{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46884/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46884","id":"gutenberg_46884","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46884","summary":null,"tags":["Animism","Category: Archaeology & Anthropology","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Human beings -- Origin","Magic","Superstition","Totemism"],"text":"THE ORIGIN OF MAN AND OF\n HIS SUPERSTITIONS\n\n\n\n\n CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS\n C. F. CLAY, MANAGER\n LONDON: FETTER LANE, E.C. 4\n\n [Illustration]\n\n NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.\n BOMBAY }\n CALCUTTA } MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.\n MADRAS }\n TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN CO.\n OF CANADA, LTD.\n TOKYO: MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA\n\n ALL RIGHTS RESERVED\n\n\n\n\n THE ORIGIN OF MAN\n AND OF HIS SUPERSTITIONS\n\n BY\n\n CARVETH READ, M.A.\n\n LECTURER ON COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY (FORMERLY GROTE PROFESSOR\n OF PHILOSOPHY) IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON\n\n CAMBRIDGE\n AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS\n 1920\n\n\n\n\n PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY\n RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,\n BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E. 1,\n AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe volume now published explains in its first part an hypothesis that\nthe human race has descended from some ape-like stock by a series\nof changes which began and, until recently, were maintained by the\npractice of hunting in pack for animal food, instead of being content\nwith the fruits and other nutritious products of the tropical forest.\nThe hypothesis occurred to me many years ago, and was first published\n(in brief) in _The Metaphysics of Nature_ (1805), Chap. XIII., and\nagain in _Natural and Social Morals_ (1909); but all it implied did not\nbecome clear until, in lecturing on Comparative Psychology, there was\nforced upon me the necessity of effecting an intelligible transition\nfrom the animal to the human mind, and of not being satisfied to say\nyear after year that hands and brains were plainly so useful that\nthey must have been developed by Natural Selection. Then one day\nthe requisite ideas came to light; and an outline of the hypothesis\nwas read at the Meeting of the British Association (Section H) at\nBirmingham in 1913, and printed in _Man_, November 1914. The Council\nof the Anthropological Institute has kindly consented to my using the\nsubstance of that article in the first chapter here following.\n\nThe article in _Man_ dealt chiefly with the physical changes which our\nrace has undergone. The correlative mental changes were explained in\nthe _British Journal of Psychology_ in an article which supplies the\nbasis of the second chapter of this book.\n\nThe hunting-pack, then, was the first form of human society; and in\nlecturing on Ethnopsychology two questions especially interested me:\n(1) Under what mental conditions did the change take place from the\norganisation of the hunting-pack (when this weakened) to the settled\nlife of the tribe or group? and (2) Why is the human mind everywhere\nbefogged with ideas of Magic and Animism? They seemed at last to have\nthe same answer: these superstitions were useful and (apparently) even\nnecessary in giving to elders enough prestige to preserve tradition\nand custom when the leader of the hunt was no longer conspicuous in\nauthority. A magic-working gerontocracy was the second form of society;\nand the third form was governed by a wizard-king or a priest-king,\nor by a king supported by wizards or priests. One must, therefore,\nunderstand the possibility of these beliefs in Magic and Animism, and\nhow they arose and obtained a hold upon all tribes and nations; and\nhence the second part of this volume\u2014on Superstition.\n\nSome results of inquiry into these matters were also published in the\n_British Journal of Psychology_ (namely, much of the substance of\nChaps. III., IV., V., VI., and VIII.) and are here reproduced, with\nthe editor\u2019s consent, enlarged and, for the most part, rewritten: the\nleast altered are Chaps. VI. and VIII. Chaps. VII., IX. and X. have not\nhitherto been printed; but part of Chap. X. was read at the Meeting of\nthe British Association at Bournemouth last year.\n\nMessrs. Williams and Norgate have given permission to use the diagram\nin the footnote to p. 3, based on one of Prof. Keith\u2019s in his\n_Antiquity of Man_.\n\nExtensive use has, of course, been made of the works of Darwin, Herbert\nSpencer and E.\u00a0B. Tylor, and (among living authors) of the volumes\nof Sir J.\u00a0G. Frazer and Prof. Ed. Westermarck. I am grateful to my\nfriends and colleagues, Prof. Spearman, Prof. J.\u00a0P. Hill and Prof.\nArthur Keith for assistance in various ways. Mr. Pycraft, too, of the\nNatural History Museum has given me important information; and my old\nfriend, Mr. Thomas Whittaker, has helped me, as usual, when my need was\ngreatest.\n\n CARVETH READ.\n\n _University College, London.\n July 1920_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n PAGE\n ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MAN FROM THE ANTHROPOIDS 1\n\n \u00a7 1. _The Hypothesis._\u2014That Man was differentiated from\n the anthropoid stock by becoming a hunter; perhaps in\n the Oligocene period 1-3\n\n \u00a7 2. _What the Hypothesis Explains._\u2014World-wide range;\n why the earliest known men were hunters; the erect\n gait; specialisation of hands; reduction of arms;\n and of teeth and jaws; modification of skull; social\n co-operation; rudiments of speech; intelligence;\n control of fire 4-13\n\n \u00a7 3. _Minor and Secondary Consequences._\u2014Alimentary\n canal; loss of seasonal marriage; naked skin;\n cannibalism; division into races; Nordic sub-race 13-21\n\n \u00a7 4. _Prey and Competitors._\u2014Climate and landscape\n in Oligocene and Miocene; animals, herbivorous;\n anthropoids and their stature in late Oligocene;\n carnivorous contemporaries 21-8\n\n \u00a7 5. _Conclusion._\u2014Summary 28-9\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE HUMAN FROM THE ANTHROPOID MIND 30\n\n \u00a7 1. _Heredity, Adaptation, Accommodation_ 30-31\n\n \u00a7 2. _The Original Stock and the Conditions of\n Differentiation._\u2014Mind of the higher apes the best\n clue to that of the original stock. Conditions of\n differentiation: the hunting life; geographical\n diffusion; social life; imaginations concerning Magic\n and Animism 31-5\n\n \u00a7 3. _Primal Society._\u2014Forms of gregariousness amongst\n Mammalia; the hunting-pack most likely original of\n human society. Other conjectures 35-40\n\n \u00a7 4. _Psychology of the Hunting-pack._\u2014Interest in the\n chase and in killing; gregariousness; various modes\n of sympathy; aggressiveness; claim to territory;\n recognition of leaders, submission to the pack,\n emulation, precedency; strategy and persistence;\n struggle to share the prey; intelligence. Different\n mentality of the herbivorous herd 40-49\n\n \u00a7 5. _The Wolf-type of Man established by Natural\n Selection._\u2014Keith\u2019s hypothesis as to epoch of\n differentiation. Slow progress of culture; full\n adaptation to hunting life prior to Neolithic culture 49-52\n\n \u00a7 6. _Some further Consequences of the\n Hunting-life._\u2014Growth of constructiveness; language;\n customs\u2014marriage; property; war; sports and games;\n laughter and lamentation 52-61\n\n \u00a7 7. _Moralisation of the Hunters._\u2014Character of\n Anthropoids; human benevolence; moral sense; effect\n of industry; of growing intelligence 61-6\n\n \u00a7 8. _Influence of the Imaginary Environment._\u2014Belief in\n Magic and Spirits often injurious; but on the whole\n advantageous; especially by establishing government 66-70\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n BELIEF AND SUPERSTITION 71\n\n \u00a7 1. \u201c_Superstition._\u201d\u2014Here used merely to include Magic\n and Animism as imagination-beliefs 71-2\n\n \u00a7 2. _Imagination._\u2014Various uses of the word; mental\n \u201cimages\u201d; in connection with reasoning; and\n with literary fiction. Here means unverifiable\n representation 72-6\n\n \u00a7 3. _Belief._\u2014Nature of belief; degrees of probability;\n tested by action; play-belief 76-9\n\n \u00a7 4. _Causes and Grounds of Belief._\u2014Derived from\n perception. Evidentiary causes, or grounds,\n raising some probability; and non-evidentiary\n causes which are not grounds. Memory, testimony,\n inference so far as unverifiable are imagination.\n Influence of apperceptive masses and of methodology.\n Non-evidentiary causes have their own apperceptive\n masses\u2014derived from bad observation, memory,\n testimony; influenced by emotion, desire and\n voluntary action; by sympathy and antipathy, and by\n suggestibility 79-85\n\n \u00a7 5. _The Beliefs of Immature Minds._\u2014Non-evidentiary\n causes more influential than with us;\n picture-thinking more vivid; no common standard of\n truth; feeble power of comparison, due perhaps to\n undeveloped brain 85-92\n\n \u00a7 6. _The Reasoning of Immature Minds._\u2014Fallacies\n of induction; ignorance of the minor premise in\n deduction; reasoning by analogy 92-8\n\n \u00a7 7. _General Ideas at the Savage Level._\u2014Savages have\n general ideas, though often not recognised or named;\n force; relations of causation and equality 99-103\n\n \u00a7 8. _The Weakness of Imagination-beliefs._\u2014Superficial\n resemblance to perception-beliefs; more nearly allied\n to play-belief 103-7\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n MAGIC 108\n\n \u00a7 1. _Antiquity of Magic_ 108-9\n\n \u00a7 2. _What is Magic?_\u2014Magic defined; imaginary impersonal\n force contrasted with power of spirits; its action\n uniform like laws of nature. Kinds of Magic 109-12\n\n \u00a7 3. _The Beginnings of Magic._\u2014A matter of speculation.\n The earliest were probably the simplest, and the\n kinds that have prevailed most widely by tradition\n and hereditary predisposition. The chief source of\n belief in Magic is the mistaking of coincidence for\n causation 112-19\n\n \u00a7 4. _Magical Force and Primitive Ideas of\n Causation._\u2014Idea of magical force derived from\n physical force (empathy, Animatism, invisible action\n at a distance, mana). How Animism and Magic corrupt\n the ideas of causation 119-24\n\n \u00a7 5. _Magic and Mystery_ 124-6\n\n \u00a7 6. _Volitional Magic._\u2014A relatively late idea 126-8\n\n \u00a7 7. _The Evolution of Magic\u2014Direct Magic._\u2014Growth and\n differentiation; four stages; spells and charms; taboo 128-34\n\n \u00a7 8. _Indirect or \u201cSympathetic\u201d Magic._\u2014Principles\n of Sympathetic Magic\u2014mimesis and participation;\n connection with Animism. Exemplary Magic 134-42\n\n \u00a7 9. _The Dissolution of Magic_ 143-4\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n ANIMISM 145\n\n \u00a7 1. _What is Animism?_\u2014Hyperphysical and psychological\n Animism. Not all savages think that every man has a\n separable soul 145-7\n\n \u00a7 2. _Psychological Animism._\u2014That everything is animated\n not an universal or primitive illusion. Animatism.\n Causes of the treatment of some inanimate things as\n living or sentient 147-53\n\n \u00a7 3. _The Ghost Theory._\u2014Originated chiefly by dreams;\n which are regarded as objective experience 153-7\n\n \u00a7 4. _Extension of the Ghost Theory to\n Animals._\u2014Influence of shadows and reflections.\n Generally, only things individually interesting have\n ghosts. Examples 157-60\n\n \u00a7 5. _Ghosts and Soul-stuff._\u2014Separated spirits need\n bodies and food, that is, soul-stuff. Abstract ideas\n of \u201cspirit,\u201d \u201cforce,\u201d etc. 161-4\n\n \u00a7 6. _Ghosts and Spirits._\u2014Ghosts first imagined, and\n other spirits on their model. Some spirits, formerly\n ghosts, now declared not to have been; others never\n incarnate 164-9\n\n \u00a7 7. _How Ghosts and Spirits are imagined._\u2014Have the same\n attributes, and not at first immaterial; confused\n with the corpse. Various conceptions. Number of souls\n to each body. External souls 169-73\n\n \u00a7 8. _Origin and Destiny of\n Souls._\u2014Reincarnation\u2014Transmigration\u2014Liable to\n second death. Place of the departed. Importance of\n next life resembling the present 174-7\n\n \u00a7 9. _The Treatment of Ghosts._\u2014Results partly from fear,\n partly from affection. Funerary rites\u2014extravagance\n and economy. Simplicity of ghosts. Inconsistent\n behaviour toward them 178-82\n\n \u00a7 10. _Evolution and Dissolution of Animism._\u2014Popular\n and priestly Animism. Different emotions excited by\n ghosts and by gods 182-6\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MAGIC AND ANIMISM 187\n\n \u00a7 1. _The Question of Priority._\u2014Wundt\u2019s theory of\n Animism and of the derivation from it of Magic.\n Reasons for dissenting. Origins of Magic and of\n Animism independent 187-93\n\n \u00a7 2. _Magic and Religion._\u2014Frazer\u2019s hypothesis as to\n the superseding of Magic by Religion. Reasons for\n dissenting. Alternative hypothesis. Caprice of\n spirits the essential distinction of Animism 193-7\n\n \u00a7 3. _Ideas and Practices of Magic adopted by\n Animism._\u2014Invisible force. Power of charms ascribed\n to spirits. Omens first magical, then spiritual\n warnings. Spells become prayers. Magical rites become\n religious ceremonies 197-203\n\n \u00a7 4. _Retrogradation._\u2014Wundt\u2019s theory explains the loss\n in many cases of animistic ideas; Fetiches; Omens;\n Prayers; religious ceremonies 203-7\n\n \u00a7 5. _Spirits know Magic, teach it, and inspire\n Magicians._\u2014Examples of spirits knowing and teaching\n Magic. Inspiration and possession 207-12\n\n \u00a7 6. _Spirits operate by Magic._\u2014Possession; smiting;\n metamorphosis; charms and spells 212-16\n\n \u00a7 7. _Spirits are controlled by Magic._\u2014Biological\n necessity of controlling spirits\u2014by fear\u2014or by\n Magic. Analogy with politics. The higher barbaric\n religions. Magico-legal control of gods. Idea of\n Fate. Free-will and uniformity 216-24\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n OMENS 225\n\n \u00a7 1. _The Prevalence of Omens_ everywhere, in all ages.\n Examples 225-6\n\n \u00a7 2. _Omens and Natural Signs._\u2014Natural signs\n all-important to hunters; and Omens are imaginary\n signs 226-7\n\n \u00a7 3. _Some Signs Conceived of as Magical._\u2014By coincidence\n some events become signs of others by a mysterious\n and infallible tie. Moods of elation or depression\n favour belief in Omens; their validity may depend\n upon acceptance. Antiquity of subjective Omens.\n Whatever causes elation or depression is ominous.\n Coincidence and analogy 227-32\n\n \u00a7 4. _Differentiation of Omens from General Magic._\u2014Omens\n are classed with charms, rites and spells, but\n distinguished by being signs only, not causes. Other\n differences 232-4\n\n \u00a7 5. _Omens Interpreted by Animism._\u2014Omens resemble\n warnings\u2014at first given by friendly animals, then by\n spirits, hence connected with Oracles and Dreams 234-8\n\n \u00a7 6. _Natural and Artificial Omens_\u2014Natural Omens\n not being always at hand, means are discovered\n for obtaining them at any time; _e.\u00a0g._ Dice,\n Hepatomancy, Astrology 238-40\n\n \u00a7 7. _Divination and Oracles._\u2014Diviners and the art of\n Divination. Power of Diviners and Oracles. Ways of\n obtaining oracles and of being inspired derived from\n low savagery 240-45\n\n \u00a7 8. _Apparent Failure of Omens_\u2014ascribed to faulty\n observation or interpretation; frustration by\n spirits, or by superior Magic; or by having been\n symbolically fulfilled 245-7\n\n \u00a7 9. _Apology for Omens._\u2014The Diviner or oracular person\n tries to be well-informed. The Stoics and Divination.\n Omens involved in Fate. Conditional and unconditional\n Omens 247-61\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n THE MIND OF THE WIZARD 252\n\n \u00a7 1. _The Rise and Fall of Wizardry._\u2014At first no\n professionals. Early professionals unpaid; except\n by influence; which enables them to maintain order.\n Animism gives rise to sorcerers and priests. Priests\n suppress sorcery and black Magic, and absorb white\n Magic in religious rites. Societies of wizards 252-7\n\n \u00a7 2. _The Wizard\u2019s Pretensions._\u2014Control of Nature;\n shape-changing and flying; the causing and curing of\n diseases; Divination; control of ghosts and spirits.\n General trust in them 257-9\n\n \u00a7 3. _Characteristics of the Wizard_\u2014Intelligence and\n knowledge; force of will and daring (initiation);\n motives\u2014attraction of mystery, reputation, power;\n distinctive costume and demeanour of a \u201csuperman\u201d;\n jealousy of rivals; histrionic temperament;\n hysterical diathesis. Suggestibility of his clients 259-76\n\n \u00a7 4. _The Wizard and the Sceptic._\u2014Social delusion and\n imposture. Scepticism frequent amongst chiefs and the\n higher social ranks, and also amongst the people,\n because of common sense. Still more difficult for\n Wizards to maintain self-delusion 276-83\n\n \u00a7 5. _The Wizard\u2019s Persuasion._\u2014Honesty and fraud. The\n Wizard by vocation. Fascination of Black Wizardry.\n Artifices professionally necessary seem justified by\n social utility. His belief strengthened by effects\n of natural causes set going by himself or by his\n clients, and by coincidences 284-92\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n TOTEMISM 293\n\n \u00a7 1. _Meaning and Scope of Totemism._\u2014Frazer\u2019s\n definitions. The Clan-Totem, and observances\n connected with it 293-6\n\n \u00a7 2. _Of the Origin of Totemism._\u2014Totemism not universal.\n Totemic names sometimes recent, generally ancient.\n Totemism has not the psychological necessity of Magic\n and Animism. Originates with the names of individuals\n or of groups? 296-9\n\n \u00a7 3. _The Conceptional Hypothesis of Frazer._\u2014Belief in\n Totems derived from the fancies of women as to cause\n of pregnancy. Criticisms 299-304\n\n \u00a7 4. _Lang\u2019s Hypothesis._\u2014Names of animals or plants\n given to groups probably by other groups.\n Circumstances of origin having been forgotten,\n explanatory myths are invented with corresponding\n observances. Comments 304-7\n\n \u00a7 5. _Totemism and Marriage._\u2014Exogamy, Totemism and\n Marriage Classes. Westermarck\u2019s hypothesis as to\n Exogamy 307-11\n\n \u00a7 6. _The Clansman and his Totem_\u2014perhaps believed to\n have the same soul 312-14\n\n \u00a7 7. _Totemism and Magic._\u2014Magical properties of names.\n Transformation. Penalties on breach of observances.\n Control of Totems 314-19\n\n \u00a7 8. _Totemism and Animism._\u2014Totems in Australia\n give warnings; are sometimes invoked in aid; the\n Wollunqua. Fusion of Totem with spirit of hero in\n Fiji; in Polynesia. Propitiation of guardian spirits,\n \u201celder brothers,\u201d species-gods in North and South\n America. Zoolatry in Africa; in Egypt 319-25\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n MAGIC AND SCIENCE 326\n\n \u00a7 1. _Their Common Ground._\u2014Both assume uniformity of\n action. Differentiated in opposite directions from\n common-sense 326-8\n\n \u00a7 2. _The Differentiation._\u2014The Wizard a\n physician\u2014genuine and magical drugs; a surgeon with\n some knowledge of Anatomy\u2014effective remedies and\n the sucking-cure; of Psychology and suggestion; his\n Physiological Psychology. Knowledge of natural signs;\n Natural signs and Omens; Astronomy and Astrology.\n Rain-rites and Meteorology 328-37\n\n \u00a7 3. _Why Magic seems to be the Source of\n Science._\u2014Conducted for ages by the same people, and\n develops faster 337-340\n\n \u00a7 4. _Animism and Science._\u2014Naturally opposed as caprice\n to uniformity; but, indirectly, Animism is the great\n nurse of Science and Art. Animism and Philosophy.\n Conclusion 340-42\n\n INDEX 345\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF MAN AND OF HIS SUPERSTITIONS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MAN FROM THE ANTHROPOIDS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. THE HYPOTHESIS\n\nThat the human species as we now see it, with its several races,\nMongolian, Negro, Mediterranean, etc., represents a Family of the\nPrimates is generally agreed; and there is evidence that the Family\nformerly comprised other species that have become extinct. Our nearest\nsurviving zoological relatives are the Gorilla, Chimpanzee and Orang,\nand (at a further remove) the Siamang and Gibbons; and in spite of the\nfundamental anatomical resemblance between those apes and ourselves,\nthe difference is so great that some explanation of how it came about\nis very desirable.\n\nThe differences between Man and his nearest relatives are innumerable;\nbut taking the chief of them, and assuming that the minor details are\ncorrelated with these, it is the hypothesis of this essay that they\nmay all be traced to the influence of one variation operating amongst\nthe original anthropoid conditions. That variation was the adoption\nof a flesh-diet and the habits of a hunter in order to obtain it.\nWithout the adoption of a flesh-diet there could have been no hunting;\nbut a flesh-diet obtained without hunting (supposing it possible)\ncould have done nothing for the evolution of our stock. The adoption\nof the hunting-life, therefore, is the essential variation upon which\neverything else depends. We need not suppose that a whole ancestral\nspecies varied in this way: it is enough that a few, or even one, of\nthe common anthropoid stock should have done so, and that the variation\nwas advantageous and was inherited.\n\nSuch a variation _must_ have occurred at some time, since Man is\neverywhere more or less carnivorous; the earliest known men were\nhunters; weapons are among the earliest known artefacts. And it\nis not improbable that the change began at the anthropoid level;\nbecause although extant anthropoids are mainly frugivorous, yet they\noccasionally eat birds\u2019-eggs and young birds; the gorilla has been said\nto eat small mammals; and other Primates (cebid\u00e6, macaques and baboons)\neat insects, arachnids, crabs, worms, frogs, lizards, birds; and the\ncrab-eating macaque collects a large portion of its food on the Malay\nlittoral. Why, then, should not one ape have betaken itself to hunting?\n\nWe need not suppose that our ancestors were ever exclusively\ncarnivorous: that is very unlikely. A mixed diet is the rule even\namongst hunting tribes, and everywhere the women collect and consume\nfruits and roots. But if at first nearly omnivorous, our ancestor\n(it is assumed) soon preferred to attack mammals, and advanced at a\nremote date to the killing of the biggest game found in his habitat.\nEverywhere savage hunters do so now: the little Semang kills the tiger,\nrhinoceros, elephant and buffalo; and many thousands of years ago, in\nEurope men slew the reindeer and the mammoth, the horse and the bison,\nthe hy\u00e6na and the cave-bear. It is true they had weapons and snares,\nwhilst the first hunter had only hands and teeth.\n\nThe change from a fruit-eating to a hunting life subserved the great\nutility of opening fresh supplies of food; and, possibly, a failure\nof the normal supply of the old customary food was the direct cause\nof the new habit. If our ape lived near the northern limits of the\ntropical forest, and a fall of temperature there took place, such as to\nreduce (especially in winter) the yield of fruit and other nutritious\nvegetation on which he had subsisted, famine may have driven him\nto attack other animals;[1] whilst more southerly anthropoids, not\nsuffering from the change of climate, continued in their ancient manner\nof life. A large anthropoid (_Dryopithecus_) inhabited Central Europe\nin the Miocene, for his bones have been found; there may have been\nothers; and during that period the climate altered from sub-tropical\nto temperate, with corresponding changes in fauna and flora. Hence it\nformerly occurred to me that perhaps the decisive change in the life of\nour Family happened there and then. It seems, however, that good judges\nput the probable date of the great differentiation much earlier, in the\nOligocene;[2] and since I cannot find that any extensive alteration\nof climate is known to have happened during that period, it seems\nnecessary to fall back upon \u201cspontaneous\u201d variation (as one must in\nmany other cases); that is to say, from causes which are at present\nbeyond our vision, the fateful ape did, in fact, prefer animal food\nso decidedly as to begin a-hunting for it. That being granted, the\nrest of the history was inevitable. The new pursuit was of a nature to\nengross the animal\u2019s whole attention and co-ordinate all his faculties;\nand to maintain and reinforce it, his structure in body and mind may\nreasonably be supposed to have undergone rapid modification by natural\nselection; because those individuals that were in any organ or faculty\nbest adapted to the new life had an advantage, which was inherited and\ngradually intensified.[3]\n\n\n\u00a7 2. WHAT THE HYPOTHESIS EXPLAINS\n\nLet me run rapidly through the chief differences between Man and his\nnearest congeners: some of them are obvious and can be stated very\nbriefly; others I shall return to in the next chapter. We shall see\nthat they all follow naturally from the above hypothesis.\n\n(1) The anthropoids are never found out of the tropical forests of\nAfrica and Malaya (including Borneo and Sumatra). They feed chiefly on\nthe fruits and other highly nutritious vegetable products that, all\nthe year round, are only there obtainable. Although often coming to\nthe ground, especially the chimpanzee and gorilla, they are adapted\nto living in the trees: that is their home. In contrast with their\nhabits, Man is at home on the ground, with unlimited range over the\nwhole planet from beyond the Arctic Circle to Tasmania and Tierra\ndel Fuego; because on the ground (chiefly) he everywhere finds his\nfood in the other animals whom he hunts and slays. This, then, is the\ncondition of his emancipation from the tropical forest. It is, indeed,\nconceivable that a frugivorous animal, originally of the forest, should\nobtain a wider range by taking to a coarser diet of roots and herbage,\nsuch as suffices the Ungulates, browsing or grazing or digging with\ntheir snouts; but this would not have led to the upright gait, or the\nbig brain, or any of the marks that distinguish Man. Not advance but\nretrogression must have followed such a change.\n\n(2) That the earliest men of whose condition of life we have any\nknowledge were hunters agrees with the hypothesis. Any other view\nof Man\u2019s origin must explain how and when he became a hunter. There\nseems to be no reason to put the change of habits (which certainly\noccurred at some time) anywhere nearer than the beginning of our\ndifferentiation. The further we put it back the better it explains\nother modifications.\n\n(3) The erect attitude was reached by the apes in the course of\nadaptation to arboreal life;[4] but the erect gait as the normal mode\nof progression is (if we neglect the gibbons\u2019 imperfect performance)\npeculiar to ourselves; and such a gait was attained because the\nmost successful hunters followed their prey afoot upon the ground.\nThe feeble ineffective shuffle of the anthropoids upon the ground,\nsupporting themselves with their arms where there are no overhanging\nboughs to swing by and help themselves along, could not have served\nthe hunter, especially if he was to leave the forest. We may, indeed,\nsuppose that at first prey was sometimes attacked by leaping upon it\nfrom the branch of a tree, as leopards sometimes do; but the less our\nancestor in his new career trusted to trees the better for him. Such\nsimple strategy could not make him a dominant animal throughout the\nworld; nothing could do this but the gradual attainment of erect gait\nadapted to running down his prey. Hence the numerous modifications of\nstructure necessary to it, whenever from time to time they occurred,\nwere preserved and accumulated by natural selection: namely, the\ncurving of the vertebral column, the balancing of the head upon a\nrelatively slender neck, changes in the joints, bones and muscles of\nthe legs, the lengthening of the leg and the specialisation of the foot\n(in which the heel is developed more than in the gorilla, and the great\ntoe is lengthened and lies parallel with the other toes).\n\n(4) The specialisation of the legs and feet, as it proceeded, made\npossible the specialisation of the hands: being gradually rid of the\ntask of assisting locomotion, whether in trees or on the ground, they\nwere used in grappling with prey, seconded by massive jaws and powerful\ncanine teeth. In course of time they brought cudgels and stones to the\nencounter, and after many ages began to alter such means of offence\ninto weapons that might be called artefacts. These simple beginnings\nprobably occupied an immense time, perhaps more than half of the total\nperiod down to the present. The utility and consequent selection of\nhands had been great throughout; but their final development may be\nreferred to the making and using of weapons fashioned according to a\nmental pattern. Those who had the best hands were selected because they\nmade the best weapons and used them best; but we know from remains of\nseveral pal\u00e6olithic stages of the art of manufacturing implements how\nvery slowly the art improved.\n\n(5) Along with specialisation of the hands went a reduction in\nthe length and massiveness of the arms; and this must have been\ndisadvantageous in directly grappling with prey. But it was necessary\nto the runner in order to lessen the weight and cumbersomeness of\nthe upper part of the body and to improve his balance and agility.\nThe change may also have been beneficial by affording physiological\ncompensation for the lengthening and strengthening of the legs. And as\nsoon as unwrought stones and clubs came into use there was mechanical\ncompensation for the shortening of the arms. The result is an adaptive\nco-ordination of the total structure to the life of a two-footed hunter.\n\n(6) Darwin says: \u201cThe early male forefathers of Man were, as previously\nstated, probably furnished with great canine teeth; but as they\ngradually acquired the habit of using stones, clubs, or other weapons,\nfor fighting with their enemies or rivals, they would use their jaws\nand teeth less and less. In this case the jaws, together with the\nteeth, would become reduced in size, as we may feel almost sure from\nnumerous analogous cases.\u201d\n\n(7) Hence the profile began to approach the orthognathous type; and it\nprogressed further in that direction on account of accompanying changes\nin the skull. The skull became less thick and rough, (_a_) because, as\nthe hands (using weapons) superseded the teeth in fighting, jaws and\nneck grew less massive, and their muscles no longer needed such solid\nattachments; (_b_) because the head was less liable to injury when no\nlonger used as the chief organ in combat. At the same time the skull\nslowly increased in capacity and became vaulted to make room for the\nbrains of an animal, which (as we shall see) acquired much knowledge\n(parietal association area) and lived by the application of its\nknowledge to the co-ordination of increasingly complex and continuous\nactivities (anterior association area).[5]\n\n(8) Monkeys of most species, whether in the New World or in the Old,\nare social, living in bands of from ten to fifty or more, and may\nco-operate occasionally in mutual defence or in keeping watch. Baboons,\nindeed, are seen in herds of several hundreds; and they are credibly\nreported to co-operate in raiding plantations, and in defending\nthemselves against leopards, other baboons and even human hunters.[6]\nGibbons, again, are social, going in bands to the number of fifty. But\nthe large anthropoids live only in families\u2014the male orang being even\nof a somewhat solitary habit; three or four families of chimpanzees may\nfor a time associate together. Man, however, is everywhere\u2014with a few\ndoubtful exceptions, probably degenerate\u2014both social and co-operative;\nand the purpose of his co-operation at the level of the Australian\nor the Semang is instructive. It is not, as we might suppose, in\nindustry, but in hunting, war, or tribal ceremonies that tribesmen work\ntogether\u2014the last no doubt of comparatively recent origin: so that a\nfew thousand years ago there was no co-operation except hunting and war\n(which come to the same thing).\n\nThat the large anthropoids are neither gregarious nor co-operative\nfollows from their having no task in which co-operation would be\nuseful, no common purpose: they are able alone to defend themselves\nand their families; and when families range apart through the woods\ntheir food is in better supply. But the ancestor of Man found an object\nfor association and co-operation in the chase. Spencer, indeed, says\nthat a large carnivore, capable of killing its own prey, profits by\nbeing solitary; and this may be true where game is scarce: in the\nOligocene and Miocene periods game was not scarce. Moreover, when our\nape first pursued game, especially big game (not being by ancient\nadaptation in structure and instinct a carnivore), he may have been,\nand probably was, incapable of killing enough prey single-handed; and,\nif so, he will have profited by becoming both social and co-operative\nas a hunter, like the wolves and dogs\u2014in short, a sort of wolf-ape\n(_Lycopithecus_). The pack was a means of increasing the supply of food\nper unit; and gregariousness increased by natural selection up to the\nlimit set by utility. Hence (as will be shown at length in the next\nchapter) Man is in character more like a dog or a wolf than he is like\nany other animal.\n\n(9) Some development of the rudiments of speech may be confidently\ntraced to social co-operation. The gibbon, most social, is also\nthe most vocal of anthropoids; but having no common task in which\nunited action is necessary, he uses his remarkable power of voice\n(apparently) merely to express his feelings and to keep the troop\ntogether. The chimpanzee and the gorilla enjoy probably a close and\naffectionate family life, but one that makes little or no demand\nfor concerted effort. Hence their vocalisation is very rudimentary.\nAccording to R.\u00a0L. Garner, it is true speech: a chimpanzee (he says)\nknows the meaning of the sounds he makes, and intends to convey it\nto some definite individual at whom he looks. But he has at command\nvery few sounds, and those mainly expressive of natural wants.[7] If\nit be urged that anthropoids do not talk because their lower jaw and\ntongue have not the special adaptation to speech that is found in\nMan, it should be considered (_a_) that if such structure had been\nuseful to them it would have been acquired, as at some time it must\nhave been by Man himself; and (_b_) that even without any change they\nmight have jabbered well enough to convey a good many discriminated,\nobjective meanings if they had needed to do so: for Man must have\nbegun in that way; he cannot have waited for the development of\nphysical structure before trying to talk. Sufficient intelligence is\nnot wanting to chimpanzees; for in captivity they learn to understand\na good deal that is said to them. What they wanted was a sufficient\nmotive for persistently trying to communicate, such that those who\nmade any progress in the art had a living advantage over others. Man\nhad such a motive; because co-operation was necessary to him, not (as\nwe have seen) in industry, but in hunting. In hunting, in planning\nand directing the hunt, speech is plainly useful; and it is better\nthan gesture, which probably preceded, and generally accompanied it;\nbecause, as speech became independent of gesture, it could go on\nwhilst the hands and body were otherwise employed, or where comrades\ncould not see one another\u2014transferring, by a very profitable division\nof labour, the whole business of expression to organs not otherwise\nneeded. It may not be much more than very simple beginnings of\narticulate speech that can be traced to early co-operative hunting;\nbut in the beginning lies the whole difficulty. And the situation was\nparticularly favourable to the beginning of language by onomatop\u0153ia,\nimitating the characteristic noises of different animals and of the\nweapons and actions employed in pursuing and slaying them.\n\n(10) The intelligence and extensive knowledge (compared with\nanthropoids) that distinguish Man in his lowest known condition are\nclearly accounted for by his adoption of the hunting life. Already\n(as we may assume) the most intelligent of living animals, with great\nknowledge of the forest, he had everything to learn about the world\nbeyond the forest as soon as he ventured into it, and everything to\nlearn about the art of hunting. Depending chiefly upon sight and\nhearing, he had to learn by observation, and to remember, and to apply\nall and more than all that the carnivore knows and does instinctively,\nor learns by following its mother. He must have learned to discriminate\nall sorts of animals, many of them new in a strange country; their\nreactions to himself, manner of flight, or of attack, or defence; the\nspoor of each and its noises; its habits and haunts, where it reposed\nor went to drink, where to set snares or lie in wait for it. Advancing\nto the use of weapons, he must have adapted them to his prey; he must\nhave discovered the best materials\u2014wood, or stone, or bone\u2014for making\nweapons, the best materials for snares, and where to find such things.\nHe must have fixed in his mind this series: game, weapons, the making\nof them, materials, where found; and must have learned to attend to\nthe items of the series in the necessary order without impatience or\nconfusion: a task far beyond the power of any other animal.\n\nFurther, the hunting life supplied a stimulus that had formerly been\nwanting to our ape. There is some difficulty in comprehending why\nthe anthropoid should be as intelligent as he is; and, similarly, it\nseemed to Wallace that the savage has intelligence above his needs\u2014\u201cin\nhis large and well-developed brain he possesses an organ quite\ndisproportionate to his actual requirements.\u201d[8] This illusion results\nfrom our not reflecting that the first task of increasing intelligence\nis to deal appropriately with details in greater and greater number\nand variety, and that the details of their life, with both savage and\nanthropoid, are just what we cannot appreciate. Still, the anthropoid\nseems to have a rather lazy time of it: especially, he seems to have\nhardly any occasion for following out a purpose needing some time for\nits accomplishment. This powerful stimulus the hunting life applies\nto carnivores, above all to dogs and wolves; and in the same way it\naffected our ape: compelling him to combine many activities for a\nconsiderable period of time, along with his fellows, and direct them\nto one end in the actual hunting, and (later) to prosecute still other\nactivities for a longer period in preparing weapons and snares to make\nthe hunting more effective. Add to these considerations the development\nof gesture and rudiments of speech, exacting intelligence for their\nacquisition and increasing intelligence by their attainment, and the\nsuperiority of the lowest savage to an anthropoid is sufficiently\nexplained. Severe must have been the selection of those that were\ncapable of such progress, and correspondingly rapid the advance and\ndifferentiation of the species.\n\n(11) Using stones as weapons, and finding that broken stones do most\ndamage, and breaking them for that purpose, the progressive hunter\nnecessarily makes some sparks fly; and if these fall amongst dry\nleaves or grass, he may light a fire. \u201cIn making flint implements\nsparks would be produced; in polishing them it would not fail to be\nobserved that they became hot; and in this way it is easy to see how\nthe two methods of making fire may have originated.\u201d[9] But if the\nproduction of fire by friction had been suggested by the polishing of\nflints, it could hardly have been discovered before the neolithic\nstage; whereas hearths are known of much earlier date. And it may have\nhappened earlier whilst some one was polishing an arrow or a spear\nwith another piece of wood: a supposition which dispenses with the\nlong inference from a warm flint to a flaming stick. It is a curious\nfact that to this day in Australia fire is sometimes made by rubbing\na spear-thrower upon a shield;[10] but I lay no stress upon this, as\nif such a practice must be traditionary from the earliest discovery\nof the method. Either in the chipping of flints or in the polishing\nof spears it is far easier, and a more probable way, to learn the art\nof making fire than by observing that dried boughs or bamboos driven\ntogether by the wind sometimes catch fire; because those processes\ninclude the very actions which the art employs: imitation of nature is\nnot called for. It is true that the natives of Nukufetan in the South\nSeas explain the discovery of fire by their having seen smoke arise\nfrom two crossed branches of a tree shaken in the wind;[11] but this,\nprobably, is merely the speculation of some Polynesian philosopher.\nVolcanoes, too, have been pointed out as a possible source of fire;\nand, in the myth, Demeter is said to have lit her torches at the crater\nof \u00c6tna\u2014an action fit for a goddess. But were such an origin of fire\nconceivable with savages, it would not show how they came to make it\nthemselves. Fire at first must have excited terror. Until uses were\nknown for fire no one could have ventured to fetch it from a volcano,\nnor to make it by imitating the friction of boughs in the wind. Fires\nwere accidentally lit by man again and again, and much damage done,\nbefore he could learn (_a_) the connection of events, (_b_) the uses\nof fire, (_c_) purposely to produce it, (_d_) how to control it. The\nsecond and fourth of these lessons are much more difficult than the\nmere making of fire; they are essential, yet generally overlooked.\nIt seems necessary to suppose a series of accidents at each step, in\norder to show the effects of fire in hardening wood, hollowing wood,\ncooking game, baking and (later) glazing clay, and so forth. Perhaps\na prairie-fire disclosed the advantages of cooking game, and many a\nprairie was afterwards burnt to that end before a more economical plan\nwas discovered. As to the effect of fire on clay, Lord Avebury observes\nthat clay-vessels may have been invented by (1) plastering gourds or\ncoco-nuts with clay to resist the fire when boiling water in them; (2)\nobserving the effect of fire on the clay; (3) leaving out the vegetable\npart.[12] This must have been a comparatively recent discovery; though\nthere is some evidence of pottery having been made by pal\u00e6olithic man.\nIt is impossible to say when fire was discovered; but it was certainly\nknown to the Mousterian culture\u2014say, 50,000 years ago: probably very\nmuch earlier; and it was made by hunters.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. MINOR AND SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES\n\n(1) The extensive adoption by Man of a flesh-diet many hundreds\nof thousands of years ago might be expected to have shortened his\nalimentary canal in comparison with that of the anthropoids; but not\nmuch evidence of it is obtainable. Topinard, giving a proportionate\nestimate, says that in Man it is about six times the length of the\nbody, in the gibbon about eight times. Dr. Arthur Keith, in a private\ncommunication with which he has favoured me, says that the adult\nchimpanzee\u2019s intestine is slightly longer than the adult man\u2019s, but\nthat the measurements are for certain reasons unsatisfactory, and that\nthere have not been enough measurements of adult chimpanzees. We must\nremember that, on the one hand, the chimpanzee is not exclusively\nfrugivorous, and that, on the other hand, it is not likely that Man has\nbeen at any time exclusively carnivorous; though the return of large\npopulations to a vegetarian diet by means of agriculture is recent.\n\n(2) Man has lost the restraint of seasonal marriage, common to the\nanthropoids with other animals, as determined by food-supply and\nother conditions of infantile welfare; though, according to Prof.\nWestermarck, traces of it may still be found in a few tribes.[13]\nThat our domestic carnivores have also lost this wholesome restraint\non passion and population points, probably, to some condition of a\nsteadier food-supply as determining or permitting the change amongst\nourselves. No growth of prudence, however, or habit of laying up stores\ncan explain the steadier supply of food; since the lower savages have\nno prudence and no stores. On the whole, the change may be attributed\n(_a_) to an omnivorous habit being more steadily gratified than one\nentirely frugivorous or carnivorous; (_b_) to our ancestors having\nwandered in quest of game from country to country in which the seasons\nvaried, so that the original correspondence of birth-time with\nfavourable conditions of welfare was thrown out. There may also have\nbeen causes that kept down the normal numbers of the pack, so as to\nbe equivalent, in scarce seasons, to more abundant food: the hunter\u2019s\nlife, whilst securing a richer normal diet, involved many destructive\nincidents. And this (by the way) was favourable to rapid selection\nand adaptation; though if the destruction had been great enough to\ncounterbalance the advantages of animal food, it must have frustrated\nthe whole experiment.\n\n(3) There is one characteristic difference of Man from the anthropoids\nwhich his hunting habits do not clearly explain\u2014his relatively naked\nskin. Darwin attributed this condition to sexual selection.[14] He\nargued that, on the one hand, so far as Man has had the power of\nchoice, women have been chosen for their beauty; and that, on the other\nhand, women have had more power of selection, even in the savage state,\nthan is usually supposed, and \u201cwould generally choose not merely the\nhandsomest men, according to their standard of taste, but those who\nwere at the same time best able to defend and support them.\u201d Hence,\nif a partial loss of hair was esteemed ornamental by our ape-like\nprogenitors, sexual selection, operating age after age, might result in\nrelative nakedness. \u201cThe faces of several species of monkey and large\nsurfaces at the posterior end of the body have been denuded of hair;\nand this we may safely attribute to sexual selection.\u201d The beard of\nthe male, and the great length of the hair of the head in some races,\nespecially seem due to this cause. The greater hairiness of Europeans,\ncompared with other races, may be a case of reversion to remote\nancestral conditions. But as all races are nearly naked, the common\ncharacter was probably acquired before the several races had diverged\nfrom the common stock.\n\nThe species of monkey that have lost the hair on various parts of their\nbodies, and the beard of males (together with the longer head-hair of\nwomen) of our own race are cases that strongly support the ascription\nof such secondary sexual characters to sexual selection. Yet, going\nback to the time before the division of modern Man into races (say,\n600,000 years), it seems incredible that any women then went unmarried,\nhair or no hair, if they were healthy (and the unhealthy soon ceased\nto exist); or that any man went unmarried, if he could do his share\nin the hunting-field (and, if not, he also soon ceased to exist). No\nfacts observed amongst extant savages\u2014the choice exerted by women, or\nthe polygamy of chiefs\u2014throw much light upon that ancient state of\naffairs. There were then no chiefs: the hunt-leader of pack or clan\nhad no authority but his personal prowess, no tradition of ancestry or\nreligion, nor probably the prestige of magic, to give him command of\nwomen. Unless, at that time, relative nakedness was strongly correlated\nwith personal prowess in the male and efficiency in the female, it is\ndifficult to understand how it can have been preserved and increased\nby sexual selection. Forgive me for adding an unkind remark: if the\nselection of women for their beauty has gone on for hundreds of\nthousands of years, and has had a cumulative effect upon the race,\nis not the result disappointing? Go into the street and look. That\n\u201cwomen have become more beautiful, according to the general opinion,\nthan men,\u201d is not an objective, truly \u00e6sthetic judgment, but one\ndetermined by causes of which \u201cgeneral opinion\u201d is falsely unconscious.\nSchopenhauer[15] thought that men are better looking than women; and of\naverage specimens this seems to be true; though, to be sure, he was a\nsort of misogynist.\n\nAnother explanation of Man\u2019s nakedness was suggested by Thomas Belt,\nbased on the parallel case of certain races of naked dogs, namely,\nthat he is the better able to free himself from parasites.[16] Darwin\nmentions this hypothesis and, in a footnote, cites in its favour \u201ca\npractice with the Australians, when the vermin get troublesome, to\nsinge themselves\u201d; but he says, in the text, \u201cwhether this evil is of\nsufficient magnitude to have led to the denudation of the body through\nnatural selection, may be doubted, since none of the many quadrupeds\ninhabiting the tropics have, as far as I know, acquired any specialised\nmeans of relief.\u201d[17] It appears, too, that against the probability\nof such a result must be set the actual disadvantage of nakedness,\nas insisted upon by Wallace, who says that savages feel the want of\nprotection and try to cover their backs and shoulders.[18] Still, the\ndisadvantage implied in occasionally feeling the want of protection\nwould not prevent the loss of hair, if this would deliver the race\nfrom serious dangers from vermin; and the force of the argument from\nthe condition of other tropical quadrupeds depends, at least in some\nmeasure, upon whether or not there is something peculiar in the case of\nnaked dogs and men.\n\nBelt argues that the naked dogs with dark, shining skins, found in\nCentral America and also in Peru,[19] and which were found there at\nthe Spanish conquest, have probably acquired their peculiar condition\nby natural selection, because they are despised by the natives, and no\ncare is taken of their breeding, and yet they do not interbreed with\nthe common hairy varieties, as usually happens with artificial stocks.\nThe advantage of a naked skin being the greater freedom it gives from\nticks, lice and other vermin, the advantage is especially great for a\ndomestic animal living in the huts of savages, where, because they are\ninhabited year after year, vermin are extraordinarily abundant. The\nnaked dog, then, differs from tropical quadrupeds which are adapted\nfrom a dateless antiquity to such vermin as infest them, by having been\nthrown by human companionship amongst not only strange vermin, but\nvermin in extraordinarily dense aggregation. Belt would have guarded a\nweak point in his case, had he explained why naked races of dogs are so\nscarce. Hairy races may have been more recently domesticated, or bred\nfor their hairiness, or less addicted to an indoor life.\n\nThe case of our own forefather also differs somewhat from that of\nother tropical mammalia; because, by hypothesis, he underwent pretty\nrapidly such an extraordinary change of life; which may have brought\nhim into circumstances where vermin, formerly negligible, became highly\ninjurious. \u201cMonkeys,\u201d as Belt observes, \u201cchange their sleeping-places\nalmost daily\u201d; the Orang is said to construct a fresh nest every\nnight; this is also reported of the Gorilla. Not improbably, then,\ndaily change of locality was the practice of the original anthropoid\nstock, whence we also are descended: thereby avoiding the accumulation\nof vermin. Did the hunting life introduce a new habit? In the old\nfrugivorous forest life, the custom was to get up into some tree for\nthe night, and within a short radius there were hundreds equally\nsuitable; and, therefore, there was nothing to check the natural\npreference for a fresh one. When, however, the hunting pack began to\nmake its lair on the ground, there was no such wide choice amongst\ncaves, rock-shelters, or thickets: one might be better than any\nother for miles around. If, then, they settled down there as in a\ncommon lair, the circumstances were, for the time, favourable to the\nmultiplication of vermin, and therefore to nakedness of skin, in order\nthe more easily to be rid of them. Perhaps, then, this difference of\nMan from the anthropoids may be referred to one common cause with all\nthe others\u2014the hunting life. There, too, the defilement of blood made\nfur inconvenient to animals not apt to cleanse themselves, like those\nin the true carnivorous heredity and tradition.\n\nWhen we consider how injurious some insects are to vertebrate life,\nbeing suspected of having caused in some cases the extinction of\nspecies, can it be said that facility in ridding oneself of such vermin\nas lice and ticks is an inadequate cause of human nakedness, or not one\nthat might outweigh the drawbacks of cold and wet? It is not, however,\nincompatible with the action of sexual selection, tending to the same\nresult; nor, again, with the preferential destruction of hairy children\nif ever infanticide was practised. A further possible ground of\ndeliberate selection may have been the mere ambition of differing from\nother animals; for a tribe on the Upper Amazons is reported to depilate\nto distinguish themselves from the monkeys, and the wish to be superior\nto other animals led a tribe in Queensland to pretend that they, unlike\nkangaroos, etc., have no fathers according to the flesh.[20] Admitting\nthat this last motive can hardly have been primitive, still, our\nnakedness may be a resultant of several causes.\n\n(4) Cannibalism, where it has been found amongst extant peoples, or\nis known to have been formerly practised, was often justified by\ncertain magical or animistic ideas, but sometimes frankly by dietetic\ntaste, or by the satisfaction of revenge or of emphatic triumph\nover an enemy. Was it an ancient and perhaps general custom? The\nexcavations at Krapina in Croatia disclosed along with remains of the\nNeanderthal species, which seems to have had a habitation there, those\nof rhinoceros and cave-bear and of some other kind of Man; and \u201csome\nof the human bones had been apparently split open: on that slender\nbasis the Krapina men have been suspected of cannibalism.\u201d[21] If the\nsuspicion is valid, the practice existed (say) 50,000 years ago in one\nspecies of Man; and perhaps much earlier, if we consider how it was\nmerely an extension of the practice of devouring game to include the\nslain members of a hostile pack; for as primitive Man, or Lycopithecus,\nhis pre-human forebear, no doubt regarded other animals as upon the\nsame level as himself, so he will have regarded human enemies as upon\nthe same footing with other animals. That true carnivores are not\ngenerally cannibals may be put down to their more ancient and perfect\nadaptation to a predatory life. For them persistent cannibalism would\nhave been too destructive, and for us it belongs to the experimental\nstage of history; though, of course, even in recent times, under stress\nof famine, reversion to the practice is not unknown to civilised men.\n\n(5) The extraordinary variability of modern Man (considered as one\nspecies) in stature, shape of skull, size and power of brain, colour,\nhairiness, quality of hair, and other characters, physical and mental,\nmay be referred chiefly to his having become adapted to various local\nconditions upon settling here or there for long periods of time after\nwandering over the world in quest of game. The settling of offshoots\nof the original stock in certain regions long enough for them to\nundergo adaptation to local circumstances is the simplest explanation\nof existing races: the Negro adapted to equatorial Africa; the Asiatic\nstock (\u201cMongolian\u201d) to Central Asia; the Mediterranean race to the\nneighbourhood of the sea after which it is named. As to the Nordic\nsub-race (of the Mediterranean, we may suppose), with its fair hair\nand skin, it has the appearance of an Arctic beast of prey, like the\nPolar bear. The snow-leopard of the Himalaya is found at a midway\nstage of such adaptation. Some geologists and zoologists now believe\nthat, during the Glacial Period, the climate of Northern Europe was\nnot everywhere such as necessarily to destroy the local fauna and\nflora, and in that case our ancestors may for ages have maintained\nthemselves there; or, if that was impossible (as the absence of\npal\u00e6olithic remains in Scandinavia seems to indicate), they may have\nroamed for many ages along the borders of glaciation, perhaps as far\nas the Pacific Coast. Chinese annals refer to fair tribes in Eastern\nSiberia 200 years before the Christian era;[22] and it seems requisite\nto imagine some extensive reservoir of mankind in order to explain the\norigin of the vast hordes which in prehistoric as in historical times\nagain and again invaded Europe\u2014hordes\n\n \u201cwhich the populous North\n Poured ever from her frozen loins, to pass\n Rhene or the Danau; when her barbarous sons\n Came like a deluge on the South, and spread\n Beneath Gibraltar to the Libyan sands.\u201d\n\nThat the race was formerly fairer than it is now may be inferred from\nthe whiteness of its children\u2019s hair: the trait has outlived its\nutility. The occurrence of a fair complexion in some mountain tribes,\nin the Alps, _e.\u00a0g._, has occasioned the conjecture that it may be due\nin some way to mountainous conditions,[23] of which snow might be one;\nbut, if we suppose that the Nordic race extended during the Glacial\nPeriod into Western Europe (having already acquired its distinctive\ncharacters), a fair complexion in the Alps may be understood by\nsupposing that, whilst the greater number of them followed the\nice-sheet back to the north-east, some followed it southward up into\nthe mountains\u2014if the complexion is really ancient there.\n\nTwo objections to this hypothesis will occur to every one: (i) Why are\nnot the Esquimo fair? Because, I suppose, they are much more recent\nimmigrants into the Arctic regions, and perhaps were fully clothed when\nthey arrived there. (ii) Could the Nordic people have existed in such\ncircumstances unclothed? Whether this was possible physiologists must\njudge. We see the Fuegians maintain themselves, practically naked,\nunder very inclement conditions. And it is not necessary to assume that\nthe Nordic hunters were entirely naked; since the correlation between\nthe hair, eyes and all parts of the skin is such that, if the whitening\nof any part (say the hair) was sufficiently advantageous to determine\nnatural selection, the remainder of the body would be similarly\naffected. And, no doubt, the Mediterranean race was always whitish.\n\nThe Amerinds seem to have been derived chiefly from the Asiatic race.\nPygmies and Australians may represent separate and still older stocks.\nBut, as a result of migrations and conquests, most peoples are of mixed\ndescent; and hence (i) individuals in the same locality sometimes\nvary greatly, because they inherit the blood of different strains in\ndifferent proportions; and (ii) classification is difficult, so that\nwhilst some observers are content to find half a dozen races, Deniker\nenumerates twenty-nine.\n\nBesides general racial differences, there exist within each race and\nwithin each national group further differences between individuals in\ntheir physical, and still more in their mental, stature and ability. As\nit was necessary that Man should vary greatly in undergoing adaptation\nto the hunting life (as well as to different local environments), he\nwas in an organic condition favourable to further variation.[24] And\nthis has been utilised in his adaptation to a certain special condition\nof his gregariousness, namely, life in the hunting-pack; for this\nrequires a difference of personality between leaders and followers,\nfirst in the chase and later in war. A good democrat may think it would\nhave been a better plan to make all men equal from the first; and I\nwould it had been so; for then the head of the race would not have had\nto drag along such an altogether disproportionate tail: a tail so huge\nand unwieldy that one may doubt whether it can ever be extricated from\nthe morass of barbarism. But in the early days of gregariousness, a\npack could not have held together, or have hunted efficiently, if all\nhad been equal and each had exercised the right of private judgment.\nSo in successful packs one led and the rest followed; as they still\ndo, and will continue to do, of whatever kind may be the leader. And\nof all structures that make up a human being the most variable is the\nbrain: the differences between men in stature and physique are trifling\ncompared with those in mental power. Whatever feat of strength your\nSamson can perform, half a dozen ordinary men can also accomplish; but\nin every generation tasks are carried out by intellectual athletes,\ntoward which all the ordinary men in the world, uniting their efforts,\ncould do nothing\u2014absolutely nothing.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. PREY AND COMPETITORS\n\nIf we suppose the differentiation of the _Hominid\u00e6_ from the\n_Anthropoidea_ to have begun in the Upper Oligocene, and that the\ndecisive change was initiated by some ape that adopted the life of a\nhunter, it is interesting to consider what the world was like in which\nhe lived, what sort of animals surrounded him, what animals probably\nbecame his prey, and what were his rivals in the chase.[25]\n\nThe surface of the planet was less mountainous than at present; in\nEurope the Pyrenees had risen, but the Alps were only beginning to\nrise; and in Asia the Himalayas began to dominate the world only in\nthe middle of the next epoch, the Miocene. The distribution of land\nand water, too, was very different in the Oligocene from that which\nwe now see: Europe was divided from Asia by a broad gulf stretching\nfrom the Indian Ocean to the Arctic Circle, and an arm of this gulf\ntoward the west submerged a great part of Central Europe; Asia was\nbroadly connected with North America, where now the sea penetrates\nbetween Siberia and Alaska; Africa had no connection with either\nEurope or Asia; North and South America were separated\u2014perhaps at\nPanama. In the Miocene, Europe, Asia and Africa became united. These\nphysiographic changes may have affected climate; for during the Eocene\ntropical conditions prevailed far to the north, and coal-beds were laid\ndown in Alaska; but from the Oligocene onwards there was a gradual\nfall of temperature, slow at first, but ending (for the present) in\nthe cataclysms of the Glacial Period. There was also a decrease in\nsome regions of atmospheric moisture, which determines the density of\nvegetation. In its general character the vegetation was similar to\nthat which now prevails in tropical, subtropical and temperate regions\nof the world. The species of plants now existing had not yet arrived;\nbut of the same genera and families as those we see, conifers, palms\nand dicotyledonous flowering plants crowded the forests and overhung\nthe rivers. The forests were more extensive and continuous than ours\noutside the tropics; for by degrees browsing animals, feeding down\nthe young trees, check the renovation of forests and clear open\nspaces, where grasses grow; changes of temperature limit the northern\nor southern extension of certain kinds of plants, and a failure of\nhumidity starves all the larger kinds; converting, at successive\nstages, forest into steppe and steppe into desert.\n\nAnimals, especially mammalia, with which chiefly we are concerned,\nwere, at the close of the Oligocene, very different from any that now\nroam the lands; all the species, most genera, many families and some\nwhole orders have since disappeared. But there were plenty to eat and a\ngood many to dread. Until we know the neighbourhood in which our ape\u2019s\nadventures began, nothing precise can be said of his circumstances.\nProbably it was somewhere in the Old World, and probably it was in\nAsia. Unfortunately, we know nothing of the zoological antiquities of\nAsia until the early Miocene, and even then a very small selection\nof what must have existed, because geologists have hitherto explored\na very small part of the continent\u2014a few beds in north-western and\nnorthern India and in Burmah. But there is so much evidence of the\nmigrations of animals in successive ages of the Tertiary Period, that\nany remains from the Oligocene and Miocene will help us to understand\nwhat sort of neighbours our remote ancestors had to live amongst.\n\nFor prey there was great variety of birds and reptiles (everywhere\neaten by savages) and fishes; but we are most concerned with the\nmammalia, which he may be supposed to have pursued afoot. Of these\nthe most important are the hoofed animals, which fall into two great\ngroups, perhaps not closely connected\u2014the odd-toed (Perissodactyls)\nand the even-toed (Artiodactyls). During the Oligocene there lived in\nEurope, or in North America, or in both\u2014and, therefore, probably in\nAsia\u2014numbers of the odd-toed group: tapirs; rhinoceroses of several\nspecies, some without horns, some with, some amphibious (Amynodonts),\nall smaller than their modern representatives; chalicotheres, strange\nbeasts something like horses, but instead of hoofs they had claws\non their toes\u2014perhaps survived in China into the Pleistocene;\nsmall predecessors of the horse with three toes on each foot;\ntitanotheres, hugest animals of their age, extinct in the middle of\nit\u2014something like the rhinoceros and nearly as big as an elephant\n(_Brontotherium_). Of the even-toed group, pig-like animals abounded,\nand some true pigs appeared; entelodonts, or giant-pigs, were common;\nanthracotheres, somewhat pig-like in size and shape; ancestral camels\nabout the size of sheep were to be had in North America; oreodonts,\nunfinished-looking creatures of many species; primitive deer and other\nruminants, small in size and not having yet grown any horns. In Europe,\nduring the Upper Oligocene, c\u0153notheres, small and graceful animals,\nlived in large herds around the lakes. There were also primitive\nproboscidia about half the size of modern elephants; many insectivores;\nand, amongst rodents, beavers and tailless hares. Generally, animals\nof this age that have left descendants were smaller than their modern\nrepresentatives; and notably their brains were smaller.\n\nIn the Lower and Middle Miocene there appeared also horned cervuline\ndeer, chevrotaines, and horned antelopes; dinotheres and mastodons,\nprobably from Africa; primitive hedgehogs, moles and shrews; and in the\nUpper Miocene, hipparion, true hares, several varieties of hornless\ngiraffe, true deer, and ancestral sheep. True horses and cattle are\nfirst known from Pliocene beds; but it is needless to follow the story\nfurther: the fauna becomes more and more modern in its character, and\nuncouth forms die out.\n\nAnthropoids are first met with in the Miocene and in Europe:\npliopithecus, allied to the gibbons, in the Lower; and dryopithecus,\nrelated to the chimpanzee, in the Middle Miocene; but they are believed\nto have come from Asia. There, in Pliocene beds of the Siwaliks\n(southern foot-hills of the Himalayas), occur the orang and chimpanzee,\nbesides macaques, langurs and baboons. Since the orang is now found\nonly in Borneo and Sumatra, and the chimpanzee only in Africa,\nsouthern Asia seems to have been the centre from which the anthropoids\ndispersed; and this seems to be the chief positive ground for believing\nthat the human stock began to be differentiated in that region. Since,\nagain, by the Middle Miocene a chimpanzee form had already migrated\ninto Europe, it may be assumed that the orang was already distinct from\nit (and perhaps had spread eastward): the differentiation of these\ngenera must, therefore, have happened earlier; and, therefore, also the\ndifferentiation of the human stock; so that this event cannot be put\nlater than some time in the Oligocene.\n\nHow big was Lycopithecus to begin with? The answer to this question\nmust affect our view of his relations both to prey and to enemies.\nInasmuch as the three extant anthropoids and Man are all of about the\nsame size, there is a presumption that their common ancestor was in\nstature superior to the gibbons and to the largest monkeys\u2014in fact,\na \u201cgiant\u201d ape (to borrow a term from Dr. Keith). Dryopithecus \u201cwas\nsmaller than the chimpanzee, but much larger than the gibbon.\u201d[26]\nAwaiting further evidence of fossils, which is much to be desired,\nit is probable, on the whole, that Lycopithecus weighed less on the\naverage than modern man, but more than the wolf.\n\nAs to competitors and aggressive enemies, there were snakes and\ncrocodiles; but, confining our attention to carnivorous mammals, the\ntime seems to have been favourable to the enterprise of a new hunter.\nBy the middle of the Oligocene, the ancient Creodonts (primitive\nflesh-eaters which had flourished in the Eocene) were nearly extinct,\nrepresented in the deposits by their last surviving family, the\nHy\u0153nodonts. Ancestors of the modern carnivores, such as may be called\nby anticipation dogs and cats, derived (according to Prof. Scott) from\nthe Creodont Family of the Miacid\u00e6, were becoming numerous, but for the\nmost part were still of small size. Apparently, the primitive dogs and\ntheir allies must, for some time, have been more formidable adversaries\nthan the primitive cats, especially if we suppose them to have already\nbegun to hunt in pack; and this is not improbable, both on account of\ntheir structure and because several distinct varieties and even genera,\nnow extant, have that habit\u2014such as wolf, jackal, dingo, dhole, Cape\nhunting-dog, etc. In the Upper Oligocene of North America, occurs a\ndog as big as a large modern wolf, and in Europe the bear-like dog,\nAmphicyon, of about the same size, but said to have been clumsy and\nslow-moving. There were several other dog-like species; they continue\nin the Miocene, and some of them increase in bulk; but true modern dogs\nor wolves (_Canis_) do not appear before the Pliocene. Then, too, first\noccur true bears (_Ursus_); hy\u00e6nas in the Upper Miocene. \u201cCats\u201d belong\nto two sub-families: (i) the true felines, our modern species and\ntheir ancestors; and (ii) the mach\u00e6rodonts, or sabre-toothed cats. The\nlatter first appear in North America in the Lower Oligocene; the former\nin Europe in the Middle Oligocene. The sabre-tooths are so called from\ntheir thin, curved upper canines; which were so long (3 to 6 inches)\nthat it is not easy to understand how they could open their mouths\nwide enough to bite with them. That they were effective in some way\nis proved by the fact that mach\u00e6rodonts, first appearing in the Lower\nOligocene, increased in numbers and diversity of species for ages, and\nsome of them in bulk. In North America, in the Upper Oligocene, one\nspecies was as large as a jaguar, and some of the biggest and most\nterrifying were contemporary with Man, and only became extinct in the\nPleistocene. Their limbs were relatively shorter and thicker than those\nof the _Felin\u00e6_. These, the true cats, at first progressed more slowly\nthan the _Mach\u00e6rodontid\u00e6_; but in the Siwalik deposits (Pliocene)\nthere occur, along with mach\u00e6rodonts, forms resembling the leopard\nand the lynx, with others as large as tigers. The largest of all this\ngroup seems to have been the cave-lion, perhaps a large variety of\nthe common African lion, which also lived with Man in Europe in the\nPleistocene. These were serious competitors in the hunting-life of\nLycopithecus and of primitive Man; and the effect of such competition\nin exterminating inferior forms is shown by the fate of the carnivorous\nmarsupials of South America (allied to _Thylacinus_), which were the\npredatory fauna of that region, until in the Pliocene, North and South\nAmerica having become united by continuous land, cats and dogs came\nin from the northern continent and put an end to them; and also by\nthe fate of the creodonts, which in the Oligocene seem everywhere to\nhave been exterminated by the new carnivores. In both cases the beaten\ncompetitors were very inferior in the size and complexity of their\nbrains; and if Man has succeeded in the struggle for life against the\nsame foes, in spite of his inferior bodily adaptation, it is probably\ndue to his very superior brains. This may also be the reason why\nmodern Man (_Homo sapiens!_), wandering everywhere over the world,\nhas everywhere exterminated such experiments in human nature as\nPithecanthropus, Eoanthropus, and Neanderthalensis; as others are soon\nto follow them into the Hades of extinct species.\n\nThese few pages give a ridiculously faint sketch of the animal world\namidst which our remote ancestors began their career. But it may\nserve to indicate that there was always plenty to eat if you could\nkill it, and plenty of rivals who wanted their share. After the\ndisappearance of the dinosaurs at the close of the Cretaceous period,\nthe mammalia, already numerous, developed rapidly, and spread in ever\nmultiplying numbers and diverging shapes over the whole area of the\nland. We may take it that from the Middle Eocene (at least) onwards\nthe earth has always been as full of wild beasts as it would hold. To\nunderstand what it was like in the Middle Oligocene, one should read\nthe adventures of hunters in South Africa seventy or eighty years\nago (their verisimilitude is vouched for by Livingstone),[27] before\na gun in the hands of every Kaffir had begun to thin the vast herds\nthat then covered the whole landscape, and in whose numbers the wild\nhunters and the lions could make no appreciable diminution. The little\nBushmen regarded themselves and the lions as joint owners and masters\nof all the game. The masters fought one another, indeed; but there was\nno necessity to fight, for there was more than enough for both: lions\nwere then sometimes met in gangs of ten or a dozen. Game throughout\nthe Cainozoic ages was abundant and of all sizes: many small, many\nmiddle-sized and some prodigious. Even in the Eocene, some of the\nAmblypoda (_Dinoceras_, Am.) and of the Barypoda (_Arsinotherium_,\nAf.) were as big as rhinoceroses; in the Oligocene, Titanotheres not\nmuch smaller than elephants; in South America, in Miocene and Pliocene\ntimes, the Toxodonts; in the Pleistocene, Ground-sloths of huge\nbulk, and Glyptodonts. Of Families still represented amongst living\nanimals, dinotheres and mastodons occur in the Miocene; and elephant,\nrhinoceros, hippopotamus, giraffe have abounded from the Pliocene to\nrecent times, in many species, over most of Africa and the northern\nhemisphere. Even the marsupials in Australia produced a species\n(_Diprotodon_) as large as a rhinoceros with a skull three feet long.\nAny one of these would have been a meal for a whole pack of hunters, if\nthey could kill it\u2014as we may be sure they could.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. CONCLUSION\n\nFrom the addiction of some ancestral ape to animal food, and to\nthe life of a hunter in order to obtain it, then, the special\ncharacteristics of Man seem to be natural consequences. The\nhypothesis from which everything follows is exceptionally simple and\nmoderate. It is generally admitted that our ancestor was a large\nanthropoid\u2014possibly more gregarious than others, possibly more apt to\nlive upon the ground; but neither of these suppositions is requisite.\nHe was adapted to his life, as the chimpanzee and gorilla are to\ntheirs: in which, probably, they have gone on with little change for\nages. But into his life a disturbing factor entered\u2014the impulse to\nattack, hunt and eat animals, which extensively replaced his former\npeaceable, frugivorous habit. The cause of this change may have been a\nfailure in the supply of his usual diet, or an \u201caccidental variation\u201d\nof appetite. Not a great number need have shared in the hunting\nimpulse; it is enough that a few should have felt it, or even one. If\nadvantageous and inheritable, it would spread through his descendants.\nIt was advantageous (_a_) in enlarging their resources of nutrition,\nand (_b_) in enabling them to escape from the tropical forest. On\nthe other hand, to those least fit for the new life it brought the\ndisadvantages of more strenuous exertion and of competition with other\ncarnivorous types. But with hands and superior intelligence, those\nthat had the requisite character succeeded. There was rapid selection\nof those whose variations of structure, character, activity were most\neffective in dealing with game and with enemies; especially of those\nwho combined and co-operated, and learned to direct co-operation by\nsome rudimentary speech.\n\nBut, again, the hunting impulse here assumed to have possessed some\nanthropoid was not something entirely new; anthropoids and many\nother Primates are known to seize and devour birds, lizards and even\nsmall mammals when chance offers an easy opportunity. It is merely a\ngreater persistence in this behaviour that turns it into hunting.\nHow very improbable that such a change should _not_ sometimes occur!\nIs it not likely to have occurred often, and with many failures?\nSimilarly, of the resulting changes: the differentiation of our hands\nand feet is only an advance upon what you see in the gorilla; as for\nour ground-life, can the adult male gorilla be fairly called arboreal?\nSeveral Primates use unwrought weapons; most of them lead a gregarious\nlife, to which our own is a return; they are co-operative at least in\ndefence; like many other animals, they communicate by gestures and\ninarticulate vocal cries. Co-operative hunting, indeed, seems to be\nnew in our Order; but since wolves and dogs, or their ancestors, fell\nin with it some time or other, why should it be beyond the capacity of\napes? On second thoughts, is the co-operative raiding of plantations\nby baboons something altogether different from hunting in pack? Thus\nat each occasion of change in structure or function, Lycopithecus\nmerely carried some tendency of the other Primates a little further,\nand a little further; until, certainly, he went a long way. The whole\nmovement can be distinctly pictured throughout, and it has an air of\nbeing natural or even inevitable. Few hypotheses ask us to grant less\nthan this one.\n\nMoreover, if the story is not true, Man is an exception to the rule\nof animal life, that the structure of every organism is made up\nof apparatus subserving its peculiar conditions of nutrition and\nreproduction. Indeed, conditions of nutrition are the ground of the\ndifferentiation of animals and plants. Conditions of reproduction need\nnot here be considered, as the apparatus is the same in the anthropoids\nand in ourselves. With many species to avoid being eaten and to mate\nare the reasons for some secondary characters, such as protective\narmour or coloration, fleetness with its correlative structures,\nnuptial plumage, and so forth. But to avoid being eaten and to mate,\nit is first of all necessary to eat and live; and accordingly, for\neach sort of animal, starting from the organisation of some earlier\nstock, its structure and activities are determined by the kind of food\nit gets, and the conditions of getting it: in our case, the hunting of\ngame afoot.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] This was suggested to me by Mr. G.\u00a0A. Garfitt.\n\n[2]\n\n[Illustration]\n\nEstimated duration of the Cainozoic Period, assuming that the thickness\nof the deposits is about 63,000 feet, and that deposits accumulate at\nthe rate of 1 foot in 100 years. Drawn to the scale of 1 mm. to 100,000\nyears. The estimate is given and explained by Prof. Sollas in the\n_Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society_, LXV. (1909). The \u201ctree\u201d\nis based on that given by Dr. A. Keith in _The Antiquity of Man_, p.\n509.\n\nIf we suppose the differentiation of the _Hominid\u00e6_ to have begun\nbefore the close of the Oligocene, about (say) 3,500,000 years are\nallowed for the evolution of the existing species of Man. All these\nreckonings are provisional.\n\n[3] That Man was from the first a hunter has been suggested by several\nauthors; but the consequences of the assumption have never (as far as I\nknow) been worked out. A.\u00a0R. Wallace, in _Darwinism_ (p. 459), has the\nfollowing passage: \u201cThe anthropoid apes, as well as most of the monkey\ntribe, are essentially arboreal in their structure, whereas the great\ndistinctive character of man is his special adaptation to terrestrial\nlocomotion. We can hardly suppose, therefore, that he originated in a\nforest region, where fruits to be obtained by climbing are the chief\nvegetable food. It is more probable that he began his existence on the\nopen plains on high plateaux of the temperate or subtropical zone,\nwhere the seeds of indigenous cereals, numerous herbivora, rodents,\ngame-birds, with fishes and molluscs in the lakes and rivers and seas\nsupplied him with an abundance of varied food. In such a region he\nwould develop skill as a hunter, trapper or fisherman, and later as a\nherdsman and cultivator\u2014a succession of which we find indications in\nthe pal\u00e6olithic and neolithic races of Europe.\u201d\n\nProf. MacBride, in his popular introduction to _Zoology_ (p. 84), also\ntraces the specialisation of Man to the hunting life.\n\nMy friend Mr. Thomas Whittaker has sent me the following extract\nfrom Comte\u2019s _Politique Positive_, I. pp. 604-5: \u201cL\u2019obligation de se\nnourrir d\u2019une proie qu\u2019il faut atteindre et vaincre, perfectionne \u00e0\nla fois tous les attributs animaux, tant int\u00e9rieurs qu\u2019ext\u00e9rieurs.\nSon influence envers les sens et les muscles est trop \u00e9vidente pour\nexiger ici aucun examen. Par sa r\u00e9action habituelle sur les plus\nhautes fonctions du cerveau, elle d\u00e9veloppe \u00e9galement l\u2019intelligence\net l\u2019activit\u00e9, dont le premier essor lui est toujours d\u00fb, m\u00eame chez\nnotre esp\u00e8ce. A tous ces t\u00eetres, cette n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 modifie aussi les\nraces qui en sont victimes, d\u2019apr\u00e8s les efforts moins \u00e9nergiques, mais\nplus continus, qu\u2019elle y provoque pour leur d\u00e9fense. Dans les deux\ncas, et surtout quant \u00e0 l\u2019attaque, elle d\u00e9termine m\u00eame les pr\u00e9mi\u00e8res\nhabitudes de co-op\u00e9ration active, au moins temporaire. Born\u00e9es \u00e0\nla simple famille chez les esp\u00e8ces insociables, ces ligues peuvent\nailleurs embrasser quelquefois de nombreuses troupes. Ainsi commencent,\nparmi les animaux, des impulsions et des aptitudes qui ne pouvaient se\nd\u00e9velopper que d\u2019apr\u00e8s la continuit\u00e9 propre \u00e0 la race la plus sociable\net la plus intelligente. Enfin, la condition carnassi\u00e8re doit aussi\n\u00eatre appreci\u00e9e dans sa r\u00e9action organique. Une plus forte excitation,\nune digestion moins laborieuse et plus rapide, une assimilation\nplus compl\u00e8te produisant un sang plus stimulant: telles sont ses\npropri\u00e9t\u00e9s physiologiques. Toutes concourent \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper les fonctions\nsup\u00e9rieures, soit en augmentant l\u2019\u00e9nergie de leurs organes, soit en\nprocurant plus de temps pour leur exercice.\u201d\n\n[4] F. Wood Jones, _Arboreal Man_, pp. 117-22.\n\n[5] On these paragraphs\u2014(3), (4), (5), (6), (7)\u2014see Darwin\u2019s _Descent\nof Man_, 2nd ed., pp. 49-54: whence, of course, I have freely borrowed.\n\n[6] Numerous references might be given, from which I select Hagenbeck,\n_Beasts and Men_, p. 63.\n\n[7] R. L. Garner, _Gorillas and Chimpanzees_, ch. vi.: where\nmention is made of such meanings as \u201cfood,\u201d \u201ccalling to some one,\u201d\n\u201caffection,\u201d \u201cgood\u201d (said, I suppose, of food), \u201cwarning cries,\u201d \u201ccold\nor discomfort,\u201d \u201cdrink,\u201d \u201cillness,\u201d \u201cdead\u201d: the entire vocabulary,\nperhaps, not more than twenty signs. The value of Garner\u2019s work is\ndisputed.\n\n[8] _Natural Selection_, p. 193.\n\n[9] Avebury, _Prehistoric Times_, 7th ed., p. 578.\n\n[10] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 619.\n\n[11] Turner\u2019s _Samoa_, p. 285.\n\n[12] _Op. cit._, p. 579.\n\n[13] _Primitive Marriage_, ch. ii.\n\n[14] _Descent of Man_, 2nd ed., pp. 595-604.\n\n[15] _Parerga and Paralipomena_, B. II, Kap. 27.\n\n[16] _A Naturalist in Nicaragua_, ch. xi.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._, p. 57.\n\n[18] _Natural Selection_, pp. 195-7.\n\n[19] Naked races of dogs have also been reported to exist in China,\nManila and South Africa; but I can learn no particulars of them.\n\n[20] W. E. Ling Roth, _North Queensland Ethnology_, Bulletin V. \u00a7 81.\n\n[21] A. Keith, _The Antiquity of Man_, p. 134.\n\n[22] M. A. Czaplicka, _My Siberian Year_, p. 230.\n\n[23] Ripley, _The Races of Europe_, pp. 76-7.\n\n[24] Darwin, _Animals and Plants under Domestication_, Pop. ed., II. p.\n308.\n\n[25] The contents of this section lie outside my own studies, and have\nbeen taken from various books of Geology and Pal\u00e6ontology: I must\nespecially mention Prof. Osborne\u2019s _Age of Mammals_ (1910) and Prof.\nScott\u2019s _Land Mammals in the Western Hemisphere_ (1913). I have also\nprofited by inspecting the Pal\u00e6ontological Gallery at South Kensington\nwith the help of its excellent Guide-Book.\n\n[26] A. Keith, _The Human Body_, p. 58.\n\n[27] _Travels and Researches in Western Africa_, ch. vii.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE HUMAN FROM THE ANTHROPOID MIND\n\n\n\u00a7 1. HEREDITY, ADAPTATION, ACCOMMODATION\n\nFollowing the general belief that Man is descended from a stock nearly\nallied to the greater anthropoids\u2014Orang, Chimpanzee, Gorilla\u2014we may\nassume that his mental endowments were once much the same as theirs;\nand that, so far as they are still the same, _heredity_ sufficiently\nexplains his having them. Thus the senses, perception, the simpler\nforms of comparison and inference, the appetites and many of the\ninstincts and emotions are common to us with the apes, are seen in\nour children under three years old, and (in short) constitute that\ngeneric consciousness (as I have called it) from which the human\nmind in general and the peculiar traits of races and individuals are\ndifferentiated.\n\nSo much for heredity; but the differences of the human from the\nanthropoid mind, alike in intelligence and in character, are enormous,\nand must be accounted for in some other way. Allowing for some original\nspecific difference which we can hardly hope to discover, the changes\nthat have taken place may be considered as the result of _adaptation_\nto those habits of life under which our species (now ranking\nzoologically as a Family) has been developed. And this adaptation I\nshall assume to have been brought about under conditions of natural\nselection: human races, as we now see them, being the survivors of\nmany variations, more or less successful, and the others having been\ndestroyed. For good judges are of opinion that, amongst the discovered\nremains of ancient specimens of the human family, some that exhibit\nmarked deviations from the modern type\u2014Neanderthalensis, Eoanthropus,\nPithecanthropus\u2014should be regarded not as belonging to our ancestral\nline, but rather as representing distinct species that have failed in\nthe struggle for existence.[28]\n\nBut besides the innate dispositions of human nature determined by\nheredity and natural selection, which are found in some measure\nuniversally, because they are adaptations to conditions that, at one\ntime and not long ago, weighed upon the ancestors of all of us, there\nare numerous traits (some of them quite superficial) that vary from\ncountry to country and from age to age, according to the economic or\npolitical type of the society in which a man lives, his place therein,\ngeographical circumstances, religious institutions and the countless\ncauses that govern manners and customs. In the lives of most men these\ntraits are not necessary; they may be adopted and cast aside more than\nonce in an individual\u2019s career: they are temporary _accommodations_\ndue to education, imitation, tradition; and, in fact, are often the\ndisguises of human nature. Still, as society grows more and more\ncomplex, orderly and stable, there is, no doubt, again some natural\nselection of those individuals who are capable of undergoing the\nrequisite accommodations. Those that cannot endure the restraints of\ncivilisation, wander away; the extremely lazy, improvident, dishonest,\nor aggressive, in considerable numbers, perish.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. THE ORIGINAL STOCK AND THE CONDITIONS OF DIFFERENTIATION\n\nTo the original mentality of man we can only seek a clue in the\nhigher Primates, and especially in the extant anthropoids. No doubt,\nduring the long millennia that have elapsed since the separation of\nour own stock from those of other genera and species, they also have\nundergone some evolution, but probably much less change than we have.\nUnfortunately, our knowledge of their habits and abilities is still\ndeplorably limited. It seems certain, however, that their intelligence\nis much greater than that of any other kind of animal. They must have\nextensive knowledge of their habitat, of all the forest can yield for\nfood or shelter, and of its other denizens dangerous or otherwise.\nThey construct for themselves some sort of sleeping-place, not much\ninferior to the Australians\u2019 \u201clean-to,\u201d by piling branches together\nin the trees. Toward men, anthropoids seem to be unaggressive, and\nusually retreat from them; but, when attacked, defend themselves with\nfury. From other animals the male gorilla has nothing to fear, and he\ndefends his family against leopards; the chimpanzee is said to fight\nleopards with varying success; and, as for the orang, Dyak chiefs told\nWallace that no animals dare attack him, except crocodiles and pythons,\nand that he kills both of them.[29] The food of these apes is chiefly\nfruit and the tender shoots of trees and bamboos; but they sometimes\neat eggs and young birds; and the gorilla is said to eat small mammals:\nin confinement they all take cooked flesh freely. Socially, they\nhardly get beyond family life. Orangs male and female are even seen\nalone, and young ones together without parents; gorillas are seen in\nfamily parties; chimpanzees in families, and occasionally three or\nfour families in company. It is said that gorillas and chimpanzees\nhave been seen together in a large band. I have met with no report of\nthese animals fighting amongst themselves, except that male gorillas\nsometimes fight for a wife. Gorillas have also been said, upon very\nslight evidence, to be polygamous; chimpanzees and orangs seem to be\nmonogamous.[30] Their family life is probably, as amongst all the other\nPrimates, affectionate: the long youth of their children implies much\nparental care. Whilst the smaller anthropoids\u2014siamang and gibbon\u2014go\nin troops, as also do the baboons and most monkeys of both hemispheres,\nthe less sociability of the great anthropoids may be understood to\nresult (_a_) from the limited supply of the right sort of food for\nthem, even in the tropical forest to which they are confined\u2014since\nanimals of their bulk must consume a great deal; and (_b_) from their\nhaving no need of combining for the purpose of defence.\n\nFrom the type thus outlined the mentality of the human race has\ndeparted so widely that some even of those who believe that our bodies\nhave been derived from some simian stock (_e.\u00a0g._ Wallace) hesitate to\nadmit that our minds can have had a similar history. But as everywhere\nelse in the animal kingdom mind and body constitute one organism, it is\nreasonable to consider whether the differentiation of the mind of man\nmay not be understood to have taken place under the same conditions as\nthose which determined the transformation of his body. What were these\nconditions?\n\n(_a_) In the foregoing chapter I have collected a number of facts and\narguments pointing to the probability that the chief cause of the\nevolution of the human Family was the adoption by some anthropoid (or\nallied form) of the life of the hunter in order to obtain animal food.\nThat the change from a frugivorous to a carnivorous diet may itself\nhave had some effect upon our temperament and activity is possible;\nbut I lay no stress upon that. Most monkeys are almost exclusively\nfrugivorous; the only Primate, except man, that depends a good deal\nupon animal food is, I believe, the crab-eating macaque (_Macacus\ncynomolgus_), of the Burmese and Malay littoral; yet monkeys are the\nmost alert and active of animals; some of them are amongst the most\ncourageous; anthropoids are amongst the most powerful. A carnivorous\ndiet alone would not explain any changes in the shape and proportions\nof our trunk and limbs, nor the upright gait, nor the gregarious habit,\nnor the development of the brain, nor the invention of weapons, nor the\nuse of fire, nor any of the mental and emotional characteristics that\ndistinguish man from the other Primates; but all these things readily\nfollow from our remote ancestor\u2019s adoption of the life of the hunter.\n\nSociologists, surveying extant peoples, have usually distinguished\nfour stages of culture, the hunting, pastoral, agricultural and\nmanufacturing; and some have indicated what they suppose to have been a\nstill earlier stage, the \u201ccollecting,\u201d such as may be seen, _e.\u00a0g._,\namongst the Fuegians. But the collecting state is plainly degenerate,\nthe resource of tribes fallen into distress; it cannot have been the\nfirst stage, because it implies no conditions that tend in any way to\ndevelop body or mind or society. That hunting came first is a true\nintuition: and, to understand the development of human nature, we\nneed only refer the hunting-life back to the very origin of the human\nstock.[31]\n\n(_b_) The great anthropoids are all confined to the equatorial forests;\nand it is obvious that, with their diet, it is impossible to pass out\nof tropical or (at furthest) sub-tropical regions. But the adoption\nof a flesh diet enabled the human stock to extend the range of its\nhunting (allowing for gradual adaptation to climate or accommodation\nby clothing) to any country that supplied the requisite prey; and,\naccordingly, in course of time, it wandered to every part of the world.\nThe settling of various off-shoots of the original stock in certain\nregions long enough for them to undergo adaptation to local conditions\nis (as we have seen) the simplest explanation of existing races.\n\n(_c_) Whilst none of the great anthropoids has advanced socially beyond\nfamily life, man is everywhere (with few and doubtful exceptions)\ngregarious\u2014living at the lowest grade in tribes or bands of about\nfifty; and the gregarious life is one of the most important conditions\nof his peculiar development. Possibly, he may originally have been\nmore gregarious than any extant anthropoid, in spite of his not\nneeding society for defence, and of its seeming to be for so large a\nfrugivorous animal inconvenient in relation to nutrition. Moreover,\nif the great anthropoids and our own ancestors were descended from\nsome stock of the lower monkeys, such as always go in troops, the\ngregarious instinct may have remained with them as a latent character.\nStill, it is my conjecture that man became gregarious, or recovered\nthe social habit, because of the utility of co-operative hunting; so\nthat he became at first a sort of wolf-ape. This will be discussed in\nthe next section. I observe here, however, that the hypothesis helps\nus to understand why man is still imperfectly sociable; the purpose\nof the hunting-pack, each wolf-ape seeking prey, was unfavourable to\nsocial life in other relations. That in human life group-consciousness\npreceded self-consciousness is a groundless and fantastic notion:\nall known savages are fully self-conscious, as their sentiments and\nbehaviour imply; and even the higher brutes are (in my judgment)\nself-conscious in their relations with others. Current speculations\nabout fashion, imitation, tradition, crowd-psychology, are in danger of\nexaggeration, and overlook the patent facts of individualism, as shown\nby the hypocrite, the criminal, the vagrant, the contra-suggestible,\nthe hermit, the sceptic, the saint. Some people\u2014without being in any\nway morbid\u2014find that a good deal of solitude is necessary to the\ncomplete life: by nature the student and the pioneer escape from the\ncrowd.\n\n(_d_) The later stages of human development have been considerably\nmodified by certain imaginary conditions peculiar to Man; for he\u2014we\nknow not at what date\u2014invented them. These may be summed up under the\nnames of Magic and Animism; and in subsequent chapters they will be\ndiscussed, with their astonishing vagaries and still more astonishing\nreactions upon human life.\n\nThe chief conditions, then, to which man has been adapted, and thereby\ndifferentiated in body and mind from the anthropoid stock, I take to be\nfour: the hunting life; geographical circumstances; social life; and\nhis own imaginations.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. PRIMAL SOCIETY\n\nIn looking for the probable form of the earliest human or (rather)\nprehuman society, one naturally makes a survey of other mammalian\nsocieties; and the task is soon accomplished. It is surprising how\nfew and simple the types of them are, in contrast with the elaborate\npolities of some hymenoptera and of the termites: these have much\ngreater superficial resemblance to modern human societies; but, in\nfact, they are families rather than societies; their interesting\nactivities will one day probably be traced to relatively simple\nmechanisms; and in every way they are too remote from us for any useful\ncomparison. As for mammalian societies, even using the term to include\nfamilies, they may be classified under four or five types:\n\n(1) Families: (_a_) Monogamous: of which the best examples seem to\nbe found in some monkeys. Many of the cats are believed to pair\nmonogamously; but it is doubtful whether, or in what measure, the male\ntakes part in the rearing of the whelps.\n\n(_b_) Polygamous: characteristic of many species of deer;\u2014after the\nbreeding-season, the stags often wander away by themselves.\n\n(2) Associations of families without apparent structure or\norganisation, such as those of the vizcacha and the beaver. They\nhave no leaders, and make no attempt at mutual defence; but their\ninco-ordinated activities, in making their burrows, dams, etc., have\nresults which, especially in the case of the beavers, look as if the\nanimals had worked upon a common, premeditated plan. Gregariousness\nexists widely in the animal kingdom without any utility in attack or\ndefence, but merely for convenience of breeding, or for the advantage\nof signalling the approach of danger, from any direction, to the whole\nflock.\n\n(3) Troops or herds, comprising several families. This type is common\namongst monkeys: generally the families are monogamous, and both\nparents care for the offspring; they have leaders, and combine in\nmutual defence. This is especially effective with the baboons\u2014who,\nhowever, are polygamous. A very similar type is characteristic of\ncattle; who also have leaders as the result of battle between the\nbulls, each trying to control and keep together as many cows as he can;\nand they often combine their forces against beasts of prey.\n\n(4) Hunting-packs\u2014most noticeable with wolves and wild dogs: they\nhave leaders, and probably an order of precedence determined by\nbattle. In the breeding-season (February to August) a pack of wolves\nbreaks up into pairs; but whether their pairing is for life or merely\nseasonal is disputed; and it is also doubtful whether the male takes\nany share in caring for the puppies; such habits may vary in different\nlocalities.[32] The numbers of the pack depend on circumstances, and\nare now much smaller in Canada than in Russia.\n\nWas our own primitive society, then, like any of these? Since direct\nevidence cannot be obtained, we must be guided in forming our\nhypothesis by two considerations: (_a_) what type of society gives\nthe best explanation of human nature as we now find it? and (_b_) for\nwhich type can we give the best reason why it should have been adopted?\nSo I point out (_a_) that man, in character, is more like a wolf or\ndog than he is like any other animal; and (_b_) that for the forming\nof a pack there was a clear ground in the advantage to be obtained by\nco-operative hunting.[33]\n\nIt must be admitted that Darwin, discussing sexual selection in man,\nsuggests a different hypothesis. He says: \u201cLooking far enough back in\nthe stream of time, and judging from the social habits of man as he now\nexists, the most probable view is that he aboriginally lived in small\ncommunities, each with a single wife, or if powerful with several, whom\nhe jealously guarded against all other men. Or he may not have been a\nsocial animal, and yet have lived with several wives, like the gorilla;\nfor all the natives \u2018agree that but one adult male is seen in a band;\nwhen the young male grows up, a contest takes place for mastery, and\nthe strongest, by killing and driving out the others, establishes\nhimself as the head of the community.\u2019 The younger males, being thus\nexpelled and wandering about, would, when at last successful in finding\na partner, prevent too close inter-breeding within the limits of the\nsame family.\u201d[34] The information concerning the polygamy of the\ngorilla, quoted here from Dr. Savage, who wrote in 1845, has not since\n(I believe) been confirmed, except by Prof. Garner.[35]\n\nNaturally, the above passage has attracted the attention of\nanthropologists; and I am sorry to expose myself to the charge of\nimmodesty in venturing to put forward a different view. Atkinson in\nhis essay on _Primal Law_, edited with qualified approval by Andrew\nLang, starts from Darwin\u2019s hypothesis, and merely modifies it by urging\nthat the young males, when driven off by their father, did not wander\naway, but kept near the family, always on the watch to murder their\nfather. This amendment he makes, because he had observed the same\nhabits in cattle and horses. Then, through a row of hypotheses with\nlittle evidence or rational connection, he arrives at an explanation of\ncertain savage laws of avoidance, exogamy, etc. More recently, Prof.\nFreud has produced a most ingenious and entertaining essay on _Totem\nund Tabu_, in which he builds upon the same foundations. You easily\nsee how the \u201c\u0152dipus complex\u201d emerges from such a primitive state of\nthings, but will hardly, without reading the work, imagine the wealth\nof speculation it contains or its literary attractiveness. Atkinson\nprobably relied upon the supposed parallel case of wild cattle and\nhorses, because those animals resemble the apes in being vegetarian:\nthough the diets are, in fact, very different. But even if such a\ncomparison indicates a possible social state of our original ape-like\nstock, what is there in such a state that can be supposed to have\nintroduced the changes that made our forebears no longer ape-like?\nSupposing those changes to have already taken place, what evidence is\nthere that the same social state endured? None: for it was assumed\nto have been the social state of our forebears on the ground of their\nresemblance in diet and family economy to the gorilla.\n\nReturning, then, to our hypothesis as to the chief cause of human\ndifferentiation, namely, that a certain Primate, more nearly allied\nto the anthropoids than to any other, became carnivorous and adopted\nthe life of a hunter, there are (as I have said) two ways in which\nthis may have happened: either by such a variation on the part of our\nancestor that he felt a stronger appetite for animal food than the\ngorilla does\u2014strong enough to make him hunt for prey; or by such a\nchange of climate in the region he inhabited\u2014say from sub-tropical to\ntemperate\u2014as to make his former diet scarce, especially in winter,\nso that he became a hunter to avoid starvation. Every one admits that\nhe became a hunter at some time: why not at the earliest? Nothing\nless than some great change of life, concentrating all his powers\nand straining every faculty, can possibly account for the enormous\ndifferentiation of Man. The adoption of the hunting life is such a\nchange; and the further back we put it, the better it explains the\nother changes that have occurred in our physical and mental nature.\n\nFrom the outset, again, our ancestor may have attacked big game,\nprobably Ungulates\u2014to whom he owed much; for not only did they provide\nprey, but by clearing the forest over wide areas compelled him to run\nin pursuit remote from his native trees, thus giving great selective\nadvantage to every variation of legs and feet adapted to running:\nthough at the very first there may have been little need to run, as\nhe was not yet an object of terror; \u201cwe must remember that if man was\nunskilful, animals were unsuspicious.\u201d[36] I suppose him, at first, to\nhave fallen to with hands and teeth: combining with others in a hungry,\nsavage onslaught. By attacking big game advantage was given to those\nindividuals and families who co-operated in hunting: thus forming the\nprimal society of the human stock; a society entirely different from\nthat of any of the Primates, or of cattle, and most like that of the\ndogs and wolves\u2014a hunting-pack.\n\nAs in the course of generations the hunting-pack developed, no doubt,\nit had recognised leaders, the most powerful males, one perhaps\npre-eminent. But it was not subject to one old male who claimed all\nthe females; for the more adult males it comprised, the stronger it\nwas; and, for the same reason, pairing, as among wolves, was the most\nefficient form of sexual relationship. But, in my judgment, it is\naltogether vain to try to deduce from this form of society, which may\nhave existed three or four million years ago, any of the known customs\nof savages concerning marriage, such as avoidance, totemism, exogamy;\nwhich would be of comparatively recent date if we put back their origin\n500,000 years. Many such rules can only have arisen when there was\nalready a tradition and a language capable of expressing relationships.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HUNTING-PACK\n\nPossibly our ape-like ancestor was more sociable than any of the\nanthropoids; but sociability in ape-life would in no way account for\nour present character as men: nothing accounts for it, except the early\nformation of the hunting-pack. Since, however, we can know nothing of\nthat institution directly, we must try to learn something about it\nfrom the parallel case of dogs and wolves. Galton remarks how readily\nthe proceedings of man and dog \u201care intelligible to one another. Every\nwhine or bark of the dog, each of his fawning, savage, or timorous\nmovements is the exact counterpart of what would have been the man\u2019s\nbehaviour, had he felt similar emotions. As the man understands the\nthoughts of the dog, so the dog understands the thoughts of the man, by\nattending to his natural voice, his countenance, and his actions.\u201d[37]\nNo more, if as much, could be said of the terms upon which we stand\nwith a tame chimpanzee, in spite of greater physical and facial\nresemblance and nearer kinship. What can connect us so closely in mind\nwith an animal so remote from us in lineage and anatomy as the dog is?\nAdaptation to the same social conditions, the life of the hunting-pack.\n\n\n(1) The master-interest of every member of the pack lies in the\nchase, because success in it is necessary to life. To show how this\npassion actuates ourselves, I quote Mr. F.\u00a0C. Selous; who, during an\nexpedition in Canada, roused a caribou stag within twenty yards, saw\n\u201cthe dreadful terror\u201d in his eyes, and shot him. \u201cDid I feel sorry for\nwhat I had done? it may be asked. Well! no, I did not. Ten thousand\nyears of superficial and unsatisfying civilisation have not altered\nthe fundamental nature of man, and the successful hunter of to-day\nbecomes a primeval savage, remorseless, triumphant, full of a wild,\nexultant joy, which none but those who have lived in the wilderness,\nand depended on their success as hunters for their daily food, can ever\nknow or comprehend.\u201d[38] To the hunter my paradox must seem a truism.\nAnd that the hunter temporarily released from civilised restraints,\nwho suffers such intoxication, merely renews old savage raptures is\nshown by the following curious parallel: a Bushman, returning from a\nsuccessful hunt to the wagons of the traveller Baines\u2014\u201cBehold me!\u201d\nhe shouted, \u201cthe hunter! Yea, look on me, the killer of elephants\nand mighty bulls! Behold me, the big elephant, the lion! Look on\nme, ye Damaras and Makalaka; admire and confess that I am a great\nBull-calf.\u201d[39]\n\nAgain, since the interest of the chase culminates in the kill\u2014for this\nis the condition of making a meal\u2014to kill becomes, in some predatory\nanimals, a passion that is often gratified without regard to their\nneeds. Wolves often slay many more sheep than they devour: a sheep-dog\nthat undergoes reversion kills by night the sheep on neighbouring farms\nwithout any call of hunger; and, says Mr. Thompson Seton (writing of\nthe natives of North Canada), \u201cthe mania for killing that is seen in so\nmany white men, is evidently a relic of savagery; for all these Indians\nand half-breeds are full of it.\u201d[40] They fired at everything they saw.\nThe manners of my own pack\u2014now long dispersed\u2014were very similar to\nthe Indians\u2019; and the sport of pigeon- or of pheasant-shooting has\nbeen reduced to its last element\u2014skilful slaying.\n\nThe disposition to slay is reinforced, when prey makes serious\nresistance, by anger; and generally by a distinct tendency, sometimes\ncalled \u201cdestructiveness,\u201d perhaps a latent character derived from the\nmonkeys, and which I take to be partly a play-impulse and partly an\nexpression of curiosity.\n\n(2) The gregariousness of the pack is variable; probably, amongst\nwolves, it was much greater anciently than it is to-day. There are\nconflicting statements about the gregariousness of wolves that have\nbeen studied in different countries. Couteulx de Canteleu (France)\nsays: \u201cThe wolf is an enemy of all society; when they assemble it is\nnot a pacific society, but a band of brigands.\u201d[41] Thompson Seton\n(Canada) says: \u201cWolves are the most sociable of beasts of prey; they\narrange to render one another assistance. A pack seems to be an\nassociation of personal acquaintances, and would resent the presence\nof a total stranger.\u201d[42] Gregariousness of wolves must be reduced by\nfailure of game (as by the destruction of bison in North America), and\nstill more by the encroachments of civilisation (as in France). The\nprimitive human pack, probably, was more constantly gregarious than\nwolves are: (_a_) because its individuals, having no instinctive or\ntraditionary knowledge of hunting, were more dependent on co-operation;\nand (_b_) because the long youth of children made it necessary for\nparents to associate with the pack during their nurture\u2014else no pack\ncould have existed; for whilst wolves are nearly full-grown at eighteen\nmonths, apes are not mature until the eighth or ninth year. At a later\nperiod, after the invention of effective weapons, an individual became,\nfor many kinds of game, less dependent on co-operation; but by that\ntime, the hunting-grounds of a pack were circumscribed by those of\nother hostile packs; so that no one dared go far alone.\n\n(3) With gregariousness went, of course, (_a_) perceptive\nsympathy\u2014every animal read instantly in the behaviour of others\ntheir feelings and impulses; (_b_) contagious sympathy\u2014the impulses\nof any animal, expressed in its behaviour, spread rapidly to all the\nrest; and (_c_) effective sympathy, so far (at least) as that all\nunited to defend any associate against aggression from outside the\npack. Perceptive and contagious sympathy, however, extend beyond the\nlimits of the pack or the species. Most of the higher mammalia can\nread the state of mind of others, though of widely different kinds,\nin their expression and behaviour; and many are liable to have their\nactions immediately affected by signs of the emotional impulses of\nothers, especially fear. These modes of sympathy, therefore, though\nliveliest amongst gregarious animals, are not dependent on specific\ngregariousness.\n\n(4) The pack has a disposition to aggression upon every sort of\nanimal outside the pack, either as prey or as a competitor for prey:\nlimited no doubt by what we should call considerations of prudence or\nutility; which must vary with the size of the pack, the prowess of its\nindividuals, the possession of weapons, etc. After the invention of\nweapons and snares, many savage tribes can kill every sort of animal in\ntheir habitat, as the pal\u00e6olithic Europeans did many thousands of years\nago. From the outset the human pack must have come into competition\nwith the true carnivores, must have defended itself against them, may\nhave discovered that attack was the safest defence, and may have been\nvictorious even without weapons. Mr. G.\u00a0P. Sanderson writes: \u201cIt is\nuniversally believed by the natives (of South India) that the tiger is\noccasionally killed by packs of wild dogs.... From what I have seen of\ntheir style of hunting, and of their power of tearing and lacerating, I\nthink there can be no doubt of their ability to kill a tiger.... Causes\nof hostility may occasionally arise between the tiger and wild dogs\nthrough attempted interference with each other\u2019s prey.\u201d[43]\n\n(5) A hunting-pack, probably, always claims a certain territory. This\nis the first ground of the sense of property, so strongly shown\nby domestic dogs: the territorial claims of the half-wild dogs of\nConstantinople are well known. To nourish a pack the hunting-grounds\nmust be extensive. Mr. Thompson Seton says that in Canada the wolf\nhas a permanent home-district and a range of about fifty miles.[44]\nVery many generations must have elapsed before the deviation of our\nforebears from anthropoid habits resulted in the formation of so many\npacks as to necessitate the practical delimitation of hunting-grounds.\nThen the aggressiveness of the pack turned upon strangers of its own\nspecies; the first wars arose, and perhaps cannibalism on the part of\nthe victors. It is certain that, in North America, wolves kill and eat\nfoxes, dogs, coyotes; and it is generally believed that wolves will eat\na disabled companion; though, according to Mr. W.\u00a0H. Hudson, a wolf\nwill only eat another when it has killed that other, and then only as\nthe carrying out of the instinct to eat whatever it has killed.[45] It\nmay be so.\n\n(6) A pack must have a leader, and must devotedly follow him as long as\nhe is manifestly the best of the pack; and here we have a rudimentary\nloyalty.\n\n(7) Every individual must be subservient to the pack, as long as it\nworks together; and this seems to be the ground of the \u201cinstinct of\nself-abasement\u201d (McDougall), so far as the attitudes involved in such\nsubserviency are due to a distinct emotional impulse, and are not\nrather expressive of fear or of devotion.\n\n(8) The members of the pack must be full of emulation; in order that,\nwhen the present leader fails, others may be ready to take his place.\n\n(9) For the internal cohesion of the pack, there must be the equivalent\nof a recognised table of precedence amongst its members; and this is\nreconciled with the spirit of emulation, by fighting until each knows\nhis place, followed by complete submission on the part of the inferior.\nMr. Th. Roosevelt says of a pack of dogs employed in bear-hunting,\n\u201cat feeding-time each took whatever his strength permitted, and each\npaid abject deference to whichever animal was his known superior\nin prowess.\u201d[46] Mr. W.\u00a0H. Hudson writes of dogs on cattle-breeding\nestablishments on the pampas, that he presumes \u201cthey are very much like\nferal dogs and wolves in their habits. Their quarrels are incessant;\nbut when a fight begins the head of the pack, as a rule, rushes to\nthe spot,\u201d and tries to part the combatants\u2014not always successfully.\n\u201cBut from the foremost in strength and power down to the weakest\nthere is a gradation of authority; each one knows just how far he can\ngo, which companion he can bully when in a bad temper or wishing to\nassert himself, and to which he must humbly yield in his turn.\u201d[47]\nThe situation reminds one of a houseful of schoolboys, and of how\nontogeny repeats phylogeny. Where political control is very feeble,\nas in mining camps or backwoods settlements, civilised men revert to\nthe same conditions. Fifty years ago, \u201call along the frontier between\nCanada and the United States, every one knew whom he could lick, and\nwho could lick him.\u201d[48] Amongst Australian aborigines, we are told\nthat \u201cprecedence counts for very much.\u201d[49]\n\n(10) A pack of wolves relies not merely upon running down its prey,\nbut resorts to various stratagems to secure it: as by surrounding it;\nheading it off from cover; driving it over a precipice; arranging\nrelays of pursuers, who take up the chase when the first begin to flag;\nsetting some to lie in ambush while the rest drive the prey in their\ndirection. Such devices imply intelligent co-operation, some means of\ncommunicating ideas, patience and self-control in the interests of the\npack and perseverance in carrying out a plan. Failure to co-operate\neffectually is said to be punished with death. Primitive man, beginning\nwith more brains than a wolf, may be supposed soon to have discovered\nsuch arts and to have improved upon them.\n\n(11) When prey has been killed by a pack of wolves, there follows a\ngreedy struggle over the carcass, each trying to get as big a meal as\npossible. Mr. Th. Roosevelt writes of dogs used in hunting the cougar\n(puma): \u201cThe relations of the pack amongst themselves (when feeding)\nwere those of wild beast selfishness.... They would all unite in the\nchase and the fierce struggle which usually closed it. But the instant\nthe quarry was killed, each dog resumed his normal attitude of greedy\nanger or greedy fear toward the others.\u201d[50] As this was a scratch\npack of hounds, however, we cannot perhaps infer that a naturally\nformed pack of wolves is equally discordant, or that the human pack\nwas ever normally like that. Galton, indeed, says: \u201cMany savages are\nso unamiable and morose as to have hardly any object in associating\ntogether, besides that of mutual support;\u201d[51] but this is by no means\ntrue of all savages. At any rate, the steadier supply of food obtained\nby our race since the adoption of pastoral or agricultural economy,\nwith other circumstances, has greatly modified the greedy and morose\nattitude in many men and disguised it in others; though it reappears\nunder conditions of extreme social dislocation, and it is a proverb\nthat \u201cthieves quarrel over their plunder.\u201d In the original pack such\na struggle over the prey may have subserved the important utility of\neliminating the weak, and of raising the average strength and ferocity.\nBut some custom must have been established for feeding the women and\nchildren. No doubt when fruits were obtainable, the women and children\nlargely subsisted upon them. But the strong instinct of parental care\nin Primates, the long youth of children, and the greater relative\ninferiority of females to males (common to anthropoids and savages)\nthan is found amongst dogs and wolves, must have made the human pack\nfrom the first differ in many ways from a pack of wolves.\n\nSo much, then, as to the traits of character established in primitive\nman by his having resorted to co-operative hunting: they all plainly\npersist in ourselves.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOn our intelligence life in the hunting-pack had just as revolutionary\nan influence, as already explained in the first chapter. The whole art\nof hunting had to be learned from its rudiments by this enterprising\nfamily. With them there was no inherited instinct or disposition, and\nno tradition or instruction, as there is with the true carnivores: they\ndepended solely on observation, memory, inference. With poor olfactory\nsense (as usual in apes) prey must be followed and inconvenient\nenemies outwitted, by acquiring a knowledge of their footprints and\nother visible signs of neighbourhood, and by discrimination of all\nthe noises they make. The habits and manners of prey and of enemies,\ntheir favourite lairs, feeding-grounds and watering-places, their\npaths through forest, marsh, thicket and high grass, must all be\nlearnt: so must their speed, endurance, means and methods of attack\nand defence. The whole country within the range of the pack must be\nknown, its resources and its difficulties; and whenever new territory\nwas entered, new lessons in all these matters had to be learned. This\nmust have entailed a rapid natural selection of brains. Only a rapidly\ndeveloping, plastic brain could have been capable of the requisite\naccommodation of behaviour in such conditions: a mechanism was required\nby which more and more new lines of specialised reaction were related\nto numerous newly observed and discriminated facts.\n\nThe very crudest weapons may be handled with variable dexterity; the\nbest handling must be discovered and practised; and this had a high\nselective value for the hands as well as for the brain. Probably crude\nweapons were very early used; for some monkeys (and baboons generally)\nthrow sticks or stones, or roll stones down upon an enemy. In Borneo,\nWallace came upon a female orang who, \u201cas soon as she saw us, began\nbreaking off branches and the great spiny fruits [of the durian]\nwith every appearance of rage, causing such a shower of missiles as\neffectually kept us from approaching too near the tree. This habit of\nthrowing down branches has been doubted; but I have, as here narrated,\nobserved it myself on three separate occasions.\u201d[52] The importance\nof the observation consists in its proving the existence in an\nanthropoid of the impulse to use missiles under the occasional stress\nof anger; so that it might be expected rapidly to develop under the\nconstant pressure of hunger. The use of clubs and stones induced the\ndiscrimination of the best materials for such weapons, and where they\ncould be found; and, in process of time, brought in a rough shaping of\nthem, the better to serve their purposes. Then came the invention of\nsnares and pitfalls and the discovery of poisons.\n\nThus the primitive human, or prehuman mind, was active in many\nnew directions; and depending for its skill, not upon instinct or\nimitation, but upon observation and memory and inference, it was\nnecessary for it to arrange ideas in a definite order before acting\nupon them, as in making weapons or planning a hunt; indefiniteness\nor confusion in such matters was fatal. The contrast between growing\nmemory of the past and present experience, between practical ideas and\nthe actions realising them that had been suspended until the right\nmoment came, furthered the differentiation of self-consciousness amidst\nthe world; the contrasts of co-operation and greed, of emulation\nand loyalty and submission, of honour and shame, furthered the\ndifferentiation of self-consciousness amidst the tribe.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf it be asked\u2014how much of all this development attributed to the\nhunting-pack might have been brought about just as well by the\nformation of a defensive herd, such as we see in cattle and horses?\u2014a\ndefinite answer can be given. The herd is, of course, marked by (2)\ngregariousness, (3) perceptive and contagious sympathy and sometimes\neffective sympathy in common defence, (7) recognition of leaders (all\nherds that travel have leaders), (8) emulation, (9) precedence; but not\nby (1) interest in the chase and in killing, nor (4) aggressiveness,\nnor (10) strategy and perseverance in attack, nor (11) greed; and\nherd-life affords no conditions for the development of intelligence\nand dexterity, nor for any of the physical characters that distinguish\nman. Herd-life does not involve the great and decisive change which\nis implied in the evolution of human nature. We must conceive, then,\nof the primitive human mind as a sort of chimpanzee mind adapted to\nthe wolfish conditions of the hunting-pack. Wolves themselves have\nundergone no great development, compared (say) with cats, for want of\nhands and other physical advantages which we had to begin with. If some\nspecies of baboon had taken to the hunting-life, there might have been\nvery interesting results.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. THE WOLF-TYPE OF MAN ESTABLISHED BY NATURAL SELECTION\n\nThe differentiation of the human from the anthropoid stock must have\nbegun a long time ago; as to when it began there is no direct evidence;\nand even if fossil remains of the earlier stages of our evolution had\nbeen discovered, we could only judge from the strata in which they\noccurred what must have been their relative antiquity. When it comes\nto reducing the chronology of past ages to figures, geologists either\ndecline to make any estimate, or the results of their calculations\nmay differ as 1 to 10. Since my own studies give me no claim to an\nopinion on such matters, whilst it is helpful to have clear ideas,\nhowever tentative, I shall adopt the views of Dr. Arthur Keith in his\nwork on _The Antiquity of Man_, based on estimates published by Prof.\nSollas.[53] On turning to p. 509 of that work, a genealogical tree\nwill be found, showing the probable lines of descent of the higher\nPrimates. The separation of the human from the great anthropoid stock\nis represented as having happened at about the last third of the\nOligocene period\u2014say 2,000,000 years ago (or, according to the later\nestimate, 3,500,000). Pithecanthropus (of Java) branched off as a\ndistinct genus about the middle of the Miocene. Neanderthal man (_Homo\nNeanderthalensis_) and Piltdown man (_Eoanthropus Dawsoni_) separated\nas distinct species (or genera) from the stock of modern man (absurdly\nnamed _Homo sapiens_) early in the Pliocene, and became extinct\nrespectively (say) 20,000 and 300,000 years ago. The races of modern\nman began to differentiate near the end of the Pliocene (say) 500,000\nyears from the present time. Such is the \u201cworking hypothesis.\u201d\n\nThe skull capacity of the great anthropoids averages 500 c.c.; that of\nPithecanthropus is estimated at 900 c.c.; the Australian native average\nis 1200 c.c.; Eoanthropus, according to Dr. Keith, rises to 1400;[54]\na Neanderthal skull has been measured at 1600 c.c.; the modern English\naverage is under 1500 c.c. Of course, mental power depends not on size\nof the brain only, but also on its differentiation, which may have\nrecently advanced.\n\nAs to culture, the Neolithic period extends in Western Europe from\nabout 2000 to 10,000 B.C.: and to that age is usually attributed the\nintroduction of agriculture, the domestication of animals, pottery,\nweaving, permanent constructed dwellings, and monuments requiring\ncollective labour; but some of these improvements may be of earlier\ndate. In other parts of the world, _e.\u00a0g._ in the Eastern Mediterranean\nregion, such culture is probably older, but still comparatively recent.\nWhat is known as the Pal\u00e6olithic stage of culture is often supposed\nto have begun early in the second quarter of the Pleistocene period,\ngiving us a retrospect of (say) 300,000 years. But if we include\nunder \u201cPal\u00e6olithic\u201d all unpolished stone-work that shows clear signs\nof having been executed according to an idea or mental pattern (and\nthis seems a reasonable definition), the \u201crostro-carinate\u201d implements\nmust be so called, and then the beginning of this culture must be\npushed back into the Pliocene.[55] In Pliocene (and perhaps Miocene)\ndeposits have further been discovered numerous \u201ceoliths\u201d: stones so\nroughly chipped that they do not imply an idea-pattern; so that, whilst\nmany arch\u00e6ologists accept them as of human workmanship, some experts\ndispute their claim to be considered artefacts. Of course, there must\nbe eoliths; the only question is whether we have yet unearthed any\nof them. Our forefathers cannot have begun by shaping stones to a\ndefinite figure and special purpose. Beginning with stones taken up\nas they lay, they discovered that a broken stone with a sharp edge\ninflicted a worse wound than a whole one; then broke stones to obtain\nthis advantage; used sharp fragments to weight clubs; and very slowly\nadvanced to the manufacture of recognisable axes and spear-heads,\nmeanwhile discovering other uses for flaked stones; and it seems to\nhave needed at least 1,400,000 (or 2,800,000) years to arrive at the\npoorest of known pal\u00e6oliths. This strikingly agrees with the law,\noften stated, that the progress of culture is, by virtue of tradition,\ncumulative, and flows, as a stone falls, with accelerating velocity: in\nspite of the ebb, to which from age to age we see it to be liable. At\nany one time, moreover, the art of stone-working was, probably, even in\nadjacent tribes, at different stages of advancement; it depends partly\nupon the kind of stone obtainable; but it has been only recently that\nsuch contrasts could occur as Herodotus[56] describes among the hosts\nof Xerxes: when, beside the well-accoutred Persians and Medes, marched\nLibyans and Mysians armed with wooden javelins hardened in the fire,\nand Ethiopians with stone-tipped arrows and spears headed with the\nsharpened horns of antelopes.\n\nThe moral of all this is that there was abundant time before the\nrise of Neolithic culture (which may be called the beginning of\ncivilisation) for the complete adaptation of mankind everywhere, by\nnatural selection, to the life of hunters; and that, since then, there\nhas not been time for the biological adaptation of any race to the\ncivilised state. We shall see that natural selection has probably had\nsome civilising influence; but any approach to complete adaptation has\nbeen impossible, not only for want of time, but also because of rapid\nchanges in the structure of civilisation, the social protection of some\neccentrics, the persistence of the hunting-life as a second resource\nor as a pastime, and by the frequent recurrence of warfare\u2014that\nis to say, man-hunting. To civilisation we are, for the most part,\nmerely accommodated by experience, education, tradition and social\npressure. A few people seem to be adapted to civilised life from their\nbirth, and others to the slavish life; but all inherit, more or less\nmanifestly, the nature of the hunter and warrior. This is a necessary\nbasis of general and social psychology; and perhaps tribal or national\ncharacters (so far as distinguishable) may be understood by assigning\nthe conditions under which they have, in various directions, been\nmodified from this type.\n\nTo avoid the appearance of overlooking an obvious objection, I may add\nthat the life of the hunter does not imply an exclusively carnivorous\ndiet, but merely that hunting is the activity upon which his faculties\nare bent and upon which his livelihood chiefly depends. It is most\nunlikely that a cousin of the frugivorous anthropoids should entirely\ngive up his ancestral food, immediately, or perhaps at any time. Even\nthe diet of the wolf, in North-East Canada, includes \u201cmuch fruit,\nespecially the uva-ursi\u201d; and the coyote there also eats berries;[57]\nso does the jackal in India. Savage women everywhere subsist largely\non roots and fruits. Dr. Keith says the teeth and jaws of the\nNeanderthal species were adapted to a coarse vegetable diet.[58] Yet\nthe Neanderthal burials at La Ferrasie, La Chapelle aux Saints, Jersey\nand Krapina, with their implements and animal remains, leave no doubt\nthat the species hunted the biggest game. At Krapina, besides mammoth\nand rhinoceros, \u201cthe cave-bear occurred abundantly, it was evidently\na favourite article of diet\u201d: the inhabitants were not fanatical\nvegetarians.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. SOME FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUNTING-LIFE\n\nBetween the remote age when our hypothetical ancestor became a hunter\nand the time to which probably belong the remains of the oldest known\nmen, there lies a gap of (say) one (or two) and a half million years,\nconcerning which we have not only no direct evidence but not even\nany parallel in the world by means of which to apply the comparative\nmethod. Just at the beginning, the parallel of the wolf-pack sheds some\nlight upon our path; but the light soon grows faint; for the primitive\nhuman, from the first more intelligent than wolves, and inheriting\nfrom the ape-stock qualities of character which the new life greatly\nmodified but could not extirpate, must under pressure of selection have\nbecome, after not many ages, an animal unlike any other. Just at the\nend, again, something concerning those who lived many thousand years\nbefore the beginning of history may be inferred from the parallel of\nexisting savage customs; from their rock-dwellings, drawings, tools,\nweapons, hearths, something about their way of life; from evidence of\ntheir burial-customs, something of their beliefs. But what can be said\nof our ancestors during all those years that intervene between the\nbeginning and the end?\n\nHaving been a hunter at the first and at the last, we may reasonably\nsuppose that he had been so all the time. But, with our present\nknowledge, our chief guide as to other matters seems to be the fact\nthat the most backward of existing savages possess powers of body and\nmind, and forms and products of culture, which must have been acquired\ngradually through a long course of development from no better origins\nthan are traceable in apes and wolves. As the use of good stone weapons\nby living savages and the occurrence of stone weapons in deposits\nof various age in the Pleistocene\u2014less and less perfectly made the\nfurther we go back\u2014justify us in assuming that there must have been\neoliths of even cruder workmanship at remoter dates, so the possession\nby savages of extensive languages, intricate customs, luxuriant myths,\nconsiderable reasoning powers and even humane sentiments, compel us to\nimagine such possessions as belonging to our prehistoric ancestors,\nin simpler and simpler forms, as we go back age by age toward the\nbeginning. A tentative reconstruction of the lost series of events may\nsometimes be supported by what has been observed of the individual\ndevelopment of our children.\n\n(_a_) For example, the constructive impulse, slightly shown by\nanthropoids that make beds and shelters in the trees, was called into\nactivity in man especially in the making of weapons, tools and snares,\nand became an absorbing passion; so that a savage (often accused of\nbeing incapable of prolonged attention!) will sit for days working at\na spear or an axe: they are inattentive only to what does not interest\nthem. Many children from about the sixth year come under the same sort\nof fascination\u2014digging, building, making bows and arrows, boats and\nso forth. This is a necessary preparation for all the achievements\nof civilised life; and it is reasonable to suppose that the stages\nof growth of such interest in construction are indicated by the\nimprovement of ancient implements.\n\n(_b_) As to language\u2014in the most general sense, as the communication\nof emotions and ideas by vocal sounds\u2014the rudiments of it are\nwidespread in animal life. A sort of dog-language is recognised, and\nmonkeys seem to have a still greater \u201cvocabulary.\u201d Hence, a number of\nemotional vocal expressions was probably in use among the primitive\nhuman stock. And the new hunting-life was favourable to the development\nof communicative signs; for it depended on co-operation, which is\nwanting in ape-life, and in the lower extant savages hardly exists,\nexcept in hunting, war, and magical or religious rites. Hunting,\nmoreover, is (as I have said) especially encouraging to onomatop\u0153ic\nexpression in imitating the noises of animals, etc. It was still more\nfavourable, perhaps, to the growth of gesture-language in imitating\nthe behaviour of animals and the actions involved in circumventing\nand attacking them. Increasing powers of communication were extremely\nuseful, and the pack must have tried to develop them. Without the\nendeavour to communicate, there could never have been a language better\nthan the ape\u2019s; nor could there have been the endeavour without the\nneed. That gesture alone was very helpful may be assumed; and it must\nhave assisted in fixing the earliest vocal signs for things and actions\nand qualities, and probably determined the earliest syntax; but when,\nin hunting, members of the pack were hidden from one another, or when\ntheir hands were occupied, gesture was not available, and communication\ndepended on the voice. The speech of children similarly emerges from\nemotional noises and impulsive babbling, assisted by gesture.\n\nPassing to later ages, we cannot expect to learn much about the\nspeech of prehistoric men, whom we know only by a few bones. As to the\nJava skull, Dr. Keith observes that \u201cthe region of the brain which\nsubserves the essentially human gift of speech, was not ape-like in\nPithecanthropus. The parts for speech are there; they are small, but\nclearly foreshadow the arrangement of convolutions seen in modern\nman.\u201d On the other hand, \u201cthe higher association areas ... had not\nreached a human level.\u201d[59] The jaw of this skull not having been\nfound, nothing can be said of its fitness for carrying out the process\nof articulation. As to Eoanthropus, \u201cif our present conception of\nthe orbital part of the third frontal convolution is well founded,\nnamely, that it takes part in the mechanism of speech, then we have\ngrounds for believing that the Piltdown man had reached that point\nof brain-development when speech had become a possibility. When one\nlooks at the lower jaw, however, and the projecting canine teeth,\none hesitates to allow him more than a potential ability.\u201d[60] The\njaw had not undergone the characteristic changes which in modern man\ngive freedom to the tongue in the articulation of words.[61] But Dr.\nKeith \u201ccannot detect any feature in the frontal, parietal or occipital\nareas which clearly separate this brain-cast from modern ones.\u201d[62]\nEoanthropus, therefore, must have had a good deal to say and, being a\nsocial animal, must have felt the need of expression; and, though he\nwas not a direct ancestor of ours, it can hardly be doubted that at\nsome period the jaws of our own ancestors were no better adapted than\nhis to articulate speech. May we not infer that articulate speech,\nmeeting a need of the stock, arose very gradually, and was slowly\ndifferentiated from some less definite and structural connection of\nexpressive and onomatop\u0153ic vocables, such as we have seen may naturally\nhave arisen amongst the earliest hunters? _Pari passu_ the jaw was\nmodified.\n\n(_c_) All savages live by custom; gregarious animals have their\ncustoms; and in the primitive hunting-pack customs must have been\nearly established as \u201cconditions of gregariousness.\u201d M. Salomon\nReinach, indeed, thinks that the anthropoid probably became human\nas the result of inventing taboos, especially in sexual relations;\nthere was economy of nervous energy in the direction of the senses,\nand consequent enrichment of the intellect.[63] His hypothesis does\nnot carry us far, perhaps, into the particulars of human form and\nfaculty; but it contains this truth, that without the growth of customs\nthere could have been no progress for human nature; and it certainly\npoints to the probability that some custom was early established with\nregard to marriage. In Prof. Westermarck\u2019s opinion our species was\noriginally monogamous.[64] Supposing this to have been the custom,\nas it is amongst many Primates, could it have persisted after the\nformation of the hunting-pack? According to Mr. Thompson Seton,\nwolves pair \u201cprobably for life\u201d;[65] but this is disputed; and so it\nis whether or no the male of a seasonal pair takes part in caring\nfor the puppies.[66] Of the primitive human stock one may say that\nwhilst, on the one hand, the association of many males and females in\nthe same pack may have tended to break up the family, on the other\nhand, the long youth of the children and the parental care generally\ncharacteristic of Primates would have tended to preserve it; that the\npractice of pairing requires the largest number of males (setting aside\npolyandry), and lessens quarrelling, and is therefore favourable to the\nstrength of the pack; and that any custom may have been established\nthat was most favourable to the species in its new life. The least\nprobable of all conditions is promiscuity; for the rearing of children\nwith their ever-lengthening youth must have been difficult, taxing the\ncare of both parents.\n\n(_d_) The claim to property is instinctive in most animals\u2014claim\nto a certain territory, or to a nest, or lair, or mate. Each early\nhuman pack probably claimed a certain hunting-range; and each family\nits lair, which it guarded, as our domestic dog guards the house. In\nAustralia \u201cevery tribe has its own country, and its boundaries are\nwell known; and they are respected by others\u201d;[67] and the Bushmen,\nwho retained the ancient hunting-life more perfectly than any other\nknown people, are said to have been formerly divided into large tribes\nwith well-defined hunting-grounds.[68] As weapons or other implements,\ncharms, or ornaments came into use, the attitude toward the territory\nor lair will have been extended to include them; indeed, it seems to be\ninstinctive even in lower Primates. \u201cIn the Zoological Gardens,\u201d says\nDarwin, \u201ca monkey, which had weak teeth, used to break open nuts with a\nstone; and I was assured by the keepers that, after using the stone, he\nhid it in the straw, and would not let any other monkey touch it. Here,\nthen, we have the idea of property.\u201d[69] Among the half-wolf train-dogs\nof Canada, the claims of one to property seem to be recognised by\nothers; for a dog will defend its _cache_ of food against another that\nordinarily it fears; and \u201cthe bigger dog rarely presses the point.\u201d[70]\nThe utility of keeping the peace within the tribe, no doubt, led to the\ngrowth of customs concerning property, and to their protection by the\nsocial sanction, and later by the taboo.[71] For taboo cannot be the\norigin of respect for property or for any custom: it implies a custom\nalready existing, which it protects by the growth of a belief in some\nmagical penalty that is effective even when there are no witnesses. The\nsame utility of order must have established customs of dividing the\nkill of the pack: later also protected by taboo, as we still see in\nmany savage tribes.\n\nThe attitude towards property is very variable amongst the tribes now\nknown to us. Still, considering how early and strongly it is manifested\nby children, we may infer with some plausibility its antiquity in\nthe race. The urgent desire of property, and tenacity in holding it,\ndisplayed by many individuals, though not an amiable, has been a highly\nuseful trait, to which is due that accumulation of capital that has\nmade possible the whole of our material and much of our spiritual\ncivilisation. Amongst barbarians it may be a necessary condition\nof social order. Had not wealth been highly prized amongst our own\nancestors, it is hard to see how revenge could ever have been appeased\nby the wergeld. The payment, indeed, was not the whole transaction;\nit implied an acknowledgment of guilt and of the obligation to make\namends; but these things would not have mollified an enemy nurtured in\nthe tradition of the blood-feud, if silver had not been dear to him.\nIt is still accepted as compensation for injuries that seem difficult\nto measure by the ounce. Wealth gives rank, and gratifies not only the\ngreed but also the emulative spirit of the pack. Acquisitiveness is an\nessential trait of aristocracy, and adhesiveness of its perpetuity.\nHomespun prudence belongs, in our ancestry, to a more recent stratum\nof motives; we see it as a blind instinct in squirrels and beavers, a\nquasi-instinctive propensity in dogs and wolves (who hide food that\nthey cannot immediately devour); but it is not known in any anthropoid,\nand is acquired at some stage by some human races\u2014not by all; for\nit is not found in many extant savages. The only occasion on which\nAustralian tribes show prudential foresight as to food is on the\napproach of the season of magical rites, when they lay in a stock of\nfood before giving themselves up for weeks or months body and soul\nto thaumaturgy.[72] Prudence is not, however, merely a function of\nforesight or intelligence, or else the Irish would be as prudent as the\nScotch.\n\n(_e_) The first wars, probably, were waged for hunting-grounds; and\nthis may have been a revival, for the carnivorous anthropoid pack,\nof a state of affairs that existed amongst their ancestors at a much\nearlier date; for battles for a feeding-ground have been witnessed\nbetween troops of the lower Primates. Such a battle between two bands\nof langur (_Semnopithecus entellus_) has been described;[73] and Darwin\nrelates after Brehm how \u201cin Abyssinia, when baboons of one species (_C.\ngelada_) descend in troops from the mountains to plunder the fields,\nthey sometimes encounter troops of another species (_C. hamadryas_),\nand then a fight ensues. The Geladas roll down great stones, which\nthe Hamadryas try to avoid, and then both species, making a great\nuproar, rush furiously against each other.\u201d[74] As packs of the\nwolf-ape increased in numbers and spread over the world, they no doubt\ngenerally came to regard one another as rivals upon the same footing\nas the great cats and packs of dogs, and every attempt at expansion or\nmigration provoked a battle. Wars strengthened the internal sympathies\nand loyalties of the pack or tribe and its external antipathies, and\nextended the range and influence of the more virile and capable tribes.\n\nIt is true that neighbouring tribes of savages are not now always\nmutually hostile. In Australia, we are told, local groups and adjacent\ntribes are usually friendly;[75] but with them the age of expansion\nseems to have closed some time ago, and a sort of equilibrium has been\nestablished. On the other hand, it is a shallow sort of profundity that\ninsists upon interpreting every war as a struggle for nutrition, an\neffort to solve the social problem. Aggressiveness and insatiable greed\nare characteristic of many tribes\u2014passions always easily exploited by\ntheir leaders, as in the civilised world by dynasts and demagogues.\nPlethora is more insolent than poverty. Lust of power, of glory, of\nmere fighting is a stronger incentive than solicitude for the poor.\n\nHowever, in the development of society nothing has been so influential\nas war: an immense subject, for the outlines of which I refer to\nHerbert Spencer\u2019s _Political Institutions_.[76]\n\n(_f_) Most of the amusements as well as the occupations of mankind\ndepend for their zest upon the spirit of hunting and fighting, which\nthey gratify and relieve, either directly or in a conventionalised\nand symbolical way, and at the same time keep alive. Sports and games\ninvolve the pursuit of some end by skill and strategy, often the\nseizing upon some sort of prey, or slaying outright, and they give\nscope to emulation. Emulation is a motive in the race for wealth, in\nevery honourable career, even in addiction to science and learning:\nthough here the main stress is upon an instinct older than the\npack\u2014curiosity, a general character of the Primates. That children\nat first play alone, later play together, and then \u201cmake up sides,\u201d\nrepeats the change from the comparatively solitary life of anthropoids\nto the social life and combined activities of the hunting-pack. From\nthe interest of the chase and the aggressiveness that is involved in it\nmust be derived all that we call \u201centerprise,\u201d whether beneficent or\ninjurious: a trait, certainly, which there is little reason to regard\nas inherited from the anthropoid stock.\n\n(_g_) The great amusement and pastime of feeding has, no doubt,\ndescended to us in unbroken tradition, through harvest and vintage\nfestivals, from the unbridled indulgence that followed a successful\nhunt. And I offer the conjecture that the origin of laughter and\nthe enjoyment of broad humour (so often discussed) may be traced to\nthese occasions of riotous exhilaration and licence. We may suppose,\nindeed, that these conditions began to prevail not in the earliest\ndays of the ravenous pack, but after some advance had been made in the\ncustoms of eating. Savages usually cram to repletion when possible,\nand with huge gusto, for there may not soon be another opportunity.\nIf uproarious feasting was advantageous physically and socially (as\ntill recently we all thought it was), addiction to the practice was a\nground of survival; and laughter (a discharge of undirected energy, as\nSpencer says), being its natural expression and enhancement, shared in\nits perpetuation. This social origin agrees with the infectiousness\nof laughter, with its connection with triumph and cruelty, and with\nthe quality of the jokes that still throughout the world excite\nmost merriment\u2014practical jokes and allusions to drunkenness, the\nindecorous, the obscene. Sir Robert Walpole preferred such humour as\nthe most sociable; because in that everybody could take part. Many\nrefinements have been introduced in polite circles; but it is in vain\nthat one begins a theory of laughter with an analysis of the genius of\nMoli\u00e8re.\n\nSimilarly, I suppose that weeping, lamentation and the facial and\nbodily expressions of grief were developed by the social utility of\ncommon mourning in tribal defeat and bereavement.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. MORALISATION OF THE HUNTERS\n\nWe are left to speculate about the earliest growth of magnanimity,\nfriendliness, compassion, general benevolence and other virtues.\nThey cannot be explained merely by the hunting-life, which so easily\naccounts for greed, cruelty, pride and every sort of aggressiveness.\nRobert Hartmann writes: \u201cIt is well known that both rude and civilised\npeoples are capable of showing unspeakable and, as it is erroneously\ntermed, inhuman cruelty towards each other. These acts of cruelty,\nmurder and rapine are often the result of the inexorable logic of\nnational characteristics and, unhappily, are truly human, since nothing\nlike them can be traced in the animal world. It would, for instance,\nbe a grave mistake to compare a tiger with a bloodthirsty executioner\nof the Reign of Terror, since the former only satisfies his natural\nappetite in preying on other animals. The atrocities of the trials\nfor witchcraft, the indiscriminate slaughter committed by the Negroes\non the coast of Guinea, the sacrifice of human victims by the Khonds,\nthe dismemberment of living men by the Battus, find no parallel in the\nhabits of animals in their savage state. And such a comparison is,\nabove all, impossible in the case of anthropoids, which display no\nhostility toward men or other animals unless they are first attacked.\nIn this respect the anthropoid ape stands upon a higher plane than\nmany men.\u201d[77] Are we, then, to explain the more amiable side of human\nnature, partly at least, by derivation from the frugivorous Primates,\nextensively modified by our wolfish adaptation, but surviving as latent\ncharacter?\n\n(_a_) Several further considerations may be offered to account for the\ngrowth of what we call humanity, (i) The long non-age of human children\nis favourable to the attachments of family life, and such attachments\nmay under certain conditions be capable of extension beyond the\nfamily; but I cannot trace the whole flood of altruistic regard to the\nsole source of maternal or parental love. (ii) Friendliness and the\ndisposition to mutual aid are so useful to a hunting-pack that is not\nmerely seasonal but permanent (as I take ours to have been), both to\nindividuals and to the pack as a whole, within certain limits (as that\nthe wounded, sick, or aged must not amount to an encumbrance), that we\nmay suppose natural selection to have favoured the growth of effective\nsympathy, not merely in mutual defence, but so far as it is actually\nfound at present in backward tribes. It nowhere seems to be excessive;\nand its manifestation in some civilised races seems to depend not\nupon a positive increase of benevolence in the generality, but (iii)\nupon the breaking down here and there of conditions that elsewhere\noppose and inhibit it. Thus the generosity, mercy and magnanimity that\nconstitute the chivalrous ideal, depend (I believe) upon the attainment\nby a class of such undisputed superiority that there is no occasion\nfor jealousy or rivalry in relation to other classes; for should the\nsuperiority be disputed, these virtues quickly disappear. Similarly,\nwhat have been called the \u201cslavish virtues\u201d of charity, humility,\nlong-suffering may arise amongst those who are free from rivalry,\nbecause they have no hope of aggrandisement in wealth or honour,\nand who have indeed suffered long. With the interfusion of classes,\ntheir virtues interfuse; for they have a common root, and are active,\nprovided that circumstances do not inhibit them.\n\n(iv) But since in individuals our complex nature varies in all\ndirections, and amongst the rest in the direction of benevolence; and\nsince any organ or quality that varies is apt to continue to do so,\nand may go on varying even beyond the limits of biological utility;\nwhy in human life may not this happen with benevolence (or with any\nother passion or virtue); so that in some men it expands with wonderful\nrichness and beauty even to the sacrifice of themselves\u2014nay, by\nexcessive clemency or generosity, even to the injury of the tribe or of\nthe race?\n\n(_b_) The moral sense or conscience has been discussed by Darwin[78]\n\u201cexclusively from the side of natural history\u201d; so as this is the way\nof considering human nature in the present book, I shall epitomise his\naccount of it; which seems to be true, and to which I see little to\nadd. He finds four chief conditions of the growth of a moral sense:\n(_a_) the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the\nsociety of its fellows, to sympathise with them and to help them.\n(_b_) When the mind is highly developed, images of past actions and\nmotives continually recur; \u201cand that feeling of dissatisfaction or even\nmisery which invariably results ... from any dissatisfied instinct\nwould arise as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always\npresent social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time\nstronger, but neither enduring in its nature nor leaving behind it a\nvery vivid impression\u201d\u2014as with anger or greed. (_c_) After language\nhas been acquired, public opinion can be expressed, and becomes the\nparamount guide of action; though still \u201cour regard for the approbation\nand disapprobation of our fellows depends on sympathy.\u201d (_d_) Social\ninstinct, sympathy and obedience to the judgment of the community are\nstrengthened by the formation of habit. Darwin then proves successively\nthese four positions.\n\nSeeing the stress here laid upon sympathy, it may make the matter\nclearer if we observe that the word occurs in different senses\u2014for\nthe participation in another\u2019s satisfaction or distress (emotional\nsympathy) and readiness to help (effective sympathy); and these are the\nmeanings under (_a_), the first of the above heads: and, again, for the\nknowledge that there are ideas or judgments in another\u2019s mind together\nwith approval or disapproval of our actions; and this is the meaning\nunder (_c_), the third head. But knowledge of another\u2019s thoughts is\nnot sympathy, except so far as, being accompanied with assent to\nhis judgment, there is participation in his feelings of approval or\ndisapproval; and, if we dissent from his judgment, there may, indeed,\nbe perceptive sympathy as to his feelings, but there is no emotional\nsympathy or participation in them\u2014there is rather fear or resentment.\nIt is necessary to bear in mind that perception of another\u2019s feelings,\nparticipation in them and impulse to help or relieve are separable\nprocesses, and that perceptive sympathy is as active in cruelty as in\ngenerosity or mercy.\n\nIt may be added that (_b_), the second of the four conditions assigned\nby Darwin as determining the growth of the moral sense or conscience,\naccounts more especially for \u201cremorse of conscience\u201d; and that (_c_),\nthe third condition, explains that tone of authority attaching to\nconscience on which Bishop Butler laid so much stress.[79]\n\nHow early the moral sense began to form itself in our stock cannot be\nestimated because it must have been a very gradual process. Probably\nthe rudiments of it appeared in the family life of the ape even before\nour differentiation; and the authoritative character of conscience\nestablished itself under the discipline of the hunting-pack before\nthere was much development of mind (for dogs know what theft is), and\nunder pressure of a public opinion that managed to express itself\nwithout language. In an original and suggestive book[80] Mr. Trotter\nhas shown that a herd (pack, tribe or nation) necessarily approves\nof whatever actions are done in its interests as good or right, and\ndisapproves of the contrary actions as bad or wrong. Confident that\nits beliefs and customs are good and right, the pack persecutes\ndissenters and nonconformists. \u201cGood\u201d is a relative idea. \u201c\u2018The good\nare good warriors and hunters,\u2019 said a Pawnee chief; whereupon the\nauthor who mentions the saying remarks that this would also be the\nopinion of a wolf if he could express it.\u201d[81] Hence we may guess the\nprincipal contents of the primitive categorical imperative. The study\nof Ethnology and History enables us to trace the modification and\nenrichment of those contents under varying conditions of culture, and\nfor the results of such study I refer to Edward Westermarck\u2019s _Origin\nand Development of Moral Ideas_.\n\n(_c_) After the introduction of agriculture, the stress of natural\nselection was in certain directions altered. At first, indeed, most\nagricultural work, probably, was done by women; but in its progress it\nfell extensively into the hands of men; and then advantage accrued to\nthose tribes that were capable of steady industry and prudence. The new\nemployment decreased aggression on the principle that \u201chad Alexander\nbeen holding the plough, he could not have run his friend Clitus\nthrough with a spear.\u201d The sick and aged were now less an encumbrance\nthan they had been to hunters. Those who could not endure a settled\nlife wandered away in their old pursuits. The more aggressive clans\nslaughtered one another in the vendetta. Social pressure and hanging\neliminated many of the more idle, improvident, dishonest and unruly,\nwhose instincts resisted \u201caccommodation.\u201d The more neighbourly and\nco-operative tended to predominate. As civilisation intensifies, the\nnumerous ways of getting a livelihood, which (as we have seen) derive\ntheir motive-force from the spirit of the pack, gratify that spirit\nunder so many disguises and with so little direct personal collision,\nas to be compatible with a great deal of friendliness and benevolence;\nand co-operation, direct or indirect, steadily increases.\n\n(_d_) Increasing capacity of forming ideas of remote ends and of\nco-ordinating many activities in their pursuit, implies the inhibition\nof many aggressive or distracting impulses, and constitutes an\nautomatic control. And although it is now fashionable to depreciate\nthe power of intelligence in human life, surely, its development has\nhad great influence. As men come to foresee the many consequences\nof action they learn to modify and regulate it, as each foreseen\nconsequence excites some impulse, either reinforcing or inhibiting\naction. Reflection upon our lot has done much to ameliorate it. The\n\u201cconditions of gregariousness\u201d (to use W.\u00a0K. Clifford\u2019s definition\nof morality) have been expounded by the more penetrating and\ncomprehensive minds\u2014prophets, poets, philosophers; and some disciples\nhave understood them and have persuaded many to believe. Nor have\nsuch luminaries arisen only in the later phases of culture when their\nwritings have been delivered or their sayings recorded. Probably it\nwas some one man who first pointed out to a tribe that had ignored\nthe fact, that whether a wrong had been done by accident or on\npurpose affected the agent\u2019s guilt and ought to affect the penalty\nexacted. Some one man, probably, first saw what injustice is often\ndisguised by the specious equality of the _lex talionis_; another\nfirst tried to assuage the bitterness of a vendetta by appointing\ncompensation; another, perhaps first proposed to substitute animal\nfor human sacrifice, or a puppet for a slave. And when we read the\nlists of sagacious proverbs that have been collected from many savage\ntribes, we must consider that it was by eminent individuals that those\nsayings were first uttered one by one: individuals with the gifts of\ninsight and expression to summarise the experience of a whole tribe in\nmemorable words, rude forerunners of our prophets and philosophers.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINARY ENVIRONMENT\n\nThe necessity of learning the whole art of hunting from its rudiments,\nwithout the help of instinct or tradition, by sheer observation, memory\nand inference, put extraordinary stress upon the brain. At first by\nknowledge, strategy, co-operation and persistence of will, later by\ndevising weapons and snares, evolving language and discovering the ways\nof making and utilising fire, man found means of entirely changing the\nconditions of his life; but this would have been impossible without\na great development of his brain; and, accordingly, it appears that\nEoanthropus, at the beginning of the Pleistocene, had a skull with\nthree times the cubic capacity of the anthropoids. With the growth of\nthe brain came a continually increasing fecundity of ideas. \u201cPiltdown\nman saw, heard, felt, thought, and dreamt much as we do.\u201d[82] The use\nof ideas is to foresee events and prepare for them beforehand: the\ngreat advantage of distance-senses over contact-senses, is to give an\nanimal time to adapt its actions to deferred events; and ideas give\nthis power in a vastly higher degree. So far the utility of brains and\nideas seems obvious. But in order that ideas may be useful in this\nway, they must (one would suppose) represent and anticipate the actual\ncourse of events. If they falsely indicate the order of nature, or\neven beings and actions that do not exist at all, ideas may seem to be\nworse than useless.\n\nNow, when we turn to the lowest existing savages, they are found to\npossess, in comparison with apes, a considerable fecundity of ideas;\nconstituting, on the one hand, a good stock of common sense, or\nknowledge of the properties and activities of the things and animals\naround them, and of how to deal with them, which enables them to carry\non the affairs of a life much more complex and continuous than any\nanimal\u2019s: but including, on the other hand, a strange collection of\nbeliefs about magic and spirits, which entirely misrepresent the course\nof nature and the effective population of the world. These latter\nbeliefs, or imaginative delusions, hamper them in so many ways, waste\nso much time, lead them sometimes into such dark and cruel practices,\nthat one may be excused for wondering whether their bigger brains\ncan have been, on the whole, of any biological advantage to them in\ncomparison with the anthropoids. The anthropoids live by common sense.\nSo do savages, and they have much more of it; but the anthropoids seem\nnot to be troubled by magic and animism. We must suppose that the\ncommon sense of primitive man increased age by age, as he became more\nand more perfectly adapted to the hunting-life, and that at some stage\nhis imagination began to falsify the relations of things and the powers\nof nature. It seems that imagination-beliefs depend chiefly upon the\ninfluence of desire and fear, suggestibility, hasty generalisation, and\nthe seduction of reasoning by analogy. At what stage imaginations, thus\ndivorced from reality, began to influence human life, it is impossible\nto say; but it cannot be less than half a million years ago, if (as Dr.\nKeith says) Eoanthropus, 400,000 years ago, \u201cthought and dreamt much as\nwe do.\u201d Why did not such delusions hinder our development? Or did they\npromote it?\n\nThe first consideration is, that biological adaptation is nearly always\na compromise: if any organ or faculty be useful on the whole, in spite\nof some disutility, its increase favours the survival of those in\nwhom it increases; and this is true of the brain and its thinking.\nThe second is, that nearly all the magical and animistic beliefs and\npractices that are socially destructive, probably belong to a stage\nof human life that is attained long after our differentiation has\nbeen established, and when some progress has been made in arts and\ncustoms. Savages of the lowest culture have few beliefs that can be\ncalled positively injurious. Talismans and spells, not by themselves\nrelied upon, but only adscititious to common-sense actions, give\nconfidence without weakening endeavour. To curse, or to \u201cpoint the\nbone,\u201d does not create but merely expresses a malevolent purpose; and,\nalthough sometimes fatal by suggestion, is on the whole better than\nto assassinate. Taboos do more good by protecting person and property\nand custom than they do harm by restricting the use of foods. Belief\nin imaginary evils waiting upon secret sins exerts, whilst supported\nby social unanimity, a control upon all kinds of behaviour: it is the\nbeginning of the \u201creligious sanction,\u201d and one sort of conscience. The\ndread of spirits that prowl at night keeps people in the family-cave\nor by the camp-fire; and that is the best place for them. Many rites\nand observances are sanitary. Totemism rarely does any harm, and may\nonce have usefully symbolised the unity of social groups. Totemic and\nmagical dances give excellent physical training, promote the spirit\nof co-operation, are a sort of drill; and (like all art), whilst\nindulging, they also restrain imagination by imposing upon it definite\nforms. For a long time there was no special profession of wizard or\npriest, with whose appearance most of the evil of magic and animism\noriginates; though probably even they generally do more good than\nharm by their courage and sagacity, by discovering drugs and poisons,\nby laying ghosts, and by their primitive studies in medicine and\npsychology.\n\nThe wizard, however, and the priest, who could never have existed but\nfor the prevalent beliefs in Magic and Animism, have a further and far\nmore important function in human life, namely, the organisation, or\nrather reorganisation of society. The organisation of the hunting-pack\ndescribed above was liable through several causes to fall asunder.\nSome of these causes are obvious: (_a_) The improvement of weapons\nand snares and discovery of poisons made very small parties, or even\nsingle families, self-sufficing\u2014as among the Bushmen (though they\nsometimes assembled for a grand hunt).[83] (_b_) Failure of game from\ndesiccation, as in Australia, or because the tribe has been driven into\na poor country like Tierra del Fuego; so that a small population is\nscattered over a wide area, and reduced to a greater or less dependence\non \u201ccollecting.\u201d (_c_) The adoption of even a primitive agricultural\nor pastoral life may make hunting a secondary interest. In such cases\nthe natural leaders of a clan are no longer (as in the old pack)\nplainly indicated; and if society is to be saved from anarchy, some\nnew control must establish itself for the preservation of tradition\nand custom. Conceivably this happened in several ways; but in fact\n(I believe) we know of only one, namely: First, the rule of wizards,\nwho are chiefly old men credited with mysterious power that makes\nthe boldest tribesman quail, such as the headmen and elders of an\nAustralian tribe. In New Guinea, too, and much of Melanesia, the power\nof rulers, even though recognised as of noble birth, depends chiefly\nupon their reputation for Magic. And among the Bushmen secrets about\npoisons and antidotes and colours for painting (probably considered\nmagical) were heirlooms in certain families of chiefs, and gave them\ncaste.[84] Secondly, at a later stage, as the belief in ghosts more\nand more prevails, and ancestral ghosts are worshipped, and ghosts\nof heroes or chiefs become veritable gods, the priests who celebrate\ntheir worship strengthen the position of chiefs or kings descended\nfrom these gods, and help to maintain more comprehensive and coherent\ngovernments than those established upon Magic only; though to these\nlater forms, also, and to Religion itself magical beliefs contribute\ntheir support. The inevitable development of illusory imaginations\nalong with common sense, then, assisted early and also later culture,\nbecause they preserved order and cohesion by re-arousing the ancient\nsubmission and loyalty of the pack. For common sense is always limited\nto present conditions, it could never have foreseen the dependence of\nhuman life upon order and the necessity of maintaining cohesion even\nat great immediate sacrifices. These interests were, therefore, served\nindirectly through delusions; natural selection must, within certain\nlimits, have favoured the superstitious. Excessively imaginative\nand superstitious tribes may sometimes have been eliminated; for\ncommon sense also has biological utility. But, perverse as it may\nseem, imaginations utterly false have had their share in promoting\n\u201cprogress\u201d: co-operating with agriculture and trade, magic, religions\nand the fine arts have, by supporting government and civil order,\nhelped in accommodating us, and even in some measure adapting us, to\nour present condition, such as it is.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[28] See _The Antiquity of Man_, by Arthur Keith.\n\n[29] _Malay Archipelago_, pp. 46-7.\n\n[30] According to R. L. Garner, however, both gorillas and chimpanzees\nare polygamous. See _Gorillas and Chimpanzees_, pp. 54 and 214.\n\n[31] This view is not opposed to the suggestion I have somewhere\nseen that the collecting activities of women, whilst men hunted,\nmay, at some stage, have led to property and domestication of plants\nand animals. Again, the pastoral and agricultural states are not\nnecessarily successive: it depends upon local conditions. For an\nexcellent survey of the gradual rise of primitive culture and the\ndifficulties it encountered, see H. Spencer\u2019s _Industrial Institutions,\nPrinciples of Sociology_, Vol. III.\n\n[32] It is certainly believed by fox-hunters that a fox feeds his vixen\nwhen she is occupied with their family, and that \u201cif the vixen is\nkilled he will bring up the family by himself.\u201d\u2014Thomas F. Dale, _The\nFox_, pp. 12, 13.\n\nNothing incredible in this\u2014nor of wolves. Can the vixen provide for\nherself and litter alone? If not, the dog must do it: else there could\nbe no foxes or wolves.\n\nHowever, de Canteleu denies that the he-wolf takes any part in rearing\nthe young (_La Chasse du Loup_, p. 30).\n\n[33] W. P. Pycraft, in his entertaining _Courtship of Animals_, after\nassuming that Man became a hunter for the sake of the excitement such\na life afforded, goes on (p. 23): \u201cA little later the advantages of\nneighbourliness were borne in on him, largely for the sake of the\ngreater ease wherewith the animals of the chase could be captured by\ntheir combined efforts; but this begat comradeship and some of the\ngraces that follow therefrom.\u201d\n\n[34] _Descent of Man_, ch. xx.\n\n[35] See above, footnote on p. 32.\n\n[36] Avebury, _Prehistoric Times_, 7th ed., p. 580.\n\n[37] _Inquiries into Human Faculty_, p. 262.\n\n[38] _Hunting Trips in North America_, p. 349.\n\n[39] G. W. Stone, _Native Races of South Africa_, p. 91.\n\n[40] _The Arctic Prairies_, p. 20.\n\n[41] _La Chasse du Loup_, p. 21.\n\n[42] _Life Histories of Northern Animals_, p. 755.\n\n[43] _Wild Beasts of India_, pp. 275-6. Cf. Casserly, _Life on an\nIndian Outpost_, pp. 94-5. Brehm says, in _Thierleben_, that in Russia\nwolves attack and kill the bear.\n\n[44] _Life Histories of Northern Animals_, p. 754.\n\n[45] _Naturalist in La Plata_, p. 346.\n\n[46] _Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter_, p. 70.\n\n[47] _Op. cit._, pp. 336-7.\n\n[48] Hiram S. Maxim, _My Life_, p. 57.\n\n[49] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 388.\n\n[50] _Op. cit._, pp. 6-7.\n\n[51] _Op. cit._, p. 78.\n\n[52] _Malay Archipelago_, p. 43.\n\n[53] See the _Report of the British Association_, 1900, pp. 711-30. The\nauthor has since then revised his estimates, assigning much greater\ndepth to the Pliocene and Miocene deposits and proportionally more\ntime for their formation. See the _Quarterly Journal of the Geological\nSociety_, LXV. (1909).\n\n[54] Dr. Smith Woodward\u2019s reconstruction gives the skull of Eoanthropus\na capacity of about 1300 c.c.\n\n[55] See Ray Lankester\u2019s _Description of the Test-Specimen_. R.A.I.,\n_Occasional Papers_, No. 4.\n\n[56] Book VII. chs. 69, 71, 74.\n\n[57] E. Thompson Seton, _The Arctic Prairies_, pp. 304 and 352.\n\n[58] _Op. cit._, pp. 151, 239, 476.\n\n[59] _Antiquity of Man_, p. 268.\n\n[60] A. Keith, _op. cit._, p. 408.\n\n[61] _Op. cit._, p. 452.\n\n[62] _Op. cit._, p. 414.\n\n[63] _Cultes, Mythes et Religion_, III. p. 430.\n\n[64] _Primitive Marriage_, ch. iii.\n\n[65] _Life Histories of Northern Animals_, p. 757.\n\n[66] See above, \u00a7 3 (4), footnote, p. 37.\n\n[67] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 198.\n\n[68] G. W. Stone, _Native Races of South Africa_, p. 33.\n\n[69] _Descent of Man_, ch. iii.\n\n[70] E. Thompson Seton, _Life Histories of Northern Animals_, p. 769.\n\n[71] E. Westermarck, _Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, II. p. 52.\n\n[72] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Northern Territory of\nAustralia_, p. 27.\n\n[73] _Royal Natural History_, I. pp. 72-3.\n\n[74] _Descent of Man_, ch. iii.\n\n[75] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 200.\n\n[76] _Principles of Sociology_, Vol. II.\n\n[77] _Anthropoid Apes_, pp. 294-5.\n\n[78] _Descent of Man_, ch. iv.\n\n[79] _Sermons on Human Nature._\n\n[80] _The Herd Instinct._\n\n[81] Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, II. p. 89.\n\n[82] A. Keith, _op. cit._, p. 429.\n\n[83] G. M. Theal, _History and Ethnology of South Africa_, p. 11.\n\n[84] G. W. Stone, _Native Races of South Africa_, p. 76.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nBELIEF AND SUPERSTITION\n\n\n\u00a7 1. SUPERSTITION\n\nInasmuch as the influence of superstition upon the history of society\ncan hardly be exaggerated, it must be worth while to inquire into\nits origin and nature. But this inquiry leads into a quagmire of\nambiguous words: and to attempt to define them for all purposes would\nentangle the discussion in endless controversies. So it will be best\nto explain merely in what sense certain words will be used in this\nbook. \u201cSuperstition,\u201d for example, means in common use (I think) false\nbeliefs concerning supernatural powers, especially such as are regarded\nas socially injurious, and particularly as leading to obscurantism or\ncruelty: but it is often extended to cover beliefs of a negligible or\nfrivolous kind, such as stories about \u201cfairy-rings,\u201d or the unluckiness\nof seeing the new moon for the first time through glass. Plainly the\ninjuriousness of a false belief is often in dispute, and at any rate is\na question of time and place. \u201cSuperstition,\u201d then, is here used merely\nas a collective term for the subjects of the ensuing chapters\u2014Magic\n(or the belief in occult forces) and Animism (or the belief in the\nactivity of spirits).\n\nThe consequences of a belief, again, whether good or evil, cannot\naffect its psychological character: in trying to explain its nature and\norigin, one cannot take account of its social values. The explanation\nof superstitions must hold of all false beliefs, whatever their utility\nor disutility. Nay, further, whether a belief is false or true does not\nnecessarily affect its psychological character: for a man may hold two\ndoctrines, one true and the other false, both derived from the sincere\ntestimony of the same person, and he may not be able to discern any\ndifference in the degrees of confidence with which he holds them or in\ntheir influence upon his conduct. The understanding of false belief,\nthen, requires an examination of belief in general.\n\nStill, whilst in the mind of any given man a true and a false belief\nmay have the same character and origin, considered generally they\nmust surely have different origins and grounds; and to make the\nsequel clearer, I will anticipate its conclusions so far as to say\nthat true beliefs seem to rest on perception or inferences verified\nby perception, and false beliefs seem to depend upon imagination\nthat cannot be verified. This general statement will need several\nqualifications. But I rely upon it at present so far as to say that\nsuperstitions are essentially imagination-beliefs.\n\nWe shall find that these superstitions, though often held by whole\ntribes with the utmost assurance, differ in some subtle way from the\nperception-beliefs of their common sense, as that \u201cfire burns\u201d and\nthat \u201cwater quenches fire.\u201d They are unstable: (1) they become active\non occasions, and otherwise are apt to be forgotten\u2014as ghosts are\nonly thought of at night. (2) They are modifiable merely for the sake\nof economy or other convenience. (3) They lose their hold on a tribe,\nfall off and die in course of time without any change in the evidence\nfor them. (4) They depend a good deal upon the assent of a crowd. (5)\nThey often vary in neighbouring countries or families, or amongst the\nmembers of a family. This is not like common sense. Superstitions or\nimagination-beliefs are unstable, in spite of being often held with\ngreat obstinacy (so that people die for them), and of their enduring,\nin the simpler forms and at a certain level of social life, for\nthousands of years. There is something wanting in the holdfast or\nanchorage of imagination-beliefs.\n\nIt is necessary to explain what I mean by \u201cimagination.\u201d\n\n\n\u00a7 2. IMAGINATION\n\nIs it enough to define \u201cimagination\u201d as merely the having of mental\n\u201cimages,\u201d pictures before the mind\u2019s eye? This would confine\nimagination to visual representations, to the exclusion of auditory,\nolfactory, etc., which are all a man born blind can have, and which\nsometimes occur to those who can see, though the visual are commonest.\nThe word \u201cimages,\u201d therefore, is sometimes used to cover all these\nmodes of representation; though \u201cphantasmata\u201d would be better.\n\nAgain, a mental image or phantasm, visual or auditory, is improperly\ncalled an imagination, if there is nothing more than the reproduction\nof a single sense-quality. Imaginations represent not abstract\nsensations, but perceptions. To see an armed knight is not merely to\nhave a visual impression of him, but to perceive a living, solid,\nheavy object definitely in space; and imagination reproduces the whole\nof this, and otherwise would be quite uninteresting. What would the\ntournament in _Ivanhoe_ amount to if the knights were only phantoms?\n\nFurther, imagination, merely as a reproduction of perception, is not\ndistinguished from memory; but, in use, the two are always contrasted.\nMemories are recognised (in their complete form) as returning to us\nfrom earlier experience, both their component pictures and the order of\nthem, and they are relatively stable; imaginations are felt to be more\nor less novel, and can easily be modified. Probably all the elements\nof an imagination might have occurred in a memory; but the arrangement\nof these elements is often so different from any actual experience as\nto baffle every attempt to redistribute them amongst their sources.\nHence, in normal cases, our attitudes toward a memory and toward an\nimagination are entirely different. If a seeming memory prove false, we\nsay it was only an imagination.\n\nBut, once more, a good many men never have images or phantasmata\n(except words), or very few or faint ones, or only when falling asleep,\nand so on. Yet they are not wanting in imagination; words or other\nsigns serve them instead of images to carry all meanings (the important\nmatter); they enter into the spirit of poetry and literary fiction:\nso that imagination may be active without images. And the fact seems\nto be that the effectiveness of mental processes depends very little\nupon phantasmata, but upon something much deeper in the mind; and that\nthere exist in men all degrees of concrete representative power, from\nthose who picture everything they think of with vivid and definite\ndetail, down, through many stages of decreasing realisation, to those\nwho have only faint or fragmentary \u201cimages,\u201d or even none at all:\nwithout its being possible to say (at present) that one type of mind is\nbetter or worse than another; though they may be adapted to different\ntasks.\n\nExpectation and reasoning, which are closely allied (for every\ndefinite expectation is a sort of inference), are often carried on in\npictures\u2014\u201cpicture thinking\u201d\u2014and this also is called imagination.\nTyndall\u2019s brilliant address on _The Scientific Uses of the Imagination_\nis well known. It greatly helps some men in thinking to form pictures\nof what they think about, such as a machine or an anatomical specimen,\nas if they had the thing before them; or even of an atom, which no man\never has before him, and which cannot be imagined by reproducing the\nprecept, but only by constructing a picture from much grosser materials\naccording to concepts. The picture thus formed necessarily falls short\nin some ways of the thing thought or meant, and can only be prevented\nfrom misleading us by guarding it with definitions or rules or abstract\nideas; and this shows that the effectiveness of thought, the deeper\nprocess mentioned above, is a concatenation or evolution of meanings\nor general ideas, and that it is, in part, by illustrating these that\npictures are useful: they also serve to fix attention, as words do.\n\nThus reasoning may express itself by imagination. On the other hand,\nimagination is more frequently contrasted with reason, as dealing in\nfiction, not reality. Our confusion is shown thus: to call an historian\nimaginative is depreciatory; yet it is as bad to say he is wanting in\nimagination. In the latter case, we mean that he fails adequately to\nconceive the events he treats of; in the former, that he embellishes or\ndistorts them with unverifiable representations.\n\nAgain, the term \u201cimagination\u201d is sometimes confined to intellectual\nprocesses in the fine arts: dramas, novels, etc., are works of\nimagination. Now dramas and novels all proceed upon one method, namely:\nthey begin by stating or insinuating an hypothesis concerning certain\npersons in a given situation, and then deducing (that is reasoning out)\nthe consequences, occasionally helping the plot by further assumptions:\nat least that is how it appears, though probably the main incident of\nthe plot is thought of first, and then an hypothesis is framed that\nconveniently leads up to it. And if the reasoning is feeble, and if\nthe subsidiary assumptions are too numerous or too facile, we say the\nwork is flimsy or improbable\u2014allowing for the _genre_; for a romance\nis not expected to be as probable as a modern novel. _Gulliver\u2019s\nTravels_ afford the most perfect example of this method; for each\nvoyage begins with a frank absurdity\u2014men six inches or sixty feet\nhigh, a flying island, rational horses; but this being granted, the\nsequel makes tolerable logic. Well, many scientific investigations seem\nto follow exactly the same method\u2014begin with an hypothesis, deduce\nthe consequences, and occasionally help out the argument with further\nhypotheses (though that is not all): and here again the conclusion is\nusually thought of first, and the hypothesis invented to explain it.\nIf it be said that the scientist believes his hypothesis to be true,\nwhilst the romancer does not, it may be replied that the scientist\nsometimes expressly warns us that his assumption is only a \u201cworking\nhypothesis,\u201d which may not be true (though he thinks it may be),\nwhereas early epic poets and minstrels often regarded their work as by\nno means without a foundation in fact.\n\nImagination and reasoning, then, are closely allied or interwoven,\nand the contrasting of them depends entirely upon this, that there\nis a sense in which imagination is not a presentation of truth or\nmatter-of-fact, whether it is believed to be or not; and a sense in\nwhich reasoning is devoted solely to the discovery of truth concerning\nfacts, and to that end is protected by a methodology, carefully\ncomparing its premises, carefully verifying its conclusions; whereas\nthe imagination that is contrasted with reasoning knows nothing of a\nmethodology nor of verification. Even the modern novelist, a great part\nof whose hypothesis is usually true\u2014the present state of society,\nfacts of history or geography, etc.,\u2014does not pretend to present a\ntruth of fact. It belongs to his art to play at reasoning; he has\nlearnt to play the game very well; but it remains play: he aims at and\nattains not truth but verisimilitude. And when we look back on the\nhistory of fiction we see (on the whole) the verisimilitude growing,\nage by age, slighter and fainter; till in early romance and poetry\nit is disturbed and broken and destroyed by stories about monsters,\nimpossible heroes, magicians and gods, believed at one time to be true,\nand just the same as stories still believed by barbarians and savages,\nbut which we believe no longer.\n\nIt is such stories as these last, including all superstitions, that\nI especially call \u201cimagination-beliefs.\u201d The term includes all false\nbeliefs, but with the rest I am not directly concerned. How are\nimagination-beliefs possible?\n\n\n\u00a7 3. BELIEF\n\nBelief is here used to denote the attitude of mind in which perceptions\nare regarded as real, judgments as true of matters-of-fact, actions and\nevents as about to have certain results. It is a serious and respectful\nattitude; for matter-of-fact compels us to adjust our behaviour to\nit, whether we have power to alter it or not. Hume describes belief\nas having a certain \u201cforce, vivacity, solidity, firmness, steadiness;\ninfluence and importance in governing our actions\u201d;[85] and these terms\nare quite just, but most of them are synonyms; and the whole dictionary\nwill not make anybody understand what belief is who has never felt it.\nHowever, there is no such person.\n\nThe quality of this attitude (or the \u201cfeeling\u201d of it) as a specific\n\u201cstate of consciousness\u201d is difficult to observe, because (like\npleasure or displeasure) it is always marginal to something else in\nthe focus of attention, some object, judgment or action; but we can\nappreciate it in its variations by considering the very different\ndegrees of \u201cforce, steadiness,\u201d etc., which characterise several\nbeliefs regarded as more or less probable. The degree of belief\nought to correspond with the weight of evidence: if evidence for\nany judgment is complete and uncontradicted, it may be called 1, and\nthe corresponding state of mind should be \u201ccertainty\u201d; if evidence\nfor it there is none, or if evidence for the contradictory judgment\nis complete, it may be called 0, and the state of mind \u201cdisbelief.\u201d\nBetween these extremes there is room for an infinite series of\nfractions, and for corresponding shades of doubt (which, of course, do\nnot really occur); and in the middle, at \u00bd, there should be suspension\nof judgment. But most of these refined attitudes are the luxury of a\nfew men severely trained in estimating evidence, and by them enjoyed\nonly in the departments they have been trained in. For the mass of\nmankind, a very few shades of confidence or dubiety fill up their\nscale of judgment-values; and these may be far from corresponding as\nthey should do with the quantity or quality of the evidence; and the\nnearest they get to suspension of judgment is a state of hesitation\nbetween alternatives that by turns seem equally likely. Disbelief,\nthough the opposite logically to belief, as rejection to acceptance,\nhas, nevertheless, much in common with it\u2014the character of finality\nand positiveness, which is often (perhaps always) derived from belief\nin something else which is incompatible with the given judgment.\n\nWhen the attitude of belief is established in one\u2019s mind by evidence\nclearly conceived, whether by the examination of facts or the weighing\nof arguments, it is called \u201cconviction,\u201d and so is the process of\nbringing it about; but if it results from considerations imperfectly\nappreciated, and from emotional appeals, especially when urged by\nanother person, it may be called \u201cpersuasion,\u201d though the word\ndescribes the process rather than the result. Most imagination-beliefs,\nincluding all superstitions, are persuasions.\n\nIt is generally admitted that the test of the strength of one\u2019s belief\nis its influence upon our actions\u2014where the test is practicable. With\nfull belief one acts \u201cconfidently\u201d (a significant verbal proposition!);\nin doubt, hesitatingly or cautiously; in disbelief, not at all, or in\nthe sense of the contrary belief. But we cannot always judge of a man\u2019s\nbeliefs from his actions; for he may be actuated by several beliefs,\nand we do not know what they are. And popular actions that involve no\nloss or hardship may express mere assent without belief.\n\nThere is a kind of imagination-belief, and the purest kind, which has\nnothing to do with evidence: it is often called \u201cmake-believe\u201d or\n\u201cplay-belief\u201d: the entering into or contemplating some activity, which\nwe know to have no direct bearing on our necessary interests, with as\nmuch ardour and absorption as if it were the only important thing in\nthe world: as in games and sports, especially in drama and romance.\nThis is one of the many things that do not astonish because they are\nso common; and the usual (and probably the true) explanation of it is,\nthat this state of mind is of the utmost utility in giving zest to\nplay, especially during youth. For many animals share in this spirit;\nand the young of the higher animals, which enjoy a long protected\nyouth, pass the time chiefly at play, and thereby develop and train\nall their faculties, physical and mental. It somewhat outlasts youth\nin many animals, and conspicuously in ourselves, some having nothing\nbetter to do (and they might do worse), and others relieving from time\nto time the strain or tedium of work and, in some sort, prolonging\nyouth into middle age; till play becomes gradually less engrossing.\n\nThis play-belief depends entirely upon imaginative excitement; and it\nshows that the attitude of belief may be adopted voluntarily, or fall\nupon us (as it were) by surprise and maintain itself for a time in\ngreat strength: with many at a melodrama it runs to anxiety, weeping\nand anguish; and this not only without evidence, but in spite of the\nknowledge that this is London, whose magistrates would never permit\nsuch doings: only one forgets London, with all its dull conventions of\nlaw and order. Attention is engrossed by the play.\n\nPlay-belief has the same traits as were said above to mark\nsuperstitions: (1) it becomes active on occasions, and otherwise\ndisappears; (2) it is always modifiable for convenience or by a change\nof taste; (3) it loses its hold and tends to die out in a man as time\ngoes on; (4) it is strengthened by the assent of an excited crowd; (5)\nthe objects of such beliefs are very variable. We shall find that in\nother ways there is a close alliance between superstition and play.\nBut, certainly, superstition has a much deeper hold upon our nature;\nfor it not only excites fear and anxiety, but itself is born of those\npassions: the desire of security and confidence, the dread of impending\nand unknown perils, these are its life and strength. So that the wonder\nis that superstitions are not more enduring. And the truth seems to be\nthat the tendency to adopt superstitions does endure at a certain level\nof mentality, though particular superstitious beliefs are mutable; just\nas in the individual, a disposition to play outlasts many particular\nmodes of recreation.\n\nBelief, then, is an attitude of mind in which we may find ourselves\nfor good reasons, or for bad reasons, or for none at all; sometimes\neven slipping into it voluntarily or involuntarily when we know the\nsituation is unreal; indeed, an attitude in which, in play or earnest,\nwe pass our lives, unless something happens to arouse doubt or\ncriticism.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. CAUSES AND GROUNDS OF BELIEF\n\nThe source, direct or indirect, of all belief is perception. In\nperception must be included, for subjective studies, introspection;\nthough being difficult to keep steady, to repeat and to compare with\nthe observation of other minds, it carries less conviction. As to\nperception we say that \u201cseeing is believing\u201d; and, in fact, an object\nholds the eye in a way that vouches for its own reality; but, if we\nsuspect that our eyes deceive us, reassurance comes with the handling\nof the thing. Belief has sometimes been discussed as if it were\nchiefly concerned with ideas or the relations of ideas; and systems\nof philosophy have sought justification in the coherence of ideas,\nwith little or no regard (not to say with contempt) for the coherence\nof ideas with perceptions. But nearly the whole of every man\u2019s life\n(savage or philosopher) passes in an attitude of unquestioning belief\nin the evidence of his senses; and it is thence that belief extends\nto ideas on a presumption of their representing reality. We know that\na perception may be fallible, but perceptions and the comparison of\nperceptions in the long run overrule everything else; and experimental\nmethods consist in taking precautions against the errors of perception,\nand in bringing every hypothesis to the test of perception.\n\nFurther causes of belief are either Evidentiary, which (though often\nmisleading) may generally be justified on reflection as raising\nsome degree of probability, and which may, therefore, be called\n\u201cgrounds\u201d; or Non-evidentiary, which (though very influential) cannot,\non reflection, be justified as having any logical value, and are,\ntherefore, causes only and not grounds.\n\n(1) Evidentiary grounds of belief are (_a_) memory, which is plainly\nindispensable if we are to learn by experience; and (_b_) testimony,\nwhich must be trusted if language is not to be useless and social\nco-operation impossible: both these grounds are supposed to rest\nupon the primary rock of previous perception, but are slippery and\ntreacherous. Memory is only valid so far as it truthfully represents\noriginal experience, and testimony only so far as it presents (i)\na valid memory, (ii) correctly reported. Hence in serious matters\nprecautions must be taken against their fallibility: otherwise they\nare not good evidence. A specious memory, so far as it is false, is\nimagination; and false testimony, so far as it reports (i) a false\nmemory or (ii) an invention of the reporter, is also imagination.\nTestimony gathers force, as a cause of belief, with the numbers and\nconsideration of those who support it, and is especially strengthened\nby their unanimity; but, as a ground of belief, it depends only on\ntheir knowledge and truthfulness. A third ground of belief is (_c_)\ninference; which is necessary to all original adjustment of our conduct\nto the future or to unperceived circumstances, but highly fallible,\nand constituting the chief problem for the exercise of Logic when\nthat science arises: especially to explain the conditions of valid\nobservations and experiments, of probability, of the conclusion of\nan argument being covered by its premises, and of the sufficiency of\nverification. False inferences that cannot be verified are imaginations.\n\nAs the growing mind of society deals with true beliefs they are piled\nup and classified in systems of science and philosophy: in which\nsystems each belief or judgment strengthens and is strengthened by\nthe rest. Even without systematisation, the mere structural similarity\nof judgments, formed unconsciously on the same implicit principles of\ncausation and classification, throws them into those loose apperceptive\nmasses which we call \u201ccommon sense.\u201d Such systems or masses, whether\nof science or of common sense, readily assimilate and confirm new\ninferences having the same character, and offer resistance to all\ninferences having a different structure, such as those about magic\nand spirits. The selective power of these apperceptive masses over\nnovel ideas constitutes \u201cunderstanding,\u201d and is the plain solid man\u2019s\nsubstitute for Logic; and so it is with many scientists, who often\nneglect the abstract study of Logic. For these systems or masses of\nexperience are the substance of Logic and Methodology, which are their\nskeletons abstracted from them. They are the basis of all effective\ncomparison and criticism; agreement or disagreement with them is the\ntest of truth or error. It is the chief defect of common sense that the\nverification of its judgments depends almost entirely upon repetition\nof experiences (what Logicians call \u201csimple enumeration\u201d), without that\nanalysis of observations which alone can show the necessary relations\nof facts; but this defect is in some measure remedied in good minds\nby that power of unformulated ideas of natural order, the result of\nunconscious analysis, which we call \u201cgood judgment\u201d\u2014a power which the\nfortunate possessor may be unable to explain.\n\n(2) Non-evidentiary causes of belief are all reducible to bad\nobservations, imaginations, and the causes that excite imagination; and\nbad observations are caused by false imaginations as to the meaning\nof sense-data. If it should seem to any one that since imagination\nconsists of ideas it must be by nature incompatible with intense\nbelief, we must consider that memory, the effects of testimony, and\ninferences also consist entirely of ideas; so that in that character\nthey do not differ from imagination. Even perception depends for\nits meaning upon implicit ideas, and erroneous perception is due to\nerroneous ideas. The weakness of imagination-belief which (despite its\nfrequent intensity) always in time becomes manifest, is due to its not\nbeing constantly confirmed by experience.\n\nIn detail the non-evidentiary causes of belief are as follows: (_a_)\nnot only the truths of experience become massed or systematised\nin common sense and science, but the errors of misinterpreted\nexperience and tradition form similar aggregates. Coincidences\nmistaken for causation, illusions, dreams, tales of thaumaturgy\nand ghost-stories, so far as they have anything in common in their\noutlines or emotional tone, form apperceptive masses which function\nin the same way as scientific systems: each of their constituent\nbeliefs strengthens and is strengthened by the rest; and each mass\n(as a delusive \u201cunderstanding\u201d) readily assimilates and confirms any\nnew tale or illusion having its own character, and resists and repels\nevery judgment having a different structure\u2014and, therefore, refuses\nexplanation. And just as science and common sense have a sort of\ninternal skeleton of principles which has been exhibited as Logic, so\nsome of these comparatively obscure and chaotic masses of illusion\nand tradition contain certain structural principles which, though\nunconscious at the lowest human level, obtain recognition as culture\nadvances\u2014for example, the principles of mimetic and contagious magic;\nand then, too, arise such caricatures of science as theogonies and\ncosmologies, chiromancy, astrology and so forth. But nothing ever\nemerges from them that can be called a test of truth or methodology;\nmuch less, of course, can such a thing be found at lower levels of\nculture. There you see the accumulating clouds of imagination-belief,\nwhich gather together from all the winds and pile themselves up to\novershadow poor humanity age after age; which still, in our own world,\nare by no means dissipated; and to whose persistent influence we may (I\nsuppose) attribute the mysticism that periodically infects philosophy\nitself.\n\n(_b_) Contributory to these masses of error are bad observations,\nconfused and distorted memories, dreams and corrupted testimony and\ntradition, all of them having their origin in some sort of experience\nand matter-of-fact, and all issuing in vain imaginations. For of course\nthere is no such thing as imagination underived from experience;\nexperience is distorted and corrupted by superstition, but it\ntransfers to superstition the attitude of belief that always belongs\nto experience, and supplies materials from which (as we shall see) it\nis often possible to construct such a defence of superstition as, to\nan unsophisticated mind, must be very plausible and persuasive.[86]\nDirect experience is often interpreted by a story in such a way as\nto make the story more credible. If a stone is shown as marking the\ntomb of a hero, or a cleft in the mountain as proving the prowess of a\nwizard, one unconsciously transfers the attitude of belief involved in\ncontemplating these relics to all the legends concerning those mighty\nmen of old.\n\n(_c_) The causes determining belief are reinforced in various ways\nby feeling and emotion. The agreeableness or disagreeableness of any\njudgment draws attention to, or diverts it from such a judgment and the\nevidence for it: except that some disagreeable emotions, especially\nfear, by a sort of fascination of attention, are favourable to belief\nin the reality of an imagined evil. They possess the whole mind.\n\n(_d_) Every desire fixes attention upon beliefs favourable to it,\nand upon any evidence favourable to them, and diverts attention from\nconflicting beliefs and considerations. Thus every desire readily forms\nabout itself a relatively isolated mass of beliefs, which resists\ncomparison and, therefore (as Ribot says),[87] does not recognise the\nprinciple of contradiction. Incompatible desires may be cherished\nwithout our becoming aware of their incompatibility; or, if the fact\nobtrudes itself upon us, we repudiate it and turn away.\n\nThe more immature a mind, again, and the less knowledge it has, the\nless inhibition of desire is exerted by foresight of consequences that\nought to awaken conflicting desires or fears; and the less compassion\none has, the less is desire inhibited by its probable consequences to\nothers: therefore, in both cases, the less check there is upon belief.\n\n(_e_) Voluntary action in connection with any belief, whether of a\nrational kind or in the routine of rites and ceremonies, favours that\nbelief: (1) by establishing the idea-circuit of means and end, the\nend suggesting the means to it, and the thought of means running\nforward to the end\u2014a circuit that resists interruption: (2) by the\ngeneral effect of habit and prejudice; for every habit of action or of\nthought has inertia, and, moreover, it is agreeable, and to break it is\ndisagreeable; so that, again, a relatively isolated system is formed,\nwhich resists comparison and criticism.\n\nOn the influence of desire and of activities for an end depends \u201cthe\nwill to believe.\u201d We cannot believe anything by directly willing it;\nbut we can will what to attend to, or what to do, and that determines\nbelief.\n\n(_f_) Finally, belief is determined by certain social influences\nbesides testimony and tradition: especially by sympathy and antipathy\nbetween families, parties, tribes; and by imitativeness and\nsuggestibility (qualified fortunately by contra-suggestibility); so\nthat beliefs become fashionable, endemic, coercive, impassioned and\nintolerant. The power of a crowd to inflict its passions and beliefs\nupon the individual has recently been much explained: it has always\nbeen practically understood by wizards, priests and politicians who\nlead mankind by the ears. Suggestibility, in general, is the liability\nto follow example or testimony without criticising it; and for many\npeople it is so easy to fall into the attitude of belief upon slight\nprovocation, that this liability, to the extent of weakness, is very\ncommon. Contra-suggestibility in general is the opposite tendency.\nBut special suggestibility (I should say) is the liability to adopt a\nbelief on testimony not only in the absence of evidence, but against\nevidence; and contra-suggestibility is the liability to reject a belief\nagainst the evidence. They are merely extreme cases. If you draw two\nequal straight lines, A and B, and say, \u201cIt seems to me that B is\nlonger than A,\u201d one person will reply \u201cCertainly,\u201d another \u201cCertainly\nnot; A is the longer.\u201d The art of suggestion consists in reducing\nyour audience to this state of imbecility; it requires you to bring\nthem into such a condition of exclusive attention to your words that,\ncomparison and criticism being excluded, their natural disposition to\nassent shall (for the time) have free play. The specially suggestible\nperson is easily thrown into this state of exclusive attention, as if\nhypnotised. He who is suggestible by one man may not be so by another;\nor he may be more suggestible in the line of his prejudices than\nagainst them.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. THE BELIEFS OF IMMATURE MINDS\n\nAll these grounds and causes of belief, evidentiary and non-evidentiary\n(except Logic and Science) are common to both mature and immature\nminds: but their proportional influence with individuals or with\nsocieties is very different at different stages of development; and\nin immature minds and in the lower stages of culture, the power of\nthe non-evidentiary causes is excessive. Probably the chief cause of\nthe growth of common sense in the generality of men is an increasing\nregularity of social life, as (notably) in the bloom of the classical\ncivilisations and in the last four hundred years.\n\nPerception, in normal circumstances, is accepted by all as a matter\nof course or, rather, of necessity: it controls the activities of\npractical life in hunting and in industry, in making weapons, hoeing\nthe ground, building houses: however, these labours may sometimes be\nmodified or interrupted by the intrusion of beliefs derived from other\nsources. If a savage sings a spell to his prey, or weapon, or tool, or\nkeeps the head of a slain enemy on a shelf that his victim\u2019s soul may\nassist him as a slave, he may thereby increase his own confidence in\nthe work of hunting or gardening; but, otherwise, if his work be no\nbetter, neither need it be the worse for such fancies. The properties\nof matter exact practical recognition, without which nothing can be\ndone. Even magical practices presuppose a sane perception of the\ncentral facts: as who is acting, for what purpose, when and where,\nwith what and toward whom. Upon this basis there may be an astonishing\nsuperstructure of imagination-belief; but there are limits to the\neffectiveness of such beliefs.\n\nM. Levy-Bruhl, indeed, in a very interesting book, maintains[88] that,\nunder the influence of social ideas (_repr\u00e9sentations collectives_),\nthe primitive mind actually perceives things differently from what\nwe do. Whilst we succeed in attaining an objective presentation,\neliminating subjective associations, with primitives _propri\u00e9t\u00e9s\nmystique_, _forces occultes_ are integral qualities of the object. He\ngrants that, in certain cases of immediate practical interest, we find\nthem very attentive and able to discriminate slight impressions, and to\nrecognise the external signs of an object on which their subsistence\nor even their life depends; but holds that, in a very great majority\nof cases, their perceptions are over-weighted by subjective elements.\nThis doctrine reverses (I venture to think) the real relations between\nperceptions and other causes of belief and their proportionate\ninfluence in savage life. It is not only where subsistence or life\nis at stake that backward peoples see things as they are: in merely\nexperimental tests, Dr. Rivers found amongst both Papuans and Todas,\nthat, as to suggestibility in perception, they showed a high degree\nof independence of judgment.[89] Their confidence in perception is\nnot, like imagination-belief, occasional, modifiable for convenience,\nliable to lapse in course of time, dependent on the assent of a crowd.\nSo far as occult or mystical attributes are by a savage assigned to\nthings, such as magical force to a weapon, they constitute a secondary,\nimaginary integration with the percept. Such imaginary attributes\ncannot, like perception attributes, be verified by sensation: compare\nthe hardness of a spearhead with its magical force.\n\nThe peculiarity of savage beliefs is due, not to corrupt and clouded\nperception, but to the influence of desire and anxiety upon their\nimagination, unrestrained by self-criticism and reinforced by the\npopular consensus. The savage\u2019s imagination is excited by the\npressing needs of his life in hunting, love, war, agriculture, and\ntherefore by hunger and emulation, hate and grief, fear and suspicion.\nImaginations spring up in his mind by analogy with experience; but\noften by remote or absurd analogies; and there is no logic at hand\nand not enough common sense to distinguish the wildest imaginative\nanalogies from trustworthy conclusions. The same pressing needs and the\nsame emotional storms often affect a whole tribe, and simultaneously\nstimulate every one\u2019s imagination; and originating (no doubt) in\nancient times and slowly accumulating and condensing, there grows up a\nmass of public imagination-beliefs, which are inculcated into every\nindividual by tradition and common ceremonies. Such beliefs embodied\nin stories and formul\u00e6, and associated with rites and customs, have\nfor a long time the strength of custom in governing the behaviour\nof individuals and in tribal respect; but they prove at last to be\nweaker than custom, inasmuch as the observances may continue whilst\nthe beliefs are forgotten or replaced by others, as the progress of\nculture makes it necessary to think of the old rites in a different\nway. In their flourishing period they extensively influence practical\naffairs, sometimes helpfully or harmlessly, sometimes injuriously and\ndisastrously. In general, imaginations are prevented by biological\nnecessity from modifying a tribe\u2019s conduct beyond certain limits; but,\nexceptionally, they result in tribal insanity, tending toward, if not\naccomplishing, the tribe\u2019s destruction, as in extreme cases of the\npractice of human sacrifice or of the ordeal by poison.\n\nIndeed, so violent and tyrannous is the power of superstitious beliefs\nin many cases, that it may be difficult to understand how they are\nalmost entirely born of the imagination. In a civilised country there\nare always current some beliefs as imaginative and absurd as any to\nbe found in the middle of Africa; but surviving amidst a greater mass\nof perception-beliefs and positive ideas about industry and commerce,\nthey have lost much of their driving power; and when the imaginative\ncharacter of any belief has been recognised, it passes into the region\nof fine art or mythology, or even of ridicule. If such things have any\nplace in our life, we turn to them of personal choice in the intervals\nof affairs. Under the influence of the fine arts or of literature\ntreating of such things, our emotional states may be intense; but\nthey are dissociated from action, exist for their own sake, have an\nappropriate tone (\u00e6sthetic) which marks their lack of energy, so\nthat they require only an imaginary satisfaction. With a backward\npeople there is much less \u201cpositive\u201d opposition to their imaginative\nprepossessions and pursuits; what seems to us absurd, seems to them\nnecessary; the actions and observances that express their beliefs are\nnot performed as a matter of personal choice, but of public custom; the\nends to be obtained (they think) are the same as those of what we call\n\u201cbusiness.\u201d And it must be so. Considering the function of superstition\nin promoting political evolution, it is plain that primitive man must\nhave been capable of believing and doing those things which (within\ncertain limits) had so much biological and social value.\n\nTo understand how the magical and religious beliefs of savages and the\nplay-beliefs of civilised man, having a common source in imagination,\nare (in spite of strong contrasts) closely allied, we must call to mind\nthe many degrees of intensity of play-belief in ourselves, varying\nfrom the momentary entertainment of playing with a child, through many\ngrades of fiction or ceremony, down to a deeply serious frame of mind,\na profound movement of dread or compassion that may long outlast our\nplay. A child\u2019s absorption in such beliefs is more intense than ours;\nbut circumstances prevent his attaining to the solid faith of a savage.\nThe child of civilised people has little or no support in tradition\n(except from nursemaids); he is not driven by the desires and anxieties\nof subsistence; and he is frequently interrupted by his seniors. The\nsavage has an overwhelming tradition and authority, pressing anxieties\nand no seniors. Until the civilised sceptic reaches his shores, there\nis, for the average tribesman, nothing but tardy experience or social\nfatigue to check his vagaries. His imagination vies with the sense of\nreality, often overpowers it; yet his beliefs show many signs of their\ninsecure foundations.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is not only the influence of society and tradition that renders\nimagination-beliefs coercive to a savage; in the immature mind of the\nindividual there are certain conditions favourable to their prevalence.\n\n(_a_) The process of imagination itself, the memory and the\npicture-thinking of savages, seems to be more vivid, sensuous, stable,\nmore like perception than our own normally is. \u201cThe Australians,\u201d\nsays Spencer and Gillen, \u201chave the most wonderful imagination.\u201d[90]\nThey often die of it; and so do Hindoo peasants, Maories, Fijians,\nNegroes and others, if they know they have been cursed or have broken\na taboo. With the Melanesians, says Dr. Coddrington, thinking is like\nseeing;[91] and Dr. Rivers has confirmed this statement. Hence there is\na tendency to accept imaginations as perceptions are accepted; and to\nbelieve in the efficacy of rites, because the mere performing of them\nwith an imagined purpose makes their purpose seem to be accomplished.\nWhen a man of intense and excited imagination makes an image of an\nenemy, and stabs it, that his enemy may suffer, his action gratifies\nthe impulse to stab, as if he wounded the enemy himself, and revenge\nseems to be a present fact. Similar intensity of imagination is found\nin civilised children\u2014greater than in ordinary adults. Savages,\nagain, seem to dream more vividly and convincingly than is usual\namongst ourselves, and are said to be more liable to hallucinations.\nPhysiological conditions of the immature brain (childish or savage),\nin which excitement does not rapidly spread through many associated\nneurones, may be the basis of the vividness of imagination, dreaming\nand hallucination.\n\n(_b_) But more important than any intensity of picture-thinking to\nthe growth and persistence of imagination-beliefs, is the want of a\nmental standard, by which they might be discredited. It is true that\neven at a low level of culture individuals are found for whom common\nsense constitutes a private standard, and who are sceptics in relation\nto their tribal beliefs.[92] But such a private standard cannot be\ncommunicated, and for the great majority of the tribesmen common\nsense is no confident guide; and perhaps they are even incapable of\neffectively comparing their ideas. At any rate, one reason why we\nbelieve our memories and not our imaginations is that, whilst in\nboth cases the images (or elements of images) entering into them are\nderived from experience, in memory the relations of images in place,\ntime and context are also derived directly from experience; whereas in\nimagination images (or their elements) are reconstructed in relations\nin which they have never been experienced, by analogies of experience\n(often distorted) or by condensations the most capricious. Therefore,\nto make imaginations credible to us, even in play, the relations of\nexperience must be faithfully imitated, as (_e.\u00a0g._) in _Robinson\nCrusoe_; or else our emotions must be so strongly excited as to possess\nour minds with the fiction to the exclusion of all criticism. But with\nimmature minds observation of fact, outside the practical, repetitive,\nnecessary course of life, is not exact and coherent; and, accordingly,\ntheir memories are not coherent, especially as to time-relations; so\nthat, by comparison with such memories, irregular imaginations suffer\nlittle. There is not enough orderly memory or general knowledge to\ndiscredit even absurd imaginations; for so far as observation and\nmemory are disorderly, generalisation, conscious or unconscious, is\nimpossible. Hence not only traditionary myths may be monstrous and\narbitrary, but occasional tales of private invention, amongst both\nchildren and savages, usually exhibit disconnected transitions and\nimpossible happenings. Yet they satisfy the immature mind.\n\n(_c_) There are certain other conditions of the immature mind that\nhinder the comparison of ideas and, therefore, the criticism of\nbeliefs. About every imperative need, such as success in hunting, with\nits desires and anxieties, rites and ceremonies grow up to gratify\nimaginatively the desires and relieve the anxieties; and ideas of\nthese observances form relatively isolated systems. To us these ideas\nusually seem absurd and irrelevant when compared with the savage\u2019s own\nexperiences and his other practices. We see a hunter, for example,\nendeavour to gain his ends by two distinct series of actions. In one\nhe fasts, enchants his weapons, casts spells upon his expected prey;\nin the other he carefully prepares his weapons, patiently tracks his\nprey, warily approaches and slays it. The latter series we approve\nand appreciate as causation; the former we ridicule as hocus-pocus,\ncontributing objectively nothing to the event (though probably it\nincreases his confidence); and we pity \u201cthe heathen in his blindness.\u201d\nAnd, indeed, he may be said to be mind-blind; for in observing the\nrites, his attention is so occupied by means and end, and caught in the\ncircuit in which these ideas revolve, and he is so earnest in carrying\nout the prescribed actions, that he cannot compare them with the really\neffective actions, so as to discover their absurdity and irrelevancy.\nIn short, a state of mental dissociation is established for the system\nof magical ideas. So far does illusion go that he seems to regard\nthe rites as the most important part of his proceedings. But that is\nnot really his deepest conviction: he trusts in Magic and keeps his\nbowstring dry.\n\n(_d_) In the case of children we may assume, and in the more backward\nraces of men we may suspect, that the comparison of judgments is\ndifficult, or sometimes even impossible, because of the imperfect\ndevelopment of the cerebral cortex. There must be some structural\nconditions of the free flow of energy through all organs of the brain,\ncorresponding with the associability and comparability of all ideas.\nWe may doubt if these conditions are complete even in good cultivated\nminds; since everybody finds one or another study or art especially\ndifficult for him, or the freeing of himself from this or that sort\nof prejudice especially repugnant. And it is not only deliberate\ncomparison that is hindered in the immaturity of the brain, but also\nthat automatic process (more or less unconscious) of assimilation\nand discrimination to which (I think) we owe most of the results of\nabstraction and generalisation that may seem to have required purposive\ncomparison. Such imperfections of structure, greatest at the lowest\nlevels of organisation, and gradually decreasing as ideal rationality\nis approached, we may call \u201cinco\u00f6rdination\u201d; and, so far as it obtains,\nthe results must be somewhat similar to the disco\u00f6rdination, the\nbreaking down or interruption of organic efficiency, that occurs in\nhysteria, hypnosis and some forms of insanity. One of the results\nprobably is suggestibility\u2014the tendency to accept what is told,\nor insinuated, without examination; for freedom from this common\nliability depends (apart from the contra-suggestible disposition) upon\nthe rapidity and definiteness with which one can compare that which\nis suggested with present fact or with one\u2019s knowledge and former\nexperience; and this is hindered by inco\u00f6rdination.\n\nEffective inco\u00f6rdination may, however, be merely functional for want\nof practice in thinking; and it exists often enough in civilised\npeople, because they have not even the desire to be consistent. In\neither case, whether from defective structure or from the dull inertia\nof disuse, there will be failure of comparison and, therefore, of\ncriticism, and also (we may suppose) a greater intensity of imagination\nand of dreaming and a liability to hallucination, such as is said to be\nfrequently the case with immature minds.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. THE REASONING OF IMMATURE MINDS\n\nWe have seen that many beliefs result from inferences, and that\ninferences, when logically justifiable, may be considered as grounds\n(raising some degree of probability); but, when not justifiable,\nthey are only causes of belief and their results are only\nimagination-beliefs. Since the general nature of reasoning is the same\nfor Socrates and Sambo, we must inquire into the particular nature of\nthe reasoning which leads immature minds into such bewildering mazes of\nerror as we see (for example) in the world-wide prevalence of Magic and\nAnimism.\n\nOn the inductive side of knowledge (the obtaining of premises) there\nis, of course, much imperfect observation and hasty generalisation;\nbut, in spite of these faults, a savage learns by repeated experiences\na great many narrow general truths about the physical world, plants,\nanimals and his fellow-men, which constitute his stock of common sense\nand on the strength of which he lives as a very intelligent animal. We\nshall find from time to time errors of observation (such as the taking\nof a dream for reality) and of generalisation (such as the classing of\nworms with reptiles); but, strictly speaking, this is not reasoning:\nall reasoning is deductive, and the immature mind\u2019s deductive processes\nneed a fuller analysis.\n\nOur Logic consists of a few universal principles generally accepted,\nwith which any more particular judgment may be compared in order\nto test its validity. The matter may be superficially acquired in\na few hours; but the full comprehension of it implies the widest\ncomparison of types of judgment from all departments of knowledge:\nLogic being (as I have said) a sort of skeleton of knowledge. Hence\nin any mind incapable of comparison and criticism\u2014or so far as it\nis incapable\u2014there must be an absence of Logic. So much effective\ncomparison of experience, however, goes on without our specially\nattending to it that a man\u2019s logical power bears no proportion to\nhis investigations into the structure of knowledge. One man may be a\ngreat student of Logic and a very inefficient reasoner from a want\nof discipline in the world of fact; another, who has never opened a\ntext-book, may yet show by the definiteness of his judgments and the\nadequacy of his plans, that he is a sort of incarnate Logic, that his\nmind works according to reason or (in other words) according to the\norder of facts. It is the highest manifestation of common sense. Such\nmen occur among backward peoples.\n\nThe only universal principles that need be considered here are the Law\nof Causation and the Form of Substance and Attribute (Mill\u2019s doctrine\nof Natural Kinds): which may be called the principles of parallel\nreasoning; because the greater part of ordinary reasoning consists in\ndrawing some inference parallel to one or the other of them, usually\nin some restricted shape. For example, a restriction of causation is\nthe proposition that \u201cexposure to intense daylight causes sun-burn,\u201d\nof substance and attribute that \u201cthe specific gravity of gold is\nabout 19\u00b75\u201d: whence we infer that if we expose ourselves to sunlight\nour faces or hands will suffer, or that any piece of gold will be\nrelatively very heavy. But in such cases erroneous inferences are\neasy: for example, to expect that exposure to London sunshine will\ncause sunburn; for there the foul atmosphere cuts off the actinic\nrays: or to expect that a lump of brass will have specific gravity\n19\u00b75. A necessary precaution before trusting an inference, therefore,\nis the ascertaining that the inference deals with the very same sort\nof case as the premise describes: else there is no complete parallel.\nAnd Logicians show in the form of the syllogism this necessary\nprecaution\u2014to use their favourite example in a case of Substance and\nAttribute:\n\n Major premise\u2014_All men are mortal_;\n Minor premise\u2014_Socrates is a man_;\n \u2042 Conclusion\u2014_Socrates is mortal_.\n\nThe conclusion _Socrates is Mortal_ is parallel to the major premise\n_All men are mortal_; and that it deals with the very same sort of case\nis secured by the minor premise, _Socrates is a man_. Whoever reasons\nmust see to it that this premise is true. But the savage has never\nnoticed that necessity; and thence come most of his errors.\n\nThe syllogism (it is now admitted) does not describe the way in which\nwe reason, but is only a form which gives some help in testing the\nvalidity of reasoning if one should ever think of doing such a thing.\nIn practice we do not think first of the major premise, then of the\nminor premise and lastly of the conclusion. As a rule we do not think\nof either premise at all: the \u201cconclusion\u201d comes first to mind. In\ncertain circumstances of association, because of our hopes or our\nfears, it occurs to us that \u201cSocrates is mortal.\u201d If some one should\ndoubt this judgment and ask for proof, we might think of the major\npremise, and then put it into words for the first time\u2014\u201cAll men die;\u201d\neven then it might not seem necessary to add that \u201cSocrates is a man.\u201d\nBut although we may not have been at the time aware of these premises\nuntil we were asked for them, their presence in the mind in some way\nwas necessary to determine the inference: the major premise was there\nas latent memory of one or more cases of people who had died; the minor\npremise was represented by the assimilation of the case of Socrates to\nthose cases of mortal men. The former experiences have left an engram,\nwhich serves as a mould into which subsequent experience may run, and\nwhich conceivably may determine subsequent judgments even though the\nformer experiences can no longer be remembered.\n\nThe phrase \u201cform of thought\u201d is most used for premises of high\ngenerality, such as the axioms of mathematics, causation, substance\nand attribute, space in three dimensions; and, undoubtedly, these are\nforms which determine the lines of all thinking to which they are\nrelevant; but they would be useless, if there were not, under them,\nforms established in very concrete material by the repetition of simple\nexperiences and ordinary events (or even by single impressive events),\nsuch as \u201cmen are mortal,\u201d \u201cwater quenches fire,\u201d which determine the\nlines of common-sense judgments. If there has been an experiential\njudgment\u2014X is related to Y, when X again appears it is expected to be\nrelated to Y.\n\nAmongst savages also, of course, experience settles in their minds\nsuch forms of thought; both the most general ones, which they never\nformulate but which necessarily control their thoughts, and many\nparticular ones concerning the experience of daily life; which last\ncontrol the details of their thoughts, and for practical purposes are\ntrue; but which, through ignorance of the minor premise, are allowed\nto assimilate many judgments of a very different nature. Thus, X\nbeing known to be related to Y, they are apt to infer that things\nthat are like X, or which they suppose to be like X, are also in the\nsame way related to Y; and this is disastrous. In civilised life,\nmost occupations are so mechanical, and the general tradition is so\npositive, that there is little encouragement to think nonsense; so that\nthe average man reasons tolerably about simple matters without having\nheard of the minor premise; but the savage\u2019s life is much less regular,\nand less fully occupied, and the tradition is full of magic and ghosts.\nAccordingly, he is always ready to think about magic and ghosts; and\nsince his thoughts about such things can only run in the mould of his\nexperiences (with some playroom for amplification, distortion and\ncondensation), whilst he is also ignorant of the function of the minor\npremise, he seems to draw often from a very sound major premise a very\nabsurd conclusion. For the minor premise is an invention of Logicians\n(perhaps their greatest): it does not occur to cursory, but only to\ncritical thought.\n\nFor example, a savage judges that to put a lock of a man\u2019s hair in the\nfire injures and may destroy him: how comes he to think so? He has\nlearnt by experience that for a man to put his hand in the fire, or\nto fall into it, hurts him; and this supplies the mould in which his\ninference about the lock of hair is cast. Similarly, he is apt to judge\nthat to throw a man\u2019s image into the fire hurts him and may destroy\nhim; and this clearly rests upon the same experience. His reasoning\nassumes the minor premise that (for the purpose of his revenge) a\nseparated part of a man, or his image, is the same as the man himself;\nand this assumption is made explicit in the famous maxims of Magic,\nthat in rites, whatever has been in contact with a man\u2014or that any\nlikeness of a man\u2014may be substituted for him. But the generalisation\nof these maxims is left for an advanced stage of culture; the savage,\nwho acts as if he held them, has never thought of, much less formulated\nthem. They are derived, by later thought, entirely from an analysis of\nhis conduct in magic. What the causes are that determine him to act as\nif he accepted the maxims of Magic will presently be discussed.[93]\n\nThere are certain other reasonings implied in savage practices, where\nthe error lies not so much in the minor premise as in the minor term,\nthus: It is matter of experience that a sense of personal power and\nelation is produced by dancing and singing; and (perhaps without\nremembering such experience) a savage infers that magical power is\nincreased by the same means. Or, again, it is matter of experience that\nmen eat and use solid food and weapons; and a savage infers that ghosts\neat ghostly food and use ghostly weapons; that is to say, that where\nfood and spears are left at a tomb and remain untouched, the ghost has\ntaken to himself the soul of these things which was his proper share.\nNow granting that there are such things as magical powers and ghosts,\nthe reasoning that identifies them respectively with physical power and\nwith men is, for the purpose of the inference, not unplausible; with a\nliberal examiner the minor premises might pass. But if magical powers\nand ghosts do not exist, the minor terms are imaginary.[94] In short,\nall these reasonings turn upon imaginations. The experiential major\npremises are true enough, but the minor premises are illusory, and as\nit is a maxim with Logicians that the force of reasoning follows the\nweaker premise, the conclusion is illusory. It is not in perception but\nin imagination that a part is the same as the whole, or that a likeness\nis the same as the thing itself; that magic controls events and that\nghosts haunt their sepulchres.\n\nThese reasonings are fallacious imitations of parallel inferences\naccording to cause and effect; but there are others of a kind peculiar\nto imagination: I mean reasonings by analogy\u2014as when a Zulu, courting\nthe dusky fair, chews a piece of wood, in the expectation that, as\nthe wood is reduced to pulp, her heart, too, will be softened. These\nprocesses are not parallel; there is no resemblance between a lady\u2019s\nheart and a piece of wood, nor between mastication and court-ship; but\nthe relation involved, the softening process, is felt to be the same in\nboth connections and, therefore, the cases on the whole are thought to\nbe the same. Many rites and observances depend upon such analogies\u2014for\nthis is the strict sense of analogy, \u201clike relations of unlike terms\u201d;\nand they have a leading part in the formation of myths in which natural\nevents are represented as personal relations\u2014Apollo chasing the\nDawn, and so forth. And I formerly thought that such arguments as the\nforegoing, in which the actions of ghosts are identified with those\nof men, or the sufferings of a part are equated with those of the\nwhole, were examples of analogical reasoning; for certainly, the terms\ninvolved are different: a ghost, or an image, or a nail-paring is not\nthe same as a man. But, on reflection, I see that though these terms\nare really different, that has nothing to do with the psychology of\nthe matter, for they are conceived by the savage to be the same; and,\ntherefore, the inference is conceived as parallel to the experiential\nground (even though this remain latent in consciousness).\n\nAnalogical thought is now understood to be imaginative only, and is\nconfined to the metaphors and similes of poetry or rhetoric; though it\nis not very long ago that it was seriously trusted in argument, as in\ndefending absolute monarchy in the State by the examples of patriarchy\nin the family, and even by the supposed \u201cregiment\u201d of bees and quails\nin their societies, of the lion over beasts and of the eagle over birds.\n\nIn this spirit, Malays, having identified the life of the rice plant\nwith human life, regard the flowering rice as in its infancy, and\nproceed to feed it with pap: and carry out the analogy at further\nstages of its development. Similarly, to facilitate childbirth, or to\nliberate the struggling soul of the dying, it is a respected recipe\nto untie all knots, unfasten all buttons, unlock all doors, open all\nwindows; for opening or loosing, no matter what, is always the same\nprocess-relation.\n\nThese seem to be the chief modes of fallacious thinking\u2014(1) false\nparallels and (2) analogies\u2014which mislead the untutored mind and give\nto imagination-beliefs such coherence as they ever attain. Two accounts\nof superstitious reasoning have been given by those who admit that\nsavages reason at all; one is that they reason correctly from absurd\npremises; the other that they reason absurdly from correct premises.\nIf the foregoing analysis is sound, there is some truth and some error\nin both these doctrines. So far as primitive ratiocination is purely\nanalogical, it is quite futile, whether its premises be true or false;\nfor it cannot be cast in any admissible logical form. So far as in\nsuperstition it imitates parallel reasoning, according to cause and\neffect or substance and attribute, the major premise is, for the most\npart, empirically true; the minor premise is false; and the conclusion\nis a vain imagination. There are three types of ratiocination: (1)\nequations, as in mathematics; and here primitive man for a long time\ngot no further than the counting of things by his fingers and toes.\n(2) Parallels of premise and inference, according to causation or\nsubstance and attribute, as in the physical and natural sciences;\nand here the savage collects by experience much common sense, and by\ninevitable fallacies much superstition. (3) Analogies of imagination.\nThe natural progress of reason consists in relegating analogies to\npoetry and rhetoric; in introducing greater and greater accuracy into\nthe judgments that serve as major premises, and greater caution in\nassuming minor premises; at last, in counting and measuring the facts\nreasoned about, and so preparing the beginnings of mathematical method.\nSuch progress is promoted by the high biological value of greater\ndefiniteness of thought. Immature man in the necessary practical\nlife\u2014which may be called the biological life\u2014has many definite\nperceptions and judgments and well-adjusted actions; outside that life,\nin the region of superstitious observance, he is not a rational, but an\nimaginative animal.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. GENERAL IDEAS AT THE SAVAGE LEVEL\n\nThe language of savages is often wanting in names of classes of\nthings for which names are with us a matter of course, and it has\nbeen supposed that those who use the language must be without the\ncorresponding general ideas. Thus it is reported that a tribe had a\nname for each kind of tree but none for tree in general; another had\na name for coco-nuts at various stages of growth (when they serve\ndifferent uses) but none for coco-nut at all times: therefore, it is\ninferred, they had no general idea of tree or of coco-nut. A Siberian\nexample is still more remarkable. The Tunguses depend entirely upon\nreindeer for food, clothes, tents and locomotion, and keep herds of\nthem; yet they have no name for the animal. But they have a name for\nwild and another for tame reindeer; a name for domestic reindeer that\nhave been broken in, and another for the unbroken; a name for the\nfemale fawn, for the doe with young, for a doe with one fawn, a doe in\nthe third year with two fawns; a name for each age-class of buck, and\nso on.[95] Are we to infer that the Tunguses have no general idea of\nreindeer?\n\nIt was, no doubt, natural to assume that we first perceive individuals,\nwhich now stand clearly before us, and then, having compared them,\narrive at general ideas. But if knowledge grows by the assimilation\nand differentiation of experiences, the class on the one hand\nand the individual on the other, must be joint products of this\nprocess: classes becoming clearer as more and more individuals are\ndiscriminated. Classes, or class-ideas never stand before us as\nindividuals do; but the greater part of the meaning of every perception\nof an individual is the kind of thing it is. And as to priority,\nto perceive the kind of thing is (biologically) far more important\nthan its individuality. If the individual did not mean the class, to\nperceive it would be useless as a guide to action. The general idea\nderived from the assimilation of experiences is the apperceptive mass\nthat converts sense-stimulation into cognition: when unconscious\nRomanes called it a \u201crecept.\u201d\n\nThe primitiveness of general ideas is shown by gesture-language, which\nprobably precedes speech, and which (except in direct indication\nof what is thought of) depends wholly upon general ideas suggested\nby imitative or significant actions. Primitive language must have\ndescribed things by general characters, so far as it consisted in\nonomatop\u0153ia; to growl like a lion could only suggest the kind of\nanimal. Primitive drawing (whether by children or savages) is nearly\nalways generic: dog, horse, frigate-bird, hammer-headed shark, but not\nany individual.\n\nThere can be no doubt that savages are capable of general and abstract\nideas; and no one now supposes that language is an adequate measure of\nthought. A language contains names only for things, groups, and aspects\nor actions of things which the people who use it need to discuss: if\nthey do not need to speak of abstractions, there are no words for them.\nBut we cannot assume of the contents of the mind, any more than of the\noutside world, that things do not exist unless we have noticed and\nnamed them. Professor Franz Boas has shown[96] that languages of the\nnorthern Amerinds, that do not idiomatically express abstract ideas,\nmay be made to do so without violence, and that the abstract expression\nis intelligible to men native to the languages. \u201cEvery one who knows\npeople of low culture,\u201d says Dr. Rivers, \u201cmust recognise the difficulty\nwhich besets the study of any abstract question, not so much because\nthe savage does not possess abstract ideas as that he has no words of\nhis own to express them.\u201d[97]\n\nAmongst the ideas attained by savages, and having an important part\nin their lives, though often taken for granted and unexpressed, are\nsome of the highest generality: for example \u201cforce.\u201d The notion of\nforce is derived from the experience of effort in our own muscular\nexertions; but with the development of our perception of physical\nobjects by the integration of sense-data\u2014sight, touch, movement and\nresisted movement (kin\u00e6sthesis), smell, hearing\u2014this sense of effort,\nbeing transferred to objects as equivalent to our own exertions about\nthem, becomes the all-important core of every object (or meaning of\nevery perception of an object), without which the thing would be a\nmere show, neither useful nor injurious\u2014sheep and tigers, rocks and\npumpkins alike indifferent. Probably the perceptions of all the higher\nanimals (down to reptiles) have this meaning. Force is reality, and by\nprimitive man is thought of as the essence of whatever he conceives\nof as real, such as spells, talismans and ghosts. Having a subjective\nground, from which it never becomes free, the notion of it is\nindefinite, varies for each of us with our constitution, age, health,\nand not only lends itself to the wildest whims of superstition, but has\nmisled scientific investigations.\n\nRelations are a class of general ideas familiar to savage thought,\noften appreciated with great subtlety and especially prominent in\nsome magical operations. Relations are not only thought of by savages\nbut compared, and likenesses discovered between them that may often\nsurprise us. A gardener of New Guinea, having planted taro, ensured the\ngrowth of the crop by saying: \u201cA mur\u00e6na, left on the shore by the tide,\nwas exhausted and on the point of expiring, when the tide returned,\nand it revived and swam away.\u201d And he struck the ground with a branch\nthree times.[98] He saw that renewal of life in the mur\u00e6na and in the\ntaro were the same thing; so that to describe one must strengthen the\nother\u2014such is the \u201cforce\u201d of a spell!\n\nThe most important relation involved in knowledge and in its practical\napplications is causation. Savages who have no word for causation and\nhave never thought of it in the abstract, must always act as if they\nassume it. This is apt to be misunderstood. It is written: \u201cThe natives\n[of Australia] have no idea of cause and effect. They notice that two\nthings occur one after the other, and at once jump to the conclusion\nthat one is cause and the other effect.\u201d They have, then, some idea of\nthe relation, though ill-discriminated. Thus, having noticed that the\nplover often cries before rain, they imitate the cry when performing\nrites to bring on rain. We rather suppose that an atmospheric change,\npreceding the approaching rain, excites the plovers. But that does not\noccur to the natives: that \u201cone after the other\u201d is the same as effect\nafter cause, or (as Logicians say) _post hoc, ergo propter hoc_, lies\nat the bottom of innumerable superstitions. The subconscious control\nexercised by this latent form of thought is very imperfect. The maxims\nof indirect Magic, that a likeness may be substituted for the thing\nitself, or a part of it for the whole, are merely formul\u00e6 of causation\nassumed under an erroneous belief as to what can be a cause. There are\ncases in which the like may be a substitute (one man for another) and\na part may nearly serve for the whole (part of a broken knife). Hence\nthese principles were stated and avowed by physicians and alchemists of\nthe Middle Ages, and observed in their practice.\n\nThe quantitative axiom of mediate relation\u2014\u201cMagnitudes equal to the\nsame magnitude are equal\u201d\u2014is, of course, never expressed by savages;\nbut it is practically understood and applied by them whenever they\nuse a common measure\u2014the fingers for counting, the pace, or hand or\narm-stretch to measure distance. These devices are gesture language;\nand the truth which the gestures assume has been forced upon the\nobservation of primitive men whenever they saw three or more nearly\nequal things together\u2014men in a row, birds in a flock, eggs in a nest.\nWe need not suppose that conscious analysis is necessary to determine\nthe relations between such things; the brain has its own method of\nanalysis; and some day we learn the results. It was late in the day\nthat the results became known; not, apparently, till the Greeks gave\nscientific form to the rudiments of mathematics. For then, for the\nfirst time, articulate axioms were wanted\u2014to satisfy the form of\nscience. The innumerable exact calculations of Egypt and Assyria could\ngo on very well without them. Their discovery required the specific\npurpose of a scientist in search of them, the state of profound\nmeditation and abstraction, excluding all irrelevant ideas, when in the\nemptiness and darkness of the mind their light became visible, like a\nfaint sound in a silent room. Thus an idea, whose functioning has for\nages controlled thought without being recognised, suddenly takes its\nplace in the organisation of knowledge.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. THE WEAKNESS OF IMAGINATION-BELIEFS\n\nWith immature minds their superstitions seem to rest on good evidence.\nSome of those who pray to Neptune are saved from shipwreck, and the\ndrowned are forgotten: all confirmatory coincidences are deeply\nimpressive, and failures are overlooked or excused. By suggestion\nthe sick are often healed, and the hale are struck down. Curses and\nincantations, if known to the intended victim, fulfil themselves. So do\ngood omens that give confidence, and bad omens that weaken endeavour.\nIf a magician has the astuteness to operate for rain only when the\nwet season approaches, the event is likely to confirm his reputation.\nSleight of hand, ventriloquism and the advantages of a dark s\u00e9ance are\nnot unknown to sorcerers tutored in an old tradition of deceit, and\ntheir clients take it for demonstration. The constant practice by a\nwhole village of both magic and industry for the same end, makes it\nimpossible for ordinary mortals to see which of them is the real agent\nof success. For the failures of magic or of sacrifice the practitioners\nalways have plausible explanations. Hence between imagination-beliefs\nand perception-beliefs, as to their causes, there may be, for the\nbelievers, no apparent difference.\n\nBut in character, also, imagination-beliefs may seem indistinguishable\nfrom perception-beliefs; in immediate feeling-quality they are\ncertainly very much like them; and, on a first consideration, they\nappear to have as much influence over men\u2019s actions: but this is not\ntrue. We must not infer that to suffer martyrdom for a cult (as witches\nhave done) can be a sign of nothing but unalterable faith in it:\nbesides fanaticism and other abnormal states of mind, one must allow\nfor loyalty to a party or leader, for oppositeness and hatred of the\npersecutor, for display, self-assertion and (in short) for a strong\nwill. Those who take part in a religious war\u2014are they driven wholly by\nenthusiasm for the supernatural, and not at all by hatred of aliens,\nlove of fighting and hope of plunder? Discounting the admixture of\nother motives, the power of imagination-beliefs is, with most people,\nmuch less than we are apt to suppose. They are unstable, and in course\nof time change, though the \u201cevidence\u201d for them may remain the same.\nMoulded from the first by desire and anxiety, they remain plastic\nunder the varying stress of these and other passions. In a primitive\nagricultural community, preparation of the soil, hoeing, reaping\nand harvesting go on (though with inferior tools and methods) just\nas they do with us; and from age to age the processes are generally\nconfirmed or slowly improved. At the same time, every such employment\nis surrounded by a sort of aura of rites, which seem to be carried out\nwith equal, or greater, scrupulosity and conviction; yet, age by age,\nthese rites slowly atrophy and lose their importance and their ancient\nmeaning, which is explained by new myths; or other rites may be learnt\nfrom neighbours or from invaders; for some rites may be necessary to\ntheir life, though not any particular ones.\n\nThe unstable character of superstitions and their close alliance with\nplay-beliefs may be shown in various ways:\n\n(_a_) The rites which express them are often carried out with\ndeception, practised on the crowd in a public performance, as by\nobtaining from heaven a shower of rice, which (over night) has been\nlodged in the tree-tops, and is shaken down at the decisive moment; or,\nin private practice, played off on the patient, by bringing a stone in\none\u2019s waist-belt and then extracting it from his body. Half the tribe\nmay deceive the rest, the men mystifying the women and children, or the\nold the young.\n\n(_b_) Religious beliefs often comprise incompatible attitudes: the\nworshippers of a god acknowledge in prosperity his superior wisdom and\npower\u2014at the same time, perhaps, employing devices to cheat him; or,\nin long continuing distress from drought or war, they may threaten\nto punish him, withhold his sacrifices and desecrate his shrine.\nIn Raiatea, when a chief of rank fell ill, extravagant rites and\nsacrifices were practised; but if these failed, \u201cthe god was regarded\nas inexorable, and was usually banished from the temple, and his image\ndestroyed.\u201d[99]\n\n(_c_) Imagination-beliefs break down under various trials\u2014such as\neconomy, selling the Rice-mother when the price of grain rises;\noffering the gods forged paper-money instead of good, or leaving many\nthings at a grave and taking back the more precious; self-preservation,\nas in substituting the king\u2019s eldest son for himself in sacrifice;\ncompassion, in burying with the dead puppets instead of slaves (though\nin this economy may have some part), or substituting in sacrifice a\nbull for a man.\n\nIn such cases as these we see how any desire, whose satisfaction\nis incompatible with a given belief or observance, tends to create\na limiting belief and to modify the rites. Social indolence and\nfatigue\u2014the product of many individual fatigues and occasional levity,\nwhereby the meaning of rites is forgotten, and the rites themselves\nare gradually slurred and abbreviated\u2014must be an important condition\nof the degeneration of rites, as it is of language. Foreign influence\nthrough trade or war introduces disturbing ideas that appeal to lovers\nof novelty, and show that other people with other beliefs are as well\noff as ourselves. Even repeated experience of failure may shake a man\u2019s\nconfidence and make him throw away his fetish: though usually he gets\nanother.\n\n(_d_) The beliefs of Magic and Animism are generally supported by\nintense emotional excitement during the incantations and ceremonies\nthat express them. Emotion is artificially stimulated and, probably,\nis felt to be necessary in order to sustain illusion. It excludes\ncriticism and increases suggestibility.\n\n(_e_) The specific connexion of such beliefs with the play attitude\nis shown: by their rites including games, such as leaping, swinging,\nspear-throwing\u2014supposed to have some magical efficacy; the\nceremonies themselves are often dances, dramas, choruses; and with\nthe degeneration of belief, the rites remain as dramatic or musical\npastimes, whilst the myths survive in epic poems, fairy-tales and\nghost-stories. When rites and incantations are not intended to incite\nto immediate action, it is necessary that the emotions generated in\ntheir performance shall subside with only an imaginary satisfaction:\nthey, therefore, acquire the \u00e6sthetic tone of beauty, or sublimity,\nor pathos (or some rudimentary form of these feelings); so that the\nperformance, thus experienced, becomes an end in itself.\n\nThese beliefs with their correlative ceremonies have a further\nresemblance to play in the indirectness of their utility. Play develops\nfaculty; but no child thinks of that. Magic and Animism (as we have\nseen) tend to maintain custom and order; but this is not known to\nany one at first and hardly now to the generality. Rites of public\ninterest, to procure rain or to encourage the crops, though useless\nfor such purposes, gratify the desire to do something, or to feel as\nif something were being done toward the end desired, especially in the\nintervals when really effective work cannot be carried on, as whilst\nthe crops are growing or after harvest: they allay anxiety and give\nhope and confidence. Moreover, they are organised pastimes\u2014not that\nthey are designed to pass the time, but that they have in fact that\nvaluable function. The men of backward societies, during a considerable\npart of their lives, have not enough to do. Social ceremonies keep\npeople out of mischief, and, at the same time, in various ways exercise\nand develop their powers. With us industry is a sufficient occupation,\nor even too engrossing, and circumstances keep us steady; so that,\nin leisure, pastimes may be treated lightly. With the savage some\npastimes must present themselves as necessary periodical religious\nduties, whose performance (in his belief) encourages and enhances\nindustry. So far, again, as needs and interests are common to a tribe,\nvillage or other group, these ceremonies ensure social co-operation\nand unity and also emulation in their performance; and they preserve\ntradition and the integration of successive generations. Our games\nare free from practical hopes and anxieties; but the more elaborate,\nsuch as horse-racing, have still a social function; or, like cricket\nand football, a tribal character: the school, college, county or even\nthe nation feels deeply concerned about them. The Olympic Games, which\ninterested the Greek world throughout all its scattered cities, have\nbeen traced back to primitive religious observances.[100]\n\nAs for the dark side of superstition, it needs no other explanation\nthan crime, fanaticism and insanity: which also are diseases of\nthe imagination. Jealousy, hatred, greed, ferocious pride and the\nlust of power are amongst the causes that mould belief. Any calling\npursued in secret, like that of the sorcerer, under a social ban, is\nof course demoralised. Where the interest of an organised profession\nstands in a certain degree of antagonism to the public interest, it\nmay become the starting-point of unlimited abominations; and of this\ntruth the interests of magicians and priests have supplied the most\nterrific examples. Dwelling upon what you know of black magic and\nred religion, the retrospect of human culture fills you with dismay;\nbut need not excite astonishment; for human nature is less adapted\nto its environment (chiefly social) than anything else in the world;\nthe development of the mind and of society has been too recent for us\nreasonably to expect anything better.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[85] _Treatise of Human Nature_, Part III. \u00a7 7. For the recent\npsychology of Belief see James Sully\u2019s _The Human Mind_, ch. xiii., and\nJames Ward\u2019s _Psychological Principles_, ch. xiv.\n\n[86] See below, ch. viii. \u00a7 5.\n\n[87] _Logique des Sentiments_, II. \u00a7 4.\n\n[88] _Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s Inf\u00e9rieures_, p. 40.\n\n[89] _British Journal of Psychology_, Vol. I. p. 393.\n\n[90] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 462.\n\n[91] _The Melanesians_, p. 247.\n\n[92] Below, ch. viii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[93] Ch. iv. \u00a7 8.\n\n[94] In assuming that there are no magical powers I do not mean that\nthe magician has no professional powers, but that such real powers as\nhe has are not magical.\n\n[95] Czaplicka, _My Siberian Year_, p. 94. Other examples in Romanes,\n_Mental Evolution in Man_, pp. 351-3.\n\n[96] _The Mind of Primitive Man_, V. pp. 150-52.\n\n[97] _Sociological Review_, January 1910, p. 9.\n\n[98] Quoted by Frazer, _Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild_, I. p. 105.\n\n[99] W. Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, II. p. 216\n\n[100] F. M. Cornford in Miss Jane Harrison\u2019s _Themis_, ch. vii.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nMAGIC\n\n \u201cThe histories I borrow, I refer them to the consciences of those I\n take them from.\u201d\u2014_Montaigne_, I. 20.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. ANTIQUITY OF MAGIC\n\nMagic, until recently, was somewhat neglected by those who treated of\nsavage ideas. In Sir E.\u00a0B. Tylor\u2019s _Primitive Culture_ only one chapter\nis given to Magic, against seven to Animism (belief in the agency of\nspirits). In Spencer\u2019s _Sociology_, Part I. is almost wholly devoted\nto the genesis and development of Animism, without a single chapter on\nMagic. The importance of early Animism became such an obsession, that\ntravellers observed and reported upon it wherever they went, making\nonly casual references to Magic\u2014much to our loss. The tradition of\nthis way of thinking seems to run back to Hume\u2019s _Natural History\nof Religion_, where he traces the development of religion from a\nprimitive belief that all natural activities are like our own, and\nthat everything is possessed and actuated by a spirit. This idea was\nadopted by Comte, and elaborated in his celebrated law of the three\nstages of the explanation of Nature as determining the growth of human\nculture: Fetichism, which ascribes all causation to the particular will\nof each object, and which by generalisation leads through polytheism to\nmonotheism; Metaphysics, which, giving up the notion of personal will,\nattributes the activities of things to abstract forces; and Positivism,\nwhich, discarding the variety of forces that can never be known, turns\nto the exact description of the order of phenomena. Mill, in turn,\nadopted these doctrines from Comte, and gave them currency amongst us,\nas part of the extraordinary influence which for many years he exerted\nupon all our thoughts. Hence the priority of Animism to every other\ntheory of things seemed at that time a matter of course.\n\nRecently there have been signs that this conception of primitive\nthought is giving way to another, namely, that Animism was preceded\nby Magic. Sir J.\u00a0G. Frazer puts it, that the idea of Magic is simpler\nthan that of Animism; that Magic is found in full force amongst people\nwhose Animism is feebly developed, and that its beliefs are more\nuniform throughout the world.[101] Substantially\u2014with qualifications\nthat will appear hereafter\u2014this view of the matter is here accepted.\nWhen one comes to argue it, to produce the primitive facts is, of\ncourse, impossible. It must even be admitted that such evidence as we\nhave amongst the few facts collected of late years concerning ancient\nraces of men, gives the earlier date to animistic ideas; for if some of\nthe cave-paintings of Aurignacian origin, in which, for example, wild\ncattle are shown pierced with arrows, may be interpreted as of magical\nsignificance; on the other hand, the burial at Le Moustier, still more\nancient, shows a regard for the corpse, in the disposal of it and in\nthe things left with it, such as usually goes with the ghost-theory.\nThese discoveries take us back some thousands of years before Menes;\nbut probably leave us far from the beginning of human ideas concerning\nthe supernatural.\n\nIf Magic preceded Animism, we must insert a stage of thought at\nthe beginning of Comte\u2019s series, making four instead of three; and\nthe suggestion may perhaps be made to appear plausible, that the\nMetaphysical stage, the reign of occult forces in explanation, is not\na mere residue of Fetichism after the spirit has departed, but rather\nthe re-emergence into daylight of magical ideas of force, that always\npersisted, but for ages were kept in comparative obscurity by the vogue\nof Animism.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. WHAT IS MAGIC?\n\nIn his _Development of Moral Ideas_ (II. 47) Prof. Westermarck observes\nthat savages distinguish two classes of phenomena; the natural or\nfamiliar, and the supernatural or mysterious. The latter again are\ndivided into the mechanical (Magic) and the volitional (Animism).\nThis seems to be true: it corrects the notion, still common, that the\nsavage explains all natural activities by Animism; recognises that\nhe takes some phenomena as a matter of course, as the animals do;\nand, as to events that are not a matter of course, rightly marks the\ndistinction between his conceptions of them as either mechanical (due\nto some uniformly acting force) or volitional (that is, arbitrary or\ncapricious). With the savage, then, there are ongoings of things around\nhim that are _perceived_ to be regular and continuous; and there are\nothers between which connections are _imagined_ to take place, and\nthese either regularly or capriciously: for thus I venture to interpret\nthe difference between the natural and the supernatural; it is the\ndifference between perception-belief and imagination-belief. Common\nsense, Magic, Animism\u2014these are the three great congeries of ideas\nthat compete for the control of his thoughts and in his interpretation\nof the world.\n\nMagic may be defined as a connexion of events imagined to be constant\nand to depend upon the agency of some thing or activity possessing an\nefficacious quality or force (in fact unreal), and not to depend (as a\nconnexion) upon the will of any particular person.\n\nWhether Magic is ever wrought by the bare wish or will of a human\nbeing will be discussed below (\u00a7 6). Here, the proviso that a magical\nconnexion does not depend upon the will of a person, is meant to\nexclude Animism. For pure Animism involves the belief that a ghost,\nspirit, or god (though he may work by Magic) can produce an effect by\nhis direct action, without using any visible or invisible means other\nthan his own spiritual body and force. This is not what a magician\ndoes: he works by means of a connexion of events known (so he thinks)\nto himself and often to others. The magical implement (talisman or\nspell) that he uses has qualities that are magical facts, just as\nthe qualities of his spear are physical facts. He can make a stone\nspear-head by means of another stone; and he may be able to make a\ntalisman by means of a spell; but the powers of the talisman or of the\nspell are their own; he cannot create Magic, but only discover and use\nit. Whether he shall use it, depends upon his choice; but its powers\ndo not; they are inherent, like physical forces. Faust can conjure\nthe devil; but so can Wagner, if he knows the spell: the power of the\nspell is indifferent to the conjuror. A man may, indeed, be a source of\nmagical power because he is a chief, or has the evil eye, or is taboo\nfor unpurged homicide; but these things do not depend upon his will; he\nis in the same class with impersonal things that are magical.\n\nA rule of Magic, as describing a uniform connexion of events, resembles\nwhat we call a law of nature; and further in this, that it is not\nsupposed to be absolute or unconditional, but a tendency, subject to\ncounteraction by hostile Magic or (perhaps) by demonic force. But it\ndiffers from a law of nature in being wholly imaginary and incapable of\nverification.\n\nTo practise Magic is to use some such rule in order to obtain an end\ndesired. This can be attempted by any man, so far as his knowledge\nreaches; and the greater his knowledge the greater his power, provided\nhe have the courage to act upon it. All stages of proficiency may be\ntraced from the simple layman who swings a bull-roarer to raise the\nwind, to the wizard who lives by his art, and is feared by all his\ntribe and far beyond it, or to the erudite magician who controls the\ndemons and vies with the gods.\n\nMagical things, objects or actions, in their simplest forms, are\ncharms, spells and rites; and since the ends for which they can be used\nare either to protect oneself or to exert power over other persons\nor things, each of these kinds of magic-thing may be defensive or\noffensive. A defensive charm is called an amulet; an offensive charm is\na talisman. For a defensive spell (say, against sickness or accident)\nthere is, I believe, no appropriate name; offensive spells (say, to\ncontrol the weather or to curse an enemy) may be called incantations\n(but the usage is not fixed). Rites (that is, any magic actions that\nare not spells) may also be defensive (as to touch wood), or offensive\n(as to point at a man); but we have no names for these different\nintentions. From these simplest beginnings the whole learning and\nmystery of Magic seems to have developed.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. THE BEGINNINGS OF MAGIC\n\nThe quest of origins is fascinating, because, if successful, it will\nhelp us to frame that outline of the history of the world which the\nphilosophic mind regards as a necessary of life. To discuss the\nbeginnings of Magic must necessarily be, in some measure, a speculative\nundertaking; because the facts are lost. If Magic was practised in the\nAurignacian culture (say) 20,000 years ago, how can we get to the back\nof it? But speculation is not guess-work, if we always keep in view\nsuch facts as we have; if we are careful to give notice whenever the\nfacts fail us; if we guide ourselves by scientific principles; and if\nwe make no assumptions merely to suit our case, but only such as are\ngenerally admitted in all departments. For example:\n\n(1) We may reasonably assume that the simplest magical beliefs and\npractices are of the earliest type: and nothing can be simpler than the\nbelief in charms, rites and spells. It is, indeed, difficult to find\nmany of these practices\u2014though some can be produced\u2014in their simplest\nforms in our records of backward peoples; partly because they have\nnot been enough observed; partly because Magic is apt everywhere to\nbecome saturated with Animism; partly because charms, rites and spells\nare generally, for greater efficacy, compounded with one another. But\nthese considerations do not affect the simplicity of the idea involved\nin the magical beliefs; which is merely this, that a certain object by\nits presence, or that an action, or an utterance, by merely entering\ninto the course of events, will serve our purpose. A bare uniformity\nof connexion\u2014if _A_, then _B_\u2014in accordance with the familiar\nongoings of Nature and our common activities, is all that is assumed.\nMany kinds of obstacles stop an arrow or a dart; carrion collects the\nvultures: so a patterned comb in one\u2019s hair stops the demon of disease;\na patterned quiver, or a certain song, brings the monkeys down from\nthe tree-tops.[102] A spell assumes merely that certain objects,\nor animals, or spirits, must always comply with a wish or command\nexpressed in words, just as another human being often does. It is their\nsupposed uniform coerciveness that makes the words magical. If any\nform of words ever seems to have been successful, it must be repeated;\nbecause to have the same effect the action must be the same. Immersed\nin an indefinite mass of experiences, the postulate that we call \u201ccause\nand effect\u201d (unformulated, of course) underlies every action, and\ntherefore underlies Magic; it is the ground of all expectation and of\nall confidence.\n\n(2) The types of Magic that are the most prevalent are probably the\nearliest; and these are charms, rites and spells. They are found not\nonly amongst savages, but the world over: even in civilised countries\nmost of the uneducated, many of the half-educated, and not a few of\nthose who have \u201cfinished their education,\u201d employ them; whereas more\ncomplicated magical practices, except such as have been taken up\ninto religious celebrations, are apt to fall into desuetude. What is\nuniversal must be adapted to very simple conditions of existence; these\nbeliefs, therefore, to mental wants and proclivities that are probably\nprimitive; and what conditions can be more simple, or more primitive,\nor more universal than ignorance of our fate and eagerness to clutch at\nanything that may give us confidence.\n\nAnd not only are charms, rites and spells in all ages and everywhere\nemployed in their simplest forms; but analysis of the most elaborate\nritual and of nominally animistic practices will discover the same\nbeliefs at the bottom of them. The idea of the amulet or the talisman\nis found in fetiches, beads, praying-wheels, and equally in a long\nmimetic dance or a passion-play; whose central purpose always is to\navert some evil or to secure some good\u2014success in hunting, or war, or\nagriculture. Similarly, the spell is involved in all rites, so far as\nverbal formul\u00e6 are used in them; and in all curses or prayers, so far\nas their efficacy depends upon a sound form of words.\n\nThe persistence of magical beliefs amongst civilised people is, in some\nmeasure, due to tradition; though the tradition could not continue\neffective if there were not in every generation a predisposition to\naccept it; and how far it is due to tradition, how far to a spontaneous\nproclivity, in any one who is inclined to believe in charms, rites\nand spells, he himself must judge as best he can. Superstition having\nbeen at one time extremely useful socially, there is some presumption\nthat tribes addicted to it (within limits) had an advantage, and that\nthe disposition became hereditary. It is a recent acquisition compared\nwith the love of climbing; but once ingrained, it must remain till\ndisutility breeds it out. Meanwhile, it is a stain on the human soul.\nSo much of one\u2019s early life is always forgotten that no one can be sure\nthat he was not inoculated with such notions in childhood; especially\nwhen we consider that religious practices, taught before they can be\nwell understood, must often wear a magical habit to a child; and that\nmedicines, whose operations nobody used to understand, were on the\nsame foot with Magic. For my own part, bating the last considerations,\nI cannot remember ever to have heard in childhood any sort of Magic\nspoken of except with amusement; yet magical beliefs have always\nhaunted me. With Animism it was otherwise. When six or seven years old,\nI was told by a nursemaid\u2014a convinced adherent of one of the many\nlittle sects that have ramified out of Wesleyanism in Cornwall\u2014the\nmost appalling ghost-stories; and these stories, exciting no doubt\nan ancient disposition, and reinforced by a visualising faculty that\nnightly peopled the darkness with innumerable spectres, entirely\noverpowered the teachings of those whom there was better reason to\ntrust, that ghosts are a superstition from which true religion has\nfor ever set us free. The effects lasted into middle age. Andrew Lang\nsaid of ghosts that \u201che did not believe, but he trembled\u201d; and that\nprecisely describes my own state of mind for many years. Now, as to\nMagic, my impression is that had it been suggested to me in a serious\nway, and not merely by casual allusions to \u201cluck,\u201d the experience\nwould have stuck in my memory. The first time that I can remember\npractising rites, I was between ten and eleven years old, living at a\nsmall boarding-school. To keep off a dreaded event, I used to go every\nmorning to the pump, fill my mouth with water and spurt it out in a\nviolent stream\u2014three times. This went on for some weeks. To the best\nof my recollection, the impulse was spontaneous, and I cannot remember\nwhy the particular rite was adopted: to spout water out of the mouth\nmay have been symbolic of a pushing away of what was feared; but I do\nnot think I was conscious of that meaning. Nothing further of the kind\nrecurs to me until about the age of fifteen, when, at another school,\nthe master-passion of my life was cricket; and I always practised some\nrite before going on the field, and carried a charm in my pocket; but I\ncannot recall what they were. At present, a day rarely passes without\nmy experiencing some impulse to practise Magic. In lighting my first\npipe in the morning (for example), if I remember how I lit it, where I\nstruck the match, etc., yesterday, and if no misfortune has happened\nsince, I feel an unmistakable impulse to \u201clight up\u201d again in the same\nway. No reason is distinctly present to me for acting so, and therefore\nit is hazardous to analyse the attitude; but it is not merely incipient\nhabit: to the best of my judgment it is this, that such a way of\nlighting my pipe was one amongst the antecedents of a quiet time, and\nthat it will be well to reinstate as many of them as possible. It is\nmore comfortable to do it than to alter it: one feels more confident.\n\nInquiry amongst my friends shows that some have similar experiences,\nand others (both men and women) have not. A _questionnaire_ on such\na point might be useful; but difficult to arrange without giving\nsuggestion or exciting bias.[103]\n\n(3) There are causes originating the belief in charms, rites and spells\nso simple that nothing could be more natural to the primitive human\nmind. What is more universally powerful in producing belief in the\nconnexion of events, and consequent expectancy of repetition, than an\ninteresting coincidence? If, says Sir E.\u00a0F. im Thurn,[104] a Carib\nsees a rock in any way abnormal or curious, and if shortly afterwards\nany evil happens to him, he regards rock and evil as cause and effect,\nand perceives in the rock a spirit. This is animistic; but the same\ntendency to be impressed by coincidence underlies Magic. For example:\nA hunting party of Esquimos met with no game. One of them went back\nto the sledges and got the ham-bone of a dog to eat. Returning with\nthis in his hand, he met and killed a seal. Ever afterwards he carried\na ham-bone in his hand when hunting.[105] The ham-bone had become a\ntalisman. Such a mental state as the Esquimo\u2019s used to be ascribed\nto the association of ideas; but it is better to consider it as an\nempirical judgment. Other circumstances of the event may have been\nassociated in his mind; but as to the ham-bone and the kill, he thinks\nof them together, and judges that they are connected. Then, having\njudged that the ham-bone influenced the kill, he carries it with him in\nfuture in order to repeat the conditions of success.\n\nWe may perhaps discern the moment when Magic first fastened upon the\nhuman mind by considering how the use of weapons and snares by the\nprimitive hunter impaired his sense of the mechanical continuity of\nthe work. In a struggle with prey body to body, success or failure\nwas thoroughly understood; but with the use of weapons and snares it\nbecame conditional upon the quality of these aids and upon his skill\nwith them: more and more conditional as the number of steps increased\nbetween the first preparation and the event; at any one of which\nunforeseen occurrences might frustrate his plans. Hence an irresistible\ndesire to strengthen and insure every step of his task; and to gratify\nthis desire Magic arose.\n\nThat Magic should depend upon the assumption that \u201cthings connected\nin thought are connected in fact\u201d seems unintelligible, until we\nconsider that the thought in which they are connected is a judgment\nconcerning the facts. But how is it possible to judge so foolishly?\nAbsurd association is intelligible; it cannot be helped; but judgment\nis not a passive process. Well: a logician might interpret the case\nas a fallacy in applying the inductive canons: the Esquimo had two\ninstances: (_a_) no ham-bone, no seal; (_b_) ham-bone, seal: or, again,\ninto the circumstances of his expedition he introduced a ham-bone,\nand the seal followed. Therefore, the carrying of a ham-bone was the\ncause of getting a seal. He had not read Mill, and did not know what\nprecautions should be taken before adopting such conclusions. The mind\nmust have begun in this way; and after many thousands of years, the\nopportunities of error in empirical judgment began to be appreciated,\nand the canons were formulated. The experience of every man at every\nstage of life, personal or social (probably evoking an inherited\ndisposition), continually impresses him with the belief in some\nconnexion of antecedent and consequent, that each event arises out of\nothers. But what it is in the antecedent that determines the event can\nnever, in practical affairs, be exactly known. In definite cases, where\nmethod is applicable, we may analyse the consequent into the tendencies\nof forces in amount and direction; or we may sometimes reproduce it by\nan experiment exactly controlled. But where these resources fail us, as\nthey often do in practical affairs, we are little confident of grasping\nall, or even the chief conditions of any event that interests us. The\nsavage knows nothing of method, and, therefore, feels less distrust.\nHe learns something of the conditions of success in hunting; this is\nbiologically necessary to him as it is to a tiger; only those survive\nthat learn them. He knows that he must have weapons as efficient as\npossible, must go to the habitat of his prey, must not be heard, or\nseen, or smelt. But with all precautions he sometimes fails; therefore\nthere must be some other condition which he does not understand. Hence\nanything observed, or any word or action, that happens to be followed\nby success, may have been a means to that success.\n\nAnd if it once has been, it always will be: not that he thinks of\nit in this general way. But even animals, as soon as they have\nlearnt a sequence, trust to it. Dogs and cats learn faster than\nguinea-pigs; monkeys faster than dogs and cats; man quicker still.\nBut in no case would there be any use in learning, if it did not\nlead to action as if the experience had been generalised. There is\nno mystery in generalisation; it is spontaneous, and only waits for\nlanguage to express itself; the difficult thing to acquire is caution.\nIn default of method, the only test of truth is relative constancy\nin experience\u2014_per enumerationem simplicem_\u2014faulty but broadly\neffective; which requires time and practice. Primitive Magic is an\nincautious, unexpressed generalisation; and the conditions are such\nthat the error cannot be easily detected. As long as a savage follows\nthe instinctive, traditionary and acquired knowledge that he has of\nhunting, practices based on wrong judgments, but not interfering with\nthe traditionary art, such as the carrying about of a bone, or a\ncrystal, or having a special pattern on his quiver, cannot impair his\nsuccess; may add to it by increasing his confidence: so that as long as\nsuccess lasts there is nothing to suggest the falsity of the judgment.\nA series of failures may make the hunter throw away his talisman, or\n(at a later stage of Magic) take it to a medicine-man to be redoctored.\nHow many thousands of times may Magic have begun in this way and lost\nits hold again, before the human mind became chronically infected with\nit!\n\nSimilarly with amulets, anything unusual that a man happens to have\nabout him, when attacked by a leopard or snake, from which he escapes,\nmay be kept as a safeguard against future perils. And with rites:\nany gesture or action, however irrelevant, that happens to precede\na successful effort, may be repeated in order to reinstate all the\nantecedents of success. So, too, with the origin of spells. It is a\ncommon impulse, and quite spontaneous, to accompany an action with\nwords, incentive or expletive. If a hunter does so in driving home\nhis spear successfully, he will next time repeat the words: they then\nbecome a spell.[106] First, then, there are practices of carrying\nabout charms, repeating words, repeating actions; next, along with\nthese practices, beliefs grow up as to the nature of their efficacy,\ntheir virtue; and much later it is discovered that some of the\npractices seem to involve certain common principles which the savage\nhad never thought of.\n\nIn trying to imagine ourselves in the place of such a man, we must not\nomit the emotional excitement that determines his judgment. It is the\nintensity of his desire for success, his anxiety about it, that makes\nhim snatch at, and cling to, whatever may possibly be a means to it: he\ndoes not see how it acts, but will take no risks by omitting it. Since\nwhat is true of primitive hunting is true of all undertakings\u2014that\nwe know some conditions of success but far from all\u2014and since we are\nall of us frequently in this position\u2014the wonder is that we resort so\nlittle to Magic. That many people do so in London is notorious.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. MAGICAL FORCE AND PRIMITIVE IDEAS OF CAUSATION\n\nMagic is a uniform connexion of events, depending on some impersonal\nforce that has no real existence. What causes make men believe in such\nforce? In the first place, everything is necessarily conceived of by\neverybody (and probably in some dim way by the higher animals) as a\ncentre of forces. Its weight, when we try to lift it; inertia, when\nwe push it, or when it is moving and we try to stop it; degree of\nhardness, when we strike or grasp it; elasticity, when the bent bough\nof a tree recoils; the sway of torrents and the lift of waves; falling\ntrees, avalanches, water-spouts, hurricanes: all these things a man\nmust think of, as he does of other men and animals, in comparison with\nhis own strength or impotence. Into their actions and reactions he\nreads such tension and effort as he himself feels in struggling with\nthem, or in grappling one of his own hands with the other; and as\ntheir action is full of surprises he does not suppose himself to know\nall that they can do.\n\nBut, further, the strain exhibited by some objects, especially trees;\nthe noises they make, creaking and groaning in the wind; the shrieking\nand moaning of the wind itself, the threatening and whispering of the\nsea, thunder and the roar of torrents: all excite _Einf\u00fchlung_ or\nempathy, illusory sympathy with things that do not feel. Their voices,\nmore than anything else, I believe, endow them for our imaginations\nwith an inward life, which Mr. Marett has well called Animatism,[107]\nand which must not be confounded with the Animism that used to be\nattributed to all children and all savages\u2014the belief that every\nobject is actuated by a spirit, or even that it has a consciousness\nlike our own. What truth there was in that doctrine is fully covered by\nAnimatism.\n\nAgain, the savage is acquainted with invisible forces some of which\nseem to act at a distance. The wind is the great type of invisible\nforce; heat, sound, odour are also invisible, and act at a distance;\nthe light of the camp-fire acts at a distance, spreading across the\nprairie or into the recesses of the forest; and lightnings issue from\nthe clouds. In dreams, one visits some remote hunting-ground and\nreturns instantly; distance and time are distorted or annihilated; and\nif you can act where you dream, why not where you intensely imagine\nyourself?\n\nHence there are abundant analogues in experience by which the savage\ncan conceive of his talisman as a force-thing that acts invisibly and\nacts at a distance. Australian medicine-men \u201cthrew their jo\u00efas (evil\nmagic) invisibly, \u2018like the wind,\u2019 as they said.\u201d[108] The talisman\nacts at a distance, like a missile; it acts for the person who owns it\nas his spear does, and is dangerous to others who have not practised\nwith it. Sometimes, indeed, magic things have no owners, and are\ndangerous to everybody: malignant influence radiating from them, like\nthe heat of a fire or the stench of a corpse. Such are two stones\ndescribed by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen[109] as marking the place\nwhere an old man and two women died for breaking a marriage-taboo.\n\u201cThey are so full of evil magic that if any but old men go near, it\nkills them. Now and then a very old man goes and throws stones and\nbushes upon the spot to keep down the evil magic.\u201d It is as if one\ncovered up a fire or a corpse. And, further, magical force may exist\nin a diffused way, like darkness, heat, cold, epidemic disease, tribal\nunrest, without necessarily attaching to any particular thing. In the\nWestern Isles of Torres Straits[110] mishaps may be signs of an unlucky\nstate of things in general. A fisherman, usually successful, having\nonce failed at his task, was depressed; but on two women dying in his\nvillage soon after, he was consoled; since this showed that failure\nwas not his fault. Currents of this magical force, favourable or\nunfavourable to things in general, may be seen in the flow and ebb of\nthe tide, the waxing and waning of the moon, and in the course of the\nseasons. From this way of thinking it is but a step to the conception\nof _mana_, as it is called in Melanesia:[111] _orenda_ of the Iroquois,\n_manitou_ of the Algonquin, _wakanda_ of the Omaha.[112] It is the\npower of the wonderful and mysterious in the world, which becomes\nespecially manifest in Magic and in the agency of spirits. Similar\nnotions are found in many regions at various stages of culture, but\nnowhere (I believe) at the lowest stages; so that it is unreasonable to\ntreat it as the first source of ideas of the supernatural. It is too\ncomprehensive a generalisation to find expression amongst savages. The\nArunta have got as far as the generalisation of evil Magic under the\nname of _arungquiltha_.[113] But _mana_ is a generalisation of all the\nimaginary forces of superstition, vague and mysterious; as \u201ccause,\u201d in\npopular use, is a generalisation of all the supposed \u201cforces\u201d of nature.\n\nRites also act at a distance by invisible force; for this power belongs\nto gesture-language, and the simplest rites are gestures. And so do\nspells; for wishes, commands, threats expressed in words, act upon\nmen at a distance by invisible force; and spells are nothing but\nsuch expressions conceived of in a particular way, as having that\nuniform efficacity which is Magic. Spells, being thought of as forces,\nare reified; so that blessings or curses cling to their objects like\ngarlands, or like contaminating rags.\n\nMagical force, then, is a notion derived from experience of natural\nforces and employed to account for events that are unusual, wonderful,\nmysterious, not to be interpreted by that common sense which is the\ncumulative result of usual occurrences. It is superimposed upon the\nolder and wider presumption of causation, and is expected to manifest\nitself with the same uniformity; so that, if the laws of it can be\ndiscovered, it supplies a basis for the Art of Magic. So far is Magic\nfrom being the source of the belief in causation! But I have spoken\nof the \u201colder and wider _presumption_ of causation\u201d; for (as has been\nshown) the definite postulate that all the ongoings of the world may be\nanalysed upon the principal of cause and effect, can never come into\nthe minds of primitive men; and even to ourselves it rarely occurs,\nexcept in scientific discussions or logical exercises; but we always\nact as if we trusted in it, and so does a savage, and so does a dog.\nThe presumption is reinforced by every moment\u2019s ordinary experience;\nand without it no consistency of life is possible. This ungeneralised\npresumption determines all thoughts and actions, mechanical, animistic,\nor magical. That the forces implied in superstition are generalised\nin such concepts as _mana_ before the principle of causation obtains\nexpression, is due to the prepotency of the unusual, wonderful,\nmysterious in attracting attention.\n\nIn our modern analysis of mechanical causation there are four\nrequirements: (1) every event has a cause; (2) causation is uniform;\n(3) the cause is the assemblage of the indispensable conditions of the\neffect (and no others); (4) the cause is proportional to the effect. In\nthe savage\u2019s mind these requirements are also obscurely recognised: (1)\nhe seeks a cause for everything: (2) he expects it to act uniformly:\n(3) he believes in reinstating all the conditions of the effect, as\nappears from his preparations for hunting, or war, or marriage, or\nwhatever he may have in hand; but he is much more ignorant than we are\nas to what conditions are indispensable and decisive: (4) he knows\nvaguely that the cause is proportional to the effect; for (_a_) he\nsucceeds in making effective weapons, etc., by mechanical means; (_b_)\nhe is very susceptible to the \u201csize-weight illusion,\u201d twice as much as\nwe are,[114] and this implies the adjustment of effort to a supposed\nweight; (_c_) he repeats a spell in order to strengthen it, or unites\na talisman, a rite and a spell in one assault, implying that greater\nforce must be directed against greater resistance; and so on.\n\nCausation, then, is universally assumed: how do Animism and Magic\ninfluence the latent conception? As to Animism, (1) it palters with the\nuniformity of causation; for though the ghost or spirit acts from human\nmotives, no one knows exactly what its motives are. It may be cajoled,\nimplored, even threatened; but the result does not always answer\ndesire: there is apparent caprice or free will, with consequent loss of\nconfidence, and an uncomfortable feeling that leads to a reaction in\nfavour of controlling the god, or ghost, by Magic. (2) The ghost is at\nfirst merely a man-force disengaged from the visible body, but still\nhaving its own body through which it can produce various effects. But\nthe fear of a ghost immediately endows it with superhuman power; and in\ncourse of time it becomes more and more powerful, even to omnipotence;\nso that it can of itself bring about any event; and, therefore, the\n\u201cassemblage of conditions\u201d becomes unnecessary to causation: there\nneed be no visible conditions: miracles occur; creation out of nothing\nis possible. (3) For such a power the \u201cproportionality of cause and\neffect\u201d becomes almost meaningless; but not quite, for there are\ndegrees of spirit-force; and what one cannot do a stronger can.\n\nAs to Magic, it has the great merit of (1) preserving the uniformity\nof causation. But (2) it vitiates the presumption of causation by\nincluding in the total antecedent unreal conditions, namely, the forces\nof rites and spells; and by generating a frame of mind that makes\nit impossible to eliminate them. The hunter uses all the resources\nof his art in hunting; he also practises rites and spells. To which\ndoes he owe his success? We might suggest that he should try the\nhunting without the rites; but he is afraid to; and should he try, his\npositivism would probably break down at the first failure to kill.\nWell, then, let him try the rites without the hunting; but he is not\nsuch a fool: and, if he were, the medicine-man would tell him that,\nof course, he must \u201cuse the means.\u201d (3) Magic impairs the sense of\nproportionality between cause and effect, by recognising antecedents\nwhich are, in their nature, immeasurable. In their admirable work, _The\nPagan Tribes of Borneo_, Messrs. Hose and McDougall remark[115] that\nit is sometimes said, that people of lowly culture have \u201cno conception\nof mechanical causation, and that every material object is regarded by\nthem as animated\u201d; but they do not think that this could be truthfully\nsaid about any of the peoples of Borneo. In the construction of houses,\nboats, weapons, traps, they have a nice appreciation of the principles\ninvolved. Yet we find[116] that these skilled artisans believe that\nthey can retard an enemy\u2019s boat by hanging under one of its benches a\nquartz pebble. Similarly, the Boloki of the Congo, having made a good\ncanoe, before launching, strike it on the stern with an axe \u201cto take\naway the weight.\u201d[117] And the Fijians, still better boat-builders,\nbelieve that to put a basket of bitter oranges on a canoe reduces its\nspeed.[118]\n\nInasmuch as the possibility of action at a distance is still in debate,\nthe savage cannot perhaps upon that tenet be confidently corrected.\n\nIf there is any truth in the foregoing account of the latent ideas, or\npresumptions, of savages concerning causation, it is plain that Magic\n(and likewise Animism) did not help, but hindered the development of\nthese ideas. Notwithstanding (or, perhaps, because of) certain specious\nresemblances to science, Magic is, and always has been, the enemy of\nscience.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. MAGIC AND MYSTERY\n\nMagic begins with ignorance of some of the conditions of a desired\nevent, and the adoption (on account of coincidence) of anything that\nfixes one\u2019s attention as contributing to the total antecedent. As\nthe supposed conditions of events grow more and more miscellaneous,\nthe disposition increases to regard anything as a possible cause of\nanything else. Hence unbounded suspicion whenever an interesting event\noccurs whose antecedents are not familiar and manifest. The more\nunusual any occurrence, the more it must excite attention and be apt to\narouse suspicion; and the first arrival of travellers or missionaries\namongst a wild tribe is an event so unprecedented, that it is likely\nenough to occasion exaggerated suspicions and behaviour which, when\nreported, misrepresent the tribe\u2019s normal attitude of mind. For this\nallowance should be made.\n\nHowever, in Magic the causation is never traceable; therefore it\nbecomes mysterious. The sense of mystery arises when something excites\nwonder, wonder gives place to curiosity, curiosity is baffled, and\nwonder returns with fear. The magical power of an inert object, such\nas a black pebble or a shark\u2019s tooth, or of a bone that is pointed\ntowards a victim, or of a spear that is swung but not thrown, and\nnevertheless inflicts a wound, though an invisible one, is something\nunknown, or mysterious. That is to say, it is a merely imagined action\nwhich remains obscure and inscrutable, in comparison with the perceived\naction of a spear thrown at a deer and slaying it with a visible wound.\nThe savage has adequate practical knowledge of the latter process; of\nthe former only a vague analogical image. He feels the difference, and\nthat the Magic is mysterious; and mystery, being common to all magical\nprocesses, and deeply impressive (especially in black Magic), becomes\nwhat we call a \u201cfundamental attribute\u201d of Magic, pervading the whole\napperceptive mass that is formed by a man\u2019s magic-beliefs. Therefore\nwhatever excites the sense of mystery tends to be assimilated[119]\nby this apperceptive mass and confirmed as magical; just as the mass\nof our scientific knowledge assimilates and confirms any proposition\nthat has the attributes of a scientific law. Hence the savage accepts\nthe mysterious remedies of an European doctor as magical; and he is\nready to regard as magical, and to fear, anything\u2014a rock, tree, or\nwater-spout\u2014that by any trait excites his sense of mystery. Magic,\nthen, does not arise from mystery; but having come into existence, it\nappeals to the feeling of mystery; and then whatever else is mysterious\ntends to become magical.[120]\n\nMagic being mysterious, the more mysterious the more powerful it must\nbe. Hence foreign Magic is more dreaded than the home-made; ancient\nMagic is more powerful than modern; muttered spells, or formul\u00e6 in\na strange language, or in one whose meaning has been lost, are more\nefficacious than intelligible speech; written characters and numbers\nhave a subduing prestige; verse is more subtle than prose (for poets\nare everywhere respected); a wizard is more impressive in a mask than\nwhen bare-faced, in a fit than when sober; and operations in the dark,\nthat ought to excite scepticism, enhance credulity.\n\nMasses of ideas having this mysterious quality form relatively\ndissociated systems, which offer resistance to all ideas that want it,\nand therefore to what we call \u201cexplanation.\u201d Hence the conservative,\ninexpugnable character of Magic and its easy alliance with Mysticism.\nResistance to explanation may go the length of denying present\nexperience; as when a man is seen to be slain by a weapon or by a\nfalling tree, and yet his death is ascribed to sorcery: the fear of\nsorcery having become a fixed idea.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. VOLITIONAL MAGIC\n\nMagical power inheres in things, rites and spells without regard to the\nman who uses them; they may be sold or taught, and then serve the new\npossessor. But much the greater part of all known magical operation\ndepends upon the agency of some person, man or spirit, who sets it\ngoing; and rites and spells are from the first, by their nature,\npersonal actions.\n\nIn the later stages of Magic, no doubt, it is held that a mere wish or\nvolition may be efficacious: in Cornwall they still tell you, when you\nare cold or tired, that you \u201clook wisht,\u201d that is, as if you had been\nill-wisht and were pining away (this meaning is generally forgotten).\nBut it seems to me improbable that such an idea should be primitive.\nPeople who, in inflicting penalties, do not discriminate between\naccidental and intentional offences, cannot be supposed to ascribe\npower to a mental process as such; and I have not been able to find\nin reports of very backward tribes any case of wish-magic unsupported\nby magical implements. Dr. Haddon says[121] that, among the eastern\nislanders of Torres Straits, the power of words and the projection of\nthe will are greatly believed in. A youth who makes love procures a\npiece of black lava shaped significantly, and anoints it with coco-nut\noil, etc.; he also anoints his own temples, and thinks as intently as\npossible about the girl, and repeats a spell whenever he sees her,\nusing the names of Sagaro and Pikaro, wife and mistress of the hero\nSida. Now, with this complex apparatus of talisman, rite and spell,\nhow much is left to wishing or the projection of the will? He thinks\nhard about the girl, no doubt; but that needs no voluntary effort: at\nleast, in this climate, voluntary effort is soon exhausted in trying to\nthink of anything else. Mr. Weeks, in his book _Among Congo Cannibals_,\ndescribing a people of somewhat higher culture, and much more advanced\nAnimism than the natives of Torres Straits, explains the nervousness\nin the poison ordeal even of those who are innocent of any nefarious\npractices, by asking\u2014\u201cFor who has not at some time wished another\u2019s\ndeath?\u201d\u2014and by the admitted doctrine that a man may be full of evil\nmagic without knowing it. From this it seems to be inferable that a\nmere wish may be effective. But not justly; for a man full of evil\nmagic is an incarnate talisman; and such a man may operate without\nwishing, as often happens with the evil-eye. At any rate, these casual\nCongo wishes do not amount to volition; the faintest velleity is enough\nfor the hair-trigger of such explosive personalities. In Japan, too,\nthe angry spirit of a living person may inflict a curse unknown to\nhimself.[122]\n\nStill, with the progress of Magic, deliberate wishes may acquire\nindependent power. A man practising evil Magic, and desiring secrecy,\nhas a strong motive to believe (that is, there is a cause of his\nbelieving) that his tacit wish has the power of invisible action at\na distance; and the way by which he arrives at that belief is quite\nclear: for a spell is a magical force; it is also an expressed wish or\ncommand; and, if muttered, is more rather than less powerful than when\nuttered aloud. Why not, then, \u201csub-muttered,\u201d or merely thought?\n\nFrom this degenerate notion of will-work we must distinguish the\npersonal power of an accomplished wizard in his whole magical activity.\nWhatever a man does with a talisman or a spell, as it were with a\ntool or a weapon, may be done with more or less concentration of\nenergy and proficiency in the performance; and one man will be plainly\nsuperior to another. Success depends upon doing one\u2019s best; therefore\nupon the will. And Magic often needs courage and resource; but in the\ndevelopment of the art it depends still more upon knowledge; wherein\nthe magician is wont to boast himself. For wizardry is the most\nreputable faculty of primitive scholarship: to know all spells and\nrites, the arts of divination and medicine, the ancestry and true name\nof all dangerous things, which gives control over them: and it is a\nuniversal belief that knowledge is power.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. THE EVOLUTION OF MAGIC\u2014DIRECT MAGIC\n\nFrom the simple beginnings thus described, Magic, like everything\nelse in the world, proceeds to grow and differentiate. It grows by\nthe lengthening of spells from the briefest wish or command to many\nverses;[123] by the extension of rites from the waving of a bough\nto raise the wind to the Australian Intichiuma ceremonies that go on\nfor many days; by the accumulating of charms by the bagful; by the\ncompounding of rites with spells, and by repetition of them three\ntimes or some other sacred number. It differentiates by being applied\nand adapted to more and more purposes: from hunting (if we suppose\nit to begin there) to war and love; to birth, marriage and death; to\nthe giving of diseases and the curing of them; to the protection of\nproperty and to the discovery (or concealment) of theft; to navigation,\nbuilding, agriculture, the care of flocks and herds, the procuring of\nrain, renewing the vigour of the sun and binding the influence of the\nPleiades. At the same time Magic, originally practised (we may presume)\nby individuals, comes to engage the concern and co-operation of\nfamilies, clans and tribes; and a distinction grows up between what we\ncall \u201cwhite\u201d and \u201cblack\u201d Magic: practices that are for the welfare of\nthe tribe, or of some portion of it, and practices designed to gratify\nprivate passions without regard to their effect upon the community.\n\nOne may notice certain stages (not always serial) in the development\nof Magic: First, the simple and direct defence of oneself or fellows\nagainst other persons or things, storms, diseases, etc.; or, again,\ndirect attack upon such hostile powers\u2014by means of charms, spells or\nrites. Secondly, indirect or dramatic Magic, operating not upon persons\nor things themselves, but (expecting the same effect) upon imitations\nof them, or upon detached parts or appurtenances; as in the well-known\ndevice of making a waxen figure of a man and melting it in the fire to\nhis destruction. Thirdly, the alliance of Magic with Animism, leading\nto sorcery, exorcism and ceremonies associated with Religion\u2014discussed\nbelow in the sixth and seventh chapters. Fourthly, the confusion of\nMagic with Science, as in Astrology and Alchemy\u2014referred to in the\nseventh and tenth chapters.\n\nDirect magical rites begin in very simple ways, probably with gestures:\nas to point at a man in threatening; to throw out the open hand in\nwarding off evil; to claw the air behind a man\u2019s back, as Australian\nwomen do. It becomes more and more elaborate as the result of much\nstudy devoted to a matter of supreme interest: especially after the\nrise of a professional class of medicine-men, with whom inventions\naccumulate and become traditionary. Similarly, spells are at first\nmerely wishes, or commands, or warnings. An Australian Wind-doctor\ncries, \u201cLet the west wind be bound.\u201d[124] The southern Massim of New\nGuinea have a spell to open a cave\u2014\u201cO rock, be cleft!\u201d and, again,\nto shut the cave\u2014\u201cO rock, be closed!\u201d[125] Nothing can be simpler.\nHow spells rise into poetry and are combined with rites and charms is\nshown by a Polynesian example: a man being ill with consumption, which\nis called _Moomoo_, a medicine-man is sent for. He comes, sits by the\npatient, and sings\u2014\n\n \u201cO Moomoo, O Moomoo!\n I\u2019m on the eve of spearing you.\u201d\n\nThen, rising, he flourishes his spear over the patient\u2019s head, and goes\naway. No one dares speak or smile.[126]\n\nAs to charms, the simplest, and perhaps the earliest, are small\npebbles, such as the Australian \u201cbulks,\u201d or crystals.[127] In Papua\nthere are quartz charms so powerful that it is not safe for even the\nowner to touch them. In that country the qualities that make a thing\nsuitable for a charm are: (1) similarity in contour, or in other ways,\nto the object to be influenced; (2) rarity; (3) unusual shape in not\nvery uncommon objects:[128] in short, whatever arrests attention. Dr.\nCodrington says: \u201cA stone takes a man\u2019s fancy; it is like something,\nclearly not a common stone; there must be _mana_ in it: puts it in his\ngarden; and a good crop proves he was right.\u201d[129] Among the Esquimo,\nstrange or curious objects never before seen are sometimes considered\nto bring success to the finder; and charms are carried shaped like\nthe animals hunted.[130] Such a taste is very ancient, if the same\npurpose was served by those animal-shaped stones, retouched to increase\nthe resemblance, which have been found in considerable numbers in\nFrance and England.[131] In the bag of a West African sorcerer may be\nseen a bit of leopard skin, of snake\u2019s skin, hawk\u2019s talons, bone of a\ndead man, leaves of certain plants, etc.; each having its own virtue,\nand uniting their powers in the interest of the formidable owner.\nThe _Chanson de Roland_ describes a talisman to which the chief of\nCharlemagne\u2019s peers must have owed no small part of his prowess\u2014his\nfamous sword:\u2014\n\n \u201cAh! Durendal, most holy, fair indeed!\n Relics enough thy golden hilt conceals:\n Saint Peter\u2019s Tooth, the Blood of Saint Basile,\n Some of the Hairs of my lord, Saint Denise,\n Some of the Robe, was worn by Saint Mary.\u201d[132]\n\nI cannot call it fair fighting, and wonder that, thus armed, he should\never have been mortally wounded by the miscreant hordes of Mahum and\nTervagant, however numerous.\n\nAn influential outgrowth of primitive Magic is the taboo. Taboo is the\ndangerousness of a person, or thing, or action, or word, conceived of\nas a motive for not touching or uttering or meddling therewith. The\ndangerousness may either lie in the nature of a person or thing, or\nbe imposed upon it. A chief, for example, and everything belonging to\nhim, is generally taboo by inherent sacredness: he is, like Mr. Weeks\u2019s\nCongolese, full of evil magic. The idea of the talisman has thus been\nextended to include certain men. In many tribes it includes all women;\nbut since to make them always taboo is too much for human nature, they\nare treated as such only periodically, or when a man is about to be\nexposed to some further danger, which will be the more likely to injure\nhim when already contaminated by evil magic.[133] This is very clear in\na case reported by Prof. Seligman:[134] at Yam warriors were forbidden\nto sleep with their wives before battle; else \u201cbow and arrow belong\nother fellow he smell you, he shoot you, you no got luck.\u201d Still,\nphysical consequences (which may explain the superstition) are also\nconsidered: a diver for pearl-shell must similarly abstain; because,\nelse, \u201cman he sleepy.\u201d The continence required of women to ensure the\nsafety of their husbands when away at war or hunting may be due to a\nbelief in a \u201csympathy\u201d or \u201cparticipation,\u201d as if husband and wife were\nin some mysterious _rapport_; but, deeper, there may have been a fetch\nof policy. When magical taboos are generally recognised and feared,\nit becomes possible to use them for social purposes: one cannot be\nsure that every magical observance had its origin in magical belief.\nThus the food-rules of Australian tribes consist of taboos upon the\nenjoyment of certain foods by women and young men, and are plainly\ndevised in the interests of the gerontocracy: so why should not a\nfiction be founded on Magic in the interest of absent husbands?\n\nThe sanctity or dangerousness of the chief is probably due, first,\nto his being really dangerous; but, secondly, to the biological\nadvantage to a tribe of respecting him, which leads to a selection of\nthose tribes amongst whom respect for the chief arises. As biological\nadaptation is never more than a moving, oscillating equilibrium, this\nfeeling sometimes becomes excessive, even to the point of insanity.\nEverything the chief touches becomes taboo; only a few sacred servants\ncan approach him; he may be thus reduced to helplessness. It is one\nof Nature\u2019s checks upon tyranny. Such is the force of taboo, that a\nMaori tribesman, being hungry, seeing some food by the wayside, and\neating it, on learning that it was the remains of the meal of a sacred\nchief, immediately fell ill, and died. The offence was fatal\u2014as soon\nas it was known. The dangerousness of women has been referred to their\nweakness; association with them must be weakening, and is therefore\nforbidden when exertion is needed.[135] Prof. Westermarck traces it\nto a \u201chorror of blood\u201d;[136] very probably; but other things may\nco-operate towards it. The life of women separates them from men, and\nbrings them into a freemasonry and community of interests, to which men\nare not admitted; differentiates their mentality, until the result is\nmysterious and therefore magical: the sexual orgasm, being more like\npain than anything that is not pain, at once attractive and revulsive,\nacquires the same character. Homicides and mourners, again, are liable\nto be taboo, either because there clings to them the mysterious quality\nand taint of death (a magical motive), or because they are followed by\nthe ghosts of the departed.\n\nThere are unlucky words which it is a social offence to utter: words\nof ill-omen, but especially names of dead people, demons and sometimes\ngods; for people are apt to come when they are called, and, if the call\nis conceived of according to Magic, come they certainly will. There\nare likewise many actions that seem to us entirely innocent, yet in\none or another tribe must be avoided by all who desire a prosperous or\nonly a tranquil life. The Papagoe Indians of Mexico forbid a girl at a\ncertain time to scratch her head, or even to touch her hair with her\nhand; for which there may be an excuse in the sacredness of the head;\nbut her brother comes at the same time under the same restriction.[137]\nThe case seems to be a type of many taboos, as being due wholly to\nsuspicion and anxiety: an anxious mother who sees her boy scratch\nhis head is reminded of his sister who must not do so; her fears are\nexcited, and she prohibits the action that excites her fear: it is\ntaboo. Writing of a Bantu tribe, M.\u00a0Jounod says, \u201cMost often taboos are\ninexplicable.\u201d[138] So are the penalties that await the breach of them:\nthe punishment rarely fits the crime. Premature baldness, failure in\nhunting or fishing, boils, lameness, dysentery\u2014may avenge the eating\nof wild duck or marriage within the forbidden circle. And if any such\nthing happens to a man, he is liable to be accused of having broken a\ntaboo; and that proves the truth of the belief in taboo.\n\nBesides things that are in their magical nature dangerous, and\ntherefore taboo, things inoffensive in themselves can sometimes be made\ntaboo by merely declaring them to be so, or by setting up a symbolic\nnotice that they are so, or by laying a conditional curse upon anybody\nwho meddles with them. They have then become dangerous. This is the\ncommon case of making a talisman by means of a spell, transferring to\nit invisible power. Such practices, especially common in Melanesia, are\noften useful as a cheap defence of property (in gardens, for instance),\nbut are also a means of exaction and tyranny. The prevalence of taboo\namongst savages, by the way, enables them readily to appreciate our\ngreat commandment to do no work on Sunday.[139]\n\n\n\u00a7 8. INDIRECT OR \u201cSYMPATHETIC\u201d MAGIC\n\nThe use of charms, rites and spells, having been established in one\ndepartment\u2014say, hunting\u2014may be extended to others by analogy, and is\nconfirmed there in the same way, namely, by still doing one\u2019s best.\nHaving obtained the charms and learnt, or invented, the rites and\nspells, one applies them, but at the same time makes war or love as\ncunningly as one can, cultivates one\u2019s garden, drives a bargain, and so\nforth, and ascribes all good results to the Magic. At first, I suppose,\nall such action was direct, discharged at the person or thing to be\ninfluenced. To slay an enemy a bone of a dead man was pointed, or a\ncrocodile\u2019s tooth hurled, in his direction (though, probably, not in\nhis sight). To keep off evil Magic a wish was expressed\u2014\u201cNever sharp\nbarn catch me\u201d;[140] or to drive away a pest a command was issued, as\nin Borneo: \u201cO rats, sparrows and noxious insects, go feed on the padi\nof people down river.\u201d[141] But a time came when Magic began also to be\ncarried out by practices indirect and purely dramatic, rites performed\nand spells recited not at the person or thing to be affected, but upon\nsome substitute, or representative, or symbol; and this must have\nhappened pretty early; for dramatic Magic is met with in Australia.\nTo this sort of Magic belong the widely-diffused methods of operating\nupon the image of a man or anything assigned to stand for him, or upon\nhair-clippings, remains of food, or footprints instead of himself; or\nof tying knots to bind, or untying them to release a curse. With spells\nthe indirect method is less common, but remarkable examples of it occur\nat a low level of culture. The Yabim of New Guinea, to promote the\ngrowth of their taro, tell a story: \u201cOnce upon a time, a man labouring\nin his field complained that he had no taro-shoots. Then came two doves\nflying from Paum. They had devoured much taro, and they perched upon a\ntree in the field, and during the night vomited up all the taro. Thus\nthe man got so many shoots that he was even able to sell some of them\nto other people.\u201d[142] Here, then, a mere story of a wish fulfilled is\nsubstituted, as a spell, for the wish itself, and expected to have the\nsame effect upon the crop; and as that is, indeed, true, any failure\nof it is no more liable to be detected. But such practices seem to us\nsillier and less promising even than direct Magic. What can be the\nmeaning of them?\n\nThe indirectness of a rite makes it more mysterious and magical, and\nthat is a recommendation. Moreover, its dramatic character gives\nan imaginative satisfaction, which must suffice to initiate such\npantomime again and again. Amongst ourselves many people are prone to\ndramatise every situation of their lives; to act in imagination their\nloves, their revenges, their opportunities of self-display, and to\nderive satisfaction from such imaginations even to the weakening of\ntheir will\u2014satisfaction without effort or danger. But although this\nimpulse may initiate pantomimic magic, it can hardly maintain it in\nthe absence of any deeper satisfaction. The belief in its efficacy,\nagain, once established, the effect of suggestion upon a victim of\nblack Magic (who by some means is acquainted with what has been done\nagainst him) may have consequences that seem to verify the rites; but\nthis can only happen when a belief in the efficacy of such practices\nalready prevails. The power of suggestion depends upon the belief;\nit cannot create the belief. We must fall back upon coincidence.\nIf, indeed, immediate and complete coincidence were requisite, if,\nwhen one practised on an enemy\u2019s life, nothing less than his speedy\ndeath would do, coincidences might be too rare to give the requisite\nconfirmation. But if some less injury will be acceptable, and if it\nneed not follow immediately; if a delay of not merely two or three\ndays, but two or three months will bring the event within the limits\nof satisfaction; and if the degree of injury may vary from death to\na bad fall, or some failure in hunting on the victim\u2019s part, or a\nquarrel with his wife; if even (as often happens) a misfortune to any\none of his family may suffice\u2014the confirmatory coincidences will be\ntolerably frequent. There must, of course, be many disappointments; but\nthese count for little, because the particular practice is supported\nby a general belief in Magic; because men desire to believe and are\nafraid to disbelieve; because failures are explained by some error in\nperforming the rites, or by the counteraction of superior Magic, or by\nthe intervention of hostile spirits.\n\nSpecial reasons for practising and believing in indirect operations of\nblack Magic are their greater secrecy and, therefore, greater safety,\nand greater gratification of the love of cunning: which last (I think)\nexplains much of the elaboration that marks these performances.\n\nIn the development of indirect Magic, very many of its practices seem\nto involve one or other of the assumptions often called the principles\nof sympathetic Magic, namely, Mimesis and Participation: (1) that to\noperate upon a likeness or representation, or by analogy, affects the\nperson, or object, or process imitated or represented as if it were\ndirectly assailed; and (2) that a part or appurtenance of any one may,\nin any magical undertaking, be substituted for the whole. Among savages\nthese principles (as has already been said) are only latent forms of\nprocedure, tacitly assumed, not formulated, and cannot have been the\nsource of the practices, but must gradually have been established by\nthem; but when notions of scientific arrangement came into vogue,\nthey were discovered and explicitly stated by the early physicians\nand alchemists, in whose thoughts Magic and Science were not clearly\ndifferentiated.\n\nIt has been supposed that these principles are natural consequences of\nthe laws of the association (or reproduction) of ideas. According to\nthe \u201claw of similarity,\u201d an idea of one thing often makes us think of\nanother that resembles it: hence the thought of an enemy is supposed\nto make me think of an image of him, or the sight of his image makes\nme think of him. According to the law \u201cof contiguity,\u201d any two things\nhaving been seen or thought of together, thereafter the thought or\nsight of one of them makes me think of the other: hence the thought of\nan enemy makes me think of his footprint, or his footprint reminds me\nof him. Possibly. But must there not have been a long preparation of\nideas before the thought of an enemy awakens in me these particular\nassociations rather than many others? And if they should occur to me,\nhow do the laws of association explain my astonishing belief that to\nput his image in the fire, or to thrust a thorn into his footprint, or\nto dig it up, carry it home and put it in the oven, will make him lame\nor afflict him with some wasting disease? There must be some system of\nideas to determine these particular judgments.\n\nSome, again, suppose that savages cannot distinguish similarity from\nidentity, part from whole; so that an image appears to them to be\nin earnest the same thing as a man, or his nail-parings the same as\nhimself. Yet it is certain that in their work-a-day life they do make\nthese distinctions, and that otherwise they could not get on at all.\nIf, then, in certain cases, and in Magic (which is all that concerns\nus now), they act or speak as if unable to draw such distinctions, it\nmust be from an acquired incapacity in that connection; just as in some\ncases they suffer from an acquired incapacity to recognise that their\nbeliefs are contradicted by experience; that is to say, some fixed\nidea or dissociation prevents them from comparing the facts; though\nsometimes it may be merely that customary forms of speech hinder the\nexpression of distinctions that really exist among their ideas.\n\nIt has been suggested that the supposed force of mimetic Magic rests\nupon the belief that as a man\u2019s shadow or reflection implies his\npresence, so does his image. And we shall see that, in some cases,\nthis explanation is not far from the mark, though it cannot serve for\nall cases; inasmuch as the image operated upon in any rite need not be\na likeness (of course it never is)\u2014a stick will serve, if declared\nto stand for the victim; and, moreover, his presence is not needed in\ncarrying out rites that act at a distance. What truth there is in this\nview has been better expressed by Prof. Yrj\u00f6 Hirn:[143] namely, that a\nunity or solidarity exists between all persons and things that stand\nto one another in a relationship of contact or similarity, on account\nof a certain magical virtue; and that this solidarity is not destroyed\nby any breach of physical continuity. To take away a man\u2019s cloak,\nor a lock of his hair, or a remnant of his food, does not interrupt\nthe magical continuity which contact has established with the man:\nsomething of him, his virtue, remains with it. And in the same way an\nimage of him contains something of his virtue; for to the immature\nmind, images or pictures are nothing but radiations or decortications\nof the thing itself, an efflux, like the Epicurean \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03b1. Hence the\nbones of a saint and his picture convey his virtue to a devotee by the\nsame process: both are conductors of some emanation from himself. There\nis much truth in this theory.\n\nWhen Animism is called in to explain Magic, this virtue or emanation\nof a man is apt to be explained as his soul, or part of it. A savage\ndislikes being photographed, lest you should take away his soul.\nM. Jounod says the Bantu regard a photograph as \u201can unsheathing of\nsoul\u201d;[144] Mr. Dorsey says no Dakota would have his portrait taken\nlest one of his souls [out of four] should remain in the picture,\ninstead of going after death to spirit-land;[145] Mr. Carl Lumholtz\nsays the Papagoes refused to be photographed, lest part of themselves\nshould be taken away, and remain behind after death.[146] And it is\na trick with some sorcerers to keep a looking-glass, in which they\npretend to catch the souls of their dupes; and, of course, shadows and\nreflections are frequently confounded with the soul. So if the use\nof an image in Magic does not imply the presence of the man himself,\ngenerally it does imply the presence of a very important part of him.\nAnd this explanation is strengthened by an apparent exception; for some\nMalays, when they make an image of an enemy to compass his destruction,\nthink it necessary before operating to coax his soul into it by a\npotent spell.\n\n \u201cHither, Soul, come hither!\n Hither, little one, come hither!\n Hither, bird, come hither!\n Hither, filmy one, come hither!\u201d[147]\n\nMust we not infer that these Malays have in some way lost the common\nbelief, and so are put to this extra trouble?\n\nIf it be asked how this account of the matter can justify the use of\na stick or stone instead of a man\u2019s image, merely assigning it to\nrepresent him, the reply (I think) is that the stick is a symbol. Since\nimages are never much like the man, and may be unlike in all degrees,\nthe stick is a sort of limiting case. A symbol is always the remainder,\nor reminder, of something that once had intrinsic value, as an image,\nshadow, or reflection has by being or participating in the man\u2019s\nsoul. Besides, it is perhaps a tacit assumption of Magic (as in other\ndepartments of life\u2014including Philosophy), \u201cthat whatever for one\u2019s\npurpose it is necessary to assume, is real or true\u201d: the situation\ndemands it.\n\nAs to the magical continuity between a man and whatever has been\nin contact with him, the belief in it may with some confidence be\nderived from the fact that it retains his odour; and when an animistic\nexplanation is required, it is naturally thought that this odour is his\nsoul or soul-stuff, as the savour of a burnt-offering is its soul-stuff\nthat regales the gods.\n\nBelief in the participation of an image, or part or appurtenance of a\nman in the man himself, or in his virtue, or in his soul, must give to\nrites of black Magic a great deal of the subjective satisfaction which\nis a secret motive of all Magic. The images, or nail-parings, or what\nnot, identify the man to be attacked; they fix the wizard\u2019s attention,\nvivify his imagination, direct the spell whom to strike (as a dog is\nset upon a trail), and heighten the joy of imaginary revenge.\n\nThere are, however, many cases usually classed as \u201csympathetic\nMagic\u201d that cannot without great violence be explained in this way;\nand I complain of the epithet \u201csympathetic,\u201d as applied to all\nindirect Magic, that it implies this explanation. Consider the Mandan\nbuffalo-dances, the hunting dance and the mating dance; these are\nimitations or dramatic representations of the hunting of buffaloes and\nof their mating, which they are designed to prosper: can such dances\nbe interpreted as the efflux or decortications of the future hunt or\nmating? Or, again, the story of the mur\u00e6na (quoted above, p. 101)\nand its resuscitation by the rising tide\u2014is this a radiation of the\nbudding of the taro which it is expected to expedite? Such cases, which\nare pretty numerous, must be understood upon some other ground than\n\u201cparticipation.\u201d\n\nMany rites and observances seem to depend upon the notion of favourable\nor unfavourable currents of invisible power, which may be taken\nadvantage of, or influenced, to obtain one\u2019s ends, in hunting, or in\nobtaining rain, or in fertilisation of animals or crops. It is good\nto plant seed, or begin any undertaking, when the moon is waxing, or\nthe tide rising; for these events show that the set of the current\nis favourable to increase or prosperity. Again, one may incite the\ncurrent or strengthen it, as in bringing on rain by throwing water\nin the air, or by leaping to help the crops to grow. To instigate or\nassist in such ways the ongoings of Nature is not the same thing as\nto cause the event: a rain-wizard does not pretend to procure rain\nin the dry season; the times of ploughing, sowing, reaping (whatever\nrites may accompany them) are not decided by Magic. Much pantomimic\nMagic may be best understood as attempting to set up such currents of\ncausation rather than as directly causative. Since instances of cause\nand effect are observed to repeat themselves, a pantomimic murder, or\na hunting dance, or fertility-rites, may be considered as setting an\nexample which Nature is expected to follow: the mur\u00e6na-spell promotes\nvitality by merely describing an example of reinvigoration. The Kai of\nN.E. New Guinea hold that if a man, by falling on a stump of bamboo in\nthe path, wounds himself to death, it is because a sorcerer, having\nobtained something infected with his victim\u2019s soul-stuff, has spread it\nover a pile stuck in the ground, and pretended to wound himself upon\nit and to groan with pain.[148] The belief implies that such practices\nare in vogue; and they seem to rely upon the assumption that \u201cwhat\nhappens once will happen again\u201d; and that who shall repeat the disaster\nis determined by the presence, among the conditions, of something\nbelonging to the victim in default of himself. It is not by sympathy\nor participation that the \u201csomething infected with his soul-stuff\u201d\nacts; but by contributing to reinstate as far as possible all the\ncircumstances of a cause like the cause of the man\u2019s death.\n\nIn other cases an exemplary cause may be constituted by the\nsubstitution of similars that do not imply participation. Dr. Haddon\ntells us that in the western islands of Torres Straits[149] the Kuman\nvine breaks up in dry weather, and the segments look like human bones;\nhence they are employed in Magic. Similarly red ochre or some other\nstain may be used instead of blood, so that a skeleton may be coloured\nwith it as a means of keeping it alive. In Chinese popular religion,\nbefore setting up a new idol, it is first carried to the temple of\nan older one, who is besought to let a portion of his soul-stuff\ntransmigrate into the new one; then, carried to its own temple and\nenthroned, its hands, feet, eyes, mouth, nose and ears are smeared\nwith blood, _or with red paint_, to open its senses and bring its\nsoul into relation with the outer world.[150] Such a substitution of\nsimilars is true in one sense; red paint is a substitute for blood as\ncolour: Magic requires that it shall also be a substitute in other\nways; and, therefore, it is so. Thus, down and feathers thrown into\nthe air in Australian rain-rites are a substitute for clouds; in\nMandan hunting-rites, men disguised in buffalo-skins are a substitute\nfor buffaloes; and thus, by substitution, a cause can always be\nconstituted which, once having been set to work, Nature is constrained\nto repeat the operation.\n\nOught we not, then, to recognise two kinds of indirect Magic\u2014the\nsympathetic, and what may be called the exemplary?[151]\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe rise of the wizard as a professional authority introduces many\nchanges into magical practice, and decisively alters its social\nimportance. He sometimes experiments in new rites and spells or in\nnew versions of the old ones; he decides some matters arbitrarily,\nas in imposing taboos on food; generally, he develops the art in the\ndirection of his professional interests, learning to conjure, act,\nventriloquise, suggest, hypnotise, and to provide excuses for failure;\nhe begins to train novices, form a school and establish a tradition\nwhich influences the whole life of his tribe. How far arbitrary\nelements enter into rites it is impossible to say, until some one\nshall discover (as some one may) marks by which to distinguish them.\nMeanwhile, there may be many rites, or ritual elements, that cannot be\nexplained on any known principles of Magic, because in fact they are\narbitrary: still, such things must usually be an imitation of other\nmagical practices. Prof. Leuba suggests, probably enough, that rites\nmay sometimes be adopted to relieve excitement, such as the dancing\nof women when the men are at war.[152] It was the custom (_e.\u00a0g._) of\nAraucanian women; and as they danced, they swept the dust away with\ntheir fans, and sang: \u201cAs we sweep the dust away, so may our husbands\nscatter the enemy.\u201d If this was arbitrarily invented, it was by analogy\nwith much mimetic Magic: they set an example of what should happen and\nconfirmed it with a spell.[153]\n\n\n\u00a79. THE DISSOLUTION OF MAGIC\n\nIn spite of the human mind\u2019s strong proclivity to Magic, the art, after\nrising to a maximum power and reputation, in course of time loses\nits influence, and is to be found festering only in the backwater\nand stagnant pools of society. Its power is not at the zenith in\nprimitive society, but much later, when there are men in command of\ngreat wealth who feel insecure, and turn for confidence to diviners and\nthaumaturgists, whom they bribe heavily to give what they most desire.\nBut by that time Magic is confused with Animism. As civil order and\nmaterial civilisation prevail, Magic is no longer invoked to increase\none\u2019s confidence, because this is ensured by the regularity of ordinary\naffairs. As positive methods in war, building, commerce are learnt and\npractised, the magical accompaniments of such undertakings, without\nbeing wholly disused, may become less and less important\u2014what we call\n\u201csurvivals,\u201d such as the breaking of a bottle of wine on the bows when\nlaunching a ship (it is forgotten that the wine must be red). Or they\nmay be lost altogether without injury to industry; whereas in savage\neconomy there is some risk that a most useful craft, such as pottery,\nweaving, or canoe-building, may be entirely discontinued, if by the\nextinction of some group of men or women the rites and songs are\nforgotten with which such labour had always been made good.[154] For\nwho would trust a pot or a canoe unconsecrated?\n\nThe great systematisations of Oneiromancy, Alchemy, Cheiromancy,\nAstrology, necessarily come forward late in the day, because they\ninvolve the constitution of science; but for that reason they are\nsoon discredited by being confronted with the positive sciences;\nwhen, without being forgotten, they are relegated to what may be\neuphemistically called \u201cselect circles.\u201d\n\nWith the growth of Animism, again, pure Magic becomes comparatively\nrare; its observances are interpreted according to the fashionable\ncreed, no longer as setting occult, quasi-mechanical forces to work,\nbut as requiring the intervention of a spirit or a god. They become\nsymbolic: ritual now does nothing of itself, but is a sign of what the\ngod does, or is desired to do. Yet Magic often has its revenge upon\nAnimism: enchaining by mysterious uniformities the god himself.\n\nIn its own nature Magic comprises qualities that tend to weaken it\n(at least, to weaken each particular form of it) and to bring about\nits decline. Magical rites and spells, on whatever scale performed,\nare things to be repeated, and what is repeated is mechanised and\nceases to live. Custom can maintain a practice whilst dispensing with\nits meaning; slowly the practice (spell or ritual) is slurred and\ncorrupted. Economy, \u201cleast effort,\u201d is the enemy of all ceremonial.\nThere is also a tendency to the attenuation of rites on the principle\n(unconscious, of course) that \u201cthe sign of a sign is a sign of the\nthing signified\u201d; whereby a meaning may be disguised in a symbol\nfor the sake of secrecy, or even for politeness. Prof. Westermarck\nhas shown how, in Morocco, the full rite for averting the evil eye\nis to throw forward the hand with outspread fingers and to exclaim,\n\u201cFive in your eye.\u201d But as this is too insulting for common use, you\nmay instead casually mention the number \u201cfive\u201d; or if even that be\ntoo plain-spoken, you can refer to \u201cThursday,\u201d which happens to be\nthe fifth day of the week. In this process there is great risk of\nforgetting the original meaning of the rite or spell; and when this\ncomes to pass, we are left with the empty shells of superstition, such\nas a dread of \u201cthirteen,\u201d \u201cFriday,\u201d salt-spilling, walking under a\nladder; for hardly a soul knows what they mean.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[101] _History of the Kingship_, p. 38; cf. also _The Magic Art_, I. p.\n235, and footnote: \u201cfaith in magic is probably older than a belief in\nspirits.\u201d\n\n[102] Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, I. p.\n417.\n\n[103] In the _American Journal of Psychology_, p. 83 (1919), E.\u00a0S.\nConkling has an instructive article on _Superstitious Belief and\nPractice among College Students_. Of a large group examined 53 per\ncent. entertained some superstition (40 per cent. M., 66 per cent.\nF.). At some time, now or formerly, 82 per cent. had been so affected\n(73 per cent. M., 90 per cent. F.). Half assigned their former\nsuperstitions to the age from twelve to sixteen. Twenty-two per cent.\nattributed the disposition to the suggestion of elders, 47 per cent. to\nsocial suggestion, 15 per cent. to social inheritance, and 15 per cent.\nto emotions and feelings beyond the control of reason.\n\n[104] _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 354.\n\n[105] Quoted by Ames, _Psychology of Religious Experience_, p. 60.\n\n[106] Charms (and possibly rites and spells) are sometimes revealed in\ndreams (Howitt, _The Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 378;\nand Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, I. p. 110). But this\ncan only happen either where the belief in charms already exists (as in\nthe cases cited), or by the coincidence of the dream with good or bad\nfortune. The connexion of events must first of all present itself as\nsomething observed: whether waking or dreaming is indifferent.\n\nFor further illustrations of the influence of coincidences in\nestablishing a belief in Magic, see ch. viii. \u00a7 5.\n\n[107] R. R. Marett, _Preanimistic Religion, Folk-Lore_, 1900.\n\n[108] A. W. Howitt, _The Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 371.\n\n[109] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 472.\n\n[110] A. C. Haddon, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres\nStraits_, V. p. 361.\n\n[111] Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, pp. 118-19.\n\n[112] For a comparison of these allied notions see E.\u00a0S. Hartland\u2019s\n_Ritual and Belief_, pp. 36-51.\n\n[113] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 548.\n\n[114] W. McDougall, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres\nStraits_, II. p. 199.\n\n[115] Vol. II. p. 2.\n\n[116] Vol. II. p. 124.\n\n[117] Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 311.\n\n[118] Thomas Williams, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 79.\n\n[119] _Tends to be_ assimilated\u2014for if the presentation have some\nspecial character of Animism, it will be assimilated to the animistic\nsystem; or if Animism be the more active and fashionable theory in a\nman\u2019s social group.\n\n[120] It has been thought strange that such a thing as a whirlwind\nmay excite in the savage either fear or anger. To explain this we\nmust consider the nature of wonder: it is an imaginative expansion\nof surprise, temporary paralysis of the imagination, with emotional\ndisturbance, but no progressive instinct of its own. It either subsides\nhelplessly, or gives place to curiosity, or passes into some other\nemotion that is connected with an instinct. Accordingly, it usually\npasses into curiosity or else fear, but sometimes into anger: which of\nthese emotions shall be aroused depends, partly, upon the character of\nthe person who wonders, partly, upon circumstances.\n\n[121] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p.\n321.\n\n[122] W. G. Aston, _Shinto_, p. 52.\n\n[123] One may trace this process in the interesting collection of\nspells in Skeat\u2019s _Malay Magic_.\n\n[124] Howitt, _The Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 397.\n\n[125] Seligman, _Melanesians of British New Guinea_, p. 376.\n\n[126] Turner, _Samoa_, p. 138. For further development of the spell,\nsee (besides Skeat, _op. cit._) the collected examples at the end of\nSayce\u2019s _Religion of the Ancient Babylonians_.\n\n[127] Parker, _The Euahlayi_, p. 26.\n\n[128] Seligman, _The Melanesians of British New Guinea_, pp. 173-5.\n\n[129] _The Melanesians_, pp. 118-19.\n\n[130] Turner, _Ethnology of the Ungava District_, Am. B. of Ethn., XI.\np. 201; and Murdoch, Ethnology of Point Barrow, _Am. B. of Ethn._, IX.\np. 434.\n\n[131] W.M. Newton, On Pal\u00e6ological Figures of Flint, _Journ. of B.\nArch. Ass._, March 1913.\n\n[132] _The Song of Roland_, done into English by C. Scott Moncrieff,\nCLXXIII.\n\n[133] T. C. Hodson, _The Naga Tribes of Manipur_, p. 88.\n\n[134] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits_, V.\np. 271.\n\n[135] A. E. Crawley, _J.A.I._, XXIV. p. 123.\n\n[136] _Development of Moral Ideas_, I, c. 26.\n\n[137] Carl Lumholtz, _New Trails in Mexico_, p. 350.\n\n[138] _Life of a South African Tribe_, p. 528.\n\n[139] See the exhaustive treatment of this subject in Frazer\u2019s _Taboo\nand the Perils of the Soul_.\n\n[140] A \u201cbarn\u201d is a small spindle-shaped stick, supposed to be\nthrown in a magical attack by wizards. Howitt, _The Native Tribes of\nSouth-East Australia_, p. 377.\n\n[141] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, I. p. 110.\n\n[142] Quoted by Frazer, _Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild_, I. p.\n105.\n\n[143] _The Sacred Shrine_, pp. 33-9.\n\n[144] _Life of a South African Tribe_, p. 340.\n\n[145] Sioux Cults, _Am. B. of Ethn._, XI. p. 484.\n\n[146] _New Trails in Mexico_, p. 61.\n\n[147] Skeat, _Malay Magic_, p. 48.\n\n[148] Quoted by Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 268.\n\n[149] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits_, V.\np. 325.\n\n[150] W. Grube, _Rel. u. K. d. Chinese_, p. 153.\n\n[151] In the _B. of Am. Ethn._, XIII. p. 374, F.\u00a0H. Cushing, describing\n\u201cZu\u00f1i Creation Myths,\u201d says the dramaturgic tendency is to suppose that\nNature can be made to act by men, if \u201cthey do first what they wish the\nelements to do,\u201d according \u201cas these things were done or made to be\ndone by the ancestral gods of creation.\u201d The last clause is, perhaps,\nan animistic gloss of the Zu\u00f1is\u2019, who were, of course, very far from\nprimitive thought.\n\n[152] _The Psychological Study of Religion_, p. 165.\n\n[153] Cf. S. H. Ray, \u201cPeople and Language of Lifu,\u201d _J.R.A.I._\n(XLVII.), p. 296, who says, a woman whose son or husband was away at\nwar would place a piece of coral to represent him on a mat, move it\nabout with her right hand as he might move in fight, and with her left\nbrush away imaginary evils. This protected him (evidently by exemplary\nMagic).\n\n[154] W. H. R. Rivers, _The Disappearance of Useful Arts_, also\n_History of Melanesian Society_, II. p. 445; and in Turner\u2019s _Samoa_\n(p. 145) we are told that the practice of embalming died out with the\nfamily of embalmers.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nANIMISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. WHAT IS ANIMISM?\n\nIf, when the cohesion of the hunting-pack had weakened, belief in Magic\nby giving authority to elders became very influential and useful in\nprimitive societies, still greater in subsequent evolution has been\nthe power of Animism. For belief in ghosts led in time to the worship\nof ancestors, and then especially to the worship of the ancestors of\nchiefs or heroes, some of whom became gods; and the belief in gods\nstrengthened the authority of chiefs and kings who were descended from\nthem, and helped to maintain the unity of the tribe or nation from\ngeneration to generation and from age to age.\n\nIn anthropology, the term Animism is usually employed to denote the\nproneness of savages and barbarians, or people of unscientific culture,\nto explain natural occurrences, at least the more remarkable or\ninteresting\u2014the weather, the growth of crops, disease and death\u2014as\ndue to the action of spirits: (1) ghosts (that is, spirits that have\nformerly been incarnate); (2) dream-spirits, that have temporarily\nquitted some body during sleep or trance; (3) invisible, living,\nconscious beings that have never been incarnate. This may be called\nHyperphysical Animism. Sometimes, however, \u201cAnimism\u201d is used to denote\na supposed attitude of savages and children toward all things, animate\nand inanimate, such that they spontaneously and necessarily attribute\nto everything a consciousness like our own, and regard all the actions\nand reactions of natural objects as voluntary and purposive. And this\nmay be called Psychological Animism. These two meanings of \u201cAnimism\u201d\nare entirely different: it is one thing to regard an object as moved\nby its own mind, another to attribute its movement or influence to a\nseparable agent which for the time possesses it; it is one thing to\nregard an object as having an anthropomorphic consciousness, another\nto believe that that consciousness is a distinct power capable of\nquitting it and sometimes returning, or of surviving its destruction,\nor of existing independently. Even if the doctrine of Animism in the\nsecond sense were granted, it would remain to be shown how men came to\nconceive that the consciousness of a thing can be separated from it,\nand exist and act by itself, and even with greater powers than it had\nbefore\u2014contrary to the opinion of Don Juan,\n\n \u201cthat soul and body, on the whole,\n Were odds against a disembodied soul.\u201d\n\nSavages do not always regard a separable spirit as necessarily\nbelonging even to human nature. Dr. Seligman writes that, among the\nVeddas, a few old men \u201cwere by no means confident that all men on their\ndeath became _yaku_\u201d (veridical ghosts). Influential men and mediums\nwould do so; but for the rest, at Godatalawa it was determined by\nexperiment. The ordinary man was invoked soon after death, and desired\nto give good success in hunting; and if much game was then obtained,\nhe had become a _yaka_.[155] Messrs. Spencer and Gillen tell us that,\naccording to the Guanjis, a woman has no _moidna_ (spirit part).[156]\nMajor C.\u00a0H. Stigand says \u201cthe Masai have no belief in a future state\nfor any but chiefs\u201d; the common dead are not even buried, but merely\nthrown out into the bush.[157] Among the Omaha, though each person has\na spirit that normally survives the body, still, a suicide ceases to\nexist.[158] In Tonga the souls of the lowest rank of the people (Tooas)\ndied with their bodies.[159] The human spirit, then, is not necessarily\nbelieved to enter upon a life after death; still less is the spirit of\nan animal. On the other hand, it is held by many tribes that something\ninherent in weapons, utensils, food and other objects, a \u201csoul\u201d or\nsoul-stuff, may be separable from them and go to Hades or serve as the\nfood of spirits, although the things themselves are not regarded as\nhaving a spirit or intelligent life.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANIMISM\n\nAndrew Lang described savages as existing in \u201ca confused frame of\nmind to which all things, animate and inanimate, ... seem on the\nsame level of life, passion and reason.\u201d[160] Children and other\nimmature people are often supposed to be in the same condition. As\nto children, it is pointed out how deeply concerned they are about\ndolls and rocking-horses, how passionately they turn to strike a table\nafter knocking their heads against it. But probably it is now admitted\nthat impulsive retaliation, on a table or bramble or shirt-stud (not\nunknown to civilised men), implies not any belief in the malignity\nor sensitiveness of those objects. Animals behave in the same way.\nTh. Roosevelt reports that an elephant was seen to destroy in rage a\nthorn tree that had pricked its trunk;[161] and that in America he\nhimself saw a bear that was burying a carcass, and lost hold of it\nand rolled over, strike it a savage whack, like a pettish child.[162]\nMoreover, in children, such behaviour is in large measure due to\nsuggestion; inasmuch as the setting of them to beat the table, or what\nnot, is an easy way of diverting them from their own pain. And, of\ncourse, the dealing with dolls, or rocking-horses, or walking-sticks,\nas if alive, is play. Such play involves intense imaginative belief,\nwhich, at first, is not clearly differentiated from earnest. But this\nstage corresponds with the play of the young of the higher animals,\nwhilst they are still physically incapable of completing the preluded\nactions; and the engrossing interest of their play expresses the\nbiological necessity of it as a means of developing their mental and\nbodily faculties. By the time that children are at all comparable with\nsavages, their play has become a temporary attitude, compatible with\nbrusque transition to matter-of-fact, or even with actions which at\nthe height of play show that the illusion is incomplete.\n\nIn savages, likewise, much of the behaviour that is supposed to betray\nan illusionary animism, even in their simple apprehension of things,\nis really an acquired way of acting, in a temporary attitude, under\nthe influence of imagination-belief, and is compatible with other\nactions that show how incomplete is the illusion. Andrew Lang, after\nthe passage above quoted, appears to limit the scope of it by the words\n\u201cwhen myth-making\u201d: no doubt, when myth-making and in practising many\nrites, savages speak or act as if they believed in the full sense that\nthe objects dealt with are sensitive intelligent beings; and yet their\neffective conduct toward them is entirely positive. They may, for\nexample, feed the growing rice-plant with pap; in harvesting it, speak\na secret language that the rice may not understand them and be alarmed,\nand proceed to cut it with knives concealed in their palms: but they\ndo cut it. They carry it home and garner it with honour, and come from\ntime to time to take a portion for food with solemn observances: but\nthen they cook and eat it.[163] Their animistic attitude, therefore,\nis not primitive, spontaneous, necessary illusion, but an acquired,\nspecialised way of imagining and dealing with certain things. Were\nit not possible to combine in this way the imaginative with the\npractical, all wizardry and priestcraft would be nothing but the sheer\ncheating which it often seems to be to superficial observers. Normally,\nimagination-beliefs that have only indirect biological utility (say, in\nmaintaining customs in order to ensure the tribe\u2019s welfare) are unable\nto overcome immediate biological needs (say, for food and shelter); but\noften they do so within certain limits, or in certain directions, as in\ninnumerable taboos of food, customs of destroying a man\u2019s property at\nhis death, starving or maiming tribesmen on the war-path. A universal\ntaboo on rice is not inconceivable. For these are social-pathological\ncases; like the self-destructive beliefs of individuals and sects\namongst ourselves, such as the faith-healers, who in sickness call upon\ntheir god instead of a physician.\n\nChildren, savages and ourselves, in some degree, attribute\nspontaneously to _some_ inanimate things, in our mere apprehension of\nthem (for this has nothing to do with the metaphysics of Pampsychism),\nsomething more than external existence: regarding them as force-things\nand, by empathy, as experiencing effort and quiescence, strain and\nrelief, and sometimes emotion and pain. It is for this attitude toward\nnature that I adopt Mr. Marett\u2019s term \u201canimatism\u201d: as not ascribing\nto inanimate things, or to plants, in general, anything like a human\npersonal consciousness; but merely an obscure, fragmentary, partial\nconsciousness, enough to correspond with our occasional experiences\nin dealing with them. Perhaps those observers who report in strong\nterms universal Animism as the tenet of a tribe, mean no more than\nthis; for example, the author above quoted as writing in the _American\nBureau of Ethnology_, who says (p. 433) that according to the Dakotas,\neverything\u2014\u201cthe commonest sticks and clays\u201d\u2014has a spirit that may\nhurt or help and is, therefore, to be propitiated. It would be unjust\nto the adherents of psychological Animism to accuse them of believing\nthat savages have universally made so much progress in \u201cfaculty\nPsychology\u201d as to distinguish personality, will, passion and reason;\nespecially as they add that savages project these powers into all\nnatural objects through incapacity for discrimination and abstraction;\nand, at the same time, know very well that in some languages of the\nmost animistic tribes (e.\u00a0g. Algonquin and Naga) the distinction of\nanimate and inanimate is the ground of grammatical gender.\n\nWe find, accordingly, that some explorers explicitly deny that, in\ntheir experience, savages regard all things as on the same level of\nlife, passion and reason. Dr. Coddrington says that, in the Banks\u2019\nIslands, yams and such things are not believed to have any _tarunga_\n(spirit)\u2014\u201cthey do not live with any kind of intelligence\u201d;[164]\nand that Melanesians do not fail to distinguish the animate and the\ninanimate. Messrs. Skeat and Blagden report that with the Semang of the\nMalay Peninsula there is very little trace of animistic beliefs; and\nthey relate a folk-tale of how a male elephant tells a female that he\nhas found a live stone (pangolin rolled into a ball): \u201cSwine,\u201d said\nthe female, \u201cstones are never alive.\u201d[165] Messrs. Hose and McDougall\ntell us that the Kayans hang garments and weapons on a tomb, and seem\nto believe that shadowy duplicates of these things are at the service\nof the ghost, but that such duplicates are inert (relatively) and not\nto be confused with the principle of intelligence.[166] \u201cSoul\u201d does not\nimply personality.\n\nTo be clear about Animism, it is necessary to bear in mind several\nmodes of belief: (1) Hyperphysical Animism, that certain things\nhave, or are possessed by a conscious spirit, and that this spirit\nis a separable entity; (2) that things are themselves conscious (or\nsemi-conscious), but their consciousness is not a separable entity;\n(3) that things are not conscious, but are informed by a separable\nessence, usually called soul (better, soul-stuff), which may be eaten\nby spirits, or may go to ghost-land with them; (4) the extension or\nlimitation of these beliefs to more or fewer classes of things. Unless\nthese distinctions are recognised, any report upon savage beliefs can\nhardly be clear and adequate; but generally we may take it that when\na traveller tells us that such and such things are not believed to\nhave souls, and says nothing of any belief as to their consciousness,\nhe means (except with regard to animals) to deny that anything like\nhuman consciousness is attributed to them. And when Mr. Torday writes\nthat, according to the Bahuana of the Upper Congo, there are two\nincorporeal parts\u2014_doshi_, common to man, animals and fetiches, and\n_bun_, peculiar to man\u2014he seems to leave it as a matter of course\nthat plants and inanimate things have neither of these, and are not\nconscious beings; though probably some of them have soul-stuff, since\nclothes, weapons and food are buried with a corpse.[167] The Rev.\nJ.\u00a0H. Weeks says that the Bakongo of the Lower Congo attribute a\nspirit only to the _nkasa_ tree (from whose bark the ordeal poison is\nderived) amongst plants;[168] and, similarly, the Baloki, further up\nthe river, attribute a spirit only to the _nka_ tree.[169] Since many\nthings are buried by these people in a grave, or broken above it, the\nthings may be supposed to have soul-stuff; but from the denying of\nspirits to plants, and from silence as to psychological Animism, it\nmay be inferred that neither plants nor inanimate things are regarded\nas conscious beings. Sir E.\u00a0F. im Thurn tells us that material things\nof all sorts are believed by the natives of Guiana to have each a body\nand a spirit\u2014evidently a conscious and malicious spirit; \u201cand that\nnot all inanimate objects have this dual nature avowedly attributed to\nthem, is probably only due to the chance that ... the spirit has not\nyet been noticed in some cases.\u201d[170] Even with these Guiana Indians,\nthen, whose Animism, in every sense, is unusually active and extensive,\ntheir attitude is an acquired, specialised way of imagining and dealing\nwith things that draw their attention and excite their suspicions, not\na primitive, necessary illusion; else there could be no exceptions.\n\nThe reasonable view, therefore, is that savages distinguish between\nthemselves and certain animals, on the one hand, and, on the other, the\nremaining animals, plants and inanimate things; and raise the second\nclass to the rank of the first, as conscious agents, only when there\nare special incentives to do so. To find all the causes that excite the\nanimistic attitude toward things would be a difficult task, but some\nof them may be indicated. Beginning from Animatism, which really is a\nprimitive and necessary illusion, it is reasonable to expect:\n\n(_a_) That any plant or inanimate thing adopted as a Totem should, by\nthat very fact, be endowed with human consciousness; though the savage\nmind is too inconsistent for us to infer that this must always happen.\n\n(_b_) That whatever seems to move or act spontaneously, like the winds\nand streams and echoes, the sun, moon, planets, and shooting stars,\nshould be felt as a spiritual agency; especially if it cry out with\nempathetic reverberation, as winds and cataracts do, trees tormented\nby the storm, waves, fire, and the ice-floe when it breaks up in\nspring; or if it excite fear by being extraordinary and dangerous, as\nthunder and lightning are, whirlwinds and whirlpools, waterspouts and\nvolcanoes. Dr. Speisser writes that at Ambrym, when the volcano is\nactive, the natives climb to the top and bring sacrifices to appease\nit, throwing coco-nuts and yams into the crater.[171]\n\n(_c_) That whatever has been regarded as having magical force should\nbe treated\u2014after the rise of the ghost-theory (supposing this to be\nof later origin) has given vogue to a new principle of explanation\u2014as\nowing its virtue to a spirit, either by immanence or possession (two\nmodes of actuation which may or may not be distinguished), and so\nbecome a fetich, instead of being merely an amulet or talisman.\n\n(_d_) That whatever is much used in ritual, especially if often\naddressed in spells or incantations, should become an object of\nreverence, apt to be personified and raised to, or even above, the\nhuman level as a conscious agent: for example, padi and rice in\nIndonesia, the ordeal tree on the Congo, already mentioned. Fire-sticks\nused in the ritual of sacrifice are often deified. In India, the conch,\nhaving for ages been used in religious rites, \u201cthe people gradually\ncame to revere the instrument itself and to adore and invoke it.\u201d[172]\n\u201cA strange religious feature [of the _Rigveda_] pointing to a remote\nantiquity is the occasional deification and worship even of objects\nfashioned by the hand of man, when regarded as useful to him. These\nare chiefly sacrificial implements.\u201d[173] The practice now extends in\nIndia to nearly every tool and utensil. Amongst the very few inanimate\ngods of the Cherokees are the Stone, invoked by the Shaman when seeking\nlost goods by means of a pebble suspended by a string; and the Flint,\ninvoked when about to scarify a patient with an arrow-head before\nrubbing in medicine.[174] By the Apache, heddontin (pollen of the\ncat-tail rush) is used as the sacrificial powder in nearly all rites,\nand is personified and prayed to.[175] When spells are addressed to\nany object, the analogy of address to human beings tends to cause that\nobject to be thought of as humanly conscious.\n\n(_e_) Stocks and stones have been worshipped, as the dwelling-place of\nspirits in many parts of the world; having superseded in the mind of\ntheir devotees the ghost of the men whose burial-place they formerly\nmarked, but who themselves have been forgotten; and probably, on the\nanalogy of these stones, others that no ghost ever haunted.\n\n(_f_) Where Animism is active amongst a timid and suspicious people,\nwhatever injures a man is believed to act of malice: as amongst the\nIndians of Guiana, who are so timid that rather than go hunting alone\nthey will take a woman or a child along with them.[176]\n\nUnder such conditions as these a sort of acquired psychological\nAnimism is very widely though very irregularly diffused; but were it\nuniversal and uniform, it could not of itself account for hyperphysical\nAnimism\u2014the doctrine that men (or some men), some animals, plants,\nthings, places, are possessed or informed by spirits that are capable\nof separate existence.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. THE GHOST THEORY\n\nHyperphysical Animism may be easiest understood as having arisen with\nthe belief in human ghosts. The causes of this belief have been fully\nset forth by Herbert Spencer[177] and Sir E.\u00a0B. Tylor[178] in a way\nthat to my mind is convincing. Amongst those causes dreams predominate;\nwherein the dead are met again as in the flesh. The living body having\nalways been for the savage a conscious force-thing, at death the\nconscious force leaves the thing or corpse. This might be accepted by\nhim as a fact of the same kind as the loss of its virtue by a talisman\nor amulet (which is known sometimes to happen), were it not for dreams\nin which the dead still live. That this conscious force that has left\nthe body is not visible except in dreams need excite little wonder,\nsince many forces natural and magical are invisible.\n\nA dream not being common to two men at the same time, the things that\nare seen in it cannot be pointed out, nor therefore directly named (in\nthis resembling subjective experiences). It was for ages impossible to\nnarrate a dream as a dream: there was no way of distinguishing it from\nexternal events, either for the dreamer himself or (were that possible)\nin reporting it to another. He was far away and met his father, yet had\nlain by the fire all night! Hence to find names with which to describe\nsuch things men turned to other ways in which they seemed to have a\ndouble existence, to shadows and reflections: which in their sudden\nappearance and disappearance, and sometimes faint, sometimes distorted\noutlines, bear some resemblance to dream-images; and probably it is\nfelt to be significant that shadows and reflections disappear at night,\njust when dreams occur. Shadows and reflections are not necessarily\nidentified with the ghost derived from the dream-image, because their\nnames are given to it; but sometimes they certainly are; so that a\nman who, on looking into water, happens not to see his reflection may\nbelieve that his spirit has gone away, and that he himself must be\nill, and accordingly he becomes ill; or if at noon near the equator he\nnotices that he has no shadow, he may think his soul is gone, and run\nto a medicine-man to get it back; and dead bodies may be believed to\nhave no shadows.[179] Inasmuch as a body even lying on the ground casts\na shadow, except at tropical noon, the belief that it does not do so\nat any time implies an acquired inability to see what is before one\u2019s\neyes; as sometimes happens in hypnosis and other conditions of negative\nhallucination.\n\nThe idea of a separable conscious personal force, or spirit, that\nleaves the body at death, serves also, as it gathers strength, to\nexplain sleep, fainting, epilepsy; and sometimes every sickness is\nattributed to the partial detachment or desertion of the spirit; which,\ntherefore, it is the doctor\u2019s business to plug in, or to catch and\nrestore; or (if I rightly remember a report of Miss Kingsley\u2019s) he may\neven supply another one from a basketful of souls kept at hand for such\nexigencies.\n\nThat the ghost theory arises not only from dreams, but is also\nsuggested by hallucinations and hypnagogic visions is very probable.\nIn various parts of the world savages have been described as having\nvisions of remarkably coherent and convincing vividness that seem not\nto have been dreams.[180] But such experiences, even when artificially\ninduced by fasting or drugs (as happens among many tribes), are rare\nin comparison with dreams; and to the influence of dreams upon these\nsavage beliefs there is abundant testimony. With some tribes dreams are\ntreated as part of their objective experience; so that to be injured\nby your neighbour in a dream is just ground for avenging yourself as\nsoon as you wake; and to see a dead man in a dream is, therefore, clear\nproof of his continued existence, and that either he has come to the\ndreamer or the dreamer has gone to visit him.\n\nThus Sir Everard im Thurn says of the native of Guiana, his dreams are\nas real as any events of his waking life; his dream-actions are done\nby his spirit: in dreams he continues to see the dead\u2014that is, their\nspirits.[181] Similarly, the Lengua Indians (W. of R. Paragua) have\ngreat faith in dreams; wherein the spirit is believed to leave the body\nand to do in fact what is dreamed.[182] According to the Cherokees, to\ndream of being bitten by a snake requires the same treatment as actual\nsnake-bite; else (perhaps years later) the same inflammation will\nappear in the wounded spot, with the same consequences.[183] The Motu\nhold that _sua_ (ghosts or spirits) are seen in dreams, and that when\na man sleeps his own _sua_ leaves his body.[184] \u201cThe Lifuans believe\nin the reality of what is seen in a dream, and are influenced by it.\nTheir dead ancestors appeared in dreams.\u201d[185] And the Polynesians of\nManatuki thought that \u201cdreams were occasioned by the spirit going to\nthe places seen in them.\u201d[186] Many more of such witnesses might be\ncited.\n\nIt is recognised by psychologists that dreams, as immediate experience,\nhave more the character of perception than of imagination. Children are\napt to confuse dreams with reality. It can only have been gradually,\nwith the growing knowledge of continuity and coherence in the course\nof events, and therewith the demand for corroboration of testimony,\nthat dreams were distinguished from the waking life. When no longer\nsupposed to be all of them real, some are still so regarded: the Dieri,\namongst lower savages, distinguish between visions, as revelations made\nby Kutchi (an evil Spirit), and ordinary dreams, as mere fancies.[187]\nBut so impressive are dreams to many people, in their eagerness to know\nmore than sense and philosophy can tell them, that they persist in\nhoping, and therefore believing, that dreams, if they give no knowledge\nof this world, may still be revelations of another, perhaps more\nreal; or if not revelations, adumbrations by way of allegory, which\nsome learned or inspired Daniel may interpret; or, at least, omens\nof good or evil, which the ancient science of Oneiromancy undertakes\nto explain. There is now a new and more promising Oneiromancy that\ninterprets dreams as indicating not the future, but one\u2019s own past,\nchiefly a forgotten past, and teaches to know oneself: more promising;\nfor what but experience can possibly be the source of dreams\u2014at least,\nof dream-elements? Some of the new principles of interpretation,\nhowever, may compare for obscurity with the ancient.\n\nThat the dead are seen alive in dreams is, then, for the savage a fact\nof observation; and, therefore, the continued existence of the dead\nis, for him, not in the first place supernatural; although it may be\ncalled hyperphysical, because it is experienced only in dreams and not\nby daylight, and is exempt from ordinary conditions of time and place.\nBut it gradually becomes supernatural, as the capricious incidents\nof dream-life are felt to be \u201cuncanny,\u201d as that which occurs only at\nnight is involved in the fears of the night, and as a great cloud of\nimaginations accumulates about the dead and obscures the simple facts\nof dream-perception in which the belief originated. This cloud of\nimaginations, by its mysterious character and by various alliances\nwith Magic, spreads and deepens until it overshadows the whole of\nhuman life; is generally, indeed, dispersed here and there by the\nforces of biological necessity, often by subterfuges laughable enough;\nwhich have, however, the merit of saving mankind from destruction: but\nsometimes it extinguishes the last ray of common sense, impoverishes\nthe believer, enfeebles him, fills his days and nights with terror,\ngives him over to practices the most cruel or the most disgusting,\nleads him to slay his own tribesmen, his own children, his own parents,\nand to offer up himself in the sure hope of resurrection.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. EXTENSION OF THE GHOST THEORY TO ANIMALS\n\nSpirits, having once been conceived of as explaining the actions of\nmen and surviving their bodily death, may by analogy be conceived to\nexplain the action of any other things in circumstances that suggest\na motive for the action, and therefore to possess or inhabit such\nthings, and to be capable of separating from them, like ghosts. Other\nthings are already, by Magic and Animatism, force-things, in some\ndegree conscious, whose forces may be capable of acting invisibly at\na distance; and at the death of a man it is his conscious force that\nleaves the body and becomes a ghost. Since, then, there is hardly any\nnatural object whose action may not in some circumstances seem to be\ninterpretable by motives, especially amongst a timid and suspicious\npeople, how can we assign any necessary limits to the spread of\nAnimism? Moreover, the causes most influential in establishing the\nghost theory for man directly require its extension to other things.\nFor not human beings only are seen in dreams, but also their clothes,\nweapons and utensils, and also animals, plants, localities. If,\nthen, the dead, because they are seen in dreams, are inferred still\nto live under conditions in which they are not visible by daylight\nto ordinary men, how can the inference be avoided that all sorts\nof things, artefacts, animals, plants, localities, share in that\nmode of existence\u2014that all have their doubles? And \u201cWhy not?\u201d the\nsavage might ask, since it is literally true of all things, without\nexception, that they are sometimes visible, sometimes invisible.[188]\nSimilar inferences seem to be justifiable from the alliance of ghosts\nwith shadows and reflections, and the fact that not man only but\neverything else has a shadow and a reflection, and that their shadows\nand reflections disappear at night, just when the things themselves\nsometimes appear in dreams. Moreover, so far as the breath, the pulse,\nthe shining of the eye, which cease in the human corpse, are sometimes\nidentified with the departed spirit, the same processes likewise cease\nat the death of animals; though, it is true, there is here no analogy\nwith inanimate things, and the breathing and circulation of plants are\nbeyond the savage\u2019s observation. Therefore, although Animism is an\ninferential construction, were the construction entirely due to the\nlogic of analogy, there would be nothing surprising in the discovery\nthat the belief \u201cthat everything has a ghost\u201d is just as universal and\nuniform in the human race as if it had been an innate or primitive\nbelief. That, on the contrary, Animism prevails very irregularly\namongst the tribes of men; that, in all directions, inferences that\nare analogically specious fail to be drawn; that instead of a general\nsystem of Animism every tribe has its own Animism; this is surprising\nand needs to be explained. The extension of the theory is easier to\nunderstand than its irregular limitation.\n\nBearing in mind that we are at present considering Animism as a belief\nin ghosts, not in spirits generally (to which we shall come in Sec.\n6), I venture to think that, although dreams, shadows and reflections\ncertainly suggest a double existence of everything, yet savages never\nassign a true ghost to anything inanimate, nor to plants, nor even to\nanimals, unless there is a special reason for doing so; because only\nin the case of human beings is the suggestion interesting enough to\ntake hold of the social imagination. Hence, even though other things\nappear in the ghost-world, they have no significance there, except in\nrelation to human ghosts (or ghostlike spirits) on whom they attend.\nAccordingly, human ghosts have a place in the beliefs of every tribe,\nbecause human beings excite affection, admiration and fear, have\nwell-marked individuality; are therefore remembered and have stories\ntold of them; and if they are seen after death, it is, of course,\nreported. The evidence makes it only too plain that the paralysis of\nattention by fear is the chief (though not the only) emotional factor\nof belief in ghosts; and what other thing in all nature is to be feared\nin comparison with one\u2019s fellow-man?\n\nThe belief in ghosts, escaped and roaming independent of any normally\nvisible body, as a social belief, is involved in the practice of\nreporting and discussing dreams, which becomes the same thing as\ntelling ghost-stories\u2014the first and most persistent motive of\nliterature. Stories can only be told effectively of things generally\ninteresting; and, at first, such things must have been recognisable by\nthe hearers and must have had some individuality. Hence\u2014\n\n(_a_) Animals that attain to such individuality may have ghosts: (i)\nAn animal that occasions widespread fear, such as a man-eating tiger.\nWe must distinguish from such cases the frequent beliefs that tigers,\nwolves, sharks, snakes, etc., are, or are possessed by, the spirits or\nghosts of men. (ii) An animal that comes to be upon terms of special\nintimacy with men; such as the very tame dogs and pigs that come when\nthey are called among the Bakongo;[189] or hunting dogs that have been\nspecially doctored among the Baloki.[190]\n\n(_b_) Animals slain at funeral feasts to accompany the dead have ghosts\nso far as necessary for that purpose; but, wanting individuality and\npersonal interest, they make no further figure in ghost-lore; they do\nnot \u201cwalk\u201d or revisit the glimpses of the moon. Thus the Tanghouls say\nthat ghosts, on reaching Kazairam (their Hades), find the gates barred\nagainst them by the deity Kokto; so at the burial feast of a rich man\na buffalo is killed, that his mighty ghost may burst open the massive\ngates of that abode. Poor ghosts must wait about outside, till a rich\none comes up with his buffalo; when they all rush in behind him.[191]\nBut we hear nothing further of the buffalo. In the Banks\u2019 Islands, pigs\nkilled at a funeral feast have no true ghosts to follow the dead to\nPanoi, but only a sort of wraith; because they only go for show, that\ntheir master may be well received there.[192]\n\n(_c_) Animals that are important prey to a hunting tribe are often\nbelieved to have ghosts that may be hunted by dead tribesmen; or that\nmust be propitiated when one of them is slain: the ghosts, for example,\nof seals and bears are bribed by the Esquimo to entice other seals and\nbears to come and be killed. A seal desires above everything, they\nsay, a drink of fresh water; so as soon as one is brought ashore a\ndipperful is poured into his mouth; else the other seals will not allow\nthemselves to be caught. The polar bear (male) desires crooked knives\nand bow-drills, or (female) women\u2019s knives and needle-cases. Hence,\nwhen a bear is killed, its ghost accompanies its skin into the hunter\u2019s\nhut; and the skin is hung up with the appropriate tools for four or\nfive days. Then the bear-ghost is driven out by a magic formula, takes\nwith it the souls of the tools, and reports well of the hunter in\nbear-soul land. Whilst in the hut, as an honoured guest, nothing is\ndone that it dislikes in human customs.[193]\n\n(_d_) In the development of mythology, animals and monsters of various\nkinds may be found inhabiting shadow-land; but these are not true\nghosts of any particular things that once died in this world.\n\nThis list of the ways in which animals may come to have ghosts is not\noffered as exhausting all the cases.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. GHOSTS AND SOUL-STUFF\n\nA ghost is a disembodied soul, having a consciousness and power at, or\ngenerally (because it is feared) above, the human level; but there may\nbe disembodied souls, or souls capable of disembodiment, that have no\nconsciousness, or none above the level of Animatism. Even if a living\nthing have a consciousness, its post-mortem apparition may not; like\nthe Banks\u2019 Islanders\u2019 pig, which, though \u201ca distinguished animal and\nacknowledged to be intelligent,\u201d has no true ghost. Among nearly all\ntribes, whatever is offered in sacrifice to gods or left in, or at,\nthe tombs of men deceased, is believed to have some sort of soul;\nbecause, plainly, spirits do not eat or consume the visible food or\nutensils; yet it is necessary to the success of the rites to suppose\nthat the spirits are satisfied; they must, therefore, take the souls of\nthe offerings. And what can be more plausible reasoning than to argue\nthat, as solid men eat solid food, ghosts eat ghostly food? \u201cSoul\u201d thus\nappears as a sort of ghost-substance, or ghost-body. For, in dreams,\nthe departed are seen as if in the flesh; and moreover analogy requires\nthat the ghost consciousness and ghost-force shall have a body of some\nsort, and, of course, one that will maintain in ghost-land the same\nrelations to other things that the mortal body did in this world. In\nghost-land, or shadow-land, or dream-land, the substance of all things\nis this soul-stuff. Sometimes the force of analogy requires a tribe to\nbelieve that, in order that the souls of things (such as earthen pots\nor weapons) may be released to accompany a ghost to the underworld,\nthe things themselves must be \u201ckilled,\u201d that is to say, broken; but\nother tribes are not such consistent logicians; and in some cases where\nthings left exposed at a grave (not buried) are broken, it may be to\nprevent their being stolen.\n\nAnything, then, may have \u201csoul\u201d after its kind: relatively inert\nthings have relatively inert souls, but never true ghosts; some\nanimals may have ghosts, especially if they have attained to a certain\nindividuality, but generally only in so far as they are imagined to\nattend upon human ghosts or spirits. Inasmuch as the word \u201csoul\u201d\nis often used as equivalent to \u201cghost,\u201d it would be convenient\nalways to speak of the soul which is ghost-food, or ghost-body, \u201cas\nsoul-stuff.\u201d[194] Soul-stuff is conceived of as material, though subtle\nand normally invisible. A man\u2019s soul-stuff may be regarded not only\nas permeating his body, but also as infecting everything he possesses\nor touches: no doubt by analogy with his odour; for a man\u2019s odour is\na personal quality, distinguishable by dogs and (I believe) by some\nsavages and hypnotic subjects; and the stench of his putrefying corpse\nmay be supposed to convey his courage and skill to those who inhale\nit.[195] And the savour of a burnt-offering is food for gods. Indeed,\nEllis says explicitly that, in Tahiti, food was put to the mouth of a\nchieftain\u2019s corpse; because, they said, there was a spiritual as well\nas a material part of food, a part which they could smell.[196]\n\nSavage ideas are generally so little thought out, and are so\nirregularly thought out by different tribes, that the relation of\na thing to its soul-stuff varies widely from one tribe to another.\nIn many cases the extraction by ghost or god of the soul-stuff from\nan offering may affect it so little, that the devotee or the priest\nproceeds to feast upon it; and I have nowhere met with the notion\n(which logic requires) that such metaphysically eviscerated food can\nonly nourish a man\u2019s body and not his soul. However, since the eating\nof the sacrifice may be an act of communion with the ghost, he then\nnaturally extracts the goodness only from his own share. In other\ncases, the breaking of weapons and utensils buried with a corpse\nimplies an intimate unity between the wholeness of an object and its\nsoul-stuff; and the Rev. J.\u00a0H. Weeks says of the considerable wealth\nput into a grave by the Bakongo, that only the shell or semblance of\nanything is supposed to remain there.[197]\n\nThis conception of soul-stuff may have been an important contribution\nto metaphysics. The doctrine of material substance is reached by\nabstracting all the qualities of things; but then there would be\nnothing left, were it not for this venerable idea of something\ninvisible and intangible in things in which qualities may \u201cinhere,\u201d\nor which may serve as a \u201csupport\u201d to them; so that, when it is taken\naway there is only a shell or semblance of anything left. But such a\ntenet is uncommon. Along another line of speculation this soul-stuff\nmay become the Soul of the World. When by philosophers spirits are\nno longer conceived to have bodies, but to be the very opposite of\nbodies, a spiritual substance must be invented to support their\nqualities, in order to put them upon an equal footing of reality with\ncorporeal things; but as there is no spirit-stuff ready made by the\nwisdom of our forefathers, this concept remains uncomfortably empty.\nTo appear as ghosts and to have mechanical energy, spirits may be\ninvested with \u201csoul-stuff\u201d as a spiritual body; but this is only subtle\nmatter. Their own substance must be correlative with their proper\nattributes as pure conscious beings, the very opposite of bodies; and,\ntherefore, immaterial, unextended, simple, self-identical, according\nto the \u201cparalogisms of Rational Psychology.\u201d But such speculations\nare confined to philosophers and theologians: some of whom, however,\nmaintain (as if reverting to the original savage idea) that spirit is\nthe true substance of material things, at least that material things\ndepend upon a spirit, or spirits, for their existence. Monists, again,\nsay there is one substance of both matter and mind, which is not either\nof these any more than it is the other. Locke very honestly calls it \u201ca\nsupposed I know not what.\u201d\n\nIn writing of Magic, I have indicated the origin of the notion of\nforce; and if my view is justifiable, it appears that those celebrated\nabstractions \u201cforce\u201d and \u201cmatter,\u201d form and substance, spirit and body,\nmay be traced to the savage mind. That savages are incapable of general\nand abstract ideas we have seen to be an illusion. They are necessary\nto economy in the organisation of the mind. When a tribe bases its\ngrammatical gender on the distinction of Animate and Inanimate, has\nit in no sense corresponding ideas? But an abstract idea results from\na long process of dissociative growth from its concrete sources, and\nmust exist in some manner at all stages of that growth, before its\ndistinctness is completed by an appropriate name; and it is reasonable\nto suppose that at every stage of growth it functions and influences\nthe course of thought. Accordingly, it is plain that from very early\ntimes thought has been greatly influenced by ideas of force, form,\nspirit and the rest of them.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. GHOSTS AND SPIRITS\n\nWhilst of some tribes (for example the Indians of Guiana) it is said\nthat there is nothing to indicate that they \u201cknow of any spirits,\nexcept such as are, or once were, situated in material bodies,\u201d[198]\namongst others we are often told that not only ghosts are known but\nalso spirits that are declared never to have been incarnate. An extreme\nform of the ghost-theory maintains that all spirits were once ghosts\nwhose incarnation has been forgotten; but this is needless, and seems\nnot to be true. It is enough that probably the original inhabitants of\nthe spirit-world were ghosts; that some of those now believed not to\nhave been ghosts were once really so; and that those spirits that were\nnever ghosts are later immigrants, who have obtained domicile by having\nbeen imagined in analogy with ghosts. The following list indicates more\nor less probable reasons why (_A_) ghosts have sometimes come to be\nregarded as non-human spirits, and (_B_) why certain non-human things\nhave come to be regarded as spirits, or as possessed by spirits, more\nor less resembling the human.\n\n_A._ Spirits that were formerly ghosts, but are now declared not to\nhave been:\n\n(_a_) Ghosts whose former life has been forgotten by mere lapse of\ntime. The memory of the dead amongst many tribes does not extend\nbeyond three or four generations. If then the ghost of some unusually\nimpressive personality happens to be remembered, when all his relatives\nand contemporaries have been forgotten, he seems to be separated\nfrom the human race. And if his name was that of some natural object,\nhis ghost, according to Spencer\u2019s hypothesis, may now be regarded as\nthe spirit of that phenomenon. But as to Spencer\u2019s hypothesis,[199]\nalthough it gives such a plausible explanation of much nature-worship\nby real facts as to the working of savage language and thought that it\nseems to me unreasonable to doubt that it has had some of the effects\nhe traces to it, yet it presses upon me more and more that most cases\nof nature-worship are to be explained by more particular causes.\n\n(_b_) To dissociate a ghost from mankind is especially easy if his\ntomb has been forgotten, or if he has no tomb. As the drowned have no\ntombs, they easily become water-demons. Tombs must often be forgotten\nin consequence of migrations. In Central Melanesia both ghosts and\nspirits are recognised; but in the west worship is directed chiefly\nto ghosts, in the east chiefly to spirits. As migration has been from\nwest to east, the tombs of ancestors can no longer be pointed out by\nthe eastern islanders, and so their ghosts may have become spirits.\nIn Tumloo (northern New Guinea) there are temples of spirits (all\nfemale) distinct from ancestral ghosts, and on the banisters of ladders\nleading up to these temples there are ornamental figures of ape-like\nanimals; the architecture of the temples points to a former superior\nculture.[200] As there are no apes in New Guinea, these figures and\ntemples may indicate a former residence under better conditions in\nJava or Borneo; and the spirits with which they are associated may\nbe ancestral ghosts whose tombs and other earthly vestiges have been\nforgotten in the migration.\n\n(_c_) We may see another way in which a ghost may become a pure spirit,\nif we suppose that as a ghost he had attained to some measure of\nworship, but that with the rise of new gods (by conquest, or by the\nreputation of being more helpful), or by his being himself too good\nto be worth worshipping, his rites have been neglected and his legend\nforgotten. Then he is no longer remembered as a ghost, or ancestor.\n\n(_d_) It may be thought honourable to a god to deny that he was ever a\nman.\n\n(_e_) The construction of a world-myth makes it necessary to begin\nsomewhere with some one; and whoever becomes the first being, it\nis necessary to deny that he was ever begotten. But there may be\ninconsistent stories: the supreme being of the central Esquimo is\na woman, Sedna, who created all things that have life; but other\ntraditions give her a human origin.[201] Similarly, in drawing up the\ngenealogy of ancestral gods, we come at last to one who was never\nbegotten. Such is Unkulunkulu of the Zulus, generally said to have\nsprung from a bed of reeds.[202]\n\n_B._ Spirits that were never incarnate, but have been imagined by\nanalogy with ghosts already propitiated:\n\n(_f_) A Totem may become a spirit; whilst, having himself no human\nantecedents, he can hardly be a ghost as of an ordinary mortal. Nothing\ncan be more irregular than the life of Totemism: with some tribes it\nseems to die out early, or leaves few and doubtful vestiges; with\nothers traces of it seem to remain even amidst conditions of high\nculture. Apparently, where it survives, the Totem tends gradually to\nlose his bestial or vegetal properties, or most of them, and to become\nan anthropomorphic spirit with his myths, in analogy with heroic or\npatriarchal ancestors. He has attained to a considerable degree of\nindividuality; yet, by association and tradition, may still confer more\nor less sacredness upon his animal kindred (cf. chap. ix. \u00a7 8).\n\n(_g_) To address any object with a spell, as a man is addressed\nin summons or command, is (as said above) an approach toward its\npersonification. Hence corn, rice, padi, nkasa, or whatever has been\nthe object of tribal rites and spells\u2014the sun and moon, the earth,\nfire, wind, clouds and rain\u2014having perhaps long been influenced and\nreinforced by Magic\u2014are apt, when Animism has gained control of man\u2019s\nimagination, to become first the embodiment and then the possession\nof spirits; the spells become prayers, and the rites religious\nceremonies or mysteries. Such spirits, at first locally honoured, may\nwith the evolution of the tribe or nation, the increasing intercourse\nof its villages, and the centralisation of its culture in some city,\nbe released from local conditions and generalised into transcendent\ngods, either each of its own kind\u2014corn or wine\u2014or of still wider\nsway over agriculture or the weather. The meteorological gods are not\nimpaired in strength by even wide migrations; for they are found to\nrule everywhere; and this may be a reason of their predominance in the\nhigher religions. Plants from which intoxicants are obtained, such\nas soma or the vine, bringing men to a condition resembling insanity\nor the ravings of a sorcerer who is supposed to be possessed, are\nespecially easy to understand as sources of inspiration. A belief in\nvegetation spirits, having originated in any way, may be extended\naccording to the circumstances and mentality of a tribe, until every\nwood is populous with dryads.\n\n(_h_) Natural objects that have, at first, been regarded with awe\nand therefore endowed with magical powers\u2014mountain-tops, ravines,\nwhirlpools, ancient trees\u2014under Animism, become the abode of spirits;\nand these, again, may, by analogy with others, cease to be conceived as\nmerely local. Among the Moors, \u201cthe _jn\u016bn_, which form a special race\nof beings created before Adam, are generally supposed to be active on\noccasions or in places which give rise to superstitious fear, and in\nmany cases they are personifications of some mysterious qualities in\npersons or lifeless objects.\u201d[203]\n\nIn each of these cases, (_f_), (_g_), (_h_), however, an Euhemerist\nexplanation may be offered. As to (_f_), Spencer, of course, argued\nthat the Totem-ancestor is always a man, who bore the name of an\nanimal, and was confounded with it after death; and Dr. Rivers has\nsuggested that some gods who seem to have been derived from Totems may\nreally represent heroes who had such Totems.[204] As to (_g_), Grant\nAllen suggested that the spirit of the corn or vine is always at first\nthe spirit of the man upon whose grave the plant grew.[205] And as\nto (_h_), the spirit of a mountain may be the ghost of a man who was\nburied on the top of it; and the spirit of a whirlpool the ghost of\na man who was drowned in it. Indeed some spirits may have originated\nin one of these ways, others in another way; and what happened in any\nparticular case can only be determined, if at all, by examination of\nits particular circumstances.\n\n(_i_) Abstract ideas may, at a very early stage of culture, be\npersonified and treated as spirits. The Semang, according to Messrs.\nSkeat and Blagden, personify Death, Hunger, Disease;[206] and the\nBeloki, according to the Rev. J.\u00a0H. Weeks, attribute all personal\nqualities to the aid of spirits; so that if one man wrestles better\nthan another, it is because the spirit Embanda is in him.[207] The\nmodern Greeks of Macedonia personify and propitiate Lady Small\nPox.[208] In the tenth and latest book of the _Rigveda_, \u201cthe\ndeification of purely abstract ideas, such as Wrath and Faith, appears\nfor the first time.\u201d[209] At a higher stage of culture we find Fides,\nFortuna, Concordia and many others. Such things are conceived of as\nmysterious powers, and they have names; and so far they resemble\ndemons. Why, then, should they not be personified and propitiated like\ndemons?\n\n(_j_) Various ways have been pointed out in which the grammatical\nstructures of language, metaphors and other figures of speech may\ninfluence the growth of mythology.\n\n(_k_) Animism having been generally adopted, spirits may be freely\ninvented in explanatory myths. The Kalinis believe that thunder\nand lightning are the clang and flash of bracelets on the arms of\nKidilumai, a girl who dances in heaven, as formerly on earth, for joy\nof the welcome rain.[210] It would be absurd to suppose that she must\nonce have lived on earth. Some amongst the Ekoi say that Thunder is a\ngiant marching across the sky; others that Thunder is the enemy of\nLightning and, on seeing it, growls to drive it away.[211] If free\ninvention may originate myths, it may modify old ones, with results\nthat cannot always be interpreted upon general principles.\n\nFinally, any spirits that have been anthropomorphised in analogy with\nancestor-ghosts may be further disguised by giving them mythical family\nconnections with the ancestors and with one another, as happened to\nBacchus and Demeter.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. HOW GHOSTS AND SPIRITS ARE IMAGINED\n\nGhosts and spirits have the same qualities and characters, eat the\nsame food, appear in dreams, possess men and animals, help sorcerers,\ngive diseases, determine the success of hunting or agriculture. At\nfirst, they are solid things, not truly incorporeal, merely invisible\nto ordinary people by daylight; though dogs or pigs may see them even\nthen. A ghost is so associated with its corpse, that it is not always\nclear which it is that escapes from the grave and walks; and one may\njudge whether a dead man has yet gone to Hades or still haunts the\nneighbourhood, by observing whether in the morning there are footprints\naround his grave; and to keep the ghost from walking, one may fill\nthe belly of the corpse with stones, or break its limbs, or bury it\ndeep and pile the earth upon it; or one may burn it. In South-East\nAustralia, ghosts can be heard at night jumping down from the trees or\nfrom the sky.[212] They may be heard to speak or sing, usually with\nthin voices, like bats: as\n\n \u201cthe sheeted dead\n Did squeak and gibber in the streets of Rome.\u201d\n\nSpirits may have all the appurtenances of an animal body; for two of\nthem waylaid an Australian, and made a wizard of him by taking out\nhis entrails and filling up the cavity with the entrails of one of\nthemselves.[213] They may marry mortals, as a devil begat Caliban upon\na witch; and not long ago the \u201cincubus\u201d was very troublesome throughout\nEurope. In short, a ghost or spirit can act physically, just as a\nman can, because he has the same organs; but with greater power,\nbecause mysterious and more feared. And such beliefs persist amongst\npeople whose culture is much higher than the Australian, as in Jacob\u2019s\nwrestling with something at the ford Jabbok, and Grettir\u2019s slaying of\nthe ghost of Glam at Thorhallstad;[214] and Euthymus, the boxer, having\nput on his armour, defeated the ghost of Lycas at Temesa.[215] To this\nday, in Macedonia, there are vampires, or animated corpses (chiefly\nTurks), that walk, and throttle people and suck their blood.[216] \u201cThe\nMoslem corpse,\u201d says R. Burton, \u201cis partly sentient in the tomb.\u201d[217]\nThe Karok of California consider it the highest crime to utter the\nname of the dead; for it makes the mouldering skeleton turn in its\ngrave and groan.[218] In fact, it is difficult to think of one\u2019s own\nfuture corpse as entirely inanimate, and this adds some discomfort\nto one\u2019s thoughts of death. According to Wundt, the K\u00f6rperseele, as\neine Eigenschaft des lebenden K\u00f6rpers, is a starting-point of Animism\nindependent of, and probably prior to, the breath and the dream, which\nsuggest the idea of a free separable soul.[219] This confusion of ideas\nin popular Animism seems to me due to (1) the strong association of the\nghost with the corpse, and the performance of rites (which must take\nplace somewhere, if at all) naturally at the grave or in connection\nwith relics; (2) the manifestation of ghosts as visible, speaking,\ntangible bodies in dreams; (3) the difficulty of imagining spirits\nto live and act except in the likeness of the body (though non-human\nforms\u2014usually animal\u2014are sometimes substituted); (4) the convenience\nof such imaginations to the story-teller; (5) the convenience of\nthem to sorcerers and purveyors of mysteries, who rely upon such\nimaginations in producing illusion by suggestion. For ages a confusion\nof ghost with corpse may exist in the popular mind along with the\nmore refined notion of soul-stuff in which a ghost becomes manifest,\nwhilst there is no attempt to reconcile these imaginations; and it\nis only by metaphysical subtilties about \u201cmind\u201d and \u201cmatter,\u201d or by\nmystical aversion to sensuosity, that the notion of pure incorporeal\nspirit without even spatial limitations is at last freed from these\nprimitive associations, partially and amongst a few people. A tendency\nto abstract conception of the spirit is set up, indeed, in the ordinary\nway of \u201cdissociation\u201d by the belief in transmigration. For if a spirit\nmay \u201cpossess\u201d all sorts of bodies\u2014men, plants, animals, etc.\u2014it is\nindependent of any particular body; though it may still be thought to\nneed _some_ body. Where the idea of pure spirit has been established\namongst educated people, it becomes necessary for those who believe\nin ghosts and have forgotten their soul-stuff to explain how a spirit\ncan manifest itself to eye, ear, nose, hand, without a physical body,\nby \u201cmaterialising\u201d itself, as invisible vapour (say one\u2019s own breath\non a frosty morning) condenses into a cloud or into dew; for the power\nof analogy as an aid to thought, or as a substitute for it, is not yet\nexhausted.\n\nThe varieties of belief that occur here and there in the world cannot\nbe explained without a much fuller knowledge of local circumstances\nthan is usually available. The Semang say that souls are red, like\nblood, and no bigger than a grain of maize;[220] the Malays that they\nare vapoury, shadowy, filmy essences, about as big as one\u2019s thumb;[221]\nin both cases shaped like the owner. Elsewhere in the Indian\nArchipelago, \u201cthe animating principle is conceived of, not as a tiny\nbeing confined to a single part of the body, but as a sort of fluid or\nether diffused through every part.\u201d[222] The less educated classes in\nJapan consider the soul as a small, round, black thing that can leave\nthe body during sleep.[223] Amongst the Ekoi, the soul is a small thing\ndwelling in the breast, whilst a man lives; but at death expands into\nthe body\u2019s full stature.[224] The difficulty of finding the soul in the\nbody leads some thinkers to suppose it must be very small, others very\nattenuated\u2014thin as a shadow and as breath invisible.\n\nWhilst many savages believe, like ourselves, that the body entertains\none soul and gives up one ghost, the Ekoi believe in two, one animating\na man\u2019s body, the other possessing, or changing into, some animal in\nthe bush. Three souls, the vegetative, sensitive and rational, are\nwell known to European philosophy. The Mandans thought that a man has\none black, one brown, and one light-coloured soul; but that only the\nlast returned to the Lord of Life.[225] The observer who tells us\nthis also reports (p. 484) that some of the Dakotas assign to each\nman four spirits: one that dies with the body; one that remains with,\nor near, it; one that accounts for its deeds and at death goes to\nthe spirit-world; and one that lingers with the small bundle of the\ndeceased\u2019s hair, which is kept by relatives until they can throw it\ninto an enemy\u2019s country to become a roving, hostile demon. In West\nAfrica, too, Miss Kingsley found four souls: one that survives the\nbody; one that lives with some animal in the bush; one, the body\u2019s\nshadow, that lies down every night in the shadow of the great god,\nand there recovers its strength; and, finally, the dream-soul. Some\nnatives hold that the three last are functions of the first or true\nsoul; but the witch-doctor treats all four separately.[226] The\nshadow of a man, his reflection, his name, his totem, his breath, his\ndream-wraith, his blood, his corpse, supply natural starting-points\nfor such speculations. Some Chinese philosophers held that \u201ceach of\nthe five viscera has its own separate male soul.\u201d[227] I have found\nno belief in six souls; but in Siberia the Altaians distinguish six\nparts or (rather) conditions or stages of the soul; and this probably\nis only another attempt to convey the same meaning.[228] Mr. Skeat\nreports that, probably, in the old Animism of the Malays, each man\nhad seven souls; though now they talk of only one; except in using\nspells, when the souls are addressed separately.[229] In the religion\nof Osiris there seems to have been a still greater number of souls:\nas of the name, the shape, the strength, the shadow, etc.: all\nreuniting with the immortal counterpart of a man\u2019s mummy, if justified\nat the last judgment. Prof. Wiedemann suggests that these beliefs\nmay have been collected from different local sources, and preserved\nfor fear of losing anything that might be true.[230] Whereas, then,\nthe prescientific mind is often accused of confusing things that are\nseparate, we see here the opposite tendency to reify abstract aspects,\nand to separate things that are in nature united; and one probable\ncause of this is the practical interest of treating, and therefore of\nattending to and addressing, separately, certain aspects of a man in\nrites of exorcism, lustration, summoning, reinforcing, propitiation.\n\nThe belief in an external soul that exists apart from oneself (though\nidentified with oneself for good or evil) in an animal, in the bush,\nor where not, may have arisen from the connecting of the soul with the\nshadow or reflection. The shadow is, indeed, attached to a man by the\nfeet (except when he leaps), if the whole is seen; but it goes away\nat night: it stretches, as the sun declines, far across the plain,\nand then disappears. The reflection is quite separate, and is seen\n_within_ a pool (as in a mirror), not on the surface, approaching us\nwhen we advance, and withdrawing when we retire: whence it is easy to\nunderstand that to take a man\u2019s photograph may be to take away his\nsoul. If this kind of soul may be some feet distant, why may it not\nbe much further off, if there be any motive (such as the desire of\nsecrecy) to wish or think it so? If it may reside within a pool, why\nnot within anything else? What, in fact, becomes of it when we turn\naway? That it should be in an animal in the bush is reasonable enough,\nif one\u2019s Totem (even though imperfectly remembered as such) is an\nanimal in the bush, and if oneself is in some sort that animal.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. ORIGIN AND DESTINY OF SOULS\n\nBeliefs as to the origin of souls sometimes bear the character of\nfanciful explanation myths. The Semang say that souls grow upon a\nsoul-tree in the world of Kari (their chief god); whence they are\nbrought by birds, which are killed and eaten by an expectant mother:\nsouls of fishes and animals are also obtained by the mothers\u2019 eating\ncertain fungi and grasses.[231] Here the analogy of the growth of\nfruits is adopted: being so familiar as to need no further explanation.\nLeibnitz\u2019s suggestion that monads are _fulgurations continuelles de la\nDivinit\u00e9_,[232] is at about the same level of thought. In other cases,\nwe see the struggling to birth of ideas that still seem plausible:\nsuch is the widespread tenet that every present human soul is the\nreincarnation of an ancestor, which we find in Australia, Melanesia,\nBorneo, Manipur, on the Congo, in North America and elsewhere. The\nBakongo seem to base their belief in reincarnation partly on personal\nresemblance; upon which ground a child may be thought to have the\nsoul even of a living man; so that to point out such a resemblance is\ndispleasing, since it implies that, the child having his soul, he must\nsoon die.[233] Another reason they give for their belief is that the\nchild speaks early of things its mother has not taught it, and that\nthis must be due to an old soul talking in a new body. But Bakongo\nalbinos are incarnations of water-spirits, and greatly feared. Possibly\nin some cases people began by naming children after their ancestors,\nand later inferred that those who bore the same name must be the same\npersons. Plato thought that, by a sort of law of psychic conservation,\nthere must always be the same number of souls in the world:[234] there\nmust, therefore, be reincarnation. That nothing absolutely begins to\nbe, or perishes, though first explicit in the Ionian philosophy, is\ngenerally assumed in savage thinking; so why should it not be true of\nsouls?\n\nAs to the destiny of souls there seems to exist amongst the tribes\nof men even greater variety of belief than as to their origin. They\nmay pass through more than one stage of development: as in the western\nisles of Torres Straits one becomes at death, first a _mari_, and later\na _markai_ with a more definite status;[235] or as with the Veddas, one\nis at first called, without much confidence, \u201cthe living one,\u201d and only\na few days later becomes, after trial of one\u2019s virtue, a _yaka_,[236]\nor authentic ghost. Often the dead will be reincarnated, but the\ninterval between death and rebirth may be passed in an underworld, or\nin a city in the forest, or indefinitely in a land of ancestors. They\nmay turn into plants; as among the Mafulu old people\u2019s ghosts become\nlarge funguses growing in the mountains:[237] but more frequently into\nanimals; perhaps their Totems, or (with seeming caprice) into such\nthings as termites or wild pigs; or (because wings seem to suit the\nspirit) into a butterfly or bee; or into owls or bats that haunt the\nnight and dwell in caves that may be tombs; or into deer or bear-cats,\nbecause these are seen in the clearings near tombs; or into snakes,\nbecause these are seen to come out of tombs, and often come into huts\nas if returning to their homes, and, moreover, cast their skins and so\ntypify the renewal of life. They may also become stars, or shooting\nstars, or mere naked demons, or white men.\n\nIt is only after ages of thought concerning the fate of our souls that\nthere arises in any systematic form the doctrine of metempsychosis,\nwhich now prevails over great part of southern and eastern Asia, and\nwas formerly known in Egypt and even in Greece. But in the widely\ndiffused doctrines of reincarnation in men or in animals, or even in\nplants, and in the general belief that a soul may wander and possess\nany kind of body, we see the sources from which this vast flood of\nsuperstition collected its waters. The Buddhist belief that not the\nsoul wanders, but its _karma_ (or character) creates a new body, may be\nconsidered as a retrogression from Animism to Magic; for what is it but\na law of the action of an occult force or virtue?\n\nThough the ghost survive the body, and it may be said (as by the\nEkoi) that it cannot perish, and the reason may even be given (as in\nthe Bismarck Archipelago), that it is of different nature from the\nbody,[238] it is by no means always immortal. It may die, as it were a\nnatural death, by oblivion; or, the next world being just like this,\nghosts may fight together and kill one another;[239] according to the\nTongans a ghost may be killed with a club; amongst the Bakongo it may\nbe destroyed by burning its corpse.[240] It has been thought that\nto suppress the ghost was the original motive of cremation; but the\nwestern Tasmanians cremated their dead, and can hardly have done so to\nbe rid of such mild Animism as seems to have been entertained by the\neastern tribes, who buried their dead or abandoned them.[241] However,\nthey seem to have been rid of it; whereas, in general, ghosts survive\ncremation, because this process cannot put an end to dreams; and it may\nthen come to be believed that burning is necessary in order to set the\nsoul free from its body; and, therefore, the wife of Periander, tyrant\nof Corinth, complained to him of being cold in the ghost world, because\nher clothes had been only buried in her tomb and not burnt.[242]\nAccording to the Egyptians, the ghost participated in every mutilation\nof the body, and perished with its dissolution. It may be held that\neven the gods die if neglected, and depend for their immortality upon\nthe perpetuation of their rites and sacrifices.[243]\n\nWhilst the ghost\u2019s life endures, its dwelling may be in the earth\nor sky, sea or forest, or in the land of the setting sun, or in the\nland of ancestors whence the tribe remembers to have migrated. Before\ndeparting to that undiscovered country, it may haunt the grave or the\nold home, till burial, or till the flesh decays, or till the funeral\nfeast, or till death has been avenged; or it may roam the country, a\nresentful demon, if its funeral rites be not duly celebrated. There\nmay be one place for all ghosts, or two, or more, according to their\nage, or rank, or qualities (as sociable or unsociable), or whether\nor not their noses were bored; or according to the manner of their\ndeath, by violence, or suicide, or sorcery. It is late before our\nposthumous destiny is thought to depend on moral character (as it does\nin metempsychosis); and even then varies with the local conception\nof the good man, as observing custom or religious rites or, finally,\nthe dictates of conscience.[244] I remember how puzzling it was in\nchildhood to make out from sermons how far \u201cgoing to heaven\u201d depended\non being good (conscientious) or on faith. Both seemed very desirable;\nyet there was a shadow of opposition between them, and to be good was\na little dangerous. But faith was indispensable, and apparently the\nmore difficult of the two, needing more elucidation, exhortation and\nreiteration.\n\nThe journey of ghosts to their own world may be short or long, an\nunadorned migration or rich in details of adventure. They may begin\nthe new life exactly as they finished this one, or the old may be\nrejuvenated. As to their manner of life there, oftenest it is a\nrepetition of their earthly state, perhaps better, or even much\nbetter, perhaps worse. And this conception is historically of the\nutmost importance: for (1) it seems to give the greatest confidence\nin a hereafter. Hume ascribes what seemed to him the incredulity of\nmen with regard to a future life \u201cto the faint idea we form of our\nfuture condition, derived from its want of resemblance to the present\nlife.\u201d[245] And (2) from this conception proceeds the development of\nghostly polities: presided over, according to tribes that have no\nchiefs, by a headman, such as Damarulum, or by the greatest known\nhunt-leader, like Kande Yaka of the Veddas; under advancing political\nstructures, by chieftains, amongst whom one may be paramount, and\nso become a king or lord of all. These ghostly politics support the\nearthly ones they imitate. It is everywhere an edifice built by hope\nand fear, under the guidance of analogy, and sometimes decorated by\ncaprice, if this find acceptance with the tribe.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. THE TREATMENT OF GHOSTS\n\nThe behaviour of men toward the ghosts of their dead is chiefly\ngoverned by fear. The human power that has left the corpse is now\ninvisible; that power, rarely quite trustworthy whilst in the body,\nespecially when unobserved, retains its desires, caprices and hatreds\nthat were partially controlled by social influences. What controls\nthem now that the man is exempt from observation? How shall one defend\noneself against him, or procure his neutrality, or even (as sometimes\nin the flesh) his help? The fear of ghosts has peculiar qualities:\nthe invisibility of a spiritual enemy produces a general objectless\nsuspicion and a sense of helplessness; associations with the physical\nconditions of the corpse and with darkness excite feelings very much\nlike those aroused by snakes and reptiles. This fear explains why\nsavages, such as the Australians, may believe in ghosts for ages\nwithout ever venturing to pray even to father or mother deceased; for\nto pray is to invoke, and they will come, and, on the whole, they are\nnot wanted. Fear may make the survivors quit the neighbourhood of the\ndead; sometimes makes them adopt means to induce the ghost to leave,\nand invent stories of how and whither he goes, which are believed by\nbiological necessity; because, unless they can be rid of the ghost and\nthe dread of him, or establish in some way the _pax deorum_, it is\nimpossible to go on living.\n\nThe Yerkla-mining never bury their dead, nor in any way dispose of\nthem. On seeing death approaching a tribesman, they make up a good fire\nfor him, and leave the neighbourhood, not to return for a considerable\ntime.[246] The Sakai, having buried the dead affectionately with\nnecklaces, wallets, etc., say to him: \u201cDo not remember any more your\nfather, mother, or relations. Think only of your ancestors gone to\nanother place. Your living friends will find food.\u201d They then burn his\nhouse and desert the settlement, even abandoning standing crops.[247]\nAmong the Kikuyu, \u201cif a person dies in a village, that village is\noften burnt, and the people trek off and build elsewhere,\u201d though much\nlabour may have been spent on the surrounding fields. Sick people are\noften deserted.[248] Where land is closely settled such flight becomes\nimpossible, and in any case it is very inconvenient; so that if any one\ncan believe it possible to deceive the ghost, or to frighten him away\nby shouting at him, beating the air with boughs or firebrands, letting\noff arrows or guns, or to restrain him from walking by breaking the\ncorpse\u2019s legs, or by placing loaded \u201cghost-shooters\u201d (straws filled\nwith gunpowder) around the grave, so much the better. Many such plans\nare adopted, and they _must_ be believed in.[249]\n\nAffection, however, has its part in the treatment of the dead: it is\nreasonable to attribute to affection the beginnings of the practices\nof leaving food at the tomb, burying weapons or ornaments with the\ncorpse, celebrating funerary rites with lamentations; though in time\nthis motive may be mixed with, or superseded by, fear of the ghost,\nor by fear of being suspected of having murdered the deceased by\nsorcery, should rites be neglected or maimed. It is not uncommon to\ncarry about some bones of the departed, to hang round one\u2019s neck the\nskulls of infants untimely dead. The wild Veddas, though, having\ncovered a corpse with boughs, they avoid the place for a long time\nfor fear of being stoned, nevertheless have a strong feeling of good\nfellowship for the spirits of their dead.[250] In the eastern isles\nof Torres Straits, the Miriam perform an eschatological mystery, in\nwhich the recently deceased reappear on their way to the other world.\nThe women and children take it for reality: their affections are said\nto be gratified; and at the same time their fears are allayed by the\nconviction that the ghosts, having been seen on their way to Hades,\nwill no longer haunt them.[251] The old Norsemen believed that the\ndead were still united with the living by intense sympathy.[252] As\nrites begun in affection may become propitiatory through fear, and\nafter prayer has been instituted may be further extended to obtain the\naid of spirits or gods in hunting, war, revenge, love, agriculture,\ntrade, or any undertaking for subsistence, riches or power, every\npassion in turn seeks its gratification through Animism.\n\nExtravagance in funerary rites, often ruinous to the family, may\nsometimes be checked by considerations of economy or convenience.\nThus some tribes of South Australia may burn all the property of the\ndeceased except their stone axes, which are too valuable to be lost to\nthe survivors. The Nagas bury with the body the things most closely\nassociated with the dead; but things of small value, never the gun\nor the cornelian necklace.[253] The Todas, who burn their dead, lay\nthe body on a bier with many valuable offerings and swing it three\ntimes over the fire; they then remove the money and the more valuable\nornaments and burn the rest with the corpse. They say that the dead\nstill have the use of everything that was swung over the fire; and tell\na story to explain the ceremony; but Dr. Rivers observes that \u201cthis\nsymbolic burning has the great advantage that the objects of value\nare not consumed, and are available for use another time.\u201d[254] The\nAraucanians buried many things with the dead, and at the grave of a\nchief slew a horse. But for all valuables\u2014silver spurs and bits and\nsteel lance-heads\u2014they left wooden substitutes. As for the horse, the\nmourners ate it, and the ghost got nothing but the skin and the soul\nof it.[255] Economy may also induce the belief that ghosts are easily\ndeceived, or are unaccountably stupid in some special way: as in the\nwidespread practice of carrying a corpse out of its house through a\nhole in the wall; trusting that, the hole having been immediately\nrepaired, the ghost can never find his way back; so soon does he\nforget the familiar door. This is cheaper than to burn the house\ndown. Superstitious practices may be carried out with self-destructive\ninfatuation, or restricted at will: in Florida (Melanesia), in a\ncertain stream, a very large eel was taken for a ghost; no one might\nbathe in, or drink at, the stream\u2014\u201cexcept at one pool, which for\nconvenience was considered not to be sacred.\u201d[256] A conflicting desire\ncreates a limiting belief. Whilst often the most painful or disgusting\nrites are endured for fear of ghosts, at other times they are assumed\nto be so dull that we are tempted to say: \u201cWhatever is convenient is\ncredible.\u201d\n\nIf we desire to know the future, ghosts are so wise that we consult\ntheir oracles and pay handsome fees to their inspired priests; but if\nwe dread their presence, it is easy to accept any suggestion that they\nare obtuse or infatuated. They may (_e.\u00a0g._) be afflicted with what\npsychiatrists call \u201carithmomania.\u201d Returning from a funeral, strew the\nground with millet-seed: then the ghost can never overtake you, for he\nmust stop to count them. Or hang a sieve outside your window: he cannot\nenter until he has counted all the holes; moreover, his system of\nnumeration does not reach beyond \u201ctwo.\u201d You can always block his path\nby drawing a line across it and pretending to jump over the line as if\nit were a stream of water: of course, he cannot pass that. Or blaze\nthrough the wood a circular trail, beginning at his grave and returning\nto it: he must follow it around for ever, always ending at the same\ncold grave. Alas, poor thin, shivering thing, that would go back to the\nold hearth and sit close amongst the kinsmen by the fire, and laugh at\nthe old jokes and listen to the old stories\u2014chiefly about ghosts\u2014have\nyou forgotten all the tricks that can be played upon your kind? Such is\nthe hom\u0153opathy of superstition: imagination creates the fear of ghosts,\nand imagination cures it.\n\nImagination-beliefs, being swayed by moods and passions, are\nnecessarily inconsistent. Natives of the Bismarck Archipelago are\ncannibals and greatly fear the ghosts of those they devour. Whilst\nfeasting they hang up a slice for the ghost himself, and afterwards\nmake an uproar to scare him away. Nevertheless they keep his skull and\njawbone, which the ghost might be supposed especially to haunt; so\neasily do other passions overcome fear. Of the fear of ghosts sometimes\nseems true that which Bacon says of the fear of death, that there is\nno passion in the mind of man so weak but it mates and masters it.\nSacrilegious miscreants have always robbed tombs, even the tombs of\nPharaohs who were gods; and timid lovers have kept tryst in graveyards.\nThe Sia Indians of North Mexico had a masterful way of dealing with\nthe ghost of a slain enemy: they annexed him together with his scalp;\nfor this having been brought to the village, a shaman offered a long\nprayer, and thus addressed the ghost: \u201cYou are now no longer an enemy;\nyour scalp is here; you will no more destroy my people.\u201d[257] To\ncapture and enslave the ghost of an enemy is said to have been the\nchief motive of head-hunting in Malaya. Compare the conduct of the\nRomans in carrying off Juno from Veii and establishing her at Rome.\nThe inconsistency (sometimes met with) of supposing a man\u2019s personal\nqualities to go with his ghost, and yet eating some part of his body to\nobtain those qualities, may be due to the latter practice having been\nmagical, and having persisted after the rise of Animism. Some of the\nEsquimo have such control over ghosts by Magic, that they fear them\nvery little. After a death, the ghost remains peaceably in the house\nfour days (if a man) or five (if a woman), and is then dismissed by\na ceremony to the grave, to wait there until a child is born in the\nvillage, when it is recalled to be the child\u2019s tutelary spirit.[258]\n\n\n\u00a7 10. EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF ANIMISM\n\nAnimism, originating in the belief in ghosts of men, tends to spread\nas the explanation of whatever had formerly been attributed to Magic\n(if we take this to have been earlier); although it is far from\noccupying the whole region that thus lies open to it. We have seen\nthat the extent of its prevalence as an explanatory principle, and\nconsequently as the basis of cults, differs greatly amongst different\npeoples. But more interesting than the spread of belief as to the\nagency of spirits so as to include more and more objects, is the\ngradual differentiation of some of them from common ghosts in power,\ncharacter and rank, and their integration into families and polities,\nsuch as we see in the _Edda_ and the _Iliad_. A process, going on for\nages and varying with every people, cannot be briefly described: the\nwork of E.\u00a0B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer, W. Wundt and others in this\ndepartment is well known. In general it may be said that, allowing for\nthe influences of geographical conditions and tradition and foreign\nintercourse, the chief cause of the evolution of a spirit-world is\nthe political evolution of those who believe in it; so that the\npatriarchies, aristocracies, monarchies and despotisms of this world\nare reflected in heaven. Tribes of the lowest culture\u2014some African\nPygmies, Fuegians, Mafulu, Semangs, Veddas\u2014have the least Animism;\nat successive grades\u2014Australians, Melanesians, Congolese, Amerinds,\nPolynesians\u2014Animism increases and grows more systematic; and it\nculminates in the barbaric civilisations of Egypt, Babylonia and India,\nand of Mexico and Peru. But in civilisations of our modern type it\nrapidly loses ground.\n\nThe cause of such differences in the extension and elaboration of the\nanimistic hypothesis cannot be that some tribes have had more time\nthan others to think it out; since they have all had an equally long\npast. Animism is known to be very ancient, and there is no reason\nto think that some races adopted it later than others. That, in the\nlower grades of culture, men want brains to think it out, is not a\nsatisfactory explanation; because, on contact with superior races,\nbackward peoples show themselves capable of much more than could have\nbeen inferred from their original state. Improvement in culture depends\nupon much besides native brains, namely, opportunities afforded by the\nresources of their habitat, and communication with other peoples. The\nmost backward peoples are the most isolated peoples. The development\nof Animism is entirely a matter of operating with ideas; and it seems\nto me that before men can build with ideas they must build with their\nhands; there must be occupations that educate, and give advantage\nto, constructive power, as in the making of boats and the building\nof houses and temples; for to this day a nation\u2019s material edifices\nare always, in clearness of plan, coherence and serviceableness, much\nin advance of their systems of theology and philosophy; because they\nmust \u201cwork,\u201d as the Pragmatists say. If you have ever gone over a\nbattleship, compare her with the _Kritik d. r. Vernunft_. Secondly,\na suitable model for the edifice of ideas must be presented in the\nworld of fact; and this, as we have seen, is supplied by the tribe\u2019s\nsocial and political structure; which, again, is clearly correlated\nwith the improvement of architecture in building the houses of chiefs\nand gods. Thirdly, a favourable condition of the working out of any\ntheory is to have the means of recording, either in oral literature or\n(still better) in writing, the advances already made; and, fourthly\u2014a\ncondition historically involved in the foregoing\u2014the growth of a\nclass of men, generally a priestly caste or order, sometimes poets,\nwho have time to think, and the education and vocation to bring the\naccumulating masses of animistic\u2014now religious\u2014ideas into greater\norder and consistency. Hence there are two stages in the development\nof Animism\u2014of course, not sharply separated: first, a long period of\nirregular growth in the tribal mind; and, secondly, a much shorter\nperiod, in which the extension of animistic theory depends more or less\nupon quasi-philosophical reflection.\n\nWith the differentiation of superior beings\u2014heroic, ancestral or\nother gods\u2014from common ghosts, Religion arises. As to the meaning of\nthe word \u201creligion,\u201d indeed, there is no agreement: some lay stress\nupon the importance of beliefs concerning supernatural beings; others\nupon prayer, sacrifice and other rites of worship; still others upon\nthe emotions of awe and mystery. To define \u201creligion\u201d (as a tribal\ninstitution) by all three of these characters seems to me the most\nconvenient plan, and the most agreeable to common usage. That, on\nthe one hand, pure Buddhism (if it ever was a living faith outside\nof a coterie of philosophers and saints), and, on the other hand,\nthe spiritual condition of a few savages, may be wanting in one or\nother mark, is no serious objection. The former case is, in fact,\nexceptional and aberrant, and the latter rudimentary; not to give them\nthe name of \u201creligion\u201d in a technical sense is no wrong to anybody.\nThus understood, then, Religion brings to the development and support\nof Animism many social utilities and other influences; especially the\ninfluence of dynasties supposed to have descended from the gods; and of\npriesthoods, whose sustentation and authority depend upon the supposed\nnecessity of their intervention in worship. In their hands the free\npopular development of animistic ideas comes to an end, and gives place\nto the co-ordination of ideas by reflection, and to the dictation of\ntenets and rites by policy. The simple motives of hope and fear that\nactuated popular Animism are now supplemented by dynastic and priestly\ninterests and ambitions; beneath which lies, faintly recognised and ill\nserved, the interest of society in order.\n\nThis later sophisticated Animism, so far as it obtains a hold upon the\npeople, is imposed upon them by suggestion, authority and deception;\nbut being superimposed upon ancient popular traditions that are never\nobliterated, it still appeals to the sentiments of awe, consolation,\nhope and enthusiastic devotion. The part of deception in the history\nof Animism, indeed, begins at the beginning, preceded, perhaps, and\nprepared for by the devices of Magic-mongers. Amongst the Arunta,\nwomen and children are taught that the noise of the bull-roarer during\ninitiation ceremonies is the voice of the spirit Twanyirika.[259] Near\nSamoa Harbour, at harvest, they offer some of the firstfruits in a bowl\nto the ghosts; and, whilst the family feasts on the remainder, \u201cthe\nhouseholder will surreptitiously stir the offerings in the bowl with\nhis finger, and then show it to the others in proof that the souls\nof the dead have really partaken.\u201d[260] So early is the end supposed\nto justify the means. Animism, like Magic, strives to maintain its\nimaginations by further stimulating the imagination; and, in both\ncases, such practices are, with many men, compatible with firm belief\non the part of the practitioner; who is merely anxious to promote the\npublic good by confirming the weaker brethren: himself weak in the\nperception of incongruities. But I am concerned chiefly with origins,\nand will pursue this nauseous topic no further.\n\nParallel with the development of Religion, a change takes place in\nthe emotions connected with Animism. As the gods emerge from the\nshadow of night and the grave, and are cleansed from the savour of\ncorruption, and withdraw to the summit of the world, they are no longer\nregarded with the shuddering fear that ghosts excite; as they acquire\nthe rank of chiefs and kings, the sentiments of attachment, awe,\nduty, dependence, loyalty, proper to the service of such superiors,\nare directed to them; and since their power far exceeds that of\nkings, and implies the total dependence of man and nature upon their\nsupport and guidance, these sentiments\u2014often amazingly strong toward\nearthly rulers\u2014may toward the gods attain to the intensest heat of\nfanaticism. Extolled by priests and poets, the attributes of the gods\nare exaggerated, until difficulties occur to a reflective mind as to\nhow any other powers can exist contrary to, or even apart from, them:\nso that philosophical problems arise as to the existence of evil and\nresponsibility, and the doctors reason high\u2014\n\n \u201cOf providence, foreknowledge, will and fate,\n Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,\n And find no end, in wandering mazes lost.\u201d\n\nThis is one cause of the dissolution of Animism: the power that\ncomprehends all powers ceases to be an object, and becomes the\nimmanence of all things, good and evil. Another cause is the complexity\nof theogonies, or of spiritual kingdoms with their orders and degrees:\nfound too fanciful, when hierarchic despotisms, that furnished the\nanalogues, give place to the simpler social structure of democracies;\nor, to a certain type of democrat, even insulting, a provocative\ndisparagement of the sovereignty of the people. And Animism has other\nenemies in the growth of Positivism, and sometimes in the resurgence of\nMagic.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[155] _The Veddas_, pp. 126-7.\n\n[156] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 170.\n\n[157] _The Land of Zing_, p. 219.\n\n[158] J. O. Dorsey, _American Bureau of Ethnology_, 1889-90, XI. p. 419.\n\n[159] Mariner\u2019s _Tonga_, p. 105.\n\n[160] _Myth, Ritual and Religion_, p. 48.\n\n[161] _African Game Trails_, p. 333.\n\n[162] _Outdoor Pastimes_, p. 77.\n\n[163] Frazer, _Spirits of the Corn and the Wild_, I. p. 183.\n\n[164] _The Melanesians_, pp. 249 and 356.\n\n[165] _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, II. p. 222.\n\n[166] _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, II. p. 3.\n\n[167] _Camp and Tramp in African Wilds_, p. 174.\n\n[168] _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 283.\n\n[169] _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 275.\n\n[170] _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 355.\n\n[171] _Two Years with the Natives of the West Pacific_, p. 199. As\nto waterspouts and shooting stars, see the _Reports of the Cambridge\nExpedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p. 252.\n\n[172] J. Hernell in the _Quarterly Journal of the Mythical Society_\n(Bangalore), IV. No. 4, p. 158.\n\n[173] A. A. Macdonell, _Sanskrit Literature_, p. 112.\n\n[174] J. Mooney in _Reports of the American Bureau of Ethnology_,\n1885-6, VII. p. 341.\n\n[175] J. E. Bourke in the _Reports of the American Bureau of\nEthnology_, 1887-8, IX. pp. 499-507.\n\n[176] E. F. im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, pp. 288, 354.\n\n[177] _Principles of Sociology_, Vol. I. chs. viii.-xii.\n\n[178] _Primitive Culture_, chs. xi., xii.\n\n[179] J. H. Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, pp. 262-3. My friend, Mr.\nTorday, tells me this belief is very common in Africa.\n\n[180] See, _e.\u00a0g._, A. W. Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East\nAustralia_, p. 406; and P.\u00a0A. Talbot, _In the Shadow of the Bush_, pp.\n83-8.\n\n[181] _Indians of Guiana_, p. 344.\n\n[182] S. H. C. Hawtrey, \u201cThe Lengua Indians,\u201d _J.A.I._, 1901.\n\n[183] J. Mooney, \u201cSacred Formulas of the Cherokees,\u201d _Am. B. of Ethn._,\nVII. p. 352.\n\n[184] C. G. Seligman, _Melanesians of British New Guinea_, pp. 190-91.\n\n[185] S. H. Ray, \u201cPeople and Language of Lifu,\u201d _J.R.A.I._, LXVII. p.\n296.\n\n[186] Turner, _Samoa_, p. 277.\n\n[187] A. W. Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 358.\n\n[188] Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, \u00a7 53.\n\n[189] J. H. Weeks, _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 238.\n\n[190] J. H. Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 233.\n\n[191] T. C. Hodson, _The Naga Tribes of Manipur_, p. 160.\n\n[192] Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 269.\n\n[193] V. Stef\u00e0nson, _My Life with the Eskimo_, p. 57.\n\n[194] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, II. p. 3.\n\n[195] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 403.\n\n[196] _Polynesian Researches_, I. p. 523.\n\n[197] _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 371.\n\n[198] E. im Thurn, _op. cit._, p. 363.\n\n[199] _Principles of Sociology_, \u00a7\u00a7 165-93.\n\n[200] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 220.\n\n[201] Franz Boas, _American Bureau of Ethnology_, VI. 1884-5, p. 583.\n\n[202] Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_, pp. 1 and 40. Cf.\nCoddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 150: Koevasi, a spirit, was never\nhuman, yet in some way the originator of the human race.\n\n[203] E. Westermarck, _Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco_, p. 343.\n\n[204] _J.R.A.I._, 1909, p. 163.\n\n[205] See his ingenious speculations in _The Evolution of the Idea of\nGod_, ch. xiii.\n\n[206] _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, II. iii. ch. vi.\n\n[207] _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 272.\n\n[208] G. F. Abbott, _Macedonian Folklore_, p. 236.\n\n[209] A. A. Macdonell, _Sanskrit Literature_, p. 44.\n\n[210] T. C. Hodson, _The Naga Tribes of Manipur_, p. 126.\n\n[211] P. A. Talbot, _In the Shadow of the Bush_, p. 73.\n\n[212] Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 437.\n\n[213] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n483.\n\n[214] _Grettir Saga_, ch. xxxv.\n\n[215] _Pausanias_, VI. p. 6.\n\n[216] G. F. Abbott, _Macedonian Folklore_, p. 217.\n\n[217] _First Footsteps in East Africa_, p. 52 note.\n\n[218] _American Bureau of Ethnology_, I. p. 200.\n\n[219] _Mythus und Religion_, 2\u00ba ed., p. 78.\n\n[220] _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, I. p. 194.\n\n[221] _Malay Magic_, p. 47.\n\n[222] _Spirits of the Corn and the Wild_, I. p. 183.\n\n[223] W. G. Aston, _Shinto_, p. 50.\n\n[224] _In the Shadow of the Bush_, p. 230.\n\n[225] J. O. Dorsey, \u201cSiouan Cults\u201d in the _American Bureau of\nEthnology_, 1889-90, XI. p. 512.\n\n[226] _West African Studies_, p. 200.\n\n[227] J. G. Frazer, _Balder the Beautiful_, II. pp. 196-208; where are\nreported other beliefs in a plurality of souls; in one case thirty, in\nanother thirty-six.\n\n[228] M. A. Czaplicka, _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 282.\n\n[229] _Malay Magic_, p. 48.\n\n[230] _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, ch. ix.\n\n[231] _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, I. p. 194.\n\n[232] _Monadologie_, 47.\n\n[233] _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 115.\n\n[234] _Republic_, 611_a_.\n\n[235] Haddon, _Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits_, Vol. V. p.\n355.\n\n[236] C. G. Seligman, _The Veddas_, p. 133.\n\n[237] R. W. Williamson, _The Mafulu_, p. 266.\n\n[238] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 396.\n\n[239] C. G. Seligman, _The Melanesians_, p. 658.\n\n[240] J. H. Weeks, _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 224.\n\n[241] Ling Roth, _The Aborigines of Tasmania_, pp. 57-61.\n\n[242] Herodotus, V. p. 93.\n\n[243] On the mortality of gods, see Frazer, _The Dying God_, ch. i.\n\n[244] _Primitive Culture_, II. pp. 75-96.\n\n[245] _Treatise_, B. I., Part III. \u00a7 9.\n\n[246] Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 450.\n\n[247] Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, II.\npp. 95-9. For similar formul\u00e6 of dismission (which, of course, are\nconstraining spells) see W. Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, I. p. 522;\nand J.\u00a0O. Dorsey, \u201cSiouan Cults,\u201d _American Bureau of Ethnology_, X. p.\n420.\n\n[248] Stigand, _The Land of Zing_, p. 250.\n\n[249] For the practice of appointing certain seasons at which the whole\ntribe or nation unites in driving out ghosts or demons by force of arms\n(sometimes with the help of cannon and elephants), as obtaining at all\nlevels of culture, from Australian savagery to the enlightenment of\nChina and Peru, and with more decorum at Athens and Rome, see Frazer,\n_The Scapegoat_, ch. iii. \u00a7 2.\n\n[250] C. G. Seligman, _The Veddas_, p. 131.\n\n[251] _Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p. 253.\n\n[252] Vigfussen and Powell, _Corpus Poeticum Boreale_, I. p. 417. For\nfurther examples of affectionate interest in ghosts, see _Primitive\nCulture_, II. pp. 31-3.\n\n[253] Hodson, _The Naga Tribes of Manipur_, p. 100.\n\n[254] _The Todas_, p. 363.\n\n[255] E. R. Smith, _The Araucanians_, p. 172.\n\n[256] Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 177.\n\n[257] Miss M. C. Stevenson, \u201cThe Sia\u201d in _American Bureau of\nEthnology_, 1889-90, XI. p. 121.\n\n[258] Stef\u00e0nson, _My Life among the Eskimo_, p. 397.\n\n[259] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n497.\n\n[260] Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 259.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE RELATIONS BETWEEN MAGIC AND ANIMISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. THE QUESTION OF PRIORITY\n\nMagic and Animism now everywhere flourish side by side, or in confused\nassociation, and, by those who believe in them, are not discriminated\nas they may be by a spectator. As to their origin, we have seen that\nboth of them are prehistoric; it is useless to inquire about it amongst\nbelievers (who can only tell you that they learnt these things from\ntheir forefathers), or to look for any sort of direct proof. In Chapter\nIV. I mentioned general considerations in favour of the priority of\nMagic; but said nothing of the opposite opinion, that Animism is prior\nand Magic derivative: an opinion held by many and, amongst them, by\nWundt, whose treatment of the problem claims attention.\n\nProf. Wundt holds that the idea of the soul is older than Magic\nand has three principal sources: (1) the gebundene Seele, or\nK\u00f6rperseele (consciousness as an attribute of the body), is\nimmediately given, without the need of any reflection, as a result of\nperception-associations; for thinking, feeling and willing are constant\nelements of a living body.[261] The influence of this idea is seen\nin the practices of making offerings to the dead at their tombs, of\npreserving the body itself, of treating the blood and various parts of\nthe body as vehicles of the soul, the use of hair and nail-parings in\nsorcery, and so forth. By contact, this soul can be transfused into\nother things. But the freie Seele, a being differing from and opposed\nto the body, is suggested (2) by breath and by the cessation of the\nbody\u2019s living functions with the last breath\u2014the Hauchseele; and also\n(3) by dreams and visions\u2014the Schattenseele. This third conception\ngradually subordinates the other two, and has the chief part in the\ndevelopment of Animism and Mythology.[262] As to sorcery (Zauber), it\nis, at first, always attributed to the human will; inasmuch as this is\nthe original type of causation. Ordinary events raise no question of\ncauses for the Naturmensch; but only extraordinary occurrences do so,\nsuch as sickness and death. Even pain or death from wounds is a matter\nof course, for the antecedents are visible to him; but pain or death\nfrom sickness has no such customary antecedent; so to explain them he\nimagines an enemy who can operate at a distance by sorcery. Sorcery he\nconceives of as an operation of one soul upon another; either directly,\nor indirectly by various appliances, such as pantomimic injury by means\nof an image. Pantomime is at first believed to affect the victim\u2019s\nsoul, and so to cause sickness in his body; but the oftener such rites\nare repeated, the more the intervention of the soul is obscured. For\nin many-linked associations, especially where the first and last links\nstand as means and end, the middle links are apt to disappear; and\nsince these are, in this case, ideas about the soul, there remains,\nafter their loss, the indefinite idea of some incomprehensible action\nat a distance by means of the pantomime: it is then no longer Sorcery\nbut Magic. Similarly, a fetich, or a talisman or amulet (which differs\nfrom a fetich only in not being the object of a cult), originally owes\nits power to an indwelling spirit, but may degenerate into a magical\nobject.[263] Magic, therefore, is always derivative and secondary; and\nAnimism is entirely independent of Magic.[264]\n\nThis theory is worked out with Prof. Wundt\u2019s usual comprehensiveness\nand methodical clearness; and the exposition abounds with interesting\ndiscussions; but it has not convinced me. The K\u00f6rperseele, as an\nattribute of the body, is, surely, not a soul at all. Customary\nperception of other men interpreted by self-consciousness, with the\nhabitual treatment of others (and of ourselves by others) as conscious\nbodies\u2014making it difficult to conceive that a corpse is really\ndead\u2014no doubt influences animistic rites; for even though the soul\nseen in dreams may be believed to live, having the consciousness of\nits former body in dreamland, yet some consciousness seems to remain\nwith the body in the grave. Many rites performed at a tomb, however,\nmay also be understood in relation to a belief that the soul, though\nhaving a separate existence as seen in dreams, still desires to\nreinhabit its body, or to protect its buried treasures, and therefore,\nthough its new home be far away, frequently returns and haunts the\nneighbourhood of its tomb, and will certainly return if summoned.\nBut it is not until the soul seen in dreams has become an object of\npopular belief, that any idea can be formed of a body-soul\u2014or more\nproperly of a soul within the body, and thence of a soul-stuff of the\nbody\u2014which leaves the body at death (and under other conditions) as\nthe vehicle of consciousness. This soul-stuff which leaves the body at\ndeath may easily come to be identified with the breath, but not until\nthe discussion of dreams has given rise to the belief in a separable\nsoul. The fact that in cold weather the last breath (or any other!)\nmay appear for a moment as a vapour, and is never seen again, cannot\nby itself suggest a separate persistent existence like that of the\nsoul; and over a considerable part of the earth such a vapour is seldom\nformed by the breath. The K\u00f6rperseele and the Hauchseele, therefore,\nare not independent sources of Animism, but are entirely dependent for\ntheir imaginary existence upon the Schattenseele, upon the growth of a\nbelief in a separable soul as seen in dreams.\n\nAs to Sorcery, it may be defined as Magic practised with the aid of\nspirits; and since its existence implies that a belief in spirits and\ntheir influence has already formed itself, it may also be believed to\noperate, in the first place, on the souls of its victims and so, in the\nsecond place, on their bodies. Then, as Prof. Wundt explains, a process\nof retrogradation sometimes occurs, in the course of which the spirits\nare forgotten, and only the mechanical rites remain as a residuum of\nbare Magic. Similarly, a fetich sometimes becomes a merely magical\ntalisman or amulet. This is hardly disputable; but it does not prove\nthat the degeneration of Sorcery is the _only_ source of Magic, or\nthat Magic has not (for the most part, indeed,) another, independent\norigin. The issue is difficult to argue upon the ground of facts,\nbecause magical practices are of such high antiquity. If, for example,\none should urge that the intichiuma ceremonies of the Arunta are not,\nso far as we have evidence, designed to operate by spiritual power upon\nthe souls of the emu or the witchettygrub, but directly to promote by\nMagic the fertility of these objects, it might be replied that such,\nindeed, may be their present character, but that the original intention\nmust have been to promote fertility by first influencing their souls,\nand that this has been forgotten. Or, again, if one should point to\nthe little stones\u2014tied up in bark and believed by the Kaitish to be\nstores of evil Magic\u2014as having no mark of the fetich, no character\nto indicate that their power is due to spirits, so that they seem to\nbe merely magical, the answer would be ready, that by long use and\nretrogradation they may have ceased to be fetiches, but that a good\ntheory requires them to have been of that nature aforetime. Thus any\ncase of apparently bare Magic may be treated as a residuum of lapsed\nAnimism; or, should its origin be recent and ascertainable, it may\nstill be said to have been constituted by analogy with such residua.\n\nWe are driven, therefore, to rest the argument upon the psychological\nconditions of such beliefs. Is the nature of the human mind, so far\nas we can interpret it at the savage level, such that the belief in\nAnimism necessarily precedes and (later) gives rise to the belief in\nMagic; or is it possible to indicate conditions that may independently\ngive rise to Magic? According to Prof. Wundt, as I have said, Sorcery\nprecedes Magic and, at first, is always attributed to human volition,\nbecause this is the original type of causation. Contrary to Hume\u2019s\ndoctrine (he says), the ordinary course of events does not excite in\nthe savage the idea of causation, or the need of explanation. Customary\nseries of events belong to those matter-of-course properties of things\nwhich he, eben wegen ihrer Regelm\u00e4ssigkeit, unm\u00f6glich hinweg denken\nkann.[265] It is the unusual occurrences\u2014accidents, storms, drought\n(where rain is much desired) and especially sickness and death\u2014that\nawaken in him the need of causal explanation. He is accustomed to pain\nfrom wounds, where he sees the conditions on which they always follow;\nbut the pain of disease has no such antecedents, and he supplies the\ngap in routine by free associations, imagining that this pain also\nmust be the work of some enemy. For in the regular course of events\nthere is for him only one region in which an effect appears notwendig\nverkn\u00fcpft mit dem Vorausgehende: namely, that of his own voluntary\nactions. The connexion is, indeed, only a matter of fact; but it\nincludes the sensations and feelings of his own power \u00fcber den Eintritt\ndes Ereignisses. This, as Berkeley saw (says Prof. Wundt), is the\ntrue origin of the notion of causality; though the true principle of\ncausality requires the elimination of this subjective ground of its\norigin.[266]\n\nIt is true, of course, that the savage has no definite idea of the\nprinciple of causation; but he has obscure ideas of all its chief\nmarks\u2014the need of some antecedent for every event, regularity of\nconnexion, and proportionality; and probably, in the depths of his\nmind, the abstract principle has made some progress toward maturity.\n(_a_) The ground or source of such ideas, according to Hume, is\ncustomary experience; and that such experience includes its own\ncausation (and, therefore, needs no explanation) is proved by Prof.\nWundt\u2019s contention that it is the unusual which first demands causal\nexplanation; because there the familiar causation is missing; so that\nthe savage tries to fill up the lacuna, as best he can, according to\nthe type of what is usual. But (_b_), according to Prof. Wundt, there\nis in the regular course of events only one region in which the idea of\ncausation (though illusory) first arises: namely, our own actions, in\nwhich we are aware of our own power over the beginning of the event.\nAnd no one, I suppose, doubts that the notion of power is derived\noriginally from the consciousness of our own exertions[267]: read, by\nsympathy, into the actions of other men and animals and, by empathy,\ninto the movements of trees, stones, winds and waters. All this,\nhowever, occurs so early in the individual and in the race (probably\nin the higher animals) that, before the need of causal explanation is\nfelt, the world is seen as if pervaded by forces, which are manifested\nin _every_ usual course of events and not merely in voluntary actions.\nAgain (_c_), power is only one character of the primitive belief in\ncausation: another, not less important, is uniformity; and the study\nof our own actions is notoriously unfavourable for the discovery of\nuniformity. Without any obvious reason for it, our visceral activities\ncan hardly be controlled at all; compound reflexes (such as yawning,\nsneezing, laughing, weeping) are very imperfectly controlled; our\nhabitual actions, once started, go on of themselves, and often\nbegin without (or contrary to) our wishes, especially gestures and\nexpressions; in fatigue control flags, in disease is often lost;[268]\nwe do not always give the same weight to the same motives, nor fulfil\nour intentions whether good or bad. But if the relation of will to\naction is not apparently uniform, it cannot be seen to be necessary;\nso that volition is generally regarded as the peculiar region of\ncaprice. This is very important in Animism. But, further (_d_), were\nthe connexion between volition and movement more constant than it is,\nit would still be most improbable that ideas of causation should be\nchiefly drawn from our consciousness of it; for the interest of action\nlies not in the mere control of our own movements, or power over the\nbeginning of events, but in the attainment of our ends; and there is\nno department of nature in which the failure of connexion is nearly\nso impressive. It is because of this failure that the savage becomes\nfascinated by ideas of magical and (later) of spiritual aid. Finally\n(_e_), no control is exercised by the will over pain\u2014headache, colic,\nrheumatism, etc.; yet we are told that the savage, when so afflicted,\nrefers his sufferings at once to the will of some enemy operating at\na distance. Such inferences are not primitive, but the result of a\nlong growth of superstitions. Among Australian aborigines, disease\nand natural death are generally believed to be caused by the magical\npractices of an enemy, not merely by his will.\n\nWe are not, then, obliged to infer that, because volition is the\ntype of necessary connexion, Sorcery, or any other form of Animism,\npreceded Magic. On the other hand, there are conditions that may have\ngiven rise independently to a belief in Magic. The savage has frequent\nexperience of regular trains of event which, for want of analytic\nability, he does not clearly understand, but which exist in his mind\nas types determining his apprehension of other sequences. When two\ninteresting events happen about the same time, the later recalls the\nearlier; because the impression of the earlier, having been deep,\nperseverates, and is apt to be re-excited by almost any occurrence.\nAn association is then formed between them, and obtains as strong a\nhold upon the mind as less interesting ones can by many repetitions.\nThe man judges them to be connected; and expects the coincidence to\nrepeat itself as usual occurrences do; and the more vividly the more\nhe desires or fears it. Such expectations, together with the idea of\ninvisible force and the oppression of mystery, by degrees establish\nthe belief in Magic. Probably no traveller amongst wild peoples, or\nobserver of the unsophisticated at home, will think that too much\nstress is here laid upon the power of coincidence to create general\nexpectations. Even the Chaldean priests (we are told) had grasped but\nimperfectly the idea of causation. \u201cWhen two events had been noticed\nto happen one after another, the first was the cause of the second.\nHence their anxiety to record the phenomena of the heavens and the\noccurrences that took place after each.\u201d[269] The Egyptians, says\nHerodotus, \u201cwhenever a prodigy takes place, watch and record the\nresult; then, if anything similar ever happens again, they expect\nthe same consequences.\u201d[270] They had merely reduced to a system the\nuniversal practice of unanalytic minds.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. MAGIC AND RELIGION\n\nThe origin of Magic, then, is independent of Animism; and in the\nhistory of human thought Magic probably preceded Animism as an\nimaginary agent in the explanation and control of interesting and\nobscure events. Sir J.\u00a0G. Frazer, in the _History of the Kingship_ and\nin the _Magic Art_,[271] says that Magic, as a means of gratifying\none\u2019s desires, is prior to Religion conceived of as a means of\nattaining one\u2019s ends by the propitiation of spirits. This is a much\nnarrower contention than that Magic is prior to Animism (which perhaps\nhe does not maintain), and it is proportionally more defensible. Whilst\nthe priority of Magic to Animism seems to me to have some low degree\nof probability, the priority of Magic to Religion, as the propitiation\nof spirits, seems probable in a much higher degree; since we have\nplain information that both the Australians and the Indians of Guiana\npractise Magic extensively and also believe in ghosts and spirits\nwithout propitiating them.[272]\n\nOn the other hand, Sir J. G. Frazer\u2019s explanation of _how_ Religion\nsuperseded Magic is questionable. He conjectures \u201cthat a tardy\nrecognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness of magic set\nthe more thoughtful part of mankind to cast about for a truer theory\nof Nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to\naccount. The shrewder intelligences must in time have come to perceive\nthat magical ceremonies and incantations did not really effect the\nresults which they were designed to produce,\u201d and the wizard inferred\nthat, \u201cif the great world went on its way without the help of him\nor his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings,\nlike himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its\ncourse.\u201d[273] To these he addressed himself, and sought by prayer what\nhe had formerly hoped to obtain by Magic. Such is Sir J.\u00a0G. Frazer\u2019s\nsuggestion, offered tentatively, and (surely) not agreeing well with\nthe facts which he has set before us. For he has shown that no amount\nof experience can discredit Magic, generally, in untutored minds; that\ncertain kinds of Magic are sometimes pushed into the background by\nReligion, but never forgotten; whilst other kinds of Magic become fused\nwith Religion itself and constitute an essential factor in its rites;\nso that they are indeed few who can be said to have betaken themselves\nto Religion _instead_ of Magic. Besides, the only ground upon which\na penetrating mind, that had discarded Magic as discredited by\nexperience, could resort by preference to the worship of spirits must\nbe that experience showed prayer and sacrifice to be more efficacious\nthan Magic in attaining our ends. Is there reason to think that (lucky\ncoincidences apart) this has ever happened? Must we not rather say\nthat, whether one relies on Magic or on Religion, experience of failure\ncounts for almost nothing? So many excuses are at hand.\n\nThe matter presents itself to me in this way: at first, belief in Magic\narises as a means of obtaining good and averting evil. Grounded, as Sir\nE.\u00a0B. Tylor says,[274] in the desire \u201cto discover, to foretell, and to\ncause events,\u201d it is irresistibly attractive by its power of increasing\none\u2019s confidence, of making sure.\n\nSecondly, at some stage after the rise of Animism, religious practices\nare added to the magical, to make assurance doubly sure, just as one\nmagical practice may be added to another, a rite to a spell. At this\nstage, there is no sense of opposition between Magic and Religion.\nThat, in fact, they are opposed in their nature, as an invariable\nto a capricious force, even if this difference were appreciated by\nsavages, need not prevent their co-operation; for Magic is known to\nbe a tendency that may fail of the effect desired, either by the\ncounteraction of superior Magic, or by imperfection in the rites; and\none sees no reason why a spirit should not be supplicated to supplement\nthe imperfect rites, or to frustrate the superior Magic. To supplicate\nthe intervention of spirits, once they are fully believed in, is an\nact so simple and natural, that we may wonder how it should ever be\nomitted where Animism prevails. For what can be more spontaneous\nthan to ask the aid of one\u2019s father or friend, and why not ask the\nspirits disembodied as freely as those in the flesh? In Melanesia not\nevery ghost is worshipped (as not having _mana_); but a man in danger\nmay call upon his father, grandfather or uncle: his nearness of kin\nbeing sufficient ground for it.[275] Certainly: and that this is not\nalways done where ghosts are rife can only be because it is believed\nthat the less one has to do with them the better! Probably, this\nconsideration restrains for ages the early impulses to pray. Primitive\nman anticipates the advice of Confucius: \u201cPay all respect to spiritual\nbeings, but keep them at a distance.\u201d[276]\n\nThirdly, certain forms of Magic come, after a time, to be\ndiscountenanced or punished: black Magic, because it is anti-social\nand criminal; other forms of Magic, when carried on by private\npractitioners, because they infringe the monopoly of supernatural\npower that has now been claimed by dynasties and priesthoods; or (in\nother words) because the public gods are jealous of all competitors.\nLegitimate Magic has now been incorporated with Religion. And the\npower of Religion becomes greater than that of Magic without Religion,\nnot only by the support of the influential classes, but also because\nReligion, whether as worship of the public gods or as sorcery or\ndevil-worship, afflicts the human mind with peculiar terrors; and,\nagain, because Religion, should it clarify morally and \u00e6sthetically,\nappeals more and more to the affections\u2014to the family affections\nand to loyalty. The impersonality of pure Magic sets it (as it does\nScience) at a great disadvantage in this competition.\n\nFinally, whilst the failures of Magic always need to be excused,\u2014as\nby a mistake in the rites or by the opposition of stronger\nMagic,\u2014Religion brings with it a new excuse for failure, namely, the\ncaprice of the spirits or gods propitiated. At their pleasure they\nmay reject the prayers and sacrifices. Persistence in such conduct on\ntheir part is sometimes met by banishment, deprivation of rank, or\nother punishment\u2014the civilised methods of China; at other times by\npraying louder and sacrificing more extravagantly, in the style that\nculminated in Mexico together with the power of barbaric priesthood.\nStill the gods may be obdurate; and, probably, to excuse the failure\nof propitiation by the caprice of the gods was, from the first, looked\nupon as an eligible device:[277] not observing that the caprice of the\ngods was incompatible with the security of their worshippers; and,\ntherefore, in conflict with that desire of security which is the root\nof the whole supernatural structure, whether magical or religious. This\nconflict must have consequences.\n\nReligion, then, very probably, is of later growth than Magic; but\nwhether Animism, as a belief in separable (or separate) spirits, human\nor other, is later or not than Magic, there is insufficient evidence.\nAt any rate, their origins are independent. Perhaps my own preference\nfor the priority of Magic depends, partly at least, on the convenience\nof that view in arranging the following considerations.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. IDEAS AND PRACTICES OF MAGIC ADOPTED BY ANIMISM\n\n(_a_) Fundamental in Magic, wherever practised, is the idea of force,\ninvisible and intangible, which can operate at a distance without any\nvisible or tangible vehicle. The idea may have been formed (as we have\nseen) by analogy with several natural phenomena, such as the wind,\nradiant heat, sound, odour, and it is involved in a savage\u2019s beliefs\nconcerning the efficacy of charms, rites and spells. When a man dies,\nhe lies speechless and motionless, no longer exerts his accustomed\nforce in any way; but, if seen in a dream, he still speaks and acts,\nperhaps wrestles with the dreamer. Here, then, is that force which\nhad deserted the body: it is visible and tangible in dreams only, or\nperhaps sometimes by twilight; or to gifted seers, or to dogs or pigs.\nThe force exerted by the ghost or spirit is the same thing as force\nmagical, except in one character: its action is capricious, depending\non the good or ill will of the ghost or spirit; whereas purely magical\nforces have uniform tendencies. Magic, then, prepares and partially\ndevelops this idea of mysterious force, without which the appearance of\na dead man in a dream, after his body has been buried or burnt, would\nhave no reality or practical consequences for the living. Comparison\nwith shadows and reflections could not lend reality to dreams; for they\nrequire the presence of the body, and themselves have no mechanical\nsignificance. Their association with the spirit or ghost probably\nfollows the use of their names to describe the dream-imagery, which\ncannot at first have a name of its own. The same names being used for\nshadow or reflection and for spirit or dream-soul, the things are in\nsome measure identified; and then the idea of force may be associated\nwith shadows and reflections; so that the falling of a shadow upon a\nman may injure or slay him.\n\nMagic-force and spirit-force being the same thing, the question whether\n_mana_ is a magical or animistic notion is misleading. It will be\nconceived of by different tribes in one way or the other, according to\nthe relative prevalence in one or the other tribe of the animistic or\nof the magical mode of explanation.\n\n(_b_) It is reasonable to expect that, as the ghost-theory spread, the\nmagical force of things should sometimes be conceived of as spiritual;\nso that amulets and talismans would come to be regarded as owing their\nvirtue either to a controlling spirit, or to an indwelling spirit\npeculiar to each: in the latter case the charm is a fetich. When a\ncharm is thus considered, its efficacy is no longer expected to be\nuniform, but depends on the mood of the indwelling or controlling\nspirit. The fact that its efficacy, though formerly presumed to be\nuniform, never was so, favours the new interpretation; and this having\nbeen accepted, a cult (or a discipline) of the spirit is apt to follow.\nThus the magician becomes a sorcerer or a priest.\n\nIn North Central Australia, short sticks or bones are used for pointing\nat an enemy and directing magical force against him. Only the Guangi\nand other tribes of the Gulf coast manufacture dead men\u2019s bones\n(femur or fibula) into pointers; but these are traded southward, and\nare considered more potent than other pointers.[278] A stick, then,\nis the primitive talisman, often \u201csung\u201d with a spell in Alcheringa\nwords, which the operator himself does not understand; and it acts by\npure magic. The dead man\u2019s bone is more potent, at first perhaps only\nbecause it is more oppressively gruesome and terrifying; we are not\ntold that it carries the power of its former owner\u2019s ghost; but how\nnear the thought must be! In South-East Australia, pointing with the\nbone (human fibula) is very common; in pointing you name your victim\nand say how he is to die; but that the efficacy of the rite does not\ndepend upon a spirit is shown by this, that, when pointing, you tie a\ncord of human hair (attached to the bone) tightly around your upper\narm, in order to drive blood into the bone. In other rites, however, in\nwhich the fat of a dead man is used, the ghost of the dead is believed\nto assist the operation; for a man\u2019s fat, especially kidney-fat, is\nthe seat of his prowess and other virtues.[279] An easy extension of\nideas by analogy would interpret a rite in which a dead man\u2019s bone is\nused, and which is on that account more potent, as owing its superior\npotency to the assistance of the dead man\u2019s ghost. It seems easy;\nbut resistance to the progress of explanation is not peculiar to the\ncivilised mind.\n\nAgain, in South-East Australia, a _bulk_\u2014a pebble, usually black\nand roundish\u2014is carried by wizards as a powerful talisman. A native\ndreamt of seeing two ghosts by his camp fire, and, on waking, found\na _bulk_ where they had stood.[280] How could such an impressive\nexperience fail to raise a belief in a connexion between ghosts and\n_bulks_: both so attractive to the imagination, and alike mysterious\nand powerful? Many such situations must strongly indicate an extension\nof the ghost-theory, once it has been formed, to explain the influence\nof charms and rites. A time comes with some tribes when the activity\nand ubiquity of spirits is so much a matter of course that every\nmysterious power is apt to be ascribed to their presence. If a person\nor thing was originally taboo, either by inherent virtue or by force\nof a spell or curse\u2014a talisman dangerous to every one who violated\nits sanctity\u2014Animism explains the danger by the wrath of a protecting\nspirit. A boundary having long been taboo, a spirit is imagined to\nprotect the boundary, and becomes the god Terminus. Diseases, at first\nattributed to Magic, are later explained by Animism; so that whilst an\nAustralian wizard is content to suck a magically implanted stone or\nsplinter from his patient\u2019s body, a priest of the Dyaks, having sucked\nout a similar object, calls it a spirit.[281] The wonder is that at\nthis stage of thought any purely magical power can survive.\n\n(_c_) An Omen is regarded as giving warning of some event, although\nbetween event and omen there is no traceable connexion\u2014in this\nresembling many magical operations; and at first omens may have\nbeen always so conceived of, and only by degrees distinguished from\ncharms and spells. But in most parts of the world omens have come to\nbe treated as divine or spiritual premonitions; and the marks which\ndistinguish omens from the rest of Magic are such as to favour a growth\nof the belief that they are sent by spirits. This subject, however, is\nso extensive that a separate chapter must be given to it.\n\n(_d_) Inasmuch as spells addressed to any object tend to the\npersonification of it, the personified object may, as the ghost-theory\ngains strength, acquire an indwelling or controlling spirit, and the\nspell addressed to it may become a prayer. Not that this is the only\nway in which prayer may originate; for (as remarked above) nothing can\nbe simpler or less in need of explanation than the invoking of the\nspirit of one\u2019s relatives (the ghost-theory having been established) to\nhelp one or, at least, not to persecute. Indeed, it is not unreasonable\nto suppose that this was often attempted, and not persisted in for\nwant of obtaining an answer; so that a long tentative age preceded\nthe settled custom of prayer. Nor is it easy to see how belief in\nthe efficacy of prayer (beginning in this way) could ever have been\nestablished, unless it were confirmed by coincidence\u2014just like\nMagic. However, the earliest form of prayer and of spell (whichever\nmay have been the earlier) being the same\u2014a simple expression of\ndesire\u2014whence prayer and spell have been differentiated, it may be\nimpossible to decide whether a given ejaculation belongs to one class\nor to the other. Thus Mr. R.\u00a0W. Williamson tells us that, amongst the\nMafulu of New Guinea, when fishing in the river Aduala, the fishers,\nafter forming a weir, but before fixing their net, all join in a sort\nof prayer or invocation to the river: \u201cAduala, give us plenty of\nfish that we may eat well.\u201d[282] But he expressly says that, whilst\nthey believe certain parts of the river, such as a waterfall or deep\npool, to be haunted by spirits, they do not believe this of the river\nitself,[283] and that generally their Animism is very backward. The\nejaculation, therefore, seems to be a spell. Compare with it the Jakun\nspell to bring monkeys within shooting distance:\n\n \u201cCome ye down with souls enchanted,\n Monkeys, by my spells enchanted.\u201d[284]\n\nIf, then, the original form of prayer and of spell is often the same,\nthe sole difference between them lies in the intention of the speaker.\nOne of the Kurnai, to stop the gales, cried: \u201cLet the West Wind be\nbound,\u201d[285] and this is evidently a command and a spell; but if he\nregarded the wind as controlled by a spirit, a change of tone would\nmake it a prayer. Still, whether with the spread of Animism a spell\nshall become a prayer, must depend upon whether the spirit addressed is\nbelieved to be the more easily importuned or coerced.\n\nThe taboo that often attaches to the names of the dead and of other\nspirits may easily have been derived from the magical practice of\nsummoning by name, or of naming the victim of a rite. To call a living\nman by name draws his attention and often brings him to the spot; a\nmagical naming is (from the temper of Magic) uniformly effective; so\nthat to avoid such control names are kept secret; and when ghosts are\nbelieved in, naming has the same power over them and is, therefore,\nextremely dangerous. Hence, in Sorcery (a dangerous art), to introduce\nthe names of spirits into spells is to secure their presence and\nassistance: and, in prayer, to use the true name of the spirit or god\naddressed may be indispensable; the worshipper\u2019s intention is not\nenough.\n\n(_e_) With the spread of Animism, magical rites often become religious.\nThis may occur by simply adding the invocation of a spirit to a magical\nrite (as a spell may be added) in order to strengthen it\u2014the two\nactions remaining quite distinct; or some degree of fusion may take\nplace, obscuring more or less the original character of the practice.\nThe Kai (Papuans of northern New Guinea) \u201cmake rain\u201d by muttering\na spell over a stone, and at the same time calling upon Balong and\nBatu to drive away Yondimi, a woman who holds up the rain; and when\nrain enough has fallen, they strew hot ashes on the stone, or put it\nin the fire, to stop the rain.[286] The animistic invocation, being\nomitted from the process of stopping the rain, seems to be merely\nadscititious to the making of it. Again, \u201cWhen rain is badly wanted\nin the Oraon country, the Oraons of each village fix a day for the\nrain-making ceremony. On the morning of the appointed day, the women\nof the village, with the wife of the village priest or Pahan at\ntheir head, proceed to the village spring or tank, and there, after\nablution, each woman fills her pitcher with water, and all proceed\nin a body to a sacred pipar-tree.... On their arrival at the sacred\ntree, all the women simultaneously pour the water in their pitchers\nover the root of the tree, saying \u2018May rain fall on the earth like\nthis.\u2019 The wife of the village priest now puts marks of vermilion,\ndiluted in oil, on the trunk of the tree. After this the women depart,\nand the Pahan or village priest proceeds to sacrifice a red cock to\nthe god Baranda at the spot.... In this case, apparently, by direct\nalliance, sacrifice and the anointing of the tree with vermilion have\nbeen superimposed upon what was once, perhaps, purely a ceremony of\nimitative magic.\u201d[287] Mr. Warde Fowler tells us that an ancient\nIguvian document contains instructions for the lustration of the\npeople before a campaign: the male population assembled in its military\ndivisions; around the host a procession went three times; at the end of\neach circuit there was prayer to Mars and to two female associates of\nhis power, to bless the people of Iguvium and to curse their enemies:\nand he observes that religion has here been imposed upon the original\nmagic-ceremony. For the idea must have been that, by drawing a magic\ncircle around the host, it would be protected in the enemy\u2019s country\nagainst hostile magic by being rendered holy. \u201cA later and animistic\nage would think of them (the soldiers) as needing protection against\nhostile spirits, of whose ways and freaks they were, of course,\nentirely ignorant.\u201d Hence the prayer to Mars.[288]\n\nSimilarly, rites connected with seed-time and harvest, originally\nmagical, become religious, as beliefs grow up in spirits of the rice,\nor corn, or vine, or in gods of agriculture or fertility. Thus, as\nmagical power is the same thing as spiritual power, magical practices\nmay be not merely the antecedents but even the foundations of religious\npractices. Long after the development of Animism, magical practices\nare maintained by natural conservatism; if priests exist, they try,\nof course, to annex such practices to the worship of their god; and\nif the annexation is accomplished, whether by priestly management or\nby a popular movement, no incongruity may be felt for a long time\nbetween the uniformity of Magic and the caprice of Animism; the whole\ncelebration is called Religion, and becomes suffused with religious\nfeeling.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. RETROGRADATION\n\nOn the other hand, in all these cases, the animistic interpretation\nof the power of fetiches, omens, prayers, rites, whether original\n(as Prof. Wundt holds) or acquired, may be lost, and a magical\ninterpretation alone remain. For one\u2019s mind becomes so engrossed with\nobjects or practices (such as fetich-things or prayers) that are\nregarded as necessary to the gratification of any masterful desire,\nthat not only irrelevant ideas, but any ideas not indispensable to the\nconnexion between the objects or practices and the gratifications,\nmay be forgotten; and as objects or practices acquire interest in\nthemselves, even the gratifications formerly desired may be forgotten.\nJust as such means as money or books, business or study, may become\nends to the exclusion of further enjoyments, so images or rites, at\nfirst subsidiary to the obtaining of demonic aid in love or revenge,\nmay be cared for with a fervour that excludes the thought of any\nintervening means to those ends (especially such means as a capricious\nspirit who may fail one), and may even be employed under a vague fear\nor discomfort in the omission of them, when no particular purpose is\nany longer remembered. On the principle of least effort, we attend only\nto what is necessary.\n\n(_a_) A saint\u2019s finger-joint may at first be treasured as a fetich\nhaving the power of the saint to save from shipwreck; after a time\nit may be carried as an amulet without any thought of the saint\u2019s\ninterposition; whilst the evil to be averted is more and more vaguely\nimagined. Seeing that spiritual and magical agencies are the same\ninvisible, unintelligible force, how easy to interchange them!\n\n(_b_) Similarly omens, from being divine messages, each relating to\na particular undertaking, may come to be merely occurrences that\nencourage or discourage a man, or a tribe, at any time; because, by\ntradition, they are lucky or unlucky. Or practically the same result\nmay be reached by philosophy: as with those Stoics who explained that\nomens are prophetic not as sent by the gods, but as involved in the\nsame procession of fatal events. Fate, before any laws of nature had\nbeen discovered, was nothing but all-comprehensive Magic: which left\nout or mediatised the gods, because, in a philosophical consideration\nof the world, they are worse than useless.\n\n(_c_) As to prayers, in any rational conception of them, the form\nof words conveying them cannot matter to a god, as long as they are\npiously meant and devoutly meditated. Yet everywhere there has been a\ntendency to reduce them to strict formul\u00e6, any departure from which\nmay, it is feared, impair their efficacy. So far as this occurs, their\noperation is magical; they have become spells. Such is the result of\ncustom, with mental inertia too dull to think; of an irreligious\ntemperament, getting quickly through an uncongenial task; of a\nsuperstitious unimaginative spirit, afraid to omit any traditionary\nmeans of safety and for whom a praying-wheel is the way of peace. To\nrob prayer of its religious meaning, there is the ever-present example\nof the magical spells that operate by their own force. A form of words,\nwhether magical or supplicatory, that has been among the antecedents\nof a time of peace or of gain, seems to be amongst its causes, and is\nrepeated that such a time may continue. Of the countless cases in which\nprayers have degenerated into spells, none is more instructive than\nthe one recorded by Dr. Rivers in his account of the dairy-ritual of\nthe Todas. The prayers offered during this ritual are uttered in the\nthroat, so that the words are undistinguishable; and they are divided\ninto two parts: first, a list of sacred beings and objects mentioned\nby sacred names, much of it unintelligible; and, secondly, a petition\nfor the protection and welfare of the buffaloes: the former is now\nthe more important; the latter is apt to be slurred over, or perhaps\nomitted.[289] Of the Roman public prayers, Mr. Warde Fowler says:\n\u201cThe idea that the spoken formula (derived from an age of Magic) was\nefficient only if no slip were made, seems to have gained in strength\ninstead of diminishing, as we might have expected it to do with\nadvancing civilisation.\u201d[290] To justify the belief in formul\u00e6 it may\nbe asserted that the gods themselves prescribed them: an excuse for\nthe superstitious dread of altering what is traditionary, and for the\npersuasion that the form itself has mysterious virtue.\n\n(_d_) That other religious ceremonies, repeated from age to age, have\nthe same tendency as prayers to become dead forms from which the\nspirit of communion or devotion has departed\u2014though under favourable\nconditions it may return from time to time\u2014is too well known; and\nif in their emptiness they are still believed somehow to serve their\npurpose, it can only be as magical rites. One may be surprised to find\nat what an early stage of culture this tendency is fully realised.\nWilliam Ellis, the celebrated missionary, says of the people of\nRaiatea: \u201cThe efficacy of their [religious] services consisted in\nthe rigid exactness with which sacred days were kept, and religious\nceremonies performed, without the least regard to the motives and\ndispositions of the devotees.... In their idol-worship, however costly\nthe sacrifice, and however near its close the ceremony might be, if\nthe priest omitted or misplaced any word in the prayers, or if his\nattention was diverted by any means so that the prayer was broken,\nthe whole was rendered unavailing: he must prepare other victims and\nrepeat his prayers over from the commencement.\u201d[291] How this concern\nfor details must be a relapse into magical notions may be read in the\naccount of rites to stop the rainfall in Torres Straits; where (we\nare told) if the wizard omit any detail, the rain continues.[292]\nPerhaps the notion of the perfect definiteness of causation (though not\nconsistently adhered to in other matters) arose from this meticulous\nanxiety of superstition: it also, however, furnishes excuses for\nfailure both to priests and wizards.\n\n(_e_) In Magic there must be something deeply satisfying to the\naverage mind: it precedes Religion, supplies the basis and framework\nof religious practices, and remains when Religion is in ruins; and\nwhen people change their Religion, they retain their Magic. Among\nthe Fijians,[293] those who were Christianised lost their dread of\nwitchcraft last of all the relics of their heathenism. Among the\nCherokees, \u201cGahuni, like several others of their Shamans, combined the\nprofessions of Indian conjuror and Methodist preacher.\u201d[294] In Norway,\nafter the general acceptance of Christianity, Lapland witchcraft was\nstill valued. The victory of the insurgents at Stiklestad, where\nSt. Olaf fell, was thought to have been due to the magic armour of\nreindeer-skin that Thore Hund had brought from Lapland; though all St.\nOlaf\u2019s men wore the cross upon helmet and shield.[295]\n\nSince then the spiritualising of Magic and the despiritualising of\nReligion are both real processes of evolution, it may be difficult,\nor even impossible, to say of any given magical practice, without\nparticular knowledge of its history, whether it is primitive or\nresiduary. Sir E.\u00a0B. Tylor writes: \u201cCharm formulas are in very many\ncases actual prayers, and as such are intelligible. Where they\nare merely verbal forms, producing their effect on nature and man\nby some unexplained process, may not they, or the types they were\nmodelled on, have been originally prayers, since dwindled into mystic\nsentences?\u201d[296] The circumstances of each case must guide our\njudgment. What shall we say, for example, of the addresses to spirits\nin Melanesia, where it is difficult to find in any dialect a word for\nprayer, \u201cso closely does the notion of efficacy cling to the form of\nwords employed\u201d?[297] Are spells there rising into prayers, or prayers\nsinking back into spells?\n\n\n\u00a7 5. SPIRITS KNOW MAGIC, TEACH IT, AND INSPIRE MAGICIANS\n\nGhosts know Magic, because they knew it in the flesh; and, by analogy,\nsimilar knowledge is likely to be attributed to spirits that are\nreputed never to have been in the flesh. As fear exalts all the powers\nof a ghost above his former reach, it may be expected to raise his\nmagical powers, especially if he had already been famous in that way.\nAnd, generally, it does so; but, exceptionally, we read that, among\nthe Lengua Indians (west of the Paraguay), whilst any man may attempt\nMagic, professional \u201cwitch-doctors\u201d are numerous and powerful; yet they\nare not credited with extraordinary powers after death.[298] Elsewhere,\nhowever, the dead magician does not forget his art. Where Shamanism\nprevails and the power of Magic or Sorcery attains its greatest social\nimportance, the spirit of a dead shaman makes some advance toward\ndeification. Among the Buryats, dead shamans are worshipped with prayer\nand sacrifice.[299] According to the _Kalevala_, the famous collection\nof Finnish poetry, in Tuonela (Hades), whither all dead shamans\ndescend, their wisdom and magical power accumulate, exceeding that of\nany living adept; so that even V\u00e4in\u00e4m\u00f6inen, the wizard hero, goes down\nto learn there the magical words he does not know.[300]\n\nSpirits, knowing Magic, also teach it, and make magicians and prophets.\nIn South-East Australia, the profession of wizard may be hereditary in\nthe eldest son; or obtained through initiation by another wizard\u2014(a\ncorpse is dug up, its bones pounded for the neophyte to chew; he is\nplastered with excrement, etc., till he becomes frenzied, his eyes\nbloodshot, his behaviour maniacal);[301] or a man may become a wizard\nby meeting a spirit who opens his side and inserts quartz-crystals,\netc.; or by deriving power from Daramulun; or by sleeping at a grave,\nwhere the deceased opens him, and takes out and replaces his bowels.\nHere we have a list of the most usual ways in which magical powers\ncan anywhere be acquired\u2014by inheritance, by tuition, by the aid of\nghosts or spirits; and it suggests the hypothesis that at first the\nmagic art was inherited, or learnt from a former wizard; and that, with\nthe growth of Animism, it became in some cases preferable, because\nmore impressive (and cheaper), to acquire it from a ghost or spirit.\nFor this is more probable than that, at the early stage in which\nAnimism exists in South-East Australia, retrogradation should have\ntaken place; so that the making of wizards, formerly ascribed only to\nspirits, should in some cases have been remitted to inheritance or to\nprofessional tuition. That in spite of the greater prestige that may\nattach to a diploma obtained from spirits, the right of practising by\ninheritance or by tuition often still persists, though, no doubt, due\nin part to dull conservatism, may also be understood by considering\nfamily and professional motives. There are heavy fees for teaching\nwitchcraft, besides the profits made in some tribes by selling the\ncontrol of familiar spirits; the profession is lucrative, and a wizardy\nfamily has an interest in its monopoly; which must be impaired,\nif any man who loses himself in the bush may come back with some\ncock-and-bull story about a ghost and his new metaphysical insides, and\nstraightway set himself up with the equivalents of a brass plate and\nred lantern. Among the Boloki on the Congo, the careers of blacksmith\nand witch-doctor are open only to the relatives of living adepts. At\nleast, practically (but for a few exceptionally cunning and rascally\ninterlopers who creep and intrude and climb into the fold), the office\nof witch-doctor is hereditary: a father trains his son, and will\ntrain (for a large fee) any youth whose family has already produced a\nwitch-doctor. But a candidate without family connexion is told that\nhe must first kill by witchcraft all the members of his family, as\nofferings to the fetich of that branch of the profession to which he\naspires.[302]\n\nNot only the spirits of primitive Animism, but likewise the gods of\nmaturer Religions, know and teach Magic. In the Maori mythology,\nTumatauenga, one of the first generation of gods, determined\nincantations for making all sorts of food abundant and for controlling\nthe winds, as well as prayers to Heaven suited to all the circumstances\nof human life; and the god Rongotakawin, having shaped the hero\nWhakatau out of the apron of Apakura, taught him Magic and enchantments\nof every kind.[303] Prof. Rhys tells us that the Welsh god M\u00e2th ab\nMathonwy, or Math H\u00ean (the ancient), was the first of the three great\nmagicians of Welsh Mythology; and he taught Magic to the culture\nhero, Gwydion ab D\u00f4n, with whose help he created a woman out of\nflowers.[304] The Teutonic equivalent of Gwydion is Woden, or Othin;\nand he too was a magician, \u201cthe father of spells,\u201d who acquired his\nwisdom by gazing down into the abyss, whilst he hung nine nights on\nthe tree, an offering to himself (and in other ways); and, in turn, he\nteaches Siegfried the omens.[305] He also taught the northern people\nshape-changing, and by spells controlled fire and the winds.[306] In\nEgypt Magic was taught by Thoth, in Babylonia by Merodach, and in Japan\nby Ohonomachi the earth-god. Indeed, whence, unless from divine beings,\ncould this precious wisdom be obtainable?\n\nSpirits also inspire or possess the magician, so that through him,\nas their mouthpiece or instrument, prophecies are uttered or wonders\nwrought. We have seen that in South-East Australia the rites of\ninitiation to wizardry by a wizard, without the aid of spirits, cause a\ncandidate to become frenzied or maniacal. With the growing fashion of\nanimistic interpretation, such behaviour is (along with insanity) put\ndown to possession by a spirit. The common beliefs that a man\u2019s soul\ncan slip in and out of him and that a man may reincarnate the spirit\nof an ancestor, facilitate this idea of possession. Dreams concerning\nspirits also promote the belief that a miracle-monger owes to them\nhis supernatural powers. The Tunguses of Turnkhausk say that the man\ndestined to be a shaman sees in a dream the devil performing rites, and\nso learns the secrets of his craft. Among the Trans-Baikal Tunguses,\nhe who wishes to become a shaman declares that such or such a dead\nshaman appeared to him in a dream, and ordered him to be his successor;\nand he shows himself crazy, stupefied and timorous. The Yakut shaman\nis preordained to serve the spirits, whether he wishes it or not: he\nbegins by raging like a madman, gabbles, falls unconscious, runs about\nthe woods, into fire and water, injures himself with weapons. Then an\nold shaman trains him.[307] On the Congo, a man may become a wizard\nby claiming to be the medium of a dead man; and a medium falls into a\nfrenzy, shouts, trembles all over, his body undulates, sweat breaks\nout, foam gathers on his mouth, his eyeballs roll: he speaks an archaic\nlanguage if he knows one.[308] In Santa Cruz (Melanesia), prophecy\nis practised by men whose bodies are taken possession of, and their\nvoices used, by ghosts: they foam at the mouth, writhe, are convulsed\nas if in madness; and the mad, too, are believed to be possessed.[309]\nSimilarly the Pythoness: the behaviour of the possessed is everywhere\nthe same. But as the same behaviour marks the youth training for\na wizard before the theory of possession or inspiration has been\nadopted, it is plain that the animistic theory does not create the\nphenomena, but is merely, at a certain stage of thought, the inevitable\nexplanation of them.\n\nFacility of falling into frenzy may be the test of fitness for\nwizardry; the Bokongo professor who trains a pupil, beats his drum,\nshakes his rattle, and tries to drive the fetich-power into him; if the\npupil remains stolid, he is disqualified; but if he sways to the music\nof the drum, jumps about like a madman, etc., he passes.[310] These\nantics at first astonish the beholder, strengthen the faith of patients\nin the witch-doctor, and of the witch-doctor in himself, and often have\na sort of hypnotic fascination for both him and them; and they gain in\nvalue under Animism by being also proofs of supernatural assistance or\ncontrol: and being an essential mark of the adept at certain stages of\nthe art\u2019s development, they are sometimes induced by rhythmic drumming,\nsinging and dancing, sometimes by fastings or drugs.\n\n\u201cBlack Magic\u201d is, at first, merely the use of Magic for anti-social\npurposes; very early a distinction is recognised between wizards\nwho cause disease and those who cure it.[311] \u201cBlack\u201d and \u201cwhite\u201d\nwizards are sometimes at open strife.[312] When tribal gods come to be\nrecognised, \u201cblack\u201d wizards are those who are assisted or inspired by\ninferior gods or demons, who may be opponents and rivals of the high\ngods. Hence the same god who, whilst paramount, aids or inspires in an\nhonourable way, may, if deposed or superseded, become the abettor of\nBlack Magic\u2014as happened to our own gods, and to others, before and\nafter the coming of Christianity; for the ancient divine sources of\npower and prophecy became devils and witch-masters. The magicians of\nour Middle Ages, of whom Faustus is the type, were \u201cblack\u201d and, in the\nspirit of Shamanism, pretended to rule the devils; but, overshadowed by\nChristianity, they\u2014at least in popular belief\u2014bought their power at a\nprice.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. SPIRITS OPERATE BY MAGIC\n\nSpirits may operate through men whom they possess, or by their naked\nsoul-force, or by words (that is, by spells), or by merely thinking:\n\n(_a_) When a man is possessed by a spirit, it is the soul-force of that\nspirit which has entered him and taken command of his voice or limbs;\nand we have seen that this soul-force is the same as force magical.\nThe spirit\u2019s action is the same as that of the _bugin_ or wizard, who\nboasted of having entered a horse and galloped off.[313]\n\n(_b_) By Animism, prior to philosophical reflection, the spirit is not\nconceived of as strictly incorporeal; its force, which is magical, is\nquasi-mechanical. Hence, in South-East Australia, spirits can carry off\na man in a bag[314] (made, no doubt, of bag-soul-stuff). But spirits\nmay act upon a man very effectually without being mechanically felt;\nas among the Ekoi, where ghosts are either good or bad, and generally\na good goes with a bad one to counteract his malevolence; but should a\nbad one wander forth alone, and should a man without the gift of seeing\nghosts (which depends upon his having four eyes) run against it in the\nstreet, the ghost will not step aside, but strikes the man in the face;\nwho then has lock-jaw, and dies.[315] As we have reason to believe that\nthis is not the natural \u00e6tiology of lock-jaw, the ghost\u2019s action is\nplainly magical: like that of the corpse-candle which, not long ago, on\na slope of Plinlimmon one rainy night, a man inadvertently ran against,\nand was \u201cstruck down dead as a horse.\u201d[316] The mere apparition of a\nghost (at least, to any one who has not four eyes) is magical. The\nsending of a bird as an omen is magical.\n\nThis immediate power of the gods is nowhere shown more emphatically\nthan in their metamorphoses: that these are sometimes wrought by\nspells or other enchantments proves that the operation is magical.\nAustralian wizards transform themselves into kangaroos and other\nanimals; and, in Arunta mythology, in the earliest Alcheringa (period\nof mythical ancestors), the Ungambikula\u2014so called from having arisen\nout of nothing\u2014with stone knives cut men out of rudimentary masses\nof unorganised matter (inapertua), and then transformed themselves\ninto little lizards.[317] So this sort of self-conjuring may be said\nto begin at the beginning; and it cannot be necessary to accumulate\nexamples of metamorphosis.\n\nSeveral explanations of this belief in the possibility of changing\nthe form of one\u2019s body, or of having it changed by others, have been\noffered: none perhaps entirely satisfactory. We are not here concerned\nwith the passing of a soul from one body to another\u2014from a man into\na wolf or into a serpent, or conversely: given the conception of a\nseparable soul, that is easy to understand. What has to be explained\nis the belief in a magical change of the body itself, as in the common\nEuropean superstition that a man may turn into a wolf, and back again,\nlike Sigmund and his son in the _Volsung Saga_. It has been pointed\nout (i) that the savage may observe striking changes in nature: as\nin the shape of clouds and smoke, the burning of wood into flame,\nsmoke and ashes, the evaporation of water; the turning of eggs into\ncaterpillars, reptiles, birds, or of a chrysalis into an imago; the\nappearance of worms in putrefying bodies, and so forth.[318] With\nsuch facts before him, why should not the savage imagine himself also\ncapable of transformation? (ii) Dream-images, too, pass one into\nanother in a marvellous way. (iii) Since men are often called by the\nnames of animals, how easy to suppose that, at times, they may really\nbe those animals. How easy to confound a man with his Totem. In many\nsavage dances, animals are imitated, and the imagination-belief in\nthe reality of the pantomime grows very strong. (iv) The savage,\nwhen his imagination has been excited, is not clever at penetrating\nconjuring tricks and disguises; and some men, at first for their own\nends, may have disguised themselves as animals and passed as animals;\nand in support of this explanation it may be observed that the animal\ninto which men transform themselves is oftenest the most feared in\ntheir neighbourhood\u2014the wolf, leopard, or tiger; and, of course,\none case believed in, others follow by analogy. The mere report of\nsuch an happening might generate belief by force of fear. (v) In a\nwild country, a man (say one who is pursued) often disappears and is\nindiscoverable; so that he may seem to have turned into a kangaroo,\nor a stone, or a tree that appears in his place, as Daphne hid\nsuccessfully in a laurel-thicket: or if such an occurrence did not\noriginate the belief in metamorphosis, it may have helped to confirm\nit. (vi) In mental disease, the patient sometimes believes himself to\nbe some kind of animal, and acts accordingly: perhaps as a result of\nthe popular belief, but doubtless also confirming it.[319] Weighing all\nthese hypotheses, I lean to the view that, starting from the fact (as\nground of analogy) that astonishing changes are observed in nature and\nin dreams, the belief in metamorphosis as a magical operation rests\nchiefly upon the deceptions and confident assertions of wizards that\nthey can, and do, change their form, supported by their reputation for\nwonder-working and by the fears of their neighbours. Now, if wizards\ncan change their shapes, of course the gods can.[320]\n\n(_c_) Spirits and gods are known to use amulets and talismans, not\ninvented by poets as symbols, but prized as the instruments of their\npower, as an enchanter values his wand. Such are the caduceus of\nHermes, the cestus of Aphrodite, Thor\u2019s hammer Mj\u00f6lnir, Woden\u2019s spear\nGunguir and his wishing staff. The gods of Egypt and Babylon also wore\ncharms. Since chieftains are frequently magicians, and also become\ngods, it follows that the gods are magicians; though, indeed, as Grimm\nobserves, their power is to be called miraculous rather than magical.\nBut Magic, being the highest power known to men, and the most desired,\nis of course attributed to spirits and to gods.\n\nThe most extensive powers of spirits, however, depend on the use of\nwords or spells. The hero of the Western Isles of Torres Straits,\nKwoiam, employed magical formul\u00e6.[321] The gods and demigods of the\nMaories carried out their extraordinary adventures by the power of\nincantations. Maui, by incantations, fishes up dry land from the bottom\nof the sea, and turns his brother-in-law into a dog; Tawhaki and\nhis brother Karahi, by incantations, make themselves invisible, and\navenge their father Hema upon his enemies; and so forth.[322] Celtic\nand Teutonic deities worked wonders by songs and spells. Isis was the\ngreatest enchantress that ever lived. She made from the spittle of Ra\na serpent that bit and poisoned him; and then she healed him by an\nincantation, having first compelled him to reveal to her his name, to\nthe knowledge of which the god himself owed his power over gods and\nmen; so that she obtained the mastery over all the gods.[323]\n\nAs spells, when used by men, may be more efficacious when muttered and\nwhispered than when spoken aloud, so they may retain their power when\nsilently wished or thought; and it is the same with spirits: to control\nevents it may be enough for them to think. And this belief emerges at\nno very high level of Animism; it needs no philosophical instruction\nin the mysterious energy of ideas. The Sia Indians (North Mexico) have\na Cougar Society, which meets for a two days\u2019 ceremonial, before a\nhunting expedition, to propitiate the cougar (puma), because he is the\ngreat father and master of all game. He is believed to draw all kinds\nof game to him by sitting still with folded arms and mentally demanding\ntheir presence; and by the same means he sends game to whomsoever he\nfavours.[324]\n\nApparently, then, Magic is an art antecedent to the existence of\nspirits and ready for their use; and they stand in the same relations\nto it as men do. Animistic usages are originally magical\u2014spells,\nrites, metamorphoses; and all animistic ideas are magical, except\none\u2014the capriciousness of spiritual agency.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. SPIRITS ARE CONTROLLED BY MAGIC\n\nThe savage imagination having created out of dreams and other strange\nexperiences a world of invisible and powerful beings who may be\nfriendly or hostile,\u2014so human that they must be accessible to prayers,\nbut often turn a deaf ear to them\u2014must desire sacrifices, yet often\nreject them\u2014capricious and inscrutable\u2014it became necessary, in\norder to restore confidence in all the relations of life, that their\ncaprice should somehow be overcome; and to accomplish this three\nways were open: first, to increase the prayers and sacrifices until\ntheir importunity and costliness should prove irresistible\u2014and this\nway led to all the magnificence and to all the horrors of religious\nrites; secondly, to work upon the fears or vulnerability of spirits by\nbeating, starving, slaying, banishing or degrading them; or, thirdly,\nto constrain them, as men are often constrained, by magical rites and\nformul\u00e6. From the beginning this necessity is felt.\n\nThe constraint of spirits by fear or violence is characteristic of\nFetichism. The wizards of the Congo catch spirits in traps; or drive\nthem into animals, which they behead; or spear them in some dark\ncorner, and then exhibit their blood upon the spear-head. Passing from\nthe Congo through many ages of progress, we arrive in China, and find\nthat in time of drought, if the city-god neglects to put an end to it,\nhe is first of all entreated; but that failing, his idol is stripped\nnaked and put to stand in the sun; or an iron chain is hung round his\nneck\u2014the mark of a criminal\u2014till rain falls; or he may be dethroned\naltogether.[325] With such crude practices, however, we are not now\nconcerned.\n\nThe control of spirits by Magic, especially by spells\u2014or by other\nspirits who, in turn, are controlled by spells\u2014is in its earlier form\ncharacteristic of Shamanism: indeed, it is the essence of Shamanism;\nthough, of course, in many shamanistic tribes, having intercourse with\npeoples of different culture, other beliefs, ascribing independent\nor even superior power to spirits, are often found. Spirits may be\nso completely subdued by spells as to excite little fear. Among the\nYurats and Ostyaks, the shamans treat their spirits without ceremony,\nand even buy and sell them.[326] So do the Esquimo angekoqs. In\nGreenland, \u201call phenomena are controlled by spirits, and these spirits\nare controlled by formul\u00e6 or charms, which are mainly in possession of\nthe medicine-men, although certain simple charms may be owned and used\nby any one.\u201d Hence, \u201cnothing like prayer or worship is possible\u201d;[327]\nfor why supplicate spirits whom you can command? \u201cThe rule of man\u2014not\nof all men, but of one specially gifted (the shaman), over Nature,\nor over the superior beings who direct her, is the fundamental idea\nof Shamanism.\u201d[328] The shaman\u2019s power depends on knowledge of the\nnames, natures and origins of all things and spirits, and of the words\nthat control them; but also on his own extraordinary personality, as\nmanifested in orgiastic frenzy. Megalomania, the vain imagination of\nbeing a \u201csuperman,\u201d is generally characteristic of magicians. Nothing\ncan be more contrary than this attitude to what most of us understand\nby Religion.\n\nOne condition of the prevalence of Shamanism among any people, or group\nof peoples, seems to be the absence from among them of chieftains\nwho have attained to any high degree of political power, and the\nconsequent non-existence of authoritative gods. Hence it spreads\nthroughout the tribes of Northern Europe and Asia, from Finland to\nKamtchatka, and with a less intensive sway amongst the Indians of North\nand South America. Under such conditions the shaman is subordinate to\nno one in this world; nor, therefore, in the spirit-world. But where\nthere are authoritative chiefs, authoritative gods correlative with\nthem are approached by an order of men who are priests rather than\nmagicians\u2014that is to say, are regarded as dealing less in magic than\nin prayer and sacrifice. And this state of affairs is apt to give rise\nto increasing pomp and extravagance of rites, to which there is no\nvisible limit; so that in some cases, as in Ashanti and Mexico, worship\nbecame homicide, and a sort of national insanity was established. For\nfrom such practices there results no security in the satisfaction of\ndesire; the caprice of the gods cannot by such means be overcome; their\nappetite grows by what it feeds on, and so does the fanaticism of the\npriesthood.\n\nNow, in political affairs something similar happens: the caprice of\ndespotic rulers becomes intolerable; and, in some countries, submission\nto their tyranny has amounted to a sort of national insanity. Elsewhere\ndevices have been adopted to limit the power of rulers. Avoiding\nassassination or revolution, it has been found possible to impose upon\na king restraints derived from his own sanctity and divine power. One\nsuch device has been to surround him with innumerable taboos which,\nat length, prevent him from doing anything. It is true that the\nostensive reason for this was not the limitation of his power, but\nthe preservation of his vitality, upon which hung the welfare of the\nwhole world; and probably this was, at first, the conscious purpose;\nbut one effect of it was to limit his power, and the utility of\nthis was its natural sanction. There are many cases in human life in\nwhich a great advantage has been gained for the race by means which\nwere intended by the conscious agents to have an entirely different\nresult.[329] In several countries, where the king has been bound by\ntaboos, another man has by some pretext usurped his power; so that this\nway of restraining despotism is not a good one. But in Japan, where\nit had been adopted by a political people, the Tycoon, who succeeded\nto the power of the taboo-burdened Mikado, himself fell at last under\nequivalent restrictions, whilst affairs were directed by his ministers.\nSuch is the natural tendency of this device amongst positivists, like\nthe Japanese; elsewhere it may transfer the regal power to warriors or\nto priests.[330] Another way of restraining the king is to establish\nthe principle that he rules by the laws, and that laws, though made\nby himself, cannot be altered. And this may have been the purpose\nof the unchangeableness of the laws of the Medes and Persians; and\naccording to the _Book of Daniel_[331] it was used in this way; though,\ncertainly, the older authority of Herodotus[332] shows that, in some\ncases, the king\u2019s advisers could find a way out for their master. Our\nown forefathers were no doubt the wisest people that ever lived; and\ntheir plan was to acknowledge fully the divinity that doth hedge a\nking, to declare that, in fact, he could do no wrong, and then to visit\nall the iniquities of government upon his ministers.\n\nIf kings need restraint, much more do invisible gods: and many nations\nhave sought to limit their prerogative, either by Magic or by legal\nfictions which, in relation to gods, can have only a magical operation.\nWhilst the tone of the _Rigveda_ is truly religious (though even there\n\u201cthe idea is often expressed that the might and valour of the gods is\nproduced by hymns, sacrifices and especially offerings of soma\u201d), \u201cin\nthe Yajurveda the sacrifice itself has become the centre of thought and\ndesire, its correct performance in every detail being all-important.\nIts power is now so great that it not only influences but compels\nthe gods to do the will of the officiating priest.\u201d[333] In Egyptian\nrites of sacrifice and prayer, the kind of victim and the manner of\nslaying and cutting it up were minutely and unchangeably decreed. \u201cThe\nformulas accompanying each act of the sacrificial priest contained\na certain number of words, whose due sequence and harmonies might\nnot suffer the slightest modification even by the god himself, under\npenalty of losing their efficacy. They were always recited with the\nsame rhythm, according to a system of melody in which every tone had\nits virtue, combined with movements that confirmed the sense and worked\nwith irresistible effect; one false note, a single discord between the\nsuccession of gestures and the utterance of the sacramental words, any\nhesitation, any awkwardness in the accomplishment of a rite, and the\nsacrifice was vain.\u201d[334] But if all was in order, the god was bound to\ngrant the petition. Babylonian religious ceremonies \u201chad for the most\npart the same end and object as the magical text used with them; they\nwere not so much a communion with the deities of heaven, as an attempt\nto compel them by particular words to relieve the worshipper from\ntrouble, or to bestow upon him some benefit.\u201d Ceremonies, therefore,\nwere useless unless accurately performed in word and deed; \u201critual was\na sort of acted magic.\u201d[335] These accounts of the religious ceremonies\nof the highest barbaric civilisations are almost in the same words\nas William Ellis uses in his account of worship at Raiatea about the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century; except that Ellis does not say\nthat the Polynesian gods were bound to grant the requests so presented.\nAccordingly, I have treated the Raiatean example under Retrogradation,\nand those of Egypt and Babylon as cases of half-conscious policy. No\ndoubt both retrogradation and policy were present in all cases; but it\nseems reasonable to suppose that the latter predominated where order\nwas more settled (an analogue of the order required in heaven) and\nthought was better trained.\n\nOne may wonder why a magical ritual should be preferred and trusted\nrather than genuinely devotional worship; since it must, in fact, just\nas often result in disappointment. But, first, as to the priesthood,\nan elaborate ritual, difficult to carry out, is favourable to their\npower, because only professionals can execute it; so that they must\nnecessarily be employed; and the more elaborate and exigent it is,\nthe more necessary they are. But, then, the more attention the\nritual demands, the less there is to spare for thinking of the gods.\nSecondly, as to the people, since the failure of worship in attaining\nour ends may be due either (animistically) to the caprice of the gods\nor (magically) to an error of the priest, it is not surprising that\nmen should trust the specialist whose education is well attested\nrather than the god whose character is inscrutable. Thirdly, a magical\nritual appeals to the expectation of uniformity, the sole ground\nof confidence concerning the future, and therefore what men most\ndesire. Nevertheless, the religious form of the rites (though empty of\nreligious feeling) is maintained; partly, because the whole political\nand ecclesiastical fabric rests upon the animistic tradition; partly,\nbecause Animism has such hold upon men\u2019s minds that a few remain\ndevout; whilst even those who regard the rites as magical do not\nperceive that magic is the antithesis of religion and rigidly excludes\nit. Only a few natural positivists and philosophers regard public\nworship as merely a political institution.\n\nThe idea of a transaction by which the gods are legally bound\u2014so\nmuch help for so much worship\u2014may be present in all magical ritual;\nbut in some religions the analogy of human relations according to law\nis explicitly extended to the relations of men with gods. The Jewish\nreligion was based on a covenant; and, according to some theologians,\nso is the Christian. It has often been said that Roman religion implied\na belief in legal obligation imposed upon the gods by rites duly\nperformed; and Mr. Warde Fowler, who thinks more highly than some have\ndone of the genuineness of religious feeling amongst the Romans, at\nleast in private worship, yet says that in the _vota publica_ we find\nsomething like a bargain or covenant with the deity in the name of the\nState.[336] Legal obligation implies effectual sanctions that may be\nbrought to bear upon transgressors, gods or men; and at a low stage\nof Animism, when no spirit exceeds the rank of demon, there may be no\nincongruity in bringing to reason a recalcitrant spirit by stopping\nhis rations or maltreating his image; but when high gods have obtained\nthe homage of men, to punish _them_ calls for great audacity or very\nsubtle management. The Chinese have managed the matter to admiration.\nThe Emperor of China acknowledged himself subject to the spirits of\nEarth and Heaven; but he himself was the son of Heaven, and all other\nspirits were subject to him. He ruled alike over the dead and the\nliving. He made deities and appointed them their functions; promoted\nthem and distributed amongst them titles of honour, if they did good\nworks; or, if they failed in their duties, degraded them. In the _Pekin\nGazette_ one finds \u201cthe deities figuring, not occasionally but very\nfrequently, in every department of official business, and treated much\nas if they were highly respectable functionaries of a superior order,\npromoted to some kind of upper house, whose abilities and influence\nwere nevertheless still at the service of the State.\u201d[337] Nowhere has\nthe unity of Church and State been so completely realised, and the\n_pax deorum_ so conclusively established. One may interpret the facts\nat discretion: an animist may accept them literally and seriously; a\ndevotee of Magic may regard decrees in the _Pekin Gazette_ as spells\nthat have coercive power in the spirit-world; a Confucian mandarin\nwill think that an excellent plan has been devised for enlisting the\nsuperstitions of the simple-minded in support of law and order. We may\nsuppose that for him Animism is but an episode in the history of human\nthought.\n\nAnother way of excluding spiritual caprice, which we might suppose to\nhave been discovered by philosophers, but which appears to be older\nthan what we usually call \u201cPhilosophy,\u201d is to subordinate the gods to\nFate. The idea has been attributed to the astronomers or astrologers\nof Babylon that Fate must be above the gods as the constant heaven of\nthe fixed stars is above the planets:[338] an analogy characteristic\nof magical thought. But the roots of the idea of Fate are much\nolder and wider spread in the slow, steady growth of the belief in\nuniformity, which is the common ground of Magic and Science; and (as\nI have said) before laws of nature had been discovered, Fate was an\nall-comprehensive Magic. Fate reduces the gods to the status of wheels\nin a machine; omens and oracles, instead of being sent or inspired\nby the gods, are also part of the machinery, and may point to their\ndestruction; prayers and sacrifices are other parts of the machinery\nand, at most, may be a means of assuaging the anxiety of one\u2019s own\nheart. A stern way of envisaging the world: but it gives not only\nsecurity against the gods, but also resignation and tranquillity.\n\nPhilosophical Christianity regards the actions of God as always\nmanifested, in the physical order, through \u201csecond causes,\u201d or, in\nother words, in \u201cthe laws of nature\u201d; and, in the spiritual order,\nas always observing the moral laws that are the principles of divine\nReason; in either case there can be no variableness nor shadow of\nturning.\n\nMagic, like Science, believes in uniformities of nature, and seeks\nby a knowledge of them to control events; but Magic is so eager to\ncontrol events that it cannot wait to learn the true uniformities;\nit is not moved, like Science, by curiosity as to the truth, but by\nblind desire for present results. The cult of spirits seeks to control\nevents not by knowledge of their natural causes, but by appealing to\nhyperphysical causes, and it resembles the belief in Free Will, by\nwhich men hope, through the influx of some unknown energy, to escape\nthe bondage of their own vices: for Kant rightly treated \u201cFreedom\u201d as\na cosmological problem, the supposed intervention of a cause that is\ntranscendent and not in the course of nature. The intervention of Free\nWill (whether divine or human) is sought in order to avert injurious\nfortune, to realise our personal or social schemes more quickly and\ncheaply than our own efforts can, to avoid the consequences of our own\nactions, amongst which is bondage to our own vices: for all these, give\nus variability, miracle, caprice. But to foresee and control events\nphysical or social, including the conduct of others, to be confident\nin the effects of our own actions according to our purposes, and in\nthe stability of our own character: for all these, there must be\nuniformity. In the long run the latter considerations determine our\nthoughts; and the necessity of uniformity to a rational life may be one\ncause of our belief (so far out-running the evidence) in uniformities\nof causation and of space-relations and of all that we mean by natural\nlaw.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[261] _Mythus und Religion_, pp. 78, 79.\n\n[262] _Op. cit._, p. 125 _et seq._\n\n[263] _Op. cit._, p. 202 _et seq._\n\n[264] This was also Spencer\u2019s opinion, _op. cit._, \u00a7 133.\n\n[265] _Op. cit._, p. 263.\n\n[266] _Op. cit._, p. 267.\n\n[267] See above, pp. 100 and 119-24.\n\n[268] Hume, _Inquiry_, \u00a7 vii.\n\n[269] A. H. Sayce, _Religion of the Ancient Babylonians_, p. 398.\n\n[270] Book II. p. 82; Rawlinson\u2019s Translation.\n\n[271] Vol. I. ch. iv.\n\n[272] But see the footnote at p. 235 of _The Magic Art_, I.: \u201cfaith\nin magic is probably older than the belief in spirits.\u201d In the same\nnote, a passage in Hegel\u2019s _Philosophy of Religion_ is referred to as\nanticipating the doctrine of the priority of Magic to Religion. The\npassage, as translated in an appendix (pp. 423-6), shows, however,\nno conception of Magic as akin to natural law, as it is described in\nseveral passages of _The Golden Bough_, but treats it as a belief in\nany human being \u201cas the ruling power over nature in virtue of his\nown will.\u201d This is rather an anticipation of Prof. Wundt\u2019s doctrine\nconcerning Sorcery; which Hegel seems not to have distinguished from\nMagic. I need hardly add that a belief in any human being as the ruling\npower over nature in virtue of his own will has never been discovered\nin any part of the world.\n\n[273] _Op. cit._, pp. 237-9.\n\n[274] _Primitive Culture_, I. 116.\n\n[275] R. H. Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 125.\n\n[276] H. A. Giles, _Chinese Literature_, p. 202.\n\n[277] Animism gave the priest another excuse for the failure of rites\n(besides those enjoyed by a mere magician), namely, that during, or\nsince, the celebration some fresh offence against the gods had been\ncommitted.\n\n[278] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, pp.\n453, 463.\n\n[279] A. W. Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, pp.\n359-361-367.\n\n[280] Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 378.\n\n[281] E. B. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, II. p. 148.\n\n[282] _The Mafulu_, p. 193.\n\n[283] _Op. cit._, p. 272.\n\n[284] Extract from a spell in Skeat\u2019s _Malay Magic_, p. 571.\n\n[285] Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 397.\n\n[286] J. G. Frazer, _The Belief in Immortality_, p. 288. For similar\ninstances see the same work, pp. 335 and 375.\n\n[287] Sarat Chandra Roy, \u201cMagic and Witchcraft on the Chota Nagpur\nPlateau,\u201d _J.R.A.I._, XLIV. p. 330. I have slightly altered the last\nsentence, which seems to have been misprinted.\n\n[288] _Religious Experience of the Roman People_, p. 215.\n\n[289] _The Todas_, pp. 30, 213.\n\n[290] _Religious Experience of the Roman People_, p. 286. But whether\nwe should expect the idea to weaken with advancing civilisation must\ndepend upon whether intelligent belief in the gods was increasing.\nPerhaps this was not the case at Rome.\n\n[291] _Polynesian Researches_, II. pp. 144 and 157 (1st ed.).\n\n[292] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p.\n199.\n\n[293] Thomas Williams, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 209.\n\n[294] J. Mooney, \u201cSacred Formulas of the Cherokees\u201d in _Am. B. of\nEthn._, VII. p. 314 (1885-6).\n\n[295] _Heimskringla, St. Olaf\u2019s Saga_, chs. cciv. and ccxl.\n\n[296] _Primitive Culture_, II. p. 273 (2nd ed.).\n\n[297] Codrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 145.\n\n[298] S. H. C. Hawtrey, \u201cThe Lengua Indians,\u201d _Journal of the Royal\nAnthropological Institute_, 1901.\n\n[299] \u201cShamanism,\u201d _Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute_,\nXXIV. (1894-5).\n\n[300] Comparetti, _The Traditionary Poetry of the Finns_, p. 184.\n\n[301] Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 404. Is this type of the neophyte\u2019s\nbehaviour, which is conformed to on certain occasions by magicians\nand inspired priests in every age and country, itself conformed to\nthe natural type of insanity or epilepsy; and, if so, consciously or\nunconsciously?\n\n[302] J. H. Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, pp. 145 and 276.\n\n[303] Grey, _Polynesian Mythology_, chs. i. and vii.\n\n[304] _Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic\nHeathendom_, p. 225.\n\n[305] _Corpus Poeticum Boreale_, pp. 24, 34, 181, 196.\n\n[306] _Heimskringla Saga, Yuglingasaga_, chs. xvii.-xviii.\n\n[307] \u201cShamanism,\u201d _Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute_,\nX., XIV. p. 85.\n\n[308] Weeks, _Congo Cannibals_, p. 265.\n\n[309] The fullest and most dramatic account of such possession may be\nfound in Williams\u2019 _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 190. See below, p. 243.\n\n[310] Weeks, _Primitive Bokongo_, p. 215.\n\n[311] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, pp.\n480-8.\n\n[312] \u201cShamanism,\u201d _Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute_,\nXXIV. p. 130.\n\n[313] Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 374.\n\n[314] _Ibid._, p. 437.\n\n[315] P. A. Talbot, _In the Shadow of the Bush_, p. 230.\n\n[316] G. Borrow, _Wild Wales_, ch. lxxxviii.\n\n[317] Spencer and Gillen, _op. cit._, p. 388.\n\n[318] H. Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, \u00a7 55.\n\n[319] E. B. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, I. 308 _et seq._\n\n[320] In a paper on _Leopard Men of the Naga Hills_, read at a meeting\nof the R.A.I. (December 9, 1919), Mr. J.\u00a0J.\u00a0H. Hutton reported that\nsuch men do not change into leopards; but sometimes their souls\ninvoluntarily pass into them. If the leopard be injured or killed he\nwhose soul was in it suffers or dies\u2014when he hears of it. Such men are\nnot feared, because their leopards do very little harm.\n\nFor this reason (I suppose) the belief is not exploited by wizards, who\nhave no use for innocent superstition, and it remains pure folklore.\nThere may not be any connexion between this animistic doctrine of human\nsouls possessing animals and the magical doctrine of shape-changing. If\nthey are connected, it is easy to see that in a certain atmosphere of\npopular philosophy, if shape-changing were believed in, the possession\ntheory might be accepted as the true explanation upon merely being\nproposed. Indeed, it would make intelligible such a case as this: a\nman\u2019s leopard is seen on the skirts of the village; but he himself is\nknown to be in his hut.\n\nAnimistic explanation does not always follow culture: Europe adheres to\nshape-changing. Yet in the _Volsung Saga_ the superstition is already\ndegenerate: Sigmund and his son change into wolves by putting on\nwolf-skins belonging to two were-wolves whom they find asleep. This is\na rationalisation\u2014disguise as a step toward change. An earlier step is\nto say a man who would change must put on a belt of wolf-skin.\n\n[321] Haddon, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_,\nV. p. 329.\n\n[322] Grey, _op. cit._, \u201cLegends of Maui and Tawhaki.\u201d\n\n[323] Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, pp. 54-8.\n\n[324] M. C. Stevenson, \u201cThe Sia,\u201d _Am. B. of Ethn._, XI. p. 118.\n\n[325] W. Grube, _Rel. u. K. d. Chinese_, p. 132.\n\n[326] \u201cShamanism,\u201d _Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute_,\nch. xxiv. p. 133.\n\n[327] Steph\u00e1nsen, _My Life with the Eskimo_, p. 391.\n\n[328] D. Comparetti, _The Traditional Poetry of the Finns_, p. 26.\n\n[329] _Natural and Social Morals_, ch. ii. \u00a7 4.\n\n[330] See many examples in J. G. Frazer\u2019s _Taboo and the Perils of the\nSoul_, ch. i.\n\n[331] Ch. vi.\n\n[332] III. p. 31.\n\n[333] Macdonell, _Sanskrit Literature_, pp. 73 and 183.\n\n[334] Maspero, _The Dawn of Civilization_, p. 124.\n\n[335] A. H. Sayce, _Religion of the Ancient Babylonians_, p. 319.\n\n[336] _Religious Experience of the Roman People_, p. 202.\n\n[337] Alfred Lyall, _Asiatic Studies_, essays on _The State and\nReligion in China_. In a milder form this system has been adopted by\nJapan; W.\u00a0E. Aston, _Shinto_, p. 237.\n\n[338] Franz Cumont, _Astrology and Religion_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nOMENS\n\n\n\u00a7 1. THE PREVALENCE OF OMENS\n\n\u201cWhen great disasters are about to befall a state or nation it often\nhappens that there is some warning,\u201d says Herodotus.[339] It happens,\nindeed, not only to states and nations, but to eminent men, or even to\ncommon men, children and old women. An old woman who in England sees\nthe new moon for the first time through glass, will not be surprised\nwhen, next morning, the market-basket drops from her arm in the middle\nof the street. In Fiji, if a woman putting bananas into a pot let one\nfall on the outside, or if the bread-fruit burst in roasting, she wrung\nher hands in dismay and cried aloud.[340] The whole world is full of\nsuch portents, and has been many thousands of years; and there is no\nclearer disproof of the vulgar error that age is the mother of wisdom\nthan this, that the older the race grows the less it attends to them:\nor rather, whilst it attends to them more and more sedulously up to a\ncertain critical hour\u2014reached by the Greeks (say) 400 B.C., and by\nWestern Europe (say) A.D. 1600\u2014it then begins to disregard, rapidly\nneglects them, till in a comparatively short time what is called the\n\u201cenlightened\u201d part of mankind forgets to take account of them at all;\nalthough it is well known that an eclipse of the moon a little before\nsunrise in the sign of Leo was a token that Darius should be defeated\nat Arbela; that on the first day that Julius C\u00e6sar sat on the golden\nthrone and wore the purple robe, an ox, having been sacrificed, was\nfound to have no heart\u2014at which C\u00e6sar himself was surprised, and soon\nafter he was assassinated; and that many signs and wonders announced\nquite recently the coming of the Spaniards into Mexico; Montezuma had\nvisions and grew melancholy; the idol of Quetzalchoatl declared that a\nstrange people approached to possess his kingdom, and so did witches\nand sorcerers; a stone spoke and warned him; a lake overflowed its\nbanks; a pyramid of fire was seen in the sky; monsters were born with\ntwo heads, and there were other portents, all to no purpose.[341]\n\nOmens, enjoyed with fear and trembling by all men in all ages, have\nsometimes been conceived of as due to magical power, but much more\ngenerally as the sendings of demons or gods; although the fact that\nthey are rarely of any use to the recipient, or even intelligible to\nhim until after the event, makes it very improbable that they involve\nthe intervention of any intelligent cause. And what are we to think of\nthe intelligence of mankind, who in spite of their experience of omens\nduring so many ages, were still eager to observe them?\n\n\n\u00a7 2. OMENS AND NATURAL SIGNS\n\nFor the wild man seeking game or on the alert for enemies it is\nnecessary to read every sign of the presence of enemies or of game in\nthe neighbourhood: footprints, broken twigs and bent grass, droppings\nof feathers, hair or dung, remnants of food or marks of habitation\ninstantly catch his eye; noises or odours arrest his other senses.\nHis world is full of these signs, and he must always be on the watch\nfor them: the birds being suddenly silent, on looking up he sees a\nhawk; a change of wind, or the aspect of clouds, announces rain or\nfair weather; the coming and departure of certain birds\u2014as with us\nthe swallow and the cuckoo\u2014portend the change of seasons. In all\nthese cases causation is active and sometimes obvious, but often very\nobscure: the apparent may be the reverse of the real order: for the\ncoming of swallows is the antecedent of our enjoying the summer; but in\nthe order of nature the course of the seasons determines the migration\nof birds. That the true relation may be misunderstood is shown by the\nbehaviour of certain Australian natives who, noticing that plovers cry\nbefore the coming of rain, take their cry to be a cause of rain, and\ntherefore imitate it when performing their rain-rites.[342] We may\nobserve how obscure is the distinction between sign and cause even\namongst ourselves, in the general belief that \u201ca change of the moon\u201d is\nconnected somehow with a change of weather; for what the relation is no\none seems clearly to conceive.\n\nThe relation between natural signs and the events signified, being\nobscure, may be mysterious; and accordingly its obscurity has been made\nuse of to defend the belief in Omens. In the _De Divinatione_[343]\nQuintus, who is unkindly given by his brother the post of apologist for\nall that nonsense, (following, I suppose, the sophistry of some Stoic)\nquotes Aratus\u2019 description of how certain movements of the sea presage\na coming storm; the gull, too, and the crow by their behaviour: and the\ncroaking of frogs and the snuffing of cattle foretell rain. I cannot\nexplain, he says, how animals have such knowledge any more than I can\nexplain the divinations of augurs; nor is it necessary to do so: in\nboth cases there are the facts.\n\nNo wonder, then, that the savage, depending for his life upon a\nknowledge of signs, driven by eagerness and anxiety to observe\nthem, and unable to distinguish coincidence from causation and the\nentanglements of causation, should imagine himself to have discovered\nmany more signs than are comprised in the order of nature. Thus in\nTorres Straits, the biro-biro announces by its arrival that yams are\nready for eating (which seems needless), and the cry of the koko\npredicts fine weather (which is credible); but, further, the sunbird\ncan foretell the coming of a boat,[344] and that must be imagination.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. SOME SIGNS CONCEIVED OF AS MAGICAL\n\nVery gradually, we may suppose, a difference came to be felt between\ntwo classes of signs: (1) those that are of a usual kind, such as the\ntracks of game, the return of the swallows, the croaking of frogs,\nwhich are almost constantly the antecedents of interesting events, such\nas the getting of food, the coming of spring, or of rain; sequences\nthat recur again and again, some of them being, like the tracks of\ngame, easily intelligible; all which, accordingly, are accepted as a\nmatter of course and incorporated with common sense. (2) Less usual\nevents, such as strange animals, lightning, eclipses, shooting-stars;\nwhich come to be considered as signs by being connected in imagination\nwith interesting events which happen soon after them, such as a failure\nin hunting, an attack by enemies, a death in the tribe, the wreck of\na canoe; though the connexions are irregular and never intelligible,\nand are accepted not as a matter of course, but as mysterious, magical\nand portentous: they are Omens. They acquire the hold upon men that\nbelongs to the growing body of superstition. Although irregular, they\nare classed with the connexions that are believed to be most regular,\nand failures are overlooked. To these are added and accumulated in\ntradition, by analogy or caprice, innumerable other signs and warnings.\n\nThat Omens obtain an inextricable hold in the tangle of superstitious\nbeliefs results from men\u2019s strong desire to foresee the future,\nespecially in social conditions full of dangers and uncertainties,\nwithout the settled organisation which, with us in ordinary times,\nmakes one year so much like another. Upon many people, indeed, this\ndesire has the same effect to this day, and becomes more active in\ntroubled times like the present. Anxious to know whether they are to\nmarry, or to hear of a death, or to come into money or some other\nadvancement, they hope to find out by visiting Mrs. Sludge in a stuffy\nchamber, or (as you may see in London) by consulting a canary at\nthe street-corner. When a fixed idea of love or ambition or anxiety\npossesses the mind and leaves it no peace, we are ready to try any\ndevice that promises to relieve the strain, and we do things sillier\nthan could have been predicted even by those who knew us best.\n\nBelief in Omens and the practice of observing them having been\nestablished, the list of portentous events grows ever larger. (_a_) In\na depressed frame of mind the future looks gloomy; in exhilaration,\ncheerful. A sensation, such as shivering, or sweating, that accompanies\nfear is apt to excite fear. In fear or depression one acts feebly\nand fails; in hope and confidence one acts vigorously and wins: the\nexpectations produced by such moods fulfil themselves, and therefore\nthe moods are ominous. This may be the reason why, when men are at\nstrife and some ambiguous Omen occurs, he who first claims its favour\nor denounces its menace upon his enemy, gains an advantage;[345] for\nthe other may be daunted and unable to rally his forces. But that\ndepends on character.\n\nThis subjective value of an Omen, making its virtue a function of the\nrecipient\u2019s disposition, sometimes became so prominent as to obscure\nits truly magical character; according to which it must be indissolubly\nconnected in some way with the event and can have nothing to do with\nthe recipient\u2019s attitude. Thus it might be held that an Omen, if it\ndeeply affected a man\u2019s imagination, would be fulfilled; but, if\nneglected, it might not be. Pliny says[346] that, according to the\naugurs, auspices had no import for one who in any enterprise declared\nthat he would not regard them. Or, again, the bearing of an Omen may be\ndetermined by the way in which it is accepted: Julius C\u00e6sar, landing in\nAfrica, fell; and that must have seemed a very bad Omen; but he, having\nthe presence of mind (though not exempt from superstition) to exclaim:\n\u201cAfrica, I lay hold of thee!\u201d changed its significance;[347] and,\ndoubtless, greatly altered its effect upon the minds of his officers\nand soldiers and of all who heard of it; and that was the important\nmatter. Hope and desire and anxiety created Omens, and they had also\nthe power to direct the incidence and corrupt the interpretation of\nOmens. In fact, there were conventional formul\u00e6 for accepting good\nOmens and rejecting bad ones: _Accipio omen, Absit omen, Tibi in caput\nredeat;_ which were counteractive spells; and it is agreed that Magic\nmay be overcome by stronger Magic.\n\nThis attitude of mind that makes an Omen subject to its acceptance,\nmay explain the otherwise absurd practice of taking the Omens again\nand again, when the earlier have been unfavourable, until one is\nobtained that flatters the inquirer\u2019s hopes. Not only amongst\nsophisticated peoples, who might be supposed to treat Omens in a\nformal and perfunctory way, but even in the lower barbarism Omens are\nthus garbled. The Karens of Borneo, consulting the liver of a pig to\nauthorise an expedition, if with one pig the appearance is forbidding,\nsacrifice a second, third, or fourth; though without a satisfactory\nforecast they will not set out. Then, having set out, they try to avoid\nhearing the cry of the woodpecker (which has two notes, the one of\ngood, the other of evil augury), lest it should be against their plans.\nAnd the same simple-minded people believe in the magical efficacy of\nthe sign, no matter how obtained. Vaticinating by the flight of a hawk,\na man will try, by shouting and by waving to it, to turn its flight\ntoward the left, that being with them the prosperous direction.[348]\nImagination-beliefs are saturated with insincerity; their unconscious\nmaxim is, \u201cBelieve as you list.\u201d\n\nAlthough it may be a general principle that savages are more impressed\nby external than by internal experiences, yet the suggestion of the\nforegoing paragraphs, that the finding of Omens in one\u2019s own sensations\nis secondary to, and dependent on, the growth of a belief in Omens\npresented by physical events, is not one upon which I much rely.\nPossibly sensations and moods are a distinct and primitive source of\nthis superstition: for it has been noticed in Australia, where the lore\nof Omens in general has made but little progress. Whilst performing\ntribal ceremonies under strong emotion, the aborigines think that their\nentrails sometimes acquire \u201csight\u201d; so that they know whether their\nwives have been unfaithful, or they feel the approach of danger.[349]\nIn the Western Isles of Torres Straits shivering and uneasy feelings\nare presentiments; and in the Eastern Isles, a dryness of one\u2019s skin\nor sneezing:[350] in New Guinea, if the right shoulder ache, expect\ngood news; if the left, bad.[351] And these simplest of all whims are\nthe longest lived; for amongst ourselves many a woman suddenly has a\npresentiment, \u201cas if some one were walking over her grave.\u201d\n\n(_b_) As a mood of elation or depression is itself ominous, so is\nwhatever excites such a mood. Depressing objects are cripples, old\nwomen, sick people, timid hares, loathsome toads, a snake coming to\nmeet a war-party, discouraging words, ugly dreams; whereas pleasant\ndreams, encouraging words, a snake going before us as against the\nenemy, hawks, wolves and blooming youth are all exhilarating: the list\nvaries from tribe to tribe. Many ominous things promise good or evil\naccording as they appear on the right hand or on the left: the left\nbeing generally held inauspicious, because (it is said) the left hand\nis the clumsier and weaker; and this may be true. But we have seen that\nin Borneo the left is preferred; and whereas the Greeks followed the\ngeneral rule, assigning evil to the left hand, the Romans thought the\nright hand was the direction of danger. And this contrariety has been\nexplained as due to a difference of orientation in the formal taking of\nOmens; for the Greek then faced northward, and had the place of sunrise\nupon his right hand; whilst the Roman faced southward and had on his\nright hand the place of sunset: so that it was not anything to do with\nhis own body, but the direction whence the sun appeared and advanced\nwith growing power and splendour which each of them judged of good\nhope, in contrast with that whither the sun declined and weakened to\nhis death. To illustrate these fancies would be an endless task, and a\nsuperfluous labour, since nothing is better known.\n\n(_c_) Coincidence, the occurrence near together of two interesting\nevents, is sure to make people think there must be some connexion\nbetween them; and the earlier event will be classed, according to\ncircumstances, as either a cause or a sign of the later; and if the\nconnexion is mysterious, it must be either a magical power like that\nof a talisman, or that special kind of Magic which is an Omen. What\ncircumstances determine this distinction, I will presently try to\nshow. Possibly all Omens that are not derived from subjective moods\nand sensations, or from things or events that excite such moods,\nwere originally founded upon coincidence. Upon this, apparently, the\nEgyptians relied in the records they kept (according to Herodotus) of\nOmens and their fulfilment; and Quintus Cicero is represented[352] as\nbelieving that the Babylonians kept such records for 470,000 years: so\nthat it was, in their view, an inductive science; but we never hear of\ntheir having kept a record of failures and disappointments.\n\nSome Omens having been established by subjective prognostication or\nby coincidence, many more may be added by analogy, or by a sort of\nreasoning. An analogy with the contrast of right and left hand may\nbe noticed in all opposites: the woodpecker in Borneo, for example,\nhaving two cries, and one of them a warning, must not the other\nbe an encouragement? The belief in Omens having taken hold of the\npublic mind, everybody is on the look-out for signs and wonders; and\nanything unusual seen, or heard, or rumoured, becomes a possible\nOmen of anything else, and men ask one another what it portends. The\nsuperstitious imagination is greedy of its accustomed food. Under\nsuch conditions, too, Omens are discovered by retrospection: a public\ncalamity, such as the death of a king, the defeat of an army, or a\npestilence (or in private life some private misfortune), makes us\nremember some foregoing event or events, which must have forewarned\nus, had we had the skill to interpret the significance of Time\u2019s\nprogression.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. DIFFERENTIATION OF OMENS FROM GENERAL MAGIC\n\nThe savage mind, sensitive to the resemblance of relations, cannot\noverlook the analogy between signs and warning cries; many Omens are\ncries; and with the spread of animistic explanation, they came to\nbe considered as the sendings of spirits or gods. But, at first, by\nmere magical thinking, under the stress of anxiety to know the future,\nand the helplessness of common sense to predict anything outside\nthe everyday routine, Omens are gradually separated from ordinary\nprobable signs (such as the tracks of game) as necessary infallible\nsigns (or tendencies) if cunning can find them out, connected by some\nsupernatural law with the unknown future that certainly awaits us, and\nas a kind of Magic. The magical habit of mind may be supposed to have\nresulted from the coalescence of beliefs concerning several imaginary\noperations\u2014by charms, spells, rites\u2014each class of beliefs having its\nown occasions, causes, or fallacious grounds. Those operations had in\ncommon the marks of being connexions of events due to imagined forces\nof a mysterious kind, and therefore grouped themselves together in\nmen\u2019s minds as the Magic apperception-mass. Omens had these marks and,\ntherefore, were assimilated to Magic. An Omen is an event regarded as\na magical sign of the good or ill success of some undertaking, or of\nthe approach of good fortune, or of calamity. And on the principle that\nideas are differentiated from a confused matrix, it is probable that\nOmens, having at first been confused with other magical antecedents\nof events, were only gradually again distinguished from them. But\nan important distinction existed and at last came to light: charms,\nrites and spells are causes of events; whereas Omens are signs only,\nnot causes. The difference is that whereas charms, rites and spells\ndirectly exert their powers upon the course of things, Omens themselves\nexert no power, but show only that there is some power at work, which\nwill have such or such results.[353]\n\nComparing Omens with other modes of Magic, several peculiarities may be\nnoticed: (_a_) Omens themselves (apart from the preparation of victims,\netc.) imply no human intervention, whereas rites and spells must be\nperformed or recited by some one, and even charms are carried about\none, or used in rites, or solemnly affixed to doors, animals or other\npossessions. (_b_) Partly as a consequence of this, Omens, considered\nin themselves, generally (as I have said) convey no suggestion of\nforce. This cannot, indeed, be said of eclipses and thunderstorms;\nbut the note of a bird, the appearance of entrails, a mere shivering\nor other change of feeling, though ominous, suggests no energetic\noperation; whilst rites and spells are often carried out with much\nexpenditure of energy, and even charms, though not obviously active,\nare necessarily believed to be powerful in some obscure way of their\nown. (_c_) Omens are often so remote in time, as well as in place,\nfrom the events indicated that any quasi-mechanical determination\nof the issue by them can hardly be thought of; but with rites and\nspells, though they may not operate openly in the hour of their setting\nto work, yet the delay is not expected to be great, and (as said)\ntheir impulsion or _nisus_ is often very impressive; and charms are\nincessantly and immediately active. (_d_) Omens in general do not\nforetell precisely what is to happen, but only the success or failure\nof some enterprise (not the \u201chow\u201d of it), happiness or misfortune;\nwhereas rites and spells have some definite object, and most charms\ninflict, or guard against, some one kind of evil, disease or shipwreck;\nthough others (it is true) bring luck or loss at large. Thus Omens are\nvery different from other magical conditions; and although it is not\nlikely that the ordinary savage or even the wizard ever consciously\ndraws these distinctions or sums them up, still they have an effect\nupon his mind, and the observation of Omens and the reading of them\nbecomes at last a special branch of the Magic Art\u2014Divination.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. OMENS INTERPRETED BY ANIMISM\n\nOmens, then, being only signs and not causes of future events, having\nno power in themselves, must be connected with some efficient power,\nor else the events prognosticated could not happen. How is that\npower to be understood? For a long time, probably, there is no clear\nconception of it: the connexion is mysterious. But there are two ways\nin which it may be interpreted: (_a_) Following the impersonal magical\nway of thinking, we are led to the idea of currents of force in which\nboth Omen and event are borne along; and, at last, to the conception\nof a fatal order of the world in which all events have their necessary\nplaces. There A is always followed by B; so that, although A exerts no\npower over B, yet (if we know the law of the sequence) when the former\nappears it is an infallible portent of the latter. The power at work is\nFate; and to this idea I must return; for in its full development it\ncomes late in history.\n\n(_b_) The other and much simpler way of explaining Omens is to\nattribute them to the intervention of spirits who, whether they control\nevents or not, at least foresee them, and send messages of warning\nto mankind. With the spread of Animism this is a matter of course.\nA sophisticated age may ask how a spirit should be able to see the\nfuture; and may answer that spirits, having greater knowledge than we\nof the present state of the world and its laws of causation, are able\nto calculate the outcome, just as an astronomer foretells an eclipse\nof the sun. A precious rationalisation! To the untutored savage there\nis no difficulty. To foresee the future is a very common performance:\nwhenever we form an expectation which is fulfilled (and that happens\nmany times a day) we accomplish this feat; and for the most part we are\nunconscious of the grounds upon which we formed the expectation. The\nsavage is always in this position: he has not analysed the relation\nof \u201cground and consequence\u201d nor examined the mental conditions that\nprecede an inference. To him, therefore, foreknowledge, within a\ncertain range, is not even mysterious; and, of course, spirits have\nthe gift in a much higher degree. In Melanesia a _vui_ (spirit)\nknows secret things without seeing;[354] and here begins the r\u00f4le of\nintuition in Philosophy. Later, a high god may give warnings, not\nmerely of what he foresees in the course of the world, but of what he\nof his own volition will bring to pass; or a lesser god may announce\nwhat he knows to be the will of the higher; or, later still, all\nspiritual warnings may sink back into helpless incidents in the course\nof Fate.\n\nOmens (as has been mentioned) resemble warnings: (_a_) Like warnings,\nthey precede events, but do not cause them. (_b_) They sometimes\nprecede an event by a considerable interval, as if to give time for\nprecaution. (_c_) They do not announce the details of any event (which\na friendly counsellor may not know), but only its character as good or\nevil. Then, if they are warnings (implying foreknowledge), since they\nare not the act of any man, they must be given by some spirit or other\nintelligence. So that once a belief in the intervention of spirits in\nmundane affairs has become prevalent in any tribe, nothing can be more\nnatural than to regard Omens as spiritual messages. Still, this way of\nthinking may have been preceded by a disposition to attribute Omens\nto the good will of animals, especially Totems; for animals are often\nwiser than we are. In Australia the Turbal tribe held that the chirping\nof insects foretold the coming of blacks; a Wakelbwa who dreamed of\na kangaroo would expect one of the Banbe subclass next day; to dream\nof old-man kangaroos sitting round the fire presaged danger.[355]\nAmong the Yuin (Western Australia) a Black-Duck clansman thought that\nblack ducks warned him against enemies; and men of the Kurnai, who had\npersonal Totems, thought they gave protection by warnings.[356] Very\nearly, however, ghosts or spirits sometimes come themselves to instruct\nus; as amongst the Kurnai, the Biraark (wizards) hold _s\u00e9ances_ at\nnight, when ghosts attend, and give news of enemies or of absent\nfriends.[357] In New Guinea, the ghosts of dead tribesmen send their\nsurviving relatives Omens by fishes or birds.[358]\n\nBy this animistic theory Omens are intimately connected with Oracles\nand Dreams; for these, too, are messages from the spirit-world.\nDreams are the chief causes of belief in spirits, and with many people\nhave not yet lost the character of supernatural visitations. Probably\nfor ages past there have been in each generation a few rationalists,\nwho treated dreams in the manner of Artabanes (as reported by\nHerodotus[359]\u2014who, however, will show that the event refuted him),\nholding that \u201cwhatever a man has been thinking of during the day\nis wont to hover round him in the visions of his dreams at night.\u201d\nIncensed against the diviners, rationalists have, in fact, too much\ndespised and neglected dreams.\n\nOracles and Dreams are amongst the phenomena of \u201cpossession.\u201d Spirits,\ndemons, gods, roaming the world and indwelling or haunting various\nbodies or localities, sometimes take up their abode in stones or bags\nof charms, which then become fetiches; or attain greater dignity in\nimages and temples; or enter into men and women, afflicting them with\ndiseases, or else with dreams, or drunkenness, or madness, or prophecy,\nor poetry;[360] for these things are hard to distinguish. And sometimes\nthe people thus afflicted wander at large, sometimes are to be found\nonly by some tree, or spring, or cave, or temple, where the spirit that\nmakes them wise above others has chosen to reside, perhaps because his\nbody was buried there.\n\nOmens, Oracles and Dreams have, besides their dependence on spirits,\nanother trait in common, namely, obscurity of meaning. When you have\nbeen favoured with one of these communications, what does it promise or\nthreaten? To answer this question passes the wit of ordinary men; and,\ntherefore, certain superior minds assume the important function of\nDiviners and, to guide their judgment, work out in course of ages with\ninfinite ingenuity the Art of Divination.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL OMENS\n\nBefore discussing Divination we had better remind ourselves of the\nimmense extension that the lore of Omens undergoes beyond the early\nrecognition of mysterious natural signs (thunder or the behaviour\nof birds, etc.), by the preparation in various ways of conditions\nunder which Omens may be obtained at will (throwing dice, roasting\nshoulder-blades, sacrificing pigs, etc.). Men are eager to know the\nfuture, at least the general complexion of it as happy or unhappy;\nand for this purpose they desire Omens. But natural Omens do not\nalways appear when wanted, though probably the mere desire of them\nhas multiplied them greatly; it is, therefore, very convenient to\ndiscover devices by which Omens can always be obtained by any one for\nany purpose. A common practice is to toss a halfpenny, and decide a\ndoubtful choice of action by head or tail: reinforcing imbecility\nwith superstition. It is impossible we should ever learn how such\nconventions originated, but may assume that the earlier were suggested\nby some accident, and many of the later by analogy. The Warramunga have\na very simple plan, when a man dies, for discovering who it was that\nby evil magic slew him. They smooth the ground about the spot where\nthe death occurred, and next morning come to examine it; and if they\nfind there the trail of a snake, they know that the murderer was a\nman of the Snake-totem.[361] It is reasonable to suppose that in the\nfirst instance they found such a trail of snake or other animal upon\nunprepared ground, and thereafter smoothed the ground to make such\nsigns plainer: thus they began the preparation of conditions for the\ntaking of Omens. A New Zealand wizard had a simple construction for\ndiscovering beforehand who would have the better of a battle: he set\nup two sticks near together, one for his own party, the other for the\nenemy, and let them fall: whichever stick fell on the top of the other\nthe party it had stood for was to conquer in the fight.[362] As ages\ngo by and more and more intellect is concentrated upon the problem\nof foreknowledge, more and more ways are discovered of preparing the\nconditions of taking Omens, more and more expensive and complicated\nones; for the more difficult the preparation and interpretation, the\nmore necessary it is to employ a professional augur. The casting of\ndice, the drawing of lots, the taking of one\u2019s chance with verses of\nVirgil or of the Bible, may seem easy, but even such devices may be\nmade difficult by accumulating rules of interpretation. The sacred\nchicken, whose vagaries in feeding occasionally relieve with grateful\ndiversion the strenuous page of Roman History, cannot have required\nhighly skilled manipulation, but to watch them a professional eye\nwas necessary; and when sacrifices are employed as opportunities of\ntaking Omens from the behaviour of the victims, the manner of their\ndying and the condition of their entrails, a technical specialist of\nhigh training becomes indispensable. This led to the intensive study\nof entrails, especially of livers (Hepatoscopy, Hepatomancy), with\nsome gain of knowledge in Anatomy. The study was widely diffused;\nbut still more widely, perhaps, the art of prophesying by the lines\nto be observed in shoulder-blades cracked by roasting over a fire\n(Scapulomancy).\n\nWhere nothing is or can be done to alter the physical conditions of\npremonitory signs, yet a painstaking analysis has been made of those\nconditions in order to interpret them in a methodical way; and this\nstudy may demand far greater skill than augury. In Cheiromancy the\nlines and eminences of the hand have been exactly mapped and defined,\nand have had their several values and meanings assigned. It is really a\nperplexing study, not to be entered upon with a light heart, yet simple\nand obvious in comparison with Astrology. The Astrologer who would\nundertake to forecast the future fate of men or nations, or to recover\nforgotten facts of antiquity, such as the date of a hero\u2019s birth (for\nit was understood that a difference of forward or backward in time\nshould not hinder scientific calculations), had to take account of all\nthe visible furniture of heaven, the stars in their constellations,\nespecially the signs of the Zodiac; the seven planets, each with its\nown qualities and powers assumed arbitrarily or by fanciful analogies,\nall unquantified and all varying in the Twelve Houses of Heaven. What\nlearning, what stupendous abilities were demanded for such a task!\nIn fact, any one who now hears of it, immediately knows it to be\nimpossible. But until many problems had been solved and the method of\nthem appreciated, no one could understand what kind of problems are\ninsoluble. Meanwhile, in this study, for ages so honoured, a mixture\nof genuine Astronomy and a parade of systematic procedure (of which\nphilosophers well know the force) made fatuity plausible.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. DIVINATION AND ORACLES\n\nOmens and Oracles are, no doubt, infallible premonitions of something,\nif one can find it out; but they are often so obscure or ambiguous that\none gets no guidance from them, and indeed it is sometimes impossible\nto judge whether they are ever fulfilled, or not. It is, therefore,\nmost important that some one should be able to expound them; and here,\nas in every department of human effort, we may be sure that, of the\nmany who attempt interpretation, one will be more successful than\nothers; and then to him all men flock for enlightenment, especially if\nhe make one good guess about some Omen or Oracle of general interest.\nSuch a man was thereby constituted a Diviner, and became the founder\nof a profession, or (at least) of a branch or function of the great\nwizardly profession. It happened long ago; for in savagery most wizards\nare already Diviners.\n\nIn course of time the profession can no longer be satisfied with\ninterpretation by guesswork, but elaborates the principles of\nthe subject, the Art of Divination, upon which, perhaps, as much\npainstaking and ingenuity have been expended as upon industry and\nscience put together. The _savants_ who carried out such work were\nprobably (many of them) as honest as fanatics can be; but the result\nalways was to raise the reputation of the profession for occult\nknowledge and mysterious insight.\n\nDiviners are either free and independent seers, soothsayers,\nfortune-tellers, mostly poverty-stricken and disreputable, though\nsometimes eminent and influential, like Tiresias and Epimenides; or\nelse officials (a much smaller party) attached to some temple or\ngovernment. Official soothsayers have often exercised immense power\nin society and politics. They are not found, of course, at the bottom\nof the scale of culture, where there is no government in Church\nor State; but in the lower barbarism, among the Bantu tribes (for\nexample), Diviners have a highly influential station. The chief of\na tribe usually has a specially trusted Diviner, and also consults\nothers in discovering sorcerers and in forecasting the future.[363]\nIn the Mazwaya clan of the Thonga there is an official Diviner who\nalone knows the exact composition of the royal \u201cmedicine,\u201d on which\nthe welfare of the whole tribe depends. He is very much feared: no one\ndares dispute with him; and he has the right of cursing even the chief\nhimself.[364] Such a powerful subject naturally excites the jealousy of\nthe chief, who sometimes endeavours to get into his own hands all the\nmedicines and occult virtues possessed by any of his tribesmen.[365]\nThe danger of opposition between Church and State was also felt in\nMelanesia and Polynesia; and in Hawaii it was decisively overcome; for\nwhen the oracle was to be consulted, the king, concealed in a frame of\nwickerwork, gave the responses himself.[366]\n\nIn Greece (sixth and fifth centuries B.C.) oracles were still more\npowerful: the record may be read in Herodotus. The most flourishing\nStates observed the Omens, and never ventured to go to war without\nconsulting the Oracles; and the Oracles undertook to advise on war and\npeace and alliances, to settle disputed claims to sovereignty and the\nconstitution of States, to sanction new laws and the foundation of\ncolonies, to order the erection of new temples and even the worship of\nnew deities\u2014some of them of very dubious reputation: to say nothing\nof the infinite extent of their private practice. Their utterances\nwere often unintelligible; they were sometimes known to have accepted\nbribes; yet the most enlightened people in the world continued to\nconsult them: whether in good faith, or for their effect upon the\nvulgar both friends and enemies, or perhaps to share responsibility for\nan action with the gods, or even because one then felt more comfortable\nthan in leaving them alone. But the diffusion of philosophy was too\nmuch for them; and, as Cicero says,[367] even the Delphic Oracle\ndeclined in reputation, not because with lapse of time the divine\nvirtue failed of those exhalations that inspired the priestess, but\nwhen men became less credulous. Perhaps it was also because social\nlife had become, under Roman government, safer and more settled and\nregular; so that a reasonable amount of foresight could be exercised\nwithout supernatural aid. Still, after the Oracles seemed to have been\nstruck dumb, they revived from time to time for two or three centuries;\nPlutarch was far from incredulous; and the equivalent of them will (I\nsuppose) continue to revive now and then, unless insane desire, and\nanxiety, and pusillanimity, and wonder and confusion of mind shall one\nday be extinguished.\n\nIn the great empires of the higher barbarism, the Magi amongst the\nMedes and Persians, and in Egypt, Babylonia and India the priesthood\nwho practised soothsaying and vaticination with their other functions,\nobtained still greater control over national life. The development of\nAstrology has always been imputed to the Chaldeans; and the importance\nof dreams and their interpretation in Egypt and Babylon is reflected in\nthe stories of Joseph and Daniel as well as in the profaner pages of\nHerodotus.\n\nThe character of Omens and the way of obtaining Oracles and of being\ninspired in Greece were merely modifications of those that have been\nin vogue amongst savages. Imagination-beliefs, in spite of their\nextravagance, have, in fact, a short tether and move in narrow circles,\nperpetually renewing the same themes. The ravings of the Pythoness\npossessed, which are said to have sometimes frightened the priests,\nmight have been studied in Fiji. This was what happened when a priest\nwas inspired: he \u201cbecomes absorbed in thought ... in a few minutes\nhe trembles; slight distortions are seen in his face, and twitching\nmovements in his limbs. These increase to a violent muscular action,\nwhich spreads until the whole frame is violently convulsed, and the\nman shivers as with a strong ague-fit. In some instances this is\naccompanied by murmurs and sobs; the veins are greatly enlarged, and\nthe circulation of the blood quickened. The priest is now possessed by\nhis god, and all his words and actions are considered as no longer his\nown, but those of the deity who has entered him. Shrill cries of Koi\nau! Koi au! \u2018It is I! It is I!\u2019 fill the air, and the god is supposed\nthus to notify his approach. While giving the answer the priest\u2019s eyes\nstand out and roll as in a frenzy; his voice is unnatural, his face\npale, his lips livid, his breathing depressed and his entire appearance\nthat of a furious madman. The sweat runs from every pore, the tears\nstart from his strained eyes; after which the symptoms gradually\ndisappear. The priest looks round with a vacant stare, and as the god\nsays \u2018I depart,\u2019 announces his actual departure by violently flinging\nhimself down on the mat, or by suddenly striking the ground with a\nclub.... The convulsive movements do not entirely disappear for some\ntime.\u201d[368]\n\nTo become inspired by means of visions or dreams, or endowed with the\npowers of a prophet or diviner, the obvious plan is to go to places\nfrequented by spirits, namely, tombs, caves and temples. The Oracle of\nTrophonius in B\u0153otia was situated in a cave into which the consultant\ndescended, and there saw visions or heard strange noises, and lost his\nsenses: on returning to the upper air, he sat in the Chair of Memory\nand reported to the priests what had happened; and they delivered him\nto his friends \u201coverpowered with fear, and quite unconscious of himself\nand his surroundings.\u201d[369] Afterwards he recovered his wits. At Oropus\nwas a sanctuary of Amphiaraus, who (against his better judgment) had\njoined the expedition of Adrastus against Thebes and, amidst the\ngeneral defeat of the army, fled and was swallowed up in the earth. His\ndeath ought to have occurred where his sanctuary stood; for it was a\nfamous Oracle, and to consult it you purified yourself and sacrificed\na ram and, spreading the skin under you, went asleep there, awaiting\na revelation in a dream.[370] In the temple of Pasiph\u00e6, too, near\nSparta, one might hope for a divine message in a dream; and a shepherd,\nsleeping by the grave of Orpheus at Libethra, was moved to sing the\nverses of Orpheus.[371]\n\nTo lose one\u2019s memory and afterwards recover one\u2019s wits is incidental\nto many initiation ceremonies, and the darkness and secrecy of\ncaves\u2014which, moreover, are often burial-places\u2014have always deeply\nimpressed our imagination. Amongst the Arunta there is a way of\nobtaining powers of Magic and Divination by going to sleep at the\nmouth of a cave; when the Iruntarinia (a kind of spirits), who live\nthere, pierce the sleeper\u2019s head with lances, drag him into the\ncave, disembowel him and give him new entrails. He awakes dazed and\nsilly; and the spirits lead him home, where gradually he recovers his\nright mind.[372] Amongst the Kurnai, again, one may become a wizard\nand diviner by sleeping at a grave; for in the night the dead man\ndisembowels one, and provides new visceral organs.[373] Elsewhere in\nAustralia a candidate for the wizardly profession is tied down at night\nin the tribal burial-ground and visited by spirits who force a stone\ninto his head\u2014apparently a kind of crystal, by gazing into which a\nwizard is able to see the past, the distant and the future.[374]\n\nThe seeking of enlightenment where spirits dwell in caves or graves,\nloss of wits by contact with them and subsequent recovery\u2014all this may\nremind us of stories in Pausanias; but what of the disembowelling and\nrenewing of the viscera? We are told by Spencer and Gillen that during\nthe performance of certain traditionary ceremonies, an Australian\u2019s\nemotion is very great, so that he says his inward parts get \u201ctied\nup in knots,\u201d and sometimes acquire \u201csight\u201d and give omens;[375] and\nHowitt tells us that fat of the kidneys is believed to be the seat\nof a man\u2019s prowess and other virtues.[376] To extract and renew a\nman\u2019s entrails, therefore, is to renew his spirit, just as we speak\nmetaphorically of a \u201cchange of heart,\u201d so that he has more vivid\nemotions, firmer courage, clearer insight. In fact, it is the magical\nequivalent of inspiration; the crystal, too, of the Euahlayi is a magic\nsource; and this is as far as the Australians have got:[377] gross\nmaterialism, which the progress or (at least) the movement of animistic\nthought has happily superseded by conceptions more refined, if not more\ntruthful.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. APPARENT FAILURE OF OMENS\n\nThough in their nature infallible, Omens are not always fulfilled\u2014at\nleast, their fulfilment is not always ascertainable. But this is easily\nexplained; for whatever an Omen may be in itself, our knowledge of\nit depends on observation, which may be superficial and incomplete,\nso that we may not know what it was. What kind of bird was it? Which\nway did it fly? How many cries did it utter? These questions go to\nthe heart of the matter; yet each of them points out an opportunity\nof error. But granting the observations perfect, we have still to\nlearn what the Omen portends; and although a simple mind, trusting to\nsimple rules, may be ready offhand with an answer, it becomes, with the\ndevelopment of the art of Divination, more and more complicated and\ndifficult, demanding long experience and profound erudition\u2014something\nworth paying for. It is popularly known that dreams are perplexing as\nthe guide of life. Are they to be accepted at face value, or do they go\nby contraries? What difference does it make whether they happen early\nin the night, or in the morning, or whether we sleep in white or in\ncoloured night-clothes? There is an extensive casuistry of this matter.\nInterpretations of Omens proceeded generally by analogy: the length\nand direction of the cracks in a shoulder-blade indicate the length\nand tenor of a man\u2019s life. Oracles, again, were often distractingly\nobscure; from Delphi much like riddles; but those of Zeus at Dodona are\nsaid to have been sometimes taken to Apollo at Delphi to ask what they\nmeant. Clearly, then, besides possible errors of observation, there\nwere further pitfalls of interpretation; if a physician or a pilot is\nsometimes out in his reckoning, why not also a diviner? So that an Omen\nmight very well be fulfilled without our knowing exactly what it was or\nwhat it indicated.\n\nBut that is not all; for we have seen that any kind of magical force\nis only infallible as a tendency; it may be counteracted, and this\nis generally thought to be the case with Omens. Just as the rites of\none magician may be frustrated by the more powerful operations of\nanother, so an Omen indicates a course of events which may, perhaps,\nbe turned aside. That which is foreseen by one spirit may be prevented\nby another, whose intervention was not foreseen; for spirits are by no\nmeans infallible. Hence, however well observed and interpreted, the\ntendency of an Omen, or of the force it manifests, may be diverted or\nreversed by some unknown cause. Moreover, we ourselves are loth to\nrelinquish all control over affairs. We have seen that the efficacy of\nOmens depended (not without reason) on the way they were received; and\nthat we may meet them with our own magical influence, accepting them,\nor rejecting with a spell.\n\nAnd further, we have seen that Magic often works by symbols, and that\na symbolic action will cause or incite a real event; and similarly it\nis believed that the event foreshown by an Omen may be symbolically\nfulfilled; that some harmless semblance of the event may be substituted\nfor it, absorb (as it were) the poison of the menace and let the\nthreatened man go free. Astyages dreamed a dream which the Magi\ninterpreted to mean that the child of his daughter (married to a\nPersian) should reign over Asia in his stead\u2014implying that the kingdom\nmust pass from the Medes. He therefore took measures to have the child\ndestroyed; but by a series of happy chances Cyrus, the child, escaped\nand grew up; and in his boyhood Astyages discovered who he was, and was\ngreatly alarmed. So he sent again for the Magi; but they, on learning\nthat the boys in the village where Cyrus had been reared had in games\nappointed him their king, decided that this fulfilled the dream; for,\nsaid they, \u201che will not reign a second time.\u201d[378] So Cyrus lived, and\nthe lordship of Asia passed to the Persians; for the Magi in this case\noverestimated the value of symbols. But all these ways of frustrating\nan Omen are incompatible with the interpretation of them by the course\nof Fate, and are only fit to be believed in by the weaker brethren.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. APOLOGY FOR OMENS\n\nIt may be some excuse for Omens that the interpretation of them was\na sort of gymnastic for ingenuity, and was a means by which the\nquick-witted maintained themselves in a world of violence. It is,\nmoreover, the business of those who undertake such work to study social\nand political conditions, just as rain-doctors study the weather. Their\njudgment, therefore, may often be better than that of men immersed\nin affairs and biassed by particular interests. Even in the lower\nsavagery diviners manage to know more than others. In Queensland,\nwhen a big mob has assembled at a camp, diviners are believed to keep\ntheir eyes and ears open, sleepless\u2014to learn who have death-bones,\nwho has operated with one, who has been pointed at, etc.;[379] and\nin South Africa (two or three steps higher in culture) diviners take\npains to obtain information as a means of \u201copening the gates of\ndistance.\u201d[380] At Delphi, also, news was welcome from all parts, and\nmen of capacity kept a steady eye upon the affairs of Greece and Asia.\nOf course, Divination, like every other superstition, was exploited\nby politicians. The Roman Government, according to Cicero, maintained\nthe College of Augurs for the advantage of the State in civil affairs,\nalthough in his time the leaders of armies had ceased to consult the\nOmens:[381] and Polybius thought that religion was Rome\u2019s most useful\ninstitution.[382] A law that the comitia should not be held when\nJupiter thundered and lightened was especially convenient when that\nassembly was inconvenient; for the official whose function it was had\nonly to declare that he saw lightning, and thereupon the comitia broke\nup. Probably even those who thus abused a superstition, yet believed\n(at least in times of danger) \u201cthere was something in it.\u201d Omens and\nOracles were sought after to allay fear and to gain confidence, and\noften they gave confidence and the strength that goes with confidence;\nor perhaps the rashness and folly that go with confidence, and so\nbetrayed the devotee; or, again, they dashed the courage of brave men,\nand spread dismay, distrust and weakness.\n\nNo superiority of mere intellect seems to ensure men against\nparticipating in these delusions. Many Stoics, though highly\ndisciplined in Logic, upheld the practices of Divination and Astrology.\nPan\u00e6tius, indeed, rejected them; and Epictetus on moral grounds\ndiscouraged Divination. \u201cFor,\u201d said he, \u201cwhat the diviner foresees is\nnot what really concerns us. We have within us a diviner who tells\nus what good and evil are, and what are the signs of them. Does the\ndiviner understand that\u2014after all his studies of the viscera? Not what\nis to happen in the future, but to do as we ought whatever happens is\nour true concern.\u201d[383] But this genuine expression of Stoic thought\nwas abandoned by most of the sect in their desire to defend as much as\npossible the popular religion. They even staked the existence of the\ngods upon the genuineness of Divination: arguing that if Divination\nexists there must be gods who send Omens; and that if Divination does\nnot exist there can be no gods\u2014since if there are gods who know the\nfuture, and have a regard for mankind, and are able to give warnings,\nthey will certainly do so. Therefore, no Divination, no gods.[384]\nThere is, indeed, a widespread pitiful persuasion that some provision\nmust have been made whereby a man may foresee his future; and so, in\na sense, there is; for the existence of order in nature implies the\npossibility of foresight; and a fanciful mind might regard Divination\nas the anticipatory manifestation of an instinct in play before the\nfaculties became capable of serious exercise. But the play was taken\ntoo seriously; and the worst of it was that its inane methods diverted\nattention from the only possible method\u2014if not always on the part of\nthe diviner, at least on the part of the great multitude, his dupes.\nM.\u00a0H.\u00a0A. Jounod says of the Bantu tribes, \u201cDivination kills any attempt\nto use reason or experience in practical life.\u201d[385] And, clearly, this\nis everywhere its tendency, be it a question of consulting a canary at\nthe street-corner, whether or not we should marry, or an augur rather\nthan an experienced general whether or not now to engage the enemy.\n\nSeneca[386] treated Omens as a necessary consequence of universal Fate:\nfor if all events are factors of one predetermined order, everything\nin the present is a sign or omen of everything to occur in the future;\nand some events, such as the flight of birds, have been selected as\nOmens, merely because the meaning or consequents of these happen to\nhave been observed; and whether Omens are respected or despised, Fate\ndetermines the whole course of events. By this way of thinking, as it\nwas fated that the Romans should be defeated at Lake Trasimenus, it\nwas also fated that the Omens should be declared unfavourable and that\nthe warning should not be taken; and if it was fated that the Romans\nshould be defeated at Cann\u00e6, it was also fated that the Omens should be\ndeclared favourable and that they should be accepted. A belief in Fate\nmakes Omens useless.\n\nIf, however, instead of Fate (all-comprehensive Magic) or\npredestination (by a supreme God), we regard the course of the world\nas determined by natural causation, whether Omens or Oracles may be\nuseful or not (supposing them possible) depends on the nature of the\nevent foretold\u2014on whether it involves ourselves conditionally only\nor unconditionally. Omens that warn us against events conditionally\nmay be useful enough, and few will think it a serious fault that\nthey discourage the use of reason. King Deiotarus, having set out on\na journey, was warned by an eagle not to go forward with it, and he\nturned back; and that same night the house at which he was to have\nslept fell down; so he escaped.[387] The danger was conditional on his\ncontinuing the journey; and, in the course of causation, a warning\nof danger, whether announced by an augur or by our own sagacity, may\noften enable us to avoid it. The causes of the future are present, and\n(within certain limits) are in our power. If I have reason to believe\nthat there will be a fire at the Opera to-night, or have a presentiment\nof some calamity there, I need not go; and, then, I shall not be burnt\nalive. Whether the presage come to me by an Omen, or by a message from\na god, or in an anonymous letter from one of the incendiaries who\nhappens to be a friend of mine, cannot matter. No, if there were gods\nwith intuitions of futurity, or with better knowledge than we have\nof present fact and greater power of calculating the consequences,\nthey might make themselves useful. On this hypothesis there is not _a\npriori_ any absurdity in the doctrine of Omens.\n\nBut with Omens or Oracles of magical or divine authority, that\nforeshadow our own fate unconditionally, the case is different. If,\nfor example, they tell a man that he will die by the fall of the roof\nof his own house, that must be his end; and any one who examines his\ncareer afterwards will find that all his efforts to escape, all his\npusillanimous crouchings and windings, were just so many steps of\ncausation upon the road to inevitable doom. To convey such a presage\nserves no purpose but to fill the victim\u2019s last days with anxiety and\ndread: it is as bad as cruelty to animals.\n\nThe defence of Omens is mere rationalisation. They took possession\nof men\u2019s minds not in an age of reason, but when beliefs were freely\nborn of hope and fear, were entirely practical, were never thought\nout and never verified. Whether the connection of Omen with event was\nconceived of magically or animistically, it was always mysterious, and\non that account was the more impressive and acceptable. The uniformity\nof such connexions was, indeed, assumed\u2014otherwise they were useless;\nthe same bird\u2019s call on this hand or on that had always the same\nsignificance; but each case at first stood by itself; it was what\nwe call \u201ca miracle.\u201d Even such assumption of causation in ordinary\ncases as common sense implies did not compel the reflection that each\ncause must itself be an effect of other causes, and so again, and so\non for ever. Nor did the assumption that spirits could foresee the\nfuture require that they should foresee the whole future, so as to\nimply an inviolable order of the world. Such considerations were left\nto amuse or perplex a later age. A great advance is marked by the\nsaying of the Bechuana prince to Casalis, that \u201cone event is the son\nof another, and we must never forget the genealogy.\u201d[388] But quite\nrecently amongst ourselves causation was so feebly appreciated, even by\nthe most educated, that testimony concerning miracles could still be\nappealed to as a ground for believing something further. One reviews\nall these wonderful fossils of the soul which are dead and yet alive,\nnot without sympathy. For myself, I am free to confess, as they used to\nsay in Parliament, that Omens and presentiments still haunt the shadowy\nprecincts of imagination with vague shapes and mutterings of evils to\ncome; which when they approach will be (I suppose) as hard and definite\nas daylight.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[339] VI. c. 27 (Rawlinson\u2019s Translation).\n\n[340] Williams, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 152.\n\n[341] De Acosta, _History of the Indies_, VII. c. 23 (translated by\nC.\u00a0R. Markham).\n\n[342] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 220.\n\n[343] Book I. cc. 7-10.\n\n[344] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p.\n260.\n\n[345] W. R. Halliday, _Greek Divination_, p. 15.\n\n[346] _Historia Naturalis_, XXVII. p. 4.\n\n[347] Suetonius: _Julius_, c. 59.\n\n[348] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, II. pp. 56-64.\n\n[349] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 266.\n\n[350] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, V. p.\n361; VI. p. 259.\n\n[351] Seligman, _Mel. of B. N. G._, p. 309.\n\n[352] _De Divinatione_, I. c. 19.\n\n[353] An infallible sign is, in Formal Logic, the same as a cause,\naccording to the scheme _If A, then B_; and it is conceivable that,\nwith strict thinking, a belief in an Omen may give rise to a magical\npractice. \u201cFor,\u201d says Lord Avebury, \u201cgranted that the fall of a stick\ncertainly preludes that of the person it represents, it follows that by\nupsetting the stick his death can be caused\u201d (_Origin of Civilisation_,\np. 166). I do not see why such an inference should not be drawn, but\ncan give no example of it. The possibility shows how much community\nthere is between Magic and the lore of Omens; but as to this particular\ncase, the magical cast of mind is already implied in the original\nsetting up of the stick whose fall should prelude that of a given\nindividual.\n\n[354] Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 123.\n\n[355] A. W. Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 401.\n\n[356] Quoted by Frazer, _Totemism and Exogamy_, I. pp. 489 and 495.\n\n[357] A. W. Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 389.\n\n[358] C. G. Seligman, _op. cit._, p. 188.\n\n[359] VII. c. 16.\n\n[360] The poet is closely allied at first to the wizard; for (besides\nthat the greatest spells and oracles are versified) the poet is\ninspired. In Australia poets are sometimes carried by ghosts into\nskyland, where they learn songs and dances. Some compose awake;\nbut the belief prevails that they are inspired in dreams by dead\nand kindred spirits. Their songs travel far amongst tribes that no\nlonger understand the language. (Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East\nAustralia_, pp. 389 and 413.) Similarly in Fiji (_Fiji and the\nFijians_, p. 98). \u201cThe poem is too wonderful for me\u201d\u2014such is the\npoet\u2019s humility; \u201cit was made by the gods\u201d\u2014such is his arrogance.\n\n[361] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 526.\n\n[362] Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, I. p. 125.\n\n[363] Casalis, _Les Bassoutos_, pp. 299 and 340.\n\n[364] Jounod, _Life of a South African Tribe_, I. 361. This \u201cmedicine\u201d\nis the chief\u2019s great store of magical force: its principal ingredients\nare the nails and hair of chiefs deceased, fixed together by a kind of\nwax.\n\n[365] Callaway, _Religion of the Amazulu_, p. 417.\n\n[366] W. Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, II. p. 235.\n\n[367] _De Div._, II. c. 57.\n\n[368] Thomas Williams, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 190.\n\n[369] Pausanias, IX. c. 10 (Frazer\u2019s Translation).\n\n[370] Pausanias, I. p. 34.\n\n[371] _Ibid._, IX. p. 30.\n\n[372] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 523.\n\n[373] A. W. Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 404.\n\n[374] Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi_, p. 25.\n\n[375] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 181.\n\n[376] _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 367.\n\n[377] This is unjust to the Australians. Amongst the Dieri (L. Eyre)\nwizards with renewed entrails communicate with supernatural beings,\ninterpret dreams and discover murderers; but they also recognise\nspiritual communication with ordinary men in visions; not ordinary\ndreams, which are mere fancies, but those that are repeated; and these\ncome from Kutchi, an evil spirit (Howitt, _op. cit._, p. 358). We may\nbe sure the Greeks were mistaken in supposing that it was Amphiaraus\nwho instituted divination by dreams.\n\n[378] Herodotus, I. cc. 107, 28.\n\n[379] W. E. Roth, _Ethnological Studies_, p. 154.\n\n[380] Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 193.\n\n[381] _De Div._, II. cc. 33, 35.\n\n[382] Polybius, VI. c. 2.\n\n[383] _Discourses_, II. c. 7.\n\n[384] _De Div._, II. c. 17; cf. c. 49.\n\n[385] _Life of a South African Tribe_, p. 521.\n\n[386] _Questiones Naturales_, II. c. 32.\n\n[387] _De Div._, I. c. 15.\n\n[388] _Les Bassoutos_, p. 248.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE MIND OF THE WIZARD\n\n\n\u00a7 1. THE RISE AND FALL OF WIZARDRY\n\nIn describing the occult arts and those who practise them, terms are\nso loosely used that it may be convenient to premise that by \u201cWizard\u201d\n(or Medicine-man) is here meant either a magician or a sorcerer; that\nis, either one who puts into operation impersonal magical forces (or\nso far as he does so), or one who relies upon the aid (or so far as\nhe does so) of ghosts or spirits under magical control. It is an\nobjection to this use of the word \u201csorcerer,\u201d that it is often applied\nto those chiefly whose practice is maleficent: but there seems to be no\nword used only in the more general sense; and the difference between\nmaleficent and beneficent wizards, whether magicians or sorcerers, will\nhere be marked, when necessary, by the familiar epithets \u201cblack\u201d and\n\u201cwhite.\u201d\n\nIn backward societies, wizardry is, or may be, practised by every\nman or woman; and, indeed, in its simpler operations or observances\nthis is true at every stage of culture. But in every kind of task it\nappears that some men can do it better than others, and they attract\nthe attention of the rest; and probably this is the beginning of the\ndifferentiation of the professional wizard: he is at first merely\none whom others ask to help them in certain matters, because they\nbelieve that he, more than themselves, has the knack of it. As the\noccult arts become complicated and dangerous the superiority of the\nmaster-mind is more manifest. We are told that amongst the Tasmanians\nthere were no professional wizards or medicine-men, but that some\npeople practised more than others. From the beginning the art excites\nwonder, and wonder credulity; and an old fellow, who was subject to\nfits of contraction in the muscles of one breast, used this mysterious\naffection to impose upon his neighbours.[389] Wonder and the deference\nit brings with it, with the self-delusion of power it generates, are\nat first the wizard\u2019s sole recompense; and to the end they remain his\nchief recompense. In Australia a wizard is initiated (in fact or by\nrepute), and is in some ways a man apart from others; yet in several\ncases it is reported that he receives no fees. For magical services\namongst the Arunta \u201cno reward of any kind is given or expected.\u201d[390]\nSometimes a wizard expects no fee unless he is successful, as among the\nTungus, Yakut and Buryats.[391] Generally, the wizard earns his living\nlike other men, and merely supplements it by fees and presents. He\nrarely attains the professional dignity of living solely by his art and\nmystery.\n\nNevertheless in simple societies the wizard is a leader or a chief. The\npredominance of old men in council depends upon their occult powers\nrather than upon their worldly wisdom: even hereditary chiefs may\nhave greater prestige through Magic than through royal descent.[392]\nI conceive that after the organisation of the primitive hunting-pack\nhad, by various causes, been weakened or destroyed, it was through\nbelief in Magic that some sort of leadership and subordination were\nre-established: perhaps in many experimental social forms, of which\nsome specimens may be found in Australia and survivals of others in\nall parts of the world. Among the Massim of the Trobriand Islands,\nhereditary chieftainship is better developed than anywhere to the south\nor west; yet \u201cat the back of every chief\u2019s power over his people is the\ndread of sorcery, without which I feel sure he is little more than a\ncypher.\u201d[393] Or the medicine-man may appear as the chief\u2019s rival, as\namong the Indians of the upper Amazons described by Capt. Whiffen, who\nobserves that in a contest between the medicine-man and the chief the\nodds are in favour of the former, since to his opponents death comes\nspeedily (by poison). He has great influence over international policy:\nwar is never made without his advice. Here we see the beginning of that\nstruggle between the temporal and spiritual powers which continues\nwith alternate victory and defeat through the whole course of history.\nCallaway[394] describes a Bantu chief as inducted to his office by\ndiviners that he may be \u201creally a chief\u201d not merely by descent. A\ndangerous concession! But other Bantu chiefs are themselves wizards,\nand strive to collect all the medicine of the tribe in their own hands;\nand Chaka declared he was the only diviner in the country.[395] The\nrise and spread of the political power of wizards, however, has been\nfully illustrated by Sir J.\u00a0G. Frazer in the sixth chapter of _The\nMagic Art_.\n\nAs animistic interpretation prevails in any society, so that the\nmarvels of Magic come to be attributed to spiritual causes, magicians\ntend to become sorcerers, and, being thus associated with spirits,\nmay not be easily distinguishable from priests. Among the Buryat a\nshaman was a priest, as knowing the will of the gods and directing\nsacrifices, but he was also an exorcist and diviner.[396] The great\nmajority of those who deal with spirits rely, more or less openly,\nupon both coercion and propitiation: but we may say generally that an\nofficiant is a sorcerer so far as he depends upon coercing spirits by\nMagic; a priest so far as he relies upon propitiating them by prayer\nand sacrifice. The sorcerer is aggressive and domineering toward\nsupernatural powers; the priest professes humility. In any case the\ncharacter of a cult is liable, in course of time, to change from one\nside to the other; and at the same time, two men may officiate in the\nsame rites and, at heart, one of them may be a priest and the other a\nsorcerer. Custom gives the name of priest to him who, when a certain\nstage has been reached in the development of Animism, when gods are\nrecognised, serves and sacrifices to the more public and reputable\nspirits. A conflict then breaks out between him and the sorcerer.\n\nWhilst magic-beliefs greatly strengthen chieftainship, religion,\nwithout impairing the magical sanction, reinforces it with other ideas,\nand therefore has a political advantage. A god is often the ancestor\nof the king and the ground of his sovereignty; and the king himself,\nor his brother, may be high-priest. The priesthood acquires commanding\ndignity; it shares the culture of the highest social rank, and may\nbecome almost the sole repository of learning and art. Wizards then\nlose their place in the sun. The beneficent practice of wizardry (or\nWhite Magic) is more or less incorporated with religious rites; the\nmaleficent practice (or Black Magic) is forbidden and punished: under\npolytheism because \u201cit is destructive to human life or welfare\u201d; under\nmonotheism, as offensive to God.[397] The sorcerer is outlawed, and\nbetakes himself to the secret performance of unholy rites in dark and\nunwholesome circumstances. He may be in full antagonism to the official\ngods, invoking demons or old down-trodden gods not yet forgotten by\nthe people, and, in the service of demons, inverting and profaning\nthe rites of public worship. But to forbid and punish the black art\nis to punish crime, not to persecute Magic as such; whose beneficent\npractices still flourish under another name. Prof. Yrj\u00f6 Hirn has\nshown that, during all the ignorant and superstitious prosecutions of\nwitches in Europe, the public religious ceremonies and observances\nwere permeated by magical ideas.[398] In spite of the antagonism\nbetween priest and sorcerer, there is not the full opposition between\nReligion and Sorcery that exists between Animism and Magic\u2014between\nthe recognition of caprice and the belief in uniformity\u2014since the\ngods themselves work by Magic and may be subject to its powers. It is\nnot an antagonism of principle, but partly of allegiance and partly of\nambition.\n\nThe influence of wizards is generally extended by means of clubs and\nsecret societies: wizards form a marked class, are well aware of it,\nand are naturally drawn into mutual understanding. In Australia no\nregular societies seem to have existed, but the medicine-men recognised\none another, initiated and trained new-comers into the profession,\nhad an esoteric tradition of rites and methods and fictions, and\nsometimes met for consultation. Among the savages of Torres Straits,\nthe _maidelaig_ meet together in the bush at night, in order to perform\ntheir sorcery, and the body of sorcerers can control an individual\n_maidelaig_; but they appear not to have a definitely organised\nsociety.[399] In Melanesia, however, many regular societies exist;[400]\nand among the Northern Amerinds they were numerous and powerful. The\nMidewinian society of the Ojibways is typical of these institutions.\nIt was the club of the legitimate professionals, in contrast with\nprivate practitioners, who were said (of course) to be favoured by evil\n_manidos_. To join the society one must undergo instruction, paying\nfees and making presents to its members. It comprised about one-tenth\nof the tribe, and what with influence, what with perquisites, did very\nwell.[401] In Africa also such societies flourish.\n\nEvery profession, organised or unorganised, provided there be an\nunderstanding amongst its members, is prone to acquire anti-social\ninterests and to establish a secret tradition; and as long as moral\nsense is very imperfect, the antagonism of the profession to the\npublic may be a virulent evil, as we see in the history of wizardry\nand priestcraft. Both the profession and its tradition begin with\npractices common to all members of a tribe; and the tradition grows\nby accumulating the discoveries and inventions of the professionals.\nExperiment and observation are employed by them (according to their\nlights) probably from the first. Dr. Haddon says that, in controlling\nthe wind and rain, the procedure of wizards in the eastern islands\nof Torres Straits was subject to variation, and so doubtless were\nthe spells, and experts relied on their own variants;[402] and Prof.\nSeligman[403] observes that, in British New Guinea, the knowledge of\n\u201cthe departmental expert\u201d (wizard controlling rain, or fertility of\ngarden, or what not) is traditionary from father to son, consisting\npartly of magical processes or formul\u00e6, partly of the results of\nyears of observation and thought. All improvements in science, art,\nindustry and humbug are made by individuals. The cumulative tradition\nbecomes more voluminous, the spells more intricate, the rites more\nelaborate; because the possible membership of the profession is thereby\nnarrowed, the self-valuation of the initiated is heightened, the wonder\nand credulity of the laity is enhanced: so much of the doctrine and\ndiscipline being allowed to transpire as to make this last effect a\nmaximum. Whilst tribal belief in Magic is the necessary ground of the\nwizard\u2019s existence, he\u2014being once recognised\u2014thenceforth confirms,\nsways and guides the tribal belief.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. THE WIZARD\u2019S PRETENSIONS\n\nWhilst societies are formed to promote the common interests of wizards,\ntoo severe competition amongst themselves is in some measure avoided\nby the specialisation of individuals in different branches of their\nmystery. In pure Magic there is some room for the division of labour\nto deal with the weather, or fertility, or disease, but the spread\nof Animism and the multiplication of fetiches and demons open to\nthe sorcerers a wide field for the multiplication of specialists.\nAmongst the Beloki, says Mr. Weeks,[404] there are eighteen classes of\nspecialists; on the lower Congo, fifty.\n\nBy spells and rites and charms wizards undertake the general control\nof Nature. They cause rain or drought, determine the rising of the sun\nand, for this purpose, may go every morning to a hill-top to summon\nhim. An Australian wizard claimed to have driven away a comet by means\nof his sacred stones.[405] The adept procures a favourable wind for\nhis friends, or for his enemies an adverse; prospers the crops or\nblights them; controls the game of the hunter, and the cattle of the\nherdsman. The height of such claims may be read in Medea\u2019s boast in the\n_Metamorphoses_.[406]\n\nIn his own person the wizard may have the power of shape-changing\ninto some animal, or into any animal. He can fly through the air to\nskyland to visit Daramulun; or to help dull imaginations, he throws up\na rope and climbs up by it, or throws up a thread (like a spider\u2019s)\nand climbs up by that.[407] Or he may fly to the moon to be the guest\nof the man whom we see there;[408] or to the region of death to visit\nErlik Khan.[409] By daylight he only flies in the spirit, during a\ntrance; but when it is quite dark he can go bodily. And probably this\npoints to the origin of such beliefs: for to dream that one flies is\nnot uncommon; and as in dreams we visit distant places, and on waking\nseem suddenly to have returned by no known means, the analogy of flight\noffers the easiest explanation of such experiences. To fly is one of\nthe most ancient and persistent exploits of the profession: European\nwitches flew upon broomsticks (degenerate from Siberian horse-staves);\nDr. Faustus upon his magical cloak; and \u201clevitation\u201d has been exhibited\nby recent \u201cmediums.\u201d\n\nWizards cause and cure love and other forms of sickness; slay, or\nrecall the soul to its accustomed habitation; sometimes the same man\nkills and cures; sometimes he works only evil, or only against evil;\nthe Black and the White Magicians may become well-recognised hostile\nsects. Wizards discover thieves and murderers, or sell a fetich by\nwhose power an evil-doer walks invisible, if he takes care not to be\nseen. They administer the ordeal and have in their power the life of\nevery one who undergoes it. They interpret dreams, and prophesy by the\nflight of birds, the fall of dice, the making of shoulder-blades and\nthe aspect of the stars.\n\nThe sorcerer communicates with the ghosts of the dead or with the\nspirits of nature and, by their aid, accomplishes whatever can be done\nby Magic. He is possessed by them, and operates or speaks by their\npower or inspiration; he drives them out of others whom they possess,\nor sends them on errands, controlling them either by the help of\nstronger spirits or by his profound knowledge of enchantments. Many of\nthese things he is believed to do best during fits or ecstasy; which he\nproduces in himself by rhythmic drumming and dancing, or by drugs, or\nby voluntary control of a disciplined temperament, to the astonishment\nand conviction of all beholders.\n\nSuch are the wizard\u2019s pretensions, so well known that a brief recital\nof them suffices; and whilst they seem to us too absurd for any one\nto believe, least of all the wizard himself, yet observers assure us\nthat he often does believe in them, and they are certainly taken to be\ngenuine by the majority of his tribesmen. For them his performances\nare so wonderful as to put to shame the achievements of scientific\ninvention; and probably this partly explains the frequent reports that\nsavages are deficient in wonder. \u201cIt takes a good deal to astonish\na savage,\u201d say Spencer and Gillen; \u201che is brought up on Magic, and\nthings that strike us with astonishment he regards as simply the\nexhibition of Magic more powerful than any possessed by himself.\u201d[410]\nStill the blacks were astonished by the phonograph. Similarly we\nare told by Stef\u00e1nson[411] that things unusual but of an understood\nkind\u2014a bow that shoots fifty yards further than any other\u2014may excite\nendless marvelling amongst the Esquimo; but what seems miraculous\u2014a\nrifle-shot, or a binocular\u2014is compared with the supposed powers of the\nshaman, who can kill an animal on the other side of a mountain, or see\nthings that are to happen to-morrow. Our surgery, too, is very inferior\nto the shaman\u2019s, who can take out a diseased heart or vertebral column\nand replace it with a sound one.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WIZARD\n\n(1) Observers generally agree that the wizard, or medicine-man, is\ndistinguished in his tribe for intelligence and penetration, or at\nleast for cunning. He is apt to impress an unsympathetic witness as\n\u201csome fellow with more brains and less industry than his fellows.\u201d\nThe wizard amongst the Fuegians, says Fitzroy, is the most cunning\nand deceitful of his tribe, and has great influence over his\ncompanions.[412] Amongst the Bakongo, the witch-doctors, according\nto Mr. Weeks, have sharp eyes, acute knowledge of human nature, and\ntact.[413] The Samoyed shamans \u201care, as a rule, the most intelligent\nand cunning of the whole race.\u201d[414] Cunning is plainly necessary to\nthe wizard\u2019s life, and, for some of his functions, much more than\ncunning. In many tribes his advice is asked in every difficulty and\nupon every undertaking. Sir E. im Thurn reports that the _peaiman_\nof the Arawaks learns and hands down the traditions of his tribe\nand is the depository of its medical and hunting lore.[415] The\nsurgical skill of Cherokee medicine-men in the treatment of wounds\nwas considerable.[416] Still greater seems to have been that of\nthe Fijians, with no mean knowledge of anatomy learnt during their\nincessant wars.[417] Medicine-men of the Amerinds discovered the\nvirtues of coca, jalap, sarsaparilla, chinchona, and guiacum,[418]\nimplying on their part superior curiosity and observation. The Bantu\ndoctors of S. Africa employ aloes, nux vomica, castor-oil, fern,\nrhubarb and other drugs.[419] Livingstone says[420] that the doctors,\nwho inherit their profession, have \u201cvaluable knowledge, the result\nof long and close observation,\u201d and that they thankfully learnt from\nhim\u2014when their patients were not present. In all parts of the world\nsome knowledge of drugs and of certain methods of treatment, such as\nsweat-baths and massage, ligatures, cauterisation and fomentation,\nseems to have been possessed by the magical profession. As\nweather-doctors and crop-guardians, they laid out the first rudiments\nof astronomy and meteorology. All their knowledge of this sort is, of\ncourse, no Magic, but experience and common sense; though science is\nnot derived from Magic, the scientist does descend from the magician:\nnot, however, in so far as the magician operates by Magic, but in so\nfar as he operates by common sense. Among the Lushai tribes the name\nfor sorcerer, _puithiam_, means \u201cgreat knower,\u201d[421] the equivalent\nof our \u201cwizard.\u201d But sorcery degrades the magic art of medicine by\ndiscouraging with its theory of \u201cpossession\u201d every impulse of rational\ncuriosity, and by substituting for empirical treatment (however crude)\nits rites of exorcism and propitiation.\n\nIn parts of the world so widely separated as Siberia, Greenland, the\nremote back-woods of Brazil and S. Africa, wizards have discovered\nthe secret of ventriloquism. Everywhere they have learned the art of\nconjuring, without which (especially the trick of \u201cpalming\u201d) many\nof their performances, and notably the sucking-cure, could not be\naccomplished. Their practice is generally clumsy and easily detected by\nsophisticated whites, but imposes upon their patients and the native\nbystanders.[422] In India it is carried to a much higher degree of\nillusion. Wizards often have a practical knowledge of some obscure\nregions of psychology; such as the force of suggestion and various\nmeans of conveying it, and the effect of continuous rhythmic movements\nand noises in inducing a state of exaltation or of dissociation.\n\nA wizard\u2019s tribesmen, of course, believe him to possess knowledge\nabsurdly in excess of the reality. He boasts of it as the foundation\nof his power over nature or over spirits; often as a supernatural gift\nof spirits whom he has visited, or who have visited him, and who have\ninitiated him; or else as secret traditionary lore. It is by knowledge\nof human nature that he rules his fellows; and he asserts that\nknowledge of the names and origins of things and of spirits gives him\nthe same control over them. In Mr. Skeat\u2019s _Malay Magic_, incantations\naddressed by a miner to spirits or to metals, adjuring the spirits to\nwithdraw from his \u201cclaim,\u201d or the grains of metal to assemble there,\ncontain the intimidating and subduing verse:\n\n \u201cI know the origin from which you sprang!\u201d\n\nThe same compelling power was employed\u2014if we may trust the\n_Kalevala_\u2014by Finnish wizards; for \u201cevery thing or being loses its\nability for evil, as soon as some one is found who knows, who proclaims\nits essence, its origin, its genealogy.\u201d \u201cTietaja, which etymologically\nsignifies wise, or learned, is ordinarily used for magician.\u201d[423]\nIt was by profound science that medi\u00e6val magicians were believed to\ncontrol demons; and anybody celebrated for science was suspected of\nsorcery: such as Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, Aquinas,\nand Raymond Lulli; whose reputation supported the credit of such men as\nParacelsus and John Dee.\n\nThe fine arts in their rudiments owe much to the wizards. Incantations\nin verse often reach a high pitch of lyric fervour. The words _rune_,\n_carmen_, _laulaa_ bear witness to the magic of poetry. Virgil and\nTaliessin have been famous for more than natural gifts; that one by\nsuperstitious repute, and this by his own vaunting.[424] Dancing and\npantomime were cultivated for their magical virtues. Primitive carving\nand painting are in many cases undertaken in order to influence the\nspirits, or the animals, or the natural powers they represent; and if\nMagic was the motive of the recently discovered animal paintings dating\nfrom the old Stone Age, its efficacy in encouraging art at that remote\nperiod rivalled that of religious patronage in some later ages.\n\n(2) In most tribes the wizard needs great force of will and persistency\nof purpose\u2014whether from deliberate choice or from infatuation with\nthe profession\u2014to carry him through the severe training that is often\nexacted from candidates for the office; great audacity and courage to\nimpel and sustain him in the practice of his art, pestered by taboos\nand (the sorcerer especially) always beset by supernatural terrors and\noften by more real dangers; and unusual presence of mind to extricate\nhimself from very embarrassing situations. It is true that, in some\ncases, where the office of wizard is hereditary, or may be assumed by\nalleging the favour of spirits, or some other underhand device\u2014perhaps\nupon the evidence of visions, or by mere fraud, or by a mixture of\nboth\u2014we hear little of really serious initiatory rites; but often\nthese formalities are very painful or very expensive. Among the Arunta,\nthere are three classes of wizards: the first and second, made by\nspirits, undergo no severe trial\u2014except the boring of a hole in their\nown tongues and the keeping of it open, as evidence of a professional\nstory about spirits who slew them with spears, cut out their entrails\nand replaced them with a new set and certain magic stones. But the\nthird class are initiated by two wizards of the first and second\nclass, who pretend to force crystal stones[425] into their bleeding\nbodies from the front of the leg up to the breast bone, into the crown\nof their heads and under the nail of the right forefinger. This they\nmust suffer in perfect silence, three times a day on three consecutive\ndays, with other tortures, followed by various taboos; and, after all,\nthey do not stand as well with the tribe as those whom the spirits\nhave initiated.[426] Can there be any doubt that the initiatory rites\nof the third class represent the older magical custom, and that the\nfabulous initiation by spirits is an overgrowth of Animism? There are\nclear motives for the change; since the latter method is easily carried\nout by oneself, is far less painful, and is more stimulating to the\nimaginative belief of the laity, and therefore more imposing. For the\ninverse change there are no motives. And therefore, probably, wizards\nof the third class are really less competent than the others; for the\nman who, after the new spirit-path has been opened up, still prefers\nthe old road through pain and privation must be (comparatively) an\nunimaginative, dull, honest, inferior fellow.\n\nOld wizards of the Warramunga, receiving a new candidate for the\nprofession, allow him during the process no rest; he must stand or\nwalk until quite worn out, when he scarcely knows what is happening\nto him; deprived for a long time of water and food, he becomes dazed\nand stupefied.[427] In the western islands of Torres Straits, a novice\nwas taken into the bush by his instructor, who def\u00e6cated into a shell\nfull of water and made him drink it with his eyes open; next he must\nchew certain fruits and plants, which made his inside bad and his\nskin itch; then shark\u2019s flesh, and, finally, the decomposing flesh\nof a dead man full of maggots. He became very ill and half frantic.\nFew cared to undergo these rites; some gave up the undertaking; some\ndied of it.[428] In British Guiana, an aspirant to wizardry undergoes\nlong fasts, wanders alone in the bush (full of terrors to the timid\nIndian), and accustoms himself to take large draughts of tobacco-juice\nmixed with water, which cause temporary insanity.[429] Across the\nwatershed to the S.W., the office of medicine-man is hereditary; yet\nWaterton reports that probationers have to endure exhausting ordeals\nand tortures.[430] The severe training of the Bantu witch-doctor kills\nmany novices.[431] Under such conditions, only men of unusual force\nof will, or constancy of infatuation (qualities not always easy to\ndiscriminate), can become wizards. Preparatory ritual for the office\nof shaman among the Buryats of Siberia is elaborate, expensive and\nintimidating: a candidate of poor family is helped by the community to\nget animals for sacrifice and objects necessary for the rites; but many\nshrink from the trial, \u201cdreading the vast responsibility it brings; for\nthe gods deal severely with those who have undergone consecration, and\npunish with death any serious mistake.\u201d There are nine degrees in the\nprofession, each requiring a special initiation.[432] Thus, in many\ncases, the ordeal of initiation turns away the weak and incompetent,\nand keeps up the wizardly profession at a high level of resolution\nand endurance. In more sophisticated societies a similar result is\nobtained by the belief that the attainment of magical powers depends\nupon the undergoing of prolonged austerity in study, or in privations\nand tortures, which give a mystical right to supernatural power: the\nsuperstition upon which Southey raised _The Curse of Kehama_\u2014least\nunreadable of his romances.\n\nAs for the courage that may be requisite for carrying on the wizard\u2019s\npractices, when he is the terror of his neighbours, their attitude\ntowards him varies, in different tribes, from the tamest toleration to\nmurderous antagonism. Thus, in the western islands of Torres Straits,\nProfessor Haddon never knew the sorcerers mobbed or violently put to\ndeath on account of their magical practices.[433] In New Caledonia,\nwhen a sorcerer causes a general famine, the people merely make him\npresents to procure a return of plenty.[434] Among the Todas, a man who\nis the victim of a sorcerer pays him to have the curse removed.[435] In\nsuch cases, effrontery is all the sorcerer needs. On the other hand,\nnear Finsch Harbour in New Guinea, a dangerous sorcerer is often put\nto death; and so he is amongst the neighbouring Kais.[436] Such in\nfact is the more general practice;[437] and the wizard, carrying on his\nprofession at the risk of his life, must be supported by the sort of\nfearlessness that criminals often show.\n\nConfronted with supernatural dangers, the sorcerer\u2019s need of courage\nmust depend upon the sincerity of his own belief in them: a matter to\nbe discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. If his professions\nare veracious, the attitude of such a man toward spiritual powers\ncannot be sustained by any ordinary daring. In the N.W. Amazons the\nshaman is the only one of his tribe who dares go alone into the haunted\nforest. Zulu doctors, who specialise as \u201cheaven-herds,\u201d fight the\nThunderstorm with spear and shield until he flees away.[438] Everywhere\nthe sorcerer fights the demons of disease with reckless valour. On the\nCongo he drives them into some animal, and then cuts its head off. In\nNorth America he intimidates, quells and exorcises them with furious\nboasting. In Siberia, to capture the fleeting soul of a patient, he\nfollows it over land and sea and into the regions of the dead. The\nInnuit of Greenland acknowledge Sedna as the supreme Being and the\ncreatress of all living things; yet their angakoq subdue even her:\none lures her from Adlivun with a magic song; whilst another, as she\nemerges, harpoons her with a seal-spear, which is then found to be\nsmeared with blood.[439] To obtain assistance from even the highest\nspirits the wizard deceives them; or to slay an enemy he usurps their\npowers. The Malay avenges himself by making an image of his victim in a\nshroud, and praying over it as over the dead; then he buries it in the\npath to his victim\u2019s house, and says:\n\n \u201cPeace be to you, ho prophet Tap, in whose charge the earth is!\n Lo I am burying the corpse of (name of victim)\n I am bidden by the prophet Mohammed,\n Because he (the victim) was a rebel against God.\n Do you assist in killing him.\n If you do not kill him,\n You shall be a rebel against God,\n A rebel against Mohammed.\n It is not I who am burying him.\n It is Gabriel who is burying him.\n Do you grant my prayer this day:\n Grant it by the grace of my petition within the fold of the creed\n La ilaha, etc.\u201d[440]\n\nOne might suppose that the audacity of blaspheming could rise no higher\nthan this; but an Egyptian woman, when in labour, was taught to declare\nherself to be Isis, and to summon the gods to her help. \u201cShould they\nrefuse to come, \u2018Then shall ye be destroyed, ye nine gods; the heaven\nshall no longer exist, the earth shall no longer exist, the five days\nover and above the year shall cease to be; offerings shall no more be\nmade to the gods, the lords of Heliopolis, etc.\u2019\u201d[441] If the facts\nwere not before us, it would be incredible that a fixed purpose of\nobtaining supernatural aid should thus exclude from the mind all\nthoughts of the divine attributes and of one\u2019s own insignificance.\n\n(3) What motives impel a man to adopt this strange and hazardous\nprofession, or sustain him amidst all the dangers and disappointments\nof exercising it? In the first place, some men are oppressed by a\nvocation toward wizardry; just as amongst ourselves some men have an\nirresistible vocation to be poets, though that way poverty stares them\nin the face. To ordinary people these seem to be cases for the asylum.\nYet we may understand the \u201cvotary of the Muses\u201d by considering that\nthe poet, as the master of rhythm, the treasurer of tradition, the\narbiter of fame, has had a necessary place in the ancient culture of\nthe tribes, and greatest in the noblest tribes. A tribe that produces\npoets has an advantage in the struggle of life; and, accordingly,\na strain of poet-blood is bred in the tribe, and shows itself in a\ncertain number of youths in each generation. I think the same must be\ntrue of wizards. They are often \u201ccalled\u201d; the Altaians believe that\nno man of his free will becomes a shaman.[442] Like poets, they are\nsacred and possessed. They are also very useful: their functions in\nseveral ways overlap those of the poet, as in cherishing traditions;\nand often they themselves are poets. They give confidence to their\nfellows amidst the awful imaginary dangers of savage life. Their\nnervous temperament may raise the vital level of a tribe. They keep\nalive the beliefs in taboo and the like mysterious dangers, on which\nsavage order and morality depend; and in many cases they become leaders\nand chieftains. In this way, belief in Magic and Animism seems to have\nbeen the necessary scaffolding of social life.[443] And were this all,\nthe utility of wizards would be clear. But they often do so much and\nsuch horrible mischief, prohibiting every improvement and spreading\ngeneral terror, that it is difficult to judge, in such cases, whether\ntheir activities leave a balance of good or of evil. Perhaps sometimes\nthe evil may exceed, and a tribe may degenerate and perish of it. On\nthe whole, however, there is certainly a balance of good, especially\nby leadership at early stages of social development; and this accounts\nfor the flourishing from age to age of the wizardly profession, and for\nthe attraction it has for those of wizardly blood who enter it, because\nit promises to satisfy an innate disposition. Even in a civilised\ncountry, this disposition still, in a few people, manifests itself in\nthe old way; but for the most part has been \u201csublimated\u201d into other\nprofessions. Of course that which attracts the neophyte of wizardry is\nnot the utility of the profession, any more than the youthful poet is\nallured by the utility of poetry. That which appeals to the wizard of\ninbred genius is (besides the indulgence of his personal powers) the\nmystery of wizardry; which excites in his soul a complex, consisting\nchiefly of curiosity as to the unknown powers that control nature and\nspirit, the fascination of fear in approaching them and an exaltation\nof self-consciousness at the prospect of attaining superhuman wisdom\nand authority. The article on Shamanism,[444] which I have cited so\noften, describes the shaman as sometimes profoundly convinced that he\nwas chosen for the service of the spirits; and says that some feel\na compulsive vocation, and endure persecution for their faith; they\ncannot help shamanising. One is mentioned as having been gifted with a\nsensitive nature and an ardent imagination, he had a strong belief in\nthe spirits and in his own mysterious intercourse with them.\n\nMen of such a temperament, I take it, distinguishing themselves\nabove others when every man practised magic or sorcery, founded the\nprofession, and are always its vital nucleus, though in time they\nmay become but a small proportion of its members. Under sincere\ninfatuation they established its observances\u2014the fastings, sufferings,\nausterities, visions and frenzies of initiation, whether into magical\nknowledge or spiritual possession; the working of themselves up,\nwhilst officiating, into the orgiastic intoxication in which they felt\ntheir own greatness and dominated their audience; and they discovered\nsome of the modes of operating by drugs and suggestion and some real\nremedies. But the profession, once formed, soon had attractions for\na very different sort of man, impelled by very different motives;\nwho saw in it the road sometimes to wealth, always to reputation and\npower. Since, amongst very primitive people there is little wealth\nto collect, and sometimes (as we have seen) remuneration of magical\nservices is neither given nor expected, the earlier of these motives\nmust have been the love of causing wonder and fear, of the power which\ntheir fellows\u2019 fears conferred and of the reputation which consequently\nspread far and wide. In Mota (Melanesia) a man in control of magical\nvirtue will render services without reward, merely to add to his\nreputation for the possession of _mana_.[445] At first they seem to\nhave had no privileges, but power acquires privilege: so that, among\nthe Warramunga, wizards are free from sexual taboos;[446] in Guiana no\ntribesman dares refuse the sorcerer anything, not even his wife;[447]\namong the Boloki, the sorcerer is never charged with injurious\nwitchcraft and, therefore, is never in danger of the ordeal.[448]\n\nSometimes, indeed, the wizard may not be respected in private life,\nbut only in the exercise of his office. Fear and wonder, in fact, do\nnot always entirely blind the eyes of neighbours to his shortcomings.\nSpencer and Gillen tell us that the Magic of distant places, being\nthe less known, is the more feared.[449] The Rev. J.\u00a0H. Weeks even\nsays that on the Congo the village medicine-man is seldom engaged at\nhome; for the people know that his fetich cannot protect him or his\nfrom harm and, therefore, hire some one from another village of whom\nthey know less.[450] Similarly, a tribe is apt to fear its own adepts\nless than those of another tribe of lower culture, whose ways are less\nknown and more mysterious: as Malays fear especially the Jakuns;[451]\nformerly the Swedes the Finns, and the Finns the Lapps; the Todas the\nKurumba;[452] and in Macedonia Mohammedan monks enjoy a far higher\nreputation for Magic than the Christian.[453]\n\nStill, the wizard, whether of home or foreign growth, becomes necessary\nin every crisis of life, at birth and marriage, in misfortune, sickness\nand death; in every undertaking\u2014hunting, agriculture or commerce;\nand by his omens and auguries may determine war and peace. After his\nown death, he may sometimes look forward to being deified. With such\npowers, surrounded by intimidated and dependent crowds, and often\nenjoying a long career of conscious or unconscious imposture, he seems\nto himself, as to others, a \u201csuperman\u201d; his _Selbstgef\u00fchl_ rises to\nmegalomania, and his boasting becomes monstrous and stupefying.\n\n(4) The more to impress the imagination of all spectators and enhance\nhis reputation, the wizard usually affects a costume, or behaviour,\nor strange companionship of animals, that distinguishes him from the\nrest of his tribe. Not always; for Miss Czaplicka[454] says that in\nSiberia the shaman is in everyday life not distinguished from others,\nexcept occasionally by a haughty demeanour; but the rule is otherwise.\nA.\u00a0W. Howitt[455] relates that one Australian medicine-man obtained\ninfluence by always carrying about with him a lace-lizard four feet\nlong; another cherished a tame brown snake; and an old woman kept a\nnative cat (_Daysurus_): \u201cfamiliars\u201d that correspond to the black cats\nand goats of our own witches. The Arunta medicine-man bores a hole\nin his tongue, appears with a broad band of powdered charcoal and\nfat across the bridge of his nose and learns to look preternaturally\nsolemn, as one possessing knowledge hidden from ordinary men.[456] In\nthe forest of the upper Amazons, the medicine-man does not depilate,\nthough the rest of his tribe do so to distinguish themselves from\nmonkeys; and he attempts to present in his costume something original\nand striking.[457] In S. Africa, too, the witch-doctor\u2019s dress is often\nvery conspicuous. So it is throughout history: the thaumaturgist, by\nhis wand, robes, austerities, demeanour, advertises himself as a man\napart from the crowd. Rites of initiation mark this superiority: as\ntribal initiation separates a man from women and boys, so the wizard\u2019s\ninitiation makes him a \u201csuperman.\u201d\n\n(5) Such a temper cannot endure opposition, and is jealous of\nrivalry; the man whom it actuates lives in constant fear of failure\nand discredit and is, therefore, full of suspicion and cruelty. In\nS. Africa, professional hatred is pushed to its last limits amongst\nmagicians. They test their colleagues, steal each other\u2019s drugs, or\npray to the gods to make their rival\u2019s art inefficient.[458] The savage\nsorcerer looks with no kindly eye upon the European; who, too plainly,\npossesses extraordinary Magic. Captain Whiffen says[459] of the\nsorcerer amongst the South Amerinds, who has much knowledge of poisons,\nthat to maintain his reputation, if he has declared that he cannot cure\na patient, he poisons him. Of the sorcerer of the Lower Congo, Mr.\nWeeks says, that \u201chis face becomes ugly, repulsive, the canvas on which\ncruelty, chicanery, hatred and all devilish passions are portrayed with\nrepellent accuracy.\u201d[460] An extreme case perhaps; but, leading up to\nit, there are all degrees of rancour and malignity toward those who\nhinder our ambitions; and it can only be in exceptional magicians that\nmegalomania is reconcilable with considerateness and magnanimity.\n\n(6) Since the greater part of the wizard\u2019s practice is imposture\n(whether he believes in himself or not), he must be an actor; and his\nsuccess must greatly depend on the degree in which he possesses the\nactor\u2019s special gifts and temperament: an audience must be a stimulus\nto him and not a check; he exhibits himself not unwillingly. To the\nshaman, Miss Czaplicka tells us,[461] an audience is useful: though\nthe presence of an European is depressing. A Chuckchee shaman without\na sort of chorus considers himself unable to discharge his office:\nnovices in training usually get a brother or sister to respond to their\nexercises. And, indeed, a wizard\u2019s exhibitions often provide without\ndesign the same sort of social entertainment as those of an actor.\nOne cannot read of the shaman\u2019s performance of a pantomimic journey\non horseback to the South, over frozen mountains, burning deserts,\nand along the bridge of a single hair, stretched across a chasm over\nfoaming whirlpools, to Erlik Khan\u2019s abode, and then home again on the\nback of a flying goose, without perceiving that in the wilds of Siberia\nsuch an entertainment, whatever other virtues it may have, supplies the\nwant of theatres and music-halls, and that in such displays a dramatic\nprofession might originate.\n\nBut there are two kinds of actors; and they correspond well enough with\nthe two kinds of wizards already described\u2014the vocational and the\nexploitative. Some actors are said to identify themselves with their\nassumed character and situation so profoundly as to substantiate the\nfiction: concentration of imagination, amounting to dissociation, makes\nthe part they play, whilst it lasts, more real than anything else; and\nraises them, for that time, in energy of thought, feeling and action,\nmuch above their ordinary powers; so that they compel the attention,\nsympathy and belief of the audience. But others study their part and\ndetermine beforehand exactly what tones, gestures, expressions are the\nmost effective reinforcement of every word, and thereafter carry out\nupon the stage in cold blood the whole dramatic lesson which they have\ntaught themselves. Perhaps more common than either of these extreme\ntypes is the actor who begins by studying under a sort of inspiration,\nand after experimenting for a few nights, repeats what he has found to\nanswer best. We need not consider those who can do nothing but what\nthey have been taught by others. Well, the wizard by vocation probably\nbehaves like the first kind of actor: enters upon any office to which\nhe may be called in exclusive devotion to his task; works himself into\na frenzy, groans, writhes and sweats under the possession of his demon;\nchants incantations in an archaic tongue; drums and dances by the\nhour, and falls into speechless trance\u2014according to the professional\npattern\u2014all in what may be described as dramatic good faith. By native\ndisposition and by practised self-suggestion he obtains a temporary\ndissociation. The opposite sort of wizard, exploiting the profession,\nsees all this, and imitates it with such improvements as he may be\nable to devise. Of the intervening crowd of charlatans, who mingle\nself-delusion with deceit in all possible proportions, no definite\naccount can be given.\n\nAccording to Diderot,[462] the greatest actors belong to the second\nclass, to the deliberate and disciplined artists. We may be sure the\ngods in the gallery, if they understood what was going on under their\neyes, would always prefer the inspired performers. Probably these are,\nin fact, the greatest in their best hours, but less to be depended on,\nless sure of being always equal to themselves. And the same may be\ntrue of the corresponding sorts of wizards. The lucid impostor, at any\nrate, is less likely to be abashed by unforeseen difficulties and by\nthe awkwardness of failure, less likely to be mobbed and murdered and\npegged down in his grave with aspen stakes.\n\n(7) Wizards are very often people who manifest an hysterical or\nepileptoid diathesis; and candidates for the profession who show signs\nof it are often preferred by the doctors. According to Miss Czaplicka,\nhysteria (common in Siberia) is at the bottom of the shaman\u2019s vocation:\nbut it is not merely a matter of climate; for the Rev. E.\u00a0T. Bryant\nwrites of the Zulus\u2014\u201cthe great majority of diviners being clearly of\nneurotic type\u201d;[463] and on all sides we obtain from descriptions of\nwizards the same impression. The word \u201cshaman\u201d comes not, as usually\nsupposed, from the Sanskrit (_\u015bramana_ = work, a religious mendicant),\nbut from _saman_, which is Manchu for \u201cone who is excited, moved,\nraised.\u201d[464] The effect on the audience of shamanising depends in\ngreat measure upon the fits, ecstasy, convulsions introduced at some\nstage of the performance and attributed to possession by the spirits.\nSimilar exhibitions have been reported by all observers of wizardry.\nProfessor Otto Stoll of Zurich has described[465] the phenomena as they\noccur in all countries and all ages; and he attributes them, as well as\nhallucinations and analgesia (as in the fire-walk), which wizards also\nhave at command, to the power of self-suggestion acquired by practice\nand training, on the basis (of course) of a natural disposition.\nCagliostro declared that he could smell atheists and blasphemers; \u201cthe\nvapour from such throws him into epileptic fits; into which sacred\ndisorder he, like a true juggler, has the art of falling when he\nlikes.\u201d[466] The wizard\u2019s fits are voluntarily induced; but from the\nmoment the attack takes place the development of its symptoms becomes\nautomatic. Between the fits, however, says Miss Czaplicka, he must be\nable to master himself, or else he becomes incapable of his profession:\nnervous and excitable often to the verge of insanity, if he passes that\nverge he must retire.[467] In short, his ecstasy is the climacterical\nscene of his dramatic performance, the whole of which must be rendered\nwith the disciplined accuracy of an artist. We are not to think of the\nshaman as an hysterical patient: if he were, there would be greater,\nnot less, reason to suspect him of deceit. No doubt the training which\ngives control of the nervous attack protects the subject from its\nunwholesome consequences; there seems to be no special liability to\ndisease or to a shortening of life. Formerly in Siberia, before the\npower of the profession was broken by immigrant beliefs and practices,\nit was necessary that the shaman should be well-developed mentally\nand physically (as has often been required of priests); and such a\nconstitution is by no means incompatible with an intense histrionic\ntemperament.\n\nA necessary complement to the suggestive devices of a wizard is the\nsuggestibility of his clients. There is such a thing as an assenting or\na dissenting disposition\u2014suggestibility or contrasuggestibility; but\nthe latter is, like the former, a tendency to react without reflection,\nand may be as well controlled by appropriate suggestions. The power\nof any given suggestion to control the course of a man\u2019s thought and\naction depends upon the resistance (apart from contra-suggestibility)\nwhich it meets with in his mind; and this depends upon the extent,\nquality and integration of his apperceptive masses, and upon the\nfacility with which they come into action. Upon the perceptual plane a\nsavage\u2019s mind is well organised, and accordingly his suggestibility is\nlow; but upon the ideational plane it is in most cases ill organised,\npoor in analysis, classification, generalisation, poor in knowledge,\nabounding in imagination-beliefs about Magic and Animism; so that,\nexcept in natural sceptics (who, as we shall see, exist among savages),\nthe suggestions of the wizard meet with little resistance from common\nsense and with ready acceptance by magical and animistic prejudice.\nBut even with a man of common sense, a suggestion, however absurd,\nmay for a time prevail, if his mental reaction is slow; although,\nwith time for reflection, he will certainly reject it. The art of the\nwizard consists in getting such hold of his client\u2019s attention that,\nas in hypnosis, the power of reflective comparison is suspended and\ncriticism abolished. There are many masters of this art. The client\u2019s\nstate of mind is very common in the effects of oratory, the theatre,\nghost-stories and generally in the propagation of opinion, suspicion\nand prejudice.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. THE WIZARD AND THE SCEPTIC\n\nInasmuch as the wizard\u2019s boasting, conjuring, ventriloquising,\ndramatising and practising of all the arts of suggestion, seem\nincompatible with sincerity, whilst nevertheless he is devoted to his\ncalling, some observers have declared him a calculating impostor,\nwhilst others maintain that he, in various degrees, believes in himself\nand shares the delusions which he propagates. Examples may be found in\nsupport of either position.\n\nSome say that the wizard believes in himself because all others believe\nin him; that at a certain level of culture, there is an universal\nsocial obsession by certain ideas, from which the individual cannot\nescape, and for whose consequences, therefore, he is not responsible.\nAccording to this theory, a sort of tribal insanity prevails. Dr.\nMercier says that, in the individual, paranoia is characterised\nby systematised delusion: \u201cthere is an organised body of (false)\nknowledge, and it differs from other delusions in the fact that it\ncolours the whole life of the patient; it regulates his daily conduct;\nit provides him with an explanation of all his experiences; it is his\ntheory of the cosmos.\u201d And, again, \u201cas long as the highest level of\nthought is intact, so that we can and do recognise that our mistakes\nare mistakes and our disorders, whether of mind or conduct, are\ndisorders, so long sanity is unaffected, and our mistakes and disorders\nare sane. As soon, however, as we become incompetent to make this\nadjustment ... insanity is established.\u201d[468] These passages exactly\ndescribe the condition of a wizard and his tribe afflicted with social\nparanoia: their theories of Magic and Animism and of the wizard\u2019s\nrelations with invisible powers, may truly be said to form an organised\nbody of (false) knowledge, to colour all their lives, to explain\neverything that happens to them; and their mistakes and disorders to\nbe incorrigible by reflection or experience. Such conditions of the\nsocial mind have, I believe, existed (and may still exist), tending\ntoward, and sometimes ending in, a tribe\u2019s destruction. That, in such\na case, there should be unanimity is not necessary; it is enough that\nthe current of belief, in certain directions, be overwhelming. But such\nextreme cases are rare. Normally there may be found, even in backward\ntribes, a good deal of incredulity and of what may be called primitive\nrationalism or positivism.\n\nConsiderable sections of a tribe sometimes co-operate in imposture, the\nmen against the women and children, or the old against the young; and\nit cannot be supposed that, where this occurs, anything like universal\ndelusion prevails. The Arunta, who teach their women and children that\nTwanyiriki is a spirit living in wild regions, who attends initiations,\nand that the noise of the bull-roarer is his voice; whilst they reveal\nto the youths when initiated that the bundle of churinga is the true\nTwanyiriki,[469] cannot be blind to the existence of social fictions.\nThe discovery by initiated youths in some parts of New Guinea, that\nBalum, the monster that is believed to swallow them during initiation,\nis nothing but a bug-a-boo, and that his growl is only the bull-roarer,\nmust be a shock to their credulity.[470] Indeed, disillusionment as\nto some popular superstition is a common characteristic of initiation\nceremonies.[471] On the mainland of New Caledonia, a spirit-night is\nheld every five months; when the people assemble around a cave and\ncall upon the ghosts, supposed to be inside it, to sing; and they do\nsing\u2014the nasal squeak of old men and women predominating.[472] There\nis not in such cases any natural growth of social delusion, subduing\nthe individual mind, but prearranged cozenage; and a wizard with such\nsurroundings, instead of being confirmed in the genuineness of his art,\nonly reads there the method of his own imposture in large type.[473]\n\nHome-bred wizards, who are less trusted than those who live further\noff, or than those of an inferior tribe, do not derive self-confidence\nfrom the unanimous approval of their neighbours.\n\nAgain, the general prevalence of delusions in a tribe does not\nsuppress the scepticism of individuals. It is reasonable to expect\nsuch scepticism to be most prevalent amongst men of rank, who are\ncomparatively exempt from the oppression of popular sanctions; and\nprobably this is the fact. Such exemption, by preserving a nucleus\nof relatively sane people, is one of the great social utilities of\nrank. The Basuto chief, Mokatchan\u00e9, surrounded by people grossly\nsuperstitious, lent himself to their practices; but in paying his\ndiviners he did not hesitate so say \u201cthat he regarded them as the\nbiggest impostors in the world.\u201d[474] In Fiji, it is doubtful whether\nthe high chiefs believed in the inspiration of the priests, though it\nsuited their policy to appear to do so. There was an understanding\nbetween the two orders: one got sacrifices (food), the other good\noracles. A chieftain, on receiving an unfavourable oracle, said to\nthe priest: \u201cWho are you? Who is your god? If you make a stir, I will\neat you\u201d[475]\u2014not metaphorically. In Tonga, \u201ceven seventeen years\nbefore the arrival of the first missionaries, the chiefs did not\ncare to conceal their scepticism.\u201d In Vavou, Taufaahan, having long\nbeen sceptical of his ancestral faith, on learning of Christianity,\nhanged five idols by the neck, beat the priestess, and burned the\nspirit-houses.[476] The Vikings, like the Homeric heroes, are said\nto have fought their gods; and at other times to have declared\nentire disbelief in them. Hence the easy conversion of the North to\nChristianity. Scepticism may have been fashionable at court much\nearlier: \u201cIt is scarcely possible to doubt,\u201d says Mr. Chadwick,\n\u201cthat familiarity, not to say levity, in the treatment of the gods\ncharacterised the Heroic Age [Teutonic\u2014A.D. 350-550] just as much as\nthat of the Vikings.\u201d[477] The burlesque representations of the gods\nin some passages of the _Iliad_ are a sort of atheism: in astonishing\ncontrast with the sublime piety elsewhere expressed. And the inadequacy\nof such a literary religion (like that of Valhalla) may explain the\nfacile reception (or revival) of the Mysteries in the sixth century\nB.C. History abounds with examples of rulers and priests who, in\ncollusion, have used religion for political convenience, in a way that\nimplied their own disbelief and opened unintentionally the doors of\ndisbelief to others.\n\nBut it is not only chiefs and heroes whose minds are sometimes\nemancipated from popular superstitions. An old Australian whose duty\nit was to watch the bones of a dead man and to keep alight a fire near\nthem, sold them for some tobacco and a tomahawk, in great fear lest\nit should be known to his tribesmen; but he \u201cevidently suffered from\nno qualms of conscience\u201d:[478] that is to say, he feared the living,\nbut not the dead. W. Stanbridge says of the aborigines of Victoria\nthat \u201cthere are doctors or priests of several vocations; of the rain,\nof rivers and of human diseases ... but there are natives who refuse\nto become doctors and disbelieve altogether the pretensions of those\npersons.\u201d[479] John Matthew writes of the tribe with which he was best\nacquainted\u2014\u201cwhilst the blacks had a term for ghosts and behind these\nwere departed spirits, ... individual men would tell you upon inquiry\nthat they believed that death was the last of them.\u201d[480] Near Cape\nKing William in New Guinea, there is a general belief in spirits and\nghosts and also in one Mate; but some whisper that there is no such\nbeing.[481] The Bakongo villagers do not believe in all witchcraft; but\nrespect some sorcerers, and regard others with more or less contempt:\nevery man, however, must profess belief, or else \u201chis life will be made\nwretched by accusations of witchcraft.\u201d[482] Before missionaries came\namongst the Baloki, many people had no faith in the medicine-men, but\nwould not oppose them for fear of being charged with witchcraft.[483]\nThe religious convictions of the Zulus were very shallow; belief in\nthe spirit-world depended on prosperity: \u201cfullness declares the Itongo\nexists; affliction says it does not exist.\u201d ... \u201cFor my part, I say\nthe Amadhlozi of our house died forever.\u201d[484] Capt. Whiffen reports\nof the tribes of S. Amerinds whom he visited that, \u201camong individuals\nthere are sceptics of every grade.\u201d[485] Whilst all Dakotas reverence\nthe great, intangible, mysterious power Takoo-Wahkon, as to particular\ndivinities, any man may worship some and despise others. \u201cOne speaks\nof the medicine-dance with respect; another smiles at the name.\u201d The\nAssiniboin generally believe that good ghosts migrate to the south\nwhere game is abundant; whilst the wicked go northward; but some think\nthat death ends all.[486] At Ureparapara (Banks Islands) food is buried\nwith a corpse; and \u201cif there be too much, some is hung above the grave,\nwhence the bolder people take it secretly and eat it.\u201d[487] Disbelief\nis expressed in actions more emphatically than in words; the plundering\nof tombs has been universal. An idol-maker of Maeva assured Ellis that,\n\u201calthough at times he thought it was all deception and only practised\nhis trade for gain, yet at other times he really thought the gods he\nhimself had made were powerful beings.\u201d[488] In Tonga it was orthodox\nthat chiefs and their retainers were immortal, doubtful whether men of\nthe third rank were so, certain that those of the lowest rank, Tooas,\nwere not; their souls died with the body; yet some of these Tooas\nventured to think that they too would live again.[489] A sceptical\nKayan could hardly believe that men continue to exist after death; for\nthen they would return to visit those they love. \u201cBut,\u201d he concluded,\n\u201cwho knows?\u201d The traditionary lore of the Kayans answers many deep\nquestions; but the keener intelligences inquire further\u2014\u201cwhy do the\ndead become visible only in dreams?\u201d etc.[490] A Tanghul told me, says\nMr. T.\u00a0C. Hodson, that no one had ever seen a Lai (deity): when things\nhappened men said a Lai had done it. \u201cIn his view clearly a Lai was a\nmere hypothesis.\u201d[491]\n\nOf such examples of the occurrence of \u201cfree-thought\u201d in all parts of\nthe world, no doubt, a little investigation would discover many more.\nEverywhere some savages think for themselves; though, like civilised\nfolk, they cannot always venture to avow their conclusions. We must\nnot suppose that belief is as uniform as custom or conventional\ndoctrine: custom and convention hinder thought in dull people, but\ndo not enslave it in the \u201ckeener intelligence.\u201d Without the enviable\nadvantage of personal intimacy with savages, I have, by reading about\nthem, gained the impression that they enjoy a considerable measure of\nindividuality\u2014as much as the less educated Europeans\u2014and are not mere\ncreatures of a social environment.\n\nThe most backward savages have a large stock of common sense concerning\nthe properties of bodies, of wind and water and fire, of plants and\nanimals and human nature; for this is the necessary ground of their\nlife. This common sense has certain characters which are in conflict\nwith their superstitions; the facts known to common sense are regular,\nproportional, the same for all; not often failing and needing excuses,\nnot extravagant and disconnected, not depending on the presence of some\nfantastic mountebank. Savages do not draw explicitly the comparisons\nthat make this conflict apparent; but it may be felt without being\ndefined. Some of them, especially, are (as amongst ourselves)\nnaturally inclined to a positive way of thinking; their common sense\npredominates over the suggestions of Magic and Animism, and they,\nmore than others aware of the conflict, become the proto-sceptics\nor rationalists. Lecky observes that beliefs and changes of belief\ndepend not upon definite arguments, but upon habits of thought. In the\nseventeenth century a new habit of thought overcame the belief in\nwitchcraft and miracles;[492] and in many other centuries it has\neverywhere done the same for those in whom the \u201capperceptive mass\u201d of\ncommon sense became more or less clearly and steadily a standard of\nbelief, repelling the apperceptive masses of Magic and Animism with all\ntheir contents and alliances. They had more definite ideas than others,\nlittle love of the marvellous, little subjection to fear, desire,\nimagination.\n\nSometimes the dictates of common sense are imposed by necessity. The\nMotu (Papuasian) were accustomed to rub spears with ginger to make\nthem fly straight. It had, however, been discovered that no amount\nof Magic would turn a poor spearman into an accurate thrower.[493]\nSpear-throwing is too serious a concern not to be judged of upon its\nmerits, however interesting the properties of ginger. A whole tribe may\nin some vital matter, whilst practising a superstitious rite, disregard\nits significance: like the Kalims, who hold a crop-festival in January,\nand afterwards take the omens as to what ground shall be cultivated for\nnext harvest; \u201cbut this seems a relic of old times, for the circle of\ncultivation is never broken, let the omens be what they may.\u201d[494] That\nis a tacit triumph of common sense.\n\nThe bearing of all this on the character of the wizard is as follows:\nsince everywhere sceptics occur, and some individuals go further than\nothers in openly or secretly rejecting superstitions, why should not\nthe wizard or sorcerer, who is amongst the most intelligent and daring\nof his tribe, be himself a rationalist and, therefore, a conscious\nimpostor? That much of his art is imposture no one disputes; and so far\nas it is so, he sees it as part of the ordinary course of experience.\nThe sorcerer on the Congo who drove a spirit into the dark corner of\na hut, stabbed it there, and showed the blood upon his spear, having\nproduced the blood (as his son confessed to Mr. Weeks) by scratching\nhis own gums, was by that action himself instructed in common\nsense.[495] He saw in it quite plainly an ordinary course of events,\nthe \u201croutine of experience\u201d; whilst the spectators were mystified. Must\nhe not, then, have more common sense than other people?\n\nIn fact, he recognises the course of nature and his own impotence,\nwhenever an attempt to conjure would endanger his reputation. The\nArunta medicine-men exhibit great dramatic action in curing various\ndiseases; but waste no antics on recognisable senile decay.[496] The\nmedicine-man of Torres Straits admits that he cannot make a \u201cbig wind\u201d\nfrom the south-east during the north-west season.[497] The Polynesian\nsorcerers confessed their practices harmless to Europeans;[498]\u2014who\nwere not suggestible on that plane of ideas. Shamans amongst the\nYakuts would not try to cure diarrh\u0153a, small-pox, syphilis, scrofula\nor leprosy, and would not shamanise in a house where small-pox had\nbeen.[499] These miracle-mongers sometimes know a hawk from a handsaw.\nIt seems reasonable, then, to assume that wizards have more common\nsense than other people; since, besides the instruction of common\nexperience, they know in their professional practice (at least in\na superficial way) the real course of events, which is concealed\nfrom the laity. And, no doubt, of those whose art is deliberate\nimposture, this is true. But the infatuation of those who are wizards\nby vocation may be incorrigible by any kind of evidence: especially\nas to the genuineness of another\u2019s performance. Dr. Rivers speaks of\nthe blindness of the man of rude culture to deceitful proceedings on\nthe part of others with which he is familiar in his own actions.[500]\nFor the wizard there are established prejudices, professional and\npersonal interest, fear of trusting his own judgment, supernatural\nresponsibility, desire of superhuman power, sometimes even a passionate\ndesire to alleviate the sufferings of his tribesmen, and everything\nelse that confirms the will to believe.\n\n\n\u00a75. THE WIZARD\u2019S PERSUASION\n\nMany practices of wizards involve a representation of the course of\nevents as something very different from the reality; and there is\nno doubt that frequently, or even in most cases, wizards are aware\nof this, as in performing the sucking cure or visiting the man in\nthe moon. But some anthropologists dislike to hear such practices\ndescribed as \u201cfraud,\u201d \u201cimposture\u201d or \u201cdeceit\u201d; and for certain classes\nof wizards it seems (as I shall show) unjust to speak in these terms\nof their profession. Still, taking the profession and its actions on\nthe whole, it is difficult to find in popular language terms more\nfairly descriptive. We meet here the inconvenience that other social or\nmoral sciences find when they try to use common words in a specially\nrestricted sense. In Economics, _e.\u00a0g._, \u201crent,\u201d \u201cwages,\u201d \u201cprofits\u201d\nhave definite meanings very different from their popular acceptance. In\nEthics, what controversy, what confusion in the defining of \u201cvirtue\u201d\nand \u201cthe good\u201d! In Metaphysics, what is the meaning of \u201ccause\u201d; what is\nthe meaning of \u201cintuition\u201d? The terms must be defined in each system.\nIf then, in these pages, the conduct of a man who, on his way to cure\na sufferer of \u201cstitch in the side,\u201d conceals in his mouth a piece of\nbone or pebble, and after dancing, and sucking hard enough at the\npatient\u2019s belly, produces that bone or pebble as the cause of pain\u2014is\ndescribed as \u201cfraud,\u201d or \u201cimposture,\u201d or \u201cdeceit,\u201d the words are used\nto describe the fact only, without any such imputation upon the man\u2019s\ncharacter as they convey in popular usage. Scientifically considered,\nthe man and his circumstances being such as they are, his actions are a\nnecessary consequence; in this limited region of thought moral censure\nis irrelevant.\n\nThere are some wizards, as it were in minor orders, such as Professor\nSeligman calls \u201cdepartmental experts,\u201d especially the man who blesses\ngardens, so earnest and harmless that no one will abuse them. They\nvisit the garden at the owner\u2019s request, practise a little hocus-pocus,\nmutter a few spells, take a small fee and go peaceably home. The owner\nindeed supposes himself to buy fertility, and obtains only peace of\nmind\u2014a greater good say the moralists. The wizard has done what he\nlearnt of his father, what respectable neighbours approve of; there\nis always some crop to justify his ministry, and many an evil power\nto excuse occasional blight or drought. If he is convinced of being a\nreally indispensable man, it is easily intelligible.\n\nAs to the profession in general, a small number of wizards\u2014wizards\nby vocation\u2014may be strongly persuaded of the genuineness of the art;\na much larger body mingles credulity in various proportions with\nfraud; and not a few are deliberate cheats. Some of the greatest\nmasters of wizardry are dissatisfied with their own colleagues: that\neminent shaman Scratching Woman said to Bogoras the traveller, \u201cThere\nare many liars in our calling.\u201d[501] On the other hand, the wizard\nwho demonstrated the \u201cpointing-stick\u201d to Messrs. Spencer and Gillen,\nand having no object upon which to discharge its Magic, thought it\nhad entered his own head and thereupon fell ill, was certainly a\nbeliever;[502] and so was the wizard who felt that he had lost his\npower after drinking a cup of tea, because hot drinks were taboo\nto him.[503] Now a cheat needs no explanation\u2014at least no more on\nthe Yenisei than on the Thames; and the variety of those who mingle\ncredulity with fraud is too great to be dealt with. What chiefly needs\nto be accounted for is the persuasion of those who\u2014in spite of so many\ncircumstances that seem to make disillusion inevitable\u2014are in some\nmanner true believers\u2014in the manner, that is to say, of imaginative\nbelief, founded on tradition and desire, unlike the perceptual belief\nof common sense.\n\n(_a_) Men under a vocation to wizardry, of course, begin with full\nbelief in it. Probably they are possessed by the imaginative and\nhistrionic temperament, which we have seen to be favourable to\neminence as a wizard. Their vocation consists in the warm sympathy\nand emulation with which, before their own initiation, they witness\nthe feats of great practitioners, and which generally imply a\nstirring of their own latent powers; just as many an actor has begun\nby being \u201cstage-struck.\u201d A man of such temperament is prone to\nself-delusion not only as to his own powers, but in other ways. The\nwizard often begins by fasting and having visions; thereby weakening\nhis apprehension of the difference between fact and phantasy. The\nfixed idea of his calling begets in his imagination a story of what\nhappened at his initiation, manifestly false, but not a falsehood\u2014a\n\u201crationalisation\u201d according to wizardly ideas of what he can remember\nof that time. If initiated with torture, which he endures for the sake\nof his vocation, he is confirmed in it. When called upon to perform,\nhe \u201cworks himself up\u201d by music, dancing and whatever arts he may have\nlearned or discovered, into a state of dissociation, during which his\njudgment of everything extraneous to his task is suspended; and his\ndramatic demeanour uninhibited by fear or shame, unembarrassed by any\nsecond thoughts, makes, by vivid gestures and contortions and thrilling\ntones, a profound impression upon patients, clients and witnesses. His\nperformances may derive some original traits from his own genius; but\nmust generally conform to a traditionary pattern and to the consequent\nexpectations of the audience. By practice he acquires\u2014as for their\nown tasks all artists, poets and actors must\u2014a facility in inducing\nthe state of dissociation (more or less strict), in which work goes\nsmoothly forward under the exclusive dominance of a certain group\nof ideas and sentiments. Whether, in this condition, he believes in\nhimself and his calling, or not, is a meaningless question. Whilst the\norgasm lasts there is no place for comparison or doubt. And since he\nreally produces by his frenzy or possession a great effect upon the\nspectators\u2014though not always the precise effect of curing a patient or\nof controlling the weather at which he aimed\u2014we need not wonder if he\nbelieves himself capable of much more than he ever accomplishes. The\ntemperament, most favourable to a wizard\u2019s success is not likely to be\naccompanied by a disposition to the positive or sceptical attitude of\nmind. Moreover, to the enthusiast for whom belief is necessary, it is\nalso necessary to create the evidence. That the end justifies the means\nis not his explicit maxim, but a matter of course. Gibbon comments on\n\u201cthe vicissitudes of pious fraud and hypocrisy, which may be observed,\nor at least suspected, in the characters of the most conscientious\nfanatics.\u201d[504] After failures, indeed, or in the languor that follows\nhis transports, there may come many chilling reflections; only,\nhowever, to be dispersed by an invincible desire to believe in his own\npowers and in the profession to which he is committed.\n\nThe \u201cwhite\u201d wizard may pacify a troubled conscience by reflecting\nthat at any rate he discharges a useful social function; as, in fact,\nhe does, so far as he relieves the fears of his tribesmen and gives\nthem confidence. To understand the \u201cblack\u201d wizard, we must turn to\nthe dark side of human nature. That a man should resort to magic or\nsorcery to avenge himself or his kinsmen, or to gratify his carnality,\njealousy or ambition, is intelligible to everybody; but that he should\nmake a profession of assisting others for a fee to betray, injure, or\ndestroy those with whom he has no quarrel, seems almost too unnatural\nto be credible. Yet it admits of a very easy explanation. The love\nof injuring and slaying is deeply rooted in us: men afflicted with\nhomicidal neurosis are known to the asylums and to the criminal courts\nof all civilised nations; assassins on hire have often been notoriously\nobtainable. To slay in cold blood by violence, or even by poison,\nseems, however, less revolting than to slay by sorcery and obscene\nrites. But the fascination of this employment may be further understood\nby considering the attraction that secret power and the proof of their\nown cunning has for many people. To slay is sweet; but the ancient\nhunter depended more upon strategy than upon the frontal attack; and no\nstrategy is so secret or needs so much skill as the Black Art. Finally,\nif sorcery is persecuted, it excites the contra-suggestibility which\nin some neurotics becomes a passion capable of supporting them at the\nstake. Hence the malevolent wizard may feel a vocation, may believe in\nhis own powers; and, of course, he will be confirmed in his belief by\nthe fear excited wherever his reputation spreads. If you put yourself\nin his place whilst practising some unholy rite, you may become aware\nthat the secrecy, the cunning, the danger, the villainy and the\nelation of it exert a peculiar fascination, and that this is enhanced\nby foul and horrible usages, such as appeal to the perverted appetites\nof insanity.\n\n(_b_) The deceit employed by a wizard in conjuring, ventriloquising,\ndressing up, keeping a \u201cfamiliar,\u201d choosing favourable opportunities\nfor his _s\u00e9ance_ and inciting himself to frenzy, seems incompatible\nwith sincerity; but whilst he knows such proceedings to be artifices,\nhe also knows them to be necessary to the effect which he produces.\nFor that effect, so far as it depends upon wizardly practices, not on\nsuch means as massage, or poisons, or drugs, is always subjective\u2014an\ninfluence on other men\u2019s belief. Are we not demanding of him greater\ndiscrimination than he is likely to enjoy, if we expect him to see\nthe hollowness of his profession, because some of the means by which\nhe operates are not what his clients suppose them to be? If it be\nsaid that the wizard\u2019s stock excuses for failure\u2014that there has been\na mistake in the rites, or that another wizard has counteracted his\nefforts\u2014are those of a man who has anticipated detection in fraud and\nprepared a way of escape, it may be replied that, according to accepted\ntenets concerning wizardry, these excuses are reasonable and not\nnecessarily subterfuges.\n\nThe professional attitude may induce a man to exonerate himself and\nhis colleagues in certain dubious dealings, for the sake of the public\nutility of their office on the whole; which is so manifest to him and\nto them, and is also acknowledged by the public. For a wizard\u2019s belief\nin his art is supported by the testimony of other wizards, in whom he\nalso believes, and by the belief of the tribe generally in the power of\nthe profession, even though he himself be not greatly esteemed. \u201cWho am\nI,\u201d he will ask, \u201cthat I should have a conscience of my own?\u201d And if\nthis attitude is inconsistent with keen intelligence and megalomania,\nsuch inconsistency is not inconsistent with our experience of human\nnature.\n\n(_c_) The effects produced by charms, spells and rites, simple or to\nthe last degree elaborate, purely magical or reinforced by spirits, are\nalways subjective, but are believed to have a much wider range. The\nwizard seems to make the sun rise when he summons it just in time every\nmorning; to cause clouds to gather in the sky when he invokes them just\nbefore the rainy season; and so on. Such performances convince others,\nbut seem to us poor evidence for any one who is in the secret. He is\nnot, however, left without further evidence of three kinds:\n\n(i) From the effects of natural causes that form part of his\nprofessional resources. Some of a wizard\u2019s practices are really good;\n_e.\u00a0g._ in curing the sick he may employ massage, or sweat-baths, or\nskilful surgery, or medicinal drugs, or suggestion, and thereby succeed\nwithout any Magic; whilst he is incapable of clearly distinguishing\nthese means from useless rites and incantations. He does not understand\nintimately why _any_ method is efficacious, and therefore cannot\nunderstand the limits of his power. His whole art is empirical. Even\nin modern science explanation always ends sooner or later (and often\npretty soon) in pointing to some connexion of phenomena which we are\nobliged to accept as a fact: the wizard is always brought to this pass\nat the first step. He has no generally acknowledged public standard\nof what may possibly happen: it is only in the mind of a natural\npositivist that a standard of common sense grows up by experience\nwithout explicit generalisation; and this standard is incommunicable.\nHence the wizard is always trying experimentally to extend his\npower\u2014of course on the model of his traditionary art; always desiring\npower, and believing that he has obtained, because he desires it.\n\n(ii) The wizard\u2019s arts are justified by the action of natural causes\nset in motion by his clients. He prepares the hunter and his weapons\nfor an expedition; the hunter does his best, and his success swells the\nreputation of the wizard. Similarly in agriculture, and in war. And in\nall these cases nothing is really due to the wizard, except the greater\nconfidence his clients derive from his ministrations: the hunter\u2019s\nhand is steadier; the sower and the reaper work more cheerfully; and\nthe warrior fights more courageously in the belief that his enemies\nare surely devoted to the infernal gods. But the wizard, with general\nacquiescence, claims far more than this, and rises in his own esteem\nas well as in the esteem of his tribe.\n\n(iii) The persevering wizard is often aided by coincidences. An\nAustralian squatter at Morton\u2019s Plains, after a drought, promised\na native rain-maker half a bullock, a bag of flour and some tea,\nif he would fill his new tank for him before the morrow night. The\nrain-maker set his rites and spells to work, filled the tank and got\nthe reward.[505] Whilst Messrs. Spencer and Gillen were with the\nUrabunna tribe, \u201cthe leading rain-maker performed a ceremony and within\ntwo days there was a downpour\u2014possibly connected with the fact that\nit was the usual time for rain to fall in that part of the country.\u201d\nThe reputation of the rain-maker was firmly established, and, no\ndoubt, his self-confidence. The Australian wizard already mentioned,\nwho thought that his Magic had entered his own head, claimed to have\ndriven away a comet by means of his magic stones. Certainly the comet\ndisappeared, and what other cause could any one point out? \u201cAt one time\nthe gusts were very unpleasant and one of the men told a wind-man to\nmake it stop. Accordingly he shouted out to the wind, and in a minute\nthere was a lull; and no one doubted that this was due to the power of\nthe wind-man.\u201d[506] Many similar cases might be given.[507] Striking\ncoincidences are not very rare: there is an illogical prejudice that\nthey are rare because they excite wonder. Moreover, as I have observed,\nso remote a resemblance to the event shamanised or prophesied may be\nregarded as a fulfilment, that fulfilment is not uncommon. In the\ninterpretation of omens, where there is only the alternative of good\nor ill success, half the guesses must be right; and by the glozing of\ndoubtful cases, more than half will seem to be right. And as for the\neffect of coincidence, Mr. Basil Thompson says, \u201cTongans never admit\ncoincidences\u201d[508]\u2014that is to say, in our sense of the word: for them,\nin what we call coincidence, there must be causation; and this seems\nto be generally true of the untutored mind. Among the Churaches, the\nprofession of shaman is generally hereditary; but a man may become a\nshaman against his will. It is enough \u201cto make a lucky guess as to\nthe issue of some event, and people flock to him for advice from all\nparts.\u201d[509] How many failures are necessary to discredit one lucky\nguess?\n\nThese three kinds of evidence in favour of the wizard\u2019s power\u2014natural\ncauses set in motion by himself, natural causes introduced by his\nclients, and sheer favourable coincidences\u2014have so much the air of\nperceptual proof, or of an appeal to common sense, that the savage\npositivist who is able to resist them must have a more solid judgment\nthan most of our educated civilised people. Judgment is an innate\nindividual character, on which education has little effect, except in\nthe special department of a man\u2019s training. A scientific expert, for\nexample, may be an excellent judge of evidence in his own pursuit,\nand elsewhere quite helpless; for where he is strong it is not a set\nof rules but the mass of his special experience that guides him. That\nout of the mass of general experience, so disorderly and fragmentary\nas it is, some minds should have the power of extracting common sense,\nin spite of the misrepresentations of Magic and Animism, is very\nremarkable, and very fortunate for the rest of us.\n\nThat the three kinds of evidence which serve so well to confirm belief\nin wizardry are all of them\u2014as to the connexion between a wizard\u2019s\nrites or spells and the event\u2014entirely coincidental, gives some\nsupport to the hypothesis that coincidences are the foundation of the\nbelief in Magic.\n\nBearing in mind, then, that a wizard\u2019s practices sometimes include real\ncauses, and that his shallow knowledge disables him for discriminating\nbetween causation and hocus-pocus; that Magic or Sorcery is generally\nbelieved in by those about him, who seek his aid, or the aid of\nothers of his class; that both they and he earnestly desire that\nhis pretensions should be well founded; that he produces striking\nsubjective effects; that in such cases his artifices are a condition of\nhis success, and that a good many coincidences, complete or partial,\nseem to prove that his art has further extraordinary influence upon men\nand nature\u2014it is no wonder that some wizards are deluded along with\ntheir dupes, especially neurotic enthusiasts or men of an imaginative\nand histrionic temperament.\n\nTo explain the possibility of some men being sincere in witchcraft is\nnot to palliate the profession, much less the anti-social practices\nof witchcraft. For the most part those practices are deceitful. They\nare not the invention of savage society; society invents nothing;\nonly the individual invents. They are the invention and tradition of\nwizards, who keep the secret so far as it is to their advantage: of\nwizards growing more and more professional, and trading upon the fears\nand hopes, the anxiety and credulity of their fellows. The spirit of\nsuperstition is common to the tribe, but its professional exploitation\nis the work of those who profit by it.\n\nObserving with satisfaction that, even amongst savages, the positive\nmind can sometimes free itself from popular superstitions and penetrate\nthe disguise of mystery-mongers, one asks why Nature could not produce\nwhole tribes of men so minded, and spare the folly and horror and\niniquity which take up so much space in the retrospect of human life.\nBecause common sense is only related to actual experience, and could\nnot appreciate the necessity of government and social co-ordination\nas the condition of all improvement in human life, until it already\nexisted. Such co-ordination had, therefore, to grow up without being\nunderstood; and it did grow up under the protection of certain beliefs\nthat induced the tribes of men to hold together and subordinate\nthemselves to leaders: amongst which beliefs the superstitions\nexploited by wizards had no small part.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[389] Ling Roth, _The Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 65.\n\n[390] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 336.\n\n[391] Czaplicka, _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 177.\n\n[392] The political importance of the wizard seems to have been first\nnoticed by Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, II. p. 178 (\u00a7 474).\n\n[393] Bellamy, quoted by Seligman, _Melanesians of British North\nGuinea_, p. 694.\n\n[394] _Religion of the Amazulu_, p. 40.\n\n[395] Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 114.\n\n[396] Czaplicka, _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 191.\n\n[397] E. Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, ch.\nxlix.\n\n[398] _The Sacred Shrine._\n\n[399] _Report of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, V. pp.\n322-3.\n\n[400] Rivers, _History of Melanesian Sociology_.\n\n[401] _Am. B. of Ethn._, VII., \u201cOjibway Medicine,\u201d by W.\u00a0J. Hoffman;\nXI., \u201cThe Sia,\u201d by M.\u00a0C. Stevenson; XIV., \u201cThe Menomini Indians,\u201d by\nW. Hoffman. For a collection of the facts see Frazer, _Totemism and\nExogamy_, IV. ch. xix; and Hutton Webster, _Primitive Secret Societies_.\n\n[402] _Report of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, VI. p.\n200.\n\n[403] _Op. cit._, p. 278.\n\n[404] _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 251.\n\n[405] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 326.\n\n[406] Book VII. The witch, imitated from Circe and Medea by Ariosto,\nTasso, Spenser, became a traditionary, romantic motive.\n\n[407] Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 388.\n\n[408] Stef\u00e1nson, _op. cit._, p. 403.\n\n[409] Czaplicka, _op. cit._, p. 240.\n\n[410] _Across Australia_, p. 51.\n\n[411] _Op. cit._, p. 184.\n\n[412] _Voyages of the Adventure and Beagle_, II. p. 178.\n\n[413] _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 216.\n\n[414] _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_, XXIV., \u201cShamanism,\u201d\np. 144.\n\n[415] _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 335.\n\n[416] _Am. B. of Ethn._, \u201cSacred Formulas of the Cherokees,\u201d by J.\nMooney, p. 323.\n\n[417] W. Mariner\u2019s _Account of the Tonga Islands_, ch. xxi.\n\n[418] _Am. B. of Ethn._, IX., \u201cMedicine Men of the Apache,\u201d by J.\u00a0E.\nBourke, p. 471.\n\n[419] Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 135.\n\n[420] _Travels and Researches in South Africa_, ch. i.\n\n[421] J. Shakespeare, _The Lushai Kuki Clans_, p. 80.\n\n[422] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, p. 120, and _Am. B.\nof Ethn._, XI. p. 417; XIV. pp. 97, 148.\n\n[423] D. Comparetti, _The Traditional Poetry of the Finns_, pp. 27 and\n25.\n\n[424] Rhys, _Celtic Heathendom_, pp. 548-50.\n\n[425] The crystals forced into a wizard\u2019s body, whether by spirits or\nby other wizards, are essential to his profession, and if they leave\nhim his power is lost. \u201cIt is the possession of these stones which\ngives his virtue to the medicine-man\u201d (Spencer and Gillen, _Northern\nTribes of Central Australia_, p. 480 note). John Mathew says that,\naccording to the belief of the Kabi (Queensland): \u201cA man\u2019s power in\nthe occult art would appear to be proportioned to his vitality, and\nthe degree of vitality which he possessed depended upon the number of\nsacred pebbles and the quantity of _yurru_ (rope) which he carried\nwithin him\u201d (_Eagle-hawk and Crow_, p. 143). \u201cRope\u201d was the property\nof the higher grade of medicine-men (substitute for snakes?), who had\nobtained it from the Rainbow in exchange for some of their pebbles.\nCertain pebbles, especially crystals, are independent magic-powers\nthroughout Australasia and elsewhere, probably of much older repute\nthan the profession of wizardry; and the wizard gets his personal power\nby having them inside him. Similarly, Jounod describes Bantu wizards\nas \u201cendowed with magical power, or rather possessing enchanted drugs\u201d\n(_Life of a South African Tribe_, p. 293): whereas we are often told\nthat the occult art begins with the extraordinary personality of the\nwizard.\n\n[426] _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, pp. 522-9.\n\n[427] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n485.\n\n[428] Haddon, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_,\nV. p. 321.\n\n[429] E. im Thurn, _The Indians of Guiana_, p. 334.\n\n[430] Thomas Whiffen, _The North-West Amazons_, p. 181.\n\n[431] Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 156.\n\n[432] _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_, XXIV., \u201cShamanism,\u201d\npp. 87-90.\n\n[433] _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, V. p.\n322.\n\n[434] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 334.\n\n[435] W. H. R. Rivers, _The Todas_, pp. 256-7.\n\n[436] _Belief in Immortality_, pp. 249, 269.\n\n[437] For examples see Weeks, _The Primitive Bakongo_, p. 204; Dudley\nKidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 149; Callaway, _Religion of the\nAmazulu_, p. 391; Hose and McDougall, _The Pagan Tribes of Borneo_,\nII. p. 115; Turner, _Samoa_, p. 342; _Shamanism_, p. 130; Carl\nLumholtz, _New Trails in Mexico_, p. 24; T.\u00a0A. Joyce, _South American\nArch\u00e6ology_, p. 245; E. Westermarck, _Origin and Development of Moral\nIdeas_, II. pp. 650-2.\n\n[438] Callaway, _Religion of the Amazulu_, pp. 384-6 and 404.\n\n[439] Franz Boas, \u201cThe Central Esquimo,\u201d _Am. B. of Ethn._, VI.\n(1884-5), p. 603.\n\n[440] W. W. Skeat, _Malay Magic_, p. 571.\n\n[441] A. Wiedemann, _The Religion of the Egyptians_, pp. 273-4.\n\n[442] A. M. Czaplicka, _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 178.\n\n[443] J. G. Frazer, _Psyche\u2019s Task_.\n\n[444] Pp. 138-9.\n\n[445] Rivers, _History of Melanesian Sociology_, II. p. 156.\n\n[446] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_.\n\n[447] im Thurn, _op. cit._, p. 339.\n\n[448] J. H. Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 145.\n\n[449] _Across Australia_, p. 350.\n\n[450] _Primitive Bakongo_, p. 285.\n\n[451] Skeat, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, I. p. 563.\n\n[452] Rivers, _The Todas_, p. 263.\n\n[453] Abbot, _Macedonian Folk-Lore_, p. 225.\n\n[454] _Op. cit._, p. 203.\n\n[455] _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, pp. 387-8.\n\n[456] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, pp. 334-5.\n\n[457] Whiffen, _op. cit._, pp. 182-3.\n\n[458] Jounod, _Life of a South African Tribe_, II. p. 456.\n\n[459] Whiffen, _op. cit._, pp. 64 and 168.\n\n[460] _Primitive Bakongo_, p. 216.\n\n[461] _Aboriginal Siberia_, pp. 230, 240.\n\n[462] _Paradoxe sur le com\u00e9dien._ Mr. William Archer, some years ago,\npublished _Masks and Faces_, an entertaining and very instructive book,\nin which he (as a genuine though unprofessional psychologist) discusses\nthis paradox in the light of evidence obtained, by _questionnaire_ and\notherwise, from actors then living.\n\n[463] _Man_, September 1817, p. 144.\n\n[464] _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 197.\n\n[465] _Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der V\u00f6lkerpsychologie._\n\n[466] Meiners, _Briefe \u00fcber die Schweiz_ (quoted by Carlyle in essay on\n_Count Cagliostro_).\n\n[467] _Aboriginal Siberia_, pp. 169, 172.\n\n[468] _Text-book of Insanity_, pp. 281 and 79.\n\n[469] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n497.\n\n[470] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, pp. 250-60.\n\n[471] For another example see Rivers, _History of Melanesian\nSociology_, II. p. 411.\n\n[472] G. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 346.\n\n[473] For the most elaborate of all such performances, see the\ninitiation into the Ghost Society of the Kwakintle Indians, in Frazer\u2019s\n_Totemism and Exogamy_, III. p. 538.\n\n[474] Casalis, _My Life in Basuto Land_, p. 185.\n\n[475] Basil Thompson, _The Fijians_, p. 158.\n\n[476] Basil Thompson, _Diversions of a Prime Minister_, pp. 201 and 346.\n\n[477] _The Heroic Age_, p. 413.\n\n[478] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, pp. 374-5.\n\n[479] \u201cAborigines of Victoria,\u201d _Transactions of the Ethnological\nSociety_, New Series, I. p. 300.\n\n[480] _Eagle-hawk and Crow_, p. 146.\n\n[481] J. G. Frazer, _Belief in Immortality_, p. 239.\n\n[482] J. H. Weeks, _The Primitive Bakongo_, pp. 284 and 285.\n\n[483] J. H. Weeks, _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 293.\n\n[484] Callaway, _op. cit._, pp. 29-30.\n\n[485] _The North-West Amazons_, p. 218.\n\n[486] J. O. Dorsey, \u201cSiouan Cults,\u201d pp. 431-2 and 485, _Am. B. of\nEthn._, XI.\n\n[487] Coddrington, _The Melanesians_, p. 270.\n\n[488] _Polynesian Researches_, II. p. 204.\n\n[489] John Martin, _W. Mariner\u2019s Account of the Tonga Islands_, II. pp.\n105 and 137.\n\n[490] Hose and McDougall, _The Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, II. pp. 48 and\n214.\n\n[491] _The Naga Tribes of Manipur_, p. 126.\n\n[492] Introduction to _The Rise of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe_.\n\n[493] C. G. Seligman, _Melanesians of British New Guinea_, p. 179.\n\n[494] T. C. Hodson, _op. cit._, p. 171.\n\n[495] _Among Congo Cannibals_, p. 284.\n\n[496] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, pp.\n531-2.\n\n[497] Haddon, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_,\nVI. p. 201.\n\n[498] Ellis, _op. cit._, II. p. 232.\n\n[499] _Shamanism_, p. 92.\n\n[500] _History of Melanesian Society_, II. p. 107.\n\n[501] A. M. Czaplicka, _Aboriginal Siberia_, p. 180.\n\n[502] _Across Australia_, p. 326.\n\n[503] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n481.\n\n[504] _Decline and Fall_, ch. xvii\u2014discussing the character of Julian.\n\n[505] Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 398.\n\n[506] _Across Australia_, pp. 14, 326, 366.\n\n[507] See Haddon, _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres\nStraits_, VI. p. 210; Stef\u00e1nson, _My Life with the Esquimo_, p. 88;\nMurdoch, Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow Expedition, in _Ninth\nAnn. Report of Am. Bureau of Eth._, p. 431; Frazer, _Psyche\u2019s Task_, p.\n55; Risley, _The People of India_, p. 77; Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi\nTribe_, pp. 48, 49, 82, 90; Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p.\n116; E. Casalis, _Les Bassoutos_ (2nd ed.), pp. 302-3; W.\u00a0E. Roth,\n_Ethnological Studies in North-West Central Queensland_, p. 154.\n\n[508] _Diversions of a Prime Minister_, p. 245.\n\n[509] \u201cShamanism,\u201d _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_, XXIV. p.\n154.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTOTEMISM\n\n\n\u00a7 1. MEANING AND SCOPE OF TOTEMISM\n\nOf very much less importance in the history of culture than Animism or\nMagic, Totemism interests us by its strangeness. To be descended from\na crocodile, or blood-brother to the crow, or \u201cthe same as a kangaroo\u201d\nmust be, we think, the grotesque notion of a lunatic. We never meet\npeople who believe such a thing; it has no stronghold in our own\nbreasts. So much the more surprising that it should, nevertheless, be\nwidely entertained. It is, indeed, far from universal among mankind,\nprobably much less ancient than Animism and certainly far less\nenduring. Where it has prevailed it is sometimes quite forgotten; and\nin the higher stages of human development it has no influence. But\nevery student of early institutions finds it necessary to give himself\nsome intelligible account of its nature and sources.\n\n\u201cA Totem,\u201d says Sir James Frazer, \u201cis a class of material objects\nwhich a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that\nthere exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and\naltogether special relation.\u201d[510]\n\nThis definition is scientifically drawn so as to include what is common\nto all Totems and not to include any character that is not universally\nconnected with them. It is true of the Totems of individuals (or\nguardian genii), very common among the Northern Amerinds; as well as\nof the Sex-Totems (say Bat for men and Owl for women) which occur in\nAustralia; and of the Totems of clans found in many parts of the world,\nof which the Australian may be supposed most nearly to represent the\noriginal institution. When one speaks of Totems without qualification,\none means these Clan-Totems, being incomparably the most important:\nothers probably derive from them.\n\n\u201cThe Clan-Totem\u201d (to quote the same source) \u201cis reverenced by a body\nof men and women who call themselves by the name of the Totem, believe\nthemselves to be of one blood, descendants of a common ancestor, and\nare bound together by common obligations to each other and by a common\nfaith in the Totem.\u201d[511] This definition is also strict: whereas it\nis not uncommon for writers on Totemism to include in their notion\nof the Totem other characters which are accidents more or less often\nassociated with it: as that the clan believes itself descended from the\nTotem; though in many cases the clan traces its origin to something\nthat was neither Totem nor man, or regards the Totem animal as\ndescended from their own human ancestress, or tells some story of the\ntransformation of a man into an animal, or of an animal into a man, or\nof an ancestor\u2019s friendship with the Totem animal; for the institution\nis a copious source of explanatory myths. Again, it may be written that\nno member of a clan may kill or injure the Totem, or eat, or utilise\nit (if an animal or plant); and this is often, but not always true. If\nthe Totem is water, or the most important food in the district\u2014dugong,\nturtle, coconut, sago\u2014abstention is impossible or intolerably\ninconvenient. Hence among the Kaitish a Water clansman when alone may\ndrink; but if others are with him he may drink only when water is\ngiven him by a man of another Totem. And to eat a little of the Totem\nsacramentally, in order to confirm one\u2019s identity with it, may be\nallowed or (rather) required. Among the Warramunga the Snake clan may\nkill snakes. It may even be the clan\u2019s duty to destroy or drive away\ntheir Totem; as happens with the Mosquito clan of the Kakadus in North\nAustralia, and with the Reptile clan amongst the Omahas. Similarly, the\nclan sometimes, but by no means always, imitate the Totem in character,\nin costume, in dances, or bear in tattoo or otherwise its badge to\nmanifest the community of nature. They may be thought to have special\nmagical powers to influence its fertility or to control its actions\n(actions of game or wind or rain), and may use these powers for the\nbenefit of the tribe. At death the soul of a clansman may pass into,\nor may appear as, the Totem animal. The Totem may be the protector of\nits clansmen, and in some cases it seems to have become a god. These\naccidents of Totemism, however, are very irregularly diffused and some\nof them are rare.\n\nMost important socially is the connexion between Totemism and\nMarriage-customs. In the great majority of cases, men and women\nof the same Totem may not intermarry; the Totem clans are said to\nbe exogamous; but there are exceptions even to this rule. In many\nparts of the world\u2014America, Africa, India, Indonesia, as well as\nAustralia\u2014tribes are divided into non-intermarrying or exogamous\nclasses (moieties or phratries); sometimes the classes are subdivided,\nand even the sub-classes again (in parts of Australia), so that in\nall the exogamous classes are eight; and the rules concerning these\nclasses are such as to prevent the marriage of brothers and sisters,\nparents and children and first cousins. The Totem clans are usually\ndistributed amongst the Marriage-classes; being probably the older\ninstitution (whether or not originally exogamous), they may be said\nto have been subordinated by the formation of the classes; and in\nthe matter of marriage they follow the class rules. But the Arunta\nwith some neighbouring tribes of Central Australia, though divided\ninto eight exogamous classes, have not subordinated the Totem clans;\nwhich, accordingly, are not exogamous. If Exogamy was originally the\nvital utility of Totemism, the institution is undermined by the\nMarriage-classes, whether the clans are subordinated to the classes\nand merely repeat their rules, or are not subordinated and lose their\nExogamy. This may explain why the classes prevail more widely than\nTotems, and may be found where Totemism seems to have become extinct.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. OF THE ORIGIN OF TOTEMISM\n\nIt has already been said that Totemism does not prevail universally\namongst mankind. There is very little evidence of its having existed\namongst the ancestors of the Indo-European peoples; and it seems to\nbe unknown to many of the most primitive of surviving tribes\u2014the\nBoschmans, Veddas, Puranas (Borneo), Andamanese, Yaghans (Tierra del\nFuego) and Californian Indians. It is not, therefore, something founded\nin human nature itself, but must have originated (whether in one or in\nseveral places) under particular conditions.\n\nThere is some probability that the earliest Totems were animals.\nWherever Totems are found most of them are animals. A list of Totems\nrecognised in North Australia, given by Spencer and Gillen,[512]\ncomprises 202 altogether: Animals 164,[513] Plants 22, Inanimate 16.\nThe animals (except insects) and plants are nearly all edible. To\nhunters animals must have been of all things the most interesting;\nnext, certain plants, especially to women. Animals lend the greatest\nplausibility to any notion of blood-relationship. The inanimate Totems\ninclude some which it is very desirable to control by Magic, such as\nWater, Wind, Fire, Sun, Moon and the Boomerang.\n\nGenerally, no doubt, Totemism is ancient; but in some cases the\nexisting Totems must be recent, as among the Bahima of Uganda.[514]\nNearly all their Totems are different coloured cows, or some part\nof a cow, and must have been adopted since the advance to pastoral\nlife\u2014at a stage of culture, therefore, much above the Australian.\n\u201cSplit Totems,\u201d arising on the division of a clan by dividing its Totem\n(as the Omahas comprised Buffalo-heads, Buffalo-tails, etc.[515]),\nwere probably formed by deliberate agreement, and had the incidental\nadvantage that a clansman\u2019s food-taboo did not extend to the whole\nbuffalo, the staple food of the tribe, but only to the head or tail.\n\nAmongst the Australian aborigines, the group of beliefs and practices\nincluded in, or connected with, Totemism are of such intense and\nwidespread social importance, that it must have prevailed amongst them\nfor many generations. The northern Amerinds are so much in advance of\nthe Australians in social organisation, culture and mentality, that\nif their Totemism has descended to them from a time when they lived\nat the Australian level, its history must go back not merely for many\ngenerations but for thousands of years. And if Egyptian gods, such\nas Hathor and Anubis, were formerly Totems, the retrospect becomes\nstill longer. I am not aware of any direct evidence of the prehistoric\nexistence of Totemism, such as we have, in some ancient burials, of the\nexistence of Animism; but some pal\u00e6olithic carvings or paintings may\nhave had totemic significance.\n\nIt follows that any account of the origin of Totemism can only be\nhypothetical. Were this all, indeed, it would be on the same foot\nwith Magic and Animism; but it is not all. That Magic should arise\nfrom belief in mysterious forces and from confusing coincidence with\ncausation, or that Animism should result from a confusion between\ndreams and objective experience (with the help of Magic-ideas) is\nhighly probable; because such errors are active to this day, and they\nseem to spring up in primitive minds by psychological necessity;\nthough it may not be intrinsically necessary that the errors should\nbe perpetuated and systematised as, in general, they have been. But\nthe case of Totemism is different; for we do not see\u2014at least, no one\nhas yet shown\u2014any sort of necessity why in certain cases clans should\nhave borne the names of certain animals: and this is the root of the\nwhole matter. Indeed, this practice, not being universal, cannot be\nnecessary; and it may have had several different origins. Any relevant\nhypothesis, therefore, can claim no more than to agree with the known\nfacts better than rival hypotheses; we cannot expect to deduce it from\nlaws of human nature; whilst still another hypothesis just as good may\nany day be put forward by some speculative genius; and the doubt must\nalways remain whether some important facts of Totemism have not been\nlost which, could they be recovered, would prove all our guesses to\nhave been made in vain.\n\nIn spite of these discouraging considerations, several hypotheses have\nbeen proposed: this also is for us a sort of psychological necessity.\nThey may be grouped into two classes, according as they assume the\ntotemic names to have been originally names of individuals or of whole\nclans. All seem to assume that one explanation must hold good for all\nthe cases.\n\nOf hypotheses that trace totemic names to individuals there is, first,\nSpencer\u2019s; namely, that the name of an animal or plant was first given\nto an individual, and then inherited by his family; who after a time\nforgot his personality, remembered only their descent from such a name,\nand assumed that their ancestor must have been an animal or plant such\nas still bore that name. Secondly, there is the explanation offered\nby Prof. Franz Boas, that the first Totems were guardian spirits of\nindividuals, and that these became Clan-Totems of their descendants.\nFor this account it may be said that among the Northern Amerinds the\nbelief in guardian spirits of individuals (generally some animal)\nis universally diffused, and perhaps of greater importance than the\nClan-Totems, seeing that these are subordinate to the Marriage-classes:\nmoreover, the Totems are rarely, if ever, believed to have been\nancestors. On the other hand, in Australia, guardian spirits of\nindividuals are rare, whilst Totemism is universal. So that, if we\nsuppose only one origin of the institution, it is more reasonable to\nview the guardian spirit as derived from the Clan-Totem. In Borneo we\nfind the guardian spirit with some traits similar to the American, but\nmuch less generally, whilst there is now no plainly marked Totemism:\nbut there are several beliefs akin to those of Totemism which may be\nmarks of its former existence; and, if so, the guardian spirit may\nalso be one of its relics.[516] Thirdly, Frazer\u2019s hypothesis, that\nTotems originated in the fancies of pregnant women, who, ignorant of\nphysiological causes, supposed that that which stirred within them must\nbe some animal or plant that had entered them; so that the child when\nborn could be no other than that animal or plant.\n\nOf hypotheses which regard totemic names as from the first names of\ngroups we have, first, Max M\u00fcller\u2019s, that they originated with clan\nmarks.[517] But in Australia clan marks are not often to be found.\nSecondly, Professor F.\u00a0B. Jevons\u2019, that the Totem was originally some\nanimal adopted by the tribe as a friendly natural power, aiding them\nin the struggle for existence.[518] But, if so, this character seems\nto have been lost, or greatly attenuated in Australia, and in America\nbelongs to the guardian spirit rather than to the Totem. Thirdly, Dr.\nHaddon\u2019s, that the Totem name was derived by a group from the animal\nor plant which was its principal food; but cases to support this\nsuggestion are very few. Fourthly, Andrew Lang\u2019s, that group names were\nobtained in some way\u2014perhaps imposed upon each group by others, and\naccepted; and that names of animals or plants having been obtained in\nany way, and the origin forgotten, just such beliefs concerning the\nrelation of the group to its namesake would be likely to arise, as in\nfact we find amongst Totemists.[519]\n\nFor want of space to discuss all these doctrines I shall deal chiefly\nwith those of Frazer and Lang.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. THE CONCEPTIONAL HYPOTHESIS\n\nSir J. G. Frazer, after very candidly relinquishing two early\nsuggestions\u2014by no means fanciful\u2014concerning the origin of\nTotemism, as unsupported by sufficient evidence, has put forward\na third\u2014\u201cconceptional Totemism\u201d\u2014which occurred to him upon the\ndiscovery by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen of the doctrine of totemic\ndescent prevalent amongst the Arunta and allied tribes. These tribes\nare said not to be aware of the connexion between sexual intercourse\nand pregnancy. They say that a child is the result of the entry into\na woman of the spirit of some pre-existing tribesman of this or\nthat Totem; which, therefore, will also be the child\u2019s. What Totem\nit is depends upon the place where the woman first becomes aware of\nquickening; for there are certain places known to the natives where\nthe people of such or such a Totem \u201cwent into the ground\u201d [perhaps\nwere buried]; and in passing such a place any woman is liable to\nbe impregnated by one of the discarnate spirits; who are always\non the look-out for an opportunity to re-enter the mortal state.\nThis is the real cause of pregnancy, for which marriage is merely a\npreparation.[520] A young woman who does not desire the dignity of\na matron, when passing such haunted ground, runs crouching by, and\ncries out that she is an old woman; for facility in being deceived\nis a saving grace of spirits. In modified forms this doctrine of \u201cno\npaternity and re-incarnation\u201d is professed by tribes throughout the\ncentre and north of the continent, in Queensland and in parts of West\nAustralia.[521]\n\nThe Arunta doctrine of conception by animal or plant spirits cannot,\nhowever, be the origin of Totemism; because, as Sir James Frazer\npoints out, the impregnating spirits are already totemic. One must,\ntherefore, suppose (he says) an earlier state of things, in which a\nwoman, ignorant of the true causes of childbirth, imagined at the first\nsymptoms of pregnancy (by which the quickening seems to be meant)\nthat she had been entered by some object, or by the spirit of some\nobject, which had been engaging her attention at the time, or which she\nmay have been eating\u2014a wallaby, emu, plum or grass-seed\u2014and later\nbelieved that the child she bare must be, or be an incarnation of, that\nobject or spirit, and in fact nothing else than a wallaby, emu, plum\nor grass-seed with the appearance of a human being. If other women\nhad similar experiences in connexion with other animals or plants,\nand if the descendants of their children remembered the stories, and\nconsidered themselves to be wallabies, grass-seed and so forth, the\nhypothesis would fully explain that identification of groups of men\nwith groups of things which is characteristic of Totemism; and the\nother characters naturally follow. Such is the conceptional theory of\nTotemism, deriving that institution from \u201cthe sick fancies of pregnant\nwomen.\u201d[522]\n\nCircumstances, which Sir James Frazer regards as very similar to those\nwhich he imagined as having prevailed at some former time amongst the\nArunta, have been discovered by Dr. Rivers at Mota and Motlar in the\nBanks Islands. There many people are \u201cby the custom of the island\u201d not\npermitted to eat certain animals or fruits or even to touch certain\ntrees; because they are believed to _be_ those animals or plants\u2014their\nmothers having suffered some influence from such animals or plants at\nconception or at some subsequent period of pregnancy. \u201cThe course of\nevents is usually as follows: a woman, sitting down in her garden,\nor in the bush, or on the shore, finds an animal or fruit in her\nloin-cloth. She takes it up and carries it to the village, where she\nasks the meaning of the appearance. The people say that she will give\nbirth to a child who will have the characters of this animal, or even\n(it appeared) would be himself or herself that animal.\u201d[523] She takes\nit to its proper home, tries to keep it, and feeds it; but after a\ntime it will disappear, and is then believed to have entered into her.\nThere is no belief in physical impregnation by the animal, nor of its\ninvading the woman as a physical object; such an animal seems to be\nconsidered as \u201cmore or less supernatural, a spirit-animal, from the\nbeginning.\u201d \u201cThe belief is not accompanied by any ignorance of the\nphysical r\u00f4le of the human father.\u201d Apparently the prohibition against\neating animals or plants thus connected with oneself rests on the idea\nthat it would amount to eating oneself\u2014a sort of cannibalism. One\npartakes of its physical and mental characters. But the resemblance\nto, and the taboo on eating, a certain animal are individual matters;\nthere is no belief in their being passed on to one\u2019s descendants. In\nthis alone the belief at Mota falls short of Totemism. \u201cYet it occurs\nin a people whose social system has no totemic features at the present\ntime, whatever it may have had in the past.\u201d[524] Possibly former\nTotem-clans have been merged in secret societies, but there is no\nclear evidence of it. In Melanesia, Totemism occurs in Fiji, Shortland\nIslands, Bismarck Archipelago (probably), Reef Islands, Santa Cruz,\nVanikolo and in some regions of the Solomon Islands, but not in the\nBanks Islands nor in the Torres Islands to the south.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThis hypothesis that Totemism is derived from the fancies of women\nconcerning the causes of their own pregnancy suggests several adverse\nconsiderations. In the first place, it is to me incredible that the\nArunta are really ignorant of paternity; young women and children\nperhaps may be, but not the seniors. My reasons for thinking so are set\nout at length in the _J.R.A.I._, 1819 (p. 146), namely, that the facts\nof childbirth are too interesting to be overlooked or misconstrued, and\nare well within the grasp of savage understanding; that those who think\nthe Arunta capable of such stupidity have attended too exclusively to\nparticular incidents of pregnancy, especially the quickening, and have\nnot considered that there is a definite series of closely connected\nincidents; that there is testimony, not to be lightly put aside, that\nthe old men know the truth in the case of human beings, and that\nknowledge of the parallel phenomena amongst animals is shared even by\nthe Arunta children; that it is possible for knowledge to be repressed\nby dogma without being extinguished; that this is an old man\u2019s dogma,\nand that we must not assume that in Australia, any more than in Europe,\nwhat people are accustomed to say is good evidence of what they really\nbelieve;[525] that other tribes at the same level of culture, in\nSouth-East Australia, are so convinced of the importance of paternity\nthat they say the child proceeds entirely from the father; that those\nwho deny paternity show by their customs and myths that they are\nsecretly aware of it; and, finally, that in some cases they have clear\nmotives for maintaining the dogma and suppressing the truth.\n\nSecondly, the observations of Dr. Rivers in the Banks Islands give\nnot the slightest support to the conceptional hypothesis. For (_a_)\nthe Banks Islands belief \u201cis not accompanied by any ignorance of the\nphysical r\u00f4le of the human father.\u201d (_b_) The belief is that the child\nborn to a woman who has been visited by a plant or animal is in some\nway \u201cinfluenced\u201d by the experience; not, as with the Arunta, that it\nis entirely due to it (except for some \u201cpreparation\u201d by the father).\n(_c_) Before the Banks Islands belief can give rise to Totemism\nthere must be a belief in the continuous inheritance of the plant or\nanimal influence; and not only is this absent, but there is a strong\ntendency to prevent it. A woman having been influenced by an eel, her\nchild is an eel; but if that child be a girl, there is no further\ntransmission of eel-like qualities; the girl, on becoming pregnant, may\nbe influenced by a yam, and then her child will be a yam. This hinders\nthe formation of a group of human beings mysteriously allied to an\nanimal or plant, such as Totemism implies. But (_d_) the conceptional\nhypothesis refers the origin of Totemism to the ignorant imaginings of\nwomen themselves, who think they have been entered by this or that;\nwhereas in the Banks Islands a woman\u2019s belief in the influence of an\nanimal or plant upon her offspring is not prompted by her own fancy,\nbut by a popular superstition. For when she carries the thing found in\nher loin-cloth to the village, \u201cthe people say\u201d she will give birth to\na child who will have the qualities of, or even will be that thing; and\na child afterwards born may not eat or touch that thing \u201cby the custom\nof the country.\u201d Had the Arunta, then, of pre-totemic days such a\nsuperstition and custom for the guidance of mothers? If so, the history\nof that superstition and custom must be more obscure than Totemism\nitself. But in the Banks Islands their origin may admit of a wide\nsolution; for although it is said that no manifest traces of Totemism\nare to be found there now; yet, seeing that the Australians, Papuans,\nPolynesians and the Melanesians to the north all have Totemism or\nplain vestiges of it, the improbability that Melanesians in the Banks\nIslands never had it is very great; and it is reasonable to suppose\nthat the superstition concerning the influence of animals or plants\nupon pregnant women, and the taboo upon the eating of such an animal or\nplant by the offspring, represent not a possible origin of Totemism,\nbut a survival of it.\n\nThese considerations raise a further question as to the employment\nof the Comparative Method. Natives of the Banks Islands are far in\nadvance of the Arunta in all the arts of life, as well as in relation\nto Totemism which they seem to have outlived. Is it admissible to\ntake some trait of their life as an example of what may have existed\namongst the Arunta at a stage of culture which is generally assumed\nto have been inferior even to the present? When the antecedents of\nan institution have been lost amongst any given people, and we set\nout to supply them from parallel cases amongst other peoples, must\nwe not require the same relative order of development? If a social\nphenomenon is found in the Banks Islands, its possibility is proved;\nbut strictly it was possible only where it occurred: elsewhere we can\nexpect only something similar, according to the similarity of other\nrelevant circumstances. Comparing the Banks Islands and their people\nwith Central Australia and its people, one discovers hardly anything\ncommon to them. And Arunta tradition (whatever worth) shows no sign of\nanything like the southern Melanesian culture: the Alcheringa ancestors\nare represented as having been already Totemists. To assume, however,\nthat the former condition of the Arunta was even lower than the\npresent, may not be justifiable: social degeneration is not uncommon.\nThere would be something to guide our judgment if we knew how recently\nthe desiccation of their country approached its present severity. But,\nin any case, can we suppose it to have been at all like the Melanesian?\n\n\n\u00a7 4. ANDREW LANG\u2019S HYPOTHESIS\n\nIn some very remote age\u2014to summarise Lang\u2019s statement\u2014at a level of\nculture inferior to that of existing Australians, distinctive names\nwere acquired by small groups of mankind. Since a group needs names\nfor other groups more than for itself (for itself it consists of\n\u201cmen\u201d as contrasted with other kinds of animals), names may at first\nhave been bestowed upon each group by some other, or others, in its\nneighbourhood\u2014probably names of animals or plants\u2014and accepted by\neach; for no opprobrium attaches to such names. In _Social Origins_\nLang offers evidence concerning names (even depreciatory and mocking\nnames) having been conferred in this way and accepted; but in _The\nSecret of the Totem_,[526] he says that how groups got their names is\nnot essential to his theory. They may have been given, or adopted, on\naccount of a group\u2019s staple food (Haddon); or because of some animal\nor plant characteristic of a group\u2019s territory; or for some fancied\nresemblance of its members to some animal. The important point is\nthat, from the first, they were names of groups\u2014not derived from the\nnames of individuals. At the early period assumed for these events\nthere was not a long enough memory of individuals to make their names\ntraditionary; and, indeed, the reckoning of descent in the female line\n(which Lang regards as universally the most ancient custom) must have\nprevented the inheritance of the names of male ancestors.\n\nWhatever may have occasioned the first fixing of names, with the flight\nof time the circumstances were forgotten; and groups of men and women\nfound themselves with names\u2014the names of animals or plants\u2014without\nknowing why. The bearing of a name in common with an animal or plant\ninevitably suggested to the savage a mysterious connexion with the\nspecies\u2014perhaps that they had the same sort of soul. It gave rise to\nan explanatory myth, and the analogy of family relationship suggested\na blood-bond: the animal or plant must be one\u2019s ancestor, brother, or\nprimal ancestral form. From this idea follows a regard for it, respect,\nreverence: it must not be killed, or eaten, or used in any way; it may\nbe protected, may be helpful; it is a Totem.\n\nThe connexion of Totemism with Exogamy (the custom of marrying outside\nthe group or kin) Lang conceives of in this way. Adopting a suggestion\nof Darwin\u2019s,[527] and the scheme of his cousin, J.\u00a0J. Atkinson in\n_Primal Law_, that the primary human group consisted of a powerful\nmale with one or more wives and their children, he argues that the\njealousy of the head of this family imposed the rule\u2014\u201cNo male to touch\nthe females in my camp.\u201d The sons, therefore, as they grew up, were\ndriven out, and must find wives elsewhere. This was the beginning of\nExogamy, and it may have preceded the rise of Totemism; but Totemism,\nonce established, strengthened the custom of Exogamy by mysterious\nsanctions. As the Totem might not be eaten, or in any way used or\ntouched, so a woman of the same Totem could not be married; and that\nnot only within their immediate family-group, but not even by a male of\nany group having the same Totem.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn maintaining this hypothesis against those who would derive Totems\nfrom the names and traditions of individuals, Lang seems to me to\nlay too much stress upon the difficulty of establishing a tradition\nof descent amongst people who trace descent (as he would say) \u201con\nthe spindle side.\u201d If the tradition began from a woman (as it might\ndo), there is no difficulty; and even if it began from a man, it is\nconceivable that his women-folk should adopt it. Moreover, in the\nopinion of both Westermarck and Frazer, it has not been shown that the\nreckoning of descent in the female line is original and universal.\nStill, the further we push back the origin of Totemism the more\ndifficult it is to understand the growth of a tradition of the descent\nand inheritance of the name and personal qualities of an individual;\nand this difficulty is avoided by an hypothesis which derives Totemism\nfrom the animal- or plant-names of groups of men and women. That such\nnames were conferred upon each group by others in the neighbourhood is\na reasonable conjecture;[528] being the earliest names of groups they\ncannot be called nicknames; and the names of animals or plants need in\nno way have been offensive. It is still more reasonable to urge that,\nhaving been adopted by a group, the circumstances of their acquisition\nwould, in a few generations, be forgotten, and that they would then\nbecome the ground of myths and mysterious totemic beliefs. But does any\none think that it will now ever be possible to decide with confidence\nwhere, when, how or why the names were given at first? I do not.\n\nAs to the origin of Exogamy, I cannot believe that the primitive human\ngroups were such as Lang described; and, if not, some other origin of\nthat custom must be sought.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. TOTEMISM AND MARRIAGE\n\nGenerally men and women of the same Totem cannot marry. Tribes, such\nas the Arunta, that do not observe this rule are so few that it\nis reasonable to consider them aberrant; so that in each case the\nnon-coincidence of Totemism and Exogamy is a distinct problem.\n\nNevertheless, there is reason to think that these institutions have not\nthe same origin. For several primitive tribes, some of them inferior\nin culture to the average Australian, have customs of Exogamy, or\n(at least) forbidding marriage between individuals of some certain\ndescription, who have not, and are not known ever to have recognised\nTotemism. Many tribes, again, who by their ethnological position may\nbe supposed once to have entertained Totemism, have abandoned it, but\nstill maintain Exogamy by means of Marriage-classes (phratries) or\notherwise. Further, many nations of advanced culture cannot be shown\never to have been totemists, but have always (as far back as can be\ntraced) enforced Exogamy so far as to prohibit marriage within certain\ndegrees of kindred. And that the connexion between Totemism and Exogamy\nis not original but acquired, is indicated by the consideration that\nthe most obvious tendency of Totemism would be to favour Endogamy\n(the practice of not marrying outside certain limits), on the obvious\nprinciple that as an animal kangaroo mates with an animal kangaroo, so\na human kangaroo should marry a human kangaroo. This is so obvious\nthat the opposite rule that a human kangaroo must not marry another\none, but (zoological paradox!) only an emu or a witchety-grub,\nseems perverse, and only to be explained by the influence of some\nsuperstition or incidental custom. According to Arunta tradition, their\nancestors in the Alcheringa were endogamous.\n\nWhether Exogamy originated in the days of the hunting-pack\u2014which\nis so far probable that the Boschmans observed it\u2014or during the\nreconstitution of society after the breaking up of the packs, or even\nlater, or in some regions at one period, in others at another, is, I\nfear, beyond our power of verifiable guessing. The best hypothesis as\nto the grounds of the custom is Westermarck\u2019s, namely, that an instinct\nof mutual avoidance grew up between near kin. This requires that at\nthe time of its origination promiscuity of sexual relations should not\nhave prevailed in the human stock, since that would have destroyed the\nconditions necessary to the rise of such an instinct. If promiscuity\nwas ever widely practised, it must have been after the breaking up of\nthe hunting-packs. That at some stage of human life, and apparently\nwith some Australian tribes not a remote one, promiscuity was\nestablished, has been argued (on the ground of some Australian customs)\nwith much plausibility; but in his _History of Human Marriage_,[529]\nWestermarck has examined this opinion very carefully, and concludes\nthat it is not tenable. His reasoning seems to me good throughout; and,\nhaving nothing important to add to it, I refer the reader to his work.\n\nWhether amongst anthropoids any instinctive avoidance prevails,\npreventing what we conceive of as incest, nobody knows. With their\nsolitary families, the growth of such a disposition may be more\ndifficult than amongst gregarious animals (such as our ancestors had\nbecome long before they could be called \u201chuman\u201d), who find other\nfamilies at hand to intermarry with; though the primitive human bands\nprobably were not large. Savages now at the lowest level, such as the\nVeddas or Yaghans, rarely form parties of more than thirty or forty.\nThe Boschmans, before their tribal habits were destroyed in the early\nyears of last century, though sometimes assembling in large numbers\nfor the great hunts by means of stockade traps, yet were usually\nscattered in groups of a few families. It is not likely that their\nremote forefathers consorted in larger numbers: eight or ten families\nmay have been enough to co-operate in hunting, or in mutual defence.\nWithin each family constituting such a band the tendency to Exogamy may\nfirst have manifested itself.\n\nWestermarck\u2019s hypothesis concerning Exogamy was first published in\nthe _History of Human Marriage_,[530] and has been re-stated in _The\nOrigin and Development of Moral Ideas_.[531] In the former work he\nfully discusses the evidence as to the effects of the inter-breeding\nof near kin, and concludes that it is probably injurious. The evidence\nis conflicting, but his conclusion seems to me justifiable. And he\nrightly points out that if, amongst civilised nations, the mischief of\ninbreeding is not always manifest, it was probably much greater amongst\nprimitive savages: (1) because the blood of the stock was purer; for in\nmodern Europe (_e.\u00a0g._) every marriage brings together many different\nstrains. (2) Because communities were then much smaller; so that\nunder endogamous conditions whatever vice may beset inbreeding would,\ngeneration after generation, be perpetuated and exaggerated without\nrelief. It may be added that with Endogamy the young folk are likely\nto begin to breed earlier\u2014perhaps by two or three years\u2014than they\nwould with Exogamy; and there is no doubt that the marriage of immature\nindividuals is highly injurious to the race.\n\nBut if inbreeding was injurious, Natural Selection favoured any\nfamily or band that practised Exogamy. That any should have done\nso on rational grounds, to avoid the observed evil effects of\ninbreeding, cannot be supposed. The motive must have been blind to the\nconsequences, and may have taken the form of coldness toward those of\nopposite sex with whom one had grown up from infancy, or of aversion\nto the idea of marrying them. Such dispositions Natural Selection\npreserved, and they have descended to ourselves; for such was the\nbeginning of the abhorrence of incest.\n\nI conjecture that this feeling first showed itself within the family,\nand led the families of a band to exchange their daughters; and that\nlater it extended to all members of the same band, and that wives were\nthen sought from other bands. Probably wives were obtained sometimes\nby capture or enticement, sometimes by exchange so far as amicable\nrelations with neighbours prevailed: for the evidence is far from\nshowing that \u201cmarriage by capture\u201d was ever a general custom; whilst\nour knowledge of the Australians and Boschmans shows that neighbouring\nbands of savages are not always hostile.\n\nSuch a state of things may have existed for ages before the rise of\nTotemism, and amongst races that never adopted Totemism. When names of\nanimals were first given to, or adopted by, various groups, Totemism\nsomewhere (perhaps in several places) resulted, as a belief in the\nmagical or spiritual connexion between men and animals of the same\nname. But the bands that adopted Totemism were already exogamous,\nhaving an aversion to marriage with others of the same band; and the\npractice of Exogamy was thus brought under the mysterious sanction of\ntotemic ideas. It would then be further extended to bar marriage with\nthose of the same Totem in other groups.\n\nTotemic sanctions may have been useful in confirming the Exogamy of\nsome groups, but all superstitious aids to right conduct are liable to\nperverse issues, and at best they are second best. Totemism prevents\nconsanguineous marriages, but also prevents marriage with thousands of\npeople where no blood-relationship is traceable. If any races were able\nto perceive that the interest of Exogamy was the prevention of marriage\nbetween near kin, and then to keep account of kinship and govern\nthemselves accordingly, they chose the better part.\n\nSome exceptions to the rule that Totem-clans are exogamous may,\nperhaps, be explained by supposing that certain bands had not adopted\nExogamy when they became totemists\u2014may not this have happened amongst\nthe Arunta?\u2014and that they have since learnt Exogamy under other\nconditions from neighbouring people, or by conquest. Amongst the\nother possible conditions there are the remarkable Marriage-classes,\nor phratries that prevail in Australia, North America, and less\nregularly in other parts of the world. These Marriage-classes are\nconsidered by some ethnologists to be of deliberate institution\u2014a\nreform for the regulation of Exogamy; and Spencer and Gillen, who\nknew the Australians so intimately, thought such a law\u2014though its\nintricacy astonishes most Europeans and stumbles many\u2014was not beyond\ntheir power of excogitation. Upon that point it would be absurd of me\nto have any opinion. But to suppose deliberate intention is contrary\nto the usual method of interpreting savage institutions: a savage\nlanguage is a system of customs much more intricate and refined than\nthe Marriage-classes, and not generally believed to have originated\nwith the deliberate enactment of rules of grammar. I conjecture\nthat those classes resulted at first from a grouping of exogamous\nTotem-clans which grew up by custom, and that the only deliberate work\nconsisted in some minor adjustments of clan-relations. Marriage of\ncousins is prevented in Central and North Australia by the recognition\nof eight sub-classes; but the same result is obtained in other tribes\nby a custom which merely forbids it. Exogamous classes having been\nestablished in some tribes, may have been imitated in others.\n\nOne result of the classificatory marriage system, however it grew up,\nis the extended use of names of kinship to denote all individuals of\nthe same or corresponding generation\u2014\u201cfather\u201d for all men who might\nby custom have married your mother; \u201cbrother\u201d and \u201csister\u201d for all men\nand women descended from those whom your father or mother might have\nmarried; \u201chusband\u201d or \u201cwife\u201d for any man or woman whom, according to\ncustom, you might have married. When further progress has been made\nin culture, distinctive names are used to express blood-relationship\nand class-relationship. It may be worth considering whether, in\nAustralia, some of the customs which have been supposed to bear witness\nto an original state of promiscuity are not really results of the\nclassificatory system of naming relationship: marital rights having\nbeen claimed on the ground of the names \u201chusband\u201d and \u201cwife\u201d as used\nin that system.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. THE CLANSMAN AND HIS TOTEM\n\nThe relationship of Clansman to Totem may be conceived of as one of\nfriendliness, protection, consanguinity, or even identity; and this\nlast I take to be the case in the age when Totemism is most alive and\npowerful. But in what sense can a man be the same as an emu? He may be\nof the same name; but by itself that would be nothing. It is not the\nname, but the identity which the name has come to signify that must be\nconsidered. Some light may be shed upon the problem by the saying of\na native to Spencer and Gillen, pointing to a photograph of himself:\n\u201cThat one is just the same as me; so is a kangaroo.\u201d The photograph\nmight be \u201cthe same\u201d as himself in the sense of resemblance; but in that\nsense the kangaroo is not the same. Some, indeed, who have speculated\non the savage mind suppose that it is not only incapable of reasoning,\nbut even of perceiving the facts before it, when under the influence\nof some strong belief; and I admit that this is sometimes true. But\nall a savage\u2019s actions in relation to his Totem show that he is aware\nof the difference: not least his efforts on certain occasions to help\nhis imagination to establish identity by disguising himself and by\nimitating the actions of this strange other self, and by eating a\nlittle of it to insure physical identity at least to that extent. He\nalso seeks to multiply it that others may eat their ration, and for any\ntheory of his identity with the Totem, this must be a puzzle.\n\nBut a photograph may be the same as oneself in another sense than mere\nsuperficial resemblance: it may, like a shadow or reflection, be (or\ncontain) a man\u2019s soul, or part of it. And similarly a kangaroo or other\nTotem may be conceived to be the same as a man, that is, as having the\nsame soul. Perhaps this is as near as we can get to the Australian\u2019s\nmeaning in the above-quoted confession of faith. It is reconcilable\nwith the ceremonial eating of some part of the Totem; for that will\nconvey spiritual as well as physical properties: and to reconcile it\nwith the multiplication of the Totem that others may eat, I point to\nthe biological necessity that each clan\u2019s Totem should be food for the\nother tribesmen. Where all edible animals and plants are Totems, how\nelse can they subsist? But we have several times seen that biological\nnecessity will place limits to a belief, and that excuses can be found\nfor necessary actions which are in conflict with a belief. That the\nclansmen give their own Totem to the tribe (since they cannot defend\nit) is an ingenious compromise.\n\nIt is reported that amongst the Euahlayi tribe occur personal Totems\n(or guardians, rare in Australia) called Yunbeai, possessed chiefly\nby wizards. A man may eat his hereditary Totem, but not his Yunbeai;\nwhich in this privilege seems to have supplanted the Totem. His spirit\nis in the Yunbeai, and its spirit is in him.[532] They have, then, the\nsame soul; and, although this belief is not strictly Totemism, it is\nprobably derived from it. A clansman of the Yuin tribe (West Australia)\nhad as his Totem the Black Duck, which warned him against enemies;\nand he related that once, whilst he slept, a Lace-Lizard man sent\nhis Totem, which went down his throat and almost ate his Black Duck\nresiding in his breast; so that he nearly died.[533] Were not his Black\nDuck and his soul the same?\n\nThis hypothesis agrees very well with a belief that one\u2019s body and\nsoul descend from the same ancestor as the Totem\u2019s; and that at death\none goes to, or becomes, the Totem; and excuses the fiction that the\nquickening of a pregnant woman may be caused by the entry into her of\nthe spirit of some totem-plant or animal.\n\nOn the Gold Coast and elsewhere in West Africa, a man has more than\none soul, it may be as many as four; and one of them dwells with some\nanimal in the bush: thence called his \u201cbush-soul.\u201d Sir James Frazer\u2019s\nfirst hypothesis concerning Totemism was that it may have been derived\nfrom the notion of an external soul which may be deposited in anything\n(as thus in an animal in the bush) for safety. He now thinks the\nconnexion of the \u201cbush-soul\u201d with Totemism uncertain.[534] If there\nhas been any connexion, may it not be that the \u201cbush-soul\u201d is derived\nfrom Totemism, and that every Totem is a sort of \u201cbush-soul\u201d\u2014that is,\nit has a soul which is the same (at least, of the same kind) as the\nclansman\u2019s?\n\n\n\u00a7 7. TOTEMISM AND MAGIC\n\nThe identity of a man with his name, as usually assumed by savages,\nwhether his personal or his totemic name, is not itself a magical\nbelief, but an inevitable result of mental association at a low level\nof intelligence: perhaps earlier than any notions that can properly be\ncalled magical. The name of a man, always thought of along with his\nother properties, seems to be as much one of them as a scar on his neck\nor any peculiar trait of visage or length of limb. This must be as old\nas naming. But such a complication of the name with other marks having\nbeen formed, it becomes the ground of magic beliefs and practices.\nTo mention the name of a man or spirit insures his presence and\nparticipation in any rite, either acting or suffering; or where writing\nis known, his name on a piece of paper is as good as his nail-parings.\nThe use of the name is not a mere animistic summons (which might be\ndisobeyed), but an immediate instatement of the given individual. Such\nmagic may enter into totemic observances.\n\nThe descent of the clan from the Totem-animal, or of the animal from\na forefather of the clan, or of both from a _tertium quid_, involves\nmetamorphosis; and this, again, is not itself a magic idea; for real\nmetamorphoses are common in the life of birds, amphibia, insects, and\nit would be unreasonable to expect savages to perceive clearly that\nthese are not parallel cases. There is a difference, however, between\ntransformations that may be observed, such as that of a chrysalis into\na butterfly, and those that have never been observed, but are merely\nimagined and asserted. The latter are more mysterious, and mystery\nis one character of magic. For example, the Witchety-Grub clan among\nthe Arunta have as their mate a bird, the chantunga, which they will\nnot eat because, they say, of old some full-grown witchety-grubs\nwere transformed into these birds.[535] This change has a magical\ncharacter, though no magical agency is assigned. But if any attempt\nwere made to explain how the great change took place, recourse might\nbe had to powers of magic. Even when agency is assigned, it is not\nalways magical. In the earliest Alcheringa the two Ungambikula (\u201cout\nof nothing\u201d) saw in groups by the shore of the salt water a number of\ninapertwa, rudimentary men, mere roundish masses, without organs or\nmeans of feeding, and these they cut out into men with stone knives,\ntherefore not by magic.[536] But, again, a tribe on the Darling River\n(Wathi-wathi) have traditions concerning Bookoomuri who lived long ago,\nexcelled in Magic, and transformed themselves into animals; and here\nthe magical power is asserted, though the manner of its operation is\nindefinite. But the Bear clan of the Tshimshians (British Columbia)\nexplain their position by the story that once upon a time an Indian,\nwhilst hunting, met a bear, which took him to its home, where he stayed\ntwo years. On returning to his village he looked like a bear; but,\nhaving been rubbed with medical herbs, recovered human shape.[537]\nAnd here the magic is as explicit as in any recipe for a were-wolf,\nor that fallacious ointment with which Lucius achieved his memorable\ntransformation.\n\nNor, further, has the prohibition to slay, injure or eat the Totem\nin the first place any magical significance; for it merely puts the\nTotem in the position of a clansman. But the situation, being strange\nand mysterious, acquires a magical atmosphere; and the enforcement of\nthe taboo by penalties is unmistakably magical. The Untmajera (North\nCentral Australia) have a legend of a Beetle-Grub man of former times\nwho ate beetle-grubs, and thereupon broke out in sores, wasted away and\ndied. Or one\u2019s hair may turn grey; or, according to the Samoan belief\n(not strictly totemistic), the forbidden food may grow inside one into\nthe whole animal or plant to the destruction of its host. Such beliefs,\nresting on the analogy of poisons and their physiological consequences,\nare magical imaginations: the taboo has the same character as a\nconditional curse.\n\nSimilarly, the prohibition of marriage within the Totem-clan, if it\noriginated (as I have supposed) with the fusion of Totemism and Exogamy\nin the customs of various early groups of men and women, is not based\non Magic; but the penalties for breaking the taboo are magical. Thus\namongst the Euahlayi and their neighbours men and women of the Iguana\nclan cannot intermarry, though coming from different parts of the\ncountry and without any traceable consanguinity; because, if they\ndid, their children, inasmuch as their ancestors on both sides were\nthe same animal, would \u201cthrow back\u201d to the form or attributes of the\niguana.[538] A grotesque anticipation of scientific ideas.\n\nBut the most remarkable connexion between Totemism and Magic occurs\nin those rites by which clansmen in several parts of the world, but\nespecially in Australia, believe themselves able to influence their\nTotems: when these are edible, to multiply them; when noxious, to\ndrive away or destroy them; or, as with the wind and rain, to control\nthem for the general good. Spencer and Gillen[539] give astonishing\ndescriptions of the rites of multiplication (or Intichiuma), carefully\nprepared and regulated, including disguisings of clansmen in the\nlikeness of the Totems, drawings of the Totems on the ground, dances,\nincantations and ceremonies, sometimes representing traditional\nhistory\u2014by which the tribesmen discharge this function of theirs.\nThey rely chiefly on mimetic (exemplary) Magic which, by dramatising\nsome natural process, brings it into real operation. In identifying\nthemselves with the Totem, they exert their imaginations to the\nutmost, and to this end may eat a little of the Totem, at other\ntimes forbidden. This assumption that by eating a little of any\nanimal, plant or human being, you become one with it, or acquire its\nqualities, or, further, that two men by eating together of the same\nfood become allied (which is in a manner materially true, but absurdly\ninterpreted), is another of those notions simpler than, and antecedent\nto, Magic, which provide a base for magical operations.[540] These\nsolemnities last for months, and are carried out with conscientious\ndiligence and earnestness: the infatuation is profound and universal.\nHere, as at most of the higher stages of culture, we find the most\nintense emotions of which men are capable excited by participation in\ncommunal imaginative exercises that have directly, in relation to their\nexpectations, absolutely no result. Indeed, pre-occupation with vain\nemployments tends to exclude all ideas that might be useful, that might\nlead (_e.\u00a0g._) to the increasing of food by the cultivation of plants\nor domestication of animals. Sir James Frazer has pointed out that a\npassage of the rites of the Grass-seed clan, in which grass-seeds are\nscattered about upon the ground, might have led to cultivation: but the\nmental state of the clan is unfavourable to cool observation. As for\nanimals, it is some excuse for the backwardness of Australian culture\nthat the Marsupialia do not comprise a single species that would\nrepay domestication. Indirectly and undesignedly these performances\nhave very useful consequences: they annually restore the unity of the\ntribe assembled from all parts for the great occasion; promote mutual\ngood-will and a spirit of co-operation, for which they afford the chief\nopportunity; maintain the social organisation and the tradition of\ncustoms by increasing the influence of the Headmen, who have a leading\npart in everything that happens, and on whose authority all order and\ndiscipline depend; interrupt the monotony of savage life with variety\nof interests; stimulate ingenuity, and fill up the time, that might\nelse be wasted in idleness or quarrelling, with artistic and dramatic\nrecreation.\n\nUpon these rites for the multiplication and control of the Totems,\nSir James Frazer based his second hypothesis concerning the origin of\nTotemism, namely, that it was a system of co-operation amongst sections\nof a savage tribe for the magical supply of food, etc.: the Emu clan\nmultiplying emus, the Kangaroo clan kangaroos, the Witchety-Grub clan\nwitchety-grubs, and so forth.[541] But he afterwards reflected that\nsuch a design was beyond the conception of savages. And, no doubt, as a\nplan thought out and deliberately adopted as a whole, most ethnologists\nwould consider it above the capacity of Australian aborigines. But if\nso\u2014though not more difficult than the invention of the Classificatory\nMarriage System\u2014it shows what complex arrangements, simulating\ndesign, may come into existence by the growth of custom; for the clans\ncertainly do co-operate in the magical supply of food.\n\nWhatever may have been the origin of Totemism the institution seems to\nhave been utilised by some tribes in an ambitious attempt to control\nall nature by grouping (on very obscure principles, if on any) various\nclasses of phenomena with the Totems, so that one clan or another is\nresponsible for everything. Short of this, it is plainly necessary to\ncontrol the wind, rain, hail and lightning. The control of an animal\nTotem is not always benevolent toward the animals themselves. In the\nKakadu tribe it is the duty of the Mosquito clan to save the rest\nfrom mosquitoes; they make imitation mosquitoes, dance and sing, and\nimagine they are killing them.[542] In North America similar beliefs\nand practices have been found both for encouraging and for discouraging\nthe Totem, but occasionally and irregularly. The Bird clan of the\nOmahas, when birds threatened the crops, prevented their devastations\nby chewing corn and spitting it about over the fields; when mosquitoes\nwere troublesome, the Wind people flapped blankets to raise a wind and\nblow the pests away; when worms attacked the crops, the Reptile clan\n(worms and reptiles are confused in primitive Zoology) countermined\ntheir approaches by pounding up some of them with a little corn into\na soup and eating it.[543] The most remarkable American rites for\nthe increase of food\u2014the Buffalo-dances and Corn-festivals of the\nMandans\u2014were not totemic, but carried out by the whole tribe. The\nbuffalo hunting-dance to bring the herd within reach, was continued,\nif necessary, for weeks\u2014in fact until the animals came; so that the\nMagic was always effectual.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. TOTEMISM AND ANIMISM\n\nIf the unity of clansmen with their Totem is very early conceived\nof as consisting in having the same, or the same sort of, soul, it\nis thenceforward essentially animistic. Yet this idea seems only\nvery slowly to have led to any sense of dependence on the Totem as a\nspiritual power, or to any expectation that it would help or succour\nthe clansmen, or (consequently) to the making of any appeal to it,\nexcept by magical coercion. Perhaps the earliest way in which the\nTotem was supposed to aid its clansmen was by omens; as a Black Duck\nman of the Yuin tribe (West Australia) thought that black ducks warned\nhim against his enemies; but this is more characteristic of guardian\nspirits than of Clan-Totems. Occasionally in Australia we meet with\nsomething like a prayer to a Totem. On the Tully River (Queensland)\nwe are told by Mr. W.\u00a0E. Roth that before a man goes to sleep, or on\nwaking in the morning, he utters in a low voice the name of the animal\nwhose name he bears, or which belongs to his group; and that then, if\nedible, he will be successful in hunting it or, if dangerous, it will\nnot hurt him without warning.\n\nProfessor Durkheim has an elaborate theory of the growth of divinities\nfrom Totems in Australia, especially in the example of Bungil, the\nEagle-Hawk, a great phratry name-animal in several tribes.[544] He\nis a persuasive writer, but perverse and ingenious. Bungil receives\nneither prayer nor sacrifice (these, indeed, in the author\u2019s view\nare not necessary to religion), and there is nothing to show that he\ndiffers from the other glorified Headmen who are found in Australia.\nThe most plausible of these superior beings is Byamee of the Euahlayi,\nwho is not a Totem, but the source of Totems, which are derived from\ndifferent parts of his body. At funerals prayers are addressed to him\nfor the souls of the dead; and, again, at the close of the Boorah\n(initiation rites) for long life, inasmuch as the tribesmen have kept\nhis law.[545] We are told that the nearest mission-station is a hundred\nmiles off, and recently established; but on reading further that only\nthose who have been initiated can go to Byamee\u2019s sky-camp, and that\ngross sinners are punished in the next life in Eleanbah Wundah, a place\ndark but for fires,[546] we cannot help reflecting that missionaries\nare not the only channels of sound doctrine.\n\nThe most authentic example of the rise of a Totem to something like\ndivine rank is the Wollunqua, the great snake of the Warramunga,\nwhich differs from other Totems in being not a real animal but a\nmythological monster. It is not approached with prayer or sacrifice;\nbut is the object of rites in part propitiatory, in part coercive, and\nis certainly regarded with superstitious awe much as a demon might\nbe. To please the Wollunqua, the clan build a long mound and draw its\nrepresentation upon it; which, however, afterwards meets with \u201csavage\ndestruction.\u201d On approaching Thapanerlu, the sacred pool where it\nlives, they whispered to it \u201cto remain quiet and do them no harm.\u201d[547]\n\nOn the whole, funeral ceremonies, in Australia, to provide the dead\nwith necessaries, food, utensils, warmth\u2014even precautions against\nghosts\u2014come nearer to religious ideas than anything connected with\nTotemism. Among the Jupagalk (Victoria) a person when in great pain\nwould call on some dead friend to come and help him, to visit him in a\ndream and teach a song against the evil magic that hurt him.[548]\n\nIn Yam Island (Torres Straits) there is a cult of two brothers, Maiou\nand Sigai, who are said to have come from Australia. They have shrines\nwithin a fence; women and uninitiated youths are not permitted to\nenter, and do not know that Maiou is the crocodile (Kodal), and Sigai\nthe hammer-headed shark (Kursi); for they are always addressed and\nspoken of by their names as heroes, and not by their animal or Totem\nnames. The shrines contain effigies made of turtle-shell representing\nthe animals; and under each effigy is a stone in which the life or\nspirit of the Totem-hero resides. The natives, in the north-west\nmonsoon, danced and sang before them for fine weather; and also on\ngoing to war, praying: \u201cO Totem Sigai and Totem Maiou, both of you\nclose the eyes of these men so that they cannot see us.\u201d[549] This\nis indisputably Religion; it is not, however, pure Totemism, but\napparently a fusion of hero-worship with the Totemism of the heroes.\nAnother hero of more recent date, Quoiam, is worshipped in the\nneighbouring island of Mabuaig. He came from North Queensland; and\nhis house and cairn are still shown on a hill-top. His Totem was the\nshovel-nosed skate, but he has undergone no fusion with that animal. We\nmay be inclined to infer that the hero can stand alone, whilst a Totem\nneeds the alliance of a hero to anthropomorphise it.\n\nSuch an inference is, on the whole, confirmed by the state of religion\nin Fiji. There, amongst the coastal tribes, Totemism is decadent and\nirregular; though even on the coast of Viti Levu there are deities\nwith animal attributes, and especially with the power of changing into\nanimals; and the animal connected with a god must not be eaten by\npeople of the district where he is worshipped.[550] In the mountainous\ninterior Totemism still flourishes, and animal-gods are worshipped\nwhich have been assumed to have originated in Totems. Dr. Rivers tells\nus[551] that he formerly assumed this, but is inclined to revise his\nopinion. The Fijian Snake-god Ndengei was, according to tradition, a\nman who came to the island from elsewhere; probably he made a great\nimpression and was apotheosised. His character as a Snake-god may be\nderived from the snake\u2019s having been his Totem. Probably god-like\nbeings in Fiji were in many cases heroes, but a close relation with\ntheir Totem endued them with something of the animal nature. \u201cThe\nevolution would not be simply from Totem to god, but from hero and\nTotem together to god.\u201d\n\nGods present in animals, sometimes in plants, were acknowledged in\nSamoa, Tahiti, Hawaii, Tonga; and, in fact, Polynesia is the region\nwhere, if anywhere, Totems contribute largely to the divine population.\nRivers will not deny (_loc. cit._) that direct evolution of gods\nfrom Totems may have taken place; but he points out that in Samoa,\nfor example, the Octopus-god (Ole Fe\u2019e) was, according to tradition,\nbrought to the island by a Fijian chief. Was then the mollusc or the\nchief the root from which the god grew up? In Savaii there were gods\nincarnate in men: one in an actual man who was a cannibal propitiated\nwith human flesh; another, invisible to the people, though seen by\nstrangers as a handsome young man wearing a girdle of leaves, was\ncalled the King of Fiji (Tuifiti). Other gods described by Turner[552]\nare Ole alii Fiti (chief of Fiji), who was manifest in an eel; and\nTinalii (King of chiefs), who was associated with the sea-eel, octopus,\nmullet, and the ends of banana leaves. Fusion seems to have been common.\n\nIt must not, of course, be assumed that all animal gods are Totems.\nAmong the ways in which animal gods may have arisen we cannot deny\nsome place to Spencer\u2019s hypothesis, that heroes have sometimes been\nworshipped as animals because they bore animal names; and, after their\ndeath, the eponymous animals, ever present to men\u2019s eyes, superseded\nthe heroes, and were connected with and transformed their legends.\nIt is also conceivable that a hero has been worshipped in the form\nof an animal or plant, because he had announced that, after death,\nhe would be in such an animal or plant; for at Ulawa (Solomon Isles)\nbananas were _buto_, things that might not be eaten, approached or\nbeheld (according to Dr. Coddrington[553]), because an influential man\nhad prohibited the eating of them, saying that, after death, he would\nbe in the banana; and with so much influence he might, in favourable\ncircumstances, have become a Banana-god. And, again, in Professor\nWestermarck\u2019s opinion, \u201cthe common prevalence of animal worship is,\nno doubt, due to the mysteriousness of the animal world; the most\nuncanny of all creatures, the serpent, is also the one most generally\nworshipped.\u201d[554]\n\nBut these considerations strengthen the probability that a Totem may\nsometimes become a god; having the general respect of the clan to\nbegin with. Some Totems having been deified with the assistance of\nheroes, others may perhaps be elevated by the force of analogy; or,\nonce the conception of a spiritual being has been reached\u2014chiefly (as\nwe suppose) by reflection on dreams\u2014and animals and even inanimate\nthings have been thought to have spiritual doubles, if then the Totem\nis conceived to have a spirit, and even the same as the clansman\u2019s\nsoul, if it is appealed to for assistance, if it sends omens, listens\nto prayer and accepts sacrifice, what is it but a god?\n\nIn North America the Totem seems nowhere to have been worshipped; and\nany tendency that may have existed to propitiate it was diverted by\nthe superior fascination of the personal guardian-genius, to which\nsometimes costly sacrifices were made and even self-mutilations;\nas among the Mandans, who often cut off a finger to secure its\nfavour.[555] On the other hand, a class of spirits was recognised\nin the \u201celder brother\u201d of each species of animal (or of the most\ninteresting species\u2014bear, deer, snake, etc.\u2014all of the totemic\nclass), a being (in the words of an early missionary, 1634) \u201cwho is\nas it were the principle and origin of all the individuals,\u201d and\n\u201cmarvellously great and powerful\u201d:[556] it watches over the species and\navenges its wrongs. In North-West America and throughout Siberia the\nBear and the Raven are objects of religious reverence; not, indeed, as\nclan-totems, but for all men. Among the Gulf nations the Yuchis are\nTotemists, and a youth at his initiation is put under the care of his\nclan-totem, instead of a personal guardian-genius as among the northern\ntribes; he looks for protection, however, not to the living animals of\nthe Totem species, but to superior beings, like the \u201celder brothers\u201d\nof the species.[557] Similar to these must be the Beast-gods of the\nZuni Indians, to whom they offer a portion of all game, praying that\nthey will intercede for them with the Sun-Father. In South America,\ntoo, the Patagonians and Araucanians teach that each species of animal\nhas a guardian spirit, who lives in a cave, and that the Indians\nthemselves at death go to live with him. We can hardly doubt that in\nall these cases, the spirit-animals are in some way connected with\ntotemic beliefs: if not gods, they are at least divine beings, and they\nexemplify a noble sort of mysticism that is natural to the Amerind\nimagination.[558]\n\nAfrica is the principal home of Zoolatry. The religion of the Bantu\nnations of South Africa is, indeed, ancestor-worship; and their\nserpent-cult seems to be an outgrowth of ancestor-worship (for they\nthink that their dead return as serpents of various species according\nto rank); unless, indeed, it has been diverted to such a subordinate\nplace from some more ancient superstition. In West Africa there are\nmany Beast-gods, especially the leopard, hyena, crocodile and python.\nThey do not, however, give much indication of totemic origin; and Sir\nJames Frazer observes that, as the hereditary worship of animals in\ncertain districts (as of the hyena at Accra) was not totemic, nor need\nsimilar practices have been so elsewhere.[559] Hence that the Egyptians\nworshipped certain animals, and that in the district of any animal\u2019s\nworship it was not killed or eaten, cannot prove that the worship\nwas totemic, unless it be shown that Totemism is the only road to\nZoolatry; for, if there are other ways, any animal that becomes divine\nwill, naturally, not be killed or eaten. On the other hand, that the\nEgyptians were not Exogamists does not prove they were not Totemists;\nsince some known Totemists are not Exogamists. The natural impression\nof a student who merely comes amongst other things to Egyptian Religion\nis that Totemism was one of its sources; but it is a subject on which,\nmore strictly than on most, only a few specialists can form a judgment.\n\nOn the whole, the contribution of Totemism to religion seems to\nhave been greatly exaggerated. Compared with the influence of dead\nheroes and ancestors, or with the personification of the greater\nmanifestations of nature\u2014Sky, Sun, Thunder\u2014it has been ineffective,\nfalling short of the production of high gods; or if, as in Polynesia,\nit seems sometimes to have come near to that achievement, it may be\nsuspected that its success owed much to an alliance with hero-worship.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[510] _Totemism and Exogamy_, I. p. 3. The definition occurs in a\nreprint of an earlier essay. A later definition (IV. p. 3) runs:\n\u201cTotemism is an intimate relation which is supposed to exist between\na group of kindred people on the one side and a species of natural\nor artificial objects on the other side, which objects are called\nthe totems of the human group.\u201d The relation appears to be one of\nfriendship and kinship, on a footing of equality, not religious in\nAustralia. I have, in this chapter, drawn freely upon the great mass of\nfacts and speculations collected in _Totemism and Exogamy_; believing\nthat in that work the author not only intended to present the evidence\nfor his own conclusions, but had also the benevolent purpose of\nassisting the labours of those who might come after him. A heavy debt\nof gratitude is due; which, indeed, causes some embarrassment if ever\none feels obliged to differ from him in opinion.\n\n[511] _Totemism and Exogamy_, I. p. 4; cf. IV. pp. 3, 4. Perhaps the\nauthor no longer approves of the word \u201creverenced.\u201d Totem and clan are\nrather on a footing of equality.\n\n[512] _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, App. B.\n\n[513] The animals are: Human 2, other Mammalia 31, Birds 46, Reptiles\n51, Amphibia 1, Fishes 8, Insects 24, Mollusca 1.\n\n[514] _Totemism and Exogamy_, II. p. 535.\n\n[515] _Totemism and Exogamy_, III. pp. 90-100.\n\n[516] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, II. pp. 96-110.\n\n[517] _Contributions to the Science of Mythology_, I. p. 201.\n\n[518] _Introduction to the History of Religion_, p. 101.\n\n[519] _Secret of the Totem_ and _Social Origins_.\n\n[520] Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n330.\n\n[521] _Native Tribes of Northern Territory of Australia_, p. 263.\n\n[522] _Totemism and Exogamy_, IV. pp. 57-63.\n\n[523] _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_, 1909, p. 173.\n\n[524] _Journal of the Anthropological Institute_, 1909, p. 175.\n\n[525] In the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, a man applies the name\nof \u201cmother\u201d to his real mother and also to his maternal aunts, who\naccept the relationship and may assert: \u201cWe all three of us bore him\u201d\n(_Totemism and Exogamy_, I. p. 305 note). Is this what they believe, or\nwhat (following their system of class-nomenclature) they are accustomed\nto say?\n\n[526] Page 125.\n\n[527] See above, ch. ii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[528] It is reasonable to suppose that a group named other groups\nto distinguish those around them, before needing to name itself. It\nfollows that probably each group sometimes bore a different name when\nspoken of by each of several neighbours. How amidst such confusion\ncould single names be fixed? Perhaps because the group designated\nadopted one of them; or by the elimination of the other names through\nmany causes in course of time, in generations, in hundreds of years.\nThe march of progress was leisurely in those days.\n\n[529] Chs. iv., v., vi.\n\n[530] Chs. xiv., xv., _Prohibition of Marriage between Kindred_.\n\n[531] Ch. xl., _Marriage_.\n\n[532] Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi Tribe_, p. 21.\n\n[533] _Totemism and Exogamy_, I. p. 489.\n\n[534] _Ibid._, IV. p. 54.\n\n[535] _Totemism and Exogamy_, I. p. 254.\n\n[536] _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 388.\n\n[537] _Totemism and Exogamy_, III. p. 13.\n\n[538] Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi_, p. 22.\n\n[539] _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, ch. vi.; _Northern Tribes\nof Central Australia_, ch. ix.\n\n[540] There is, however, another possible reason for the eating by the\nclan or by its Headman of some portion of the food which they profess\nto supply to the rest of the tribe\u2014namely, that it expresses a prior\nclaim to some sort of proprietorship, which is then waived.\n\n[541] _Totemism and Exogamy_, IV. pp. 55-7.\n\n[542] Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes North. Ter. Aust._, p. 324.\n\n[543] _Totemism and Exogamy_, III. pp. 104-5.\n\n[544] _The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life_, II. ch. ix.\n\n[545] Langloh Parker, _The Euahlayi Tribe_, pp. 458, 478, etc. In\nEleanbah Wundah, they hold their right hands pressed against their\nsides, which A. Lang thought a remarkable image. It is, W.\u00a0E. Roth\ntells us, gesture-language for sickness. (_Ethnological Studies in\nNorth-West Central Queensland_, p. 90.)\n\n[546] _The Euahlayi_, pp. 4 to 8, and 78.\n\n[547] _North. Ts. of C. Aust._, p. 253.\n\n[548] Howitt, _Northern Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 435.\n\n[549] Haddon, _Reports of the Expedition to Torres Straits_, V. pp. 37,\n38.\n\n[550] W. H. R. Rivers, _J. A. I._, 1909, p. 158.\n\n[551] _J. A. I._, 1909, p. 163.\n\n[552] _Samoa_, chs. iv., v.; especially pp. 28, 48, 62-3, 70, 75. Fiji\nhad in some way deeply impressed the Samoan imagination.\n\n[553] _The Melanesians_, p. 31.\n\n[554] _Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, II. p. 590.\n\n[555] _Totemism and Exogamy_, III.\n\n[556] Quoted by Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, II. p. 244.\n\n[557] _Totemism and Exogamy_, III. p. 311.\n\n[558] On species-gods see Tylor\u2019s _Primitive Culture_, II. pp. 242-6.\n\n[559] _Totemism and Exogamy_, II. p. 574.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nMAGIC AND SCIENCE\n\n\n\u00a7 1. THEIR COMMON GROUND\n\nIt is not infrequently said that Science is derived from Magic, and\nthe tenet is strengthened by eminent names; nor is it displeasing to\nsome bystanders whose attitude toward Science is one of imperfect\nsympathy; but it seems to me to involve a misunderstanding of the\nmatter. Magic and Science have, indeed, some common ground; for both\nare products of our poor human mind, which is sorely pestered in\nexplaining its experiences by the notion of \u201cforces\u201d that somehow\nbring about events, and which cannot get on at all without assuming\nuniformities of relation. Magic supposes constant connexions of events\ndue to the agency, force, influence or virtue of charms, rites and\nspells; which connexions, however, are found only to be tendencies of\nsome events to excite others, inasmuch as they may be frustrated by\ncounteracting charms, rites or spells. This reads like a caricature\nof scientific ideas. Not long ago, too, \u201cforces\u201d had a considerable\nvogue amongst scientists; and such mysteries as \u201cvital force\u201d and\n\u201cpsychic force\u201d are still to be met with. But it is plain that we never\nknow more than that under certain conditions a change takes place;\nand when we try to explain the change by analysing the conditions,\nwe never find any \u201cforce\u201d distinct from the collocation and motion\nof bodies or particles. \u201cForce\u201d may be technically and formally used\nin various propositions, but the idea never contributes anything to\nthe explanation of events; whilst the fact that with many people it\nseems to do so, often makes it a nuisance. That it seems to carry some\nexplanation with it is due to the continuous influence of Magic which,\nthough always the antithesis of Science, was yet for very many ages\nassociated with Science. Magic is entirely constituted by notions\nof force, sometimes violent, as in the discharge of an enchanted\nspear; sometimes subtle, like the efficacy of an opal; intangible,\ninvisible, and operating at a distance through space and time, like a\nwitch\u2019s spells that eclipse the sun or moon. These forces have only a\none-sided relation to the workaday world; they meet with no resistance\nfrom what we take to be the \u201cproperties of matter,\u201d such as weight\nand impenetrability; but are themselves entirely exempt from natural\nlaw: what we call the \u201creal world\u201d has no hold upon them; they live\nin a world of their own. They are absolutely immeasurable; and hence\nthe causation, which is certainly implied in the notion of their\noperation, is indefinite, and becomes vaguer and vaguer as the magical\nsystem develops; and all this is the opposite of what happens in the\nhistory of Science. In spite of having a necessary common ground in the\nhuman mind, Magic and Science are contrasted from the first, in their\ndevelopment grow wider and wider apart, in their methods and ideas\nmore and more opposed. If either can be said to precede the other, it\nis Science (at least, in its earliest and crudest form) that precedes\nMagic.\n\nWe had better begin, however, by considering a third something which is\nearlier than either of them, and which I have called Common-sense: I\nmean the accumulation of particular items of positive knowledge (which,\nas such, is the first form of Science) acquired by primitive man,\nand in less measure by the higher brutes: facts about cold and heat,\nsunshine and rain, the powers of water and fire, the life of trees and\nanimals, the properties of wood and stone, and so forth, which are\nunfailingly confirmed by further experience. Examination of the life\nof savages discovers that this positive knowledge of theirs amounts\nto a great deal, and that they are able to use it \u201cand reason not\ncontemptibly.\u201d From this Common-sense Science and a good deal of Magic\nare differentiated, and they expand at very unequal rates in opposite\ndirections. Each of them starts from it; but whilst Magic rapidly\ndistorts, perverts and mystifies it out of recognition in innumerable\nimaginations, Science slowly connects its fragments together,\ncorrects, defines and extends it, without ever altering its original\npositive character. The difference between Magic and Science lies (as\nwe have seen) in the causes that establish belief in them; in the\ncharacter of their ideas\u2014respectively, incoherent and vague, coherent\nand definite; and, as a consequence, in their respective falsity and\ntruth.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. THE DIFFERENTIATION\n\nWhilst Magic, amongst savage and barbarous people, is practised\nmore or less by almost everybody, it is especially developed by\nthe professional wizard, and in his art and tradition it is most\nconveniently studied. The wizard, or (at least) a leader amongst\nwizards, is a man of superior ability, penetration and enterprise;\nliable to be misled by a sanguine and ambitious temperament into\nextravagant imaginations and impostures, but with much more real\nknowledge than the rest of the tribe. He often takes pains to increase\nhis knowledge, for it is the true basis of his power: \u201cthe power of\nthe Angoqok,\u201d says Mr. Turner, writing of the Esquimo,[560] \u201chas some\nbasis in experienced weather-lore, and knowledge of the habits of\nanimals, by which he advises hunters.\u201d But this knowledge is often the\nstarting-point of his delusions, not altogether by any fault of his\nown, but as a result of his attempts to apply knowledge to new cases\nwithout any appreciation of the need of caution or of the conditions\nof sound inference and of proof and disproof. He never knows why he\nis right or why he is wrong. Hence, beside the modest edifice of his\nreal knowledge, he builds out in one direction a few genuine additions\nwarranted by sound inference and observation; whilst in the other\ndirection he raises, largely by analogy, with the help of \u201csympathy\u201d\nand spiritual powers, a towering structure of imaginations, which\nthrows his little hut of Common-sense quite into the shade.\n\n(_a_) For example, the wizard is often literally a medicine-man or\nphysician, and knows the use of certain drugs; and he may discover\nother drugs and more uses for them, and in that direction lies\nPharmacology. But in the other direction he adopts on altogether\nfanciful occasions a great many other recipes that serve no purpose but\ncharlatanry and mystification. Pliny, much of whose _Natural History_\nis a handbook of ancient medicine, describes hundreds of remedies\nderived from animals, vegetables and minerals; and Burton[561] cites\nGaleottus as having enumerated 800 medicinal herbs and other drugs.\nSome of these were good and are still in use, but most were useless\nor worse than useless. The difference between these two classes of\ndrugs depended on a difference of method in determining their uses: a\ndifference that existed but was not yet understood (namely), on the one\nhand, proof by experience, giving in the smaller class the rudiments\nof medical science; and, on the other hand, acceptance on the strength\nof superficial likeness, or of the doctrine of qualities, virtues and\nsignatures, which made the larger class essentially magical.\n\nThus all sorts of precious stones and metals were believed to be\nmedicinal, not because they had been known to cure any disease, but\nbecause it seemed obvious in those days that precious things must\nhave all sorts of desirable effects by some occult virtue. Gold, the\nmost perfect of all substances (according to the alchemists), must in\nparticular be a propitious and powerful restorative. So Chaucer says of\nhis Doctour of Phisik:\n\n \u201cFor gold in phisik is a cordial,\n Therefore he lovede gold in special.\u201d\n\nAnd throughout India at the present day gold is a trusty item in any\nprescription. Belief in the virtue of precious stones probably goes\nback to very early times; since we find that in Australia crystals are\nnot only magically powerful but the great primary sources of Magic, by\nhaving which inside him the wizard acquires and maintains his power.\n\nWith herbs, again, whilst the utility of some, such as quinine or\nsenna, was a matter of experience, others were equally prized out\nof pure fancy. Dracunculus, a plant spotted with various colours,\nlike a viper\u2019s skin, was supposed to be a remedy for all kinds of\nsnake-stings.[562] The Cherokees gave their children a concoction of\nburs to strengthen their memories; for as a bur will stick to anything,\nthe mind of a man with bur inside him will cling to all kinds of useful\ninformation. The same Amerinds had other remedies which illustrate\nthe character of magical physic. They concocted a vermifuge of the\nred fleshy stalks of chickweed, which somewhat resemble worms, and\ntherefore must have some influence upon them; and they steeped in\nthis concoction a flint arrow-head, that its sharpness, communicated\nto the brew, might cut the worms in pieces. Biliousness, marked by\nthe vomiting of yellow bile, was cured by four herbs\u2014all yellow in\nroot, or stalk, or flower. To ward off smallpox they ate the flesh of\nthe buzzard: that bird being, in their opinion, exempt from smallpox,\nbecause its foul stench keeps the disease-spirit at a distance. To cure\nsnake-bite, they said, rub the place in the direction contrary to that\nin which the snake coils itself (to the right); because this is the\nsame as uncoiling it.[563] But here there seems to be some hiatus in\nthe thought, for how does uncoiling the snake counteract its poison?\nOne easily appreciates the exultation of the wizard to whom this idea\nfirst revealed itself, and his contempt for the dull process of working\nit out, when its place in the harmony of things was self-evident.\n\nIn some of these cases we find the assumption (tacit with primitive\npractitioners, but explicit in Medi\u00e6val Medicine) that \u201clike causes\nlike\u201d: the adhesiveness of the bur is communicated to the memory, the\nsharpness of the flint arrow-point to the vermifuge, the buzzard\u2019s\nimmunity from smallpox to the eater of the buzzard. And this is\nintelligible: because, first, there are many examples (superficially\nconsidered) of like causing like, such as animal generation, the\nspread of fire; hot things heat, and cold things cool, and so forth:\nand, secondly, qualities such as stickiness and sharpness, are thought\nof by savages as fine material, like curses and ghosts, which may\nbe transferred from one thing to another. But in other cases it is\nassumed that \u201clike cures like,\u201d as chickweed cures worms, and yellow\nherbs biliousness (as in Europe turmeric was long believed to cure\njaundice); and this is a very different matter\u2014equivalent to \u201clike\nexpels or annuls like.\u201d In ordinary experience, there seem to be no\nobvious examples of it: but in primitive medical practice it is found\nthat fomentation reduces inflammation, rubbing with snow is good for\nfrost-bite, an emetic cures sickness, and castor oil diarrh\u0153a; and such\nmay be the experiential ground of these magico-medical fancies.\n\nThe power of herbs may depend upon rites observed at their gathering:\nwhen a Cherokee wizard pulled up a plant for medicine, he dropped a\nbead into the hole to compensate the earth for the theft;[564] and\nwhen a Greek physician gathered the _Panaces Asclepion_, which was\na remedy for all diseases, he filled the hole with various kinds of\ngrain by way of expiation.[565] In employing medicinal herbs it is\nalso important to remember _when_ they should be procured, as on the\neve of the summer solstice, at the new or the full moon, or at the\nturn of the tide; _by whom_\u2014a child or a virgin; and _where_\u2014on a\nmountain-top or at a grave. Hierabotane was so potent that whoever\nrubbed himself with it obtained whatever he desired; and in gathering\nit, you first offered honey to the earth in expiation, then traced\na circle around it with iron, and\u2014taking care that neither sun nor\nmoon should shine upon it\u2014at the rising of the Dog Star, you pulled\nit up with the left hand, and dried separately in the shade the root,\nthe stem and the leaves.[566] Indeed the conditions under which a\ndrug can be legitimately obtained so as to ensure its efficacy, may\nbe so numerous, minute and exigent as to make the satisfying of them\nalmost impossible; so we need not wonder if the remedy sometimes fails.\nPrescriptions often include the flesh or juices of dead bodies, or\ntheir pounded bones, or other foul and repulsive ingredients related to\nBlack Magic\u2014much trusted, and still traditional in some strata of this\ncountry, where the belief is inexpugnable that medicine, the nastier it\nis, is the more efficacious.\n\nIf any one wonders how such prescriptions can have held their ground\nfor ages, it was because patients did not always die. Recovery was\ncredited to the drastic medicine, and death to evil Magic; and the _vis\nmedicatrix natur\u00e6_, that staunch ally of honest physic, was sometimes\ntoo strong for the wizard\u2019s whole pharmacop\u0153ia.\n\n(_b_) Again, the wizard is a surgeon, and knows something of the\nconstruction and working of the human body, and this is the beginning\nof Anatomy and Physiology. He was especially well informed in these\nmatters in such a country as Fiji, where he had access to two great\nsources of anatomical knowledge\u2014frequent wars and cannibalism. He\nalso knows certain ways of treating wounds and other lesions, such\nas bandages, ligatures, splints, slings, massage and fomentations,\nwhich all admit of rational development and have been continuously\npractised to this day. Could he be content to abide by the facts, all\nmight be well; but he is tempted to extend his methods in various\ndirections to cases which, on very slight grounds, he believes to be\nsimilar. The best known example of the erroneous extension by analogy\nof a sound method is the sucking-cure. It is, or has been, practised\nall over the world, and obviously rests on the proved utility of\nsuction in extracting from the flesh thorns or poisons. In Australia\nsnake-bite is sometimes cured by sucking the wound and rinsing the\nmouth with water.[567] But the operation is gradually applied to other\ncases until, whatever pain you suffer, it is attributed to something\nlike poison, or a thorn (or, later, a spirit), that has got inside\nyou, though by an invisible wound, and may be sucked out. The wizard,\naccordingly, undertakes to suck it out, and he sometimes exhibits it to\nyou\u2014a piece of wood or bone, which he brought to your bedside in his\nwaistband. Sometimes a medicine-man enjoys great suctorial powers by\nhaving a lizard in his own body.[568]\n\nFor getting a foreign body out of a man a method alternative to suction\nis pressure. Mr. Howitt[569] reports a remarkable prescription for\ncuring headache. Cut out of the ground a circular turf, place the\nsufferer\u2019s head in the hole and the turf upon his head; then sit or\nstand upon it. He may presently declare that he feels relief; but\nperhaps he only desires it. It is a fact that a patient sometimes feels\nbetter after such treatment, though the cause of his pain was nothing\nthat could possibly yield to suction or pressure: that is to say, his\nmind yields to suggestion. But not all savages are equally suggestible,\nany more than we are. Dr. Coddrington says[570] that, in Pentecost\nIsland, witches profess to cure pain with a leaf-poultice, and in\ntaking it off to remove with it the cause of pain, perhaps a snake\nor a lizard. \u201cBut,\u201d said a native, \u201cno one sees the things but the\nwoman, and the pain remains\u201d\u2014one of those troublesome sceptics! Yet\nit is possible that had he just undergone the operation, he would not\nhave denied that the pain was better. There is a state of mind between\nsuggestibility and sane judgment, namely, assentation: unwillingness or\nunreadiness to form or state one\u2019s own opinion, and, consequently, an\nappearance of acquiescing in another\u2019s assertion. There is confusion\nand conflict, from which assent is the easiest relief. This state of\nmind for the immediate purpose of medicine-man or orator may serve as\nwell as suggestibility; but may soon pass off when the patient recovers\nhis faculties, and should be distinguished from the suggestibility\nthat takes a relatively permanent impression from the pretensions of a\nmountebank. The power of suggestion, however, is one of the facts that\nthe wizard has observed, and he counts upon its aid. He has also learnt\nto practise hypnotism; and seeing how mysterious these things have been\nto the most enlightened moderns, we need not wonder that he employs\nthem in magical therapeutics\u2014dancing, drumming, shouting to overpower\nhis patient and to incite himself to put forth his utmost energy.\nNowhere, probably, in the whole range of his art, is the difference\nbetween Reality and Magic so obscure to himself.\n\nThe wizard, then, acquired in his medical functions (and in others) a\ncertain empirical knowledge of some obscure facts in Psychology, and\nthis knowledge persisted in his profession in shady quarters to our own\ntime; but with the growth of positive Science, its mysteriousness was\nmistaken for quackery, until quite recently, when the facts forced\nthemselves on the attention of some men, who needed great courage\nto confess their conviction. A crude Physiological Psychology, too,\nresulted from savage observation of a connexion between the agitations\nof body and mind. Very early sundry mental powers\u2014skill, courage,\naffection\u2014are located in special parts of the body\u2014the heart, spleen,\nkidneys, bowels\u2014as they still are in popular language. Apart from the\nbare observation that the bowels and heart are disturbed during emotion\n(which is true and important), these doctrines are not Science; nor\nare they exactly Magic, but belong to the region of ideas ancillary to\nMagic\u2014ideas of qualities as material things. The savage, always eager\nto apply his supposed knowledge to practice, utilises his Physiological\nPsychology for the improvement of his mind, and misses no opportunity\nto make a meal upon an enemy\u2019s (or perhaps a relative\u2019s) heart or\nspleen or kidney or tongue or eye, in order to appropriate the quality\nfor which the deceased had been conspicuous.\n\n(_c_) Savages (as we have seen in the chapter on Omens) are familiar\nwith a great many natural signs by which to judge of things not now\npresent, but that have happened, or are about to happen. Every hunter\nmust have a great stock of such knowledge, inasmuch as the pursuit of\ngame entirely depends upon it. This knowledge of natural signs is, on\nthe one hand, a genuine contribution to Natural History; it increases,\nis handed down from generation to generation, and forms the nucleus\nof Botany and Zoology. But, on the other hand, there is reared upon\nit, under the influence of hope and fear, the belief in Omens that\ngive warning of good or ill success in all the affairs of life. Omens,\nat first merely signs mysteriously connected with events, are later\nregarded as the sendings of spirits or gods, whose oracles forecast the\nfate of heroes and nations. At first, perhaps, the wizard may do no\nmore than other tribesmen to promote this particular superstition; but\nit is he who works out the great art of Divination, without which Omens\nwould have been a matter of much less consequence.\n\nThe most famous branch of Divination, namely, Astrology, was the\ninvention of a comparatively late age, and it was, of course, long\npreceded by the discovery of the rudiments of Astronomy as part of\nthe common sense of agriculture: some knowledge of the regularity of\nthe motions of the sun and moon and of the constancy of the stars\nin contrast with the planets. This is plainly presupposed by the\ncomprehensive system of predictions based on sympathetic Magic,\narbitrary assumptions and fanciful analogies which, for the last four\nor five thousand years, has promised to disclose to any mother the\ncareer of her infant, or to any monarch the future of his kingdom. But\nwhat now seems fanciful or arbitrary once seemed reasonable. The sun\nmanifestly rules all things; the waxing and waning of the moon must\nstrengthen and weaken all things; the signs of the Zodiac are certainly\nconnected with the seasons; the planets partake of the nature of the\ngods.[571] If there are gods they must, as the Stoics argued, have some\nway of communicating with men; and what way can be more congruous with\ntheir nature than by writing on the face of the heavens? But generally\nthe ideas of Astrology were magical rather than animistic. Having\ndetermined the powers and dispositions of the heavenly bodies, let us\nconsider only what must necessarily follow from their influences in\nconjunction or opposition and various relations in trine, quartile and\nsextile. Thus they dreamed and speculated, but at the same time made\nmany exact observations on the sky. And so Astronomy made some progress\nin spite of Magic.\n\n(_d_) More widely prevalent than Astrology and far more ancient is the\nart of controlling the weather, especially rain; for rain, from its\nuncertainty in many countries and its indispensableness, is a matter of\ndeeper interest and anxiety than even the sun himself. \u201cRain-making,\u201d\nas it is called, common in Australia and other regions of lowly\nculture, survives when society has risen to higher levels, becomes the\nfunction of the most eminent wizards or priests, sometimes the duty of\nkings, and is not extinct amongst ourselves. But from what knowledge of\nfact or common sense can \u201crain-making\u201d be derived? I conjecture it was\nfrom facts observed in the behaviour of fire.\n\nThe making of fire was the first great chemical experiment and the\nfoundation of all Chemistry. Having made fire, the most wonderful of\nall achievements, there would be little excuse for astonishment if men\nhad then thought they could also make rain; but probably they never\nthought so. It seems to me a misconception of rain-rites to describe\nthem as endeavours to \u201cmake\u201d rain; for they plainly aim not at making,\nbut at inducing, instigating or propagating it. The Swazies, we are\ntold explicitly, try to procure rain by throwing water high into the\nair, expecting that the falling drops will stimulate the clouds in\nsympathy with them.[572] Savages may be said to \u201cmake\u201d fire; for until\nthey rub their sticks, or knock their flints together, it does not\nexist. But in the so-called \u201cmaking\u201d of rain there is nearly always\nsome water to begin with; and the essence of a rain-rite is the\nsplashing of water into the air, or the pouring of it out, sometimes on\na particular stone, or on a particular person, with many variations.\nIn rare instances the water has been forgotten: the Kurnai, instead\nof water, let blood, and throw down into the air for clouds; but in\nanother rite they fill their mouths with water and squirt it out in one\ndirection or another (according to the clan) and sing a spell: to stop\nthe rain they throw up fire-sticks.[573] Those who practise such rites\nhope that the spilling of a little water will bring on a great downfall\nor outpouring of water, namely, rain; and this agrees with the fact\nthat a wizard will not operate except when the rainy season approaches.\nNow this inducing of much by little is not, indeed, analogous to the\n_making_ of fire; but it is analogous to the spread or propagation of\nfire; when, having produced a few sparks, these spread through tinder\nto the firewood, and thence a conflagration may be communicated to the\nprairie or to the forest. My conjecture is, then, that not the making\n(which is never attempted) but the inducing, or propagation of rain is\nbased on the analogy of the propagation of fire, and belongs to the\nclass of exemplary or incentive rites; which are to be understood not\nas intending the direct causation of events, but rather as instigating\nNature to bring it about: the class described in Chap. IV. \u00a7 8, such\nas the furthering of crops by fertility-rites, or the ensuring of\nsuccessful hunting or warfare by a dramatic dance.\n\nRain-rites being very apt to fail of their purpose, the wizard is in\ndanger of losing his reputation, or of some worse fate. His attention\nis, therefore, drawn to the signs of the weather, the character and\ncourse of the seasons, the connexion of rain with the aspect of the\nsky and direction of the wind; so that he learns to operate for rain\nonly when rain may reasonably be expected. He has then laid out the\nrudiments of Meteorology, but by observation, not by hocus-pocus.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. WHY MAGIC SEEMS TO BE THE SOURCE OF SCIENCE\n\nIn no case, then, is Science derived from Magic, but Science on the one\nhand and Magic on the other are differentiated from Common-sense,[574]\nand Science is much nearer akin to Common-sense than Magic is, being\nof the same substance and only formally different. And in that sense\nit is earlier than Magic, and sometimes formally earlier, as in the\ncase of Astronomy and Astrology. The illusion that Magic is the earlier\nis due to the misinterpretation of two facts: (_a_) Magic and Science\nare, for the most part and during many ages, worked out by the same\nmen\u2014magicians or priests; and all that they do is mistaken for Magic,\neven by themselves. And (_b_) Magic in most of its branches undergoes\nimmense development, whilst the Sciences remain rudimentary; grows old\nand even decrepit, whilst they are still in infancy; so that, on first\nemerging into public notice, they seem to issue from the matrix of\nMagic.\n\nThe reasons for the relative backwardness of Science, again, are\nchiefly three: (_a_) For ages it is in the hands of wizards who, though\nhighly valuing knowledge, are mainly eager for power and prophecy. It\nis true that Science gives power, and the hope of power is a reasonable\nincentive to the study of Science; but it must be a remote incentive,\nin the actual work of research rigorously excluded. There, unless\ntruth is the sole end in view, the procedure will not be clean, will\nbe confined to immediate utility. But this is a recent discovery. The\nwizard has no such ideas: he is governed by his desires and traditions.\nHence for verification he is content with coincidences; negative\ninstances he neglects, or regards failure merely as an occasion for\nexcuses. He accepts connexions of events remote in space and time, and\nis very slow to see the necessity of connecting events in the closest\npossible sequence. Moreover, having no understanding even of the facts\nhe knows (such as the making of fire), the mysteriousness of any\nrelation of events constitutes no objection to his acceptance of it; as\nthe magical side of his practice grows, so does its mystery; until at\nlast mysteriousness is a strong recommendation, and becomes a character\nof the apperceptive mass that assimilates and confirms all magical\nbeliefs. This state of mind always offers strong resistance to positive\nexplanation.\n\n(_b_) Another reason of the backwardness of Science is the slow\nelucidation of the idea of Causation\u2014long obscured by the\nimpressiveness of coincidence and by fallacious imaginations of magical\nand spiritual forces: a process still incomplete. Until this idea had\nmade considerable progress in definiteness (in antiquity, say, with\nArchimedes, and in modern times with Galileo), it was impossible that\nthe indispensableness of analysis and elimination should be understood,\nthat absolute respect should be felt for negative instances and that\nany gap in a series of events should always be regarded as an instant\nproblem. And, finally (_c_), for scientific progress it was necessary\nthat reasoning by analogy should be abandoned, and a methodology\ndiscovered of parallel and equational reasoning, with the apparatus\nthat makes exact investigation possible.\n\nAs the Sciences grow in comprehensiveness, precision and solidarity,\nthey constitute their own apperceptive mass, assimilation with which\nis the supreme test of all relevant beliefs; and this, together with\na methodology that has become a habit of mind, tends to establish a\nsocial atmosphere in which Magic is no longer thinkable. Exact habits\nof thought in commerce and industry contribute greatly to this result.\nSo we are tempted to ridicule our benighted predecessors; but a study\nof the conditions of their life shows that darkness was no more their\nfault than illumination is our merit.\n\nThe nearest approach that can be truthfully made to the position that\nScience is derived from Magic, is to say that the scientist is derived\nfrom the wizard (or wizard-priest), on that side of his activity in\nwhich he relied upon fragments of positive knowledge; but this was,\nin nature, always opposed to his Magic. In the course of thousands of\nyears some men grew more interested in the positive than in the magical\nside of their profession, and became scientists; whilst others adhered\nto the fanciful and mystical. It is remarkable that, as sceptics occur\nin the most unsuspected quarters, so pure scientists may sometimes\nbe found as an institution in barbarous or even savage communities.\nIn a Bantu tribe there is a class of doctors that claim no powers by\nthe aid of spirits or Magic, but without any ceremony dispense a few\nwell-known drugs\u2014aloes, nux vomica, castor-oil, fern-root, rhubarb,\nand the bark of various trees, purgative or emetic.[575] The Kanyahs of\nBorneo have a weather-prophet to determine the right time for sowing;\nhe is not expected to cultivate padi, but is supplied with it by the\nrest of the village. Not knowing how many days there are in a year,\nand finding that the seasons do not correspond with any certain number\nof lunar months, he depends entirely upon observation of the altitude\nof the sun by means of an upright pole, whose upper end is carved into\na human figure.[576] Except the carving on his pole, there is nothing\nto indicate that either Magic or Animism perturbs the method of this\nAstronomer Royal. Hence the adventure, though most wonderful, is not\nunexampled in a humbler world, by which eminent citizens amongst\nthe Greek laity, with minds almost free from Magic and Animism,\nestablished for ever Philosophy and the Sciences as liberal studies.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. ANIMISM AND SCIENCE\n\nAnimism is opposed to Science, as well as to Magic,[577] by its\nrejection of uniformity. A spirit, indeed, has some character (though\nit may be very faintly marked); for he is, or is assimilated to, a\nhuman ghost. But although he is supposed to have reasons or motives\nfor his actions, they are often unintelligible. Until he is brought\nunder the control of magical rites and formul\u00e6, he may reject offerings\nand prayers, as if by pure caprice or free-will. His interventions\nare incalculable. Hence he may be the unseen agent in anything that\nhappens; and the habit is formed of putting upon him, or one of his\nkind, every occurrence whose cause is not obvious: diseases, deaths,\nstorms, droughts, noises in the forest, unusual behaviour of animals. A\nspirit-being with its body of soul-stuff capable of taking any shape, a\nmaterial thing exerting mechanical power, there is nothing that may not\nbe imputed to it. But being entirely imaginary, its supposed agency can\nonly satisfy the imagination by the assimilation of each intervention\nby the animistic apperceptive mass. It is never seen or known to do any\none of the actions attributed to it; for the understanding, based on\nperception and the classification and analysis of perceptions, it is\nnothing. Moreover, so far as the actions of a spirit are of free-will,\nor motiveless, or pure caprice, there is no distinct imagination of\neven a spiritual cause. When a man, suffering from disease, or hearing\nan unfamiliar noise, refers it to a spirit, there is usually nothing in\nhis mind but the word of vague meaning and a feeling of awe, wonder,\nor dread. He gets no further in the understanding of the fact, and\ncuriosity is paralysed. To say \u201ca spirit did it\u201d becomes, therefore,\na means of avoiding the labour of explanation; it is a good example\nof the \u201cprinciple of least effort.\u201d But in another direction his wits\nmay get to work. He is full of fear, and objectless fear must invent\na danger, which is easily done by supposing that the spirit has\nbeen actuated by wrath. Then something must have been done to enrage\nhim: a taboo has been broken, his rites have been neglected, sin has\nbeen committed\u2014according to the customary ideas of the tribe. There\nmust be lustration, propitiation, expiation, perhaps with horrible\ncruelty. Again, then, shall we say the man has been diverted from the\nimportant inquiry into the causes of disease or drought? But this is\nlaughable: how can he set about such a task? It is the tragedy of the\nworld that for thousands of years the speculative powers of man\u2014of\nsome men\u2014expanded without any power, except in the classical age, of\ndiscriminating sense from nonsense. Therefore, looking back, we see\neverywhere else superstition and the kingdom of darkness.\n\nAnimism can never have directly enriched Science with a single natural\nlaw; but, indirectly, it has instigated many investigations. With the\ndevelopment of Religion, the building of temples and the regulation\nof sacrifices and festivals according to their seasons, necessitated\nat least the empirical study of Geometry, Arithmetic and Astronomy;\nand the preservation of the ancient language of the sacred formul\u00e6 of\nritual required a knowledge of prosody, phonetics and grammar. For\nthousands of years erudition was confined to the priestly orders.\nThey also practised, or were the chief patrons of, all the fine arts,\nArchitecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music and Poetry; and by their\nconnexion with government they left in Egypt and Assyria, in monuments\nand inscriptions, History, or the materials of History. Indirectly,\nthe progress of mental culture, both in learning and in \u00e6sthetics, has\ndepended almost entirely on the development of Animism; and this in\nturn has depended on the aid which Animism gave to government and to\nthe extension of law and order, however imperfect, over wide regions\nof the earth. This is the fundamental utility which, first, Magic and,\nafterwards, Animism subserve, and for the sake of which\u2014unconsciously,\nof course\u2014they arise and prevail. Mankind has been subdued through\nimagination; because the peoples that had the cast of imagination\nrequisite for their political organisation and co-operation had an\nadvantage over others.\n\nWe must qualify this by observing that other imaginations, such as\ndevotion to the Family and Patriotism, with a much surer hold than\nAnimism has upon experience, have had a great and growing influence\nupon the solidarity and civilisation of some branches of the human\nrace, especially the Nordic.\n\nPhilosophy has derived from Animism most of her problems\u2014free-will\nand predestination, final causes, creation and miracles, emanation\nand intuition, idealism and materialism, immortality, the being and\nattributes of God, eternity, infinity\u2014in some of which, indeed,\nmagical ideas are deeply concerned: all of them the exercise of the\nmost eminent minds, exercise so delightful and so disappointing.\nConsidering their source, we cannot wonder that these problems remain\nproblems, and that philosophical discussion has, of late years, turned\nfrom them to questions concerning the theory of knowledge.\n\n * * * * *\n\nA student of human origins is under no obligation to predict the\nfuture. Fortunately: for several considerations make the task appear\naltogether impossible. Of these I will mention three: (_a_) Whereas\nnations have hitherto submitted to, and enforced, law and order, and\nundertaken costly works of utility or splendour, in large measure under\nthe influence of animistic illusions, it is now everywhere noticeable\nin the more civilised countries, that these illusions are being\ndissipated, and it is very difficult to judge how people will behave\nwhen they are gone. It is, indeed, true that our ordinary working life\nhas always depended chiefly on common sense, a knowledge of facts\nwithin the range of ordinary experience and memory. Animistic or\nmagical rites and ceremonies associated with the working-life may have\nincreased the confidence and encouraged the co-operation of labourers,\nbut were not indispensable; although the association of Magic with\nindustry seems sometimes to have become so close, that to forget the\nMagic was to destroy the industry. When, however, we turn to those\nconditions of social life that are beyond the purview of common sense,\nsuch as the preservation of tribal tradition and solidarity, and future\nprosperity, loyalty to the king and obedience to his officers, it is\nplain that something else than common sense was needed to reinforce\nthe interest of the whole against the tendency of the individual\u2019s\nself-assertion to overcome his social dispositions, and that this\ncontrol was found chiefly in Religion. It is also true that at present,\nwhilst some beliefs concerning supernatural things are being lost,\nothers are being resuscitated; but the lapsing beliefs are noble and\nvenerable and have exerted great public power and authority; whilst\nthose now eagerly propagated, are the raw infatuation of quacks, on a\nlevel with the Animism of an Australian medicine-man and, indeed, much\ninferior to his, as having no moral influence or authority. What must\ncome of this is so dubious, as to discourage one about the future of\nthe world.\n\n(_b_) Reflection on the levity with which imagination-beliefs are let\nslip and lost, or received and adopted, upon no evidence either way,\nfrom mere shallowness of soul, brings forward a second consideration\nthat makes the future impredictable, namely, the low average\ndevelopment of mankind in both intellect and character. This is the\nconsequence of our having depended, probably from the very beginning,\non leaders. A pack or tribe needed enough variability to produce able\nleaders and enough average ability to follow and support them in a\ncrowd. Natural Selection, therefore, has operated first in producing\nvariability; and all tribes, even the lowest, produce relatively\neminent men. The average intelligence or ability of the crowd, in\nwhich individuality is liable to be lost, is much less important. The\nresult is that each nation has its military affairs, organisation of\nindustry, science, invention, literature and art provided for it by\na small number of citizens; the rest fill the ranks, and learn what\nthey are taught. Thus arranged, the leading nations have of late years\nmade wonderful progress in science and in everything that can be done\nby machinery; but there is no reason to suppose that anything has\nbeen done towards raising the average intelligence and character; and\nin default of that, in my judgment, nothing has been done to advance\ncivilisation. The world is no safer against war, revolution, demagogy,\ndespotism, degeneration. The greatest improvements have been made in\nmeans of destruction; next we may put the invention of flying machines;\nand their chief use has been destruction. Destruction now pauses, not\nbecause the antagonists are satiated; they are only exhausted; and\nthere is more hatred in the world than was ever known before. How then\nshall we judge of things to come?\n\n(_c_) Speaking of the average man, we usually think of the European and\nNorth American average; but in considering what changes may be expected\nin the world, the people of India (800,000,000), China (350,000,000),\nand the millions of the rest of Asia, the Eastern Archipelago, Africa\nand South America cannot be left out; and to include them does not\nraise the average. What will be their contribution to history? There\nare two rational proposals for raising the average, namely, eugenics\nand deliberate elimination of the unfit; and there are 1,600,000,000 on\nwhom to operate.\n\nAny one who anxiously desires to foresee the future of our race is in\na position to sympathise with the ancients. Go, inquire at Delphi or\nDodona; or sleep in Stonehenge, or at the tomb of Merlin, or by the\nbarrows at Upsala, and dream of things to come; or consult the stars,\ncast the nativity of Lycopithecus, and read in heaven the fate of his\nposterity. If these methods are not very hopeful, any one of them is as\ngood as guessing. The only safe reflection is that he who lives longest\nwill see most.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[560] \u201cEthnology of the Ungava District,\u201d _Am. B. of Ethn._, XI. p.\n195. Other examples _ante_, ch. viii. \u00a7 3.\n\n[561] _Anatomy of Melancholy_, Part II. Sec. IV. Mem. 1, Subsec. 3.\n\n[562] Pliny, XXV. c. 6.\n\n[563] J. Mooney, \u201cSacred Formulas of the Cherokees,\u201d _Am. B. of Ethn._,\nVII. pp. 323-39.\n\n[564] J. Mooney, _op. cit._\n\n[565] Pliny, XXV. c. 11.\n\n[566] _Ibid._, XXV. c. 59.\n\n[567] A. W. Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 384.\n\n[568] Spencer and Gillen, _Across Australia_, p. 339.\n\n[569] _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 381.\n\n[570] _The Melanesians_, p. 199.\n\n[571] For Proclus\u2019 defence of Astrology see Whewell\u2019s _History of the\nInductive Sciences_, Book IV. ch. iii., 1st ed., pp. 298-300.\n\n[572] Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 114.\n\n[573] A. W. Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, pp. 397-9.\n\n[574] I do not mean that Magic is always a _direct_ derivative of\nCommon-sense: we have seen (ch. vi. \u00a7 5) that it sometimes comes from\nAnimism by retrogradation, and (elsewhere) often from coincidences.\n\n[575] Dudley Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, pp. 134-5.\n\n[576] Hose and McDougall, _Pagan Tribes of Borneo_, I. p. 106.\n\n[577] _Ante_, ch. vi. \u00a7 3.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nA\n\n Abstract and general ideas in lower culture, 99-102, 163-4;\n personified, 168\n Actor and Wizard, 272-3\n Adaptation, 30, 67\n Affection for the dead, 179\n Aggressiveness, 43\n Agriculture, neolithic, 50;\n as affecting natural selection, 64\n Allen, Grant, on plant-spirits, 167\n Analogy, 97-8\n Animals give Omens, 236\n Animatism, 120, 149, 151, 157\n Animism, 35;\n evil effects of, 67;\n good effects, 69;\n Chap. V. (145-86), see Contents;\n and Magic and Common-sense, 110;\n extended to plants and lifeless things, 150-3;\n development of, 183-4;\n deception in, 185;\n how related to Magic, Chap. VI. (187-284), see Contents;\n political advantage over Magic, 255;\n and Totemism, 319-25;\n and Science, 341;\n and Fine Art, 341;\n and Philosophy, 342\n Anthropoids, habitat of, 5;\n mentality and habits, 31-2;\n skull capacity, 50;\n character, 61\n Apperceptive mass of Science and Common-sense, 81;\n of Magic and Animism, 82, 126\n Arbitrary Magic, 133, 142;\n taboos, 133;\n myths, 168\n Archer, W., _Masks and Faces_, 273 _n._\n Asia, southern, probable locus of Man\u2019s origin, 23-4\n Astrology, 239, 242, 335\n Atkinson, J. J., on _Primal Law_, 38, 306\n Avebury on making fire, 11;\n baking clay, 13;\n omens and Magic, 233 _n._\n\n\nB\n\n Baboons, 58\n Belief, Chap. III. (71-107), see Contents\n Belt, Th., on hairless dogs, 15;\n habits of monkeys sleeping, 17\n Berkeley on causality, 191\n Black Magic, 107, 125, 129, 135-6, 139, 196, 211, 255, 287\n Boas, Franz, on savage language, 100;\n on Totemism, 298\n Bogoras on the Shaman, 285\n _Book of Daniel_, 219\n Brain development in Man, 7, 26, 50;\n in child and savage, 91\n Brehm on baboons, 58\n Bryant, E. T., on South African diviners, neurotic, 274\n Buddhist _karma_, 175\n Burton, R., on Moslem corpse, 170\n Burton\u2019s _Anatomy of Melancholy_ on drugs, 329\n Butler, J., on Conscience, 64\n\n\nC\n\n Callaway on chiefs and diviners, 254\n Cannibalism, 18\n Canteleu, C. de, on wolves, 42\n Casalis on Bassoutos, 251\n Cats in the Oligocene, etc., 26\n Causation tacitly assumed by savages, 101;\n confused with coincidence, 101, 122;\n implied in Magic, 113;\n how the idea affected by Animism and Magic, 123;\n origin of idea, 188-92;\n its slow development, 338\n Causes of belief, 80-4\n Chadwick on treatment of Teutonic gods, 278\n Charms, 111, 113, 130-1, 198\n Chaucer on the Doctour of Phisik, 329\n Cheiromancy, 239\n Chief\u2019s taboo, 132\n Chronology of geologic ages, 3, 49\n Cicero on the Delphic Oracle, 242;\n on the Augurs, 248\n Coddrington on savage thought, 89;\n in Banks Islands, 149;\n on _buto_, 322\n Coincidence confused with causation, 101;\n source of belief in Magic, 116-8, 124, 136, 193;\n in Omens, 231-2;\n confirms Wizard\u2019s pretensions, 290-1\n Common-sense, 67;\n its limitations, 69, 292;\n unlike superstition, 72, 110;\n makes sceptics, 281-2, 291;\n forced upon Wizard, 282-3;\n relation to Magic and Science, 327, 337\n Comparative Method, 304\n Comte on early hunting life of Man, 4 _n._;\n on stages of culture, 108-9\n Confucius on attitude toward spirits, 196\n Conkling, E. S., on superstitious beliefs among students, 115 _n._\n Conscience, growth of, 62-4\n Constructive impulse in anthropoids and men, 53\n Contra-suggestibility, 84\n Co-operation, in hunting, 8;\n the ground of language, 9;\n amongst wolves, 45\n Criticism of beliefs hindered by relative dissociation, 90\n Crystal a Magic source, 245, 263 _n._\n Cushing, T. H., on dramaturgic Magic, 142 _n._\n Czaplicka, A. M., on Siberian shaman, 270, 272, 274\n\n\nD\n\n Darwin, C., on teeth and jaws of Man, 7;\n on sexual selection as cause of naked skin, 14;\n on vermin as possible cause, 16;\n on growth of moral sense, 63\n _De Divinatione_, 227, 232\n Deniker on races of Men, 20\n Desire as cause of belief, 83\n Diderot on actors, 273\n Diet of Primates and hunters, 2\n Differentiation of Man began in the Oligocene, 3, and _note_;\n of Omens from other Magic, 232-3\n Diviners, 234, 238, 240, 241, 247, 249\n Dogs, naked varieties, 16;\n primitive, 25;\n likeness to Man, 40, 43, 44, 46, 57, 64\n Dorsey, J. O., on Dakotas, 138, 149;\n on Omaha, 146\n Dramatic Magic, 134-5\n Dreams and ghosts, 153-6, 159;\n and Omens, 237, 245 _n._\n Durkheim on Totem divinities, 319\n\n\nE\n\n Edda, 183\n Ellis, W., on spirit-food, 162;\n on Religion in Raiatea, 206, 220;\n the idol-maker, 280\n Emotion as cause of belief, 83, 86;\n in religion, 185, 186\n Emulation within the pack, 44;\n in games, business, etc., 59\n Endogamy, 307\n Eoanthropus, 49, 55, 66, 67\n Eoliths, 50, 53\n Epictetus on divination, 248\n Erect gait of Man, 5\n Evil eye, 128\n Exemplary Magic, 140-2, 336\n Exogamy and Totems and Marriage Classes, 295, 305, 307-11\n External soul, 173\n\n\nF\n\n Fate and Magic, 223;\n and Omens, 235, 249;\n and Causation, 249-50\n Fear a cause of superstition, 83;\n gives power to ghosts, 123;\n of the dead, 178-9\n Feeling as cause of belief, 83\n Fetichism, 108\n Fire, how first made, 11\n Force, idea of, 100-1, 119-22, 163;\n force and ghosts, 197-8;\n in Magic and Science, 326-7\n Forms of thought in primitive mind, 94, 95\n Fowler, Ward, on Iguvian Magic, 202, 203;\n on Roman prayers, 205, 221\n Fraud, in what sense attributed to Wizards, 284\n Frazer, J. G., on Magic and Animism, 109;\n on driving out ghosts, 179 _n._;\n on Magic and Religion, 193, 195;\n on power of Wizard, 284;\n on Totemism, 293, 299, 304;\n first Hypothesis on Totemism, 313;\n on Grass-seed Rites, 317;\n second Hypothesis on Totemism, 317;\n on Zoolatry, 324\n Free-will and Animism, 223\n Freud on _Totem und Tabu_, 38\n Funerary rites, extravagance and economy, 180;\n and Religion, 320\n\n\nG\n\n Galton, F., on dog and man, 40;\n moroseness of savages, 46\n Garner, R. L., on speech of chimpanzee, 9;\n on polygamy of apes, 32 _n._\n General ideas at savage level, Chap. III. \u00a7 7;\n present though unnamed, 100\n Generic consciousness of Primates, 30\n Gesture, 54, 100, 121;\n and Magic, 129\n Ghosts and spirits alike, 169;\n how imagined, 169, 173;\n and corpse, 170;\n may die or be killed, 176;\n their way of life, 177, 183;\n easily deceived, 181;\n and Magic, 199\n Ghost-theory, 163-7;\n extended to animals, 157-60;\n and soul-stuff, 161-4;\n and spirits, 164-9\n Gibbon on fanatics, 287\n Gods from tools, etc., 152;\n from plants and meteors, 166-7;\n from abstract ideas, 168;\n subject to death, 176;\n act by Magic, 213-5;\n controlled by Magic, 219-23;\n teach Magic, 309, 310;\n from ancestors, 69, 255;\n and Totems, 321-4\n Gregariousness, 8, 34, 42\n Grimm, J., on divine power, 215\n\n\nH\n\n Haddon, A. C., on Magic in Torres Straits, 127, 141, 150, 256;\n on treatment of Wizard, 265;\n Totemism, 299\n Hallucination, 89, 92, 155\n Hartland, E. S., 121 _n._\n Hartmann, R., on character of anthropoids, 61\n Hegel on sorcery, 194 _n._\n Hepatoscopy, 239\n Herd-life, the character it develops, 48\n Herodotus on the army of Xerxes, 51;\n on Egyptian prediction, 193;\n on Persian law, 219;\n on Omens, 225, 232;\n on Dreams, 237, 241, 242\n Hirn, Yrj\u00f6, on sympathetic Magic, 138;\n Magic and Religion, 253\n _History of Human Marriage_, 308-9\n Hodson, T. C., on a Tanghul sceptic, 281\n Hose and McDougall on Pagan tribes of Borneo, 124\n Howitt, A. W., prowess in kidney-fat, 245;\n on Medicine Man, 271;\n to cure headache, 332\n Hudson, W. H., on wolves, 44;\n on dogs, 45\n Humanity, growth of the sentiments, 61-2\n Hume, J., _Natural History of Religion_, 108;\n on future life, 177;\n on causation, 190, 191\n Hunting-life, influence of, 1, 2, Chap. I. \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3 (see Contents),\n 33, 35, 37, 39, Chap. II. \u00a7 4 (see Contents);\n on intelligence, 47, 66\n Hunting-pack, its organisation, 36, 41, 45;\n organisation lost, 68, 69\n Hutton, J. J. H., on Leopard men, 214 _n._\n Hyperphysical Animism, 145, 150\n\n\nI\n\n _Iliad_, 183, 279\n Images or mental pictures, 73;\n vivid in savages and children, 89\n Imagination, Chap. III. \u00a7 4 (see Contents);\n as unverifiable representation, 74\n Imagination-beliefs, 67, 76;\n mimic perception-beliefs, 103;\n their power overrated, 103-4;\n allied to play-belief, 104-6, 148;\n often inconsistent, 181-2\n Indirect Magic, 129, Chap. IV. \u00a7\u00a7 6, 7 (see Contents)\n Industry and Magic, 143\n Initiation of Wizard, 203, 211, 263-5 _n._;\n and disillusion, 277\n Intelligence of Man, how developed, 10, 47-8;\n of Anthropoids, 31-2;\n its influence on morals, 65\n Intichiuma, 129, 316\n Intuition, 235\n\n\nJ\n\n Jevons, F. B., on Totemism, 299\n Jounod, H. A., on taboos, 133;\n on photograph-soul, 138;\n on divination, 249;\n on Magician\u2019s power, 263 _n._\n\n\nK\n\n _Kalevala_, 208, 262\n Kant on free-will, 223\n Keith, A., on epoch of Man\u2019s differentiation, 3 _n._;\n on length of intestine, 13;\n on the genealogical tree of the Primates, 49;\n capacity of skulls, 50;\n on Neanderthal species, 52;\n on speech-organs of Pithecanthropus and Eoanthropus, 56, 66-7\n Kingsley, Mary, on soul-doctors, 155;\n on four souls, 172\n\n\nL\n\n Lamentation and weeping, 61\n Lang, A., on ghosts, 114;\n on Animism, 147, 148;\n on Totemism, 299, 304-7\n Laughter, 60\n Laws of Association of Ideas, 137\n Lecky on Belief, 174\n Leibnitz, 174\n Leuba, J. H., 142\n Levy-Bruhl on the primitive mind, 85-6\n Livingstone on South African game, 27;\n on South African doctors, 260\n Love of the chase, 41\n Lyall, Alfred, _Asiatic Studies_, 222\n Lycopithecus, 8, 18;\n his stature, 25, 26, 29\n\n\nM\n\n MacBride, E. W., on specialisation of Man, 4 _n._\n McDougall, W., on self-abasement, 44, 124. _See also_ Hose and\n McDougall\n Magic, 35, Chap. IV., see Contents;\n relation to government, 68-69, 253-4;\n relation to Animism, Chap. VI., see Contents;\n to Fine Art, 262;\n to Religion, 194-7, 254-5;\n to Omens, 227-34;\n its equivalent for inspiration, 245;\n relation to Totemism, 314-8;\n to science, 111, Chap. X. \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2, 3, see Contents;\n to Medicine, 260, 328-31\n Major premise of primitive reasoning, 94, 95, 98\n _Mana_, 121, 122, 193\n Marett, R. R., on Animatism, 120, 149\n Marriage, seasonal, 13;\n and Totemism, 307-11\n Mathew, J., on source of magical power, 263 _n._\n Maxim, H. S., on precedence, 45\n Memory and Belief, 73, 80\n Mercier, C., on paranoia, 276\n Metamorphosis, 213-14, 314-15\n Methodology, none for the primitive mind, 82, 117\n Mill, J. S., on Comte, 108;\n on induction, 117\n Mimesis, principle of, 136\n Minor premise not understood in primitive reasoning, 95-6\n Mousterian culture, 13\n M\u00fcller, Max, on Totemism, 299\n\n\nN\n\n Natural selection of best hunters, 4;\n of the gregarious, 8;\n of the intelligent, 11;\n adapted Man to the hunting life, not to civilisation, 51;\n except partially, 64;\n within limits favoured the superstitious, 70, 114\n Neanderthal Man, 49, 50, 52\n Neolithic culture, 50, 51\n Nordic Race, 19-20\n\n\nO\n\n Odour as soul-stuff, 139, 162\n Oligocene supposed age of the differentiation of _Hominid\u00e6_, 3, 24;\n landscape, flora and fauna then, 22-8\n Omen, magical or spiritual, 200, 204, Chap. VII., see Contents\n Oracles, dreams and omens, 236-7;\n in Greece, 241-3;\n in Fiji, 243;\n often obscure, 246\n _Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, 109, 309\n\n\nP\n\n Pal\u00e6olithic Culture, 50\n Pan\u00e6tius on Divination, 248\n Participation, principle of, 136\n Pausanias, 244\n Pawnee chief on the good man, 64\n _Pekin Gazette_, 222\n Perception as source of belief, 79, 85;\n among savages, 36, 137\n Philosophy and Animism, 342\n Photograph and soul, 312\n Pithecanthropus, 49, 55\n Pliny (the Elder) on Ancient Medicine, 329, 331\n Plutarch, 242\n Poet respected, 126;\n inspired, 237 _n._;\n and wizard, 267\n Polybius on Roman Religion, 248\n Positivism, 108\n Possession, 210-11, 212, 237, 242-3\n Prayers, at first seem dangerous, 195-6;\n from spells, also spontaneous, 200, 201;\n become spells, 204, 205\n Precedence in the hunting-pack, 44;\n amongst Australians, 45\n Priest, 68-9;\n and sorcerer, 254-5;\n and learning, 341\n _Primal Law_, 38, 306\n Property, 43, 56-8\n Psychology of the hunting-pack, Chap. II. \u00a7 4 (40-8)\n Psychological Animism, 145, Chap. V. \u00a7 2 (147-53)\n\n\nR\n\n Races of Men, 19\n Rain-rites, 202, 335-7\n Ray, S. H., on the Lifuans, 142 _n._, 156\n Reason and imagination, 74-5;\n in immature minds, Chap. III. \u00a7 6\n Reflection and ghost, 154, 158\n Reinach, S., on sex-taboo, 56\n Reincarnation, 174\n Relations in savage thought, 101\n Religion, 69;\n meaning of word, 184;\n and Magic, 193-7;\n and Totemism, 321-5\n Retrogradation, Ch. VI. \u00a7 4 (203-7)\n _Rigveda_, 152, 168, 219\n Rivera, W. H. R., on suggestibility in savages, 86;\n on savage thought, 89, 100;\n on Totemic gods, 167, 321-2;\n on Toda prayers, 205;\n blindness of savages to deceit, 283;\n on a custom at Mota, 301, 303\n Roosevelt on dogs, 44, 45;\n elephant and bear, 147\n Roth, W. E., on prayer to Totem, 319\n Roy, S. C., on Oraon rain-rites, 202\n\n\nS\n\n Sanderson, G. P., on Indian wild dogs, 43\n Scapulomancy, 239\n Schopenhauer on female beauty, 15\n Scientists in barbarism, 339\n _Secret of the Totem_, 305\n Seligman on sex-taboo, 131;\n on departmental experts, 257, 284\n Selous, F. C., on the hunter\u2019s joy, 41\n Seneca on Omens, 249\n Seton, Thompson, on Indians\u2019 love of killing, 41;\n on wolves, 42, 44, 56\n Sexual selection as cause of naked skin, 14\n Shadow and ghost, 154, 158\n Shaman derivation of word, 274\n Shamanism, 217-8, 254\n Skeat and Blagden on the Semang, 149, 168;\n on Malay Magic, 172, 261\n Skin naked, 14-18\n Skull changes in, 7;\n capacity of, 50\n Social life of Primates, 7, 32;\n of Man, 8, 34-6, 37-8\n _Social Origins_, 305\n Societies of Wizards, 256\n Sollas on geological time, 3 _n._, 49 _n._\n Sorcerer and Magician, 252;\n and Priest, 254\n Sorcery, 129;\n defined, 189\n Soul and soul-stuff, 147, 151, 154, 155, 161-3, 171;\n how many, 172;\n origin and destiny of, 174-7;\n of Totem and clansman, 312, 313\n Southey, R., _The Curse of Kehama_, 265\n Species of Man, 31\n Speech in apes and men, 9, 54, 55\n Speisser on Animism in Ambrym, 152\n Spell, 68, 111, 113, 130;\n tends to personify, 152, 156;\n and prayer, 200, 201\n Spencer, H., _Pol. Institutions_, 8, 59;\n on Laughter, 60;\n Sociology, 108;\n on Animism, 153, 165, 167, 183;\n on Totemism, 298\n Spencer and Gillen on savage imagination, 83;\n on Guanjis, 146;\n on magic stones, 120-1, 263 _n._;\n emotions of Australians, 244;\n foreign Magic, 270;\n account of a Wizard, 285;\n list of Totems, 296\n Spirits and ghosts, Chap. V. \u00a7\u00a7 6-7 (164-73);\n power of, 212-3;\n controlled by Magic, 216-24;\n and Omens, 234-8\n Stages in development of Magic, 129\n Stanbridge, W., on aborigines\u2019 scepticism, 279\n Standard of truth for savages, 89\n Stef\u00e1nson on Esquimo, 160\n Stigand, G. H., on the Masai, 146\n Stoics and divination, 248\n Stoll, Otto, on self-suggestion, 274\n Struggle over prey, 45-6\n Substitution in Magic, 141\n Suggestibility, 84, 275\n Superstition, Chap. III., see Contents;\n utility of, 69;\n its dark side, 107;\n innate disposition to, 114, 153\n Syllogism and savage thinking, 92-7\n Symbols, 139;\n may fulfil Omens, 246\n Sympathy, perceptive, contagious, effective in the pack, 48;\n and moral sense, 63-4\n\n\nT\n\n Taboo, 68;\n on persons and things, 131-2;\n on words, 133;\n names of dead and of spirits, 201;\n on kings, 219;\n connected with Totemism, 315, 316\n Talisman, 68, 131, etc.\n Testimony, 80, 82\n Thompson, Basil, on Tongan rejection of coincidence, 291\n Thurn, E. F. im, on savage belief, 116, 151, 155;\n on the _peaiman_, 260\n Torday, E., on Bahuana, 150;\n dead cast no shadow, 154 _n._\n Totemism, 68, 151, 166, 167, 173;\n Chap. IX. (293-325), see Contents\n Transmigration, 171, 175\n Trotter on herd-instinct, 64\n Turner, G., on Samoan gods, 322\n Turner (_Am. B. of Ethn._) on Esquimo Angoqok, 328\n Tylor, E. B., _Primitive Culture_, 108;\n on Animism, 153, 183;\n on motivation of Magic, 195;\n on spell and prayer, 207\n Tyndall on the _Scientific Uses of the Imagination_, 74\n\n\nV\n\n Ventriloquism practised by Wizard, 261\n Vocation of Wizard, 267-9, 285\n _Volsung Saga_, 213, 215 _n._\n Voluntary action as cause of belief, 83;\n supposed source of idea of cause, 188, 192\n\n\nW\n\n Wallace, A. R., on place of Man\u2019s origin, 4 _n._;\n on human brain, 11;\n nakedness, 16; the Orang, 32, 33, 47\n War, 58-9\n Weeks, J. H., on _Congo Cannibals_, 127, 131;\n the Bakongo, 130, 162, 168;\n specialists in Magic, 257;\n on character of wizard, 260, 271;\n sorcerer not honoured at home, 270;\n his trickery, 282\n Westermarck, E., on seasonal marriage, 13;\n primitive monogamy, 56;\n on moral ideas, 64;\n savage classification of phenomena, 109;\n on sex-taboo, 132;\n on averting the evil eye, 144;\n descent in female line, 306;\n Totemism and marriage, 308-9;\n animal worship, 323\n Whiffen, Th., on chief and medicine-man, 254;\n medicine-man\u2019s unscrupulousness, 271;\n sceptics, 280\n Wiedemann on Religion of Ancient Egyptians, 173, 267\n Williamson, R. W., on the Mafulu, 201\n Wizard, 68-9, 128;\n the mind of, Chap. VIII. (252-92), see Contents;\n and government, 253-4;\n societies, 256;\n his utility, 268;\n and Pharmacology, 328, 331;\n Anatomy and Physiology, 332;\n Psychology, 333-4;\n Botany and Zoology, 334;\n Astronomy, 335;\n Meteorology, 337\n Wollunqua, 320\n Wolves, 8, 11, 25, 36, 37 and note, 41, 42, 44, 45, 52, 53, 64\n Wundt, W., on K\u00f6rperseele, 170, 183;\n on Animism and Magic and idea of cause, 187-92;\n or retrogradation, 203\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s note\n\n\nWords in italics have been surrounded by _underscores_, and words in\nsmall capitals changed to all capitals. Footnotes were renumbered and\nmoved to the end of the chapter they belong to.\n\nSome minor corrections were made without note, such as missing\npunctuation and missing page numbers in the index. Also the following\ncorrections were made, on page\n\n 13 \u201cprobaby\u201d changed to \u201cprobably\u201d (probably very much earlier)\n 93 \u201ccritisism\u201d changed to \u201ccriticism\u201d (incapable of comparison and\n criticism)\n 224 \u201cshephered\u201d changed to \u201cshepherd\u201d (and a shepherd, sleeping by\n the grave of Orpheus)\n 348 \u201cMcDougal\u201d changed to \u201cMcDougall\u201d (See also Hose and McDougall)\n 350 \u201cunscupulousness\u201d changed to \u201cunscrupulousness\u201d (medicine-man\u2019s\n unscrupulousness)\n 350 \u201cWiedermann\u201d changed to \u201cWiedemann\u201d (Wiedemann on Religion of\n Ancient Egyptian).\n\nOtherwise the original was preserved, including inconsistent spelling,\nhyphenation, capitalization, and possible errors in foreign words.\nAdditional: The names of some of the quoted authors were spelled\ninconsistently in the original, for example Codrington was spelled most\nof the time with two d\u2019s. Also the name of Vilhj\u00e1lmur Stef\u00e1nsson (who\nwas born as William Stephenson) was spelled in several different ways.\nThese have not been corrected. The also mentioned Stevenson is somebody\nelse. Also: The index has not been checked for errors, besides the ones\nin the list above.","title":"The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":132679}