{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46743/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46743","id":"gutenberg_46743","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46743","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics"],"text":"BY THE SAME AUTHOR.\n\n\n OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Crown 8vo. 3s.\n 6d.\n\n THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. Third Edition. 8vo. 14s. net.\n\n THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS. 8vo. 14s. net.\n\n PHILOSOPHY: ITS SCOPE AND RELATIONS. 8vo. 6s. 6d. net.\n\n LECTURES ON THE ETHICS OF GREEN, SPENCER, AND MARTINEAU. 8vo. 8s. 6d.\n net.\n\n THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITY. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES\n AND ESSAYS. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n\n HENRY SIDGWICK: A Memoir. By A. S. and E. M. S. With Portraits. 8vo.\n 12s. 6d. net.\n\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON.\n\n\n\n\nTHE METHODS OF ETHICS\n\n\n\n\n\u1f2a \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2,\n\u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2;--PLATO.\n\n\n\n\n THE\n METHODS OF ETHICS\n\n BY\n\n HENRY SIDGWICK\n\n SOMETIME KNIGHTBRIDGE PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE\n UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE\n\n _SEVENTH EDITION_\n\n London\n MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n 1907\n\n [_The Right of Translation is reserved._]\n\n\n\n\n _First Edition 1874._\n _Second Edition 1877._\n _Third Edition 1884._\n _Fourth Edition 1890._\n _Fifth Edition 1893._\n _Sixth Edition 1901._\n _Seventh Edition 1907._\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION\n\n\nIn offering to the public a new book upon a subject so trite as Ethics,\nit seems desirable to indicate clearly at the outset its plan and\npurpose. Its distinctive characteristics may be first given negatively.\nIt is not, in the main, metaphysical or psychological: at the same time\nit is not dogmatic or directly practical: it does not deal, except by\nway of illustration, with the history of ethical thought: in a sense\nit might be said to be not even critical, since it is only quite\nincidentally that it offers any criticism of the systems of individual\nmoralists. It claims to be an examination, at once expository and\ncritical, of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions\nas to what ought to be done which are to be found--either explicit\nor implicit--in the moral consciousness of mankind generally: and\nwhich, from time to time, have been developed, either singly or in\ncombination, by individual thinkers, and worked up into the systems now\nhistorical.\n\nI have avoided the inquiry into the Origin of the Moral Faculty--which\nhas perhaps occupied a disproportionate amount of the attention of\nmodern moralists--by the simple assumption (which seems to be made\nimplicitly in all ethical reasoning) that there is something[1] under\nany given circumstances which it is right or reasonable to do, and that\nthis may be known. If it be admitted that we now have the faculty of\nknowing this, it appears to me that the investigation of the historical\nantecedents of this cognition, and of its relation to other elements\nof the mind, no more properly belongs to Ethics than the corresponding\nquestions as to the cognition of Space belong to Geometry.[2] I make,\nhowever, no further assumption as to the nature of the object of\nethical knowledge: and hence my treatise is not dogmatic: all the\ndifferent methods developed in it are expounded and criticised from a\nneutral position, and as impartially as possible. And thus, though my\ntreatment of the subject is, in a sense, more practical than that of\nmany moralists, since I am occupied from first to last in considering\nhow conclusions are to be rationally reached in the familiar matter\nof our common daily life and actual practice; still, my immediate\nobject--to invert Aristotle\u2019s phrase--is not Practice but Knowledge.\nI have thought that the predominance in the minds of moralists of a\ndesire to edify has impeded the real progress of ethical science:\nand that this would be benefited by an application to it of the same\ndisinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries\nof physics. It is in this spirit that I have endeavoured to compose\nthe present work: and with this view I have desired to concentrate the\nreader\u2019s attention, from first to last, not on the practical results to\nwhich our methods lead, but on the methods themselves. I have wished\nto put aside temporarily the urgent need which we all feel of finding\nand adopting the true method of determining what we ought to do; and to\nconsider simply what conclusions will be rationally reached if we start\nwith certain ethical premises, and with what degree of certainty and\nprecision.\n\nI ought to mention that chapter iv. of Book i. has been reprinted (with\nconsiderable modifications) from the _Contemporary Review_, in which\nit originally appeared as an article on \u201cPleasure and Desire.\u201d And I\ncannot conclude without a tribute of thanks to my friend Mr. Venn, to\nwhose kindness in accepting the somewhat laborious task of reading and\ncriticising my work, both before and during its passage through the\npress, I am indebted for several improvements in my exposition.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION\n\n\nIn preparing this work for the second edition, I have found it\ndesirable to make numerous alterations and additions. Indeed the extent\nwhich these have reached is so considerable, that I have thought it\nwell to publish them in a separate form, for the use of purchasers\nof my first edition. On one or two points I have to acknowledge a\ncertain change of view; which is partly at least due to criticism. For\ninstance, in chap. iv. of Book i. (on \u201cPleasure and Desire\u201d), which has\nbeen a good deal criticised by Prof. Bain and others, although I still\nretain my former opinion on the psychological question at issue, I have\nbeen led to take a different view of the relation of this question\nto Ethics; and in fact \u00a7 1 of this chapter as it at present stands\ndirectly contradicts the corresponding passage in the former edition.\nSo again, as regards the following chapter, on \u2018Free-Will,\u2019 though I\nhave not exactly found that the comments which it has called forth have\nremoved my difficulties in dealing with this time-honoured problem,\nI have become convinced that I ought not to have crudely obtruded\nthese difficulties on the reader, while professedly excluding the\nconsideration of them from my subject. In the present edition therefore\nI have carefully limited myself to explaining and justifying the view\nthat I take of the practical aspect of the question. I have further\nbeen led, through study of the Theory of Evolution in its application\nto practice, to attach somewhat more importance to this theory than I\nhad previously done; and also in several passages of Books iii. and iv.\nto substitute \u2018well-being\u2019 for \u2018happiness,\u2019 in my exposition of that\nimplicit reference to some further end and standard which reflection on\nthe Morality of Common Sense continually brings into view. This latter\nchange however (as I explain in the concluding chapter of Book iii.) is\nnot ultimately found to have any practical effect. I have also modified\nmy view of \u2018objective rightness,\u2019 as the reader will see by comparing\nBook i. chap. i. \u00a7 3 with the corresponding passage in the former\nedition; but here again the alteration has no material importance.\nIn my exposition of the Utilitarian principle (Book iv. chap. i.) I\nhave shortened the cumbrous phrase \u2018greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber\u2019 by omitting--as its author ultimately advised--the last four\nwords. And finally, I have yielded as far as I could to the objections\nthat have been strongly urged against the concluding chapter of the\ntreatise. The main discussion therein contained still seems to me\nindispensable to the completeness of the work; but I have endeavoured\nto give the chapter a new aspect by altering its commencement, and\nomitting most of the concluding paragraph.\n\nThe greater part, however, of the new matter in this edition is merely\nexplanatory and supplementary. I have endeavoured to give a fuller\nand clearer account of my views on any points on which I either have\nmyself seen them to be ambiguously or inadequately expressed, or have\nfound by experience that they were liable to be misunderstood. Thus in\nBook i. chap. ii. I have tried to furnish a rather more instructive\naccount than my first edition contained of the mutual relations of\nEthics and Politics. Again, even before the appearance of Mr. Leslie\nStephen\u2019s interesting review in _Fraser_ (March 1875), I had seen the\ndesirability of explaining further my general view of the \u2018Practical\nReason,\u2019 and of the fundamental notion signified by the terms \u2018right,\u2019\n\u2018ought,\u2019 etc. With this object I have entirely rewritten chap. iii.\nof Book i., and made considerable changes in chap. i. Elsewhere,\nas in chaps. vi. and ix. of Book i., and chap. vi. of Book ii., I\nhave altered chiefly in order to make my expositions more clear and\nsymmetrical. This is partly the case with the considerable changes that\nI have made in the first three chapters of Book iii.; but I have also\ntried to obviate the objections brought by Professor Calderwood[3]\nagainst the first of these chapters. The main part of this Book\n(chaps. iv.-xii.) has been but slightly altered; but in chap. xiii. (on\n\u2018Philosophical Intuitionism\u2019), which has been suggestively criticised\nby more than one writer, I have thought it expedient to give a more\ndirect statement of my own opinions; instead of confining myself (as\nI did in the first edition) to comments on those of other moralists.\nChap. xiv. again has been considerably modified; chiefly in order to\nintroduce into it the substance of certain portions of an article\non \u2018Hedonism and Ultimate Good,\u2019 which I published in _Mind_ (No.\n5). In Book iv. the changes (besides those above mentioned) have\nbeen inconsiderable; and have been chiefly made in order to remove a\nmisconception which I shall presently notice, as to my general attitude\ntowards the three Methods which I am principally occupied in examining.\n\nIn revising my work, I have endeavoured to profit as much as possible\nby all the criticisms on it that have been brought to my notice,\nwhether public or private.[4] I have frequently deferred to objections,\neven when they appeared to me unsound, if I thought I could avoid\ncontroversy by alterations to which I was myself indifferent. Where I\nhave been unable to make the changes required, I have usually replied,\nin the text or the notes, to such criticisms as have appeared to me\nplausible, or in any way instructive. In so doing, I have sometimes\nreferred by name to opponents, where I thought that, from their\nrecognised position as teachers of the subject, this would give a\ndistinct addition of interest to the discussion; but I have been\ncareful to omit such reference where experience has shown that it would\nbe likely to cause offence. The book is already more controversial\nthan I could wish; and I have therefore avoided encumbering it with\nany polemics of purely personal interest. For this reason I have\ngenerally left unnoticed such criticisms as have been due to mere\nmisapprehensions, against which I thought I could effectually\nguard in the present edition. There is, however, one fundamental\nmisunderstanding, on which it seems desirable to say a few words.\nI find that more than one critic has overlooked or disregarded the\naccount of the plan of my treatise, given in the original preface and\nin \u00a7 5 of the introductory chapter: and has consequently supposed me\nto be writing as an assailant of two of the methods which I chiefly\nexamine, and a defender of the third. Thus one of my reviewers seems\nto regard Book iii. (on Intuitionism) as containing mere hostile\ncriticism from the outside: another has constructed an article on\nthe supposition that my principal object is the \u2018suppression of\nEgoism\u2019: a third has gone to the length of a pamphlet under the\nimpression (apparently) that the \u2018main argument\u2019 of my treatise is\na demonstration of Universalistic Hedonism. I am concerned to have\ncaused so much misdirection of criticism: and I have carefully altered\nin this edition the passages which I perceive to have contributed to\nit. The morality that I examine in Book iii. is my own morality as\nmuch as it is any man\u2019s: it is, as I say, the \u2018Morality of Common\nSense,\u2019 which I only attempt to represent in so far as I share it; I\nonly place myself outside it either (1) temporarily, for the purpose\nof impartial criticism, or (2) in so far as I am forced beyond it by\na practical consciousness of its incompleteness. I have certainly\ncriticised this morality unsparingly: but I conceive myself to have\nexposed with equal unreserve the defects and difficulties of the\nhedonistic method (cf. especially chaps. iii., iv. of Book ii., and\nchap. v. of Book iv.). And as regards the two hedonistic principles, I\ndo not hold the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally with\nany stronger conviction than I do that of aiming at one\u2019s own. It was\nno part of my plan to call special attention to this \u201cDualism of the\nPractical Reason\u201d as I have elsewhere called it: but I am surprised\nat the extent to which my view has perplexed even those of my critics\nwho have understood it. I had imagined that they would readily trace\nit to the source from which I learnt it, Butler\u2019s well-known Sermons.\nI hold with Butler that \u201cReasonable Self-love and Conscience are\nthe two chief or superior principles in the nature of man,\u201d each of\nwhich we are under a \u201cmanifest obligation\u201d to obey: and I do not (I\nbelieve) differ materially from Butler in my view either of reasonable\nself-love, or--theology apart--of its relation to conscience. Nor,\nagain, do I differ from him in regarding conscience as essentially a\nfunction of the practical Reason: \u201cmoral precepts,\u201d he says in the\n_Analogy_ (Part II. chap. viii.), \u201care precepts the reason of which\nwe see.\u201d My difference only begins when I ask myself, \u2018What among the\nprecepts of our common conscience do we really see to be ultimately\nreasonable?\u2019 a question which Butler does not seem to have seriously\nput, and to which, at any rate, he has given no satisfactory answer.\nThe answer that I found to it supplied the rational basis that I had\nlong perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Bentham, regarded\nas an ethical doctrine: and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly\nreceived antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] I did not mean to exclude the supposition that two or more\nalternatives might under certain circumstances be equally right (1884).\n\n[2] This statement now appears to me to require a slight modification\n(1884).\n\n[3] Cf. _Mind_, No. 2.\n\n[4] Among unpublished criticisms I ought especially to mention the\nvaluable suggestions that I have received from Mr. Carveth Read; to\nwhose assistance in revising the present edition many of my corrections\nare due.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION\n\n\nIn this third edition I have again made extensive alterations,\nand introduced a considerable amount of new matter. Some of these\nchanges and additions are due to modifications of my own ethical or\npsychological views; but I do not think that any of these are of great\nimportance in relation to the main subject of the treatise. And by far\nthe largest part of the new matter introduced has been written either\n(1) to remove obscurities, ambiguities, and minor inconsistencies\nin the exposition of my views which the criticisms[5] of others or\nmy own reflection have enabled me to discover; or (2) to treat as\nfully as seemed desirable certain parts or aspects of the subject\nwhich I had either passed over altogether or discussed too slightly\nin my previous editions, and on which it now appears to me important\nto explain my opinions, either for the greater completeness of my\ntreatise,--according to my own view of the subject,--or for its better\nadaptation to the present state of ethical thought in England. The most\nimportant changes of the first kind have been made in chaps. i. and\nix. of Book i., chaps, i.-iii. of Book ii., and chaps. i., xiii., and\nxiv. of Book iii.: under the second head I may mention the discussions\nof the relation of intellect to moral action in Book i. chap. iii., of\nvolition in Book i. chap. v., of the causes of pleasure and pain in\nBook ii. chap. vi., of the notion of virtue in the morality of Common\nSense in Book iii. chap. ii., and of evolutional ethics in Book iv.\nchap. iv. (chiefly).\n\nI may add that all the important alterations and additions have been\npublished in a separate form, for the use of purchasers of my second\nedition.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[5] I must here acknowledge the advantage that I have received from\nthe remarks and questions of my pupils, and from criticisms privately\ncommunicated to me by others; among these latter I ought especially to\nmention an instructive examination of my fundamental doctrines by the\nRev. Hastings Rashdall.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION\n\n\nThe chief alterations in this fourth edition are the following. (1) I\nhave expanded the discussion on Free Will in Book i. chap. v. \u00a7 3, to\nmeet the criticisms of Mr. Fowler, in his _Principles of Morals_, and\nDr. Martineau, in his _Types of Ethical Theory_. (2) In consequence\nof the publication of the last-mentioned work, I have rewritten\npart of chap. xii. of Book iii., which deals with the Ethical view\nmaintained by Dr. Martineau. (3) I have expanded the argument in\nBook iii. chap. xiv., to meet objections ably urged by Mr. Rashdall\nin _Mind_ (April 1885). (4) I have somewhat altered the concluding\nchapter, in consequence of an important criticism by Prof. v. Gizycki\n(_Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr Wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, Jahrg. iv.\nHeft i.) which I had inadvertently overlooked in preparing the third\nedition. Several pages of new matter have thus been introduced: for\nwhich--I am glad to say--I have made room by shortening what seemed\nprolix, omitting what seemed superfluous, and relegating digressions to\nnotes, in other parts of the work: so that the bulk of the whole is not\nincreased.\n\nFor the index which forms a new feature in the present edition I am\nindebted to the kindness of Miss Jones of Girton College, the author of\n_Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION\n\n\nSuch criticisms of my Ethical opinions and reasonings as have come\nunder my notice, since the publication of the fourth edition of this\ntreatise, have chiefly related to my treatment of the question of\nFree Will in Book i. chap. v., or to the hedonistic view of Ultimate\nGood, maintained in Book iii. chap. iv. I have accordingly rewritten\ncertain parts of these two chapters, in the hope of making my arguments\nmore clear and convincing: in each case a slight change in view will\nbe apparent to a careful reader who compares the present with the\npreceding edition: but in neither case does the change affect the\nmain substance of the argument. Alterations, in one or two cases not\ninconsiderable, have been made in several other chapters, especially\nBook i. chap. ii., and Book iii. chaps. i. and ii.: but they have\nchiefly aimed at removing defects of exposition, and do not (I think)\nin any case imply any material change of view.\n\nMy thanks are again due to Miss Jones, of Girton College, for reading\nthrough the proofs of this edition and making most useful corrections\nand suggestions: as well as for revising the index which she kindly\nmade for the fourth edition.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION\n\n\nThe revision of _The Methods of Ethics_ for this edition was begun by\nProfessor Sidgwick and carried through by him up to p. 276, on which\nthe last of his corrections on the copy were made. The latter portion\nof his revision was done under the pressure of severe illness, the\nincrease of which prevented him from continuing it beyond the point\nmentioned; and by the calamity of his death the rest of the book\nremains without the final touches which it might have received from his\nhand. In accordance with his wish, I have seen pp. 277 to 509 through\nthe press unchanged--except for a few small alterations which he had\nindicated, and the insertion on pp. 457-459 of the concluding passage\nof Book iv. chapter iii.[6] Such alterations as were made by Professor\nSidgwick in this edition prior to p. 276 will be found chiefly in\nchapters i.-v. and ix. of Book i., and chapters iii. and vi. of Book ii.\n\nThe Appendix on \u201cThe Kantian Conception of Free Will,\u201d promised in note\n1 on p. 58 of this edition, is substantially a reprint of a paper by\nProfessor Sidgwick under that heading which appeared in _Mind_, vol.\nxiii. No. 51, and accurately covers the ground indicated in the note.\n\nThere is one further matter of importance. Among the MS. material\nwhich Professor Sidgwick intended to be referred to, in preparing\nthis edition for the press, there occurs, as part of the MS. notes\nfor a lecture, a brief history of the development in his thought of\nthe ethical view which he has set forth in the _Methods of Ethics_.\nThis, though not in a finished condition, is in essentials complete\nand coherent, and since it cannot fail to have peculiar value and\ninterest for students of the book, it has been decided to insert it\nhere. Such an arrangement seems to a certain extent in harmony with the\nauthor\u2019s own procedure in the Preface to the Second Edition; and in\nthis way while future students of the _Methods_ will have access to an\nintroductory account which both ethically and historically is of very\nexceptional interest, no dislocation of the text will be involved.\n\nIn the account referred to Professor Sidgwick says:--\n\n \u201cMy first adhesion to a definite Ethical system was to the\n Utilitarianism of Mill: I found in this relief from the apparently\n external and arbitrary pressure of moral rules which I had been\n educated to obey, and which presented themselves to me as to some\n extent doubtful and confused; and sometimes, even when clear, as\n merely dogmatic, unreasoned, incoherent. My antagonism to this was\n intensified by the study of Whewell\u2019s _Elements of Morality_ which\n was prescribed for the study of undergraduates in Trinity. It was\n from that book that I derived the impression--which long remained\n uneffaced--that Intuitional moralists were hopelessly loose (as\n compared to mathematicians) in their definitions and axioms.\n\n The two elements of Mill\u2019s view which I am accustomed to distinguish\n as Psychological Hedonism [that each man does seek his own Happiness]\n and Ethical Hedonism [that each man ought to seek the general\n Happiness] both attracted me, and I did not at first perceive their\n incoherence.\n\n Psychological Hedonism--the law of universal\n pleasure-seeking--attracted me by its frank naturalness. Ethical\n Hedonism, as expounded by Mill, was morally inspiring by its dictate\n of readiness for absolute self-sacrifice. They appealed to different\n elements of my nature, but they brought these into apparent harmony:\n they both used the same words \u201cpleasure,\u201d \u201chappiness,\u201d and the\n persuasiveness of Mill\u2019s exposition veiled for a time the profound\n discrepancy between the natural end of action--private happiness, and\n the end of duty--general happiness. Or if a doubt assailed me as to\n the coincidence of private and general happiness, I was inclined to\n hold that it ought to be cast to the winds by a generous resolution.\n\n But a sense grew upon me that this method of dealing with the conflict\n between Interest and Duty, though perhaps proper for practice\n could not be final for philosophy. For practical men who do not\n philosophise, the maxim of subordinating self-interest, as commonly\n conceived, to \u201caltruistic\u201d impulses and sentiments which they feel to\n be higher and nobler is, I doubt not, a commendable maxim; but it is\n surely the business of Ethical Philosophy to find and make explicit\n the rational ground of such action.\n\n I therefore set myself to examine methodically the relation of\n Interest and Duty.\n\n This involved a careful study of Egoistic Method, to get the relation\n of Interest and Duty clear. Let us suppose that my own Interest is\n paramount. What really is my Interest, how far can acts conducive\n to it be known, how far does the result correspond with Duty (or\n Wellbeing of Mankind)? This investigation led me to feel very\n strongly _this_ opposition, rather than that which Mill and the\n earlier Utilitarians felt between so-called Intuitions or Moral Sense\n Perceptions, and Hedonism, whether Epicurean or Utilitarian. Hence the\n arrangement of my book--ii., iii., iv. [Book ii. Egoism, Book iii.\n Intuitionism, Book iv. Utilitarianism].\n\n The result was that I concluded that no complete solution of the\n conflict between my happiness and the general happiness was possible\n on the basis of mundane experience. This [conclusion I] slowly and\n reluctantly accepted--cf. Book ii. chap. v., and last chapter of\n treatise [Book ii. chap. v. is on \u201cHappiness and Duty,\u201d and the\n concluding chapter is on \u201cThe Mutual Relations of the Three Methods\u201d].\n This [was] most important to me.\n\n In consequence of this perception, moral choice of the general\n happiness or acquiescence in self-interest as ultimate, became\n practically necessary. But on what ground?\n\n I put aside Mill\u2019s phrases that such sacrifice was \u201cheroic\u201d: that it\n was not \u201cwell\u201d with me unless I was in a disposition to make it. I put\n to him in my mind the dilemma:--Either it is for my own happiness or\n it is not. If not, why [should I do it]?--It was no use to say that\n if I was a moral hero I should have formed a habit of willing actions\n beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my own\n pleasure in the other scale. I knew that at any rate I was not the\n kind of moral hero who does this without reason; from _blind_ habit.\n Nor did I even wish to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that\n that kind of hero, however admirable, was certainly not a philosopher.\n I must somehow _see_ that it was right for me to sacrifice my\n happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part.\n\n Thus, in spite of my early aversion to Intuitional Ethics, derived\n from the study of Whewell, and in spite of my attitude of discipleship\n to Mill, I was forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical\n intuition.\n\n The utilitarian method--which I had learnt from Mill--could not, it\n seemed to me, be made coherent and harmonious without this fundamental\n intuition.\n\n In this state of mind I read Kant\u2019s Ethics again: I had before read\n it somewhat unintelligently, under the influence of Mill\u2019s view\n as to its \u201cgrotesque failure.\u201d[7] I now read it more receptively\n and was impressed with the truth and importance of its fundamental\n principle:--_Act from a principle or maxim that you can will to be\n a universal law_--cf. Book iii. chap. i. \u00a7 3 [of _The Methods of\n Ethics_]. It threw the \u201cgolden rule\u201d of the gospel (\u201cDo unto others as\n ye would that others should do unto you\u201d) into a form that commended\n itself to my reason.\n\n Kant\u2019s resting of morality on Freedom did not indeed commend itself to\n me,[8] though I did not at first see, what I now seem to see clearly,\n that it involves the fundamental confusion of using \u201cfreedom\u201d in two\n distinct senses--\u201cfreedom\u201d that is realised only when we do right,\n when reason triumphs over inclination, and \u201cfreedom\u201d that is realised\n equally when we choose to do wrong, and which is apparently implied\n in the notion of ill-desert. What commended itself to me, in short,\n was Kant\u2019s ethical principle rather than its metaphysical basis.\n This I briefly explain in Book iii. chap. i. \u00a7 3 [of _The Methods of\n Ethics_]. I shall go into it at more length when we come to Kant.\n\n That whatever is right for me must be right for all persons in similar\n circumstances--which was the form in which I accepted the Kantian\n maxim--seemed to me certainly fundamental, certainly true, and not\n without practical importance.\n\n But the fundamental principle seemed to me inadequate for the\n construction of a system of duties; and the more I reflected on it the\n more inadequate it appeared.\n\n On reflection it did not seem to me really to meet the difficulty\n which had led me from Mill to Kant: it did not settle finally the\n subordination of Self-interest to Duty.\n\n For the Rational Egoist--a man who had learnt from Hobbes that\n Self-preservation is the first law of Nature and Self-interest the\n only rational basis of social morality--and in fact, its actual basis,\n so far as it is effective--such a thinker might accept the Kantian\n principle and remain an Egoist.\n\n He might say, \u201cI quite admit that when the painful necessity comes\n for another man to choose between his own happiness and the general\n happiness, he must as a reasonable being prefer his own, i.e. it is\n right for him to do this on my principle. No doubt, as I probably do\n not sympathise with him in particular any more than with other persons,\n I as a disengaged spectator should like him to sacrifice himself to\n the general good: but I do not expect him to do it, any more than I\n should do it myself in his place.\u201d\n\n It did not seem to me that this reasoning could be effectively\n confuted. No doubt it was, from the point of view of the universe,\n reasonable to prefer the greater good to the lesser, even though the\n lesser good was the private happiness of the agent. Still, it seemed\n to me also undeniably reasonable for the individual to prefer his\n own. The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the\n rationality of self-sacrifice. I could not give up this conviction,\n though neither of my masters, neither Kant nor Mill, seemed willing to\n admit it: in different ways, each in his own way, they refused to admit\n it.\n\n I was, therefore, [if] I may so say, a disciple on the loose, in search\n of a master--or, if the term \u2018master\u2019 be too strong, at any rate I\n sought for sympathy and support, in the conviction which I had attained\n in spite of the opposite opinions of the thinkers from whom I had\n learnt most.\n\n It was at this point then that the influence of Butler came in. For\n the stage at which I had thus arrived in search of an ethical creed,\n at once led me to understand Butler, and to find the support and\n intellectual sympathy that I required in his view.\n\n I say to understand him, for hitherto I had misunderstood him,\n as I believe most people then misunderstood, and perhaps still\n misunderstand, him. He had been presented to me as an advocate of the\n authority of Conscience; and his argument, put summarily, seemed to be\n that because reflection on our impulses showed us Conscience claiming\n authority therefore we ought to obey it. Well, I had no doubt that\n my conscience claimed authority, though it was a more utilitarian\n conscience than Butler\u2019s: for, through all this search for principles I\n still adhered for practical purposes to the doctrine I had learnt from\n Mill, _i.e._ I still held to the maxim of aiming at the general\n happiness as the supreme directive rule of conduct, and I thought I\n could answer the objections that Butler brought against this view\n (in the \u201cDissertation on Virtue\u201d at the end of the _Analogy_). My\n difficulty was, as I have said, that this claim of conscience, whether\n utilitarian or not, had to be harmonised with the claim of Rational\n Self-love; and that I vaguely supposed Butler to avoid or override\n [the latter claim].\n\n But reading him at this stage with more care, I found in him, with\n pleasure and surprise, a view very similar to that which had developed\n itself in my own mind in struggling to assimilate Mill and Kant. I\n found he expressly admitted that \u201cinterest, my own happiness, is a\n manifest obligation,\u201d and that \u201cReasonable Self-love\u201d [is \u201cone of the\n two chief or superior principles in the nature of man\u201d]. That is, he\n recognised a \u201cDualism of the Governing Faculty\u201d--or as I prefer to\n say \u201cDualism of the Practical Reason,\u201d since the \u2018authority\u2019 on which\n Butler laid stress must present itself to my mind as the authority of\n reason, before I can admit it.\n\n Of this more presently: what I now wish to make clear is that it was\n on this side--if I may so say--that I entered into Butler\u2019s system and\n came under the influence of his powerful and cautious intellect. But\n the effect of his influence carried me a further step away from Mill:\n for I was led by it to abandon the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism,\n and to recognise the existence of \u2018disinterested\u2019 or \u2018extra-regarding\u2019\n impulses to action, [impulses] not directed towards the agent\u2019s\n pleasure [cf. chap. iv. of Book i. of _The Methods of Ethics_]. In fact\n as regards what I may call a Psychological basis of Ethics, I found\n myself much more in agreement with Butler than Mill.\n\n And this led me to reconsider my relation to Intuitional Ethics. The\n strength and vehemence of Butler\u2019s condemnation of pure Utilitarianism,\n in so cautious a writer, naturally impressed me much. And I had myself\n become, as I had to admit to myself, an Intuitionist to a certain\n extent. For the supreme rule of aiming at the general happiness, as I\n had come to see, must rest on a fundamental moral intuition, if I was\n to recognise it as binding at all. And in reading the writings of the\n earlier English Intuitionists, More and Clarke, I found the axiom I\n required for my Utilitarianism [That a rational agent is bound to aim\n at Universal Happiness], in one form or another, holding a prominent\n place (cf. _History of Ethics_, pp. 172, 181).\n\n I had then, theoretically as well as practically, accepted this\n fundamental moral intuition; and there was also the Kantian principle,\n which I recognised as irresistibly valid, though not adequate to give\n complete guidance.--I was then an \u201cintuitional\u201d moralist to this\n extent: and if so, why not further? The orthodox moralists such as\n Whewell (then in vogue) said that there was a whole intelligible system\n of intuitions: but how were they to be learnt? I could not accept\n Butler\u2019s view as to the sufficiency of a plain man\u2019s conscience: for it\n appeared to me that plain men agreed rather verbally than really.\n\n In this state of mind I had to read Aristotle again; and a\n light seemed to dawn upon me as to the meaning and drift of his\n procedure--especially in Books ii., iii., iv. of the _Ethics_--(cf.\n _History of Ethics_, chap. ii. \u00a7 9, p. 58, read to end of section).\n\n What he gave us there was the Common Sense Morality of Greece,\n reduced to consistency by careful comparison: given not as something\n external to him but as what \u201cwe\u201d--he and others--think, ascertained by\n reflection. And was not this really the Socratic induction, elicited by\n interrogation?\n\n Might I not imitate this: do the same for _our_ morality here and now,\n in the same manner of impartial reflection on current opinion?\n\n Indeed _ought_ I not to do this before deciding on the question whether\n I had or had not a system of moral intuitions? At any rate the result\n would be useful, whatever conclusion I came to.\n\n So this was the part of my book first written (Book iii., chaps.\n i.-xi.), and a certain imitation of Aristotle\u2019s manner was very marked\n in it at first, and though I have tried to remove it where it seemed to\n me affected or pedantic, it still remains to some extent.\n\n But the result of the examination was to bring out with fresh force\n and vividness the difference between the maxims of Common Sense\n Morality (even the strongest and strictest, _e.g._ Veracity and\n Good Faith) and the intuitions which I had already attained, _i.e._\n the Kantian Principle (of which I now saw the only certain element\n in Justice--\u201ctreat similar cases similarly\u201d--to be a particular\n application), and the Fundamental Principle of Utilitarianism. And this\n latter was in perfect harmony with the Kantian Principle. I certainly\n could will it to be a universal law that men should act in such a way\n as to promote universal happiness; in fact it was the only law that it\n was perfectly clear to me that I could thus decisively will, from a\n universal point of view.\n\n I was then a Utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis.\n\n But further, the reflection on Common Sense Morality which I had gone\n through, had continually brought home to me its character as a system\n of rules tending to the promotion of general happiness (cf. [_Methods\n of Ethics_] pp. 470, 471).\n\n Also the previous reflection on hedonistic method for Book ii. had\n shown me its weaknesses. What was then to be done? [The] conservative\n attitude [to be observed] towards Common Sense [is] given in chapter\n v. of Book iv.: \u201cAdhere generally, deviate and attempt reform only\n in exceptional cases in which,--notwithstanding the roughness of\n hedonistic method,--the argument against Common Sense is decisive.\u201d\n\n In this state of mind I published my book: I tried to say what I had\n found: that the opposition between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism was\n due to a misunderstanding. There was indeed a fundamental opposition\n between the individual\u2019s interest and either morality, which I could\n not solve by any method I had yet found trustworthy, without the\n assumption of the moral government of the world: so far I agreed with\n both Butler and Kant.\n\n But I could find no real opposition between Intuitionism and\n Utilitarianism.... The Utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham seemed to me\n to want a basis: that basis could only be supplied by a fundamental\n intuition; on the other hand the best examination I could make of the\n Morality of Common Sense showed me no clear and self-evident principles\n except such as were perfectly consistent with Utilitarianism.\n\n Still, investigation of the Utilitarian method led me to see defects\n [in it]: the merely empirical examination of the consequences of\n actions is unsatisfactory; and being thus conscious of the practical\n imperfection in many cases of the guidance of the Utilitarian calculus,\n I remained anxious to treat with respect, and make use of, the guidance\n afforded by Common Sense in these cases, on the ground of the general\n presumption which evolution afforded that moral sentiments and opinions\n would point to conduct conducive to general happiness; though I\n could not admit this presumption as a ground for overruling a strong\n probability of the opposite, derived from utilitarian calculations.\u201d\n\nIt only remains to mention that the Table of Contents and the Index\nhave been revised in accordance with the changes in the text.\n\n E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.\n\n GIRTON COLLEGE,\n CAMBRIDGE, _April 1901_.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[6] Cf. note on p. 457, and Prefatory Note to the Seventh Edition.\n\n[7] Kant\u2019s _Fundamental Principles_ (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der\nSitten_), \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, pp. 5, 6 [7th edition (large\nprint), 1879].\n\n[8] Book i. chap. v. of _The Methods of Ethics_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION\n\n\nThis Edition is a reprint of the Sixth, the only changes (besides\ncorrection of a few clerical errors) being an alteration of type in the\npassage which occurs on p. 457 in the Sixth Edition and pp. 457-459\nin this Edition, together with consequent changes (1) in paging and\nindexing, (2) in the reference to the passage in question in the\nreprinted Preface to the Sixth Edition, and (3) in the insertion of the\nnote on p. 457.\n\n E. E. C. J.\n\n _December 1906._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n BOOK I\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n PAGES\n\n 1. Ethics is a department of the Theory or Study of Practice. 1-2\n\n 2. It is the study of what ought to be, so far as this depends upon\n the voluntary action of individuals. 2-4\n\n 3. In deciding what they ought to do, men naturally proceed on\n different principles, and by different methods. 4-6\n\n 4. There are two _prima facie_ rational Ends, Excellence or\n Perfection and Happiness: of which the latter at least may be\n sought for oneself or universally. It is also commonly thought\n that certain Rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior\n consequences. The Methods corresponding to these different\n principles reduce themselves in the main to three, Egoism,\n Intuitionism, Utilitarianism. 6-11\n\n 5. These methods we are to examine separately, abstracting them\n from ordinary thought, where we find them in confused combination,\n and developing them as precisely and consistently as possible. 11-14\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n ETHICS AND POLITICS\n\n 1. In considering the relation between Ethics and Politics, we have\n to distinguish between Positive Law and Ideal Law. 15-18\n\n 2. But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine\n what ought to be done in an ideal society: it therefore does not\n necessarily require as a preliminary the theoretical construction\n of such a society. 18-22\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n ETHICAL JUDGMENTS\n\n 1. By \u2018Reasonable\u2019 conduct--whether morally or prudentially\n reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it \u2018ought\u2019 to be\n done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a\n judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the\n _means_ to ulterior ends: in particular, the term \u2018ought,\u2019 as used\n in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging\n feels a specific emotion: 23-28\n\n 2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is\n prescribed under penalties: 28-31\n\n 3. The notion expressed by \u201cought,\u201d in its strictest ethical use\n is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution\n into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and\n judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future\n conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of\n impulse to action. 31-35\n\n 4. This \u2018dictate of reason\u2019 is also exemplified by merely\n prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives. 35-38\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n PLEASURE AND DESIRE\n\n 1. The psychological doctrine, that the object of Desire is always\n Pleasure, is liable to collide with the view of Ethical judgments\n just given: and in any case deserves careful examination. 39-42\n\n 2. If by \u201cpleasure\u201d is meant \u201cagreeable feeling,\u201d this doctrine\n is opposed to experience: for throughout the whole scale of our\n desires, from the highest to the lowest, we can distinguish\n impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the\n desire of pleasure: 42-51\n\n 3. as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two\n kinds of impulse. 51-52\n\n 4. Nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration\n either of the \u2018unconscious\u2019 or the \u2018original\u2019 aim of human action. 52-54\n\n Note 54-56\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n FREE WILL\n\n 1. The Kantian identification of \u2018Free\u2019 and \u2018Rational\u2019 action is\n misleading from the ambiguity of the term \u2018freedom.\u2019 57-59\n\n 2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue\n in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that\n the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming: 59-65\n\n 3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as\n free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of\n the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important--Theology\n apart--for systematic Ethics generally: 65-70\n\n 4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of\n Justice: 71-72\n\n 5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes\n more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.72-76\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS\n\n 1. The Methods indicated in chap. i. have a _prima facie_ claim to\n proceed on reasonable principles: other principles seem, in so far\n as they can be made precise, to reduce themselves to these: 77-80\n\n 2. especially the principle of \u201cliving according to Nature.\u201d 80-83\n\n 3. In short, all varieties of Method may conveniently be classed\n under three heads: Intuitionism and the two kinds of Hedonism,\n Egoistic and Universalistic. The common confusion between the two\n latter is easily explained, but must be carefully guarded against. 83-87\n\n Note 87-88\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n\n EGOISM AND SELF-LOVE\n\n 1. To get a clear idea of what is commonly known as Egoism, we must\n distinguish and exclude several possible meanings of the term: 89-93\n\n 2. and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of\n pleasure over pain for the agent,--pleasures being valued in\n proportion to their pleasantness. 93-95\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n\n INTUITIONISM\n\n 1. I apply the term Intuitional--in the narrower of two legitimate\n senses--to distinguish a method in which the rightness of some\n kinds of action is assumed to be known without consideration of\n ulterior consequences. 96-98\n\n 2. The common antithesis between Intuitive and Inductive is\n inexact, since this method does not necessarily proceed from the\n universal to the particular. We may distinguish Perceptional\n Intuitionism, according to which it is always the rightness of some\n particular action that is held to be immediately known: 98-100\n\n 3. Dogmatic Intuitionism, in which the general rules of Common\n Sense are accepted as axiomatic: 100-101\n\n 4. Philosophical Intuitionism, which attempts to find a deeper\n explanation for these current rules. 101-103\n\n Note 103-104\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n\n GOOD\n\n 1. Another important variety of Intuitionism is constituted by\n substituting for \u201cright\u201d the wider notion \u201cgood.\u201d 105-106\n\n 2. The common judgment that a thing is \u201cgood\u201d does not on\n reflection appear to be equivalent to a judgment that it is\n directly or indirectly pleasant. 106-109\n\n 3. \u201cGood\u201d = \u201cdesirable\u201d or \u201creasonably desired\u201d: as applied to\n conduct, the term does not convey so definite a dictate as\n \u201cright,\u201d and it is not confined to the strictly voluntary. 109-113\n\n 4. There are many other things commonly judged to be good: but\n reflection shows that nothing is ultimately good except some\n mode of human existence. 113-115\n\n\n BOOK II\n\n EGOISM\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF EGOISM\n\n 1. The Principle of Egoistic Hedonism is the widely accepted\n proposition that the rational end of conduct for each individual\n is the Maximum of his own Happiness or Pleasure. 119-121\n\n 2. There are several methods of seeking this end: but we may take\n as primary that which proceeds by Empirical-reflective comparison\n of pleasures. 121-122\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n EMPIRICAL HEDONISM\n\n 1. In this method it is assumed that all pleasures sought and pains\n shunned are commensurable; and can be arranged in a certain scale\n of preferableness: 123-125\n\n 2. pleasure being defined as \u201cfeeling apprehended as desirable by\n the sentient individual at the time of feeling it.\u201d 125-130\n\n Note 130\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n EMPIRICAL HEDONISM (_continued_)\n\n 1. To get a clearer view of this method, let us consider objections\n tending to show its inherent impracticability: as, first, that\n \u201cpleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,\u201d and that a \u201csum of\n pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning\u201d: 131-134\n\n 2. that transient pleasures cannot satisfy; and that the\n predominance of self-love tends to defeat its own end: 134-138\n\n 3. that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is\n unfavourable to pleasure: 138-140\n\n 4. that any quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains is\n vague and uncertain, even in the case of our own past\n experiences: 140-144\n\n 5. that it also tends to be different at different times:\n especially through variations in the present state of the person\n performing the comparison: 144-146\n\n 6. that, in fact, the supposed definite commensurability of\n pleasures is an unverifiable assumption: 146-147\n\n 7. that there is a similar liability to error in appropriating\n the experience of others; and in inferring future pleasures\n from past. 147-150\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n OBJECTIVE HEDONISM AND COMMON SENSE\n\n 1. It may seem that the judgments of Common Sense respecting the\n Sources of Happiness offer a refuge from the uncertainties of\n Empirical Hedonism: but there are several fundamental defects in\n this refuge; 151-153\n\n 2. and these judgments when closely examined are found to be\n perplexingly inconsistent. 153-158\n\n 3. Still we may derive from them a certain amount of practical\n guidance. 158-161\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n HAPPINESS AND DUTY\n\n 1. It has been thought possible to prove on empirical grounds that\n one\u2019s greatest happiness is always attained by the performance of\n duty. 162-163\n\n 2. But no such complete coincidence seems to result from a\n consideration either of the Legal Sanctions of Duty: 163-166\n\n 3. or of the Social Sanctions: 166-170\n\n 4. or of the Internal Sanctions: even if we consider not merely\n isolated acts of duty, but a virtuous life as a whole. 170-175\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n DEDUCTIVE HEDONISM\n\n 1. Hedonistic Method must ultimately rest on facts of empirical\n observation: but it might become largely deductive, through\n scientific knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain: 176-180\n\n 2. but we have no practically available general theory of these\n causes, either psychophysical, 180-190\n\n 3. or biological. 190-192\n\n 4. Nor can the principle of \u2018increasing life,\u2019 or that of \u2018aiming\n at self-development,\u2019 or that of \u2018giving free play to impulse,\u2019\n be so defined as to afford us any practical guidance to the end\n of Egoism, without falling back on the empirical comparison of\n pleasures and pains. 192-195\n\n\n BOOK III\n\n INTUITIONISM\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n INTUITIONISM\n\n 1. The fundamental assumption of Intuitionism is that we have the\n power of seeing clearly what actions are in themselves right and\n reasonable. 199-201\n\n 2. Though many actions are commonly judged to be made better\n or worse through the presence of certain _motives_, our common\n judgments of right and wrong relate, strictly speaking, to\n _intentions_. One motive, indeed, the desire to do what is right\n as such, has been thought an essential condition to right conduct:\n but the Intuitional method should be treated as not involving this\n assumption. 201-207\n\n 3. It is certainly an essential condition that we should not\n believe the act to be wrong; and this implies that we should\n not believe it to be wrong for any similar person in similar\n circumstances: but this implication, though it may supply a\n valuable practical rule, cannot furnish a complete criterion of\n right conduct. 207-210\n\n 4. The _existence_ of apparent cognitions of right conduct,\n intuitively obtained, as distinct from their validity, will\n scarcely be questioned; and to establish their validity it is not\n needful to prove their \u2018originality.\u2019 210-214\n\n 5. Both particular and universal intuitions are found in our\n common moral thought: but it is for the latter that ultimate\n validity is ordinarily claimed by intuitional moralists. We must\n try, by reflecting on Common Sense, how far we can state these\n Moral Axioms with clearness and precision. 214-216\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n VIRTUE AND DUTY\n\n 1. Duties are Right acts, for the adequate performance of which a\n moral motive is at least occasionally necessary. Virtuous conduct\n includes the performance of duties as well as praiseworthy acts\n that are thought to go beyond strict duty, and that may even be\n beyond the power of some to perform. 217-221\n\n 2. Virtues as commonly recognised, are manifested primarily in\n volitions to produce particular right effects--which must at least\n be thought by the agent to be not wrong--: but for the\n completeness of some virtues the presence of certain emotions\n seems necessary. 221-228\n\n 3. It may be said that Moral Excellence, like Beauty, eludes\n definition: but if Ethical Science is to be constituted, we must\n obtain definite Moral Axioms. 228-230\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES\n\n 1. The common conception of Wisdom assumes a harmony of the ends of\n different ethical methods: all of which--and not one rather than\n another--the wise man is commonly thought to aim at and attain as\n far as circumstances admit. 231-233\n\n 2. The Will is to some extent involved in forming wise decisions:\n but more clearly in acting on them--whatever we may call the\n Virtue thus manifested. 233-236\n\n 3. Of minor intellectual excellences, some are not strictly\n Virtues: others are, such as Caution and Decision, being in\n part voluntary. 236-237\n\n Note 237\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n BENEVOLENCE\n\n 1. The Maxim of Benevolence bids us to some extent _cultivate_\n affections, and confer happiness 238-241\n\n 2. on sentient, chiefly human, beings; especially in certain\n circumstances and relations, in which affections--which are hardly\n virtues--prompt to kind services. Rules for the distribution of\n Kindness are needed, 241-246\n\n 3. as claims may conflict; but clearly binding rules cannot be\n obtained from Common Sense in a definite form; 246-247\n\n 4. nor clear principles from which rules may be deduced; as is\n seen when we examine the duties to Kinsmen, as commonly\n conceived: 247-250\n\n 5. and the wider duties of Neighbourhood, Citizenship, Universal\n Benevolence; and the duties of cultivating Reverence and Loyalty: 250-254\n\n 6. and those springing from the Conjugal relation: 254-256\n\n 7. and those of Friendship: 256-259\n\n 8. and those of Gratitude: and those to which we are prompted by\n Pity. 259-263\n\n Note 263\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n JUSTICE\n\n 1. Justice is especially difficult to define. The Just cannot\n be identified with the Legal, as laws may be unjust. Again, the\n Justice of laws does not consist merely in the absence of\n arbitrary inequality in framing or administering them. 264-268\n\n 2. One element of Justice seems to consist in the fulfilment of (1)\n contracts and definite understandings, and (2) expectations arising\n naturally out of the established order of Society; but the duty of\n fulfilling these latter is somewhat indefinite: 268-271\n\n 3. and this social order may itself, from another point of view,\n be condemned as unjust; that is, as tried by the standard of Ideal\n Justice. What then is this Standard? We seem to find various\n degrees and forms of it. 271-274\n\n 4. One view of Ideal Law states Freedom as its absolute End: but\n the attempt to construct a system of law on this principle\n involves us in insuperable difficulties. 274-278\n\n 5. Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common\n conception of Ideal Justice. The principle of this is rather\n \u2018that Desert should be requited.\u2019 278-283\n\n 6. But the application of this principle is again very perplexing:\n whether we try to determine Good Desert (or the worth of\n services), 283-290\n\n 7. or Ill Desert, in order to realise Criminal Justice. There\n remains too the difficulty of reconciling Conservative and Ideal\n Justice. 290-294\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n LAWS AND PROMISES\n\n 1. The duty of obeying Laws, though it may to a great extent be\n included under Justice, still requires a separate treatment. We\n can, however, obtain no _consensus_ for any precise definition\n of it. 295-297\n\n 2. For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is\n ideally legitimate, 297-299\n\n 3. nor as to the criterion of a traditionally legitimate\n government, 299-301\n\n 4. nor as to the proper limits of governmental authority. 301-303\n\n 5. The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it\n was understood by both promiser and promisee is thought to be\n peculiarly stringent and certain 303-304\n\n 6. (it being admitted that its obligation is relative to the\n promisee, and may be annulled by him, and that it cannot override\n strict prior obligations). 304-305\n\n 7. But Common Sense seems to doubt how far a promise is binding\n when it has been obtained by force or fraud: 305-306\n\n 8. or when circumstances have materially altered since it was\n made--especially if it be a promise to the dead or absent,\n from which no release can be obtained, or if the performance\n of the promise will be harmful to the promisee, or inflict a\n disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser. 306-308\n\n 9. Other doubts arise when a promise has been misapprehended: and\n in the peculiar case where a prescribed form of words has been\n used. 308-311\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n\n CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. TRUTH\n\n 1. I have not adopted the classification of duties into Social\n and Self-regarding: as it seems inappropriate to the Intuitional\n method, of which the characteristic is, that it lays down certain\n absolute and independent rules: such as the rule of Truth. 312-315\n\n 2. But Common Sense after all scarcely seems to prescribe\n truth-speaking under all circumstances: nor to decide clearly\n whether the beliefs which we are bound to make true are those\n directly produced by our words or the immediate inferences from\n these. 315-317\n\n 3. It is said that the general allowance of Unveracity would be\n suicidal, as no one would believe the falsehood. But this argument,\n though forcible, is not decisive; for (1) this result may be in\n special circumstances desirable, or (2) we may have reason to\n expect that it will not occur. 317-319\n\n Note 319\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n\n OTHER SOCIAL DUTIES AND VIRTUES\n\n 1. Common opinion sometimes condemns sweepingly malevolent feelings\n and volitions: but Reflective Common Sense seems to admit some as\n legitimate, determining the limits of this admission on\n utilitarian grounds. 320-324\n\n 2. Other maxims of social duty seem clearly subordinate to\n those already discussed: as is illustrated by an examination of\n Liberality and other cognate notions. 324-326\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n\n SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES\n\n 1. The general duty of seeking one\u2019s own happiness is commonly\n recognised under the notion of Prudence. 327-328\n\n 2. This as specially applied to the control of bodily appetites is\n called Temperance: but under this notion a more rigid restraint is\n sometimes thought to be prescribed: though as to the principle of\n this there seems no agreement. 328-329\n\n 3. Nor is it easy to give a clear definition of the maxim of\n Purity--but in fact common sense seems averse to attempt this.\n We must note, however, that suicide is commonly judged to be\n absolutely wrong. 329-331\n\n\n CHAPTER X\n\n COURAGE, HUMILITY, ETC.\n\n 1. The Duty of Courage is subordinate to those already discussed:\n and in drawing the line between the Excellence of Courage and\n the Fault of Foolhardiness we seem forced to have recourse to\n considerations of expediency. 332-334\n\n 2. Similarly the maxim of Humility seems either clearly\n subordinate or not clearly determinate. 334-336\n\n\n CHAPTER XI\n\n REVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE\n\n 1. We have now to examine the moral maxims that have been defined,\n to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of\n scientific intuitions. 337-338\n\n 2. We require of an Axiom that it should be (1) stated in clear\n and precise terms, (2) really self-evident, (3) not conflicting\n with any other truth, (4) supported by an adequate \u2018consensus of\n experts.\u2019 These characteristics are not found in the moral maxims\n of Common Sense. 338-343\n\n 3. The maxims of Wisdom and Self-control are only self-evident in\n so far as they are tautological: 343-345\n\n 4. nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted\n axioms for determining the duties of the Affections: 345-349\n\n 5. and as for the group of principles that were extracted from\n the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a\n satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them: 349-352\n\n 6. and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous\n qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common\n Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent\n First Principle. Still more is this the case with Veracity: 352-355\n\n 7. similarly with other virtues: even the prohibition of Suicide,\n so far as rational, seems to rest ultimately on utilitarian\n grounds. 355-357\n\n 8. Even Purity when we force ourselves to examine it rigorously\n yields no clear independent principle. 357-359\n\n 9. The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance,\n but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms. 359-361\n\n\n CHAPTER XII\n\n MOTIVES OR SPRINGS OF ACTION AS SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT\n\n 1. It has been held by several moralists that the \u201cUniversal\n Conscience\u201d judges primarily not of Rightness of acts, but of Rank\n of Motives. 362-365\n\n 2. If, however, we include the Moral Sentiments among these\n motives, this latter view involves all the difficulties and\n perplexities of the former, yet it is paradoxical to omit these\n sentiments. 365-367\n\n 3. But even if we leave these out, we still find very little\n agreement as to Rank of Motives: and there is a special difficulty\n arising from complexity of motive. Nor does Common Sense seem to\n hold that a \u201chigher\u201d motive--below the highest--is always to be\n preferred to a \u201clower.\u201d 367-372\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM\n\n 1. The Philosopher, as such, attempts to penetrate beneath the\n surface of Common Sense to some deeper principles: 373-374\n\n 2. but has too often presented to the world, as the result of his\n investigation, tautological propositions and vicious circles. 374-379\n\n 3. Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real\n importance, intuitively known; though they are not sufficient by\n themselves to give complete practical guidance. Thus we can exhibit\n a self-evident element in the commonly recognised principles of\n Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence. 379-384\n\n 4. This is confirmed by a reference to Clarke\u2019s and Kant\u2019s\n systems: 384-386\n\n 5. and also to Utilitarianism: which needs for its basis a\n self-evident principle of Rational Benevolence; as is shown by\n a criticism of Mill\u2019s \u201cproof.\u201d 386-389\n\n Note 389-390\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV\n\n ULTIMATE GOOD\n\n 1. The notion of Virtue, as commonly conceived, cannot without a\n logical circle be identified with the notion of Ultimate Good: 391-394\n\n 2. nor is it in accordance with Common Sense to regard Subjective\n Rightness of Will, or other elements of Perfection, as\n constituting Ultimate Good. 394-395\n\n 3. What is ultimately good or desirable must be Desirable\n Consciousness. 395-397\n\n 4. _i.e._ either simply Happiness, or certain objective relations\n of the Conscious Mind. 398-400\n\n 5. When these alternatives are fairly presented, Common Sense\n seems disposed to choose the former: especially as we can now\n explain its instinctive disinclination to admit Pleasure as\n ultimate end: while the other alternative leaves us without a\n criterion for determining the comparative value of different\n elements of \u2018Good.\u2019 400-407\n\n\n BOOK IV\n\n UTILITARIANISM\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE MEANING OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n 1. The ethical theory called Utilitarianism, or Universalistic\n Hedonism, is to be carefully distinguished from Egoistic Hedonism:\n and also from any psychological theory as to the nature and origin\n of the Moral Sentiments. 411-413\n\n 2. The notion of \u2018Greatest Happiness\u2019 has been determined in Book\n ii. chap. i.: but the extent and manner of its application require\n to be further defined. Are we to include all Sentient Beings? and\n is it Total or Average Happiness that we seek to make a maximum?\n We also require a supplementary Principle for _Distribution_ of\n Happiness: the principle of Equality is _prima facie_ reasonable. 413-417\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n Common Sense demands a Proof of the first Principle of this method,\n more clearly than in the case of Egoism and Intuitionism. Such\n a proof, addressed to the Egoistic Hedonist, was in fact given\n in Book iii. chap. xiii. \u00a7 3: it exhibited the essence of the\n Utilitarian Principle as a clear and certain moral Intuition. But\n it is also important to examine its relation to other received\n maxims. 418-422\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THE RELATION OF UTILITARIANISM TO THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE\n\n 1. Taking as our basis Hume\u2019s exhibition of the Virtues as\n Felicific qualities of character, we can trace a complex\n coincidence between Utilitarianism and Common Sense. It is\n not needful--nor does it even help the argument--to show this\n coincidence to be perfect and exact. 423-426\n\n 2. We may observe, first, that Dispositions may often be admired\n (as generally felicific) when the special acts that have resulted\n from them are infelicific. Again, the maxims of many virtues\n are found to contain an explicit or implicit reference to Duty\n conceived as already determinate. Passing over these to examine\n the more definite among common notions of Duty: 426-430\n\n 3. we observe, first, how the rules that prescribe the distribution\n of kindness in accordance with normal promptings of Family\n Affections, Friendship, Gratitude, and Pity have a firm Utilitarian\n basis: and how Utilitarianism is naturally referred to for an\n explanation of the difficulties that arise in attempting to define\n these rules. 430-439\n\n 4. A similar result is reached by an examination, singly and\n together, of the different elements into which we have analysed the\n common notion of Justice: 439-448\n\n 5. and in the case of other virtues. 448-450\n\n 6. Purity has been thought an exception: but a careful examination\n of common opinions as to the regulation of sexual relations\n exhibits a peculiarly complex and delicate correspondence between\n moral sentiments and social utilities. 450-453\n\n 7. The hypothesis that the Moral Sense is \u2018unconsciously\n Utilitarian\u2019 also accounts for the actual differences in different\n codes of Duty and estimates of Virtue, either in the same age and\n country, or when we compare different ages and countries. It is not\n maintained that perception of rightness has always been consciously\n derived from perception of utility: a view which the evidence of\n history fails to support. 453-457\n\n On the Utilitarian view, the relation between Ethics and Politics\n is different for different parts of the legal code. 457-459\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n 1. Ought a Utilitarian, then, to accept the Morality of Common\n Sense provisionally as a body of Utilitarian doctrine? Not quite;\n for even accepting the theory that the Moral Sense is derived from\n Sympathy, we can discern several causes that must have operated\n to produce a divergence between Common Sense and a perfectly\n Utilitarian code of morality. 460-467\n\n 2. At the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code\n in any other way than by taking Positive Morality as our basis. 467-471\n\n 3. If General Happiness be the ultimate end, it is not reasonable\n to adopt \u201csocial health\u201d or \u201cefficiency\u201d as the practically\n ultimate criterion of morality. 471-474\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM (_continued_)\n\n 1. It is, then, a Utilitarian\u2019s duty at once to support generally,\n and to rectify in detail, the morality of Common Sense: and the\n method of pure empirical Hedonism seems to be the only one that he\n can at present use in the reasonings that finally determine the\n nature and extent of this rectification. 475-480\n\n 2. His innovations may be either negative and destructive, or\n positive and supplementary. There are certain important general\n reasons against an innovation of the former kind, which may, in\n any given case, easily outweigh the special arguments in its\n favour. 480-484\n\n 3. Generally, a Utilitarian in recommending, by example or precept,\n a deviation from an established rule of conduct, desires his\n innovation to be generally imitated. But in some cases he may\n neither expect nor desire such imitation; though cases of this\n kind are rare and difficult to determine. 485-492\n\n 4. There are no similar difficulties in the way of modifying the\n Ideal of Moral Excellence--as distinguished from the dictates of\n Moral Duty--in order to render it more perfectly felicific. 492-495\n\n\n CONCLUDING CHAPTER\n\n THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS\n\n 1. It is not difficult to combine the Intuitional and Utilitarian\n methods into one; but can we reconcile Egoistic and Universalistic\n Hedonism? 496-498\n\n 2. In so far as the latter coincides with Common Sense, we have\n seen in Book ii. chap. v. that no complete reconciliation is\n possible, on the basis of experience. 498-499\n\n 3. Nor does a fuller consideration of Sympathy, as a specially\n Utilitarian sanction, lead us to modify this conclusion; in spite\n of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to\n sympathetic pleasures. 499-503\n\n 4. The Religious Sanction, if we can show that it is actually\n attached to the Utilitarian Code, is of course adequate: 503-506\n\n 5. but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments\n alone. Still, without this or some similar assumption, a\n fundamental contradiction in Ethics cannot be avoided. 506-509\n\n\n APPENDIX ON KANT\u2019S CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL 511\n\n\n INDEX 517\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The boundaries of the study called Ethics are variously and often\nvaguely conceived: but they will perhaps be sufficiently defined, at\nthe outset, for the purposes of the present treatise, if a \u2018Method\nof Ethics\u2019 is explained to mean any rational procedure by which we\ndetermine what individual human beings \u2018ought\u2019--or what it is \u2018right\u2019\nfor them--to do, or to seek to realise by voluntary action.[9] By\nusing the word \u201cindividual\u201d I provisionally distinguish the study of\nEthics from that of Politics,[10] which seeks to determine the proper\nconstitution and the right public conduct of governed societies: both\nEthics and Politics being, in my view, distinguished from positive\nsciences by having as their special and primary object to determine\nwhat ought to be, and not to ascertain what merely is, has been, or\nwill be.\n\nThe student of Ethics seeks to attain systematic and precise general\nknowledge of what ought to be, and in this sense his aims and methods\nmay properly be termed \u2018scientific\u2019: but I have preferred to call\nEthics a study rather than a science, because it is widely thought that\na Science must necessarily have some department of actual existence\nfor its subject-matter. And in fact the term \u2018Ethical Science\u2019\nmight, without violation of usage, denote either the department of\nPsychology that deals with voluntary action and its springs, and with\nmoral sentiments and judgments, as actual phenomena of individual\nhuman minds; or the department of Sociology dealing with similar\nphenomena, as manifested by normal members of the organised groups of\nhuman beings which we call societies. We observe, however, that most\npersons do not pursue either of these studies merely from curiosity,\nin order to ascertain what actually exists, has existed, or will exist\nin time. They commonly wish not only to understand human action, but\nalso to regulate it; in this view they apply the ideas \u2018good\u2019 and\n\u2018bad,\u2019 \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018wrong,\u2019 to the conduct or institutions which they\ndescribe; and thus pass, as I should say, from the point of view of\nPsychology or Sociology to that of Ethics or Politics. My definition\nof Ethics is designed to mark clearly the fundamental importance of\nthis transition. It is true that the mutual implication of the two\nkinds of study--the positive and the practical--is, on any theory, very\nclose and complete. On any theory, our view of what ought to be must\nbe largely derived, in details, from our apprehension of what is; the\nmeans of realising our ideal can only be thoroughly learnt by a careful\nstudy of actual phenomena; and to any individual asking himself \u2018What\nought I to do or aim at?\u2019 it is important to examine the answers which\nhis fellow-men have actually given to similar questions. Still it seems\nclear that an attempt to ascertain the general laws or uniformities\nby which the varieties of human conduct, and of men\u2019s sentiments and\njudgments respecting conduct, may be _explained_, is essentially\ndifferent from an attempt to determine which among these varieties of\nconduct is _right_ and which of these divergent judgments _valid_. It\nis, then, the systematic consideration of these latter questions which\nconstitutes, in my view, the special and distinct aim of Ethics and\nPolitics.\n\n\u00a7 2. In the language of the preceding section I could not avoid taking\naccount of two different forms in which the fundamental problem of\nEthics is stated; the difference between which leads, as we shall\npresently see, to rather important consequences. Ethics is sometimes\nconsidered as an investigation of the true Moral laws or rational\nprecepts of Conduct; sometimes as an inquiry into the nature of the\nUltimate End of reasonable human action--the Good or \u2018True Good\u2019 of\nman--and the method of attaining it. Both these views are familiar,\nand will have to be carefully considered: but the former seems most\nprominent in modern ethical thought, and most easily applicable\nto modern ethical systems generally. For the Good investigated in\nEthics is limited to Good in some degree attainable by human effort;\naccordingly knowledge of the end is sought in order to ascertain what\nactions are the right means to its attainment. Thus however prominent\nthe notion of an Ultimate Good--other than voluntary action of any\nkind--may be in an ethical system, and whatever interpretation may be\ngiven to this notion, we must still arrive finally, if it is to be\npractically useful, at some determination of precepts or directive\nrules of conduct.\n\nOn the other hand, the conception of Ethics as essentially an\ninvestigation of the \u2018Ultimate Good\u2019 of Man and the means of attaining\nit is not universally applicable, without straining, to the view of\nMorality which we may conveniently distinguish as the Intuitional\nview; according to which conduct is held to be right when conformed\nto certain precepts or principles of Duty, intuitively known to be\nunconditionally binding. In this view the conception of Ultimate Good\nis not necessarily of fundamental importance in the determination of\nRight conduct except on the assumption that Right conduct itself--or\nthe character realised in and developed through Right conduct--is the\nsole Ultimate Good for man. But this assumption is not implied in the\nIntuitional view of Ethics: nor would it, I conceive, accord with the\nmoral common sense of modern Christian communities. For we commonly\nthink that the complete notion of human Good or Well-being must include\nthe attainment of Happiness as well as the performance of Duty; even if\nwe hold with Butler that \u201cthe happiness of the world is the concern of\nHim who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it,\u201d and that, accordingly,\nit is not right for men to make their performance of Duty conditional\non their knowledge of its conduciveness to their Happiness. For those\nwho hold this, what men ought to take as the _practically_ ultimate\nend of their action and standard of Right conduct, may in some cases\nhave no logical connexion with the conception of Ultimate Good for man:\nso that, in such cases, however indispensable this latter conception\nmay be to the completeness of an ethical system, it would still not be\nimportant for the methodical determination of Right conduct.\n\nIt is on account of the prevalence of the Intuitional view just\nmentioned, and the prominent place which it consequently occupies in\nmy discussion, that in defining Ethics I have avoided the term \u2018Art of\nConduct\u2019 which some would regard as its more appropriate designation.\nFor the term \u2018Art\u2019--when applied to the contents of a treatise--seems\nto signify systematic express knowledge (as distinguished from the\nimplicit knowledge or organised habit which we call skill) of the right\nmeans to a given end. Now if we assume that the rightness of action\ndepends on its conduciveness to some ulterior end, then no doubt--when\nthis end has been clearly ascertained--the process of determining the\nright rules of conduct for human beings in different relations and\ncircumstances would naturally come under the notion of Art. But on\nthe view that the practically ultimate end of moral action is often\nthe Rightness of the action itself--or the Virtue realised in and\nconfirmed by such action--and that this is known intuitively in each\ncase or class of cases, we can hardly regard the term \u2018Art\u2019 as properly\napplicable to the systematisation of such knowledge. Hence, as I do not\nwish to start with any assumption incompatible with this latter view, I\nprefer to consider Ethics as the science or study of what is right or\nwhat ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of\nindividuals.[11]\n\n\u00a7 3. If, however, this view of the scope of Ethics is accepted, the\nquestion arises why it is commonly taken to consist, to a great extent,\nof psychological discussion as to the \u2018nature of the moral faculty\u2019;\nespecially as I have myself thought it right to include some discussion\nof this kind in the present treatise. For it does not at first appear\nwhy this should belong to Ethics, any more than discussions about the\nmathematical faculty or the faculty of sense-perception belong to\nmathematics and physics respectively. Why do we not simply start with\ncertain premises, stating what ought to be done or sought, without\nconsidering the faculty by which we apprehend their truth?\n\nOne answer is that the moralist has a practical aim: we desire\nknowledge of right conduct in order to act on it. Now we cannot help\nbelieving what we see to be true, but we can help doing what we see\nto be right or wise, and in fact often do what we know to be wrong or\nunwise: thus we are forced to notice the existence in us of irrational\nsprings of action, conflicting with our knowledge and preventing its\npractical realisation: and the very imperfectness of the connexion\nbetween our practical judgment and our will impels us to seek for more\nprecise knowledge as to the nature of that connexion.\n\nBut this is not all. Men never ask, \u2018Why should I believe what I see to\nbe true?\u2019 but they frequently ask, \u2018Why should I do what I see to be\nright?\u2019 It is easy to reply that the question is futile, since it could\nonly be answered by a reference to some other recognised principle of\nright conduct, and the question might just as well be asked as regards\nthat again, and so on. But still we do ask the question widely and\ncontinually, and therefore this demonstration of its futility is not\ncompletely satisfactory; we require besides some explanation of its\npersistency.\n\nOne explanation that may be offered is that, since we are moved\nto action not by moral judgment alone, but also by desires and\ninclinations that operate independently of moral judgment, the answer\nwhich we really want to the question \u2018Why should I do it?\u2019 is one which\ndoes not merely prove a certain action to be right, but also stirs in\nus a predominant inclination to do the action.\n\nThat this explanation is true for some minds in some moods I would not\ndeny. Still I think that when a man seriously asks \u2018why he should do\u2019\nanything, he commonly assumes in himself a determination to pursue\nwhatever conduct may be shown by argument to be reasonable, even though\nit be very different from that to which his non-rational inclinations\nmay prompt. And we are generally agreed that reasonable conduct in any\ncase has to be determined on principles, in applying which the agent\u2019s\ninclination--as it exists apart from such determination--is only one\nelement among several that have to be considered, and commonly not the\nmost important element. But when we ask what these principles are, the\ndiversity of answers which we find manifestly declared in the systems\nand fundamental formul\u00e6 of professed moralists seems to be really\npresent in the common practical reasoning of men generally; with this\ndifference, that whereas the philosopher seeks unity of principle, and\nconsistency of method at the risk of paradox, the unphilosophic man\nis apt to hold different principles at once, and to apply different\nmethods in more or less confused combination. If this be so, we can\noffer another explanation of the persistent unsatisfied demand for an\nultimate reason, above noticed. For if there are different views of\nthe ultimate reasonableness of conduct, implicit in the thought of\nordinary men, though not brought into clear relation to each other,--it\nis easy to see that any single answer to the question \u2018why\u2019 will not\nbe completely satisfactory, as it will be given only from one of these\npoints of view, and will always leave room to ask the question from\nsome other.\n\nI am myself convinced that this is the main explanation of the\nphenomenon: and it is on this conviction that the plan of the present\ntreatise is based. We cannot, of course, regard as valid reasonings\nthat lead to conflicting conclusions; and I therefore assume as a\nfundamental postulate of Ethics, that so far as two methods conflict,\none or other of them must be modified or rejected. But I think it\nfundamentally important to recognise, at the outset of Ethical inquiry,\nthat there is a diversity of methods applied in ordinary practical\nthought.\n\n\u00a7 4. What then are these different methods? what are the different\npractical principles which the common sense of mankind is _prima facie_\nprepared to accept as ultimate? Some care is needed in answering this\nquestion: because we frequently prescribe that this or that \u2018ought\u2019\nto be done or aimed at without any express reference to an ulterior\nend, while yet such an end is tacitly presupposed. It is obvious that\nsuch prescriptions are merely, what Kant calls them, Hypothetical\nImperatives; they are not addressed to any one who has not first\naccepted the end.\n\nFor instance: a teacher of any art assumes that his pupil wants to\nproduce the product of the art, or to produce it excellent in quality:\nhe tells him that he _ought_ to hold the awl, the hammer, the brush\ndifferently. A physician assumes that his patient wants health: he\ntells him that he _ought_ to rise early, to live plainly, to take hard\nexercise. If the patient deliberately prefers ease and good living\nto health, the physician\u2019s precepts fall to the ground: they are no\nlonger addressed to him. So, again, a man of the world assumes that his\nhearers wish to get on in society, when he lays down rules of dress,\nmanner, conversation, habits of life. A similar view may be plausibly\ntaken of many rules prescribing what are sometimes called \u201cduties to\noneself\u201d: it may be said that they are given on the assumption that\na man regards his own Happiness as an ultimate end: that if any one\nshould be so exceptional as to disregard it, he does not come within\ntheir scope: in short, that the \u2018_ought_\u2019 in such formul\u00e6 is still\nimplicitly relative to an _optional_ end.\n\nIt does not, however, seem to me that this account of the matter is\nexhaustive. We do not all look with simple indifference on a man who\ndeclines to take the right means to attain his own happiness, on no\nother ground than that he does not care about happiness. Most men would\nregard such a refusal as irrational, with a certain disapprobation;\nthey would thus implicitly assent to Butler\u2019s statement[12] that\n\u201cinterest, one\u2019s own happiness, is a manifest obligation.\u201d In other\nwords, they would think that a man _ought_ to care for his own\nhappiness. The word \u2018ought\u2019 thus used is no longer relative: happiness\nnow appears as an ultimate end, the pursuit of which--at least within\nthe limits imposed by other duties--appears to be prescribed by\nreason \u2018categorically,\u2019 as Kant would say, _i.e._ without any tacit\nassumption of a still ulterior end. And it has been widely held by even\northodox moralists that all morality rests ultimately on the basis\nof \u201creasonable self-love\u201d;[13] _i.e._ that its rules are ultimately\nbinding on any individual only so far as it is his interest on the\nwhole to observe them.\n\nStill, common moral opinion certainly regards the duty or virtue of\nPrudence as only a part--and not the most important part--of duty\nor virtue in general. Common moral opinion recognises and inculcates\nother fundamental rules--_e.g._ those of Justice, Good Faith,\nVeracity--which, in its ordinary judgments on particular cases, it is\ninclined to treat as binding without qualification and without regard\nto ulterior consequences. And, in the ordinary form of the Intuitional\nview of Ethics, the \u201ccategorical\u201d prescription of such rules is\nmaintained explicitly and definitely, as a result of philosophical\nreflection: and the realisation of Virtue in act--at least in the\ncase of the virtues just mentioned--is held to consist in strict and\nunswerving conformity to such rules.\n\nOn the other hand it is contended by many Utilitarians that all the\nrules of conduct which men prescribe to one another as moral rules\nare really--though in part unconsciously--prescribed as means to the\ngeneral happiness of mankind, or of the whole aggregate of sentient\nbeings; and it is still more widely held by Utilitarian thinkers that\nsuch rules, however they may originate, are only valid so far as their\nobservance is conducive to the general happiness. This contention I\nshall hereafter examine with due care. Here I wish only to point out\nthat, if the duty of aiming at the general happiness is thus taken\nto include all other duties, as subordinate applications of it, we\nseem to be again led to the notion of Happiness as an ultimate end\ncategorically prescribed,--only it is now General Happiness and not the\nprivate happiness of any individual. And this is the view that I myself\ntake of the Utilitarian principle.\n\nAt the same time, it is not necessary, in the methodical investigation\nof right conduct, considered relatively to the end either of private or\nof general happiness, to assume that the end itself is determined or\nprescribed by reason: we only require to assume, in reasoning to cogent\npractical conclusions, that it is adopted as ultimate and paramount.\nFor if a man accepts any end as ultimate and paramount, he accepts\nimplicitly as his \u201cmethod of ethics\u201d whatever process of reasoning\nenables him to determine the actions most conducive to this end.[14]\nSince, however, to every difference in the end accepted at least\nsome difference in method will generally correspond: if all the ends\nwhich men are found practically to adopt as ultimate (subordinating\neverything else to the attainment of them under the influence of\n\u2018ruling passions\u2019), were taken as principles for which the student of\nEthics is called upon to construct rational methods, his task would\nbe very complex and extensive. But if we confine ourselves to such\nends as the common sense of mankind appears to accept as rational\nultimate ends, the task is reduced, I think, within manageable limits;\nsince this criterion will exclude at least many of the objects which\nmen practically seem to regard as paramount. Thus many men sacrifice\nhealth, fortune, happiness, to Fame; but no one, so far as I know, has\ndeliberately maintained that Fame is an object which it is reasonable\nfor men to seek for its own sake. It only commends itself to reflective\nminds either (1) as a source of Happiness to the person who gains\nit, or (2) a sign of his Excellence, moral or intellectual, or (3)\nbecause it attests the achievement by him of some important benefit\nto society, and at the same time stimulates him and others to further\nachievement in the future: and the conception of \u201cbenefit\u201d would, when\nexamined in its turn, lead us again to Happiness or Excellence of human\nnature,--since a man is commonly thought to benefit others either by\nmaking them happier or by making them wiser and more virtuous.\n\nWhether there are any ends besides these two, which can be reasonably\nregarded as ultimate, it will hereafter[15] be part of our business to\ninvestigate: but we may perhaps say that _prima facie_ the only two\nends which have a strongly and widely supported claim to be regarded\nas rational ultimate ends are the two just mentioned, Happiness and\nPerfection or Excellence of human nature--meaning here by \u2018Excellence\u2019\nnot primarily superiority to others, but a partial realisation of,\nor approximation to, an ideal type of human Perfection. And we must\nobserve that the adoption of the former of these ends leads us to\ntwo _prima facie_ distinct methods, according as it is sought to be\nrealised universally, or by each individual for himself alone. For\nthough doubtless a man may often best promote his own happiness by\nlabouring and abstaining for the sake of others, it seems to be implied\nin our common notion of self-sacrifice that actions most conducive to\nthe general happiness do not--in this world at least--always tend\nalso to the greatest happiness of the agent.[16] And among those who\nhold that \u201chappiness is our being\u2019s end and aim\u201d we seem to find a\nfundamental difference of opinion as to whose happiness it is that it\nis ultimately reasonable to aim at. For to some it seems that \u201cthe\nconstantly proper end of action on the part of any individual at the\nmoment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to\nthe end of his life\u201d;[17] whereas others hold that the view of reason\nis essentially universal, and that it cannot be reasonable to take\nas an ultimate and paramount end the happiness of any one individual\nrather than that of any other--at any rate if equally deserving\nand susceptible of it--so that general happiness must be the \u201ctrue\nstandard of right and wrong, in the field of morals\u201d no less than of\npolitics.[18] It is, of course, possible to adopt an end intermediate\nbetween the two, and to aim at the happiness of some limited portion\nof mankind, such as one\u2019s family or nation or race: but any such\nlimitation seems arbitrary, and probably few would maintain it to be\nreasonable _per se_, except as the most practicable way of aiming at\nthe general happiness, or of indirectly securing one\u2019s own.\n\nThe case seems to be otherwise with Excellence or Perfection.[19] At\nfirst sight, indeed, the same alternatives present themselves:[20] it\nseems that the Excellence aimed at may be taken either individually\nor universally; and circumstances are conceivable in which a man is\nnot unlikely to think that he could best promote the Excellence of\nothers by sacrificing his own. But no moralist who takes Excellence\nas an ultimate end has ever approved of such sacrifice, at least so\nfar as Moral Excellence is concerned; no one has ever directed an\nindividual to promote the virtue of others except in so far as this\npromotion is compatible with, or rather involved in, the complete\nrealisation of Virtue in himself.[21] So far, then, there seems to\nbe no need of separating the method of determining right conduct\nwhich takes the Excellence or Perfection of the individual as the\nultimate aim from that which aims at the Excellence or Perfection of\nthe human community. And since Virtue is commonly conceived as the\nmost valuable element of human Excellence--and an element essentially\npreferable to any other element that can come into competition with\nit as an alternative for rational choice--any method which takes\nPerfection or Excellence of human nature as ultimate End will _prima\nfacie_ coincide to a great extent with that based on what I called\nthe Intuitional view: and I have accordingly decided to treat it as a\nspecial form of this latter.[22] The two methods which take happiness\nas an ultimate end it will be convenient to distinguish as Egoistic\nand Universalistic Hedonism: and as it is the latter of these, as\ntaught by Bentham and his successors, that is more generally understood\nunder the term \u2018Utilitarianism,\u2019 I shall always restrict that word to\nthis signification. For Egoistic Hedonism it is somewhat hard to find\na single perfectly appropriate term. I shall often call this simply\nEgoism: but it may sometimes be convenient to call it Epicureanism: for\nthough this name more properly denotes a particular historical system,\nit has come to be commonly used in the wider sense in which I wish to\nemploy it.\n\n\u00a7 5. The last sentence suggests one more explanation, which, for\nclearness\u2019 sake, it seems desirable to make: an explanation, however,\nrather of the plan and purpose of the present treatise than of the\nnature and boundaries of the subject of Ethics as generally understood.\n\nThere are several recognised ways of treating this subject, none of\nwhich I have thought it desirable to adopt. We may start with existing\nsystems, and either study them historically, tracing the changes in\nthought through the centuries, or compare and classify them according\nto relations of resemblance, or criticise their internal coherence.\nOr we may seek to add to the number of these systems: and claim after\nso many unsuccessful efforts to have at last attained the one true\ntheory of the subject, by which all others may be tested. The present\nbook contains neither the exposition of a system nor a natural or\ncritical history of systems. I have attempted to define and unfold\nnot one Method of Ethics, but several: at the same time these are not\nhere studied historically, as methods that have actually been used or\nproposed for the regulation of practice; but rather as alternatives\nbetween which--so far as they cannot be reconciled--the human mind\nseems to me necessarily forced to choose, when it attempts to frame\na complete synthesis of practical maxims and to act in a perfectly\nconsistent manner. Thus, they might perhaps be called natural methods\nrationalised; because men commonly seem to guide themselves by a\nmixture of different methods, more or less disguised under ambiguities\nof language. The impulses or principles from which the different\nmethods take their rise, the different claims of different ends to be\nrational, are admitted, to some extent, by all minds: and as along\nwith these claims is felt the need of harmonising them--since it is,\nas was said, a postulate of the Practical Reason, that two conflicting\nrules of action cannot both be reasonable--the result is ordinarily\neither a confused blending, or a forced and premature reconciliation,\nof different principles and methods. Nor have the systems framed by\nprofessed moralists been free from similar defects. The writers have\nusually proceeded to synthesis without adequate analysis; the practical\ndemand for the former being more urgently felt than the theoretical\nneed of the latter. For here as in other points the development of the\ntheory of Ethics would seem to be somewhat impeded by the preponderance\nof practical considerations; and perhaps a more complete detachment\nof the theoretical study of right conduct from its practical\napplication is to be desired for the sake even of the latter itself:\nsince a treatment which is a compound between the scientific and the\nhortatory is apt to miss both the results that it would combine; the\nmixture is bewildering to the brain and not stimulating to the heart.\nSo again, I am inclined to think that here, as in other sciences, it\nwould be an advantage to draw as distinct a line as possible between\nthe known and the unknown; as the clear indication of an unsolved\nproblem is at any rate a step to its solution. In ethical treatises,\nhowever, there has been a continual tendency to ignore and keep out\nof sight the difficulties of the subject; either unconsciously, from\na latent conviction that the questions which the writer cannot answer\nsatisfactorily must be questions which ought not to be asked; or\nconsciously, that he may not shake the sway of morality over the minds\nof his readers. This last well-meant precaution frequently defeats\nitself: the difficulties thus concealed in exposition are liable to\nreappear in controversy: and then they appear not carefully limited,\nbut magnified for polemical purposes. Thus we get on the one hand vague\nand hazy reconciliation, on the other loose and random exaggeration of\ndiscrepancies; and neither process is effective to dispel the original\nvagueness and ambiguity which lurks in the fundamental notions of our\ncommon practical reasonings. To eliminate or reduce this indefiniteness\nand confusion is the sole immediate end that I have proposed to\nmyself in the present work. In order better to execute this task, I\nhave refrained from expressly attempting any such complete and final\nsolution of the chief ethical difficulties and controversies as would\nconvert this exposition of various methods into the development of a\nharmonious system. At the same time I hope to afford aid towards the\nconstruction of such a system; because it seems easier to judge of the\nmutual relations and conflicting claims of different modes of thought,\nafter an impartial and rigorous investigation of the conclusions to\nwhich they logically lead. It is not uncommon to find in reflecting\non practical principles, that--however unhesitatingly they seem to\ncommand our assent at first sight, and however familiar and apparently\nclear the notions of which they are composed--nevertheless when we\nhave carefully examined the consequences of adopting them they wear a\nchanged and somewhat dubious aspect. The truth seems to be that most of\nthe practical principles that have been seriously put forward are more\nor less satisfactory to the common sense of mankind, so long as they\nhave the field to themselves. They all find a response in our nature:\ntheir fundamental assumptions are all such as we are disposed to\naccept, and such as we find to govern to a certain extent our habitual\nconduct. When I am asked, \u201cDo you not consider it ultimately reasonable\nto seek pleasure and avoid pain for yourself?\u201d \u201cHave you not a moral\nsense?\u201d \u201cDo you not intuitively pronounce some actions to be right and\nothers wrong?\u201d \u201cDo you not acknowledge the general happiness to be a\nparamount end?\u201d I answer \u2018yes\u2019 to all these questions. My difficulty\nbegins when I have to choose between the different principles or\ninferences drawn from them. We admit the necessity, when they conflict,\nof making this choice, and that it is irrational to let sometimes one\nprinciple prevail and sometimes another; but the necessity is a painful\none. We cannot but hope that all methods may ultimately coincide: and\nat any rate, before making our election we may reasonably wish to have\nthe completest possible knowledge of each.\n\nMy object, then, in the present work, is to expound as clearly and as\nfully as my limits will allow the different methods of Ethics that I\nfind implicit in our common moral reasoning; to point out their mutual\nrelations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much\nas possible. In the course of this endeavour I am led to discuss the\nconsiderations which should, in my opinion, be decisive in determining\nthe adoption of ethical first principles: but it is not my primary\naim to establish such principles; nor, again, is it my primary aim to\nsupply a set of practical directions for conduct. I have wished to keep\nthe reader\u2019s attention throughout directed to the processes rather than\nthe results of ethical thought: and have therefore never stated as my\nown any positive practical conclusions unless by way of illustration:\nand have never ventured to decide dogmatically any controverted points,\nexcept where the controversy seemed to arise from want of precision or\nclearness in the definition of principles, or want of consistency in\nreasoning.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[9] The exact relation of the terms \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018what ought to be\u2019 is\ndiscussed in chap. iii. of this Book. I here assume that they may be\nused as convertible, for most purposes.\n\n[10] I use \u2018Politics\u2019 in what I take to be its most ordinary\nsignification, to denote the science or study of Right or Good\nLegislation and Government. There is a wider possible sense of the\nterm, according to which it would include the greater part of Ethics:\n_i.e._ if understood to be the Theory of Right Social Relations. See\nchap. ii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[11] The relation of the notion of \u2018Good\u2019 to that of \u2018Right\u2019 or \u2018what\nought to be\u2019 will be further considered in a subsequent chapter of this\nBook (ix.)\n\n[12] See the Preface to Butler\u2019s _Sermons on Human Nature_.\n\n[13] The phrase is Butler\u2019s.\n\n[14] See the last paragraph of chap. iii. of this Book.\n\n[15] See chap. ix. of this Book, and Book iii. chap. xiv.\n\n[16] For a full discussion of this question, see Book ii. chap. v. and\nthe concluding chapter of the work.\n\n[17] Bentham, _Memoirs_ (vol. x. of Bowring\u2019s edition), p. 560.\n\n[18] Bentham again, _Memoirs_, p. 79. See note at the end of Book i.\nchap. vi. The Utilitarians since Bentham have sometimes adopted one,\nsometimes the other, of these two principles as paramount.\n\n[19] I use the terms \u2018Excellence\u2019 and \u2018Perfection\u2019 to denote the same\nultimate end regarded in somewhat different aspects: meaning by either\nan ideal complex of mental qualities, of which we admire and approve\nthe manifestation in human life: but using \u2018Perfection\u2019 to denote the\nideal as such, while \u2018Excellence\u2019 denotes such partial realisation of\nor approximation to the ideal as we actually find in human experience.\n\n[20] It may be said that even more divergent views of the reasonable\nend are possible here than in the case of happiness: for we are not\nnecessarily limited (as in that case) to the consideration of sentient\nbeings: inanimate things also seem to have a perfection and excellence\nof their own and to be capable of being made better or worse in their\nkind; and this perfection, or one species of it, appears to be the end\nof the Fine Arts. But reflection I think shows that neither beauty\nnor any other quality of inanimate objects can be regarded as good or\ndesirable in itself, out of relation to the perfection or happiness of\nsentient beings. Cf. _post_, chap. ix. of this Book.\n\n[21] Kant roundly denies that it can be my duty to take the Perfection\nof others for my end: but his argument is not, I think, valid. Cf.\n_post_, Book iii. chap. iv. \u00a7 1.\n\n[22] See Book iii. chap. xiv., where I explain my reasons for only\ngiving a subordinate place to the conception of Perfection as Ultimate\nEnd.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE RELATION OF ETHICS TO POLITICS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the last chapter I have spoken of Ethics and Politics as being\nboth Practical Studies, including in the scope of their investigation\nsomewhat that lies outside the sphere of positive sciences--viz. the\ndetermination of ends to be sought, or rules to be unconditionally\nobeyed. Before proceeding further, it would seem desirable to determine\nin outline the mutual relations of these cognate studies, regarded from\nthe point of view of Ethics.\n\nAs I have defined them, Ethics aims at determining what ought to be\ndone by individuals, while Politics aims at determining what the\ngovernment of a state or political society ought to do and how it ought\nto be constituted,--including under the latter head all questions as to\nthe control over government that should be exercised by the governed.\n\nAt first sight it may seem that Politics, so conceived, must be a\nbranch of Ethics. For all the actions of government are actions of\nindividuals, alone or in combination, and so are all the actions of\nthose who, obeying, influencing, or perhaps occasionally resisting\ngovernment, maintain and from time to time modify the constitution of\ntheir state: and it would seem that if properly performed such actions\nmust be determined on ethical principles or be capable of justification\nby such principles. But this argument is not decisive; for by similar\nreasoning Ethics would have to comprehend all arts, liberal and\nindustrial. _E.g._ it is a main part of the moral duty of a sea-captain\nand his subordinates to navigate their ship properly; but we do not\ntake Ethics to include a study of the rules of navigation. It may be\nreplied that every man is not a sailor, but--at least in a country\nunder popular government--every citizen has important political duties,\nwhich he ought to perform according to knowledge, so far as possible;\nbut, similarly, it is an important part of every adult\u2019s moral duty\nto take care of his health, and it is proverbial that \u201cevery man at\nforty is a fool or his own physician\u201d; yet we do not consider Ethics to\ninclude the art of medicine.\n\nThe specially important connexion between Ethics and Politics arises in\na different way. It is the business of government, by laying down and\nenforcing laws, to regulate the outward conduct of the governed, not in\none department only, but in all their social relations, so far as such\nconduct is a proper subject for coercive rules. And not only ought this\nregulation to be in harmony with morality--for obviously people ought\nnot to be compelled to do what they ought not to do--but further, to an\nimportant extent the Law of a man\u2019s state will properly determine the\ndetails of his moral duty, even beyond the sphere of legal enforcement.\nThus we commonly regard it as an individual\u2019s moral duty, under the\nhead of Justice, to \u201cgive every man his own,\u201d even when--through some\naccident--the other party has not the power of legally enforcing his\nright; but still, in considering what is the other\u2019s \u201cown,\u201d we assume\nhim generally to be guided by the law of his state; if that were\nchanged, his moral duty would change with it. Similarly, the mutual\nmoral duties of husbands and wives, and of children and parents, will\nvary in detail with the variations in their legal relations.\n\nBut when we look closer at the relation thus constituted between\nEthics and Politics, we see that a distinction has to be taken between\nactual or Positive Law and Ideal Law or Law as it ought to be. It is\nfor the latter that Political Theory lays down principles; but it is\nPositive, not Ideal, Law that primarily determines right conduct for an\nindividual here and now, in the manner just exemplified. No doubt if\nPositive and Ideal Law appear to me to diverge very widely--if (_e.g._)\nI am convinced by political theory that a fundamental change in the\nlaw of property is desirable--this conviction is likely to influence\nmy view of my moral duty under the existing law; but the extent of\nthis influence is vague and uncertain. Suppose I am a slave-owner\nin a society in which slavery is established, and become convinced\nthat private property in human beings should be abolished by law: it\ndoes not therefore follow that I shall regard it as my moral duty to\nset free my slaves at once. I may think immediate general abolition\nof slavery not only hopeless, but even inexpedient for the slaves\nthemselves, who require a gradual education for freedom: so that it is\nbetter for the present to aim at legal changes that would cut off the\nworst evils of slavery, and meanwhile to set an example of humane and\nconsiderate treatment of bondsmen. Similar reasonings might be applied\nto the abolition of private property in the instruments of production,\nor in appointments to offices, civil or ecclesiastical. Speaking\ngenerally, the extent to which political ideals ought to influence\nmoral duty would seem to depend partly on the apparent remoteness\nor nearness of the prospect of realising the ideal, partly on its\nimperativeness, or the expediency of immediate realisation: and the\nforce attached to both these considerations is likely to vary with the\npolitical method adopted; so that it belongs to Politics rather than\nEthics to determine them more precisely.\n\nTo sum up: we have to distinguish clearly between two questions: (1)\nhow far the determination of right conduct for an individual here\nand now ought to be influenced by Positive Laws, and other commands\nof Government as actually established; and (2) how far it ought to\nbe influenced by Political Theory, as to the functions and structure\nof Government as it ought to be. As regards the former, it clearly\nbelongs to Ethics to determine the grounds and limits of obedience\nto Government; and also the general conception of political duty, so\nfar as it goes beyond mere obedience--with due recognition of the\nlarge variations due to the varying political conditions of different\nstates. (A \u201cgood citizen\u201d in the United States will reasonably form\na conception of his actual political duty widely divergent from that\nreasonably formed by a good citizen in Russia.[23]) And this will be\nthe primary business of Ethics so far as it deals with the political\nside of life. The discussion of political ideals will only come within\nits purview in a more indefinite and indirect way, so far as such\nideals cannot but have some influence on the determination of political\nduty under existing conditions.\n\n\u00a7 2. I have stated the Relation of Ethics to Politics--regarded from an\nethical point of view--that seems to me to accord with the definition\nof the former subject adopted in the preceding chapter. Some thinkers,\nhowever, take a view of Ethical Theory which involves a relation to\nPolitical Theory quite different from that just set forth; regarding\nTheoretical or \u201cAbsolute\u201d Ethics as properly an investigation not of\nwhat ought to be done here and now, but of what ought to be the rules\nof behaviour in a society of ideally perfect human beings. Thus the\nsubject-matter of our study would be doubly ideal: as it would not only\nprescribe what ought to be done as distinct from what is, but what\nought to be done in a society that itself _is_ not, but only _ought_ to\nbe. In this view the conclusions of Theoretical or \u201cAbsolute\u201d Ethics\nwould have as indirect and uncertain a relation to the practical\nproblems of actual life as those of Theoretical Politics:--or even more\nso, as in sober political theory it is commonly only the government and\nnot the governed society that is conceived in an ideal condition. Still\nthe two studies are not unlikely to blend in one theory of ideal social\nrelations;--unless the ideal society is conceived as having no need\nof government, so that Politics, in the ordinary sense,[24] vanishes\naltogether.\n\nThose who take this view[25] adduce the analogy of Geometry to show\nthat Ethics ought to deal with ideally perfect human relations, just\nas Geometry treats of ideally straight lines and perfect circles. But\nthe irregular lines which we meet with in experience have spatial\nrelations which Geometry does not ignore altogether; it can and does\nascertain them with a sufficient degree of accuracy for practical\npurposes: though of course they are more complex than those of\nperfectly straight lines. So in Astronomy, it would be more convenient\nfor purposes of study if the stars moved in circles, as was once\nbelieved: but the fact that they move not in circles but in ellipses,\nand even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses, does not take them out\nof the sphere of scientific investigation: by patience and industry we\nhave learnt how to reduce to principles and calculate even these more\ncomplicated motions. It may be useful for purposes of instruction to\nassume that the planets move in perfect ellipses: but what we want, as\nastronomers, to know is the actual motion of the stars, and its causes:\nand similarly as moralists we naturally inquire what ought to be done\nin the actual world in which we live. In neither case can we hope to\nrepresent in our general reasonings the full complexity of the actual\nconsiderations: but we endeavour to approximate to it as closely as\npossible. It is only so that we really grapple with the question to\nwhich mankind generally require an answer: \u2018What is a man\u2019s duty in his\npresent condition?\u2019 For it is too paradoxical to say that the whole\nduty of man is summed up in the effort to attain an ideal state of\nsocial relations; and unless we say this, we must determine our duties\nto existing men in view of existing circumstances: and this is what\nthe student of Ethics seeks to do in a systematic manner.\n\nThe inquiry into the morality of an ideal society can therefore be at\nbest but a preliminary investigation, after which the step from the\nideal to the actual, in accordance with reason, remains to be taken.\nWe have to ask, then, how far such a preliminary construction seems\ndesirable. And in answering this we must distinguish the different\nmethods of Ethics. For it is generally held by Intuitionists that true\nmorality prescribes absolutely what is in itself right, under all\nsocial conditions; at least as far as determinate duties are concerned:\nas (_e.g._) that truth should always be spoken and promises kept, and\n\u2018Justice be done, though the sky should fall.\u2019 And so far as this is\nheld it would seem that there can be no fundamental distinction drawn,\nin the determination of duty, between the actual state of society and\nan ideal state: at any rate the general definition of (_e.g._) Justice\nwill be the same for both, no less than its absolute stringency. Still\neven an extreme Intuitionist would admit that the details of Justice\nand other duties will vary with social institutions: and it is a\nplausible suggestion, that if we can clearly contemplate as a pattern\nthe \u201cabsolute\u201d Justice of an ideal community, we shall be better able\nto attain the merely \u201crelative\u201d Justice that is alone possible under\nexisting conditions. How far this is so, we shall be in a better\nposition to judge when we have examined the definition of Justice from\nan Intuitional point of view.\n\nThe question takes a simpler form in the case of the method which\nproposes as an ultimate end, and supreme standard, Universal\nHappiness.[26] Here we have merely to ask how far a systematic\nconsideration of the social relations of an ideally happy group of\nhuman beings is likely to afford guidance in our efforts to promote\nhuman happiness here and now. I shall not at present deny that this\ntask might usefully be included in an exhaustive study of this method.\nBut it can easily be shown that it is involved in serious difficulties.\n\nFor as in ordinary deliberation we have to consider what is best\nunder certain conditions of human life, internal or external, so\nwe must do this in contemplating the ideal society. We require to\ncontemplate not so much the end supposed to be attained--which is\nsimply the most pleasant consciousness conceivable, lasting as long and\nas uninterruptedly as possible--but rather some method of realising\nit, pursued by human beings; and these, again, must be conceived as\nexisting under conditions not too remote from our own, so that we\ncan at least endeavour to imitate them. And for this we must know\nhow far our present circumstances are modifiable; a very difficult\nquestion, as the constructions which have actually been made of such\nideal societies show. For example, the _Republic_ of Plato seems in\nmany respects sufficiently divergent from the reality, and yet he\ncontemplates war as a permanent unalterable fact, to be provided for\nin the ideal state, and indeed such provision seems the predominant\naim of his construction; whereas the soberest modern Utopia would\ncertainly include the suppression of war. Indeed the ideal will often\nseem to diverge in diametrically opposite directions from the actual,\naccording to the line of imagined change which we happen to adopt,\nin our visionary flight from present evils. For example, permanent\nmarriage-unions now cause some unhappiness, because conjugal affection\nis not always permanent; but they are thought to be necessary, partly\nto protect men and women from vagaries of passion pernicious to\nthemselves, but chiefly in order to the better rearing of children. Now\nit may seem to some that in an ideal state of society we could trust\nmore to parental affections, and require less to control the natural\nplay of emotion between the sexes, and that \u2018Free Love\u2019 is therefore\nthe ideal; while others would maintain that permanence in conjugal\naffection is natural and normal, and that any exceptions to this rule\nmust be supposed to disappear as we approximate to the ideal. Again,\nthe happiness enjoyed in our actual society seems much diminished by\nthe unequal distribution of the means of happiness, and the division\nof mankind into rich and poor. But we can conceive this evil removed\nin two quite different ways: either by an increased disposition on\nthe part of the rich to redistribute their share, or by such social\narrangements as would enable the poor to secure more for themselves. In\nthe one case the ideal involves a great extension and systematisation\nof the arbitrary and casual almsgiving that now goes on: in the other\ncase, its extinction.\n\nIn short, it seems that when we abandon the firm ground of actual\nsociety we have an illimitable cloudland surrounding us on all sides,\nin which we may construct any variety of pattern states; but no\ndefinite ideal to which the actual undeniably approximates, as the\nstraight lines and circles of the actual physical world approximate to\nthose of scientific geometry.\n\nIt may be said, however, that we can reduce this variety by studying\nthe past history of mankind, as this will enable us to predict to\nsome extent their future manner of existence. But even so it does\nnot appear that we shall gain much definite guidance for our present\nconduct. For let us make the most favourable suppositions that we can,\nand such as soar even above the confidence of the most dogmatic of\nscientific historians. Let us assume that the process of human history\nis a progress of mankind towards ever greater happiness. Let us assume\nfurther that we can not only fix certain limits within which the future\nsocial condition of mankind must lie, but even determine in detail the\nmutual relations of the different elements of the future community,\nso as to view in clear outline the rules of behaviour, by observing\nwhich they will attain the maximum of happiness. It still remains quite\ndoubtful how far it would be desirable for us to imitate these rules\nin the circumstances in which we now live. For this foreknown social\norder is _ex hypothesi_ only presented as a more advanced stage in\nour social progress, and not as a type or pattern which we ought to\nmake a struggle to realise approximately at an earlier stage. How far\nit should be taken as such a pattern, is a question which would still\nhave to be determined, and in the consideration of it the effects of\nour actions on the existing generation would after all be the most\nimportant element.[27]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[23] It may be doubted whether the latter ought properly to be termed\na \u201cgood citizen,\u201d and not rather a \u201cfaithful subject of the Czar of\nRussia.\u201d But this doubt only illustrates the divergence to which I am\ndrawing attention.\n\n[24] Sometimes, as before observed, Politics appears to be used in a\nwider sense, to denote the theory of ideal social relations, whether\nconceived to be established through governmental coercion or otherwise.\n\n[25] In writing this section I had primarily in view the doctrine set\nforth in Mr. Spencer\u2019s _Social Statics_. As Mr. Spencer has restated\nhis view and replied to my arguments in his _Data of Ethics_, it is\nnecessary for me to point out that the first paragraph of this section\nis not directed against such a view of \u2018Absolute\u2019 and \u2018Relative\u2019\nEthics as is given in the later treatise--which seems to me to differ\nmaterially from the doctrine of _Social Statics_. In _Social Statics_\nit is maintained not merely--as in the _Data of Ethics_--that Absolute\nEthics which \u201cformulates normal conduct in an ideal society\u201d ought to\n\u201ctake precedence of Relative Ethics\u201d; but that Absolute Ethics is the\nonly kind of Ethics with which a philosophical moralist can possibly\nconcern himself. To quote Mr. Spencer\u2019s words:--\u201cAny proposed system of\nmorals which recognises existing defects, and countenances acts made\nneedful by them, stands self-condemned.... Moral law ... requires as\nits postulate that human beings be perfect. The philosophical moralist\ntreats solely of the _straight_ man ... shows in what relationship\nhe stands to other straight men ... a problem in which a _crooked_\nman forms one of the elements, is insoluble by him.\u201d _Social Statics_\n(chap. i.). Still more definitely is Relative Ethics excluded in the\nfollowing passage of the concluding chapter of the same treatise (the\nitalics are mine):--\u201cIt will very likely be urged that, whereas the\nperfect moral code is confessedly beyond the fulfilment of imperfect\nmen, some other code is needful for our present guidance ... to say\nthat the imperfect man requires a moral code which recognises his\nimperfection and allows for it, _seems at first sight reasonable_. _But\nit is not really so_ ... a system of morals which shall recognise man\u2019s\npresent imperfections and allow for them _cannot be devised; and would\nbe useless if it could be devised_.\u201d\n\n[26] I omit, for the present, the consideration of the method which\ntakes Perfection as an ultimate end: since, as has been before\nobserved, it is hardly possible to discuss this satisfactorily, in\nrelation to the present question, until it has been somewhat more\nclearly distinguished from the ordinary Intuitional Method.\n\n[27] Some further consideration of this question will be found in a\nsubsequent chapter. Cf. Book iv. chap. iv. \u00a7 2.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nETHICAL JUDGMENTS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the first chapter I spoke of actions that we judge to be right\nand what ought to be done as being \u201creasonable,\u201d or \u201crational,\u201d and\nsimilarly of ultimate ends as \u201cprescribed by Reason\u201d: and I contrasted\nthe motive to action supplied by the recognition of such reasonableness\nwith \u201cnon-rational\u201d desires and inclinations. This manner of speaking\nis employed by writers of different schools, and seems in accordance\nwith the common view and language on the subject. For we commonly think\nthat wrong conduct is essentially irrational, and can be shown to be so\nby argument; and though we do not conceive that it is by reason alone\nthat men are influenced to act rightly, we still hold that appeals to\nthe reason are an essential part of all moral persuasion, and that\npart which concerns the moralist or moral philosopher as distinct from\nthe preacher or moral rhetorician. On the other hand it is widely\nmaintained that, as Hume says, \u201cReason, meaning the judgment of truth\nand falsehood, can never of itself be any motive to the Will\u201d; and\nthat the motive to action is in all cases some Non-rational Desire,\nincluding under this term the impulses to action given by present\npleasure and pain. It seems desirable to examine with some care the\ngrounds of this contention before we proceed any further.\n\nLet us begin by defining the issue raised as clearly as possible. Every\none, I suppose, has had experience of what is meant by the conflict of\nnon-rational or irrational desires with reason: most of us (_e.g._)\noccasionally feel bodily appetite prompting us to indulgences which\nwe judge to be imprudent, and anger prompting us to acts which we\ndisapprove as unjust or unkind. It is when this conflict occurs that\nthe desires are said to be irrational, as impelling us to volitions\nopposed to our deliberate judgments; sometimes we yield to such\nseductive impulses, and sometimes not; and it is perhaps when we do\n_not_ yield that the impulsive force of such irrational desires is most\ndefinitely felt, as we have to exert in resisting them a voluntary\neffort somewhat analogous to that involved in any muscular exertion.\nOften, again,--since we are not always thinking either of our duty\nor of our interest,--desires of this kind take effect in voluntary\nactions without our having judged such actions to be either right\nor wrong, either prudent or imprudent; as (_e.g._) when an ordinary\nhealthy man eats his dinner. In such cases it seems most appropriate\nto call the desires \u201cnon-rational\u201d rather than \u201cirrational.\u201d Neither\nterm is intended to imply that the desires spoken of--or at least the\nmore important of them--are not normally accompanied by intellectual\nprocesses. It is true that some impulses to action seem to take\neffect, as we say \u201cblindly\u201d or \u201cinstinctively,\u201d without any definite\nconsciousness either of the end at which the action is aimed, or of\nthe means by which the end is to be attained: but this, I conceive, is\nonly the case with impulses that do not occupy consciousness for an\nappreciable time, and ordinarily do not require any but very familiar\nand habitual actions for the attainment of their proximate ends. In\nall other cases--that is, in the case of the actions with which we\nare chiefly concerned in ethical discussion--the result aimed at, and\nsome part at least of the means by which it is to be realised, are\nmore or less distinctly represented in consciousness, previous to the\nvolition that initiates the movements tending to its realisation.\nHence the resultant forces of what I call \u201cnon-rational\u201d desires,\nand the volitions to which they prompt, are continually modified by\nintellectual processes in two distinct ways; first by new perceptions\nor representations of means conducive to the desired ends, and secondly\nby new presentations or representations of facts actually existing\nor in prospect--especially more or less probable consequences of\ncontemplated actions--which rouse new impulses of desire and aversion.\n\nThe question, then, is whether the account just given of the influence\nof the intellect on desire and volition is not exhaustive; and whether\nthe experience which is commonly described as a \u201cconflict of desire\nwith reason\u201d is not more properly conceived as merely a conflict among\ndesires and aversions; the sole function of reason being to bring\nbefore the mind ideas of actual or possible facts, which modify in the\nmanner above described the resultant force of our various impulses.\n\nI hold that this is not the case; that the ordinary moral or prudential\njudgments which, in the case of all or most minds, have some--though\noften an inadequate--influence on volition, cannot legitimately be\ninterpreted as judgments respecting the present or future existence\nof human feelings or any facts of the sensible world; the fundamental\nnotion represented by the word \u201cought\u201d or \u201cright,\u201d[28] which such\njudgments contain expressly or by implication, being essentially\ndifferent from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical\nexperience. The question is one on which appeal must ultimately be\nmade to the reflection of individuals on their practical judgments\nand reasonings: and in making this appeal it seems most convenient\nto begin by showing the inadequacy of all attempts to explain the\npractical judgments or propositions in which this fundamental notion\nis introduced, without recognising its unique character as above\nnegatively defined. There is an element of truth in such explanations,\nin so far as they bring into view feelings which undoubtedly accompany\nmoral or prudential judgments, and which ordinarily have more or less\neffect in determining the will to actions judged to be right; but so\nfar as they profess to be interpretations of what such judgments mean,\nthey appear to me to fail altogether.\n\nIn considering this question it is important to take separately the\ntwo species of judgments which I have distinguished as \u201cmoral\u201d and\n\u201cprudential.\u201d Both kinds might, indeed, be termed \u201cmoral\u201d in a wider\nsense; and, as we saw, it is a strongly supported opinion that all\nvalid moral rules have ultimately a prudential basis. But in ordinary\nthought we clearly distinguish cognitions or judgments of duty from\ncognitions or judgments as to what \u201cis right\u201d or \u201cought to be done\u201d in\nview of the agent\u2019s private interest or happiness: and the depth of the\ndistinction will not, I think, be diminished by the closer examination\nof these judgments on which we are now to enter.\n\nThis very distinction, however, suggests an interpretation of the\nnotion of rightness which denies its peculiar significance in moral\njudgments. It is urged that \u201crightness\u201d is properly an attribute of\nmeans, not of ends: so that the attribution of it merely implies\nthat the act judged right is the fittest or only fit means to the\nrealisation of some end understood if not expressly stated: and\nsimilarly that the affirmation that anything \u2018ought to be done\u2019 is\nalways made with at least tacit reference to some ulterior end. And I\ngrant that this is a legitimate interpretation, in respect of a part of\nthe use of either term in ordinary discourse. But it seems clear (1)\nthat certain kinds of actions--under the names of Justice, Veracity,\nGood Faith, etc.--are commonly held to be right unconditionally,\nwithout regard to ulterior results: and (2) that we similarly regard\nas \u201cright\u201d the adoption of certain ends--such as the common good\nof society, or general happiness. In either of these cases the\ninterpretation above suggested seems clearly inadmissible.[29]\n\nWe have therefore to find a meaning for \u201cright\u201d or \u201cwhat ought to be\u201d\nother than the notion of fitness to some ulterior end. Here we are met\nby the suggestion that the judgments or propositions which we commonly\ncall moral--in the narrower sense--really affirm no more than the\nexistence of a specific emotion in the mind of the person who utters\nthem; that when I say \u2018Truth ought to be spoken\u2019 or \u2018Truthspeaking is\nright,\u2019 I mean no more than that the idea of truthspeaking excites in\nmy mind a feeling of approbation or satisfaction. And probably some\ndegree of such emotion, commonly distinguished as \u2018moral sentiment,\u2019\nordinarily accompanies moral judgments on real cases. But it is absurd\nto say that a mere statement of my approbation of truth-speaking is\nproperly given in the proposition \u2018Truth ought to be spoken\u2019; otherwise\nthe fact of another man\u2019s disapprobation might equally be expressed\nby saying \u2018Truth ought not to be spoken\u2019; and thus we should have two\ncoexistent facts stated in two mutually contradictory propositions.\nThis is so obvious, that we must suppose that those who hold the view\nwhich I am combating do not really intend to deny it: but rather to\nmaintain that this subjective fact of my approbation is all that\nthere is any _ground_ for stating, or perhaps that it is all that any\nreasonable person is prepared on reflection to affirm. And no doubt\nthere is a large class of statements, in form objective, which yet\nwe are not commonly prepared to maintain as more than subjective if\ntheir validity is questioned. If I say that \u2018the air is sweet,\u2019 or\n\u2018the food disagreeable,\u2019 it would not be exactly true to say that\nI mean no more than that I like the one or dislike the other: but\nif my statement is challenged, I shall probably content myself with\naffirming the existence of such feelings in my own mind. But there\nappears to me to be a fundamental difference between this case and\nthat of moral feelings. The peculiar emotion of moral approbation is,\nin my experience, inseparably bound up with the conviction, implicit\nor explicit, that the conduct approved is \u2018really\u2019 right--_i.e._\nthat it cannot, without error, be disapproved by any other mind. If\nI give up this conviction because others do not share it, or for any\nother reason, I may no doubt still retain a sentiment prompting to\nthe conduct in question, or--what is perhaps more common--a sentiment\nof repugnance to the opposite conduct: but this sentiment will no\nlonger have the special quality of \u2018moral sentiment\u2019 strictly so\ncalled. This difference between the two is often overlooked in ethical\ndiscussion: but any experience of a change in moral opinion produced by\nargument may afford an illustration of it. Suppose (_e.g._) that any\none habitually influenced by the sentiment of Veracity is convinced\nthat under certain peculiar circumstances in which he finds himself,\nspeaking truth is not right but wrong. He will probably still feel a\nrepugnance against violating the rule of truthspeaking: but it will be\na feeling quite different in kind and degree from that which prompted\nhim to veracity as a department of virtuous action. We might perhaps\ncall the one a \u2018moral\u2019 and the other a \u2018quasi-moral\u2019 sentiment.\n\nThe argument just given holds equally against the view that approbation\nor disapprobation is not the mere liking or aversion of an individual\nfor certain kinds of conduct, but this complicated by a sympathetic\nrepresentation of similar likings or aversions felt by other human\nbeings. No doubt such sympathy is a normal concomitant of moral\nemotion, and when the former is absent there is much greater difficulty\nin maintaining the latter: this, however, is partly because our moral\nbeliefs commonly agree with those of other members of our society, and\non this agreement depends to an important extent our confidence in the\ntruth of these beliefs.[30] But if, as in the case just supposed, we\nare really led by argument to a new moral belief, opposed not only to\nour own habitual sentiment but also to that of the society in which\nwe live, we have a crucial experiment proving the existence in us of\nmoral sentiments as I have defined them, colliding with the represented\nsympathies of our fellow-men no less than with our own mere likings\nand aversions. And even if we imagine the sympathies opposed to our\nconvictions extended until they include those of the whole human race,\nagainst whom we imagine ourselves to stand as _Athanasius contra\nmundum_; still, so long as our conviction of duty is firm, the emotion\nwhich we call moral stands out in imagination quite distinct from the\ncomplex sympathy opposed to it, however much we extend, complicate and\nintensify the latter.\n\n\u00a7 2. So far, then, from being prepared to admit that the proposition\n\u2018X ought to be done\u2019 _merely_ expresses the existence of a certain\nsentiment in myself or others, I find it strictly impossible so to\nregard my own moral judgments without eliminating from the concomitant\nsentiment the peculiar quality signified by the term \u2018moral.\u2019 There is,\nhowever, another interpretation of \u2018ought,\u2019 in which the likings and\naversions that men in general feel for certain kinds of conduct are\nconsidered not as sympathetically represented in the emotion of the\nperson judging, and thus constituting the moral element in it, but as\ncauses of pain to the person of whom \u2018ought\u2019 or \u2018duty\u2019 is predicated.\nOn this view, when we say that a man \u2018ought\u2019 to do anything, or that it\nis his \u2018duty\u2019 to do it, we mean that he is bound under penalties to do\nit; the particular penalty considered being the pain that will accrue\nto him directly or indirectly from the dislike of his fellow-creatures.\n\nI think that this interpretation expresses a part of the meaning\nwith which the words \u2018ought\u2019 and \u2018duty\u2019 are used in ordinary thought\nand discourse. For we commonly use the term \u2018moral obligation\u2019 as\nequivalent to \u2018duty\u2019 and expressing what is implied in the verb\n\u2018ought,\u2019 thus suggesting an analogy between this notion and that of\nlegal obligation; and in the case of positive law we cannot refuse\nto recognise the connexion of \u2018obligation\u2019 and \u2018punishment\u2019: a law\ncannot be properly said to be actually established in a society if it\nis habitually violated with impunity. But a more careful reflection on\nthe relation of Law to Morality, as ordinarily conceived, seems to show\nthat this interpretation of \u2018ought\u2019--though it cannot be excluded--must\nbe distinguished from the special ethical use of the term. For the\nideal distinction taken in common thought between legal and merely\nmoral rules seems to lie in just this connexion of the former but not\nthe latter with punishment: we think that there are some things which a\nman ought to be compelled to do, or forbear, and others which he ought\nto do or forbear without compulsion, and that the former alone fall\nproperly within the sphere of law. No doubt we also think that in many\ncases where the compulsion of law is undesirable, the fear of moral\ncensure and its consequences supplies a normally useful constraint on\nthe will of any individual. But it is evident that what we mean when we\nsay that a man is \u201cmorally though not legally bound\u201d to do a thing is\nnot merely that he \u201cwill be punished by public opinion if he does not\u201d;\nfor we often join these two statements, clearly distinguishing their\nimport: and further (since public opinion is known to be eminently\nfallible) there are many things which we judge men \u2018ought\u2019 to do,\nwhile perfectly aware that they will incur no serious social penalties\nfor omitting them. In such cases, indeed, it would be commonly said\nthat social disapprobation \u2018ought\u2019 to follow on immoral conduct; and\nin this very assertion it is clear that the term \u2018ought\u2019 cannot mean\nthat social penalties are to be feared by those who do not disapprove.\nAgain, all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly\ndeveloped find themselves from time to time in conflict with the\ncommonly received morality of the society to which they belong: and\nthus--as was before said--have a crucial experience proving that duty\ndoes not mean _to them_ what other men will disapprove of them for not\ndoing.\n\nAt the same time I admit, as indeed I have already suggested in \u00a7 3\nof chap. i., that we not unfrequently pass judgments resembling moral\njudgments in form, and not distinguished from them in ordinary thought,\nin cases where the obligation affirmed is found, on reflection, to\ndepend on the existence of current opinions and sentiments as such.\nThe members of modern civilised societies are under the sway of a code\nof Public Opinion, enforced by social penalties, which no reflective\nperson obeying it identifies with the moral code, or regards as\nunconditionally binding: indeed the code is manifestly fluctuating and\nvariable, different at the same time in different classes, professions,\nsocial circles, of the same political community. Such a code always\nsupports to a considerable extent the commonly received code of\nmorality: and most reflective persons think it generally reasonable\nto conform to the dictates of public opinion--to the code of Honour,\nwe may say, in graver matters, or the rules of Politeness or Good\nBreeding in lighter matters--wherever these dictates do not positively\nconflict with morality; such conformity being maintained either on\ngrounds of private interest, or because it is thought conducive to\ngeneral happiness or wellbeing to keep as much as possible in harmony\nwith one\u2019s fellow-men. Hence in the ordinary thought of unreflective\npersons the duties imposed by social opinion are often undistinguished\nfrom moral duties: and indeed this indistinctness is almost inherent\nin the common meaning of many terms. For instance, if we say that a\nman has been \u2018dishonoured\u2019 by a cowardly act, it is not quite clear\nwhether we mean that he has incurred contempt, or that he has deserved\nit, or both: as becomes evident when we take a case in which the Code\nof Honour comes into conflict with Morality. If (_e.g._) a man were\nto incur social ostracism anywhere for refusing a duel on religious\ngrounds, some would say that he was \u2018dishonoured,\u2019 though he had\nacted rightly, others that there could be no real dishonour in a\nvirtuous act. A similar ambiguity seems to lurk in the common notion\nof \u2018improper\u2019 or \u2018incorrect\u2019 behaviour. Still in all such cases the\nambiguity becomes evident on reflection: and when discovered, merely\nserves to illustrate further the distinction between the notion\nof \u2018right conduct,\u2019 \u2018duty,\u2019 what we \u2018ought\u2019 or are under \u2018moral\nobligation\u2019 to do--when these terms are used in a strictly ethical\nsense--and conduct that is merely conformed to the standard of current\nopinion.\n\nThere is, however, another way of interpreting \u2018ought\u2019 as connoting\npenalties, which is somewhat less easy to meet by a crucial\npsychological experiment. The moral imperative may be taken to be a\nlaw of God, to the breach of which Divine penalties are annexed; and\nthese, no doubt, in a Christian society, are commonly conceived to be\nadequate and universally applicable. Still, it can hardly be said that\nthis belief is shared by all the persons whose conduct is influenced\nby independent moral convictions, occasionally unsupported either by\nthe law or the public opinion of their community. And even in the case\nof many of those who believe fully in the moral government of the\nworld, the judgment \u201cI ought to do this\u201d cannot be identified with\nthe judgment \u201cGod will punish me if I do not\u201d; since the conviction\nthat the former proposition is true is distinctly recognised as an\nimportant part of the grounds for believing the latter. Again, when\nChristians speak--as they commonly do--of the \u2018justice\u2019 (or other moral\nattributes) of God, as exhibited in punishing sinners and rewarding the\nrighteous, they obviously imply not merely that God _will_ thus punish\nand reward, but that it is \u2018right\u2019[31] for Him to do so: which, of\ncourse, cannot be taken to mean that He is \u2018bound under penalties.\u2019\n\n\u00a7 3. It seems then that the notion of \u2018ought\u2019 or \u2018moral obligation\u2019 as\nused in our common moral judgments, does not merely import (1) that\nthere exists in the mind of the person judging a specific emotion\n(whether complicated or not by sympathetic representation of similar\nemotions in other minds); nor (2) that certain rules of conduct are\nsupported by penalties which will follow on their violation (whether\nsuch penalties result from the general liking or aversion felt for\nthe conduct prescribed or forbidden, or from some other source). What\nthen, it may be asked, does it import? What definition can we give\nof \u2018ought,\u2019 \u2018right,\u2019 and other terms expressing the same fundamental\nnotion? To this I should answer that the notion which these terms\nhave in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition.\nIn so saying, I do not mean to imply that it belongs to the \u201coriginal\nconstitution of the mind\u201d; _i.e._ that its presence in consciousness\nis not the result of a process of development. I do not doubt that the\nwhole fabric of human thought--including the conceptions that present\nthemselves as most simple and elementary--has been developed, through\na gradual process of psychical change, out of some lower life in which\nthought, properly speaking, had no place. But it is not therefore to be\ninferred, as regards this or any other notion, that it has not really\nthe simplicity which it appears to have when we now reflect upon it.\nIt is sometimes assumed that if we can show how thoughts have grown\nup--if we can point to the psychical antecedents of which they are the\nnatural consequents--we may conclude that the thoughts in question are\nreally compounds containing their antecedents as latent elements. But\nI know no justification for this transference of the conceptions of\nchemistry to psychology;[32] I know no reason for considering psychical\nantecedents as really constitutive of their psychical consequents, in\nspite of the apparent dissimilarity between the two. In default of such\nreasons, a psychologist must accept as elementary what introspection\ncarefully performed declares to be so; and, using this criterion, I\nfind that the notion we have been examining, as it now exists in our\nthought, cannot be resolved into any more simple notions: it can only\nbe made clearer by determining as precisely as possible its relation\nto other notions with which it is connected in ordinary thought,\nespecially to those with which it is liable to be confounded.\n\nIn performing this process it is important to note and distinguish\ntwo different implications with which the word \u201cought\u201d is used; in\nthe narrowest ethical sense what we judge \u2018ought to be\u2019 done, is\nalways thought capable of being brought about by the volition of any\nindividual to whom the judgment applies. I cannot conceive that I\n\u2018ought\u2019 to do anything which at the same time I judge that I cannot do.\nIn a wider sense, however,--which cannot conveniently be discarded--I\nsometimes judge that I \u2018ought\u2019 to know what a wiser man would know,\nor feel as a better man would feel, in my place, though I may know\nthat I could not directly produce in myself such knowledge or feeling\nby any effort of will. In this case the word merely implies an ideal\nor pattern which I \u2018ought\u2019--in the stricter sense--to seek to imitate\nas far as possible. And this wider sense seems to be that in which\nthe word is normally used in the precepts of Art generally, and in\npolitical judgments: when I judge that the laws and constitution of my\ncountry \u2018ought to be\u2019 other than they are, I do not of course imply\nthat my own or any other individual\u2019s single volition can directly\nbring about the change.[33] In either case, however, I imply that what\nought to be is a possible object of knowledge: _i.e._ that what I judge\nought to be must, unless I am in error, be similarly judged by all\nrational beings who judge truly of the matter.\n\nIn referring such judgments to the \u2018Reason,\u2019 I do not mean here to\nprejudge the question whether valid moral judgments are normally\nattained by a process of reasoning from universal principles or axioms,\nor by direct intuition of the particular duties of individuals.\nIt is not uncommonly held that the moral faculty deals primarily\nwith individual cases as they arise, applying directly to each case\nthe general notion of duty, and deciding intuitively what ought\nto be done by this person in these particular circumstances. And\nI admit that on this view the apprehension of moral truth is more\nanalogous to Sense-perception than to Rational Intuition (as commonly\nunderstood):[34] and hence the term Moral Sense might seem more\nappropriate. But the term Sense suggests a capacity for feelings\nwhich may vary from _A_ to _B_ without either being in error, rather\nthan a faculty of cognition:[35] and it appears to me fundamentally\nimportant to avoid this suggestion. I have therefore thought it better\nto use the term Reason with the explanation above given, to denote the\nfaculty of moral cognition:[36] adding, as a further justification of\nthis use, that even when a moral judgment relates primarily to some\nparticular action we commonly regard it as applicable to any other\naction belonging to a certain definable class: so that the moral truth\napprehended is implicitly conceived to be intrinsically universal,\nthough particular in our first apprehension of it.\n\nFurther, when I speak of the cognition or judgment that \u2018X ought to\nbe done\u2019--in the stricter ethical sense of the term ought[37]--as a\n\u2018dictate\u2019 or \u2018precept\u2019 of reason to the persons to whom it relates, I\nimply that in rational beings as such this cognition gives an impulse\nor motive to action: though in human beings, of course, this is only\none motive among others which are liable to conflict with it, and is\nnot always--perhaps not usually--a predominant motive. In fact, this\npossible conflict of motives seems to be connoted by the term \u2018dictate\u2019\nor \u2018imperative,\u2019 which describes the relation of Reason to mere\ninclinations or non-rational impulses by comparing it to the relation\nbetween the will of a superior and the wills of his subordinates. This\nconflict seems also to be implied in the terms \u2018ought,\u2019 \u2018duty,\u2019 \u2018moral\nobligation,\u2019 as used in ordinary moral discourse: and hence these terms\ncannot be applied to the actions of rational beings to whom we cannot\nattribute impulses conflicting with reason. We may, however, say of\nsuch beings that their actions are \u2018reasonable,\u2019 or (in an absolute\nsense) \u2018right.\u2019\n\n\u00a7 4. I am aware that some persons will be disposed to answer all the\npreceding argument by a simple denial that they can find in their\nconsciousness any such unconditional or categorical imperative as I\nhave been trying to exhibit. If this is really the final result of\nself-examination in any case, there is no more to be said. I, at least,\ndo not know how to impart the notion of moral obligation to any one\nwho is entirely devoid of it. I think, however, that many of those who\ngive this denial only mean to deny that they have any consciousness of\nmoral obligation to actions without reference to their consequences;\nand would not really deny that they recognise some universal end or\nends--whether it be the general happiness, or well-being otherwise\nunderstood--as that at which it is ultimately reasonable to aim,\nsubordinating to its attainment the gratification of any personal\ndesires that may conflict with this aim. But in this view, as I have\nbefore said, the unconditional imperative plainly comes in as regards\nthe end, which is--explicitly or implicitly--recognised as an end at\nwhich all men \u2018ought\u2019 to aim; and it can hardly be denied that the\nrecognition of an end as ultimately reasonable involves the recognition\nof an obligation to do such acts as most conduce to the end. The\nobligation is not indeed \u201cunconditional,\u201d but it does not depend on the\nexistence of any non-rational desires or aversions. And nothing that\nhas been said in the preceding section is intended as an argument in\nfavour of Intuitionism, as against Utilitarianism or any other method\nthat treats moral rules as relative to General Good or Well-being.\nFor instance, nothing that I have said is inconsistent with the view\nthat Truthspeaking is only valuable as a means to the preservation of\nsociety: only if it be admitted that it _is_ valuable on this ground I\nshould say that it is implied that the preservation of society--or some\nfurther end to which this preservation, again, is a means--must be\nvaluable _per se_, and therefore something at which a rational being,\nas such, ought to aim. If it be granted that we need not look beyond\nthe preservation of society, the primary \u2018dictate of reason\u2019 in this\ncase would be \u2018that society _ought_ to be preserved\u2019: but reason would\nalso dictate that truth ought to be spoken, so far as truthspeaking\nis recognised as the indispensable or fittest means to this end: and\nthe notion \u201cought\u201d as used in either dictate is that which I have been\ntrying to make clear.\n\nSo again, even those who hold that moral rules are only obligatory\nbecause it is the individual\u2019s interest to conform to them--thus\nregarding them as a particular species of prudential rules--do not\nthereby get rid of the \u2018dictate of reason,\u2019 so far as they recognise\nprivate interest or happiness as an end at which it is ultimately\nreasonable to aim. The conflict of Practical Reason with irrational\ndesire remains an indubitable fact of our conscious experience, even if\npractical reason is interpreted to mean merely self-regarding Prudence.\nIt is, indeed, maintained by Kant and others that it cannot properly\nbe said to be a man\u2019s duty to promote his own happiness; since \u201cwhat\nevery one inevitably wills cannot be brought under the notion of duty.\u201d\nBut even granting[38] it to be in some sense true that a man\u2019s volition\nis always directed to the attainment of his own happiness, it does not\nfollow that a man always does what he believes will be conducive to his\nown _greatest_ happiness. As Butler urges, it is a matter of common\nexperience that men indulge appetite or passion even when, in their own\nview, the indulgence is as clearly opposed to what they conceive to be\ntheir interest as it is to what they conceive to be their duty. Thus\nthe notion \u2018ought\u2019--as expressing the relation of rational judgment\nto non-rational impulses--will find a place in the practical rules of\nany egoistic system, no less than in the rules of ordinary morality,\nunderstood as prescribing duty without reference to the agent\u2019s\ninterest.\n\nHere, however, it may be held that Egoism does not properly regard\nthe agent\u2019s own greatest happiness as what he \u201cought\u201d to aim at: but\nonly as the ultimate end for the realisation of which he has, on\nthe whole, a predominant desire; which may be temporarily overcome\nby particular passions and appetites, but ordinarily regains its\npredominance when these transient impulses have spent their force. I\nquite recognise that this is a view widely taken of egoistic action,\nand I propose to consider it in a subsequent chapter.[39] But even\nif we discard the belief, that any end of action is unconditionally\nor \u201ccategorically\u201d prescribed by reason, the notion \u2018ought\u2019 as above\nexplained is not thereby eliminated from our practical reasonings: it\nstill remains in the \u201chypothetical imperative\u201d which prescribes the\nfittest means to any end that we may have determined to aim at. When\n(_e.g._) a physician says, \u201cIf you wish to be healthy you ought to\nrise early,\u201d this is not the same thing as saying \u201cearly rising is\nan indispensable condition of the attainment of health.\u201d This latter\nproposition expresses the relation of physiological facts on which\nthe former is founded; but it is not merely this relation of facts\nthat the word \u2018ought\u2019 imports: it also implies the unreasonableness of\nadopting an end and refusing to adopt the means indispensable to its\nattainment. It may perhaps be argued that this is not only unreasonable\nbut impossible: since adoption of an end means the preponderance of a\ndesire for it, and if aversion to the indispensable means causes them\nnot to be adopted although recognised as indispensable, the desire for\nthe end is _not_ preponderant and it ceases to be adopted. But this\nview is due, in my opinion, to a defective psychological analysis.\nAccording to my observation of consciousness, the adoption of an end\nas paramount--either absolutely or within certain limits--is quite a\ndistinct psychical phenomenon from desire: it is a kind of volition,\nthough it is, of course, specifically different from a volition\ninitiating a particular immediate action. As a species intermediate\nbetween the two, we may place resolutions to act in a certain way at\nsome future time: we continually make such resolutions, and sometimes\nwhen the time comes for carrying them out, we do in fact act otherwise\nunder the influence of passion or mere habit, without consciously\ncancelling our previous resolve. This inconsistency of will our\npractical reason condemns as irrational, even apart from any judgment\nof approbation or disapprobation on either volition considered by\nitself. There is a similar inconsistency between the adoption of an\nend and a general refusal to take whatever means we may see to be\nindispensable to its attainment: and if, when the time comes, we do not\ntake such means while yet we do not consciously retract our adoption\nof the end, it can hardly be denied that we \u2018ought\u2019 in consistency to\nact otherwise than we do. And such a contradiction as I have described,\nbetween a general resolution and a particular volition, is surely a\nmatter of common experience.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[28] The difference between the significations of the two words is\ndiscussed later.\n\n[29] As, for instance, when Bentham explains (_Principles of Morals\nand Legislation_, chap. i. \u00a7 i. note) that his fundamental principle\n\u201cstates the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in\nquestion as being the right and proper end of human action,\u201d we cannot\nunderstand him really to _mean_ by the word \u201cright\u201d \u201cconducive to the\ngeneral happiness,\u201d though his language in other passages of the same\nchapter (\u00a7\u00a7 ix. and x.) would seem to imply this; for the proposition\nthat it is conducive to general happiness to take general happiness as\nan end of action, though not exactly a tautology, can hardly serve as\nthe fundamental principle of a moral system.\n\n[30] See Book iii. chap. xi. \u00a7 1.\n\n[31] \u2018Ought\u2019 is here inapplicable, for a reason presently explained.\n\n[32] In Chemistry we regard the antecedents (elements) as still\nexisting in and constituting the consequent (compound) because the\nlatter is exactly similar to the former in weight, and because we can\ngenerally cause this compound to disappear and obtain the elements in\nits place. But we find nothing at all like this in the growth of mental\nphenomena: the psychical consequent is in no respect exactly similar\nto its antecedents, nor can it be resolved into them. I should explain\nthat I am not here arguing the question whether the _validity_ of moral\njudgments is affected by a discovery of their psychical antecedents.\nThis question I reserve for subsequent discussion. See Book iii. chap.\ni. \u00a7 4.\n\n[33] I do not even imply that any combination of individuals could\ncompletely realise the state of political relations which I conceive\n\u2018ought to\u2019 exist. My conception would be futile if it had no relation\nto practice: but it may merely delineate a pattern to which no more\nthan an approximation is practically possible.\n\n[34] We do not commonly say that particular physical facts are\napprehended by the Reason: we consider this faculty to be conversant\nin its discursive operation with the relation of judgments or\npropositions: and the intuitive reason (which is here rather in\nquestion) we restrict to the apprehension of universal truths, such as\nthe axioms of Logic and Mathematics.\n\n[35] By cognition I always mean what some would rather call \u201capparent\ncognition\u201d--that is, I do not mean to affirm the _validity_ of the\ncognition, but only its existence as a psychical fact, and its claim to\nbe valid.\n\n[36] A further justification for this extended use of the term Reason\nwill be suggested in a subsequent chapter of this Book (chap. viii. \u00a7\n3).\n\n[37] This is the sense in which the term will always be used in the\npresent treatise, except where the context makes it quite clear that\nonly the wider meaning--that of the political \u2018ought\u2019--is applicable.\n\n[38] As will be seen from the next chapter, I do not grant this.\n\n[39] Chap. ix. of this Book.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPLEASURE AND DESIRE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding chapter I have left undetermined the emotional\ncharacteristics of the impulse that prompts us to obey the dictates\nof Reason. I have done so because these seem to be very different\nin different minds, and even to vary much and rapidly in the same\nmind, without any corresponding variation in the volitional direction\nof the impulse. For instance, in the mind of a rational Egoist the\nruling impulse is generally what Butler and Hutcheson call a \u201ccalm\u201d\nor \u201ccool\u201d self-love: whereas in the man who takes universal happiness\nas the end and standard of right conduct, the desire to do what is\njudged to be reasonable as such is commonly blended in varying degrees\nwith sympathy and philanthropic enthusiasm. Again, if one conceives\nthe dictating Reason--whatever its dictates may be--as external to\noneself, the cognition of rightness is accompanied by a sentiment of\nReverence for Authority; which may by some be conceived impersonally,\nbut is more commonly regarded as the authority of a supreme Person,\nso that the sentiment blends with the affections normally excited by\npersons in different relations, and becomes Religious. This conception\nof Reason as an external authority, against which the self-will\nrebels, is often irresistibly forced on the reflective mind: at other\ntimes, however, the identity of Reason and Self presents itself as\nan immediate conviction, and then Reverence for Authority passes\nover into Self-respect; and the opposite and even more powerful\nsentiment of Freedom is called in, if we consider the rational Self\nas liable to be enslaved by the usurping force of sensual impulses.\nQuite different again are the emotions of Aspiration or Admiration\naroused by the conception of Virtue as an ideal of Moral Beauty.[40]\nOther phases of emotion might be mentioned, all having with these\nthe common characteristic that they are inseparable from an apparent\ncognition--implicit or explicit, direct or indirect--of _rightness_\nin the conduct to which they prompt. There are, no doubt, important\ndifferences in the moral value and efficacy of these different\nemotions, to which I shall hereafter call attention; but their primary\npractical effect does not appear to vary so long as the cognition of\nrightness remains unchanged. It is then with these cognitions that\nEthics, in my view, is primarily concerned: its object is to free them\nfrom doubt and error, and systematise them as far as possible.\n\nThere is, however, one view of the feelings which prompt to voluntary\naction, which is sometimes thought to cut short all controversy as to\nthe principles on which such action ought to be regulated. I mean the\nview that volition is always determined by pleasures or pains actual or\nprospective. This doctrine--which I may distinguish as Psychological\nHedonism--is often connected and not seldom confounded with the method\nof Ethics which I have called Egoistic Hedonism; and no doubt it seems\nat first sight a natural inference that if one end of action--my\nown pleasure or absence of pain--is definitely determined for me by\nunvarying psychological laws, a different end cannot be prescribed for\nme by Reason.\n\nReflection, however, shows that this inference involves the unwarranted\nassumption that a man\u2019s pleasure and pain are determined independently\nof his moral judgments: whereas it is manifestly possible that our\nprospect of pleasure resulting from any course of conduct may largely\ndepend on our conception of it as right or otherwise: and in fact the\npsychological theory above mentioned would require us to suppose that\nthis is normally the case with conscientious persons, who habitually\nact in accordance with their moral convictions. The connexion of the\nexpectation of pleasure from an act with the judgment that it is right\nmay be different in different cases: we commonly conceive a truly moral\nman as one who finds pleasure in doing what he judges to be right\nbecause he so judges it: but, even where moral sensibility is weak,\nexpectation of pleasure from an act may be a necessary consequent of a\njudgment that it is right, through a belief in the moral government of\nthe world somehow harmonising Virtue and Self-interest.\n\nI therefore conclude that there is no necessary connexion between\nthe psychological proposition that pleasure or absence of pain to\nmyself is always the actual ultimate end of my action, and the ethical\nproposition that my own greatest happiness or pleasure is for me the\n_right_ ultimate end. It may, however, be replied that if the former\nproposition be accepted in the same quantitatively precise form as the\nlatter--if it is admitted that I must by a law of my nature always aim\nat the greatest possible pleasure (or least pain) to myself--then at\nleast I cannot conceive any aim conflicting with this to be prescribed\nby Reason. And this seems to me undeniable. If, as Bentham[41] affirms,\n\u201con the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is\u201d\ninevitably \u201cled to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his\nview of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest\ndegree contributory to his own greatest happiness,\u201d[42] then, to any\none who knows this, it must become inconceivable that Reason dictates\nto him to pursue any other line of conduct. But at the same time, as\nit seems to me, the proposition that he \u2018ought\u2019 to pursue _that_ line\nof conduct becomes no less clearly incapable of being affirmed with\nany significance. For a psychological law invariably realised in my\nconduct does not admit of being conceived as \u2018a precept\u2019 or \u2018dictate\u2019\nof reason: this latter must be a rule from which I am conscious that it\nis possible to deviate. I do not, however, think that the proposition\nquoted from Bentham would be affirmed without qualification by any of\nthe writers who now maintain psychological Hedonism. They would admit,\nwith J. S. Mill,[43] that men often, not from merely intellectual\ndeficiencies, but from \u201cinfirmity of character, make their election\nfor the nearer good, though they know it to be less valuable: and this\nno less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures ... they pursue\nsensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware\nthat health is the greater good.\u201d[44]\n\nThis being so, Egoistic Hedonism becomes a possible ethical ideal\nto which psychological Hedonism seems to point. If it can be shown\nthat the ultimate aim of each of us in acting is always solely _some_\npleasure (or absence of pain) to himself, the demonstration certainly\nsuggests that each _ought_ to seek his own _greatest_ pleasure.[45] As\nhas been said, no cogent inference is possible from the psychological\ngeneralisation to the ethical principle: but the mind has a natural\ntendency to pass from the one position to the other: if the actual\nultimate springs of our volition are always our own pleasures and\npains, it seems _prima facie_ reasonable to be moved by them in\nproportion to their pleasantness and painfulness, and therefore to\nchoose the greatest pleasure or least pain on the whole. Further,\nthis psychological doctrine seems to conflict with an ethical view\nwidely held by persons whose moral consciousness is highly developed:\nviz. that an act, to be in the highest sense virtuous, must not be\ndone solely for the sake of the attendant pleasure, even if that be\nthe pleasure of the moral sense; so that if I do an act from the sole\ndesire of obtaining the glow of moral self-approbation which I believe\nwill attend its performance, the act will not be truly virtuous.\n\nIt seems therefore important to subject psychological Hedonism, even in\nits more indefinite form, to a careful examination.\n\n\u00a7 2. It will be well to begin by defining more precisely the question\nat issue. First, I will concede that pleasure is a kind of feeling\nwhich stimulates the will to actions tending to sustain or produce\nit,--to sustain it, if actually present, and to produce it, if it be\nonly represented in idea--; and similarly pain is a kind of feeling\nwhich stimulates to actions tending to remove or avert it.[46] It\nseems convenient to call the felt volitional stimulus in the two cases\nrespectively Desire[47] and Aversion; though it should be observed\nthat the former term is ordinarily restricted to the impulse felt\nwhen pleasure is not actually present, but only represented in idea.\nThe question at issue, then, is not whether pleasure, present or\nrepresented, is normally accompanied by an impulse to prolong the\nactual or realise the represented feeling, and pain correspondingly by\naversion: but whether there are no desires and aversions which have not\npleasures and pains for their objects--no conscious impulses to produce\nor avert results other than the agent\u2019s own feelings. In the treatise\nto which I have referred, Mill explains that \u201cdesiring a thing, and\nfinding it pleasant, are, in the strictness of language, two modes of\nnaming the same psychological fact.\u201d If this be the case, it is hard\nto see how the proposition we are discussing requires to be determined\nby \u201cpractised self-consciousness and self-observation\u201d; as the denial\nof it would involve a contradiction in terms. The truth is that an\nambiguity in the word Pleasure has tended to confuse the discussion\nof this question.[48] When we speak of a man doing something \u201cat his\npleasure,\u201d or \u201cas he pleases,\u201d we usually signify the mere fact of\nvoluntary choice: not necessarily that the result aimed at is some\nprospective feeling of the chooser. Now, if by \u201cpleasant\u201d we merely\nmean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force\non the will, it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological,\nto say that we desire what is pleasant--or even that we desire a\nthing in proportion as it appears pleasant. But if we take \u201cpleasure\u201d\nto denote the kind of feelings, above defined, it becomes a really\ndebateable question whether the end to which our desires are always\nconsciously directed is the attainment by ourselves of such feelings.\nAnd this is what we must understand Mill to consider \u201cso obvious, that\nit will hardly be disputed.\u201d\n\nIt is rather curious to find that one of the best-known of English\nmoralists regards the exact opposite of what Mill thinks so obvious, as\nbeing not merely a universal fact of our conscious experience, but even\na necessary truth. Butler, as is well known, distinguishes self-love,\nor the impulse towards our own pleasure, from \u201cparticular movements\ntowards particular external objects--honour, power, the harm or good\nof another\u201d; the actions proceeding from which are \u201cno otherwise\ninterested than as every action of every creature must from the nature\nof the case be; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or\npreference of his own.\u201d Such particular passions or appetites are,\nhe goes on to say, \u201c_necessarily presupposed by the very idea_ of\nan interested pursuit; since the very idea of interest or happiness\nconsists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object.\u201d We\ncould not pursue pleasure at all, unless we had desires for something\nelse than pleasure; for pleasure consists in the satisfaction of just\nthese \u201cdisinterested\u201d impulses.\n\nButler has certainly over-stated his case,[49] so far as my own\nexperience goes; for many pleasures,--especially those of sight,\nhearing and smell, together with many emotional pleasures,--occur to\nme without any perceptible relation to previous desires, and it seems\nquite _conceivable_ that our primary desires might be entirely directed\ntowards such pleasures as these. But as a matter of fact, it appears to\nme that throughout the whole scale of my impulses, sensual, emotional,\nand intellectual alike, I can distinguish desires of which the object\nis something other than my own pleasure.\n\nI will begin by taking an illustration of this from the impulses\ncommonly placed lowest in the scale. The appetite of hunger, so far\nas I can observe, is a direct impulse to the eating of food. Such\neating is no doubt commonly attended with an agreeable feeling of\nmore or less intensity; but it cannot, I think, be strictly said that\nthis agreeable feeling is the object of hunger, and that it is the\nrepresentation of this pleasure which stimulates the will of the hungry\nman as such. Of course, hunger is frequently and naturally accompanied\nwith anticipation of the pleasure of eating: but careful introspection\nseems to show that the two are by no means inseparable. And even when\nthey occur together the pleasure seems properly the object not of the\nprimary appetite, but of a secondary desire which can be distinguished\nfrom the former; since the _gourmand_, in whom this secondary desire\nis strong, is often prompted by it to actions designed to stimulate\nhunger, and often, again, is led to control the primary impulse, in\norder to prolong and vary the process of satisfying it.\n\nIndeed it is so obvious that hunger is something different from the\ndesire for anticipated pleasure, that some writers have regarded\nits volitional stimulus (and that of desire generally) as a case of\naversion from present pain. This, however, seems to me a distinct\nmistake in psychological classification. No doubt desire is a state of\nconsciousness so far similar to pain, that in both we feel a stimulus\nprompting us to pass from the present state into a different one. But\naversion from pain is an impulse to get out of the present state and\npass into some other state which is only negatively represented as\ndifferent from the present: whereas in desire as such, the primary\nimpulse is towards the realisation of some positive future result. It\nis true that when a strong desire is, for any reason, baulked of its\neffect in causing action, it is generally painful in some degree: and\nso a secondary aversion to the state of desire is generated, which\nblends itself with the desire and may easily be confounded with it.\nBut here, again, we may distinguish the two impulses by observing the\ndifferent kinds of conduct to which they occasionally prompt: for the\naversion to the pain of ungratified desire, though it may act as an\nadditional stimulus towards the gratification of the desire, may also\n(and often does) prompt us to get rid of the pain by suppressing the\ndesire.\n\nThe question whether all desire has in some degree the quality of pain,\nis one of psychological rather than ethical interest;[50] so long as\nit is admitted that it is often not painful in any degree comparable\nto its intensity as desire, so that its volitional impulse cannot be\nexplained as a case of aversion to its own painfulness. At the same\ntime, so far as my experience goes, I have no hesitation in answering\nthe question in the negative. Consider again the case of hunger; I\ncertainly do not find hunger as an element of my normal life at all\na painful feeling: it only becomes painful when I am in ill health,\nor when the satisfaction of the appetite is abnormally delayed. And,\ngenerally speaking, any desire that is not felt to be thwarted in\nits primary impulse to actions tending to its satisfaction, is not\nonly not itself a painful feeling--even when this attainment is still\nremote--but is often an element of a state of consciousness which\nas a whole is highly pleasurable. Indeed, the pleasures afforded by\nthe consciousness of eager activity, in which desire is an essential\nelement, constitute a considerable item in the total enjoyment of\nlife. It is almost a commonplace to say that such pleasures, which\nwe may call generally the pleasures of Pursuit, are more important\nthan the pleasures of Attainment: and in many cases it is the prospect\nof the former rather than of the latter that induces us to engage in\na pursuit. In such cases it is peculiarly easy to distinguish the\ndesire to attain the object pursued, from a desire of the pleasure of\nattainment: since the attainment only becomes pleasant in prospect\nbecause the pursuit itself stimulates a desire for what is pursued.\nTake, for example, the case of any game which involves--as most games\ndo--a contest for victory. No ordinary player before entering on such\na contest, has any desire for victory in it: indeed he often finds\nit difficult to imagine himself deriving gratification from such\nvictory, before he has actually engaged in the competition. What he\ndeliberately, before the game begins, desires is not victory, but\nthe pleasant excitement of the struggle for it; only for the full\ndevelopment of this pleasure a transient desire to win the game is\ngenerally indispensable. This desire, which does not exist at first, is\nstimulated to considerable intensity by the competition itself: and in\nproportion as it is thus stimulated both the mere contest becomes more\npleasurable, and the victory, which was originally indifferent, comes\nto afford a keen enjoyment.\n\nThe same phenomenon is exhibited in the case of more important kinds\nof pursuit. Thus it often happens that a man, feeling his life languid\nand devoid of interests, begins to occupy himself in the prosecution\nof some scientific or socially useful work, for the sake not of the\nend but of the occupation. At first, very likely, the occupation is\nirksome: but soon, as he foresaw, a desire to attain the end at which\nhe aims is stimulated, partly by sympathy with other workers, partly by\nhis sustained exercise of voluntary effort directed towards it; so that\nhis pursuit, becoming eager, becomes also a source of pleasure. Here,\nagain, it is no doubt true that in proportion as his desire for the end\ngrows strong, the attainment of it becomes pleasant in prospect: but it\nwould be a palpable mistake to say that this prospective pleasure is\nthe object of the desire that causes it.[51]\n\nWhen we compare these pleasures with those previously discussed,\nanother important observation suggests itself. In the former case,\nthough we could distinguish appetite, as it appears in consciousness,\nfrom the desire of the pleasure attending the satisfaction of appetite,\nthere appeared to be no incompatibility between the two. The fact that\na glutton is dominated by the desire of the pleasures of eating in no\nway impedes the development in him of the appetite which is a necessary\ncondition of these pleasures. But when we turn to the pleasures\nof pursuit, we seem to perceive this incompatibility to a certain\nextent: a certain subordination of self-regard seems to be necessary\nin order to obtain full enjoyment. A man who maintains throughout an\nepicurean mood, keeping his main conscious aim perpetually fixed on\nhis own pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the chase; his\neagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the\npleasure its highest zest. Here comes into view what we may call the\nfundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the impulse towards pleasure, if\ntoo predominant, defeats its own aim. This effect is not visible, or at\nany rate is scarcely visible, in the case of passive sensual pleasures.\nBut of our active enjoyments generally, whether the activities on\nwhich they attend are classed as \u2018bodily\u2019 or as \u2018intellectual\u2019 (as\nwell as of many emotional pleasures), it may certainly be said that\nwe cannot attain them, at least in their highest degree, so long as\nwe keep our main conscious aim concentrated upon them. It is not only\nthat the exercise of our faculties is insufficiently stimulated by the\nmere desire of the pleasure attending it, and requires the presence\nof other more objective, \u2018extra-regarding,\u2019 impulses, in order to be\nfully developed: we may go further and say that these other impulses\nmust be temporarily predominant and absorbing, if the exercise and\nits attendant gratification are to attain their full scope. Many\nmiddle-aged Englishmen would maintain the view that business is more\nagreeable than amusement; but they would hardly find it so if they\ntransacted the business with a perpetual conscious aim at the attendant\npleasure. Similarly, the pleasures of thought and study can only be\nenjoyed in the highest degree by those who have an ardour of curiosity\nwhich carries the mind temporarily away from self and its sensations.\nIn all kinds of Art, again, the exercise of the creative faculty is\nattended by intense and exquisite pleasures: but it would seem that in\norder to get them, one must forget them: the genuine artist at work\nseems to have a predominant and temporarily absorbing desire for the\nrealisation of his ideal of beauty.\n\nThe important case of the benevolent affections is at first sight\nsomewhat more doubtful. On the one hand it is of course true, that when\nthose whom we love are pleased or pained, we ourselves feel sympathetic\npleasure and pain: and further, that the flow of love or kindly feeling\nis itself highly pleasurable. So that it is at least plausible to\ninterpret benevolent actions as aiming ultimately at the attainment\nof one or both of these two kinds of pleasures, or at the averting\nof sympathetic pain from the agent. But we may observe, first, that\nthe impulse to beneficent action produced in us by sympathy is often\nso much out of proportion to any actual consciousness of sympathetic\npleasure and pain in ourselves, that it would be paradoxical to regard\nthis latter as its object. Often indeed we cannot but feel that a tale\nof actual suffering arouses in us an excitement on the whole more\npleasurable than painful, like the excitement of witnessing a tragedy;\nand yet at the same time stirs in us an impulse to relieve it, even\nwhen the process of relieving is painful and laborious and involves\nvarious sacrifices of our own pleasures. Again, we may often free\nourselves from sympathetic pain most easily by merely turning our\nthoughts from the external suffering that causes it: and we sometimes\nfeel an egoistic impulse to do this, which we can then distinguish\nclearly from the properly sympathetic impulse prompting us to relieve\nthe original suffering. And finally, the much-commended pleasures of\nbenevolence seem to require, in order to be felt in any considerable\ndegree, the pre-existence of a desire to do good to others for their\nsake and not for our own. As Hutcheson explains, we may _cultivate_\nbenevolent affection for the sake of the pleasures attending it (just\nas the glutton cultivates appetite), but we cannot produce it at will,\nhowever strong may be our desire of these pleasures: and when it\nexists, even though it may owe its origin to a purely egoistic impulse,\nit is still essentially a desire to do good to others for their sake\nand not for our own.\n\nIt cannot perhaps be said that the self-abandonment and\nself-forgetfulness, which seemed an essential condition of the full\ndevelopment of the other elevated impulses before noticed, characterise\nbenevolent affection normally and permanently; as love, when a powerful\nemotion, seems naturally to involve a desire for reciprocated love,\nstrong in proportion to the intensity of the emotion; and thus the\nconsciousness of self and of one\u2019s own pleasures and pains seems\noften heightened by the very intensity of the affection that binds\none to others. Still we may at least say that this self-suppression\nand absorption of consciousness in the thought of other human beings\nand their happiness is a common incident of all strong affections:\nand it is said that persons who love intensely sometimes feel a sense\nof antagonism between the egoistic and altruistic elements of their\ndesire, and an impulse to suppress the former, which occasionally\nexhibits itself in acts of fantastic and extravagant self-sacrifice.\n\nIf then reflection on our moral consciousness seems to show that \u201cthe\npleasure of virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express\ncondition of its not being the object sought,\u201d[52] we need not distrust\nthis result of observation on account of the abnormal nature of the\nphenomenon. We have merely another illustration of a psychological law,\nwhich, as we have seen, is exemplified throughout the whole range\nof our desires. In the promptings of Sense no less than in those of\nIntellect or Reason we find the phenomenon of strictly disinterested\nimpulse: base and trivial external ends may excite desires of this\nkind, as well as the sublime and ideal: and there are pleasures of the\nmerely animal life which can only be obtained on condition of not being\ndirectly sought, no less than the satisfactions of a good conscience.\n\n\u00a7 3. So far I have been concerned to insist on the felt incompatibility\nof \u2018self-regarding\u2019 and \u2018extra-regarding\u2019 impulses only as a means of\nproving their essential distinctness. I do not wish to overstate this\nincompatibility: I believe that most commonly it is very transient, and\noften only momentary, and that our greatest happiness--if that be our\ndeliberate aim--is generally attained by means of a sort of alternating\nrhythm of the two kinds of impulse in consciousness. A man\u2019s conscious\ndesire is, I think, more often than not chiefly extra-regarding; but\nwhere there is strong desire in any direction, there is commonly keen\nsusceptibility to the corresponding pleasures; and the most devoted\nenthusiast is sustained in his work by the recurrent consciousness of\nsuch pleasures. But it is important to point out that the familiar\nand obvious instances of conflict between self-love and some\nextra-regarding impulse are not paradoxes and illusions to be explained\naway, but phenomena which the analysis of our consciousness in its\nnormal state, when there is no such conflict, would lead us to expect.\nIf we are continually acting from impulses whose immediate objects are\nsomething other than our own happiness, it is quite natural that we\nshould occasionally yield to such impulses when they prompt us to an\nuncompensated sacrifice of pleasure. Thus a man of weak self-control,\nafter fasting too long, may easily indulge his appetite for food to\nan extent which he knows to be unwholesome: and that not because the\npleasure of eating appears to him, even in the moment of indulgence, at\nall worthy of consideration in comparison with the injury to health;\nbut merely because he feels an impulse to eat food, which prevails\nover his prudential judgment. Thus, again, men have sacrificed all\nthe enjoyments of life, and even life itself, to obtain posthumous\nfame: not from any illusory belief that they would be somehow capable\nof deriving pleasure from it, but from a direct desire of the future\nadmiration of others, and a preference of it to their own pleasure. And\nso, again, when the sacrifice is made for some ideal end, as Truth, or\nFreedom, or Religion: it may be a real sacrifice of the individual\u2019s\nhappiness, and not merely the preference of one highly refined pleasure\n(or of the absence of one special pain) to all the other elements of\nhappiness. No doubt this preference is possible; a man may feel that\nthe high and severe delight of serving his ideal is a \u201cpearl of great\nprice\u201d outweighing in value all other pleasures. But he may also feel\nthat the sacrifice will not repay _him_, and yet determine that it\nshall be made.\n\nTo sum up: our conscious active impulses are so far from being always\ndirected towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for\nourselves, that we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding\nimpulses, directed towards something that is not pleasure, nor relief\nfrom pain; and, indeed, a most important part of our pleasure depends\nupon the existence of such impulses: while on the other hand they are\nin many cases so far incompatible with the desire of our own pleasure\nthat the two kinds of impulse do not easily coexist in the same moment\nof consciousness; and more occasionally (but by no means rarely) the\ntwo come into irreconcilable conflict, and prompt to opposite courses\nof action. And this incompatibility (though it is important to notice\nit in other instances) is no doubt specially prominent in the case of\nthe impulse towards the end which most markedly competes in ethical\ncontroversy with pleasure: the love of virtue for its own sake, or\ndesire to do what is right as such.\n\n\u00a7 4. The psychological observations on which my argument is based will\nnot perhaps be directly controverted, at least to such an extent as\nto involve my main conclusion: but there are two lines of reasoning\nby which it has been attempted to weaken the force of this conclusion\nwithout directly denying it. In the first place, it is urged that\nPleasure, though not the only conscious aim of human action, is\nyet always the result to which it is unconsciously directed. The\nproposition would be difficult to disprove; since no one denies that\npleasure in some degree normally accompanies the attainment of a\ndesired end: and when once we go beyond the testimony of consciousness\nthere seems to be no clear method of determining which among the\nconsequences of any action is the end at which it is aimed. For the\nsame reason, however, the proposition is at any rate equally difficult\nto prove. But I should go further, and maintain that if we seriously\nset ourselves to consider human action on its unconscious side, we\ncan only conceive it as a combination of movements of the parts of\na material organism: and that if we try to ascertain what the \u2018end\u2019\nin any case of such movements is, it is reasonable to conclude that\nit is some material result, some organic condition conducive to the\npreservation either of the individual organism or of the race to which\nit belongs. In fact, the doctrine that pleasure (or the absence of\npain) is the end of all human action can neither be supported by the\nresults of introspection, nor by the results of external observation\nand inference: it rather seems to be reached by an arbitrary and\nillegitimate combination of the two.\n\nBut again, it is sometimes said that whatever be the case with our\npresent adult consciousness, our original impulses were all directed\ntowards pleasure[53] or from pain, and that any impulses otherwise\ndirected are derived from these by \u201cassociation of ideas.\u201d I can find\nno evidence that even tends to prove this: so far as we can observe the\nconsciousness of children, the two elements, extra-regarding impulse\nand desire for pleasure, seem to coexist in the same manner as they\ndo in mature life. In so far as there is any difference, it seems to\nbe in the opposite direction; as the actions of children, being more\ninstinctive and less reflective, are more prompted by extra-regarding\nimpulse, and less by conscious aim at pleasure. No doubt the two\nkinds of impulse, as we trace back the development of consciousness,\ngradually become indistinguishable: but this obviously does not justify\nus in identifying with either of the two the more indefinite impulse\nout of which both have been developed. But even supposing it were found\nthat our earliest appetites were all merely appetites for pleasure, it\nwould have little bearing on the present question. What I am concerned\nto maintain is that men do not _now_ normally desire pleasure alone,\nbut to an important extent other things also: some in particular having\nimpulses towards virtue, which may and do conflict with their conscious\ndesire for their own pleasure. To say in answer to this that all men\n_once_ desired pleasure is, from an ethical point of view, irrelevant:\nexcept on the assumption that there is an original type of man\u2019s\nappetitive nature, to which, as such, it is right or best for him to\nconform. But probably no Hedonist would expressly maintain this; though\nsuch an assumption, no doubt, is frequently made by writers of the\nIntuitional school.\n\n NOTE.--Some psychologists regard Desire as essentially painful. This\n view seems to me erroneous, according to the ordinary use of the term:\n and though it does not necessarily involve the confusion--against\n which I am chiefly concerned to guard in the present chapter--between\n the volitional stimulus of desire itself and the volitional stimulus\n of aversion to desire as painful, it has some tendency to cause\n this confusion. It may therefore be worth while to point out that\n the difference of opinion between myself and the psychologists in\n question--of whom I select Dr. Bain as a leading example--depends\n largely, though not entirely, on a difference of definition. In chap.\n viii. of the second division of his book on _The Emotions and the\n Will_, Dr. Bain defines Desire as \u201cthat phase of volition where there\n is a motive and not ability to act on it,\u201d and gives the following\n illustration:--\n\n \u201cThe inmate of a small gloomy chamber conceives to himself the\n pleasure of light and of an expanded prospect: the unsatisfying ideal\n urges the appropriate action for gaining the reality; he gets up and\n walks out. Suppose now that the same ideal delight comes into the\n mind of a prisoner. Unable to fulfil the prompting, he remains under\n the solicitation of the motive: and his state is denominated craving,\n longing, appetite, desire. If all motive impulses could be at once\n followed up, desire would have no place ... there is a bar in the way\n of acting which leads to the state of conflict and renders desire a\n more or less painful state of mind.\u201d\n\n Now I agree that Desire is most frequently painful in some degree\n when the person desiring is inhibited from acting for the attainment\n of the desired object. I do not indeed think that even under these\n circumstances it is always painful, especially when it is accompanied\n with hope. Take the simple case of hunger. Ordinarily, when I am\n looking forward to dinner with a good appetite, I do not find hunger\n painful--unless I have fasted unusually long--although custom and a\n regard for my digestion prevent me from satisfying the appetite till\n the soup is served. Still I admit that when action tending to fruition\n is excluded, desire is very liable to be painful.\n\n But it is surely contrary to usage to restrict the term Desire to this\n case. Suppose Dr. Bain\u2019s prisoner becomes possessed of a file, and\n sees his way to getting out of prison by a long process, which will\n involve, among other operations, the filing of certain bars. It would\n surely seem absurd to say that his desire finally ceases when the\n operation of filing begins. No doubt the concentration of attention\n on the complex activities necessary for the attainment of freedom\n is likely to cause the prisoner to be so absorbed by other ideas\n and feelings that the desire of freedom may temporarily cease to be\n present in his consciousness. But as the stimulus on which his whole\n activity ultimately depends is certainly derived from the unrealised\n idea of freedom, this idea, with the concomitant feeling of desire,\n will normally recur at brief intervals during the process. Similarly\n in other cases, while it is quite true that men often work for a\n desired end without consciously feeling desire for the end, it would\n be absurd to say that they never feel desire while so working: at any\n rate this restricted use of the term has never, I think, been adopted\n by ethical writers in treating of Desire. And in some passages Dr.\n Bain himself seems to adopt a wider meaning. He says, for instance,\n in the chapter from which I have quoted, that \u201cwe have a form of\n desire ... _when we are working for distant ends_.\u201d If, then, it be\n allowed that the feeling of Desire is at any rate sometimes an element\n of consciousness coexisting with a process of activity directed to\n the attainment of the desired object, or intervening in the brief\n pauses of such a process, I venture to think that when the feeling is\n observed under these conditions, it will not be found in accordance\n with the common experience of mankind to describe it as essentially\n painful.\n\n Take, as a simple instance, the case of a game involving bodily\n exercise and a contest of skill. Probably many persons who take part\n in such exercises for sanitary or social purposes begin without\n any perceptible desire to win the game: and probably as long as\n they remain thus indifferent the exercise is rather tedious.\n Usually, however, a conscious desire to win the game is excited,\n as a consequence of actions directed towards this end: and--in my\n experience at least--in proportion as the feeling grows strong, the\n whole process becomes more pleasurable. If this be admitted to be a\n normal experience, it must surely be also admitted that Desire in this\n case is a feeling in which introspection does not enable us to detect\n the slightest quality of pain.\n\n It would be easy to give an indefinite number of similar instances of\n energetic activity carried on for an end--whether in sport or in the\n serious business of life--where a keen desire for the attainment of\n the end in view is indispensable to a real enjoyment of the labour\n required to attain, and where at the same time we cannot detect any\n painfulness in the desire, however much we try to separate it in\n introspective analysis from its concomitant feeling.\n\n The error that I am trying to remove seems to me partly due to\n overlooking these cases, and contemplating exclusively cases in which\n Desire is for some reason or other prevented from having its normal\n effect in stimulating activity directed to the attainment of the\n desired object. Partly, however, it seems to be due to the resemblance\n between Desire and Pain, to which I have drawn attention in the text\n of this chapter, _i.e._ the _unrestfulness_ which is undoubtedly a\n characteristic of the state of desire, and--ordinarily--of pain.\n For the characteristic of \u201cunrestfulness\u201d requires some care to\n distinguish it from \u201cuneasiness,\u201d in the sense in which this latter\n term signifies some degree of painfulness. The mistake is connected\n with the equally erroneous view--which Hobbes controverts in his\n usual forcible style--that \u201cthe Felicity of this life consisteth\n in the repose of a mind satisfied\u201d; and it has also some affinity\n with the widespread view--which has left its mark on more than one\n European language--that labour, strenuous activity, is essentially\n painful. On both these points, it ought to be said, there is doubtless\n considerable divergence between the experiences of different\n individuals: but at any rate among Englishmen I conceive that a person\n who finds desire always painful--in the sense in which, as I have\n tried to show, the word is commonly used both by moralists and in\n ordinary discourse--is as exceptional a being as one who finds labour\n always painful.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[40] The relation of the \u00e6sthetic to the moral ideal of conduct will be\ndiscussed in a subsequent chapter (ix.) of this Book.\n\n[41] I here, as in chap. i., adopt the exact hedonistic interpretation\nof \u2018happiness\u2019 which Bentham has made current. This seems to me the\nmost suitable use of the term; but I afterwards (Book i. chap. vii. \u00a7\n1) take note of other uses.\n\n[42] _Constitutional Code_, Introduction, \u00a7 2.\n\n[43] _Utilitarianism_, chap. ii. p. 14.\n\n[44] Mr. Leslie Stephen, who holds (_Science of Ethics_, p. 50) that\n\u201cpain and pleasure are the sole determining causes of action,\u201d at the\nsame time thinks that it \u201cwill be admitted on all hands\u201d that \u201cwe are\nnot always determined by a calculation of pleasure to come.\u201d\n\n[45] Or, more precisely, \u2018greatest surplus of pleasure over pain.\u2019\n\n[46] The qualifications and limitations which this proposition\nrequires, before it can be accepted as strictly true, do not seem to me\nimportant for the purpose of the present argument. See Book ii. chap.\nii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[47] In the present treatise \u2018Desire\u2019 is primarily regarded as a felt\nimpulse or stimulus to actions tending to the realisation of what is\ndesired. There are, however, states of feeling, sometimes intense, to\nwhich the term \u2018desire\u2019 is by usage applicable, in which this impulsive\nquality seems to be absent or at least latent; because the realisation\nof the desired result is recognised as hopeless, and has long been\nso recognised. In such cases the \u2018desire\u2019 (so-called) remains in\nconsciousness only as a sense of want of a recognised good, a feeling\nno more or otherwise impulsive than the regretful memory of past joy.\nThat is, desire in this condition may develop a secondary impulse to\nvoluntary day-dreaming, by which a bitter-sweet imaginary satisfaction\nof the want is attained; or, so far as it is painful, it may impel to\naction or thought which will bring about its own extinction: but its\nprimary impulse to acts tending to realise the desired result is no\nlonger perceptible.\n\nWith this state of mind\n\n --\u201cthe desire of the moth for the star,\n Of the night for the morrow\u201d--\n\nI am not concerned in the present discussion. I notice it chiefly\nbecause some writers (_e.g._ Dr. Bain) seem to contemplate as the sole\nor typical case of desire, \u201cwhere there is a motive and no ability to\nact upon it\u201d; thus expressly excluding that condition of desire (as I\nuse the term) which seems to me of primary importance from an ethical\npoint of view, _i.e._ where action tending to bring about the desired\nresult is conceived as at once possible.\n\n[48] The confusion occurs in the most singular form in Hobbes, who\nactually identifies Pleasure and Appetite--\u201cthis motion in which\nconsisteth pleasure, is a solicitation to draw near to the thing that\npleaseth.\u201d\n\n[49] The same argument is put in a more guarded, and, I think,\nunexceptionable form by Hutcheson. It is perhaps more remarkable that\nHume, too, shares Butler\u2019s view which he expresses almost in the\nlanguage of the famous sermons. \u201cThere are,\u201d he says, \u201cbodily wants\nor appetites, acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede\nall sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of\nthe object. Thus hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their\nend: and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a\npleasure, which may become the object of another species of inclination\nthat is secondary and interested.\u201d Hence Hume finds that \u201cthe\nhypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct from\nself-love,\u201d is \u201cconformable to the analogy of nature.\u201d See _Enquiry\nconcerning the Principles of Morals_ (Appendix II.).\n\n[50] Some further discussion of it will be found in the note at the end\nof the chapter.\n\n[51] Professor J. S. Mackenzie, in his _Manual of Ethics_ (3rd edition,\nBook i. chap. ii. note), arguing for the universal painfulness of\ndesire, urges that the so-called \u201cpleasures of pursuit\u201d are really\npleasures of \u201cprogressive attainment\u201d; what causes pleasure being\nthe series of partial attainments that precede the final attainment.\nThere seems to me much truth in this view, as regards some forms of\npursuit; but in other cases I can find nothing deserving the name in\nthe course of the pursuit: the prominent element of the pleasure seems\nto be clearly the reflex of eager and hopeful, perhaps consciously\nskilful, activity. _E.g._ this is often the case in the pursuit of\ntruth, scientific or historical. I have spent most pleasant hours in\nhunting for evidence in favour of a conjecture that had occurred to\nme as a possible solution of a difficult historical question, without\nany \u201cprogressive attainment\u201d at all, as I found no evidence of any\nimportance: but the pleasure had none the less been real, at any rate\nin the earlier part of the pursuit. Or take the common experience of\ndeer-stalking, or the struggle for victory in an evenly balanced game\nof chess, or a prolonged race in which no competitor gains on the\nothers till near the end. I find nothing like \u201cprogressive attainment\u201d\nin these cases.\n\nBut even granting Mr. Mackenzie\u2019s view to be more widely applicable\nthan I think it, the question it deals with seems to me in the main\nirrelevant to the issue that I am now discussing: since it remains true\nthat the presence of antecedent desire is an essential condition of the\npleasures of attainment--whether \u201cprogressive\u201d or \u201ccatastrophic\u201d--and\nthat the desire is not itself perceptibly painful.\n\n[52] Lecky, _Hist. of European Morals_, Introduction.\n\n[53] I must ask the reader to distinguish carefully the question\ndiscussed in this chapter, which relates to the _objects_ of desires\nand aversions, from the different question whether the _causes_ of\nthese impulses are always to be found in antecedent experiences of\npleasure and pain. The bearing of this latter question on Ethics,\nthough not unimportant, is manifestly more indirect than that of the\nquestion here dealt with: and it will be convenient to postpone it till\na later stage of the discussion. Cf. _post_, Book ii. chap. vi. \u00a7 2,\nand Book iv. chap. iv. \u00a7 1.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nFREE WILL\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding chapters I have treated first of rational,\nand secondly of disinterested action, without introducing the vexed\nquestion of the Freedom of the Will. The difficulties connected\nwith this question have been proved by long dialectical experience\nto be so great, that I am anxious to confine them within as strict\nlimits as I can, and keep as much of my subject as possible free from\ntheir perturbing influence. And it appears to me that we have no\npsychological warrant for identifying Disinterested with either \u201cFree\u201d\nor \u201cRational\u201d action; while to identify Rational and Free action is\nat least misleading, and tends to obscure the real issue raised in\nthe Free Will controversy. In the last chapter I have tried to show\nthat action strictly disinterested, that is, disregardful of foreseen\nbalance of pleasure to ourselves, is found in the most instinctive\nas well as in the most deliberate and self-conscious region of our\nvolitional experience. And rational action, as I conceive it, remains\nrational, however completely the rationality of any individual\u2019s\nconduct may be determined by causes antecedent or external to his own\nvolition: so that the conception of acting rationally, as explained in\nthe last chapter but one, is not bound up with the notion of acting\n\u2018freely,\u2019 as maintained by Libertarians generally against Determinists.\nI say \u201cLibertarians generally,\u201d because in the statements made by\ndisciples of Kant as to the connexion of Freedom and Rationality,\nthere appears to me to be a confusion between two meanings of the term\nFreedom, which require to be carefully distinguished in any discussion\nof Free Will. When a disciple of Kant[54] says that a man \u201cis a free\nagent in so far as he acts under the guidance of reason,\u201d the statement\neasily wins assent from ordinary readers; since, as Whewell says, we\nordinarily \u201cconsider our Reason as being ourselves rather than our\ndesires and affections. We speak of Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering\n_us_, or of _ourselves_ as controlling them. If we decide to prefer\nsome remote and abstract good to immediate pleasures, or to conform to\na rule which brings us present pain (which decision implies exercise\nof Reason), we more particularly consider such acts as our _own_\nacts.\u201d[55] I do not, therefore, object on the score of usage to this\napplication of the term \u201cfree\u201d to denote voluntary actions in which\nthe seductive solicitations of appetite or passion are successfully\nresisted: and I am sensible of the gain in effectiveness of moral\npersuasion which is obtained by thus enlisting the powerful sentiment\nof Liberty on the side of Reason and Morality. But it is clear that if\nwe say that a man is a \u201cfree\u201d agent in so far as he acts rationally,\nwe cannot also say--in the same sense--that it is by his own \u201cfree\u201d\nchoice that he acts irrationally, when he does so act; and it is this\nlatter proposition which Libertarians generally have been concerned to\nmaintain. They have thought it of fundamental importance to show the\n\u2018Freedom\u2019 of the moral agent, on account of the connexion that they\nhave held to exist between Freedom and Moral Responsibility: and it is\nobvious that the Freedom thus connected with Responsibility is not the\nFreedom that is only manifested or realised in rational action, but\nthe Freedom to choose between right and wrong which is manifested or\nrealised equally in either choice. Now it is implied in the Christian\nconsciousness of \u201cwilful sin\u201d that men do deliberately and knowingly\nchoose to act irrationally. They do not merely prefer self-interest to\nduty (for here is rather a conflict of claims to rationality than clear\nirrationality); but (_e.g._) sensual indulgence to health, revenge to\nreputation, etc., though they know that such preference is opposed to\ntheir true interests no less than to their duty.[56] Hence it does\nnot really correspond to our experience as a whole to represent the\nconflict between Reason and passion as a conflict between \u2018ourselves\u2019\non the one hand and a force of nature on the other. We may say, if\nwe like, that when we yield to passion, we become \u2018the slaves of our\ndesires and appetites\u2019: but we must at the same time admit that our\nslavery is self-chosen. Can we say, then, of the wilful wrongdoer that\nhis wrong choice was \u2018free,\u2019 in the sense that he might have chosen\nrightly, not merely if the antecedents of his volition, external\nand internal, had been different, but supposing these antecedents\nunchanged? This, I conceive, is the substantial issue raised in the\nFree Will controversy; which I now propose briefly to consider: since\nit is widely believed to be of great Ethical importance.\n\n\u00a7 2. We may conveniently begin by defining more exactly the notion\nof Voluntary action, to which, according to all methods of Ethics\nalike, the predicates \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018what ought to be done\u2019--in the\nstrictest ethical sense--are exclusively applicable. In the first\nplace, Voluntary action is distinguished as \u2018conscious\u2019 from actions\nor movements of the human organism which are \u2018unconscious\u2019 or\n\u2018mechanical.\u2019 The person whose organism performs such movements only\nbecomes aware of them, if at all, after they have been performed;\naccordingly they are not imputed to him as a person, or judged to be\nmorally wrong or imprudent; though they may sometimes be judged to be\ngood or bad in respect of their consequences, with the implication\nthat they ought to be encouraged or checked as far as this can be done\nindirectly by conscious effort.\n\nSo again, in the case of conscious actions, the agent is not regarded\nas morally culpable, except in an indirect way, for entirely unforeseen\neffects of his voluntary actions. No doubt when a man\u2019s action has\ncaused some unforeseen harm, the popular moral judgment often blames\nhim for carelessness; but it would be generally admitted by reflective\npersons that in such cases strictly moral blame only attaches to the\nagent in an indirect way, in so far as his carelessness is the result\nof some wilful neglect of duty. Thus the proper immediate objects of\nmoral approval or disapproval would seem to be always the results of\na man\u2019s volitions so far as they were intended--_i.e._ represented in\nthought as certain or probable[57] consequences of his volitions:--or,\nmore strictly, the volitions themselves in which such results were so\nintended, since we do not consider that a man is relieved from moral\nblame because his wrong intention remains unrealised through external\ncauses.\n\nThis view seems at first sight to differ from the common opinion\nthat the morality of acts depends on their \u2018motives\u2019; if by motives\nare understood the desires that we feel for some of the foreseen\nconsequences of our acts. But I do not think that those who hold this\nopinion would deny that we are blameworthy for any prohibited result\nwhich we foresaw in willing, whether it was the object of desire or\nnot. No doubt it is commonly held that acts, similar as regards their\nforeseen results, may be \u2018better\u2019 or \u2018worse\u2019[58] through the presence\nof certain desires or aversions. Still so far as these feelings are\nnot altogether under the control of the will, the judgment of \u2018right\u2019\nand \u2018wrong\u2019--in the strictest sense of these terms--seems to be not\nproperly applicable to the feelings themselves, but rather to the\nexertion or omission of voluntary effort to check bad motives and\nencourage good ones, or to the conscious adoption of an object of\ndesire as an end to be aimed at--which is a species of volition.\n\nWe may conclude then that judgments of right and wrong relate properly\nto volitions accompanied with intention--whether the intended\nconsequences be external, or some effects produced on the agent\u2019s own\nfeelings or character. This excludes from the scope of such judgments\nthose conscious actions which are not intentional, strictly speaking;\nas when sudden strong feelings of pleasure and pain cause movements\nwhich we are aware of making, but which are not preceded by any\nrepresentation in idea either of the movements themselves or of their\neffects. For such actions, sometimes distinguished as \u2018instinctive,\u2019\nwe are only held to be responsible indirectly so far as any bad\nconsequences of them might have been prevented by voluntary efforts to\nform habits of more complete self-control.\n\nWe have to observe further that our common moral judgments recognise an\nimportant distinction between _impulsive_ and _deliberate_ wrongdoing,\ncondemning the latter more strongly than the former. The line between\nthe two cannot be sharply drawn: but we may define \u2018impulsive\u2019 actions\nas those where the connexion between the feeling that prompts and the\naction prompted is so simple and immediate that, though intention\nis distinctly present, the consciousness of personal choice of the\nintended result is evanescent. In deliberate volitions there is always\na conscious selection of the result as one of two or more practical\nalternatives.\n\nIn the case, then, of such volitions as are pre-eminently the objects\nof moral condemnation and approbation, the psychical fact \u2018volition\u2019\nseems to include--besides intention, or representation of the results\nof action--also the consciousness of self as choosing, resolving,\ndetermining these results. And the question which I understand to be at\nissue in the Free Will controversy may be stated thus: Is the self to\nwhich I refer my deliberate volitions a self of strictly determinate\nmoral qualities, a definite character partly inherited, partly formed\nby my past actions and feelings, and by any physical influences that\nit may have unconsciously received; so that my voluntary action, for\ngood or for evil, is at any moment completely caused by the determinate\nqualities of this character, together with my circumstances, or the\nexternal influences acting on me at the moment--including under this\nlatter term my present bodily conditions?--or is there always a\npossibility of my choosing to act in the manner that I now judge to be\nreasonable and right, whatever my previous actions and experiences may\nhave been?\n\nIn the above questions a materialist would substitute \u2018brain and\nnervous system\u2019 for \u2018character,\u2019 and thereby obtain a clearer notion;\nbut I have avoided using terms which suggest materialistic assumptions,\nbecause Determinism by no means involves Materialism. For the present\npurpose the difference is unimportant. The substantial dispute relates\nto the completeness of the causal dependence of any volition upon the\nstate of things at the preceding instant, whether we specify these as\n\u2018character and circumstances,\u2019 or \u2018brain and environing forces.\u2019[59]\n\nOn the Determinist side there is a cumulative argument of great force.\nThe belief that events are determinately related to the state of things\nimmediately preceding them is now held by all competent thinkers in\nrespect of all kinds of occurrences except human volitions. It has\nsteadily grown both intensively and extensively, both in clearness and\ncertainty of conviction and in universality of application, as the\nhuman mind has developed and human experience has been systematised and\nenlarged. Step by step in successive departments of fact conflicting\nmodes of thought have receded and faded, until at length they have\nvanished everywhere, except from this mysterious citadel of Will.\nEverywhere else the belief is so firmly established that some declare\nits opposite to be inconceivable: others even maintain that it\nalways was so. Every scientific procedure assumes it: each success\nof science confirms it. And not only are we finding ever new proof\nthat events are cognisably determined, but also that the different\nmodes of determination of different kinds of events are fundamentally\nidentical and mutually dependent: and naturally, with the increasing\nconviction of the essential unity of the cognisable universe, increases\nthe indisposition to allow the exceptional character claimed by\nLibertarians for the department of human action.\n\nAgain, when we fix our attention on human action, we observe that\nthe portion of it which is originated unconsciously is admittedly\ndetermined by physical causes: and we find that no clear line can be\ndrawn between acts of this kind and those which are conscious and\nvoluntary. Not only are many acts of the former class entirely similar\nto those of the latter, except in being unconscious: but we remark\nfurther that actions which we habitually perform continually pass from\nthe conscious class into the--wholly or partly--unconscious: and the\nfurther we investigate, the more the conclusion is forced upon us,\nthat there is no kind of action originated by conscious volition which\ncannot also, under certain circumstances, be originated unconsciously.\nAgain, when we look closely at our conscious acts, we find that in\nrespect of such of them as I have characterised as \u2018impulsive\u2019--acts\ndone suddenly under the stimulus of a momentary sensation or\nemotion--our consciousness can hardly be said to suggest that they are\nnot completely determined by the strength of the stimulus and the state\nof our previously determined temperament and character at the time of\nits operation: and here again, as was before observed, it is difficult\nto draw a line clearly separating these actions from those in which the\napparent consciousness of \u2018free choice\u2019 becomes distinct.\n\nFurther, we always explain[60] the voluntary action of all men except\nourselves on the principle of causation by character and circumstances.\nIndeed otherwise social life would be impossible: for the life of man\nin society involves daily a mass of minute forecasts of the actions of\nother men, founded on experience of mankind generally, or of particular\nclasses of men, or of individuals; who are thus necessarily regarded\nas things having determinate properties, causes whose effects are\ncalculable. We infer generally the future actions of those whom we know\nfrom their past actions; and if our forecast turns out in any case to\nbe erroneous, we do not attribute the discrepancy to the disturbing\ninfluence of Free Will, but to our incomplete acquaintance with their\ncharacter and motives. And passing from individuals to communities,\nwhether we believe in a \u201csocial science\u201d or not, we all admit and take\npart in discussions of social phenomena in which the same principle\nis assumed: and however we may differ as to particular theories, we\nnever doubt the validity of the assumption: and if we find anything\ninexplicable in history, past or present, it never occurs to us to\nattribute it to an extensive exercise of free will in a particular\ndirection. Nay, even as regards our own actions, however \u2018free\u2019 we feel\nourselves at any moment, however unconstrained by present motives and\ncircumstances and unfettered by the result of what we have previously\nbeen and felt, our volitional choice may appear: still, when it is once\nwell past, and we survey it in the series of our actions, its relations\nof causation and resemblance to other parts of our life appear, and\nwe naturally explain it as an effect of our nature, education, and\ncircumstances. Nay we even apply the same conceptions to our future\naction, and the more, in proportion as our moral sentiments are\ndeveloped: for with our sense of duty generally increases our sense of\nthe duty of moral culture, and our desire of self-improvement: and the\npossibility of moral self-culture depends on the assumption that by a\npresent volition we can determine to some extent our actions in the\nmore or less remote future. No doubt we habitually take at the same\ntime the opposite, Libertarian, view as to our future: we believe, for\nexample, that we are perfectly able to resist henceforward temptations\nto which we have continually yielded in the past. But it should be\nobserved that this belief is (as moralists of all schools admit and\neven urge) _at any rate to a great extent_ illusory and misleading.\nThough Libertarians contend that it is _possible_ for us at any moment\nto act in a manner opposed to our acquired tendencies and previous\ncustoms,--still, they and Determinists alike teach that it is much less\neasy than men commonly imagine to break the subtle unfelt trammels of\nhabit.\n\n\u00a7 3. Against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered\nfor Determinism there is to be set the immediate affirmation of\nconsciousness in the moment of deliberate action. Certainly when I have\na distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct,\none of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible\nnot to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive,--supposing\nthat there is no obstacle to my doing it other than the condition of\nmy desires and voluntary habits,--however strong may be my inclination\nto act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such\ninclinations in the past.[61] I recognise that each concession to\nvicious desire makes the difficulty of resisting it greater when the\ndesire recurs: but the difficulty always seems to remain separated\nfrom impossibility by an impassable gulf. I do not deny that the\nexperience of mankind includes cases in which certain impulses--such as\naversion to death or extreme pain, or morbid appetite for alcohol or\nopium--have reached a point of intensity at which they have been felt\nas irresistibly overmastering voluntary choice. I think we commonly\njudge that when this point is reached the individual ceases to be\nmorally responsible for the act done under such overmastering impulse:\nbut at any rate the moral problem thus presented is very exceptional;\nin ordinary cases of yielding to temptation this consciousness of\nthe irresistibility of impulse does not come in. Ordinarily, however\nstrong may be the rush of appetite or anger that comes over me, it does\nnot present itself as irresistible; and, if I deliberate at such a\nmoment, I cannot regard the mere force of the impulse as a reason for\ndoing what I otherwise judge to be unreasonable. I can suppose that my\nconviction of free choice _may_ be illusory: that if I knew my own\nnature I _might_ see it to be predetermined that, being so constituted\nand in such circumstances, I should act on the occasion in question\ncontrary to my rational judgment. But I cannot conceive myself seeing\nthis, without at the same time conceiving my whole conception of what\nI now call \u201cmy\u201d action fundamentally altered: I cannot conceive that\nif I contemplated the actions of my organism in this light I should\nrefer them to my \u201cself\u201d--_i.e._ to the mind so contemplating--in the\nsense in which I now refer them. In this conflict of arguments, it is\nnot surprising that the theoretical question as to the Freedom of the\nWill is still differently decided by thinkers of repute; and I do not\nmyself wish at present to pronounce any decision on it. But I think it\npossible and useful to show that the ethical importance of deciding\nit one way or another is liable to be exaggerated; and that any one\nwho will consider the matter soberly and carefully will find this\nimportance to be of a strictly limited kind.\n\nIt is chiefly on the Libertarian side that I find a tendency to the\nexaggeration of which I have just spoken. Some Libertarian writers\nmaintain that the conception of the Freedom of the Will, alien as it\nmay be to positive science, is yet quite indispensable to Ethics and\nJurisprudence; since in judging that I \u201cought\u201d to do anything I imply\nthat I \u201ccan\u201d do it, and similarly in praising or blaming the actions\nof others I imply that they \u201ccould\u201d have acted otherwise. If a man\u2019s\nactions are mere links in a chain of causation which, as we trace\nit back, ultimately carries us to events anterior to his personal\nexistence, he cannot, it is said, really have either merit or demerit;\nand if he has not merit or demerit, it is repugnant to the common moral\nsense of mankind to reward or punish--even to praise or blame--him.\nIn considering this argument, it will be convenient--for clearness of\ndiscussion--to assume in the first instance that there is no doubt\nor conflict in our view of what it is right to do, except such as\nmay be caused by the present question. It will also be convenient to\nseparate the discussion of the importance of Free Will in relation to\nmoral action generally from the special question of its importance in\nrelation to punishing and rewarding; since, in the latter species of\naction, what chiefly claims attention is not the present Freedom of\nthe agent, but the past Freedom of the person now acted on.\n\nAs regards action generally, the Determinist allows that a man is only\nmorally bound to do what is \u201cin his power\u201d; but he explains \u201cin his\npower\u201d to mean that the result in question will be produced if the\nman choose to produce it. And this is, I think, the sense in which\nthe proposition \u201cwhat I ought to do I can do\u201d is commonly accepted:\nit means \u201ccan do if I choose,\u201d not \u201ccan choose to do.\u201d Still the\nquestion remains \u201c_Can_ I choose to do what in ordinary thought I\njudge to be right to do?\u201d Here my own view is that--within the limits\nabove explained--I inevitably conceive that I _can_ choose; however,\nI can suppose myself to regard this conception as illusory, and to\njudge, inferring the future from the past, that I certainly shall not\nchoose, and accordingly that such choice is not really possible to\nme. This being supposed, it seems to me undeniable that this judgment\nwill exclude or weaken the operation of the moral motive in the case\nof the act contemplated: I either shall not judge it reasonable to\nchoose to do what I should otherwise so judge, or if I do pass the\njudgment, I shall also judge the conception of duty applied in it to be\nillusory, no less than the conception of Freedom. So far I concede the\nLibertarian contention as to the demoralising effect of Determinism, if\nheld with a real force of conviction. But I think the cases are rare in\nwhich it is even on Determinist principles legitimate to conclude it to\nbe certain--and not merely highly probable--that I shall deliberately\nchoose to do what I judge to be unwise.[62] Ordinarily the legitimate\ninference from a man\u2019s past experience, and from his general knowledge\nof human nature, would not go beyond a very strong probability that he\nwould choose to do wrong: and a mere probability--however strong--that\nI shall not will to do right cannot be regarded by me in deliberation\nas a reason for not willing:[63] while it certainly supplies a rational\nground for willing strongly--just as a strong probability of any other\nevil supplies a rational ground for special exertions to avoid it.\nIndeed, I do not see why a Libertarian should not--equally with a\nDeterminist--accept as valid, and find it instructive to contemplate,\nthe considerations that render it probable that he will _not_ choose\nto do right in any particular circumstances. In all ordinary cases,\ntherefore, it does not seem to me relevant to ethical deliberation to\ndetermine the metaphysical validity of my consciousness of freedom to\nchoose whatever I may conclude to be reasonable, unless the affirmation\nor negation of the Freedom of the Will somehow modifies my view of what\nit would be reasonable to choose to do if I could so choose.\n\nI do not think that any such modification of view can be maintained, as\nregards the ultimate ends of rational action which, in chap. i., I took\nas being commonly accepted. If Happiness, whether private or general,\nbe taken as the ultimate end of action on a Libertarian view, the\nadoption of a Determinist view affords no ground for rejecting it: and\nif Excellence is in itself admirable and desirable, it surely remains\nequally so whether any individual\u2019s approximation to it is entirely\ndetermined by inherited nature and external influences or not:--except\nso far as the notion of Excellence includes that of Free Will. Now Free\nWill is obviously not included in our common ideal of physical and\nintellectual perfection: and it seems to me also not to be included\nin the common notions of the excellences of character which we call\nvirtues: the manifestations of courage, temperance, and justice do not\nbecome less admirable because we can trace their antecedents in a happy\nbalance of inherited dispositions developed by a careful education.[64]\n\nCan, then, the affirmation or negation of Free Will affect our view of\nthe fittest means for the attainment of either end? In considering this\nwe have to distinguish between the case of a connexion between means\nand end believed to exist on empirical or other scientific grounds, and\nthe case where the belief in such connexion is an inference from the\nbelief in a moral government of the world. According to the received\nview of the moral government of the world, the performance of Duty\nis the best means of attaining the agent\u2019s happiness largely through\nits expected consequences in another world, in which virtue will be\nrewarded and vice punished by God: if, then, the belief in the moral\ngovernment of the world and a future life for men is held to depend\non the assumption of Free Will, this latter becomes obviously of\nfundamental ethical importance: not, indeed, in determining a man\u2019s\nDuty, but in reconciling it with his Interest. This, I think, is\nthe main element of truth in the view that the denial of Free Will\nremoves motives to the performance of Duty: and I admit the validity\nof the contention, so far as (1) the course of action conducive to an\nindividual\u2019s Interest would be thought to diverge from his Duty, apart\nfrom theological considerations, and (2) in the theological reasoning\nthat removes this divergence Free Will is an indispensable assumption.\nThe former point will be examined in a subsequent chapter;[65] the\nlatter it hardly falls within the scope of this treatise to discuss.[66]\n\nIf we confine our attention to such connexion between means and ends\nas is scientifically cognisable, it does not appear that an act now\ndeliberated on can be less or more a means to any ulterior end, because\nit is predetermined. It may, however, be urged that in considering how\nwe ought to act in any case, we have to take into account the probable\nfuture actions of others, and also of ourselves; and that with regard\nto these it is necessary to decide the question of Free Will, in order\nthat we may know whether the future is capable of being predicted from\nthe past. But here, again, it seems to me that no definite practical\nconsequences would logically follow from this decision. For however far\nwe may go in admitting Free Will as a cause, the actual operation of\nwhich may falsify the most scientific forecasts of human action, still\nsince it is _ex hypothesi_ an absolutely unknown cause, our recognition\nof it cannot lead us to modify any such forecasts: at most, it can only\naffect our reliance on them.\n\nWe may illustrate this by an imaginary extreme case. Suppose we were\nsomehow convinced that all the planets were endowed with Free Will,\nand that they only maintained their periodic motions by the continual\nexercise of free choice, in resistance to strong centrifugal or\ncentripetal inclinations. Our general confidence in the future of the\nsolar system might reasonably be impaired, though it is not easy to say\nhow much;[67] but the details of our astronomical calculations would\nbe clearly unaffected: the free wills could in no way be taken as an\nelement in the reckoning. And the case would be similar, I suppose, in\nthe forecast of human conduct, if psychology and sociology should ever\nbecome exact sciences. At present, however, they are so far from being\nsuch that this additional element of uncertainty can hardly have even\nany emotional effect.\n\nTo sum up: we may say that, in so far as we reason to any definite\nconclusions as to what the future actions of ourselves or others\nwill be, we must consider them as determined by unvarying laws: if\nthey are not completely so determined our reasoning is _pro tanto_\nliable to error: but no other is open to us. While on the other\nhand, when we are endeavouring to ascertain (on any principles) what\nchoice it is reasonable to make between two alternatives of present\nconduct, Determinist conceptions are as irrelevant as they are in\nthe former case inevitable. And from neither point of view does it\nseem practically important, for the general regulation of conduct, to\ndecide the metaphysical question at issue in the Free-will Controversy:\nunless--passing from Ethics into Theology--we rest the reconciliation\nof Duty and Interest on a theological argument that requires the\nassumption of Free Will.\n\n\u00a7 4. So far I have been arguing that the adoption of Determinism\nwill not--except in certain exceptional circumstances or on certain\ntheological assumptions--reasonably modify a man\u2019s view of what it\nis right for him to do or his reasons for doing it. It may, however,\nbe said that--granting the reasons for right action to remain\nunaltered--still the motives that prompt to it will be weakened; since\na man will not feel _remorse_ for his actions, if he regards them as\nnecessary results of causes anterior to his personal existence. I admit\nthat so far as the sentiment of remorse implies self-blame irremovably\nfixed on the self blamed, it must tend to vanish from the mind of a\nconvinced Determinist. Still I do not see why the imagination of a\nDeterminist should not be as vivid, his sympathy as keen, his love of\ngoodness as strong as a Libertarian\u2019s: and I therefore see no reason\nwhy dislike for his own shortcomings and for the mischievous qualities\nof his character which have caused bad actions in the past should not\nbe as effective a spring of moral improvement as the sentiment of\nremorse would be. For it appears to me that men in general take at\nleast as much pains to cure defects in their circumstances, organic\ndefects, and defects of intellect--which cause them no remorse--as they\ndo to cure moral defects; so far as they consider the former to be no\nless mischievous and no less removable than the latter.\n\nThis leads me to the consideration of the effect of Determinist\ndoctrines on the allotment of punishment and reward. For it must be\nadmitted, I think, that the common retributive view of punishment,\nand the ordinary notions of \u201cmerit,\u201d \u201cdemerit,\u201d and \u201cresponsibility,\u201d\nalso involve the assumption of Free Will: if the wrong act, and the\nbad qualities of character manifested in it, are conceived as the\nnecessary effects of causes antecedent or external to the existence of\nthe agent, the moral responsibility--in the ordinary sense--for the\nmischief caused by them can no longer rest on him. At the same time,\nthe Determinist can give to the terms \u201cill-desert\u201d and \u201cresponsibility\u201d\na signification which is not only clear and definite, but, from an\nutilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning. In this view,\nif I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful act, I mean that it\nis right to punish him for it; primarily, in order that the fear of\npunishment may prevent him and others from committing similar acts\nin future. The difference between these two views of punishment is\ntheoretically very wide. I shall, however, when I come to examine\nin detail the current conception of Justice,[68] endeavour to show\nthat this admission can hardly have any practical effect; since it is\npractically impossible to be guided, either in remunerating services\nor in punishing mischievous acts, by any other considerations than\nthose which the Determinist interpretation of desert would include.\nFor instance, the treatment of legal punishment as deterrent and\nreformatory rather than retributive seems to be forced upon us by the\npractical exigences of social order and wellbeing--quite apart from\nany Determinist philosophy.[69] Moreover, as I shall hereafter show,\nif the retributive view of Punishment be strictly taken--abstracting\ncompletely from the preventive view--it brings our conception of\nJustice into conflict with Benevolence, as punishment presents itself\nas a purely useless evil. Similarly, as regards the sentiments which\nprompt to the expression of moral praise and blame--I admit that in\nthe mind of a convinced Determinist, the desire to encourage good and\nprevent bad conduct must take the place of a desire to requite the one\nor the other: but again I see no reason why the Determinist species of\nmoral sentiments should not be as effective in promoting virtue and\nsocial wellbeing as the Libertarian species.\n\n\u00a7 5. It is, however, of obvious practical importance to ascertain how\nfar the power of the will (whether metaphysically free or not) actually\nextends: for this defines the range within which ethical judgments are\nin the strictest sense applicable. This inquiry is quite independent of\nthe question of metaphysical freedom; we might state it in Determinist\nterms as an inquiry into the range of effects which it would be\npossible to cause by human volition, provided that adequate motives are\nnot wanting. These effects seem to be mainly of three kinds: first,\nchanges in the external world consequent upon muscular contractions;\nsecondly, changes in the train of ideas and feelings that constitutes\nour conscious life; and thirdly, changes in the tendencies to act\nhereafter in certain ways under certain circumstances.\n\nI. The most obvious and prominent part of the sphere of volitional\ncausation is constituted by such events as can be produced by muscular\ncontractions. As regards these, it is sometimes said that it is\nproperly the muscular contraction that we will, and not the more\nremote effects; for these require the concurrence of other causes, and\ntherefore we can never be absolutely certain that they will follow.\nBut no more is it certain, strictly speaking, that the muscular\ncontraction will follow, since our limb may be paralysed, etc. The\nimmediate consequent of the volition is some molecular change in the\nmotor nerves. Since, however, we are not conscious in willing of our\nmotor nerves and their changes,--nor indeed commonly of the muscular\ncontractions that follow them,--it seems a misuse of terms to describe\neither as the normal \u2018object\u2019 of the mind in willing: since it is\nalmost always some more remote effect which we consciously will and\nintend. Still of almost all effects of our will on the external world\nsome contraction of our muscles is an indispensable antecedent; and\nwhen that is over our part in the causation is completed.\n\nII. We can control to some extent our thoughts and feelings. It would\nseem, indeed, that an important part of what we commonly call \u2018control\nof feeling\u2019 comes under the head just discussed. Our control over\nour muscles enables us to keep down the expression of the feeling\nand to resist its promptings to action: and as the giving free vent\nto a feeling tends, generally speaking, to sustain and prolong it,\nthis muscular control amounts to a certain power over the emotion.\nBut there is not the same connexion between our muscular system and\nour thoughts: and yet experience shows that most men (though some, no\ndoubt, much more than others) can voluntarily determine the direction\nof their thoughts, and pursue at will a given line of meditation. In\nsuch cases, what is effected by the effort of will seems to be the\nconcentration of our consciousness on a part of its content, so that\nthis part grows more vivid and clear, while the rest tends to become\nobscure and ultimately to vanish. Frequently this voluntary exertion is\nonly needed to initiate a train of ideas, which is afterwards continued\nwithout effort: as in recalling a series of past events or going\nthrough a familiar train of reasoning. By such concentration we can\nfree ourselves of many thoughts and feelings upon which we do not wish\nto dwell: but our power to do this is very limited, and if the feeling\nbe strong and its cause persistent, it requires a very unusual effort\nof will to banish it thus.\n\nIII. The effect of volition, however, to which I especially wish to\ndirect the reader\u2019s attention is the alteration in men\u2019s tendencies\nto future action which must be assumed to be a consequence of general\nresolutions as to future conduct, so far as they are effective. Even\na resolution to do a particular act--if it is worth while to make it,\nas experience shows it to be--must be supposed to produce a change\nof this kind in the person who makes it: it must somehow modify his\npresent tendencies to act in a certain way on a foreseen future\noccasion. But it is in making general resolutions for future conduct\nthat it is of most practical importance for us to know what is within\nthe power of the will. Let us take an example. A man has been in the\nhabit of drinking too much brandy nightly: one morning he resolves\nthat he will do so no more. In making this resolve he acts under the\nbelief that by a present volition he can so far alter his habitual\ntendency to indulgence in brandy, that some hours hence he will resist\nthe full force of his habitual craving for the stimulant. Now whether\nthis belief is well or ill founded is a different question from that\nusually discussed between Determinists and Libertarians: at the same\ntime the two questions are liable to be confused. It is sometimes\nvaguely thought that a belief in Free Will requires us to maintain that\nat any moment we can alter our habits to any extent by a sufficiently\nstrong exertion. And no doubt most commonly when we make such efforts,\nwe believe at the moment that they will be completely effectual: we\nwill to do something hours or days hence with the same confidence with\nwhich we will to do something immediately. But on reflection, no one, I\nthink, will maintain that in such cases the future act appears to be\nin his power in the same sense as a choice of alternatives that takes\neffect immediately. Not only does continual experience show us that\nsuch resolutions as to the future have a limited and too frequently an\ninadequate effect: but the common belief is really inconsistent with\nthe very doctrine of Free Will that is thought to justify it: for if\nby a present volition I can fully determine an action that is to take\nplace some hours hence, when the time comes to do that act I shall\nfind myself no longer free. We must therefore accept the conclusion\nthat each such resolve has only a limited effect: and that we cannot\nknow when making it how far this effect will exhibit itself in the\nperformance of the act resolved upon. At the same time it can hardly\nbe denied that such resolves sometimes succeed in breaking old habits:\nand even when they fail to do this, they often substitute a painful\nstruggle for smooth and easy indulgence. Hence it is reasonable to\nsuppose that they always produce some effect in this direction; whether\nthey operate by causing new motives to present themselves on the side\nof reason, when the time of inner conflict arrives; or whether they\ndirectly weaken the impulsive force of habit in the same manner as an\nactual breach of custom does, though in an inferior degree.[70]\n\nIf this account of the range of volition be accepted, it will, I\ntrust, dispel any lingering doubts which the argument of the preceding\nsection, as to the practical unimportance of the Free Will controversy,\nmay have left in the reader\u2019s mind. For it may have been vaguely\nthought that while on the Determinist theory it would be wrong, in\ncertain cases, to perform a single act of virtue if we had no ground\nfor believing that we should hereafter duly follow it up; on the\nassumption of Freedom we should boldly do always what would be best\nif consistently followed up, being conscious that such consistency is\nin our power. But the supposed difference vanishes, if it be admitted\nthat by any effort of resolution at the present moment we can only\nproduce a certain limited effect upon our tendencies to action at some\nfuture time, and that immediate consciousness cannot tell us that this\neffect will be adequate to the occasion, nor indeed how great it will\nreally prove to be. For the most extreme Libertarian must then allow\nthat before pledging ourselves to any future course of action we ought\nto estimate carefully, from our experience of ourselves and general\nknowledge of human nature, what the probability is of our keeping\npresent resolutions in the circumstances in which we are likely to\nbe placed. It is no doubt morally most important that we should not\ntranquilly acquiesce in any weakness or want of self-control: but the\nfact remains that such weakness is not curable by a single volition:\nand whatever we can do towards curing it by any effort of will at any\nmoment, is as clearly enjoined by reason on the Determinist theory as\nit is on the Libertarian. On neither theory is it reasonable that we\nshould deceive ourselves as to the extent of our weakness, or ignore it\nin the forecast of our conduct, or suppose it more easily remediable\nthan it really is.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[54] I have thought it expedient to exclude the Kantian conception\nof Free Will from the scope of the discussion in this chapter,\npartly on account of the confusion mentioned in the text; partly\nbecause it depends on the conception of a causality not subject to\ntime-conditions, which appears to me altogether untenable, while it\ndoes not fall within the plan of the present treatise to discuss it.\nBut considering the widespread influence of Kantian theory on current\nethical thought, I have thought it desirable to give a brief discussion\nof his conception of Free Will in an Appendix (I.).\n\n[55] _Elements of Morality_, Book i. chap. ii. At the same time, it is\nalso true--as I afterwards say--that we sometimes identify ourselves\nwith passion or appetite in conscious conflict with reason: and then\nthe rule of reason is apt to appear an external constraint, and\nobedience to it a servitude, if not a slavery.\n\n[56] The difficulty which Socrates and the Socratic schools had in\nconceiving a man to choose deliberately what he knows to be bad for\nhim--a difficulty which drives Aristotle into real Determinism in his\naccount of purposed action, even while he is expressly maintaining the\n\u201cvoluntariness\u201d and \u201cresponsibility\u201d of vice--seems to be much reduced\nfor the modern mind by the distinction between moral and prudential\njudgments, and the _prima facie_ conflict between \u2018interest\u2019 and\n\u2018duty.\u2019 Being thus familiar with the conception of deliberate choice\nconsciously opposed _either_ to interest _or_ to duty, we can without\nmuch difficulty conceive of such choice in conscious opposition to\nboth. See chap. ix. \u00a7 3, of this Book.\n\n[57] It is most convenient to regard \u201cintention\u201d as including not only\nsuch results of volition as the agent _desired_ to realise, but also\nany that, without desiring, he foresaw as certain or probable. The\nquestion how far we are responsible for all the foreseen consequences\nof our acts, or, in the case of acts prescribed by definite moral\nrules, only for their results within a certain range, will be\nconsidered when we come to examine the Intuitional Method.\n\n[58] In a subsequent chapter (chap. ix. of this Book) I shall examine\nmore fully the relation of the antithesis \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018wrong\u2019 to\nthe vaguer and wider antithesis \u2018good\u2019 and \u2018bad,\u2019 in our practical\nreasonings.\n\n[59] It is not uncommon for Determinists to conceive of each volition\nas connected by uniform laws with our past state of consciousness. But\nany uniformities we might trace among a man\u2019s past consciousnesses,\neven if we knew them all, would yet give us very imperfect guidance as\nto his future action: as there would be left out of account--\n\n(1) All inborn tendencies and susceptibilities, as yet latent or\nincompletely exhibited;\n\n(2) All past physical influences, of which the effects had not been\nperfectly represented in consciousness.\n\n[60] I do not mean that this is the only view that we take of the\nconduct of others: I hold (as will presently appear) that in judging of\ntheir conduct morally, we ordinarily apply the conception of Free Will.\nBut we do not ordinarily regard it as one kind of causation, limiting\nand counteracting the other kind.\n\n[61] It is not the possibility of merely indeterminate choice, of an\n\u201carbitrary freak of unmotived willing,\u201d with which we are concerned\nfrom an ethical point of view, but the possibility of choosing between\nrational and irrational motives.\n\n[62] I think that in most cases when a man yields to temptation,\njudging that it is \u201cno use trying to resist,\u201d he judges in\nsemi-conscious self-sophistication, due to the influence of appetite\nor passion disturbing the process of reasoning. I do not doubt that\nthis self-sophistication is likely to take a Determinist form in the\nmind of one who has adopted Determinism as a speculative opinion: but\nI see no reason for thinking that a Libertarian is not in equal danger\nof self-sophistication, though in his case it will take a different\nform. _E.g._ where a Determinist would reason \u201cI certainly shall take\nmy usual glass of brandy to-night, so there is no use resolving not to\ntake it,\u201d the Libertarian\u2019s reasoning would be \u201cI mean to leave off\nthat brandy, but it will be just as easy to leave it off to-morrow\nas to-day; I will therefore have one more glass, and leave it off\nto-morrow.\u201d\n\n[63] There is, however, a special case in which this probability may\nbe indirectly a reason for not resolving to do what would otherwise be\nbest; _i.e._ where this resolution would only be right if followed by\nsubsequent resolutions. The problem thus presented is considered later,\npp. 75, 76.\n\n[64] I should admit, indeed, that the ordinary notion of merit becomes\ninapplicable (see pp. 71, 72). But I do not see that Perfection becomes\nless an End to be aimed at, because we cease to regard its attainment\nas meritorious. The inapplicability of the notion of \u2018merit\u2019 to Divine\naction has never been felt to detract from the Perfection of the Divine\nNature.\n\n[65] See Book ii. chap. v. and the concluding chapter of the treatise.\n\n[66] I ought, however, to point out that an important section of\ntheologians who have held the belief in the moral government of the\nworld in its intensest form have been Determinists.\n\n[67] In order to determine this we should require first to settle\nanother disputed question, as to the general reasonableness of our\nexpectation that the future will resemble the past.\n\n[68] See Book iii. chap. v.\n\n[69] Thus we find it necessary to punish negligence, when its effects\nwere very grave, even when we cannot trace it to wilful disregard of\nduty; and to punish rebellion and assassination none the less although\nwe know that they were prompted by a sincere desire to serve God or to\nbenefit mankind.\n\n[70] It should be observed that the same kind of change is sometimes\nbrought about, without volition, by a powerful emotional shock, due\nto extraneous causes: and hence it might be inferred that in all\ncases it is a powerful impression of an emotional kind that produces\nthe effect; and that the will is only concerned in concentrating our\nattention on the benefits to be gained or evils to be avoided by the\nchange of habit, and so intensifying the impression of these. But\nthough this kind of voluntary contemplation is a useful auxiliary to\ngood resolutions, it does not seem to be this effort of will that\nconstitutes the resolution: we can clearly distinguish the two. Hence\nthis third effect of volition cannot be resolved into the second, but\nmust be stated separately.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The results of the three preceding chapters may be briefly stated\nas follows:--\n\nThe aim of Ethics is to systematise and free from error the apparent\ncognitions that most men have of the rightness or reasonableness of\nconduct, whether the conduct be considered as right in itself, or as\nthe means to some end commonly conceived as ultimately reasonable.[71]\nThese cognitions are normally accompanied by emotions of various\nkinds, known as \u201cmoral sentiments\u201d: but an ethical judgment cannot be\nexplained as affirming merely the existence of such a sentiment: indeed\nit is an essential characteristic of a moral feeling that it is bound\nup with an apparent cognition of something more than mere feeling.\nSuch cognitions, again, I have called \u2018dictates,\u2019 or \u2018imperatives\u2019;\nbecause, in so far as they relate to conduct on which any one is\ndeliberating, they are accompanied by a certain impulse to do the acts\nrecognised as right, which is liable to conflict with other impulses.\nProvided this impulse is effective in producing right volition, it is\nnot of primary importance for ethical purposes to determine the exact\ncharacteristics of the emotional states that precede such volitions.\nAnd this remains true even if the force actually operating on his will\nis mere desire for the pleasures that he foresees will attend right\nconduct, or aversion to the pains that will result from doing wrong:\nthough we observe that in this case his action does not correspond to\nour common notion of strictly virtuous conduct; and though there seems\nto be no ground for regarding such desires and aversions as the sole,\nor even the normal, motives of human volitions. Nor, again, is it\ngenerally important to determine whether we are always, metaphysically\nspeaking, \u2018free\u2019 to do what we clearly see to be right. What I \u2018ought\u2019\nto do, in the strictest use of the word \u2018ought,\u2019 is always \u2018in my\npower,\u2019 in the sense that there is no obstacle to my doing it except\nabsence of adequate motive; and it is ordinarily impossible for me,\nin deliberation, to regard such absence of motive as a reason for not\ndoing what I otherwise judge to be reasonable.\n\nWhat then do we commonly regard as valid ultimate reasons for acting\nor abstaining? This, as was said, is the starting-point for the\ndiscussions of the present treatise: which is not primarily concerned\nwith proving or disproving the validity of any such reasons, but\nrather with the critical exposition of the different \u2018methods\u2019--or\nrational procedures for determining right conduct in any particular\ncase--which are logically connected with the different ultimate reasons\nwidely accepted. In the first chapter we found that such reasons were\nsupplied by the notions of Happiness and Excellence or Perfection\n(including Virtue or Moral Perfection as a prominent element),\nregarded as ultimate ends, and Duty as prescribed by unconditional\nrules. This threefold difference in the conception of the ultimate\nreason for conduct corresponds to what seem the most fundamental\ndistinctions that we apply to human existence; the distinction between\nthe conscious being and the stream of conscious experience, and the\ndistinction (within this latter) of Action and Feeling. For Perfection\nis put forward as the ideal goal of the development of a human being,\nconsidered as a permanent entity; while by Duty, we mean the kind of\nAction that we think ought to be done; and similarly by Happiness or\nPleasure we mean an ultimately desired or desirable kind of Feeling.\nIt may seem, however, that these notions by no means exhaust the list\nof reasons which are widely accepted as ultimate grounds of action.\nMany religious persons think that the highest reason for doing anything\nis that it is God\u2019s Will: while to others \u2018Self-realisation\u2019 or\n\u2018Self-development,\u2019 and to others, again, \u2018Life according to nature\u2019\nappear the really ultimate ends. And it is not hard to understand why\nconceptions such as these are regarded as supplying deeper and more\ncompletely satisfying answers to the fundamental question of Ethics,\nthan those before named: since they do not merely represent \u2018what ought\nto be,\u2019 as such; they represent it in an apparently simple relation\nto what actually is. God, Nature, Self, are the fundamental facts of\nexistence; the knowledge of what will accomplish God\u2019s Will, what is,\n\u2018according to Nature,\u2019 what will realise the true Self in each of us,\nwould seem to solve the deepest problems of Metaphysics as well as\nof Ethics. But just because these notions combine the ideal with the\nactual, their proper sphere belongs not to Ethics as I define it, but\nto Philosophy--the central and supreme study which is concerned with\nthe relations of all objects of knowledge. The introduction of these\nnotions into Ethics is liable to bring with it a fundamental confusion\nbetween \u201cwhat is\u201d and \u201cwhat ought to be,\u201d destructive of all clearness\nin ethical reasoning: and if this confusion is avoided, the strictly\nethical import of such notions, when made explicit, appears always to\nlead us to one or other of the methods previously distinguished.\n\nThere is least danger of confusion in the case of the theological\nconception of \u2018God\u2019s Will\u2019; since here the connexion between \u2018what\nis\u2019 and \u2018what ought to be\u2019 is perfectly clear and explicit. The\ncontent of God\u2019s Will we conceive as presently existing, in idea: its\nactualisation is the end to be aimed at. There is indeed a difficulty\nin understanding how God\u2019s Will can fail to be realised, whether\nwe do right or wrong: or how, if it cannot fail to be realised in\neither case, its realisation can give the ultimate motive for doing\nright. But this difficulty it belongs to Theology rather than Ethics\nto solve. The practical question is, assuming that God wills in a\nspecial sense what we ought to do, how we are to ascertain this in\nany particular case. This must be either by Revelation or by Reason,\nor by both combined. If an external Revelation is proposed as the\nstandard, we are obviously carried beyond the range of our study; on\nthe other hand, when we try to ascertain by reason the Divine Will,\nthe conception seems to present itself as a common form under which a\nreligious mind is disposed to regard whatever method of determining\nconduct it apprehends to be rational; since we cannot know any act\nto be in accordance with the Divine Will, which we do not also, by\nthe same exercise of thought, know to be dictated by reason. Thus,\ncommonly, it is either assumed that God desires the Happiness of men,\nin which case our efforts should be concentrated on its production: or\nthat He desires their Perfection, and that that should be our end: or\nthat whatever His end may be (into which perhaps we have no right to\ninquire) His Laws are immediately cognisable, being in fact the first\nprinciples of Intuitional Morality. Or perhaps it is explained that\nGod\u2019s Will is to be learnt by examining our own constitution or that\nof the world we are in: so that \u2018Conformity to God\u2019s Will\u2019 seems to\nresolve itself into \u2018Self-realisation,\u2019 or \u2018Life according to nature.\u2019\nIn any case, this conception, however important it may be in supplying\nnew motives for doing what we believe to be right, does not--apart from\nRevelation--suggest any special criterion of rightness.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us pass to consider the notions \u2018Nature,\u2019 \u2018Natural,\u2019\n\u2018Conformity to Nature.\u2019 I assume--in order to obtain a principle\ndistinct from \u2018Self-realisation,\u2019[72]--that the \u2018Nature\u2019 to which we\nare to conform is not each one\u2019s own individual nature, but human\nnature generally, considered either apart from or in relation to its\nenvironment: that we are to find the standard of right conduct in a\ncertain type of human existence which we can somehow abstract from\nobservation of actual human life. Now in a certain sense every rational\nman must, of course, \u201cconform to nature\u201d; that is, in aiming at any\nends, he must adapt his efforts to the particular conditions of his\nexistence, physical and psychical. But if he is to go beyond this, and\nconform to \u2018Nature\u2019 in the adoption of an ultimate end or paramount\nstandard of right conduct, it must be on the basis--if not of strictly\nTheological assumptions, at any rate--of the more or less definite\nrecognition of Design exhibited in the empirically known world. If we\nfind no design in nature, if the complex processes of the world known\nto us through experience are conceived as an aimless though orderly\ndrift of change, the knowledge of these processes and their laws may\nindeed limit the aims of rational beings, but I cannot conceive how it\ncan determine the ends of their action, or be a source of unconditional\nrules of duty. And in fact those who use \u2018natural\u2019 as an ethical notion\ndo commonly suppose that by contemplating the actual play of human\nimpulses, or the physical constitution of man, or his social relations,\nwe may find principles for determining positively and completely the\nkind of life he was designed to live. I think, however, that every\nattempt thus to derive \u2018what ought to be\u2019 from \u2018what is\u2019 palpably\nfails, the moment it is freed from fundamental confusions of thought.\nFor instance, suppose we seek practical guidance in the conception of\nhuman nature regarded as a system of impulses and dispositions, we\nmust obviously give a special precision to the meaning of \u201cnatural\u201d;\nsince in a sense, as Butler observes, any impulse is natural, but it is\nmanifestly idle to bid us follow Nature in this sense: for the question\nof duty is never raised except when we are conscious of a conflict of\nimpulses, and wish to know which to follow. Nor does it help us to say\nthat the supremacy of Reason is Natural, as we have started by assuming\nthat what Reason prescribes is conformity to Nature, and thus our line\nof thought would become circular: the Nature that we are to follow must\nbe distinguished from our Practical Reason, if it is to become a guide\nto it. How then are we to distinguish \u2018natural impulses\u2019--in the sense\nin which they are to guide rational choice--from the unnatural? Those\nwho have occupied themselves with this distinction seem generally to\nhave interpreted the Natural to mean either the _common_ as opposed\nto the rare and exceptional, or the _original_ as opposed to what is\nlater in development; or, negatively, what is not the effect of human\nvolition. But I have never seen any ground for assuming broadly that\nNature abhors the exceptional, or prefers the earlier in time to the\nlater; and when we take a retrospective view of the history of the\nhuman race, we find that some impulses which all admire, such as the\nlove of knowledge and enthusiastic philanthropy, are both rarer and\nlater in their appearance than others which all judge to be lower.\nAgain, it is obviously unwarrantable to eschew as unnatural and opposed\nto the Divine design all such impulses as have been produced in us\nby the institutions of society, or our use of human arrangements and\ncontrivances, or that result in any way from the deliberate action of\nour fellow-men: for this were arbitrarily to exclude society and human\naction from the scope of Nature\u2019s purposes. And besides it is clear\nthat many impulses so generated appear to be either moral or auxiliary\nto morality and in other ways beneficial: and though others no doubt\nare pernicious and misleading, it seems that we can only distinguish\nthese latter from the former by taking note of their effects, and\nnot by any precision that reflection can give to the notion of\n\u2018natural.\u2019 If, again, we fall back upon a more physical view of our\nnature and endeavour to ascertain for what end our corporeal frame was\nconstructed, we find that such contemplation determines very little. We\ncan infer from our nutritive system that we are intended to take food,\nand similarly that we are to exercise our various muscles in some way\nor other, and our brain and organs of sense. But this carries us a very\ntrifling way, for the practical question almost always is, not whether\nwe are to use our organs or leave them unused, but to what extent or in\nwhat manner we are to use them: and it does not appear that a definite\nanswer to this question can ever be elicited, by a logical process of\ninference, from observations of the human organism, and the actual\nphysical life of men.\n\nIf, finally, we consider man in his social relations--as father, son,\nneighbour, citizen--and endeavour to determine the \u201cnatural\u201d rights and\nobligations that attach to such relations, we find that the conception\n\u2018natural\u2019 presents a problem and not a solution. To an unreflective\nmind what is customary in social relations usually appears natural; but\nno reflective person is prepared to lay down \u201cconformity to custom\u201d as\na fundamental moral principle: the problem, then, is to find in the\nrights and obligations established by custom in a particular society at\na particular time an element that has a binding force beyond what mere\ncustom can give. And this problem can only be solved by reference to\nthe ultimate good of social existence--whether conceived as happiness\nor as perfection--or by appealing to some intuitively known principle\nof social duty, other than the principle of aiming at the happiness or\nperfection of society.\n\nNor, again, does it help us to adopt the more modern view of Nature,\nwhich regards the organic world as exhibiting, not an aggregate of\nfixed types, but a continuous and gradual process of changing life. For\ngranting that this \u2018evolution\u2019--as the name implies--is not merely a\nprocess from old to new, but a progress from less to more of certain\ndefinite characteristics; it is surely absurd to maintain that we ought\n_therefore_ to take these characteristics as Ultimate Good, and make it\nour whole endeavour to accelerate the arrival of an inevitable future.\nThat whatever is to be will be better than what is, we all hope; but\nthere seems to be no more reason for summarily identifying \u2018what ought\nto be\u2019 with \u2018what certainly will be,\u2019 than for finding it in \u2018what\ncommonly is,\u2019 or \u2018what originally was.\u2019\n\nOn the whole, it appears to me that no definition that has ever been\noffered of the Natural exhibits this notion as really capable of\nfurnishing an independent ethical first principle. And no one maintains\nthat \u2018natural\u2019 like \u2018beautiful\u2019 is a notion that though indefinable is\nyet clear, being derived from a simple unanalysable impression. Hence I\nsee no way of extracting from it a definite practical criterion of the\nrightness of actions.\n\n\u00a7 3. The discussion in the preceding section will have shown that not\nall the different views that are taken of the ultimate reason for\ndoing what is concluded to be right lead to practically different\nmethods of arriving at this conclusion. Indeed we find that almost\nany method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason by means\nof some--often plausible--assumption. Hence arises difficulty in the\nclassification and comparison of ethical systems; since they often\nappear to have different affinities according as we consider Method or\nUltimate Reason. In my treatment of the subject, difference of Method\nis taken as the paramount consideration: and it is on this account that\nI have treated the view in which Perfection is taken to be the Ultimate\nEnd as a variety of the Intuitionism which determines right conduct\nby reference to axioms of duty intuitively known; while I have made\nas marked a separation as possible between Epicureanism or Egoistic\nHedonism, and the Universalistic or Benthamite[73] Hedonism to which I\npropose to restrict the term Utilitarianism.\n\nI am aware that these two latter methods are commonly treated as\nclosely connected: and it is not difficult to find reasons for this.\nIn the first place, they agree in prescribing actions as means to an\nend distinct from, and lying outside the actions; so that they both\nlay down rules which are not absolute but relative, and only valid if\nthey conduce to the end. Again, the ultimate end is according to both\nmethods the same in quality, i.e. pleasure; or, more strictly, the\nmaximum of pleasure attainable, pains being subtracted. Besides, it\nis of course to a great extent true that the conduct recommended by\nthe one principle coincides with that inculcated by the other. Though\nit would seem to be only in an ideal polity that \u2018self-interest well\nunderstood\u2019 leads to the perfect discharge of all social duties, still,\nin a tolerably well-ordered community it prompts to the fulfilment of\nmost of them, unless under very exceptional circumstances. And, on the\nother hand, a Universalistic Hedonist may reasonably hold that his\nown happiness is that portion of the universal happiness which it is\nmost in his power to promote, and which therefore is most especially\nentrusted to his charge. And the practical blending of the two systems\nis sure to go beyond their theoretical coincidence. It is much\neasier for a man to move in a sort of diagonal between Egoistic and\nUniversalistic Hedonism, than to be practically a consistent adherent\nof either. Few men are so completely selfish, whatever their theory of\nmorals may be, as not occasionally to promote the happiness of others\nfrom natural sympathetic impulse unsupported by Epicurean calculation.\nAnd probably still fewer are so resolutely unselfish as never to find\n\u201call men\u2019s good\u201d in their own with rather too ready conviction.\n\nFurther, from Bentham\u2019s psychological doctrine, that every human being\nalways does aim at his own greatest apparent happiness, it seems to\nfollow that it is useless to point out to a man the conduct that would\nconduce to the general happiness, unless you convince him at the same\ntime that it would conduce to his own. Hence on this view, egoistic\nand universalistic considerations must necessarily be combined in any\npractical treatment of morality: and this being so, it was perhaps\nto be expected that Bentham[74] or his disciples would go further,\nand attempt to base on the Egoism which they accept as inevitable\nthe Universalistic Hedonism which they approve and inculcate. And\naccordingly we find that J. S. Mill does try to establish a logical\nconnexion between the psychological and ethical principles which he\nholds in common with Bentham, and to convince his readers that because\neach man naturally seeks his own happiness, therefore he ought to seek\nthe happiness of other people.[75]\n\nNevertheless, it seems to me undeniable that the practical affinity\nbetween Utilitarianism and Intuitionism is really much greater than\nthat between the two forms of Hedonism. My grounds for holding this\nwill be given at length in subsequent chapters. Here I will only\nobserve that many moralists who have maintained as practically valid\nthe judgments of right and wrong which the Common Sense of mankind\nseems intuitively to enunciate, have yet regarded General Happiness as\nan end to which the rules of morality are the best means, and have held\nthat a knowledge of these rules was implanted by Nature or revealed by\nGod for the attainment of this end. Such a belief implies that, though\nI am bound to take, as _my_ ultimate standard in acting, conformity to\na rule which is for me absolute, still the natural or Divine reason\nfor the rule laid down is Utilitarian. On this view, the _method_ of\nUtilitarianism is certainly rejected: the connexion between right\naction and happiness is not ascertained by a process of reasoning.\nBut we can hardly say that the Utilitarian principle is altogether\nrejected: rather the limitations of the human reason are supposed to\nprevent it from apprehending adequately the real connexion between the\ntrue principle and the right rules of conduct. This connexion, however,\nhas always been to a large extent recognised by all reflective persons.\nIndeed, so clear is it that in most cases the observance of the\ncommonly received moral rules tends to render human life tranquil and\nhappy, that even moralists (as Whewell) who are most strongly opposed\nto Utilitarianism have, in attempting to exhibit the \u201cnecessity\u201d of\nmoral rules, been led to dwell on utilitarian considerations.\n\nAnd during the first period of ethical controversy in modern England,\nafter the audacious enunciation of Egoism by Hobbes had roused in\nreal earnest the search for a philosophical basis of morality,\nUtilitarianism appears in friendly alliance with Intuitionism. It was\nnot to supersede but to support the morality of Common Sense, against\nthe dangerous innovations of Hobbes, that Cumberland declared \u201cthe\ncommon good[76] of all Rationals\u201d to be the end to which moral rules\nwere the means. We find him quoted with approval by Clarke, who is\ncommonly taken to represent Intuitionism in an extreme form. Nor does\nShaftesbury, in introducing the theory of a \u201cmoral sense,\u201d seem to have\ndreamt that it could ever impel us to actions not clearly conducive\nto the Good[76] of the Whole: and his disciple Hutcheson expressly\nidentified its promptings with those of Benevolence. Butler, I think,\nwas our first influential writer who dwelt on the discrepancies between\nVirtue as commonly understood and \u201cconduct likeliest to produce an\noverbalance of happiness.\u201d[77] When Hume presented Utilitarianism as\na mode of explaining current morality, it was seen or suspected to\nhave a partially destructive tendency. But it was not till the time\nof Paley and Bentham that it was offered as a method for determining\nconduct, which was to overrule all traditional precepts and supersede\nall existing moral sentiments. And even this final antagonism relates\nrather to theory and method than to practical results: practical\nconflict, in ordinary human minds, is mainly between Self-interest and\nSocial Duty however determined. Indeed, from a practical point of view\nthe principle of aiming at the \u201cgreatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber\u201d is _prima facie_ more definitely opposed to Egoism than the\nCommon-Sense morality is. For this latter seems to leave a man free to\npursue his own happiness under certain definite limits and conditions:\nwhereas Utilitarianism seems to require a more comprehensive and\nunceasing subordination of self-interest to the common good. And\nthus, as Mill remarks, Utilitarianism is sometimes attacked from two\nprecisely opposite sides: from a confusion with Egoistic Hedonism it is\ncalled base and grovelling; while at the same time it is more plausibly\ncharged with setting up too high a standard of unselfishness and making\nexaggerated demands on human nature.\n\nA good deal remains to be said, in order to make the principle and\nmethod of Utilitarianism perfectly clear and explicit: but it seems\nbest to defer this till we come to the investigation of its details. It\nwill be convenient to take this as the final stage of our examination\nof methods. For on the one hand it is simpler that the discussion of\nEgoistic should precede that of Universalistic Hedonism; and on the\nother, it seems desirable that we should obtain in as exact a form as\npossible the enunciations of Intuitive Morality, before we compare\nthese with the results of the more doubtful and difficult calculations\nof utilitarian consequences.\n\nIn the remaining chapters of this Book I shall endeavour to remove\ncertain ambiguities as to the general nature and relations of the\nother two methods, as designated respectively by the terms Egoism and\nIntuitionism, before proceeding to the fuller examination of them in\nBooks ii. and iii.\n\n NOTE.--I have called the ethical doctrine that takes universal\n happiness as the ultimate end and standard of right conduct by the\n name of Bentham, because the thinkers who have chiefly taught this\n doctrine in England during the present century have referred it to\n Bentham as their master. And it certainly seems to me clear--though\n Mr. Bain (cf. _Mind_, January 1883, p. 48) appears to doubt it--that\n Bentham adopted this doctrine explicitly, in its most comprehensive\n scope, at the earliest stage in the formation of his opinions; nor\n do I think that he ever consciously abandoned or qualified it. We\n find him writing in his common-place book, in 1773-4 (cf. _Works_,\n Bowring\u2019s edition, vol. x. p. 70), that Helvetius had \u201cestablished a\n standard of rectitude for actions\u201d;--the standard being that \u201ca sort\n of action is a right one, when the tendency of it is to augment the\n mass of happiness in the community.\u201d And we find him writing fifty\n years later (cf. _Works_, vol. x. p. 79) the following account of his\n earliest view, in a passage which contains no hint of later dissent\n from it:--\u201cBy an early pamphlet of Priestley\u2019s ... light was added\n to the warmth. In the phrase \u2018the greatest happiness of the greatest\n number,\u2019 I then saw delineated, for the first time, a plain as well as\n a true standard for whatever is right or wrong ... in human conduct,\n _whether in the field of morals or of politics_.\u201d\n\n At the same time I must admit that in other passages Bentham seems\n no less explicitly to adopt Egoistic Hedonism as the method of\n \u2018private Ethics,\u2019 as distinct from legislation: and in his posthumous\n \u2018Deontology\u2019 the two principles appear to be reconciled by the\n doctrine, that it is always the individual\u2019s true interest, even from\n a purely mundane point of view, to act in the manner most conducive\n to the general happiness. This latter proposition--which I regard\n as erroneous--is not, indeed, definitely put forward in any of the\n treatises published by Bentham in his lifetime, or completely prepared\n by him for publication: but it may be inferred from his common-place\n book that he held it (see his _Works_, vol. x. pp. 560, 561).\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[71] As I have before said, the applicability of a method for\ndetermining right conduct relatively to an ultimate end--whether\nHappiness or Perfection--does not necessarily depend on the acceptance\nof the end as prescribed by reason: it only requires that it should\nbe in some way adopted as ultimate and paramount. I have, however,\nconfined my attention in this treatise to ends which are widely\naccepted as reasonable: and I shall afterwards endeavour to exhibit the\nself-evident practical axioms which appear to me to be implied in this\nacceptance. Cf. _post_, Book iii. chap. xiii.\n\n[72] The notion of \u2018Self-realisation\u2019 will be more conveniently\nexamined in the following chapter: where I shall distinguish different\ninterpretations of the term \u2018Egoism,\u2019 which I have taken to denote one\nof the three principal species of ethical method.\n\n[73] See Note at the end of the chapter.\n\n[74] See Note at the end of the chapter.\n\n[75] We shall have occasion to consider Mill\u2019s argument on this point\nin a subsequent chapter. Cf. _post_, Book iii. chap. xiii.\n\n[76] It should be observed that neither Cumberland nor Shaftesbury uses\nthe term \u201cGood\u201d (substantive) in a purely and exclusively hedonistic\nsense. But Shaftesbury uses it mainly in this sense: and Cumberland\u2019s\n\u201cGood\u201d includes Happiness as well as Perfection.\n\n[77] See Dissertation II. _Of the Nature of Virtue_ appended to the\n_Analogy_. It may be interesting to notice a gradual change in Butler\u2019s\nview on this important point. In the first of his Sermons on Human\nNature, published some years before the _Analogy_, he does not notice,\nany more than Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, any possible want of harmony\nbetween Conscience and Benevolence. A note to Sermon XII., however,\nseems to indicate a stage of transition between the view of the first\nSermon and the view of the Dissertation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nEGOISM AND SELF-LOVE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding chapters I have used the term \u201cEgoism,\u201d as it\nis most commonly used, to denote a system which prescribes actions\nas means to the end of the individual\u2019s happiness or pleasure. The\nruling motive in such a system is commonly said to be \u201cself-love.\u201d But\nboth terms admit of other interpretations, which it will be well to\ndistinguish and set aside before proceeding further.\n\nFor example, the term \u201cegoistic\u201d is ordinarily and not improperly\napplied to the basis on which Hobbes attempted to construct morality;\nand on which alone, as he held, the social order could firmly rest, and\nescape the storms and convulsions with which it seemed to be menaced\nfrom the vagaries of the unenlightened conscience. But it is not\nstrictly the end of Egoism as I have defined it--greatest attainable\npleasure for the individual--but rather \u201cself-preservation,\u201d which\ndetermines the first of those precepts of rational egoism which Hobbes\ncalls \u201cLaws of Nature,\u201d viz., \u201cSeek peace and ensue it.\u201d And in the\ndevelopment of his system we often find that it is Preservation rather\nthan Pleasure, or perhaps a compromise between the two,[78] that is\ntaken as the ultimate end and standard of right conduct.\n\nAgain, in Spinoza\u2019s view the principle of rational action is\nnecessarily egoistic, and is (as with Hobbes) the impulse of\nself-preservation. The individual mind, says Spinoza, like everything\nelse, strives so far as it is able to continue in its state of being:\nindeed this effort is its very essence. It is true that the object of\nthis impulse cannot be separated from pleasure or joy; because pleasure\nor joy is \u201ca passion in which the soul passes to higher perfection.\u201d\nStill it is not at Pleasure that the impulse primarily aims, but at the\nmind\u2019s Perfection or Reality: as we should now say, at Self-realisation\nor Self-development. Of this, according to Spinoza, the highest form\nconsists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessary\norder as modifications of the one Divine Being, and that willing\nacceptance of all which springs from this comprehension. In this\nstate the mind is purely active, without any admixture of passion or\npassivity: and thus its essential nature is realised or actualised to\nthe greatest possible degree.\n\nWe perceive that this is the notion of Self-realisation as defined not\nonly _by_ but _for_ a philosopher: and that it would mean something\nquite different in the case of a man of action--such, for example, as\nthe reflective dramatist of Germany introduces exclaiming:\n\n Ich kann mich nicht\n Wie so ein Wortheld, so ein Tugend-Schw\u00e4tzer\n An meinem Willen w\u00e4rmen, und Gedanken ...\n Wenn ich nicht wirke mehr, bin ich vernichtet.[79]\n\nThe artist, again, often contemplates his production of the beautiful\nas a realisation of self: and moralists of a certain turn of mind, in\nall ages, have similarly regarded the sacrifice of inclination to duty\nas the highest form of Self-development; and held that true self-love\nprompts us always to obey the commands issued by the governing\nprinciple--Reason or Conscience--within us, as in such obedience,\nhowever painful, we shall be realising our truest self.\n\nWe see, in short, that the term Egoism, so far as it merely implies\nthat reference is made to self in laying down first principles of\nconduct, does not really indicate in any way the substance of such\nprinciples. For all our impulses, high and low, sensual and moral\nalike, are so far similarly related to self, that--except when two\nor more impulses come into conscious conflict--we tend to identify\nourselves with each as it arises. Thus self-consciousness may be\nprominent in yielding to any impulse: and egoism, in so far as it\nmerely implies such prominence, is a common form applicable to all\nprinciples of action.\n\nIt may be said, however, that we do not, properly speaking, \u2018develop\u2019\nor \u2018realise\u2019 self by yielding to the impulse which happens to be\npredominant in us; but by exercising, each in its due place and proper\ndegree, all the different faculties, capacities, and propensities, of\nwhich our nature is made up. But here there is an important ambiguity.\nWhat do we mean by \u2018due proportion and proper degree\u2019? These terms\nmay imply an ideal, into conformity with which the individual mind\nhas to be trained, by restraining some of its natural impulses and\nstrengthening others, and developing its higher faculties rather\nthan its lower: or they may merely refer to the original combination\nand proportion of tendencies in the character with which each is\nborn; to this, it may be meant, we ought to adapt as far as possible\nthe circumstances in which we place ourselves and the functions\nwhich we choose to exercise, in order that we may \u201cbe ourselves,\u201d\n\u201clive our own life,\u201d etc. According to the former interpretation\nrational Self-development is merely another term for the pursuit of\nPerfection for oneself: while in the latter sense it hardly appears\nthat Self-development (when clearly distinguished) is really put\nforward as an absolute end, but rather as a means to happiness; for\nsupposing a man to have inherited propensities clearly tending to\nhis own unhappiness, no one would recommend him to develop these as\nfully as possible, instead of modifying or subduing them in some way.\nWhether actually the best way of seeking happiness is to give free\nplay to one\u2019s nature, we will hereafter consider in the course of our\nexamination of Hedonism.\n\nOn the whole, then, I conclude that the notion of Self-realisation\nis to be avoided in a treatise on ethical method, on account of its\nindefiniteness: and for a similar reason we must discard a common\naccount of Egoism which describes its ultimate end as the \u2018good\u2019 of\nthe individual; for the term \u2018good\u2019 may cover all possible views of\nthe ultimate end of rational conduct. Indeed it may be said that\nEgoism in this sense was assumed in the whole ethical controversy of\nancient Greece; that is, it was assumed on all sides that a rational\nindividual[80] would make the pursuit of his own good his supreme\naim: the controverted question was whether this Good was rightly\nconceived as Pleasure or Virtue, or any _tertium quid_. Nor is the\nambiguity removed if we follow Aristotle in confining our attention to\nthe Good attainable in human life, and call this Well-being\n(\u0395\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1). For we may still argue with the Stoics, that virtuous or\nexcellent activities and not pleasures are the elements of which true\nhuman Well-being is composed. Indeed Aristotle himself adopts this\nview, so far as to determine the details of Well-being accordingly:\nthough he does not, with the Stoics, regard the pursuit of Virtue and\nthat of Pleasure as competing alternatives, holding rather that the\n\u201cbest pleasure\u201d is an inseparable concomitant of the most excellent\naction. Even the English term Happiness is not free from a similar\nambiguity.[81] It seems, indeed, to be commonly used in Bentham\u2019s way\nas convertible with Pleasure,--or rather as denoting that of which the\nconstituents are pleasures;--and it is in this sense that I think it\nmost convenient to use it. Sometimes, however, in ordinary discourse,\nthe term is rather employed to denote a particular kind of agreeable\nconsciousness, which is distinguished from and even contrasted with\ndefinite specific pleasures--such as the gratifications of sensual\nappetite or other keen and vehement desires--as being at once calmer\nand more indefinite: we may characterise it as the feeling which\naccompanies the normal activity of a \u201chealthy mind in a healthy body,\u201d\nand of which specific pleasures seem to be rather stimulants than\nelements. Sometimes, again--though, I think, with a more manifest\ndivergence from common usage--\u201chappiness\u201d or \u201ctrue happiness\u201d is\nunderstood in a definitely non-hedonistic sense, as denoting results\nother than agreeable feelings of any kind.[82]\n\n\u00a7 2. To be clear, then, we must particularise as the object of\nSelf-love, and End of the method which I have distinguished as Egoistic\nHedonism, Pleasure, taken in its widest sense, as including every\nspecies of \u201cdelight,\u201d \u201cenjoyment,\u201d or \u201csatisfaction\u201d; except so far\nas any particular species may be excluded by its incompatibility with\nsome greater pleasures, or as necessarily involving concomitant or\nsubsequent pains. It is thus that Self-love seems to be understood\nby Butler[83] and other English moralists after him; as a desire\nof one\u2019s own pleasure generally, and of the greatest amount of it\nobtainable, from whatever source it may be obtained. In fact, it\nis upon this generality and comprehensiveness that the \u2018authority\u2019\nand \u2018reasonableness\u2019 attributed to Self-love in Butler\u2019s system are\nfounded. For satisfaction or pleasure of some kind results from\ngratifying any impulse; thus when antagonistic impulses compete for\nthe determination of the Will, we are prompted by the desire for\npleasure in general to compare the pleasures which we foresee will\nrespectively attend the gratification of either impulse, and when we\nhave ascertained which set of pleasures is the greatest, Self-love\nor the desire for pleasure in general reinforces the corresponding\nimpulse. It is thus called into play whenever impulses conflict, and\nis therefore naturally regulative and directive (as Butler argues) of\nother springs of action. On this view, so far as Self-love operates,\nwe merely consider the _amount_ of pleasure or satisfaction: to use\nBentham\u2019s illustration, \u201cquantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is\nas good as poetry.\u201d\n\nThis position, however, seems to many offensively paradoxical; and\nJ. S. Mill[84] in his development of Bentham\u2019s doctrine thought it\ndesirable to abandon it and to take into account differences in quality\namong pleasures as well as differences in degree. Now here we may\nobserve, first, that it is quite consistent with the view quoted as\nBentham\u2019s to describe some kinds of pleasure as inferior in quality to\nothers, if by \u2018a pleasure\u2019 we mean (as is often meant) a whole state of\nconsciousness which is only partly pleasurable; and still more if we\ntake into view subsequent states. For many pleasures are not free from\npain even while enjoyed; and many more have painful consequences. Such\npleasures are, in Bentham\u2019s phrase, \u201cimpure\u201d: and as the pain has to be\nset off as a drawback in valuing the pleasure, it is in accordance with\nstrictly quantitative measurement of pleasure to call them inferior\nin kind. And again, we must be careful not to confound intensity of\n_pleasure_ with intensity of _sensation_: as a pleasant feeling may be\nstrong and absorbing, and yet not so pleasant as another that is more\nsubtle and delicate. With these explanations, it seems to me that in\norder to work out consistently the method that takes pleasure as the\nsole ultimate end of rational conduct, Bentham\u2019s proposition must be\naccepted, and all _qualitative_ comparison of pleasures must really\nresolve itself into quantitative. For all pleasures are understood\nto be so called because they have a common property of pleasantness,\nand may therefore be compared in respect of this common property. If,\nthen, what we are seeking is pleasure as such, and pleasure alone, we\nmust evidently always prefer the more pleasant pleasure to the less\npleasant: no other choice seems reasonable, unless we are aiming at\nsomething besides pleasure. And often when we say that one kind of\npleasure is better than another--as (_e.g._) that the pleasures of\nreciprocated affection are superior in quality to the pleasures of\ngratified appetite--we mean that they are more pleasant. No doubt we\nmay mean something else: we may mean, for instance, that they are\nnobler and more elevated, although less pleasant. But then we are\nclearly introducing a non-hedonistic ground of preference: and if this\nis done, the method adopted is a perplexing mixture of Intuitionism and\nHedonism.\n\nTo sum up: Egoism, if we merely understand by it a method that aims\nat Self-realisation, seems to be a form into which almost any ethical\nsystem may be thrown, without modifying its essential characteristics.\nAnd even when further defined Egoistic Hedonism, it is still\nimperfectly distinguishable from Intuitionism if quality of pleasures\nis admitted as a consideration distinct from and overruling quantity.\nThere remains then Pure or Quantitative Egoistic Hedonism, which, as\na method essentially distinct from all others and widely maintained\nto be rational, seems to deserve a detailed examination. According to\nthis the rational agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and\npain to himself as alone important in choosing between alternatives of\naction; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure\nover pain--which, without violation of usage, we may designate as\nhis \u2018greatest happiness.\u2019 It seems to be this view and attitude of\nmind which is most commonly intended by the vaguer terms \u2018egoism,\u2019\n\u2018egoistic\u2019: and therefore I shall allow myself to use these terms in\nthis more precise signification.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[78] Thus the end for which an individual is supposed to renounce the\nunlimited rights of the State of Nature is said (_Leviathan_, chap.\nxiv.) to be \u201cnothing else but the security of a man\u2019s person in this\nlife, and the means of preserving life so as not to be weary of it.\u201d\n\n[79] Schiller\u2019s _Wallenstein_.\n\n[80] I shall afterwards try to explain how it comes about that, in\nmodern thought, the proposition \u2018My own Good is my only reasonable\nultimate end\u2019 is not a mere tautology, even though we define \u2018Good\u2019 as\nthat at which it is ultimately reasonable to aim. Cf. _post_, chap. ix.\nand Book iii. chaps. xiii. xiv.\n\n[81] Aristotle\u2019s selection of \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 to denote what he\nelsewhere calls \u201cHuman\u201d or \u201cPracticable\u201d good, and the fact that,\nafter all, we have no better rendering for \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 than\n\u201cHappiness\u201d or \u201cFelicity,\u201d has caused no little misunderstanding of his\nsystem. Thus when Stewart (_Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_,\nBook ii. chap. ii.) says that \u201cby many of the best of the ancient\nmoralists ... the whole of ethics was reduced to this question ... What\nis most conducive on the whole to our happiness?\u201d the remark, if not\nexactly false, is certain to mislead his readers; since by Stewart,\nas by most English writers, \u201cHappiness\u201d is definitely conceived as\nconsisting of \u201cPleasures\u201d or \u201cEnjoyments.\u201d\n\n[82] Thus Green (_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book iii. chap. iv. \u00a7 228)\nsays, \u201cIt is the realisation of those objects in which we are mainly\ninterested, _not the succession of enjoyments which we shall experience\nin realising them_, that forms the definite content of our idea of\ntrue happiness, so far as it has such content at all.\u201d Cf. also \u00a7 238.\nIt is more remarkable to find J. S. Mill (_Utilitarianism_, chap.\niv.) declaring that \u201cmoney\u201d--no less than \u201cpower\u201d or \u201cfame\u201d--comes by\nassociation of ideas to be \u201ca part of happiness,\u201d an \u201cingredient in\nthe individual\u2019s conception of happiness.\u201d But this seems to be a mere\nlooseness of phraseology, venial in a treatise aiming at a popular\nstyle; since Mill has expressly said that \u201cby happiness is intended\npleasure and the absence of pain,\u201d and he cannot mean that money is\neither the one or the other. In fact he uses in the same passage--as\nan alternative phrase for \u201cparts of happiness\u201d--the phrases \u201csources\nof happiness\u201d and \u201csources of pleasure\u201d: and his real meaning is more\nprecisely expressed by these latter terms. That is, the distinction\nwhich he is really concerned to emphasise is that between the state\nof mind in which money is valued solely as a means of buying other\nthings, and the state of mind--such as the miser\u2019s--in which the mere\nconsciousness of possessing it gives pleasure, apart from any idea of\nspending it.\n\n[83] See Sermon XI. \u201c... the cool principle of self-love or general\ndesire of our own happiness.\u201d\n\n[84] _Utilitarianism_, chap. ii.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nINTUITIONISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. I have used the term \u2018Intuitional\u2019 to denote the view of ethics\nwhich regards as the practically ultimate end of moral actions their\nconformity to certain rules or dictates[85] of Duty unconditionally\nprescribed. There is, however, considerable ambiguity as to the exact\nantithesis implied by the terms \u2018intuition,\u2019 \u2018intuitive,\u2019 and their\ncongeners, as currently used in ethical discussion, which we must now\nendeavour to remove. Writers who maintain that we have \u2018intuitive\nknowledge\u2019 of the rightness of actions usually mean that this rightness\nis ascertained by simply \u201clooking at\u201d the actions themselves, without\nconsidering their ulterior consequences. This view, indeed, can hardly\nbe extended to the whole range of duty; since no morality ever existed\nwhich did not consider ulterior consequences to some extent. Prudence\nor Forethought has commonly been reckoned a virtue: and all modern\nlists of Virtues have included Rational Benevolence, which aims at the\nhappiness of other human beings generally, and therefore necessarily\ntakes into consideration even remote effects of actions. It must be\nobserved, too, that it is difficult to draw the line between an act and\nits consequences: as the effects consequent on each of our volitions\nform a continuous series of indefinite extension, and we seem to be\nconscious of causing all these effects, so far as at the moment of\nvolition we foresee them to be probable. However, we find that in the\ncommon notions of different kinds of actions, a line is actually drawn\nbetween the results included in the notion and regarded as forming part\nof the act, and those considered as its consequences. For example,\nin speaking truth to a jury, I may possibly foresee that my words,\noperating along with other statements and indications, will unavoidably\nlead them to a wrong conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of\nthe accused, as certainly as I foresee that they will produce a\nright impression as to the particular matter of fact to which I am\ntestifying: still, we should commonly consider the latter foresight or\nintention to determine the nature of the act as an act of veracity,\nwhile the former merely relates to a consequence. We must understand\nthen that the disregard of consequences, which the Intuitional view is\nhere taken to imply, only relates to certain determinate classes of\naction (such as Truth-speaking) where common usage of terms adequately\ndefines what events are to be included in the general notions of the\nacts, and what regarded as their consequences.\n\nBut again: we have to observe that men may and do judge remote as well\nas immediate results to be in themselves good, and such as we ought to\nseek to realise, without considering them in relation to the feelings\nof sentient beings. I have already assumed this to be the view of those\nwho adopt the general Perfection, as distinct from the Happiness, of\nhuman society as their ultimate end; and it would seem to be the view\nof many who concentrate their efforts on some more particular results,\nother than morality, such as the promotion of Art or Knowledge. Such\na view, if expressly distinguished from Hedonism, might properly be\nclassed as Intuitional, but in a sense wider than that defined in\nthe preceding paragraph: _i.e._ it would be meant that the results in\nquestion are judged to be good _immediately_, and not by inference from\nexperience of the pleasures which they produce. We have, therefore,\nto admit a wider use of \u2018Intuition,\u2019 as equivalent to \u2018immediate\njudgment as to what ought to be done or aimed at.\u2019 It should, however,\nbe observed that the current contrast between \u2018intuitive\u2019 or \u2018_a\npriori_\u2019 and \u2018inductive\u2019 or \u2018_a posteriori_\u2019 morality commonly involves\na certain confusion of thought. For what the \u2018inductive\u2019 moralist\nprofesses to know by induction, is commonly not the same thing as what\nthe \u2018intuitive\u2019 moralist professes to know by intuition. In the former\ncase it is the conduciveness to pleasure of certain kinds of action\nthat is methodically ascertained: in the latter case, their rightness:\nthere is therefore no proper opposition. If Hedonism claims to give\nauthoritative guidance, this can only be in virtue of the principle\nthat pleasure is the only reasonable ultimate end of human action: and\nthis principle cannot be known by induction from experience. Experience\ncan at most tell us that all men always do seek pleasure as their\nultimate end (that it does not support this conclusion I have already\ntried to show): it cannot tell us that any one ought so to seek it.\nIf this latter proposition is legitimately affirmed in respect either\nof private or of general happiness, it must either be immediately\nknown to be true,--and therefore, we may say, a moral intuition--or be\ninferred ultimately from premises which include at least one such moral\nintuition; hence either species of Hedonism, regarded from the point\nof view primarily[86] taken in this treatise, might be legitimately\nsaid to be in a certain sense \u2018intuitional.\u2019 It seems, however, to be\nthe prevailing opinion of ordinary moral persons, and of most of the\nwriters who have maintained the existence of moral intuitions, that\ncertain kinds of actions are unconditionally prescribed without regard\nto ulterior consequences: and I have accordingly treated this doctrine\nas a distinguishing characteristic of the Intuitional method, during\nthe main[87] part of the detailed examination of that method which I\nattempt in Book iii.\n\n\u00a7 2. Further; the common antithesis between \u2018intuitive\u2019 and \u2018inductive\u2019\nmorality is misleading in another way: since a moralist may hold the\nrightness of actions to be cognisable apart from the pleasure produced\nby them, while yet his method may be properly called Inductive. For he\nmay hold that, just as the generalisations of physical science rest\non particular observations, so in ethics general truths can only be\nreached by induction from judgments or perceptions relating to the\nrightness or wrongness of particular acts.\n\nFor example, when Socrates is said by Aristotle to have applied\ninductive reasoning to ethical questions, it is this kind of induction\nwhich is meant.[88] He discovered, as we are told, the latent ignorance\nof himself and other men: that is, that they used general terms\nconfidently, without being able, when called upon, to explain the\nmeaning of those terms. His plan for remedying this ignorance was\nto work towards the true definition of each term, by examining and\ncomparing different instances of its application. Thus the definition\nof Justice would be sought by comparing different actions commonly\njudged to be just, and framing a general proposition that would\nharmonise with all these particular judgments.\n\nSo again, in the popular view of Conscience it seems to be often\nimplied that particular judgments are the most trustworthy.\n\u2018Conscience\u2019 is the accepted popular term for the faculty of moral\njudgment, as applied to the acts and motives of the person judging;\nand we most commonly think of the dictates of conscience as relating\nto particular actions. Thus when a man is bidden, in any particular\ncase, to \u2018trust to his conscience,\u2019 it commonly seems to be meant\nthat he should exercise a faculty of judging morally this particular\ncase without reference to general rules, and even in opposition to\nconclusions obtained by systematic deduction from such rules. And\nit is on this view of Conscience that the contempt often expressed\nfor \u2018Casuistry\u2019 may be most easily justified: for if the particular\ncase can be satisfactorily settled by conscience without reference\nto general rules, \u2018Casuistry,\u2019 which consists in the application\nof general rules to particular cases, is at best superfluous. But\nthen, on this view, we shall have no practical need of any such\ngeneral rules, or of scientific Ethics at all. We may of course form\ngeneral propositions by induction from these particular conscientious\njudgments, and arrange them systematically: but any interest which\nsuch a system may have will be purely speculative. And this accounts,\nperhaps, for the indifference or hostility to systematic morality\nshown by some conscientious persons. For they feel that they can at\nany rate do without it: and they fear that the cultivation of it may\nplace the mind in a wrong attitude in relation to practice, and prove\nrather unfavourable than otherwise to the proper development of the\npractically important faculty manifested or exercised in particular\nmoral judgments.\n\nThe view above described may be called, in a sense,\n\u2018ultra-intuitional,\u2019 since, in its most extreme form, it recognises\nsimple immediate intuitions alone and discards as superfluous all modes\nof reasoning to moral conclusions: and we may find in it one phase or\nvariety of the Intuitional method,--if we may extend the term \u2018method\u2019\nto include a procedure that is completed in a single judgment.\n\n\u00a7 3. But though probably all moral agents have experience of such\nparticular intuitions, and though they constitute a great part of the\nmoral phenomena of most minds, comparatively few are so thoroughly\nsatisfied with them, as not to feel a need of some further moral\nknowledge even from a strictly practical point of view. For these\nparticular intuitions do not, to reflective persons, present themselves\nas quite indubitable and irrefragable: nor do they always find when\nthey have put an ethical question to themselves with all sincerity,\nthat they are conscious of clear immediate insight in respect of\nit. Again, when a man compares the utterances of his conscience at\ndifferent times, he often finds it difficult to make them altogether\nconsistent: the same conduct will wear a different moral aspect at one\ntime from that which it wore at another, although our knowledge of\nits circumstances and conditions is not materially changed. Further,\nwe become aware that the moral perceptions of different minds, to\nall appearance equally competent to judge, frequently conflict: one\ncondemns what another approves. In this way serious doubts are aroused\nas to the validity of each man\u2019s particular moral judgments: and we are\nled to endeavour to set these doubts at rest by appealing to general\nrules, more firmly established on a basis of common consent.\n\nAnd in fact, though the view of conscience above discussed is one\nwhich much popular language seems to suggest, it is not that which\nChristian and other moralists have usually given. They have rather\nrepresented the process of conscience as analogous to one of jural\nreasoning, such as is conducted in a Court of Law. Here we have always\na system of universal rules given, and any particular action has to be\nbrought under one of these rules before it can be pronounced lawful or\nunlawful. Now the rules of positive law are usually not discoverable\nby the individual\u2019s reason: this may teach him that law ought to be\nobeyed, but what law is must, in the main, be communicated to him\nfrom some external authority. And this is not unfrequently the case\nwith the conscientious reasoning of ordinary persons when any dispute\nor difficulty forces them to reason: they have a genuine impulse to\nconform to the right rules of conduct, but they are not conscious, in\ndifficult or doubtful cases, of seeing for themselves what these are:\nthey have to inquire of their priest, or their sacred books, or perhaps\nthe common opinion of the society to which they belong. In so far as\nthis is the case we cannot strictly call their method Intuitional.\nThey follow rules generally received, not intuitively apprehended.\nOther persons, however (or perhaps all to some extent), do seem to\nsee for themselves the truth[89] and bindingness of all or most of\nthese current rules. They may still put forward \u2018common consent\u2019 as an\nargument for the validity of these rules: but only as supporting the\nindividual\u2019s intuition, not as a substitute for it or as superseding it.\n\nHere then we have a second Intuitional Method: of which the fundamental\nassumption is that we can discern certain general rules with really\nclear and finally valid intuition. It is held that such general rules\nare implicit in the moral reasoning of ordinary men, who apprehend\nthem adequately for most practical purposes, and are able to enunciate\nthem roughly; but that to state them with proper precision requires\na special habit of contemplating clearly and steadily abstract moral\nnotions. It is held that the moralist\u2019s function then is to perform\nthis process of abstract contemplation, to arrange the results as\nsystematically as possible, and by proper definitions and explanations\nto remove vagueness and prevent conflict. It is such a system as this\nwhich seems to be generally intended when Intuitive or _a priori_\nmorality is mentioned, and which will chiefly occupy us in Book iii.\n\n\u00a7 4. By philosophic minds, however, the \u2018Morality of Common Sense\u2019 (as\nI have ventured to call it), even when made as precise and orderly as\npossible, is often found unsatisfactory as a system, although they have\nno disposition to question its general authority. It is found difficult\nto accept as scientific first principles the moral generalities that\nwe obtain by reflection on the ordinary thought of mankind, even\nthough we share this thought. Even granting that these rules can be so\ndefined as perfectly to fit together and cover the whole field of human\nconduct, without coming into conflict and without leaving any practical\nquestions unanswered,--still the resulting code seems an accidental\naggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some rational synthesis.\nIn short, without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly\njudged to be right is so, we may yet require some deeper explanation\n_why_ it is so. From this demand springs a third species or phase of\nIntuitionism, which, while accepting the morality of common sense as in\nthe main sound, still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which\nit does not itself offer: to get one or more principles more absolutely\nand undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might\nbe deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight\nmodifications and rectifications.[90]\n\nThe three phases of Intuitionism just described may be treated as\nthree stages in the formal development of Intuitive Morality: we may\nterm them respectively Perceptional, Dogmatic, and Philosophical. The\nlast-mentioned I have only defined in the vaguest way: in fact, as\nyet I have presented it only as a problem, of which it is impossible\nto foresee how many solutions may be attempted: but it does not seem\ndesirable to investigate it further at present, as it will be more\nsatisfactorily studied after examining in detail the Morality of Common\nSense.\n\nIt must not be thought that these three phases are sharply\ndistinguished in the moral reasoning of ordinary men: but then no more\nis Intuitionism of any sort sharply distinguished from either species\nof Hedonism. A loose combination or confusion of methods is the most\ncommon type of actual moral reasoning. Probably most moral men believe\nthat their moral sense or instinct in any case will guide them fairly\nright, but also that there are general rules for determining right\naction in different departments of conduct: and that for these again\nit is possible to find a philosophical explanation, by which they may\nbe deduced from a smaller number of fundamental principles. Still for\nsystematic direction of conduct, we require to know on what judgments\nwe are to rely as ultimately valid.\n\nSo far I have been mainly concerned with differences in intuitional\nmethod due to difference of generality in the intuitive beliefs\nrecognised as ultimately valid. There is, however, another class of\ndifferences arising from a variation of view as to the precise quality\nimmediately apprehended in the moral intuition. These are peculiarly\nsubtle and difficult to fix in clear and precise language, and I\ntherefore reserve them for a separate chapter.\n\n NOTE.--Intuitional moralists have not always taken sufficient\n care in expounding their system to make clear whether they regard\n as ultimately valid, moral judgments on single acts, or general\n rules prescribing particular kinds of acts, or more universal and\n fundamental principles. For example, Dugald Stewart uses the term\n \u201cperception\u201d to denote the immediate operation of the moral faculty;\n at the same time, in describing what is thus perceived, he always\n seems to have in view general rules.\n\n Still we can tolerably well distinguish among English ethical writers\n those who have confined themselves mainly to the definition and\n arrangement of the Morality of Common Sense, from those who have\n aimed at a more philosophical treatment of the content of moral\n intuition. And we find that the distinction corresponds in the main\n to a difference of periods: and that--what perhaps we should hardly\n have expected--the more philosophical school is the earlier. The\n explanation of this may be partly found by referring to the doctrines\n in antagonism to which, in the respective periods, the Intuitional\n method asserted and developed itself. In the first period all orthodox\n moralists were occupied in refuting Hobbism. But this system, though\n based on Materialism and Egoism, was yet intended as ethically\n constructive. Accepting in the main the commonly received rules of\n social morality, it explained them as the conditions of peaceful\n existence which enlightened self-interest directed each individual to\n obey; provided only the social order to which they belonged was not\n merely ideal, but made actual by a strong government. Now no doubt\n this view renders the theoretical basis of duty seriously unstable;\n still, assuming a decently good government, Hobbism may claim to at\n once explain and establish, instead of undermining, the morality\n of Common Sense. And therefore, though some of Hobbes\u2019 antagonists\n (as Cudworth) contented themselves with simply reaffirming the\n absoluteness of morality, the more thoughtful felt that system must\n be met by system and explanation by explanation, and that they must\n penetrate beyond the dogmas of common sense to some more irrefragable\n certainty. And so, while Cumberland found this deeper basis in the\n notion of \u201cthe common good of all Rationals\u201d as an ultimate end,\n Clarke sought to exhibit the more fundamental of the received rules\n as axioms of perfect self-evidence, necessarily forced upon the\n mind in contemplating human beings and their relations. Clarke\u2019s\n results, however, were not found satisfactory: and by degrees the\n attempt to exhibit morality as a body of scientific truth fell into\n discredit, and the disposition to dwell on the emotional side of the\n moral consciousness became prevalent. But when ethical discussion\n thus passed over into psychological analysis and classification, the\n conception of the objectivity of duty, on which the authority of moral\n sentiment depends, fell gradually out of view: for example, we find\n Hutcheson asking why the moral sense should not vary in different\n human beings, as the palate does, without dreaming that there is any\n peril to morality in admitting such variations as legitimate. When,\n however, the new doctrine was endorsed by the dreaded name of Hume,\n its dangerous nature, and the need of bringing again into prominence\n the cognitive element of moral consciousness, were clearly seen: and\n this work was undertaken as a part of the general philosophic protest\n of the Scottish School against the Empiricism that had culminated\n in Hume. But this school claimed as its characteristic merit that\n it met Empiricism on its own ground, and showed among the facts of\n psychological experience which the Empiricist professed to observe,\n the assumptions which he repudiated. And thus in Ethics it was led\n rather to expound and reaffirm the morality of Common Sense, than to\n offer any profounder principles which could not be so easily supported\n by an appeal to common experience.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[85] I use the term \u201cdictates\u201d to include the view afterwards mentioned\n(\u00a7 2) in which the ultimately valid moral imperatives are conceived as\nrelating to particular acts.\n\n[86] I have explained in the concluding paragraph of chap. iii. that a\ndifferent view of hedonistic systems is admissible.\n\n[87] The wider of the two meanings of \u2018Intuition\u2019 here distinguished is\nrequired in treating of Philosophical Intuitionism. See Book iii. chap.\nxiii.\n\n[88] It must, however, be remembered that Aristotle regarded the\ngeneral proposition obtained by induction as really more certain (and\nin a higher sense knowledge) than the particulars through which the\nmind is led up to it.\n\n[89] Strictly speaking, the attributes of truth and falsehood only\nbelong formally to Rules when they are changed from the imperative mood\n(\u201cDo _X_\u201d) into the indicative (\u201c_X_ ought to be done\u201d).\n\n[90] It should be observed that such principles will not necessarily\nbe \u201cintuitional\u201d in the narrower sense that excludes consequences; but\nonly in the wider sense as being self-evident principles relating to\n\u2018what ought to be.\u2019\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nGOOD\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We have hitherto spoken of the quality of conduct discerned by\nour moral faculty as \u2018rightness,\u2019 which is the term commonly used by\nEnglish moralists. We have regarded this term, and its equivalents in\nordinary use, as implying the existence of a dictate or imperative of\nreason, which prescribes certain actions either unconditionally, or\nwith reference to some ulterior end.\n\nIt is, however, possible to take a view of virtuous action in which,\nthough the validity of moral intuitions is not disputed, this notion\nof rule or dictate is at any rate only latent or implicit, the moral\nideal being presented as attractive rather than imperative. Such a view\nseems to be taken when the action to which we are morally prompted,\nor the quality of character manifested in it, is judged to be \u2018good\u2019\nin itself (and not merely as a means to some ulterior Good). This,\nas was before noticed, was the fundamental ethical conception in\nthe Greek schools of Moral Philosophy generally; including even the\nStoics, though their system, from the prominence that it gives to the\nconception of Natural Law, forms a transitional link between ancient\nand modern ethics. And this historical illustration may serve to\nexhibit one important result of substituting the idea of \u2018goodness\u2019 for\nthat of \u2018rightness\u2019 of conduct, which at first sight might be thought\na merely verbal change. For the chief characteristics of ancient\nethical controversy as distinguished from modern may be traced to the\nemployment of a generic notion instead of a specific one in expressing\nthe common moral judgments on actions. Virtue or Right action is\ncommonly regarded as only a species of the Good: and so, on this view\nof the moral intuition, the first question that offers itself, when we\nendeavour to systematise conduct, is how to determine the relation of\nthis species of good to the rest of the genus. It was on this question\nthat the Greek thinkers argued, from first to last. Their speculations\ncan scarcely be understood by us unless with a certain effort we throw\nthe quasi-jural notions of modern ethics aside, and ask (as they did)\nnot \u201cWhat is Duty and what is its ground?\u201d but \u201cWhich of the objects\nthat men think good is truly Good or the Highest Good?\u201d or, in the more\nspecialised form of the question which the moral intuition introduces,\n\u201cWhat is the relation of the kind of Good we call Virtue, the qualities\nof conduct and character which men commend and admire, to other good\nthings?\u201d\n\nThis, then, is the first difference to be noticed between the two\nforms of the intuitive judgment. In the recognition of conduct as\n\u2018right\u2019 is involved an authoritative prescription to do it: but when we\nhave judged conduct to be good, it is not yet clear that we ought to\nprefer this kind of good to all other good things: some standard for\nestimating the relative values of different \u2018goods\u2019 has still to be\nsought.\n\nI propose, then, to examine the import of the notion \u2018Good\u2019 in the\nwhole range of its application;--premising that, as it is for the\nconstituents of Ultimate Good that we require a standard of comparison,\nwe are not directly concerned with anything that is clearly only good\nas a means to the attainment of some ulterior end. If, indeed, we had\nonly this latter case to consider, it would be plausible to interpret\n\u2018good\u2019 without reference to human desire or choice, as meaning merely\n\u2018fit\u2019 or \u2018adapted\u2019 for the production of certain effects--a good horse\nfor riding, a good gun for shooting, etc. But as we apply the notion\nalso to ultimate ends, we must seek a meaning for it which will cover\nboth applications.\n\n\u00a7 2. There is, however, a simple interpretation of the term--which is\nwidely maintained to be the true one--according to which everything\nwhich we judge to be good is implicitly conceived as a means to\nthe end of pleasure, even when we do not make in our judgment any\nexplicit reference to this or any other ulterior end. On this view,\nany comparison of things in respect of their \u2018goodness\u2019 would seem\nto be really a comparison of them as sources of pleasure; so that any\nattempt to systematise our intuitions of goodness, whether in conduct\nand character or in other things, must reasonably lead us straight to\nHedonism. And no doubt, if we consider the application of the term,\noutside the sphere of character and conduct, to things that are not\ndefinitely regarded as means to the attainment of some ulterior object\nof desire, we find a close correspondence between our apprehension\nof pleasure derived from an object, and our recognition that the\nobject is in itself \u2018good.\u2019 The good things of life are things which\ngive pleasure, whether sensual or emotional: as good dinners, wines,\npoems, pictures, music: and this gives a _prima facie_ support to the\ninterpretation of \u2018good\u2019 as equivalent to \u2018pleasant.\u2019 I think, however,\nthat if we reflect on the application of the term to the cases most\nanalogous to that of conduct--_i.e._ to what we may call \u2018objects of\ntaste\u2019--we shall find that this interpretation of it has not clearly\nthe support of common sense. In the first place, allowing that the\njudgment that any object is good of its kind is closely connected with\nthe apprehension of pleasure derived from it, we must observe that\nit is generally to a specific kind of pleasure that the affirmation\nof goodness corresponds; and that if the object happens to give us\npleasure of a different kind, we do not therefore call it good--at\nleast without qualification. For instance, we should not call a wine\ngood solely because it was very wholesome; nor a poem on account of\nits moral lessons. And hence when we come to consider the meaning of\nthe term \u2018good\u2019 as applied to conduct, there is no reason, so far,\nto suppose that it has any reference or correspondence to _all_ the\npleasures that may result from the conduct. Rather the perception\nof goodness or virtue in actions would seem to be analogous to the\nperception of beauty[91] in material things: which is normally\naccompanied with a specific pleasure which we call \u2018\u00e6sthetic,\u2019 but\nhas often no discoverable relation to the general usefulness or\nagreeableness of the thing discerned to be beautiful: indeed, we often\nrecognise this kind of excellence in things hurtful and dangerous.\n\nBut further: as regards \u00e6sthetic pleasures, and the sources of such\npleasures that we commonly judge to be good, it is the received opinion\nthat some persons have more and others less \u2018good taste\u2019: and it is\nonly the judgment of persons of good taste that we recognise as valid\nin respect of the real goodness of the things enjoyed. We think that of\nhis own pleasure each individual is the final judge, and there is no\nappeal from his decision,--at least so far as he is comparing pleasures\nwithin his actual experience; but the affirmation of goodness in any\nobject involves the assumption of a universally valid standard, which,\nas we believe, the judgment of persons to whom we attribute good taste\napproximately represents. And it seems clear that the term \u2018good\u2019 as\napplied to \u2018taste\u2019 does not mean \u2018pleasant\u2019; it merely imports the\nconformity of the \u00e6sthetic judgment so characterised to the supposed\nideal, deviation from which implies error and defect. Nor does it\nappear to be always the person of best taste who derives the greatest\nenjoyment from any kind of good and pleasant things. We are familiar\nwith the fact that connoisseurs of wines, pictures, etc., often retain\ntheir intellectual faculty of appraising the merits of the objects\nwhich they criticise, and deciding on their respective places in the\nscale of excellence, even when their susceptibilities to pleasure\nfrom these objects are comparatively blunted and exhausted. And more\ngenerally we see that freshness and fulness of feeling by no means go\nalong with taste and judgment: and that a person who possesses the\nformer may derive more pleasure from inferior objects than another may\nfrom the best.\n\nTo sum up: the general admission that things which are called \u2018good\u2019\nare productive of pleasure, and that the former quality is inseparable\nin thought from the latter, does not involve the inference that the\ncommon estimates of the goodness of conduct may be fairly taken as\nestimates of the amount of pleasure resulting from it. For (1) analogy\nwould lead us to conclude that the attribution of goodness, in the case\nof conduct as of objects of taste generally, may correspond not to all\nthe pleasure that is caused by the conduct, but to a specific pleasure,\nin this case the contemplative satisfaction which the conduct causes to\na disinterested spectator: and (2) it may not excite even this specific\npleasure generally in proportion to its goodness, but only (at most) in\npersons of good moral taste: and even in their case we can distinguish\nthe intellectual apprehension of goodness--which involves the\nconception of an ideal objective standard--from the pleasurable emotion\nwhich commonly accompanies it; and may suppose the latter element of\nconsciousness diminished almost indefinitely.\n\nFinally, when we pass from the _adjective_ to the _substantive_\n\u2018good,\u2019 it is at once evident that this latter cannot be understood as\nequivalent to \u2018pleasure\u2019 or \u2018happiness\u2019 by any persons who affirm--as\na significant proposition and not as a mere tautology--that the\nPleasure or Happiness of human beings is their Good or Ultimate\nGood. Such affirmation, which would, I think, be ordinarily made by\nHedonists, obviously implies that the _meaning_ of the two terms is\ndifferent, however closely their denotation may coincide. And it does\nnot seem that any fundamental difference of meaning is implied by the\ngrammatical variation from adjective to substantive.\n\n\u00a7 3. What then can we state as the general meaning of the term \u2018good\u2019?\nShall we say--with Hobbes, and many since Hobbes--that \u2018whatsoever\nis the object of any man\u2019s Desire, that it is which he for his part\ncalleth Good, and the object of his aversion, Evil\u2019? To simplify the\ndiscussion, we will consider only what a man desires for itself--not\nas a means to an ulterior result,--and for himself--not benevolently\nfor others: his own Good[92] and ultimate Good. We have first to meet\nthe obvious objection that a man often desires what he knows is on the\nwhole bad for him: the pleasure of drinking champagne which is sure\nto disagree with him, the gratification of revenge when he knows that\nhis true interest lies in reconciliation. The answer is that in such\ncases the desired result is accompanied or followed by other effects\nwhich when they come excite aversion stronger than the desire for the\ndesired effect: but that these bad effects, though fore-_seen_ are not\nfore-_felt_: the representation of them does not adequately modify\nthe predominant direction of desire as a present fact. But, granting\nthis, and fixing attention solely on the result desired, apart from\nits concomitants and consequences--it would still seem that what is\ndesired at any time is, as such, merely apparent Good, which may not\nbe found good when fruition comes, or at any rate not so good as it\nappeared. It may turn out a \u2018Dead Sea apple,\u2019 mere dust and ashes in\nthe eating: more often, fruition will partly correspond to expectation,\nbut may still fall short of it in a marked degree. And sometimes--even\nwhile yielding to the desire--we are aware of the illusoriness of this\nexpectation of \u2018good\u2019 which the desire carries with it. I conclude,\ntherefore, that if we are to conceive of the elements of ultimate\nGood as capable of quantitative comparison--as we do when we speak of\npreferring a \u2018greater\u2019 good to a \u2018lesser,\u2019--we cannot identify the\nobject of desire with \u2018good\u2019 simply, or \u2018true good,\u2019 but only with\n\u2018apparent good.\u2019\n\nBut further: a prudent man is accustomed to suppress, with more or less\nsuccess, desires for what he regards as out of his power to attain\nby voluntary action--as fine weather, perfect health, great wealth\nor fame, etc.; but any success he may have in diminishing the actual\nintensity of such desires has no effect in leading him to judge the\nobjects desired less \u2018good.\u2019\n\nIt would seem then, that if we interpret the notion \u2018good\u2019 in relation\nto \u2018desire,\u2019 we must identify it not with the actually _desired_, but\nrather with the _desirable_:--meaning by \u2018desirable\u2019 not necessarily\n\u2018what _ought_ to be desired\u2019 but what would be desired, with strength\nproportioned to the degree of desirability, if it were judged\nattainable by voluntary action, supposing the desirer to possess a\nperfect forecast, emotional as well as intellectual, of the state of\nattainment or fruition.\n\nIt still remains possible that the choice of any particular good, thus\ndefined as an object of pursuit, may be on the whole bad, on account\nof its concomitants and consequences; even though the particular\nresult when attained is not found other than it was imagined in the\ncondition of previous desire. If, therefore, in seeking a definition\nof \u2018ultimate Good\u2019 we mean \u2018good on the whole,\u2019 we have--following the\nline of thought of the preceding paragraph--to express its relation to\nDesire differently. In the first place we have to limit our view to\ndesire which becomes practical in volition; as I may still regard as\ndesirable results which I judge it on the whole imprudent to aim at.\nBut, even with this limitation, the relation of my \u2018good on the whole\u2019\nto my desire is very complicated. For it is not even sufficient to say\nthat my Good on the whole is what I should actually desire and seek if\nall the consequences of seeking it could be foreknown and adequately\nrealised by me in imagination at the time of making my choice. No doubt\nan equal regard for all the moments of our conscious experience--so\nfar, at least, as the mere difference of their position in time is\nconcerned--is an essential characteristic of rational conduct. But the\nmere fact, that a man does not afterwards feel for the consequences of\nan action aversion strong enough to cause him to regret it, cannot be\naccepted as a complete proof that he has acted for his \u2018good on the\nwhole.\u2019 Indeed, we commonly reckon it among the worst consequences\nof some kinds of conduct that they alter men\u2019s tendencies to desire,\nand make them desire their lesser good more than their greater: and\nwe think it all the worse for a man--even in this world--if he is\nnever roused out of such a condition and lives till death the life of\na contented pig, when he might have been something better. To avoid\nthis objection, it would have to be said that a man\u2019s future good on\nthe whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all\nthe consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him\nwere accurately foreseen and adequately realised in imagination at the\npresent point of time.\n\nThis hypothetical composition of impulsive forces involves so\nelaborate and complex a conception, that it is somewhat paradoxical\nto say that this is what we commonly _mean_ when we talk of a man\u2019s\n\u2018good on the whole.\u2019 Still, I cannot deny that this hypothetical\nobject of a resultant desire supplies an intelligible and admissible\ninterpretation of the terms \u2018good\u2019 (substantive) and \u2018desirable,\u2019\nas giving philosophical precision to the vaguer meaning with which\nthey are used in ordinary discourse: and it would seem that a calm\ncomprehensive desire for \u2018good\u2019 conceived somewhat in this way, though\nmore vaguely, is normally produced by intellectual comparison and\nexperience in a reflective mind. The notion of \u2018Good\u2019 thus attained\nhas an ideal element: it is something that _is_ not always actually\ndesired and aimed at by human beings: but the ideal element is entirely\ninterpretable in terms of _fact_, actual or hypothetical, and does not\nintroduce any judgment of value, fundamentally distinct from judgments\nrelating to existence;--still less any \u2018dictate of Reason.\u2019[93]\n\nIt seems to me, however, more in accordance with common sense to\nrecognise--as Butler does--that the calm desire for my \u2018good on the\nwhole\u2019 is _authoritative_; and therefore carries with it implicitly\na rational dictate to aim at this end, if in any case a conflicting\ndesire urges the will in an opposite direction. Still we may keep the\nnotion of \u2018dictate\u2019 or \u2018imperative\u2019 merely implicit and latent,--as it\nseems to be in ordinary judgments as to \u2018my good\u2019 and its opposite--by\ninterpreting \u2018ultimate good on the whole for me\u2019 to mean what I should\npractically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason, assuming\nmy own existence alone to be considered. On this view, \u201cultimate good\non the whole,\u201d unqualified by reference to a particular subject, must\nbe taken to mean what as a rational being I should desire and seek to\nrealise, assuming myself to have an equal concern for _all_ existence.\nWhen conduct is judged to be \u2018good\u2019 or \u2018desirable\u2019 in itself,\nindependently of its consequences, it is, I conceive, this latter point\nof view that is taken. Such a judgment differs, as I have said, from\nthe judgment that conduct is \u2018right,\u2019 in so far as it does not involve\na definite precept to perform it; since it still leaves it an open\nquestion whether this particular kind of good is the greatest good that\nwe can under the circumstances obtain. It differs further, as we may\nnow observe, in so far as good or excellent actions are not implied to\nbe in our power in the same strict sense as \u2018right\u2019 actions--any more\nthan any other good things: and in fact there are many excellences\nof behaviour which we cannot attain by any effort of will, at least\ndirectly and at the moment: hence we often feel that the recognition\nof goodness in the conduct of others does not carry with it a clear\nprecept to do likewise, but rather\n\n the vague desire\n That stirs an imitative will.\n\nIn so far as this is the case Goodness of Conduct becomes an ulterior\nend, the attainment of which lies outside and beyond the range of\nimmediate volition.\n\n\u00a7 4. It remains to consider by what standard the value of conduct or\ncharacter,[94] thus intuitively judged to be good in itself, is to be\nco-ordinated and compared with that of other good things. I shall not\nnow attempt to establish such a standard; but a little reflection may\nenable us to limit considerably the range of comparison for which it\nis required. For I think that if we consider carefully such permanent\nresults as are commonly judged to be good, other than qualities of\nhuman beings, we can find nothing that, on reflection, appears to\npossess this quality of goodness out of relation to human existence, or\nat least to some consciousness or feeling.[95]\n\nFor example, we commonly judge some inanimate objects, scenes, etc. to\nbe good as possessing beauty, and others bad from ugliness: still no\none would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in\nexternal nature, apart from any possible contemplation of it by human\nbeings. In fact when beauty is maintained to be objective, it is not\ncommonly meant that it exists as beauty out of relation to any mind\nwhatsoever: but only that there is some standard of beauty valid for\nall minds.\n\nIt may, however, be said that beauty and other results commonly judged\nto be good, though we do not conceive them to exist out of relation to\nhuman beings (or at least minds of some kind), are yet so far separable\nas ends from the human beings on whom their existence depends, that\ntheir realisation may conceivably come into competition with the\nperfection or happiness of these beings. Thus, though beautiful\nthings cannot be thought worth producing except as possible objects\nof contemplation, still a man may devote himself to their production\nwithout any consideration of the persons who are to contemplate them.\nSimilarly knowledge is a good which cannot exist except in minds; and\nyet one may be more interested in the development of knowledge than in\nits possession by any particular minds; and may take the former as an\nultimate end without regarding the latter.\n\nStill, as soon as the alternatives are clearly apprehended, it will, I\nthink, be generally held that beauty, knowledge, and other ideal goods,\nas well as all external material things, are only reasonably to be\nsought by men in so far as they conduce either (1) to Happiness or (2)\nto the Perfection or Excellence of human existence. I say \u201chuman,\u201d for\nthough most utilitarians consider the pleasure (and freedom from pain)\nof the inferior animals to be included in the Happiness which they take\nas the right and proper end of conduct, no one seems to contend that we\nought to aim at perfecting brutes, except as a means to our ends, or\nat least as objects of scientific or \u00e6sthetic contemplation for us.\nNor, again, can we include, as a practical end, the existence of beings\nabove the human. We certainly apply the idea of Good to the Divine\nExistence, just as we do to His work, and indeed in a pre-eminent\nmanner: and when it is said that \u201cwe should do all things to the glory\nof God,\u201d it may seem to be implied that the existence of God is made\nbetter by our glorifying Him. Still this inference when explicitly\ndrawn appears somewhat impious; and theologians generally recoil from\nit, and refrain from using the notion of a possible addition to the\nGoodness of the Divine Existence as a ground of human duty. Nor can the\ninfluence of our actions on other extra-human intelligences besides the\nDivine be at present made matter of scientific discussion.\n\nI shall therefore confidently lay down, that if there be any Good other\nthan Happiness to be sought by man, as an ultimate practical end, it\ncan only be the Goodness, Perfection, or Excellence of Human Existence.\nHow far this notion includes more than Virtue, what its precise\nrelation to Pleasure is, and to what method we shall be logically led\nif we accept it as fundamental, are questions which we shall more\nconveniently discuss after the detailed examination of these two other\nnotions, Pleasure and Virtue, in which we shall be engaged in the two\nfollowing Books.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[91] It is, however, necessary to distinguish between the ideas of\n_Moral Goodness_ and _Beauty_ as applied to human actions: although\nthere is much affinity between them, and they have frequently been\nidentified, especially by the Greek thinkers. No doubt both the ideas\nthemselves and the corresponding pleasurable emotions, arising on the\ncontemplation of conduct, are often indistinguishable: a noble action\naffects us like a scene, a picture, or a strain of music: and the\ndelineation of human virtue is an important part of the means which\nthe artist has at his disposal for producing his peculiar effects.\nStill, on looking closer, we see not only that there is much good\nconduct which is not beautiful, or at least does not sensibly impress\nus as such; but even that certain kinds of crime and wickedness have\na splendour and sublimity of their own. For example, such a career as\nC\u00e6sar Borgia\u2019s, as Renan says, is \u201cbeau comme une temp\u00eate, comme un\nab\u00eeme.\u201d It is true, I think, that in all such cases the beauty depends\nupon the exhibition in the criminal\u2019s conduct of striking gifts and\nexcellences mingled with the wickedness: but it does not seem that we\ncan abstract the latter without impairing the \u00e6sthetic effect. And\nhence I conceive, we have to distinguish the sense of beauty in conduct\nfrom the sense of moral goodness.\n\n[92] It would seem that, according to the common view of \u2018good,\u2019 there\nare occasions in which an individual\u2019s sacrifice of his own good on\nthe whole, according to the most rational conception of it that he\ncan form, would apparently realise greater good for others. Whether,\nindeed, such a sacrifice is ever really required, and whether, if so,\nit is truly reasonable for the individual to sacrifice his own good\non the whole, are among the profoundest questions of ethics: and I\nshall carefully consider them in subsequent chapters (especially Book\niii. chap. xiv.). I here only desire to avoid any prejudgment of these\nquestions in my definition of \u2018my own good.\u2019\n\n[93] As before said (chap. iii. \u00a7 4), so far as my \u2018good on the whole\u2019\nis adopted as an end of action, the notion of \u2018ought\u2019--implying a\ndictate or imperative of Reason--becomes applicable to the necessary or\nfittest means to the attainment of the adopted end.\n\n[94] Character is only known to us through its manifestation in\nconduct; and I conceive that in our common recognition of Virtue as\nhaving value in itself, we do not ordinarily distinguish character from\nconduct: we do not raise the question whether character is to be valued\nfor the sake of the conduct in which it is manifested, or conduct for\nthe sake of the character that it exhibits and develops. How this\nquestion should be answered when it is raised will be more conveniently\nconsidered at a later stage of the discussion. See Book iii. chap. ii.\n\u00a7 2, and chap. xiv. \u00a7 1.\n\n[95] No doubt there is a point of view, sometimes adopted with great\nearnestness, from which the whole universe and not merely a certain\ncondition of rational or sentient beings is contemplated as \u2018very\ngood\u2019: just as the Creator in Genesis is described as contemplating it.\nBut such a view can scarcely be developed into a method of Ethics. For\npractical purposes, we require to conceive some parts of the universe\nas at least less good than they might be. And we do not seem to have\nany ground for drawing such a distinction between different portions of\nthe non-sentient universe, considered in themselves and out of relation\nto conscious or sentient beings.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nEGOISTIC HEDONISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF EGOISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The object of the present Book is to examine the method of\ndetermining reasonable conduct which has been already defined in\noutline under the name of Egoism: taking this term as equivalent to\nEgoistic Hedonism, and as implying the adoption of his own greatest\nhappiness as the ultimate end of each individual\u2019s actions. It may be\ndoubted whether this ought to be included among received \u201cmethods of\n_Ethics_\u201d; since there are strong grounds for holding that a system\nof morality, satisfactory to the moral consciousness of mankind in\ngeneral, cannot be constructed on the basis of simple Egoism. In\nsubsequent chapters[96] I shall carefully discuss these reasons: at\npresent it seems sufficient to point to the wide acceptance of the\nprinciple that it is reasonable for a man to act in the manner most\nconducive to his own happiness. We find it expressly admitted by\nleading representatives both of Intuitionism and of that Universalistic\nHedonism to which I propose to restrict the name of Utilitarianism.\nI have already noticed that Bentham, although he puts forward the\ngreatest happiness of the greatest number as the \u201ctrue standard of\nright and wrong,\u201d yet regards it as \u201cright and proper\u201d that each\nindividual should aim at his own greatest happiness. And Butler is\nequally prepared to grant \u201cthat our ideas of happiness and misery\nare of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us ... that,\nthough virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to\nand pursuit of what is right and good as such; yet, when we sit down\nin a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other\npursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at\nleast not contrary to it.\u201d[97]\n\nAnd even Clarke[98]--notwithstanding the emphatic terms in which he has\nmaintained that \u201cVirtue truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake\nand Vice to be avoided\u201d--yet admits that it is \u201cnot truly reasonable\nthat men by adhering to Virtue should part with their lives, if thereby\nthey eternally deprived themselves of all possibility of receiving any\nadvantage from that adherence.\u201d\n\nAnd, generally, in the ages of Christian faith, it has been obvious\nand natural to hold that the realisation of virtue is essentially an\nenlightened and far-seeing pursuit of Happiness for the agent. Nor\nhas this doctrine been held only by persons of a cold and calculating\nturn of mind: we find it urged with emphasis by so chivalrous and\nhigh-minded a preacher as Bishop Berkeley. No doubt this is only one\nside or element of the Christian view: the opposite doctrine, that an\naction done from motives of self-interest is not properly virtuous,\nhas continually asserted itself as either openly conflicting or in\nsome manner reconciled with the former. Still the former, though less\nrefined and elevated, seems to have been the commoner view. Indeed,\nit is hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes that\n\u2018interested\u2019 actions, tending to promote the agent\u2019s happiness, are\n_prima facie_ reasonable: and that the _onus probandi_ lies with those\nwho maintain that disinterested conduct, as such, is reasonable.\n\nBut, as has been before said, in the common notions of \u2018interest,\u2019\n\u2018happiness,\u2019 etc., there is a certain amount of vagueness and\nambiguity: so that in order to fit these terms for the purposes\nof scientific discussion, we must, while retaining the main part\nof their signification, endeavour to make it more precise. In my\njudgment this result is attained if by \u2018greatest possible Happiness\u2019\nwe understand the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain;\nthe two terms being used, with equally comprehensive meanings, to\ninclude respectively all kinds of agreeable and disagreeable feelings.\nFurther, if this quantitative definition of the end be accepted,\nconsistency requires that pleasures should be sought in proportion\nto their pleasantness; and therefore the less pleasant consciousness\nmust not be preferred to the more pleasant, on the ground of any other\nqualities that it may possess. The distinctions of _quality_ that Mill\nand others urge may still be admitted as grounds of preference, but\nonly in so far as they can be resolved into distinctions of quantity.\nThis is the type to which the practical reasoning that is commonly\ncalled \u2018Egoistic\u2019 tends to conform, when we rigorously exclude all\nambiguities and inconsistencies: and it is only in this more precise\nform that it seems worth while to subject such reasoning to a detailed\nexamination. We must therefore understand by an Egoist a man who when\ntwo or more courses of action are open to him, ascertains as accurately\nas he can the amounts of pleasure and pain that are likely to result\nfrom each, and chooses the one which he thinks will yield him the\ngreatest surplus of pleasure over pain.\n\n\u00a7 2. It must, however, be pointed out that the adoption of the\nfundamental _principle_ of Egoism, as just explained, by no means\nnecessarily implies the ordinary empirical method of seeking one\u2019s own\npleasure or happiness. A man may aim at the greatest happiness within\nhis reach, and yet not attempt to ascertain empirically what amount\nof pleasure and pain is likely to attend any given course of action;\nbelieving that he has some surer, deductive method for determining\nthe conduct which will make him most happy in the long-run. He may\nbelieve this on grounds of Positive Religion, because God has promised\nhappiness as a reward for obedience to certain definite commands: or\non grounds of Natural Religion, because God being just and benevolent\nmust have so ordered the world that Happiness will in the long-run be\ndistributed in proportion to Virtue. It is (_e.g._) by a combination of\nboth these arguments that Paley connects the Universalistic Hedonism\nthat he adopts as a method for determining duties, with the Egoism\nwhich seems to him self-evident as a fundamental principle of rational\nconduct. Or again, a man may connect virtue with happiness by a process\nof _a priori_ reasoning, purely ethical; as Aristotle seems to do by\nthe assumption that the \u2018best\u2019 activity will be always attended by\nthe greatest pleasure as its inseparable concomitant; \u2018best\u2019 being\ndetermined by a reference to moral intuition, or to the common moral\nopinions of men generally, or of well-bred and well-educated men. Or\nthe deduction by which Maximum Pleasure is inferred to be the result of\na particular kind of action may be psychological or physiological: we\nmay have some general theory as to the connexion of pleasure with some\nother physical or psychical fact, according to which we can deduce the\namount of pleasure that will attend any particular kind of behaviour:\nas (_e.g._) it is widely held that a perfectly healthy and harmonious\nexercise of our different bodily and mental functions is the course of\nlife most conducive to pleasure in the long-run. In this latter case,\nthough accepting unreservedly the Hedonistic principle, we shall not be\ncalled upon to estimate and compare particular pleasures, but rather to\ndefine the notions of \u2018perfect health\u2019 and \u2018harmony of functions\u2019 and\nconsider how these ends may be attained. Still those who advocate such\ndeductive methods commonly appeal to ordinary experience, at least as\nsupplying confirmation or verification; and admit that the pleasantness\nand painfulness of pleasures and pains are only directly known to the\nindividual who experiences them. It would seem, therefore, that--at\nany rate--the obvious method of Egoistic Hedonism is that which we may\ncall Empirical-reflective: and it is this I conceive that is commonly\nused in egoistic deliberation. It will be well, therefore, to examine\nthis method in the first instance; to ascertain clearly the assumptions\nwhich it involves, and estimate the exactness of its results.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[96] See chap. iii. \u00a7 2, and chap. v. of this Book.\n\n[97] Butler, Serm. xi.\n\n[98] _Boyle Lectures_ (1705). Prop. i. p. 116.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nEMPIRICAL HEDONISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The first and most fundamental assumption, involved not only in\nthe empirical method of Egoistic Hedonism, but in the very conception\nof \u2018Greatest Happiness\u2019 as an end of action, is the commensurability of\nPleasures and Pains. By this I mean that we must assume the pleasures\nsought and the pains shunned to have determinate quantitative relations\nto each other; for otherwise they cannot be conceived as possible\nelements of a total which we are to seek to make as great as possible.\nIt is not absolutely necessary to exclude the supposition that there\nare some kinds of pleasure so much more pleasant than others, that the\nsmallest conceivable amount of the former would outweigh the greatest\nconceivable amount of the latter; since, if this were ascertained to\nbe the case, the only result would be that any hedonistic calculation\ninvolving pleasures of the former class might be simplified by\ntreating those of the latter class as practically non-existent.[99]\nI think, however, that in all ordinary prudential reasoning, at any\nrate, the assumption is implicitly made that all the pleasures and\npains that man can experience bear a finite ratio to each other in\nrespect of pleasantness and its opposite. So far as this ratio can be\nmade definite the Intensity of a pleasure (or pain) can be balanced\nagainst its Duration:[100] for if we conceive one pleasure (or pain),\nfinite in duration, to be intensively greater than another in some\ndefinite ratio, it seems to be implied in this conception that the\nlatter if continuously increased in extent--without change in its\nintensity--would at a certain point just balance the former in amount.\n\nIf pleasures, then, can be arranged in a scale, as greater or less\nin some finite degree; we are led to the assumption of a hedonistic\nzero, or perfectly neutral feeling, as a point from which the positive\nquantity of pleasures may be measured. And this latter assumption\nemerges still more clearly when we consider the comparison and\nbalancing of pleasures with pains, which Hedonism necessarily involves.\nFor pain must be reckoned as the negative quantity of pleasure, to\nbe balanced against and subtracted from the positive in estimating\nhappiness on the whole; we must therefore conceive, as at least ideally\npossible, a point of transition in consciousness at which we pass\nfrom the positive to the negative. It is not absolutely necessary to\nassume that this strictly indifferent or neutral feeling ever actually\noccurs. Still experience seems to show that a state at any rate very\nnearly approximating to it is even common: and we certainly experience\ncontinual transitions from pleasure to pain and _vice versa_, and thus\n(unless we conceive all such transitions to be abrupt) we must exist at\nleast momentarily in this neutral state.\n\nIn what I have just said, I have by implication denied the paradox\nof Epicurus[101] that the state of painlessness is equivalent to\nthe highest possible pleasure; so that if we can obtain absolute\nfreedom from pain, the goal of Hedonism is reached, after which\nwe may vary, but cannot increase, our pleasure. This doctrine is\nopposed to common sense and common experience. But it would, I think,\nbe equally erroneous, on the other hand, to regard this neutral\nfeeling--hedonistic zero, as I have called it--as the normal condition\nof our consciousness, out of which we occasionally sink into pain, and\noccasionally rise into pleasure. Nature has not been so niggardly to\nman as this: so long as health is retained, and pain and irksome toil\nbanished, the mere performance of the ordinary habitual functions of\nlife is, according to my experience, a frequent source of moderate\npleasures, alternating rapidly with states nearly or quite indifferent.\nThus we may venture to say that the \u2018apathy\u2019 which so large a\nproportion of Greek moralists in the post-Aristotelian period regarded\nas the ideal state of existence, was not really conceived by them as\n\u201cwithout one pleasure and without one pain\u201d; but rather as a state of\nplacid intellectual contemplation, which in philosophic minds might\neasily reach a high degree of pleasure.\n\n\u00a7 2. We have yet to give to the notions of pleasure and pain the\nprecision required for quantitative comparison. In dealing with this\npoint, and in the rest of the hedonistic discussion, it will be\nconvenient for the most part to speak of pleasure only, assuming that\npain may be regarded as the negative quantity of pleasure, and that\naccordingly any statements made with respect to pleasure may be at once\napplied, by obvious changes of phrase, to pain.\n\nThe equivalent phrase for Pleasure, according to Mr. Spencer,[102]\nis \u201ca feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain\nthere\u201d; and similarly, Mr. Bain says that \u201cpleasure and pain, in the\nactual or real experience, are to be held as identical with motive\npower.\u201d But--granting that pleasures normally excite desire--it still\ndoes not seem to me that I judge pleasures to be greater and less\nexactly in proportion as they stimulate the will to actions tending\nto sustain them. Of course neither Mr. Bain nor Mr. Spencer must be\nunderstood to lay down that all pleasures when actually felt actually\nstimulate to exertion of some kind; since this is obviously not true of\nthe pleasures of repose, a warm bath, etc. The stimulus must in such\ncases be understood to be latent and potential; only becoming actual\nwhen action is required to prevent the cessation or diminution of the\npleasure. Thus a man enjoying rest after fatigue is vaguely conscious\nof a strong clinging to his actual condition, and of a latent readiness\nto resist any impulse to change it. Further, the stimulus of moderate\npleasures and pains may become unfelt through habitual repression.\nFor instance, in a habitually temperate man the stimulus to prolong\nthe pleasure of eating or drinking usually ceases before the pleasure\nceases: it is only occasionally that he feels the need of controlling\nan impulse to eat or drink up to the point of satiety. So again, a\nprotracted pain of moderate intensity and free from alarm--such as a\ndull prolonged toothache--seems sometimes to lose its felt stimulus to\naction without losing its character as pain. Here again the stimulus\nmay be properly conceived as latent: since if asked whether we should\nlike to get rid of even a mild toothache, we should certainly answer\nyes.\n\nBut even if we confine our attention to cases where the stimulus is\npalpable and strong, Mr. Bain\u2019s identification of \u201cpleasure and pain\u201d\nwith motive power does not appear to me to accord exactly with our\ncommon empirical judgments. He himself contrasts the \u201cdisproportionate\nstrain of active powers in one direction,\u201d to which \u201cany sudden and\ngreat delight may give rise,\u201d with the \u201cproper frame of mind under\ndelight,\u201d which is \u201cto inspire no endeavours except what the charm\nof the moment justifies.\u201d[103] And he elsewhere explains that \u201cour\npleasurable emotions are all liable to detain the mind unduly,\u201d through\nthe \u201catmosphere of excitement\u201d with which they are surrounded, carrying\nthe mind \u201cbeyond the estimate of pleasure and pain, to the state\nnamed \u2018passion,\u2019\u201d in which a man is not \u201cmoved solely by the strict\nvalue of the pleasure,\u201d but also by \u201cthe engrossing power of the\nexcitement.\u201d[104] It is true that in such cases Mr. Bain seems to hold\nthat these \u201cdisturbances and anomalies of the will _scarcely_ begin\nto tell in the actual feeling,\u201d[105] but it seems to me clear that\nexciting pleasures are liable to exercise, even when actually felt, a\nvolitional stimulus out of proportion to their intensity as pleasures;\nand Mr. Bain himself seems to recognise this in a passage where he\nsays that \u201cacute pleasures and pains stimulate the will perhaps more\nstrongly than an equivalent stimulation of the massive kind.\u201d[106] I\nalso find that some feelings which stimulate strongly to their own\nremoval are either not painful at all or only slightly painful:--_e.g._\nordinarily the sensation of being tickled. If this be so, it is\nobviously inexact to define pleasure, _for purposes of measurement_,\nas the kind of feeling that we seek to retain in consciousness. Shall\nwe then say that there is a measurable quality of feeling expressed by\nthe word \u201cpleasure,\u201d which is independent of its relation to volition,\nand strictly undefinable from its simplicity?--like the quality of\nfeeling expressed by \u201csweet,\u201d of which also we are conscious in varying\ndegrees of intensity. This seems to be the view of some writers: but,\nfor my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleasure,--using the\nterm in the comprehensive sense which I have adopted, to include the\nmost refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications, no\nless than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments,--the only\ncommon quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to\nbe that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term\n\u201cdesirable,\u201d in the sense previously explained. I propose therefore\nto define Pleasure--when we are considering its \u201cstrict value\u201d\nfor purposes of quantitative comparison--as a feeling which, when\nexperienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended\nas desirable or--in cases of comparison--preferable.\n\nHere, however, a new question comes into view. When I stated in the\npreceding chapter, as a fundamental assumption of Hedonism, that it is\nreasonable to prefer pleasures in proportion to their intensity, and\nnot to allow this ground of preference to be outweighed by any merely\nqualitative difference, I implied that the preference of pleasures on\ngrounds of quality as opposed to quantity--as \u2018higher\u2019 or \u2018nobler\u2019--is\nactually possible: and indeed such non-hedonistic preference is\ncommonly thought to be of frequent occurrence. But if we take the\ndefinition of pleasure just given--that it is the kind of feeling\nwhich we apprehend to be desirable or preferable--it seems to be a\ncontradiction in terms to say that the less pleasant feeling can ever\nbe thought preferable to the more pleasant.\n\nThis contradiction may be avoided as follows. It will be generally\nadmitted that the pleasantness of a feeling is only directly cognisable\nby the individual who feels it at the time of feeling it. Thus,\nthough (as I shall presently argue), in so far as any estimate of\npleasantness involves comparison with feelings only represented in\nidea, it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the\nrepresentation--still, no one is in a position to controvert the\npreference of the sentient individual, so far as the quality of the\npresent feeling alone is concerned. When, however, we judge of the\npreferable quality (as \u2018elevation\u2019 or \u2018refinement\u2019) of a state of\nconsciousness as distinct from its pleasantness,[107] we seem to appeal\nto some common standard which others can apply as well as the sentient\nindividual. Hence I should conclude that when one kind of pleasure is\njudged to be qualitatively superior to another, although less pleasant,\nit is not really the feeling itself that is preferred, but something in\nthe mental or physical conditions or relations under which it arises,\nregarded as cognisable objects of our common thought. For certainly\nif I in thought distinguish any feeling from all its conditions and\nconcomitants--and also from all its effects on the subsequent feelings\nof the same individual or of others--and contemplate it merely as the\ntransient feeling of a single subject; it seems to me impossible to\nfind in it any other preferable quality than that which we call its\npleasantness, the degree of which is only cognisable directly by the\nsentient individual.\n\nIt should be observed that if this definition of pleasure be accepted,\nand if, as before proposed, \u2018Ultimate Good\u2019 be taken as equivalent\nto \u2018what is ultimately desirable,\u2019 the fundamental proposition of\nethical Hedonism has chiefly a negative significance; for the statement\nthat \u2018Pleasure is the Ultimate Good\u2019 will only mean that nothing is\nultimately desirable except desirable feeling, apprehended as desirable\nby the sentient individual at the time of feeling it. This being so, it\nmay be urged against the definition that it could not be accepted by\na moralist of stoical turn, who while recognising pleasure as a fact\nrefused to recognise it as in any degree ultimately desirable. But I\nthink such a moralist ought to admit an implied judgment that a feeling\nis _per se_ desirable to be inseparably connected with its recognition\nas pleasure; while holding that sound philosophy shows the illusoriness\nof such judgments. This, in fact, seems to have been substantially the\nview of the Stoic school.\n\nHowever this may be, I conceive that the preference which pure Hedonism\nregards as ultimately rational, should be defined as the preference of\nfeeling valued merely as feeling, according to the estimate implicitly\nor explicitly made by the sentient individual at the time of feeling\nit; without any regard to the conditions and relations under which\nit arises. Accordingly we may state as the fundamental assumption of\nwhat I have called Quantitative Hedonism,--implied in the adoption of\n\u201cgreatest surplus of pleasure over pain\u201d as the ultimate end,--that\nall pleasures and pains, estimated merely as feelings, have for the\nsentient individual cognisable degrees of desirability, positive or\nnegative; observing further, that the empirical method of Hedonism can\nonly be applied so far as we assume that these degrees of desirability\nare definitely given in experience.\n\nThere is one more assumption of a fundamental kind, which is not\nperhaps involved in the acceptance of the Hedonistic calculus\nconsidered as purely theoretical, but is certainly implied if it be\nput forward as a practical method for determining right conduct: the\nassumption, namely, that we can by foresight and calculation increase\nour pleasures and decrease our pains. It may perhaps be thought\npedantic to state it formally: and in fact no one will deny that the\nconditions upon which our pleasures and pains depend are to some\nextent cognisable by us and within our own control. But, as we shall\nsee, it has been maintained that the practice of Hedonistic observation\nand calculation has an inevitable tendency to decrease our pleasures\ngenerally, or the most important of them: so that it becomes a question\nwhether we can gain our greatest happiness by seeking it, or at any\nrate by trying to seek it with scientific exactness.\n\n NOTE.--It is sometimes thought to be a necessary assumption of\n Hedonists that a surplus of pleasure over pain is actually attainable\n by human beings: a proposition which an extreme pessimist would deny.\n But the conclusion that life is always on the whole painful would not\n prove it to be unreasonable for a man to aim ultimately at minimising\n pain, if this is still admitted to be possible; though it would, no\n doubt, render immediate suicide, by some painless process, the only\n reasonable course for a perfect egoist--unless he looked forward to\n another life.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[99] We find it sometimes asserted by persons of enthusiastic and\npassionate temperament, that there are feelings so exquisitely\ndelightful, that one moment of their rapture is preferable to an\neternity of agreeable consciousness of an inferior kind. These\nassertions, however, are perhaps consciously hyperbolical, and not\nintended to be taken as scientific statements: but in the case of\npain, it has been deliberately maintained by a thoughtful and subtle\nwriter, with a view to important practical conclusions, that \u201ctorture\u201d\nso extreme as to be \u201cincommensurable with moderate pain\u201d is an actual\nfact of experience. (See \u201cA Chapter in the Ethics of Pain,\u201d by the late\nEdmund Gurney, in a volume of essays entitled _Tertium Quid_.) This\ndoctrine, however, does not correspond to my own experience; nor does\nit appear to me to be supported by the common sense of mankind:--at\nleast I do not find, in the practical forethought of persons noted for\ncaution, any recognition of the danger of agony such that, in order to\navoid the smallest extra risk of it, the greatest conceivable amount of\nmoderate pain should reasonably be incurred.\n\n[100] Bentham gives four qualities of any pleasure or pain (taken\nsingly) as important for purposes of Hedonistic calculation: (1)\nIntensity, (2) Duration, (3) Certainty, (4) Proximity. If we assume\n(as above argued) that Intensity must be commensurable with Duration,\nthe influence of the other qualities on the comparative value of\npleasures and pains is not difficult to determine: for we are\naccustomed to estimate the value of chances numerically, and by this\nmethod we can tell exactly (in so far as the degree of uncertainty\ncan be exactly determined) how much the doubtfulness of a pleasure\ndetracts from its value: and _proximity_ is a property which it is\nreasonable to disregard except in so far as it diminishes uncertainty.\nFor my feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as my\nfeelings next minute, if only I could make an equally sure forecast of\nthem. Indeed this equal and impartial concern for all parts of one\u2019s\nconscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in the common\nnotion of the _rational_--as opposed to the merely _impulsive_--pursuit\nof pleasure.\n\n[101] Cf. Cic. _de Fin._ Book i. chap. xi. \u00a7 38.\n\n[102] _Principles of Psychology_, Part ii. chap. ix. \u00a7 125.\n\n[103] _The Emotions and the Will_, 3rd Edition, p. 392.\n\n[104] _Mental and Moral Science_, Book iv. chap. iv. \u00a7 4.\n\n[105] _Ibid._ Book iv. chap. v. \u00a7 4.\n\n[106] _Ibid._ Book iii. chap. i. \u00a7 8.\n\n[107] It was before observed that by saying that one pleasure is\nsuperior in _quality_ to another we may mean that it is preferable\nwhen considered merely as pleasant: in which case difference in kind\nresolves itself into difference in degree.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nEMPIRICAL HEDONISM--_Continued_\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Let, then, pleasure be defined as feeling which the sentient\nindividual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly\napprehends to be desirable;--desirable, that is, when considered\nmerely as feeling, and not in respect of its objective conditions or\nconsequences, or of any facts that come directly within the cognisance\nand judgment of others besides the sentient individual. And let it be\nprovisionally assumed that feelings generally can be compared from this\npoint of view, with sufficient definiteness for practical purposes,\nand empirically known to be more or less pleasant in some definite\ndegree. Then the empirical-reflective method of Egoistic Hedonism will\nbe, to represent beforehand the different series of feelings that\nour knowledge of physical and psychical causes leads us to expect\nfrom the different lines of conduct that lie open to us; judge which\nseries, as thus represented, appears on the whole preferable, taking\nall probabilities into account; and adopt the corresponding line of\nconduct. It may be objected that the calculation is too complex for\npractice; since any complete forecast of the future would involve a\nvast number of contingencies of varying degrees of probability, and\nto calculate the Hedonistic value of each of these chances of feeling\nwould be interminable. Still we may perhaps reduce the calculation\nwithin manageable limits, without serious loss of accuracy, by\ndiscarding all manifestly imprudent conduct, and neglecting the less\nprobable and less important contingencies; as we do in some of the\narts that have more definite ends, such as strategy and medicine. For\nif the general in ordering a march, or the physician in recommending\na change of abode, took into consideration all the circumstances that\nwere at all relevant to the end sought, their calculations would\nbecome impracticable; accordingly they confine themselves to the most\nimportant; and we may deal similarly with the Hedonistic art of life.\n\nThere are, however, objections urged against the Hedonistic method\nwhich go much deeper; and by some writers are pressed to the extreme\nof rejecting the method altogether. A careful examination of these\nobjections seems to be the most convenient way of obtaining a clear\nview, both of the method itself and of the results that may reasonably\nbe expected from it.\n\nI should, however, point out that we are now only concerned with what\nmay be called _intrinsic_ objections to Egoistic Hedonism; arguments,\nthat is, against the possibility of obtaining by it the results at\nwhich it aims. We are not now to consider whether it is reasonable for\nan individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end; or how far\nthe rules of action deduced from the adoption of this end, and from the\nactual conditions of the individual\u2019s existence, will coincide with\ncurrent opinions as to what is right. These questions, according to the\nplan of my work, are postponed for future consideration:[108] our sole\nconcern at present is with objections tending to show the intrinsic\nimpracticability of Hedonism as a rational method.\n\nWe are met, in the first place, by an objection which, if valid at\nall, must be admitted to be decisive. It has been affirmed[109] by\nGreen that \u201cpleasure as feeling, in distinction from its conditions\nthat are not feelings, cannot be conceived.\u201d If so, Rational Hedonism\nwould certainly be impossible: but the proposition seems equally\nopposed to common sense, and to the universal assumption of empirical\npsychologists; who, in investigating elaborately and systematically\nthe conditions, mental and physical, of pleasure and pain, necessarily\nassume that these feelings can be distinguished in thought from their\n\u201cconditions which are not feelings.\u201d I also find that the writer\nhimself from whom I have quoted, in a later treatise,[110] conducts\nlong arguments respecting pleasure which are only intelligible if the\ndistinction between pleasure and its conditions is thoroughly grasped\nand steadily contemplated. Indeed he carries a distinction of this\nkind to an extreme point of subtlety; as he requires us to distinguish\nthe \u201cself-satisfaction sought in all desire that amounts to will\u201d from\nthe \u201cpleasure\u201d that \u201cthere is in all self-satisfaction if attained\u201d:\nwhereas other moralists regard self-satisfaction as a species of\npleasure.[111] To maintain that we can distinguish pleasure from\nself-satisfaction, and cannot distinguish it from its conditions, seems\nto me too violent a paradox to need refutation. It is possible that\nGreen may only mean that pleasure cannot be thought to exist apart from\nconditions which are not feelings, and that it necessarily varies with\nany variation in its conditions. The statement thus interpreted I do\nnot deny: but it is quite irrelevant to the question whether pleasure\ncan be _estimated_ separately from its conditions, or whether pleasures\nreceived under different conditions can be quantitatively compared.\nI cannot have the pleasure of witnessing a tragedy or the pleasure\nof witnessing a farce, without having along with either a complex of\ninnumerable thoughts and images, very diverse in quality in the two\ncases: but this does not prevent me from deciding confidently whether\nthe tragedy or the farce will afford me most pleasure on the whole.\n\nI pass to another objection made by the same writer to the Hedonistic\nconception of the supreme end of action as \u201cthe greatest possible\nsum of pleasures.\u201d (It should be \u201cthe greatest possible surplus of\npleasure over pain\u201d: but the difference is unimportant for the present\nargument.) The phrase, he says, is \u201cintrinsically unmeaning\u201d: but his\njustification for this statement appears to be different in different\ntreatises. At first he boldly affirmed that \u201cpleasant feelings are not\nquantities that can be added,\u201d[112] apparently because \u201ceach is over\nbefore the other begins.\u201d The latter statement, however, is equally\ntrue of the parts of time: but it would be obviously absurd to say that\nhours, days, years are \u201cnot quantities that can be added.\u201d Possibly\nthis consideration occurred to Green before writing the _Prolegomena\nto Ethics_: at any rate in the latter treatise he admits that states\n\u201cof pleasant feeling\u201d can be added together in \u201cthought,\u201d only denying\nthat they can be added \u201cin enjoyment or imagination of enjoyment.\u201d[113]\nBut this concedes all that is required for the Hedonistic valuation\nof future feelings; no Hedonist ever supposed that the happiness he\naims at making as great as possible was something to be enjoyed all\nat once, or ever wanted to imagine it as so enjoyed. And unless the\ntransiency of pleasure diminishes its pleasantness--a point which I\nwill presently consider--I cannot see that the possibility of realising\nthe Hedonistic end is at all affected by the necessity of realising\nit in successive parts. Green, in another passage,[114] appears to\nlay down that \u201can end\u201d which is \u201cto serve the purpose of a criterion\u201d\nmust \u201cenable us to distinguish actions that bring men nearer to it\nfrom those which do not.\u201d This, however, would only be the case if by\nan \u201cend\u201d is necessarily meant a goal or consummation, which, after\ngradually drawing nearer to it, we reach all at once: but this is not,\nI conceive, the sense in which the word is ordinarily understood by\nethical writers: and certainly all that I mean by it is an object of\nrational aim--whether attained in successive parts or not--which is\nnot sought as a means to the attainment of any ulterior object, but\nfor itself. And so long as any one\u2019s prospective balance of pleasure\nover pain admits of being made greater or less by immediate action in\none way or another,[115] there seems no reason why \u2018Maximum Happiness\u2019\nshould not provide as serviceable a criterion of conduct as any\n\u2018chief good\u2019 capable of being possessed all at once, or in some way\nindependent of the condition of time.\n\n\u00a7 2. If, however, it be maintained, that the consciousness of the\ntransiency of pleasure either makes it less pleasant at the time or\ncauses a subsequent pain, and that the deliberate and systematic\npursuit of pleasure tends to intensify this consciousness; the\nproposition, if borne out by experience, would certainly constitute\na relevant objection to the method of Egoistic Hedonism. And this\nview would seem to be in the mind of the writer above quoted (though\nit is nowhere clearly put forward): since he affirms that it is\n\u201cimpossible that self-satisfaction should be found in any succession\nof pleasures\u201d;[116] as self-satisfaction being \u201csatisfaction for a\nself that abides and contemplates itself as abiding\u201d must be at least\nrelatively permanent:[117] and it is, I suppose, implied that the\ndisappointment of the Hedonist, who fails to find self-satisfaction\nwhere he seeks for it, is attended with pain or loss of pleasure.[118]\nIf this be so, and if the self-satisfaction thus missed can be obtained\nby the resolute adoption of some other principle of action, it would\ncertainly seem that the systematic pursuit of pleasure is in some\ndanger of defeating itself: it is therefore important to consider\ncarefully how far this is really the case.\n\nSo far as my own experience goes, it does not appear to me that the\nmere transiency of pleasures is a serious source of discontent, so\nlong as one has a fair prospect of having as valuable pleasures in\nthe future as in the past--or even so long as the life before one has\nany substantial amount of pleasure to offer. But I do not doubt that\nan important element of happiness, for all or most men, is derived\nfrom the consciousness of possessing \u201crelatively permanent\u201d sources\nof pleasure--whether external, as wealth, social position, family,\nfriends; or internal, as knowledge, culture, strong and lively interest\nin the wellbeing of fairly prosperous persons or institutions. This,\nhowever, does not, in my opinion, constitute an objection to Hedonism:\nit rather seems obvious, from the hedonistic point of view, that \u201cas\nsoon as intelligence discovers that there are fixed objects, permanent\nsources of pleasure, and large groups of enduring interests, which\nyield a variety of recurring enjoyments, the rational will, preferring\nthe greater to the less, will unfailingly devote its energies to the\npursuit of these.\u201d[119] It may be replied that if these permanent\nsources of pleasure are consciously sought merely as a means to the\nhedonistic end, they will not afford the happiness for which they\nare sought. With this I to some extent agree; but I think that if\nthe normal complexity of our impulses be duly taken into account,\nthis statement will be found not to militate against the adoption of\nHedonism, but merely to signalise a danger against which the Hedonist\nhas to guard. In a previous chapter[120] I have, after Butler, laid\nstress on the difference between impulses that are, strictly speaking,\ndirected towards pleasure, and \u2018extra-regarding\u2019 impulses which do not\naim at pleasure,--though much, perhaps most, of our pleasure consists\nin the gratification of these latter, and therefore depends upon\ntheir existence. I there argued that in many cases the two kinds of\nimpulse are so far incompatible that they do not easily coexist in the\nsame moment of consciousness. I added, however, that in the ordinary\ncondition of our activity the incompatibility is only momentary, and\ndoes not prevent a real harmony from being attained by a sort of\nalternating rhythm of the two impulses in consciousness. Still it\nseems undeniable that this harmony is liable to be disturbed; and that\nwhile on the one hand individuals may and do sacrifice their greatest\napparent happiness to the gratification of some imperious particular\ndesire, so, on the other hand, self-love is liable to engross the mind\nto a degree incompatible with a healthy and vigorous outflow of those\n\u2018disinterested\u2019 impulses towards particular objects, the pre-existence\nof which is necessary to the attainment, in any high degree, of the\nhappiness at which self-love aims. I should not, however, infer from\nthis that the pursuit of pleasure is necessarily self-defeating\nand futile; but merely that the principle of Egoistic Hedonism,\nwhen applied with a due knowledge of the laws of human nature, is\npractically self-limiting; _i.e._ that a rational method of attaining\nthe end at which it aims requires that we should to some extent put\nit out of sight and not directly aim at it. I have before spoken of\nthis conclusion as the \u2018Fundamental Paradox of Egoistic Hedonism\u2019;\nbut though it presents itself as a paradox, there does not seem to\nbe any difficulty in its practical realisation, when once the danger\nindicated is clearly seen. For it is an experience only too common\namong men, in whatever pursuit they may be engaged, that they let the\noriginal object and goal of their efforts pass out of view, and come\nto regard the means to this end as ends in themselves: so that they\nat last even sacrifice the original end to the attainment of what is\nonly secondarily and derivatively desirable. And if it be thus easy and\ncommon to forget the end in the means overmuch, there seems no reason\nwhy it should be difficult to do it to the extent that Rational Egoism\nprescribes: and, in fact, it seems to be continually done by ordinary\npersons in the case of amusements and pastimes of all kinds.\n\nIt is true that, as our desires cannot ordinarily be produced by an\neffort of will--though they can to some extent be repressed by it--if\nwe started with no impulse except the desire of pleasure, it might\nseem difficult to execute the practical paradox of attaining pleasure\nby aiming at something else. Yet even in this hypothetical case the\ndifficulty is less than it appears. For the reaction of our activities\nupon our emotional nature is such that we may commonly bring ourselves\nto take an interest in any end by concentrating our efforts upon its\nattainment. So that, even supposing a man to begin with absolute\nindifference to everything except his own pleasure, it does not follow\nthat if he were convinced that the possession of other desires and\nimpulses were necessary to the attainment of the greatest possible\npleasure, he could not succeed in producing these. But this supposition\nis never actually realised. Every man, when he commences the task of\nsystematising his conduct, whether on egoistic principles or any other,\nis conscious of a number of different impulses and tendencies within\nhim, other than the mere desire for pleasure, which urge his will in\nparticular directions, to the attainment of particular results: so that\nhe has only to place himself under certain external influences, and\nthese desires and impulses will begin to operate without any effort of\nwill.\n\nIt is sometimes thought, however, that there is an important class of\nrefined and elevated impulses with which the supremacy of self-love is\nin a peculiar way incompatible, such as the love of virtue, or personal\naffection, or the religious impulse to love and obey God. But at any\nrate in the common view of these impulses, this difficulty does not\nseem to be recognised. None of the school of moralists that followed\nShaftesbury in contending that it is a man\u2019s true interest to foster\nin himself strictly disinterested social affections, has noted any\ninherent incompatibility between the existence of these affections and\nthe supremacy of rational self-love. And similarly Christian preachers\nwho have commended the religious life as really the happiest, have not\nthought genuine religion irreconcilable with the conviction that each\nman\u2019s own happiness is his most near and intimate concern.\n\nOther persons, however, seem to carry the religious consciousness\nand the feeling of human affection to a higher stage of refinement,\nat which a stricter disinterestedness is exacted. They maintain\nthat the essence of either feeling, in its best form, is absolute\nself-renunciation and self-sacrifice. And certainly these seem\nincompatible with self-love, however cautiously self-limiting. A man\ncannot both wish to secure his own happiness and be willing to lose it.\nAnd yet how if willingness to lose it is the true means of securing\nit? Can self-love not merely reduce indirectly its prominence in\nconsciousness, but directly and unreservedly annihilate itself?\n\nThis emotional feat does not seem to me possible: and therefore I\nmust admit that a man who embraces the principle of Rational Egoism\ncuts himself off from the special pleasure that attends this absolute\nsacrifice and abnegation of self. But however exquisite this may be,\nthe pitch of emotional exaltation and refinement necessary to attain it\nis comparatively so rare, that it is scarcely included in men\u2019s common\nestimate of happiness. I do not therefore think that an important\nobjection to Rational Egoism can be based upon its incompatibility\nwith this particular consciousness: nor that the common experience\nof mankind really sustains the view that the desire of one\u2019s own\nhappiness, if accepted as supreme and regulative, inevitably defeats\nits own aim through the consequent diminution and desiccation of the\nimpulses and emotional capacities necessary to the attainment of\nhappiness in a high degree; though it certainly shows a serious and\nsubtle danger in this direction.\n\n\u00a7 3. There is, however, another way in which the habit of mind\nnecessarily resulting from the continual practice of hedonistic\ncomparison is sometimes thought to be unfavourable to the attainment\nof the hedonistic end: from a supposed incompatibility between the\nhabit of reflectively observing and examining pleasure, and the\ncapacity for experiencing pleasure in normal fulness and intensity.\nAnd it certainly seems important to consider what effect the continual\nattention to our pleasures, in order to observe their different\ndegrees, is likely to have on these feelings themselves. The inquiry\nat first sight seems to lead to irreconcilable contradiction in our\nview of pleasure. For if pleasure only exists as it is felt, the more\nconscious we are of it, the more pleasure we have: and it would seem\nthat the more our attention is directed towards it, the more fully we\nshall be conscious of it. On the other hand Hamilton\u2019s statement that\n\u201cknowledge and feeling\u201d (cognition and pleasure or pain) are always\n\u201cin a certain inverse proportion to each other,\u201d corresponds _prima\nfacie_ to our common experience: for the purely cognitive element of\nconsciousness seems to be neither pleasurable nor painful, so that the\nmore our consciousness is occupied with cognition, the less room there\nseems to be for feeling.\n\nThis view, however, rests on the assumption that the total intensity\nof our consciousness is a constant quantity; so that when one element\nof it positively increases, the rest must positively--as well as\nrelatively--diminish. And it does not appear to me that experience\ngives us any valid ground for making this general assumption: it rather\nseems that at certain times in our life intellect and feeling are\nsimultaneously feeble; so that the same mental excitement may intensify\nboth simultaneously.\n\nStill it seems to be a fact that any very powerful feeling, reaching to\nthe full intensity of which our consciousness is normally capable, is\ncommonly diminished by a contemporaneous stroke of cognitive effort:\nhence it is a general difficulty in the way of exact observation of\nour emotions that the object cognised seems to shrink and dwindle in\nproportion as the cognitive regard grows keen and eager. How then\nare we to reconcile this with the proposition first laid down, that\npleasure only exists as we are conscious of it? The answer seems to\nbe that the mere consciousness of a present feeling--apart from any\ndistinct representative elements--cannot diminish the feeling of which\nit is an indispensable and inseparable condition: but in introspective\ncognition we go beyond the present feeling, comparing and classifying\nit with remembered or imagined feelings; and the effort of representing\nand comparing these other feelings tends to decrease the mere\npresentative consciousness of the actual pleasure.\n\nI conclude, then, that there is a real danger of diminishing pleasure\nby the attempt to observe and estimate it. But the danger seems only to\narise in the case of very intense pleasures, and only if the attempt is\nmade at the moment of actual enjoyment; and since the most delightful\nperiods of life have frequently recurring intervals of nearly neutral\nfeeling, in which the pleasures immediately past may be compared and\nestimated without any such detriment, I do not regard the objection\nfounded on this danger as particularly important.\n\n\u00a7 4. More serious, in my opinion, are the objections urged against the\npossibility of performing, with definite and trustworthy results, the\ncomprehensive and methodical comparison of pleasures and pains which\nthe adoption of the Hedonistic standard involves. I cannot indeed\ndoubt that men habitually compare pleasures and pains in respect\nof their intensity: that (_e.g._) when we pass from one state of\nconsciousness to another, or when in any way we are led to recall a\nstate long past, we often unhesitatingly declare the present state\nto be more or less pleasant than the past: or that we declare some\npleasant experiences to have been \u2018worth,\u2019 and others \u2018not worth,\u2019 the\ntrouble it took to obtain them, or the pain that followed them. But,\ngranting this, it may still be maintained (1) that this comparison as\nordinarily made is both occasional and very rough, and that it can\nnever be extended as systematic Hedonism requires, nor applied, with\nany accuracy, to all possible states however differing in quality; and\n(2) that as commonly practised it is liable to illusion, of which we\ncan never measure the precise amount, while we are continually forced\nto recognise its existence. This illusion was even urged by Plato as\na ground for distrusting the apparent affirmation of consciousness\nin respect of _present_ pleasure. Plato thought that the apparent\nintensity of the coarser bodily pleasures was illusory; because these\nstates of consciousness, being preceded by pain, were really only\nstates of relief from pain, and so properly neutral, neither pleasant\nnor painful--examples of what I have called the hedonistic zero--only\nappearing pleasant from contrast with the preceding pain.\n\nTo this, however, it has been answered, that in estimating pleasure\nthere is no conceivable appeal from the immediate decision of\nconsciousness: that here the Phenomenal is the Real--there is no other\nreal that we can distinguish from it. And this seems to me true, in so\nfar as we are concerned only with the present state. But then--apart\nfrom the difficulty just noticed of observing a pleasure while it is\nfelt without thereby diminishing it--it is obvious that in any estimate\nof its intensity we are necessarily comparing it with some other state.\nAnd this latter must generally be a representation, not an actual\nfeeling: for though we can sometimes experience two or perhaps more\npleasures at once, we are rarely in such cases able to compare them\nsatisfactorily: for either the causes of the two mutually interfere, so\nthat neither reaches its normal degree of intensity; or, more often,\nthe two blend into one state of pleasant consciousness the elements of\nwhich we cannot estimate separately. But if it is therefore inevitable\nthat one term at least in our comparison should be an imagined\npleasure, we see that there is a possibility of error in any such\ncomparison; for the imagined feeling may not adequately represent the\npleasantness of the corresponding actual feeling. And in the egoistic\ncomparison, the validity of which we are now discussing, the objects\nprimarily to be compared are all represented elements of consciousness:\nfor we are desiring to choose between two or more possible courses of\nconduct, and therefore to forecast future feelings.\n\nLet us then examine more closely the manner in which this comparison is\nordinarily performed, that we may see what positive grounds we have for\nmistrusting it.\n\nIn estimating for practical purposes the value of different pleasures\nopen to us, we commonly trust most to our prospective imagination:\nwe project ourselves into the future, and imagine what such and\nsuch a pleasure will amount to under hypothetical conditions. This\nimagination, so far as it involves conscious inference, seems to be\nchiefly determined by our own experience of past pleasures, which are\nusually recalled generically, or in large aggregates, though sometimes\nparticular instances of important single pleasures occur to us as\ndefinitely remembered: but partly, too, we are influenced by the\nexperience of others sympathetically appropriated: and here again we\nsometimes definitely refer to particular experiences which have been\ncommunicated to us by individuals, and sometimes to the traditional\ngeneralisations which are thought to represent the common experience of\nmankind.\n\nNow it does not seem that such a process as this is likely to be free\nfrom error: and, indeed, no one pretends that it is. In fact there is\nscarcely any point upon which moralisers have dwelt with more emphasis\nthan this, that man\u2019s forecast of pleasure is continually erroneous.\nEach of us frequently recognises his own mistakes: and each still more\noften attributes to others errors unseen by themselves, arising either\nfrom misinterpretation of their own experience, or from ignorance or\nneglect of that of others.\n\nHow then are these errors to be eliminated? The obvious answer is that\nwe must substitute for the instinctive, largely implicit, inference\njust described a more scientific process of reasoning: by deducing\nthe probable degree of our future pleasure or pain in any given\ncircumstances from inductive generalisations based on a sufficient\nnumber of careful observations of our own and others\u2019 experience. We\nhave then to ask, first, how far can each of us estimate accurately his\nown past experience of pleasures and pains? secondly, how far can this\nknowledge of the past enable him to forecast, with any certainty, the\ngreatest happiness within his reach in the future? thirdly, how far can\nhe appropriate, for the purposes of such forecasts, the past experience\nof others?\n\nAs regards the first of these questions, it must be remembered that\nit is not sufficient to know generally that we derive pleasures and\npains from such and such sources; we require to know approximately\nthe positive or negative degree of each feeling; unless we can form\nsome quantitative estimate of them, it is futile to try to attain our\n_greatest possible_ happiness--at least by an empirical method. We\nhave therefore to compare quantitatively each pleasure as it occurs,\nor as recalled in imagination, with other imagined pleasures: and the\nquestion is, how far such comparisons can be regarded as trustworthy.\n\nNow for my own part, when I reflect on my pleasures and pains, and\nendeavour to compare them in respect of intensity, it is only to\na very limited extent that I can obtain clear and definite results\nfrom such comparisons, even taking each separately in its simplest\nform:--whether the comparison is made at the moment of experiencing\none of the pleasures, or between two states of consciousness recalled\nin imagination. This is true even when I compare feelings of the same\nkind: and the vagueness and uncertainty increases, in proportion as\nthe feelings differ in kind. Let us begin with sensual gratifications,\nwhich are thought to be especially definite and palpable. Suppose I\nam enjoying a good dinner: if I ask myself whether one kind of dish\nor wine gives me more pleasure than another, sometimes I can decide,\nbut very often not. So if I reflect upon two modes of bodily exercise\nthat I may have taken: if one has been in a marked degree agreeable or\ntedious, I take note of it naturally; but it is not natural to me to go\nfurther than this in judging of their pleasurableness or painfulness,\nand the attempt to do so does not seem to lead to any clear\naffirmation. And similarly of intellectual exercises and states of\nconsciousness predominantly emotional: even when the causes and quality\nof the feelings compared are similar, it is only when the differences\nin pleasantness are great, that hedonistic comparison seems to yield\nany definite result. But when I try to arrange in a scale pleasures\ndiffering in kind; to compare (_e.g._) labour with rest, excitement\nwith tranquillity, intellectual exercise with emotional effusion, the\npleasure of scientific apprehension with that of beneficent action, the\ndelight of social expansion with the delight of \u00e6sthetic reception; my\njudgment wavers and fluctuates far more, and in the majority of cases\nI cannot give any confident decision. And if this is the case with\nwhat Bentham calls \u2018pure\u2019--_i.e._ painless--pleasures, it is still\nmore true of those even commoner states of consciousness, where a\ncertain amount of pain or discomfort is mixed with pleasure, although\nthe latter preponderates. If it is hard to say which of two different\nstates of contentment was the greater pleasure, it seems still harder\nto compare a state of placid satisfaction with one of eager but hopeful\nsuspense, or with triumphant conquest of painful obstacles. And perhaps\nit is still more difficult to compare pure pleasures with pure pains,\nand to say how much of the one kind of feeling we consider to be\nexactly balanced by a given amount of the other when they do not occur\nsimultaneously: while an estimate of simultaneous feelings is, as we\nhave seen, generally unsatisfactory from the mutual interference of\ntheir respective causes.\n\n\u00a7 5. But again, if these judgments are not clear and definite, still\nless are they consistent. I do not now mean that one man\u2019s estimate\nof the value of any kind of pleasures differs from another\u2019s: for we\nhave assumed each sentient individual to be the final judge of the\npleasantness and painfulness of his own feelings, and therefore this\nkind of discrepancy does not affect the validity of the judgments,\nand creates no difficulty until any one tries to appropriate the\nexperience of others. But I mean that each individual\u2019s judgment of\nthe comparative value of his own pleasures is apt to be different at\ndifferent times, though it relates to the same past experiences; and\nthat this variation is a legitimate ground for distrusting the validity\nof any particular comparison.\n\nThe causes of this variation seem to be partly due to the nature of\nthe represented feeling, and partly to the general state of the mind\nat the time of making the representation. To begin with the former: we\nfind that different kinds of past pleasures and pains do not equally\nadmit of being revived in imagination. Thus, generally speaking, our\nmore emotional and more representative pains are more easily revived\nthan the more sensational and presentative: for example, it is at this\nmoment much more easy for me to imagine the discomfort of expectancy\nwhich preceded a past sea-sickness than the pain of the actual nausea:\nalthough I infer--from the recollection of judgments passed at the\ntime--that the former pain was trifling compared with the latter. To\nthis cause it seems due that past hardships, toils, and anxieties often\nappear pleasurable when we look back upon them, after some interval;\nfor the excitement, the heightened sense of life that accompanied the\npainful struggle, would have been pleasurable if taken by itself; and\nit is this that we recall rather than the pain. In estimating pleasures\nthe other cause of variation is more conspicuous; we are conscious of\nchanges occasional or periodic in our estimate of them, depending upon\nchanges in our mental or bodily condition. _E.g._ it is a matter of\ncommon remark with respect to the gratifications of appetite that we\ncannot estimate them adequately in the state of satiety, and that we\nare apt to exaggerate them in the state of desire. (I do not deny that\nintensity of antecedent desire intensifies the pleasure of fruition; so\nthat this pleasure not only _appears_, as Plato thought, but actually\nis greater owing to the strength of the desire that has preceded. Still\nit is a matter of common experience that pleasures which have been\nintensely desired are often found to disappoint expectation.)\n\nThere seem to be no special states of aversion, determined by bodily\ncauses, and related to certain pains as our appetites to their\ncorrespondent pleasures; but most persons are liable to be thrown by\nthe prospect of certain pains into the state of passionate aversion\nwhich we call fear, and to be thereby led to estimate such pains as\nworse than they would be judged to be in a calmer mood.\n\nFurther, when feeling any kind of pain or uneasiness we seem liable\nto underrate pain of a very dissimilar kind: thus in danger we value\nrepose, overlooking its _ennui_, while the tedium of security makes\nus imagine the mingled excitement of past danger as almost purely\npleasurable. And again when we are absorbed in any particular pleasant\nactivity, the pleasures attending dissimilar activities are apt to be\ncontemned: they appear coarse or thin, as the case may be: and this\nconstitutes a fundamental objection to noting the exact degree of\na pleasure at the time of experiencing it. The eager desire, which\noften seems an indispensable element of the whole state of pleasurable\nactivity, generally involves a similar bias: indeed any strong\nexcitement, in which our thought is concentrated on a single result or\ngroup of results--whether it be the excitement of aversion, fear, hope,\nor suspense--tends to make us inappreciative of alien pleasures and\npains alike. And, speaking more generally, we cannot imagine as very\nintense a pleasure of a kind that at the time of imagining it we are\nincapable of experiencing: as (_e.g._) the pleasures of intellectual\nor bodily exercise at the close of a wearying day; or any emotional\npleasure when our susceptibility to the special emotion is temporarily\nexhausted. On the other hand, it is not easy to guard against error, as\nphilosophers have often thought, by making our estimate in a cool and\npassionless state. For there are many pleasures which require precedent\ndesire, and even enthusiasm and highly wrought excitement, in order to\nbe experienced in their full intensity; and it is not likely that we\nshould appreciate these adequately in a state of perfect tranquillity.\n\n\u00a7 6. These considerations make clearer the extent of the assumptions\nof Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, stated in the preceding chapter:\nviz. (1) that our pleasures and pains have each a definite degree, and\n(2) that this degree is empirically cognisable. Firstly, if pleasure\nonly exists as it is felt, the belief that every pleasure and pain\nhas a definite intensive quantity or degree must remain an _a priori_\nassumption, incapable of positive empirical verification. For the\npleasure can only have the degree as compared with other feelings, of\nthe same or some different kind; but, generally speaking, since this\ncomparison can only be made in imagination, it can only yield the\nhypothetical result that if certain feelings could be felt together,\nprecisely as they have been felt separately, one would be found more\ndesirable than the other in some definite ratio. If, then, we are asked\nwhat ground we have for regarding this imaginary result as a valid\nrepresentation of reality, we cannot say more than that the belief\nin its general validity is irresistibly suggested in reflection on\nexperience, and remains at any rate uncontradicted by experience.\n\nBut secondly, granting that each of our pleasures and pains has\nreally a definite degree of pleasantness or painfulness, the question\nstill remains whether we have any means of accurately measuring\nthese degrees. Is there any reason to suppose that the mind is ever\nin such a state as to be a perfectly neutral and colourless medium\nfor imagining all kinds of pleasures? Experience certainly shows us\nthe frequent occurrence of moods in which we have an apparent bias\nfor or against a particular kind of feeling. Is it not probable that\nthere is always some bias of this kind? that we are always more in\ntune for some pleasures, more sensitive to some pains, than we are to\nothers? It must, I think, be admitted that the exact cognition of the\nplace of each kind of feeling in a scale of desirability, measured\npositively and negatively from a zero of perfect indifference, is at\nbest an ideal to which we can never tell how closely we approximate.\nStill in the variations of our judgment and the disappointment of our\nexpectations we have experience of errors of which we can trace the\ncauses and allow for them, at least roughly; correcting in thought\nthe defects of imagination. And since what we require for practical\nguidance is to estimate not individual past experiences, but the value\nof a kind of pleasure or pain, as obtained under certain circumstances\nor conditions; we can to some extent diminish the chance of error\nin this estimate by making a number of observations and imaginative\ncomparisons, at different times and in different moods. In so far\nas these agree we may legitimately feel an increased confidence in\nthe result: and in so far as they differ, we can at least reduce our\npossible error by striking an average of the different estimates. It\nwill be evident, however, that such a method as this cannot be expected\nto yield more than a rough approximation to the supposed truth.\n\n\u00a7 7. We must conclude then that our estimate of the hedonistic value\nof any past pleasure or pain, is liable to an amount of error which\nwe cannot calculate exactly; because the represented pleasantness of\ndifferent feelings fluctuates and varies indefinitely with changes in\nthe actual condition of the representing mind. We have now to observe\nthat, for similar reasons, even supposing we could adequately allow\nfor, and so exclude, this source of error in our comparison of past\npleasures, it is liable to intrude again in arguing from the past to\nthe future. For our capacity for particular pleasures may be about\nto change, or may have actually changed since the experiences that\nform the data of our calculation. We may have reached the point of\nsatiety in respect of some of our past pleasures, or otherwise lost our\nsusceptibility to them, owing to latent changes in our constitution: or\nwe may have increased our susceptibility to pains inevitably connected\nwith them: or altered conditions of life may have generated in us new\ndesires and aversions, and given relative importance to new sources of\nhappiness. Or any or all of these changes may be expected to occur,\nbefore the completion of the course of conduct upon which we are now\ndeciding. The most careful estimate of a girl\u2019s pleasures (supposing\na girl gifted with the abnormal habit of reflection that would be\nnecessary) would not much profit a young woman: and the hedonistic\ncalculations of youth require modification as we advance in years.\n\nIt may be said, however, that no one, in making such a forecast, can\nor does rely entirely on his own experience: when endeavouring to\nestimate the probable effect upon his happiness of new circumstances\nand influences, untried rules of conduct and fashions of life, he\nalways argues partly from the experience of others. This is, I\nthink, generally true: but by including inferences from other men\u2019s\nexperience we inevitably introduce a new possibility of error; for\nsuch inference proceeds on the assumption of a similarity of nature\namong human beings, which is never exactly true, while we can never\nexactly know how much it falls short of the truth; though we have\nsufficient evidence of the striking differences between the feelings\nproduced in different men by similar causes, to convince us that the\nassumption would in many cases be wholly misleading. On this ground\nPlato\u2019s reason for claiming that the life of the Philosopher has more\npleasure than that of the Sensualist is palpably inadequate. The\nphilosopher, he argues, has tried both kinds of pleasure, sensual as\nwell as intellectual, and prefers the delights of philosophic life;\nthe sensualist ought therefore to trust his decision and follow his\nexample. But who can tell that the philosopher\u2019s constitution is\nnot such as to render the enjoyments of the senses, in his case,\ncomparatively feeble? while on the other hand the sensualist\u2019s mind\nmay not be able to attain more than a thin shadow of the philosopher\u2019s\ndelight. And so, generally speaking, if we are to be guided by\nanother\u2019s experience, we require to be convinced not only that he\nis generally accurate in observing, analysing, and comparing his\nsensations, but also that his relative susceptibility to the different\nkinds of pleasure and pain in question coincides with our own. If he\nis unpractised in introspective observation, it is possible that he\nmay mistake even the external conditions of his own happiness; and so\nthe communication of his experience may be altogether misleading. But\nhowever accurately he has analysed and determined the causes of his\nfeelings, that similar causes would produce similar effects in us must\nalways be uncertain. And the uncertainty is increased indefinitely if\nour adviser has to recall in memory out of a distant past some of the\npleasures or pains to be compared. Thus in the ever-renewed controversy\nbetween Age and Youth, wisdom is not after all so clearly on the side\nof maturer counsels as it seems to be at first sight. When a youth is\nwarned by his senior to abstain from some pleasure, on the ground of\nprudence, because it is not worth the possible pleasures that must\nbe sacrificed for it and the future pains that it will entail; it is\ndifficult for him to know how far the elder man can recall--even if he\ncould once feel--the full rapture of the delight that he is asking the\nyounger to renounce.\n\nAnd further, this source of error besets us in a more extended and\nmore subtle manner than has yet been noticed. For our sympathetic\napprehension of alien experiences of pleasure and pain has been so\ncontinually exercised, in so many ways, during the whole of our life,\nboth by actual observation and oral communication with other human\nbeings, and through books and other modes of symbolic suggestion; that\nit is impossible to say how far it has unconsciously blended with our\nown experience, so as to colour and modify it when represented in\nmemory. Thus we may easily overlook the discrepancy between our own\nexperience and that of others, in respect of the importance of certain\nsources of pleasure and pain, if no sudden and striking disappointment\nof expectations forces it on our notice. Only with considerable care\nand attention can sympathetic persons separate their own real likes and\ndislikes from those of their associates: and we can never tell whether\nthis separation has been completely effected.\n\nBut again: the practical inference from the past to the future is\nfurther complicated by the fact that we can alter ourselves. For it\nmay be that our past experience has been greatly affected by our being\nnot properly attuned to certain pleasures, as (_e.g._) those of art,\nor study, or muscular exercise, or society, or beneficent action;\nor not duly hardened against certain sources of pain, such as toil,\nor anxiety, or abstinence from luxuries: and there may be within\nour power some process of training or hardening ourselves which may\nprofoundly modify our susceptibilities. And this consideration is\nespecially important,--and at the same time especially difficult to\ndeal with,--when we attempt to appropriate the experience of another.\nFor we may find that he estimates highly pleasures which we not only\nhave never experienced at all, but cannot possibly experience without\na considerable alteration of our nature. For example, the pleasures of\nthe religious life, the raptures of prayer and praise and the devotion\nof the soul to God, are commonly thought to require Conversion or\ncomplete change of nature before they can be experienced. And in the\nsame way the sacrifice of sensual inclination to duty is disagreeable\nto the non-moral man when he at first attempts it, but affords to the\ntruly virtuous man a deep and strong delight. And similarly almost all\nthe more refined intellectual and emotional pleasures require training\nand culture in order to be enjoyed; and since this training does not\nalways succeed in producing any considerable degree of susceptibility,\nit may always be a matter of doubt for one from whom it would require\nthe sacrifice of other pleasures, whether such sacrifice is worth\nmaking.\n\nThe foregoing considerations must, I think, seriously reduce our\nconfidence in what I have called the Empirical-reflective method\nof Egoistic Hedonism. I do not conclude that we should reject it\naltogether: I am conscious that, in spite of all the difficulties that\nI have urged, I continue to make comparisons between pleasures and\npains with practical reliance on their results. But I conclude that\nit would be at least highly desirable, with a view to the systematic\ndirection of conduct, to control and supplement the results of such\ncomparisons by the assistance of some other method: if we can find any\non which we see reason to rely.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[108] See chap. v. of this Book, chap. xiv. of Book iii., and the\nconcluding chapter of the treatise.\n\n[109] See Green\u2019s Introduction to vol. ii. of Hume\u2019s _Treatise on Human\nNature_, \u00a7 7. The statement is substantially repeated in the same\nwriter\u2019s _Prolegomena to Ethics_.\n\n[110] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, \u00a7 158.\n\n[111] _E.g._ Butler, _Sermon_ xi. says, \u201cEvery man hath a desire for\nhis own happiness ... the object [desired] is our own happiness,\nenjoyment, satisfaction.\u201d\n\n[112] Introduction to Hume, _l.c._\n\n[113] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, \u00a7 221.\n\n[114] _Ibid._ \u00a7 359.\n\n[115] This Green in several passages seems expressly to admit _e.g._\n(\u00a7 332) he says that certain measures \u201cneeded in order to supply\nconditions favourable to good character, tend also to make life more\npleasant on the whole\u201d: and, elsewhere, that \u201cit is easy to show that\nan overbalance of pain would result to those capable of being affected\nby it\u201d from the neglect of certain duties.\n\n[116] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, \u00a7 176.\n\n[117] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 232.\n\n[118] I cannot state this positively, because--as I have said--Green\nexpressly distinguishes self-satisfaction from pleasure, and does not\nexpressly affirm that its absence is attended by pain.\n\n[119] Sully, _Pessimism_, chap. xi. p. 282.\n\n[120] Book i. chap. iv.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nOBJECTIVE HEDONISM AND COMMON SENSE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Before we examine those methods of seeking one\u2019s own happiness\nwhich are more remote from the empirical, it will be well to consider\nhow far we may reasonably avoid the difficulties and uncertainties of\nthe method of reflective comparison, by relying on the current opinions\nand accepted estimates of the value of different objects commonly\nsought as sources of pleasure.\n\nIt certainly seems more natural to men, at least in the main plan and\nordering of their lives, to seek and consciously estimate the objective\nconditions and sources of happiness, rather than happiness itself;\nand it may plausibly be said that by relying on such estimates of\nobjects we avoid the difficulties that beset the introspective method\nof comparing feelings: and that the common opinions as to the value of\ndifferent sources of pleasure express the net result of the combined\nexperience of mankind from generation to generation: in which the\ndivergences due to the limitations of each individual\u2019s experience, and\nto the differently tinged moods in which different estimates have been\ntaken, have balanced and neutralised each other and so disappeared.\n\nI do not wish to undervalue the guidance of common sense in our pursuit\nof happiness. I think, however, that when we consider these common\nopinions as premises for the deductions of systematic egoism, they must\nbe admitted to be open to the following grave objections.\n\nIn the first place, Common Sense gives us only, at the best, an\nestimate true for an average or typical human being: and, as we have\nalready seen, it is probable that any particular individual will be\nmore or less divergent from this type. In any case, therefore, each\nperson will have to correct the estimate of common opinion by the\nresults of his own experience in order to obtain from it trustworthy\nguidance for his own conduct: and this process of correction, it\nwould seem, must be involved in all the difficulties from which we\nare trying to escape. But, secondly, the experience of the mass of\nmankind is confined within limits too narrow for its results to be of\nmuch avail in the present inquiry. The majority of human beings spend\nmost of their time in labouring to avert starvation and severe bodily\ndiscomfort: and the brief leisure that remains to them, after supplying\nthe bodily needs of food, sleep, etc., is spent in ways determined\nrather by impulse, routine, and habit, than by a deliberate estimate of\nprobable pleasure. It would seem, then, that the common sense to which\nwe have here to refer can only be that of a minority of comparatively\nrich and leisured persons.\n\nBut again, we cannot tell that the mass of mankind, or any section of\nthe mass, is not generally and normally under the influence of some\nof the causes of mal-observation previously noticed. We avoid the\n\u201cidols of the cave\u201d by trusting Common Sense, but what is to guard us\nagainst the \u201cidols of the tribe\u201d? Moreover, the common estimate of\ndifferent sources of happiness seems to involve all the confusion of\nideas and points of view, which in defining the empirical method of\nHedonism we have taken some pains to eliminate. In the first place it\ndoes not distinguish between objects of natural desire and sources\nof experienced pleasure. Now we have seen (Book i. chap. iv.) that\nthese two are not exactly coincident--indeed we find numerous examples\nof men who continue not only to feel but to indulge desires, the\ngratification of which they know by ample experience to be attended\nwith more pain than pleasure. And therefore the current estimate of\nthe desirability of objects of pursuit cannot be taken to express\nsimply men\u2019s experience of pleasure and pain: for men are apt to think\ndesirable what they strongly desire, whether or not they have found it\nconducive to happiness on the whole: and so the common opinion will\ntend to represent a compromise between the average force of desires and\nthe average experience of the consequences of gratifying them.\n\nWe must allow again for the intermingling of moral with purely\nhedonistic preferences in the estimate of common sense. For even when\nmen definitely expect greater happiness from the course of conduct\nwhich they choose than from any other, it is often because they think\nit the right, or more excellent, or more noble course; making, more\nor less unconsciously, the assumption (which we shall presently have\nto consider) that the morally best action will prove to be also the\nmost conducive to the agent\u2019s happiness. And a similar assumption\nseems to be made--without adequate warrant--as regards merely \u00e6sthetic\npreferences.\n\nAgain, the introduction of the moral and \u00e6sthetic points of view\nsuggests the following doubt:--Are we to be guided by the preferences\nwhich men avow, or by those which their actions would lead us to infer?\nOn the one hand, we cannot doubt that men often, from weakness of\ncharacter, fail to seek what they sincerely believe will give them most\npleasure in the long-run: on the other hand, as a genuine preference\nfor virtuous or refined pleasure is a mark of genuine virtue or refined\ntaste, men who do not really feel such preference are unconsciously or\nconsciously influenced by a desire to gain credit for it, and their\nexpress estimate of pleasures is thus modified and coloured.\n\n\u00a7 2. But, even if we had no doubt on general grounds that Common Sense\nwould prove our best guide in the pursuit of happiness, we should still\nbe perplexed by finding its utterances on this topic very deficient in\nclearness and consistency. I do not merely mean that they are different\nin different ages and countries--that we might explain as due to\nvariations in the general conditions of human life--: but that serious\nconflicts and ambiguities are found if we consider only the current\ncommon sense of our own age and country. We can make a list of sources\nof happiness apparently recommended by an overwhelming _consensus_ of\ncurrent opinion: as health, wealth, friendship and family affections,\nfame and social position, power, interesting and congenial occupation\nand amusement,--including the gratification, in some form, of the love\nof knowledge, and of those refined, partly sensual, partly emotional,\nsusceptibilities which we call \u00e6sthetic.[121] But if we inquire\ninto the relative value of these objects of common pursuit, we seem\nto get no clear answer from Common Sense--unless, perhaps, it would\nbe generally agreed that health ought to be paramount to all other\nsecondary ends: though even on this point we could not infer general\nagreement from observation of the actual conduct of mankind. Nay,\neven as regards the positive estimate of these sources of happiness,\nwe find on closer examination that the supposed _consensus_ is much\nless clear than it seemed at first. Not only are there numerous and\nimportant bodies of dissidents from the current opinions: but the very\nsame majority, the same Common Sense of Mankind that maintains these\nopinions, is found in a singular and unexpected manner to welcome and\napprove the paradoxes of these dissidents. Men show a really startling\nreadiness to admit that the estimates of happiness which guide them in\ntheir ordinary habits and pursuits are erroneous and illusory; and that\nfrom time to time the veil is, as it were, lifted, and the error and\nillusion made manifest.\n\nFor, first, men seem to attach great value to the ample gratification\nof bodily appetites and needs: the wealthier part of mankind spend\na considerable amount of money and forethought upon the means of\nsatisfying these in a luxurious manner: and though they do not often\ndeliberately sacrifice health to this gratification--common sense\ncondemns that as irrational--still one may say that they are habitually\ncourageous in pressing forward to the very verge of this imprudence.\n\nAnd yet the same people are fond of saying that \u201chunger is the best\nsauce,\u201d and that \u201ctemperance and labour will make plain food more\ndelightful than the most exquisite products of the culinary art.\u201d And\nthey often argue with perfect sincerity that the rich have really no\nadvantage, or scarcely any advantage, over the comparatively poor, in\nrespect of these pleasures; for habit soon renders the more luxurious\nprovision for the satisfaction of their acquired needs no more pleasant\nto the rich than the appeasing of his more primitive appetites is\nto the poor man. And the same argument is often extended to all the\nmaterial comforts that wealth can purchase. It is often contended that\nhabit at once renders us indifferent to these while they are enjoyed,\nand yet unable to dispense with them without annoyance: so that the\npleasures of the merely animal life are no greater to the rich than to\nthe poor, but only more insecure. And from this there is but a short\nstep to the conclusion, that wealth, in the pursuit of which most men\nagree in concentrating their efforts, and on the attainment of which\nall congratulate each other,--wealth, for which so many risk their\nhealth, shorten their lives, reduce their enjoyments of domestic life,\nand sacrifice the more refined pleasures of curiosity and art,--is\nreally a very doubtful gain, in the majority of cases; because the\ncares and anxieties which it entails balance, for most men, the slight\nadvantage of the luxuries which it purchases.[122]\n\nAnd similarly, although social rank and status is, in England, an\nobject of passionate pursuit, yet it is continually said, with general\napproval, that it is of no intrinsic value as a means of happiness;\nthat though the process of ascending from a lower grade to a higher\nis perhaps generally agreeable, and the process of descending from a\nhigher to a lower certainly painful, yet permanent existence on the\nloftier level is no more pleasant than on the humbler; that happiness\nis to be found as easily in a cottage as in a palace (if not, indeed,\nmore easily in the cottage): and so forth.\n\nStill more trite are the commonplaces as to the emptiness and vanity\nof the satisfaction to be derived from Fame and Reputation. The case\nof posthumous fame, indeed, is a striking instance of the general\nproposition before laid down, that the commonly accepted ends of action\nare determined partly by the average force of desires that are not\ndirected towards pleasure, nor conformed to experiences of pleasure.\nFor posthumous fame seems to rank pretty high among the objects that\ncommon opinion regards as good or desirable for the individual:\nand the pursuit of it is not ordinarily stigmatised as contrary to\nprudence, even if it leads a man to sacrifice other important sources\nof happiness to a result of which he never expects to be actually\nconscious. Yet the slightest reflection shows such a pursuit to be\n_prima facie_ irrational,[123] from an egoistic point of view; and\nevery moraliser has found this an obvious and popular topic. The actual\nconsciousness of present fame is no doubt very delightful to most\npersons: still the moraliser does not find it difficult to maintain\nthat even this is attended with such counterbalancing disadvantages as\nrender its hedonistic value very doubtful.\n\nAgain, the current estimate of the desirability of Power is tolerably\nhigh, and perhaps the more closely and analytically we examine the\nactual motives of men, the more widespread and predominant its pursuit\nwill appear: for many men seem to seek wealth, knowledge, even\nreputation, as a means to the attainment of power, rather than for\ntheir own sakes or with a view to other pleasures. And yet men assent\nwillingly when they are told that the pursuit of power, as of fame,\nis prompted by a vain ambition, never satisfied, but only rendered\nmore uneasy by such success as is possible for it: that the anxieties\nwhich attend not only the pursuit but the possession of power, and the\njealousies and dangers inseparable from the latter, far outweigh its\npleasures.\n\nSociety of some sort no one can deny to be necessary to human\nhappiness: but still the kind and degree of social intercourse which\nis actually sought by the more wealthy and leisured portion of the\ncommunity, with no little expenditure of time, trouble, and means, is\noften declared to yield a most thin and meagre result of pleasure.\n\nWe find, no doubt, great agreement among modern moralisers as to the\nimportance of the exercise of the domestic affections as a means of\nhappiness: and this certainly seems to have a prominent place in the\nplan of life of the majority of mankind. And yet it may fairly be\ndoubted whether men in general do value domestic life very highly,\napart from the gratification of sexual passion. Certainly whenever\nany part of civilised society is in such a state that men can freely\nindulge this passion and at the same time avoid the burden of a\nfamily, without any serious fear of social disapprobation, celibacy\ntends to become common: it has even become so common as to excite\nthe grave anxiety of legislators. And though such conduct has always\nbeen disapproved by common sense, it seems to be rather condemned as\nanti-social than as imprudent.\n\nThus our examination shows great instability and uncertainty in the\nmost decisive judgments of common sense; since, as I have said, bodily\ncomfort and luxury, wealth, fame, power, society are the objects which\ncommon opinion seems most clearly and confidently to recommend as\nsources of pleasure. For though the pleasures derived from Art and the\ncontemplation of the beautiful in Nature, and those of curiosity and\nthe exercise of the intellect generally, are highly praised, it is\ndifficult to formulate a \u201ccommon opinion\u201d in respect of them, since the\nhigh estimates often set upon them seem to express the real experience\nof only small minorities. And though these have persuaded the mass\nof mankind, or that portion of it which is possessed of leisure, to\nlet Culture be regarded as an important source of happiness; they can\nscarcely be said to have produced any generally accepted opinion as to\nits importance in comparison with the other sources before mentioned,\nthe pleasures of which are more genuinely appreciated by the majority;\nstill less as to the relative value of different elements of this\nculture.\n\nBut even supposing the _consensus_, in respect of sources of happiness,\nwere far more complete and clear than impartial reflection seems to\nshow, its value would still be considerably impaired by the dissent of\nimportant minorities, which we have not yet noticed. For example, many\nreligious persons regard all mundane pleasures as mean and trifling;\nso full of vanity and emptiness that the eager pursuit of them is\nonly possible through ever-renewed illusion, leading to ever-repeated\ndisappointment. And this view is shared by not a few reflective persons\nwho have no religious bias: as is evident from the numerous adherents\nthat Pessimism has won in recent times. Indeed a somewhat similar\njudgment, on the value of the ordinary objects of human pursuit, has\nbeen passed by many philosophers who have not been pessimists: and\nwhen we consider that it is the philosopher\u2019s especial business to\nreflect with care and precision on the facts of consciousness, we\nshall hesitate, in any dispute between philosophers and the mass of\nmankind, to let our conclusion be determined by merely counting heads.\nOn the other hand, as has been already observed, the philosopher\u2019s\nsusceptibilities and capacities of feeling do not fairly represent\nthose of humanity in general: and hence if he ventures to erect the\nresults of his individual experience into a universal standard, he is\nlikely to overrate some pleasures and underrate others. Perhaps the\nmost convincing illustrations of this are furnished by thinkers not\nof the idealist or transcendental type, but professed Hedonists, such\nas Epicurus and Hobbes. We cannot accept as fair expressions of the\nordinary experience of the human race either Epicurus\u2019s identification\nof painlessness with the highest degree of pleasure, or Hobbes\u2019s\nasseveration that the gratifications of curiosity \u201cfar exceed in\nintensity all carnal delights.\u201d Thus we seem to be in this dilemma:\nthe mass of mankind, to whose common opinion we are naturally referred\nfor catholically authoritative beliefs respecting the conditions of\nhappiness, are deficient in the faculty or the habit of observing and\nrecording their experience: and usually, in proportion as a man is, by\nnature and practice, a better observer, the phenomena that he has to\nobserve are more and more divergent from the ordinary type.\n\n\u00a7 3. On the whole, it must, I think, be admitted that the Hedonistic\nmethod cannot be freed from inexactness and uncertainty by appealing\nto the judgments of common sense respecting the sources of happiness.\nAt the same time I would not exaggerate the difficulty of combining\nthese into a tolerably coherent body of probable doctrine, not\nuseless for practical guidance. For first, it must be observed, that\nit is only occasionally and to a limited extent that these commonly\ncommended sources of happiness come into competition with one\nanother and are presented as alternatives. For example, the pursuit\nof wealth often leads also to power (besides the power that lies in\nwealth) and to reputation: and again, these objects of desire can\nusually be best attained--as far as it is in our power to attain\nthem at all--by employment which in itself gives the pleasure that\nnormally attends energetic exercise of one\u2019s best faculties: and this\ncongenial employment is not incompatible with adequate exercise of\nthe affections, social and domestic; nor with cultivated amusement\n(which must always be carefully limited in amount if it is to be\nreally amusing). And no one doubts that to carry either employment\nor amusement to a degree that injures health involves generally a\nsacrifice of happiness, no less than over-indulgence in sensual\ngratifications.\n\nAnd as for the philosophical or quasi-philosophical paradoxes as to\nthe illusoriness of sensual enjoyments, wealth, power, fame, etc., we\nmay explain the widespread acceptance which these find by admitting\na certain general tendency to exaggeration in the common estimates\nof such objects of desire, which from time to time causes a reaction\nand an equally excessive temporary depreciation of them. As we saw\n(chap. iii.) it is natural for men to value too highly the absent\npleasures for which they hope and long: power and fame, for example,\nare certainly attended with anxieties and disgusts which are not\nforeseen when they are represented in longing imagination: yet it may\nstill be true that they bring to most men a clear balance of happiness\non the whole. It seems clear, again, that luxury adds _less_ to the\nordinary enjoyment of life than most men struggling with penury\nsuppose: there are special delights attending the hard-earned meal,\nand the rarely-recurring amusement, which must be weighed against the\nprofuser pleasures that the rich can command: so that we may fairly\nconclude that increase of happiness is very far from keeping pace\nwith increase of wealth. On the other hand, when we take into account\nall the pleasures of Culture, Power, Fame, and Beneficence, and still\nmore the security that wealth gives against the pains of privation\nand the anxieties of penury--for the owner himself and those whom\nhe loves--we can hardly doubt that increase of wealth brings on the\naverage _some_ increase of happiness: at least until a man reaches an\nincome beyond that of the great majority in any actual community. Thus\non the whole it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that, while\nit is extravagant to affirm that happiness is \u201cequally distributed\nthrough all ranks and callings,\u201d it is yet _more_ equally distributed\nthan the aspect of men\u2019s external circumstances would lead us to infer:\nespecially considering the importance of the pleasures that attend the\nexercise of the affections. Again, common sense is quite prepared to\nrecognise that there are persons of peculiar temperament to whom the\nordinary pleasures of life are really quite trifling in comparison with\nmore refined enjoyments: and also that men generally are liable to\nfall, for certain periods, under the sway of absorbing impulses, which\ntake them out of the range within which the judgments of common sense\nare even broadly and generally valid. No one (_e.g._) expects a lover\nto care much for anything except the enjoyments of love; nor considers\nthat an enthusiast sacrifices happiness in making everything give way\nto his hobby.\n\nIn fact we may say that common sense scarcely claims to provide more\nthan rather indefinite general rules, which no prudent man should\nneglect without giving himself a reason for doing so. Such reasons\nmay either be drawn from one\u2019s knowledge of some peculiarities in\none\u2019s nature, or from the experience of others whom one has ground\nfor believing to be more like oneself than the average of mankind\nare. Still, as we saw, there is considerable risk of error in thus\nappropriating the special experience of other individuals: and, in\nshort, it does not appear that by any process of this kind,--either\nby appealing to the common opinion of the many, or to that of\ncultivated persons, or to that of those whom we judge most to resemble\nourselves,--we can hope to solve with precision or certainty the\nproblems of egoistic conduct.\n\nThe question then remains, whether any general theory can be attained\nof the causes of pleasure and pain so certain and practically\napplicable that we may by its aid rise above the ambiguities and\ninconsistencies of common or sectarian opinion, no less than the\nshortcomings of the empirical-reflective method, and establish the\nHedonistic art of life on a thoroughly scientific basis. To the\nconsideration of this question I shall proceed in the last chapter of\nthis book: but before entering upon it, I wish to examine carefully\na common belief as to the means of attaining happiness which--though\nit hardly claims to rest upon a scientific basis--is yet generally\nconceived by those who hold it to have a higher degree of certainty\nthan most of the current opinions that we have been examining. This\nis the belief that a man will attain the greatest happiness open\nto him by the performance of his Duty as commonly recognised and\nprescribed--except so far as he may deviate from this standard in\nobedience to a truer conception of the conduct by which universal good\nis to be realised or promoted.[124] The special importance of this\nopinion to a writer on Morals renders it desirable to reserve our\ndiscussion of it for a separate chapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[121] The consideration of the importance of Morality as a source of\nhappiness is reserved for the next chapter.\n\n[122] It is striking to find the author of the _Wealth of Nations_, the\nfounder of a long line of plutologists who are commonly believed to\nexalt the material means of happiness above all other, declaring that\n\u201cwealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility,\u201d and that\n\u201cin ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are\nnearly upon a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the\nhighway possesses that security which kings are fighting for.\u201d Adam\nSmith, _Moral Sentiments_, Part iv. chap. i.\n\n[123] No doubt such a pursuit may be justified to self-love by dwelling\non the pleasures of hope and anticipation which attend it. But this is\nobviously an after-thought. It is not for the sake of these originally\nthat posthumous fame is sought by him whom it spurs\n\n \u201cTo scorn delights and live laborious days.\u201d\n\n\n[124] In the following chapter I have not entered into any particular\nconsideration of the case in which the individual\u2019s conscience is\ndefinitely in conflict with the general moral consciousness of his\nage and country: because, though it is commonly held to be a man\u2019s\nduty always to obey the dictates of his own conscience, even at the\nrisk of error, it can hardly be said to be a current opinion that he\nwill always attain the greatest happiness open to him by conforming to\nthe dictates of his conscience even when it conflicts with received\nmorality.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nHAPPINESS AND DUTY\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The belief in the connexion of Happiness with Duty is one to\nwhich we find a general tendency among civilised men, at least after\na certain stage in civilisation has been reached. But it is doubtful\nwhether it would be affirmed, among ourselves, as a generalisation from\nexperience, and not rather as a matter of direct Divine Revelation, or\nan inevitable inference from the belief that the world is governed by a\nperfectly Good and Omnipotent Being. To examine thoroughly the validity\nof the latter belief is one of the most important tasks that human\nreason can attempt: but involving as it does an exhaustive inquiry\ninto the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, it could hardly\nbe included within the scope of the present treatise.[125] Here, then,\nI shall only consider the coincidence of Duty and Happiness in so far\nas it is maintained by arguments drawn from experience and supposed to\nbe realised in our present earthly life. Perhaps, as so restricted,\nthe coincidence can hardly be said to be \u201ccurrently believed\u201d: indeed\nit may be suggested that the opposite belief is implied in the general\nadmission of the necessity of rewards and punishments in a future\nstate, in order to exhibit and realise completely the moral government\nof the world. But reflection will show that this implication is not\nnecessary; for it is possible to hold that even here virtue is always\nrewarded and vice punished, so far as to make the virtuous course of\naction always the most prudent; while yet the rewards and punishments\nare not sufficient to satisfy our sense of justice. Admitting that\nthe virtuous man is often placed on earth in circumstances so\nadverse that his life is not as happy as that of many less virtuous;\nit is still possible to maintain that by virtue he will gain the\nmaximum of happiness that can be gained under these circumstances,\nall appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. And this view has\ncertainly been held by moralists of reputation on grounds drawn from\nactual experience of human life; and seems often to be confidently put\nforward on similar grounds by popular preachers and moralisers. It\nappears therefore desirable to subject this opinion to a careful and\nimpartial examination. In conducting this examination, at the present\nstage of our inquiry, we shall have to use the received notions of Duty\nwithout further definition or analysis: but it is commonly assumed\nby those whose view we are to examine that these conceptions--as\nthey are found in the moral consciousness of ordinary well-meaning\npersons--are at least approximately valid and trustworthy; and the\npreceding chapters will have fully shown that the generalisations of\nHedonism must be established, if at all, by large considerations and\ndecisive preponderances, and that it would be idle in considering a\nquestion of this kind to take account of slight differences, and to\npretend to weigh in our mental scales comparatively small portions of\nhappiness.[126]\n\n\u00a7 2. Accepting, then, the common division[127] of duties into\nself-regarding and social, it may be conceded that as far as the first\nare concerned the view that we are examining is not likely to provoke\nany controversy: for by \u2018duties towards oneself\u2019 are commonly meant\nacts that tend directly or indirectly to promote one\u2019s happiness. We\nmay therefore confine our attention to the social department of Duty,\nand consider whether by observing the moral rules that prescribe\ncertain modes of behaviour towards others we shall always tend to\nsecure the greatest balance of happiness to ourselves.\n\nHere it will be convenient to adopt with some modification the\nterminology of Bentham; and to regard the pleasures consequent on\nconformity to moral rules, and the pains consequent on their violation,\nas the \u2018sanctions\u2019 of these rules. These \u2018sanctions\u2019 we may classify\nas External and Internal. The former class will include both \u2018Legal\nSanctions,\u2019 or penalties inflicted by the authority, direct or\nindirect, of the sovereign; and \u2018Social Sanctions,\u2019 which are either\nthe pleasures that may be expected from the approval and goodwill of\nour fellow-men generally, and the services that they will be prompted\nto render both by this goodwill and by their appreciation of the\nusefulness of good conduct, or the annoyance and losses that are to\nbe feared from their distrust and dislike. The internal sanctions\nof duty--so far as it diverges from the conduct which self-interest\napart from morality would dictate--will lie in the pleasurable emotion\nattending virtuous action, or in the absence of remorse, or will\nresult more indirectly from some effect on the mental constitution of\nthe agent produced by the maintenance of virtuous dispositions and\nhabits. This classification is important for our present purpose,\nchiefly because the systems of rules to which these different sanctions\nare respectively attached may be mutually conflicting. The Positive\nMorality of any community undergoes development, and is thus subject\nto changes which affect the consciences of the few before they are\naccepted by the many; so that the rules at any time sustained by the\nstrongest social sanctions may not only fall short of, but even clash\nwith, the intuitions of those members of the community who have most\nmoral insight. For similar reasons Law and Positive Morality may be\nat variance, in details. For though a law could not long exist, which\nit was universally thought wrong to obey; there may easily be laws\ncommanding conduct that is considered immoral by some more or less\nenlightened fraction of the community, especially by some sect or party\nthat has a public opinion of its own: and any individual may be so much\nmore closely connected with this fraction than with the rest of the\ncommunity, that the social sanction may in his case practically operate\nagainst the legal.\n\nThis conflict of sanctions is of great importance in considering\nwhether these sanctions, as at present capable of being foreseen,\nare sufficient in all cases to determine a rational egoist to the\nperformance of social duty: for the more stress we lay on either the\nlegal or the social sanctions of moral conduct, the greater difficulty\nwe shall have in proving the coincidence of duty and self-interest in\nthe exceptional cases in which we find these sanctions arrayed against\nwhat we conceive to be duty.\n\nBut even if we put these cases out of sight, it still seems clear that\nthe external sanctions of morality alone are not always sufficient to\nrender immoral conduct also imprudent. We must indeed admit that in an\neven tolerably well-ordered society--_i.e._ in an ordinary civilised\ncommunity in its normal condition--all serious open violation of law is\ncontrary to prudence, unless it is an incident in a successful process\nof violent revolution: and further, that violent revolutions would\nvery rarely--perhaps never--be made by a combination of persons, all\nperfectly under the control of enlightened self-love; on account of\nthe general and widespread destruction of security and of other means\nof happiness which such disturbances inevitably involve. Still, so\nlong as actual human beings are not all rational egoists, such times\nof disorder will be liable to occur: and we cannot say that _under\nexisting circumstances_ it is a clear universal precept of Rational\nSelf-love that a man should \u201cseek peace and ensue it\u201d; since the\ndisturbance of political order may offer to a cool and skilful person,\nwho has the art of fishing in troubled waters, opportunities of gaining\nwealth, fame, and power, far beyond what he could hope for in peaceful\ntimes. In short, though we may admit that a society composed entirely\nof rational egoists would, when once organised, tend to remain in a\nstable and orderly condition, it does not follow that any individual\nrational egoist will always be on the side of order in any existing\ncommunity.[128]\n\nBut at any rate, in the most orderly societies with which we are\nacquainted, the administration of law and justice is never in so\nperfect a state as to render _secret_ crimes always acts of folly, on\nthe score of the legal penalties attached to them. For however much\nthese may outweigh the advantages of crime, cases must inevitably\noccur in which the risk of discovery is so small, that on a sober\ncalculation the almost certain gain will more than compensate for the\nslight chance of the penalty. And finally, in no community is the law\nactually in so perfect a state that there are not certain kinds of\nflagrantly anti-social conduct which slip through its meshes and escape\nlegal penalties altogether, or incur only such legal penalties as are\noutweighed by the profit of law-breaking.\n\n\u00a7 3. Let us proceed, then, to consider how far the social sanction in\nsuch cases supplies the defects of the legal. No doubt the hope of\npraise and liking and services from one\u2019s fellow-men, and the fear\nof forfeiting these and incurring instead aversion, refusal of aid,\nand social exclusion, are considerations often important enough to\ndetermine the rational egoist to law-observance, even in default of\nadequate legal penalties. Still these sanctions are liable to fail\njust where the legal penalties are defective; social no less than\nlegal penalties are evaded by secret crimes; and in cases of criminal\nrevolutionary violence, the efficacy of the social sanction is apt\nto be seriously impaired by the party spirit enlisted on the side of\nthe criminal. For it has to be observed that the force of the social\nsanction diminishes very rapidly, in proportion to the number of\ndissidents from the common opinion that awards it. Disapprobation that\nis at once intense and quite universal would be so severe a penalty\nas perhaps to outweigh any imaginable advantages; since it seems\nimpossible for a human being to live happily, whatever other goods\nhe may enjoy, without the kindly regards of some of his fellows: and\nso, in contemplating the conventional portrait of the tyrant, who is\nrepresented as necessarily suspicious of those nearest him, even of\nthe members of his own family, we feel prepared to admit that such\na life must involve the extreme of unhappiness. But when we turn\nto contemplate the actual tyrannical usurpers, wicked statesmen,\nsuccessful leaders of unwarranted rebellion, and, speaking generally,\nthe great criminals whose position raises them out of the reach of\nlegal penalties, it does not appear that the moral odium under which\nthey lie must necessarily count for much in an egoistic calculation of\nthe gain and loss resulting from their conduct. For this disesteem\nis only expressed by a portion of the community: and its utterance\nis often drowned in the loud-voiced applause of the multitude whose\nadmiration is largely independent of moral considerations. Nor are\nthere wanting philosophers and historians whose judgment manifests a\nsimilar independence.\n\nIt seems, then, impossible to affirm that the external sanctions of\nmen\u2019s legal duties will always be sufficient to identify duty with\ninterest. And a corresponding assertion would be still more unwarranted\nin respect of moral duties not included within the sphere of Law. In\nsaying this, I am fully sensible of the force of what may be called\nthe Principle of Reciprocity, by which certain utilitarians have\nendeavoured to prove the coincidence of any individual\u2019s interest with\nhis social duties. Virtues (they say) are qualities either useful or\ndirectly agreeable to others: thus they either increase the market\nvalue of the virtuous man\u2019s services, and cause others to purchase them\nat a higher rate and to allot to him more dignified and interesting\nfunctions; or they dispose men to please him, both out of gratitude\nand in order to enjoy the pleasures of his society in return: and\nagain--since man is an imitative animal--the exhibition of these\nqualities is naturally rewarded by a reciprocal manifestation of them\non the part of others, through the mere influence of example. I do\nnot doubt that the prospect of these advantages is an adequate motive\nfor cultivating many virtues and avoiding much vice. Thus on such\ngrounds a rational egoist will generally be strict and punctual in the\nfulfilment of all his engagements, and truthful in his assertions,\nin order to win the confidence of other men; and he will be zealous\nand industrious in his work, in order to obtain gradually more\nimportant and therefore more honourable and lucrative employment; and\nhe will control such of his passions and appetites as are likely to\ninterfere with his efficiency; and will not exhibit violent anger or\nuse unnecessary harshness even towards servants and subordinates; and\ntowards his equals and superiors in rank he will be generally polite\nand complaisant and good-humoured, and prompt to show them all such\nkindness as costs but little in proportion to the pleasure it gives.\nStill, reflection seems to show that the conduct recommended by this\nline of reasoning does not really coincide with moral duty. For, first,\nwhat one requires for social success is that one should _appear_,\nrather than _be_, useful to others: and hence this motive will not\nrestrain one from doing secret harm to others, or even from acting\nopenly in a way that is really harmful, though not perceived to be\nso. And again, a man is not useful to others by his virtue only, but\nsometimes rather by his vice; or more often by a certain admixture\nof unscrupulousness with his good and useful qualities. And further,\nmorality prescribes the performance of duties equally towards all, and\nthat we should abstain as far as possible from harming any: but on the\nprinciple of Reciprocity we should exhibit our useful qualities chiefly\ntowards the rich and powerful, and abstain from injuring those who can\nretaliate; while we may reasonably omit our duties to the poor and\nfeeble, if we find a material advantage in so doing, unless they are\nable to excite the sympathy of persons who can harm us. Moreover, some\nvices (as for example, many kinds of sensuality and extravagant luxury)\ndo not inflict any immediate or obvious injury on any individual,\nthough they tend in the long-run to impair the general happiness: hence\nfew persons find themselves strongly moved to check or punish this kind\nof mischief.\n\nDoubtless in the last-mentioned cases the mere disrepute inevitably\nattaching to open immorality is an important consideration. But I do\nnot think that this will be seriously maintained to be sufficient\nalways to turn the scales of prudence against vice--at least by\nany one who has duly analysed the turbid and fluctuating streams\nof social opinion upon which the good or ill repute of individuals\nmainly depends, and considered the conflicting and divergent elements\nthat they contain. Many moralists have noticed the discrepancy in\nmodern Europe between the Law of Honour (or the more important rules\nmaintained by the social sanction of polite persons) and the morality\nprofessed in society at large. This is, however, by no means the only\ninstance of a special code, divergent in certain points from the\nmoral rules generally accepted in the community where it exists. Most\nreligious sects and parties, and probably the majority of trades and\nprofessions, exhibit this phenomenon in some degree. I do not mean\nmerely that special rules of behaviour are imposed upon members of\neach profession, corresponding to their special social functions and\nrelations: I mean that a peculiar moral opinion is apt to grow up,\nconflicting to a certain extent with the opinion of the general public.\nThe most striking part of this divergence consists generally in the\napproval or excusal of practices disapproved by the current morality:\nas (_e.g._) licence among soldiers, bribery among politicians in\ncertain ages and countries, unveracity of various degrees among priests\nand advocates, fraud in different forms among tradesmen. In such cases\nthere are generally strong natural inducements to disobey the stricter\nrule (in fact it would seem to be to the continual pressure of these\ninducements that the relaxation of the rule has been due): while at the\nsame time the social sanction is weakened to such an extent that it\nis sometimes hard to say whether it outweighs a similar force on the\nother side. For a man who, under these circumstances, conforms to the\nstricter rule, if he does not actually meet with contempt and aversion\nfrom those of his calling, is at least liable to be called eccentric\nand fantastic: and this is still more the case if by such conformity\nhe foregoes advantages not only to himself but to his relatives or\nfriends or party. Very often this professional or sectarian excusal of\nimmorality of which we are speaking is not so clear and explicit as to\namount to the establishment of a rule, conflicting with the generally\nreceived rule: but is still sufficient to weaken indefinitely the\nsocial sanction in favour of the latter. And, apart from these special\ndivergences, we may say generally that in most civilised societies\nthere are two different degrees of positive morality, both maintained\nin some sort by common consent; a stricter code being publicly taught\nand avowed, while a laxer set of rules is privately admitted as the\nonly code which can be supported by social sanctions of any great\nforce. By refusing to conform to the stricter code a man is often not\nliable to incur exclusion from social intercourse, or any material\nhindrance to professional advancement, or even serious dislike on the\npart of any of the persons whose society he will most naturally seek;\nand under such circumstances the mere loss of a certain amount of\nreputation is not likely to be felt as a very grave evil, except by\npersons peculiarly sensitive to the pleasures and pains of reputation.\nAnd there would seem to be many men whose happiness does not depend\non the approbation or disapprobation of the moralist--and of mankind\nin general in so far as they support the moralist--to such an extent\nas to make it prudent for them to purchase this praise by any great\nsacrifice of other goods.\n\n\u00a7 4. We must conclude, then, that if the conduct prescribed to the\nindividual by the avowedly accepted morality of the community of which\nhe is a member, can be shown to coincide with that to which Rational\nSelf-love would prompt, it must be, in many cases, solely or chiefly on\nthe score of the internal sanctions. In considering the force of these\nsanctions, I shall eliminate those pleasures and pains which lie in the\nanticipation of rewards and punishments in a future life: for as we\nare now supposing the calculations of Rational Egoism to be performed\nwithout taking into account any feelings that are beyond the range of\nexperience, it will be more consistent to exclude also the pleasurable\nor painful anticipations of such feelings.\n\nLet us, then, contemplate by itself the satisfaction that attends the\nperformance of duty as such (without taking into consideration any\nulterior consequences), and the pain that follows on its violation.\nAfter the discussions of the two preceding chapters I shall not of\ncourse attempt to weigh exactly these pleasures and pains against\nothers; but I see no empirical grounds for believing that such feelings\nare always sufficiently intense to turn the balance of prospective\nhappiness in favour of morality. This will hardly be denied if the\nquestion is raised in respect of isolated acts of duty. Let us take\nan extreme case, which is yet quite within the limits of experience.\nThe call of duty has often impelled a soldier or other public servant,\nor the adherent of a persecuted religion, to face certain and painful\ndeath, under circumstances where it might be avoided with little or\nno loss even of reputation. To prove such conduct always reasonable\nfrom an egoistic point of view, we have to assume that, in all cases\nwhere such a duty could exist and be recognised, the mere pain[129]\nthat would follow on evasion of duty would be so great as to render\nthe whole remainder of life hedonistically worthless. Surely such an\nassumption would be paradoxical and extravagant. Nothing that we know\nof the majority of persons in any society would lead us to conclude\nthat their moral feelings taken alone form so preponderant an element\nof their happiness. And a similar conclusion seems irresistible even in\nmore ordinary cases, where a man is called on to give up, for virtue\u2019s\nsake, not life, but a considerable share of the ordinary sources\nof human happiness. Can we say that all, or even most, men are so\nconstituted that the satisfactions of a good conscience are certain to\nrepay them for such sacrifices, or that the pain and loss involved in\nthem would certainly be outweighed by the remorse that would follow the\nrefusal to make them?[130]\n\nPerhaps, however, so much as this has scarcely ever been expressly\nmaintained. What Plato in his _Republic_ and other writers on the same\nside have rather tried to prove, is not that at any particular moment\nduty will be, to every one on whom it may devolve, productive of more\nhappiness than any other course of conduct; but rather that it is every\none\u2019s interest on the whole to choose the life of the virtuous man. But\neven this it is very difficult even to render probable: as will appear,\nI think, if we examine the lines of reasoning by which it is commonly\nsupported.\n\nTo begin with Plato\u2019s argument. He represents the soul of the virtuous\nman as a well-ordered polity of impulses, in which every passion and\nappetite is duly obedient to the rightful sovereignty of reason, and\noperates only within the limits laid down by the latter. He then\ncontrasts the tranquil peace of such a mind with the disorder of\none where a succession of baser impulses, or some ruling passion,\nlords it over reason: and asks which is the happiest, even apart from\nexternal rewards and punishments. But we may grant all that Plato\nclaims, and yet be no further advanced towards the solution of the\nquestion before us. For here the issue does not lie between Reason and\nPassion, but rather--in Butler\u2019s language--between Rational Self-love\nand Conscience. We are supposing the Egoist to have all his impulses\nunder control, and are only asking how this control is to be exercised.\nNow we have seen that the regulation and organisation of life best\ncalculated to attain the end of self-interest appears _prima facie_\ndivergent at certain points from that to which men in general are\nprompted by a sense of duty. In order to maintain Plato\u2019s position it\nhas to be shown that this appearance is false; and that a system of\nself-government, which under certain circumstances leads us to pain,\nloss, and death, is still that which self-interest requires. It can\nscarcely be said that our nature is such that only this anti-egoistic\nkind of regulation is possible; that the choice lies between this\nand none at all. It is easy to imagine a rational egoist, strictly\ncontrolling each of his passions and impulses--including his social\nsentiments--within such limits that its indulgence should not involve\nthe sacrifice of some greater gratification: and experience seems to\nshow us many examples of persons who at least approximate as closely to\nthis type as any one else does to the ideal of the orthodox moralist.\nHence if the regulation of Conscience be demonstrably the best means\nto the individual\u2019s happiness, it must be because the order kept by\nSelf-love involves a sacrifice of pleasure on the whole, as compared\nwith the order kept by Conscience. And if this is the case, it would\nseem that it can only be on account of the special emotional pleasure\nattending the satisfaction of the moral sentiments, or special pain or\nloss of happiness consequent on their repression and violation.\n\nBefore, however, we proceed further, a fundamental difficulty must be\nremoved which has probably some time since suggested itself to the\nreader. If a man thinks it reasonable to seek his own interest, it\nis clear that he cannot himself disapprove of any conduct that comes\nunder this principle or approve of the opposite. And hence it may\nappear that the pleasures and pains of conscience cannot enter into\nthe calculation whether a certain course of conduct is or is not in\naccordance with Rational Egoism, because they cannot attach themselves\nin the egoist\u2019s mind to any modes of action which have not been already\ndecided, on other grounds, to be reasonable or the reverse. And this\nis to a certain extent true; but we must here recur to the distinction\n(indicated in Book i. chap. iii. \u00a7 1) between the general impulse\nto do what we believe to be reasonable, and special sentiments of\nliking or aversion for special kinds of conduct, independent of their\nreasonableness. In the moral sentiments as they exist in ordinary men,\nthese two kinds of feeling are indistinguishably blended; because it\nis commonly believed that the rules of conduct to which the common\nmoral sentiments are attached are in some way or other reasonable. We\ncan, however, conceive the two separated: and in fact, as was before\nsaid, we have experience of such separation whenever a man is led by a\nprocess of thought to adopt a different view of morality from that in\nwhich he has been trained; for in such a case there will always remain\nin his mind some quasi-moral likings and aversions, no longer sustained\nby his deliberate judgment of right and wrong. And thus there is every\nreason to believe that most men, however firmly they might adopt the\nprinciples of Egoistic Hedonism, would still feel sentiments prompting\nto the performance of social duty, as commonly recognised in their\nsociety, independently of any conclusion that the actions prompted by\nsuch sentiments were reasonable and right. For such sentiments would\nalways be powerfully supported by the sympathy of others, and their\nexpressions of praise and blame, liking and aversion: and since it is\nagreed that the conduct commonly recognised as virtuous is _generally_\ncoincident with that which enlightened self-love would dictate, a\nrational egoist\u2019s habits of conduct will be such as naturally to\nfoster these (for him) \u2018quasi-moral\u2019 feelings. The question therefore\narises--not whether the egoist should cherish and indulge these\nsentiments up to a certain point, which all would admit--but whether he\ncan consistently encourage them to grow to such a pitch that they will\nalways prevail over the strongest opposing considerations; or, to put\nit otherwise, whether prudence requires him to give them the rein and\nlet them carry him whither they will. We have already seen ground for\nbelieving that Rational Self-love will best attain its end by limiting\nits conscious operation and allowing free play to disinterested\nimpulses: can we accept the further paradox that it is reasonable for\nit to abdicate altogether its supremacy over some of these impulses?\n\nOn a careful consideration of the matter, it will appear, I think,\nthat this abdication of self-love is not really a possible occurrence\nin the mind of a sane person, who still regards his own interest as\nthe reasonable ultimate end of his actions. Such a man may, no doubt,\nresolve that he will devote himself unreservedly to the practice of\nvirtue, without any particular consideration of what appears to him\nto be his interest: he may perform a series of acts in accordance\nwith this resolution, and these may gradually form in him strong\nhabitual tendencies to acts of a similar kind. But it does not seem\nthat these habits of virtue can ever become so strong as to gain\nirresistible control over a sane and reasonable will. When the\noccasion comes on which virtue demands from such a man an extreme\nsacrifice--the imprudence of which must force itself upon his notice,\nhowever little he may be in the habit of weighing his own pleasures\nand pains--he must always be able to deliberate afresh, and to act (as\nfar as the control of his will extends) without reference to his past\nactions. It may, however, be said that, though an egoist retaining\nhis belief in rational egoism cannot thus abandon his will to the\nsway of moral enthusiasm, still, supposing it possible for him to\nchange his conviction and prefer duty to interest,--or supposing we\ncompare him with another man who makes this choice,--we shall find\nthat a gain in happiness on the whole results from this preference.\nIt may be held that the pleasurable emotions attendant upon such\nvirtuous or quasi-virtuous habits as are compatible with adhesion\nto egoistic principles are so inferior to the raptures that attend\nthe unreserved and passionate surrender of the soul to virtue, that\nit is really a man\u2019s interest--even with a view to the present life\nonly--to obtain, if he can, the convictions that render this surrender\npossible; although under certain circumstances it must necessarily\nlead him to act in a manner which, considered by itself, would be\nundoubtedly imprudent. This is certainly a tenable proposition, and\nI am quite disposed to think it true of persons with specially\nrefined moral sensibilities. But--though from the imperfections of the\nhedonistic calculus the proposition cannot in any case be conclusively\ndisproved--it seems, as I have said, to be opposed to the broad results\nof experience, so far as the great majority of mankind are concerned.\nObservation would lead me to suppose that most men are so constituted\nas to feel far more keenly pleasures (and pains) arising from some\nother source than the conscience; either from the gratifications of\nsense, or from the possession of power and fame, or from strong human\naffections, or from the pursuit of science, art, etc.; so that in many\ncases perhaps not even early training could have succeeded in giving\nto the moral feelings the requisite predominance: and certainly where\nthis training has been wanting, it seems highly improbable that a mere\nchange of ethical conviction could develop their moral susceptibilities\nso far as to make it clearly their earthly interest to resolve on\nfacing all sacrifices for the fulfilment of duty.\n\nTo sum up: although the performance of duties towards others and\nthe exercise of social virtue seem to be _generally_ the best means\nto the attainment of the individual\u2019s happiness, and it is easy to\nexhibit this coincidence between Virtue and Happiness rhetorically\nand popularly; still, when we carefully analyse and estimate the\nconsequences of Virtue to the virtuous agent, it appears improbable\nthat this coincidence is complete and universal. We may conceive\nthe coincidence becoming perfect in a Utopia where men were as much\nin accord on moral as they are now on mathematical questions, where\nLaw was in perfect harmony with Moral Opinion, and all offences were\ndiscovered and duly punished: or we may conceive the same result\nattained by intensifying the moral sentiments of all members of the\ncommunity, without any external changes (which indeed would then be\nunnecessary). But just in proportion as existing societies and existing\nmen fall short of this ideal, rules of conduct based on the principles\nof Egoistic Hedonism seem liable to diverge from those which most men\nare accustomed to recognise as prescribed by Duty and Virtue.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[125] Such discussion of the question as seemed desirable in a work\nlike this will be found in the concluding chapter of the treatise.\n\n[126] For a similar reason I shall here treat the notions of \u2018Duty\u2019\nand \u2018Virtuous action\u2019 as practically coincident; reserving for future\ndiscussion the divergences between the two which reflection on the\ncommon usage of the terms appears to indicate. See Book iii. chap. ii.\n\n[127] Whatever modifications of this division may afterwards appear to\nbe necessary (cf. Book iii. chap. ii. \u00a7 1, and chap. vii. \u00a7 1) will\nnot, I think, tend to invalidate the conclusions of the present chapter.\n\n[128] I do not here consider the case of revolutionists aiming\nsincerely at the general wellbeing; since the morality of such\nrevolutions will generally be so dubious, that these cases cannot\nfurnish any clear argument on either side of the question here\ndiscussed.\n\n[129] Under the notion of \u2018moral pain\u2019 (or pleasure) I intend to\ninclude, in this argument, all pain (or pleasure) that is due to\nsympathy with the feelings of others. It is not convenient to enter, at\nthis stage of the discussion, into a full discussion of the relation\nof Sympathy to Moral Sensibility; but I may say that it seems to me\ncertain, on the one hand, that these two emotional susceptibilities\nare actually distinct in most minds, whatever they may have been\noriginally; and on the other hand that sympathetic and strictly\nmoral feelings are almost inextricably blended in the ordinary moral\nconsciousness: so that, for the purposes of the present argument it is\nnot of fundamental importance to draw a distinction between them. I\nhave, however, thought it desirable to undertake a further examination\nof sympathy--as the internal sanction on which Utilitarians specially\nlay stress--in the concluding chapter of this treatise: to which,\naccordingly, the reader may refer.\n\n[130] A striking confirmation of this is furnished by those Christian\nwriters of the last century who treat the _moral_ unbeliever as a fool\nwho sacrifices his happiness both here and hereafter. These men were,\nfor the most part, earnestly engaged in the practice of virtue, and yet\nthis practice had not made them love virtue so much as to prefer it,\neven under ordinary circumstances, to the sensual and other enjoyments\nthat it excludes. It seems then absurd to suppose that, in the case of\npersons who have not developed and strengthened by habit their virtuous\nimpulses, the pain that might afterwards result from resisting the call\nof duty would always be sufficient to neutralise all other sources of\npleasure.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nDEDUCTIVE HEDONISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the preceding chapter we have seen reason to conclude that,\nwhile obedience to recognised rules of duty tends, under ordinary\ncircumstances, to promote the happiness of the agent, there are yet no\nadequate empirical grounds for regarding the performance of duty as\na universal or infallible means to the attainment of this end. Even,\nhowever, if it were otherwise, even if it were demonstrably reasonable\nfor the egoist to choose duty at all costs under all circumstances, the\nsystematic endeavour to realise this principle would not--according\nto common notions of morality--solve or supersede the problem of\ndetermining the right method for seeking happiness. For the received\nmoral code allows within limits the pursuit of our own happiness,\nand even seems to regard it as morally prescribed;[131] and still\nmore emphatically inculcates the promotion of the happiness of other\nindividuals, with whom we are in various ways specially connected: so\nthat, under either head, the questions that we have before considered\nas to the determination and measurement of the elements of happiness\nwould still require some kind of answer.\n\nIt remains to ask how far a scientific investigation of the causes of\npleasure and pain can assist us in dealing with this practical problem.\n\nNow it is obvious that for deciding which of two courses of action\nis preferable on hedonistic grounds, we require not only to measure\npains and pleasures of different kinds, but also to ascertain how they\nmay be produced or averted. In most important prudential decisions,\ncomplex chains of consequences are foreseen as intervening between\nthe volition we are immediately to initiate and the feelings which\nconstitute the ultimate end of our efforts; and the degree of accuracy\nwith which we forecast each link of these chains obviously depends\nupon our knowledge, implicit or explicit, of the relations of cause\nand effect among various natural phenomena. But if we suppose the\ndifferent elements and immediate sources of happiness to have been\nduly ascertained and valued, the investigation of the conditions\nof production of each hardly belongs to a general treatise on the\nmethod of ethics; but rather to some one or other of the special\narts subordinate to the general art of conduct. Of these subordinate\narts some have a more or less scientific basis, while others are in\na merely empirical stage; thus if we have decided how far health is\nto be sought, it belongs to the systematic art of hygiene, based on\nphysiological science, to furnish a detailed plan of seeking it; so\nfar, on the other hand, as we aim at power or wealth or domestic\nhappiness, such instruction as the experience of others can give\nwill be chiefly obtained in an unsystematic form, either from advice\nrelative to our own special circumstances, or from accounts of success\nand failure in analogous situations. In either case the exposition\nof such special arts does not appear to come within the scope of the\npresent treatise; nor could it help us in dealing with the difficulties\nof measuring pleasures and pains which we have considered in the\nprevious chapters.\n\nIt may, however, be thought that a knowledge of the causes of pleasure\nand pain may carry us beyond the determination of the means of gaining\nparticular kinds of pleasure and avoiding particular kinds of pain; and\nenable us to substitute some deductive method of evaluing the elements\nof happiness for the empirical-reflective method of which we have seen\nthe defects.[132]\n\nA hedonistic method, indeed, that would dispense altogether with direct\nestimates of the pleasurable and painful consequences of actions is\nalmost as inconceivable as a method of astronomy that would dispense\nwith observations of the stars. It is, however, conceivable that by\ninduction from cases in which empirical measurement is easy we may\nobtain generalisations that will give us more trustworthy guidance\nthan such measurement can do in complicated cases; we may be able to\nascertain some general psychical or physical concomitant or antecedent\nof pleasure and pain, more easy to recognise, foresee, measure, and\nproduce or avert in such cases, than pleasure and pain themselves. I\nam willing to hope that this refuge from the difficulties of Empirical\nHedonism may some time or other be open to us: but I cannot perceive\nthat it is at present available. There is at present, so far as I can\njudge, no satisfactorily established general theory of the causes of\npleasure and pain; and such theories as have gained a certain degree of\nacceptance, as partially true or probable, are manifestly not adapted\nfor the practical application that we here require.\n\nThe chief difficulty of finding a universally applicable theory of\nthe causes of pleasures and pains is easily explained. Pleasures\nand pains may be assumed to have universally--like other psychical\nfacts--certain cerebral nerve-processes, specifically unknown, as\ntheir inseparable concomitants: accordingly, we may seek their causes\neither in antecedent physical or antecedent psychical facts. But in\none important class of cases the chief cognisable antecedents are\nobviously of the former kind, while in another important class they\nare obviously of the latter kind: the difficulty is to establish any\ntheory equally applicable to both classes, or to bring the results of\nthe two lines of inquiry under a single generalisation without palpably\nunsupported hypotheses. In the case of pleasures and pains--especially\npains--connected with sensation the most important cognisable\nantecedents are clearly physical. I do not deny that, when the pain\nis foreseen, the attitude of mind in which it is met may materially\ninfluence its magnitude: indeed, in the hypnotic condition of the\nbrain, the feeling of pain may be apparently altogether prevented by an\nantecedent belief that it will not be felt. Still in the main, under\nordinary conditions, the pains of sensation--probably the intensest\nin the experience of most persons--invade and interrupt our psychical\nlife from without; and it would be idle to look for the chief causes\nof their intensity or quality among antecedent psychical facts. This\nis not equally true of the most prominent pleasures of sense: since\nantecedent desire, if not an absolutely indispensable condition of\nsuch pleasures, seems at any rate necessary to their attaining a high\ndegree of intensity. Still the chief causes of these desires themselves\nare clearly physical states and processes--not merely neural--in the\norganism of the sentient individual: and this is also true of a more\nindefinite kind of pleasure, which is an important element of ordinary\nhuman happiness,--the \u201cwell-feeling\u201d that accompanies and is a sign of\nphysical well-being.\n\nOn the other hand, when we investigate the causes of the pleasures and\npains that belong to intellectual exercises or the play of personal\naffections,--or of the pleasures (and to some extent pains) that belong\nto the contemplation of beauty (or its opposite) in art or nature,--no\nphysiological theory can carry us far, owing to our ignorance of the\nneural processes that accompany or antecede these feelings.\n\nThis is my general conclusion: the grounds for which I propose to\nillustrate and explain further in the present chapter. It would,\nhowever, seem to be quite beyond my limits to attempt anything like an\nexhaustive discussion of either psychological or physiological theories\nof the causes of pleasure and pain. I shall confine myself to certain\nleading generalisations, which seem to have a special interest for\nstudents of ethics; either because ethical motives have had a share in\ncausing their acceptance; or because--though inadequately grounded as\ngeneral theories--they appear to have a partial and limited value for\npractical guidance.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us begin by considering a theory, primarily psychological,\nwhich has at least the merit of antiquity--as it is admittedly\nderived from Aristotle,[133]--and is, in some form or other, still\ncurrent.[134] It is that expressed by Sir W. Hamilton[135] in the\nfollowing propositions: \u201cPleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous\nand unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious:\npain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a\npower.\u201d The phrases suggest _active_ as ordinarily distinguished from\n_passive_ states; but Hamilton explains that \u201cenergy\u201d and similar terms\n\u201care to be understood to denote indifferently all the processes of our\nhigher and lower life of which we are conscious,\u201d--on the ground that\nconsciousness itself implies more than a mere passivity of the subject.\nI think, however, that the theory is evidently framed primarily to\nsuit the pleasures and pains that belong to the intellectual life\nas such, and is only applied by a somewhat violent straining to an\nimportant class among the pleasures and pains that belong to man\u2019s\nanimal life. For Hamilton explains his terms (_a_) \u201cspontaneous\u201d and\n(_b_) \u201cunimpeded\u201d to imply respectively (_a_) absence of \u201cforcible\nrepression\u201d or \u201cforcible stimulation\u201d of the power exercised, and (_b_)\nabsence of checks or hindrances on the part of the object about which\nit is conversant. But these terms seem to have no clear psychical\nimport in application to organic sensations of the kind ordinarily\ncalled passive. _E.g._ the feelings and vague representations of bodily\nprocesses which constitute the consciousness of a toothache are as free\nfrom conscious repression or stimulation as those which constitute\nthe consciousness that accompanies a warm bath:--except so far as\nthe mere presence of pain implies constraint, since we experience it\nunwillingly, and the mere presence of pleasure implies the opposite:\nbut in this sense constraint and its opposite are characteristics of\nthe effects to be explained, and cannot therefore be regarded as their\ncauses.\n\nIndeed, the ethical interest and value of the theory appears to me\nto lie in its very one-sidedness. It tends to correct a vulgar error\nin the estimate of pleasure, by directing attention strongly to the\nimportance of a class of pleasures which ordinary pleasure-seeking\nprobably undervalues,--the pleasures that specially belong to a life\nfilled with strenuous activity, whether purely intellectual, or\npractical and partly physical.[136] In the same way it effectively\ndispels the popular inadvertence of regarding labour as normally\npainful because some labour is so, and because the pleasures connected\nwith relief from toil--the pleasures of repose and play--are in\nthe experience of most persons more striking than the pleasures of\nstrenuous activity. At the same time, even if we limit the theory\nto the pleasures and pains immediately connected with voluntary\nactivity--intellectual or physical--it seems to me devoid not only\nof definite guidance, but also of adequate theoretical precision.\nFor it seems to imply that the exercise of our powers is always made\nless pleasant by the presence of impediments; but this is obviously\nnot true either of mainly intellectual or mainly physical activities.\nSome obstacles undeniably increase pleasure by drawing out force and\nskill to overcome them, as is clearly shown in the case of games and\nsports: and even if we understand pain-causing impediments to be only\nsuch hindrances as repress and diminish action, I do not find that the\ntheory is supported by experience, except so far as the repression\ncauses the specific discomfort of unsatisfied desire. _E.g._ I find\nentertainment rather than discomfort in trying to make out objects in a\ndim light, or the meaning of a speech in a strange language, provided\nthat failure does not interfere with the attainment of any end to which\nI attach importance. It is a fundamental defect in Hamilton\u2019s theory,\neven in its more limited application, that it ignores the teleological\ncharacter of normal human activity.\n\nThis defect is avoided in a modification of the theory that a recent\nwriter has adopted. \u201cThe antithesis,\u201d says Mr. Stout,[137] \u201cbetween\npleasure and pain is coincident with the antithesis between free\nand impeded progress towards an end. Unimpeded progress is pleasant\nin proportion to the intensity and complexity of mental excitement.\nAn activity which is ... thwarted and retarded ... is painful in\nproportion to its intensity and complexity and to the degree of\nthe hindrance.\u201d Mr. Stout admits the difficulty of applying this\nprinciple of explanation to the pleasures and pains of sense:[138]\nand--unlike Hamilton--he expressly recognises that \u201ca struggle with\ndifficulties which is not too prolonged or too intense may enhance the\npleasure of success out of all proportion to its own painfulness.\u201d\nBut this qualification seems to render the propositions first laid\ndown unimportant from our present practical point of view, whatever\nmay be their theoretical value. I think, too, that the importance of\nantecedent desire, as a condition of the pleasures and pains attendant\non voluntary activities, should be more expressly recognised. When\ndesire is strong, hopeful effort to overcome difficulties in the\nway of fruition tends to be proportionally pleasurable--apart from\nactual success--while disappointment or the fear of disappointment\nsimilarly tends to be painful: but when desire is not strong, the\nshock of thwarted activity and unfulfilled expectation may be rather\nagreeable than otherwise. Thus, suppose I take a walk for pleasure,\nintending to reach a neighbouring village, and find an unexpected\nflood crossing my road; if I have no strong motive for arriving at the\nvillage, the surprise and consequent change in the plan of my walk\nwill probably be on the whole a pleasurable incident.\n\nThe importance of eager desire as a condition of pleasure is noteworthy\nfrom an ethical point of view: as it gives the psychological\nbasis for the familiar precept to repress--with a view to private\nhappiness--desires for ends that are either unattainable or\nincompatible with the course of life which prudence marks out; and for\nthe somewhat less trite maxim of encouraging and developing desires\nthat prompt in the same direction as rational choice.\n\nSuppose now we drop the dubious term \u201cunimpeded\u201d--retaining Hamilton\u2019s\nidea of \u201coverstrained or repressed exertion\u201d as the condition of\npain--and at the same time passing to a physical point of view,\nmean by \u201cactivity\u201d the activity of an _organ_. We thus reach\nwhat is substantially Mr. Spencer\u2019s doctrine, that pains are the\npsychical concomitants of excessive or deficient actions of organs,\nwhile pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities.[139] In\nconsidering this theory it will be convenient to take pains and\npleasures separately: as it is obviously based primarily on experiences\nof pain rather than of pleasure,--especially of the pains of sense to\nwhich Hamilton\u2019s theory seemed palpably inapplicable. Instances are\nabundant in which pain is obviously caused by excessive stimulation of\nnerves. Thus when we gradually increase the intensity of sensible heat,\npressure, muscular effort, we encounter pain at a certain point of the\nincrease; \u201cdeafening\u201d sounds are highly disagreeable; and to confront\na tropical sun with unprotected eyeballs would soon become torture.\nSome pains, again, as Spencer points out, arise from the excessive\nactions of organs whose normal actions yield no feelings: as when the\ndigestive apparatus is overtaxed. Still in none of these cases does\nit seem clear that pain supervenes through a mere intensification _in\ndegree_ of the action of the organ in question; and not rather through\nsome change in the kind of action--some inchoate disintegration or\ndisorganisation. And this latter cause--rather than mere quantity of\nstimulation--is strongly suggested by a consideration of the pains due\nto wounds and diseases, and even of the transient digestive discomforts\nwhich arise from an improper kind rather than an improper quantity\nof food. And a similar explanation seems to me most probable in the\ncase of pains which, according to Mr. Spencer, arise from \u201cdeficient\u201d\naction. He speaks of these as \u201cdiscomforts or cravings\u201d; but, as I\nhave before pointed out,[140] bodily appetites and other desires may\nbe strongly-felt impulses to action without being appreciably painful:\nand, in my experience, when they become decidedly painful, some\ndisturbance tending to derangement may be presumed either in the organ\nprimarily concerned or in the organism as a whole. Thus hunger, in my\nexperience, may be extremely keen without being appreciably painful:\nand when I find it painful, experience leads me to expect a temporarily\nreduced power of assimilation, indicating some disorganisation in the\ndigestive apparatus.[141]\n\nIn any case, empirical evidence supports \u201cexcessive action\u201d of an organ\nas a cause of pain far more clearly than \u201cdeficient action.\u201d Indeed a\nconsideration of this evidence has led some psychologists to adopt the\ngeneralisation[142] that there is no quality of sensation absolutely\npleasant or unpleasant, but that every kind of sensation as it grows in\nintensity begins at a certain point to be pleasurable, and continues\nsuch up to a certain further point at which it passes rapidly through\nindifference into pain. My own experience, however, fails to support\nthis generalisation. I agree with Gurney[143] that \u201cof many tastes and\nodours the faintest possible suggestion is disagreeable\u201d; while other\nfeelings resulting from stimulation of sense-organs appear to remain\nhighly pleasurable at the highest degree of stimulation which the\nactual conditions of physical life appear to allow.\n\nHowever this may be, whether we conceive the nervous action of which\npain is an immediate consequent or concomitant as merely excessive in\nquantity, or in some way discordant or disorganised in quality, it\nis obvious that neither explanation can furnish us with any important\npractical guidance: since we have no general means of ascertaining,\nindependently of our experience of pain itself, what nervous actions\nare excessive or disorganised: and the cases where we have such means\ndo not present any practical problems which the theory enables us to\nsolve. No one doubts that wounds and diseases are to be avoided under\nall ordinary circumstances: and in the exceptional circumstances in\nwhich we may be moved to choose them as the least of several evils, the\nexactest knowledge of their precise operation in causing pain is not\nlikely to assist our choice.\n\nIt may be said, however,--turning from pain to pleasure,--that the\ngeneralisation which we have been considering at any rate gives us a\npsychophysical basis for the ancient maxim of \u201cavoiding excess\u201d in\nthe pursuit of pleasure. But we have to observe that the practical\nneed of this maxim is largely due to the qualifications which the\npsychophysical generalisation requires to make it true. Thus it is\nespecially needed in the important cases in which over-stimulation is\nfollowed by pain not at once but after an interval of varying length.\n_E.g._ alcoholic drinking, to many, remains pleasurable at the time up\nto the point of excess at which the brain can no longer perform its\nfunctions: it is \u201cnext morning\u201d that the pain comes, or perhaps--in the\ncase of \u201cwell-seasoned\u201d topers--not till after many years of habitual\nexcess. It should be noted also that it is not always the organ of\nwhich the exercise gives pleasure that also, through over-exercise,\ncauses the pain of excess. Thus when we are tempted to eat too much,\nthe seductive pleasure is mainly due to the nerves of taste which are\nnot overtaxed; the pains come from the organs of digestion, whose\nfaint, vague pleasures alone would hardly tempt the voluptuary to\nexcess. In the case of dangerous mental excitements the penalty on\nexcess is usually still more indirect.\n\nOn the whole, granting that pleasure like virtue resides somewhere\nin the mean, it must be admitted that this proposition gives no\npractical directions for attaining it. For first, granting that both\nexcessive and deficient activities of organs cause pain, the question\nstill remains--as Spencer himself says--What determines in any case\nthe lower and the higher limits within which action is pleasurable?\nSpencer\u2019s answer to this question I will consider presently. But\nthere is a question no less obvious to which he does not expressly\nadvert, viz. why among the normal activities of our physical organs,\nthat have counterparts in consciousness, some only are pleasurable in\nany appreciable degree, while many if not most are nearly or quite\nindifferent. It seems undeniable (_e.g._) that while tastes and\nsmells are mostly either agreeable or disagreeable, most sensations\nof touch and many of sight and sound are not appreciably[144] either;\nand that, in the daily routine of healthy life, eating and drinking\nare ordinarily pleasant, while dressing and undressing, walking and\nmuscular movements generally are practically indifferent.\n\nIt does not seem that an adequate explanation can be found in the\noperation of habit.[145] It is no doubt true that actions through\nfrequent uniform repetition tend to become automatic and lose their\nconscious counterparts, and hedonic indifference certainly seems in\nsome cases to be a stage through which such actions pass on the way\nto unconsciousness. Thus even a business walk in a strange town is\nnormally pleasant through the novelty of the sights: but a similar walk\nin the town where one lives is ordinarily indifferent, or nearly so;\nwhile if one\u2019s attention is strongly absorbed by the business, it may\nbe performed to a great extent unconsciously. On the other hand, the\noperations of habit often have the opposite effect of making activities\npleasant which were at first indifferent or even disagreeable: as in\nthe case of acquired tastes, physical or intellectual. Indeed such\nexperiences have long been--I think, quite legitimately--used by\nmoralists as an encouragement to irksome duties, on the ground that\ntheir irksomeness will be transient, through the operation of habit,\nwhile the gain of their performance will be permanent. Mr. Spencer,\nindeed, regards such experiences as so important that he ventures to\nbase on them the prediction that \u201cpleasure will eventually accompany\nevery mode of action demanded by social conditions.\u201d This, however,\nseems unduly optimistic, in view not only of the first-mentioned\ntendency of habit to hedonic indifference, but also of a third tendency\nto render actions, at first indifferent or even pleasant, gradually\nmore irksome. Thus our intellect gradually wearies of monotonous\nactivities, and the _ennui_ may sometimes become intense: so again the\nrelish of a kind of diet at first agreeable may turn through monotony\ninto disgust.\n\nSome quite different explanation must therefore be sought for the\nvarying degrees in which pleasure accompanies normal activities. Can\nwe find this in a suggestion of Mr. Spencer\u2019s, developed by Mr. Grant\nAllen,[146] that the pleasurableness of normal organic activities\ndepends on their _intermittence_, and that \u201cthe amount of pleasure\nis probably ... in the inverse ratio of the natural frequency of\nexcitation\u201d of the nerve-fibres involved? This theory certainly\nfinds some support in the fact that the sensual pleasures generally\nrecognised as greatest are those attending the activities of organs\nwhich are normally left unexercised for considerable intervals.\nStill, there are many facts that it does not explain--_e.g._ the\ngreat differences in the pleasures obtainable at any given time by\ndifferent stimulations of the same sense; the phenomenon expressed in\nthe proverbial phrase \u201cL\u2019app\u00e9tit vient en mangeant\u201d; and the fact that\nthe exercise of the visual organs after apparently dreamless sleep does\nnot give appreciably keener pleasure than it does at ordinary times. It\nwould seem that we must seek for some special cause of the pleasurable\neffect of intermittence in certain cases. And this cannot be merely\nthe greater intensity of the nervous action that takes place when\nlong-unexercised and well-nourished nerve-centres are stimulated: for\nwhy, if that were the explanation, should the normal consciousness of\nfull nervous activity, gradually attained--as when we are in full swing\nof energetic unwearied work of a routine kind--be often nearly or quite\nindifferent?\n\nAmong the various competing hypotheses offered at this point of our\ninquiry--no one of which, I believe, has attained anything like general\nacceptance as covering the whole ground--I select for discussion one\nthat has special ethical interest.\n\nAccording to this hypothesis,[147] the organic process accompanied\nby pleasure is to be conceived as a \u201crestoration of equilibrium\u201d\nafter \u201cdisturbance\u201d: so that the absence of appreciable pleasure in\nthe case of certain normal activities is explained by the absence of\nantecedent disturbance. This view is obviously applicable to certain\nclasses of pleasures which, though by no means rare are incidental\nin a normal life:--the pleasure of relief after physical pain, or\nafter the strain of great anxiety, and the pleasure of repose after\nunusual exertions, intellectual or muscular. But when we attempt to\napply it to sensational pleasures generally, the indefiniteness of\nthe notion of \u201cequilibrium,\u201d as applied to the processes of a living\norganism, becomes manifest. For our physical life consists of a series\nof changes, for the most part periodically recurrent with slight\nmodification after short intervals: and it is difficult to see why we\nshould attach the idea of \u201cdisturbance\u201d or \u201crestoration of equilibrium\u201d\nto any one among these normal processes rather than any other:--_e.g._\nit is difficult to see why the condition of having expended energy\nshould be regarded as a departure from equilibrium any more than the\ncondition of having just taken in nutriment. In fact, to render the\nhypothesis we are considering at all applicable to normal pleasures\nof sense, we have to pass from the physiological to the psychological\npoint of view, and take note of the psychical state of _desire_, as\na consciously _unrestful_ condition, of which the essence is a felt\nimpulse to pass out of this state towards the attainment of the desired\nobject. Our hypothesis, then, may take this unrestful consciousness as\na sign of what, from a physiological point of view, is \u201cdisturbance of\nequilibrium,\u201d and similarly, the satisfaction of desire may be taken to\nbe, physiologically, a restoration of equilibrium. On this assumption,\nthe theory becomes undeniably applicable to those gratifications of\nsensual appetite which form the most prominent element of the pleasures\nof sense, as popularly conceived.\n\nNow we have already noted that by a wide-spread confusion of thought,\ndesire has often been regarded as a species of pain. Accordingly, the\ntheory that we are considering was originally prompted by the ethical\nmotive of depreciating the vulgarly overvalued pleasures of satisfied\nbodily appetite, by laying stress on their inseparable connexion\nwith antecedent pain. The depreciation, however, fails so far as the\nappetite which is a necessary antecedent condition of the pleasure\nis--though an unrestful state--not appreciably painful.[148]\n\nIn any case, admitting the physical counterpart of conscious desire\nto be a \u2018disturbance of equilibrium,\u2019 or an effect and sign of such\ndisturbance, the theory seems open to obvious objections, if it is\nextended to cover the whole range of the pleasures of sense. For\nconscious desire is certainly not a necessary condition of experiencing\nthe simple pleasures of the special senses: normally no sense of\nwant has preceded the experience of pleasant sights, sounds, odours,\nflavours, or of the more important pleasures, more complex in their\npsychical conditions, which we call \u00e6sthetic. No doubt in special cases\nantecedent privation may produce a conscious want of these latter\npleasures which may increase their intensity when they are at length\nattained: or even without any felt privation, the prospect of enjoying\nsuch pleasures may produce a keen desire for the enjoyment, which may\nbe regarded as a \u201cdisturbance of equilibrium\u201d no less plausibly than\na bodily appetite. But it would be quite unwarrantable therefore to\nsuppose a similar disturbance, though unfelt, in the ordinary cases\nwhere pleasures of this kind are experienced without any antecedent\nconsciousness of desire or want.\n\nI have perhaps said enough to support my general conclusion that\npsychophysical speculation as to the causes of pleasure and pain does\nnot at present afford a basis for a deductive method of practical\nHedonism. But, before passing from this topic, I may remark that the\ndifficulties in the way of any such theory seem especially great in\nthe case of the complex pleasures which we distinguish as \u201c\u00e6sthetic.\u201d\nAll would agree that \u00e6sthetic gratification, when at all high, depends\non a subtle harmony of different elements in a complex state of\nconsciousness; and that the pleasure resulting from such harmonious\ncombination is indefinitely greater than the sum of the simpler\npleasures which the uncombined elements would yield. But even those\nwho estimate most highly the success that has so far been attained\nin discovering the conditions of this harmony, in the case of any\nparticular art, would admit that mere conformity to the conditions\nthus ascertained cannot secure the production of \u00e6sthetic pleasure\nin any considerable degree. However subtly we state in general terms\nthe objective relations of elements in a delightful work of art, on\nwhich its delight seems to depend, we must always feel that it would\nbe possible to produce out of similar elements a work corresponding to\nour general description which would give no delight at all; the touch\nthat gives delight depends upon an instinct for which no deductive\nreasoning can supply a substitute. This is true, even without taking\ninto account the wide divergences that we actually find in the \u00e6sthetic\nsensibilities of individuals: still less, therefore, is it needful to\nargue that, from the point of view of an individual seeking his own\ngreatest happiness, none but a mainly inductive and empirical method of\nestimating \u00e6sthetic pleasures can be made available.\n\n\u00a7 3. I now pass to consider a theory which may be distinguished from\nthose discussed in the preceding section as being biological rather\nthan psychophysical: since it directs attention not to the actual\npresent characteristics of the organic states or changes of which\npleasures and pains are the concomitants or immediate consequents,\nbut to their relations to the life of the organism as a whole. I mean\nthe theory that \u201cpains are the correlatives of actions injurious to\nthe organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of acts conducive\nto its welfare.\u201d Mr. Spencer, from whom the above propositions are\nquoted,[149] subsequently explains \u201cinjurious\u201d and \u201cconducive to\nwelfare\u201d to mean respectively \u201ctending to decrease or loss of life,\u201d\nand \u201ctending to continuance or increase of life\u201d: but in his deduction\nby which the above conclusion is summarily established, \u201cinjurious\u201d\nand \u201cbeneficial\u201d are used as equivalent simply to \u201cdestructive\u201d and\n\u201cpreservative\u201d of organic life: and it will be more convenient to take\nthe terms first in this simpler signification.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s argument is as follows:--\n\n \u201cIf we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase--a\n feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there;\n and if we substitute for the word Pain the equivalent phrase--a\n feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out;\n we see at once that, if the states of consciousness which a creature\n endeavours to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions,\n and if the states of consciousness which it endeavours to expel are\n the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear\n through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial.\n In other words, those races of beings only can have survived in\n which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with\n activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable\n and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or\n indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been, other\n things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals among\n races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best,\n tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.\u201d\n\nNow I am not concerned to deny the value of this summary deduction\nfor certain purposes. But it can easily be shown to be inadequate to\nafford a basis for a deductive method of seeking maximum happiness for\nthe individual, by substituting Preservation for Pleasure as the end\ndirectly aimed at. In the first place, Mr. Spencer only affirms the\nconclusion to be true, as he rather vaguely says, \u201con the average\u201d: and\nit is obvious that though the tendency to find injurious acts pleasant\nor preservative acts painful must be a disadvantage to any species\nof animal in the struggle for existence, it may--if existing only\nto a limited extent--be outweighed by other advantages, so that the\norganism in which it exists may survive in spite of it. This, I say,\nis obvious _a priori_: and common experience, as Mr. Spencer admits,\nshows \u201cin many conspicuous ways\u201d that this has been actually the case\nwith civilised man during the whole period of history that we know:\nowing to the changes caused by the course of civilisation, \u201cthere has\narisen and must long continue a deep and involved derangement of the\nnatural connexions between pleasures and beneficial actions and between\npains and detrimental actions.\u201d This seems to be in itself a sufficient\nobjection to founding a deductive method of Hedonism on Mr. Spencer\u2019s\ngeneral conclusion. It is, indeed, notorious that civilised men take\npleasure in various forms of unhealthy conduct and find conformity to\nthe rules of health irksome; and it is also important to note that they\nmay be, and actually are, susceptible of keen pleasure from acts and\nprocesses that have no material tendency to preserve life. Nor is there\nany difficulty in explaining this on the \u201cevolution hypothesis\u201d; since\nwe cannot argue _a priori_ from this hypothesis that the development\nof the nervous system in human beings may not bring with it intense\nsusceptibilities to pleasure from non-preservative processes, if only\nthe preservation of the individuals in whom such susceptibilities\nare developed is otherwise adequately provided for. Now this latter\nsupposition is obviously realised in the case of persons of leisure\nin civilised society; whose needs of food, clothing, shelter, etc.,\nare abundantly supplied through the complex social habit which we call\nthe institution of private property: and I know no empirical ground\nfor supposing that a cultivated man tends, in consequence of the keen\nand varied pleasure which he seeks and enjoys, to live longer than a\nman who goes through a comparatively dull round of monotonous routine\nactivity, interspersed by slightly pleasurable intervals of repose and\nplay.\n\n\u00a7 4. If, however, the individual is not likely to obtain a maximum\nof Pleasure by aiming merely at Preservation, it remains to consider\nwhether \u201cquantity of life\u201d will serve any better. Now it is of course\ntrue that so far as nervous action is attended by consciousness\npleasurable in quality, the more there is of it, the happier we shall\nbe. But even if we assume that the more intense and full life is \u201con\nthe average\u201d the happier, it by no means follows that we shall gain\n_maximum_ pleasure by aiming merely at intensity of consciousness:\nfor we experience intense pains even more indubitably than intense\npleasures, and in those \u201cfull tides of soul,\u201d in which we seem to\nbe most alive, painful consciousness may be mixed in almost any\nproportion. And further we often experience excitement nearly or quite\nneutral in quality (_i.e._ not distinctly pleasurable or painful),\nwhich reaches a great pitch of intensity, as in the case of laborious\nstruggles with difficulties, and perplexing conflicts of which the\nissue is doubtful.\n\nIt may, however, be replied that \u201cquantity of life\u201d must be taken to\nimply not merely intensity of consciousness, but multiplicity and\nvariety--a harmonious and many-sided development of human nature. And\nexperience certainly seems to support the view that men lose happiness\nby allowing some of their faculties or capacities to be withered\nand dwarfed for want of exercise, and thus not leaving themselves\nsufficient variety of feelings or activities: especially as regards\nthe bodily organs, it will be agreed that the due exercise of most, if\nnot all, is indispensable to the health of the organism; and further,\nthat the health maintained by this balance of functions is a more\nimportant source of the individual\u2019s happiness than the unhealthy\nover-exercise of any one organ can be. Still, it would appear that the\nharmony of functions necessary to health is a very elastic one, and\nadmits of a very wide margin of variation, as far as the organs under\nvoluntary control are concerned. A man (_e.g._) who exercises his brain\nalone will probably be ill in consequence: but he may exercise his\nbrain much and his legs little, or _vice versa_, without any morbid\nresults. And, in the same way, we cannot lay down the proposition, that\na varied and many-sided life is the happiest, with as much precision\nas would be necessary if it were to be accepted as a basis for\ndeductive Hedonism. For it seems to be also largely true, on the other\nside, that the more we come to exercise any faculty with sustained\nand prolonged concentration, the more pleasure we derive from such\nexercise, up to the point at which it becomes wearisome, or turns into\na semi-mechanical routine which renders consciousness dull and languid.\nIt is, no doubt, important for our happiness that we should keep\nwithin this limit: but we cannot fix it precisely in any particular\ncase without special experience: especially as there seems always to\nbe a certain amount of weariness and tedium which must be resisted and\novercome, if we would bring our faculties into full play, and obtain\nthe full enjoyment of our labour. And similarly in respect of passive\nemotional consciousness: if too much sameness of feeling results in\nlanguor, too much variety inevitably involves shallowness. The point\nwhere concentration ought to stop, and where dissipation begins, varies\nfrom man to man, and must, it would seem, be decided by the specific\nexperience of individuals.\n\nThere is, however, another and simpler way in which the maxim\nof \u2018giving free development to one\u2019s nature\u2019 may be understood:\n_i.e._ in the sense of yielding to spontaneous impulses, instead of\nendeavouring to govern these by elaborate forecasts of consequences:\na scientific justification for this course being found in the theory\nthat spontaneous or instinctive impulses really represent the effects\nof previous experiences of pleasure and pain on the organism in which\nthey appear, or its ancestors. On this ground, it has been maintained\nthat in complicated problems of conduct, experience will \u201cenable\nthe constitution to estimate the respective amounts of pleasure and\npain consequent upon each alternative,\u201d where it is \u201cimpossible for\nthe intellect\u201d to do this: and \u201cwill further cause the organism\ninstinctively to shun that course which produces on the whole most\nsuffering.\u201d[150] That there is an important element of truth in this\ncontention I would not deny. But any broad conclusion that non-rational\ninclination is a better guide than reason to the individual\u2019s happiness\nwould be quite unwarranted by anything that we know or can plausibly\nconjecture respecting biological evolution. For--overlooking the effect\nof natural selection to foster impulses tending to the preservation\nof the race rather than the pleasure of the individual, and granting\nthat every sentient organism tends to adapt itself to its environment,\nin such a manner as to acquire instincts of some value in guiding\nit to pleasure and away from pain--it by no means follows that in\nthe human organism one particular kind of adaptation, that which\nproceeds by unconscious modification of instinct, is to be preferred\nto that other kind of adaptation which is brought about by conscious\ncomparison and inference. It rather seems clear, that this proposition\ncan only be justified by a comparison of the consequences of yielding\nto instinctive impulses with the consequences of controlling them by\ncalculations of resulting pleasure and pain. But it will hardly be\nmaintained that in the majority of clear instances where non-rational\nimpulse conflicts with rational forecast, a subsequent calculation of\nconsequences appears to justify the former; the assertion would be in\ntoo flagrant conflict with the common sense and common experience of\nmankind. Hence, however true it may be that in certain cases instinct\nis on the whole a safer guide than prudential calculation, it would\nstill seem that we can only ascertain these cases by careful reflection\non experience: we cannot determine the limits to which prudential\ncalculation may prudently be carried, except by this very calculation\nitself.\n\nWe seem, then, forced to conclude that there is no scientific short-cut\nto the ascertainment of the right means to the individual\u2019s happiness:\nevery attempt to find a \u2018high priori road\u2019 to this goal brings us back\ninevitably to the empirical method. For instead of a clear principle\nuniversally valid, we only get at best a vague and general rule, based\non considerations which it is important not to overlook, but the\nrelative value of which we can only estimate by careful observation\nand comparison of individual experience. Whatever uncertainty besets\nthese processes must necessarily extend to all our reasonings about\nhappiness. I have no wish to exaggerate these uncertainties, feeling\nthat we must all continue to seek happiness for ourselves and for\nothers, in whatever obscurity we may have to grope after it: but there\nis nothing gained by underrating them, and it is idle to argue as if\nthey did not exist.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[131] \u201cIt should seem that a due concern about our own interest or\nhappiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, ... is\nvirtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable.\u201d Butler (in the\nDissertation _Of the Nature of Virtue_ appended to the _Analogy_).\n\n[132] This view is suggested by Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s statement--in\na letter to J. S. Mill, published in Mr. Bain\u2019s _Mental and Moral\nScience_; and partially reprinted in Mr. Spencer\u2019s _Data of Ethics_,\nchap. iv. \u00a7 21--that \u201cit is the business of moral science to deduce,\nfrom the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds\nof actions necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to\nproduce unhappiness,\u201d and that when it has done this, \u201cits deductions\nare to be recognised as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to\nirrespective of a direct estimate of happiness or misery.\u201d I ought,\nhowever, to say that Mr. Spencer has made it clear in his latest\ntreatise that the only cogent deductions of this kind which he\nconceives to be possible relate to the behaviour not of men here and\nnow, but of ideal men living in an ideal society, and living under\nconditions so unlike those of actual humanity that all their actions\nproduce \u201cpleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere\u201d (_Data of Ethics_, \u00a7\n101). The laws of conduct in this Utopia constitute, in Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nview, the subject-matter of \u201cAbsolute Ethics\u201d; which he distinguishes\nfrom the \u201cRelative Ethics\u201d that concerns itself with the conduct\nof the imperfect men who live under the present imperfect social\nconditions, and of which the method is, as he admits, to a great\nextent \u201cnecessarily empirical\u201d (_Data of Ethics_, \u00a7 108). How far\nsuch a system as Mr. Spencer calls Absolute Ethics can be rationally\nconstructed, and how far its construction would be practically useful,\nI shall consider in a later part of this treatise (Book iv. chap. iv.),\nwhen I come to deal with the method of Universalistic Hedonism: at\npresent I am only concerned with the question how far any deductive\nEthics is capable of furnishing practical guidance to an individual\nseeking his own greatest happiness here and now.\n\n[133] Aristotle\u2019s theory is, briefly, that every normal\nsense-perception or rational activity has its correspondent pleasure,\nand that the most perfect is the most pleasant: the most perfect in the\ncase of any faculty being the exercise of the faculty in good condition\non the best object. The pleasure follows the activity immediately,\ngiving it a kind of finish, \u201clike the bloom of youth.\u201d Pleasures\nvary in kind, as the activities that constitute life vary: the best\npleasures are those of the philosophic life.\n\n[134] See Bouillier, _Du plaisir et de la douleur_, chap. iii.; L.\nDumont, _Th\u00e9orie scientifique de la sensibilit\u00e9_, chap. iii.; as well\nas Stout, _Analytic Psychology_, chap. xii.--to which I refer later.\n\n[135] _Lectures on Metaphysics_, vol. ii. Lect. xlii.\n\n[136] In Aristotle\u2019s exposition of this theory--which with him is only\na theory of pleasure--the ethical motive of exhibiting the philosophic\nlife as preferable to that of the sensualist, in respect of the\npleasures it affords, is quite unmistakable.\n\n[137] _Analytic Psychology_, chap. xii. 2.\n\n[138] The physiological theory which Mr. Stout puts forward, as at once\ncorrespondent and supplementary to his psychological generalisation,\nwill be noticed later.\n\n[139] _Psychology_, chap. ix. \u00a7 128.\n\n[140] Book i. chap. iv.\n\n[141] It may be added that in the case of emotional pains and\npleasures, the notion of _quantitative_ difference between the cerebral\nnerve-processes, antecedent respectively to the one and the other,\nseems altogether unwarrantable: the pains of shame, disappointed\nambition, wounded love, do not appear to be distinguishable from the\npleasures of fame, success, reciprocated affection, by any difference\nof intensity in the impressions or ideas accompanied by the pleasures\nand pains respectively.\n\n[142] See Wundt, _Grundz\u00fcge der physiologischen Psychologie_, chap. x.\n\n[143] _Power of Sound_, chap. i. \u00a7 2.\n\n[144] I say \u201cappreciably\u201d because the controverted psychological\nquestion whether there are any _strictly_ neutral or indifferent\nmodifications of consciousness seems to me unimportant from a practical\npoint of view. See Sully, _Human Mind_, chap. xiii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[145] See Stout, _Analytic Psychology_, _l.c._\n\n[146] _Physiological \u00c6sthetics_, chap. ii.\n\n[147] See Stout, _Analytic Psychology_, chap. xii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[148] See Book i. chap. iv. _Note_.\n\n[149] _Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 125, and _Data of Ethics_, \u00a7 33.\n\n[150] The quotations are from Mr. Spencer\u2019s _Social Statics_, chap.\niv.: but I should explain that in the passage quoted Mr. Spencer is not\nwriting from the point of view of Egoistic Hedonism.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nINTUITIONISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTUITIONISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The effort to examine, closely but quite neutrally, the system\nof Egoistic Hedonism, with which we have been engaged in the last\nBook, may not improbably have produced on the reader\u2019s mind a certain\naversion to the principle and method examined, even though (like\nmyself) he may find it difficult not to admit the \u2018authority\u2019 of\nself-love, or the \u2018rationality\u2019 of seeking one\u2019s own individual\nhappiness. In considering \u2018enlightened self-interest\u2019 as supplying a\n_prima facie_ tenable principle for the systematisation of conduct, I\nhave given no expression to this sentiment of aversion, being anxious\nto ascertain with scientific impartiality the results to which this\nprinciple logically leads. When, however, we seem to find on careful\nexamination of Egoism (as worked out on a strictly empirical basis)\nthat the common precepts of duty, which we are trained to regard as\nsacred, must be to the egoist rules to which it is only generally\nspeaking and for the most part reasonable to conform, but which under\nspecial circumstances must be decisively ignored and broken,--the\noffence which Egoism in the abstract gives to our sympathetic and\nsocial nature adds force to the recoil from it caused by the perception\nof its occasional practical conflict with common notions of duty. But\nfurther, we are accustomed to expect from Morality clear and decisive\nprecepts or counsels: and such rules as can be laid down for seeking\nthe individual\u2019s greatest happiness cannot but appear wanting in these\nqualities. A dubious guidance to an ignoble end appears to be all that\nthe calculus of Egoistic Hedonism has to offer. And it is by appealing\nto the superior certainty with which the dictates of Conscience or the\nMoral Faculty are issued, that Butler maintains the practical supremacy\nof Conscience over Self-love, in spite of his admission (in the passage\nbefore quoted[151]) of theoretical priority in the claims of the\nlatter.[152] A man knows certainly, he says, what he ought to do: but\nhe does not certainly know what will lead to his happiness.\n\nIn saying this, Butler appears to me fairly to represent the common\nmoral sense of ordinary mankind, in our own age no less than in his.\nThe moral judgments that men habitually pass on one another in ordinary\ndiscourse imply for the most part that duty is usually not a difficult\nthing for an ordinary man to _know_, though various seductive impulses\nmay make it difficult for him to _do_ it. And in such maxims as that\nduty should be performed \u2018advienne que pourra,\u2019 that truth should be\nspoken without regard to consequences, that justice should be done\n\u2018though the sky should fall,\u2019 it is implied that we have the power of\nseeing clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable\nin themselves, apart from their consequences;--or rather with a merely\npartial consideration of consequences, from which other consequences\nadmitted to be possibly good or bad are definitely excluded.[153] And\nsuch a power is claimed for the human mind by most of the writers who\nhave maintained the existence of moral intuitions; I have therefore\nthought myself justified in treating this claim as characteristic of\nthe method which I distinguish as Intuitional. At the same time,\nas I have before observed, there is a wider sense in which the term\n\u2018intuitional\u2019 might be legitimately applied to either Egoistic or\nUniversalistic Hedonism; so far as either system lays down as a first\nprinciple--which if known at all must be intuitively known--that\nhappiness is the only rational ultimate end of action. To this meaning\nI shall recur in the concluding chapters (xiii. and xiv.) of this Book;\nin which I shall discuss more fully the intuitive character of these\nhedonistic principles. But since the adoption of this wider meaning\nwould not lead us to a distinct ethical method, I have thought it best,\nin the detailed discussion of Intuitionism which occupies the first\neleven chapters of this Book, to confine myself as far as possible to\nMoral Intuition understood in the narrower sense above defined.\n\n\u00a7 2. Here, perhaps, it may be said that in thus defining Intuitionism I\nhave omitted its most fundamental characteristic; that the Intuitionist\nproperly speaking--in contrast with the Utilitarian--does not judge\nactions by an external standard at all; that true morality, in his\nview, is not concerned with outward actions as such, but with the\nstate of mind in which acts are done--in short with \u201cintentions\u201d and\n\u201cmotives.\u201d[154] I think, however, that this objection is partly due to\na misunderstanding. Moralists of all schools, I conceive, would agree\nthat the moral judgments which we pass on actions relate primarily to\nintentional actions regarded as intentional. In other words, what we\njudge to be \u2018wrong\u2019--in the strictest ethical sense--is not any part\nof the actual effects, as such, of the muscular movements immediately\ncaused by the agent\u2019s volition, but the effects which he foresaw in\nwilling the act; or, more strictly, his volition or choice of realising\nthe effects as foreseen.[155] When I speak therefore of acts, I must be\nunderstood to mean--unless the contrary is stated--acts presumed to be\nintentional and judged as such: on this point I do not think that any\ndispute need arise.\n\nThe case of motives is different and requires careful discussion. In\nthe first place the distinction between \u201cmotive\u201d and \u201cintention\u201d in\nordinary language is not very precise: since we apply the term \u201cmotive\u201d\nto foreseen consequences of an act, so far as they are conceived to be\nobjects of desire to the agent, or to the desire of such consequences:\nand when we speak of the intention of an act we usually, no doubt,\nhave desired consequences in view. I think, however, that for purposes\nof exact moral or jural discussion, it is best to include under the\nterm \u2018intention\u2019 all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as\ncertain or probable; since it will be admitted that we cannot evade\nresponsibility for any foreseen bad consequences of our acts by the\nplea that we felt no desire for them, either for their own sake or\nas means to ulterior ends:[156] such undesired accompaniments of the\ndesired results of our volitions are clearly chosen or willed by\nus. Hence the intention of an act may be judged to be wrong, while\nthe motive is recognised as good; as when a man commits perjury to\nsave a parent\u2019s or a benefactor\u2019s life. Such judgments are, in fact,\ncontinually passed in common moral discourse. It may, however, be said\nthat an act cannot be right, even when the intention is such as duty\nwould prescribe, if it be done from a bad motive: that--to take a case\nsuggested by Bentham--a man who prosecutes from malice a person whom\nhe believes to be guilty, does not really act rightly; for, though it\nmay be his duty to prosecute, he ought not to do it from malice. It is\ndoubtless true that it is our duty to get rid of bad motives if we can;\nso that a man\u2019s intention cannot be _wholly_ right, unless it includes\nthe repression, so far as possible, of a motive known to be bad. But\nno one, I think, will contend that we can always suppress entirely\na strong emotion; and such suppression will be especially difficult\nif we are to do the act to which the wrong impulse prompts; while\nyet, if that act be clearly a duty which no one else can so properly\nperform, it would be absurd to say that we ought to omit it because\nwe cannot altogether exclude an objectionable motive. It is sometimes\nsaid that, though we may not be able in doing our duty to exclude a\nbad motive altogether from our minds, it is still possible to refuse\nto act from it. But I think that this is only possible so far as the\ndetails of action to which a right motive would prompt differ to some\nextent from those to which a wrong motive would prompt. No doubt this\nis often the case:--thus, in Bentham\u2019s example, a malevolent prosecutor\nmay be prompted to take unfair advantage of his enemy, or cause him\nneedless pain by studied insults; and it is obviously possible for\nhim--and his duty--to resist such promptings. But so far as precisely\nthe same action is prompted by two different motives, both present in\nmy consciousness, I am not conscious of any power to cause this action\nto be determined by one of the two motives to the exclusion of the\nother. In other words, while a man can resolve to aim at any end which\nhe conceives as a possible result of his voluntary action, he cannot\nsimultaneously resolve _not_ to aim at any other end which he believes\nwill be promoted by the same action; and if that other end be an object\nof desire to him, he cannot, while aiming at it, refuse to act from\nthis desire.[157]\n\nOn the whole, then, I conclude (1) that while many actions are\ncommonly judged to be made _better_ or _worse_ by the presence or\nabsence of certain motives, our judgments of _right_ and _wrong_\nstrictly speaking relate to intentions, as distinguished from\nmotives;[158] and (2) that while intentions affecting the agent\u2019s own\nfeelings and character are morally prescribed no less than intentions\nto produce certain external effects, still, the latter form the\nprimary--though not the sole--content of the main prescriptions of\nduty, as commonly affirmed and understood: but the extent to which this\nis the case, will become more clear as we proceed.\n\nIt has indeed been maintained by moralists of influence that the moral\nvalue of our conduct depends upon the degree to which we are actuated\nby the one motive which they regard as truly moral: viz. the desire\nor free choice[159] of doing what is right as such, realising duty or\nvirtue for duty or virtue\u2019s sake:[160] and that a perfectly good act\nmust be done entirely from this motive. I think, however, that it is\ndifficult to combine this view--which I may conveniently distinguish as\nStoical--with the belief, which modern orthodox moralists have usually\nbeen concerned to maintain, that it is always a man\u2019s true interest\nto act virtuously. I do not mean that a man who holds this belief\nmust necessarily be an egoist: but it seems to me impossible for him\nto exclude from his motives a regard for his own interest, while yet\nbelieving that it will be promoted by the act which he is willing.\nIf, therefore, we hold that this self-regard impairs the moral value\nof an act otherwise virtuous, and at the same time hold that virtue\nis always conducive to the virtuous agent\u2019s interest, we seem driven\nto the conclusion that knowledge of the true relation between virtue\nand happiness is an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of moral\nperfection. I cannot accept this paradox: and in subsequent chapters\nI shall try to show that the Stoical view of moral goodness is not on\nthe whole sustained by a comprehensive survey and comparison of common\nmoral judgments: since in some cases acts appear to have the quality\nof virtue even more strikingly when performed from some motive other\nthan the love of virtue as such. For the present I wish rather to point\nout that the doctrine above stated is diametrically opposed to the\nview that the universal or normal motives of human action are either\nparticular desires of pleasure or aversions to pain for the agent\nhimself, or the more general regard to his happiness on the whole which\nI term Self-love; that it also excludes the less extreme doctrine that\nduties may be to some extent properly done from such self-regarding\nmotives; and that one or other of these positions has frequently been\nheld by writers who have expressly adopted an Intuitional method of\nEthics. For instance, we find Locke laying down, without reserve or\nqualification, that \u201cgood and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain,\nor that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us:\u201d[161] so\nthat \u201cit would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free\nactions of man, without annexing it to some reward or punishment to\ndetermine his will.\u201d On the other hand, he expresses, with no less\nemphasis, the conviction that \u201cfrom self-evident propositions, by\nnecessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the\nmeasures of right and wrong might be made out,\u201d[162] so that \u201cmorality\nmight be placed among the sciences capable of demonstration.\u201d The\ncombination of these two doctrines gives us the view that moral rules\nare essentially laws of God, which men are impelled to obey, solely or\nmainly, from fear or hope of divine punishments or rewards; and some\nsuch view as this seems to be widely accepted, by plain men without\nvery refined moral sensibilities.\n\nAs an example, again, of thinkers who, while recognising in human\nnature a disinterested regard for duty or virtue as such, still\nconsider that self-love is a proper and legitimate motive to right\nconduct, we may refer to Butler and his disciples. Butler regards\n\u201creasonable self-love\u201d as not merely a normal motive to human action,\nbut as being--no less than conscience--a \u201cchief or superior principle\nin the nature of man\u201d; so that an action \u201cbecomes unsuitable\u201d to this\nnature, if the principle of self-love be violated. Accordingly the\naim of his teaching is not to induce men to choose duty rather than\ninterest, but to convince them that there is no inconsistency between\nthe two; that self-love and conscience lead \u201cto one and the same course\nof life.\u201d\n\nThis intermediate doctrine appears to me to be more in harmony with\nthe common sense of mankind on the whole than either of the extreme\nviews before contrasted. But I do not conceive that any one of the\nthree positions is inconsistent with fundamental assumptions of the\nIntuitional method. Even those who hold that human beings cannot\nreasonably be expected to conform to moral rules disinterestedly, or\nfrom any other motive than that supplied by the sanctions divinely\nattached to them, still commonly conceive God as supreme Reason,\nwhose laws must be essentially reasonable: and so far as such laws\nare held to be cognisable by the \u2018light of nature\u2019--so that morality,\nas Locke says, may be placed among demonstrative sciences--the method\nof determining them will be none the less intuitional because it is\ncombined with the belief that God will reward their observance and\npunish their violation. On the other hand those who hold that regard\nfor duty as duty is an indispensable condition of acting rightly,\nwould generally admit that acting rightly is not adequately defined as\nacting from a pure desire to act rightly; that though, in a certain\nsense, a man who sincerely desires and intends to act rightly does all\nhe can, and completely fulfils duty, still such a man may have a wrong\njudgment as to the particulars of his duty, and therefore, in another\nsense, may act wrongly. If this be admitted, it is evident that, even\non the view that the desire or resolution to fulfil duty as such is\nessential to right action, a distinction between two kinds of rightness\nis required; which we may express by saying that an act is--on this\nview--\u201cformally\u201d[163] right, if the agent in willing is moved by pure\ndesire to fulfil duty or chooses duty for duty\u2019s sake; \u201cmaterially\u201d\nright, if he intends the right particular effects. This distinction\nbeing taken, it becomes plain that there is no reason why the same\nprinciples and method for determining material rightness, or rightness\nof particular effects, should not be adopted by thinkers who differ\nmost widely on the question of formal rightness; and it is, obviously,\nwith material rightness that the work of the systematic moralist is\nmainly concerned.\n\n\u00a7 3. The term \u2018formal rightness,\u2019 as above used, implying a _desire_ or\nchoice of the act as right, implies also a _belief_ that it is so. But\nthe latter condition may exist without the former: I cannot perform an\nact from pure love of duty without believing it to be right: but I can\nbelieve it to be right and yet do it from some other motive. And there\nseems to be more agreement among moralists who adopt the Intuitional\nMethod as to the moral indispensability of such a belief, than we have\nfound with respect to the question of motive: at least, it would, I\nconceive, be universally held that no act can be absolutely right,\nwhatever its external aspect and relations, which is believed by the\nagent to be wrong.[164] Such an act we may call \u201csubjectively\u201d wrong,\neven though \u201cobjectively\u201d right. It may still be asked whether it is\nbetter in any particular case that a man should do what he mistakenly\nbelieves to be his duty, or what really is his duty in the particular\ncircumstances--considered apart from his mistaken belief--and would\nbe completely right if he could only think so. The question is rather\nsubtle and perplexing to Common Sense: it is therefore worth while to\npoint out that it can have only a limited and subordinate practical\napplication. For no one, in considering what he ought himself to do\nin any particular case, can distinguish what he believes to be right\nfrom what really is so: the necessity for a practical choice between\n\u2018subjective\u2019 and \u2018objective\u2019 rightness can only present itself in\nrespect of the conduct of another person whom it is in our power to\ninfluence. If another is about to do what we think wrong while he\nthinks it right, and we cannot alter his belief but can bring other\nmotives to bear on him that may overbalance his sense of duty, it\nbecomes necessary to decide whether we ought thus to tempt him to\nrealise what we believe to be objectively right against his own\nconvictions. I think that the moral sense of mankind would pronounce\nagainst such temptation,--thus regarding the Subjective rightness\nof an action as more important than the Objective,--unless the evil\nof the act prompted by a mistaken sense of duty appeared to be very\ngrave.[165] But however essential it may be that a moral agent should\ndo what he believes to be right, this condition of right conduct is\ntoo simple to admit of systematic development: it is, therefore, clear\nthat the details of our investigation must relate mainly to \u2018objective\u2019\nrightness.\n\nThere is, however, one practical rule of some value, to be obtained by\nmerely reflecting on the general notion of rightness,[166] as commonly\nconceived. In a previous chapter[167] I endeavoured to make this notion\nclearer by saying that \u2018what I judge to be right must, unless I am\nin error, be judged to be so by all rational beings who judge truly\nof the matter.\u2019 This statement does not imply that what is judged\nto be right for one man must necessarily be judged so for another:\n\u2018objective\u2019 rightness may vary from _A_ to _B_ no less than the\n\u2018objective\u2019 facts of their nature and circumstances vary. There seems,\nhowever, to be this difference between our conceptions of ethical and\nphysical objectivity respectively: that we commonly refuse to admit\nin the case of the former--what experience compels us to admit as\nregards the latter--variations for which we can discover no rational\nexplanation. In the variety of coexistent physical facts we find an\naccidental or arbitrary element in which we have to acquiesce, as we\ncannot conceive it to be excluded by any extension of our knowledge\nof physical causation. If we ask, for example, why any portion of\nspace empirically known to us contains more matter than any similar\nadjacent portion, physical science can only answer by stating (along\nwith certain laws of change) some antecedent position of the parts of\nmatter which needs explanation no less than the present; and however\nfar back we carry our ascertainment of such antecedent positions, the\none with which we leave off seems as arbitrary as that with which we\nstarted. But within the range of our cognitions of right and wrong, it\nwill be generally agreed that we cannot admit a similar unexplained\nvariation. We cannot judge an action to be right for _A_ and wrong for\n_B_, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some\ndifference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in\ntheir duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, I\nimplicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and\ncircumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects.\nNow by making this latter judgment explicit, we may protect ourselves\nagainst the danger which besets the conscience, of being warped and\nperverted by strong desire, so that we too easily think that we ought\nto do what we very much wish to do. For if we ask ourselves whether\nwe believe that any similar person in similar circumstances ought to\nperform the contemplated action, the question will often disperse\nthe false appearance of rightness which our strong inclination has\ngiven to it. We see that we should not think it right for another,\nand therefore that it cannot be right for us. Indeed this test of\nthe rightness of our volitions is so generally effective, that Kant\nseems to have held that all particular rules of duty can be deduced\nfrom the one fundamental rule \u201cAct as if the maxim of thy action\nwere to become by thy will a universal law of nature.\u201d[168] But this\nappears to me an error analogous to that of supposing that Formal\nLogic supplies a complete criterion of truth. I should agree that a\nvolition which does not stand this test[169] is to be condemned; but I\nhold that a volition which does stand it may after all be wrong. For\nI conceive that all (or almost all) persons who act conscientiously\ncould sincerely will the maxims on which they act to be universally\nadopted: while at the same time we continually find such persons in\nthoroughly conscientious disagreement as to what each ought to do in a\ngiven set of circumstances. Under these circumstances, to say that all\nsuch persons act rightly--in the objective sense--because their maxims\nall conform to Kant\u2019s fundamental rule, would obliterate altogether\nthe distinction between subjective and objective rightness; it would\namount to affirming that whatever any one thinks right is so, unless he\nis in error as to the facts of the case to which his judgment applies.\nBut such an affirmation is in flagrant conflict with common sense;\nand would render the construction of a scientific code of morality\nfutile: as the very object of such a code is to supply a standard for\nrectifying men\u2019s divergent opinions.\n\nWe may conclude then that the moral judgments which the present method\nattempts to systematise are primarily and for the most part intuitions\nof the rightness or goodness (or the reverse) of particular kinds of\nexternal effects of human volition, presumed to be intended by the\nagent, but considered independently of the agent\u2019s own view as to the\nrightness or wrongness of his intention; though the quality of motives,\nas distinct from intentions, has also to be taken into account.\n\n\u00a7 4. But the question may be raised, whether it is legitimate to take\nfor granted (as I have hitherto been doing) the existence of such\nintuitions? And, no doubt, there are persons who deliberately deny\nthat reflection enables them to discover any such phenomenon in their\nconscious experience as the judgment or apparent perception that an act\nis in itself right or good, in any other sense than that of being the\nright or fit means to the attainment of some ulterior end. I think,\nhowever, that such denials are commonly recognised as paradoxical, and\nopposed to the common experience of civilised men:--at any rate if the\npsychological question, as to the _existence_ of such moral judgments\nor apparent perceptions of moral qualities, is carefully distinguished\nfrom the ethical question as to their _validity_, and from what we\nmay call the \u2018psychogonical\u2019 question as to their _origin_. The first\nand second of these questions are sometimes confounded, owing to an\nambiguity in the use of the term \u201cintuition\u201d; which has sometimes\nbeen understood to imply that the judgment or apparent perception\nso designated is _true_. I wish therefore to say expressly, that by\ncalling any affirmation as to the rightness or wrongness of actions\n\u201cintuitive,\u201d I do not mean to prejudge the question as to its ultimate\nvalidity, when philosophically considered: I only mean that its truth\nis apparently known immediately, and not as the result of reasoning. I\nadmit the possibility that any such \u201cintuition\u201d may turn out to have an\nelement of error, which subsequent reflection and comparison may enable\nus to correct; just as many apparent perceptions through the organ of\nvision are found to be partially illusory and misleading: indeed the\nsequel will show that I hold this to be to an important extent the case\nwith moral intuitions commonly so called.\n\nThe question as to the validity of moral intuitions being thus\nseparated from the simple question \u2018whether they actually exist,\u2019 it\nbecomes obvious that the latter can only be decided for each person by\ndirect introspection or reflection. It must not therefore be supposed\nthat its decision is a simple matter, introspection being always\ninfallible: on the contrary, experience leads me to regard men as often\nliable to confound with moral intuitions other states or acts of mind\nessentially different from them,--blind impulses to certain kinds of\naction or vague sentiments of preference for them, or conclusions from\nrapid and half-unconscious processes of reasoning, or current opinions\nto which familiarity has given an illusory air of self-evidence. But\nany errors of this kind, due to careless or superficial reflection,\ncan only be cured by more careful reflection. This may indeed be much\naided by communication with other minds; it may also be aided, in a\nsubordinate way, by an inquiry into the antecedents of the apparent\nintuition, which may suggest to the reflective mind sources of error\nto which a superficial view of it is liable. Still the question\nwhether a certain judgment presents itself to the reflective mind as\nintuitively known cannot be decided by any inquiry into its antecedents\nor causes.[170]\n\nIt is, however, still possible to hold that an inquiry into the\nOrigin of moral intuitions must be decisive in determining their\nValidity. And in fact it has been often assumed, both by Intuitionists\nand their opponents, that if our moral faculty can be shown to be\n\u2018derived\u2019 or \u2018developed\u2019 out of other pre-existent elements of mind\nor consciousness, a reason is thereby given for distrusting it; while\nif, on the other hand, it can be shown to have existed in the human\nmind from its origin, its trustworthiness is thereby established.\nEither assumption appears to me devoid of foundation. On the one hand,\nI can see no ground for supposing that a faculty thus derived, is, as\nsuch, more liable to error than if its existence in the individual\npossessing it had been differently caused:[171] to put it otherwise,\nI cannot see how the mere ascertainment that certain apparently\nself-evident judgments have been caused in known and determinate ways,\ncan be in itself a valid ground for distrusting this class of apparent\ncognitions. I cannot even admit that those who affirm the truth of such\njudgments are bound to show in their causes a tendency to make them\ntrue: indeed the acceptance of any such _onus probandi_ would seem to\nme to render the attainment of philosophical certitude impossible.\nFor the premises of the required demonstration must consist of caused\nbeliefs, which as having been caused will equally stand in need of\nbeing proved true, and so on _ad infinitum_: unless it be held that\nwe can find among the premises of our reasonings certain apparently\nself-evident judgments which have had no antecedent causes, and that\nthese are therefore to be accepted as valid without proof. But such an\nassertion would be an extravagant paradox: and, if it be admitted that\nall beliefs are equally in the position of being effects of antecedent\ncauses, it seems evident that this characteristic alone cannot serve to\ninvalidate any of them.\n\nI hold, therefore, that the _onus probandi_ must be thrown the other\nway: those who dispute the validity of moral or other intuitions on the\nground of their derivation must be required to show, not merely that\nthey are the effects of certain causes, but that these causes are of a\nkind that tend to produce invalid beliefs. Now it is not, I conceive,\npossible to prove by any theory of the derivation of the moral faculty\nthat the fundamental ethical conceptions \u2018right\u2019 or \u2018what ought to\nbe done,\u2019 \u2018good\u2019 or \u2018what it is reasonable to desire and seek,\u2019 are\ninvalid, and that consequently _all_ propositions of the form \u2018_X_ is\nright\u2019 or \u2018good\u2019 are untrustworthy: for such ethical propositions,\nrelating as they do to matter fundamentally different from that with\nwhich physical science or psychology deals, cannot be inconsistent\nwith any physical or psychological conclusions. They can only be shown\nto involve error by being shown to contradict each other: and such a\ndemonstration cannot lead us cogently to the sweeping conclusion that\nall are false. It may, however, be possible to prove that some ethical\nbeliefs have been caused in such a way as to make it probable that they\nare wholly or partially erroneous: and it will hereafter be important\nto consider how far any Ethical intuitions, which we find ourselves\ndisposed to accept as valid, are open to attack on such psychogonical\ngrounds. At present I am only concerned to maintain that no general\ndemonstration of the derivedness or developedness of our moral faculty\ncan supply an adequate reason for distrusting it.\n\nOn the other hand, if we have been once led to distrust our moral\nfaculty on other grounds--as (_e.g._) from the want of clearness and\nconsistency in the moral judgments of the same individual, and the\ndiscrepancies between the judgments of different individuals--it seems\nto me equally clear that our confidence in such judgments cannot\nproperly be re-established by a demonstration of their \u2018originality.\u2019\nI see no reason to believe that the \u2018original\u2019 element of our moral\ncognition can be ascertained; but if it could, I see no reason to hold\nthat it would be especially free from error.\n\n\u00a7 5. How then can we hope to eliminate error from our moral intuitions?\nOne answer to this question was briefly suggested in a previous chapter\nwhere the different phases of the Intuitional Method were discussed.\nIt was there said that in order to settle the doubts arising from the\nuncertainties and discrepancies that are found when we compare our\njudgments on particular cases, reflective persons naturally appeal\nto general rules or formul\u00e6: and it is to such general formul\u00e6 that\nIntuitional Moralists commonly attribute ultimate certainty and\nvalidity. And certainly there are obvious sources of error in our\njudgments respecting concrete duty which seem to be absent when we\nconsider the abstract notions of different kinds of conduct; since\nin any concrete case the complexity of circumstances necessarily\nincreases the difficulty of judging, and our personal interests or\nhabitual sympathies are liable to disturb the clearness of our moral\ndiscernment. Further, we must observe that most of us feel the need\nof such formul\u00e6 not only to correct, but also to supplement, our\nintuitions respecting particular concrete duties. Only exceptionally\nconfident persons find that they always seem to see clearly what ought\nto be done in any case that comes before them. Most of us, however\nunhesitatingly we may affirm rightness and wrongness in ordinary\nmatters of conduct, yet not unfrequently meet with cases where our\nunreasoned judgment fails us; and where we could no more decide the\nmoral issue raised without appealing to some general formula, than we\ncould decide a disputed legal claim without reference to the positive\nlaw that deals with the matter.\n\nAnd such formul\u00e6 are not difficult to find: it only requires a little\nreflection and observation of men\u2019s moral discourse to make a\ncollection of such general rules, as to the validity of which there\nwould be apparent agreement at least among moral persons of our own age\nand civilisation, and which would cover with approximate completeness\nthe whole of human conduct. Such a collection, regarded as a code\nimposed on an individual by the public opinion of the community\nto which he belongs, we have called the Positive Morality of the\ncommunity: but when regarded as a body of moral truth, warranted to\nbe such by the _consensus_ of mankind,--or at least of that portion\nof mankind which combines adequate intellectual enlightenment with\na serious concern for morality--it is more significantly termed the\nmorality of Common Sense.\n\nWhen, however, we try to apply these currently accepted principles, we\nfind that the notions composing them are often deficient in clearness\nand precision. For instance, we should all agree in recognising Justice\nand Veracity as important virtues; and we shall probably all accept the\ngeneral maxims, that \u2018we ought to give every man his own\u2019 and that \u2018we\nought to speak the truth\u2019: but when we ask (1) whether primogeniture\nis just, or the disendowment of corporations, or the determination of\nthe value of services by competition, or (2) whether and how far false\nstatements may be allowed in speeches of advocates, or in religious\nceremonials, or when made to enemies or robbers, or in defence of\nlawful secrets, we do not find that these or any other current maxims\nenable us to give clear and unhesitating decisions. And yet such\nparticular questions are, after all, those to which we naturally expect\nanswers from the moralist. For we study Ethics, as Aristotle says, for\nthe sake of Practice: and in practice we are concerned with particulars.\n\nHence it seems that if the formul\u00e6 of Intuitive Morality are really to\nserve as scientific axioms, and to be available in clear and cogent\ndemonstrations, they must first be raised--by an effort of reflection\nwhich ordinary persons will not make--to a higher degree of precision\nthan attaches to them in the common thought and discourse of mankind\nin general. We have, in fact, to take up the attempt that Socrates\ninitiated, and endeavour to define satisfactorily the general notions\nof duty and virtue which we all in common use for awarding approbation\nor disapprobation to conduct. This is the task upon which we shall be\nengaged in the nine chapters that follow. I must beg the reader to\nbear in mind that throughout these chapters I am not trying to prove or\ndisprove Intuitionism, but merely by reflection on the common morality\nwhich I and my reader share, and to which appeal is so often made in\nmoral disputes, to obtain as explicit, exact, and coherent a statement\nas possible of its fundamental rules.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[151] See p. 119.\n\n[152] It may seem, he admits, that \u201csince interest, one\u2019s own\nhappiness, is a manifest obligation,\u201d in any case in which virtuous\naction appears to be not conducive to the agent\u2019s interest, he would\nbe \u201cunder two contrary obligations, _i.e._ under none at all. But,\u201d he\nurges, \u201cthe obligation on the side of interest really does not remain.\nFor the natural authority of the principle of reflection or conscience\nis an obligation ... the most certain and known: whereas the contrary\nobligation can at the utmost appear no more than probable: since no\nman can be _certain_ in any circumstances that vice is his interest in\nthe present world, much less can he be certain against another: and\nthus the certain obligation would entirely supersede and destroy the\nuncertain one.\u201d--(Preface to Butler\u2019s _Sermons_.)\n\n[153] I have before observed (Book i. chap. viii. \u00a7 1) that in the\ncommon notion of an act we include a certain portion of the whole\nseries of changes partly caused by the volition which initiated the\nso-called act.\n\n[154] Some would add \u201ccharacter\u201d and \u201cdisposition.\u201d But since\ncharacters and disposition not only cannot be known directly but can\nonly be definitely conceived by reference to the volitions and feelings\nin which they are manifested, it does not seem to me possible to regard\nthem as the primary objects of intuitive moral judgments. See chap. ii.\n\u00a7 2 of this Book.\n\n[155] No doubt we hold a man responsible for unintended bad\nconsequences of his acts or omissions, when they are such as he might\nwith ordinary care have foreseen; still, as I have before said (p. 60),\nwe admit on reflection that moral blame only attaches to such careless\nacts or omissions indirectly, in so far as the carelessness is the\nresult of some previous wilful neglect of duty.\n\n[156] I think that common usage, when carefully considered, will be\nfound to admit this definition. Suppose a nihilist blows up a railway\ntrain containing an emperor and other persons: it will no doubt be held\ncorrect to say simply that his intention was to kill the emperor; but\nit would be thought absurd to say that he \u2018did not intend\u2019 to kill the\nother persons, though he may have had no desire to kill them and may\nhave regarded their death as a lamentable incident in the execution of\nhis revolutionary plans.\n\n[157] A further source of confusion between \u201cintention\u201d and \u201cmotive\u201d\narises from the different points of view from which either may be\njudged. Thus an act may be one of a series which the agent purposes\nto do for the attainment of a certain end: and our moral judgment of\nit may be very different, according as we judge the intention of the\nparticular act, or the general intention of the series regarded as a\nwhole. Either point of view is legitimate, and both are often required;\nfor we commonly recognise that, of the series of acts which a man does\nto attain (_e.g._) any end of ambition, some may be right or allowable,\nwhile others are wrong; while the general intention to attain the end\nby wrong means, if necessary, as well as right--\n\n \u201cGet place and wealth, if possible with grace;\n If not, by any means get wealth and place\u201d--\n\nis clearly a wrong intention. So again, in judging a motive to be good\nor bad, we may either consider it simply in itself, or in connexion\nwith other balancing and controlling motives--either actually present\nalong with it, or absent when they ought to be present. Thus in the\nabove case we do not commonly think the desire for wealth or rank bad\nin itself; but we think it bad as the sole motive of a statesman\u2019s\npublic career. It is easy to see that one or other of these different\ndistinctions is apt to blend with and confuse the simple distinction\nbetween intention and motive.\n\n[158] The view that moral judgments relate primarily or most properly\nto motives will be more fully discussed in chap. xii. of this Book.\n\n[159] I use these alternative terms in order to avoid the Free Will\nControversy.\n\n[160] Many religious persons would probably say that the motive of\nobedience or love to God was the highest. But those who take this view\nwould generally say that obedience and love are due to God as a Moral\nBeing, possessing the attributes of Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, and\nnot otherwise: and if so, these religious motives would seem to be\nsubstantially identical with regard for duty and love of virtue, though\nmodified and complicated by the addition of emotions belonging to\nrelations between persons.\n\n[161] Locke\u2019s _Essay_, II. c. 28, \u00a7\u00a7 5, 6.\n\n[162] _Ibid._ IV. c. 3, \u00a7 18.\n\n[163] I do not myself usually employ the antithesis of Form and Matter\nin philosophical exposition, as it appears to me open to the charge of\nobscurity and ambiguity. In the present case we may interpret \u201cformal\nrightness\u201d as denoting at once a _universal_ and _essential_, and a\n_subjective_ or _internal_ condition of the rightness of actions.\n\n[164] It is not, I conceive, commonly held to be indispensable, in\norder to constitute an act completely right, that a belief that it\nis right should be actually present in the agent\u2019s mind: it might be\ncompletely right, although the agent never actually raised the question\nof its rightness or wrongness. See p. 225.\n\n[165] The decision would, I think, usually be reached by weighing\nbad consequences to the agent\u2019s character against bad consequences\nof a different kind. In extreme cases the latter consideration would\ncertainly prevail in the view of common sense. Thus we should generally\napprove a statesman who crushed a dangerous rebellion by working on the\nfear or cupidity of a leading rebel who was rebelling on conscientious\ngrounds. Cf. _post_, Book iv. chap. iii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[166] The antithesis of \u2018subjective\u2019 and \u2018objective\u2019 cannot be applied\nto the condition of right conduct considered in this paragraph: for\nthis formal condition is at once subjective and objective; being,\nas I argue, involved in our common notion of right conduct, it\nis, therefore, necessarily judged by us to be of really universal\napplication: and, though it does not secure complete objective\nrightness, it is an important protection against objective wrongness.\n\n[167] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[168] See the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ (pp. 269-273,\nHartenstein; Abbott\u2019s transl. [1879] pp. 54-61). Here Kant first says,\n\u201cThere is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: _Act\nonly on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it\nshould become a universal law_. Now, if all imperatives of duty can be\ndeduced from this one imperative as from their principle ... we shall\nat least be able to show what we understand by [duty] and what this\nnotion means.\u201d He then demonstrates the application of the principle\nto four cases, selected as representative of \u201cthe many actual duties\u201d;\nand continues: \u201cif now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any\ntransgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that\nour maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us\u201d\n...: then, summing up the conclusion of this part of his argument, he\nsays, \u201cwe have exhibited clearly and definitely for _every practical\napplication_ the content of the categorical imperative which must\ncontain the principle of all duty, if there is such a thing at all.\u201d\n\n[169] I do not mean that I am prepared to accept Kant\u2019s fundamental\nmaxim, in the precise form in which he has stated it: but the\nqualifications which it seems to me to require will be more\nconveniently explained later.\n\n[170] See Book i. chap. iii. p. 32.\n\n[171] I cannot doubt that every one of our cognitive faculties,--in\nshort the human mind as a whole,--has been derived and developed,\nthrough a gradual process of physical change, out of some lower life\nin which cognition, properly speaking, had no place. On this view, the\ndistinction between \u2018original\u2019 and \u2018derived\u2019 reduces itself to that\nbetween \u2018prior\u2019 and \u2018posterior\u2019 in development: and the fact that the\nmoral faculty appears somewhat later in the process of evolution than\nother faculties can hardly be regarded as an argument against the\nvalidity of moral intuition; especially since this process is commonly\nconceived to be homogeneous throughout. Indeed such a line of reasoning\nwould be suicidal; as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed\nis certainly later in development than moral cognition, and would\ntherefore, by this reasoning, be less trustworthy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nVIRTUE AND DUTY\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Before, however, we attempt to define particular virtues or\ndepartments of duty, it will be well to examine further the notions\nof Duty and Virtue in general, and the relations between the two, as\nwe find them implicitly conceived by the common sense of mankind,\nwhich we are endeavouring to express. Hitherto I have taken Duty to\nbe broadly convertible with Right conduct: I have noticed, however,\nthat the former term--like \u201cought\u201d and \u201cmoral obligation\u201d--implies at\nleast the _potential_ presence of motives prompting to wrong conduct;\nand is therefore not applicable to beings to whom no such conflict of\nmotives can be attributed. Thus God is not conceived as performing\nduties, though He is conceived as realising Justice and other kinds of\nRightness in action. For a similar reason, we do not commonly apply the\nterm \u2018duty\u2019 to right actions--however necessary and important--when\nwe are so strongly impelled to them by non-moral inclinations that no\nmoral impulse is conceived to be necessary for their performance. Thus\nwe do not say generally that it is a duty to eat and drink enough:\nthough we do often say this to invalids who have lost their appetite.\nWe should therefore perhaps keep most close to usage if we defined\nDuties as \u2018those Right actions or abstinences, for the adequate\naccomplishment of which a moral impulse is conceived to be at least\noccasionally necessary.\u2019 But as this line of distinction is vague, and\ncontinually varying, I shall not think it necessary to draw attention\nto it in the detailed discussion of duties: it seems sufficient to\npoint out that we shall be chiefly concerned with such right conduct as\ncomes within the definition just suggested.\n\nIt may be said, however, that there is another implication in the term\n\u201cduty\u201d which I have so far overlooked, but which its derivation--and\nthat of the equivalent term \u2018obligation\u2019--plainly indicates: viz.\nthat it is \u201cdue\u201d or owed to some one. But I think that here the\nderivation does not govern the established usage: rather, it is\ncommonly recognised that duties owed _to_ persons, or \u201crelative\u201d\nduties, are only one species, and that some duties--as (_e.g._)\nTruth-speaking--have no such relativity. No doubt it is possible\nto view any duty as relative to the person or persons immediately\naffected by its performance; but it is not usual to do this where\nthe immediate effects are harmful--as where truth-speaking causes a\nphysically injurious shock to the person addressed--: and though it\nmay still be conceived to be ultimately good for society, and so \u201cdue\u201d\nto the community or to humanity at large, that truth should even in\nthis case be spoken, this conception hardly belongs to the intuitional\nview that \u2018truth should be spoken regardless of consequences.\u2019 Again,\nit may be thought by religious persons that the performance of duties\nis owed not to the human or other living beings affected by them, but\nto God as the author of the moral law. And I certainly would not deny\nthat our common conception of duty involves an implied relation of an\nindividual will to a universal will conceived as perfectly rational:\nbut I am not prepared to affirm that this implication is necessary, and\nan adequate discussion of the difficulties involved in it would lead to\nmetaphysical controversies which I am desirous of avoiding. I propose,\ntherefore, in this exposition of the Intuitional method, to abstract\nfrom this relation of Duty generally to a Divine Will: and, for reasons\npartly similar, to leave out of consideration the particular \u201cduties to\nGod\u201d which Intuitionists have often distinguished and classified. Our\nview of the general rules of \u201cduty to man\u201d (or to other animals)--so\nfar as such rules are held to be cognisable by moral intuition--will,\nI conceive, remain the same, whether or not we regard such rules as\nimposed by a Supreme Rational Will: since in any case they will be\nsuch as we hold it rational for all men to obey, and therefore such\nas a Supreme Reason would impose. I shall not therefore treat the\nterm \u201cDuty\u201d as implying necessarily a relation either to a universal\nImponent or to the individuals primarily affected by the performance\nof duties: but shall use it as equivalent generally to Right conduct,\nwhile practically concentrating attention on acts and abstinences for\nwhich a moral impulse is thought to be more or less required.\n\nThe notion of Virtue presents more complexity and difficulty, and\nrequires to be discussed from different points of view. We may begin\nby noticing that there seem to be some particular virtues (such as\nGenerosity) which may be realised in acts objectively--though not\nsubjectively--wrong, from want of insight into their consequences: and\neven some (such as Courage) which may be exhibited in wrong acts that\nare known by the agent to be such. But though the contemplation of such\nacts excites in us a quasi-moral admiration, in the latter case we\ncertainly should not call them virtuous, and it is doubtful whether we\nshould do so in the former case, if we were using the term strictly.\nIt will therefore involve no material deviation from usage, if we\nlimit the term \u201cVirtue\u201d to qualities exhibited in right conduct:[172]\naccordingly I propose to adopt this limitation in subsequent\ndiscussions.\n\nHow far, then, are we to regard the spheres of Duty and Virtue (thus\ndefined) as co-extensive? To a great extent they undoubtedly are so,\nin the common application of the terms, but not altogether: since in\nits common use each term seems to include something excluded from the\nother. We should scarcely say that it was virtuous--under ordinary\ncircumstances--to pay one\u2019s debts, or give one\u2019s children a decent\neducation, or keep one\u2019s aged parents from starving; these being duties\nwhich most men perform, and only bad men neglect. On the other hand,\nthere are acts of high and noble virtue which we commonly regard as\ngoing beyond the strict duty of the agent; since, while we praise their\nperformance, we do not condemn their non-performance. Here, however,\na difficulty seems to arise; for we should not deny that it is, in\nsome sense, a man\u2019s strict duty to do whatever action he judges most\nexcellent, so far as it is in his power.\n\nBut can we say that it is as much in a man\u2019s power to realise Virtue\nas it is to fulfil Duty?[173] To some extent, no doubt, we should\nsay this: no quality of conduct is ever called a virtue unless it\nis thought to be _to some extent_ immediately attainable at will\nby all ordinary persons, when circumstances give opportunity for\nits manifestation. In fact the line between virtues and other\nexcellences of behaviour is commonly drawn by this characteristic of\nvoluntariness;--an excellence which we think no effort of will could at\nonce enable us to exhibit in any appreciable degree is called a gift,\ngrace, or talent, but not properly a virtue. Writers like Hume,[174]\nwho obliterate this line, diverge manifestly from common sense. Still\nI regard it as manifestly paradoxical to maintain that it is in the\npower of any one at any time to realise virtue in the highest form or\ndegree; (_e.g._) no one would affirm that any ordinary man can at will\nexhibit the highest degree of courage in the sense in which courage\nis a virtue--when occasion arises. It would seem, therefore, that we\ncan distinguish a margin of virtuous conduct, which may be beyond the\nstrict duty of any individual as being beyond his power.\n\nCan we then, excluding this margin, say that virtuous conduct, so\nfar as it is in a man\u2019s power, coincides completely with his duty?\nCertainly we should agree that a truly moral man cannot say to himself,\n\u201cThis is the best thing on the whole for me to do, but yet it is not\nmy duty to do it though it is in my power\u201d: this would certainly seem\nto common sense an immoral paradox.[175] And yet there seem to be acts\nand abstinences which we praise as virtuous, without imposing them as\nduties upon all who are able to do them; as for a rich man to live very\nplainly and devote his income to works of public beneficence.\n\nPerhaps we may harmonise these inconsistent views by distinguishing\nbetween the questions \u2018what a man ought to do or forbear\u2019 and \u2018what\nother men ought to blame him for not doing or forbearing\u2019: and\nrecognising that the standard normally applied in dealing with the\nlatter question is laxer than would be right in dealing with the\nformer. But how is this double standard to be explained? We may\npartly explain it by the different degrees of our knowledge in the\ntwo cases: there are many acts and forbearances of which we cannot\nlay down definitely that they ought to be done or forborne, unless\nwe have the complete knowledge of circumstances which a man commonly\npossesses only in his own case, and not in that of other men. Thus I\nmay easily assure myself that I ought to subscribe to a given hospital:\nbut I cannot judge whether my neighbour ought to subscribe, as I do\nnot know the details of his income and the claims which he is bound\nto satisfy. I do not, however, think that this explanation is always\napplicable: I think that there are not a few cases in which we refrain\nfrom blaming others for the omission of acts which we do not doubt that\nwe in their place should have thought it our duty to perform. In such\ncases the line seems drawn by a more or less conscious consideration of\nwhat men ordinarily do, and by a social instinct as to the practical\neffects of expressed moral approbation and disapprobation: we think\nthat moral progress will on the whole be best promoted by our praising\nacts that are above the level of ordinary practice, and confining our\ncensure--at least if precise and particular--to acts that fall clearly\nbelow this standard. But a standard so determined must be inevitably\nvague, and tending to vary as the average level of morality varies\nin any community, or section of a community: indeed it is the aim of\npreachers and teachers of morality to raise it continually. Hence it is\nnot convenient to use it in drawing a theoretical line between Virtue\nand Duty: and I have therefore thought it best to employ the terms so\nthat virtuous conduct may include the performance of duty as well as\nwhatever good actions may be commonly thought to go beyond duty; though\nrecognising that Virtue in its ordinary use is most conspicuously\nmanifested in the latter.\n\n\u00a7 2. So far I have been considering the term \u2018Virtuous\u2019 as applied to\nconduct. But both this general term, and the names connoting particular\nvirtues--\u201cjust,\u201d \u201cliberal,\u201d \u201cbrave,\u201d etc.--are applied to persons as\nwell as to their acts: and the question may be raised which application\nis most appropriate or primary. Here reflection, I think, shows that\nthese attributes are not thought by us to belong to acts considered\napart from their agents: so that Virtue seems to be primarily a\nquality of the soul or mind, conceived as permanent in comparison\nwith the transient acts and feelings in which it is manifested. As so\nconceived it is widely held to be a possession worth aiming at for\nits own sake; to be, in fact, a part of that Perfection of man which\nis by some regarded as the sole Ultimate Good. This view I shall\nconsider in a subsequent chapter.[176] Meanwhile it may be observed\nthat Virtues, like other habits and dispositions, though regarded as\ncomparatively permanent attributes of the mind, are yet attributes of\nwhich we can only form definite notions by conceiving the particular\ntransient phenomena in which they are manifested. If then we ask in\nwhat phenomena Virtuous character is manifested, the obvious answer is\nthat it is manifested in voluntary actions, so far as intentional; or,\nmore briefly, in volitions. And many, perhaps most, moralists would\ngive this as a complete answer. If they are not prepared to affirm with\nKant that a good will is the only absolute and unconditional Good,\nthey will at any rate agree with Butler that \u201cthe object of the moral\nfaculty is actions, comprehending under that name active or practical\nprinciples: those principles from which men would act if occasions\nand circumstances gave them power.\u201d And if it be urged that more than\nthis is included (_e.g._) in the Christian conception of the Virtue\nof Charity, the \u201clove of our neighbour,\u201d they will explain with Kant\nthat by this love we must not understand the emotion of affection, but\nmerely the resolution to benefit, which alone has \u201ctrue moral worth.\u201d\n\nI do not, however, think that the complete exclusion of an emotional\nelement from the conception of Virtue would be really in harmony\nwith the common sense of mankind. I think that in our common moral\njudgments certain kinds of virtuous actions are held to be at any\nrate adorned and made better by the presence of certain emotions in\nthe virtuous agent: though no doubt the element of volition is the\nmore important and indispensable. Thus the Virtue of Chastity or\nPurity, in its highest form, seems to include more than a mere settled\nresolution to abstain from unlawful lust; it includes some sentiment\nof repugnance to impurity. Again, we recognise that benefits which\nspring from affection and are lovingly bestowed are more acceptable to\nthe recipients than those conferred without affection, in the taste of\nwhich there is admittedly something harsh and dry: hence, in a certain\nway, the affection, if practical and steady, seems a higher excellence\nthan the mere beneficent disposition of the will, as resulting in more\nexcellent acts. In the case of Gratitude even the rigidity of Kant[177]\nseems to relax, and to admit an element of emotion as indispensable to\nthe virtue: and there are various other notions, such as Loyalty and\nPatriotism, which it is difficult--without paradox--either to exclude\nfrom a list of virtues or to introduce stripped bare of all emotional\nelements.\n\nA consideration of the cases last mentioned will lead us to conclude\nthat, in the view of Common Sense, the question (raised in the\npreceding chapter), whether an act is virtuous in proportion as it\nwas done from regard for duty or virtue, must be answered in the\nnegative: for the degree in which an act deserves praise as courageous,\nloyal, or patriotic does not seem to be reduced by its being shown\nthat the predominant motive to the act was natural affection and not\nlove of virtue as such. Indeed in some cases I think it clear that we\ncommonly attribute virtue to conduct where regard for duty or virtue\nis not consciously present at all: as in the case of a heroic act of\ncourage--let us say, in saving a fellow-creature from death--under an\nimpulse of spontaneous sympathy. So again, when we praise a man as\n\u201cgenuinely humble\u201d we certainly do not imply that he is conscious of\nfulfilling a duty--still less that he is conscious of exhibiting a\nvirtue--by being humble.\n\nIt further appears to me that in the case of many important virtues\nwe do not commonly consider the ultimate spring of action--whether it\nbe some emotional impulse or the rational choice of duty as duty--in\nattributing a particular virtue to particular persons: what we regard\nas indispensable is merely a settled resolve to will a certain kind\nof external effects. Thus we call a man veracious if his speech\nexhibits, in a noteworthy degree, a settled endeavour to produce in\nthe minds of others impressions exactly correspondent to the facts,\nwhatever his motive may be for so doing: whether he is moved, solely\nor mainly, by a regard for virtue, or a sense of the degradation of\nfalsehood, or a conviction that truth-speaking is in the long run the\nbest policy, or a sympathetic aversion to the inconveniences which\nmisleading statements cause to other people. I do not mean that we\nregard these motives as of equal moral value: but that the presence or\nabsence of any one or other of them is not implied in our attribution\nof the virtue of veracity. Similarly we attribute Justice, if a man\nhas a settled habit of weighing diverse claims and fulfilling them in\nthe ratio of their importance; Good Faith if he has a settled habit\nof strictly keeping express or tacit engagements: and so forth. Even\nwhere we clearly take motives into account, in judging of the degree\nof virtue it is often rather the force of seductive motives resisted\nthan the particular nature of the prevailing springs of action which\nwe consider. Thus we certainly think virtue has been manifested in a\nhigher degree in just or veracious conduct, when the agent had strong\ntemptations to be unjust or unveracious; and in the same way there are\ncertain dispositions or habits tending to good conduct which are called\nvirtues when there are powerful seductive motives operating and not\notherwise; _e.g._ when we attribute the virtue of temperance to a man\nwho eats and drinks a proper amount, it is because we also attribute to\nhim appetites prompting to excess.\n\nAt the same time I admit that Common Sense seems liable to some\nperplexity as to the relation of virtue to the moral effort required\nfor resisting unvirtuous impulses. On the one hand a general assent\nwould be given to the proposition that virtue is especially drawn out\nand exhibited in a successful conflict with natural inclination: and\nperhaps even to the more extreme statement that there is no virtue[178]\nin doing what one likes. On the other hand we should surely agree\nwith Aristotle that Virtue is imperfect so long as the agent cannot\ndo the virtuous action without a conflict of impulses; since it is\nfrom a wrong bent of natural impulse that we find it hard to do what\nis best, and it seems absurd to say that the more we cure ourselves\nof this wrong bent, the less virtuous we grow. Perhaps we may solve\nthe difficulty by recognising that our common idea of Virtue includes\ntwo distinct elements, the one being the most perfect ideal of moral\nexcellence that we are able to conceive for human beings, while the\nother is manifested in the effort of imperfect men to attain this\nideal. Thus in proportion as a man comes to like any particular kind of\ngood conduct and to do it without moral effort, we shall not say that\nhis conduct becomes less virtuous but rather more in conformity with\na true moral ideal; while at the same time we shall recognise that in\nthis department of his life he has less room to exhibit that other kind\nof virtue which is manifested in resistance to seductive impulses, and\nin the energetic striving of the will to get nearer to ideal perfection.\n\nSo far I have been considering the manifestation of virtue in emotions\nand volitions, and have not expressly adverted to the intellectual\nconditions of virtuous acts: though in speaking of such acts it is of\ncourse implied that the volition is accompanied with an intellectual\nrepresentation of the particular effects willed. It is not, however,\nimplied that in willing such effects we must necessarily think of\nthem as right or good: and I do not myself think that, in the view of\ncommon sense, this is an indispensable condition of the virtuousness\nof an act; for it seems that some kinds of virtuous acts may be done\nso entirely without deliberation that no moral judgment was passed\non them by the agent. This might be the case, for instance, with\nan act of heroic courage, prompted by an impulse of sympathy with\na fellow-creature in sudden peril. But it is, I conceive, clearly\nnecessary that such an act should not be even vaguely thought to be\nbad. As I have already said, it is more doubtful how far an act which\nis conceived by the agent to be good, but which is really bad, is ever\njudged by common sense to be virtuous[179]: but if we agree to restrict\nthe term to acts which we regard as right, it is again obvious\nthat the realisation of virtue may not be in the power of any given\nperson at any given time, through lack of the requisite intellectual\nconditions.[180]\n\nTo sum up the results of a rather complicated discussion: I consider\nVirtue as a quality manifested in the performance of duty (or good\nacts going beyond strict duty): it is indeed primarily attributed to\nthe mind or character of the agent; but it is only known to us through\nits manifestations in feelings and acts. Accordingly, in endeavouring\nto make precise our conceptions of the particular virtues, we have\nto examine the states of consciousness in which they are manifested.\nExamining these, we find that the element of volition is primarily\nimportant, and in some cases almost of sole importance, but yet\nthat the element of emotion cannot be altogether discarded without\npalpable divergence from common sense. Again, concentrating our\nattention on the volitional element, we find that in most cases what\nwe regard as manifestations of virtue are the volitions to produce\ncertain particular effects; the general determination to do right as\nright, duty for duty\u2019s sake, is indeed thought to be of fundamental\nimportance as a generally necessary spring of virtuous action; but it\nis not thought to be an indispensable condition of the existence of\nvirtue in any particular case. Similarly in considering the emotional\nelement, though an ardent love of virtue or aversion to vice generally\nis a valuable stimulus to virtuous conduct, it is not a universally\nnecessary condition of it: and in the case of some acts the presence\nof other emotions--such as kind affection--makes the acts better than\nif they were done from a purely moral motive. Such emotions, however,\ncannot be commanded at will: and this is also true of the knowledge of\nwhat ought to be done in any particular case,--which, if we restrict\nthe term \u2018virtuous\u2019 to right acts, is obviously required to render\nconduct perfectly virtuous. For these and other reasons I consider that\nthough Virtue is distinguished by us from other excellences by the\ncharacteristic of voluntariness--it must be _to some extent_ capable\nof being realised at will when occasion arises--this voluntariness\nattaches to it only in a certain degree; and that, though a man can\nalways do his Duty if he knows it, he cannot always realise virtue in\nthe highest degree.\n\nIt should, however, be observed that even when it is beyond our\npower to realise virtue immediately at will, we recognise a duty of\ncultivating it and seeking to develop it: and this duty of cultivation\nextends to all virtuous habits or dispositions in which we are found\nto be deficient, so far as we can thus increase our tendency to do the\ncorresponding acts in future; however completely such acts may on each\noccasion be within the control of the will. It is true that for acts of\nthis latter kind, so far as they are perfectly deliberate, we do not\nseem to need any special virtuous habits; if only we have knowledge of\nwhat is right and best to be done, together with a sufficiently strong\nwish to do it.[181] But, in order to fulfil our duties thoroughly,\nwe are obliged to act during part of our lives suddenly and without\ndeliberation: on such occasions there is no room for moral reasoning,\nand sometimes not even for explicit moral judgment; so that in order to\nact virtuously, we require such particular habits and dispositions as\nare denoted by the names of the special virtues: and it is a duty to\nfoster and develop these in whatever way experience shows this to be\npossible.\n\nThe complicated relation of virtue to duty, as above determined, must\nbe borne in mind throughout the discussion of the particular virtues,\nto which I shall proceed in the following chapters. But, as we have\nseen, the main part of the manifestation of virtue in conduct consists\nin voluntary actions, which it is within the power of any individual\nto do--so far as they are recognised by him as right,--and which\ntherefore come within our definition of Duty, as above laid down; it\nwill not therefore be necessary, during the greater part of the ensuing\ndiscussion, to distinguish between principles of virtuous conduct and\nprinciples of duty; since the definitions of the two will coincide.\n\n\u00a7 3. Here, however, a remark is necessary, which to some extent\nqualifies what was said in the preceding chapter, where I characterised\nthe common notions of particular virtues--justice, etc.--as too vague\nto furnish exact determinations of the actions enjoined under them. I\nthere assumed that rules of duty ought to admit of precise definition\nin a universal form: and this assumption naturally belongs to the\nordinary or jural view of Ethics as concerned with a moral code: since\nwe should agree that if obligations are imposed on any one he ought at\nleast to know what they are, and that a law indefinitely drawn must\nbe a bad law. But so far as we contemplate virtue as something that\ngoes beyond strict duty and is not always capable of being realised at\nwill, this assumption is not so clearly appropriate: since from this\npoint of view we naturally compare excellence of conduct with beauty\nin the products of the Fine Arts. Of such products we commonly say,\nthat though rules and definite prescriptions may do much, they can\nnever do all; that the highest excellence is always due to an instinct\nor tact that cannot be reduced to definite formul\u00e6. We can describe\nthe beautiful products when they are produced, and to some extent\nclassify their beauties, giving names to each; but we cannot prescribe\nany certain method for producing each kind of beauty. So, it may be\nsaid, stands the case with virtues: and hence the attempt to state an\nexplicit maxim, by applying which we may be sure of producing virtuous\nacts of any kind, must fail: we can only give a general account of\nthe virtue--a description, not a definition--and leave it to trained\ninsight to find in any particular circumstances the act that will\nbest realise it. On this view, which I may distinguish as \u00c6sthetic\nIntuitionism, I shall have something to say hereafter.[182] But I\nconceive that our primary business is to examine the larger claims of\nthose Rational or Jural Intuitionists, who maintain that Ethics admits\nof exact and scientific treatment, having for its first principles\nthe general rules of which we have spoken, or the most fundamental\nof them: and who thus hold out to us a hope of getting rid of the\nfluctuations and discrepancies of opinion, in which we acquiesce\nin \u00e6sthetic discussions, but which tend to endanger seriously the\nauthority of ethical beliefs. And we cannot, I think, decide on the\nvalidity of such claims without examining in detail the propositions\nwhich have been put forward as ethical axioms, and seeing how far they\nprove to be clear and explicit, or how far others may be suggested\npresenting these qualities. For it would not be maintained, at least\nby the more judicious thinkers of this school, that such axioms are\nalways to be found with proper exactness of form by mere observation of\nthe common moral reasonings of men; but rather that they are at least\nimplied in these reasonings, and that when made explicit their truth\nis self-evident, and must be accepted at once by an intelligent and\nunbiassed mind. Just as some mathematical axioms are not and cannot\nbe known to the multitude, as their certainty cannot be seen except\nby minds carefully prepared,--but yet, when their terms are properly\nunderstood, the perception of their absolute truth is immediate and\nirresistible. Similarly, if we are not able to claim for a proposed\nmoral axiom, in its precise form, an explicit and actual assent of\n\u201c_orbis terrarum_,\u201d it may still be a truth which men before vaguely\napprehended, and which they will now unhesitatingly admit.\n\nIn this inquiry it is not of great importance in what order we take\nthe virtues. We are not to examine the system of any particular\nmoralist, but the Morality (as it was called) of Common Sense; and the\ndiscussion of the general notions of Duty and Virtue, in which we have\nbeen engaged in the present chapter, will have shown incidentally the\ngreat difficulty of eliciting from Common Sense any clear principle\nof classification of the particular duties and virtues. Hence I\nhave thought it best to reserve what I have to say on the subject\nof classification till a later period of the discussion; and in the\nfirst place to take the matter to be investigated quite empirically,\nas we find it in the common thought expressed in the common language\nof mankind. The systems of moralists commonly attempt to give some\ndefinite arrangement to this crude material: but in so far as they are\nsystematic they generally seem forced to transcend Common Sense, and\ndefine what it has left doubtful; as I shall hereafter try to show.\n\nFor the present, then, it seems best, in this empirical investigation,\nto take the virtues rather in the order of their importance; and, as\nthere are some that seem to have a special comprehensiveness of range,\nand to include under them, in a manner, all or most of the others, it\nwill be convenient to begin with these. Of these Wisdom is perhaps the\nmost obvious: in the next chapter, therefore, I propose to examine our\ncommon conceptions of Wisdom, and certain other cognate or connected\nvirtues or excellences.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[172] It is more convenient, for the purpose of expounding the morality\nof common sense, to understand by Virtue a quality exhibited in right\nconduct; for then we can use the common notions of the particular\nvirtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or\naspects of right conduct as generally recognised. And I think that this\nemployment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as\nany other equally precise use would be.\n\n[173] In Book i. chap. v. \u00a7 3 I have explained the sense in which\nDeterminists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man\u2019s power\nto do his duty.\n\n[174] Cf. _Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_, Appendix iv.\n\n[175] If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a\nsincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be\nused in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition\nof a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not\nprepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as\nvalid--as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book,\nhear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to\nmean that such and such conduct _would_ be best if the speaker were\ndifferently constituted.\n\n[176] Chap. xiv. of this Book.\n\n[177] Cf. _Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre_, \u00a7 33: \u201cdiese Tugend, welche\nmit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Z\u00e4rtlichkeit des\nWohlwollens verbindet.\u201d\n\n[178] Or no \u201cmerit\u201d:--but so far as this latter notion is precisely\napplied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch. v. of this\nBook (on Justice).\n\n[179] I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently\nconsidered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when\nexhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues--generosity,\ncourage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad\nthrough ignorance.\n\n[180] This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole\naccepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which,\nhowever, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do\nclearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance\nas caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade\nourselves that if (_e.g._) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to\ntorture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected\nmeans of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of\nexplanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting\nit as generally true.\n\n[181] Hence the Socratic doctrine that \u2018all virtue is knowledge\u2019; on\nthe assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is\ngood.\n\n[182] See chap. xiv. \u00a7 1 of this Book.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nWISDOM AND SELF-CONTROL\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Wisdom was always placed by the Greek philosophers first in the\nlist of virtues, and regarded as in a manner comprehending all the\nothers: in fact in the post-Aristotelian schools the notion of the\nSage or ideally Wise man (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2) was regularly employed to\nexhibit in a concrete form the rules of life laid down by each system.\nIn common Greek usage, however, the term just mentioned would signify\nexcellence in purely speculative science, no less than practical\nwisdom[183]: and the English term Wisdom has, to some extent, the same\nambiguity. It is, however, chiefly used in reference to practice: and\neven when applied to the region of pure speculation suggests especially\nsuch intellectual gifts and habits as lead to sound practical\nconclusions: namely, comprehensiveness of view, the habit of attending\nimpartially to a number of diverse considerations difficult to estimate\nexactly, and good judgment as to the relative importance of each. At\nany rate, it is only Practical Wisdom which we commonly class among\nVirtues, as distinguished from purely intellectual excellences. How\nthen shall we define Practical Wisdom? The most obvious part of its\nmeaning is a tendency to discern, in the conduct of life generally,\nthe best means to the attainment of any ends that the natural play\nof human motives may lead us to seek: as contrasted with technical\nskill, or the faculty of selecting the best means to given ends in a\ncertain limited and special department of human action. Such skill in\nthe special arts is partly communicable by means of definite rules,\nand partly a matter of tact or instinct, depending somewhat on natural\ngifts and predispositions, but to a great extent acquired by exercise\nand imitation; and similarly practical Wisdom, if understood to be\nSkill in the Art of Life, would involve a certain amount of scientific\nknowledge, the portions of different sciences bearing directly on\nhuman action, together with empirical rules relating to the same\nsubject-matter; and also the tact or trained instinct just mentioned,\nwhich would even be more prominent here, on account of the extreme\ncomplexity of the subject-matter. But it does not appear from this\nanalysis why this skill should be regarded as a virtue: and reflection\nwill show that we do not ordinarily mean by wisdom merely the faculty\nof finding the best means to any ends: for we should not call the\nmost accomplished swindler wise; whereas we should not hesitate to\nattribute to him cleverness, ingenuity, and other purely intellectual\nexcellences. So again we apply the term \u201cworldly-wise\u201d to a man who\nskilfully chooses the best means to the end of ambition; but we should\nnot call such a man \u2018wise\u2019 without qualification. Wisdom, in short,\nappears to me to imply right judgment in respect of ends as well as\nmeans.\n\nHere, however, a subtle question arises. For the assumption on which\nthis treatise proceeds is that there are several ultimate ends of\naction, which all claim to be rational ends, such as every man ought\nto adopt. Hence, if Wisdom implies right judgment as to ends, it is\nclear that a person who regards some one end as the sole right or\nrational ultimate end will not consider a man wise who adopts any\nother ultimate end. Can we say then that in the common use of the word\nWisdom any one ultimate end is distinctly implied to the exclusion of\nothers? It may be suggested, perhaps, that in the moral view of Common\nSense which we are now trying to make clear, since Wisdom itself is\nprescribed or commended as a quality of conduct intuitively discerned\nto be right or good, the ultimate end which the wise man prefers must\nbe just this attainment of rightness or goodness in conduct generally;\nrather than pleasure for himself or others, or any other ulterior end.\nI think, however, that in the case of this notion it is impossible to\ncarry out that analysis of ordinary practical reasoning into several\ndistinct methods, each admitting and needing separate development,\nupon which the plan of this treatise is founded. For, as we saw, it\nis characteristic of Common Sense to assume coincidence or harmony\namong these different competing methods. And hence, while as regards\nmost particular virtues and duties, the exercise of moral judgment in\nordinary men is _prima facie_ independent of hedonistic calculations,\nand occasionally in apparent conflict with their results,--so that the\nreconciliation of the different procedures presents itself as a problem\nto be solved--in the comprehensive notion of Wisdom the antagonism is\nlatent. Common Sense seems to mean by a Wise man, a man who attains\nat once all the different rational ends; who by conduct in perfect\nconformity with the true moral code attains the greatest happiness\npossible both for himself and for mankind (or that portion of mankind\nto which his efforts are necessarily restricted). But if we find this\nharmony unattainable,--if, for example, Rational Egoism seems to\nlead to conduct opposed to the true interests of mankind in general,\nand we ask whether we are to call Wise the man who seeks, or him who\nsacrifices, his private interests,--Common Sense gives no clear reply.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us now return to the question whether Wisdom, as exhibited\nin right judgment as to ends, is in any degree attainable at will,\nand so, according to our definition, a Virtue. At first sight, the\nperception of the right end may seem not to be voluntary any more than\nthe cognition of any other kind of truth; and though in most cases\nthe attainment of truth requires voluntary effort, still we do not\ngenerally think it possible for any man, by this alone, to attain even\napproximately the right solution of a difficult intellectual problem.\nIt is often said, however, that the cognition of Moral truth depends\nlargely upon the \u2018heart,\u2019 that is, upon a certain condition of our\ndesires and other emotions: and it would seem to be on this view that\nWisdom is regarded as a Virtue; and we may admit it as such, according\nto the definition before given, so far as this condition of feeling\nis attainable at will. Still, on closer scrutiny, there hardly seems\nto be agreement as to the right emotional conditions of the cognition\nof ends: as some would say that prayer or ardent aspiration produced\nthe most favourable state, while others would urge that emotional\nexcitement is likely to perturb the judgment, and would say that we\nneed for right apprehension rather tranquillity of feeling: and some\nwould contend that a complete suppression of selfish impulses was the\nessential condition, while others would regard this as chimerical and\nimpossible, or, if possible, a plain misdirection of effort. On these\npoints we cannot decide in the name of Common Sense: but it would be\ngenerally agreed that there are certain violent passions and sensual\nappetites which are known to be liable to pervert moral apprehensions,\nand that these are to some extent under the control of the Will; so\nthat a man who exercises moral effort to resist their influence,\nwhen he wishes to decide on ends of action, may be said to be so far\nvoluntarily wise.\n\nAnd this applies to some extent even to that other function of Wisdom,\nfirst discussed, which consists in the selection of the best means\nto the attainment of given ends. For experience seems to show that\nour insight in practical matters is liable to be perverted by desire\nand fear, and that this perversion may be prevented by an effort of\nself-control: so that unwisdom, even here, is at least not altogether\ninvoluntary. Thus in a dispute which may lead to a quarrel, I may\nbe entirely unable to show foresight and skill in maintaining my\nright in such a manner as to avoid needless exasperation, and so far\nmay be unable to conduct the dispute wisely: but it is always in my\npower, before taking each important step, to reduce the influence of\nanger or wounded _amour propre_ on my decisions, and I may avoid much\nunwisdom in this way. And it is to be observed that volition has a more\nimportant part to play in developing or protecting our insight into the\nright conduct of life, than it has in respect of the technical skill to\nwhich we compared Practical Wisdom; in proportion as the reasonings in\nwhich Practical Wisdom is exhibited are less clear and exact, and the\nconclusions inevitably more uncertain. For desire and fear could hardly\nmake one go wrong in an arithmetical calculation; but in estimating a\nbalance of complicated practical probabilities it is more difficult to\nresist the influence of strong inclination: and it would seem to be\na more or less definite consciousness of the continual need of such\nresistance, which leads us to regard Wisdom as a Virtue.\n\nWe may say then that Practical Wisdom, so far as it is a virtue,\ninvolves a habit of resistance to desires and fears which is commonly\ndistinguished as Self-control. But suppose a man has determined with\nfull insight the course of conduct that it is reasonable for him to\nadopt under any given circumstances, the question still remains whether\nhe will certainly adopt it. Now I hardly think that Common Sense\nconsiders the _choice_, as distinct from the _cognition_, of right ends\nto belong to Wisdom; and yet we should scarcely call a man wise who\ndeliberately chose to do what he knew to be contrary to reason. The\ntruth seems to be that the notion of such a choice, though the modern\nmind admits it as possible,[184] is somewhat unfamiliar in comparison\nwith either (1) impulsive irrationality, or (2) mistaken choice of bad\nfor good. In the last case, if the mistake is entirely involuntary,\nthe choice has, of course, no subjective wrongness: often, however,\nthe mistaken conclusion is caused by a perverting influence of desire\nor fear of which the agent is obscurely conscious, and which might be\nresisted and dispelled by an effort of will. As so caused, the mistake\nfalls under the head of culpable unwisdom, due to want of self-control\nsimilar in kind--though not in degree--to that which is exhibited in\nthe rarer phenomenon of a man deliberately choosing to do what he knows\nto be bad for him.\n\nThe case of impulsive wrongdoing is somewhat different. It is clear\nthat a resolution made after deliberation, in accordance with our\nview of what is right, should not be abandoned or modified except\ndeliberately--at least if time for fresh deliberation be allowed--:\nand the self-control required to resist impulses prompting to such\nabandonment or modification--which we may perhaps call Firmness,--is\nan indispensable auxiliary to Wisdom. But the gusts of impulse that\nthe varying occasions of life arouse sometimes take effect so rapidly\nthat the resolution to which they run counter is not actually recalled\nat the time: and in this case the self-control or firmness required to\nprevent unreasonable action seems to be not attainable at will, when\nit is most wanted. We can, however, cultivate this important habit\nby graving our resolves deeper in the moments of deliberation that\ncontinually intervene among the moments of impulsive action.\n\n\u00a7 3. In examining the functions of Wisdom, other subordinate\nexcellences come into view, which are partly included in our ideal\nconception of Wisdom, and partly auxiliary or supplementary. Some of\nthese, however, no one would exactly call virtues: such as Sagacity in\nselecting the really important points amid a crowd of others, Acuteness\nin seeing aids or obstacles that lie somewhat hidden. Ingenuity in\ndevising subtle or complicated means to our ends, and other cognate\nqualities more or less vaguely defined and named. We cannot be acute,\nor ingenious, or sagacious when we please, though we may become more\nso by practice. The same may be said of Caution, so far as Caution\nimplies taking into due account _material_ circumstances unfavourable\nto our wishes and aims: for by no effort of will can we certainly\nsee what circumstances are material; we can only look steadily and\ncomprehensively. The term \u2018Caution,\u2019 however, may also be legitimately\napplied to a species of Self-control which we shall properly regard\nas a Virtue: viz. the tendency to deliberate whenever and so long as\ndeliberation is judged to be required, even though powerful impulses\nurge us to immediate action.[185]\n\nAnd, in antithesis to Caution, we may notice as another minor virtue\nthe quality called Decision, so far as we mean by Decision the habit of\nresisting an irrational impulse to which men are liable, of continuing\nto some extent in the deliberative attitude when they know that\ndeliberation is no longer expedient, and that they ought to be acting.\n\u2018Decision,\u2019 however, is often applied (like \u2018Caution\u2019) to denote solely\nor chiefly a merely intellectual excellence; viz. the tendency to judge\nrightly as to the time for closing deliberation.\n\nI conclude then that so far as such qualities as those which I have\ndistinguished as Caution, and Decision, are recognised as Virtues and\nnot merely as intellectual excellences, it is because they are, in\nfact, species of Self-control; _i.e._ because they involve voluntary\nadoption of and adhesion to rational judgments as to conduct, in spite\nof certain irrational motives prompting in an opposite direction. Now\nit may seem at first sight that if we suppose perfect correctness of\njudgment combined with perfect self-control, the result will be a\nperfect performance of duty in all departments; and the realisation of\nperfect Virtue, except so far as this involves the presence of certain\nspecial emotions not to be commanded at will.[186] And no doubt a\nperfectly wise and self-controlled man cannot be conceived as breaking\nor neglecting any moral rule. But it is important to observe that even\nsincere and single-minded efforts to realise what we see to be right\nmay vary in intensity; and that therefore the tendency to manifest a\nhigh degree of intensity in such efforts is properly praised as Energy,\nif the quality be purely volitional; or under some such name as Zeal\nor Moral Ardour, if the volitional energy be referred to intensity of\nemotion, and yet not connected with any emotion more special than the\ngeneral love of what is Right or Good.\n\n NOTE.--It is to be observed that in the discussions of this chapter\n the question at issue between Intuitional and Utilitarian Ethics is\n not yet reached. For, granting that we can elicit by reflection clear\n rules of duty under the heads of Wisdom, Caution and Decision, the\n rules are obviously not independent; they presuppose an intellectual\n judgment otherwise obtained, or capable of being obtained, as to what\n is right or expedient to do.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[183] Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from\nSocrates in distinguishing sharply \u2018theoretic\u2019 from \u2018practical\u2019 wisdom,\nrestricts the term \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 to the former, and uses another word\n(\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) to denote the latter.\n\n[184] I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and\nmodern thought in this respect. Cf. _ante_, Book i. chap. v. \u00a7 1, p.\n59, note.\n\n[185] It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which\nthe term \u2018Caution\u2019 is sometimes used. Since of the various means which\nwe may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain;\nand some are dangerous--that is, involve a chance of consequences\neither antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be\navoided--while others are free from such danger; \u2018Caution\u2019 is often\nused to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain\nand less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in\neach case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with\nother ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may\nentail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution\nmay obviously be determined without difficulty.\n\n[186] See p. 223, and \u00a7 2 of the next chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nBENEVOLENCE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We have seen that the virtue of Practical Wisdom comprehends all\nothers, so far as virtuous conduct in each department necessarily\nresults from a clear knowledge and choice of the true ultimate end or\nends of action, and of the best means to the attainment of such end\nor ends.[187] From this point of view, we may consider the names of\nthe special virtues as denoting special departments of this knowledge;\nwhich it is now our business to examine more closely.\n\nWhen, however, we contemplate these, we discern that there are\nother virtues, which, in different ways, may be regarded as no less\ncomprehensive than Wisdom. Especially in modern times, since the\nrevival of independent ethical speculation, there have always been\nthinkers who have maintained, in some form, the view that Benevolence\nis a supreme and architectonic virtue, comprehending and summing up\nall the others, and fitted to regulate them and determine their proper\nlimits and mutual relations.[188] This widely supported claim to\nsupremacy seems an adequate reason for giving to Benevolence the first\nplace after Wisdom, in our examination of the commonly received maxims\nof Duty and Virtue.\n\nThe general maxim of Benevolence would be commonly said to be, \u201cthat\nwe ought to love all our fellow-men,\u201d or \u201call our fellow-creatures\u201d:\nbut, as we have already seen, there is some doubt among moralists as\nto the precise meaning of the term \u201clove,\u201d in this connexion: since,\naccording to Kant and others, what is morally prescribed as the Duty\nof Benevolence is not strictly the affection of love or kindness, so\nfar as this contains an emotional element, but only the determination\nof the will to seek the good or happiness of others. And I agree that\nit cannot be a strict duty to feel an emotion, so far as it is not\ndirectly within the power of the Will to produce it at any given time.\nStill (as I have said) it seems to me that this emotional element is\nincluded in our common notion of Charity or Philanthropy, regarded\nas a Virtue: and I think it paradoxical[189] to deny that it raises\nthe mere beneficent disposition of the will to a higher degree of\nexcellence, and renders its effects better. If this be so, it will be\na duty to cultivate the affection so far as it is possible to do so:\nand indeed this would seem (no less than the permanent disposition to\ndo good) to be a normal effect of repeated beneficent resolves and\nactions: since, as has often been observed, a benefit tends to excite\nlove in the agent towards the recipient of the benefit, no less than\nin the recipient towards the agent. It must be admitted, however, that\nthis effect is less certain than the production of the benevolent\ndisposition; and that some men are naturally so unattractive to others\nthat the latter can feel no affection, though they may entertain\nbenevolent dispositions, towards the former. At any rate, it would\nseem to be a duty generally, and till we find the effort fruitless,\nto cultivate kind affections towards those whom we ought to benefit;\nnot only by doing kind actions, but by placing ourselves under any\nnatural influences which experience shows to have a tendency to produce\naffection.\n\nBut we have still to ascertain more particularly the nature of the\nactions in which this affection or disposition of will is shown. They\nare described popularly as \u2018doing good.\u2019 Now we have before[190]\nnoticed that the notion \u2018good,\u2019 in ordinary thought, includes,\nundistinguished and therefore unharmonised, the different conceptions\nthat men form of the ultimate end of rational action. It follows\nthat there is a corresponding ambiguity in the phrase \u2018doing good\u2019:\nsince, though many would unhesitatingly take it to mean the promotion\nof Happiness, there are others who, holding that Perfection and not\nHappiness is the true ultimate Good, consistently maintain that the\nreal way to \u2018do good\u2019 to people is to increase their virtue or aid\ntheir progress towards Perfection. There are, however, even among\nanti-Epicurean moralists, some--such as Kant--who take an opposite\nview, and argue that my neighbour\u2019s Virtue or Perfection cannot be\nan end to me, because it depends upon the free exercise of his own\nvolition, which I cannot help or hinder. But on the same grounds it\nmight equally well be argued that I cannot _cultivate_ Virtue in\nmyself, but only practise it from moment to moment: whereas even Kant\ndoes not deny that we can cultivate virtuous dispositions in ourselves,\nand that in other ways than by the performance of virtuous acts: and\nCommon Sense always assumes this to be possible and prescribes it as a\nduty. And surely it is equally undeniable that we can cultivate virtue\nin others: and indeed such cultivation is clearly the object not only\nof education, but of a large part of social action, especially of our\nexpression of praise and blame. And if Virtue is an ultimate end for\nourselves, to be sought for its own sake, benevolence must lead us to\ndo what is possible to obtain it for our neighbour. And indeed we see\nthat in the case of intense individual affection, the friend or lover\ngenerally longs that the beloved should be excellent and admirable\nas well as happy: perhaps, however, this is because love involves\npreference, and the lover desires that the beloved should be really\nworthy of preference as well as actually preferred by him, as otherwise\nthere is a conflict between Love and Reason.\n\nOn the whole then, I do not find, in the common view of what\nBenevolence bids us promote for others, any clear selection indicated\nbetween the different and possibly conflicting elements of Good as\ncommonly conceived. But we may say, I think, that the promotion of\nHappiness is practically the chief part of what Common Sense considers\nto be prescribed as the external duty of Benevolence: and for\nclearness\u2019 sake we will confine our attention to this in the remainder\nof the discussion.[191] It should be observed that by happiness we are\nnot to understand simply the gratification of the actual desires of\nothers, for men too often desire what would tend to their unhappiness\nin the long run: but the greatest possible amount of pleasure or\nsatisfaction for them on the whole--in short, such happiness as was\ntaken to be the rational end for each individual in the system of\nEgoistic Hedonism. It is this that Rational Benevolence bids us provide\nfor others; and if one who loves is led from affectionate sympathy\nwith the longings of the beloved to gratify those longings believing\nthat the gratification will be attended with an overplus of painful\nconsequences, we commonly say that such affection is weak and foolish.\n\n\u00a7 2. It remains to ask towards whom this disposition or affection is to\nbe maintained, and to what extent. And, firstly, it is not quite clear\nwhether we owe benevolence to men alone, or to other animals also. That\nis, there is a general agreement that we ought to treat all animals\nwith kindness, so far as to avoid causing them unnecessary pain; but it\nis questioned whether this is directly due to sentient beings as such,\nor merely prescribed as a means of cultivating kindly dispositions\ntowards men. Intuitional moralists of repute have maintained this\nlatter view: I think, however, that Common Sense is disposed to regard\nthis as a hard-hearted paradox, and to hold with Bentham that the\npain of animals is _per se_ to be avoided. Passing to consider how\nour benevolence ought to be distributed among our fellow-men, we may\nconveniently make clear the Intuitional view by contrasting it with\nthat of Utilitarianism. For Utilitarianism is sometimes said to resolve\nall virtue into universal and impartial Benevolence: it does not,\nhowever, prescribe that we should love all men equally, but that we\nshould aim at Happiness generally as our ultimate end, and so consider\nthe happiness of any one individual as equally important with the\nequal happiness of any other, as an element of this total; and should\ndistribute our kindness so as to make this total as great as possible,\nin whatever way this result may be attained. Practically of course the\ndistribution of any individual\u2019s services will, even on this view,\nbe unequal: as each man will obviously promote the general happiness\nbest by rendering services to a limited number, and to some more than\nothers: but the inequality, on the Utilitarian theory, is secondary\nand derivative. Common Sense, however, seems rather to regard it as\nimmediately certain without any such deduction that we owe special dues\nof kindness to those who stand in special relations to us. The question\nthen is, on what principles, when any case of doubt or apparent\nconflict of duties arises, we are to determine the nature and extent of\nthe special claims to affection and kind services which arise out of\nthese particular relations of human beings. Are problems of this kind\nto be solved by considering which course of conduct is on the whole\nmost conducive to the general happiness, or can we find independent\nand self-evident principles sufficiently clear and precise to furnish\npractical guidance in such cases? The different answers given to this\nfundamental question will obviously constitute the main difference\nbetween the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods; so far as the \u2018good\u2019\nwhich the benevolent man desires and seeks to confer on others is\nunderstood to be Happiness.\n\nWhen, however, we come to investigate this question we are met with\na difficulty in the arrangement of the subject, which, like most\ndifficulties of classification, deserves attentive consideration,\nas it depends upon important characteristics of the matter that has\nto be arranged. In a narrower sense of the term, Benevolence is not\nunfrequently distinguished from--and even contrasted with--Justice; we\nmay of course exercise both towards the same persons, but we commonly\nassume that the special function of Benevolence begins where Justice\nends; and it is rather with this special function that we are concerned\nin considering claims to affection, and to kind services normally\nprompted by affection. At the same time, if we consider these services\nas strictly due to persons in certain relations, the moral notion under\nwhich these duties are presented to us is not easily distinguishable\nfrom that of Justice; while yet these duties can hardly be withdrawn\nfrom the sphere of Benevolence in the narrowest sense. It is sometimes\ngiven as a distinction between Justice and Benevolence, that the\nservices which Justice prescribes can be claimed as a right by their\nrecipient, while Benevolence is essentially unconstrained: but we\ncertainly think (_e.g._) that parents have a right to filial affection\nand to the services that naturally spring from it. It is further said\nthat the duties of Affection are essentially indefinite, while those\nwe classify under the head of Justice are precisely defined: and no\ndoubt this is partly true. We not only find it hard to say exactly\nhow much a son owes his parents, but we are even reluctant[192] to\ninvestigate this: we do not think that he ought to ask for a precise\nmeasure of his duty, in order that he may do just so much and no\nmore; while a great part of Justice consists in the observance of\nstated agreements and precise rules. At the same time it is difficult\nto maintain this distinction as a ground of classification; for the\nduties of Affection are admittedly liable to come into competition with\neach other, and with other duties; and when this apparent conflict of\nduties occurs, we manifestly need as precise a definition as possible\nof the conflicting obligations, in order to make a reasonable choice\namong the alternatives of conduct presented to us. Accordingly in the\nfollowing chapter (\u00a7 2) I shall show how this competition of claims\nrenders our common notion of Justice applicable to these no less than\nto other duties: meanwhile, it seems proper to treat here separately\nof all duties that arise out of relations where affection normally\nexists, and where it ought to be cultivated, and where its absence is\ndeplored if not blamed. For all are agreed that there are such duties,\nthe non-performance of which is a ground for censure, beyond the\nobligations imposed by law, or arising out of specific contract, which\nwill come under a different head.\n\nBeyond these duties, again, there seems to be a region of performance\nwhere the services rendered cannot properly be claimed as of debt, and\nblame is not felt to be due for non-performance: and with regard to\nthis region, too,--which clearly belongs to Benevolence as contrasted\nwith Justice--there is some difficulty in stating the view of Common\nSense morality. There are two questions to be considered. We have to\nask, firstly, whether services rendered from affection, over and above\nwhat strict Duty is thought to require, are to be deemed Virtuous;\nand secondly, whether the affection itself is to be considered worthy\nof admiration as a moral excellence, and therefore a mental condition\nthat we should strive to attain. I think that Common Sense clearly\nregards as virtuous the disposition to render substantial positive\nservices to men at large, and promote their well-being,--whether such\na disposition springs out of natural kindliness of feeling towards\nhuman beings generally, or whether it is merely the result of moral\neffort and resolve--provided it is accompanied by an adequate degree\nof intellectual enlightenment.[193] And the same may be said of the\nless comprehensive affection that impels men to promote the well-being\nof the community of which they are members; and again of the affection\nthat normally tends to accompany the recognition of rightful rule or\nleadership in others. In some ages and countries Patriotism and Loyalty\nhave been regarded as almost supreme among the virtues; and even now\nCommon Sense gives them a high place.\n\nBut when we pass to more restricted, and, ordinarily more intense,\naffections, such as those which we feel for relations and friends, it\nbecomes more difficult to determine whether they are to be considered\nas moral excellences and cultivated as such.\n\nFirst, to avoid confusion, we must remark that Love is not merely a\ndesire to do good to the object beloved, although it always involves\nsuch a desire. It is primarily a pleasurable emotion, which seems\nto depend upon a certain sense of union with another person, and it\nincludes, besides the benevolent impulse, a desire of the society of\nthe beloved: and this element may predominate over the former, and\neven conflict with it, so that the true interests of the beloved may\nbe sacrificed. In this case we call the affection selfish, and do\nnot praise it at all, but rather blame. If now we ask whether intense\nLove for an individual, considered merely as a benevolent impulse,\nis in itself a moral excellence, it is difficult to extract a very\ndefinite answer from Common Sense: but I think it inclines on the\nwhole to the negative. We are no doubt generally inclined to admire\nany kind of conspicuously \u2018altruistic\u2019 conduct and any form of intense\nlove, however restricted in its scope; yet it hardly seems that the\nsusceptibility to such individualised benevolent emotions is exactly\nregarded as an essential element of moral Perfection, which we ought\nto strive after and cultivate like other moral excellences; we seem,\nin fact, to doubt whether such effort is desirable in this case, at\nleast beyond the point up to which such affection is thought to be\nrequired for the performance of recognised duties. Again, we think it\nnatural and desirable that--as generally speaking each person feels\nstrong affection for only a few individuals,--in his efforts to promote\ndirectly the well-being of others he should, to a great extent, follow\nthe promptings of such restricted affection: but we are hardly prepared\nto recommend that he should render services to special individuals\nbeyond what he is bound to render, and such as are the natural\nexpression of an eager and overflowing affection, without having any\nsuch affection to express: although, as was before said, in certain\nintimate relations we do not approve of the limits of duty being too\nexactly measured.\n\nOn the whole, then, I conclude that--while we praise and admire\nenthusiastic Benevolence and Patriotism, and are touched and charmed\nby the spontaneous lavish outflow of Gratitude, Friendship, and the\ndomestic affections--still what chiefly concerns us as moralists,\nunder the present head, is the ascertainment of the right rules of\ndistribution of services and kind acts, in so far as we consider\nthe rendering of these to be morally obligatory. For provided a man\nfulfils these duties (and observes the other recognised rules of\nmorality) Common Sense is not prepared to say how far it is right or\ngood that he should sacrifice any other noble and worthy aim--such as\nthe cultivation of knowledge or any of the fine arts--to the claims\nof philanthropy or personal affection: there seem to be no generally\naccepted \u201cintuitional\u201d principles for determining such a choice of\nalternatives.[194]\n\n\u00a7 3. What then are the duties that we owe to our fellow-men--so far as\nthey do not seem to come under the head of Justice more properly than\nBenevolence? Perhaps the mere enumeration of them is not difficult.\nWe should all agree that each of us is bound to show kindness to\nhis parents and spouse and children, and to other kinsmen in a less\ndegree: and to those who have rendered services to him, and any others\nwhom he may have admitted to his intimacy and called friends: and to\nneighbours and to fellow-countrymen more than others: and perhaps we\nmay say to those of our own race more than to black or yellow men, and\ngenerally to human beings in proportion to their affinity to ourselves.\nAnd to our country as a corporate whole we believe ourselves to owe\nthe greatest sacrifices when occasion calls (but in a lower stage\nof civilisation this debt is thought to be due rather to one\u2019s king\nor chief): and a similar obligation seems to be recognised, though\nless definitely and in a less degree, as regards minor corporations\nof which we are members. And to all men with whom we may be brought\ninto relation we are held to owe slight services, and such as may be\nrendered without inconvenience: but those who are in distress or urgent\nneed have a claim on us for special kindness. These are generally\nrecognised claims: but we find considerable difficulty and divergence,\nwhen we attempt to determine more precisely their extent and relative\nobligation: and the divergence becomes indefinitely greater when we\ncompare the customs and common opinions now existing among ourselves\nin respect of such claims, with those of other ages and countries. For\nexample, in earlier ages of society a peculiar sacredness was attached\nto the tie of hospitality, and claims arising out of it were considered\npeculiarly stringent: but this has changed as hospitality in the\nprogress of civilisation has become a luxury rather than a necessary,\nand we do not think that we owe much to a man because we have asked\nhim to dinner. Or again we may take an instance where the alteration\nis perhaps actually going on--the claims of kindred in respect of\nbequest. We should now commonly think that a man ought usually to\nleave his property to his children: but that if he has no children we\nthink he may do what he likes with it, unless any of his brothers or\nsisters are in poverty, in which case compassion seems to blend with\nand invigorate the evanescent claim of consanguinity. But in an age\nnot long past a childless man was held to be morally bound to leave\nhis money to his collateral relatives: and thus we are naturally led\nto conjecture that in the not distant future, any similar obligation\nto children--unless they are in want or unless their education is not\ncompleted--may have vanished out of men\u2019s minds. A similar change might\nbe traced in the commonly recognised duty of children to parents.\n\nIt may however be urged that this variation of custom is no obstacle to\nthe definition of duty, because we may lay down that the customs of any\nsociety ought to be obeyed so long as they are established, just as the\nlaws ought, although both customs and laws may be changed from time to\ntime. And no doubt it is generally expedient to conform to established\ncustoms: still, on reflection, we see that it cannot be laid down as\nan absolute duty. For the cases of Custom and Law are not similar: as\nin every progressive community there is a regular and settled mode of\nabrogating laws that are found bad: but customs cannot be thus formally\nabolished, and we only get rid of them through the refusal of private\nindividuals to obey them; and therefore it must be sometimes right to\ndo this, if some customs are vexatious and pernicious, as we frequently\njudge those of antique and alien communities to be. And if we say that\ncustoms should generally be obeyed, but that they may be disobeyed\nwhen they reach a certain degree of inexpediency, our method seems to\nresolve itself into Utilitarianism: for we cannot reasonably rest the\ngeneral obligation upon one principle, and determine its limits and\nexceptions by another. If the duties above enumerated can be referred\nto independent and self-evident principles, the limits of each must be\nimplicitly given in the intuition that reveals the principle.\n\n\u00a7 4. In order then to ascertain how far we possess such principles, let\nus examine in more detail what Common Sense seems to affirm in respect\nof these duties.\n\nThey seem to range themselves under four heads. There are (1)\nduties arising out of comparatively permanent relationships not\nvoluntarily chosen, such as Kindred and in most cases Citizenship\nand Neighbourhood: (2) those of similar relationships voluntarily\ncontracted, such as Friendship: (3) those that spring from special\nservices received, or Duties of Gratitude: and (4) those that seem due\nto special need, or Duties of Pity. This classification is, I think,\nconvenient for discussion: but I cannot profess that it clearly and\ncompletely avoids cross divisions; since, for example, the principle\nof Gratitude is often appealed to as supplying the _rationale_ for\nthe duties owed by children to parents. Here, however, we come upon a\nmaterial disagreement and difficulty in determining the maxim of this\nspecies of duty. It would be agreed that children owe to their parents\nrespect and kindness generally, and assistance in case of infirmity or\nany special need: but it seems doubtful how far this is held by Common\nSense to be due on account of the relationship alone, or on account of\nservices rendered during infancy, and how far it is due to cruel or\nneglectful parents. Most perhaps would say, here and in other cases,\nthat mere nearness of blood constituted a certain claim: but they would\nfind it hard to agree upon its exact force.[195]\n\nBut, apart from this, there seems great difference of opinion as to\nwhat is due from children to parents who have performed their duty; as,\nfor example, how far obedience is due from a child who is no longer in\nits parents\u2019 guardianship or dependent on them for support:--whether\n(_e.g._) a son or a daughter is bound not to oppose a parent\u2019s wishes\nin marrying or choosing a profession. Practically we find that parental\ncontrol is greater in the case of persons who can enrich their children\nby testament: still we can hardly take this into consideration in\ndetermining the ideal of filial duty: for to this, whatever it may be,\nthe child is thought to be absolutely bound, and not as a _quidproquo_\nin anticipation of future benefits: and many would hold that a parent\nhad no moral right to disinherit a child, except as a penalty for a\ntransgression of duty.\n\nAnd this leads to what we may conveniently examine next, the duty\nof parents to children. This too we might partly classify under a\ndifferent head, viz. that of duties arising out of special needs: for\nno doubt children are naturally objects of compassion, on account\nof their helplessness, to others besides their parents. But on the\nlatter they have a claim of a different kind, springing from the\nuniversally recognised duty of not causing pain or any harm to other\nhuman beings, directly or indirectly, except in the way of deserved\npunishment: for the parent, being the cause of the child\u2019s existing in\na helpless condition, would be indirectly the cause of the suffering\nand death that would result to it if neglected. Still this does not\nseem an adequate explanation of parental duty, as recognised by\nCommon Sense. For we commonly blame a parent who leaves his children\nentirely to the care of others, even if he makes ample provision for\ntheir being nourished and trained up to the time at which they can\nsupport themselves by their own labour. We think that he owes them\naffection (as far as this can be said to be a duty) and the tender and\nwatchful care that naturally springs from affection: and, if he can\nafford it, somewhat more than the necessary minimum of food, clothing,\nand education. Still it does not seem clear how far beyond this he\nis bound to go. It is easy to say broadly that he ought to promote\nhis children\u2019s happiness by all means in his power: and no doubt it\nis natural for a good parent to find his own best happiness in his\nchildren\u2019s, and we are disposed to blame any one who markedly prefers\nhis own interest to theirs: still it seems unreasonable that he should\npurchase a small increase of their happiness by a great sacrifice of\nhis own: and moreover there are other worthy and noble ends which may\n(and do) come into competition with this. To take instances of actual\noccurrence: one parent is led to give up some important and valuable\nwork, which perhaps no one else can or will do, in order to leave his\nchildren a little more wealth: another brings them to the verge of\nstarvation in order to perfect an invention or prosecute scientific\nresearches. We seem to condemn either extreme: yet what clear and\naccepted principle can be stated for determining the true mean?\n\nAgain, as we have seen, some think that a parent has no right to\nbequeath his inheritance away from his children, unless they have been\nundutiful: and in some states this is even forbidden by law. Others,\nhowever, hold that children as such have no claims to their parents\u2019\nwealth: but only if there is a tacit understanding that they will\nsucceed to it, or, at any rate, if they have been reared in such habits\nof life and social relations as will render it difficult and painful\nfor them to live without inherited wealth.\n\nIt would be tedious to go in detail through all the degrees of\nconsanguinity, as it is clear that our conception of the mutual duties\nof kinsmen becomes vaguer as the kinship becomes more remote. Among\nchildren of the same parents, brought up together, affection of more\nor less strength grows up so naturally and commonly, that we regard\nthose who feel no affection for their brothers and sisters with a\ncertain aversion and moral contempt, as somewhat inhuman: and we think\nthat in any case the services and kind acts which naturally spring\nfrom affection ought to be rendered to some extent; but the extent\nseems quite undefined. And even towards remoter kinsmen we think that\na certain flow of kindly feeling will attend the representation of\nconsanguinity in men of good dispositions. Some indeed still think that\ncousins have a moral right to a man\u2019s inheritance in default of nearer\nheirs, and to assistance in any need; but it seems equally common to\nhold that they can at most claim to be selected _ceteris paribus_ as\nthe recipients of bounty, and that an unpromising cousin should not be\npreferred to a promising stranger.\n\n\u00a7 5. I have placed Neighbourhood along with Kindred among the relations\nout of which a certain claim for mutual services is thought to spring.\nHowever, no one perhaps would say that mere local juxtaposition is in\nitself a ground of duties: it seems rather that neighbours naturally\nfeel more sympathy with one another than with strangers, as the tie of\ncommon humanity is strengthened even by such conjunction and mutual\nassociation as mere neighbourhood (without co-operation or friendship)\nmay involve, and a man in whom this effect is not produced is thought\nmore or less inhuman. And so in large towns where this mutual sympathy\ndoes not so naturally grow up (for all the townsmen are in a sense\nneighbours, and one cannot easily sympathise with each individual\nin a multitude), the tie of neighbourhood is felt to be relaxed, and\nneighbour only claims from neighbour, as the nearest man, what one\nman may claim from another. For there are some services, slight in\nordinary times but greater in the case of exceptional need, which\nany man is thought to have a right to ask from any other: so that a\ncomparatively trifling circumstance may easily give a special direction\nto this general claim, and make it seem reasonable that the service\nshould be asked from one person rather than another. Thus any degree\nof kinship seems to have this effect (since the representation of this\ntends to produce a feeling of union and consequent sympathy), and so\neven the fact of belonging to the same province, as creating a slight\nprobability of community of origin; and again similarities of various\nkinds, as one sympathises more easily with one\u2019s like, and so persons\nnaturally seek aid in distress from those of the same age, or sex, or\nrank, or profession. The duty of neighbourhood seems therefore only a\nparticular application of the duty of general benevolence or humanity.\nAnd the claim of fellow-countrymen is of the same kind: that is, if\nthey are taken as individuals; for one\u2019s relation to one\u2019s country as\na whole is thought to be of a different kind, and to involve much more\nstringent obligations.\n\nStill the duties of Patriotism are difficult to formulate. For the\nmere obedience to the laws of a country which morality requires from\nall its inhabitants seems to come under another head: and aliens are\nequally bound to this. And in the case of most social functions which\nmen undertake, patriotism is at least not a prominent nor indispensable\nmotive: for they undertake them primarily for the sake of payment; and\nhaving undertaken them, are bound by Justice and Good Faith to perform\nthem adequately. However, if any of the functions of Government are\nunpaid, we consider that men exhibit patriotism in performing them:\nfor though it is plausible to say that they get their payment in\nsocial distinction, still on reflection this view does not appear to\nbe quite appropriate; since social distinction is intended to express\nfeelings of honour and respect, and we cannot properly render these as\npart of a bargain, but only as a tribute paid to virtue or excellence\nof some kind. But how far any individual is bound to undertake such\nfunctions is not quite clear: and the question seems generally decided\nby considerations of expediency,--except in so far as duties of this\nkind devolve, legally or constitutionally, upon all the citizens in a\nfree country, as is ordinarily the case to some extent. Among these the\nduty of fighting the national enemies is prominent in many countries:\nand even where this function has become a salaried and voluntarily\nadopted profession, it is often felt to be in a special sense the\n\u2018service of one\u2019s country,\u2019 and we think it at least desirable and\nbest that it should be performed with feelings of patriotism: as we\nfind it somewhat degrading and repulsive that a man should slaughter\nhis fellow-men for hire. And in great crises of national existence\nthe affection of Patriotism is naturally intensified: and even in\nordinary times we praise a man who renders services to his country\nover and above the common duties of citizenship. But whether a\ncitizen is at any time morally bound to more than certain legally or\nconstitutionally determined duties, does not seem to be clear: nor,\nagain, is there general agreement on the question whether by voluntary\nexpatriation[196] he can rightfully relieve himself of all moral\nobligations to the community in which he was born.\n\nNor, finally, does there seem to be any _consensus_ as to what each man\nowes to his fellow-men, as such. The Utilitarian doctrine, as we have\nseen, is that each man ought to consider the happiness of any other\nas _theoretically_ of equal importance with his own, and only of less\nimportance _practically_, in so far as he is better able to realise\nthe latter. And it seems to me difficult to say decidedly that this\nis _not_ the principle of general Benevolence, as recognised by the\ncommon sense of mankind. But it must be admitted that there is also\ncurrent a lower and narrower estimate of the services that we are held\nto be strictly bound to render to our fellow-men generally. This lower\nview seems to recognise (1)--as was before noticed--a negative duty to\nabstain from causing pain or harm to any of our fellow-men, except in\nthe way of deserved punishment; to which we may add, as an immediate\ncorollary, the duty of making reparation for any harm that we may\nhave done them:[197] and (2) a positive duty to render, when occasion\noffers, such services as require either no sacrifice on our part, or\nat least one very much less in importance than the service rendered.\nFurther, a general obligation of being \u2018useful to society\u2019 by some kind\nof systematic work is vaguely recognised; rich persons who are manifest\ndrones incur some degree of censure from the majority of thoughtful\npersons. Beyond this somewhat indefinite limit of Duty extends the\nVirtue of Benevolence without limit: for excess is not thought to be\npossible in doing good to others, nor in the disposition to do it,\nunless it leads us to neglect definite duties.\n\nUnder the notion of Benevolence as just defined, the minor rules of\nGentleness, Politeness, Courtesy, etc. may be brought, in so far as\nthey prescribe the expression of general goodwill and abstinence from\nanything that may cause pain to others in conversation and social\ndemeanour. There is, however, an important part of Politeness which\nit may be well to notice and discuss separately; the duty, namely, of\nshowing marks of Reverence to those to whom they are properly due.\n\nReverence we may define as the feeling which accompanies the\nrecognition of Superiority or Worth in others. It does not seem to be\nnecessarily in itself benevolent, though often accompanied by some\ndegree of love. But its ethical characteristics seem analogous to\nthose of benevolent affection, in so far as, while it is not a feeling\ndirectly under the control of the will, we yet expect it under certain\ncircumstances and morally dislike its absence, and perhaps commonly\nconsider the expression of it to be sometimes a duty, even when the\nfeeling itself is absent.\n\nStill, as to this latter duty of expressing reverence, there seems to\nbe great divergence of opinion. For the feeling seems to be naturally\nexcited by all kinds of superiority,--not merely moral and intellectual\nexcellences, but also superiorities of rank and position: and indeed\nin the common behaviour of men it is to the latter that it is more\nregularly and formally rendered. And yet, again, it is commonly said\nthat Reverence is more properly due to the former, as being more real\nand intrinsic superiorities: and many think that to show any reverence\nto men of rank and position rather than to others is servile and\ndegrading: and some even dislike the marks of respect which in most\ncountries are exacted by official superiors from their subordinates,\nsaying that obedience legally defined is all that is properly owed in\nthis relation.\n\nA more serious difficulty of a somewhat similar kind arises when\nwe consider how far it is a duty to cultivate the affection of\nLoyalty: meaning by this term--which is used in various senses--the\naffection that is normally felt by a well-disposed servant or official\nsubordinate towards a good master or official superior. On the one hand\nit is widely thought that the duties of obedience which belong to these\nrelations will be better performed if affection enters into the motive,\nno less than the duties of the family relations: but in the former\ncase it seems to be a tenable view that the habits of orderliness and\ngood faith--ungrudging obedience to law and ungrudging fulfilment of\ncontract--will ordinarily suffice, without personal affection; and,\non the other hand, a disposition to obey superiors, beyond the limits\nof their legal or contractual rights to issue commands, may easily be\nmischievous in its effects, if the superiors are ill-disposed. In the\ncase of a wise and good superior it is, indeed, clearly advantageous\nthat inferiors should be disposed to obey beyond these limits; but it\nis not therefore clear that this disposition is one which it should\nbe made a duty to cultivate beyond the degree in which it results\nspontaneously from a sense of the superior\u2019s goodness and wisdom. Nor\ndo I think that any decided enunciation of duty on this point can be\nextracted from Common Sense.\n\n\u00a7 6. We have next to consider the duties of Affection that arise out of\nrelationships voluntarily assumed. Of these the most important is the\nConjugal Relation. And here we may begin by asking whether it be the\nduty of human beings generally to enter into this relation. It is no\ndoubt normal to do so, and most persons are prompted to it by strong\ndesires: but in so far as it can be said to be prescribed by Common\nSense, it does not seem an independent duty, but derivative from and\nsubordinate to the general maxims of Prudence and Benevolence.[198] And\nin all modern civilised societies, law and custom leave the conjugal\nunion perfectly optional: but the conditions under which it may be\nformed, and to a certain extent the mutual rights and duties arising\nout of it, are carefully laid down by law; and it is widely thought\nthat this department of law more than others ought to be governed\nby independent moral principles, and to protect, as it were, by an\nouter barrier, the kind of relation which morality prescribes. If\nwe ask what these principles are, Common Sense--in modern European\ncommunities--seems to answer that the marriage union ought to be (1)\nexclusively monogamic, (2) at least designed to be permanent, and (3)\nnot within certain degrees of consanguinity. I do not, however, think\nthat any of these propositions can on reflection be maintained to be\nself-evident. Even against incest we seem to have rather an intense\nsentiment than a clear intuition; and it is generally recognised that\nthe prohibition of all but monogamic unions can only be rationally\nmaintained on utilitarian grounds.[199] As regards the permanence\nof the marriage-contract all would no doubt agree that fidelity is\nadmirable in all affections, and especially in so close and intimate\na relation as the conjugal: but we cannot tell _a priori_ how far it\nis possible to prevent decay of love in all cases: and it is certainly\nnot self-evident that the conjugal relation ought to be maintained\nwhen love has ceased; nor that if the parties have separated by mutual\nconsent they ought to be prohibited from forming fresh unions. In so\nfar as we are convinced of the rightness of this regulation, it is\nalways, I think, from a consideration of the generally mischievous\nconsequences that would ensue if it were relaxed.\n\nFurther, in considering the evils on the opposite side we are led\nto see that there is no little difference of opinion among moral\npersons as to the kind of feeling which is morally indispensable to\nthis relation. For some would say that marriage without intense and\nexclusive affection is degrading even though sanctioned by law: while\nothers would consider this a mere matter of taste, or at least of\nprudence, provided there was no mutual deception: and between these two\nviews we might insert several different shades of opinion.\n\nNor, again, is there agreement as to the external duties arising out of\nthe relationship. For all would lay down conjugal fidelity, and mutual\nassistance (according to the customary division of labour between men\nand women--unless this should be modified by mutual agreement). But\nbeyond this we find divergence: for some state that \u201cthe marriage\ncontract binds each party, whenever individual gratification is\nconcerned, to prefer the happiness of the other party to its own[200]\u201d:\nwhile others would say that this degree of unselfishness is certainly\nadmirable, but as a mere matter of duty it is enough if each considers\nthe other\u2019s happiness equally with his (or her) own. And as to the\npowers and liberties that ought to be allowed to the wife, and the\nobedience due from her to the husband--I need scarcely at the present\ntime (1874) waste space in proving that there is no _consensus_ of\nmoral opinion.\n\n\u00a7 7. The conjugal relation is, in its origin, of free choice, but\nwhen it has once been formed, the duties of affection that arise out\nof it are commonly thought to be analogous to those arising out of\nrelations of consanguinity. It therefore holds an intermediate position\nbetween these latter, and ordinary friendships, partnerships, and\nassociations, which men are equally free to make and to dissolve.\nNow most associations that men form are for certain definite ends,\ndetermined by express contract or tacit understanding: accordingly the\nduty arising out of them is merely that of fidelity to such contract\nor understanding, which will be considered later under the heads of\nJustice and Good Faith. But this does not seem to be the case with what\nin a strict sense of the term are called Friendships[201]: for although\nFriendship frequently arises among persons associated for other ends,\nyet the relation is always conceived to have its end in itself, and to\nbe formed primarily for the development of mutual affection between the\nfriends, and the pleasure which attends this. Still, it is thought that\nwhen such an affection has once been formed it creates mutual duties\nwhich did not previously exist: we have therefore to inquire how far\nthis is the case, and on what principles these can be determined.\n\nNow here a new kind of difficulty has to be added to those which we\nhave already found in attempting to formulate Common Sense. For we\nfind some who say that, as it is essential to Friendship that the\nmutual kindly feeling, and the services springing from it, should be\nspontaneous and unforced, neither the one nor the other should be\nimposed as a duty; and, in short, that this department of life should\nbe fenced from the intrusion of moral precepts, and left to the free\nplay of natural instinct. And this doctrine all would perhaps admit to\na certain extent: as, indeed, we have accepted it with regard to all\nthe deeper flow and finer expression of feeling even in the domestic\nrelations: for it seemed pedantic and futile to prescribe rules for\nthis, or even (though we naturally admire and praise any not ungraceful\nexhibition of intense and genuine affection) to delineate an ideal of\nexcellence for all to aim at. Still, there seemed to be an important\nsphere of strict duty--however hard to define--in the relations of\nchildren to parents, etc., and even in the case of friendship it\nseems contrary to common sense to recognise no such sphere; as it not\nunfrequently occurs to us to judge that one friend has behaved wrongly\nto another, and to speak as if there were a clearly cognisable code of\nbehaviour in such relations.\n\nPerhaps, however, we may say that all clear cases of wrong conduct\ntowards friends come under the general formula of breach of\nunderstanding. Friends not unfrequently make definite promises of\nservice, but we need not consider these, as their violation is\nprohibited by a different and clearer moral rule. But further, as all\nlove is understood to include[202] a desire for the happiness of its\nobject, the profession of friendship seems to bind one to seek this\nhappiness to an extent proportionate to such profession. Now common\nbenevolence (cf. _ante_, \u00a7 5) prescribes at least that we should render\nto other men such services as we can render without any sacrifice,\nor with a sacrifice so trifling as to be quite out of proportion to\nthe service rendered. And since the profession of friendship--though\nthe term is used to include affections of various degree--must imply\na greater interest in one\u2019s friend\u2019s happiness than in that of men\nin general, it must announce a willingness to make more or less\nconsiderable sacrifices for him, if occasion offers. If then we decline\nto make such sacrifices, we do wrong by failing to fulfil natural and\nlegitimate expectations. So far there seems no source of difficulty\nexcept the indefiniteness inevitably arising from the wide range of\nmeanings covered by the term Friendship. But further questions arise in\nconsequence of the changes of feeling to which human nature is liable:\nfirst, whether it is our duty to resist such changes as much as we can;\nand secondly, whether if this effort fails, and love diminishes or\ndeparts, we ought still to maintain a disposition to render services\ncorresponding to our past affection. And on these points there does\nnot seem to be agreement among moral and refined persons. For, on the\none hand, it is natural to us to admire fidelity in friendship and\nstability of affections, and we commonly regard these as most important\nexcellences of character: and so it seems strange if we are not to aim\nat these as at all other excellences, as none more naturally stir us to\nimitation. And hence many would be prepared to lay down that we ought\nnot to withdraw affection once given, unless the friend behaves ill:\nwhile some would say that even in this case we ought not to break the\nfriendship unless the crime is very great. Yet, on the other hand, we\nfeel that such affection as is produced by deliberate effort of will is\nbut a poor substitute for that which springs spontaneously, and most\nrefined persons would reject such a boon: while, again, to conceal the\nchange of feeling seems insincere and hypocritical.\n\nBut as for services, a refined person would not accept such from a\nformer friend who no longer loves him: unless in extreme need, when\nany kind of tie is, as it were, invigorated by the already strong\nclaim which common humanity gives each man upon all others. Perhaps,\ntherefore, there cannot be a duty to offer such services in any case,\nwhen the need is not extreme. Though this inference is not quite clear:\nfor in relations of affection we often praise one party for offering\nwhat we rather blame the other for accepting. But it seems that\ndelicate questions of this kind are more naturally referred to canons\nof good taste and refined feeling than of morality proper: or at least\nonly included in the scope of morality in so far as we have a general\nduty to cultivate good taste and refinement of feeling, like other\nexcellences.\n\nOn the whole, then, we may say that the chief difficulties in\ndetermining the moral obligations of friendship arise (1) from the\nindefiniteness of the tacit understanding implied in the relation,\nand (2) from the disagreement which we find as to the extent to which\nFidelity is a positive duty. It may be observed that the latter\ndifficulty is especially prominent in respect of those intimacies\nbetween persons of different sex which precede and prepare the way for\nmarriage.\n\n\u00a7 8. I pass now to the third head, Gratitude. It has been already\nobserved that the obligation of children to parents is sometimes based\nupon this: and in other affectionate relationships it commonly blends\nwith and much strengthens the claims that are thought to arise out\nof the relations themselves; though none of the duties that we have\ndiscussed seem referable entirely to gratitude. But where gratitude\nis due, the obligation is especially clear and simple. Indeed the\nduty of requiting benefits seems to be recognised wherever morality\nextends; and Intuitionists have justly pointed to this recognition as\nan instance of a truly universal intuition. Still, though the general\nforce of the obligation is not open to doubt (except of the sweeping\nand abstract kind with which we have not here to deal), its nature and\nextent are by no means equally clear.\n\nIn the first place, it may be asked whether we are only bound to repay\nservices, or whether we owe the special affection called Gratitude;\nwhich seems generally to combine kindly feeling and eagerness to\nrequite with some sort of emotional recognition of superiority, as the\ngiver of benefits is in a position of superiority to the receiver. On\nthe one hand we seem to think that, in so far as any affection can\npossibly be a duty, kindly feeling towards benefactors must be such:\nand yet to persons of a certain temperament this feeling is often\npeculiarly hard to attain, owing to their dislike of the position of\ninferiority; and this again we consider a right feeling to a certain\nextent, and call it \u2018independence\u2019 or \u2018proper pride\u2019; but this feeling\nand the effusion of gratitude do not easily mix, and the moralist finds\nit difficult to recommend a proper combination of the two. Perhaps\nit makes a great difference whether the service be lovingly done: as\nin this case it seems inhuman that there should be no response of\naffection: whereas if the benefit be coldly given, the mere recognition\nof the obligation and settled disposition to repay it seem to suffice.\nAnd \u2018independence\u2019 alone would prompt a man to repay the benefit in\norder to escape from the burden of obligation. But it seems doubtful\nwhether in any case we are morally satisfied with this as the sole\nmotive.\n\nIt is partly this impatience of obligation which makes a man desirous\nof giving as requital more than he has received; for otherwise his\nbenefactor has still the superiority of having taken the initiative.\nBut also the worthier motive of affection urges us in the same\ndirection: and here, as in other affectionate services, we do not\nlike too exact a measure of duty; a certain excess falling short of\nextravagance seems to be what we admire and praise. In so far, however,\nas conflict of claims makes it needful to be exact, we think perhaps\nthat an equal return is what the duty of gratitude requires, or rather\nwillingness to make such a return, if it be required, and if it is in\nour power to make it without neglecting prior claims. For we do not\nthink it obligatory to requite services in all cases, even if it be\nin our power to do so, if the benefactor appear to be sufficiently\nsupplied with the means of happiness: but if he either demand it or\nobviously stand in need of it, we think it ungrateful not to make an\nequal return. But when we try to define this notion of \u2018equal return,\u2019\nobscurity and divergence begin. For (apart from the difficulty of\ncomparing different kinds of services where we cannot make repayment\nin kind) Equality has two distinct meanings, according as we consider\nthe effort made by the benefactor, or the service rendered to the\nbenefited. Now perhaps if either of these be great, the gratitude\nis naturally strong: for the apprehension of great earnestness in\nanother to serve us tends to draw from us a proportionate response\nof affection: and any great pleasure or relief from pain naturally\nproduces a corresponding emotion of thankfulness to the man who has\nvoluntarily caused this, even though his effort may have been slight.\nAnd hence it has been suggested, that in proportioning the dues of\ngratitude we ought to take whichever of the two considerations will\ngive the highest estimate. But this does not seem in accordance with\nCommon Sense: for the benefit may be altogether unacceptable, and it\nis hard to bind us to repay in full every well-meant blundering effort\nto serve us; though we feel vaguely that some return should be made\neven for this. And though it is more plausible to say that we ought\nto requite an accepted service without weighing the amount of our\nbenefactor\u2019s sacrifice, still when we take extreme cases the rule seems\nnot to be valid: _e.g._ if a poor man sees a rich one drowning and\npulls him out of the water, we do not think that the latter is bound to\ngive as a reward what he would have been willing to give for his life.\nStill, we should think him niggardly if he only gave his preserver\nhalf-a-crown: which might, however, be profuse repayment for the cost\nof the exertion. Something between the two seems to suit our moral\ntaste: but I find no clear accepted principle upon which the amount can\nbe decided.\n\nThe last claim to be considered is that of Special Need. This has\nbeen substantially stated already, in investigating the obligation of\nGeneral Benevolence or Common Humanity. For it was said that we owe to\nall men such services as we can render by a sacrifice or effort small\nin comparison with the service: and hence, in proportion as the needs\nof other men present themselves as urgent, we recognise the duty of\nrelieving them out of our superfluity. But I have thought it right\nto notice the duty separately, because we are commonly prompted to\nfulfil it by the specific emotion of Pity or Compassion. Here, again,\nthere seems a doubt how far it is good to foster and encourage this\nemotion--as distinct from the practical habit of rendering prompt aid\nand succour in distress, whenever such succour is judged to be right.\nOn the one hand, the emotional impulse tends to make the action of\nrelieving need not only easier to the agent, but more graceful and\npleasing: on the other hand, it is generally recognised that mistaken\npity is more likely to lead us astray than--_e.g._--mistaken gratitude:\nas it is more liable to interfere dangerously with the infliction of\npenalties required for the maintenance of social order, or with the\noperation of motives to industry and thrift, necessary for economic\nwell-being.\n\nAnd when--to guard against the last-mentioned danger--we try to define\nthe external duty of relieving want, we find ourselves face to face\nwith what is no mere problem of the closet, but a serious practical\nperplexity to most moral persons at the present day. For many ask\nwhether it is not our duty to refrain from all superfluous indulgences,\nuntil we have removed the misery and want that exist around us, as far\nas they are removable by money. And in answering this question Common\nSense seems to be inevitably led to a consideration of the economic\nconsequences of attempting--either by taxation and public expenditure,\nor by the voluntary gifts of private persons--to provide a sufficient\nincome for all needy members of the community; and is thus gradually\nbrought to substitute for the Intuitional method of dealing with\nproblems of this kind a different procedure, having at least much\naffinity with the Utilitarian method.[203]\n\nIn conclusion, then, we must admit that while we find a number of\nbroad and more or less indefinite rules unhesitatingly laid down by\nCommon Sense in this department of duty, it is difficult or impossible\nto extract from them, so far as they are commonly accepted, any clear\nand precise principles for determining the extent of the duty in any\ncase. And yet, as we saw, such particular principles of distribution of\nthe services to which good-will prompts seem to be required for the\nperfection of practice no less than for theoretical completeness; in\nso far as the duties which we have been considering are liable to come\ninto apparent conflict with each other and with other prescriptions of\nthe moral code.\n\nIn reply it may perhaps be contended that if we are seeking exactness\nin the determination of duty, we have begun by examining the wrong\nnotion: that, in short, we ought to have examined Justice rather\nthan Benevolence. It may be admitted that we cannot find as much\nexactness as we sometimes practically need, by merely considering the\ncommon conceptions of the duties to which men are prompted by natural\naffections; but it may still be maintained that we shall at any rate\nfind such exactness adequately provided for under the head of Justice.\nThis contention I will proceed to examine in the next chapter.\n\n NOTE.--It should be borne in mind throughout the discussion carried\n on in this and the next six chapters that what we are primarily\n endeavouring to ascertain is not true morality but the morality of\n Common Sense: so that if any moral proposition is admitted to be\n paradoxical, the admission excludes it,--not as being necessarily\n false, but as being not what Common Sense holds.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[187] The qualifications which this proposition requires have been\nalready noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.\n\n[188] The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be\nUtilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully\ndiscussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by\nmany whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.\n\n[189] See note at end of chapter.\n\n[190] Cf. Book i. chaps. vii. ix.\n\n[191] A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when\nwe come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the\nresult of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which\nforms the main subject of the present book. Cf. _post_, chap. xiv. of\nthis Book.\n\n[192] This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this\nprecise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies\nbetween Duty and Self-interest.\n\n[193] It must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is\ncombined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of\ndifferent courses of action that may be presented as alternatives, and\ncomparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting\nfrom them, the more good, _ceteris paribus_, is likely to be caused\nby it on the whole. And so far as there seems to be a certain natural\nincompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and\nthe spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse, Common Sense is somewhat\npuzzled which to prefer; and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends\nthis incompatibility and includes the two.\n\n[194] This question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter\nof this Book (chap. xiv.).\n\n[195] It may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its\nexistence. But life alone, apart from any provision for making life\nhappy, seems a boon of doubtful value, and one that scarcely excites\ngratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient.\n\n[196] In 1868 it was affirmed, in an Act passed by the Congress of\nthe United States, that \u201cthe right of expatriation is a natural and\ninherent right of all people.\u201d I do not know how far this would be\ntaken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country\nwhenever he finds it convenient--provided no claims except those of\nPatriotism retain him there. But if it was intended to imply this, I\nthink the statement would not be accepted in Europe without important\nlimitations: though I cannot state any generally accepted principle\nfrom which such limitations could be clearly deduced.\n\n[197] How far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is\ninvoluntary, and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary\ncare on our part, is not clear: but it will be convenient to defer the\nconsideration of this till the next chapter (\u00a7 5): as the whole of this\ndepartment of duty is more commonly placed under the head of Justice.\n\n[198] I raise this question, because if the rule of \u2018living according\nto Nature\u2019 were really adopted as a first principle, in any ordinary\nmeaning of the term \u2018nature,\u2019 it would certainly seem to be the duty of\nall normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations: but just this\ninstance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by Common\nSense. See Book i. chap. vi. \u00a7 2.\n\n[199] The moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put\nforward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of\nthe two sexes. This argument, however, seems to require the assumption\nthat all men and women ought to marry: but this scarcely any one will\nexpressly affirm: and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried,\nand there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is\nallowed, paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for\nany man to find a mate.\n\n[200] Cf. Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, Book ii. part ii. class\n2, \u00a7 2.\n\n[201] I use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense\nthan the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards\nall persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations,\nthrough business or otherwise.\n\n[202] It was before observed that this is only one--and not always the\nmost prominent--element of the whole emotional state which we call love.\n\n[203] See Book iv. chap. iii. \u00a7 3.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nJUSTICE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We have seen that in delineating the outline of duty, as\nintuitively recognised, we have to attempt to give to common terms\na definite and precise meaning. This process of definition always\nrequires some reflection and care, and is sometimes one of considerable\ndifficulty. But there is no case where the difficulty is greater, or\nthe result more disputed, than when we try to define Justice.\n\nBefore making the attempt, it may be as well to remind the reader what\nit is that we have to do. We have not to inquire into the derivation\nof the notion of Justice, as we are not now studying the history of\nour ethical thought, but its actual condition. Nor can we profess to\nfurnish a definition which will correspond to every part of the common\nusage of the term; for many persons are undoubtedly vague and loose in\ntheir application of current moral notions. But it is an assumption of\nthe Intuitional method[204] that the term \u2018justice\u2019 denotes a quality\nwhich it is ultimately desirable to realise in the conduct and social\nrelations of men; and that a definition may be given of this which\nwill be accepted by all competent judges as presenting, in a clear\nand explicit form, what they have always meant by the term, though\nperhaps implicitly and vaguely. In seeking such a definition we may, so\nto speak, clip the ragged edge of common usage, but we must not make\nexcision of any considerable portion.[205]\n\nPerhaps the first point that strikes us when we reflect upon our\nnotion of Justice is its connexion with Law. There is no doubt that\njust conduct is to a great extent determined by Law, and in certain\napplications the two terms seem interchangeable. Thus we speak\nindifferently of \u2018Law Courts\u2019 and \u2018Courts of Justice,\u2019 and when a\nprivate citizen demands Justice, or his just rights, he commonly means\nto demand that Law should be carried into effect. Still reflection\nshows that we do not mean by Justice merely conformity to Law. For,\nfirst, we do not always call the violators of law unjust, but only of\nsome Laws: not, for example, duellists or gamblers. And secondly, we\noften judge that Law as it exists does not completely realise Justice;\nour notion of Justice furnishes a standard with which we compare actual\nlaws, and pronounce them just or unjust. And, thirdly, there is a part\nof just conduct which lies outside the sphere even of Law as it ought\nto be; for example, we think that a father may be just or unjust to his\nchildren in matters where the law leaves (and ought to leave) him free.\n\nWe must then distinguish Justice from what has been called the virtue\nor duty of Order, or Law-observance: and perhaps, if we examine the\npoints of divergence just mentioned, we shall be led to the true\ndefinition of Justice.\n\nLet us therefore first ask, Of what kind of laws is the observance\ngenerally thought to be a realisation of Justice? In most cases they\nmight be described as laws which define and secure the interests of\nassignable individuals. But this description is not complete, as\nJustice is admittedly concerned in the apportionment of adequate\npunishment to each offender; though we should not say that a man had\nan interest in the adequacy of his punishment. Let us say, then,\nthat the laws in which Justice is or ought to be realised, are laws\nwhich distribute and allot to individuals either objects of desire,\nliberties and privileges, or burdens and restraints, or even pains\nas such. These latter, however, are only allotted by law to persons\nwho have broken other laws. And as all law is enforced by penalties,\nwe see how the administration of law generally may be viewed as\nthe administration of Justice, in accordance with this definition:\nnot because all laws are primarily and in their first intention\ndistributive, but because the execution of law generally involves\nthe due allotment of pains and losses and restraints to the persons\nwho violate it. Or, more precisely, we should say that this legal\ndistribution _ought_ to realise Justice, for we have seen that it\nmay fail to do so. We have next to ask, therefore, What conditions\nmust laws fulfil in order that they may be just in their distributive\neffects?\n\nHere, however, it may seem that we are transgressing the limit which\ndivides Ethics from Politics: for Ethics is primarily concerned with\nthe rules which ought to govern the private conduct of individuals;\nand it is commonly thought that private persons ought to obey even\nlaws that they regard as unjust, if established by lawful authority.\nStill, this is doubted in the case of laws that seem extremely unjust:\nas (_e.g._) the Fugitive Slave law in the United States before the\nrebellion. At any rate it seems desirable that we should here digress\nsomewhat into political discussion; partly in order to elucidate\nthe notion of Justice, which seems to be essentially the same in\nboth regions, and partly because it is of great practical importance\nto individuals, in regulating private conduct beyond the range of\nLaw-observance, to know whether the laws and established order of the\nsociety in which they live are just or unjust.\n\nNow perhaps the most obvious and commonly recognised characteristic\nof just laws is that they are Equal: and in some departments of\nlegislation, at least, the common notion of Justice seems to be\nexhaustively expressed by that of Equality. It is commonly thought,\nfor example, that a system of taxation would be perfectly just if it\nimposed exactly equal burdens upon all:[206] and though this notion\nof \u2018equal burden\u2019 is itself somewhat difficult to define with the\nprecision required for practical application, still we may say that\nJustice here is thought to resolve itself into a kind of equality.\nHowever, we cannot affirm generally that all laws ought to affect all\npersons equally, for this would leave no place for any laws allotting\nspecial privileges and burdens to special classes of the community;\nbut we do not think all such laws necessarily unjust: _e.g._ we think\nit not unjust that only persons appointed in a certain way should\nshare in legislation, and that men should be forced to fight for their\ncountry but not women. Hence some have said that the only sense in\nwhich justice requires a law to be equal is that its execution must\naffect equally all the individuals belonging to any of the classes\nspecified in the law. And no doubt this rule excludes a very real\nkind of injustice: it is of the highest importance that judges and\nadministrators should never be persuaded by money or otherwise to\nshow \u2018respect of persons.\u2019 So much equality, however, is involved\nin the very notion of a law, if it be couched in general terms:\nand it is plain that laws may be equally executed and yet unjust:\nfor example, we should consider a law unjust which compelled only\nred-haired men to serve in the army, even though it were applied with\nthe strictest impartiality to all red-haired men. We must therefore\nconclude, that, in laying down the law no less than in carrying it\nout, all inequality[207] affecting the interests of individuals which\nappears arbitrary, and for which no sufficient reason can be given,\nis held to be unjust. But we have still to ask, what kind of reasons\nfor inequality Justice admits and from what general principle (or\nprinciples) all such reasons are to be deduced?\n\n\u00a7 2. Perhaps we shall find it easier to answer this question, if we\nexamine the notion of Justice as applied to that part of private\nconduct which lies beyond the sphere of law. Here, again, we may\nobserve that the notion of Justice always involves allotment of\nsomething considered as advantageous or disadvantageous: whether it be\nmoney or other material means of happiness; or praise, or affection,\nor other immaterial good, or some merited pain or loss. Hence I should\nanswer the question raised in the preceding chapter (\u00a7 3), as to\nthe classification of the duties there discussed under the heads of\nJustice and Benevolence respectively, by saying that the fulfilment of\nany duty of the affections, considered by itself, does not exemplify\nJustice: but that when we come to compare the obligations arising\nout of different affectionate relations, and to consider the right\nallotment of love and kind services, the notion of Justice becomes\napplicable. In order to arrange this allotment properly we have to\ninquire what is Just. What then do we mean by a just man in matters\nwhere law-observance does not enter? It is natural to reply that we\nmean an impartial man, one who seeks with equal care to satisfy all\nclaims which he recognises as valid and does not let himself be unduly\ninfluenced by personal preferences. And this seems an adequate account\nof the virtue of justice so far as we consider it merely subjectively,\nand independently of the intellectual insight required for the\nrealisation of objective justice in action: if we neglect to give due\nconsideration to any claim which we regard as reasonable, our action\ncannot be just in intention. This definition suffices to exclude wilful\ninjustice: but it is obvious that it does not give us a sufficient\ncriterion of just acts, any more than the absence of arbitrary\ninequality was found to be a sufficient criterion of just laws.[208] We\nwant to know what are reasonable claims.\n\nWell, of these the most important--apart from the claims discussed in\nthe preceding chapter--seems to be that resulting from contract. This\nis to a certain extent enforced by law: but it is clear to us that a\njust man will keep engagements generally, even when there may be no\nlegal penalty attached to their violation. The exact definition of this\nduty, and its commonly admitted qualifications, will be discussed in\nthe next chapter: but of its general bindingness Common Sense has no\ndoubt.\n\nFurther, we include under the idea of binding engagements not merely\nverbal promises, but also what are called \u2018implied contracts\u2019 or\n\u2018tacit understandings.\u2019 But this latter term is a difficult one to\nkeep precise: and, in fact, is often used to include not only the case\nwhere _A_ has in some way positively implied a pledge to _B_, but also\nthe case where _B_ has certain expectations of which _A_ is aware.\nHere, however, the obligation is not so clear: for it would hardly be\nsaid that a man is bound to dispel all erroneous expectations that he\nmay know to be formed respecting his conduct, at the risk of being\nrequired to fulfil them. Still, if the expectation was such as most\npersons would form under the circumstances, there seems to be some sort\nof moral obligation to fulfil it, if it does not conflict with other\nduties, though the obligation seems less definite and stringent than\nthat arising out of contract. Indeed I think we may say that Justice is\ngenerally, though somewhat vaguely, held to prescribe the fulfilment\nof all such expectations (of services, etc.) as arise naturally and\nnormally out of the relations, voluntary or involuntary, in which we\nstand towards other human beings. But the discussions in the preceding\nchapter have shown the difficulty of defining even those duties of this\nkind which, in an indefinite form, seemed certain and indisputable:\nwhile others are only defined by customs which to reflection appear\narbitrary. And though while these customs persist, the expectations\nspringing from them are in a certain sense natural, so that a just man\nseems to be under a kind of obligation to fulfil them, this obligation\ncannot be regarded as clear or complete, for two reasons that were\ngiven in the last chapter; first, because customs are continually\nvarying, and as long as any one is in a state of variation, growing or\ndecaying, the validity of the customary claim is obviously doubtful;\nand secondly, because it does not seem right that an irrational and\ninexpedient custom should last for ever, and yet it can only be\nabolished by being \u201cmore honoured in the breach than in the observance.\u201d\n\nThis line of reflection therefore has landed us in a real perplexity\nrespecting the department of duty which we are at present examining.\nJustice is something that we conceive to be intrinsically capable of\nperfectly definite determination: a scrupulously just man, we think,\nmust be very exact and precise in his conduct. But when we consider\nthat part of Justice which consists in satisfying such natural\nand customary claims as arise independently of contract, it seems\nimpossible to estimate these claims with any exactness. The attempt to\nmap out the region of Justice reveals to us a sort of margin or dim\nborderland, tenanted by expectations which are not quite claims and\nwith regard to which we do not feel sure whether Justice does or does\nnot require us to satisfy them. For the ordinary actions of men proceed\non the expectation that the future will resemble the past: hence it\nseems natural to expect that any particular man will do as others do\nin similar circumstances, and, still more, that he will continue to do\nwhatever he has hitherto been in the habit of doing; accordingly his\nfellow-men are inclined to think themselves wronged by his suddenly\nomitting any customary or habitual act, if the omission causes them\nloss or inconvenience.[209] On the other hand, if a man has given no\npledge to maintain a custom or habit, it seems hard that he should be\nbound by the unwarranted expectations of others. In this perplexity,\ncommon sense often appears to decide differently cases similar in\nall respects, except in the quantity of disappointment caused by the\nchange. For instance, if a poor man were to leave one tradesman and\ndeal with another because the first had turned Quaker, we should hardly\ncall it an act of injustice, however unreasonable we might think it:\nbut if a rich country gentleman were to act similarly towards a poor\nneighbour, many persons would say that it was unjust persecution.\n\nThe difficulty just pointed out extends equally to the duties of\nkindness--even to the specially stringent and sacred duties of the\ndomestic affections and gratitude--discussed in the previous chapter.\nWe cannot get any new principle for settling any conflict that may\npresent itself among such duties, by asking \u2018what Justice requires of\nus\u2019: the application of the notion of Justice only leads us to view\nthe problem in a new aspect as a question of the right _distribution_\nof kind services--it does not help us to solve it. Had we clear and\nprecise intuitive principles for determining the claims (_e.g._) of\nparents on children, children on parents, benefactors on the recipients\nof their benefits, we might say exactly at what point or to what\nextent the satisfaction of one of these claims ought in justice to\nbe postponed to the satisfaction of another, or to any worthy aim of\na different kind: but I know no method of determining a problem of\nthis kind which is not either implicitly utilitarian, or arbitrarily\ndogmatic, and unsupported by Common Sense.\n\n\u00a7 3. If now we turn again to the political question, from which we\ndiverged, we see that we have obtained from the preceding discussion\none of the criteria of the justice of laws which we were seeking--viz.\nthat they must avoid running counter to natural and normal\nexpectations--: but we see at the same time that the criterion cannot\nbe made definite in its application to private conduct, and it is easy\nto show that there is the same indefiniteness and consequent difficulty\nin applying it to legislation. For Law itself is a main source of\nnatural expectations; and, since in ordinary times the alterations in\nlaw are very small in proportion to the amount unaltered, there is\nalways a natural expectation that the existing laws will be maintained:\nand although this is, of course, an indefinite and uncertain\nexpectation in a society like ours, where laws are continually being\naltered by lawful authority, it is sufficient for people in general to\nrely upon in arranging their concerns, investing their money, choosing\ntheir place of abode, their trade and profession, etc. Hence when such\nexpectations are disappointed by a change in the law, the disappointed\npersons complain of injustice, and it is to some extent admitted that\njustice requires that they should be compensated for the loss thus\nincurred. But such expectations are of all degrees of definiteness and\nimportance, and generally extend more widely as they decrease in value,\nlike the ripples made by throwing a stone into a pond, so that it is\npractically impossible to compensate them all: at the same time, I\nknow no intuitive principle by which we could separate valid claims\nfrom invalid, and distinguish injustice from simple hardship.[210]\n\nBut even if this difficulty were overcome further reflection must, I\nthink, show that the criterion above given is incomplete or imperfectly\nstated: otherwise it would appear that no old law could be unjust,\nsince laws that have existed for a long time must create corresponding\nexpectations. But this is contrary to Common Sense: as we are\ncontinually becoming convinced that old laws are unjust (_e.g._ laws\nestablishing slavery): indeed, this continually recurring conviction\nseems to be one of the great sources of change in the laws of a\nprogressive society.\n\nPerhaps we may say that there are natural expectations which grow up\nfrom other elements of the social order, independent of and so possibly\nconflicting with laws: and that we call rules unjust which go counter\nto these. Thus _e.g._ primogeniture appears to many unjust, because\nall the landowner\u2019s children are brought up in equally luxurious\nhabits, and share equally the paternal care and expenditure, and so\nthe inequality of inheritance seems paradoxical and harsh. Still, we\ncannot explain every case in this way: for example, the conviction that\nslavery is unjust can hardly be traced to anything in the established\norder of the slave-holding society, but seems to arise in a different\nway.\n\nThe truth is, this notion of \u2018natural expectations\u2019 is worse than\nindefinite: the ambiguity of the term conceals a fundamental conflict\nof ideas, which appears more profound and far-reaching in its\nconsequences the more we examine it. For the word \u2018natural,\u2019 as used\nin this connexion, covers and conceals the whole chasm between the\nactual and the ideal--what is and what ought to be. As we before\nnoticed,[211] the term seems, as ordinarily used, to contain the\ndistinct ideas of (1) the common as opposed to the exceptional, and\n(2) the original or primitive as contrasted with the result of later\nconventions and institutions. But it is also used to signify, in more\nor less indefinite combination with one or other of these meanings,\n\u2018what would exist in an ideal state of society.\u2019 And it is easy to\nsee how these different meanings have been blended and confounded.\nFor since by \u2018Nature\u2019 men have really meant God, or God viewed in a\nparticular aspect--God, we may say, as known to us in experience--when\nthey have come to conceive a better state of things than that which\nactually exists, they have not only regarded this ideal state as\nreally exhibiting the Divine purposes more than the actual, and as\nbeing so far more \u2018natural\u2019: but they have gone further, and supposed\nmore or less definitely that this ideal state of things must be what\nGod originally created, and that the defects recognisable in what\nnow exists must be due to the deteriorating action of men. But if we\ndismiss this latter view, as unsupported by historical evidence, we\nrecognise more plainly the contrast and conflict between the other two\nmeanings of \u2018natural,\u2019 and the corresponding discrepancy between the\ntwo elements of the common notion of Justice. For, from one point of\nview, we are disposed to think that the _customary_ distribution of\nrights, goods, and privileges, as well as burdens and pains, is natural\nand just, and that this ought to be maintained by law, as it usually\nis: while, from another point of view, we seem to recognise an ideal\nsystem of rules of distribution which ought to exist, but perhaps have\nnever yet existed, and we consider laws to be just in proportion as\nthey conform to this ideal. It is the reconciliation between these two\nviews which is the chief problem of political Justice.[212]\n\nOn what principles, then, is the ideal to be determined? This is, in\nfact, the question which has been chiefly in view from the outset of\nthe chapter; but we could not satisfactorily discuss it until we had\ndistinguished the two elements of Justice, as commonly conceived--one\nconservative of law and custom, and the other tending to reform them.\nIt is on this latter that we shall now concentrate our attention.\n\nWhen, however, we examine this ideal, as it seems to show itself in\nthe minds of different men in different ages and countries, we observe\nvarious forms of it, which it is important to distinguish.\n\nIn the first place, it must be noticed that an ideal constitution\nof society may be conceived and sought with many other ends in view\nbesides the right distribution of good and evil among the individuals\nthat compose it: as (_e.g._) with a view to conquest and success in\nwar, or to the development of industry and commerce, or to the highest\npossible cultivation of the arts and sciences. But any such political\nideal as this is beyond the range of our present consideration, as it\nis not constructed on the basis of our common notion of Justice. Our\npresent question is, Are there any clear principles from which we may\nwork out an ideally just distribution of rights and privileges, burdens\nand pains, among human beings as such? There is a wide-spread view,\nthat in order to make society just certain Natural Rights should be\nconceded to all members of the community, and that positive law should\nat least embody and protect these, whatever other regulations it may\ncontain: but it is difficult to find in Common Sense any definite\nagreement in the enumeration of these Natural Rights, still less any\nclear principles from which they can be systematically deduced.\n\n\u00a7 4. There is, however, one mode of systematising these Rights\nand bringing them under one principle, which has been maintained\nby influential thinkers; and which, though now perhaps somewhat\nantiquated, is still sufficiently current to deserve careful\nexamination. It has been held that Freedom from interference is\nreally the whole of what human beings, originally and apart from\ncontracts, can be strictly said to _owe_ to each other: at any rate,\nthat the protection of this Freedom (including the enforcement of\nFree Contract) is the sole proper aim of Law, _i.e._ of those rules\nof mutual behaviour which are maintained by penalties inflicted\nunder the authority of Government. All natural Rights, on this view,\nmay be summed up in the Right to Freedom; so that the complete and\nuniversal establishment of this Right would be the complete realisation\nof Justice,--the Equality at which Justice is thought to aim being\ninterpreted as Equality of Freedom.\n\nNow when I contemplate this as an abstract formula, though I cannot say\nthat it is self-evident to me as the true fundamental principle of\nIdeal Law, I admit that it commends itself much to my mind; and I might\nperhaps persuade myself that it is owing to the defect of my faculty\nof moral (or jural) intuition that I fail to see its self-evidence.\nBut when I endeavour to bring it into closer relation to the actual\ncircumstances of human society, it soon comes to wear a different\naspect.\n\nIn the first place, it seems obviously needful to limit the extent of\nits application. For it involves the negative principle that no one\nshould be coerced for his own good alone; but no one would gravely\nargue that this ought to be applied to the case of children, or of\nidiots, or insane persons. But if so, can we know _a priori_ that it\nought to be applied to all sane adults? since the above-mentioned\nexceptions are commonly justified on the ground that children, etc.,\nwill manifestly be better off if they are forced to do and abstain\nas others think best for them; and it is, at least, not intuitively\ncertain that the same argument does not apply to the majority of\nmankind in the present state of their intellectual progress. Indeed,\nit is often conceded by the advocates of this principle that it does\nnot hold even in respect of adults in a low state of civilisation. But\nif so, what criterion can be given for its application, except that it\nmust be applied wherever human beings are sufficiently intelligent to\nprovide for themselves better than others would provide for them? and\nthus the principle would present itself not as absolute, but merely a\nsubordinate application of the wider principle of aiming at the general\nhappiness or well-being of mankind.\n\nBut, again, the term Freedom is ambiguous. If we interpret it strictly,\nas meaning Freedom of Action alone, the principle seems to allow any\namount of mutual annoyance except constraint. But obviously no one\nwould be satisfied with such Freedom as this. If, however, we include\nin the idea absence of pain and annoyance inflicted by others, it\nbecomes at once evident that we cannot prohibit all such annoyances\nwithout restraining freedom of action to a degree that would be\nintolerable; since there is scarcely any gratification of a man\u2019s\nnatural impulses which may not cause some annoyance to others. Hence\nin distinguishing the mutual annoyances that ought to be allowed from\nthose that must be prohibited we seem forced to balance the evils of\nconstraint against pain and loss of a different kind: while if we admit\nthe Utilitarian criterion so far, it is difficult to maintain that\nannoyance to individuals is never to be permitted in order to attain\nany positive good result, but only to prevent more serious annoyance.\n\nThirdly, in order to render a social construction possible on this\nbasis, we must assume that the right to Freedom includes the right\nto limit one\u2019s freedom by contract; and that such contracts, if they\nare really voluntary and not obtained by fraud or force, and if they\ndo not violate the freedom of others, are to be enforced by legal\npenalties. But I cannot see that enforcement of Contracts is strictly\nincluded in the notion of realising Freedom; for a man seems to be most\ncompletely free when no one of his volitions is allowed to have any\neffect in causing the _external_ coercion of any other. If, again, this\nright of limiting Freedom is itself unlimited, a man might thus freely\ncontract himself out of freedom into slavery, so that the principle\nof freedom would turn out suicidal; and yet to deduce from this\nprinciple a limited right of limiting freedom by contract seems clearly\nimpossible.[213]\n\nBut if it be difficult to define freedom as an ideal to be realised\nin the merely personal relations of human beings, the difficulty is\nincreased when we consider the relation of men to the material means of\nlife and happiness.\n\nFor it is commonly thought that the individual\u2019s right to Freedom\nincludes the right of appropriating material things. But, if Freedom\nbe understood strictly, I do not see that it implies more than his\nright to non-interference while actually using such things as can\nonly be used by one person at once: the right to prevent others from\nusing at any future time anything that an individual has once seized\nseems an interference with the free action of others beyond what is\nneeded to secure the freedom, strictly speaking, of the appropriator.\nIt may perhaps be said that a man, in appropriating a particular\nthing, does not interfere with the freedom of others, because the\nrest of the world is still open to them. But others may want just\nwhat he has appropriated: and they may not be able to find anything\nso good at all, or at least without much labour and search; for many\nof the instruments and materials of comfortable living are limited in\nquantity. This argument applies especially to property in land: and it\nis to be observed that, in this case, there is a further difficulty\nin determining how much a man is to be allowed to appropriate by\n\u2018first occupation.\u2019 If it be said that a man is to be understood to\noccupy what he is able to use, the answer is obvious that the use of\nland by any individual may vary almost indefinitely in extent, while\ndiminishing proportionally in intensity. For instance, it would surely\nbe a paradoxical deduction from the principle of Freedom to maintain\nthat an individual had a right to exclude others from pasturing sheep\non any part of the land over which his hunting expeditions could\nextend.[214] But if so can it be clear that a shepherd has such a right\nagainst one who wishes to till the land, or that one who is using the\nsurface has a right to exclude a would-be miner? I do not see how\nthe deduction is to be made out. Again, it may be disputed whether\nthe right of Property, as thus derived, is to include the right of\ncontrolling the disposal of one\u2019s possessions after death. For this\nto most persons seems naturally bound up with ownership: yet it is\nparadoxical to say that we interfere with a man\u2019s freedom of action by\nanything that we may do after his death to what he owned during his\nlife: and jurists have often treated this right as purely conventional\nand not therefore included in \u2018natural law.\u2019\n\nOther difficulties might be raised: but we need not pursue them,\nfor if Freedom be taken simply to mean that one man\u2019s actions are\nto be as little as possible restrained by others, it is obviously\nmore fully realised without appropriation. And if it be said that it\nincludes, beside this, facility and security in the gratification of\ndesires, and that it is Freedom in this sense that we think should\nbe equally distributed, and that this cannot be realised without\nappropriation; then it may be replied, that in a society where nearly\nall material things are already appropriated, this kind of Freedom\nis not and cannot be equally distributed. A man born into such a\nsociety, without inheritance, is not only far less free than those\nwho possess property, but he is less free than if there had been no\nappropriation. It may be said[215] that, having freedom of contract,\nhe will give his services in exchange for the means of satisfying his\nwants; and that this exchange must necessarily give him more than he\ncould have got if he had been placed in the world by himself; that, in\nfact, any human society always renders the part of the earth that it\ninhabits more capable of affording gratification of desires to each\nand all of its later-born members than it would otherwise be. But\nhowever true this may be as a general rule, it is obviously not so\nin all cases: as men are sometimes unable to sell their services at\nall, and often can only obtain in exchange for them an insufficient\nsubsistence. And, even granting it to be true, it does not prove that\nsociety, by appropriation, has not interfered with the natural freedom\nof its poorer members: but only that it compensates them for such\ninterference, and that the compensation is adequate: and it must be\nevident that if compensation in the form of material commodities can be\njustly given for an encroachment on Freedom, the realisation of Freedom\ncannot be the one ultimate end of distributive Justice.\n\n\u00a7 5. It seems, then, that though Freedom is an object of keen and\ngeneral desire, and an important source of happiness, both in itself\nand indirectly from the satisfaction of natural impulses which it\nallows, the attempt to make it the fundamental notion of theoretical\nJurisprudence is attended with insuperable difficulties: and that even\nthe Natural Rights which it claims to cover cannot be brought under\nit except in a very forced and arbitrary manner.[216] But further,\neven if this were otherwise, an equal distribution of Freedom does not\nseem to exhaust our notion of Justice. Ideal Justice, as we commonly\nconceive it, seems to demand that not only Freedom but all other\nbenefits and burdens should be distributed, if not equally, at any\nrate justly,--Justice in distribution being regarded as not identical\nwith Equality, but merely exclusive of arbitrary inequality.\n\nHow, then, shall we find the principle of this highest and most\ncomprehensive ideal?\n\nWe shall be led to it, I think, by referring again to one of the\ngrounds of obligation to render services, which was noticed in the\nlast chapter: the claim of Gratitude. It there appeared that we have\nnot only a natural impulse to requite benefits, but also a conviction\nthat such requital is a duty, and its omission blameworthy, to some\nextent at least; though we find it difficult to define the extent.\nNow it seems that when we, so to say, _universalise_ this impulse and\nconviction, we get the element in the common view of Justice, which we\nare now trying to define. For if we take the proposition \u2018that good\ndone to any individual ought to be requited by him,\u2019 and leave out\nthe relation to the individual in either term of the proposition, we\nseem to have an equally strong conviction of the truth of the more\ngeneral statement \u2018that good deeds ought to be requited.\u2019[217] And\nif we take into consideration all the different kinds and degrees of\nservices, upon the mutual exchange of which society is based, we get\nthe proposition \u2018that men ought to be rewarded in proportion to their\ndeserts.\u2019 And this would be commonly held to be the true and simple\nprinciple of distribution in any case where there are no claims arising\nfrom Contract or Custom to modify its operation.\n\nFor example, it would be admitted that--if there has been no previous\narrangement--the profits of any work or enterprise should be divided\namong those who have contributed to its success in proportion to the\nworth of their services. And it may be observed, that some thinkers\nmaintain the proposition discussed in the previous section--that\nLaw ought to aim at securing the greatest possible Freedom for each\nindividual--not as absolute and axiomatic, but as derivative from\nthe principle that Desert ought to be requited; on the ground that\nthe best way of providing for the requital of Desert is to leave men\nas free as possible to exert themselves for the satisfaction of their\nown desires, and so to win each his own requital. And this seems to be\nreally the principle upon which the Right of Property is rested, when\nit is justified by the proposition that \u2018every one has an exclusive\nright to the produce of his labour.\u2019 For on reflection it is seen that\nno labour really \u2018produces\u2019 any material thing, but only adds to its\nvalue: and we do not think that a man can acquire a right to a material\nthing belonging to another, by spending his labour on it--even if he\ndoes so in the _bona fide_ belief that it is his own property--but\nonly to adequate _compensation_ for his labour; this, therefore, is\nwhat the proposition just quoted must mean. The principle is, indeed,\nsometimes stretched to explain the original right of property in\nmaterials, as being in a sense \u2018produced\u2019 (_i.e._ found) by their\nfirst discoverer;[218] but here again, reflection shows that Common\nSense does not grant this (as a _moral_ right) absolutely, but only\nin so far as it appears to be not more than adequate compensation for\nthe discoverer\u2019s trouble. For example, we should not consider that\nthe first finder of a large uninhabited region had a moral right to\nappropriate the whole of it. Hence this justification of the right of\nproperty refers us ultimately to the principle \u2018that every man ought to\nreceive adequate requital for his labour.\u2019 So, again, when we speak of\nthe world as justly governed by God, we seem to mean that, if we could\nknow the whole of human existence, we should find that happiness is\ndistributed among men according to their deserts. And Divine Justice is\nthought to be a pattern which Human Justice is to imitate as far as the\nconditions of human society allow.\n\nThis kind of Justice, as has been said, seems like Gratitude\nuniversalised: and the same principle applied to punishment may\nsimilarly be regarded as Resentment universalised; though the parallel\nis incomplete, if we are considering the present state of our moral\nconceptions. History shows us a time in which it was thought not only\nas natural, but as clearly right and incumbent on a man, to requite\ninjuries as to repay benefits: but as moral reflection developed in\nEurope this notion was repudiated, so that Plato taught that it could\nnever be right really to harm any one, however he may have harmed us.\nAnd this is the accepted doctrine in Christian societies, as regards\nrequital by individuals of personal wrongs. But in its universalised\nform the old conviction still lingers in the popular view of Criminal\nJustice: it seems still to be widely held that Justice requires pain\nto be inflicted on a man who has done wrong, even if no benefit result\neither to him or to others from the pain. Personally, I am so far from\nholding this view that I have an instinctive and strong moral aversion\nto it: and I hesitate to attribute it to Common Sense, since I think\nthat it is gradually passing away from the moral consciousness of\neducated persons in the most advanced communities: but I think it is\nstill perhaps the more ordinary view.\n\nThis, then, is one element of what Aristotle calls Corrective Justice,\nwhich is embodied in criminal law. It must not be confounded with\nthe principle of Reparation, on which legal awards of damages are\nbased. We have already noticed this as a simple deduction from the\nmaxim of general Benevolence, which forbids us to do harm to our\nfellow-creatures: for if we have harmed them, we can yet approximately\nobey the maxim by giving compensation for the harm. Though here the\nquestion arises whether we are bound to make reparation for harm that\nhas been quite blamelessly caused: and it is not easy to answer it\ndecisively.[219] On the whole, I think we should condemn a man who\ndid not offer some reparation for any serious injury caused by him to\nanother--even if quite involuntarily caused, and without negligence:\nbut perhaps we regard this rather as a duty of Benevolence--arising\nout of the general sympathy that each ought to have for others,\nintensified by this special occasion--than as a duty of strict Justice.\nIf, however, we limit the requirement of Reparation, under the head\nof strict Justice, to cases in which the mischief repaired is due to\nacts or omissions in some degree culpable, a difficulty arises from\nthe divergence between the moral view of culpability, and that which\nsocial security requires. Of this I will speak presently.[220] In any\ncase there is now[221] no danger of confusion or collision between\nthe principle of Reparative and that of Retributive Justice, as the\none is manifestly concerned with the claims of the injured party, and\nthe other with the deserts of the wrongdoer: though in the actual\nadministration of Law the obligation of paying compensation for wrong\nmay sometimes be treated as a sufficient punishment for the wrongdoer.\n\nWhen, however, we turn again to the other branch of Retributive\nJustice, which is concerned with the reward of services, we\nfind another notion, which I will call Fitness, often blended\nindistinguishably[222] with the notion of Desert, and so needing to be\ncarefully separated from it; and when the distinction has been made, we\nsee that the two are liable to come into collision. I do not feel sure\nthat the principle of \u2018distribution according to Fitness\u2019 is found,\nstrictly speaking, in the analysis of the ordinary notion of Justice:\nbut it certainly enters into our common conception of the ideal or\nperfectly rational order of society, as regards the distribution both\nof instruments and functions, and (to some extent at least) of other\nsources of happiness. We certainly think it reasonable that instruments\nshould be given to those who can use them best, and functions allotted\nto those who are most competent to perform them: but these may not\nbe those who have rendered most services in the past. And again, we\nthink it reasonable that particular material means of enjoyment should\nfall to the lot of those who are susceptible of the respective kinds\nof pleasure; as no one would think of allotting pictures to a blind\nman, or rare wines to one who had no taste: hence we should probably\nthink it fitting that artists should have larger shares than mechanics\nin the social distribution of wealth, though they may be by no means\nmore deserving. Thus the notions of Desert and Fitness appear at least\noccasionally conflicting; but perhaps, as I have suggested, Fitness\nshould rather be regarded as a utilitarian principle of distribution,\ninevitably limiting the realisation of what is abstractly just, than\nas a part of the interpretation of Justice proper: and it is with the\nlatter that we are at present concerned. At any rate it is the Requital\nof Desert that constitutes the chief element of Ideal Justice, in so\nfar as this imports something more than mere Equality and Impartiality.\nLet us then examine more closely wherein Desert consists; and we will\nbegin with Good Desert or Merit, as being of the most fundamental and\npermanent importance; for we may hope that crime and its punishment\nwill decrease and gradually disappear as the world improves, but the\nright or best distribution of the means of wellbeing is an object that\nwe must always be striving to realise.\n\n\u00a7 6. And first, the question which we had to consider in defining\nGratitude again recurs: whether, namely, we are to apportion the\nreward to the effort made, or to the results attained. For it may be\nsaid that the actual utility of any service must depend much upon\nfavourable circumstances and fortunate accidents, not due to any desert\nof the agent: or again, may be due to powers and skills which were\nconnate, or have been developed by favourable conditions of life, or\nby good education, and why should we reward him for these? (for the\nlast-mentioned we ought rather to reward those who have educated\nhim). And certainly it is only in so far as _moral_ excellences are\nexhibited in human achievements that they are commonly thought to be\nsuch as God will reward. But by drawing this line we do not yet get\nrid of the difficulty. For it may still be said that good actions are\ndue entirely, or to a great extent, to good dispositions and habits,\nand that these are partly inherited and partly due to the care of\nparents and teachers; so that in rewarding these we are rewarding the\nresults of natural and accidental advantages, and it is unreasonable to\ndistinguish these from others, such as skill and knowledge, and to say\nthat it is even ideally just to reward the one and not the other. Shall\nwe say, then, that the reward should be proportionate to the amount of\nvoluntary effort for a good end? But Determinists will say that even\nthis is ultimately the effect of causes extraneous to the man\u2019s self.\nOn the Determinist view, then, it would seem to be ideally just (if\nanything is so) that all men should enjoy equal amounts of happiness:\nfor there seems to be no justice in making _A_ happier than _B_, merely\nbecause circumstances beyond his own control have first made him\nbetter. But why should we not, instead of \u2018all men,\u2019 say \u2018all sentient\nbeings\u2019? for why should men have more happiness than any other animal?\nBut thus the pursuit of ideal justice seems to conduct us to such a\nprecipice of paradox that Common Sense is likely to abandon it. At any\nrate the ordinary idea of Desert has thus altogether vanished.[223] And\nthus we seem to be led to the conclusion which I anticipated in Book i.\nchap. v.: that in this one department of our moral consciousness the\nidea of Free Will seems involved in a peculiar way in the moral ideas\nof Common Sense, since if it is eliminated the important notions of\nDesert or Merit and Justice require material modification.[224] At the\nsame time, the difference between Determinist and Libertarian Justice\ncan hardly have any practical effect. For in any case it does not seem\npossible to separate in practice that part of a man\u2019s achievement which\nis due strictly to his free choice from that part which is due to the\noriginal gift of nature and to favouring circumstances:[225] so that\nwe must necessarily leave to providence the realisation of what we\nconceive as the theoretical ideal of Justice, and content ourselves\nwith trying to reward voluntary actions in proportion to the worth of\nthe services intentionally rendered by them.\n\nIf, then, we take as the principle of ideal justice, so far as this can\nbe practically aimed at in human society, the requital of voluntary\nservices in proportion to their worth, it remains to consider on what\nprinciple or principles the comparative worth of different services is\nto be rationally estimated. There is no doubt that we commonly assume\nsuch an estimate to be possible; for we continually speak of the \u2018fair\u2019\nor \u2018proper\u2019 price of any kind of services as something generally known,\nand condemn the demand for more than this as extortionate. It may be\nsaid that the notion of Fairness or Equity which we ordinarily apply\nin such judgments is to be distinguished from that of Justice; Equity\nbeing in fact often contrasted with strict Justice, and conceived as\ncapable of coming into collision with it. And this is partly true:\nbut I think the wider and no less usual sense of the term Justice,\nin which it includes Equity or Fairness, is the only one that can be\nconveniently adopted in an ethical treatise: for in any case where\nEquity comes into conflict with strict justice, its dictates are\nheld to be in a higher sense just, and what ought to be ultimately\ncarried into effect in the case considered--though not, perhaps, by\nthe administrators of law. I treat Equity, therefore, as a species of\nJustice; though noting that the former term is more ordinarily used\nin cases where the definiteness attainable is recognised as somewhat\nless than in ordinary cases of rightful claims arising out of law or\ncontract. On what principle, then, can we determine the \u201cfair\u201d or\n\u201cequitable\u201d price of services? When we examine the common judgments\nof practical persons in which this judgment occurs, we find, I think,\nthat the \u2018fair\u2019 in such cases is ascertained by a reference to analogy\nand custom, and that any service is considered to be \u2018fairly worth\u2019\nwhat is usually given for services of the kind. Hence this element\nof the notion of Justice may seem, after all, to resolve itself into\nthat discussed in \u00a7 2: and in some states of society it certainly\nappears that the payment to be given for services is as completely\nfixed by usage as any other customary duty, so that it would be a clear\ndisappointment of normal expectation to deviate from this usage. But\nprobably no one in a modern civilised community would maintain in its\nfull breadth this identification of the Just with the Usual price of\nservices: and so far as the judgments of practical persons may seem\nto imply this, I think it must be admitted that they are superficial\nor merely inadvertent, and ignore the established mode of determining\nthe market prices of commodities by free competition of producers and\ntraders. For where such competition operates the market value rises\nand falls, and is different at different places and times; so that no\nproperly instructed person can expect any fixity in it, or complain of\ninjustice merely on account of the variations in it.\n\nCan we then say that \u2018market value\u2019 (as determined by free competition)\ncorresponds to our notion of what is ideally just?\n\nThis is a question of much interest, because this is obviously the mode\nof determining the remuneration of services that would be universal\nin a society constructed on the principle previously discussed, of\nsecuring the greatest possible Freedom to all members of the community.\nIt should be observed that this, which we may call the Individualistic\nIdeal, is the type to which modern civilised communities have, until\nlately, been tending to approximate: and it is therefore very important\nto know whether it is one which completely satisfies the demands\nof morality; and whether Freedom, if not an absolute end or First\nPrinciple of abstract Justice, is still to be sought as the best means\nto the realisation of a just social order by the general requital of\nDesert.\n\nAt first sight it seems plausible to urge that the \u2018market value\u2019\nrepresents the estimate set upon anything by mankind generally, and\ntherefore gives us exactly that \u2018common sense\u2019 judgment respecting\nvalue which we are now trying to find. But on examination it seems\nlikely that the majority of men are not properly qualified to decide on\nthe value of many important kinds of services, from imperfect knowledge\nof their nature and effects; so that, as far as these are concerned,\nthe true judgment will not be represented in the market-place. Even in\nthe case of things which a man is generally able to estimate, it may be\nmanifest in a particular case that he is ignorant of the real utility\nof what he exchanges; and in this case the \u2018free\u2019 contract hardly\nseems to be fair: though if the ignorance was not caused by the other\nparty to the exchange, Common Sense is hardly prepared to condemn the\nlatter as unjust for taking advantage of it. For instance, if a man\nhas discovered by a legitimate use of geological knowledge and skill\nthat there is probably a valuable mine on land owned by a stranger,\nreasonable persons would not blame him for concealing his discovery\nuntil he had bought the mine at its market value: yet it could not\nbe said that the seller got what it was really worth. In fact Common\nSense is rather perplexed on this point: and the _rationale_ of the\nconclusion at which it arrives, must, I conceive, be sought in economic\nconsiderations, which take us quite beyond the analysis of the common\nnotion of Justice.[226]\n\nAgain, there are social services recognised as highly important\nwhich generally speaking have no price in any market, on account of\nthe indirectness and uncertainty of their practical utility: as,\nfor instance, scientific discoveries. The extent to which any given\ndiscovery will aid industrial invention is so uncertain, that even if\nthe secret of it could be conveniently kept, it would not usually be\nprofitable to buy it.\n\nBut even if we confine our attention to products and services generally\nmarketable, and to bargains thoroughly understood on both sides,\nthere are still serious difficulties in the way of identifying the\nnotions of \u2018free\u2019 and \u2018fair\u2019 exchange. Thus, where an individual, or\ncombination of individuals, has the monopoly of a certain kind of\nservices, the market-price of the aggregate of such services can under\ncertain conditions be increased by diminishing their total amount; but\nit would seem absurd to say that the social Desert of those rendering\nthe services is thereby increased, and a plain man has grave doubts\nwhether the price thus attained is fair. Still less is it thought fair\nto take advantage of the transient monopoly produced by emergency:\nthus, if I saw Cr\u0153sus drowning and no one near, it would not be held\nfair in me to refuse to save him except at the price of half his\nwealth. But if so, can it be fair for any class of persons to gain\ncompetitively by the unfavourable economic situation of another class\nwith which they deal? And if we admit that it would be unfair, where\nare we to draw the line? For any increase of the numbers of a class\nrenders its situation for bargaining less favourable: since the market\nprice of different services depends partly upon the ease or difficulty\nof procuring them--as Political Economists say, \u2018on the relation\nbetween the supply of services and the demand for them\u2019--and it does\nnot seem that any individual\u2019s social Desert can properly be lessened\nmerely by the increased number or willingness of others rendering the\nsame services. Nor, indeed, does it seem that it can be decreased by\nhis own willingness, for it is strange to reward a man less because\nhe is zealous and eager in the performance of his function; yet in\nbargaining the less willing always has the advantage. And, finally, it\nhardly appears that the social worth of a man\u2019s service is necessarily\nincreased by the fact that his service is rendered to those who can pay\nlavishly; but his reward is certainly likely to be greater from this\ncause.\n\nSuch considerations as these have led some political thinkers to hold\nthat Justice requires a mode of distributing payment for services,\nentirely different from that at present effected by free competition:\nand that all labourers ought to be paid according to the intrinsic\nvalue of their labour as estimated by enlightened and competent judges.\nIf the Socialistic Ideal--as we may perhaps call it--could be realised\nwithout counter-balancing evils, it would certainly seem to give a\nnearer approximation to what we conceive as Divine Justice than the\npresent state of society affords. But this supposes that we have found\nthe rational method of determining value: which, however, is still\nto seek. Shall we say that these judges are to take the value of a\nservice as proportionate to the amount of happiness produced by it? If\nso, the calculation is, of course, exposed to all the difficulties of\nthe hedonistic method discussed in Book ii.: but supposing these can\nbe overcome, it is still hard to say how we are to compare the value\nof different services that must necessarily be combined to produce\nhappy life. For example, how shall we compare the respective values of\nnecessaries and luxuries? for we may be more sensible of the enjoyment\nderived from the latter, but we could not have this at all without the\nformer. And, again, when different kinds of labour co-operate in the\nsame production, how are we to estimate their relative values? for even\nif all mere unskilled labour may be brought to a common standard, this\nseems almost impossible in the case of different kinds of skill. For\nhow shall we compare the labour of design with that of achievement?\nor the supervision of the whole with the execution of details? or the\nlabour of actually producing with that of educating producers? or the\nservice of the _savant_ who discovers a new principle, with that of the\ninventor who applies it?\n\nI do not see how these questions, or the difficulties noticed in the\npreceding paragraph, can be met by any analysis of our common notion\nof Justice. To deal with such points at all satisfactorily we have, I\nconceive, to adopt quite a different line of reasoning: we have to ask,\nnot what services of a certain kind are intrinsically worth, but what\nreward can procure them and whether the rest of society gain by the\nservices more than the equivalent reward. We have, in short, to give up\nas impracticable the construction of an ideally just social order,[227]\nin which all services are rewarded in exact proportion to their\nintrinsic value. And, for similar reasons, we seem forced to conclude,\nmore generally, that it is impossible to obtain clear premises for\na reasoned method of determining exactly different amounts of Good\nDesert. Indeed, perhaps, Common Sense scarcely holds such a method\nto be possible: for though it considers Ideal Justice to consist in\nrewarding Desert, it regards as Utopian any general attempt to realise\nthis ideal in the social distribution of the means of happiness. In the\nactual state of society it is only within a very limited range that\nany endeavour is made to reward Good Desert. Parents attempt this to\nsome extent in dealing with their children, and the State in rewarding\nremarkable public services rendered by statesmen, soldiers, etc.: but\nreflection on these cases will show how very rough and imperfect are\nthe standards used in deciding the amount due. And ordinarily the only\nkind of Justice which we try to realise is that which consists in the\nfulfilment of contracts and definite expectations; leaving the general\nfairness of Distribution by Bargaining to take care of itself.\n\n\u00a7 7. When we pass to consider the case of Criminal Justice, we find,\nin the first place, difficulties corresponding to those which we\nhave already noticed. We find, to begin, a similar implication and\npartial confusion of the ideas of Law and Justice. For, as was said,\nby \u2018bringing a man to Justice\u2019 we commonly mean \u2018inflicting legal\npunishment\u2019 on him: and we think it right that neither more nor less\nthan the penalty prescribed by law should be executed, even though\nwe may regard the legal scale of punishment as unjust. At the same\ntime, we have no such perplexity in respect of changes in the law as\noccurs in the case of Civil Justice; for we do not think that a man can\nacquire, by custom, prescriptive rights to over-lenient punishment,\nas he is thought to do to an unequal distribution of liberties and\nprivileges. If now we investigate the ideal of Criminal Justice, as\nintuitively determined, we certainly find that in so far as punishment\nis not regarded as merely preventive,[228] it is commonly thought that\nit ought to be proportioned to the gravity of crime.[229] Still, when\nwe endeavour to make the method of apportionment perfectly rational and\nprecise, the difficulties seem at least as great as in the case of Good\nDesert. For, first, the assumption of Free Will seems necessarily to\ncome in here also; since if a man\u2019s bad deeds are entirely caused by\nnature and circumstances, it certainly appears, as Robert Owen urged,\nthat he does not properly deserve to be punished for them; Justice\nwould rather seem to require us to try to alter the conditions under\nwhich he acts. And we actually do punish deliberate offences more than\nimpulsive, perhaps as implying a more free choice of evil. Again,\nwe think that offences committed by persons who have had no moral\ntraining, or a perverted training, are really less criminal; at the\nsame time it is commonly agreed that men can hardly remit punishment\non this account. Again the gravity--from a moral point of view--of a\ncrime seems to be at least much reduced, if the motive be laudable,\nas when a man kills a villain whose crimes elude legal punishment,\nor heads a hopeless rebellion for the good of his country: still it\nwould be paradoxical to affirm that we ought to reduce punishment\nproportionally: Common Sense would hold that--whatever God may do--men\nmust, generally speaking, inflict severe punishment for any gravely\nmischievous act forbidden by law which has been intentionally done,\neven though it may have been prompted by a good motive.\n\nBut even if we neglect the motive, and take the intention only into\naccount, it is not easy to state clear principles for determining the\ngravity of crimes. For sometimes, as in the case of the patriotic\nrebel, the intention of the criminal is to do what is right and good:\nand in many cases, though he knows that he is doing wrong, he does\nnot intend to cause any actual harm to any sentient being; as when\na thief takes what he thinks will not be missed. Again, we do not\ncommonly think that a crime is rendered less grave by being kept\nperfectly secret; and yet a great part of the harm done by a crime is\nthe \u2018secondary evil\u2019 (as Bentham calls it) of the alarm and insecurity\nwhich it causes; and this part is cut off by complete secrecy. It may\nbe replied that this latter difficulty is not a practical one; because\nwe are not called upon to punish a crime until it has been discovered,\nand then the secondary evil has been caused, and is all the greater\nbecause of the previous secrecy. But it remains true that it was not\ndesigned for discovery; and therefore that this part of the evil caused\nby the crime was not intended by the criminal. And if we say that the\nheinousness of the crime depends on the loss of happiness that would\ngenerally be caused by such acts if they were allowed to go unpunished,\nand that we must suppose the criminal to be aware of this; we seem to\nbe endeavouring to force a utilitarian theory into an intuitional form\nby means of a legal fiction.\n\nWe have hitherto spoken of intentional wrong-doing: but positive law\nawards punishment also for harm that is due to rashness or negligence;\nand the justification of this involves us in further difficulties.\nSome jurists seem to regard rashness and negligence as positive states\nof mind, in which the agent consciously refuses the attention or\nreflection which he knows he ought to give; and no doubt this sort\nof wilful recklessness does sometimes occur, and seems as properly\npunishable as if the resulting harm had been positively intended. But\nthe law as actually administered does not require evidence that this\nwas the agent\u2019s state of mind (which indeed in most cases it would be\nimpossible to give): but is content with proof that the harm might have\nbeen prevented by such care as an average man would have shown under\nthe circumstances. And most commonly by \u2018carelessness\u2019 we simply mean\na purely negative psychological fact, _i.e._ that the agent did not\nperform certain processes of observation or reflection; it is therefore\nat the time strictly involuntary, and so scarcely seems to involve\nill-desert. It may be said perhaps that though the present carelessness\nis not blameworthy, the past neglect to cultivate habits of care is so.\nBut in many individual instances we cannot reasonably infer even this\npast neglect; and in such cases the utilitarian theory of punishment,\nwhich regards it as a means of preventing similar harmful acts in\nthe future, seems alone applicable. Similar difficulties arise, as\nwas before hinted (p. 282), in determining the limits within which\nReparation is due; that is, on the view that it is not incumbent on us\nto make compensation for all harm caused by our muscular actions, but\nonly for harm which--if not intentional--was due to our rashness or\nnegligence.\n\nThe results of this examination of Justice may be summed up as\nfollows. The prominent element in Justice as ordinarily conceived\nis a kind of Equality: that is, Impartiality in the observance or\nenforcement of certain general rules allotting good or evil to\nindividuals. But when we have clearly distinguished this element,\nwe see that the definition of the virtue required for practical\nguidance is left obviously incomplete. Inquiring further for the\nright general principles of distribution, we find that our common\nnotion of Justice includes--besides the principle of Reparation for\ninjury--two quite distinct and divergent elements. The one, which we\nmay call Conservative Justice, is realised (1) in the observance of\nLaw and Contracts and definite understandings, and in the enforcement\nof such penalties for the violation of these as have been legally\ndetermined and announced; and (2) in the fulfilment of natural and\nnormal expectations. This latter obligation, however, is of a somewhat\nindefinite kind. But the other element, which we have called Ideal\nJustice, is still more difficult to define; for there seem to be\ntwo quite distinct conceptions of it, embodied respectively in what\nwe have called the Individualistic and the Socialistic Ideals of a\npolitical community. The first of these takes the realisation of\nFreedom as the ultimate end and standard of right social relations:\nbut on examining it closer we find that the notion of Freedom will\nnot give a practicable basis for social construction without certain\narbitrary[230] definitions and limitations: and even if we admit these,\nstill a society in which Freedom is realised as far as is feasible does\nnot completely suit our sense of Justice. _Prima facie_, this is more\nsatisfied by the Socialistic Ideal of Distribution, founded on the\nprinciple of requiting Desert: but when we try to make this principle\nprecise, we find ourselves again involved in grave difficulties; and\nsimilar perplexities beset the working out of rules of Criminal Justice\non the same principle.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[204] How far an independent principle of Justice is required for the\nUtilitarian method will be hereafter considered. (Book iv. chap. i.)\n\n[205] Aristotle, in expounding the virtue of \u0394\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, which\ncorresponds to our Justice, notices that the word has two meanings; in\nthe wider of which it includes in a manner all Virtue, or at any rate\nthe social side or aspect of Virtue generally. The word \u2018Justice\u2019 does\nnot appear to be used in English in this comprehensive manner (except\noccasionally in religious writings, from the influence of the Greek\nword as used in the New Testament): although the verb \u201cto justify\u201d\nseems to have this width of meaning; for when I say that one is\n\u201cjustified\u201d in doing so and so, I mean no more than that such conduct\nis right for him. In the present discussion, at any rate, I have\nconfined myself to the more precise signification of the term.\n\n[206] I ought to say that, in my view, this only applies to taxes\nin the narrower sense in which they are distinguished from payments\nfor services received by individuals from Government. In the case of\nthese latter, I conceive that Justice is rather held to lie in duly\nproportioning payment to amount of service received. Some persons have\nheld that all payments made to Government ought to be determined on\nthis principle: and this view seems to me to be consistent with the\nindividualistic ideal of political order, which I shall presently\nexamine: but, as I have elsewhere tried to show (_Princ. of Pol.\nEcon._ Book iii. chap. viii.), there is an important department of\nGovernmental expenditure to which this principle is not applicable.\n\n[207] It may be well to notice a case in which the very equality of\napplication, which is, as has been said, implied in the mere idea of a\nlaw couched in general terms, is felt to be unjust. This is the case\nwhere the words of a statute, either from being carelessly drawn, or on\naccount of the inevitable defects of even the most precise terminology,\ninclude (or exclude) persons and circumstances which are clearly not\nincluded in (or excluded from) the real intent and purpose of the law.\nIn this case a particular decision, strictly in accordance with a law\nwhich generally considered is just, may cause extreme injustice: and so\nthe difference between actual Law and Justice is sharply brought out.\nStill we cannot in this way obtain principles for judging generally of\nthe justice of laws.\n\n[208] It should be observed that we cannot even say, in treating of\nthe private conduct of individuals, that _all_ arbitrary inequality\nis recognised as unjust: it would not be commonly thought unjust in a\nrich bachelor with no near relatives to leave the bulk of his property\nin providing pensions exclusively for indigent red-haired men, however\nunreasonable and capricious the choice might appear.\n\n[209] It may be observed that sometimes claims generated in this way\nhave legal validity; as when a right of way is established without\nexpress permission of the landowner, merely by his continued indulgence.\n\n[210] This is the case even, as I say, when laws are altered lawfully:\nstill more after any exceptional crisis at which there has occurred\na rupture of political order: for then the legal claims arising out\nof the new order which is thus rooted in disorder conflict with those\npreviously established in a manner which admits of no theoretical\nsolution: it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise. See\nnext chapter, \u00a7 3.\n\n[211] Book i. chap. vi. \u00a7 2.\n\n[212] It is characteristic of an unprogressive society that in it these\ntwo points of view are indistinguishable; the Jural Ideal absolutely\ncoincides with the Customary, and social perfection is imagined to\nconsist in the perfect observance of a traditional system of rules.\n\n[213] This question, how far the conception of Freedom involves\nunlimited right to limit Freedom by free contract, will meet us again\nin the next chapter, when we consider the general duty of obedience to\nLaw.\n\n[214] It has often been urged as a justification for expropriating\nsavages from the land of new colonies that tribes of hunters have\nreally no moral right to property in the soil over which they hunt.\n\n[215] This is the argument used by optimistic political economists such\nas Bastiat.\n\n[216] The further consideration of Political Freedom, with which\nwe shall be occupied in the next chapter, will afford additional\nillustrations of the difficulties involved in the notion.\n\n[217] If the view given in the text be sound, it illustrates very\nstrikingly the difference between natural instincts and moral\nintuitions. For the impulse to requite a service is, on its emotional\nside, quite different from that which prompts us to claim the fruits of\nour labour, or \u201ca fair day\u2019s wages for a fair day\u2019s work.\u201d Still, our\napprehension of the _duty_ of Gratitude seems capable of being subsumed\nunder the more general intuition \u2018that desert ought to be requited.\u2019\n\n[218] It certainly requires a considerable strain to bring the \u2018right\nof First Discovery\u2019 under the notion of \u2018right to the produce of one\u2019s\nlabour.\u2019 Hence Locke and others have found it necessary to suppose,\nas the ultimate justification of the former right, \u2018a tacit consent\u2019\nof mankind in general that all things previously unappropriated shall\nbelong to the first appropriator. But this must be admitted to be a\nrather desperate device of ethico-political construction: on account\nof the fatal facility with which it may be used to justify almost any\narbitrariness in positive law.\n\n[219] The reader will find an interesting illustration of the\nperplexity of Common Sense on this point in Mr. O. W. Holmes, Junior\u2019s,\nbook on _The Common Law_, chap. iii., where the author gives a\npenetrating discussion of the struggle, in the development of the\ndoctrine of torts in English Law, between two opposing views: (1) that\n\u201cthe risk of a man\u2019s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some\nmoral short-coming,\u201d and (2) that \u201ca man acts at his peril always, and\nwholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.\u201d\nThe former is the view that has in the main prevailed in English Law;\nand this seems to me certainly in harmony with the Common Sense of\nmankind, so far as legal liability is concerned; but I do not think\nthat the case is equally clear as regards moral obligation.\n\n[220] Cf. _post_, pp. 292-3. It may be added that there is often a\nfurther difficulty in ascertaining the amount of compensation due:\nfor this frequently involves a comparison of things essentially\ndisparate, and there are some kinds of harm which it seems impossible\nto compensate.\n\n[221] In the earlier stage of moral development, referred to in the\npreceding paragraph, retribution inflicted on the wrongdoer was\nregarded as the normal mode of reparation to the person injured. But\nthis view is contrary to the moral Common Sense of Christian Societies.\n\n[222] I think the term \u201cmerit\u201d often blends the two notions, as when\nwe speak of \u201cpromotion by merit.\u201d By moralists, however, \u201cmerit\u201d is\ngenerally used as exactly equivalent to what I have called \u201cdesert.\u201d\n\n[223] The only tenable Determinist interpretation of Desert is, in my\nopinion, the Utilitarian: according to which, when a man is said to\ndeserve reward for any services to society, the meaning is that it is\nexpedient to reward him, in order that he and others may be induced\nto render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards. Cf.\n_post_, Book iv. chap. iii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[224] Perhaps we may partly attribute to the difficulties above\ndiscussed, that the notion of Desert has sometimes dropped out of the\nideal of Utopian reconstructors of society, and \u2018Equality of Happiness\u2019\nhas seemed to be the only end. Justice, it has been thought, prescribes\nsimply that each should have an equal share of happiness, as far as\nhappiness depends on the action of others. But there seems to be much\ndifficulty in working this out: for (apart from the considerations\nof Fitness above mentioned) equal happiness is not to be attained by\nequal distribution of objects of desire. For some require more and some\nless to be equally happy. Hence, it seems, we must take differences of\n_needs_ into consideration. But if merely mental needs are included (as\nseems reasonable) we should have to give less to cheerful, contented,\nself-sacrificing people than to those who are naturally moody and\n_exigeant_, as the former can be made happy with less. And this is too\nparadoxical to recommend itself to Common Sense.\n\n[225] No doubt, it would be possible to remove, to some extent, the\ninequalities that are attributable to circumstances, by bringing the\nbest education within the reach of all classes, so that all children\nmight have an equal opportunity of being selected and trained for\nany functions for which they seemed to be fit: and this seems to be\nprescribed by ideal justice, in so far as it removes or mitigates\narbitrary inequality. Accordingly in those ideal reconstructions of\nsociety, in which we may expect to find men\u2019s notions of abstract\njustice exhibited, such an institution as this has generally found a\nplace. Still, there will be much natural inequality which we cannot\nremove or even estimate.\n\n[226] Cf. _post_, Book iv. chap. iii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[227] It is not perhaps necessary that I should here enlarge on the\n_practical_ obstacles in the way of any attempt to realise such an\nideal system.\n\n[228] I have already expressed my opinion that this Utilitarian view of\npunishment is gradually tending to prevail; but I do not think that it\nhas yet prevailed.\n\n[229] Of course those who hold that the essence of Justice consists in\nsecuring external Freedom among the members of a community, and that\npunishment is only justified as a means to this end, naturally think\nthat in awarding punishment we ought to consider merely its efficacy as\nsuch means. But this can scarcely be put forward as an interpretation\nof the common notion of Just Punishment.\n\n[230] By \u2018arbitrary\u2019 I mean such definitions and limitations as destroy\nthe self-evidence of the principle; and, when closely examined, lead us\nto regard it as subordinate.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nLAWS AND PROMISES\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the discussion of Justice the moral obligations of obedience to\nLaw and observance of Contract have been included, and have, indeed,\nappeared to be the most definite part of the complex system of private\nduties commonly included under that term. At the same time, as we have\nseen, there are some laws, the violation of which does not interfere\nwith the rights of others, and therefore has not the characteristics of\nan act of Injustice. While again, the duty of Fidelity to promises is\nalso commonly conceived as independent of any injury that might be done\nto the promisee by breaking it: for (_e.g._) men ordinarily judge that\npromises to the dead, though they are beyond the reach of injury, ought\nto be kept: indeed, some would regard them as even more sacred than\npromises made to the living. It seems therefore desirable to examine\nthe propositions \u2018that Law ought to be obeyed\u2019 and \u2018that promises ought\nto be kept,\u2019 considered as independent principles.\n\nTo begin with the former: how are we to ascertain what the Law is\nwhich, as is commonly thought, we are morally bound to obey, as such?\nIt is plain that we cannot here distinguish Legal from other rules by\nconsidering the sanctions actually attached to them, as we had occasion\nto do in a previous chapter.[231] For commands issued by rebels and\nusurpers are held to have as such no general bindingness, though they\nmay be enforced by judicial penalties; it would be generally agreed\nthat so far as it is our duty to obey such commands this is solely in\norder to avoid the greater evils which might result to ourselves and\nothers from our disobedience; and that the extent of such a duty must\nbe determined by considerations of expediency. Nor, again, can we say\nthat all commands even of a legitimate sovereign are to be regarded as\nLaws in the sense in which the term must be taken in the proposition\nthat \u2018laws ought to be obeyed\u2019: since we all recognise that a rightful\nsovereign may command his subjects to do what is wrong, and that it is\nthen their duty to disobey him. It seems therefore that for our present\npurpose we must define Laws to be Rules of Conduct laid down by a\nRightful Authority, commanding within the limits of its authority.\n\nThere are therefore two questions to be settled, if the proposition\nthat laws ought to be obeyed is to furnish practical guidance: (1) how\nwe are to distinguish the Rightful Lawmaker--whether individual or\nbody, and (2) how we are to ascertain the limits of this lawmaker\u2019s\nauthority. The questions should be distinguished; but, as we shall\nsee, they can only be partially separated. Beginning with the first\nquestion, we may assume that the authority to make laws resides in\nsome living man or men. No doubt in some societies, at some stages of\ntheir development, the whole or a part of the code of laws habitually\nobserved, or at least recognised as binding, has been believed to be\nof divine or semi-divine institution; or perhaps from mere antiquity\nto possess a sanctity superior to that of any living authority, so as\nto be not legitimately alterable. But we hardly find this view in the\nCommon Sense of civilised Europe, upon which we are now reflecting: at\nany rate in our societies there is not thought to be any portion of the\ndefinite prescriptions of positive law which, in virtue of its origin,\nis beyond the reach of alteration by any living authority.\n\nWhere then is this authority to be found?\n\nIn the answers commonly given to this question, the conflict between\nthe Ideal and the Traditional or Customary, which has perplexed us\nin seeking the definition of Justice, meets us again in an even more\ncomplicated form. For not only do some say that obedience is always due\nto the traditionally legitimate authority in any country, while others\nmaintain that an authority constituted in accordance with certain\nabstract principles is essentially legitimate, and that a nation has\na right to claim that such an authority shall be established, even at\nthe risk of civil strife and bloodshed: but often, too, the authority\nactually established is not even traditionally legitimate. So that\nwe have to distinguish _three_ claims to authority, each of which\nmay come into conflict with either of the other two: (1) that of the\nGovernment held to be ideally or abstractly right, and such as ought to\nbe established: (2) that of the Government _de jure_, according to the\nconstitutional traditions in any given country: and (3) that of the _de\nfacto_ Government.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us begin by considering the Ideal. Here I do not propose to\nconsider all views as to the right constitution of supreme authority\nwhich speculative thinkers have put forward; but only such as have\na _prima facie_ claim to express the Common Sense of mankind on the\nsubject. Of these the most important, and the most widely urged and\nadmitted, is the principle that the Sovereign in any community can\nonly be rightly constituted by the Consent of the Subjects. This, as\nwas noticed in the preceding chapter, is involved in the adoption of\nFreedom as the ultimate end of political order: if no one originally\nowes anything to another except non-interference, he clearly ought\nonly to be placed in the relation of Subject to Sovereign by his own\nconsent. And thus, in order to reconcile the original right of Freedom\nwith the actual duty of Law-observance, some supposition of a social\ncompact appears necessary; by means of which Obedience to Law becomes\nmerely a special application of the duty of keeping compacts.\n\nIn what way, then, are the terms of this fundamental compact to be\nknown? No one now maintains the old view that the transition from the\n\u2018natural\u2019 to the \u2018political\u2019 state actually took place by means of\nan \u201coriginal contract,\u201d which conferred indelible legitimacy on some\nparticular form of social organisation. Shall we say, then, that a man\nby remaining a member of a community enters into a \u2018tacit undertaking\u2019\nto obey the laws and other commands imposed by the authority generally\nrecognised as lawful in that community? In this way however the Ideal\nlapses into the Customary: and the most unlimited despotism, if\nestablished and traditional, might claim to rest on free consent as\nwell as any other form of government: so that the principle of abstract\nFreedom would lead to the justification of the most unqualified\nconcrete tyranny and servitude; and thus our theory would end by\nriveting men\u2019s chains under pretence of exalting their freedom. If\nto avoid this result, we suppose that certain \u2018Natural Rights\u2019 are\ninalienable--or tacitly reserved in the tacit compact--and that laws\nare not strictly legitimate which deprive a man of these, we are again\nmet by the difficulty of deducing these inalienable rights from any\nclear and generally accepted principles. For instance, as we have seen,\na widely accepted opinion is that all such rights may be summed up\nin the notion of Freedom; but we have also seen that this principle\nis ambiguous, and especially that the right of private property as\ncommonly recognised cannot be clearly deduced from it; and if so it\nwould certainly be most paradoxical to maintain that no government can\nlegitimately claim obedience for any commands except such as carry\nout the principle of protecting from interference the Freedom of the\nindividuals governed. It has been thought that we can avoid this\ndifficulty by constituting the supreme organ of government so that any\nlaw laid down by it will always be a law to which every person called\non to obey it will have consented personally or by his representatives:\nand that a government so constituted, in which--to adopt Rousseau\u2019s\nphrase--every one \u201cobeys himself alone,\u201d will completely reconcile\nfreedom and order. But how is this result to be attained? Rousseau held\nthat it could be attained by pure direct democracy, each individual\nsubordinating his private will to the \u201cgeneral will\u201d of the sovereign\npeople of which all are equally members. But this \u201cgeneral will\u201d must\nbe practically the will of the majority: and it is paradoxical to\naffirm that the freedom and natural rights of a dissentient minority\nare effectively protected by establishing the condition that the\noppressors must exceed the oppressed in number. Again, if the principle\nbe absolute it ought to apply to all human beings alike: and if to\navoid this absurdity we exclude children, an arbitrary line has to be\ndrawn: and the exclusion of women, which even those who regard the\nsuffrage as a natural right are often disposed to maintain, seems\naltogether indefensible. And to suppose--as some have done--that the\nideal of \u201cobeying oneself alone\u201d can be even approximately realised\nby Representative Democracy, is even more patently absurd. For a\nRepresentative assembly is normally chosen only by a part of the\nnation, and each law is approved only by a part of the assembly: and it\nwould be ridiculous to say that a man has assented to a law passed by a\nmere majority of an assembly against one member of which he has voted.\n\nBut, again, to lay down absolutely that the laws of any community ought\nto express the will of the majority of its members seems incompatible\nwith the view so vigorously maintained by Socrates and his most\nfamous disciples, that laws ought to be made by people who understand\nlaw-making. For though the majority of a representative assembly in a\nparticular country at a particular time may be more fit to make laws\nfor their country than any set of experts otherwise selected, it is\ncertainly not self-evident that this will be universally the case. Yet\nsurely the Socratic proposition (which is merely a special application\nof the principle noticed in the latter part of the preceding chapter,\n\u2018that function should be allotted to the fittest\u2019) has as much claim\nto be considered a primary intuition as the one that we have been\ndiscussing. Indeed, the secular controversy between Aristocracy and\nDemocracy seems ultimately reducible to a conflict between those two\nprinciples: a conflict of which it is impossible to find a solution, so\nlong as the argument remains in the _a priori_ region.\n\n\u00a7 3. However, to discuss this exhaustively would carry us too far\nbeyond the range of Ethics proper: but we may perhaps conclude that\nit is impossible to elicit from Common Sense any clear and certain\nintuitions as to the principles on which an ideal constitution should\nbe constructed. And there is an equal want of agreement as to the\nintrinsic lawfulness of introducing such a constitution in violation\nof the traditional and established order in any community. For some\nthink that a nation has a natural right to a government approximately\nconformed to the ideal, and that this right may be maintained by force\nin the last resort. Others, however, hold that, though the ideal polity\nmay rightly be put forward and commended, and every means used to\npromote its realisation which the established government in any country\npermits,--still, rebellion can never be justifiable for this purpose\nalone. While others,--perhaps the majority,--would decide the question\non grounds of expediency, balancing the advantages of improvement\nagainst the evils of disorder.\n\nBut further, as we saw, it is not so easy to say what the established\ngovernment is. For sometimes an authority declared by law to be\nillegitimate issues ordinances and controls the administration of\njustice. The question then arises, how far obedience is due to such\nan authority. All are agreed that usurpation ought to be resisted;\nbut as to the right behaviour towards an established government which\nhas sprung from a successful usurpation, there is a great difference\nof opinion. Some think that it should be regarded as legitimate, as\nsoon as it is firmly established: others that it ought to be obeyed\nat once, but under protest, with the purpose of renewing the conflict\non a favourable opportunity: others think that this latter is the\nright attitude at first, but that a usurping government, when firmly\nestablished, loses its illegitimacy gradually, and that it becomes,\nafter a while, as criminal to rebel against it as it was originally to\nestablish it. And this last seems, on the whole, the view of Common\nSense; but the point at which the metamorphosis is thought to take\nplace can hardly be determined otherwise than by considerations of\nexpediency.\n\nBut again, it is only in the case of an absolute government, where\ncustomary obedience is unconditionally due to one or more persons,\nthat the fundamental difficulties of ascertaining the legitimacy of\nauthority are of the simple kind just discussed. In a constitutionally\ngoverned state numerous other moral disagreements arise. For, in such a\nstate, while it is of course held that the sovereign is morally bound\nto conform to the constitution,[232] it is still disputed whether the\nsubjects\u2019 obligation to obedience is properly conceived as conditional\nupon this conformity: and whether they have the moral right (1) to\nrefuse obedience to an unconstitutional command; and (2) even to\ninflict on the sovereign the penalty of rebellion for violating the\nconstitution. Again, in determining what the constitutional obligations\nreally are we find much perplexity and disagreement, not merely as to\nthe exact ascertainment of the relevant historical facts but as to the\nprinciples on which these facts ought to be treated. For the various\nlimitations of sovereign authority comprised in the constitution have\noften been originally concessions extorted by fear from a sovereign\npreviously absolute; and it is doubted how far such concessions are\nmorally binding on the sovereign from whom they were wrested, and\nstill more how far they are binding on succeeding sovereigns. Or,\n_vice vers\u00e2_, a people may have allowed liberties once exercised to\nfall into disuse; and it is doubted whether it retains the right of\nreclaiming them. And, generally, when a constitutional rule has to be\nelicited from a comparison of precedents, it is open to dispute whether\na particular act of either party should be regarded as a constitutive\nprecedent or as an illegitimate encroachment. And hence we find that,\nin constitutional countries, men\u2019s view of what their constitution\ntraditionally is has often been greatly influenced by their view of\nwhat it ideally ought to be: in fact, the two questions have rarely\nbeen kept quite distinct.\n\n\u00a7 4. But even in cases where we can ascertain clearly to what authority\nobedience is properly due, further difficulties are liable to arise\nwhen we attempt to define the limits of such obedience. For in modern\nsociety, as we have seen, all admit that any authority ought to be\ndisobeyed which commands immoral acts; but this is one of those\ntautological propositions, so common in popular morality, which convey\nno real information; the question is, what acts there are which do\nnot cease to be immoral when they have been commanded by a rightful\nauthority. There seems to be no clear principle upon which these\ncan be determined. It has sometimes been said that the Law cannot\noverride definite duties; but the obligation of fidelity to contract\nis peculiarly definite, and yet we do not consider it right to fulfil\na contract of which a law, passed subsequently to the making of the\ncontract, has forbidden the execution. And, in fact, we do not find\nany practical agreement on this question, among persons who would not\nconsciously accept the utilitarian method of deciding it by a balance\nof conflicting expediences. For some would say that the duties of\nthe domestic relations must yield to the duty of law-observance, and\nthat (_e.g._) a son ought not to aid a parent actively or passively\nin escaping the punishment of crime: while others would consider this\nrule too inhuman to be laid down, and others would draw the line\nbetween assistance and connivance. And similarly, when a rightly\nconstituted government commands acts unjust and oppressive to others;\nCommon Sense recoils from saying either that all such commands ought\nto be obeyed or that all ought to be disobeyed; but--apart from\nutilitarian considerations--I can find no clear accepted principle for\ndistinguishing those unjust commands of a legitimate government which\nought to be obeyed from those which ought not to be obeyed. Again, some\njurists hold that we are not strictly bound to obey laws, when they\ncommand what is not otherwise a duty, or forbid what is not otherwise\na sin; on the ground that in the case of duties prescribed only by\npositive laws, the alternatives of obeying or submitting to the penalty\nare morally open to us.[233] Others, however, think this principle too\nlax; and certainly if a widespread preference of penalty to obedience\nwere shown in the case of any particular law, the legislation in\nquestion would be thought to have failed. Nor, on the other hand, does\nthere seem to be any agreement as to whether one is bound to submit to\nunjust penalties.\n\nSince, then, on all these points there is found to be so much\ndifference of opinion, it seems idle to maintain that there is any\nclear and precise axiom or first principle of Order, intuitively seen\nto be true by the common reason and conscience of mankind. There is, no\ndoubt, a vague general habit of obedience to laws as such (even if bad\nlaws), which may fairly claim the universal _consensus_ of civilised\nsociety: but when we try to state any explicit principle corresponding\nto this general habit, the _consensus_ seems to abandon us, and we are\ninevitably drawn into controversies which seem to admit of no solution\nexcept that offered by the utilitarian method.[234]\n\n\u00a7 5. We have next to treat of Good Faith, or Fidelity to Promises;\nwhich it is natural to consider in this place, because, as has been\nseen, the Duty of Law-observance has by some thinkers been based upon\na prior duty of fulfilling a contract. The Social Contract however, as\nabove examined, seems at best merely a convenient fiction, a logical\nartifice, by which the mutual jural relations of the members of a\ncivilised community may be neatly expressed: and in stating the ethical\nprinciples of Common Sense, such a fiction would seem to be out of\nplace. It must, however, be allowed that there has frequently been a\nclose historical connection between the Duty of Law-observance and\nthe duty of Good Faith. In the first place, a considerable amount of\nConstitutional Law at least, in certain ages and countries, has been\nestablished or confirmed by compacts expressly made between different\nsections of the community; who agree that for the future government\nshall be carried on according to certain rules. The duty of observing\nthese rules thus presents itself as a Duty of Fidelity to compact. Yet\nmore is this the case, when the question is one of imposing not a law,\nbut a law-giver; whose authority is strengthened by the exaction of\nan oath of allegiance from his subjects generally or a representative\nportion of them. Still, even in such cases, it can only be by a\npalpable fiction that the mass of the citizens can be regarded as bound\nby an engagement which only a few of them have actually taken.\n\nWe may begin our examination of the duty of Keeping Promises by\nnoticing that some moralists have classified or even identified it\nwith Veracity. From one point of view there certainly seems to be an\nanalogy between the two; as we fulfil the obligations of Veracity and\nGood Faith alike by effecting a correspondence between words and\nfacts--in the one case by making fact correspond with statement, and\nin the other by making statement correspond with fact. But the analogy\nis obviously superficial and imperfect; for we are not bound to make\nour actions correspond with our assertions generally, but only with our\npromises. If I merely assert my intention of abstaining from alcohol\nfor a year, and then after a week take some, I am (at worst) ridiculed\nas inconsistent: but if I have pledged myself to abstain, I am blamed\nas untrustworthy. Thus the essential element of the Duty of Good Faith\nseems to be not conformity to my own statement, but to expectations\nthat I have intentionally raised in others.\n\nOn this view, however, the question arises whether, when a promise\nhas been understood in a sense not intended by the promiser, he is\nbound to satisfy expectations which he did not voluntarily create. It\nis, I think, clear to Common Sense that he is so bound in some cases,\nif the expectation was natural and such as most men would form under\nthe circumstances: but this would seem to be one of the more or less\nindefinite duties of Justice, and not properly of Good Faith, as there\nhas not been, strictly speaking, any promise at all. The normal effect\nof language is to convey the speaker\u2019s meaning to the person addressed\n(here the promiser\u2019s to the promisee), and we always suppose this to\nhave taken place when we speak of a promise. If through any accident\nthis normal effect is missed, we may say that there is no promise, or\nnot a perfect promise.\n\nThe moral obligation, then, of a promise is perfectly constituted when\nit is understood by both parties in the same sense. And by the term\n\u2018promise\u2019 we include not words only, but all signs and even tacit\nunderstandings not expressly signified in any way, if such clearly form\na part of the engagement. The promiser is bound to perform what both he\nand the promisee understood to be undertaken.\n\n\u00a7 6. Is, then, this obligation intuitively seen to be independent and\ncertain?\n\nIt is often said to be so: and perhaps we may say that it seems so to\nunreflective common sense. But reflection seems at least to disclose a\nconsiderable number of qualifications of the principle; some clear and\nprecise, while others are more or less indefinite.\n\nIn the first place, thoughtful persons would commonly admit that\nthe obligation of a promise is relative to the promisee, and may be\nannulled by him. And therefore if the promisee be dead, or otherwise\ninaccessible and incapable of granting release, there is constituted an\nexceptional case, of which the solution presents some difficulty.[235]\n\nSecondly, a promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding,\nbecause the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount; just\nas in law a contract to do what a man is not legally free to do, is\ninvalid: otherwise one could evade any moral obligation by promising\nnot to fulfil it, which is clearly absurd.[236] And the same principle\nis of course applicable to immoral omissions or forbearances to act:\nhere however, a certain difficulty arises from the necessity of\ndistinguishing between different kinds or degrees of obligatoriness\nin duties; since it is clear that a promise may sometimes make it\nobligatory to abstain from doing what it would otherwise have been a\nduty to do. Thus it becomes my duty not to give money to a meritorious\nhospital if I have promised all I can spare to an undeserving friend;\nthough apart from the promise it might have been my duty to prefer the\nhospital to the friend. We have, however, already seen the difficulty\nof defining the limits of strict duty in many cases: thus (_e.g._)\nit might be doubted how far the promise of aid to a friend ought to\noverride the duty of giving one\u2019s children a good education. The\nextent, therefore, to which the obligation of a promise overrides prior\nobligations becomes practically somewhat obscure.\n\n\u00a7 7. Further qualifications of the duty of fidelity to promises, the\nconsideration of which is involved in more difficulty and dispute,\nare suggested when we examine more closely the conditions under which\npromises are made, and the consequences of executing them. In the first\nplace, it is much disputed how far promises obtained by \u2018fraud or\nforce\u2019 are binding. As regards fraud, if the promise was understood\nto be conditional on the truth of a statement which is found to be\nfalse, it is of course not binding, according to the principle I\noriginally laid down. But a promise may be made in consequence of such\na fraudulent statement, and yet made quite unconditionally. Even so,\nif it were clearly understood that it would not have been made but\nfor the false statement,[237] probably most persons would regard it\nas not binding. But the false statement may be only one consideration\namong others, and it may be of any degree of weight; and it seems\ndoubtful whether we should feel justified in breaking a promise,\nbecause a single fraudulent statement had been a part of the inducement\nto make it: still more if there has been no explicit assertion, but\nonly a suggestion of what is false: or no falsehood at all, stated or\nsuggested, but only a concealment of material circumstances. We may\nobserve that certain kinds of concealment are treated as legitimate\nby our law: in most contracts of sale, for example, the law adopts\nthe principle of \u2018caveat emptor,\u2019 and does not refuse to enforce the\ncontract because the seller did not disclose defects in the article\nsold, unless by some words or acts he produced the belief that it was\nfree from such defects. Still, this does not settle the moral question\nhow far a promise is binding if any material concealment is shown to\nhave been used to obtain it. We have also to consider the case in which\nan erroneous impression has not been wilfully produced, but was either\nshared by the promisee or produced in some way unintentionally. Perhaps\nin this last case most would say that the bindingness of the promise\nis not affected, unless it was expressly conditional. But on all these\npoints Common Sense seems doubtful: and somewhat similar difficulties\npresent themselves when we endeavour to define the obligation of\npromises partly obtained by some degree of illegal violence and\nintimidation.\n\n\u00a7 8. But, secondly, even if a promise has been made quite freely and\nfairly, circumstances may alter so much before the time comes to fulfil\nit, that the effects of keeping it may be quite other than those which\nwere foreseen when it was made. In such a case probably all would\nagree that the promisee ought to release the promiser. But if he\ndeclines to do this, it seems difficult to decide how far the latter\nis bound. Some would say that he is in all cases: while others would\nconsider that a considerable alteration of circumstances removed the\nobligation--perhaps adding that all engagements must be understood to\nbe taken subject to a general understanding that they are only binding\nif material circumstances remain substantially the same. But such a\nprinciple very much impairs the theoretical definiteness of the duty.\n\nThis difficulty assumes a new aspect when we consider the case already\nnoticed, of promises made to those who are now dead or temporarily out\nof the reach of communications. For then there is no means of obtaining\nrelease from the promise, while at the same time its performance may be\nreally opposed to the wishes--or what would have been the wishes--of\nboth parties. The difficulty is sometimes concealed by saying that\nit is our duty to carry out the \u2018intention\u2019 of the promise. For as\nso used the word Intention is, in common parlance, ambiguous: it\nmay either mean the signification which the promisee attached to\nthe terms employed, as distinct from any other signification which\nthe common usage of words might admit: or it may include ulterior\nconsequences of the performance of the promise, which he had in view\nin exacting it. Now we do not commonly think that the promiser is\nconcerned with the latter. He certainly has not pledged himself to\naim generally at the end which the promisee has in view, but only so\nfar as some particular means are concerned: and if he considers these\nmeans not conducive to the end, he is not thereby absolved from his\npromise, under ordinary circumstances. But in the case supposed, when\ncircumstances have materially changed, and the promise does not admit\nof revision, probably most persons would say that we ought to take into\nconsideration the ulterior wishes of the promisee, and carry out what\nwe sincerely think _would_ have been his intention. But the obligation\nthus becomes very vague: since it is difficult to tell from a man\u2019s\nwishes under one set of circumstances what he would have desired under\ncircumstances varying from these in a complex manner: and practically\nthis view of the obligation of a promise generally leads to great\ndivergence of opinion. Hence it is not surprising that some hold that\neven in such a case the obligation ought to be interpreted strictly:\nwhile others go to the other extreme, and maintain that it ceases\naltogether.\n\nBut again, it was said that a promise cannot abrogate a prior\nobligation; and, as a particular application of this rule, it would be\ngenerally agreed that no promise can make it right to inflict harm on\nany one. On further consideration, however, it appears doubtful how\nfar the persons between whom the promise passed are included in the\nscope of this restriction. For, first, it does not seem to be commonly\nheld that a man is as strictly bound not to injure himself as he is to\navoid harming others; and so it is scarcely thought that a promise is\nnot binding because it was a foolish one, and will entail an amount of\npain or burden on the promiser out of proportion to the good done to\nthe promisee. Still, if we take an extreme case, where the sacrifice\nis very disproportionate to the gain, many conscientious persons would\nthink that the promise ought rather to be broken than kept. And,\nsecondly, a different question arises when we consider the possibility\nof injuring the promisee by fulfilling the promise. For when it is said\nto be wrong to do harm to any one, we do not commonly mean only what he\nthinks harm, but what really is so, though he may think it a benefit;\nfor it seems clearly a crime for me to give any one what I know to be\npoison, even though he may be stubbornly convinced that it is wholesome\nfood. But now suppose that I have promised _A_ to do something, which,\nbefore I fulfil the promise, I see reason to regard as likely to injure\nhim. The circumstances may be precisely the same, and only my view of\nthem have changed. If _A_ takes a different view and calls on me to\nfulfil the promise, is it right to obey him? Surely no one would say\nthis in an extreme case, such as that of the poison. But if the rule\ndoes not hold for an extreme case, where can we draw the line? at what\npoint ought I to give up my judgment to _A_, unless my own conviction\nis weakened? Common Sense seems to give no clear answer.\n\n\u00a7 9. I have laid down that a promise is binding in so far as it\nis understood on both sides similarly: and such an understanding\nis ordinarily attained with sufficient clearness, as far as the\napprehension of express words or signs is concerned. Still, even here\nobscurity and misapprehension sometimes occur; and in the case of\nthe tacit understandings with which promises are often complicated, a\nlack of definite agreement is not improbable. It becomes, therefore,\nof practical importance to decide the question previously raised: What\nduty rests on the promiser of satisfying expectations which he did not\nintend to create? I called this a duty not so much of Good Faith as of\nJustice, which prescribes the fulfilment of normal expectations. How\nthen shall we determine what these are? The method by which we commonly\nascertain them seems to be the following. We form the conception of\nan average or normal man, and consider what expectations he would\nform under the circumstances, inferring this from the beliefs and\nexpectations which men generally entertain under similar circumstances.\nWe refer, therefore, to the customary use of language, and customary\ntacit understandings current among persons in the particular relations\nin which promiser and promisee stand. Such customary interpretations\nand understandings are of course not obligatory upon persons entering\ninto an engagement: but they constitute a standard which we think\nwe may presume to be known to all men, and to be accepted by them,\nexcept in so for as it is explicitly rejected. If one of the parties\nto an engagement has deviated from this common standard without giving\nexpress notice, we think it right that he should suffer any loss that\nmay result from the misunderstanding. This criterion then is generally\napplicable: but if custom is ambiguous or shifting it cannot be\napplied; and then the just claims of the parties become a problem, the\nsolution of which is very difficult, if not strictly indeterminate.\n\nSo far we have supposed that the promiser can choose his own words, and\nthat if the promisee finds them ambiguous he can get them modified,\nor (what comes to the same thing) explained, by the promiser. But we\nhave now to observe that in the case of promises made to the community,\nas a condition of obtaining some office or emolument, a certain\nunalterable form of words has to be used if the promise is made at\nall. Here the difficulties of moral interpretation are much increased.\nIt may be said, indeed, that the promise ought to be interpreted in\nthe sense in which its terms are understood by the community: and, no\ndoubt, if their usage is quite uniform and unambiguous, this rule of\ninterpretation is sufficiently obvious and simple. But since words are\noften used in different ways by different members of the same society,\nand especially with different degrees of strictness and laxity, it\noften happens that a promise to the community cannot strictly be said\nto be understood in any one sense: the question therefore arises,\nwhether the promiser is bound to keep it in the sense in which it will\nbe most commonly interpreted, or whether he may select any of its\npossible meanings. And if the formula is one of some antiquity, it is\nfurther questioned, whether it ought to be interpreted in the sense\nwhich its words would now generally bear, or in that which they bore\nwhen it was drawn up; or, if they were then ambiguous, in the sense\nwhich appears to have been attached to them by the government that\nimposed the promise. On all these points it is difficult to elicit any\nclear view from Common Sense. And the difficulty is increased by the\nfact that there are usually strong inducements to make these formal\nengagements, which cause even tolerably conscientious persons to\ntake them in a strained and unnatural sense. When this has been done\ncontinually by many persons, a new general understanding grows up as to\nthe meaning of the engagements: sometimes they come to be regarded as\n\u2018mere forms,\u2019 or, if they do not reach this point of degradation, they\nare at least understood in a sense differing indefinitely from their\noriginal one. The question then arises, how far this process of gradual\nillegitimate relaxation or perversion can modify the moral obligation\nof the promise for a thoroughly conscientious person. It seems clear\nthat when the process is complete, we are right in adopting the new\nunderstanding as far as Good Faith is concerned, even if it palpably\nconflicts with the natural meaning of language; although it is always\ndesirable in such cases that the form of the promise should be changed\nto correspond with the changed substance. But when, as is ordinarily\nthe case, the process is incomplete, since a portion of the community\nunderstands the engagement in the original strict sense, the obligation\nbecomes difficult to determine, and the judgments of conscientious\npersons respecting it become divergent and perplexed.\n\nTo sum up the results of the discussion: it appears that a clear\n_consensus_ can only be claimed for the principle that a promise,\nexpress or tacit, is binding, if a number of conditions are fulfilled:\nviz. if the promiser has a clear belief as to the sense in which it was\nunderstood by the promisee, and if the latter is still in a position\nto grant release from it, but unwilling to do so, if it was not\nobtained by force or fraud, if it does not conflict with definite prior\nobligations, if we do not believe that its fulfilment will be harmful\nto the promisee, or will inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the\npromiser, and if circumstances have not materially changed since it was\nmade. If any of these conditions fails, the _consensus_ seems to become\nevanescent, and the common moral perceptions of thoughtful persons fall\ninto obscurity and disagreement.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[231] Cf. _ante_, Book ii. chap. v. \u00a7 2.\n\n[232] It is perhaps hardly necessary that I should here notice the\nHobbist doctrine, revived in a modified form by Austin, that \u201cthe\npower of the sovereign is incapable of [legal] limitation.\u201d For no\none now maintains pure Hobbism: and Austin is as far as possible from\nmeaning that there cannot be an express or tacit understanding between\nSovereign and Subjects, the violation of which by the former may make\nit morally right for the latter to rebel. In fact, as used by him,\nHobbes\u2019 doctrine reduces itself to the rather unimportant proposition\nthat a sovereign will not be punished for unconstitutional conduct\nthrough the agency of his own law-courts, so long as he remains\nsovereign. I may take this opportunity of observing that Austin\u2019s\ndefinition of Law is manifestly unsuited for our present purpose: since\na law, in his view, is not a command that ought to be obeyed, but a\ncommand for the violation of which we may expect a particular kind of\npunishment.\n\n[233] Cf. Blackstone, _Introduction_, \u00a7 2. \u201cIn relation to those laws\nwhich enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are\nnot _mala in se_, but _mala prohibita_ merely, without any intermixture\nof moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance, here I apprehend\nconscience is no further concerned, than by directing a submission to\nthe penalty in case of our breach of those laws ... the alternative is\noffered to every man, \u2018either abstain from this or submit to such a\npenalty.\u2019\u201d\n\n[234] Into the ethical difficulties peculiar to International Law, I\nhave not thought it worth while to enter.\n\n[235] Vows to God constitute another exception: and it is thought by\nmany that if these are binding, there must be some way in which God\ncan be understood to grant release from them. But this it is beyond my\nprovince to discuss.\n\n[236] The case is somewhat different when the act has become immoral\nafter the promise was made: still, here also, the prior duty of\nabstaining from it would be universally held to prevail.\n\n[237] What is here said of a \u2018statement\u2019 may be extended to any mode of\nproducing a false impression.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES--VERACITY\n\n\n\u00a7 1. It may easily seem that when we have discussed Benevolence,\nJustice, and the observance of Law and Contract, we have included in\nour view the whole sphere of social duty, and that whatever other\nmaxims we find accepted by Common Sense must be subordinate to the\nprinciples which we have been trying to define.\n\nFor whatever we owe definitely to our fellow-men, besides the\nobservance of special contracts, and of positive laws, seems--at least\nby a slight extension of common usage--to be naturally included under\nJustice: while the more indefinite obligations which we recognise seem\nto correspond to the goodwill which we think ought to exist among all\nmembers of the human family, together with the stronger affections\nappropriate to special relations and circumstances. And hence it may\nbe thought that the best way of treating the subject would have been\nto divide Duty generally into Social and Self-regarding, and again to\nsubdivide the former branch into the heads which I have discussed one\nby one; afterwards adding such minor details of duty as have obtained\nspecial names and distinct recognition. And this is perhaps the proper\nplace to explain why I did not adopt this course. The division of\nduties into Social and Self-regarding, though obvious, and acceptable\nenough as a rough _prima facie_ classification, does not on closer\nexamination seem exactly appropriate to the Intuitional Method. For\nthese titles naturally suggest that the happiness or well-being, of the\nagent or of others, is always the end and final determinant of right\naction: whereas the Intuitional doctrine is, that at least certain\nkinds of conduct are prescribed absolutely, without reference to their\nulterior consequences. And if a more general meaning be given to the\nterms, and by Social duties we understand those which consist in the\nproduction of certain effects upon others, while in the Self-regarding\nwe aim at producing certain effects upon ourselves, the division\nis still an unsuitable one. For these consequences are not clearly\nrecognised in the enunciation of common rules of morality: and in\nmany cases we produce marked effects both on ourselves and on others,\nand it is not easy to say which (in the view of Common Sense) are\nmost important: and again, this principle of division would sometimes\nmake it necessary to cut in two the class of duties prescribed under\nsome common notion; as the same rule may govern both our social and\nour solitary conduct. Take, for example, the acts morally prescribed\nunder the head of Courage. It seems clear that the prominence given to\nthis Virtue in historic systems of morality has been due to the great\nsocial importance that must always attach to it, so long as communities\nof men are continually called upon to fight for their existence and\nwell-being: but still the quality of bravery is the same essentially,\nwhether it be exhibited for selfish or social ends.\n\nIt is no doubt true that when we examine with a view to definition\nthe kinds of conduct commended or prescribed in any list of Virtues\ncommonly recognised, we find, to a great extent, that the maxims we\nobtain are clearly not absolute and independent: that the quality\ndenoted by our term is admittedly only praiseworthy in so far as it\npromotes individual or general welfare, and becomes blameworthy--though\nremaining in other respects the same--when it operates adversely\nto these ends. We have already noticed this result in one or two\ninstances, and it will be illustrated at length in the following\nchapters. But though this is the case to a great extent, it is,\nfor our present purpose, of special importance to note the--real\nor apparent--exceptions to the rule; because they are specially\ncharacteristic of the method that we call Intuitionism.\n\nOne of the most important of these exceptions is Veracity: and the\naffinity in certain respects of this duty--in spite of fundamental\ndifferences--to the duty of Good Faith or Fidelity to Promises\nrenders it convenient to examine the two in immediate succession.\nUnder either head a certain correspondence between words and facts is\nprescribed: and hence the questions that arise when we try to make the\nmaxims precise are somewhat similar in both cases. For example, just\nas the duty of Good Faith did not lie in conforming our acts to the\n_admissible_ meaning of certain words,[238] but to the meaning which we\nknew to be put on them by the promisee; so the duty of Truthspeaking is\nnot to utter words which _might_, according to common usage, produce\nin other minds beliefs corresponding to our own, but words which we\nbelieve will have this effect on the persons whom we address. And this\nis usually a very simple matter, as the natural effect of language is\nto convey our beliefs to other men, and we commonly know quite well\nwhether we are doing this or not. A certain difficulty arises, as in\nthe case of promises, from the use of set forms imposed either by law\nor by custom; to which most of the discussion of the similar difficulty\nin the preceding chapter applies with obvious modifications. In the\ncase of formul\u00e6 imposed by law--such (_e.g._) as declarations of\nreligious belief--it is doubtful whether we may understand the terms in\nany sense which they commonly bear, or are to take them in the sense\nintended by the Legislature that imposed them; and again, a difficulty\nis created by the gradual degradation or perversion of their meaning,\nwhich results from the strong inducements offered for their general\nacceptance; for thus they are continually strained and stretched until\na new general understanding seems gradually to grow up as to the\nmeaning of certain phrases; and it is continually disputed whether we\nmay veraciously use the phrases in this new signification. A similar\nprocess continually alters the meaning of conventional expressions\ncurrent in polite society. When a man declares that he \u2018has great\npleasure in accepting\u2019 a vexatious invitation, or is \u2018the obedient\nservant\u2019 of one whom he regards as an inferior, he uses phrases which\nwere probably once deceptive. If they are so no longer, Common Sense\ncondemns as over-scrupulous the refusal to use them where it is\ncustomary to do so. But Common Sense seems doubtful and perplexed\nwhere the process of degradation is incomplete, and there are still\npersons who may be deceived: as in the use of the reply that one is\n\u2018not at home\u2019 to an inconvenient visitor from the country.\n\nHowever, apart from the use of conventional phrases, the rule \u2018to\nspeak the truth\u2019 is not generally difficult of application in conduct.\nAnd many moralists have regarded this, from its simplicity and\ndefiniteness, as a quite unexceptionable instance of an ethical axiom.\nI think, however, that patient reflection will show that this view is\nnot really confirmed by the Common Sense of mankind.\n\n\u00a7 2. In the first place, it does not seem clearly agreed whether\nVeracity is an absolute and independent duty, or a special application\nof some higher principle. We find (_e.g._) that Kant regards it as\na duty owed to oneself to speak the truth, because \u2018a lie is an\nabandonment or, as it were, annihilation of the dignity of man.\u2019 And\nthis seems to be the view in which lying is prohibited by the code of\nhonour, except that it is not thought (by men of honour as such) that\nthe dignity of man is impaired by _any_ lying: but only that lying for\nselfish ends, especially under the influence of fear, is mean and base.\nIn fact there seems to be circumstances under which the code of honour\nprescribes lying. Here, however, it may be said to be plainly divergent\nfrom the morality of Common Sense. Still, the latter does not seem to\ndecide clearly whether truth-speaking is absolutely a duty, needing\nno further justification: or whether it is merely a general right\nof each man to have truth spoken to him by his fellows, which right\nhowever may be forfeited or suspended under certain circumstances. Just\nas each man is thought to have a natural right to personal security\ngenerally, but not if he is himself attempting to injure others in\nlife and property: so if we may even kill in defence of ourselves and\nothers, it seems strange if we may not lie, if lying will defend us\nbetter against a palpable invasion of our rights: and Common Sense does\nnot seem to prohibit this decisively. And again, just as the orderly\nand systematic slaughter which we call war is thought perfectly right\nunder certain circumstances, though painful and revolting: so in the\nword-contests of the law-courts, the lawyer is commonly held to be\njustified in untruthfulness within strict rules and limits: for an\nadvocate is thought to be over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he\nknows to be false, if he is instructed to say it.[239] Again, where\ndeception is designed to benefit the person deceived, Common Sense\nseems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most\npersons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this\nseemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous\nshock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to\nchildren, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should\nnot know the truth. But if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in\nany case be admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and how far\nit is admissible, except by considerations of expediency; that is, by\nweighing the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment\nof mutual confidence involved in all violation of truth.\n\nThe much argued question of religious deception (\u2018pious fraud\u2019)\nnaturally suggests itself here. It seems clear, however, that Common\nSense now pronounces against the broad rule, that falsehoods may\nrightly be told in the interests of religion. But there is a subtler\nform in which the same principle is still maintained by moral persons.\nIt is sometimes said that the most important truths of religion cannot\nbe conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed,\nas it were, in a shell of fiction; so that by relating such fictions\nas if they were facts, we are really performing an act of substantial\nveracity.[240] Reflecting upon this argument, we see that it is not\nafter all so clear wherein Veracity consists. For from the beliefs\nimmediately communicated by any set of affirmations inferences are\nnaturally drawn, and we may clearly foresee that they will be drawn.\nAnd though commonly we intend that both the beliefs immediately\ncommunicated and the inferences drawn from them should be true, and\na person who always aims at this is praised as candid and sincere:\nstill we find relaxation of the rule prescribing this intention claimed\nin two different ways by at least respectable sections of opinion.\nFor first, as was just now observed, it is sometimes held that if\na conclusion is true and important, and cannot be satisfactorily\ncommunicated otherwise, we may lead the mind of the hearer to it\nby means of fictitious premises. But the exact reverse of this is\nperhaps a commoner view: viz. that it is only an absolute duty to make\nour actual affirmations true: for it is said that though the ideal\ncondition of human converse involves perfect sincerity and candour, and\nwe ought to rejoice in exhibiting these virtues where we can, still in\nour actual world concealment is frequently necessary to the well-being\nof society, and may be legitimately effected by any means short of\nactual falsehood. Thus it is not uncommonly said that in defence of a\nsecret we may not indeed _lie_,[241] _i.e._ produce directly beliefs\ncontrary to fact; but we may \u201cturn a question aside,\u201d _i.e._ produce\nindirectly, by natural inference from our answer, a negatively false\nbelief; or \u201cthrow the inquirer on a wrong scent,\u201d _i.e._ produce\nsimilarly a positively false belief. These two methods of concealment\nare known respectively as _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio falsi_, and\nmany think them legitimate under certain circumstances: while others\nsay that if deception is to be practised at all, it is mere formalism\nto object to any one mode of effecting it more than another.\n\nOn the whole, then, reflection seems to show that the rule of Veracity,\nas commonly accepted, cannot be elevated into a definite moral axiom:\nfor there is no real agreement as to how far we are bound to impart\ntrue beliefs to others: and while it is contrary to Common Sense\nto exact absolute candour under all circumstances, we yet find no\nself-evident secondary principle, clearly defining when it is not to be\nexacted.\n\n\u00a7 3. There is, however, one method of exhibiting _a priori_ the\nabsolute duty of Truth, which we must not overlook; as, if it be\nvalid, it would seem that the exceptions and qualifications above\nmentioned have been only admitted by Common Sense from inadvertence and\nshallowness of thought.\n\nIt is said that if it were once generally understood that lies were\njustifiable under certain circumstances, it would immediately become\nquite useless to tell the lies, because no one would believe them; and\nthat the moralist cannot lay down a rule which, if generally accepted,\nwould be suicidal. To this there seem to be three answers. In the first\nplace it is not necessarily an evil that men\u2019s confidence in each\nother\u2019s assertions should, _under certain peculiar circumstances_,\nbe impaired or destroyed: it may even be the very result which we\nshould most desire to produce: _e.g._ it is obviously a most effective\nprotection for legitimate secrets that it should be universally\nunderstood and expected that those who ask questions which they have\nno right to ask will have lies told them: nor, again, should we be\nrestrained from pronouncing it lawful to meet deceit with deceit,\nmerely by the fear of impairing the security which rogues now derive\nfrom the veracity of honest men. No doubt the ultimate result of\ngeneral unveracity under the circumstances would be a state of things\nin which such falsehoods would no longer be told: but unless this\nultimate result is undesirable, the prospect of it does not constitute\na reason why the falsehoods should not be told so long as they are\nuseful. But, secondly, since the beliefs of men in general are not\nformed purely on rational grounds, experience shows that unveracity\nmay long remain partially effective under circumstances where it is\ngenerally understood to be legitimate. We see this in the case of\nthe law-courts. For though jurymen are perfectly aware that it is\nconsidered the duty of an advocate to state as plausibly as possible\nwhatever he has been instructed to say on behalf of any criminal he may\ndefend, still a skilful pleader may often produce an impression that he\nsincerely believes his client to be innocent: and it remains a question\nof casuistry how far this kind of hypocrisy is justifiable. But,\nfinally, it cannot be assumed as certain that it is never right to act\nupon a maxim of which the universal application would be an undoubted\nevil. This assumption may seem to be involved in what was previously\nadmitted as an ethical axiom, that what is right for me must be right\nfor \u2018all persons under similar conditions.\u2019[242] But reflection will\nshow that there is a special case within the range of the axiom in\nwhich its application is necessarily self-limiting, and excludes the\npractical universality which the axiom appears to suggest: _i.e._ where\nthe agent\u2019s conditions include (1) the knowledge that his maxim is not\nuniversally accepted, and (2) a reasoned conviction that his act will\nnot tend to make it so, to any important extent. For in this case the\naxiom will practically only mean that it will be right for all persons\nto do as the agent does, if they are sincerely convinced that the act\nwill not be widely imitated; and this conviction must vanish if it\n_is_ widely imitated. It can hardly be said that these conditions are\nimpossible: and if they are possible, the axiom that we are discussing\ncan only serve, in its present application, to direct our attention to\nan important danger of unveracity, which constitutes a strong--but not\nformally conclusive--utilitarian ground for speaking the truth.[243]\n\n NOTE.--Mr. Stephen (_Science of Ethics_, chap. v. \u00a7 33) explains the\n exceptions to the rule of truth-speaking as follows:--\n\n \u201cThe rule, \u2018Lie not,\u2019 is the external rule, and corresponds\n approximately to the internal rule, \u2018Be trustworthy.\u2019 Cases occur\n where the rules diverge, and in such cases it is the internal rule\n which is morally approved. Truthfulness is the rule because in the\n vast majority of cases we trust a man in so far as he speaks the\n truth; in the exceptional cases, the mutual confidence would be\n violated when the truth, not when the lie, is spoken.\u201d\n\n This explanation seems to me for several reasons inadequate. (1)\n If we may sometimes lie to defend the life or secrets of others,\n it is paradoxical to say that we may not do so to defend our own;\n but a falsehood in self-defence obviously cannot be justified as an\n application of the maxim \u201cbe trustworthy.\u201d (2) Even when the falsehood\n is in legitimate defence of others against attacks, we cannot say\n that the speaker manifests \u201ctrustworthiness\u201d without qualification;\n for the deceived assailant trusts his veracity, otherwise he would\n not be deceived: the question therefore is under what circumstances\n the confidence of _A_ that I shall speak the truth may legitimately\n be disappointed in order not to disappoint the confidence of _B_\n that I shall defend his life and honour. This question Mr. Stephen\u2019s\n explanation does not in any way aid us to answer.\n\n The general question raised by Mr. Stephen, as to the value of\n \u201cinternal rules,\u201d expressed in the form \u201cBe this,\u201d in contrast to\n external rules, expressed in the form \u201cDo this,\u201d will be dealt with in\n a subsequent chapter (xiv. \u00a7 1).\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[238] The case where set forms are used being the _exceptio probans\nregulam_.\n\n[239] It can hardly be said that the advocate merely _reports_ the\nfalse affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading\ndepends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the\ncase which, for the time at least, he appears to hold.\n\n[240] _E.g._ certain religious persons hold--or held in 1873--that it\nis right solemnly to affirm a belief that God created the world in 6\ndays and rested on the 7th, meaning that 1 : 6 is the divinely ordered\nproportion between rest and labour.\n\n[241] Cf. Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, Book ii. chap. xv. \u00a7 299.\n\n[242] Cf. chap. i. \u00a7 3 of this Book.\n\n[243] See Book iv. chap. v. \u00a7 3 for a further discussion of this axiom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nOTHER SOCIAL DUTIES AND VIRTUES\n\n\n\u00a7 1. When we proceed to inquire how far the minor social duties\nand virtues recognised by Common Sense appear on examination to be\nanything more than special applications of the Benevolence--general\nor particular--discussed in chap. iv., the department of duty which\nmost prominently claims our attention, is that which deals with the\nexistence, and determines the legitimacy, of feelings antithetical to\nthe benevolent.\n\nFor it seems that malevolent affections are as natural to man as\nthe benevolent: not indeed in the same sense--for man tends to have\nnormally some kindly feeling for any fellow-man, when there is no\nspecial cause operating to make him love or hate, (though this tendency\nis obscured in the lower stages of social development by the habitual\nhostility between strange tribes and races); but still such special\ncauses of malevolent feeling continually occur, and, in the main,\nexemplify a psychological law analogous to that by which the growth of\nbenevolent feelings is explained. For just as we are apt to love those\nwho are the cause of pleasure to us whether by voluntary benefits or\notherwise: so by strict analogy we naturally dislike those who have\ndone us harm, either consciously from malevolence or mere selfishness,\nor even unconsciously, as when another man is an obstacle to our\nattainment of a much-desired end. Thus we naturally feel ill-will to a\nrival who deprives us of an object of competition: and so in persons\nin whom the desire of superiority is strong, a certain dislike of any\none who is more successful or prosperous than themselves is easily\naroused: and this envy, however repulsive to our moral sense, seems as\nnatural as any other malevolent emotion. And it is to be observed that\neach of the elements into which we can analyse malevolent affection\nfinds its exact counterpart in the analysis of the benevolent: as the\nformer includes a dislike of the presence of its object and a desire to\ninflict pain on it, and also a capacity of deriving pleasure from the\npain thus inflicted.[244]\n\nIf now we ask how far indulgence of malevolent emotions is right and\nproper, the answer of Common Sense is not easy to formulate. For some\nwould say broadly that they ought to be repressed altogether or as\nfar as possible. And no doubt we blame all envy (though sometimes\nto exclude it altogether requires a magnanimity which we praise):\nand we regard as virtues or natural excellences the _good-humour_\nwhich prevents one from feeling even pain to a material extent--not\nto say resentment--from trifling annoyances inflicted by others,\nthe _meekness_ which does not resent even graver injuries, the\n_mildness_ and _gentleness_ which refrain from retaliating them, and\nthe _placability_ which accords forgiveness rapidly and easily. We\nare even accustomed to praise the _mercy_ which spares even deserved\npunishment: because though we never exactly disapprove of the\ninfliction of deserved punishment, and hold it to be generally a duty\nof government--and in certain cases of private persons--to inflict\nit, we do not think that this duty admits of no exceptions; we think\nthat in exceptional cases considerations not strictly relevant to the\nquestion of justice may be properly regarded as reasons for remitting\npunishment, and we admire the sympathetic nature that eagerly avails\nitself of these legitimate occasions for remission.\n\nOn the other hand Common Sense admits instinctive resentment for wrong\nto be legitimate and proper: and even a more sustained and deliberate\nmalevolence is commonly approved as virtuous indignation. The problem,\nthen, is how to reconcile these diverse approvals. Even as regards\nexternal duty, there is some difficulty; since, though it is clear to\ncommon sense that in a well-ordered society punishment of adults ought\ngenerally to be inflicted by government, and that a private individual\nwronged ought not to \u201ctake the law into his own hands,\u201d--still there\nare in all societies injuries to individuals which the law does not\npunish at all or not adequately, and for which effective requital is\noften possible without transgressing the limits of legality; and there\nseems to be no clear agreement as to the right manner of dealing with\nthese. For the Christian code is widely thought to prescribe a complete\nand absolute forgiveness of such offences, and many Christians have\nendeavoured to carry out this rule by dismissing the offences as far\nas possible from their minds, or at least allowing the memory of them\nto have no effect on their outward conduct. Few, however, would deny\nthat, so far as a wrong done to me gives ground for expecting future\nmischief from the offender to myself or to others, I am bound as a\nrational being to take due precautions against this future mischief;\nand probably most would admit that such precautions for the future, in\nthe case we are considering, may include the infliction of punishment\nfor the past, where impunity would give a dangerous temptation to a\nrepetition of the unpunished offence. If we ask, therefore, how far\nforgiveness is practically possible, the answer seems admittedly to\ndepend on two considerations: (1) how far the punishment to which\nresentment prompts is really required in the interests of society,\nand (2) how far, if so, it will be adequately inflicted if the person\nwronged refrains from inflicting it. But, obviously, so far as we allow\nthe question to be settled by these considerations we are introducing a\nmethod difficult to distinguish from the Utilitarian.\n\nAnd we seem led to a similar result in discussing the legitimacy\nof malevolent feeling. Here again we find much disagreement among\nthoughtful persons: for many would say that though the emotion of\nanger is legitimate, it ought to be directed always against wrong\nacts as such, and not against the agent: for even where the anger may\nlegitimately prompt us to punish him, it ought never to overcome our\nkindly feeling towards him. And certainly if this state of mind is\npossible, it seems the simplest reconciliation of the general maxim of\nBenevolence with the admitted duty of inflicting punishment. On the\nother hand, it is urged, with some reason, that to retain a genuine\nkindly feeling towards a man, while we are gratifying a strong impulse\nof aversion to his acts by inflicting pain on him, requires a subtle\ncomplexity of emotion too far out of the reach of ordinary men to be\nprescribed as a duty: and that we must allow as right and proper a\ntemporary suspension of benevolence towards wrong-doers until they have\nbeen punished. Some, again, make a distinction between Instinctive\nand Deliberate Resentment: saying that the former is legitimate in\nso far as it is required for the self-defence of individuals and the\nrepression of mutual violence, but that deliberate resentment is not\nsimilarly needed, for if we act deliberately we can act from a better\nmotive. Others, however, think that a deliberate and sustained desire\nto punish wrong-doers is required in the interests of society, since\nthe mere desire to realise Justice will not practically be strong\nenough to repress offences: and that it is as serious a mistake to\nattempt to substitute the desire of Justice for natural resentment as\nit would be to substitute prudence for natural appetite in eating and\ndrinking, or mere dutifulness for filial affection.[245]\n\nAgain, a distinction may be taken between the impulse to inflict pain\nand the desire of the antipathetic pleasure which the agent will reap\nfrom this infliction; so that, while we approve the former under\ncertain circumstances, we may still regard the latter as altogether\ninadmissible. It would seem, however, that a man under the influence\nof a strong passion of resentment can hardly exclude from his mind\naltogether an anticipation of the pleasure that he will feel when the\npassion is gratified; and if so, he can hardly exclude altogether the\ndesire of this gratification. If, therefore, it is important for the\nwell-being of society that men should derive hearty satisfaction from\nthe punishment of a nefarious criminal, it is perhaps going too far\nto prohibit absolutely the desire of this satisfaction; though we may\nsay that a man ought not to cherish this desire, and gloat over the\nanticipated pleasure.\n\nOn the whole we may perhaps sum up by saying that a superficial view\nof the matter naturally leads us to condemn sweepingly all malevolent\nfeelings and the acts to which they prompt, as contrary to the general\nduty of benevolence: but that the common sense of reflective persons\nrecognises the necessity of relaxing this rule in the interests of\nsociety: only it is not clear as to the limits or principles of this\nrelaxation, though inclined to let it be determined by considerations\nof expediency.\n\n\u00a7 2. The remaining virtues that are clearly and exclusively social,\nwill be easily seen to have no independent maxims; the conduct in which\nthey are respectively realised being merely the fulfilment, under\nspecial conditions, of the rules already discussed. We need not, then,\nenter upon an exhaustive examination of these minor virtues--for it\nis not our object to frame a complete glossary of ethical terms--:\nbut for illustration\u2019s sake it may be well to discuss one or two of\nthem; and I will select for examination Liberality with its cognate\nnotions, partly on account of the prominence that it has had in the\nearlier ages of thought, and partly because of a certain complexity\nin the feelings with which it is usually regarded. Considered as a\nVirtue, Liberality seems to be merely Benevolence, as exhibited in\nthe particular service of giving money, beyond the limits of strict\nduty as commonly recognised:--for in so far as it can be called a duty\nto be liberal, it is because in the performance of the more or less\nindefinite duties enumerated in chap. iv. we do not like exactness to\nbe sought; a certain excess is needful if the duty is to be well done.\nAnd perhaps in the case of the poor this graceful excess is excluded by\nprudence: for though a poor man might make a great sacrifice in a small\ngift we should call this generous but scarcely liberal; Liberality\nappears to require an external abundance in the gift even more than a\nself-sacrificing disposition. It seems therefore to be possible only to\nthe rich: and, as I have hinted, in the admiration commonly accorded to\nit there seems to be mingled an element rather \u00e6sthetic than moral. For\nwe are all apt to admire power, and we recognise the latent power of\nwealth gracefully exhibited in a certain degree of careless profusion\nwhen the object is to give happiness to others. Indeed the vulgar\nadmire the same carelessness as manifested even in selfish luxury.\n\nThe sphere of Liberality, then, lies generally in the fulfilment\nof the indefinite duties of Benevolence. But there is a certain\nborderground between Justice and Benevolence where it is especially\nshown; namely, in the full satisfaction of all customary expectations,\neven when indefinite and uncertain; as (_e.g._) in the remuneration\nof services, in so far as this is governed by custom; and even\nwhere it is left entirely to free contract, and therefore naturally\ndetermined by haggling and bargaining (as market value generally), it\nis characteristic of a liberal man to avoid this haggling and to give\nsomewhat higher remuneration than the other party might be induced\nto take, and similarly to take for his own services a somewhat lower\npayment than he might persuade the other to give. And again, since laws\nand promises and especially tacit understandings are sometimes doubtful\nand ambiguous, a liberal man will in such cases unhesitatingly adopt\nthe interpretation which is least in his own favour, and pay the most\nthat he can by any fairminded person be thought to owe, and exact the\nleast that reasonably can be thought to be due to himself: that is, if\nthe margin be, relatively to his resources, not considerable.[246] And\nof a man who does the opposite of all this we predicate Meanness; this\nbeing the vice antithetical to Liberality. Here again there seems no\nplace for this particular vice if the amount at stake be considerable;\nfor then we think it not mean to exact one\u2019s own rights to the full,\nand worse than mean to refuse another what he ought to have; in fact\nin such cases we think that any indefiniteness as to rights should\nbe practically removed by the decision of a judge or arbitrator. The\nvice of meanness then is, we may say, bounded on the side of vice by\ninjustice: the mean man is blamed not for violation of Justice, but,\nbecause he chooses a trifling gain to himself rather than the avoidance\nof disappointment to others. And here, again, it should be observed,\nan element not strictly moral is included in the common disapprobation\nof meanness. For, as we have seen, a certain carelessness of money\nis admired as a sign of power and superiority: and the opposite habit\nis a symbol of inferiority. The mean man then is apt to be despised\nas having the bad taste to show this symbol needlessly, preferring a\nlittle gain to the respect of his fellow-men.\n\nMeanness, however, has a wider sphere than Liberality, and refers not\nmerely to the taking or refusing of money, but to taking advantages\ngenerally: in this wider sense the opposite virtue is Generosity.\n\nIn so far as the sphere of Generosity coincides with that of\nLiberality, the former seems partly to transcend the latter, partly to\nrefer more to feelings than to outward acts, and to imply a completer\ntriumph of unselfish over selfish impulses. In the wider sense it\nis strikingly exhibited in conflict and competition of all kinds.\nHere it is sometimes called Chivalry. Reflection shows us that the\nessence of this beautiful virtue is the realisation of Benevolence\nunder circumstances which make it peculiarly difficult and therefore\npeculiarly admirable. For Generosity or Chivalry towards adversaries\nor competitors seems to consist in showing as much kindness and regard\nfor their well-being as is compatible with the ends and conditions of\nconflict: one prominent form of this being the endeavour to realise\nideal justice in these conditions, not merely by observing all the\nrules and tacit understandings under which the conflict is conducted,\nbut by resigning even accidental advantages. Such resignation, however,\nis not considered a strict duty: nor is there any agreement as to how\nfar it is right and virtuous; for what some would praise and approve,\nothers would regard as quixotic and extravagant.\n\nTo sum up, we may say that the terms Liberality and Generosity, so far\nas they are strictly ethical, denote the virtue of Benevolence (perhaps\nincluding Justice to some extent) as exhibited in special ways and\nunder special conditions. And the examination of the other minor social\nvirtues would evidently lead to similar general results: though it\nmight not always be easy to agree on their definitions.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[244] It is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains\nand losses of others, in various ways, without the specific emotion\nwhich I distinguish as malevolent affection: either (1) from the sense\nof power exercised--which explains much of the wanton cruelty of\nschoolboys, despots, etc.--or (2) from a sense of their own superiority\nor security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others,\nor (3) even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the\nmanifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others; a real\ntragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one. But these\nfacts, though psychologically interesting, present no important ethical\nproblems; since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from\nsuch motives as these.\n\n[245] Butler (Sermon VIII., _Upon Resentment_) recognises that\ndeliberate resentment \u201chas in fact a good influence upon the affairs of\nthe world\u201d; though \u201cit were much to be wished that men would act from a\nbetter principle.\u201d\n\n[246] If the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice,\nthe conduct seems to be more than liberal, and (unless blamed as\nextravagant) is rather praised as generous or highminded.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nSELF-REGARDING VIRTUES\n\n\n\u00a7 1. I conceive that according to the morality of Common Sense, an\nultimate harmony between (1) Self-interest and (2) Virtue is assumed\nor postulated; so that the performance of duty and cultivation of\nVirtue generally may be regarded as a \u201cduty to self,\u201d as being always\nconducive to the agent\u2019s true interest and well-being. But further,\nCommon Sense (in modern Europe) recognises a strict duty of preserving\none\u2019s own life, even when the prospect life offers is one in which\npain preponderates over pleasure; it is, indeed, held to be right and\npraiseworthy to encounter certain death in the performance of strict\nduty, or for the preservation of the life of another, or for any very\nimportant gain to society; but not merely in order to avoid pain to\nthe agent. At the same time, within the limits fixed by this and other\nduties, Common Sense considers, I think,[247] that it is a duty to\nseek our own happiness, except in so far as we can promote the welfare\nof others by sacrificing it. This \u201cdue concern about our own interest\nor happiness\u201d may be called the Duty of Prudence. It should, however,\nbe observed that--since it is less evident that men do not adequately\ndesire their own greatest good, than that their efforts are not\nsufficiently well directed to its attainment--in conceiving Prudence as\na Virtue or Excellence, attention is often fixed almost exclusively on\nits intellectual side. Thus regarded, Prudence may be said to be merely\nWisdom made more definite by the acceptance of Self-interest as its\nsole ultimate end: the habit of calculating carefully the best means\nto the attainment of our own interest, and resisting all irrational\nimpulses which may tend to perturb our calculations or prevent us from\nacting on them.\n\n\u00a7 2. There are, however, current notions of particular virtues, which\nmight be called Self-regarding; but yet with respect to which it is\nnot quite clear whether they are merely particular applications of\nPrudence, or whether they have independent maxims. Of these Temperance,\none of the four cardinal virtues anciently recognised, seems the most\nprominent. In its ordinary use, Temperance is the habit of controlling\nthe principal appetites (or desires which have an immediate corporeal\ncause). The habit of moderating and controlling our desires generally\nis recognised by Common Sense as useful and desirable, but with less\ndistinctness and emphasis.\n\nAll are agreed that our appetites need control: but in order to\nestablish a maxim of Temperance, we have to determine within what\nlimits, on what principle, and to what end they ought to be controlled.\nNow in the case of the appetites for food, drink, sleep, stimulants,\netc., no one doubts that bodily health and vigour is the end naturally\nsubserved by their gratification, and that the latter ought to be\nchecked whenever it tends to defeat this end (including in the notion\nof health the most perfect condition of the mental faculties, so far\nas this appears to depend upon the general state of the body). And,\nfurther, the indulgence of a bodily appetite is manifestly imprudent,\nif it involves the loss of any greater gratification of whatever kind:\nand otherwise wrong if it interferes with the performance of duties;\nthough it is perhaps doubtful how far this latter indulgence would\ncommonly be condemned as \u2018intemperance.\u2019\n\nSome, however, deduce from the obvious truth, that the maintenance\nof bodily health is the chief natural end of the appetites, a more\nrigid rule of restraint, and one that goes beyond prudence. They say\nthat this end ought to fix not only the negative but the positive\nlimit of indulgence; that the pleasure derived from the gratification\nof appetite should never be sought _per se_ (even when it does not\nimpair health, or interfere with duty, or with a greater pleasure of a\ndifferent kind); but only in so far as such gratification is positively\nconducive to health. When we consider to what a marked divergence from\nthe usual habits of the moral rich this principle would lead, we might\nbe disposed to say that it is clearly at variance with Common Sense:\nbut it often meets with verbal assent.\n\nThere is, again, a third and intermediate view which accepts the\nprinciple that the gratification of appetite is not to be sought for\nits own sake, but admits other ends as legitimate besides the mere\nmaintenance of health and strength:--_e.g._ \u201ccheerfulness, and the\ncultivation of the social affections.\u201d[248] Some such principle seems\nto be more or less consciously held by many persons: hence we find that\nsolitary indulgence in the pleasures of the table is very frequently\nregarded with something like moral aversion: and that the banquets\nwhich are given and enjoyed by moral persons, are vaguely supposed to\nhave for their end not the common indulgence of sensual appetites, but\nthe promotion of conviviality and conversational entertainment. For\nit is generally believed that the enjoyment in common of a luxurious\nmeal develops social emotions, and also stimulates the faculties of\nwit and humour and lively colloquy in general; and feasts which are\nobviously not contrived with a view to such convivial and colloquial\ngratifications seem to be condemned by refined persons. Still it would\nbe going too far to state, as a maxim supported by Common Sense in\nrespect of sensual pleasures generally, that they are never to be\nsought except they positively promote those of a higher kind.\n\n\u00a7 3. In the last section we have spoken chiefly of the appetites for\nfood and drink. It is, however, in the case of the appetite of sex\nthat the regulation morally prescribed most clearly and definitely\ntranscends that of mere prudence: which is indicated by the special\nnotion of Purity or Chastity.[249]\n\nAt first sight it may perhaps appear that the regulation of the sexual\nappetite prescribed by the received moral code merely confines its\nindulgence within the limits of the union sanctioned by law: only that\nhere, as the natural impulse is peculiarly powerful and easily excited,\nit is especially necessary to prohibit any acts, internal as well as\nexternal, that tend even indirectly to the transgression of these\nlimits. And this is to a great extent true: still on reflection it will\nappear, I think, that our common notion of purity implies a standard\nindependent of law; for, first, conformity to this does not necessarily\nsecure purity: and secondly, all illegitimate sexual intercourse is\nnot thought to be impure,[250] and it is only by inadvertence that the\ntwo notions are sometimes confounded. But it is not very clear what\nthis standard is. For when we interrogate the moral consciousness of\nmankind, we seem to find two views, a stricter and a laxer, analogous\nto the two interpretations of Temperance last noticed. It is agreed\nthat the sexual appetite ought never to be indulged for the sake of the\nsensual gratification merely, but as a means to some higher end: but\nsome say that the propagation of the species is the only legitimate,\nas it is obviously the primary natural, end: while others regard the\ndevelopment of mutual affection in a union designed to be permanent as\nan end perfectly admissible and right. I need not point out that the\npractical difference between the two views is considerable; so that\nthis question is one which it is necessary to raise and decide. But\nit may be observed that any attempt to lay down minute and detailed\nrules on this subject seems to be condemned by Common Sense as tending\nto defeat the end of purity; as such minuteness of moral legislation\ninvites men in general to exercise their thoughts on this subject to an\nextent which is practically dangerous.[251]\n\nI ought to point out that the Virtue of Purity is certainly not merely\nself-regarding, and is therefore properly out of place in this chapter:\nbut the convenience of discussing it along with Temperance has led me\nto take it out of its natural order. Some, however, would go further,\nand say that it ought to be treated as a distinctly social virtue: for\nthe propagation and rearing of children is one of the most important of\nsocial interests: and they would maintain that Purity merely connotes\na sentiment protective of these important functions, supporting the\nrules which we consider necessary to secure their proper performance.\nBut it seems clear that, though Common Sense undoubtedly recognises\nthis tendency of the sentiment of Purity to maintain the best possible\nprovision for the continuance of the human race, it still does not\nregard that as the fundamental point in the definition of this rule\nof duty, and the sole criterion in deciding whether acts do or do not\nviolate the rule.\n\nThere seem to be no similar special questions with respect to most\nother desires. We recognise, no doubt, a general duty of self-control:\nbut this is merely as a means to the end of acting rationally\n(whatever our interpretation of rational action may be); it only\nprescribes that we should yield to no impulse which prompts us to act\nin antagonism to ends or rules deliberately accepted. Further, there\nis a certain tendency among moral persons to the ascetic opinion that\nthe gratification of merely sensual impulse is in itself somewhat\nobjectionable: but this view does not seem to be taken by Common Sense\nin particular cases;--we do not (_e.g._) commonly condemn the most\nintense enjoyment of muscular exercise, or warmth, or bathing. The only\nother case, besides that of the appetites above discussed, in which\nthe Common Sense of our age and country seems to regard as right or\nadmirable the repression of natural impulses, beyond what Prudence and\nBenevolence would dictate, is that of the promptings of pain and fear.\nAn important instance of this is to be found in the before-mentioned\nrule prohibiting suicide absolutely, even in face of the strongest\nprobability that the rest of a man\u2019s life will be both miserable and\nburdensome to others. But in other cases also praise is apparently\nbestowed on endurance of pain and danger, beyond what is conducive to\nhappiness; as we shall have occasion to observe in the next chapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[247] Kant argues (_Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre_, Th. I., \u00a7 iv.)\nthat as every one \u201cinevitably wills\u201d means to promote his own happiness\nthis cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i.\nchap. iv. \u00a7 1), a man does not \u201cinevitably will\u201d to do what he believes\nwill be most conducive to his own _greatest_ happiness.\n\nThe view in the text is that of Butler (Dissertation _Of the nature\nof Virtue_); who admits that \u201cnature has not given us so sensible a\ndisapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice,\nand cruelty\u201d; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for\nvarious reasons less needed in the former case.\n\n[248] See Whewell\u2019s _Elements of Morality_, Book ii. chap. x.\n\n[249] The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity,\nonly somewhat more external and superficial.\n\n[250] In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be\ndirectly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations\nof Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order\nrather than of Purity.\n\n[251] It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving\nthat Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the\nobservance of purity that the medi\u00e6val Casuistry fell into disrepute.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nCOURAGE, HUMILITY, ETC.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Besides the Virtue of Purity, which we found it convenient\nto discuss in the last chapter, there remain one or two prominent\nexcellences of character which do not seem to be commonly admired and\ninculcated with any distinct reference either to private or to general\nhappiness; and which, though in most cases obviously conducive to\none or other of these ends, sometimes seem to influence conduct in a\ndirection at variance with them.\n\nFor example, Courage is a quality which excites general admiration,\nwhether it is shown in self-defence, or in aiding others, or even when\nwe do not see any benefit resulting from the particular exhibition of\nit. Again, in Christian societies, Humility (if believed sincere) often\nobtains unqualified praise, in spite of the loss that may evidently\nresult from a man\u2019s underrating his own abilities. It will be well,\ntherefore, to examine how far in either case we can elicit a clear and\nindependent maxim defining the conduct commended under each of these\nnotions.\n\nTo begin with Courage. We generally denote by this term a disposition\nto face danger of any kind without shrinking. We sometimes also call\nthose who bear pain unflinchingly courageous: but this quality of\ncharacter we more commonly distinguish as Fortitude. Now it seems\nplain that if we seek for a definition of _strict duty_, as commonly\nrecognised, under the head either of Courage or of Fortitude, we can\nfind none that does not involve a reference to other maxims and ends.\nFor no one would say that it is our _duty_ to face danger or to bear\navoidable pain generally, but only if it meets us in the course of\nduty.[252] And even this needs further qualification: for as regards\nsuch duties as those (_e.g._) of general Benevolence, it would be\ncommonly allowed that the agent\u2019s pain and danger are to be taken into\naccount in practically determining their extent: it would be held\nthat we are not bound to endure any pain except for the prevention\nof manifestly greater pain to another, or the attainment of a more\nimportant amount of positive good: nor to run any risk, unless the\nchance of additional benefit to be gained for another outweighs the\ncost and chance of loss to ourselves if we fail. Indeed it is doubtful\nwhether the common estimate of the duty of Benevolence could be said to\namount quite to this.[253]\n\nWhen, however, we consider Courage as an Excellence rather than a duty,\nit seems to hold a more independent position in our moral estimation.\nAnd this view corresponds more completely than the other to the common\napplication of the notion; as there are many acts of courage, which are\nnot altogether within the control of the Will, and therefore cannot\nbe regarded as strict duties. For (1) danger is frequently sudden and\nneeds to be met without deliberation, so that our manner of meeting\nit can only be semi-voluntary. And (2) though naturally timid persons\ncan perhaps with effort control fear as they can anger or appetite,\nif time be allowed for deliberation, and can prevent it from taking\neffect in dereliction of duty: still this result is not all that is\nrequired for the performance of such courageous acts as need more than\nordinary energy--for the energy of the timid virtuous man is liable to\nbe exhausted in the effort to control his fear: _e.g._ in battle he can\nperhaps stand still to be killed as well as the courageous man, but not\ncharge with the same impetuosity or strike with the same vigour and\nprecision.[254]\n\nSo far then as Courage is not completely voluntary, we have to consider\nwhether it is a desirable quality rather than whether we are strictly\nbound to exhibit it. And here there seems no doubt that we commonly\nfind it morally admirable without reference to any end served by it,\nand when the dangers which call it forth might be avoided without any\ndereliction of duty. At the same time we call a man foolhardy who runs\nunnecessarily into danger beyond a certain degree. Where then is the\nlimit to be fixed? On utilitarian principles we should endeavour to\nstrike as exact a balance as possible between the amount of danger\nincurred in any case and the probable benefit of cultivating and\ndeveloping by practice a habit so frequently necessary for the due\nperformance of important duties. This will obviously give a different\nresult for different states of society and different callings and\nprofessions; as most people need this instinctive courage less in\ncivilised societies than in semi-barbarous ones, and civilians less\nthan soldiers. Perhaps the instinctive admiration of mankind for acts\nof daring does not altogether observe this limit: but we may say, I\nthink, that in so far as it attempts to justify itself on reflection,\nit is commonly in some such way as this; and Common Sense does not seem\nto point to any limit depending on a different principle.\n\n\u00a7 2. As the Virtue of Courage is prominent in Pagan ethics, and in\nthe Code of Honour which may be regarded as a sort of survival of the\npagan view of morality, so Humility especially belongs to the ideal\nset before mankind by Christianity. The common account, however, of\nthis virtue is somewhat paradoxical. For it is generally said that\nHumility prescribes a low opinion of our own merits: but if our merits\nare comparatively high, it seems strange to direct us to have a low\nopinion of them. It may be replied, that though our merits may be\nhigh when compared with those of ordinary men, there are always some\nto be found superior, and we can compare ourselves with these, and in\nthe extreme case with ideal excellence, of which all fall far short;\nand that we ought to make this kind of comparison and not the other\nkind, and contemplate our faults--of which we shall assuredly find\na sufficiency--and not our merits. But surely in the most important\ndeliberations which human life offers, in determining what kind of\nwork we shall undertake and to what social functions we shall aspire,\nit is often necessary that we should compare our qualifications\ncarefully with those of average men, if we are to decide rightly. And\nit would seem just as irrational to underrate ourselves as to overrate;\nand though most men are more prone to the latter mistake, there are\ncertainly some rather inclined to the former.\n\nI think that if we reflect carefully on the common judgments in which\nthe notion of Humility is used, we shall find that the quality commonly\n_praised_ under this name (which is not always used eulogistically), is\nnot properly regulative of the opinions we form of ourselves--for here\nas in other opinions we ought to aim at nothing but Truth--but tends\nto the repression of two different seductive emotions, one entirely\nself-regarding, the other relating to others and partly taking effect\nin social behaviour. Partly, the Virtue of Humility is manifested in\nrepressing the emotion of self-admiration, which springs naturally from\nthe contemplation of our own merits, and as it is highly agreeable,\nprompts to such contemplation. This admiring self-complacency is\ngenerally condemned: but not, I think, by an intuition that claims\nto be ultimate, as it is commonly justified by the reason that such\nself-admiration, even if well-grounded, tends to check our progress\ntowards higher virtue. The mere fact of our feeling this admiration is\nthought to be evidence that we have not sufficiently compared ourselves\nwith our ideal, or that our ideal is not sufficiently high: and it is\nthought to be indispensable to moral progress that we should have a\nhigh ideal and should continually contemplate it. At the same time,\nwe obviously need some care in the application of this maxim. For all\nadmit that self-respect is an important auxiliary to right conduct: and\nmoralists continually point to the satisfactions of a good conscience\nas part of the natural reward which Providence has attached to virtue:\nyet it is difficult to separate the glow of self-approbation which\nattends the performance of a virtuous action from the complacent\nself-consciousness which Humility seems to exclude. Perhaps we may say\nthat the feeling of self-approbation itself is natural and a legitimate\npleasure, but that if prolonged and fostered it is liable to impede\nmoral progress: and that what Humility prescribes is such repression\nof self-satisfaction as will tend on the whole to promote this end. On\nthis view the maxim of Humility is clearly a dependent one: the end to\nwhich it is subordinate is progress in Virtue generally. As for such\npride and self-satisfaction as are based not on our own conduct and its\nresults, but on external and accidental advantages, these are condemned\nas involving a false and absurd view as to the nature of real merit.\n\nBut we not only take pleasure in our own respect and admiration,\nbut still more, generally speaking, in the respect and admiration\nof others. The desire for this, again, is held to be to some extent\nlegitimate, and even a valuable aid to morality: but as it is a\ndangerously seductive impulse, and frequently acts in opposition to\nduty, it is felt to stand in special need of self-control. Humility,\nhowever, does not so much consist in controlling this desire, as in\nrepressing the claim for its satisfaction which we are naturally\ndisposed to make upon others. We are inclined to demand from others\n\u2018tokens of respect,\u2019 some external symbol of their recognition of our\nelevated place in the scale of human beings; and to complain if our\ndemands are not granted. Such claims and demands Humility bids us\nrepress. It is thought to be our duty not to exact, in many cases, even\nthe expression of reverence which others are strictly bound to pay.\nAnd yet here, again, there is a limit, in the view of Common Sense,\nat which this quality of behaviour passes over into a fault: for the\nomission of marks of respect[255] is sometimes an insult which impulses\ncommonly regarded as legitimate and even virtuous (sense of Dignity,\nSelf-respect, Proper Pride, etc.) prompt us to repel. I do not,\nhowever, think it possible to claim a _consensus_ for any formula for\ndetermining this limit.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[252] In the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that\nFortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations: though in so far\nas these relieve the sufferer without annoying others, the duty seems\ndoubtful.\n\n[253] Cf. _ante_, chap. iv. \u00a7 5 of this Book.\n\n[254] The above remarks apply in a less degree to the \u201cmoral courage\u201d\nby which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in\nthe performance of what they believe to be duty: for the adequate\naccomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the\ncontrol of the will at any given time.\n\n[255] I do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials,\nthe omission of which would be a breach of established order; since\nthe special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the\nquestion beyond the sphere of application of the Virtue of Humility.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nREVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We have now concluded such detailed examination of the morality\nof Common Sense as, on the plan laid down in chap. i. of this Book,\nit seemed desirable to undertake. We have not discussed all the terms\nof our common moral vocabulary: but I believe that we have omitted\nnone that are important either in themselves or relatively to our\npresent inquiry. For of those that remain we may fairly say, that they\nmanifestly will not furnish independent maxims: for reflection will\nshow that the conduct designated by them is either prescribed merely as\na means to the performance of duties already discussed; or is really\nidentical with the whole or part of some of these, viewed in some\nspecial aspect, or perhaps specialised by the addition of some peculiar\ncircumstance or condition.\n\nLet us now pause and survey briefly the process in which we have been\nengaged, and the results which we have elicited.\n\nWe started with admitting the point upon the proof of which moralists\nhave often concentrated their efforts, the existence of apparently\nindependent moral intuitions. It seemed undeniable that men judge\nsome acts to be right and wrong in themselves, without consideration\nof their tendency to produce happiness to the agent or to others: and\nindeed without taking their consequences into account at all, except in\nso far as these are included in the common notion of the act. We saw,\nhowever, that in so far as these judgments are passed in particular\ncases, they seem to involve (at least for the more reflective part of\nmankind) a reference of the case to some general rule of duty: and\nthat in the frequent cases of doubt or conflict of judgments as to\nthe rightness of any action, appeal is commonly made to such rules\nor maxims, as the ultimately valid principles of moral cognition.\nIn order, therefore, to throw the Morality of Common Sense into a\nscientific form, it seemed necessary to obtain as exact a statement as\npossible of these generally recognised principles. I did not think that\nI could dispense myself from this task by any summary general argument,\nbased on the unscientific character of common morality. There is no\ndoubt that the moral opinions of ordinary men are in many points loose,\nshifting, and mutually contradictory, but it does not follow that we\nmay not obtain from this fluid mass of opinion, a deposit of clear\nand precise principles commanding universal acceptance. The question,\nwhether we can do this or not, seemed to me one which should not be\ndecided _a priori_ without a fair trial: and it is partly in order\nto prepare materials for this trial that the survey in the preceding\neight chapters has been conducted. I have endeavoured to ascertain\nimpartially, by mere reflection on our common moral discourse, what are\nthe general principles or maxims, according to which different kinds of\nconduct are judged to be right and reasonable in different departments\nof life. I wish it to be particularly observed, that I have in no case\nintroduced my own views, in so far as I am conscious of their being at\nall peculiar to myself: my sole object has been to make explicit the\nimplied premises of our common moral reasoning. I now wish to subject\nthe results of this survey to a final examination, in order to decide\nwhether these general formul\u00e6 possess the characteristics by which\nself-evident truths are distinguished from mere opinions.\n\n\u00a7 2. There seem to be four conditions, the complete fulfilment of which\nwould establish a significant proposition, apparently self-evident,\nin the highest degree of certainty attainable: and which must be\napproximately realised by the premises of our reasoning in any inquiry,\nif that reasoning is to lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions.\n\nI. The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise. The rival\noriginators of modern Methodology, Descartes and Bacon, vie with each\nother in the stress that they lay on this point: and the latter\u2019s\nwarning against the \u201cnotiones male terminat\u00e6\u201d of ordinary thought is\npeculiarly needed in ethical discussion. In fact my chief business in\nthe preceding survey has been to free the common terms of Ethics, as\nfar as possible, from objection on this score.\n\nII. The self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful\nreflection. It is needful to insist on this, because most persons are\nliable to confound intuitions, on the one hand with mere impressions\nor impulses, which to careful observation do not present themselves as\nclaiming to be dictates of Reason; and on the other hand, with mere\nopinions, to which the familiarity that comes from frequent hearing\nand repetition often gives a false appearance of self-evidence which\nattentive reflection disperses. In such cases the Cartesian method of\ntesting the ultimate premises of our reasonings, by asking ourselves\nif we clearly and distinctly apprehend them to be true, may be of real\nuse; though it does not, as Descartes supposed, afford a complete\nprotection against error. A rigorous demand for self-evidence in our\npremises is a valuable protection against the misleading influence of\nour own irrational impulses on our judgments: while at the same time\nit not only distinguishes as inadequate the mere external support of\nauthority and tradition, but also excludes the more subtle and latent\neffect of these in fashioning our minds to a facile and unquestioning\nadmission of common but unwarranted assumptions.\n\nAnd we may observe that the application of this test is especially\nneeded in Ethics. For, on the one hand, it cannot be denied that any\nstrong sentiment, however purely subjective, is apt to transform\nitself into the semblance of an intuition; and it requires careful\ncontemplation to detect the illusion. Whatever we desire we are apt to\npronounce desirable: and we are strongly tempted to approve of whatever\nconduct gives us keen pleasure.[256] And on the other hand, among the\nrules of conduct to which we customarily conform, there are many which\nreflection shows to be really derived from some external authority:\nso that even if their obligation be unquestionable, they cannot be\nintuitively ascertained. This is of course the case with the Positive\nLaw of the community to which we belong. There is no doubt that we\nought,--at least generally speaking,--to obey this: but what it is we\ncannot of course ascertain by any process of abstract reflection, but\nonly by consulting Reports and Statutes. Here, however, the sources of\nknowledge are so definite and conspicuous, that we are in no danger of\nconfounding the knowledge gained from studying them with the results\nof abstract contemplation. The case is somewhat different with the\ntraditional and customary rules of behaviour which exist in every\nsociety, supplementing the regulative operation of Law proper: here it\nis much more difficult to distinguish the rules which a moral man is\ncalled upon to define for himself, by the application of intuitively\nknown principles, from those as to which some authority external to the\nindividual is recognised as the final arbiter.[257]\n\nWe may illustrate this by referring to two systems of rules which we\nhave before[258] compared with Morality; the Law of Honour, and the\nLaw of Fashion or Etiquette. I noticed that there is an ambiguity in\nthe common terms \u2018honourable\u2019 and \u2018dishonourable\u2019; which are no doubt\nsometimes used, like ethical terms, as implying an absolute standard.\nStill, when we speak of the Code of Honour we seem to mean rules of\nwhich the exact nature is to be finally determined by an appeal to\nthe general opinion of well-bred persons: we admit that a man is in a\nsense \u2018dishonoured\u2019 when this opinion condemns him, even though we may\nthink his conduct unobjectionable or even intrinsically admirable.[259]\nSimilarly, when we consider from the point of view of reason the\nrules of Fashion or Etiquette, some may seem useful and commendable,\nsome indifferent and arbitrary, some perhaps absurd and burdensome:\nbut nevertheless we recognise that the final authority on matters of\nEtiquette is the custom of polite society; which feels itself under\nno obligation of reducing its rules to rational principles. Yet it\nmust be observed that each individual in any society commonly finds in\nhimself a knowledge not obviously incomplete of the rules of Honour\nand Etiquette, and an impulse to conform to them without requiring any\nfurther reason for doing so. Each often seems to see at a glance what\nis honourable and polite just as clearly as he sees what is right: and\nit requires some consideration to discover that in the former cases\ncustom and opinion are generally the final authority from which there\nis no appeal. And even in the case of rules regarded as distinctly\nmoral, we can generally find an element that seems to us as clearly\nconventional as the codes just mentioned, when we contemplate the\nmorality of other men, even in our own age and country. Hence we may\nreasonably suspect a similar element in our own moral code: and must\nadmit the great importance of testing rigorously any rule which we\nfind that we have a habitual impulse to obey; to see whether it really\nexpresses or can be referred to a clear intuition of rightness.\n\nIII. The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually\nconsistent. Here, again, it is obvious that any collision between two\nintuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, or in\nboth. Still, we frequently find ethical writers treating this point\nvery lightly. They appear to regard a conflict of ultimate rules as\na difficulty that may be ignored or put aside for future solution,\nwithout any slur being thrown on the scientific character of the\nconflicting formul\u00e6. Whereas such a collision is absolute proof that\nat least one of the formul\u00e6 needs qualification: and suggests a doubt\nwhether the correctly qualified proposition will present itself with\nthe same self-evidence as the simpler but inadequate one; and whether\nwe have not mistaken for an ultimate and independent axiom one that is\nreally derivative and subordinate.\n\nIV. Since it is implied in the very notion of Truth that it is\nessentially the same for all minds, the denial by another of a\nproposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence\nin its validity. And in fact \u2018universal\u2019 or \u2018general\u2019 consent has often\nbeen held to constitute by itself a sufficient evidence of the truth\nof the most important beliefs; and is practically the only evidence\nupon which the greater part of mankind can rely. A proposition accepted\nas true upon this ground alone has, of course, neither self-evidence\nnor demonstrative evidence for the mind that so accepts it; still, the\nsecure acceptance that we commonly give to the generalisations of the\nempirical sciences rests--even in the case of experts--largely on\nthe belief that other experts have seen for themselves the evidence\nfor these generalisations, and do not materially disagree as to\nits adequacy. And it will be easily seen that the absence of such\ndisagreement must remain an indispensable negative condition of the\ncertainty of our beliefs. For if I find any of my judgments, intuitive\nor inferential, in direct conflict with a judgment of some other mind,\nthere must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to suspect\nerror in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between\nthe two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of\nneutrality. And though the total result in my mind is not exactly\nsuspense of judgment, but an alternation and conflict between positive\naffirmation by one act of thought and the neutrality that is the result\nof another, it is obviously something very different from scientific\ncertitude.\n\nNow if the account given of the Morality of Common Sense in the\npreceding chapters be in the main correct, it seems clear that,\ngenerally speaking, its maxims do not fulfil the conditions just\nlaid down. So long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague\ngeneralities, as we meet them in ordinary discourse, we are disposed to\nyield them unquestioning assent, and it may be fairly claimed that the\nassent is approximately universal--in the sense that any expression of\ndissent is eccentric and paradoxical. But as soon as we attempt to give\nthem the definiteness which science requires, we find that we cannot\ndo this without abandoning the universality of acceptance. We find,\nin some cases, that alternatives present themselves, between which\nit is necessary that we should decide; but between which we cannot\npretend that Common Sense does decide, and which often seem equally\nor nearly equally plausible. In other cases the moral notion seems to\nresist all efforts to obtain from it a definite rule: in others it is\nfound to comprehend elements which we have no means of reducing to a\ncommon standard, except by the application of the Utilitarian--or some\nsimilar--method. Even where we seem able to educe from Common Sense\na more or less clear reply to the questions raised in the process of\ndefinition, the principle that results is qualified in so complicated\na way that its self-evidence becomes dubious or vanishes altogether.\nAnd thus in each case what at first seemed like an intuition turns out\nto be either the mere expression of a vague impulse, needing regulation\nand limitation which it cannot itself supply, but which must be drawn\nfrom some other source: or a current opinion, the reasonableness of\nwhich has still to be shown by a reference to some other principle.\n\nIn order that this result may be adequately exhibited, I must ask\nthe reader to travel with me again through the series of principles\nelicited from Common Sense in the previous chapters, and to examine\nthem from a somewhat different point of view. Before, our primary aim\nwas to ascertain impartially what the deliverances of Common Sense\nactually are: we have now to ask how far these enunciations can claim\nto be classed as Intuitive Truths.\n\nThe reader should observe that throughout this examination a double\nappeal is made; on the one hand to his individual moral consciousness,\nand, on the other hand, to the Common Sense of mankind, as expressed\ngenerally by the body of persons on whose moral judgment he is\nprepared to rely. I ask him (1) whether he can state a clear, precise,\nself-evident first principle, according to which he is prepared to\njudge conduct under each head: and (2) if so, whether this principle\nis really that commonly applied in practice, by those whom he takes to\nrepresent Common Sense.[260]\n\n\u00a7 3. If we begin by considering the duty of acting wisely, discussed in\nchap. iii., we may seem perhaps to have before us an axiom of undoubted\nself-evidence. For acting wisely appeared to mean taking the right\nmeans to the best ends; _i.e._ taking the means which Reason indicates\nto the ends which Reason prescribes. And it is evident that it must be\nright to act reasonably. Equally undeniable is the immediate inference\nfrom, or negative aspect of, this principle; that it is wrong to act\nin opposition to rational judgment. This, taken in connexion with\nthe empirical fact of impulses in our minds conflicting with Reason,\ngives--as another self-evident principle--the maxim of Temperance or\nSelf-control in its widest interpretation; _i.e._ \u2018That reason should\nnever give way to Appetite or Passion.\u2019[261] And these principles have\nsometimes been enounced with no little solemnity as answering the\nfundamental question of Ethics and supplying the basis or summary of a\ndoctrine of Practice.\n\nBut this statement of principles turns out to be one of those stages,\nso provokingly frequent in the course of ethical reflection, which,\nas far as practical guidance is concerned, are really brief circuits,\nleading us back to the point from which we started. Or rather, to\nprevent misapprehension, it should be observed that the maxims just\ngiven may be understood in two senses: in one sense they are certainly\nself-evident, but they are also insignificant: in another sense they\ninclude more or less distinctly a direction to an important practical\nduty, but as so understood they lose their self-evidence. For if the\nrules of Wisdom and Self-control mean (1) that we ought always to do\nwhat we see to be reasonable, and (2) that we are not to yield to any\nimpulse urging us in an opposite direction; they simply affirm that it\nis our duty (1) generally, and (2) under special temptations, to do\nwhat we judge to be our duty;[262] and convey no information as to the\nmethod and principles by which duty is to be determined.\n\nBut if these rules are further understood (as they sometimes are\nunderstood) to prescribe the cultivation of a habit of acting\nrationally; that is, of referring each act to definitely conceived\nprinciples and ends, instead of allowing it to be determined by\ninstinctive impulses; then I cannot see that the affirmation of this\nas an universal and absolute rule of duty is self-evidently true. For\nwhen Reason is considered not in the present as actually commanding,\nbut as an End of which a fuller realisation has to be sought in the\nfuture; the point of view from which its sovereignty has to be judged\nis entirely changed. The question is no longer whether the dictates of\nReason ought always to be obeyed, but whether the dictation of Reason\nis always a Good; whether any degree of predominance of Reason over\nmere Impulse must necessarily tend to the perfection of the conscious\nself of which both are elements. And it is surely not self-evident\nthat this predominance cannot be carried too far; and that Reason is\nnot rather self-limiting, in the knowledge that rational ends are\nsometimes better attained by those who do not directly aim at them\nas rational. Certainly Common Sense is inclined to hold that in many\nmatters instinct is a better spring of action than reason: thus it\nis commonly said that a healthy appetite is a better guide to diet\nthan a doctor\u2019s prescription: and, again, that marriage is better\nundertaken as a consequence of falling in love than in execution of a\ntranquil and deliberate design: and we before observed (chap. iv.) that\nthere is a certain excellence in services springing from spontaneous\naffection which does not attach to similar acts done from pure sense\nof duty. And in the same way experience seems to show that many acts\nrequiring promptitude and vigour are likely to be more energetic and\neffective, and that many acts requiring tact and delicacy are likely\nto be more graceful and pleasant to others, if they are done not in\nconscious obedience to the dictates of Reason but from other motives.\nIt is not necessary here to decide how far this view is true: it\nsuffices to say that we do not know intuitively that it is not true\nto some extent; we do not know that there may not be--to use Plato\u2019s\nanalogy--_over-government_ in the individual soul no less than in the\nstate. The residuum, then, of clear intuition which we have so far\nobtained, is the insignificant proposition that it is our duty to do\nwhat we judge to be our duty.\n\n\u00a7 4. Let us pass now to what I have called the duties of the\nAffections, the rules that prescribe either love itself in some degree,\nor the services that naturally spring from it in those relations where\nit is expected and desired. Here, in the first place, the question\nhow far we are bound to render these services when we do not feel the\naffection is answered differently in many cases by different persons,\nand no determination of the limit seems self-evident. And similarly\nif we ask whether affection itself is a duty; for on the one hand it\nis at least only partially within the control of the will, and in so\nfar as it can be produced by voluntary effort, there is thought to\nbe something unsatisfactory and unattractive in the result; and on\nthe other hand, in certain relations it seems to be commonly regarded\nas a duty. On those points the doctrine of Common Sense is rather a\nrough compromise between conflicting lines of thought than capable of\nbeing deduced from a clear and universally accepted principle. And\nif we confine ourselves to the special relations where Common Sense\nadmits no doubt as to the broad moral obligation of at least rendering\nsuch services as affection naturally prompts, still the recognised\nrules of external duty in these relations are, in the first place,\nwanting in definiteness and precision: and secondly, they do not, when\nrigorously examined, appear to be, or to be referable to, independent\nintuitions so far as the _particularity_ of the duties is concerned.\nLet us take, for example, the duty of parents to children. We have\nno doubt about this duty as a part of the present order of society,\nby which the due growth and training of the rising generation is\ndistributed among the adults. But when we reflect on this arrangement\nitself, we cannot see _intuitively_ that it is the best possible. It\nmay be plausibly maintained that children would be better trained,\nphysically and mentally, if they were brought up under the supervision\nof physicians and philosophers, in large institutions maintained out\nof the general taxes. We cannot decide _a priori_ which of these\nalternatives is preferable; we have to refer to psychological and\nsociological generalisations, obtained by empirical study of human\nnature in actual societies. If, however, we consider the duty of\nparents by itself, out of connexion with this social order, it is\ncertainly not self-evident that we owe more to our own children than\nto others whose happiness equally depends on our exertions. To get the\nquestion clear, let us suppose that I am thrown with my family upon a\ndesert island, where I find an abandoned orphan. Is it evident that I\nam less bound to provide this child, as far as lies in my power, with\nthe means of subsistence, than I am to provide for my own children?\nAccording to some, my special duty to the latter would arise from the\nfact that I have brought them into being: but, if so, it would seem\nthat on this principle I have a right to diminish their happiness,\nprovided I do not turn it into a negative quantity; since, as without\nme they would not have existed at all, they can, as my children, have\nno claim upon me for more than an existence on the whole above zero in\nrespect of happiness. We might even deduce a parental right (so far as\nthis special claim is concerned) to extinguish children painlessly at\nany point of their existence, if only their life up to that point has\nbeen on the whole worth having; for how can persons who would have had\nno life at all but for me fairly complain that they are not allowed\nmore than a certain quantity?[263] I do not mean to assert that these\ndoctrines are even implicitly held by Common Sense: but merely to show\nthat here, as elsewhere, the pursuit of an irrefragable intuition may\nlead us unaware into a nest of paradoxes.\n\nIt seems, then, that we cannot, after all, say that the special\nduty of parents to children, considered by itself, possesses clear\nself-evidence: and it was easy to show (cf. chap. iv.) that as\nrecognised by Common Sense its limits are indeterminate.\n\nThe rule prescribing the duty of children to parents need not detain\nus; for to Common Sense it certainly seems doubtful whether this is\nnot merely a particular case of gratitude; and we certainly have no\nclear intuition of what is due to parents who do not deserve gratitude.\nAgain, the moral relation of husband and wife seems to depend chiefly\nupon contract and definite understanding. It is, no doubt, usually\nthought that Morality, as well as law prescribes certain conditions\nfor all connubial contracts: and in our own age and country it is held\nthat they should be (1) monogamic and (2) permanent. But it seems clear\nthat neither of these opinions would be maintained to be a primary\nintuition. Whether these or any other legal regulations of the union\nof the sexes can be deduced from some intuitive principle of Purity,\nwe will presently consider: but as for such conjugal duties as are not\nprescribed by Law, probably no one at the present day would maintain\nthat there is any such general agreement as to what these are, as would\nsupport the theory that they may be known _a priori_.[264]\n\nIf, then, in these domestic relations--where the duties of affection\nare commonly recognised as so imperative and important--we can find no\nreally independent and self-evident principles for determining them,\nI need not perhaps spend time in showing that the same is the case in\nrespect of the less intimate ties (of kindred, neighbourhood, etc.)\nthat bind us to other human beings. Indeed, this was made sufficiently\nmanifest in our previous discussion of those other duties.\n\nNo doubt there are certain obligations towards human beings generally\nwhich are, speaking broadly, unquestionable: as, for example, the\nnegative duty of abstaining from causing pain to others against\ntheir will, except by way of deserved punishment (whether this is\nto be placed under the head of Justice or Benevolence); and of\nmaking reparation for any pain which we may have caused. Still,\nwhen we consider the extent of these duties and try to define their\nlimits,--when we ask how far we may legitimately cause pain to other\nmen (or other sentient beings) in order to obtain happiness for\nourselves or third persons, or even to confer a greater good on the\nsufferer himself, if the pain be inflicted against his will,--we do\nnot seem able to obtain any clear and generally accepted principle\nfor deciding this point, unless the Utilitarian formula be admitted\nas such. Again, as regards Reparation, there is, as we have seen,\na fundamental doubt how far this is due for harm that has been\ninvoluntarily caused.\n\nSimilarly, all admit that we have a general duty of rendering services\nto our fellow-men and especially to those who are in special need, and\nthat we are bound to make sacrifices for them, when the benefit that\nwe thereby confer very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves; but\nwhen we ask how far we are bound to give up our own happiness in order\nto promote that of our fellows, while it can hardly be said that Common\nSense distinctly accepts the Utilitarian principle, it yet does not\ndefinitely affirm any other.\n\nAnd even the common principle of Gratitude, though its stringency is\nimmediately and universally felt, seems yet essentially indeterminate:\nowing to the unsolved question whether the requital of a benefit ought\nto be proportionate to what it cost the benefactor, or to what it is\nworth to the recipient.\n\n\u00a7 5. When we pass to consider that element of Justice which presented\nitself as Gratitude universalised, the same difficulty recurs in a more\ncomplicated form. For here, too, we have to ask whether the Requital\nof Good Desert ought to be proportioned to the benefit rendered, or to\nthe effort made to render it. And if we scrutinise closely the common\nmoral notion of Retributive Justice, it appears, strictly taken, to\nimply the metaphysical doctrine of Free Will; since, according to\nthis conception, the reasonableness of rewarding merit is considered\nsolely in relation to the past, without regard to the future bad\nconsequences to be expected from leaving merit without encouragement:\nand if every excellence in any one\u2019s actions or productions seems\nreferable ultimately to causes other than himself, the individual\u2019s\nclaim to requital, from this point of view, appears to vanish. On the\nother hand it is obviously paradoxical in estimating Desert to omit\nthe moral excellences due to hereditary transmission and education: or\neven intellectual excellences, since good intention without foresight\nis commonly held to constitute a very imperfect merit. Even if we cut\nthrough this speculative difficulty by leaving the ultimate reward of\nreal Desert to Divine Justice, we still seem unable to find any clear\nprinciples for framing a scale of merit. And much the same may be said,\n_mutatis mutandis_, of the scale of Demerit which Criminal Justice\nseems to require.\n\nAnd even if these difficulties were overcome, we should still be\nonly at the commencement of the perplexities in which the practical\ndetermination of Justice on self-evident principles is involved. For\nthe examination of the contents of this notion, which we conducted\nin chap. v., furnished us not with a single definite principle, but\nwith a whole swarm of principles, which are unfortunately liable to\ncome into conflict with each other; and of which even those that when\nsingly contemplated have the air of being self-evident truths, do not\ncertainly carry with them any intuitively ascertainable definition\nof their mutual boundaries and relations. Thus, for example, in\nconstructing an ideally perfect distribution of the means of happiness,\nit seems necessary to take into account the notion (as I called it) of\nFitness, which, though often confounded with Desert, seems essentially\ndistinct from it. For the social \u2018distribuend\u2019 includes not merely the\nmeans of obtaining pleasurable passive feelings, but also functions and\ninstruments, which are important sources of happiness, but which it is\nobviously reasonable to give to those who can perform and use them.\nAnd even as regards the material means of comfort and luxury--wealth,\nin short--we do not find that the same amount produces the same result\nof happiness in every case: and it seems reasonable that the means of\nrefined and varied pleasure should be allotted to those who have the\ncorresponding capacities for enjoyment.[265] And yet these may not be\nthe most deserving, so that this principle may clearly conflict with\nthat of requiting Desert.\n\nAnd either principle, as we saw, is liable to come into collision with\nthe widely-accepted doctrine that the proper ultimate end of Law is\nto secure the greatest possible Freedom of action to all members of\nthe community: and that all that any individual, strictly speaking,\nowes to any other is non-interference, except so far as he has further\nbound himself by free contract. But further, when we come to examine\nthis principle in its turn, we find that, in order to be capable\nat all of affording a practical basis for social construction, it\nneeds limitations and qualifications which make it look less like an\nindependent principle than a \u201cmiddle axiom\u201d of Utilitarianism; and that\nit cannot without a palpable strain be made to cover the most important\nrights which Positive Law secures. For example, the justification of\npermanent appropriation is surely rather that it supplies the only\nadequate motive for labour than that it, strictly speaking, realises\nFreedom: nor can the questions that arise in determining the limits\nof the right of property--such as whether it includes the right of\nbequest--be settled by any deductions from this supposed fundamental\nprinciple. Nor again, can even the enforcement of contracts be fairly\nsaid to be a realisation of Freedom; for a man seems, strictly\nspeaking, freer when no one of his volitions is allowed to cause\nan external control of any other. And if we disregard this as a\nparadoxical subtlety, we are met on the opposite side by the perplexity\nthat if abstract Freedom is consistent with any engagement of future\nservices, it must on the same grounds be consistent with such as are\nperpetual and unqualified, and so even with actual slavery. And this\nquestion becomes especially important when we consider that the duty\nof obeying positive laws has by many been reconciled with the abstract\nright of Freedom, by supposing a \u2018tacit compact\u2019 or understanding\nbetween each individual and the rest of his community. This Compact,\nhowever, seems on examination too clearly fictitious to be put forward\nas a basis of moral duty: as is further evident from the indefinitely\nvarious qualifications and reservations with which the \u2018understanding\u2019\nhas by different thinkers been supposed to be \u2018understood.\u2019 Hence\nmany who maintain the \u2018Birthright of Freedom\u2019 consider that the only\nabstractedly justifiable social order is one in which no laws are\nimposed without the _express_ consent of those who are to obey them.\nBut we found it impossible really to construct society upon this basis:\nand such Representative Governments as have actually been established\nonly appear to realise this idea by means of sweeping limitations\nand transparent fictions. It was manifest, too, that the maximum of\nwhat may be called Constitutional Freedom--_i.e._ the most perfect\nconformity between the action of a government and the wishes of the\nmajority of its subjects--need by no means result in the realisation of\nthe maximum of Civil Freedom in the society so governed.\n\nBut even if we could delineate to our satisfaction an ideal social\norder, including an ideal form of government, we have still to\nreconcile the duty of realising this with the conformity due to the\nactual order of society. For we have a strong conviction that positive\nlaws ought, generally speaking, to be obeyed: and, again, our notion of\nJustice seemed to include a general duty of satisfying the expectations\ngenerated by custom and precedent. Yet if the actual order of society\ndeviates very much from what we think ought to exist, the duty of\nconforming to it seems to become obscure and doubtful. And apart from\nthis we cannot say that Common Sense regards it as an axiom that Laws\nought to be obeyed. Indeed, all are agreed that they ought to be\ndisobeyed when they command what is wrong: though we do not seem able\nto elicit any clear general view as to what remains wrong after it has\nbeen commanded by the sovereign. And, again, the positive laws that\nought to be obeyed as such must be the commands issued by a (morally)\nrightful authority: and though these will ordinarily coincide with the\ncommands legally enforced, we cannot say that this is always the case;\nfor the courts may be temporarily subservient to a usurper; or, again,\nthe sovereign hitherto habitually obeyed may be one against whom it\nhas become right to rebel (since it is generally admitted that this is\nsometimes right). We require, then, principles for determining when\nusurpation becomes legitimate and when rebellion is justifiable: and we\ndo not seem able to elicit these from Common Sense--except so far as\nit may be fairly said that on this whole subject Common Sense inclines\nmore to the Utilitarian method than it does in matters of private\nmorality.\n\nStill less can we state the general duty of satisfying \u2018natural\nexpectations\u2019--_i.e._ such expectations as an average man would form\nunder given circumstances--in the form of a clear and precise moral\naxiom. No doubt a just man will generally satisfy customary claims: but\nit can hardly be maintained that the mere existence of a custom renders\nit clearly obligatory that any one should conform to it who has not\nalready promised to do so; especially since bad customs can only be\nabolished by individuals venturing to disregard them.\n\n\u00a7 6. We have still to examine (whether as a branch of Justice or\nunder a separate head) the duty of fulfilling express promises and\ndistinct understandings. The peculiar confidence which moralists have\ngenerally felt in this principle is strikingly illustrated by those\nendeavours to extend its scope which we have just had occasion to\nnotice: and it certainly seems to surpass in simplicity, certainty,\nand definiteness the moral rules that we have hitherto discussed.\nHere, then, if anywhere, we seem likely to find one of those ethical\naxioms of which we are in search. Now we saw that the notion of a\nPromise requires several qualifications not commonly noticed to make\nit precise: but this alone is no reason why it may not be fitly\nused in framing a maxim, which when enunciated and understood will\nproperly claim universal acceptance as self-evident. For similarly\nthe uninstructed majority of mankind could not define a circle as a\nfigure bounded by a line of which every point is equidistant from the\ncentre: but nevertheless, when the definition is explained to them,\nthey will accept it as expressing the perfect type of that notion\nof roundness which they have long had in their minds. And the same\npotential universality of acceptance may, I think, be fairly claimed\nfor the propositions that the promise which the Common Sense of mankind\nrecognises as binding must be understood by promiser and promisee in\nthe same sense at the time of promising, and that it is relative to\nthe promisee and capable of being annulled by him, and that it cannot\noverride determinate[266] prior obligations.\n\nBut the case is different with the other qualifications which we had to\ndiscuss. When once the question of introducing these has been raised,\nwe see that Common Sense is clearly divided as to the answer. If we ask\n(_e.g._) how far our promise is binding if it was made in consequence\nof false statements, on which, however, it was not understood to be\nconditional; or if important circumstances were concealed, or we were\nin any way led to believe that the consequences of keeping the promise\nwould be different from what they turn out to be; or if the promise was\ngiven under compulsion; or if circumstances have materially altered\nsince it was given, and we find that the results of fulfilling it will\nbe different from what we foresaw when we promised; or even if it be\nonly our knowledge of consequences which has altered, and we now see\nthat fulfilment will entail on us a sacrifice out of proportion to the\nbenefit received by the promisee; or perhaps see that it will even be\ninjurious to him though he may not think so;--different conscientious\npersons would answer these and other[267] questions (both generally and\nin particular cases) in different ways: and though we could perhaps\nobtain a decided majority for some of these qualifications and against\nothers, there would not in any case be a clear _consensus_ either way.\nAnd, moreover, the mere discussion of these points seems to make it\nplain that the confidence with which the \u201cunsophisticated conscience\u201d\nasserts unreservedly \u201cthat promises ought to be kept,\u201d is due to\ninadvertence; and that when the qualifications to which we referred are\nfairly considered, this confidence inevitably changes into hesitation\nand perplexity. It should be added, that some of these qualifications\nthemselves suggest a reference to the more comprehensive principle\nof Utilitarianism, as one to which this particular rule is naturally\nsubordinate.\n\nAgain, reflection upon the place of this duty in a classified system\nof moral obligations tends to confirm our distrust of the ordinary\nenunciations of Common Sense in respect of it. For, as was seen,\nFidelity to promises is very commonly ranked with Veracity; as though\nthe mere fact of my having said that I would do a thing were the ground\nof my duty to do it. But on reflection we perceive that the obligation\nmust be regarded as contingent on the reliance that another has placed\non my assertion: that, in fact, the breach of duty is constituted by\nthe disappointment of expectations voluntarily raised. And when we see\nthis we become less disposed to maintain the absoluteness of the duty:\nit seems now to depend upon the amount of harm done by disappointing\nexpectations; and we shrink from saying that the promise ought to be\nkept, if the keeping it would involve an amount of harm that seems\ndecidedly to outweigh this.\n\nThe case of Veracity we may dismiss somewhat more briefly, as here\nit was still more easy to show that the common enunciation of the\nunqualified duty of Truth-speaking is made without full consideration,\nand cannot approve itself to the reflective mind as an absolute first\nprinciple. For, in the first place, we found no clear agreement as to\nthe fundamental nature of the obligation; or as to its exact scope,\n_i.e._ whether it is our actual affirmation as understood by the\nrecipient which we are bound to make correspondent to fact (as far as\nwe can), or whatever inferences we foresee that he is likely to draw\nfrom this, or both. To realise perfect Candour and Sincerity, we must\naim at both: and we no doubt admire the exhibition of these virtues:\nbut few will maintain that they ought to be exhibited under all\ncircumstances. And, secondly, it seems to be admitted by Common Sense,\nthough vaguely and reluctantly, that the principle, however defined,\nis not of universal application; at any rate it is not thought to be\nclearly wrong that untruths should be told to children, or madmen, or\ninvalids, or by advocates, or to enemies or robbers, or even to persons\nwho ask questions which they have no right to ask (if a mere refusal\nto answer would practically reveal an important secret). And when\nwe consider the limitations generally admitted, it seems still more\nplain than in the last case, that they are very commonly determined by\nutilitarian reasonings, implicit or explicit.\n\n\u00a7 7. If, then, the prescriptions of Justice, Good Faith, and Veracity,\nas laid down by Common Sense, appear so little capable of being\nconverted into first principles of scientific Ethics, it seems scarcely\nnecessary to inquire whether such axioms can be extracted from the\nminor maxims of social behaviour, such as the maxim of Liberality or\nthe rules restraining the Malevolent Affections: or, again, from such\nvirtues as Courage and Humility, which we found it difficult to class\nas either social or self-regarding. Indeed, it was made plain in chap.\nviii. that as regards the proper regulation of resentment, Common Sense\ncan only be saved from inconsistency or hopeless vagueness by adopting\nthe \u2018interest of society\u2019 as the ultimate standard: and in the same way\nwe cannot definitely distinguish Courage from Foolhardiness except by\na reference to the probable tendency of the daring act to promote the\nwellbeing of the agent or of others, or to some definite rule of duty\nprescribed under some other notion.\n\nIt is true that among what are commonly called \u201cduties to self\u201d\nwe find the duty of self-preservation prescribed with apparent\nabsoluteness,--at least so far as the sacrifice of one\u2019s life is not\nimperatively required for the preservation of the lives of others,\nor for the attainment of some result conceived to be very important\nto society. I think, however, that when confronted with the question\nof preserving a life which we can foresee will be both miserable and\nburdensome to others--_e.g._ the life of a man stricken with a fatal\ndisease which precludes the possibility of work of any kind, during the\nweeks or months of agony that remain to him,--though Common Sense would\nstill deny the legitimacy of suicide, even under these conditions, it\nwould also admit the necessity of finding reasons for the denial. This\nadmission would imply that the universal wrongness of suicide is at any\nrate not self-evident. And the reasons that would be found--so far as\nthey did not ultimately depend upon premises drawn from Revelational\nTheology--would, I think, turn out to be utilitarian, in a broad sense\nof the term: it would be urged that if any exceptions to the rule\nprohibiting suicide were allowed, dangerous encouragement would be\ngiven to the suicidal impulse in other cases in which suicide would\nreally be a weak and cowardly dereliction of social duty: it would\nalso probably be urged that the toleration of suicide would facilitate\nsecret murders. In short, the independent axiom of which we are in\nsearch seems to disappear on close examination in this case no less\nthan in others.\n\nSo again, reflection seems to show that the duties of Temperance,\nSelf-control, and other cognate virtues, are only clear and definite\nin so far as they are conceived as subordinate either to Prudence (as\nis ordinarily the case), or to Benevolence or some definite rule of\nsocial duty, or at least to some end--such as \u2018furtherance of moral\nprogress\u2019[268]--of which the conception involves the notion of duty\nsupposed to be already determinate. Certainly the authority of Common\nSense cannot be fairly claimed for any restriction even of the bodily\nappetites for food and drink, that is not thus subordinated.\n\nIn the case, however, of the sexual appetite, a special regulation\nseems to be prescribed on some independent principle under the notion\nof Purity or Chastity. In chap. ix. of this Book, where we examined\nthis notion, it appeared that Common Sense is not only not explicit,\nbut actually averse to explicitness, on this subject. As my aim in the\npreceding chapters was to give, above all things, a faithful exposition\nof the morality of Common Sense, I allowed my inquiry to be checked\nby this (as it seemed) clearly recognisable sentiment. But when it\nbecomes our primary object to test the intuitive evidence of the moral\nprinciples commonly accepted, it seems necessary to override this\naversion: for we can hardly ascertain whether rational conviction is\nattainable as to the acts allowed and forbidden under this notion and\nits opposite, without subjecting it to the same close scrutiny that\nwe have endeavoured to give to the other leading notions of Ethics.\nHere the briefest account of such a scrutiny will be sufficient. I am\naware that in giving even this I cannot but cause a certain offence to\nminds trained in good moral habits: but I trust I may claim the same\nindulgence as is commonly granted to the physiologist, who also has\nto direct the student\u2019s attention to objects which a healthy mind is\nnaturally disinclined to contemplate.\n\n\u00a7 8. What, then, is the conduct which Purity forbids (for the principle\nis more easily discussed in its negative aspect)? As the normal and\nobvious end of sexual intercourse is the propagation of the species,\nsome have thought that all indulgence of appetite, except as a means\nto this end, should be prohibited. But this doctrine would lead to a\nrestriction of conjugal intercourse far too severe for Common Sense.\nShall we say, then, that Purity forbids such indulgence except under\nthe conditions of conjugal union defined by Law? But this answer,\nagain, further reflection shows to be unsatisfactory. For, first, we\nshould not, on consideration, call a conjugal union impure, _merely_\nbecause the parties had wilfully omitted to fulfil legal conditions,\nand had made a contract which the law declined to enforce. We might\ncondemn their conduct, but we should not apply to it this notion.\nAnd, secondly, we feel that positive law may be unfavourable to\nPurity, and that in fact Purity, like Justice, is something which the\nlaw ought to maintain, but does not always. We have to ask, then,\nwhat kind of sexual relations we are to call essentially impure,\nwhether countenanced or not by Law and Custom? There appear to be no\ndistinct principles, having any claim to self-evidence, upon which\nthe question can be answered so as to command general assent. It\nwould be difficult even to state such a principle for determining the\ndegree of consanguinity between husband and wife which constitutes\na union incestuous; although the aversion with which such unions\nare commonly regarded is a peculiarly intense moral sentiment; and\nthe difficulty becomes indefinitely greater when we consider the\n_rationale_ of prohibited degrees of affinity. Again, probably few\nwould stigmatise a legal polygynous connexion as impure, however they\nmight disapprove of the law and of the state of society in which\nsuch a law was established: but if legal Polygyny is not impure, is\nPolyandry, when legal and customary--as is not unfrequently the case\namong the lower races of man--to be so characterised? and if not, on\nwhat rational principle can the notion be applied to institutions\nand conduct? Again, where divorce by mutual consent, with subsequent\nmarriage, is legalised, we do not call this an offence against Purity:\nand yet if the principle of free change be once admitted, it seems\nparadoxical to distinguish purity from impurity merely by less rapidity\nof transition;[269] and to condemn as impure even \u2018Free Love,\u2019 in so\nfar as it is earnestly advocated as a means to a completer harmony of\nsentiment between men and women, and not to mere sensual license.\n\nShall we, then, fall back upon the presence of mutual affection (as\ndistinguished from mere appetite) as constituting the essence of pure\nsexual relations? But this, again, while too lax from one point of\nview, seems from another too severe for Common Sense: as we do not\ncondemn marriages without affection as impure, although we disapprove\nof them as productive of unhappiness. Such marriages, indeed, are\nsometimes stigmatised as \u201clegalised prostitution,\u201d but the phrase is\nfelt to be extravagant and paradoxical; and it is even doubtful whether\nwe do disapprove of them under all circumstances; as (_e.g._) in the\ncase of royal alliances.\n\nAgain, how shall we judge of such institutions as those of Plato\u2019s\nCommonwealth, establishing community of women and children, but at the\nsame time regulating sexual indulgence with the strictest reference\nto social ends? Our habitual standards seem inapplicable to such novel\ncircumstances.\n\nThe truth seems to be, that reflection on the current sexual morality\ndiscovers to us two distinct grounds for it: first and chiefly, the\nmaintenance of a certain social order, believed to be most conducive\nto the prosperous continuance of the human race: and, secondly,\nthe protection of habits of feeling in individuals believed to be\ngenerally most important to their perfection or their happiness. We\ncommonly conceive that both these ends are to be attained by the same\nregulations: and in an ideal state of society this would perhaps be\nthe case: but in actual life there is frequently a partial separation\nand incompatibility between them. But further, if the repression of\nsexual license is prescribed merely as a means to these ends, it\ndoes not seem that we can affirm as self-evident that it is always\na necessary means in either case: on the contrary, it seems clear\nthat such an affirmation would be unreliable apart from empirical\nconfirmation. We cannot reasonably be sure, without induction from\nsociological observations, that a certain amount of sexual license\nwill be incompatible with the maintenance of population in sufficient\nnumbers and good condition. And if we consider the matter in its\nrelation to the individual\u2019s perfection, it is certainly clear that he\nmisses the highest and best development of his emotional nature, if\nhis sexual relations are of a merely sensual kind: but we can hardly\nknow _a priori_ that this lower kind of relation interferes with the\ndevelopment of the higher (nor indeed does experience seem to show that\nthis is universally the case). And this latter line of argument has a\nfurther difficulty. For the common opinion that we have to justify does\nnot merely condemn the lower kind of development in comparison with the\nhigher, but in comparison with none at all. Since we do not positively\nblame a man for remaining celibate (though we perhaps despise him\nsomewhat unless the celibacy is adopted as a means to a noble end):\nit is difficult to show why we should condemn--in its bearing on the\nindividual\u2019s emotional perfection solely--the imperfect development\nafforded by merely sensual relations.\n\n\u00a7 9. Much more might be said to exhibit the perplexities in which the\nattempt to define the rule of Purity or Chastity involves us. But I do\nnot desire to extend the discussion beyond what is necessary for the\ncompletion of my argument. It seems to me that the conclusion announced\nin \u00a7 2 of this chapter has now been sufficiently justified. We have\nexamined the moral notions that present themselves with a _prima facie_\nclaim to furnish independent and self-evident rules of morality: and\nwe have in each case found that from such regulation of conduct as\nthe Common Sense of mankind really supports, no proposition can be\nelicited which, when fairly contemplated, even appears to have the\ncharacteristic of a scientific axiom. It is therefore scarcely needful\nto proceed to a systematic examination of the manner in which Common\nSense provides for the co-ordination of these principles. In fact, this\nquestion seems to have been already discussed as far as is profitable:\nfor the attempt to define each principle singly has inevitably led\nus to consider their mutual relations: and it was in the cases where\ntwo moral principles came into collision that we most clearly saw\nthe vagueness and inconsistency with which the boundaries of each\nare determined by Common Sense. For example, the distinction between\nperfectly stringent moral obligations, and such laxer duties as may be\nmodified by a man\u2019s own act, is often taken: and it is one which, as we\nsaw, is certainly required in formulating the Common-Sense view of the\neffect of a promise in creating new obligations: but it is one which we\ncannot apply with any practical precision, because of the high degree\nof indeterminateness which we find in the common notions of duties to\nwhich the highest degree of stringency is yet commonly attributed.\n\nIt only remains to guard my argument from being understood in a more\nsweeping sense than it has been intended or is properly able to bear.\nNothing that I have said even tends to show that we have not distinct\nmoral impulses, claiming authority over all others, and prescribing\nor forbidding kinds of conduct as to which there is a rough general\nagreement, at least among educated persons of the same age and country.\nIt is only maintained that the objects of these impulses do not admit\nof being scientifically determined by any reflective analysis of common\nsense. The notions of Benevolence, Justice, Good Faith, Veracity,\nPurity, etc., are not necessarily emptied of significance for us,\nbecause we have found it impossible to define them with precision. The\nmain part of the conduct prescribed under each notion is sufficiently\nclear: and the general rule prescribing it does not necessarily lose\nits force because there is in each case a margin of conduct involved in\nobscurity and perplexity, or because the rule does not on examination\nappear to be absolute and independent. In short, the Morality of Common\nSense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to\ncommon people in common circumstances: but the attempt to elevate it\ninto a system of Intuitional Ethics brings its inevitable imperfections\ninto prominence without helping us to remove them.[270]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[256] Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness,\non which Kant insists: cf. _ante_, chap. i. \u00a7 3 of this Book.\n\n[257] The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is:\nof course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an\nexternal authority must rest on some principle which the individual\u2019s\nreason has to apply.\n\n[258] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[259] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[260] It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of\nCommon Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring\nto bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought\ncertainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the\n\u2018experts\u2019 on whose \u2018consensus\u2019 we are to rely, in this or any other\nsubject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent\nnegative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this\ndiscussion. I have been careful not to _exaggerate_ the doubtfulness\nand inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to be _more_\ndoubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will\nonly be strengthened.\n\n[261] In chap. ix. Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a\nspecial application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this\nseemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the\npreceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as\npossible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of\ntheir exposition.\n\n[262] The admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken\nsubject to the distinction before established between \u201csubjective\u201d and\n\u201cobjective\u201d rightness. It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly\nthat I should not do what I judge to be wrong: but if my judgment is\nmistaken, my action in accordance with it will not be \u201cobjectively\u201d\nright.\n\n[263] It may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been\nmaintained in considering what God is in justice bound to do for human\nbeings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which He stands\nto them.\n\n[264] It is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of\nsuggestions for the better regulation of marriage, to which reflective\nminds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of\ntradition and custom; as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers\nin all ages--especially of those (as _e.g._ Plato) to whom we cannot\nattribute any sensual or licentious bias.\n\n[265] For example, many seem to hold that wealth is, roughly speaking,\nrightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the\nuncultivated a bare subsistence, since the former are far more capable\nof deriving happiness from wealth than the latter.\n\n[266] I refer later (p. 360) to the difficulty before noticed in\nrespect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate.\n\n[267] I have omitted as less important the special questions connected\nwith promises to the dead or to the absent, or where a form of words is\nprescribed.\n\n[268] It was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of\nHumility, considered as a purely internal duty.\n\n[269] It should be observed that I am not asking for an exact\nquantitative decision, but whether we can really think that the\ndecision depends upon considerations of this kind.\n\n[270] It should be observed that the more positive treatment of\nCommon-sense Morality, in its relation to Utilitarianism, to which we\nshall proceed in chap. iii. of the following Book, is intended as an\nindispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been\ncompleted.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nMOTIVES OR SPRINGS OF ACTION CONSIDERED AS SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the first chapter of this third Book I was careful to\npoint out that motives, as well as intentions, form part of the\nsubject-matter of our common moral judgments: and indeed in our notion\nof \u2018conscientiousness\u2019 the habit of reflecting on motives, and judging\nthem to be good or bad, is a prominent element. It is necessary,\ntherefore, in order to complete our examination of the Intuitional\nMethod, to consider this comparison of motives, and ascertain how far\nit can be made systematic, and pursued to conclusions of scientific\nvalue. And this seems a convenient place for treating of this part of\nthe subject: since it has been maintained by an important school of\nEnglish moralists that Desires and Affections rather than Acts are\nthe proper subjects of the ethical judgment: and it is natural to\nfall back upon this view when systematic reflection on the morality\nof Common Sense has shown us the difficulty of obtaining a precise\nand satisfactory determination of rightness and wrongness in external\nconduct.\n\nTo avoid confusion, it should be observed that the term \u2018motive\u2019 is\ncommonly used in two ways. It is sometimes applied to those among\nthe foreseen consequences of any act which the agent desired in\nwilling: and sometimes to the desire, or conscious impulse itself.\nThe two meanings are in a manner correspondent, as, where impulses\nare different, there must always be some sort of difference in their\nrespective objects. But for our present purpose it is more convenient\nto take the latter meaning: as it is our own impulsive nature that we\nhave practically to deal with, in the way of controlling, resisting,\nindulging the different impulses; and therefore it is the ethical\nvalue of these that we are primarily concerned to estimate: and we\noften find that two impulses, which would be placed very far apart\nin any psychological list, are directed towards an end materially\nidentical, though regarded from a different point of view in each case.\nAs (_e.g._) both appetite and Rational self-love may impel a man to\nseek a particular sensual gratification; though in the latter case it\nis regarded under the general notion of pleasure, and as forming part\nof a sum called Happiness. In this chapter, then, I shall use the term\nMotive to denote the desires of particular results, believed to be\nattainable as consequences of our voluntary acts, by which desires we\nare stimulated to will those acts.[271]\n\nThe first point to notice in considering the ethical result of a\ncomprehensive comparison of motives is, that the issue in any internal\nconflict is not usually thought to be between positively good and bad,\nbut between better and less good, more or less estimable or elevated\nmotives. The only kind of motive which (if any) we commonly judge\nto be _intrinsically_ bad, apart from the circumstances under which\nit operates, is malevolent affection; that is, the desire, however\naroused, to inflict pain or harm on some other sentient being. And\nreflection shows (as we saw in chap. viii. of this Book) that Common\nSense does not pronounce even this kind of impulse absolutely bad:\nsince we commonly recognise the existence of \u2018legitimate resentment\u2019\nand \u2018righteous indignation\u2019; and though moralists try to distinguish\nbetween anger directed \u2018against the act\u2019 and \u2018against the agent,\u2019 and\nbetween the impulse to inflict pain and the desire of the antipathetic\npleasure that the agent will reap from this infliction, it may be\nfairly doubted whether it is within the capacity of ordinary human\nnature to maintain these distinctions in practice. At any rate there\nis no other motive except deliberate malevolence which Common Sense\ncondemns as absolutely bad. The other motives that are commonly\nspoken of in \u2018dyslogistic\u2019 terms seem to be most properly called (in\nBentham\u2019s language) \u2018Seductive\u2019 rather than bad. That is, they prompt\nto forbidden conduct with conspicuous force and frequency: but when we\nconsider them carefully we find that there are certain limits, however\nnarrow, within which their operation is legitimate.\n\nThe question, then, is how far the intuitive knowledge that our common\njudgments seem to imply of the relative goodness of different kinds of\nmotives is found on reflection to satisfy the conditions laid down in\nthe preceding chapter. I have before[272] argued that it is incorrect\nto regard this comparison of _motives_ as the normal form of our common\nmoral judgments, nor do I see any ground for holding it to be the\noriginal form. I think that in the normal development of man\u2019s moral\nconsciousness, both in the individual and in the race, moral judgments\nare first passed on outward acts, and that motives do not come to\nbe definitely considered till later; just as external perception of\nphysical objects precedes introspection. At the same time, in my view,\nit does not therefore follow that the comparison of motives is not the\nfinal and most perfect form of the moral judgment. It might approve\nitself as such by the systematic clearness and mutual consistency\nof the results to which it led, when pursued by different thinkers\nindependently: and by its freedom from the puzzles and difficulties to\nwhich other developments of the Intuitional Method seem to be exposed.\n\nIt appears, however, on examination that, on the one hand, many (if not\nall) of the difficulties which have emerged in the preceding discussion\nof the commonly received principles of conduct are reproduced in a\ndifferent form when we try to arrange Motives in order of excellence:\nand on the other hand, such a construction presents difficulties\npeculiar to itself, and the attempt to solve these exhibits greater and\nmore fundamental differences among Intuitive moralists, as regards Rank\nof Motive, than we found to exist as regards Rightness of outward acts.\n\n\u00a7 2. In the first place, it has to be decided whether we are to\ninclude in our list of motives the Moral Sentiments, or impulses\ntowards particular kinds of virtuous conduct as such, _e.g._ Candour,\nVeracity, Fortitude. It seems unwarrantable to exclude them, as\nsuch sentiments are observable as distinct and independent impulses\nin most well-trained minds, and we sometimes recognise their\nexistence in considerable intensity, as when we speak of a man being\n\u2018enthusiastically brave,\u2019 or \u2018intensely veracious,\u2019 or as \u2018having\na passion for justice.\u2019 At the same time their admission places us\nin the following dilemma. Either the objects of these impulses are\nrepresented by the very notions that we have been examining--in which\ncase, after we have decided that any impulse is better than its rival,\nall the perplexities set forth in the previous chapters will recur,\nbefore we can act on our decision; for what avails it to recognise\nthe superiority of the impulse to do justice, if we do not know\nwhat it is just to do?--or if in any case the object which a moral\nsentiment prompts us to realise is conceived more simply, without the\nqualifications which a complete reflection on Common Sense forced us\nto recognise; then, as the previous investigation shows, we shall\ncertainly not find agreement as to the relation between this and other\nimpulses. For example, a dispute, whether the impulse to speak the\ntruth ought or ought not to be followed, will inevitably arise when\nVeracity seems opposed either to the general good, or to the interests\nof some particular person; that is, when it conflicts with \u2018particular\u2019\nor \u2018universal\u2019 benevolence. Hutcheson expressly places these latter\nimpulses in a higher rank than \u201ccandour, veracity, fortitude\u201d;\nreserving the highest moral approbation for \u201cthe most extensive\nbenevolence\u201d or \u201ccalm, stable, universal goodwill to all.\u201d[273] But\nthis view, which coincides practically with Utilitarianism, would\ncertainly be disputed by most Intuitional moralists. Again, some of\nthese moralists (as Kant) regard all actions as bad--or not good--which\nare not done from pure regard for duty or choice of Right as Right:\nwhile Hutcheson, who represents the opposite pole of Intuitional\nEthics, equally distinguishes the love of Virtue as a separate impulse;\nbut treats it as at once co-ordinate in rank and coincident in its\neffects with universal Benevolence.\n\nSo, again, moralists diverge widely in estimating the ethical value of\nSelf-love. For Butler seems to regard it as one of two superior and\nnaturally authoritative impulses, the other being Conscience: nay, in a\npassage before quoted, he even concedes that it would be reasonable for\nConscience to yield to it, if the two could possibly conflict. Other\nmoralists (and Butler elsewhere)[274] appear to place Self-love among\nvirtuous impulses under the name of Prudence: though among these they\noften rank it rather low, and would have it yield in case of conflict,\nto nobler virtues. Others, again, exclude it from Virtue altogether:\n_e.g._ Kant, in one of his treatises,[275] says that the end of\nSelf-love, one\u2019s own happiness, cannot be an end for the Moral Reason;\nthat the force of the reasonable will, in which Virtue consists, is\nalways exhibited in resistance to natural egoistic impulses.\n\nDr. Martineau, whose system is framed on the basis that I am now\nexamining, attempts to avoid some of the difficulties just pointed out\nby refusing to admit the existence of any virtuous impulses except\nthe \u201cpreference for the superior of the competing springs of action\nin each case\u201d of a conflict of motives. \u201cI cannot admit,\u201d he says,\n\u201ceither the _loves of Virtues_--of candour, veracity, fortitude--or\nthe virtues themselves, as so many additional impulses over and above\nthose from the conflict of which they are formed. I do not confess my\nfault _in order to be candid_ ... unless I am a prig, I never think of\ncandour, as predicable, or going to be predicable, of me at all.\u201d[276]\nI am not, however, sure whether Dr. Martineau really means to _deny_\nthe existence of persons who act from a conscious desire to realise an\nideal of Candour or Fortitude, or whether he merely means to express\n_disapproval_ of such persons: in the former sense his statement seems\nto me a psychological paradox, in conflict with ordinary experience:\nin the latter sense it seems an ethical paradox, affording a striking\nexample of that diversity of judgments as to the rank of motives, to\nwhich I am now drawing attention.\n\n\u00a7 3. But even if we put out of sight the Moral sentiments and\nSelf-love, it is still scarcely possible to frame a scale of motives\narranged in order of merit, for which we could claim anything like a\nclear consent, even of cultivated and thoughtful persons. On one or\ntwo points, indeed, we seem to be generally agreed; _e.g._ that the\nbodily appetites are inferior to the benevolent affections and the\nintellectual desires; and perhaps that impulses tending primarily to\nthe well-being of the individual are lower in rank than those which\nwe class as extra-regarding or disinterested. But beyond a few vague\nstatements of this kind, it is very difficult to proceed. For example,\nwhen we compare personal affections with the love of knowledge or\nof beauty, or the passion for the ideal in any form, much doubt and\ndivergence of opinion become manifest. Indeed, we should hardly agree\non the relative rank of the benevolent affections taken by themselves;\nfor some would prefer the more intense, though narrower, while others\nwould place the calmer and wider feelings in the highest rank. Or\nagain, since Love, as we saw,[277] is a complex emotion, and commonly\nincludes, besides the desire of the good or happiness of the beloved,\na desire for union or intimacy of some kind; some would consider\nan affection more elevated in proportion as the former element\npredominated, while others would regard the latter as at least equally\nessential to the highest kind of affection.\n\nAgain, we may notice the love of Fame as an important and widely\noperative motive, which would be ranked very differently by different\npersons: for some would place the former \u201cspur that the clear\nspirit doth raise\u201d among the most elevated impulses after the moral\nsentiments; while others think it degrading to depend for one\u2019s\nhappiness on the breath of popular favour.\n\nFurther, the more we contemplate the actual promptings that precede any\nvolition, the more we seem to find complexity of motive the rule rather\nthan the exception, at least in the case of educated persons: and from\nthis composition of impulses there results a fundamental perplexity as\nto the principles on which our decision is to be made, even supposing\nthat we have a clear view of the relative worth of the elementary\nimpulses. For the compound will generally contain nobler and baser\nelements, and we can hardly get rid of the latter; since--as I have\nbefore said--though we may frequently suppress and expel a motive by\nfirmly resisting it, it does not seem possible to exclude it if we do\nthe act to which it prompts. Suppose, then, that we are impelled in one\ndirection by a combination of high and low motives, and in another by\nan impulse that ranks between the two in the scale, how shall we decide\nwhich course to follow? Such a case is by no means uncommon: _e.g._ an\ninjured man may be moved by an impulse of pity to spare his injurer,\nwhile a regard for justice and a desire of revenge combined impel him\nto inflict punishment. Or, again, a Jew of liberal views might be\nrestrained from eating pork by a desire not to shock the feelings of\nhis friends, and might be moved to eat it by the desire to vindicate\ntrue religious liberty combined with a liking for pork. How are we to\ndeal with such a case as this? For it will hardly be suggested that we\nshould estimate the relative proportions of the different motives and\ndecide accordingly;--qualitative analysis of our motives is to some\nextent possible to us, but the quantitative analysis that this would\nrequire is not in our power.\n\nBut even apart from this difficulty arising from complexity of\nmotives, I think it impossible to assign a definite and constant\nethical value to each different kind of motive, without reference to\nthe particular circumstances under which it has arisen, the extent\nof indulgence that it demands, and the consequences to which this\nindulgence would lead in any particular case. I may conveniently\nillustrate this by reference to the table, drawn up by Dr.\nMartineau,[278] of springs of action arranged in order of merit.\n\nLOWEST.\n\n 1. Secondary Passions:--Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.\n\n 2. Secondary Organic Propensions:--Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.\n\n 3. Primary Organic Propensions:--Appetites.\n\n 4. Primary Animal Propension:--Spontaneous Activity (unselective).\n\n 5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite).\n\n 6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic\n feelings).\n\n 7. Primary Passions:--Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.\n\n 8. Causal energy:--Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.\n\n 9. Secondary Sentiments:--Love of Culture.\n\n 10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.\n\n 11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social; with (approximately)\n Generosity and Gratitude.\n\n 12. Primary Affection of Compassion.\n\n 13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.\n\nHIGHEST.\n\nThis scale seems to me open to much criticism, both from a\npsychological and from an ethical point of view:[279] but, granting\nthat it corresponds broadly to the judgments that men commonly pass\nas to the different elevation of different motives, it seems to me\nin the highest degree paradoxical to lay down that each class of\nmotives is always to be preferred to the class below it, without\nregard to circumstances and consequences. So far as it is true that\n\u201cthe conscience says to every one, \u2018Do not eat till you are hungry and\nstop when you are hungry no more,\u2019\u201d it is not, I venture to think,\nbecause a \u201cregulative right is clearly vested in primary instinctive\nneeds, relatively to their secondaries,\u201d but because experience has\nshown that to seek the gratification of the palate apart from the\nsatisfaction of hunger is generally dangerous to physical well-being;\nand it is in view of this danger that the conscience operates. If\nwe condemn \u201ca ship captain,\u201d who, \u201ccaught in a fog off a lee shore,\nneglects, through indolence and love of ease, to slacken speed and\ntake cautious soundings and open his steam-whistle,\u201d it is not because\nwe intuitively discern Fear to be a higher motive than Love of Ease,\nbut because the consequences disregarded are judged to be indefinitely\nmore important than the gratification obtained: if we took a case in\nwhich fear was not similarly sustained by prudence, our judgment would\ncertainly be different.\n\nThe view of Common Sense appears rather to be that most natural\nimpulses have their proper spheres, within which they should be\nnormally operative, and therefore the question whether in any case a\nhigher motive should yield to a lower one cannot be answered decisively\nin the general way in which Dr. Martineau answers it: the answer must\ndepend on the particular conditions and circumstances of the conflict.\nWe recognise it as possible that a motive which we commonly rank as\nhigher may wrongly intrude into the proper sphere of one which we\nrank as lower, just as the lower is liable to encroach on the higher;\nonly since there is very much less danger of the former intrusion,\nit naturally falls into the background in ethical discussions and\nexhortations that have a practical aim. The matter is complicated\nby the further consideration that as the character of a moral agent\nbecomes better, the motives that we rank as \u201chigher\u201d tend to be\ndeveloped, so that their normal sphere of operation is enlarged at\nthe expense of the lower. Hence there are two distinct aims in moral\nregulation and culture, so far as they relate to motives: (1) to keep\nthe \u201clower\u201d motive within the limits within which its operation is\nconsidered to be legitimate and good on the whole, so long as we cannot\nsubstitute for it the equally effective operation of a higher motive;\nand at the same time (2) to effect this substitution of \u201chigher\u201d for\n\u201clower\u201d gradually, as far as can be done without danger,--up to a limit\nwhich we cannot definitely fix, but which we certainly conceive, for\nthe most part, as falling short of complete exclusion of the lower\nmotive.\n\nI may illustrate by reference to the passion of resentment of which\nI before spoke. The view of reflective common sense is, I think,\nthat the malevolent impulse so designated, as long as it is strictly\nlimited to resentment against wrong and operates in aid of justice,\nhas a legitimate sphere of action in the social life of human beings\nas actually constituted: that, indeed, its suppression would be\ngravely mischievous, unless we could at the same time intensify the\nordinary man\u2019s regard for justice or for social well-being so that\nthe total strength of motives prompting to the punishment of crime\nshould not be diminished. It is, no doubt, \u201cto be wished,\u201d as Butler\nsays, that men would repress wrong from these higher motives rather\nthan from passionate resentment; but we cannot hope to effect this\nchange in human beings generally except by a slow and gradual process\nof elevation of character: therefore supposing a conflict between\n\u201cCompassion,\u201d which is highest but one in Dr. Martineau\u2019s scale, and\n\u201cResentment,\u201d which he places about the middle, it is by no means to be\nlaid down as a general rule that compassion ought to prevail. We ought\nrather--with Butler--to regard resentment as a salutary \u201cbalance to the\nweakness of pity,\u201d which would be liable to prevent the execution of\njustice if resentment were excluded.\n\nOr we might similarly take the impulse which comes lowest (among those\nnot condemned altogether) in Dr. Martineau\u2019s scale--the \u201cLove of Ease\nand Sensual Pleasure.\u201d No doubt this impulse, or group of impulses, is\ncontinually leading men to shirk or scamp their strict duty, or to fall\nin some less definite way below their own ideal of conduct; hence the\nattitude habitually maintained towards it by preachers and practical\nmoralists is that of repression. Still, common sense surely recognises\nthat there are cases in which even this impulse ought to prevail over\nimpulses ranked above it in Dr. Martineau\u2019s scale; we often find\nmen prompted--say by \u201clove of gain\u201d--to shorten unduly their hours\nof recreation; and in the case of a conflict of motives under such\ncircumstances we should judge it best that victory should remain on the\nside of the \u201clove of ease and pleasure,\u201d and that the encroachment of\n\u201clove of gain\u201d should be repelled.\n\nI do not, however, think that in either of these instances the\nconflict of motives would remain such as I have just described: I think\nthat though the struggle might begin as a duel between resentment and\ncompassion, or between love of ease and love of gain, it would not be\nfought out in the lists so drawn; since higher motives would inevitably\nbe called in as the conflict went on, regard for justice and social\nwell-being on the side of resentment, regard for health and ultimate\nefficiency for work on the side of love of ease; and it would be the\nintervention of these higher motives that would decide the struggle, so\nfar as it was decided rightly and as we should approve. This certainly\nis what would happen in my own case, if the supposed conflict were at\nall serious and its decision deliberate; and this constitutes my final\nreason for holding that such a scale as Dr. Martineau has drawn up, of\nmotives arranged according to their moral rank, can never have more\nthan a very subordinate ethical importance. I admit that it may serve\nto indicate in a rough and general way the kinds of desires which it\nis ordinarily best to encourage and indulge, in comparison with other\nkinds which are ordinarily likely to compete and collide with them;\nand we might thus settle summarily some of the comparatively trifling\nconflicts of motive which the varying and complex play of needs,\nhabits, interests, and their accompanying emotions, continually stirs\nin our daily life. But if a serious question of conduct is raised, I\ncannot conceive myself deciding it morally by any comparison of motives\nbelow the highest: it seems to me that the question must inevitably be\ncarried up for decision into the court of whatever motive we regard as\nsupremely regulative: so that the comparison ultimately decisive would\nbe not between the lower motives primarily conflicting, but between the\neffects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives\nrespectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as\nthe ultimate end or ends of reasonable action. And this, I conceive,\nwill be the course naturally taken by the moral reflection not only of\nutilitarians, but of all who follow Butler in regarding our passions\nand propensions as forming naturally a \u201csystem or constitution,\u201d in\nwhich the ends of lower impulses are subordinate as means to the ends\nof certain governing motives, or are comprehended as parts in these\nlarger ends.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[271] In Green\u2019s _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book ii. chaps. i. and ii.\na peculiar view is taken of \u201cmotives, of that kind by which it is\nthe characteristic of moral or human action, to be determined.\u201d Such\nmotives, it is maintained, must be distinguished from desires in the\nsense of \u201cmere solicitations of which a man is conscious\u201d; they are\n\u201cconstituted by the reaction of the man\u2019s self upon these, and its\nidentification of itself with one of them.\u201d In fact the \u201cdirection of\nthe self-conscious self to the realisation of an object\u201d which I should\ncall an act of will, is the phenomenon to which Green would restrict\nthe term \u201cdesire in that sense in which desire is the principle and\nnotion of an imputable human action.\u201d\n\nThe use of terms here suggested appears to me inconvenient, and the\npsychological analysis implied in it to a great extent erroneous. I\nadmit that in certain simple cases of choice, where the alternatives\nsuggested are each prompted by a single definite desire, there is no\npsychological inaccuracy in saying that in willing the act to which he\nis stimulated by any such desire the agent \u201cidentifies himself with the\ndesire.\u201d But in more complex cases the phrase appears to me incorrect,\nas obliterating important distinctions between the two kinds of\npsychical phenomena which are usually and conveniently distinguished as\n\u201cdesires\u201d and volitions. In the first place, as I have before pointed\nout (chap. i. \u00a7 2 of this Book), it often happens that certain foreseen\nconsequences of volition, which as foreseen are undoubtedly _willed_\nand--in a sense--_chosen_ by the agents, are not objects of desire\nto him at all, but even possibly of aversion--aversion, of course,\novercome by his desire of other consequences of the same act. In the\nsecond place, it is specially important, from an ethical point of view,\nto notice that, among the various desires or aversions aroused in us\nby the complex foreseen consequences of a contemplated act, there are\noften impulses with which we do not identify ourselves, but which we\neven try to suppress as far as possible: though as it is not possible\nto suppress them completely--especially if we do the act to which they\nprompt--we cannot say that they do not operate as motives.\n\n[272] Cf. _ante_, chap. i. \u00a7 2 of this Book.\n\n[273] Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, Book i. chap. iv. \u00a7 10.\n\n[274] See the Dissertation _Of the Nature of Virtue_ appended to the\n_Analogy_.\n\n[275] The _Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Tugendlehre_: but it ought\nto be observed that the ethical view briefly expounded in the _Kritik\nder reinen Vernunft_ appears to have much more affinity with Butler\u2019s.\n\n[276] _Types of Ethical Theory_, Vol. ii. p. 284, 2nd edition.\n\n[277] Cf. _ante_, chap. iv. \u00a7 2 of this Book.\n\n[278] _Types of Ethical Theory_, vol. ii. p. 266. Dr. Martineau\nexplains that the chief composite springs are inserted in their\napproximate place, subject to the variations of which their composition\nrenders them susceptible.\n\n[279] Thus we might ask why the class of \u201cpassions\u201d is so strangely\nrestricted, why conjugal affection is omitted, whether wonder can\nproperly be regarded as a definite motive, whether \u201ccensoriousness\u201d is\nproperly ranked with \u201cvindictiveness\u201d as one of the \u201clowest passions,\u201d\netc.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nPHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Is there, then, no possibility of attaining, by a more profound\nand discriminating examination of our common moral thought, to real\nethical axioms--intuitive propositions of real clearness and certainty?\n\nThis question leads us to the examination of that third phase of the\nintuitive method, which was called Philosophical Intuitionism.[280] For\nwe conceive it as the aim of a philosopher, as such, to do somewhat\nmore than define and formulate the common moral opinions of mankind.\nHis function is to tell men what they ought to think, rather than\nwhat they do think: he is expected to transcend Common Sense in his\npremises, and is allowed a certain divergence from Common Sense in his\nconclusions. It is true that the limits of this deviation are firmly,\nthough indefinitely, fixed: the truth of a philosopher\u2019s premises\nwill always be tested by the acceptability of his conclusions: if\nin any important point he be found in flagrant conflict with common\nopinion, his method is likely to be declared invalid. Still, though\nhe is expected to establish and concatenate at least the main part of\nthe commonly accepted moral rules, he is not necessarily bound to take\nthem as the basis on which his own system is constructed. Rather, we\nshould expect that the history of Moral Philosophy--so far at least\nas those whom we may call orthodox thinkers are concerned--would be a\nhistory of attempts to enunciate, in full breadth and clearness, those\nprimary intuitions of Reason, by the scientific application of which\nthe common moral thought of mankind may be at once systematised and\ncorrected.\n\nAnd this is to some extent the case. But Moral Philosophy, or\nphilosophy as applied to Morality, has had other tasks to occupy\nit, even more profoundly difficult than that of penetrating to the\nfundamental principles of Duty. In modern times especially, it has\nadmitted the necessity of demonstrating the harmony of Duty with\nInterest; that is, with the Happiness or Welfare of the agent on\nwhom the duty in each case is imposed. It has also undertaken to\ndetermine the relation of Right or Good generally to the world\nof actual existence: a task which could hardly be satisfactorily\naccomplished without an adequate explanation of the existence of Evil.\nIt has further been distracted by questions which, in my view, are of\npsychological rather than ethical importance, as to the \u2018innateness\u2019\nof our notions of Duty, and the origin of the faculty that furnishes\nthem. With their attention concentrated on these difficult subjects,\neach of which has been mixed up in various ways with the discussion\nof fundamental moral intuitions, philosophers have too easily been\nled to satisfy themselves with ethical formul\u00e6 which implicitly\naccept the morality of Common Sense _en bloc_, ignoring its defects;\nand merely express a certain view of the relation of this morality\nto the individual mind or to the universe of actual existence.\nPerhaps also they have been hampered by the fear (not, as we have\nseen, unfounded) of losing the support given by \u2018general assent\u2019 if\nthey set before themselves and their readers too rigid a standard\nof scientific precision. Still, in spite of all these drawbacks, we\nfind that philosophers have provided us with a considerable number\nof comprehensive moral propositions, put forward as certain and\nself-evident, and such as at first sight may seem well adapted to serve\nas the first principles of scientific morality.\n\n\u00a7 2. But here a word of caution seems required, which has been somewhat\nanticipated in earlier chapters, but on which it is particularly\nneedful to lay stress at this point of our discussion: against a\ncertain class of sham-axioms, which are very apt to offer themselves\nto the mind that is earnestly seeking for a philosophical synthesis of\npractical rules, and to delude the unwary with a tempting aspect of\nclear self-evidence. These are principles which appear certain and\nself-evident because they are substantially tautological: because,\nwhen examined, they are found to affirm no more than that it is right\nto do that which is--in a certain department of life, under certain\ncircumstances and conditions--right to be done. One important lesson\nwhich the history of moral philosophy teaches is that, in this region,\neven powerful intellects are liable to acquiesce in tautologies of this\nkind; sometimes expanded into circular reasonings, sometimes hidden\nin the recesses of an obscure notion, often lying so near the surface\nthat, when once they have been exposed, it is hard to understand how\nthey could ever have presented themselves as important.\n\nLet us turn, for illustration\u2019s sake, to the time-honoured Cardinal\nVirtues. If we are told that the dictates of Wisdom and Temperance\nmay be summed up in clear and certain principles, and that these are\nrespectively,\n\n (1) It is right to act rationally,\n\n (2) It is right that the Lower parts of our nature should be governed\n by the Higher,\n\nwe do not at first feel that we are not obtaining valuable information.\nBut when we find (cf. _ante_, chap. xi. \u00a7 3) that \u201cacting rationally\u201d\nis merely another phrase for \u201cdoing what we see to be right,\u201d and,\nagain, that the \u201chigher part\u201d of our nature to which the rest are to\nsubmit is explained to be Reason, so that \u201cacting temperately\u201d is\nonly \u201cacting rationally\u201d under the condition of special non-rational\nimpulses needing to be resisted, the tautology of our \u201cprinciples\u201d is\nobvious. Similarly when we are asked to accept as the principle of\nJustice \u201cthat we ought to give every man his own,\u201d the definition seems\nplausible--until it appears that we cannot define \u201chis own\u201d except as\nequivalent to \u201cthat which it is right he should have.\u201d\n\nThe definitions quoted may be found in modern writers: but it\nseems worthy of remark that throughout the ethical speculation of\nGreece,[281] such universal affirmations as are presented to us\nconcerning Virtue or Good conduct seem almost always to be propositions\nwhich can only be defended from the charge of tautology, if they are\nunderstood as definitions of the problem to be solved, and not as\nattempts at its solution. For example, Plato and Aristotle appear to\noffer as constructive moralists the scientific knowledge on ethical\nmatters of which Socrates proclaimed the absence; knowledge, that is,\nof the Good and Bad in human life. And they seem to be agreed that such\nGood as can be realised in the concrete life of men and communities\nis chiefly Virtue,--or (as Aristotle more precisely puts it) the\n_exercise_ of Virtue: so that the practical part of ethical science\nmust consist mainly in the knowledge of Virtue. If, however, we ask\nhow we are to ascertain the kind of conduct which is properly to be\ncalled Virtuous, it does not seem that Plato can tell us more of each\nvirtue in turn than that it consists in (1) the knowledge of what is\nGood in certain circumstances and relations, and (2) such a harmony of\nthe different elements of man\u2019s appetitive nature, that their resultant\nimpulse may be always in accordance with this knowledge. But it is just\nthis knowledge (or at least its principles and method) that we are\nexpecting him to give us: and to explain to us instead the different\nexigencies under which we need it, in no way satisfies our expectation.\nNor, again, does Aristotle bring us much nearer such knowledge by\ntelling us that the Good in conduct is to be found somewhere between\ndifferent kinds of Bad. This at best only indicates the _whereabouts_\nof Virtue: it does not give us a method for finding it.\n\nOn the Stoic system,[282] as constructed by Zeno and Chrysippus, it is\nperhaps unfair to pronounce decisively, from the accounts given of it\nby adversaries like Plutarch, and such semi-intelligent expositors as\nCicero, Diogenes Laertius, and Stob\u00e6us. But, as far as we can judge\nof it, we must pronounce the exposition of its general principles\na complicated enchainment of circular reasonings, by which the\ninquirer is continually deluded with an apparent approach to practical\nconclusions, and continually led back to the point from which he set\nout.\n\nThe most characteristic formula of Stoicism seems to have been that\ndeclaring \u2018Life according to Nature\u2019 to be the ultimate end of action.\nThe spring of the motion that sustained this life was in the vegetable\ncreation a mere unfelt impulse: in animals it was impulse accompanied\nwith sensation: in man it was the direction of Reason, which in him\nwas naturally supreme over all merely blind irrational impulses.\nWhat then does Reason direct? \u2018To live according to Nature\u2019 is one\nanswer: and thus we get the circular exposition of ethical doctrine\nin its simplest form. Sometimes, however, we are told that it is\n\u2018Life according to Virtue\u2019: which leads us into the circle already\nnoticed in the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy; as Virtue, by the\nStoics also, is only defined as knowledge of Good and Bad in different\ncircumstances and relations. Indeed, this latter circle is given by the\nStoics more neatly and perfectly: for with Plato and Aristotle Virtue\nwas not the _sole_, but only the _chief_ content of the notion Good,\nin its application to human life: but in the view of Stoicism the two\nnotions are absolutely coincident. The result, then, is that Virtue\nis knowledge of what is good and ought to be sought or chosen, and of\nwhat is bad and ought to be shunned or rejected: while at the same time\nthere is nothing good or properly choice-worthy, nothing bad or truly\nformidable, except Virtue and Vice respectively. But if Virtue is thus\ndeclared to be a science that has no object except itself, the notion\nis inevitably emptied of all practical content. In order, therefore, to\navoid this result and to reconcile their system with common sense, the\nStoics explained that there were other things in human life which were\nin a manner preferable, though not strictly good, including in this\nclass the primary objects of men\u2019s normal impulses. On what principle\nthen are we to select these objects when our impulses are conflicting\nor ambiguous? If we can get an answer to this question, we shall at\nlength have come to something practical. But here again the Stoic could\nfind no other general answer except either that we were to choose what\nwas Reasonable, or that we were to act in accordance with Nature: each\nof which answers obviously brings us back into the original circle at a\ndifferent point.[283]\n\nIn Butler\u2019s use of the Stoic formula, this circular reasoning seems to\nbe avoided: but it is so only so long as the intrinsic reasonableness\nof right conduct is ignored or suppressed. Butler assumes with his\nopponents that it is reasonable to live according to Nature, and argues\nthat Conscience or the faculty that imposes moral rules is naturally\nsupreme in man. It is therefore reasonable to obey Conscience. But\nare the rules that Conscience lays down merely known to us as the\ndictates of arbitrary authority, and not as in themselves reasonable?\nThis would give a surely dangerous absoluteness of authority to the\npossibly unenlightened conscience of any individual: and Butler is\nmuch too cautious to do this: in fact, in more than one passage of the\n_Analogy_[284] he expressly adopts the doctrine of Clarke, that the\ntrue rules of morality are essentially reasonable. But if Conscience\nis, after all, Reason applied to Practice, then Butler\u2019s argument seems\nto bend itself into the old circle: \u2018it is reasonable to live according\nto Nature, and it is natural to live according to Reason.\u2019\n\nIn the next chapter I shall have to call attention to another logical\ncircle into which we are liable to slide, if we refer to the Good or\nPerfection, whether of the agent or of others, in giving an account\nof any special virtue; if we allow ourselves, in explaining Good or\nPerfection, to use the general notion of virtue (which is commonly\nregarded as an important element of either). Meanwhile I have already\ngiven, perhaps, more than sufficient illustration of one of the most\nimportant dangers that beset the students of Ethics. In the laudable\nattempt to escape from the doubtfulness, disputableness, and apparent\narbitrariness of current moral opinions, he is liable to take refuge in\nprinciples that are incontrovertible but tautological and insignificant.\n\n\u00a7 3. Can we then, between this Scylla and Charybdis of ethical inquiry,\navoiding on the one hand doctrines that merely bring us back to common\nopinion with all its imperfections, and on the other hand doctrines\nthat lead us round in a circle, find any way of obtaining self-evident\nmoral principles of real significance? It would be disheartening\nto have to regard as altogether illusory the strong instinct of\nCommon Sense that points to the existence of such principles, and\nthe deliberate convictions of the long line of moralists who have\nenunciated them. At the same time, the more we extend our knowledge\nof man and his environment, the more we realise the vast variety of\nhuman natures and circumstances that have existed in different ages\nand countries, the less disposed we are to believe that there is any\ndefinite code of absolute rules, applicable to all human beings without\nexception. And we shall find, I think, that the truth lies between\nthese two conclusions. There are certain absolute practical principles,\nthe truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest; but\nthey are of too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope,\nto enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them what we\nought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be\ndetermined by some other method.\n\nOne such principle was given in chap. i. \u00a7 3 of this Book; where I\npointed out that whatever action any of us judges to be right for\nhimself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in\nsimilar circumstances. Or, as we may otherwise put it, \u2018if a kind of\nconduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for\nsome one else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the\ntwo cases, other than the fact that I and he are different persons.\u2019\nA corresponding proposition may be stated with equal truth in respect\nof what ought to be done _to_--not _by_--different individuals. These\nprinciples have been most widely recognised, not in their most abstract\nand universal form, but in their special application to the situation\nof two (or more) individuals similarly related to each other: as so\napplied, they appear in what is popularly known as the Golden Rule, \u2018Do\nto others as you would have them do to you.\u2019 This formula is obviously\nunprecise in statement; for one might wish for another\u2019s co-operation\nin sin, and be willing to reciprocate it. Nor is it even true to say\nthat we ought to do to others only what we think it right for them to\ndo to us; for no one will deny that there may be differences in the\ncircumstances--and even in the natures--of two individuals, _A_ and\n_B_, which would make it wrong for _A_ to treat _B_ in the way in which\nit is right for _B_ to treat _A_. In short the self-evident principle\nstrictly stated must take some such negative form as this; \u2018it cannot\nbe right for _A_ to treat _B_ in a manner in which it would be wrong\nfor _B_ to treat _A_, merely on the ground that they are two different\nindividuals, and without there being any difference between the natures\nor circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground\nfor difference of treatment.\u2019 Such a principle manifestly does not give\ncomplete guidance--indeed its effect, strictly speaking, is merely to\nthrow a definite _onus probandi_ on the man who applies to another a\ntreatment of which he would complain if applied to himself; but Common\nSense has amply recognised the practical importance of the maxim: and\nits truth, so far as it goes, appears to me self-evident.\n\nA somewhat different application of the same fundamental principle that\nindividuals in similar conditions should be treated similarly finds\nits sphere in the ordinary administration of Law, or (as we say) of\n\u2018Justice.\u2019 Accordingly in \u00a7 1 of chap. v. of this Book I drew attention\nto \u2018impartiality in the application of general rules,\u2019 as an important\nelement in the common notion of Justice; indeed, there ultimately\nappeared to be no other element which could be intuitively known with\nperfect clearness and certainty. Here again it must be plain that this\nprecept of impartiality is insufficient for the complete determination\nof just conduct, as it does not help us to decide what kind of rules\nshould be thus impartially applied; though all admit the importance of\nexcluding from government, and human conduct generally, all conscious\npartiality and \u2018respect of persons.\u2019\n\nThe principle just discussed, which seems to be more or less clearly\nimplied in the common notion of \u2018fairness\u2019 or \u2018equity,\u2019 is obtained\nby considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a\nLogical Whole or Genus. There are others, no less important, which\nemerge in the consideration of the similar parts of a Mathematical or\nQuantitative Whole. Such a Whole is presented in the common notion\nof the Good--or, as is sometimes said, \u2018good on the whole\u2019--of any\nindividual human being. The proposition \u2018that one ought to aim at\none\u2019s own good\u2019 is sometimes given as the maxim of Rational Self-love\nor Prudence: but as so stated it does not clearly avoid tautology;\nsince we may define \u2018good\u2019 as \u2018what one ought to aim at.\u2019 If, however,\nwe say \u2018one\u2019s good on the whole,\u2019 the addition suggests a principle\nwhich, when explicitly stated, is, at any rate, not tautological. I\nhave already referred to this principle[285] as that \u2018of impartial\nconcern for all parts of our conscious life\u2019:--we might express it\nconcisely by saying \u2018that Hereafter _as such_ is to be regarded neither\nless nor more than Now.\u2019 It is not, of course, meant that the good of\nthe present may not reasonably be preferred to that of the future on\naccount of its greater certainty: or again, that a week ten years hence\nmay not be more important to us than a week now, through an increase in\nour means or capacities of happiness. All that the principle affirms\nis that the mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is\nnot a reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of\none moment that to that of another. The form in which it practically\npresents itself to most men is \u2018that a smaller present good is not to\nbe preferred to a greater future good\u2019 (allowing for difference of\ncertainty): since Prudence is generally exercised in restraining a\npresent desire (the object or satisfaction of which we commonly regard\nas _pro tanto_ \u2018a good\u2019), on account of the remoter consequences of\ngratifying it. The commonest view of the principle would no doubt be\nthat the present _pleasure_ or _happiness_ is reasonably to be foregone\nwith the view of obtaining greater pleasure or happiness hereafter: but\nthe principle need not be restricted to a hedonistic application; it is\nequally applicable to any other interpretation of \u2018one\u2019s own good,\u2019 in\nwhich good is conceived as a mathematical whole, of which the integrant\nparts are realised in different parts or moments of a lifetime.\nAnd therefore it is perhaps better to distinguish it here from the\nprinciple \u2018that Pleasure is the sole Ultimate Good,\u2019 which does not\nseem to have any logical connexion with it.\n\nSo far we have only been considering the \u2018Good on the Whole\u2019 of a\nsingle individual: but just as this notion is constructed by comparison\nand integration of the different \u2018goods\u2019 that succeed one another\nin the series of our conscious states, so we have formed the notion\nof Universal Good by comparison and integration of the goods of all\nindividual human--or sentient--existences. And here again, just as in\nthe former case, by considering the relation of the integrant parts to\nthe whole and to each other, I obtain the self-evident principle that\nthe good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point\nof view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other;\nunless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more\ngood is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other. And\nit is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good\ngenerally,--so far as it is attainable by my efforts,--not merely at a\nparticular part of it.\n\nFrom these two rational intuitions we may deduce, as a necessary\ninference, the maxim of Benevolence in an abstract form: viz. that\neach one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual\nas much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less,\nwhen impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by\nhim. I before observed that the duty of Benevolence as recognised by\ncommon sense seems to fall somewhat short of this. But I think it may\nbe fairly urged in explanation of this that _practically_ each man,\neven with a view to universal Good, ought chiefly to concern himself\nwith promoting the good of a limited number of human beings, and that\ngenerally in proportion to the closeness of their connexion with him.\nI think that a \u2018plain man,\u2019 in a modern civilised society, if his\nconscience were fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question,\nwhether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness\non any occasion if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater\nhappiness of some other human being,--without any counterbalancing gain\nto any one else,--would answer unhesitatingly in the negative.\n\nI have tried to show how in the principles of Justice, Prudence,\nand Rational Benevolence as commonly recognised there is at least a\nself-evident element, immediately cognisable by abstract intuition;\ndepending in each case on the relation which individuals and their\nparticular ends bear as parts to their wholes, and to other parts\nof these wholes. I regard the apprehension, with more or less\ndistinctness, of these abstract truths, as the permanent basis of\nthe common conviction that the fundamental precepts of morality are\nessentially reasonable. No doubt these principles are often placed\nside by side with other precepts to which custom and general consent\nhave given a merely illusory air of self-evidence: but the distinction\nbetween the two kinds of maxims appears to me to become manifest\nby merely reflecting upon them. I know by direct reflection that\nthe propositions, \u2018I ought to speak the truth,\u2019 \u2018I ought to keep my\npromises\u2019--however true they may be--are not self-evident to me; they\npresent themselves as propositions requiring rational justification\nof some kind. On the other hand, the propositions, \u2018I ought not to\nprefer a present lesser good to a future greater good,\u2019 and \u2018I ought\nnot to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of another,\u2019[286]\ndo present themselves as self-evident; as much (_e.g._) as the\nmathematical axiom that \u2018if equals be added to equals the wholes are\nequal.\u2019\n\nIt is on account of the fundamental and manifest importance, in my\nview, of the distinction above drawn between (1) the moral maxims\nwhich reflection shows not to possess ultimate validity, and (2) the\nmoral maxims which are or involve genuine ethical axioms, that I\nrefrained at the outset of this investigation from entering at length\ninto the psychogonical question as to the origin of apparent moral\nintuitions. For no psychogonical theory has ever been put forward\nprofessing to discredit the propositions that I regard as really\naxiomatic, by showing that the causes which produced them were such\nas had a tendency to make them false: while as regards the former\nclass of maxims, a psychogonical proof that they are untrustworthy\nwhen taken as absolutely and without qualification true is in my view,\nsuperfluous: since direct reflection shows me they have no claim to be\nso taken. On the other hand, so far as psychogonical theory represents\nmoral rules as, speaking broadly and generally, means to the ends of\nindividual and social good or well-being, it obviously tends to give a\ngeneral support to the conclusions to which the preceding discussion\nhas brought us by a different method: since it leads us to regard\nother moral rules as subordinate to the principles of Prudence and\nBenevolence.[287]\n\n\u00a7 4. I should, however, rely less confidently on the conclusions set\nforth in the preceding section, if they did not appear to me to be\nin substantial agreement--in spite of superficial differences--with\nthe doctrines of those moralists who have been most in earnest in\nseeking among commonly received moral rules for genuine intuitions\nof the Practical Reason. I have already pointed out[288] that in the\nhistory of English Ethics the earlier intuitional school show, in this\nrespect, a turn of thought on the whole more philosophical than that\nwhich the reaction against Hume rendered prevalent. Among the writers\nof this school there is no one who shows more earnestness in the effort\nto penetrate to really self-evident principles than Clarke.[289]\nAccordingly, I find that Clarke lays down, in respect of our behaviour\ntowards our fellow-men, two fundamental \u201crules of righteousness\u201d:[290]\nthe first of which he terms Equity, and the second Love or Benevolence.\nThe Rule of Equity he states thus: \u201cWhatever I judge reasonable or\nunreasonable that another should do for me: that by the same judgment\nI declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should _in the like case_\ndo for him\u201d[291]--which is of course, the \u2018Golden Rule\u2019 precisely\nstated. The obligation to \u201cUniversal Love or Benevolence\u201d he exhibits\nas follows:--\n\n\u201cIf there be a natural and necessary difference between Good and\nEvil: and that which is Good is fit and reasonable, and that which\nis Evil is unreasonable, to be done: and that which is the Greatest\nGood is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen: then ...\nevery rational creature ought in its sphere and station, according\nto its respective powers and faculties, to do all the Good it can to\nits fellow-creatures: to which end, universal Love and Benevolence is\nplainly the most certain, direct, and effectual means.\u201d[292]\n\nHere the mere statement that a rational agent is bound to aim at\nuniversal good is open to the charge of tautology, since Clarke defines\n\u2018Good\u2019 as \u2019that which is fit and reasonable to be done.\u2019 But Clarke\nobviously holds that each individual \u2018rational creature\u2019 is capable\nof receiving good in a greater or less degree, such good being an\nintegrant part of universal good. This indeed is implied in the common\nnotion, which he uses, of \u2018doing Good to one\u2019s fellow-creatures,\u2019 or,\nas he otherwise expresses it, \u2018promoting their welfare and happiness.\u2019\nAnd thus his principle is implicitly what was stated above, that the\ngood or welfare of any one individual must as such be an object of\nrational aim to any other reasonable individual no less than his own\nsimilar good or welfare.\n\n(It should be observed, however, that the proposition that Universal\nBenevolence is the right means to the attainment of universal good, is\nnot quite self-evident; since the end may not always be best attained\nby directly aiming at it. Thus Rational Benevolence, like Rational\nSelf-Love, may be self-limiting; may direct its own partial suppression\nin favour of other impulses.)\n\nAmong later moralists, Kant is especially noted for his rigour in\nseparating the purely rational element of the moral code: and his\nethical view also appears to me to coincide to a considerable extent,\nif not completely, with that set forth in the preceding section.\nI have already noticed that his fundamental principle of duty is\nthe \u2018formal\u2019 rule of \u201cacting on a maxim that one can will to be law\nuniversal\u201d; which, duly restricted,[293] is an immediate practical\ncorollary from the principle that I first noticed in the preceding\nsection. And we find that when he comes to consider the ends at which\nvirtuous action is aimed, the only really ultimate end which he lays\ndown is the object of Rational Benevolence as commonly conceived--the\nhappiness of other men.[294] He regards it as evident _a priori_ that\neach man as a rational agent is bound to aim at the happiness of other\nmen: indeed, in his view, it can only be stated as a _duty_ for me\nto seek my own happiness so far as I consider it as a part of the\nhappiness of mankind in general. I disagree with the negative side of\nthis statement, as I hold with Butler that \u201cone\u2019s own happiness is a\nmanifest obligation\u201d independently of one\u2019s relation to other men; but,\nregarded on its positive side, Kant\u2019s conclusion appears to agree to a\ngreat extent with the view of the duty of Rational Benevolence that I\nhave given:--though I am not altogether able to assent to the arguments\nby which Kant arrives at his conclusion.[295]\n\n\u00a7 5. I must now point out--if it has not long been apparent to the\nreader--that the self-evident principles laid down in \u00a7 3 do not\nspecially belong to Intuitionism in the restricted sense which, for\nclear distinction of methods, I gave to this term at the outset of\nour investigation. The axiom of Prudence, as I have given it, is\na self-evident principle, implied in Rational Egoism as commonly\naccepted.[296] Again, the axiom of Justice or Equity as above\nstated--\u2018that similar cases ought to be treated similarly\u2019--belongs\nin all its applications to Utilitarianism as much as to any system\ncommonly called Intuitional: while the axiom of Rational Benevolence\nis, in my view, required as a rational basis for the Utilitarian system.\n\nAccordingly, I find that I arrive, in my search for really clear\nand certain ethical intuitions, at the fundamental principle of\nUtilitarianism. I must, however, admit that the thinkers who in\nrecent times have taught this latter system, have not, for the most\npart, expressly tried to exhibit the truth of their first principle\nby means of any such procedure as that above given. Still, when I\nexamine the \u201cproof\u201d of the \u201cprinciple of Utility\u201d presented by the most\npersuasive and probably the most influential among English expositors\nof Utilitarianism,--J. S. Mill,--I find the need of some such procedure\nto complete the argument very plain and palpable.\n\nMill begins by explaining[297] that though \u201cquestions of ultimate ends\nare not amenable\u201d to \u201cproof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the\nterm,\u201d there is a \u201clarger meaning of the word proof\u201d in which they\nare amenable to it. \u201cThe subject,\u201d he says, is \u201cwithin the cognisance\nof the rational faculty.... Considerations may be presented capable\nof determining the intellect to\u201d accept \u201cthe Utilitarian formula.\u201d\nHe subsequently makes clear that by \u201cacceptance of the Utilitarian\nformula\u201d he means the acceptance, not of the agent\u2019s own greatest\nhappiness, but of \u201cthe greatest amount of happiness altogether\u201d as the\nultimate \u201cend of human action\u201d and \u201cstandard of morality\u201d: to promote\nwhich is, in the Utilitarian view, the supreme \u201cdirective rule of human\nconduct.\u201d Then when he comes to give the \u201cproof\u201d--in the larger sense\nbefore explained--of this rule or formula, he offers the following\nargument. \u201cThe sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything\nis desirable, is that people do actually desire it.... No reason can\nbe given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each\nperson, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own\nhappiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof\nwhich the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that\nhappiness is a good: that each person\u2019s happiness is a good to that\nperson, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate\nof persons.\u201d[298] He then goes on to argue that pleasure, and pleasure\nalone, is what all men actually do desire.\n\nNow, as we have seen, it is as a \u201cstandard of right and wrong,\u201d or\n\u201cdirective rule of conduct,\u201d that the utilitarian principle is put\nforward by Mill: hence, in giving as a statement of this principle\nthat \u201cthe general happiness is _desirable_,\u201d he must be understood to\nmean (and his whole treatise shows that he does mean) that it is what\neach individual _ought_ to desire, or at least--in the stricter sense\nof \u2018ought\u2019--to aim at realising in action.[299] But this proposition\nis not established by Mill\u2019s reasoning, even if we grant that what\nis actually desired may be legitimately inferred to be in this sense\ndesirable. For an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a\ndifferent part of the general happiness, does not constitute an actual\ndesire for the general happiness, existing in any individual; and Mill\nwould certainly not contend that a desire which does not exist in any\nindividual can possibly exist in an aggregate of individuals. There\nbeing therefore no actual desire--so far as this reasoning goes--for\nthe general happiness, the proposition that the general happiness is\ndesirable cannot be in this way established: so that there is a gap\nin the expressed argument, which can, I think, only be filled by some\nsuch proposition as that which I have above tried to exhibit as the\nintuition of Rational Benevolence.\n\nUtilitarianism is thus presented as the final form into which\nIntuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident\nfirst principles is rigorously pressed. In order, however, to make this\ntransition logically complete, we require to interpret \u2018Universal Good\u2019\nas \u2018Universal Happiness.\u2019 And this interpretation cannot, in my view,\nbe justified by arguing, as Mill does, from the psychological fact that\nHappiness is the sole object of men\u2019s actual desires, to the ethical\nconclusion that it alone is desirable or good; because in Book i.\nchap. iv. of this treatise I have attempted to show that Happiness or\nPleasure is not the only object that each for himself actually desires.\nThe identification of Ultimate Good with Happiness is properly to be\nreached, I think, by a more indirect mode of reasoning; which I will\nendeavour to explain in the next Chapter.\n\n NOTE.--The great influence at present exercised by Kant\u2019s teaching\n makes it worth while to state briefly the arguments by which he\n attempts to establish the duty of promoting the happiness of others,\n and the reasons why I am unable to regard these arguments as cogent.\n In some passages he attempts to exhibit this duty as an immediate\n deduction from his fundamental formula--\u201cact from a maxim that thou\n canst will to be universal law\u201d--when considered in combination with\n the desire for the kind services of others which (as he assumes) the\n exigencies of life must arouse in every man. The maxim, he says,\n \u201cthat each should be left to take care of himself without either aid\n or interference,\u201d is one that we might indeed _conceive_ existing\n as a universal law: but it would be impossible for us to _will_\n it to be such. \u201cA will that resolved this would be inconsistent\n with itself, for many cases may arise in which the individual thus\n willing needs the benevolence and sympathy of others\u201d (_Grundlegung_,\n p. 50 [Rosenkrantz]). Similarly elsewhere (_Metaph. Anfangsgr. d.\n Tugendlehre_, Einleit. \u00a7 8 and \u00a7 30) he explains at more length that\n the Self-love which necessarily exists in every one involves the\n desire of being loved by others and receiving aid from them in case of\n need. We thus necessarily constitute ourselves an end for others, and\n claim that they shall contribute to our happiness: and so, according\n to Kant\u2019s fundamental principle, we must recognise the duty of making\n _their_ happiness _our_ end.\n\n Now I cannot regard this reasoning as strictly cogent. In the first\n place, that every man in need wishes for the aid of others is an\n empirical proposition which Kant cannot know _a priori_. We can\n certainly conceive a man in whom the spirit of independence and the\n distaste for incurring obligations would be so strong that he would\n choose to endure any privations rather than receive aid from others.\n But even granting that every one, in the actual moment of distress,\n must necessarily wish for the assistance of others; still a strong\n man, after balancing the chances of life, may easily think that he and\n such as he have more to gain, on the whole, by the general adoption\n of the egoistic maxim; benevolence being likely to bring them more\n trouble than profit.\n\n In other passages, however, Kant reaches the same conclusion by an\n apparently different line of argument. He lays down that, as all\n action of rational beings is done for some end, there must be some\n absolute end, corresponding to the absolute rule before given, that\n imposes on our maxims the form of universal law. This absolute end,\n prescribed by Reason necessarily and _a priori_ for all rational\n beings as such, can be nothing but Reason itself, or the Universe of\n Rationals; for what the rule inculcates is, in fact, that we should\n act as rational units in a universe of rational beings (and therefore\n on principles conceived and embraced as universally applicable). Or\n again, we may reach the same result negatively. For all particular\n ends at which men aim are constituted such by the existence of\n impulses directed towards some particular objects. Now we cannot\n tell _a priori_ that any one of these special impulses forms part of\n the constitution of all men: and therefore we cannot state it as an\n absolute dictate of Reason that we should aim at any such special\n object. If, then, we thus exclude all particular empirical ends, there\n remains only the principle that \u201call Rational beings as such are ends\n to each\u201d: or, as Kant sometimes puts it, that \u201chumanity exists as an\n end in itself.\u201d\n\n Now, says Kant, so long as I confine myself to mere non-interference\n with others, I do not positively make Humanity my end; my aims remain\n selfish, though restricted by this condition of non-interference with\n others. My action, therefore, is not truly virtuous; for Virtue is\n exhibited and consists in the effort to realise the end of Reason\n in opposition to mere selfish impulses. Therefore \u201cthe ends of the\n subject, which is itself an end, must of necessity be my ends, if the\n representation of Humanity as an end in itself is to have its full\n weight with me\u201d (_Grundlegung_, p. 59), and my action is to be truly\n rational and virtuous.\n\n Here, again, I cannot accept the form of Kant\u2019s argument. The\n conception of \u201chumanity as an end in itself\u201d is perplexing: because by\n an End we commonly mean something to be realised, whereas \u201chumanity\u201d\n is, as Kant says, \u201ca self-subsistent end\u201d: moreover, there seems to be\n a sort of paralogism in the deduction of the principle of Benevolence\n by means of this conception. For the humanity which Kant maintains to\n be an end in itself is Man (or the aggregate of men) _in so far as\n rational_. But the subjective ends of other men, which Benevolence\n directs us to take as our own ends, would seem, according to Kant\u2019s\n own view, to depend upon and correspond to their _non-rational_\n impulses--their empirical desires and aversions. It is hard to see\n why, if man _as a rational being_ is an absolute end to other rational\n beings, they must therefore adopt his subjective aims as determined by\n his non-rational impulses.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[280] Cf. _ante_, Book i. chap. viii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[281] I am fully sensible of the peculiar interest and value of the\nethical thought of ancient Greece. Indeed through a large part of the\npresent work the influence of Plato and Aristotle on my treatment of\nthis subject has been greater than that of any modern writer. But\nI am here only considering the value of the general principles for\ndetermining what ought to be done, which the ancient systems profess to\nsupply.\n\n[282] The following remarks apply less to _later_ Stoicism--especially\nthe Roman Stoicism which we know at first hand in the writings of\nSeneca and Marcus Aurelius; in which the relation of the individual man\nto Humanity generally is more prominent than it is in the earlier form\nof the system.\n\n[283] It should be observed that in determining the particulars of\nexternal duty the Stoics to some extent used the notion \u2018nature\u2019\nin a different way: they tried to derive guidance from the complex\nadaptation of means to ends exhibited in the organic world. But since\nin their view the whole course of the Universe was both perfect and\ncompletely predetermined, it was impossible for them to obtain from\nany observation of actual existence a clear and consistent principle\nfor preferring and rejecting alternatives of conduct: and in fact\ntheir most characteristic practical precepts show a curious conflict\nbetween the tendency to accept what was customary as \u2018natural,\u2019 and the\ntendency to reject what seemed arbitrary as unreasonable.\n\n[284] Cf. _Analogy_, Part ii. chap. i. and chap. viii.\n\n[285] Cf. _ante_, note to p. 124.\n\n[286] To avoid misapprehension I should state that in these\npropositions the consideration of the different degrees of _certainty_\nof Present and Future Good, Own and Others\u2019 Good respectively, is\nsupposed to have been fully taken into account _before_ the future or\nalien Good is judged to be greater.\n\n[287] It may, however, be thought that in exhibiting this aspect of the\nmorality of Common Sense, psychogonical theory leads us to define in a\nparticular way the general notion of \u2018good\u2019 or \u2018well-being,\u2019 regarded\nas a result which morality has a demonstrable natural tendency to\nproduce. This point will be considered subsequently (chap. xiv. \u00a7 1 of\nthis Book: and Book iv. chap. iv.).\n\n[288] Cf. _ante_, Book i. chap. viii. Note, pp. 103, 104.\n\n[289] In drawing attention to Clarke\u2019s system, I ought perhaps to\nremark that his anxiety to exhibit the parallelism between ethical and\nmathematical truth (on which Locke before him had insisted) renders\nhis general terminology inappropriate, and occasionally leads him into\ndownright extravagances. _E.g._ it is patently absurd to say that \u201ca\nman who wilfully acts contrary to Justice wills things to be what\nthey are not and cannot be\u201d: nor are \u201cRelations and Proportions\u201d or\n\u201cfitnesses and unfitnesses of things\u201d very suitable designations for\nthe matter of moral intuition. But for the present purpose there is no\nreason to dwell on these defects.\n\n[290] Clarke\u2019s statement of the \u201cRule of Righteousness with respect to\nourselves\u201d I pass over, because it is, as he states it, a derivative\nand subordinate rule. It is that we should preserve our being, be\ntemperate, industrious, etc., _with a view to the performance of Duty_:\nwhich of course supposes Duty (_i.e._ the ultimate and absolute rules\nof Duty) already determined. I may observe that the reasonableness of\nPrudence or Self-love is only recognised by Clarke indirectly; in a\npassage which I quoted before (p. 120).\n\n[291] _Boyle Lectures_ (1705), etc., pp. 86, 87.\n\n[292] _l.c._ p. 92.\n\n[293] I think that Kant, in applying this axiom, does not take due\naccount of certain restrictive considerations. Cf. chap. vii. \u00a7 3 of\nthis Book, and also Book iv. chap. v. \u00a7 3.\n\n[294] Kant no doubt gives the agent\u2019s own Perfection as another\nabsolute end; but when we come to examine his notion of perfection, we\nfind that it is not really determinate without the statement of other\nends of reason, for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect\nourselves. See _Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre_, I. Theil, \u00a7 v. \u201cThe\nperfection that belongs to men generally ... can be nothing else than\nthe cultivation of one\u2019s power, and also of one\u2019s will, to satisfy the\nrequirements of duty in general.\u201d\n\n[295] See note at the end of the chapter.\n\n[296] On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence--which\nI regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics--my final view is given\nin the last chapter of this treatise.\n\n[297] _Utilitarianism_, chap. i. pp. 6, 7, and chap. ii. pp. 16, 17.\n\n[298] _l.c._ chap. iv. pp. 52, 53.\n\n[299] It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in\nMill\u2019s mind between two possible meanings of the term \u2018desirable,\u2019 (1)\nwhat can be desired and (2) what ought to be desired. I intended to\nshow by the two first sentences of this paragraph that I was aware of\nthis confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to\ndiscuss it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nULTIMATE GOOD\n\n\n\u00a7 1. At the outset of this treatise[300] I noticed that there are\ntwo forms in which the object of ethical inquiry is considered; it\nis sometimes regarded as a Rule or Rules of Conduct, \u2018the Right,\u2019\nsometimes as an end or ends, \u2018the Good.\u2019 I pointed out that in the\nmoral consciousness of modern Europe the two notions are _prima facie_\ndistinct; since while it is commonly thought that the obligation\nto obey moral rules is absolute, it is not commonly held that the\nwhole Good of man lies in such obedience; this view, we may say,\nis--vaguely and respectfully but unmistakably--repudiated as a Stoical\nparadox. The ultimate Good or Wellbeing of man is rather regarded as\nan ulterior result, the connexion of which with his Right Conduct\nis indeed commonly held to be certain, but is frequently conceived\nas supernatural, and so beyond the range of independent ethical\nspeculation. But now, if the conclusions of the preceding chapters are\nto be trusted, it would seem that the practical determination of Right\nConduct depends on the determination of Ultimate Good. For we have\nseen (_a_) that most of the commonly received maxims of Duty--even of\nthose which at first sight appear absolute and independent--are found\nwhen closely examined to contain an implicit subordination to the more\ngeneral principles of Prudence and Benevolence: and (_b_) that no\nprinciples except these, and the formal principle of Justice or Equity\ncan be admitted as at once intuitively clear and certain; while, again,\nthese principles themselves, so far as they are self-evident, may be\nstated as precepts to seek (1) one\u2019s own good on the whole, repressing\nall seductive impulses prompting to undue preference of particular\ngoods, and (2) others\u2019 good no less than one\u2019s own, repressing any\nundue preference for one individual over another. Thus we are brought\nround again to the old question with which ethical speculation in\nEurope began, \u2018What is the Ultimate Good for man?\u2019--though not in the\negoistic form in which the old question was raised. When, however, we\nexamine the controversies to which this question originally led, we\nsee that the investigation which has brought us round to it has tended\ndefinitely to exclude one of the answers which early moral reflection\nwas disposed to give to it. For to say that \u2018General Good\u2019 consists\nsolely in general Virtue,--if we mean by Virtue conformity to such\nprescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality\nof Common Sense--would obviously involve us in a logical circle; since\nwe have seen that the exact determination of these prescriptions and\nprohibitions must depend on the definition of this General Good.\n\nNor, I conceive, can this argument be evaded by adopting the view of\nwhat I have called \u2018\u00c6sthetic Intuitionism\u2019 and regarding Virtues as\nexcellences of conduct clearly discernible by trained insight, although\ntheir nature does not admit of being stated in definite formul\u00e6. For\nour notions of special virtues do not really become more independent\nby becoming more indefinite: they still contain, though perhaps more\nlatently, the same reference to \u2018Good\u2019 or \u2018Wellbeing\u2019 as an ultimate\nstandard. This appears clearly when we consider any virtue in relation\nto the cognate vice--or at least _non-virtue_--into which it tends to\npass over when pushed to an extreme, or exhibited under inappropriate\nconditions. For example, Common Sense may seem to regard Liberality,\nFrugality, Courage, Placability, as intrinsically desirable: but\nwhen we consider their relation respectively to Profusion, Meanness,\nFoolhardiness, Weakness, we find that Common Sense draws the line\nin each case not by immediate intuition, but by reference either to\nsome definite maxim of duty, or to the general notion of \u2018Good\u2019 or\nWellbeing: and similarly when we ask at what point Candour, Generosity,\nHumility cease to be virtues by becoming \u2018excessive.\u2019 Other qualities\ncommonly admired, such as Energy, Zeal, Self-control, Thoughtfulness,\nare obviously regarded as virtues only when they are directed to\ngood ends. In short, the only so-called Virtues which can be thought\nto be essentially and always such, and incapable of excess, are such\nqualities as Wisdom, Universal Benevolence, and (in a sense) Justice;\nof which the notions manifestly involve this notion of Good, supposed\nalready determinate. Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to\nGood; Benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called \u201cdoing\nGood\u201d: Justice (when regarded as essentially and always a Virtue) lies\nin distributing Good (or evil) impartially according to right rules.\nIf then we are asked what is this Good which it is excellent to know,\nto bestow on others, to distribute impartially, it would be obviously\nabsurd to reply that it is just this knowledge, these beneficent\npurposes, this impartial distribution.\n\nNor, again, can I perceive that this difficulty is in any way met by\nregarding Virtue as a quality of \u201ccharacter\u201d rather than of \u201cconduct,\u201d\nand expressing the moral law in the form, \u201cBe this,\u201d instead of the\nform \u201cDo this.\u201d[301] From a practical point of view, indeed, I fully\nrecognise the importance of urging that men should aim at an ideal\nof character, and consider action in its effects on character. But I\ncannot infer from this that character and its elements--faculties,\nhabits, or dispositions of any kind--are the constituents of Ultimate\nGood. It seems to me that the opposite is implied in the very\nconception of a faculty or disposition; it can only be defined as a\ntendency to act or feel in a certain way under certain conditions; and\nsuch a tendency appears to me clearly not valuable in itself but for\nthe acts and feelings in which it takes effect, or for the ulterior\nconsequences of these,--which consequences, again, cannot be regarded\nas Ultimate Good, so long as they are merely conceived as modifications\nof faculties, dispositions, etc. When, therefore, I say that effects\non character are important, it is a summary way of saying that by the\nlaws of our mental constitution the present act or feeling is a cause\ntending to modify importantly our acts and feelings in the indefinite\nfuture: the comparatively permanent result supposed to be produced\nin the mind or soul, being a tendency that will show itself in an\nindefinite number of particular acts and feelings, may easily be more\nimportant, in relation to the ultimate end, than a single act or the\ntransient feeling of a single moment: but its comparative permanence\nappears to me no ground for regarding it as itself a constituent of\nultimate good.\n\n\u00a7 2. So far, however, I have been speaking only of particular virtues,\nas exhibited in conduct judged to be objectively right: and it may be\nargued that this is too external a view of the Virtue that claims to\nconstitute Ultimate Good. It may be said that the difficulty that I\nhave been urging vanishes if we penetrate beyond the particular virtues\nto the root and essence of virtue in general,--the determination of\nthe will to do whatever is judged to be right and to aim at realising\nwhatever is judged to be best--; since this subjective rightness or\ngoodness of will, being independent of knowledge of what is objectively\nright or good, is independent of that presupposition of Good as already\nknown and determined, which we have seen to be implied in the common\nconceptions of virtue as manifested in outward acts. I admit that if\nsubjective rightness or goodness of Will is affirmed to be the Ultimate\nGood, the affirmation does not exactly involve the logical difficulty\nthat I have been urging. None the less is it fundamentally opposed to\nCommon Sense; since the very notion of subjective rightness or goodness\nof will implies an objective standard, which it directs us to seek, but\ndoes not profess to supply. It would be a palpable and violent paradox\nto set before the right-seeking mind no end except this right-seeking\nitself, and to affirm this to be the sole Ultimate Good, denying\nthat any effects of right volition can be in themselves good, except\nthe subjective rightness of future volitions, whether of self or of\nothers. It is true that no rule can be recognised, by any reasonable\nindividual, as more authoritative than the rule of doing what he judges\nto be right; for, in deliberating with a view to my own immediate\naction, I cannot distinguish between doing what is objectively right,\nand realising my own subjective conception of rightness. But we are\ncontinually forced to make the distinction as regards the actions\nof others and to judge that conduct may be objectively wrong though\nsubjectively right: and we continually judge conduct to be objectively\nwrong because it tends to cause pain and loss of happiness to\nothers,--apart from any effect on the subjective rightness of their\nvolitions. It is as so judging that we commonly recognise the mischief\nand danger of fanaticism:--meaning by a fanatic a man who resolutely\nand unswervingly carries out his own conception of rightness, when it\nis a plainly mistaken conception.\n\nThe same result may be reached even without supposing so palpable a\ndivorce between subjective and objective rightness of volition as\nis implied in the notion of fanaticism. As I have already pointed\nout,[302] though the \u2018dictates of Reason\u2019 are always to be obeyed, it\ndoes not follow that \u2018the dictation of Reason\u2019--the predominance of\nconsciously moral over non-moral motives--is to be promoted without\nlimits; and indeed Common Sense appears to hold that some things\nare likely to be better done, if they are done from other motives\nthan conscious obedience to practical Reason or Conscience. It thus\nbecomes a practical question how far the dictation of Reason, the\npredominance of moral choice and moral effort in human life, is a\nresult to be aimed at: and the admission of this question implies that\nconscious rightness of volition is not the sole ultimate good. On the\nwhole, then, we may conclude that neither (1) subjective rightness or\ngoodness of volition, as distinct from objective, nor (2) virtuous\ncharacter, except as manifested or realised in virtuous conduct, can be\nregarded as constituting Ultimate Good: while, again, we are precluded\nfrom identifying Ultimate Good with virtuous conduct, because our\nconceptions of virtuous conduct, under the different heads or aspects\ndenoted by the names of the particular virtues, have been found to\npresuppose the prior determination of the notion of Good--that Good\nwhich virtuous conduct is conceived as producing or promoting or\nrightly distributing.\n\nAnd what has been said of Virtue, seems to me still more manifestly\ntrue of the other talents, gifts, and graces which make up the common\nnotion of human excellence or Perfection. However immediately the\nexcellent quality of such gifts and skills may be recognised and\nadmired, reflection shows that they are only valuable on account of\nthe good or desirable conscious life in which they are or will be\nactualised, or which will be somehow promoted by their exercise.\n\n\u00a7 3. Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or Desirable\nconscious or sentient Life--of which Virtuous action is one element,\nbut not the sole constituent? This seems in harmony with Common Sense;\nand the fact that particular virtues and talents and gifts are largely\nvalued as means to ulterior good does not necessarily prevent us from\nregarding their exercise as also an element of Ultimate Good: just as\nthe fact that physical action, nutrition, and repose, duly proportioned\nand combined, are means to the maintenance of our animal life, does\nnot prevent us from regarding them as indispensable elements of such\nlife. Still it seems difficult to conceive any kind of activity or\nprocess as both means and end, from precisely the same point of view\nand in respect of precisely the same quality: and in both the cases\nabove mentioned it is, I think, easy to distinguish the aspect in\nwhich the activities or processes in question are to be regarded as\nmeans from that in which they are to be regarded as in themselves\ngood or desirable. Let us examine this first in the case of the\nphysical processes. It is in their purely physical aspect, as complex\nprocesses of corporeal change, that they are means to the maintenance\nof life: but so long as we confine our attention to their corporeal\naspect,--regarding them merely as complex movements of certain\nparticles of organised matter--it seems impossible to attribute to\nthese movements, considered in themselves, either goodness or badness.\nI cannot conceive it to be an ultimate end of rational action to secure\nthat these complex movements should be of one kind rather than another,\nor that they should be continued for a longer rather than a shorter\nperiod. In short, if a certain quality of human Life is that which is\nultimately desirable, it must belong to human Life regarded on its\npsychical side, or, briefly, Consciousness.\n\nBut again: it is not all life regarded on its psychical side which we\ncan judge to be ultimately desirable: since psychical life as known to\nus includes pain as well as pleasure, and so far as it is painful it\nis not desirable. I cannot therefore accept a view of the wellbeing or\nwelfare of human beings--as of other living things--which is suggested\nby current zoological conceptions and apparently maintained with more\nor less definiteness by influential writers; according to which, when\nwe attribute goodness or badness to the manner of existence of any\nliving organism, we should be understood to attribute to it a tendency\neither (1) to self-preservation, or (2) to the preservation of the\ncommunity or race to which it belongs--so that what \u201cWellbeing\u201d adds\nto mere \u201cBeing\u201d is just promise of future being. It appears to me that\nthis doctrine needs only to be distinctly contemplated in order to be\nrejected. If all life were as little desirable as some portions of\nit have been, in my own experience and in that (I believe) of all or\nmost men, I should judge all tendency to the preservation of it to be\nunmitigatedly bad. Actually, no doubt, as we generally hold that human\nlife, even as now lived, has on the average, a balance of happiness,\nwe regard what is preservative of life as generally good, and what is\ndestructive of life as bad: and I quite admit that a most fundamentally\nimportant part of the function of morality consists in maintaining such\nhabits and sentiments as are necessary to the continued existence,\nin full numbers, of a society of human beings under their actual\nconditions of life. But this is not because the mere existence of human\norganisms, even if prolonged to eternity, appears to me in any way\ndesirable; it is only assumed to be so because it is supposed to be\naccompanied by Consciousness on the whole desirable; it is therefore\nthis Desirable Consciousness which we must regard as ultimate Good.\n\nIn the same way, so far as we judge virtuous activity to be a part of\nUltimate Good, it is, I conceive, because the consciousness attending\nit is judged to be in itself desirable for the virtuous agent; though\nat the same time this consideration does not adequately represent the\nimportance of Virtue to human wellbeing, since we have to consider\nits value as a means as well as its value as an end. We may make the\ndistinction clearer by considering whether Virtuous life would remain\non the whole good for the virtuous agent, if we suppose it combined\nwith extreme pain. The affirmative answer to this question was strongly\nsupported in Greek philosophical discussion: but it is a paradox from\nwhich a modern thinker would recoil: he would hardly venture to assert\nthat the portion of life spent by a martyr in tortures was in itself\ndesirable,--though it might be his duty to suffer the pain with a view\nto the good of others, and even his interest to suffer it with a view\nto his own ultimate happiness.\n\n\u00a7 4. If then Ultimate Good can only be conceived as Desirable\nConsciousness--including the Consciousness of Virtue as a part but only\nas a part--are we to identify this notion with Happiness or Pleasure,\nand say with the Utilitarians that General Good is general happiness?\nMany would at this point of the discussion regard this conclusion as\ninevitable: to say that all other things called good are only means to\nthe end of making conscious life better or more desirable, seems to\nthem the same as saying that they are means to the end of happiness.\nBut very important distinctions remain to be considered. According to\nthe view taken in a previous chapter,[303] in affirming Ultimate Good\nto be Happiness or Pleasure, we imply (1) that nothing is desirable\nexcept desirable feelings, and (2) that the desirability of each\nfeeling is only directly cognisable by the sentient individual at the\ntime of feeling it, and that therefore this particular judgment of the\nsentient individual must be taken as final[304] on the question how far\neach element of feeling has the quality of Ultimate Good. Now no one, I\nconceive, would estimate in any other way the desirability of feeling\nconsidered merely as feeling: but it may be urged that our conscious\nexperience includes besides Feelings, Cognitions and Volitions, and\nthat the desirability of these must be taken into account, and is not\nto be estimated by the standard above stated. I think, however, that\nwhen we reflect on a cognition as a transient fact of an individual\u2019s\npsychical experience,--distinguishing it on the one hand from the\nfeeling that normally accompanies it, and on the other hand from that\nrelation of the knowing mind to the object known which is implied\nin the term \u201ctrue\u201d or \u201cvalid cognition\u201d[305]--it is seen to be an\nelement of consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability:\nand the same may be said of Volitions, when we abstract from their\nconcomitant feelings, and their relation to an objective norm or ideal,\nas well as from all their consequences. It is no doubt true that in\nordinary thought certain states of consciousness--such as Cognition\nof Truth, Contemplation of Beauty, Volition to realise Freedom or\nVirtue--are sometimes judged to be preferable on other grounds than\ntheir pleasantness: but the general explanation of this seems to be\n(as was suggested in Book ii. chap. ii. \u00a7 2) that what in such cases\nwe really prefer is not the present consciousness itself, but either\neffects on future consciousness more or less distinctly foreseen, or\nelse something in the objective relations of the conscious being, not\nstrictly included in his present consciousness.\n\nThe second of these alternatives may perhaps be made clearer by some\nillustrations. A man may prefer the mental state of apprehending truth\nto the state of half-reliance on generally accredited fictions,[306]\nwhile recognising that the former state may be more painful than\nthe latter, and independently of any effect which he expects either\nstate to have upon his subsequent consciousness. Here, on my view,\nthe real object of preference is not the consciousness of knowing\ntruth, considered merely as consciousness,--the element of pleasure\nor satisfaction in this being more than outweighed by the concomitant\npain,--but the relation between the mind and something else, which, as\nthe very notion of \u2018truth\u2019 implies, is whatever it is independently of\nour cognition of it, and which I therefore call objective. This may\nbecome more clear if we imagine ourselves learning afterwards that\nwhat we took for truth is not really such: for in this case we should\ncertainly feel that our preference had been mistaken; whereas if our\nchoice had really been between two elements of transient consciousness,\nits reasonableness could not be affected by any subsequent discovery.\n\nSimilarly, a man may prefer freedom and penury to a life of luxurious\nservitude, not because the pleasant consciousness of being free\noutweighs in prospect all the comforts and securities that the\nother life would afford, but because he has a predominant aversion\nto that relation between his will and the will of another which we\ncall slavery: or, again, a philosopher may choose what he conceives\nas \u2018inner freedom\u2019--the consistent self-determination of the\nwill--rather than the gratifications of appetite; though recognising\nthat the latter are more desirable, considered merely as transient\nfeelings. In either case, he will be led to regard his preference\nas mistaken, if he be afterwards persuaded that his conception of\nFreedom or self-determination was illusory; that we are all slaves of\ncircumstances, destiny, etc.\n\nSo again, the preference of conformity to Virtue, or contemplation\nof Beauty, to a state of consciousness recognised as more pleasant\nseems to depend on a belief that one\u2019s conception of Virtue or Beauty\ncorresponds to an ideal to some extent objective and valid for all\nminds. Apart from any consideration of future consequences, we should\ngenerally agree that a man who sacrificed happiness to an erroneous\nconception of Virtue or Beauty made a mistaken choice.\n\nStill, it may be said that this is merely a question of definition:\nthat we may take \u2018conscious life\u2019 in a wide sense, so as to include\nthe objective relations of the conscious being implied in our notions\nof Virtue, Truth, Beauty, Freedom; and that from this point of view\nwe may regard cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Free or\nVirtuous action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to Pleasure\nor Happiness--even though we admit that Happiness must be included\nas a part of Ultimate Good. In this case the principle of Rational\nBenevolence, which was stated in the last chapter as an indubitable\nintuition of the practical Reason, would not direct us to the pursuit\nof universal happiness alone, but of these \u201cideal goods\u201d as well, as\nends ultimately desirable for mankind generally.\n\n\u00a7 5. I think, however, that this view ought not to commend itself to\nthe sober judgment of reflective persons. In order to show this, I\nmust ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that I before\nrequested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent\nvalidity of common moral precepts. I appeal firstly to his intuitive\njudgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed\nbefore it: and secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary\njudgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me at least\nit seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of\nthe conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness\naccompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and\nintrinsically desirable; any more than material or other objects\nare, when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence.\nAdmitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have\njust been described, of which the ultimate object is something that\nis not merely consciousness: it still seems to me that when (to use\nButler\u2019s phrase) we \u201csit down in a cool hour,\u201d we can only justify to\nourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by\nconsidering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness\nof sentient beings.\n\nThe second argument, that refers to the common sense of mankind,\nobviously cannot be made completely cogent; since, as above stated,\nseveral cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art,\netc.--not to speak of Virtue--are ends independently of the pleasure\nderived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements\nof \u201cideal good\u201d are productive of pleasure in various ways; but also\nthat they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly\nspeaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This\nseems obviously true of Beauty; and will hardly be denied in respect\nof any kind of social ideal: it is paradoxical to maintain that any\ndegree of Freedom, or any form of social order, would still be commonly\nregarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency\nto promote the general happiness. The case of Knowledge is rather more\ncomplex; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value\nof knowledge, when its \u2018fruitfulness\u2019 has been demonstrated. It is,\nhowever, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long\nfruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed\non one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote:\nand even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown\nto be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some\nrespect on utilitarian grounds; both as furnishing to the inquirer\nthe refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the\nintellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on\nthe whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating\nto this last, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the\nmisdirection of valuable effort; so that the meed of honour commonly\npaid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously,\nby a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the\nlegitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed,\nas in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is\ngenerally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis.\n\nThe case of Virtue requires special consideration: since the\nencouragement in each other of virtuous impulses and dispositions is a\nmain aim of men\u2019s ordinary moral discourse; so that even to raise the\nquestion whether this encouragement can go too far has a paradoxical\nair. Still, our experience includes rare and exceptional cases in which\nthe concentration of effort on the cultivation of virtue has seemed to\nhave effects adverse to general happiness, through being intensified\nto the point of moral fanaticism, and so involving a neglect of other\nconditions of happiness. If, then, we admit as actual or possible\nsuch \u2018infelicific\u2019 effects of the cultivation of Virtue, I think we\nshall also generally admit that, in the case supposed, conduciveness\nto general happiness should be the criterion for deciding how far the\ncultivation of Virtue should be carried.\n\nAt the same time it must be allowed that we find in Common Sense an\naversion to admit Happiness (when explained to mean a sum of pleasures)\nto be the sole ultimate end and standard of right conduct. But this, I\nthink, can be fully accounted for by the following considerations.\n\nI. The term Pleasure is not commonly used so as to include clearly\n_all_ kinds of consciousness which we desire to retain or reproduce:\nin ordinary usage it suggests too prominently the coarser and commoner\nkinds of such feelings; and it is difficult even for those who are\ntrying to use it scientifically to free their minds altogether from the\nassociations of ordinary usage, and to mean by Pleasure only Desirable\nConsciousness or Feeling of whatever kind. Again, our knowledge of\nhuman life continually suggests to us instances of pleasures which will\ninevitably involve as concomitant or consequent either a greater amount\nof pain or a loss of more important pleasures: and we naturally shrink\nfrom including even hypothetically in our conception of ultimate good\nthese--in Bentham\u2019s phrase--\u201cimpure\u201d pleasures; especially since we\nhave, in many cases, moral or \u00e6sthetic instincts warning us against\nsuch pleasures.\n\nII. We have seen[307] that many important pleasures can only be felt on\ncondition of our experiencing desires for other things than pleasure.\nThus the very acceptance of Pleasure as the ultimate end of conduct\ninvolves the practical rule that it is not always to be made the\nconscious end. Hence, even if we are considering merely the good of\none human being taken alone, excluding from our view all effects of\nhis conduct on others, still the reluctance of Common Sense to regard\npleasure as the sole thing ultimately desirable may be justified by\nthe consideration that human beings tend to be less happy if they are\nexclusively occupied with the desire of personal happiness. _E.g._ (as\nwas before shown) we shall miss the valuable pleasures which attend the\nexercise of the benevolent affections if we do not experience genuinely\ndisinterested impulses to procure happiness for others (which are, in\nfact, implied in the notion of \u2018benevolent affections\u2019).\n\nIII. But again, I hold, as was expounded in the preceding chapter,\nthat disinterested benevolence is not only thus generally in harmony\nwith rational Self-love, but also in another sense and independently\nrational: that is, Reason shows me that if my happiness is desirable\nand a good, the equal happiness of any other person must be equally\ndesirable. Now, when Happiness is spoken of as the sole ultimate good\nof man, the idea most commonly suggested is that each individual is to\nseek his own happiness at the expense (if necessary) or, at any rate,\nto the neglect of that of others: and this offends both our sympathetic\nand our rational regard for others\u2019 happiness. It is, in fact, rather\nthe end of Egoistic than of Universalistic Hedonism, to which Common\nSense feels an aversion. And certainly one\u2019s individual happiness is,\nin many respects, an unsatisfactory mark for one\u2019s supreme aim, apart\nfrom any direct collision into which the exclusive pursuit of it may\nbring us with rational or sympathetic Benevolence. It does not possess\nthe characteristics which, as Aristotle says, we \u201cdivine\u201d to belong\nto Ultimate Good: being (so far, at least, as it can be empirically\nforeseen) so narrow and limited, of such necessarily brief duration,\nand so shifting and insecure while it lasts. But Universal Happiness,\ndesirable consciousness or feeling for the innumerable multitude of\nsentient beings, present and to come, seems an End that satisfies\nour imagination by its vastness, and sustains our resolution by its\ncomparative security.\n\nIt may, however, be said that if we require the individual to sacrifice\nhis own happiness to the greater happiness of others on the ground\nthat it is reasonable to do so, we really assign to the individual a\ndifferent ultimate end from that which we lay down as the ultimate\nGood of the universe of sentient beings: since we direct him to take,\nas ultimate, Happiness for the Universe, but Conformity to Reason\nfor himself. I admit the substantial truth of this statement, though\nI should avoid the language as tending to obscure the distinction\nbefore explained between \u201cobeying the dictates\u201d and \u201cpromoting the\ndictation\u201d of reason. But granting the alleged difference, I do not\nsee that it constitutes an argument against the view here maintained,\nsince the individual is essentially and fundamentally different from\nthe larger whole--the universe of sentient beings--of which he is\nconscious of being a part; just because he has a known relation to\nsimilar parts of the same whole, while the whole itself has no such\nrelation. I accordingly see no inconsistency in holding that while\nit _would_ be reasonable for the aggregate of sentient beings, if it\ncould act collectively, to aim at its own happiness only as an ultimate\nend--and would be reasonable for any individual to do the same, if he\nwere the only sentient being in the universe--it may yet be _actually_\nreasonable for an individual to sacrifice his own Good or happiness for\nthe greater happiness of others.[308]\n\nAt the same time I admit that, in the earlier age of ethical thought\nwhich Greek philosophy represents, men sometimes judged an act to be\n\u2018good\u2019 _for the agent_, even while recognising that its consequences\nwould be on the whole painful to him,--as (_e.g._) a heroic exchange\nof a life full of happiness for a painful death at the call of duty.\nI attribute this partly to a confusion of thought between what it\nis reasonable for an individual to desire, when he considers his\nown existence alone, and what he must recognise as reasonably to be\ndesired, when he takes the point of view of a larger whole: partly,\nagain, to a faith deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of mankind,\nthat there cannot be really and ultimately any conflict between the\ntwo kinds of reasonableness.[309] But when \u2018Reasonable Self-love\u2019 has\nbeen clearly distinguished from Conscience, as it is by Butler and\nhis followers, we find it is naturally understood to mean desire for\none\u2019s own Happiness: so that in fact the interpretation of \u2018one\u2019s own\ngood,\u2019 which was almost peculiar in ancient thought to the Cyrenaic\nand Epicurean heresies, is adopted by some of the most orthodox of\nmodern moralists. Indeed it often does not seem to have occurred to\nthese latter that this notion can have any other interpretation.[310]\nIf, then, when any one hypothetically concentrates his attention on\nhimself, Good is naturally and almost inevitably conceived to be\nPleasure, we may reasonably conclude that the Good of any number of\nsimilar beings, whatever their mutual relations may be, cannot be\nessentially different in quality.\n\nIV. But lastly, from the universal point of view no less than from\nthat of the individual, it seems true that Happiness is likely to be\nbetter attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to\naim at it be carefully restricted. And this not only because action is\nlikely to be more effective if our effort is temporarily concentrated\non the realisation of more limited ends--though this is no doubt an\nimportant reason:--but also because the fullest development of happy\nlife for each individual seems to require that he should have other\nexternal objects of interest besides the happiness of other conscious\nbeings. And thus we may conclude that the pursuit of the ideal objects\nbefore mentioned, Virtue, Truth, Freedom, Beauty, etc., _for their\nown sakes_, is indirectly and secondarily, though not primarily and\nabsolutely, rational; on account not only of the happiness that will\nresult from their attainment, but also of that which springs from their\ndisinterested pursuit. While yet if we ask for a final criterion of\nthe comparative value of the different objects of men\u2019s enthusiastic\npursuit, and of the limits within which each may legitimately engross\nthe attention of mankind, we shall none the less conceive it to depend\nupon the degree in which they respectively conduce to Happiness.\n\nIf, however, this view be rejected, it remains to consider whether we\ncan frame any other coherent account of Ultimate Good. If we are not\nto systematise human activities by taking Universal Happiness as their\ncommon end, on what other principles are we to systematise them? It\nshould be observed that these principles must not only enable us to\ncompare among themselves the values of the different non-hedonistic\nends which we have been considering, but must also provide a common\nstandard for comparing these values with that of Happiness; unless we\nare prepared to adopt the paradoxical position of rejecting happiness\nas absolutely valueless. For we have a practical need of determining\nnot only whether we should pursue Truth rather than Beauty, or\nFreedom or some ideal constitution of society rather than either, or\nperhaps desert all of these for the life of worship and religious\ncontemplation; but also how far we should follow any of these lines of\nendeavour, when we foresee among its consequences the pains of human\nor other sentient beings, or even the loss of pleasures that might\notherwise have been enjoyed by them.[311]\n\nI have failed to find--and am unable to construct--any systematic\nanswer to this question that appears to me deserving of serious\nconsideration: and hence I am finally led to the conclusion (which\nat the close of the last chapter seemed to be premature) that the\nIntuitional method rigorously applied yields as its final result the\ndoctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism,[312]--which it is convenient\nto denote by the single word, Utilitarianism.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[300] See Book i. chap. i. \u00a7 2.\n\n[301] Cf. Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, chap. iv. \u00a7 16.\n\n[302] Chap. xi. \u00a7 3; see also chap. xii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[303] Book ii. chap. ii.\n\n[304] Final, that is, so far as the quality of the present feeling\nis concerned. I have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the\ndesirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with\nfeelings only represented in idea, it is liable to be erroneous through\nimperfections in the representation.\n\n[305] The term \u201ccognition\u201d without qualification more often implies\nwhat is signified by \u201ctrue\u201d or \u201cvalid\u201d: but for the present purpose it\nis necessary to eliminate this implication.\n\n[306] Cf. Lecky, _History of European Morals_, pp. 52 _seqq._\n\n[307] Book i. chap. iv.; cf. Book ii. chap. iii.\n\n[308] I ought at the same time to say that I hold it no less reasonable\nfor an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. This\n\u201cDualism of the Practical Reason\u201d will be further discussed in the\nconcluding chapter of the treatise.\n\n[309] We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some\nof Plato\u2019s Dialogues, such as the _Gorgias_, where the ethical argument\nhas a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more\nor less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent\nin the common notion of good: partly a noble and stirring expression of\na profound moral faith.\n\n[310] Cf. Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_, Book\nii. chap. i.\n\n[311] The controversy on vivisection, to which I referred just now,\naffords a good illustration of the need that I am pointing out. I\ndo not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the\nparadox that the pain of sentient beings is not _per se_ to be avoided.\n\n[312] I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p. 134) the\nmetaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that\nHappiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (= sum\nof pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a\n\u201cChief Good\u201d must be \u201csomething of which some being can be conceived\nin possession\u201d--something, that is, which he can have all at once.\nOn considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as\nit is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form\nof the notion \u2018a Chief Good\u2019 (or \u2018Summum Bonum\u2019), which is perhaps\ninappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter\nused the notion of \u2018Ultimate Good\u2019: as I can see no shadow of reason\nfor affirming that that which is Good or Desirable _per se_, and not\nas a means to some further end, must _necessarily_ be capable of being\npossessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a\nGood of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of\nhuman existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be\nsubject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\nUTILITARIANISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE MEANING OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The term Utilitarianism is, at the present day, in common use,\nand is supposed to designate a doctrine or method with which we are\nall familiar. But on closer examination, it appears to be applied to\nseveral distinct theories, having no necessary connexion with one\nanother, and not even referring to the same subject-matter. It will\nbe well, therefore, to define, as carefully as possible, the doctrine\nthat is to be denoted by the term in the present Book: at the same time\ndistinguishing this from other doctrines to which usage would allow\nthe name to be applied, and indicating, so far as seems necessary, its\nrelation to these.\n\nBy Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct\nwhich, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that\nwhich will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that\nis, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.\nIt would tend to clearness if we might call this principle, and the\nmethod based upon it, by some such name as \u201cUniversalistic Hedonism\u201d:\nand I have therefore sometimes ventured to use this term, in spite of\nits cumbrousness.\n\nThe first doctrine from which it seems necessary to distinguish this,\nis the Egoistic Hedonism expounded and discussed in Book ii. of this\ntreatise. The difference, however, between the propositions (1) that\neach ought to seek his own happiness, and (2) that each ought to seek\nthe happiness of all, is so obvious and glaring, that instead of\ndwelling upon it we seem rather called upon to explain how the two\never came to be confounded, or in any way included under one notion.\nThis question and the general relation between the two doctrines were\nbriefly discussed in a former chapter.[313] Among other points it was\nthere noticed that the confusion between these two ethical theories was\npartly assisted by the confusion with both of the psychological theory\nthat in voluntary actions every agent does, universally or normally,\nseek his own individual happiness or pleasure. Now there seems to be no\n_necessary_ connexion between this latter proposition and any ethical\ntheory: but in so far as there is a natural tendency to pass from\npsychological to ethical Hedonism, the transition must be--at least\nprimarily--to the Egoistic phase of the latter. For clearly, from the\nfact that every one actually does seek his own happiness we cannot\nconclude, as an immediate and obvious inference, that he ought to seek\nthe happiness of other people.[314]\n\nNor, again, is Utilitarianism, as an ethical doctrine, necessarily\nconnected with the psychological theory that the moral sentiments are\nderived, by \u201cassociation of ideas\u201d or otherwise, from experiences of\nthe non-moral pleasures and pains resulting to the agent or to others\nfrom different kinds of conduct. An Intuitionist might accept this\ntheory, so far as it is capable of scientific proof, and still hold\nthat these moral sentiments, being found in our present consciousness\nas independent impulses, ought to possess the authority that they\nseem to claim over the more primary desires and aversions from which\nthey have sprung: and an Egoist on the other hand might fully admit\nthe altruistic element of the derivation, and still hold that these\nand all other impulses (including even Universal Benevolence) are\nproperly under the rule of Rational Self-love: and that it is really\nonly reasonable to gratify them in so far as we may expect to find our\nprivate happiness in such gratification. In short, what is often called\nthe \u201cutilitarian\u201d theory of the origin of the moral sentiments cannot\nby itself provide a proof of the ethical doctrine to which I in this\ntreatise restrict the term Utilitarianism. I shall, however, hereafter\ntry to show that this psychological theory has an important though\nsubordinate place in the establishment of Ethical Utilitarianism.[315]\n\nFinally, the doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate\n_standard_ must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence\nis the only right or always best _motive_ of action. For, as we have\nbefore observed, it is not necessary that the end which gives the\ncriterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously\naim: and if experience shows that the general happiness will be more\nsatisfactorily attained if men frequently act from other motives than\npure universal philanthropy, it is obvious that these other motives are\nreasonably to be preferred on Utilitarian principles.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us now examine the principle itself somewhat closer. I\nhave already attempted (Book ii. chap. i.) to render the notion of\nGreatest Happiness as clear and definite as possible; and the results\nthere obtained are of course as applicable to the discussion of\nUniversalistic as to that of Egoistic Hedonism. We shall understand,\nthen, that by Greatest Happiness is meant the greatest possible surplus\nof pleasure over pain, the pain being conceived as balanced against an\nequal amount of pleasure, so that the two contrasted amounts annihilate\neach other for purposes of ethical calculation. And of course, here\nas before, the assumption is involved that all pleasures included in\nour calculation are capable of being compared quantitatively with one\nanother and with all pains; that every such feeling has a certain\nintensive quantity, positive or negative (or, perhaps, zero), in\nrespect of its desirableness, and that this quantity may be to some\nextent known: so that each may be at least roughly weighed in ideal\nscales against any other. This assumption is involved in the very\nnotion of Maximum Happiness; as the attempt to make \u2018as great as\npossible\u2019 a sum of elements not quantitatively commensurable would be a\nmathematical absurdity. Therefore whatever weight is to be attached to\nthe objections brought against this assumption (which was discussed in\nchap. iii. of Book ii.) must of course tell against the present method.\n\nWe have next to consider who the \u201call\u201d are, whose happiness is to be\ntaken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings\ncapable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our\nconduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former\nview is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill, and (I believe) by the\nUtilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accordance with\nthe universality that is characteristic of their principle. It is the\nGood _Universal_, interpreted and defined as \u2018happiness\u2019 or \u2018pleasure,\u2019\nat which a Utilitarian considers it his duty to aim: and it seems\narbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end, as so conceived,\nany pleasure of any sentient being.\n\nIt may be said that by giving this extension to the notion, we\nconsiderably increase the scientific difficulties of the hedonistic\ncomparison, which have already been pointed out (Book ii. chap. iii.):\nfor if it be difficult to compare the pleasures and pains of other men\naccurately with our own, a comparison of either with the pleasures and\npains of brutes is obviously still more obscure. Still, the difficulty\nis at least not greater for Utilitarians than it is for any other\nmoralists who recoil from the paradox of disregarding altogether the\npleasures and pains of brutes. But even if we limit our attention to\nhuman beings, the extent of the subjects of happiness is not yet quite\ndeterminate. In the first place, it may be asked, How far we are to\nconsider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with\nthose of existing human beings? It seems, however, clear that the\ntime at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness\nfrom a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity\nmust concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries,\nexcept in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity--and\neven the existence of human beings to be affected--must necessarily\nbe more uncertain. But a further question arises when we consider\nthat we can to some extent influence the number of future human (or\nsentient) beings. We have to ask how, on Utilitarian principles, this\ninfluence is to be exercised. Here I shall assume that, for human\nbeings generally, life on the average yields a positive balance of\npleasure over pain. This has been denied by thoughtful persons: but\nthe denial seems to me clearly opposed to the common experience\nof mankind, as expressed in their commonly accepted principles of\naction. The great majority of men, in the great majority of conditions\nunder which human life is lived, certainly act as if death were one\nof the worst of evils, for themselves and for those whom they love:\nand the administration of criminal justice proceeds on a similar\nassumption.[316]\n\nAssuming, then, that the average happiness of human beings is a\npositive quantity, it seems clear that, supposing the average happiness\nenjoyed remains undiminished, Utilitarianism directs us to make the\nnumber enjoying it as great as possible. But if we foresee as possible\nthat an increase in numbers will be accompanied by a decrease in\naverage happiness or _vice versa_, a point arises which has not only\nnever been formally noticed, but which seems to have been substantially\noverlooked by many Utilitarians. For if we take Utilitarianism to\nprescribe, as the ultimate end of action, happiness on the whole, and\nnot any individual\u2019s happiness, unless considered as an element of the\nwhole, it would follow that, if the additional population enjoy on the\nwhole positive happiness, we ought to weigh the amount of happiness\ngained by the extra number against the amount lost by the remainder.\nSo that, strictly conceived, the point up to which, on Utilitarian\nprinciples, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that\nat which average happiness is the greatest possible,--as appears to be\noften assumed by political economists of the school of Malthus--but\nthat at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons\nliving into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum.\n\nIt may be well here to make a remark which has a wide application in\nUtilitarian discussion. The conclusion just given wears a certain air\nof absurdity to the view of Common Sense; because its show of exactness\nis grotesquely incongruous with our consciousness of the inevitable\ninexactness of all such calculations in actual practice. But, that\nour practical Utilitarian reasonings must necessarily be rough, is\nno reason for not making them as accurate as the case admits; and we\nshall be more likely to succeed in this if we keep before our mind\nas distinctly as possible the strict type of the calculation that\nwe should have to make, if all the relevant considerations could be\nestimated with mathematical precision.\n\nThere is one more point that remains to be noticed. It is evident that\nthere may be many different ways of distributing the same quantum\nof happiness among the same number of persons; in order, therefore,\nthat the Utilitarian criterion of right conduct may be as complete as\npossible, we ought to know which of these ways is to be preferred.\nThis question is often ignored in expositions of Utilitarianism. It\nhas perhaps seemed somewhat idle, as suggesting a purely abstract and\ntheoretical perplexity, that could have no practical exemplification;\nand no doubt, if all the consequences of actions were capable of\nbeing estimated and summed up with mathematical precision, we should\nprobably never find the excess of pleasure over pain exactly equal\nin the case of two competing alternatives of conduct. But the very\nindefiniteness of all hedonistic calculations, which was sufficiently\nshown in Book ii., renders it by no means unlikely that there may be no\n_cognisable_ difference between the quantities of happiness involved\nin two sets of consequences respectively; the more rough our estimates\nnecessarily are, the less likely we shall be to come to any clear\ndecision between two apparently balanced alternatives. In all such\ncases, therefore, it becomes practically important to ask whether any\nmode of distributing a given quantum of happiness is better than any\nother. Now the Utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer to this\nquestion: at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking the\ngreatest happiness on the whole by some principle of Just or Right\ndistribution of this happiness. The principle which most Utilitarians\nhave either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality--as\ngiven in Bentham\u2019s formula, \u201ceverybody to count for one, and nobody for\nmore than one.\u201d And this principle seems the only one which does not\nneed a special justification; for, as we saw, it must be reasonable to\ntreat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason\napparent for treating him differently.[317]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[313] Book i. chap. vi. It may be worth while to notice, that in Mill\u2019s\nwell-known treatise on Utilitarianism this confusion, though expressly\ndeprecated, is to some extent encouraged by the author\u2019s treatment of\nthe subject.\n\n[314] I have already criticised (Book iii. chap. xiii.) the mode in\nwhich Mill attempts to exhibit this inference.\n\n[315] Cf. _post_, chap. iv.\n\n[316] Those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume\nthat the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary\nhuman action are in themselves painful: a view entirely contrary\nto my own experience, and, I believe, to the common experience of\nmankind. See chap. iv. \u00a7 2 of Book i. So far as their argument is not\na development of this psychological error, any plausibility it has\nseems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances\nand disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life, and on\nthe exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race, or\nperhaps of most men during small portions of their lives.\n\nThe reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic\nutilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive\nwriter, may refer to Professor Macmillan\u2019s book on the _Promotion\nof General Happiness_ (Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1890). The author\nconsiders that \u201cthe philosophical world is pretty equally divided\nbetween optimists and pessimists,\u201d and his own judgment on the question\nat issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense.\n\n[317] It should be observed that the question here is as to the\ndistribution of _Happiness_, not the _means of happiness_. If more\nhappiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of\nhappiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible\ndeduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to\nB, whatever inequality in the distribution of the _means_ of happiness\nthis may involve.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n\nIn Book ii., where we discussed the method of Egoistic Hedonism, we did\nnot take occasion to examine any proof of its first principle: and in\nthe case of Universalistic Hedonism also, what primarily concerns us is\nnot how its principle is to be proved to those who do not accept it,\nbut what consequences are logically involved in its acceptance. At the\nsame time it is important to observe that the principle of aiming at\nuniversal happiness is more generally felt to require some proof, or\nat least (as Mill puts it) some \u201cconsiderations determining the mind\nto accept it,\u201d than the principle of aiming at one\u2019s own happiness.\nFrom the point of view, indeed, of abstract philosophy, I do not see\nwhy the Egoistic principle should pass unchallenged any more than the\nUniversalistic. I do not see why the axiom of Prudence should not be\nquestioned, when it conflicts with present inclination, on a ground\nsimilar to that on which Egoists refuse to admit the axiom of Rational\nBenevolence. If the Utilitarian has to answer the question, \u2018Why should\nI sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of another?\u2019 it\nmust surely be admissible to ask the Egoist, \u2018Why should I sacrifice a\npresent pleasure for a greater one in the future? Why should I concern\nmyself about my own future feelings any more than about the feelings\nof other persons?\u2019 It undoubtedly seems to Common Sense paradoxical to\nask for a reason why one should seek one\u2019s own happiness on the whole;\nbut I do not see how the demand can be repudiated as absurd by those\nwho adopt the views of the extreme empirical school of psychologists,\nalthough those views are commonly supposed to have a close affinity\nwith Egoistic Hedonism. Grant that the Ego is merely a system of\ncoherent phenomena, that the permanent identical \u2018I\u2019 is not a fact\nbut a fiction, as Hume and his followers maintain; why, then, should\none part of the series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be\nconcerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any\nother series?\n\nHowever, I will not press this question now; since I admit that\nCommon Sense does not think it worth while to supply the individual\nwith reasons for seeking his own interest.[318] Reasons for doing his\nduty--according to the commonly accepted standard of duty--are not held\nto be equally superfluous: indeed we find that utilitarian reasons\nare continually given for one or other of the commonly received rules\nof morality. Still the fact that certain rules are commonly received\nas binding, though it does not establish their self-evidence, renders\nit generally unnecessary to prove their authority to the Common Sense\nthat receives them: while for the same reason a Utilitarian who claims\nto supersede them by a higher principle is naturally challenged, by\nIntuitionists no less than by Egoists, to demonstrate the legitimacy\nof his claim. To this challenge some Utilitarians would reply by\nsaying that it is impossible to \u201cprove\u201d a first principle; and this\nis of course true, if by proof we mean a process which exhibits the\nprinciple in question as an inference from premises upon which it\nremains dependent for its certainty; for these premises, and not the\ninference drawn from them, would then be the real first principles.\nNay, if Utilitarianism is to be _proved_ to a man who already holds\nsome other moral principles,--whether he be an Intuitional moralist,\nwho regards as final the principles of Truth, Justice, Obedience to\nauthority, Purity, etc., or an Egoist who regards his own interest as\nthe ultimately reasonable end of his conduct,--it would seem that the\nprocess must be one which establishes a conclusion actually _superior_\nin validity to the premises from which it starts. For the Utilitarian\nprescriptions of duty are _prima facie_ in conflict, at certain points\nand under certain circumstances, both with rules which the Intuitionist\nregards as self-evident, and with the dictates of Rational Egoism; so\nthat Utilitarianism, if accepted at all, must be accepted as overruling\nIntuitionism and Egoism. At the same time, if the other principles\nare not throughout taken as valid, the so-called proof does not seem\nto be addressed to the Intuitionist or Egoist at all. How shall we\ndeal with this dilemma? How is such a process--clearly different from\nordinary proof--possible or conceivable? Yet there certainly seems to\nbe a general demand for it. Perhaps we may say that what is needed is\na line of argument which on the one hand allows the validity, to a\ncertain extent, of the maxims already accepted, and on the other hand\nshows them to be not absolutely valid, but needing to be controlled and\ncompleted by some more comprehensive principle.\n\nSuch a line of argument, addressed to Egoism, was given in chap. xiii.\nof the foregoing book. It should be observed that the applicability\nof this argument depends on the manner in which the Egoistic first\nprinciple is formulated. If the Egoist strictly confines himself\nto stating his conviction that he ought to take his own happiness\nor pleasure as his ultimate end, there seems no opening for any\nline of reasoning to lead him to Universalistic Hedonism as a first\nprinciple;[319] it cannot be proved that the difference between his\nown happiness and another\u2019s happiness is not _for him_ all-important.\nIn this case all that the Utilitarian can do is to effect as far as\npossible a reconciliation between the two principles, by expounding to\nthe Egoist the _sanctions_ of rules deduced from the Universalistic\nprinciple,--_i.e._ by pointing out the pleasures and pains that may\nbe expected to accrue to the Egoist himself from the observation and\nviolation respectively of such rules. It is obvious that such an\nexposition has no tendency to make him accept the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number as his ultimate end; but only as a means to the end\nof his own happiness. It is therefore totally different from a _proof_\n(as above explained) of Universalistic Hedonism. When, however, the\nEgoist puts forward, implicitly or explicitly, the proposition that his\nhappiness or pleasure is Good, not only _for him_ but from the point\nof view of the Universe,--as (_e.g._) by saying that \u2018nature designed\nhim to seek his own happiness,\u2019--it then becomes relevant to point out\nto him that _his_ happiness cannot be a more important part of Good,\ntaken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And\nthus, starting with his own principle, he may be brought to accept\nUniversal happiness or pleasure as that which is absolutely and without\nqualification Good or Desirable: as an end, therefore, to which the\naction of a reasonable agent as such ought to be directed.\n\nThis, it will be remembered, is the reasoning[320] that I used in chap.\nxiii. of the preceding book in exhibiting the principle of Rational\nBenevolence as one of the few Intuitions which stand the test of\nrigorous criticism. It should be observed, however, that as addressed\nto the Intuitionist, this reasoning only shows the Utilitarian first\nprinciple to be _one_ moral axiom: it does not prove that it is\n_sole_ or _supreme_. The premises with which the Intuitionist starts\ncommonly include other formul\u00e6 held as independent and self-evident.\nUtilitarianism has therefore to exhibit itself in the twofold relation\nabove described, at once negative and positive, to these formul\u00e6.\nThe Utilitarian must, in the first place, endeavour to show to the\nIntuitionist that the principles of Truth, Justice,[2] etc. have only a\ndependent and subordinate validity: arguing either that the principle\nis really only affirmed by Common Sense as a general rule admitting\nof exceptions and qualifications, as in the case of Truth, and that\nwe require some further principle for systematising these exceptions\nand qualifications; or that the fundamental notion is vague and needs\nfurther determination, as in the case of Justice;[321] and further,\nthat the different rules are liable to conflict with each other, and\nthat we require some higher principle to decide the issue thus raised;\nand again, that the rules are differently formulated by different\npersons, and that these differences admit of no Intuitional solution,\nwhile they show the vagueness and ambiguity of the common moral\nnotions to which the Intuitionist appeals.\n\nThis part of the argument I have perhaps sufficiently developed in the\npreceding book. It remains to supplement this line of reasoning by\ndeveloping the positive relation that exists between Utilitarianism\nand the Morality of Common Sense: by showing how Utilitarianism\nsustains the general validity of the current moral judgments, and\nthus supplements the defects which reflection finds in the intuitive\nrecognition of their stringency; and at the same time affords a\nprinciple of synthesis, and a method for binding the unconnected and\noccasionally conflicting principles of common moral reasoning into\na complete and harmonious system. If systematic reflection upon the\nmorality of Common Sense thus exhibits the Utilitarian principle\nas that to which Common Sense naturally appeals for that further\ndevelopment of its system which this same reflection shows to be\nnecessary, the proof of Utilitarianism seems as complete as it can\nbe made. And since, further--apart from the question of proof--it is\nimportant in considering the method of Utilitarianism to determine\nexactly its relation to the commonly received rules of morality, it\nwill be proper to examine this relation at some length in the following\nchapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[318] The relation of Egoistic to Universalistic Hedonism is further\nexamined in the concluding chapter.\n\n[319] It is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than\nthat of argument: _i.e._ by appeals to his sympathies, or to his moral\nor quasi-moral sentiments.\n\n[320] I ought to remind the reader that the argument in chap. xiii.\nonly leads to the first principle of Utilitarianism, if it be admitted\nthat Happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically Good or\nDesirable. I afterwards in chap. xiv. endeavoured to bring Common Sense\nto this admission.\n\n[321] That is, so far as we mean by Justice anything more than the\nsimple negation of arbitrary inequality.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nRELATION OF UTILITARIANISM TO THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. It has been before observed (Book i. chap. vi.) that the two\nsides of the double relation in which Utilitarianism stands to the\nMorality of Common Sense have been respectively prominent at two\ndifferent periods in the history of English ethical thought. Since\nBentham we have been chiefly familiar with the negative or aggressive\naspect of the Utilitarian doctrine. But when Cumberland, replying to\nHobbes, put forward the general tendency of the received moral rules\nto promote the \u201ccommon Good[322] of all Rationals\u201d his aim was simply\nConservative: it never occurs to him to consider whether these rules as\ncommonly formulated are in any way imperfect, and whether there are any\ndiscrepancies between such common moral opinions and the conclusions\nof Rational Benevolence. So in Shaftesbury\u2019s system the \u201cMoral\u201d or\n\u201cReflex Sense\u201d is supposed to be always pleased with that \u201cbalance\u201d\nof the affections which tends to the good or happiness of the whole,\nand displeased with the opposite. In Hume\u2019s treatise this coincidence\nis drawn out more in detail, and with a more definite assertion that\nthe perception of utility[323] (or the reverse) is in each case the\nsource of the moral likings (or aversions) which are excited in us\nby different qualities of human character and conduct. And we may\nobserve that the most penetrating among Hume\u2019s contemporary critics,\nAdam Smith, admits unreservedly the objective coincidence of Rightness\nor Approvedness and Utility: though he maintains, in opposition to\nHume, that \u201cit is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness, which\nis either the first or the principal source of our approbation or\ndisapprobation.\u201d After stating Hume\u2019s theory that \u201cno qualities of\nthe mind are approved of as virtuous, but such as are useful or\nagreeable either to the person himself or to others, and no qualities\nare disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary tendency\u201d;\nhe remarks that \u201cNature seems indeed to have so happily adjusted our\nsentiments of approbation and disapprobation to the conveniency both of\nthe individual and of the society, that after the strictest examination\nit will be found, I believe, that this is universally the case.\u201d\n\nAnd no one can read Hume\u2019s _Inquiry into the First Principles of\nMorals_ without being convinced of this at least, that if a list were\ndrawn up of the qualities of character and conduct that are directly or\nindirectly productive of pleasure to ourselves or to others, it would\ninclude all that are commonly known as virtues. Whatever be the origin\nof our notion of moral goodness or excellence, there is no doubt that\n\u201cUtility\u201d is a general characteristic of the dispositions to which we\napply it: and that, so far, the Morality of Common Sense may be truly\nrepresented as at least unconsciously Utilitarian. But it may still be\nobjected, that this coincidence is merely general and qualitative, and\nthat it breaks down when we attempt to draw it out in detail, with the\nquantitative precision which Bentham introduced into the discussion.\nAnd no doubt there is a great difference between the assertion that\nvirtue is always productive of happiness, and the assertion that the\nright action is under all circumstances that which will produce the\ngreatest possible happiness on the whole. But it must be borne in mind\nthat Utilitarianism is not concerned to prove the absolute coincidence\nin results of the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods. Indeed, if it\ncould succeed in proving as much as this, its success would be almost\nfatal to its practical claims; as the adoption of the Utilitarian\nprinciple would then become a matter of complete indifference.\nUtilitarians are rather called upon to show a natural transition from\nthe Morality of Common Sense to Utilitarianism, somewhat like the\ntransition in special branches of practice from trained instinct and\nempirical rules to the technical method that embodies and applies the\nconclusions of science: so that Utilitarianism may be presented as the\nscientifically complete and systematically reflective form of that\nregulation of conduct, which through the whole course of human history\nhas always tended substantially in the same direction. For this purpose\nit is not necessary to prove that existing moral rules are _more_\nconducive to the general happiness than any others: but only to point\nout in each case some manifest felicific tendency which they possess.\n\nHume\u2019s dissertation, however, incidentally exhibits much more than a\nsimple and general harmony between the moral sentiments with which we\ncommonly regard actions and their foreseen pleasurable and painful\nconsequences. And, in fact, the Utilitarian argument cannot be fairly\njudged unless we take fully into account the cumulative force which\nit derives from the complex character of the coincidence between\nUtilitarianism and Common Sense.\n\nIt may be shown, I think, that the Utilitarian estimate of consequences\nnot only supports broadly the current moral rules, but also sustains\ntheir generally received limitations and qualifications: that,\nagain, it explains anomalies in the Morality of Common Sense,\nwhich from any other point of view must seem unsatisfactory to the\nreflective intellect; and moreover, where the current formula is not\nsufficiently precise for the guidance of conduct, while at the same\ntime difficulties and perplexities arise in the attempt to give it\nadditional precision, the Utilitarian method solves these difficulties\nand perplexities in general accordance with the vague instincts of\nCommon Sense, and is naturally appealed to for such solution in\nordinary moral discussions. It may be shown further, that it not only\nsupports the generally received view of the relative importance of\ndifferent duties, but is also naturally called in as arbiter, where\nrules commonly regarded as co-ordinate come into conflict: that, again,\nwhen the same rule is interpreted somewhat differently by different\npersons, each naturally supports his view by urging its Utility,\nhowever strongly he may maintain the rule to be self-evident and\nknown _a priori_: that where we meet with marked diversity of moral\nopinion on any point, in the same age and country, we commonly find\nmanifest and impressive utilitarian reasons on both sides: and that\nfinally the remarkable discrepancies found in comparing the moral\ncodes of different ages and countries are for the most part strikingly\ncorrelated to differences in the effects of actions on happiness, or in\nmen\u2019s foresight of, or concern for, such effects. Most of these points\nare noticed by Hume, though in a somewhat casual and fragmentary way:\nand many of them have been incidentally illustrated in the course of\nthe examination of Common Sense Morality, with which we were occupied\nin the preceding Book. But considering the importance of the present\nquestion, it may be well to exhibit in systematic detail the cumulative\nargument which has just been summed up, even at the risk of repeating\nto some extent the results previously given.\n\n\u00a7 2. We may begin by replying to an objection which is frequently\nurged against Utilitarianism. How, it is asked, if the true ground\nof the moral goodness or badness of actions lies in their utility or\nthe reverse, can we explain the broad distinction drawn by Common\nSense between the moral and other parts of our nature? Why is the\nexcellence of Virtue so strongly felt to be different in kind, not\nmerely from the excellence of a machine, or a fertile field, but also\nfrom the physical beauties and aptitudes, the intellectual gifts and\ntalents of human beings. I should answer that--as was argued in an\nearlier chapter (Book iii. chap. ii.)--qualities that are, in the\nstrictest sense of the term, Virtuous, are always such as we conceive\ncapable of being immediately realised by voluntary effort, at least\nto some extent; so that the prominent obstacle to virtuous action is\nabsence of adequate motive. Hence we expect that the judgments of\nmoral goodness or badness, passed either by the agent himself or by\nothers, will--by the fresh motive which they supply on the side of\nvirtue--have an immediate practical effect in causing actions to be at\nleast externally virtuous: and the habitual consciousness of this will\naccount for almost any degree of difference between moral sentiments\nand the pleasure and pain that we derive from the contemplation of\neither extra-human or non-voluntary utilities and inutilities. To this,\nhowever, it is replied, that among the tendencies to strictly voluntary\nactions there are many not commonly regarded as virtuous, which are\nyet not only useful but on the whole _more_ useful than many virtues.\n\u201cThe selfish instinct that leads men to accumulate confers ultimately\nmore advantage on the world than the generous instinct that leads men\nto give.... It is scarcely doubtful that a modest, diffident, and\nretiring nature, distrustful of its own abilities, and shrinking with\nhumility from conflict, produces on the whole less benefit to the world\nthan the self-assertion of an audacious and arrogant nature, which is\nimpelled to every struggle, and develops every capacity. Gratitude has\nno doubt done much to soften and sweeten the intercourse of life, but\nthe corresponding feeling of revenge was for centuries the one bulwark\nagainst social anarchy, and is even now one of the chief restraints to\ncrime. On the great theatre of public life, especially in periods of\ngreat convulsions where passions are fiercely roused, it is neither\nthe man of delicate scrupulosity and sincere impartiality, nor yet\nthe single-minded religious enthusiast, incapable of dissimulation or\nprocrastination, who confers most benefit on the world. It is much\nrather the astute statesman, earnest about his ends, but unscrupulous\nabout his means, equally free from the trammels of conscience and\nfrom the blindness of zeal, who governs because he partly yields to\nthe passions and the prejudices of his time. But ... it has scarcely\nyet been contended that the delicate conscience which in these cases\nimpairs utility constitutes vice.\u201d[324]\n\nThese objections are forcibly urged; but they appear to me not very\ndifficult to answer, it being always borne in mind that the present\nargument does not aim at proving an exact coincidence between\nUtilitarian inferences and the intuitions of Common Sense, but\nrather seeks to represent the latter as inchoately and imperfectly\nUtilitarian.\n\nIn the first place, we must carefully distinguish between the\nrecognition of goodness in dispositions, and the recognition of\nrightness in conduct. An act that a Utilitarian must condemn as likely\nto do more harm than good may yet show a disposition or tendency that\nwill on the whole produce more good than harm. This is eminently the\ncase with scrupulously conscientious acts. However true it may be\nthat unenlightened conscientiousness has impelled men to fanatical\ncruelty, mistaken asceticism, and other infelicific conduct, I suppose\nno Intuitionist would maintain that carefulness in conforming to\naccepted moral rules has not, on the whole, a tendency to promote\nhappiness. It may be observed, however, that when we perceive the\neffects of a disposition generally felicific to be in any particular\ncase adverse to happiness, we often apply to it, as so operating, some\nterm of condemnation: thus we speak, in the case above noticed, of\n\u2018over-scrupulousness\u2019 or \u2018fanaticism.\u2019 But in so far as we perceive\nthat the same disposition would generally produce good results,\nit is not inconsistent still to regard it, abstracting from the\nparticular case, as a good element of character. Secondly, although,\nin the view of a Utilitarian, only the useful is praiseworthy, he\nis not bound to maintain that it is necessarily worthy of praise in\nproportion as it is useful. From a Utilitarian point of view, as has\nbeen before said, we must mean by calling a quality \u2018deserving of\npraise,\u2019 that it is expedient to praise it, with a view to its future\nproduction: accordingly, in distributing our praise of human qualities,\non utilitarian principles, we have to consider primarily not the\nusefulness of the quality, but the usefulness of the praise: and it\nis obviously not expedient to encourage by praise qualities which are\nlikely to be found in excess rather than in defect. Hence (_e.g._)\nhowever necessary self-love or resentment may be to society, it is\nquite in harmony with Utilitarianism that they should not be recognised\nas virtues by Common Sense, in so far as it is reasonably thought that\nthey will always be found operating with at least sufficient intensity.\nWe find, however, that when self-love comes into conflict with impulses\nseen to be on the whole pernicious, it is praised as Prudence: and\nthat when a man seems clearly deficient in resentment, he is censured\nfor tameness: though as malevolent impulses are much more obviously\nproductive of pain than pleasure, it is not unnatural that their\noccasional utility should be somewhat overlooked. The case of Humility\nand Diffidence may be treated in a somewhat similar way. As we saw[325]\nit is only inadvertently that Common Sense praises the tendency to\nunderrate one\u2019s own powers: on reflection it is generally admitted\nthat it cannot be good to be in error on this or any other point. But\nthe desires of Superiority and Esteem are so strong in most men, that\narrogance and self-assertion are both much commoner than the opposite\ndefects, and at the same time are faults peculiarly disagreeable to\nothers: so that humility gives us an agreeable surprise, and hence\nCommon Sense is easily led to overlook the more latent and remote bad\nconsequences of undue self-distrust.\n\nWe may observe further that the perplexity which we seemed to find in\nthe Morality of Common Sense, as to the relation of moral excellence\nto moral effort, is satisfactorily explained and removed when we\nadopt a Utilitarian point of view: for on the one hand it is easy to\nsee how certain acts--such as kind services--are likely to be more\nfelicific when performed without effort, and from other motives than\nregard for duty: while on the other hand a person who in doing similar\nacts achieves a triumph of duty over strong seductive inclinations,\nexhibits thereby a character which we recognise as felicific in a\nmore general way, as tending to a general performance of duty in all\ndepartments. So again, there is a simple and obvious utilitarian\nsolution of another difficulty which I noticed, as to the choice\nbetween Subjective and Objective rightness in the exceptional case in\nwhich alone the two can be presented as alternatives,--_i.e._ when we\nare considering whether we shall influence another to act contrary to\nhis conviction as to what is right. A utilitarian would decide the\nquestion by weighing the felicific consequences of the particular right\nact against the infelicific results to be apprehended hereafter from\nthe moral deterioration of the person whose conscientious convictions\nwere overborne by other motives: unless the former effects were very\nimportant he would reasonably regard the danger to character as the\ngreater: but if the other\u2019s mistaken sense of duty threatened to cause\na grave disaster, he would not hesitate to overbear it by any motives\nwhich it was in his power to apply. And in practice I think that the\nCommon Sense of mankind would come to similar conclusions by more vague\nand semi-conscious reasoning of the same kind.\n\nIn order, however, to form a precise estimate of the extent to which\nUtilitarianism agrees or disagrees with Common Sense, it seems best\nto examine the more definite judgments of right and wrong in conduct,\nunder the particular heads represented by our common notions of\nvirtues and duties. I may begin by pointing out once more that so far\nas any adequately precise definitions of these notions are found to\ninvolve, implicitly or explicitly, the notion of \u2018good\u2019 or of \u2018right\u2019\nsupposed already determinate, they can afford no ground for opposing\na Utilitarian interpretation of these fundamental conceptions. For\nexample, we saw this to be the case with the chief of the intellectual\nexcellences discussed in Book iii. chap. iii. Wisdom, as commonly\nconceived, is not exactly the faculty of choosing the right means to\nthe end of universal happiness; rather, as we saw, its notion involves\nan uncritical synthesis of the different ends and principles that are\ndistinguished and separately examined in the present treatise. But if\nits import is not distinctly Utilitarian, it is certainly not anything\nelse as distinct from Utilitarian: if we can only define it as the\nfaculty or habit of choosing the right or best means to the right or\nbest end, for that very reason our definition leaves it quite open to\nus to give the notions \u2018good\u2019 and \u2018right\u2019 a Utilitarian import.\n\n\u00a7 3. Let us then examine first the group of virtues and duties discussed\nin Book iii. chap. iv., under the head of Benevolence. As regards the\ngeneral conception of the duty, there is, I think, no divergence that\nwe need consider between the Intuitional and Utilitarian systems.\nFor though Benevolence would perhaps be more commonly defined as a\ndisposition to promote the Good of one\u2019s fellow-creatures, rather than\ntheir Happiness (as definitely understood by Utilitarians); still, as\nthe chief element in the common notion of good (besides happiness)\nis moral good or Virtue,[326] if we can show that the other virtues\nare--speaking broadly--all qualities conducive to the happiness of the\nagent himself or of others, it is evident that Benevolence, whether it\nprompts us to promote the virtue of others or their happiness, will\naim directly or indirectly at the Utilitarian end.[327]\n\nNor, further, does the comprehensive range which Utilitarians give to\nBenevolence, in stating as their ultimate end the greatest happiness\nof all sentient beings, seem to be really opposed to Common Sense;\nfor in so far as certain Intuitional moralists restrict the scope of\nthe direct duty of Benevolence to human beings, and regard our duties\nto brute animals as merely indirect and derived \u201cfrom the duty of\nSelf-culture,\u201d they rather than their Utilitarian opponents appear\nparadoxical. And if, in laying down that each agent is to consider all\nother happiness as equally important with his own, Utilitarianism seems\nto go beyond the standard of duty commonly prescribed under the head\nof Benevolence, it yet can scarcely be said to conflict with Common\nSense on this point. For the practical application of this theoretical\nimpartiality of Utilitarianism is limited by several important\nconsiderations. In the first place, generally speaking, each man is\nbetter able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other\npersons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs,\nand his greater opportunities of gratifying them. And besides, it is\nunder the stimulus of self-interest that the active energies of most\nmen are most easily and thoroughly drawn out: and if this were removed,\ngeneral happiness would be diminished by a serious loss of those means\nof happiness which are obtained by labour; and also, to some extent,\nby the diminution of the labour itself. For these reasons it would not\nunder actual circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man\nwere to concern himself with the happiness of others as much as with\nhis own. While if I consider the duty abstractly and ideally, even\nCommon Sense morality seems to bid me \u201clove my neighbour as myself.\u201d\n\nIt might indeed be plausibly objected, on the other hand, that under\nthe notions of Generosity, Self-sacrifice, etc., Common Sense praises\n(though it does not prescribe as obligatory) a suppression of egoism\nbeyond what Utilitarianism approves: for we perhaps admire as virtuous\na man who gives up his own happiness for another\u2019s sake, even when the\nhappiness that he confers is clearly less than that which he resigns,\nso that there is a diminution of happiness on the whole. But (1) it\nseems very doubtful whether we do altogether approve such conduct when\nthe disproportion between the sacrifice and the benefit is obvious\nand striking: and (2) a spectator is often unable to judge whether\nhappiness is lost on the whole, as (_a_) he cannot tell how far he who\nmakes the sacrifice is compensated by sympathetic and moral pleasure,\nand (_b_) the remoter felicific consequences flowing from the moral\neffects of such a sacrifice on the agent and on others have to be taken\ninto account: while (3) even if there be a loss in the particular\ncase, still our admiration of self-sacrifice will admit of a certain\nUtilitarian justification, because such conduct shows a disposition far\nabove the average in its general tendency to promote happiness, and it\nis perhaps this disposition that we admire rather than the particular\nact.\n\nIt has been said,[328] however, that the special claims and duties\nbelonging to special relations, by which each man is connected with\na few out of the whole number of human beings, are expressly ignored\nby the rigid impartiality of the Utilitarian formula: and hence that,\nthough Utilitarianism and Common Sense may agree in the proposition\nthat all right action is conducive to the happiness of some one or\nother, and so far beneficent, still they are irreconcileably divergent\non the radical question of the _distribution_ of beneficence.\n\nHere, however, it seems that even fair-minded opponents have scarcely\nunderstood the Utilitarian position. They have attacked Bentham\u2019s\nwell-known formula, \u201cevery man to count for one, nobody for more than\none,\u201d on the ground that the general happiness will be best attained by\ninequality in the distribution of each one\u2019s services. But so far as it\nis clear that it will be best attained in this way, Utilitarianism will\nnecessarily prescribe this way of aiming at it; and Bentham\u2019s dictum\nmust be understood merely as making the conception of the ultimate end\nprecise--laying down that one person\u2019s happiness is to be counted for\nas much as another\u2019s (supposed equal in degree) as an element of the\ngeneral happiness--not as directly prescribing the rules of conduct\nby which this end will be best attained. And the reasons why it is,\ngenerally speaking, conducive to the general happiness that each\nindividual should distribute his beneficence in the channels marked out\nby commonly recognised ties and claims, are tolerably obvious.\n\nFor first, in the chief relations discussed in chap. iv. of Book\niii.--the domestic, and those constituted by consanguinity,\nfriendship, previous kindnesses, and special needs,--the services\nwhich Common Sense prescribes as duties are commonly prompted by\nnatural affection, while at the same time they tend to develop and\nsustain such affection. Now the subsistence of benevolent affections\namong human beings is itself an important means to the Utilitarian\nend, because (as Shaftesbury and his followers forcibly urged) the\nmost intense and highly valued of our pleasures are derived from such\naffections; for both the emotion itself is highly pleasurable, and it\nimparts this quality to the activities which it prompts and sustains,\nand the happiness thus produced is continually enhanced by the\nsympathetic echo of the pleasures conferred on others. And again, where\ngenuine affection subsists, the practical objections to spontaneous\nbeneficence, which were before noticed, are much diminished in force.\nFor such affection tends to be reciprocated, and the kindnesses\nwhich are its outcome and expression commonly win a requital of\naffection: and in so far as this is the case, they have less tendency\nto weaken the springs of activity in the person benefited; and may\neven strengthen them by exciting other sources of energy than the\negoistic--personal affection, and gratitude, and the desire to deserve\nlove, and the desire to imitate beneficence. And hence it has been\noften observed that the injurious effects of almsgiving are at least\nmuch diminished if the alms are bestowed with unaffected sympathy\nand kindliness, and in such a way as to elicit a genuine response of\ngratitude. And further, the beneficence that springs from affection is\nless likely to be frustrated from defect of knowledge: for not only are\nwe powerfully stimulated to study the real conditions of the happiness\nof those whom we love, but also such study is rendered more effective\nfrom the sympathy which naturally accompanies affection.\n\nOn these grounds the Utilitarian will evidently approve of the\ncultivation of affection and the performance of affectionate services.\nIt may be said, however, that what we ought to approve is not so much\naffection for special individuals, but rather a feeling more universal\nin its scope--charity, philanthropy, or (as it has been called) the\n\u2018Enthusiasm of Humanity.\u2019 And certainly all special affections tend\noccasionally to come into conflict with the principle of promoting the\ngeneral happiness: and Utilitarianism must therefore prescribe such a\nculture of the feelings as will, so far as possible, counteract this\ntendency. But it seems that most persons are only capable of strong\naffections towards a few human beings in certain close relations,\nespecially the domestic: and that if these were suppressed, what they\nwould feel towards their fellow-creatures generally would be, as\nAristotle says, \u201cbut a watery kindness\u201d and a very feeble counterpoise\nto self-love: so that such specialised affections as the present\norganisation of society normally produces afford the best means of\ndeveloping in most persons a more extended benevolence, to the degree\nto which they are capable of feeling it. Besides, each person is for\nthe most part, from limitation either of power or knowledge, not in a\nposition to do much good to more than a very small number of persons;\nit therefore seems, on this ground alone, desirable that his chief\nbenevolent impulses should be correspondingly limited.\n\nAnd this leads us to consider, secondly, the reasons why, affection\napart, it is conducive to the general happiness that special claims\nto services should be commonly recognised as attaching to special\nrelations; so as to modify that impartiality in the distribution\nof beneficence which Utilitarianism _prima facie_ inculcates. For\nclearness\u2019 sake it seems best to take this argument separately,\nthough it cannot easily be divided from the former one, because the\nservices in question are often such as cannot so well be rendered\nwithout affection. In such cases, as we saw,[329] Common Sense\nregards the affection itself as a duty, in so far as it is capable\nof being cultivated: but still prescribes the performance of the\nservices even if the affection be unhappily absent. Indeed we may\nproperly consider the services to which we are commonly prompted by\nthe domestic affections, and also those to which we are moved by\ngratitude and pity, as an integral part of the system of mutual aid\nby which the normal life and happiness of society is maintained,\nunder existing circumstances; being an indispensable supplement to\nthe still more essential services which are definitely prescribed by\nLaw, or rendered on commercial terms as a part of an express bargain.\nAs political economists have explained, the means of happiness are\nimmensely increased by that complex system of co-operation which has\nbeen gradually organised among civilised men: and while it is thought\nthat under such a system it will be generally best on the whole to let\neach individual exchange such services as he is disposed to render for\nsuch return as he can obtain for them by free contract, still there\nare many large exceptions to this general principle. Of these the most\nimportant is constituted by the case of children. It is necessary for\nthe well-being of mankind that in each generation children should\nbe produced in adequate numbers, neither too many nor too few; and\nthat, as they cannot be left to provide for themselves, they should\nbe adequately nourished and protected during the period of infancy;\nand further, that they should be carefully trained in good habits,\nintellectual, moral, and physical: and it is commonly believed that the\nbest or even the only known means of attaining these ends in even a\ntolerable degree is afforded by the existing institution of the Family,\nresting as it does on a basis of legal and moral rules combined. For\nLaw fixes a minimum of mutual services and draws the broad outlines of\nbehaviour for the different members of the family, imposing[330] on the\nparents lifelong union and complete mutual fidelity and the duty of\nproviding for their children the necessaries of life up to a certain\nage; in return for which it gives them the control of their children\nfor the same period, and sometimes lays on the latter the burden of\nsupporting their parents when aged and destitute: so that Morality, in\ninculcating a completer harmony of interests and an ampler interchange\nof kindnesses, is merely filling in the outlines drawn by Law. We\nfound, however, in attempting to formulate the different domestic\nduties as recognised by Common Sense, that there seemed to be in most\ncases a large vague margin with respect to which general agreement\ncould not be affirmed, and which, in fact, forms an arena for continual\ndisputes. But we have now to observe that it is just this margin\nwhich reveals most clearly the latent Utilitarianism of common moral\nopinion: for when the question is once raised as to the precise mutual\nduties (_e.g._) of husbands and wives, or of parents and children, each\ndisputant commonly supports his view by a forecast of the effects on\nhuman happiness to be expected from the general establishment of any\nproposed rule; this seems to be the standard to which the matter is, by\ncommon consent, referred.\n\nSimilarly the claim to services that arises out of special need (which\nnatural sympathy moves us to recognise) may obviously be rested on an\nutilitarian basis: indeed the proper fulfilment of this duty seems so\nimportant to the well-being of society, that it has in modern civilised\ncommunities generally been brought to some extent within the sphere of\nGovernmental action. We noticed that the main utilitarian reason why it\nis not right for every rich man to distribute his superfluous wealth\namong the poor, is that the happiness of all is on the whole most\npromoted by maintaining in adults generally (except married women),\nthe expectation that each will be thrown on his own resources for the\nsupply of his own wants. But if I am made aware that, owing to a sudden\ncalamity that could not have been foreseen, another\u2019s resources are\nmanifestly inadequate to protect him from pain or serious discomfort,\nthe case is altered; my theoretical obligation to consider his\nhappiness as much as my own becomes at once practical; and I am bound\nto make as much effort to relieve him as will not entail a greater\nloss of happiness to myself or others. If, however, the calamity is\none which might have been foreseen and averted by proper care, my duty\nbecomes more doubtful: for then by relieving him I seem to be in danger\nof encouraging improvidence in others. In such a case a Utilitarian\nhas to weigh this indirect evil against the direct good of removing\npain and distress: and it is now more and more generally recognised\nthat the question of providing for the destitute has to be treated as\na utilitarian problem of which these are the elements,--whether we are\nconsidering the minimum that should be secured to them by law, or the\nproper supplementary action of private charity.\n\nPoverty, however, is not the only case in which it is conducive to\nthe general happiness that one man should render unbought services to\nanother. In any condition or calling a man may find himself unable\nto ward off some evil, or to realise some legitimate or worthy end,\nwithout assistance of such kind as he cannot purchase on the ordinary\ncommercial terms;--assistance which, on the one hand, will have no bad\neffect on the receiver, from the exceptional nature of the emergency,\nwhile at the same time it may not be burdensome to the giver. Here,\nagain, some jurists have thought that where the service to be rendered\nis great, and the burden of rendering it very slight, it might properly\nbe made matter of legal obligation: so that (_e.g._) if I could save\na man from drowning by merely holding out a hand, I should be legally\npunishable if I omitted the act. But, however this may be, the moral\nrule condemning the refusal of aid in such emergencies is obviously\nconducive to the general happiness.\n\nFurther, besides these--so to say--_accidentally_ unbought services,\nthere are some for which there is normally no market-price; such as\ncounsel and assistance in the intimate perplexities of life, which one\nis only willing to receive from genuine friends. It much promotes the\ngeneral happiness that such services should be generally rendered. On\nthis ground, as well as through the emotional pleasures which directly\nspring from it, we perceive Friendship to be an important means to the\nUtilitarian end. At the same time we feel that the charm of Friendship\nis lost if the flow of emotion is not spontaneous and unforced. The\ncombination of these two views seems to be exactly represented by the\nsympathy that is not quite admiration with which Common Sense regards\nall close and strong affections; and the regret that is not quite\ndisapproval with which it contemplates their decay.\n\nIn all cases where it is conducive to the general happiness that\nunbought services should be rendered, Gratitude (if we mean by this\na settled disposition to repay the benefit in whatever way one can\non a fitting opportunity) is enjoined by Utilitarianism no less than\nby Common Sense; for experience would lead us to expect that no\nkind of onerous services will be adequately rendered unless there\nis a general disposition to requite them. In fact we may say that a\ngeneral understanding that all services which it is expedient that _A_\nshould render to _B_ will be in some way repaid by _B_, is a natural\nsupplement of the more definite contracts by which the main part of\nthe great social interchange of services is arranged. Indeed the\none kind of requital merges in the other, and no sharp line can be\ndrawn between the two: we cannot always say distinctly whether the\nrequital of a benefit is a pure act of gratitude or the fulfilment of\na tacit understanding.[331] There is, however, a certain difficulty in\nthis view of gratitude as analogous to the fulfilment of a bargain.\nFor it may be said that of the services peculiar to friendship\ndisinterestedness is an indispensable characteristic; and that in all\ncases benefits conferred without expectation of reward have a peculiar\nexcellence, and are indeed peculiarly adapted to arouse gratitude;\nbut if they are conferred in expectation of such gratitude, they lose\nthis excellence; and yet, again, it would be very difficult to treat\nas a friend one from whom gratitude was not expected. This seems,\nat first sight, an inextricable entanglement: but here, as in other\ncases, an apparent ethical contradiction is found to reduce itself to a\npsychological complexity. For most of our actions are done from several\ndifferent motives, either coexisting or succeeding one another in rapid\nalternation: thus a man may have a perfectly disinterested desire\nto benefit another, and one which might possibly prevail over all\nconflicting motives if all hope of requital were cut off, and yet it\nmay be well that this generous impulse should be sustained by a vague\ntrust that requital will not be withheld. And in fact the apparent\npuzzle really affords another illustration of the latent Utilitarianism\nof Common Sense. For, on the one hand, Utilitarianism prescribes that\nwe should render services whenever it is conducive to the general\nhappiness to do so, which may often be the case without taking into\naccount the gain to oneself which would result from their requital: and\non the other hand, since we may infer from the actual selfishness of\naverage men that such services would not be adequately rendered without\nexpectation of requital, it is also conducive to the general happiness\nthat men should recognise a moral obligation to repay them.\n\nWe have discussed only the most conspicuous of the duties of affection:\nbut it is probably obvious that similar reasonings would apply in the\ncase of the others.\n\nIn all such cases there are three distinct lines of argument which\ntend to show that the commonly received view of special claims and\nduties arising out of special relations, though _prima facie_ opposed\nto the impartial universality of the Utilitarian principle, is really\nmaintained by a well-considered application of that principle.\nFirst, morality is here in a manner protecting the normal channels\nand courses of natural benevolent affections; and the development of\nsuch affections is of the highest importance to human happiness, both\nas a direct source of pleasure, and as an indispensable preparation\nfor a more enlarged \u201caltruism.\u201d And again, the mere fact that such\naffections are normal, causes an expectation of the services that are\ntheir natural expression; and the disappointment of such expectations\nis inevitably painful. While finally, apart from these considerations,\nwe can show in each case strong utilitarian reasons why, generally\nspeaking, services should be rendered to the persons commonly\nrecognised as having such claims rather than to others.\n\nWe have to observe, in conclusion, that the difficulties which we found\nin the way of determining by the Intuitional method the limits and the\nrelative importance of these duties are reduced in the Utilitarian\nsystem, to difficulties of hedonistic comparison.[332] For each of the\npreceding arguments has shown us different kinds of pleasures gained\nand pains averted by the fulfilment of the claims in question. There\nare, first, those which the service claimed would directly promote or\navert: secondly, there is the pain and secondary harm of disappointed\nexpectation, if the service be not rendered: thirdly, we have to reckon\nthe various pleasures connected with the exercise of natural benevolent\naffections, especially when reciprocated, including the indirect\neffects on the agent\u2019s character of maintaining such affections. All\nthese different pleasures and pains combine differently, and with\nalmost infinite variation as circumstances vary, into utilitarian\nreasons for each of the claims in question; none of these reasons being\nabsolute and conclusive, but each having its own weight, while liable\nto be outweighed by others.\n\n\u00a7 4. I pass to consider another group of duties, often contrasted with\nthose of Benevolence, under the comprehensive notion of Justice.\n\n\u201cThat Justice is useful to society,\u201d says Hume, \u201cit would be a\nsuperfluous undertaking to prove\u201d: what he endeavours to show at some\nlength is \u201cthat public utility is the _sole_ origin of Justice\u201d: and\nthe same question of origin has occupied the chief attention of J.\nS. Mill.[333] Here, however, we are not so much concerned with the\ngrowth of the sentiment of Justice from experiences of utility, as\nwith the Utilitarian basis of the mature notion; while at the same\ntime if the analysis previously given be correct, the Justice that\nis commonly demanded and inculcated is something more complex than\nthese writers have recognised. What Hume (_e.g._) means by Justice is\nrather what I should call Order, understood in its widest sense: the\nobservance of the actual system of rules, whether strictly legal or\ncustomary, which bind together the different members of any society\ninto an organic whole, checking malevolent or otherwise injurious\nimpulses, distributing the different objects of men\u2019s clashing desires,\nand exacting such positive services, customary or contractual, as are\ncommonly recognised as matters of debt. And though there have rarely\nbeen wanting plausible empirical arguments for the revolutionary\nparadox quoted by Plato, that \u201claws are imposed in the interest of\nrulers,\u201d it remains true that the general conduciveness to social\nhappiness of the habit of Order or Law-observance, is, as Hume says,\ntoo obvious to need proof; indeed it is of such paramount importance\nto a community, that even where particular laws are clearly injurious\nit is usually expedient to observe them, apart from any penalty which\ntheir breach might entail on the individual. We saw, however, that\nCommon Sense sometimes bids us refuse obedience to bad laws, because\n\u201cwe ought to obey God rather than men\u201d (though there seems to be no\nclear intuition as to the kind or degree of badness that justifies\nresistance); and further allows us, in special emergencies, to violate\nrules generally good, for \u201cnecessity has no law,\u201d and \u201csalus populi\nsuprema lex.\u201d\n\nThese and similar common opinions seem at least to suggest that\nthe limits of the duty of Law-observance are to be determined by\nutilitarian considerations. While, again, the Utilitarian view gets\nrid of the difficulties in which the attempt to define intuitively the\ntruly legitimate source of legislative authority involved us;[334]\nat the same time that it justifies to some extent each of the\ndifferent views current as to the intrinsic legitimacy of governments.\nFor, on the one hand, it finds the moral basis of any established\npolitical order primarily in its effects rather than its causes; so\nthat, generally speaking, obedience will seem due to any _de facto_\ngovernment that is not governing very badly. On the other hand, in\nso far as laws originating in a particular way are likely to be (1)\nbetter, or (2) more readily observed, it is a Utilitarian duty to aim\nat introducing this mode of origination: and thus in a certain stage\nof social development it may be right that (_e.g._) a \u2018representative\nsystem\u2019 should be popularly demanded, or possibly (in extreme cases)\neven introduced by force: while, again, there is expediency in\nmaintaining an ancient mode of legislation, because men readily obey\nsuch: and loyalty to a dispossessed government may be on the whole\nexpedient, even at the cost of some temporary suffering and disorder,\nin order that ambitious men may not find usurpation too easy. Here,\nas elsewhere, Utilitarianism at once supports the different reasons\ncommonly put forward as absolute, and also brings them theoretically to\na common measure, so that in any particular case we have a principle of\ndecision between conflicting political arguments.\n\nAs was before said, this Law-observance, in so far at least as it\naffects the interests of other individuals, is what we frequently\nmean by Justice. It seems, however,[335] that the notion of Justice,\nexhaustively analysed, includes several distinct elements combined in\na somewhat complex manner: we have to inquire, therefore, what latent\nutilities are represented by each of these elements.\n\nNow, first, a constant part of the notion, which appears in it even\nwhen the Just is not distinguished from the Legal, is impartiality or\nthe negation of arbitrary inequality. This impartiality, as we saw[336]\n(whether exhibited in the establishment or in the administration of\nlaws), is merely a special application of the wider maxim that it\ncannot be right to treat two persons differently if their cases are\nsimilar in all material circumstances. And Utilitarianism, as we saw,\nadmits this maxim no less than other systems of Ethics. At the same\ntime, this negative criterion is clearly inadequate for the complete\ndetermination of what is just in laws, or in conduct generally; when we\nhave admitted this, it still remains to ask, \u201cWhat are the inequalities\nin laws, and in the distribution of pleasures and pains outside the\nsphere of law, which are not arbitrary and unreasonable? and to what\ngeneral principles can they be reduced?\u201d\n\nHere in the first place we may explain, on utilitarian principles,\nwhy apparently arbitrary inequality in a certain part of the conduct\nof individuals[337] is not regarded as injustice or even--in some\ncases--as in any way censurable. For freedom of action is an important\nsource of happiness to the agents, and a socially useful stimulus\nto their energies: hence it is obviously expedient that a man\u2019s\nfree choice in the distribution of wealth or kind services should\nnot be restrained by the fear of legal penalties, or even of social\ndisapprobation, beyond what the interests of others clearly require;\nand therefore, when distinctly recognised claims are satisfied, it\nis _pro tanto_ expedient that the mere preferences of an individual\nshould be treated by others as legitimate grounds for inequality in\nthe distribution of his property or services. Nay, as we have before\nseen, it is within certain limits expedient that each individual should\npractically regard his own unreasoned impulses as reasonable grounds of\naction: as in the rendering of services prompted by such affections as\nare normally and properly spontaneous and unforced.\n\nPassing to consider the general principles upon which \u2018just claims\u2019 as\ncommonly recognised appear to be based, we notice that the grounds of a\nnumber of such claims may be brought under the general head of \u2018normal\nexpectations\u2019; but that the stringency of such obligations varies\nmuch in degree, according as the expectations are based upon definite\nengagements, or on some vague mutual understanding, or are merely such\nas an average man would form from past experience of the conduct of\nother men. In these latter cases Common Sense appeared to be somewhat\nperplexed as to the validity of the claims. But for the Utilitarian\nthe difficulty has ceased to exist. He will hold any disappointment\nof expectations to be _pro tanto_ an evil, but a greater evil in\nproportion to the previous security of the expectant individual, from\nthe greater shock thus given to his reliance on the conduct of his\nfellow-men generally: and many times greater in proportion as the\nexpectation is generally recognised as normal and reasonable, as in\nthis case the shock extends to all who are in any way cognisant of his\ndisappointment. The importance to mankind of being able to rely on\neach other\u2019s actions is so great, that in ordinary cases of absolutely\ndefinite engagements there is scarcely any advantage that can\ncounterbalance the harm done by violating them. Still, we found[338]\nthat several exceptions and qualifications to the rule of Good Faith\nwere more or less distinctly recognised by Common Sense: and most of\nthese have a utilitarian basis, which it does not need much penetration\nto discern. To begin, we may notice that the superficial view of the\nobligation of a promise which makes it depend on the assertion of the\npromiser, and not, as Utilitarians hold, on the expectations produced\nin the promisee, cannot fairly be attributed to Common Sense: which\ncertainly condemns a breach of promise much more strongly when others\nhave acted in reliance on it, than when its observance did not directly\nconcern others, so that its breach involves for them only the indirect\nevil of a bad precedent,--as when a man breaks a pledge of total\nabstinence. We see, again, how the utilitarian reasons for keeping a\npromise are diminished by a material change of circumstances,[339] for\nin that case the expectations disappointed by breaking it are at least\nnot those which the promise originally created. It is obvious, too,\nthat it is a disadvantage to the community that men should be able\nto rely on the performance of promises procured by fraud or unlawful\nforce, so far as encouragement is thereby given to the use of fraud or\nforce for this end.[340] We saw, again,[341] that when the performance\nwould be injurious to the promisee, Common Sense is disposed to admit\nthat its obligation is superseded; and is at least doubtful whether the\npromise should be kept, even when it is only the promiser who would\nbe injured, if the harm be extreme;--both which qualifications are in\nharmony with Utilitarianism. And similarly for the other qualifications\nand exceptions: they all turn out to be as clearly utilitarian, as the\ngeneral utility of keeping one\u2019s word is plain and manifest.\n\nBut further, the expediency of satisfying normal expectations, even\nwhen they are not based upon a definite contract, is undeniable; it\nwill clearly conduce to the tranquillity of social existence, and\nto the settled and well-adjusted activity on which social happiness\ngreatly depends, that such expectations should be as little as possible\nbaulked. And here Utilitarianism relieves us of the difficulties which\nbeset the common view of just conduct as something absolutely precise\nand definite. For in this vaguer region we cannot draw a sharp line\nbetween valid and invalid claims; \u2018injustice\u2019 shades gradually off into\nmere \u2018hardship.\u2019 Hence the Utilitarian view that the disappointment of\nnatural expectations is an evil, but an evil which must sometimes be\nincurred for the sake of a greater good, is that to which Common Sense\nis practically forced, though it is difficult to reconcile it with the\ntheoretical absoluteness of Justice in the Intuitional view of Morality.\n\nThe gain of recognising the relativity of this obligation will be still\nmore felt, when we consider what I distinguished as Ideal Justice, and\nexamine the general conceptions of this which we find expressed or\nlatent in current criticisms of the existing order of Society.\n\nWe have seen that there are two competing views of an ideally just\nsocial order--or perhaps we may say two extreme types between which\nthe looser notions of ordinary men seem to fluctuate--which I called\nrespectively Individualistic and Socialistic. According to the former\nview an ideal system of Law ought to aim at Freedom, or perfect mutual\nnon-interference of all the members of the community, as an absolute\nend. Now the general utilitarian reasons for leaving each rational\nadult free to seek happiness in his own way are obvious and striking:\nfor, generally speaking, each is best qualified to provide for his own\ninterests, since even when he does not know best what they are and how\nto attain them, he is at any rate most keenly concerned for them: and\nagain, the consciousness of freedom and concomitant responsibility\nincreases the average effective activity of men: and besides, the\ndiscomfort of constraint is directly an evil and _pro tanto_ to be\navoided. Still, we saw[342] that the attempt to construct a consistent\ncode of laws, taking Maximum Freedom (instead of Happiness) as an\nabsolute end, must lead to startling paradoxes and insoluble puzzles:\nand in fact the practical interpretation of the notion \u2018Freedom,\u2019 and\nthe limits within which its realisation has been actually sought, have\nalways--even in the freest societies--been more or less consciously\ndetermined by considerations of expediency. So that we may fairly say\nthat in so far as Common Sense has adopted the Individualistic ideal\nin politics, it has always been as subordinate to and limited by the\nUtilitarian first principle.[343]\n\nIt seems, however, that what we commonly demand or long for, under the\nname of Ideal Justice, is not so much the realisation of Freedom, as\nthe distribution of good and evil according to Desert: indeed it is as\na means to this latter end that Freedom is often advocated; for it is\nsaid that if we protect men completely from mutual interference, each\nwill reap the good and bad consequences of his own conduct, and so be\nhappy or unhappy in proportion to his deserts. In particular, it has\nbeen widely held that if a free exchange of wealth and services is\nallowed, each individual will obtain from society, in money or other\nadvantages, what his services are really worth. We saw, however, that\nthe price which an individual obtains under a system of perfect free\ntrade, for wealth or services exchanged by him, may for several reasons\nbe not proportioned to the social utility of what he exchanges: and\nreflective Common Sense seems to admit this disproportion as to some\nextent legitimate, under the influence of utilitarian considerations\ncorrecting the unreflective utterances of moral sentiments.\n\nTo take a particular case: if a moral man were asked how far it is\nright to take advantage in bargaining of another\u2019s ignorance, probably\nhis first impulse would be to condemn such a procedure altogether.\nBut reflection, I think, would show him that such a censure would\nbe too sweeping: that it would be contrary to Common Sense to \u201cblame\n_A_ for having, in negotiating with a stranger _B_, taken advantage\nof _B_\u2019s ignorance of facts known to himself, provided that _A_\u2019s\nsuperior knowledge had been obtained by a legitimate use of diligence\nand foresight, which _B_ might have used with equal success.... What\nprevents us from censuring in this and similar cases is, I conceive,\na more or less conscious apprehension of the indefinite loss to the\nwealth of the community that is likely to result from any effective\nsocial restrictions on the free pursuit and exercise\u201d of economic\nknowledge. And for somewhat similar reasons of general expediency, if\nthe question be raised whether it is fair for a class of persons to\ngain by the unfavourable economic situation of any class with which\nthey deal, Common Sense at least hesitates to censure such gains--at\nany rate when such unfavourable situation is due \u201cto the gradual action\nof general causes, for the existence of which the persons who gain are\nnot specially responsible.\u201d[344]\n\nThe general principle of \u2018requiting good desert,\u2019 so far as Common\nSense really accepts it as practically applicable to the relations of\nmen in society, is broadly in harmony with Utilitarianism; since we\nobviously encourage the production of general happiness by rewarding\nmen for felicific conduct; only the Utilitarian scale of rewards will\nnot be determined entirely by the magnitude of the services performed,\nbut partly also by the difficulty of inducing men to perform them.\nBut this latter element seems to be always taken into account (though\nperhaps unconsciously) by Common Sense: for, as we have been led to\nnotice,[345] we do not commonly recognise merit in right actions,\nif they are such as men are naturally inclined to perform rather\ntoo much than too little. Again, in cases where the Intuitional\nprinciple that ill-desert lies in wrong intention conflicts with the\nUtilitarian view of punishment as purely preventive, we find that in\nthe actual administration of criminal justice, Common Sense is forced,\nhowever reluctantly, into practical agreement with Utilitarianism.\nThus after a civil war it demands the execution of the most purely\npatriotic rebels; and after a railway accident it clamours for the\nsevere punishment of unintentional neglects, which, except for their\nconsequences, would have been regarded as very venial.\n\nIf, however, in any distribution of pleasures and privileges, or of\npains and burdens, considerations of desert do not properly come in\n(_i.e._ if the good or evil to be distributed have no relation to any\nconduct on the part of the persons who are to receive either)--or\nif it is practically impossible to take such considerations into\naccount--then Common Sense seems to fall back on simple equality as\nthe principle of just apportionment.[346] And we have seen that the\nUtilitarian, in the case supposed, will reasonably accept Equality\nas the only mode of distribution that is not arbitrary; and it may\nbe observed that this mode of apportioning the means of happiness is\nlikely to produce more happiness on the whole, not only because men\nhave a disinterested aversion to unreason, but still more because they\nhave an aversion to any kind of inferiority to others (which is much\nintensified when the inferiority seems unreasonable). This latter\nfeeling is so strong that it often prevails in spite of obvious claims\nof desert; and it may even be sometimes expedient that it should so\nprevail.\n\nFor, finally, it must be observed that Utilitarianism furnishes us\nwith a common standard to which the different elements included in\nthe notion of Justice may be reduced. Such a standard is imperatively\nrequired: as these different elements are continually liable to\nconflict with each other. The issue, for example, in practical\npolitics between Conservatives and Reformers often represents such a\nconflict: the question is, whether we ought to do a certain violence to\nexpectations arising naturally out of the existing social order, with\nthe view of bringing about a distribution of the means of happiness\nmore in accordance with ideal justice. Here, if my analysis of the\ncommon notion of Justice be sound, the attempt to extract from it a\nclear decision of such an issue must necessarily fail: as the conflict\nis, so to say, permanently latent in the very core of Common Sense. But\nthe Utilitarian will merely use this notion of Justice as a guide to\ndifferent kinds of utilities; and in so far as these are incompatible,\nhe will balance one set of advantages against the other, and decide\naccording to the preponderance.\n\n\u00a7 5. The duty of Truth-speaking is sometimes taken as a striking\ninstance of a moral rule not resting on a Utilitarian basis. But a\ncareful study of the qualifications with which the common opinion of\nmankind actually inculcates this duty seems to lead us to an opposite\nresult: for not only is the general utility of truth-speaking so\nmanifest as to need no proof, but wherever this utility seems to be\nabsent, or outweighed by particular bad consequences, we find that\nCommon Sense at least hesitates to enforce the rule. For example, if\na man be pursuing criminal ends, it is _prima facie_ injurious to the\ncommunity that he should be aided in his pursuit by being able to rely\non the assertions of others. Here, then, deception is _prima facie_\nlegitimate as a protection against crime: though when we consider\nthe bad effects on habit, and through example, of even a single act\nof unveracity, the case is seen to be, on Utilitarian principles,\ndoubtful: and this is just the view of Common Sense. Again, though it\nis generally a man\u2019s interest to know the truth, there are exceptional\ncases in which it is injurious to him--as when an invalid hears bad\nnews--and here, too, Common Sense is disposed to suspend the rule.\nAgain, we found it difficult to define exactly wherein Veracity\nconsists; for we may either require truth in the spoken words, or in\nthe inferences which the speaker foresees will be drawn from them,\nor in both. Perfect Candour, no doubt, would require it in both:\nbut in the various circumstances where this seems inexpedient, we\noften find Common Sense at least half-willing to dispense with one\nor other part of the double obligation. Thus we found a respectable\nschool of thinkers maintaining that a religious truth may properly be\ncommunicated by means of a historical fiction: and, on the other hand,\nthe unsuitability of perfect frankness to our existing social relations\nis recognised in the common rules of politeness, which impose on us\nnot unfrequently the necessity of suppressing truths and suggesting\nfalsehoods. I would not say that in any of these cases Common Sense\npronounces quite decidedly in favour of unveracity: but then neither\nis Utilitarianism decided, as the utility of maintaining a general\nhabit of truth-speaking is so great, that it is not easy to prove it to\nbe clearly outweighed by even strong special reasons for violating the\nrule.\n\nYet it may be worth while to point out how the different views as to\nthe legitimacy of Malevolent impulses, out of which we found it hard\nto frame a consistent doctrine for Common Sense, exactly correspond\nto different forecasts of the consequences of gratifying such\nimpulses. _Prima facie_, the desire to injure any one in particular\nis inconsistent with a deliberate purpose of benefiting as much as\npossible people in general; accordingly, we find that what I may\ncall Superficial Common Sense passes a sweeping condemnation on\nsuch desires. But a study of the actual facts of society shows that\nresentment plays an important part in that repression of injuries which\nis necessary to social wellbeing; accordingly, the reflective moralist\nshrinks from excluding it altogether. It is evident, however, that\npersonal ill-will is a very dangerous means to the general happiness:\nfor its direct end is the exact opposite of happiness; and though\nthe realisation of this end may in certain cases be the least of two\nevils, still the impulse if encouraged is likely to prompt to the\ninfliction of pain beyond the limits of just punishment, and to have an\ninjurious reaction on the character of the angry person. Accordingly,\nthe moralist is disposed to prescribe that indignation be directed\nalways against acts, and not against persons; and if indignation so\nrestricted would be efficient in repressing injuries, this would seem\nto be the state of mind most conducive to the general happiness. But it\nis doubtful whether average human nature is capable of maintaining this\ndistinction, and whether, if it could be maintained, the more refined\naversion would by itself be sufficiently efficacious: accordingly,\nCommon Sense hesitates to condemn personal ill-will against\nwrong-doers--even if it includes a desire of malevolent satisfaction.\n\nFinally, it is easy to show that Temperance, Self-control, and what\nare called the Self-regarding virtues generally, are \u2018useful\u2019 to the\nindividual who possesses them: and if it is not quite clear, in the\nview of Common Sense, to what end that regulation and government of\nappetites and passions, which moralists have so much inculcated and\nadmired, is to be directed; at least there seems no obstacle in the\nway of our defining this end as Happiness. And even in the ascetic\nextreme of Self-control, which has sometimes led to the repudiation\nof sensual pleasures as radically bad, we may trace an unconscious\nUtilitarianism. For the ascetic condemnation has always been chiefly\ndirected against those pleasures, in respect of which men are\nespecially liable to commit excesses dangerous to health; and free\nindulgence in which, even when it keeps clear of injury to health,\nis thought to interfere with the development of other faculties and\nsusceptibilities which are important sources of happiness.\n\n\u00a7 6. An apparent exception to this statement may seem to be constituted\nin the case of the sexual appetite, by the regulation prescribed under\nthe notion of Purity or Chastity. And there is no doubt that under\nthis head we find condemned, with special vehemence and severity, acts\nof which the immediate effect is pleasure not obviously outweighed by\nsubsequent pain. But a closer examination of this exception transforms\nit into an important contribution to the present argument: as it\nshows a specially complex and delicate correspondence between moral\nsentiments and social utilities.\n\nIn the first place, the peculiar intensity and delicacy of the moral\nsentiments that govern the relations of the sexes are thoroughly\njustified by the vast importance to society of the end to which they\nare obviously a means,--the maintenance, namely, of the permanent\nunions which are held to be necessary for the proper rearing and\ntraining of children. Hence the first and fundamental rule in this\ndepartment is that which directly secures conjugal fidelity: and the\nutilitarian grounds for protecting marriage indirectly, by condemning\nall extra-nuptial intercourse of the sexes, are obvious: for to remove\nthe moral censure that rests on such intercourse would seriously\ndiminish men\u2019s motives for incurring the restraints and burdens which\nmarriage entails; and the youth of both sexes would form habits of\nfeeling and conduct tending to unfit them for marriage; and, if such\nintercourse were fertile, it would be attended with that imperfect care\nof the succeeding generation, which it seems the object of permanent\nunions to prevent; while if it were sterile, the future of the human\nrace would, as far as we can see, be still more profoundly imperilled.\n\nBut, further, it is only on Utilitarian principles that we can account\nfor the anomalous difference which the morality of Common Sense has\nalways made between the two sexes as regards the simple offence of\nunchastity. For the offence is commonly more deliberate in the man,\nwho has the additional guilt of soliciting and persuading the woman;\nin the latter, again, it is far more often prompted by some motive\nthat we rank higher than mere lust: so that, according to the ordinary\ncanons of intuitional morality, it ought to be more severely condemned\nin the man. The actual inversion of this result can only be justified\nby taking into account the greater interest that society has in\nmaintaining a high standard of female chastity. For the degradation\nof this standard must strike at the root of family life, by impairing\nmen\u2019s security in the exercise of their parental affections: but there\nis no corresponding consequence of male unchastity, which may therefore\nprevail to a considerable extent without imperilling the very existence\nof the family, though it impairs its wellbeing.\n\nAt the same time, the condemnation of unchastity in men by the common\nmoral sense of Christian countries at the present day, is sufficiently\nclear and explicit: though we recognise the existence of a laxer\ncode--the morality, as it is called, of \u2018the world\u2019--which treats\nit as indifferent, or very venial. But the very difference between\nthe two codes gives a kind of support to the present argument; as\nit corresponds to easily explained differences of insight into the\nconsequences of maintaining certain moral sanctions. For partly,\nit is thought by \u2018men of the world\u2019 that men cannot practically be\nrestrained from sexual indulgence, at least at the period of life when\nthe passions are strongest: and hence that it is expedient to tolerate\nsuch kind and degree of illicit sexual intercourse as is not directly\ndangerous to the wellbeing of families. Partly, again, it is maintained\nby some, in bolder antagonism to Common Sense, that the existence of\na certain limited amount of such intercourse (with a special class of\nwomen, carefully separated, as at present, from the rest of society)\nis scarcely a real evil, and may even be a positive gain in respect\nof general happiness; for continence is perhaps somewhat dangerous\nto health, and in any case involves a loss of pleasure considerable\nin intensity; while at the same time the maintenance of as numerous\na population as is desirable in an old society does not require\nthat more than a certain proportion of the women in each generation\nshould become mothers of families; and if some of the surplus make it\ntheir profession to enter into casual and temporary sexual relations\nwith men, there is no necessity that their lives should compare\ndisadvantageously in respect of happiness with those of other women in\nthe less favoured classes of society.\n\nThis view has perhaps a superficial plausibility: but it ignores the\nessential fact that it is only by the present severe enforcement\nagainst unchaste women of the penalties of social contempt and\nexclusion, resting on moral disapprobation, that the class of\ncourtesans is kept sufficiently separate from the rest of female\nsociety to prevent the contagion of unchastity from spreading; and\nthat the illicit intercourse of the sexes is restrained within such\nlimits as not to interfere materially with the due development of the\nrace. This consideration is sufficient to decide a Utilitarian to\nsupport generally the established rule against this kind of conduct,\nand therefore to condemn violations of the rule as on the whole\ninfelicific, even though they may perhaps appear to have this quality\nonly in consequence of the moral censure attached to them.[347]\nFurther, the \u2018man of the world\u2019 ignores the vast importance to the\nhuman race of maintaining that higher type of sexual relations which\nis not, generally speaking, possible, except where a high value is set\nupon chastity in both sexes. From this point of view the Virtue of\nPurity may be regarded as providing a necessary shelter under which\nthat intense and elevated affection between the sexes, which is most\nconducive both to the happiness of the individual and to the wellbeing\nof the family, may grow and flourish.\n\nAnd in this way we are able to explain what must have perplexed\nmany reflective minds in contemplating the common-sense regulation\nof conduct under the head of Purity: viz. that on the one hand the\nsentiment that supports these rules is very intense, so that the\nsubjective difference between right and wrong in this department is\nmarked with peculiar strength: while on the other hand it is found\nimpossible to give a clear definition of the conduct condemned under\nthis notion. For the impulse to be restrained is so powerful and so\nsensitive to stimulants of all kinds, that, in order that the sentiment\nof purity may adequately perform its protective function, it is\nrequired to be very keen and vivid; and the aversion to impurity must\nextend far beyond the acts that primarily need to be prohibited, and\ninclude in its scope everything (in dress, language, social customs,\netc.) which may tend to excite lascivious ideas. At the same time it\nis not necessary that the line between right and wrong in such matters\nshould be drawn with theoretical precision: it is sufficient for\npractical purposes if the main central portion of the region of duty be\nstrongly illuminated, while the margin is left somewhat obscure. And,\nin fact, the detailed regulations which it is important to society to\nmaintain depend so much upon habit and association of ideas, that they\nmust vary to a great extent from age to age and from country to country.\n\n\u00a7 7. The preceding survey has supplied us with several illustrations of\nthe manner in which Utilitarianism is normally introduced as a method\nfor deciding between different conflicting claims, in cases where\ncommon sense leaves their relative importance obscure,--as (_e.g._)\nbetween the different duties of the affections, and the different\nprinciples which analysis shows to be involved in our common conception\nof Justice--: and we have also noticed how, when a dispute is raised\nas to the precise scope and definition of any current moral rule, the\neffects of different acceptations of the rule on general happiness\nor social wellbeing are commonly regarded as the ultimate grounds\non which the dispute is to be decided. In fact these two arguments\npractically run into one; for it is generally a conflict between maxims\nthat impresses men with the need of giving each a precise definition.\nIt may be urged that the consequences to which reference is commonly\nmade in such cases are rather effects on \u2018social wellbeing\u2019 than on\n\u2018general happiness\u2019 as understood by Utilitarians; and that the two\nnotions ought not to be identified. I grant this: but in the last\nchapter of the preceding Book I have tried to show that Common Sense\nis unconsciously utilitarian in its practical determination of those\nvery elements in the notion of Ultimate Good or Wellbeing which at\nfirst sight least admit of a hedonistic interpretation. We may now\nobserve that this hypothesis of \u2018Unconscious Utilitarianism\u2019 explains\nthe different relative importance attached to particular virtues by\ndifferent classes of human beings, and the different emphasis with\nwhich the same virtue is inculcated on these different classes by\nmankind generally. For such differences ordinarily correspond to\nvariations--real or apparent--in the Utilitarian importance of the\nvirtues under different circumstances. Thus we have noticed the greater\nstress laid on chastity in women than in men: courage, on the other\nhand, is more valued in the latter, as they are more called upon to\ncope energetically with sudden and severe dangers. And for similar\nreasons a soldier is expected to show a higher degree of courage than\n(_e.g._) a priest. Again, though we esteem candour and scrupulous\nsincerity in most persons, we scarcely look for them in a diplomatist\nwho has to conceal secrets, nor do we expect that a tradesman in\ndescribing his goods should frankly point out their defects to his\ncustomers.\n\nFinally, when we compare the different moral codes of different ages\nand countries, we see that the discrepancies among them correspond, at\nleast to a great extent, to differences either in the actual effects\nof actions on happiness, or in the extent to which such effects are\ngenerally foreseen--or regarded as important--by the men among whom\nthe codes are maintained. Several instances of this have already been\nnoticed: and the general fact, which has been much dwelt upon by\nUtilitarian writers, is also admitted and even emphasised by their\nopponents. Thus Dugald Stewart[348] lays stress on the extent to which\nthe moral judgments of mankind have been modified by \u201cthe diversity in\ntheir physical circumstances,\u201d the \u201cunequal degrees of civilisation\nwhich they have attained,\u201d and \u201ctheir unequal measures of knowledge\nor of capacity.\u201d He points out, for instance, that theft is regarded\nas a very venial offence in the South Sea Islanders, because little\nor no labour is there required to support life; that the lending of\nmoney for interest is commonly reprehended in societies where commerce\nis imperfectly developed, because the \u2018usurer\u2019 in such communities is\ncommonly in the odious position of wringing a gain out of the hard\nnecessities of his fellows; and that where the legal arrangements for\npunishing crime are imperfect, private murder is either justified or\nregarded very leniently. Many other examples might be added to these\nif it were needful. But I conceive that few persons who have studied\nthe subject will deny that there is a certain degree of correlation\nbetween the variations in the moral code from age to age, and the\nvariations in the real or perceived effects on general happiness of\nactions prescribed or forbidden by the code. And in proportion as the\napprehension of consequences becomes more comprehensive and exact,\nwe may trace not only change in the moral code handed down from age\nto age, but progress in the direction of a closer approximation to\na perfectly enlightened Utilitarianism. Only we must distinctly\nnotice another important factor in the progress, which Stewart has\nnot mentioned: the extension, namely, of the capacity for sympathy\nin an average member of the community. The imperfection of earlier\nmoral codes is at least as much due to defectiveness of sympathy as\nof intelligence; often, no doubt, the ruder man did not perceive the\neffects of his conduct on others; but often, again, he perceived them\nmore or less, but felt little or no concern about them. Thus it happens\nthat changes in the conscience of a community often correspond to\nchanges in the extent and degree of the sensitiveness of an average\nmember of it to the feelings of others. Of this the moral development\nhistorically worked out under the influence of Christianity affords\nfamiliar illustrations.[349]\n\nI am not maintaining that this correlation between the development of\ncurrent morality and the changes in the consequences of conduct as\nsympathetically forecast, is perfect and exact. On the contrary,--as I\nshall have occasion to point out in the next chapter--the history of\nmorality shows us many evidences of what, from the Utilitarian point\nof view, appear to be partial aberrations of the moral sense. But\neven in these instances we can often discover a germ of unconscious\nUtilitarianism; the aberration is often only an exaggeration of an\nobviously useful sentiment, or the extension of it by mistaken analogy\nto cases to which it does not properly apply, or perhaps the survival\nof a sentiment which once was useful but has now ceased to be so.\n\nFurther, it must be observed that I have carefully abstained from\nasserting that the perception of the rightness of any kind of\nconduct has always--or even ordinarily--been derived by conscious\ninference from a perception of consequent advantages. This hypothesis\nis naturally suggested by such a survey as the preceding; but the\nevidence of history hardly seems to me to support it: since, as we\nretrace the development of ethical thought, the Utilitarian basis of\ncurrent morality, which I have endeavoured to exhibit in the present\nchapter, seems to be rather less than more distinctly apprehended by\nthe common moral consciousness. Thus (_e.g._) Aristotle sees that\nthe sphere of the Virtue of Courage (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1), as recognised\nby the Common Sense of Greece, is restricted to dangers in war: and\nwe can now explain this limitation by a reference to the utilitarian\nimportance of this kind of courage, at a period of history when the\nindividual\u2019s happiness was bound up more completely than it now is with\nthe welfare of his state, while the very existence of the latter was\nmore frequently imperilled by hostile invasions: but this explanation\nlies quite beyond the range of Aristotle\u2019s own reflection. The origin\nof our moral notions and sentiments lies hid in those obscure regions\nof hypothetical history where conjecture has free scope: but we do\nnot find that, as our retrospect approaches the borders of this\nrealm, the conscious connexion in men\u2019s minds between accepted moral\nrules and foreseen effects on general happiness becomes more clearly\ntraceable. The admiration felt by early man for beauties or excellences\nof character seems to have been as direct and unreflective as his\nadmiration of any other beauty: and the stringency of law and custom in\nprimitive times presents itself as sanctioned by the evils which divine\ndispleasure will supernaturally inflict on their violators, rather than\nby even a rude and vague forecast of the natural bad consequences of\nnon-observance. It is therefore not as the mode of regulating conduct\nwith which mankind began, but rather as that to which we can now see\nthat human development has been always tending, as the adult and not\nthe germinal form of Morality, that Utilitarianism may most reasonably\nclaim the acceptance of Common Sense.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[350]If we consider the relation of Ethics to Politics from a\nUtilitarian point of view, the question, what rules of conduct for the\ngoverned should be fixed by legislators and applied by judges, will be\ndetermined by the same kind of forecast of consequences as will be used\nin settling all questions of private morality: we shall endeavour to\nestimate and balance against each other the effects of such rules on\nthe general happiness. In so far, however, as we divide the Utilitarian\ntheory of private conduct from that of legislation, and ask which is\nprior, the answer would seem to be different in respect of different\nparts of the legal code.\n\n1. To a great extent the rules laid down in a utilitarian code of law\nwill be such as any man sincerely desirous of promoting the general\nhappiness would generally endeavour to observe, even if they were not\nlegally binding. Of this kind is the rule of not inflicting any bodily\nharm or gratuitous annoyance on any one, except in self-defence or\nas retribution for wrong; the rule of not interfering with another\u2019s\npursuit of the means of happiness, or with his enjoyment of wealth\nacquired by his own labour or the free consent of others; the rule\nof fulfilling all engagements freely entered into with any one,--at\nany rate unless the fulfilment were harmful to others, or much more\nharmful to oneself than beneficial to him, or unless there were good\ngrounds for supposing that the other party would not perform his share\nof a bilateral contract--; and the rule of supporting one\u2019s children\nwhile helpless, and one\u2019s parents if decrepit, and of educating one\u2019s\nchildren suitably to their future life. As regards such rules as these,\nUtilitarian Ethics seems independent of Politics, and naturally prior\nto it; we first consider what conduct is right for private individuals,\nand then to how much of this they can advantageously be compelled by\nlegal penalties.\n\n2. There are other rules again which it is clearly for the general\nhappiness to observe, if only their observance is enforced on others;\n_e.g._ abstinence from personal retaliation of injuries, and a more\ngeneral and unhesitating fulfilment of contracts than would perhaps be\nexpedient if they were not legally enforced.\n\n3. But again, in the complete determination of the mutual claims\nof members of society to services and forbearances, there are many\npoints on which the utilitarian theory of right private conduct apart\nfrom law would lead to a considerable variety of conclusions, from\nthe great difference in the force of the relevant considerations\nunder different circumstances; while at the same time uniformity is\neither indispensable, to prevent disputes and disappointments, or at\nleast highly desirable, in order to maintain effectively such rules\nof conduct as are _generally_--though not _universally_--expedient.\nUnder this head would come the exacter definition of the limits of\nappropriation,--_e.g._ as regards property in literary compositions and\ntechnical inventions,--and a large part of the law of inheritance, and\nof the law regulating the family relations. In such cases, in so far as\nthey are capable of being theoretically determined, Utilitarian Ethics\nseems to blend with Utilitarian Politics in a rather complicated way;\nsince we cannot determine the right conduct for a private individual in\nany particular case, without first considering what rule (if any) it\nwould be on the whole expedient to maintain, in the society of which\nhe is a member, by legal penalties, as well as by the weaker and less\ndefinite sanctions of moral opinion. This problem, moreover, in any\nconcrete case is necessarily further complicated by the consideration\nof the delicate mutual relations of Positive Law and Positive\nMorality--as we may call the actual moral opinions generally held in a\ngiven society at a given time. For on the one hand it is dangerous in\nlegislation to advance beyond Positive Morality, by prohibiting actions\n(or inactions) that are generally approved or tolerated; on the other\nhand, up to the point at which this danger becomes serious, legislation\nis a most effective instrument for modifying or intensifying public\nopinion, in the direction in which it is desirable that it should\nprogress. Leaving this difficult question of social dynamics, we may\nsay that normally in a well-organised society the most important and\nindispensable rules of social behaviour will be legally enforced and\nthe less important left to be maintained by Positive Morality. Law will\nconstitute, as it were, the skeleton of social order, clothed upon by\nthe flesh and blood of Morality.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[322] It ought to be observed that Cumberland does not adopt a\nhedonistic interpretation of Good. Still, I have followed Hallam in\nregarding him as the founder of English Utilitarianism: since it seems\nto have been by a gradual and half-unconscious process that \u2018Good\u2019 came\nto have the definitely hedonistic meaning which it has implicitly in\nShaftesbury\u2019s system, and explicitly in that of Hume.\n\n[323] I should point out that Hume uses \u201cutility\u201d in a narrower sense\nthan that which Bentham gave it, and one more in accordance with the\nusage of ordinary language. He distinguishes the \u201cuseful\u201d from the\n\u201cimmediately agreeable\u201d: so that while recognising \u201cutility\u201d as the\nmain ground of our moral approbation of the more important virtues,\nhe holds that there are other elements of personal merit which we\napprove because they are \u201cimmediately agreeable,\u201d either to the person\npossessed of them or to others. It appears, however, more convenient\nto use the word in the wider sense in which it has been current since\nBentham.\n\n[324] Lecky, _Hist. of Eur. Mor._ chap. i, pp. 37, 40 _seqq_. (13th\nimpression).\n\n[325] Book iii. chap. x.\n\n[326] Book iii. chap. iv. \u00a7 1.\n\n[327] It will be seen that I do not here assume in their full breadth\nthe conclusions of chap. xiv. of the preceding Book.\n\n[328] Cf. J. Grote, _An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_,\nchap. v.\n\n[329] Book iii. chap. iv. \u00a7 1.\n\n[330] Strictly speaking, of course, the Law of modern states does not\nenforce this, but only refuses to recognise connubial contracts of any\nother kind: but the social effect is substantially the same.\n\n[331] Sometimes such unbargained requital is even legally obligatory:\nas when children are bound to repay the care spent on them by\nsupporting their parents in decrepitude.\n\n[332] Further discussion of the method of dealing with these\ndifficulties, in their utilitarian form, will be found in the two\nfollowing chapters.\n\n[333] _Utilitarianism_, chap. v.\n\n[334] Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3.\n\n[335] Cf. Book iii. chap. v.\n\n[336] Book iii. chap. xiii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[337] Cf. _ante_, p. 268 note.\n\n[338] Book iii. chap. vi.\n\n[339] Cf. _ante_, Book iii. chap. vi. \u00a7 8.\n\n[340] In the case of force, however, there is the counterbalancing\nconsideration that the unlawful aggressor may be led to inflict worse\ninjury on his victim, if he is unable to rely on the latter\u2019s promise.\n\n[341] Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. \u00a7 8.\n\n[342] Book iii. chap. v. \u00a7 4.\n\n[343] In another work (_Principles of Political Economy_, Book iii.\nchap. ii.) I have tried to show that complete _laisser faire_, in the\norganisation of industry, tends in various ways to fall short of the\nmost economic production of wealth.\n\n[344] The quotations are from my _Principles of Political Economy_,\nBook iii. chap. ix.; where these questions are discussed at somewhat\ngreater length.\n\n[345] Cf. _ante_, \u00a7 2, and Book iii. chap. ii. \u00a7 1.\n\n[346] I have before observed that it is quite in harmony with\nUtilitarian principles to recognise a sphere of private conduct within\nwhich each individual may distribute his wealth and kind services as\nunequally as he chooses, without incurring censure as unjust.\n\n[347] It is obvious that so long as the social sanction is enforced,\nthe lives of the women against whom society thus issues its ban\nmust tend to be unhappy from disorder and shame, and the source of\nunhappiness to others; and also that the breach by men of a recognised\nand necessary moral rule must tend to have injurious effects on their\nmoral habits generally.\n\n[348] _Active and Moral Powers_, Book ii. chap. iii.\n\n[349] Among definite changes in the current morality of the Gr\u00e6co-Roman\ncivilised world, which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to\nthe extension and intensification of sympathy due to Christianity,\nthe following may be especially noted: (1) the severe condemnation\nand final suppression of the practice of exposing infants; (2)\neffective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats; (3)\nimmediate moral mitigation of slavery, and a strong encouragement of\nemancipation; (4) great extension of the eleemosynary provision made\nfor the sick and poor.\n\n[350] This passage, which in the second and subsequent editions\noccurred in chap. ii. of Book i., was omitted by Professor Sidgwick\nfrom that chapter in the sixth edition, with the intention of\nincorporating it in Book iv., which he did not live to revise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. If the view maintained in the preceding chapter as to the general\nUtilitarian basis of the Morality of Common Sense may be regarded as\nsufficiently established, we are now in a position to consider more\nclosely to what method of determining right conduct the acceptance\nof Utilitarianism will practically lead. The most obvious method, of\ncourse, is that of Empirical Hedonism, discussed in Book ii. chap.\niii.; according to which we have in each case to compare all the\npleasures and pains that can be foreseen as probable results of the\ndifferent alternatives of conduct presented to us, and to adopt the\nalternative which seems likely to lead to the greatest happiness on the\nwhole.\n\nIn Book ii., however, it appeared that even the more restricted\napplication of this method, which we there had to consider, was\ninvolved in much perplexity and uncertainty. Even when an individual is\nonly occupied in forecasting his own pleasures, it seems difficult or\nimpossible for him to avoid errors of considerable magnitude; whether\nin accurately comparing the pleasantness of his own past feelings, as\nrepresented in memory, or in appropriating the experience of others,\nor in arguing from the past to the future. And these difficulties\nare obviously much increased when we have to take into account all\nthe effects of our actions on all the sentient beings who may be\naffected by them. At the same time, in Book ii. we could not find any\nsatisfactory substitute for this method of empirical comparison. It\ndid not appear reasonable to take refuge in the uncriticised beliefs\nof men in general as to the sources of happiness: indeed, it seemed\nimpossible to extract any adequately clear and definite _consensus_\nof opinion from the confused and varying utterances of Common Sense on\nthis subject. Nor again could it be shown that the individual would be\nmore likely to attain the greatest happiness open to him by practically\nconfining his efforts to the realisation of any scientifically\nascertainable physical or psychical conditions of happiness: nor did\nit seem possible to infer on empirical grounds that the desired result\nwould be secured by conformity to the accepted principles of morality.\nBut when we consider these latter in relation, not to the happiness of\nthe individual, but to that of human (or sentient) beings generally,\nit is clear from the preceding chapter that the question of harmony\nbetween Hedonism and Intuitionism presents _prima facie_ an entirely\ndifferent aspect. Indeed from the considerations that we have just\nsurveyed it is but a short and easy step to the conclusion that in the\nMorality of Common Sense we have ready to hand a body of Utilitarian\ndoctrine; that the \u201crules of morality for the multitude\u201d are to be\nregarded as \u201cpositive beliefs of mankind as to the effects of actions\non their happiness,\u201d[351] so that the apparent first principles of\nCommon Sense may be accepted as the \u201cmiddle axioms\u201d of Utilitarian\nmethod; direct reference being only made to utilitarian considerations,\nin order to settle points upon which the verdict of Common Sense is\nfound to be obscure and conflicting. On this view the traditional\ncontroversy between the advocates of Virtue and the advocates of\nHappiness would seem to be at length harmoniously settled.\n\nAnd the arguments for this view which have been already put forward\ncertainly receive support from the hypothesis, now widely accepted,\nthat the moral sentiments are ultimately derived, by a complex and\ngradual process, from experiences of pleasure and pain. The hypothesis,\nin a summary form, would seem to be this; (1) in the experience of\neach member of the human community the pain or alarm caused to him by\nactions of himself and of others tends by association to excite in\nhim a dislike of such actions, and a similar though feebler effect is\nproduced by his perception of pain or danger caused to others with\nwhom he is connected by blood, or by community of interest, or any\nspecial tie of sympathy: (2) experience also tends more indirectly\nto produce in him sentiments restraining him from actions painful or\nalarming to others, through his dread of their resentment and its\nconsequences,--especially dread of his chief\u2019s anger, and, where\nreligious influence has become strong, of the anger of supernatural\nbeings: (3) with these latter feelings blends a sympathetic aversion\nto the pain of other men generally, which--at first comparatively\nfeeble--tends to grow in force as morality develops. In the same way\nexperiences of pleasure and gratitude, and desire of the goodwill of\nothers and its consequences, tend to produce liking for actions that\nare perceived to cause pleasure to self or to others. The similar\naversions and likings that are thus produced in the majority of the\nmembers of any society, through the general similarity of their natures\nand conditions, tend to become more similar through communication\nand imitation,--the desire of each to retain the goodwill of others\noperating to repress individual divergencies. Thus common likings for\nconduct that affects pleasurably the community generally or some part\nof it, and common dislikes for conduct causing pain and alarm, come\nto be gradually developed; they are transmitted from generation to\ngeneration, partly perhaps by physical inheritance, but chiefly by\ntradition from parents to children, and imitation of adults by the\nyoung; in this way their origin becomes obscured, and they finally\nappear as what are called the moral sentiments. This theory does not,\nin my view, account adequately for the actual results of the faculty\nof moral judgment and reasoning, so far as I can examine them by\nreflection on my own moral consciousness: for this, as I have before\nsaid, does not yield any apparent intuitions that stand the test of\nrigorous examination except such as, from their abstract and general\ncharacter, have no cognisable relation to particular experiences of\nany kind.[352] But that the theory gives a partially true explanation\nof the historical origin of particular moral sentiments and habits and\ncommonly accepted rules, I see no reason to doubt; and thus regarded\nit seems to supplement the arguments of the preceding chapter that\ntend to exhibit the morality of common sense as unconsciously or\n\u2018instinctively\u2019 utilitarian.\n\nBut it is one thing to hold that the current morality expresses,\npartly consciously but to a larger extent unconsciously, the results\nof human experience as to the effects of actions: it is quite another\nthing to accept this morality _en bloc_, so far as it is clear and\ndefinite, as the best guidance we can get to the attainment of maximum\ngeneral happiness. However attractive this simple reconciliation\nof Intuitional and Utilitarian methods may be, it is not, I think,\nreally warranted by the evidence. In the first place, I hold that in a\ncomplete view of the development of the moral sense a more prominent\nplace should be given to the effect of sympathy with the impulses that\nprompt to actions, as well as with the feelings that result from them.\nIt may be observed that Adam Smith[353] assigns to this operation\nof sympathy,--the echo (as it were) of each agent\u2019s passion in the\nbreast of unconcerned spectators,--the first place in determining our\napproval and disapproval of actions[354]; sympathy with the effect of\nconduct on others he treats as a merely secondary factor, correcting\nand qualifying the former. Without going so far as this, I think that\nthere are certainly many cases where the resulting moral consciousness\nwould seem to indicate a balance or compromise between the two kinds of\nsympathy; and the compromise may easily be many degrees removed from\nthe rule which Utilitarianism would prescribe. For though the passions\nand other active impulses are doubtless themselves influenced, no\nless than the moral sentiments, by experiences of pleasure and pain;\nstill this influence is not sufficient to make them at all trustworthy\nguides to general, any more than to individual, happiness--as some\nof our moral sentiments themselves emphatically announce. But even\nif we consider our common moral sentiments as entirely due--directly\nor indirectly--to the accumulated and transmitted experiences of\nprimary and sympathetic pains and pleasures; it is obvious that the\ndegree of accuracy with which sentiments thus produced will guide us\nto the promotion of general happiness must largely depend upon the\ndegree of accuracy with which the whole sum of pleasurable and painful\nconsequences, resulting from any course of action, has been represented\nin the consciousness of an average member of the community. And it is\nseen at a glance that this representation has always been liable to\nerrors of great magnitude, from causes that were partly noticed in the\nprevious chapter, when we were considering the progress of morality. We\nhave to allow, first, for limitation of sympathy; since in every age\nand country the sympathy of an average man with other sentient beings,\nand even his egoistic regard for their likings and aversions, has been\nmuch more limited than the influence of his actions on the feelings of\nothers. We must allow further for limitation of intelligence: for in\nall ages ordinary men have had a very inadequate knowledge of natural\nsequences; so that such indirect consequences of conduct as have been\nfelt have been frequently traced to wrong causes, and been met by wrong\nmoral remedies, owing to imperfect apprehension of the relation of\nmeans to ends. Again, where the habit of obedience to authority and\nrespect for rank has become strong, we must allow for the possibly\nperverting influence of a desire to win the favour or avert the anger\nof superiors. And similarly we must allow again for the influences of\nfalse religions; and also for the possibility that the sensibilities of\nreligious teachers have influenced the code of duty accepted by their\nfollowers, in points where these sensibilities were not normal and\nrepresentative, but exceptional and idiosyncratic.[355]\n\nOn the other hand, we must suppose that these deflecting influences\nhave been more or less limited and counteracted by the struggle for\nexistence in past ages among different human races and communities;\nsince, so far as any moral habit or sentiment was unfavourable to the\npreservation of the social organism, it would be a disadvantage in\nthe struggle for existence, and would therefore tend to perish with\nthe community that adhered to it. But we have no reason to suppose\nthat this force would be adequate to keep positive morality always\nin conformity with a Utilitarian ideal. For (1) imperfect morality\nwould be only one disadvantage among many, and not, I conceive, the\nmost important, unless the imperfection were extreme,--especially\nin the earlier stages of social and moral development, in which the\nstruggle for existence was most operative: and (2) a morality perfectly\npreservative of a human community might still be imperfectly felicific,\nand so require considerable improvement from a Utilitarian point of\nview.[356] Further, analogy would lead us to expect that however\ncompletely adapted the moral instincts of a community may be at some\nparticular time to its conditions of existence, any rapid change of\ncircumstances would tend to derange the adaptation, from survival of\ninstincts formerly useful, which through this change become useless or\npernicious. And indeed, apart from any apparent changes in external\ncircumstances, it might result from the operation of some law of human\ndevelopment, that the most completely organised experience of human\nhappiness in the past would guide us but imperfectly to the right\nmeans of making it a maximum in the future. For example, a slight\ndecrease in the average strength of some common impulse might render\nthe traditional rules and sentiments, that regulate this impulse,\ninfelicific on the whole. And if, when we turn from these abstract\nconsiderations to history, and examine the actual morality of other\nages and countries, we undoubtedly find that, considered as an\ninstrument for producing general happiness, it continually seems to\nexhibit palpable imperfections,--there is surely a strong presumption\nthat there are similar imperfections to be discovered in our own moral\ncode, though habit and familiarity prevent them from being obvious.\n\nFinally, we must not overlook the fact that the divergences which we\nfind when we compare the moralities of different ages and countries,\nexist to some extent side by side in the morality of any one society at\nany given time. It has already been observed that whenever divergent\nopinions are entertained by a minority so large, that we cannot fairly\nregard the dogma of the majority as the plain utterance of Common\nSense, an appeal is necessarily made to some higher principle, and\nvery commonly to Utilitarianism. But a smaller minority than this,\nparticularly if composed of persons of enlightenment and special\nacquaintance with the effects of the conduct judged, may reasonably\ninspire us with distrust of Common Sense: just as in the more technical\nparts of practice we prefer the judgment of a few trained experts\nto the instincts of the vulgar. Yet again, a contemplation of these\ndivergent codes and their relation to the different circumstances in\nwhich men live, suggests that Common-Sense morality is really only\nadapted for ordinary men in ordinary circumstances--although it may\nstill be expedient that these ordinary persons should regard it as\nabsolutely and universally prescribed, since any other view of it may\ndangerously weaken its hold over their minds. So far as this is the\ncase we must use the Utilitarian method to ascertain how far persons\nin special circumstances require a morality more specially adapted to\nthem than Common Sense is willing to concede: and also how far men of\npeculiar physical or mental constitution ought to be exempted from\nordinary rules, as has sometimes been claimed for men of genius, or\nmen of intensely emotional nature, or men gifted with more than usual\nprudence and self-control.\n\nFurther, it is important to notice, that besides the large amount\nof divergence that exists between the moral instincts of different\nclasses and individuals, there is often a palpable discrepancy\nbetween the moral instincts of any class or individual, and such\nUtilitarian reasonings as their untrained intellects are in the\nhabit of conducting. There are many things in conduct which many\npeople think right but not expedient, or at least which they would\nnot think expedient if they had not first judged them to be right;\nin so far as they reason from experience only, their conclusions as\nto what conduces to the general happiness are opposed to their moral\nintuitions. It may be said that this results generally from a hasty and\nsuperficial consideration of expediency; and that the discrepancy would\ndisappear after a deeper and completer examination of the consequences\nof actions. And I do not deny that this would often turn out to be the\ncase: but as we cannot tell _a priori_ how far it would be so, this\nonly constitutes a further argument for a comprehensive and systematic\napplication of a purely Utilitarian method.\n\nWe must conclude, then, that we cannot take the moral rules of Common\nSense as expressing the _consensus_ of competent judges, up to the\npresent time, as to the kind of conduct which is likely to produce\nthe greatest amount of happiness on the whole. It would rather seem\nthat it is the unavoidable duty of a systematic Utilitarianism to make\na thorough revision of these rules, in order to ascertain how far\nthe causes previously enumerated (and perhaps others) have actually\noperated to produce a divergence between Common Sense and a perfectly\nUtilitarian code of morality.\n\n\u00a7 2. But in thus stating the problem we are assuming that the latter\nterm of this comparison can be satisfactorily defined and sufficiently\ndeveloped; that we can frame with adequate precision a system of rules,\nconstituting the true moral code for human beings as deduced from\nUtilitarian principles. And this seems to have been commonly assumed\nby the school whose method we are now examining. But when we set\nourselves in earnest to the construction of such a system, we find it\nbeset with serious difficulties. For, passing over the uncertainties\ninvolved in hedonistic comparison generally, let us suppose that\nthe _quantum_ of happiness that will result from the establishment\nof any plan of behaviour among human beings can be ascertained with\nsufficient exactness for practical purposes--even when the plan is as\nyet constructed in imagination alone. It still has to be asked, What\nis the nature of the human being for whom we are to construct this\nhypothetical scheme of conduct? For humanity is not something that\nexhibits the same properties always and everywhere: whether we consider\nthe intellect of man or his feelings, or his physical condition and\ncircumstances, we find them so different in different ages and\ncountries, that it seems _prima facie_ absurd to lay down a set of\nideal Utilitarian rules for mankind generally. It may be said that\nthese differences after all relate chiefly to details; and that there\nis in any case sufficient uniformity in the nature and circumstances of\nhuman life always and everywhere to render possible an outline scheme\nof ideal behaviour for mankind at large. But it must be answered, that\nit is with details that we are now principally concerned; for the\nprevious discussion has sufficiently shown that the conduct approved by\nCommon Sense has a _general_ resemblance to that which Utilitarianism\nwould prescribe; but we wish to ascertain more exactly how far the\nresemblance extends, and with what delicacy and precision the current\nmoral rules are adapted to the actual needs and conditions of human\nlife.\n\nSuppose, then, that we contract the scope of investigation, and only\nendeavour to ascertain the rules appropriate to men as we know them,\nin our own age and country. We are immediately met with a dilemma:\nthe men whom we know are beings who accept more or less definitely a\ncertain moral code: if we take them as they are in this respect, we can\nhardly at the same time conceive them as beings for whom a code is yet\nto be constructed _de novo_: if, on the other hand, we take an actual\nman--let us say, an average Englishman--and abstract his morality,\nwhat remains is an entity so purely hypothetical, that it is not clear\nwhat practical purpose can be served by constructing a system of moral\nrules for the community of such beings. Could we indeed assume that\nthe scientific deduction of such a system would ensure its general\nacceptance; could we reasonably expect to convert all mankind at once\nto Utilitarian principles, or even all educated and reflective mankind,\nso that all preachers and teachers should take universal happiness as\nthe goal of their efforts as unquestioningly as physicians take the\nhealth of the individual body; and could we be sure that men\u2019s moral\nhabits and sentiments would adjust themselves at once and without\nany waste of force to these changed rules:--then perhaps in framing\nthe Utilitarian code we might fairly leave existing morality out of\naccount. But I cannot think that we are warranted in making these\nsuppositions; I think we have to take the moral habits, impulses, and\ntastes of men as a material given us to work upon no less than the rest\nof their nature, and as something which, as it only partly results\nfrom reasoning in the past, so can only be partially modified by any\nreasoning which we can now apply to it. It seems therefore clear that\nthe solution of the hypothetical Utilitarian problem of constructing an\nideal morality for men conceived to be in other respects as experience\nshows them to be, but with their actual morality abstracted, will not\ngive us the result which we practically require.\n\nIt will perhaps be said, \u201cNo doubt such an ideal Utilitarian morality\ncan only be gradually, and perhaps after all imperfectly, introduced;\nbut still it will be useful to work it out as a pattern to which\nwe may approximate.\u201d But, in the first place, it may not be really\npossible to approximate to it: since any particular existing moral\nrule, though not the ideally best even for such beings as existing\nmen under the existing circumstances, may yet be the best that they\ncan be got to obey: so that it would be futile to propose any other,\nor even harmful, as it might tend to impair old moral habits without\neffectively replacing them by new ones. And secondly, the endeavour\ngradually to approximate to a morality constructed on the supposition\nthat the non-moral part of existing human nature remains unchanged, may\nlead us wrong: because the state of men\u2019s knowledge and intellectual\nfaculties, and the range of their sympathies, and the direction and\nstrength of their prevailing impulses, and their relations to the\nexternal world and to each other, are continually being altered,\nand such alteration is to some extent under our control and may be\nfelicific in a high degree: and any material modifications in important\nelements and conditions of human life may require corresponding\nchanges in established moral rules and sentiments, in order that the\ngreatest possible happiness may be attained by the human being whose\nlife is thus modified. In short, the construction of a Utilitarian\ncode, regarded as an ideal towards which we are to progress, is met by\na second dilemma:--The nature of man and the conditions of his life\ncannot usefully be assumed to be constant, unless we are confining our\nattention to the present or proximate future; while again, if we are\nconsidering them in the present or proximate future, we must take into\naccount men\u2019s actual moral habits and sentiments, as a part of their\nnature not materially more modifiable than the rest.\n\nNor, again, can I agree with Mr. Spencer[357] in thinking that it is\npossible to solve the problems of practical ethics by constructing\nthe final perfect form of society, towards which the process of human\nhistory is tending; and determining the rules of mutual behaviour which\nought to be, and will be, observed by the members of this perfect\nsociety. For, firstly, granting that we can conceive as possible a\nhuman community which is from a utilitarian point of view perfect; and\ngranting also Mr. Spencer\u2019s definition of this perfection--viz. that\nthe voluntary actions of all the members cause \u201cpleasure unalloyed\nby pain anywhere\u201d to all who are affected by them[358]--; it still\nseems to me quite impossible to forecast the natures and relations\nof the persons composing such a community, with sufficient clearness\nand certainty to enable us to define even in outline their moral\ncode. And secondly, even if it were otherwise, even if we could\nconstruct scientifically Mr. Spencer\u2019s ideal morality, I do not think\nsuch a construction would be of much avail in solving the practical\nproblems of actual humanity. For a society in which--to take one point\nonly--there is no such thing as punishment, is necessarily a society\nwith its essential structure so unlike our own, that it would be idle\nto attempt any close imitation of its rules of behaviour. It might\npossibly be best for us to conform approximately to some of these\nrules; but this we could only know by examining each particular rule\nin detail; we could have no general grounds for concluding that it\nwould be best for us to conform to them as far as possible. For even\nsupposing that this ideal society is ultimately to be realised, it\nmust at any rate be separated from us by a considerable interval of\nevolution; hence it is not unlikely that the best way of progressing\ntowards it will be some other than the apparently directest way, and\nthat we shall reach it more easily if we begin by moving away from it.\nWhether this is so or not, and to what extent, can only be known by\ncarefully examining the effects of conduct on actual human beings, and\ninferring its probable effects on the human beings whom we may expect\nto exist in the proximate future.\n\n\u00a7 3. Other thinkers of the evolutionist school suggest that the\ndifficulties of Utilitarian method might be avoided, in a way more\nsimple than Mr. Spencer\u2019s, by adopting, as the _practically_ ultimate\nend and criterion of morality, \u201chealth\u201d or \u201cefficiency\u201d of the social\norganism, instead of happiness. This view is maintained, for instance,\nin Mr. Leslie Stephen\u2019s _Science of Ethics_;[359] and deserves careful\nexamination. As I understand Mr. Stephen, he means by \u201chealth\u201d that\nstate of the social organism which tends to its preservation under the\nconditions of its existence, as they are known or capable of being\npredicted; and he means the same by \u201cefficiency\u201d;--since the work for\nwhich, in his view, the social organism has to be \u201cefficient\u201d is simply\nthe work of living, the function of \u201cgoing on.\u201d I say this because\n\u201cefficiency\u201d might be understood to imply some \u2018task of humanity\u2019\nwhich the social organism has to execute, beyond the task of merely\nliving; and similarly \u201chealth\u201d might be taken to mean a state tending\nto the preservation not of existence merely, but of _desirable_\nexistence--desirability being interpreted in some non-hedonistic\nmanner: and in this case an examination of either term would lead us\nagain over the ground traversed in the discussion on Ultimate Good (in\nchap. xiv. of the preceding Book).[360] But I do not understand that\nany such implications were in Mr. Stephen\u2019s mind; and they certainly\nwould not be in harmony with the general drift of his argument. The\nquestion, therefore, is whether, if General Happiness be admitted to\nbe the really ultimate end in a system of morality, it is nevertheless\nreasonable to take Preservation of the social organism as the\npractically ultimate \u201cscientific criterion\u201d of moral rules.\n\nMy reasons for answering this question in the negative are two-fold.\nIn the first place I know no adequate grounds for supposing that if we\naim exclusively at the preservation of the social organism we shall\nsecure the maximum attainable happiness of its individual members:\nindeed, so far as I know, of two social states which equally tend\nto be preserved one may be indefinitely happier than the other. As\nhas been before observed[361] a large part of the pleasures which\ncultivated persons value most highly--\u00e6sthetic pleasures--are derived\nfrom acts and processes that have no material tendency to preserve\nthe individual\u2019s life:[362] and the statement remains true if we\nsubstitute the social organism for the individual. And I may add that\nmuch refined morality is concerned with the prevention of pains which\nhave no demonstrable tendency to the destruction of the individual\nor of society. Hence, while I quite admit that the maintenance of\npreservative habits and sentiments is the most indispensable function\nof utilitarian morality--and perhaps almost its sole function in\nthe earlier stages of moral development, when to live at all was\na difficult task for human communities--I do not therefore think\nit reasonable that we should be content with the mere securing of\nexistence for humanity generally, and should confine our efforts to\npromoting the increase of this security, instead of seeking to make the\nsecured existence more desirable.\n\nBut, secondly, I do not see on what grounds Mr. Stephen holds that the\ncriterion of \u2018tendency to the preservation of the social organism\u2019\nis necessarily capable of being applied with greater precision than\nthat of \u2018tendency to general happiness,\u2019 even so far as the two\nends are coincident: and that the former \u201csatisfies the conditions\nof a scientific criterion.\u201d I should admit that this would probably\nbe the case, if the Sociology that we know were a science actually\nconstructed, and not merely the sketch of a possible future science:\nbut Mr. Stephen has himself told us that sociology at present \u201cconsists\nof nothing more than a collection of unverified guesses and vague\ngeneralisations, disguised under a more or less pretentious apparatus\nof quasi-scientific terminology.\u201d This language is stronger than I\nshould have ventured to use; but I agree generally with the view that\nit expresses; and it appears to me difficult for a writer who holds\nthis view to maintain that the conception of \u201csocial health,\u201d regarded\nas a criterion and standard of right conduct, is in any important\ndegree more \u201cscientific\u201d than the conception of \u201cgeneral happiness.\u201d\n\nHolding this estimate of the present condition of Sociology, I consider\nthat, from the utilitarian point of view, there are equally decisive\nreasons against the adoption of any such notion as \u201cdevelopment\u201d of\nthe social organism--instead of mere preservation--as the practically\nultimate end and criterion of morality. On the one hand, if by\n\u201cdevelopment\u201d is meant an increase in \u201cefficiency\u201d or preservative\nqualities, this notion is only an optimistic specialisation of that\njust discussed (involving the--I fear--unwarranted assumption that the\nsocial organism tends to become continually more efficient); so that\nno fresh arguments need be urged against it. If, however, something\ndifferent is meant by development--as (_e.g._) a disciple of Mr.\nSpencer might mean an increase in \u201cdefinite coherent heterogeneity,\u201d\nwhether or not such increase was preservative--then I know no\nscientific grounds for concluding that we shall best promote general\nhappiness by concentrating our efforts on the attainment of this\nincrease. I do not affirm it to be impossible that every increase in\nthe definite coherent heterogeneity of a society of human beings may\nbe accompanied or followed by an increase in the aggregate happiness\nof the members of the society: but I do not perceive that Mr. Spencer,\nor any one else, has even attempted to furnish the kind of proof which\nthis proposition requires.[363]\n\nTo sum up: I hold that the utilitarian, in the existing state of our\nknowledge, cannot possibly construct a morality _de novo_ either for\nman as he is (abstracting his morality), or for man as he ought to\nbe and will be. He must start, speaking broadly, with the existing\nsocial order, and the existing morality as a part of that order: and in\ndeciding the question whether any divergence from this code is to be\nrecommended, must consider chiefly the immediate consequences of such\ndivergence, upon a society in which such a code is conceived generally\nto subsist. No doubt a thoughtful and well-instructed Utilitarian\nmay see dimly a certain way ahead, and his attitude towards existing\nmorality may be to some extent modified by what he sees. He may discern\nin the future certain evils impending, which can only be effectually\nwarded off by the adoption of new and more stringent views of duty in\ncertain departments: while, on the other hand, he may see a prospect\nof social changes which will render a relaxation of other parts of the\nmoral code expedient or inevitable. But if he keeps within the limits\nthat separate scientific prevision from fanciful Utopian conjecture,\nthe form of society to which his practical conclusions relate will be\none varying but little from the actual, with its actually established\ncode of moral rules and customary judgments concerning virtue and vice.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[351] Cf. J. S. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, chap. ii. Mill, however, only\naffirms that the \u201crules of morality for the multitude\u201d are to be\naccepted by the philosopher provisionally, until he has got something\nbetter.\n\n[352] I refer to the abstract principles of Prudence, Justice, and\nRational Benevolence as defined in chap. xiii. of the preceding Book.\n\n[353] _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, Book i.\n\n[354] This operation of sympathy is strikingly illustrated in the penal\ncodes of primitive communities, both by the mildness of the punishments\ninflicted for homicide, and by the startling differences between the\npenalties allotted to the same crime according as the criminal was\ntaken in the act or not. \u201cIt is curious to observe,\u201d says Sir H. Maine\n(_Ancient Law_, chap. x.), \u201chow completely the men of primitive times\nwere persuaded that the impulses of the injured person were the proper\nmeasure of the vengeance he was entitled to exact, and how literally\nthey imitated the probable rise and fall of his passions in fixing the\nscale of punishment.\u201d And even in more civilised societies there is a\nvery common feeling of uncertainty as to the propriety of inflicting\npunishment for crimes committed long ago, which seems traceable to the\nsame source.\n\n[355] No doubt this influence is confined within strict limits:\nno authority can permanently impose on men regulations flagrantly\ninfelicific: and the most practically originative of religious teachers\nhave produced their effect chiefly by giving new force and vividness to\nsentiments already existing (and recognised as properly authoritive) in\nthe society upon which they acted. Still, it might have made a great\ndifference to the human race if (_e.g._) Mohammed had been fond of\nwine, and indifferent to women.\n\n[356] On this point I shall have occasion to speak further in the next\nsection.\n\n[357] I refer especially to the views put forward by Mr. Spencer in the\nconcluding chapters of his _Data of Ethics_.\n\n[358] This definition, however, does not seem to me admissible, from\na utilitarian point of view: since a society in this sense perfect\nmight not realise the maximum of possible happiness; it might still be\ncapable of a material increase of happiness through pleasures involving\na slight alloy of pain, such as Mr. Spencer\u2019s view of perfection would\nexclude.\n\n[359] See especially chap. ix. Pars. 12-15.\n\n[360] It is obvious that if \u2018desirability,\u2019 in the above definition,\nwere interpreted hedonistically, the term \u201chealth\u201d would merely give us\na new name for the general problem of utilitarian morality; not a new\nsuggestion for its solution. I ought to say that the notions of \u201csocial\nwelfare\u201d or \u201cwellbeing\u201d are elsewhere used by Mr. Stephen, in the place\nof those here quoted, but I do not think that he means by them any more\nthan what I understand him to mean by \u201chealth\u201d or \u201cefficiency\u201d--_i.e._\nthat state of the social organism which tends to its preservation under\nthe conditions of its existence.\n\n[361] Book ii. chap. vi. \u00a7 3.\n\n[362] I do not mean to assert that \u2018play\u2019 in some form is not necessary\nfor physical health: but there is a long step from the encouragement of\nplay, so far as salutary, to the promotion of social culture.\n\n[363] It may be observed that the increased heterogeneity which the\ndevelopment of modern industry has brought with it, in the form of a\nspecialisation of industrial functions which tends to render the lives\nof individual workers narrow and monotonous, has usually been regarded\nby philanthropists as seriously infelicific; and as needing to be\ncounteracted by a general diffusion of the intellectual culture now\nenjoyed by the few--which, if realised, would tend _pro tanto_ to make\nthe lives of different classes in the community _less_ heterogeneous.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM--_Continued_\n\n\n\u00a7 1. If, then, we are to regard the morality of Common Sense as a\nmachinery of rules, habits, and sentiments, roughly and generally but\nnot precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest\npossible happiness for sentient beings generally; and if, on the other\nhand, we have to accept it as the actually established machinery for\nattaining this end, which we cannot replace at once by any other, but\ncan only gradually modify; it remains to consider the practical effects\nof the complex and balanced relation in which a scientific Utilitarian\nthus seems to stand to the Positive Morality of his age and country.\n\nGenerally speaking, he will clearly conform to it, and endeavour\nto promote its development in others. For, though the imperfection\nthat we find in all the actual conditions of human existence--we may\neven say in the universe at large as judged from a human point of\nview--is ultimately found even in Morality itself, in so far as this\nis contemplated as Positive; still, practically, we are much less\nconcerned with correcting and improving than we are with realising and\nenforcing it. The Utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper\nof rebellion against the established morality, as something purely\nexternal and conventional, into which the reflective mind is always\napt to fall when it is first convinced that the established rules\nare not intrinsically reasonable. He must, of course, also repudiate\nas superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or Divine Code which\nIntuitional moralists inculcate.[364] Still, he will naturally\ncontemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvellous product of\nnature, the result of long centuries of growth, showing in many parts\nthe same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most\nelaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit: he will handle\nit with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid\nelement of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which\nthe actual _quantum_ of human happiness is continually being produced;\na mechanism which no \u2018politicians or philosophers\u2019 could create, yet\nwithout which the harder and coarser machinery of Positive Law could\nnot be permanently maintained, and the life of man would become--as\nHobbes forcibly expresses it--\u201csolitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and\nshort.\u201d\n\nStill, as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will\nbe the Utilitarian\u2019s duty to aid in improving it; just as the most\norderly, law-abiding member of a modern civilised society includes\nthe reform of laws in his conception of political duty. We have\ntherefore to consider by what method he will ascertain the particular\nmodifications of positive morality which it would be practically\nexpedient to attempt to introduce, at any given time and place. Here\nour investigation seems, after all, to leave Empirical Hedonism as\nthe only method ordinarily applicable for the ultimate decision of\nsuch problems--at least until the science of Sociology shall have been\nreally constructed. I do not mean that the rudiments of Sociological\nknowledge which we now possess are of no practical value: for certainly\nchanges in morality might be suggested--and have actually been proposed\nby persons seriously concerned to benefit their fellow-creatures--which\neven our present imperfect knowledge would lead us to regard as\ndangerous to the very existence of the social organism. But such\nchanges for the most part involve changes in positive law as well:\nsince most of the rules of which the observance is fundamentally\nimportant for the preservation of an organised community are either\ndirectly or indirectly maintained by legal sanctions: and it would\nbe going too far beyond the line which, in my view, separates ethics\nfrom politics, to discuss changes of this kind in the present book.\nThe rules with which we have primarily to deal, in considering the\nutilitarian method of determining private duty, are rules supported by\nmerely moral sanctions; and the question of maintaining or modifying\nsuch rules concerns, for the most part, the well-being rather than the\nvery existence of human society. The consideration of this question,\ntherefore, from a utilitarian point of view, resolves itself into a\ncomparison between the total amounts of pleasure and pain that may\nbe expected to result respectively from maintaining any given rule\nas at present established, and from endeavouring to introduce that\nwhich is proposed in its stead. That this comparison must generally\nbe of a rough and uncertain kind, we have already seen; and it is\nhighly important to bear this in mind; but yet we seem unable to\nfind any substitute for it. It is not meant, of course, that each\nindividual is left to his own unassisted judgment in dealing with\nsuch questions: there is a mass of traditional experience, which each\nindividual imbibes orally or from books, as to the effects of conduct\nupon happiness; but the great formul\u00e6 in which this experience is\ntransmitted are, for the most part, so indefinite, the proper range\nof their application so uncertain, and the observation and induction\non which they are founded so uncritical, that they stand in continual\nneed of further empirical verification; especially as regards their\napplicability to any particular case.\n\nIt is perhaps not surprising that some thinkers[365] of the Utilitarian\nschool should consider that the task of hedonistic calculation which\nis thus set before the utilitarian moralist is too extensive: and\nshould propose to simplify it by marking off a \u201clarge sphere of\nindividual option and self-guidance,\u201d to which \u201cethical dictation\u201d\ndoes not apply. I should quite admit that it is clearly expedient to\ndraw a dividing line of this kind: but it appears to me that there\nis no simple general method of drawing it; that it can only be drawn\nby careful utilitarian calculation applied with varying results to\nthe various relations and circumstances of human life. To attempt the\nrequired division by means of any such general formula as that \u2018the\nindividual is not responsible to society for that part of his conduct\nwhich concerns himself alone and others only with their free and\nundeceived consent\u2019[366] seems to me practically futile: since, owing\nto the complex enlacements of interest and sympathy that connect the\nmembers of a civilised community, almost any material loss of happiness\nby any one individual is likely to affect some others without their\nconsent to some not inconsiderable extent. And I do not see how it is\nfrom a utilitarian point of view justifiable to say broadly with J.\nS. Mill that such secondary injury to others, if merely \u201cconstructive\nor presumptive,\u201d is to be disregarded in view of the advantages of\nallowing free development to individuality; for if the injury feared is\ngreat, and the presumption that it will occur is shown by experience\nto be strong, the definite risk of evil from the withdrawal of the\nmoral sanction must, I conceive, outweigh the indefinite possibility\nof loss through the repression of individuality in one particular\ndirection.[367] But further: even supposing that we could mark off\nthe \u201csphere of individual option and self-guidance\u201d by some simple\nand sweeping formula, still within this sphere the individual, if he\nwishes to guide himself reasonably on utilitarian principles, must take\nsome account of all important effects of his actions on the happiness\nof others; and if he does this methodically, he must, I conceive,\nuse the empirical method which we have examined in Book ii. And--to\nprevent any undue alarm at this prospect--we may observe that every\nsensible man is commonly supposed to determine at least a large part\nof his conduct by what is substantially this method; it is assumed\nthat, within the limits which morality lays down, he will try to get\nas much happiness as he can for himself and for other human beings,\naccording to the relations in which they stand to him, by combining in\nsome way his own experience with that of other men as to the felicific\nand infelicific effects of actions. And it is actually in this way that\neach man usually deliberates (_e.g._) what profession to choose for\nhimself, or what mode of education for his children, whether to aim\nat marriage or remain single, whether to settle in town or country,\nin England or abroad, etc. No doubt there are, as we saw,[368] other\nends besides Happiness, such as Knowledge, Beauty, etc., commonly\nrecognised as unquestionably desirable, and therefore largely pursued\nwithout consideration of ulterior consequences: but when the pursuit of\nany of these ends involves an apparent sacrifice of happiness in other\nways, the practical question whether under these circumstances such\npursuit ought to be maintained or abandoned seems always decided by an\napplication, however rough, of the method of pure empirical Hedonism.\n\nAnd in saying that this must be the method of the Utilitarian moralist,\nI only mean that no other can normally be applied in reducing to a\ncommon measure the diverse elements of the problems with which he\nhas to deal. Of course, in determining the nature and importance\nof each of these diverse considerations, the utilitarian art of\nmorality will lay various sciences under contribution. Thus, for\nexample, it will learn from Political Economy what effects a general\ncensure of usurers, or the ordinary commendation of liberality in\nalmsgiving, is likely to have on the wealth of the community; it will\nlearn from the physiologist the probable consequences to health of a\ngeneral abstinence from alcoholic liquors or any other restraint on\nappetite proposed in the name of Temperance; it will learn from the\nexperts in any science how far knowledge is likely to be promoted by\ninvestigations offensive to any prevalent moral or religious sentiment.\nBut how far the increase of wealth or of knowledge, or even the\nimprovement of health, should under any circumstances be subordinated\nto other considerations, I know no scientific method of determining\nother than that of empirical Hedonism. Nor, as I have said, does it\nseem to me that any other method has ever been applied or sought by the\ncommon sense of mankind, for regulating the pursuit of what our older\nmoralists called \u2018Natural Good,\u2019--_i.e._ of all that is intrinsically\ndesirable _except_ Virtue or Morality, within the limits fixed by the\nlatter; the Utilitarian here only performs somewhat more consistently\nand systematically than ordinary men the reasoning processes which\nare commonly admitted to be appropriate to the questions that this\npursuit raises. His distinctive characteristic, as a Utilitarian, is\nthat he has to apply the same method to the criticism and correction of\nthe limiting morality itself. The particulars of this criticism will\nobviously vary almost indefinitely with the variations in human nature\nand circumstances: I here only propose to discuss the general points of\nview which a Utilitarian critic must take, in order that no important\nclass of relevant considerations may be omitted.\n\n\u00a7 2. Let us first recall the distinction previously noticed[369]\nbetween duty as commonly conceived,--that to which a man is bound\nor obliged--, and praiseworthy or excellent conduct; since, in\nconsidering the relation of Utilitarianism to the moral judgments\nof Common Sense, it will be convenient to begin with the former\nelement of current morality, as the more important and indispensable;\n_i.e._ with the _ensemble_ of rules imposed by common opinion in any\nsociety, which form a kind of unwritten legislation, supplementary\nto Law proper, and enforced by the penalties of social disfavour and\ncontempt. This legislation, as it does not emanate from a definite\nbody of persons acting in a corporate capacity, cannot be altered\nby any formal deliberations and resolutions of the persons on whose\n_consensus_ it rests; any change in it must therefore result from\nthe private action of individuals, whether determined by Utilitarian\nconsiderations or otherwise. As we shall presently see, the practical\nUtilitarian problem is liable to be complicated by the conflict and\ndivergence which is found to some extent in all societies between the\nmoral opinions of different sections of the community: but it will\nbe convenient to confine our attention in the first instance to the\ncase of rules of duty clearly supported by \u2018common consent.\u2019 Let us\nsuppose then that after considering the consequences of any such rule,\na Utilitarian comes to the conclusion that a different rule would be\nmore conducive to the general happiness, if similarly established in\na society remaining in other respects the same as at present--or in\none slightly different (in so far as our forecast of social changes\ncan be made sufficiently clear to furnish any basis for practice). And\nfirst we will suppose that this new rule differs from the old one not\nonly positively but negatively; that it does not merely go beyond and\ninclude it, but actually conflicts with it. Before he can decide that\nit is right for him (_i.e._ conducive to the general happiness) to\nsupport the new rule against the old, by example and precept, he ought\nto estimate the force of certain disadvantages necessarily attendant\nupon such innovations, which may conveniently be arranged under the\nfollowing heads.\n\nIn the first place, as his own happiness and that of others connected\nwith him form a part of the universal end at which he aims, he must\nconsider the importance to himself and them of the penalties of social\ndisapprobation which he will incur: taking into account, besides\nthe immediate pain of this disapprobation, its indirect effect in\ndiminishing his power of serving society and promoting the general\nhappiness in other ways. The prospect of such pain and loss is, of\ncourse, not decisive against the innovation; since it must to some\nextent be regarded as the regular price that has to be paid for the\nadvantage of this kind of reform in current morality. But here, as in\nmany Utilitarian calculations, everything depends on the quantity of\nthe effects produced; which in the case supposed may vary very much,\nfrom slight distrust and disfavour to severe condemnation and social\nexclusion. It often seems that by attempting change prematurely an\ninnovator may incur the severest form of the moral penalty, whereas if\nhe had waited a few years he would have been let off with the mildest.\nFor the hold which a moral rule has over the general mind commonly\nbegins to decay from the time that it is seen to be opposed to the\ncalculations of expediency: and it may be better for the community as\nwell as for the individual that it should not be openly attacked, until\nthis process of decay has reached a certain point.\n\nIt is, however, of more importance to point out certain general reasons\nfor doubting whether an apparent improvement will really have a\nbeneficial effect on others. It is possible that the new rule, though\nit would be more felicific than the old one, if it could get itself\nequally established, may be not so likely to be adopted, or if adopted,\nnot so likely to be obeyed, by the mass of the community in which it is\nproposed to innovate. It may be too subtle and refined, or too complex\nand elaborate: it may require a greater intellectual development, or\na higher degree of self-control, than is to be found in an average\nmember of the community, or an exceptional quality or balance of\nfeelings. Nor can it be said in reply, that by the hypothesis the\ninnovator\u2019s example must be good to whatever extent it operates, since\n_pro tanto_ it tends to substitute a better rule for a worse. For\nexperience seems to show that an example of this kind is more likely\nto be potent negatively than positively; that here, as elsewhere in\nhuman affairs, it is easier to pull down than to build up; easier to\nweaken or destroy the restraining force that a moral rule, habitually\nand generally obeyed, has over men\u2019s minds, than to substitute for it a\nnew restraining habit, not similarly sustained by tradition and custom.\nHence the effect of an example intrinsically good may be on the whole\nbad, because its destructive operation proves to be more vigorous than\nits constructive. And again, such destructive effect must be considered\nnot only in respect of the particular rule violated, but of all other\nrules. For just as the breaking of any positive law has an inevitable\ntendency to encourage lawlessness generally, so the violation of any\ngenerally recognised moral rule seems to give a certain aid to the\nforces that are always tending towards moral anarchy in any society.\n\nNor must we neglect the reaction which any breach with customary\nmorality will have on the agent\u2019s own mind. For the regulative habits\nand sentiments which each man has received by inheritance or training\nconstitute an important force impelling his will, in the main, to\nconduct such as his reason would dictate; a natural auxiliary, as it\nwere, to Reason in its conflict with seductive passions and appetites;\nand it may be practically dangerous to impair the strength of these\nauxiliaries. On the other hand, it would seem that the habit of acting\nrationally is the best of all habits, and that it ought to be the aim\nof a reasonable being to bring all his impulses and sentiments into\nmore and more perfect harmony with Reason. And indeed when a man has\nearnestly accepted any moral principle, those of his pre-existing\nregulative habits and sentiments that are not in harmony with this\nprinciple tend naturally to decay and disappear; and it would perhaps\nbe scarcely worth while to take them into account, except for the\nsupport that they derive from the sympathy of others.\n\nBut this last is a consideration of great importance. For the moral\nimpulses of each individual commonly draw a large part of their\neffective force from the sympathy of other human beings. I do\nnot merely mean that the pleasures and pains which each derives\nsympathetically from the moral likings and aversions of others are\nimportant as motives to felicific conduct no less than as elements of\nthe individual\u2019s happiness: I mean further that the direct sympathetic\necho in each man of the judgments and sentiments of others concerning\nconduct sustains his own similar judgments and sentiments. Through this\ntwofold operation of sympathy it becomes practically much easier for\nmost men to conform to a moral rule established in the society to which\nthey belong than to one made by themselves. And any act by which a man\nweakens the effect on himself of this general moral sympathy tends _pro\ntanto_ to make the performance of duty more difficult for him. On the\nother hand, we have to take into account--besides the intrinsic gain\nof the particular change--the general advantage of offering to mankind\na striking example of consistent Utilitarianism; since, in this case\nas in others, a man gives a stronger proof of genuine conviction by\nconduct in opposition to public opinion than he can by conformity.\nIn order, however, that this effect may be produced, it is almost\nnecessary that the non-conformity should not promote the innovator\u2019s\npersonal convenience; for in that case it will almost certainly be\nattributed to egoistic motives, however plausible the Utilitarian\ndeduction of its rightness may seem.\n\nThe exact force of these various considerations will differ\nindefinitely in different cases; and it does not seem profitable to\nattempt any general estimate of them: but on the whole, it would\nseem that the general arguments which we have noticed constitute\nan important rational check upon such Utilitarian innovations on\nCommon-Sense morality as are of the negative or destructive kind.\n\nIf now we consider such innovations as are merely positive and\nsupplementary, and consist in adding a new rule to those already\nestablished by Common Sense; it will appear that there is really no\ncollision of methods, so far as the Utilitarian\u2019s own observance of\nthe new rule is concerned. For, as every such rule is, _ex hypothesi_,\nbelieved by him to be conducive to the common good, he is merely giving\na special and stricter interpretation to the general duty of Universal\nBenevolence, where Common Sense leaves it loose and indeterminate.\nHence the restraining considerations above enumerated do not apply\nto this case. And whatever it is right for him to do himself, it is\nobviously right for him to approve and recommend to other persons in\nsimilar circumstances. But it is a different question whether he ought\nto seek to impose his new rule on others, by express condemnation of\nall who are not prepared to adopt it; as this involves not only the\nimmediate evil of the annoyance given to others, but also the further\ndanger of weakening the general good effect of his moral example,\nthrough the reaction provoked by this aggressive attitude. On this\npoint his decision will largely depend on the prospect, as far as\nhe can estimate it, that his innovation will meet with support and\nsympathy from others.\n\nIt should be observed, however, that a great part of the reform in\npopular morality, which a consistent Utilitarian will try to introduce,\nwill probably lie not so much in establishing new rules (whether\nconflicting with the old or merely supplementary) as in enforcing\nold ones. For there is always a considerable part of morality in the\ncondition of receiving formal respect and acceptance, while yet it is\nnot really sustained by any effective force of public opinion: and the\ndifference between the moralities of any two societies is often more\nstrikingly exhibited in the different emphasis attached to various\nportions of the moral code in each, than in disagreement as to the\nrules which the code should include. In the case we are considering,\nit is chiefly conduct which shows a want of comprehensive sympathy or\nof public spirit, to which the Utilitarian will desire to attach a\nseverer condemnation than is at present directed against it. There is\nmuch conduct of this sort, of which the immediate effect is to give\nobvious pleasure to individuals, while the far greater amount of harm\nthat it more remotely and indirectly causes is but dimly recognised by\nCommon Sense. Such conduct, therefore, even when it is allowed to be\nwrong, is very mildly treated by common opinion; especially when it is\nprompted by some impulse not self-regarding. Still, in all such cases,\nwe do not require the promulgation of any new moral doctrine, but\nmerely a bracing and sharpening of the moral sentiments of society, to\nbring them into harmony with the greater comprehensiveness of view and\nthe more impartial concern for human happiness which characterise the\nUtilitarian system.\n\n\u00a7 3. We have hitherto supposed that the innovator is endeavouring\nto introduce a new rule of conduct, not for himself only, but for\nothers also, as more conducive to the general happiness than the\nrule recognised by Common Sense. It may perhaps be thought that this\nis not the issue most commonly raised between Utilitarianism and\nCommon Sense: but rather whether exceptions should be allowed to\nrules which both sides accept as generally valid. For no one doubts\nthat it is, _generally speaking_, conducive to the common happiness\nthat men should be veracious, faithful to promises, obedient to\nlaw, disposed to satisfy the normal expectations of others, having\ntheir malevolent impulses and their sensual appetites under strict\ncontrol: but it is thought that an exclusive regard to pleasurable and\npainful consequences would frequently admit exceptions to rules which\nCommon Sense imposes as absolute. It should, however, be observed\nthat the admission of an exception on general grounds is merely the\nestablishment of a more complex and delicate rule, instead of one that\nis broader and simpler; for if it is conducive to the general good\nthat such an exception be admitted in one case, it will be equally\nso in all similar cases. Suppose (_e.g._) that a Utilitarian thinks\nit on general grounds right to answer falsely a question as to the\nmanner in which he has voted at a political election where the voting\nis by secret ballot. His reasons will probably be that the Utilitarian\nprohibition of falsehood is based on (1) the harm done by misleading\nparticular individuals, and (2) the tendency of false statements to\ndiminish the mutual confidence that men ought to have in each other\u2019s\nassertions: and that in this exceptional case it is (1) expedient that\nthe questioner should be misled; while (2), in so far as the falsehood\ntends to produce a general distrust of all assertions as to the manner\nin which a man has voted, it only furthers the end for which voting\nhas been made secret. It is evident, that if these reasons are valid\nfor any person, they are valid for all persons; in fact, that they\nestablish the expediency of a new general rule in respect of truth\nand falsehood, more complicated than the old one; a rule which the\nUtilitarian, as such, should desire to be universally obeyed.\n\nThere are, of course, some kinds of moral innovation which, from\nthe nature of the case, are not likely to occur frequently; as\nwhere Utilitarian reasoning leads a man to take part in a political\nrevolution, or to support a public measure in opposition to what Common\nSense regards as Justice or Good Faith. Still, in such cases a rational\nUtilitarian will usually proceed on general principles, which he would\ndesire all persons in similar circumstances to carry into effect.\n\nWe have, however, to consider another kind of exceptions, differing\nfundamentally from this, which Utilitarianism seems to admit; where\nthe agent does not think it expedient that the rule on which he\nhimself acts should be universally adopted, and yet maintains that his\nindividual act is right, as producing a greater balance of pleasure\nover pain than any other conduct open to him would produce.\n\nNow we cannot fairly argue that, because a large aggregate of acts\nwould cause more harm than good, therefore any single act of the kind\nwill produce this effect. It may even be a straining of language to\nsay that it has a _tendency_ to produce it: no one (_e.g._) would\nsay that because an army walking over a bridge would break it down,\ntherefore the crossing of a single traveller has a tendency to\ndestroy it. And just as a prudent physician in giving rules of diet\nrecommends an occasional deviation from them, as more conducive to the\nhealth of the body than absolute regularity; so there may be rules\nof social behaviour of which the general observance is necessary\nto the well-being of the community, while yet a certain amount of\nnon-observance is rather advantageous than otherwise.\n\nHere, however, we seem brought into conflict with Kant\u2019s fundamental\nprinciple, that a right action must be one of which the agent\ncould \u201cwill the maxim to be law universal.\u201d[370] But, as was\nbefore[371] noticed in the particular case of veracity, we must\nadmit an application of this principle, which importantly modifies\nits practical force: we must admit the case where the belief that\nthe action in question will not be widely imitated is an essential\nqualification of the maxim which the Kantian principle is applied\nto test. For this principle,--at least so far as I have accepted it\nas self-evident--means no more than that an act, if right for any\nindividual, must be right on general grounds, and therefore for some\n_class_ of persons; it therefore cannot prevent us from defining this\nclass by the above-mentioned characteristic of believing that the act\nwill remain an exceptional one. Of course if this belief turns out\nto be erroneous, serious harm may possibly result; but this is no\nmore than may be said of many other Utilitarian deductions. Nor is\nit difficult to find instances of conduct which Common Sense holds\nto be legitimate solely on the ground that we have no fear of its\nbeing too widely imitated. Take, for example, the case of Celibacy.\nA universal refusal to propagate the human species would be the\ngreatest of conceivable crimes from a Utilitarian point of view;--that\nis, according to the commonly accepted belief in the superiority of\nhuman happiness to that of other animals;--and hence the principle in\nquestion, applied without the qualification above given, would make\nit a crime in any one to choose celibacy as the state most conducive\nto his own happiness. But Common Sense (in the present age at least)\nregards such preference as within the limits of right conduct; because\nthere is no fear that population will not be sufficiently kept up, as\nin fact the tendency to propagate is thought to exist rather in excess\nthan otherwise.\n\nIn this case it is a non-moral impulse on the average strength of\nwhich we think we may reckon: but there does not appear to be any\nformal or universal reason why the same procedure should not be applied\nby Utilitarians to an actually existing moral sentiment. The result\nwould be a discrepancy of a peculiar kind between Utilitarianism and\nCommon-Sense morality; as the very firmness with which the latter\nis established would be the Utilitarian ground for relieving the\nindividual of its obligations. We are supposed to see that general\nhappiness will be enhanced (just as the excellence of a metrical\ncomposition is) by a slight admixture of irregularity along with\na general observance of received rules; and hence to justify the\nirregular conduct of a few individuals, on the ground that the supply\nof regular conduct from other members of the community may reasonably\nbe expected to be adequate.\n\nIt does not seem to me that this reasoning can be shown to be\nnecessarily unsound, as applied to human society as at present\nconstituted: but the cases in which it could really be thought to be\napplicable, by any one sincerely desirous of promoting the general\nhappiness, must certainly be rare. For it should be observed that\nit makes a fundamental difference whether the sentiment in mankind\ngenerally, on which we rely to sustain sufficiently a general rule\nwhile admitting exceptions thereto, is moral or non-moral; because a\nmoral sentiment is inseparable from the conviction that the conduct to\nwhich it prompts is objectively right--_i.e._ right whether or not it\nis thought or felt to be so--for oneself and all similar persons in\nsimilar circumstances; it cannot therefore coexist with approval of the\ncontrary conduct in any one case, unless this case is distinguished by\nsome material difference other than the mere non-existence in the agent\nof the ordinary moral sentiment against his conduct. Thus, assuming\nthat general unveracity and general celibacy would both be evils of\nthe worst kind, we may still all regard it as legitimate for men in\ngeneral to remain celibate if they like, on account of the strength of\nthe natural sentiments prompting to marriage, because the existence\nof these sentiments in ordinary human beings is not affected by the\nuniversal recognition of the legitimacy of celibacy: but we cannot\nsimilarly all regard it as legitimate for men to tell lies if they\nlike, however strong the actually existing sentiment against lying\nmay be, because as soon as this legitimacy is generally recognised\nthe sentiment must be expected to decay and vanish. If therefore we\nwere all enlightened Utilitarians, it would be impossible for any one\nto justify himself in making false statements while admitting it to\nbe inexpedient for persons similarly conditioned to make them; as he\nwould have no ground for believing that persons similarly conditioned\nwould act differently from himself. The case, no doubt, is different in\nsociety as actually constituted; it is conceivable that the practically\neffective morality in such a society, resting on a basis independent\nof utilitarian or any other reasonings, may not be materially affected\nby the particular act or expressed opinion of a particular individual:\nbut the circumstances are, I conceive, very rare, in which a really\nconscientious person could feel so sure of this as to conclude that\nby approving a particular violation of a rule, of which the _general_\n(though not _universal_) observance is plainly expedient, he will not\nprobably do harm on the whole. Especially as all the objections to\ninnovation, noticed in the previous section, apply with increased\nforce if the innovator does not even claim to be introducing a new and\nbetter general rule.\n\nIt appears to me, therefore, that the cases in which practical doubts\nare likely to arise, as to whether exceptions should be permitted from\nordinary rules on Utilitarian principles, will mostly be those which I\ndiscussed in the first paragraph of this section: where the exceptions\nare not claimed for a few individuals, on the mere ground of their\nprobable fewness, but either for persons generally under exceptional\ncircumstances, or for a class of persons defined by exceptional\nqualities of intellect, temperament, or character. In such cases the\nUtilitarian may have no doubt that in a community consisting generally\nof enlightened Utilitarians, these grounds for exceptional ethical\ntreatment would be regarded as valid; still he may, as I have said,\ndoubt whether the more refined and complicated rule which recognises\nsuch exceptions is adapted for the community in which he is actually\nliving; and whether the attempt to introduce it is not likely to do\nmore harm by weakening current morality than good by improving its\nquality. Supposing such a doubt to arise, either in a case of this\nkind, or in one of the rare cases discussed in the preceding paragraph,\nit becomes necessary that the Utilitarian should consider carefully the\nextent to which his advice or example are likely to influence persons\nto whom they would be dangerous: and it is evident that the result\nof this consideration may depend largely on the degree of publicity\nwhich he gives to either advice or example. Thus, on Utilitarian\nprinciples, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under\ncertain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly;\nit may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would\nbe wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it\ncan be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to do in\nthe face of the world; and even, if perfect secrecy can be reasonably\nexpected, what it would be wrong to recommend by private advice or\nexample. These conclusions are all of a paradoxical character:[372]\nthere is no doubt that the moral consciousness of a plain man broadly\nrepudiates the general notion of an esoteric morality, differing from\nthat popularly taught; and it would be commonly agreed that an action\nwhich would be bad if done openly is not rendered good by secrecy. We\nmay observe, however, that there are strong utilitarian reasons for\nmaintaining generally this latter common opinion; for it is obviously\nadvantageous, generally speaking, that acts which it is expedient to\nrepress by social disapprobation should become known, as otherwise the\ndisapprobation cannot operate; so that it seems inexpedient to support\nby any moral encouragement the natural disposition of men in general\nto conceal their wrong doings; besides that the concealment would in\nmost cases have importantly injurious effects on the agent\u2019s habits of\nveracity. Thus the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem\nto be this; that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right\nwhich would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively\nsecret; and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that\nesoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric. Or if\nthis concealment be difficult to maintain, it may be desirable that\nCommon Sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to\nconfine to an enlightened few. And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably\ndesire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should\nbe rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should\nkeep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable\nindefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to\nlead to bad results in their hands.\n\nOf course, as I have said, in an ideal community of enlightened\nUtilitarians this swarm of perplexities and paradoxes would vanish;\nas in such a society no one can have any ground for believing that\nother persons will act on moral principles different from those\nwhich he adopts. And any enlightened Utilitarian must of course\ndesire this consummation; as all conflict of moral opinion must _pro\ntanto_ be regarded as an evil, as tending to impair the force of\nmorality generally in its resistance to seductive impulses. Still\nsuch conflict may be a necessary evil in the actual condition of\ncivilised communities, in which there are so many different degrees of\nintellectual and moral development.\n\nWe have thus been led to the discussion of the question which we\nreserved in the last section; viz. how Utilitarianism should deal\nwith the fact of divergent moral opinions held simultaneously by\ndifferent members of the same society. For it has become plain that\nthough two different kinds of conduct cannot both be right under the\nsame circumstances, two contradictory opinions as to the rightness of\nconduct may possibly both be expedient; it may conduce most to the\ngeneral happiness that _A_ should do a certain act, and at the same\ntime that _B_, _C_, _D_ should blame it. The Utilitarian of course\ncannot really join in the disapproval, but he may think it expedient\nto leave it unshaken; and at the same time may think it right, if\nplaced in the supposed circumstances, to do the act that is generally\ndisapproved. And so generally it may be best on the whole that there\nshould be conflicting codes of morality in a given society at a\ncertain stage of its development. And, as I have already hinted, the\nsame general reasoning, from the probable origin of the moral sense\nand its flexible adjustment to the varying conditions of human life,\nwhich furnished a presumption that Common-Sense morality is roughly\ncoincident with the Utilitarian code proper for men as now constituted,\nmay be applied in favour of these divergent codes also: it may be said\nthat these, too, form part of the complex adjustment of man to his\ncircumstances, and that they are needed to supplement and qualify the\nmorality of Common Sense.\n\nHowever paradoxical this doctrine may appear, we can find cases where\nit seems to be implicitly accepted by Common Sense; or at least\nwhere it is required to make Common Sense consistent with itself.\nLet us consider, for example, the common moral judgments concerning\nrebellions. It is commonly thought, on the one hand, that these abrupt\nbreaches of order are sometimes morally necessary; and, on the other\nhand, that they ought always to be vigorously resisted, and in case\nof failure punished by extreme penalties inflicted at least on the\nring-leaders; for otherwise they would be attempted under circumstances\nwhere there was no sufficient justification for them: but it seems\nevident that, in the actual condition of men\u2019s moral sentiments, this\nvigorous repression requires the support of a strong body of opinion\ncondemning the rebels as wrong, and not merely as mistaken in their\ncalculations of the chances of success. For similar reasons it may\npossibly be expedient on the whole that certain special relaxations\nof certain moral rules should continue to exist in certain professions\nand sections of society, while at the same time they continue to be\ndisapproved by the rest of the society. The evils, however, which must\nspring from this permanent conflict of opinion are so grave, that an\nenlightened Utilitarian will probably in most cases attempt to remove\nit; by either openly maintaining the need of a relaxation of the\nordinary moral rule under the special circumstances in question; or,\non the other hand, endeavouring to get the ordinary rule recognised\nand enforced by all conscientious persons in that section of society\nwhere its breach has become habitual. And of these two courses it seems\nlikely that he will in most cases adopt the latter; since such rules\nare most commonly found on examination to have been relaxed rather for\nthe convenience of individuals, than in the interest of the community\nat large.\n\n\u00a7 4. Finally, let us consider the general relation of Utilitarianism to\nthat part of common morality which extends beyond the range of strict\nduty; that is, to the Ideal of character and conduct which in any\ncommunity at any given time is commonly admired and praised as the sum\nof Excellences or Perfections. To begin, it must be allowed that this\ndistinction between Excellence and Strict Duty does not seem properly\nadmissible in Utilitarianism--except so far as some excellences are\nonly partially and indirectly within the control of the will, and we\nrequire to distinguish the realisation of these in conduct from the\nperformance of Duty proper, which is always something that _can_ be\ndone at any moment. For a Utilitarian must hold that it is always wrong\nfor a man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be\nmost conducive to Universal Happiness. Still, it seems practically\nexpedient,--and therefore indirectly reasonable on Utilitarian\nprinciples,--to retain, in judging even the strictly voluntary conduct\nof others, the distinction between a part that is praiseworthy and\nadmirable and a part that is merely right: because it is natural to us\nto compare any individual\u2019s character or conduct, not with our highest\nideal--Utilitarian or otherwise--but with a certain average standard\nand to admire what rises above the standard; and it seems ultimately\nconducive to the general happiness that such natural sentiments of\nadmiration should be encouraged and developed. For human nature seems\nto require the double stimulus of praise and blame from others, in\norder to the best performance of duty that it can at present attain:\nso that the \u2018social sanction\u2019 would be less effective if it became\npurely penal. Indeed, since the pains of remorse and disapprobation\nare in themselves to be avoided, it is plain that the Utilitarian\nconstruction of a Jural morality is essentially self-limiting; that is,\nit prescribes its own avoidance of any department of conduct in which\nthe addition that can be made to happiness through the enforcement of\nrules sustained by social penalties appears doubtful or inconsiderable.\nIn such departments, however, the \u00e6sthetic phase of morality may still\nreasonably find a place; we may properly admire and praise where it\nwould be inexpedient to judge and condemn. We may conclude, then,\nthat it is reasonable for a Utilitarian to praise any conduct more\nfelicific in its tendency than what an average man would do under the\ngiven circumstances:--being aware of course that the limit down to\nwhich praise worthiness extends must be relative to the particular\nstate of moral progress reached by mankind generally in his age and\ncountry; and that it is desirable to make continual efforts to elevate\nthis standard. Similarly, the Utilitarian will praise the Dispositions\nor permanent qualities of character of which felicific conduct is\nconceived to be the result, and the Motives that are conceived to\nprompt to it when it would be a clear gain to the general happiness\nthat these should become more frequent: and, as we have seen,[373] he\nmay without inconsistency admire the Disposition or Motive if it is\nof a kind which it is generally desirable to encourage, even while he\ndisapproves of the conduct to which it has led in any particular case.\n\nPassing now to compare the contents of the Utilitarian Ideal of\ncharacter with the virtues and other excellences recognised by Common\nSense, we may observe, first, that general coincidence between the\ntwo on which Hume and others have insisted. No quality has ever been\npraised as excellent by mankind generally which cannot be shown to have\nsome marked felicific effect, and to be within proper limits obviously\nconducive to the general happiness. Still, it does not follow that\nsuch qualities are always fostered and encouraged by society in the\nproportion which a Utilitarian would desire: in fact, it is a common\nobservation to make, in contemplating the morality of societies other\nthan our own, that some useful qualities are unduly neglected, while\nothers are over-prized and even admired when they exist in such excess\nas to become, on the whole, infelicific. The consistent Utilitarian\nmay therefore find it necessary to rectify the prevalent moral ideal\nin important particulars. And here it scarcely seems that he will find\nany such Utilitarian restrictions on innovation, as appeared to exist\nin the case of commonly received rules of duty. For the Common-Sense\nnotions of the different excellences of conduct (considered as\nextending beyond the range of strict duty) are generally so vague as to\noffer at least no definite resistance to a Utilitarian interpretation\nof their scope: by teaching and acting upon such an interpretation a\nman is in no danger of being brought into infelicific discord with\nCommon Sense: especially since the ideal of moral excellence seems\nto vary within the limits of the same community to a much greater\nextent than the code of strict duty. For example, a man who in an age\nwhen excessive asceticism is praised, sets an example of enjoying\nharmless bodily pleasures, or who in circles where useless daring is\nadmired, prefers to exhibit and commend caution and discretion, at the\nworst misses some praise that he might otherwise have earned, and is\nthought a little dull or unaspiring: he does not come into any patent\nconflict with common opinion. Perhaps we may say generally that an\nenlightened Utilitarian is likely to lay less stress on the cultivation\nof those negative virtues, tendencies to restrict and refrain, which\nare prominent in the Common-Sense ideal of character; and to set more\nvalue in comparison on those qualities of mind which are the direct\nsource of positive pleasure to the agent or to others--some of which\nCommon Sense scarcely recognises as excellences: still, he will not\ncarry this innovation to such a pitch as to incur general condemnation.\nFor no enlightened Utilitarian can ignore the fundamental importance\nof the restrictive and repressive virtues, or think that they are\nsufficiently developed in ordinary men at the present time, so that\nthey may properly be excluded from moral admiration; though he may hold\nthat they have been too prominent, to the neglect of other valuable\nqualities, in the common conception of moral Perfection. Nay, we may\neven venture to say that, under most circumstances, a man who earnestly\nand successfully endeavours to realise the Utilitarian Ideal, however\nhe may deviate from the commonly-received type of a perfect character,\nis likely to win sufficient recognition and praise from Common Sense.\nFor, whether it be true or not that the whole of morality has sprung\nfrom the root of sympathy, it is certain that self-love and sympathy\ncombined are sufficiently strong in average men to dispose them to\ngrateful admiration of any exceptional efforts to promote the common\ngood, even though these efforts may take a somewhat novel form. To any\nexhibition of more extended sympathy or more fervent public spirit\nthan is ordinarily shown, and any attempt to develop these equalities\nin others, Common Sense is rarely unresponsive; provided, of course,\nthat these impulses are accompanied with adequate knowledge of actual\ncircumstances and insight into the relation of means to ends, and that\nthey do not run counter to any recognised rules of duty.[374] And\nit seems to be principally in this direction that the recent spread\nof Utilitarianism has positively modified the ideal of our society,\nand is likely to modify it further in the future. Hence the stress\nwhich Utilitarians are apt to lay on social and political activity\nof all kinds, and the tendency which Utilitarian ethics have always\nshown to pass over into politics. For one who values conduct in\nproportion to its felicific consequences, will naturally set a higher\nestimate on effective beneficence in public affairs than on the purest\nmanifestation of virtue in the details of private life: while on the\nother hand an Intuitionist (though no doubt vaguely recognising that a\nman ought to do all the good he can in public affairs) still commonly\nholds that virtue may be as fully and as admirably exhibited on a small\nas on a large scale. A sincere Utilitarian, therefore, is likely to be\nan eager politician: but on what principles his political action ought\nto be determined, it scarcely lies within the scope of this treatise to\ninvestigate.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[364] I do not mean that this sentiment is in my view incompatible\nwith Utilitarianism; I mean that it must not attach itself to any\nsubordinate rules of conduct, but only to the supreme principle of\nacting with impartial concern for all elements of general happiness.\n\n[365] For example, Mr. Bain in _Mind_ (Jan. 1883, pp. 48, 49).\n\n[366] This sentence is not an exact quotation, but a summary of\nthe doctrine set forth by J. S. Mill in his treatise _On Liberty_\n(Introduction).\n\n[367] See Mill _On Liberty_, chap. iv. It may be observed that Mill\u2019s\ndoctrine is certainly opposed to common sense: since (_e.g._) it would\nexclude from censure almost all forms of sexual immorality committed by\nunmarried and independent adults.\n\n[368] Cf. Book iii. chap. xiv.\n\n[369] Cf. especially Book iii. chap. ii.\n\n[370] Cf. Book iii. chap. i. and chap. xiii.\n\n[371] Book iii. chap. vii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[372] In particular cases, however, they seem to be admitted by Common\nSense to a certain extent. For example, it would be commonly thought\nwrong to express in public speeches disturbing religious or political\nopinions which may be legitimately published in books.\n\n[373] Cf. chap. iii. \u00a7 2 of this Book.\n\n[374] We have seen that a Utilitarian may sometimes have to override\nthese rules; but then the case falls under the head discussed in the\nprevious section.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUDING CHAPTER\n\nTHE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In the greater part of the treatise of which the final chapter\nhas now been reached, we have been employed in examining three methods\nof determining right conduct, which are for the most part found more\nor less vaguely combined in the practical reasonings of ordinary men,\nbut which it has been my aim to develop as separately as possible.\nA complete synthesis of these different methods is not attempted in\nthe present work: at the same time it would hardly be satisfactory to\nconclude the analysis of them without some discussion of their mutual\nrelations. Indeed we have already found it expedient to do this to a\nconsiderable extent, in the course of our examination of the separate\nmethods. Thus, in the present and preceding Books we have directly\nor indirectly gone through a pretty full examination of the mutual\nrelations of the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods. We have found\nthat the common antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians must\nbe entirely discarded: since such abstract moral principles as we can\nadmit to be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with\na Utilitarian system, but even seem required to furnish a rational\nbasis for such a system. Thus we have seen that the essence of Justice\nor Equity (in so far as it is clear and certain), is that different\nindividuals are not to be treated differently, except on grounds of\nuniversal application; and that such grounds, again, are supplied by\nthe principle of Universal Benevolence, that sets before each man the\nhappiness of all others as an object of pursuit no less worthy than\nhis own; while other time-honoured virtues seem to be fitly explained\nas special manifestations of impartial benevolence under various\ncircumstances of human life, or else as habits and dispositions\nindispensable to the maintenance of prudent or beneficent behaviour\nunder the seductive force of various non-rational impulses. And\nalthough there are other rules which our common moral sense when first\ninterrogated seems to enunciate as absolutely binding; it has appeared\nthat careful and systematic reflection on this very Common Sense, as\nexpressed in the habitual moral judgments of ordinary men, results in\nexhibiting the real subordination of these rules to the fundamental\nprinciples above given. Then, further, this method of systematising\nparticular virtues and duties receives very strong support from a\ncomparative study of the history of morality; as the variations in the\nmoral codes of different societies at different stages correspond, in a\ngreat measure, to differences in the actual or believed tendencies of\ncertain kinds of conduct to promote the general happiness of different\nportions of the human race: while, again, the most probable conjectures\nas to the pre-historic condition and original derivation of the moral\nfaculty seem to be entirely in harmony with this view. No doubt, even\nif this synthesis of methods be completely accepted, there will remain\nsome discrepancy in details between our particular moral sentiments\nand unreasoned judgments on the one hand, and the apparent results of\nspecial utilitarian calculations on the other; and we may often have\nsome practical difficulty in balancing the latter against the more\ngeneral utilitarian reasons for obeying the former: but there seems\nto be no longer any theoretical perplexity as to the principles for\ndetermining social duty.\n\nIt remains for us to consider the relation of the two species of\nHedonism which we have distinguished as Universalistic and Egoistic.\nIn chap. ii. of this Book we have discussed the rational process\n(called by a stretch of language \u2018proof\u2019) by which one who holds it\nreasonable to aim at his own greatest happiness may be determined to\ntake Universal Happiness instead, as his ultimate standard of right\nconduct. We have seen, however, that the application of this process\nrequires that the Egoist should affirm, implicitly or explicitly, that\nhis own greatest happiness is not merely the rational ultimate end for\nhimself, but a part of Universal Good: and he may avoid the proof of\nUtilitarianism by declining to affirm this. It would be contrary to\nCommon Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual\nand any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently \u201cI\u201d am\nconcerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense,\nfundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality\nof the existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not\nsee how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as\nfundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an\nindividual. And it may be observed that most Utilitarians, however\nanxious they have been to convince men of the reasonableness of aiming\nat happiness generally, have not commonly sought to attain this result\nby any logical transition from the Egoistic to the Universalistic\nprinciple. They have relied almost entirely on the Sanctions of\nUtilitarian rules; that is, on the pleasures gained or pains avoided\nby the individual conforming to them. Indeed, if an Egoist remains\nimpervious to what we have called Proof, the only way of rationally\ninducing him to aim at the happiness of all, is to show him that his\nown greatest happiness can be best attained by so doing. And further,\neven if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational\nBenevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which\nit is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore\na harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational\nBenevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made\ncompletely rational. This latter view, indeed (as I have before said),\nappears to me, on the whole, the view of Common Sense: and it is that\nwhich I myself hold. It thus becomes needful to examine how far and in\nwhat way the required demonstration can be effected.\n\n\u00a7 2. Now, in so far as Utilitarian morality coincides with that\nof Common Sense--as we have seen that it does in the main--this\ninvestigation has been partly performed in chap. v. of Book ii. It\nthere appeared that while in any tolerable state of society the\nperformance of duties towards others and the exercise of social virtues\nseem _generally_ likely to coincide with the attainment of the greatest\npossible happiness in the long run for the virtuous agent, still the\n_universality_ and _completeness_ of this coincidence are at least\nincapable of empirical proof: and that, indeed, the more carefully\nwe analyse and estimate the different sanctions--Legal, Social, and\nConscientious--considered as operating under the actual conditions of\nhuman life, the more difficult it seems to believe that they can be\nalways adequate to produce this coincidence. The natural effect of this\nargument upon a convinced Utilitarian is merely to make him anxious to\nalter the actual conditions of human life: and it would certainly be a\nmost valuable contribution to the actual happiness of mankind, if we\ncould so improve the adjustment of the machine of Law in any society,\nand so stimulate and direct the common awards of praise and blame, and\nso develop and train the moral sense of the members of the community,\nas to render it clearly prudent for every individual to promote as much\nas possible the general good. However, we are not now considering what\na consistent Utilitarian will try to effect for the future, but what\na consistent Egoist is to do in the present. And it must be admitted\nthat, as things are, whatever difference exists between Utilitarian\nmorality and that of Common Sense is of such a kind as to render the\ncoincidence with Egoism still more improbable in the case of the\nformer. For we have seen that Utilitarianism is more rigid than Common\nSense in exacting the sacrifice of the agent\u2019s private interests where\nthey are incompatible with the greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber: and of course in so far as the Utilitarian\u2019s principles bring\nhim into conflict with any of the commonly accepted rules of morality,\nthe whole force of the Social Sanction operates to deter him from what\nhe conceives to be his duty.\n\n\u00a7 3. There are, however, writers of the Utilitarian school[375] who\nseem to maintain or imply, that by due contemplation of the paramount\nimportance of Sympathy as an element of human happiness we shall be led\nto see the coincidence of the good of each with the good of all. In\nopposing this view, I am as far as possible from any wish to depreciate\nthe value of sympathy as a source of happiness even to human beings as\nat present constituted. Indeed I am of opinion that its pleasures and\npains really constitute a great part of that internal reward of social\nvirtue, and punishment of social misconduct, which in Book ii. chap.\nv. I roughly set down as due to the moral sentiments. For, in fact,\nthough I can to some extent distinguish sympathetic from strictly moral\nfeelings in introspective analysis of my own consciousness, I cannot\nsay precisely in what proportion these two elements are combined. For\ninstance: I seem able to distinguish the \u201csense of the ignobility\nof Egoism\u201d of which I have before spoken--which, in my view, is the\nnormal emotional concomitant or expression of the moral intuition\nthat the Good of the whole is reasonably to be preferred to the Good\nof a part--from the jar of sympathetic discomfort which attends the\nconscious choice of my own pleasure at the expense of pain or loss to\nothers; but I find it impossible to determine what force the former\nsentiment would have if actually separated from the latter, and I am\ninclined to think that the two kinds of feeling are very variously\ncombined in different individuals. Perhaps, indeed, we may trace a\ngeneral law of variation in the relative proportion of these two\nelements as exhibited in the development of the moral consciousness\nboth in the race and in individuals; for it seems that at a certain\nstage of this development the mind is more susceptible to emotions\nconnected with abstract moral ideas and rules presented as absolute;\nwhile after emerging from this stage and before entering it the\nfeelings that belong to personal relations are stronger.[376] Certainly\nin a Utilitarian\u2019s mind sympathy tends to become a prominent element\nof all instinctive moral feelings that refer to social conduct; as in\nhis view the rational basis of the moral impulse must ultimately lie\nin some pleasure won or pain saved for himself or for others; so that\nhe never has to sacrifice himself to an Impersonal Law, but always\nfor some being or beings with whom he has at least some degree of\nfellow-feeling.\n\nBut besides admitting the actual importance of sympathetic pleasures\nto the majority of mankind, I should go further and maintain that,\non empirical grounds alone, enlightened self-interest would direct\nmost men to foster and develop their sympathetic susceptibilities to\na greater extent than is now commonly attained. The effectiveness\nof Butler\u2019s famous argument against the vulgar antithesis between\nSelf-love and Benevolence is undeniable: and it seems scarcely\nextravagant to say that, amid all the profuse waste of the means of\nhappiness which men commit, there is no imprudence more flagrant than\nthat of Selfishness in the ordinary sense of the term,--that excessive\nconcentration of attention on the individual\u2019s own happiness which\nrenders it impossible for him to feel any strong interest in the\npleasures and pains of others. The perpetual prominence of self that\nhence results tends to deprive all enjoyments of their keenness and\nzest, and produce rapid satiety and _ennui_: the selfish man misses\nthe sense of elevation and enlargement given by wide interests; he\nmisses the more secure and serene satisfaction that attends continually\non activities directed towards ends more stable in prospect than an\nindividual\u2019s happiness can be; he misses the peculiar rich sweetness,\ndepending upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy, which is\nalways found in services rendered to those whom we love and who are\ngrateful. He is made to feel in a thousand various ways, according to\nthe degree of refinement which his nature has attained, the discord\nbetween the rhythms of his own life and of that larger life of which\nhis own is but an insignificant fraction.\n\nBut allowing[377] all this, it yet seems to me as certain as any\nconclusion arrived at by hedonistic comparison can be, that the\nutmost development of sympathy, intensive and extensive, which is now\npossible to any but a very few exceptional persons, would not cause a\nperfect coincidence between Utilitarian duty and self-interest. Here\nit seems to me that what was said in Book ii. chap. v. \u00a7 4, to show\nthe insufficiency of the Conscientious Sanction, applies equally,\n_mutatis mutandis_, to Sympathy. Suppose a man finds that a regard for\nthe general good--Utilitarian Duty--demands from him a sacrifice, or\nextreme risk, of life. There are perhaps one or two human beings so\ndear to him that the remainder of a life saved by sacrificing their\nhappiness to his own would be worthless to him from an egoistic point\nof view. But it is doubtful whether many men, \u201csitting down in a cool\nhour\u201d to make the estimate, would affirm even this: and of course that\nparticular portion of the general happiness, for which one is called\nupon to sacrifice one\u2019s own, may easily be the happiness of persons\nnot especially dear to one. But again, from this normal limitation of\nour keenest and strongest sympathy to a very small circle of human\nbeings, it results that the very development of sympathy may operate\nto increase the weight thrown into the scale against Utilitarian duty.\nThere are very few persons, however strongly and widely sympathetic,\nwho are so constituted as to feel for the pleasures and pains of\nmankind generally a degree of sympathy at all commensurate with their\nconcern for wife or children, or lover, or intimate friend: and if\nany training of the affections is at present possible which would\nmaterially alter this proportion in the general distribution of our\nsympathy, it scarcely seems that such a training is to be recommended\nas on the whole felicific.[378] And thus when Utilitarian Duty calls on\nus to sacrifice not only our own pleasures but the happiness of those\nwe love to the general good, the very sanction on which Utilitarianism\nmost relies must act powerfully in opposition to its precepts.\n\nBut even apart from these exceptional cases--which are yet sufficient\nto decide the abstract question--it seems that the course of conduct\nby which a man would most fully reap the rewards of sympathy (so far\nas they are empirically ascertainable) will often be very different\nfrom that to which a sincere desire to promote the general happiness\nwould direct him. For the relief of distress and calamity is an\nimportant part of Utilitarian duty: but as the state of the person\nrelieved is on the whole painful, it would appear that sympathy under\nthese circumstances must be a source of pain rather than pleasure, in\nproportion to its intensity. It is probably true, as a general rule,\nthat in the relief of distress other elements of the complex pleasure\nof benevolence decidedly outweigh this sympathetic pain:--for the\neffusion of pity is itself pleasurable, and we commonly feel more\nkeenly that amelioration of the sufferer\u2019s state which is due to our\nexertions than we do his pain otherwise caused, and there is further\nthe pleasure that we derive from his gratitude, and the pleasure that\nis the normal reflex of activity directed under a strong impulse\ntowards a permanently valued end. Still, when the distress is bitter\nand continued, and such as we can only partially mitigate by all our\nefforts, the philanthropist\u2019s sympathetic discomfort must necessarily\nbe considerable; and the work of combating misery, though not devoid\nof elevated happiness, will be much less happy on the whole than many\nother forms of activity; while yet it may be to just this work that\nDuty seems to summon us. Or again, a man may find that he can best\npromote the general happiness by working in comparative solitude for\nends that he never hopes to see realised, or by working chiefly among\nand for persons for whom he cannot feel much affection, or by doing\nwhat must alienate or grieve those whom he loves best, or must make it\nnecessary for him to dispense with the most intimate of human ties. In\nshort, there seem to be numberless ways in which the dictates of that\nRational Benevolence, which as a Utilitarian he is bound absolutely\nto obey, may conflict with that indulgence of kind affections which\nShaftesbury and his followers so persuasively exhibit as its own reward.\n\n\u00a7 4. It seems, then, that we must conclude, from the arguments given\nin Book ii. chap. v., supplemented by the discussion in the preceding\nsection, that the inseparable connexion between Utilitarian Duty and\nthe greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it cannot be\nsatisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds. Hence another section\nof the Utilitarian school has preferred to throw the weight of Duty on\nthe Religious Sanction: and this procedure has been partly adopted\nby some of those who have chiefly dwelt on sympathy as a motive. From\nthis point of view the Utilitarian Code is conceived as the Law of God,\nwho is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote the general\nhappiness, and as having announced an intention of rewarding those who\nobey His commands and punishing the disobedient. It is clear that if we\nfeel convinced that an Omnipotent Being has, in whatever way, signified\nsuch commands and announcements, a rational egoist can want no further\ninducement to frame his life on Utilitarian principles. It only remains\nto consider how this conviction is attained. This is commonly thought\nto be either by supernatural Revelation, or by the natural exercise of\nReason, or in both ways. As regards the former it is to be observed\nthat--with a few exceptions--the moralists who hold that God has\ndisclosed His law either to special individuals in past ages who have\nleft a written record of what was revealed to them, or to a permanent\nsuccession of persons appointed in a particular manner, or to religious\npersons generally in some supernatural way, do not consider that it is\nthe Utilitarian Code that has thus been revealed, but rather the rules\nof Common-Sense morality with some special modifications and additions.\nStill, as Mill has urged, in so far as Utilitarianism is more rigorous\nthan Common Sense in exacting the sacrifice of the individual\u2019s\nhappiness to that of mankind generally, it is strictly in accordance\nwith the most characteristic teaching of Christianity. It seems,\nhowever, unnecessary to discuss the precise relation of different\nRevelational Codes to Utilitarianism, as it would be going beyond our\nprovince to investigate the grounds on which a Divine origin has been\nattributed to them.\n\nIn so far, however, as a knowledge of God\u2019s law is believed to be\nattainable by the Reason, Ethics and Theology seem to be so closely\nconnected that we cannot sharply separate their provinces. For, as we\nsaw,[379] it has been widely maintained, that the relation of moral\nrules to a Divine Lawgiver is implicitly cognised in the act of thought\nby which we discern these rules to be binding. And no doubt the terms\n(such as \u2018moral obligation\u2019), which we commonly use in speaking of\nthese rules, are naturally suggestive of Legal Sanctions and so of\na Sovereign by whom these are announced and enforced. Indeed many\nthinkers since Locke have refused to admit any other meaning in the\nterms Right, Duty, etc., except that of a rule imposed by a lawgiver.\nThis view, however, seems opposed to Common Sense; as may be, perhaps,\nmost easily shown[380] by pointing out that the Divine Lawgiver is\nHimself conceived as a Moral Agent; _i.e._ as prescribing what is\nright, and designing what is good. It is clear that in this conception\nat least the notions \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018good\u2019 are used absolutely, without\nany reference to a superior lawgiver; and that they are here used in a\nsense not essentially different from that which they ordinarily bear\nseems to be affirmed by the _consensus_ of religious persons. Still,\nthough Common Sense does not regard moral rules as being _merely_\nthe mandates of an Omnipotent Being who will reward and punish men\naccording as they obey or violate them; it certainly holds that this\nis a true though partial view of them, and perhaps that it may be\nintuitively apprehended. If then reflection leads us to conclude that\nthe particular moral principles of Common Sense are to be systematised\nas subordinate to that pre-eminently certain and irrefragable intuition\nwhich stands as the first principle of Utilitarianism; then, of course,\nit will be the Utilitarian Code to which we shall believe the Divine\nSanctions to be attached.\n\nOr, again, we may argue thus. If--as all theologians agree--we are to\nconceive God as acting for some end, we must conceive that end to be\nUniversal Good, and, if Utilitarians are right, Universal Happiness:\nand we cannot suppose that in a world morally governed it can be\nprudent for any man to act in conscious opposition to what we believe\nto be the Divine Design. Hence if in any case after calculating the\nconsequences of two alternatives of conduct we choose that which seems\nlikely to be less conducive to Happiness generally, we shall be acting\nin a manner for which we cannot but expect to suffer.\n\nTo this it has been objected, that observation of the actual world\nshows us that the happiness of sentient beings is so imperfectly\nattained in it, and with so large an intermixture of pain and misery,\nthat we cannot really conceive Universal Happiness to be God\u2019s end,\nunless we admit that He is not Omnipotent. And no doubt the assertion\nthat God is omnipotent will require to be understood with some\nlimitation; but perhaps with no greater limitation than has always been\nimplicitly admitted by thoughtful theologians. For these seem always to\nhave allowed that some things are impossible to God: as, for example,\nto change the past. And perhaps if our knowledge of the Universe were\ncomplete, we might discern the _quantum_ of happiness ultimately\nattained in it to be as great as could be attained without the\naccomplishment of what we should then see to be just as inconceivable\nand absurd as changing the past. This, however, is a view which it\nbelongs rather to the theologian to develop. I should rather urge that\nthere does not seem to be any other of the ordinary interpretations\nof Good according to which it would appear to be more completely\nrealised in the actual universe. For the wonderful perfections of work\nthat we admire in the physical world are yet everywhere mingled with\nimperfection, and subject to destruction and decay: and similarly in\nthe world of human conduct Virtue is at least as much balanced by Vice\nas Happiness is by misery.[381] So that, if the ethical reasoning that\nled us to interpret Ultimate Good as Happiness is sound, there seems no\nargument from Natural Theology to set against it.\n\n\u00a7 5. If, then, we may assume the existence of such a Being, as God,\nby the _consensus_ of theologians, is conceived to be, it seems that\nUtilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of Divine sanctions\nto the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis; and\nsuch sanctions would, of course, suffice to make it always every one\u2019s\ninterest to promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge.\nIt is, however, desirable, before we conclude, to examine carefully\nthe validity of this assumption, in so far as it is supported on\nethical grounds alone. For by the result of such an examination will\nbe determined, as we now see, the very important question whether\nethical science can be constructed on an independent basis; or whether\nit is forced to borrow a fundamental and indispensable premiss from\nTheology or some similar source.[382] In order fairly to perform this\nexamination, let us reflect upon the clearest and most certain of\nour moral intuitions. I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as\nclearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry,\nthat it is \u2018right\u2019 and \u2018reasonable\u2019 for me to treat others as I should\nthink that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions,\nand to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to universal\nGood or Happiness. But I cannot find inseparably connected with this\nconviction, and similarly attainable by mere reflective intuition,\nany cognition that there actually is a Supreme Being who will\nadequately[383] reward me for obeying these rules of duty, or punish\nme for violating them.[384] Or,--omitting the strictly theological\nelement of the proposition,--I may say that I do not find in my moral\nconsciousness any intuition, claiming to be clear and certain, that\nthe performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation\npunished. I feel indeed a desire, apparently inseparable from the moral\nsentiments, that this result may be realised not only in my own case\nbut universally; but the mere existence of the desire would not go\nfar to establish the probability of its fulfilment, considering the\nlarge proportion of human desires that experience shows to be doomed\nto disappointment. I also judge that in a certain sense this result\n_ought_ to be realised: in this judgment, however, \u2018ought\u2019 is not used\nin a strictly ethical meaning; it only expresses the vital need that\nour Practical Reason feels of proving or postulating this connexion of\nVirtue and self-interest, if it is to be made consistent with itself.\nFor the negation of the connexion must force us to admit an ultimate\nand fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is\nReasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow\nthat the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason,\nmanifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory.\n\nI do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining a practical\nsolution of this fundamental contradiction, through any legitimately\nobtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world,\nit would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether:\nbut it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalising it\ncompletely. We should doubtless still, not only from self-interest, but\nalso through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing,\nimparted by education and sustained by communication with other men,\nfeel a desire for the general observance of rules conducive to general\nhappiness; and practical reason would still impel us decisively to\nthe performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which what\nis recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly\nunderstood. But in the rarer cases of a recognised conflict between\nself-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself,\nwould cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would have to\nbe decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two\ngroups of non-rational impulses.\n\nIf then the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be\nregarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental\ncontradiction in one chief department of our thought, it remains\nto ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for\naccepting this hypothesis. This, however, is a profoundly difficult\nand controverted question, the discussion of which belongs rather\nto a treatise on General Philosophy than to a work on the Methods\nof Ethics: as it could not be satisfactorily answered, without a\ngeneral examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs. Those\nwho hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed\nof conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises, may\nreasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic\ncertainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If on the\nother hand we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of\nnature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which\nyet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong\ndisposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the\nsystematic coherence of our beliefs,--it will be more difficult to\nreject a similarly supported assumption in ethics, without opening the\ndoor to universal scepticism.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[375] See J. S. Mill\u2019s treatise on Utilitarianism (chap. iii. passim):\nwhere, however, the argument is not easy to follow, from a confusion\nbetween three different objects of inquiry: (1) the actual effect of\nsympathy in inducing conformity to the rules of Utilitarian ethics, (2)\nthe effect in this direction which it is likely to have in the future,\n(3) the value of sympathetic pleasures and pains as estimated by an\nenlightened Egoist. The first and third of these questions Mill did not\nclearly separate, owing to his psychological doctrine that each one\u2019s\nown pleasure is the sole object of his desires. But if my refutation of\nthis doctrine (Book i. chap. iv. \u00a7 3) is valid, we have to distinguish\ntwo ways in which sympathy operates: it generates sympathetic pleasures\nand pains, which have to be taken into account in the calculations of\nEgoistic Hedonism; but it also may cause impulses to altruistic action,\nof which the force is quite out of proportion to the sympathetic\npleasure (or relief from pain) which such action seems likely to\nsecure to the agent. So that even if the average man ever should reach\nsuch a pitch of sympathetic development, as never to feel prompted to\nsacrifice the general good to his own, still this will not prove that\nit is egoistically reasonable for him to behave in this way.\n\n[376] I do not mean to imply that the process of change is merely\ncircular. In the earlier period sympathy is narrower, simpler, and\nmore presentative; in the later it is more extensive, complex, and\nrepresentative.\n\n[377] I do not, however, think that we are justified in stating as\n_universally_ true what has been admitted in the preceding paragraph.\nSome few thoroughly selfish persons appear at least to be happier\nthan most of the unselfish; and there are other exceptional natures\nwhose chief happiness seems to be derived from activity, disinterested\nindeed, but directed towards other ends than human happiness.\n\n[378] See chap. iii. \u00a7 3 of this Book, pp. 432-33.\n\n[379] See Book iii. chap. i. \u00a7 2: also Book iii. chap. ii. \u00a7 1.\n\n[380] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[381] It may perhaps be said that this comparison has no force for\nLibertarians, who consider the essence of Virtue to lie in free choice.\nBut to say that _any_ free choice is virtuous would be a paradox from\nwhich most Libertarians--admitting that Evil may be freely chosen no\nless than Good--would recoil. It must therefore be Free choice of good\nthat is conceived to realise the divine end: and if so, the arguments\nfor the utilitarian interpretation of Good--thus freely chosen--would\nstill be applicable _mutatis mutandis_: and if so, the arguments for\nregarding rules of utilitarian duty as divinely sanctioned would be\nsimilarly applicable.\n\n[382] It is not necessary, if we are simply considering Ethics as a\npossible independent science, to throw the fundamental premiss of\nwhich we are now examining the validity into a Theistic form. Nor does\nit seem always to have taken that form in the support which Positive\nReligion has given to Morality. In the Buddhist creed this notion of\nthe rewards inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have been\ndeveloped in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than it has in\nany phase of Christianity. But, as conceived by enlightened Buddhists,\nthese rewards are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme Person,\nbut by the natural operation of an impersonal Law.\n\n[383] It may be well to remind the reader that by \u2018adequate\u2019 is here\nmeant \u2018sufficient to make it the agent\u2019s interest to promote universal\ngood\u2019; not necessarily \u2018proportional to Desert.\u2019\n\n[384] I cannot fall back on the resource of thinking myself under a\nmoral necessity to regard all my duties _as if they_ were commandments\nof God, although not entitled to hold speculatively that any such\nSupreme Being really exists. I am so far from feeling bound to\nbelieve for purposes of practice what I see no ground for holding as\na speculative truth, that I cannot even conceive the state of mind\nwhich these words seem to describe, except as a momentary half-wilful\nirrationality, committed in a violent access of philosophic despair.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nTHE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL\n\n\n[_Reprinted, with some omissions, from_ MIND, 1888, _Vol. XIII., No.\n51_.]\n\nMy aim is to show that, in different parts of Kant\u2019s exposition of his\ndoctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the\nsame word freedom; while yet Kant does not appear to be conscious of\nany variation in the meaning of the term.\n\n[In the one sense, Freedom = Rationality, so that a man is free in\nproportion as he acts in accordance with Reason.] I do not in the\nleast object to this use of the term Freedom, on account of its\ndeviation from ordinary usage. On the contrary, I think it has much\nsupport in men\u2019s natural expression of ordinary moral experience in\ndiscourse. In the conflict that is continually going on in all of us,\nbetween non-rational impulses and what we recognise as dictates of\npractical reason, we are in the habit of identifying ourselves with\nthe latter rather than with the former: as Whewell says, \u201cwe speak of\nDesire, Love, Anger, as mastering us, and of ourselves as controlling\nthem\u201d--we continually call men \u201cslaves\u201d of appetite or passion, whereas\nno one was ever called a slave of reason. If, therefore, the term\nFreedom had not already been appropriated by moralists to another\nmeaning--if it were merely a question of taking it from ordinary\ndiscourse and stamping it with greater precision for purposes of\nethical discussion--I should make no objection to the statement that\n\u201ca man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally.\u201d But, what\nEnglish defenders of man\u2019s free agency have generally been concerned\nto maintain, is that \u201cman has a freedom of _choice_ between good and\nevil,\u201d which is realised or manifested when he deliberately chooses\nevil just as much as when he deliberately chooses good; and it is\nclear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he\nacts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term,\nthat it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does\nso act. The notions of Freedom must be admitted to be fundamentally\ndifferent in the two statements: and though usage might fairly allow\nthe word Freedom to represent either notion, if only one or other of\nthe above-mentioned propositions were affirmed, to use it to represent\nboth, in affirming both propositions, is obviously inconvenient; and it\nimplies a confusion of thought so to use it, without pointing out the\ndifference of meaning.\n\nIf this be admitted, the next thing is to show that Kant does use the\nterm in this double way. In arguing this, it will be convenient to have\nnames for what we admit to be two distinct ideas. Accordingly, the kind\nof freedom which I first mentioned--which a man is said to manifest\nmore in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason--shall\nbe referred to as \u2018Good\u2019 or \u2018Rational Freedom,\u2019 and the freedom that is\nmanifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called \u2018Neutral\u2019\nor \u2018Moral Freedom.\u2019[385]\n\nBut before I proceed to the different passages of Kant\u2019s exposition in\nwhich \u2018Good Freedom\u2019 and \u2018Neutral Freedom\u2019 respectively occur, it seems\ndesirable to distinguish this latter from a wider notion with which\nit may possibly be confounded, and which it would be clearly wrong to\nattribute to Kant. I mean the \u201cpower of acting without a motive,\u201d which\nReid and other writers, on what used to be called the Libertarian side,\nhave thought it necessary to claim. \u201cIf a man could not act without\na motive,\u201d says Reid, \u201che could have no power\u201d--that is, in Reid\u2019s\nmeaning, no free agency--\u201cat all.\u201d This conception of Freedom--which\nI may conveniently distinguish as \u2018Capricious Freedom\u2019--is, as I\nsaid, certainly not Kantian: not only does he expressly repudiate it,\nbut nowhere--so far as I know--does he unconsciously introduce it.\nIndeed it is incompatible with any and every part of his explanation\nof human volition: the originality and interest of his defence of\nNeutral Freedom--the power of choice between good and evil--lies in its\ncomplete avoidance of Capricious Freedom or the power of acting without\na motive _in any particular volition_.\n\n[This] distinction helps me to understand how [it is that] many\nintelligent readers have failed to see in Kant\u2019s exposition the two\nFreedoms--Good or Rational Freedom and Neutral or Moral Freedom--which\nI find in Kant. They have their view fixed on the difference between\nRational or Moral Freedom, which Kant maintains, and the Freedom\nof Caprice, which he undoubtedly repudiates: and are thus led to\noverlook with him the distinction between the Freedom that we realise\nor manifest in proportion as we do right, and the Freedom that is\nrealised or manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong.\nWhen we have once put completely out of view the Freedom of Caprice,\nthe power of acting without a motive, or against the strongest\nmotive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational\ndesires or aversions,--when we have agreed to exclude this, and to\nconcentrate attention on the difference between Good Freedom and\nNeutral Freedom--I venture to think that no one can avoid seeing each\nmember of this latter antithesis in Kant. It will be easily understood\nthat, as he does not himself distinguish the two conceptions, it is\nnaturally impossible for the most careful reader always to tell which\nis to be understood; but there are many passages where his argument\nunmistakably requires the one, and many other passages where it\nunmistakably requires the other. Speaking broadly, I may say that,\nwherever Kant has to connect the notion of Freedom with that of Moral\nResponsibility or moral imputation, he, like all other moralists who\nhave maintained Free Will in this connexion, means (chiefly, but not\nsolely) Neutral Freedom--Freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much\nas in choosing right. Indeed, in such passages it is with the Freedom\nof the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned: since it is the\nwrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his\nresponsibility on to causes beyond his control. On the other hand, when\nwhat he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to\nLaw as such, without the intervention of sensible impulses, when he\nseeks to exhibit the independence of Reason in influencing choice,\nthen in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies\nFreedom with this independence of Reason, and thus clearly implies the\nproposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally.\n\nAs an example of the first kind, I will take the passage towards\nthe close of chap. iii. of the \u201cAnalytic of Practical Reason,\u201d[386]\nwhere he treats, in its bearing on Moral Responsibility, his\npeculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in\nhuman actions. According to Kant, every such action, regarded as a\nphenomenon determined in time, must be thought as a necessary result\nof determining causes in antecedent time--otherwise its existence\nwould be inconceivable--but it may be also regarded in relation to the\nagent considered as a thing-in-himself, as the \u201cno\u00fcmenon\u201d of which the\naction is a phenomenon: and the conception of Freedom may be applied\nto the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena. For since his\nexistence as a no\u00fcmenon is not subject to time-conditions, nothing in\nthis no\u00fcmenal existence comes under the principle of determination\nby antecedent causes: hence, as Kant says, \u201cin this his existence\nnothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every\naction ... even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being,\nis in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but\nthe result of his causality as a no\u00fcmenon.\u201d This is the well-known\nmetaphysical solution of the difficulty of reconciling Free Will with\nthe Universality of physical causation: I am not now concerned to\ncriticise it,--my point is that if we accept this view of Freedom at\nall, it must obviously be Neutral Freedom: it must express the relation\nof a no\u00fcmenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of\nbad volitions, in which the moral law is violated, no less than the\nrelation of a no\u00fcmenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or\nrational volitions, in which the moral law or categorical imperative\nis obeyed. And, as I before said, Kant in this passage--being\nespecially concerned to explain the possibility of moral imputation,\nand justify the judicial sentences of conscience--especially takes as\nhis illustrations no\u00fcmena that exhibit bad phenomena. The question he\nexpressly raises is \u201cHow a man who commits a theft\u201d can \u201cbe called\nquite free\u201d at the moment of committing it? and answers that it is\nin virtue of his \u201ctranscendental freedom\u201d that \u201cthe rational being\ncan justly say of _every unlawful action_ that he performs that he\ncould very well have left it undone,\u201d although as phenomenon it is\ndetermined by antecedents, and so necessary; \u201cfor it, with all the\npast which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of\nhis character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he\nimputes to himself\u201d the bad actions that result necessarily from his\nbad character taken in conjunction with other causes. Hence, however he\nmay account for his error from bad habits which he has allowed to grow\non him, whatever art he may use to paint to himself an unlawful act he\nremembers as something in which he was carried away by the stream of\nphysical necessity, this cannot protect him from self-reproach:--not\neven if he have shown depravity so early that he may reasonably be\nthought to have been born in a morally hopeless condition--he will\nstill be rightly judged, and will judge himself \u201cjust as responsible\nas any other man\u201d: since in relation to his no\u00fcmenal self his life as\na whole, from first to last, is to be regarded as a single phenomenon\nresulting from an absolutely free choice.\n\nI need not labour this point further; it is evident that the\nnecessities of Kant\u2019s metaphysical explanation of moral responsibility\nmake him express with peculiar emphasis and fulness the notion of what\nI have called Neutral Freedom, a kind of causality manifested in bad\nand irrational volitions no less than in the good and rational.\n\nOn the other hand, it is no less easy to find passages in which the\nterm Freedom seems to me most distinctly to stand for Good or Rational\nFreedom. Indeed, such passages are, I think, more frequent than those\nin which the other meaning is plainly required. Thus he tells us that\n\u201ca free will must find its principle of determination in the [moral]\n\u2018Law,\u2019\u201d[387] and that \u201cfreedom, whose causality can be determined only\nby the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all inclinations\nby the condition of obedience to pure law.\u201d[388] Whereas, in the\nargument previously examined, his whole effort was to prove that\nthe no\u00fcmenon or supersensible being, of which each volition is a\nphenomenon, exercises \u201cfree causality\u201d in unlawful acts, he tells us\nelsewhere, in the same treatise, that the \u201csupersensible nature\u201d of\nrational beings, who have also a \u201csensible nature,\u201d is their \u201cexistence\naccording to laws which are independent of every empirical condition,\nand therefore belong to the autonomy of pure [practical] reason.\u201d[389]\nSimilarly, in an earlier work, he explains that \u201csince the conception\nof causality involves that of laws ... though freedom is not a property\nof the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason\nlawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality according to immutable\nlaws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise, a free will would be a chim\u00e6ra\n(_Unding_).\u201d[390] And this immutable law of the \u201cfree\u201d or \u201cautonomous\u201d\nwill is, as he goes on to say, the fundamental principle of morality,\n\u201cso that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the\nsame.\u201d\n\nI have quoted this last phrase, not because it clearly exhibits the\nnotion of Rational Freedom,--on the contrary, it rather shows how\neasily this notion may be confounded with the other. A will subject to\nits own moral laws _may_ mean a will that, so far as free, conforms\nto these laws; but it also _may_ be conceived as capable of freely\ndisobeying these laws--exercising Neutral Freedom. But when Freedom\nis said to be a \u201ccausality according to immutable laws\u201d the ambiguity\nis dispelled; for this evidently cannot mean merely a faculty of\nlaying down laws which may or may not be obeyed; it must mean that\nthe will, _qu\u00e2_ free, acts in accordance with these laws;--the human\nbeing, doubtless, often acts contrary to them; but then, according to\nthis view, its choice in such actions is determined not \u201cfreely\u201d but\n\u201cmechanically,\u201d by \u201cphysical\u201d and \u201cempirical\u201d springs of action.\n\nIf any further argument is necessary to show that Kantian \u201cFreedom\u201d\nmust sometimes be understood as Rational or Good Freedom, I may quote\none or two of the numerous passages in which Kant, either expressly or\nby implication, identifies Will and Reason; for this identification\nobviously excludes the possibility of Will\u2019s choosing between Reason\nand non-rational impulses. Thus in the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik\nder Sitten_,[391] he tells us that \u201cas Reason is required to deduce\nactions from laws, Will is nothing but pure practical reason\u201d; and,\nsimilarly, in the _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, he speaks of the\n\u201cobjective reality of a pure Will or, _which is the same thing_, a pure\npractical reason.\u201d[392] Accordingly, whereas in some passages[393] the\n\u201cautonomy\u201d which he identifies with \u201cFreedom\u201d is spoken of as \u201cautonomy\nof _will_,\u201d in others we are told that the \u201cmoral law expresses\nnothing else than autonomy of the pure practical _reason_: that is,\nFreedom.\u201d[394]\n\nI think that I have now established the verbal ambiguity that I\nundertook to bring home to Kant\u2019s account of Free Will; I have shown\nthat in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between\nincompatible meanings. But it may, perhaps, be thought that the defect\nthus pointed out can be cured by a merely verbal correction: that the\nsubstance of Kant\u2019s ethical doctrine may still be maintained, and may\nstill be connected with his metaphysical doctrine. It may still be held\nthat Reason dictates that we should at all times act from a maxim that\nwe can will to be a universal law, and that we should do this from pure\nregard for reason and reason\u2019s law, admitting that it is a law which we\nare free to disobey; and it may still be held that the reality of this\nmoral freedom is to be reconciled with the universality of physical\ncausation by conceiving it as a relation between the agent\u2019s no\u00fcmenal\nself--independent of time-conditions--and his character as manifested\nin time; the only correction required being to avoid identifying\nFreedom and Goodness or Rationality as attributes of agents or actions.\n\nI should quite admit that the most important parts both of Kant\u2019s\ndoctrine of morality, and of his doctrine of Freedom may be saved:--or\nI should perhaps rather say that the latter may be left to conduct an\nunequal struggle with the modern notions of heredity and evolution:\nat any rate I admit that it is not fundamentally affected by my\npresent argument. But I think that a good deal more will have to go\nfrom a corrected edition of Kantism than merely the \u201cword\u201d Freedom\nin certain passages, if the confusion introduced by the ambiguity of\nthis word is to be eliminated in the manner that I have suggested. I\nthink that the whole topic of the \u201cheteronomy\u201d of the will, when it\nyields to empirical or sensible impulses, will have to be abandoned or\nprofoundly modified. And I am afraid that most readers of Kant will\nfeel the loss to be serious; since nothing in Kant\u2019s ethical writing\nis more fascinating than the idea--which he expresses repeatedly in\nvarious forms--that a man realises the aim of his true self when he\nobeys the moral law, whereas, when he wrongly allows his action to\nbe determined by empirical or sensible stimuli, he becomes subject\nto physical causation, to laws of a brute outer world. But if we\ndismiss the identification of Freedom and Rationality, and accept\ndefinitely and singly Kant\u2019s other notion of Freedom as expressing the\nrelation of the human thing-in-itself to its phenomenon, I am afraid\nthat this spirit-stirring appeal to the sentiment of Liberty must be\ndismissed as idle rhetoric. For the life of the saint must be as much\nsubject--in any particular portion of it--to the necessary laws of\nphysical causation as the life of the scoundrel: and the scoundrel must\nexhibit and express his characteristic self-hood in his transcendental\nchoice of a bad life, as much as the saint does in his transcendental\nchoice of a good one. If, on the other hand, to avoid this result,\nwe take the other horn of the dilemma, and identify inner freedom\nwith rationality, than a more serious excision will be required. For,\nalong with \u2018Neutral\u2019 or \u2018Moral\u2019 Freedom, the whole Kantian view of the\nrelation of the no\u00fcmenon to the empirical character will have to be\ndropped, and with it must go the whole Kantian method of maintaining\nmoral responsibility and moral imputation: in fact, all that has made\nKant\u2019s doctrine interesting and impressive to English advocates of Free\nWill (in the ordinary sense), even when they have not been convinced of\nits soundness.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[385] The terms \u2018rational\u2019 and \u2018moral\u2019 seem to me most appropriate\nwhen I wish to suggest the affinity between the two notions: the terms\n\u2018good\u2019 and \u2018neutral\u2019 seem preferable when I wish to lay stress on the\ndifference.\n\n[386] _Werke_, v. pp. 100-104 (Hartenstein).\n\n[387] _Werke_, v. p. 30.\n\n[388] _Ibid._ p. 83.\n\n[389] _Ibid._ p. 46.\n\n[390] _Werke_, iv. p. 294.\n\n[391] _Werke_, iv. p. 260 (Hartenstein).\n\n[392] _Werke_, v. p. 58. See an acute discussion of Kant\u2019s perplexing\nuse of the term \u201cWill\u201d in Prof. Schurman\u2019s _Kantian Ethics_, which has\nanticipated me in the above quotations.\n\n[393] _E.g._ _Werke_, iv. p. 296.\n\n[394] _E.g._ _Werke_, v. p. 35.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n \u2018Absolute\u2019 and \u2018Relative\u2019 Ethics, 18 note 2, 177 note 1\n\n \u2018Act,\u2019 meaning of, 200 note 3, 201, 202\n\n Action, ultimate end of, 3, 4, etc.;\n motive to, may be non-rational, 5;\n instinctive, 24, 61;\n deliberate, 24, 61;\n deliberate and impulsive, 61\n\n Acuteness, 236\n\n \u00c6sthetic Intuitionism, 228, 392;\n implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, 392, 393\n\n \u00c6sthetic sensibility, theories of, 189\n\n Affections, Duties of the, 345-349\n\n Affections, social and domestic, 138, 153, 156, 157, 433, 434\n\n \u2018Altruism,\u2019 439\n\n \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, 456\n\n \u2018Apathy\u2019 as ideal of happiness, 125\n\n Aristotle, 59 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 98-99, 99 note 1, 121-122,\n 180, 180 note 1, 181 note 1, 215, 224, 231 note 1, 264 note 2,\n 281, 375 note 1, 376, 403, 456\n\n Art, Definition of, 4\n\n \u2018Art of conduct,\u2019 4\n\n Austin, 300 note 1\n\n Aversion, 42, 43, 46, 145\n\n Axioms, 215, 338-343, 379-389 _passim_;\n must (_a_) have the terms clear and precise, 338, 339;\n (_b_) be really self-evident, 339-341;\n (_c_) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, 341;\n (_d_) be supported by consensus of experts, 341, 342\n\n Axiom--of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, 387;\n of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, 386;\n of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism,\n 387, 388;\n -s of Impartiality, 379-383, 496, 497\n\n\n Bacon, 338\n\n Bain, 43 note 2, Note 54-56, Note 87-88, 125, 126, 127, 477 note 1;\n (_The Emotions and the Will_) 54, 55 Note, 126 note 1;\n (_Mental and Moral Science_) 127 notes 1-3, 177 note 1\n\n Bastiat, 278 note 1\n\n Beauty, 114\n\n Benevolence, 238-263 _passim_, 391, 393;\n comprehensiveness and supremacy of, 238, 238 note 2;\n common maxim of, 238-239;\n axiom of, 382, 385, 387, 496;\n prescribes promotion of others\u2019 Happiness rather than Perfection,\n 240, 241;\n principles of its distribution, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263;\n and Justice, spheres of, 242, 243, 268;\n virtue of, 244, 253;\n duty of, 252, 253, 253 note 1, 258;\n Kant\u2019s view of the duty of, 239, 240;\n intellectual _versus_ emotional excellence of, 244 note 1;\n conflicting claims to, 246;\n duties of, classified, 248;\n rational, cf. _Rational Benevolence_;\n Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, 430-431\n\n Benevolent--emotion, 239;\n disposition, 239\n\n Bentham, 10, 41, 41 note 1, 84, 85, 86, Note 87-88, 92, 94, 119,\n 124 note 1, 143, 164, 203, 292, 364, 414, 417, 423 note 2, 424;\n (_Memoirs_) 10 notes 2 and 3,\n (_Deontology, Works_, Bowring\u2019s edition) 87, 88 Note,\n (_Principles of Morals and Legislation_) 26 note 1,\n (_Constitutional Code_) 41 note 2\n\n Bequest, change of view respecting, 246, 247\n\n Berkeley, Bishop, 120\n\n Blackstone, _Introduction_, 302 note 1\n\n Bouillier, 180 note 2\n\n Butler, 7, 39, 44, 44 note 2, 81, 86, 93, 94, 119, 133 note 2, 136,\n 172, 200, 222, 366, 366 note 3, 371, 372, 378, 386, 401, 405,\n 501;\n (_Analogy_) 378;\n (_Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue_) 86 note 2, 176 note 1,\n 327 note 1;\n (_Sermons on Human Nature_) 7 note 1, 86 note 2, 93 note 2,\n 120 note 1, 200 note 2, 323 note 1\n\n\n Candour, 355\n\n Cardinal Virtues, 375\n\n Carelessness, Culpability of, 60, 292\n\n Casuistry, 99\n\n Categorical Imperative, 7, 8, 15, 35, 36, 37, 209, 209 note 1\n\n Caution, 236, 236 note 1, 237\n\n Celibacy, 487, 488\n\n Charity (Philanthropy), 222, 239, 430, 431, 434\n\n Chastity and Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2\n\n \u2018Chief Good\u2019 (Summum Bonum), 134, 407 note 1\n\n Chivalry, 326\n\n Chrysippus, 376\n\n Cicero, 376;\n _De Finibus_, 125 note 1\n\n Clarke, 86, 104, 120, 120 note 2, 384, 384 notes 3 and 4, 385;\n _Boyle Lectures_, 120 note 2, 385 notes 1 and 2\n\n Classification of Duties, 312-315\n\n \u2018Cognition,\u2019 use of, 34 note 2\n\n \u201cCommon good of all Rationals,\u201d Cumberland\u2019s ultimate end, 104, 423\n\n Common Morality, 215-216; (cf. _Morality of Common Sense_)\n\n Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good,\n explanation of, 402-406\n\n Compassion, 262, 371\n\n Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7\n\n Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256,\n 255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1\n\n Conscience, popular view of, 99;\n jural view of, 100-101\n\n Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler\u2019s view of the\n relation between, 86, 86 note 2;\n and Self-love, Butler\u2019s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200,\n 200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366\n\n Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form\n of morality, 455-457\n\n Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125\n\n Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97;\n may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97\n\n Contract, claims arising from, 269;\n and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1\n\n Courage, 332-334;\n defined, 332;\n Greek view of, 456;\n and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333;\n Moral, 333 note 3;\n Virtue of, 313, 333, 334;\n and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations,\n 334, 355\n\n Courtesy, 253\n\n Cudworth, 103 Note\n\n Culture, 157, etc.\n\n Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104;\n and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1\n\n Custom, alterations in, 247\n\n\n Decision, 236, 237\n\n Deductive Hedonism, 176-195\n\n Descartes, 338, 339\n\n Desert--Good, how determined, 284-290;\n Ill, how determined, 291-292;\n requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349;\n and Freedom, 280, 287;\n and Right of Property, 280, 280 note 1;\n and Determinism, 284, 285;\n Utilitarian interpretation of, 284 note 1;\n and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 291\n\n \u2018Desirable,\u2019 confusion in Mill\u2019s use of, 388 note 2\n\n Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective\n relations of the conscious mind, 398-400\n\n Desire, 43, 45-47;\n non-rational, 23-24;\n irrational, 23, 24;\n and Pleasure, relation between, 39-56 _passim_\n\n Determinism and Free Will, 57 _seq._;\n Aristotelian, 59 note 1;\n and Materialism, 62;\n arguments for, 62-65;\n argument against, 65, 66\n\n Determinist meaning of \u2018desert,\u2019 etc., 71, 72, 284 note 1\n\n Development as ethical aim, 90 _seq._, 192 _seq._, 473\n\n \u2018Dictates,\u2019 how used, 96 note 1\n\n \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, two meanings of, 264 note 2\n\n \u2018Disinterested action,\u2019 57\n\n Distribution, Principle of Equality a _prima facie_ reasonable\n Principle of, 417\n\n Divine penalties, 31\n\n \u2018Doing good,\u2019 ambiguity of, 239, 240\n\n Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, 200, 205, 206,\n 366, 404, 404 note 1;\n need of harmonising, 507-509\n\n Dumont, 180 note 2\n\n \u2018Duties to God\u2019 and \u2018duty to man,\u2019 218\n\n Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, 163, 312, 313\n\n \u2018Duties to oneself,\u2019 7\n\n \u2018Duty\u2019--meaning and use of, 78, 217, 218, 220 note 3, 239, 504-505;\n and \u2018right conduct\u2019 distinguished, 217\n\n Duty relativity of, 218, 219;\n and Happiness of agent, 36, 162-175 _passim_, 495 _seq._;\n implies conflict of impulses, 81;\n of self-preservation, 356;\n of promoting others\u2019 happiness, Kant\u2019s arguments for, 389-390;\n most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate\n Good, 391, 392\n\n\n \u2018Egoism,\u2019 11, 80 note 1, 89 _seq._;\n ordinary use, and ambiguity of, 89;\n indefiniteness of, 95;\n and Greek ethical controversy, 91-92\n\n Egoism, cf. _Egoistic Hedonism_\n\n Egoism--meaning of, 120-121;\n and Self-love, 36, 89-95 _passim_;\n Principle and Method of, 119-122;\n precepts of, not clear and precise, 199-200;\n rationality of, 119-120, 199, 200 note 1;\n sense of ignobility of, 199-200, 200 note 1 (cf. 402 _seq._), 501;\n = Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, 95;\n and Utilitarianism, relation between, 497 _seq._;\n and Utilitarian sanctions, 499-503\n\n \u2018Egoist,\u2019 meaning of, 121\n\n Egoistic End--and Positive Religion, 121;\n and Natural Religion, 121\n\n Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, 11, 84, 95\n\n Egoistic Hedonism, 42, 119-121;\n End of, 93;\n Pure or Quantitative, defined, 95;\n Fundamental Principle of, 93, 120, 121;\n Empirical-reflective Method of, 121, 122, 131 _seq._;\n and Conscience, 161 note 1;\n Fundamental Paradox of, 48, 130, 136, 137, 173-174, 194\n\n Empirical Hedonism, 123-150;\n fundamental assumption of, 123, 131, 146;\n objections to, 460;\n Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of\n special knowledge, 477, 479\n\n Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, 146\n\n Empiricism, 104\n\n \u2018End,\u2019 ethical use of the term, 134\n\n End, Interdependence of Method and, 8, 83, 84;\n adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, 39\n\n Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, 8, 9\n\n Energy, 237\n\n Epicureanism, 11, 84\n\n Epicurus, 158\n\n \u2018Equal return,\u2019 ambiguity of, 261 (cf. 288 _seq._)\n\n \u2018Equality of Happiness,\u2019 as Social End, 284 note 2\n\n Ethical--judgment, 23-38, 77;\n Principles and Methods, 77-88 _passim_;\n Method, three principal species of, 83 _seq._;\n controversy, ancient and modern, 105, 106, 392;\n Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, 129;\n and Psychological Hedonism, 40-42, 412, 412 note 1;\n and Physical Science, structure of, compared, 509\n\n Ethics--boundaries of, 1;\n Study or Science? 1, 2;\n forms of the problem of, 2, 3, 391;\n and man\u2019s \u2018True Good,\u2019 3;\n definition of, 4, 15;\n Absolute and Relative, 18 note 2, 177 note 1;\n and geometry, analogy between, 18-19;\n and astronomy, analogy between, 19;\n concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19;\n aim of, 40, 77;\n and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506;\n mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509\n\n Ethics and Politics (cf. _Law_), 15-22 _passim_, 266, 457;\n distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2;\n Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298);\n in an ideal society, 18 _seq._\n\n \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 (= Well-being = the Good attainable in\n human life), 91, 92;\n misunderstanding of Aristotle\u2019s use of, 92 note 2\n\n Excellence (cf. _Perfection_)\n\n \u2018Excellence\u2019 and \u2018Perfection,\u2019 10 note 3\n\n Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493\n\n _Explanation_ essentially different from _Justification_, 2\n\n\n Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1\n\n Feeling--preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on\n objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399;\n _qu\u00e2_ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128,\n 129, 398\n\n Fidelity (cf. _Good Faith_), 258, 259\n\n Firmness, 235, 236\n\n Fitness and Desert, 350\n\n \u2018Formal\u2019 and \u2018Material\u2019 Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1\n\n Fortitude defined, 332\n\n Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1\n\n Freedom--sentiment of, 39;\n as absolute end of ideal law, 274 _seq._, 293, 297, 350-351;\n sphere of, must be limited, 275;\n ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293;\n and Contract, 276, 276 note 1;\n and Property, 276, 277;\n Civil and Constitutional, 298, 351\n\n Free Will--controversy, 57-76 _passim_, 59, 61-62, 65 note 1, 74, 75;\n conception of, applied (_a_) in judging the conduct of others,\n 63 note 1, 66, 67, (_b_) in forecasting our own future, 64;\n partial illusoriness of the belief in, 64, 65;\n and Happiness, 68;\n and Perfection (or Excellence), 68, 68 note 2;\n and Moral government of the world, 69, 69 note 2, 70;\n and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, 67,\n 68, 72-76, 285;\n and Justice, 71, 72, 284, 291;\n and Desert (or Merit), 68 note 2, 285, 291;\n and Duty, 78;\n (or Freedom of Will)--two senses of, 57-59;\n and Moral responsibility, 58;\n conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of \u2018responsibility,\u2019\n \u2018desert,\u2019 etc., 71;\n metaphysical--ethical import of, as regards (_a_) choice between\n rational and irrational alternatives, 67, 68, 70-71, (_b_) view\n of what is rational, 68, 69, (_c_) forecasts of future action,\n 69, 70, 70 note 1\n\n Friendship and its duties, 257-259, 257 note 1, 437\n\n\n \u2018General Good,\u2019 392\n\n Generosity, 219, 326\n\n Gentleness, 253, 321\n\n God\u2019s Will--conformity to, 79;\n as ultimate reason for action, 79, 80\n\n \u2018Golden Rule,\u2019 the, unpreciseness of, 379-380\n\n \u2018Good,\u2019 105-115 _passim_;\n indefiniteness of, 91-92;\n use and force of the term, 86 note 1, 105, 107 _seq._, 112, 113;\n and not \u2018Right\u2019 the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, 105;\n has not the same connotation as \u2018pleasant,\u2019 107, 108, 109, 110;\n implies reference to an universally valid standard, 108-109, 114;\n adjective, and \u2018Good\u2019 substantive, 109;\n notion of, distinct from \u2018Pleasure\u2019 and \u2018the Pleasant,\u2019 and = \u2018what\n ought to be desired,\u2019 109 _seq._\n\n Good, The, 3, 92, 106;\n (human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, 3;\n (human) is either (_a_) Happiness or (_b_) Perfection or Excellence\n of human existence, 114, 115;\n the absolute and unconditional, in Kant\u2019s view, 222;\n in English ethical thought, 423 note 1\n\n Good conduct, 106, 107, 112-113;\n standard of, needed, 113;\n Greek conception of, 107 note 1, 404-405, 405 note 1\n\n Good Faith, 224, 303-311 _passim_, 352-354, 355;\n stringency of the duty of, 304-305;\n obligation of, affected by (_a_) fraud or force, 305-306,\n 306 note 1, (_b_) material change of circumstances, 306-308,\n (_c_) misapprehension, 309, (_d_) use of a prescribed formula,\n 309, 310\n\n Good Taste, 108\n\n Good humour, 321\n\n Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, 113-114,\n 113 note 2;\n (Moral) and Beauty, 107-108, 107 note 1, 228\n\n Government--by Consent of Subjects, 297, 351;\n Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, 299;\n established, difficulty of identifying, 300, 301\n\n Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, 296, 297, 299-301;\n ideal, 297-299\n\n Grant Allen, 187;\n _Physiological \u00c6sthetics_, 187 note 1\n\n Gratitude, 259-261, 437-438;\n universalised, furnishes the principle \u2018that desert ought to be\n requited,\u2019 279, 279 note 1, 280;\n Kant on, 223, 223 note 1\n\n \u2018Greatest Happinesss,\u2019 meaning of, 121, 413;\n Utilitarian notion of, its extent, 414;\n total and average, distinguished, 415, 416\n\n \u2018Greatest Pleasure,\u2019 explanation of, 44 note 3\n\n Greek ethical thought, the problem of, 106;\n tautological maxims of, 375-376\n\n Green, T. H., 132 _seq._, 134 note 3, 135 note 3;\n (_Introduction to Hume\u2019s Treatise on Human Nature_) 132 note 2,\n 133 note 3;\n (_Prolegomena to Ethics_) 93 note 1, 133 note 1, 134 notes 1 and 2,\n 135 notes 1 and 2, 363 note 1\n\n Grote, J., _An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_, 432 note 1\n\n Gurney, E., 123, 184; (_Tertium Quid_) 123 note 1;\n (_Power of Sound_) 184 note 1\n\n\n Hallam, 423 note 1\n\n Hamilton, 139, 180-182;\n (_Lectures on Metaphysics_) 180 note 3\n\n Happiness--as End, 7, 8, 78;\n and Duty, connexion between, 162-175 _passim_;\n and Duty, are they coincident? 162, 163, 165, 176;\n and Duty, Plato\u2019s view of relation between, 171-172;\n and Virtue, 174-175, 459;\n and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle\u2019s view, 121-122;\n determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for\n Ethics, 176;\n production of, 176-177;\n relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, 193;\n and Self-development, 192-193;\n rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account\n of Ultimate Good, 406;\n an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, 407 note 1;\n principle of distribution of, required, 416, 417;\n universal, as divine end, 503-505;\n Christian view of, 120, 138;\n Sources of, 151 _seq._\n\n \u2018Happiness,\u2019 41 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 93 note 1;\n ambiguity of, 92;\n precise meaning of, 120\n\n Harm, 292, 293\n\n Harmony as cause of Pleasure, 189\n\n Health, 153, 154, 159\n\n \u2018Hedonism,\u2019 meaning of, 93\n\n Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and\n Egoistic, 11;\n connexion between the two Methods of, 84, 497 _seq._;\n objections to, stated and considered:--(_a_) that the calculation\n required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for\n practice, 131, 132;\n (_b_) that \u201cpleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,\u201d 132, 133;\n (_c_) that \u201ca sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,\u201d\n 133, 134;\n (_d_) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, 135;\n (_e_) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end,\n 136 _seq._;\n (_f_) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures\n is unfavourable to pleasure, 138-140;\n (_g_) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and\n uncertain, 140-150;\n Deductive, 176-195 _passim_;\n deductive, Spencer\u2019s view of, 177 note 1;\n Method of, must be empirical, 195;\n Empirical, method of, 460;\n and Intuitionism, 461;\n and Pessimism, 131 Note\n\n Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), 124, 125\n\n Helvetius, 88\n\n Highest Good, the (cf. _The Good_ and _Ultimate Good_), 106\n\n Hobbes, 44 note 1, 56, 86, 89, 103, 109, 300 note 1, 423, 476;\n (_Leviathan_) 89 note 1\n\n Holmes, O. W., jun., _The Common Law_, 281 note 1\n\n Honour, Code of, 30, 31, 168, 340\n\n Hume, 23, 86, 104, 220, 384, 419, 423, 424, 423 notes 1 and 2,\n 426, 440, 441, 493;\n (_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_) 44 note 2,\n 220 note 2, 424\n\n Humility, 334-336 _passim_, 355, 356 note 1, 429\n\n Hunger, 45, 46\n\n Hutcheson, 44 note 2, 50, 86, 86 note 2, 104, 366;\n (_System of Moral Philosophy_) 366 note 1\n\n Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, 6, 7, 37\n\n\n Ideal and Actual, relation between, 79;\n connected (_a_) in the conception of \u201cGod\u2019s Will,\u201d 79,\n (_b_) in the notion of \u201cNature,\u201d 80-83\n\n Ideal--Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate,\n 299 _seq._;\n and Traditional Authority, 296;\n Society, ethics of, how far useful, 22-24, 465\n\n \u201cIdols of the Cave\u201d and \u201cIdols of the Tribe,\u201d 152\n\n Impulse to do acts _qu\u00e2_ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), 77\n\n Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, 51, 52, 136\n\n Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. _Hedonistic Zero_\n\n Individualistic--Ideal, 286-287;\n and Socialistic Ideals, 293, 294, 444-445\n\n Inequality, Reasonable, 268 _seq._\n\n Ingenuity, 236\n\n Intention, 60 note 1, 202, 202 note 1\n\n Interest, meaning of, 7, 120;\n ethical character of, in Butler\u2019s view, 176 note 1\n\n \u2018Internal acts,\u2019 204\n\n Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, 193, 194\n\n Intrinsic value, how determined, 288, 289\n\n Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (_a_)\n ulterior consequences, 96, 97, (_b_) \u201cinduction from experience\u201d\n of pleasures, 97, 98 (cf. 102 note 1)\n\n Intuitional--Method, cf. _Intuitionism_;\n moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and\n Philosophical, 103, 104\n\n \u2018Intuitional\u2019--sense in which used, 96, 97, 98;\n wider and narrower senses of, 97, 102 note 1, 201\n\n Intuitionism, 3, 8, 17, 20, 96-104 _passim_, 199-216 _passim_;\n differences of its method due to two causes, 103;\n its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism),\n 406-407;\n chronological development of the method of, in England, 103-104;\n and Utilitarianism, 85-86, 388-389, 423-457 _passim_, 496-497;\n Philosophical, 102-104, 373-389 _passim_;\n Perceptional, 98-100, 102;\n Dogmatic, 100-101 (cf. _Intuitionism_, _Intuitive Morality_,\n _Positive Morality_, _Morality of Common Sense_);\n Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, 101, 200, 201;\n three phases of, 102, 103;\n a variety of, constituted by substituting for \u2018right\u2019 the notion\n \u2018good,\u2019 105-107;\n \u00c6sthetic, 228, 392;\n Jural or Rational, 228-229\n\n \u2018Intuitive\u2019 or \u2018_a priori_\u2019 Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic\n Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102\n\n Irrational choice--sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38,\n 41-42, 58, 59, 110;\n Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of,\n 59 note 1\n\n\n Jural method of Ethics, 100-101\n\n Just claims--arising from contract, 269;\n arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1\n\n \u2018Justice,\u2019 \u2018justify,\u2019 etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442\n\n Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 _passim_, 349-352, 355, 440-448 _passim_;\n or Equity, essence of, 496;\n specially difficult to define, 264;\n intuitional view of the definition of, 264;\n involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271;\n and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1;\n distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265;\n and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279,\n 285 note 1;\n and taxation, 266, 266 note 1;\n Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294;\n Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445;\n Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275;\n Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279;\n Corrective, 281;\n Reparative, 281, 282, 281 note 1, 282 note 1, 293;\n Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, 282-283, 282 note 2;\n and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 285;\n and \u2018Equity\u2019 or \u2018Fairness,\u2019 285, 286;\n Hume\u2019s treatment of, 440\n\n\n Kant, 6, 7, 11 note 1, 36, 58, 58 note 1, 209, 210, 210 note 1,\n 222, 223, 239, 240, 315, 327 note 1, 366, 385, 386, 386 note 1,\n 389-390 Note, 486, Appendix 510;\n (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_) 209 note 1, 389-390 Note;\n (_Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Tugendlehre_) 223 note 1,\n 327 note 1, 366 note 3, 386 note 2, 389 Note;\n (_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_) 366 note 3\n\n Kant\u2019s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion\n of rightness, 209-210, 209 note 1, 210 note 1, 339 note 1, 386,\n 389 Note, 486\n\n Knowledge--as an End, 114, 399, 401;\n and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between,\n 139, 140;\n and Feeling, Hamilton\u2019s view of the relation between, 139\n\n\n _Laisser faire_ and economic production, 445 note 2\n\n Law, 295-303; and Morality, relation between, 29, 457;\n and Positive Morality, 164;\n Austin\u2019s definition of, 300 note 1\n\n Laws--just, characteristics of, 266, 267, 271-272;\n that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, 296\n\n Law-observance (or Order), 295-303 _passim_, 352, 440, 441;\n and Good Faith, 295, 303;\n in regard to _mala prohibita_, 302 note 1\n\n Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 50 note 1, 399 note 1, 427 note 1\n\n Legal obligation and punishment, 29\n\n Liberality, 324-326, 325 note 1, 355\n\n Libertarian position, 58, 64-65, 66\n\n Liberty, Sentiment of, 58\n\n Locke, (_Essay_) 205, 280 note 1, 503;\n ethical view of, 205, 206\n\n Love, 50, 244, 245, 367, 368;\n common sense estimate of, 245, 258, 258 note 1\n\n Loyalty, 223, 244, 254\n\n\n Mackenzie, J. S., 47, 48\n\n Maine, Sir H., (_Ancient Law_) 461 note 2\n\n Malevolence--character of, as motive, 364;\n sometimes sweepingly condemned, 321, 324;\n sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, 322, 323, 324\n\n Malevolent affections natural and normal, 320, 321\n\n Marcus Aurelius, 376 note 1\n\n \u2018Market value,\u2019 286 _seq._\n\n Marriage, Plato\u2019s ideal of, 358-359 (cf. 348 note 1)\n\n Martineau, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372;\n (_Types of Ethical Theory_) 367 note 1, 369 note 1\n\n Maxims--of Virtue, dependence or independence of, 313;\n of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in,\n 380-382\n\n \u2018Maximum Happiness\u2019 as criterion of conduct, 134\n\n Meanness, notion of, examined, 325, 326\n\n Meekness, 321\n\n Mercy, 321\n\n Merit, 68 note 2, 284 _seq._;\n (cf. _Desert_)\n\n Method of Ethics, definition of, 1;\n only one rational, 6, 12;\n more than one natural, 6\n\n _Methods of Ethics, The_, purpose of, 11-14, 78\n\n Mildness, 321\n\n Mill, J. S., 44, 85, 87, 94, 121, 177 note 1, 412 notes 1 and 2,\n 414, 418, 440, 478, 504;\n (_Utilitarianism_) 93 note 1, 461 note 1, 499 note 1;\n (_On Liberty_) 478 notes 1 and 2\n\n _Mind_, 87 Note, 477 note 1\n\n Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, 106\n\n Moral Faculty--a function of Reason, 23-38 _passim_;\n why subject of ethical discussion, 4, 5;\n Utilitarian theory of origin of, 461, 462, 497\n\n Moral Judgment, 23-38;\n object of, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364;\n (or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 _seq._;\n Sense, 34;\n Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 _seq._, 102-103, 493-494;\n Sentiment, 26-28, 77;\n Sentiments, (_a_) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as\n motives, 365-367, (_b_) theory of their derivation from\n experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462;\n and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174;\n Motive, 77, 204 _seq._, 223;\n Motive, varying forms of:--(_a_) Reverence for Authority,\n (_b_) Religious Sentiment, (_c_) Self-respect,\n (_d_) sentiment of Freedom, (_e_) Admiration or Aspiration,\n 39-40;\n instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings--discrepancy between,\n 466, 467;\n Intuitions, 211-216 _passim_;\n Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337;\n Intuitions, connexion between (_a_) Existence and Origin of,\n 211, 212, (_b_) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213,\n 212 note 2, 214;\n Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216;\n Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1;\n Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229;\n Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505;\n Axioms, Kant\u2019s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2;\n Maxims, 337-361 _passim_;\n Maxims which _are_, and which are _not_, directly self-evident,\n distinction between, 383;\n Responsibility, 59-60;\n Obligation, 217;\n and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427\n\n \u2018Moral\u2019 (in narrower sense) and \u2018Prudential\u2019 distinguished, 25-26\n\n Moral Courage, 333 note 3\n\n Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374\n\n Morality--\u2018inductive\u2019 and \u2018intuitive,\u2019 double ambiguity of antithesis\n between, 97-99;\n _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ (or inductive and intuitive), 97;\n and growth of Sympathy, 455-456, 455 note 1\n\n Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), 85, 102, 229, 263 Note,\n 337-361 _passim_;\n and Positive Morality, 215;\n and Egoism, 498-499 (cf. _Happiness and Duty_);\n development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, 455-456;\n axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, 338, 342, 343;\n furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms,\n 360, 361;\n and Utilitarianism, 361 note 1, 423-457 _passim_, 461, 498, 499;\n first principles of, as \u201cmiddle axioms\u201d of Utilitarianism, 461;\n Mill\u2019s view of, 461 note 1;\n not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification,\n 461 _seq._, 467\n\n Motive meaning of, 202, 362, 363;\n and Intention, 202, 203, 203 note 1;\n -s, different views of Right, 204-207;\n and Desire, Green\u2019s view of, 363 note 1;\n and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, 493, 494\n\n Motives to action, 23;\n as subjects of moral judgment, 362-372;\n as affecting morality of actions, 60-61, 224;\n regarded as _better_ and _worse_ rather than _good_ and\n _bad_, 363-364;\n \u2018seductive,\u2019 364;\n (\u201cSprings of action\u201d) Dr. Martineau\u2019s table of (369)\n ethically estimated, 371, 372;\n \u2018higher\u2019 not always to be preferred to \u2018lower,\u2019 369, 370, 371;\n moral regulation of, 370\n\n\n Natural, The--Interpretation of, 80 _seq._;\n gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, 82\n\n Natural--Selection, effect of, on impulses, 194;\n and normal claims, indefiniteness of, 270, 271, 272, 272 note 1;\n expectations, ambiguity of, 272, 273, 352;\n Rights--difficulty of determining, 298;\n Good, 477\n\n Nature--Life according to, 79 _seq._, 377, 378;\n conformity to, 80;\n Stoic use of, 377, 378 note 1;\n Butler\u2019s use of, 378\n\n Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, 250, 251, 252\n\n Neutral excitements, 186 note 1 (cf. _Hedonistic Zero_)\n\n\n \u2018Objective\u2019 and \u2018subjective,\u2019 ethical application of, 207, 207 note 1,\n 208 notes 1 and 2, 208, 209, 210, 344 note 2, 394, 395, 429, 430\n\n Objective Hedonism, meaning of, 151;\n and Common Sense, 151-161;\n advantages of, 151;\n defects of, 151 _seq._, 458, 459\n\n Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, 400, 401\n\n Objectivity of Moral Judgment, 27, 33\n\n Order, cf. _Law-observance_\n\n Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, 383, 384,\n 384 note 1\n\n \u2018Ought,\u2019 23-38 _passim_;\n relative and unconditional uses of, 6, 7, 39;\n implies reasonableness, 25;\n and \u2018right\u2019 imply the same notion, 1 note 1, 23, 25;\n does not refer to matters of fact, 25;\n implies objectivity, 27, 33;\n does not merely signify (_a_) appropriateness of means to ends,\n 26, (_b_) an emotion of the person judging, 26-28, nor\n (_c_) bound under penalties, 29 _seq._;\n an elementary and irresolvable notion, 32-33;\n narrower and wider sense of, 33, 34, 34 note 4;\n carries with it an impulse to action, 34;\n implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from\n \u2018right\u2019), 34, 35, 217;\n determinist sense of, 78;\n loose meaning of, 508\n\n Owen, Robert, 291\n\n\n Pain--definition of, 42-43 note 1, 180, 191;\n the negative quantity of pleasure, 124, 125;\n physical concomitant of, 183 _seq._;\n Aristotle\u2019s and Hamilton\u2019s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,\n 181 note 1;\n Mr. Stout\u2019s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;\n Mr. Spencer\u2019s theory of, 183 _seq._;\n Grant Allen\u2019s view of, 187;\n biological theory of, 190 _seq._\n\n Paley, 86, 121\n\n Parents and children, duties of, 243, 243 note 1, 248-250,\n 248 note 1, 346, 347\n\n Patriotism, 223, 244, 245;\n duties of, 251, 252, 252 note 1\n\n \u2018Perception,\u2019 ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, 103 Note\n\n Perfection or Excellence as End, 10, 11, 10 notes 3 and 4,\n 20 note 1, 78, 114, 115;\n and Intuitionism, 11, 83, 84, 97;\n Kant\u2019s treatment of, 386 note 2\n\n Perfectionists, view of, 97\n\n Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, 373\n\n \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 231 note 1\n\n Pity or Compassion, 262\n\n Placability, 321\n\n Plato, (_Republic_) 21, 171, 172;\n 140, 145, 148, 171, 172, 281, 345, 348 note 1, 358, 375 note 1, 376;\n (_Gorgias_) 405 note 1; 441\n\n Pleasure--definitions of, 42, 43, 43 note 1, 125, 127 _seq._,\n 131, 190;\n ambiguities of, 43, 44, 93 _seq._;\n forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures,\n 40, 173;\n the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, 41, 42,\n 42 note 1, 136;\n of Virtue, its \u2018disinterestedness\u2019 not abnormal, 50, 51;\n as aim of unconscious action, 52, 53;\n as \u2018original\u2019 aim of action, 53, 54;\n application of the term, 93;\n has only quantitative differences, 94, 95, 121;\n maximum, deductive methods of determining, 121, 122;\n rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, 124 note 1;\n \u2018quality\u2019 of, 94, 95, 121, 128-129, 128 note 1;\n as Feeling, conceivableness of, 132, 133;\n permanent sources of, 135, 136, 153;\n how estimated, 141 _seq._ (cf. 127, 128, 398);\n from others\u2019 pain, various modes of, 321 note 1;\n and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, 44 note 1;\n and Desire, controversy as to relation between, 39-56;\n Aristotle\u2019s and Hamilton\u2019s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,\n 181 note 1;\n Mr. Stout\u2019s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;\n Mr. Spencer\u2019s theory of, 183 _seq._;\n Grant Allen\u2019s view of, 187;\n biological theory of, 190 _seq._;\n and Desire, (_a_) Mill\u2019s view of, 43-44, (_b_) Butler\u2019s view of,\n 44, (_c_) Bain\u2019s view of, 54-56;\n effect of desire on estimate of, 144, 145;\n and Preservation, 190, etc.;\n (Hobbes\u2019 view of) 89;\n and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza\u2019s view\n of, 90;\n and \u2018quantity of life,\u2019 192;\n \u2018pure\u2019 143;\n of pursuit, 46 _seq._, 47 note 1, 55-56;\n of attainment, 47;\n of business, 49;\n intellectual and \u00e6sthetic, 107-108, 153, 157, 472;\n benevolent and sympathetic, 49, 50;\n of virtue, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175;\n -s, of the animal life, 154, 157, 159;\n of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith\u2019s view of, 155 note 1--(cf.\n _Health_, _Wealth_, etc.);\n Stoic view of, 129;\n Green\u2019s view of, 132 _seq._;\n Plato\u2019s view of its illusoriness, 140;\n Spencer and Grant Allen\u2019s \u2018Intermittence\u2019 theory of, 187\n\n Pleasures and Pains, Moral, 170 _seq._, 171 note 1;\n of Sympathy, 49, 50, 499-502, 499 note 1;\n scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, 124, 125;\n commensurability of, 123-125, 124 note 1, 128 note 1, 131,\n 132, 140-150;\n difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of,\n 140-150;\n incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, 123, 124;\n intensity of, commensurable with duration, 124;\n Bentham\u2019s four dimensions of, 124 note 1;\n volitional efficacy of, 125-127;\n their relation to normal activities, 185, etc.;\n Aristotle\u2019s and Hamilton\u2019s theory of, 180 _seq._;\n Stout\u2019s theory of, 182;\n Wundt\u2019s theory of, 184;\n Spencer\u2019s biological theory of, 190 _seq._\n\n Plutarch, 376\n\n Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), 253;\n Code of, 30, 340, 341\n\n Political order, Rousseau\u2019s view of an ideally just, 298\n\n Politics--and Ethics, 15-22;\n definition of, 1 note 1, 15 (cf. Law)\n\n Positive Morality--and Morality of Common Sense, 215;\n relation of, to preservation and to happiness, 464, 465;\n alteration of, 164, 480\n\n Power, 156, 157, 159\n\n Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, 507 note 1\n\n Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, 131\n\n Practical (or Moral) Judgment, 23 seq.\n\n Practical (or Moral) Reason, 23-38 _passim_;\n its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational\n desires, 36;\n and Nature, 81;\n a postulate of, 6, 12;\n Dualism of, 404 note 1, 366, 200, 205-206, 499, 507-509 (cf.\n _Happiness and Duty_)\n\n Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, 428, 429\n\n Priestley, 88 Note\n\n Promise, 303-311 _passim_;\n conditions and meaning of, 304;\n conditions of bindingness of a, 311\n\n Proof of a first principle, how possible, 419, 420\n\n Proof--of Egoism may be demanded, 418, 419;\n of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419\n\n Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 _passim_;\n clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419;\n addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498;\n addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422\n\n \u201cProof\u201d of Utilitarian principle, Mill\u2019s, 387, 388\n\n Property and Right of Bequest, 277\n\n Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391;\n common sense view of, 327, 328;\n Kant\u2019s and Butler\u2019s views of, 327 note 1;\n self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381;\n and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497\n\n \u2018Prudential\u2019 and \u2018Moral,\u2019 25-26\n\n Psychological Hedonism, 40 _seq._;\n of Bentham, 85;\n ethical import of, 41, 205\n\n Public Opinion, Code of, 30\n\n Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates\n of, 495\n\n Punishment, 281, 290 _seq._, 290 note 1, 291 note 1;\n preventive and retributory views of, 71-72\n\n Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359\n\n\n Quantitative Hedonism, 129\n\n Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174\n\n Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174\n\n\n Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369;\n conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366;\n difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368\n\n Rational action, not to be identified with (_a_) disinterested or\n (_b_) free action, 57;\n Spinoza\u2019s view of the principle of, 89-90\n\n Rational Benevolence, 96;\n may be self-limiting, 385;\n Kant\u2019s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390\n\n Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)--and Conscience,\n 172, 200, 200 note 2, 366;\n and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 _seq._\n\n Reason--and Ultimate Ends, 9, 77, 77 note 1;\n relation of, to Will and Desire, 23 _seq._;\n reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their\n _objectivity_, 33;\n conflict with, implied in the terms _dictate_, _precept_,\n _imperative_, _ought_, _duty_, _moral obligation_, 34, 35;\n dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, 41;\n dictates or imperatives of, 34, 36, 77;\n and the Divine Will, 79, 80;\n dictate of, implied by _right_, _rightness_, and their equivalents,\n 105;\n and instinct, 193-195;\n may be self-limiting, 345;\n _dictates_ and _dictation_ of, 345, 395, 404\n\n Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, 5-6\n\n Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler\u2019s view of, 119, 120;\n Clarke\u2019s view of, 120;\n Christian view of, 120;\n common sense view of, 120\n\n Rebellion, when justifiable?, 299, 300, 301, 352\n\n Reciprocity, principle of, 167, 168\n\n Religious deception, 316, 316 note 2\n\n Renan quoted, 108 note 1\n\n Reputation, 155\n\n Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, 322, 323;\n deliberate, Butler\u2019s view of, 323 note 1, 371;\n universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, 281;\n evaluation of, 449\n\n Resolutions, 37;\n general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, 37-38\n\n Respect, tokens of, 336, 336 note 1\n\n Reverence for Authority, 39\n\n \u2018Right\u2019--notion involved in, is unique, 25;\n and \u2018good,\u2019 3, 4;\n and \u2018ought,\u2019 distinction between, 34, 35;\n conduct and \u2018good\u2019 conduct, 106, 113\n\n Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, 3\n\n Rights, 274, etc.\n\n Rightful authority, how known?, 296;\n what are its limits?, 301, 302\n\n Rousseau, 298;\n his political ideal, difficulty of realising, 298, 299\n\n \u2018Rule of Equity,\u2019 Clarke\u2019s, 384-385\n\n \u2018Rule of Love or Benevolence,\u2019 Clarke\u2019s, 385\n\n \u2018Rules of Righteousness,\u2019 Clarke\u2019s, 384, 384 note 4, 385\n\n Rules prescribing actions as _good_ or _right_ open to Utilitarian\n interpretation, 430\n\n\n Sagacity, 236\n\n Sanctions, 164-175 _passim_, 498, 499, 500 _seq._, 502, 505, 507-508;\n conflict of, 164, 165;\n legal, and happiness, 165, 166, 165 note 1;\n social, and happiness, 166, 167;\n social, and extra-legal duty, 167, 168;\n internal, and happiness, 170, 170 note 1, 171, 171 note 1, 172,\n 173, 501-502\n\n Scottish School of Ethical Thought, 104\n\n Self-control, 235-237, 331, 344, 345, 356\n\n Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion,\n 90, 91;\n as ethical aim, 192, 193;\n understood as = _yielding to instinctive impulses_, 193-194\n\n Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, 339, 340, 341\n\n Self-interest, 25, 26\n\n Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, 89;\n and certain elevated impulses, 137-138;\n Butler\u2019s view of, 93;\n and benevolence and affection, 138, 403, 502\n\n Self-preservation, 89\n\n Self-realisation, 80, 90, 95\n\n Self-regarding virtues, 327-331\n\n Self-sacrifice, 109 note 1, 138, 431, 432\n\n Self-satisfaction, Green\u2019s view of, 133, 135, 135 note 3\n\n Selfishness, 499\n\n Services, comparative worth of, how determined, 286, 287;\n reward of, how determined, 290\n\n Shaftesbury, 86, 86 notes 1 and 2, 138, 423, 423 note 1, 433, 501\n\n Sidgwick, _Principles of Political Economy_, 267 note, 445 note 2,\n 446 note 1\n\n Sincerity, 355\n\n Smith, Adam, 424, 461, (_Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral\n Sentiments_) 155 note 1\n\n Social Contract, 17, 297-298, 303, 351\n\n Social rank and status, 153, 155\n\n Socialistic ideal, 289, 293-294\n\n Sociology--scope and subject of, 2;\n present condition of, 472, 473\n\n Socrates, 59 note 1, 98-99, 215, 231 note 1, 299\n\n Socratic Induction, 98-99\n\n Socratic principle of \u201cGovernment by experts,\u201d 299\n\n \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1, \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2, 231, 231 note 1\n\n Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 _seq._;\n judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly\n trustworthy, 158-160;\n common sense estimates of (_a_) at best are only true for\n ordinary persons, (_b_) are vitiated by mal-observation,\n (_c_) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of\n experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (_d_) mix moral and \u00e6sthetic\n preferences with hedonistic, 153, (_e_) are found to be full\n of inconsistencies, 153-158\n\n Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1\n\n Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341\n\n Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262\n\n Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 _seq._, 194 note 1, 470,\n 471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473;\n (_Social Statics_), 18 note 2, 194 note 1;\n (_Data of Ethics_), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1\n\n \u201cSphere of individual option\u201d determined by Utilitarian calculation,\n 477-479\n\n Spinoza, 90\n\n Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473;\n (_Science of Ethics_), 42 note 1, 471\n\n Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455;\n (_Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_), 92 note 2, 454 note 1\n\n Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106;\n ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377\n\n Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1\n\n Stoics, 92, 105, 129\n\n Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186;\n (_Analytic Psychology_), 182 note 1\n\n Subjective, cf. _Objective_\n\n _Suggestio falsi_, 317\n\n Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356\n\n Sully, _Pessimism_, 136 note 1, 186 note 1\n\n _Suppressio veri_, 317\n\n Sympathy--and Moral Sensibility, relation between, 170 note 1,\n 500-501;\n with impulses prompting to action, 463, 463 note 2;\n limitations and perversions of, 464;\n twofold operation of, on moral impulses, 483;\n confusion in Mill\u2019s view of, 499 note 1;\n and happiness of agent, 170 note 1, 499 note 1, 499-503\n\n Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility\n to, 99-100\n\n\n Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, 374 _seq._\n\n Temperance, 224, 328, 329, 344 note 1, 356\n\n Torquemada, 226 note 1\n\n \u2018True Good,\u2019 3 (cf. _Good_, _Ultimate Good_)\n\n Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, 339\n\n\n Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, 404, 497-498\n\n Ultimate Good, My, 109 _seq._, 109 note 1, 497-498\n\n Ultimate Good, The (the Good), 3, 106 _seq._, 391-407 _passim_\n\n Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary\n thought, 6\n\n Ultimate reasons for conduct, 78, 79;\n differences in, correspond to different aspects of human\n existence, 78 (cf. 79)\n\n \u2018Ultra-intuitional,\u2019 100\n\n \u2018Unconscious Utilitarianism\u2019 of Common Sense Morality, 453 _seq._,\n 489, etc.\n\n Universal Happiness as standard and motive, 413\n\n Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (_a_) in\n Bentham\u2019s view, 87 Note;\n (_b_) in Paley\u2019s view, 121\n\n Unveracity, common, 316 _seq._, 486\n\n Utilitarian--formula of distribution not really at variance with\n Common Sense, 432, 433;\n justification of special affections, 433, 434;\n ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human\n beings, 467-470;\n rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical\n method, 476-480;\n innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of\n (_a_) on the agent, 481, 482-483, (_b_) on others, 482, 483;\n innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent\n and others, 483, 484;\n innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of\n acceptance, 489-490, 489 note 1;\n reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, 484;\n exceptions to current morality (_a_) may generally be stated as\n fresh rules, 485, 489, (_b_) special and rare cases of, 486-487;\n Duty and Religious Sanction, 503-506;\n Sanction, 500 _seq._\n\n Utilitarianism, 8, 11, 119;\n (= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), 84, 119, 411;\n Proof of, 418-422;\n Principle of, 87, (Mill\u2019s view of) 387, 388;\n Method of, 460-495;\n meaning of, 411-417 _passim_;\n to be distinguished from (_a_) Egoistic Hedonism, 411, 412,\n (_b_) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, 412-413;\n _motive_ and _standard_ of, to be discriminated, 413;\n contradictory objections to, 87;\n and Intuitionism, relation between, 85-86, 386 _seq._, 496-497;\n and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English\n ethical thought, 86, 423, 424;\n and Egoism, relation between, 497, 498;\n and Egoism, harmony of, (_a_) not empirically demonstrable, 503,\n (_b_) required by Reason, 506;\n and Common Sense Morality, 8, 423-457 _passim_, 468, 469, 475,\n 476, 480 _seq._, 498, 499;\n justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves,\n 432 _seq._;\n more rigid than Common Sense, 499, 504;\n function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, 454, 455;\n reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, 473-474, 475-476;\n aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, 476;\n and Axiom of Benevolence, 387, 388, 496-497, 498;\n and Conjugal and Parental Duties, 435, 436;\n and Duties of Special Need, 436, 437;\n and Gratitude, 437, 438;\n and benevolent Duties, 435 _seq._;\n and Law-observance, 440, 441;\n and Impartiality, 441, 442, 447, 447 note 1;\n and Normal Expectations, 442-443;\n and Good Faith, 443, 444, 443 note 3;\n and Freedom, 444, 445;\n and distribution according to Desert, 445-447;\n and Justice, 440 _seq._, 447;\n and Veracity, 448, 449, 483;\n and Malevolence, 449;\n and Self-regarding virtues, 450;\n and Purity, 449-450;\n and Sympathy, 500 _seq._;\n and Christianity, 504\n\n \u2018Utility,\u2019 Hume\u2019s and Bentham\u2019s uses of, 423 note 2\n\n\n Veracity, 97, 224, 313, 314-319 _passim_, 355, 448, 449;\n and Good Faith, 303, 304, 313, 314\n\n Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), 10, 14, 78, 106,\n 219, 219 note 1, 220, 220 note 3, 221, 222, 226, 227;\n or Right Action, its relation to the Good, 106;\n and Happiness, 119, 120, 174-175, 461;\n Plato\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s accounts of, 376;\n involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue,\n 393, 394, 395;\n and Duty, 217-230 _passim_;\n and emotion, 222-223, 226;\n voluntariness of, 220, 227;\n and motive, 223-224;\n and habit, 227;\n and moral effort, relation between, 224, 225, 429;\n intellectual conditions of, 225;\n is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, 227 note 1;\n felicific character of, 424, 425\n\n Virtues, intellectual, 231-237 _passim_;\n self-regarding, 327-331 _passim_\n\n Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, 77, 78\n\n Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, 365, 366;\n Dr. Martineau\u2019s rejection of, 367\n\n Vivisection controversy, 402, 406 note 1\n\n Volition, analysis of, 61, 62;\n Determinist view of, 62 note 1;\n conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, 67, 71;\n causes muscular contractions, 73;\n affects thought and feeling, 73, 74;\n acting through resolutions alters men\u2019s tendencies to action,\n 74, 75, 75 note 1;\n its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, 77\n\n Voluntary action, definition of, 59\n\n Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, 67 note 3\n\n\n Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, 256 note 2\n\n Wealth, 153, 154, 155\n\n Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), 92, 92 note 1;\n Stoic view of, 92;\n Aristotle\u2019s view of, 92, 92 note 2;\n not = mere promise of future being, 396, 397\n\n Whewell, 58, 86;\n (_Elements of Morality_), 58 note 2, 317 note 1, 329 note 1\n\n Will--Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, 394, 395;\n divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, 395\n\n Wisdom, 230, 231-236 _passim_, 344, 345, 393, 430;\n meaning and use of term, 231;\n Greek view of, 231;\n common sense definition of, 233;\n refers to ends as well as means, 231-233;\n in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, 233-235;\n in adoption of selected ends, 235;\n comprehensiveness of, 238;\n and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, 375;\n and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, 237 Note\n\n Wundt, 184 note 3\n\n\n Zeal or Moral Ardour, 237, 392\n\n Zeno, 376\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.\n\n\n\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\n\nMany references in the index are to the original numbers of the notes,\nwhich do not correspond to the renumbering used in this e-text.\n\n\nThe following apparent errors have been corrected:\n\np. ix \"more that\" changed to \"more than\"\n\np. xii \"chap iv.\" changed to \"chap. iv.\"\n\np. xix \"chap iv.\" changed to \"chap. iv.\"\n\np. xxviii \"201\" changed to \"201-207\"\n\np. xxxv \"legal code\" changed to \"legal code.\"\n\np. 44 \"his own,\" changed to \"his own.\"\n\np. 55 \"adapted by\" changed to \"adopted by\"\n\np. 272 (note) \"\u00a7 2\" changed to \"\u00a7 2.\"\n\np. 318 (note) \"chap i.\" changed to \"chap. i.\"\n\np. 415 (note) \"appear\" changed to \"appears\"\n\np. 492 \"let as\" changed to \"let us\"\n\np. 518 \"285:\" changed to \"285;\"\n\np. 519 \"cf. Law\" changed to \"cf. _Law_\"\n\np. 519 \"cf. Perfection\" changed to \"cf. _Perfection_\"\n\np. 520 \"180-182,\" changed to \"180-182;\"\n\np. 521 \"Hedonistic Zero\" changed to \"_Hedonistic Zero_\"\n\np. 522 \"Note; 486\" changed to \"Note, 486\"\n\np. 523 \"203 note 1,\" changed to \"203 note 1;\"\n\np. 524 \"84, 97:\" changed to \"84, 97;\"\n\np. 526 \"Good, Ultimate Good\" changed to \"_Good_, \"Ultimate Good\"\n\n\nThe following possible errors have been left as printed:\n\np. 177 evaluing\n\np. 524 405 note 1; 441\n\n\nThe following are used inconsistently in the text:\n\nCommon-sense and Common-Sense\n\ncounterbalancing and counter-balancing\n\nfairminded and fair-minded\n\ngoodwill and good-will\n\nhighminded and high-minded\n\nlawgiver and law-giver\n\nnote and Note\n\ntruthspeaking, truth-speaking, Truthspeaking and Truth-speaking\n\ntwofold and two-fold\n\n_vice vers\u00e2_ and _vice versa_\n\nwellbeing, well-being, Wellbeing and Well-being\n\nwidespread and wide-spread\n\nwrongdoing and wrong-doing","title":"The Methods of Ethics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":216605}