{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_47001/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_47001","id":"gutenberg_47001","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/47001","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:\n\n\nItalic text has been marked with _underscores_. Inconsistencies in\nhyphenation have not been corrected, punctuation has been silently\ncorrected. A list of other corrections to the text can be found at the\nend of the document. In the book the Latin text is printed on the left\npage, and the English translation on the right. Here, the text is split\nby sections starting with a roman numeral, and the Latin text is\nfollowed by its English translation. The section numbers that appeared in\nthe margin are placed between *asterisks*. Sidenotes are placed\nbetween #hashtags# and are placed either above the paragraph they refer\nto or inline. Numbers printed in superscript are preceded by a ^.\n\n\n\n\n  [Illustration: M. TULLIUS CICERO.\n  _FROM THE JAMES LOEB COLLECTION._]\n\n\n\n\n  CICERO\n\n  DE OFFICIIS\n\n\n  WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY\n  WALTER MILLER\n\n\n  LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN\n  NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.\n  MCMXIII\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  Introduction                    _Page_ ix\n\n  Bibliography                         xiii\n\n  Book I                                  1\n\n  Book II                               167\n\n  Book III                              269\n\n  Index                                 405\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIn the _de Officiis_ we have, save for the latter Philippics, the great\norator's last contribution to literature. The last, sad, troubled years\nof his busy life could not be given to his profession; and he turned his\nnever-resting thoughts to the second love of his student days and made\nGreek philosophy a possibility for Roman readers. The senate had been\nabolished; the courts had been closed. His occupation was gone; but\nCicero could not surrender himself to idleness. In those days of\ndistraction (46-43 B.C.) he produced for publication almost as much as\nin all his years of active life.\n\nThe liberators had been able to remove the tyrant, but they could not\nrestore the republic. Cicero's own life was in danger from the fury of\nmad Antony and he left Rome about the end of March, 44 B.C. He dared not\neven stop permanently in any one of his various country estates, but,\nwretched, wandered from one of his villas to another nearly all the\nsummer and autumn through. He would not suffer himself to become a prey\nto his overwhelming sorrow at the death of the republic and the final\ncrushing of the hopes that had risen with Caesar's downfall, but worked\nat the highest tension on his philosophical studies.\n\nThe Romans were not philosophical. In 161 B.C. the senate passed a\ndecree excluding all philosophers and teachers of rhetoric from the\ncity. They had no taste for philosophical speculation, in which the\nGreeks were the world's masters. They were intensely, narrowly\npractical. And Cicero was thoroughly Roman. As a student in a Greek\nuniversity he had had to study philosophy. His mind was broad enough and\nhis soul great enough to give him a joy in following after the mighty\nmasters, Socrates, Plato, Zeno, Cleanthes, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and\nthe rest. But he pursued his study of it, like a Roman, from a\n\"practical\" motive--to promote thereby his power as an orator and to\naugment his success and happiness in life. To him the goal of philosophy\nwas not primarily to know but to do. Its end was to point out the course\nof conduct that would lead to success and happiness. The only side of\nphilosophy, therefore, that could make much appeal to the Roman mind was\nethics; pure science could have little meaning for the practical Roman;\nmetaphysics might supplement ethics and religion, without which true\nhappiness was felt to be impossible.\n\nPhilosophical study had its place, therefore, and the most important\ndepartment of philosophy was ethics. The treatise on Moral Duties has\nthe very practical purpose of giving a practical discussion of the basic\nprinciples of Moral Duty and practical rules for personal conduct.\n\nAs a philosopher, if we may so stretch the term as to include him,\nCicero avows himself an adherent of the New Academy and a disciple of\nCarneades. He had tried Epicureanism under Phaedrus and Zeno, Stoicism\nunder Diodotus and Posidonius; but Philo of Larissa converted him to the\nNew Academy.\n\nScepticism declared the attainment of absolute knowledge impossible. But\nthere is the easily obtainable golden mean of the probable; and that\nappealed to the practical Roman. It appealed especially to Cicero; and\nthe same indecision that had been his bane in political life naturally\nled him first to scepticism, then to eclecticism, where his choice is\ndictated by his bias for the practical and his scepticism itself\ndisappears from view. And while Antiochus, the eclectic Academician of\nAthens, and Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic of Rhodes, seem to have had\nthe strongest influence upon him, he draws at his own discretion from\nthe founts of Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academicians alike; he has only\ncontempt for the Epicureans, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. But the more he\nstudied and lived, the more of a Stoic in ethics he became.\n\nThe cap-sheaf of Cicero's ethical studies is the treatise on the Moral\nDuties. It takes the form of a letter addressed to his son Marcus (see\nIndex), at this time a youth of twenty-one, pursuing his university\nstudies in the Peripatetic school of Cratippus in Athens, and sowing for\nwhat promised to be an abundant crop of wild oats. This situation gives\nforce and definiteness to the practical tendencies of the father's\nethical teachings. And yet, be it observed, that same father is not\nwithout censure for contributing to his son's extravagant and riotous\nliving by giving him an allowance of nearly \u00a3870 a year.\n\nOur Roman makes no pretensions to originality in philosophic thinking.\nHe is a follower--an expositor--of the Greeks. As the basis of his\ndiscussion of the Moral Duties he takes the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes\n(see Index), \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, drawing also from many other sources, but\nfollowing him more or less closely in Books I and II; Book III is more\nindependent and much inferior. He is usually superficial and not always\nclear. He translates and paraphrases Greek philosophy, weaving in\nillustrations from Roman history and suggestions of Roman mould in a\nform intended to make it, if not popular, at least comprehensible, to\nthe Roman mind. How well he succeeded is evidenced by the comparative\nreceptivity of Roman soil prepared by Stoic doctrine for the teachings\nof Christianity. Indeed, Anthony Trollope labels our author the \"Pagan\nChristian.\" \"You would fancy sometimes,\" says Petrarch, \"it is not a\nPagan philosopher but a Christian apostle who is speaking.\" No less an\nauthority than Frederick the Great has called our book \"the best work on\nmorals that has been or can be written.\" Cicero himself looked upon it\nas his masterpiece.\n\nIt has its strength and its weakness--its sane common sense and noble\npatriotism, its self-conceit and partisan politics; it has the master's\nbrilliant style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical\nflourishes, and it fails often in logical order and power; it rings true\nin its moral tone, but it shows in what haste and distraction it was\ncomposed; for it was not written as a contribution to close scientific\nthinking; it was written as a means of occupation and diversion.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nThe following works are quoted in the critical notes:--\n\n  _MSS._ A = _codex Ambrosianus_. Milan. 10th century.\n         B = _codex Bambergensis_. Hamburg. 10th century.\n         H = _codex Herbipolitanus_. W\u00fcrzburg. 10th century.\n         L = _codex Harleianus_. London. 9th century.\n       a b = _codices Bernenses_. Bern. 10th century.\n         c = _codex Bernensis_. Bern. 13th century.\n         p = _codex Palatinus_. Rome. 12th century.\n\n  _Editio Princeps_: The first edition of the _de Officiis_ was from the\n         press of Sweynheim and Pannartz at the Monastery of Subiaco;\n         possibly the edition published by Fust and Sch\u00f6ffer at Mainz is\n         a little older. Both appeared in 1465. The latter was the first\n         to print the Greek words in Greek type. The _de Officiis_ is,\n         therefore, the first classical book to be issued from a\n         printing press, with the possible exception of Lactantius and\n         Cicero's _de Oratore_ which bear the more exact date of October\n         30, 1465, and were likewise issued from the Monastery press at\n         Subiaco.\n\n  _Baiter & Kayser_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia.\n         Lipsiae, 1860-69.\n\n  _Beier_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... cum\n         commentariis editi a Carolo Beiero. Lipsiae, 1820.\n\n  _Erasmus_:     }  M. Tullii Ciceronis Officia, diligenter restituta.\n  _Melanchthon_: }  Ejusdem de Amicitia et Senectute dialogi...: cum\n         annotationibus Erasmi et P. Melanchthonis. Parisiis, 1533.\n\n  _Ed._: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia recognovit\n         C. F. W. M\u00fcller. Teubner: Lipsiae, 1879. This edition is the\n         basis of the text of the present volume.\n\n  _Ernesti_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera ex recensione novissima. J. A.\n         Ernesti; cum eiusdem notis, et clave Ciceroniana. Editio prima\n         Americana. Bostoniae, 1815-16.\n\n  _Facciolati_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, de\n         Senectute, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis, et Paradoxa.\n         Accedit Q. fratris commentariolum petitionis. Ex recensione J.\n         Facciolati. Venetiis, 1747.\n\n  _Fleckeisen, Alf._: Kritische Miscellen. Dresden, 1864.\n\n  _Gernhard_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres. Rec. et\n         scholiis Iac. Facciolati suisque animadversionibus instruxit\n         Aug. G. Gernhard. Lipsiae, 1811.\n\n  _Graevius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres; ... de\n         Senectute; ... de Amicitia; Paradoxa; Somnium Scipionis; ex\n         recensione J. G. Graevii. Amstelodami, 1689.\n\n  _Gulielmus_: }  M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant ...\n  _Gruter_:    }  emendata studio ... J. Gulielmi et J. Gruteri.\n         Hamburgi, 1618-19.\n\n  _Heine, Otto_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum Filium Libri\n         tres. 6te Aufl. Berlin, 1885.\n\n  _Heusinger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... recensuit\n         adjectisque J. M. Heusingeri e suis annotationibus ... editurus\n         erat J. F. Heusinger. (Edited by C. Heusinger.) Brunsvigae,\n         1783.\n\n  _Holden_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, with\n         Introduction, Analysis and Commentary by Herbert Ashton Holden.\n         7th Edition. Cambridge, 1891. To his full notes the translator\n         is indebted for many a word and phrase.\n\n  _Klotz_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia. Recognovit\n         Reinholdus Klotz. Lipsiae, 1850-57, 1869-74.\n\n  _Lambinus_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant, a D. Lambino\n         ... ex codicibus manuscriptis emendata et aucta ... Lutetiae,\n         1566-84.\n\n  _Lange_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis lib. III. Cato Major vel de\n         Senectute ... Laelius vel de Amicitia ... Paradoxa Stoicorum\n         sex, Somnium Scipionis ... opera C. Langii recogniti ...\n         ejusdem in hosce ... libros annotationes. Cum annotationibus\n         P. Manutii, etc. Antverpiae, 1568.\n\n  _Lund_: De emendandis Ciceronis libris de Officiis observationes\n         criticae. Scripsit G. F. G. Lund. Kopenhagen, 1848.\n\n  _Manutius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Officiorum libri tres: Cato Maior, vel\n         de Senectute: Laelius, vel de Amicitia: Paradoxa Stoicorum sex\n         ... additae sunt ... variae lectiones. (Edited by P. Manuzio.)\n         P. Manutius: Venetiis, 1541.\n\n  _M\u00fcller, C. F. W._: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. F\u00fcr den\n         Schulgebrauch erkl\u00e4rt. Leipzig, 1882.\n\n  _Muretus_: M. Antoni Mureti Scholia in Cic. officia. Mureti opera ed.\n         Ruhnken. Lugd. Bat., 1879.\n\n  _Orelli_: }  M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia, ac\n  _Baiter_: }  deperditorum fragmenta ... Edidit J. C. Orellius (M.\n  _Halm_:   }  Tullii Ciceronis Scholiastae. C. M. Victorinus, Rufinus,\n         C. Julius Victor, Boethius, Favonius Eulogius, Asconius\n         Pedianus, Scholia Bobiensia, Scholiasta Gronovianus, Ediderunt\n         J. C. Orellius et J. G. Baiter. Turici, 1826-38). Ed. 2. Opus\n         morte Orellii interruptum contin. J. G. Baiterus et C. Halmius,\n         1845-62.\n\n  _Pearce_: M. Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum filium libri tres. Notis\n         illustravit et ... emendavit Z. Pearce. Londini, 1745.\n\n  _Stuerenburg_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Recensuit\n         R. Stuerenburg. Accedit Commentarius. Lipsiae, 1843.\n\n  _Unger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Erkl\u00e4rt v. G. F.\n         Unger. Leipzig, 1852.\n\n  _Victorius, P._: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera, omnium quae hactenus\n         excusa sunt castigatissima, nunc primum in lucem edita. 4 tom.\n         Venetiis, 1532-34-36.\n\n  _Zumpt_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres cum selectis J. M.\n         et J. F. Heusingerorum suisque notis. Scholarum in usum iterum\n         edidit Car. Tim. Zumptius. Brunsvigae, 1849.\n\n\n\n\nCICERO DE OFFICIIS\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\nMORAL GOODNESS\n\n\n\n\nLIBER PRIMUS / BOOK I\n\n\n*1* I. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque\nAthenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter\nsummam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia\naugere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper\ncum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in\ndicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in\nutriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur,\nmagnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum\nlitterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et\nad dicendum[1] et ad iudicandum.\n\n*2* Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum,\net disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te,\nquantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a\nPeripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici\nvolumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio),\norationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem.\nNec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi\nscientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte,\nornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi\nassumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.\n\n*3* Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes\nmeas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se[2]\naequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc\nquoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id\nquidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in\ngenere elaboraret[3] sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc\nquietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero\nhaberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen,\nut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque\nprofecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus.\n\n*4* Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare\nvoluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem,\nsi illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset,\nornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et\nIsocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit\nalterum.\n\n    [1] _dicendum_ Edd.; _discendum_ MSS. (i.e. acquisition of\n    learning).\n\n    [2] _se_ A c, Edd.; not in B H a b p.\n\n    [3] _elaboraret_ Lambin., Edd.; laboraret MSS.\n\n\n#Introduction: the importance of combining Greek and Latin studies.#\n\n*1* I. My dear son Marcus, you have now been studying a full year under\nCratippus, and that too in Athens, and you should be fully equipped with\nthe practical precepts and the principles of philosophy; so much at\nleast one might expect from the pre-eminence not only of your teacher\nbut also of the city; the former is able to enrich you with learning,\nthe latter to supply you with models. Nevertheless, just as I for my own\nimprovement have always combined Greek and Latin studies--and I have\ndone this not only in the study of philosophy but also in the practice\nof oratory--so I recommend that you should do the same, so that you may\nhave equal command of both languages. And it is in this very direction\nthat I have, if I mistake not, rendered a great service to our\ncountrymen, so that not only those who are unacquainted with Greek\nliterature but even the cultured consider that they have gained much\nboth in oratorical power and in mental training.\n\n#Greek Philosophy and Cicero's own.#\n\n*2* You will, therefore, learn from the foremost of present-day\nphilosophers, and you will go on learning as long as you wish; and your\nwish ought to continue as long as you are not dissatisfied with the\nprogress you are making. For all that, if you will read my philosophical\nbooks, you will be helped; my philosophy is not very different from that\nof the Peripatetics (for both they and I claim to be followers of\nSocrates and Plato). As to the conclusions you may reach, I leave that\nto your own judgment (for I would put no hindrance in your way), but by\nreading my philosophical writings you will be sure to render your\nmastery of the Latin language more complete. But I would by no means\nhave you think that this is said boastfully. For there are many to whom\nI yield precedence in knowledge of philosophy; but if I lay claim to the\norator's peculiar ability to speak with propriety, clearness, elegance,\nI think my claim is in a measure justified, for I have spent my life in\nthat profession.\n\n#Philosophy and oratory.#\n\n*3* And therefore, my dear Cicero, I cordially recommend you to read\ncarefully not only my orations but also these[A] books of mine on\nphilosophy, which are now about as extensive. For while the orations\nexhibit a more vigorous style, yet the unimpassioned, restrained style\nof my philosophical productions is also worth cultivating. Moreover, for\nthe same man to succeed in both departments, both in the forensic style\nand in that of calm philosophic discussion has not, I observe, been the\ngood fortune of any one of the Greeks so far, unless, perhaps, Demetrius\nof Phalerum can be reckoned in that number--a clever reasoner, indeed,\nand, though rather a spiritless orator, he is yet charming, so that you\ncan recognize in him the disciple of Theophrastus. But let others judge\nhow much I have accomplished in each pursuit; I have at least attempted\nboth.\n\n*4* I believe, of course, that if Plato had been willing to devote\nhimself to forensic oratory, he could have spoken with the greatest\neloquence and power; and that if Demosthenes had continued the studies\nhe pursued with Plato and had wished to expound his views, he could have\ndone so with elegance and brilliancy. I feel the same way about\nAristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession,\nundervalued that of the other.\n\n    [A] Cicero is alluding to his Republic, Tusculan\n    Disputations, Theories of the Supreme Good and Evil, The\n    Nature of the Gods, Academics, Hortensius, his essays on\n    Friendship (Laelius), Old Age (Cato), Fate, Divination, etc.\n    (15 in all).\n\n\nII. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa\nposthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum\net auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et\nutilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere\nvidentur ea, quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla\nenim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque\ndomesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero\ncontrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est\nhonestas omnis et neglegendo[4] turpitudo.\n\n*5* Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis\nest enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat\ndicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et\nmalorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic\ninstituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis,\nnon honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum\nnaturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam\nnec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut\ntemperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.\n\n#de Fin. II, 12 ff.; Tusc. Disp. IV-V; de Off. III, 117#\n\n*6* Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat,\ntamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi\nconsentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla\nofficii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi\naut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se\ndicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum,\nAcademicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam\npridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de\nofficio, si rerum aliquem dilectum[5] reliquissent, ut ad officii\ninventionem aditus esset. Sequemur[6] igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac\nin quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e\nfontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo\nvidebitur, hauriemus.\n\n*7* Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante\ndefinire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror.\nOmnis enim, quae [a] ratione[7] suscipitur de aliqua re institutio,\ndebet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo\ndisputetur....[8]\n\n    [4] _et neglegendo_ A H a b, Edd.; _et in neglegendo_ B c.\n\n    [5] _dilectum_ B H a b, Edd.; _delectum_ A c.\n\n    [6] _sequemur_ Graevius, Edd.; _sequimur_ MSS.\n\n    [7] [_a_] _ratione_ Ed.; _a ratione_ MSS.; _ratione_ M\u00fcller.\n\n    [8] Cicero's definition must have followed here, something\n    like _Omne igitur, quod ratione actum est officium\n    appellamus_ Unger.\n\n\n#Statement of subject.#\n\nII. But since I have decided to write you a little now (and a great deal\nby and by), I wish, if possible, to begin with a matter most suited at\nonce to your years and to my position. Although philosophy offers many\nproblems, both important and useful, that have been fully and carefully\ndiscussed by philosophers, those teachings which have been handed down\non the subject of moral duties seem to have the widest practical\napplication. For no phase of life, whether public or private, whether in\nbusiness or in the home, whether one is working on what concerns oneself\nalone or dealing with another, can be without its moral duty; on the\ndischarge of such duties depends all that is morally right, and on their\nneglect all that is morally wrong in life.\n\n#The philosophic schools and ethical teaching.#\n\n*5* Moreover, the subject of this inquiry is the common property of all\nphilosophers; for who would presume to call himself a philosopher, if he\ndid not inculcate any lessons of duty? But there are some schools that\ndistort all notions of duty by the theories they propose touching the\nsupreme good and the supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good as\nhaving no connection with virtue and measures it not by a moral standard\nbut by his own interests--if he should be consistent and not rather at\ntimes over-ruled by his better nature, he could value neither friendship\nnor justice nor generosity; and brave he surely cannot possibly be that\ncounts pain the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds pleasure to be\nthe supreme good.\n\n#Reasons for choice of subject and authorities.#\n\n*6* Although these truths are so self-evident that the subject does not\ncall for discussion, still I have discussed it in another connection.\nIf, therefore, these schools should claim to be consistent, they could\nnot say anything about duty; and no fixed, invariable, natural rules of\nduty can be posited except by those who say that moral goodness is worth\nseeking solely or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teaching of\nethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the Academicians, and the\nPeripatetics; for the theories of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been\nlong since rejected; and yet they would have the right to discuss duty\nif they had left us any power of choosing between things, so that there\nmight be a way of finding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this\ntime and in this investigation follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a\ntranslator, but, as is my custom, I shall at my own option and\ndiscretion draw from those sources in such measure and in such manner as\nshall suit my purpose.\n\n*7* Since, therefore, the whole discussion is to be on the subject of\nduty, I should like at the outset to define what duty is, as, to my\nsurprise, Panaetius has failed to do. For every systematic development\nof any subject ought to begin with a definition, so that every one may\nunderstand what the discussion is about.\n\n\nIII. Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet\nad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in\nomnis partis usus vitae conformari[9] possit. Superioris generis huius\nmodi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium\naliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem\nofficiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum,\ntamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis\nspectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque\netiam alia divisio est officii.\n\n*8* Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum\nofficium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, hoc autem\ncommune officium \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd vocant.[10] Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum\nquod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id\nesse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.\n\n*9* Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi\ndeliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in\ndeliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contrarias\nsententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt[11] aut consultant, ad\nvitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad\nopes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id\nnecne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis\ncadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id,\nquod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra\nrevocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus\nafferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.\n\n*10* Hac divisione, cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo\nsit, duo praetermissa sunt; nec enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit,\ndeliberari solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius,\nitemque duobus propositis utilibus utrum utilius. Ita, quam ille\ntriplicem putavit esse rationem, in quinque partes distribui debere\nreperitur. Primum igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter, tum pari\nratione de utili, post de comparatione eorum disserendum.\n\n    [9] _conformari_ Edd.; _confirmari_ MSS. (i.e. fortified).\n\n    [10] _officium_ \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd _vocant_ Pearce, Ed., Heine;\n    _officium vocant_ MSS., Bt.\n\n    [11] _anquirunt_ A B H b; _inquirunt_ a c.\n\n\n#Classification of duties.#\n\nIII. Every treatise on duty has two parts: one, dealing with the\ndoctrine of the supreme good; the other, with the practical rules by\nwhich daily life in all its bearings may be regulated. The following\nquestions are illustrative of the first part: whether all duties are\nabsolute; whether one duty is more important than another; and so on.\nBut as regards special duties for which positive rules are laid down,\nthough they are affected by the doctrine of the supreme good, still the\nfact is not so obvious, because they seem rather to look to the\nregulation of every-day life; and it is these special duties that I\npropose to treat at length in the following books.\n\n*8* And yet there is still another classification of duties: we\ndistinguish between \"mean\"[B] duty, so-called, and \"absolute\" duty.\nAbsolute duty we may, I presume, call \"right,\" for the Greeks call it\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, while the ordinary duty they call \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd. And the meaning of\nthose terms they fix thus: whatever is right they define as absolute\nduty, but \"mean\" duty, they say, is duty for the performance of which an\nadequate reason may be rendered.\n\n#The threefold classification of Panaetius.#\n\n*9* The consideration necessary to determine conduct is, therefore, as\nPanaetius thinks, a threefold one: first, people question whether the\ncontemplated act is morally right or morally wrong; and in such\ndeliberation their minds are often led to widely divergent conclusions.\nAnd then they examine and consider the question whether the action\ncontemplated is or is not conducive to comfort and happiness in life, to\nthe command of means and wealth, to influence, and to power, by which\nthey may be able to help themselves and their friends; this whole matter\nturns upon a question of expediency. The third type of question arises\nwhen that which seems to be expedient seems to conflict with that which\nis morally right; for when expediency seems to be pulling one way, while\nmoral right seems to be calling back in the opposite direction, the\nresult is that the mind is distracted in its inquiry and brings to it\nthe irresolution that is born of deliberation.\n\n#The question is fivefold.#\n\n*10* Although omission is a most serious defect in classification, two\npoints have been overlooked in the foregoing:[C] for we usually consider\nnot only whether an action is morally right or morally wrong, but also,\nwhen a choice of two morally right courses is offered, which one is\nmorally better; and likewise, when a choice of two expedients is\noffered, which one is more expedient. Thus the question which Panaetius\nthought threefold ought, we find, to be divided into five parts. First,\ntherefore, we must discuss the moral--and that, under two sub-heads;\nsecondly, in the same manner, the expedient; and finally, the cases\nwhere they must be weighed against each other.\n\n    [B] Cicero's technical terms are difficult because he has to\n    invent them to translate Greek that is perfectly simple:\n\n    _rectum_ is 'right,' i.e. perfect, absolute. Its opposite is\n    _medium_, 'mean,' i.e. intermediate, falling short of the\n    'absolute' and occupying a middle ground; common; ordinary.\n\n    _honestum_ is 'morally right'; as a noun, 'moral goodness'\n    (= _honestas_); its opposite is _turpe_, 'morally wrong.'\n\n    _honestas_ is 'moral rectitude,'--'moral goodness';\n    'morality'; its opposite _turpitudo_, 'moral wrong,'\n    'immorality.'\n\n    _honestus_, on the other hand, is always 'honourable'; and\n    _honores_ are always 'offices of honour.'\n\n    [C] For Panaetius was a Stoic, and the Stoics did not admit\n    that there were any degrees of right or wrong.\n\n\n*11* IV. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se,\nvitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque,\nquae sint ad vivendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut\nlatibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item[12] animantium omnium\nest coniunctionis adpetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae\nprocreata sint[13]; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest,\nquod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque\npraesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut\nfuturum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia\ncernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus[14] et quasi\nantecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus\nadiungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad\neamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.\n\n*12* Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad\norationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum\nquendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum\ncoetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas\nstudeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi\nsoli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique\ndebeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam\nfacit.\n\n*13* In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque\ninvestigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum\navemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut\noccultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex\nquo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae\nhominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio\nquaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura\nvelit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et\nlegitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum\ncontemptio.\n\n*14* Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc\nanimal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque\nqui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud\nanimal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam\nsimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo\netiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque\nconservandam[15] putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat,\ntum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat\naut cogitet.\n\nQuibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum,\nquod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere\ndicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.\n\n    [12] _item_ Manutius, Edd.; _autem_ MSS.\n\n    [13] _procreata sint_ B H a b; _procreata sunt_ A (?), Bt.;\n    _procreantur_ c.\n\n    [14] _praegressus_ A H a b, Edd.; _progressus_ B c.\n\n    [15] _conservandam_ MSS.; _conservanda_ codd. aliquot\n    recentiores, Bt.\n\n\n#The essential differences between man and the lower animals.#\n\n*11* IV. First of all, Nature has endowed every species of living\ncreature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems\nlikely to cause injury to life or limb, and of procuring and providing\neverything needful for life--food, shelter, and the like. A common\nproperty of all creatures is also the reproductive instinct (the purpose\nof which is the propagation of the species) and also a certain amount of\nconcern for their offspring. #Instinct and Reason.# But the most marked\ndifference between man and beast is this: the beast, just as far as it\nis moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or\nfuture, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment;\nwhile man--because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends\nthe chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands\nthe relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies,\nand connects and associates the present and the future--easily surveys\nthe course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for\nits conduct.\n\n#Family ties.#\n\n*12* Nature likewise by the power of reason associates man with man in\nthe common bonds of speech and life; she implants in him above all, I\nmay say, a strangely tender love for his offspring. She also prompts\nmen to meet in companies, to form public assemblies and to take part in\nthem themselves; and she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the\neffort on man's part to provide a store of things that minister to his\ncomforts and wants--and not for himself alone, but for his wife and\nchildren and the others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought to\nprovide; and this responsibility also stimulates his courage and makes\nit stronger for the active duties of life.\n\n#Search after truth.#\n\n*13* Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are\npeculiar to man. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of\nbusiness cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new,\nand we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as\nindispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is\ntrue, simple, and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's nature. To\nthis passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it\nwere, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is\nunwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct\nor is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according\nto justice and law. From this attitude come greatness of soul and a\nsense of superiority to worldly conditions.\n\n#Moral sensibility.#\n\n*14* And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is\nthe only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for\nmoderation in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of\nbeauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason,\nextending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of\nspirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be\nmaintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature and Reason are\ncareful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly fashion, and in every\nthought and deed to do or think nothing capriciously.\n\nIt is from these elements that is forged and fashioned that moral\ngoodness which is the subject of this inquiry--something that, even\nthough it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour[D];\nand by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it merits praise, even\nthough it be praised by none.\n\n    [D] Cicero plays on the double meaning of _honestum_: (1)\n    'moral goodness,' and (2) 'honourable,' 'distinguished,' etc.\n\n\n#Phaedr., 250 D#\n\n*15* V. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti\nvides, \"quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores,\" ut ait Plato,\n\"excitaret sapientiae.\" Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium\noritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur\naut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum\ncontractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac\nrobore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in\nquo inest modestia et temperantia.\n\n*(15)* Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt,\ntamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte,\nquae prima discripta[16] est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus,\ninest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est\nproprium. *16* Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque\nverissimum sit, quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et\nexplicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi\nsolet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur,\nsubiecta est veritas.\n\n*17* Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad\neas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et\nsocietas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia\nmagnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis\ncomparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo\nautem[17] et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia,\nversantur in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum\nmentis agitatio. Iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam\net ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus.\n\n    [16] _discripta_ Heine; _descripta_ MSS., Bt.\n\n    [17] _autem_ MSS., M\u00fcller, Heine; _item_ Pearce, Ed., Bt.\n\n\n*15* V. You see here, Marcus, my son, the very form and as it were the\nface of Moral Goodness; \"and if,\" as Plato says, \"it could be seen with\nthe physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom.\" #The\nfour Cardinal Virtues.# But all that is morally right rises from some\none of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the full perception\nand intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of\norganized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the\nfaithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and\nstrength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness\nand moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist\ntemperance and self-control.\n\n#Their several provinces.#\n\n*(15)* Although these four are connected and interwoven, still it is in\neach one considered singly that certain definite kinds of moral duties\nhave their origin: in that category, for instance, which was designated\nfirst in our division and in which we place wisdom and prudence, belong\nthe search after truth and its discovery; and this is the peculiar\nprovince of that virtue. *16* For the more clearly anyone observes the\nmost essential truth in any given case and the more quickly and\naccurately he can see and explain the reasons for it, the more\nunderstanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and justly so. So,\nthen, it is truth that is, as it were, the stuff with which this virtue\nhas to deal and on which it employs itself.\n\n*17* Before the three remaining virtues, on the other hand, is set the\ntask of providing and maintaining those things on which the practical\nbusiness of life depends, so that the relations of man to man in human\nsociety may be conserved, and that largeness and nobility of soul may be\nrevealed not only in increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages\nfor one's self and one's family but far more in rising superior to these\nvery things. But orderly behaviour and consistency of demeanour and\nself-control and the like have their sphere in that department of things\nin which a certain amount of physical exertion, and not mental activity\nmerely, is required. For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and\norder into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral\nrectitude and moral dignity.\n\n\n*18* VI. Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque\ndivisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam\nattingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et\nscientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem,\nerrare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus.[18] In hoc genere et\nnaturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne incognita pro\ncognitis habeamus iisque temere assentiamur; quod vitium effugere qui\nvolet (omnes autem velle debent), adhibebit ad considerandas res et\ntempus et diligentiam. *19* Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum\nstudium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt\neasdemque non necessarias.\n\nQuibus vitiis declinatis quod in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis\noperae curaeque ponetur, id iure laudabitur, ut in astrologia C.\nSulpicium audivimus, in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus, multos\nin dialecticis, plures in iure civili, quae omnes artes in veri\ninvestigatione versantur; cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra\nofficium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen\nfit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; tum agitatio\nmentis, quae numquam acquiescit, potest nos in studiis cognitionis[19]\netiam sine opera nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi\naut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene\nbeateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur.\n\nAc de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.\n\n    [18] _ducimus_ c, Edd.; _dicimus_ A B H a b.\n\n    [19] _cognitionis_ A, Bt., M\u00fcller, Heine; _cogitationis_ BH\n    a b c (error caused by _cogitatio_ in next line).\n\n\n#A. Wisdom.#\n\n*18* VI. Now, of the four divisions which we have made of the essential\nidea of moral goodness, the first, consisting in the knowledge of truth,\ntouches human nature most closely. For we are all attracted and drawn to\na zeal for learning and knowing; and we think it glorious to excel\ntherein, while we count it base and immoral to fall into error, to\nwander from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In this\npursuit, which is both natural and morally right, two errors are to be\navoided: first, we must not treat the unknown as known and too readily\naccept it; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as all should do)\nwill devote both time and attention to the weighing of evidence. *19*\nThe other error is that some people devote too much industry and too\ndeep study to matters that are obscure and difficult and useless as\nwell.\n\nIf these errors are successfully avoided, all the labour and pains\nexpended upon problems that are morally right and worth the solving will\nbe fully rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy, for example,\nwas Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have heard; in mathematics, Sextus\nPompey, whom I have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil law,\nstill more. All these professions are occupied with the search after\ntruth; but to be drawn by study away from active life is contrary to\nmoral duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity; activity,\nhowever, may often be interrupted, and many opportunities for returning\nto study are opened. Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at\nrest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge even without\nconscious effort on our part. Moreover, all our thought and mental\nactivity will be devoted either to planning for things that are morally\nright and that conduce to a good and happy life, or to the pursuits of\nscience and learning.\n\nWith this we close the discussion of the first source of duty.\n\n\n*20* VII. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua\nsocietas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius\npartes duae,[20] iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua\nviri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel\nbenignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.\n\nSed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus\niniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.\n\n*21* Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui\nquondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut\nlege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas\nArpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum\npossessionum discriptio.[21] Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae\nnatura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e\nquo[22] si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.\n\n#Ep. IX, ad Archytam, 358 A#\n\n*22* Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum\nnati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque,\nut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia\ncreari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se\naliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi,\ncommunes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando\naccipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum\ninter homines societatem.\n\n*23* Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum\nconventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur\nfortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose\nexquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum\nest, appellatam fidem.\n\nSed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum, qui inferunt, alterum\neorum, qui ab iis, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam.\nNam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua\nperturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus afferre videtur socio; qui autem\nnon defendit nec obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quam\nsi parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserat. *24* Atque illae quidem\niniuriae, quae nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, saepe a metu\nproficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet ne, nisi id\nfecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maximam autem partem ad\niniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea, quae concupiverunt;\nin quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.\n\n    [20] _partes duae_ BH b; _partes duae sunt_ c, Bt., Heine.\n\n    [21] _discriptio_ B, Edd.; _descriptio_ A H a b c.\n\n    [22] _e quo_ A^1 H a b c, M\u00fcller; _eo_ B, _de quo_ Bt.\n    (suppl.), Heine.\n\n\n#B. Justice.#\n\n*20* VII. Of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its\napplication is the principle by which society and what we may call its\n\"common bonds\" are maintained. Of this again there are two\ndivisions--justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on\nthe basis of which men are called \"good men\"; and, close akin to\njustice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity.\n\nThe first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to\nanother, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use\ncommon possessions for the common interests, private property for their\nown.\n\n#Public _vs._ private interests.#\n\n*21* There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established\nby nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy\n(as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory)\nor through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war) or by\ndue process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this\nprinciple the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the\nTusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of\nprivate property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those\nthings which by nature had been common property became the property of\nindividuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen\nto his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that,\nhe will be violating the laws of human society.\n\n*22* But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for\nourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our\nfriends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the\nearth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for\nthe sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in\nthis direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to\nthe general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and\nreceiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to\ncement human society more closely together, man to man.\n\n#Good faith.#\n\n*23* The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith--that is, truth\nand fidelity to promises and agreements. And therefore we may follow the\nStoics, who diligently investigate the etymology of words; and we may\naccept their statement that \"good faith\" is so called because what is\npromised is \"made good,\" although some may find this derivation[E]\nrather far-fetched.\n\n#Injustice: active and passive.#\n\nThere are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice--the one, on the\npart of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who,\nwhen they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being\ninflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger or some other\npassion, wrongfully assaults another seems, as it were, to be laying\nviolent hands upon a comrade; but he who does not prevent or oppose\nwrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he deserted his\nparents or his friends or his country. *24* Then, too, those very wrongs\nwhich people try to inflict on purpose to injure are often the result of\nfear: that is, he who premeditates injuring another is afraid that, if\nhe does not do so, he may himself be made to suffer some hurt. But for\nthe most part, people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure some\npersonal end; in this vice, avarice is generally the controlling motive.\n\n    [E] Of course, 'good faith' and 'made good' have just as\n    little etymological connection as _fiat_ and _fidem_.\n\n\n*25* VIII. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum\nad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis\npecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut\nnuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re\npublica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non\nposset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum\nelegantia et copia; quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae\ncupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens\nvituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est.\n\n*26* Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio,\ncum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt.[23] Quod\nenim est apud Ennium:\n\n#Fab. inc. (Thyestes?) Vahlen^2, 404#\n\n              N\u00falla sancta s\u00f3cietas\n    N\u00e9c fides regni \u00e9st,\n\nid latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures\nexcellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit\nservare \"sanctam societatem.\" Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris,\nqui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse\nopinionis errore finxerat, principatum. Est autem in hoc genere\nmolestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque\nexsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis\ncavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur.\n\n*27* Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione\naliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et\ncogitata[24] fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo\nmotu accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur.\n\nAc de inferenda quidem iniuria satis dictum est.\n\n    [23] _inciderunt_ A B H L a b; _inciderint_ c.\n\n    [24] _cogitata_ A B H a b p, Edd.; _cogitatu_ c, _cogitato_\n    alii, Madvig (ad De Fin. p. 696).\n\n\n*25* VIII. Again, men seek riches partly to supply the needs of life,\npartly to secure the enjoyment of pleasure. #The dangers of ambition.#\nWith those who cherish higher ambitions, the desire for wealth is\nentertained with a view to power and influence and the means of\nbestowing favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since declared\nthat no amount of wealth was enough for the man who aspired to be the\nforemost citizen of the state, unless with the income from it he could\nmaintain an army. Fine establishments and the comforts of life in\nelegance and abundance also afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it\ngives rise to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not mean to\nfind fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody,\nbut unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided.\n\n*26* The great majority of people, however, when they fall a prey to\nambition for either military or civil authority, are carried away by it\nso completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. For\nEnnius says:\n\n    \"There is no fellowship inviolate,\n    No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;\"\n\nand the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide application. For\nwhenever a situation is of such a nature that not more than one can hold\npre-eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes so keen that it\nis an extremely difficult matter to maintain a \"fellowship inviolate.\"\n#Caesar.# We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar,\nwho, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had\nconceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the\ntrouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest souls and in the\nmost brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and\nmilitary authority, for power, and for glory, springing up; and\ntherefore we must be the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction.\n\n#The motives to wrong.#\n\n*27* But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal of difference\nwhether the wrong is done as a result of some impulse of passion, which\nis usually brief and transient, or whether it is committed wilfully and\nwith premeditation; for offences that come through some sudden impulse\nare less culpable than those committed designedly and with malice\naforethought.\n\nBut enough has been said on the subject of inflicting injury.\n\n\n*28* IX. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures\nsolent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus\nsuscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis\nstudiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari\ndebeant, desertos esse patiantur. #Rep. VI, 485 ff. VII, 520 D# Itaque\nvidendum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos\ndictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique\nvehementer expetant,[25] de quibus inter se digladiari soleant,\ncontemnant et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum\n[iustitiae genus] assequuntur,[26] ut[27] inferenda ne cui noceant\niniuria, in alterum incidunt[28]; discendi enim studio impediti, quos\ntueri debent, deserunt. #Rep. I, 347 C# Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam\nquidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate\nfieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium.\n\n*29* Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendae aut odio quodam\nhominum suum se negotium agere dicant nec facere cuiquam videantur\niniuriam. Qui altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt;\ndeserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam studii,\nnihil operae, nihil facultatum.\n\nQuando igitur duobus generibus iniustitiae propositis adiunximus causas\nutriusque generis easque res ante constituimus, quibus iustitia\ncontineretur, facile, quod cuiusque temporis officium sit, poterimus,\nnisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare; *30* est enim difficilis\ncura rerum alienarum. #Heaut. Tim. 77# Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes\n\"humani nihil a se alienum putat\"; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus\natque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam\nilla, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus,\naliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui\nvetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas enim\nlucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae.\n\n    [25] _expetant_ A B a b; _expectant_ H; _exspectant_ c.\n\n    [26] _alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur_ MSS.; _alterum\n    assequuntur_ Pearce, J. M. Heusinger, et al.; _alterum genus\n    assequuntur_ Beier.\n\n    [27] _ut_ Halm; _in_ MSS.; om. Bt.\n\n    [28] _in alterum incidunt_ A B H a b; _in altero delinqunt_\n    c, Bt. (_delinquunt_, i.e. they offend in the other\n    direction).\n\n\n#Motives to passive injustice;#\n\n*28* IX. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting\nduty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur\nenmity or trouble or expense; #a. Preoccupation.# or through\nindifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation\nor self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be\nneglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to\nfear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate,\nwhen he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit\nof truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most\nmen eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each\nother to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in\nthat they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the\nopposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave\nto their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks,\nthey will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion.\nBut in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own\naccord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that\nit is voluntary.\n\n#b. Self-interest.#\n\n*29* There are some also who, either from zeal in attending to their own\nbusiness or through some sort of aversion to their fellow-men, claim\nthat they are occupied solely with their own affairs, without seeming to\nthemselves to be doing anyone any injury. But while they steer clear of\nthe one kind of injustice, they fall into the other: they are traitors\nto social life, for they contribute to it none of their interest, none\nof their effort, none of their means.\n\n#Rules of duty required by Justice.#\n\nNow since we have set forth the two kinds of injustice and assigned the\nmotives that lead to each, and since we have previously established the\nprinciples by which justice is constituted, we shall be in a position\neasily to decide what our duty on each occasion is, unless we are\nextremely self-centred; *30* for indeed it is not an easy matter to be\nreally concerned with other people's affairs; and yet in Terence's play,\nwe know, Chremes \"thinks that nothing that concerns man is foreign to\nhim.\" Nevertheless, when things turn out for our own good or ill, we\nrealize it more fully and feel it more deeply than when the same things\nhappen to others and we see them only, as it were, in the far distance;\nand for this reason we judge their case differently from our own. It is,\ntherefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a\nthing, when there is a doubt whether it be right or wrong; for\nrighteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign\nthat we are thinking of a possible wrong.\n\n\n*31* X. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae maxime videntur digna\nesse iusto homine eoque, quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque\ncontraria, ut reddere depositum, facere promissum; quaeque pertinent ad\nveritatem et ad fidem, ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum.\n#Ch. VII# Referri enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio, fundamenta\niustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati\nserviatur. Ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper\nest idem. *32* Potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum, ut\nid effici sit inutile vel ei, cui promissum sit, vel ei, qui promiserit.\n#e.g. Eur. Hipp. 1315-1319# Nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus, quod\nTheseo promiserat, non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto filio non esset\norbatus; ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium, quod de\nHippolyti interitu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus\nincidit. Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus\npromiseris, inutilia, nec, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint,\ncui[29] promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori; ut, si\nconstitueris cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque\ninterim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non\nfacere, quod dixeris, magisque ille, cui promissum sit, ab officio\ndiscedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis standum non\nesse quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo\npromiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, non nulla\nlegibus.\n\n*33* Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida,\nsed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud \"Summum ius summa\niniuria\" factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium. Quo in genere etiam\nin re publica multa peccantur, ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent\ncum hoste indutiae factae, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent\npactae, non noctium indutiae. Ne noster quidem probandus, si verum est\nQ. Fabium Labeonem seu quem alium (nihil enim habeo praeter auditum)\narbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus a senatu datum, cum ad locum\nvenisset, cum utrisque separatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, ne\nappetenter, atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent. Id cum utrique\nfecissent, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum finis\nsic, ut ipsi dixerant, terminavit; in medio relictum quod erat, populo\nRomano adiudicavit. Decipere hoc quidem est, non iudicare. Quocirca in\nomni est re fugienda talis sollertia.\n\n    [29] _cui_ B a, Edd.; _cui quod_ H b; _cui quid_ A c.\n\n\n#Change of duty in change of circumstances.#\n\n*31* X. But occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most\nbecoming to the just man and to the \"good man,\" as we call him, undergo\na change and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, not be a\nduty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise, and it may become right\nand proper sometimes to evade and not to observe what truth and honour\nwould usually demand. For we may well be guided by those fundamental\nprinciples of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no\nharm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved.\nWhen these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also\nundergoes a change, and it does not always remain the same. *32*\n#Non-fulfilment of promises.# For a given promise or agreement may turn\nout in such a way that its performance will prove detrimental either to\nthe one to whom the promise has been made or to the one who has made it.\nIf, for example, Neptune, in the drama, had not carried out his promise\nto Theseus, Theseus would not have lost his son Hippolytus; for, as the\nstory runs, of the three wishes[F] that Neptune had promised to grant\nhim the third was this: in a fit of anger he prayed for the death of\nHippolytus, and the granting of this prayer plunged him into unspeakable\ngrief. Promises are, therefore, not to be kept, if the keeping of them\nis to prove harmful to those to whom you have made them; and, if the\nfulfilment of a promise should do more harm to you than good to him to\nwhom you have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give the\ngreater good precedence over the lesser good. For example, if you have\nmade an appointment with anyone to appear as his advocate in court, and\nif in the meantime your son should fall dangerously ill, it would be no\nbreach of your moral duty to fail in what you agreed to do; nay, rather,\nhe to whom your promise was given would have a false conception of duty,\nif he should complain that he had been deserted in his time of need.\nFurther than this, who fails to see that those promises are not binding\nwhich are extorted by intimidation or which we make when misled by\nfalse pretences? Such obligations are annulled in most cases by the\npraetor's edict in equity,[G] in some cases by the laws.\n\n#Chicanery.#\n\n*33* Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an\nover-subtle and even fraudulent construction of the law. This it is that\ngave rise to the now familiar saw, \"More law, less justice.\" Through\nsuch interpretation also a great deal of wrong is committed in\ntransactions between state and state; thus, when a truce had been made\nwith the enemy for thirty days, a famous general[H] went to ravaging\ntheir fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated \"days,\"\nnot nights. Not even our own countryman's action is to be commended, if\nwhat is told of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true--or whoever it was (for I\nhave no authority but hearsay): appointed by the Senate to arbitrate a\nboundary dispute between Nola and Naples, he took up the case and\ninterviewed both parties separately, asking them not to proceed in a\ncovetous or grasping spirit, but to make some concession rather than\nclaim some accession. When each party had agreed to this, there was a\nconsiderable strip of territory left between them. And so he set the\nboundary of each city as each had severally agreed; and the tract in\nbetween he awarded to the Roman People. Now that is swindling, not\narbitration. And therefore such sharp practice is under all\ncircumstances to be avoided.\n\n    [F] The three wishes were: (1) safe return from Hades; (2)\n    escape from the Labyrinth; (3) the death of Hippolytus.\n\n    [G] Each praetor, at his inauguration, announced publicly the\n    principles and policies that should guide him in the\n    administration of his office. These were the source of the\n    _Ius Praetorium_, which explained and supplemented the common\n    law (_Ius Civile_) and even modified its ancient rigour so as\n    to conform with a more advanced public sentiment, and form a\n    most valuable part of the body of Roman Law.\n\n    [H] This story is told of Cleomenes, King of Sparta (520-491\n    B.C.), in the war with Argos. (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. 223\n    A.)\n\n\nXI. Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda, a quibus\niniuriam acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque haud\nscio an satis sit eum, qui lacessierit, iniuriae suae paenitere, ut et\nipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores.\n\n*34* Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum\nsint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim,\ncumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad\nposterius, si uti non licet superiore. *35* Quare suscipienda quidem\nbella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem\nvictoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt,\nut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in\ncivitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus\nsustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem\nloci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse\nadhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit\ninsidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset optemperatum,\nsi non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus.\n\nEt cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis\npositis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries\npercusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta\nest, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem\nrecepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.\n\n*36* Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure\nperscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi\nquod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.\n[Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius\ntiro militabat. Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem,\nCatonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum\namore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut,\nsi eum patitur[30] in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae\nsacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.\n*37* Adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.][31] M. quidem Catonis\nsenis est epistula ad M. filium, in qua scribit se audisse eum missum\nfactum esse a consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet\nigitur, ut caveat, ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles non\nsit, cum hoste pugnare.\n\n    [30] _patitur_ A B H a b; _patiatur_ c.\n\n    [31] _Popilius ... movendo_ bracketed by Madvig, Edd.;\n    _Popilius ... poterat_ bracketed by Unger.\n\n\n#Our duty to those who have wronged us.#\n\nXI. Again, there are certain duties that we owe even to those who have\nwronged us. For there is a limit to retribution and to punishment; or\nrather, I am inclined to think, it is sufficient that the aggressor\nshould be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in order that he may\nnot repeat the offence and that others may be deterred from doing wrong.\n\n*34* Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the\nrights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of\nsettling a dispute: first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and\nsince the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we\nmust resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of\ndiscussion. *35* #Excuse for war.# The only excuse, therefore, for going\nto war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is\nwon, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous\nin their warfare. #Justice toward the vanquished.# For instance, our\nforefathers actually admitted to full rights of citizenship the\nTusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed\nCarthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed\nCorinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they\ndid--its convenient situation, probably--and feared that its very\nlocation might some day furnish a temptation to renew the war. In my\nopinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall\nnot admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we\nshould still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if\nnot the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all.\n\nNot only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by\nforce of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down\ntheir arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even\nthough the battering-ram has hammered at their walls. And among our\ncountrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this\ndirection, that those who have given promise of protection to states or\nnations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the\npatrons of those states.\n\n#The humanity of Rome's laws of war.#\n\n*36* As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code\nof the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this\nit may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after\nan official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has\nbeen given and a formal declaration made. Popilius was general in\ncommand of a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on his first\ncampaign. When Popilius decided to disband one of his legions, he\ndischarged also young Cato who was serving in that same legion. But when\nthe young man out of love for the service stayed on in the field, his\nfather wrote to Popilius to say that if he let him stay in the army, he\nshould swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance, for in view\nof the voidance of his former oath he could not legally fight the foe.\nSo extremely scrupulous was the observance of the laws in regard to the\nconduct of war. *37* There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus\nCato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the\nyouth has been discharged by the consul,[I] when he was serving in\nMacedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be\ncareful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally\na soldier has no right to be fighting the foe.\n\n    [I] Lucius Aemilius Paulus (B.C. 168).\n\n\nXII. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui proprio nomine\nperduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam\nmitigatam. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc\nperegrinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: AUT STATUS DIES CUM\nHOSTE, itemque: ADVERSUS HOSTEM AETERNA AUCTORITAS. Quid ad hanc\nmansuetudinem addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli nomine\nappellare? Quamquam id nomen durius effecit[32] iam vetustas; a\nperegrino enim recessit et proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret,\nremansit.\n\n*38* Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur gloria, causas\nomnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas\nesse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, minus\nacerbe gerenda sunt. Ut enim cum civi aliter contendimus, si[33] est\ninimicus, aliter, si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et\ndignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae), sic cum Celtiberis, cum\nCimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter\nimperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio\ndimicabatur. Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.\nPyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara:\n\n#Ennius, Ann. VI, Vahlen^2, xii, 194-201#\n\n    Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis,\n    Nec[34] cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes\n    Ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique.\n    Vosne velit an me regnare era, quidve ferat Fors,\n    Virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum:\n    Quorum virtuti[35] belli fortuna pepercit,\n    Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est.\n    Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis.\n\nRegalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia.\n\n    [32] _effecit_ Edd.; _efficit_ MSS.\n\n    [33] _cum cive_ [Edd.: _civi_] _aliter contendimus si_ L,\n    Anemoecius, Edd.; _cum civiliter contendimus aliter si_ A B H\n    a b c.\n\n    [34] _Nec_ A B H b c; _Non_ L p, Bt., Heine.\n\n    [35] _virtuti_ A B^2 L c, Edd.; _virtute_ B^1 H b; _virtutei_\n    Vahlen.\n\n\nXII. This also I observe--that he who would properly have been called \"a\nfighting enemy\" (_perduellis_) was called \"a guest\" (_hostis_), thus\nrelieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for \"enemy\"\n(_hostis_) meant to our ancestors what we now call \"stranger\"\n(_peregrinus_). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: \"Or a\nday fixed for trial with a stranger\" (_hostis_). And again: \"Right of\nownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger\"\n(_hostis_). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at\nwar is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given\nthat word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of\n\"stranger\" and has taken on the technical connotation of \"an enemy under\narms.\"\n\n#Justice in war.#\n\n*38* But when a war is fought out for supremacy and when glory is the\nobject of war, it must still not fail to start from the same motives\nwhich I said a moment ago were the only righteous grounds for going to\nwar. But those wars which have glory for their end must be carried on\nwith less bitterness. For we contend, for example, with a fellow-citizen\nin one way, if he is a personal enemy, in another, if he is a rival:\nwith the rival it is a struggle for office and position, with the enemy\nfor life and honour. So with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we\nfought as with deadly enemies, not to determine which should be supreme,\nbut which should survive; but with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites,\nCarthaginians, and Pyrrhus we fought for supremacy. The Carthaginians\nviolated treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the others were more merciful.\nFrom Pyrrhus we have this famous speech on the exchange of prisoners:\n\n    \"Gold will I none, nor price shall ye give; for I ask none;\n    Come, let us not be chaff'rers of war, but warriors embattled.\n    Nay; let us venture our lives, and the sword, not gold, weigh the\n      outcome.\n    Make we the trial by valour in arms and see if Dame Fortune\n    Wills it that ye shall prevail or I, or what be her judgment.\n    Hear thou, too, this word, good Fabricius: whose valour soever\n    Spared hath been by the fortune of war--their freedom I grant them.\n    Such my resolve. I give and present them to you, my brave Romans;\n    Take them back to their homes; the great gods' blessings attend\n      you.\"\n\nA right kingly sentiment this and worthy a scion of the Aeacidae.\n\n\n*39* XIII. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti\npromiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda, ut primo Punico bello\nRegulus captus a Poenis cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset\niurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu\nnon censuit, deinde, cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad\nsupplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere.\n\n*40* [Secundo autem Punico bello post Cannensem pugnam quos decem\nHannibal Romam astrictos misit iure iurando se redituros esse, nisi de\nredimendis iis, qui capti erant, impetrassent, eos omnes censores, quoad\nquisque eorum vixit, qui peierassent, in aerariis reliquerunt nec minus\nillum, qui iuris iurandi fraude culpam invenerat. Cum enim Hannibalis\npermissu exisset de castris, rediit paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio\nquid diceret; deinde egressus e castris iure iurando se solutum putabat,\net erat verbis, re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non\nquid dixeris, cogitandum.\n\nMaximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris\nconstitutum, cum a Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi\ndaturum et eum necaturum, senatus et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho\ndedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro inferentis\ninteritum cum scelere approbavit.][36]\n\n*41* Ac de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est.\n\nMeminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. Est\nautem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt\nqui ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.\n\nCum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus\nquasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed\nfraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam\neorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse\nvideantur.\n\nDe iustitia satis dictum.\n\n    [36] _Secundo ... re non erat_ om. L c; _Secundo ...\n    approbavit_ om. A B H a b p, Edd.\n\n\n#Fidelity to a promise:#\n\n*39* XIII. Again, if under stress of circumstances individuals have made\nany promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then.\n#(1) Regulus.# For instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was\ntaken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent to Rome on parole to\nnegotiate an exchange of prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it\nwas he that made the motion in the senate that the prisoners should not\nbe restored; and in the second place, when his relatives and friends\nwould have kept him back, he chose to return to a death by torture\nrather than prove false to his promise, though given to an enemy.\n\n#(2) Hannibal's envoys.#\n\n*40* And again in the Second Punic War, after the Battle of Cannae,\nHannibal sent to Rome ten Roman captives bound by an oath to return to\nhim, if they did not succeed in ransoming his prisoners; and as long as\nany one of them lived, the censors kept them all degraded and\ndisfranchised, because they were guilty of perjury in not returning.\nAnd they punished in like manner the one who had incurred guilt by an\nevasion of his oath: with Hannibal's permission this man left the camp\nand returned a little later on the pretext that he had forgotten\nsomething or other; and then, when he left the camp the second time, he\nclaimed that he was released from the obligation of his oath; and so he\nwas, according to the letter of it, but not according to the spirit. In\nthe matter of a promise one must always consider the meaning and not the\nmere words.\n\nOur forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward\nan enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate to administer\npoison to the king and thus work his death, the senate and Gaius\nFabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with\ntheir disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at\nonce powerful, unprovoked, aggressive, and successful.\n\n*41* With this I will close my discussion of the duties connected with\nwar.\n\n#Justice toward slaves.#\n\nBut let us remember that we must have regard for justice even towards\nthe humblest. Now the humblest station and the poorest fortune are those\nof slaves; and they give us no bad rule who bid us treat our slaves as\nwe should our employees: they must be required to work; they must be\ngiven their dues.\n\n#Injustice of hypocrisy.#\n\nWhile wrong may be done, then, in either of two ways, that is, by force\nor by fraud, both are bestial: fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox,\nforce to the lion; both are wholly unworthy of man, but fraud is the\nmore contemptible. But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant\nthan that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most\nfalse, makes it his business to appear virtuous.\n\nThis must conclude our discussion of justice.\n\n\n#Ch. VII#\n\n*42* XIV. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ac de\nliberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis\naccommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne\nobsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et\nceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates, tum ut pro\ndignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam\nhaec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit\nilli, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed\nperniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios\nliberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena\nconvertant.\n\n*43* Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui\neripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in\nsuos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem\ntantum abest ab[37] officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse\ncontrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit\namicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum\ntranslatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil\nest enim liberale, quod non idem iustum.\n\n*44* Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam\nfacultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum\nin eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his[38]\net suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos.\nInest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et\nauferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam\nlicet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut\nbenefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis\nquam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est\nconiunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.\n\n*45* Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset\ndignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi in quem beneficium\nconferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad\nnostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia,\noptabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.\n\n    [37] _ab_ c, Edd.; not in A B H L b.\n\n    [38] _his_ H a, Edd.; _iis_ A B b; _eis_ L c.\n\n\n#Justice and generosity.#\n\n*42* XIV. Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and\ngenerosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this,\nbut it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars: we must,\nin the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove\nan injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the\nsecond place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that\nit shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient; for this is\nthe corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of\nkindness must be measured. For those who confer a harmful favour upon\nsome one whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not\ngenerous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise those who\ninjure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the\nsame injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of\ntheir neighbours.\n\n#Generosity must be#\n\n#(1) hurtful to no one,#\n\n*43* Now, there are many--and especially those who are ambitious for\neminence and glory--who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be\nthought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of\ngetting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so\nremote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to\nduty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality\nas will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by\nLucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of\nstrangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for\nnothing is generous, if it is not at the same time just.\n\n#(2) within our means,#\n\n*44* The second point for the exercise of caution was that our\nbeneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more\nopen-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults:\nfirst, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to\nstrangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or\nbequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a\npassion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply\nthe means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many\npeople do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of\nostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really\ngenerous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show\nof being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to\ngenerosity or moral goodness.\n\n#(3) according to merit.#\n\n*45* The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should\nweigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our\nbenevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his\nattitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations to us, and our common\nsocial ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our\ninterest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be\ncombined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and\nthe more important considerations must have the greater weight.\n\n\n*46* XV. Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque\nsapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra\nvirtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum,\nin quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, colendum autem esse ita\nquemque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit\nornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua multa iam dicta sunt,\niustitia. Nam fortis animus et magnus in homine non perfecto nec\nsapiente[39] ferventior plerumque est, illae virtutes bonum virum\nvidentur potius attingere.\n\nAtque haec in moribus.\n\n*47* De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud\nest in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligamur,[40]\nsed benivolentiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed\nstabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, ut non\nineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est;\nnullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est.\n\n#Op. 349-351#\n\n*48* Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, si modo possis,\niubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? an\nimitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim\nsi in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia\nconferre, quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo\ngenera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi, demus\nnecne, in nostra potestate est, non reddere viro bono non licet,\nmodo[41] id facere possit sine iniuria.\n\n*49* Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium,\nquin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo\nquisque animo, studio, benivolentia facerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim\nfaciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel\nrepentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque\nmagna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque\ndelata sunt.\n\nSed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria\nsunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei\npotissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum\nsperant,[42] etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt.\n\n    [39] _sapiente_ MSS.; _sapienti_ Wesenberg, Bt.\n\n    [40] _diligamur_ A B^2 H L b c; _diligimur_ B^1, Bt^1.\n\n    [41] _modo_ A H L b c; _si modo_ B.\n\n    [42] _sperant_ Marg. A, Edd.; _spectant_ A b (_spernant_\n    Marg. b).\n\n\n*46* XV. Now, the men we live with are not perfect and ideally wise,\nbut men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of\nvirtue. I therefore think that this is to be taken for granted, that no\none should be entirely neglected who shows any trace of virtue; but\nthe more a man is endowed with these finer virtues--temperance,\nself-control, and that very justice about which so much has already been\nsaid--the more he deserves to be favoured. I do not mention fortitude,\nfor a courageous spirit in a man who has not attained perfection and\nideal wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other virtues that\nseem more particularly to mark the good man.\n\nSo much in regard to the character of the object of our beneficence.\n\n#Motives to generosity:#\n\n#(1) love,#\n\n*47* But as to the affection which anyone may have for us, it is the\nfirst demand of duty that we do most for him who loves us most; but we\nshould measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour of its\npassion, but rather by its strength and constancy. #(2) requital,# But\nif there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not\nto begin with us, but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems,\nis called for; for no duty is more imperative than that of proving one's\ngratitude.\n\n*48* But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible,\nwhat one has borrowed in time of need, what, pray, ought we to do when\nchallenged by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate the fruitful\nfields, which return more than they receive? For if we do not hesitate\nto confer favours upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how\nought we to deal with those who have already helped us? For generosity\nis of two kinds: doing a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do the\nkindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable\nto a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the\nrights of others.\n\n*49* Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours\nreceived; for, as a matter of course, the greater the favour, the\ngreater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give\ndue weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection, that prompted the\nfavour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody\nwithout discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a\nsudden impulse of the heart, shifting as the wind. Such acts of\ngenerosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed\nwith judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.\n\nBut in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first\nrule of duty requires us--other things being equal--to lend assistance\npreferably to people in proportion to their individual need. #(3)\nself-interest,# Most people adopt the contrary course: they put\nthemselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to\nreceive the greatest favours, even though he has no need of their help.\n\n\n*50* XVI. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut\nquisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum\nconferetur.\n\nSed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae,\nrepetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi\ngeneris humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae\ndocendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter\nse homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re longius\nabsumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus,\nut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus;\nsunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.\n\n*51* Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter\nomnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum\nusum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta[43] sunt\nlegibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus\nipsis,[44] cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est,\namicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium[45] autem communia hominum videntur\nea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri\nin permultas potest:\n\n#(Telephus?) Vahlen^2, Fab. Inc. 398#\n\n    Hom\u00f3, qui erranti c\u00f3miter monstr\u00e1t viam,\n    Quasi l\u00famen de suo l\u00famine accend\u00e1t, facit.\n    Nihil\u00f3 minus ipsi l\u00facet,[46] cum illi acc\u00e9nderit.\n\nUna ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari\npossit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; *52* ex quo sunt illa communia: non\nprohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit,\nconsilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt,\ndanti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad\ncommunem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum\nsunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris\nliberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: \"Nihilo minus ipsi\nlucet,\" ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.\n\n    [43] _discripta_ H b, Edd.; _descripta_ A B L a c.\n\n    [44] _legibus ipsis_ Gulielmus, Edd.; _e_ (_ex_ c) _quibus\n    ipsis_ MSS.\n\n    [45] _Omnium_ Zumpt, Edd.; _omnia_ MSS.\n\n    [46] _ipsi lucet_ Edd.; _ipsi luceat_ A B H b c; _ipsi ut\n    luceat_ a.\n\n\n#(4) relationship.#\n\n*50* XVI. The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will\nbe best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion\nto the closeness of his relationship.\n\n#The principles of human society.#\n\nBut it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles\nof fellowship and society that nature has established among men. The\nfirst principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting\nbetween all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection\nis reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning,\nof communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and\nunite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are\nwe farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may\nhave courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that\nthey have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with\nreason or speech.\n\n*51* This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men\nas men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that\nnature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with\nthe understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by\nthe statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those\nsame laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by\nthe Greek proverb: \"Amongst friends all things in common.\"[J]\nFurthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the\nsort defined by Ennius; and though restricted by him to one instance,\nthe principle may be applied very generally:\n\n    \"Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way\n    Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his:\n    No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit.\"\n\nIn this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a\nstranger what it costs us nothing to give. *52* On this principle we\nhave the following maxims:\n\n\"Deny no one the water that flows by;\" \"Let anyone who will take fire\nfrom our fire;\" \"Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;\"\n\nfor such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss.\nWe should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing\nsomething to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are\nlimited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of\nuniversal liberality must be regulated according to that test of\nEnnius--\"No less shines his\"--in order that we may continue to have the\nmeans for being generous to our friends.\n\n    [J] \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 (\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd) \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd (Plato, Phaedr. 279 C; Aristotle,\n    Eth. VIII, 11).\n\n\n*53* XVII. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa\ninfinita discedatur, propior[47] est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae,\nqua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse\ncivitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana,\nporticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea\net familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae.\n\nArtior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa\nsocietate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. *54* Nam\ncum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi,\nprima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una\ndomus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium\nrei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum\nsobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos\ntamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus\netiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum\npublicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines\n_et_[48] caritate; *55* magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum,\neisdem uti sacris, sepulcra habere communia.\n\nSed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum\nviri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti; illud enim\nhonestum, quod saepe dicimus, etiam si in alio cernimus, [tamen][49] nos\nmovet atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. *56* Et\nquamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in\nquibus ipsa inesse videatur, tamen iustitia et liberalitas id maxime\nefficit. Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius quam morum similitudo\nbonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit\nut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod\nPythagoras vult in amicitia, ut[50] unus fiat ex pluribus.\n\nMagna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et\ncitro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea\nsunt, firma devinciuntur societate.\n\n*57* Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla\nest gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique\nnostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed\nomnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus\ndubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior\nistorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus\ndelenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt.\n\n*58* Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum\ntribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum\nbeneficiis maximis obligati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus, quae\nspectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps\nbene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque\nest.\n\nQuam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante\ndixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes,\nconsolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime,\nestque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit.\n\n    [47] _propior_ A a c (ex corr.), Edd.; _proprior_ B H b.\n\n    [48] _et_ Perizonius, Edd.; not in MSS.\n\n    [49] _tamen_ MSS., M\u00fcller; del. Unger, Bt., Heine.\n\n    [50] _efficiturque id quod P. ultimum in amicitia putavit ut_\n    Nonius (s.v. ultimum) (i.e. Pythagoras's ideal of friendship\n    is realized).\n\n\n#Degrees of social relationship:#\n\n#(1) citizenship,#\n\n*53* XVII. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or\nremoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our\ncommon humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same\npeople, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together;\nit is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for\nfellow-citizens have much in common--forum, temples, colonnades,\nstreets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of\nsocial and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many.\n\n#(2) kinship,#\n\nBut a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with\nthat infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception\nis now confined to a small and narrow circle. *54* For since the\nreproductive instinct is by nature's gift the common possession of all\nliving creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and\nwife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one\nhome, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil\ngovernment, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds\nbetween brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second\ncousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they\ngo out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these,\nin turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a\nnew stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth\nstates have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast\nthrough good-will and affection; *55* for it means much to share in\ncommon the same family traditions, the same forms of domestic worship,\nand the same ancestral tombs.\n\n#(3) friendship,#\n\nBut of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none more noble, none more\npowerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in\nintimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral\ngoodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends\nto the one in whose character it seems to dwell. *56* And while every\nvirtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still\njustice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more\nconducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good\nmen; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is\na natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the\nresult is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are\nunited in one.\n\nAnother strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of\nkind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and\nacceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the\nties of an enduring intimacy.\n\n#(4) love of country.#\n\n*57* But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field,\nthere is no social relation among them all more close, none more dear\nthan that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are\ndear; dear are children, relatives, friends; but one native land\nembraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his\nlife for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the\nmore execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to\npieces with every form of outrage and who are[K] and have been[L]\nengaged in compassing her utter destruction.\n\n*58* Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where\nmost of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and\nparents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation;\nnext come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for\nsupport and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with\nwhom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is\none.\n\nAll needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those\nwhom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living,\ncounsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even\nreproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest\nwhich is cemented by congeniality of character.\n\n    [K] Antony and his associates.\n\n    [L] Caesar, Clodius, Catiline.\n\n\n*59* XVIII. Sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis videndum erit, quid\ncuique maxime necesse sit, et quid quisque vel sine nobis aut possit\nconsequi aut non possit. Ita non iidem erunt necessitudinum gradus, qui\ntemporum; suntque officia, quae aliis magis quam aliis debeantur; ut\nvicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut\nfamiliarem, at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam\nvicinum defenderis. Haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni\nofficio [et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda],[51] ut boni\nratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque[52]\nvidere, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, quantum cuique debeatur,\nintellegas.\n\n*60* Sed ut nec medici nec imperatores nec oratores, quamvis artis\npraecepta perceperint, quicquam magna laude dignum sine usu et\nexercitatione consequi possunt, sic officii conservandi praecepta\ntraduntur illa quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed rei magnitudo usum quoque\nexercitationemque desiderat.\n\nAtque ab iis[53] rebus, quae sunt in iure societatis humanae, quem ad\nmodum ducatur honestum, ex quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus.\n\n*61* Intelligendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor, e\nquibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri, quod animo\nmagno elatoque humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in probris\nmaxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest:\n\n#Inc. inc. fab., Ribbeck^2, 210#\n\n    \"V\u00f3s enim,[54] iuvenes, \u00e1nimum geritis m\u00faliebrem, \u00edlla\" virgo\n      \"viri\"[55]\n\net si quid eius modi:\n\n#Enn. Aj., Vahlen^2, 18#\n\n    Salm\u00e1cida, spolia s\u00edne sudore et s\u00e1nguine.\n\nContraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta\nsunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum\ncampus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, hinc\nnoster Cocles,[56] hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M.\nMarcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi\nmagnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod\nstatuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari.\n\n    [51] _et ... capienda_ om. Facciolati, Edd.\n\n    [52] _deducendoque_ p; _ducendoque_ A B H L a b (superscr.\n    sec. m. _demendo_); _demendoque_ c.\n\n    [53] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.\n\n    [54] _enim_ A B H b c; _etenim_ a.\n\n    [55] _illa\" virgo \"viri\"_ Ed.; _illa virgo viri_ MSS.;\n    _virago_ Orelli.\n\n    [56] _Leuctris, hinc noster Cocles_ Baldwin, Edd.; _leutris\n    stercocles_ A B H a b; _leutrister chodes_ c; _leutris\n    stercodes_ L.\n\n\n#Duties may vary under varying circumstances.#\n\n*59* XVIII. But in the performance of all these duties we shall have to\nconsider what is most needful in each individual case and what each\nindividual person can or cannot procure without our help. In this way we\nshall find that the claims of social relationship, in its various\ndegrees, are not identical with the dictates of circumstances; for there\nare obligations that are due to one individual rather than to another:\nfor example, one would sooner assist a neighbour in gathering his\nharvest than either a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in\ncourt, one would defend a kinsman and a friend rather than a neighbour.\nSuch questions as these must, therefore, be taken into consideration in\nevery act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit and keep it up],\nin order to become good calculators of duty, able by adding and\nsubtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is\ndue to each individual.\n\n*60* But as neither physicians nor generals nor orators can achieve any\nsignal success without experience and practice, no matter how well they\nmay understand the theory of their profession, so the rules for the\ndischarge of duty are formulated, it is true, as I am doing now, but a\nmatter of such importance requires experience also and practice.\n\nThis must close our discussion of the ways in which moral goodness, on\nwhich duty depends, is developed from those principles which hold good\nin human society.\n\n#C. Fortitude.#\n\n*61* We must realize, however, that while we have set down four cardinal\nvirtues from which as sources moral rectitude and moral duty emanate,\nthat achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the world which is won\nwith a spirit great, exalted, and superior to the vicissitudes of\nearthly life. And so, when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to\nrise to our lips is, if possible, something like this:\n\n    \"For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden[M] a man's;\"\n\nand this:\n\n    \"Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood.\"\n\nWhen, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or\nother praise in more eloquent strain the brave and noble work of some\ngreat soul. Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of\nMarathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own\nCocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and\ncountless others, and, above all, the Roman People as a nation are\ncelebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory,\nmoreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in\nsoldier's garb.\n\n    [M] Cloelia (see Index).\n\n\n*62* XIX. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus,\nsi iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis\ncommodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est\npotius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur\na Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro\naequitate. Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est\ninsidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim[57] honestum esse\npotest, quod iustitia vacat.\n\n#Menex. 246 E; Laches 197 B#\n\n*63* Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: \"Non,\" inquit, \"solum scientia,\nquae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est\nappellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate,\nnon utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam\nfortitudinis.\" Itaque viros fortes et[58] magnanimos eosdem bonos et\nsimplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt\nex media laude iustitiae.\n\n*64* Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi\nfacillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. #Laches\n182 E# Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum\ninflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque animi magnitudine\nmaxime excellet,[59] ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus\nesse. Difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare\naequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. Ex quo fit, ut neque\ndisceptatione vinci se nec ullo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur,\nexistuntque in re publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam\nmaximas consequantur et sint vi[60] potius superiores quam iustitia\npares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius; nullum enim est tempus,\nquod iustitia vacare debeat.\n\n*65* Fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui\npropulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum\nillud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria\niudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore\nimperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus.\nFacillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo\nest, gloriae cupiditate[61]; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix\ninvenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi\nmercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.\n\n    [57] _enim_ A C, Edd.; not in A B H L b, Bt^2.\n\n    [58] _et_ a, Edd.; not in A B H L b c p.\n\n    [59] _excellet_ A B H L b c; _excellit_ a, Bt.\n\n    [60] _vi_ a, Edd.; _ut_ A B H b; _utcumque_ L c.\n\n    [61] _altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate_ Pearce\n    (confirmed by several MSS.), Edd.; _alt. an. et gloriae\n    cupiditate_ A B H b p; _est alt. an. et gloria et cupiditate_\n    L c.\n\n\n#Fortitude in the light of justice.#\n\n*62* XIX. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and\ntoil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the\ncommon good, it is a vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but\nits nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The\nStoics, therefore, correctly define courage as \"that virtue which\nchampions the cause of right.\" Accordingly, no one has attained to true\nglory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning;\nfor nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.\n\n*63* This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: \"Not only must all\nknowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than\nwisdom,\" he says, \"but even the courage that is prompt to face danger,\nif it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes,\nshould have the name of effrontery rather than of courage.\" And so we\ndemand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same\ntime be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to\ndeception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice.\n\n*64* But the mischief is that from this exaltation and greatness of\nspirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power.\nFor just as Plato tells us that the whole national character of the\nSpartans was on fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the\nmore notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the more ambitious he\nis to be the foremost citizen, or, I should say rather, to be sole\nruler. But when one begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to\npreserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential to\njustice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be\nconstrained either by argument or by any public and lawful authority;\nbut they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public\nlife, seeking to obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force\nrather than equals through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the\ngreater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for\nbeing guilty of injustice.\n\n#True greatness of spirit.#\n\n*65* So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be\nconsidered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic\ngreatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which nature most\naspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in\nreality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who\ndepends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among\nthe great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is\ntempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be\nsure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has\npassed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for\nglory as a reward for his achievements.\n\n\n*66* XX. Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur,\nquarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum\nest[62] nihil hominem, nisi quod honestum decorumque sit, aut admirari\naut optare aut expetere oportere nullique neque homini neque\nperturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut, cum ita\nsis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas quidem et\nmaxime utiles, sed [ut] vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et\npericulorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent.\n\n*67* Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam\nutilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos\nviros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana\ncontemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id,\nquod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber\nsis. Nam et ea, quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva\nducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique\nducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in\nhominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae\ndiscedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque\nconstantiae. *68* Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur,\neum frangi cupiditate nec, qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci\na voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda[63] et pecuniae fugienda\ncupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare\ndivitias, nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si\nnon habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre.\n\nCavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra dixi; eripit enim\nlibertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec\nvero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut\ndeponenda non numquam.\n\n*69* Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et\nmetu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia[64] et iracundia, ut\ntranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum\netiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico,\ntranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque\nperfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et\nquidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre\npotuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari.\n*70* His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne\ncui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere, ut\nvelis.\n\n    [62] _persuasum est_ Madvig (ad de Fin. p. 448 ff.), Edd.;\n    _p. sit_ MSS.\n\n    [63] _vitanda_ Edd. (cum duobus codd. Guelpherbytanis);\n    _videnda_ MSS.\n\n    [64] _voluptate nimia_ Orelli, M\u00fcller; _voluptate animi_ A H\n    L a b c; _vol. animi et securitas_ (_et iracundia ut tr.\n    animi_ by a later hand on the margin) B; _voluptate_\n    [_animi_], Bt., Heine.\n\n\n#Characteristics of Fortitude:#\n\n*66* XX. The soul that is altogether courageous and great is marked\nabove all by two characteristics: one of these is indifference to\noutward circumstances; for such a person cherishes the conviction that\nnothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to be either admired\nor wished for or striven after, and that he ought not to be subject to\nany man or any passion or any accident of fortune. The second\ncharacteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in the way above\nmentioned, one should do deeds not only great and in the highest degree\nuseful, but extremely arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both\nto life and to many things that make life worth living.\n\n#(1) Moral courage.#\n\n*67* All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of\nthese two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the\nrational cause that makes men great, in the former. #Indifference to\noutward fortunes.# For it is the former that contains the element that\nmakes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this\nquality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral\nrectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For\nwe must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight\nwhat most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from\nfixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and\ngreat singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to\npass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so\nunflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state\nof the dignity of a philosopher. *68* Moreover, it would be inconsistent\nfor the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for\nthe man who has shown himself invincible to toil to be conquered by\npleasure. We must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also\nbeware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic of\nnarrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches; and there is\nnothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if\none does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality,\nif one does possess it.\n\nAs I said before, we must also beware of ambition for glory; for it robs\nus of liberty, and in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake\neverything. And one ought not to seek military authority; nay, rather it\nought sometimes to be declined,[N] sometimes to be resigned.[O]\n\n#(3) Freedom from passion.#\n\n*69* Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion,\nnot only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and\npleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and\nfreedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of\ncharacter. #The retired life.# But there have been many and still are\nmany who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have\nwithdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such\nhave been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers[P]\nand certain other[Q] earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the\nconduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived\nin the country and found their pleasure in the management of their\nprivate estates. *70* Such men have had the same aims as kings--to\nsuffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty,\nthat is, in its essence, to live just as they please.\n\n    [N] As Cicero did at the expiration of his consulship.\n\n    [O] As Sulla did in his dictatorship. The contrast to Caesar\n    is the more striking for Cicero's not mentioning it.\n\n    [P] e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras.\n\n    [Q] Such as Cicero's friend, Atticus, and Marcus Piso.\n\n\nXXI. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi,\notiosis, alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas\nhabeant, alteri, si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo neutrorum\nomnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilior et tutior et minus\naliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum\ngeneri et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem\npublicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt.\n\n*71* Quapropter et iis forsitan concedendum sit rem publicam non\ncapessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et iis,\nqui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a\nre publica recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis\nlaudemque concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere\nse dicant ea, quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non\nmodo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto; quorum iudicium in eo,\nquod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non\nprobare; sed videntur labores et molestias, tum offensionum et\nrepulsarum quasi quandam ignominiam timere et infamiam. Sunt enim, qui\nin rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime\ncontemnant, in dolore sint molliores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur\ninfamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter.\n\n*72* Sed iis, qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum gerendarum, abiecta\nomni cunctatione adipiscendi magistrates et gerenda res publica est; nec\nenim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest.\nCapessentibus autem rem publicam nihilo[65] minus quam philosophis, haud\nscio an magis etiam et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est[66]\nrerum humanarum, quam saepe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque\nsecuritas, siquidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque\nvicturi. *73* Quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in\neorum vita, quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus egent, et\nquia, si quid adversi eveniat, tam graviter cadere non possunt. Quocirca\nnon sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur maioraque studia\nefficiendi[67] rem publicam gerentibus quam quietis, quo magis iis et\nmagnitudo est animi adhibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus.\n\nAd rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat, ne id modo consideret, quam\nilla res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; in quo\nipso considerandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut\nnimis confidat propter cupiditatem. In omnibus autem negotiis, prius\nquam aggrediare, adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.\n\n    [65] _nihilo_ Wesenberg, Edd.; _nihil_ MSS.\n\n    [66] _est_ Manutius, Edd.; _sit_ MSS.\n\n    [67] _maioraque studia efficiendi_ Unger, M\u00fcller; _maioraque\n    efficiendi_ A^1 B H L b c; _maiorque cura efficiendi_ a, Bt.,\n    Heine; _maioraque efficienda_ A^2 p.\n\n\n#The life of public service _vs._ the life of retirement.#\n\nXXI. So, while this desire is common to men of political ambitions and\nmen of retirement, of whom I have just spoken, the one class think they\ncan attain their end if they secure large means; the other, if they are\ncontent with the little they have. And in this matter, neither way of\nthinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is\neasier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to\nothers, while the career of those who apply themselves to statecraft and\nto conducting great enterprises is more profitable to mankind and\ncontributes more to their own greatness and renown.\n\n*71* So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius who have devoted\nthemselves to learning must be excused for not taking part in public\naffairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some still more\nvalid reason have retired from the service of the state and left to\nothers the opportunity and the glory of its administration. But if those\nwho have no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and military offices,\nwhich most people admire, I think that this should be set down not to\ntheir credit but to their discredit; for in so far as they care little,\nas they say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult not to\nsympathize with their attitude; in reality, however, they seem to dread\nthe toil and trouble and also, perhaps, the discredit and humiliation of\npolitical failure and defeat. For there are people who in opposite\ncircumstances do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for\npleasure, but in pain they are too sensitive; they are indifferent to\nglory, but they are crushed by disgrace; and even in their inconsistency\nthey show no great consistency.\n\n#Public service a duty.#\n\n*72* But those whom Nature has endowed with the capacity for\nadministering public affairs should put aside all hesitation, enter the\nrace for public office, and take a hand in directing the government; for\nin no other way can a government be administered or greatness of spirit\nbe made manifest. Statesmen, too, no less than philosophers--perhaps\neven more so--should carry with them that greatness of spirit and\nindifference to outward circumstances to which I so often refer,\ntogether with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free\nfrom worries and lead a dignified and self-consistent life. *73* This is\neasier for the philosophers; as their life is less exposed to the\nassaults of fortune, their wants are fewer; and if any misfortune\novertakes them, their fall is not so disastrous. Not without reason,\ntherefore, are stronger emotions aroused in those who engage in public\nlife than in those who live in retirement, and greater is their ambition\nfor success; the more, therefore, do they need to enjoy greatness of\nspirit and freedom from annoying cares.\n\nIf anyone is entering public life, let him beware of thinking only of\nthe honour that it brings; but let him be sure also that he has the\nability to succeed. At the same time, let him take care not to lose\nheart too readily through discouragement nor yet to be over-confident\nthrough ambition. In a word, before undertaking any enterprise, careful\npreparation must be made.\n\n\n*74* XXII. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam\nurbanas, minuenda est haec opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt\npropter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque\nplerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et\ncupidi bellorum gerendorum; vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae res\nexstiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae.\n\n*75* Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit eius nomen quam\nSolonis illustrius citeturque Salamis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae\nanteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas, non\nminus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum est; illud enim semel\nprofuit, hoc semper proderit civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium,\nhoc maiorum instituta servantur; et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit,\nin quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at ille vere a[68] se adiutum\nThemistoclem; est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone\nerat constitutus.\n\n*76* Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis\nquamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis partum[69] putatur, tamen ne minima\nquidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi sunt; quin\netiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habuerunt exercitus et\nfortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum\nversaremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur; parvi\nenim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi; nec plus Africanus,\nsingularis et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia rei publicae\nprofuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. Gracchum\ninteremit; quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione\n(attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est), sed tamen id\nipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu.\n\n#Cic., de temp. suis, iii#\n\n*77* Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et\ninvidis audio:\n\n    \"Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi.\"\n\nUt enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubernantibus nonne togae arma\ncesserunt? neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec\nmaius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus\naudacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quae res igitur\ngesta umquam in bello tanta? *78* qui triumphus conferendus? licet enim\nmihi, M. fili, apud te gloriari, ad quem et hereditas huius gloriae et\nfactorum imitatio pertinet. Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis\nlaudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus hoc tribuit, ut diceret\nfrustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in rem\npublicam beneficio, ubi triumpharet, esset habiturus.\n\nSunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in\nquibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est.\n\n    [68] _a_ Edd.; not in MSS.; _se adiutum_ A B H b, Edd.;\n    _adiuvit_ L^1 c p; _se adiutum ab illo dixerit (?)\n    Themistocles_ L^2.\n\n    [69] _L. partum_ Lambinus, M\u00fcller; _partum L._, Bt.; om.\n    _partum_ A^1 B H L^1 a b; _L. dilatatum_ A^2; _dilatatum L._\n    L^2 c.\n\n\n#Victories of war _vs._ victories of peace.#\n\n*74* XXII. Most people think that the achievements of war are more\nimportant than those of peace; but this opinion needs to be corrected.\nFor many men have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for\nfame. This is notably the case with men of great spirit and natural\nability, and it is the more likely to happen, if they are adapted to a\nsoldier's life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the facts, we\nshall find that there have been many instances of achievement in peace\nmore important and no less renowned than in war.\n\n#Themistocles _vs._ Solon.#\n\n*75* However highly Themistocles, for example, may be extolled--and\ndeservedly--and however much more illustrious his name may be than\nSolon's, and however much Salamis may be cited as witness of his most\nglorious victory--a victory glorified above Solon's statesmanship in\ninstituting the Areopagus--yet Solon's achievement is not to be\naccounted less illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served\nthe state once and only once; while Solon's work will be of service for\never. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the\ninstitutions of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles\ncould not readily point to any instance in which he himself had rendered\nassistance to the Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert\nthat Themistocles had received assistance from it; for the war was\ndirected by the counsels of that senate which Solon had created.\n\n#Pausanias and Lysander _vs._ Lycurgus.#\n\n*76* The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Although it is\nthought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her\nsupremacy, yet these are not even remotely to be compared with the\nlegislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, it was due to these\nthat Pausanias and Lysander had armies so brave and so well disciplined.\nFor my own part, I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to\nGaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey,\nwhen I was engaged in public life. For arms are of little value in the\nfield unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, though\na great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater\nservice to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same\ntime by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official authority,\nby removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong\nwholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war\nalso since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that,\nexecuted as a political measure without the help of an army.\n\n#Cicero's great victory.#\n\n*77* The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I am\ntold, the malicious and envious are wont to rail:\n\n    \"Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises,[R] ye laurels.\"[S]\n\nNot to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I\nwas at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious\nperil, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels\nand my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the\nmost desperate traitors--dropped to the ground of their own accord! What\nachievement in war, then, was ever so great? *78* What triumph can be\ncompared with that? For I may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you\nbelong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating\nmy deeds. And it was to me, too, that Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with\nthe honours of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, when he\nsaid that his third triumph would have been gained in vain, if he were\nnot to have through my services to the state a place in which to\ncelebrate it.\n\nThere are, therefore, instances of civic courage that are not inferior\nto the courage of the soldier. Nay, the former calls for even greater\nenergy and greater devotion than the latter.\n\n    [R] The praises of Cicero for his overthrow of the conspiracy\n    of Catiline.\n\n    [S] The laurels of the triumphant general.\n\n\n*79* XXIII. Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo excelso magnificoque\nquaerimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen\ncorpus et ita afficiendum est, ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in\nexsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. Honestum autem id, quod\nexquirimus, totum est positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non\nminorem utilitatem afferunt, qui togati rei publicae praesunt, quam qui\nbellum gerunt. Itaque eorum consilio saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta\nbella sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis bellum tertium\nPunicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas. *80* Quare expetenda\nquidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed\ncavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus.\nBellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur.\n\nFortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec\ntumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et\nconsilio nec a ratione discedere.\n\n*81* Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere\ncogitatione futura et aliquanto[70] ante constituere, quid accidere\npossit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec\ncommittere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: \"Non putaram.\"\n\nHaec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque\nfidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere\nimmane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque\npostulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique\nanteponenda.\n\n    [70] _aliquanto_ Edd.; _aliquando_ MSS.\n\n\n#(2) Physical courage.#\n\n*79* XXIII. That moral goodness which we look for in a lofty,\nhigh-minded spirit is secured, of course, by moral, not by physical,\nstrength. And yet the body must be trained and so disciplined that it\ncan obey the dictates of judgment and reason in attending to business\nand in enduring toil. But that moral goodness which is our theme depends\nwholly upon the thought and attention given to it by the mind. And in\nthis way, the men who in a civil capacity direct the affairs of the\nnation render no less important service than they who conduct its wars:\nby their statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or terminated;\nsometimes also they are declared. Upon Marcus Cato's counsel, for\nexample, the Third Punic War was undertaken, and in its conduct his\ninfluence was dominant, even after he was dead. *80* And so diplomacy in\nthe friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage\nin settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take\nthat course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake\nof public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way\nas to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace.\n\nBut it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in\ntimes of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying\nis, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not\nto swerve from the path of reason.\n\n#Courage and discretion.#\n\n*81* Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also\nfor great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future,\nto discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for\nill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be\nreduced to having to say \"I had not thought of that.\"\n\nThese are the activities that mark a spirit, strong, high, and\nself-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray\nand to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish\nkind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we\nmust gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.\n\n\n#Ch. XXII#\n\n*82* XXIV. De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde\nconsiderandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. Idque est magni\nviri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni\nfortuna recta atque honesta retinere. Ut enim sunt, quem ad modum supra\ndixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperias multos, quibus\npericulosa et calida[71] consilia quietis et cogitatis[72] splendidiora\net maiora videantur.\n\n*83* Nunquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles\ntimidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos\npericulis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in\nadeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter\naegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas\ncurationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quare in tranquillo\ntempestatem adversam optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati\nquavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipiscare re explicata\nboni quam addubitata mali.\n\nPericulosae autem rerum actiones partim iis[73] sunt, qui eas\nsuscipiunt, partim rei publicae. Itemque alii de vita, alii de gloria et\nbenivolentia civium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus\nesse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore\net gloria quam de ceteris commodis.\n\n*84* Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam\nprofundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam\nquidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante; ut\nCallicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello\nmultaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non\nparuit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus\ndimicandum putabant; quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa\namissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque\nhaec quidem Lacedaemoniis[74] plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum\nCleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset\nLacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt.\n\n#Ann. xii, Vahlen^2, 370-372#\n\nQuanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius:\n\n    Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.\n    Noenum rumores ponebat[75] ante salutem.\n    Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.\n\nQuod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim, qui,\nquod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant[76]\ndicere.\n\n    [71] _calida_ Nonius, Edd.; _callida_ MSS.\n\n    [72] _consilia quietis et cogitatis_ Edd.; _consilia et\n    quietis et cogitationis_ A B H a b; _consilia et quietis\n    cogitationibus_ c p.\n\n    [73] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.\n\n    [74] _quidem Lacedaemoniis_ Edd., _quidem de Lacedaemoniis_\n    MSS.\n\n    [75] _Noenum rumores ponebat_ Lachmann (ad Lucr. III, 198);\n    _Non enim rumores ponebat_ MSS.; _Non ponebat enim_ alii.\n\n    [76] _audeant_ Ernesti; _audent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine.\n\n\n*82* XXIV. As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great\ncare should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or\nwantonness. And it is a great man's duty in troublous times to single\nout the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in every turn of\nfortune to hold to a true and honourable course. For whereas there are\nmany, as I have said before, who place the achievements of war above\nthose of peace, so one may find many to whom adventurous, hot-headed\ncounsels seem more brilliant and more impressive than calm and\nwell-considered measures.\n\n#Courage in times of doubt and danger.#\n\n*83* We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming cowardly and craven\nin our avoidance of danger; but we must also beware of exposing\nourselves to danger needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than that.\nAccordingly, in encountering danger we should do as doctors do in their\npractice: in light cases of illness they give mild treatment; in cases\nof dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply hazardous and even\ndesperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm,\nwould pray for a storm; a wise man's way is, when the storm does come,\nto withstand it with all the means at his command, and especially, when\nthe advantages to be expected in case of a successful issue are greater\nthan the hazards of the struggle.\n\n#Patriotism and self-sacrifice.#\n\nThe dangers attending great affairs of state fall sometimes upon those\nwho undertake them, sometimes upon the state. In carrying out such\nenterprises, some run the risk of losing their lives, others their\nreputation and the good-will of their fellow-citizens. It is our duty,\nthen, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and\nto hazard honour and glory more readily than other advantages.[T]\n\n*84* Many, on the other hand, have been found who were ready to pour\nout not only their money but their lives for their country and yet would\nnot consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory--even\nthough the interests of their country demanded it. For example, when\nCallicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many\nsignal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen\nto the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from\nthe Arginusae and not to risk an engagement with the Athenians. His\nanswer to them was that \"the Spartans could build another fleet, if they\nlost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself.\"\nAnd yet what he did dealt only a slight blow to Sparta; there was\nanother which proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism\nrecklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that,\nthe Spartan power fell.\n\nHow much better was the conduct of Quintus Maximus! Of him Ennius says:\n\n    \"One man--and he alone--restored our state by delaying.\n    Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety;\n    Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever\n      brighter.\"\n\nThis sort of offence[U] must be avoided no less in political life. For\nthere are men who for fear of giving offence do not dare to express\ntheir honest opinion, no matter how excellent.\n\n    [T] Such as the esteem and good-will of fellow-citizens;\n    life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the existence of\n    the state and all the advantages it brings.\n\n    [U] Sacrificing public interests to personal glory.\n\n\n*85* XXV. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis\npraecepta teneant, #Rep. i. 342 E# unum, ut utilitatem civium sic\ntueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum\nsuorum, #Rep. iv, 420 B# alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent,\nne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic\nprocuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad\neorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium\nconsulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt,\nseditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii\nstudiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum.\n\n*86* Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non\nsolum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et\nfortis civis et in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit\ntradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur\ntotamque eam sic tuebitur, ut omnibus consulat; nec vero criminibus\nfalsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque ita iustitiae\nhonestatique adhaerescet, ut, dum ea conservet, quamvis graviter\noffendat mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat illa, quae dixi.\n\n#Rep. vi, 488 B; 489 C#\n\n*87* Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare\napud eundem est Platonem, \"similiter facere eos, qui inter se\ncontenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae\ncertarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret.\" #Rep. viii, 567 C; Leg.\nix, 856 B# Idemque praecipit, ut \"eos adversarios existimemus, qui arma\ncontra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint,\"\nqualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio.\n\n*88* Nec vero audiendi, qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque\nmagnanimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil\nmagno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In\nliberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est\nfacilitas et altitudo animi, quae dicitur, ne, si irascamur aut\nintempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem\ninutilem et odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo\natque clementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua\nadministrari civitas non potest. Omnis autem et animadversio et\ncastigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, qui punitur[77]\naliquem aut verbis castigat,[78] sed ad rei publicae utilitatem referri.\n\n*89* Cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de\ncausis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. Prohibenda autem\nmaxime est ira in puniendo; numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam,\nmediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet\nPeripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent\nutiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est\noptandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae\nad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur.\n\n    [77] _punitur_ Nonius, Edd.; _punit_ a; _puniet_ A B H b c.\n\n    [78] _castigat_ MSS.; _fatigat_ Nonius, Orelli.\n\n\n#Public administration must be free from#\n\n*85* XXV. Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government\nshould not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the\ngood of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own\ninterests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to\ncare for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the\ninterests of some one party to betray the rest. #(1) partisanship,# For\nthe administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must\nbe conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of\nthose to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of\na part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the\ncivil service a dangerous element--dissension and party strife. The\nresult is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic,\nothers of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole.\n\n*86* As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose at Athens,[V]\nand in our own country not only dissensions[W] but also disastrous civil\nwars[X] broke out. All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and\nworthy of a leading place in the state will shun with abhorrence; he\nwill dedicate himself unreservedly to his country, without aiming at\ninfluence or power for himself; and he will devote himself to the state\nin its entirety in such a way as to further the interests of all.\nBesides, he will not expose anyone to hatred or disrepute by groundless\ncharges, but he will surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that\nhe will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than be untrue to\nthem, and will face death itself rather than renounce them.\n\n#(2) self-seeking,#\n\n*87* A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering and\nscrambling for office. Concerning this also we find a fine thought in\nPlato: \"Those who compete against one another,\" he says, \"to see which\nof two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors\nquarrelling as to which one of them shall do the steering.\" And he\nlikewise lays down the rule that we should regard only those as\nadversaries who take up arms against the state, not those who strive to\nhave the government administered according to their convictions. This\nwas the spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus\nMetellus: there was in it no trace of rancour.\n\n#(3) vindictiveness,#\n\n*88* Neither must we listen to those who think that one should indulge\nin violent anger against one's political enemies and imagine that such\nis the attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For nothing is more\ncommendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than\ncourtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy\nequal rights before the law, we must school ourselves to affability and\nwhat is called \"mental poise\"[Y]; for if we are irritated when people\nintrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make unreasonable requests, we\nshall develop a sour, churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and\noffensive to others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbearance are to\nbe commended only with the understanding that strictness may be\nexercised for the good of the state; for without that, the government\ncannot be well administered. On the other hand, if punishment or\ncorrection must be administered, it need not be insulting; it ought to\nhave regard to the welfare of the state, not to the personal\nsatisfaction of the man who administers the punishment or reproof.\n\n#(4) anger.#\n\n*89* We should take care also that the punishment shall not be out of\nproportion to the offence, and that some shall not be chastised for the\nsame fault for which others are not even called to account. In\nadministering punishment it is above all necessary to allow no trace of\nanger. For if anyone proceeds in a passion to inflict punishment, he\nwill never observe that happy mean which lies between excess and defect.\nThis doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics--and wisely\napproved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that\nit is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But in\nreality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated; and it is to\nbe desired that they who administer the government should be like the\nlaws, which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice.\n\n    [V] From the death of Pericles on.\n\n    [W] Such as the conspiracy of Catiline.\n\n    [X] The civil wars of Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey.\n\n    [Y] The quality elsewhere expressed by Cicero with\n    \u03b2\u03b1\u03b8\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2--'depth,' 'reserve,' the art of concealing and\n    controlling one's feelings under an outward serenity of\n    manner.\n\n\n*90* XXVI. Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram\nfluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam\nut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est,\npraeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus\neademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque[79] de C. Laelio accepimus.[80]\nPhilippum quidem, Macedonum regem, rebus gestis et gloria superatum a\nfilio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse; itaque alter\nsemper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus; ut recte praecipere videantur,\nqui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius.\nPanaetius quidem Africanum, auditorem et familiarem suum, solitum ait\ndicere, \"ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate\nexsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis[81] facilioribus possint\nuti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos sibique praefidentes tamquam\nin gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut perspicerent rerum\nhumanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque fortunae.\"\n\n*91* Atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio\namicorum iisque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas. Isdemque\ntemporibus cavendum est, ne assentatoribus patefaciamus auris neve[82]\nadulari nos sinamus, in quo falli facile est; tales enim nos esse\nputamus, ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum\nhomines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur et in maximis versantur\nerroribus.\n\nSed haec quidem hactenus.\n\n*92* Illud autem sic est iudicandum, maximas geri res et maximi animi ab\niis,[83] qui res publicas regant, quod earum administratio latissime\npateat ad plurimosque pertineat; esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos\netiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam\nseseque suarum rerum finibus continerent aut interiecti inter\nphilosophos et eos, qui rem publicam administrarent, delectarentur re\nsua familiari non eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes\nab eius usu suos potiusque et amicis impertientes et rei publicae, si\nquando usus esset. Quae primum bene parta[84] sit nullo neque turpi\nquaestu neque odioso, deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia,\nparsimonia,[85] tum quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat nec\nlibidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat.\n\nHaec praescripta servantem licet magnifice, graviter animoseque vivere\natque etiam simpliciter, fideliter,\u2020 vere hominum amice.\n\n    [79] _itemque_ H^2 a, Edd.; _idemque_ A B H^1 L b c.\n\n    [80] _accepimus_ B^2 a c, Edd.; _accipimus_ A B^1 H b.\n\n    [81] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.\n\n    [82] _neve_ Nonius, Edd.; _nec_ MSS.\n\n    [83] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.\n\n    [84] _parta_ B^1, Edd.; _parata_ A B^2 H L a b c.\n\n    [85] _deinde ... parsimonia_ Edd., after Unger, transpose; in\n    MSS. it follows _tum ... pareat_.\n\n\n#Fortitude in prosperity.#\n\n*90* XXVI. Again, when fortune smiles and the stream of life flows\naccording to our wishes, let us diligently avoid all arrogance,\nhaughtiness, and pride. For it is as much a sign of weakness to give way\nto one's feelings in success as it is in adversity. But it is a fine\nthing to keep an unruffled temper, an unchanging mien, and the same cast\nof countenance in every condition of life; this, history tells us, was\ncharacteristic of Socrates and no less of Gaius Laelius. Philip, king of\nMacedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and\nfame, was superior to him in affability and refinement. Philip,\naccordingly, was always great; Alexander, often infamously bad.\n#Humility.# There seems to be sound advice, therefore, in this word of\nwarning: \"The higher we are placed, the more humbly should we walk.\"\nPanaetius tells us that Africanus, his pupil and friend, used to say:\n\"As, when horses have become mettlesome and unmanageable on account of\ntheir frequent participation in battles, their owners put them in the\nhands of trainers to make them more tractable; so men, who through\nprosperity have become restive and over self-confident, ought to be put\ninto the training-ring, so to speak, of reason and learning, that they\nmay be brought to comprehend the frailty of human affairs and the\nfickleness of fortune.\"\n\n*91* The greater our prosperity, moreover, the more should we seek the\ncounsel of friends, and the greater the heed that should be given to\ntheir advice. Under such circumstances also we must beware of lending an\near to sycophants or allowing them to impose upon us with their\nflattery. For it is easy in this way to deceive ourselves, since we thus\ncome to think ourselves duly entitled to praise; and to this frame of\nmind a thousand delusions may be traced, when men are puffed up with\nconceit and expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule by committing the\nmost egregious blunders.\n\nSo much for this subject.\n\n#Greatness of mind in public and in private life.#\n\n*92* To revert to the original question[Z]--we must decide that the most\nimportant activities, those most indicative of a great spirit, are\nperformed by the men who direct the affairs of nations; for such public\nactivities have the widest scope and touch the lives of the most people.\nBut even in the life of retirement there are and there have been many\nhigh-souled men who have been engaged in important inquiries or embarked\non most important enterprises and yet kept themselves within the limits\nof their own affairs; or, taking a middle course between philosophers on\nthe one hand and statesmen on the other, they were content with managing\ntheir own property--not increasing it by any and every means nor\ndebarring their kindred from the enjoyment of it, but rather, if ever\nthere were need, sharing it with their friends and with the state. Only\nlet it, in the first place, be honestly acquired, by the use of no\ndishonest or fraudulent means; let it, in the second place, increase by\nwisdom, industry, and thrift; and, finally, let it be made available for\nthe use of as many as possible (if only they are worthy) and be at the\nservice of generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality and\nexcess.\n\nBy observing these rules, one may live in magnificence, dignity, and\nindependence, and yet in honour, truth and charity toward all.\n\n    [Z] \u00a7 70.\n\n\n*93* XXVII. Sequitur, ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit,\nin qua verecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et\nmodestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur.\nHoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine decorum potest; Graece enim\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd dicitur. Huius[86] vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari;\n*94* nam et, quod decet, honestum est et, quod honestum est, decet;\nqualis autem differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intellegi quam\nexplanari potest. Quicquid est enim, quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum\nantegressa est honestas. Itaque non solum in hac parte honestatis, de\nqua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus quid\ndeceat apparet. Nam et ratione uti atque oratione prudenter et agere,\nquod agas, considerate omnique in re quid sit veri videre et tueri\ndecet, contraque falli, errare, labi, decipi tam dedecet quam delirare\net mente esse captum; et iusta omnia decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut\nturpia, sic indecora.\n\nSimilis est ratio fortitudinis. Quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit,\nid dignum viro et decorum videtur, quod contra, id ut turpe, sic\nindecorum.\n\n*95* Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum,\net ita pertinet, ut non recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in\npromptu. Est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod\ndeceat; quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari. Ut\nvenustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valetudine, sic\nhoc, de quo loquimur, decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute\nconfusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.\n\n*96* Est autem eius discriptio[87] duplex; nam et generale quoddam\ndecorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic\nsubiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atque illud\nsuperius sic fere definiri solet: decorum id esse, quod consentaneum sit\nhominis excellentiae in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus\ndifferat. Quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, ut id\ndecorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo\nmoderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.\n\n    [86] _dicitur. Huius_ Edd.; _dicitur decorum. huius_ MSS.\n\n    [87] _discriptio_ b, Edd.; _descriptio_ A B H a; _distinctio_\n    L c.\n\n\n#D. Temperance.#\n\n*93* XXVII. We have next to discuss the one remaining division of moral\nrectitude. That is the one in which we find considerateness and\nself-control, which give, as it were, a sort of polish to life; it\nembraces also temperance, complete subjection of all the passions, and\nmoderation in all things. #Propriety.# Under this head is further\nincluded what, in Latin, may be called _decorum_[AA] (propriety); for in\nGreek it is called \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd.[AA] Such is its essential nature, that it is\ninseparable from moral goodness; *94* for what is proper is morally\nright, and what is morally right is proper. The nature of the difference\nbetween morality and propriety can be more easily felt than expressed.\nFor whatever propriety may be, it is manifested only when there is\npre-existing moral rectitude. And so, not only in this division of moral\nrectitude which we have now to discuss but also in the three preceding\ndivisions, it is clearly brought out what propriety is. #Propriety and\nthe Cardinal Virtues.# For to employ reason and speech rationally, to do\nwith careful consideration whatever one does, and in everything to\ndiscern the truth and to uphold it--that is proper. To be mistaken, on\nthe other hand, to miss the truth, to fall into error, to be led\nastray--that is as improper as to be deranged and lose one's mind. And\nall things just are proper; all things unjust, like all things immoral,\nare improper.\n\nThe relation of propriety to fortitude is similar. What is done in a\nmanly and courageous spirit seems becoming to a man and proper; what is\ndone in a contrary fashion is at once immoral and improper.\n\n*95* This propriety, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each\ndivision of moral rectitude; and its relation to the cardinal virtues is\nso close, that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require any\nabstruse process of reasoning to see it. For there is a certain element\nof propriety perceptible in every act of moral rectitude; and this can\nbe separated from virtue theoretically better than it can be\npractically. As comeliness and beauty of person are inseparable from the\nnotion of health, so this propriety of which we are speaking, while in\nfact completely blended with virtue, is mentally and theoretically\ndistinguishable from it.\n\n#Propriety defined.#\n\n*96* The classification of propriety, moreover, is twofold: (1) we\nassume a general sort of propriety, which is found in moral goodness as\na whole; then (2) there is another propriety, subordinate to this, which\nbelongs to the several divisions of moral goodness. The former is\nusually defined somewhat as follows: \"Propriety is that which harmonizes\nwith man's superiority in those respects in which his nature differs\nfrom that of the rest of the animal creation.\" And they so define the\nspecial type of propriety which is subordinate to the general notion,\nthat they represent it to be that propriety which harmonizes with\nnature, in the sense that it manifestly embraces temperance and\nself-control, together with a certain deportment such as becomes a\ngentleman.\n\n    [AA] _Decorum_ Cicero's attempt to translate \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, means an\n    appreciation of the fitness of things, propriety in inward\n    feeling or outward appearance, in speech, behaviour, dress,\n    etc. _Decorum_ is as difficult to translate into English as\n    \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd is to reproduce in Latin; as an adjective, it is here\n    rendered by 'proper,' as a noun, by 'propriety.'\n\n\n#Cic., Or. xxii, 71#\n\n*97* XXVIII. Haec ita intellegi possumus existimare ex eo decoro, quod\npo\u00ebtae sequuntur; de quo alio loco plura dici solent. Sed tum[88]\nservare illud po\u00ebtas, quod deceat, dicimus, cum id, quod quaque persona\ndignum est, et fit et dicitur; ut, si Aeacus aut Minos diceret:\n\n#Attius, Atreus, Ribbeck^2, 203#\n\n    \u00f3derint, dum m\u00e9tuant,\n\naut:\n\n#Ibid., 226#\n\n    nat\u00eds sepulchro ipse \u00e9st parens,\n\nindecorum videretur, quod eos fuisse iustos accepimus; at Atreo dicente\nplausus excitantur; est enim digna persona oratio. Sed po\u00ebtae, quid\nquemque deceat, ex persona iudicabunt; nobis autem personam imposuit\nipsa natura magna cum excellentia praestantiaque animantium\nreliquarum.[89]\n\n*98* Quocirca po\u00ebtae in magna varietate personarum, etiam vitiosis quid\nconveniat et quid deceat, videbunt, nobis autem cum a natura\nconstantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint,\ncumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem ad modum nos adversus\nhomines geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem\npertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod spectatur\nin uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta\ncompositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se\nomnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet\nin vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et\nconstantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.\n\n*99* Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi\ncuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non\nsolum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod\ndifferat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam.\nIustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in\nquo maxime vis perspicitur decori.\n\nHis igitur expositis, quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum\nputo.\n\n*100* Officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae\ndeducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae; quam si sequemur\nducem, numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax\nnatura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum, et id,\nquod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de\nqua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed\nmulto etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati\nsunt.\n\n*101* Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura;[90] una pars in\nappetitu posita est, quae est \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc\nrapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et[91] explanat, quid faciendum\nfugiendumque[92] sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet.\n\n    [88] _Sed tum_ L c, Edd.; _sed ut tum_ A B H b.\n\n    [89] _reliquarum_ A^1 B^1 H a b; _reliquorum_ A^2 B^2 c.\n\n    [90] _natura_ Edd.; _naturae_ MSS.\n\n    [91] _et_ L c, Edd.; not in A B H b.\n\n    [92] _fugiendumque_ A B H a b; _fugiendumve_ L c p.\n\n\n#Poetic propriety.#\n\n*97* XXVIII. That this is the common acceptation of propriety we may\ninfer from that propriety which poets aim to secure. Concerning that, I\nhave occasion to say more in another connection. Now, we say that the\npoets observe propriety, when every word or action is in accord with\neach individual character. For example, if Aeacus or Minos said:\n\n    \"Let them hate, if only they fear,\"\n\nor:\n\n    \"The father is himself his children's tomb,\"\n\nthat would seem improper, because we are told that they were just men.\nBut when Atreus speaks those lines, they call forth applause; for the\nsentiment is in keeping with the character. But it will rest with the\npoets to decide, according to the individual characters, what is proper\nfor each; but to us Nature herself has assigned a character of\nsurpassing excellence, far superior to that of all other living\ncreatures, and in accordance with that we shall have to decide what\npropriety requires.\n\n*98* The poets will observe, therefore, amid a great variety of\ncharacters, what is suitable and proper for all--even for the bad.\n#Moral propriety.# But to us Nature has assigned the r\u00f4les of\nsteadfastness, temperance, self-control, and considerateness of others;\nNature also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour towards our\nfellow-men. Hence we may clearly see how wide is the application not\nonly of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in general,\nbut also of the special propriety which is displayed in each particular\nsubdivision of virtue. For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry\nof the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very\nreason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this\npropriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of\nour fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes\nupon every word and deed.\n\n#Considerateness.#\n\n*99* We should, therefore, in our dealings with people show what I may\nalmost call reverence toward all men--not only toward the men who are\nthe best, but toward others as well. For indifference to public opinion\nimplies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle.\nThere is, too, a difference between justice and considerateness in one's\nrelations to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice not to do\nwrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their\nfeelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best seen.\n\nWith the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear what the nature is of\nwhat we term propriety.\n\n#Duties prescribed by propriety:#\n\n*100* Further, as to the duty which has its source in propriety, the\nfirst road on which it conducts us leads to harmony with Nature and the\nfaithful observance of her laws. #(1) Follow Nature,# If we follow\nNature as our guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be pursuing\nthat which is in its nature clear-sighted and penetrating (Wisdom), that\nwhich is adapted to promote and strengthen society (Justice), and that\nwhich is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But the very essence of\npropriety is found in the division of virtue which is now under\ndiscussion (Temperance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's\nlaws that we should give our approval to the movements not only of the\nbody, but still more of the spirit.\n\n#(2) subject appetite to reason.#\n\n*101* Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold:\none force is appetite (that is, \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae, in Greek), which impels a man this\nway and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what\nshould be done and what should be left undone. The result is that reason\ncommands, appetite obeys.\n\n\nXXIX. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec vero\nagere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est\nenim fere discriptio[93] officii.\n\n*102* Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi oboediant eamque neque\npraecurrant nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant sintque\ntranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo elucebit omnis\nconstantia omnisque moderatio. Nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et\ntamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione\nretinentur, ii[94] sine dubio finem et modum transeunt; relinquunt enim\net abiciunt oboedientiam nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege\nnaturae; a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam corpora. Licet\nora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu\ncommoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium voltus, voces,\nmotus statusque mutantur.\n\n*103* Ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam revertamur,\nappetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse excitandamque\nanimadversionem et diligentiam, ut ne quid temere ac fortuito,\ninconsiderate neglegenterque agamus. Neque enim ita generati a natura\nsumus, ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, ad severitatem potius\net ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora. Ludo autem et ioco uti illo\nquidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus ceteris tum, cum gravibus\nseriisque rebus satis fecerimus. Ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum nec\nimmodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet. Ut enim pueris non omnem\nludendi licentiam damus, sed eam, quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit\naliena, sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat. *104*\nDuplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum,\nobscenum, alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum. Quo genere non\nmodo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam\nphilosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete\ndicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae vocant \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03b8\u03ad\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\nFacilis igitur est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci. Alter est, si\ntempore fit, ut si remisso animo, _gravissimo_ homine dignus,[95] alter\nne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudini adhibetur verborum[96]\nobscenitas.\n\nLudendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis omnia profundamus\nelatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. Suppeditant autem\net campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi.\n\n    [93] _discriptio_ B H, Bt.^1; _descriptio_ A L a b c, Bt.^2,\n    M\u00fcller, Heine.\n\n    [94] _ii_ Edd.; _hi_ a; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.\n\n    [95] _fit, ut si remisso animo, gravissimo homine dignus_\n    Ed.; _fit, ut_ (_et_ c) _remisso animo homine dignus_ MSS.;\n    _fit aut si rem. an. magno homine_ Madvig; _fit, ut sit\n    remissio animo, homine dignus_ Unger.\n\n    [96] _turpitudini adhibetur verborum_ A B H a b, Edd.;\n    _turpitudo adhibetur et verborum_ L c.\n\n\nXXIX. Again, every action ought to be free from undue haste or\ncarelessness; neither ought we to do anything for which we cannot assign\na reasonable motive; for in these words we have practically a definition\nof duty.\n\n*102* The appetites, moreover, must be made to obey the reins of reason\nand neither allowed to run ahead of it nor from listlessness or\nindolence to lag behind; but people should enjoy calm of soul and be\nfree from every sort of passion. #Self-control in# #(1) passions,# As a\nresult strength of character and self-control will shine forth in all\ntheir lustre. For when appetites overstep their bounds and galloping\naway, so to speak, whether in desire or aversion, are not well held in\nhand by reason, they clearly overleap all bound and measure; for they\nthrow obedience off and leave it behind and refuse to obey the reins of\nreason, to which they are subject by Nature's laws. And not only minds\nbut bodies as well are disordered by such appetites. We need only to\nlook at the faces of men in a rage or under the influence of some\npassion or fear or beside themselves with extravagant joy: in every\ninstance their features, voices, motions, attitudes undergo a change.\n\n*103* From all this--to return to our sketch of duty--we see that all\nthe appetites must be controlled and calmed and that we must take\ninfinite pains not to do anything from mere impulse or at random,\nwithout due consideration and care. #(2) amusements,# For Nature has not\nbrought us into the world to act as if we were created for play or jest,\nbut rather for earnestness and for some more serious and important\npursuits. We may, of course, indulge in sport and jest, but in the same\nway as we enjoy sleep or other relaxations, and only when we have\nsatisfied the claims of our earnest, serious tasks. #(3) raillery,#\nFurther than that, the manner of jesting itself ought not to be\nextravagant or immoderate, but refined and witty. For as we do not grant\nour children unlimited licence to play, but only such freedom as is not\nincompatible with good conduct, so even in our jesting let the light of\na pure character shine forth. *104* There are, generally speaking, two\nsorts of jest: the one, coarse, rude, vicious, indecent; the other,\nrefined, polite, clever, witty. With this latter sort not only our own\nPlautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also the books of Socratic\nphilosophy abound; and we have many witty sayings of many men--like\nthose collected by old Cato under the title of _Bons Mots_ (or\nApophthegms). So the distinction between the elegant and the vulgar jest\nis an easy matter: the one kind, if well timed (for instance, in hours\nof mental relaxation), is becoming to the most dignified person; the\nother is unfit for any gentleman, if the subject is indecent and the\nwords obscene.\n\nThen, too, certain bounds must be observed in our amusements and we must\nbe careful not to carry things too far and, swept away by our passions,\nlapse into some shameful excess. Our Campus, however, and the amusements\nof the chase are examples of wholesome recreation.\n\n\n*105* XXX. Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu\nhabere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat;\nillae nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu,\nhominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut\nanquirit aut agit videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin\netiam, si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit ex\npecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed nomine), sed si\nquis est paulo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et\ndissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecundiam.\n\n*106* Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam\nhominis praestantia, eamque contemni et reici oportere; sin sit\nquispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse\neius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem\nreferatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare\nvolumus,[97] quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus,\nquam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere quamque\nhonestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie.\n\n*107* Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse\npersonis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus\nrationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne\nhonestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii\nexquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in\ncorporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad\ncursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis\ndignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores\netiam varietates. *108* Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos,\nmaior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem\ntemporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas,\nin C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior,\nvita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis\natque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 Graeci[98] nominarunt,\nSocratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem\nconsecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex\nnostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere,\ndissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere\nGraeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque\nversutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset\net plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit.\n\n*109* Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, qui nihil ex\nocculto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis\ninimici, itemque alii, qui[99] quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant,\ndum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo\nin genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum\naccepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post\nLysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium [quemque], quamvis[100]\npraepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in\nCatulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio\u2020 Mancia[101]\nvidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica,\ncontraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos\nvindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis [ne Xenocratem quidem,\nseverissimum philosophorum,][102] ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum\nfuisse.\n\nInnumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen\nvituperandorum.\n\n    [97] _volumus_ A B^1 H^1 b; _volemus_ B^2 H^2, Bt., Heine;\n    _velimus_ L; _vellemus_ c.\n\n    [98] \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1 _Graeci_ Edd.; _ironia graeci_ A B H b; _ironian\n    graeci_ a; _greci mironian_ c.\n\n    [99] _qui_ A L c; _si_ B H a b.\n\n    [100] _alium_ [_quemque_] _quamvis_ Ed.; _alium quemque\n    quamvis_ MSS.; _quemque alium quamvis_ p; _aliquem, quamvis_\n    Pearce, Bt.; _alium quamvis_, Facciolati, Heine.\n\n    [101] _et in patre et in filio_ A B b, Edd.; _et in patre et\n    filio_ H a; _et patre et filio_ L c. _itemque_ B H^2, Bt.^1,\n    M\u00fcller; _idemque_ A H^1 L a b c, Bt.^2, Heine. _in Q\n    Mucio_\u2020 _Mancia_ Heine, Bt.^2; _in q. mucio mantia_ B; _in\n    q. mutio mancia_ H L c; _in q. mutio mantia_ a; _inque mucio\n    mantia_ b; _inque mutio mantia_ A; _in q. muntio mantia_ p;\n    _in Q. Mucio, Mancia_ M\u00fcller.\n\n    [102] _ne_ (_nec_ c) _Xenocratem_ (_-n_ L c) ...\n    _philosophorum_ MSS.; bracketed by Heumann, Edd.\n\n\n*105* XXX. But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep\nbefore our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other\nbeasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure and this they\nare impelled by every instinct to seek; but man's mind is nurtured by\nstudy and meditation; he is always either investigating or doing, and he\nis captivated by the pleasure of seeing and hearing. #(4) pleasure.#\nNay, even if a man is more than ordinarily inclined to sensual\npleasures, provided, of course, that he be not quite on a level with the\nbeasts of the field (for some people are men only in name, not in\nfact)--if, I say, he is a little too susceptible to the attractions of\npleasure, he hides the fact, however much he may be caught in its toils,\nand for very shame conceals his appetite.\n\n*106* From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the\ndignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; but\nif some one should be found who sets some value upon sensual\ngratification, he must keep strictly within the limits of moderate\nindulgence. One's physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be\nordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according\nto the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the\nsuperiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is\nto abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness,\nand how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and\nsobriety.\n\n#The universal and the individual nature of man.#\n\n*107* We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two\ncharacters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact\nof our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority\nwhich lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are\nderived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our\nduty. #Individual endowments.# The other character is the one that is\nassigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical\nendowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for\nthe race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal\nappearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. *108* Diversities\nof character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had\na large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund\nand employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them,\nMarcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual\nseriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate\nfriend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere\nlife. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and\nwitty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call \u03b5\u1f34\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd--in\nevery conversation, pretending to need information and professing\nadmiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on\nthe other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any\nseasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian\ngenerals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at\nconcealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their\nmovements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these\nqualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all\nothers. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to\nmake his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger\nservice for his country, feigned insanity.\n\n*109* Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward\nand open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or\ntreachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others\nstill who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may\ngain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most\ncrafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we\nare told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander\nas admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent\nhe may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear\nbut a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in\nthe case of Catulus--both father and son--and also of Quintus Mucius\nMancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was\nanother master of this art; but his father, on the other hand--the man\nwho punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings--had no\nsuch gracious manner in social intercourse [...], and because of that\nvery fact he rose to greatness and fame.\n\nCountless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and\nthey are not in the least to be criticized.\n\n\n*110* XXXI. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen\npropria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic\nenim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea\ntamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia\ngraviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae\nregula[103] metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam\nsequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum\nillud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante\net repugnante natura.\n\n*111* Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam\naequabilitas _cum_[104] universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam\nconservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim\nsermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus[105] est nobis, ne, ut quidam,\nGraeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque\nvitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. *112* Atque haec\ndifferentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse\nconsciscere alius debeat, alius [in eadem causa] non debeat.[106] Num\nenim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari\ntradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se\ninteremissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant\nfaciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque\nipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque\nconsilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus\nfuit.\n\n*113* Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et\nmulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et\nin omni sermone omnibus affabilem [et iucundum][107] esse se vellet!\ndomi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id\naliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies\noppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset.\n\nQuae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque\nmoderari nec velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime\nquemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum.\n\n*114* _Suum_[108] quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum\net vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur\nhabere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas\nfabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu,\nMelanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam,\nnon saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non\nvidebit sapiens vir in vita?\n\nAd quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin\naliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non\nerunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non\ndecore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam[109] est\nenitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia\nfugiamus.\n\n    [103] _studia nostra nostrae naturae regula_ Ernesti, Bt.,\n    Heine; _studia nostra nostra_ (corr. ex _nostri_) _regula_ A;\n    _studia nostrae regulae_ B; _studia nostrae regul\u0101_ H;\n    _studia nostra regula_ a; _studia_ (corr. in _studii_)\n    _nostri regula_ b; _studia nostra naturae regula_ L c,\n    Nonius; _studia nostrae naturae regula_ M\u00fcller.\n\n    [104] _cum_ Lambinus, Edd.; not in MSS.\n\n    [105] _innatus_ Bt., Edd.; _notus_ MSS.\n\n    [106] _alius in eadem causa non debeat_ L c p, M\u00fcller, Heine;\n    not in A B H b; _alius non debeat_ a; _alius_ [_in eadem\n    causa_] _non debeat_ Bt., Ed.\n\n    [107] _et iocundum_ L c p; not in A B H a b; [_et iucundum_]\n    Bt., Ed.\n\n    [108] _Suum_ Orelli; not in MSS.; but p has _ingenium suum_.\n\n    [109] _tam_ L c, Edd.; _tam_ (i.e. _tamen_) A B H b.\n\n\n#Conduct must accord with individual endowments.#\n\n*110* XXXI. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own\npeculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in\norder that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more\neasily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal\nlaws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent\nof our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better\nand nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of\nour own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or\nto aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of\nthat propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as\nnothing is proper that \"goes against the grain,\" as the saying is--that\nis, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius.\n\n*111* If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing\nmore than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and\nall its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not\nmaintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's\nown. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain\npeople who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well\ndeserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything\nforeign into our actions or our life in general. *112* #The same course\nmay be right for one, wrong for another.# Indeed, such diversity of\ncharacter carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for\none man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did\nMarcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who\nsurrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they\nwould have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode\nof life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But\nCato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he\nhimself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained\never true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die\nrather than to look upon the face of a tyrant.\n\n*113* How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he\nsubmitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be\ncalled women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant\nto all! And arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his\nmen-servants and maid-servants, in order to attain in the end the object\nof his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having,\nwould have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such\nindignities!\n\n#Let every one sustain his own character.#\n\nIf we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's\nduty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to\nregulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would\nsuit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the\nbetter it fits him.\n\n*114* Every one, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own\nnatural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and\ndefects; in this respect, we should not let actors display more\npractical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the\nones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality\nof their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more\nstress upon the action, choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra;\nRupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely\nin the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his r\u00f4le\nupon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in\nlife?\n\nWe shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that r\u00f4le to which we\nare best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall\nthrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all\npossible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform\nit, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as\npossible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of\nexcellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults\nwe have.\n\n\n*115* XXXII. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur,\nquam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi\niudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores,\ndivitiae,[110] opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita\ntemporibus gubernantur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a\nnostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad\nius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia\nalius mavult excellere.\n\n*116* Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii\nstudent plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f.\nin iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad\neas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem\nAfricanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit\nTimotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam\npater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem\ninterdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum\nconsequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii,[111] qui magna\nsibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus.\n\n*117* Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et\ncogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et\nquales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium\ndifficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas\nconsilii, tum id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod\nmaxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque\nvivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare.\n\n#Mem. II, i, 21-34#\n\n*118* Nam quod[112] Herculem Prodicus[113] dicit, ut est apud\nXenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum,\nquam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in\nsolitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas\ncerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius\nesset, hoc Herculi \"Iovis satu edito\" potuit fortasse contingere, nobis\nnon item,[114] qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum\nstudia institutaque impellimur; plerumque autem parentium praeceptis\nimbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis\niudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime\nexoptant; non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae\nsine[115] parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.\n\n    [110] _nobilitas, h., divitiae_ Unger; _nobilitatem, h.,\n    divitias_ MSS.\n\n    [111] _ii_ Edd.; _hii_ A H b; _hij_ c; _hi_ B a.\n\n    [112] _Nam quod_ L c, Edd.; _namque_ A B H a b.\n\n    [113] _Prodicus_ Manutius, Edd.; _prodigus_ L c; _prodigum_ B\n    H b.\n\n    [114] _item_ Edd.; _idem_ MSS.\n\n    [115] _sine_ Stuerenburg, Edd. plerique; _sive_ MSS., Bt.^1\n\n\n*115* XXXII. To the two above-mentioned characters[AB] is added a third,\nwhich some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which\nwe assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military\ncommands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence,\nand their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled\nby circumstances. #Selection of a career:# But what r\u00f4le we ourselves\nmay choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some\nturn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to\noratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to\nexcel in one, another in another.\n\n#(1) inheritance,#\n\n*116* They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in\nsome particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same\ndepartment of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius,\nin the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that\ndistinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some\nhave added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who\ncrowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus,\nConon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father\nin military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture\nand intellectual power. #(2) choice,# It happens sometimes, too, that a\nman declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a\nvocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve\nsignal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their\naims high.\n\n*117* All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in\nmind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we\nmust decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in\nlife we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the\nworld. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgment is most\nimmature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that\nto which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in\nsome particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide\nintelligently what is best for him.\n\n#Hercules at the parting of the ways.#\n\n*118* For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules, as we find it\nin the words of Prodicus in Xenophon: \"When Hercules was just coming\ninto youth's estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto every man\nfor choosing the path of life on which he would enter), he went out into\na desert place. And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and the\npath of Virtue, he sat down and debated long and earnestly which one it\nwere better for him to take.\" This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules,\n\"scion of the seed of Jove\"; but it cannot well happen to us; for we\ncopy, each the model he fancies, and we are constrained to adopt their\npursuits and vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the teachings\nof our parents, that we fall irresistibly into their manners and\ncustoms. #(3) accident,# Others drift with the current of popular\nopinion and make especial choice of those callings which the majority\nfind most attractive. Some, however, as the result either of some happy\nfortune or of natural ability, enter upon the right path of life,\nwithout parental guidance.\n\n    [AB] The universal and the individual; \u00a7 107.\n\n\n*119* XXXIII. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut\nexcellenti[116] ingenii magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque\ndoctrina aut utraque re ornati spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem\npotissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam\ncuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus, quae\naguntur, ex eo, quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid\ndeceat, exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est ei rei[117]\ncura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus\nnobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare.\n\n*120* Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna\nproximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae,\nsed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna\nnon numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur.\nQui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne\ncontulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se\nintellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit\n(potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam\nmutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin\nminus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus\ndelectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim\ndiluere quam repente praecidere. *121* Commutato autem genere vitae omni\nratione curandum est, ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur.\n\nSed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud\nexceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut\nquaedam imitari possit[118] (ut superioris filius Africani, qui hunc\nPaulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem valetudinis non tam potuit\npatris similis esse, quam ille fuerat sui); si igitur non poterit sive\ncausas defensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella gerere,\nilla tamen praestare debebit, quae erunt in ipsius potestate, iustitiam,\nfidem, liberalitatem, modestiam, temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod\ndesit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis\nomnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui\ndedecori esse nefas [et vitium][119] iudicandum est.\n\n    [116] _excellenti_ L c; _excellente_ A B H a b; _excellentis_\n    p.\n\n    [117] _est ei rei_ Gruter, Edd.; _est eius rei_ L c p; _est\n    rei_ A B H b; _est ei_ a.\n\n    [118] _possit_ J. M. Heusinger, Edd.; _possint_ MSS.\n\n    [119] _et_ (_sed_ b) _vitium_ A B H a b; [_et vitium_] Bt.^2,\n    Ed.; _et vicium_ c; _et impium_ L p, Bt.^1, Heine.\n\n\n*119* XXXIII. There is one class of people that is very rarely met with:\nit is composed of those who are endowed with marked natural ability, or\nexceptional advantages of education and culture, or both, and who also\nhave time to consider carefully what career in life they prefer to\nfollow; and in this deliberation the decision must turn wholly upon each\nindividual's natural bent. #(4) natural bias.# For we try to find out\nfrom each one's native disposition, as was said above, just what is\nproper for him; and this we require not only in case of each individual\nact but also in ordering the whole course of one's life; and this last\nis a matter to which still greater care must be given, in order that we\nmay be true to ourselves throughout all our lives and not falter in the\ndischarge of any duty.\n\n*120* But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is\nexerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of\ncourse, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life;\nbut of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much\nmore stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with\nNature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If,\ntherefore, anyone has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of\nnature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it\nconsistently--for that is the essence of Propriety--unless, perchance,\nhe should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work.\n#Change of vocation.# If this should happen (and it can easily happen),\nhe must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour\nsuch change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If\nnot, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships\nbecome no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men\nthink) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke.\n*121* And when we have once changed our calling in life, we must take\nall possible care to make it clear that we have done so with good\nreason.\n\nBut whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of\nour fathers, let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not\nimitate their faults; second, we need not imitate certain other things,\nif our nature does not permit such imitation; for example, the son of\nthe elder Africanus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus, the\nson of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health be so much like his\nfather as Africanus had been like his. If, then, a man is unable to\nconduct cases at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with his\neloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his duty to practise\nthese other virtues, which are within his reach--justice, good faith,\ngenerosity, temperance, self-control--that his deficiencies in other\nrespects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, however, that is\nhanded down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any\ninherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds; and to\ndishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame.\n\n\n*122* XXXIV. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus aetatibus\ntribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seniorum, aliquid etiam de hac\ndistinctione dicendum est.\n\nEst igitur adulescentis maiores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos\net probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis\nenim aetatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est.\nMaxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore\npatientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in\ncivilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et\ndare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, meminerint\nverecundiae, quod erit facilius, si _ne_ in eius modi quidem rebus\nmaiores natu nolent[120] interesse.\n\n*123* Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi\netiam augendae videntur; danda vero opera, ut et amicos et iuventutem et\nmaxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuvent. Nihil\nautem magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque\ndedat; luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima\nest; sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, duplex malum est,\nquod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adulescentium\nimpudentiorem intemperantiam.\n\n*124* Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum,\n[de civium,][121] de peregrinorum officiis dicere.\n\nEst igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam\ncivitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges,\niura discribere,[122] ea fidei suae commissa meminisse.\n\nPrivatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque\nsummissum et abiectum neque se efferentem,[123] tum in re publica ea\nvelle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire\nbonum civem et dicere.\n\n*125* Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum\nnegotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena re\npublica curiosum.\n\nIta fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur, quid deceat, et quid aptum\nsit personis, temporibus, aetatibus. Nihil est autem, quod tam deceat,\nquam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam.\n\n    [120] _si ne in ... nolent_ Stuerenburg, Edd.; _si in ...\n    nolint_ A B H a b; _si in ... volent_ L c; _si in ... non\n    nolint_ Lambinus.\n\n    [121] _de civium_ MSS.; [_de civium_] Hieron., Wolff, Edd.\n\n    [122] _discribere_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _describere_ MSS.\n\n    [123] _efferentem_ A H^1 L a b c; _ecferentem_ B H^2, Ed.\n\n\n*122* XXXIV. Since, too, the duties that properly belong to different\ntimes of life are not the same, but some belong to the young, others to\nthose more advanced in years, a word must be said on this distinction\nalso.\n\n#Duties of#\n\n#(1) youth,#\n\nIt is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference to his elders and\nto attach himself to the best and most approved of them, so as to\nreceive the benefit of their counsel and influence. For the inexperience\nof youth requires the practical wisdom of age to strengthen and direct\nit. And this time of life is above all to be protected against\nsensuality and trained to toil and endurance of both mind and body, so\nas to be strong for active duty in military and civil service. And even\nwhen they wish to relax their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment\nthey should beware of excesses and bear in mind the rules of modesty.\nAnd this will be easier, if the young are not unwilling to have their\nelders join them even in their pleasures.\n\n#(2) age,#\n\n*123* The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have their physical\nlabours reduced; their mental activities should be actually increased.\nThey should endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and practical\nwisdom to be of as much service as possible to their friends and to the\nyoung, and above all to the state. But there is nothing against which\nold age has to be more on its guard than against surrendering to\nfeebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice in any time of life, is in\nold age especially scandalous. But if excess in sensual indulgence is\nadded to luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not only\ndisgraces itself; it also serves to make the excesses of the young more\nshameless.\n\n*124* At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss the duties of\nmagistrates, of private individuals, [of native citizens,] and of\nforeigners.\n\n#(3) magistrates,#\n\nIt is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind that\nhe represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and\nits dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional\nrights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a\nsacred trust.\n\n#(4) private citizens,#\n\nThe private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on\nfair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither\nservile and grovelling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters\npertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for such a\nman we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen.\n\n#(5) aliens.#\n\n*125* As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his duty to\nattend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry into other people's\nbusiness, and under no condition to meddle in the politics of a country\nnot his own.\n\n#Duty and Propriety.#\n\nIn this way I think we shall have a fairly clear view of our duties when\nthe question arises what is proper and what is appropriate to each\ncharacter, circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so essentially\nproper as to maintain consistency in the performance of every act and in\nthe conception of every plan.\n\n\n*126* XXXV. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis, dictis, in\ncorporis denique motu et statu cernitur idque positum est in tribus\nrebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto, difficilibus ad\neloquendum, sed satis erit intellegi, in his autem tribus continetur\ncura etiam illa, ut probemur iis, quibuscum apud quosque vivamus, his\nquoque de rebus pauca dicantur.\n\nPrincipio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem,\nquae formam nostram reliquamque figuram, in qua esset species honesta,\neam posuit in promptu, quae partes autem corporis ad naturae\nnecessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque foedum,[124]\neas contexit atque abdidit. *127* Hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam\nimitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura occultavit, eadem\nomnes, qui sana mente sunt, removent ab oculis ipsique necessitati dant\noperam ut quam occultissime pareant; quarumque partium corporis usus\nsunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus\nappellant; quodque facere turpe non est,[125] modo occulte, id dicere\nobscenum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat nec\norationis obscenitas.\n\n*128* Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene\nCynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia[126] non sint,\nverbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia[127] sint, nominibus\nappellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re[128] turpe est,\nsed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine\nobscenum; pluraque in eam sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam\ndisputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab\noculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio\naccubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum.\n\n*129* Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut\nmolle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus\noratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta.\nScaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in\nscaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casu\nevenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore.\nNostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non\nlavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim\nnatura ipsa magistra et duce.\n\n    [124] _foedum_ Klotz, M\u00fcller, Heine; _formam_ A B H a b;\n    _turpem_ L c, Bt.\n\n    [125] _turpe non est_ a, Edd.; _non turpe est_ L; _non turpe_\n    (om. _est_) c; _turpe non turpe est_ A B H b (the first\n    _turpe_ crossed out in A B).\n\n    [126] _quae turpia_ B b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_, L c; _quae\n    ... autem_ om. H.\n\n    [127] _quae turpia_ B H b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_ L c.\n\n    [128] _re_ B H, Edd.; not in A L b c p.\n\n\n#Propriety in bodily actions.#\n\n*126* XXXV. But the propriety to which I refer shows itself also in\nevery deed, in every word, even in every movement and attitude of the\nbody. And in outward, visible propriety there are three\nelements--beauty, tact, and taste; these conceptions are difficult to\nexpress in words, but it will be enough for my purpose if they are\nunderstood. In these three elements is included also our concern for the\ngood opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we live. For these\nreasons I should like to say a few words about this kind of propriety\nalso.\n\nFirst of all, Nature seems to have had a wonderful plan in the\nconstruction of our bodies. Our face and our figure generally, in so far\nas it has a comely appearance, she has placed in sight; but the parts of\nthe body that are given us only to serve the needs of nature and that\nwould present an unsightly and unpleasant appearance she has covered up\nand concealed from view. *127* #Modesty.# Man's modesty has followed\nthis careful contrivance of Nature's; all right-minded people keep out\nof sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to nature's\ndemands as privately as possible; and in the case of those parts of the\nbody which only serve nature's needs, neither the parts nor the\nfunctions are called by their real names. To perform these functions--if\nonly it be done in private--is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is\nindecent. And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar\nmention of them is free from indecency.\n\n*128* But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who\nare practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the\nmere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while\nother things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery,\nfraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not\nindecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally\nright; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great\nmany other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow\nnature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears.\nSo, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression,\nour eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have\ncalled \"propriety.\"\n\n*129* In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes: our\nconduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one\nhand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit\nthat while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding\nupon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional\ndiscipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never\nstep out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might\nmake an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his\nperson should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom, grown\nsons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with their\nfathers-in-law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of\nmodesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide.\n\n\n*130* XXXVI. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero\nvenustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus,\ndignitatem virilem. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus\nornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Nam et\npalaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores, et histrionum non nulli gestus\nineptiis non vacant,[129] et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et\nsimplicia, laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est,\ncolor exercitationibus corporis. Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non\nodiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam\nneglegentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in\nplerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.\n\n*131* Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur _in_[130] ingressu\nmollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in\nfestinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt,\nanhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna\nsignificatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis\nelaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si\ncavebimus, ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, et si\nattentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus.\n\n*132* Motus autem animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri\nappetitus; cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus\nimpellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam\noptimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus.\n\n    [129] _ineptiis non vacant_ A B H a b; _inepti non vacant\n    offensione_ L c p.\n\n    [130] _in_ Edd.; not in MSS.\n\n\n#Propriety:#\n\n#(1) in outward appearance;#\n\n*130* XXXVI. Again, there are two orders of beauty: in the one,\nloveliness predominates; in the other, dignity; of these, we ought to\nregard loveliness as the attribute of woman, and dignity as the\nattribute of man. Therefore, let all finery not suitable to a man's\ndignity be kept off his person, and let him guard against the like fault\nin gesture and action. The manners taught in the palaestra,[AC] for\nexample, are often rather objectionable, and the gestures of actors on\nthe stage are not always free from affectation; but simple, unaffected\nmanners are commendable in both instances. Now dignity of mien is also\nto be enhanced by a good complexion; the complexion is the result of\nphysical exercise. We must besides present an appearance of\nneatness--not too punctilious or exquisite, but just enough to avoid\nboorish and ill-bred slovenliness. We must follow the same principle in\nregard to dress. In this, as in most things, the best rule is the golden\nmean.\n\n#(2) in inward self-control.#\n\n*131* We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of listless\nsauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal\nprocessions, or of hurrying too fast, when time presses. If we do this,\nit puts us out of breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted;\nand all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But it is much more\nimportant that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony\nwith nature's laws. And we shall not fail in this if we guard against\nviolent excitement or depression, and if we keep our minds intent on the\nobservance of propriety.\n\n*132* Our mental operations, moreover, are of two kinds: some have to do\nwith thought, others with impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the\ndiscovery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We must be careful,\ntherefore, to employ our thoughts on themes as elevating as possible and\nto keep our impulses under the control of reason.\n\n    [AC] The Greek palaestra, a public school of wrestling and\n    athletics, adopted by the Romans became a place of exercise\n    where the youth were trained in gestures and attitudes, a\n    nursery of foppish manners.\n\n\nXXXVII. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex, altera\ncontentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur\niudiciorum, contionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus,\ncongressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia.\nContentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio\nan possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur\nmagistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta\nomnia; quamquam, quae[131] verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt,\neadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.\n\n*133* Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo\nsequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, utrumque omnino a natura petundum\nest, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse\nloquentium et leniter.\n\nNihil fuit in Catulis, ut eos exquisito iudicio putares uti litterarum,\nquamquam erant litterati; sed et alii; hi autem optime uti lingua Latina\nputabantur; sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque expressae neque oppressae,\nne aut obscurum esset aut putidum, sine contentione vox nec languens nec\ncanora. Uberior oratio L. Crassi nec minus faceta, sed bene loquendi de\nCatulis opinio non minor. Sale vero et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris\nfrater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones\naliorum sermone vinceret.\n\nIn omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omni re quid deceat\nexquirimus.\n\n*134* Sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis\nminimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos; nec vero, tamquam in possessionem\nsuam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in sermone\ncommuni vicissitudinem non iniquam putet; ac videat in primis, quibus de\nrebus loquatur; si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem; in\nprimisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus;\nquod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi\ncausa aut per ridiculum aut severe maledice contumelioseque dicitur.\n\n*135* Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de domesticis negotiis aut\nde re publica aut de artium studiis atque doctrina. Danda igitur opera\nest, ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio,\nsed utcumque aderunt; neque enim isdem[132] de rebus nec omni tempore\nnec similiter delectamur. Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo\ndelectationem habeat, et, ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi\nmodus.\n\n    [131] _quae_ A^2 c, Edd.; _quoniam_ (per compend.) A^1 B H a\n    b.\n\n    [132] _enim isdem_ (_hisdem_ B H) A B H b, M\u00fcller; _enim\n    omnes isdem_ L c, most Edd.\n\n\n#Propriety in speech: oratory and conversation.#\n\nXXXVII. The power of speech in the attainment of propriety is great, and\nits function is twofold: the first is oratory; the second, conversation.\nOratory is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in court\nand speeches in popular assemblies and in the senate; conversation\nshould find its natural place in social gatherings, in informal\ndiscussions, and in intercourse with friends; it should also seek\nadmission at dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by\nrhetoricians; there are none for conversation; and yet I do not know why\nthere should not be. But where there are students to learn, teachers are\nfound; there are, however, none who make conversation a subject of\nstudy, whereas pupils throng about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet\nthe same rules that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will\napply also to conversation.\n\n*133* Now since we have the voice as the organ of speech, we should aim\nto secure two properties for it: that it be clear, and that it be\nmusical. We must, of course, look to nature for both gifts. But\ndistinctness may be improved by practice; the musical qualities, by\nimitating those who speak with smooth and articulate enunciation.\n\nThere was nothing in the two Catuli to lead one to suppose that they had\na refined literary taste; they were men of culture, it is true; and so\nwere others; but the Catuli were looked upon as the perfect masters of\nthe Latin tongue. Their pronunciation was charming; their words were\nneither mouthed nor mumbled: they avoided both indistinctness and\naffectation; their voices were free from strain, yet neither faint nor\nshrill. More copious was the speech of Lucius Crassus and not less\nbrilliant, but the reputation of the two Catuli for eloquence was fully\nequal to his. But in wit and humour Caesar, the elder Catulus's\nhalf-brother, surpassed them all: even at the bar he would with his\nconversational style defeat other advocates with their elaborate\norations.\n\nIf, therefore, we are aiming to secure propriety in every circumstance\nof life, we must master all these points.\n\n#Conversation as an art.#\n\n*134* Conversation, then, in which the Socratics are the best models,\nshould have these qualities. It should be easy and not in the least\ndogmatic; it should have the spice of wit. And the one who engages in\nconversation should not debar others from participating in it, as if he\nwere entering upon a private monopoly; but, as in other things, so in a\ngeneral conversation he should think it not unfair for each to have his\nturn. He should observe, first and foremost, what the subject of\nconversation is. If it is grave, he should treat it with seriousness; if\nhumorous, with wit. And above all, he should be on the watch that his\nconversation shall not betray some defect in his character. This is most\nlikely to occur, when people in jest or in earnest take delight in\nmaking malicious and slanderous statements about the absent, on purpose\nto injure their reputations.\n\n*135* The subjects of conversation are usually affairs of the home or\npolitics or the practice of the professions and learning. Accordingly,\nif the talk begins to drift off to other channels, pains should be taken\nto bring it back again to the matter in hand--but with due consideration\nto the company present; for we are not all interested in the same things\nat all times or in the same degree. We must observe, too, how far the\nconversation is agreeable and, as it had a reason for its beginning, so\nthere should be a point at which to close it tactfully.\n\n\n*136* XXXVIII. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut\nperturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non\noptemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira\nexsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid\nappareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus,\net vereri et diligere videamur.\n\nObiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum\nest fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore,\nid agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et\nsecandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam\nnisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul\nabsit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. *137* Magnam\nautem partem[133] clementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen\nadiuncta, ut severitas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur, atque etiam\nillud ipsum, quod acerbitatis habet obiurgatio, significandum est,\nipsius id causa, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum.\n\nRectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, quae cum inimicissimis\nfiunt, etiamsi nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere,\niracundiam pellere. Quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec\nconstanter fieri possunt neque iis, qui adsunt, probari.\n\nDeforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare falsa praesertim et cum\nirrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.\n\n    [133] _magnam autem partem_ Lambinus, Edd.; _magna autem\n    parte_ MSS.\n\n\n#Propriety of speech#\n\n*136* XXXVIII. But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of\nlife, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that\nis excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be\nfree from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or\ninordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the\nkind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and\nconsideration toward those with whom we converse.\n\n#(1) in reproofs,#\n\nIt may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On\nsuch occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and\nmore forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being\nangry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to\ncautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly--never at all, unless it\nis unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry,\nbut anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious\ncan be done. *137* In most cases, we may apply a mild reproof, so\ncombined, however, with earnestness, that while severity is shown,\noffensive language is avoided. Nay more, we must show clearly that even\nthat very harshness which goes with our reproof is designed for the good\nof the person reproved.\n\n#(2) in disputes,#\n\nThe right course, moreover, even in our differences with our bitterest\nenemies, is to maintain our dignity and to repress our anger, even\nthough we are treated outrageously. For what is done under some degree\nof excitement cannot be done with perfect self-respect or the approval\nof those who witness it.\n\n#(3) in self-praise.#\n\nIt is bad taste also to talk about oneself--especially if what one says\nis not true--and, amid the derision of one's hearers, to play \"The\nBraggart Captain.\"[AD]\n\n    [AD] Like Pyrgopolinices in the _Miles Gloriosus_ of Plautus,\n    or Thraso in the _Eunuchus_ of Terence.\n\n\n*138* XXXIX. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volumus quidem certe,\ndicendum est etiam, qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat\nesse, cuius finis est usus,[134] ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi\ndescriptio et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia.\n\nCn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse\naccepimus, quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis\ndomum; quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad\nconsulatum putabatur; hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit\naedibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, summi\net clarissimi viri filius, in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum\nrettulit, sed ignominiam etiam et[135] calamitatem. *139* Ornanda enim\nest dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed\ndomino domus honestanda est, et, ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sua\nsolum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites\nmulti recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo,\nadhibenda cura est laxitatis; aliter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino\nfit,[136] si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando alio domino\nsolita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur:\n\n#Inc. inc. fab., Ribbeck^2, 184-185#\n\n    o domus \u00e1ntiqua, heu[137] quam d\u00edspari\n    domin\u00e1re domino!\n\nquod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.\n\n*140* Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum\nsumptu et magnificentia prodeas; quo in genere multum mali etiam in\nexemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem facta\nprincipum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, virtutem quis? at quam\nmulti villarum magnificentiam imitati! quarum quidem certe est\nadhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque[138] revocandus. Eademque\nmediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae transferenda est.\n\nSed haec hactenus.\n\n*141* In omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut\nappetitus rationi pareat, quo nihil est ad officia conservanda\naccommodatius, deinde ut animadvertatur, quanta illa res sit, quam\nefficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur,\nquam causa postulet. Tertium est, ut caveamus, ut ea, quae pertinent ad\nliberalem speciem et dignitatem,[139] moderata[140] sint. Modus autem\nest optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nec progredi\nlongius. Horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum optemperare\nrationi.\n\n    [134] _est usus_ L c, Edd.; _et usus_ B H a b.\n\n    [135] _et_ L c, Edd.; not in B H b.\n\n    [136] _fit_ Bt., Ed.; _sit_ B H a b; _est_ L (corr. ex _sit_\n    b), M\u00fcller, Heine; not in c.\n\n    [137] _heu_ Edd.; _et_ MSS.; _ei_ Schenkl.\n\n    [138] _mediocritatemque_: _que_ italicized by Ed. but\n    attested by B H L b c.\n\n    [139] _ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem_ B H b, Edd.; _ad\n    liberalitatem specie et dignitate_ L c p.\n\n    [140] _moderata_ L c p, Edd.; _moderanda_ B H a b.\n\n\n#The proper home.#\n\n*138* XXXIX. But since I am investigating this subject in all its phases\n(at least, that is my purpose), I must discuss also what sort of house a\nman of rank and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime object is\nserviceableness. To this the plan of the building should be adapted; and\nyet careful attention should be paid to its convenience and distinction.\n\nWe have heard that Gnaeus Octavius--the first of that family to be\nelected consul--distinguished himself by building upon the Palatine an\nattractive and imposing house. Everybody went to see it, and it was\nthought to have gained votes for the owner, a new man, in his canvass\nfor the consulship. That house Scaurus demolished, and on its site he\nbuilt an addition to his own house. Octavius, then, was the first of his\nfamily to bring the honour of a consulship to his house; Scaurus, though\nthe son of a very great and illustrious man, brought to the same house,\nwhen enlarged, not only defeat, but disgrace and ruin. *139* The truth\nis, a man's dignity may be enhanced by the house he lives in, but not\nwholly secured by it; the owner should bring honour to his house, not\nthe house to its owner. And, as in everything else a man must have\nregard not for himself alone but for others also, so in the home of a\ndistinguished man, in which numerous guests must be entertained and\ncrowds of every sort of people received, care must be taken to have it\nspacious. But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an air of\nlonesomeness, a spacious palace often becomes a discredit to its owner.\nThis is sure to be the case if at some other time, when it had a\ndifferent owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant, when\npassers-by remark:\n\n    \"O good old house, alas! how different\n    The owner who now owneth thee!\"\n\nAnd in these times that may be said of many a house![AE]\n\n*140* One must be careful, too, not to go beyond proper bounds in\nexpense and display, especially if one is building for oneself. For much\nmischief is done in this way, if only in the example set. For many\npeople imitate zealously the foibles of the great, particularly in this\ndirection: for example, who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus,\nexcellent man that he was? But how many there are who have copied the\nmagnificence of his villas! Some limit should surely be set to this\ntendency and it should be reduced at least to a standard of moderation;\nand by that same standard of moderation the comforts and wants of life\ngenerally should be regulated.\n\nBut enough on this part of my theme.\n\n#Three rules for the duty of propriety.#\n\n*141* In entering upon any course of action, then, we must hold fast to\nthree principles: first, that impulse shall obey reason; for there is no\nbetter way than this to secure the observance of duties; second, that we\nestimate carefully the importance of the object that we wish to\naccomplish, so that neither more nor less care and attention may be\nexpended upon it than the case requires; the third principle is that we\nbe careful to observe moderation in all that is essential to the outward\nappearance and dignity of a gentleman. Moreover, the best rule for\nsecuring this is strictly to observe that propriety which we have\ndiscussed above, and not to overstep it. Yet of these three principles,\nthe one of prime importance is to keep impulse subservient to reason.\n\n    [AE] Members of Caesar's party were now occupying the houses\n    that had been the homes of Pompey's friends. Antony, for\n    example, lived in Pompey's house.\n\n\n*142* XL. Deinceps de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum dicendum\nest. Haec autem scientia continentur ea, quam Graeci \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd nominant,\nnon hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed\nilla est \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1, in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio. Itaque, ut\neandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia\nsit scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo\ncollocandarum. Ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et collocationis fore; nam\net ordinem sic definiunt: compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis\nlocis; locum autem actionis opportunitatem[141] temporis esse dicunt;\ntempus autem actionis opportunum[142] Graece \u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, Latine appellatur\noccasio. Sic fit, ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur, ut dixi,\nscientia sit opportunitatis[143] idoneorum ad agendum temporum.\n\n#Ch. VI#\n\n*143* Sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio\ndiximus; hoc autem loco de moderatione et temperantia et harum similibus\nvirtutibus quaerimus. Itaque, quae erant prudentiae propria, suo loco\ndicta sunt; quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae\npertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem, quibuscum vivimus,\nnunc dicenda sunt.\n\n*144* Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, quem ad modum in\noratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et\nconvenientia; turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa convivio\ndigna[144] aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem. Bene Pericles, cum\nhaberet collegam in praetura Sophoclem po\u00ebtam iique de communi officio\nconvenissent et casu formosus puer praeteriret dixissetque Sophocles: \"O\npuerum pulchrum, Pericle!\" \"At enim praetorem, Sophocle, decet non solum\nmanus, sed etiam oculos abstinentes habere.\" Atqui[145] hoc idem\nSophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione\ncaruisset. Tanta vis est et loci et temporis. Ut, si qui, cum causam sit\nacturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid\naliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio\nfaciat, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.\n\n*145* Sed ea, quae multum ab humanitate discrepant, ut si qui in foro\ncantet, aut si qua est alia magna perversitas, facile apparet nec\nmagnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat; quae autem parva videntur\nesse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis[146] est\ndiligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum\ndiscrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet, sic videndum[147] est\nin vita ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et\nmelior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.\n\n    [141] _oportunitate(m)_ Ed.\n\n    [142] _oportunum_ Ed.\n\n    [143] _oportunitatis_ Ed.\n\n    [144] _convivio digna_ B H a b, Edd.; _convivio dignum_ c;\n    _convivii dicta_ L p.\n\n    [145] _Atqui_ M\u00fcller, Heine; _atque_ MSS., Bt.\n\n    [146] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.\n\n    [147] _videndum_ L c, Edd.; _vivendum_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Orderliness--the right thing at the right time.#\n\n*142* XL. Next, then, we must discuss orderliness of conduct and\nseasonableness of occasions. These two qualities are embraced in that\nscience which the Greeks call \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1--not that \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 which we\ntranslate with _moderation_ [_modestia_], derived from _moderate_; but\nthis is the \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1 by which we understand _orderly conduct_. And so, if\nwe may call it also _moderation_, it is defined by the Stoics as\nfollows: \"Moderation is the science of disposing aright everything that\nis done or said.\" So the essence of orderliness and of right-placing, it\nseems, will be the same; for _orderliness_ they define also as \"the\narrangement of things in their suitable and appropriate places.\" By\n\"place of action,\" moreover, they mean _seasonableness of circumstance_;\nand the _seasonable circumstance_ for an action is called in Greek\n\u03b5\u1f50\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, in Latin _occasio_ (occasion). So it comes about that in this\nsense _moderation_, which we explain as I have indicated, is the\nscience of doing the right thing at the right time.\n\n*143* A similar definition can be given for prudence, of which I have\nspoken in an early chapter. But in this part we are considering\ntemperance and self-control and related virtues. Accordingly, the\nproperties which, as we found, are peculiar to prudence, were discussed\nin their proper place, while those are to be discussed now which are\npeculiar to these virtues of which we have for some time been speaking\nand which relate to considerateness and to the approbation of our\nfellow-men.\n\n*144* Such orderliness of conduct is, therefore, to be observed, that\neverything in the conduct of our life shall balance and harmonize, as in\na finished speech. #Seasonableness of speech.# For it is unbecoming and\nhighly censurable, when upon a serious theme, to introduce such jests as\nare proper at a dinner, or any sort of loose talk. When Pericles was\nassociated with the poet Sophocles as his colleague in command and they\nhad met to confer about official business that concerned them both, a\nhandsome boy chanced to pass and Sophocles said: \"Look, Pericles; what a\npretty boy!\" How pertinent was Pericles's reply: \"Hush, Sophocles, a\ngeneral should keep not only his hands but his eyes under control.\" And\nyet, if Sophocles had made this same remark at a trial of athletes, he\nwould have incurred no just reprimand. So great is the significance of\nboth place and circumstance. For example, if anyone, while on a journey\nor on a walk, should rehearse to himself a case which he is preparing to\nconduct in court, or if he should under similar circumstances apply his\nclosest thought to some other subject, he would not be open to censure;\nbut if he should do that same thing at a dinner, he would be thought\nill-bred, because he ignored the proprieties of the occasion.\n\n#The little things that count.#\n\n*145* But flagrant breaches of good breeding, like singing in the\nstreets or any other gross misconduct, are easily apparent and do not\ncall especially for admonition and instruction. But we must even more\ncarefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults which pass unnoticed by\nthe many. However slightly out of tune a harp or flute may be, the fault\nis still detected by a connoisseur; so we must be on the watch lest\nhaply something in our life be out of tune--nay, rather, far greater is\nthe need for painstaking, inasmuch as harmony of actions is far better\nand far more important than harmony of sounds.\n\n\n*146* XLI. Itaque, ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt,\nsic nos, si acres ac diligentes esse volumus animadversores[que][148]\nvitiorum, magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis. Ex oculorum optutu,\nsuperciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex\nhilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis,\nex summissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte\nfiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrepet. Quo in genere non est\nincommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudicare, ut, si quid\ndedeceat in illis,[149] vitemus ipsi; fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis\nin aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Itaque\nfacillime corriguntur in discendo, quorum vitia imitantur emendandi\ncausa magistri.\n\n*147* Nec vero alienum est ad ea eligenda, quae dubitationem afferent,\nadhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos et, quid iis de quoque\nofficii genere placeat, exquirere. Maior enim pars eo fere deferri\nsolet, quo a natura ipsa deducitur. In quibus videndum est, non modo\nquid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat atque etiam de qua\ncausa quisque sentiat. Ut enim pictores et ii, qui signa fabricantur, et\nvero etiam po\u00ebtae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut, si\nquid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ab\naliis,[150] quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt, sic aliorum iudicio\npermulta nobis et facienda et non facienda et mutanda et corrigenda\nsunt.\n\n*148* Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est\npraecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore\nduci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem\nconsuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur\nlicere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur.\nCynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae,\nsine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.\n\n*149* Eos autem, quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magnis\nest, bene de re publica sentientes ac bene meritos aut merentes sic\nut[151] aliquo honore aut imperio affectos observare et colere debemus,\ntribuere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistratum habebunt,\nhabere dilectum civis et peregrini in ipsoque peregrino, privatimne an\npublice venerit. Ad summam, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis\nhominum conciliationem et consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus.\n\n    [148] _animadversores_ [_que_] Ed.; _animadversoresque_ MSS.;\n    *_animadversoresque_ Bt.; _animadversores_ Orelli, M\u00fcller,\n    Heine.\n\n    [149] _dedeceat_ a c, Edd.; _deceat_ H L b; _non deceat_ B.\n    _in illis_ a Bt.^1, Ed.; _in illos_ B H b c; _illos_ L, Bt.^2\n\n    [150] _et ab aliis_ a, Bt., Ed.; _aliis_ B H b; _et cum\n    aliis_ c; _et ex aliis_ Unger, M\u00fcller.\n\n    [151] _sic ut_ L p, Nonius; not in B H b c.\n\n\n#We correct our faults#\n\n#(1) by observing others,#\n\n*146* XLI. As, therefore, a musical ear detects even the slightest\nfalsity of tone in a harp, so we, if we wish to be keen and careful\nobservers of moral faults, shall often draw important conclusions from\ntrifles. We observe others and from a glance of the eyes, from a\ncontracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air of sadness, from an\noutburst of joy, from a laugh, from speech, from silence, from a raising\nor lowering of the voice, and the like, we shall easily judge which of\nour actions is proper, and which is out of accord with duty and nature.\nAnd, in the same manner, it is not a bad plan to judge of the nature of\nour every action by studying others, that so we may ourselves avoid\nanything that is unbecoming in them. For it happens somehow or other\nthat we detect another's failings more readily than we do our own; and\nso in the school-room those pupils learn most easily to do better whose\nfaults the masters mimic for the sake of correcting them.\n\n#(2) by the criticisms of the wise.#\n\n*147* Nor is it out of place in making a choice between duties involving\na doubt, to consult men of learning or practical wisdom and to ascertain\nwhat their views are on any particular question of duty. For the\nmajority usually drift as the current of their own natural inclinations\ncarries them; and in deriving counsel from one of these, we have to see\nnot only what our adviser says, but also what he thinks, and what his\nreasons are for thinking as he does. For, as painters and sculptors and\neven poets, too, wish to have their works reviewed by the public, in\norder that, if any point is generally criticized, it may be improved;\nand as they try to discover both by themselves and with the help of\nothers what is wrong in their work; so through consulting the judgment\nof others we find that there are many things to be done and left undone,\nto be altered and improved.\n\n#The laws of the state are rules of duty.#\n\n*148* But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance\nwith the established customs and conventions of a community; for these\nare in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of\nsupposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something\ncontrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a\nright to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and\nsuperhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special\nprivilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected,\nfor it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility\nnothing can be upright, nothing morally good.\n\n#Special rules.#\n\n*149* It is, furthermore, our duty to honour and reverence those whose\nlives are conspicuous for conduct in keeping with their high moral\nstandards, and who, as true patriots, have rendered or are now rendering\nefficient service to their country, just as much as if they were\ninvested with some civil or military authority; it is our duty also to\nshow proper respect to old age, to yield precedence to magistrates, to\nmake a distinction between a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, and, in the\ncase of the foreigner himself, to discriminate according to whether he\nhas come in an official or a private capacity. In a word, not to go into\ndetails, it is our duty to respect, defend, and maintain the common\nbonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the members of the\nhuman race.\n\n\n*150* XLII. Iam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberales habendi, qui\nsordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui\nin odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum. Illiberales\nautem et sordidi quaestus mercennariorum omnium, quorum operae, non\nquorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum\nservitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus, quod\nstatim vendant; nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur; nec vero\nest quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte\nversantur; nec enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque\nartes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum:\n\n#Eunuchus II, 2, 26#\n\n    Cet\u00e1rii, lani\u00ed, coqui, fart\u00f3res, piscat\u00f3res,\n\nut ait Terentius; adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores totumque\nludum talarium.\n\n*151* Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris\nutilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum\nhonestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura\nautem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa\nundique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum\nvituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut\nsaepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque\ncontulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex\nquibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius,\nnihil dulcius, nihil homine libero[152] dignius; #C.M. XV-XVII# de qua\nquoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim[153] assumes, quae\nad hunc locum pertinebunt.\n\n    [152] _homine libero_ Edd.; _homine nihil libero_ B H L a b\n    c.\n\n    [153] _illim_ B^1, Edd.; _illum_ H; _illa_ B^2 p; _illinc_ a\n    b c; _illic_ L.\n\n\n#Occupations:#\n\n#(1) vulgar,#\n\n*150* XLII. Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which\nones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman and which ones are\nvulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means\nof livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will,\nas those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman, too,\nand vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay\nfor mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their case the\nvery wages they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must\nconsider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail\nimmediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of\ndownright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than\nmisrepresentation. And all mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for\nno workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least respectable of all\nare those trades which cater to sensual pleasures:\n\n    \"Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers,\n    And fishermen,\"\n\nas Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the perfumers, dancers,\nand the whole _corps de ballet_.[AF]\n\n#(2) liberal.#\n\n*151* But the professions in which either a higher degree of\nintelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is\nderived--medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching--these are\nproper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a\nsmall scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large\nscale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and\ndistributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly\ndisparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those\nwho are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with\nthe fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country\nestate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all\nthe occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than\nagriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more\nbecoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my\nCato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.\n\n    [AF] The _ludus talarius_ was a kind of low variety show,\n    with loose songs and dances and bad music.\n\n\n*152* XLIII. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum\nofficia ducerentur, satis expositum videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae\nhonesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus\nhonestis utrum honestius, qui locus a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam\ncum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit\ncognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta\nmoderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se comparentur\nnecesse est.\n\n*153* Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex\ncommunitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento\nconfirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum\naffluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia,[154] quae cognitione digna sint,\nsummo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo\ntanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque\nomnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd Graeci vocant--prudentiam\nenim, quam Graeci \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est\nrerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam\nprincipem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua\ncontinetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si\nmaxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur\nofficium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca\nquodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea\nautem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur\nad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognitioni anteponenda est.\n\n*154* Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa[155] ostendit et iudicat. Quis\nenim est tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si\nei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit\nallatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui subvenire opitularique\npossit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se\nstellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem\nin parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.\n\n*155* Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae\npraeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum\nutilitatem,[156] qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.\n\n    [154] _copiis_ [_quamvis_] _omnia_, Ed.; _copiis quamvis omnia_\n    MSS.; _copiis omnia_ Lambinus, Bt., M\u00fcller, Heine.\n\n    [155] _re ipsa_ B H a b, Bt., Ed.; _re ab se_ L c (i.e.\n    _reapse_ Orelli, M\u00fcller, Heine); _ab ipsa re_ p.\n\n    [156] _utilitatem_ B H a b; _caritatem_ L c p (affection).\n\n\n#Comparative estimate of duties.#\n\n*152* XLIII. Now, I think I have explained fully enough how moral duties\nare derived from the four divisions of moral rectitude. But between\nthose very actions which are morally right, a conflict and comparison\nmay frequently arise, as to which of two moral actions is morally\nbetter--a point overlooked by Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude\nsprings from four sources (one of which is prudence; the second, social\ninstinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance) it is often\nnecessary in deciding a question of duty that these virtues be weighed\nagainst one another.\n\n#Justice _vs._ Wisdom.#\n\n*153* My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to nature\nwhich depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon\nknowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)\nsuppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an\nabundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace\nstudy and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the\nsolitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he\nwould die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom--what the\nGreeks call \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1; for by prudence, which they call \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, we\nunderstand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to\nbe sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which\nI have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and\ndivine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and\nmen and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of\nthe virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty\nwhich is connected with the social obligation is the most important\nduty.[AG] And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for\nthe study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and\ndefective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover,\nare best seen in the safe-guarding of human interests. It is essential,\nthen, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above\nspeculative knowledge.\n\n*154* Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove by their conduct.\nFor who is so absorbed in the investigation and study of creation, but\nthat, even though he were working and pondering over tasks never so much\nworth mastering and even though he thought he could number the stars and\nmeasure the length and breadth of the universe, he would drop all those\nproblems and cast them aside, if word were suddenly brought to him of\nsome critical peril to his country, which he could relieve or repel? And\nhe would do the same to further the interests of parent or friend or to\nsave him from danger.\n\n*155* From all this we conclude that the duties prescribed by justice\nmust be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties\nimposed by it; for the former concern the welfare of our fellow-men; and\nnothing ought to be more sacred in men's eyes than that.\n\n    [AG] Cicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows\n    from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue,\n    and (2) the duties derived from the highest virtue are the\n    highest duties, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then\n    it can only follow that the duties derived from wisdom are\n    the highest duties. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise\n    that the \"bonds of union between gods and men and the\n    relations of man to man\" are derived from wisdom, and\n    therewith sidetracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from\n    the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been\n    shunted.\n\n    Cicero could not refrain from introducing a bit of\n    theoretical speculation that has no value for his practical\n    position--it actually prejudices it and confuses the reader.\n\n\nXLIV. Atque illi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in rerum cognitione\nversata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus et commodis non\nrecesserunt: nam et erudiverunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque\nrebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus,\nSyracosium Dionem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad rem\npublicam attulimus, si modo aliquid attulimus, a doctoribus atque\ndoctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus. *156* Neque solum vivi\natque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem\netiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus\nullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad\ndisciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium\ncontulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae\ndediti ad hominum utilitatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque\npotissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo\nprudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod\ncogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum\ncommunitate iuncti sumus.\n\n*157* Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,\nsed, cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo\netiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique[157]\nsollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis,\nid est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga\ncognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi remota\ncommunitate[158] coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et\nimmanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum\natque communitas.\n\n#Plato, Rep. II, 369 B; Arist., Pol. I, 1253 A#\n\n*158* Nec verum est, quod dicitur a quibusdam, propter necessitatem\nvitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque\nefficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et\nsocietatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent,\nquasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque\ningenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia\ncollocaret. Non est ita; nam et solitudinem fugeret et socium studii\nquaereret, tum docere tum discere vellet, tum audire tum dicere. Ergo\nomne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam\nvalet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia\ncontinetur.\n\n    [157] _cogitandique_ L c p, Edd.; _congregandique_ B H a b.\n\n    [158] _communitate_ p (per compendium), Bt.^2, M\u00fcller, Heine;\n    _comitate_ A B H L a b c.\n\n\n#Wisdom in the service of Justice.#\n\nXLIV. And yet scholars, whose whole life and interests have been devoted\nto the pursuit of knowledge, have not, after all, failed to contribute\nto the advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have trained many\nto be better citizens and to render larger service to their country. So,\nfor example, the Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes; Plato,\nDion of Syracuse; and many, many others. As for me myself, whatever\nservice I have rendered to my country--if, indeed, I have rendered\nany--I came to my task trained and equipped for it by my teachers and\nwhat they taught me. *156* And not only while present in the flesh do\nthey teach and train those who are desirous of learning, but by the\nwritten memorials of their learning they continue the same service after\nthey are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing\nupon laws, customs, or political science; in fact, they seem to have\ndevoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public\nbusiness. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of\nthe pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical\nwisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also\nmuch speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation\nnever so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred,\nwhile speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by\nthe bonds of society.\n\n*157* And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for the sake of making\nhoneycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature,\nso human beings--and to a much higher degree--exercise their skill\ntogether in action and thought because they are naturally gregarious.\n#Justice more valuable than Wisdom and Fortitude.# And so, if that\nvirtue [Justice] which centres in the safeguarding of human interests,\nthat is, in the maintenance of human society, were not to accompany the\npursuit of knowledge, that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of\nresults. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if unrestrained by the\nuniting bonds of society, would be but a sort of brutality and savagery.\nHence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that\nunite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative\nknowledge.\n\n*158* And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of\nunion in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs\nof daily life; for, they say, without the aid of others we could not\nsecure for ourselves or supply to others the things that nature\nrequires; but if all that is essential to our wants and comfort were\nsupplied by some magic wand, as in the stories, then every man of\nfirst-rate ability could drop all other responsibility and devote\nhimself exclusively to learning and study. Not at all. For he would seek\nto escape from his loneliness and to find some one to share his studies;\nhe would wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as to\nspeak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and\nsafeguard human society should be given the preference over that duty\nwhich arises from speculation and science alone.\n\n\n*159* XLV. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae\nmaxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper\nanteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita\nflagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus\nsit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita\nobscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei\npublicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc[159]\ncommodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei\npublicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.\n\n*160* Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id[160]\ngenus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. [Etenim\ncognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere\nconsiderate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.][161]\n\nAtque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non\ndifficile sit in exquirendo officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum,\nvidere. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus,\nquid cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus,\nsecunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis\ndebeantur.\n\n*161* Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi potest non solum id\nhomines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus\npropositis honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio est, ut\nsupra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.\n\n    [159] _hoc_ L c p, Edd.; _haec_ B H a b.\n\n    [160] _id_ a, Edd.; _ut_ b; _hoc_ B H L c p.\n\n    [161] _Etenim ... prudenter_ bracketed by Unger.\n\n\n#Justice _vs._ Temperance.#\n\n*159* XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether\nthis social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is\nalways to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think\nnot. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a\nwise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has\nmade a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so\nindecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man,\ntherefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his\ncountry; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But\nthe problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot\narise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do\nany of those things.\n\n#Order of precedence of duties.#\n\n*160* This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between\nconflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the\ninterests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for\ndiscreet action will presuppose learning and practical wisdom; it\nfollows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but\ninactive) speculation.]\n\nSo much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been\nmade so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not\ndifficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover,\neven in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so\nwell defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of\nany other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to\ncountry; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the\nrest.\n\n*161* From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people\nare often in doubt not only whether an action is morally right or wrong,\nbut also, when a choice is offered between two moral actions, which one\nis morally better. This point, as I remarked above, has been overlooked\nby Panaetius. But let us now pass on to what remains.\n\n\n\n\nCICERO DE OFFICIIS\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nEXPEDIENCY\n\n\n\n\nLIBER SECUNDUS / BOOK II\n\n\n*1* I. Quem ad modum officia ducerentur ab honestate, Marce fili, atque\nab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore.\nSequitur, ut haec officiorum genera persequar, quae pertinent ad vitae\ncultum et ad earum rerum, quibus utuntur homines, facultatem, ad opes,\nad copias[; in quo tum quaeri dixi, quid utile, quid inutile, tum ex\nutilibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile].[162] De quibus dicere\naggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto ac de iudicio meo dixero.\n\n*2* Quamquam enim libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi, sed etiam\nad scribendi studium excitaverunt, tamen interdum vereor, ne quibusdam\nbonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum mirenturque in ea tantum me\noperae et temporis ponere.\n\nEgo autem, quam diu res publica per eos gerebatur, quibus se ipsa\ncommiserat, omnis meas curas cogitationesque in eam conferebam; cum\nautem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset usquam consilio aut\nauctoritati locus, socios denique tuendae rei publicae, summos viros,\namisissem, nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis\nrestitissem, nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus.\n\n*3* Atque utinam res publica stetisset, quo coeperat, statu nec in\nhomines non tam commutandarum quam evertendarum rerum cupidos\nincidisset! Primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in\nagendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis\nnon ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus.\nCum autem res publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni\nsolebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt\nforenses et senatoriae. *4* Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in\nhis studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime\nmolestias[163] posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum\nmultum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam\nhonoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat\nphilosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae\ntemporibus;[164] id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium\nnon erat.\n\n    [162] _in quo ... maxime utile_ bracketed by Heumann,\n    Facciolati, Edd.; _tum ex ... maxime utile_ not in B H a b.\n\n    [163] _molestias_ L c p, Nonius, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [164] _temporibus_ Victorius, Edd.; _temporis_ B H a b;\n    _tempori_ L c p.\n\n\n#Statement of subject.#\n\n*1* I. I believe, Marcus, my son, that I have fully explained in the\npreceding book how duties are from moral rectitude, or rather from each\nof virtue's four divisions. My next step is to trace out those kinds of\nduty which have to do with the comforts of life, with the means of\nacquiring the things that people enjoy, with influence, and with wealth.\n[In this connection, the question is, as I said: (1) what is expedient,\nand what is inexpedient; and (2) of several expedients, which is of more\nand which of most importance.] These questions I shall proceed to\ndiscuss, after I have said a few words in vindication of my present\npurpose and my principles of philosophy.\n\n#Why Cicero wrote on philosophy.#\n\n*2* Although my books have aroused in not a few men the desire not only\nto read but to write, yet I sometimes fear that what we term philosophy\nis distasteful to certain worthy gentlemen, and that they wonder that I\ndevote so much time and attention to it.\n\nNow, as long as the state was administered by the men to whose care she\nhad voluntarily entrusted herself, I devoted all my effort and thought\nto her. But when everything passed under the absolute control of a\ndespot and there was no longer any room for statesmanship or authority\nof mine; and finally when I had lost the friends[AH] who had been\nassociated with me in the task of serving the interests of the state,\nand who were men of the highest standing, I did not resign myself to\ngrief, by which I should have been overwhelmed, had I not struggled\nagainst it; neither, on the other hand, did I surrender myself to a life\nof sensual pleasure unbecoming to a philosopher.\n\n*3* I would that the government had stood fast in the position it had\nbegun to assume and had not fallen into the hands of men who desired not\nso much to reform as to abolish the constitution. For then, in the first\nplace, I should now be devoting my energies more to public speaking than\nto writing, as I used to do when the republic stood; and in the second\nplace, I should be committing to written form not these present essays\nbut my public speeches, as I often formerly did. But when the republic,\nto which all my care and thought and effort used to be devoted, was no\nmore, then, of course, my voice was silenced in the forum and in the\nsenate. *4* And since my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I\nhad been well-read along these lines of thought from my early youth,\nthat the most honourable way for me to forget my sorrows would be by\nturning to philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great deal of\ntime to philosophy as a discipline; but after I began to fill the high\noffices of state and devoted myself heart and soul to the public\nservice, there was only so much time for philosophical studies as was\nleft over from the claims of my friends and of the state; all of this\nwas spent in reading; I had no leisure for writing.\n\n    [AH] Such as Pompey, Cato, Hortensius, and Piso.\n\n\n*5* II. Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea\nlitteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant\ncognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia,\nquid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur\nqui expetunt,[165] philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est\nphilosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae.\nSapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum\ndivinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur,\nscientia; cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit,\nquod laudandum putet. *6* Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque\ncurarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid\nanquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio\nconstantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per\nquam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum\nminimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium\natque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina\nvirtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris?\n\n#Hortensius, de Div., II, 1.#\n\nSed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accuratius disputari solent,\nquod alio quodam libro fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis\ndeclarandum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad hoc nos studium\npotissimum contulissemus.\n\n*7* Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus,\nsatisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse\ndicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore\npraecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra\nsententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat\numquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius\nnon modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut\nceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes\nalia probabilia, contra alia dicimus.\n\n*8* Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi\nvideantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam\nvitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra\nautem omnia disputatur[166] a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere\nnon posset,[167] nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio.\n\n#II, 20 ff.#\n\nSed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror,\ndiligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima\nnobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui\nista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota\nesse nolui.\n\nSed iam ad instituta pergamus.\n\n    [165] _expetunt_ L c p, Edd.; _expetant_ H; _expectant_ B a\n    b.\n\n    [166] _disputatur_ Edd.; _disputantur_ MSS.\n\n    [167] _posset_ a c; _possit_ B H b.\n\n\n#Why philosophy is worth while.#\n\n*5* II. Therefore, amid all the present most awful calamities I yet\nflatter myself that I have won this good out of evil--that I may commit\nto written form matters not at all familiar to our countrymen but still\nvery much worth their knowing. For what, in the name of heaven, is more\nto be desired than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better\nfor a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are\ncalled philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will\ntranslate the word into our idiom, than \"the love of wisdom.\" Wisdom,\nmoreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is\n\"the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which\nthose things are controlled.\" And if the man lives who would belittle\nthe study of philosophy, I quite fail to see what in the world he would\nsee fit to praise. *6* For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and\nrelaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who\nare always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively\npromote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of\ncharacter and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to\nthose qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no\n\"method\" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least\nimportant concerns is without its method, is the language of people who\ntalk without due reflection and who blunder in matters of the utmost\nimportance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where\nshall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of\nlearning?\n\nNow, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss\nthis subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books.\nFor the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of\npublic service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit.\n\n#Position of the New Academy.#\n\n*7* But people raise other objections against me--and that, too,\nphilosophers and scholars--asking whether I think I am quite consistent\nin my conduct: for although our school maintains that nothing can be\nknown for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my\nopinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to\nformulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding\nof our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in\nuncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of\nmental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should\ndispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with\nus; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others\nuncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable,\nothers improbable.\n\n*8* What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be\nprobable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning\nthe presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness\nof assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And\nas to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only\nbecause we could not get a clear view of what is \"probable,\" unless a\ncomparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides.\n\nBut this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my\n\"Academics.\" And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that\nmost ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your\nmaster--and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that\nillustrious sect[AI]--still I wish our school, which is closely related\nto yours, not to be unknown to you.\n\nLet us now proceed to the task in hand.\n\n    [AI] Aristotle and Theophrastus.\n\n\n*9* III. Quinque igitur rationibus propositis officii persequendi,\nquarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae,\ncopias, opes, facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, si quando ea,\nquae dixi, pugnare inter se viderentur, honestatis pars confecta est,\nquam quidem tibi cupio esse notissimam.\n\nHoc autem, de quo nunc agimus, id ipsum est, quod \"utile\" appellatur. In\nquo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est, ut\nhonestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid,\nquod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum, qua nulla pernicies\nmaior hominum vitae potuit afferri.\n\n*10* Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec\ntria genera confusa[168] cogitatione distinguunt. [Quicquid enim iustum\nsit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum; ex\nquo efficitur, ut, quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile.][169] Quod qui\nparum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantes\nmalitiam sapientiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinioque\nomnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis,\nnon fraude et malitia se intellegant ea, quae velint, consequi posse.\n\n*11* Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt inanima,\nut aurum, argentum, ut ea, quae gignuntur e terra, ut alia generis\neiusdem, partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus.\nEorum autem alia[170] rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione utentia;\nexpertes rationis equi, boves, reliquae pecudes, [apes,][171] quarum\nopere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam; ratione autem\nutentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum hominum. Deos placatos\npietas efficiet et sanctitas, proxime autem et secundum deos homines\nhominibus maxime utiles esse possunt.\n\n*12* Earumque item rerum, quae noceant et obsint, eadem divisio est. Sed\nquia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse\nplurimum arbitrantur.\n\nEa enim ipsa, quae inanima diximus, pleraque sunt hominum operis\neffecta; quae nec haberemus, nisi manus et ars accessisset, nec iis sine\nhominum administratione uteremur. Neque enim valetudinis curatio neque\nnavigatio neque agri cultura neque frugum fructuumque reliquorum\nperceptio et conservatio sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset. *13*\nIam vero et earum rerum, quibus abundaremus, exportatio et earum, quibus\negeremus, invectio certe nulla esset, nisi his[172] muneribus homines\nfungerentur. #(Attius, Prometheus?), Inc. inc. fab. Ribbeck^2, 154#\nEademque ratione nec lapides ex terra exciderentur ad usum nostrum\nnecessarii, nec \"ferrum, aes, aurum, argentum\" effoderetur \"penitus\nabditum\" sine hominum labore et manu.\n\n    [168] _haec tria genera confusa_ B H a b, Bt.^2, Heine; _haec\n    tria genere confusa_ c, Bt.^1, M\u00fcller; _haec tria genera, re\n    confusa_ J. F. Heusinger.\n\n    [169] _Quicquid ... sit utile_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2,\n    M\u00fcller, Heine.\n\n    [170] _alia_ H^2 (inserted above the line) a, Edd.; not in B\n    H^1 b; _partim_ c.\n\n    [171] _apes_ MSS.; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd.\n\n    [172] _his_ H, Edd.; _iis_ B L b; _hijs_ c.\n\n\n#Expediency and Moral Rectitude identical.#\n\n*9* III. Five principles, accordingly, have been laid down for the\npursuance of duty: two of them have to do with propriety and moral\nrectitude; two, with the external conveniences of life--means, wealth,\ninfluence; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the four first\nmentioned seem to be in conflict. The division treating of moral\nrectitude, then, has been completed, and this is the part with which I\ndesire you to be most familiar.\n\nThe principle with which we are now dealing is that one which is called\nExpediency. The usage of this word has been corrupted and perverted and\nhas gradually come to the point where, separating moral rectitude from\nexpediency, it is accepted that a thing may be morally right without\nbeing expedient, and expedient without being morally right. No more\npernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life.\n\n*10* There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very highest reputation\nwho distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions,[AJ]\nalthough they are indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I\nassume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For whatever is just, they\nhold, is also expedient; and in like manner, whatever is morally right\nis also just. It follows, then, that whatever is morally right, is also\nexpedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that theory do often, in their\nadmiration for shrewd and clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But\nthey must be disabused of this error and their way of thinking must be\nwholly converted to the hope and conviction that it is only by moral\ncharacter and righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that they\nmay attain to the objects of their desires.\n\n#Classification of expedients.#\n\n*11* Of the things, then, that are essential to the sustenance of human\nlife, some are inanimate (gold and silver, for example, the fruits of\nthe earth, and so forth), and some are animate and have their own\npeculiar instincts and appetites. Of these again some are rational,\nothers irrational. Horses, oxen, and the other cattle, [bees,] whose\nlabour contributes more or less to the service and subsistence of man,\nare not endowed with reason; of rational beings two divisions are\nmade--gods and men. Worship and purity of character will win the favour\nof the gods; and next to the gods, and a close second to them, men can\nbe most helpful to men.\n\n*12* The same classification may likewise be made of the things that are\ninjurious and hurtful. But as people think that the gods bring us no\nharm, they decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that men are\nmost hurtful to men.\n\n#Necessity of man's helpfulness to man.#\n\nAs for mutual helpfulness, those very things which we have called\ninanimate are for the most part themselves produced by man's labours; we\nshould not have them without the application of manual labour and skill\nnor could we enjoy them without the intervention of man. And so with\nmany other things: for without man's industry there could have been no\nprovisions for health, no navigation, no agriculture, no ingathering or\nstoring of the fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. *13* Then,\ntoo, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities\nor importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By\nthe same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the\nstone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor\nwould \"iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within,\" be mined.\n\n    [AJ] That is, they make a false distinction between (1) moral\n    rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral\n    rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the\n    expedient that is (apparently) not morally right.\n\n\nIV. Tecta vero, quibus et frigorum vis pelleretur et calorum molestiae\nsedarentur, unde aut initio generi humano dari potuissent aut postea\nsubveniri,[173] si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae motu aut vetustate\ncecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere\ndidicisset? *14* Adde ductus aquarum, derivationes fluminum, agrorum\nirrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde\nsine hominum opere habere possemus? Ex quibus multisque aliis perspicuum\nest, qui fructus quaeque utilitates ex rebus iis, quae sint inanimae,\npercipiantur, eas nos nullo modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere\npotuisse.\n\nQui denique ex bestiis fructus aut quae commoditas, nisi homines\nadiuvarent, percipi posset? Nam et qui principes inveniendi fuerunt,\nquem ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nec\nhoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare aut tueri aut\ntempestivos fructus ex iis capere possemus; ab eisdemque et, quae\nnocent,[174] interficiuntur et, quae usui possunt esse, capiuntur.\n\n*15* Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla\nesse potuisset? Qui enim aegris subveniretur,[175] quae esset oblectatio\nvalentium, qui victus aut cultus, nisi tam multae nobis artes\nministrarent? quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum distat[176] a\nvictu et cultu bestiarum. Urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent\nnec aedificari nec frequentari; ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum\niuris aequa discriptio[177] certaque vivendi disciplina; quas res et\nmansuetudo animorum consecuta et verecundia est effectumque, ut esset\nvita munitior, atque ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus et\ncommodandis[178] nulla re egeremus.\n\n    [173] _subveniri_ L c, M\u00fcller, Heine; _subvenire_ B H a b,\n    Bt., Ed.\n\n    [174] _et, quae nocent_ Bt.^2; _et eae, quae nocent_ B H b,\n    Bt.^1; _et ea quae nocent_ L; _ea quae nocent_ c.\n\n    [175] _qui ... subveniretur_ Gernhard, Edd.; _qui ...\n    subvenire_ B H; _quis ... subveniret_ L c; _quid ...\n    subveniret_ a b.\n\n    [176] _distat_ L c p, M\u00fcller, Heine; _destitute_ B H a b, Bt.\n\n    [177] _discriptio_ H b; _descriptio_ B a c.\n\n    [178] _mutuandisque facultatibus et commodandis_ Nonius,\n    Bt.^2, M\u00fcller; _mutandisque facultatibus et commodis_ MSS.,\n    Bt.^1, Heine.\n\n\n#Mutual helpfulness the key to civilization.#\n\nIV. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for\nthe human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the\ndiscomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or\nof earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not\nthe bonds of social life taught men in such events to look to their\nfellow-men for help? *14* Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation\nworks, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these\nwithout the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is\nobvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands,\nhave received the profits and the benefits accruing from inanimate\nthings.\n\nFinally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the\nco-operation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering\nwhat use could be made of each beast; and to-day, if it were not for\nman's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care\nof them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too,\nnoxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured.\n\n*15* Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would\nnot be worth living at all? For how would the sick be healed? What\npleasure would the well enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there\nwere not so many arts to minister to our wants? In all these respects\nthe civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the\ncomforts and wants of the lower animals. And without the association of\nmen, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city\nlife, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable\ndistribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these\ninstitutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others,\nwith the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and\nby giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and\nconveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants.\n\n\n*16* V. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim, cui\nnon perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur,\nneminem neque ducem bello[179] nec principem domi magnas res et\nsalutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo\nThemistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine\nadiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia\ntestibus non necessariis.\n\nAtque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque\nconsensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab\nhomine nascatur. Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici\nmagni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae,\nvastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet\nquaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures\ndeleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam\nomni reliqua calamitate.\n\n*17* Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines\nplurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse\nvirtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque,\nquae in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et[180] tractatione beluarum fiunt\nutiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem\nstudia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata [virorum\npraestantium][181] sapientia et virtute excitantur. *18* Etenim virtus\nomnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo,\nquid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid\nconsequens, ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit,\nalterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 nominant,\nappetitionesque, quas illi \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c2, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium\niis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea,\nquae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si\nquid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui\nnocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas\nhumanitasque patitur.\n\n    [179] _bello_ B H a b, M\u00fcller, Heine; _belli_ L c p, Bt.\n\n    [180] _usu et_ L c p; not in B H a b; bracketed by Bt.^1\n\n    [181] _virorum praestantium_ bracketed by Ed.\n\n\n*16* V. I have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is\nthere to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are\nnot self-evident--namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as\na statesman at home could have accomplished great things for the benefit\nof the state, without the hearty co-operation of other men? He cites the\ndeeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he\nsays, could not have achieved so great success without the support of\nother men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact\nthat no one questions.\n\n#Man's hurtfulness to man.#\n\nAnd yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the\nsympathetic co-operation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is\nno curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a\nbook by Dicaearchus on \"The Destruction of Human Life.\" He was a famous\nand eloquent Peripatetic and he gathered together all the other causes\nof destruction--floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of\nwild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes\nof men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of\ncomparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of\nmen--that is, by wars or revolutions--than by any and all other sorts of\ncalamity.\n\n#Co-operation and the virtues.#\n\n*17* Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is\nthe source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set\nit down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and\nto attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human\nlife derives from inanimate objects and from the employment and use of\nanimals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the co-operation of men, on\nthe other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests,\nis secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior ability]. *18*\nAnd, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in\nthree properties: the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in\nany given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its\nconsequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to\nrestrain the passions (which the Greeks call \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7) and make the impulses\n(\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03af) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to\ntreat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated,\nin order that we may through their co-operation have our natural wants\nsupplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any\nimpending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to\ninjure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity\nwill permit.\n\n\n*19* VI. Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatem assequi possimus, ut\nhominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus, dicemus, neque ita multo\npost, sed pauca ante dicenda sunt.\n\nMagnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel\nadversas, quis ignorat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad\nexitus pervehimur optatos et, cum reflavit, affligimur. Haec igitur ipsa\nfortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas,\ntempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia, deinde a bestiis ictus,\nmorsus, impetus; haec ergo, ut dixi, rariora. *20* At vero interitus\nexercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, clades imperatorum, ut\nnuper summi et singularis viri, invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob\neas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugae,\nrursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, victoriae, quamquam fortuita\nsunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici\npossunt.\n\nHoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo hominum studia ad\nutilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus. Quae si longior\nfuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse\netiam brevior videbitur.\n\n*21* Quaecumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque\nhonestandum, aut benivolentiae gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa\nquempiam diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, quemque\ndignum fortuna quam amplissima putant, aut cui fidem habent et bene\nrebus suis consulere arbitrantur, aut cuius opes metuunt, aut contra, a\nquibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones\naliquas proponunt, aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae\nsordidissima est illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima et iis, qui ea\ntenentur, et illis, qui ad eam[182] confugere conantur; *22* male enim\nse res habet, cum, quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. Sed\nquoniam non numquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quem ad modum sit\nutendum eo, dicemus, si prius iis[183] de rebus, quae virtuti propiores\nsunt, dixerimus.\n\nAtque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati de causis\npluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine\naut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu, ne vi\nparere cogantur, aut spe largitionis promissisque[184] capti aut\npostremo, ut saepe in nostra re publica videmus, mercede conducti.\n\n    [182] _eam_ c, Edd.; _ea_ B H a b.\n\n    [183] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [184] _promissisque_ L c, Edd.; _promissionisque_ B H a b;\n    _promissionibusque_ alii.\n\n\n*19* VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the\nability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say\na few words by way of preface.\n\n#Co-operation _vs._ Fortune.#\n\nWho fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal\nand for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to\nthe wished for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to\ndestruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual\ncalamities, arising, first, from inanimate nature--hurricanes, storms,\nshipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild\nbeasts--kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are\ncomparatively rare. *20* But think, on the one side, of the destruction\nof armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the\nloss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the\nhatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence\nfrequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and\nvoluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil\nand military honours, and the victories;--though all these contain an\nelement of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good\nor for ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our\nfellow-men.\n\nWith this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to\nexplain how we can win the affectionate co-operation of our fellows and\nenlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly\nprolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object\nin view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short.\n\n#How men are led to promote another's interests.#\n\n*21* Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise\nhis estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives:\n(1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of\nhim; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think\nhim deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may\nhave confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own\ninterests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the\ncontrary, hope for some favour--as, for example, when princes or\ndemagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by\nthe promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and\nmost sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for\nthose who venture to resort to it. *22* For things are in a bad way,\nwhen that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But\nsince recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I\nshall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those\nqualities which are more closely allied to merit.\n\nNow, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's\nauthority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by\ngratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence\nof that other's social position or by the hope that their submission\nwill turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled\nperforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of\nmoney and by liberal promises; or, finally, (6) they may be bribed with\nmoney, as we have frequently seen in our own country.\n\n\n*23* VII. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac\ntenendas quam diligi nec alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius:\n\n#(Thyestes?) Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 402#\n\nQu\u00e9m metuunt, od\u00e9runt; quem quisque \u00f3dit, periisse \u00e9xpetit.\n\nMultorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum,\nnuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa\npertulit civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo,[185] interitus declarat,\nquantum odium hominum valeat[186] ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes\nexitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit;\nmalus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis\nvel ad perpetuitatem.\n\n*24* Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio co\u00ebrcent, sit sane adhibenda\nsaevitia, ut eris[187] in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui\nvero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis[188] nihil\npotest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus,\nquamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis\ntacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt\nintermissae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latissime patet neque\nad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum,\nid amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime quae\nvolemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur.\n\nEtenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi\nnecesse est. *25* Quid enim censemus superiorem illum Dionysium quo\ncruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente\ncarbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum Pheraeum quo animo\nvixisse arbitramur? qui, ut scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum\ndiligeret, tamen ad eam ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum, et eum\nquidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio\niubebat anteire praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur\narculas muliebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum occultaretur,\nexquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret\nquam coniugem! Nec eum fefellit; ab ea est enim ipsa propter pelicatus\nsuspicionem interfectus.\n\nNec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse\ndiuturna. *26* Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata\ncrudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi,\nAlexander, non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa\nAgrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.\n\nQuid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt universique se ad Pyrrhum\ncontulerunt? Quid? Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes\nfere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae\ncalamitatis?\n\n    [185] _ac paret cum maxime mortuo_, Halm, M\u00fcller, Heine;\n    _paretque cum maxime mortuo_ c^1, Bt.; _paretque, c. m. m._\n    L; _apparet, cuius maxime mortui_ b; _apparet cuius maxime\n    portui_ B H a.\n\n    [186] _valeat_ c; _valet_ B H a b.\n\n    [187] _ut eris_ Baiter; _ut eriis_ B; _uteris_ L; _utere\n    hiis_ H; _utere iis_ b; _utere his_ a; _utantur eis_ c.\n\n    [188] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H L a; _hijs_ c; _hiis_ b.\n\n\n#The motive of love _vs._ that of fear.#\n\n*23* VII. But of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence\nand hold it fast than love; nothing is more foreign to that end than\nfear. For Ennius says admirably:\n\n    \"Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him\n      dead.\"\n\nAnd we recently discovered, if it was not known before, that no amount\nof power can withstand the hatred of the many. #Hatred of tyranny.# The\ndeath of this tyrant,[AK] whose yoke the state endured under the\nconstraint of armed force and whom it still obeys more humbly than ever,\nthough he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and\nthe same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of\nwhom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a\npoor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may\nbe trusted to keep it safe for ever.\n\n*24* But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have\nto employ severity--masters, for example, toward their servants, when\nthese cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a\nfree state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are\nthe maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by\nsome one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so\nintimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through\nunvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some\nhigh office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with\nkeener fangs than freedom never endangered. Let us, then, embrace this\npolicy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not\nonly of security but also of influence and power--namely, to banish fear\nand cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in\nprivate and in public life.\n\nFurthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of\nthose whom they intimidate. *25* #The wretchedness of fear.# What, for\ninstance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting\nfears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he\nused to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of\nmind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he\ndearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet\nhall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian--one, too,\ntattooed like a Thracian, as the records state--to go before him with a\ndrawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into\nthe lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not\nconcealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded\nslave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was\nmurdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity.\n\nAnd indeed no power is strong enough to be lasting, if it labours under\nthe weight of fear. *26* Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious\nbeyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that\nAlexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that\ntyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him\nwith one accord.\n\nAgain, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius and march over as one\nman to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy\ntyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view\ntheir disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators?\n\n    [AK] Julius Caesar.\n\n\nVIII. Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. Verum tamen,\nquam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis,\nbella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum\naut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et\nrefugium senatus, *27* nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac\nuna re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios\naequitate et fide defendissent; *(27)* itaque illud patrocinium orbis\nterrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.\n\nSensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero\nSullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in\nsocios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo\nsecuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria; est enim ausus dicere,\nhasta posita cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium\net certe civium, \"praedam se suam vendere.\" Secutus est, qui in causa\nimpia, victoria etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publicaret,\nsed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure\ncomprehenderet.\n\n*28* Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi\nimperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari,\nsine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt.\nMulta praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol\nvidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multorum impunita\nscelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset licentia; a quo\nquidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit\nhereditas. *29* Nec vero umquam bellorum civilium semen et causa deerit,\ndum homines perditi hastam illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt;\nquam P.[189] Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto\ntricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta non recessit; alter autem, qui\nin illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo\ndebet intellegi talibus praemiis propositis numquam defutura bella\ncivilia.\n\nItaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema\nscelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus. Atque in has\nclades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui quam cari\nesse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere\npotuerunt, quid debent putare singuli? Quod cum perspicuum sit,\nbenivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam sequitur, ut disseramus,\nquibus rebus facillime possimus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore\net fide caritatem.\n\n*30* Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam\naccommodandum est, a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi.\nCertum igitur hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium,\nfamiliaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum et nostra mirantium;\nhaec enim una[190] res prorsus, ut non multum differat inter summos et\nmediocris viros, aeque[191] utrisque est propemodum comparanda.\n\n*31* Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes\negent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad\ncetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas.\n\n    [189] _P._ c, Edd.; _L._ B H a b.\n\n    [190] _enim una_ Baiter; _enim est una_ MSS.\n\n    [191] _aeque_ Lund; _eaque_ MSS.\n\n\n#The old Republic and the new despotism.#\n\nVIII. I prefer in this connection to draw my illustrations from foreign\nhistory rather than from our own. Let me add, however, that as long as\nthe empire of the Roman People maintained itself by acts of service, not\nof oppression, wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to\nsafeguard our supremacy; the end of our wars was marked by acts of\nclemency or by only a necessary degree of severity; the senate was a\nhaven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; *27* and the highest\nambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and\nallies with justice and honour. *(27)* And so our government could be\ncalled more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion.\n\nThis policy and practice we had begun gradually to modify even before\nSulla's time; but since his victory we have departed from it altogether.\nFor the time had gone by when any oppression of the allies could appear\nwrong, seeing that atrocities so outrageous were committed against Roman\ncitizens. In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory disgraced a\nrighteous cause. For when he had planted his spear[AL] and was selling\nunder the hammer in the forum the property of men who were patriots and\nmen of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens, he had the effrontery to\nannounce that \"he was selling his spoils.\" After him came one who, in an\nunholy cause, made an even more shameful use of victory; for he did not\nstop at confiscating the property of individual citizens, but actually\nembraced whole provinces and countries in one common ban of ruin.\n\n*28* And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed and ruined, we have\nseen a model of Marseilles carried in a triumphal procession, to serve\nas proof to the world that the supremacy of the people had been\nforfeited; and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city without whose\nhelp our generals have never gained a triumph for their wars beyond the\nAlps. I might mention many other outrages against our allies, if the sun\nhad ever beheld anything more infamous than this particular one. #The\nwages of the sin of Rome.# Justly, therefore, are we being punished. For\nif we had not allowed the crimes of many to go unpunished, so great\nlicence would never have centred in one individual. His estate descended\nby inheritance to but a few individuals, his ambitions to many\nscoundrels. *29* And never will the seed and occasion of civil war be\nwanting, so long as villains remember that blood-stained spear and hope\nto see another. As Publius Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman\nwas dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not shrink from a\nstill more criminal spear. And still another Sulla, who was a mere clerk\nunder the former dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor.\nFrom this, one would realize that, if such rewards are offered, civil\nwars will never cease to be.\n\nAnd so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing--and even\nthey wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes--but our republic\nwe have lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is while we have\npreferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection,\nthat all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution\ncould overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what\nought private individuals to expect? And since it is manifest that the\npower of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains\nfor us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection,\nlinked with honour and confidence, which we desire.\n\n#The acquisition of friends.#\n\n*30* But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be\ndetermined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether\nit is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the\nlove of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and\nabsolute essential--that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate\nand loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but\nlittle difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and\nfriendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both.\n\n*31* All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour,\nfame, and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these\nhonours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the\nacquisition of friends.\n\n    [AL] The Romans were accustomed to set up a spear as a sign\n    of an auction-sale--a symbol derived from the sale of booty\n    taken in war.\n\n\nIX. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc\ndicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed\nattingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat\nplurimum.\n\nSumma igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit\nmultitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos\nputat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus\npariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque\nquidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere\npossimus.\n\n*32* Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta\nvideamus; quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco\nvoluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit;\nvehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione\nliberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum,\nquae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem. Etenim illud\nipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet\nanimosque omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque quasi perlucet\nex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, idcirco illos, in quibus eas\nvirtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem\ncausae diligendi gravissimae; possunt enim praeterea non nullae esse\nleviores.\n\n*33* Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si\nexistimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis\nfidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et\nfutura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum\nsit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem\nhomines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis[192]\nhominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in\niis[193] fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his\nfortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur.\n\n*34* Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe\ncum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia\nnihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior,\nhoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem\nintellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam\nfidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia\nnihil valebit prudentia.\n\n    [192] _et fidis_ MSS.; del. Facciolati, Pearce; [_et fidis_]\n    Bt., Ed.\n\n    [193] _iis_ B; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n\nIX. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled\n\"Laelius.\" #The attainment of glory.# Let us now take up the discussion\nof Glory, although I have published two books[AM] on that subject also.\nStill, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help\nin the conduct of more important business.\n\nThe highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the\naffection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the\npeople. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are\nawakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. #How to gain\npopularity:# But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses,\nby which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.\n\n#(1) through good-will,#\n\n*32* But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at\ngood-will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally\nthrough kind services[AN]; next to that, it is elicited by the will to\ndo a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too,\nthe love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere\nname and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all\nthose virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability of\nmanner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and\npropriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts\nboth by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with\nmost lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore,\ncompelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those\nvirtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to\nlove--not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides.\n\n#(2) through confidence,#\n\n*33* Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two\nconditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom\ncombined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we\nthink have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have\nbetter insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a\ncrisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision\naccording to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the\nworld accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in\nmen who are just and true--that is, good men--on the definite assumption\nthat their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or\nwrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our\nlives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.\n\n#Justice _vs._ Wisdom;#\n\n*34* Of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to\ninspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has\nconsiderable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to\ninspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and\nthe more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he\nbecomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command\nall the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to\ndo much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.\n\n    [AM] Now lost, though they were still known to Petrarch.\n\n    [AN] Cicero means by \"kind services\" the services of the\n    lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his\n    services, if he contributed them, were \"acts of kindness.\"\n\n\n*35* X. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos\nconstet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes\nhabere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem\nprudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in\ndisputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis\naccommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur,\nut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus;\npopularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur[194] de\nopinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum\nrevertamur.\n\n*36* Erat igitur ex iis[195] tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc\ntertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis[196] digni\niudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna\net praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis\nsi perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt\nmaximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes\nquasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et\ncontemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum\nputant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam\nquos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam\ninstructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,[197] sed de iis[198] male\nexistimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii,[199] qui \"nec\nsibi nec alteri,\" ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria,\nnulla cura est.\n\n*37* Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute\nputantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii\nnon facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae,\nmaioris partis animos[200] a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum\nadmoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors,\ndivitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in\nutramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis\nampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum\nquis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis?\n\n    [194] _loquimur_ B; _loquamur_ H a b; _loquemur_ c.\n\n    [195] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H; _hijs_ c; not in a b.\n\n    [196] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [197] _haud contemnunt quidem_ b, Bt.^2; _contemnunt quidem\n    nautiquam_ B H a p, Bt.^1, Heine; _contemnunt quidem\n    nequaquam_ c; _non contemnunt quidem_ Madvig, M\u00fcller.\n\n    [198] _iis_ B, Edd.; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [199] _ii_ B b; _hii_ H; _hi_ a; _hij_, c. So \u00a7 37.\n\n    [200] _maioris partis animos_ c, Edd.; _maiores partis animi_\n    B; _maiores partes animi_ H a b.\n\n\n*35* X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am now separating the\nvirtues--as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the\nsame time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I\nmyself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The\nexplanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech\nwe employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic\ndiscussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our\nlanguage entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am\nspeaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others\ngood, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we\nmust employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the\npractice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject.\n\n#(3) through esteem and admiration.#\n\n*36* The third, then, of the three conditions I named as essential to\nglory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our\nfellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or\nbetter than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities\nthat they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and\nextol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain\npre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt\nupon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For\nthey do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they\nconsider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do\nnot despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And\ntherefore, as I said before, those are despised who are \"of no use to\nthemselves or their neighbours,\" as the saying is, who are idle, lazy,\nand indifferent.\n\n*37* On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are\nthought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and\nalso from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual\npleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater\npart of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of\naffliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life\nand death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when\nmen, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward\ncircumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and\nvirtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to\nitself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to\nadmire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue?\n\n\n*38* XI. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et\nmaxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica\nquaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest,\nqui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea,\nquae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum,\nqui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni\nspectatum arbitrantur.\n\nItaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, omnia iustitia\nconficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem\ncausam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas\nplerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.\n\n*39* Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae\nadiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat, quibuscum possit\nfamiliares conferre sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te\nboni viri feras. Ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti\nopinio iustitiae necessaria est, eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non\nhabebunt, [iniusti habebuntur,][201] nullis praesidiis saepti multis\nafficientur iniuriis. *40* #I, 96# Atque iis[202] etiam, qui vendunt\nemunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia\nad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem,\nqui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula\niustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur\naliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum,\nille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam\ndispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges\nlatronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter\naequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est\napud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus\nLusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt;\nquem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit\nferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet.\n\nCum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet\natque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta\nre publica fore putamus?\n\n    [201] _iniusti habebuntur_ B H b; bracketed by Facciolati,\n    Edd.\n\n    [202] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b, not in c.\n\n\n#Justice is the best way to popularity.#\n\n*38* XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires\ngreat admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men\nare called \"good men,\" seems to people generally a quite marvellous\nvirtue--and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears\ndeath or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above\nequity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by\nmoney; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him\ntried as by fire.\n\nThose three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means\nof obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it\nseeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same\nreason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for\nthose things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried\naway.\n\n*39* Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls\nfor human co-operation--first and above all, in order that one may have\nfriends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy,\nunless one is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns\nsociety and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for\njustice is essential--even more so than to others; for they who do not\nhave it [but are considered unjust] will have no defence to protect\nthem and so will be the victims of many kinds of wrong. *40* So also to\nbuyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are\nengaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for\nthe conduct of business. #Honour among thieves.# Its importance is so\ngreat, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on\nwithout some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by\nforce or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing\neven in a band of robbers; and if the one called the \"Pirate Captain\"\nshould not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted\nor murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code\nof laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division\nof booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus,\nacquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually\ndefied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius--the one surnamed\n\"the Wise\"--in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms,\nand so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an\neasy conquest.\n\nSince, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it\nstrengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we\nthink its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and\ncourts?\n\n\n*41* XII. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam\napud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati\nreges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops[203] multitudo ab iis, qui\nmaiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem;\nqui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum\ninfimis[204] pari iure retinebat.[205] Eademque constituendarum legum\nfuit causa, quae regum. *42* Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile;\nneque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro\nconsequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt\ninventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur.\n\nErgo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum\nde iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem\netiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non\nposse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et\nretinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non\nesset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae.\n\nSed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae,\nquae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessarios, sed etiam\nliberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. *43* #Xen.\nMem. II, 6, 39# Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam\nproximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut,\nqualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et inani\nostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se\ngloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices\nagit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi\ndecidunt, nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt\npermulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti\nerimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria\nrerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et\nmortui numerum optinent iure caesorum.\n\n    [203] _inops_ inferior MSS., Edd.; _in otio_ (i.e. \"at will\")\n    B H a b p; _inicio_ (= _initio_) c.\n\n    [204] _infimis_ c, Edd.; _infirmis_ B a b; _infirmos_ H.\n\n    [205] _retinebat_ c, Edd.; _pertinebat_ B H a p;\n    _pertinebant_ b.\n\n\n#Kings chosen for the sake of justice.#\n\n*41* XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes,\nas Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high\nmoral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy\njustice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the\nstrong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was\nconspicuous for his virtue; and as he shielded the weaker classes from\nwrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the\nhigher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for\nmaking constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. *42*\nFor what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law.\nFor rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the\npeople secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they\nwere satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws\nwere invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same\nvoice.\n\nThis, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those\nmen whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If\nin addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did\nnot think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is,\ntherefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its\nown sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement\nof personal honour and glory.\n\nBut as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of\ninvesting it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring\nexpenses--both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of\nlife--so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to\naccount. *43* #The way to glory is Justice.# And yet, as Socrates used\nto express it so admirably, \"the nearest way to glory--a short-cut, as\nit were--is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be.\" For if\nanyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show,\nby hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory\nstrikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences\nsoon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit\ncan be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but for\nbrevity's sake, I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus,\nPublius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome\nshall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they\nlived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose\nmurder was justifiable.\n\n\nXIII. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam[206] volet, iustitiae fungatur\nofficiis. #I, 20-41# Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore.\n\n    [206] _veram gloriam_ Edd.; _veram iustitiae gloriam_ MSS.\n\n\n#Ways of winning a good name:#\n\nXIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge\nthe duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in\nthe course of the preceding book.\n\n\n*44* (XIII.) Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi\nin eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen\nquaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam\ncelebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero,\narbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium\nconiciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et,\ntamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec\ndictum eius esse nec factum. *45* Quorum autem prima aetas propter\nhumilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii,[207]\nsimul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis\ndebent contendere: quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non\ninvidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur.\n\nPrima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis\nrebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt;\nsemper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum,\ncuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo\ntamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri][208] praefecisset, magnam\nlaudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando,\nomni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re\npublica cecidit.\n\nMihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam\nob rem pergamus ad ea, quae restant.\n\n*46* Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam\ncorporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores\nsunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a\nmodestia cum[209] pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime\nautem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros\net sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum\nsi frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes,\nquos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. *47* P. Rutili adulescentiam ad\nopinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus.\nNam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde\nmutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione\nnobili et gloriosa, et, qua[210] aetate qui exercentur, laude affici\nsolent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se\nin foro optime iam facere, quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude\nmeditari.\n\n    [207] _ii_ B, Edd.; _hi_ H; _iis_ b; _hij_ c; _his_ a.\n\n    [208] _alteri_ MSS.; om. Graevius, Edd.\n\n    [209] _cum_ Victorius, Edd.; _tum_ MSS.\n\n    [210] _et, qua_ Manutius, Edd.; _ex qua_ MSS.\n\n\n*44* (XIII.) But although the very essence of the problem is that we\nactually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be\nlaid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being\nwhat we are. For if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of\nliving up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from\nhis father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by\nsome chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world\nare turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if\nhe moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be\nkept a secret. *45* Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure\norigin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as\nsoon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their\neyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This\nthey will do with the better heart, because that time of life is\naccustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition.\n\n#(1) by a military career,#\n\nWell, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for\nglory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among\nour forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare\nwas almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has\ncoincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime,\nthe other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a\ncavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and\nof the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for\nendurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit\naccorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic.\n\nThe subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history,\nbut the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel.\n\n#(2) by personal character,#\n\n*46* As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than\nmere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through\nintellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those\nwhich we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation,\nthen, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from\nself-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. #(3) by\nassociation with the great,# Next to that, young men win recognition\nmost easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who\nare at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public\naffairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in\nthe public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they\nhave themselves selected them for imitation. *47* His frequent visits\nto the home of Publius Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to gain a\nreputation for integrity of character and for ability as a jurisconsult.\nNot so, however, Lucius Crassus; for though he was a mere boy, he looked\nto no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided ability he won for\nhimself in that brilliant and famous prosecution[AO] a splendid\nreputation as an orator. And at an age when young men are accustomed\nwith their school exercises to win applause as students of oratory, this\nRoman Demosthenes, Lucius Crassus, was already proving himself in the\nlaw-courts a master of the art which he might even then have been\nstudying at home with credit to himself.\n\n    [AO] At the age of 21 Crassus conducted the case against\n    Gaius Papirius Carbo, a former supporter of the Gracchi. The\n    prosecution was so ably conducted that Carbo committed\n    suicide to escape certain condemnation.\n\n\n*48* XIV. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo\nsit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio\n[orationis][211] maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam\neloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere\nconciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et\nPhilippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad\nPhilippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus\npraecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam\nalliciant militesque blande appellando [sermone][212] deliniant. Quae\nautem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam\nexcitat [gloriam][213]; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque\ndicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam\nceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas,\nnihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente.\n\n*49* Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent,\nmultique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud\npopulum[214] et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est\nadmiratio in iudiciis.\n\nQuorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat;\nquarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata\npersaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M.\nAntonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum\nseditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. *50* Sed\nhoc quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi aut rei publicae\ncausa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut\npatrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio Iulius. In\naccusando etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. Semel igitur\naut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae\ntribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est\nreprehendendum; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis vel potius vix\nhominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis. Id cum periculosum\nipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator\nnominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere nato, illius filio, qui\niuris civilis in primis peritus fuit.\n\n*51* Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem\numquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri\nnullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura\nad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem\nperniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est\nhabendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium[215] impiumque,\ndefendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas.\nIudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri\nsimile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim\ncum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo\nStoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia\ndefensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui\npotentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et\nsaepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex.\nRoscio Amerino fecimus quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.\n\n    [211] _orationis_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Fleckeisen, Bt.^2,\n    M\u00fcller, Heine.\n\n    [212] _blande appellando sermone_ a c, Edd.; _blando\n    appellando sermone_ B H b; _blande appellando_ Gulielmus\n    (with three inferior MSS.), Bt., Heine; [_sermone_] Ed.\n\n    [213] _excitat gloriam_ MSS.; _excitat_ [_gloriam_] Ed.;\n    _excitat_ Lange.\n\n    [214] _et apud populum_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [215] _modo ne nefarium_ L c, Edd.; _modo nefarium_ Nonius;\n    _et nefarium_ B H a b.\n\n\n#(4) by eloquence.#\n\n*48* XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a twofold\none--conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other--there can be\nno doubt that of the two this debating-power (for that is what we mean\nby eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet,\nit is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in\nconversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for\ninstance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander,\nand of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters\nwere, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in\nthem they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to\naffection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a\nwinning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an\nassembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent\nand judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers\nthink him understanding and wise beyond all others. And if his speech\nhave also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond\nall measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man.\n\n*49* But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for\neloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained\ndistinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies,\nand in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite\nthe highest admiration.\n\n#Prosecution _vs._ defence.#\n\nThe classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are\ndivided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the\ndefence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still\nthat of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation. I\nspoke of Crassus a moment ago; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the\nsame success. A prosecution brought the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius\ninto favourable notice, when he brought an action against Gaius\nNorbanus, a seditious and dangerous citizen. *50* But this should not be\ndone often--never, in fact, except in the interest of the state (as in\nthe cases of those above mentioned) or to avenge wrongs (as the two\nLuculli, for example, did) or for the protection of our provincials (as\nI did in the defence of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prosecution of\nAlbucius in behalf of the Sardinians). The activity of Lucius Fufius in\nthe impeachment of Manius Aquilius is likewise famous. This sort of\nwork, then, may be done once in a lifetime, or at all events not often.\nBut if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent\nprosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no\ndisgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of her enemies. And\nyet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires a heartless man,\nit seems, or rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one\nperson after another on capital charges.[AP] It is not only fraught with\ndanger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to\nallow himself to be called a prosecutor. Such was the effect of this\nepithet upon Marcus Brutus, the scion of a very noble family and the son\nof that Brutus who was an eminent authority in the civil law.\n\n#Spare the innocent; defend the guilty.#\n\n*51* Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed:\nnever prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent.\nFor that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For\nwhat is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men\nthe eloquence bestowed by nature for the safety and protection of our\nfellow-men? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we\nneed not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a\nguilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For\npeople expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is\nalways the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is\nsometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible,\neven if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say\nthis, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the\nposition of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for\nthe defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the\npleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to\none who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of some\none in power. This I have done on many other occasions; and once in\nparticular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus Roscius of Ameria\nagainst the power of Lucius Sulla when he was acting the tyrant. The\nspeech is published, as you know.\n\n    [AP] A \"capital charge\" meant to the Roman a charge\n    endangering a person's _caput_, or civil status. A conviction\n    on such a charge resulted in his civil degradation and the\n    loss of his privileges as a Roman citizen.\n\n\n*52* XV. Sed expositis adulescentium officiis, quae valeant ad gloriam\nadipiscendam, deinceps de beneficentia[216] ac de liberalitate dicendum\nest; cuius est ratio duplex; nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut\npecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti praesertim, sed illa\nlautior ac splendidior et viro forti claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in\nutroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca,\naltera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque, quae fit ex re familiari,\nfontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur;\nqua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. *53* At qui\nopera, id est virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, primum,\nquo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adiutores\nhabebunt, dein consuetudine beneficentiae paratiores erunt et tamquam\nexercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum.\n\nPraeclare in[217] epistula[218] quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus\naccusat, quod largitione benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: \"Quae te,\nmalum!\" inquit, \"ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles\nputares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non\nte regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem[219] sperent fore?\"\n\nBene \"ministrum et praebitorem,\"[220] quia sordidum regi, melius etiam,\nquod largitionem \"corruptelam\" dixit esse; fit enim deterior, qui\naccipit, atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior.\n\n*54* Hoc ille filio, sed praeceptum putemus omnibus.\n\nQuam ob rem id quidem non dubium est, quin illa benignitas, quae constet\nex opera et industria, et honestior sit et latius pateat et possit\nprodesse pluribus; non numquam tamen est largiendum, nec hoc\nbenignitatis genus omnino repudiandum est et saepe idoneis hominibus\nindigentibus de re familiari impertiendum, sed diligenter atque\nmoderate; multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid\nautem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare, ut id diutius\nfacere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae; cum enim\ndando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita, cum\nbenivolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse velint, non tanta studia\nassequuntur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt.\n\n*55* Quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut eam benignitas\naperire non possit, nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus; modus\nadhibeatur, isque referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse debemus, id\nquod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum iam in proverbii\nconsuetudinem venit, \"largitionem fundum non habere\"; etenim quis potest\nmodus esse, cum et idem, qui consuerunt, et idem illud alii desiderent?\n\n    [216] _beneficentia_ Edd.; _beneficientia_ MSS. (ubique).\n\n    [217] _in_ B H a b; not in L c p.\n\n    [218] _epistula_ H, Heine; _epistola_ B L a b c.\n\n    [219] _praebitorem_ B H L b c p; _praebitorem putant_ a.\n\n    [220] _sperent ... praebitorem_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n\n#Generosity of two kinds:#\n\n*52* XV. Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in\nso far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory, I must next\nin order discuss kindness and generosity. The manner of showing it is\ntwofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or\nby gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich\nman; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a\nstrong and eminent man. For although both ways alike betray a generous\nwish to oblige, still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon\none's bank account, in the other upon one's personal energy; and the\nbounty which is drawn from one's material substance tends to exhaust the\nvery fountain of liberality. Liberality is thus forestalled by\nliberality: for the more people one has helped with gifts of money, the\nfewer one can help. *53* But if people are generous and kind in the way\nof personal service--that is, with their ability and personal\neffort--various advantages arise: first, the more people they assist,\nthe more helpers they will have in works of kindness; and second, by\nacquiring the habit of kindness they are better prepared and in better\ntraining, as it were, for bestowing favours upon many.\n\nIn one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for\ntrying by gifts of money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians:\n\"What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope,\" he says,\n\"as that those men would be loyal subjects to you whom you had\ncorrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the\nMacedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward\nand purveyor?\"\n\n\"Steward and purveyor\" was well said, because it was degrading for a\nprince; better still, when he called the gift of money \"corruption.\" For\nthe recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to\nbe constantly looking for one bribe after another.\n\n*54* It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take\nit diligently to heart.\n\nThat liberality, therefore, which consists in personal service and\neffort is more honourable, has wider application, and can benefit more\npeople. There can be no doubt about that. #(1) gifts of money,#\nNevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of\nliberality is not to be discouraged altogether. We must often distribute\nfrom our purse to the worthy poor, but we must do so with discretion and\nmoderation. For many[AQ] have squandered their patrimony by\nindiscriminate giving. But what is worse folly than to do the thing you\nlike in such a way that you can no longer do it at all? Then, too,\nlavish giving leads to robbery[AR]; for when through over-giving men\nbegin to be impoverished, they are constrained to lay their hands on the\nproperty of others. And so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of\nwinning good-will, the affection they gain from the objects of their\ngifts is not so great as the hatred they incur from those whom they\ndespoil.\n\n*55* One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous\nimpulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to\neverybody. A limit should be observed and that limit should be\ndetermined by our means. We ought, in a word, to remember the phrase,\nwhich, through being repeated so very often by our countrymen, has come\nto be a common proverb: \"Bounty has no bottom.\" For indeed what limit\ncan there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive gifts claim\nwhat they have been in the habit of getting, and those who have not wish\nfor the same bounty?\n\n    [AQ] Julius Caesar was a striking example of this.\n\n    [AR] Cicero evidently had in mind such instances as Sulla,\n    Caesar, Antony, and Catiline--_alieni appetens, sui profusus_\n    (Sall., Cat. V).\n\n\nXVI. Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi, alteri\nliberales: prodigi, qui epulis et viscerationibus et gladiatorum\nmuneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas\nres, quarum memoriam aut brevem aut nullam omnino sint relicturi, *56*\nliberales autem, qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt\naut aes alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum collocatione\nadiuvant aut opitulantur in re vel quaerenda vel augenda. *(56)* Itaque\nmiror, quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quem de divitiis\nscripsit; in quo multa praeclare, illud absurde: est enim multus in\nlaudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium munerum taliumque\nsumptuum facultatem fructum divitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus\nliberalitatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior videtur et\ncertior.\n\n#Not found in our Aristotle.#\n\nQuanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit! qui has pecuniarum\neffusiones non admiremur, quae fiunt ad multitudinem deliniendam. _Ait\nenim_,[221] \"qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium\ncogerentur[222] mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri, omnesque\nmirari, sed cum attenderint, veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus\niacturis infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari, cum\npraesertim neque necessitati subveniatur nec dignitas augeatur ipsaque\nilla delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus _capiatur_,[223]\neaque a levissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria\nquoque moriatur voluptatis.\" *57* Bene etiam colligit \"haec pueris et\nmulierculis et servis et servorum simillimis liberis esse grata, gravi\nvero homini et ea, quae fiunt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse\nnullo modo.\"\n\nQuamquam intellego in nostra civitate inveterasse iam bonis temporibus,\nut splendor aedilitatum ab optimis viris postuletur.[224] Itaque et P.\nCrassus cum cognomine dives, tum copiis functus est aedilicio maximo\nmunere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo Q.\nMucio magnificentissima aedilitate functus est, deinde C. Claudius App.\nf., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; omnes autem P. Lentulus me\nconsule vicit superiores; hunc est Scaurus imitatus; magnificentissima\nvero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu; in quibus omnibus quid mihi\nplaceat, vides.\n\n    [221] _Ait enim_ Ed.; _at hi_ a; _at hii_ H; _at ii_ B b; _at\n    hij_ c.\n\n    [222] _cogerentur_ B H a b; _cogantur_ L c p.\n\n    [223] _capiatur_ Beier; not in MSS.\n\n    [224] _postuletur_ B H a b, Heine; _postularetur_ L c p, Bt.\n\n\n#Extravagant waste of the public games.#\n\nXVI. There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the\none class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those\nwho squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the\npeople, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast\nfights--vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none\nat all. *56* The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their\nown means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends'\ndebts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them\nin acquiring property or increasing what they have. *(56)* And so I\nwonder what Theophrastus could have been thinking about when he wrote\nhis book on \"Wealth.\" It contains much that is fine: but his position is\nabsurd, when he praises at great length the magnificent appointments of\nthe popular games, and it is in the means for indulging in such\nexpenditures that he finds the highest privilege of wealth. But to me\nthe privilege it gives for the exercise of generosity, of which I have\ngiven a few illustrations, seems far higher and far more certain.\n\nHow much more true and pertinent are Aristotle's words, as he rebukes us\nfor not being amazed at this extravagant waste of money, all to win the\nfavour of the populace. \"If people in time of siege,\" he says, \"are\nrequired to pay a mina for a pint of water, this seems to us at first\nbeyond belief, and all are amazed; but when they think about it, they\nmake allowances for it on the plea of necessity. But in the matter of\nthis enormous waste and unlimited expenditure we are not very greatly\nastonished, and that, too, though by it no extreme need is relieved, no\ndignity is enhanced, and the very gratification of the populace is but\nfor a brief, passing moment; such pleasure as it is, too, is confined to\nthe most frivolous, and even in these the very memory of their enjoyment\ndies as soon as the moment of gratification is past.\" *57* His\nconclusion, too, is excellent: \"This sort of amusement pleases children,\nsilly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who\nweighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of\nthem.\"\n\n#Magnificent entertainments expected of an aedile.#\n\nAnd yet I realize that in our country, even in the good old times, it\nhad become a settled custom to expect magnificent entertainments from\nthe very best men in their year of aedileship. So both Publius Crassus,\nwho was not merely surnamed \"The Rich\" but was rich in fact, gave\nsplendid games in his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus\n(with Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the world, as his\ncolleague) gave most magnificent entertainments in his aedileship. Then\ncame Gaius Claudius, the son of Appius, and, after him, many others--the\nLuculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius Lentulus, however, in the year\nof my consulship, eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus\nemulated him. And my friend Pompey's exhibitions in his second\nconsulship were the most magnificent of all. And so you see what I\nthink about all this sort of thing.\n\n\n*58* XVII. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, homini\ndivitissimo, praetermissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit.\nQuare et, si postulatur a populo, bonis viris si non desiderantibus, at\ntamen approbantibus faciundum est, modo pro facultatibus, nos ipsi ut\nfecimus, et, si quando aliqua res maior atque utilior populari\nlargitione acquiritur, ut Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decumae nomine\nmagno honori fuerunt. Ne M.[225] quidem Seio vitio datum est, quod in\ncaritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia\nnec turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nec maxima liberavit. Sed honori\nsummo nuper nostro Miloni fuit, qui gladiatoribus emptis rei publicae\ncausa, quae salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus\nfuroresque compressit.\n\nCausa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut utile. *59* In\nhis[226] autem ipsis mediocritatis regula optima est. L. quidem\nPhilippus Q. f., magno vir ingenio in primisque clarus, gloriari solebat\nse sine ullo munere adeptum esse omnia, quae haberentur amplissima.\nDicebat idem Cotta, Curio. Nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo\ngloriari; nam pro amplitudine honorum, quos cunctis suffragiis adepti\nsumus nostro quidem anno, quod contigit eorum nemini, quos modo\nnominavi, sane exiguus sumptus aedilitatis fuit.\n\n*60* Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum\nductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod\npraesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum\ngratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter\nPompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et his ipse Panaetius, quem\nmultum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus\nDemetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam\npecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. #The portion here\nreferred to is lost.# Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re\npublica scripsi, diligenter disputatum.\n\nTota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus\nnecessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate\nmoderanda est.\n\n    [225] _M._ Orelli, Ed.; _Marco_ MSS.\n\n    [226] _his_ H, Edd.; _hijs_ c; _iis_ B b; _is_ L.\n\n\n*58* XVII. Still we should avoid any suspicion of penuriousness.\nMamercus was a very wealthy man, and his refusal of the aedileship was\nthe cause of his defeat for the consulship. #Justification of such\nextravagance.# If, therefore, such entertainment is demanded by the\npeople, men of right judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even\nif they do not like the idea. But in so doing they should keep within\ntheir means, as I myself did. They should likewise afford such\nentertainment, if gifts of money to the people are to be the means of\nsecuring on some occasion some more important or more useful object.\nThus Orestes recently won great honour by his public dinners given in\nthe streets, on the pretext of their being a tithe-offering. Neither did\nanybody find fault with Marcus Seius for supplying grain to the people\nat an _as_[AS] the peck at a time when the market-price was prohibitive;\nfor he thus succeeded in disarming the bitter and deep-seated prejudice\nof the people against him at an outlay neither very great nor\ndiscreditable to him in view of the fact that he was aedile at the time.\nBut the highest honour recently fell to my friend Milo, who bought a\nband of gladiators for the sake of the country, whose preservation then\ndepended upon my recall from exile, and with them put down the desperate\nschemes, the reign of terror, of Publius Clodius.\n\nThe justification for gifts of money, therefore, is either necessity or\nexpediency. *59* #The golden mean is best.# And in making them even in\nsuch cases, the rule of the golden mean is best. To be sure, Lucius\nPhilippus, the son of Quintus, a man of great ability and unusual\nrenown, used to make it his boast that without giving any\nentertainments he had risen to all the positions looked upon as the\nhighest within the gift of the state. Cotta could say the same, and\nCurio. I, too, may make this boast my own--to a certain extent[AT]; for\nin comparison with the eminence of the offices to which I was\nunanimously elected at the earliest legal age--and this was not the good\nfortune of any one of those just mentioned--the outlay in my aedileship\nwas very inconsiderable.\n\n#Lavish expenditure on public works.#\n\n*60* Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made\nfor walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of\nservice to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present\nsatisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public\nimprovements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for\nPompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of\ntheatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers\ndo not approve of them--our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am\nfollowing, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius\nof Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for\nthrowing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But\nthis whole theme is discussed at length in my books on \"The Republic.\"\n\nTo conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant\namount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be\nnecessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our\nability and regulated by the golden mean.\n\n    [AS] The _as_ was a copper coin worth somewhat less than a\n    penny. Selling grain to the people at such a price was\n    practically giving it away to purchase their good-will.\n\n    [AT] The saving clause is added, because Cicero never filled\n    the office of Censor.\n\n\n*61* XVIII. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod a liberalitate\nproficiscitur, non uno modo in disparibus causis affecti esse debemus.\nAlia causa est eius, qui calamitate premitur, et eius, qui res meliores\nquaerit nullis suis rebus adversis. *62* Propensior benignitas esse\ndebebit in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In iis tamen,\nqui se adiuvari volent, non ne affligantur, sed ut altiorem gradum\nascendant, restricti omnino esse nullo modo debemus, sed in deligendis\nidoneis iudicium et diligentiam adhibere. Nam praeclare Ennius:\n\n#Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 409#\n\n    Bene f\u00e1cta male loc\u00e1ta male facta \u00e1rbitror.\n\n*63* Quod autem tributum est bono viro et grato, in eo cum ex ipso\nfructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Temeritate enim remota gratissima est\nliberalitas, eoque eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuiusque\nbonitas commune perfugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, ut iis\nbeneficiis quam plurimos afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis posterisque\nprodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim immemorem\nbeneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam\nfieri eumque, qui faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant.\n\nAtque haec benignitas etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e servitute\ncaptos, locupletari tenuiores; quod quidem volgo solitum fieri ab ordine\nnostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo[227]\nconsuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe[228] antepono; haec\nest gravium hominum atque magnorum, illa quasi assentatorum populi\nmultitudinis levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium.\n\n*64* Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non\nacerbum in omnique re contrahenda, vendundo emendo, conducendo locando,\nvicinitatibus et confiniis, aequum, facilem, multa multis de suo iure\ncedentem, a litibus vero, quantum liceat et nescio an paulo plus etiam,\nquam liceat, abhorrentem. Est enim non modo liberale paulum non numquam\nde suo iure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem ratio\nest rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi[229] sinere flagitiosum est, sed\nita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiaeque absit suspicio; posse enim\nliberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio nimirum est pecuniae\nfructus maximus.\n\nRecte etiam a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas; est enim, ut mihi\nquidem videtur, valde decorum patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus\nillustribus, idque etiam rei publicae est ornamento, homines externos\nhoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere. Est autem etiam\nvehementer utile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per hospites apud\nexternos populos valere opibus et gratia. Theophrastus quidem scribit\nCimonem Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem fuisse; ita\nenim instituisse et vilicis imperavisse, ut omnia praeberentur,\nquicumque Laciades in villam suam devertisset.\n\n    [227] _ergo_ B H a b, M\u00fcller; _ego_ L c p, Lactantius, Bt.,\n    Heine.\n\n    [228] _longe_ L c p, Lactantius, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [229] _dilabi_ L c, Ed., Heine; _delabi_ B H a b, Bt.\n\n\n#General rules for beneficence.#\n\n*61* XVIII. Now, as touching that second division of gifts of money,\nthose which are prompted by a spirit of generosity, we ought to look at\ndifferent cases differently. The case of the man who is overwhelmed by\nmisfortune is different from that of the one who is seeking to better\nhis condition, though he suffers from no actual distress. *62* It will\nbe the duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, unless,\nperchance, they deserve their misfortune. But of course we ought by no\nmeans to withhold our assistance altogether from those who wish for aid,\nnot to save them from utter ruin but to enable them to reach a higher\ndegree of fortune. But in selecting worthy cases, we ought to use\njudgment and discretion. For, as Ennius says so admirably,\n\n    \"Good deeds misplaced, methinks, are evil deeds.\"\n\n*63* Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man who is good and\ngrateful finds its reward, in such a case, not only in his own good-will\nbut in that of others. For when generosity is not indiscriminate giving,\nit wins most gratitude and people praise it with more enthusiasm,\nbecause goodness of heart in a man of high station becomes the common\nrefuge of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to benefit as many\nas possible with such kindnesses that the memory of them shall be handed\ndown to children and to children's children, so that they too may not be\nungrateful. For all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it\nas a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages\ngenerosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the\npoor.\n\nRansoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of\ncharity that is a service to the state as well as to the individual.\nAnd we find in one of Crassus's orations the full proof given that such\nbeneficence used to be the common practice of our order. This form of\ncharity, then, I much prefer to the lavish expenditure of money for\npublic exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth and dignity,\nthe latter to those shallow flatterers, if I may call them so, who\ntickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble.\n\n*64* It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the same time liberal\nin giving and not inconsiderate in exacting his dues, but in every\nbusiness relation--in buying or selling, in hiring or letting, in\nrelations arising out of adjoining houses and lands--to be fair,\nreasonable, often freely yielding much of his own right, and keeping out\nof litigation as far as his interests will permit and perhaps even a\nlittle farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to abate a\nlittle of one's rightful claims, but it is sometimes even advantageous.\nWe should, however, have a care for our personal property, for it is\ndiscreditable to let it run through our fingers; but we must guard it in\nsuch a way that there shall be no suspicion of meanness or avarice. For\nthe greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the\nopportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one's\nfortune.\n\n#Another expression of beneficence is hospitality.#\n\nHospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, and rightly so.\nFor, as it seems to me at least, it is most proper that the homes of\ndistinguished men should be open to distinguished guests. And it is to\nthe credit of our country also that men from abroad do not fail to find\nhospitable entertainment of this kind in our city. It is, moreover, a\nvery great advantage, too, for those who wish to obtain a powerful\npolitical influence by honourable means to be able through their social\nrelations with their guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence\nabroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospitality, Theophrastus\nwrites that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the Laciads, the\npeople of his own deme; for he instructed his bailiffs to that end and\ngave them orders that every attention should be shown to any Laciad who\nshould ever call at his country home.\n\n\n*65* XIX. Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia dantur, haec tum in\nuniversam rem publicam, tum in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure\ncavere [,consilio iuvare,][230] atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam\nplurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas pertinet et ad gratiam.\n\nItaque cum multa praeclara maiorum, tum quod optime constituti iuris\ncivilis summo semper in honore fuit cognitio atque interpretatio; quam\nquidem ante hanc confusionem temporum in possessione sua principes\nretinuerunt, nunc, ut honores, ut omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius\nscientiae splendor deletus est, idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc\ncontigit, cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par esset,\nscientia facile vicisset. Haec igitur opera grata multis et ad\nbeneficiis obstringendos homines accommodata.\n\n*66* Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi [gravior] facultas[231] et\ngratior et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia praestabilius vel admiratione\naudientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? Huic\n[quoque] ergo[232] a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis[233]\nprincipatus datus. Diserti igitur hominis et facile laborantis, quodque\nin patriis est moribus, multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito\ndefendentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent.\n\n*67* Admonebat me res, ut hoc quoque loco intermissionem eloquentiae, ne\ndicam interitum, deplorarem, ni vererer, ne de me ipso aliquid viderer\nqueri. Sed tamen videmus, quibus exstinctis oratoribus quam in paucis\nspes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quam in multis sit audacia. Cum\nautem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut\ndiserti, licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem,\ncommendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem pro re alterius, eos\nipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt,\nplurimum gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat industria.\n\n*68* Iam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu), ut\nanimadvertant, cum iuvare alios velint, ne quos offendant. Saepe enim\naut eos laedunt, quos non debent, aut eos, quos non expedit; si\nimprudentes, neglegentiae est, si scientes, temeritatis. Utendum etiam\nest excusatione adversus eos, quos invitus offendas, quacumque possis,\nquare id, quod feceris, necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris,\nceterisque operis et officiis erit id, quod violatum videbitur,[234]\ncompensandum.\n\n    [230] _consilio iuvare_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Muther,\n    M\u00fcller, Heine.\n\n    [231] _dicendi gravior facultas_ B H b; _gravior facultas_ L\n    c p; _dicendi_ [_gravior_] _facultas_ Ed.; _dicendi facultas_\n    Lambinus.\n\n    [232] _huic quoque ergo_ B H L b c, Bt.; _huic ergo_\n    Facciolati; _huic_ [_quoque_] _ergo_ Ed.\n\n    [233] _in toga dignitatis_ L c p, Edd.; _in tota dignitatis_\n    B H b; _in tota dignitate_ a.\n\n    [234] _videbitur_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H b; _est_ a.\n\n\n#(2) personal service.#\n\n*65* XIX. Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts of money but by\npersonal service[AU] are bestowed sometimes upon the community at large,\nsometimes upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his legal rights\n[,to assist him with counsel,] and to serve as many as possible with\nthat sort of knowledge tends greatly to increase one's influence and\npopularity.\n\n#The profession of the law.#\n\nThus, among the many admirable ideas of our ancestors was the high\nrespect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the\nexcellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times\nthe foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in\ntheir own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed\nalong with offices of honour and positions of dignity; and this is the\nmore deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a\nman[AV] who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his\npredecessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service such as this,\nthen, finds many to appreciate it and is calculated to bind people\nclosely to us by our good services.\n\n#Eloquence at the bar.#\n\n*66* Closely connected with this profession, furthermore, is the gift of\neloquence; it is at once more popular and more distinguished. For what\nis better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or\nthe hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has\nprotected? It was to eloquence, therefore, that our fathers assigned the\nforemost rank among the civil professions. The door of opportunity for\ngenerous patronage to others, then, is wide open to the orator whose\nheart is in his work and who follows the custom of our forefathers in\nundertaking the defence of many clients without reluctance and without\ncompensation.\n\n#The decline of eloquence.#\n\n*67* My subject suggests that at this point I express once more my\nregret at the decadence, not to say the utter extinction, of eloquence;\nand I should do so, did I not fear that people would think that I were\ncomplaining on my own account. We see, nevertheless, what orators have\nlost their lives and how few of any promise are left, how far fewer\nthere are who have ability, and how many there are who have nothing but\npresumption. But though not all--no, not even many--can be learned in\nthe law or eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service to many\nby canvassing in their support for appointments, by witnessing to their\ncharacter before juries and magistrates, by looking out for the\ninterests of one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid of\njurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform such services win the\nmost gratitude and find a most extensive sphere for their activities.\n\n#A warning to eloquence.#\n\n*68* Of course, those who pursue such a course do not need to be warned\n(for the point is self-evident) to be careful when they seek to oblige\nsome, not to offend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom they\nought not or those whom it is inexpedient to offend. If they do it\ninadvertently, it is carelessness; if designedly, inconsiderateness. A\nman must apologize also, to the best of his ability, if he has\ninvoluntarily hurt anyone's feelings, and explain why what he has done\nwas unavoidable and why he could not have done otherwise; and he must by\nfuture services and kind offices atone for the apparent offence.\n\n    [AU] Acts of kindness and personal service mean to Cicero\n    throughout this discussion the services of the lawyer, which\n    were voluntary and gratis.\n\n    [AV] This eminent jurist was Servius Sulpicius Lemonia Rufus,\n    a close friend of Cicero, author of the well-known letter of\n    condolence to Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia.\n\n\n*69* XX. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna\nsoleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in\nbeneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio\nest; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat\nin opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et\ncelerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra\npropensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit.\nNimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non\npotest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, \"pecuniam\nqui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem\net, qui rettulerit, habere[235] et, qui habeat, rettulisse.\"\n\nAt qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem\nbeneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi\nquamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut\nexspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se[236] usos aut\nclientes appellari mortis instar putant. *70* At vero ille tenuis, cum,\nquicquid factum sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet,[237] non modo\nilli, qui est meritus, sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat (eget enim\nmultis), gratum se videri studet neque vero verbis auget suum munus, si\nquo forte fungitur, sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, si\nopulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo aut, si[238] forte, in\nliberis eius manet gratia; sin autem inopem, probum tamen et modestum,\nomnes non improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo est,\npraesidium sibi paratum vident. *71* Quam ob rem melius apud bonos quam\napud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto.\n\nDanda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis facere possimus; sed si res\nin contentionem veniet, nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui\ncum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam\ncollocaret: \"Ego vero,\" inquit, \"malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam\npecuniam, quae viro.\" Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione\ndivitiarum; quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet?\nIllum fortasse adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper; sed fac iuvare;\nutentior[239] sane sit, honestior vero quo modo? Quodsi etiam bonus erit\nvir, ne impediant divitiae, quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque\nomne iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit!\n\nExtremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra\naequitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est\nperpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse\nlaudabile.\n\n    [235] _gratiam ... habere_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [236] _vero se_ B H a b; _vero tuo se_ L c p.\n\n    [237] _putet_ Ed.; _putat_ MSS.\n\n    [238] _si_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [239] _utentior_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine; _potentior_ later MSS.;\n    _opulentior_ one MS. (C. Lange), Lambinus, Bt.^2, M\u00fcller.\n\n\n#The basis for personal service is character not fortune.#\n\n*69* XX. Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider\neither their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy\nremark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we\nlook not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The\nphrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing\na service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause\nof a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more\ninclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return.\nBut we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the\npoor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but\nif he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As\nsome one has happily said, \"A man has not repaid money, if he still has\nit; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has\nthe sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the\nsense of the favour, he has repaid it.\"\n\nOn the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the\nfavourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by\nour kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a\nfavour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a\nclaim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in\nreturn. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a\npatron or to be called clients. *70* Your man of slender means, on the\nother hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard\nfor himself and not for his outward circumstances. #The poor man's\ngratitude.# Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the\none who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he\nexpects similar favours in the future--and he needs the help of many;\nand his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not\nexaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore,\nshould not be overlooked--that if one defends a wealthy favourite of\nfortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or,\npossibly, to his children. But if one defends a man who is poor but\nhonest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest--and there is a\nlarge proportion of that sort among the people--look upon such an\nadvocate as a tower of defence raised up for them. *71* I think,\ntherefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than\nkindness to the favourites of fortune.\n\nWe must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and\nconditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on\nthis point, we must, I should say, follow the advice of Themistocles:\nwhen some one asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in\nmarriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but\nless esteemed, he said: #Wealth no inducement nor a bar to personal\nservice# \"For my part, I prefer a man without money to money without a\nman.\" But the moral sense of to-day is demoralized and depraved by our\nworship of wealth. Of what concern to any one of us is the size of\nanother man's fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor;\nbut not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have\nmore money to spend: but how is he any the better man for that? Still,\nif he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a\nhindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but\nin conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man's\ncharacter, not on his wealth.\n\nThe supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by\npersonal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right\nnor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation\nand fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of\npraise.\n\n\n*72* XXI. Sed, quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, quae ad\nsingulos spectant, deinceps de iis, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem\npublicam pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim[240]\neius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim, singulos ut\nattingant; quae sunt etiam gratiora. Danda opera est omnino, si possit,\nutrisque, nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed ita, ut ea res\naut prosit aut certe ne obsit rei publicae. C. Gracchi frumentaria magna\nlargitio; exhauriebat igitur aerarium; modica M. Octavi et rei publicae\ntolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae\nsalutaris.\n\n*73* In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit,\nut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat.\nPerniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam\ntamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum\npraebuit--sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, \"non esse\nin civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem haberent.\" Capitalis oratio est,\nad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc\nenim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque\nconstitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen\nspe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.\n\n*74* Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe fiebat\npropter aerarii tenuitatem assiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit\nconferendum, idque ne eveniat, multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae\nnecessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit (malo enim[241]\nquam nostrae ominari; neque tamen de nostra, sed de omni re publica\ndisputo), danda erit opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint,\nnecessitati esse parendum. Atque etiam omnes, qui rem publicam\ngubernabunt, consulere debebunt, ut earum rerum copia sit, quae\nsunt[242] necessariae. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat et debeat,\nnon est necesse disputare; est enim in promptu; tantum locus attingendus\nfuit.\n\n*75* Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et muneris publici, ut\navaritiae pellatur etiam minima suspicio. \"Utinam,\" inquit C. Pontius\nSamnis, \"ad illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem natus,\nquando Romani dona accipere[243] coepissent! non essem passus diutius\neos imperare.\" Ne illi multa saecula exspectanda fuerunt; modo enim hoc\nmalum in hanc rem publicam invasit. Itaque facile patior tum potius\nPontium fuisse, siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum et\ndecem anni sunt, cum de pecuniis repetundis a L. Pisone lata lex est,\nnulla antea cum fuisset. At vero postea tot leges et proximae quaeque\nduriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantum [Italicum][244] bellum propter\niudiciorum metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudiciis expilatio\ndireptioque sociorum, ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute\nvaleamus.\n\n    [240] _partim_ L c p, Edd.; _quae_ (_que_ = _quae_ H)\n    _partim_ B H a b.\n\n    [241] _malo enim_ B H L b p; _malo enim alii_ a; _malo enim\n    aliene_ (_alienae_) c.\n\n    [242] _sunt_ B H b, Bt.^2; _sunt ad victum_ L c p, Bt.^1,\n    Heine.\n\n    [243] _dona accipere_ B H L a p c; _accipere dona_ b, Ed.\n\n    [244] _tantum [Italicum]_ Bake, Edd.; _tantum Italicum_ L c\n    p; _tantum Iliacum_ B H; _tanti militari cum_ b.\n\n\n#Service to the state through personal service to individuals.#\n\n*72* XXI. Now, since we have finished the discussion of that kind of\nhelpful services which concern individuals, we must next take up those\nwhich touch the whole body politic and the state. Of these public\nservices, some are of such a nature that they concern the whole body of\ncitizens; others, that they affect individuals only. And these latter\nare the more productive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all\nmeans attend to both kinds of service; but we must take care in\nprotecting the interests of individuals that what we do for them shall\nbe beneficial, or at least not prejudicial to the state. Gaius Gracchus\ninaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale; this had a\ntendency to exhaust the exchequer. Marcus Octavius inaugurated a\nmoderate dole; this was both practicable for the state and necessary for\nthe commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to\nthe state.\n\n#The statesman's duty toward#\n\n#(1) property rights,#\n\n*73* The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his\nfirst care that every one shall have what belongs to him and that\nprivate citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of\nthe state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his\ntribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was\nrejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary\nmoderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played\nthe demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that \"there were\nnot in the state two thousand people who owned any property.\" That\nspeech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal\ndistribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could\nbe conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of\nconstitutional state and municipal governments was that individual\nproperty rights might be secured. For although it was by Nature's\nguidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the\nhope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection\nof cities.\n\n#(2) taxation,#\n\n*74* The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent\nthe levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be\ntaken long in advance. Such a tax was often levied in the times of our\nforefathers on account of the depleted state of their treasury and their\nincessant wars. But if any state (I say \"any,\" for I would rather speak\nin general terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I am not\ndiscussing our own state but states in general)--if any state ever has\nto face a crisis requiring the imposition of such a burden, every\neffort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to\nthe inevitable, if they wish to be saved. #(3) necessities of life,# And\nit will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to\ntake measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of\nlife. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the\nduty is self-evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter.\n\n#(4) official integrity.#\n\n*75* But the chief thing in all public administration and public service\nis to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking. \"I would,\"\nsays Gaius Pontius, the Samnite, \"that fortune had withheld my\nappearance until a time when the Romans began to accept bribes, and that\nI had been born in those days! I should then have suffered them to hold\ntheir supremacy no longer.\" Aye, but he would have had many generations\nto wait; for this plague has only recently infected our nation. And so I\nrejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing that he was so\nmighty a man! It is not yet a hundred and ten years since the enactment\nof Lucius Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no such law\nbefore. But afterward came so many laws, each more stringent than the\nother, so many men were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a\nwar[AW] was stirred up on account of the fear of what our courts would\ndo to still others, so frightful was the pillaging and plundering of the\nallies when the laws and courts were suppressed,[AX] that now we find\nourselves strong not in our own strength but in the weakness of others.\n\n    [AW] The Italian or Social War, B.C. 100-88.\n\n    [AX] During the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar.\n\n\n*76* XXII. Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit abstinens. Quidni\nlaudet? Sed in illo alia maiora; laus abstinentiae[245] non hominis est\nsolum, sed etiam temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit\nmaxima, potitus [est][246] Paulus tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit,\nut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil\ndomum suam intulit[247] praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam. Imitatus\npatrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa. Quid? qui eius\ncollega fuit in censura, L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum\ncopiosissimam urbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare quam domum suam\nmaluit; quamquam Italia ornata domus ipsa mihi videtur ornatior.\n\n*77* Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo, unde egressa est, referat\nse oratio, quam avaritia, praesertim in principibus et rem publicam\ngubernantibus. Habere enim quaestui rem publicam non modo turpe est, sed\nsceleratum etiam et nefarium. #Plut. Inst. Lacon. 239 F# Itaque, quod\nApollo Pythius oraclum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse\nperituram, id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis, sed etiam omnibus\nopulentis populis praedixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius\nbenivolentiam multitudinis possunt ii, qui rei publicae praesunt, quam\nabstinentia et continentia.\n\n*78* Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem\ntemptant, ut possessores pellantur suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas\ndebitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei publicae,\nconcordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum aliis adimuntur, aliis\ncondonantur pecuniae, deinde aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere\nsuum cuique non licet. #\u00a7 73# Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi,\ncivitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque\ncustodia. *79* Atque in hac pernicie rei publicae ne illam quidem\nconsequuntur, quam putant, gratiam; nam cui res erepta est, est\ninimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse et maxime\nin pecuniis creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse\nsolvendo; at vero ille, qui accepit[248] iniuriam, et meminit et prae se\nfert dolorem suum, nec, si plures sunt ii, quibus inprobe datum est,\nquam illi, quibus iniuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent; non\nenim numero haec iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet aequitatem,\nut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis ante possessum, qui nullum\nhabuit, habeat, qui autem habuit, amittat?\n\n    [245] _abstinentiae_ L c p, Edd.; _sapientiae_ B H a b.\n\n    [246] _potitus_ J. F. Heusinger; _potitus [est]_ Edd.;\n    _potitus est_ MSS.\n\n    [247] _intulit_ B H b, Edd.; _detulit_ L c p.\n\n    [248] _accepit_ L c, Edd.; _accipit_ B H a b p.\n\n\n*76* XXII. Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life.\nWhy should he not? But Africanus had other and greater virtues. The\nboast of official integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to\nhis times. When Paulus got possession of all the wealth of Macedon--and\nit was enormous--he brought into our treasury so much money[AY] that the\nspoils of a single general did away with the need for a tax on property\nin Rome for all time to come. But to his own house he brought nothing\nsave the glory of an immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's\nexample and was none the richer for his overthrow of Carthage. And what\nshall we say of Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship? Was he\none penny the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations the\nrichest of cities? He preferred to adorn Italy rather than his own\nhouse. And yet by the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it seems\nto me, still more splendidly adorned.\n\n#Integrity _vs._ avarice.#\n\n*77* There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the point from\nwhich it digressed, no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in\nmen who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the\nstate for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous.\nAnd so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that \"Sparta should\nnot fall from any other cause than avarice,\" seems to be a prophecy not\nto the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They\nwho direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the\nmasses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and\nself-denial.\n\n#The menace of agrarian laws.#\n\n*78* But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason\neither attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants\nmay be driven out of their homes, or propose that money loaned should\nbe remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the\ncommonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot\nexist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another;\nand second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the\nrights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the\npeculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man\nthe free and undisturbed control of his own particular property. *79*\nAnd yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to public welfare, they do\nnot gain even that popularity which they anticipate. For he who has been\nrobbed of his property is their enemy; he to whom it has been turned\nover actually pretends that he had no wish to take it; and most of all,\nwhen his debts are cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that\nhe may be thought to have been insolvent; whereas the victim of the\nwrong both remembers it and shows his resentment openly. Thus even\nthough they to whom property has been wrongfully awarded be more in\nnumber than they from whom it has been unjustly taken, they do not for\nthat reason have more influence; for in such matters influence is\nmeasured not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair that a man who\nnever had any property should take possession of lands that had been\noccupied for many years or even generations, and that he who had them\nbefore should lose possession of them?\n\n    [AY] Nearly two million pounds sterling.\n\n\n*80* XXIII. Ac[249] propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum\nephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat,\nnecaverunt, exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt, ut et\ntyranni exsisterent et optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime\nconstituta res publica dilaberetur; nec vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed\netiam reliquam Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum,[250] quae a\nLacedaemoniis profectae manarunt latius. Quid? nostros Gracchos, Ti.\nGracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariae contentiones\nperdiderunt?\n\n*81* At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum eius civitas\nquinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem\nclandestino introitu urbe est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem\nimproviso oppressisset,[251] sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi\nfuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam adventu suo liberavit.\nSed cum magnam animadverteret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem,\nquod et eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possederant, egere\niniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quinquaginta annorum possessiones\nmoveri[252] non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio\nmulta hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur sine\niniuria, iudicavit neque illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum\nilla fuerant, oportere. *82* Cum igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem\nconstituendam pecunia, Alexandream se proficisci velle dixit remque\nintegram ad reditum suum iussit esse, isque celeriter ad Ptolomaeum,\nsuum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandream conditam.\nCui[253] cum exposuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque docuisset,\na rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit, ut grandi pecunia\nadiuvaretur. Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium\nquindecim principes, cum quibus causas cognovit et eorum, qui aliena\ntenebant, et eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecitque aestimandis\npossessionibus, ut persuaderet aliis, ut pecuniam accipere mallent,\npossessionibus cederent, aliis, ut commodius putarent numerari sibi,\nquod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare. Ita perfectum est, ut omnes\nconcordia constituta sine querella discederent.\n\n*83* O virum magnum dignumque, qui in re publica nostra natus esset! Sic\npar est agere cum civibus, non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro\nponere et bona civium voci subicere[254] praeconis. At ille Graecus, id\nquod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit,\neaque est summa ratio et sapientia boni civis, commoda civium non\ndivellere atque omnis aequitate eadem continere. Habitent gratis in\nalieno. Quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim, aedificarim, tuear, impendam, tu\nme invito fruare meo? Quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aliis dare\naliena? *84* Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea\npecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam?\n\n    [249] _Ac_ Edd.; _at_ MSS.\n\n    [250] _malorum_ L c p, Edd.; _maiorum_ B H a b.\n\n    [251] _oppressisset_ L c p, Edd.; _pressisset_ B H a b.\n\n    [252] _moveri_ L c p, Edd.; _movere_ B H a b.\n\n    [253] _cui_ Edd.; _qui_ MSS.\n\n    [254] _subicere_ L c p, Edd.; _subiacere_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Instances of agrarian legislation.#\n\n*80* XXIII. Now, it was on account of just this sort of wrong-doing that\nthe Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to\ndeath--an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time\non--and for the same reason--dissensions so serious ensued that tyrants\narose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most\nadmirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but by\nthe contagion of the ills that, starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely\nand more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. What shall\nwe say of our own Gracchi, the sons of that famous Tiberius Gracchus and\ngrandsons of Africanus? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue that\ncaused their downfall and death?\n\n#Aratus of Sicyon.#\n\n*81* Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his\ncity had been kept for fifty years in the power of its tyrants, he came\nover from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by\nsurprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from\nbanishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the\ncity, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great\ndifficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he\nconsidered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be\nleft in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken\npossession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that\ntenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course\nof that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands\nby right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore\ndecided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the\npresent incumbents or to let them keep it without compensation to its\nformer possessors. *82* So, when he had come to the conclusion that he\nmust have money to meet the situation, he announced that he meant to\nmake a trip to Alexandria and gave orders that matters should remain\nas they were until his return. And so he went in haste to his friend\nPtolemy, then upon the throne, the second king after the founding of\nAlexandria. To him he explained that he wished to restore constitutional\nliberty to his country and presented his case to him. And, being a man\nof the highest standing, he easily secured from that wealthy king\nassistance in the form of a large sum of money. And when he had returned\nwith this to Sicyon, he called into counsel with him fifteen of the\nforemost men of the city. With them he investigated the cases both of\nthose who were holding possession of other people's property and of\nthose who had lost theirs. And he managed by a valuation of the\nproperties to persuade some that it was more desirable to accept money\nand surrender their present holdings; others he convinced that it was\nmore to their interest to take a fair price in cash for their lost\nestates than to try to recover possession of what had been their own. As\na result, harmony was preserved, and all parties went their way without\na word of complaint.\n\n#Justice the corner-stone of statecraft.#\n\n*83* A great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our\ncommonwealth! That is the right way to deal with one's fellow-citizens,\nand not, as we have already witnessed on two occasions, to plant the\nspear in the forum and knock down the property of citizens under the\nauctioneer's hammer. But yon Greek, like a wise and excellent man,\nthought that he must look out for the welfare of all. And this is the\nhighest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom on the part of a good\ncitizen, not to divide the interests of the citizens but to unite all on\nthe basis of impartial justice. \"Let them live in their neighbour's\nhouse rent-free.\"[AZ] Why so? In order that, when I have bought, built,\nkept up, and spent my money upon a place, you may without my consent\nenjoy what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob one man of what\nbelongs to him and to give to another what does not belong to him? *84*\nAnd what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a\nfarm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money?\n\n    [AZ] An assumed appeal to one of Caesar's edicts.\n\n\nXXIV. Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat,\nprovidendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit,\nut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla\nres vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla\npotest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam\nvehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris\ntemptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti,\nut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes\nalienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe\nsublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum\nquidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea[255] perfecit, cum eius iam nihil\ninteresset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum\ndelectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset.\n\n*85* Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur,\naberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur, in primisque operam dabunt, ut\niuris et iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores\npropter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel\ntenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel\nbelli vel domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris,\nvectigalibus.\n\nHaec magnorum hominum sunt, haec apud maiores nostros factitata, haec\ngenera officiorum qui persequentur,[256] cum summa utilitate rei\npublicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam.\n\n*86* In his autem utilitatum praeceptis Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui\nAthenis nuper est mortuus, duo praeterita censet esse a Panaetio,\nvaletudinis curationem et pecuniae; quas res a summo philosopho\npraeteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles; sunt certe utiles. Sed\nvaletudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut\nprodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu\ncorporis tuendi causa [praetermittendis voluptatibus],[257] postremo\narte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent.\n\n*87* Res autem familiaris quaeri debet iis rebus, a quibus abest\nturpitudo, conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia, eisdem etiam rebus\naugeri. Has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo\nlibro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quem nos, ista fere aetate cum\nessemus, qua es tu nunc, e Graeco in Latinum convertimus. [258]Sed toto\nhoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, (vellem[259] etiam\nde utenda) commodius a quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum[260] medium\nsedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur. Sunt\ntamen ea cognoscenda; pertinent enim ad utilitatem, de qua hoc libro\ndisputatum est.[258]\n\n    [255] _cogitarat, ea_ B H a b, Bt.^2, M\u00fcller; _cogitarat, cum\n    ipsius intererat, tum ea_ c p, Bt.^1, Heine.\n\n    [256] _persequentur_ c; _persequuntur_ b, Bt.^2;\n    _persecuntur_ B H p, Bt.^1, Heine.\n\n    [257] _praetermittendis voluptatibus_ MSS.; del. Heine, Edd.\n\n    [258] _Sed ... disputatum est_ transposed from \u00a7 90 by Unger,\n    Edd.\n\n    [259] _vellem_ c p, Bt.^1, Ed.; not in B H a b, Bt.^2\n\n    [260] _Ianum_ c, Edd.; _ianuae_ B H a b p.\n\n\n#Economics of debts.#\n\nXXIV. We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no\nindebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace\nthat can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred,\nwe are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors\nprofit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a\ngovernment more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit,\nunless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for\nthe repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my\nconsulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to\nforce the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this\nplague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was\nnever greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully;\nfor the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was\nenforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still\ncarried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal\nadvantage to him.[BA] So great was his passion for wrong-doing that the\nvery doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake, even when there\nwas no motive for it.\n\n*85* Those, then, whose office it is to look after the interests of the\nstate will refrain from that form of liberality which robs one man to\nenrich another. #Administration of the courts in equity.# Above all,\nthey will use their best endeavours that every one shall be protected in\nthe possession of his own property by the fair administration of the law\nand the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be oppressed because\nof their helplessness, and that envy shall not stand in the way of the\nrich, to prevent them from keeping or recovering possession of what\njustly belongs to them; they must strive, too, by whatever means they\ncan, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory,\nand in revenues.\n\nSuch service calls for great men; it was commonly rendered in the days\nof our ancestors; if men will perform duties such as these, they will\nwin popularity and glory for themselves and at the same time render\neminent service to the state.\n\n#Sanitation.#\n\n*86* Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Antipater of Tyre,\na Stoic philosopher who recently died at Athens, claims that two points\nwere overlooked by Panaetius--the care of health and of property. I\npresume that the eminent philosopher overlooked these two items because\nthey present no difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Although\nthey are a matter of course, I will still say a few words on the\nsubject. Individual health is preserved by studying one's own\nconstitution, by observing what is good or bad for one, by constant\nself-control in supplying physical wants and comforts (but only to the\nextent necessary to self-preservation), by foregoing sensual pleasures,\nand finally, by the professional skill of those to whose science these\nmatters belong.\n\n#Finance.#\n\n*87* As for property, it is a duty to make money, but only by honourable\nmeans; it is a duty also to save it and increase it by care and thrift.\nThese principles Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, has set forth most\nhappily in his book entitled \"Oeconomicus.\" When I was about your\npresent age, I translated it from the Greek into Latin.\n\nBut this whole subject of acquiring money, investing money (I wish I\ncould include also spending money) is more profitably discussed by\ncertain worthy gentlemen on \"Change\" than could be done by any\nphilosophers of any school. For all that, we must take cognizance of\nthem; for they come fitly under the head of expediency, and that is the\nsubject of the present book.\n\n    [BA] Caesar, it seems, had had some part in the schemes of\n    Catiline in B.C. 63 and possibly in the plot of B.C. 66-65.\n    When his conquests in Gaul had freed him from his debts and\n    made him rich, his party, with his consent, passed (B.C. 49)\n    the obnoxious legislation here referred to--that all interest\n    in arrears should be remitted, and that that which had been\n    paid should be deducted from the principal.\n\n\n*88* XXV. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a\nPanaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda\ncum externis [et externa cum corporis][261] et ipsa inter se corporis et\nexterna cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo\ncomparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, [cum corporis externa hoc\nmodo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus,][262] ipsa inter\nse corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires\nceleritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana\nrusticis. *89* Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis: a\nquo cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret, respondit:\n\"Bene pascere\"; quid secundum: \"Satis bene pascere\"; quid tertium:[263]\n\"Male pascere\"; quid quartum: \"Arare\"; et cum ille, qui quaesierat,\ndixisset: \"Quid faenerari?\", tum Cato: \"Quid hominem,\" inquit,\n\"occidere?\"\n\nEx quo et multis aliis intellegi debet utilitatum comparationes fieri\nsolere, recteque hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorum officiorum\ngenus.[264]\n\nReliqua deinceps persequemur.\n\n    [261] [_et ... corporis_] bracketed by Unger, Edd.\n\n    [262] [_cum corporis ... corporis viribus_] bracketed by\n    Unger, Edd.\n\n    [263] _quid tertium: \"Male pascere\"_ c p, Edd.; not in B H a\n    b.\n\n    [264] _officiorum genus._ Here follows in MSS. _Sed toto ...\n    disputatum est_ transposed to \u00a7 87.\n\n\n#Comparison of expediencies.#\n\n*88* XXV. But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against\nanother;--for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by\nPanaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with\noutward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages\nare compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical\nadvantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as\nthis: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than\nwealth; [external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better\nto have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while the physical\nadvantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is\npreferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages\nalso may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be\npreferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived\nfrom the farm. *89* To this class of comparisons belongs that famous\nsaying of old Cato's: when he was asked what was the most profitable\nfeature of an estate, he replied: \"Raising cattle successfully.\" What\nnext to that? \"Raising cattle with fair success.\" And next? \"Raising\ncattle with but slight success.\" And fourth? \"Raising crops.\" And when\nhis questioner said, \"How about money-lending?\" Cato replied: \"How about\nmurder?\"\n\nFrom this as well as from many other incidents we ought to realize that\nexpediencies have often to be weighed against one another and that it is\nproper for us to add this fourth division in the discussion of moral\nduty.\n\nLet us now pass on to the remaining problems.\n\n\n\n\nCICERO DE OFFICIIS\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nTHE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE EXPEDIENT\n\n\n\n\nLIBER TERTIUS / BOOK III\n\n\n*1* I. P. Scipionem, M.[265] fili, eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus\nest, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit eius fere aequalis, numquam\nse minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus\nesset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna; quae declarat\nillum et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui\nsolitum, ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum colloquio alterius non\negeret. Ita duae res, quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum acuebant,\notium et solitudo. Vellem nobis hoc idem vere dicere liceret; sed si\nminus imitatione tantam ingenii praestantiam consequi possumus,\nvoluntate certe proxime accedimus; nam et a re publica forensibusque\nnegotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob eam causam\nurbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli sumus.\n\n*2* Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa\ncomparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis\nmuneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e[266] coetu hominum\nfrequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat,\nnostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum\nest. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum\nnobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? *3* Ita, qui in maxima\ncelebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes\nconspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos, quantum\nlicet, et saepe soli sumus. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus,\nnon solum ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excerpere ex his\nipsis,[267] si quid inesset boni, propterea et otio fruor, non illo\nquidem, quo debebat is,[268] qui quondam peperisset otium civitati, nec\neam solitudinem languere patior, quam mihi affert necessitas, non\nvoluntas.\n\n*4* Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequebatur. Nulla\nenim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum\nsolitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis agitatione\ninvestigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur, nec otiosum\nnec solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, ut\ncogitatione tacita a[269] solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi\noperam omne studium curamque convertimus. Itaque plura brevi tempore\neversa quam multis annis stante re publica scripsimus.\n\n    [265] _M._ Nonius; _Marce_ MSS.\n\n    [266] _e_ c, Edd.; _a_ a; not in B H b.\n\n    [267] _ex his ipsis_ c, Edd.; _ex his_ a; _ex ipsis_ B H b.\n\n    [268] _debebat is_ c, Edd.; _debeat_ B H b; _debeat is_ corr.\n    in _debeat_ a.\n\n    [269] _a_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n\n#Preface: Scipio and Cicero.#\n\n*1* I. Cato, who was of about the same years, Marcus, my son, as that\nPublius Scipio who first bore the surname of Africanus, has given us the\nstatement that Scipio used to say that he was never less idle than when\nhe had nothing to do and never less lonely than when he was alone. An\nadmirable sentiment, in truth, and becoming to a great and wise man. It\nshows that even in his leisure hours his thoughts were occupied with\npublic business and that he used to commune with himself when alone; and\nso not only was he never unoccupied, but he sometimes had no need for\ncompany. The two conditions, then, that prompt others to\nidleness--leisure and solitude--only spurred him on. I wish I could say\nthe same of myself and say it truly. But if by imitation I cannot attain\nto such excellence of character, in aspiration, at all events, I\napproach it as nearly as I can; for as I am kept by force of armed\ntreason away from practical politics and from my practice at the bar, I\nam now leading a life of leisure. For that reason I have left the city\nand, wandering in the country from place to place, I am often alone.\n\n*2* But I should not compare this leisure of mine with that of\nAfricanus, nor this solitude with his. For he, to find leisure from his\nsplendid services to his country, used to take a vacation now and then\nand to retreat from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude,\nas into a haven of rest. #The orator's retirement.# But my leisure is\nforced upon me by want of public business, not prompted by any desire\nfor repose. For now that the senate has been abolished and the courts\nhave been closed, what is there, in keeping with my self-respect, that I\ncan do either in the senate-chamber or in the forum? *3* So, although I\nonce lived amid throngs of people and in the greatest publicity, I am\nnow shunning the sight of the miscreants with whom the world abounds and\nwithdrawing from the public eye as far as I may, and I am often alone.\nBut I have learned from philosophers that among evils one ought not only\nto choose the least, but also to extract even from these any element of\ngood that they may contain. For that reason, I am turning my leisure to\naccount--though it is not such repose as the man should be entitled to\nwho once brought the state repose from civil strife--and I am not\nletting this solitude, which necessity and not my will imposes on me,\nfind me idle.\n\n*4* And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the higher praise. For no\nliterary monuments of his genius have been published, we have no work\nproduced in his leisure hours, no product of his solitude. From this\nfact we may safely infer that, because of the activity of his mind and\nthe study of those problems to which he used to direct his thought, he\nwas never unoccupied, never lonely. But I have not strength of mind\nenough by means of silent meditation to forget my solitude; and so I\nhave turned all my attention and endeavour to this kind of literary\nwork. I have, accordingly, written more in this short time since the\ndownfall of the republic than I did in the course of many years, while\nthe republic stood.\n\n\n*5* II. Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera et fructuosa nec\nulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus\nest nec uberior[270] quam de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque\nvivendi praecepta ducuntur. Quare, quamquam a Cratippo nostro, principe\nhuius memoriae philosophorum, haec te assidue audire atque accipere\nconfido, tamen conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus undique\ncircumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. *6* Quod\ncum omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, tum haud\nscio an nemini potius quam tibi; sustines enim non parvam exspectationem\nimitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, non nullam fortasse\nnominis. Suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi; ad\nquos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem\nredire turpissimum est dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri.\nQuare, quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere, si\ndiscendi labor est potius quam voluptas, tantum fac ut efficias neve\ncommittas, ut, cum[271] omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi\ndefuisse videare.\n\nSed haec hactenus; multa enim saepe ad te cohortandi gratia scripsimus;\nnunc ad reliquam partem propositae divisionis revertamur.\n\n*7* Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime\ndisputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti\nsumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et\nconsultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id\nesset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile,\ntertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile\nvideretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis\ntribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit\ndicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. *8* Quod eo magis miror, quia\nscriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse\nPanaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quem locum miror a\nPosidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum\nscribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium.\n\n*9* Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio\npraetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia\nnumquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest\nhabere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione\nPanaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest,\nquin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione\ntripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam;\npraeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps\nesse dicturum. *10* Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam\nscribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui\nPanaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam\npartem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim\npulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae\nPanaetius praetermisisset [et non perfecisset][272] propter eorum, quae\nperfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum.\n\n    [270] _uberior_ c, Edd.; _uerior_ B H a b.\n\n    [271] _ut, cum_ c, Edd.; _ut ne, cum_ B H a b.\n\n    [272] _et non perfecisset_ MSS.; del. Muretus; bracketed by\n    Edd.\n\n\n#Young Cicero admonished to diligence in his studies.#\n\n*5* II. But, my dear Cicero, while the whole field of philosophy is\nfertile and productive and no portion of it barren and waste, still no\npart is richer or more fruitful than that which deals with moral duties;\nfor from these are derived the rules for leading a consistent and moral\nlife. And therefore, although you are, as I trust, diligently studying\nand profiting by these precepts under the direction of our friend\nCratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present age, I still think it\nwell that your ears should be dinned with such precepts from every side\nand that, if it could be, they should hear nothing else. *6* These\nprecepts must be laid to heart by all who look forward to a career of\nhonour, and I am inclined to think that no one needs them more than you.\nFor you will have to fulfil the eager anticipation that you will imitate\nmy industry, the confident expectation that you will emulate my course\nof political honours, and the hope that you will, perhaps, rival my name\nand fame. You have, besides, incurred a heavy responsibility on account\nof Athens and Cratippus: for since you have gone to them for the\npurchase, as it were, of a store of liberal culture, it would be a great\ndiscredit to you to return empty-handed, thereby disgracing the high\nreputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, put forth the best\nmental effort of which you are capable; work as hard as you can (if\nlearning is work rather than pleasure); do your very best to succeed;\nand do not, when I have put all the necessary means at your disposal,\nallow it to be said that you have failed to do your part.\n\nBut enough of this. For I have written again and again for your\nencouragement. Let us now return to the remaining section of our\nsubject as outlined.\n\n#Panaetius on Moral Duties.#\n\n*7* Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most\nthorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed\nhim in the main--but with slight modifications. He classifies under\nthree general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to\nconsider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is\nmorally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or\ninexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that\nwhich has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which\nseems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in\nthree books; but while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third\nhead in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. *8* And I\nwonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records\nthat Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those\nthree books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched\nupon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he\nstates that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so\nessentially important as this.\n\n#Why Panaetius omitted the \"Conflict\" of the moral and the expedient.#\n\n*9* Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that\npoint was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it\nwas not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such\na thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with\nregard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt--whether that\nquestion which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been\nincluded or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to\ndebate--that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For\nif a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third\nmust necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close\nof the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper\nturn. *10* We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact.\nHe writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also\nwas a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that \"as no painter had been\nfound to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left\nunfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt\nadequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of\nthe surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture\nto supply what he had left undone.\"\n\n\n*11* III. Quam ob rem de iudicio Panaeti dubitari non potest; rectene\nautem hanc tertiam partem ad exquirendum officium adiunxerit an secus,\nde eo fortasse disputari potest. Nam, sive honestum solum bonum est, ut\nStoicis placet, sive, quod honestum est, id ita summum bonum est, quem\nad modum Peripateticis vestris videtur, ut omnia ex altera parte\ncollocata vix minimi momenti instar habeant, dubitandum non est, quin\nnumquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus\nSocratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohaerentia\nopinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi, ut et,\nquicquid honestum esset, id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam,\nquod non honestum.\n\n*12* Quodsi is esset Panaetius, qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret,\nquod ea efficiens utilitatis esset, ut ii, qui res expetendas vel\nvoluptate vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem\naliquando cum honestate pugnare; sed cum sit is, qui id solum bonum\niudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam\nutilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri nec decessione\npeiorem, non videtur debuisse eius modi deliberationem introducere, in\nqua, quod utile videretur, cum eo, quod honestum est, compararetur. *13*\nEtenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere,\nid habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam: cum virtute congruere semper,\ncetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti\nnon repugnarent. Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam hanc comparationem non\nrecte introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquam praecipiendum\nfuisse.\n\nAtque[273] illud quidem honestum, quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in\nsapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis\nautem, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem\nperfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt. *14*\nHaec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici\nappellant; ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii bonitate\nmulti assequuntur et progressione discendi. Illud autem officium, quod\nrectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt,\nomnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest.\n*15* Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant,[274]\nid cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid absit a\nperfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat\npraetermissum; quod idem[275] in poematis, in picturis usu venit in\naliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae\nlaudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis[276] aliquid\nprobi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem,[277] quid in una quaque re vitii\nsit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt\nfacile sententia.\n\n    [273] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, M\u00fcller, Heine; _atqui_ Fleckeisen,\n    Bt.^2, Ed.\n\n    [274] _compareant_ Anemoecius, Edd.; _comparant_ B H a b;\n    _appareant_ c; _comparent_ p.\n\n    [275] _idem_ Nonius, M\u00fcller, Heine; _autem_ B H a b; _item_\n    c, Bt.\n\n    [276] _iis_ Baiter, M\u00fcller, Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [277] _qui quidem_ many MSS., Bt.^1, M\u00fcller; _qui idem_ B H a\n    b c; _qui [idem]_ Bt.^2, Heine.\n\n\n#The conflict between Expediency and Moral Rectitude only apparent.#\n\n*11* III. In regard to Panaetius's real intentions, therefore, no doubt\ncan be entertained. But whether he was or was not justified in adding\nthis third division to the inquiry about duty may, perhaps, be a matter\nfor debate. For whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics\nbelieve, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, moral goodness is in so\nfar the highest good that everything else gathered together into the\nopposing scale would have scarcely the slightest weight, it is beyond\nquestion that expediency can never conflict with moral rectitude. And\nso, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who\nfirst drew a conceptual distinction between things naturally\ninseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in agreement in so far as\nthey maintain that if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and\nif anything is not morally right, it is not expedient.\n\n*12* But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is worth\ncultivating only because it is productive of advantage, as do certain\nphilosophers who measure the desirableness of things by the standard of\npleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that expediency sometimes\nclashes with moral rectitude. But since he is a man who judges that the\nmorally right is the only good, and that those things which come in\nconflict with it have only the appearance of expediency and cannot make\nlife any better by their presence nor any worse by their absence, it\nfollows that he ought not to have raised a question involving the\nweighing of what seems expedient against what is morally right. *13*\nFurthermore, when the Stoics speak of the supreme good as \"living\nconformably to nature,\" they mean, as I take it, something like this:\nthat we are always to be in accord with virtue, and from all other\nthings that may be in harmony with nature to choose only such as are not\nincompatible with virtue. This being so, some people are of the opinion\nthat it was not right to introduce this counterbalancing of right and\nexpediency and that no practical instruction should have been given on\nthis question at all.\n\nAnd yet moral goodness, in the true and proper sense of the term, is the\nexclusive possession of the wise and can never be separated from virtue;\nbut those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly have perfect moral\ngoodness, but only a semblance of it. *14* #The \"absolute\" and the\n\"mean.\"# And indeed these duties under discussion in these books the\nStoics call \"mean duties\"[BB]; they are a common possession and have\nwide application; and many people attain to the knowledge of them\nthrough natural goodness of heart and through advancement in learning.\nBut that duty which those same Stoics call \"right\" is perfect and\nabsolute and \"satisfies all the numbers,\"[BC] as that same school says,\nand is attainable by none except the wise man. *15* On the other hand,\nwhen some act is performed in which we see \"mean\" duties manifested,\nthat is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the\ncommon crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of\nreal perfection; but as far as their comprehension does go, they think\nthere is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the\nestimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art:\nordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The\nreason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of\nexcellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have\nnot the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular\npiece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts,\nthey readily abandon their former opinion.\n\n    [BB] See note on I, 8.\n\n    [BC] I.e., fills all the requirements of absolute\n    perfection--an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that\n    specific numbers stand for perfection of specific kinds;\n    \"absolute duty\" combines them all.\n\n\nIV. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda\nquaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni\nhominum genere communia. *16* Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis\nindoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes\nviri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius [aut Aristides][278] iustus\nnominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc[279] iustitiae tamquam a\nsapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem\nvolumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et\nC. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum\nofficiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque\nsapientium.\n\n*17* Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis\nrepugnantia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod\ncolitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam\nest comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam\ncadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie\ndicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non\npotest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.\n\nSed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni.\n\n*18* Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt\npraeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod\nutile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo\nPanaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc\nipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, \"solere\" modo, non etiam \"oportere.\"\nEtenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum\nsit,[280] sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare\nturpissimum est.\n\nQuid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat\nconsiderandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit\nid, de quo consideretur. *19* Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe\nplerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa\nponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse[281] scelus\nquam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur\nse astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo\nquidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud\npulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero\nhonestas utilitatem secuta est.[282]\n\nItaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo,\nquod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile,\nformula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione\nrerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. *20* Erit autem haec formula\nStoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his\nlibris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a\nPeripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae\nhonesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius\nhaec ab eis disseruntur,[283] quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile\nvidetur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis,[284] quibus\net honestum aliquid non utile et utile[285] non honestum. Nobis autem\nnostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile\noccurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam.\n\n    [278] _aut Aristides_ (_Aristidesve_ p) MSS., Lactantius;\n    bracketed by J. M. Heusinger, Edd.\n\n    [279] _hoc_ Lactantius, Edd., _his_ MSS.\n\n    [280] _sit_ c, Bt.^2, M\u00fcller; not in B H a b, Bt.^1; _est_\n    Heine.\n\n    [281] _esse_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.\n\n    [282] _utilitatem secuta est_ MSS., M\u00fcller, Heine;\n    _utilitatem; honestatem utilitas secuta est_ Baiter, Ed.\n\n    [283] _disseruntur_ certain MSS., C. Lange and Fr. Fabricius,\n    M\u00fcller, Heine; _disserentur_ MSS., Bt.\n\n    [284] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ (_hijs_ c) MSS.\n\n    [285] _et honestum ... et utile_ Lambinus, Bt.^2, M\u00fcller,\n    Heine, _et honestum ... aut utile_ B H a b; _aut honestum ...\n    aut utile_ c, Bt.^1\n\n\n#Absolute goodness and imperfect humanity.#\n\nIV. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these\nbooks, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness,\nnot the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all\nmankind. *16* Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a\nnatural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios\nare mentioned as \"brave men\" or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called \"the\njust,\" it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of\ncourage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one\nof them the ideal \"wise man.\" For no one of them was wise in the sense\nin which we wish to have \"wise\" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and\nGaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed\n\"the wise.\" Not even the famous Seven were \"wise.\" But because of their\nconstant observance of \"mean\" duties they bore a certain semblance and\nlikeness to wise men.\n\n*17* For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality\nagainst conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated\nby those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable;\nbut we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right\nwhich comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the\ntruly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally\nright in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we\ncannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of\nvirtue.\n\nSo much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their\ncareful observance of duty.\n\n#Moral rectitude and apparent expediency.#\n\n*18* Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of\nprofits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by\nconsiderations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any\nquestion, to weigh the morally right against what they think the\nexpedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated\nthat people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant\nprecisely what he said--merely that \"such was their custom,\" not that\nsuch was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral\nto think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally\nright, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to\nchoose between them.\n\n#Occasion for doubt.#\n\nWhat, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to\ncall for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to\nthe character of an action under consideration. *19* For it often\nhappens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed\nunder ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not\nto be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some\nparticular case that admits of wider application: what more atrocious\ncrime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate\nfriend? But if anyone kills a tyrant--be he never so intimate a\nfriend--he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People,\nat all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they\nhold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed\nover moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand\nwith expediency.\n\n#Need of a rule for guidance.#\n\nSome general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide\nwithout error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with\nwhat we feel to be morally right; and if we follow that rule in\ncomparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of\nduty. *20* That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the\nStoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following\nin these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your\nPeripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is\nmorally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the\ndiscussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider\nwhatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is\nnot at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if\nconducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally\nright and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New\nAcademy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend\nany theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to\nmy rule.\n\n\n*21* V. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo\nsuum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas,\nquam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus\nexternis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim\nsic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut\nviolet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum\nnaturam, humani generis societatem. *22* Ut, si unum quodque membrum\nsensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri\nvaletudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus\nnecesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum\ndetrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum\net communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad\nusum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non\nrepugnante natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras\nfacultates, copias, opes augeamus.\n\n*23* Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus\npopulorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem\nmodo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc\nenim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem;\nquam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno co\u00ebrcent.\n\nAtque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et\nhumana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam\nvolent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri\ndetraxerit, sibi adsumat. *24* Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam\nexcelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas\nquam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro\nnihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi\nest. [Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra\nnaturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.][286]\n\n*25* Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri\npossit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere\nimitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in\nconcilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine\nullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus\ncopiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus.\n\nQuocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic\nanteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere\nnon posse.\n\n*26* Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur,\naut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam[287]\ncenset mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum,\npropinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat\ncontra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui\nomnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet,\nsed[288] multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo,\nquod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius\nexistimat.\n\n    [286] _Detrahere ... generis eiusdem_ MSS.; bracketed by\n    Baiter, Edd.\n\n    [287] _fugiendam_ b, Ed.; _fugienda_ B H a c.\n\n    [288] _sed_ c, Edd.; _et_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Wrongful gains are against the laws:#\n\n#(1) of nature,#\n\n*21* V. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to\nprofit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to nature than is death\nor poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or\nour property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life\nand fellowship between man and man. For if we are so disposed that each,\nto gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then\nthose bonds of human society, which are most in accord with nature's\nlaws, must of necessity be broken. *22* Suppose, by way of comparison,\nthat each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and\nimagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself\nthe health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would\nnecessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize\nupon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could\nappropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably\nbe annihilated. For, without any conflict with nature's laws, it is\ngranted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for\nhis neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but nature's\nlaws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by\ndespoiling others.\n\n#(2) of nations,#\n\n*23* But this principle is established not by nature's laws alone (that\nis, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of\nparticular communities, in accordance with which in individual states\nthe public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord\nordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage\nto injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard;\nthis is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should\nnot be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by\nthe penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine.\n\n#(3) of gods and men.#\n\nAgain, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the\nReason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone\nwill hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live\nin accord with nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting\nanything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he\nhas taken from his neighbour. *24* Then, too, loftiness and greatness of\nspirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony\nwith nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it\nrequires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them\nas naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal.\n#Self-seeking _vs._ self-sacrifice.# [But for anyone to rob his\nneighbour for his own profit is more contrary to nature than death,\npain, and the like.]\n\n*25* In like manner it is more in accord with nature to emulate the\ngreat Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of\naiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not\nonly free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in\nwealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus\nHercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the\nworld, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given\nhim a place in the council of the gods.\n\nThe better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is\nendowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of\npleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to nature,\ncannot do harm to his fellow-man.\n\n*26* Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for\nhimself, he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of\nnature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of\nchildren, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of\ninjustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of\nnature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the\nindividual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he\nbelieves that while such a course should be avoided, the other\nalternatives are much worse--namely, death, poverty, pain--he is\nmistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his\nproperty are more serious than those affecting his soul.\n\n\nVI. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius\ncuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis\nhumana consortio.\n\n*27* Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque\nsit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est\nsecundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita\nest, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est,\ncerte violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum\nigitur extremum. *28* Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt,\nparenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam\nrationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem\ncommunis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia\nomnem societatem distrahit civitatis.\n\nQui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii[289]\ndirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata beneficentia,\nliberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt,\netiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim\nconstitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis\nartissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem\nhomini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel\nexterna vel corporis ... vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent\niustitia[290]; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina\nvirtutum.\n\n*29* Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse\nconficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? [Minime\nvero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio,\nneminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.][291] Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem\ntyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu\nspoliare possit, nonne faciat?\n\n*30* Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam\npartem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris\ncontraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei\npublicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis,\nsi quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin\nautem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius\nquam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra\nnaturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque\nappetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est;\nest enim iniusta. *31* Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum\nconservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque\ninutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum\nnecessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit,\nmodo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens\nhanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati\nconsulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati.\n\n*32* Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est\nenim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque\nest contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare,\natque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate\nexterminandum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa\nsanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus\ncorporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a\ncommuni tamquam humanitatis corpore[292] segreganda est.\n\nHuius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium\nexquiritur.\n\n    [289] _ii_ Bt., Ed.; _hi_ B a b; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.\n\n    [290] _quae vacent iustitia_ MSS., Ed., Heine; _quae vacent\n    iniustitia_ cod. Ubaldini, Bt.^1; _quae non v. iustitia_ O.\n\n    [291] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.\n\n    [292] _humanitatis corpore_ Muret, cod. Guelf., Ed., Bt.,\n    Heine; _humanitate corporis_ MSS., M\u00fcller; Unger strikes out\n    _corporis_.\n\n\n#The interest of society is the interest of the individual.#\n\nVI. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the\ninterest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For\nif the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to\nthe common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed.\n\n*27* And further, if nature ordains that one man shall desire to\npromote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because\nhe is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same\nnature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And if\nthis is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and\nif this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to\nwrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the\nconclusion is likewise true. *28* For that is an absurd position which\nis taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a\nbrother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their\nfellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence\nthat they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations,\nsocial ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole\nstructure of civil society.\n\n#Better endure any loss than wrong a fellow man for gain.#\n\nOthers again who say that regard should be had for the rights of\nfellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal\nbrotherhood of mankind; and when this is annihilated, kindness,\ngenerosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who\nwork all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling\nagainst the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods\nhave established between human beings, and the closest bond of this\nfellowship is the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature for man\nto rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss,\nwhether to his property or to his person ... or even to his very\nsoul--so far as these losses are not concerned with justice[BD]; for\nthis virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues.\n\n*29* But, perhaps, some one may say: \"Well, then, suppose a wise man\nwere starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly\nuseless member of society?\" [Not at all; for my life is not more\nprecious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing\nwrong to anybody for my own advantage.] \"Or again; supposing a righteous\nman were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of\nclothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?\"\n\n*30* These cases are very easy to decide. For if merely for one's own\nbenefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a\nperfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary\nto nature's law. #The interests of society must decide about\nexceptions.# But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to\nrender signal service to the state and to human society--if from that\nmotive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter\nfor censure. But if such is not the case, each one must bear his own\nburden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not\nto say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is\nmore repugnant to nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's\nneighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests\nis repugnant to nature; for it is unjust. *31* And therefore nature's\nlaw itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely\ndetermine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency\nhave the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is\nidle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to\nthe common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do\nnot find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing.\nBut thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his\nduty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so\nfond of dwelling.\n\n#No duty due to a tyrant.#\n\n*32* As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no\nties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it\nis not opposed to nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally\nright to kill;--nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be\nexterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper\nmeasures; for as certain members are amputated, if they show signs\nthemselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize\nthe health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage\nmonsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the\ncommon body of humanity.\n\nOf this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what\nmoral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances.\n\n    [BD] I.e., there are no circumstances of loss or gain that\n    can warrant a violation of justice.\n\n\n*33* VII. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi\naliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas\nconsultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex\nquibus[293] perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum,\nquid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit.\n\nSed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium\nimponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut\nquaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego\na te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id,\nquod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per\nCratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime\npropter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud\nprobabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile.\n\n*34* Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum\nhonestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed\nea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum,\nnihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam\npestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista\ndistraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis,\nsed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent,[294] induxit\neam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantiam. Hanc igitur\npartem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte\nnostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum,\nquod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt.[295]\n\n    [293] _superioribus ... ex quibus_ Walker, Bt.^2, Ed.; _ex\n    superioribus ... quibus_ MSS., Bt.^1; _superioribus ...\n    quibus_, Heine.\n\n    [294] _ea ... incidissent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _eam_\n    [repugnantiam] ... _incidisset_ Unger, Bt.^2\n\n    [295] _venerunt_ Manutius, Edd.; _venerint_ MSS.\n\n\n*33* VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would\nhave followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his\ndesign. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his\nformer books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be\navoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided\nfor the reason that it is not immoral at all.\n\nWe are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which\nis unfinished to be sure, but still almost completed; and as\nmathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition\nbut require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily\nto explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with\nme, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake\nexcept what is morally right. #Moral Right the only good or the chief\ngood.# But if Cratippus[BE] does not permit this assumption, you will\nstill grant this at least--that what is morally right is the object most\nworth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for\nmy purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more\nprobable; and besides these, there is no other alternative that seems\nprobable at all.[BF]\n\n#Vindication of Panaetius: nothing can be expedient that is not morally\nright.#\n\n*34* In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on\nthis point; for he has said not that the truly expedient could under\ncertain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not\nhave said that conscientiously[BG]), but only that what _seemed_\nexpedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that\nnothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right,\nand nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he\nsays that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the\ndoctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he\nintroduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the\nend that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient\npreference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in\neach other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This\npart, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to\ncompletion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the\nsaying is. For of all that has been worked out on this line since the\ntime of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all\nsatisfactory to me.\n\n    [BE] As a Peripatetic, Cratippus insisted that there was\n    _natural_ good as well as _moral_ good; thus health, honour,\n    etc., were good and worth seeking for their own sake, though\n    in less degree than virtue. But the Stoics (and Cicero is now\n    speaking as a Stoic) called all those other blessings not\n    \"good\" nor \"worth seeking for their own sake,\" but\n    \"indifferent.\"\n\n    [BF] With this he waves aside, without even the honour of\n    mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.\n\n    [BG] Because he was a Stoic.\n\n\n*35* VIII. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri\nnecesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas\nadiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas\nrelinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitudo sit, ibi utilitatem\nesse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo\n(recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque\ncontraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem\nre utilitas et turpitudo[296] esse non potest.\n\nItemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut\nZenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua\nomnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse\naut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile: ita,\nquicquid honestum, id utile.\n\n*36* Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum\nest, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena,\nhinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes\ndireptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non\nferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regnandi exsistunt\ncupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest.\nEmolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum,\nquam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est,\nnon vident.\n\n*37* Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est\nenim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur,\nquod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa\nenim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea\ndeliberanda omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio.\n\nAtque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque\nremovenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid\nprofecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare\npossimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil\nincontinenter esse faciendum.\n\n    [296] _re utilitas et turp._ c, Edd.; _re utili turpitudo_ B\n    H a b.\n\n\n#Expediency and immorality incompatible.#\n\n*35* VIII. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or\nother, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer\ninspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what\npresents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to\nsacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency\nwhere there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugnant to\nnature as immorality (for nature demands right and harmony and\nconsistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly\nin accord with nature as expediency, then surely expediency and\nimmorality cannot coexist in one and the same object.\n\n#The morally right is also expedient.#\n\nAgain: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only\nthing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as\ninfinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it\nnecessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or\nthe supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient;\nconsequently, that which is morally right is also expedient.\n\n#The evils resulting from contrary view.#\n\n*36* Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize\nupon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate\nthat from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's\ndagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives\nrise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering\nof provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive\nwealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in\nthe midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive\nthan such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective\nthey see the material rewards but not the punishment--I do not mean the\npenalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of\nall, their own demoralization.\n\n*37* Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is\nwicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course\nwhich they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they\nknow is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even\nthough they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those\nactions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere\nconsideration of which is itself morally wrong.\n\n#Moral rectitude and secret sin.#\n\nFurthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and\nthought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we\nhave only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought\nto be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods\nand men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice,\nof lust or of intemperance.\n\n\n#Rep. II, 359 C#\n\n*38* IX. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra\ndiscessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum\na\u00ebneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus\nfores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine\ninvisitata[297] anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse\ninduit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit.\nIbi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse\nautem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum\ninverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit\neaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare\narbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic\nrepente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae.\n\nHunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo[298] plus sibi licere\nputet peccare, quam si non haberet[299]; honesta enim bonis viris, non\nocculta quaeruntur.\n\n*39* Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non\nsatis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone;\nquasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Haec est\nvis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus\nquidem sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis\ncausa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne\nfacturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam[300] potest id quidem; sed\nquaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent\nrustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid\nvaleat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi\nsint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam\nadhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod\nexpediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se\nipsa fugienda esse concedant.\n\nSed iam ad propositum revertamur.\n\n    [297] _invisitata_ B H^1, Edd.; _inusitata_ H^2 a b c.\n\n    [298] _ni(c)hilo_ c, Edd.; _nihil_ B H a b.\n\n    [299] _peccare ... haberet_ MSS.; bracketed by Madv., Bt.\n\n    [300] _nequaquam_ Manutius, Bt., Ed., Heine; _quamquam_ (and\n    yet it is possible) MSS., M\u00fcller.\n\n\n#The story of Gyges and his ring.#\n\n*38* IX. By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar\nstory of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of\nheavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes,\na horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw\nthe body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his\nfinger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to\nan assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As\noften as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his\nhand, he became invisible to every one, while he himself saw everything;\nbut as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became\nvisible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he\ndebauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal\nmaster and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without\nanyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the\nring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.\n\nNow, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that\nhe was free to do wrong any more than if he did not have it; for good\nmen aim to secure not secrecy but the right.\n\n*39* And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all\nvicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related\nby Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was\nactually true or even possible! #The moral of the story.# But the force\nof the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even\nto suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or\nsovereignty or sensual gratification--if your act should be hidden for\never from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition,\nthey say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that\nwere possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one\ndo? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy: they assert\nthat it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning\nof my words, \"if possible.\" For when we ask what they would do, if they\ncould escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape\ndetection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer\nthat, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their\nselfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally\nminded; should they say that they would not do so, they would be\ngranting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.\n\nBut let us now return to our theme.\n\n\n*40* X. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis\nspecie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter\nutilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud,\npossitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino\ncollegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste;\nfuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor.\nCum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi\nnomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile,\npatriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere\ndeberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas\nquidem esse potuisset.\n\nAt in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; *41* species enim\nutilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam\ncum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit his et pietatem et\nhumanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et\ntamen muri causam[301] opposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec\nsane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.\n\n*42* Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque\ntradendae, cum iis[302] ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod\nsine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa:\n\"Qui stadium,\" inquit, \"currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime\npossit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum[303] certet, aut manu\ndepellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod\npertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est.\"\n\n*43* Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non\ntribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra\nofficium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum\nest. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera\ngeneris eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque\ncontra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir\nbonus faciet, ne si index quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam\namici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam\nesse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.\n*44* Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit,[304] meminerit deum se\nadhibere[305] testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil\nhomini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus\nmorem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT.\nHaec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice\nposse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non\namicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. *45* Loquor autem de\ncommunibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest\nesse tale.\n\nDamonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut,\ncum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui\nmorti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa\npostulavisset, vas factus sit[306] alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non\nrevertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset,\nadmiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium\nascriberent.\n\n*46* Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod\nhonestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas;\ncum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et\nfides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus\nofficii.\n\n    [301] _causam_ c, Edd.; _causa_ B H a b.\n\n    [302] _iis_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [303] _quicum_ MSS., Bt., Heine; _quocum_ Ed.\n\n    [304] _erit_ Ed., Bt.^2, Heine; _sit_ MSS.; _est_ Bt.^1\n\n    [305] _adhibere_ B H a, Bt., Ed.; _habere_ b c, Lact.,\n    M\u00fcller.\n\n    [306] _sit_ Manubius, Edd.; _est_ MSS., Nonius.\n\n\n#Conflicts between:#\n\n#(1) apparent Expediency and Justice,#\n\n*40* X. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious\nappearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not\nwhether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable\nadvantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent\nadvantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his\ncolleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him\nmight have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate,\nand had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family.\nBut when the leading men of the state had determined that all the\nkindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder\nof the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was\nexpedient--namely, to serve the country's interests--was so\npre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce\nin its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral\nlightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible\nexpediency.\n\nNot so in the case of the king[BH] who founded the city: *41* it was the\nspecious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided\nthat it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the\nthrone with another, he slew his brother.[BI] He threw to the winds his\nbrotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to\nhim--but was not--expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered\nthe excuse about his wall--a specious show of moral rectitude, neither\nreasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with\ndue respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus.[BJ]\n\n#(2) individual and general interests,#\n\n*42* And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interests and\nsurrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should\nconsider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his\nneighbour's. \"When a man enters the foot-race,\" says Chrysippus with his\nusual aptness, \"it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive\nwith all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or\nwith his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is\nnot unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own\nadvantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour.\"\n\n#(3) obligations to friends and duty,#\n\n*43* It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions\nof duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to\ndo for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not\nright. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is\nshort and easy to master: apparent advantages--political preferment,\nriches, sensual pleasures, and the like--should never be preferred to\nthe obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a\nfriend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his\noath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's\ncase; for he lays aside the r\u00f4le of friend when he assumes that of\njudge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will\nprefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the\ntime for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit\nhis friend's convenience. *44* But when he comes to pronounce the\nverdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his\nwitness--that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God\nhimself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of\nview it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if\nwe were only true to it now) to appeal to the juror with this\nformula--\"to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour.\" This\nform of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be\nmorally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we\nwere bound to do everything that our friends desired, such relations\nwould have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. *45* But I\nam speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally\nwise and perfect such situations cannot arise.\n\n#Damon and Phintias.#\n\nThey say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed\nsuch ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had\nappointed a day for the execution of one of them, and the one who had\nbeen condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of\nputting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety\nfor his appearance, with the understanding that if his friend did not\nreturn, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned\non the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness\nbegged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship.\n\n#Rules of precedence.#\n\n*46* Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in\nfriendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be\ndisregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests\nare submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous\nregard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship.\nIn this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting\nduties--the subject of this part of our investigation.\n\n    [BH] Romulus.\n\n    [BI] Remus.\n\n    [BJ] I.e., whether he be god or man.\n\n\nXI. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in\nCorinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt,\nut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum\nest utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo.\nSed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi\ndebemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. *47* Male etiam, qui peregrinos\nurbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros,\nPapius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non\nlicere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola;\nusu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.\n\nIlla praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate\ncontemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum\nmaxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores\nanimos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio,\nnulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis\nobscuret.\n\n*48* Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere\nstatuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis\nnaves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum\nquendam suadentem, ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque[307] reciperent,\nlapidibus obruerunt. Atqui[308] ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea\nnulla erat repugnante honestate.\n\n*49* Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit\nin contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non\nopus esse; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret;\ndatus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta\nesset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum\nopes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna\nexspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles\nafferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non\nesset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque eam rem, quam ne audierant\nquidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas\nimmunes, socios vectigales habemus.\n\n    [307] _Xerxemque_ B H a b, Bt., Heine; _Xersenque_ c;\n    _Xersemque_ Nonius, Ed.\n\n    [308] _Atqui_ Victorius, Fl., Bt.^2, Ed.; _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1\n\n\n#(4) apparent political expediency and duty to humanity.#\n\nXI. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often\ncommitted in transactions between state and state, as by our own country\nin the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the\nAthenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their\nnavy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient;\nfor Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But\nno cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human\nnature, whose leadings we ought to follow. *47* They, too, do wrong who\nwould debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and\nwould exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time\nof our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of\ncourse, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and\nprivileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two\nof our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners\nfrom enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the\nlaws of humanity.\n\n#Moral right far outweighs apparent expediency.#\n\nThere are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of\nthe state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our\nown country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and\nespecially in the Second Punic War when news came of the disaster at\nCannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success;\nnever a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The\ninfluence of moral right is so potent, that it eclipses the specious\nappearance of expediency.\n\n*48* When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian\ninvasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and\nchildren in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the\nsea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they\nshould stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They\nstoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought\nwas expediency; but it was not--not at all, for it clashed with moral\nrectitude.\n\n*49* After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles\nannounced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the\nstate, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He\nrequested the people to appoint some one with whom he might discuss it.\nThey appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan\nfleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly\nset on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed.\nWhen Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager\nexpectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles\nwas in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The\nresult was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right\nwas likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they\nrejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their\nattitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we\nmake our allies pay tribute.[BK]\n\n    [BK] The Cilician pirates had been crushed by Pompey and\n    settled at Soli (Pompeiopolis). They gathered strength again\n    during the distractions of the civil wars, and Antony is even\n    said to have sought their aid in the war against Brutus and\n    Cassius.\n\n    Marseilles and King Deiotarus of Armenia had supported Pompey\n    and in consequence were made tributary by Caesar's party.\n\n\nXII. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tum quidem,\ncum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare,\nquod turpe sit, calamitosum est. *50* #\u00a7 40# Sed incidunt, ut supra\ndixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut\nanimadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi.\nEius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus\nAlexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia\net fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores\nAlexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum\nviderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo\nvenditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et\nconsultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe\niudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit.\n\n*51* In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et\ngravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo.\nAntipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit,\nemptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum\nsit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam\nvendat, velle quam optime vendere.\n\n\"Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quam ceteri, fortasse etiam\nminoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria?\"\n\n*52* Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: \"Quid ais? tu cum\nhominibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus\nsis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas,\nut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua\nsit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae?\"\n\nRespondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: \"Aliud est celare, aliud tacere;\nneque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui\nsit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici\nvilitas[309]; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem[310] mihi\ndicere necesse est.\"\n\n*53* \"Immo vero,\" inquiet ille, \"necesse est,[311] siquidem meministi\nesse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem.\"\n\n\"Memini,\" inquiet ille; \"sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum\ncuiusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed\ndonandum.\"\n\n    [309] _vilitas_ a, Edd.; _utilitas_, B H b c.\n\n    [310] _idem_ B H a b; _id_ c, Bt.\n\n    [311] _immo ... est_ c, Ed., Heine; _immo vero necesse est_\n    p; _immo vero_ [_inquiet ille_] _necesse est_ Bt.\n\n\nXII. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is\nmorally wrong can never be expedient--not even when one secures by means\nof it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a\ncourse expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. *50*\n#Expediency _vs._ moral rectitude in business relations.# But, as I said\nabove, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with\nmoral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether\ntheir conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The\nfollowing are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of\ndearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and\nsuppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from\nAlexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other\nimporters have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has\nsighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to\nreport the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and\nsell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case\nof a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man\nwould think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians\nif he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt\nwhether such silence would really be immoral.\n\n#Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#\n\n*51* In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and\nhighly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater,\na most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the\nfacts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any\ndetail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should\ndeclare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is\nprescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has\ngoods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage,\nprovided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.\n\n\"I have imported my stock,\" Diogenes's merchant will say; \"I have\noffered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my\ncompetitors--perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is\nwronged?\"\n\n*52* \"What say you?\" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; \"it\nis your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve\nsociety; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have\nthese inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow,\nthat your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely\nthat the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; #Is\nconcealment of truth immoral?# will you, in view of all these facts,\nconceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close\nat hand for them?\"\n\n\"It is one thing to conceal,\" Diogenes will perhaps reply; \"not to\nreveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not\nconcealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of\nthe gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more\nadvantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am\nunder no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your\ninterest to be told.\"\n\n*53* \"Yea,\" Antipater will say, \"but you are, as you must admit, if you\nwill only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by nature and\nexisting between man and man.\"\n\n\"I do not forget them,\" the other will reply; \"but do you mean to say\nthat those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as\nprivate property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at\nall, but freely give everything away.\"\n\n\nXIII. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: \"Quamvis hoc turpe\nsit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam,\" sed ita expedire, ut turpe non\nsit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum.\n\n*54* Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit,\nceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in\nomnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae _sint_,[312]\nruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus\nvenditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se\nvenditurum putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit.\n\n*55* \"Ille vero,\" inquit Antipater; \"quid est enim aliud erranti viam\nnon monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc\nnon est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem\nincurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in\nerrorem alterum inducere.\"\n\n*(55)* Diogenes contra: \"Num te emere co\u00ebgit, qui ne hortatus quidem\nest? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti.\nQuodsi, qui proscribunt villam bonam beneque aedificatam, non\nexistimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata\nratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium\nemptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum\nnon omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas?\nQuid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia\nnarrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco\npraedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo?'\"\n\n*56* Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur\nhonestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile\nvideatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec\nest illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae\ndiiudicanda sunt;[313] non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut\nexplicaremus. *57* Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios[314]\nnec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est\ncelare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare\nemolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem\ncelandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non\naperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti\npotius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris,\nvafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?\n\n    [312] _sint_ Bt.^1, Ed., Heine; not in MSS., Bt^2.\n\n    [313] _sunt_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _est_ [dissensio]\n    Unger, Bt.^2\n\n    [314] _Rhodios_ c, Edd.; _Rhodius_ B H a b.\n\n\nXIII. In this whole discussion, you see, no one says \"However wrong\nmorally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do\nit\"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without\nbeing morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be\ndone, because it is morally wrong.\n\n#A vendor's duty.#\n\n*54* Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on\naccount of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but\nwhich nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the\nreputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that\nvermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is\nbuilt of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows\nabout it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser\nthese facts but sells him the house for far more than he could\nreasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is\nunjust or dishonourable.\n\n*55* \"Yes,\" says Antipater, \"it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty\nin closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious\nloss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his\nway' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public\nexecration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on\nhis way: it is deliberately leading a man astray.\"\n\n*(55)* \"Can you say,\" answers Diogenes, \"that he compelled you to\npurchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he\ndid not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered\nguilty of swindling when they place upon their placards FOR SALE: A FINE\nVILLA, WELL BUILT, even when it is neither good nor properly built,\nstill less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For\nwhere the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there\nbe on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly\nstated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good\nwhat has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a\nvendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale?\nAnd what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's\nbidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale?'\"\n\n*56* In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is\ndefended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency\nis so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what\nseems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the\ncontradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the\nmorally right. #Cicero's decision in the cases.# But I must give my\ndecision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise\nthe questions, but to offer a solution. *57* I think, then, that it was\nthe duty of that grain dealer not to keep back the facts from the\nRhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with\nhis purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a\nthing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in\ntrying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something\nthat you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails\nto discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person\nwould be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or\nstraightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty,\nsly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and\nsubtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of\nreproach and many more besides?\n\n\n*58* XIV. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum\nest, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec\ninfacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere\nsolebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat[315] se hortulos\naliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine\ninterpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam,\nqui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere,\nsed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in\nhortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius,\nqui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se\nconvocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie\npiscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori[316]\nvenit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos\nmultitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi\npisces abiciebantur.\n\n*59* Tum Canius: \"Quaeso,\" inquit, \"quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne\npiscium? tantumne cumbarum?\"\n\nEt ille: \"Quid mirum?\" inquit, \"hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est\npiscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt.\"\n\nIncensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille\nprimo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti\nPythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit.\nInvitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum\nnullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum\nessent, quod eos nullos videret.\n\n\"Nullae, quod sciam,\" inquit; \"sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri\nmirabar, quid accidisset.\"\n\n*60* Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius,\ncollega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus\nipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur,[317] quid esset dolus malus, respondebat:\ncum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab\nhomine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud\nsimulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum\npotest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum.\n\n    [315] _dictitabat_ c, Edd.; _dictabat_ B H a b.\n\n    [316] _tempori_ B H b, Bt.^1, Ed.; _tempore_ a c; _temperi_\n    Fl., Bt.^2, Heine.\n\n    [317] _quaereretur_ Edd., with authority; _quaererem_ MSS.\n\n\n#Concealment of truth _vs._ misrepresentation and falsehood.#\n\n*58* XIV. If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what\nare we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius,\na Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once\nwent to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for\nbusiness. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little\ncountry-seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself,\nuninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad,\none Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an\nestate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself\nat home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the\nestate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might\nbe expected of a money-lender, could command favours of all classes,\ncalled the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the\nnext day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to\ndo. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous\nbanquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes;\neach fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the\nfishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius.\n\n*59* \"Pray, Pythius,\" said Canius thereupon, \"what does this mean?--all\nthese fish?--all these boats?\"\n\n\"No wonder,\" answered Pythius; \"this is where all the fish in Syracuse\nare; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get\nalong without this estate.\"\n\nInflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it\nto him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained\nhis point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country-seat,\nhe paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire\nequipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed\nthe transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early\nhimself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door\nneighbour whether it was a fisherman's holiday, for not a sign of them\ndid he see.\n\n\"Not so far as I know,\" said he; \"but none are in the habit of fishing\nhere. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday.\"\n\n#Criminal fraud.#\n\n*60* Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my\ncolleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established forms\nto apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by \"criminal\nfraud,\" as specified in these forms, he would reply: \"Pretending one\nthing and practising another\"--a very felicitous definition, as one\nmight expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all\nothers who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless,\ndishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be\nexpedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices.\n\n\n*61* XV. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio\ndissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat,\nquicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque[318] iste dolus\nmalus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela[319] duodecim tabulis,\ncircumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in\nquibus additur EX FIDE BONA. Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba\nmaxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT\nINTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS,\npotest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE\nAGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in\nsimulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus\ncontrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem[320] venditor, non, qui\ncontra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit,\nnon plus quam semel eloquetur. *62* Q. quidem Scaevola P. f., cum\npostulasset, ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur idque\nvenditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare; addidit centum milia.\nNemo est, qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant, ut si\nminoris, quam potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pernicies,\nquod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. #Medea, Vahlen^2, 273# Ex\nquo Ennius \"nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non\nquiret.\" Vere id quidem, si, quid esset \"prodesse,\" mihi cum Ennio\nconveniret.\n\n*63* Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris,\nquos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere \"sapientis esse nihil\ncontra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris.\nNeque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis,\namicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae\ndivitiae sunt civitatis.\" Huic[321] Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante\ndixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum\ncompendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec\ngratia est.\n\n*64* Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae\nres sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est\nis, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe[322] istum[323]\nvirum bonum non facile reperimus.\n\nNumquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper\nest honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile.\n\n    [318] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, M\u00fcller, Heine; _Atqui_ Manutius,\n    Ed., Bt.^2\n\n    [319] _ut tutela_ MSS., Bt., M\u00fcller; _ut in tutela_ Heine,\n    Ed.\n\n    [320] _non illicitatorem_ c (_inl._) p, Edd.; _non\n    licitatorem_ B H a b.\n\n    [321] _huic_ c, Edd.; _huius_ B H a b.\n\n    [322] _certe_ Lamb., Edd.; _recte_ MSS.\n\n    [323] _istum_ p c, Edd.; _iustum_ B H a b.\n\n\n*61* XV. But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and\nconcealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily\nlife. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or\nconcealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. #Criminal\nfraud and the law.# Besides, your \"criminal fraud\" had previously been\nprohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships,\nfor example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of\nminors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective,\nwithout statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that\nthe decision shall be \"as good faith requires.\"[BL] In all other cases\nin equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a\ncase calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is\n\"the fairer is the better\"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust:\n\"honest dealing, as between honest parties.\" Pray, then, can there be\nany element of fraud in what is adjusted for the \"better and fairer\"? Or\ncan anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when \"honest dealing\nbetween honest parties\" is stipulated? But \"criminal fraud,\" as Aquilius\nsays, consists in false pretence. #Criminal fraud in the light of moral\nrectitude.# We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of\nbusiness transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run\nprices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them\ndown; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all\nwhat he will give or take. *62* Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of\nPublius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to\npurchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that\nhe considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and\nabove what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an\nhonest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise\nman, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could\nhave commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea--the world\naccounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives\nEnnius occasion to say:\n\n    \"In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself.\"\n\nAnd Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning\nof \"benefit.\"\n\n*63* Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in\nhis books on \"Moral Duty\" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that #The standard\nof selfishness.# \"it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private\ninterests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs,\nlaws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking\nprosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our\nchildren, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the\nprivate fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state.\" Hecaton\ncould not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment\nago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own\nprofit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great\npraise nor gratitude.\n\n*64* Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute\n\"criminal fraud,\" there are very few transactions into which \"criminal\nfraud\" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he\ncan, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to\nfind the good man as thus defined.\n\nTo conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is\nalways immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness\nis always moral.\n\n    [BL] See \u00a7 70 below.\n\n\n*65* XVI. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili,\nut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam,\ncum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua\nnuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris\nconsultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim\nesset[324] in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi\nnominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. *66* Ut, cum in arce\naugurium augures acturi essent iussissentque Ti.[325] Claudium\nCentumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum\naltitudo officeret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam\n[vendidit],[326] emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus illud\nidem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum demolitus esset cognossetque\nClaudium aedes postea proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri\niussus, arbitrum illum adegit, QUICQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX\nFIDE BONA. M. Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim\nceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit ex filio est\nnominandus)--is igitur iudex ita pronuntiavit: \"cum in vendendo rem eam\nscisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere.\"\n\n*67* Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium,\nquod nosset venditor. Quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius\nille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi\nreticentiae iure civili comprehendi[327] non possunt; quae autem\npossunt, diligenter tenentur. M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster,\nC. Sergio Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante\nannis emerat. Eae serviebant,[328] sed hoc in mancipio Marius non\ndixerat. Adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum\ndefendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urguebat, \"quod vitii venditor non\ndixisset sciens, id oportere praestari,\" aequitatem Antonius, \"quoniam\nid vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendidisset, nihil\nfuisse necesse dici, nec eum esse deceptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo\niure esset, teneret.\"\n\n*68* Quorsus haec? Ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris\nastutos.\n\n    [324] _esset_ p c, Edd.; _est_ B H a b.\n\n    [325] _Ti._ Lange, Edd.; _titum_ MSS.\n\n    [326] _vendidit_ B H a b; _et vendidit_ p c.; Edd. omit.\n\n    [327] _comprehendi_ MSS.; _omnes comprehendi_ Bt., Heine.\n\n    [328] _serviebant_ Heus., Edd.; _sergio serviebant_ B H a b;\n    _sergio alii serviebant_ c.\n\n\n#Concealment of truth about real estate prohibited by law.#\n\n*65* XVI. In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is\nstipulated in our civil code that when a transfer of any real estate is\nmade, all its defects shall be declared as far as they are known to the\nvendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be\nsufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be\nmade good and that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when\nquestioned, he should be assessed double damages. A like penalty for\nfailure to make such declaration also has now been secured by our\njurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of real\nestate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made\ngood by him. *66* For example, the augurs were proposing to take\nobservations from the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius\nCentumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, to pull down such\nparts of the building as obstructed the augurs' view by reason of their\nheight. Claudius at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius\nCalpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice was served also upon him.\nAnd so, when Calpurnius had pulled down those parts of the building and\ndiscovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale only after the\naugurs had ordered them to be pulled down, he summoned the former owner\nbefore a court of equity to decide \"what indemnity the owner was under\nobligation 'in good faith' to pay and deliver to him.\" The verdict was\npronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato (for as other men\nreceive a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who bestowed\nupon the world so bright a luminary must have his distinguishing name\nfrom his son); he, as I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced\nthe verdict that \"since the augurs' mandate was known to the vendor at\nthe time of making the transfer and since he had not made it known, he\nwas bound to make good the purchaser's loss.\"\n\n#Scope of Cato's decision.#\n\n*67* With this verdict he established the principle that it was\nessential to good faith that any defect known to the vendor must be made\nknown to the purchaser. If his decision was right, our grain dealer and\nthe vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to suppress the\nfacts in those cases. But the civil code cannot be made to include all\ncases where facts are thus suppressed; but those cases which it does\ninclude are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a kinsman\nof ours, sold back to Gaius Sergius Orata the house which he himself had\nbought a few years before from that same Orata. It was subject to an\nencumbrance, but Marius had said nothing about this fact in stating the\nterms of sale. The case was carried to the courts. Crassus was counsel\nfor Orata; Antonius was retained by Gratidianus. Crassus pleaded the\nletter of the law that \"the vendor was bound to make good the defect,\nfor he had not declared it, although he was aware of it\"; Antonius laid\nstress upon the equity of the case, pleading that, \"inasmuch as the\ndefect in question had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the same\nhouse that he had sold to Marius), no declaration of it was needed, and\nin purchasing it back he had not been imposed upon, for he knew to what\nlegal liability his purchase was subject.\"\n\n*68* What is the purpose of these illustrations? To let you see that our\nforefathers did not countenance sharp practice.\n\n\nXVII. Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias, leges,\nquatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et\nintellegentia. Ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid\nsimulate, ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas,\netiamsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo\ninsequente saepe incidunt. Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam\nplagam ponas, [domum propter vitia vendas,][329] in eam aliquis incurrat\nimprudens?\n\n*69* Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more\nturpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege\nsanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est\ntamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes,\ninterior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem\ncivitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse\nvoluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium,\nidem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam\net expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas\nipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis\nexemplis. 70* Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM\nCAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER\nOPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint \"boni,\" et quid sit \"bene\nagi,\" magna quaestio est.\n\nQ. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus\niis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen\nexistimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus,\nfiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus\nvitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere,\npraesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque\ncuique praestare oporteret.\n\n*71* Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, quae volt illa\nquidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum.\nPrudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si\nomnia, quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante.\n\nNec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam\nfraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione venditoris\nfraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de\nfurtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum alia causa est.\n\n*72* Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum\nnaturam esse, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec\nulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio\nintellegentiae; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum\nhonestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisque reperietur, qui\nimpunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria?\n\n    [329] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.\n\n\n#Law _vs._ philosophy in dealing with knavery.#\n\nXVII. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers\nin another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm\nupon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and\nconscience. Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness,\nwith false pretence, or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception,\nthen, to set snares, even if one does not mean to start the game or to\ndrive it into them? Why, wild creatures often fall into snares undriven\nand unpursued. Could one in the same way advertise a house for sale,\npost up a notice \"To be sold,\" like a snare, and have somebody run into\nit unsuspecting?\n\n#Civil law _vs._ moral law.#\n\n*69* Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of\nprocedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor\nforbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is\nforbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship--although\nI have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and\nagain--which has the very widest application, uniting all men together\nand each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong\nto the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are\ncitizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our\nforefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and\nanother by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the\nuniversal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But\nwe possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine\nJustice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we\nwere true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the\nexcellent models which Nature and Truth afford. *70* #\"Good faith\" in\nperformance of contracts.# For how weighty are the words: \"That I be not\ndeceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you\"! How\nprecious are these: \"As between honest people there ought to be honest\ndealing, and no deception\"! But who are \"honest people,\" and what is\n\"honest dealing\"--these are serious questions.\n\nIt was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the\ngreatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula\nwas appended \"as good faith requires;\" and he held that the expression\n\"good faith\" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in\ntrusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and\nselling, in hiring and letting--in a word, in all the transactions on\nwhich the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it\nrequired a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each\nindividual's obligation to the other, especially when counter-claims\nwere admissible in most cases.\n\n*71* Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, which desires, of\ncourse, to pass for wisdom, but is far from it and totally unlike it.\nFor the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil;\nwhereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery\nprefers the evil to the good.\n\nIt is not only in the case of real estate transfers that the civil law,\nbased upon a natural feeling for the right, punishes trickery and\ndeception, but also in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the\nvendors part is disallowed. For by the aediles' ruling the vendor is\nanswerable for any deficiency in the slave he sells, for he is supposed\nto know if his slave is sound, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The\ncase of those who have just come into the possession of slaves by\ninheritance is different.\n\n#Cunning is not wisdom.#\n\n*72* From this we come to realize that since nature is the source of\nright, it is not in accord with nature that anyone should take advantage\nof his neighbour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found\nthan knavery that wears the mask of wisdom. Thence come those countless\ncases in which the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For how\nfew will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the\npower to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment!\n\n\n*73* XVIII. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in\nquibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de\nsicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco\ndisserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed\nvinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec[330] consideremus, quae faciunt\nii, qui habentur boni.\n\nL. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e\nGraecia Romam attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt\nheredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis\npotentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem\nnullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non\nrepudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur?\nMihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi\nmortuum; *74* sed, cum Basilus M. Satrium, sororis filium, nomen suum\nferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni\net Sabini; o turpem notam temporum [nomen illorum]!),[331] non erat\naequum principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen\npervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque\npropulsat,[332] cum potest, iniuste facit, #\u00a7 23# ut in primo libro\ndisserui, qualis habendus est is, qui non modo non repellit, sed etiam\nadiuvat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae\nvidentur, si sunt malitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate, sed\nsimulatione quaesitae.\n\nAtqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri\nsolet. *75* Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula.\n*(75)* Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum\nfacinus. Sic enim cogitans: \"Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc\nexpedit,\" res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est\nfraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium.\n\n    [330] _haec_ c. Edd.; _hoc_ B H a b.\n\n    [331] _turpem notam temporum nomen illorum_ H a (_turpe_) b,\n    Bt.; excl. _nomen illorum_ Victorius, Ed.; _turpe nomen\n    illorum temporum_ c.\n\n    [332] _propulsat_ cod. Bern., O., Edd.; _propulsat a suis_\n    Edd.\n\n\n*73* XVIII. Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see\nif it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in\ngeneral finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss\ncut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of\npublic moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions\nof philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here\nthe conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men.\n\nCertain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will,\npurporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more\neasily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves\ntwo of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus\nHortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery,\nstill, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they\ndid not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others.\nWhat shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of\nguilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and\ndo not hate the other now that he is dead. *74* Be that as it may,\nBasilus had in fact desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear\nhis name and inherit his property. (I refer to the Satrius who is the\npresent patron of Picenum and the Sabine country--and oh, what a\nshameful stigma it is upon the times![BM]) And therefore it was not\nright that two of the leading citizens of Rome should take the estate\nand Satrius succeed to nothing except his uncle's name. For if he does\nwrong who does not ward off and repel injury when he can--as I explained\nin the course of the First Book--what is to be thought of the man who\nnot only does not try to prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it?\nFor my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if\nthey are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions\nhypocritical rather than sincere.\n\n#The same standard for expediency as for moral rectitude.#\n\nAnd yet in such cases there are times when one course is likely to\nappear expedient and another morally right. *75* The appearance is\ndeceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral\nrectitude. *(75)* And the man who does not accept the truth of this will\nbe capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he\nreasons \"That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings\nadvantage,\" he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two\nconceptions that nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to\nall sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime.\n\n    [BM] The shame was that states enjoying the rights of Roman\n    citizenship should need a patron to protect their interests\n    in the Roman capital.\n\n\nXIX. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit,\npossit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur,\nne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At\ndares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus\nesse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo\nautem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se\ntransferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus,\nnescire fateatur. *76* At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam\nnotionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat eum virum bonum esse, qui prosit,\nquibus possit, noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non\nnoceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in\neorum locum ipse succedat? \"Non igitur faciat,\" dixerit quis, \"quod\nutile sit, quod expediat?\" Immo intellegat nihil nec expedire nec utile\nesse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non\npoterit.\n\n*77* _C._[333] Fimbriam consularem audiebam de patre nostro puer iudicem\nM. Lutatio Pinthiae fuisse, equiti Romano sane honesto, cum is\nsponsionem fecisset, NI VIR BONUS ESSET. Itaque ei dixisse Fimbriam se\nillam rem numquam iudicaturum, ne aut spoliaret fama probatum hominem,\nsi contra iudicavisset, aut statuisse videretur virum bonum esse\naliquem, cum ea res innumerabilibus officiis et laudibus contineretur.\n\nHuic igitur viro bono, quem Fimbria etiam, non modo Socrates noverat,\nnullo modo videri potest quicquam esse utile, quod non honestum sit.\nItaque talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam\naudebit, quod non audeat praedicare. Haec non turpe est dubitare\nphilosophos, quae ne rustici quidem dubitent? a quibus natum est id,\nquod iam contritum est vetustate, proverbium. Cum enim fidem alicuius\nbonitatemque laudant, dignum esse dicunt, \"quicum in tenebris mices.\"\nHoc quam habet vim nisi illam, nihil expedire, quod non deceat, etiamsi\nid possis nullo refellente optinere?\n\n*78* Videsne hoc proverbio neque Gygi illi posse veniam dari neque huic,\nquem paulo ante fingebam digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse\nconverrere? Ut enim, quod turpe est, id, quamvis occultetur, tamen\nhonestum fieri nullo modo potest, sic, quod honestum non est, id utile\nut sit, effici non potest adversante et repugnante natura.\n\n    [333] _C._ Bt., Ed., Heine; not in MSS.\n\n\n#The good man not tempted to unrighteous gain.#\n\nXIX. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his\nfingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail\nhimself of that power--no, not even though he could be perfectly sure\nthat no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one\nwere to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping of his\nfingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir,\nhe would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the\none whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to\nenrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him\nconfess that he does not know what a good man is. *76* #Who is the good\nman?# If, on the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the idea of\na good man which lies wrapped up in his own mind,[BN] he would then at\nonce make it clear to himself that a good man is one who helps all whom\nhe can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong. What shall we say,\nthen? Would he not be doing harm who by a kind of magic spell should\nsucceed in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing himself\ninto their place? \"Well,\" some one may say, \"is he not to do what is\nexpedient, what is advantageous to himself?\" Nay, verily; he should\nrather be brought to realize that nothing that is unjust is either\nadvantageous or expedient; if he does not learn this lesson, it will\nnever be possible for him to be a \"good man.\"\n\n*77* When I was a boy, I used to hear my father tell that Gaius Fimbria,\nan ex-consul, was judge in a case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, a Roman\nknight of irreproachable character. On that occasion Pinthia had laid a\nwager to be forfeited \"if he did not prove in court that he was a good\nman.\" Fimbria declared that he would never render a decision in such a\ncase, for fear that he might either rob a reputable man of his good\nname, if he decided against him, or be thought to have pronounced some\none a good man, when such a character is, as he said, established by the\nperformance of countless duties and the possession of praiseworthy\nqualities without number.\n\n#To a good man moral wrong is never expedient.#\n\nTo this type of good man, then, known not only to a Socrates but even to\na Fimbria, nothing can possibly seem expedient that is not morally\nright. Such a man, therefore, will never venture to think--to say\nnothing of doing--anything that he would not dare openly to proclaim. Is\nit not a shame that philosophers should be in doubt about moral\nquestions on which even peasants have no doubts at all? For it is with\npeasants that the proverb, already trite with age, originated: when they\npraise a man's honour and honesty, they say \"He is a man with whom you\ncan safely play at odd and even[BO] in the dark.\" What is the point of\nthe proverb but this--that what is not proper brings no advantage, even\nif you can gain your end without any one's being able to convict you of\nwrong?\n\n*78* Do you not see that in the light of this proverb no excuse is\navailable either for the Gyges of the story or for the man who I assumed\na moment ago could with a snap of his fingers sweep together everybody's\ninheritance at once. For as the morally wrong cannot by any possibility\nbe made morally right, however successfully it may be covered up, so\nwhat is not morally right cannot be made expedient, for nature refuses\nand resists.\n\n    [BN] The Platonic doctrine of ideas known in a previous\n    existence and gradually developing into renewed\n    consciousness. Learning is but a remembering of what the soul\n    has known before.\n\n    [BO] Lit. 'flash with the fingers'; shoot out some fingers\n    the number of which had to be guessed.\n\n\n*79* XX. At enim, cum permagna praemia sunt, est causa peccandi.\n\nC. Marius cum a spe consulatus longe abesset et iam[334] septimum annum\npost praeturam iaceret, neque petiturus umquam consulatum videretur, Q.\nMetellum, cuius legatus erat, summum virum et civem, cum ab eo,\nimperatore suo, Romam missus esset, apud populum Romanum criminatus est\nbellum illum ducere; si se consulem fecissent; brevi tempore aut vivum\naut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem populi Romani redacturum. Itaque\nfactus est ille quidem consul, sed a fide iustitiaque discessit, qui\noptimum et gravissimum civem, cuius legatus et a quo missus esset, in\ninvidiam falso crimine adduxerit.\n\n*80* Ne noster quidem Gratidianus officio viri boni functus est tum, cum\npraetor esset collegiumque praetorium tribuni plebi adhibuissent, ut res\nnummaria de communi sententia constitueretur; iactabatur enim temporibus\nillis nummus sic, ut nemo posset scire, quid haberet. Conscripserunt\ncommuniter edictum cum poena atque iudicio constitueruntque, ut omnes\nsimul in rostra post meridiem escenderent. Et ceteri quidem alius alio,\nMarius ab subselliis in rostra recta idque, quod communiter compositum\nfuerat, solus edixit. Et ea res, si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit;\nomnibus vicis statuae, ad eas tus, cerei; quid multa? nemo umquam\nmultitudini fuit carior.\n\n*81* Haec sunt, quae conturbent in deliberatione non numquam, cum id, in\nquo violatur aequitas, non ita magnum, illud autem, quod ex eo paritur,\npermagnum videtur, ut Mario praeripere collegis et tribunis plebi\npopularem gratiam non ita turpe, consulem ob eam rem fieri, quod sibi\ntum proposuerat, valde utile videbatur. Sed omnium una regula est, quam\ntibi cupio esse notissimam, aut illud, quod utile videtur, turpe ne sit\naut, si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. Quod igitur? possumusne aut\nillum Marium virum bonum iudicare aut hunc[335]? Explica atque excute\nintellegentiam tuam, ut videas, quae sit in ea [species] forma[336] et\nnotio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa,\ncriminari, praeripere, fallere? Nihil profecto minus.\n\n*82* Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri\nboni et splendorem et nomen amittas? Quid est, quod afferre tantum\nutilitas ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen\neripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit? Quid enim interest, utrum ex\nhomine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat\nbeluae?\n\n    [334] _et iam_ Edd.; _etiam_ MSS.\n\n    [335] _aut hunc_ c, Edd.; _atque hunc_ B H a b.\n\n    [336] _ea species forma_ B H a b; _ea specie forma_ c p; _ea\n    forma_, Klotz, Heine, Ed.; _ea species_, Bt.\n\n\n#The moral loss that comes from wrong ambitions:#\n\n*79* XX. \"But stay,\" some one will object, \"when the prize is very\ngreat, there is excuse for doing wrong.\"\n\n#(1) Marius,#\n\nGaius Marius had been left in obscurity for more than six whole years\nafter his praetorship and had scarcely the remotest hope of gaining the\nconsulship. It looked as if he would never even be a candidate for that\noffice. He was now a lieutenant under Quintus Metellus, who sent him on\na furlough to Rome. There before the Roman People he accused his own\ngeneral, an eminent man and one of our first citizens, of purposely\nprotracting the war and declared that if they would make him consul, he\nwould within a short time deliver Jugurtha alive or dead into the hands\nof the Roman People. And so he was elected consul, it is true, but he\nwas a traitor to his own good faith and to justice; for by a false\ncharge he subjected to popular disfavour an exemplary and highly\nrespected citizen, and that too, although he was his lieutenant and\nunder leave of absence from him.\n\n#(2) Gratidianus,#\n\n*80* Even our kinsman Gratidianus failed on one occasion to perform what\nwould be a good man's duty: in his praetorship the tribunes of the\npeople summoned the college of praetors to counsel, in order to adopt by\njoint resolution a standard of value for our currency; for at that time\nthe value of money was so fluctuating that no one could tell how much he\nwas worth. In joint session they drafted an ordinance, defining the\npenalty and the methods of procedure in cases of violation of the\nordinance, and agreed that they should all appear together upon the\nrostra in the afternoon to publish it. And while all the rest withdrew,\nsome in one direction, some in another, Marius (Gratidianus) went\nstraight from the council chamber to the rostra and published\nindividually what had been drawn up by all together. And that coup, if\nyou care to know, brought him vast honour; in every street statues of\nhim were erected; before these incense and candles burned. In a word, no\none ever enjoyed greater popularity with the masses.\n\n#No material gain can compensate for moral loss.#\n\n*81* It is such cases as these that sometimes perplex us in our\nconsideration, when the point in which justice is violated does not seem\nso very significant, but the consequences of such slight transgression\nseem exceedingly important. For example, it was not so very wrong\nmorally, in the eyes of Marius,[BP] to overreach his colleagues and the\ntribunes in turning to himself alone all the credit with the people; but\nto secure by that means his election to the consulship, which was then\nthe goal of his ambition,[BQ] seemed very greatly to his interest. But\nfor all cases we have one rule, with which I desire you to be perfectly\nfamiliar: that which seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or, if\nit is morally wrong, it must not seem expedient. What follows? Can we\naccount either the great Marius or our Marius Gratidianus a good man?\nWork out your own ideas and sift your thoughts so as to see what\nconception and idea of a good man they contain. Pray, tell me, does it\ncoincide with the character of your good man to lie for his own profit,\nto slander, to overreach, to deceive? Nay, verily; anything but that!\n\n*82* Is there, then, any object of such value or any advantage so worth\nthe winning that, to gain it, one should sacrifice the name of a \"good\nman\" and the lustre of his reputation? What is there that your so-called\nexpediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take\naway, if it steals from you the name of a \"good man\" and causes you to\nlose your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make\nwhether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping\nthe outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast\nwithin?\n\n    [BP] Gratidianus's.\n\n    [BQ] Never attained, however. For his conspicuous position as\n    a popular leader made him an early mark for Sulla's\n    proscriptions.\n\n\nXXI. Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dum modo potentiam\nconsequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere\nvoluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset? Utile ei videbatur plurimum\nposse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset,\nnon videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis\nhabebat, quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res\npossit intellegi:\n\n#Eur. Phoen. 524-525#\n\n    Nam s\u00ed violandum est i\u00fas, regnandi gr\u00e1tia\n    Viol\u00e1ndum est; aliis r\u00e9bus pietat\u00e9m colas.\n\nCapitalis [Eteocles vel potius Euripides],[337] qui id unum, quod omnium\nsceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit! *83* Quid igitur minuta colligimus,\nhereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui rex\npopuli Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque\nperfecerit! Hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est;\nprobat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram\net detestabilem gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in\nea civitate, quae libera fuerit quaeque[338] esse debeat, regnare, sed\nei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo\npotius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere? Potest enim, di\nimmortales! cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium\npatriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civibus parens\nnominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda[339] utilitas est, et quidem sic,\nut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur.\n\n*84* Non habeo, ad volgi opinionem quae maior utilitas quam regnandi\nesse possit; nihil contra inutilius ei, qui id iniuste consecutus sit,\ninvenio, cum ad veritatem coepi revocare rationem. Possunt enim cuiquam\nesse utiles angores, sollicitudines, diurni et nocturni metus, vita\ninsidiarum periculorumque plenissima?\n\n#_Inc. Fab._, Ribbeck^2, 651#\n\n    M\u00falti iniqui atque \u00ednfideles r\u00e9gno, pauci b\u00e9nivoli,[340]\n\ninquit Accius. At cui regno? Quod a Tantalo et Pelope proditum iure\noptinebatur. Nam quanto pluris ei regi putas, qui exercitu populi Romani\npopulum ipsum Romanum oppressisset civitatemque non modo liberam, sed\netiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi co\u00ebgisset? *85* Hunc tu quas\nconscientiae labes in animo censes habuisse, quae vulnera? Cuius autem\nvita ipsi potest utilis esse, cum eius vitae ea condicio sit, ut, qui\nillam eripuerit, in maxima et gratia futurus sit et gloria? Quodsi haec\nutilia non sunt, quae maxime videntur, quia plena sunt dedecoris ac\nturpitudinis, satis persuasum esse debet nihil esse utile, quod non\nhonestum sit.\n\n    [337] Bracketed by Ed., Heine, et al.\n\n    [338] _fuerit quaeque_ c, Edd.; _fuit_ B H a b.\n\n    [339] _dirigenda_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigenda_ Ed.\n\n    [340] _beni(e)voli_ St\u00fcrenbg.; _benivoli sunt_ c; _boni sunt_\n    B H a b.\n\n\nXXI. Again, when people disregard everything that is morally right and\ntrue, if only they may secure power thereby, #(3) Pompey,# are they not\npursuing the same course as he[BR] who wished to have as a father-in-law\nthe man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? He thought\nit advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon\nanother; and he failed to see how unjust to his country this was, and\nhow wrong morally. #(4) Caesar.# But the father-in-law himself used to\nhave continually upon his lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae,\nwhich I will reproduce as well as I can--awkwardly, it may be, but still\nso that the meaning can be understood:\n\n    \"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake\n    Were wrong most right:--be God in all else feared!\"[BS]\n\nOur tyrant deserved his death for having made an exception of the one\nthing that was the blackest crime of all. *83* Why do we gather\ninstances of petty crime--legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent\nbuying and selling? Behold, here you have a man who was ambitious to be\nking of the Roman People and master of the whole world; and he achieved\nit! #Even to gain a throne by moral wrong is not expedient.# The man who\nmaintains that such an ambition is morally right is a madman; for he\njustifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous\nand detestable suppression glorious. But if anyone agrees that it is not\nmorally right to be king in a state that once was free and that ought to\nbe free now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for him who can\nreach that position, with what remonstrance or rather with what appeal\nshould I try to tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh ye\nimmortal gods! can the most horrible and hideous of all murders--that of\nfatherland--bring advantage to anybody, even though he who has committed\nsuch a crime receives from his enslaved fellow-citizens the title of\n\"Father of his Country\"[BT]? #Identity of expediency and moral\nrectitude.# Expediency, therefore, must be measured by the standard of\nmoral rectitude, and in such a way, too, that these two words shall seem\nin sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the\nsame.\n\n*84* What greater advantage one could have, according to the standard of\npopular opinion, than to be a king, I do not know; when, however, I\nbegin to bring the question back to the standard of truth, then I find\nnothing more disadvantageous for one who has risen to that height by\ninjustice. For can occasions for worry, anxiety, fear by day and by\nnight, and a life all beset with plots and perils be of advantage to\nanybody?\n\n    \"Thrones have many foes and friends untrue, but few devoted\n      friends,\"\n\nsays Accius. But of what sort of throne was he speaking? Why, one that\nwas held by right, handed down from Tantalus and Pelops. Aye, but how\nmany more foes, think you, had that king who with the Roman People's\narmy brought the Roman People themselves into subjection and compelled a\nstate that not only had been free but had been mistress of the world to\nbe his slave? *85* What stains do you think he had upon his conscience,\nwhat scars upon his heart? But whose life can be advantageous to\nhimself, if that life is his on the condition that the man who takes it\nshall be held in undying gratitude and glory? But if these things which\nseem so very advantageous are not advantageous because they are full of\nshame and moral wrong, we ought to be quite convinced that nothing can\nbe expedient that is not morally right.\n\n    [BR] Pompey, who in 59 married Caesar's daughter Julia,\n    twenty-four years his junior, and already betrothed to\n    Caepio.\n\n    [BS] From A. S. Way's translation.\n\n    [BT] The title bestowed on Cicero for saving the republic (in\n    63) and on Caesar for overthrowing it (after the battle of\n    Munda, in 45).\n\n\n*86* XXII. Quamquam id quidem cum saepe alias, tum Pyrrhi bello a C.\nFabricio consule iterum et a senatu nostro iudicatum est. Cum enim rex\nPyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset, cumque de imperio\ncertamen esset cum rege generoso ac potenti,[341] perfuga ab eo venit in\ncastra Fabrici eique est pollicitus, si praemium sibi proposuisset, se,\nut clam venisset, sic clam in Pyrrhi castra rediturum et eum veneno\nnecaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad Pyrrhum, idque eius\nfactum laudatum a senatu est. Atqui, si speciem utilitatis opinionemque\nquaerimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga unus et gravem adversarium\nimperii sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus et flagitium, quicum laudis\ncertamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum.\n\n*87* Utrum igitur utilius vel Fabricio, qui talis in hac urbe, qualis\nAristides Athenis, fuit, vel senatui nostro, qui numquam utilitatem a\ndignitate seiunxit, armis cum hoste certare an venenis? Si gloriae causa\nimperium expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria;\nsin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum\ninfamia.\n\nNon igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, quas civitates L.\nSulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavisset, ut eae rursus\nvectigales essent neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant,\nredderemus. Ei senatus est assensus. Turpe imperio! piratarum enim\nmelior fides quam senatus. At aucta vectigalia, utile igitur. Quousque\naudebunt dicere quicquam utile, quod non honestum? *88* potest autem\nulli imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse et benivolentia sociorum,\nutile esse odium et infamia?\n\nEgo etiam cum Catone meo saepe dissensi; nimis mihi praefracte videbatur\naerarium vectigaliaque defendere, omnia publicanis negare, multa sociis,\ncum in hos benefici esse deberemus, cum illis sic agere, ut cum colonis\nnostris soleremus, eoque magis, quod[342] illa ordinum coniunctio ad\nsalutem rei publicae pertinebat. Male etiam Curio, cum causam\nTranspadanorum aequam esse dicebat, semper autem addebat: \"Vincat\nutilitas!\" Potius doceret non esse aequam, quia non esset utilis rei\npublicae, quam, cum utilem non esse diceret, esse aequam fateretur.\n\n    [341] _potenti_ Nonius, Edd.; _potente_ MSS.\n\n    [342] _quod_ L c, Edd.; _quo_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Apparent conflicts between expediency and moral rectitude:#\n\n#(1) Fabricius and the deserter,#\n\n*86* XXII. And yet this very question has been decided on many occasions\nbefore and since; but in the war with Pyrrhus the decision rendered by\nGaius Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate was\nparticularly striking. Without provocation King Pyrrhus had declared war\nupon the Roman People; the struggle was against a generous and powerful\nprince, and the supremacy of power was the prize; a deserter came over\nfrom him to the camp of Fabricius and promised, if Fabricius would\nassure him of a reward, to return to the camp of Pyrrhus as secretly as\nhe had come, administer poison to the king, and bring about his death.\nFabricius saw to it that this fellow was taken back to Pyrrhus; and his\naction was commended by the senate. And yet, if the mere show of\nexpediency and the popular conception of it are all we want, this one\ndeserter would have put an end to that wasting war and to a formidable\nfoe of our supremacy; but it would have been a lasting shame and\ndisgrace to us to have overcome not by valour but by crime the man with\nwhom we had a contest for glory.\n\n*87* Which course, then, was more expedient for Fabricius, who was to\nour city what Aristides was to Athens, or for our senate, who never\ndivorced expediency from honour--to contend against the enemy with the\nsword or with poison? If supremacy is to be sought for the sake of\nglory, crime should be excluded, for there can be no glory in crime; but\nif it is power for its own sake that is sought, whatever the price, it\ncannot be expedient if it is linked with shame.\n\n#(2) the senate and the tributary allies,#\n\nThat well-known measure, therefore, introduced by Philippus, the son of\nQuintus, was not expedient. With the authority of the senate, Lucius\nSulla had exempted from taxation certain states upon receipt of a lump\nsum of money from them. Philippus proposed that they should again be\nreduced to the condition of tributary states, without repayment on our\npart of the money that they had paid for their exemption. And the senate\naccepted his proposal. Shame upon our government! The pirates' sense of\nhonour is higher than the senate's. \"But,\" some one will say, \"the\nrevenues were increased, and therefore it was expedient.\" How long will\npeople venture to say that a thing that is not morally right can be\nexpedient? *88* Furthermore, can hatred and shame be expedient for any\ngovernment? For government ought to be founded upon fair fame and the\nloyalty of allies?\n\n#(3) Cato and the publicans,#\n\nOn this point I often disagreed even with my friend Cato; it seemed to\nme that he was too rigorous in his watchful care over the claims of the\ntreasury and the revenues; he refused everything that the farmers of the\nrevenue asked for and much that the allies desired; whereas, as I\ninsisted, it was our duty to be generous to the allies and to treat the\npublicans as we were accustomed individually to treat our tenants--and\nall the more, because harmony between the orders was essential to the\nwelfare of the republic.[BU] #(4) Curio and the colonies.# Curio, too,\nwas wrong, when he pleaded that the demands of the people beyond the Po\nwere just, but never failed to add \"Let expediency prevail.\" He ought\nrather to have proved that the claims were not just, because they were\nnot expedient for the republic, than to have admitted that they were\njust, when, as he maintained, they were not expedient.\n\n    [BU] The publicans, farmers of the revenue, were the moneyed\n    men of the times and belonged to the equestrian order. They\n    purchased from the senate the farming of the revenues and\n    then sublet their contract to the collectors. Sometimes they\n    found that they had agreed to pay too high a rate and\n    petitioned the senate to release them from their contract or\n    reduce their obligations, as on this occasion (B.C. 61). The\n    opposition of Cato and others strained the relations between\n    the senate, who had control of the business, and the\n    equestrian order, driving many of the equites over to\n    Caesar's side. Complete harmony between the senate and the\n    knights, as Cicero says, was the only thing that could have\n    saved Rome from the popular party and Caesar.\n\n\n*89* XXIII. Plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium\nquaestionum: \"sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non\nalere.\"\n\nIn utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate, ut putat,\nofficium dirigit[343] magis quam humanitate.\n\nQuaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius\niacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio res familiaris, alio ducit\nhumanitas.\n\n\"Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebitne eam sapiens,\nsi potuerit?\"\n\nNegat, quia sit iniurium.\n\n\"Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum?\"\n\n\"Minime, non plus quam navigantem[344] in alto eicere de navi velit,\nquia sua sit. Quoad enim perventum est[345] eo, quo sumpta navis est,\nnon domini est navis, sed navigantium.\"\n\n*90* \"Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique sapientes, sibine\nuter_que_[346] rapiat, an alter cedat alteri?\"\n\n\"Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa\nvivere.\"\n\n\"Quid, si haec paria in utroque?\"\n\n\"Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut micando victus alteri cedet\nalter.\"\n\n\"Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id\nmagistratibus filius?\"\n\n\"Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat patrem, si arguatur.\"\n\n\"Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis?\"\n\n\"Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere cives in parentes.\"\n\n\"Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater,\nsilebitne filius?\"\n\n\"Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet,\naccusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res\nspectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris.\"\n\n*91* Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos acceperit imprudens\npro bonis, cum id rescierit, soluturusne sit eos, si cui[347] debeat,\npro bonis. Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, cui potius assentior.\n\nQui vinum[348] fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere. Non necesse putat\nDiogenes, Antipater viri boni existimat. Haec sunt quasi controversa\niura Stoicorum. \"In mancipio vendendo dicendane vitia, non ea, quae nisi\ndixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure civili, sed haec, mendacem esse,\naleatorem, furacem, ebriosum?\" Alteri dicenda videntur, alteri non\nvidentur.\n\n*92* \"Si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet vendere, indicetne ei\nvir bonus aurum illud esse an emat denario, quod sit mille denarium?\"\n\nPerspicuum est iam, et quid mihi videatur, et quae sit inter eos\nphilosophos, quos nominavi, controversia.\n\n    [343] _dirigit_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigit_ Ed.\n\n    [344] _quam navigantem_ Heus., Edd.; _quam si navigantem_\n    MSS.\n\n    [345] _est_ c, Nonius; _sit_ B H a b.\n\n    [346] _sibine uterque_ Victorius, Edd.; _sibi neuter_ MSS.\n\n    [347] _si cui_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _sicut_ B H a b.\n\n    [348] _vinum_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _venenum_ B H a b p.\n\n\n#Hecaton debates the question of expediency _vs._ moral rectitude.#\n\n*89* XXIII. The sixth book of Hecaton's \"Moral Duties\" is full of\nquestions like the following: \"Is it consistent with a good man's duty\nto let his slaves go hungry when provisions are at famine prices?\"\n\nHecaton gives the arguments on both sides of the question; but still in\nthe end it is by the standard of expediency, as he conceives it, rather\nthan by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty.\n\nThen he raises this question: supposing a man had to throw part of his\ncargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced\nhorse or a cheap and worthless slave? In this case regard for his\nproperty interest inclines him one way, human feeling the other.\n\n\"Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a plank from a sinking\nship, shall a wise man wrest it away from him if he can?\"\n\n\"No,\" says Hecaton; \"for that would be unjust.\"\n\n\"But how about the owner of the ship? Shall he take the plank away\nbecause it belongs to him?\"\n\n\"Not at all; no more than he would be willing when far out at sea to\nthrow a passenger overboard on the ground that the ship was his. For\nuntil they reach the place for which the ship is chartered, she belongs\nto the passengers, not to the owner.\"\n\n*90* \"Again; suppose there were two to be saved from the sinking\nship--both of them wise men--and only one small plank, should both seize\nit to save themselves? Or should one give place to the other?\"\n\n\"Why of course, one should give place to the other, but that other must\nbe the one whose life is more valuable either for his own sake or for\nthat of his country.\"\n\n\"But what if these considerations are of equal weight in both?\"\n\n\"Then there will be no contest, but one will give place to the other, as\nif the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even.\"\n\n\"Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or making underground\npassages to the treasury, should a son inform the officers of it?\"\n\n\"Nay; that were a crime; rather should he defend his father, in case he\nwere indicted.\"\n\n\"Well, then, are not the claims of country paramount to all other\nduties?\"\n\n\"Aye, verily; but it is to our country's interest to have citizens who\nare loyal to their parents.\"\n\n\"But once more--if the father attempts to make himself king, or to\nbetray his country, shall the son hold his peace?\"\n\n\"Nay, verily; he will plead with his father not to do so. If that\naccomplishes nothing, he will take him to task; he will even threaten;\nand in the end, if things point to the destruction of the state, he will\nsacrifice his father to the safety of his country.\"\n\n#A similar debate by Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#\n\n*91* Again, he raises the question: \"If a wise man should inadvertently\naccept counterfeit money for good, will he offer it as genuine in\npayment of a debt after he discovers his mistake?\" Diogenes says \"Yes\";\nAntipater, \"No,\" and I agree with him.\n\nIf a man knowingly offers for sale wine that is spoiling, ought he tell\nhis customers? Diogenes thinks that it is not required; Antipater holds\nthat an honest man would do so. These are like so many points of the law\ndisputed among the Stoics. \"In selling a slave, should his faults be\ndeclared--not those only which the seller is bound by the civil law to\ndeclare or have the slave returned to him, but also the fact that he is\nuntruthful, or disposed to gamble, or steal, or get drunk?\" The one\nthinks such facts should be declared, the other does not.\n\n*92* \"If a man thinks that he is selling brass, when he is actually\nselling gold, should an upright man inform him that his stuff is gold,\nor go on buying for one shilling[BV] what is worth a thousand?\"\n\nIt is clear enough by this time what my views are on these questions,\nand what are the grounds of dispute between the above-named\nphilosophers.\n\n    [BV] The _denarius_ was worth at this time about ninepence.\n\n\nXXIV. Pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLO\nMALO, ut praetores solent, FACTA SINT.\n\nSi quis medicamentum cuipiam dederit ad aquam intercutem pepigeritque,\nsi eo medicamento sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamento umquam postea\nuteretur, si eo medicamento sanus factus sit et annis aliquot post\ninciderit in eundem morbum nec ab eo, quicum pepigerat, impetret, ut\niterum eo[349] liceat uti, quid faciendum sit. Cum sit is inhumanus, qui\nnon concedat, nec ei quicquam fiat iniuriae, vitae et saluti\nconsulendum.\n\n*93* Quid? si qui sapiens rogatus sit ab eo, qui eum heredem faciat, cum\nei testamento sestertium milies relinquatur, ut, ante quam hereditatem\nadeat, luce palam in foro saltet, idque se facturum promiserit, quod\naliter heredem eum scripturus ille non esset, faciat, quod promiserit,\nnecne? Promisisse nollem et id arbitror fuisse gravitatis; quoniam\npromisit, si saltare in foro turpe ducet, honestius mentietur, si ex\nhereditate nihil ceperit, quam si ceperit, nisi forte eam pecuniam in\nrei publicae magnum aliquod tempus contulerit, ut vel saltare, cum\npatriae consulturus sit, turpe non sit.\n\n    [349] _iterum eo_ Pearce, Edd.; _item eo_ B H a b; _item tum_\n    c.\n\n\n#Promises not binding:#\n\n#(1) when life or health is at stake,#\n\nXXIV. The question arises also whether agreements and promises must\nalways be kept, \"when,\" in the language of the praetors' edicts, \"they\nhave not been secured through force or criminal fraud.\"\n\nIf one man gives another a remedy for the dropsy, with the stipulation\nthat, if he is cured by it, he shall never make use of it again; suppose\nthe patient's health is restored by the use of it but some years later\nhe contracts the same disease once more; and suppose he cannot secure\nfrom the man with whom he made the agreement permission to use the\nremedy again, what should he do? That is the question. Since the man is\nunfeeling in refusing the request, and since no harm could be done to\nhim by his friend's using the remedy, the sick man is justified in doing\nwhat he can for his own life and health.\n\n#(2) when reputation is at stake,#\n\n*93* Again: suppose that a millionaire is making some wise man his heir\nand leaving him in his will a hundred million sesterces[BW]; and suppose\nthat he has asked the wise man, before he enters upon his inheritance,\nto dance publicly in broad daylight in the forum; and suppose that the\nwise man has given his promise to do so, because the rich man would not\nleave him his fortune on any other condition; should he keep his promise\nor not? I wish he had made no such promise; that, I think, would have\nbeen in keeping with his dignity. But seeing that he has made it, it\nwill be morally better for him, if he believes it morally wrong to dance\nin the forum, to break his promise and refuse to accept his inheritance\nrather than to keep his promise and accept it--unless, perhaps, he\ncontributes the money to the state to meet some grave crisis. In that\ncase, to promote thereby the interests of one's country, it would not\nbe morally wrong even to dance, if you please, in the forum.\n\n    [BW] Approximately \u00a3750,000.\n\n\n*94* XXV. Ac ne illa quidem promissa servanda sunt, quae non sunt\niis[350] ipsis utilia, quibus illa promiseris. Sol Pha\u00ebthonti filio, ut\nredeamus ad fabulas, facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset; optavit,\nut in currum patris tolleretur; sublatus est. Atque[351] is, ante quam\nconstitit, ictu fulminis deflagravit. Quanto melius fuerat in hoc\npromissum patris non esse servatum! Quid, quod Theseus exegit promissum\na Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset, optavit interitum\nHippolyti filii, cum is patri suspectus esset de noverca; quo optato\nimpetrato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus. *95* Quid, _quod_[352]\nAgamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum\nesset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno\nnatum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus\nadmittendum fuit.\n\nErgo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita\nreddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat\ninsaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui\napud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum?\nNon credo; facias[353] enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse\ncarissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus\nfiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita\ncommutata utilitate fiunt non honesta.\n\nAc de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam\nsimulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum.\n\n*96* Sed quoniam a quattuor fontibus honestatis #\u00a7\u00a7 15 ff.# primo libro\nofficia duximus, in eisdem versemur, cum docebimus ea, #\u00a7\u00a7 40-70# quae\nvideantur esse utilia neque sint, #\u00a7\u00a7 71-95# quam sint virtutis inimica.\nAc de prudentia quidem, quam vult imitari malitia, itemque de iustitia,\nquae semper est utilis, disputatum est. Reliquae sunt duae partes\nhonestatis, quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine et\npraestantia cernitur, altera in conformatione et moderatione\ncontinentiae et temperantiae.\n\n    [350] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [351] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, M\u00fcller, Heine; _Atqui_ Fl., Bt.^2,\n    Ed.\n\n    [352] _quod_ Ed.; not in MSS., Bt., et al.\n\n    [353] _facias_ c, Bt., Ed., Heine; _facies_ A B H a b,\n    M\u00fcller.\n\n\n#(3) when not expedient for him to whom the promise is made.#\n\n*94* XXV. No more binding are those promises which are inexpedient for\nthe persons themselves to whom they have been given. To go back to the\nrealm of story, the sungod promised his son Pha\u00ebthon to do for him\nwhatever he should wish. His wish was to be allowed to ride in his\nfather's chariot. It was granted. And before he came back to the ground\nhe was consumed by a stroke of lightning. How much better had it been,\nif in his case the father's promise had not been kept. And what of that\npromise, the fulfilment of which Theseus required from Neptune? When\nNeptune offered him three wishes, he wished for the death of his son\nHippolytus, because the father was suspicious of the son's relations\nwith his step-mother. And when this wish was granted, Theseus was\noverwhelmed with grief. *95* And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to\nDiana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he\nwas brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born\nmore beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than\ncommit so horrible a crime.\n\n#Trusts not always to be restored.#\n\nPromises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not\nalways to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you\nwhen he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity;\nit would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to\ndo so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes\nto make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I\nbelieve you should not; for you would be acting against the state,\nwhich ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are\nmany things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which\nunder certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a\npromise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change\nof expediency, cease to be morally right.\n\nWith this I think I have said enough about those actions which\nmasquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are\nreally contrary to justice.\n\n*96* Since, however, in Book One we derived moral duties from the four\nsources of moral rectitude, let us continue the same fourfold division\nhere in pointing out how hostile to virtue are those courses of conduct\nwhich seem to be, but really are not, expedient. We have discussed\nwisdom, which cunning seeks to counterfeit, and likewise justice, which\nis always expedient. There remain for our discussion two divisions of\nmoral rectitude, the one of which is discernible in the greatness and\npre-eminence of a superior soul, the other, in the shaping and\nregulation of it by temperance and self-control.\n\n\n*97* XXVI. Utile videbatur Ulixi, ut quidem po\u00ebtae tragici prodiderunt\n(nam apud Homerum, optimum auctorem, talis de Ulixe nulla suspicio est),\nsed insimulant eum tragoediae simulatione insaniae militiam subterfugere\nvoluisse. Non honestum consilium, at utile, ut aliquis fortasse dixerit,\nregnare et Ithacae vivere otiose cum parentibus, cum uxore, cum filio.\nUllum tu decus in cotidianis laboribus et periculis cum hac\ntranquillitate conferendum putas?\n\nEgo vero istam contemnendam et abiciendam, quoniam, quae honesta non\nsit, ne utilem quidem esse arbitror. *98* Quid enim auditurum putas\nfuisse Ulixem, si in illa simulatione perseveravisset? qui cum maximas\nres gesserit in bello, tamen haec audiat ab Aiace:\n\n#(Accius or Pacuvius, Judicium Armorum?) _Inc. inc. fab._, Ribbeck^2\n55-60#\n\n    Cuius \u00edpse princeps i\u00faris iurand\u00ed fuit,\n    Quod \u00f3mnes scitis, s\u00f3lus neglex\u00edt fidem;\n    Furere \u00e1ssimulare, n\u00e9 coiret, \u00ednstitit.\n    Quodn\u00ed Palamedi p\u00e9rspicax prud\u00e9ntia\n    Ist\u00edus percepset[354] m\u00e1litiosam aud\u00e1ciam,\n    Fid\u00e9 sacratae[355] i\u00fas perpetuo f\u00e1lleret.\n\n*99* Illi vero non modo cum hostibus, verum etiam cum fluctibus, id quod\nfecit, dimicare melius fuit quam deserere consentientem Graeciam ad\nbellum barbaris inferendum.\n\nSed omittamus et fabulas et externa; ad rem factam nostramque veniamus.\nM. Atilius Regulus cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset\nduce Xanthippo Lacedaemonio, imperatore autem patre Hannibalis\nHamilcare, iuratus missus est ad senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent Poenis\ncaptivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem. Is cum Romam venisset,\nutilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam iudicavit;\nquae erat talis: manere in patria, esse domui suae cum uxore, cum\nliberis, quam calamitatem accepisset in bello, communem fortunae\nbellicae iudicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis haec negat\nesse utilia? quem censes? Magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat. *100*\nXXVII. Num[356] locupletiores quaeris auctores? Harum enim est virtutum\nproprium nihil extimescere, omnia humana despicere, nihil, quod homini\naccidere possit, intolerandum putare. Itaque quid fecit? In senatum\nvenit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret recusavit, quam diu iure\niurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam (\"O\nstultum hominem,\" dixerit quispiam, \"et repugnantem utilitati suae!\"),\nreddi captivos negavit esse utile; illos enim adulescentes esse et bonos\nduces, se iam confectum senectute. Cuius cum valuisset auctoritas,\ncaptivi retenti sunt, ipse Carthaginem rediit, neque eum caritas patriae\nretinuit nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem\net ad exquisita supplicia proficisci, sed ius iurandum conservandum\nputabat. Itaque tum, cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa,\nquam si domi senex captivus, periurus consularis remansisset.\n\n*101* At stulte, qui non modo non censuerit captivos remittendos, verum\netiam dissuaserit.\n\nQuo modo stulte? etiamne, si rei publicae conducebat? potest autem, quod\ninutile rei publicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse?\n\n    [354] _percepset_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _percepisset_ MSS.;\n    _perspexet_ M\u00fcller.\n\n    [355] _sacratae_ Edd.; _sacrata_ B H a b; _sacratum_ c.\n\n    [356] _num_ A L c, Edd.; _nam_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Fortitude:#\n\n#(1) Ulysses's ruse,#\n\n*97* XXVI. Ulysses thought his ruse expedient, as the tragic poets, at\nleast, have represented him. In Homer, our most reliable authority, no\nsuch suspicion is cast upon him; but the tragedies charge him with\ntrying to escape a soldier's service by feigning madness. The trick was\nnot morally right, but, some one may perhaps say, \"It was expedient for\nhim to keep his throne and live at ease in Ithaca with parents, wife,\nand son. Do you think that there is any glory in facing daily toil and\ndanger that can be compared with a life of such tranquillity?\"\n\nNay; I think that tranquillity at such a price is to be despised and\nrejected; for if it is not morally right, neither is it expedient. *98*\nFor what do you think would have been said of Ulysses, if he had\npersisted in that pretended madness, seeing that, notwithstanding his\ndeeds of heroism in the war, he was nevertheless upbraided by Ajax thus:\n\n    \"'Twas he himself who first proposed the oath; ye all\n    Do know; yet he alone of all his vow did break;\n    He feigned persistently that he was mad, that thus\n    He might not have to join the host. And had not then\n    Palamedes, shrewd and wise, his tricky impudence\n    Unmasked, he had evaded e'en for aye his vow.\"\n\n*99* Nay, for him it had been better to battle not only with the enemy\nbut also with the waves, as he did, than to desert Greece when she was\nunited for waging the war against the barbarians.\n\nBut let us leave illustrations both from story and from foreign lands\nand turn to real events in our own history. #(2) the example of\nRegulus.# Marcus Atilius Regulus in his second consulship was taken\nprisoner in Africa by the stratagem of Xanthippus, a Spartan general\nserving under the command of Hannibal's father Hamilcar.[BX] He was sent\nto the senate on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain\nnoble prisoners of war[BY] were not restored to the Carthaginians. When\nhe came to Rome, he could not fail to see the specious appearance of\nexpediency, but he decided that it was unreal, as the outcome proves.\nHis apparent interest was to remain in his own country, to stay at home\nwith his wife and children, and to retain his rank and dignity as an\nex-consul, regarding the defeat which he had suffered as a misfortune\nthat might come to anyone in the game of war. Who says that this was not\nexpedient? Who, think you? Greatness of soul and courage say that it was\nnot. *100* #The violation of his oath could not have been expedient for\nhim.# XXVII. Can you ask for more competent authorities? The denial\ncomes from those virtues, for it is characteristic of them to await\nnothing with fear, to rise superior to all the vicissitudes of earthly\nlife, and to count nothing intolerable that can befall a human being.\nWhat, then, did he do? He came into the senate and stated his mission;\nbut he refused to give his own vote on the question; for, he held, he\nwas not a member of the senate so long as he was bound by the oath sworn\nto his enemies. And more than that, he said--\"What a foolish fellow,\"\nsome one will say, \"to oppose his own best interests\"--he said that it\nwas not expedient that the prisoners should be returned; for they were\nyoung men and gallant officers, while he was already bowed with age. And\nwhen his counsel prevailed, the prisoners were retained and he himself\nreturned to Carthage; affection for his country and his family failed to\nhold him back. And even then he was not ignorant of the fact that he was\ngoing to a most cruel enemy and to exquisite torture; still, he thought\nhis oath must be sacredly kept. And so even then, when he was being\nslowly put to death by enforced wakefulness, he enjoyed a happier lot\nthan if he had remained at home an aged prisoner of war, a man of\nconsular rank forsworn.\n\n*101* \"But,\" you will say, \"it was foolish of him not only not to\nadvocate the exchange of prisoners but even to plead against such\naction.\"\n\nHow was it foolish? Was it so, even if his policy was for the good of\nthe state? Nay; can what is inexpedient for the state be expedient for\nany individual citizen?\n\n    [BX] Cicero is careless in his dates. Regulus was consul in\n    267 and 256. He was defeated and taken prisoner in his second\n    proconsulship at the battle of Tunes in 255. And the Hamilcar\n    of 255 was not Hannibal's father, for his career does not\n    begin until 247, when he was a mere youth, and he was still\n    in his prime when he fell in battle in Spain, in 229.\n\n    [BY] At the battle of Panormus in 250 Lucius Caecilius\n    Metellus took among the prisoners no less than thirteen\n    Carthaginian generals--all men of noble birth.\n\n\nXXVIII. Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt fundamenta naturae, cum\nutilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad\neamque rapimur nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui\nutilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur?\nSed quia nusquam possumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia\nreperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non\ntam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus.\n\n*102* Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iure iurando? num iratum timemus\nIovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo,\nqui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil exhibere alteri, sed\neorum etiam, qui deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt, numquam nec\nirasci deum nec nocere. Quid autem iratus Iuppiter plus nocere\npotuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus? Nulla igitur vis fuit\nreligionis, quae tantam utilitatem perverteret.\n\nAn ne turpiter faceret? Primum minima de malis. Num[357] igitur tantum\nmali turpitudo ista habebat,[358] quantum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud\netiam apud Accium:\n\n#Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 227-228#\n\n                          Fregist\u00edn[359] fidem?\n    N\u00e9que dedi neque do \u00ednfideli cu\u00edquam\n\nquamquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculente tamen dicitur.\n\n*103* Addunt etiam, quem ad modum nos dicamus videri quaedam utilia,\nquae non sint, sic se dicere videri quaedam honesta, quae non sint, \"ut\nhoc ipsum videtur honestum, conservandi iuris iurandi causa ad cruciatum\nrevertisse; sed fit non honestum, quia, quod per vim hostium esset\nactum, ratum esse non debuit.\"\n\nAddunt etiam, quicquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, etiamsi antea\nnon videretur.\n\nHaec fere contra Regulum. Sed prima _quaeque_[360] videamus.\n\n    [357] _Num_ Edd.; _non_ MSS.\n\n    [358] _habebat_ L c, Edd.; _habebit_ A B H a b.\n\n    [359] _fregistin_ Edd.; _fregistine_ A B H a b; _fregisti_ L\n    c.\n\n    [360] _quaeque_ Forchhammer, M\u00fcller, Heine; not in MSS., Bt.,\n    Ed.\n\n\n#Expediency inseparable from moral rectitude.#\n\nXXVIII. People overturn the fundamental principles established by\nnature, when they divorce expediency from moral rectitude. For we all\nseek to obtain what is to us expedient; we are irresistibly drawn toward\nit, and we cannot possibly be otherwise. For who is there that would\nturn his back upon what is to him expedient? Or rather, who is there\nthat does not exert himself to the utmost to secure it? But because we\ncannot discover it anywhere except in good report, propriety, and moral\nrectitude, we look upon these three for that reason as the first and the\nhighest objects of endeavour, while what we term expediency we account\nnot so much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary incident to\nliving.\n\n#Arguments against Regulus's fidelity to his oath:#\n\n#(1) he had no need to fear God's wrath,#\n\n*102* \"What significance, then,\" some one will say, \"do we attach to an\noath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; it is\nthe universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never\nangry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine not only of those[BZ] who\nteach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes\nno trouble upon others, but also of those[CA] who believe that God is\never working and ever directing His world. Furthermore, suppose Jupiter\nhad been wroth, what greater injury could He have inflicted upon\nRegulus than Regulus brought upon himself? Religious scruple, therefore,\nhad no such preponderance as to outweigh so great expediency.\"\n\n#(2) \"Of two evils choose the less,\"#\n\n\"Or was he afraid that his act would be morally wrong? As to that, first\nof all, the proverb says 'Of evils choose the least.' Did that moral\nwrong, then, really involve as great an evil as did that awful torture?\nAnd secondly, there are the lines of Accius:\n\n    _Thyestes._ 'Hast thou broke thy faith?'\n    _Atreus._ 'None have I giv'n; none give I ever to the faithless.'\n\nAlthough this sentiment is put into the mouth of a wicked king, still it\nis illuminating in its correctness.\"\n\n#(3) oaths extorted by constraint not binding,#\n\n*103* Their third argument is this: just as we maintain that some things\nseem expedient but are not, so they maintain, some things seem morally\nright but are not. \"For example,\" they contend, \"in this very case it\nseems morally right for Regulus to have returned to torture for the sake\nof being true to his oath. But it proves not to be morally right,\nbecause what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have been binding.\"\n\n#(4) exceptional expediency makes right.#\n\nAs their concluding argument, they add: whatever is highly expedient may\nprove to be morally right, even if it did not seem so in advance.\n\nThese are in substance the arguments raised against the conduct of\nRegulus. Let us consider them each in turn.\n\n    [BZ] The Epicureans.\n\n    [CA] The Stoics.\n\n\n*104* XXIX. \"Non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque\nirasci solet nec nocere.\"\n\nHaec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum\nvalet. Sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet\nintellegi; est enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem\naffirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad\niram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam\npraeclare Ennius:\n\n#(Thyestes?) _Fab. inc._, Vahlen^2, 403#\n\n    \u00d3 Fides alma \u00e1pta pinnis \u00e9t ius iurand\u00fam Iovis!\n\nQui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio\n\"vicinam Iovis optimi maximi,\" #Unknown# ut in Catonis oratione est,\nmaiores nostri esse voluerunt.\n\n*105* At enim ne iratus quidem Iuppiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi\nnocuit ipse Regulus.\n\nCerte, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem non modo [non][361]\nsummum malum, sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi\naffirmant. Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an\ngravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare. Quem enim locupletiorem\nquaerimus quam principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa\ncruciatum subierit voluntarium?\n\nNam quod aiunt: \"minima de malis,\" id est ut turpiter potius quam\ncalamitose, an est ullum maius malum turpitudine? quae si in deformitate\ncorporis habet[362] aliquid offensionis, quanta illa depravatio et\nfoeditas turpificati animi debet videri! *106* Itaque nervosius qui ista\ndisserunt, solum audent malum dicere id, quod turpe sit, qui autem\nremissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.\n\nNam illud quidem:\n\n#Accius, Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 228#\n\n    N\u00e9que dedi neque do \u00ednfideli cu\u00edquam\n\nidcirco recte a po\u00ebta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum\nfuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit,\nvideant, ne quaeratur latebra periurio.\n\n*107* Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi saepe cum\nhoste servanda.[363] Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri\noportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est\nperiurium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris,\nnulla fraus sit,[364] ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata\nnon est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum\nhoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. *108* Non enim falsum\niurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut\nverbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite\nenim[365] Euripides:\n\n#Hippolytus 612#\n\n    Iur\u00e1vi lingua, m\u00e9ntem iniurat\u00e1m gero.\n\nRegulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles\nperturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur,\nadversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni\nita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos[366] hostibus\ndedidisset.\n\n    [361] _non modo non_ B H a; _non modo nos_ c; _non modo_ L c\n    p, Edd.\n\n    [362] _habet_ L c, Edd.; _habeat_ A B H a b.\n\n    [363] _Est ... servanda_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2, Ed.\n\n    [364] _sit_ Edd. plerique; _est_ MSS., Bt.^1\n\n    [365] _Scite enim_ A L c, Edd.; _scit enim_ B H a b.\n\n    [366] _vinctos_ A L c, Edd.; _victos_ B H a b.\n\n\n#Rebuttal.#\n\n*104* XXIX. \"He need not have been afraid that Jupiter in anger would\ninflict injury upon him; he is not wont to be angry or hurtful.\"\n\n#(1) An oath is a covenant with Justice and Good Faith;#\n\nThis argument, at all events, has no more weight against Regulus's\nconduct than it has against the keeping of any other oath. But in taking\nan oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case\nof violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance\nbacked by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God\nas one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer\nconcerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the\nobligations of justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so admirably:\n\n    \"Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; thou oath in Jupiter's\n      great name!\"\n\nWhoever, therefore, violates his oath violates Good Faith; and, as we\nfind it stated in Cato's speech, our forefathers chose that she should\ndwell upon the Capitol \"neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best.\"\n\n*105* \"But,\" objection was further made, \"even if Jupiter had been\nangry, he could not have inflicted greater injury upon Regulus than\nRegulus brought upon himself.\"\n\n#What is evil?#\n\nQuite true, if there is no evil except pain. But philosophers[CB] of the\nhighest authority assure us that pain is not only not the supreme evil\nbut no evil at all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no unimportant\nwitness--nay, I am rather inclined to think he was the very best\nwitness--to the truth of their doctrine. For what more competent witness\ndo we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of Rome, who voluntarily\nfaced torture for the sake of being true to his moral duty?\n\n#(2) no evil can be greater than moral wrong;#\n\nAgain, they say \"Of evils choose the least\"--that is, shall one \"choose\nmoral wrong rather than misfortune,\" or is there any evil greater than\nmoral wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain amount of\naversion, how offensive ought the deformity and hideousness of a\ndemoralized soul to seem! *106* Therefore, those[CC] who discuss these\nproblems with more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is the only\nevil, while those[CD] who treat them with more laxity do not hesitate to\ncall it the supreme evil.\n\nOnce more, they quote the sentiment:\n\n    \"None have I given, none give I ever to the faithless.\"\n\nIt was proper for the poet to say that, because, when he was working out\nhis Atreus, he had to make the words fit the character. But if they mean\nto adopt it as a principle, that a pledge given to the faithless is no\npledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury\nthat they seek.\n\n#What is perjury?#\n\n*107* Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an\noath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn\nwith the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be\nperformed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does\nnot count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. For example,\nsuppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as\nthe price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception--not even\nif one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so;\nfor a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the\ncommon foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any\npledged word nor any oath mutually binding. *108* For swearing to what\nis false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath \"upon your\nconscience,\" as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to\nperform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says:\n\n    \"My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath.\"\n\n#Oaths made to an enemy as binding as treaties.#\n\nBut Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covenants\nof war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a\nlegitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an\nenemy, we have our whole fetial[CE] code as well as many other laws that\nare binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the\nsenate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains\nto the enemy.\n\n    [CB] The Stoics.\n\n    [CC] The Stoics.\n\n    [CD] The Peripatetics.\n\n    [CE] See Index, s.v.\n\n\n*109* XXX. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum iterum consules\nessent, quia, cum male pugnatum apud Caudium esset, legionibus nostris\nsub iugum missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt iis; iniussu\nenim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodemque tempore Ti. Numicius, Q.\nMaelius, qui tum tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat\nfacta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur; atque huius\ndeditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedebatur, suasor et auctor fuit.\n\nQuod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut Numantinis, quibuscum\nsine senatus auctoritate foedus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit\neam, quam L. Furius, Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; qua\naccepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius his quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum\nin eadem causa esset, deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae\nvidebatur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores\nutilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est.\n\n#\u00a7 103#\n\n*110* At non debuit ratum esse, quod erat actum per vim.--Quasi vero\nforti viro vis possit adhiberi.\n\nCur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum praesertim de captivis\ndissuasurus esset?\n\nQuod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis. Non enim suo iudicio stetit,\nsed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus; cui nisi ipse auctor\nfuisset, captivi profecto Poenis redditi essent; ita incolumis in patria\nRegulus restitisset. Quod quia patriae non utile putavit, idcirco sibi\nhonestum et sentire illa et pati credidit.\n\n#\u00a7 103#\n\nNam quod aiunt, quod valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, immo vero esse,\nnon fieri. Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec, quia\nutile, honestum, sed, quia honestum, utile.\n\nQuare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis haud facile quis dixerit hoc\nexemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius.\n\n\n#Roman strictness.#\n\n*109* XXX. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Veturius and Spurius\nPostumius in their second consulship lost the battle at the Caudine\nForks, and our legions were sent under the yoke. And because they made\npeace with the Samnites, those generals were delivered up to them, for\nthey had made the peace without the approval of the people and senate.\nAnd Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, tribunes of the people, were\ndelivered up at the same time, because it was with their sanction that\nthe peace had been concluded. This was done in order that the peace with\nthe Samnites might be annulled. And Postumius, the very man whose\ndelivery was in question, was the proposer and advocate of the said\ndelivery.\n\nMany years later,[CF] Gaius Mancinus had a similar experience: he\nadvocated the bill, introduced in accordance with a decree of the senate\nby Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered up to\nthe Numantines, with whom he had made a treaty without authorization\nfrom the senate; and when the bill was passed, he was delivered up to\nthe enemy. His action was more honourable than Quintus Pompey's;\nPompey's situation was identical with his, and yet at his own entreaty\nthe bill was rejected. In this latter case, apparent expediency\nprevailed over moral rectitude; in the former cases, the false semblance\nof expediency was overbalanced by the weight of moral rectitude.\n\n#(3) the interests of the state higher than personal advantage;#\n\n*110* \"But,\" they argued against Regulus, \"an oath extorted by force\nought not to have been binding.\" As if force could be brought to bear\nupon a brave man!\n\n\"Why, then, did he make the journey to the senate, especially when he\nintended to plead against the surrender of the prisoners of war?\"\n\nTherein you are criticizing what is the noblest feature of his conduct.\nFor he was not content to stand upon his own judgment but took up the\ncase, in order that the judgment might be that of the senate; and had it\nnot been for the weight of his pleading, the prisoners would certainly\nhave been restored to the Carthaginians; and in that case, Regulus would\nhave remained safe at home in his country. But because he thought this\nnot expedient for his country, he believed that it was therefore morally\nright for him to declare his conviction and to suffer for it.\n\n#(4) nothing expedient unless morally right.#\n\nWhen they argued also that what is highly expedient may prove to be\nmorally right, they ought rather to say not that it \"may prove to be\"\nbut that it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expedient\nwhich is not at the same time morally right; neither can a thing be\nmorally right just because it is expedient, but it is expedient because\nit is morally right.\n\nFrom the many splendid examples in history, therefore, we could not\neasily point to one either more praiseworthy or more heroic than the\nconduct of Regulus.\n\n    [CF] 184 years, i.e., in B.C. 137.\n\n\n*111* XXXI. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione\ndignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. Nam quod rediit, nobis nunc\nmirabile videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit;\nitaque ista laus non est hominis, sed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad\nastringendam fidem iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. Id\nindicant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, indicant foedera,\nquibus etiam cum hoste devincitur fides, indicant notiones\nanimadversionesque censorum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iure\niurando iudicabant.\n\n*112* L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tr. pl. diem\ndixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset;\ncriminabatur etiam, quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus\nappellatus, ab hominibus relegasset et ruri habitare iussisset. Quod cum\naudivisset adulescens filius, negotium exhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam\net cum primo luci[367] Pomponi domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset\nnuntiatum, qui illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem\narbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo remotisque arbitris ad se adulescentem\niussit venire. At ille, ut ingressus est, confestim gladium destrinxit\niuravitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi ius iurandum sibi\ndedisset se patrem missum esse facturum. Iuravit hoc terrore coactus\nPomponius; rem ad populum detulit, docuit, cur sibi causa desistere\nnecesse esset, Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis ius\niurandum valebat.\n\nAtque hic T. Manlius is est, qui ad Anienem Galli, quem ab eo provocatus\nocciderat, torque detracto cognomen invenit, cuius tertio consulatu\nLatini ad Veserim fusi et fugati, magnus vir in primis et, qui\nperindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in filium.\n\n    [367] _primo luci_ Beier, Heine, Ed.; _primo lucis_ c; _prima\n    luce_ A B H a b.\n\n\n#The most striking lesson in the story of Regulus.#\n\n*111* XXXI. But of all that is thus praiseworthy in the conduct of\nRegulus, this one feature above all others calls for our admiration: it\nwas he who offered the motion that the prisoners of war be retained. For\nthe fact of his returning may seem admirable to us nowadays, but in\nthose times he could not have done otherwise. That merit, therefore,\nbelongs to the age, not to the man. For our ancestors were of the\nopinion that no bond was more effective in guaranteeing good faith than\nan oath. That is clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by the\n\"sacred\" laws,[CG] by the treaties in which good faith is pledged even\nto the enemy, by the investigations made by the censors and the\npenalties imposed by them; for there were no cases in which they used to\nrender more rigorous decisions than in cases of violation of an oath.\n\n#The sanctity of an oath in the old days.#\n\n*112* Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, brought an indictment\nagainst Lucius Manlius, Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his\ndictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He further charged him\nwith having banished his own son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus)\nfrom all companionship with his fellow-men, and with requiring him to\nlive in the country. When the son, who was then a young man, heard\nthat his father was in trouble on his account, he hastened to Rome--so\nthe story goes--and at daybreak presented himself at the house of\nPomponius. The visitor was announced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he\nthought that the son in his anger meant to bring him some new evidence\nto use against the father, he arose from his bed, asked all who were\npresent to leave the room, and sent word to the young man to come in.\nUpon entering, he at once drew a sword and swore that he would kill the\ntribune on the spot, if he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit\nagainst his father. Constrained by the terror of the situation,\nPomponius gave his oath. He reported the matter to the people,\nexplaining why he was obliged to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his\nsuit against Manlius. Such was the regard for the sanctity of an oath in\nthose days.\n\nAnd that lad was the Titus Manlius who in the battle on the Anio killed\nthe Gaul by whom he had been challenged to single combat, pulled off his\ntorque and thus won his surname. And in his third consulship he routed\nthe Latins and put them to flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was\none of the greatest of the great, and one who, while more than generous\ntoward his father, could yet be bitterly severe toward his son.\n\n    [CG] \"Sacred\" laws, according to Festus (p. 318), were laws\n    that placed their transgressor, together with his household\n    and his property, under the ban of some divinity; other\n    authorities limit the term to the laws enacted upon the\n    Sacred Mount (B.C. 394).\n\n\n*113* XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando iure iurando, sic\ndecem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal\nse in castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi de redimendis\ncaptivis impetravissent, si non redierunt, vituperandi. De quibus non\nomnes uno modo; nam Polybius, bonus auctor in primis, ex decem\nnobilissimis, qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse dicit re a senatu\nnon impetrata; unum ex decem, qui paulo post, quam erat[368] egressus e\ncastris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse; reditu\nenim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur, non\nrecte; fraus enim astringit,[369] non dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur\nstulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit senatus,\nut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.\n\n*114*[370] Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non\nquos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui\nrelicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos senatus\nnon censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset\ninsitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita\nfractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus\nrebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione\nea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur.\n\n*115* _C._[371] Acilius autem, qui Graece scripsit historiam, plures ait\nfuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem fraude, ut iure iurando\nliberarentur, eosque a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.\n\nSit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, quae timido animo,\nhumili, demisso fractoque fiant, quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de\ncaptivis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae,\ncensuisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, quia sint\nflagitiosa, foeda, turpia.\n\n    [368] _Novem ... quam erat_ c, Bt.^1, Ed.; om. A B H a b;\n    _unum qui_ Unger, Bt.^2\n\n    [369] _astringit_ c p, Ed., Heine; _distringit_ A B H a b,\n    Unger, Bt.\n\n    [370] \u00a7 114 bracketed by Heus., Bt., as un-Ciceronian.\n\n    [371] _C._ Heine, Ed.; not in MSS.\n\n\n#Contrast between Regulus and the ten envoys from Hannibal.#\n\n*113* XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for being true to his oath,\nso those ten whom Hannibal sent to the senate on parole after the battle\nof Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not return; for\nthey were sworn to return to the camp which had fallen into the hands of\nthe Carthaginians, if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange\nof prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in regard to the facts.\nPolybius, one of the very best authorities, states that of the ten\neminent nobles who were sent at that time, nine returned when their\nmission failed at the hands of the senate. But one of the ten, who, a\nlittle while after leaving the camp, had gone back on the pretext that\nhe had forgotten something or other, remained behind at Rome; he\nexplained that by his return to the camp he was released from the\nobligation of his oath. He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the\nguilt of perjury--it merely aggravates it. #The ancient Roman\ndiscipline.# His cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence\nwas, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ordered that the cunning\nscoundrel should be taken back to Hannibal in chains.\n\n*114* But the most significant part of the story is this: the eight\nthousand prisoners in Hannibal's hands were not men that he had taken in\nthe battle or that had escaped in the peril of their lives, but men that\nthe consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in camp. Though these might\nhave been ransomed by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to\nredeem them, in order that our soldiers might have the lesson planted in\ntheir hearts that they must either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard\nthis news, according to that same writer, he lost heart completely,\nbecause the senate and the people of Rome displayed courage so lofty in\na time of disaster. Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when placed\nin the balance against moral rectitude.\n\n*115* Gaius Acilius, on the other hand, the author of a history of Rome\nin Greek, says that there were several who played the same trick of\nreturning to the camp to release themselves thus from the obligation of\ntheir oath, and that they were branded by the censors with every mark of\ndisgrace.\n\n#Expediency and Courage identical.#\n\nLet this be the conclusion of this topic. For it must be perfectly\napparent that acts that are done with a cowardly, craven, abject, broken\nspirit, as the act of Regulus would have been if he had supported in\nregard to the prisoners a measure that seemed to be advantageous for him\npersonally, but disadvantageous for the state, or if he had consented to\nremain at home--that such acts are not expedient because they are\nshameful, dishonourable, and immoral.\n\n\n*116* XXXIII. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, moderatione, modestia,\ncontinentia, temperantia continetur.\n\nPotest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huic talium virtutum choro\ncontrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi\nnominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque censuerunt ob eam\nrem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis\nfloret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. Cum his\n\"viris[372] equisque,\" ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere\nsententia est, decertandum est.\n\n*117* Nam si non modo utilitas, sed vita omnis beata corporis firma\nconstitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro\nscriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas, et quidem summa (sic enim\ncensent), cum honestate pugnabit. Nam ubi primum prudentiae locus\ndabitur? an ut conquirat undique suavitates? Quam miser virtutis\nfamulatus servientis voluptati! Quod autem munus prudentiae? an legere\nintellegenter voluptates? Fac nihil isto esse iucundius, quid cogitari\npotest turpius?\n\nIam, qui dolorem summum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum\nfortitudo, quae est dolorum laborumque contemptio? Quamvis enim multis\nlocis dicat Epicurus, sicuti[373] dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, tamen\nnon id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere,\nqui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore.\n\nEt,[374] si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia dicit ille\nquidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt; nam qui potest\ntemperantiam laudare is, qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate? est enim\ntemperantia libidinum inimica, libidines autem consectatrices\nvoluptatis.\n\n*118* Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non\nincallide tergiversantur; prudentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem\nvoluptates, depellentem dolores; fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo\nexpediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris;\netiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo\nmodo possunt; dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione\nfiniri. Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes, quae\nin communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. Neque enim\nbonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia,\nsi haec non per se expetantur,[375] sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve\nreferantur.\n\nConferamus igitur in pauca.\n\n*119* Nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus, quae honestati esset\ncontraria, sic omnem voluptatem dicimus honestati esse contrariam. Quo\nmagis reprehendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, qui se\ndirempturos controversiam putaverunt, si cum honestate voluptatem\ntamquam cum homine pecudem copulavissent. Non recipit istam\nconiunctionem honestas, aspernatur, repellit. Nec vero finis bonorum [et\nmalorum],[376] qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimillimis rebus misceri et\ntemperari potest. #De Finibus, II# Sed de hoc (magna enim res est) alio\nloco pluribus; nunc ad propositum.\n\n*120* Quem ad modum igitur, si quando ea, quae videtur[377] utilitas,\nhonestati repugnat, diiudicanda res sit, satis est supra disputatum. Sin\nautem speciem utilitatis etiam voluptas habere dicetur, nulla potest\nesse ei cum honestate coniunctio. Nam, ut tribuamus aliquid voluptati,\ncondimenti fortasse non nihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit.\n\n*121* Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem sententia magnum, sed\nperinde erit, ut acceperis. Quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi\ncommentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse\nvenissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara\nvoce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his\nvoluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis[378] temporis\nquantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te\nhoc scientiae genere gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero,\net, dum aberis, absens loquar.\n\nVale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum,\nsed multo fore cariorem, si talibus monitis[379] praeceptisque\nlaetabere.\n\n    [372] _viris_ c p, Edd.; _veris_ A B H b.\n\n    [373] _sicuti_ L c, Edd.; _sicut id_ A B H a b.\n\n    [374] _dolore. Et_ M\u00fcller, Heine; _dolore: ut_ MSS., Bt.;\n    _dolore. Ut_ Ed.\n\n    [375] _expetantur_ A, Edd.; _expectantur_ B a; _exspectantur_\n    c.\n\n    [376] Omitted by Muretus; bracketed by Heine, Ed., et al.\n\n    [377] _videtur_ c, Edd.; _videretur_ B H a b; _viderentur_ A.\n\n    [378] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ A B H a b; _hijs_ c.\n\n    [379] _monitis_ Lambinus, Edd.; _monumentis_ A B H a b;\n    _monimentis_ c.\n\n\n#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Temperance.#\n\n*116* XXXIII. We have still left our fourth division, comprising\npropriety, moderation, temperance, self-restraint, self-control.\n\nCan anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of\nvirtues? And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus,\nand the philosophers who bear the name of Anniceris find all good to\nconsist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is\nproductive of pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus\nhas come into vogue--an advocate and supporter of practically the same\ndoctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out \"with horse and\nfoot,\" as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our\nstandard of moral rectitude.\n\n#The fallacy of Epicureanism.#\n\n*117* For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus, not only\nexpediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical\nconstitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain\nsound, then that expediency--and what is more, the highest expediency,\nas they estimate it--will assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For,\nfirst of all, what position will wisdom occupy in that system? The\nposition of collector of pleasures from every possible source? What a\nsorry state of servitude for a virtue--to be pandering to sensual\npleasure! And what will be the function of wisdom? To make skilful\nchoice between sensual pleasures? Granted that there may be nothing more\npleasant, what can be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such a\nr\u00f4le?\n\nThen again, if anyone hold that pain is the supreme evil, what place in\nhis philosophy has fortitude, which is but indifference to toil and\npain? For however many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right\nmanfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but\nwhat it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms\nof pleasure and evil in terms of pain.\n\nAnd further, if I should listen to him, I should find that in many\npassages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control;\nbut \"the water will not run,\" as they say. For how can he commend\nself-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? For\nself-control is the foe of the passions, and the passions are the\nhandmaids of pleasure.\n\n#Epicureanism and the Cardinal Virtues.#\n\n*118* And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, those\nphilosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without\ncleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that\nprovides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude\nalso in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it\nis a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for\nenduring pain. They bring even temperance in--not very easily, to be\nsure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of\npleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I\nshould say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which\nare discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For\nneither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than\nfriendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are\ncultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.\n\nLet us now recapitulate briefly.\n\n#Sensual pleasure and moral rectitude incompatible.#\n\n*119* As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed to moral\nrectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual\npleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. And therefore Calliphon and\nDinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they\nimagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure\nwith moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast! But moral\nrectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why,\nthe supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and\nmixture of absolutely contradictory qualities. But this theory I have\ndiscussed more fully in another connection; for the subject is a large\none. Now for the matter before us.\n\n*120* We have, then, fully discussed the problem how a question is to be\ndecided, if ever that which seems to be expediency clashes with moral\nrectitude. But if, on the other hand, the assertion is made that\npleasure admits of a show of expediency also, there can still be no\npossible union between it and moral rectitude. For, to make the most\ngenerous admission we can in favour of pleasure, we will grant that it\nmay contribute something that possibly gives some spice to life, but\ncertainly nothing that is really expedient.\n\n#Conclusion.#\n\n*121* Herewith, my son Marcus, you have a present from your father--a\ngenerous one, in my humble opinion; but its value will depend upon the\nspirit in which you receive it. And yet you must welcome these three\nbooks as fellow-guests, so to speak, along with your notes on\nCratippus's lectures. But as you would sometimes give ear to me also, if\nI had come to Athens (and I should be there now, if my country had not\ncalled me back with accents unmistakable, when I was half-way there), so\nyou will please devote as much time as you can to these volumes, for in\nthem my voice will travel to you; and you can devote to them as much\ntime as you will. And when I see that you take delight in this branch of\nphilosophy, I shall then talk further with you--at an early date,[CH] I\nhope, face to face--but as long as you are abroad, I shall converse with\nyou thus at a distance.\n\nFarewell, my dear Cicero, and be assured that, while you are the object\nof my deepest affection, you will be dearer to me still, if you find\npleasure in such counsel and instruction.\n\n    [CH] But Cicero never saw his son Marcus again.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nReferences are to Book and Section; all dates, given in parentheses\n(...), are B.C.\n\nAcademicians.\n  1. adherents of the New Academy (_q.v._);\n    their right to teach ethics, I, 6;\n    attitude toward knowledge, II, 7;\n    Cicero's philosophy, II, 1-8.\n  2. adherents of the Old Academy, III, 20.\n\nAcademy,\n  1. the Older, a school of philosophy founded by Plato and so called\n      from its home;\n    their doctrine of ideas, III, 76, 81;\n    the pre-existence and immortality of the soul;\n    monotheism;\n    the goodness of God;\n    striving after His perfection.\n  2. the New, a modification of the Old, sceptical, anti-dogmatic,\n      eclectic, III, 20.\n\nAccius, Lucius, a tragic poet (born 170). His tragedies were mostly\n      imitations from the Greek. Cicero knew him personally;\n  quotes from him, III, 84, 102, 106.\n\nAcilius;\n  Gaius Acilius Glabrio (tribune, 197);\n  interpreter, when Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus came to Rome;\n  author of History of Rome, III, 115.\n\nAdmiration, how won with dignity, II, 31 fg.\n\nAeacidae, descendants of Aeacus (_q.v._), the father of Peleus and\n      Telamon and grandfather of Achilles and Ajax, I, 38.\n\nAeacus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Aegina (_q.v._);\n  renowned for his justice and piety, I, 97;\n  after his death he became with Minos and Rhadamanthus judge in Hades.\n\nAedileship, cost of, II, 57-60.\n\nAegina, an island in the Saronic Gulf, a dangerous rival to Athens,\n      directly in front of Piraeus and only twelve miles away, III, 46;\n  unjustly appropriated by Athens (429), III, 46.\n\nAeginetans, the people of Aegina (_q.v._).\n\nAelius;\n  _see_ Tubero.\n\nAemilius;\n  _see_ Paulus and Scaurus.\n\nAequians, a warlike mountain tribe on the upper Anio, warring against\n      Rome (till 304), I, 35.\n\nAesopus, Claudius, an intimate friend of Cicero, Rome's greatest tragic\n      actor, I, 114.\n\nAfrica, the province in which Carthage was, I, 112 (Thapsus);\n  III, 99 (Carthage).\n\nAfricanus;\n  _see_ Scipio.\n\nAgamemnon, leader of the war against Troy;\n  when detained at Aulis he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia to save\n      the expedition, III, 95. For this he was slain on his return from\n      Troy by his wife Clytaemnestra.\n\nAgesilaus, king of Sparta (398-360);\n  waged war in Asia (396-394), victor at Coronea, saviour of Sparta\n      after Mantinea (362); II, 16.\n\nAgis IV, king of Sparta (244-240);\n  attempted to re-establish the institutions of Lycurgus and reform\n      property abuses;\n  put to death through organized wealth, II, 80.\n\nAgrarian Laws, a menace to the stability of the government, II, 78-83.\n\nAgriculture, impossible without man, II, 12;\n  man's noblest calling, I, 151.\n\nAgrigentum, a city on the south coast of Sicily, once \"the most\n      beautiful city of mortals,\" ruled by Phalaris (560), II, 26.\n\nAjax, son of Telamon; could brook no wrong, went mad, and committed\n      suicide when the arms of Achilles were awarded to Odysseus,\n      I, 113;\n  rebuked Odysseus, III, 98.\n  Subject of a tragedy by Ennius, I, 114.\n\nAlbucius, Titus, an Epicurean;\n  praetor in Sardinia (105);\n  prosecuted for extortion, II, 50.\n\nAlexander, the Great (356-323), son of Philip of Macedon, II, 16, 48;\n  greater than his father in achievement, inferior in courtliness,\n      I, 90;\n  governor of Macedonia (340), II, 53;\n  conquered Greece (338-335), subdued Asia (334-331), Egypt (331),\n      invaded India (329-327), founded Alexandria and other cities, and\n      died of a drunken debauch (I, 90).\n\nAlexander, tyrant of Pherae (369);\n  brother, son-in-law, and successor of Jason (_q.v._), defeated and\n      slew Pelopidas of Thebes at Cynocephalae (364);\n  murdered by his wife and her three brothers, II, 25, 26.\n\nAlexandria, the metropolis of Egypt at the mouth of the Nile;\n  founded by Alexander (332);\n  centre of wealth (II, 82);\n  grain market, III, 50.\n\nAlps, the mountains between Italy and further Gaul, II, 28.\n\nAmbition, a cause of injustice, I, 25-26, 46, 65;\n  of moral wrong, III, 82;\n  of treason, III, 82-83;\n  the foe of freedom, I, 68; II, 28.\n\nAmusements, wholesome, I, 103-104.\n\nAnger, never excusable, I, 89.\n\nAnio, the Sabine river, tributary to the Tiber;\n  the battle on (340), which gave Rome supremacy over all Latium,\n      III, 112.\n\nAnniceris, of Cyrene (4th century), a successor of Aristippus;\n  his school a cross between the Epicurean and the Cyrenaic: he denied\n      that pleasure was merely absence of pain;\n  he held that every act had its own distinct purpose and that the\n      virtues are good in themselves;\n  his teachings were not permanent, III, 116.\n\nAntigonus, one of Alexander's generals, governor of Asia (323-301),\n      king of Asia (306-301);\n  father of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Philip, II, 48.\n\nAntiope, mother of Amphion and Zethus, by whom she was saved from the\n      persecutions of her former husband Lycus and his wife Dirce;\n  her vengeance on Dirce drove her mad;\n  subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.\n\nAntipater, vice-regent of Macedon (334);\n  father of Cassander, II, 48.\n\nAntipater, of Tarsus (2nd century), pupil and successor of Diogenes of\n      Babylonia;\n  teacher of Panaetius;\n  his ethical teachings, III, 51-55, 91.\n\nAntipater, of Tyre (1st century), friend of Cato the younger;\n  a Stoic, II, 86.\n\nAntonius, Marcus, the famous orator (143-87), II, 49;\n  advocate, III, 67;\n  father of Cicero's colleague and grandfather of the triumvir.\n\nApelles, of Cos (4th century), the greatest painter of his age;\n  court painter to Alexander the Great;\n  his masterpiece was a Venus rising from the sea;\n  another Venus left unfinished, III, 10.\n\nApollo, god of the light of day;\n  giver of oracles at Pytho, II, 77.\n\nAppetite, subject to Reason, I, 101-103, 132, 141.\n\nAppius Claudius Pulcher, father of Gaius, II, 57.\n\nAquilius;\n  Gaius Aquilius Gallus, famous jurist;\n  Cicero's colleague in the praetorship;\n  author of formulae on criminal fraud, III, 60-61.\n\nAquilius, Manius, consul (101) with Marius;\n  victorious in the Servile War in Sicily;\n  prosecuted (98) but acquitted, II, 50.\n\nAratus, of Sicyon, soldier and statesman (271-213), removed the tyrant\n      Nicocles (251) and averted financial ruin, II, 81, 82;\n  leader of the Achaean League;\n  poisoned by order of Philip of Macedon.\n\nAreopagites, members of the Council of Areopagus.\n\nAreopagus, \"Mars Hill,\" a spur of the Acropolis, seat of the highest\n      court of Athens;\n  the court itself, with powers of senate and supreme court, reorganized\n      and enlarged in function by Solon, I, 75.\n\nArginusae, a group of islands off the coast of Asia Minor, near Lesbos,\n      scene of the victory of the Athenian fleet (406), I, 84.\n\nArgos, the chief city of Argolis, II, 81.\n\nAristides, \"the Just,\" III, [16], 49, 87;\n  fought at Marathon (490), Salamis (480), and commanded the Athenians\n      at Plataea (479);\n  exiled (483) because his policies clashed with those of Themistocles.\n\nAristippus, of Cyrene (flourished 370), founder of the Cyrenaic school,\n      III, 116;\n  disciple of Socrates, but taught that the chief end of man was to get\n      enjoyment from everything (hedonism), to subject all things and\n      circumstances to himself for pleasure;\n  but pleasure must be the slave not the master;\n  good and bad identical with pleasure and pain;  I, 148.\n\nAristo, of Chios (3rd century), a Stoic philosopher, pupil of Zeno;\n  he taught indifference to externals, nothing good but virtue, nothing\n      evil but vice;\n  his theories rejected, I, 6.\n\nAristotle (385-322), disciple of Plato and teacher of Alexander the\n      Great;\n  founder of the Peripatetic school;\n  greatest of philosophers, master of all knowledge--physics,\n      metaphysics, natural philosophy, ethics, politics, poetics,\n      sociology, logic, rhetoric, etc.; II, 56; III, 35;\n  might have been a great orator, I, 4.\n\nArpinates, the people of Arpinum, owners of public lands, I, 21.\n\nArpinum, a town in Latium, birthplace of Cicero and Gaius Marius, I, 21.\n\nAthenians, the people of Athens, I, 75, 84;\n  their cruel subjugation of Aegina, III, 46;\n  left their homes to fight at Salamis, III, 48;\n  political strife, I, 86;\n  high moral principles of, III, 49, 55.\n\nAthens, II, 64, 86; III, 55, 87;\n  the intellectual and artistic centre of the world;\n  led Greece in the Persian wars (490-479);\n  humbled by Sparta (404);\n  the university city of the Roman world, I, 1; III, 6, 121.\n\nAtilius;\n  _see_ Regulus.\n\nAtilius;\n  Sextus Atilius Serranus, consul (136), III, 109.\n\nAtreus, son of Pelops and father of Agamemnon and Menelaus, murderer of\n      his half-brother Chrysippus and of his brother Thyestes's\n      children;\n  murdered by his nephew Aegisthus;\n  a fruitful theme for tragedy, I, 97;  III, 106.\n\nAttic, belonging to Attica, the province in which Athens is situated;\n  Attic comedy, the comedy of Aristophanes, Eupolis, Menander, etc.,\n      I, 104.\n\nAvarice, the great temptation, II, 38, 77;\n  the root of evil, III, 73-75;\n  due to delusion as to expediency, III, 36;\n  avoided by the statesman, II, 76-77;\n  contrary to all law, III, 21-23;\n  _see also_ Covetousness.\n\n\nBabylonia, the district around Babylon at the head of the Persian Gulf,\n      III, 51.\n\nBardulis, king of Illyria, conquered a large part of Macedonia from\n      Perdiccas, the brother and predecessor of Philip;\n  defeated and slain by Philip (358);\n  called a \"brigand,\" because his career did not tend to promote\n      civilization, II, 40.\n\nBasilus, Lucius Minucius, otherwise unknown;\n  perhaps Sulla's lieutenant, III, 73-74.\n\nBeauty, physical, I, 98, 126;\n  types of, I, 130.\n\nBeneficence;\n  _see_ Generosity.\n\nBribery, in Rome, II, 21-22, 75.\n\nBrutus, Lucius Junius, led the Romans to expel the Tarquins;\n  helped by Collatinus, who shared with him the first consulship (509),\n      III, 40.\n\nBrutus, Marcus Junius, an eminent jurist, one of the three founders of\n      the civil law;\n  father of \"the Accuser,\" II, 50.\n\nBrutus; Marcus Junius Brutus Accusator, orator and vigorous prosecutor,\n      son of the preceding, II, 50.\n\n\nCaelian Hill, the south-east hill of Rome, III, 66.\n\nCaesar, Gaius Julius, son of Lucius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, candidate\n      for the consulship (88), slain by Marius (87);\n  poet and orator, I, 108, 133.\n\nCaesar, Gaius Julius (100-44), consul (59), in Gaul (58-50), conquered\n      Pompey at Pharsalus (48), dictator (48-44), assassinated (44);\n  orator, statesman, scholar, soldier;\n  despot, II, 2;\n  tyrant, I, 112; II, 23-28, 83;\n  confiscator, I, 43; II, 84;\n  enslaver of Rome, III, 85;\n  treatment of Marseilles, II, 28;\n  a victim of depraved ambition, I, 26; III, 83;\n  a conspirator with Catiline, his love of wrong, II, 84;\n  deserved his death, III, 19, 32, 82.\n\nCaesar, Lucius Julius, father of the Dictator, I, 108.\n\nCallicratidas, succeeded Lysander as admiral of the Spartan fleet,\n      I, 109;\n  defeated Conon, took Lesbos, lost the battle and his life at Arginusae\n      (406), I, 84.\n\nCalliphon, a Greek philosopher, probably a disciple of Epicurus, taught\n      that the supreme good was a union between moral rectitude and\n      pleasure, III, 119.\n\nCalpurnius;\n  Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi;\n  _see_ Piso.\n\nCalpurnius;\n  Publius Calpurnius Lanarius;\n  _see_ Lanarius.\n\nCalypso, the nymph of Ogygia, who kept Odysseus (Ulysses) with her seven\n      years, I, 113.\n\nCampus (Martius), the open plain next to the Tiber outside the north\n      wall of Rome;\n  playground and drillground, I, 104.\n\nCanius, Gaius, a Roman knight, III, 58-60.\n\nCannae, a town on the Aufidus in Apulia, scene of Hannibal's\n      overwhelming defeat of the Romans (216), I, 40; III, 47, 113.\n\nCapitolium, the Capitoline Hill, between the forum and the Tiber, the\n      citadel of Rome, with the temple of Jupiter and Good Faith,\n      III, 104;\n  place of augury, III, 66.\n\nCarthage, once a mighty city, on the north central coast of Africa,\n      III, 99, 100;\n  the most formidable commercial and military rival of Rome;\n  conquered by Rome in the First Punic War (264-241), I, 39;\n  Second Punic War (219-202), I, 40; III, 47;\n  destroyed in the Third (149-146), I, 35; II, 76.\n\nCarthaginians, the people of Carthage, I, 39, 108; III, 99, 110, 113;\n  treacherous, III, 102;\n  cruel, III, 100, 102;\n  treaty-breaking, I, 38.\n\nCassander, son of Antipater, disinherited by his father, gained the\n      throne of Macedonia (306) by wars and murders (319-301), II, 48.\n\nCato, Marcus Porcius, the Censor (or Major, the Elder, I, 37) (234-149),\n      author, I, 104; III, 1;\n  orator, III, 104;\n  soldier, served in Second Punic War (217-202);\n  statesman, responsible for the destruction of Carthage (146), I, 79;\n  \"the Wise,\" III, 16;\n  consul (195);\n  censor (184);\n  stalwart champion of the simple life and stern morals, II, 89;\n  bitterly opposed luxury and Greek culture; yielded in old age.\n\nCato, Marcus Porcius, son of the preceding;\n  jurist;\n  served under Paulus in Macedon (168), I, 37;\n  [under Marcus Popilius Laenas in Liguria (172), I, 36].\n\nCato, Marcus Porcius, grandson of the Censor and father of Cato\n      Uticensis, III, 66.\n\nCato;\n  Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis (95-46), son of the preceding and\n      great-grandson of the Censor;\n  a Stoic philosopher;\n  orator;\n  soldier, I, 112;\n  defeated at Thapsus (46);\n  judge, III, 66;\n  stern and unyielding as his great-grandfather, I, 112; III, 88;\n  his suicide, I, 112;\n  close friend of Cicero (II, 2); III, 88.\n\nCatulus, Quintus Lutatius, half-brother of Julius Caesar Strabo, I, 133;\n  orator;\n  scholar, I, 133;\n  author;\n  soldier;\n  consul with Marius (102) in the war against the Cimbri (101);\n  gentleman, I, 109;\n  committed suicide to escape the proscriptions of Marius (87).\n\nCatulus, Quintus Lutatius, son of the preceding, defeated Lepidus at the\n      Milvian bridge;\n  statesman, I, 76;\n  scholar, I, 133.\n\nCaudium, a little town in the mountains of Samnium;\n  near it are the Caudine Forks, the scene of the disastrous battle\n      (321); III, 109; (II, 79).\n\nCeltiberians, a powerful people of central Spain, opposed Rome in Second\n      Punic War, were reduced in the Numantian War (134), submitted on\n      the death of Sertorius (72), I, 38.\n\nCentumalus, Tiberius Claudius;\n  unknown, III, 66.\n\nChicanery, I, 33.\n\nChremes, a character in Terence's _Heauton Timorumenus_, I, 30.\n\nChrysippus, of Soli (250-207), studied Stoic philosophy at Athens under\n      Cleanthes, whom he succeeded;\n  voluminous writer. \"Had there been no Chrysippus, there had been no\n      Stoa,\" III, 42.\n\nCicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator's father, III, 77;\n  died (64).\n\nCicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator (106-43), born at Arpinum, educated\n      at Rome under Archias, the Scaevolas, and the teachers of\n      philosophy (_see_ Introduction), at Athens, in Asia, and at\n      Rhodes;\n  his training was all for service, I, 155;\n  as consul (63) he crushed the conspiracy of Catiline, I, 84;\n  banished (58), II, 58;\n  his enforced retirement from his profession, III, 2-4;\n  as a philosopher and orator, I, 1-3;\n  follower of Socrates and Plato, I, 2;\n  of the New Academy, II, 7-8;\n  why he wrote on philosophy, II, 2-8; III, 1-5;\n  attitude on the downfall of the Republic, II, 2.\n\nCicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator's only son, I, 1, 15, 78; II, 1-8,\n      44; III, 1, 5, 33;\n  born in 65;\n  served with credit under Pompey, II, 45, and Sextus Pompey;\n  a student of Peripatetic philosophy under Cratippus in Athens (44-43),\n      I, 1;\n  admonished to read also his father's works, I, 3; III, 121;\n  served under Brutus (43-42);\n  consul with Octavian (30).\n\nCimbrians, a Celtic people, migrating in a vast horde toward Italy, were\n      cut to pieces by Marius and Catulus in the Raudian Plains near\n      Verona (101), I, 38.\n\nCimon, of Athens, son of the great Miltiades;\n  victorious admiral;\n  statesman;\n  genial and generous, II, 64;\n  died (449).\n\nCirce, nymph of Aeaea, a sorceress;\n  she kept Odysseus (Ulysses) in her halls a year, I, 113.\n\nCivic, compared with military service, I, 74 fg.\n\nClaudius;\n  _see_ Appius and Centumalus and Pulcher.\n\nCleombrotus, son of Pausanias, king of Sparta, fell at Leuctra (371),\n      I, 84.\n\nCleomenes;\n  _see_ note to I, 33.\n\nClodius; Publius Clodius Pulcher, Cicero's inveterate enemy, one of the\n      most turbulent and corrupt characters of Rome, guilty of mutiny in\n      the army, bribery in the courts, profligacy in his public and\n      private life;\n  secured Cicero's banishment;\n  hired gladiators to force his own election to the praetorship, but was\n      killed in a broil with Milo's rival gang of ruffians, II, 58.\n\nCloelia, a Roman girl sent as a hostage to Porsena;\n  she made her escape by swimming the Tiber, was sent back, but restored\n      by the king with rewards for her courage, (I, 61).\n\nClytaemnestra, daughter of Tyndareus, wife of Agamemnon, paramour of\n      Aegisthus, with whom she murdered her husband on his return from\n      Troy;\n  she was in turn slain by her son Orestes.\n  Subject of a tragedy by Accius, I, 114.\n\nCocles, Horatius, the hero who with two others kept the bridge against\n      Porsena and Tarquin, I, 61.\n\nCollatinus, Lucius Tarquinius, husband of Lucretia, associate of Brutus\n      in driving out the Tarquins and his colleague in the first\n      consulship (509), III, 40.\n\nComedy;\n  _see_ Old Comedy.\n\nConcealment, of guilt, III, 37-39.\n\nConon, famous Athenian admiral, defeated by Lysander at Aegospotami\n      (405), victorious over Pisander of Sparta at Cnidus (394),\n      restored the long walls, I, 116.\n\nConsiderateness, a subdivision of the virtue of Temperance, I, 99, 143.\n\nConversation, a division of speech, I, 132-133; II, 48;\n  an art, I, 134-135.\n\nCo-operation, and civilization, II, 12-16;\n  and the virtues, II, 17-18;\n  _vs._ Fortune, II, 19;\n  a universal need, II, 39;\n  how secured, II, 21 fg.\n\nCorinth, a famous city at the Isthmus of Corinth;\n  wealthy;\n  next to Athens, richest in treasures of art;\n  head of the Achaean League;\n  sacked and utterly destroyed by the Romans under Mummius (146), I, 35;\n      II, 76; III, 46.\n\nCornelius;\n  _see_ Scipio and Spinther and Sulla.\n\nCos, chief city of the island of Cos, one of the Sporades;\n  famed for its silks;\n  the birthplace of Apelles, painter of the Coan Venus, III, 10.\n\nCotta, Gaius Aurelius, distinguished orator;\n  one of the speakers in Cicero's _de Oratore_ and _de Natura Deorum_;\n  consul (75); II, 59.\n\nCourage;\n  _see_ Fortitude.\n\nCovetousness, I, 68; III, 30;\n  _see_ Avarice.\n\nCrassus, Lucius Licinius, the famous orator, II, 63; III, 67;\n  at 21 (119) he won renown by his prosecution of Carbo, the one-time\n      friend of the Gracchi, II, 47, 49;\n  his aedileship most splendid, II, 57;\n  as consul (95), he secured the expulsion from Rome of all who were not\n      citizens, III, 47;\n  this was a cause of the Social War.\n  He was the greatest orator of Rome before Cicero, fluent, graceful,\n      witty, I, 108, 133;\n  Cicero's mouthpiece in the _de Oratore_.\n\nCrassus;\n  Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, the triumvir;\n  his wealth and ambition, I, 25;\n  sided with Sulla against Marius and grew enormously rich by the\n      proscriptions;\n  his avarice did not shrink from any meanness or even crime, I, 109;\n      III, 73-75.\n  He defeated Spartacus (71);\n  slain in Parthia (53).\n\nCrassus;\n  Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, II, 57;\n  father of the triumvir, consul (97);\n  ended his own life to escape the prescriptions of Marius (87);\n  Cicero bought his house.\n\nCratippus, of Mitylene, an eminent Peripatetic, came to Athens (about\n      50) to lecture;\n  foremost of contemporary philosophers and teacher of young Cicero,\n      I, 1, 2; II, 8; III, 5, 6, 33, 121.\n\nCunning, not wisdom, II, 10; III, 72, 96.\n\nCurio, Gaius Scribonius, II, 59;\n  orator and statesman, III, 88;\n  consul, (76).\n\nCynics, a school of philosophy so called from the Athenian gymnasium,\n      Cynosarges, where they met, later adapted to their snarling manner\n      and dirty habits;\n  its leaders were Antisthenes of Athens, a disciple of Socrates, and\n      Diogenes of Sinope;\n  they taught the virtue of poverty and want, indifference to all\n      convention and decency;\n  Cicero's contempt for them and their so-called philosophy, I, 128,\n      148.\n\nCyrenaics, the philosophic sect founded by Aristippus (_q.v._),\n      III, 116.\n\nCyrsilus, a Medizing Athenian, III, 48.\n\nCyrus, the Great, founder of the Persian Empire;\n  wonderfully gifted in winning the co-operation of men and nations,\n      II, 16.\n\n\nDamon, a Pythagorean and friend of Phintias, III, 45.\n\nDebts, cancellation of, II, 78-79, 83-85;\n  avoidance of, II, 84;\n  payment enforced, II, 84.\n\nDecius;\n  Publius Decius Mus, father and son, I, 61; III, 16;\n  the former, consul with Manlius Torquatus (360), devoted himself to\n      death in the battle on the Veseris.\n  The son did the same at the battle of Sentinum (295) and brought the\n      Samnite wars to an end.\n\nDemetrius of Phalerum (345-283), orator, statesman, II, 60;\n  philosopher, poet;\n  pupil of Theophrastus, I, 3;\n  the only Greek who was both orator and philosopher, I, 3;\n  he inspired the founding of the Alexandrine library.\n\nDemetrius Poliorcetes, II, 26;\n  son of Antigonus and king of Macedon (294-287).\n  His life was occupied with continuous warfare against enemies in\n      Egypt, Asia, Greece, Macedonia, Epirus.\n\nDemosthenes, the greatest orator of Athens (385-322);\n  pupil of Isaeus and of Plato, I, 4;\n  might have been a great philosopher, I, 4;\n  at 18 he prosecuted his defaulting guardian with success, II, 47;\n  then turned to public speaking and statecraft as a profession.\n\nDiana, goddess of the light of the night, identified with Artemis,\n      III, 95.\n\nDicaearchus, of Messana (4th century), a Peripatetic philosopher,\n      geographer, and historian, II, 16;\n  pupil of Aristotle and friend of Theophrastus.\n\nDinomachus, a Greek philosopher, always named with Calliphon (_q.v._),\n      III, 119.\n\nDiogenes, of Babylonia, pupil and successor of Chrysippus;\n  best known for his part in the famous embassy with Carneades and\n      Critolaus from Athens to Rome (156) where, on motion of Cato, they\n      were not permitted to remain;\n  his ethics rather loose, III, 51-55, 91.\n\nDion, a kinsman of the elder Dionysius and tyrant of Syracuse (356-353);\n  a devoted disciple of Plato at Syracuse and Athens, I, 155.\n\nDionysius, the elder (430-367), tyrant of Syracuse (405-367), a\n      typically cruel tyrant, suspicious and fearful, II, 25;\n      III, 45 (?);\n  devoted to art and literature, himself a poet crowned with a prize at\n      Athens.\n\nDionysius, the younger, son of the preceding and tyrant of Syracuse\n      (367-356, 346-343);\n  devoted to literature;\n  Plato, Aristippus, Archytas, and others were brought to his court.\n  Whether the Damon and Phintias story is to be connected with him or\n      his father is uncertain, III, 45 (?).\n\nDrusus, Marcus Livius, son of Gaius Gracchus's colleague in the\n      tribuneship;\n  an eloquent orator, I, 108;\n  as tribune (91) he attempted to renew the social and agrarian\n      legislation of Gracchus and was assassinated.\n\nDuty, the most important subject in philosophy, I, 4;\n  the most fruitful field, III, 5;\n  the philosophic sects and duty, I, 4-6;\n  best presentation, III, 7;\n  classification, I, 7-9;\n  order of importance, I, 58, 152-160; III, 90;\n  to those who have wronged us, I, 33;\n  to an enemy, I, 35-40; III, 98-115;\n  to a slave, I, 41; III, 89;\n  toward the laws, I, 148;\n  of generosity, I, 42-60;\n  of Temperance-Propriety, I, 100-151; III, 116-121;\n  of Fortitude, III, 97-115;\n  to be prosperous, II, 87;\n  duties of youth, I, 122; II, 52;\n  of age, I, 123;\n  of magistrates, I, 124;\n  of statesmen, I, 73-85;\n  of private citizens, I, 124;\n  of aliens, I, 125;\n  _vs._ claims of friendship, III, 43-44;\n  change of duty in change of circumstance, I, 31, 59; III, 32;\n  \"mean\" and \"absolute\" duty, I, 8; III, 14;\n  doubts as to, I, 147.\n\n\nEloquence, at the bar, II, 66;\n  its decline, II, 67;\n  _see_ Oratory.\n\nEnnius, Quintus (239-169), a Greek by birth, the father of Roman poetry,\n      wrote an epic (the Annals), I, 84;\n  tragedies, I, 26, 51, 52; II, 23, 62; III, 62, 104;\n  comedies and satires.\n\nEpaminondas, one of the greatest men of Greece, a student of Pythagorean\n      philosophy, I, 155;\n  the greatest general of Thebes, victorious at Leuctra (371), I, 84;\n  humbled Sparta and made Thebes the leading city of Greece;\n  fell at Mantinea (362).\n\nEpicurus (342-270), founded at Athens the school that bears his name;\n  author of 300 books, natural and ethical philosophy;\n  held happiness to be the highest good;\n  Cicero confuses his teaching here with that of Aristippus and the\n      Cyrenaics;\n  with the latter, happiness consists in individual pleasures;\n  with Epicurus, it is permanent calm of soul and freedom from pain,\n      with pure and lasting pleasures--the pleasures that come from a\n      life of righteousness, III, 12, 117;\n  the gods existed but had nothing to do with human life, III, 102;\n  adopted the atomic theory.\n  His own life was temperate even to abstinence;\n  his followers went to excess.\n  A very popular school, III, 116;\n  represented by Cicero as illogical, III, 39;\n  their theory of society, I, 158.\n\nEpigoni, the sons of the Seven against Thebes;\n  under Alcmaeon, Diomedes, etc., they conquered and destroyed the city.\n  Subject of a tragedy of Accius, I, 114.\n\nErillus, of Carthage, pupil of Zeno the Stoic, held that knowledge is\n      the only good, while everything else is neither good nor evil;\n  his ethical theories rejected, I, 6.\n\nEteocles, son of Oedipus, drove out his brother Polynices, in order to\n      reign alone, and brought on the war of the Seven against Thebes;\n  the brothers fell by each other's hands; III, 82.\n\nEuripides (480-406), tragic poet of Athens; disciple of Anaxagoras and\n      friend of Socrates;\n  wrote 75 to 90 plays;\n  17 are extant;\n  Cicero quotes from the _Hippolytus_, III, 82;\n  the _Phoenissae_, III, 108.\n\nEvil, the supreme, I, 5; III, 119;\n  not pain, I, 5; III, 105, 117;\n  but moral wrong, III, 105, 106;\n  the only, III, 106.\n\nExpediency, definition, II, 1, 11;\n  indispensable, III, 101;\n  identical with Moral Rectitude, II, 9-10; III, 20, 35, 49, 83, 85,\n      110;\n  conflict with Moral Rectitude impossible, III, 9, 11, 18, 34, 40, 48,\n      72;\n  incompatible with immorality, III, 35, 77, 81, 82, 87; II, 64;\n  one standard for both, III, 75;\n  relative, II, 88 fg.;\n  possible change of, III, 95;\n  occasion for doubt, III, 19;\n  apparent conflict with justice, III, 40, 86;\n  apparent political expediency _vs._ humanity, III, 46-49;\n  in business, III, 50 fg.;\n  apparent conflict with Fortitude, III, 97-115;\n  apparent conflict with Temperance, III, 116.\n\n\nFabius;\n  _see_ Maximus.\n\nFabricius;\n  Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, hero of old Rome, famed for integrity and\n      moral dignity;\n  called \"the Just,\" III, 16, 87;\n  consul (282);\n  served against Pyrrhus (280);\n  ambassador to Pyrrhus to negotiate exchange of prisoners;\n  Pyrrhus tried to gain his favour by appeals to his ambition, avarice,\n      and fears--in vain, I, 38;\n  consul again (278), he sent back to Pyrrhus the traitor, I, 40;\n      III, 86-87;\n  a rigorous censor (275);\n  lived and died in poverty.\n\nFame;\n  _see_ Glory.\n\nFear, the wretchedness of, II, 25-26;\n  _vs._ love, II, 23-26;\n  dangerous to the one who employs it, II, 26.\n\nFetial Law, the laws of the _Fetiales_, a college of four priests who\n      served as guardians of the public faith;\n  they conducted the ceremonies attendant upon demands for redress,\n      declarations of war, ratification of treaties, establishment of\n      peace; I, 36; III, 108.\n\nFides;\n  _see_ Good Faith;\n  the goddess, III, 104;\n  etymology of, I, 23.\n\nFimbria, Gaius Flavius, colleague of Marius in his second consulship\n      (104);\n  orator and jurist, III, 77.\n\nFinance, II, 87;\n  reform of currency, III, 80-81.\n\nFortitude, the third Cardinal Virtue, I, 15, 61-92;\n  its characteristics, I, 66;\n  in the light of justice, I, 62, 157;\n  dangers attending, I, 46, 62-63;\n  _vs._ expediency, III, 97-115;\n  in Epicurus's system, III, 117.\n\nFraud, criminal, III, 60 fg.\n\nFriendship, motives to, I, 55-56;\n  acquisition of friends, II, 30;\n  ideal, I, 56; III, 45-46;\n  _vs._ duty, III, 43-44.\n\nFufius, Lucius, an orator of no great ability, II, 50.\n\nFurius;\n  Lucius Furius Philus, consul (136), proconsul in Spain, III, 109;\n  a learned interlocutor in Cicero's _Republic_.\n\n\nGalus, Gaius Sulpicius;\n  _see_ Sulpicius.\n\nGaul, an inhabitant of Gaul, the land north of the Apennines, III, 112.\n\nGenerosity, divisions of, II, 52;\n  close to nature, III, 24;\n  must not harm its object, I, 42-43;\n  in proportion to one's means, I, 42-44; II, 55;\n  to the recipient's merits, I, 45-60;\n  motives to, I, 47-49; III, 118;\n  means to winning popularity, II, 32;\n  gifts of money, II, 52-60;\n  personal service, II, 52, 53;\n  to individuals, II, 65-71;\n  to the state, II, 72 fg.;\n  when most appreciated, II, 63.\n\nGlory, a means to popularity, II, 31, 43;\n  preferred to wealth, II, 88.\n\nGods, favour of, won by piety, II, 11;\n  do no harm, II, 12; III, 102;\n  free from care, III, 102;\n  slow to anger, III, 102, 104, 105.\n\nGolden Mean, I, 89;\n  in generosity, II, 58, 59, 60;\n  in personal adornment, I, 130.\n\nGood, the supreme, I, 5, 7; III, 52, 119;\n  not pleasure, I, 5; III, 116, 117, 118;\n  but moral goodness, III, 11, 35;\n  living in harmony with nature, III, 13;\n  the only, moral goodness, I, 67; III, 12.\n\nGood faith, III, 104;\n  even to an enemy, III, 86 fg., 111, 113.\n\nGood man, what constitutes a, III, 63, 75-77.\n\nGracchus, Gaius Sempronius, brother of the younger Tiberius;\n  a more radical reformer;\n  tribune (123 and 122);\n  fell (121) a martyr to his reforms for the restoration of the public\n      lands and the reduction of the cost of living, II, 72, 80;\n  his death applauded by Cicero, II, 43.\n\nGracchus, Publius Sempronius, father of the elder Tiberius, II, 43.\n\nGracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, father of the tribunes, II, 43;\n  in his own tribuneship he defended Scipio (187);\n  a great soldier, II, 80;\n  twice consul, triumphed twice;\n  a just ruler in Spain;\n  son-in-law of the elder, father-in-law of the younger Africanus, an\n      ardent aristocrat;\n  hence Cicero's praise, II, 43.\n\nGracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, son of the foregoing;\n  a persuasive orator;\n  friend of the people and helper of the poor and oppressed;\n  murdered for attempting as tribune (133) to reform agrarian abuses and\n      build up a class of small farmers, I, 76, 109; II, 80;\n  his death applauded by Cicero, II, 43.\n\nGratidianus, Marcus Marius;\n  _see_ Marius.\n\nGratitude, how won, II, 63.\n\nGreece, the land of liberty, letters, art, and civilization, II, 60;\n      III, 48, 73, 99;\n  cause of fall, II, 80.\n\nGreek, belonging to or a native of Greece, I, 108, 111; II, 83; III, 82;\n  leaders in literature, I, 3;\n  masters of philosophy, I, 8, 51, 142, 153; II, 18;\n  Greek and Latin studies, I, 1.\n\nGyges, the shepherd who dethroned Candaules and became king of Lydia\n      (716-678), III, 38, 78.\n\nGytheum, the harbour-town and arsenal of Sparta, III, 49.\n\n\nHamilcar, a successful Carthaginian general in the First Punic War,\n      defeated by Regulus at Ecnomus;\n  opposed Regulus in Africa, III, 99;\n  confused with Hamilcar Barca (_q.v._), III, 99.\n\nHamilcar Barca, famous commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily\n      (247-241);\n  in Spain (238-229);\n  father of Hannibal, III, 99.\n\nHannibal (247-183), one of the world's greatest generals, I, 108;\n  son of Hamilcar Barca, III, 99;\n  sacked Saguntum (219), crossed the Alps and defeated the Romans on the\n      Trebia and Ticinus (218), at Trasimenus (217), Cannae (216),\n      I, 40; III, 113-114;\n  defeated at Zama (202);\n  maligned by the Romans as treacherous and cruel, I, 38.\n\nHarm, from gods to men, II, 12; III, 102;\n  men to men, II, 16 fg.\n\nHealth, impossible without man's co-operation, II, 12, 15;\n  care of, II, 86.\n\nHecaton, of Rhodes, a Stoic, pupil of Panaetius, III, 63, 89.\n\nHercules, the greatest of heroes, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and Alcmena,\n      I, 118;\n  his choice of his path in life, I, 118;\n  performer of the twelve labours;\n  benefactor of humanity, III, 25;\n  his attainment of heaven, III, 25.\n\nHernicians, a tribe in the Sabine mountains, subdued by Rome (306),\n      I, 35.\n\nHerodotus, of Halicarnassus (5th century), lived also at Athens and\n      Thurii;\n  the father of history;\n  travelled widely and wrote the history of Persia and Greece, II, 41.\n\nHesiod, the Boeotian didactic poet (8th century);\n  author of the Theogony, the Works and Days, etc., I, 48.\n\nHippolytus, son of Theseus;\n  his stepmother Phaedra fell in love with him;\n  he rejected her advances but promised not to tell, III, 108;\n  she accused him falsely;\n  his innocence proved, Phaedra hanged herself and Theseus suffered\n      lifelong remorse, I, 32; III, 94.\n\nHome, of man of rank;\n  _see_ House.\n\nHomer, the poet, author of Iliad and Odyssey, III, 97.\n\nHonesty, the bond of human society, III, 21 fg.;\n  the corner-stone of government, II, 78 fg.\n\nHouse, suitable for a man of rank, I, 138-140.\n\nHortensius, Quintus (114-50), Cicero's famous rival as orator and\n      advocate;\n  his close friend (after 63), III, 73;\n  enormously wealthy;\n  lavish in his aedileship (75), II, 57;\n  not always scrupulous, III, 73-74.\n\nHospitality, the duty of, II, 64.\n\nHumility, in prosperity, I, 90-91.\n\n\nIllyria, the country between Macedonia and the Adriatic, II, 40.\n\nIngratitude, abhorred, II, 63.\n\nInjustice, active and passive, I, 23, 28;\n  never expedient, III, 84;\n  of hypocrisy, I, 41.\n\nInstinct and Reason, difference between man and beast, I, 11.\n\nIntegrity, official, II, 75, 76, 77.\n\nIphigenia, daughter of Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra (_q.v._);\n  sacrificed at Aulis, III, 95.\n\nIsocrates (436-338), one of the ten Attic orators, pupil of Gorgias and\n      Socrates;\n  a polished speaker;\n  greater as a teacher than as an orator;\n  might have been a great philosopher, I, 4.\n\nItalian War (90-88), caused by Rome's injustice to the allies, provoked\n      by the fear of prosecution on the part of the corrupt aristocrats,\n      II, 75;\n  resulted in Rome's granting the contentions of the allies.\n\nItaly, in government identified with Rome, II, 76.\n\nIthaca, the home of Odysseus (Ulysses), an island of the Ionian group\n      west of Greece, probably the historical Leucas, III, 97.\n\n\nJanus, an old Italian sun-god;\n  a covered passage (commonly called his temple) adjoining the forum\n      accommodated the banking houses of Rome, II, 87.\n\nJason, tyrant of Pherae (395-370), generalissimo of Thessaly (374-370),\n      an able soldier and diplomat, I, 108.\n\nJests;\n  _see_ Wit.\n\nJove;\n  _see_ Jupiter.\n\nJugurtha, king of Numidia (118-106), campaigned with Scipio against\n      Numantia;\n  war with Rome (112-106) protracted by his bribes as much as by his\n      arms, III, 79;\n  executed in Rome (104).\n\nJulius;\n  _see_ Caesar.\n\nJunius;\n  _see_ Brutus and Pennus and Silanus.\n\nJupiter, the greatest of the gods of Italy, III, 102, 105;\n  \"Supreme and Best,\" III, 104;\n  father of Hercules, I, 118.\n\nJustice, the second Cardinal Virtue, I, 15, 17, 20-41;\n  in what consisting, I, 20;\n  not fully comprehended, III, 69;\n  queen of all the virtues, III, 28;\n  most important, I, 153;\n  close to nature, I, 153; III, 24;\n  rule of duty, I, 29-30;\n  in war, I, 38-40;\n  and generosity, I, 42;\n  _vs._ Wisdom, I, 152-157;\n  _vs._ Fortitude, I, 157;\n  _vs._ Temperance, I, 159-160;\n  indispensable in business, II, 40;\n  inspires most confidence, II, 34;\n  the best means to popularity, II, 39;\n  to glory, II, 43;\n  always expedient, III, 96;\n  in conflict with apparent expediency, III, 40, 86.\n\n\nLabeo, Quintus Fabius, grandson of Fabius Maximus, consul (183);\n  injustice of, I, 33.\n\nLacedaemon; _see_ Sparta.\n\nLaciads, citizens of the deme of Lacia, west of Athens, the home of\n      Miltiades, II, 64.\n\nLaelius, Gaius, surnamed \"the Wise,\" III, 16;\n  statesman; soldier under Scipio at Carthage, successful against\n      Viriathus, II, 40;\n  a Stoic, pupil of Diogenes and Panaetius; a man of endless charm and\n      wit, I, 90, 108;\n  his friendship for Africanus immortalized, II, 31;\n  a man of letters, centre of the literary group comprising also Scipio,\n      Panaetius, Polybius, Terence, Lucilius.\n\nLanarius, Gaius Calpurnius, III, 66.\n\nLatin, study of combined with Greek, I, 1-2.\n\nLatins, the people of Latium, the province in which Rome is situated,\n      the first territory added to Rome, I, 38;\n  decisive battle on the Anio, III, 112.\n\nLaw, the origin of, II, 41-42;\n  the majesty of, I, 148;\n  as a profession, II, 65;\n  its decline with the end of the Republic, II, 67; III, 2.\n\nLentulus;\n  Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, the splendour of his aedileship\n      (63), II, 57;\n  as consul (57) he was largely instrumental in securing Cicero's recall\n      from banishment.\n\nLeuctra, a town of Boeotia, where the Spartans under Cleombrotus were\n      disastrously defeated by Epaminondas and the Thebans (371), I, 61;\n      II, 26.\n\nLove, how won, II, 32;\n  _vs._ fear, II, 23-26.\n\nLucullus, Lucius Licinius (110-56), surnamed Ponticus for his victories\n      over Mithradates (84-66);\n  famed for his wealth and magnificence, I, 140;\n  for the splendour of his aedileship with his brother Marcus (79),\n      II, 57;\n  with him prosecuted Servilius to avenge their father whom he had\n      accused of bribery and corruption, II, 50;\n  patron of letters, especially of the poet Archias.\n\nLucullus, Marcus Licinius, associated with his brother Lucius (_q.v._),\n      II, 50, 57;\n  soldier and orator.\n\nLusitania, western Spain, practically modern Portugal, II, 40.\n\nLutatius; _see_ Catulus.\n\nLuxury, a vice, I, 92, 106, 123.\n\nLycurgus (9th century), the famous lawgiver of Sparta, author (?) of the\n      Spartan constitution, I, 76.\n\nLydia, the central country of western Asia Minor, III, 38.\n\nLysander, the Spartan admiral who defeated the Athenians at Aegospotami\n      (405), received the capitulation of Athens (404), established the\n      Thirty Tyrants (403), and gave Sparta her leadership, I, 76, 109.\n\nLysander, the ephor (241), a descendant of the admiral, a friend of King\n      Agis (_q.v._), sought to bring about agrarian reforms based upon\n      the constitution of Lycurgus;\n  for this he was banished, II, 80.\n\nLysis, of Tarentum, a Pythagorean; expelled from Italy, he came to\n      Thebes and taught Epaminondas, I, 155.\n\n\nMacedonia, until the time of Philip a small country north of Thessaly,\n      I, 37.\n\nMacedonians, the people of Macedon, I, 90; II, 53;\n  deserted to Pyrrhus, II, 26;\n  Paulus and their wealth, II, 76.\n\nMaelius, Quintus, tribune (321), more probably tribune-elect, as\n      tribunes could not leave the city, III, 109.\n\nMagnificence, in the home, I, 140.\n\nMamercus;\n  Aemilius Lepidus Mamercus Livianus, a kinsman of Caesar;\n  though defeated once, II, 58, he was later (77) consul.\n\nMancia, Quintus Mucius, unknown, I, 109.\n\nMancinus, Gaius Hostilius;\n  in his consulship (137) he was defeated by the Numantines;\n  his delivery to the enemy, III, 109.\n\nManlius;\n  Aulus Manlius Capitolinus, father of Lucius (_q.v._), III, 112.\n\nManlius;\n  Lucius Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus;\n  named dictator to mark the year (363), he used his office to engage in\n      a war;\n  that he transgressed but a \"few days\" was due to the intervention of\n      the tribunes, III, 112.\n\nManlius;\n  Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, his son, a famous hero of Roman\n      story;\n  as consul at the time of the battle on the Veseris he executed his own\n      son for disobeying orders, though the disobedience won the _spolia\n      opima_, III, 112.\n\nMarathon, a plain about twenty miles north of Athens where (490)\n      Miltiades and his ten thousand defeated the hosts of Darius,\n      I, 61.\n\nMarcellus, Marcus Claudius, campaigned against Hannibal in Italy, took\n      Syracuse (212), five times consul, a brave but cruel soldier,\n      over-praised by the Romans, I, 61.\n\nMarcus;\n  _see_ Cicero--Marcus Tullius, the son.\n\nMarcius;\n  _see_ Philippus.\n\nMarius, Gaius (157-87), seven times consul;\n  gained his first consulship dishonourably, III, 79, 81;\n  conquered Jugurtha (107);\n  saved Rome from the invading Cimbri (102) and Teutons (101);\n  a military genius, I, 76;\n  cruel and selfish, he flooded the streets of Rome with her best blood\n      in the civil war with Sulla.\n\nMarius;\n  Marcus Marius Gratidianus, the son (or grandson) of Marcus Gratidius\n      whose sister married Cicero's grandfather;\n  adopted by a kinsman of the great Marius;\n  hence his name;\n  twice praetor;\n  murdered by Catiline during Sulla's proscriptions, III, 67;\n  his unbounded popularity in his first praetorship (86), III, 80-81.\n\nMars, the god of war, III, 34.\n\nMarseilles (Massilia), a Greek city on the southern coast of Gaul,\n      independent of the province;\n  it sided with Pompey;\n  Caesar captured the city after a protracted siege and exacted cruel\n      vengeance, II, 28.\n\nMaximus;\n  Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, consul four times;\n  in his second dictatorship (217) he won his surname by harassing\n      Hannibal, watching his plans and working on the defensive,\n      I, 84, 108.\n\nMedes, the people of Media, a great kingdom in central Asia Minor added\n      to Persia by Cyrus, II, 41.\n\nMedus, a son of Medea and Aegeus;\n  wandering in search of his mother he came to Colchis, where Medea\n      saved his life;\n  the subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.\n\nMelanippa, mother of Boeotus and Aeolus by Posidon (Neptune);\n  blinded and imprisoned by her father, she was at last rescued by her\n      sons and her sight was restored by Posidon;\n  subject of a tragedy of Ennius, I, 114.\n\nMetellus;\n  Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, won his surname by his\n      victories over Andriscus (148);\n  a political rival and yet a good friend of the younger Scipio, I, 87.\n\nMetellus;\n  Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, nephew of the preceding,\n      statesman and soldier;\n  as consul (109), carried on the war with Jugurtha with distinguished\n      success, III, 79.\n\nMetrodorus, of Lampsacus (330-277), the most distinguished of the\n      disciples of Epicurus;\n  his Epicureanism was of the grossly sensual sort;\n  his conception of happiness misunderstood by Cicero, III, 117.\n\nMilo, Titus Annius, an unscrupulous and turbulent fellow;\n  as tribune (57) he did much for Cicero's recall and made a sworn enemy\n      of Clodius (_q.v._);\n  hired gladiators to force his own election, II, 58;\n  defended without success by Cicero for killing Clodius.\n\nMinerva, goddess of thought, temperament, wit, I, 97.\n\nMinos, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Crete;\n  because of his upright life he was made judge with Aeacus (_q.v._) in\n      Hades, I, 97.\n\nModeration, defined, I, 142.\n\nModesty, I, 126-129.\n\nMucius;\n  _see_ Scaevola.\n\nMummius;\n  Lucius Mummius Achaicus, as consul (146) broke up the Achaean League,\n      razed Corinth to the ground, I, 35; II, 46;\n  carried to Italy untold treasures of wealth and art, II, 76.\n\n\nNaples, the beautiful Greek city of Campania, I, 33.\n\nNasica;\n  _see_ Scipio.\n\nNeptune, god of the sea, I, 32;\n  III, 94.\n\nNew Academy;\n  _see_ Academy.\n\nNicocles, tyrant of Sicyon, II, 81.\n\nNola, a city in Campania, loyal to Rome, I, 33.\n\nNorbanus, Gaius, tribune (95), impeached (94) for treason, II, 49;\n      consul (83).\n\nNumantia, the capital of Celtiberia, razed to the ground after a long\n      siege by the younger Scipio, I, 35, 76;\n  treacherously treated by Rome, III, 109.\n\nNumicius, Tiberius, colleague of Quintus Maelius (_q.v._), III, 109.\n\n\nOath, significance of, I, 39, 40; III, 102 fg.;\n  fidelity to, I, 39, 40; III, 99-112;\n  violation of, III, 113 fg.;\n  _see_ Perjury.\n\nOctavius, Gnaeus, as praetor commanded the fleet against Perseus (168)\n      and gained a triumph;\n  consul (165), I, 138.\n\nOctavius, Marcus, tribune (120);\n  had the corn law of Gaius Gracchus repealed and secured the passage of\n      a new and more conservative one, II, 72.\n\nOld Age, duties peculiar to, I, 123;\n  worst vices of, I, 123.\n\nOld Comedy, that of Aristophanes, Cratinus, Eupolis, etc., the comedy of\n      personal abuse, I, 104.\n\nOrata, Gaius Sergius Silus, praetor (97), III, 67.\n\nOratory, a division of speech, I, 132;\n  divisions of, II, 49;\n  a means for winning favour, II, 48;\n  a means for service, II, 65-71;\n  a power to save, II, 51.\n\nOrderliness, defined, I, 142;\n  of action, I, 142-145.\n\nOrestes;\n  Gnaeus Aufidius Orestes Aurelianus, consul (71), II, 58.\n\n\nPalamedes, the inventor;\n  exposed Ulysses's trick, III, 98;\n  treacherously done to death in revenge.\n\nPalatine, the hill above the forum on the south;\n  east of the capital, I, 138.\n\nPanaetius, of Rhodes (180-111 _ca._), Stoic philosopher, disciple of\n      Diogenes and Antipater (_q.v._) at Athens, close friend of Laelius\n      (_q.v._) and Scipio, I, 90; II, 76;\n  popularized philosophy, II, 35;\n  wrote a book on moral duty, III, 7;\n  failed to define duty, I, 7;\n  classification of duty, I, 9;\n  omits third division, I, 152, 161; II, 88;\n  reasons for omission, III, 7-18, 34;\n  how it would have been met, III, 33;\n  other omissions, II, 86;\n  on co-operation, II, 16;\n  defends lawyer's efforts in a bad case, II, 51;\n  on expensive public buildings, II, 60;\n  Cicero's model, II, 60; III, 7;\n  Hecaton's teacher, III, 63.\n\nPapius, Gaius, as tribune (65), revived the law of Pennus (_q.v._),\n      III, 47.\n\nPatriotism, I, 83;\n  duty to country, I, 160; III, 90, 95;\n  to die for country, I, 57;\n  sacrifice for, I, 84; III, 100;\n  right to do wrong for one's country, I, 159; III, 93, 95.\n\nPaulus, Lucius Aemilius, consul (216), defeated and slain at Cannae,\n      I, 114.\n\nPaulus;\n  Lucius Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, son of the preceding;\n  in his second consulship he conquered Perseus of Macedon at Pydna\n      (168) and enriched Rome with spoils, II, 76;\n  the father of the younger Africanus, I, 116, 121.\n\nPausanias, king of Sparta, commander-in-chief of the forces of Greece at\n      Plataea (479) to the glory of Sparta, I, 76.\n\nPeloponnesian War, the death-struggle of Athens with Sparta (431-404),\n      I, 84.\n\nPeloponnesus, the lower peninsula of Greece, in which Sparta was the\n      chief city, I, 84.\n\nPelops, son of Tantalus and king of Mycenae, father of Atreus and\n      Thyestes, III, 84.\n\nPennus, Marcus Junius;\n  as tribune (126) he secured a law expelling all foreigners from Rome,\n      III, 47.\n\nPericles, the peerless statesman of Athens, II, 16;\n  philosopher, friend of Anaxagoras and Socrates;\n  orator of mighty power, serious and deep, I, 108;\n  general, I, 144;\n  his administration made Athens unequalled in the splendour of her\n      public buildings, II, 60.\n\nPeripatetics, followers of Aristotle (_q.v._), empiricists, II, 16;\n  students of exact science;\n  lack the poetry and eloquence of Plato but not very different from the\n      New Academy, I, 2; III, 20;\n  followers of Socrates and Plato, I, 2;\n  their right to teach ethics, I, 6;\n  seek the golden mean, I, 89;\n  moral rectitude the supreme good, III, 11;\n  moral wrong the supreme evil, III, 106;\n  young Cicero their follower, I, 1; II, 8.\n\nPerjury, III, 106-103, 113.\n\nPerseus, the last king of Macedon, conquered by Paulus (_q.v._), I, 37.\n\nPersians, the people of Persia, the great empire of western Asia;\n  under Darius they invaded Greece and were beaten back at Marathon\n      (490), I, 61;\n  under Xerxes were overwhelmingly defeated at Salamis (480), I, 61;\n      III, 48, 49;\n  and at Plataea (479), I, 61.\n\nPhaedra, daughter of Minos, wife of Theseus and stepmother of Hippolytus\n      (_q.v._), III, 94.\n\nPha\u00ebthon, his story, III, 94.\n\nPhalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum (6th century), type of inhuman cruelty,\n      II, 26; III, 29, 32;\n  slain in an uprising of his people, II, 26;\n  typical of Caesar.\n\nPhalerum, a deme of Attica on the bay of Phalerum, I, 3; II, 60.\n\nPherae, a town of south-eastern Thessaly, the home of Admetus;\n  of Jason, I, 108;\n  of Alexander, II, 25.\n\nPhilip, conqueror, king of Macedon (359-336), educated at Thebes,\n      cultured, I, 90;\n  wise, II, 48;\n  eloquent, tactful and firm in discipline, II, 53.\n\nPhilip, the younger, son of Antigonus (_q.v._), II, 48.\n\nPhilippus, Lucius Marcius, orator second only to Crassus and Antonius,\n      I, 108;\n  statesman, II, 59;\n  as tribune (104), proposed agrarian reforms, II, 73;\n  dishonest policy toward the Asiatic states, III, 87.\n\nPhilippus, Quintus Marcius, father of preceding, consul (186 and 169),\n      II, 59; III, 87.\n\nPhilosophers, why righteous, I, 28;\n  attitude toward civic duty, I, 28;\n  as teachers, I, 155.\n\nPhilosophy, the study of, I, 1-4;\n  theoretical speculation, I, 153;\n  meaning, II, 5;\n  spirit of, II, 7;\n  as a discipline, II, 4;\n  worth while, II, 5 fg.;\n  why Cicero turned to it, II, 2-8; III, 1-6.\n\nPhintias, the friend of Damon (_q.v._) III, 45.\n\nPhoenissae, the Phoenician Women, a tragedy of Euripides dealing with\n      the war of the Seven against Thebes, III, 82.\n\nPicenum, state of north-east Italy, on the Adriatic, III, 74.\n\nPinthia, Marcus Lutatius, unknown, III, 77.\n\nPiraeus, the great, landlocked harbour of Athens, about five miles from\n      the city, III, 46.\n\nPiso;\n  Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, so surnamed for his integrity;\n  author and statesman;\n  tribune (149);\n  law against extortion, II, 75;\n  consul (133).\n\nPlaetorian Law, enacted (192), III, 61.\n\nPlataea, the heroic little city at the foot of Mount Cithaeron in\n      Boeotia;\n  alone with Athens at Marathon (490);\n  the scene of the final defeat of the Persians in Hellas (479), I, 61.\n\nPlato (429-347), pupil and friend of Socrates, profound philosopher and\n      brilliant author, I, 22, 63;\n  ideal statesman, I, 85, 87;\n  might have been a great orator, I, 4;\n  founder of the Academy (_q.v._);\n  a great teacher, I, 155;\n  often quoted by Cicero, I, 15 22, 28, 63, 64, 85, 87; III, 38, 39.\n\nPlautus, Titus Maccius (254-184), the greatest of Rome's comic poets;\n      rich in wit, I, 104.\n\nPo, the great river of Cisalpine Gaul, III, 88.\n\nPoeni;\n  _see_ Carthaginians.\n\nPolybius, of Megalopolis (204-122), president of the Achaean League,\n      detained at Rome in the house of Aemilius Paulus;\n  friend of Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius;\n  author of a history of Rome, III, 113.\n\nPompey;\n  Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106-48), warrior, I, 76; (II, 20;)\n  politician, the enemy of Caesar, the idol of Cicero, II, 2;\n  conquered the pirates, Sertorians, Mithradates, Judaea, I, 78;\n  triumvir;\n  married Julia, III, 82;\n  adorned Rome with great buildings, II, 60;\n  magnificent shows, II, 57;\n  defeated at Pharsalus (48), II, 45.\n\nPompey;\n  Quintus Pompeius Rufus, consul (141);\n  as commander in the war with Numantia (140) made the unfortunate\n      peace, III, 109.\n\nPompey, Sextus, cousin of Pompey the Great, Stoic, scholar,\n      geometrician, I, 19.\n\nPomponius, Marcus, tribune (363);\n  accuser of Lucius Manlius, III, 112.\n\nPontius, Gaius, the Samnite general, victor at the Caudine Forks (321),\n      II, 75;\n  faithlessly treated, defeated (292), and executed in Rome.\n\nPoor, services to the, II, 61 fg.;\n  their gratitude, II, 63, 69-71.\n\nPopilius [Marcus Popilius Laenas, as consul (172) campaigning in\n      Liguria, I, 36].\n\nPopular esteem, a means to glory, II, 31;\n  how gained, II, 44 fg.\n\nPosidonius, of Apamea (135-51), a Stoic, disciple of Panaetius at\n      Athens, III, 8;\n  established a school at Rhodes where Cicero studied under him;\n  later he lived with Cicero in Rome;\n  author of many works, I, 159; III, 10.\n\nPostumius;\n  Spurius Postumius Albinus, defeated in his second consulship (321) at\n      the Caudine Forks, III, 109.\n\nProdicus, of Ceos (fifth century), a respected sophist;\n  his \"Choice of Hercules,\" I, 118.\n\nProfession;\n  _see_ Vocation.\n\nPromises, non-fulfilment sometimes a duty, I, 32; III, 92-95;\n  sacred though given to an enemy, I, 39-40.\n\nProperty, private, how obtained, I, 92;\n  rights of, I, 21; II, 73-79, 85; III, 53;\n  public, rights of, I, 21, 51.\n\nPropriety, defined, I, 96;\n  its relations to the Cardinal Virtues, I, 93-100;\n  poetic, I, 97;\n  moral, I, 98-99;\n  conduct in accord with personal endowment, I, 110-117;\n  in choosing a career, I, 115-121;\n  in outward appearance, I, 130;\n  in inward self-control, I, 131-132;\n  in speech, I, 132 fg.;\n  in the home, I, 138-140.\n\nPropylaea, the magnificent gateway to the Acropolis of Athens, built\n      (437-431) by Pericles and Mnesicles at a cost of \u00a3500,000, II, 60.\n\nProsecution, II, 49;\n  to be rarely undertaken, II, 50;\n  a public service, II, 50.\n\nPrudence;\n  _see_ Wisdom.\n\nPtolemy, Philadelphus (309-247), king of Egypt, patron of art and\n      letters, had the Bible translated;\n  vastly rich, II, 82.\n\nPublic Lands, private occupation to be maintained, I, 21.\n\nPublic Service, as a career, I, 70 fg.;\n  as a duty, I, 72;\n  as an honour, I, 73;\n  free from partisanship, I, 85-86;\n  self-seeking, I, 87;\n  vindictiveness, I, 88;\n  anger, I, 89;\n  guided by wisdom, I, 155-156.\n\nPublic shows, extravagant expenditures, II, 55-60;\n  expected of an aedile, II, 57-60.\n\nPulcher, Gaius Claudius, son of Appius, aedile (99), II, 57;\n  consul (92).\n\nPunic Wars;\n  _see_ Carthage.\n\nPyrrho, of Elis (fourth century), founder of the school of the Sceptics;\n  held that virtue is the only good, that truth and knowledge are\n      unattainable;\n  his ethical theories rejected, I, 6.\n\nPyrrhus (318-272), king of Epirus, descended from Achilles and Aeacus,\n      I, 38;\n  a daring soldier and a gallant enemy, I, 38;\n  a career of adventure and conquest, I, 38; III, 86;\n  invaded Italy (280-275);\n  the story of the poisoner, I, 40; III, 86;\n  (_see also_ Fabricius);\n  invaded Macedonia (273) and the enemy's troops joined him, II, 26;\n  killed in Argos (272).\n\nPythagorean, a follower of Pythagoras or member of his secret\n      fraternity, I, 155; III, 45.\n\nPythagoras, of Samos (sixth century), studied in the Orient, great\n      mathematician;\n  moral and religious teacher;\n  serious, ascetic, I, 108;\n  taught transmigration of souls;\n  founded a secret brotherhood of ideal friendship, I, 56;\n  asceticism was the rule of practice, with deep meditation and lofty\n      aspiration.\n\nPythian, epithet of Apollo, from Pytho, another name for Delphi, II, 77.\n\nPythius, of Syracuse, his dishonesty, III, 58.\n\n\nQuirinus, the Sabine name for the deified Romulus, III, 41.\n\n\nRecklessness, to be avoided, I, 81, 83.\n\nRegulus, Marcus Atilius, a favourite hero of old Rome;\n  consul (267 and 256), annihilated the Carthaginian fleet, took many\n      towns, was finally (255) defeated and taken prisoner, I, 39;\n      III, 99;\n  his famous embassy and the ethics of his conduct, III, 99-115.\n\nRemus, twin brother of Romulus, slain for leaping in derision over the\n      new walls of Rome, III, 41.\n\nReproof, how administered, I, 136.\n\nRepublic, the Roman;\n  its glory, II, 2;\n  the protectorate of the world, II, 27;\n  its downfall, I, 35; II, 2-5, 29, 65; III, 2, 4, 83;\n  the tyrant's sway, II, 23-29; III, 81-85;\n  enslaved, III, 84-85.\n\nRetirement, the life of, I, 69-70.\n\nRhodes, a large island off the coast of Caria, III, 50.\n\nRhodian, a native of Rhodes, III, 50, 57; III, 63.\n\nRiches, the object of acquiring, I, 25;\n  proper use of, I, 68;\n  compared with virtue, III, 24;\n  (_see_ Wealth).\n\nRoman, of or belonging to Rome, III, 58;\n  people, I, 33; III, 79, 83-86, 105, 109, 114;\n  the people of Rome, II, 75;\n  celebrated for courage, I, 61;\n  champion of justice, I, 36; II, 26;\n  hatred of tyranny and injustice, III, 19;\n  atonement for tyranny and injustice, II, 27-29;\n  their enslavement, III, 85-86.\n\nRome, the capital of the Empire and mistress of the world, I, 39, 40;\n      III, 73, 79, 99, 112, 113.\n\nRomulus, the mythical king, founder of Rome, III, 40;\n  builder of its walls;\n  not justified in slaying his brother, III, 41.\n\nRoscius, Sextus, of Ameria, accused by Chrysogonus, a freedman of\n      Sulla's, of murdering his father;\n  bravely and successfully defended by Cicero at the age of twenty-six,\n      II, 51.\n\nRupilius, an actor otherwise unknown, I, 114.\n\nRutilius;\n  Publius Rutilius Rufus, a disciple of Publius Scaevola, II, 47;\n  of Panaetius, III, 10;\n  with Quintus Scaevola in Asia he repressed the extortion of the\n      publicans, was banished, and devoted his life to philosophy and\n      literature, III, 10.\n\n\nSabine, belonging to the province of central Italy, III, 74;\n  the Sabines, unfriendly to Rome till subdued and added to the empire\n      (290), I, 35, 38.\n\nSacred Laws;\n  the _Leges Sacratae_, laws for the violation of which the offender was\n      nominally consecrated to some god--i.e., laden with a curse,\n      III, 111.\n\nSalamis, the island and straits directly in front of the Piraeus\n      (_q.v._), where (480) Themistocles and the allied Greeks virtually\n      annihilated the fleets of Persia, I, 61, 75.\n\nSale, fraud in sale of real estate, III, 54-64;\n  laws concerning, III, 65-71;\n  of slaves, III, 71-72.\n\nSalmacis, a fountain (and nymph) at Halicarnassus, whose waters made men\n      who drank them weak and effeminate, I, 61.\n\nSamnites, the brave, liberty-loving people of Samnium, a province of\n      south-central Italy;\n  after seventy-one years (343-272) of war with Rome admitted to\n      citizenship, I, 38;\n  famous for their victory at the Caudine Forks, III, 109;\n  Gaius Pontius, II, 75.\n\nSanitation;\n  _see_ Health.\n\nSardinia, the large island north of Sicily, made a province (238),\n      misgoverned, II, 50.\n\nSatrius;\n  Marcus Minucius Basilus Satrianus, adopted by Lucius Minucius Basilus,\n      his inheritance, III, 74.\n\nScaevola, Publius Mucius, father of the pontifex maximus, consul (133)\n      and friend of Tiberius Gracchus, an expert in the pontifical law,\n      II, 47.\n\nScaevola, Quintus Mucius, the Augur, son of the preceding, son-in-law of\n      Laelius, friend of Africanus, consul (117), preceptor to Cicero;\n  simple in his greatness, I, 109.\n\nScaevola, Quintus Mucius, the Pontifex Maximus, son of Publius,\n      preceptor of Cicero;\n  orator, jurist;\n  authority on the civil law, his business honour, III, 62, 70;\n  followed his father's calling, I, 116;\n  magnificent aedileship, II, 57;\n  consul (95), III, 47.\n\nScaurus, Marcus Aemilius, consul (115);\n  partisan rather than statesman, I, 76;\n  ambassador to Jugurtha (112), notorious corruptionist, but loyal\n      aristocrat;\n  hence Cicero's praise, I, 108.\n\nScaurus, Marcus Aemilius, son of the preceding, step-son of Sulla,\n      aedile (58) with extraordinary magnificence, II, 57;\n  governor of Sardinia (56), which he plundered outrageously;\n  successfully defended by Cicero and Hortensius;\n  later (52) condemned and banished, I, 138;\n  palace on the Palatine, I, 138.\n\nScipio, Gnaeus Cornelius, brother of Publius (_see_ following);\n  consul (222) with Marcus Marcellus;\n  with Publius in Spain (217-211);\n  a gallant soldier, I, 61; III, 16.\n\nScipio, Publius Cornelius, brother of Gnaeus and father of the elder\n      Africanus, I, 121;\n  consul (218), defeated by Hannibal at the Ticinus;\n  waged war in Spain (217-211);\n  a gallant soldier, I, 61; III, 16.\n\nScipio;\n  Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major (234-183), the son of\n      Publius, I, 121;\n  grandfather of the Gracchi, II, 80;\n  defeated Hannibal at Zama (202) and closed the war;\n  never idle in his zeal for Rome, III, 1-4.\n\nScipio, Publius Cornelius, son of Africanus Major, adoptive father of\n      Africanus Minor;\n  gifted mentally but physically disqualified for an active career,\n      I, 121.\n\nScipio;\n  Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, son of Aemilius\n      Paulus Macedonicus, I, 116, 121;\n  adopted son of Publius Africanus's son, I, 121;\n  friend and pupil of Panaetius, I, 90;\n  intimate friend of Laelius (_q.v._) and devoted to literature;\n  serious, earnest, I, 108;\n  self-control, II, 76;\n  a great soldier, I, 76, 116;\n  at Pydna (168) with his father;\n  captured and destroyed Carthage (136) and Numantia (133), I, 35;\n      II, 76;\n  statesman of high ideals, a bitter rival and yet a friend of\n      Quintus Metellus, I, 87.\n\nScipio;\n  Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, known chiefly as the man who\n      led the riot and murdered Tiberius Gracchus, I, 76, 109.\n\nScipio;\n  Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, son of the preceding;\n  died in his consulship (111);\n  a charming gentleman and a brilliant speaker, I, 109.\n\nSecret sin, II, 37 fg.\n\nSeius, Marcus, reduced the price of corn and regained his lost\n      popularity, II, 58.\n\nSelf-control;\n  _see_ Temperance.\n\nSelf-sacrifice, III, 25;\n  of Regulus, III, 97-115.\n\nSergius, Gaius;\n  _see_ Orata.\n\nSicily, the great island south-west of Italy, fertile and rich, occupied\n      along the coasts by prosperous Greek colonies, a Roman province\n      (212 on), an easy prey for rapacious governors, as Verres whom\n      Cicero prosecuted (70), II, 50.\n\nSicyon, a city near Corinth, famous as a centre of art;\n  Aratus and the tyranny, II, 81-82.\n\nSilanus, Decimus Junius, stepfather of Marcus Brutus, consul (62),\n      aedile, II, 57.\n\nSlaves, duty toward, I, 41; III, 89.\n\nSocial Instinct, man and beast, I, 12, 50;\n  bees, I, 157;\n  leads to justice, I, 157;\n  weighed against justice, I, 159 fg.\n\nSociety, principles of, I, 50-57; III, 53;\n  rights of, I, 21;\n  service to, I, 153, 155.\n\nSocrates (469-399), the great philosopher and teacher, II, 43;\n  his ethics, III, 11, 77;\n  his perfect poise, I, 90;\n  brilliant dialectician, with a profound meaning in every word, I, 108;\n  personal eccentricities, I, 148.\n  \"The noblest, ay, and the wisest and most righteous man that we have\n      ever known.\"\n\nSocratic, following Socrates, I, 104, 134; II, 87;\n  most schools of philosophy are based on the teaching of Socrates--the\n      Academy, I, 2;\n  the Peripatetic, I, 2; III, 20;\n  the Cynic, I, 128;\n  the Cyrenaic, III, 116;\n  the Stoic, I, 6;\n  etc.\n\nSol, the sun-god, father of Pha\u00ebthon, III, 94.\n\nSolon, the great lawgiver of Athens (638-558 _ca._), poet, soldier,\n      statesman;\n  his feigned madness and the acquisition of Salamis, I, 108;\n  his constitution and the reorganized Areopagus, I, 75.\n\nSophocles, the great tragic poet (495-406), supreme on the Athenian\n      stage (468-441);\n  general in the war against Samos (440), I, 144.\n\nSparta, capital of Lacedaemon in the south-eastern part of the\n      Peloponnesus, III, 99;\n  constitution of Lycurgus, I, 76;\n  national character, I, 64;\n  position at end of Persian wars, I, 76;\n  at end of Peloponnesian war, I, 76;\n  her arsenal, III, 49;\n  disasters, I, 84;\n  despotic, II, 26;\n  cause of her fall, II, 77, 80.\n\nStoics, adherents of the school founded by Zeno, an offshoot from\n      Cynicism, I, 128;\n  refounded by Chrysippus;\n  philosophy with them is practical, making life accord with Nature's\n      laws, III, 13;\n  virtue and philosophy are identical;\n  virtue the only good, I, 6; III, 11, 12;\n  moral wrong the only evil, III, 106;\n  pain no evil, III, 105;\n  no degrees of right or wrong, I, 10;\n  etymologists, I, 23;\n  define fortitude, I, 62;\n  temperance, I, 142;\n  duties, III, 14;\n  controversies, III, 91;\n  their right to teach ethics, I, 6;\n  Cicero adopts their teaching, I, 6; III, 20;\n  common interests, I, 22;\n  their theology a pantheistic materialism, God working in his\n      providence, III, 102;\n  representative Stoics, II, 51, 86; III, 51.\n\nSulla;\n  Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix (138-78), noble, profligate, brilliant\n      genius;\n  would stoop to anything, I, 109;\n  soldier against Jugurtha, Mithradates, Marius, Rome;\n  statesman;\n  reformed the constitution;\n  absolute monarch of Rome (81-79);\n  treatment of tributary allies, III, 87;\n  confiscator, I, 43; II, 29;\n  overturned the old morals, II, 27;\n  Cicero opposed him, II, 51.\n\nSulla, Publius Cornelius, nephew of the dictator, II, 29;\n  defended by Cicero on charge of complicity in Catiline's conspiracy.\n\nSulla, Cornelius, a freedman of the dictator, II, 29.\n\nSulpicius;\n  Gaius Sulpicius Galus, consul (166);\n  famous astronomer, I, 19;\n  predicted an eclipse of the moon.\n\nSulpicius;\n  Publius Sulpicius Rufus (124-88), an eminent orator of little\n      character, II, 49.\n\nSungod;\n  _see_ Sol.\n\nSuperbus;\n  _see_ Tarquin.\n\nSyracuse, a great Greek city in south-eastern Sicily, rich in art and in\n      goods;\n  ruled by Dion, I, 155;\n  Dionysius, II, 25; III, 45;\n  a popular resort, III, 58.\n\n\nTantalus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and father of Pelops (_q.v._), III, 84.\n\nTarquin;\n  Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome (535-510), a cruel\n      tyrant, expelled by Brutus and Collatinus, III, 40.\n\nTarquins, the kinsmen of Tarquinius Superbus, all expelled (510),\n      III, 40.\n\nTaxation, levying of, II, 74.\n\nTemperance, the fourth Cardinal Virtue, I, 93-151;\n  definition, I, 93;\n  the passions, I, 102;\n  speech, I, 103;\n  _vs._ Justice, I, 159-160;\n  essential to success, II, 77;\n  _vs._ apparent Expediency, III, 116 fg.\n\nTerence;\n  Publius Terentius Afer (195-159), a comic poet, friend of Laelius and\n      Scipio;\n  six plays are left;\n  quotation from the _Heauton Timorumenus_, I, 30;\n  the _Eunuchus_, I, 150.\n\nThebe, daughter of Jason and wife of Alexander of Pherae, II, 25.\n\nThebes, the capital of Boeotia, home of Pindar and Epaminondas, I, 155.\n\nThemistocles, brilliant statesman of Athens, II, 16;\n  gave Athens her fleet and saved Greece at Salamis (480), I, 75;\n  consummate general, I, 108;\n  not always scrupulous in his methods, III, 49;\n  his valuation of character, II, 71.\n\nTheophrastus, of Lesbos, favourite pupil and successor of Aristotle, a\n      marvellous teacher, master of Demetrius of Phalerum, I, 3;\n  a prolific author;\n  cited, II, 56, 64.\n\nTheopompus, of Chios (fourth century), pupil of Isocrates, orator and\n      historian, II, 40.\n\nThermopylae, a narrow pass on the seashore between Thessaly and Locris,\n      held by Leonidas and his three hundred against the hosts of Xerxes\n      (480), I, 61.\n\nTheseus, the great legendary hero of Athens, benefactor of the world;\n  uniter of Athens and Attica;\n  father of Hippolytus (_q.v._) by Antiope;\n  husband of Phaedra;\n  his son's death, I, 32; III, 94.\n\nThrace, the vast country north of the Aegean;\n  though the home of Orpheus, Linus, etc., it was generally considered\n      barbarous, II, 25.\n\nThyestes, son of Pelops and brother of Atreus (_q.v._), (III, 102).\n\nTimotheus, admiral of the Athenian fleet (378-356), compared with his\n      father Conon, I, 116.\n\nTorquatus;\n  _see_ Manlius.\n\nTrades;\n  _see_ Vocation.\n\nTroezen, a city of Argolis, near the shore opposite Aegina;\n  the asylum of the Athenians at the approach of Xerxes, III, 48.\n\nTrusts, when not to be restored, III, 95.\n\nTruth, the search after, I, 13.\n\nTubero, Quintus Aelius, the Stoic, a pupil of Panaetius, praetor (123);\n      a talented jurist, III, 63.\n\nTusculum, a town in the Alban hills, the oldest municipium in Italy,\n      admitted (381), I, 35;\n  public lands of, I, 21;\n  Cicero's favourite country home.\n\nTwelve Tables, the laws of, drawn up (450);\n  quoted, I, 37; III, 111.\n\nTyranny, II, 23-29;\n  inspired by false perspective, III, 36;\n  right and duty toward the tyrant, III, 19, 85.\n\nTyre, the great commercial city on the coast of Phoenice, II, 86.\n\n\nUlysses (Odysseus), son of Laertes of Ithaca, the shrewdest of the Greek\n      heroes at Troy, III, 97;\n  the hero of the Odyssey, I, 113.\n\n\nVarro, Gaius Terentius, consul (216) with Paulus, responsible for the\n      disaster at Cannae, III, 114.\n\nVenus (Aphrodite), the goddess of beauty and love;\n  of Cos, III, 10.\n\nVeseris, a little stream near Mount Vesuvius;\n  scene of the battle of Manlius Torquatus and the elder Decius,\n      III, 112.\n\nVeturius;\n  Titus Veturius Calvinus, consul with Spurius Postumius (321) at the\n      Caudine Forks, III, 109.\n\nVice, luxurious living, I, 123;\n  sensual pleasure, I, 102, 104-106, 122-123; II, 37;\n  avarice, II, 77;\n  extravagance, I, 140;\n  misrepresentation, I, 150;\n  untruth, I, 150;\n  corrected by observing others, I, 146;\n  by the criticism of the wise, I, 147.\n\nViriathus, II, 40.\n\nVirtue, defined, II, 18;\n  chief function of, II, 17;\n  the four Cardinal Virtues described, I, 15-17;\n  the sources of moral rectitude, I, 152; III, 96;\n  Nature's leadings to, I, 100;\n  endangered by sensual pleasure, II, 37;\n  rulers chosen for, II, 41.\n\nVocation, choice of, I, 115-120;\n  change of, I, 120-121;\n  vulgar and liberal, I, 150-152.\n\nVolscians, a people of lower Latium, subdued (303), given full\n      citizenship (188), I, 35.\n\n\nWar, rights of, to be enforced, I, 34;\n  Cato's son, I, 36-37;\n  excuse for war, I, 35, 80;\n  justice in war, I, 38;\n  war for supremacy, I, 38;\n  for glory, I, 38;\n  needless cruelty, I, 82.\n\nWealth, Theophrastus on, II, 56;\n  insatiable thirst for, I, 25;\n  why sought, I, 25-27;\n  the real good of wealth, II, 56;\n  _see_ Riches.\n\nWisdom, the first of the Cardinal Virtues, I, 15-19;\n  most important, I, 153; II, 6;\n  absolute, III, 16;\n  and propriety, I, 94, 100;\n  _vs._ Justice, I, 152-157, 160;\n  confounded with cunning, II, 10; III, 72, 96;\n  in Epicurus's system, III, 117.\n\nWit, kinds of, I, 103-104;\n  representatives of, I, 108.\n\n\nXanthippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune, whose generalship defeated\n      Regulus, III, 99.\n\nXenocrates, of Chalcedon (396-314), a pupil of Plato, president of the\n      Academy, industrious and severe, I, 109.\n\nXenophon, soldier, historian, disciple of Socrates, II, 87;\n  the story of Hercules's choice, I, 118.\n\nXerxes, king of Persia (485-465), son of Darius, invaded Greece (480),\n      came to grief at Salamis and Plataea, III, 48.\n\n\nYouth, duties peculiar to, I, 123; II, 52;\n  time for choosing profession, I, 117.\n\n\nZeno, of Cytium (fourth century), pupil of Crates the Cynic and founder\n      of the Stoic school (_see_ Stoics), III, 35.\n\n\nLETCHWORTH: AT THE ARDEN PRESS.\n\n\n\n\nCORRECTIONS:\n\n\n  page     original text                   correction\n  190 sn   Fab. inc. Valhen^2, 402         Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 402\n  230 fn   _Ma co_ MSS.                    _Marco_ MSS.\n  344      set etiam adiuvat iniuriam?     sed etiam adiuvat iniuriam?\n  413      treacherous and crue, I, 38.    treacherous and cruel, I, 38.\n  421      friend o Quintus Metellus,      friend of Quintus Metellus,\n  422      father of Phaethon, III, 94.    father of Pha\u00ebthon, III, 94.","title":"De Officiis","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":113958}