of\nseventy years, have each given us a delineation of the same Jesus? These\nare problems which have an intimate bearing on the question whether they\nbelong to the order of historical or fictitious compositions, but with\nwhich unbelief has hitherto most prudently declined to grapple. I shall\nnot pursue them further here, as I have discussed them fully in the work\nalready referred to, and shown that the portraiture of Jesus Christ as\ndelineated in our Gospels is inconsistent with any theory of their origin\nwhich has been propounded by our opponents. To this work I must refer the\nreader.\n\nBut there is a second character which is harmoniously delineated in the\nGospels, to which I have not alluded in the work above referred to, that\nof Simon Peter. This character, though a subordinate one, is also a\nperfect delineation of its kind, instinct with historic life. It differs\nfrom that of Jesus Christ in being that of a purely human character,\npossessed of many of the virtues and not a few of the frailties of\nordinary human nature. No student of the Gospels can rise from their\nperusal without a lively conception of it. If they are historical, the\naccount of the origin of this second character of which they present us so\nperfect a delineation is a very simple one. It is that of a genuine man,\nwhose actions they have correctly recorded. But if the Gospels are such as\nmy opponents affirm them to be, I must earnestly put to them the question,\nHow came this character there also? Each Gospel presents us with a\ndelineation of Peter. In each the same living man is before us, in all his\nvirtues and in all his failings. How, I ask, is it possible that the\nauthor of each Gospel has succeeded in creating a character of Simon\nPeter\u2014each true to nature and each manifestly a delineation of the same\nperson\u2014out of a number of fictions, myths, and legends? Can any one affirm\nthat the Peter of the Gospels presents us with one single trait of a\ncharacter formed by legend?\n\nBut the existence of this delineation in each of the Gospels involves\nthose with whom I am reasoning in a yet further difficulty. The New\nTestament contains a fifth delineation of the character of Simon Peter,\nprofessedly drawn by himself. I allude to his first Epistle. This\nunbelievers say is not his genuine production, though the external\nevidence for it is strong. In either case it will be equally available for\nmy argument. If it was written by him, it is separated by an interval of\nfrom thirty to forty years from the Peter of the Gospels. After such a\nperiod of time we ought to find the same substantial lineaments of\ncharacter, but chastened, improved, and softened by the influence of\nChristianity. This is precisely what we do find. The Peter of the Epistle\nis the Peter of the Gospels, in all the substantial elements of his\ncharacter, but raised to a greater moral elevation. The Peter of the\nGospels is the Peter of youthful aspirations, who has had little\nexperience of the trials and struggles of human life. The Peter of the\nEpistle while continually reminding us of the Peter of the Gospels, is a\ndeeply softened man, with many of his infirmities changed into the graces\nto which they are allied.\n\nNow if the four Peters of the Gospels are fictions, how have their\ninventors succeeded in delineating him true to his youthful character, and\ntrue to human nature? If, on the other hand, the Peters of the Gospels and\nof the Epistle are all five creations of the imagination, the difficulty\nis increased to impossibility. How was it possible for the forger of the\nEpistle to have delineated a Peter who should be true to the legendary\ncharacter of the Peter of the Gospels, and at the same time such an\nimproved version of it as would naturally result from the trials of\nbetween thirty and forty years spent in the service and in attempts to put\nin practice the teaching of his Master? It follows, therefore, that the\nfive portraitures of Simon Peter presented us in the New Testament, are so\nmany distinctive proofs that the Gospels are historical realities, and not\nthe mere offspring of the imaginations of their respective authors.\n\nI am now in a position to restore the Gospels to their place in history,\nand to estimate the value of their testimony. The Synoptics are so many\nversions of the traditions, preserved in the different Churches during the\nfirst century, of that portion of the life and teaching of Jesus which\nformed the groundwork of Christianity. Such an account, more or less full,\nmust have been handed down from the first origin of the Church. This\naccount received enlargements from different narrators who had been\nwitnesses of different events of our Lord\u2019s life and ministry; but so\ncompletely was it interwoven with the daily course of Christian life, that\nit is impossible that matters inconsistent with its fundamental conception\ncan have become incorporated with it. Moreover, the whole period lay\nwithin the limits of time during which traditions are strictly historical.\nNo community ever existed which had equal facilities for handing down\naccurately the events of its Founder\u2019s life, or had stronger inducements\nto do so. The Church was struggling for existence, and seeking to\nassimilate to itself the elements by which it was surrounded. This alone\nmust have kept steadily in its memory the leading events of the life of\nJesus. These, as we have seen, must also have formed the subjects in which\nits converts were habitually instructed. Jesus Christ, to use the\nexpressive language of St. Paul, must have been to the primitive Christian\ncommunity from the hour of its birth \u201call and in all.\u201d\n\nFrom the various direct and indirect references in St. Paul\u2019s Epistles we\ncan form a general idea of the life and teaching of Jesus, as it must have\nbeen accepted by the Churches to which he wrote. All the outlines\nfurnished by these Epistles may be traced in our present Gospels. If we\ndescend to a still later period, we shall find that accounts,\nsubstantially the same, were spread over the entire Church. Even if it is\ntrue that the early Ecclesiastical writers do not cite the Gospels, it is\nevident that they were in possession of accounts, either written or\nunwritten, which were for all practical purposes the same. It follows,\ntherefore, that as the Synoptics contain three versions of the ministry of\nJesus which were handed down by the Churches of the first century, their\nclaim to the character of historical documents substantially accurate in\nall their main features is unquestionable.\n\nNothing is more lamentable than the manner in which a number of minute\nverbal questions have been introduced into this great controversy. Both\nparties have freely indulged in it. The life of Christianity has been made\nto depend on whether some passage in a particular Father bears a precise\nverbal agreement with another passage to be found in our present Gospels.\nSuch matters may be interesting as mere literary questions, but surely\nthey are not worthy to be dignified by the title of historical ones. To\nrepresent the life of Christianity as depending on them, is to leave the\nbroad basis of historical investigation, and descend to the mere\ntechnicalities of legal evidence, by which the parties who are most\ncapable of throwing light on the case are excluded from giving evidence at\nall, while many minor points are debated with the utmost ardour. I desire\nto express no opinion as to whether this is right or wrong in judicial\nprocesses; but the principles of history are widely different. All\nevidence must be accepted for what it is worth, and for no more. The\nissues are great ones, and are not dependent on any mere set of barren\ntechnicalities.\n\nChristianity is not only one of the greatest facts in history, but the\ngreatest; and its truth or falsehood can never be dependent on whether a\npassage more or less in Justin Martyr is an accurate citation of another\nin St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel. The only questions of real importance are: Do the\nnumerous references of the early Christian writers to the life and\nteaching of Jesus Christ substantially agree with the accounts of that\nlife and teaching given in our Gospels? Do they contain any account which\ngives a really different version of it? If such agreement exists, although\nthere may be minor differences, the matter is settled as an historical\nquestion. The Gospels, in all their great outlines, are virtually accurate\naccounts of the traditions of the primitive Church respecting the actions\nand the teaching of its Founder, and as such they satisfy all the\nconditions of history.\n\nIt is impossible that I should in this place enter on the question of the\nauthorship or the date of the Fourth Gospel. The literature on this\nsubject would fill a library of no mean size. I shall only refer to Mr.\nSanday\u2019s able vindication of its historical character. One thing\nrespecting it is clear. It is either the veritable work of an eye\u2010witness\nof the facts which it records, or it is a consummate fiction, such as can\nbe found nowhere else, either in the ancient or the modern world. Its\nauthor must have united a fixed determination to perpetrate a forgery on a\nmost sacred subject, with one of the loftiest ideals of morality, and an\ninimitable power of simple description, and of inventing fictitious scenes\nin a manner which is in the highest degree true to human nature. If this\nwork was really written by a person who was not a Jew, one hundred and\nfifty years after the events which are described in it, and a century\nafter the destruction of Jerusalem, the accuracy of its descriptions is\none of the most singular phenomena in literary history. Wherever it runs\nparallel with the Synoptic Gospels, it throws light on their obscurities\nwithout the smallest apparent intention of doing so. In some places it\nhelps to correct erroneous impressions into which the reader of the\nSynoptic narratives might otherwise have fallen. Even in that most\nstriking disagreement between them, respecting the Paschal character of\nthe Last Supper, we find in the Synoptics hints which corroborate St.\nJohn\u2019s account of it. One simple alternative, and one only, lies before\nus; either to accept this Gospel as a history of the highest authority, or\nto reject it as an audacious forgery.\n\nIt now remains for me very briefly to consider the value of the testimony\nof the Gospels to the truth of the Resurrection.\n\nIf one thing more than another is evident respecting them, it is that they\nwere not written for the purposes of controversy with unbelievers, but for\nthe instruction of Christians. It is certain that the last thing which\noccurred to their authors was to guard their narratives against possible\nobjections. This is made clear by every page. At the time when they were\ncomposed, the Resurrection had long been accepted by the entire body of\nbelievers, as the foundation of their faith. It was therefore not\nnecessary for the Gospels to prove it, as it would have been if they had\nbeen composed with a direct view to unbelievers. This is a point which it\nis important to bear in mind in considering the nature of their testimony.\nTwo of the narratives of it are entirely incidental; and it is quite clear\nthat their authors never intended to give an exhaustive account of the\nfacts. The other two, though giving us more details, participate largely\nin the same character. It is impossible to read either narrative with care\nand not feel that it was never intended to be a systematic account of all\nthe facts with which the author was acquainted respecting the\nResurrection.\n\nIt is objected against these narratives that they abound with variations,\namounting to contradictions. The variations are unquestionable, and it\nwill readily be conceded that it is extremely difficult to piece together\nall the details of the existing accounts so as to weave them into an\nharmonious whole. In fact they are inevitable whenever the incidents\ndescribed are of exciting interest. Such must have been the character of\nthose connected with the Resurrection.\n\nThe chief difficulty is found in the details of the morning of that\nimportant day. They are in an extremely fragmentary form, and it is quite\nclear that we have not all the events before us. If we had, we should then\nbe in a position to judge what is the precise nature of the variations in\nthe minor details. But even if contradictions could be proved to exist,\nhow does their presence invalidate the main facts, whose truth is\nestablished by wholly independent testimony? The only way in which it can\nbe made to do so is by mixing up questions involving particular theories\nof inspiration with considerations purely historical. Such discrepancies\nexist in connection with some of the most important facts of history in\ntheir minor details, without in the smallest degree invalidating their\nhistorical credibility.\n\nThis may be easily tested by examining a number of newspaper accounts of\nany exciting event, which are derived from reporters entirely independent\nof each other. One witnesses one thing, and one another; and it is often\ndifficult to weave the whole into a perfectly consistent narrative. No one\ncan doubt that the morning of the Resurrection must have been one in the\nlast degree exciting to the disciples of our Lord. They were not mere\nreporters, but persons profoundly interested in the various occurrences.\nIt would therefore have been inconsistent with the historical truth of\ntheir position, if their narratives had presented us with no variations.\n\nIt is certain that several women accompanied our Lord on His last journey\nto Jerusalem. What was more likely than that they would visit the\nsepulchre at different times, and with different purposes? Can any one\ndoubt that their excitement must have been great? What conceivable\ndifference can it make to the great fact of the Resurrection, that one\naccount mentions two Marys as going to the sepulchre; that the second adds\nto these Salome; that the third mentions several women; and that the\nfourth mentions Mary Magdalene alone? There might have been, as far as\nanything which appears in the narratives is concerned, several different\nvisits; or the same person may have returned more than once. Or what is\nthe use of urging that there is an apparent variation of about an hour\nbetween the different accounts, as to the precise time when these visits\nwere made? Do variations of this description, which are found in accounts\nderived from eye\u2010witnesses of Louis XVI\u2019s flight from Paris, in the\nsmallest degree invalidate the fact? Or what conceivable difference does\nit make that one narrative represents the women as seeing one angel, and\nanother two; and that one describes the appearance as taking place inside,\nand another outside the sepulchre? It is quite possible that all these\naccounts may be true, and that these occurrences took place on different\noccasions. If they were true, nothing was more unlikely than that the\nwomen could have given an orderly narrative of them. Variations must occur\nin all reports of events when the witnesses see only a portion of them.\nThe great facts before us are plain and evident; and unless they are\nfalsehoods, there could be no possibility of mistake respecting them.\nDifferent bodies of women found the sepulchre empty. Some of them affirmed\nthat they had seen Jesus risen from the dead, and that He sent a message\nby them to His disciples. Peter and John visited the sepulchre, and found\nit empty. Later in the same day, Peter affirmed that Jesus Christ appeared\nto him; on which day also two other disciples affirmed that they had seen\nHim on a journey, at first without recognizing Him, but that they did so\nafterwards. On the evening of the same day, these two disciples, ten of\nthe Apostles, with other persons in company, saw Him in a body, and were\npermitted to test the reality of His Resurrection by handling His Person,\nand by seeing Him eat. About such facts there could be no mistake. Most of\nthem were well known and accepted when St. Paul wrote his Epistles, when\nthe means of testing their truth was ample. We know on the same authority\nthat the whole apostolic body asserted that they had seen the Lord, and\nthat as many as five hundred other persons made a similar assertion. These\nare the chief facts, and a number of minor variations such as those above\nreferred to cannot affect their credibility.\n\nIt has been objected that the author of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel was ignorant\nof some of these appearances. On what ground is the objection made? On the\nfact that he has not mentioned them? Does a writer always report all he\nknows, especially when his writing is intended for the use of those who\nfirmly believe the fact already? Nothing can exceed the fragmentary\ncharacter of this portion of his narrative. If this Gospel was composed at\nthe late period assigned to it by those against whom I am reasoning,\nnamely, A.D. 90, it is incredible that these were the only facts known to\nthe writer, at least thirty years after St. Paul wrote his Epistles. The\ncharge of ignorance might be sustained with far greater plausibility if it\nwere admitted that St. Matthew was the author of this Gospel, because it\nmight have been expected that he would mention the first occasion on which\nhis Master had appeared to him rather than the third. But his authorship\nis denied, and the publication of the Gospel assigned to the last ten\nyears of the century, when it was impossible that the author, whoever he\nmay have been, could be ignorant that it was alleged that our Lord had\nappeared on other occasions besides those mentioned by him.\n\nI will now consider the threefold account of the great appearance on the\nmorning of Easter\u2010day. One of them is contained in the supplement to St.\nMark\u2019s Gospel; the other two are those in Luke and John. Let us first\ncarefully observe the mode in which they are narrated in the supplement.\n\nIts author seems to have entertained a stronger view of the indisposition\nof the disciples to believe the truth of the Resurrection than the other\ntwo narratives appear to warrant. He first notices the appearance to Mary\nMagdalene on the morning of that day, and says that the disciples refused\nto credit her report. Next, he tells us of the appearance to the two\ndisciples as they went into the country; and states that on their return\nthey told it to the remainder, \u201c_Neither believed __ they them._\u201d\n\u201cAfterward,\u201d he adds, \u201che appeared _to the eleven as they sat at meat, and\nupbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they\nbelieved not those who had seen him after he was risen_.\u201d It is evident\nthat the author of the supplement entertained a strong view of the\nincredulity of the disciples when their companions reported to them the\nfact of the Resurrection.\n\nLet us now examine how the facts stand in Luke\u2019s narrative. It opens with\na detailed account of the journey into the country of Cleopas and his\ncompanion, and of our Lord\u2019s appearance to them. Our Lord addresses them\nin the following words: \u201c_O fools and slow of heart,_\u201d (\u03a9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u0392\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3) \u201c_to believe all that the prophets have spoken._\u201d After\ntheir recognition of Jesus, they are described as immediately returning to\nJerusalem, \u201c_and find the eleven gathered together and those that were\nwith them, saying, the Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared unto\nSimon._\u201d \u201c_And they_\u201d (_i.e._ Cleopas and his companion) \u201c_told what\nthings were done on the way, and how he was known unto them in the\nbreaking of bread._\u201d The narrative then proceeds: \u201c_And as they thus\nspake,_\u201d (_i.e._ Cleopas and his companion) \u201c_Jesus himself stood in the\nmidst of them, and said unto them, Peace be unto you._\u201d It then informs us\nthat they were terrified and supposed that the appearance was that of a\nspirit. On this our Lord reasons with them: \u201c_Why are ye troubled, and why\ndo thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet that it is I\nmyself, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have. And when\nhe had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet._\u201d The writer\nthen adds: \u201cAnd when they yet believed not for joy and wondered, he said\nunto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled\nfish, and of an honey\u2010comb, and he took it and did eat before them.\u201d The\nauthor then proceeds with his narrative: \u201cThese are the words that I spake\nunto you, while I was yet with you, that all things might be fulfilled\nthat are written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets and in the\nPsalms concerning me.\u201d And he adds: \u201c_Then opened he their understanding,\nthat they might understand the Scriptures._\u201d\n\nThe following is the account given of the same meeting in St. John\u2019s\nGospel. After having given a full description of the appearance to Mary\nMagdalene, he thus describes our Lord\u2019s appearance on the evening of\nEaster\u2010day: \u201cThen the first day at evening, being the first day of the\nweek, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear\nof the Jews, _came Jesus and stood in the midst, and said unto them, Peace\nbe unto you. And when he had so said, he showed them his hands and his\nside._ Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord. _Then said\nJesus unto them again, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even\nso send I you. And when he had said this he breathed on them, and said,\nReceive ye the Holy Ghost._\u201d\n\nThe difference between the supplement of Mark\u2019s Gospel and the narratives\nof Luke and John is very remarkable. Are the variations such as would be\nfound in different reports of a set of fictions, or are they such as\ndistinguish brief but inexact reports of actual occurrences? This is a\nvery important question.\n\nFirst: the three accounts bear the clearest indications of being\nindependent. It is incredible that any one of the three writers having\nbefore him one or both of the other two accounts should have composed his\nown as it now stands.\n\nSecondly: the author of the supplement uses very strong language in\ndescribing the unbelief of the disciples. He says that when they told it\nto the others, they did not believe their report. St. Luke, on the other\nhand, informs us that as soon as Cleopas and his companion entered the\nroom where on their return they found the Apostles and others assembled\ntogether, they were received with the exclamation: \u201c_The Lord is risen\nindeed, and hath appeared unto Simon._\u201d\n\nAgain: the author of the supplement says that when Jesus appeared to the\neleven as they sat at meat \u201c_he upbraided them with their unbelief and\nhardness of heart_ (\u1f60\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd)\n_because they did not believe them that had seen him after he was risen._\u201d\nSt. Luke tells us that not only were Cleopas and his companion received\nwith the joyful exclamation, \u201c_The Lord is risen indeed_,\u201d but instead of\nupbraiding them Jesus addressed them with the words \u201c_Peace be unto you_;\u201d\nwhich is confirmed by the author of the fourth Gospel, who, if St. John\nwas really the author, must have been present. In neither of these Gospels\nis there one word of \u201cupbraiding the disciples with unbelief;\u201d while both\naffirm that Jesus proceeded to give them rational grounds for believing\nthat He was actually risen from the dead, by showing them, according to\none, \u201chis hands and his feet,\u201d according to the other, \u201chis hands and his\nside.\u201d It is quite probable that He may have done both. St. John adds,\n\u201c_Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord._\u201d\n\nBut St. Luke\u2019s account is more specific. He tells us that immediately on\nHis entry fear took possession of their minds. \u201c_They were terrified and\naffrighted_,\u201d and supposed that it might be a spirit, and not Jesus\nactually raised from the dead. Our Lord therefore before showing them His\nhands and His feet proceeded to reason with them as to the reality of His\nappearance. \u201c_Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones __\nas ye see me have._\u201d Here there is nothing of reproach, such as is\nsuggested by the supplement to St. Mark\u2019s Gospel. Yet there was\nincredulity of a certain kind in the room, but not one which was worthy of\nreproach. We learn from St. Luke that it was not the incredulity of\n_unbelief, but of joy_; in other words, that the news seemed too good to\nbe true, and they dared scarcely trust the evidence of their senses. On\nthis however nothing in the form of a _reproach_ passes the lips of Jesus;\nbut for their further satisfaction, _he asks for food and eats it before\nthem_.\n\nOn all these points the narratives of St. Luke and St. John throw light on\neach other, as such accounts, if founded on fact, ought to do, while their\nindependence is indisputable. According to those with whom I am reasoning,\nthe Gospel of St. John is much the latest written. If therefore the author\nhad borrowed from Luke, it is incredible that a writer who had such powers\nof setting forth fictions in the garb of facts, should have omitted the\nother remarkable incidents mentioned by St. Luke, and not have dressed\nthem up with the art of which he was so consummate a master, for these\nwould have communicated a striking reality to the scenes. It is therefore\nunquestionable that these two accounts present all the phenomena of\nhistory, and none of those of fiction.\n\nBut how stands the continuation of St. Mark\u2019s Gospel, which affirms that\nour Lord upbraided the eleven with their unbelief and hardness of heart on\nthe occasion of His appearance on Easter evening?\n\nThe author of the supplement was probably not aware that Cleopas and his\ncompanion were present in the room when our Lord appeared to the eleven,\nor even that others besides the eleven were present, as is expressly\naffirmed by St. Luke to have been the case. The impression which it leaves\non the mind is that they reported the Resurrection to the disciples\ngenerally on their return, and that it was disbelieved by them, and that\nthe appearance to the eleven was a subsequent event.\n\nWe are now in a position to see how this misapprehension may have\noriginated; and that instead of invalidating the account, it forms a\nstrong confirmation of its truth. There were persons in the room whom our\nLord had actually reproached for their unbelief, viz. Cleopas and his\ncompanion; though He reproached none who were present on the occasion of\nHis appearance. The words stated by St. Luke to have been used by Him\nwere, \u03a9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u0392\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u1fb3, \u201cO fools and slow of heart.\u201d Those\nused in St. Mark in describing the address to the eleven are \u1f60\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u201cHe upbraided their unbelief and\nhardness of heart.\u201d The one expression is the very counterpart of the\nother. There were persons present who had been thus reproached but a few\nhours before: the author of the continuation was aware of the fact that\nsome had been thus reproached, and he supposed that the reproach was\naddressed to all the assembled disciples, instead of the salutation of\npeace with its attendant circumstances.\n\nThen as to their having been received with expressions of incredulity on\ntheir return, St. Luke tells us that they returned to Jerusalem, \u201c_and\nfound the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them._\u201d Now as\nthey had set out early in the day, it was necessary on their return that\nthey should make some inquiry as to where the Apostles were to be found.\nIn doing this it is probable enough that they went to inquire of some\ndisciples who received their account with incredulity, and that then this\nincredulity may through misapprehension have been transferred to the whole\nassembly. I submit therefore that notwithstanding this disagreement\nbetween the three accounts, that of the continuation of St. Mark\u2019s Gospel\ngives a strong corroboration of the statements of the other two. These are\nprecisely the kind of variations which we find in reports of events after\nthey have passed through a few stages of oral transmission.\n\nThe narratives of St. Luke and St. John furnish us with one more very\nincidental confirmation of each other. St. Luke informs us that on the\noccasion of this interview our Lord \u201c_opened their understanding, that\nthey might understand the Scriptures._\u201d St. John says that \u201c_He breathed\non them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost._\u201d The words and the mode of\nexpression differ greatly; but both statements point to one and the same\nfact, that on this occasion the persons present supposed that they\nreceived a supernatural enlightenment. St. Luke describes the effect\nproduced on the minds of the disciples; St. John gives the actual medium\nof its production. Coincidences of this kind prove that the narratives\nmust be founded on facts, and are beyond the skill of a forger to imitate.\n\nI have now considered a few of the leading features of the Gospels, which\nestablish the general historical character of their contents. A close\nexamination of them would put us in possession of a large amount of\nadditional evidence, but to enter on such an inquiry here would be\ninconsistent with the limits of the present work. As I have already\nobserved, the minute scrutiny of a number of minor details, as far as the\ngreat historical question is concerned, would be a needless expenditure of\nlabour. The real question at issue is: Is the account of our Lord\u2019s life\nand teaching, as it is handed down in our present Gospels, substantially\ntrue in its great outlines, or has one of a wholly different character\nbeen substituted for the true one, and usurped its place in the teaching\nof the Church? On a broad question of this kind, minor discrepancies in\nthe accounts have no real bearing. If the narrative is true in its great\noutlines, it follows that our Lord\u2019s character must have been beyond all\nquestion superhuman, and justifies us in affirming that He must have been\na \u201cteacher come from God.\u201d Such a conclusion will still leave open a\nnumber of questions of the deepest importance, but they belong to the\nprovince of theology to investigate, and form no necessary portion of an\nhistorical inquiry. If the Gospels _in their broad outlines_ are\nhistorical; above all, _if Jesus Christ rose from the dead_, it follows\nthat the New Testament must contain a divine revelation.\n\nAs this last fact forms the central position of Christianity, I have made\nits historical truth the chief subject of my investigation. In doing this\nI have relied only on documents which are contained in the New Testament\nitself, and chiefly on those whose genuineness is conceded by opponents. I\nhave shown that no species of documents can possess a higher historical\nvalue than these, and that the circumstances under which they were\nwritten, the nature of their contents, and the persons to whom they were\naddressed, form an attestation to the truth of the facts asserted in them,\nwhich is unrivalled in the whole course of literature. By means of these I\nhave firmly established the fact that the belief in the Resurrection of\nJesus Christ was the foundation on which the Church rested as a community\nfrom the first dawning of its existence, and the basis of the life of its\nindividual members; and that considerable numbers of the followers of\nJesus Christ affirmed that they had seen and conversed with Him after He\nhad risen from the dead. I have shown that these facts rest on the highest\nform of historical attestation. This being so, there can be only two\nalternatives respecting them. Either the belief in the Resurrection was\nfounded on the fact that He actually rose from the dead; or it must have\noriginated in the delusions of His followers. I have shown that the\nvarious theories which have been propounded to account for it on the\nlatter supposition, when tested by the actual facts, are untrue both to\nhuman nature and to the possibilities of the case. From this it results,\nas a necessary consequence, that JESUS CHRIST ROSE FROM THE DEAD. If He\nrose from the dead, the truth of His divine mission is established, and\nHis claim to be the King and supreme Legislator of the Church is\nvindicated. This claim may be fully set forth in two sayings of His own,\nrecorded in St. John\u2019s Gospel: \u201cI am the light of the world; he that\nfolloweth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of\nlife.\u201d (xiii. 12.) \u201cThou sayest that I am a king. For this end was I born,\nand for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto\nthe truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice.\u201d (xviii. 37.)\n\nThe practical conclusion which this investigation suggests cannot be\nbetter expressed than in the words of the same divine Teacher: \u201cHe that\nbelieveth, believeth not on me, but on Him that sent me; and he that seeth\nme seeth Him that sent me. I am come, a light into the world, that\nwhosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness. And if any man\nhear my words, and believe not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge\nthe world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not\nmy words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same\nshall judge him in the last day.\u201d\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 My quotations throughout this work are taken from the first edition.\n      The passage here quoted is somewhat altered in the third edition,\n      but not so as to affect the general meaning.\n\n    2 The word which is here translated in the A. V. \u201cmiracles\u201d is in the\n      original \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1.\n\n    3 J. S. Mill, in his recently published essays, considers this the\n      most formidable objection against theism.\n\n    4 See for example, Matt. v. 39\u201042, Luke vi. 20, 21, 24\u201026, and various\n      others of a similar description.\n\n    5 \u201cThe Jesus of the Evangelists.\u201d\n\n    6 Mr. Mill, in his recently published Essay on Theism, has strongly\n      expressed his belief that these discourses are the veritable\n      utterances of Jesus.","title":"The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":158820}