{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_46901/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_46901","id":"gutenberg_46901","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46901","summary":null,"tags":["Bruno, Giordano, 1548-1600","Category: Biographies","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: History - Religious","Category: Philosophy & Ethics"],"text":"Transcriber's Note:\n                          ###################\n\nThis e-text is based on the 1903 edition of the original\nbook. Minor punctuation errors have been tacitly corrected.\nInconsistencies in hyphenation, ligatures, and accented\nforms, such as 'sun-flower/sunflower', 'formul\u00e6/formulae',\n'Combinatori\u00e2/Combinatoria', etc., have been retained. Missing footnote\nnumbers have been added according to sequence.\n\nThe Table of Contents has been changed regarding the content\nof the first section 'Biographies, Works, and Essays.'\n\nItalic text in the original version has been placed between underscores\n(_italic_); passages in small caps have been symbolised by forward\nslashes (/small caps/). [oe] represents the respective ligature,\n^{text} signifies a superscript passage.\n\nThe following passages have been corrected:\n\n    # p. 16: 'Beza' --> 'B\u00e9za'; 'before Venetian tribunal' --> 'before\n    the Venetian tribunal'\n    # p. 18 (sidenote): 'Circu\u00e6s' --> 'Circ\u00e6us'\n    # p. 30: 'Artic' --> 'Arctic'; 'terrestial' --> 'terrestrial'\n    # p. 37: 'Mauviss\u00e8re' --> 'Mauvissi\u00e8re'\n    # p. 64: 'aquaintance' --> 'acquaintance'\n    # p. 71: 'bann' --> 'ban'\n    # p. 131: 'fanastic' --> 'fantastic'\n    # p. 252: 'philosphy' --> 'philosophy'\n    # p. 295: 'allmighty' --> 'almighty'\n    # p. 330: 'intuites' --> 'intuits'\n    # p. 348: 'docrine' --> 'doctrine'\n    # p. 353: 'Carri\u00e9re' --> 'Carri\u00e8re'\n    # Index, Bartholm\u00e8ss, Christian:  ' 2, 16, 20, ...' -->\n    '5, 16, 20, ...'\n\n\n\n\n                            GIORDANO BRUNO\n\n\n\n\n                            [Illustration]\n\n\n\n\n                   [Illustration: _Giordano Bruno._\n\n                     _Statue by Ettore Ferrari._]\n\n\n\n\n                            GIORDANO BRUNO\n\n\n                                  BY\n\n                           J. LEWIS McINTYRE\n\n      M.A. EDIN. AND OXON.: D.SC. EDIN.: ANDERSON LECTURER IN THE\n                        UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN\n\n\n                                London\n                     MACMILLAN AND CO., /Limited/\n                    NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n                                 1903\n\n                         _All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\n                                  To\n\n                                MY WIFE\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis volume attempts to do justice to a philosopher who has hardly\nreceived in England the consideration he deserves. Apart from the _Life\nof Giordano Bruno_, by I. Frith (Mrs. Oppenheim), in the English and\nForeign Philosophical Library, 1887, there has been no complete work\nin our language upon the poet, teacher, and martyr of Nola, while his\nphilosophy has been treated only in occasional articles and reviews.\nYet he is recognised by the more liberal-minded among Italians as\nthe greatest and most daring thinker their country has produced. The\npathos of his life and death has perhaps caused his image to stand out\nmore strongly in the minds of his countrymen than that of any other of\ntheir leaders of thought. A movement of popular enthusiasm, begun in\n1876, resulted, on 9th June 1889, in the unveiling of a statue in Rome\nin the Campo dei Fiori, the place on which Bruno was burned. Both in\nFrance and in Germany he has been recognised as the prophet, if not as\nthe actual founder, of modern philosophy, and as one of the earliest\napostles of freedom of thought and of speech in modern times.\n\nThe first part of the present work--the _Life of Bruno_--is based\nupon the documents published by Berti, Dufour, and others, and on the\npersonal references in Bruno's own works. I have tried to throw some\nlight on Bruno's life in England, on his relations with the French\nAmbassador, Mauvissi\u00e8re, and on his share in some of the literary\nmovements of the time. I have, however, been no more successful than\nothers in finding any documents referring directly to Bruno's visit to\nEngland.\n\nIn the second part--_The Philosophy of Bruno_--I have sought to give\nnot a systematic outline of Bruno's philosophy as a whole under the\nvarious familiar headings, which would prove an almost impossible\ntask, but a sketch, as nearly as possible in Bruno's own words, of the\nproblems which interested this mind of the sixteenth century, and of\nthe solutions offered. The first chapter points out the sources from\nwhich Bruno derived the materials of his thinking. The succeeding\nchapters are devoted to some of the main works of Bruno,--the _Causa_\n(Chapter II.), _Infinito_ and _De Immenso_ (Chapters III. and IV.), _De\nMinimo_ (Chapter V.), _Spaccio_ (Chapter VI.), and _Heroici Furori_\n(Chapter VII.),--and contain as little as possible of either criticism\nor comment, except in so far as these are implied in the selection\nand arrangement of the material. I have adopted this method partly\nbecause Bruno's works are still comparatively unknown to the English\nreader, and partly because his style, full as it is of obscurities,\nredundances, repetitions, lends itself to selection, but not easily to\ncompact exposition. Several phases of Bruno's activity I have left\nalmost untouched--his poetry, his mathematical theories, his art of\nmemory. The eighth chapter turns upon his philosophy of religion, about\nwhich there has been much controversy; while the last attempts to\nbring him into relation and comparison with some of the philosophers\nwho succeeded him. I subjoin a list of works and articles which are\nof importance for the study of Bruno. Throughout I have referred for\nBruno's works to the recent Italian edition of the Latin works, issued\nat the public expense, 1879 to 1891 (three volumes in eight parts,\nwith introductions, etc.), and to Lagarde's edition of the Italian\nworks--Gotha, 1888. Of the latter there are two volumes, but the paging\nis continuous from one to the other, page 401 beginning the second\nvolume.\n\n    J. LEWIS M'INTYRE.\n\n    /University of Aberdeen/,\n    16_th July_ 1903.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\n    /Biographies, Works, and Essays/                                xiii\n\n\n    PART I\n\n    /Life of Bruno/                                                    1\n\n\n    PART II\n\n    /Philosophy of Bruno/                                            119\n\n\n    CHAPTER I\n\n    /The Sources of the Philosophy/                                  121\n\n\n    CHAPTER II\n\n    /The Foundations of Knowledge/                                   153\n\n\n    CHAPTER III\n\n    /The Infinite Universe--The Mirror of God/                       180\n\n\n    CHAPTER IV\n\n    /Nature and the Living Worlds/                                   203\n\n\n    CHAPTER V\n\n    /The Last and the Least Things: Atoms and Soul-Monads/           223\n\n\n    CHAPTER VI\n\n    /The Practical Philosophy of Bruno/                              252\n\n\n    CHAPTER VII\n\n    /The Higher Life/                                                277\n\n\n    CHAPTER VIII\n\n    /Positive Religions and the Religion of Philosophy/              294\n\n\n    CHAPTER IX\n\n    /Bruno in the History of Philosophy/                             323\n\n    INDEX                                                            361\n\n\n\n\nBIOGRAPHIES AND GENERAL WORKS ON BRUNO\n\n\nBartholm\u00e8ss, Christian, _Jordano Bruno_, vol. i., Paris, 1846--on the\nlife and times of Bruno; vol. 2, 1847--on his works and philosophy.\n\nCarri\u00e8re, Moritz, _Die philosophische Weltanschauung der\nReformationszeit_, 1st ed., 1847; 2nd ed., 1887.\n\nBerti, Domenico, _Giordano Bruno da Nola, sua vita e sua dottrina_.\nAppeared first in the _Nuova Antologia_, 1867. Some new documents were\npublished in _Documenti intorno a Giordano Bruno da Nola_, 1880. A\nsecond edition of the Life, including all the documents, appeared in\n1889.\n\nDufour, _G. B. \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve_ (1578). _Documents in\u00e9dits_: Gen\u00e8ve, 1884.\nAlso given in Berti's second edition.\n\nSigwart, _Die Lebensgeschichte G. B.'s_ (_Verzeichniss der Doctoren_,\netc., T\u00fcbingen, 1880), a paper which is expanded and corrected in his\n_Kleine Schriften_, 1st series (pp. 49-124 and 293-304): Freiburg i.\nB., 1889.\n\nBrunnhofer, _G. B.'s Weltanschauung und Verh\u00e4ngniss_: Leipzig, 1882. A\nvigorous eulogy of Bruno and his work.\n\nFrith, _Life of Giordano Bruno_: London, 1887.\n\nRiehl, _Giordano Bruno, Zur Erinnerung an den 17. Februar, 1600_:\nLeipzig, 1st ed., 1889; 2nd, 1900.\n\nK\u00fchlenbeck (\"Landseck\") _Bruno, der M\u00e4rtyrer der neuen Weltanschauung_:\nLeipzig, 1890.\n\nPognisi, _G. B. e l'Archivio di San Giovanni Decollato_; Torino, etc.,\n1891.\n\n\nItalian biographies and pamphlets are innumerable. Among the best are--\n\nMariano, _G. B. La Vita e l'uomo_: Roma, 1881.\n\nLevi, _G. B. o la Religione del Pensiero_: Torino, 1887.\n\nMorselli, _G. B., Commemorazione_, etc.: Torino, 1888. Morselli regards\nBruno as the precursor of all modern philosophy, and as prophet of most\nof the scientific discoveries of the 19th century.\n\nTocco, _G. B. Conferenza_: Firenze, 1886. On Bruno's religion and\nphilosophy of religion.\n\n\nOf writers in English on Bruno may also be named:--Owen, in his\n_Sceptics of the Italian Renaissance_: London, 1893 (pp. 244-342);\nDaniel Brinton and Thomas Davidson, _G. B., Philosopher and Martyr,\nTwo Addresses_: Philadelphia, 1890; Plumptre, in his _Studies in\nLittle-known Subjects_: London, 1898 (pp. 61-127); Whittaker in _Essays\nand Notices_, 1895 (reprinted from _Mind_, April 1884 and July 1887);\nthe _Quarterly Review_ for October 1902, \"Giordano Bruno in England\";\nand R. Adamson, _The Development of Modern Philosophy_: Edinburgh and\nLondon, 1903, vol. 2 (pp. 23-44).\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\nLIFE OF BRUNO\n\n\nI\n\n[Sidenote: Birth and Family.]\n\nIn 1548, at a stormy period of the history of Italy, Bruno was\nborn in the township of Nola, lying within the kingdom of Naples,\nwhich at that time was under Spanish rule. His father, Giovanni,\nwas a soldier, probably of good family, and in deference, it may be\nsupposed, to the King of Spain, the son was named Filippo; the more\nfamous name of Giordano was only assumed when he entered a religious\norder. Through his mother, Fraulissa Savolina, a German or Saxon\norigin has been claimed for Bruno; there were several inhabitants of\nTeutonic name in the village of his birth--suggesting a settlement of\n_Landknechts_,--and the name, Fraulissa, has a German ring;[1] but\nBruno himself nowhere in the addresses or works published in Germany\nmakes any hint of his own connection with the race, while the name was\nprobably a generic term for the wife of a soldier, borrowed from the\nSwiss or German men-at-arms.[2]\n\n[Sidenote: Nola.]\n\nTheir home was on the lower slopes of Mount Cicala, which rises above\nNola, and amid its laughing gardens Bruno first imbibed a love of\nnature, which marked him out from so many of his contemporaries. The\nsoil of Nola is among the most fertile of all Italy, and the pleasant\nplain in which it lies is ringed with hills which lie shadowy under\nthe clear sky; most prominent and most mysterious is Vesuvius, a\nfew miles to the south. But the charms of natural beauty in Nola\nwere surpassed by those of picturesque antiquity: the half-mythical\nPelasgians founded it before the walls of Rome were begun; they were\nfollowed by the Chalcidians of Cuma, from whom the Nolans inherited a\nGreek spirit, calm yet quick, eager in the pursuit of wisdom and in\nthe love of beauty, which down even to the 16th century distinguished\nthem above other Italians. There followed a chequered history in\nwhich the Samnites, the early Romans, Hannibal, Sulla, and Spartacus,\nplayed successive parts. Nola was the death-place of Augustus, and to\nthat fact owed its greatness in Imperial times, when its two great\namphitheatres and multitude of beautiful temples topped a great city,\nshut in by massive walls, with twelve gates that opened to all parts\nof Italy. Evil times were to come; Alaric, the Saracens, Manfred, and\nothers had their will of Nola, and earthquakes, flood, and plague\nreduced it by the end of the 15th century to one tenth of its former\nself. It had its own martyrs, for the old faith and for the new; one of\nthe latter, Pomponio Algerio, suffered during Bruno's lifetime a fate\nthat foreshadowed his own; accused while a student at Padua of contempt\nfor the Christian religion, he was imprisoned in Padua, Venice, and\nRome, and finally burnt at the stake. Its sons never lost their love\nfor the mother-town; Bruno speaks of it always with affection, as to\nhim \"the garden of Italy\"; of a nephew of Ambrogio Leone, the historian\nof its antiquities, we are told that, on returning to Nola after a\nfew days' absence, seeming ill with longing, he threw himself on the\nearth and kissed it with unspeakable joy.[3] Perhaps the suggestion\nof Bartholm\u00e8ss is not groundless, that the volcanic soil and air of\nNola influenced the character of the people as of the wine. \"Hence the\ndelicacy of their senses, vivacity of gesture, mobility of humour, and\npassionate ardour of spirit.\"[4]\n\n[Sidenote: Childhood of Bruno.]\n\nOf the childhood of Bruno little is to be learned. Cicala, his home,\nhe describes as a \"little village of four or five cottages not too\nmagnificent.\"[5] In all probability his upbringing was simple, his\nsurroundings homely. We need not go further, and suppose that his\nsurroundings were not only homely, but degraded and vicious.[6] His\nfather, although a soldier by profession, seems to have been a man\nof some culture; at least he was a friend of the poet Tansillo, who\nexcited the admiration of the young Bruno, and first turned his mind\ntowards the Muses. Tansillo's poetry, following the taste of the age,\nwas not too refined, but its passion called forth a ready reflection\nin the ardent nature of the lad. It was perhaps the only door to\nthe higher artistic life of the time which was open to Bruno; the\nneighbours, if we may judge from satiric references in the Italian\nDialogues, were of a rough homely type. Bruno tells, for example,[7]\nhow Scipio Savolino (perhaps his uncle) used to confess all his sins\nto Don Paulino, Cur\u00e9 of S. Primma that is in a village near Nola\n(Cicala), on a Holy Friday, of which \"though they were many and great,\"\nhis boon companion the Cur\u00e9 absolved him without difficulty. Once was\nenough, however, for in the following years, without many words or\ncircumstances, Scipio would say to Don Paulino, \"Father mine, the sins\nof a year ago to-day, you know them\"; and Don Paulino would reply,\n\"Son, thou knowest the absolution of a year ago to-day--go in peace and\nsin no more!\"\n\nOne incident of Bruno's childhood, which has been thought a promise of\nextraordinary powers, he himself relates in the _Sigillus Sigillorum_.\nDescribing the different causes of \"concentration,\"[8] (_Contractio_),\nhe instances fear among them:--\"I myself, when still in swaddling\nclothes, was once left alone, and saw a great and aged serpent, which\nhad come out of a hole in the wall of the house; I called my father,\nwho was in the next room; he ran with others of the household, sought\nfor a stick, growled at the presence of the serpent, uttering words\nof vehement anger, while the others expressed their fear for me,--and\nI understood their words no less clearly, I believe, than I should\nunderstand them now. After several years, waking up as if from a dream,\nI recalled all this to their memory, nothing being further from the\nminds of my parents; they were greatly astonished.\"[9] As well they\nmight be! It is hardly right, however, to see in the story evidence\nof marvellous faculty showing itself in infancy, beyond that of an\nimpressionable and tenacious mind. No doubt the drama had been repeated\nmany times by the parents for behoof of visitors.[10]\n\nSuperstitious beliefs abounded among Bruno's fellow-countrymen; many\nof them clung to him through life, were moulded by him into a place in\nhis philosophy, and bore fruit in his later teaching and practice of\nnatural magic. Thus we are told how the spirits of the earth and of the\nwaters may at times, when the air is pure and calm, become visible\nto the eye. He himself had seen them on Beech Hill, and on Laurel\nHill, and they frequently appeared to the inhabitants of these places,\nsometimes playing tricks upon them, stealing and hiding their cattle,\nbut afterwards returning the property to their stalls. Other spirits\nwere seen about Nola by the temple of Portus in a solitary place, and\neven under a certain rock at the roots of Mount Cicala, formerly a\ncemetery for the plague-stricken; he and many others had suffered the\nexperience when passing at night of being struck with a multitude of\nstones, which rebounded from the head and other parts of the body with\ngreat force, in quick succession, but did no injury either to him or\nto any of the others.[11] It was at Nola that Bruno saw what seemed a\nball or beam of fire, but was \"really\" one of the living beings that\ninhabit the ethereal space; \"as it came moving swiftly in a straight\nline, it almost touched the roofs of the houses and would have struck\nthe face of Mount Cicala, but it sprang up into the air and passed\nover.\"[12] To understand the mind of Bruno, it is necessary to remember\nthe atmosphere of superstition in which he lived as a child.\n\n[Sidenote: Unity of Nature.]\n\nOne lesson from nature was early implanted which gave body and form\nto Bruno's later views: he had seen from Cicala, the fair mount, how\nVesuvius looked dark, rugged, bare, barren, and repellent; but when\nlater he stood on the slopes of Vesuvius itself, he discovered that\nit was a perfect garden, rich in all the fairest forms and colours,\nand luxurious bounty of fruits, while now it was his own beloved hill,\nCicala, that gloomed dim and formless in the distance. He learnt once\nfor all that the divine majesty of nature is everywhere the same, that\ndistance alters the look but never the nature or substance of things,\nthat the earth is everywhere full of life,--and beyond the earth the\nwhole universe, he inferred, must be the same.[13]\n\n\nII\n\n[Sidenote: Naples.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1563.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Dominicans.]\n\nWhen about eleven years of age, Bruno passed from Nola to Naples in\norder to receive the higher education of the day--Humanity, Logic,\nand Dialectic,--attending both public and private courses; and in his\nfifteenth year (1562 or 1563) he took the habit of St. Dominic, and\nentered the monastery of that order in Naples. Of his earlier teachers\nhe mentions only two,--\"il Sarnese,\" who is probably Vincenzo Colle da\nSarno, a writer of repute, and Fra Theophilo da Vairano, a favourite\nexponent of Aristotle, who was afterwards called to lecture in Rome.\nMuch ingenuity has been exercised in attempting to find a reason for\nBruno's choice of a religious life; but the Church was almost the\n_only_ career open to a clever and studious boy, whose parents were\nneither rich nor powerful. The Dominican Order into which he was taken,\nalthough the narrowest, and the most bigoted,[14] was all-powerful in\nthe kingdom, and directed the machinery of the Inquisition. Naples\nwas governed by Spain with a firm hand, and the Dominican was the\nchosen order of Spain. Just at this time there were riots against the\nInquisition, to which an end was put by the beheading and burning of\ntwo of the ringleaders.[15] The Waldensian persecution was then fiercer\nand more brutal than it had ever been; on a day of 1561 eighty-eight\nvictims were butchered with the same knife, their bodies quartered,\nand distributed along the road to Calabria.[16] Plague, famine,\nearthquake, the Turks, and the Brigands, under \"King\" Marconi, swelled\nthe wave of disaster that had come upon the kingdom of Naples. Little\nwonder then that one whose aim was a life of learning should seek it\nunder the mantle of the strong Dominican order.\n\n[Sidenote: The Cloister.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1572.]\n\nThe cloister stood above Naples, amidst beautiful gardens, and had been\nthe home of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose gentle spirit still breathed\nwithin its walls. In its church, amid the masterpieces of Giovanni\nMerliano of Nola, \"the Buonarotti of Naples,\" stood the image of Christ\nwhich had spoken with the Angelic Doctor, and had approved his works.\nLong afterwards, at his trial, Bruno spoke of having the works of St.\nThomas always by him, \"continually reading, studying and re-studying\nthem, and holding them dear.\" On his entry into the order, Bruno laid\ndown, as was customary, the name Filippo, and took that of Giordano, by\nwhich, except for a short period, he was thenceforth known. After his\nyear's probation he took the vows before Ambrosio Pasqua, the Prior,\nand in due course, probably about 1572, became priest, his first mass\nbeing said in Campagna.[17]\n\n[Sidenote: Processes for heresy.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1576.]\n\n[Sidenote: Rome.]\n\nIt was the age of the counter-reformation which had been inaugurated\nby Loyola, its course set by the decision of the Council of Trent \"to\nerase with fire and sword the least traces of heresy,\" and Bruno early\nbegan to feel his fetters, and to suffer from their weight. During his\nnoviciate even, a writing had been drawn up against him, because he\nhad given away some images of the saints, retaining for himself only a\ncrucifix, and again because he had advised a fellow-novice, who was\nreading _The Seven Delights of the Madonna_ to throw it aside and take\nrather _The Lives of the Fathers_ or some such book. But the writing\nwas merely intended to terrify him, and the same day was torn up by\nthe Prior.[18] In 1576, however, the suspicions of his superiors took\na more active turn, and a process was instituted in which the matter\nof the noviciate was supported by charges of later date, of which\nBruno never learned the details. He believed the chief count was an\napology for the Arian heresy made by him in the course of a private\nconversation, and rather on the ground of its scholastically correct\nform than on that of its truth.[19] In any case Bruno left Naples while\nthe process was pending, and came to Rome, where he put up in the\ncloister of Minerva. His accusers did not leave him in peace, however:\na third process was threatened at Rome with 130 articles;[20] and, on\nlearning from a friendly source that some works of St. Chrysostom and\nSt. Hieronymus, with a commentary of the arch-heretic Erasmus, had been\ndiscovered--he had, as he supposed, safely disposed of them before\nleaving Naples,--Bruno yielded to discretion, abandoned his monkly\nhabit, and escaped from Rome. From this time began a life of restless\nwandering throughout Europe which ended only after sixteen years, when\nhe fell into the power of the Inquisition at Venice.\n\n\nIII\n\n[Sidenote: Noli.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1576?]\n\n[Sidenote: Savona. Turin. Venice.]\n\nBruno, who resumed for the time his baptismal name of Filippo,\njourneyed first to the picturesque little town of Noli, in the Gulf\nof Genoa, whither a more famous exile, Dante, had also come. There\nhe lived for four or five months, teaching grammar to boys, and\n\"the Sphere\"--that is, astronomy and cosmography, with a dash of\nmetaphysics,--to certain gentlemen. Thence he came to Savona, to\nTurin,[21] and to Venice. In Venice six weeks were spent, probably in\nthe vain attempt to find work--the printing offices and the schools\nwere closed on account of the plague which was carrying off thousands\nof the inhabitants; but the time was utilised in printing the first\nof his books--no longer extant--on the _Signs of the Times_,[22]\nwritten, like so many other works of other people, to put together a\nfew \"danari.\" It was shown to a reverend Father Remigio of Florence,\ntherefore was probably orthodox, or its unorthodoxy was veiled.\nThis work may have been the first of Bruno's writings on the art of\nmemory or on Lully's art of knowing. Another work belonging to this\nearly period was the _Ark of Noah_. It was probably written before\nhe left Naples, and was dedicated to Pope Pius V., but is not known\nto have been published: its title is that of a mystical writing of\nHugo of St. Victor, but according to the account in the _Cena_,[23]\nit was an allegorical and probably satirical work, somewhat after the\nfashion of Bruno's _Cabala_:--The animals had assembled to settle a\ndisputed question of rank, and the ass was in great danger of losing\nhis pre-eminent post,--in the poop of the Ark,--because his power lay\nin hoofs rather than in horns; when we consider Bruno's frequent and\nbitter invocations of Asinity, we can hardly avoid seeing in the work\nan allusion to the credulity and ignorance of the monkhood.\n\n[Sidenote: Padua.]\n\n[Sidenote: Brescia.]\n\n[Sidenote: Milan.]\n\n[Sidenote: Bergamo.]\n\n[Sidenote: Chamb\u00e9ry.]\n\n[Sidenote: Geneva.]\n\n[Sidenote: May 1579.]\n\n[Sidenote: Did Bruno adopt Calvinism?]\n\n[Sidenote: Freedom of speech.]\n\n[Sidenote: De la Faye.]\n\n\"From Venice,\"[24] Bruno tells us, \"I went to Padua, where I found\nsome fathers of the order of St. Dominic, whom I knew; they persuaded\nme to resume the habit, even though I should not wish to return to the\norder, as it was more convenient for travel: with this idea I went to\nBergamo, and had a robe made of cheap white cloth, placing over it the\n_scapular_ which I kept when I left Rome.\" On his way to Bergamo he\nseems to have touched at Brescia and Milan, at the former place curing,\n\"with vinegar and polypod,\" a monk who claimed to have the spirit of\nprophecy.[25] At Milan he first heard of his future patron and friend,\nSir Philip Sidney.[26] From Bergamo he was making for Lyons, but at\nChamb\u00e9ry was warned that he would meet with little sympathy there,\nand turned accordingly towards Geneva, the home of exiled reformers\nof all nationalities, but especially of Italians. It is uncertain how\nthe time was distributed among these places,--possibly Bruno spent a\nwinter, as Berti suggests, at Chamb\u00e9ry, having crossed the Alps the\nprevious autumn;--what _is_ certain is, that he arrived at Geneva in\nApril or May of 1579. Under the date May 22, of that year, in the\nbook of the Rector of the Academy at Geneva, is inscribed the name\n_Philippus Brunus_, in his own hand. On his arrival at the hostelry\nin Geneva, he was called upon by a distinguished exile and reformer,\nthe Marquis of Vico, a Neapolitan. To the court at Venice, Bruno gave\nthe following account of this visit and of his life in Geneva:--\"He\nasked me who I was, and whether I had come to stay there and to profess\nthe religion of the city, to which, after I had given an account\nof myself and of my reasons for abandoning the Order, I said that I\nhad no intention of professing the religion of the city, not knowing\nwhat it was, and that therefore I wished rather to remain living in\nfreedom and security, than in any other manner. I was persuaded, in\nany case, to lay aside the habit I wore; so I had made for myself\nfrom the cloth a pair of trews and other things, while the Marquis\nhimself, with other Italians, gave me a sword, hat, cape, and other\nnecessaries of clothing, and enabled me to support myself so far by\ncorrecting proofs. I stayed about two months, and attended at times\nthe preachings and discussions, both of Italians and Frenchmen who\nlectured and preached in the city; among others, I heard several times\nNicolo Balbani of Lucca, who read on the epistles of St. Paul, and\npreached the Gospels; but having been told that I could not remain\nthere long if I did not make up my mind to adopt the religion of\nthe city, for if not I should receive no assistance, I resolved to\nleave.\"[27] When the inscription of Bruno's name in the book of the\nRector of the Academy was found, a doubt appeared to be thrown upon\nthe truth or frankness of this evidence about himself. The regulations\nof 1559 had made it necessary for intending members to accept and sign\nthe Calvinist confession of faith; but from 1576 onward, it was only\nrequired that they should belong to the community, a condition Bruno\nfulfilled by attending the ministrations of Nicolo Balbani at the\nItalian Church; this would account also for his name being in the list\nof the Protestant refugees. The real cause of his departure from Geneva\nhas, however, been revealed by the documents which Dufour published\nin 1884.[28] On Thursday August 6, 1579, \"one Philippe Jordan called\nBrunus, an Italian,\" was brought before the Council, for having \"caused\nto be printed certain replies and invectives against M. de la Faye,\nenumerating twenty errors made by the latter in one of his lectures.\"\nDe la Faye was then Professor of Philosophy in the Academy, of which in\n1580 he became Rector, resigning that post for the theological chair a\nfew years later. His one title to fame is, that he was the biographer\nof B\u00e9za, and he was in no sense a strong man; all the more bitter and\nintense was his anger at the intruding Italian who criticised his\nviews, and--a far graver crime--disparaged his learning. Bruno, heard\nbefore a body of councillors, and having confessed his fault, was to\nbe set free on giving thanks to God and an apology to M. de la Faye,\nadmitting his fault before the Consistory (the governing body of the\nChurch in Geneva), and tearing up the defamatory libel.[29] But when\nhe did appear, on August 13, the philosopher adopted a different\ntone:--\"Philippe Brun appeared before the Consistory--to admit his\nfault, in so far as he had erred in doctrine, and called the ministers\nof the Church of Geneva '_pedagogues_,' asserting that he neither\nwould excuse nor condemn himself in that, for it had not been reported\ntruly, although he understood that one, Anthony de la Faye, had made\nsuch a report. Inquired whom he had called pedagogues, he replied\nwith many excuses and assertions that he had been persecuted, making\nmany conjectures and numerous other accusations.\"----Finally, \"it was\ndecided that he be duly admonished, that he have to admit his fault,\nand that, should he refuse to do so, he be forbidden communion, and\nsent back again to the Council, who are prayed not to endure such a\nperson, a disturber of the school; and in the meantime he shall have to\nadmit his fault. He replied that he repented of having committed the\nfault, for which he would make amends by a better conversation, and\nfurther confessed that he had uttered calumny against De la Faye. The\nadmonitions and exclusions from the communion were carried out, and\nhe was sent back with admonitions.\"[30] Apparently these steps were\neffective; the required apology was made, and on August 27 Bruno was\nabsolved from the form of excommunication passed upon him. No doubt,\nhowever, life in Geneva was made less easy for him, and he left soon\nafter. The sentence of excommunication passed by the Consistory--the\nonly one within its power--does not prove that Bruno was a full member\nof the Protestant community, nor that he partook of the communion,\nwhich at his trial in Venice he absolutely denied ever having done; but\nformal excommunication must have entailed many unpleasantnesses, so\nthat his appeal for remission is quite comprehensible. His unfortunate\nexperiences in Geneva account, however, for the extreme dislike of\nCalvinism which his writings express. Of the two reformed schools,\nLutheranism was by far the more tolerant, and gave him, later, the\nmore cordial welcome. Calvin, we must remember, whose spirit continued\nin Theodore B\u00e9za, had written a pamphlet on Servetus, a \"faithful\nexposition of the errors of Michael Servetus, a short refutation of\nthe same, in which it is shown to be lawful to coerce heretics by\nthe sword.\" It was more probably, however, Bruno's attitude towards\nthe Aristotelian philosophy which brought him into conflict with the\nauthorities: Geneva was as thoroughly convinced of the all-wisdom of\nAristotle as Rome.[31] B\u00e9za had written to Ramus that they had decided\nonce for all, _ne tantillum ab Aristotelis sententi\u00e2 deflectere_, and\nArminius, when a youth of twenty-two, was expelled from Geneva for\nteaching the Dialectic of Ramus.\n\n\nIV\n\n[Sidenote: Lyons.]\n\n[Sidenote: Toulouse.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1579-81]\n\nAfter a short stay in Lyons, where \"he could not make enough to keep\nhim alive,\" Bruno passed to Toulouse, which boasted then of one of the\nmost flourishing universities in the world. In his account of his life\nbefore the Venetian tribunal, he gives two years and a half to Toulouse,\nbut he must have left it before the end of 1581, so that his actual\nstay was only two years. While he was holding private classes on the\nSphere, and other philosophical subjects, a chair at the University\nfell vacant. Bruno was persuaded to become a candidate; to that end\nhe took a Doctorate (in Theology), and was allowed to compete. By the\nfree election of the students, as the custom was, he was chosen for\nthe chair, and thereafter for two sessions lectured on Aristotle's _De\nAnima_ and on other matters. Part of these lectures is perhaps given to\nus in the works published afterwards at Paris. It was fortunate that\nthe University did not require of its ordinary professors that they\nshould attend mass, as was the case, for example, at the Sorbonne.\nBruno could not have done so owing to his excommunication, but that he\nwas unconscious of any want of sympathy towards the Catholic Church is\nshown by his visit in Toulouse to the confessional of a Jesuit.\n\nThe city was not generally favourable to heretics, and in 1616 Lucilio\nVanini was burnt there for his opinions. A cancelled phrase in the\nevidence suggests that Bruno's departure from Toulouse was owing to\ndisputes and difficulties regarding his doctrine, but his alleged\nreason was the civil war that was then raging in the south of France,\nwith Henry of Navarre in the field. While at Toulouse, Bruno seems to\nhave completed a work in more than one volume, the _Clavis Magna_, or\n\"Great Key,\" a general, and as Bruno thought, a final textbook on the\nart of memory:--\"All the ideas of the older writers on this subject (so\nfar as we are able to make out from the books that have come to our\nhands), their doctrines and methods, have their fitting place in our\ninvention, which is a superlatively pregnant one, and has appropriated\nto it the book of the Great Key.\"[32] One volume only, it appears, was\npublished by Bruno, and that in England, the _Sigillus Sigillorum_.\n\n[Sidenote: Works published in Paris.]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Umbris._]\n\n[Sidenote: _Ars Memori\u00e6._]\n\n[Sidenote: _Cantus Circ\u00e6us_.]\n\nTo Paris Bruno came about the close of 1581, and almost at once\nsprang into fame. A course of thirty lectures on \"The thirty divine\nattributes\" (as given by Thomas Aquinas) brought him the offer of an\nordinary professorship, but this he could not take, being unable to\nattend mass. However, his fame reached the ears of the king, Henry the\nThird, who summoned him to his presence, to know among other things\n\"whether the memory Bruno had, and the art of memory he professed,\nwere natural or due to magic.\" Bruno proved to him that a powerful\nmemory was a natural product, and dedicated to him a book on the\nArt of Memory. Henry III. was the son of an Italian mother, and had\na keen, if uncritical and dilettante, love of learning. At the time\nBruno arrived in Paris philosophy was one of the king's chief hobbies,\nand the fact had a great influence on Bruno's future. During his stay\nin Paris Bruno published several works, of which the first perhaps\nwas the \"Shadows of Ideas\" (_De Umbris Idearum_), 1582, dedicated to\nHenry III., along with which, but without a separate frontispiece,\nwas the _Art of Memory_ (_Ars Memori\u00e6 Jordani Bruni_); there followed\n\"The Incantation of Circe\" (_Cantus Circ\u00e6us_), 1582, dedicated to\nPrince Henry of Angoul\u00eame, and edited by Regnault. The _De Umbris_\ngives the metaphysical basis of the art of memory, the _Ars Memori\u00e6_\na psychological analysis of the faculty, and an account of the theory\nof the art itself, while the _Cantus Circ\u00e6us_ offers first a practical\napplication, and secondly a more elementary account of the theory and\npractice of the system. Obscurity was, in those days of pedantry, one\nof the safest ways of securing a hearing: there is nothing of value in\nBruno's art except the philosophy by which he sought to support it--a\nrenovated Neoplatonism. It has been pointed out, however, \"that the art\nwas a convenient means of introducing Bruno to strange universities,\ngaining him favour with the great, or helping him out of pressing money\ntroubles. It was his exoteric philosophy with which he could carefully\ndrape his philosophy of religion hostile to the Church, and ride as a\nhobby horse in his unfruitful humours.\"[33] There can be no question of\nBruno's own belief in it; it was not, for example, a cipher language\nby which he covered his real thoughts: the Copernican theory is not,\nas Berti says, absent from the Parisian writings, rather it is forced\nobtrusively into them.[34]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Compendios\u00e2 Architectur\u00e2, etc._]\n\n[Sidenote: _Il Candelaio._]\n\nIn Paris was published also the \"Compendious Architecture\" (_De\nCompendios\u00e2 Architectur\u00e2 et Complemento Artis Lullii_), 1582, dedicated\nto Giovanni Moro, the Venetian Ambassador in Paris. It is the earliest\nof the Lullian works in which Bruno expounds or comments upon the art\nof Raymond Lully, a logical calculus and mnemonic scheme in one, that\nattracted many imitators up to and after Bruno's time. In the same year\nappeared a work of a very different stamp, _Il Candelaio_, or \"The\nTorchbearer,\" \"a comedy by Bruno of Nola, _Academico di nulla academia,\ndetto il fastidito: In tristitia hilaris, hilaritate tristis_.\" It is\na satire upon some of the chief vices of the age--in the forefront\npedantry, superstition, and sordid love. Without great dramatic\npower--the characters are personified types, not individuals--it has\nbeen judged to be second to none of the comedies of the time, in\nspirit, wit, and pert comedy. It certainly excels in many respects the\n_Cortegiana_ of Aretino, to which it is similar in character. It is\nequally realistic in the sense that it \"calls a spade a spade,\" and\ndoes not shrink from representing vice as speaking in its own language.\nBruno is not, however, to be blamed for an obscenity which was _de\nrigueur_ in the literature of the time. But although the humour is\nbroad and occasionally amusing, there is no grace, no lighter touch;\nthe picture is all dark. The attack upon the pedant, however, strikes a\nkeynote of Bruno's life; in him he saw the greatest enemy his teaching\nhad to face, and therefore he struck at him whenever the opportunity\noffered.\n\n[Sidenote: The University.]\n\nOwing perhaps to some of these works, Bruno was granted an\nExtraordinary Readership at the university. There were, however, two\nuniversities in Paris, and it is uncertain at which Bruno taught:\nthey were the Sorbonne, catholic and conservative, the censorship\nof which must have passed his Parisian works, and the College of\nFrance--following the liberal policy of its founder, Francis II.,\ndeclaring war against pedantry in general, and the Jesuit Society in\nparticular.[35] As has been said, Bruno was at this time eager to be\ntaken back into the fold of the Church, and turned to the Jesuits for\nassistance, so that the latter college could hardly have been his\nhabitation; on the other hand, his revolutionary teaching could not\nfail in the end to excite the indignation of the Sorbonne pupils:\nAristotle was, here as elsewhere, \"divine.\" Yet when Bruno returned\nto Paris in 1585, and when he was on the eve of a second departure,\nhe recalled with pleasure the humanity and kindness shown to him by\nrectors and professors on his first visit. They had honoured him by\n\"the continued presence of the more learned at his lectures both\npublic and private, so that any title rather than that of stranger was\nbefitting him with this kindly parent of letters.\"[36] And Nostitz,\none of Bruno's pupils, remembered with admiration, thirty-three\nyears later, the skill and versatility of his teacher: \"He was able\nto discourse impromptu on any subject suggested, to speak without\npreparation extensively and eloquently, and he attracted many pupils\nand admirers in Paris.\"[37]\n\nBut Bruno's evil genius would not allow him rest; whether on account,\nas he himself says, of \"tumults,\"--which may mean either the civil\nwar[38] or an active resistance to his own teaching on the part of\nthe youth of Paris,--or because of the attraction of a less bigoted\ncountry, he was drawn in 1583 to exchange Paris for London.\n\n\nV\n\n[Sidenote: England, 1583.]\n\nEngland under Elizabeth was renowned for its tolerance; all manner\nof religious refugees found there a place of safety: to Italians its\nwelcome was particularly cordial, their language was the favoured one\nof the court, and Elizabeth herself eagerly saw and spoke with them\nin their own tongue. Florio--an Italian in spite of having had London\nfor his birthplace, the friend of Shakespeare, of Spenser and Ben\nJonson--was constantly at court; two of Elizabeth's physicians were\nItalian, as were several of the teachers of the universities. Perhaps\nthe happiest days of Bruno's troubled life were spent here; he had\naccess to the most brilliant literary society of the time; he was able\nto speak, write, and publish in his own tongue, and in consequence gave\nall the most polished and brilliant of his works to the world during\nthis period.\n\n[Sidenote: Oxford, 1583.]\n\n[Sidenote: The University and Aristotle.]\n\nIn April, May, and June of 1583 Bruno was in Oxford, although the\nuniversity and college records make no mention of his name. He must\nhave known it as a stronghold of Aristotelianism; on its statutes stood\n\"that Bachelors and Masters who did not follow Aristotle faithfully\nwere liable to a fine of five shillings for every point of divergence,\nand for every fault committed against the Logic of the Organon\"; and\nthat this was no dead law had been proved a few years before when one\nBarebones was degraded and expelled because of an attack on Aristotle\nfrom the standpoint of Ramus. The only living subject of teaching was\ntheology, there was no real science, and no real scholarship. This\npeaceful school was not likely to be gratified by the letter which\nBruno wrote asking permission to lecture at Oxford; it is printed in\nthe _Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum_:[39] \"To the most excellent the\nVice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford, its most famous Doctors\nand celebrated Masters--Salutation from Philotheus Jordanus Brunus\nof Nola, Doctor of a more scientific theology, professor of a purer\nand less harmful learning, known in the chief universities of Europe,\na philosopher approved and honourably received, a stranger with\nnone but the uncivilised and ignoble, a wakener of sleeping minds,\ntamer of presumptuous and obstinate ignorance, who in all respects\nprofesses a general love of man, and cares not for the Italian more\nthan for the Briton, male more than female, the mitre more than the\ncrown, the toga more than the coat of mail, the cowled more than the\nuncowled; but loves him who in intercourse is the more peaceable,\npolite, friendly and useful--(Brunus) whom only propagators of folly\nand hypocrites detest, whom the honourable and studious love, whom\nnoble minds applaud.\" The epistle which so begins is the preface to a\nwork on the art of discovering, arranging, and remembering facts of\nknowledge, by which Bruno hoped to commend himself to the English, as\nhe had succeeded in commending himself to the French universities.\nHe attempted to disarm prejudice by sheltering under the twofold\ntruth--\"if this writing appears to conflict with the common and\napproved faith, understand that it is put forward by me _not as\nabsolutely true_, but as more consonant with our senses and our reason,\nor at least less dissonant than the other side of the antithesis. And\nremember, that we are not so much eager to show our own knowledge, as\nmoved by the desire of showing the weakness of the common philosophy,\nwhich thrusts forward what is mere opinion as if demonstratively\nproved, and of making it clear by our discussion (if the gods grant it)\nhow much in harmony with regulated sense, in consonance with the truth\nof the substance of things, is that which the garrulous multitude of\nplebeian philosophers ridicule as foreign to sense.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Alasco of Poland.]\n\n[Sidenote: The disputation.]\n\n[Sidenote: The _Cena_.]\n\n[Sidenote: The _Causa_.]\n\nHe was coldly received, however; in common-sense England his new art\ncould evoke no enthusiasm, and his real and vital doctrines met with\nnothing but opposition at the old university--\"the widow of true\nscience,\" Bruno calls it. From the 10th to the 13th June the Polish\nprince, Alasco, was in Oxford, and disputations were held in his honour\nas well as banquets. Among others, Bruno disputed publicly in presence\nof the prince and some of the English nobility.[40] Alasco appears to\nhave caused some excitement to the Elizabethan court. According to Mr.\nFaunt (of the secretary's office) he had been General in more than\nforty fought battles, spoke Latin and Italian well, and was of great\nrevenues. Mauvissi\u00e8re grumbled in a letter to the French king, that\nthe Palatine Lasque and a Scottish ambassador seemed to be governing\nthe court.[41] The real object of the visit was apparently political,\nto prevent the traffic in arms between England and Muscovy.[42]\nWhether Alasco succeeded in this design or not, he seems to have found\nlife in England too fast for his purse--\"A learned man of graceful\nfigure, with a very long beard, in decorous and beautiful attire,\nwho was received kindly by the Queen, with great honour and praise\nby the nobles, by the university of Oxford with erudite delectations\n(_oblectationibus_) and varied spectacles; but after four months,\nbeing harassed for debt, he withdrew secretly.\"[43] The arrival of\nthis tragic-comic figure in Oxford appears to have gratified the city\nand university; he was most hospitably received, and put up at Christ\nChurch. On the following day there was a dinner at All Souls, at which\n\"he was solemnlie satisfied with scholarlie exercises and courtlie\nfare.\" That evening was performed a \"pleasant comedie,\" the _Rivales_,\nand on the following night a \"statelie tragedie,\" _Dido_,[44] and there\nwere in the intervals shows, disputations in philosophy, physics,\nand divinity, in all of which, we are glad to know, \"these learned\nopponents, respondents, and moderators, acquitted themselves like\nthemselves, sharplie and soundlie.\" Let us hope that Bruno too, who\ntook part in one of these disputations, made this impression. According\nto his own account the protagonist put forward by the university could\nnot reply to one of his arguments, and was left fifteen times by as\nmany syllogisms, \"like a hen in the stubble,\" resorting accordingly\nto incivility and abuse, in face of the patience and humanity of the\nNeapolitan \"reared under a kinder sky.\" The result was unfortunate for\nBruno; it put an end to the public lectures, which he was giving at\nthe time, on the Immortality of the Soul and on the \"Five-fold Sphere.\"\nThe same month he returned to London, and shortly after published\nthe _Cena_ (Ash-Wednesday Supper), in which he ridiculed the Oxford\nDoctors. _Inter alia_, he thought they knew a good deal more of beer\nthan of Greek.[45] The impression this attack produced in his London\ncircle was apparently not that which he desired, for in the following\ndialogue, the _Causa_, he was much more judicious.[46] He admitted much\nin the university that was well instituted from the beginning: \"the\nfine arrangement of studies, the gravity of the ceremonies, careful\nordering of the exercises, seemliness of the habits worn, and many\nother circumstances that made for the requirements and adornment of a\nuniversity; without doubt every one must admit it to be the first in\nEurope, and consequently in all the world--nay, more, in gentleness\nof spirit and acuteness of mind, such as are naturally brought out\nin both parts of Britain, it equals perhaps the most excellent of\nthe universities. Nor is it to be forgotten that before speculative\nphilosophy was taught in any other part of Europe it flourished\nhere, and through its princes in metaphysics (although barbarians in\nspeech and of the profession of the cowl) the splendour of one of\nthe noblest and rarest spheres of philosophy, in our times almost\nextinct, was diffused to all other academies in civilised countries.\"\nWhat Bruno condemned in Oxford was the undue attention it gave to\nlanguage and words, to the ability to speak in Ciceronian Latin and\nin eloquent-phrase, neglecting the realities of which the words were\nsigns. As for the knowledge of Aristotle and of philosophy generally\nthat was demanded for the degree of Master or Doctor, Bruno suggests\nan evasion that probably had its origin in the undergraduate wit of\nthe time. The statute read \"_nisi potaverit e fonte Aristotelis_,\" but\nthere were three springs in the town, the _Fons Aristotelis_, _Fons\nPythagorae_, _Fons Platonis_, and \"as the water for the beer and cider\nwas taken from these springs, one could not be three days in Oxford\nwithout imbibing not merely of the spring of Aristotle, but of those\nof Pythagoras and of Plato as well.\" Doctors were easily created and\ndoctorates easily bought. There were of course exceptions, men renowned\nfor eloquence and doctrine like Tobias Matthew[47] and Culpepper,[48]\nbut as a rule the nobility and best men generally refused to avail\nthemselves of the \"honour,\" and preferred the substance of learning to\nits shadow.\n\n\nVI\n\n[Sidenote: London.]\n\nIt was after his return from Oxford that the pleasant and busy life\nin London literary society began--the period of Bruno's greatest\nproductiveness. In the house of the enlightened and cultured\nMauvissi\u00e8re he found, for the first time since leaving Nola, a\nhome.[49] Bruno's position in London has given rise to great difference\nof opinion; none of the ordinary contemporary records make mention of\nhim, or the slightest allusion to his presence in England. At his trial\nhe professed to have brought letters to the French Ambassador from the\nKing of France, to have stayed at the house of the former continuously,\nto have gone constantly to the Court with the Ambassador, and to have\nknown Elizabeth; and in his works he claims intimacy with Sidney and\nGreville. It was consequently thought that he moved in the highest\nEnglish society of the time, and from the _Cena_ that he belonged to\na literary coterie, or club, of which Sidney, Greville, Dyer, Temple,\nand others were members. Lagarde, believing Bruno (but on ludicrous\ngrounds)[50] to have sprung from the lowest of Italian society, could\nhardly accept this familiar legend of Bruno-biographies, and more\nrecently, the _Quarterly Review_ has questioned both the friendship\nwith Sidney and Greville, and the existence of the supposed Society.\nAs to the last, there was certainly at one time a literary society,\nSidney's _Areopagus_, to which Spenser belonged in 1579, but which\nconcerned itself chiefly with artificial rules of versification, and\nthe merits of various metres; the habit of meeting may have very well\npersisted for a few years, after the first flush of enthusiasm had\npassed, and the Ash Wednesday supper may have represented one of these\nmeetings to which Bruno--the defender of the Copernican theory--may\nhave been invited as Protagonist. As for Bruno's position, it must\nhave been that of a secretary or tutor, perhaps both, in Mauvissi\u00e8re's\nemployment. The French Ambassador was constantly in want of funds, and\ncould not very well afford to support any casual stranger whom the\nKing of France recommended to him. In November 1584 he complained of\nabsolute penury, of being unable to obtain money due to him from the\nKing of France (the King paid him by occasional doles only), of being\nhard pressed by London and Italian bankers, while his wife was in ill\nhealth. He was not greatly respected either by the Court, who, with\ngood grounds, believed him to have no influence with the French King,\nor by Mary of Scotland and the English Catholics, partly because of\nhis supposed Huguenot leanings, and partly because of their distrust\nof Henry III., or by the French King himself. Mauvissi\u00e8re had been\nsent to England as one who could be trusted not to err by way of\nundue zeal. Henry had no desire to see the unfortunate Queen of Scots\nliberated, although he put out all his diplomatic power to save her\nlife; the _status quo_ in England suited his policy only too well;\nthere was no need for active interference. It was Mary of Guise that\nspurred on Mauvissi\u00e8re to act as energetically as he did for Queen\nMary. We may assume then that Bruno, when Oxford rejected him, entered\nthe French Embassy as an unofficial secretary. The words he employed\nat the Venetian inquiry quite harmonise with this supposition: \"In\nhis house I stayed as his gentleman, nothing more,\" not as friend or\nguest, but as \"_his_ gentleman.\"[51] That he went constantly to Court\nwith the Ambassador, and was introduced to Queen Elizabeth, would be\nnatural in the case of a secretary--it would be curious in the case of\na mere guest, or of any servant lower than a secretary. Finally, in the\n_Infinito_[52] the grateful remark that Mauvissi\u00e8re entertained Bruno\nwithin his family, \"not as one who was of service to him (Mauvissi\u00e8re),\nbut as one whom he could serve on the many occasions in which aid\nwas required by the Nolan,\" obviously suggests that services _were_\nrendered by Bruno to the Ambassador. A man who was prepared to make a\nliving by teaching children as readily as by lecturing to students, by\nsetting books in print as readily as by writing them, was not likely to\nbe an expensive secretary, and it must have been pleasant to Bruno to\nescape from the turmoil of scholastic strife and its bitter antagonisms\nto the quiet haven of the Embassy. His host was a well-meaning, kindly,\nbut unfortunate man, unequal to the great issues that were being\ndecided around him. Although it was a Catholic family, and mass was\nfrequently said in the house, Bruno's religious freedom was respected.\nHe attended neither mass nor any of the preachings, on account of his\nexcommunication. If one may judge from Bruno's enthusiasm, the wife\nand daughter of Mauvissi\u00e8re must have been charming companions, the\none \"endowed with no mean beauty of form, both veiling and clothing\nthe spirit within, and also with the threefold blessing of a discreet\njudgment, a pleasing modesty, and a kind courtesy, holding in an\nindissoluble tie the mind of her consort, and captivating all who come\nto know her\"; the other, \"who has scarcely seen six summers, and from\nher speech you could not tell whether she be of Italy, of France, or\nof England; from her musical play, whether she is of corporeal or\nincorporeal substance; from the ripe sweetness of her manners, whether\nshe is descended from heaven or risen from earth.\"[53] For Mauvissi\u00e8re\nhimself, to whom the three most important of the Italian dialogues\nare dedicated, no words that Bruno can invent are too high praise. In\nthe dedication of the _Causa_, after comparing his persevering zeal\nand delicate diplomatic powers to the dropping of water upon hard\nstone, and his steadfast support of Bruno in face of detractions of\nthe ignorant and the mercenary, of sophists, hypocrites, barbarians,\nand plebeians, to the strength of the rock against seething waves,\nthe philosopher adds, \"I, whom the foolish hate, the ignoble despise,\nwhom the wise love, the learned admire, the great honour--I, for the\ngreat favours enjoyed from you, food and shelter, freedom, safety,\nharbourage, who through you have escaped so terrible and fierce a\nstorm, to you consecrate this anchor, these shrouds and slackened\nsails, this merchandise so dear to me, more precious still to the\nfuture world, to the end that through your favour they may not fall\na prey to the ocean of injustice, turbulence, and hostility.\" The\nmerchandise of which Bruno thought so highly was the Dialogue itself;\nwe must of course allow for the grandiloquence of the dedications\nof the time, and of Bruno's especially, but a real gratitude shines\nthrough the words.\n\n[Sidenote: Queen Elizabeth.]\n\n[Sidenote: Mendo\u00e7a.]\n\nHis account of the Queen must be taken much less seriously, although\nhis praise of her formed one of the many counts against him in Venice.\n\"That most singular and rare of ladies, who from this cold clime, near\nto the Arctic parallel, sheds a bright light upon all the terrestrial\nglobe. Elizabeth, a Queen in title and in dignity, inferior to no\nKing in all the world. For her judgment, counsel, and government, not\neasily second to any other that bears a sceptre in the earth. In her\nfamiliarity with the arts, knowledge of the sciences, understanding\nand practice of all languages spoken in Europe by the people or by\nthe learned, I leave the whole world to judge what rank she should\nhold among princes.\"[54] In a satirical passage of the _Causa_, where\nBruno is proving that all vices, defects, crimes are masculine, all\nvirtues, excellences, goodnesses, feminine, Elizabeth is given as\na crowning example:--\"than whom no man is more worthy in the whole\nkingdom, among the nobles no one more heroic, among the long robed\nno one more learned, among the councillors no one more wise.\"[55]\nExaggerated as the language is, it is not more so than was common with\nthe writers who adorned Elizabeth's Court; and it was one of his errors\nwhich Bruno could easily regret before his judges. \"In my book on 'the\nCause, Principle, and One,' I praise the Queen of England and call\nher 'divine,' not as a term of worship, but as an epithet such as the\nancients used to apply to their princes, and in England where I then\nwas, and where I composed this book, the title 'divine' is usually\ngiven to the Queen. I was the more inclined to call her so, that she\nknew me, as I went continually with the Ambassador to Court; but I know\nI erred in praising this lady, she being a heretic, and in calling her\n'divine.'\" Through Mauvissi\u00e8re, Bruno made acquaintance with Bernardino\ndi Mendo\u00e7a, Spanish Ambassador to England from 1578 to 1584, a much\nstronger man as well as a more unscrupulous servant of his king than\nMauvissi\u00e8re could be. Bruno says definitely that Mendo\u00e7a was known by\nhim at the English Court. So well was he known that Bruno approached\nthe Ambassador in Paris on the delicate subject of his own relations\nwith the Catholic Church, and was introduced by him to the Papal\nNuncio. There is absolutely no reason for doubting these statements,\nand if true, they are quite compatible with acquaintance, if not\nfriendship, between Bruno and Sir Philip Sidney, or the others whom he\nmentions. Mendo\u00e7a was not, however a _persona grata_ at Court: he was a\nthorough-going supporter of the Scottish Queen, and seems to have had\na finger in almost every conspiracy that was planned or formed by the\nEnglish Catholics. He became unbearable to Queen Elizabeth; his recall\nwas demanded and refused; but in January of 1584 he was compelled to\nleave England, and a formal rupture with Spain was the consequence,\nwhich became actual war four years afterwards. Philip of Spain did not\ndesert his champion, in whom he had the highest confidence. In October\nof 1584 Mendo\u00e7a became Ambassador to France, and there in 1855 Bruno\nrenewed acquaintance with him.\n\n[Sidenote: Sidney.]\n\n[Sidenote: Greville.]\n\n[Sidenote: Spenser.]\n\nLike all his contemporaries, Bruno came under the spell of Sir\nPhilip Sidney's charm. He had already heard in Milan and in France\nof that \"most illustrious and excellent cavalier, one of the rarest\nand brightest spirits in the world.\" To Sir Philip are dedicated the\ntwo chief ethical writings of Bruno, the _Spaccio_, and the _Heroici\nFurori_, with the expressed assurance that the author is not presenting\na lyre to a deaf man, nor a mirror to a blind. \"The Italian reasons\nwith one who can understand his speech; his verses are under the\ncensure and the protection of a poet. Philosophy displays her form\nunveiled to so clear an eye as yours. The way of heroism is pointed\nout to a heroic and generous spirit.\" Sidney was one of the first to\ntake an interest in the Italian on his arrival in England, and when\nthe _Spaccio_ was published, on the eve, as Bruno thought, of his\ndeparture from England towards the close of 1584,[56] Bruno could not\nturn his back upon Sidney's \"beautiful, fortunate, and chivalrous\ncountry, without saluting him with a mark of recognition, along with\nthe generous and humane spirit, Sir Fulke Greville.\" There was some\ndisagreement, however, between Greville and Bruno, \"the invidious\nErinnys of vile, malignant, ignoble, interested persons, had spread\nits poison\" between them, in Bruno's emphatic words. What the ground\nof division was we do not know; possibly the tone in which the _Cena_\nspoke of Oxford men, and of English scholars generally, had offended\nGreville, and this may have called out the partial retractation in the\n_Causa_. As is well known the friendship of the two men, Sidney and\nGreville (with whom Edward Dyer was closely associated), was of the\nnoblest type. Greville died in 1628 in the fulness of years and of\nhonours, but had retained the impress of his young friendship fresh\nto the end.[57] It may be added that he became an intimate of Francis\nBacon, who may through him have been introduced to Bruno's works. It\nmust have been in some such way also that Spenser knew of Bruno, as it\nis probable that the Cantos on Mutability (first published posthumously\nin 1609, but written probably after his visit to England in 1596) were\n\"suggested\" by Bruno's _Spaccio_.[58] The \"new poet\" certainly could\nnot have met Bruno, for he was in Ireland continuously, as secretary,\nfrom 1580 till 1589, when he came over to publish the first three books\nof the _Faerie Queen_.\n\n[Sidenote: Bacon.]\n\n[Sidenote: Shakespeare.]\n\nIt is possible, on the other hand, that Bruno met Bacon, who was a\nrising young barrister and member of Parliament when he arrived in\nEngland, and had already achieved some fame as a critic of Aristotle.\nThe idea, however, that he knew and influenced Shakespeare, is\nentirely fanciful. Richard Field, a friend of Shakespeare, had come to\nLondon in 1579, and served his apprenticeship with Thomas Vautrollier;\nand Field was Shakespeare's first publisher, having set up for himself\nby 1587. It has been suggested that before this time Shakespeare\nworked in Vautrollier's printing office. On the other hand, it has\nbeen universally received that Vautrollier was Bruno's publisher in\nEngland, and Bruno usually corrected his own proofs. Hence the two may\nhave met, Shakespeare and Bruno, in a grimy printer's den. The idea is\ncharming, but it has to yield before the light of fact. Shakespeare\ndid not come to London until 1586, and there is no proof that he\nworked with Vautrollier. Bruno had left England by the end of 1585,\nand there is no proof that Vautrollier was his printer. The suggested\nanalogies between one or two ideas in Hamlet and Bruno's conceptions\nof transmigration, of the relativity of evil, and the rest, are of\nthe shallowest.[59] Thomas Vautrollier, a French printer who came to\nLondon some years before, and set up a press in Blackfriars, was said\n(by Thomas Baker) to have gained an undesired notoriety as Bruno's\nprinter, and to have been compelled to leave England for a period,\nwhich he spent in Edinburgh, to the advantage of Scottish printing.\nThe _Triginta Sigilli_ and all the Italian Dialogues of Bruno were\ncertainly published in England, although Venice or Paris was set down\nas their place of publication. According to Bruno, this was \"that\nthey might sell more easily, and have the greater success, for if\nthey had been marked as printed in England, they would have sold with\ngreater difficulty in those parts.\" It is doubtful, however, whether\nVautrollier was really the printer; in any case it was not on that\naccount that he went to Edinburgh.[60]\n\n[Sidenote: Florio.]\n\n[Sidenote: Alexander Dicson.]\n\n[Sidenote: _Antidicsonus_.]\n\n[Sidenote: Watson.]\n\nOf the Italians in England during Elizabeth's reign the most familiar\nto us is Florio, whose father had been preacher to the Protestant\nItalians in London. Florio had been at Oxford, from which university\nhe dedicated his \"First Fruites\" to Leicester in 1578, so that he was\nalready well known as a scholar when Bruno came to England and made\nhis acquaintance. This may have occurred through Sidney; or _vice\nversa_, Sidney's attention may have been called to Bruno by Florio.\nThe latter was described by Cornwallis as one who looked \"more like a\ngood fellow than a wise man,\" yet was \"wise beyond his fortune or his\neducation.\" It was long after Bruno's departure that Florio devoted\nhimself to the charming translation of Montaigne (published in 1603),\nof which a copy has been found bearing Shakespeare's name, while to\nShakespeare is attributed a sonnet in praise of Florio. Curiously, we\nfind him in his translation acknowledging assistance from one with\nwhom Bruno also has casually connected him in the _Cena_, viz. Matthew\nGwinne. Of Bruno's more intimate acquaintance in England we know\nlittle: there are two whose names occur in the dialogues, \"Smith\" in\nthe _Cena_, and Dicson in the _Causa_, both sympathetic listeners and\nadherents of _Theophilo_, who is Bruno's representative. The former\nit is naturally difficult to place: he may however have been the poet\nWilliam Smith, a disciple of Spenser, who published a pastoral poem\n\"Chloris, or the Complaint of the Passionate Despised Shepherd.\" Of\nDicson,--\"learned, honourable, lovable, well-born faithful friend\nAlexander Dicson, whom the Nolan loves as his own eyes,\"[61] a little\nmore can be told. He was the author of a _De Umbra Rationis_, (1583),\nobviously inspired by Bruno's _De Umbris Idearum_, and on the same\nbasis of Neoplatonism. The work is extremely sketchy, occasionally\ndiffuse, and of little value even were there anything of value in the\nArt of Memory which it teaches. But it seems from a reply it called\nforth (_Antidicsonus_) to have had some vogue, and to have been backed\nby a vigorous and aggressive school in which Bruno, who is joined\nin condemnation with Dicson, may have had a place.[62] The poet\nThomas Watson has also connected Bruno with Dicson in his _Compendium\nMemori\u00e6 Localis_, published in 1585 or 1586. Watson also published a\ntranslation of Tasso's _Aminta_, in Latin hexameters,--in 1585, _i.e._\nin the year following the appearance of Bruno's _Spaccio_, with its\nsatire on Tasso's _Age of Gold_.[63] Watson had been in Paris in 1581,\nwhen he met Walsingham, and he may of course have met Bruno also: he\nwas a scholarly poet, although his work lay more in the direction of\ntranslation and imitation of foreign writers, than in that of original\nverse, but during his lifetime he ranked as the equal of Spenser and\nSidney. The _Compendium of Local Memory_ is in clear, simple, classical\nLatin, in strong contrast with the corresponding works of Dicson and of\nBruno; but the principles of the Art which it describes are those of\nBruno, or Ravenna, or of some common source, more skilfully arranged\nand more aptly expressed.\n\n\nVII\n\n[Sidenote: _The Thirty Seals._]\n\n[Sidenote: _Cena de le Ceneri._]\n\n[Sidenote: _De la causa, principio et Uno_, 1584.]\n\n[Sidenote: _De l'infinito universo et Mondi._]\n\nNo fewer than seven works from Bruno's facile pen were published\nin England; the first of these was the Thirty Seals, and the Seal\nof Seals (1583) _Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum, quibus adjectus\nest Sigillus[64] Sigillorum_. It was dedicated to Mauvissi\u00e8re, but\nthe introductory epistle was addressed to the Vice-Chancellor of\nOxford. Bound along with it, in front, was a _Modern and Complete Art\nof Remembering_ which is merely a reprint of the last part of the\n_Cantus Circ\u00e6us_. The work belongs to the mnemonic and psychological\nwritings of Bruno; the thirty seals are hints \"for the acquiring,\narranging, and recollecting of all sciences and arts,\" the Seal of\nSeals \"for comparing and explaining all operations of the mind. And\nit may be called Art of Arts; for here you will easily find all that\nis theoretically enquired into by logic, metaphysics, the cabala,\nnatural magic, arts great and small.\" (The part called _Sigillus\nSigillorum_ was a volume of Bruno's _Clavis Magna_, perhaps the only\nvolume published.) It was followed by an Italian dialogue, \"the\nAsh Wednesday Supper,\" _La Cena de le Ceneri_, also dedicated to\nMauvissi\u00e8re. Written in praise of the Copernican theory, it goes beyond\nCopernicus himself in its intuition of the infinity of the universe,\nof the identity of matter in the earth with the matter of the planets\nand stars, and of the possibility that such living beings inhabit\nthem as inhabit the earth: earth and stars themselves are also said\nto be living organisms: so there are not seven planets or wandering\nstars only, but innumerable such; for every world, whether of the\nsun-type or of the earth-type, is in motion, its motion proceeding\nfrom the spirit within it. Finally, this philosophy is shown to be\nin complete accord with all true religion, to conflict only with the\nfalse. After the \"Ash-Wednesday Supper\" came \"Cause, Principle, and\nUnity\" (_De la causa, principio et Uno_), 1584; again dedicated to\nMauvissi\u00e8re.[65] The first of its dialogues is an apology for the\n_Cena_, which, as we have seen, had caused considerable feeling in\nBruno's circle of readers, for the severity and irony of its strictures\nupon Oxford, and England generally. In the others the immanence or\nspirituality of all causation; the eternity of matter; its divinity\nas the potentiality of all life; its realisation in the universe as a\nwhole (as a \"formed\" thing); the infinite whole and the innumerable\nparts, as different aspects of the same: the origin of evil and of\ndeath: the coincidence of matter and form in the One: the source of\nall individual and finite forms in the one material substance: the\ncoincidence in the One of the possible and the real, the century and\nthe moment, the solid and the point: the universe all centre and all\ncircumference: diversity and difference as nothing but diverse and\ndifferent aspects of one and the same substance: the coincidence of\ncontraries:--these are among the chief topics of this, the freshest\nand most brilliant of Bruno's philosophical writings: \"a dialogue\nworthy of Plato,\" Moritz Carri\u00e8re has said. In the same year appeared\n_The Infinite Universe and its worlds_ (_De l'infinito universo et\nMondi_), dedicated to Mauvissi\u00e8re.[66] It contained a masterly array of\nreasons, physical and metaphysical, for the belief that the universe\nis infinite, and is full of innumerable worlds of living creatures;\nsense and imagination are shown to be at once the source and the limit\nof human knowledge. Yet the argument is mainly _a priori_: the infinite\npower of the Efficient Cause cannot be ineffective, the divine goodness\ncannot withhold the good of _life_ from any _possible_ being; the\ndivine will is one with the divine intelligence and with the divine\naction: all _possible_ existence falls within the sphere of the divine\nintelligence, therefore is willed; but whatever is willed is realised,\nfor the power is infinite; and whatever is is good, for it is willed by\nthe infinitely good. Whatever really is, is a substance, and therefore\nimmortal. The substance of us is immutable, only the outward face or\nform of it changes, passes away; in the whole all things are good;\nwhere things appear evil or defective, it is because we look at the\npart or the present, not at the whole or the eternal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Spaccio de la bestia trionfante._]\n\n[Sidenote: The _Cabala_, 1585.]\n\n\"The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast,\" _Spaccio de la bestia\ntrionfante_, 1584,[67] was dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney. In form\nan allegorical, satirical prose poem, it is in fact an introduction\nto a new ethical system. A repentant Jupiter resolves to drive\nout the numerous beasts that occupy his heavenly firmament--the\nconstellations--and to replace them by the virtues, with Truth as their\ncrown. He calls a council of the gods to consider this plan, and in\nthe discussion that follows numberless topics are touched upon--the\nhistory of religions, the contrast between natural and positive\nreligion, and the fundamental forms of morality. The _Spaccio_ is,\nhowever, preparatory to a future work, in which moral philosophy shall\nbe treated \"by the inner light which the divine intellectual sun has\nirradiated into my soul,\" says Bruno;[68] in it, and other dialogues,\nthe whole structure of the philosophy is to be completed, of which\nthe _Bestia_ is merely a tentative sketch.[69] Jupiter represents the\nhuman spirit; and the constellations, the Bear, the Scorpion, etc., are\nthe vices of the age, which are to be driven out by Bruno's hierarchy\nof virtues. The work, which is rich in both moral and religious\nsuggestion, was early regarded as an attack on the Pope or the Church,\nthe supposed \"Triumphant Beast.\" Gaspar Schopp, for example, writes\nto that effect after witnessing Bruno's death. It is really an attack\nupon all religions of mere credulity as opposed to religions of truth\nand of deeds. The \"Cabal\" (_Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo, con l' Aggiunta\ndell' Asino Cillenico_) was published in 1585.[70] It is dedicated\nto an imaginary Bishop of Casamarciano, who represents the spirit\nof backwardness, ignorant simplicity, and was not a real person, as\nsome biographers supposed. It is a still more biting, a merciless\nsatire on Asinity (_i.e._ ignorance, credulity, and unenquiring faith\nin religion). In a later work[71] there is a remark on the _Asinus\nCillenicus_, \"the image and figure of the animal are well known, many\nhave written on it, we among the rest, in a particular fashion; but\nas it displeased the vulgar, and failed to please the wise, for its\nsinister meaning, the work was suppressed.\" Whether this refers to the\nwhole _Cabala_, or to the last part of it, is not known.\n\n[Sidenote: _Heroici Furori_, 1585.]\n\nThe \"Enthusiasms of the Noble\" (_De gl' heroici furori_), 1585,[72]\ndedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, consists of sonnets, with prose\nillustrations, after the model of Dante's _Vita Nuova_. Its theme is\nthat of the _Ph\u00e6drus_ and _Symposium_, the rising of the love for\nspiritual beauty out of that for sensible beauty, reaching its height\nin the divine _furor_--an ecstatic unity with the divine life, in which\nall the miseries and misfortunes of the merely earthly life disappear.\nMany of the sonnets are of extreme beauty, although Brunnhofer goes\ntoo far when he speaks of them as surpassing Petrarca's, except in\nsmoothness of form, and as equalling Shakespeare's.\n\n\nVIII\n\n[Sidenote: The women of England.]\n\nIt may not be amiss to give from these works some illustrations of life\nin England as Bruno found it.\n\nEngland, as in the days of Erasmus, was renowned on the continent for\nits beautiful women, and Bruno's passionate and enthusiastic nature\ncould not but feel the attraction of \"the fair and gracious nymphs of\nEngland.\" In the _Cena_ he appeals to the muses of England, \"gracious\nand gentle, soft and tender, young, fair and delicate, blond-haired,\nwhite of chin, pink of cheek, of enticing lips, eyes divine, breasts\nof ivory, and hearts of adamant: how many thoughts do I weave for you\nin my mind, how many emotions besiege my spirit, how many passions\nfill my life, how many tears pour from my eyes, sighs burst from my\nbreast, fires sparkle from my heart?\"[73] Nature was taking its revenge\nindeed for the long years of suppression in the Church. If this dark,\nslender, \"interesting\" Italian found favour with the fair and cultured\ninhabitants of England, he was the less successful with the people\nin general, the _Plebs_, then as now uncompromisingly opposed to the\n\"foreigner.\" In his belief England \"could boast of a Plebs which\nfor want of respect, rudeness, roughness, rusticity, savagery, ill\ntraining, was second to none in the world.\"[74] No doubt he writes from\nexperience when he describes the greater part of them as \"appearing\nlike so many wolves and bears, when they see a foreigner--one part of\nthem, the artisans, shopkeepers, knowing you as some kind of foreigner,\nscrew their noses at you, call you dog! traitor! stranger! which is\nwith them a term of high abuse, and renders its object liable to all\nthe injuries in the world, no matter what manner of man he is, young\nor old, in gown or in uniform, noble or gentleman. They will come upon\nyou with a rustic fury, careless of the who or why, where, or how, not\nreferring to one another, but every one, giving vent to the natural\nhatred he has for the foreigner, will try with his own hand and his own\nrod to take the measure of your doublet, and if you are not careful to\nsave yourself, of the hair of your head;--and when at length you think\nyou may be allowed to go to the barber's, and to rest your wearied,\nill-handled body, behold them so many executioners and tipstaffs;--if\nthey can pretend that you touched any one of them, you will have your\nback and legs as sore as if you had the heels of Mercury, or were\nmounted upon the Pegasean Horse, or bestrode the steed of Perseus, the\nHippogriff of Astolfo, the dromedary of Madian, or had trotting under\nyou one of the giraffes of the three Magicians: by force of blows they\nwill make you run, helping you forward with their heavy fists,--better\nfor you were they hoofs of ox, ass, or mule: and will not let you go\ntill they have you fast in a prison,--and there I take my leave of\nyou.\" In the second dialogue of the _Cena_, there occurs incidentally,\na characteristic account of the state of Elizabethan London. Fulke\nGreville had agreed with Bruno to have a discussion in his house on the\nCopernican theory, on the evening of Ash Wednesday. When the day came,\nno further message arriving, Bruno concluded that the meeting had been\npostponed, and after dinner went out to visit some Italian friends.\nReturning after sunset, he found Florio and Guin (Gwynne), impatiently\nawaiting him: a number of cavaliers, gentlemen, and doctors, had met to\nhear the discussion, but the chief character of the play was awanting.\nThey hurried him off, in the dark, and thinking to shorten the road,\nleft the straight way and made for the Thames to get a boat to take\nthem to the Palace. \"Arrived at the bridge of Lord Buckhurst's Palace,\nwe shouted and cried for 'oares'--'_id est Gondolieri_'--and wasted\nas much time as would easily have sufficed to take us by land to our\ndestination, and to have done some business on the way. At last from\nafar two boatmen replied, and slowly, slowly drew up to the shore;\nafter many interrogations and replies as to the whence, whither, why,\nand how much, they rested the bow on the last step of the bridge. Then\none of the two, that appeared like the ancient boatman of the Tartarean\nworld, gave his hand to the Nolan, while the other, who I think was his\nson, although his years were five and sixty or so, received the rest\nof us. Although there was no Hercules or Aeneas or Rhadamanth, king of\nSarza, still\n\n            ... Gemuit sub pondere cimba\n    Sutilis, et multam accepit limosa paludem....\n\n\"The sweet harmony (of its creaking and whistling) like love, invited\nus to forget our misfortunes, the times and the seasons, and to\naccompany the sounds with song. Florio (recalling his days of love)\nsang _Dove senza me dolce mia vita_, and the Nolan replied with\n_Saracin dolente_ or _Femenil ingegno_, and the like; and so little\nby little we advanced as the barque permitted. Although worms and age\nhad reduced it to something like cork, it seemed from its _festina\nlente_ all of lead, and the arms of the two ancients worn out. So with\nmuch time we made little way, and before we had covered a third of\nthe distance--a little beyond the place they call the Temple--our old\nfathers, instead of hurrying, ran their prow alongside the shore. To\nthe Nolan asking if they wished a little breathing time, they answered\nthat they were not going any further, for this was their stance. In\nconclusion, they would not budge for us, and when we had paid them and\nthanked them (there is nothing else to do when you suffer a wrong from\none of these _canaille_), they showed us the direct road for getting on\nto the street. Now, oh for your help, Maphelina, muse of Merlin! That\nwas a road which commenced in a black mud, from which there was no\nescape even by good luck. The Nolan, who had studied and practised in\nthe schools more than we, bade us follow him through a passage, that he\nthought to see, filthy though it was. But he had not ceased speaking\nwhen he was planted in the mire so firmly that he could not drag out\nhis limbs, and so with mutual help we went through the midst of it,\nhoping that the purgatory would be of short duration; but by unjust and\nhard fate he and we found ourselves engulfed in a slimy passage, that,\njust as if it were the 'field of jealousy' or the 'garden of delights,'\nwas bounded on this side and on that by good walls, and because there\nwas no light to guide us we could not distinguish between the way we\nhad come and the way we ought to go, hoping at every step for the\nend.\" ... \"Higher up the street we found a lava which on one side left\na stony place where we could walk dry; step by step we stumbled like\ndrunk men--and not without danger of breaking a head or a leg. To make\na long story short at last the Elysian fields appeared, viz. the broad,\nordinary street--and then from the houses we discovered we were about\ntwenty steps from the place where we had set out to find the boatman,\nand not far from the Nolan's rooms!\" The temptation to give up the\nexpedition was overcome, and after sundry adventures with apprentices,\nservitors, and bravos of the gentle class, they arrived safely at Fulke\nGreville's, where supper was already in progress.\n\n[Sidenote: Hostility in England.]\n\nIn the Italian dialogues the personal note of complaint sounds more\nhighly than in Bruno's other works, and we may imagine that Bruno\nhimself felt neglected in England more than in other countries, while\nEnglish hostility to his teaching was probably more contemptuous,\ntherefore more galling and more difficult to overcome. He might\nrepeat as he did, the bold saying that \"to the true philosopher every\ncountry is fatherland,\" or call himself with Socrates a citizen of the\nworld; but a touch of despair sounds through the words:--\"a citizen\nand servant of the world, son of Father Sol and Mother Earth; because\nhe loves the world too much, he must be hated, cursed, persecuted,\nand rejected by it. Meanwhile let him not be idle, nor ill-occupied\nwhile awaiting death, transmigration, change.\"[75] Elsewhere there is\nalmost a savage stoicism; he cries that he is attacked not by one but\nby many, almost by all, and the reason is that he hates the people,\ncares not for the multitude, adores one thing only:--\"That through\nwhich he in subjection is free, in pain content, in necessity rich, in\ndeath living, and through which he envies not those who in freedom are\nslaves, in pleasure pained, in riches poor, in life dead, because in\nthe body they have a chain that binds them, in the spirit an _inferno_\nthat depresses them, in the soul error that weakens them, and in the\nmind lethargy that slays, etc.\"[76] Yet the climate of England seems to\nhave pleased Bruno: \"there more than in any other region the climate is\ntemperate; for the excessive rigour of the snows is driven out by the\nearth beneath, and the superfluous fervour of the sun blesses it with a\ncontinuous, a perpetual spring, as is testified by the ever green and\nflowery land.\"[77] From the _Spaccio_, it appears that he was struck\nin England, _inter alia_, with the multitude of crows, the richness of\nthe sheep and the sleekness of the cattle, the stern game-laws, and the\nland-hunger of the people.[78]\n\n\nIX\n\n[Sidenote: Return to France, October 1585.]\n\nWhen Mauvissi\u00e8re was recalled, Bruno in all probability sailed with\nhim. It had been decided, unjustly, as Mauvissi\u00e8re thought, to recall\nhim to France in 1584; but owing to his wife's health and perhaps his\nclaims on the French treasury, he secured a postponement till the\nfollowing year, on condition he should do his best for Queen Mary and\nher son with Elizabeth, \"but not mix himself up with any of the plots\nagainst Elizabeth.\" In October 2, 1585, he was still in London, for he\nwrote to his friend Archibald Douglas, the Scottish Ambassador, from\nLondon on that date; the following letter, however, was from Paris\n(Nov. 3, 1585) and told a pathetic story.[79] On his way across (Bruno\nwith him, we may suppose) he had been \"robbed of all he had in England,\ndown to his shirt, of the handsome presents given him by the Queen, and\nof his silver plate: nothing was left, either to him or to his wife\nand children, so that they resembled those exiled Irish who solicit\nalms in England, with their children by their side.\" He had lent money\nalso to the Queen of Scots, and was in great trouble concerning it,\n\"for neither her officers nor her treasurer possessed a _sou_, nor\ndid they speak of repayment.\" The unfortunate ambassador had fallen\nupon evil days: he was accused of having spoken ill of his successor,\nChateauneuf, and had to write, as the report went, to Elizabeth, to\nunsay his insinuations. In December 1586, he wrote to Archibald Douglas\nof his wife--the Maria de Bochetel, whom Bruno praises--having died\nin childbirth. It would be interesting to know how Bruno fared in\nthe robbery of Mauvissi\u00e8re's goods. At least we may assume that he\narrived in Paris with very little worldly goods, but with part of the\nmanuscript of a great work on the Universe (the _De Immenso_) in his\npossession, during the month of October 1585.\n\n\nX\n\n[Sidenote: Paris: Oct. 1585-June 1586.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Church.]\n\n[Sidenote: The 120 Theses.]\n\n\"In Paris I spent another year in the house of gentlemen of my\nacquaintance, but at my own expense the greater part of the time:\nbecause of the tumults I left Paris, and went from there to\nGermany.\"[80] So Bruno told the tribunal at Venice; but the duration of\nhis second visit to Paris was from October 1585 to June 1586. One of\nhis first steps was to make further efforts towards reconciliation with\nthe Church: he presented himself for confession to a Jesuit father,\nwhile consulting with the Bishop of Bergamo (the Papal Nuncio), but\nthey were unable to absolve him, as he was an apostate. What Bruno\nwished was that he might be received into the Church without being\ncompelled to return again to the priesthood, and he begged the Nuncio\nto write to the Pope Sixtus V. on his behalf. The Bishop, however, had\nno hope of the favour being granted, and declined to write unless Bruno\nagreed to return to his order. To the same effect was the advice of\nthe Jesuit father Alfonso Spagnolo to whom he was referred; to obtain\nabsolution from the Pope he must return to the order--to his bonds, in\nother words; and without absolution he could not enjoy the privileges\neither of mass or of the confessional.[81] This idea Bruno could by\nno means entertain, and therefore he resigned himself to his position\nas an alien to the Catholic Church. He had no intention of remaining\nin Paris, where perhaps his Italian writings had made him no longer\nacceptable, but he desired not to leave it without some recognition\nof the favour shown him there in the past. The means he adopted was\na public disputation, to be held in the Royal Hall of the university\nat Pentecost of the year 1586. These disputations of the learned were\na delight to the youth of the time, and drew audiences comparable in\nour own time only to great football or cricket matches.[82] He drew\nup one hundred and twenty theses against the Peripatetic Philosophy,\nwhich still formed the substance of the teaching at the Sorbonne; and\nhis side was taken up by the rival, more modern, college of Cambray\n(afterwards the College of France), of which he appears now to have\nbecome an associate.[83] It was the custom of the real propounder of\nthe theses to preside at the debate, leaving it to another to act as\nprotagonist, and intervening only when the latter's discomfiture was\nimminent. In this case Bruno chose a young Parisian nobleman of his own\nfollowing--John Hennequin, a Master of Arts--but we may well imagine\nthat he did not long keep silent himself. We have no knowledge of how\nthe debate went, but it cannot have been too favourable to Bruno, for\nhe left Paris immediately afterwards. Its date was the 25th of May;\nBruno, therefore, left Paris probably in early June 1586.\n\n[Sidenote: Criticism of Peripatetic Theory.]\n\nThe articles, with a note of explanation attached to each, and an\nintroduction to the whole--(_Excubitor_, the Awakener)--being the\naddress of Hennequin at the beginning of the disputation, but written\nby Bruno himself--were published in Paris and again at Wittenberg.[84]\nThey contain a temperate but powerful criticism of the Aristotelians,\nby the words of Aristotle himself, and of Aristotle from the standpoint\nof Bruno's own physical theory, which he believed to be that of the\nPythagoreans and Platonists. The right to criticise the \"divine\"\nAristotle, Bruno claimed on the same grounds as those on which\nAristotle himself enjoyed the right of criticising his predecessors:\nwe are to him as he to them: their truth, which to him seemed error,\nmay be right to us again, for opinion, like other history, moves in\ncycles. And as to authority, the mass of which was against Bruno, \"if\nwe are really sick, it helps us nought that public opinion thinks we\nare really making for health.\"[85] \"It is a poor mind that will think\nwith the multitude because it _is_ a multitude: truth is not altered\nby the opinions of the vulgar or the confirmation of the many\"--\"it is\nmore blessed to be wise in truth in face of opinion than to be wise\nin opinion in face of truth.\"[86] The new philosophy gives wings to\nthe mind, to carry it far from the prison cell in which it has been\ndetained by the old system, and from which it could look out upon the\norbs of the stars only through chinks and cracks:--to carry it out\ninto infinite space, to behold the innumerable worlds, sisters of the\nearth, like it in heart and in will, living and life-producing; and\nreturning, to see within itself--\"not without, apart, or far from us,\nbut in ourselves, and everywhere one, more intimate, more in the heart\nof each of us, than we are to ourselves\"[87]--the divine cause, source,\nand centre of things. Aristotle and the sources of the scholastic\nphilosophy were occupying Bruno's leisure almost exclusively at this\ntime: he had begun the great Latin work, the _De Immenso_, which\nwas to see the light in Frankfort; and he published in this year a\ncommentary on the physics of Aristotle as well as an account of a\nmathematical and cosmometric invention of one _Fabrizio Mordenti_,\nwhich seems to be of much less value than Bruno supposed.[88]\n\n\nXI\n\n[Sidenote: 1586.]\n\n[Sidenote: Mainz.]\n\n[Sidenote: Marburg.]\n\n[Sidenote: July 25, 1586.]\n\n[Sidenote: Wittenberg.]\n\n[Sidenote: Aug. 20, 1586.]\n\n[Sidenote: Dedication of _De Lampade_.]\n\nLeaving France for Germany, the Nolan made his first halt at \"_Mez_,\nor _Magonza_, which is an archiepiscopal city, and the first elector\nof the Empire\";[89] it is certainly Mayence. There he remained some\ndays; but not finding either there or at \"_Vispure_, a place not far\nfrom there,\" any means of livelihood such as he cared for, he went on\nto Wittenberg in Saxony. \"Vispure\" has caused considerable exercise of\ningenuity among Bruno's biographers. The best explanation seems to be\nthat of Brunnhofer, that it represents Wiesbaden, which is not far from\nMayence, and is still popularly known as Wisbare or Wisbore; but there\nmay also be a telescoping of the words Wiesbaden and Marburg. Bruno\nwas certainly at the latter town, but it is of course a long distance\nfrom Mayence. On the 1st of July 1586, Petrus Nigidius, Doctor of Law\nand Professor of Moral Philosophy, was elected Rector of the university\nat Marburg. In the roll of students matriculated under his rectorship\nstands as eighth name that of \"_Jordanus Nolanus_ of Naples, Doctor\nof Roman Theology,\" with the date July 25, 1586, and the following\nnote by the rector:--\"When the right of publicly teaching philosophy\nwas denied him by me, with the consent of the faculty of philosophy,\nfor weighty reasons, he blazed out, grossly insulting me in my own\nhouse, protesting I was acting against the law of nations, the custom\nof all the universities of Germany, and all the schools of humanity.\nHe refused then to become a member of the university,--his fee was\nreadily returned, and his name accordingly erased from the album of\nthe university by me.\" The name could still be read through the thick\nline drawn across it, and some later rector, when Bruno had become\nmore famous, re-wrote the name above, and cancelled the words \"with\nthe consent of the faculty of philosophy\" in Nigidius' note.[90] The\n\"weighty reasons\" for which Bruno was driven from Marburg may have been\nmerely his description of himself as a Doctor of \"Roman Theology\" at a\nProtestant university; or perhaps an attack upon Ramus at a place where\nthe Ramian Logic had many adherents; or the Copernican system taught\nby him, which was as firmly opposed by Protestants as by Catholics.\nIn any case \"the Knight-Errant of Philosophy\" departed sorrowfully\nand came to Wittenberg, where he found, for the third time, a respite\nfrom his journeyings. On the 20th August 1586 he matriculated at the\nuniversity,[91] and there remained for nearly two years. Then, as\nnow, the Protestant Church in Germany was divided into two parties,\nthe Lutheran and the Calvinist or Reformed Churches. Melanchthon's\nattempt to unite the two--he himself belonged to the latter--brought\nupon his head the \"formula of concord,\" better known as the \"formula\nof discord,\" because of the disputes it caused. Among other things it\ncondemned the views of the Calvinists on the person of Christ, their\ndenial of his \"Real Presence\" in the bread and wine of the communion\ntable, and their doctrine of predestination. When Bruno arrived in\nWittenberg, Lutherans were still in power, as they had been under the\nold Duke Augustus. His son Christian I., however, under the influence\nof John Casimir, his brother-in-law, of the Palatinate, had gone\nover to the Calvinist faction, and was trying with the aid of the\nChancellor, Krell, to supplant the reigning faith and authority. At\nthe university the philosophical faculty was, in the main, Calvinist,\nthe theological Lutheran; and among the latter party was an Italian\nAlberico Gentile, the father of International Law, whom Bruno had\nperhaps known in England as a professor at Oxford. Through him Bruno\nfound favour with the Lutheran party, and received permission to\nlecture, on the condition that he taught nothing that was subversive\nof their religion. For two years, accordingly, he lectured on the\n_Organon_ of Aristotle, and other subjects of philosophy, including\nthe Lullian art, which he had for a time discarded. The excellent\nterms on which he stood with his colleagues is shown by the dedication\nof a Lullian work, _De Lampade Combinatoria_, to the senate of the\nuniversity. He speaks gratefully of their kind reception of himself,\nthe freedom of access and residence which was granted not only to\nstudents but to professors from all parts of Europe. In his own case\n\"a man of no name, fame, or authority among you, escaped from the\ntumults of France, supported by no princely commendation, with no\noutward marks of distinction such as the public loves, neither approved\nnor even questioned in the dogmas of your religion; but as showing no\nhostility to man, rather a peaceful and general philanthropy, and my\nonly title the profession of philosophy, merely because I was a pupil\nin the temple of the Muses, you thought me worthy of the kindliest\nwelcome, enrolled me in the album of your academy, and gave me a place\nin a body of men so noble and learned that I could not fail to see\nin you neither a private school nor an exclusive conventicle, but as\nbecomes the Athens of Germany, a true university.\" In this introduction\na large number of the professors are invoked by name, among them the\nenlightened Gr\u00fcn, a professor of philosophy, who taught that theology\ncannot be detached from philosophy--that they are necessary complements\none of the other.\n\n[Sidenote: Works published.]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Progressu_, 1587.]\n\nIn Wittenberg was published (1587), the _De Lampade Combinatoria\nLulliana_, the second of the commentaries on Lully's art, and\nrepresenting perhaps the _clavis magna_ of the _De Umbris_ and\nother Parisian publications. It was dedicated to the senatus of the\nUniversity of Wittenberg. A reprint, however, appeared in Prague in the\nfollowing year with a new frontispiece, a dedication to William of St.\nClement, and the addition of a small treatise.[92] The chief purpose\nof the work was to furnish the reader with means for \"the discovery of\nan indefinite number of propositions and middle terms for speaking and\narguing. It is also the sole key to the intelligence of all Lullian\nworks whatsoever,\" Bruno writes with his sublime confidence, \"and\nno less to a great number of the mysteries of the Pythagoreans and\nCabalists.\" As in the earlier work, so in this also, the root ideas\nare that thought is a complex of elements, which are to it as the\nletters of the alphabet are to a printed book; but thought and reality\nor nature are not opposed to one another--they are essentially one.\nThe elements of thought when discovered will accordingly give us the\nconstitutive elements of nature and the connections in, and workings\nof, nature will be understood from the different complications of these\nsimple elements of thought. In the same year appeared the _De Progressu\net Lampade Venatori\u00e2 Logicorum_, \"To enable one to dispute promptly and\ncopiously on any subject proposed.\" It was dedicated to the Chancellor\nof the University of Wittenberg, and was mainly a commentary, without\nspecial references, on the _Topics_ of Aristotle, and doubtless formed\npart of the lectures on the _Organon_, given in Bruno's first year at\nWittenberg. The simile of the hunt--_i.e._ the idea that the solution\nof a problem or the finding of a middle term is like a quarry that has\nto be stalked and hunted down--is a favourite one with Bruno.\n\n[Sidenote: 1588.]\n\n[Sidenote: _Oratio Valedictoria._]\n\n[Sidenote: Luther.]\n\nUnfortunately for Bruno, the Duke's party in Wittenberg soon gained the\nupper hand--only for a time, it is true[93]--and the party to which\nBruno himself belonged fell out of power. As a Copernican, Bruno must\nin any case soon have fallen foul of the Calvinists, by whom the new\ntheory had been declared a heresy. He therefore left Wittenberg in the\nbeginning of 1588, after delivering on the 8th of March an eloquent\nfarewell address to the university (_Oratio Valedictoria_). By the\nfable of Paris and the three Goddesses, he indicated his own choice of\nWisdom (Minerva) over riches or fame (Juno), and over worldly pleasure\nor the delights of society (Venus):--\"Wisdom is communicated neither so\nreadily nor so widely as riches or pleasure. There are not and there\nnever have been so many Philosophers as Emperors and Princes; nor to\nso many has it been granted to see Minerva robed and armed, as to see\nVenus and Juno even in naked simplicity. To see her is to become blind,\nto be wise through her is to be foolish. They say Tiresias saw Minerva\nnaked, and was struck blind; who that had looked upon her, would not\ndespise the sight of other things?--'man shall not see me and live.'\n... Wisdom, Sophia, Minerva, beautiful as the moon, great as the sun,\nterrible as the marshalled ranks of armies; like the moon in her fair\ngracefulness, like the sun in her lofty majesty, like armies in her\ninvincible courage.... The first-born before all creatures, sprung\nfrom the head of Jove--for she is a breath from the virtue of God,\nan emanation of omnipotent brightness, sincere and pure, clear and\ninviolate, honourable, powerful, and kind beyond words, well pleasing\nto God, incomparable:--pure, because nothing of defilement can touch\nher; clear, because she is the brightness of eternal light; inviolate,\nbecause she is the spotless mirror of the majesty of God; honourable,\nbecause the image of goodness itself; powerful, because being one\nshe can do all things, being permanent in herself, she renews all\nthings; kind, because she visits the nations that are sacred to her\nand makes men friends of God, and prophets; pleasing to God, because\nGod loves only him that dwells with wisdom; incomparable, for she is\nmore beautiful than the sun and brighter than the light of all the\nstars. Her have I loved and sought from my youth, and desired for\nmy spouse, and have become a lover of her form--and I prayed that\nshe might be sent to abide with me, and work with me, that I might\nknow what I lacked, and what was acceptable to God: for she knew and\nunderstood, and would guide me soberly in my work and would keep me\nin her charge: ... But wisdom in the highest sense, in its essence as\nthe thought of God, is incommunicable, incomprehensible, apart from all\nthings. Wisdom has three phases or aspects or 'mansions'--first, the\nmind of God the eternal, then the visible world itself which is the\nfirst-born, and third, the mind of man which is the second-born of the\nhighest, the true wisdom unattainable by man. Here among men wisdom has\nbuilt herself a house of reason and of thought (which comes _after_\nthe world), in which we see the shadow of the first, the archetypal\nand ideal house (which is _before_ the world), and the image of the\nsecond, the sensible and natural house, which _is_ the world. The seven\ncolumns of the house or temple are the seven Arts--Grammar, Rhetoric\n(with poetry), Logic, Mathematics, Physics, Ethics, and Metaphysics,\nand the temple was built first among the Egyptians and Assyrians, viz.\nin the Chaldeans, then among the Persians, with the Magi and Zoroaster,\nthird the Indians with their Gymnosophists; ... seventhly, in our time,\namong the Germans.\" So far has Bruno come from taking the Germans as\nmere beer-bibbers, as he had written of them in England.[94] \"Since the\nempire (of wisdom) devolved upon you there have risen amongst you new\narts and great minds, the like of which no other nations can shew.\" In\nthe category of German temple-builders are Albertus Magnus, Nicolas of\nCusa, Copernicus, Palingenius, Paracelsus; \"among humanists many, apt\nimitators of the Attic and Ausonian muses, and among them one greater\nthan the rest who more than imitates, rather rivals, the ancient muses\"\n(Erasmus). It is not unnatural that, in his own Wittenberg, Luther\nshould be praised, as among the temple-builders or priests of truth:\nbut Bruno's words have a ring of sincerity, proving that his sympathy\nwas really aroused for the Lutherans. \"When the world was infected by\nthat strong man armed with key and sword, fraud and force, cunning and\nviolence, hypocrisy and ferocity,--at once fox and lion, and vicar\nof the tyrant of hell,--infected with a superstitious worship and an\nignorance more than brutal, under the name of divine wisdom and of a\nGod-pleasing simplicity; and there was no one to oppose or withstand\nthe voracious beast, or dispose an unworthy and abandoned generation\nto better and happier state and condition,--what other part of Europe\nor the world could have brought forth for us that Alcides, stronger\nthan Hercules himself, in that he did greater things with less effort\nand with fewer instruments,--destroying a greater and far more deadly\nmonster than ever any of the past centuries had to suffer? Here in\nWittenberg he dragged up that three-headed Cerberus with its threefold\ntiara from its pit of darkness: you saw it, and it the sun. Here\nthat dog of Styx was compelled to vomit forth its poison. Here your\nHercules, your country's Hercules, triumphed over the adamantine gates\nof hell, over the city girt about with its threefold wall, and defended\nby its nine windings of the Styx.\"\n\nTo this temple Bruno, eager in his pursuit of the ever-eluding Truth,\nhad come,--\"a foreigner, an exile, a fugitive, the sport of fortune,\nmeagre in body, slender of means, destitute of favour, pursued by the\nhatred of the multitude and the contempt of fools and the base,\" and\ncould on leaving say to its people that he had become an \"occasion,\nor matter, or subject in whom they unfolded and demonstrated to the\nworld the beauty and wealth of their virtues of moderation, urbanity,\nand kindness of heart.\" It was the last, or nearly the last, spell of\nhappiness that life had in store for him.\n\n\nXII\n\n[Sidenote: Prague: 1588.]\n\n[Sidenote: June 10, 1588.]\n\n[Sidenote: January 13, 1589.]\n\n[Sidenote: Helmstadt.]\n\nThe court of the Emperor Rudolph II. was at Prague, in Bohemia; from\nthere his fame as a Maecenas of the learned, and especially of those\nwho claimed power to read the heavens or to work magic, had spread to\nmany countries. Perhaps Sidney, who had visited him from Elizabeth\non the death of Maximilian, may have spoken of him to Bruno: while\ntwo of Bruno's friends, the Spanish Ambassador St. Clement and the\nmathematician Mordentius, were at Prague in 1588. Thither, accordingly,\nhe now turned in the hope of settled quarters, introducing himself,\nas was his frequent habit, with a Lullian work, which he caused to\nbe printed soon after his arrival, and dedicated to the Spanish\nAmbassador.[95] The introductory letter is dated from Prague, June\n10, 1588, and is in praise of Lully, whose importance to philosophy\nBruno values much more highly than his successors have done: it\npromised at the same time a future work, the _Lampas Cabalistica_, in\nwhich the inner secrets of Lullism were to be more fully revealed.\nThis, so far as we know, never appeared, and Bruno tried to obtain\nthe Emperor's patronage by a mathematical work dedicated to him, of\nsomewhat revolutionary type--\"One hundred and sixty articles against\nthe mathematicians and philosophers of the day.\" The Emperor, however,\nhad few funds to spare for any but the professed astrologists and\nalchemists in whom lay his real interest--not at all scientific,\nalthough Tycho Brah\u00e9 and Kepler profited themselves and the world by\nit. With three hundred dollars, which the Emperor gave in recognition\nof his powers, Bruno left about the close of the year, and on January\n13, 1589, matriculated in the Julian university of Brunswick at\nHelmstadt. This, the youngest university in Germany at the time, of\nonly twelve years' standing, had been founded for the Protestant\ncause by the reigning Duke Julius, a breezy and popular prince, who\nloved theologians little, Catholics not at all, and founded a model\nuniversity on liberal principles. It was not, however, an unqualified\nsuccess. Bruno received some recognition from the university, or\nfrom the Duke, and when the latter died in May 1589 he obtained\npermission to give a funeral oration some days after the official\nprogramme had been carried through (on the 1st of July)--the _Oratio\nConsolatoria_.[96]\n\nBruno professes as his reason for wishing to speak that he must express\nhis gratitude to one who had made the university he founded free to all\nlovers of the Muses, even to strangers such as Bruno himself was:--an\nexile from his Italian fatherland for honourable reasons and zeal for\nthe truth, here he had received the freedom of the university: in\nItaly he was exposed to the greedy maw of the Roman wolf--here he was\nin safety: there he had been chained to a superstitious and absurd\ncult--here he was exhorted to more reformed rites. What is remarkable\nin this speech is the bitterness of Bruno's personal attack upon Rome,\nand \"the violent tyranny of the Tiberine beast.\" The constellations\nare allegorically treated as symbols of the virtues of Julius, or of\nthe vices which he attacked and repressed: among them \"the head of the\nGorgon, on which for hair there grow venomous snakes, representing\nthat monster of perverse Papal tyranny, which has tongues more numerous\nthan the hairs of the head, aiding and serving it, each and all\nblasphemous against God, nature, and man, infecting the world with the\nrankest poison of ignorance and vice.\" It was indeed strange that Bruno\nshould have thought of entering Italy after publishing words like these.\n\n[Sidenote: Excommunication of Bruno in Helmstadt.]\n\n[Sidenote: Oct. 6, 1589.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1590.]\n\nHowever, he was not to find the Protestants much more tolerant than\nthe Catholics. In the university archives there is extant a letter\nfrom him to the prorector of the academy, appealing against a public\nexcommunication of himself by the first pastor and superintendent of\nthe church at Helmstadt, Boethius. According to this letter, Boethius\nhad made himself both judge and executioner, without giving the\nItalian a hearing at all: and the letter appealed to the senate and\nrector against the public execution of an unjust sentence, privately\npassed; it demanded a hearing, so that if any legal derogation were\nto be made from his rank and good name, he might at least feel it to\nbe justly made, and demanded that Boethius be summoned to show he\nhad not fulminated his bolt out of private malice, but in pursuance\nof the duty of a good pastor on behalf of his sheep. The date of the\nletter is October 6, 1589. No further records of the affair have been\nfound, so that the appeal was probably rejected. The meaning of the\nexcommunication is not quite clear: Bruno does not seem to have been\na full member of either the reformed or the Lutheran church, although\nattending services; and in all probability the sentence was a formal\none, which, however, carried serious social inconveniences with it.\nThe prorector, Hofmann, was not one to sympathise either with Bruno\nor with his philosophy; he was unhappy unless attacking some other\nperson's opinions: philosophy in general fell under his condemnation,\nalthough he professed knowledge of it. A few years after he drove Bruno\nfrom Helmstadt he himself was dethroned from his place of authority,\n\"ordered to stick to his last,\" and had to leave Helmstadt in the\nend (1601). No doubt it is against him that the invectives in _De\nImmenso_,[97] are directed:--\"This scholarch, excelling director of the\nschool of Minerva: this Rhadamanthus of boys, without a shadow of an\nidea even of ordinary philosophy, lauds to the skies the Peripatetic,\nand dares to criticise the thoughts of diviner men (whose ashes are to\nbe preferred to the souls of such as these).\" Later Boethius also had\nto be suppressed by the consistory.[98] The young Duke, with whom no\ndoubt Bruno stood in favour, since he presented him with eighty _scudi_\nafter the funeral oration, was of the opposite party to Hofmann, but\neven with this support the Italian could not struggle against his\nenemies, and towards the middle of 1590 he left for Frankfort, \"in\norder to get two books printed.\"\n\n\nXIII\n\n[Sidenote: Frankfort.]\n\n[Sidenote: Z\u00fcrich, 1591.]\n\nThese were the great Latin works he had been writing, perhaps begun\nin England itself;--the _De Minimo_, and the _De Immenso_, with the\n_De Monade_ as a part of or introduction to the latter. The printing,\nhowever, was not begun till the following year: the censor's permission\nwas obtained for the first of them only in March 1591, and it appeared\nin the catalogue of the Spring bookmarket. He again sought and found\npatronage with an old friend of Sir Philip Sidney, one of the Wechels,\nfamous printers of their day, in the house of another of whom (Andr\u00e9)\nSidney had lived. In the protocol-book of the council of Frankfort,\nunder the date July 2, 1590, a petition of _Jordanus Brunus_ of\nNola is mentioned, in which he asks permission to stay in the house\nof the printer Wechel. This, as the book of the Burgomaster under\nthe same date shows, was roughly refused:--\"_Soll man ime sein pitt\nabschlagen, und sagen, das er sein pfennig anderswo verzehre_\"--\"his\npetition is to be refused and he is to be told go and spend his coin\nelsewhere.\" In spite of this refusal, Wechel found Bruno lodging in\nthe Carmelite Monastery, where he stayed, working with his own hands\nat the printing of his books, for some six months,--until December,\nperhaps, of that year. Frankfort was the main centre of the book world\nin those days; to its half-yearly book-marts printers and sellers\ncame from all parts of Europe to see the new books of the world, to\ndispose of their goods, to stock their houses. Among others in this\nyear came the booksellers Ciotto and Bertano, who afterwards were\nwitnesses before the Inquisition, and who stayed in the monastery\nprobably in September of that year, where they met Bruno. In the\ndedication of the _De Minimo_, of date February 13, 1591, Bruno's\npublishers wrote that \"he had only the last folium of the work to\ncorrect, when by an unforeseen chance he was hurried away, and could\nnot put the finishing hand upon it, as he had done on the rest of the\nwork: he wrote accordingly asking us to supply in his name what by\nchance it had been denied him to complete.\" The \"unforeseen chance\"\nmay, as Sigwart suggests, have been the final putting into effect of\nthe Council's refusal to allow him to stay in the town, which may till\nthen have remained a dead letter; or it may have been the summons to\nZurich. He had made the acquaintance of a young Swiss squire, Hainzel,\nan Augsburger by birth, at whose castle of Elgg in Switzerland a gay\nand open hospitality was extended to a number of the bizarre and the\nlearned spirits of the time: Hainzel had leanings towards the Black\nArts,--Alchemy and the rest,--but had interest to spare for any others\nabout which an air of mystery clung, such as Bruno's _Art_ of Memory\nand of Knowledge. Bruno spent a few months with him near Z\u00fcrich and\nwrote for him the _De imaginum compositione_, etc.--as a handbook of\nthese arts. Another of the Frankfort pupils would also be in Z\u00fcrich,\nthe brilliant but erratic Raphael Eglin, who published in 1609 at\nMarburg (where he was professor of theology), a work Bruno had dictated\nin Z\u00fcrich,--the _Summa Terminorum Metaphysicorum_. Eglin suffered along\nwith his friend Hainzel from the trickery of the Alchemists, to whom\nrecourse was had in the hope of repairing the fortunes dissipated by\nthe Squire of Elgg's hospitality.[99] The _Summa_ is dedicated in a\nletter of April 1595 (from Z\u00fcrich) to _Frederic a Salices_, and in a\npersonal reminiscence Eglin remarks on Bruno's fluency of thought and\nspeech--\"standing on one foot, he would both think and dictate as fast\nas the pen could follow: so rapid was his mind, so forceful his spirit.\"\n\n[Sidenote: March, 1591.]\n\nIn order perhaps to print the _De Imaginum Compositione_ for Hainzel,\nor to complete the other works, Bruno returned to Frankfort about\nthe beginning of March, 1591, and on the 17th of that month obtained\npermission to publish the _De Minimo_.[100] It is to this period\nprobably that he referred when he spoke of himself before the Venetian\ntribunal, as having spent six months in Frankfort (Doc. 9). It was a\n_second_ period of six months after his return from the Z\u00fcrich visit,\nof which he omitted all mention--no doubt he had good reason for\nthat.[101] At the autumn book-market his _De Monade_, _De Immenso_,\nand _De Imag. Compositione_, were ready[102]--the last works that\nhe published. About the same time, on an evil day for himself, he\nresponded to the invitation of a young Venetian patrician, and crossed\nover to his fatherland,--the last of his free journeyings.\n\n[Sidenote: _De Minimo._]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Monade._]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Immenso._]\n\nThe Frankfort works are fully dealt with in the chapters on Bruno's\nphilosophy that follow: in their order they were (1) the _De triplici\nMinimo et Mensura_:--\"On the threefold minimum and measurement,\nbeing the elements of three speculative and of many practical\nsciences\":--dedicated to Duke Henry of Brunswick. It is the first of\nthree Latin poems, written somewhat after the manner of Lucretius, but\nwith prose notes to each chapter or section. The style unfortunately\nseldom approaches that of Lucretius, either in Latinity or in poetic\nimagery, but the works are full of vigorous verse, and the force of\nthe ideas suffers little from the fact that they are pressed into\nthe Procrustean bed of rhyme and rhythm. The others were (2) the _De\nMonade, Numero et Figura_:--\"On the Monad, number and figure, being\nthe elements of a more esoteric (_secret_, or perhaps _inward_)\nPhysics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics\"; and (3) the _De Immenso et\nInnumerabilibus_:--\"On the Immeasurable and the Innumerable, or on\nthe universe and the worlds.\" Both are dedicated to Duke Henry. The\nthree works together contain Bruno's finished philosophy of God and\nof Nature, of the universe and of the worlds within it, as well as a\ncriticism of the prevailing and contrary doctrines of the time.\n\n[Sidenote: _De Imag. Comp._]\n\nIn Frankfort appeared also, in 1591, (4) the _De Imaginum, Signorum,\net Idearum Compositione_:--\"On the composition or arrangement, of\nImages, Signs, and Ideas, for all kinds of inventions, dispositions,\nand memory.\" It is dedicated to Hainzel, and is the last of the works\npublished by Bruno himself. It sums up all those published earlier\non the theory of knowledge and on the art of memory. It assumes an\nidentity between the Mind from which the universe sprang, or which is\nexpressed in the universe, and the mind of each individual by whom it\nis known or approached. It follows that the ideas in our own minds\ncontain implicitly a knowledge of the inmost nature of reality. Here,\nhowever, it is chiefly the mnemonic corollaries of this thought that\nare developed--ideas are to be arranged or grouped about certain images\nor pictures, in such a way that when any one occurs to the mind, it may\nreadily call up those others which are most closely associated with it,\n_i.e._ which belong to the same [Greek: topos] or \"place\" in the mind.\n\n\nXIV\n\n[Sidenote: Venice.]\n\n[Sidenote: Aug. 1591.]\n\nDuring the second part of his stay in Frankfort, Bruno received an\ninvitation from a young patrician of Venice, Giovanni Mocenigo, to come\nto him there and instruct him in the arts for which Bruno was famed.\nTo the surprise of all who knew the circumstances, Bruno accepted,\nand re-entered, in August, the Italy which he had left some fourteen\nyears earlier as a refugee. It was through the bookseller Ciotto that\nthe negotiations were carried on. Mocenigo appeared in his shop one\nday to buy a work of Bruno which Ciotto in his deposition called at\nfirst the _Heroici Furori_, but this name was cancelled, and _De Minimo\nmagno et mensura_ written in its stead; in all probability it was\nneither the _Furori_ nor any of the Latin poems to which the second\n(erroneous) title might refer, but one of the Lullian works. Mocenigo\nasked at the same time whether Ciotto knew Bruno, and where he was;\nand on the reply that he was probably at Frankfort (they had found\nlodging in the same monastery there), Mocenigo expressed a wish that\nBruno would come to Venice to teach him the secrets of Memory, and the\nothers he professed, as shown by the book that had just changed hands.\nCiotto believed Bruno would come if asked; and accordingly, after a few\ndays, Mocenigo brought a letter for Bruno, which Ciotto undertook to\ndeliver, and in which he was besought to come to Venice. The message\nmust have been delivered in the autumn of 1591, and Bruno seems to have\nreplied by immediate acceptance.[103] A previous letter, however, had\nbeen written, probably before Mocenigo spoke with Ciotto, and sent by\nanother hand; it may have been the receipt of it which brought Bruno\nfrom Z\u00fcrich to Frankfort, to hasten the printing of his Latin works. In\nboth letters there were evidently specious promises of protection.[104]\n\n[Sidenote: Bruno's reasons for returning.]\n\n[Sidenote: March 3, 1592.]\n\nThe motives of Mocenigo were more than questionable. He was of the\nnoblest blood of Venice, the Doge's Chair having been seven times\nfilled by members of his family, and among the patrician youth there\nwas a fashionable craze for Lullism and kindred much-promising arts\nat this time.[105] _De Valeriis_, another Venetian noble, wrote, in\n1589, an _Opus Aureum_, which was published at Strassburg along with\nother Lullian works (including Bruno's) in 1609. Again, Bruno believed\nin, and probably taught, a kind of \"natural magic,\" the magic of\nsympathetic influence from stars, animals, plants, and stones upon the\nlife of man. Mocenigo, as his conduct abundantly showed, was shallow,\nmean, superstitious, weak-minded, and vain. He was just the type of man\nto be attracted therefore by anything that savoured of the black art,\nof which Bruno was popularly regarded as a devotee. His real aim may\nhave been to be initiated by Bruno into this, although he professed\nthe desire merely of having the Lullian mnemonics and art of invention\ntaught him. His disappointment, when he found Bruno had nothing new to\ngive him in that direction, might account, in a man of his character,\nfor the revenge he took. But there may have been worse behind: Mocenigo\nhad been one of the _Savii all' Eresia_--the assessors appointed by the\nState to the Inquisition Board in Venice--and was therefore familiar\nwith the intrigues of that body. He was also under the influence of his\nFather Confessor, by whose orders he denounced Bruno. The proceedings\nmake it extremely probable, therefore, that the Inquisition laid\na trap for Bruno, into which he unsuspectingly walked. It is more\ndifficult to understand how the latter so calmly entered the lion's\njaws. _Acidalius_ (Valens Havekenthal), writing to Michael Forgacz from\nBologna (January 21, 1592), expressed the general surprise. \"Tell me\none thing more: Giordano Bruno, whom you knew at Wittenberg, the Nolan,\nis said to be living just now among you at Padua. Is it really so?\nWhat sort of man is this that he dares enter Italy, which he left an\nexile, as he used himself to confess? I wonder, I wonder! I cannot yet\nbelieve the rumour, although I have it on good authority. You shall\ntell me whether it is true or false.\" But clearly ill rumours were\nspreading, for on the third of March he wrote in a different tone, \"I\nno longer wonder about that other sophist, so diverse and incredible\nare the tales I hear daily of him here.\"[106] Probably Bruno did not\nunderstand what manner of reputation he had; he still regarded himself\nas belonging to the Catholic Church. Ciotto deposed he had heard\nnothing from Bruno's lips which might suggest a doubt of his being a\ngood Catholic and Christian. Venice was a free and powerful state,\nMocenigo the son of a powerful house, so that he may well have looked\nfor safety; and it was his beloved Italy, for which he had never ceased\nto yearn since the day he had crossed the Alps.\n\nTo Venice, at any rate, he came, living for a time by himself, and\nspending some three months also at Padua, the neighbouring university\ntown, where he gathered pupils about him, and wrote as constantly as\nbefore. Some manuscripts that were bought in Paris a few years ago,\nand which had belonged to Bruno, were partly written in the hand of\none of these pupils, Jerome Besler, whom Bruno had known in Helmstadt,\nand who acted there as his copyist. Others of his German, and possibly\nsome English friends were met with at this renowned university.[107]\nIt was only a few months after he left that Galilei was invited to\nteach in Padua--\"the creator of modern science following in the steps\nof its prophet.\"[108] The university was in a state of ferment at the\ntime Bruno arrived, one of the hottest disputes being that between\nthe students and certain professors, who read or dictated instead\nof freely speaking their lectures--_Doctores chartacei_ they were\ncalled--and a fine of twenty ducats was imposed by the senate on every\none who should be found guilty of this crime. Bruno's memory-art may\ntherefore, as Bartholm\u00e8ss suggests, have \"supplied a felt want.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Bruno in Mocenigo's house.]\n\nEarly in 1592 Bruno took a fatal step, which showed how little he\nrealised his danger--he gave up his personal freedom and went to live\nin Mocenigo's house. There the two opposite natures soon clashed, and\nthe young patrician began to show his real character. The teaching\ndid not satisfy him, did not give him the power over nature and man\nwhich he no doubt expected. He approached Ciotto again before the\nspring book-market, telling him how Giordano was living in his house\nat his expense, \"who promised to teach me much, and has had clothes\nand money in plenty from me, but I cannot bring him to a point, and\nfear he may not be quite honest\"; and asking him to make inquiries in\nFrankfort as to Bruno's character, and the likelihood of his fulfilling\nhis obligations. Ciotto returned with an unfavourable report: Bruno\nwas known to make profession of a memory-art, and of other _similar\nsecrets_, but had never been known to do any good with them, and all\nwho had gone to him for such things had remained unsatisfied; moreover,\nit was not understood in Frankfort how he could stay in Venice, as\nhe was held for a man of no religion. To this Mocenigo replied, \"I\ntoo have my doubts of him, but I will see how much I can get of what\nhe promised me, so as not to lose entirely what I have paid him, and\nthen I will give him up to the judgment of the Holy Office\"--the\nInquisition. This estimable frame of mind no doubt asserted itself in\nthe relations of pupil and master. Bruno had been introduced by Ciotto\nto the house of Andrea Morosini, an enlightened patrician, whose open\nhospitality a number of the most cultured men of the time enjoyed; they\nformed an Academy after the manner of those of Cosenza, Naples, and\nother places. \"Several gentlemen meet there,\" said Morosini of these\ngatherings, \"prelates among them, for entertainment, discoursing of\nliterature, and principally of philosophy; thither Bruno came several\ntimes, and talked of various things, as is the custom; but there was\nnever a sign that he held any opinions against the faith, and so far\nas I (Morosini) am concerned, I have always thought him a Catholic,\nand had I had the least suspicion of the contrary I should not have\npermitted him to enter my house.\"[109] The last statement must, of\ncourse, be taken _cum grano_. At this time Bruno was preparing a work\non \"the Seven Liberal Arts, and on Seven other Inventive Arts,\"[110]\nwhich he hoped to be able to present to the Pope in order to obtain\nfrom him absolution, and have the ban of excommunication removed,\nwithout the compulsion of again entering the order. Many Neapolitan\nfathers of the order came to Venice to a meeting of Chapter, and to\nsome of these Bruno spoke--to a Father Domenico especially:--he wished\nto present himself at the feet of his Holiness with some \"approved\"\nwork, and his ultimate design, as he told Domenico, was to go to Rome\nand live quietly a life of letters, perhaps obtaining some lecturing\nin addition.[111] Among others he consulted Mocenigo, who promised to\nassist him so far as he could.\n\n\nXV\n\n[Sidenote: May 22.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Inquisition.]\n\n[Sidenote: Second Denunciation.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Venetian tribunal.]\n\nMeantime Mocenigo was putting pressure on Bruno to obtain the secrets\nhe sought to know, while Bruno at last became aware of his danger. He\npretended he wished to go to Frankfort to have some books printed,\nand on a certain Thursday in May he took leave of Mocenigo. The\nlatter, fearing his prey was about to escape, began to cajole him\ninto staying, but passed to complaint and finally to threats as Bruno\npersisted. On the night of the following day (Friday), as Bruno had\nalready made preparations for leaving, Mocenigo came with his servitor\nBartolo and five or six men, whom Bruno recognised as gondoliers,\nfrom the neighbouring stance, seized the philosopher and locked him\nup in an attic-room. Mocenigo promised, if he would stay and teach\nwhat was desired--viz. \"the formul\u00e6 for memory and geometry\"!--to set\nhim at liberty, otherwise something unpleasant would befal him. This\nnovel method of drawing instruction being foiled by the self-respect\nof the prisoner, the latter was left for the night, transferred the\nfollowing day to a cellar under the ground, and during the night was\nhanded over to the servants of the Inquisition, who brought him to\ntheir prison. On the 23rd of May, Mocenigo denounced him to the Holy\nOffice, with a hideous but cunning travesty of some of his opinions,\nreporting him, for example, as saying that Christ's miracles were\nonly apparent, that He and the apostles were magicians, and that he\nhimself (Bruno) could do as much or more if he had a mind; that the\nCatholic faith was full of blasphemies against God; that the Friars\nought to be prevented from preaching, and should be deprived of their\nrevenues, because the world was befouled by them--they were asses,\nand the doctrines of the Church asses' beliefs, and so on. The arrest\nwas on the following night (Sunday night), and on the Monday a second\ndenunciation was entered by Mocenigo, than which there is no more\npitiful self-revelation of meanness and hypocrisy extant. He confesses\nor rather boasts that, on locking up Bruno, he had recited the charges\nhe would make against him, \"hoping to coerce him into revealing his\nsecrets,\" _i.e._ the Secret Arts. Bruno's only reply had been to ask\nfor his liberty, to say that he had not really intended to leave, but\nwas still ready to teach Mocenigo everything he knew, to work for him\n(\"to be my slave,\" said Mocenigo), without any further recognition,\nand to give him anything that he had in the house; only he asked to\nhave returned him a copy of a book of _conjurations_ that Mocenigo had\nfound among his written papers and had appropriated. To explain his\ndelay in accusing Bruno, Mocenigo professed not to have been able to\nget enough against the latter until he had the philosopher in his own\nhouse two months earlier (viz. in March), \"and then I wished to get the\ngood of him, and by the steps I took I was able to assure myself that\nhe would not leave without telling me of it. _All the time I promised\nmyself to bring the matter before the censorship of the Holy Office._\"\nThese denouncements were confirmed on oath by Mocenigo, whose age is\ngiven at thirty-four years, so that the excuse of youth falls from\nhim. The following Tuesday the Holy Tribunal met to consider the case.\nIt consisted, in Venice, of the Papal Nuncio (Ludovico Taberna), the\nPatriarch of Venice (Lorenzo Priuli),[112] the Father Inquisitor (John\nGabrielli of Saluzzo, _de Salutiis_),[113] along with three assessors\nor representatives of the State (_Savii all' Eresia_), one of whom was\nalways present, with the right of suspending the meeting if he thought\nproper: at the present time the three were Aloysius Fuscari, Sebastian\nBarbadico, and Tomaso Morosini. On this day the evidence of Ciotto and\nBertano, the booksellers who had known Bruno at Frankfort as well as\nat Venice (Bertano was also at Z\u00fcrich), was taken; it was in the main\nfavourable, only Bertano recalled the prior of the Carmelite monastery\nat Frankfort having said of Bruno that he spent most of his time in\nwriting, and went about dreaming dreams and meditating new things, that\nhe had a fine mind and knowledge of letters, and was a _universal_\nman, but that he had no religion so far as the prior knew, and he\nquoted a saying of Bruno's to the effect that the apostles did not\nknow everything, and that he had the mind, if he wished, to make all\nthe world of one religion; while Ciotto reported the common belief in\nFrankfort that Bruno was a man of _no religion_.\n\n[Sidenote: First examination of Bruno.]\n\nThe prisoner himself was then brought forward--\"A man of ordinary\nstature, with chestnut-brown beard, of the age and appearance of forty\nyears\"; Ciotto, too, described him as a slender man of small stature,\nwith a small dark beard, about forty years of age. Bruno of his own\naccord, before a question was put, professed his readiness to speak the\ntruth; he had several times had the threat made to him of being brought\nbefore the Holy Office (viz. by Mocenigo), but had always treated it\nas a jest, because he was quite ready to give an account of himself.\nThis he proceeded to do. The biographical part of his account has been\nembodied in the preceding pages.\n\n[Sidenote: Third deposition of Mocenigo.]\n\nOn the 29th Mocenigo made another deposition, the result of further\nreflections, at the request of the Father Inquisitor, on the utterances\nof Bruno against the Catholic faith. Bruno had said that the Catholics\ndid not act on the model of the apostles, who taught by example and\ngood deeds, converting through love, not force; that he preferred\nthe Catholic religion to others, but it also stood in great need of\nreform; that he hoped great things from the King of Navarre; that it\nwas a mistake to allow the friars to remain so rich (in Venice): they\nshould do as in France, where the nobles enjoyed the revenues of the\nmonasteries, the friars living on soup, as befitted such \"asses.\" This\nwas a powerful stroke of diplomacy on Mocenigo's part. It was also\nhinted that Bruno's life was not pure, that he said the Church erred\nin making a sin of what was of great service in nature, and of what he\n(Bruno) regarded as a high merit.\n\n[Sidenote: The twofold truth.]\n\n[Sidenote: Fra Domenico.]\n\n[Sidenote: Philosophical and theological truth.]\n\n[Sidenote: Bruno's creed.]\n\nNext day (Saturday) Bruno continued his account of his life, the first\nnote of defence being struck in an appeal to the famous doctrine of the\n\"twofold truth.\" \"Some of the works composed by me and printed I do\nnot approve, because I spoke and discoursed too much as a philosopher\nrather than as an 'honest'[114] man and good Christian, and in\nparticular I know that in some of these works I taught and believed on\nphilosophic grounds what ought to have been referred to the potency,\nwisdom, and goodness of God, according to the Christian faith, basing\nmy doctrine on sense and reason, and not upon faith.\" On Tuesday,\nJune 2, a deposition was read from Fra Domenico da Nocera confirming\nBruno's appeal to him, and his desire for the favour of the Pope and\na reconciliation with the Church, so that he might be able to live\nquietly in Rome. The prisoner was then cross-examined, and submitted\na list of his works, published and unpublished. In these he claimed\nto have spoken always \"philosophically, and according to the light of\nnature, having no special regard to what ought to be believed according\nto the faith: his intention had been not to impugn religion, but only\nto exalt philosophy, although many impieties might have been uttered\non the strength of his natural light. Directly he had taught nothing\ncontrary to the Christian Catholic religion; thus in Paris he had been\nallowed to vindicate the articles against the Peripatetics and others,\nby natural principles, without prejudice to the truth according to the\nlight of the faith: indirectly, Aristotle's and Plato's works were as\ncontrary, indeed much more contrary, to the faith than the articles\nphilosophically propounded and defended by him.\" He proceeded to give\nan admirable statement of his \"philosophical\" creed which might have\nfired the hearts of his judges:--\"I believe in an infinite universe,\nthe effect of the infinite divine potency, because it has seemed to me\nunworthy of the divine goodness and power to create a finite world,\nwhen able to produce besides it another and others infinite: so that\nI have declared that there are endless particular worlds similar to\nthis of the Earth; with Pythagoras I regard it as a star, and similar\nto it are the moon, the planets, and other stars, which are infinite,\nand all these bodies are worlds, and without number, constituting the\ninfinite all (_universit\u00e0_) in an infinite space; while the latter\nis called the infinite universe, in which are innumerable worlds; so\nthat there are two kinds of infinity, one in the magnitude of the\nuniverse, the other in the multitude of worlds, by which indirectly\nthe truth according to the faith may be impugned. In this universe\nI place a universal providence, in virtue of which everything lives,\ngrows, moves, and comes to and abides in its perfection. It is present\nin two fashions: the one is that in which the spirit is present in\nthe body, wholly in the whole, and wholly in any part of the whole,\nand that I call _nature_, the shadow, the footprint of divinity;\nthe other is the ineffable way in which God by essence, presence\nand power, is in all and above all, not as part, not as spirit or\nlife, but in an inexplicable way. Then in the divinity, I regard all\nattributes as being one and the same thing. With theologians and the\ngreatest philosophers I assume three attributes--_power_, _wisdom_,\nand _goodness_, or _mind_, _understanding_, and _love_; through these,\nthings have, first, existence by reason of _mind_; then an ordered and\ndistinct existence by reason of _understanding_; third, concord and\nsymmetry by reason of _love_. Distinction in divinity is thus posited\nby way of reason, not of substantial truth.\" God in Himself is one;\nbut three aspects of this unity may be distinguished, Mind (Will or\nForce or Power), Understanding (Knowledge, the Word), and Love or Soul.\nThese three aspects correspond, of course, to the three Persons of the\nGodhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit respectively. Bruno\nconfesses, however, to have doubted, from the philosophic point of\nview, the becoming flesh of the Understanding or Word of God, although\nhe did not remember giving definite expression to this doubt; and as\nto the Spirit, he did not think of it as a person, but rather as the\nsoul or life in the universe.[115] \"From the Spirit, the life of the\nuniverse, springs, in my philosophy, the life and soul of everything\nthat has soul and life; and I regard it as immortal, as also bodies\nin substance are immortal, death being nothing but division and\ncongregation: as the Preacher says, 'The thing that hath been it is\nthat which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be\ndone; and there is no new thing under the sun.'\"\n\n[Sidenote: Aquinas.]\n\nBruno confessed to have doubted the application of the word \"persons\"\nto these distinctions within the Godhead, since his eighteenth year;\nbut he had read in St. Augustine that it was not an old term, but\nnew at that time. To none of his doubts as to the distinction of\npersons or the Incarnation had he ever knowingly given expression,\nexcept in quoting others, Arius, Gabellius, and the like.... On the\nsame day, in his prison-house, he was further examined, and repeated\nthat whatever he had written or said contrary to the Catholic faith\nwas not intended as direct impugnment of the faith, but was based on\nphilosophic grounds or on the authority of heretics; he made clearer\nalso his reason for doubting the applicability of the term \"persons\"\nto the distinctions in the Godhead, quoting Augustine's words, \"_Cum\nformidine proferimus hoc nomen personae, quando loquimur de divinis, et\nnecessitate coacti utimur_.\" Especially as to the divinity of Christ\nhe had been unable to understand how there could be any such relation\nbetween the infinite, divine substance, and the human, finite, as\nbetween any other two things,--soul and body, for example,--which may\nsubsist together as one reality, but he had only hesitated as to the\nineffable manner of the Incarnation, and not as to the authority of\nthe Holy Scriptures which says \"The Word was made flesh.\" Divinity\ncould not be held, theologically speaking, to be along with humanity\nin any other fashion than by way of _assistentia_ (_i.e._ temporary\ninfluence or presence), but he did not infer anything from this\ncontrary to the divinity of Christ, or of the supposed Divine Being\nthat is called Christ; the miracles of Christ he had always held to\nbe divine, true, and real--not apparent miracles; while the miracles\nof others were only in virtue of Christ: as to the sacrifice of the\nHoly Mass and the Transubstantiation of the flesh and blood of Christ\nhe had always held with the Church: he had not attended Mass because\nof his excommunication, but had been to Vespers and to preachings in\nthe Churches: in his dealings with heretics, he had always treated\nof matters philosophical, and had never allowed anything to escape\nhim that was contrary to the Catholic Doctrine, and for that reason\nCalvinists and Lutherans had always thought of him as having no\nreligion, because he did not entangle himself with theirs, and had been\nin many parts without having communicated, or accepted the religion\nof any of them. Some of the grosser charges of Mocenigo were read\nto him, which he strenuously denied,--and \"as he spoke,\" says the\nfaithful record, \"he grew exceedingly sorrowful,\" marvelling that such\nthings could be imputed to him. More strenuous grew his assertion of\nhis orthodoxy--as to the person of Christ, the Virgin Motherhood, the\nSacrament of Repentance; he spoke of his repeated efforts to obtain\nabsolution, how for his sins he had always asked pardon of God, and\nwould also willingly have confessed himself had he been able, because\nhe had never doubted of this sacrament (or of any of the others),\nbeing firmly convinced that impenitent sinners were condemned and that\nhell was their portion. Heretic theologians,--Melanchthon, Luther,\nCalvin and others,--he condemned and despised, and had read their\nbooks from curiosity merely, although there were others, as those of\nRaymond Lully, which he had kept by him because they treated of matters\nphilosophical. Saint Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, he had always\nesteemed and loved as his own soul; had his writings always by him,\nread, studied, and pondered over them; and had spoken of Aquinas in one\nof his works as \"The Honour and Light of all the race of theologians,\nand of Peripatetics among philosophers.\"[116] When he had spoken\nof good works as necessary for salvation, he had in his mind not\nCatholicism, but the \"_reformed_ religion, which is in fact _deformed_\nin the extreme.\" One by one Mocenigo's charges were read, and denied,\nexcept that as to his contrasting the apostles' method of spreading\nthe Gospel with that of the Catholic Church,--this charge he evaded.\nWhen the grossest of all, however, was read, alleging him to have said\nthe apparent miracles of Christ and the apostles were due to the black\nart, and that he himself could equally well do them all--he could not\nrestrain himself;--\"raising both hands, and crying, 'What is this?\nWho has invented these devilries? I never said such a thing, it never\nentered my imagination; oh God! what is this? I would rather be dead\nthan that such a thing should have been uttered by me!'\" His references\nto women he admitted an error, but they had been spoken in lightness\namid company and during talk of things \"otiose and mundane.\" Threatened\nwith extreme measures if he refused to confess his errors with respect\nto the Church, Bruno promised to make a greater effort to recall all he\nhad said and done against the Christian and Catholic faith, protested\nthe sincerity of all he said, and was left in peace for a time. This\ninterview took place in the prison of the Inquisition.\n\nOn the following day in the same place the examination was\ncontinued--his neglect of Holy Days and Fastings in England and\nGermany; his attendance at heretic preachings (although he emphatically\ndenied that he ever partook of the communion in any Protestant church);\nhis doubts concerning the Incarnation, the Miracles, the Sacraments;\nhis familiarity with magical arts; his praise of heretics and heretic\nPrinces,--these were some of the many points of indictment which he had\nto face. The _Book of Conjurations_, and others like it, he professed\nto have had only out of curiosity, although he despised and discredited\nsorcery; but he had wished to study the divining art, and especially\nthe divinatory (prophetic) side of astrology, merely out of scientific\ninterest, and therefore had such books by him. Heretics he had praised,\nonly for the moral virtues they had showed, or from convention (as in\nthe case of Queen Elizabeth). The course of his examination was making\nclear to Bruno at last in how great danger he really stood; and on this\nday he made, probably in hope of immediate release, a formal and solemn\nabjuration of all the errors he had ever committed pertaining to the\nCatholic life and profession, all the heresies he had believed and the\ndoubts he had permitted himself to hold about the Catholic Faith or the\ndecrees of the Church; and prayed that the Holy Tribunal would receive\nhim into the bosom of the Holy Church, provide him with remedies proper\nto his salvation, and show mercy upon him.\n\n[Sidenote: July 30.]\n\nThe earlier processes against him at Naples and at Rome were, however,\nrecalled to mind; and on the following day he was again questioned as\nto his familiarity with the magic arts. Three weeks later Morosini was\nexamined and Ciotto re-examined; in both cases the evidence was wholly\nin Bruno's favour. Then a long interval elapsed. It was not till the\n30th of July that the case was again taken up.[117] Bruno had nothing\nto add to his defence, except his constant desire to enter the Church,\nif he could only do so without undergoing the bondage of monkhood\nagain. Worn out by anxiety, and possibly by torture, he humbled himself\nbefore his judges: kneeling, he asked pardon of God and of his judges\nfor all the errors he had committed, and offered himself as prepared\nfor any penance they might lay upon him. He hoped his chastisement\nmight exceed rather in gravity than in publicity, whereby dishonour\nmight be cast upon the sacred habit of the Order which he had borne;\nand if by the mercy of God and of \"their illustrious lordships,\" his\nlife should be granted him, he promised to make amends for the scandal\nhe had created by equally great edification.\n\n\nXVI\n\n[Sidenote: Dec. 22.]\n\nThis closed the acts of the process so far as the Venetian tribunal was\nconcerned. The \"Sacred Congregation of the Supreme Tribunal of the Holy\nOffice,\" at Rome, was eager to secure the distinguished heretic for\nitself, and on the 12th of September the Cardinal San Severina wrote to\nthis effect; the Venetian tribunal, on the 17th, gave orders that Bruno\nbe sent as soon as possible to the Governor of Ancona, who would see\nto his further custody to Rome. On the 28th this decision was reported\nto the Doge and Council of Venice by the Vicar of the Patriarch (the\nFather Inquisitor and Thomas Morosini being present), with an account\nof the charges against Bruno, and he added, that they did not wish to\nact without first informing the College (the Doge and Senators), so\nthat they might give what order they thought fit, and the tribunal\nwould wait to know what reply should be made to Rome; but he begged\nfor expedition, since there was at that very time an opportunity of\nsending the prisoner in security; to all which the Senate promised to\ngive due consideration. On the same day the Father Inquisitor returned,\nafter dinner, to learn the decision of the Signors, adding that there\nwas a vessel at hand, ready to set out. The State was not so willing,\nhowever, to allow the Church to have its way, and it was replied \"that\nthe matter being of moment, and deserving consideration, and the\noccupations of the State being many and weighty, they could not at that\ntime come to a decision, and his Reverence might for the present let\nthe vessel sail.\" On the 3rd of October they wrote to their ambassador\n(Donato) at Rome, that the request had been refused, on the ground\nthat it meant an infringement of the rights of the Venetian tribunal\nand a menace for the future to their subjects. Nearly three months\nelapsed before any further steps were taken. On the 22nd December the\nPapal Nuncio appeared before the College pressing them to deal with\nthe Friar Giordano Bruno, described as a publicly known Arch-heretic,\nwhom the Pope desired to have at Rome, in order to bring to an end\nthe process that was begun against him in the Holy Inquisition, and\ntheir serenities were begged to permit his being carried to Rome, that\njustice might be done. His Holiness, the Pope, had already, in the\ninterval, impressed his desire upon the minds of the ambassadors at\nRome. On the procurator, Donato, who had meanwhile returned from Rome,\npressing the unconstitutional nature of the act, the Nuncio pointed out\nthat Bruno was a Neapolitan, not a subject of the Venetian Republic\nat all; that there were earlier unfinished processes against him both\nin Naples and in Rome; and that in similar cases the accused had been\nsent to the chief tribunal at Rome. The Senate agreed to consider the\nmatter, and expressed their desire to give every possible satisfaction\nto his Holiness.\n\n[Sidenote: January 7, 1593.]\n\nOn the 7th of January, their procurator, Contarini, reported on Bruno\nto the College that \"his faults were extremely grave in respect of\nheresies, although in other respects one of the most excellent and\nrarest natures, and of exquisite learning and knowledge\"; _but_,\nsince the case was begun at Naples and Rome, was one of extraordinary\ngravity, and Bruno a stranger, not a subject, he thought it might be\nconvenient to satisfy his Holiness, as had been done before at times\nin similar cases. He also hinted that Bruno himself, on being informed\nthat his case was to be brought to a speedy conclusion, had said he\nwould send a writing in which he was to ask to be remitted to Rome,\nbut that this might have been intended merely to put off time. His\nreport he desired to have kept secret, both for public and for private\nreasons.[118] It was successful in its aim, for on the 7th of January\nit was decided that \"to gratify the Pope, the said Giordano Bruno be\nremitted to the Tribunal of the Inquisition at Rome, being consigned to\nMonsignor the Nuncio that he may be sent in what custody and by what\nmeans his Reverend Lordship thinks best; that the Nuncio be notified\nof this, and that our ambassador at Rome be also advised thereof to\nrepresent it to his Holiness as a mark of the continued readiness of\nthe Republic to do what is pleasing to him.\"[119] The ambassador,\nParuta, was informed of the decision, and asked to present it to the\nPope as proceeding, in the words of the letter, \"from our reverend and\nfilial regard for his Holiness, with whom you should condole in our\nname on his indisposition; and if on the arrival of these presents\nhe is in good health, as with the grace of God we hope, you shall\ncongratulate him thereupon.\" His Holiness, on Paruta's informing him\nof the decision, was highly gratified, and replied with \"courteous\nand kindly words, saying how greatly he desired to remain always in\nharmony with the Republic, and how he hoped it might not give him bones\nthat were very hard to gnaw, in case others should cast up to him\nthat he yielded overmuch to the affection he bore it.\"[120] Clearly\nVenice had no desire to quarrel with the Papal Government just at\nthat time, and the unfortunate Bruno was made a political sacrifice.\nThe persistency of the Pope's representative at Venice in demanding\nBruno's transference to Rome, and the Pope's evident relief when Venice\nyielded, show how important the death or complete recantation of Bruno\nhad come to be thought by the Catholic party.\n\nOn the 27th of February 1593 Bruno entered the prison of the\nInquisition at Rome.[121]\n\n\nXVII\n\nBruno's behaviour before the Venetian tribunal has been regarded as a\nsignal blot upon his character. In the course of his cross-examination\nhe entirely changed his attitude, which was at first one of defiant\nself-confidence, open confession of his (philosophic) differences from\nthe Church, and of indirect attacks upon the faith in his writings;\ninsistence upon his right to use \"the natural light\" of sense and\nreason, so long as the doctrines of the Church were accepted by way of\nfaith. Later he passed from this attitude to one of anxious and angry\ndenial of all charges of heterodoxy, of trafficking with heretics,\nand the like; and finally to one of almost cringing submission and\nprofessed readiness to undergo any punishment for his misdeeds. It is\npossible that he began by overrating the tolerance of the Venetian\nRepublic. In Morosini's circle, of which Fra Paolo Sarpi was afterwards\na member, he had heard enlightened talk and free criticism of the\nChurch, and especially of Rome. One of the reputed sayings of Morosini,\n\"we were born Venetians before we became Christians,\" makes one\nhesitate to accept as quite honest his evidence before the tribunal.\nBut Bruno's trial occurred at a time when tolerance had given way\nto diplomacy. Had Bruno been a Venetian or of another nationality\nthe result would have been different. They had adopted a policy of\nfriendship towards the Papal government, and in consequence dealt\nduring that period much more severely with heretical doctrine than with\nlooseness of life. Bruno may have discovered this in the course of his\ntrial, and changed his position in order to save his life. Sigwart\ncomes to the conclusion that \"it is impossible to believe in his entire\ngenuineness and truthfulness; it is clear that he was now trying\nto save himself and escape condemnation by submission.\" Numberless\nquotations might be made from his writings which give the lie to his\ndenials before the tribunal, and his wonderful memory could not have\nallowed them to slip from his mind. However, there is this to be said,\nthat Bruno had never regarded himself as anything but a Catholic;\nthat his criticisms of that Church were suggestions of reform from\nwithin rather than attacks from without; that he had always retained\nan instinctive dislike both of Calvinism and of Lutheranism, in spite\nof his exaggerated but conventional praises of Luther at Wittenberg;\nthat he had never formally compared his philosophy with his traditional\nfaith, but rather laid that faith aside and worked as a philosopher\nmerely: hence his reputation in Germany as a man of no religion. When\nhe first became aware that he was in danger of losing life or at least\nliberty, and his dream of a quiet retirement with freedom of work in\nItaly began to fade, he must have lost his centre of judgment, and had\ndifficulty in estimating his own past doings and sayings from the new\nstandpoint. It would be unjust to say there was the smallest element of\nhypocrisy in his submission, or of deceit in his denial of guilt. And\nin any case, whatever errors he committed before the Venetian tribunal\nwere amply amended by his behaviour before the Roman.[122] One thing is\ncertain: he never either then or afterwards recanted or in any sense\nwithdrew a single proposition belonging to his philosophical creed.\n\nTo Rome there went with him, in all probability, copies of the\ndenunciations and evidence given at Venice, the works which Mocenigo\nhad marked, and lists of all his works, including that given by\nhimself, which would be valuable could it now be found. From January\n16, 1593 to January 14, 1599 there is absolute silence concerning\nBruno, so far as discovered documents go. In 1849 an opportunity was\nobtained of studying the archives of the Vatican, but the student did\nnot pass beyond November 1598 (beginning from February 1600), before\nthe opportunity was over.[123] The earliest of these records of Bruno\nis, as stated above, of January 14, 1599. To the congregation (of the\nHoly Office) \"there were read eight heretical propositions, taken\nfrom the works of Fra Giordano Bruno of Nola, apostate of the order\nof Preaching Friars, imprisoned in the prison of the Holy Office, and\nfrom the process against him, by the Reverend Fathers Commissario\nand Bellarmino. It was decided that selected propositions be read to\nhim, in order to determine whether he was willing to abjure them as\nheretical. Other heretical propositions are to be looked for in the\nprocess and in the books.\"\n\nWhat had happened all these years? Why was Bruno's life spared so long?\nThis unusual clemency on the part of the Inquisition points to a great\ndifference in their estimate of Bruno's importance from their view\nof that of other heretics. In a list of twenty-one prisoners of the\nInquisition made on the 5th of April 1599, only one besides Bruno had\nbeen for more than a year in their hands; the duration of imprisonment\nfor the others could be counted by months or days. As a general rule\nthey were not slow in striking. Among the reasons that have been\nsuggested is the time required to go over the four processes which had\nalready been drawn up against Bruno, if the documents were extant, and\nto obtain and read his books and manuscripts. This may be dismissed at\nonce; Bruno's books could not be scarce _then_, although they became\nso later, and it could not require six years to find enough material\nto condemn him if that were desired. Another suggestion is that Bruno\nwas a Dominican, and the whole order was concerned in procuring his\nrecantation, rather than have the scandal which his death in apostasy\nwould cause. The historians of the order afterwards denied that Bruno,\nif really put to death, had been one of their order--\"Had he been one\nof us he would have remained with us _et convictu et sensibus_.\"[124]\nMore probable is the idea that Pope Clement had some favour for Bruno,\nwho had intended to dedicate a book to him, and whose skilful pen and\nbiting tongue he hoped to win over to the side of the Church. The book\non the _Seven Liberal Arts_ may have been actually completed, and\nmay have presented a _modus vivendi_ between religious authority and\nphilosophic freedom, as Brunnhofer suggests. If the hope of winning him\nover was really held, it is not likely that they refrained in his case,\nany more than in Campanella's, from the use of torture.\n\nBellarmino, a Jesuit, to whom along with Commissario the study of\nBruno's works and of the processes had been entrusted, was one of the\nmost learned prelates of the day, a keen and ready controversialist,\nin spite of his reputed love of peace, and a skilful writer of many\napologetic and polemical works. Beneath the surface of enlightenment\nthere lay hidden a nature of intense bigotry: it was he who decided\nthat Copernicanism was a heresy; he played a part later in the process\nagainst Galilei, and in the attack upon Fra Paolo Sarpi; through his\nagency the Platonist Patrizzi was induced to retract his heresies,\nand his works were placed along with those of Telesius, the apostle of\nNaturalism, upon the index.\n\n[Sidenote: February 4, 1599.]\n\nOn the 4th of February the congregation again considered Bruno's\ncase, he having in the interval made some protest against the eight\npropositions selected. His Holiness decreed that it should be intimated\nto him by the Reverend Fathers Bellarmino and Commissario, \"that\nthe propositions are heretical, and not only now or lately declared\nheretical, but according to the most ancient Fathers of the Church\nand the Apostolic See. If he shall admit them as such, it is well,\nbut if not, a term of forty days shall be set him.\" What were the\neight propositions? It is of course almost impossible to say, but\nprobably Tocco[125] is right in suggesting that they were neither any\nof those already withdrawn in Venice (as held \"philosophically,\" but\nnot theologically), nor any of the charges of Mocenigo which Bruno had\nso vigorously denied, but actual admissions common to his works and to\nthe confessions he had made at Venice--for example, propositions as\nto (1) the distinction of persons in God; (2) the Incarnation of the\nWord; (3) the nature of the Holy Spirit; (4) the Divinity of Christ;\n(5, 6, and 7) the necessity, eternity, and infinity of Nature; (8) the\nTransmigration of Souls. It must have been in the last four of these,\nor some similar propositions, that Bruno stood fast by his new faith.\n\n\nXVIII\n\n[Sidenote: December 21, 1599.]\n\nHe was granted more than forty days, however, or the period was\nrenewed, for it was not until the 21st of December of that year that\nthe patience or perseverance of the Inquisition began to be exhausted.\nOn that date--the next on which there is any record of Bruno--the\ncongregation again reopened the case. In a rough copy of the report\nwhich has been found Bruno is quoted as saying, \"that he neither\nought nor will recant, that he has nothing to recant, no matter for\nrecantation, does not know what he ought to recant.\" In the fair\ncopy the names of the members of the tribunal are given. At their\nhead was Cardinal Madruzzi, and among them were the fanatical San\nSeverin, embittered by his failure to secure the Papacy (he had gone\nso far as to choose his name--Clement--when his rival was elected\nin 1592, and became Clement VIII.), the man who figures in history\nas having declared St. Bartholomew's \"a glorious day, a day of joy\nfor Catholics\"; the ascetic Sfondrati; the intolerant Borghese,\nafterwards Pope Paul V.; and the learned Bellarmino. After hearing\nBruno on his defence, it was decided among them that Hippolyte Maria,\ngeneral of the Dominican order, and Paul of Mirandula, their vicar,\n\"should deal with Bruno, show him what had to be abjured, that he\nmight confess his errors, amend his ways, and agree to abjure; and\nshould try to bring him to the point as soon as possible.\" Bruno,\nhowever, as they reported, stood firm, denying that he had made any\nheretical statements, and insisting that he had been misunderstood by\nthe ministers of the Holy Office, and by his Holiness; and at the\nsame meeting (20th of January 1600) a memorial from Bruno to the Pope,\nwho was present, having been opened but not read, it was decreed\n\"that further measures be proceeded to, _servatis servandis_, that\nsentence be passed, and that the said Friar Giordano be handed over\nto the secular authority.\" On the 8th of February this decision was\ncarried into effect, and he was placed in the hands of the Governor\nof Rome, with the usual recommendation that he be punished \"with as\ngreat clemency as possible, and without effusion of blood\"--the formula\nfor burning at the stake. A witness of the passing of the sentence\nwas Gaspar Schopp, a youthful but none the less fanatical convert\nfrom the reformed religion to Catholicism. It was a year of jubilee\nin Rome. Pope Clement was possessed of great diplomatic gifts, he had\ngained the submission of Henry IV. of France, had united France again\nwith Spain, and detached it from England, and had quieted or lulled\nnumerous disputes within the Church itself. Rome was therefore crowded\nwith visitors, more so than usual even in a year of jubilee. Of the\ndistinguished foreigners paying their homage to Clement, Gaspar Schopp\nwas one; facile of tongue as of pen, he quickly gained the Pope's\nfavour, was made a knight of St. Peter, and a count of the Sacred\nPalace. This adept at coat-turning sent from Rome a letter to Conrad\nRittershausen, which was for long the sole authority for Bruno's death,\nbut was held by Catholic writers on Bruno to be a forgery. In the face\nof the solid arguments and evidence forthcoming, Catholic reviewers\neven at the present day deny that Bruno was put to death. It is quite\nneedless at this date to enter into the question of the authenticity of\nthe letter, its assertion of Bruno's punishment being the sole ground\non which that was ever doubted.[126] We learn from it that Bruno was\npublicly reported in Rome to have been burned as _a Lutheran_; and\none of the aims of Schopp in writing--which he did on the very day\nof Bruno's death--was to prove the falsity of this report. He had\nheard the sentence pronounced, and its damnatory clauses he gives\nas the following:--(1) Bruno's early doubts concerning and ultimate\ndenial of the Transubstantiation, and of the virgin conception; (2)\nthe publication in London of the Bestia Trionfanti, which was held\nto mean the Pope; (3) the \"horrible absurdities\" taught in his Latin\nwritings, such as the infinite number of worlds, the transmigration of\nsouls, the lawfulness and utility of magic, the Holy Spirit described\nas merely the soul of the world, the eternity of the world, Moses\nspoken of as an Egyptian working his miracles by magic--in which he\nexcelled other Egyptians--and as having invented the decalogue, the\nHoly Scriptures a fable, the salvation of the devil, the Hebrews alone\ndescended from Adam and Eve, other peoples from the men created the\nprevious day; Christ not God, but an illustrious magician, who deceived\nmen, and on that account was properly hanged (_impiccato_) and not\ncrucified; the prophets and apostles corrupt men, magicians, who were\nfor the most part hanged. \"In fine, I should never have done were I to\npass in review all the monstrosities he has advanced, whether in his\nbooks or by word of mouth. In one word, there is not an error of the\npagan philosophers or of our heretics, ancient or modern, that he did\nnot sustain.\" The delay at Rome, it is suggested, was due to Bruno's\nconstant promises to retract, but he was only putting off his judges,\nand the duration of his imprisonment is given (officially?) at \"about\ntwo years.\" It is clear that on the occasion of the sentence being read\nthe denouncements of Mocenigo, as well as all later evidences dragged\nfrom Bruno's own lips, or picked up from his books, were recited for\nthe benefit, presumably, of the visitors present. When the sentence\nwas pronounced Bruno was degraded, excommunicated, and handed over to\nthe secular magistrates, as we have seen. The whole letter is redeemed\nby the reply of Bruno to his judges--\"Greater perhaps is your fear in\npronouncing my sentence than mine in hearing it.\" These strong words\nare almost the last we have of Bruno. At the stake he turned his eyes\nangrily away from the crucifix held before him. And so, adds Schopp,\n\"he was burned and perished miserably, and is gone to tell, I suppose,\nin those other worlds of his fancy, how the blasphemous and impious\nare dealt with by the Romans!\" It is pleasant to know that when Lord\nDigby was English ambassador to Spain he caused Gaspard Schopp to be\nhorse-whipped.[127] For the degradation of Bruno, as we learn from the\nRegister of the Depository-General of the Pontificate, two _scudi_\nof gold were paid to the Bishop of Sidonia. The memorable words he\nuttered at the time were reported by another than Schopp, the Count\nof Ventimiglia, who was a pupil of Bruno, and present at his death\n(perhaps at the sentence also)--\"You who sentence me are in greater\nfear than I who am condemned\"; and before his death Bruno recommended\nVentimiglia \"to follow in his glorious footsteps, to avoid prejudices\nand errors.\"[128]\n\nIn the _Avvisi_ and _Ritorni_ of Rome, which represented, however\nmeagrely, the newspapers of the time, two references to Bruno appeared,\nwith short garbled accounts of him. In one he was spoken of as a Friar\nof S. Dominic, of Nola, burnt alive in the Campo di Fiori, an obstinate\nheretic, _with his tongue tied_, owing to the brutish words he uttered,\nrefusing to listen to the comforters or others: in another he was\nreported as saying that he died a martyr, and willingly, and that his\nsoul would ascend with the smoke to Paradise, \"but now he knows whether\nhe spoke the truth!\" The fullest account, however, of his death, and\none which should put to rest all doubts on the subject, is in the\nreports of the Company of St. John the Beheaded. This company--called\nalso the Company of Mercy or Pity (_della misericordia_)--was\ninstituted for the purpose of accompanying condemned heretics to the\nplace of death, encouraging them to repent, to die with contrition for\ntheir sins. The priests bore tablets painted with images, which were\npresented to the condemned to kiss, from time to time, till the faggots\nwere lit. Even the executioner was called to their aid occasionally,\nand the cruellest methods adopted to produce at least the appearance of\nkissing, and so of repentance. In obstinate cases, on the other hand,\nthe tongue was tied, so that the heretic could not speak to the people.\nWhen the sufferers repented before death the Company took note of their\nlast wishes, and they were buried in the tombs of the Cloister donated\nfor that purpose by Innocent VIII., but if they were impenitent no will\nwas allowed, and the ashes were abandoned to the winds of heaven. This\nmust have happened in Bruno's case, for there is no mention of will or\nof burial in the report. Its date is Thursday, 16th February (an error\nfor 17th), and it reads thus:[129]--\"At the second hour of the night\nit was intimated to the Company that an impenitent was to be executed\nin the morning; so at the sixth hour the comforters and the chaplain\nmet at St. Ursula, and went to the prison of the Tower of Nona. After\nthe customary prayers in the chapel there was consigned to them the\nunder-mentioned condemned to death, viz. Giordano, son of the late\nGiovanni Bruno, an Apostate Friar of Nola in the Kingdom, an impenitent\nheretic. With all charity our brethren exhorted him to repent, and\nthere were called two Fathers of St. Dominic, two of the Society of\nJesus, two of the new Church, and one of St. Jerome, who, with all\naffection and much learning, showed him his error, but he remained to\nthe end in his accursed obstinacy, his brain and intellect seething\nwith a thousand errors and vanities. So, persevering in his obstinacy,\nhe was led by the servants of justice to the Campo dei Fiori, there\nstripped, bound to a stake, and burnt alive, attended always by our\nCompany chanting the litanies, the comforters exhorting him up to the\nlast point to abandon his obstinacy, but in it finally he ended his\nmiserable, unhappy life.\"\n\nSo Bruno passed away; his ashes were scattered, his name almost\nforgotten. His death was the merest incident amid the great doings\nof the year of Jubilee. None of the many bishops and cardinals and\ndistinguished visitors in Rome, with the single exception of Gaspard\nSchopp, makes any mention of the occurrence or of the man; and Schopp\ndid so only because he wished to point a moral from the case. During\nhis seven years' imprisonment, Bruno had almost passed out of the\nshort-lived memory of his fellowmen. Burnings of heretics were not\ninfrequent spectacles, and required no special notice. Three years\nlater (August 7, 1603) all his works were placed upon the Index, and\nconsequently became rare. They were classed with other dangerous works\non the black arts, and Bruno's name became one to avoid.\n\nThis was the death which in happier days he had foreseen for himself\nshould he ever enter Italy:--\"Torches, fifty or a hundred, will not\nfail him, even though the march be at mid-day, should it be his fate\nto die in Roman Catholic country.\" What were the real grounds on which\nhis condemnation and sentence were founded? The alleged grounds we have\nalready seen, but they cannot have formed the actual motive of the Pope\nand the Inquisition. Neither at Venice nor in Rome can much weight have\nbeen laid upon the evidence of the weakling Mocenigo. The Cardinals\ncannot have imagined that Bruno would ever open his heart or even speak\nfreely to so shallow a nature so utterly different in all things from\nhimself. The mere fact of his having left his order was not enough, nor\nhis refusal to return to it, nor were his heretical opinions--defended\nas they might be, and as Aristotle's own teaching had to be defended in\nthe Church, by the subterfuge of the twofold truth. Had his chief fault\nbeen, as some have thought, his praises of Elizabeth, Henry III., Henry\nof Navarre, Luther, Duke Julius, and other enemies, real or supposed,\nof the Church, he would not so long have occupied the prisons of the\nInquisition. Probably his earliest biographer, Bartholm\u00e8ss, was right\nin suggesting that Bruno was regarded as a heresiarch--he is several\ntimes so described in the documents--the founder of a new sect, the\nleader of an incipient but dangerous crusade against the Church. It\nwas as the apostle of a new religion, founded on a new intuition,\na new conception of the universe, and of its relation to God, that\nBruno died. Had he been won over to the side of the Church, his mind\nconquered and his spirit crushed by the long years of waiting, and\npossibly the days and nights of physical torture, it would have been\na signal triumph for the papacy. But the heart which had trembled at\nthe beginning, when the sudden gulf yawned before it, grew more and\nmore steadfast as its trials increased. We can only re-echo Carri\u00e8re's\nwords, that in the soul of such a man, who after eight years'\nconfinement in the prisons of the Inquisition remained so firm, \"the\ngoverning motives must have been an eternal and inviolable impulse\ntowards Truth, an unbending sense of right, an irrepressible and free\nenthusiasm.\" That for which he died was not any special cult or any\nspecial interpretation of Scripture or history, but a broad freedom of\nthought with the right of free interpretation of history and of nature,\nwhich in his own case was founded upon a philosophy, one of the noblest\nthat has been thought out by man.\n\nThe fear of death was no part of this philosophy; what we call\ndeath, it teaches, is a mere change of state, of \"accidents\"--no\nreal substance, such as the human spirit is, can ever die. One of\nthe highest values of his philosophy he thought to be this, that it\nfreed man from the fear of death, \"which is worse than death itself.\"\nStrikingly apposite to his own fate is a passage from Ovid[130] that he\nquotes--\n\n    O' genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis,\n    Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina vana timetis,\n    Materiam vatum, falsique pericula mundi?\n    Corpora sive rogus flamma, seu tabe vetustas\n    Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis;\n    Morte carent animae domibus habitantque receptae.\n\nBruno himself lived within the sphere of which he writes in the\n_Spaccio_, \"surrounded by the impregnable wall of true philosophic\ncontemplation, where the peacefulness of life stands fortified and on\nhigh, where truth is open, where the necessity of the Eternity of all\nsubstantial things is clear, where nought is to be feared but to be\ndeprived of human perfection and justice.\" His finest epitaph is to\nbe found in his own words, \"I have fought: that is much--victory is\nin the hands of fate. Be that as it may with me, this at least future\nages will not deny of me, be the victor who may,--that I did not fear\nto die, yielded to none of my fellows in constancy, and preferred a\nspirited death to a cowardly life.\"\n\nNo end in history is more tragic, when looked at in all its\ncircumstances, than that of Giordano Bruno. First a life of endless,\nunresting struggle, striving through years of wandering, in many lands,\nto overcome prejudice and outworn authority, to proclaim and urge on\nunwilling minds the splendid gospel which inspired himself, and by\nwhich for a brief time he may have thought to supplant the old; now\nadmired of kings, and sought after by the highest in the land, at\nanother time a hunted pedlar of literary wares; then eight years in\ndarkness from the world, with shame or death to choose for release.\nThe choice made for the nobler end, the mockeries of religion he had\ndetested and reviled pursued him to the end to--the very stake; and the\nfuneral pyre of this martyr for liberty of thought, for the new light\nof science, became a spectacle for the gay and thoughtless sight-seers\nof the Roman Jubilee year, to all of whom, one sad disciple excepted,\nit was but another \"damnable and obstinate heretic\" who was on this\nearth, for that brief spell, foretasting his eternal doom.\n\n\nXIX\n\nIt is not easy to characterise so complex a personality as Bruno\nundoubtedly was. The fiery passionate blood of the south ran in his\nveins, the joy of a strong-flowing life was in his heart and brain. A\nchild of Nature, he was almost from the first, \"cribbed, cabined, and\nconfined\" by the stone walls of the cloister, as his mind was hampered\nby the laws and dogmas of the Church.[131] From Nature herself he drew\nhis first lessons. While his fellows taught that Nature was a thing\nof evil, he learnt to love her, and to turn to her rather than to the\nauthority of man for instruction. He believed also, as very few of his\nage did, in the power of human thought to penetrate the secret nature\nof things, to reach even to the deepest and highest reality, so far as\nthat can be known by another than itself. Trusting to his own mind, to\nsense and reason, for his theory of the world, he found himself opposed\nin all essentials to the general thought of the time.\n\nHis purpose from the first was to use his own eyes, to discover truth\nfor himself, and to hold fast whatever seemed to be right, irrespective\nof the opinions of others. \"From the beginning I was convinced of the\nvanity of the cry which summons us to close or lower the eyes that\nwere given to us open and upward-looking. Seeing I do not pretend\nnot to see, nor fear to profess it openly; and as there is continual\nwar between light and darkness, knowledge and ignorance, everywhere\nhave I met with hatred, abuse, clamour, insult (ay, not without risk\nto my life) from the brute and stupid multitude; but guided by the\nhand of truth and the divine light, I have overcome it.\" Not that he\nreally formed his theory by induction from sense-data, or by deductive\nreasoning; it was rather an inspiration, or an intuition, springing\nfrom his temperament, to which optimism was as necessary as pessimism\nrepellent; and there were numerous suggestions of it both in Bruno's\nimmediate predecessors, Copernicus and the rest, and in earlier\nthinkers. Bruno himself found it, as he thought, in the more ancient\npre-Aristotelian philosophies. But, however obtained, this philosophy\nsatisfied even _his_ boundless enthusiasm, and it became the chief\nmotive of his life to convince others of its truth, inspire them with\nthe same enthusiasm, and endow them with the joyous freedom of life\nof which it seemed to him to be the source. His philosophy, in other\nwords, became his religion, his inward religion,--Catholicism remaining\na mere habit, a set of formulae to which he was indifferent, to most of\nwhich he was willing to subscribe because he had not questioned them.\n\n[Sidenote: Authority.]\n\nHis perfect self-confidence, and belief in the power of human reason\n(especially his own reason) to penetrate the mysteries of things, was\naccompanied by contempt for the argument from authority in philosophy,\ncontempt for humility, submission, obedience in the speculative life.\nTo believe with the many because they were many was the mark of a\nslave. Bruno, before Bacon, before Descartes, insisted on the need of\nfirst of all clearing the mind from all prejudices, all traditional\nbeliefs that rested on authority alone, before attempting the pursuit\nof truth. They were impediments--burdens that delayed or prevented the\nattainment of the goal. The whole of the _Cabala_ is a satire on the\nquietistic attitude, the standpoint of ignorant and ignoring faith,\nwhich regards sense and reason as alike misleading and unnecessary\nguides, for which science and philosophy are mere troublings of the\nstill waters of life. \"Oh, holy asinity\"! one of the sonnets begins,\n\"oh, holy ignorance, holy folly and pious devotion, which alone makest\nsouls so good that human wit and zeal can no further go; strenuous\nwatchfulness, in whatsoever art, or invention, or contemplation of the\nwise, arrives not to the heaven wherein thou buildest thy mansion. Of\nwhat avail is your study, ye curious ones, your desire to know how\nnature works, whether the stars are earth, or fire or sea? Holy asinity\nfor that cares not, but with folded hands and bended knees awaits from\nGod its fate.\"[132]\n\nHaving already that touch of vanity in his character which the\npossession of a quick mind among sluggards or dullards almost\ninevitably entails, he was thrown, by his attitude towards nature\nand the Church, more and more back upon himself. At every step he\nmet with a leaden, uncomprehending, but dogged opposition, until he\nseemed to himself the one seeing man in a world of the blind. At\ntimes this belief was expressed only too emphatically; the reader of\nBruno must expect to find a passage in almost every work pointing out\nthat that work is the best of its kind, and dispenses with all others\non the subject; while his opponents in any theory are bedaubed with\nepithets to which the amenities of modern party strife are politeness\nitself.[133] Boundless was his confidence in himself, in his power\nof discerning truth, and in his ability to overcome all difficulties\nin the way of its discovery. \"Difficulty,\" he writes in the _Cena_,\n\"is ordained to check poltroons. Things ordinary and easy are for the\nvulgar, for ordinary people. But rare, heroic, divine men pass along\nthis way of difficulty, that necessity may be constrained to yield them\nthe palm of immortality. Although it may not be possible to come so far\nas to gain the prize, run your race nevertheless, do your hardest in\nwhat is of so great importance, strive to your last breath. It is not\nonly he who arrives at the goal that is praised, but also whoever dies\nno coward's or poltroon's death; he casts the fault of his loss and of\nhis death upon the back of fate, and shows the world that he has come\nto such an end by no defect of himself, but by error of fortune.\"[134]\n\nHis outward fortunes left Bruno indifferent; it was the opposition\nto his philosophy that embittered him, and excited the magnificent\ninvectives scattered everywhere through his works. Of his own mission\nBruno had the highest conception: \"The Nolan has set free the\nhuman mind, and its knowledge, that was shut up within the narrow\nprison-house of the atmosphere (the troubled air), whence it could\nonly with difficulty, as through chinks, see the far distant stars;\nits wings were clipped, that it might not fly and pass through the\nveil of clouds, and see that which is really to be found there.... But\nhe in the eye of sense and reason, with the key of unwearied inquiry,\nhas opened those prison-doors of the truth which man might open, laid\nbare nature that was covered over and veiled from sight, given eyes to\nthe moles, enlightened the blind ... loosened the tongue of the mute,\nthat could not and dared not express their inmost feelings.\"[135] It\nwas not to the many that he spoke, however; there was little in his\nheart of that love for his fellowman that was so charming a trait in\nSpinoza, with all the latter's desire for solitude, and under all his\npersecutions. Bruno, whether a son of the people or not, had never the\nslightest respect for that body. We have already seen what opinion\nhe formed of the English populace, and he held a similar view of the\n_plebs_ in general--\"_Rogatus tumet, Pulsatus rogat, Pugnis concisus\nadorat_,\" he quotes (or misquotes)[136] concerning it. Distrust of\nthe natural man he had imbibed along with the teaching of the Church,\nand doubt as to his capacity for receiving or understanding the\ntruth. Those who have acquired the truth that he has to teach need\nnot, he writes, communicate it to all, \"unless they will see what\nswine can do with pearls, and will gather those fruits of their zeal\nand labour which usually spring from rash and foolish ignorance,\ntogether with presumption and incivility, its constant and trusty\ncompanions.\"[137] Speaking of the doctrine of the necessity of all\nhuman events, as determined and foreseen by God, and its coincidence\nwith true liberty, he shows how theologians and philosophers have held\nit, but have refrained from communicating it to the vulgar, by whom\nit could not be understood, who would use it as an excuse for giving\nrein to their passions. \"Faith is required for the instruction of the\n_plebs_, that must be governed; demonstration (truth) for the wise, the\ncontemplative, that know how to govern themselves and others.\"[138]\nSo speculation as to the future life must be kept from them, for it\nis \"with the greatest difficulty that they can be restrained from\nvice and impelled to virtuous acts through their faith in eternal\npunishment: what would become of them if they were persuaded of some\nlighter condition regulating the rewards of heroic and humane deeds,\nthe punishment of wickedness and sin?\"[139] He was an \"aristocrat of\nlearning,\"--only the wise should have the government of the world; the\npeople were unfit to judge either of truth or of men.\n\n[Sidenote: Pedantry.]\n\nAlong with this distrust of the vulgar went a far more intense dislike\nof the kind of learning they admired, and of the type of scholar,\nthe pedant, that most appealed to them. The minds of the vulgar, it\nseemed to him, were more readily turned by sophisms, by the appearances\non the surface of things, than by the truth that is hidden in their\nsubstance, and is indeed their substance itself;[140] and the man--too\nfrequent in the Italian, and generally in the learned world of those\ndays--most apt to veil a real ignorance by a pretended knowledge, by a\nshow of externals, by appeal to authorities with whom he had himself\nno acquaintance, was _the pedant_. Bruno himself was not without\nthat touch of vanity which led him, like others, to mass together\nquotations and phrases from Latin and even from Greek writers; to\npoint an argument by forced analogies from classical mythology; to\nheap up references, in support of his theories, to the Neoplatonists,\nto the mystics, to the Cabbalah, to the older Greek philosophers:\nthese adornments were quite in the fashion of his time, and looked\nat in that light they add to, rather than detract from, the peculiar\ncharm and spirit of his writings. The true pedant--such as Polihimnio\nin the _Causa_ (who has been thought to have suggested Polonius in\n_Hamlet_), Mamphurio in the _Candelaio_, Prudentio in the _Cena_--is\none that for style loves long words, learned phrases, irrespective of\ntheir context; who, under pretence of accuracy, delights in trifling,\nsubtle distinctions, sows broadcast mythological or classical allusions\nwithout a hint of relevancy. His favourite hunting-ground is, however,\nphilosophy, and it is to philosophy, according to Bruno, that the\npedant has done greatest injury. One of the most vigorous descriptions\nof him which Bruno gives is in the _Causa_,[141] where, no doubt,\nsome of the actual writers of the time are satirised. Curiously,\nRamus and Patrizzi, both reformers of philosophy, are mentioned as\n\"arch-pedants\"; but men have always criticised most bitterly those who\nstood nearest to themselves.\n\nBruno regarded words as the servants of his pen, claimed, and indeed\nexercised almost too freely, the right of inventing new words for new\nthings. Use and wont, he knew, determined the fate of words as of other\nthings; some which had fallen into decay would rise again, others now\nhonoured would lapse from use. For the teaching of the philosophers of\nold their own old words were the clearest mirror, but for new theories\nnew words might be sought from the readiest source:--\"grammarians are\nthe servants of words, words are our servants; it is for them to study\nthe use to which we put our words.\"[142]\n\n\nXX\n\nFor such coinage, as for illustrations to his theories, references to\nold authorities, material for his satire on pedants, as well as for\nmore doubtful purposes,--mystical or magical formul\u00e6, or \"proofs,\"--his\nprodigious memory never left Bruno at a loss. But if this memory, in\nits tenacity, supplied him with powerful and ready arguments against\nhis opponents in their appeal to the authority of antiquity, it\nwas also, in its fertility, the source of the chief defects of his\nwriting, and perhaps also of his speaking. His imagination runs riot\nin the pursuit of allegories, metaphors, similes from mythology.\nTiraboschi, the historian of Italian literature, defies \"the most acute\nintelligence to penetrate into his system, the most patient of men to\nendure the reading of it.\"\n\nSo far was this enormous mass of material from blocking up the spring\nof originality in his mind, however, that the ideas in which he may be\nsaid to have \"anticipated\" modern thought are innumerable. No doubt,\nin many cases, they came from the earlier Greek philosophers whom he\nchiefly studied; but Bruno invariably gives them a connection with his\nown theory, such as precludes us from taking his restoration of them\nfor a happy chance. Such ideas, for example, are those of the evolution\nor gradual transformation of lower organisms into higher (_De Umbris_,\nInt. 7), of the part played by _the hand_ in the evolution of the human\nrace (_Cabala_, L. 586. 35), of the gradual changes brought about on\nthe surface of the earth, its seas, its islands, the configuration of\nthe land, the climate of different countries, by the constant, if\nimperceptible, operation of natural causes (_Cena_, L. 190 ff.): of\nthe true nature of mountains, which are only excrescences as compared\nwith the real mountains, the larger continents that slope upwards\nfrom the sea (_e.g._ France): of the true nature of comets, so far at\nleast as that they are perfectly natural bodies allied to planets[143]\n(_Infinit._ L. 372; _De Imm._ iv. 9. 51); of the identity of the\nmatter of heavenly bodies with that of the earth, the universality of\nmovement (even the fixed stars move, cf. _Infinit._, L. 350, 351, 400),\nthe possibility (he said rather the _certainty_) of other worlds than\nour own being inhabited by beings similar to or more highly developed\nthan ourselves (L. 360. 27). He \"anticipated\" also the idea of Lessing\nthat myths may contain foreshadowings of truth, and that they should\nbe interpreted not by their letter, as matters of fact, but by their\nspirit, as indications of higher \"truths of reason.\" The Bible should\nbe interpreted in the same way: as Spinoza afterwards taught, so Bruno\nheld, that the Scriptures inculcated moral and practical truths, to\nwhich their seemingly historical statements were entirely subordinate.\n\nAdd to this fermenting thought, power of memory, keenness and sureness\nof glance, and imaginative force, the fact that Bruno had a deeply\npoetic nature, fiery, vivid, passionate in defence of what seemed to\nhim true, equally passionate in hatred of what seemed to him false,\nand the sources of his strength and weakness alike become clear. The\nItalian writings remain, in spite of their occasional obscurity, the\nmost brilliant of philosophical works in that language, while the Latin\nworks are a monument of learning (too often misapplied or useless), of\nacute reasoning, and of poetic enthusiasm.\n\n\nXXI\n\n[Sidenote: Religion.]\n\nBruno was far from being what we should now call a Rationalist; he felt\nthat cold reason, mere human logic alone, could not fathom the deepest\nnature of things, which was God, but that this deepest nature of things\nwas apart from conditions of time and space. Whatever occurred under\nthese conditions,--whatever fell within the actual world,--he claimed\nfor sense and reason, _i.e._ as a subject of natural explanation,\nas accessible in all its aspects to human knowledge. There are thus\ntwo very distinct sides to Bruno's philosophical character: on the\none side he is a forerunner of modern science, in his love of nature\nas a whole, in his desire to understand it, in his application of\npurely \"empirical\" methods to its analysis. To this side belong his\nrejection of the orthodox dogmas concerning the Trinity, the Immaculate\nConception, and the rest, his theory of an evolution of man, his idea\nof a natural history of religions, his entire rejection of authority\nhowever high as an argument for or against a theory or view of nature.\nHis own religious creed was simple, and he believed it to be the\nessence of what was true in all the jarring sects that had separated\nman from man, nation from nation, and race from race--\"the law of\nlove--which springs not from the evil genius of any one race, but from\nGod the father of all, and is in harmony with universal nature, which\nteaches a general love of man, that we should love our enemies even,\nshould not remain like brutes or barbarians, but be transformed into\nthe likeness of Him who makes His sun to rise upon the good and the\nbad, and pours the rain of His mercies upon the just and the unjust.\nThis is the religion above controversy or dispute, which I observe\nfrom the belief of my own mind, and from the custom of my fatherland\nand my race.\"[144] On the other side, he had inherited the mysticism\nof the Neoplatonist school, or at least it called out a responsive\necho from his mind so soon as he came under its influence. He was\nfull of enthusiasm, as we shall find, for the divine--in things, in\nus, in the world, in the universe--a \"God-intoxicated man\" far more\nstrikingly than the impassive Spinoza. It was because the Copernican\ntheory fitted into his mystical thought of the One, as an identity of\nthe infinitely small, the point, and the infinitely great, the broad,\ndeep, immeasurable universe, that it appeared to him an inspiration\nof genius. Therefore he defended it, extended it further than its\noriginator dared extend it, and finally died for it and for all that\nit meant to him. His belief in natural magic belongs again to this\nside, or rather to the influence of the one side of his nature upon\nthe other; owing to their essential unity in God, natural things have\nsympathies with one another and with human life, so that a change in\none thing--a stone, a tree--may indirectly cause a corresponding change\nin another, a human being. It was characteristic of him that he sought\nto give to these beliefs--which, be it remembered, were universal in\nhis time--a rational basis, a connection with his thought-system as a\nwhole.\n\nThe two sides or standpoints are never far apart in Bruno: it is\noften impossible to say to which a given theory or mood should\nbe attributed, but in his earlier life the mystical, in his later\nthe naturalistic, or rationalist standpoint may be said to have\npredominated. It is with the more metaphysical attitude that a certain\nvein of optimism in Bruno's philosophy is connected, the familiar\nconception of evil, natural or moral, as necessary for the good of\nthe whole, like the discords by which a harmony is heightened. No\nabsolute evil, for the consistent Neoplatonist, can possibly exist in a\nworld which flows from the divine and is an outpouring of His nature.\nBut Bruno had little or nothing of the practical optimist in his own\ncharacter; whatever he thought to be evil, he fought against with all\nhis might; a victim of intolerance, he had himself no toleration for\nsome points of view--those, namely, which he felt might weaken the\nbonds of civil society and of human brotherhood. \"Such evil teachers,\"\nhe writes in the _Sigillus_ (ii. 2. 182), \"succeeding time, and a\nworld wise overlate in its own ill condition, will exterminate as the\ntares, canker-worms, locust plagues of their age--nay, as scorpions and\nvipers.\" Bruno saw only too clearly the evils of the world, and of his\nage, from the greatest of which--tyranny over the soul, and suppression\nof mental liberty--he suffered in his own person; and his life, as\nwe have seen, was spent in a ceaseless, and for the time unavailing,\nstruggle against them. But he never lost his faith in the ultimate\nvictory of his own philosophy, based as it was upon his faith in the\n_essential_ goodness, justice, and truth of the eternal source of\nthings. As all things flow from, so all things tend to return to God.\nPhilosophy goes further than to teach merely that pain and evil are not\nabsolute facts, not grounded in the nature of things; it also frees\nthe believer from the burden they impose:--\"the practical test of a\nperfect philosophy is, when one by the height of his speculation is so\nfar withdrawn from bodily things as hardly to feel pain. And there is\ngreater virtue, as we believe, in one who has come to such a point as\nnot to feel pain at all than in another who feels it but resists. He\nwho is more deeply moved by the thought of some other thing does not\nfeel the pangs of death.\"[145]\n\n\n\n\nWORKS OF BRUNO PUBLISHED AFTER 1592[146]\n\n\n1. _Summa terminorum metaphysicorum ad capessendum Logicae et\nPhilosophiae studium, ex Jordani Bruni Nolani Entis descensu manusc.\nexcerpta; nunc primum luci commissa; a Raphaele Eglino Iconio,\nTigurino_: Zurich, 1595. Reprinted in 1609:--_Summa Terminorum\nMetaphysicorum, Jordani Bruni Nolani. Accessit eiusdem Praxis Descensus\nseu Multiplicatio Entis ex Manuscripto per Raphaelum Eglinum Iconium\nTigurinum in Acad. Marpurg. Profess. Theolog. cum supplemento Rodolphi\nGoclenii Senioris_, Marburg, 1609.[147]\n\nDescribed by the editor, Eglin, who was with Bruno at Zurich, and\nafterwards became Professor of Theology at Marburg, as Bruno's\n\"Metaphysical remains.\" It represents the fruit of the lectures\ngiven by Bruno at Zurich in 1591,[148] and is one of the earliest\nphilosophical dictionaries extant. It is on the model of the Fifth\nBook of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_, now known to have been intended by\nAristotle as a separate work, but differs in its choice and arrangement\nof the terms of philosophy which are discussed. The first part of the\nwork, which was published by itself in Zurich, may best be described\nas a handbook to philosophy generally, the main reference being to\nAristotle's system, as was natural: with it Bruno writes for the most\npart in agreement. The _second part_, however, which was not published\nuntil the Marburg Edition (p. 73 ff. of the State Edition), is an\n\"application\" of the several terms already defined to the Neoplatonist\nphilosophy: in its first section (_De Deo seu Mente_) they are applied\nand illustrated by reference to God as the source of the world, of whom\nall things are emanations, in a graduated scale of being; in the second\n(_Intellectus seu Idea_) to the world of Ideas--God in the world, the\nsoul in all things and in everything; and a third section (_Amor seu\npulchritudo_) should have followed, dealing with God as the end and\ngoal of things, but is awanting.[149] The document on the Predicates\nof God which Mocenigo presented to the Court at Venice was probably\nthe second part of the _Summa_, or perhaps only its first section\n(Brunnhofer, p. 106).\n\n\n2. _Artificium perorandi traditum a Jordano Bruno Nolano Italo,\ncommunicatum a Johan. Henrico Alstedio. In gratiam eorum qui\neloquentiae vim et rationem cognoscere cupiunt._ Frankfort, 1612. (Also\nin Gfr\u00f6rer, and State Edition, vol. ii. pt. 3, No. 3).--A summary\nof, or a commentary on, the spurious Rhetoric of Aristotle (_ad\nAlexandrum_), with the addition of a second part by Bruno, on which he\nhimself lays no great stress, on elocution or adornment; he refers his\nreaders, however, to the orators themselves for complete instruction.\nIt contains chiefly lists of heads of arguments and of synonyms for\nrhetorical use. Apparently the work is printed from notes of Bruno's\nlectures in Wittenberg (1587), which came into the hands of the editor,\nAlsted, in 1610.\n\n\n3. _Lampas Triginta Statuarum._--First published in the State Edition,\nvol. iii. pp. 1-258, from MSS. of the Noroff collection at Moscow. This\nis in the hand of Besler, Bruno's pupil and copyist, and was done at\nPadua in the autumn of 1591, although Besler had received the original,\nwhich he copied, in April 1590 at Helmstadt. Another MS. is in the\nAugustan Library, and is both more obviously correct and of earlier\ndate than the copy of Besler (1587); in all probability the work was\ndictated by Bruno at Wittenberg, and is that referred to as _Lampas\nCabalistica_ in the letter of dedication prefixed to the _De Specierum\nScrutinio_ (Prague, 1588), and as shortly to be published.[150]\n\nIt contains a finished study of philosophy from Bruno's standpoint,\narranged under thirty and more headings, \"Types,\" \"Statues and\nImages,\" \"Fields,\" etc. Under each heading are thirty \"articles,\"\n\"conditions,\" \"descriptions,\" \"contemplations.\" For example, we have\nfirst the two triads--Chaos, Orcus, Nox; and Pater, Intellectus Primus,\nLux--typifying the lowest and the highest principles of things: the\nfirst three are Vacuum, Potency in Appetite, and Matter; the second\nthree Mind or Reason, Understanding or Soul, and Love or Spirit. At\nthe close of the _Statuae_ there follows the practical application of\nthem to the scale of Nature--the outflow of the highest towards the\nlowest, the gradual transition from lowest to highest; an account of\nthe thirty predicates of Substance and of \"Nature\" in the universal\nsense; and a logical or methodological illustration of the uses of the\nArt under the headings of Definition, Verification, Demonstration. The\ngeneral purpose of the whole is to give an instrument for discovery\n(\"_Invention_\") of truth, after the model of the Lullian Art, just\nas some of the earlier works (e.g. _De Umbris_) contain a similar\ninstrument for _remembering_ knowledge acquired.[151] Unfortunately the\nwork is entirely marred by the artificial distinctions drawn, and the\ntying down (or expansion) of the ideas treated therein to the thirty\nfundamental notions and thirty applications of each. Thus subjects and\npredicates are thirty in number each, and the modes of predication\nare in classes of fifteen. It is impossible not to agree with Tocco's\nverdict, that \"However fine the analysis employed in distinguishing\nthe subtlest shades of concepts, however great the number of elevated\nphilosophical thoughts scattered throughout, expounded with vigour\nand felicity of imagery, the tractate as a whole has little value,\njust as the _ars inventiva_ itself has little--more fit to blunt than\nto sharpen the inventive powers.\"[152] One gladly re-echoes Bruno's\nwords at the close: \"_Itaque gratias deo agentes, Artem Inventivam per\ntriginta statuas perfecimus._\"\n\n\n4. _Animadversiones circa Lampaaem Lullianam_ (State Edition, vol. ii.\npt. 2).--From the Augustan MSS., dated 13th March 1587. Notes dictated\nin Wittenberg, on the Lullian art as a universal instrument for the\ndiscovery of truth.\n\n\n5. _Libri Physicorum Aristotelis, a clariss. Dn. D. Jordano Bruno\nNolano explanati._--From two codices in the Erlangen Library, the\nsecond of which is in the hand of Besler, and was written, presumably,\nat Helmstadt. The earlier MS. in a German handwriting points to\nthe commentaries having been dictated by Bruno during his stay\nat Wittenberg.[153] The books of Aristotle treated are the five\nbooks of the _Physica_, the _De generatione et corruptione_, the\n_Meteorologica_, Book IV. There is an introduction on the methods\nof the sciences, and other matters, by Bruno himself; the remainder\nfollows closely the text of Aristotle, except in the fourth and fifth\nbooks, where Bruno is much less exact.\n\n\n6. _De Magia_, et _Theses de Magia_.--The MS. of this work is in the\nErlangen Codex, by Besler, and also in the Moscow (Noroff) collection,\nby the same hand; the former is a copy of the latter, which was\ndictated by Bruno in the early part of 1590 at Helmstadt.\n\nIt deals with one of the three divisions of Magic, viz. Natural or\nPhysical Magic (the others being Divine, Metaphysical or Supernatural,\nand Mathematical--that of symbols, numbers, etc.). Physical magic is\nshown to be a natural consequence, first, of the fact that the same\nsoul, the soul of the world, is in all things, of which the individual\nfinite soul of each thing is a temporary mode or phase; hence all\nthings are linked one with another, through their spiritual identity,\nin a bond of sympathy; secondly, of the hierarchy of beings--the\nprinciple that all finite things are emanations, in increasing degree\nof imperfection, from the Divine. The Theses represent a summary of\nthe _De Magia_, and in the latter the headings of the former are\nreferred to throughout, except in two episodes or excursus not strictly\nconnected with natural magic (on spirit-charms and spirit-analogies):\nthe work is referred to in the _De Minimo_, i. 3. 210 (_re_ the magical\ninfluences of bodies newly dead; \"the soul everywhere recognises the\nmatter of its own body, as we have shown in the book on physical\nmagic\").\n\n\n7. _De Magia Mathematica._--Merely a collection of excerpts from\nwriters on Magic--Tritemius, Agrippa, Pietro Di Abano, the (Pseudo-)\nAlbertus Magnus. (Noroff MSS. The title is that of the Italian editors.)\n\n\n8. _De Rerum Principiis et Elementis et Causis._--(Noroff MSS. The\nwriting was begun on the 16th of March 1590, in Helmstadt, by Besler,\nto Bruno's dictation.)\n\nIt contains the theory of the natural and material elements or\nprinciples of things--light and fire, wind or air, water or vapour\nor darkness, and earth or the dry, with their \"forms,\" time and\nplace--leaving the metaphysical and the immaterial principles (spirit\nand soul) for consideration elsewhere. It is not of great scientific\nvalue. Bruno makes use of abstract terms even more readily than\nAristotle (e.g. \"_lux seminaliter est ubique, et in tenebris_,\"\np. 514). The chief aim of the work is to illustrate the magical\napplications of the different elements[154] (cf. pp. 516, 525, etc.).\nIts value mainly lies in the light it throws on Bruno's atomic theory,\nand on one or two other minor points of his philosophy--the harmony,\nco-ordination, and sympathy between all natural things, the doctrines\nof liberty and necessity, etc.\n\n\n9. _De Medicina Lulliana, partim ex mathematicis, partim ex physicis\nprincipiis educta._--Written immediately after the above (_de rerum\nprincipiis_), to which it occasionally refers: merely a collection of\nabstracts from works of Lully on medicine, as a practical application\nof the system of magic contained in the three previous writings. It is\naccordingly of the astrological type of medi\u00e6val medicine.\n\n\n10. _De Vinculis in genere._ Noroff MSS.--A first sketch in Bruno's\nown hand, dating probably from Frankfort; and a later, much more\ndetailed, in Besler's, copied at Padua. It in a sense completes the\ntractates on Magic, by dealing with \"attraction\" in general, of which\nthe attractions and sympathies of natural and mathematical magic are\nspecial cases. As it stands, however (for neither sketch is finished:\nBruno's covers wider ground than Besler's, the latter breaks off\nabruptly before the natural end is reached), it is a psychological\nessay on the human passions, and more especially on human love, from\na purely objective, matter-of-fact standpoint. In it the most grossly\nmaterial and the highest spiritual sources of love are placed side by\nside; and to love, including self-love, are reduced all passions, all\neffects, even _hate_, which is an outcome, a reversion of love.\n\n\n\n\n    PART II\n\n    PHILOSOPHY OF BRUNO\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE SOURCES OF THE PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n[Sidenote: Aristotle's rejection of mathematical method.]\n\n[Sidenote: His treatment of the earlier Greeks.]\n\nIn the school and the monastery at Naples Bruno passed as a matter of\ncourse through a training in the Scholastic Philosophy. Before entering\nthe monastery of St. Dominic at fifteen years of age he had studied\n\"humane letters, logic, and dialectic,\"[155] and had attended, among\nother lectures, a private course by Theophilus of Varrano, an Augustine\nmonk and distinguished Aristotelian. From him, probably, Bruno received\nan impetus towards the study of Aristotle in the original works, if not\nalso in the original tongue, which stood him in admirable stead when he\ncame later to attack the foundations of the vulgar philosophy. He was\nfamiliar at first hand with all the main writings of Aristotle.[156] He\nhad read, too, and cites, most of the earlier commentators--Adrastus\nand Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius, Simplicius, and\n\"Philoponus\"[157]--as well as the later, the Arabians and other\nSchoolmen. He had accordingly a more thorough acquaintance with the\nmind of Aristotle than any of the latter's staunchest supporters in\nhis time: the lack of the historic sense prevented him, however,\nfrom taking a just view of the system as a whole: it was not the\nAristotle of Greek philosophy whom he rejected, and against whom he\nwielded the powerful weapons of his armoury, but the Aristotle of his\nown day,--a living force with which no one could avoid a reckoning,\nthe influence of which was no longer for good, but which formed, as\nBruno felt, a barrier against the progressive thought and spirit of\nthe time. In the introductory letter to the _Figuratio Arist. Phys.\nAuditus_, Bruno gave three reasons for undertaking the work:[158]--(1)\n\"that he might not appear, like so many others, to be taking up the\noffice of censor without a sufficient knowledge of his subject; (2)\nthat he might present to his opponents the philosophy of Aristotle\nas it really was, for the majority of the Aristotelians admired it\nrather from their faith in the man Aristotle than from discriminate\njudgment concerning the principles of the philosophy; (3) that he might\nseem not an audacious caviller against thoughts that were beyond his\ndepth, but a genuine and legitimate disputant on doctrines that were\nclear to himself.\"[159] The name of Aristotle was a charm; his opinion\nfinal not in matters of pure philosophy alone, but equally in natural\ntheory; his natural philosophy had been harmonised with scriptural\nauthority, and was the accepted doctrine of the Church. The cry which\nhis critic heard had weight behind it: \"You against Aristotle--against\nso many authorities, so great names? I would rather be in error along\nwith them, than find truth with you!\"[160] The danger lay not so much\nin the error of Aristotle's theory of nature, or of his metaphysical\ntheories, as in his authority; \"many of the Peripatetics,\" Bruno says\nin the _Cena_, \"grow angry, and flush and quarrel about Aristotle, yet\ndo not understand even the meanings of the titles of his books.\"[161]\nIt was the influence of this authority that Bruno, in the interests\nof true philosophy and science, set to work to undermine. The charge\nwhich he brought against Aristotle was the same as that which Bacon\nafterwards brought--that he attempted to explain nature by logical\ncategories. \"It is not strange that from impossible, logical, and\nimaginary distinctions quite discordant with the truth of things, he\ninfers an infinite number of other untruths\" (_inconvenientia_).[162]\n\"Matter is formless only to logical abstraction, as with Aristotle,\nwho is constantly dividing by reason what is indivisible according\nto nature and truth:\"[163] \"a logical intention (or concept) is made\ninto a principle (or element) of nature.\"[164] However unfair and\nindeed absurd the charge must appear when Aristotle is considered in\nhis actual place within the development of philosophy and science, and\nhowever far Bruno or Bacon or any of the nature-philosophers of the\nRenaissance was from avoiding the use in explanation of similar purely\nlogical or metaphysical conceptions, it was still a great and necessary\nstep to call attention to the need of observation and experiment upon\nnature, and to the value of mathematics as a method of calculating and\ncorrelating the phenomena observed. This was a second objection to\nAristotle, that he despised mathematics, \"being too much of a logician\n(and stronger in criticism than in argument),\" yet, Bruno adds, \"when\nhe sought to explain any of the more profound facts of nature, he was\noften driven by necessity to the repudiated mathematics.\" Many of\nBruno's own mathematical applications savour rather of Neopythagorean\nmysticism than of the spirit of modern science, and his geometry was\nfar from Euclidean, but he at least made a serious attempt to account\nfor the building-up of bodies and of the universe on mathematical\nprinciples. A third objection, which again we find in Bacon, is as to\nAristotle's treatment of his predecessors. His depreciation of them\nis condemned in the _Causa_:--\"Of all philosophers I do not know one\nwho founds more upon imagination, or is further removed from nature\nthan he: and if sometimes what he says is excellent, we know that it\ndoes not spring from his own principles, but is always a proposition\ntaken from other philosophers.\"[165] In another passage he is described\nas a \"dry sophist, aiming with malicious explanations and frivolous\narguments to pervert the opinions of the ancients, and to oppose the\ntruth, not so much perhaps through imbecility of intelligence as\nthrough the influence of envy and ambition.\"[166] So Bacon speaks of\nhim as imposing \"innumerable fictions upon the nature of things at his\nown will: being everywhere more anxious as to how one should extricate\noneself by an answer, and how some positive reply in words should be\nmade, than as to the internal truth of things.\"[167] In particular\nit was argued that Aristotle confused the various meanings of the\nsame name with one another:--\"He takes the word _vacuum_ in a sense\nin which no one has ever understood it, building castles in the air,\nand then pulling down his 'vacuum,' but not that of any other who has\nspoken of a vacuum or made use of the name. So he acts in all other\ncases,--those for example of 'motion,' 'infinite,' 'matter,' 'form,'\n'demonstration,' 'being,' always building on the faith of his own\ndefinition, which gives the name a new sense.\"[168]\n\n[Sidenote: The Pre-Aristotelians.]\n\nThe close study of Aristotle himself, which was one of the greatest\nresults of the Humanist movement, had the effect of bringing into\ngreater prominence the earlier Greek philosophers, whose doctrines\nAristotle states and criticises in many of his works--notably the\n_Physics_ and _Metaphysics_. The rediscovery of antiquity included\nthat of ancient philosophy; and Bruno's dissatisfaction with Aristotle\nled him into greater sympathy with the nature-philosophers whom\nAristotle decried. Towards these earlier Greeks, as towards other\nphilosophers, his attitude is wholly that of an Eclectic: he does\nnot attempt to appreciate their relative value, nor to discover any\nevolution of thought through the successive systems. From each he\ntakes that which agrees or appears to agree with his own philosophy,\nand treats it as an anticipation of, or as an authority for, the\nlatter. The \"universal intelligence,\" for example, as the universal\nefficient cause in nature, is a doctrine ascribed in the _Causa_\nindiscriminately to the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Magi,\nOrpheus, Empedocles, and Plotinus.[169] The belief in an infinite ether\n(Heraclitus' Fire) surrounding the earth, and containing innumerable\nworlds within it, in the _Cena_ is attributed, equally without\ndiscrimination, to Heraclitus, Democritus, Epicurus, Pythagoras,\nParmenides, and Melissus.[170] Xenophanes represented for Bruno the\nstatic aspect of Pantheism--the Absolute One as in itself, apart from\nall reference to the finite;[171] Heraclitus its dynamic aspect--the\nAbsolute as unfolding, revealing itself, \"appearing\" in and through\nthe finite.[172] Anaxagoras expressed the relation between the\nfinite individual and the One,--\"All things are in all things,\" for\n\"omnipotent, all-producing divinity pervades the whole, therefore\nnothing is so small but that divinity lies concealed in it.\"[173]\n\"Everything is in everything, because spirit or soul is in all things,\nand therefore out of anything may be produced anything else.\"[174]\nTo Anaxagoras, as to Bruno, nature was divine.[175] No special\ndistinction was made by Bruno between the teaching of Anaxagoras and\nthat of Empedocles: in one passage he attributes to the former the\ntheory of effluxes and influxes of atoms through the pores of bodies,\nwhich really belongs to the latter,[176] and in another suggests that\nEmpedocles only put in a more \"abstract\" way what Anaxagoras had shown\n\"concretely,\" that all things are in all.[177]\n\n[Sidenote: Democritus]\n\n[Sidenote: Lucretius]\n\nWith Leucippus and Democritus Bruno might have been expected to claim\naffinity, through their common atomism and naturalism: with two\ncardinal features of the traditional Epicureanism he was however in\nentire disagreement. The one was its admission of the void or vacuum:\nit explained the constitution of diverse bodies out of atoms which\nwere all of the same spherical form, by the different positions and\norder in which the void and solid parts respectively were arranged,\nwhereas Bruno could not imagine the corporeal atoms holding together\nwithout a material substance, extending continuously throughout the\nuniverse.[178] The other point of contrast was its denial that\nanything but corporeal matter exists, with the corollary that forms\nare merely accidental dispositions of matter: Bruno confesses to have\nbeen at one time of the same opinion, but he had been unable wholly to\nreduce forms to matter, and therefore was compelled to admit two kinds\nof substance, forms or ideas, and matter or body, although these again\nwere modes of a still higher unity, the One.[179] \"The deep thought of\nthe learned Lucretius\"[180] early fascinated Bruno, and Lucretius gave\nthe trend not only to much of his philosophy but also to the style of\nhis writing. The Latin poems were suggested by Lucretius' _De rerum\nnatura_, to which they are far inferior, certainly, in literary charm;\nthe philosophical system of the later writer however is not only bolder\nand grander in itself, but far more thoroughly worked out into the\ndetail of exposition and of criticism. In the Italian dialogues also\nLucretius is constantly quoted,--frequently from memory, as one may\njudge from the errors made.\n\n[Sidenote: Neoplatonism]\n\n[Sidenote: Egyptian theosophy.]\n\n[Sidenote: Hebrew Cabala.]\n\nBut in the first reaction against the now barren Peripatetic\nphilosophy, the school to which Bruno turned, with so many of his\nfellow-countrymen, was that which nominally derived from Aristotle's\nimmediate predecessor. The revival of Platonism in its secondary\nform of Neoplatonism was one of the most marked traits of the time.\nIn connection with the attempt to unite the Greek and Latin Churches\nin 1438, a Greek scholar came from Constantinople,--one _Georgius\nGemistus_ (Gemistus Plethon),--to the court at Florence, and there\nopened the minds of the Italians to the beauty of the Platonic\nphilosophy. Its mystical world of ideas charmed all who were embued\nwith the new spirit--romantic, adventurous, hopeful, self-confident.\nThe Ideas, it is true, were materialised and personified in the\ntransition through Neoplatonism, and it was as spirits of the stars\nand worlds, demons of the earth and sea, the living souls of plants\nand stones, that they appealed to minds fed on the grosser fare of\nmedi\u00e6val superstition. Plethon's lectures, uncritical as they were,\nensured the spread of Platonism in Italy. Bessarion of Trebizond,\nMarsilio Ficino, who became head of the Platonist Academy at Florence,\nand Pico of Mirandula followed in his steps. Both Ficino and Pico\nare mentioned by Bruno, and his knowledge of Plato, as of Plotinus,\nPorphyry, and other Neoplatonists, was derived, almost certainly, from\nFicino's translations. The teaching of Plato was interpreted in the\nlight of, and confused by admixture with, the mystical ideas of Philo\nand Plotinus, of Porphyry and Iamblichus, of the Jewish Cabala, and the\nmythical sayings of Egyptian, Chaldean, Indian, and Persian sages. The\nnew world was struggling for light, and it rushed towards every gleam\nof brightness, however feeble. Thus in the address to the senate at\nWittenberg before leaving the university, Bruno named the foremost of\nthose whom he regarded as Builders of the Temple of Wisdom: the list\nbegins with the Chaldeans among the Egyptians and Assyrians; there\nfollow Zoroaster and the Magi among the Persians, the Gymnosophists of\nIndia, Orpheus and Atlas among Thracians and Libyans, Thales and other\nwise men among the Greeks,--and so down to Paracelsus in Bruno's own\ncentury. The fantastic grouping is characteristic of the uncritical\nsyncretism of this last phase of Neoplatonism: Plethon had conjoined\nthe dogmas of Plato with those of Zoroaster, and had confirmed both by\nillustrations from Greek mythology. Among the most widely read works\nwere those of Iamblichus the Platonist, who died early in the fourth\ncentury,--the _Life of Pythagoras_, and especially the _Mysteries of\nthe Egyptians_.[181] Another work, in many books, which has not come\ndown to us, but which penetrated into the literature of the middle\nages, was on the _Perfect Theology of the Chaldaeans_. To Iamblichus,\nas to Plotinus, the Ideal world was a hierarchy of Gods, from the\nineffable, unsearchable One, down, tier upon tier, through successive\nemanations, to the Gods that are immanent in the world we know and the\nthings of the world. In the scheme not only do the Ideas of Plato, the\nNumbers of Pythagoras, the Forms of Aristotle, find a place, but also\nall the Gods of the Greek mythology, of the Egyptian religion, of the\nBabylonian and Hebrew esoteric cults. The same character is to be found\nin the writings of the so-called Hermes or Mercurius Trismegistus, to\nwhom Bruno constantly appeals.[182] It was partly for their cosmology,\nmore in accord with modern thought than that of the Peripatetics and\nthe Church, that they were read; but still more for the support their\nbelief in demonic spirits, governing the movements of the worlds and of\nall individual things, gave to magical and theurgical practices, which\nthrough the slackening of the rule of the Church were now universal.\n\"All stars are called fires by the Chaldaeans,\" writes Bruno, \"animals\nof fire, ministers of fire, innumerable gods, divine oracles.\"[183]\n\"The Chaldaeans and the wise Rabbis endowed the stars with intelligence\nand feeling.\"[184] \"There are some who are by no means thought worthy\nof a hearing among philosophers,--the Chaldaeans and Hebrew sages, who\nattribute body to the omnipotent God, calling him 'a consuming fire'\":\nbelow Him were innumerable Gods, flames of fire, and spirits of air,\nwhich were subtle, active, mobile bodies: souls too were spirits--that\nis, subtle bodies; and Bruno adds, \"We do not pursue this mode of\nphilosophising, but are far from despising it, nor have ever thought\nthat a wise man should think it contemptible.\"[185] The theology or\ntheosophy of the Egyptians is praised in the _Spaccio_,[186]--\"The\nmagical and divine cult of the Egyptians, who saw divinity in all\nthings, and in all actions (each manifesting divinity in its own\nspecial way); and knew by means of its forms in the bosom of nature\nhow to secure the benefits they derived from it--as out of the sea\nand rivers it gives fish, out of the deserts wild beasts, and out of\nmines metals, out of trees fruits, and out of certain parts of nature,\ncertain animals, certain brutes, certain plants, are gifted certain\nfates, virtues, fortunes, or impressions. Divinity in the sea was\ncalled Neptune, in the sun Apollo, in the earth Ceres, in the deserts\nDiana, and diversely in each of the other species of things: as divine\nideas, they were diverse deities in Nature, and all were referred to\none deity of deities, one source of Ideas above Nature.\" The passage\nshows clearly the connection between the revived enthusiasm for the old\npagan cults and the new but dark beginnings of independent study of\nnature, in Magic, Divination, Alchemy, and Astrology: equally close was\nthe connection of both with the revival of Pantheism, the conception\nof nature as a single whole throbbing with one life, springing from\none single source. So of the Hebrew Cabala, Bruno writes, \"its wisdom\n(whatever it be in its kind) derives from the Egyptians, among whom\nMoses was brought up.\" \"In the first place it attributes to the first\nprinciple a name ineffable, from which proceed, in the second place,\nfour names, afterwards resolved into twelve, these into seventy-two,\nthese into one hundred and forty-four, etc., etc. By each name they\nname a god, an angel, an intelligence, a power that presides over\na species of things,--so the whole of divinity is reduced back to\none source, as all light is brought back to the first, self-shining\nlight; and the images in the diverse, innumerable mirrors,--particular\nexistences,--are referred to one formal,[187] ideal source.\"[188]\n\nAs might be expected, Plato himself was best known to the school\nthrough one of the least characteristic of his works, the _Timaeus_,\nwith its fantastic cosmology and demonology, alongside of which\nwas placed the work of (the Pseudo-) Timaeus of Locris, a later\nwriting, based upon that of Plato, although professing to belong to\nan earlier date: next to these in importance came the _Republic_,\nwith the theory of Ideas. It was from the Chaldaeans, Egyptians, and\nPythagoreans that Plato was supposed to have derived his cosmology.\nIt is, however, with the system of Plotinus that Bruno's earlier\ntheory has the closest affinity: he passed far beyond that system,\nas the following chapters may show, but many of the ideas that had\ncome down from the master remained throughout part of the basis of\nBruno's thought: such are, for example, the idea of the Universal\nIntelligence,--distinct from the One, the Highest and Unknowable\nBeing, or God,--as the soul of the world and the source of the forms\nof material things;[189] the _rationes_ or ideas which are contained\nin it mould and form all things from the seed onwards: the seed is a\nminiature world containing _implicitly_, _i.e._ in its _ratio_, form\nor soul, the perfect thing.[190] The conception again of the lower,\nsensible world, as an imitation of the higher, the intelligible,\nis derived from Plotinus, as is that of the seven grades or steps\nof emanation from the First Principle to the material world, which\ncorrespond to the seven grades by which the human mind rises from the\nknowledge of sensible things to that of the Highest, the Good.[191]\nThe order of knowledge corresponds step for step with the order of\nemanation--of creation. Most significant of all for the development\nof Bruno's philosophy was Plotinus' conception of an \"intelligible\nmatter,\" which is common to all the different beings and species,\nin the intelligible world, just as brute matter is that which is\ncommon to all kinds of corporeal objects.[192] Again from Plotinus\nderives the distinction that the matter underlying the intelligible\nworld _is_ all things and all together: having in it (implicitly) all\nforms, there is nothing into which it may change: whereas the matter\nof the sensible world _becomes_ all by change in its parts, becomes\nat successive moments this and that, is therefore at all times in\ndiversity, change, movement. Matter of either kind is never without\nform, but all forms are in them in different ways--in the one in the\ninstant of eternity, in the other in the instants of time; in the one\nall at once, in the other successively, in the one _complicitly_, in\nthe other _explicitly_.[193] The same idea is attributed in the _De\nImmenso_ (Book V.) to the Platonists,--\"that God has imbued celestial\nmatter with all forms at once, but gives them to elemental matter in\nsingle moments, just as he has poured into the nature of the Gods\nall ideas once for all, but instils them into animal nature day by\nday. And as in the order of minds there is an ultimate principle\nwhich is incorruptible, so in the order of bodies. For the order\nof bodies follows that of intelligences as a footmark follows the\nfoot, as a shadow follows the body; hence whatever order is proved\nto hold of minds, the same will be found to hold of \"bodies.\"[194]\nIt only remained to identify the two kinds of matter, the divine and\nthe \"elemental,\" the spiritual and the corporeal, to obtain the pure\nPantheistic naturalism of the middle period of Bruno's philosophy:\nat that stage he was no longer in sympathy with the Neoplatonist\npsychology, and denied the doctrine of a _separate_ intelligence or\nunderstanding in man, an intelligence, that is, of different origin\nfrom sense, and therefore of different kind; he rejected also their\nview that the imagination which is the source of instinct in animals,\ndiffers from human imagination, and their assertion of a difference\nin kind between reason and intellect in man. For Bruno, as the order\nof nature was throughout the same in kind, constituted of similar\nelements, so the order of thought or knowledge was one in kind, from\nits lowest phase in sense, to its highest in the divine ecstasy. In the\n_Heroici Furori_ (as again in the posthumous _De Vinculis in genere_)\nthe Platonic doctrine of the ascent to the ecstatic vision and love\nof divine beauty, from sense-perception and the material feeling for\nsensible beauty, is the essential topic throughout: and in both Bruno\nis largely indebted for his symbolism to the Neoplatonist mystics.\n\n[Sidenote: Averroes:--Ibn Roschd (1126-1198).]\n\nThe renewed passion for physical science brought another school of\nphilosophy into prominence--the Arabian.[195] The chief commentaries of\nthis school on Aristotle, as well as many of their original writings,\nwere translated and published before the middle of the sixteenth\ncentury. Their interest being directed rather towards the physical\nand metaphysical writings of the master, than towards the logical,\nthey helped to satisfy and to foster the growing spirit of inquiry,\nand at the same time to spread abroad a more exact knowledge of the\nreal Aristotle than was to be derived from the Christian commentators,\nwhose philosophy was much less in sympathy with Aristotle's than was\nimagined. The general trend of the Arabian school in metaphysics was\ntowards a modified Aristotelianism, leavened by the Neoplatonist\nconception of the essential unity of all being and all thought,\nparticular things and particular ideas being a free outflow from the\nOne, into which they of necessity return again without affecting\nits fundamental nature. Bruno was familiar with _Avicenna_,[196]\n_Avempace_,[197] _Avicebron_,[198] _Algazel_,[199] and above all\n_Averroes_. Avicebron or Avencebrol was the author of the famous\n_Fons Vitae_, \"the Source of Life,\" which gained a quite undeserved\nnotoriety for its supposed materialism. Bruno did not know it at first\nhand, but through quotations in the translated Arabian writings,[200]\nand criticisms in the Scholastics. Accordingly his idea of it is by no\nmeans accurate.[201] He knew that Avicebron had spoken of matter as\ndivine, that he had reduced even the \"substantial forms\" of Aristotle\nto transitory phases of matter--\"the stable, the eternal, progenetrix,\nmother of all things,\"[202] and had shown the logical necessity of\nassuming a matter, or ground, out of which corporeal nature on the one\nhand, incorporeal or spiritual on the other, are differentiated.[203]\nIt is clear that this underlying matter was not material in the\nordinary sense, but a unity which in itself was neither corporeal nor\nspiritual, yet in its different aspects was both at once. That is a\nconception which formed one of the main theses in Bruno's philosophy.\nDirectly or indirectly, he drew from the _Fons Vitae_ the thought of\na common something which runs through all differences, which is their\nbasis, and gives them reality, which stands to them in the relation of\nAristotle's matter to forms: under the differences of bodily objects\nthere lies one common matter, under the differences of spiritual\nbeings another, and under the differences of these two secondary\n\"matters\" lies a primary matter in which both are one. So too the\nprogress of thought is from the most complex, or composite, material\nbodies,--through the less complex, the spiritual,--to the highest\nand simplest, the One.[204] Of Algazel's _Makacid_--a resum\u00e9 of the\nchief philosophical systems, which were criticised in a second part of\nthe work--a translation was published in 1506. Although an orthodox\ntheologian, he taught Bruno that the Sacred Books had as their end not\nso much truth or knowledge about reality \"as goodness of custom, the\nadvantage of the civil body, harmonious living together of peoples,\nand practice for the benefit of human intercourse, maintenance of\npeace, increase of republics\";[205] in other words, that the Bible\nclaimed no authority in regard to matters of historical fact or of\nnatural science, but contained a revelation of moral or practical\nrather than of speculative or theoretical truth.[206] For Averroes,\nBruno has the highest respect:[207] he constantly speaks of him as\n\"the most subtle and weighty of the Peripatetics\"; \"Averroes, though\nan Arab and ignorant of Greek (!), is more at home in the Peripatetic\ndoctrine than any Greek I have read: and he would have understood\nit better, had he not been so devoted to his deity Aristotle.\"[208]\nThis blind faith in Aristotle was the weak spot in Averroes' armour,\nand the cause of many of his subtleties. \"He could not believe that\nAristotle, whose knowledge was co-extensive with creation, could have\nerred; rather than deny Aristotle, he refused to believe his own\nsenses.\"[209] In philosophical theory there were at least two points\nof contact between Bruno and the great Arabian--one was the doctrine\nthat forms, _i.e._ individual particular objects, are sent out from and\ntherefore originally contained in matter, or, in modern phrase, that\nthe evolution of natural objects is from within outwards, not imposed\nupon nature by an alien and separate creator:[210] the other was the\ntheory of a universal intelligence pervading and illuminating all human\nminds, yet remaining one and the same in all, itself an emanation from\nthe Divine, and the lowest in the order of intelligences.[211] Bruno\ndid not, however, speak of it as separate from the finite minds, but as\nimmanent in them: nor did he regard it as the only immortal element in\nman.\n\n[Sidenote: _Albertus Magnus._]\n\nOf the Scholastics proper, from whom much at least of Bruno's\nterminology is derived, two seem to have influenced him most\nstrongly:--Albert the Great, whose interest in natural science entitled\nhim to a place in the temple of wisdom: \"He had no equal in his time,\nand was far superior to Aristotle, whose school, in which he ranked\naccording to the conditions of his age, was unworthy of him\";[212]\nand Thomas Aquinas, the angelic doctor, \"honour and glory of all and\nevery race of theologians and of Peripatetic philosophers.\"[213]\nGenerally speaking, however, the Scholastic is to Bruno the pedant,\nthe dabbler in words, as contrasted with the student of nature or\nof reality.[214] Under this condemnation fell two of the greatest\ninnovators upon the Aristotelian philosophy of his own time,--Ramus,\nand Patrizzi. The great logician was merely \"a French arch-pedant, who\nhas written _The School upon the Liberal Arts_, and the _Animadversions\nagainst Aristotle_. We may admit that he understood Aristotle, but he\nunderstood him badly; and had he understood him well, he would perhaps\nhave been minded to make honourable war upon him, as the judicious\nTelesio has done.\"[215] The fashionable philosopher and Platonist is\n\"_un altro sterco di pedanti_, an Italian who has soiled so many quires\nwith his _Discussiones Peripateticae_; we cannot say he understood\nAristotle, either well or ill, but he has read and re-read, stitched\nand unstitched, and compared with a thousand other Greek authors,\nfriendly and unfriendly to Aristotle, and in the end has undergone\ngreat labour, not only without any profit, but also with very great\ndisprofit, so that he who would see into what presumptuous folly and\nvanity the pedantic habit may plunge a man, let him look at that book,\nbefore the memory of it is lost.\" Tocco has laid his finger upon the\nreason for Bruno's dislike of these moderns, and it explains his\nobjection to the Scholastics generally:--it was that they attempted to\nremodel and reform the Logic and Rhetoric of Aristotle, the very parts\nof his work which Bruno regarded as the most perfect,--and neglected\nthe physical works, the theory of which had so powerful an authority\nto back it, and therefore all the more required the energies of the\nstronger minds of the time to be directed upon it.[216]\n\n[Sidenote: Lully, 1235-1305.]\n\nOne of the medi\u00e6val writers Bruno associated so closely with himself,\nthat his indebtedness might easily be exaggerated: this was Raymond\nLully, whose grim figure stands out from the shadowy thirteenth\ncentury,--the author of the celebrated _Art of Reasoning_.[217]\nThe object of the Art was to tabulate the primary forms or elements\nof thought, and their modes of combination, from which data, it was\nbelieved, any process of reasoning, however complex, might be carried\nout, without greater expenditure of energy than in performing an\narithmetical operation with any of the first nine numbers. There was no\nquestion of a possible divorce between thought and reality. The result\nof any such process of rational calculus properly carried out was\ntruth. Bruno thought with Lully that the ultimate ideas within reach of\nhuman thought were at the same time substantial elements in reality and\nthat the completest knowledge of reality--short of the Absolute--was\nwithin the power of human reason to achieve. Lully included in this\nrational sphere the dogmas of Christian theology: faith was for the\nmany, who must be _driven_ to believe; reason for the few, the wise.\nLully's method attracted, and his teaching influenced nearly all the\ngreater minds of the later middle ages, and of the Renaissance. They\nbecame a source of as bitter contention as the doctrines of Aristotle\nhimself. Bruno speaks of Lully as \"almost divine\"; Agrippa, after being\nan ardent follower, came to see the vanity of the system, and Bacon\ncalled it a method of imposture. At different times Bruno expounded,\ncriticised, and expanded the Art. He claims[218] to have \"embellished\nthe method of him whom the best leaders among philosophers admire,\nfollow, imitate.\" Duns Scotus (\"Scotigena\"), Nicholas of Cusa,\nParacelsus, Agrippa, are named, unjustly, as having drawn their chief\ndoctrines from this source: Lefevre and Bouill\u00e9[219] cited among his\nmost recent followers. The art was taught \"by some divine genius to a\nrude uncultured hermit, and although it seems to issue from one too\ndense and stupid, yet it excels the teaching of any famous Attic orator\nin this kind, as a crop of wheat excels one of barley. It seemed to\nus unfitting that this work, struggling upwards to the light, against\nthe envy of oppressing darkness, should be suffered to perish and be\nlost.\"[220] Yet Bruno by no means thought Lully's exposition perfect.\nOf his own Lullian work, the _De Compendiosa Architectura_,[221]\nhe says that it \"suffices for the understanding, estimating, and\nprosecuting of the art of Lully, by those who are skilled in the vulgar\nphilosophy. For in it is expressed in one whole, all that is in Lully's\nmany 'Arts,' in which he always seems to be saying the same thing; you\nhave there all that is in the _Ars Brevis_, the _Ars Magna_, and other\nbooks bearing the name of _Arbor Scientiae_, _Inventionis_, _Artes\ndemonstrativae_, _mixtionis principiorum_, _Auditus cabalistici_, or\nany other of that kind, in which the poor fellow strove always to\nexpress the same thing.\"\n\nIt was the dream of universal knowledge that attracted Bruno and\nothers to Lullism, just as the dream of universal power over nature\nattracted the greater minds of the Renaissance to the pseudo-science\nof Alchemy. The same idea is at the root of both. All things are in\nall things, _i.e._ the one fundamental nature is in each and every\nindividual thing, therefore out of any one may be produced any\nother. So in the idea of any one thing, the knowledge of all and\nany others is necessarily contained, requiring only a proper method\nfor its extraction, as out of the seed may be brought the great\ntree. Therefore, to Bruno, the hermit Lully seemed \"omniscient and\nalmost divine,\" his method an inspiration from above.[222] There is\nlittle, however, to connect Bruno with the substantive teaching of\nLully, apart from the method. He explicitly rejects, for example, the\nmain contention of Lully, that the Christian dogmas are capable of\ndemonstration by reason.--\"Those relations (_i.e._ between God and\nman), which have been revealed to the worshippers of Christ alone, are\ncontrary to all reasoning, philosophy, other faiths and superstitions,\nand allow of no demonstration but of faith only, in spite of what Lully\nin his madness (_delirando_) attempted to do, in face of the opinion of\nthe great theologians.\"[223]\n\n[Sidenote: _Nicolaus Cusanus._]\n\nForemost of all, however, of the influences which directed Bruno's\nthought was that of the Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa (Nicholas Chrypffs).\nA \"pre-reformation reformer,\" he stands both in theology and philosophy\nbetween the old and the new eras, summing up in his own theory the\npurest theology and the most refined philosophy of the Middle Ages,\nyet inevitably pointing forwards to a scientific and religious reform\nwhich should transcend both. \"Where,\" cried Bruno in his oration at\nWittenberg, \"will you find his equal? and the greater he is the fewer\nare they to whom he is accessible. Had not the robe of the priest\ninfected his genius it would have been not merely equal to but far\nsuperior to that of Pythagoras.\"[224] \"He knew and discerned much,\nand is truly one of the most gifted natures that have ever breathed\nthe air of heaven; but as to the apprehension of truth, he was like a\nswimmer in tempestuous waters, cast now high now low, he did not see\nthe light continuously, openly, clearly; did not swim as in calm and\nquiet waters, but interruptedly, at intervals, for he had not cast\noff all the false principles which he had received from the common\ndoctrine--his starting-point.\"[225]\n\nA sketch of the philosophy of the Cusan will show in how close a\nrelation Bruno stands to him, yet how great is the difference in\noutcome between the two philosophies. Clemens, whose sympathies are\nwith the orthodox theologian, does not hesitate to say that this is\n\"the real and direct source from which Bruno drew with both hands,\nthe philosophy to which he owes many of the main principles of his\nnature-philosophy, and which he has to thank for all the essentials of\nteaching said to be peculiar to himself\"; and Falckenberg is equally\ninclined to underrate the originality of the Italian in preference to\nthe German philosopher. The outset of Cusanus' philosophy is from a\ntheory of knowledge which he held from Platonist traditions:--Knowledge\nis posterior both in time and in value to Being, or Reality, of which\nit is at best a copy or a sign, hence Reality can never be wholly\ncomprehended by it. Every human assertion is at best a \"conjecture,\" a\nhypothesis or approach to truth, but never the absolute truth itself.\nOnly in the Divine spirit are thought and reality one; the Divine\nthought is at the same time creative, human only reflective, imitative,\nthus the Ultimate Being is and must remain incomprehensible for human\nminds. So Bruno also taught. The Cusan did not, however, reject on\nthis account all human knowledge. On the contrary, reason approximates\never more and more closely to the Divine mind, as a polygon approaches\nmore and more to the form of a circle when the number of its sides is\nincreased; as it never becomes an actual circle, so the Divine reason\nmay be known ever more and more truly through human reason, but never\nquite truly. It is the knowledge of this our essential _ignorance_ of\nthe Divine that brings us nearest to it.[226] Thus although from one\npoint of view all that is best in human experience may be attributed to\nthe Divine nature in a higher form (_positive theology_), from another\nevery predicate, even the highest, may be denied of it (_negative\ntheology_), or from still a third standpoint (_mystical theology_),\ncontrary predicates equally hold or do not hold of the Divine. This\n\"coincidence of contraries,\" suggested perhaps by the tradition of\nHeraclitus and Empedocles, was in the Cusan a principle of knowledge\nmerely. The Divine was at once the greatest and the least; _greatest_\nbecause we could not imagine it added to, for it was the all; _least_\nbecause, being truly existent, we could not imagine anything taken away\nfrom it. It is owing to the limits of human thought, therefore, that\nGod is at once greatest and least, equal and unequal, many and one; God\nHimself is free from all contradiction, the apparent contraries of our\nunderstanding are in Him one and the same. So, to our imagination, the\ninfinite circle coincides with the infinite straight line, and a top\nspinning with its fastest movement appears to stand still.\n\nBruno extols the greatness of this discovery--\"Considering it\nphysically, mathematically, morally, one sees that the philosopher who\nsaw into the coincidence of contraries made a discovery of the highest\nimportance, and that the magician who knows to seek it where it is\nis no feeble practician.\"[227] Yet, although he made use of the same\ngeometrical illustrations, and believed himself to be substantially\nfollowing Cusanus, his theory was widely different. The coincidence\nsprings in Bruno, not from the limitations of the human mind, but from\nthe fulness of the Divine nature. It is not in God as the transcendent\nunknowable Being that the coincidence inheres, but in the infinite\nuniverse as one with God, which is in itself at once the greatest and\nthe least, the maximum and the minimum. Since nature is permeated by\nGod, in everything, in the least of things, is God the greatest; the\nleast _is_ the greatest, has in it the nature of the whole, and so,\ntoo, the greatest is the least. In Bruno it is a _pantheistic_, in\nthe Cusan a _theistic_, doctrine. The same conception occurs again in\nits different meanings, when both compare God to an infinite circle\nin which centre and circumference are one; in Cusanus it is to our\nknowledge that He so appears, in Bruno He really _is_ infinite, and is\nwith His whole nature at any point or centre, as well as in the whole,\nthe circumference.\n\n[Sidenote: The Trinity.]\n\nWith the Cusan the threefold nature of the Highest Being is deduced as\na necessity of Reason: it is (1) _unity_ eternal; (2) _sameness_ or\n_equality_ eternal; and (3) the _union_ of unity and equality. As there\ncannot be three eternal and highest beings, these three are necessarily\none--the Unity (the Father) produces or begets from itself the _same_\n(the Son), and out of both springs their union (the Holy Ghost), yet\neach of these in the One is one and the same.[228] In the universe,\nthe created world, there is also a Trinity, since it is a copy or\nreflection of the Divine. (1) _Possibility_ or _Matter_, the unlimited,\nindeterminate, but capable of being limited and determined, corresponds\nto the unity of the eternal; (2) _Actuality_, or _Form_, the limiting\nor determining something, that which limits, corresponds to the\nsameness or equality of the Eternal; and (3) the unifying _movement_ by\nwhich the possible receives actuality, matter receives form, implying a\nspirit of union, of Love, corresponds to the Absolute Union, the Holy\nGhost.[229] At a later stage of his philosophy, however, the Cusan\ngave a second deduction of the Trinity.[230] God is both Absolute\nPossibility, Absolute Power or Potency (the Creative Word, the Son),\nand the union of both in Absolute Reality; yet these are merely\ndifferent aspects or points of view of the Eternal Being. Again, God\nis the identity of knowing, or intellect, the knowable or intelligible\n(the Word), and love, as the inter-relation of each with each, the\nstriving of the knowing after the knowable, its highest good.[231]\nBruno also adopts the Trinity of Possibility or Matter, Potency or\nForm, and Reality, but it is applied at once to God and to Nature as\ntwo sides of the same thing. As the Divine potency is infinite, so\nis nature, its expression, infinite; matter and form do not in their\norigin stand opposed to one another, as if separated from one another,\nany more than _power_ and _possibility_ are separate in God; all that\ncan be is realised; matter has in itself all possible forms, and\nproduces these out of itself in the successive moments of time; the\nuniverse is eternal, therefore, in order that the infinite power may\nin it be realised. In all these respects Bruno transforms the orthodox\nCusanus' conception of a created and finite world; although nowhere\nperhaps has the idea of a creation been more skilfully woven into a\nprofound philosophical system than in the Cardinal's quaint dialogues.\nThe Cusan does not attempt the impossible, to account for the fact of\ncreation--\"God comprehends (or contains) all things, for all things are\nin Him, and He unfolds all things out of Himself, for in all things He\nlives\"; but the essence and the process of the comprehension and the\nunfolding are unknowable by us, just as we can never understand how\n_chance_ comes to be united with _necessity_ (creation) in the world.\nIt is to this incomprehensible partnership that the imperfections of\ncreated things are attributed. In its reality the universe is finite,\nlimited; in its possibility (_i.e._ its _idea_) it is infinite, but\nonly _privatively_ infinite--that is, God could still call a more\nperfect universe into existence than it has actually pleased Him to do.\nOnly He, as the Absolute Greatest, is infinite in the full _negative_\nsense, _i.e._ that which can neither be nor be thought greater than it\nis. Here Bruno's theory is in complete contrast with that of the Cusan.\nThere are, however, many consequences that both alike have drawn, as\nthat no two things in the universe are wholly and in all respects\nalike (the _identity of indiscernibles_); each thing expresses the\nnature of the whole in a special way, but all things may be arranged\nin graduated scales from the lowest to the highest, or from any one to\nany other, _i.e._ there are no absolute differences, only differences\nof degree. Nor are there absolute centres in the universe, or in any\nof the worlds, nor perfect figures--thus there are no perfect circles\ndescribed, _e.g._ by the planets, in nature. A further corollary was\nthat the whole is mirrored in each of the parts, as each particular\nthing partakes of the soul or creative force of all; each does not,\nhowever, mirror or reflect the Divine nature with the same adequacy as\nevery other; some do so more perfectly than others, man most perfectly\nof all.[232] Cusanus did not definitely accept the suggestion of a\nsoul of the universe, analogous in its relation to the world to the\nsoul of man in the body; still less did he identify it with God, as\nBruno tended more and more to do. Hence he escaped the fantastical\nconsequences of the belief in Universal Animism, which were drawn\nwithout reserve by the Renaissance writers--the consequence, _e.g._\nthat if one soul, one nature, pervades all things, and is the life of\nall things, then out of each may be produced any other--out of lead,\ngold, etc. On the other hand, the four elements at least were different\nforms of the same fundamental being, and might be produced each out of\nthe other; and, in common with Bruno, Cusanus held the pre-Aristotelian\nbelief in Atomism:--there cannot be division of anything, cube or\nsurface, or line--_ad infinitum_; ultimately there must in each kind\nbe a minimum,[233] an atom, beyond which we cannot _in fact_ go,\nalthough to _thought_ it may be still further divisible; so there is\nin every figure, in every kind of thing, a definite _number_ of atoms.\nIt was partly this thought, partly also the mystical value from time\nimmemorial given to the different numbers and geometrical figures, that\nled both Cusanus and Bruno to look to mathematics and geometry for\nthe true method or organon of natural science. \"Number is the natural\nand fruitful principle of the understanding's activity; irrational\nbeings do not number. But number is nothing but the unfolding of the\nunderstanding. Without it the understanding would have none of the\nresults to which it attains.... Nothing can exist before number, for\nall that goes beyond the simplest unity is in its fashion a composite,\nand, therefore, without number is unthinkable, for multitude,\ndifference, and relation of parts arise from number.\"[234] In both\nagain human knowledge proceeds inversely as creation (or emanation)\nfrom number, the many, back through successive grades of simplicity to\nthe one highest, most simple, God, in whom are all things complicitly\n(without number). \"What appears to us as after another, successive, is\nby no means after in Thy Thought, which is eternity itself. The single\nthought, which is Thy word, embraces (_complicat_) all and each in\nitself, Thy single word cannot be manifold, opposite, changeable....\nIn the eternity in which Thou thinkest, coincides all the _after\nanother_ of time, with the _now_ of eternity. There is, therefore, no\npast nor future where future and past coincide with the present.\"[235]\nThe merely logical understanding, that which is based upon sense and\nrequires sense-images for its material, is inadequate to this highest\nknowledge, gives approximation merely, and we are thrown back upon\nmystical intuition on the one hand, reasoned faith on the other, for\nour insight into the true nature of the One and the All.[236]\n\n[Sidenote: Agrippa of Nettesheim.]\n\nOther influences which gave direction to Bruno's genius belong rather\nto physical science and pseudo-science than to philosophical theory.\nCornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim (1487-1535), the scholarly adventurer,\nthe Faust who acquired all the knowledge and most of the arts of\nhis time, wrote a compendium and justification (from Neoplatonist\nphilosophy) of magical practices,[237] and at the close of his life\nthe great declamation \"on the uncertainty and vanity of all sciences\nand arts,\"[238]--a plea for the simple life and the simple gospel. The\n_De occulta philosophia_ is the chief source from which Bruno drew the\nfantastical lore of the _De Monade_.[239] The satires upon Asinity, as\nthe chief human virtue, in the _Spaccio_ and the _Cabala_, directed\nas they are against blind faith without works or wisdom, found their\noccasion at least in Agrippa's praise of the Ass (in the _De Vanitate_)\nas the mouthpiece of God in the story of Balaam, and the bearer of\nChrist in the New Testament history.\n\n[Sidenote: Paracelsus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Cardanus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Telesio.]\n\n_Paracelsus_[240] proposed a reform of medicine on Neoplatonist\nprinciples, attacking the Galenian doctrine of the Four Humours, which\nwas based on the four elements of the Aristotelians (the warm and the\ncold, the moist and the dry). His own more \"natural\" theory made salt,\nsulphur, and mercury the (chemical) elements of all things--those\nwhich in living organisms were vivified and directed by an inner\nspirit (_e.g._ the _Archaeus_ in man), a direct emanation from the\nsoul of the universe. Through their common constitution, and the\nspirit that infused all things alike, there was a subtle, mysterious\nsympathy between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the individual body\nand the universe, and it was by the study of the relations (magical,\nastrological, and the rest) between the stars and the things of earth,\nbetween the different metals and the body of man, that Paracelsus\nproposed to reform the art of medicine. Bruno, in the _Causa_,[241]\npraises Paracelsus for his \"philosophical\" treatment of medicine,\nthat he did not rest content with the three chemical principles alone\nfor explanation of the different vital phenomena, but sought the true\nprinciple of life everywhere in a spirit or soul. He is one of the\nbuilders of the temple of wisdom,--_ad miraculum medicus_.[242] In his\nmagical writings and in the _De Monade_, Bruno is largely indebted\nfor materials to Paracelsus. The same general tendency, the desire\nfor a return to nature and to sense-observation as opposed to the\nauthority of Aristotle, and to the cult of logical or grammatical\nsubtleties, is found also in Cardan.[243] In his work there is the\nsame mixture of mathematics and physical science with theology, magic,\nand Neoplatonism, and to him Bruno owes many of his superstitions.\nThe more profound Telesio also (who before Bruno \"made honourable war\nupon Aristotle\")[244] attempted, independently of all authority, from\nsense-knowledge and induction alone, to penetrate the mysteries of\nnature.\n\n[Sidenote: Copernicus.]\n\nOnly one name remains with which that of Bruno is indelibly\nassociated--that of Copernicus, whose _De orbium coelestium\nRevolutionibus_ was published in 1543. It was his theory of the\nsolar system, coinciding as it seemed with that of the most ancient\nphilosophers, that gave the decisive trend to Bruno's thought, holding\nhim fast to the one all-important fact that the earth is not the centre\nof the universe but one of its humblest members. Without the solid\narguments of Copernicus, Bruno's superb conception of the cosmic system\nwould have remained a dream, an intuition of genius, rather than a\nwell-grounded forecast of modern scientific discovery. \"There is more\nunderstanding,\" said Bruno, \"in two of his chapters than in the whole\nphilosophy of nature of Aristotle and all the Peripatetics.[245] Grave,\nthoughtful, careful, and mature in mind, not inferior to any of the\nastronomers that went before him--in natural judgment far superior\nto Ptolemy, Hipparch, Eudoxus, and all the others that have walked\nin their footsteps--a height he attained by freeing himself from the\nprejudices, not to say blindness, of the vulgar philosophy. Yet he did\nnot get beyond it; being more a student of mathematics than of nature,\nhe was unable wholly to uproot all unfitting, vain principles, to solve\nall contrary difficulties, liberate both himself and others from so\nmany vain inquiries, and fix their contemplation on things abiding and\nsure. With all that, who can sufficiently appraise the greatness of\nthis German, who paid little heed to the foolish multitude, and stood\nsolid against the torrent of opposing belief. Although almost destitute\nof living reasons for weapons, he took up those cast-off and rusty\nfragments that he could get to his hand from antiquity; repolished\nthem, brought the pieces together, mended them, so that through his\narguments--mathematical rather than physical though they were--he made\na cause that had been ridiculed, despised, neglected, to be honoured\nand prized, to seem more probable than its contrary, and certainly\nmore suitable and expeditious for calculation.\"[246] Copernicus had put\nforward the theory as a hypothesis merely, and had shown how much more\nsimply the different positions of the sun and planets as seen from the\nearth could be explained by it, and how much more accurately they could\nbe calculated. In the Epistle prefixed to his work (said by Bruno not\nto be by Copernicus himself), the reader was warned of the folly of\ntaking this hypothesis as true. To Bruno the contrary of the hypothesis\nwas absurd. Bruno did not appreciate the mathematical proofs of\nCopernicus, and constantly spoke of him as too much of a mathematician,\ntoo little of a physicist: his own mathematical demonstrations were,\nhowever, much less successful than those of his predecessor.[247]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE[248]\n\n\nIt is the object of this chapter to give some account of the\nspeculations on nature and spirit which occupied Bruno during his first\nyear in England, and which show how hard he was striving to pierce\nthrough the shell of medi\u00e6val thought in which his mind was encased.\nHowever fiercely he struggled to gain his freedom, it was impossible\nthat he should do so quite at once. With all his contemporaries, he was\nimbued in Aristotle's ways of thought, and the problems he set himself\nto answer were largely determined for him by Aristotle. The categories\nwith which he wrought,--\"principle,\" \"cause,\" \"form,\" \"matter,\"\n\"potency,\" \"act,\" \"subject,\" were those of the Stagirite, and were\nopen, therefore, to the same charge of unfruitfulness. On the other\nhand, while the outward form of Bruno's philosophy, and to a certain\nextent its matter also, were essentially Aristotelian, the spirit which\ninfused it all was not so; the emotion and enthusiasm with which he\nwrote savoured rather of the fire of Plato than of the logical mind of\nhis successor; and throughout, the new conception of nature and of mind\nwhich belongs to modern philosophy was struggling to the light.\n\nFrom his Platonist masters Bruno had learned that the Highest or\nFirst Principle was unknowable to man, being beyond the reach of his\nsenses and of his understanding alike: a complete systematisation of\nknowledge was therefore impossible. A philosophy of nature had to seek\nonly for physical (_i.e._ real or \"immanent\") causes or principles;\nthese might depend, indeed, upon the highest and first principle or\ncause, but the dependence was not so close that the knowledge of the\nformer gave us knowledge of the latter: no single system of knowledge\ncould embrace both. Knowing the universe, we yet knew nothing of the\nessence or substance of its first cause, any more than that of the\nsculptor Apelles could be inferred from the statue he had made. The\nthings of nature, although effects of the divine operation, became the\nremotest accidents, when regarded as means to the knowledge of the\ndivine supernatural Essence. \"We have still less ground for knowing it\nthan for knowing Apelles from his finished statues, for all of these\nwe may see, and examine, part by part, but not the great and infinite\neffect of the divine potency.\"[249] The First Principle is, therefore,\nthe concern of the moralist and of the theologian, as revealed to them\nby the gods, or declared to them through the inspired knowledge of\ndiviner men and of the prophets. On the other hand, in the universe we\nhave the infinite image of God, and it is, therefore, possible through\nit to obtain an approximate knowledge of Him: \"the magnificent stars\nand shining bodies, which are so many inhabited worlds, and animate\nbeings or deities, worlds similar to that which contains ourselves,\nmust depend, since they are composite and capable of dissolution,\nupon a principle and cause; and consequently, by their greatness,\ntheir life and work, they show forth and preach the majesty of this\nfirst principle and cause.\"[250] Thus the starting-point of Bruno's\nmature philosophy is _nature_ as the vestige or imprint of divinity,\nand divinity is considered only \"as nature itself or as reflected in\nnature\": the presence of a transcendent principle above and beyond\nnature is, indeed, premised to the discussion of the _Causa_, but it is\nno longer admitted that its study falls within the philosopher's scope,\nnor does it ever hamper or in any way influence the course of the\nargument. So far from that, we find, at the completion of the dialogue,\nthat we have arrived at an _immanent_ principle or divinity, which\nrenders the _transcendent_ superfluous.\n\n[Sidenote: Principle: Cause.]\n\nThe purpose of the _Causa_,[251] Bruno's first purely philosophical\nwork, was to determine what are the creative and constitutive\nprinciples of the natural world,--its efficient cause, its end, its\nform, its matter, and its unity; or, in other words, to lay down the\n\"foundations of knowledge,\" to give an outline-picture of reality the\ndetails of which it was left to experience and observation to fill in.\nBruno begins by laying down certain distinctions, which, however, do\nnot, in the end, prove very binding. First, a _principle_ (_principio_)\nis that which enters, intrinsically, into the constitution of a thing,\nwhile a _cause_ concurs from without in its production; thus, matter\nand form, which are principles rather than causes, are the elements of\nwhich a thing is composed and into which it is resolved. A cause, on\nthe other hand, remains outside of the resultant object--for example,\nthe efficient, creating cause, and the end or final cause for which\nthe thing is ordained. Principle is the more general term, for \"in\nNature, not everything that is principle, is also cause: the point\nis principle of the line, not cause; the instant, of the event; the\nstarting-point, of the movement; the premisses, of the argument.\"[252]\nGod is both principle and cause, but from different points of view:\n\"He is first _principle_ in so far as all things are posterior to him\nin nature, duration, or dignity; he is first _cause_ in so far as all\nthings are distinguished from him as effect from efficient, thing\nproduced from producer. The points of view are different, for not\nalways is the prior and more worthy a cause of that which is posterior\nand less worthy; and not always is the cause prior and more worthy than\nthat which is caused.\"[253] There are really two marks of a principle\ngiven by Bruno, priority in worth, and internality; but, generally,\na principle is that without which a thing could not come into being,\nand which if taken away would take away also the being of the thing.\nTo a cause the latter half of this description would not apply, as it\nremains outside of the effect. Thus God as principle is immanent in all\nthings, and is the higher source from which they proceed. This twofold\ninterpretation of the relation of God to nature and to natural things\nwas already inherent in the Neoplatonic doctrine which formed Bruno's\nstarting-point, since God as the source of emanation was outside of\nthe emanations themselves, and was unaffected by them; on the other\nhand, the gradations in the different stages of emanation, and the\npossibility of rising from the lowest to the highest, to the One\nabove all, implied the existence of _somewhat_ of the One as a common\nnature in all. The two points of view were, however, held apart, and\nthe contradiction between them was not consciously perceived, so that\nthe coincidence of nature between God as the source, and matter as\nthe lowest emanation, never suggested itself; on the contrary, their\ncomplete opposition was maintained until Bruno put forward his theory\nof the \"divinity of matter,\" which forms the real theme of the _Causa_.\n\n[Sidenote: Efficient cause of nature.]\n\nThe _efficient cause_ of the natural world is the universal\nintelligence, \"the first and principal faculty of the soul of the\nworld.\" This _intellectus universalis_ is to natural things as our\nintellect to the thoughts of our mind, and Bruno identifies it with\nthe Demiurge of the Platonists, and the \"seed-sower\" of the Magi, for\nit impregnates matter with all \"forms\": it is an _artefice interno_,\nfor it works from within in giving form and figure to matter, as the\nseed or root from within sends forth the stem, the stem the branches,\nthe branches the formed twigs, and these the buds; \"from within leaves,\nflowers, fruit are formed, figured, patterned; from within again in\ndue time the sap is recalled from leaves and fruit to twigs, from\ntwigs to branches, from these to stem, from stem to root.... But how\nmuch greater an artificer is he that works not in any single part of\nmatter alone, but continually and in all.\"[254] The _intellectus_ is\nboth external and internal to any particular being; _i.e._ it is not a\npart of any particular existence, is not exhausted by it, therefore is\nso far external to it; on the other hand, it does not act upon matter\nfrom without, but from within,[255] the efficient cause is at the same\ntime an inward principle.\n\n[Sidenote: Formal cause of nature.]\n\n[Sidenote: Final cause.]\n\nThe _formal_ cause of nature is the _ideal reason_; before the\nintelligence can produce species or particular things, can bring\nthem forth from the potentiality of matter into reality, it must\ncontain them \"formally,\" _i.e._ ideally, in itself, as the sculptor\ncannot mould different statues without having first thought out their\ndifferent forms.[256] This ideal reason is the _Idea ante rem_ of the\nScholastics. The ideas of the intelligence are not, as such, the things\nof nature, they are the models by which the intellect guides nature\nin its production of individual things. The _final_ cause which the\nintellect sets before itself is the perfection of the universe, _i.e._\nthat all possible forms may have actual existence in the different\nportions of matter; from its joy in this end proceeds its ceaseless\nactivity in the production of forms out of matter.[257]\n\n[Sidenote: Form.]\n\nAmong _constitutive principles_ or elements of things, the\n_intellectus_ again takes the foremost place as the form; for, as we\nhave seen, it is both extrinsic and intrinsic to the nature of things,\n... \"the soul is in the body as the pilot in the ship; in so far as\nhe is moved along with it, he is part of the ship, but in so far as\nhe governs and guides it, he is not a part but a separate agent; so\nthe soul of the universe, in so far as it animates and gives form to\nthings, is intrinsic formal principle; in so far as it directs and\ngoverns, it is not part, nor principle, but cause.\"[258] As external,\nthe soul of the world is independent of matter, and untouched by its\ndefects: it is only the perfections of the lower that are present\nin the higher being, and that to a higher degree. As internal it\nconstitutes the soul in all things--down to the very lowest, although\nin these it is repressed or latent. This all-presence of soul does not\nmean, however, that each particular thing, _e.g._ a table or garment,\nis, as such, a living and sensible being, but only that in everything,\nhowever small or insignificant, there is a portion or share of spirit,\nanimating it, and this, \"if it find a properly disposed subject, may\nextend itself so as to become plant or animal, and may receive the\nlimbs of any body whatsoever, such as is commonly said to be animate.\"\nEven the smallest material body, therefore, has in it the potentiality\nof life and mind.\n\n[Sidenote: Substance.]\n\nIt follows that there are, strictly speaking, only two _substances_,\nmatter and spirit: all particular things result from the composition in\nvarying degrees of these two--are therefore mere \"accidents,\" and have\nno abiding reality. Bruno joins issue in this with the Peripatetics, to\nwhom the \"real man,\" for example, is a composite of body and soul, or\nthe true soul is the perfection or actualisation of the living body,\nor is a resultant from a certain harmony of form and of limbs.[259]\nDeath or dissolution would mean to them the loss of their being;\nwhereas neither \"body nor soul need fear death, for both matter and\nform are constant abiding principles.\"[260] This theory of substance\nand of immortality was regarded by Bruno as one of the cardinal points\nof his philosophy,[261] and one in which he differed most widely from\nAristotle, as interpreted by him, and from the Aristotelians. Its\nstatement, and the criticism of the Peripatetics, occur again and\nagain throughout the works, and he believed the removal from man of the\nfear of death to be one of the greatest results of his teaching.--\"This\nspirit, being persistent along with matter--and these being the one\nand the other indissoluble, it is impossible that anything should\nin any respect see corruption or come to death, in its substance,\nalthough in certain accidents everything changes face, and passes now\ninto one composition, now into another, through now one disposition,\nnow another, leaving off or taking up now this now that existence.\nAristotelians, Platonists, and other sophists have not understood what\nthe substance of things is. In natural things that which they call\nsubstance, apart from matter, is pure accident. When we know what\n_form_ really is, we know what is life and what is death; and, the\nvain and puerile fear of the latter passing from us, we experience\nsome of that blessedness which our philosophy brings with it, inasmuch\nas it lifts the dark veil of foolish sentiment concerning Orcus and\nthe insatiable Charon, that wrests from us or empoisons all that is\nsweetest in our lives.\"[262]\n\nThere is a certain ambiguity in the description of substance. Whether\nis the spiritual unity which is placed over against matter itself\nsubstance, or is it rather the particular souls which are part of it,\nand which are thus immortal, changing only the form of composition\ninto which they enter? In this dialogue it seems Bruno is speaking\nonly of the world-soul,[263] but in later works, especially in the\n_Spaccio_ and _De Minimo_, the substantiality and immortality of the\nindividual soul are categorically asserted. In the _Causa_ however,\nBruno maintains quite clearly the substantiality of the universal soul\nalone, the finite individual being merely one of the modes of its\ndetermination in matter.[264]\n\nHaving shown that no part of matter is ever entirely without \"form,\"\nBruno leaves aside for the present the question whether all form\n(Spirit) is equally accompanied by matter. The form or world-soul\nis not more than one, for all numerical multiplication depends on\nmatter. It is in itself unchanging; only the objects vary, the\ndifferent portions of matter into which it enters: and although\nin the object it is the spirit or form which causes the part to\ndiffer from the whole, yet _it_ does not differ in the part or in\nthe whole. There are differences of aspect only, according as it is\nregarded as (_a_) subsisting in itself, or as (_b_) the actuality and\nperfection of some object, or as (_c_) referred to different objects\nwith different dispositions.[265] That is, Spirit in itself,--the\nuniversal Spirit,--the Spirit or Soul of a particular animate being,\nthe Spirits or Souls of a number of different beings (a system of\nbeings), these are all the same thing looked at from different points\nof view. It is the same unique Spirit which determines the life of\nthe human individual, the development of the human race as a whole,\nand the persistence of the world; the soul of Caesar and the spirit\nof humanity are one with the soul of the universe. The relation of\nspirit to matter in Bruno's philosophy is more difficult to understand.\nSpirit is said to be neither external to nor mixed with matter, nor\ninherent in it, but \"inexistent,\" _i.e._ associated with or present to\nit. Moreover it is defined and determined by matter, because having\nin itself power to realise particular things of innumerable kinds,\nit \"contracts\" or limits itself to realise a given individual; and\non the other side the potency of matter, which is indeterminate, and\ncapable of any form whatsoever, is \"determined\" to one particular\nkind; so that the one is cause of the definition and determination\nof the other. Thus particular bodies are modes (determinations) of\nspirit and also of matter. As the universal form, spirit is all-present\nthroughout the universe, not however materially or in extension, but\nspiritually, _i.e._ intensively. Bruno's favourite illustration is\nthat of a voice or utterance--\"imagine a voice which is wholly in\nthe whole of a room, and in every part of it; everywhere it is heard\nwholly, as these words which I speak are understood wholly by all,\nand would be even if there were a thousand present; and if my voice\ncould reach to all the world, it would be all in all.\"[266] So the\nsoul is individual, not as a point is, but, analogously to a voice, or\nutterance, filling the universe. It is clear from these passages that\nthe finite soul has no more reality in this phase of Bruno's pantheism\nthan in Spinoza's; not only is the world-soul one as _unique_, but it\nis also one as indivisible--there are no parts of it: it is wholly in\neach of the parts of the universe--in each of its realisations. The\nfinite individual, as this particular soul in this particular body, is\naccordingly a mere accident, and passes away as all accidents do; its\nexistence is due chiefly to matter, by the varying \"dispositions\" of\nwhich the universal form is \"determined\" to this or that particular\nform; matter is in general the source of all particularity, all number\nand measure. The difficulty underlying this attribution of diversity to\na matter which is supposed to be, apart from the _form_, undetermined\nand undifferentiated, has been referred to above. It is emphasised\nin the argument to this part of the _Causa_ given in the introductory\nepistle,[267] where matter, although formless in itself, is spoken of\nas \"consisting in diverse grades of active and passive qualities?\"\nBruno seems, however, at this time unconscious of the difficulty.\nCertainly from pure matter and pure form, body and spirit, standing\nover against one another, no start could be made. Diversity had to come\ninto the world somehow.\n\n[Sidenote: The deduction of matter.]\n\nWe have not yet solved the problem as to the relation between these two\nprinciples themselves--matter and form. Bruno confesses to have held\nat one period the \"Epicurean view that matter was the only substance,\nthe forms being merely accidental dispositions of it; but on further\nconsideration he was compelled to recognise a formal as well as a\nmaterial substance.\"[268] In fact, however, both form and matter\ntend as the philosophy develops to coincide in a higher unity which\nis at last the ultimate reality. The \"proof\" of \"Matter\" is from the\nanalogy between Nature and Art. All who have attempted, said Bruno,\nto distinguish _matter_ from _form_ have made use of the analogy of\nthe arts (_e.g._ the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics). Take\nsome art such as that of the wood-worker; in all its forms and all its\noperations it has as subject (or material) wood--as the iron-worker\nhas iron; the tailor, cloth. All these arts produce each in its own\nmaterial various pictures, arrangements, figures, none of which is\nproper or natural to that material. So Nature, which art resembles,\nmust have for its operations a certain matter (material); for no agent\nintending to make something can work without something _of_ which to\nmake it, or wishing to act can do so without something _on_ which to\nact; there is therefore a species of subject or material, of which\nand in which _nature_ effectuates its operation, its work, and which\nis by it formed in the many forms presented to the eye of reflection.\nAnd as wood by itself has not any artificial form, but may have any or\nall through the action of the wood-worker, so the matter of which we\nspeak, of itself and in its own nature, has not any _natural_ form, but\nmay have any or all through the agent, the active principle of nature.\nThis natural matter or material is imperceptible, differing so from\nthe material of art, because the matter of nature has absolutely no\nform, whereas the matter of art is a thing already formed by nature.\nArt can operate only upon the surface of things formed by nature, as\nwood, iron, stone, wool, and similar things; but nature operates from\nthe centre so to speak, of its subject, or matter, which in itself is\nwholly devoid of form. The subjects of the arts are many--of nature\none; for those being diversely formed by nature, are different and\nvarious, while the latter, not being formed at all, is entirely\nindifferent,--every difference and variety being due to the form.[269]\nAs it is absolutely formless, this matter cannot be perceived by the\nsenses, which are the media of natural forms, but only by the eye\nof reason. As visible matter, that of art, remains the same under\ncountless variations of form,--the form of a tree becoming that of a\ntrunk, of a beam, of a table, a chair, a stool, a comb, its nature\nas wood continuing throughout; so in _nature_ that which was seed\nbecomes herb; the herb, corn in the ear; the corn, bread; the bread,\nbile; bile, blood; blood again seed, an embryo, a man, a corpse, earth,\nstone, or other things, and so through all natural forms. There must\nthen be one and the same thing which in itself is not stone nor earth,\nnor corpse, nor man, nor embryo, nor blood, nor anything else.[270]\nSo the Pythagorean Timaeus[271] inferred, from the transmutations of\nthe elements one into another,--earth into water, the dry into the\nmoist,--a _tertium quid_, which was neither moist nor dry, but became\nsubject now of the one, now of the other _nature_. Otherwise the earth\nwould have gone to nothing and the water come from nothing, which is\nimpossible. Thus nothing is ever annihilated but the accidental, the\nexterior, material form, both matter and the substantial form, _i.e._\nspirit, being eternal.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural forms.]\n\nThe argument has proved that there is a something, the \"I know not\nwhat\" of Locke, which is the substance of all natural things, \"natural\nforms.\" We have now to see in what relation this substance stands to\nthe forms, the differences, which are on its surface. All natural forms\ndissolve in matter, and come again in matter, so that nothing is really\n\"constant, firm, eternal, or deserving of the name of a principle,\nbut matter: besides that the forms have no existence without matter,\nin it they are generated and decay, from it they issue, into it are\nreceived again; therefore matter, which remains always the same and\nalways fruitful, must be regarded as the only substantial principle, as\nthat which always is and always abides; and the forms but as varying\ndispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and are renewed;\ntherefore they have no claim to be principles.\"[272]\n\nThe matter or material of which Bruno here speaks is what afterwards\nwas called _extension_, or the extended substance, and the natural\nforms are the various individual shapes or bodies of nature: both from\nthe transformations of one into the other, and again from the fact\nthat the particular forms come into being and cease to exist, it was\nargued that there must be an underlying something, material indeed, but\ndifferent from all the things we know or see, indifferently capable of\nbecoming any one of them, persisting throughout their becoming, their\nchange, and their ceasing to exist,--_i.e._ a permanent reality.\n\n[Sidenote: Matter as potentiality.]\n\n[Sidenote: First principle or absolute.]\n\nMatter, however, meant not only \"subject\" or substrate, but also\n\"potentiality,\" or possibility: and we have to consider it in this\nlight also. Everything that exists is therefore _possible_, and the\npossibility of coming into existence,--\"passive potency,\"--implies\nthat of bringing into existence--\"active potentiality or power\"; the\none is never without the other, not even in the first principle.\nThus the first principle is all that which it has the possibility of\nbeing--in it reality and possibility are one; whereas a stone, _e.g._\nis not all that it has the possibility of being, for it is not lime,\nnor vase, nor dust, nor grass. That which is all that it can be, the\nAbsolute, is also all that any other thing is or can be: it embraces\nall being within itself. Other things are not thus absolute, but\nlimited to one reality at a time, _i.e._ one specific and particular\nexistence. They can be more only through succession and change. \"Every\npossibility and actuality that in the (first) principle is as it were\n_complicate_, united, one, in other things is _explicate_, dispersed,\nmany. The universe, which is the great _simulacrum_ and image (of the\nfirst principle) is--it also--all that which it may be in its kinds\nand principal members, as containing all matter, to which no element\nof the whole (the universal) form can be added, in which no phase of\nthat form is ever wanting; but it is not all that which it may be in\nits differences, its modes, properties, and individuals; thus it is\na mere shadow of the first reality, and first potency, and so far in\nit reality and possibility are not the same absolutely, that no part\nof it is all that which it may be: besides that, as we have said,\nthe universe is all that it may be only in explicitness, dispersion,\ndistinctness, whereas its _principle_ is so unitedly and indifferently,\nfor in it all is all, and the same, simply, without difference or\ndistinction.\"[273]\n\n[Sidenote: Matter and form are one.]\n\n[Sidenote: Matter or substrate of the spiritual world.]\n\nBruno works out at considerable length the paradoxes to which this\nidentity of all possibility and all reality in the first principle\nlead. Thus, in magnitude it is both greatest and least, and as in\nmagnitude, so in goodness, in beauty; the sun would fitly represent\nsuch a principle if it were at the same moment in all parts of the\nuniverse, if its motion were so swift that it was everywhere at\nonce, and therefore motionless. God, however, is not only all that\nthe sun may be, but also all that everything else may be--\"potency\nof all potencies, reality of all realities, life of all lives, soul\nof all souls, being of all beings.\" That which elsewhere is contrary\nand opposite, is in Him one and the same.[274] Bruno has brought us\nback in a curious way to the very first principle which he proposed\nto exclude from contemplation: it can be understood, it is true,\nonly by negations, for our intellect cannot measure itself with the\nimmeasurable: we can form no image or idea of a great that might\nnot be greater. But here follows one of the most vital steps in his\nphilosophy:--As the absolute possibility, the first principle becomes\nitself _matter_, and as there is no possibility without an actuality,\npresent or to come, the absolute possibility is also absolute\nreality, or matter and form coincide in the _One_.[275] We approach\nthis conclusion first from the consideration of matter as \"subject\"\n(substrate). From the changes of one natural substance into others we\ninferred a universal substrate, undifferentiated, which formed at once\nthe basis of the community of nature in things, and the ground of their\ndifference.[276] But the spiritual and the corporeal worlds, also, as\ndistinguished from one another, imply a common \"subject\" or substrate\nin which they are _one_ or identical. Bruno refers, as we have seen,\nto Plotinus[277] as having held that distinction and difference imply\na common ground or unity, and that \"intelligible\" distinctions are not\nexempt from this rule. \"As man _qu\u00e2_ man is different from lion _qu\u00e2_\nlion, but in the common nature of animal or of corporeal substance\nthey are one and the same, so the matter of things corporeal, as such,\nis different from the matter of things incorporeal, as such: but from\nanother point of view it is the same matter which in dimensions or\nextension is corporeal matter, and which when without dimensions or\nextension is an incorporeal substance. In things eternal (spiritual)\nthere is one matter in one simple realisation, in things variable\n(corporeal) matter has now one, now another; in the former, it has at\none time and all together all that which it can have, and is all that\nit may be; in the latter, at many times, on different occasions, and\nin succession. The former has all species of figure and dimension, and\nbecause it has all, it has none: for that which is so many diverse\nthings, cannot be any one of them in particular. That which is all\nmust include every particular existence.[278] In it, absolute potency\nand absolute actuality, matter and form, do not differ at all; it is\nthe extreme of purity, simplicity, individuality, and unity, because it\nis absolutely all. It is individual in the highest sense. Being both\nmatter and form, it is neither: as matter, it has all dimensions and\nnone; as form, it has all formal existence or qualities and none. The\ncorporeal matter is _contracted_ to this or that dimension, whereas\nspiritual matter is free (_absoluta_) of dimensions, therefore is both\nabove all, and comprising all. Thus matter in itself, being without\ndimensions, is indivisible: it acquires dimensions according to the\nnature of the form it receives: the dimensions under the human form\ndiffer from those under the horse form, and from those under the olive\nor the myrtle form. But before it can be under any of these forms, it\nmust have _in faculty_ all their dimensions, as it has the possibility\nor potency of receiving all the forms. In itself it includes rather\nthan excludes all dimensions, because it does not receive them as from\nwithout, but sends them, brings them forth, from itself, as from the\nwomb.\"[279] In other words, _Nature_, under one aspect, is a spiritual\nunity, in which are comprised all possible differences, or all separate\nexistences: under another it is these many existences themselves, in\neach of which, in succession, all differences are \"realised,\" all\nmodes come into being: and finally, under another aspect, it is the\nforce which brings forth the separate forms or existences out of the\nformless, indeterminate, undifferentiated unity of being, or God.\n\nThe two kinds of matter, or potentiality, the lower and the higher,\nare thus essentially one; so we reach the notion, not indeed of \"the\nhighest and best principle,\" as Bruno is again careful to remind us,\nbut of the soul of the world, as reality of all, and potency of all,\nand all in all. Thus in the end, although individuals are innumerable,\nall things are one; and the knowledge of this unity is the goal and\nlimit of all philosophy of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The unity of spirit and body.]\n\n[Sidenote: Coincidence of all things in the One.]\n\nThis unity, which embraces all the knowable, is the subject of the\nfifth dialogue of the _Causa_. The steps by which we have reached it\nare:--first, the identification of a common nature, or _substratum_\nin things corporeal,--corporeal matter, that which is common to\nall physical existences; secondly, the recognition that there must\nsimilarly be a corresponding matter, or common ground of things\nspiritual; there also differences exist and demand an identity; and\nfinally, corporeal matter and spiritual matter must themselves coincide\nin ground; there must exist that which is indifferently either, or\nwhich is the potency of both, and their \"subject\" or substratum. To the\nobjection that to have dimensions is characteristic of matter, it is\nanswered that each kind of matter _has_ dimensions, only the latter has\nthem absolutely, _i.e._ it has all indifferently, and therefore none,\nwhile the other is always \"contracted\" to one or other at each instant,\nbut has all successively. We have seen that at the close of the fourth\ndialogue Bruno refers again to the first principle, unknowable, or\nknowable only by faith, and professes to abstain from any consideration\nof it. It is quite clear, however, that Bruno could not have said of\nit anything other than he says of this unity of the corporeal and the\nspiritual itself. That which is implicitly all reality in such a manner\nthat it is at the same time none of the particular forms of the real,\nis all things and none--could not be other than the highest principle.\nFurther, this unity already has the distinction applied formerly to the\nHighest Intelligence,--it \"is all,\" and at the same time it \"creates\nall,\" in producing the forms out of itself. The unity then is only the\nworld-soul from a special point of view, or the world-soul is at once\nthe unity of itself and of the corporeal world.[280] This means that\nof the spiritual and the corporeal worlds each is a unity in itself,\nand each only a special aspect of a final unity which embraces both.\nIt is no wonder then that Schelling found a congenial spirit in Bruno.\nThe reality of this final matter or unity is moreover higher, truer,\nthan that of any of the forms to which it gives birth, and finally it\nis _divine_. Little more is wanting to prove the entire superfluity\nof the theological highest principle. The unity (or matter) is by no\nmeans an \"abstract\" identity, but a concrete whole, which contains all\ndifferentiation in itself, and a \"dynamic\" being, which produces, or\nrealises, its own modes. \"Determinate, sensible, _explicate_ existence\nis not the highest characteristic (_raggione_) of actuality, but\nis a thing consequent, an effect of the latter; thus the principal\nessence of wood, _e.g._ the characteristic of its actuality, does not\nconsist in its being 'bed'; but in its being of such a substance and\nconsistency that it _may be_ bed, bench, beam, idol, or anything formed\nof wood. Nature, however, from its material produces all things, not\nas art, by mechanical removal or addition of parts, but by separation,\nbirth, efflux, as the Pythagoreans understood,\"--Bruno adds Anaxagoras,\nDemocritus, the Wise Men of Babylon, Moses! \"Rather, then, it contains\nthe forms and includes them, than is empty of them, or excludes them;\nand matter, which makes explicit what it contains implicitly, ought to\nbe called a _Divine thing_: it is the substance of nature.\"[281] Thus\nthe One is the only ultimate reality; it is neither matter nor form,\nyet both together,--implicitly. And it has no parts, or all parts, for\nall parts coincide in it, the smallest with the greatest, in it all\nparticular things coincide with one another, and all differences. It\nhas all possible existence and is therefore unchangeable, it has all\nperfections and therefore is infinitely perfect.\n\n[Sidenote: Indifference of all things in the Infinite.]\n\n\"The universe is one, infinite, immovable. One is the absolute\npossibility, one the reality. One the form or soul, one matter or body.\nOne the thing, one the _ens_. One the greatest and best, which can not\nbe comprised, and therefore can neither be ended nor limited, and even\nso is infinite and unlimited, and consequently immovable. It does not\nmove locally, for there is no place outside of itself, to which it\nmight transport itself (for it is the all). Of it is no generation, for\nthere is no other existence which it can desire or expect, for it has\nall existence. Of it is no corruption, for there is no other thing to\nwhich it can change; it is everything. It cannot grow less or greater,\nfor it is infinite; it cannot be added to, and it cannot be subtracted\nfrom, for the infinite has no proportional parts. It cannot be subject\nto mutation in any quality whatever, nor is there anything contrary\nto, or diverse from it, which may alter it, for in it all things are\nin harmony.\"[282] In it height is not greater than length or depth;\nhence by a kind of simile it may be called a sphere. It has no parts,\nfor a part of the infinite must be infinite, and if it is infinite it\nconcurs in one with the whole; hence the universe is one, infinite,\nwithout parts. Within it there is not part greater and part less, for\none part, however great, has no greater proportion to the infinite than\nanother, however small; and therefore, in infinite duration, there is\nno difference between the hour and the day, between the day and the\nyear, between the year and the century, between the century and the\nmoment; for moments and hours are not more in number than centuries,\nand those bear no less proportion to eternity than these. Similarly,\nin the immeasurable, the foot is not different from the yard, the yard\nfrom the mile, for in proportion to immensity, the mile is not nearer\nthan the foot. Infinite hours are not more than infinite centuries,\ninfinite feet are not of greater number than infinite miles.[283]\nThus, Bruno frankly draws the conclusion, which is inherent in all\npantheistic thought, that in the infinite all things are indifferent;\nthere are no proportional parts thereof--in it one is not greater nor\nbetter than another: \"In comparison, similitude, union, identity with\nthe infinite, one does not approach nearer by being a man than by being\nan ant, by being a star than by being a man. In the infinite these\nthings are indifferent, and what I say of these holds of all other\nthings or particular existences. Now if all these particular things\nin the infinite are not one and another, are not different, are not\nspecies, it necessarily follows that they are not number (_i.e._ not\ndistinct)--the universe is again an immovable, unchangeable one. If in\nit act does not differ from potency, then point, line, superficies and\nbody do not differ in it (for each is potency of the other--a line by\nmotion may become a surface, a surface a body). In the infinite, then,\npoint does not differ from body; since the point is potency of body, it\ndoes not differ from body, where potency and act are one and the same\nthing. If point does not differ from body, centre from circumference,\nfinite from infinite, the greatest from the least, then the universe,\nas we have said, is all centre, or the centre of the universe is\neverywhere; or, again, the circumference is everywhere but the centre\nis nowhere.\" Thus, not only are the particular existences indifferent\nin the infinite: they have also in it no _true_ reality, _i.e._ their\nexistence is a purely relative one.\n\nWe have now to consider the relation of particular things one to\nanother. It follows from the argument that all things are in all;\neach particular thing has the possibility of all reality, has all\nreality implicit in itself, but only one _mode_ is at any particular\ntime realised, and the life of particular things consists in their\nconstant transmutation from one mode to another. While the universe\ncomprehends all existence and all modes of existence,--of particular\nthings, each has all existence, but not all _modes_ of existence,\nand cannot _actually_ have all circumstances and accidents, for many\nforms are incompatible in the same subject, either as contraries or as\nbelonging to diverse species. The same individual subject (_supposito_)\ncannot be under the accidents of horse and of man, under the dimensions\nof a plant and of an animal. Moreover, the universe comprehends all\nexistence wholly, because outside of and beyond infinite existence\nthere is nothing that exists, for there is no outside or beyond: of\nparticular things on the other hand, each comprehends all existence,\nbut not wholly, for beyond each are infinite others. But the ens,\nsubstance, essence of all is one, which being infinite and unlimited in\nits substance as in its duration, in its greatness as in its force, can\nneither be called principle nor resultant; for as everything concurs\nin its unity and identity, it is not relative, but absolute. In the\none infinite, immovable, which is substance, _ens_, there is multitude,\nnumber; and number, as \"mode\" of the _ens_, differentiates thing from\nthing; it does not therefore make the _ens_ to be more than one, but\nto be of many modes, forms, and figures. Hence \"leaving the logicians\nto their vain imaginings,\" we find that all that makes difference\nand number is pure accident, pure figure, pure \"complexion\"; every\ncreation of whatsoever sort it may be is an _alteration_, the substance\nremaining always the same, for there is only One Being, divine,\nimmortal.[284]\n\n[Sidenote: Beauty, harmony, permanence of nature.]\n\nThus all things are in the universe, the universe in all things; we in\nit, it in us; and so all concurs in a perfect unity. Therefore, cries\nBruno, we need not be troubled in spirit, nor be afraid; for this\nunity is one, stable, and always abides; this one is eternal; every\naspect, every face, every other thing, is vanity, is as nought; all\nthat is outside of this One is nought. These philosophers have found\nthe wisdom that they love, who have found this unity. Wisdom, truth,\nunity, are the same. All difference in bodies, difference of formation,\ncomplexion, figure, colour, or other property, is nothing but a varying\naspect of one and the same substance,--an aspect that changes, moves,\npasses away, of one immovable, abiding, and eternal being, in which are\nall forms, figures, members, but indistinct and \"agglomerated,\" just as\nin the seed, or germ, the arm is not distinct from the head, the sinew\nfrom the bone, and the distinction or \"disglomeration\" does not produce\nanother and new substance, but only realises in act and fulfilment\ncertain qualities of the substance, already present.\n\nThe coincidence of Bruno's doctrine with some of Spinoza's principal\npositions is striking, although their terms are different. The\nindeterminate all-comprising unity of Bruno is that which was\nafterwards called by Spinoza substance; its two aspects, material and\nspiritual--substances with Bruno,--are attributes in Spinoza, and\nfinally, the innumerable finite and passing modes with both are mere\naccidents, and therefore do not determine any change in the one reality\nitself. In a subsequent chapter other more detailed resemblances will\nbe pointed out in their bearing on the history of Spinoza's development.\n\n[Sidenote: _Coincidence of Contraries._]\n\n[Sidenote: \"Signs.\"]\n\nThe concluding portion of this dialogue and of the work is taken up\nwith the doctrine of the _Coincidence of Contraries_, which derives\nfrom that of the unity and coincidence of all differences, and which,\nalthough it was undoubtedly contained in his own system, Bruno obtained\ndirectly from Nicholas of Cusa. It is an indirect proof, from the side\nof particular things themselves, of the identity of all in the One.\nThe first illustrations are geometrical.[285] The straight line and\nthe circle, or the straight line and the curve, are opposites; but\nin their elements, or their _minima_, they coincide, for, as Cusanus\nsaw, there is no difference between the smallest possible arc and the\nsmallest possible chord. Again, in the _maximum_ there is no difference\nbetween the infinite circle and the straight line; the greater a circle\nis, the more nearly it approximates to straightness ... as a line\nwhich is greater in magnitude than another approximates more nearly to\nstraightness, so the greatest of all ought to be superlatively, more\nthan all, straight, so that in the end the infinite straight line is an\ninfinite circle. Thus the maximum and the minimum come together in one\nexistence, as has already been proved, and both in the maximum and in\nthe minimum, contraries are one and indifferent.\n\n[Sidenote: \"Verifications.\"]\n\nThese geometrical illustrations are \"signs\" of the identity\nof contraries, those which follow are called by Bruno\n\"verifications,\"[286] the first of which is taken from the primary\nqualities of bodies. The element of heat, its \"principle,\" must be\nindivisible--it cannot have differences within itself, and can be\nneither hot nor cold, therefore it is an identity of hot and cold.\n\"One contrary is the 'principle' or starting-point of the other, and\ntherefore transmutations are circular, because there is a substrate,\nprinciple, term, continuation and concurrence of both.\" So minimal\nwarmth and minimal cold are the same. The movement towards cold takes\nits beginning from the limit of greatest heat (its \"principle\" in\nanother sense). Thus not only do the two maxima sometimes concur in\nresistance, the two minima in concordance, but even the maximum and the\nminimum concur through the succession of transmutations. Doctors fear\nwhen one is in the best of health; it is in the height of happiness\nthat the foreseeing are most timid. So also the \"principle\" of\ncorruption and of generation is one and the same. The end of decay is\nthe beginning of generation; corruption is nothing but a generation,\ngeneration a corruption. Love is hate, hate is love in the end; hatred\nof the unfitting is love of the fitting, the love of this the hatred of\nthat. In substance and in root, therefore, love and hate, friendship\nand strife, are one and the same thing. Poison gives its own antidote,\nand the greatest poisons are the best medicines. There is but one\npotency of two contraries, because contraries are apprehended by one\nand the same sense, therefore belong to the same subject or substrate;\nwhere the principle (_i.e._ the source, or faculty) of the _knowledge_\nof two objects is the same, the principle (_i.e._ elementary form)\nof their _existence_ is also one. (Examples are the curved and the\nplane, the concave and the convex, anger and patience, pride and\nhumility, miserliness and liberality). In conclusion:--\"He who would\nknow the greatest secrets of nature, let him regard and contemplate\nthe minima and maxima of contraries and opposites. _Profound magic it\nis to know how to extract the contrary after having found the point\nof union._\" Aristotle was striving towards it, but did not attain it,\nsaid Bruno; \"remaining with his foot in the _genus_ of opposition,\nhe was so fettered that he could not descend to the _species_ of\ncontrariety ... but wandered further from the goal at every step, as\nwhen he said that contraries could not co-exist at the same time in\nthe same subject.\"[287] There is a na\u00efve but at the same time a bold\nrealism in this demand of Bruno's that reality shall correspond even\nto the simpler unities of thought--unities which after all are mere\nlimitations. It is only because we cannot distinguish in imagination\nbetween an infinite circle and a straight line that their identity in\nactual existence is postulated, and so the minimal chord and minimal\narc coincide to our limited imagination only. Admittedly in the case\nof sense-qualities the argument is from oneness of faculty knowing to\noneness of things known. These, however, are only, as we have said,\n\"signs\" and \"verifications\" of a metaphysical truth which is arrived at\nby other methods.\n\nA corresponding passage in the _De Minimo_[288] explains more fully\nthe coincidence of contraries in the _minimum_:--\"In the _minimum_,\nthe simple, the monad, all opposites coincide, odd and even, many and\nfew, finite and infinite; therefore that which is _minimum_ is also\n_maximum_, and any degree between these.\" Besides the coincidence of\ncontraries in God as the monad of monads, the examples are given of the\nindifference of all dimensions in the universe, and the ubiquity of\nits centre; the indifference of the radial directions from the centre\nof a particular sphere; the indifference of all points in the diurnal\nrotation of the earth, so that any point whatever is east, west, north,\nor south; the \"subjective\" coincidence of concave and convex in the\ncircle (\"subjective\" meaning \"in the thing itself\"); the coincidence\nof the acute and the obtuse angle in the inclination of one line to\nanother; that of smallest arc and chord as of greatest arc and chord,\n\"whence it follows that the infinite circle and the infinite straight\nline, also the infinite diameter, area, and centre are one and the\nsame.\" Lastly, we have the coincidence of swiftest motion with slowest,\nor with rest, \"for the absolutely swift (swift '_simpliciter_,'\n_i.e._ in its highest possible manifestation, without any degree of\nthe contrary, slowness) which moves from A to B, and from B to A, is\nat once in A, and in B, and in the whole orbit, therefore, it stands\nstill.\"\n\nThese coincidences are again of two kinds: some \"subjective\" in the\nmodern sense, _e.g._ the coincidences of directions in the globe; any\none may be taken as depth according to the spectator's standpoint;\nothers are \"objective,\" _e.g._ when in God the one and the many are\nsaid to coincide. According as the stress is laid on one or on the\nother, the theory may be regarded as either dualistic (as Cusanus'\nreally was) or as pantheistic. There is no doubt, however, that it was\nin the latter sense that Bruno held the coincidence of contraries.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE INFINITE UNIVERSE--THE MIRROR OF GOD[289]\n\n\nIn the contemplation of the infinite, writes Bruno, man attains his\nhighest good. All things aspire to the end for which they are ordained,\nand the more perfect its nature the more nobly and effectively does\neach aspire. Man alone, however, as endowed with a twofold nature,\npursues a twofold good,--\"on the boundary line of eternity and time,\nbetween the archetypal world and the copy, the intelligible and the\nsensible, participating in either substance.\"[290] Human effort can\nfind satisfaction in none but the highest and first truth and goodness.\nNeither our intellect nor our will ever rests. It is clear therefore\nthat their end lies not in particular goods or truths which lead us\non from one to another and to another, but in universal good and\ntruth, outside of and beyond which no good or truth exists. So long\nas we believe that any truth is left to know, or any good to gain, we\nseek always further truth, desire always further good. The end of our\ninquiry, therefore, and of our effort cannot be in a truth or in a good\nthat is limited. In each and all is the desire in-born to become all\nthings. Such infinite desire implies the existence in reality of that\nwhich will satisfy it. If \"Universal Nature\" or Spirit is _able_ to\nsatisfy the appetite of each \"particular nature\" or mode of itself, and\nthat of itself as a whole, then the understanding and desire which are\ninnate, inseparable from and co-substantial with each and all shall not\nbe in vain, nor look hopelessly to a false and impossible end. Again,\nwere universal nature and the efficient cause content with finite\ntruth and good, they would not satisfy the infinite aspiration of\nparticular things. It is true that even the desire for continuance of\nour present life is not satisfied; a particular mode of matter cannot\nrealise all \"forms\" or ideas at once, but only in succession and one\nby one; it knows and therefore desires only that which is present to\nit at any given time: by force of nature, therefore, it comes in its\nignorance (which arises from the \"contraction\" of the form to this or\nthat particular matter and the limitation of matter by this or that\nform) to desire to be _always_ that which it _now_ is. The wise soul,\nhowever, will not fear death, will indeed sometimes wish for it, since\nthere awaits every substance eternity of duration, immensity of space,\nand the realisation of all being. \"Whatever the good be for which a\nman strives, let him turn his eyes to the heavens and the worlds;\nthere is spread before him a picture, a book, a mirror, in which he\nmay behold, read, contemplate the imprint (_vestigium_), the law, and\nthe reflection of the highest good--and with his sensible ears drink\nin the highest harmony, and raise himself as by a ladder, according to\nthe grades of the forms of things, to the contemplation of another,\nthe highest world.\"[291] The contemplation of the extended infinite\nand \"explicate\" or unfolded nature is thus only a means by which we\nmay rise to the contemplation of the infinite in itself, \"implicate\"\nnature, God. \"It is no frivolous or futile contemplation, but one\nmost weighty and worthy of the perfect man, which we pursue, when we\nseek the splendour, the fusion, and the intercommunication of divinity\nand of nature not in an Egyptian, Syrian, Greek or Roman individual,\nnot in food, drink, or any ignoble matter, with the gaping many, but\nin the august palace of the all-powerful, in the immeasurable space\nof the Ether, in the infinite potency of twofold nature, all-becoming\nand all-creating. So from the eternal vast and immeasurable effect in\nvisible things, we comprehend the eternal and the immeasurable majesty\nand goodness. Let us then turn our eyes to the omniform image of the\nomniform God, and gaze upon the living and mighty reflection of Him.\"\n\nThe three characteristics of the universe as a mirror of God which\nBruno sought to drive home to the minds of men were its infinite\nextent, the infinite number of its parts, and its uniformity, or the\nsimilarity of its constituent elements throughout its whole extent. His\nillustrations and his arguments would in many cases cause a smile if\nthey were put forward seriously at the present day, but no absurdities\ncan outbalance his enthusiasm, the readiness and thoroughness of his\npolemic against Aristotle and the old cosmology, and the fertility of\nimagination by which he is able to look, and to make others look, at\nthings from his new, and therefore, at first, confusing point of view.\n\n[Sidenote: The universe infinite.]\n\nBruno's arguments rest partly on inferences from sense-knowledge,\npartly on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus the infinity of\nextent is evidenced, first, by the teaching of sense, in the constant\nchange which our circle of vision undergoes as we move from one place\nto another. There always appears to be an ultimate limit, but no sooner\ndo we move than the limit is seen to have been only apparent; so, it\nmay be inferred, could we transfer ourselves with our senses to any\nof the distant stars, we should still seem to ourselves to be in the\ncentre of a closed sphere,--the very same appearance which is presented\nto us on this earth.\n\nAristotle's theory of the limitation of space by the ultimate sphere\nof the heavens was open to objections, many of which were raised in\nthe early schools. The \"subtle Averroes\" had endeavoured to avoid some\nof these by the doctrine that beyond this outer sphere is the divine\nbeing, the eternal self-sufficient Mind.[292] \"But how,\" asks Bruno,\n\"can body be bounded by that which is not body? The divine nature is no\nless nor in any other manner _within_ the whole than _without_; it is\nneither place nor in place.\"[293] Space therefore is always bounded by\nspace, body by body, that is, each is infinite in extent. Were divinity\nthat which bounds space, it would itself be space under another\nname.[294] Aristotle's theory implied that the universe as a whole was\nnot in any place or space. The \"place\" of each body, he had said, is\nthe containing surface of the sphere above it; the outermost sphere,\ntherefore, as there is no other beyond it, is itself uncontained and\nwithout place. The theory implied also the identity of body and space,\nand was the ground of Aristotle's rejection of the vacuum in nature.\nFor a truer conception of Space, Bruno turned to an earlier commentator\n(or group of commentators--\"Philoponus\") on Aristotle, who defined it\nas \"a continuous physical quantity in three dimensions, in which the\nmagnitude of bodies is contained, in nature before and apart from all\nbodies, receiving all indifferently, beyond all conditions of action\nand passion, not mixing with things, impenetrable, without form or\nplace.\"[295] It is called _physical_, because it can not be separated\nfrom the existence of natural things. It is itself not contained,\nbecause it equals with its dimensions those of body as the transparency\nof a crystal has the same dimensions with the crystal itself. Neither\nbody nor space can be thought of the one apart from the other.[296]\nGranted the infinity of space, that of matter necessarily follows by an\ninverse of the principle of sufficient reason:--for there is no reason,\naccording to Bruno, why this small part alone of space, where our earth\nis, should be filled; the eternal operation is not distinct from the\neternal power, nor could it be the will of God to cramp nature, which\nis the hand of the all-powerful, his force, act, reason, word, voice,\norder and will.[297] \"There is one matter, one power, one space, one\nefficient cause, God and Nature, everywhere equally, and everywhere\npowerful.--We insult the infinite cause when we say that it may be the\ncause of a finite effect; to a finite effect it can have neither the\nname nor the relation of an efficient.\"[298]\n\nThe corresponding argument from the capacity of our human imagination\nto think always of a greater than any given magnitude, _i.e._ its\ninability to rest short of the infinite, is expanded elsewhere. Our\nimaginative faculty is the _umbra_ or shadow of nature; its power,\ntherefore, of adding quantity to quantity, _ad infinitum_, must have\nsomething in nature to which it corresponds; nature does not give a\nfaculty for which there is no satisfaction. There is then in truth an\ninfinite universe, such as our imagination demands. Bruno notices the\nobjection that on this theory anything whatever might be said about the\nuniverse, _e.g._ that it is infinite man, since one can imagine a human\nform filling the universe; and he replies, \"it _is_ infinite man, or\ninfinite ass, or infinite tree, each and all, since in the infinite all\nparticular things are one and the same.\"[299]\n\n[Sidenote: Aristotle.]\n\n[Sidenote: 1. The _primum mobile_.]\n\n[Sidenote: 2. The elements.]\n\n[Sidenote: 3. The whole and its parts.]\n\nThe arguments we have traced are:--(1) What appears to be a limit\nto our senses always proves to be imaginary, when we are able to\ntest it, therefore we may infer that it is imaginary in other cases;\n(2) the very notion of space, implying that it has neither form nor\nplace, means that it is infinite, limitless; (3) we cannot imagine a\nportion of space than which there is not another greater, and so _ad\ninfinitum:_ but reality cannot fall short of thought, therefore space\nis infinite. The arguments of Aristotle against the infinity of the\nworld are taken up in detail in the second book of the _De Immenso_. As\nthe controversy, however important at the time, has lost much of its\ninterest for us, we need only give a brief sketch of its main lines.\nThe first argument was drawn from the assumption of an ultimate sphere\nor _primum mobile_ which moved about the earth as a centre.[300] It\nwas clear that if the universe were infinite the radii of this sphere\nwould be infinitely prolonged, and therefore the termini of any two\ngiven radii at an infinite distance one from another. The motion of\nthe sphere would thus be inconceivable, for it would require infinite\ntime in which to pass from one point to another. The answer of Bruno\nwas that the universe as a whole was not moveable at all, nor had it\nany centre; only its parts were moved and each of these had its own\nrelative and finite centre. The apparent motion of the sphere was due\nto the real movement of the earth about its axis. A similar answer\nwas given to the argument from the movements of bodies according to\ntheir elements. As to us on the earth, the earth appears to be the\ncentre of the universe, so to the inhabitants of the moon, the moon\nwill appear to be such. Matter rising from the earth to the moon would\nappear to the inhabitants of the latter to fall. These distinctions\nwere relative to the finite worlds, but might not be referred to\nthe whole universe. As the earth is one world, the moon another, so\neach has its own centre, each its own _up_ and _down_: nor can these\ndifferences be assigned absolutely to the whole and its parts together,\nbut only relatively to the position and condition of the latter.[301]\nIn his _third_ argument Aristotle sought to prove that infinite body\nin general was impossible.[302] If the whole is infinite its simple\nelements must be so also. These must be either of an infinite number of\nkinds, different from one another, or of a finite number of kinds, or\nall of the same kind. But the first of the alternatives is impossible\non the _a priori_ ground that each element must have a special kind of\nmovement corresponding to it, and the kinds of movement are actually\nfew in number; the second and third, because the movement of the\nelements should then be infinite, whereas in the actual universe motion\nis limited both in centre and circumference. The arguments, however, do\nnot apply to Bruno's theory of the universe. Motion is always from one\ndefinite point to another; we do not set out from Italy in order to go\non _ad infinitum_, but to go to some definite point. He does not, as\nEpicurus did, regard all minima as in infinite motion downwards through\nthe universe; there is no down, no centre, no up, all is simply and\ngenerally in flux. It is not the elements that are innumerable in kind,\nbut the composite bodies, the stars, which are constituted by them;\nand of these the parts move about their natural body, as the parts of\nthe earth towards the earth, and those of the moon toward the moon in\ntheir own regions; all motion is therefore limited,--each world has, as\nit were, _margins_ of its own. The idea that if any of the elements,\nas fire or water, were infinite, there would be infinite lightness or\ngravity, and hence that the universe would move as a whole upwards or\ndownwards, is equally at fault. To the universe as a whole the terms\nheavy and light do not apply, but only to its parts, the finite and\ndeterminate bodies consisting of finite and determinate elements. These\nelements, whether they be taken as of one or more kinds, since they\ncannot move outside of the universe, must have finite movements.\n\n[Sidenote: 4. Action between the infinite and the finite.]\n\nThe fourth argument[303] was based upon the impossibility of action\nbetween an infinite body and a second body whether finite or infinite.\nAn infinite cannot act upon a finite because the action would\nnecessarily be timeless. Were it in time we could then find a finite\nbody which in the same time would produce the same effect; but there\ncan be no such equality between the finite and the infinite. Similarly\naction between two infinites would occur in infinite time; in other\nwords, would not take place at all. The conclusion is that neither\nfire nor earth nor any of the elements can be infinite in quantity.\nBruno suggests, in the first place,[304] that a change may be produced\ntimelessly; thus if a body in a large circle cover a certain space in\nthe _minimum_ of time, a body in a smaller circle will cover a less\nspace in _no_ time, for nothing can be smaller than the minimum.[305]\nIn the second place, no action of the whole or effect upon the whole\nexists, it is only the finite bodies within it, each with its finite\nforce, that act upon one another. Even if two infinite bodies, over\nagainst one another, were supposed, their action would not be of one\nwhole upon another, but of the parts on the contiguous parts.[306]\nForce is exerted by bodies not _intensively_ but _extensively_, because\nas, where one part of a body is, there another is not, so at the point\nwhere one part of the body acts another does not.[307]\n\n[Sidenote: 5. Proportion of parts to whole in the infinite.]\n\nA difficulty, not unknown to recent philosophy, occurred as to the\nrelation of infinites to one another. Whatever is an element of\nthe infinite must be infinite also; hence both earths and suns are\ninfinite in number. But the infinity of the former, said Bruno, is not\ngreater than that of the latter; nor, where all are inhabited, are\nthe inhabitants in greater proportion to the infinite than the stars\nthemselves.[308] Each sun is surrounded by several earths or planets,\nbut the one class is not greater in respect of its infinite than the\nother. A single sun, earth, constellation, is not really a part of\nthe infinite nor a part in it, for it can bear no proportion to it.\nA thousand infinities are not more than two or three, and even _one_\nis not comprehensible by finite numbers. In the innumerable and the\nimmeasurable there is no place for more or less, few or many, nor for\nany distinctions of number or measure.[309] The matter of the stars\nis immeasurable, and no less immeasurable is that of the fiery type\nor suns than of the aqueous type or earths. Nor does the fact that\nthese infinities are not given to sense disprove their existence, as\nAristotle had maintained. To imagine there is nothing beyond the sphere\nwhich limits our range of sight, is to be like Bruno as a child, when\nhe believed there was nothing beyond Mount Vesuvius because there _was_\nnothing to strike his senses.[310] Though each class be infinite,\nwe have seen that the infinite does not act infinitely, that is\n_intensively_, but acts finitely, _i.e. extensively_. Each individual\nand species is finite, but the number of all individuals is infinite,\nand infinite are the matter in which they consist and the space in\nwhich they move. Everywhere, therefore, limit and measure are only in\nthe particular and the individual, which, compared with the universe,\nare nothing.\n\n[Sidenote: 6. Figure and body.]\n\nA further argument was derived from the necessity of figure in body\nand from the relation of body to space.[311] Every body is known to\nus as of a certain and definite figure, whereas infinite body would\nnecessarily be unfigured. In this case, said Bruno, Aristotle is\nconfounding body with space, although he elsewhere separates the two\nnotions. That space is something other than the bodies which fill it,\nthat it is more than limit or figure, is evident from the fact that\nalways between any two corporeal surfaces, between any two atoms, there\nis space. Nor is space merely an accident of body, a special quality of\nit, as colour is, for example, for we cannot think of colour without\na body in which it exists, and when the body is abstracted the colour\ngoes also, whereas space may be thought of apart from body, and body,\nwhen removed does not take with it its space. Perhaps we should say\nthat space is really the continuous ether or light which penetrates\nthroughout the universe, and seems to fill space more continuously than\nwood, stone, or iron, in which there is an admixture of _vacuum_. Must\nall bodies be figured, then the figure of the infinite is the sphere.\nThe dimensions of space coincide with those of body, and the definition\ngiven of body as tri-dimensional quantity applies also to space:--there\ncannot be any body which is not in place, nor can its dimensions exist\nwithout equal dimensions of the containing space.\n\n[Sidenote: 7. The centre of the earth, etc.]\n\nA seventh argument, closely related to some of the others, is drawn\nfrom the old belief in the earth as the centre of gravity, the heaviest\nbody in the universe, and in the empyrean as the outermost limit and\nthe lightest body.[312] But, as we have seen, there is in the universe\nno centre--as the stars and their inhabitants are heavenly beings to\nus, so are we and our earth to them. \"Just as the earth knows no centre\nor downward direction proper which is away from its own body, but only\na centre of its mass, a central cavern of its heart, from which the\nprecious life is diffused through the whole body, and which we may\nbelieve to be the chief seat of the soul; so there must be in the moon\nand other bodies a centre which connects all parts, to which every\nmember contributes, and which is nourished by all the forces of the\nliving body.\" The old belief, therefore, that if there were inhabitants\nat the antipodes they would be apt to fall downwards into space, or\nthat the parts of the moon and its living beings might fall upon our\nearth, was absurd, for the face of the earth always looks upward in the\ndirection of the radii from the centre to the superficies.[313]\n\n[Sidenote: 8. The perfect as the self-limited.]\n\nThe last argument was that drawn from the supposed perfection of the\nuniverse.[314] Aristotle defined the perfect as that which was limited\nby itself, not by another. Hence the immeasurable would not be perfect,\nwhile the world was perfect because limited by its own terminus. Again\nbody does not pass over into any other kind of quantity, but it is\nthe limit into which the line and the point flow. The first argument,\nsaid Bruno, would hold of any fragment of body, while the second\nwould apply to any animal or member of an animal, for these also are\nself-contained and do not pass over into any other kind. Perfection\nhas no reference to quantity, nor to limitation by self, which is a\ngeometrical determination.[315] For this mechanical idea of perfection,\nBruno substitutes a teleological; the perfect is that which consists\nof a number of parts or members, working together towards the end for\nwhich the whole is ordained: the universe is perfect \"as adorned by so\nmany worlds, which are so many deities, and as that in and to which, as\na unity embracing the perfection of all, innumerable things perfect in\ntheir kind are reduced, referred, united.\"[316]\n\n[Sidenote: Infinite number of worlds.]\n\nThe infinity of space or ether and of matter being proved, it follows\nagain, by the principle of sufficient reason, that the \"worlds\" are\n\"innumerable\" or infinite in number.--As it is good that the world\nexists, and would be bad did it not exist, so in a similar space,\nand where similar causes are, it is good that there be a world, and\nbad should there not be one. If the world is single, then there is a\nsingle, finite, particular good, and infinite wide-spread universal\nevil. He who is able to produce good, and does not do so, without\ncause, is evil; \"as not to be able is _privatively_ evil, to be able\nand to be unwilling would be so _positively_, and God in regard to the\nfinite effect would be a finitely good cause, in regard, however, to\nthe repression of infinite realisation, would be infinitely evil.\"[317]\nPerfection does not belong to our world, our system, taken by itself,\nsince there are innumerable other possible worlds which cannot be\ncontained in it. Given a man endowed with all human perfections, the\nexistence of other men subordinate to him is not excluded, but rather\ndemanded in order that he may fulfil the harmony of his being. So\nthe best, the first, of the monads,--which comprises all particular\nthings in itself,--embraces, in spite of its unity, innumerable worlds,\nwithout limit, under its corporeal aspect. _One_ does not suffice, for\nthe productive mind diffuses itself throughout the whole universe,\nwholly in every part, in equal goodness and power, and fills the\nvoid in order that its great image may be presented throughout the\nwhole.[318] Nature thus puts forth an infinite mirror of itself and a\nfitting reflection; its substance is infinite and its force eternal,\nthere is an _explicit_ immeasurable, as God is _implicitly_ in the\nwhole and everywhere wholly.[319] To the infinite nothing finite\nbears any proportion, nor can be a fitting product of it. Hence if it\ncommunicate itself at all to corporeal things, or unfold its magnitude\nin corporeal existences and in multitude, the reflection of its essence\nand imprint of its power must be infinite in magnitude and without\nnumber. \"Although, when we consider individuals singly, under that\nproximate and immediate respect in which they are particulars, they\nmust be referred to a finite principle and cause (since a finite effect\ndemands a finite power), in the consideration of the universe, however,\neach and all the innumerable existences in immeasurable space point to\nan infinite first cause.\"[320]\n\n[Sidenote: Argument from God to the world.]\n\nIn the simplicity and unity of God's being, all attributes are one,\ntherefore knowledge, will, and power coincide. The consequences of this\ndoctrine Bruno unfolds in a series of aphorisms or propositions--which\nare interesting as anticipating Spinoza's method of \"proof\":[321]--1.\nThe Divine essence is infinite. 2. As the measure of being, so is the\nmeasure of power. 3. As the measure of power, so is the measure of\naction. 4. God is absolutely simple essence or being in which there\ncan be no complexity nor internal diversity. 5. Consequently in him,\nbeing, power, action, volition, and whatever can be truly attributed to\nhim, are one and the same. 6. Therefore the will of God is above all\nthings, and can be frustrated neither by himself nor by another. 7.\nConsequently the Divine will is not only necessary, but is necessity\nitself, and its opposite is not only impossible but impossibility\nitself. 8. In simple essence there cannot be contrariety of any kind,\nnor inequality: will, therefore, is not contrary to, nor unequal\nto, power. 9. Necessity and liberty are one, hence what acts by the\nnecessity of nature acts freely; it would not act freely at all did\nit act otherwise than is demanded by necessity and nature, or by the\nnecessity of nature.[322] 10. There is not an infinite _power_, unless\nthere be an infinite _possible_; _i.e._ there is not that which is able\nto create an infinite unless there be that which is able to be created.\nWhat is a power which is impossible of realisation or which is relative\nto an impossible? 11. As there is a world in _this_ space, so also\nthere is able to be one in any space similar to that which, were this\nworld removed, would remain equal to the world. 12. There is no ground\nfor denying, outside the world, a similar space to that in which the\nworld is, nor any for regarding it as finite.[323] 14. It is better to\nbe than not to be; it is more worthy to create what is good than not to\ncreate it. To posit (create) being and truth is incomparably better\nthan to allow not-being or nothing. 15. The potency of nature ought\nnot to be frustrated, nor space remain unfilled for infinite duration,\nfor then potency would be relative to an impossible. 16. That infinite\npotency (whether extensive or intensive) should be frustrated of\nexistence means that infinite evil should be actually posited, as space\nis actually infinite. 17. As _this_ space can receive this world and be\nadorned thereby, so also any similar space whatever, indiscernible from\nit, a similar principle being present, could have received a similar\nworld.[324] 19. Of God and of nature we should think as highly as\npossible. 20. Of the greatest things nothing should be rashly asserted\nwhich is contrary to sense and reason.\n\n[Sidenote: Knowledge of God.]\n\nThe infinite number of worlds is thus made to depend for its proof\nupon the identity of power and will, of will and knowledge, _i.e._\nthought, in God. Whatever is in the mind of God is realised in the\nuniverse. Before God past, present, and future are one, present, and\neternal;[325] he is unable to change his purpose or to deny himself.\nWhat he wills and what he can are one and the same; nor can he do what\nhe wills not, for fate is the Divine will itself. Hence, as he cannot\nbe other than he is, so nothing can be done by him otherwise than as it\nis done. The nature of God is a simple substance; however many names\nbe predicated of it, they signify, one and all, the same thing.[326]\nInfinite virtue, if limited neither by itself nor by another, acts by\nthe necessity of its own nature, not by a necessity alien to itself\nand to its will; it is itself necessity. The necessity by which it\nacts, therefore, can be frustrated neither from within, by itself, nor\nfrom without, by another: not the former, for it cannot be both one\nthing and another, nor the latter, because its necessity is the law of\nall other things. There can be nothing which may prevent this nature,\nnecessity, will, power, from proceeding according to its whole power,\nwhich is goodness itself, according to its whole goodness, which is\npower itself, and both are infinite, and diffuse themselves infinitely.\nMan's liberty of action is expressed imperfectly, and sometimes in\nan imperfect object, is continually being disturbed by passion and\nignorance of things; for if we acted without any disturbance of the\nwill, or course of thought, without ignorance, or passion, then our\naction would be determined always towards the better of two opposed\nends. Before we act we stand between the two ways and deliberate, and\nat last determine, but in uncertainty and perturbedness of spirit;\nwhile God, as in nature most perfect, acts in the one of two ways\nthat is the most fitting. Nor is it an imperfection of nature to be\ndetermined in one direction only, away from that which may lead to\nerror. Thus we may not refer the will and action of God to a liberty of\nthis kind, of being equally or unequally disposed to two contradictory\nvolitions or acts--a liberty of indifference--but his liberty is of the\nkind which is identical with necessity. Over it is nothing greater, in\nthe way of it there is nothing equal, all things in all and throughout\nall serve it. God's knowledge is not discursive, involves no effort.\nTo be in the mind of God is to be realised (_species concepta deo est\neffectio resque_). Thus as the perfect monad, he is intrinsically and\nextrinsically the whole, sustaining all things. There is on the one\nside infinite goodness and infinite desire for its realisation, on the\nother infinite desire of being realised; the result must be perfect\nsatisfaction and perfect good.\n\n[Sidenote: Abstract ideas.]\n\nIn order to understand how far Bruno has moved at this, the final\nstage of his philosophy, from the Neoplatonism of its beginnings, the\nninth chapter of the last book of the _De Immenso_ must be taken into\naccount.[327] It is interesting in view of the relation of Spinoza to\nBruno, as well as of the consistency of Bruno's own thought. In it the\nexistence of _abstract ideal types_ is contended against,--\"Nowhere is\nessence apart from existence;--nature is nothing but the virtue that is\nimmanent (_insita_) in things, and the law by which all things fulfil\ntheir course. There is no abstract that subsists in logical reason\nbut not in reality, no justice by which things are just, no goodness\nthrough which they are good, wisdom through which they are wise, nor\nare _deitas_ and _feritas_ the ground of existence of gods and beasts:\nnor is it light by which shining bodies shine, nor shadow by which\nfolly, darkness, fictions, nonsense come to exist.\" The student of\nnature must not suppose form and matter, light and colour and motion,\nto exist separately by themselves because they may be conceived or\ndefined by themselves. There is then no archetypal world to which the\nCreator looked in fabricating this of ours, but nature produces all\nthings from within itself, without thought or hesitation. \"Study to\nknow where Nature and God are, for there are the causes of things, the\nlife of principles, the source of elements, the seeds of the things\nthat are to be brought forth, the typal forms, active potency producing\nall things, ... there is also matter, the underlying passive potency,\nabiding, present, ever coming together into one as it were, for it\nis not as if a creator came from on high, to give it order and form\nfrom without. Matter pours forth all things from its own lap, Nature\nitself is the inward workman, a living art, a wondrous virtue which is\nendowed with mind, giving realisation to a matter which is its own, not\nforeign to itself; not hesitating, but producing all things easily out\nof itself, as fire shines and burns, as light spreads without effort\nthrough space.... Nature is not so miserably endowed as to be excelled\nby human art, which is directed by a kind of internal sense, while\nseveral kinds of animals, guided by their inward mind, show an innate\nforesight of a wonderful kind,--ants and the industrious bees, which\nhave no type or model spread before them. For there is a nature which\nis _more than present to_, which is _immanent in_ things, remote from\nnone as none is remote from being, except the false: and while only\nthe surface of things without changes, deeper in the heart of all than\nis each to itself it lives, the principle of existence, source of all\nforms, ... Mind, God, Being, One, Truth, Fate, Reason, Order.\"[328]\n_Natura naturata_ is thus not a resultant or outcome of _natura\nnaturans_ with Bruno; they are one and the same thing under different\naspects, and both are one with God, the living force in things.\n\n[Sidenote: Aristotle on plurality of worlds.]\n\n[Sidenote: Perfection.]\n\nThe arguments of Aristotle against the plurality of worlds are in the\nseventh book set out one by one, and controverted from Bruno's own\nstandpoint, at times with great fulness and subtlety. It would be\nunprofitable to enter far into this debate, where the advantage lay so\nobviously on one side. We have already seen that Bruno was able to lay\nhis finger upon the weak spot in Aristotle's system, the definitions\nof space and time. There is no absolute norm of time, said Bruno,\nwhether arithmetical, geometrical, or physical; for in this kind we\ncannot fix a _minimum_, and least of all on Peripatetic principles;\nthere is always a less than any given period of time, hence we cannot\nlay down any true measure of time, _i.e._ all time is relative to the\nindividual. In any case the daily movement (of the outermost sphere, as\nAristotle thought, but in fact) of the earth, is not really circular.\nThere are as many moving agents as there are stars, as there are souls,\nor deities.[329] But \"if we must assume some one presiding over the\ninfinite number of agents, we must ascend above all or descend down\nto the centre of all, to the absolute being, present above all and\nwithin all ... more intimate to all things than each is to itself, not\nmore distant from one than from another, for it is equally the nearest\nto all.\"[330] Several of the arguments of Aristotle were drawn from\nabstract conceptions of unity and perfection, and evidently raised\ninteresting problems for the time of Bruno. They are, briefly, that\na plurality of worlds would be irrational, since no reason could be\ngiven for one number rather than another, that it is more in accordance\nwith the perfection of the monad, that all reality should be massed\ntogether in one world, that the economy of nature does not admit of\nthe multiplication of goods, that the passive capacity (_matter_) is\nnot equal to the active power (the _form_), that the perfect is by\nits very nature unique. Bruno answers that there is no definite, but\nan infinite, number of worlds, and that if the former were the case\nno reason could be put forward why there should be only one, which in\nBruno's sense of world is no doubt true. As to the monad, the true\nmonad is that which embraces all number or plurality in itself. \"We\nare not compelled to define a number, we who say that there is an\ninfinite number of worlds; _there_ no distinction exists of odd or\neven, since these are differences of number, not of the innumerable.\nNor can I think there have ever been philosophers who, in positing\nseveral worlds, did not posit them also as infinite: for would not\nreason, which demands something further beyond this sensible world, so\nalso outside of and beyond whatever number of worlds is assumed, assume\nagain another and another?\"[331]\n\n[Sidenote: One life in all the worlds.]\n\nThat there are more worlds than one is due to the presence everywhere\nthroughout space of the same principle of life, which everywhere has\nthe same effect; just as within one of these worlds, the earth, we find\ndifferent species of the same animal--of man, for example--which cannot\nbe descended from the same parentage. There are \"men of different\ncolours, cavemen, mountain-pygmies, the guardians of minerals, the\ngiants of the South,\" each of which races must have been produced\nindependently in its own place. And finally, although it is true\nthat nothing can be added to the perfect, why may not the perfect\nbe multiplicable? Though the perfect man is one, nature may produce\nseveral within the same species. \"Everywhere is one soul, one spirit\nof the world, wholly in the whole and in every part of it, as we find\nin our lesser world also. This soul ... (should the kind of place and\nof element not conflict) produces all things everywhere; so that for\nthe generation of some even time is not required.... The infinite\nuniverse, and it only under God, is perfect. Nothing finite is so good\nthat it could not be better; whatever may be better has some degree\nof evil and defect, as what is not absolutely bright is not without\nsome signs of obscurity.... Therefore the perfect, absolutely and\nin itself, is one, infinite, which cannot be greater or better, and\nthan which nothing can be greater or better. This is one, everywhere,\nthe only God, universal nature, of which nothing can be a perfect\nimage or reflection, but the infinite. Everything finite therefore is\nimperfect, every sensible world is imperfect, as good and evil, matter\nand form, light and darkness, joy and sadness concur in it, and all\nthings everywhere are in alteration and movement; but all of them, in\nthe infinite, are as in unity, truth, and goodness, and in this aspect\nthe infinite is rightly called the universe.\"[332] In the infinite, as\nwe have learned from the _Causa_, all contraries are one. The universe\nis perfect, not because of its quantity, but because it contains all\nother things in it.[333] Within the limits of their kind small causes\ncan produce small effects with some perfection; much more effective is\nthat immeasurable and more general cause, of which nothing stands in\nthe way. It is a harmony of the many in one, the only corporeal image\nof the divine mind. The finite, however, is imperfect only when taken\napart from the whole to which it belongs, _i.e._ evil and defect are\nappearances only. Although in nature not all things are of their best,\nand more species than one produce monstrosities, yet we may not find\nfault with the great building of the mighty architect, for even the\nsmall, weak, and diminutive contributes its part to the nobility of the\nwhole. Is a picture most beautiful when it is blazoned all over with\ngold and purple? Does it not shine out best from a dull background?\nCan there be any part which, in its order and place within the whole\nbody, is not good, and the best in the end and in the whole? A harmony\nin music is better the greater the variety within it of length, accent,\npause, and the like.[334]\n\nThe perfect may be either (1) \"the perfect absolutely, or (2) the\nperfect in its kind.\" The former again is twofold, according as it\nis (1) \"that which is wholly in the whole and in every part, or (2)\nthat which is wholly in the whole but not in the part.\" Of these the\none is divinity, the intellect of the universe, absolute goodness and\ntruth, the other the immeasurable corporeal reflection of the divine.\nAs within the universe there are many things perfect in their kind,\nwhich it combines in its unity, containing in itself the perfection of\nall, it may in a second sense be called the absolutely perfect. For\nno one world singly, nor system of worlds, nor any number of systems,\ncan be brought into comparison with God, except indirectly, through\nthe immeasurable wisdom, power, and goodness. \"Nothing is absolutely\nimperfect or evil, for the highest nature exists in a certain sense\nin the meanest and lowest, as on the palette of a painter colours are\nthought little of which presently, unfolded into the scheme of the\npicture, shall seem to be, along with the painter himself, of chief\nimportance.\"[335] Moral evil, itself, as we shall find, has no reality\nfor Bruno's pantheism. Justice and goodness, not existing as abstract\nentities, have their only ground in the divine will, _i.e._ in the\ncourse of nature.[336] On the other hand, it is not in the part, the\ndetail, the trivial or minute existence, that the divine will is most\nadequately declared, but in the whole, its plan and its law. \"What\nis best and most glorious, most beseeming the goodness of His nature,\nis to be attributed to His will. It is impious to seek this in the\nblood of insects, in the mummied corpse, in the foam of the epileptic,\nunder the shaking feet of murderers, or in the melancholy mysteries of\nvile necromancers;[337] it must be sought rather in the inviolable,\nintemerate law of nature, in the religion of a mind directed duly by\nthat law, in the splendour of the sun, in the beauty of the things\nwhich are brought forth from this our parent, after His true image,\nas expressed bodily in the beauty of those innumerable living things,\nwhich, in the immeasurable sweep of the one heaven, shine and live,\nhave sense and intelligence, and sing praises to the One, the highest\nand best.\"[338]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nNATURE AND THE LIVING WORLDS\n\n\nWe have found that, according to Bruno, the universe is infinite in\nextent, and that there are innumerable worlds within it: it remains\nto know what are the materials that constitute the universe, and the\nmoving principles that govern its changes and direct the worlds in\ntheir courses.\n\n[Sidenote: Uniformity of Nature.]\n\nNature, he said, is the same in kind, in its substance, and in its\nelements, throughout its whole extent--a daring conception for a\ntime when the empyrean and all space beyond it were still regarded\nas the special abode of divinity. He reminded his opponents of his\nown childish experiences:--when from Cicala he looked towards Mount\nVesuvius, he thought it dark, gloomy, bare of trees and flowers; but\nwhen he approached it, he found it fairer than Cicala itself, while now\nthe latter looked bare and dark.[339] The Aristotelians were committing\na similar error in judging the distant stars and the firmament to be\nin reality as they appeared to our eyes, and in denying the existence\nof that which was not visible to us. \"As the philosopher must not\nbelieve what cannot be demonstrated by evidence, so neither must he\nfoolishly despise or find fault with what cannot be disproved by\nreason.\"[340] Had men, instead of bending so long over the books of\nAristotle and his commentators, the _nebulosa volumina_, but turned\ntheir eyes to the book and light of nature, they would have formed a\nfar different conception of the constitution of the heavens than that\nof the eight, nine, ten, or more spheres and innumerable epicycles of\nthe Ptolemaic system. Bruno showed how as we rise from the surface of\nthe earth our horizon becomes wider, while in detail less vivid, and\nhe supposed himself to continue the ascension upwards to the surface\nof the moon.[341] A few miles away tree and mountain would not be\ndistinguishable from the rest of the earth, but we should perceive\nonly a wide circle of light with dark spots, the appearance of sea and\nof land respectively. As the distance increased the form of the earth\nwould become more visible while it lost all appearance of opacity,\nand the whole would seem continuous light. As we neared the moon, the\nearth would come to appear exactly as the moon does to us from the\nearth. The moon also revolves round its own axis, and from it, as\nwith us, the universe will appear to revolve round it as centre. It\nhad been said that the appearance of the heavenly bodies had always\nbeen and continued to be the same, but Bruno points to the fact that\nalthough a mountain, when seen from at hand, changes its face from day\nto day, and from season to season, yet from a distance it seems always\nthe same.[342] It is owing to the distance that the face of the moon\nappears to us never to change, although it is certainly subject to as\nmany alterations as the earth itself; and to the dwellers on the moon\nthe earth will appear equally changeless. The light and shadow seen\non the surface of the moon are due to the variety of sea and land in\nit, the one reflecting light, the other absorbing. On the moon, as on\nthe earth, Nature is in continuous change: for example, the relative\npositions of sea and land are ever altering; but the magnitude of the\ndistance renders these invisible, and more especially the minuteness\nand gradual nature of the changes themselves. The lunar spectator will\nbe presented with eclipses of the earth, and, according to the position\nof sea and land, _i.e._ of light and shadow, with phases of the\nearth.[343] In the same way Bruno applied his principle of similarity\nto show that from distant stars the earth would appear of uniform\nmagnitude and unvarying position, while in the neighbourhood of other\nsuns it and all the other planets would disappear. As matter is the\nsame in kind throughout the universe, so it is subject everywhere to\nthe same law of unceasing change:--\"The sun in its rising never seeks\ntwice the same point, all things by stress of the continuous flux are\nrenewed, nor ever seek again the haunts they have left, nor is there\nany part of the earth which does not pass through every region, and\na like force now carries each part in one direction or another, now\ndrives it away; and if by chance any one revisit the centre, it is no\nlonger in the same form, nor in the same connection (_ordine_).\"[344]\nNot even the whole can ever be twice the same, since the order and\narrangement of its parts are continuously changing. Even in things\nthat seem ever to present the same face there is a latent alteration\nwhich time will bring to light. There would otherwise be nothing to\nprevent the whole of Nature being fixed, petrified, as it were, to all\neternity. Yet the substance of things--the atom--is unchanging.[345]\n\"All things are in flow; the parts of the earth, seas, and rivers vary\ntheir positions, by a certain ebbing and flowing order of Nature. As\nmatter wanders, flowing in and out, now here, now there, so the forms\ntravel through matter. For there is not any form which, once occupying\na portion of matter, retains it always, nor any matter which, once\nobtaining a certain form, maintains it for ever. Hence it is that,\nmatter always taking up one form or another, and having equal capacity\nfor all, consequently by virtue of its eternity it must sometimes fall\nin with that which is able to bind it to itself for ever; if this were\nto happen, all things would be so constituted that there would be no\nalteration or difference in them.\"[346]\n\n[Sidenote: The Ether.]\n\nThe universe to Bruno is transfused with spirit, soul or life, \"the\nsoul of the universe,\" which animates its every part. \"The seat or\nplace of God is the universe, everywhere the whole immeasurable heaven,\nempty space, of which He is the fulness.\" The material aspect, or, as\nBruno sometimes seems to say, the _body_ of this spirit is the ether,\na subtle fluid distinguished from the air we breathe by the absence\nof moisture. The ether is a purely passive, non-resisting medium,\npermeating the universe, without quality, and unimpressionable by\nforce or action; thus it is penetrated by the heat of any radiating\nbody without diminishing its force. It took the place, for Bruno,\nof the mythical Fifth Essence, which had so long fed the dreams of\nphilosophers--\"Divine yet corporeal, material yet without matter,\na form without privation, conjoining act with potency, neither\nheavy nor light, suffering neither generation, nor corruption, nor\nalteration, neither increase nor decrease; beyond which no sensible\nexistence is, first-born and creatrix of Nature, simplest of beings,\nall-containing, most powerful, most active, most living, most perfect\nof existences, endowed with life and intelligence, of its own nature\nmoving circularly, etc., etc.--all this is at length proved to have\nbeen a most portentous shadow without body.\"[347] Heaven is either\nempty space, or it is an ethereal substance, \"a very subtle kind of\nair, which is the first and most universal occupant of space.\"[348]\nAgain, the ether is described as a vapour or smoke, a nebulous matter,\npenetrating throughout the depths of the void, interpenetrating all\nthings and embracing all; as not entering into movement of its own\naccord, for it is but an exhalation of the wind--a kind of continuous\nvapour such as is contained in the bowels of the earth: in it is\nneither heat nor cold nor any similar effect (_passio_), but it is\nthe medium through which these are borne. All these require moisture:\nmoisture alone can \"fix\" light or darkness or combine atoms into a\nconcrete body and prevent their random flight through the air.[349]\nIt has been claimed that in this and other passages Bruno anticipated\nthe modern theory of the ether; it must be noted, however, that he\nexpressly denies to its parts any kind of motion--it is only the\ncomposite body which moves--and that he speaks of this heaven or ether\nas the soul which is at once immanent in and comprehends the stars,\n_i.e._ as the soul of the universe.\n\n[Sidenote: Moisture.]\n\n[Sidenote: Earth: Fire.]\n\nOf the strictly material elements of the universe, the most important\nis _moisture_ or _water_. It is moisture which gives concreteness and\ntherefore weight to things. Nothing has weight which has not been\nformed into one by the union of innumerable parts under the action\nof water.[350] Consistently with this, Bruno believed the heaviest\nbodies, as the metals, to be the most solid and concrete, and therefore\nto contain most moisture. It is moisture also which, penetrating\nthrough the arteries, veins, and bones of the earth, gives to it both\nvariety of aspect and the power of life. The visible moisture on the\nearth's surface, the seas and lakes, is a mere nothing as compared\nto that which is diffused through its interior--is but the sweat, as\nit were, of the earth's body.[351] Bruno's passion for homogeneity\nled him to understand that in its surface the land under the sea\nis similar to that above it, with which the former is continually\nchanging place, and it is divided up into plains, mountains, valleys,\nthe islands and rocks of the sea being the tops of the mountains:--a\nremarkable intuition of the truth, however arrived at. As to the\nfamiliar elements, _earth_ and _fire_, Bruno could neither allow a\nspecial place or sphere nor a special direction of movement to either,\nas in the Aristotelian cosmology. The earth was not the centre of the\nuniverse, and there were earths or similar planets everywhere. To the\nseveral arguments of the Peripatetics[352] for the centrality of the\nearth,--from the heaviness, the darkness, solidity, composite character\nof the earth's matter, and the movements of its parts, from the idea\nthat contraries shun one another so that the coldest element, for\nexample, should be in the centre, the hottest at the extreme,--Bruno\nopposed the common-sense answers that his own theory suggested to\nhim. His appeal was always from \"fictitious order\" to the evidence\nof \"sense and reason.\" The argument has no longer any interest in\nitself, and to pursue it into detail would hardly be edifying; but so\nfull is it, so weighty and so vigorous, that one wonders how even the\n\"Peripatetics\" failed to be convinced by it. Bruno's very errors are\ninteresting. Fire for example, far from being the outermost, lightest,\nsubtlest element, was regarded by him as a body of which the substance,\n(light and heat being _accidents_) was water mixed with earth;[353]\nand in general, he maintained, no element was ever found in isolation.\nAs to the supposed coldness of the central element,--the earth,--he\nbelieved, again anticipating future discoveries, that the centre of\nthe earth was not cold, but hot, the source of terrestrial warmth;\nbut the theory loses something of its value, scientifically, from the\nimagined _vitality_ of the planet, by which it is supported.[354] It\nwas natural that the _coincidence of contraries_ should be brought to\ndo duty against the maxim on which the Aristotelian view was really\nbased--namely, that contraries tend to rest at the greatest possible\ndistance from one another, against which Bruno marshalled a whole\narmy of facts. Away from the shadow of the earth there was perhaps no\nlight but that of the sun, too strong for our eyes, for the daylight\narose from a mixture of the light of the sun and the darkness of the\nearth; we could see other colours by it, for the reason that they\nwere similarly composed--mixtures of light and darkness. The heat of\nthe sun also was only bearable when tempered by the coolness of the\nearth or other planets. The body of the earth, great as it is, can\nbear this heat only through its swift revolution. As to the objection\nthat if the earth moved we should feel its motion, Bruno remarked\nthat when we are carried in a smoothly and continuously moving\nvehicle, not striking against any object, we do not perceive that we\nare moving, except by comparison with some object known to us to be\nfixed. Thus sense furnishes its own correction.[355] The differences\nin the distances of the planets from the sun, as seen from the earth,\nare explained much more readily by the assumption that they and the\nearth itself are moving about the sun, than by that of the centrality\nof the earth, which compelled astronomers to the complicated device\nof the epicycles.[356] The fact that the moon always turns the same\nface towards the earth disproved the Ptolemaic theory: were it on an\nepicycle, as was supposed, this would be impossible. According to\nthe old doctrine, the earth was fixed immovably in the centre of the\nuniverse, while about it circled the spheres of sun, planets, and fixed\nstars. With Bruno, on the other hand, the centre of the universe is\neverywhere, or nowhere,--in other words it is relative to the body on\nwhich the spectator is supposed to stand.\n\nThe principle of continuous change was employed to explain, among\nother matters, the variation of the equinoxes, which was already\nknown to occur; but the continuous change was itself accounted for on\nteleological grounds.--\"The motion which causes the poles to tremble,\nand the equinoctial and solstitial points to vary irregularly, is\non account of the variations which are always taking place in parts\nof the earth; for the frigid zones may not always be frigid, nor\nthe torrid, torrid; all parts must rest and have holiday from each\nkind of 'affect,' and consequently take up every kind of disposition\nsuccessively.\" ... \"The centre of the earth, therefore, and its\nposition relatively to the poles, will vary.\"[357] No star ever\nrepeats one day the revolution of the previous, or any one year that\nof another. Mathematical exactness, as we have seen, is never found\nin the material world: the earth may not always present the same face\nto the sun, so that one pole must at length pass into the place of\nthe other--a change which must occur sensibly and continuously, and\nirregularly, as natural bodies and elements of bodies are naturally in\ncontinuous alteration and movement. \"The same composite body is never\nin exactly the same state at any two moments, nor consists of quite the\nsame parts, for from all sides and everywhere there is, necessarily,\nan unceasing influx and efflux of elementary bodies.\"[358] The stars\nand planets are compared to a flock of birds, which float hither and\nthither in the clear ether, guided only by their desires.[359] Never\ndoes the flock present precisely the same appearance twice. In nature\nthe law is vicissitude and succession, so that each thing may in actual\nfact come to be all things.[360]\n\n[Sidenote: Earths and Suns.]\n\n[Sidenote: Comets.]\n\nAll the stars consist of the same elements, since water cannot subsist\nwithout earth, nor fire without water; but in some stars the aqueous\nelement predominates (planets), in others the igneous (suns). From\nsameness of appearance and of effects (_accidents_) we may infer\nsameness of substance. It is clear therefore to Bruno that moon,\nplanets, stars, are all of precisely the same substance as the earth.\nIt is unnecessary to point out by how long a period this brilliant\nphilosophical faith preceded the slower if surer march of science. The\ngreat worlds of the universe are of two kinds--the suns, in which fire\nis the predominating element, and from which light is diffused; and\nthe earths or planets, in which water predominates and which reflects\nlight. To the first class belong the so-called fixed stars, from which\nour sun would appear no larger and no brighter than they appear to\nus; to the second belong the moon, Mercury, and other planets, all in\none and the same ethereal space, suspended in free air and balanced\nby their own weight as is our earth. In all are seas and woods,\nrivers, men, cattle, reptiles, birds, fishes, as on the earth, and in\nall the same continuous changes occur.[361] No one is in the centre\nof the universe rather than another, for about all equally extends\nimmeasurable space with its innumerable stars. Of these \"first bodies\"\none kind could not exist without the other, for it is by the concourse\nof contraries and opposites that nature provides for movement, life,\nand growth in things. About each of the scintillating stars, or suns,\nwhich we see, there must circle planets which are for the most part\ninvisible to us, but which _may_ become visible.[362] In the same way,\nboth on account of the smallness of their bodies, and especially on\nthat of the less intensity of reflected light in comparison with light\nof original force, the planets which are about our fixed star, the\nsun, would not be seen from any of the others. The discovery in the\nlast half-century of what is almost certainly a satellite of Sirius\nconfirms in this also Bruno's \"anticipation of nature.\" Another of\nthese was his theory of comets,[363] which he held to be of the same\nnature as planets, and to move in similar orbits. He believed also\nthat there were other solar planets which never appeared to us because\ntheir position in the heavens precluded their reflecting any of the\nsun's rays to us:--a belief to which the reported eclipses of the sun\nby occult bodies has given some support. The shape of the comet, with\nits appendages, was only apparent, Bruno said, and was due to the angle\nmade by the light reflected from its surface. In another reference,\nhowever, he compares it with the oblique reflection of light from a\nmirror, or from the surface of water; it is the watery matter, the\nvapours which are drawn out by the warmth of the sun, that give the\nunusual reflection.[364] This shows how nearly he approached the modern\ntheory. In the true spirit of the Renaissance, however, he appealed to\nthe authority of the ancients, of Aeschylus and Hipparchus of Chios,\nwho, according to Aristotle, regarded the comets as planets.[365]\nThe comets of the sixteenth century,[366] so far as observed, went\nwholly against the received view that their orbits must lie within the\nsphere of the moon, and proved that the substance of bodies beyond\nthat sphere was the same as the elementary substance of the earth,\nas well as that there was penetrable space beyond. Both of these to\nBruno were important consequences. Still greater, however, was their\nimportance for humanity, in removing the grounds of the terror which\ncomets and other heavenly wonders had hitherto inspired. \"There are\nsome,\" said Bruno, \"who rest their faith in a virtue above and beyond\nnature, saying that God, who is above nature, creates these appearances\nin the heavens in order to signify something to us: as if those were\nnot better, nay the very best, signs of divinity which arise in the\nordinary course of nature; among which are those of which we speak, for\nthey also are not apart from this order, although their order is hidden\nfrom us.\"\n\nTo account for the many appearances which seemed to conflict with\nhis new view of the universe, Bruno had recourse to several slight\nexperiments and analogies of daily observation such as a schoolmaster\nmight employ at the present day before his class,[367] but by which\neven a man of Kepler's intelligence refused then to be convinced; at\nleast he would not openly profess his conviction. Among other fruitful\nsuggestions which Bruno makes is that the sun may perhaps turn on its\nown axis, and again that it may contain vapour and earth.[368] He had\na curious theory that the heat of the sun is only directed outward\n_from the surface_, not inwards; that this is the general course of\nradiation; and that it leaves an inner surface of the sun cold, on\nwhich solar animals live; finally that meteors are \"animals\" expelled\nfrom the sun! So always the fruitful idea is accompanied by the absurd.\n\nFrom the principle of the identity of nature it follows that bodies\nwhich are remote from us are the same in kind with those that are with\nus and near us; nothing may be denied of the former which is affirmed\nof the latter, and _vice versa_. There can be no doubt, therefore,\nof their similar composition and similar parts. Thus if here on the\nearth we nowhere see fire subsisting without earth, nowhere earth\nwithout water or fire, while their composites are both contained in\nand penetrated by air and void, then the same is necessarily the case\nin the upper world also; neither sense nor reason compels us to assert\nor suspect otherwise.[369] Bruno has grasped, however confusedly,\nthe idea that each individual, each being in the universe, is as it\nwere an epitome of the universe itself; that each therefore stands in\na peculiar relation to it, differing from it only in the \"proportion\"\nin which the elements are composed into unity. It is impossible\nnot to see in this idea the germ of the most important development\nof Leibniz' philosophy, whatever the source may have been through\nwhich it came to the latter. It is true that here, at least, Bruno's\nconception appears much less spiritual than that of his successor,\ninasmuch as he is thinking rather of the actual physical elements\nwhich go to make up a body (and in which all bodies are similar to\none another). On the other hand, the formation of the body is, in his\nview, the work of the soul, and it is in the last resort the identity\nof the universal soul of nature in all its members that brings each\nof these into correspondence with all others. It is true, also, that\nBruno has no definite explanation of what constitutes an individual,\nand his readers are exposed to the dilemma either of regarding the\nphysical atoms as themselves \"_beseelt_,\"--a view which Bruno nowhere\nsanctions,--or, on the other hand, of accepting a dualism of spirit\n(the soul of the universe or God) and matter (the material atoms,\nmoisture, fire, and ether). Yet the tenour of Bruno's philosophy is\nwholly opposed to such a dualism. As a corollary of this theory,\nBruno suggested an explanation of what has been called \"spontaneous\ngeneration,\" supported, however, by tales of the credulous rather than\nby actual observation. \"Dust that has been heated by the sun, as soon\nas moisture falls upon it, becomes a frog, the whole substance of dung\ngoes into worms or flies, the body of a horse will turn into wasps,\nthe provident bee rises from the body of an ox!\"[370] As each thing\nis in its inner nature identical with every other, so it _may_, and\nin the natural course _does, become_ every other, as we have learned\nfrom the Italian works. Nevertheless, the outward appearances of things\ndo not cease to be different from one another. \"That is more latent\nin one subject which is more unfolded in the remainder.\" \"The subject\nof all is one (_monas_), and all things are in truth one, although in\nindividuals they seem to be many.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Movements of bodies; their soul-principle.]\n\nThe movements of the earth and of other free-moving bodies are always\nattributed by Bruno to an \"internal principle or _soul_.\" Movement\nfrom without could only take place through direct contact, and the\nliquid air or ether is too light to move these heavy bodies.[371] \"It\nis taking things by the wrong end to say that the loadstone attracts\nthe iron, the amber the straw, the sun the sunflower. In the iron there\nis a kind of sense, awakened by a spiritual (_i.e._ a subtly material)\nvirtue diffused from the loadstone, ... and generally everything that\ndesires and has intelligence moves towards the thing desired, converts\nitself into it as far as possible, beginning with the wish to be in\nthe same place.\" By the same principle are explained the phenomena\nof _gravity_, which is defined as impulse towards the place of\npreservation, such as the earth is to the stone that has formed part of\nit; its opposite, \"_levity_,\" is impulse away from the contrary or the\ninjurious. \"_Gravity_ and _levity_ are nothing but the impulse of parts\nto their place, where they may either move or be at rest, or to a place\nthrough which it is necessary for them to go (in the circular movement\nof all material things).\" Thus the motions of the heavy and the light\nare merely relative movements; the same kind of motion does not belong\nalways to the same kind of substance or element.[372]\n\nThe movement of the stars is determined not by considerations of place\nonly, but also by the necessity that bodies of one kind are under of\nderiving sustenance from those of another,--the suns from the earths\nand the earths from the suns. It is through the soul that their needs\nare felt, and the soul directs their movements as does the human\nsoul those of the human body. There are, however, no fixed limits to\ntheir movements: they are governed only by the convenience of life,\nas perceived by the sense and mind, which are inborn in each. By this\nfantastic principle Bruno explained what he thought to be the fact,\nthat all heavenly bodies whatsoever are in movement; or perhaps we\nshould say he inferred the fact from the principle:--which was first\nin the order of his thought it would be impossible to know. Like most\nof his contemporaries he looked upon the conception of a soul in all\nthings with peculiar reverence--\n\n    _Porgimus haec paucis, vulgus procul esto prophanum,\n    Ne liceat laico sacrum conscendere montem._\n\nThe method by which Bruno sought to know the nature of the souls of\nthe worlds is one which the course of modern philosophy has rendered\nfamiliar to us in other connections. It rests upon the argument from\nthe part to the whole. \"Whatever we find in a part of the world\nbelongs, in a higher sense (_sublimius_), to the whole, and must be\nattributed to it. All the capacities of each part are attributed to\nthe whole--that is, their perfections and activities, not the qualities\nthey possess as parts, and as less than the whole in any respect.\" Thus\nthe hindrances to which lesser individuals are exposed, the necessity\nof taking in and giving out matter as their forms change, exist in the\ngreater individual in a minimal degree. But in all parts of the earth\nBruno found signs of life, sensation, and even intelligence. Stones of\ndifferent kinds were universally believed to have a kind of sensibility\nand instinct: to move of their own accord, attract other bodies to\nthemselves, act upon our human spirits and senses. The phenomena of\nanimal instinct were a constant object of interest to Bruno, who saw\nin them the expression of a deeper intelligence than the merely human.\nIt is true the observations on which he built may not always have been\nexact; but that does not detract from the value of his principle. Thus\nthe porcupine (_istrix_) moved his admiration because of its careful\nstoring up of a stock of darts in its back, with which to protect its\nlife; it could, with unerring aim, cast one at its enemy, hearing, it\nis said, with its skin; and its precision far surpassed all that the\ncunning of man, with his many instruments, could do. With perfect skill\nit threw its darts, yet sparingly, so that no part of its body was ever\ndefenceless, the spirit directing all its actions from one centre, to\nwhich, from every part of the body, report was made! \"With how much\nhigher reason will the _star_ be endowed, of the body of which animals\nare made, by whose spirit they flourish? So the earth from one centre\ndirects all its actions and those of its parts; it never errs, neither\nit nor any of the worlds which dwell in the immeasurable ether.\"[373]\n\nBruno rejected[374] the popular notion that the behaviour of ants,\nspiders, and other animals does not spring from their proper foresight\nand artifice, but from divine, unerring intelligence acting upon them\nfrom without, giving them those \"_thrusts_\" (_spinte_) which are called\n\"natural instincts\"--a term which he regarded as meaningless. \"Is this\n'natural instinct' sense or intellect? If the former, is it internal\nor external? Clearly it is not external; but if internal, where is\nthe internal sense from which they could have their foresight, their\narts and artifices, their precautions, expeditions, to meet various\nconditions, both present and future? There must be some proximate\nprinciple, _i.e._ a form of _intelligence_ peculiar to each animal,\nwhich determines its actions. The divine and universal intelligence is\nmerely the principle that _gives_ it intelligence, through which it\nunderstands.\"[375] The action of animals of a given kind were supposed\nto be after one perfect model, and to be undeliberate. Bruno therefore\nplaced their intelligence higher than that of man, nearer the level of\nthat of the world-souls. \"The swallow makes its nest, the ants their\ncave, the spiders their web or nets, in one way only, than which they\ncould not make them more admirably or suitably.... Who knows whether\nthe spirit of man is rising upwards, that of others moving downwards?\nAt least it is to be referred to a defect of light and divine force\nthat men hesitate and deliberate in all that belongs to the means of\nlife, the modes of worship and defence, for if all knew perfectly, all\nwould be governed in the best, and consequently in one way only.\" It\nis, then, on the analogy of these supposed higher, unerring faculties\nof animals that Bruno considers the souls of the worlds to think and\nact. They have perfect freedom, since their life and soul are their\nown, not borrowed, as ours. \"Thus as we breathe, see, sleep, without\nlabour or anxiety, and while our soul performs the function of life,\nthe vital humours and spirits continually circulate, so these, the\nchief members of the world, divine animals, have no need to undergo any\nanxious toil, for all things with them are done for the best.\" Their\nfixed aim of life defines for them certain determinate orbits, \"in\nwhich they move freely by the force of that soul which is much more\ncertainly present in these high, perfect, divine bodies than in us, of\nmore ignoble condition, who draw from them spirit and body, come forth\nliving out of their bosom, are nourished by them, and at length are\ndissolved and received back into them.\"[376]\n\nIt is to the internal spirit also that the spherical form of the worlds\nis due. The so-called mountains of the earth do not in the least\ndetract from its spherical form. Bruno anticipated modern science in\nhis discovery or intuition that the real mountains are not those we\nare accustomed to call such, but immense tracts of country,--the whole\nof France, for example. \"I find the whole country of France to be one\nmountain, which rises gradually from the North Sea to Auvergne, where\nis its summit, marked on the west by the Pyrenees, where the Garonne\nflows, on the east by the Rhone, on the south by the Mediterranean\nSea.\"[377] The whole earth is, however, as smooth in reality as is to\nus the pumice stone, which to the ant seems furrowed with mountains\nand valleys. It is on teleological grounds that Bruno accounts for this\nsphericity. Composite things are preserved through the harmony and\nunion of their parts, while decay arises from dissolution. But such\nharmony and union are best secured by the spherical form: towards this\nform, then, every soul aspires in the moulding of its body. The most\nperfect animals, the stars, having fewer limitations, have the greater\nadvantages; being almost independent, free, self-sufficient, they are\nmost closely united in themselves, _i.e._ tend most nearly to the\npurely spherical form.[378]\n\nHowever perfect they are, the stars are yet of mortal stuff. \"You\nmay say if you will that the worlds change and decay in old age, or\nthat the earth seems to grow grey with years, and that all the great\nanimals of the universe perish like the small, for they change, decay,\ndissolve. Matter, weary of old forms, eagerly snatches after new, for\nit desires to become all things, and to resemble, as far as may be,\nall being.\" The efflux and influx of atomic matter into the great\nbodies is continuous, and this is the only kind of motion which is\nunceasing.[379] \"As the conflux of native matter is greater, so the\nbodies grow more and more, and increase up to a certain limit, on\ntouching which they grow weary and become subject to a contrary order;\nas about the seed atoms are gathered and added continuously until the\nbody and its limbs reach their maturity, when the same parts are cast\nout from the centre, and the breaking up of the composite is presented\nto our eyes.\" Hence there are atoms innumerable roaming through the\nvoid, while infinite changes succeed one another in bodies. Those in\none region receive the atoms repulsed from another: there is no danger\nof their straying infinitely without reaching a goal, for everywhere\nare great bodies to receive what is expelled from other stars.\n\nComposite as the worlds are,--capable, therefore, of dissolution and\ndestruction,--yet, as Timaeus had suggested, the power and providence\nof the divine purpose may maintain them eternally as they are.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V[380]\n\nTHE LAST AND THE LEAST THINGS: ATOMS AND SOUL-MONADS\n\n\nThe reaction against Aristotelianism had, as one of its results, a\nrenascence of the atomic theory of Democritus and Lucretius; and one of\nthe earliest adherents of the renovated doctrine was Bruno. Although\na complete presentation of the theory was not given until his later\nworks, the _De Minimo_ and the _Articuli adv. Mathematicos_, appeared,\nyet already in the Italian dialogues there were frequent references to\nit. In the _Cena_,[381] for example, it is said that in the physical\ndivision of a finite body infinite progress is impossible, and, as\nwe shall afterwards find, in Bruno there is no distinction between\nphysical and mathematical division. Again, in the _Cena_ an animistic\natomism is suggested, which presents a curious anticipation of some of\nLeibniz' characteristic views. \"It is more than probable, as all things\npartake of life, that many or innumerable individuals live not only\nin us, but in all composite things; when anything \"dies,\" as is said,\nwe must believe it to be not death, but change only; the accidental\ncomposition or concord ceases, the things that enter into it remaining\nalways immortal; and this is truer of those things we call spiritual\nthan of those we call corporeal or material.\"[382] Thus every body or\norganism, for all bodies are organisms to Bruno, is itself constituted\nby other living beings, the atoms--living atoms--being alike the\norigin and the end of all. So Leibniz wrote:--\"Every living body\nhas a presiding entelechy, which is the soul in the animal; but the\nmembers of this living body are full of other living beings--plants,\nanimals,--each of which, again, has its entelechy or presiding\nsoul.\"[383] In the _Infinito_ Bruno refers to the continuous changes of\nall composite bodies as arising from the ceaseless flux of atoms out of\nand into each body, even the greater \"animals,\" the stars and planets,\nsending out particles, which wander through the universe from one to\nanother.[384] Again, when discussing the four elements, he ascribes to\nwater the power of holding together the atoms of earth, or \"the dry.\"\n\"If from the earth all water were to be removed, so that there remained\npurely dry matter, this remainder would necessarily be an incoherent,\nrare, loose substance, easy to be dispersed through the air, in the\nform of innumerable discontinuous bodies; for while the air or ether\nmakes a continuum, that which makes a _coherent_ continuum is water or\nmoisture.\"[385] These indivisible \"prime bodies,\" of which the worlds\nare originally composed, are spoken of as flying throughout space from\nworld to world, in infinite movement, entering now into this, now into\nthat \"composition.\"[386] Finally, in the _Spaccio_, we are reminded\nthat \"every trifle, however worthless, is of value in the order of the\nwhole, the universe, for great things are composed of little, little\nthings of the least, and these of the individuals (or indivisibles)\nor minima.\"[387] In its main outlines, accordingly, Bruno's atomic\ntheory was already formed in his mind when he wrote his earlier\nphilosophical works, and even some of his peculiar applications of it\nhad already suggested themselves. It is hardly possible, therefore,\nto find any very marked development in this regard between the London\nand the Frankfort periods. There is elaboration and completion rather\nthan development in any definite direction;[388] and, as we have seen,\nthe writing of the larger works, containing the developed system, was\nprojected in London, and even carried out to a certain extent before\nBruno left England.[389] In the _Acrotismus_, which occupies a middle\nplace between the two periods, the doctrine is equally in evidence,\nin reference both to the atoms and to the continuous ether in which\nthey move. \"There is a limit to the division of nature--an indivisible\nsomething; the division of nature arrives at ultimate minimal parts,\nunapproachable by human instruments. Of these minimal bodies every\nsensible body is composed, and such a body, resolved into its minima,\ncan retain no semblance of complexity; for these are the first bodies\nout of which all others are made, and which are, in the truest sense,\nthe matter of all things that have corporeal existence. Resolved into\nthese parts, stone has no look of stone, flesh of flesh, bone of bone;\nin their elements, bone, stone, and flesh do not differ, but only when\nformed out of these, compounded, compacted, and arranged in diverse\nmanners, do flesh, stone, and bone and other things become different\none from another.\"[390] And Bruno describes how, between the heavenly\nbodies, there is a substance, \"ingenerable and incorruptible, the\nimmeasurable air, a kind of spiritual body\"--the ether.[391]\n\n[Sidenote: Object of _De Minimo_.]\n\n[Sidenote: Atomism a metaphysical doctrine.]\n\nIts full extension, however, the theory receives in the _De Minimo_,\nwhere the atom, or corporeal unity, is not the sole minimum discussed.\nThe full title of the work is:--\"On the threefold minimum, and measure,\nbeing the principles of the three speculative sciences and of many\npractical arts.\" We find nowhere any distinct statement as to what\nBruno meant by the \"threefold minimum,\" and the three speculative\nsciences to which its several members refer. It was supposed that the\nminima were (1) the monad or unity which is the unit of number, (2)\nthe point, which is the unit of the line, and (3) the atom, which is\nthe unit of body. But arithmetic and geometry can hardly be called\nspeculative sciences, and Tocco has shown that Bruno had in view the\ntriad of _God_, the _soul_ and the _atom_--the three kinds of simple\nsubstance, each immortal and indestructible:--_God_ as the supreme and\nmost simple unity, Monad of Monads; _soul_ as that which lives in each\ncomposite being and holds in unity the atoms which from time to time\nenter into its composition; and the _atom_, the most simple of material\nsubstances, in the sum of which, with their containing ether, the\nmaterial universe consists. Had Bruno carried out his subdivision of\nthe speculative sciences, he would probably have referred God, as the\nsubstance of all reality, to a speculative theology, of Neoplatonist\ntype; soul as the simple substance of animate beings to metaphysics\nproper; and the atoms, the substance of body, to a speculative physics,\ndealing with the metaphysical presuppositions of the general theory of\nnature, which was set forth in the _De Immenso_. The scheme, however,\nwas never fully carried out,[392] the times being not yet ripe for\nthe complete separation of the speculative and the experimental or\nobservational sciences. In referring the atomic theory to metaphysics,\nBruno showed a true instinct, for while in one sense atomism is a\nscientific hypothesis capable of furnishing laws which explain the\ninteraction of bodies,--the corpuscular theory,--and as such has\nproved its value by the brilliant developments of recent years, on the\nother hand, it is also a presupposition of knowledge, a ground of the\npossibility of our knowledge of body, and therefore has its place in\nspeculative theory, or metaphysics, in the widest sense. Both points of\nview are presented in Bruno's doctrine, but that from which he starts\nis the epistemological, following in this the guidance of Nicholas of\nCusa.\n\n[Sidenote: Knowledge implies the atom.]\n\n[Sidenote: Relativity of minimum.]\n\nKnowledge is measurement, and all measure implies a minimum in each\nkind of being. Were it possible to subdivide anything _ad infinitum_,\nthe half would be potentially equal to the whole, and measurement\nfrustrated. There must be a limit to division, an ultimate part, which\nitself has no parts, and which is the _substance_ of the composition\ninto which it enters, the composition on the other hand being an\n\"_accident_\" of this minimum. As it is primarily a condition of\nmeasurement, the minimum differs in the different spheres of measure or\nknowledge to which the category of quantity applies. In magnitudes of\none or two dimensions it is the point, in bodies the atom, in numbers\nthe monad or unity. Thus number is accident of the monad, monad is the\nessence of number, as composition is accident of the atom, atom is\nessence of the composite. Again, the \"sensible minimum\" must be far\ngreater than the natural or real minimum, for in so far as minimum is\nqualified by sensible, it is implied that the minimum is not absolutely\nsuch, but is a composite. The minimum of taste, touch, etc., must\npossess certain qualities, by which it has relation to sense, and\nthese can derive only from some form of composition. In their primary\nform the minima of nature must be without difference; therefore that\nsome are sensible, others not, must be due to some addition in the\nformer.[393]\n\nThus each species of existence, as light, moisture, vital force,[394]\nhas its own minimum, and the minimum is relative in this sense also,\nthat there are different kinds of existence not resolvable one into\nanother: the absolute minimum would be God, who is also the absolute\nmaximum. The relative minimum, accordingly, is determined either by\nthe thought and design of the observer, or by the species of existence\nto which the subject belongs; nature has set limits, both lower and\nupper, within which the individual of any species must stay, or cease\nto belong to that species. Accordingly, what _one_ regards as great and\ncomposite, _another_ may take as first and minimum: the unit of one\nscience may be analysed in another into further elements. \"Pythagoras\nin his philosophy started with the monad and numbers; Plato with atoms,\nlines and surfaces; Empedocles with the four elements; the physicians\nwith the four humours, and so on; but the Pythagorean monad is prior to\nthe placed monad (the atom), Plato's matter of bodies to the qualified\nbodies of Empedocles, the four simple bodies of Empedocles to the four\nfirst combinations of these, the four humours. So to the universe\nthe whole solar system, the sun and all its planets, may be a simple\nunit.\"[395]\n\nHere Bruno suggests two principles for the classification and\nsystematising of the sciences, to which it would have been well had he\nhimself and his successors faithfully adhered. The one is, that the\nmodes of measurement, _i.e._ the methods and laws of the sciences,\nmust differ for the different kinds of existence studied: that a\nbiological law, for example, cannot be adopted as an explanation of\nmental phenomena, nor the atomic theory account for the phenomena of\nlife. On the other hand there are _orders_ of existence, according to\nthe complexity of the subjects involved. If we regard the science which\ndeals with the more concrete subject as \"higher,\" then each higher\nscience (_e.g._ psychology) must take for granted the principles and\nresults of each lower science (biology, physics, mathematics),--each\nmust adopt and retain a unit for itself, which it has not further to\nanalyse.\n\n[Sidenote: The \"minima\" in the classification of sciences.]\n\nIn the same way the minima offer a ground for the distinction of the\nmore abstract sciences one from another. The term \"individual nature\"\n(_atoma natura_) may, according to Bruno, have one of several uses. It\nmay be applied either \"negatively or privatively, and if negatively,\nthen either accidentally or substantially.\" His instance of the\n_accidental_ use is a voice or sound, which expands spherically, is\nwholly wherever it is, _i.e._ the full content of the sound is heard,\nwherever its influence extends, not a part here, a part there, although\nthe intensity may vary in degree. Of the _substantial_ use examples are\nthe spirit, which is wholly in the whole body of man, or that spirit\nwhich is in the whole extent of the life of the earth, by whose life we\nlive and in which we have our being, or, above this substantial nature\nor individual soul, that of the universe, and supreme above all, the\nmind of minds, God, one spirit completely filling all things.[396]\nThe atom-nature is _privatively_ so-called, when it is the element and\nsubstance of a magnitude which is the same in kind with it, and may\nbe reduced to it, and it is distinguished from the atom _negatively_\nso-called, because it is not divisible, either in genus or in species,\neither _per se_ or _per accidens_. Examples are, (1) in discrete\nquantities:--unity to the mathematician, the universal proposition to\nthe logician, the syllable to the grammarian; and (2) in continuous\nquantities, varying with the species of continuum:--the minimal pain,\nsweetness, colour, light, triangle, circle, straight line, curve; in\nduration, the instant; in place, the minimal space; in length and\nbreadth, the point; in body, the least and first body.\n\n[Sidenote: Minimum as substance.]\n\nIn the second place, the atom or minimum is also a metaphysical [Greek:\npou st\u00f4]; not only is it the last result of analysis, but it is also\nthe permanent substance of being, and again it contains all being in\nitself--it is essence of being. Thus such an individual nature \"never\ncomes into existence by way of generation, nor passes out of it by way\nof corruption or dissolution; only _per accidens_ may we say that it\nnow is, now is not.\"[397] Certain of them, however, the souls, deities,\nGod, are in their intrinsic nature eternal, immortal, indissoluble. Of\nthese it was Bruno's intention to treat at large in a _Metaphysics_ and\na _De Anima_ which he purposed to write \"if God granted him time.\"[398]\nUnfortunately, it was willed otherwise.\n\nNothing that becomes, changes, decays, is real (_ens_). It is by\nmeditating on this perpetual unity of nature, by conforming ourselves,\nand preserving ourselves in likeness to it, that we come to partake in\nthe life of the gods, and to deserve the name of substance. That which\ntime, movement, fate bring to us is nought; for while they are, they\nare not. \"Let us then,\" cries Bruno, \"supply the mind with material,\nin the contemplation of the _minimum_, through which it may exalt\nitself to the _maximum_.\"[399] Since the real minimum, whether atom\nor soul, is immortal and indestructible, we know, as Pythagoras saw,\nthat there is no death, but only transition; death is a dissolution\nwhich can occur only to the composite, for the composite is never\n_substance_, but is always _adventitious_. Otherwise we should be\nchanging our substance every moment with the continuous influx of\natoms into our bodies. Only by the individual substance of the soul\nare we that which we are; about it as a centre, which is everywhere in\nits whole being (_ubique totum_), the disgregation and aggregation of\natoms takes place. According to a law of the soul-world, all bodies\nand forces tend to the spherical form; God, as monad of monads, is the\nperfect or infinite sphere, of which the centre is at once nowhere and\neverywhere; and in Him (as in all minima, simple substances, monads)\nall opposites coincide, the many and the few, finite and infinite;\ntherefore that which is _minimum_ is also _maximum_, or anything\nbetween these, each is all things, the greatest and the whole.[400]\nTherefore, if contemplation is to follow in the footsteps of nature, it\nmust begin, continue, and end with the _minimum_.[401] In other words,\nthe minimum in each sphere of being contains implicitly in itself the\nwhole reality of that sphere. The minimum is its substance, not merely\nthe ultimate of analysis, but the actual source, the dynamic origin of\nreality, as God is implicitly the whole universe and also the source of\nthe universe as it actually exists. It is because the minimum is all\nreality, is the _maximum_, that the knowledge of it gives us that of\nthe whole.\n\n[Sidenote: Uniqueness of all things.]\n\n[Sidenote: Sense and knowledge.]\n\n[Sidenote: Relativity.]\n\n[Sidenote: Judgment based upon sensation.]\n\nIn the third place the atomic theory offers an explanation of the\nuniqueness of each natural existence, which Bruno's philosophical\ntheory already assumed. The ever moving atoms present a mechanism by\nwhich the infinite diversity and infinite succession of change in\nthings may be brought about. The _appearance_ of similarity, exactness,\netc., is, as we have found, an illusion. Mathematically exact figures\nor bodies--a true circle, for example--are unattainable by sense, even\nif they exist in nature; but they do not exist in nature. Sense is the\nprimary faculty, through which the material of all others must pass,\nso that what has not entered through that window of the soul cannot be\nknown at all. But a single point out of place on the circumference of a\ncircle makes it cease to be a true circle, and our sense-apprehension\nis necessarily so confused and indistinct that we cannot distinguish\nbetween the true and the false, where truth depends upon so\ninappreciable a difference. Moreover sense-knowledge is relative to\nthe knowing subject, or to the subject's position with regard to the\nobject. What to the eye of one is too large is to another too small; a\nsound which is pleasant to one ear is not so to another; the food which\nto the hungry man tastes sweet, to the full man is nauseous; the ape to\nthe ape is beautiful, but to the man is of laughter-inspiring ugliness.\nHence the circumspect will not say \"this has a good odour, taste,\nsound, this has a beautiful appearance,\" but will add \"to me,\" \"now,\"\n\"sometimes.\" Nothing is good or evil, pleasant or painful, beautiful or\nugly, _simply_ and _absolutely_; but the same objects in relation to\nindividual subjects receive from the senses contrary denominations,\nas they in fact produce contrary effects. In deciding what is to be\ncalled good or bad, honourable or base, nature and custom have been\nthe chief agents, and alterations have issued from the slow rise and\nvictory of different opinions. Among the Druids and Magi certain things\nwere performed publicly at sacrifices which now, even when committed in\nprivacy, are regarded as execrable, and are so by way of law, and in\nthe present condition of affairs. Philosophy, as it teaches to abstract\nfrom particulars, to bring the nature and condition of things as far\nas possible under an absolute judgment, must define differently the\nuseful and good in an _absolute_ sense, from the useful and good as\n_contracted_ to the human species. Objectively there is no definitely\ngood or definitely evil, definitely true or definitely false, so that\nfrom one point of view we may say that all things are good; from\nanother that all things are evil; from a third that nothing is good\nor evil, as neither of the contraries is true; from a fourth that all\nthings are both good and evil, as each of the contraries is true.\nNo sense deceives or is deceived: each judges of its proper object\naccording to its own measure. There is no higher tribunal to which to\nrefer its object, nor can reason judge of colour any more than can the\near; sensible truth does not follow any general or universal rule,\nbut one which is particular, mutable, and variable. In the working\nof an external sense there may be different degrees of perfection or\ndefect, but not of truth or falsity, which consist in the reference\nof the subject and predicate to one another. The faculty by which we\njudge this or that to be _true_ colour or light, and distinguish from\napparent colour or light, is not in the eye. To affirm that man is an\nanimal, we must know both man and animal, know that animal nature is in\nman, and other things which, as means or circumstances, concur directly\nor indirectly in this knowledge. External sense can apprehend only one\nspecies or image of the object; from the colour and figure to pass to\nits name, its truth, its difference from other objects, belongs to a\nmore inward faculty. Yet the latter is always based upon sense;--a deaf\nman can neither imagine nor dream of sounds which he has never heard,\nnor a blind man of colours and figures which he has never seen.[402]\nThis digression on the relativity of knowledge, and on the different\nfunctions of sense and reason, in which Bruno follows partly the\nteaching of Lucretius, partly the Peripatetic doctrine of knowledge,\nshows that even if a true or perfectly exact geometrical figure existed\nin nature, none of the faculties with which we are endowed could\napprehend it, since it is not given by external sense.[403]\n\n[Sidenote: No exactness or similarity in composites.]\n\nBut in the second place[404] reason tells us that no true circle,\nor other figure, is possible in nature: for there is in nature\nno similarity except in the atoms; a true circle would imply the\nequality of all lines from the centre, but no two lines in nature\nare entirely and in all respects equal to one another. The circle or\npart of a circle which appears most perfect to us--the rainbow--is\nan illusion of the senses, due to the reflection of the light of the\nsun from the clouds; so the circles made by a stone falling into\nwater cannot be perfect, for this would mean that the stone itself\nis perfectly spherical, that the water is everywhere of the same\ndensity, that no wind is playing upon its surface. Sound is not equally\ndiffused owing to differences in the density and rarity of the air,\nnor is the horizon ever a perfect circle, owing to differences of\nclearness in different directions. Object and faculty alike are in\ncontinuous change; all natural things are continually altering their\nform or changing their position; therefore although they seem to\nsense to remain fixed for a time, we know that this is impossible,\nfrom the nature of things.[405] Whatsoever falls in the scope of\nsense-perception, even the distant sphere and stars, we judge to\nconsist of the same elements, therefore to be subject equally to\nperpetual variability and vicissitude. Thus--the atoms alone being\nsimple, and remaining ever the same--no composite thing can be the same\nfor one moment even, as each is being altered continually in all parts\nand on all sides by the efflux and influx of innumerable atoms.[406]\n\"Hence nothing is perfectly straight, nothing perfectly circular among\ncomposites, nothing absolutely solid but the atoms, nothing absolutely\nvoid but the spaces between them.\" The facet of a diamond appears to\nbe a perfect plane, perfectly compact, yet in reality it is rough and\nporous.[407] In matter no two lines or figures are entirely equal, nor\ncan the same figure be repeated twice.[408] No man is twice of the same\nweight, the very instruments by which we measure and weigh things are\nthemselves in constant change, and the flux of atoms is never equal,\nbut now denser, now rarer. In general no two things are of the same\nweight, length, sound, or number, nor are two motions or parts of\nmotion ever the same. To say that ten trees are equal to ten others is\nto speak merely from a _logical_ point of view, for in fact each is\n_one_ in a peculiar and special sense.[409] \"Equality is only in those\nthings which are permanent and the same; changing bodies are unequal to\nthemselves at any two instants.\"[410] \"Nothing variable or composite\nconsists at two moments of time wholly of the same parts and the same\norder of parts, since the efflux and influx of atoms is continuous, and\ntherefore not even from the primary integrating parts will you be able\nto name a thing as the same twice.\"[411]\n\nNumber itself is not an absolute, but a relative determination: it does\nnot touch the nature of the thing itself. Nature has no difference\nof number, as we have, of odd and even, tens and hundreds; nor do\nthe gods, spirits, or other rational beings define the numbers and\nmeasures of objects by the same series of terms. Both numbers and\nthe methods of numbering are as diverse as are the fingers, heads,\nand mental equipment of the numberers. That which fits in with the\nnumbers of nature will therefore never fit in with our numbers. Thus\nten horses and ten men, although determined arithmetically by one and\nthe same number, are in nature, or physically, wholly unequal to one\nanother.[412]\n\n[Sidenote: The atoms.]\n\n[Sidenote: Time and space.]\n\nIn order that men's minds may be better disposed for the reception of\ntruth, it is necessary first to demolish the foundations of error;[413]\nBruno accordingly sets himself to disprove the infinite divisibility of\nthe continuum.[414] It was the common belief that there were no limits\nset to the dividing power of either nature or art, so that, however\nsmall a part might be arrived at, it was possible to divide it into yet\nsmaller parts, on the analogy of the division of a fraction into tens\nof thousands of parts. Bruno denied this analogy to be justifiable,\nas in the latter case we are concerned not with division but with\nmultiplication or addition, not with a continuum, but with discrete\nquantities, and it was part of his general theory that the addition of\ndiscretes might be carried on _ad infinitum_; the inverse process he\ndenied. He thus held opinions directly contrary to those of Aristotle,\nwith whom the mass of the universe was finite, limited by its enclosing\nsphere, the parts of the universe unlimited. Aristotle had an upper but\nnot a lower limit; Bruno a lower but not an upper. So time and space,\nwhich Aristotle had treated as _finite_ in duration or extent, but as\n_infinitely divisible_, like the universe itself, are regarded by Bruno\nas unlimited in their dimensions, but as consisting of discrete minimal\nparts. \"In every point of duration is beginning without end, and end\nwithout beginning\"; it is the centre of two infinities. Therefore the\nwhole of duration is one infinite instant, both beginning and end, as\nimmeasurable space is an infinite _minimum_ or centre. \"The beginning\nand source of all errors, both in physics and in mathematics, is the\nresolution of the continuous _in infinitum_. To us it is clear that\nthe resolution both of nature and of true art, which does not advance\nbeyond nature, descends from a finite magnitude and number to the\natom, but that there is no limit to the extension of things either\nin nature or in thought, except in regard to the form of particular\nspecies. Everywhere and always we find the _minimum_, the _maximum_\nnowhere and never. The _maximum_ and _minimum_, however, may in one\nsense coincide, so that we know the maximum to be everywhere, since\nfrom what has been said it is evident that the maximum consists in the\nminimum and the minimum in the maximum, as in the many is the one, in\nthe one the many. Yet reason and nature may more readily separate the\nminimum from the maximum than the maximum from the minimum. Therefore\nthe immeasurable universe is nothing but centre everywhere; eternity\nnothing but a moment always; immeasurable body an atom; immeasurable\nplane a point; immeasurable space the receptacle of a point or\natom.\"[415]\n\nThe chief source of error on the part of the Peripatetics was their\nfailure to distinguish between the minimum as a part, and the minimum a\n_terminus_ or limit. Hence their idea that no combination of physical\nminima would give a magnitude, since two or more would touch one\nanother with their whole surface, _i.e._ would coincide:--otherwise\nthe minimum would have parts, a part of each touching the other, and\na part not touching. On their theory it would follow that magnitudes\ndo not consist of parts, or at least not of elementary parts. This is\ninconsistent with nature, for existing magnitudes must have been built\nup out of nature's elements, and with art, for art can measure only\non the assumption of first parts. It is true that what is posited as\nfirst part in one operation may be the last result in another, for\nthe _minimum_, as we have seen, is a relative conception, but _some_\nfirst part is always assumed in any operation. And as the operation\nof art is not infinite, so neither is there infinite subordination of\nparts.[416] When two minima touch one another, they do not do so with\ntheir whole body, _or any part of it_, but one with its terminus or\nlimit may touch several others; no body touches another with the whole\nof itself or a part, but with either the whole or the part of its\n_limiting_ surface. The _terminus_ of a thing is therefore no part of\nit, and by implication not a minimal part. Hence there are two kinds of\n_minima_ concerned--that of the touching body, or part, and the minimum\nof that by which the contact is effected, the _terminus_.[417] The\natom, which is the minimal sphere, touches in the absolutely minimal\npoint, the smallest _terminus_. Other spheres do not touch in a point\nsimply, but in more than one, or in a plane circle.[418] By adding\nlimit to limit we never obtain a magnitude; the _terminus_ is no part,\nand therefore if in contact it would touch with its whole self, so that\nmagnitude is not made up of _termini_, whether points, atoms, lines, or\nsurfaces which are termini; and this was the false ground on which the\nAristotelians denied the possibility of the atom. It remained to ask if\nthe _termini_ were infinite, since the atoms were not; but it was clear\nthat their number was determined by that of the atoms. For two limits\ndo not touch one another:--\"They do not cohere or make a _quantum_,\nbut through them others in contact with one another make a _contiguum_\nor _continuum_.\"[419] It may be added that if the parts of a divisible\nbody were infinite in number, the parts of the whole would be equalled\nby the parts of the half, for in the infinite there can be no greater\nand less. In the infinite, as we have seen above, there is no\ndifference between palms, digits, miles, between units and thousands,\nnor in the infinite time that has elapsed are there more months than\nyears, more years than centuries. If any one set of these were less\nthan the others it would be finite, and if one finite number may be\napplied to the whole, then the whole is finite.[420] The force of the\nAchilles dilemma was derived from the false idea that the _minimum_ of\none kind had some relation to that of another kind, _e.g._ that of\ntime to that of motion, that of impulsive force to that of the motion\nproduced. A thing of one kind does not define or measure a thing of\nanother, and the duration of one does not compare in the same sense\nwith the duration of another. Parts of different things are only\nequivocally called parts, and _minima_ are _minima_ only according to\ntheir proper (and diverse) definitions; therefore one is not measured\nby another, except in a rough way, for practical purposes.[421]\n\n[Sidenote: The vacuum. Atoms spherical.]\n\nAs the atoms come into contact with one another, not in all points of\ntheir surface, but in a definite number, it follows that there is a\nspace between them, in the interstices; it was this thought which led\nDemocritus to posit a vacuum.[422] The figure of the corporeal minimum\nmust be spherical, for any mass which has projections can always be\nthought of as smaller, when these projections have been removed; and\nnature itself suggests this, by the gradual rounding off of substances\nthrough time, and the apparent roundness and smoothness of rough and\njagged bodies when the observer is at a distance.[423] Diversity of\nforms of composite bodies results easily from spherical atoms, through\ndifferences in situation and order, differing amounts of vacuum and\nsolid; but a simple vacuum with solid bodies is not sufficient,--there\nmust be a certain matter through which the latter cohere together.[424]\nAlthough all other determinations may be abstracted from, figure at\nleast must be predicated of the atoms; quantity cannot be asserted of\nthat which is thought to be unfigured. These determinations of the\nminimum, though not given to sense, may nevertheless be made object\nof thought, by analogy or inference from the combinations of sensible\n_minima_ in larger composites, the same forms of aggregation being\nrepeated in the higher which occur in the lower forms.[425]\n\nFrom the consideration of mathematical figures as consisting of\n_minima_, Bruno attempted both to remodel and to simplify the existing\nmathematical theory, and, unfortunately fell foul of the new analytical\nmathematics, the theory of rationals and of approximations, which\nat that time was receiving marked extensions, and which has since\njustified itself so completely by results. It is true he did not\nentirely reject it, but he regarded it as merely an artifice for rough\npractical measurements. The true measure is always the _minimum_,\ninferred by analogy from the combinations of greater parts, which\nare perceived by sense. Thus the minimal circle, after the atom\nitself, consists of seven minima, the minimal triangle of three, and\nthe minimal square of four, and as each figure increases not by the\naddition of one atom merely, but by a number determined by the original\nnumber of atoms in the figure, it follows that no one figure is ever\nequal to another. Thus the second triangle is of six minima, the second\nsquare of nine, the second circle of nineteen. The \"squaring of the\ncircle\" is therefore impossible,[426] although it may be approximately\nreached through the ultimate coincidence of arc and chord, by which\nthe circle becomes equal to a polygon with an infinite number of\nsides.[427] This, however, is only an approximation of sense, which\nfails to observe the infinitesimal differences that are caused by\nthe existence of a few atoms, more or less, in a figure. They are\nvisible to the eye of reason, which comprehends that no two figures in\nnature are ever exactly equal. In exact geometry the number of one\nspecies of figure has nothing in common with that of another. It is\nclear, however, that even on his own ground Bruno was in error in this\nregard; for example, the seventh triangle and the fifth square are\neach composed of thirty-six minima.[428] But it is hardly necessary to\ntake seriously his teaching in this respect. He was wholly governed\nby the belief in the infinite diversity of nature, and the absolute\nincommensurability of any member of one species of beings with one\nof a different species. \"Since a definite minimum exists, it is not\npossible either in reality or in thought for a square to be equalled\nby a circle, nor even a square by a pentagon, a triangle by a square,\nnor in fine any species of figure by a figure of another species; for\ndifference in the number of sides implies also difference in the order\nand number of parts. As figures in this respect are as numbers, and\none species of number cannot be equalled by another either 'formally'\nor fundamentally (_i.e._ either in idea or in fact), we can never make\nan equilateral figure of any kind equal to one of another by first\nparts.\"[429] Where this transformation is apparently carried out, as\nwhere a cube of wax is moulded to another figure, the result is due to\nthe varying degrees of density in the different parts of the material;\nno solid parts are added or subtracted, but the disposition and extent\nof the pores or vacua are altered. But no argument can be drawn from\nthis rough method, for the principles of practice are different from\nthose of science.[430]\n\nThe latter principles are then applied boldly to geometrical science:\nthus it is shown that an angle, although it may be multiplied\nindefinitely, can be divided only into two parts; all its lines, it is\nunderstood, consisting of _fila_ or rows of atoms;[431] that the circle\nhas not an infinite number of radii, for from the circumference to\nthe centre only six such lines can be drawn;[432] that not every line\ncan be divided into two equal parts, for the physical line or _filum_\nmay, naturally, consist of an odd number of atoms;[433] in any case\ngeometrical bisection can at best be a near approximation,--though the\ntwo halves be apparently equal, they may really differ by many atoms.\nOn this basis, in the fourth and fifth books of the _De Minimo_, Bruno\noffers a simplification of the geometry of Euclid. As nature itself is\nthe highest unification of the manifold, and the monad is the unity\nand essence of all number, so we are taught to pass \"from the infinite\nforms and images of art to the definite forms of nature, which the\nmind in harmony with nature grasps in a few forms, while the _first\nmind_ has at once the potentiality and the reality of all particular\nthings in the (simple) monad.\"[434] In accordance with the method\nof simplification suggested by this doctrine, Bruno sets himself to\nshow that the greater part of Euclid may be intuitively presented in\nthree complicated figures, named respectively the _Atrium Appollinis_,\n_Atrium Palladis_, and _Atrium Veneris_. He hoped that by this means,\n\"if not always, for the most part at any rate, without further\nexplanation, the demonstration and the very evidence of the thing\nmight be presented to the senses of all, without numbers,--not after\nthe partial method of others, who in considering a statue take now the\nfoot, now the eyes, now the forehead, now other parts separately,--but\nexplaining all in each and each in all.\"[435] It is no part of the\npurpose of this book to go at length into the mathematics of Bruno,\nwhich unfortunately have not yet met with a competent exposition.\nApart from the difficulty of the matter itself, the poetical form and\nsetting of his theorems is an additional stumbling-block in the way of\nunderstanding. Bruno was put to many shifts in order to give a poetical\ncolouring to the most prosaic of subjects.\n\nWe have gone thus fully into the detail of Bruno's atomic theory, more\nso perhaps than its intrinsic value seems to demand, because this\naspect of his doctrine is the most important philosophically, and\nhas exercised the greatest influence upon the course of speculation.\nIt also provides most clearly an exemplification of the return which\nwas made, or thought to be made, by the Renaissance to the older\npre-Aristotelian philosophy and science. The rejection by Aristotle\nand his scholastic followers of the atomic theory of Leucippus and\nDemocritus had been based upon the identification of space and body.\nThe possibility of a vacuum in the corporeal world was denied, on\nthe ground that discreteness was inconsistent with the continuity\nwhich was felt to be a necessary condition of space. Accordingly, the\nreintroduction of the atom was possible only in one of two ways--either\nby the distinction between body and space, or by the application of\nthe atomic constitution of body to space itself. The former and truer\nsolution was not open to Bruno. His time was still too much under\nthe domination of Peripatetic thought for him to be able to take the\nimportant step of critically separating these two notions. The latter\nway, therefore, was that which he followed. Hence the curious attempt\nto remodel mathematical theory on the basis of the atom, which we\nhave described above, and the reduction of mathematical certainty to\nan illusion of sense. Figure is to be found only in the combinations\nof atoms; and owing to the spherical form of the atom, the infinite\nnumber of them existing in any body which is presented to sense, and\nthe space which lies between their surfaces, mathematical equality and\nexactness are impossible. Neither straight line, therefore, nor perfect\ncircle are to be found in reality. Mathematics, which should be based\nupon, or which presupposes, continuity, is confounded with physics,\nwhich presupposes the analysis of body into discrete, impenetrable\natoms. Physical atomism finds its justification in the experienced\nfact of resistance, which is the primary quality of body as perceived\nby our senses. In mathematical space, on the other hand, we abstract\nfrom all qualities except that of dimension only. Resistance would be\ninexplicable were it possible to proceed _ad infinitum_ in dividing\nmatter; it implies an ultimate irreducible and indestructible unit,\nwhether we regard this unit as a centre of force or as an inert\nsubstance merely.\n\nThe same influence of Aristotelian thought led Bruno to posit a subtle\nmatter, the Ether, as filling up the interstices between the atoms.\nSpace and body having been identified, it was seen that a vacuum was\ninconsistent with the nature of things. The Aristotelian _plenum_ was\nreintroduced in this form, that there might be some reality where the\ndiscrete atoms were not. The bolder step of asserting the fact, and\nindeed, the necessity of a vacuum as a presupposition of knowledge of\nthe material world, was not taken until there appeared the work of\nGassendi, by whom the final blow was given to the old conception of\nbody and space, and through whom the critical separation of the one\nfrom the other was first rendered possible. It is curious that Bruno\ndid not think of applying to the continuous ether any geometrical\nmeasure; had he done so, he would have understood the value of the new\ntheory of infinitesimals and irrationals which he opposed so strongly.\nAgain, had he carried out more fully the distinction which he draws\nbetween the atom and the _terminus_ or limit, the same result would\nhave followed. Pure geometry is the geometry of the limit; for the\nlimit is not only between atom and atom, or body and body, but also\nbetween atom and vacuum or ether. In this sense it is both continuous\nand figured, the compatibility of which qualities Bruno had denied; the\ncontinuous is measured, not by making it discrete, but by making the\nnumber, the measure, fluid or continuous.\n\n[Sidenote: Metaphysical atomism.]\n\nLasswitz has shown that there are in Bruno's theory three distinct\naspects, not, however, clearly separated one from another, of the\natomic hypothesis: they may be named severally the metaphysical, the\nphysical, and the critical aspects. From the metaphysical point of view\nthe atom is the ultimately simple, indeterminate substance of things;\nits conception results from the effort to find the real substance\nwhich is outside of, and unaffected by, the change and decay apparent\non the surface of things, but felt to be unreal. Simplicity, unity,\nsubstance, is that which is sought, an abiding somewhat underlying\nthe flux of the universe, which is regarded as an illusory appearance\nto sense. From this aspect it is that the identity of _minimum_ and\n_maximum_, of the least with the greatest, is to be explained. Number,\nplurality, and diversity no longer apply to the absolutely simple: all\nare determinations of human and finite origin which are here no longer\nvalid. In the simple all contraries coincide, for the very reason that\nit has no determinations in itself; even the highest qualities which\nmen would attribute to God, for example,--justice and goodness,--are\nimproperly predicated of him, for as in him the greatest and the least\ncoincide, so do goodness and evil and all other contrary qualities. In\nthis respect Bruno was following closely in the footsteps of Nicolaus\nof Cusa.\n\n[Sidenote: Physical Atomism.]\n\n[Sidenote: Critical Atomism.]\n\nFrom the second point of view, that of _physical_ atomism, the atom\nis nothing more than a hypothesis to explain the constitution and\nqualities of nature as we experience it. We seek to account for the\ndifferences in material bodies and in their ways of acting upon one\nanother by the interaction of ultimate elements of which the nature\nand laws may be variously interpreted. Of this point of view also\nthere are traces in Bruno, although for it he had least regard. He\ndoes not attempt, for example, to apply the theory of the atoms to\nexplain the four elements which had come down from Aristotle. He\nleaves them practically intact, and we have seen that they form a\nstanding difficulty in the way of a consistent theory. The earth alone\nis atomic in its nature; water, air, and fire seem alike fluid and\ncontinuous in quality, but wherein their difference from one another\nconsists he was unable, or did not care, to make clear. Perhaps, if\nwe take his view at its best, we should say that all three represent\nstrata, varying in density, of the one fluid and all-pervading ether.\nHad he worked out this conception, which was evidently present, on\noccasions, to his mind, he would have given an example of what is\nmeant by physical atomism. But this was left for another century to\nfulfil. From the third or _critical_ point of view, which inquires\ninto the presuppositions or the possibility of knowledge, Bruno\nmay be regarded as being, to some extent, a forerunner of Kant, in\nthe stress he lays upon the relation of the minimum to measure or\nknowledge, and in his doctrine of the relativity of the conception of\nthe _minimum_. The minimum, instead of a last of division, becomes a\nfirst of composition--a ground which we must necessarily assume in\norder to account for the experienced fact of composition. To know a\ncomposite is to measure it, and measurement implies the _minimum_ or\nfirst part, without which quantity in any form cannot be explained.\nAs the comparison of numbers with one another, their determination\nas greater or less, is only possible on the assumption of a unit, a\ncommon measure to which each may be referred, so the comparison of\nbodies with one another, as to quantity and quality alike, demands a\ncorporeal minimum, to which their differences must be reduced. This\nrelation to knowledge carries with it the relativity of the minimum\naccording to the subject-matter with which the knower is for the time\nbeing concerned. If all knowledge is of the same type, then in each\napplication of it--each subdivision of knowledge as a whole--there\nis presupposed the corresponding minimum. That which is least in one\nsphere may be greatest in another; that which is element of one science\nmay be that which another seeks to analyse into lesser constituents.\nThe celestial body, which is a highly complex combination of elements,\nmay be the unit of astronomical science. The phrase, which is the unit\nof the rhetorician, is analysed by the logician and the grammarian into\nterms and words; these are analysed by another science into syllables\nand letters; these by the mathematician into lines and points. Thus\nevery science has its own (relative) minimum. Only one _minimum_ is\n_absolutely_ so named,--God as the monad of monads. It is to be noted\nthat the relativity of the monad is dependent upon the origin of its\nconception, in the conditions of knowledge; it is because quantity\nis universal that a minimum is necessary, and it is because quantity\ndiffers in kind, in each subject of knowledge,--because it is, in\nscholastic phrase, equivocally applied in the different cases,--that\nthe minima differ from one another. The minimal number is no measure\nof the minimal body nor of the geometrical figure, and the numbers\nwhich are in use among men are not those which may be employed by other\nand higher rational beings. Thus, even number itself is a relative\ndetermination; ten horses, said Bruno, are not _really_ equal to ten\nmen, but only _conventionally_.\n\nThe ancient atomism upon which Bruno founded his theory was, at any\nrate in its traditional rendering, frankly materialistic. It admitted\nnothing but atoms and the void, all things else being dependent upon\nthe _composition_ of atoms, which itself, and all that results from\nit, is merely an appearance to sense, without corresponding reality\nin nature. All physical operations were explained by mechanical\narrangement and movement of the atoms. The method which was pursued\nthus unscientifically, without consciousness of the extent of its\nvalidity, modern atomic theory has followed scientifically, with full\ncomprehension of its bearings, and perhaps without due consideration\nof its limits. Bruno tells us that he had at one time been an adherent\nof Democritus' atomic theory, but on reflection had been unable to\nrest satisfied with his materialistic account of the nature of things.\nIn this case also he showed himself unable to get rid of the ties\nwhich bound all the thought of his time--even that thought which most\nbelieved itself to be free.\n\nAristotle's distinction of form and matter in nature, of pure activity\nand pure passivity, had still sufficient influence to render even in\nBruno's time a purely mechanical treatment of nature an impossibility.\nThe opposing school, the Neo-Platonism which attracted so many minds\nof that period, because of its supposed inconsistency with Aristotle's\nsystem, was itself an offshoot, to some extent, of that system, and\nwas still less scientific in its tendency. Mysticism, of which it was\npartly a cause and partly an effect, lent its weight also against\nany mechanical interpretation of nature. Thus even while apparently\ngoverned by scientific aspiration, Bruno gives a teleological scheme of\nthe universe which renders any scientific explanation of it impossible.\nNot only, as we have seen, is the ether identified with the first\nsubstance, spirit, or soul of the universe, but also the greater and\nlesser organic bodies are governed each by its individual soul, which\nis somehow distinguished from the universal spirit, and within each of\nthese is an infinite number of smaller living bodies. In other words,\nthe atoms themselves are animated _virtually_, if not _actually_. This\nanimistic interpretation is in direct conflict with the mechanical\ninterpretation which science has followed, and which it must continue\nto follow if it is to produce any result. Thus, motion and the changes\nof composition that derive from motion are explained not by the\nmechanical impact of atoms and bodies upon one another, but by the\naction of the intrinsic soul in each being, which causes the motion of\nthe body, in accordance with its need and desire of self-preservation.\nAll motion, even the slightest, is thus explained by a final cause.\nIn the whole universe also, the constantly occurring changes and\ntransformations are due to a similar final cause--the need for each\nthing to become _explicitly_ that which it already is _implicitly_,\n_i.e._ the whole of reality. It required once more a critical\nseparation of the spheres of validity of the respective conceptions\nof nature and spirit, such as Kant attempted, before full scope could\nbe given to mechanical interpretation on the one side, and teleology\nrestricted to the domain of spirit only on the other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BRUNO\n\n\nThe distinctively ethical teaching of Bruno is contained in the two\ndialogues--the _Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante_, and the _Heroici\nFurori_. The latter describes the struggles and aspirations of the\n\"heroic\" or generous human soul in its pursuit of the infinitely\nbeautiful and good--its efforts towards union with the divine source of\nall things. To this more constructive work, in which moral philosophy\nwas to be treated according to \"the inward light with which the divine\nsun of intelligence had irradiated\" the soul of the writer, the\n_Spaccio_ was to form an introduction. \"It seemed well to begin with a\nkind of prelude, after the manner of musicians; to draw some dim and\nconfused lines, as painters do; to lay deep bases and dark foundations,\nas do the great builders; and this end seemed best achieved by putting\ndown in number and in order all the primary forms of morality which are\nthe capital virtues and vices.\"[436] The _Spaccio_, with its shorter\nappendage, the _Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo_, contained a bitter attack\nupon the prevalent forms of Christian religion; it especially attacked\nthe doctrine of the all-sufficiency of faith, which, interpreted as\nit then was, might stand as the formula of mediaeval corruption and\nstagnation; and it was upon this dialogue, almost solely, that the\nreputation Bruno long enjoyed--that of being an atheist--was based.\nIt is therefore well to remember the introductory nature of the work.\nHad not \"atheism\" been frequently synonymous with \"unorthodoxy,\" the\n_Heroic Enthusiasms_ would have shown on how shallow a foundation the\ncharge rested, for that dialogue breathes the purest religious emotion\nand aspiration. Bruno had, however, a premonition of the fate that was\nto befall his memory. He protested, perhaps with a touch of sarcasm,\nthat nothing in his work was said \"_assertively_,\"--that he had no\nwish either directly or indirectly to strike at the truth, to send\na shaft against anything that was honourable, useful, natural, and,\nconsequently, divine.[437] His own religion was that which had its\nbeginning, its growth, and its continuance in \"the raising of the dead,\nmaking whole the sick, and giving of one's goods\"; and not that in the\nspirit of which the goods of others were seized, the whole maimed, and\nthe living put to death.[438] The conclusions of the _Spaccio_ were not\ntherefore to be regarded as presenting a finished system, but as mere\nsuggestions, to be tested \"when the music should be given in concert,\nthe picture finished, the roof put on the building.\" On the other hand,\nit is clear also that in the _Spaccio_ Bruno intended to present a\npopular moral philosophy, or to point out the degree of virtue which\nmight be attained without the influence of the divine _afflatus_\ndescribed in the _Enthusiasms_. As in the philosophy of Aristotle\nbefore Bruno, and in that of Spinoza after him, the perfection of this\ncustomary morality formed at the same time the ante-chamber through\nwhich alone entrance was to be gained into the inner chamber of divine\nlove. This is the real meaning that underlies the bizarre and at times\nextravagant humour of the dialogue: it points out the purification to\nwhich the human soul must submit before it can become a fitting vessel\nfor the divine enthusiasm.\n\n[Sidenote: Faith and works.]\n\nBefore a purer morality can be taught to any avail, there must exist a\ndesire for it in the minds of those to whom it shall be revealed. In\nthe way of Bruno's proposed reformation there stood the attitude of the\nChurch and of the religious orders towards \"faith\" and towards \"works\"\nrespectively. Faith meant merely professed belief in, or acceptance\nof, their doctrines, and conformity with their practices--blind\nacceptance and unreasoning conformity--in contrast with which an\nearthly life that was simply moral was held to be of no value towards\nthe blessed life hereafter. Under the influence of this spirit the\nworst vices were practised, condoned, and pardoned, even in Bishops\nand Cardinals, not to speak of the ordinary priests and monks. It is\nonly as embodying this conception that Bruno attacked the Church. Thus\nJupiter, in the _Spaccio_, complains that his powers are decaying:--\"I\nhave not vigour enough to pit myself against certain half-men, and I\nmust, to my great chagrin, leave the world to run its course as chance\nand fortune direct. I am like the old lion of \u00c6sop--the ass kicked\nit with impunity, the ape played tricks upon it, the pig came and\nrubbed its dusty paunch upon it, as if it were some lifeless log. My\nnoble oracles, fanes, and altars are thrown down, and most unworthily\ndesecrated; while altars and statues are raised there to some whom I\nam ashamed to name, for they are worse than our satyrs, fauns, and\nother half-beasts, viler than the crocodiles of Egypt; for these at\nleast showed some mark of divinity when magically guided, but those\nare quite the scum of the earth.\"[439] Bruno is ironically contrasting\nthe Christian ideal, as he interprets it, with that of the Greeks and\nEgyptians. The former is that of a being only half-human, half-free;\non one side of his nature he is reduced to the level of the beast,\nthe ass, the bearer of burdens, unquestioning, faithful. Again, one\nof the constellations, the _Corona Borealis_, is to be left in the\nheavens, escaping the general fate,[440] until the time when it shall\nbe given in reward to \"the invincible arm that shall bring peace, the\nlong-desired, to a miserable, long-suffering Europe, cutting down the\nmany heads of that worse than Lernean monster that is scattering its\nfateful poison of manifold heresy, and sending it through every portion\nof her veins.\"[441] To this decision of Jupiter, Momus, the critic and\nwit of the assembly, adds that it would be enough \"if a certain sect\nof pedants could be rooted out, who, doing no good themselves, as the\ndivine and natural law bade, yet thought themselves, and desired to\nbe thought by others, pious and pleasing to the gods; they said that\nto do good was good, to do evil, evil; but that men gained grace and\nfavour with the gods, not through the good that they did, but through\nhoping and believing in accordance with _their_ catechism. As if the\ngods, said Mercury, were anxious about nothing but their own vainglory,\ncared nothing for the injury caused to human society. And they defame\nus, Momus continued, by calling this an institution of heaven,\ndecrying effects or fruits; while all the time they are doing no work\nthemselves, but living on the works of others, who instituted temples,\nchapels, hospices, hospitals, colleges, universities, for quite other\nmen than they. These others, even if they are not perfect, will not,\nlike their usurpers, be perverse and pernicious to the world; they will\nbe useful to the state, skilled in speculative science, studious of\nmorality, fanning zeal and enthusiasm for doing good to one another,\nand maintaining the common weal for which all laws are ordained. The\nusurpers are worse than grubs, caterpillars, or destroying locusts, and\nshould be exterminated accordingly.\"[442] How is it possible, we read\nelsewhere, that men should regard that as the highest type of religion\nwhich holds behaviour, the doing of good deeds, to be unimportant,\nor even to be vice and error; or pretends that the gods do not care\nfor good deeds--that through such, however great they are, men are\nnot justified?[443] This creed was a disease that ran through a man's\nnature and poisoned it for ever. \"When one turned from any other\nprofession or faith to this, his liberality was exchanged for avarice,\nmildness for insolence, humility for pride; formerly open handed with\nhis own goods, he now became a robber and usurper of those of others;\na good man became a hypocrite; a sincere one, cunningly evil; a simple\none, malicious; he who was once conscious of his own defects became\nthe most arrogant of men; he who was ready to do any good action, to\nlearn any new knowledge, became prone to every kind of ignorance and\nribaldry; he who had merely the makings of a rogue became the worst\npossible of men.\"[444] Miracle-working was the universal means by which\nthe supremacy of faith was maintained. Momus therefore proposed to\nsend Orion upon the earth. \"He can do miracles--can walk upon the waves\nof the sea without sinking or wetting his feet; let us send him among\nmen to make them believe everything we would have them believe--that\nblack is white, that the human intellect is blind where it thinks\nitself to see best; that what to reason appears excellent, good, best,\nis vile, wicked, evil in the extreme; that nature is a strumpet, the\nlaw of nature a ribaldry; that nature and divinity cannot work together\nfor one and the same good end; that the justice of the one is not\nsubordinate to that of the other, but that they are as contrary as\ndarkness and light.\"[445]\n\n[Sidenote: Asinity.]\n\nThe attitude of mind which formed the ideal of the Church for its\nmembers Bruno typified frequently enough, as we have seen, by the Ass,\nafter Cusanus' _Docta Ignorantia_ and Agrippa's praise of Asinity in\nhis work on _The Vanity of all Sciences_. But _they_ were in earnest:\nBruno bitterly ironical. In his _Cabala_ Asinity is given the two\nplaces left vacant in the heavens by the council of the gods in the\n_Spaccio_: the place of _Ursa Major_ is taken by Asinity in the\nabstract, that of _Eridanus_ by Asinity in the concrete. The whole\nwork is in praise of \"the pure goodness, royal sincerity, magnificent\nmajesty of ignorance, learned foolishness, divine Asinity.\"[446]\nAsinity is in the sphere of practice as submission to authority in that\nof speculation, or pedantry in that of teaching. Against all of these\nBruno casts the shafts of his irony, now broad and heavy, now fine,\nlight and piercing.[447] The list of virtues which Bruno gives as\nadorning the soul of the renovated man does not present any novelty,\nexcept perhaps in the order assigned to the different virtues.[448]\nAlong with each mythical figure of the constellations he names the\nvarious vices that are expelled, and into the place of which the\nvirtues come. The Bear, the highest constellation in the heavens, is\nreplaced by Truth, the Dragon by Prudence, Cepheus by _Sophia_, or\nWisdom. The following table shows some of the virtues which occupy the\ndifferent posts vacated by the mythical beings of the heavens, and\ntheir contrary vices.\n\n    +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+\n    |/Constellation./ |     /Virtue./   |            /Vices./         |\n    +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+\n    | 1. _Ursa_       |      Truth      |Deformity, Falsity, Defect,  |\n    |                 |                 | Impossibility, Contingency, |\n    |                 |                 | Hypocrisy,                  |\n    |                 |                 | Imposture, Felony.          |\n    | 2. _Ursa Major_ |The place is left|                             |\n    |                 | left vacant, to |                             |\n    |                 | be filled in    |                             |\n    |                 | the satire of   |                             |\n    |                 | the Cabala by   |                             |\n    |                 | \"_Asinity_ in   |                             |\n    |                 | the abstract.\"  |                             |\n    | 3. _Draco_      |    Prudence.    |Cunning, Craftiness,         |\n    |                 |                 | Malice, Stupidity, Inertia, |\n    |                 |                 | Imprudence.                 |\n    |                 |                 | (Envy).[449]                |\n    | 4. _Cepheus_    |     Wisdom.     |Sophistry, Ignorance (of     |\n    |                 |                 | evil disposition), foolish  |\n    |                 |                 | Faith (Hardness).           |\n    | 5. _Bootes_     |      Law.       |Prevarication, Crime,        |\n    |   (Arctophylax) |                 | Excess, Exorbitance,        |\n    |                 |                 | (Inconstancy).              |\n    | 6. _Corona      |    Judgment.    |Iniquity.                    |\n    |    Borealis_    |                 |                             |\n    | 7. _Hercules_   |     Courage.    |Ferocity, Fury, Cruelty.     |\n    |                 |                 | Slackness, Debility,        |\n    |                 |                 | Pusillanimity (Violence).   |\n    | 8. _Lyra_       |_Mnemosyne_, and |Ignorance, Inertia,          |\n    |                 | the Nine        | Bestiality (Conspiracy).    |\n    |                 | Muses, her      |                             |\n    |                 | daughters,--the |                             |\n    |                 | branches of     |                             |\n    |                 | knowledge.      |                             |\n    | 9. _Cygnus_     |   Repentance.   |Self-love, Uncleanness,      |\n    |                 |                 | Filthiness, Immodesty,      |\n    |                 |                 | Wantonness.                 |\n    |10. _Cassiopeia_ |   Simplicity.   |Boastfulness on the one      |\n    |                 |                 | side, Dissimulation on      |\n    |                 |                 | the other (Vanity).         |\n    |11. _Perseus_    |  Diligence or   |Torpor, Idleness, Inertia,   |\n    |                 |   Solicitude.   | Foolish Occupation,         |\n    |                 |                 | Perturbation, Vain          |\n    |                 |                 | solicitude.                 |\n    |12. _Triptolemus_|   Humanity or   |Misanthropy, Envy,           |\n    |                 |  Philanthropy.  | Malignity.                  |\n    +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+\n\nThere follow as \"virtues\":--Sagacity, judicious election or choice,\naffability, magnanimity (_Aquila_); divine enthusiasm or rapture\n(_Pegasus_); hopefulness, faith and sincerity (the _Triangle_);\nvirtuous emulation, tolerance, sociability (and friendship--the\n_Pleiades_); love (peace and friendship--_Gemini_); conversion\nor emendation, heroic generosity (or magnanimity, again--_Leo_);\ncontinence, equity (and justice--_Libra_); sincerity (observance of\npromises--_Scorpio_); contemplation, the love of solitude (freedom\nof mind), temperance (_Aquarius_); just reserve and taciturnity,\ntranquillity of mind, industry, prudent fear, vigilance for the state,\nkindliness, liberality, judicious sagacity (_Hydra_); divine magic\n(and soothsaying), abstinence (the _Cup_!), the divine parable (the\nsacred mystery,--_Chiron_); sincere piety and wise religion (the\n_Altar_); honour, glory, and, finally, health, security and repose, as\nthe due reward of the virtues, and remuneration for zealous work and\nendurance.[450]\n\nIt will be seen that the list is redundant, and it is more so in the\ntext, where several virtues are usually given under each head. Several\nof the names do not denote virtues in the ordinary sense (_e.g._\nknowledge of magic, ability to interpret the divine parables): they are\nmerely qualities which it is desirable for the good man to have. Others\nrefer to qualities which could not be acquired by any one destitute\nof them (_e.g._ hope, love, piety), while others represent rather the\noutcome of the virtuous life than any one of its constituent elements,\n_e.g._ Knowledge, Divine Enthusiasm, Contemplation, Honour. There\nremain the familiar virtues of Greek philosophy:--Courage; prudence\nand sagacity; temperance (continence and abstinence); wisdom (or the\nlove of truth); justice, including submission to law, active justice\nor judgment, and equity; sincerity, with truthfulness, simplicity,\nfaith, the observance of promises; sociability and friendliness, with\nhumanity, affability, tolerance, kindliness; liberality; magnanimity\nand heroic generosity; tranquillity or gentleness. More modern are\nthe virtues of solicitude, diligence or industry, of emulation, and\nof love of solitude, or \"Monachism.\" There is accordingly nothing of\nvalue to be derived for systematic ethics from this or from any other\nwork of Bruno. It is in the digressions from the main argument that his\nphilosophy of practical life is revealed.[451]\n\n[Sidenote: Peace and liberty.]\n\n[Sidenote: Law]\n\n[Sidenote: Judgment.]\n\nThe two things which seemed to Bruno for his time the most desirable\nwere _peace_ and _freedom_--freedom alike of thought and of speech. The\ncharacteristics of the Church which he consistently condemned were on\nthe one hand its violence, the dissension and strife it stirred up, on\nthe other its tyranny over mind and tongue. Hence the aim of the moral\nlife, from the lower plane on which we stand in the _Spaccio_, is to\nsecure the prosperity of the state, the peaceful common life of its\nmembers, and the avoidance of all interference with the individual,\nexcept where the positive end, security, appears endangered. Of the\nnine muses, the daughters of Mnemosyne,[452] _Ethica_ is at once the\nlast born and the most worthy. Her task is to institute religions,\nto establish ceremonies, to posit laws, to execute judgments, with\nprudence, sagacity, readiness, and generous philanthropy; to approve,\nconfirm, preserve, defend whatever is well instituted, established,\nposited, executed; adapting, as far as may be, both passions and\nactions to the worship of the gods, and the common life of men.--The\nfunction of _Law_, the daughter of wisdom, is to prevent the powerful\nfrom making undue use of their pre-eminence and strength, and in other\nrespects vigorously to protect the common life and civil intercourse\nof men.[453] \"The powerful are to be sustained by the weak, the feeble\nare not to be oppressed by the strong, tyrants are to be deposed,\njust governors and kings ordained and confirmed, republics fostered;\nviolence shall not tread reason under foot, ignorance not despise\nknowledge, the poor shall be aided by the rich, virtues and studies\nnecessary or useful to the community be promoted, advanced, maintained.\nNo one is to be put into a place of power that is not superior in\nmerits, by force of virtue and talent, either in himself, which is\nrare and almost impossible, or through communication with and counsel\nof others, which is due, ordinary and necessary. The two hands by\nwhich any law is strong to bind are _justice_ and _possibility_, one\nmoderated by the other, for although many things are possible that are\nnot just, nothing is just that is not possible. Whether it come from\nheaven or from the earth, no institution or law ought to be approved\nor accepted which does not tend to the highest end, viz. the direction\nof our minds and reform of our natures so that they produce fruits\nnecessary or useful for human intercourse.\"[454] _Judgment_ shall make\na scale of virtues and of crimes, the greatest in either class being\nthat which affects the Republic as a whole; next that which affects\nother individuals than the agent; a crime committed between two who\nare in accord is hardly a crime, while there is no crime if the fault\nremains in the individual--does not proceed to bad example or to bad\ndeed. _Repentance_ is to be approved by it, but not set upon the same\nlevel as _innocence_;[455] _belief_ and _opinion_, but not placed so\nhigh as _deeds_ and _work_; _confession_ and _admission_ of fault,\nbut not as _correction_ and _abstention_. It shall not place one who\nto no purpose mortifies the flesh on a level with one who bridles his\nspirit, nor compare one who is a useless solitary with another who is\nin profitable intercourse[456] with his fellows, nor applaud so highly\none who, perhaps unnecessarily, subdues his desires, as another, who\nrefrains from evil-speaking and from evil-doing; not make so great a\ntriumph over one who has healed a base, useless cripple, worth little\nif any more when whole than maimed, as over another who has liberated\nhis fatherland, or reformed a mind diseased.[457] The _Roman people_\nwas the type of the best-governed state, \"more bridled and restrained\nfrom the vices of incivility and barbarity, more refined and willing\nfor generous undertakings than any other; and as their law and religion\nwere, so were their customs and deeds, so their honour and happiness.\"\nHow different from the pedants of the Church, who flourish throughout\nEurope: while saluting with peace they bring wherever they enter in the\nsword of division, and the fire of dispersion; taking son from father,\nneighbour from neighbour, citizen from fatherland, and causing other\ndivorces more abhorrent and contrary to all nature and law; calling\nthemselves ministers of one who raises the dead and heals the sick,\nthey more than all others on the earth are maimers of the sound, and\nslayers of the living, not so much with fire and sword, as with the\ntongue of malice.[458]\n\n[Sidenote: The scales.]\n\nUnder the _Scales_, Bruno describes some of the reforms he believes\nnecessary: in courts, offices and honours are for the future to go\nby merit; \"in republics, the just are to preside, the wealthy to\ncontribute, the learned to teach, the prudent to guide, the brave to\nfight, those that have judgment to counsel, those that have authority\nto command; in states, the scales represent the keeping of contracts\nof peace, confederations, leagues, the careful weighing of action\nbeforehand; in individuals the weighing of what each wishes with what\nhe knows, of what he knows with what he can, of what he wishes, knows,\nand can with what he ought; of what he wishes, knows, can, and ought,\nwith what he is, does, has, and expects.\"[459]\n\n[Sidenote: Sincerity.]\n\nUnderlying this cult of humanity one cannot but feel the robust\nnaturalism of the Renaissance, which in Bruno's mind is apart\naltogether from the mystical exclusive intellectualism of his more\ncharacteristic philosophy. It is with man as a natural being, living\nout his earthly life, and gathering such fruits as may be of kindliness\nand love from his fellow-creatures, that the practical philosophy\nis concerned. The religion attacked was one that struck at the root\nof this human love, and made of earth a purgatory for the sake of\nthe uncertain life to come. Hence the emphasis laid on _sincerity_,\n_faithfulness_, or _truthfulness_, as high among the virtues. \"Without\nit every contract is uncertain and doubtful, all intercourse is\ndissolved, all social life at an end.\" Bruno is as rigid as Kant in\nregard to the keeping of faith; even promises made to the wicked\nmay not be broken. It was \"a law of some Jew or Saracen, brutal and\nbarbarian, not of civilised and heroic Greek or Roman, that sometimes,\nand with certain kinds of people, faith might be pledged for individual\ngain, and for an opportunity of deception, making it the servant of\ntyranny and treachery.\"[460]\n\nThe antipathy of Bruno towards the Jews is to be explained by the\nsame principle of social life and progress; it is not, as Lagarde\nsupposes,[461] an offspring of his hatred towards the Church, regarded\nas a direct descendant of Judaism. So far as it is not an expression\nof an unreasoning anti-Semitic wave of feeling, such as occasionally\noverwhelms some of the European peoples, it may have had three\ngrounds: the reputed avarice of the Jew:[462] his exclusiveness,\nunsociability;--\"a race always base, servile, mercenary, solitary,\nincommunicative, shunning intercourse with the Gentiles, whom they\nbrutally despise, and by whom in their turn, and with good reason,\nthey are contemned\":[463]--or his religion, which appeared to Bruno\na corruption of the nobler Egyptian religion. Thus in _Spaccio_[464]\nthe punishment of the children for the sins of the fathers is said to\nbe found only among Barbarians, and first among the Jews, \"a race so\npestilent, leprous, and generally pernicious that it should be effaced\nfrom the earth.\"[465]\n\n[Sidenote: Temperance.]\n\n_Temperance_, as a virtue, is rather the peace of mind that goes with\ncivilisation--urbanity--than the more physical virtue: its opposites\nare intemperance, excess, asperity, savagery, barbarity. \"It is through\nintemperance in sensual and in intellectual passions that families,\nrepublics, civil societies, the world, are dissolved, disordered,\ndestroyed, swallowed up.\"[466] Again, Bruno's unorthodox standpoint\nwith regard to the vows of _chastity_ and of celibacy taken by nuns and\npriests is part of a healthy reaction towards naturalism from the false\nsentiment which condemned as unholy whatever pertained to the natural\nman. The place of _Virgo_ is taken by chastity, continence, modesty,\nshame; the contrasting vices being lust, incontinence, shamelessness.\n\"It is through these,\" Bruno adds, \"that virginity becomes a virtue. In\nitself it is neither virtue nor vice, implies no goodness, dignity, or\nmerit, and when it resists the command of nature it becomes a wrong,\nan impotence, a folly, madness express; while if it is in compliance\nwith some urgent reason, it is called _continence_, and has the essence\nof virtue, because it participates in that courage and contempt for\npleasure which is not vain or worthless, but benefits human intercourse\nand brings honourable satisfaction to others.\"[467] \"The laws of the\nwise do not forbid love, but irrational love; the sycophancies of the\nfoolish prescribe, without reason, limits to reason, and condemn the\nlaw of nature; the most corrupt of them call _it_ corrupt, because\nby it they are not raised above nature to become heroic spirits,\nbut are depraved, contrary to nature and below all worth, to become\nbrutes.\"[468]\n\n[Sidenote: The Golden Age.]\n\nIn the third dialogue of the _Spaccio_ is a digression on _Otium_,\nIdleness, and the Golden Age, which had been brought into popularity\nby the pastoral poem of Tasso, the _Aminta_, and its imitators (_e.g._\nGuarini in the _Pastor Fido_). _Otium_ presses its claim to a place in\nthe heavens as being more truly a virtue than solicitude or strenuous\neffort, to which the place of _Perseus_ had been given. Its chief\nargument is that through it the golden age had been instituted and\nmaintained, by the law of idleness which is the law of nature, while\nit was through solicitude, with its following of vainglory, contempt\nof others, violence, oppression, torment, fear, and death, that the\nage had departed. \"All praise the fair age of gold, when I kept minds\nquiet and peaceful, safe from this virtuous goddess of yours. For\ntheir bodies, hunger was sufficient sauce to make a delicious and\nsatisfying repast out of acorns, apples, chestnuts, peaches, and roots,\nwhich benign nature administered at a time when such food was the best\nnourishment for them, gave them most pleasure, and kept them longest\nin life, which the many artificial sauces that industry and zeal have\ndiscovered cannot do.\"[469] Industry had introduced property, and\ndivided up not only the earth, which is given to all its children,\nbut also the sea, and perhaps the air as well; so that instead of\nsufficiency for all there is too much for some and too little for\nothers. It had introduced an unnatural inequality, and confused\ntogether peoples whom nature had intended to live apart, with the\nconsequence that the vices of one race were being implanted upon those\nof others. The right of the stronger had taken the place of the law of\nnature, violence that of the peace of nature, which are the law and\npeace of God.\n\n    O bella et\u00e1 de l'oro\n    Non gia perche di latte\n    Sen corse il fiume, et still\u00f3 mele il bosco.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Ma 'n primavera eterna\n    Ch' hora s' accende et verna\n    Rise di luce, et di sereno il cielo,\n    Ne porto peregrino\n    O' guerra, o merce a' l' altrui lidi il pino.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Ma legge aurea et felice\n    Che natura scolpi. S' ei piace, ei lice[470]\n\nBruno was no imperialist. Nature seemed to him to have fixed definite\nboundaries to the extension of the different races, by which the\nspecial genius of each was kept pure. In the _Cena_ (126. 9) Tiphys\nand his successors (Columbus, Vespucci, and others are meant, although\nnot named) are said to have \"discovered means of disturbing the peace\nof peoples, violating the natural trend of the genius of countries,\nconfounding what foreseeing nature had distinguished, doubling,\nthrough commerce, evil feelings, adding the vices of one race to those\nof another, propagating new incitements, instruments, methods of\ntyranny and assassination, which in time, by the natural vicissitude\nof things, would recoil upon our own heads.\"[471] It was really, he\nthought, for the advantage of men themselves that the world-regions\nshould be kept as distinct in their usages and customs as they are\nphysically distinct by the natural divisions of mountains and tracts of\nsea. From region to region, vice and the poison of perverse laws and\nreligions, the materials of discord and extermination, were propagated\nand disseminated to the suffocation of every good fruit; there were no\nadvantages which could compare with these evils.[472] It should be\nremembered that the colonists of the day were the Spaniards, with the\ncorruption and cruelty of whose rule Italians were only too familiar;\nand their misdeeds were far greater in the new world.\n\n[Sidenote: Progress.]\n\n[Sidenote: Evolution.]\n\n[Sidenote: Man and the animals.]\n\nThe age of gold, however, of idleness, and peaceful happiness, was\nfar from Bruno's ideal; the reply of Momus to _Otium_ showed that it\nhad not made men virtuous in the golden age any more than the brutes\nwere virtuous now--that men were perhaps originally more stupid than\nmany of the latter; but in their emulation of divine actions and their\nattempts to satisfy spiritual desires, difficulties had arisen and\nneeds sprung up; through these their minds were sharpened, industries\nhad been discovered, arts invented; and so from day to day out of the\ndepth of the human intellect necessity brought forth new and marvellous\ninventions.[473] Thus more and more they advance, through pressing\nand earnest occupation, from the bestial nature, and approximate more\nand more nearly to the divine. That injustice and vice increase along\nwith industries is only a corollary of the increase of justice and of\nvirtue. If oxen or apes had as much virtue and spirit as man, they\nwould have the same apprehensions, the same passions, and the same\nvices. So in men those that have in them somewhat of the pig nature, or\nof the ass or ox nature, are certainly less wicked, not infected by so\ncriminal vices as more highly developed men might be; but they are not\nfor that more virtuous, unless the brutes also are more virtuous than\nmen, being infected with fewer vices.[474] In this generous conception\nof human progress, and of its spur--solicitude, necessity, pain--Bruno\nis quite at one with modern theories of human evolution; it can hardly\nbe said, however, that he anticipated the evolution theory so far as\nit involves an identity of origin for human beings and lower animals.\nThe idea that different human beings express different animal types was\nnot a new one. It means in Bruno that such men have animal souls, but\nthis is not because their bodies have reverted to the animal type. It\nis the soul that moulds the body and gives, in these cases, the animal\nexpression to the face--the look of wolf, or bear, or fox, or serpent.\nThere is no question of a _physical continuity_ between animal and man,\nbut there is a _psychical continuity_, since a soul which is that of\nan animal in one generation may become that of a man in another.[475]\nA much nearer approach to the evolution-theory is to be found in the\n_Cabala_,[476] where it is said that if a serpent could have its\nhead moulded into that of a man, its tongue widened, its shoulders\nbroadened, arms and hands branching out from it, and, where the tail\nnow is, a pair of legs, it would think, look, breathe, speak, work,\nand walk just as a man does, for it would be nothing but a man. Or if\nthe reverse process occurred, in a man (_involution_), in place of\ntalking he would hiss, in place of walking he would creep, in place of\nbuilding a palace he would hollow out a hiding-place for himself. This\nis not, however, because the body of the one had been transformed into\nthat of the other animal, function following structure; the soul with\nall its qualities is unchanged--it is one and the same in both; the\ndifferences are only in the power of expression. A serpent or any other\nanimal might have a higher intelligence than man, yet remain inferior\nto him through poverty of instruments. If man had not hands, but two\nfeet in their stead, however high his intelligence, family and social\nlife would have been no more enduring with him than with the horse,\nthe deer, or the pig; it would only have exposed him to greater danger\nand more certain ruin; and, in consequence, there would have been\nnone of the institutions of doctrine, the inventions of discipline,\nthe congregations of citizens, the raising of edifices and other\nthings that represent human greatness and excellence, and make man\nthe invincible superior over all other species. All this is referred\nnot so much to his mind as to his hand, the organ of organs.[477] It\nis in the development of the hand, also, that modern anthropology has\nsought one of the chief conditions of human development. It is clear,\nhowever, that in these theories there are two positions not distinctly\nseparated: one that the soul gives form to the body, the other that all\ndifference comes from the body, the soul remaining apart, and in its\nessence untouched by the changes its body undergoes. We shall have to\nreturn to this question in the following chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: Riches and poverty.]\n\n[Sidenote: Avarice.]\n\n[Sidenote: Fortune.]\n\nAnother digression occurs under _Hercules_,[478] where Riches, Poverty,\nand Fortune contend for the place of honour that is finally given to\nCourage or Fortitude. Such personifications of the virtues had been\nfamiliarised in Italian philosophy by Petrarca (_Remedium utriusque\nfortunae_), but Bruno refers back to Crantor's discussion of the\nrelative value for the soul of Riches and other goods.[479] In our\ndialogue Riches is decided to be neither good nor bad in itself; it may\nbe indifferently either, according to its possessor: therefore it is\nto incur neither disgrace nor honour, neither be condemned to Hades,\nnor raised up to Heaven, but to wander from place to place. It shall be\nfound by no one who has not first repented of his good mind and healthy\nbrain; he must give up, according to Momus, all thought of prudence,\n\"not trusting in Heaven, regarding not justice or injustice, honour or\nshame, calm or storm, but committing all to chance. As a general rule\nRiches are to go to the most insensate, the most foolish, careless,\nsilly--to beware of the wise as of fire. Poverty, on the other hand (in\ninferior or corporeal goods), may be conjoined with riches in goods of\nthe mind, as riches in inferior goods may never be, for no one that is\nwise or wishes to gain knowledge can ever achieve great things by their\nmeans. To philosophy Riches are an impediment, while Poverty offers it\na safe and easy road. He will be great who in poverty is rich because\nhe is content; and he is a slave who in riches is poor because he has\nnot enough. Not he that has little but he that desires much is really\npoor. The friends of _Poverty_ are open, the enemies of _Riches_ are\nsecret; the poor man by repressing desire may rival Jove in happiness;\nthe rich, ever spreading more and more widely the nets of cupidity,\nis plunged more and more into depths of misery. _Avarice_ is the dark\nside, the shadow, of both Riches and Poverty, ever fleeing Poverty and\npursuing Riches, but ever eluded by the latter, and ever caught by\nthe former; far from Poverty in reality, she is ever close by it in\nimagination; it is this darkness or shadow that make Poverty and Riches\nalike to be evil. One may be poor in virtue of _affect_ (feeling,\nemotion) as well as in virtue of _effect_ (actual, material want).\n_Fortune_ also is rejected, in spite of her claim to be absolutely\njust; as all things are ultimately or really one, no part of the world,\nshe claims, should be treated as more worthy or unworthy than another,\nand fortune regards all equally, or does not respect any particular\nperson more than another, which is really justice!\n\n[Sidenote: Courage.]\n\n[Sidenote: Simplicity.]\n\n[Sidenote: Self-consciousness.]\n\nTo the place for which these have striven succeeds _Fortitude_, the\nservant of the higher virtues: \"Constant and brave must be he that\nadministers judgment, with prudence, by the law, and according to\ntruth. He shall be guided by the book in which is the catalogue of\nthe things the brave man ought not to fear, viz.: those which do not\nmake him worse, as hunger, nakedness, thirst, pain, poverty, solitude,\npersecution, death; and that of other things which, as they make him\nworse, must be avoided at all cost,--gross ignorance, injustice,\ninfidelity, lying, avarice, and the rest.\"[480] Beside _Fortitude_\nmay be placed _Simplicity_,[481] between the vicious extremes of\nBoastfulness on the one hand and Dissimulation on the other, the latter\nbeing the less hateful of the two: \"sometimes even the gods must make\nuse of it, and to escape envy, reproach, outrage, Prudence is wont to\ncover Truth with her vestments.\" Simplicity is pleasing to the gods,\nfor it has in a manner the likeness of the divine countenance, being\nalways the same and unconscious of itself. That which reflects upon\nor is conscious of itself, makes itself in a sense to be many, to be\nother and other, becoming both object and faculty, the knowing and the\nknowable, whereas in the act of intelligence many things concur in\none. The most simple intelligence does not know itself, by reflection,\nbecause it is absolute, pure light: and again it alone knows itself,\nnegatively, for it cannot be hidden.[482]\n\n[Sidenote: Solicitude.]\n\n[Sidenote: Truth.]\n\nThe transition from ordinary morality,--the virtue of the everyday\nlife of human society,--to the divine aspiration of the \"heroic\"\nsoul, is to be found in the virtue of _Solicitude_, and the primary\ntriad of _Truth_, _Prudence_, and _Wisdom_. On the feet of Solicitude\n(Diligence, Endurance) \"are the winged sandals of the divine impetus,\nthrough which she leaves beneath her the vulgar good, and contemns the\nsoft caresses of pleasures, that, like insidious sirens, try to delay\nher in the pursuit of the works she seeks.\" On labour and fatigue she\nnurses the generous mind,--enables it not only to subdue itself, but to\nattain the highest state--that of not feeling fatigue, or pain, when\nfatigue or pain must be undergone. In noble work fatigue is pleasure\nand not fatigue to itself, but in other than in such work or virtuous\nactivity, it is not pleasure to itself, but intolerable fatigue. \"Be\nwith me\" Solicitude concludes, \"generous, heroic, anxious _Fear_,\nstimulate me that I do not perish from the number of the illustrious\nbefore I perish from that of the living. Before torpor or death take\nfrom me my hands, grant that the glory of my works may not be in their\npower to take. _Anxiety_, grant that the roof be finished before the\nrain come: that the windows be whole before the winds of treacherous\nand unquiet winter blow. _Memory_ of a well-spent life, thou shalt\nmake old age and death destroy my soul before they disturb it. Fear of\nlosing the glory acquired in my life shall make old age and death not\nbitter to me, but dear and desirable.\" The end which this strenuous\nvirtue seeks is that of the intellectual triad placed in the highest\npart of the heavens by the gods,--Truth, Prudence and Wisdom, which in\nreality are one and the same.[483] Truth is the unity which stands\nabove the all of things, and the goodness which is pre-eminent over\nall things, for being, goodness, and truth are one:--in other words,\nit is the Eleatic One,--the \"implicit universe,\"--of the metaphysical\nworks.[484] It is _before_ things as cause and principle, and things\nhave dependence upon it: it is _in_ things, as their substance, and\nthrough it things subsist: it is _after_ things, for through it things\nare known without error. These three aspects represent metaphysical,\nphysical, and logical truth respectively. What is presented to our\nsenses and may be grasped by our intelligence, is not the highest\ntruth, but only the figure, image, resplendence, or appearance of it.\n_Prudence_ also is both above and in us. It is above as Providence,\nwhen it is also truth itself, and there Liberty, Necessity, Essence,\nEntity, all are one, the Absolute. In us Prudence is the virtue of\nthe consultative and deliberative faculty,--\"it is a principal form\nof reason dealing with the universal and the particular,[485] has for\nits maid-servant _dialectics_, and for guide acquired wisdom, vulgarly\ncalled _metaphysics_, which deals with the universals of all things\nthat fall within human knowledge.\"[486] So too Wisdom, _Sophia_, is at\nonce supra-mundane,--when it is one with Providence itself, light and\neye in one,--and mundane, inferior, not truth itself, wisdom itself,\nbut participant in truth and in wisdom,--an eye that is illuminated by\na foreign light. The first is invisible, infigurable, incomprehensible;\nthe second is figured in the heavens, reflected in finite minds,\ncommunicated by words. The earthly or inferior forms, however, as Bruno\nmakes clear, are of value only for the sake of the higher unity, to\nattain which is the real end of the philosophic life. \"He who pretends\nto know what he does not know, says Wisdom, is a wanton Sophist: he who\ndenies knowing what he knows, is ungrateful to the Active Intelligence,\ninsults truth, and outrages me, as do all those who seek me--not for\nmyself, or for the supreme virtue and love of that divinity which\nis above every Jupiter and every heaven,--but either to sell me for\nmoney, honour, or other gain, or to be known rather than to know, or\nto detract from and be able to destroy the happiness of others....\nThey that seek me for love of the supreme and first truth are wise,\nand therefore blessed.\"[487] Bruno's _Summum Bonum_ is therefore\n_knowledge_, an intellectual comprehension of the All of things, as it\nis in the supreme Unity or source of the world. It is for the sake of\nthis end of the few, the wise, that the many, the vulgar, and foolish,\nare to be kept at peace, in harmony with one another, following\nobediently their higher guides in religion or in the state. There is\nnot in Bruno any more than in Spinoza any sense of the infinite worth,\nor the infinite pitifulness of man as an earth-born creature of hopes\nand fears, creeping towards the light, with the clogging darkness\nbehind, groping in childish terror and childish trust, for the hand of\na loving, human God. Therefore, although he lived in the midst of the\nReformation, its true meaning passed him by.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE HIGHER LIFE\n\n\nWe now turn to the higher moral life, which is at the same time the\nreligious life, of the heroic soul in its struggle towards perfection.\nThis perfection consists in comprehension of the world as infinitely\nperfect, in the union with God as the source from which the world\nflows, the spirit in which it lives, and in the Love of God as at once\ninfinite beauty and infinite goodness.\n\nWe have seen that there are to Bruno, as to Plato and to Aristotle,\ntwo classes of men, the \"vulgar\" and the \"heroic,\"[488] the lower or\nsubject, and the upper or ruling classes: as in each of us there are\ntwo principles, a higher, intellect or reason or mind, and a lower,\nsense and sensual passion. The danger is as great to the world when the\nlower class attempts to usurp the place of the higher, as it is to the\nindividual soul when passion overwhelms reason. The spread of pedantry,\nin the universities and in the churches, greater in his time and more\nmenacing to human progress than it had ever been, was an illustration\nto Bruno's eye of the results ensuing when lower minds tampered with\ndivine knowledge.[489]\n\nThe heroic soul is raised by the divine spirit within it out of the\nturmoil of the constant change and vicissitude, to which the vulgar\nsoul is, in common with all living things, subjected. \"The beginning,\nmiddle, and end, birth, growth, and perfection of all earthly things\nare from contraries, through contraries, in contraries, and to\ncontraries; and where there is contrariety, there is also action,\nreaction, movement, diversity, multitude, order, degrees, succession,\nchange.\" \"There is never any pleasure,\" we read elsewhere, \"without\nsome bitterness;--nay, if there were not the bitter in things, there\nwould not be the pleasurable, for fatigue makes us to find pleasure in\nrepose, separation causes us to find joy in union, and so everywhere\nwe find that one contrary is the reason of another being desired and\npleasing:\"[490] and so it is with pain. None, therefore, are ever\nsatisfied with their state, except the unfeeling or the foolish who\nhave no knowledge of their own ill, but enjoy the present without fear\nof the future, can find rest in what is, and have no feeling or desire\nfor what might be: \"in short have no sense of contrariety, which is\nfigured by the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.[491]\" Ignorance\nis the mother of sensual happiness and joy; hence \"the heroic love (in\nits beginning) is a torment, for it does not rest in the present, as\ndoes sensual love, but feels ambition, emulation, suspicious fear for\nthe future, the absent, the contrary.\" Yet the wise man is neither\nhappy nor miserable,--knowing that good and evil are alike relative,\nalike fading and temporary things, he is neither dismayed nor elated,\nbut becomes continent in his inclinations, and temperate in his\npleasures. Pleasure is not really pleasure to him, for he has present\nto him its ceasing; pain is not pain, for he has by force of thought\nits termination before him: all mutable things therefore are to him as\nthings that are not.[492]\n\nOwing to the ever-moving cycle of change, the ordinary soul must of\nnecessity fall back, in the course of the eternal process of its life,\nto the lowest stage, however high in the scale it may have risen; but\nthis, although an evil for it, does not prejudice the whole, in which\nall things work together for good. Some few, however, may escape this\ndanger, through becoming united with the eternal Mind or Source.[493]\nThey then cease to be subject to mutation,--Mind being immutable,--and\npersist in eternal blessedness and love. For such favoured ones of\nheaven, the greatest evils of this life are converted into goods,\ncorrespondingly great. It is suffering that compels the labour and the\nstriving which lead most frequently to the glory of immortal splendour.\n_Death in one age makes to live in all others._[494]\n\n[Sidenote: Kinds of furor.]\n\nThere are, however, two kinds of _furori_ (or inspiration). \"In some\nthere is only blindness, stupidity, unreasoning impulse; others consist\nin a certain divine abstraction by which some men become better in fact\nthan ordinary men. These again are of two kinds, for some becoming\nthe habitation of gods or of divine spirits, say or do miraculous\nthings without themselves or others understanding the reason; these\nfor the most part are promoted to this state from one of rudeness and\nignorance: the divine sense and spirit enters into them as into a house\nswept and garnished, they being void of any spirit or sense of their\nown. Others being more habituated to or skilled in contemplation, and\nhaving innate in them a lucid and intellectual spirit, are moved by an\ninternal impulse and natural fervour, with love of divinity, justice,\ntruth, glory; by the fire of desire, fanned by the breath of purpose,\nthey give edge to their senses, and in the sulphur of the thinking\nfaculty enkindle the light of reason, by which they see further than\nordinary men. These come in the end to speak and operate not as vases\nor instruments, but as principal artificers and agents--the first\n_have_ worth or dignity, the second _are_ worthy: or the first are\nworthy as an ass that carries the sacraments, the second as a sacred\nthing. In the first we see divinity in effect--we admire, adore, obey\nit; in the second we see the excellence of our own humanity.\"[495]\n\n[Sidenote: Ascent towards union with the divine.]\n\nThe steps towards the highest peak of human excellence are compared,\nafter Neoplatonist example, to the degrees in intensity of light, as\nwe proceed from darkness, in which it is entirely absent, to shadow,\nthen to the colours in their order from black to white, next to the\nbrightness diffused from polished or transparent bodies, the rays\noutflowing from the sun, finally to the sun itself, in which light _is_\nmost truly and most vividly itself.[496] First of all it is needful for\nthe soul to turn to the light, \"by act of _conversion_ to present the\nlight of intelligence to its eyes, so to regain its lost virtue, to\nstrengthen its sinews, to terrify and put to rout its enemies,\"--the\nlower, sense-feelings and passions. The conversion seems to arise as\nby an act of grace from above; or, to express this in other words,\nthe soul or spirit tends towards that with which it has greatest\naffinity, as the sun-flower tends towards the sun, and this affinity\nin the human soul is Love.[497] The symbol of love is fire, for love\nconverts the object of love into the lover, as fire is of all elements\nthe most active, the most potent to transform others into itself.[498]\nIt is the divine in man that makes him or impels him to love God as He\nis in reality, and the goal or aim of that love is to take God into\nhimself, to become one with God. No really divine or heroic love can\never rest satisfied in anything but spiritual beauty. For there are\nthree kinds of love, as there are three kinds of Platonic rapture--the\ncontemplative, the practical, the idle or voluptuous. One from the\nperception of corporeal form and beauty rises to the thought of the\nspiritual and divine; another enjoys the vision of beauty for itself,\nand for the grace of the spirit that is reflected in the grace of the\nbody; while still another enjoys only the material pleasure that beauty\nprovides; the last is the love of barbarous natures, incapable of\nraising themselves to love that which is really worthy of love.[499]\n\n[Sidenote: Beauty.]\n\nTo the two higher kinds of love correspond the two kinds of\nbeauty--_sensible_ and _intelligible_. That in the body which calls\nforth love--its beauty--is a certain spirituality, which consists not\nin definite dimensions, \"nor in determinate colours or forms, but in\na certain harmony and consonance of members and colours.\" Corporeal\nbeauty is not, however, true or permanent beauty, and therefore cannot\ncall forth true or permanent love. The beauty of bodies is accidental,\n\"shadowy,\" and like other qualities is absorbed, altered, and decays\nthrough the change of the subject-body, for the latter frequently from\nbeautiful becomes ugly, without any change taking place in the soul.\n_Reason_, however, apprehends the more truly beautiful by conversion\nto that which _makes_ beauty in body, the source of the beauty, and\nthat is the soul, which has so moulded and formed it. _Intellect_\nrises still higher, sees that while the soul is incomparably beautiful\nabove the beauty of bodily things, it is not beautiful in itself, or\nprimitively, otherwise there could not exist the diversity that is\nfound in souls--some being wise, lovable, beautiful, others foolish,\nhateful, ugly. Hence it must rise to that higher intelligence which of\nitself is beautiful and of itself is good. That is the One, the Supreme\nCaptain, who when presented to the eyes of the thoughts militant,\nilluminates them, encourages, strengthens, and leads them to victory\nin the contempt of every other beauty, and repudiation of every other\ngood. Its presence, therefore, is that which enables us to overcome\nevery difficulty and conquer every force.[500] The Intelligence which\nis the truest beauty attainable by us, is not yet Divinity itself, but\nonly the highest \"intelligible species,\" or form, the highest Idea.\nDivinity itself is the final, the most perfect object of thought and\nlove, not attainable in our present state, in which God cannot become\nobject to us, except through some image.[501] No image of the Divine,\nhowever, even the most inadequate, can be abstracted or otherwise\nderived by the senses, from corporeal beauty or excellence. Such can be\nformed only by the intellect, and on such the human intellect feeds,\nin this lower world, until it be allowed to behold with purer eyes the\nbeauty of divinity itself. In a fine simile Bruno describes how one\nmay come to some mansion, most exquisitely adorned, and as he goes\nabout observing now this, now that, is pleased and happy, filled with\ndelight and noble wonder. But if then he sees the living Lord of these\nbeautiful forms, of beauty incomparably greater, he lets go all care\nor thought of them, intent wholly on this _one_, their source. Such\nis the difference between the earthly state, when we see the divine\nbeauty in intelligible or abstract forms, derived from its effects,\nits works, masterpieces, its shadows and similitudes, and the perfect\nstate, when we are allowed to behold it in its real presence.[502]\nThe \"intelligible species\" of this conception, which Bruno derives\nfrom Neoplatonism, are simply the ideas of the \"speculative sciences,\"\nwhich include, however, what would now be called the natural sciences.\nHuman Perfection consists in a form of knowledge, a system of\nthought, by which the knower becomes one with the mind in which this\nthought-system originated, the mind of God. Our knowledge--that is,\nour perfection--can never, however, be complete, since the object,\nthe knowable, can never be perfectly comprehended. But it may be made\ncomplete so far as our vision extends; and herein lies a saving clause\nfor the \"ordinary\" man. Few can reach the goal, but all may run; it\nis enough that each do his best possible. The generous spirit prefers\nto fail nobly in the pursuit of the highest rather than to succeed\nin inferior and baser enterprises.[503] _Acteon_ typifies the human\nintellect in its pursuit of the divine wisdom and capture of divine\nbeauty.[504] The wild beasts whom he tracks down are the \"intelligible\nspecies\" or ideal forms, rarely sought, and rarely seen by those that\nseek them. His dogs are the thoughts that issue outwards in search of\ngoodness, wisdom, beauty beyond himself. The fate of Acteon--his death\nunder the fangs of his own hounds--represents how the generous spirit,\ncoming into the presence of that highest beauty, is ravished out of\nitself, is converted into the very prey which it pursued: itself is\nnow the prey of its own thoughts, for it has contracted divinity into\nitself, has no longer to seek it outside of itself: as love converts\ninto the thing loved.[505] His death means that he ends his life\naccording to the world of folly, of sense, of blindness and of fancy,\nonly to commence the new intellectual life, the life of the gods.[506]\n\n[Sidenote: The infinite process.]\n\nThe first step, however, in the desire of the infinitely beautiful\nis but the beginning of an endless series; the heart goes out on an\nendless quest, while the intellect cannot but follow. For the intellect\ncannot rest in any definite or finite idea or object, but is driven\never forwards towards the source of all ideas, the ocean of all truth\nand goodness. Whatever form may be presented to it and comprehended by\nit, it judges that there must be a greater above and beyond that. Hence\nit is in constant discourse and movement, for whatever it possesses\nis seen to be a _measured_ thing, and therefore cannot be sufficient\nin itself, nor good in itself, nor beautiful in itself. It is not the\nuniverse, not absolute Being, but Being \"contracted\" to this or that\nnature, species, form, represented to the intellect, and presented to\nthe mind (_animo_). Thus always from beauty comprehended, and therefore\nmeasured or limited,--the beautiful by participation,--we progress\ntowards that which is truly beautiful, beautiful without any limit or\nmargin.[507] On the other hand,[508] this infinite process is not in\nvain, for it is not from imperfect to perfect, but a \"circular movement\nabout the degrees of perfection, in order to arrive at the infinite\ncentre which is neither formed nor form.\" This paradox Tansillo (taking\nthe part of the Nolan) refuses to explain. It probably hints at the\nidea, as familiar in Bruno as the infinite process itself, that in each\nform or degree of perfection, the infinite with all its perfection,\nis wholly present. It is a centre which is at the same time the\ncircumference.\n\nIn a subsequent dialogue[509] the object alike of intellectual pursuit\nand of the heart's desire is described as a positive or \"perfective\"\ninfinite. The will cannot rest satisfied with a finite good; but\nif there is other good beyond, desires it, seeks it, because, as\nthe common saying goes, the acme of one species is the foot and the\nbeginning of the next higher species. The highest good being infinite,\nit is communicated infinitely, but also according to the nature of the\nthings to which it is communicated. Neither to the universe, _e.g._ as\nregards mass and figure, nor to the intellect, nor to the heart, are\nany definite limits fixed; yet the intellect and the heart may still\nbecome perfect through or by their object, for that object is not\nmerely a \"privative infinite[510]\" or potentiality, but a perfective\nor positive[511] infinite as being itself actuality and perfection.\nWhen the intellect conceives truth, or light, the good, the beautiful,\nwithin the whole capacity of its nature, and the soul drinks of the\ndivine nectar and of the source of eternal life, so much as its vessel\ncan hold, it is seen that the light (of truth) extends beyond, and\nthat the intellect may go on and on, penetrating more deeply into it.\nThe nectar and the source of living water are infinitely productive;\nthe soul may quench its thirst in it again and again.[512]\n\nThus the blessed or perfect life for Bruno meant a permanent,\ncontinuous absorption of the individual soul in the divine goodness--a\npermanence or eternity which was also one with the instant of time.\nThere was no greater value at any later moment than at the first union\nof the soul with its divine object: the soul was thereby removed, once\nfor all, out of the constant flux of things, the incessant renewal and\nrebirth of the soul throughout the ages, and lifted up into the calm of\nthe eternal and immutable.\n\n[Sidenote: Soul and body.]\n\nEven the heroic soul, however, is, as other souls, on the border line\nbetween corporeal and incorporeal nature; in part it tends to rise\ntowards the upper world, in part inclines towards the lower world.\nIf sense ascends to imagination, imagination to reason, reason to\nintellect, intellect to mind, then the soul is wholly converted into\nGod, and its dwelling-place is the intelligible world. In the contrary\ndirection it descends through conversion to the sensible world, by way\nof intellect, reason, imagination, sense, and the vegetative faculty.\nMind (the highest faculty in Bruno's psychology:--the intuitive\nperception of unity with the supreme ideal world) is oppressed by its\nconjunction with the more material faculties of the soul; knowing of\na higher state to which the soul might rise, it despises the present\nin favour of the future. If a brute had sense of the difference\nbetween its condition and that of man, and between the baseness of its\nstate and the nobility of that of man, to which it did not feel it\nimpossible to rise, it would prefer death which should put it on the\nway to that state, to life which held it fast in its present one. So\nthe soul, compelled by its loftier thoughts, as if dead to the body,\naspires upwards. Although living in the body, it \"vegetates\" there as\ndead--is present in it so far as animation is concerned, but absent\nfrom it in its proper action.[513]\n\nThus the heroic soul, although present in the body, is absent from it\nwith the better part of itself, and unites itself in an indissoluble\nbond with divine things. It feels neither love nor hatred of mortal\nthings, considering itself too great to be the slave and servant of\nits body: the latter it regards simply as a prison-house within which\nits liberty is closed in; a snare that holds its wings entangled; a\nchain that binds its hands; fetters that hold its feet fast; a veil\nthat bewilders its vision. Yet it is neither slave, nor captive, nor\nentangled, nor chained, nor held fast, bound nor blind, for the body\ncannot tyrannise over it further than itself allows. It has spirit\nallotted to it proportionally to its nearness to divinity, since the\ncorporeal world and matter are subject to divinity and nature. So it\nmay make itself strong against fortune, magnanimous against injustice,\nbold in face of poverty, disease, and persecution.[514]\n\n[Sidenote: The soul.]\n\n[Sidenote: Distraction of the body.]\n\nThe soul of man, in Bruno's psychology, as in Aristotle's, performs\na double function:--\"the one is to vivify and actuate the body, and\nthe other to contemplate the higher world. It has a receptive faculty\ntowards the spiritual, an active faculty towards the corporeal. Body\nis as dead, a thing privative towards the soul, which is its life and\nperfection, and the soul is as dead, a thing privative to the higher\nilluminating intelligence from which its intellect derives both its\ntendency or nature, and its actual form, its realisation.\"[515] The\nsoul is not locally in the body, but is related to it as intrinsic\nform, and as extrinsic giver of form: moulding the members, and giving\nshape to the composite result from within and from without. \"Body is in\nsoul, soul in mind, and mind either _is_, or is _in_ God, as Plotinus\nsaid.\"[516] The dualism of nature and divinity, of corporeal and\nspiritual, intellect and sense, permeates the ethical as it permeates\nthe earlier philosophical thought of Bruno: nowhere is the Neoplatonist\neffort to overcome the dualism inherent both in Plato and in Aristotle\nless effective than here. Thus the body remains--in spite of the\ncontinuity seemingly maintained between the highest and the lowest\nof the emanations from the supreme, or the identity asserted between\nsense, imagination, reason, intellect,--the chief hindrance to the\naspiration of the soul. For the body is in continual movement, change,\nalteration, and its faculties are conditioned by its inherent nature,\nits operations by its faculties. \"How then can immobility, subsistence,\nentity, truth, be understood by that which is always different from\nitself, always acting and becoming in different ways? What truth, what\nrepresentation can be depicted or impressed when the pupils of the eyes\nare dispersed into water, the water into vapour, the vapour into flame,\nthe flame into air--that into other things and again other, the object\nof sense and sense-knowledge passing endlessly through the infinite\ncycle of changes?\" Thought and passion take their character from their\nobject, or the sense-data on which they are based: but \"that which\nhas always before it now one thing now another, now in one way now\nin another, must necessarily be quite blind in regard to that beauty\nwhich is always one, and in one manner, which is unity itself, entity,\nidentity.\"[517]\n\nInto the very life of the generous soul there enter, accordingly, the\ncontrarieties by which on a lower plane the soul is governed:--\"the\nskilfulness and art of nature cause it to faint with desire for\nthat which destroys it, to be content in the midst of torment, to\nbe tormented in the midst of all content. For nothing derives from\nprinciples of peace, but everything from contrary principles, through\nthe victory and dominance of one side of the contrariety. There is no\npleasure of generation on one side without the pain of corruption on\nthe other; and the things that are becoming and those that are decaying\nare conjoined in one and the same composite being. The sense of joy\nand the sense of sorrow go ever together; it is called joy rather than\nsorrow if the former predominates and has greater force to solicit\nthe sense.\"[518] The life in death of the more divine soul is only an\nextreme instance:--\"it is the death of lovers from an extreme of joy,\nthe Cabalist _mors osculi_, and is at the same time eternal life,\nsuch as man may have potentially, _in disposition_, in this world,\nbut actually, _in effect_, in eternity alone.\"[519] Again it is the\ncontrast of infinite desire and finite power:--\"the weakness of the\nhuman mind which is intent on its divine enterprise, and suddenly\nis engulfed in the abyss of incomprehensible excellence. Sense and\nimagination are confused and absorbed, the soul can neither go forward\nnor backward, nor know where to turn, but loses its being just as a\ndrop of water vanishes in the sea, or a little vapour thins out and\nloses its proper substance in the spacious immeasurable air.\"[520]\n\n[Sidenote: Intelligence and love.]\n\nAs the height of our intelligence, so is the depth of our love or\npassion; the higher, _i.e._ the more comprehensive, the object of\nknowledge, the more absorbed become feelings and emotions in its\ncontemplation.[521] The most complete absorption is that of the heroic\nmind in its infinite and all-comprehensive object. That is not perfect\ndivine heroic love which feels the spur or the bridle, or regret or\ngrief for any other love; but that which is entirely without sense or\nfeeling of other passions. It is so deep in its delight that nothing\ncan displease or divert it or cause it to stumble in the least, and\nthis is to reach the highest blessedness in our present state--to have\npleasure without any sense of pain.[522] The loss of sense is caused by\nthe absorption of the whole being in virtue, in the truly good, and in\nfelicity. Regulus, Lucretia, Socrates, Anaxarchus, Scaevola, Cocles,\nare instanced as noble human beings who had no feeling or sense of the\ngreatest tortures, or what would be such to baser human natures.[523]\n\"A keener joy, or fear, or hope, faith, or indignation, or contempt,\nturns the mind away from any present, less vivid, passion.\" \"One who is\nmore deeply moved by the sight of some other thing, does not suffer the\npangs of death. The truly wise and virtuous man, not feeling pain, is\nperfectly happy, so far as the present life admits, at least in the eye\nof reason.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Aspiration.]\n\nIn its aspiration the soul need not go beyond itself, need only enter\ninto the depths of its own mind (_mens_); \"for this it is unnecessary\nto open the eyes wide upon the heavens, to raise aloft the hands, to\nwend one's way to the temple, to intone to the ears of idols, that one\nmay best be heard; rather we should enter into the innermost heart\nof ourselves, for God is near to us, with us, within us, more truly\nthan we are in ourselves; being soul of souls, life of lives, essence\nof essences.\" Divinity is not more nor less present in the other\nworlds than in our own or in ourselves.[524] Therefore the heroic soul\nwithdraws from the many, neither hating them nor seeking to be like\nthem, associating only with those whom it may make better, or who\nmay make it better; but aiming ever to be self-sufficient in its own\nwisdom. \"The soul must come to the point when it no longer regards\nbut despises fatigue, and the more the contest of passions and vices\nrages within, the struggle of vicious enemies without, the more it must\naspire and rise, and pass, with one breath (if it may be) over this\nmountain of difficulty. Here there is no need for other arms or shield\nthan the grandeur of an invincible mind, the endurance of a spirit\nwhich maintains the even tenor of its life, proceeds from knowledge,\nand is regulated by the art of speculating upon things high and low,\ndivine and human, in which its highest good consists.\"[525]\n\n[Sidenote: Love of God.]\n\nTo the love in the human soul there corresponds love in the divine\nnature, because love is of the essence of divinity. It precedes, in\nthe mythology of the ancients, all the other gods. Hence there is a\nnatural instinct or tendency of all things towards the beautiful and\ngood. Love is that by virtue of which all things are produced, which\nis in all things, and is the vigour of all things; by its guidance\nsouls rise to contemplation, by the power of flight it inspires,\nthe difficulties of nature are overcome, and men become united with\nGod.[526] To see God is to be seen by God; to be heard by divinity is\nto hear the voice of divinity; to be favoured by its grace is the same\nthing as offering oneself to it. The divine potency that is wholly\nin everything does not offer nor withdraw itself except through the\nconversion of the other, its object, to it, or aversion from it.[527]\nTo love God is to be loved by God. It is only through love, again,\nthat we can approach the inmost nature of God; we cannot reason or\neven think of the divine without detracting from it rather than adding\nto its glory.[528] To think of God is to limit Him, and, therefore,\nas we have seen, every conception of Him is inadequate: the deepest,\nthe highest knowledge of divine things is by way of negation, never\nby affirmation. For the divine beauty and divine goodness can never\nfall within our understanding (our conceptual knowledge), but are\never beyond and beyond in absolute incomprehensibility. No finite\nintelligence ever perceives the substance of divinity, but always its\nsimilitude, its image; even the highest intelligences are, in the\nlanguage of the schools, not _formally_, but only _denominatively_,\ngods, or divine,--divinity and the divine beauty remaining one and\nexalted above all things.[529] Being itself eternal, unchangeable, the\ndivine truth reveals itself to the few to whom it is revealed--not as\nin the physical sciences, which are acquired by the natural light\nof sense and reason, proceeding from the known to the unknown, in\nsuccessive stages, but--suddenly and at one stroke. There is no need\nof expense of time, laborious study, active inquiry, to secure it; but\nit enters into us as readily as the solar light is present, without\nlapse of time to him who turns to it, and lays himself open to receive\nit.[530] When the soul is thus wholly turned to God--to the Idea of\nIdeas--the mind is lifted up to the unity above essence, and becomes\nall love, all simplicity and unity. The soul is permeated at once with\nthe desire or love of the divine beauty in itself, \"without similitude,\nfigure, image, or form\"--a desire or love which is its own realisation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nPOSITIVE RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGION OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nThe hostility which the Italian and some of the Latin writings of\nBruno showed towards the positive religions of his day, alike the\nCatholic, the Reformed, the Jewish, and the Mahomedan, had two grounds:\nhis belief that religious or sectarian strife was the chief cause of\nthe evils of war and civil discord that were rife throughout Europe,\nand the fact that one and all of these Churches claimed the right\nof limiting thought as well as of dictating practice, and in their\nexercise of this right formed an unendurable barrier in the way of\nhuman progress. Of the Roman Catholic Church, to which all his life\nBruno belonged in spirit if not in outward conformity, he never\nexpressly denied any of the essential doctrines, as he maintained\nbefore the Inquisition at Venice. On the other hand, he admitted\nthat he had occasionally made indirect criticism of these doctrines,\nspeaking or writing \"philosophically,\" not \"theologically.\" To the\ndoctrine of the Trinity, for example, he had given a rationalist,\nhalf-mystical interpretation, seeing in it a figure or metaphor of the\ncoincidence in God of the three highest principles--Mind (the Father),\nIntellect (the word, the Son), and Love, the creating, vivifying force\nof the Universe (the Comforter or Holy Spirit). It is quite clear\nthat he did not accept as \"philosophically\" true the distinction of\nPersons, or the special divinity of Christ. Only once, perhaps, does\nhe write seriously of Christ as the Son of God, and that in one of\nthe posthumous works, the _Lampas Triginta Statuarum_.[531] \"Charity\nis the most perfect and consummate harmony, by which the soul in us\nbecomes so harmonious in itself that it is attuned both to God and\nto all men equally, not only to friends but even to enemies; to this\nperfection we are drawn, impelled, invited by the Son of the almighty\nGod, to raise us up to the likeness of the Father, 'who maketh His\nsun to rise upon good and evil, and sends His rain upon the just and\nthe unjust,' uplifting us from the savage condition of life common to\nbrutes and to the uncivilised, who love their friends and neighbours,\nbut hate strangers and enemies.\" On the other hand, this very law is\nelsewhere spoken of as coming not from the \"evil spirit or genius of\nany one race,\" but from God, the Father of all, as being in harmony\nwith universal nature, and as teaching a general philanthropy; \"that we\nshould love our very enemies, not be like brutes and barbarians, but\ntransform ourselves after the image of Him who makes His sun to rise\nupon good and evil, and makes the rain of His mercies to fall upon\njust and unjust. This is the religion which I observe, as beyond all\ncontroversy, and above all disputation, both from the conviction of my\nmind, and in accordance with the custom of my fatherland and race.\"[532]\n\nWhat Bruno rejected in Christianity was the whole mass of doctrine\nwhich suggested a miraculous or supernatural interference with the\norder of nature, for the benefit either of a particular person, or of\na particular race. That is the nerve, for example, of his satire upon\nthe popular idea of Providence in the _Spaccio_.[533] There Mercury,\non one of his visits to Sophia, relates a number of things he has to\nsee carried out, by the order of Providence, about the little hamlet\nof Cicala. They are none of the cleanest--the number of melons that\nare to ripen in Franzino's garden and that are not to be gathered till\nover-ripe, of jujubes that are to be picked from Giovanni Bruno's\ntree, that are to fall to the earth, or that are to be eaten by worms;\nhow Vasta, in curling the hair on her temples, is to overheat the\niron and burn fifty-seven of them, but is not to scorch her head--and\nso on. These unpleasant details, however, are only a prelude to a\nphilosophical conception of the divine action. God, it is said, does\nnot provide for this and that individual as occasion arises.[534] He\n\"does all things without deliberation, anxiety, or perplexity: provides\nfor innumerable species and an infinite number of individuals, not in\nany order of succession, but at once and all together: He is not like\na finite agent, doing things one by one, with many acts, an infinite\nnumber of acts for an infinite number of things, but does everything,\npast, present, and future, with one simple and unique act.\"[535] So the\nknowledge of God is simple, containing implicitly in itself all things\nthat are or happen in the extended universe (the _explicate_ unity).\nIt is only to our confused vision that this divine government does not\nappear just and holy. Mercury advises Sophia to put more strength and\nwarmth into her prayers, for to the mind of the infinite the small is\nas important as the great! \"The least things are just as much a care\nto the gods as the principal things, for the greatest and chiefest\ncannot subsist without the least and lowliest.\" The minutest trifle in\nthe order of the universe is important, for great things are composed\nof little, little things of least things, and these of atoms and\nminima.[536] The act of the divine knowledge is the substance of all\nthings: all are therefore known, ordained, foreseen. \"Divine knowledge\nis not as human, which comes after things, but is before and in all\nthings, and if it were not so, things could not be causes or agents,\neither proximate or secondary.\"[537]\n\nThus the order of nature is fixed and eternal, ordained and foreknown\nfrom all time. We have seen that Bruno rejected the superstitious idea\nthat comets and other heavenly wonders had a supernatural meaning; and\nthat he found the truest signs of divinity in the orderly course of\nnature.[538] Miracles he explained either through imposture or through\nsympathetic magic. Along with these he rejected also what may be called\nthe morbid side of medi\u00e6val Christianity--its constant dwelling upon\nthe physical, sensational aspects of Christ's life, sufferings, and\ndeath,[539] its appeal to the hysterical in man. Against a religion\nof incoherent personal emotion and brute ignorance, he would set one\nof humane love and of reasoned knowledge. The chief value of the New\nTestament, in his eyes, was its preaching of \"the Gospel law of mutual\nlove,\" which the tyranny of Rome had violated.[540] The religion to\nwhich he gave his adherence was that which raised the dead, healed the\nsick, gave to the poor; not the contrary form to which the Inquisition\nhad brought the Church in Catholic lands.\n\n[Sidenote: Man and God.]\n\n[Sidenote: The Bible,--not science but morality its aim.]\n\nWith great boldness Bruno drew from his conception of the Infinite\nthe consequence that there can be no action of the finite upon the\ninfinite, no change or effect in God produced through man. A practical\ncorollary of this was the argument for freedom of thought. The virtue\nof _Judgment_, in the _Spaccio_, has entrusted to it the defence of\nthe true law, and the removal of unjust or false laws, dictated by\nenmity to the peace and happiness of the human commonwealth. It shall\nkindle and fan the appetite for glory in the human breast, as the only\nsure stimulus for inciting men to the heroic deeds that increase,\nmaintain, or strengthen republics. But it shall not pay heed to what\nmen _imagine_ or _think_, provided their words and deeds do not corrupt\nthe peace of the realm. Deeds are its only concern, and it has to judge\nthe tree, not by the fineness, but by the goodness of its fruits.\nHeaven is not interested in any way in what does not interest man;\nit is moved and angered, not by anything done, said, or thought by\nmen, except in so far as the welfare of republics is endangered. Gods\nwould not be gods if they were either pleased or displeased, grieved\nor delighted, by what men did or thought; they would be more needy\nthan men, would be as dependent on men as men are on themselves for\nutility and profit.[541] The gods are beyond all passion: they have\n_active_ anger and pleasure only, not passive. Therefore they do not\nthreaten punishment or promise reward for good or evil that results in\n_them_, but for that committed on peoples and in the human societies\nwhich they foster by their divine laws and statutes, since human\nlaws do not suffice. The gods do not seek the reverence, fear, love,\nworship, or respect of men, for any other end or utility than that of\nmen themselves. Glory cannot be added to the gods from without; they\nhave made their laws not to receive glory but to communicate glory\nto men. The sole sphere of justice is the moral actions of men with\nregard to other men; inward sins are sins only so far as they have\noutward effect, and inward justice is not justice without outward\npractice.[542] In the _Cena_ Bruno had already made practical use of\nthis principle in maintaining that the Scriptures teach not science,\nbut an ideal of conduct, and therefore that any argument from them as\nto the actual constitution of the world is devoid of compelling force,\nwhile, on the other side, no scientific theory or hypothesis can be\nruled out simply because it is contradicted by any statement in the\nScriptures. They were written, not in the service of our intellect to\ninstruct us in philosophy, but for the grace of our mind and heart,\nordaining by their laws what should be our behaviour in the moral\nlife. The Scriptures were written in the language and adapted to the\nintelligence of the vulgar, the people of the time. \"A historian making\nuse of words which the ordinary man could not understand, would be\nabsurd; and still more so would be one who desired to give to a whole\npeople a law and model of life, if he were to employ terms which he\nalone or very few could understand, and should waste time over matters\nindifferent to the end for which the laws were ordained. For this\nreason Alghazel said that the function of the books of the law was not\nso much to probe the truth of things, or speculation, as to promote\ngood customs,\" and to provide for the welfare of republics and of\nhumanity. To use the terms of science where there is no need, is to ask\nthat the vulgar, the foolish many, from whom only conduct is required,\nshall have a special comprehension,--to ask that the hand shall have\nthe eye, whereas it is not made by nature to see, but to work, and to\nobey the eye.[543]\n\nThe revelation of the Scriptures is accordingly reduced to that of a\nmoral ideal, to be enforced upon the ordinary man by the threat of\nfuture punishment and promise of future reward; but it is an ideal\nwhich the wise man would acquire by the light of reason alone, and\nwhich he would pursue for its own sake.\n\nOn the other hand, the ceremonies and worship of the Church were never\nattacked by Bruno, nor did he ever place himself in open hostility\nto it; while he submitted, formally at least, to the rites of the\nProtestant churches in Geneva and Helmstadt. The grounds of this\noutward conformity may have been various: Bruno had no interest in\nspeculative theology, and probably kept an open mind towards the\nprevailing dogmas and the ceremonies that symbolised the truths\ncontained in them. He believed with Pomponazzi, and others after him,\nthat religion is a good thing for the many, the foolish and ignorant\nof the world, while knowledge or philosophy takes its place with the\nwise. The former must be governed by laws which they have blindly to\nobey, hence the supernatural sanction required; the latter pursue\nthe true good without this stimulus, by virtue of reason. But for the\nsake of the many, the few must conform in outward practice with the\nreligion of their state.[544] Brunnhofer goes so far as to see in\nthis the idea of Lessing, that religion is a means whereby men are\ngradually educated upwards to a true knowledge of God,--leading them\nfrom the state of darkness and savagery to that of moral behaviour, at\nwhich point only the full light of science and philosophy takes the\nplace of religion.[545] There was a religion, however, for the few\nas well as for the many, for the wholly civilised as well as for the\nsemi-barbarians of Europe,--the philosophical religion of the _Heroici\nFurori_. Another reason for his conformity was that Bruno regarded the\nhistorical religions as allegories, or metaphors, of truth. Not that it\nwas for every one to say what was metaphorical merely, what truth or\nfact: in the hands of Jews, Christians, and Mahomedans, and the many\nsects of each, the same Scripture met with as many interpretations as\nthe number of the sects.[546] The interpretation of the divine words,\nuttered by inspired prophet or poet,--for the divine inspiration was\nnot given at one place or one time only,--was again the work of the\nwise few.\n\n[Sidenote: Egyptian religion: Animism.]\n\nBruno's own leaning was towards Rationalism,--as in his interpretation\nof the Trinity, of Creation, of the Incarnation, of Immortality, of\nProvidence.[547] In this he was only following Lully and Nicolaus\nof Cusa, who also \"demonstrated\" some of the deepest of Christian\ndoctrines, interpreted in their own way. Yet Bruno was by no means a\nthorough Rationalist: there remained always a sphere within which\nFaith only was available, to which neither reason nor intellect could\npenetrate. We remember that he ridiculed Lully for attempting to\ndemonstrate some of the particular doctrines which \"are revealed to\nthe worshippers of Christ (_Christicoli_) alone, are contrary to all\nreason, philosophy, other faiths or superstitions, and are capable\nof no demonstration, but admit of faith only.\"[548] It is improbable\nthat any ironical meaning should be read into the words; for the\ndistinction between faith and knowledge or science, between theological\nand philosophical discussion, between the supernatural light and the\nlight of nature or reason, occurs again and again, not only in Bruno's\nreplies to the Inquisitors of Venice, but in the published works. Here\nand there he deprecates the taking of his statements, should they\nconflict with or tend to weaken the accepted faith, as \"assertively\"\nmade, and claims, like Copernicus, the right of arguing for any thesis\nwhich is \"more in harmony with our sense and reason, or at least less\nout of harmony with them than the contradictory thesis,\" however high\nthe authority of the latter may be.[549] Discreet theologians would\nfix no limit to natural reasonings, however far these went, provided\nthey did not determine against the divine authority, but subordinated\nthemselves to it.[550] Even the _Heroici Furori_ disclaims any\nsupernatural reasoning or revelation. \"If there is another order,\nabove the natural, which either destroys or corrects the latter, I\nbelieve in it, and may not dispute about it, for I do not reason in\nany other than a natural spirit.\" He is dealing with Philosophy, not\nTheology.[551] In other words, Bruno refuses to dogmatise, just as he\ncondemns dogmatism in others; philosophy or science should be allowed\nto pursue its own course, irrespective of religion, and untrammelled by\nthe Church, so long as it does not attack the authority of the Church,\nand thereby weaken the forces that make for peace and harmony among\nmen.[552] Short of that, entire freedom of thought should be allowed.\nSometimes it might be well that the wise and heroic, as well as the\nothers, should submit and humble the light of reason received from God,\n\"the mark of divinity hidden in the substance of our nature,\" if some\nhigher light forbid or warn. But,--\"In matters of philosophy at least,\nby whose free altars I have taken refuge from the threatening waves, I\nshall listen only to those doctors who bid us not close the eyes but\nopen them as widely as we may.\"[553] It has been suggested that Bruno,\nlike many others who were unstable in the Church, made use of the\nsubterfuge of the twofold truth;[554] in other words, that he professed\nto disbelieve theologically what he accepted as philosophical truth:\nor that he held one and the same proposition to be _true_ to sense and\nreason, _i.e._ to harmonise with all other \"natural\" knowledge, and\nyet to be _false_ to faith, _i.e._ inconsistent with revealed truth.\nBut no theologian denied more strenuously than Bruno, in spite of\noccasional lapses, the possibility of two kinds of truth. There were\nindeed two kinds of _evidence_: \"one from the light of our own senses\nand rational inference, such as we require in speculative sciences,\nin the arts, and in practical life, where true and false, good and\nevil, are apprehended by human reason and natural light;\" the other,\nfrom light of a foreign, namely, a divine source. For as God neither\ndeceives nor is deceived, and is not envious, but good in the highest\ndegree--is indeed truth and goodness itself; so, when he speaks to us\nof occult things, of mysteries, it must be evident that everything\nhe proposes for our belief is true, and that everything he proposes\nfor our doing is good. But God is also the Author of nature, of our\nsenses, of our eyes, and of that truth and evidence which is in them\nand according to them; truth does not contradict truth, goodness is not\nopposed to goodness. The word of God that is spread through the parts\nof nature, His hand and instrument,--for Nature is either God himself,\nor the divine force manifest in things,--is not opposed to the word\nof God, from whatever other part or principle it springs.[555] There\ncould be no clearer assertion of the right of philosophy and science to\npursue their own way in the discovery of truth. Nothing revealed from\nabove can conflict with truth acquired by the discursive, slow-moving\nhuman reason, nor on the other hand can any real truth arrived at by\nscience ever contradict the pure, genuinely-revealed, word of God.\nThe sphere of faith is separated from that of reason; faith follows\nthe authority of revelation, is an infallible certainty equal to,\nif not greater than, that of sense-knowledge and the intuition of\nfirst principles. Revealed truths are outside the sphere of sense and\nreason, not, however, as opposed or contrary to the truths belonging\nto that sphere, but as above them. While _philosophical_ faith\nenables us to act according to reason and human nature, guiding us by\nprinciples innate in ourselves, to the perfection of our _natural_\ncondition, _theological_ faith leads us by supernatural principles to\na _supernatural_ end, to become formed in the likeness and in the\nknowledge of God.[556] Neither must we call to the bar of reason what\nis above reason, summon before our tribunal \"cases\" of eternity,[557]\nnor on the other hand must faith be allowed to prejudice the discovery\nof truth by natural methods: if so, it becomes a danger and a\nsnare.[558] Bruno was therefore a Rationalist only in a limited sense:\nwhile he claimed for the philosopher entire freedom of interpretation\nof religious dogmas or legends, the interpretation was to be governed\nnot by the facts of ordinary knowledge, but by the mystical intuition\nof divine truth, given, in inspired moments, to the heroic soul.\nThere were two types of rationalism in mediaeval philosophy--that of\nAverroes, which sought to supplant the positive religions by a religion\nof philosophy, and that of Scotus Erigena, which aimed at upholding\npopular faiths while allowing the philosopher freedom of thought in\ninterpreting the doctrines these faiths involved. Bruno's rationalism\nis clearly of the second type, although personally he disliked all\nprevailing religions for the reasons already given.[559] All positive\nreligions expressed for him one and the same truth, some more, some\nless adequately,--that the supreme end of human activity is the union\nof the soul with God, whereby it becomes one with God and is raised\nabove the sphere of sense and reason, above nature, out of the ordinary\ncycle of human life and human death. That which of all others most\nnearly approached his ideal was the half-mythical religion of the\nEgyptians, from whom indeed he believed the later religions, as well as\nthe earlier philosophies, to have been inspired. The Egyptian worship\nof the gods in the form of living animals was symbolic of the truth\nthat God is in all things: \"Animals and plants,\" says Jupiter in the\n_Spaccio_, \"are living effects of nature, and nature is nothing but\nGod in things. Diverse things represent diverse deities, and diverse\npowers.\"[560] God is in all things, but not fully expressed in each,\n\"in some more, in some less excellently,\" in some one divine attribute\nor power predominates, in some another. Thus the viper or the scorpion\nrepresents _Mars_, the cock or the lion the _Sun_, because of their\ngreater affinity, respectively, with these deities, or rather with the\ndivine powers which the deities embody. For as divinity is communicated\nin a divine scale downwards to nature, so from the light that is\nreflected in natural things we may rise to the divine life that is\nabove them. It was on these sympathies between animals, plants, metals,\non the one hand, and the various attributes of divinity on the other,\nthat genuine magic and divination depended. The _Magi_ ascended by the\nsame scale of nature to the highest divinity, by which that divinity\nitself descended to the least of things, in its self-communication.\nTheir ceremonies were not vain imaginations, but living voices that\nreached the very ears of the gods. \"These wise men knew God to be in\nthings, divinity to be latent in nature, acting in and scintillating\ndiversely from diverse subjects, and making them to participate in\nitself, as in its being, life, and intelligence.\"[561] Of Jupiter,\nVenus, and the rest is said what Bruno no doubt thought of Christ, and\nother founders of religion, that they had been mortal human beings.\nWhat men adored was not Jupiter, as a divine being, but divinity, as\nexpressed in Jupiter: in this or that man were worshipped the name and\nsymbol of a divinity which in their birth communicated itself to men,\nand with their death was thought to have completed its work and to\nhave returned to heaven.[562] But divinity is communicated not only\nthrough these divinely chosen human vessels, but through earth, and\nsun, and moon, the planets, the stars, and all that is in them: one\ndivinity under innumerable names, according to the innumerable modes in\nwhich it is diffused. Endlessly varied also are the methods by which it\nmust be sought, under conditions appropriate to each thing, while it\nmust be honoured and worshipped with endlessly different rites, because\nthe kinds of favour we seek to obtain from it are beyond number. Later\nreligions had transformed for the worse what to the Egyptians was\nmerely a fable or metaphor, by which a mystery above the reach of sense\nwas expressed, or presented to the mind in a sign or symbol.[563]\n\n[Sidenote: The finite and the infinite.]\n\nHow Bruno understood the relation of the finite human soul to the\ndivine mind, or to the soul of the universe, it is not easy to\ndetermine, and it is doubtful whether he ever made it clear to himself.\nMen, as natural beings, enter into the determinate order of _Nature_,\nwhich, as we have seen, is the divine power that moves matter to life.\nThis divine power is the soul in all things, everywhere \"one mundane\nspirit, wholly in the whole and in every part of it, producing all\nthings in each according to the conditions of matter, time, and place.\"\nMen, for example, are not descended from one parent only, but have\ncome to life in the ordinary course of nature, in different places and\nat different times; hence the difference between the races.[564] We\nhave seen that Bruno also reverts repeatedly to the idea that various\nmen present in their expressions various animal characters, which\nare an index to their inward nature, and at the same time point to a\ntransition from a previous or towards a future state.[565] And again\nit was shown how animals differed from men not necessarily in degree\nor quality of mind, but only in the outward organism through which\nalone the mind could express itself. It is clear then that man should\nhave no higher place than any other animal, should stand no nearer God\nthan they; yet in a sense he does, for the human state appears to be\nthe only one from which the soul may raise itself out of the incessant\nflow of earthly vicissitude, and enjoy the calm of eternal intellectual\nunion with God.[566] The soul of any animal (or plant?) may in time,\nhowever, take the body of a man, when this outlet is given to it, just\nas that of a man, should he refuse his opportunity, may sink back, and\nindeed must sink back, to the animal state, in the never-ceasing cycle\nof change. But what precisely is this soul that passes from one body\nto another, perhaps from one star to another? In one passage we read\nthat as in corporeal matter the body of the ass does not differ from\nthat of the man, so in spiritual matter the soul of the ass remains\nthe same as that of the man; the soul of either is not different from\nthat which is in all things, _i.e._ the soul of the universe.[567]\nWe should then have to assume that it is _matter_, not the form or\nsoul, that differentiates individuals. According to the differences\nof the organised bodies are the souls that are in them; or, it is one\nand the same soul which constitutes the vital and cognitive principle\nin different animal bodies, and in different \"worlds\" or stars. The\nindividual human and animal souls would be merely modes of the one\nearth-soul, just as the different star-souls would be merely modes\nof the one soul of the universe, the first and highest emanation of\ndivinity. The immortality of the individual soul would mean accordingly\nits reabsorption, at the close of its bodily life, into the eternal;\nbut it would be impossible then to ascribe any continuity or identity\nto the souls of two beings which succeed each other in nature. This\nimpersonal immortality is that which is most prominent in the Italian\ndialogues; it gives place, so far as prominence is concerned, to\nquite another standpoint in the later Latin works. Thus we find in\nthe _Causa_ the comparison of the presence of the spiritual in matter\nto that of a voice in a room: it is wholly in the room and in every\npart of the room, yet it is only one utterance that is so heard in the\ndifferent parts.[568] It might be added that the different degrees\nof perfection or of divinity in different things would correspond\nexactly with the differences in the intensity, vividness, of the\nsound in nearer and more distant parts of the room. As matter itself\nis ultimately one with spirit,[569] the outcome of this theory is an\nextreme Pantheism; especially as in the _Causa_ the transcendent Unity,\nelsewhere distinguished from the soul of the universe, is disregarded.\nDivinity constitutes both existence and essence of all things, and all\nthings are ultimately one--God, in whom individual beings have their\nreality, and in whom each is one with all other beings. \"We have not\nto look for divinity at a distance from us, for we have it with us,\nmore truly intimate to us than we are to ourselves\"; and so with\nall other finite things.[570] It has been shown also that death from\nthis standpoint is merely the dissolution of a composite thing into\nits immortal elements, spirit and matter;[571] death is a change of\n\"accidents\" to the substance (_i.e._ of qualities, conditions), never a\nchange of substance itself.[572] Not only we, but all other substances,\nspiritual and corporeal alike, are beyond reach of death; but as all\nsubstances are ultimately one, this does not mean a peculiar, personal\nimmortality for each of us as separate beings.\n\n[Sidenote: Optimism.]\n\nIt follows also from this aspect of Bruno's philosophy, that\nas all things are divine, so all are good. The forms of all\nliving things--men, animals, metals, even those of deformed\ncreatures--are beautiful and perfect in heaven (_i.e. sub specie\naeternitatis_).[573] All things being subordinated to the will of the\nbest, everything is good, and tends towards good; the contrary is only\napparent when we refuse to look beyond the present, as the beauty of a\nbuilding is not manifest to one who sees only a part of it, a stone, a\npiece of cement, a partition wall, but is clearest to one who can see\nthe whole, and is able to compare part with part.[574]\n\n[Sidenote: The worth of the finite individual.]\n\nBut there is another aspect of Bruno's theory of the relation of the\nfinite individual soul to the universal spirit, according to which\nevery finite thing has an infinite worth from the very fact of its\nexistence as a member, or part of the universe. It is in this phase,\nlater in time than the other, but never completely dissociated from\nit, that the real contribution of Bruno to the history of philosophy\nappears.\n\nIt is foreshadowed in the _Heroici Furori_,[575] where the pursuit\nof an infinite object by a finite intelligence is justified from the\ninfinite potentiality of the latter, as eternal and unlimited in its\ncapacity for delight and blessedness. The infinite desire is itself\na pledge of its fulfilment in an eternal life.[576] The individual,\nfinite as it is, must realise in itself the whole nature of the\nuniverse to which it belongs; each thing, each substance or monad,\nrealises in the course of its life all other possible existences. Each\ntakes on successively all possible forms, just as at every moment all\npossible forms are actually realised in the universe as a whole. Each\nthing, and every part of each, present to us the \"similitude,\" the\nimage of the universe. It is precisely the thought which afterwards\nloomed so largely in the philosophy of Leibniz, that each monad is a\nmirror of the universe. The _transmigration_ of the earlier philosophy\nappears in a far nobler light in this phase. The soul of man does not\nchange in itself as it passes through its innumerable forms; now it\nis endowed with the \"instruments\" or members of the human body; anon\nit will take up the members of another body; \"for the soul which has\nnow the bodily organs of a horse there await the bodily members of a\nman and of all other kinds of being, in regular series, or in confused\norder; the death of the present members has no bearing upon the future\nlife and its innumerable forms. The soul would not suffer if this were\nknown to it; the wise soul does not fear death, sometimes desires\nit, and goes to meet it. Before every substance lies eternity for\nduration, immensity for place, omniformity for realisation.\"[577] The\nsoul is not limited to the earth alone, but has the infinite worlds\nbefore it, for its dwelling-place. It is owing to this individual\n(indivisible, therefore unchanging) substance--the soul--that we are\nwhat we are; about it as a centre there occur in each life continuous\n\"massing and unmassing\" of corporeal atoms, through which the changes\nof form are brought about. \"By birth and growth the spirit-architect\nexpands into this mass of which we consist, spreading outwards from\nthe heart. Thither again it withdraws, winding up the threads of its\nweb, retiring by the same path along which it advanced, passing out\nby the same gate through which it entered. Birth is expansion of the\ncentre, life consistency of the sphere, death contraction to the\ncentre.\" It is the soul that gathers about it, groups and vivifies\nthe atom-mass; and the strongest argument for its immortality is that\nit cannot be of less value, of inferior condition, than the atoms\nthemselves of which it avails itself to its own ends, and which are\nin their nature imperishable.[578] Each soul exists apart in its own\nunity and individuality; the soul of the universe does not impart\nanything of itself to the souls of its members.[579] The hierarchy\nof souls is not a scale of beings within beings, but a multitude of\nrealities, co-existent to all eternity, the _Monas Monadum_ at their\nhead, representing perfectly, completely, at every moment (_i.e._\ntimelessly), the reality of all the others, yet separable from them. Of\nthe others _that_ is higher which knows more perfectly, and in closer\nunity--that is, more adequately--the universe to which it belongs. Thus\nthere is the daemon or soul \"which is wholly in the whole extent of\nthe life of _the earth_, by the life of which we live, and in the being\nof which we are;\" above it is the individual soul or substantial nature\nwhich is in the wider extent of the _solar system_ to which the earth\nbelongs; above it again the soul of the whole system of the _universe_;\nand highest of all the mind of minds--_God_, the one spirit filling all\nthings wholly.[580]\n\nSo in the _Lampas_ the _Intellectus primus_ is said to be separable\nfrom particular finite intelligences. It does not belong to their\nsubstance: it works in them, but not as a part of them. It does not\ngradually leave the being to which it has presented itself when that\nbegins to decay, but simply ceases to operate, just as it comes also\n_suddenly_ to each, if at all.[581]\n\nIt follows that each of the lower monads is so far imperfect that it\nis never at any one time all that it has the possibility of being; the\neternal essence of humanity, for example, the truth of humanity, its\nideal, is realised not in any one individual, but only in the species\nas a whole,[582] and this is true of the perfection of every other\nspecies. But Bruno's optimism surmounts this difficulty. The evil, the\nimperfection, is so only to the individual, and in that particular\nphase of its life. Each thing has a double tendency and a double\nstriving--to remain in the state in which it is, and to press beyond\nthat to realise new forms. But each thing has in itself the nature of\nthe whole--is therefore in its inmost nature perfect. It is imperfect\nonly in its explicit nature--on its outward side. The striving after\nnew life is due to the felt conflict, or want of harmony, between\nwhat it has in it to become--its inner self--and what it has actually\nbecome, the limited form in which it appears. On the one hand evil is\nnecessary for good, for were the imperfections not felt, there would\nbe no striving after perfection; all defect and sin consist merely in\nprivation, in the non-realisation of possible qualities. \"It would not\nbe well were evil non-existent, for it makes for the necessity of good,\nsince if evil were removed the desire of good would also cease.\"[583]\nIn its whole life, however, the soul will realise all good, and\ntherefore is only _per accidens_ imperfect. On the other hand, however\nmean in itself at any moment, it is a necessary part of the whole,\nand therefore, relatively to the whole it is good. \"If we look to the\norder of the universe it will appear that every action and effect is\ngood by way of necessity, for even the things which appear the most\ntrifling and sordid are parts of greater and more noble things, as the\nformless are parts of the formed, the least are necessary elements of\nthe great, the great of the greatest; and as the less cannot subsist\nwithout the least, so neither can the greatest without the great. All\nbeings, therefore, of whatsoever nature, are good, if they are rightly\nconsidered, not less good than greater things, if we take into account\nthe fact that the goodness of the whole depends on the goodness of its\nparts.\"[584]\n\nEvery part, every individual in the universe, differs from every other;\neach has its own inalienable individuality by which it stands out from\nall others and is _itself_. So far was this principle carried by Bruno\nthat, as we have seen, he denied that any body could ever occupy the\nsame place twice; the planets moved not in circles or regular paths,\nbut ever in spiral course, so that at each moment their places were\nother than at any prior or later moment. No two circles, no two lines\nin nature, were ever exactly equal; hence there was never a perfect\ncircle nor a perfectly straight line. The principle is not at all an\nepistemological one. It does not mean that _we_ could not distinguish\nbetween two precisely equal things, but that two such things could not\nexist, not even in the minutest forms of nature, since the infinite\nvariety of the infinite all must reflect at every moment the infinite,\neternally realised, thought of the One Mind.\n\n[Sidenote: God in nature.]\n\nThere are accordingly three aspects of God in Bruno's philosophy--three\ndifferent standpoints from which He may be approached. The first is\nthat of natural religion--God in Nature. Nature is \"the omniform image\nof the omniform God--His great living semblance (_simulacrum_).\"[585]\nIts order reveals the mind from which it springs--the stars \"declare\nthe glory of the majesty of God and the works of His hands. Thence we\nare uplifted to the infinite cause of the infinite effect.\"[586] Nature\nis God in things,[587] His infinite mirror, the _explicate_, unfolded,\nextended, immeasurable world, and He is _implicitly_ everywhere in the\nwhole.[588] There is, however, no argument from the world to God's\nexistence. From the first the infinite power and goodness are assumed,\nand the universe, in Bruno's thought, is simply a broad general\nrevelation of what each one of us may find in himself.[589]\n\n[Sidenote: God in us.]\n\nThe form which the cosmological argument takes in Bruno is that as\nindividual things, taken singly, must be referred each to a finite\nprinciple and cause, a finite effect implying a finite power; so\nfrom the point of view of the universe of things, the innumerable\nindividuals in immeasurable space must be referred to an infinite first\ncause. But to our thought the universe is only an inciting cause; we\ncannot know God or anything of God's nature from it further than an\narchitect or sculptor can be known from one or all of his works. The\nbeauty and majesty of external nature leads us to aspire to God, its\nsource; but a nearer spring of knowledge is in ourselves. \"We are\nled to regard divinity not as without us, separate or distant from\nus, but as within ourselves (since it is everywhere wholly), for it\nis more intimate to us than we can be to ourselves, since it is the\nsubstantiating and most essential centre of all essences and of all\nbeing.\"[590] It is from these two aspects of his philosophy, the\nidentifying of _nature_ with God, and the identifying of the true being\nof each of us with God, that Bruno has been described as a Pantheist.\nSo far, however, as this term implies the identity of the individual\nthings with each other, the conception that all things are one, not\nin the sense of forming a unity of differents, but in the sense of an\nindifference or uniformity of all, the term \"Pantheism\" would give a\nvery false impression of Bruno's religious belief. It is neither the\nPantheism which reduces all to a lifeless one, in which all differences\nare merged, nor that which breaks up the one into a many in which all\ndifferences are lost; but the Pantheism of a living, self-manifesting\nOne, which is throughout eternity unfolding itself in the diverse units\nof the world--a pantheism not different from that of any of the higher\nreligions.\n\n[Sidenote: God in Himself.]\n\nNeither in nature, however, nor in ourselves, in the soul of man, is\nthe whole being of God to be found. Could we indeed see the substance,\nthe truth of ourselves, could our eye in seeing itself see all things,\nas the eye of God in seeing other things sees itself,--then it would\nbe possible to understand all things and to create all things, for we\nshould then in reality _be_ God. We never penetrate to the deep-lying\nindividual in ourselves, but see only the accidents, the externals; as\nwe never see our own eye, but only its reflection from a mirror, so our\nintellect cannot see itself in itself, nor anything else in itself,\nbut always some external form, semblance, image, figure, sign.[591]\nThe truth of things--God--everywhere eludes our sense and our reason,\nour discursive intelligence. It is revealed, as we have seen, only to\nour intuitive, comprehensive glance--a sudden insight for which reason\nonly prepares the way. Yet even this insight, \"comprehension,\" is not\n\"comprehending.\" We are brought, perhaps, through it into contact and\ninto harmony with Him, but He is never, even to intuition, knowable. To\nbe known would mean to be comprehended, limited, and therefore finite.\n\nFirst, then, God, the Monad, or Mind, is the true, _innermost_ nature\nof things; \"in themselves things are in motion, in matter, dependent,\ndefective, are rather _non-entia_ than _entia_, for as from not-being\nthey become, so from being they may cease to be; hence they truly exist\nonly where they cannot cease to be, _i.e._ in the first cause and\nunfailing principle, which has power to bring them forth when it will.\nTherefore they are more truly in the _Monad_ itself, and consequently\nare more truly known in it, in simplicity and togetherness, where\nall things are _one_ in an ineffable sense, without distinction,\ndistribution, or number.\"[592] God is the source of the determinations,\nthe forms of all things. \"The first _measure_ is Mind itself: for all\nmeasure receives its denomination from mind\"[593] (_mensura_, _mens_).\n\"One is _mind_, everywhere wholly, giving measure to all things; one\n_intellect_, giving order to all things; one _love_, producing harmony\nbetween all things.\"[594] The first section of the _Praxis Descensus_\nsums up the relation, the meaning of \"creation,\" thus:[595]--\"God is\nthe universal substance, being, by which all things are; essence, the\nsoul of all essence, by which whatever is, is; more intimate in every\nbeing than its form or its nature; for as nature is the ground of the\nbeing of each thing, so the deeper ground of the nature of each thing\nis God.\"\n\n[Sidenote: Theism.]\n\nIn the second place, the order and life of things has its source\nin God, as the _Monas ordinatrix_; the whole order of nature, both\nas it is simultaneously, as it has been, and as it shall be, lies\n\"complicitly,\" grasped in one thought, and realised in one act, in his\nMind. \"What immutable substance wills, it wills immutably, _i.e._ it\nwills necessarily, not as determined by an alien will, which enforces\nthe necessity, but of its own will; this necessity is far from being\ncontrary to liberty; liberty itself, will, and necessity are one\nand the same\" (in God).[596] Divine necessity differs from natural\ncausation, the sequence of causes and effects, in that in nature the\ncauses, will, and knowledge may be frustrated, the effect averted; but\ndivine necessity is necessity in all respects--to will, to know, to\nact, are one. In the third place, God is above and beyond both natural\nthings and their order in the universe as a whole. In the later works,\nit is no longer as a mystical being--inaccessible, because wholly\nabstract, empty of content, the sublimated unity of things--that God\nis posited. The Neoplatonism of the earlier works, although remaining\nin the language and even in much of the thoughts of the later, has\nbeen overcome in fact.[597] God is indeed transcendent, beyond the\nworld, but He is so only as comprehending the world in Himself, its\nsource, its truth--yet more than the source of things or of their\norder. In all other things we may distinguish between existence and\nessence (_i.e._ the fact of their being, their historical presence in\nthe world, and their nature, through which they are what they are);\nin God alone these are one or indistinguishable.[598] God and things\ndiffer by a greater difference than substance and accident--_i.e._\nthings are not accidents, or \"modes\" of God. They differ from one\nanother by their special _differentiae_, but resemble in other\nrespects. God differs, not as marked off, limited by them, but as\ncontaining them all in essence, presence, power and eternity.[599] He\nis not apart from things, but in them; in _them_ not as comprehended\nor contained by them, but as comprehending and containing them, and\nas the essential basis of all things, the centre of the universal\nlife and substance.[600] He is all things in all, because He gives\nexistence to all; He is none of them, because above all, transcending\neach and all in essence, nobility and power.[601] He comprises all\nthings, not as excluded and, as it were, looking upon them from\napart and from above, for He is also comprised by all things. He is\ncomprised also not as included, contained, repressed within alien\nlimits, for He also comprises all things. He is therefore within all\nthings, as He who gives essence to all things; and is the basis of\nall being, the heart and source of all life. He comprises all things,\nas excelling them, governing, moving, disposing, limiting--Himself\nunlimited.[602] Hence, also, as we saw, He is nameless; names are for\ndistinguishing, defining, separating from other things, but He is above\nall difference, otherness, diversity, multitude[603]; or again, all\nnames, all predicates, attributes, are equally true of Him, because He\ncomprises all in Himself. It is in this sense that He is _Monad_ of\n_Monads_, _entity_ of _entities_, \"in whom are all things, who is in\nnone, not even in Himself, because He is indivisible, and is simplicity\nitself.\"[604]\n\nBruno's philosophical religion is in the end a theism, but theism of\na purely intellectual or rationalist type. The natural world is after\nall nothing over against God who subsists in absolute simplicity--as\nMind; in absolute immobility, changelessness--as Intellect (the\nWorld of Ideas); in absolute perfection, self-sufficiency, and\nself-satisfaction--as Love, or Holy Spirit. Over against this\nself-contained Trinity, the changing and passing world is a _non-ens_:\nas _it_ changes not, neither can it know change: to know change would\nbe a change in itself--its knowledge is as immutable, as simple as\nitself. \"Although we see things come into being that before were not,\nand the world itself, as is believed, was produced out of nothing--a\nnew thing, yet from this change and novelty of effects, no change in\nHis action or power can be inferred, for He exists above all motion and\nall vicissitude, an unchanging agent in eternity; not as artificers,\nor material principles, moved by changing dispositions to new willing,\nnew faculty, new effects, but from the instant of eternity, above time\nand above change, He creates all that which becomes in time, in change,\nin motion, in vicissitude. Before and above time and motion there is\nnot always time and motion, but there we find divinity, immutable and\ninvariable. He has from eternity willed that to be which now is.\"\n\"There liberty makes necessity, necessity attests liberty.\"[605] \"Past\nis not past to it (the First Intelligence), nor future future, but\nthe whole of eternity is present to it as one whole, all together, in\nits completeness.\"[606] Seldom, even in recent idealist philosophy,\nhas the World of Ideas maintained its hold so powerfully over a mind\nwhose whole trend was towards a naturalistic interpretation of things.\nThe religious instinct dominates to the last Bruno's thought; these\npassages are from the very latest of his works. Each and all of his\nspeculations on nature, on its elements, its individuals, its general\nlaws, bring him back to the all-embracing Mind, in which nature has its\nsource, but which nature by no means exhausts. So his speculations on\nthe nature of man, on the moral life, on the inspiration of the artist\nand of the generous human soul, the hunter after truth, point again to\na thought, a world above nature, revealed neither capriciously nor yet\nto the natural faculties of the seeker, but to a divinely implanted\npower of intuitive insight. It was an attempt, more consistent perhaps\nand more thorough than any other has been, to combine the independence\nand freedom and worth of individual souls, of the finite many, in one\nthought with the absolute unity, necessity, eternity of God. And this,\nafter all, is the one aim philosophy has to achieve.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nBRUNO IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nPerhaps no philosopher of equal originality and strength has had\nso little apparent influence upon contemporary or later thought as\nBruno. His name hardly occurs in any of the writers of his own or the\nfollowing century; when it does occur, it is mentioned only that the\nauthor may make sufficiently clear the discrepancy between the actual\nor reputed views of Bruno and those of himself. Yet it is easy to\nunderestimate the influence his writings and his personality exercised;\nneither in France, in England, nor in Germany could his prolonged stay\nhave failed to rouse, in some at least of his hearers, sympathy with\nhis lofty conception of the universe and of man's destiny; through them\nBruno's books must have passed into the hands of many philosophers,\nboth before and after they were placed upon the _Index Expurgatorius_\nin 1603. A natural consequence of this public ban would be that Bruno\nwas no longer quoted or referred to as an authority; but all thinkers\nof sceptical or liberal tendency would at least be eager to read his\nworks when the opportunity offered itself. Owing to the great scarcity\nof the copies and their increasing costliness, this would become a\nchance less and less frequent as time went on. Even so, however, one\nmay trace how his ideas filtered through many minds and helped to\ndetermine the course of modern philosophy, of which Bruno has as high\nclaims as either Bacon or Descartes to be named the founder.\n\n[Sidenote: Antidicsonus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Thomas Watson.]\n\nIn English writers the only contemporary notices of Bruno which have\nbeen found are in two small works on mnemonics,--one by a professed\nopponent of Bruno's friend, Alexander Dicson, the other by the poet\nThomas Watson. The former, the _Anti-dicsonus_ of a certain Cambridge\nscholar, G. P., of date 1584, was dedicated to Thomas Moffat or Moufet,\na well-known philosopher and doctor of medicine, from whom support\nwas hoped against the \"Dicson School.\" Of this school Bruno, who was\nthen in England, must have been regarded as a member. The author is\na follower of Ramus, and ridicules the art of memory which consists\nin _locis et umbris_ and its \"self-parading memoriographs, such as\nMetrodorus, Rosselius, _the Nolan_, and Dicson; these are the reefs\nand whirlpools in which the purer science of memory would have been\nwholly destroyed, had she not clung to her faith in the Rameans as a\npillar of refuge.\" It is an interesting note, for it shows that Bruno's\nantipathy to Ramus was returned by Ramus' followers,--an antipathy\nso difficult to understand when we remember that both were reformers\nin philosophy, and that both zealously attacked Aristotle. The work\nagainst which G. P. writes is Alexander Dicson's _De Umbra rationis\net iudicii, sive de memoriae virtute Prosopopoeia_, dedicated to the\nEarl of Leicester (1583). There can be no doubt that it is based\nupon Bruno's _De Umbris Idearum_ (1582), with which it agrees both\nin substance and in metaphysical basis. Dicson, as already pointed\nout, was one of Bruno's mouthpieces in an Italian dialogue. Here at\nleast is an avenue for influence from Bruno upon English thought.\nUnfortunately Dicson's work is not of great value, and, with the man\nhimself, has long been forgotten. But G. P.'s reliance upon Moffat's\nsupport to repel \"the attacks of Scepsius,[607] and the wrath and\nviolence towards me of the whole school of Dicson,\" shows that on the\nside, at any rate, of his mnemonic doctrine Bruno's teaching had not\nfallen on wholly barren soil. Again, he is spoken of with respect,\nif not quite with admiration, in Thomas Watson's dedication of his\n_Compendium Memoriae Localis_ (n. d., but probably 1585) to Henry No\u00ebl,\nQueen Elizabeth's courtier. \"I very much fear if my little work (_nugae\nmeae_) is compared with the mystical and deeply learned _Sigilli_ of\nthe Nolan, or with the _Umbra artificiosa_ of Dicson, it may bring more\ninfamy to its author than utility to the reader.\" The scholarly poet,\nterse and brilliant Latinist, could hardly have felt in harmony with\nthe passionate but confused thought, the virile but unscholarly style\nof Bruno; yet the art of memory he professes in this compendium is no\nother than that of Bruno and of Dicson, and the \"Memoriographs,\" whom\n\"G. P.\" attacks.\n\n[Sidenote: Bacon.]\n\nIf we turn to Bacon, who was in London while Bruno was with\nMauvissi\u00e8re, already in high favour with the Queen, and at home in the\nsociety of Burghley, Leicester, Walsingham, and Sidney, we find entire\nneglect of Bruno's philosophy. Only in one passage, perhaps, does\nBacon mention Bruno's name; it is in the introduction to the _Historia\nNaturalis et Experimentalis_.[608] After a list of the philosophers\nof Greece, and the remark that \"all these made up at their pleasure\nfeigned accounts (or \"plots\") of worlds, as of fables, and recited,\npublished these fables of theirs--some more consistent certainly and\nprobable, others harder of belief,\" he adds that among the moderns,\nthrough the instruction of schools and colleges, the imagination\nis kept within stricter bounds, yet men have not ceased imagining.\n\"Patrizzi, Talesio, _Bruno_, Severin of Denmark, Gilbert of England,\nCampanella, have tried the stage, acted new plays which were neither\nmarked by applauding favour of the public, nor by brilliancy of plot.\"\nThe names are those of men with whom it is no shame for Bruno to stand\nside by side; and one and all are instances of Bacon's incapacity\nfor grasping the true direction in which the thought of his time was\nflowing; but the mere mention of Bruno in such a context implies that\nhis works were still read, and that they were estimated at a high\nvalue by the lovers of \"philosophy.\" There are, however, many points\nof contact between Bacon and Bruno, suggesting an influence, indirect\nif not direct, of the latter upon the former. Bacon was perfectly at\nhome in Italian literature, and it is unlikely that he omitted to read\nBruno's dialogues. Two casual but significant proofs that he did so\nare, the legend related of Mount Athos and of Olympus, that men had\nwritten in the ashes of the sacrifices offered upon their summits,\nand had returned the following year to find the ashes and the writing\nundisturbed, the inference being that the summits of these mountains\nwere in a region of perpetual calm;[609] and the suggestion that the\nmovements of the heavenly bodies may be in spiral lines instead of in\nperfect circles.[610] The latter especially is a characteristic thought\nof Bruno.\n\nBacon, like Bruno, was a believer in a purified natural magic, the\nhandmaid of metaphysics, \"because of its broad ways and wider dominion\nover nature.\"[611] They are united in their admiration for the Book\nof Job as a compendium of natural philosophy. Bacon writes that \"if\nwe take that small book of Job and diligently work through it, we\nshall find it full, and, as it were, pregnant with the mysteries of\nnatural philosophy.\"[612] Both recur with conviction to the saying\nof Solomon that there is nothing new under the sun. \"As to novelty,\nthere is no one who has thoroughly imbibed letters and philosophy, but\nhas had it impressed on his heart that there is nothing new upon the\nearth.\"[613] Deeper harmonies, if not more suggestive, exist between\nthe two reformers of philosophy than these. One is the argument against\nauthority, against general agreement, against antiquity of belief, as\ngrounds or reasons _for_ belief, and the special application of this\nargument to undermine the hold of the Aristotelian philosophy upon\nthe minds of men. \"It is the old age of the world and the fulness of\nyears that are to be regarded as its true antiquity. For that age,\nwith respect to us ancient and older, with respect to the world itself\nwas new and younger.\" \"As we expect greater knowledge and maturer\njudgment from an old man than from a young, so from our own age we\nshould expect (if it knew its strength, and were willing to make trial\nand to put it forth) far greater things than from old times,\" etc.[614]\nSo faith and religion are to be kept apart from investigation, science,\nor philosophy, although the latter does not on that account carry us\naway from God; the one shows the will, the other (natural philosophy)\nthe power of God.[615] To faith are to be given the things that are\nof faith, to philosophy the things that are of philosophy.[616] It\nwas on the same ground also--the use of other than natural principles\nto explain natural phenomena--that both Bruno and Bacon condemned the\nphysical works of Aristotle. He \"corrupted natural philosophy with his\ndialectics--gave the human soul, the noblest of substances, a genus\nfrom words of second intention; settled the business of the _dense_ and\nthe _rare_, through which bodies occupy greater or less dimensions or\nspaces, by the feigned distinction between act and potency; asserted a\nunique and proper movement of each body, being more concerned for an\nanswer one might make in a discussion and to have something positive\nin words, than for the inward truth of things, as is best shown by\na comparison of his philosophy with the others celebrated among the\nGreeks.\" And Bacon, like Bruno and other innovators of the day, goes\nback to Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus, Parmenides, Empedocles,\nHeraclitus, whose principles \"have something of natural philosophy, and\nsavour of the nature of things--experience, bodily existence, whereas\nthe physics of Aristotle, for the most part, sound of nothing but\ndialectical terms.\"[617]\n\n[Sidenote: Method.]\n\n[Sidenote: _Omnia animata._]\n\nThe false straining after simplicity of explanation, the tendency to\nseek for similarities rather than differences, to expect order on the\nsurface rather than at the root of things, is condemned as vigorously\nby Bruno as by Bacon, although not placed in the forefront of the\ntheory of method, as it is by the latter writer. One of the Idols of\nthe Tribe was--\"the tendency to suppose greater order and equality in\nthings than is actually to be found; although in nature many things\nare _monodica_ (_i.e. monadica_, unique), and full of imparity, yet\nthe mind feigns parallels, correspondences, relations which are not.\nHence the erroneous idea, _e.g._ that 'in the heavens all things move\nin perfect circles,' rejecting utterly spiral lines and _dracones_\n(except for the name): hence the element of fire and its sphere were\nintroduced to constitute a _quaternio_ with the other three that were\nactually perceived by sense,\" etc.[618] These things were condemned\nalso, and for the same reason, by Bruno, who, however, went further,\nand insisted on the uniqueness of every individual existence in the\nuniverse. Again Bacon retained (without, however, giving it a place\nin his philosophy) the scholastic distinction between divine or\nangelic, _intuitive_, knowledge, and the acquired piecemeal knowledge\nof man. \"God, the inditer and worker of forms, and perhaps angels\nand (higher) intelligences, know forms immediately by affirmation,\nand from the beginning of their contemplation. But that is certainly\nabove men to whom it is conceded only to advance in the beginning by\nnegatives, to come to rest in the last place only, in affirmatives,\nafter exclusion of every kind.\"[619] In Bruno the same distinction\nis drawn, but it is made also _within_ human knowledge, the intuitive\nknowledge of the heroic mind being the same in kind as that of the\nhigher intelligences, and only different from that of God in that it\ndoes not _create_ what it intuits. So the scholastic distinction of\n_natura naturans_ as the form or immanent principle of things, and\n_natura naturata_ as the sum of things actually existing, the outward\nexpression in matter of the activity of the form--a distinction which,\nin Bruno, is transcended by the identification of one with the other,\nas two aspects of a higher unity--also reappears in Bacon's theory of\nform. However different the \"form\" of Bacon may have seemed to himself\nfrom the scholastic \"form,\" it is still the immanent cause of the\nproperties of the body to which it belongs, or in which it adheres,\nand as such is actually named by Bacon the _natura naturans_.[620]\nSo with Bacon, as with Bruno, Campanella, and Telesius, all things\nare endowed with life, with sensation, with soul, which is the inward\nprinciple of their external movements. He ridiculed Gilbert, who first\nsuggested a scientific explanation of magnetism and electricity, and\nput forward on his own account as a theory of electrical attraction\nthat \"friction excites the appetite of bodies for contact, which\nappetite does not like air much, but prefers something else which is\ntangible.\" The phenomena of chemical affinity and the like were also\nexplained, precisely as Campanella or Cardan would account for them, by\nthe delight in mutual contact, _i.e._ by an inherent sensibility, and\ndesire or striving of like towards like.[621] In both Bacon and Bruno,\nalso, this universal animism is combined with an atomistic theory of\nmechanical nature, and with the belief that no physical phenomenon is\nunderstood until it can be expressed in mathematical terms: \"the more\nour inquiry inclines to simple natures, the plainer and clearer shall\nthings become; for we shall have to deal with the simple instead of\nthe manifold, the computable instead of the surd, the definite and\ncertain instead of the vague,--as in the elements of letters, and the\nnotes of harmonies, and an inquiry is best conducted when the physical\nis defined by the mathematical.\"[622] The last result of analysis is\nnot, with either Bacon or Bruno, the atom of the Epicurean physics,\nviz. an immutable substance floating in empty space; but Bacon's\n_particulae verae_ are much more confusedly thought out than the\nItalian's theory--of a subtle ethereal matter diffused throughout the\nuniverse, and of the denser atoms which are in constant motion within\nit. There is, however, the same perpetual flux and reflux in matter\nwith Bacon as with Bruno.[623] In the last resort, Bacon took refuge\nin a hope of future explanation--always, however, by simple, positive,\ncomputable factors--regarding atoms and void, as on a par with _materia\nprima_, human abstractions, entirely unfruitful, not light-bringing\n\"anticipations of nature.\" In regard to the relation between the\nhuman understanding and nature, both had absolute convictions of the\npower of the former, directed by the rules of experience and limited\nby the data of sensation, to comprehend the latter; but while Bruno\nsaw in the negative limits of the understanding a positive hint of a\nreality beyond, the more careful Bacon saw only a further ground for\nfalling back from reason upon faith. Thus the incapacity of the mind\nto rest in any finite space, without thinking of a space beyond that\nand beyond, or of imagining a body than which none could be greater,\nwas proof to Bruno that space itself was infinite, and that body or\nmatter was immeasurable, _i.e._ infinite in extent and in quantity.\nBacon also makes use of this impossibility in the human intellect of\nresting, acquiescing, at any point as a finality. \"It must ever pass\nbeyond--but it is in vain. Thus it is unthinkable that there should\nbe any extreme or outermost rim to the world, our mind always of\nnecessity thinks there may be something beyond: nor can we think how\neternity could have flowed down to this day: the distinction between\nan infinity _a parte ante_ and an infinity _a parte post_ cannot be\nmaintained, for it would follow that one infinite is greater than\nanother, and that an infinite is used up, and declines into a finite.\nSimilar is the subtlety about lines always divisible (however small\nparts we take), from the impotency of thought.\"[624] But the conclusion\ndrawn is simply the positivist one, that such endless questioning\nafter the unknowable is profitless and absurd. The one sees in it a\nmetaphysical or cosmological argument--infinite capacity for knowing\nimplies an infinite to be known, as infinite or endless desire implies\nan infinite or limitless good: the other a methodological argument\nagainst attempting to fly when we are born to creep. In two other\ncases Bacon rejected the work of Bruno, and rightly, viz. in regard\nto the Art of Lully, and the Art of Memory; and it is possible that\nhe may have had Bruno in his mind in writing both passages. \"Some\nmen, rather ostentatious than learned, have laboured about a certain\nmethod not deserving the name of a true method, as being rather a\nkind of imposture, which may nevertheless have proved acceptable to\nsome triflers. Such was the Art of Lully, simply a massed collection\nof technical terms. This kind of collection resembles an old broker's\nshop, where many fragments of things are to be found, but nothing of\nany value.\"[625] Again, \"there exists certainly some kind of art (of\nmemory), but we are convinced that better precepts for confirming and\nextending the memory might be laid down than are contained in this art,\nand also that the practice of the art might be made better than as it\nhas been received. As now managed, it is but barren and useless.\"[626]\n\n[Sidenote: Kepler.]\n\nOn the Continent it was rather the cosmological theories of Bruno\nthat attracted attention; and there, no less than in England, every\nsuspicion of sympathy with the heretic was avoided. Only Kepler had the\ncourage to complain (as a letter of Martin Hasdal to Galilei tells)\nthat Galilei had omitted to make praiseful mention of Bruno in his\n_Nuntius Sidereus_.[627] Galilei, a thorough diplomatist, would hardly\nhave gone so far:[628] yet in the metaphysical basis of his theory of\nthe universe, and in his theory of knowledge, he only elaborates ideas\nalready suggested by Bruno.[629] But Kepler, fearless before men,\nshrank from the thought of the infinite world in which Bruno found\na glorious freedom for the play of his mind. Kepler could not, and\ndid not, give up his enclosing sphere of fixed stars, shutting in the\nsolar system as comfortably as the orange-skin its seeds, not accepting\nthe giddy hypothesis of Bruno that each of the stars is itself a sun,\nwith a solar system of its own, and that beyond and beyond, in endless\nseries, are other suns and other worlds.[630]\n\nEven _Vanini_ the unfortunate, if light-headed, sceptic, who in\n1619, at Toulouse, met with a fate similar to that of Bruno, but\nmore horrible, mentions the latter only by indication in his\nearlier work,--the _Amphitheatre of the Eternal Providence_ (p.\n359)--\"_Nonnulli semiphilosophi novi_ have said that beyond the last\nsphere of the heavens there is an infinite created universe, as if from\nGod no finite action could proceed.\"[631]\n\n[Sidenote: Descartes.]\n\nOf the philosophers who represent the main line of development of\nmodern thought on the Continent in the seventeenth century,--Descartes,\nGassendi, Spinoza, Leibniz,--there is not one who has not been accused\nof having borrowed his chief doctrines, without acknowledgment,\nfrom the Italian philosopher. Bishop Huet[632] described Bruno as\nthe _antesignanus_ of the Cartesian philosophy, and pointed to the\n_De Immenso et innumerabilibus_ as containing indications of almost\nall its ideas. The charge is of course absurd so far as Descartes'\ncharacteristic philosophy is concerned--the ideas by which he created\na revolution in modern thought. Bruno indeed begged men to throw over\nall prejudices, all traditional beliefs, before entering upon the study\nof nature: he agreed with Descartes therefore in rejecting wholly every\nauthority but that of man's own reason, in demanding complete freedom\nof thought, not only from outward, but also from inward, subjective\nfetters. Most nearly he approaches the \"Cartesian doubt\" in the preface\nto the _Articuli adv. Mathematicos_.[633] \"As to the liberal arts,\nso far from me is the custom or institution of believing masters or\nparents, or even the common sense which (by its own account) often and\nin many ways is proved to deceive us and lead us astray, that I never\nsettle anything in philosophy rashly or without reason; but what is\nthought perfectly certain and evident, whenever and wherever it has\nbeen brought into controversy, is as doubtful to me as things that are\nthought too difficult of belief, or too absurd.\" But this is still\nvery far from the universal doubt of Descartes,--doubt, not of this\nor that particular opinion or belief, but of all possible beliefs.\nBruno's aim was _knowledge_, to add to or correct the sum of general\nopinion as to the world as a whole, as to man's relation to it and to\nGod; Descartes' was _certainty_, to find a basis from which a system of\nthought might be built up _de novo_, and from which at the same time\na secure ground for morality and religion might be derived. The doubt\nwas nothing without the certainty to which it led,--the certainty of\nself-consciousness,--which, as it has been said, is only the other\nside, the positive expression of the universal doubt itself. On the\nother hand, in the subsequent steps of the Cartesian philosophy,--the\narguments on the nature of God, and the relation of the infinite to\nthe finite substances,--many touches suggest the influence of Bruno's\ncomprehensive attempt to combine a philosophical pantheism with a\nscientific atomism. It is unlikely that Descartes should have been\nignorant of a writer well known to Mersenne and Huet. The former[634]\nwould have excused Bruno \"had he been content to philosophise upon a\npoint, an atom, or on unity,--but because he attacked the Christian\nreligion, it is reasonable to decry him as one of the most wicked men\nthe earth has ever produced!\" Certainly the fact that Descartes nowhere\nmentions the guilty philosopher is of no importance in deciding as to\nthe influence of the latter upon him.[635]\n\n[Sidenote: Gassendi 1592-1655.]\n\nIt was only natural that Gassendi's critics should have placed him\nin a close relation to the Nolan. There is no improbability in the\nidea that Gassendi was attracted to the latter as an opponent of\nthe Aristotelian philosophy, against which he himself had already\nwritten in his youth--although no part of the work was published until\n1624.[636] Both also approached the reform of natural philosophy\nfrom the same standpoint, that of sense-experience, and both arrived\nat an atomic theory of the ultimate constitution of nature. Bruno,\nbefore Gassendi, had attempted to place the ethical teaching of\nEpicurus in a fairer light than popular prejudice allowed, but while\nGassendi followed Epicurus in his atomism only too strictly, Bruno\nwas much more independent, and advanced much nearer to the modern\nview. So in his general theory of the system of the world, Gassendi\nstops half-way--with the conception of a limited matter, but in an\nendless space, of a beginning for the world, but in an endless\ntime, of a plurality of worlds with the earth as centre of our\nsystem: here also it is Bruno that is the more advanced, and the more\ndaring thinker;--yet, from the respect with which Gassendi writes\nof Copernicus, it is clear that his sympathies were with the new\nhypothesis. It may be added that although Gassendi rejected the notion\nof a world-soul, in the ordinary sense, as distinct from God, and that\nof souls of the individual worlds, or of stones, etc., yet he too was\nfain to explain the attraction of the magnet for the iron, of the earth\nfor the stone, of atom for atom, by an influence passing from the one\nto the other, by which the one became aware of the other's existence,\nand was impelled towards it, _i.e._ by a kind of sense, or feeling, a\nsoul, which was at the same time the principle of movement.\n\n[Sidenote: Spinoza.]\n\nIt is, however, on the development of Spinoza's[637] thought that\nthe most direct influence of Bruno can be shown. Sigwart[638] and\nAvenarius[639] have proved that in preparing the short treatise on\n\"God, Man, and his Blessedness,\" Spinoza must have had the _Causa_\nand _Infinito_ of Bruno almost before his eyes. The treatise consists\nof several parts which are more or less independent of one another,\nand which represent tentative approaches towards the finished Ethics;\nbut it differs from the Ethics in the far greater prominence of\nthe mystical, Neoplatonist element. Pollock suggests that it may\nhave been his free-thinking teacher Dr. Van den Ende who introduced\nSpinoza to Bruno's writings: there is no external evidence of the\nacquaintanceship, but that, it is needless to say, is of slight\nimportance. Spinoza certainly read Italian, and he practised in other\ncases the same neglect of authorities, of whose substance he was making\nuse: it was indeed the custom of the time--there were few who followed\nBurton's example.\n\nThere are certain general resemblances between the finished\nphilosophies of the two authors, so far as Bruno can be said to have\na finished philosophy. The first principle of both is the unity out\nof which all things spring, to which all return, and in which all\nhave their true nature, or highest reality,--a unity with which both\nidentify nature and spirit alike, and which is for both God. God is\naccordingly beyond the reach of all human knowledge; determination is\nnegation, limit, by which the infinite is untouched. All attributes\nin God are one only, or none; thought is one with extension, love\nwith intelligence; yet in strictness God is neither thought nor\nextension, intelligence nor love, or he is these in another than\nour human meaning. So far as this central thought is concerned,\nit is Bruno that is the deeper thinker. In him the _One_ is not a\ndead negation, in which real things are absorbed to the loss of all\ntheir reality and life, as it is with Spinoza: rather it is a living\nfountain, gushing forth in the infinite streams of living beings: the\nwhole of nature is the expression of its own inward being. The One is\nin process; the whole, in which this process results, is a harmony\nevery member of which has its own independent reality and worth, over\nagainst all others, as a manifestation of divinity. The life of the\none is that of its members; all are necessary to it, as it to them.\nCarri\u00e8re[640] indeed places Bruno above Spinoza as having found in the\none a self-consciousness, a _subject_ infinite in that it knows itself\nand all things in itself, preserving all things, as necessary to its\nexternal enjoyment and love; while Spinoza is still within the bonds\nof _substance_--in God there is neither understanding nor will, in Him\nall difference vanishes, the modes are an illusion. So the Spinozistic\nparallelism between thought and matter finds its counterpart in Bruno,\nwith whom all that is thought, all that is possible, is also real, or\nactual, _i.e._ has extended or material existence. It is true that\nthis conception is much more precisely expressed in Spinoza, with his\nclean-cut distinction between the world of body and the world of mind\nor ideas, to which the possible belongs, but it was a distinction\nwhich he could not consistently uphold; on the other hand, the\nuniversal animism, the doctrine that to every material thing or event\nthere corresponds a spiritual reality or process, which is only the\nother side of the parallelism of soul and body, is more clearly and\nvigorously defended by the earlier philosopher. The natural and the\nspiritual, matter and form, are not two principles, or elements which\ncombine to produce a given result, or which harmonise with one another:\nthey are one and the same thing, and their truth is their life, their\nsoul, their thought. Bruno was in earnest with his animism, as his\nconfident belief in magical correlations showed.[641]\n\nFrom their principles both derived a conviction of the necessity[642]\nand of the goodness of all things, but it is Bruno rather than Spinoza\nwho attempted to reconcile individual liberty with determinism in the\nuniverse as a whole, and individual moral responsibility with the\nnecessary goodness of the all. The corresponding relativity of evil,\nthe fallacy of \"fortune\" or \"chance\" (as anything but \"uncertainty\" of\nthe finite mind), were already asserted by Bruno, and his ideas as to\nthe relation between the religion of the Church, or the teaching of the\nBible, and the investigations of science, are precisely those which\nSpinoza adopts.\n\n[Sidenote: The short tractate.]\n\n[Sidenote: Ratio.]\n\nIn the _De Deo seu Homine_, however, the correspondences are much\ngreater and more definite between Spinoza and Bruno, showing that the\nformer passed through a phase of Neoplatonism, in which his pantheism\nwas much less formal or abstract than it afterwards became. Thus the\npredicates applied in the _Ethics_ to God are applied here to nature,\nas by Bruno also:--Nature is infinite in the sense of \"without limits\nor bounds,\" containing no parts in itself, and therefore not a whole\nover against other wholes; there cannot be two infinites, or boundless\nworlds.[643] The parallelism between outward nature and the thought\nor understanding of God is also more after Bruno's mode of expression\n(ch. ii. \u00a7 11, 19). \"Neither substance nor qualities can be in the\ninfinite understanding of God, which are not _formaliter_ in nature\n(1) because of the infinite power of God--there is no cause or ground\nin Him why He should create one thing rather than another, hence He\ncreates all; (2) because of the simplicity of His will; (3) because He\ncannot refrain from doing what is good.\" The thesis, and the first and\nthird of the arguments by which it is supported, are all verbally close\nto Bruno's argument in the _Infinito_ and in the _De Immenso_. So the\neffort of all finite things after self-conservation,[644] and their\nconsequent movement, are explained not mechanically, through the action\nof one material thing upon another, but rather spiritually, through\nthe unity of nature in which all share. Thus even that possibility of\nan action of thought upon matter (extension) is allowed, which in the\n_Ethics_ is, formally at least, denied. In the _Tractate_ also there\nis more emphasis laid upon the _goodness_ of God, as the source of the\ninfinite world of finite beings, whereas in the _Ethics_ a logical,\nmechanical necessity takes its place. It is in the second, more\nmystical and ethical part, of the treatise, however, that the influence\nof the Nolan philosopher is most apparent, and here it is the _Summa\nTerminorum_ or _Heroici Furori_ that seems to have formed the direct or\nindirect source of many of the conceptions--such, for example, as the\ndistinction between _Ratio_ and _Intellectus_. _Ratio_ is discursive\nthought, building up knowledge by successive steps; _Intellectus_\n\"intuitive thought,\" direct and simultaneous perception of the whole\nof the object--the only adequate or complete form of knowledge, for\nwhich reasoning is merely a preparation in us. Our knowledge of God,\nso far as it is possible at all, is of the second type: we cannot know\nHim as he is, through His effects, His creation: it is only the few to\nwhom He reveals Himself that can know Him as He is, by direct contact\nwith Him. Yet this revelation is constantly open to all men; for each\nand all God is, always, intimately present, \"more intimately than each\nis to himself.\"[645] Other ideas which Sigwart has found common to the\n_Short Tractate_ and the writings of Bruno, are those of the Love of\nGod as springing from the knowledge of God; the correspondence between\nthe degrees or stages of love and those of knowledge; the inability\nof our minds to rest in a finite object or finite good, the constant\npressure onwards towards other and other objects; the contrast between\nsensible love and intellectual love; God as the highest, most complete\nobject, the knowledge of Him above and embracing in itself all other\nknowledge, making the knower one with his object, transforming him into\nGod himself; the divine Harmony in the soul which ensues; the love of\nGod which is man's highest blessedness, which is wholly disinterested,\nand blind to all earthly good or beautiful things; love which is\nunlimited in its possibility, as its object is infinite: with this\nlimitless possibility of Love is the idea of immortality connected;\nbut \"Bruno deduces from the immortality of man the possibility of a\nlove which increases infinitely; while for Spinoza, on the contrary,\nthe infinitely increasing love of God is a ground of proof for\nimmortality.\"[646] When there is added to these many instances of\ndoctrines in Spinoza's earlier work which were later modified in the\ndirection of greater rigidity and mechanical systematisation, the fact\nthat the _Tractate_ embraces two tentative dialogues, in one of which\nSpinoza is represented by a Theophilus (as Bruno in so many of his\ndialogues is represented), it is impossible not to feel convinced that\nSpinoza for a period of his life at least was a follower of Bruno. It\nis true that many of these ideas are not the property of Bruno alone,\nbut of the school of Neoplatonism of which he like Spinoza was at any\nrate a partial adherent, but nowhere else than in Bruno is to be found\nthe same \"collocation\" of these ideas as occur in this tractate of\nSpinoza. It is an open question whether the movement of the latter away\nfrom the Italian's philosophy was entirely a progressive, and not in\nsome respects a retrograde movement.\n\n[Sidenote: Leibniz.]\n\nAt first sight it might seem much more natural to connect Leibniz\nwith Bruno, because of the obvious correspondence of many of their\nfundamental ideas:--their analysis of the universe into a system of\nindependent realities, each differing from every other--each mirroring\nthe universe in itself from its own individual point of view; each\ntherefore in a sense containing or comprising the all in itself, as\neach is again a necessary constituent of the all. In place of Spinoza's\ndead world, we find in Leibniz, as in Bruno, finite things in constant\nflow, constant change, each passing necessarily through every phase\nthrough which any other has passed--representing the universe as it\nis in time, as well as the universe as it is at any moment in actual\nexistence; each experiencing, in other words, the life, the process,\nas well as the quality, the being of the all. Everything that is, _is_\nnecessarily, everything that occurs, occurs necessarily, in Bruno\nbecause the whole flows out from the thought of God, as God thinks it\n(_i.e._ in the relations in which it stands in the one all-embracing\nthought of God); in Leibniz, because of the will of God, who in His\ngoodness has chosen the best of all ideal systems, within which each\nthing or event has its necessary place. In both, all things are, from\nthe point of view of the whole, good:--in Bruno because in God truth\nand goodness, will and understanding, are one; in Leibniz because of\nthe will of God, which has chosen for the best: evil is finitude,\nor again is ignorance, an error of standpoint. In both freedom and\nnecessity are one, because the necessity belongs to God's own nature;\nHe wills out of Himself, undetermined, uninfluenced from without, and\nthis is freedom. In both, as we have seen, the principle of sufficient\nreason is a ground both for the infinite number and infinite variety\nof the finite beings in the universe, and for the impossibility that\ntwo should exist which are exactly identical one with another. Were it\nknown that Leibniz had studied Bruno before his system was formed, we\nmight almost say that he had chosen that aspect of the Nolan philosophy\nwhich with Spinoza had been disregarded, viz. the aspect in which all\nrights are given to the finite individual, and to the world of finite\nbeings, as each representing the infinite, containing the infinite\nin itself, and, so far as possibility goes, each of infinite divine\nworth. Whereas just that side which appealed to Spinoza would have\nfailed to touch Leibniz--the side in which God appears as one with\nthe universe, not as beyond or outside of it, but as immanent in the\nwhole, and present in the fulness of His nature to each and every\nmember of the whole. Philosophically Leibniz' mission was to develop\nthe Cartesian doctrine of the three substances--God, finite spirit,\nand body--in a direction which identified the first and third with\nthe second, broke up the unity of God into the immeasurable many of\nthe monad spirits, and its infinity into indefiniteness. The God of\nLeibniz, even as the highest of the monads, is separate from, apart\nfrom, the other monads--a finite along with other finites. So each of\nthe ordinary monads is a world by itself, shut up within itself, with\nno windows from which it can look out upon the world, and _really_ be\naffected by what is passing without it. There is _no_ without--each is,\nin a word, _God_, and so far as it is concerned there may be no other\nbeing in existence. Bruno, on the contrary, was fully conscious--at\ntimes--of the necessity of holding the balance between the infinite\nunity of God and the finite units or realities, which are the\nexpression, the manifestation, the self-revelation of the one. Why this\nrevelation? he does not indeed ask; but given it as actual, he finds\nthe reconciliation in it at once of the necessity of the whole and the\nliberty of the unit, the goodness of the all and the moral frailty of\nthe individual.[647]\n\nInteresting as this speculative comparison of the two philosophies may\nbe, there is not, however, even the slightest ground for attributing\nany direct historical influence of Bruno upon Leibniz. If influence\noccurred at all--which is doubtful--it was through Spinoza or some of\nthe minor philosophical writings of the time. Lacroze (in a letter\nof 1737) accused Leibniz of \"having drawn his whole system\" from\nBruno's book _De Maximo et Minimo_ (_sic!_): he added that he had told\nLeibniz this fact himself, both by word of mouth and in writing, and\nthat the reason why so few had noticed it was that the philosophical\nwritings of Bruno were obscure and repellent. The same suggestion\nhas been repeatedly made since--more especially as regards the name\n\"_Monad_,\" which Leibniz, after much searching and deliberation,\ngave to his \"real unities\" from 1696 onwards.[648] Brunnhofer goes\nso far as to see both the ideas and the main formulas of Leibniz\nin Bruno--the monad-doctrines, monads as living mirrors of the\nuniverse, as fulgurations of God, the Pre-established Harmony--the\nfuture as involved in the present, \"the present is pregnant with the\nfuture,\"--the phenomenality of sense-objects--God as the highest\nmonad, etc. He argues that Leibniz derived his idea that \"the monads\nhave no windows by which anything can enter or depart\" from casual\nremarks by Bruno as to the \"windows of the soul,\" \"the gates of the\nsenses\" by which images enter in, or \"the chinks and holes\" by which\nwe gaze outwards upon the world. The _coup de gr\u00e2ce_ was given to this\nlegend, for so we must call it, by Ludwig Stein in his _Leibniz und\nSpinoza_.[649] He showed that Leibniz was already in full possession\nof the _idea_ of the monad at least ten years before he found the most\nfitting expression for it, and that after 1696 he used the word \"Monad\"\nalways as the distinctive badge or typical name for his substances\nor forces; that before 1700 he knew of Bruno only one of the Lullian\nworks (the _De Arte Combinatori\u00e2_, _v._ Dutens, ii. 367), and perhaps\nthe mathematical articles (_adv. Mathematicos_, _ib._ iii. 147). Apart\nfrom these works, which could have no reference to his own philosophy,\nhe was acquainted with Bruno only by hearsay, as a reputed forerunner\nof Descartes; even as librarian of the Brunswick Library, although\nsome of Bruno's works were in his guardianship, he is not likely to\nhave read them until his attention was called to them by their alleged\nresemblance to his own theory. And then, as we learn from the letter\nto Lacroze (11th April 1708),[650] he hardly appreciated them at their\ntrue value--\"Mr. Toland has not spoken to me of the _Specchio_ (_i.e._\n_Spaccio_, an error that does not show much familiarity with Bruno)\n_della Bestia trionfante_ of Giordano Bruno. I think I have seen the\nbook at some time, and that it is against the Pope. I have two works\nof his on the Infinite, one in Latin, the other in Italian. The author\nis not wanting in genius, but is not very profound (_ne manque pas\nd'esprit, mais il n'est pas trop profond_).\" Elsewhere he speaks of\nBruno only as believing in \"innumerable worlds\" with Leucippus and\nDemocritus, and as having been burnt, not, as he believes, on account\nof his book the _De Immenso_, but for other opinions.[651]\n\nThere is therefore little reason to suppose that Leibniz had great\ninterest in Bruno, or that he had read his works so carefully as\nto have derived any sustenance or advancement for his philosophy\nfrom them. Stein has in any case shown that the term \"Monad\"\ncame to Leibniz, not from Bruno at all, but from the younger Van\nHelmont, in whose theory it plays almost as important a part as in\nLeibniz--although the difference between the two \"Monads\" was greater\nthan the resemblance.[652]\n\nMeanwhile literature in France and England had not lost sight of\nBruno.[653] In 1633 there was published in the former a play, _Boniface\net le P\u00e9dant_, which has been described as a refined and Gallicised\nimitation of the _Candelaio_; in its turn it suggested, perhaps, the\n_P\u00e9dant Jou\u00e9_ of Cyrano de Bergerac, and some of the pedant-scenes in\nMoli\u00e8re.[654] In 1634 in England a masque by Thomas Carew--the _Coelum\nBritannicum_--was played in English by Charles I., which was based,\npartly at least, upon the _Spaccio_, with Charles I. in the place of\nTruth.[655]\n\n[Sidenote: Bayle.]\n\n[Sidenote: Budgell.]\n\n[Sidenote: Toland.]\n\nPierre Bayle, by the article in his _Dictionnaire Historique et\nCritique_ (1697), which had a very wide influence, probably damned\nBruno's reputation for a century. The article on Spinoza also did the\nsame service for the Dutch philosopher, with whom, indeed, Bayle joined\nBruno, as having held the same \"abominable doctrine\" of atheism. He had\nno real knowledge of Bruno, the biography is frivolous and inexact,\nand the philosophy--a garbled version--is reported on hearsay.[656]\nIt was Bayle's authority which stamped Bruno with the sarcastic\ndescription of \"a knight errant in philosophy,\" which has sometimes\nbeen spoken of as a happy touch of Hegel's invention, but really dates\nback to one Lionardo Nicodemo (1683), who described Bruno as \"playing\nthe part of a wandering knight (_i.e._ a travelling scholastic),\nnow here, now there, at different universities in France, England,\nGermany, Switzerland, Italy, with shield pendant, and lance in rest,\nchallenging the Aristotelians to learned combat.\"[657] In England the\nsame aspersion upon Bruno's name was stereotyped by an article in the\n_Spectator_ of May 27, 1712 (one of Budgell's). The writer, however,\nhad the fairness, which Bayle had not, to read Bruno's _Spaccio_\nbefore making reflections upon it. Contrary to his expectations, for\nBruno was \"a professed atheist, with a design to depreciate religion,\"\nhe found \"very little danger\" in it. This did not prevent him from\ntaking Bruno as a text for a would-be humorous disquisition on Atheism.\nIt was John Toland,[658] the \"poor denizen of Grub Street,\" and once\nfamous, or infamous, author of _Christianity not Mysterious_, who in\nEngland first paid Bruno something of the respect he deserved. His\nchampionship was not, perhaps, of the most discerning or of the most\nvaluable, but it was honest. A copy of the _Spaccio_ had come into\nhis possession,--one which he believed to be the only one then in\nexistence,--and as a result of his reading he claimed Bruno as the\nfounder of free thought. He had studied the sayings on Divine Magic in\nthat work, and had fastened on the fact that Bruno \"regarded magic as\nnothing but a more recondite, non-vulgar, although perfectly natural\nwisdom.\" This was certainly true; but Toland added, \"So he sometimes\ncalls the eternal vicissitude of material forms Transmigration,\" which\nwas at least misleading. Among his manuscripts Toland left \"an account\nof Giordano Bruno's Book of the Universe\" (_De l' Infinito_), along\nwith a translation of the introductory epistle.[659] And somewhat\nearlier, in 1713, a translation of the _Spaccio_ was made into English\nby W. Morehead,[660] who may have been one of Toland's brethren, as the\nQuarterly Reviewer suggests. Toland himself was, however, believed\nto be the author. He had visited Lacroze at Berlin in 1706, and had\ndefended the Nolan against that virulent searcher-out of atheists,\ndeists, pantheists, and the like \"miscreants and libertines.\" To a\nfellow-enthusiast in Germany (Baron Hohendorf) Toland wrote three years\nlater, giving the proofs of Bruno's punishment, with a translation of\nSchopp's account, and stating his belief as to Bruno's real doctrine\n(viz. free-thinking).[661] \"The author,\" he wrote, \"gives full play\nto his spirit, which is always diverting, but at the same time very\npowerful; he is often diffuse, but never wearisome. In a very small\nspace he has expounded a complete system of natural religion, the\ntheory of ancient cosmography, history, comparison and refutation\nof different opinions, besides many curious observations on diverse\nsubjects. But the author abounds in pleasantries, and in satirical\ntraits: he is impious in a sovereign degree, and does not always keep\nhimself within the limits of allegory.\" And so Bruno, like Spinoza in\nthis also, went down to posterity as a worthless, impious atheist, one\nof the reputed authors of the mythical work _De Tribus Impostoribus_,\nwhich no one had ever seen, but in which the three founders of the\ngreat religions of the world were attacked as conscious cheats! So far\nwas the world as yet from understanding the martyr for truth and for\n\"the religion of thought.\"\n\nIt was from Germany that the reaction came. The story of the\nrestoration of Bruno's name (his _Ehrenrettung_) has been told by\nBartholm\u00e8ss, and needs but a very brief sketch here. Heumann[662]\nrepudiated Lacroze's description of him as an atheist and forerunner\nof Spinoza's pantheism, describing him as a martyr for the Lutheran\nfaith and as an eclectic in philosophy. Brucker[663]--without the\nhistorical sense, but a painstaking and learned, if diffuse, analyst,\njudging all philosophies by the standard of orthodox Protestantism\nand the Leibnizian philosophy--yet sympathised with Bruno, described\nhim as an \"eclectic, combining ideas of the Eleatics with those of\nDemocritus and Epicurus, Copernicus and Pythagoras, not an impostor,\nbut an intellectual enthusiast--_cum ratione insanivit_.\" Throughout\nthe remaining part of the century a number of monographs appeared, by\nJordan, Christiani, Kindervater; with, on the _contra_ side, Lessman\nand Lauckhard. Adelung thought Bruno worthy of a place in his _History\nof Human Folly_ (1785). In the same year (1785) appeared F. H. Jacobi's\n_Letters on Spinoza's Philosophy_, which contained a \"restoration\" at\none stroke of both Bruno and Spinoza to their place among the great\nnames of the history of thought.[664] This fine thinker--if not great\nthinker--penetrated by the beauty and calm of Spinoza's pantheism, saw\nin Bruno a true forerunner. Bruno had \"taken up the substance of the\nancient philosophy, transformed it into flesh and blood, was wholly\npermeated by its spirit, without ceasing to be himself.\" Naturally\nit was in the _Causa_ that Jacobi found the greatest affinity with\nSpinoza, as in it the starting-point of Bruno is from the One, the\nHighest, which is at the same time the All--the universe, the unity\nof the One and Many, of Spirit and Nature. Jakobi's friend, Hamann,\nthe \"Wizard of the North,\" the mystical critic of Kantianism,\nwent a step further than Jakobi himself; Bruno's principle of the\ncoincidence of opposites, he said, was of more value to him than all\nthe Kantian criticism. In the pantheistic or monistic side of Bruno's\nphilosophy he found sympathy with his own revolt against the excessive\nintellectualism and rationalism which seemed to him to be the chief\ndanger of the Kantian philosophy.[665] Goethe also was carried away\nby the flowing tide of enthusiasm, and, indeed, his own philosophical\nconception had much affinity with that of the Nolan, although in their\ninner natures the two men differed _toto coelo_.[666] Buhle--first in\nhis _Comment on the Rise and Progress of Pantheism_ (1790), afterwards\nin his learned and careful _History of Philosophy_[667]--placed Bruno\namongst the highest of pantheistic writers. Even Tennemann[667] grows\neloquent over the brilliant effort of Bruno, by which he almost\nachieved a philosophy of the Absolute two centuries before Schelling\nand Hegel.[668] Fulleborn is more cautious and critical, but in his\n_Contributions to the History of Philosophy_ he gives analyses and\nextracts from several of Bruno's works.[669] Schelling himself, as is\nclear from the dialogue which he wrote bearing Bruno's name, regarded\nthe Italian as nearest to himself among his forerunners in the\nphilosophy of the absolute. There is obviously a close analogy between\nthe two; and Schelling may be said to take, with regard to the course\nof philosophy after him, the same place which Bruno took as regards\nthe lines of development in the philosophy of the seventeenth century.\nBoth had a wider view, and perhaps a deeper insight, than their\nsuccessors, while lacking the power of strenuous thought necessary to\ncarry out their views into the completeness of a philosophical system.\nIt is doubtful, however, whether Schelling knew much more of Bruno than\nJakobi's essay and his abstract of the _Causa_ had to tell.\n\nHegel took a much less enthusiastic view of Bruno's philosophy than\ndid his contemporary and sometime partner--to place Bruno on a level\nwith Spinoza was to give him a higher reputation than he deserved:\nhis doctrine was a mere re-echo of the Alexandrine. Yet Hegel, too,\nsaw something to admire in this \"Bacchantic\" spirit, revelling in\nthe discovery of its oneness with the Idea, and with all other\nbeings, with the all of nature which is an externalisation of spirit.\nIt was under the influence of Hegel or of the Hegelian philosophy\nthat the first really complete and satisfactory studies of Bruno\nappeared:--Christian Bartholm\u00e8ss' _Jordano Bruno_,[670] and Moritz\nCarri\u00e8re's _Philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit_.[671]\nThe quick and generous enthusiasm of the first, the wide philosophic\ncomprehension of the second have probably done more to attract public\nattention to the forgotten Nolan, and to guarantee him a permanent\nplace in the history of philosophy, than any other writings about him.\nSince their time the literature upon Bruno has steadily increased, and\nwith it has grown the comprehension of and sympathy with the man as\nwell as with the idea he so fearlessly proclaimed, and so strenuously\ndefended. It is no part of the purpose of this work to parallel Bruno\nwith any of the more modern philosophers. It is foolhardy to say, for\nexample, as Brunnhofer does, that Schopenhauer alone reaches the same\nheight of literary style in modern philosophy, \"although the Nolan\nleaves the Frankfort philosopher far behind him through the strength\nof his philosophical conception of the universe, which holds its own\nagainst pessimism and optimism alike.\"[672] It is foolhardy, and it\nis misleading, to place him in comparison with philosophers who have\nnearly three centuries of thought, of social, industrial, and literary\ngrowth, between him and them. Like all the philosophers whom a touch\nof poetical imagination has redeemed, Bruno stands more or less alone,\nand he overtops all the others of his century. None of the ordinary\nrubrics of historical terminology in philosophy apply to him, not\neven that of \"Eclectic.\" He is far more than that. His philosophy, as\nperhaps these pages have shown, bears the stamp of individuality, the\nindividuality of a strong mind, fed with nearly all the knowledge,\nand all the out-reaching guesses at truth of its own time, and of the\ntimes that had gone before, striving to turn this difficult mass into\nnourishment for itself, and to transmit the achievement to others.\nHe was an eclectic, just as every great thinker is an eclectic, but\nit is the bricks merely, not the style of architecture, that he has\nborrowed from others. He never founded a school, not merely because the\ncircumstances of his life, and the fate of his writings, precluded him\nfrom being widely known or studied in any country, but also because his\nphilosophy was too much a thing of himself to be readily attractive to\nmany of his hearers or readers. Yet it has been a force making for the\nprogress of thought and of liberty, and it is still an active force.\nHuman nature has not yet lost the tendency to rest calmly in its \"habit\nof believing,\" to shut itself up in its finite world, refusing either\nto look abroad, or to look at itself from an external point of view;\nit is still apt to think \"geocentrically,\" to take its molehills for\nmountains, while \"underlooking,\" if the term may be allowed, the real\nmountains that are before it, to hold doggedly to one contrary, reject\nutterly the other, whereas the truth always lies in their unity. To\nthese recurring foibles of humanity, and more especially, perhaps, of\nphilosophic humanity, the fresh and vigorous writings of the Dominican\nmonk and martyr of the sixteenth century will ever form a healthy\ncounterpoise.\n\n\n\n\nADDITIONAL NOTES\n\n\n1. To p. 5 and p. 27, _Bruno's upbringing_.--In the _Infinito_, Lag.\n362. 34, Burchio, the Aristotelian pedant of the dialogue, addresses\nFracastorio in the following polite terms:--\"You would be more learned\nthan Aristotle--you, a beast, a poor devil, a beggar, a wretch, fed on\nbread of millet, perishing of hunger, begotten of a tailor, born of a\nwasher-woman, nephew to Cecco the cobbler, _figol di Momo, postiglion\nde le puttane_, brother to Lazarus that makes shoes for asses!\" It\nis almost incredible that any one should have taken these words as\nbiographical or rather auto-biographical. They are in the mouth of\na pedant and enemy: they are addressed not to the Bruno-character\nof the dialogue (\"Philotheo\"), but to Fracastorio, who temporarily\ntakes his place as a well-trained disciple. Yet Lagarde, that amazing\neditor, gravely wonders whether the Dominicans did not know that their\nnovice had been \"postiglion de le puttane,\" or whether they were glad\nto forget it when they saw the pure and attractive young face! (_v._\nLagarde's edition of the Italian works, pp. 789, 798).\n\n\n2. To p. 10. _The Arian heresy._--Before the Venetian tribunal Bruno\nexplained his position with regard to the Arian heresy thus:--\"I showed\nthe opinion of Arius to be less dangerous than it was generally held\nto be, because generally it is understood that Arius meant to say that\nthe Word was the first creation of the Father, and I declared that\nArius said the Word was neither Creator nor Creation, but intermediary\nbetween the Creator and the Creation, as the word is intermediary\nbetween the speaker and what is spoken, and therefore it is said to be\nfirst-born before all creatures; through it, not out of it, have all\nthings been created....\" (Doc. xi. Bert. i. p. 403).\n\n\n3. To p. 33. _Sidney and Greville._--Greville had been a schoolmate of\nSidney at Shrewsbury, but proceeded to Jesus College, Cambridge, while\nSidney went to Christ Church at Oxford; afterwards they were constant\nfriends at Court. When Sidney went to Heidelberg in 1577, the Queen\nwould not allow the handsome Greville to accompany him, nor would she\nlet either go with Drake to the West Indies in 1585, and Greville was\nkept at home from Leicester's Expedition to the Low Countries, in which\npoor Sidney met with a heroic death (Oct. 17, 1586). In a letter of\n1586, Greville describes Sidney as \"that prince of gentlemen\": writing\nto Douglas after Sidney's death, he says that the name of Sidney's\nfriendship has carried him above his own worth. The epitaph Greville\nwrote for himself is familiar, but will bear repetition:--\"Fulke\nGreville, Servant to Queen Elizabeth, Councillor to King James, and\nfriend to Sir Philip Sidney. _Trophaeum Peccati._\"\n\n\n4. To p. 35. _Vautrollier and Bruno._--Vautrollier traded in Scotland\nas early as 1580 as a bookseller: he had already enjoyed the patronage\nof King James, and was even encouraged to return with a printing\npress, which he did in 1584. Thereafter he published in both London\nand Edinburgh till 1587. On the other hand some of Bruno's works were\nprinted in 1585, so that the theory of Vautrollier's flight to Scotland\nowing to his being the printer of Bruno's works, falls through. The\nbusiness in London was carried on during his absence by his wife,\nand the \"troubles\" out of which Mr. Randolph helped him were quite\nunconnected with Bruno, and may have arisen from his printing of John\nKnox's _History of the Reformation in Scotland_, which Archbishop\nWhitgift suppressed. The letter to Mr. Randolph is in L'Espine's\n_Treatise of Apostasy_, 1587 (Vautrollier: London).\n\n\n5. To p. 51. _Mordentius._--Fabrizio Mordente of Salerno was a\nmathematician of the sixteenth century, of whom only two works are\nknown to have existed,--one published in 1597, the other written in\nconjunction with his brother Gaspar in 1591. He was the inventor of\nan eight-point compasses of which Bruno writes in the second of the\nMordentius dialogues, and on which he bestows apparently extravagant\npraise. The peculiarity of the invention, as far as one can discover,\nconsisted in the introduction of four \"runners,\" two on either limb of\nthe compasses, and secured by screws; but there seems to have been no\ngradation of the compasses, and it is difficult to perceive any great\nvalue in the novelty, without that essential addition. The first of\nthe two dialogues suggests a possible origin for some of Bruno's ideas\non atomic geometry, as we find, attributed to Mordentius, two ideas\nthat were applied to some purpose in Bruno's own mathematical works.\nThey are (1) that of the measurement of inappreciable subdivisions of\ncontinuous quantities by integration, and (2) that of the impossibility\nof infinite division, the continuous being composed of discrete minima,\nbeyond which no division can go, and the _minima_ (like the _maxima_)\nbeing relative, differing in different subjects, so that, for example,\nwhat in _astronomy_ is a minimal quantity may in _geodesy_ be greater\nthan the diameter of the earth.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n    Absolute, first principle or, 166\n\n    Agrippa of Nettesheim, Cornelius, 148, 149;\n      _De occulta philosophia_, 131, 149;\n      _De Vanitate Scientiarum_, 149, 257\n\n    Alasco, Prince, of Poland, 23\n\n    Algerio, Pomponio, 4\n\n    Alsted, John Henry, _Artificium perorandi_, 114\n\n    Anaxagoras, 126\n\n    Animism, 305;\n      universal, 147\n\n    _Antidicsonus_, 36, 324\n\n    Aquinas, St. Thomas, 9, 80, 137\n\n    Areopagus, literary society, 27\n\n    Aretino, Pietro, _Cortegiana_ of, 19\n\n    Arian heresy, the, 357\n\n    Aristotle, _De Anima_, 16, 158, 159;\n      criticism of, 50, 123;\n      _Organon_, 53, 55;\n      _Topics_, 55;\n      _Metaphysics_, 113, 125;\n      _Rhetoric_, 114, 138;\n      _Physics_, 115, 116, 122, 125, 236;\n      _De generatione et corruptione_, 116;\n      _Meteorologica_, 116;\n      Bruno's acquaintance with, 121-23;\n      rejection of mathematical method, 123;\n      treatment of predecessors, 124;\n      _Logic_, 138;\n      theory of limitation of space, 183;\n      on finitude of world, 185, 186;\n      on plurality of worlds, 197\n\n    Asinity, 257\n\n    Aspiration, 291\n\n    Atom, the, 236;\n      knowledge implies the, 227;\n      spherical, 240;\n      and materialism, 249\n\n    Atomism, belief of Bruno and Cusanus in, 147;\n      a metaphysical doctrine, 227, 246;\n      mathematical, 245;\n      physical, 247;\n      critical, 247;\n      and mathematics, 331\n\n    Avarice, 272\n\n    Avenarius, 337\n\n    Averroes, 136, 305\n\n    Avicebron or Avencebrol, _Fons Vitae_, 135\n\n\n    Bacon, Francis, 33, 123, 139, 325-29;\n      _Novum Organum_, 123, 124, 327-32;\n      _Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis_, 325;\n      _Historia Ventorum_, 326;\n      _De Augmentis Scientiarum_, 327, 328, 333;\n      method, 329;\n      theory of form, 330\n\n    Balbani, Nicolo, of Lucca, 13\n\n    Bartholm\u00e8ss, Christian, 5, 16, 20, 97, 311, 348, 350\n\n    Bas\u00e4us' Catalogue of Frankfort Books, 65\n\n    Bayle, Pierre, 348\n\n    Beauty, 281, 283;\n      reason apprehends true, 281\n\n    Bellarmino, censor of Bruno's works, 89\n\n    Berti, Domenico, 5, 8, 10, 11, 94, 95, 333, 357\n\n    Besler, Bruno's pupil and copyist, 114-17\n\n    Bible's teaching, the, 299\n\n    Bochetel, Maria de, 47\n\n    Body, distraction of the, 288\n\n    Bodies, movements of, 216;\n      prime, 224\n\n    Brunnhofer, 3, 18, 41, 51, 60, 64, 89, 114, 301, 337, 345, 354\n\n    Bruno, Giovanni, father of Bruno, 3\n\n    Bruno, Giordano (Filippo), birth and family, 3;\n      childhood, 5, 357;\n      at Naples, 8, 121;\n      enters Dominican Order, 9;\n      became priest, 9;\n      charges of heresy, 9, 10;\n      at Rome, 10;\n      at Venice, 11, 66;\n      at Padua, 12, 69;\n      at Geneva, 12;\n      before Consistory, 15;\n      at Toulouse, 16, 17;\n      Doctor in Theology and professor, 16;\n      at Paris, 17, 18;\n      Reader at the university, 20;\n      at London, 21;\n      at Oxford, 21;\n      impressions of Oxford, 25;\n      relation to Mauvissi\u00e8re, 27;\n      on Mauvissi\u00e8re, 29;\n      admiration for women of England, 41;\n      hostility in England, 45;\n      consults Bishop of Bergamo, 48;\n      associate of College of France, 49;\n      at Marburg, 51;\n      at Wittenberg, 52;\n      at Helmstadt, 60;\n      denounced by Mocenigo at Venice, 72, 73;\n      examination before Tribunal, 74, 294, 357;\n      defence, 75;\n      creed, 76, 77, 109;\n      abjuration of errors, 81;\n      remitted to Rome, 84;\n      orthodoxy, 87;\n      death, 92-96;\n      grounds for death, 97;\n      mission, 103;\n      dislike of pedantry, 105;\n      originality, 107;\n      optimism in philosophy,\n      111, 175, 313;\n      works published during imprisonment and posthumously, 113-17;\n      interest in Greek philosophy, 125;\n      and Cusanus, 147;\n      religion, 297;\n      rationalism, 301;\n      restoration of name, 351\n      _Publications_--Italian Dialogues, 5, 29, 34, 45, 127;\n      _Sigillus Sigillorum_, 5, 12, 17, 37, 111, 112, 137, 140, 297;\n      _Le Opere Italiane_, 5, 89;\n      _Opera Latina_, 6, 7, 12, 17, 20, 22, 40, 80, 96, 106, 113,\n      114, 122, 126, 127, 134-37, 140, 141, 151, 178, 180, 181, 183,\n      184, 188, 196-200, 202, 207, 209-11, 213, 216, 230, 231, 235,\n      236, 242, 243, 260, 261, 266, 292, 295, 297, 298, 302-4, 307,\n      310, 311, 313-16, 318-20, 334, 335;\n      _De Immenso_, 8, 48, 51, 62, 65, 108, 122, 133, 152, 180, 183,\n      185, 186, 191, 192, 196, 203-08, 212, 213, 215, 218, 221, 223,\n       226, 307, 311, 315;\n      _Signs of the Times_, 11;\n      _Ark of Noah_, 11;\n      _Cabala_, 11, 40, 41, 102, 107, 149, 219, 252, 265, 270, 308;\n      _Cena_, 12, 23, 25, 27, 33, 35, 37, 41, 103, 104, 106, 108, 123,\n      125, 126, 152, 161, 163, 170, 216, 219, 268, 299, 300, 301, 310,\n      327;\n      _Clavis Magna_, 17, 37;\n      \"The Thirty Divine Attributes,\" 17;\n      _De Umbris_, 18, 19, 103, 107, 115, 310, 324;\n      _Ars Memori\u00e6_, 18;\n      _Cantus Circ\u00e6us_, 18, 37;\n      _De Compendiosa Architectura_, 19, 140, 141;\n      _Il Candelaio_, 19, 106;\n      _Oratio Consolatoria_, 21, 60, 260, 298;\n      _Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum_, 22, 26, 34, 37;\n      \"Immortality of the Soul\" and \"The Five-fold Sphere,\" 25;\n      _Causa_, 25, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 106, 124-26, 132, 133, 135, 137,\n      138, 150, 153, 155, 200, 302, 309, 340;\n      _Infinito_, 28, 108, 125, 131, 142, 180, 185, 192, 217, 221, 224,\n      310, 357;\n      _Spaccio_, 32, 39, 40, 46, 57, 130, 131, 144, 149, 160, 224,\n      252-54, 265, 296, 302, 306, 307, 341;\n      _Heroici Furori_, 32, 41, 42, 100, 126, 129, 134, 137, 252, 253,\n      302, 310, 313;\n      _Modern and Complete Art of Remembering_, 37;\n      Centum et Viginti, Articuli _De Natura et Mundo_, 49;\n      _De Lampade Combinatoria_, 53, 139, 261;\n      _De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana_, 54;\n      _De Specierum Scrutino_, 54, 59, 114;\n      _De Progressu Lampada Venatoria Logicorum_, 55;\n      _De Minimo_, 62-65, 106, 116, 160, 163, 178, 223, 226, 228,\n      234-36, 238-41, 243, 312, 313, 320;\n      _De Monade_, 62, 65, 80, 149, 150;\n      _Articuli adv. Mathematicos_, 110, 244, 295, 318, 335;\n      _Summa terminorum metaphysicorum_, 113, 304, 305, 308, 321, 341;\n      _Artificium perorandi_, 114;\n      _Lampas Triginta Statuarum_, 114, 295, 313, 314, 320, 321;\n      _De Magia_, et _Theses de Magia_, 116;\n      _De Magia Mathematica_, 116, 137;\n      _De Rerum Principiis et Elementis et Causis_, 116;\n      _De Medicina Lulliana_, 117, 139;\n      _De Vinculis in genere_, 117, 134, 266;\n      _Acrotismus_, 180, 217, 223, 225, 226\n\n    Budgell, Eustace, in _Spectator_, 348\n\n    Buhle, _History of Philosophy_, 352\n\n    Burton, Robert, _Anatomy of Melancholy_, 347\n\n\n    Cabala, Hebrew, 130, 131\n\n    Camden's _Elizabeth_, 24\n\n    Cardanus, 150\n\n    Carri\u00e8re, Moritz, 339\n\n    Cause of nature, efficient, 157, 184;\n      formal, 158;\n      final, 158\n\n    Change, ceaseless, 205, 210, 221\n\n    Christianity, attack on, 225\n\n    Cicala, Mount, 5, 7\n\n    Clemens, F. J. 142, 266\n\n    Coincidence of all things in One, 172, 176;\n      of contraries, 176, 179, 209;\n      verifications of, 177-79\n\n    Comets, Bruno's theory of, 212\n\n    Commerce, the evils of, 269\n\n    Company of St. John the Beheaded, 95, 96\n\n    Contarini, Venetian procurator, report of, 84\n\n    Continuum not divisible, 237\n\n    Copernicanism, a heresy, 89;\n      influence of, on Bruno, 110\n\n    Copernicus, 150-52;\n      _De orbium c[oe]lestium Revolutionibus_, 150\n\n    Culpepper, Warden of New College, 26\n\n    Cusanus. See Nicolaus of Cusa.\n\n\n    Death and life contrasted, 289\n\n    Democritus, 126\n\n    Descartes, 334-36\n\n    Desire, human, 181\n\n    Dicson, Alexander, 35, 36;\n      _De Umbra Rationis_, 36, 324\n\n    Disputation of Pentecost, 49\n\n    Divine essence, attributes of, 193;\n      union with the, 280;\n      finite soul and mind, 307\n\n    Divinity of Christ, 79;\n      of matter, 157\n\n    Domenico da Nocera, 71, 75\n\n    Dominicans, the, 8, 357\n\n    Douglas, Archibald, 47\n\n    Dufour, Th\u00e9ophil, 14\n\n\n    Earth, the, 208; as centre of gravity, 190;\n      its movements, 211;\n      and suns, 211\n\n    Eglin, Raphael, 64, 113\n\n    Egyptian theosophy, 130;\n      religion, 305\n\n    Elements, the, 185;\n      in isolation, 209\n\n    Elizabeth, Queen, 21, 30, 31, 47, 81;\n      the London of, 41, 45\n\n    Empedocles, 126\n\n    England, works published in, 37\n\n    Epitaph, Bruno's, 99\n\n    Erlangen Codex, 116\n\n    Ether, the, 206, 245\n\n    Euclid, simplification of, 243\n\n    Evolution, theory of, 270\n\n    Existences, finite, 173;\n      differ, all, 235\n\n\n    Faith and works, 254\n\n    Faye, Anthony de la, 14\n\n    Ficino, Marsilio, 128\n\n    Figure in body and space, 189\n\n    Finite soul and divine mind, 307\n\n    Fiorentino, in _Giornale de la Domenica_, 6\n\n    Fire, Bruno's theory of, 209\n\n    Florio, 21, 35, 43;\n      \"First Fruites,\" 35;\n      translation of Montaigne, 35\n\n    Form, intellect as, 158, 160;\n      natural, 165\n\n    Franco, Nicolo, 39\n\n    Frankfort, works published at, 51, 62, 66, 114;\n      petition to council of, 63\n\n    Furor (inspiration), kinds of, 279\n\n\n    Gassendi, Pierre, 336, 337\n\n    Gemistus, Georgius (Gemistus Plethon), 127, 128\n\n    Gentile, Alberico, 53\n\n    God in us, 291, 316;\n      love of, 291-93, 342;\n      man and, 298;\n      in nature, 315;\n      in himself, 317\n\n    Goethe, 352\n\n    Golden Age, the, 266\n\n    Greville, Sir Fulke, 27, 33, 43, 357\n\n    Gr\u00fcn, professor of philosophy, 54\n\n    Gwinne, Matthew, 35, 43\n\n\n    Hegel, 353;\n      _De Orbitis Planetarum_, 108\n\n    Helmstadt, Bruno at, 60, 61\n\n    Hennequin, John, 49\n\n    Henry III., 17, 18\n\n    Heraclitus' fire, 125\n\n    Heretical propositions, the eight, 90\n\n    Heumann, _Acta Philosophorum_, 350\n\n\n    Iamblichus, 129\n\n    Ideas, abstract, 196\n\n    Identity in God, 167;\n      in kind of all beings, 215\n\n    Imagination of Bruno, 107\n\n    Immaculate conception, rejection of, 109\n\n    Immortality, 159;\n      meaning of, 309;\n      individual, 311\n\n    Indifference of all things in the Infinite, 173\n\n    Infinite and the finite, the, 187, 307;\n      action between the, 187;\n      relation of, 188\n\n    Intellect, 282, 341\n\n    Intelligence and Love, 290;\n      instinct and, 219\n\n    Isolation, no elements in, 209\n\n\n    Jacobi, F. H., _Letters on Spinoza's Philosophy_, 351\n\n    Jews, antipathy towards the, 265\n\n    Judgment, 262;\n      based upon sensations, 234\n\n    Juvenal, 104\n\n\n    Kepler, 333\n\n    Knowledge of God, 194;\n      principles of, 229;\n      relativity of, 233;\n      Bruno's _Summum Bonum_, 276\n\n\n    Lacroze, 345, 346, 350\n\n    Lagarde, 5, 11, 12, 23, 25, 27, 28-31, 36, 40, 42, 46, 57, 102-8,\n    124, _et seq._, 142, 144, 150, 154-65, 167-69, 172, _et seq._, 185,\n    193, 216, _et seq._, 252, 253, 255-57, 259, 261 _et seq._, 276-93,\n    296 _et seq._, 357\n\n    Law, function of, 262\n\n    Leibniz, _Monadology_, 224;\n      and Bruno, 343;\n      Bruno's influence on, 345;\n      on Bruno, 347\n\n    Lessing's idea of myths anticipated, 108\n\n    Life, one principle of, 199;\n      the practical, 261;\n      the strenuous, 279;\n      and death contrasted, 289\n\n    London of Elizabeth, the, 42, 45\n\n    Love, degrees of, 281;\n      intelligence and, 290\n\n    Lucian's _Parliament of the Gods_, 39\n\n    Lucretius, 127;\n      _De rerum natura_, 127\n\n    Lully, Raymond, 138-41;\n      _Art of Reasoning_, 115, 139, 333\n\n    Luther, 57\n\n\n    Magnus, Albertus, 137\n\n    Man and the animals, 270;\n      and God, 298\n\n    Matter, divinity of, 157;\n      spirit and, 161;\n      and form, 163, 168;\n      deduction of, 163;\n      the true substance, 165;\n      as potentiality, 166;\n      substrate of the spiritual world, 168;\n      the ultimate unity, 171\n\n    Matthew, Tobias, 26\n\n    Mauvissi\u00e8re, 26, 27, 29, 47;\n      _Teulet Papers_, 23;\n      _Salisbury Papers_, 47\n\n    Melanchthon, 52\n\n    Mendo\u00e7a, Bernardino di, 31, 32\n\n    \"Metaphysical Remains,\" 113\n\n    Minima, the three, 227;\n      in the classification of the sciences, 229\n\n    Minimum, relativity of, 227;\n      as substance, 230;\n      indestructible, 231;\n      mathematics of the, 241\n\n    Miracles and deceit, 257\n\n    Mirror of God, 182\n\n    Mocenigo, Giovanni, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75\n\n    Moisture, a material element, 207\n\n    Mordente, Fabrizio, 51, 358\n\n    Morehead, W., 39, 349\n\n    Morosini, Andrea, 71\n\n    Mystical and naturalistic attitude compared 110, 111\n\n\n    Naples, Bruno at, 8, 121;\n      cloister at, 9\n\n    Nature as one and many, 169;\n      permanence of beauty, harmony, 175;\n      uniformity of, 203;\n      and spirit, 251\n\n    Necessity and liberty, 195\n\n    Neoplatonist school, 127, 128;\n      mysticism of the, 110, 134\n\n    Nicodemo, Lionardo, 348\n\n    Nicolaus of Cusa, 141, 176;\n      sketch of his philosophy, 142-48;\n      _De Docta Ignorantia_, 143, 145, 257;\n      and Bruno compared, 144, 146;\n      _Alchoran_, 145;\n      _De Ludo globi_, 147;\n      _De Idiota_, 149;\n      _De Conjecturis_, 148;\n      _De Visione Dei_, 148;\n      _De Venatione Sapienti\u00e6_, 148\n\n    Nigidius, Petrus, 51\n\n    Nola, 3, 4, 7\n\n\n    Object of _De Minimo_, 226\n\n    Ovid, _Metamorphoses_, 99\n\n    Oxford and Aristotle, 21, 22;\n      Bruno's impressions of, 25\n\n\n    Padua, 12, 69\n\n    Paracelsus, 149, 150;\n      _ad miraculum medicus_, 150\n\n    Paris, 18\n\n    Perfection, abstract conception of, 198;\n      plurality and, 199;\n      nature of, 201;\n      progress and, 285\n\n    Peripatetic philosophy, theses against, 49;\n      criticism of theory, 49\n\n    Philosophy, practical test of a perfect, 112;\n      Bruno's--Matter and spirit, 159;\n      necessity and liberty, 195;\n      similarity in composites, 234;\n      time and space, 237;\n      part and limit, 239;\n      peace and liberty, 261;\n      sincerity, 264;\n      temperance, 265;\n      evolution, 270;\n      avarice, 272;\n      fortune, 272;\n      courage, 273;\n      simplicity, 273;\n      solicitude, 274;\n      beauty, 281, 283;\n      love, 281, 290\n\n    Pius V., Pope, 39\n\n    Plato, _Tim\u00e6us_, 131;\n      _Republic_, 131\n\n    Platonism, Platonists, 128, 133\n\n    Plethon. See Gemistus, Georgius\n\n    Plotinus, 132, 133;\n      _Enneads_, 132, 168\n\n    Pognisi, _Giordano Bruno_, 96\n\n    Prague, 59\n\n    Pre-Aristotelians, the, 125\n\n    Predicates of God, 114;\n      of substance and nature, 115\n\n    Primum mobile, the, 185\n\n    Principle: cause, 155;\n      first or absolute, 166\n\n    Process, the infinite, 284\n\n    Progress, human, 269;\n      and perfection, 285\n\n    Prudence, the virtue of deliberative faculty, 275\n\n\n    _Quarterly Review_, 27, 34, 348\n\n\n    Ramus, Petrus, Dialectic of, 16, 324\n\n    Ratio or discursive thought, 341\n\n    Rationalism in Bruno, 301;\n      medi\u00e6val, 305\n\n    Reality of things, timeless, 321\n\n    Reuchlin, Johann, _De arte cabbalistica_, 131\n\n    Riches and poverty, 271\n\n    Riehl, _Giordano Bruno_, 69\n\n    Roche, La, _Memoirs of Literature_, 94\n\n    Roman people, Bruno on, 263\n\n    Rome, Bruno at, 10;\n      tribunal at, 91\n\n    Rudolph II., 59\n\n\n    Savolina, Fraulissa, mother of Bruno, 3\n\n    Schelling, 352\n\n    Scholastics, the, 137\n\n    Schopenhauer, 354\n\n    Schopp, Gaspar, 40, 94;\n      letter on Bruno's death, 92, 350\n\n    Self-consciousness, 273\n\n    Sense-knowledge, relativity of, 232\n\n    Shakespeare, 34, 35\n\n    Sidney, Sir Philip, 12, 27, 31, 32, 35, 59, 357\n\n    Sigwart, 3, 52, 63-65, 67, 86, 337, 340, 342\n\n    Soul, the goods of the, 271;\n      the body, 286;\n      functions of the, 286;\n      hierarchy of, 313\n\n    Soul-principle in bodies, 216, 224\n\n    Spagnolo, Alfonso, 48\n\n    Spenser, Edmund, _Cantos on Mutability_, 33;\n      _F\u00e6rie Queen_, 33\n\n    Spinoza on Bible interpretation, 108;\n      and Bruno, 176, 337-43;\n      _De Deo seu Homine_, 340, 342;\n      _Ethics_, 341\n\n    Spirit and matter, 161;\n      unity of, and body, 170\n\n    Stars, souls of the, 217\n\n    Stein, Ludwig, 346\n\n    Superstition and natural law, 7\n\n\n    Tansillo, affection of Bruno for, 5;\n      quoted, 283\n\n    Tasso, _Aminta_, 36, 268\n\n    Telesio, _De natura rerum_, 150\n\n    Temple of Wisdom, the, 57;\n      builders of, 128\n\n    Tennemann, Wilhelm G., 352\n\n    Theism in Bruno, 319\n\n    Theophilus of Varrano, 121\n\n    Tiraboschi, Girolamo, historian, 107\n\n    Tocco, Felice, _Conferenza_, 90;\n      _Le Opere Latine de G. Bruno_, 114, 225;\n      criticism of _Lampas Triginta Statuarum_, 115;\n      _Le Opere Inedite di G. Bruno_, 115, 116;\n      _Le Fonti piu recenti_, 138, 149\n\n    Toland, John, 38, 94, 349\n\n    Trinity, rejection of the, 109;\n      Cusanus' proof of the, 145;\n      interpretation of the, 294, 295\n\n    Trismegistus, Mercurius or Hermes, 129\n\n    Truth, philosophical and theological, 76;\n      the \"implicit universe,\" 274, 275;\n      the twofold, 303\n\n\n    Universe, infinite in extent, 182, 183;\n      perfection of the, 190\n\n\n    Vacuum, the, 240\n\n    Vanini, Lucilio, burnt as a heretic at Toulouse, 17, 334\n\n    Vautrollier, bookseller, 34, 358\n\n    Venice, works published at, 11;\n      tribunal at, 73, 294, 357;\n      relation between, and the Pope, 85\n\n    Verifications of coincidence, 177\n\n    Vico, Marquis of, 12\n\n    Virtues, table of the, 259\n\n\n    Wagner in Bruno's _Opere Italiane_, 89\n\n    Waldensian persecution, 8\n\n    Watson, Thomas, _Compendium Memori\u00e6 Localis_, 36, 325;\n      translation of Tasso's _Aminta_, 36\n\n    Whole and its parts, the, 186\n\n    Williams, L., 41\n\n    Wisdom reviewed, 275\n\n    Wittenberg, Bruno at, 51, 52;\n      works published at, 54, 55;\n      lectures at, 114;\n      notes dictated at, 115\n\n    Wittmann, _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, 135, 136\n\n    Works, Marburg edition, 113;\n      State edition, 113-115;\n      published during imprisonment and posthumously, 113-117;\n      Noroff collection, 116, 117\n\n    Worlds, innumerable, 191, 194;\n      decay of, 221\n\n\n    Zurich, Bruno at, 64;\n      work published at, 113\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n_Printed by_ /R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED/, _Edinburgh_\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: Brunnhofer, p. 321, Appendix.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Sigwart, i. p. 118 (note 5).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Berti, _Vita di S. B._, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Bartholm\u00e8ss, vol. i. p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Lagarde, 452. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _V._ additional note.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Lagarde, _Op. Ital._, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _i.e._ Heightening of normal powers.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 10: On Bruno's family _v._ Fiorentino, in the _Giornale de la\nDomenica_ (Naples), for Jan. 29, 1882.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _De Magia, Op. Lat._ iii. Op. 430, 431.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _De Immenso, v. Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _De Immenso_, iii. (i. 1. 313).]\n\n[Footnote 14: Ct. the punning line \"_Domini canes evangelium latrantur\nper totum orbem._\"]\n\n[Footnote 15: Berti, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Cf. _Spaccio de la Bestia_, Lag. p. 552, 1.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Venetian Documents, No. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Docs. 8 and 13.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Vide_ additional note.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Doc. 1 (Berti, p. 378).]\n\n[Footnote 21: Tasso came about the same time, to be repulsed as\nplague-stricken from the gates.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Doc. 9. Berti, p. 393 (a line is omitted in the 2nd\nEdition).]\n\n[Footnote 23: Lag. 147. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Fra Paolo Sarpi was at this time teaching philosophy in\none of the monasteries in Venice, but Bruno does not seem to have met\nhim.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Sig. Sig._ (_Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 191).]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Cena_, Lag. 143. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Doc. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Giordano Bruno \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve_ (1579), par Th\u00e9ophil Dufour:\n_v._ Berti, pp. 449 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 29: From the Register of the Council.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Register of Consistory, 1577-1579.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Bartholm\u00e8ss, i. pp. 62, 63 (with note).]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Vide De Umbris_ (_Op. Lat._ ii. 1. p. 65, cf. p. 87).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Brunnhofer's _Giordano Bruno_, etc., p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Introd. to _De Umbris_.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Bartholm\u00e8ss, I. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Vide Acrot. Camoer._ Epistle to the Rector of the\nUniversity (Filesac.). _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 56, 57.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Artificium Arist. Lull. Ram._ 1615.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Cf. _Orat. Consol._ (i. 1. 32).]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. pp. 76-8.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Cena_, L. 176, 37 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Teulet Papers_, ii. p. 570 (May 16, 1583).]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Op. cit._, p. 693.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Camden's _Elizabeth_.]\n\n[Footnote 44: The MS. of _Dido_, which was acted by Christ Church men,\nis still preserved in the library of Christ Church.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Lag. p. 120 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 46: L. p. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 47: 1546-1628. Studied at University College; President\nof St. John's, 1572-7; Dean of Christ Church (to 1584); afterwards\nArchbishop of York: \"One of a proper person (such people, _ceteris\nparibus_ and sometimes _ceteris imparibus_, were preferred by the\nQueen) and an excellent preacher\"--(Fuller, quoted in the _Dict. Nat.\nBiog._)]\n\n[Footnote 48: Warden of New, 1573-99; Dean of Chichester, 1577.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Vide Trig. Sigilli_, Dedication.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Vide_ add. note.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Doc. 9, _Berta_, p. 305. \"Castelnuovo, in casa del qual\nnon faceva altro se non che stava per il suo gentilhomo.\"]\n\n[Footnote 52: Preface, L. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Lag. 264, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 54: L. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 55: L. 226. 25 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Mauvissi\u00e8re's successor was nominated in Nov. 1584,\nalthough he did not leave until a year later.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Vide_ add. note.]\n\n[Footnote 58: First pointed out, I believe, by Mr. Whittaker in _Essays\nand Notices_, 1895 (_v._ the note to _Giordano Bruno_, p. 94).]\n\n[Footnote 59: Cf. the _Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1902. The references\nare _Tschischwitz: Shakespeare-Forschungen--Hamlet_, 1868; _W. K\u00f6nig,\nShakespeare-Jahrbuch_, xi.; _Frith's Giordano Bruno_; on the other side\n_Beyersdorff, Giordano Bruno und Shakespeare_ (1889); _Furness_ in the\n_New Variorum Shakespeare_.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Vide_ add. note.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Lag. 223. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 62: _Vide infra_, part ii. ch. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 63: In the _Aminta_.]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Sigillus_ is really a diminutive of \"Signum\" in Bruno's\nview; \"Seal\" therefore means much the same as \"Sign.\"]\n\n[Footnote 65: \"Venezia\" on the title-page.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Again \"Venetia.\" The Introduction is translated in _A\ncollection of several pieces_, by Mr. John Toland, 2 vols., London,\n1726.]\n\n[Footnote 67: \"_Parigi._\" Translated, except for the introductory\nletter to Sidney, in _Sp. dalla Best. Triom., or the Expulsion of the\nTriumphant Beast_, London, 1713; attributed to W. Morehead.\n\nThe Spaccio was in its outward form, no doubt, suggested by Lucian's\n_Parliament of the Gods_. Fiorentino has pointed out that Niccolo\nFranco had made use of a similar idea in a dialogue published in 1539,\nin which he described a journey to heaven, where he was at first\nrefused admittance; he had a parley with the Gods, until, with the aid\nof Momus, he obtained permission to enter, conversed with Jupiter,\nreceived some favours, and returned. Franco was impaled in 1565 by Pope\nPius V., hence perhaps the absence of his name in Bruno. Perhaps the\nidea of the Spaccio was also determined by a prophecy of the Bohemian\nCipriano Leowicz (\"On the more signal great conjunctions of the\nplanets,\" 1564), that about the beginning of April 1584 would occur a\nreunion of almost all the planets in the sign of Aries, and it should\nbe the last in that sign. It was inferred that the Christian religion\nwould also come to an end then. This would agree with the reason given\nabove for Bruno's preface, viz. that he was leaving England in 1584,\nMauvissi\u00e8re's term having expired.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Lag. 417.]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Ib._ 408.]\n\n[Footnote 70: _Parigi_ is on the title page.]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Op. Lat._ ii. 3, 237.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Also _Parigi_. Translated in \"The Heroic Enthusiasts,\" an\nEthical Poem, by L. Williams, London, 1887. (The Argument or Summary,\nand the Apology of Bruno, are omitted.)]\n\n[Footnote 73: Lag. 123. 3. Cf. _Her. Fur._ 747. 19--\"le belle et\ngratiose Ninfe del Padre Tamesi,\" 749. 40, \"Leggiadre Nimphe, ch'a le'\nherbose Sponde del Tamesi gentil fatte Soggiorno,\" and 753. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Lag. 144. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Lag. 406. 17 (_Spaccio_).]\n\n[Footnote 76: Lag. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 77: 521. 27 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 78: 551. 38, 522. 23, 550. 2, 490. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Salisbury Papers_, iii. p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Doc. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Doc. 17. Berti, p. 426, 427.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Landseck's _Bruno_.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Vide Op. Lat._ vol. iii. Introd. p. xxxix.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Centum et Viginti Articuli _De Natura et Mundo_, adv.\nPeripateticos, Paris, 1586; and \"J. B. N. _Camoeracensis Acrotismus_,\netc.\" Wittenberg, 1588. \"Camoeracensis\" qualifies Bruni,--\"of the\nCollege of Cambray.\" Acrotismus is barbarous Latinising of [Greek:\nAkroasis].]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 86: i. 1. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Ib._ 68, 69.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Figuratio Aristotelici Physici Auditus_, Paris,\n1586. _Dialogi Duo de Fabricii Mordentis Salernitani prope divina\nadinventione ad perfectam cosmimetrae praxim_, Paris, 1586. _Vide_ add.\nnote.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Doc. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Eglin, a pupil of Bruno, was Professor of Theology at\nMarburg in 1607 (Brunnhofer, p. 60).]\n\n[Footnote 91: Sigwart. The university has since been united with that\nof Halle, the seat being at the latter place.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _De Specierum Scrutinio et Lampade Combinatoria Raimundi\nLulli_, \"the omniscient and almost divine hermit doctor.\" Prague, 1588.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Krell was imprisoned, and put to death ten years later.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Vide Spaccio_, Lag. 516. 11, and 553. 21 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _De Specierum Scrutinio_, _vide supra_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Published 1589, Helmstadt.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Bk. iv. ch. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Cf. Frith's _Bruno_, p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Vide_ Brunnhofer and Sigwart.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Censor's Register: Frankfort Archives.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Sigwart, and _Op. Lat._ vol. iii. introd. p. xxix.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Bass\u00e4us Catalogue of Frankfort Books from 1564-1592,\nprinted 1592 (Sigwart).]\n\n[Footnote 103: Doc. 6 (Ciotto's evidence).]\n\n[Footnote 104: Doc. 8 (Bruno's own statements).]\n\n[Footnote 105: Sigwart, _Kl. Schriften_, i. p. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Vide Op. Lat._, vol i., introd. p. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Bertano described him as lecturing at Padua to some\nGerman scholars (Doc. 7). On _Besler_, and Bruno's connection with him,\n_v._ St\u00f6lzle, _Archiv f. Geschichte d. Phil._, iii.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Riehl, _Giordano Bruno_.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Doc. 15, Morosini's evidence.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Doc. 17 (Bruno). Cf. 16 (Ciotto re-examined), and 9\n(Bruno).]\n\n[Footnote 111: Doc. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Ambassador in Paris during Bruno's first visit (1582).]\n\n[Footnote 113: The Nuncio was sometimes represented by his auditor, the\nPatriarch by his vicar.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _i.e._ orthodox, right-thinking.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Bruno refers to the Pythagorean doctrine, quoting the\n_\u00c6neid_, vi. 724 ff.: _Principio c[oe]lum ... mens agitat molem_.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _De Monade_ (_Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 415).]\n\n[Footnote 117: Doc. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Doc. 24. Venetian State Archives.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Doc. 25. State Archives.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Docs. 26, 27.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Roman Documents, III.]\n\n[Footnote 122: It must not be left out of mind that documents have\noccasionally been tampered with, and statements put into the mouths of\nwitnesses which are in substance false, as Fiorentino hints concerning\nthese reports of Bruno's trial. But there is no special reason for\ndoubt here.]\n\n[Footnote 123: It is officially stated that there are no further\ndocuments.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Wagner's introduction to Bruno's _Opere Italiane_, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Conferenza_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 126: For the part of this letter relative to Bruno, _v._\nBartholm\u00e8ss (with French translation), Berti and Frith.]\n\n[Footnote 127: The letter was translated into English by La Roche,\n_Memoirs of Literature_, vol. ii., and by Toland, _Misc. Works_, vol.\ni. Schopp refers to Bruno's death in a work published in 1611 (_i.e._\nseveral years before the letter itself was published) as having\noccurred ten years earlier (Berti, p. 10).]\n\n[Footnote 128: Berti, p. 326, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Pognisi, _Giordano Bruno e l'Archivio di San Giovanni\nDecollato_, Torino, 1891, and vol. iii. of _Op. Lat._ introd.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Metam._ xv.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Cf. _Her. Fur._ 623. 20 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Lag. 564. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _E.g._ cf. _De Umbris_, p. 10 ff., and _Magia Math., Op.\nLat._ iii. 5. 506.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Lag. 141. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 135: _Cena_, Lag. 125. 12 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Juvenal, i. 3. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Lag. 129. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Lag. 318. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Lag. 619. 20. Cf. also 700. 25, 717. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Lag. 718. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Lag. 223. 14 ff., cf. 242. 35, and _De Minimo_, bk. iii.\n1.]\n\n[Footnote 142: _De Minimo, Op. Lat._ i. 3, 135.]\n\n[Footnote 143: In his _De Orbitis Planetarum_, 1801, Hegel\n\"demonstrated\" that the number of planets could not exceed seven.\nBefore it appeared, Piazzi had discovered Ceres.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Art. Adv. Math. Epist. Ded._ (i. 3. 4).]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Sig. Sig._ (ii. 2. 192.)]\n\n[Footnote 146: Works published during Bruno's imprisonment, and\nposthumously.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Cf. _Op. Lat._ vol. i. pt. 4. Also in Gfr\u00f6rer.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Cf. p. 67, l. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Brunnhofer (p. 81) suggests that the first part\ncontains the exoteric, the second the esoteric teaching of Bruno. But\nas Tocco (_Opere Latine di G. B._, p. 136) rightly points out, some\nsuch knowledge of Aristotelian terms as that in Part i. would form a\nnecessary preliminary to the study of philosophy in Bruno's time. He\nmakes use of the Aristotelian terms to express ideas quite different\nfrom those of Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 150: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Vide_ Tocco, _Opere Inedite di G. B._ Napoli, 1891.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Op. cit._ p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 153: _Vide Op. Lat._ iii., Introduction by Vitelli; but\naccording to St\u00f6lzle (_Archiv f\u00fcr Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. 1890) and Tocco\n(_Op. Ined._, p. 99) they belong to the first stay in Paris. The latter\nadds that they may have been repeated in Wittenberg.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Under the heading \"Time\" (_de tempore_) there is a short\ntreatise on Astrology.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Doc. 8: the words suggest a special training in Latin,\nGreek, Philosophy, and Rhetoric,--not the whole Trivium and Quadrivium\nof the ordinary education of the day, as Berti supposes.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Cf. _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 61; ii. 3; i. 4. 39, 65, 69; i. 1.\n256, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 157: i. 4. 21; i. 1. 223; i. 1. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 158: A compendium of Aristotle's _Physics_.]\n\n[Footnote 159: _Op. Lat._ i. 4. 131 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 160: (_De Immenso_, iii. 3), _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Lag. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 162: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Lag. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Ib._ 252. Cf. Bacon's _Nov. Org._ i. 54:--\"Aristotle,\nwho altogether enslaved his natural Philosophy to his Logic, and so\nrendered it nearly useless and contentious,\" (_vide infra_, ch. 9).]\n\n[Footnote 165: Lag. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Ib._ 280.]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Nov. Org._ i. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 168: (_De l' Infinito_), Lag. 324.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Lag. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 170: _Ib._ 183. Cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 282, 288.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 96, 3. 26, 3. 271; i. 1. 291; i. 3.\n26; iii. 70, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Lag. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 196, and (_Her. Fur._) Lag. 722. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Cena_, Lag. 237. 9. Cf. _Her. Fur._ Lag. 722. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Lag. 256. 25, 273. 25. Cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 377.]\n\n[Footnote 176: i. 1. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 177: i. 2. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 178: i. 3. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Causa_, Lag. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Cf. _Her. Fur._, Lag. 636. If not by Iamblichus, this\nwork issued certainly from his school, to which Julian the Apostate\nbelonged.]\n\n[Footnote 182: _E.g. Op. Lat._ i. 1. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Ibid._]\n\n[Footnote 184: _Op. cit._]\n\n[Footnote 185: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 409.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Lag. 532.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _i.e._ creative or original.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Spaccio_, Lag. 533. Bruno was probably acquainted with\nthe _De arte cabbalistica_ (1517) of Reuchlin the Platonist, and with\nPico of Mirandula's _Cabalistarum selectiora obscurioraque dogmata_.\nOf the Cabala itself the first part (Creation) was published in Hebrew\nat Mantua 1562, a translation into Latin at Basle 1587: the second\npart, _The Book of Splendour_, Hebrew, 1560, a translation, not, as\nit seems, until the following century. It is unlikely that Bruno read\nHebrew, although he makes use of Hebrew letters among his symbols. But\nthere were many writings on the Cabala from which he could have derived\nhis idea of their teaching--_e.g._ Agrippa's _Occulta Philosophia_, to\nwhich he was indebted for much of the _De Monade_. The Cabala (_i.e._\n\"traditional teaching\") is a collection of dogmas made about the ninth\nand thirteenth centuries; it was certainly influenced by Neoplatonism,\nand contained the interpretation of creation as emanation in graduated\nseries of beings from the one supreme Being, of the Logos or Divine\nWord as intermediary between the Supreme and the lower beings (viz, the\nmaterial world and all sensible objects): the elements of the Logos\nare the Sephiroth, the ten numbers of Pythagoras, corresponding to the\nchief virtues or qualities; next to these are the ideas or forms, then\nthe world-souls, and last of all material things.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Causa_, Lag. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Ib._ ii. i. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Plotinus, _Enneads_, ii. 4. 4; cf. Bruno's _Causa_, Lag.\n267.]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Causa_, Lag. 271; cf. Plot. _Enn._ ii. 4. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 194: i. 2. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Vide_ Munk, _M\u00e9langes de Philosophie juive et Arabe_,\nParis, 1589; and _Dictionnaire des sciences Philosophiques_, Paris,\n1844-52.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Ibn Sina, 980-1037 /A.D./; cf. _Op. Lat._ iii.\n458, 475.]\n\n[Footnote 197: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 223, called by Bruno _Hispanus_, but\nreally an Arabian, Ibn Badja,--d. 1138.]\n\n[Footnote 198: A Jew, Ibn Gebirol, fl. 1050.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Al Ghazzali, 1059-1111 /A.D./]\n\n[Footnote 200: Cf. _Op. Lat._ iii. 696.]\n\n[Footnote 201: _Vide_ Wittman, _Giord. Bruno's Beziehungen zu\nAvencebrol_ in the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Phil._ 13. 2 (1900).]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Causa_, Lag. 253; cf. 246, and _Op. Lat._ iii. 696.]\n\n[Footnote 203: _Causa_, Lag. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Cf. Wittman, _loc. cit._]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Cena_, Lag. 170.]\n\n[Footnote 206: _Her. Fur._ Lag. 742. Algazel is connected with Averroes\nby Bruno in another argument against authority,--that the mere habit of\nand familiarity with a given belief does not authorise its truth, for\n\"those who from boyhood and youth are accustomed to eat poison, come to\nsuch a state that it is transformed into a sweet and good nourishment\nfor them, and on the contrary they come to abhor what is really good\nand pleasant according to common nature.\"]\n\n[Footnote 207: A Latin translation of Averroes' _Commentaries_ was\npublished in 1472, and one of his criticisms of Algazel (_Destructio\ndestructionis_) in 1497 and in 1527.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Causa_, Lag. 271, and _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 209: i. 1. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 210: _Causa_, Lag. 271: on Averroes cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 221,\n224, 337, 338, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 211: _Her. Fur._ Lag. 677.]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 16. Albertus lived from 1193 to 1280\nA.D. There are frequent references to the spurious writings attributed\nto him, in Bruno's _De Magia Mathematica_, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 213: i. 2. 415. Cf. _Sig. Sig._ ii. 2. 190, for a reputed\nmiracle related of Saint Thomas.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Cf. the ridicule in Lag. 361 and 563.]\n\n[Footnote 215: _Causa_, Lag. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Tocco, _Fonti piu recenti_, etc., p. 538.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Besides the several works on the Art of Reasoning,\nLully had written also on theology and on medicine, and Bruno, in his\n(posthumous) _Medicina Lulliana_, gave a compendium of the latter group\nof writings.]\n\n[Footnote 218: _De Lampade Combinatoria_, _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Faber Stapulensis (_c._ 1500), and Carolus Bovillus\n(_c._ 1470-1553). Both were rather followers of Cusanus.]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Op. Lat_. ii. 2. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 221: ii. 2. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 222: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 329, 3. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 223: _De Comp. Arch._ ii. 2. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 224: i. 1. 17. On Cusanus _v._ Falckenberg, _Grundz\u00fcge\nder Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus_, 1880, Uebinger, _Philosophie\ndes N. C._, 1880, and _Gotteslehre des N. C._, 1888, F. J. Clemens,\n_Giord. Bruno und Nikolaus von Cusa_, 1847, Scharpff, _Des N. von C.\nwichstigste Schriften_, 1862.]\n\n[Footnote 225: _Infinito_, Lag. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Cf. Cusanus' _De docta ignorantia_.]\n\n[Footnote 227: _Spaccio_, Lag. 420.]\n\n[Footnote 228: _De docta ignorantia_, i. 7. _Alchoran_, ii. 7, 8.]\n\n[Footnote 229: _Doct. ignor._ ii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 230: _De Possest._]\n\n[Footnote 231: _Alchoran_, ii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Cusanus, _De Ludo globi_, bk. i.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Cusanus, _De Idiota_, iii. (_De Mente_, 9).]\n\n[Footnote 234: Cusanus, _De Conjecturis_, i. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 235: _Id. De Visione Dei_, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 236: _Id. De Venatione Sapientiae._]\n\n[Footnote 237: _De occulta philosophia._]\n\n[Footnote 238: _De Vanitate Scientiarum._]\n\n[Footnote 239: Tocco. _Fonti piu recenti_, etc. p. 534.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Theophrastus Bombastes von Hohenheim, 1493-1541.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Lag. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 242: i. 1. 17. In the _Sig. Sig._ ii. 2. 181, he\nis put forward as an example of the value of the life of\nsolitude:--\"Paracelsus, who glories more in the title of hermit than in\nthat of doctor or master, became a leader and author among physicians,\nsecond to none\"--a reference to the title of _Eremita_, which\nParacelsus took, however, from his birthplace Einsiedeln, and to his\nwell known and strongly expressed contempt for the learning of books.]\n\n[Footnote 243: 1501-1576 /A.D./]\n\n[Footnote 244: The first two books of the _De natura rerum_ were\npublished in 1565.]\n\n[Footnote 245: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 246: _Cena_, Lag. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Bruno praises and gives long extracts from Copernicus in\nthe _De Immenso_, bk. iii. ch. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 248: _De la Causa_, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Lag. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Lag. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 251: _De la Causa, principio et uno_, 1584.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Lag. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 253: _Ib._ The terms correspond to Aristotle's [Greek:\narch\u00ea] and [Greek: aition], respectively; no clear distinction was\ndrawn between their meanings by Aristotle, however. Bruno's aim is\nto contrast the inwardly active, _immanent_ principle of life and of\nmovement with the _transient_, outwardly active cause, and to interpret\nnature, as a whole, as the manifestation of some such inward principle,\nrather than as a mechanical system to which the impulse was given from\nwithout.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Lag. 231. 38. The _Intellectus_ is identified also with\nthe Pythagorean world-mover (Verg. _Aeneid_, vi. 726); the \"World's\nEye\" of the Orphic Poems; the \"distinguisher\" of Empedocles; the\n\"Father and Progenitor of all things\" of Plotinus.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Lag. 232. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Lag. 232. 33 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 257: On Perfection, _vide infra_, p. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Lag. 233. 27. Cf. Arist. _De Anima_, ii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Cf. Arist. _De Anima_, ii. ch. 1 and 2.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Lag. 238. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 261: Cf. _Lucretius_.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Lag. 202. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 263: Cf. _e.g._ 238. 12, when the form or soul is said to\nbe _one_ in all things, and differences are said to arise from the\ndispositions of _matter_.]\n\n[Footnote 264: _Vide infra_, ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Lag. 240. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Lag. 242. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 267: _Epist. Pro\u00ebm._, Lag. 203. 19. When he wrote the\n_De Minimo_ the question had at least presented itself to Bruno as\nrequiring solution: _vide_ bk. iv. (_Op. Lat._ i. 3. 274). Individual\ndifferences are referred to two possible sources--the different\ncompositions of the forms or ideal types, and the varied dispositions\nof matter; and it is suggested that the latter of these may derive from\nthe former.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Lag. 246. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Lag. 248. 17. The apparent conflict between this and the\npreceding pages will resolve itself below.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Lag. 249. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Pseudo-Timaeus, 94 A.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Lag. 253. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 273: Lag. 257, 258.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Lag. 258-260.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Lag. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Lag. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 277: _Supra_, ch. i. Cf. Plotinus, _Ennead_, ii. 4. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Lag. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Lag. 268-271. Bruno refers here to Averroes, and\nespecially to Plotinus, v. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 280: Compare the ambiguity in Spinoza's definition of mind in\nrelation to body.]\n\n[Footnote 281: Lag. 273, 274.]\n\n[Footnote 282: Lag. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Lag. 278. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Lag. pp. 278-281.]\n\n[Footnote 285: Lag. 285. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 286: Lag. 288. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 287: Lag. 288, 289.]\n\n[Footnote 288: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 147. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 289: _De Immenso: de l' Infinito: Acrotismus_, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 290: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 291: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 292: _De Immenso_, bk. i. ch. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 293: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 294: P. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 295: P. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 296: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 232. On _Space_, cf. _Acrot._ Art.\n31, 33-37 (Vacuum, Ether, etc.), and _Infinito_, Lag. 365.]\n\n[Footnote 297: P. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 298: P. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 299: Cf. _Infinito_, Lag. 322. 1 ff. for the argument.]\n\n[Footnote 300: Bk. ii. ch. 2.; cf. _Infinito_, Dial. v., Lag. 387.]\n\n[Footnote 301: _De Imm._ i. 1. 264; cf. _Inf._ 392. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 302: Bk. ii. ch. 4 (267 ff.).]\n\n[Footnote 303: Bk. ii. ch. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Ch. 7. (p. 278); cf. _Infinito_, Lag. 335 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 305: _Vide infra_, ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 306: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 307: _Ib._ p. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 308: Bk. ii. ch. 8 (p. 283); cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 4. 216, and\n_Infinito_, Lag. 344 ff. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 309: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 310: P. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 311: Bk. ii. ch. 10. p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 312: Bk. ii. ch. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 313: P. 300 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 314: Bk. ii. ch. 12. 302 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 315: Bk. ii. ch. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Cf. also _infra_, p. 199 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 317: _De Imm._ bk. i. ch. 10. pp. 235-8; cf. _Infinito_, 312\nf., 316. Bruno does not use the term \"principle of sufficient reason\":\nhis principle is the inverse of that of Leibniz--\"whatever has not a\nsufficient reason for existing is necessarily non-existent,\"--Bruno's\nbeing that \"whatever has not a sufficient reason for non-existence\n(_i.e._ whatever is possible) necessarily exists.\"]\n\n[Footnote 318: _De Imm._ bk. i. ch. 11. p. 239; _Infin._ 314 f.]\n\n[Footnote 319: _De Imm._ bk. i. ch. 11. p. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 320: _Ib. Schol._ ch. 11. pp. 241, 242.]\n\n[Footnote 321: P. 242 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 322: Cf. _Infinito_, Lag. 316. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 323: No. 13 states that the worlds could not interfere with\none another, since space is infinite.]\n\n[Footnote 324: No. 18 denies that the perfection of the world in _one_\nspace should either add to or detract from the perfection of another\nworld in other space or render it less necessary.]\n\n[Footnote 325: Bk. i. ch. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 326: P. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 327: _Op. Lat._ vol. i. pt. 2. p. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 328: _Ib._, ch. x. p. 312 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 329: Cf. _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 330: P. 260. On _Time_ cf. _Acrot._, Arts. 38-40.]\n\n[Footnote 331: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 332: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 333: P. 309 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 334: P. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 335: P. 312. Cf. Fiorentino's _Telesio_, p. 85. On\nPerfection, and the Perfection of the Universe, cf. Bruno's _Acrot._,\nArts. 17 and 51.]\n\n[Footnote 336: Cf. Spinoza.]\n\n[Footnote 337: Allusions to practices of the Black Art.]\n\n[Footnote 338: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 339: _De Immenso_, iii. ch. 1. (p. 313 ff.).]\n\n[Footnote 340: P. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 341: Bk. iii. ch. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 342: Ch. 4. p. 341 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 343: So Bruno explained the phases of the moon.]\n\n[Footnote 344: Bk. vi. ch. 17. p. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 345: Ch. 18. p. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 346: _Ib._ p. 220. If the flow of change were arrested at any\none point in Nature, it would ultimately be arrested throughout the\nwhole.]\n\n[Footnote 347: Bk. iv. ch. 1. (_Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 6).]\n\n[Footnote 348: P. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 349: P. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 350: P. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 351: After Empedocles.]\n\n[Footnote 352: _De Imm._ bk. iii. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 353: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 354: P. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 355: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 356: The saying of King Alfonso in this regard is worth\nrepetition,--that \"had he been consulted at the creation of the world\nhe would have spared the Maker some absurdities.\"]\n\n[Footnote 357: _Op. Lat._ i. 1.. 360.]\n\n[Footnote 358: P. 362, cf. _supra._]\n\n[Footnote 359: P. 369 (ch. 7)--\n\n    \"Promptius utque magis qu\u00e2vis pernice volucrum\n    Versum quaque meent, immensumque aera findant\n    Intima nempe animae vis concitat illa,\" etc.\n]\n\n[Footnote 360: P. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 361: _De Imm._ bk. iv. ch. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 362: Ch. 8 (p. 42 f.).]\n\n[Footnote 363: Ch. 4, Schol. cf. bk. iv. ch. 13 (_Op. Lat._ i. 2. 67).]\n\n[Footnote 364: _De Imm._ bk. vi. ch. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 365: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 366: 1531, 1532, 1572, 1577, 1585. (Bk. v. chs. 9 and 13.)]\n\n[Footnote 367: _E.g. De Imm._ bk. iv. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 368: _Ib._ ch. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 369: _De Imm._ bk. v. ch. 2 (p. 119).]\n\n[Footnote 370: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 371: _Cena_, Lag. 183. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 372: Lag. 184. 35; _Acrot._ Art. 68; _Infinito_, 370. 29,\n375. 6, 390. 34; _Acrot._ Art. 80 (i. 1. 189), etc.]\n\n[Footnote 373: _De Imm._ bk. v. ch. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 374: _Cena_, Lag. 185. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 375: _Cabala_, p. 587. 23 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 376: On movements of suns and earths, as determined by the\nsoul, and the need of mutual sustenance, cf. _Acrot._ Arts. 65, 66, 67,\n72.]\n\n[Footnote 377: Cf. _Cena_, Lag. 166. 32, where it is suggested that\nthe Alps and Pyrenees once formed the summit of a very high mountain,\ngradually broken up, through continuous geological changes, into the\nlesser forms we now call mountains. So the whole of Britain is a\nmountain, rising up out of the sea; its summit is the highest point,\nScotland.]\n\n[Footnote 378: _De Imm._ bk. iv. ch. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 379: Cf. _Infinito_, Lag. 351. 30, on the gradual changes\nof the earth's surface, which Bruno infers are present, although\nimperceptible, in other stars also. Cf. _ib._ 332. 15, and _De Imm._,\nbks. iv. and vi.; _Acrot._ Arts. 48 and 74. In _Inf._ 353. 30,\nrocks, lakes, rivers, springs, etc., are compared to the different\nmembers or organs of the human body: the accidents or disturbances of\nthem,--clouds, rain, snow, etc.,--to the diseases of the human body.]\n\n[Footnote 380: _Acrotismus: De Minimo._]\n\n[Footnote 381: Lag. p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 382: Lag. 164. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 383: _Monadology_, \u00a7 70. Cf. also \u00a7\u00a7 64, 66, 67-69.]\n\n[Footnote 384: Lag. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 385: Lag. 357. 10; cf. 334. 24, 359. 13, 393. 5, and _Her.\nFur._ 738. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 386: Lag. 367. 12, 375. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 387: Lag. 455. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 388: Contrast Tocco, _Opere Latine di G.B._, part 5.]\n\n[Footnote 389: Fiorentino's Preface to _Op. Lat._ vol. i. p. xxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 390: _Acrot. Cam._ Art. 42, p. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 391: _Acrot. Cam._ Art. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 392: _Vide De Min._ p. 211 (bk. ii. ch. 6).]\n\n[Footnote 393: _De Min._ bk. i. ch. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 394: _Ib. Schol._ (p. 170).]\n\n[Footnote 395: Ch. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 396: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 397: This thought recurs in Leibniz.]\n\n[Footnote 398: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. pp. 209-211.]\n\n[Footnote 399: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 400: P. 147. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 401: P. 149. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 402: _De Min._ bk. ii. ch. 3, pp. 191 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 403: P. 195. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 404: Ch. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 405: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 199. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 406: P. 200. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 407: P. 200. 28, 201. 4; cf. 223. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 408: _De Min._ bk. ii. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 409: P. 203. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 410: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 207. 5 (cf. p. 302, bk. v. ch. 2).]\n\n[Footnote 411: P. 208. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 412: P. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 413: _De Min._ bk. i. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 414: Arist. _Phys. Z._ 1. 231, a 23.]\n\n[Footnote 415: _De Min._ p. 153. 22 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 416: P. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 417: _De Min._ P. 173. 9; cf. 173. 7, 180.]\n\n[Footnote 418: P. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 419: P. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 420: P. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 421: _De Min._ i. ch. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 422: Ch. 11. p. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 423: Ch. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 424: Ch. 2. p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 425: _De Min._ i. ch. 14. p. 184. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 426: ii, ch. 8. p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 427: iii. ch. 12. p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 428: Lasswitz, p. 26, note, where it is said the eighth\ntriangle and the sixth circle are equal.]\n\n[Footnote 429: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 217. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 430: Pp. 219, 221.]\n\n[Footnote 431: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. p. 243 (bk. iii. ch. 3).]\n\n[Footnote 432: P. 245 (bk. iii. ch. 4.), cf. p. 323 (bk. v. c. 9), 324.\n(c. 10).]\n\n[Footnote 433: P. 306 (bk. v. ch. 5.).]\n\n[Footnote 434: P. 270. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 435: Cf. _Art. adv. Math._ ii. The figures there are slightly\ndifferent, and named _Figurae Mentis_, _Intellectus_, _Amoris_.]\n\n[Footnote 436: Lag. 407. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 437: Lag. p. 407. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 438: P. 406. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 439: Lag. 427. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 440: The constellations as typifying vices were to be\nexpelled from the heavens and replaced by the personified virtues.]\n\n[Footnote 441: Lag. p. 445.]\n\n[Footnote 442: Lag. p. 446. 1 ff., cf. 447. \"_Questa fetida Sporcaria\ndel mondo_,\" and 467.]\n\n[Footnote 443: P. 462. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 444: P. 468. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 445: Lag. p. 543. 35 ff., cf. 544. 20, 546. 16, and esp.\n554. 13 ff. (_Chiron_ the Centaur), for other references to the Church\nand its beliefs. Bruno could not have written the last passage while\nretaining any shred of genuine belief in the divinity of Christ. v.\nalso 534. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 446: _Cabala_, p. 565.]\n\n[Footnote 447: Cf. the poem in the _Cabala_, p. 564. 25, _O' Sant'\nAsinita_, and _Cena_, Lag. 147. 21 (the Ark of Noah), etc.]\n\n[Footnote 448: The lists given in the argument are not quite the same\nas those in the body of the work, and both differ to some extent\nfrom the list of vices which is put in the mouth of Jupiter at the\nbeginning, p. 439.]\n\n[Footnote 449: From Lag. p. 439.]\n\n[Footnote 450: Cf. also p. 488. Another list of virtues is in the\neulogium on Julius in the _Oratio Consolatoria_ (_Op. Lat._ i. 1. 47\nff.). There also the constellations typify different virtues.]\n\n[Footnote 451: In the _De Lamp. Comb._, are two lists of virtues\nand vices, after Lully; with each virtue are given the two vicious\nextremes, in Aristotelian fashion. (_Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 257).]\n\n[Footnote 452: Lag. 489. 18 (_Sub Lyra_). They are _Arithmetica_,\n_Geometria_, _Musica_, _Logica_, _Poesia_, _Astrologia_, _Physica_,\n_Metaphysica_, _Ethica_.]\n\n[Footnote 453: Lag. p. 461. 11 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 454: Pp. 461, 462.]\n\n[Footnote 455: In contrast with _St. Luke_ 15. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 456: Reading _conversation_ for _conservation_.]\n\n[Footnote 457: Lag. pp. 464, 465.]\n\n[Footnote 458: Lag. pp. 465, 466.]\n\n[Footnote 459: P. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 460: Pp. 520, 521.]\n\n[Footnote 461: _Op. cit._ p. 794.]\n\n[Footnote 462: Compare the picture of Avarice in _Spaccio_, pp. 477,\n478, with Shakespeare's _Shylock_.]\n\n[Footnote 463: _Cabala_, p. 576. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 464: P. 500. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 465: Cf. p. 535. 4, and 541. 35,--\"_Escremento de l'\nEgitto_,\" which may not mean more than outgrowth or offshoot of Egypt,\nalthough it has been interpreted otherwise.]\n\n[Footnote 466: P. 542. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 467: _Spaccio_, p. 526. 11; Clemens' translation (_op. cit._\np. 172) gives this saying an unnecessarily sinister meaning.]\n\n[Footnote 468: _De Vinculis in genere_ (_Op. Lat._ iii. p. 697. 26).]\n\n[Footnote 469: Lag. p. 503. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 470: From Tasso's _Aminta_, act i. _sub fin._--Bruno hardly\never mentions the authors of the poems in his ethical works, so that\nthe layman in literature has great difficulty in knowing which, if any,\nare his own. Thus Rixner and Siber translate the above, and give it as\nBruno's (_op. cit._ p. 230). In the fourth line Bruno reads \"E 'n\" for\n\"Ma 'n.\"]\n\n[Footnote 471: Cf. _Infinito_, p. 398. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 472: Cf. _De Imm._ vii. 16 (_Op. Lat._ i. 2. p. 278).]\n\n[Footnote 473: Lag. p. 507. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 474: P. 507. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 475: _Vide infra_, ch. vii., _re_ transmigration.]\n\n[Footnote 476: Lag. p. 586. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 477: Lag. p. 586. 35 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 478: _Ib._ p. 469. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 479: _Sextus Math._ xi. 51-58. Crantor was one of the Old\nAcademy, and wrote a commentary on the _Timaeus_, as well as some\nethical works, of which that \"On Mourning\" seems to have been most in\nvogue. The goods of the soul were placed in the following order of\nmerit by him:--Virtue, Health, Pleasure, Riches.--_Vide_ Zeller, ii.\n696.]\n\n[Footnote 480: Lag. p. 487, 488.]\n\n[Footnote 481: P. 492 (_Cassiopoeia_).]\n\n[Footnote 482: P. 493.]\n\n[Footnote 483: _Vide_ Lag. pp. 457 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 484: _Vide supra_, ch. 2. and cf. _Cabala_, Lag. 578. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 485: A reminiscence of Aristotle's [Greek: phron\u00easis].]\n\n[Footnote 486: Lag. 458. 459.]\n\n[Footnote 487: Lag. 459. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 488: There is a mingling, in Bruno's use of this word, of\nmeanings derived from [Greek: h\u00ear\u00f4s], and from Plato's [Greek: er\u00f4s].]\n\n[Footnote 489: Lag. 717. 39 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 490: Lag. 634. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 491: 634. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 492: Lag. 635.]\n\n[Footnote 493: 649, 650.]\n\n[Footnote 494: 626, 20 _f._]\n\n[Footnote 495: Lag. 639. 22 ff.; cf. _Sig. Sig._ \u00a7 48, for the first\nkind of furor (_Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 191).]\n\n[Footnote 496: Lag. 672. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 497: Cf. the Sonnet on p. 631:--\n\n    Amor per cui tant' alto il ver discerno,\n    Ch' apre le porte di diamante nere,\n    Per gl' occhi entra il mio nume, et per vedere\n    Nasce, vive, si nutre, ha regno eterno,\n    Fa scorger--quant' ha 'l ciel, terr' et inferno.\n]\n\n[Footnote 498: Lag. 628. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 499: Lag. 639.]\n\n[Footnote 500: Lag. 672. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 501: 646. 2 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 502: Lag. 646, 647.]\n\n[Footnote 503: 647. 34 ff.; cf. the Sonnet (Tansillo's) on p. 648:--\n\n    Poi che spiegat' ho' l' ali al bel desio,\n    Quanto piu sott' il pie l' aria mi scorgo,\n    Piu le veloci penne al vento porgo,\n    Et spreggio il mondo, et vers' il ciel m' invio.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Fendi sicur le nubi, et muor contento;\n    S' il ciel si illustre morte ne destina.\n]\n\n[Footnote 504: _Alle selve i mastini e i' veltri slaccia Il grovan\nAtteon_, etc., p. 651.]\n\n[Footnote 505: Lag. 651, 652.]\n\n[Footnote 506: 653. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 507: Lag. 654, 655.]\n\n[Footnote 508: 658. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 509: 731. 9 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 510: _E.g._ darkness is _privatively_ infinite, although it\nhas a limit in light, a positive something.]\n\n[Footnote 511: _E.g._ light is _positively_ infinite; its\nlimit--darkness--is privation.]\n\n[Footnote 512: Lag. 731.]\n\n[Footnote 513: Lag. 662, 663.]\n\n[Footnote 514: 701. 30 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 515: Lag. 732. 23; the terms correspond to [Greek:\ndynamis] and [Greek: energeia], or [Greek: hyl\u00ea] and [Greek: eidos],\nrespectively.]\n\n[Footnote 516: 647. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 517: Lag. 744. 1 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 518: 696. 24; cf. 681. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 519: 705. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 520: 716. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 521: Lag. 663. 36; cf. 666. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 522: P. 680. 2 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 523: Cf. also _Sigillus Sigillorum_ (ii. 2. 192), where\nPolemon and Laurentius are added to the above list. The highest kind\nof \"contraction\" or concentration is the subject, viz. that which is\nproper to philosophers. Cf. also _De Vinculis in genere_ (vol. iii. p.\n657). Diogenes the Cynic and Epicurus are placed side by side as having\nheld that they had attained the highest good in this life possible to\nman, when they could keep the mind free from pain, fear, anger, or\nother melancholy passions and preserve it in a certain heroic delight.\nBy this contempt of the ignoble things in this life, viz. those subject\nto change, they protested that they had attained, even in this mortal\nbody, to a life similar to that of the gods.]\n\n[Footnote 524: Lag. 700. 35; cf. 681. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 525: P. 700. 14, 701. 4 ff.; cf. also 710. 11. The divine\nbeauty excludes the possibility of our loving in its stead any other\nobject. Also 713. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 526: _Op. Lat._, ii. 2. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 527: Lag. 704. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 528: Lag. 699. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 529: P. 742. 24; cf. also 723. 28 and 724. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 530: Lag. 741. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 531: _Op. Lat._ iii. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 532: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 4 (Letter to Rudolph II., prefixed to\nthe _Art. adv. Math._).]\n\n[Footnote 533: Lag. 452. 3 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 534: Cf. Lucretius, ii. 1093 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 535: Lag. 454. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 536: Lag. 455. 35. Cf. _De Immenso_, ii. 13. 310, 311.]\n\n[Footnote 537: Lag. 456. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 538: Cf. the mockery of _Momus_ in the _Spaccio_ (_sub\nOrion_, Lag. p. 543).]\n\n[Footnote 539: _Sig. Sig. Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 190.]\n\n[Footnote 540: _Orat._ Consol. _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 51; cf. i. 3. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 541: Cf. Lucretius, ii. 646: \"_Omnis enim per se divom natura\nnecessest_,\" etc.]\n\n[Footnote 542: Lag. 463. 464.]\n\n[Footnote 543: _Cena_, Lag. 169. 17 ff.; cf. Spinoza, _Tractatus\nTheologico politicus_, esp. ch. 14 and 15, and preface, \u00a7 24:\n\"Scripturam rationem absolute liberam relinquere et nihil cum\nphilosophia commune habere.\"]\n\n[Footnote 544: Cf. what is said of the danger of preaching determinism\nto the many, in _Inf._, Lag., 317. 11, and _Her. Fur._, Lag. 619. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 545: Giordano Bruno's, _Weltanschauung_, etc., pp. 23, 24.]\n\n[Footnote 546: _Cena_, Lag. 171, 172.]\n\n[Footnote 547: _Vide_ Berti, Docs. xi. and xii.]\n\n[Footnote 548: Comp. _Arch. art. Lull._, _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 549: _Op. Lat._ ii. 2. 78 (preface to _Triginta Sigilli_);\ncf. i. 1. 82 (_Acrotismus_), and the _Spaccio_ (_supra_, p. 253).]\n\n[Footnote 550: _Causa_, Lag. 267. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 551: Lag. 693. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 552: Cf. the passage in the _Infinito_ referred to above,\nLag. 317. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 553: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 554: _E.g._ by Sigwart. Cf. _supra_, p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 555: _Summa_, _Op. Lat._ i. 4. 100, 101 (sub. _Evidentia_).]\n\n[Footnote 556: _Loc. cit._ p. 99, _sub Fides_.]\n\n[Footnote 557: _Ib._ s. _Auctoritas_; cf. _Causa_, Lag. 271. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 558: _E.g. Inf._ Lag. 378. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 559: Cf. Tocco, _Conferenza_, p. 50 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 560: Lag. 529 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 561: _Spaccio_, Lag. p. 530.]\n\n[Footnote 562: _Spaccio_, 531.]\n\n[Footnote 563: _De Immenso_, _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 564: _De Immenso_, _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 284 f.: \"Every land\nproduces all kinds of animals, as is clear from inaccessible islands,\nnor was there one first wolf, or lion, or bull, from which all wolves,\nlions, and cattle are descended and transported to these islands, but\nat every part the earth from the beginning has given all things,\" etc.]\n\n[Footnote 565: Cf. _Spaccio_, Lag. 411. 9; _Her. Fur._ 662. 22; _Cantus\nCircaeus_ (_Op. Lat._ ii. 1); _De Minimo_ (i. 3. 207); _De Monade_ (i.\n2. 327), and iii. 261, 653.]\n\n[Footnote 566: Cf. Plato's _Phaedrus_, \u00a7 61.]\n\n[Footnote 567: _Cabala_, Lag. 584.]\n\n[Footnote 568: Lag. 242. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 569: _Causa_, Dial. 4; esp. Lag. 265, 38 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 570: _Cena_, Lag. 128. 5; cf. _Spaccio_, 533. 16, 539. 2, and\n_Op. Lat._ i. 3. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 571: Lag. 164. 18 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 572: Lag. 202. 39 ff., 238. 27 ff., 303. 17, 317. 7, 409. 13,\n547. 16; _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 573: _De Umbris_ (ii. 1. 46).]\n\n[Footnote 574: _Inf._ 303. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 575: Lag. 66. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 576: Cf. Bartholm\u00e8ss (vol. i. p. 124), who refers to Cardan\nand Campanella as offering a similar \"proof\" of immortality.]\n\n[Footnote 577: _De Imm._, _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 578: _De Minimo_, bk. i. (i. 3. 143). There also it is\nsaid that the transformations are not fortuitous, but depend on the\ncharacter of the life that has been lived, as Pythagoras and the\nPlatonists taught.]\n\n[Footnote 579: Bruno \"inclines\" to this view only in one of his latest\nworks, the _Lampas_ (vol. iii. 59), but it is clearly implied in the\n_De Minimo_.]\n\n[Footnote 580: _De Minimo_, ii. ch. 6 (_Op. Lat._ i. 3. 208 ff.).\nCf. i. 2. 80: \"The seats of the blessed are the stars; the seat of\nthe gods is the ether or heavens; for the stars I call gods in a\nsecondary sense; the seat of God is the universe, everywhere, the whole\nimmeasurable heaven--empty space, of which he is the fulness.\" For\nBruno's _Demonology_, _vide_ i. 2. 61 (_De Immenso_, iv. 11), and i. 2.\n399 (_De Monade_).]\n\n[Footnote 581: _Lampas_, _Op. Lat._ iii. 48; cf. _Her. Fur._ Lag. 741.\n15.]\n\n[Footnote 582: _Her. Fur._ Lag. 721. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 583: _Lampas_, _Op. Lat._ iii. 21; cf. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 584: _Ib._ p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 585: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 586: _Op. Lat._ i. 2. 51; i. 1. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 587: i. 2. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 588: i. 1. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 589: _De Immenso_, bk. i. ch. 10-13.]\n\n[Footnote 590: _Op. Lat._ i. 1. 68, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 591: Cf. _Op. Lat._ ii. 3. 90 (_De Imag. Comp._). \"Intellect\"\nis here used in a general sense, not in the special one of \"intuitive\nthought.\"]\n\n[Footnote 592: _Summa, Op. Lat._ i. 4. 117. It does not imply their\nformal identity.]\n\n[Footnote 593: _Art. adv. Math. Op. Lat._ i. 3. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 594: i. 2. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 595: i. 4. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 596: i. 4. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 597: For Bruno's revolt against the mystical in Neoplatonism,\ncf. _De Imm._ v. 1. 1 (_Op. Lat._ i. 2. 118), and cf. viii. p. 298 ff.\n313; _De Mon._, p. 410.]\n\n[Footnote 598: _Op. Lat._ i. 4. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 599: _Ib._ 83.]\n\n[Footnote 600: _Ib._ 85.]\n\n[Footnote 601: _Ib._ 86.]\n\n[Footnote 602: _Op. Lat._ i. 4. p. 99. God is not, however, passively\ncomprised: cf. iii. 509 (_De rerum princip._): \"_Mens eminentius tota\nin toto ita ut etiam sit tota extra totum et supra totum_,\" _etc._]\n\n[Footnote 603: _Op. Lat._ iii. 42 (_Lampas_), cf. i. 4. 85, 86.]\n\n[Footnote 604: i. 3. 146, 147 (_De Min._)]\n\n[Footnote 605: _Summa, Op. Lat._ i. 4. 93, 95.]\n\n[Footnote 606: _Lampas, Op. Lat._ iii. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 607: \"Scepsius,\" behind whose authority Dicson shelters, is,\naccording to G. P., Dicson himself.]\n\n[Footnote 608: Ellis and Spedding, ii. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 609: _Historia Ventorum_, Ellis and Spedding, ii, p. 51; cf.\n_Nov. Org._ ii. 12. The source of the Mount Athos legend is certainly\nAristotle's _Problemata_ (xxvi. 39), while that for Olympus is either\nSolinus, or more probably Bruno, in the _Cena de le Cenere_ (Lag. 167.\n13). Bruno, on his part, refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias; it is not\nto be found, however, in Alexander's commentary upon the Meteorologica\n(E. and S. refer to Ideler, i. 148).]\n\n[Footnote 610: _Nov. Org._ i. aph. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 611: _Ib._ ii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 612: _De Augm._ i. p. 466; cf. Bruno's _Cena_, Lag. 177. 27.\nElsewhere, however, Bacon condemns the habit of \"some of the moderns,\"\nwho have attempted to base natural philosophy upon the first chapter of\nGenesis and the Book of Job, and other sacred scriptures.--_Nov. Org._\ni. ax. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 613: _De Augm._ i. 479, and Bruno, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 614: _Nov. Org._ i. ax. 84; cf. 77 (the argument _ex\nconsensu_), and _De Augm._ i. p. 458. In their note E. and S. refer\nto Esdras, c. 14, v. 10: \"the world has lost its youth, and the times\nbegin to wax old\"; and to Casmann's _Problemata Marina_ (1596), as well\nas to Bruno's _Cena_ (1584).]\n\n[Footnote 615: _Nov. Org._ i. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 616: _Ib._ i. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 617: _Nov. Org._ i. 63; cf. also 71.]\n\n[Footnote 618: _Ib._ i. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 619: _Nov. Org._ ii. 15. It was a scholastic distinction; E.\nand S. illustrate it from Thomas Aquinas' _Summa Theologiae_, I^{ma},\n_q._ 45 (E. and S. i. p. 259).]\n\n[Footnote 620: _Ib._ ii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 621: _E.g. ib._ i. 66, where are added \"the appetite\na thing has to return to its natural dimension or extension (viz.\nElasticity), the appetite to conjugate with masses of its own kind, as\nthe dense to the sphere of the earth, the rare to the sphere of the\nsky.\" These are described as really \"physical\" kinds of motion, not, as\nAristotle's are, \"logical\" and \"scholastical.\" Cf. the Natural History,\nE. and S. ii. 600, 602; and Bruno, _supra_.]\n\n[Footnote 622: _Nov. Org._ ii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 623: _Vide_ Bacon's Essay on the Vicissitude of Things; and\nfor his Atomism, the _Historia Densi et Rari_ (E. and S. vol. ii.), and\n_Cogit. de Natura Rerum_ (_ib._ vol. iii.).]\n\n[Footnote 624: _Nov. Org._ i. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 625: _De Augm._ vi. ch. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 626: _Ib._ v. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 627: Berti, _Vita di G. B._ p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 628: _Vide_ Cay von Brockdorff, _Galilei's Philosophische\nMission_ (Vierteljahrschrift f\u00fcr Wiss. Philos. und Sociol., 1902).]\n\n[Footnote 629: _Vide_ the _Discorsi_: and cf. the truculent Brunnhofer:\n\"_Galileo, der Bruno Zugleich ausbeutete und ignorirte_\" (_op. cit._,\np. 69).]\n\n[Footnote 630: _Vide_ Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i., on Kepler:\nhe refers to _Opera_, i. p. 688, and vi. p. 136.]\n\n[Footnote 631: _Fiorentino_, in Bruno, _Op. Lat._, vol. i. p. xix. The\nfull title of Vanini's work is, \"Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae\ndivino-magicum, christiano-physicum, necnon astrologo-catholicum,\nadversus veteres philosophos, Atheos, Epicureos, Peripateticos et\nStoicos. Auctore Julio C\u00e6sare Vanino, Philosopho, Theologo, ae Juris\nutriusque Doctor. Lugduni, 1615.\" With his remark compare Campanella,\n_Quidam Nolanus_ (Metaphys. ii. 1. 5).]\n\n[Footnote 632: _Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae_, 1689.]\n\n[Footnote 633: _Op. Lat._ i. 3. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 634: _Contre l'impi\u00e9t\u00e9 des d\u00e9sistes, ath\u00e9es et libertins de\nce temps_ (1624, p. 229, 234, etc.).]\n\n[Footnote 635: _Vide_ Bartholm\u00e8ss, i. pp. 257, 259. Descartes, like\nGalilei, was careful not to prejudice himself in the eyes of the\nChurch. For Gassendi, _v._ Gentzken, _Hist. Phil._, p. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 636: _Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos._]\n\n[Footnote 637: Cf. Brunnhofer, p. xix: \"The longer I consider the\nquestion, the more probable it appears to me that Spinoza would have\nbeen impossible, historically, if Bruno had had time to develop the\nrich fulness of his ideas in a systematic form.\" Cf. p. 81, where,\nhowever, he lays too much stress on verbal analogies between Bruno's\n_Summa_ and the _Ethica_ of Spinoza.]\n\n[Footnote 638: Spinoza's _Neuentdeckter Tractat von Gott, dem Menschen,\nund dessen Gl\u00fcckseligkeit_, Gotha, 1866, and his translation of this,\n_Kurzer Tractat_, with introduction and notes. T\u00fcbingen, 1870.]\n\n[Footnote 639: _Die Beiden Ersten Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus._\nLeipzig, 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 640: Moritz Carri\u00e8re, _Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit_,\np. 470.]\n\n[Footnote 641: Cf. Tocco, _Conferenza_, p. 15; Sigwart, _Neuentdeckter\nTractat_, pp. 110-113.]\n\n[Footnote 642: _E.g._ Bruno's _Acrot._ (_Op. Lat._ i. 1, 108).]\n\n[Footnote 643: _Short Tractate_, ch. i. \u00a7 9, and Bruno's _Causa_, Dial.\nv. Sigwart, _Neuent. Tract._, pp. 115, 116.]\n\n[Footnote 644: \"_Il desio di conservarsi_\" of Bruno. Pollock\n(_Spinoza_, p. 109) refers to Descartes, _Prin. Phil._ 2, chs. 37 and\n43, and Spinoza's _Cog. Met._ (pt. i. ch. 6, \u00a7 9), where the \"effort\"\nis \"the thing itself,\" whereas in the essay it is providence, _i.e._\nGod. Cf. part i., ch. 5, with _Ethica_, iii. 6 and 7.]\n\n[Footnote 645: Sigwart, _Neuent. Tract._, pp. 120-124.]\n\n[Footnote 646: _Ib._ p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 647: Cf. Carri\u00e8re. _Op. cit._ p. 471 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 648: _Thesauri Epistolici la Croziani_, 1746; Hansch,\n_Prin. Philos. Leibn._, 1728; Thes. ix., xxxi., lxxi. Cf. Steffens,\nClemens, D\u00fchring, Brunnhofer, _op. cit._, and also in G.B.'s _Lehre vom\nKleinsten, als die Quelle der pr\u00e4-establirten Harmonie von Leibniz_,\n1890; also Tocco, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 649: _Ein Beitrag zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der\nLeibnizschen Philosophie_ (1890), v. pp. 197 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 650: In Dutens, v. 492; cf. also a letter of 1st May (p.\n493).]\n\n[Footnote 651: In Dutens, v. 385 (June 1712), and v. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 652: It appears that the term _Monas Monadum_ used by Bruno\nof God does not occur in Leibniz at all.]\n\n[Footnote 653: In Burton's _Anatomy of Melancholy_ (1621) _Brunus_\nappears with _Copernicus_ as author of \"some prodigious tenent or\nparadox of the earth's motion, of infinite worlds in an infinite waste\"\n(vol. i. p. 11 of Shilleto's edition). In the \"Digression on Air,\" the\n_Cena_ is referred to (ii. p. 46),--the changes of sea and land, the\nfixed stars as suns with planets about them, the air of the heavens as\nidentical with that of the earth, the infinite worlds in an infinite\nether (_ib._ 47, 57, 62). Bruno, _infelix Brunus_ as Kepler had called\nhim, is classed with atheistical writers in a later part of the work\n(vol. iii. p. 447).]\n\n[Footnote 654: Bartholm\u00e8ss, i. pp. 261, 262.]\n\n[Footnote 655: _Vide Quarterly Review_, October 1902: \"Giordano Bruno\nin England,\" and the biography of Carew in _Encycl. Britan._ (by R.\nAdamson).]\n\n[Footnote 656: Cf. Bartholm\u00e8ss, i. p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 657: _Vide_ Rixner und Siber, _op. cit._ heft v. p. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 658: Janius Junius Toland (1669-1722); v. Leslie Stephen's\n_English Thought_, etc., vol. i. ch. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 659: _Vide Collection of several pieces of Mr. John Toland,\nwith some memoirs of his life and writings_, London (1726), vol. i.]\n\n[Footnote 660: According to the _British Museum Catalogue_. No name\nis on the title page of the work--\"_Spaccio_, etc., or the Expulsion\nof the Triumphant Beast.\" To the chequered history of this title and\nits various interpretations may be added a modern instance from the\n_Dictionary of National Biography, sub Vautrollier_: \"Bruno's Last\nTromp\"!]\n\n[Footnote 661: _Vide Toland's Miscellaneous Works_, London (1747), vol.\ni.]\n\n[Footnote 662: _Acta Philosophorum_ (1715 ff.), parts iii. ix. xi. xv.,\ncf. Zimmermann in _Mus. Helvet._ T. v.]\n\n[Footnote 663: _Kurze Fragen aus der Phil. Hist._ (1736), and _Hist.\nCrit._ (1742-1744).]\n\n[Footnote 664: Cf. his _Werke_, t. iv. pt. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 665: Cf. Carri\u00e8re, _op. cit._ p. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 666: Brunnhofer has suggested an active influence of Bruno\nupon Goethe--_v._ G\u00f6the--_Jahrbuch_ (1886), G\u00f6the's _Bildkraft_ (1890),\nLeipzig; also Carri\u00e8re, p. 487.]\n\n[Footnote 667: _Geschichte des neueren Philosophie_, 6 vols., G\u00f6ttingen\n(1800-1805), vol. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 668: _History of Philosophy_, 11 vols. (1798-1819), vol. 9,\npp. 372-429.]\n\n[Footnote 669: _Beitr\u00e4ge_, vii. 4 and xi. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 670: 2 vols., Paris, 1846, 1847.]\n\n[Footnote 671: Stuttgart, 1847, pp. 365-494. 2nd edition, enlarged,\nLeipzig, 1887, 2 vols. Both of the above works were preceded by a\ntranslation into Italian (by Florence Waddington) of Schelling's\n_Dialogue_, with an introduction by Terenzio Mamiani (on Bruno),\nFirenze, 1845; 2nd edition, 1859.]\n\n[Footnote 672: _Op. cit._, _Vorrede_, xi. A bibliography of the more\nrecent works on Bruno is given at the beginning of this volume.]","title":"Giordano Bruno","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":113186}